The Power of Diversity in the Armed Forces: International Perspectives on Immigrant Participation in the Military 9780228013440

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the power of diversity in the armed forces

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hu ma n D i me nsi o ns i n F or e i gn P o l i cy, M i l i tary Stu dies , a nd Se c ur i t y St ud i e s Series editors: Stéphanie A.H. Bélanger, Pierre Jolicoeur, and Stéfanie von Hlatky Books in this series illuminate thorny issues in national and international security, analyzing both military and foreign policy. They highlight the human dimensions of war, such as the health and well-being of military members, the factors that influence military cooperation and operational effectiveness, civil-military relations and decisions regarding the use of force, and the challenges of violence and terrorism, as well as human security and conflict resolution. Some authors focus on the ethical, moral, and legal ramifications of ongoing conflicts and wars, while others, through the lens of policy analysis, explore the impact of military and political strife on human rights and the role the public plays in shaping international policy. Published in collaboration with Queen’s University and the Royal Military College of Canada, with the Centre for International and Defence Policy, the Canadian Institute for Military and Veteran Health Research, and the Centre for Security, Armed Forces, and Society, the series plays a pivotal role in reconceptualizing contemporary security challenges – both in the academic realm and for broader publics.   1 Going to War? Trends in Military Interventions Edited by Stéfanie von Hlatky and H. Christian Breede   2 Bombs, Bullets, and Politicians France’s Response to Terrorism Christophe Chowanietz   3 War Memories Commemoration, Recollections, and Writings on War Edited by Stéphanie A.H. Bélanger and Renée Dickason   4 Disarmament under International Law John Kierulf

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  5 Contract Workers, Risk, and the War in Iraq Sierra Leonean Labor Migrants at US Military Bases Kevin J.A. Thomas   6 Violence and Militants From Ottoman Rebellions to Jihadist Organizations Baris Cayli   7 Frontline Justice The Evolution and Reform of Summary Trials in the Canadian Armed Forces Pascal Lévesque

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  8 Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism Assessing Domestic and International Strategies Edited by Stéfanie von Hlatky   9 Transhumanizing War Performance Enhancement and the Implications for Policy, Society, and the Soldier Edited by H. Christian Breede, Stéphanie A.H. Bélanger, and Stéfanie von Hlatky 10 Coping with Geopolitical Decline The United States in European Perspective Edited by Frédéric Mérand 11 Rivals in Arms The Rise of U K-France Defence Relations in the Twenty-First Century Alice Pannier 12 Outsourcing Control The Politics of International Migration Cooperation Katherine H. Tennis 13 Why We Fight New Approaches to the Human Dimensions of Warfare Edited by Robert C. Engen, H. Christian Breede, and Allan English

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14 Canada as Statebuilder? Development and Reconstruction Efforts in Afghanistan Laura Grant and Benjamin Zyla 15 Women, Peace, and Security Feminist Perspectives on International Security Edited by Caroline Leprince and Cassandra Steer 16 The Ones We Let Down Toxic Leadership Culture and Gender Integration in the Canadian Forces Charlotte Duval-Lantoine 17 Postcards from the Western Front Pilgrims, Veterans, and Tourists after the Great War Mark Connelly 18 War and Remembrance Recollecting and Representing War Edited by Renée Dickason, Delphine Letort, Michel Prum, and Stéphanie A.H. Bélanger 19 The Power of Diversity in the Armed Forces International Perspectives on Immigrant Participation in the Military Edited by Grazia Scoppio and Sara Greco

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The Power of Diversity in the Armed Forces International Perspectives on Immigrant Participation in the Military

Edited by grazia scoppio

and

sara greco

McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Chicago

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©  McGill-Queen’s University Press 2022 ISBN ISBN ISBN ISBN

978-0-2280-1110-1 (cloth) 978-0-2280-1111-8 (paper) 978-0-2280-1344-0 (eP DF ) 978-0-2280-1345-7 (eP ub)

Legal deposit third quarter 2022 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free (100% post-consumer recycled), processed chlorine free

We acknowledge the support of the Canada Council for the Arts. Nous remercions le Conseil des arts du Canada de son soutien.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Title: The power of diversity in the Armed Forces: international perspectives on immigrant participation in the military / edited by Grazia Scoppio and Sara Greco. Names: Scoppio, Grazia, editor. | Greco, Sara, editor. Series: Human dimensions in foreign policy, military studies, and security studies; 19. Description: Series statement: Human dimensions in foreign policy, military studies, and security studies; 19 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: Canadiana (print) 20220209936 | Canadiana (ebook) 20220209995 | IS BN 9780228011118 (paper) | I SB N 9780228011101 (cloth) | ISB N 9780228013440 (eP DF ) | IS BN 9780228013457 (eP U B ) Subjects: L CS H: Armed Forces—Minorities. | L C SH : Diversity in the workplace. | L CS H: Immigrants. Classification: L CC UB416 .P 69 2022 | DDC 355.008—dc23

This book was typeset by Marquis Interscript in 10.5 / 13 Sabon.

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We dedicate this book to Grazia’s late mother, Myriam Scoppio, and her father, Girolamo Scoppio, and to Sara’s father, Folco Greco, grandmother Angiolina Passaro, and late grandfather, Florindo Passaro. Their stories of immigration continue to inspire us. This book is also a tribute to all immigrants who bravely leave their homelands to build a better life for themselves and their families.

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Contents



Figures and Tables  xi

Foreword xiii Major-General Lise Bourgon Acknowledgments xvii

Introduction: Diversity vis-à-vis Expansion: Non-citizen Military Participation 3 Sara Greco and Grazia Scoppio pa rt o n e : d i v e r s i t y , i n c l u s i o n , a n d i m m i g r a n t i d e n t i t i e s i n t h e m i l i ta r y

  1 Fighting for Your Host Country: Non-citizen Soldiers in Belgium 17 Delphine Resteigne   2 The Swiss Armed Forces’ Reputation and Integration Function for Recruits with Migration Backgrounds  34 Stefano De Rosa and Tibor Szvircsev Tresch   3 Whose Military Is It Anyway? Transforming the Australian Defence Force into Australia’s Defence Force  56 Jarrod Pendlebury   4 The Military as a Path to Citizenship, Integration, and Identity: Visible Minorities and Immigrants’ Perspectives about the Military in Canada  78 Grazia Scoppio, Nancy Otis, and Yan (Lizzie) Yan

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x Contents

  5 Children of Migrant Workers in Military Service: Cross-sectional Comparison in the Israel Defense Forces  107 Uzi Ben-Shalom, Deby Babis, Galia Sabar, Anabel Lifszyc Friedlander, and Corinne Berger pa rt t w o : m o t i vat o r s a n d b a r r i e r s t o i m m i g r a n t recruitment and retention

  6 In Defence of Diversity: Including Immigrants in the US Military as a Strategic Imperative  125 Emerald M. Archer   7 Caught between Progressive and Traditional: The Swedish Military Managing Diversity  151 Arita Holmberg and Beatrice Pahv   8 Gym Warriors: Motivations of and Barriers to Second-Generation Immigrants for Enlisting in the Dutch Armed Forces  169 René Moelker and Lema Salah   9 Nationalism and the Absence of Immigrants in the Brazilian Armed Forces 183 Maria Celina D’Araujo 10 International Perspectives from India, Norway, and Poland on Immigrant Intake in the Military  205 Samir Rawat, Ole Boe, Andrzej Piotrowski, and Shradha Sharma

Conclusion: Expanding the Consideration of Immigrants and the Military  228 Alan Okros

Contributors 243 Index 251

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Figures and Tables

figures

1.1 Acculturation strategies  21 2.1 Motivation to serve and perceived reputation of a military career 43 2.2 Perceived importance of origin-related characteristics  45 2.3 Expectations for integration in society  47 2.4 Expectations for integration in society: Language regions 48 4.1 Number of foreign national prospective applicants by gender and visible minority from fiscal year 2016/17 to 2019/20, derived from data provided by CF RG  85 ta b l e s

1.1 Distribution of non-Belgian E U nationals among military personnel (by rank and nationality), 2018  27 1.2 Distribution of non-Belgian E U nationals among civilians (by level and nationality), 2018  28 2.1 Expectations for integration in society: Language regions and migration background  49 2.2 Differences and similarities between soldiers with and without migration background  51 4.1 Degree to which recruiting sources were informative: Born in Canada and born abroad  93 4.2 Mean satisfaction with aspects of recruiting: Born in Canada and born abroad  93

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xii

Figures and Tables

4.3 Recruiting-centre atmosphere: Born in Canada and born abroad 94 4.4 Recently seen CAF recruiting or career-opportunity advertising: Born in Canada and born abroad  94 4.5 Mean influence of C A F information sources: Born in Canada and born abroad  95 4.6 Mean influence of non-C A F information sources: Born in Canada and born abroad  95 4.7 Mean influence of family, friends, and other individuals: Born in Canada and born abroad  96 4.8 Reasons for joining the C A F : Born in Canada and born abroad 97 5.1 Descriptive statistics of research variables  115 5.2 Pearson’s r correlations between year of enlistment, identity, and adaptation to the military among S CM W s 116 5.3 Military background details: Cross-sectional comparison of S C MWs and SI F Us 117 5.4 Descriptive statistics of the research variables: A comparison of S C MWs and SI F U sub-samples  118 5.5 Sense of affiliation: A comparison of S CM W s and S I F U sub-samples 118 5.6 Adaptation to the military across religions: Among SC M Ws 120

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Foreword

As a woman and as a helicopter pilot by training, who has risen through the ranks to where I am today, I strongly believe that diversity and representation are essential for the security environment. Soldiers, sailors, and aviators must be diverse in order to represent the society they serve and to ensure the security needs of all citizens are protected. There is a concrete strength in diversity; it contributes to greater operational effectiveness and institutional success. Women, visible minorities, and other diverse groups bring additional competencies and perspectives to an armed forces that is extremely useful in garrison and deployment. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), for example, have done a relatively good job at integrating women and visible minorities in the organization, but the numbers have now plateaued. I attribute this stagnancy to the fact that while women and visible minorities were indeed integrated, they were never truly included. During my tenure as a visiting defence fellow with Queen’s University’s Centre for International and Defence Policy in 2020–21, I was able to reflect and research on diversity, inclusion, and culture in the military. The research I conducted shows that the key to diversity is the principle of inclusion, because inclusion unlocks the “power of diversity.” This is the message that this book aims to convey and that I would like to relay to those seeking to understand how we may begin to incorporate immigrants / non-citizens into an armed forces: equity does not automatically translate to inclusivity. Inclusion is the key; it constitutes an acknowledgment and embrace of individual differences and manifests itself with all individuals feeling like they belong, fit in, and are valued and respected.

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xiv Foreword

But how? The requirements for change are clear: we cannot have a cohesive force, we cannot have effective teams, if members feel marginalized, or unsafe. Individuals cannot achieve their potential and contribute to the collective if they do not feel comfortable being themselves. What is more, individuals will not join the forces if they do not and cannot see themselves represented in their military organizations. It is imperative that the military aligns its values with those of society, which includes making sure its conduct meets professional standards and its culture lives up to espoused values. Here, leadership is crucial. It is the key determinant for inclusion; therefore armed forces must develop and support inclusive leaders. Militaries need to prioritize creating, developing, and nurturing leaders who appreciate and embrace all individuals, and rid themselves of hierarchies that favour those who conform to the antiquated status quo. Military members cannot feel as if they have to shed their unique identities if and when they don their uniform. The armed forces should be a place where all people can thrive as individuals, where differences are accepted, valued, and celebrated. Wide and deep changes are required to address both the cultural and structural inequalities that face individuals who identify as a woman, a member of a visible minority, a person with a disability, an Indigenous person, and / or a member of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer plus (L GB T Q +) communities. Now is the time to listen and define the gaps remaining in armed forces in order to make them equitable and inclusive organizations and employers of choice for all individuals. While inclusion is valuable, when it comes to immigrants / non-citizens who often may not join the military in their host country, equity remains an important consideration for this population. What this means is that the institution must change to allow equitable access. Once it does, my hope is that, through targeted recruiting and other initiatives, immigrants / non-citizens will be able to enter into the forces along with all other eligible individuals, and be able to thrive and contribute to the organization. However, the topic of immigrants / non-citizens’ participation and inclusion in the armed forces is not widely studied. Hence, this book constitutes a very timely contribution to this topic. The pages that follow shed light on a new dimension for consideration: the inclusion of immigrants / non-citizens in the armed forces as a way for militaries to better reflect the diversity of the populations they serve, while also meeting recruitment needs. This collection harnesses international

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Foreword xv

and interdisciplinary perspectives from twelve countries, with contributions from seasoned academics, students, and new scholars. This volume seeks to attract the attention of policy-makers and civil society alike and offers a clear starting point for those looking to expand their understanding on this important topic. It is my hope that this is just the beginning of discussions to achieve a more equitable, diverse, and inclusive military, not as a dream for the future, but as a reality for tomorrow. Major-General Lise Bourgon Deputy Commander of Military Personnel Command Women, Peace and Security Champion Canadian Armed Forces

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Acknowledgments

With what started as a small panel at the 2019 Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society conference, this project grew into a larger undertaking, which includes this edited volume, a workshop that was held in June 2021 through the Centre for International and Defence Policy (C I DP ) at Queen’s University, and a policy brief published by the C I DP . We are forever grateful to all the contributors to this book, who enthusiastically collaborated with us on this project since its inception, and willingly shared their research and expertise to advance knowledge in this area. This book would not have been possible without tremendous ­support from the CIDP, as well as funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, the Canadian Department of National Defence, the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC), and Queen’s University. We would be remiss if we did not also acknowledge the excellent administrators and staff members at Queen’s University and R M C who helped support our project through their professionalism in their everyday work. The assistance from our publisher, McGill-Queen’s University Press, and the guidance and advice from its staff through the whole publication process, has been remarkable. Let us not forget also that much of the work for this book was conducted during the COVID pandemic. To that end, we want to thank all the healthcare workers, essential workers, and first responders who have kept all of us safe through it all. We extend our hearts to everyone around the world who has been impacted by the pandemic.

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xviii Acknowledgments

Last, but not least, we want to thank our families for their patience and encouragement as we worked many long hours to take this book from an initial idea to a published manuscript. Grazia and Sara

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the power of diversity in the armed forces

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introduction

Diversity vis-à-vis Expansion: Non-citizen Military Participation Sara Greco and Grazia Scoppio

The topic of diversity or lack thereof in the armed forces is a puzzle that continues to fuel discussions among scholars and government officials globally. Yet these conversations fail to acknowledge the representation of those who can contribute to a diverse society but often may not to the military: immigrants / non-citizens. To be sure, if they are at once to meet recruiting needs and reflect the diversity of the population they serve, militaries around the world should seek to find innovative ways to increase and diversify their recruitment pools. This edited collection offers a spectrum of international perspectives that constitute a novel response for how to meet those two imperatives simultaneously: allow immigrants / non-citizens to participate in the armed forces. The scholarly perspectives that follow come from Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, India, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States (US). Collectively, they shed light on some of the barriers to immigrants / non-citizens’ full participation in the armed forces in order to draw cross-country comparisons, identify common challenges and opportunities, share best practices, and provide evidence-based recommendations. Ultimately, this volume’s grounding claim is that the participation and integration of immigrants / non-citizens in the armed forces form a strategic and operational imperative, as well as an ethical and moral obligation, consistent with the goals of achieving greater equity, diversity, and inclusion in defence organizations globally. Many countries, particularly those with low fertility rates, rely on immigrants to support their population growth and economy (Vollset 2020). Indeed, as the world continues to face the CO VI D pandemic,

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the decline in immigration rates caused by international border closures and travel restrictions is hurting many countries, including Canada, given its “reliance on immigration for labour-force growth and to offset Canada’s aging demographic” (Agopsowicz 2020, 1). In addition to bringing much-needed labour, immigrants help diversify their host societies by adding various cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and religious backgrounds. These diverse individuals, with distinctive perspectives and assets, can enhance operational capabilities within the armed forces, if given the chance. Yet access to many armed forces remains limited or closed to them. This introductory chapter sets the stage for the rest of the volume by providing some context regarding diversity in the armed forces and the related existing literature and by exploring the broader societal benefits and challenges, of immigrants / non-citizens’ military ­participation. This chapter closes with a detailed outline of the book. We organize the volume into two parts to reflect two key considerations. The first part – “Diversity, Inclusion, and Immigrant Identities in the Military” (chapters 1–5) – addresses conceptual questions about the inclusion of immigrants in the military, while the second part – “Motivators and Barriers to Immigrant Recruitment and Retention” (chapters 6–10) – outlines the key forces that may attract or deter their entry. Together, the chapters provide a comparative and international overview of how a number of countries have historically and contemporarily addressed the participation of immigrants in their forces, with the aim of informing policy and prompting discourse. This collection is an interdisciplinary undertaking that harnesses the expertise of contributors from a range of scholarly backgrounds – including political science, psychology, and sociology – and p ­ rofessional sectors – including academe, government, and military. We see this volume as a way to bridge the gap between the academic and practitioner communities. Given its interdisciplinary nature, it will be of interest to those researching, studying, and teaching within a variety of disciplines and sub-disciplines, including defence and security studies; diversity management; gender studies; global and international studies; migration studies; military history; military sociology; peace, conflict, and war studies; political science; and race and ethnic studies. It is also well-suited for military institutions ­delivering professional military education. Following from that, it may serve as a valuable resource for military personnel and defence practitioners working in the areas of recruitment, defence policy, or

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Introduction 5

employment equity. It may also prove useful for high-ranking military personnel, as armed forces adapt to their own changing composition. Given the novelty of this topic, our aim is to address the principal questions vis-à-vis immigrants’ military participation, with the expectation and hope that it will propel further academic inquiry. Just the same, we hope that this volume will encourage policy-makers in Canada and around the world to consider opening their countries’ armed forces to immigrants / non-citizens. Finally, this book may be an interesting read for the general public, increasing awareness and offering a way to strengthen civil–military relations through immigrants / non-citizens’ participation in the armed forces. To set the stage for the areas examined below, we begin by proposing a common understanding of diversity and related concepts in the context of the armed forces. Organizational diversity refers to the unique make-up of a workforce, encompassing both visible and invisible differences, such as ability, age, culture, ethnicity, gender, language, race, religion, sexual orientation, and other intersecting dimensions of identity. A great deal of research has been conducted on this topic, including in the specific context of military organizations. Indeed, there is an existing body of literature on diversity in the military from the perspectives of culture, equal opportunity, and gender. There are a number of studies that have focused on specific minority groups, such as women’s participation in the armed forces as early as the 1980s (see Segal and Segal 1983). Other researchers have looked at diversity in the military within national contexts (see Dandeker and Mason 2001; Parco and Levy 2010). Some published works have investigated the challenges militaries around the world face when responding and adapting to a changing societal and threat environment (see McDonald and Parks, eds., 2011; Pinch, MacIntyre, Browne, and Okros, eds., 2006; Soeters and van der Meulen 2007). Yet specific research on the military participation of immigrants / non-citizens from an international perspective is scarce, partly because these groups are often completely or partly excluded. Our book fills this gap and adds to the existing literature that ­highlights the need for changes within the military to increase diversity, equity, and inclusion. As we see illustrated in the chapters that follow, many countries make immigrants partly or completely ineligible to serve in the military; however, more inclusive and equitable access would at once increase diversity and augment recruiting pools, while providing these ­newcomers access to citizenship and integration into the host country.

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Indeed, various recruiting criteria exist for foreigners wishing to join the military in their host country, and there is a spectrum for how inclusive or exclusive the criteria. Among the countries surveyed in this volume, the US can be perceived as residing on the more inclusive end, with its long history of recruiting foreign nationals who are permanent residents and expediting their path to citizenship. Yet the political climate may at times influence such policies, as we see in the chapter on that country. Other countries are more selective but still allow recruitment from a number of allied or neighbouring states, as in Belgium, where European Union (E U ) citizens may apply to the armed forces, and in India, where immigrants from Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan, Tibet, and Vietnam are allowed to serve. Next on the ­spectrum are countries that permit only citizens from a specific country to sign up, such as Norway, which has a bilateral agreement with Iceland. Other militaries, such as Australia and Canada’s, recruit foreign nationals who are permanent residents only if they have exceptional skills or qualifications, such as a being a trained doctor or pilot. Finally, at the other end of the spectrum are countries such as Brazil, Israel, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland, which exclude non-citizens. Beyond the scope of this volume, but still noteworthy, are other states that allow immigrants / non-citizens to serve, which includes Bahrain, Britain, Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Monaco, New Zealand, and Spain (Editorial Staff 2020). Kolby Hanson and Erik Lin-Greenberg categorize countries that recruit immigrants / non-citizens based on their motivation: expertise, labour, or international influence (2019). While these categories ­identify the economic and strategic benefits of membership, they fail to acknowledge equity, diversity, and inclusion. As the authors point out, controversy around recruiting immigrants / non-citizens often relates to mercenaries, and there is little evidence of objections to bringing in permanent residents. The current volume looks beyond strictly economic and strategic arguments to how more diversity and ­inclusiveness increase a force’s power, by bolstering state security and operational effectiveness. This volume also shows that the rationale for immigrants’ military participation is not so cut and dry, as instrumental motivators may yield normative consequences, and vice versa. A more diverse and inclusive armed forces can also have positive societal implications. The literature on US immigrant legislation and citizenship indicates that, as with recruiting permanent residents, the public supports military service as a pathway to citizenship (Wallace

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Introduction 7

and Wallace 2020). As this scholarship shows, military service is a central reflection of citizenship (Krebs 2004), which this volume reinforces through discussions about it as a way for the individual to construct an identity as a citizen, not just a soldier. Military participation as a method of fostering inclusivity and a sense of belonging is a central theme in this volume. Increasing ­inclusivity within the ranks has the potential to facilitate immigrants’ integration within society as well (Leal 1999), another useful consideration for policy-makers. But these outcomes will not occur naturally; policy is required to establish and maintain inclusivity. Scholars have largely debunked the “contact hypothesis,” the idea that “the armed forces may bring together individuals of various ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic backgrounds in common cause and in collaborative spirit, which provides a suitable environment in which to break down communal barriers” (Krebs 2004). We obtain a clear sense from all of these chapters that both operational and cultural barriers inhibit military participation for ­immigrants / non-citizens. The volume’s authors unpack and challenge these b ­ arriers. Language requirements, diversity policies that focus on ­representation rates more than inclusion, lengthy security c­ learance, as well as strict regulations concerning citizenship of origin, all serve as operational and logistical barriers. Outdated recruitment strategies may ignore portions of the population altogether or fail in their appeal to more diverse groups. Recruitment strategies that do not reach an entire population represent a barrier that straddles the operational and cultural spheres mentioned above. From a cultural vantage, while a military should reflect the populations it serves, distinctive features of the armed forces may make this difficult. Examples include ­discrimination against non-“mainstream” cultures, ethnicities, and other intersecting social identities; the conflation of loyalty with ­citizenship or homogeneity with operational effectiveness and unit cohesion; deep-rooted nationalistic sentiments; engrained masculine cultural norms; and a very closed, traditional, and patriarchal military culture that is unresponsive to social change. Finally, knowledge about the negative experiences of visible minorities that have served or continue to do so can also deter others from enlisting and slow the achieving of a more diverse and inclusive force. To address these systemic barriers requires attention not only to policy-making, but also to policy review, starting from attraction, recruitment, and career progression and running all the way through to retirement, to ensure

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that norms of equity, diversity, and inclusion can become systematically understood and internalized. To summarize, this edited volume aims to address a gap in the existing academic literature and policy sphere on the topic of diversity in the armed forces by bringing together international perspectives from twelve countries on their experience of including or excluding immigrants and non-citizens in their armed forces. Throughout these chapters, we can see both differences and similarities across various national contexts and approaches towards immigrants joining the military, as well as a range of cultural, operational, social, systemic, and other barriers that immigrants / non-citizens may face. Recall the argument that this volume advances, that their participation and integration are both a strategic and an operational imperative, as well as ethically and morally necessary. In order to at once augment recruitment pools and increase diversity, discussions and policies around their military eligibility must shift from how to manage “other” ­minority groups towards how to provide diverse groups equitable access and an inclusive work environment, in line with a broader approach of equity, diversity, and inclusion. Although more research is needed, we hope that this volume will spark discussions and inform policies that are more equitable and inclusive. This will in turn strengthen military organizations across the globe, through the power of diversity. For example, publications such as this one shed light on the ethical imperative and operational gains associated with women’s service in the armed forces. They also highlight some of the barriers to women’s recruitment and retention, such as deeply engrained m ­ asculine cultural norms. chapter summaries

Part I (chapters 1–5) starts with Delphine Resteigne focusing on Belgium in chapter 1 and the impact of migration waves on military recruitment and retention, particularly within the E U . She addresses the consequences of societal migration patterns within the military. Since 2003, citizens from other EU countries may apply to the Belgian Defence Force. This greater openness, however, has attracted few non-nationals. The author addresses one of the major obstacles to such recruitment: a language requirement. She asks whether the ­government might need to consider recruiting (non-E U ) immigrants to fill its military ranks. To answer this question, she analyzes current

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Introduction 9

policies and legal evolution, as well as the results of her quantitative study, which explores the perception and acceptance of ethnic diversity among military personnel. Chapter 2, on Switzerland, by Stefano De Rosa and Tibor Szvircsev Tresch, compares the attitudes and perceptions towards the armed forces of individuals with and without migration backgrounds. High rates of migration have made Swiss society more multicultural, which has been reflected in its armed forces, particularly due to general conscription for all Swiss men. The researchers present their results, after surveying nearly 1,300 recruits to quantify the impact of ­conscription on recruits with immigrant backgrounds. What they found is that recruits with migration backgrounds, after completing basic training, show a slightly higher motivation and willingness to perform in the armed forces; consider military service more profitable for their own personal development than do their peers without migration backgrounds; believe that a militia-cadre position within the armed forces enjoys a high social reputation; and feel more Swiss than before their service and more integrated into Swiss society. Armed forces composition is the subject of Jarrod Pendleburry’s chapter 3, on the Australian Defence Force (AD F ). He explains why the A D F remains predominantly Anglo-Celtic, despite government efforts to build a military that reflects the country’s demographic. Existing initiatives aimed at “diversifying” the ADF have emphasized the capability benefits of cultural and linguistic diversity. The author explains that this argument is similar to that for having more women in the military; in other words, it “others” first- and second-generation immigrants in order to argue for their inclusion. However, the author argues that, unlike for women, such “otherness” defies methods of classifying and recording, so senior leaders must develop policy based on incomplete and potentially misleading data. Pendleburry outlines some of the challenges complexifying levels of “diversity” within an organization and suggests that such efforts can distract from a broader liberal-democratic goal of bringing in a broad spectrum of Australians. Ultimately, the author maintains that current directions in policy prioritize the amount of “otherness” within the ranks, rather than identifying and removing barriers to recruiting and retaining first- and second-generation immigrants. Chapter 4, by Grazia Scoppio, Nancy Otis, and Yan Yan, looks at how the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) struggles to achieve a diverse workforce, representative of the population it serves. It explores the

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option of Canada’s opening military service to immigrants / noncitizens so as to better represent visible minorities and address recruiting ­challenges, while offering some newcomers a path towards citizenship, integration, and a Canadian identity. The authors use Mary Gentile’s (1996) diversity framework to analyze and explain how the C A F has responded with respect to diversity and inclusion. They also present select studies of the CAF’s attractiveness as an employer, as well as barriers to joining among various visible minority and immigrant groups. Finally, using data from a survey completed by CAF applicants, they examine factors that influence Canadian- and foreign-born ­applicants to join the C AF and their satisfaction with its recruiting  services. Chapter 5, by Uzi Ben-Shalom, Deby Babis, Galia Sabar, Anabel Lifszyc Friedlander, and Corinne Berger, addresses the experiences of second-generation foreign migrants in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The offspring of working migrants become citizens, so they must enlist. The authors investigate the adaptation of these children in terms of their satisfaction with military service, willingness to excel, and perception of cohesion and the multicultural climate of their unit. The authors compare the attitudes of the children of ­working migrants to a sample of former Soviet soldiers who arrived two decades earlier. The foreign migrants’ children seemed better adapted to the military system, though restricted to certain roles and seldom promoted. The authors speculate that this group of migrants is highly adapted because of their personal gains from the military, unique life experiences, and self-selection for enlistment. This chapter presents several factors that promote their adaptation, including their units’ multicultural climate, their ethnic identity, and their religious conviction. Part II (chapters 6–10) turns to explore motivators and barriers to inclusion in the military. Emerald M. Archer offers another North American perspective in chapter 6. Beginning with its global war on terror, the US Armed Forces and coalition partners showed that they understood the value of diverse teams working together for strategic purposes. The US National Security Strategy has since pivoted away from counterterrorism and stability operations, lessening the focus on diversity as a strategic asset. The Department of Defense made efforts to draw on diversity by recruiting immigrants, but recent changes to policy have threatened that diversity, as immigrant enlistees have been discharged and recruitment programs for immigrants

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Introduction 11

s­ uspended. Archer uses this recent case to explain the crucial role of diversity in the armed forces, highlighting immigrants as force multipliers. She offers a theoretical argument whereby the three categories of an “immigrant” – gender, generational status, and citizenship ­status – work in synergy to produce a soldier with unique skills and perspectives, which creates a more effective fighting force and ­strengthens readiness. Ultimately, with US troops serving worldwide, the skills and experiences immigrants bring to the military are more vital to national security than ever. Chapter 7, by Arita Holmberg and Beatrice Pahv, explores how the military in Sweden manoeuvres between traditional citizen-soldier values and progressive, politically driven ideas of diversity and e­ quality. Specifically, it focuses on the period 2015–19, when conscription was enforced again, in response to shortfalls in military recruitment and a perceived decrease in national security. Concurrently, Swedish society was confronted with increasing migration flows, which at once brought challenges to the welfare systems and strengthened sentiments of nationalism. The authors conducted a qualitative study to find out how the military manages the decline of traditional and progressive ideas of rights and responsibility of citizens and people in a country where these values have become highly politicized. Their analysis focuses on the process of building a new total defence, which involves civilian and military dimensions. In chapter 8, René Moelker and Lema Salah present the results of their study, which shows that younger generations from immigrant backgrounds in the Netherlands are interested in military careers but are not aware of the possibilities. They additionally report on attitudes towards the armed forces and motivations of youngsters in general. They interviewed youth mostly from Moroccan ethnic backgrounds at martial-arts schools in the poorer parts of large cities like The Hague, where the military was also recruiting. The researchers found that young people were very interested in joining the military but were not aware of the possibilities to pursue a military career, although their findings differed by gender. Indeed, female respondents were more prone to give the armed forces a chance, even though the Dutch military is predominantly white and male. These findings lead the authors to question whether the military is ready to work in a more intersectional way and whether it can become more open to including more women and people with migrant backgrounds, particularly through targeted recruitment.

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In chapter 9, Maria Celina D’Araujo presents her research on the perception of military service and offers a history of military nationalism in Brazil. Being a young (about 40 per cent of the population is under 24) and multicultural society does not guarantee young and multicultural armed forces. The author identifies factors that could affect whether and when a country can begin to change its policies to allow non-citizens into the military, including type and style of government. As she points out, Brazil’s past military dictatorship, with its strict nationalist policies, was a huge setback to diversifying its armed forces. She provides a historical overview, starting with the period after independence in 1822, when military contingents were forced to defend the white elite that affirmed its lordship over all lands, riches, Indigenous peoples, and enslaved Africans and their descendants. During the Paraguayan War (1864–70), a sentiment of nationality expanded, and the idea that only Brazilians by birth or option could join the military gradually consolidated. Subsequently, when international tensions in the late 1930s and early 1940s were marked by the three centres of power in the world – the Soviet Union, the US, and the fascist Axis – not only did members of the military have to be Brazilian, they also had to act as formers of a nationalist people. These tendencies were reinforced during the military dictatorship (1964–85), when the armed forces defended the nation and its interests and became one of the main actors in politics and the “guardians of nationality.” D’Araujo concludes that the fact that only native-born Brazilians can become officers – resulting in a predominantly white military elite – is an indication that nationality and nationalism walk hand in hand in the Brazilian Armed Forces, supporting the belief that naturalized citizens cannot be fully trusted to defend their land. In chapter 10, Samir Rawat, Andrzej Piotrowski, Ole Boe, and Shradha Sharma compare the policies of India, Norway, and Poland vis-à-vis immigrants joining the armed forces. They identify the legal, political, and societal factors that determine whether a country allows non-citizens into the military. Uniquely, they also outline some underlying reasons why immigrants might seek out military service outside of their homeland, including the opportunity to gain the legal status of citizenship. They also discuss some of the perceived challenges when immigrants take positions of power in the military hierarchy. Finally, they recommend best practices that may provide insights for policymakers and stakeholders in national defence organizations vis-à-vis integrating non-citizens into the military.

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Introduction 13

The concluding chapter by Alan Okros provides a summary of the volume’s main takeaways and outlines key points of convergence and divergence across the chapters. The areas of convergence include the rationale for why the topic of immigrants and the military is important; the conditions under which individuals are deemed to be of value to the military; and perspectives on the challenges of managing diversity within defence organizations. In answering a number of questions about n ­ on-citizens’ military participation, this volume raises new points for ­exploration. To that end, Okros outlines some new questions and avenues for future research, and presents new theoretical frameworks that may illuminate the topics under consideration. The observations and suggestions in this chapter are offered to assist scholars to situate these types of studies in broader frameworks, to apply more critical perspectives, and to engage in theory-building. The issues being examined are of significance to academic and professional military audiences but, more important, are crucial for the individuals who are the focal point of these chapters: those seeking to serve the nation in uniform.

references

Agopsowicz, Andrew. 2020. “COVI D-19 Derails Canadian Immigration. Royal Bank of Canada Economics.” 29 May. https://thoughtleadership. rbc.com/covid-19-derails-canadian-immigration/ . Dandeker, Christopher, and David Mason. 2001. “The British Armed Services and the Participation of Minority Ethnic Communities: From Equal Opportunities to Diversity?” Sociological Review 49, no. 2: ­219–35. doi: 10.1111/1467-954X.00253. Editorial Staff. 2020. “Full List of Countries That Recruit Foreigners Yearly: 2020 Updates.” Current School News. 4 June. https://www.­ currentschoolnews.com/education-news/countries-that-recruit-­ foreigners/ . Gentile, Mary. 1996. Managerial Excellence through Diversity. Prospect Heights, I L: Waveland Press. Hanson, Kolby, and Erik Lin-Greenberg. 2019. “Noncitizen Soldiers: Explaining Foreign Recruitment by Modern State Militaries.” Security Studies 28, no. 2: 286–320. doi: 10.1080/09636412.2019.1551571. Krebs, Ronald R. 2004. “A School for the Nation? How Military Service Does Not Build Nations, and How It Might.” International Security 28, no. 4: 85–124. doi: 10.1162/0162288041588278.

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Leal, David L. 1999. “It’s Not Just a Job: Military Service and Latino Political Participation.” Political Behaviour 21, no. 2: 153–74. doi: 10.1023/A:1022038816779. McDonald, Daniel P., and Kizzy M. Parks, eds. 2011. Managing Diversity in the Military: The Value of Inclusion in a Culture of Uniformity. New York: Routledge, 2011. Parco, James, and David A. Levy. 2010. Attitudes Aren’t Free: Thinking Deeply about Diversity in the U.S. Armed Forces. Montgomery, A L: Air University Press. Pinch, Franklin C., Allister T. MacIntyre, Phyllis Browne, and Alan C. Okros, eds. 2006. Challenge and Change in the Military: Gender and Diversity Issues. Kingston, ON : Canadian Defence Academy Press. Segal, Mady Wechsler, and David R. Segal. 1983. “Social Change and the Participation of Women in the American Military.” In Louis Kriesberg, ed., Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change. Greenwich, C T : J A I Press. Soeters, Joseph, and Jan van der Meulen. 2007. Cultural Diversity in the Armed Forces: An International Comparison. New York: Routledge. Vollset, Stein Emil, Emily Goren, Chun-Wei Yuan, Jackie Cao, Amanda E. Smith, Thomas Hsiao, Catherine Bisignano, Gulrez S. Azhar, Emma Castro, Julian Chalek, et al. 2020. “Fertility, Mortality, Migration, and Population Scenarios for 195 Countries and Territories from 2017 to 2100: A Forecasting Analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study.” Lancet 396: 1285–1306. Wallace, Geoffrey P.R., and Sophia Jordán Wallace. 2020. “Who Gets to Have a D REAM ? Examining Public Support for Immigrant Reform.” International Migration Review 54, no. 2: 527–58. doi: 10.1177/ 0197918319833924.

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pa rt o n e

Diversity, Inclusion, and Immigrant Identities in the Military

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1 Fighting for Your Host Country: Non-citizen Soldiers in Belgium Delphine Resteigne

To the extent that the military is a complex organization (Perrow 1986) and, as such, constantly interacts with its environment, this chapter first briefly describes Belgium’s societal context and how linguistic diversity has helped fragment national identity. Second, it analyzes how military organizations have increasingly opened their doors to less traditional segments of the population. Since 2003, the Belgian Armed Forces has allowed European Union (E U ) citizens to apply to join. This greater openness, however, has attracted few nonnationals. This low participation seems linked to two elements, both external and internal. Externally, language requirements and having to work in a bilingual army inhibit recruitment. I describe how various political reforms have progressively separated the two main linguistic communities and also how the emphasis on language prerequisites can discourage non-citizens. Internally, elements of military culture, as well as resistance to diversification (especially ethnic), inhibit integration of non-citizen soldiers. In the following sections, I first look at current policies and how “denationalization” of the military function is flowing from both globalization and the decline of the nation-state, which is particularly obvious in a linguistically divided country like Belgium. In this context, the opening of the armed forces to E U citizens appears as a logical next step, especially when recruitment of nationals has become problematic. Then, based on quantitative surveys, I look at the perception and acceptance of ethnic diversity among military personnel.

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a linguistic divide rooted in history

The emphasis on the linguistic dimension and language representation between French- and Dutch-speakers in the Belgian military can be traced back to the country’s history. According to Ernest Renan (1997), two elements define a nation: the memory of a common past and the reaffirmation of wanting to live together. If we look at the common memory, Belgium emerged as a nation in 1830 following the Belgian Revolution, when it seceded from the southern provinces of the Netherlands, and officially became a neutral and independent state under a provisional government and a national Congress. Belgium was a constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary democracy, with French as the official language. In 1898, Dutch was also recognized as an official language, but it was not until 1967 that a Dutch version of the constitution was approved by Parliament. Notwithstanding these frictions, Belgium was long hailed as a model of consociational democracy: “a government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy” (Lijphart 1974, 79). Despite power-sharing structures that facilitate group representation, the formal (institutionalized) recognition of differences can encourage fragmentation and schisms. Historically, three main cross-cutting cleavages have structured Belgian society: religion (Catholics / freethinkers), class (left / right), and language (Dutch / French) (Lorwin 1974). The linguistic divide was the last to appear, becoming salient at the end of the First World War, partly as a result of the indignity and suffering allegedly endured by Flemish enlisted soldiers at the hands of a French-dominated military elite (De Schaepdrijver 2004). At the end of the 1950s, with secularization and de-ideologization under way in Belgium – as in most other Western societies – the two older schisms began to lose relevance, and the linguistic one began to dominate politics. The traditional “segmented pluralism” (Lorwin 1974), with integrated Catholic, socialist, and, to a lesser extent, liberal pillars, began to disintegrate, and these segmented institutions lost their roles in socialization and social control. One of their main, structuring actors – political parties – split along linguistic lines. In the absence of these cross-cutting identities, it became more difficult for political elites to find compromises, unravelling the consociational model (Lijphart 1974). Linguistic tensions were also fuelled by the differing economic situations of the two communities, characterized by, among other factors,

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Fighting for Your Host Country 19

persistently higher unemployment in Wallonia and Brussels. This was the result of Wallonia’s economic decline, which began in the late 1950s (with the closure of the coal and steel industries). It also led to a new Flemish demand for economic autonomy. From the 1970s on, these increasing linguistic tensions and Flemish demands for more autonomy changed governance, and in 1993 Belgium became a federal state, where the central government incorporates regional sub-units into decision-making (Hechter 2000). According to article 1 of the new constitution, those sub-units consist of three unilingual linguistic communities (Flemish, French, and – quite often forgotten – German) and three regions (two unilingual, Flemish and Wallonia, and one bilingual, the Brussels capital region).1 These distinct political entities are responsible for different policy domains, while some competencies have remained at the national level (including defence, foreign policy, legal matters, and social security). It was hoped – mainly among French-speaking political elites – that such a reconfiguration would result in a new equilibrium or, at the very least, avoid an “escalation trap,” where both adversaries would engage in a coercive strategy and tit-for-tat retaliations, and players would pay a higher and higher price for a continuing stand-off (Oberschall 2007). After having been held for years in a minority status under French dominance, the Flemish community appears less and less in line with the francophones over the final nature of the state. It generally supports further devolution to the region (Flemish), with some calling for a confederation, and a minority (until now at least) for an independent Flanders. It is in that particular context that the Belgian Armed Forces, as one of the last national symbols, have to deal with the sensibilities of the various linguistic communities. s t i l l a n at i o n a l c u lt u r e ?

Various cultural studies (Hofstede 1991; 2001; Inglehart 1989; Trompenaars and Hampden Turner 1997) have characterized Belgium as a homogeneous country or as a country with a single national culture, like France or the Netherlands. Or at a minimum, Geert Hofstede’s classic study published in 1991 states that, if there are indeed some cultural differences between French- and Dutch-speakers, they are smaller than the international differences between the Belgians on the one hand and the French and the Dutch on the other, so that one can speak of a specific Belgian national culture, a sort of mental software

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that helps to distinguish members between themselves and others. According to his 6-D model, cultures differ in six fundamental ways: • power-distance, or the attitude towards inequalities • individualism, or the degree of interdependence • masculinity (versus femininity), in the society’s dominant values • uncertainty avoidance, or how the society deals with the uncertain future • long-term (versus short-term) orientation, how the society maintains the transition between the past-present and the future • indulgence (versus restraint), how individuals control their desires and impulses In the country-comparison survey by Hofstede (n.d.), Belgium scores very high on the individualism index (75), which means that its people usually favour individual opinions, but reveal a rather high degree of power-distance (65). This indicates a sort of contradiction: though highly individualistic, the majority also needs a hierarchy and tends to accept inequalities and control. A moderate score on the ­masculinity–femininity index (54) reveals a society driven both by masculine values (like achievement, competition, and success) and feminine ones (like caring or quality of life), which shows a tendency to compromise, and mutual agreements in social and professional life. As for avoiding uncertainty, Belgium scores very high (94), which reveals fear of change, hence the stress on planning and structures. Regarding long-term orientation, a very high score (82) reveals a strong pragmatism and a tendency to adapt to societal evolution. A moderate score on indulgence (57) suggests reasonable control on impulses and desires. Despite this rather homogeneous picture, Hofstede’s conclusions should perhaps be reconsidered, as Belgium has become more linguistically segmented, with two “national” cultures. Language has always been a pre-existing element of the national identity. Through the years, the language cleavage has progressively eroded horizontal solidarities (for example, among the working class and various professional groups). Thus nowadays the cross-class alliance around a nationbuilding project (Fligstein 2008) seems severely weakened. According to John Berry et al. (1992), a process of mutual adaptation, or acculturation, results when culturally diverse groups come into continuous contact, gradually altering the original culture patterns

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Fighting for Your Host Country 21 Maintenance of cultural identity and characteristics is considered to be of value

Adaptation to dominant culture is considered to be of value

+

–

+ INTEGRATION

A S S I M I L A T I ON

multiculturalism

melting pot

SEPARATION

M A R GI NA L I Z A T I ON

– segregation

exclusion

Figure 1.1  Acculturation strategies (Richardson, Op den Bujs, and Van der Zee 2011)

of either or both. Generally, members of various ethnicities see acculturation differently. It is possible to distinguish four strategies within acculturation (figure 1.1) along two dimensions: preserving identity and characteristics, versus adapting to the dominant culture (of the host ethnic culture). Within those two dimensions, one can distinguish between the private and the public context. Hence four conceivable strategies: integration, separation, assimilation, and marginalization. Integration arises from a desire to adapt to the dominant culture while preserving ethnic cultural identity and characteristics. Separation stems from a lack of interest in adapting to the dominant culture and a desire to preserve ethnic cultural identity. Assimilation flows from a willingness to adapt to the dominant culture and the lack of a wish to preserve identity and characteristics. Marginalization results from non-interest in adapting to the dominant culture and in preserving ethnic cultural identity and characteristics. In Belgium, political reforms have progressively led to a kind of separation and an emphasis on the linguistic dimension. As we see in the sections that follow, this element can discourage non-citizens from entering the military. a m u lt i c u lt u r a l c o u n t r y i n   t h e   h e a rt   o f   t h e   e u

When speaking about the armed forces, we often tend to use the “moral” argument that the military should reflect the society it serves. Gathering “citizens in uniform,” it should accordingly represent the various

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s­ egments of society. Even if it is trying to become more reflective, many countries still have a long way to go. And, in Belgium, the high degree of cultural diversity tends to complicate this exercise. As a result of successive immigration waves, first from the south of Europe (mid-twentieth century) and later from North or s­ ub-Saharan Africa (mid-1960s), including the former Belgian Congo, Belgium can nowadays be labelled a multicultural society, with many people living in a country where they were not born. Citing place of birth, a ­permanent characteristic, ensures comparability of statistics at the international level. Nationality is by definition shifting, as some migrants are likely to acquire this from their countries over time (Lafleur and Marfouk 2017). “Foreigner” conventionally means someone either foreign-born (an immigrant) who has retained their original nationality or born in the country of reference to foreign parents. All individuals born outside Belgium are defined by the government as “first-generation immigrants,” but, for individuals born in Belgium, another distinction can be made. People with parents born in Belgium are defined as “native,” and those with one or both parents born elsewhere are “second-generation immigrants.” In this last category, a distinction is usually made between EU and non-EU countries. Based on these categories, 69.8 per cent of the Belgian population in 2016 was native, 16.5 per cent was first-generation immigrants, and 13.7 per cent was second-generation (Baeyens et al. 2020). If we now look at the difference between E U and non-E U immigrants, about half of immigrants are coming from other EU ­countries (53.1 per cent for the first generation and 52.3 per cent for the second). The migrant population (Lafleur and Marfouk 2017) increased from 1,080,790 in 2001 to 1,812,409 in 2016. In 2018, 166,894 ­people immigrated to Belgium using various administrative channels, while 116,714 people emigrated. The net migration (the difference between the two figures) therefore amounted to 50,180 people, or more than four-fifths of the increase in residents. Belgium’s three regions differ significantly in the distribution of immigrants (Baeyens et al. 2020). Individuals with a migration background make up a much larger share of the population in Brussels (71.8  per  cent) than in Wallonia (31.1 per cent) and Flanders (22.1 per cent). As for diversity among migrants, almost half come from the EU (47.71 per cent) and from Africa (25.81 per cent) (Lafleur and Marfouk 2017). In fact, four countries account for about onethird (36 per cent) of migrants: France, Italy, Morocco, and the

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Fighting for Your Host Country 23

Netherlands. In Brussels, most migrants have a non-E U origin; in Wallonia, the majority are from the EU (Baeyens et al. 2020). Some 75 per cent of first-generation immigrants are of working age (20 to 64 years old), compared to 57 per cent of natives and 50 per cent of second-generation immigrants. According to the National Bank of Belgium (Baeyens et al. 2020), this breakdown will substantially modify the national labour market. Those younger generations can also help rejuvenate the military, where the mean age is thirty-nine years (Directorate General Human Resources 2019). Immigration and employment figures also display ethnic stratification, which tends to leave migrants inactive or precarious and having very hard jobs. According to socioeconomic monitoring by Unia (2013) (the name derives from the Latin unio: I unite), which is the Interfederal Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism, an independent public institution, the employment rate of foreign-born men (54.9 per cent) is 23.4 per cent lower than that for men of Belgian origin (78.3 per cent). For foreign-born women, the rate is even lower (41.7 per cent). This lower integration also reflects country of origin. For E U -born immigrants, the employment rate is very close to that of natives, but for non-E U immigrants, the gap is bigger (Baeyens et al. 2020). This trend is visible throughout Europe, with Belgium among the worst at labour-market integration. In 2019, only 61 per cent of first-generation immigrants were employed, which is almost 12 per cent lower than for native people. Although level of education is often blamed, it affects only part of the gap. Other factors include labour-market rigidities, a high level of job tenure, scarcity of policies to help migrants find a job, personal characteristics, and poor integration through schools. Immigrants (especially non-EU) are over-represented in low-paid jobs. Government packages to expedite economic recovery during and after C O V I D , combined with rising public debt, will encourage a very competitive labour market and a possible resurgence of protectionist policies and nationalist ideologies. Here too, as we see in the next section, the Belgian Armed Forces could offer a broad range of jobs, including vocational and academic opportunities, for non-E U immigrants. d i v e r s i t y i n t h e b e l g i a n m i l i ta r y

Like other complex organizations, Western armed forces have become more diverse, both externally and internally. Externally, their current

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missions are extremely varied, take place all over the world, in regions culturally, ethnically, linguistically very diverse, and often occur within a multinational framework. Internally, in post-industrial societies, demographic change has rendered them more diverse than their predecessors. Facing recruitment and retention problems, they have progressively opened their doors to new segments of the population. This greater complexity warrants flexibility as they seek to ­interact with various stakeholders in culturally complex operations both at home and abroad, in Belgium, for example, when patrolling the streets in Brussels during the Operation Vigilant Guardian, launched after the terrorist attacks in 2016 (Resteigne 2021). With crisis-response and asymmetric operations taking place all over the world, armed forces have adopted a more modular and ­flexible structure, involving elements they can implement rapidly and then integrate in a multinational task force as required. Classical authors (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960) found the feeling of national identity generally higher among military personnel than among their civilian counterparts. As Western armed forces “­civilianize,” they resemble other complex organizations more than ever before. More recent studies (Haltiner and Weibull 2007) have corroborated such findings, showing that they still tend to take the nation as a reference group. In Belgium, the military, together with the monarchy, represents one of the last symbols of national unity. Before the 1990s, the question of diversity in the Belgian military was not really considered. It was mainly events of 1993 in Somalia that revealed the difficulties faced by soldiers regarding diversity, particularly in new theaters of operations. Three Belgian paratroopers who had been accused of violence against young Somalis were acquitted by the Military Court, and other acts committed by Belgian soldiers in Somalia became public. At this point, Minister of Defence Jean-Pol Poncelet asked Unia, the Interfederal Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism, and Philippe Manigart, the chair of ­sociology of the Royal Military Academy, to investigate the source of racist attitudes in the military. They recommended recruitment of more women and ethnic minorities. Also, in an attempt to have Belgian defence mirror the country’s multicultural reality, the minister ­broadened policies on equal opportunities to include diversity. Beginning in March 2003, several measures were gradually implemented. A Diversity Steering Group brought together staff officers from the various Adjunct Chiefs of Staff (ACO S es) and Directorates

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Fighting for Your Host Country 25

General (DGs) to integrate diversity into all aspects of defence policy. This policy was intended to provide tools for employees to increase diversity, and describe ways to use, monitor, and promote it. A diversity cell was also created among the human resources departments to deal with recruitment, selection, training and development, and management of employees’ performance and well-being. A few years later, in March 2006, the Belgian military brought in the federal administration’s Diversity Charter (Ministry of Defence 2007), and its ­anti-discrimination law took effect on 10 May 2007. Finally, on 14 November 2011, each ACOS and DG signed the charter to promote equality for women and men in the department and to implement the principles of United Nations Security Council Resolution (U N S CR) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (W P S). The charter involved a commitment to take concrete actions and exclude all forms of ­discrimination from the military. The Ministry of Defence has also defined seven values for military personnel (commitment, courage, honour, integrity, loyalty, respect, and sense of duty) and four values for civilian personnel (impartiality, loyalty, professionalism, and respect) to reflect its overall diversity policy. This policy now shapes recruitment and harnesses communication channels to attract a more diverse workforce. As in most Western countries, the Belgian military offers upward mobility to individuals with less education and income, as well as to ethnic minorities. Regarding access for ethnic minorities and for non-citizens, successive reforms of the nationality code (laws of 28 June 1984, 13 June 1991, 16 August 1993, and 1 March 2000) simplified acquisition of nationality. As a consequence, the number of foreign-born Belgians (especially non-Europeans) has been increasing. Unlike in other countries (including Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States), Belgium keeps no official statistics on the number of Belgians of foreign descent, either for the general population or for the military. By law, ethnic origin cannot be mentioned on any official document or collected for statistics, including birth registries or censuses, respectively. The Belgian Armed Forces, like the Canadian and Swiss (among others), were linguistically diverse from the beginning, always having speakers of Flemish, French, and German, though not always officially recognized. Until the 1930s, French was the forces’ only official language, and all officers spoke French (including the Flemings). At the Royal Military Academy, French remained the only official ­language until 1935. The post-1945 introduction of a quota system

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at all levels of the hierarchy means that today the military is roughly representative in terms of language (60 per cent is Dutch-speaking and 40 per cent francophone). The military regulates the use of languages even more than the civil service. For example, a superior must always speak to a subordinate in their preferred language. After 1935, the Royal Military Academy’s new regulations permitted Dutch, and since 1940, courses have been taught in both languages separately. For non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and troops, schools remain separate, which means that courses and training are taught in one of the national languages, unlike the situation for officers, who must be bilingual. More recently, because of increasing Belgian participation in multinational, usually anglophone operations, the armed forces now tend to encourage personnel to learn English. As a consequence, in 2016, the Royal Military Academy decided to propose the master curriculum in English-only for all cadets. opening ranks to non-citizen soldiers

On 30 October 2000, in an interview for La dernière heure, André Flahaut, former Belgian defence minister, aired the idea of recruiting non-EU citizens living in Belgium. According to Flahaut (2000), this policy, which would prefigure a future European army, could offer such people access to specific jobs that remained unfilled and help integrate them into Belgian society. The Belgian constitution reserves military jobs to citizens, except as provided for by law, but contravenes the principle of free movement of workers within the E U . Not wanting to amend the constitution, the government decided to broaden recruitment to include only EU citizens, which it achieved through a new law adopted on 27 March 2003. Article 8 states that a Belgian or a citizen of an E U member-state may join the military. Recruitment of E U citizens began in 2004, and in 2018, there were 169 non-Belgian citizens (156 military personnel and 13 civilians) in the armed forces, or 0.006% of the country’s total workforce.2 Table 1.1 shows the distribution of military foreign recruits by rank and nationality. The bulk of the foreign recruits were privates (101 versus 46 NCOs and only nine officers), and most were French or Dutch. There are few foreign officers, as they must be proficient in French and Dutch; all of the officers were from either France (five) or the Netherlands

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Fighting for Your Host Country 27

Table 1.1 Distribution of non-Belgian EU nationals in Belgian Armed Forces (by rank and nationality), 2018 Nationality

Officers

NCO s

Netherlands

4 5 / / / / / / / / / / / / / 9

21 11 5 2 / 2 1 1 1 / / 1 / / 1 46

France Italy Spain Germany Romania Portugal Poland Britain Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Latvia Luxembourg Switzerland Total

Privates 42 23 8 6 7 4 4 2 1 1 1 / 1 1 / 101

Total 67 39 13 8 7 6 5 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 156

Source: D G HR (2018).

(four). The current language requirement seems to be the major obstacle to non-Belgian recruitment, especially at the officer level. As for non-Belgian, EU-national civilian workers, they are spread across four levels by qualifications (table 1.2). The number of women among non-Belgian E U employees (both military and civilian) is higher (18.3 per cent) than among the entire military (8.1 per cent). Indeed, there was a higher proportion of women among civilian workers (43.53 per cent in 2015) than among military personnel (7.72 per cent in 2015). Hiring non-citizen civilians increases not just ethnic diversity, but also gender diversity. This encourages a sort of “denationalization” of the military function, which flows from globalization: multinational businesses no longer recruit based on nationality. Yet nationality as a condition for military service dates back to the early nineteenth century and is linked to the emergence of nationalism and citizenship. The nation-state – especially in Europe – is, however, on the decline, so the opening of militaries to EU citizens appears a logical next step, especially when nationals seem uninterested.

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Table 1.2 Distribution of non-Belgian EU nationals among civilians (by level and nationality), 2018

Nationality

Level A (university degree)

Level B

Level C

Level D

Total

1 1 / 1 1 / / / 4

1 / / / / / / / 1

/ 1 2 / / / / / 3

1 1 / / / 1 1 1 5

3 3 2 1 1 / 1 1

France Italy Spain Germany Netherlands Portugal DRC Switzerland Total

13

Source: D G H R (2018).

a h e s i ta n t a c c e p ta n c e of a more diverse workforce

There has been no research yet on how Belgium’s armed forces have reacted to the recruiting of E U citizens. Nevertheless, as this section shows, there have been several surveys on diversity. In a 2009 study of 1,200 Belgian military and civilian personnel in the armed forces (Richardson, Resteigne, and Bonneu 2014), as many as 32 per cent clearly preferred the separation strategy for ethnic minorities, and 33 per cent favoured adaptation of ethnic minorities to the dominant culture (assimilation). Less than one in ten (9 per cent) believed that ethnic minorities should maintain their own culture in a public / professional content (i.e., wanted integration). In a second, 2015 survey by the chair of sociology at the Royal Military Academy, 32 per cent agreed that “foreigners do not have their place at the Belgian Defence” (Lecoq 2015). Only 14 per cent agreed that “Belgian residents who are originally from outside the European Union should be allowed to enter to the Belgian Defense” (Lecoq 2015). These results illustrate the majority’s reluctance about non-European immigrants joining the military. On cultural diversity, defence ­employees were even less open than the general population. Fewer than half (45 per cent) concurred that “the presence of different

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cultures is a richness for our country,” in comparison with 55 per cent among the national population (Lecoq 2015). Fewer than a third (29 per cent) agreed that “it is better for a country that a variety of religions coexist,” compared to 49 per cent of the population writ large (Lecoq 2015). These differences between defence personnel and the wider public can be explained largely by socio-demographic ­differences, especially level of education, which was lower among the former. In both samples, the lower the level of education, the less the support for multiculturalism. In order to reduce this discrepancy, the defence forces need an inclusive organizational culture, supported and valued by the military hierarchy. However, the most recent Strategic Vision for Belgian Defence (Ministry of Defence 2016) does not mention “diversity” in its 144 pages. More recently, the top echelon has occasionally called for more diversity and inclusion (Resteigne and Manigart 2020): “The most important thing is that all staff feel good in Defence,” said Chief of Defence General Marc Compernol while opening a 2018 conference at headquarters in Brussels marking the fifteenth anniversary of the diversity policy. The current policies tend to focus on the differentiation–inclusion spectrum. According to Alan Okros (2009), such policies aim for representation of minority groups, so as to mirror demographic ­distribution and, more specifically, ethnic composition. Okros argues, however, that such policies are misleading and decrease effectiveness and inclusivity (2009). He suggests we must distinguish between demographic and identity diversity, which is much more complex. Accordingly, I propose moving away from demographic interpretation towards identity diversity. Instead of relating diversity to assumed categorizations (such as ethnicity), we should personalize it to mean how members relate and perform their social roles. Nevertheless, the image and perception of such demographic groups in traditionally homogeneous organizations continues to influence how their members feel and can play those social roles. d e n at i o n a l i z i n g t h e m i l i ta r y ?

Being in a small army and a country that hosts the capital of Europe and several major institutions, members of Belgian defence are used to thinking in European rather than national terms and to intervening

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in operations that are multinational (E U , North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NA T O], or UN). Still, even after opening its doors to EU citizens almost twenty years ago, the Belgian Armed Forces still attracts few members of ethnic minorities and EU immigrants. Belgium is not the only E U member that recruits non-nationals, and many countries are also “denationalizing” their military institutions. Despite this brave new world, the majority of Belgian defence ­employees do not grasp the need for a more multicultural workforce. As with other kinds of diversity, rhetoric needs to give way to concrete plans and inclusive leadership. Yet some traditional members continue to favour profiles, ideas, and leaders that are similar to themselves. When the forces need to fill the depleted ranks for culturally diverse operations, searching for wide-ranging talents surely offers a possible solution.

notes

  1 Although, since 1961, the Belgian census has had no questions on ­linguistic identification (McRae 1986), it is generally assumed that Flemings make up about 58 per cent of the population, francophones 41 per cent, and German-speakers 1 per cent.   2 As of 2018, the Belgian Ministry of Defence employed 27,935 ­personnel, 26,483 of them military and 1,452 civilians (Directorate General Human Resources 2018). references

Baeyens, Arnout, David Cornille, Philippe Delhez, Céline Piton, and Luc Van Meensel. 2020. “The Economic Impact of Immigration in Belgium.” NBB Economic Review (Nov.): 1–244. Berry, John W., Ype H. Poortinga, Marshall H. Segall, and Pierre R. Dasen. 1992. Cross Cultural Psychology: Research and Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. De Schaepdrijver, Sophie. 2004. La Belgique et la Première Guerre ­mondiale. Brussels: Peter Lang, Documents pour l’Histoire des Francophonies, 4. D GH R (Directorate-General for Human Resources). 2018. Annual Report. Brussels: Ministry of Defence. – 2019. Annual Report. Brussels: Ministry of Defence.

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Flahaut, André. 2000. Le plan stratégique pour la modernisation de l’Armée belge 2000–2015. Des propositions concrètes pour entrer dans le XXI ème siècle. Brussels: Ministry of Defence. – 2003. Plan stratégique + Evaluation and Perspectives. Brussels: Ministry of Defence. Fligstein, Neil. 2008. “Who Are the Europeans and How Does This Matter for Politics?” In J.T. Checkel and P.J. Katzenstein, eds, European Identity, 132–66. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Haltiner, Karl, and Alice Weibull. 2007. “Value Orientations and Political Attitudes among Future Military and Civilian Elites.” In G. Caforio, ed., Cultural Differences between the Military and Parent Society in Democratic Countries, 51–82. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science. Hechter, Michael. 2000. Containing Nationalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Hofstede, Geert. n.d. “Country Comparisons: Belgium.” Accessed 10 Nov. 2020. https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/ belgium/. – 1991. Culture and Organization: Software of the Mind. New York: McGraw-Hill International. – 2001. Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations across Nations. London: Sage. Huntington, Samuel. 1957. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press. Inglehart, Ronald. 1989. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press. Janowitz, Morris. 1960. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. New York: Free Press. Lafleur, Jean-Michel, and Abdeslam Marfouk. 2017. Pourquoi l’immigration? 21 questions que se posent les Belges sur les migrations internationales au XXI e siècle. Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia, L’Harmattan, Col. Carrefours. Lecoq, Valerian. 2015. “Identité de la Défense belge: enquête 2015,” Technical Report. Brussels: Royal Military Academy, Department of Behavioural Sciences, Chair of Sociology. Lijphart, Arend. 1974. “Consociational Democracy.” In K. McRae, ed., Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies, 70–89. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited. Lorwin, Val. 1974. “Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies.” In K. McRae, ed.,

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Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies, 33–69. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited. Manigart, Philippe. 1985. Les Forces armées belges en transition: une analyse sociologique. Brussels: Institute of Sociology Press, Free University of Brussels. – 2007. “Diversity in the Belgian Armed Force.” In J. Soeters and J. van der Meulen, eds, Cultural Diversity in the Armed Forces: An International Comparison, 185–99. London: Routledge. Manigart, Philippe, and Delphine Resteigne. 2015. “Genre et ethnicité, deux types de diversité passé à la loupe.” In Dynamiques internationales 11 (Dec.). Accessed 31 Jan. 2022. http://www.dynamiques-internationales.com/. McRae, Kenneth. 1986. Conflict and Compromise in Multinational Societies: Belgium. Waterloo, ON : Wilfrid Laurier University Press. Ministry of Defence. 2007. Charter for the Promotion of Equality for Women and Men in the Department of Defence and for the Implementation of the Principles of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. Brussels: Ministry of Defence. – 2016. Strategic Vision for Belgian Defence. Brussels: Ministry of Defence, 29 June. Moniteur belge. 2003. “Loi du 27 mars 2003 relative au recrutement des militaires et au statut des musiciens militaires et modifiant diverses lois applicables au personnel de la Défense.” Moniteur belge (Brussels), 30 April. Oberschall, Anthony. 2007. Conflict and Peace Building in Divided Societies: Repsonses to Ethnic Violence. London, Routledge. Okros, Alan. 2009. “Rethinking ‘Diversity’ and ‘Security.’” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 47, no. 4: 346–73. Perrow, Charles. 1986. Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill. Renan, Ernest. 1997. Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? Paris: Éditions Mille et une nuits. Resteigne, Delphine. 2021. “Les armées et les Constabulary Missions sur le territoire national: étude du cas belge.” In B. Jankowski, A. Muxel, and M. Thura, eds, Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP , 361–82. Brussels: Peter Lang. Resteigne, Delphine, and Philippe Manigart. 2020. “The Different Soldiers: A Look at Diversity and Inclusion in Military Organizations.” In J. Heeren-Bogers, R. Moelker, E. Kleinreesink, J. Van der Meulen,

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J. Soeters, and R. Beeres, eds, The Yin-Yang Military, 125–39. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Richardson, Rudy, Tessa Op den Buijs, and Karen van der Zee. 2011. “Changes in Multicultural, Muslim and Acculturation Attitudes in the Netherlands Armed Forces.” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 35, no. 5 (Sept.): 5 ­ 80–91. doi: 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2011.04.004. Richardson, Rudy, Delphine Resteigne, and Mathias Bonneu. 2014. “Perspectives on Diversity in the Military: A Comparison between Belgium and the Netherlands.” International Journal of Social Science Studies 2, no. 3: 38–49. Trompenaars, Fons, and Charles Hampden Turner. 1997. Riding the Waves of Culture: Understanding Cultural Diversity in Business. London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing. Unia. 2013. “For Equality, against Discrimination.” Accessed 31 Jan. 2022. https://www.unia.be/en.

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2 The Swiss Armed Forces’ Reputation and Integration Function for Recruits with Migration Backgrounds Stefano De Rosa and Tibor Szvircsev Tresch

introduction

In 1291 – according to the legend of Switzerland’s founding – Werner Stauffacher, Walter Fürst, and Arnold von Melchtal1 came together on a mountain meadow, called Rütli, and swore to support each other. This event, along with the creation of the Swiss Confederation in 1291, can also be seen as the origin of the concept of a common national defence. Fast forward to 2022, a little thought experiment: Werner Stauffacher, Walter Fürst, and Dragan Malbasic2 come together and stand up for the security of Switzerland (Niedermann 2009). The time of a largely homogeneous cultural background among service members is clearly over. The increasing intercultural mix within society is also evident in the Swiss Armed Forces (SAF). In the SAF – which is based on conscription – the number of people with a migration background is increasing in line with the overall population. The aim of this chapter is to find out how people with and without a foreign background in the SA F differ in terms of motivations for service. What are their attitudes towards the Swiss military? How do they experience their service? What do they expect from it? Does it help them integrate into Swiss society? Many people associate military service with entry into a forced ­community, where people with different cultures live and work together in close proximity. Such intercultural cooperation can produce

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problems, but create opportunities. For instance, military service can ease integration of people with a migration background. In this chapter, we argue that in a multicultural country like Switzerland, the military plays an integrative role3 by facilitating interaction between people with a range of cultural backgrounds. The integrative capacity can even be seen as an unofficial – or latent – task of the SAF . It contributes, along with the official – manifest – task of national defence, to the SAF’s legitimacy. In fact, many Swiss citizens argue that military service can be considered “a school of life” and “a source of identity” (Szvircsev Tresch et al. 2020, 172). More than two-thirds of Swiss see military service as helping to integrate people with a migration background. Yet almost 30 per cent question the loyalty of naturalized Swiss4 in the military. Thus the vast majority supports naturalized citizens serving in the armed forces (Szvircsev Tresch et al. 2014). However, there is hardly any research on how such soldiers judge their time in the military. This chapter seeks to help close this gap. In the following pages, we identify a person as having a “migration background” if at least one parent does not have a Swiss passport or was born abroad. It does not matter which parent. This chapter is based on our empirical study that we began in 2013. In this chapter, we first explain the Swiss military model, which ­consists of compulsory military service and the militia principle. We include discussions of managing diversity in the SAF. Next, we present the main facts and figures on immigration and outline theories on integration. Then, we introduce various views on military service, such as on motivation and reputation. We also describe forms of integration during service and into society. Our results also factor in multilingualism and its implications for immigrant soldiers. t h e s w i s s m i l i ta r y s y s t e m

Conscription and Militia The federal constitution regulates the legal basis of the S A F . Accordingly, “every Swiss man is required to do military service” (Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation 2020).5 This force “shall be organized as a militia” (Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation 2020). What do these principles mean in practice?

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On reaching the age of majority (18), every Swiss man must enter the recruitment process. Non-citizens are not admitted to the S A F and so not allowed to serve. Naturalized men under 25, however, are obligated to complete the recruitment process. Women may enlist, but they make up fewer than 1 per cent of the SAF (Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport 2019). In the military system (based on militia), enlisted persons are regularly called to duty. A person assigned to the military first completes about five months of basic military training (recruit school), followed by annual refresher courses of three to four weeks. This form of service lasts until age 34 or a total of 245 days in the S A F for persons in lower ranks. This principle also governs many military careers, since the majority of subordinate officers, captains, and even staff officers are not professionals; they are called militia cadres – they have a civil occupation and serve only part-time in the military, typically a few weeks per year. According to military regulations, soldiers may also be required to take a certain rank if there are not enough volunteers for a cadre function. There are some exceptions to conscription, including medical exemptions and individuals with criminal records. Exempt individuals must fulfil substitute service or pay a substitute tax, 3 per cent of the individual’s annual income, but no less than 400 Swiss Francs (CHF), or approximately $575 (Canadian). In total, about two of three young men qualify for military service (Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport 2019). Moreover, there is an alternative civilian service for persons who are enlisted but claim objection of conscience. The length of this substitute service is one and a half times longer than regular military service. Since 2009, access to this alternative has been greatly facilitated, so numbers have increased substantially. Over the last 20 years, due to various reforms, the S AF has been steadily shrinking, from 400,000 to 140,000 members. Every year, about 20,000 persons – mainly young men – enter recruit schools. Under these circumstances, how does the S AF manage diversity? Diversity in the SAF Members of the SA F represent a cross-section of young Swiss men. Conscription leads to a kind of “natural” diversity, with a range of socioeconomic backgrounds, ethnic origins, languages, and political

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orientations. Although the diversity is quite notable, the S AF has no consistent strategy for managing it. The S A F ensures that training and courses address the topic regularly to raise awareness of the issue (Federal Government 2010, 62–5). Nevertheless, as part of the federal administration, the SAF is bound to the general diversity principles of the Confederation: “The ­fostering of equal opportunities and the demand for non-discrimination are the essential cornerstones of diversity management” (F S D S A 2020; translation by the authors). Thus, as far as possible, everyone should have equal opportunities and not be discriminated against. SAF ­measures focus on age, gender, language proficiencies, and people with different levels of ability. Other foci include ethnicity, lifestyle, religion, and sexual orientation6 (Personal Verteidigung 2020). Within the SAF, language is a notable sign of diversity. The country’s four official languages – French, German, Italian, and Romansch – create considerable challenges. This is reflected in the many multilingual S A F platoons and companies. Most young adults are not proficient in more than one national language (Grin et al. 2015). Only after the Second World War did the multilingualism of the armed forces receive official recognition. In fact, the German language ­(spoken by 65 per cent of the population) is still dominant in the SAF, which disadvantages speakers of French (23 per cent) and Italian (8 per cent). But it is repeatedly stressed that the armed forces bridge the language regions. This is why the armed forces is going to great lengths to solve problems of linguistic diversity, by translating ­guidelines or recruiting cadres. However, these efforts involve specific ­measures at the company level, rather than for the armed forces (Altermatt 2004). How does multilingualism being a salient element of diversity affect immigrants in the SA F ? To what extent are soldiers with a migration background given special consideration? In principle, little or none. There are no statistics on soldiers’ migration backgrounds or origins. According to official statements, all Swiss are equal in the armed forces and have the same rights and duties: “There are only Swiss citizens in the armed forces” is the maxim (von Matt 2015). Since origins are discounted, the results of our study are particularly revealing. As there are no official statistics for the SAF, the next option is to look at Swiss society. What does immigration look like? How many newcomers will join the military?

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i m m i g r at i o n a n d i n t e g r at i o n i n s w i t z e r l a n d

Foreign Population and Naturalizations Switzerland has one of the highest proportions of foreign-born ­residents of any country in Europe – nearly 30 per cent, according to the International Migration Report 2017 of the United Nations. Foreign citizens increased from 15 per cent in the 1980s to 25 per cent in 2018. Most of these individuals are immigrants from other parts of Europe: mainly Italy, Germany, and Portugal (Federal Statistical Office 2020d). Foreign nationals differ significantly from Swiss in terms of education. Significantly more of them have completed only compulsory schooling (23 per cent, versus 6 per cent of Swiss citizens). With that said, more foreigners (37 per cent) than Swiss citizens (27 per cent) possess a university degree (Federal Statistical Office 2020b). This indicates that immigrants are overrepresented both in the upper social class and in the lower social class. Moreover, there are also differences in unemployment rates, with higher shares among foreigners. In the last ten years, the mean unemployment rate of foreign citizens was 5.6 per cent, compared to 2.2 per cent among Swiss nationals (Federal Statistical Office 2020e). The crucial point is that unemployment is higher among foreigners, regardless of educational level. Even among persons with a university degree, unemployment rates for foreigners and Swiss citizens were 5.8 per cent and 2.8 per cent, respectively (Federal Statistical Office 2020a). This suggests certain challenges in the labour market unique to foreigners, such as language barriers or smaller professional networks. To that end, obtaining citizenship can improve immigrants’ chances in the labour market. Citizenship confers new rights and a new obligation. A naturalized person is given the political right to vote and be elected to political office. Some professions require Swiss citizenship – for instance, the security sector and judicial office. With those new Swiss citizenship rights comes mandatory military service, which affects only young men. From the 1990s until the mid-2000s, yearly naturalization rates grew from about 1 per cent to 3 per cent of foreign residents. In most recent years, they have hovered around 2 per cent annually (Federal Statistical Office 2019b). At least one of three naturalized Swiss ­citizens is originally from Germany, Italy, or from Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo (Federal Statistical Office 2019a).

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Before someone can apply for citizenship, they must satisfy a number of criteria. Prior to the revision of the Swiss Citizenship Act in 2018, candidates had to have resided in the country for at least 12 years. If they did so between the ages of 10 and 20, those years were doubled (counted twice). Further requirements are respect for the legal system, so no criminal record and not posing a danger to domestic or international security. There are other, “softer” prerequisites, like integration into “Swiss life” and familiarity with the Swiss way of life, customs, and traditions – in effect, speaking an official language and having a job. If someone is married for at least three years to a Swiss citizen, the process is simpler, requiring only five years of residence (Federal Government 2013). Slightly less than 30 per cent of all naturalizations use this simplified route (Federal Statistical Office 2019b). Until 2017, nearly 50 per cent of the foreign population had fulfilled the minimum period of residence. Foreigners born in Switzerland had slightly higher rates, at about 55 per cent. Thus, approximately ­one-third of all naturalized Swiss were born in the country, and another third had lived there for at least twelve years. The median age at n ­ aturalization is about thirty-two years. Relatedly, 30 per cent of those naturalized are not yet of age to serve (Federal Statistical Office 2019a). As we have shown, Swiss society is clearly shaped by immigration. However, only a small proportion of immigrants are naturalized, and even fewer face compulsory military service. What does this mean for integration? In the next section, we present some relevant theories. Theoretical Perspective on Integration What does it mean when a person immigrates into a society? According to classic sociological theories, there are four dimensions of change: cultural, emotional, social, and structural (Esser 2003): • cultural: learning a new language, and certain social values and norms – i.e., cognitive skills, acquired and learned over time • emotional: identifying with the host country – for instance, f­ eeling a sense of belonging and recognizing the new country’s culture as one’s own • social: establishing contacts and ties with the host society  – including association memberships and interethnic ­relationships, such as marriages and friendships

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• structural: gaining a position in society through work or education, and legal status – relating to rights and obligations Responses to these dimensions shape the individual’s integration. When a person acts similarly to a native Swiss along these four dimensions, one speaks of assimilation. This may occur if someone’s social network from their country of origin is weak, while their relationships with Swiss citizens are very strong. Failure of convergence across these four dimensions can create marginalization. This may occur with cultural distance vis-à-vis the host country, perhaps from failure to learn the language or poor job outcomes. Another form of integration is cultural diversity for the individual. According to Hartmut Esser (2010), such a person preserves bonds with the country of origin, while realigning along the four dimensions – for example, learning the host country’s language or holding a stable professional position (Esser 2010). The children of immigrants – second-generation immigrants – are involved in this process (Reinprecht and Weiss 2012). What is the role of naturalization in this context? At least in Switzerland, it plays a mixed part. Naturalization is seen by the federal administration as a very strong sign of integration: it “implies a type of identification and attachment to the host country” and “is an expression of ­successful civic integration” (Federal Statistical Office 2020c). Its requirements align with the four dimensions of integration – cultural, emotional, social, and structural. We can therefore assume that S A F members with migration backgrounds have already achieved a high level of such integration. Studies also show that naturalization leads to better integration, which can be measured in terms of wages. Lower-income immigrants can benefit from their new citizenship, at least in the labour market, which can help prevent discrimination (Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Ward 2019). There is also empirical evidence about the emotional dimension, with identification with the host country increasing after naturalization (Fick 2016). Though often presented as such, citizenship is not necessarily the end of the integration process. According to the theory of ethnic ­boundary making, the distinction between immigrants and natives is the outcome of a “social process rather than a cultural given, made and remade rather than taken for granted, chosen depending on ­circumstances rather than ascribed through birth” (Wimmer 2008a, 971). A person’s immigrant status is “the outcome of a political and symbolic

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struggle over the categorical division of society” (Wimmer 2008a, 985). “Immigrants” and “natives” contribute equally to the making of the boundary, and the same persons may judge themselves d ­ ifferently in distinct situations (Wimmer 2008b). In this context, some native Swiss do not consider naturalized persons as “full” citizens. The apparently light-hearted term Papierlischwizer7 (paper Swiss) emphasizes this boundary, regardless of an individual’s actual integration (Gemperli 2014). In certain cases, “true Swiss” simply require more “persuasion” to consider a naturalized person “true Swiss.” Non-native Swiss may feel like second-class citizens, and this may jeopardize their keenness for military service because they do not feel fully accepted. So, it is not self-evident that the Swiss passport provides the same conditions and consequences for everyone. Are there differences between young Swiss nationals with and without foreign origin in military service? Perhaps naturalized citizens may not be fully accepted, leading to marginalization within the ranks. Or maybe immigrants do not identify with the SA F , which leads to others’ concerns about their loyalty. d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e d ata

Our results are based on a survey we conducted in 2013 and 2014 among recruits of the SAF. We aimed to check the integration benefits of military service for young Swiss immigrant citizens. The recruit schools begin three times in the year, with 7,000 to 8,000 men and women8 at each start. We collected data at 15 institutions representing each branch of service and covered all three starts between summer 2013 and spring 2014. The same individuals were asked to complete a questionnaire at three points during their service: at the beginning, in the middle, and at the end.9 The final sample we collected consists of data from 2,508 people – about a tenth of the cohort – who completed all three questionnaires. We found 28 per cent of respondents had a foreign origin – i.e., a migration background. We took into account recruits’ and their ­parents’ nationality at birth, as well as place of birth (Swiss or not). For having a migration background, at least one parent must have been born abroad. As compulsory military service applies to men only, there are very few female soldiers in the sample – 0.4 per cent, or roughly the

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distribution in the SAF. The recruits’ mean age was between 20 and 21 years. Twenty-four per cent of participants – native-born or with a migration background – had a high-school diploma, while 65 per cent had attended a vocational school. Of the interviewees, 80 per cent spoke German, 17 per cent French, and 3 per cent Italian, compared with the general population: 69 per cent, 23 per cent, and 8 per cent, respectively. In the sample, slightly more migrant soldiers spoke French (23 per cent) or Italian (5 per cent). In religion, 43 per cent of soldiers self-identified as Catholic, and 19 per cent as Protestant, while 18 per cent reported having no religion. The largest non-­Christian communities in Switzerland are Muslim. Among the interviewees, 4 per cent were Muslim, nearly all (97 per cent) with a migration background. How do soldiers with a migration background look at military service compared to their colleagues? Do their expectations differ? Do they have different experiences in service? The next section explores these questions. r e s u lt s

Reputation of the SAF and Motivation to Serve A lot of empirical evidence shows that young Swiss citizens, ages 18–29, are more sceptical about the armed forces than older groups. Population surveys from the last twenty years report an average approval rating of 59 per cent among young adults (Szvircsev Tresch et al. 2020), almost identical to our respondents, at 58 per cent. This approval rate is independent of migration background. We asked recruits at three different times about how motivated they were for service. Overall, the number of motivated service members decreased from the beginning (57 per cent), to the middle (51 per cent), to the end (49 per cent) of their service (figure 2.1). However, the decline was slightly less pronounced among migrant soldiers, with 53 per cent still motivated at the end. Similarly, more soldiers with a migration background felt proud that they finished the recruit school than their counterparts. However, with 58 per cent versus 52 per cent, the difference was small. Overall, most soldiers rated the armed forces positively, with marginally higher values for soldiers with a migration background. But

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100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Total mb+ mbTotal mb+ mbTotal mb+ mbTotal mb+ mb(n=2477) (n=695) (n=1782) (n=2482) (n=700) (n=1782) (n=2451) (n=683) (n=1768) (n=2481) (n=701) (n=1780) Motivation at the beginning

Motivation at the end*

Perceived reputation of military career*

Civil benefits as motivation for military career*

Figure  2.1  Motivation to serve and perceived reputation of a military career Summed agreement of the answers “tends to be true,” “is true,” and “is completely true” on a scale of six answers. * = statistically significant difference between; MB+ = migration background; and MB- = without migration background.

how do they judge the attractiveness of a militia military career? Of migrant soldiers, 41 per cent opined that a cadre position was still highly regarded in society, while only 31 per cent of native-born soldiers held that view. In response to the statement: “The civil benefits might motivate me to continue my training in the military,” 30 per cent of the former group agreed, compared to 20 per cent of the latter group. Thus the former group values a military career more, believing it offers advantages in civilian life. Integration in the Service It is assumed that soldiers on duty treat each other in a spirit of ­community and solidarity. For twenty weeks, the soldiers of the S AF live together nearly every day and are almost always in contact with each other. In such a situation, there is a risk of tension and conflict between soldiers of different origins. What do our data show about unit cohesion? At the end of the recruit school, 89 per cent of respondents agreed with the statement: “There is mutual respect in our platoon.” For other similar items about living together, there was also a high level

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of agreement. For example, 85 per cent said they were satisfied with their superiors’ treatment of them, and 72 per cent with their situation in service. Most important, soldiers with and without a migration background felt the same. Does that mean no tensions or conflicts? Not necessarily: we also inquired about racism. We asked recruits twice to respond to the statement: “During my military service racism troubles me a lot,” once in the middle and once at the end of the service. The answer categories ranged from one (“not at all”) to six (“very much”). Although most did not report experiencing racism, more migrant recruits reported difficulties ­(categories four through six). In the middle of the recruit school, 7 per cent of soldiers without a migration background and 10 per cent of those with such a background identified some troubles. The ­percentages increased from the middle to the end of service, especially for migrant recruits, reaching 10 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively. It seems that prolonged community life in service is not without problems, especially for soldiers with a migration background. This assertion is confirmed by results from the statement: “During my military service, the observance of religious practice (food, prayer times, etc…) causes me a lot of trouble.” At the end, 10 per cent of respondents reported such difficulties, especially Muslims – 31 per cent of them. Substantial unease became apparent here. Another way to determine how a person’s origin affects their ­military service is to compare it to civilian life. To achieve this, we asked the soldiers mid-service how important certain personal ­characteristics – origin, religion, skin colour – were in everyday life in the armed forces and in civil society. Fourteen per cent said that origin mattered in the military, and 41 per cent for civilian life (­figure  2.2). Similarly, 10 per cent thought religion was significant in the forces, compared to 34 per cent for civil life. Nine per cent believed that skin colour mattered in service, and 26 per cent in civil society. Soldiers with and without a migration background rated these c­ haracteristics the same. But, at the end of recruit school, slightly more soldiers rated these origin-related characteristics important in everyday service. For ­example, 21 per cent said that someone’s origin was significant in the military. This suggests that frictions and tensions may emerge in service over time. Perhaps recruits’ awareness of being in their final weeks of training elicits a change in reporting. Regardless, the big differences to civilian life remain. The soldiers perceive the military context as more egalitarian and less discriminatory than the civilian.

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100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40%

41% 34%

30% 20%

14%

26%

21% 10%

10% 0%

...in the civil life (n=2481)

...in the military (middle of service) (n=2484)

...in the military (end of service) (n=2480)

Someone's origin plays an important role… *

...in the civil life (n=2484)

...in the military (middle of service) (n=2486)

18% 9% ...in the military (end of service) (n=2468)

Someone's religion plays an important role… *

...in the civil life (n=2479)

...in the military (middle of service) (n=2482)

16%

...in the military (end of service) (n=2475)

Someone's skin colour plays an important role… *

Figure 2.2  Perceived importance of origin-related characteristics Summed agreement of the answers “tends to be true,” “is true,” and “is completely true” on a scale of six answers. * Statistically significant differences.

A clear majority of soldiers, whether with or without a migration background, did not experience discrimination or exclusion during their service. Nevertheless, some forms of racism did occur and seemed even to increase. Muslims in particular had trouble in religious ­practice. Overall, however, most respondents perceived the military as far more inclusive than the civilian world. Expectations for Integration in Society What benefits, if any, for civil life do soldiers expect from their ­military experience? Do they take advantage of their service to further their professional goals? Do they feel more a part of Swiss society? Here again, the role of a migration background is of special interest. At the end of recruit school, 39 per cent of the interviewees, ­regardless of background, reported a change in feeling Swiss. The picture is ­different vis-à-vis external perception. When asked: “Do you think that others now see you more as Swiss?” 38 per cent of respondents with a migration background agreed, compared to 29 per cent of the others (figure 2.3). This sizable gap may be because

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a Swiss person of colour and/or with a foreign name can clearly display their citizenship by wearing their SAF uniform or by showing their military service on their résumé. Also at the end of recruit school, a slight majority thought their personality strengthened – 57 per cent of those with a migration background and 52 per cent of their counterparts. Military service may also facilitate integration into the labour ­market. In fact, 26 per cent of those with a migration background said they thought they would reach their professional goals faster, as compared to 15 per cent of the native-born sample. Very similarly, 39 per cent of the former foresaw a better chance on the job market, and 29 per cent of the latter. Military service seems to have an integrative effect vis-à-vis the labour market. Soldiers who said they now appeared more Swiss judged their job chances as significantly better after service (­correlation coefficient γ: 0.55). So did those who felt their personality strengthened (correlation coefficient γ: 0.58). Thus soldiers with a migration background believed they benefited more from military service. In conclusion, the two groups differed only slightly in their responses. Notably, those with a migration background valued the reputation of a military career in society more highly and showed a little more motivation at the end of their service. Both groups saw military life as much more inclusive than civilian life. Finally, soldiers with a migration background expected to be more integrated in the labour market due to their military service. This is partly because they expected to be perceived more as Swiss in the future. Migration Background versus Language Affiliation Having described the small but revealing differences relating to m ­ igration backgrounds, we now ask: what do these results mean? Why is there little bias based on migration background during military service? And why do soldiers with such a background anticipate better integration? These findings may relate to Switzerland being comprised of a German-speaking majority (65 per cent) and three language minorities. Most Swiss live in a homogeneous language region, isolated from other linguistic areas. In recruit schools, service members interact with comrades from all parts of the country, including those speaking another tongue. For most soldiers, such differences are much more salient than other traits, like migration background. Many hardly

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The Swiss Armed Forces 47

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30%

31%

39%

38% 29%

31%

mb(n=1793)

Total (n=2492)

29%

20% 10% 0%

Total (n=2942)

mb+ (n=699)

Do you think that others now see you more as Swiss?*

mb+

mb-

Do you think that you will have better chances on the job market after military service?*

Figure 2.3  Expectations for integration in society Summed agreement of the answers “tends to be true,” “is true,” and “is completely true” on a scale of six answers. * Statistically significant difference between; MB+ = migration background; and MB- = without migration background.

understand compatriots speaking a different language, but communicate easily with recruits with a migration background from their own linguistic region. Thus the social boundary between majority and minority groups lies especially among German-, French-, and Italianspeaking soldiers instead of vis-à-vis persons of foreign origin. Evidence of this lies in responses to the sentence: “During my military service I find it very difficult to speak and understand the language used.” At the end of recruit school, 43 per cent of Italian-speakers and 23 per cent of French-speakers agreed, compared to only 9 per cent of German-speakers. Similarly, 95 per cent of Italian-speaking and 89 per cent of French-speaking soldiers opined that language plays an important role in everyday military life, while only 83 per cent of German-speakers felt that way. It is obvious that major adaptations are needed in the service to accommodate linguistic minorities. Belonging to a minority, Italian- and French-speaking soldiers see military service with different eyes – it plays a different role in their lives, especially in their expectations. They anticipate more a­ dvantages – for instance, strengthening their personality (Italian-speakers: 73 per cent, French-speakers: 60 per cent, and German-speakers: 52 per cent; see figure 2.4).

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100% 90% 80%

73%

70% 60% 50%

60%

58%

52% 40%

40%

37%

29%

30%

28% 16%

20% 10% 0%

Germanspeaking

Frenchspeaking

Italianspeaking

I think my personality is strengthened by military service.

Germanspeaking

Frenchspeaking

Italianspeaking

Do you think that you will have better chances on the job market after military service?

Germanspeaking

Frenchspeaking

Italianspeaking

I achieve my professional goals faster because I graduate from recruit school.

Figure 2.4  Expectations for integration in society: Language regions Summed agreement of the answers “tends to be true,” “is true,” and “is completely true” on a scale of six answers. * All differences are statistically significant.

Similar differences appear about integration into the labour market: “Do you think that you will have better chances on the job market after military service?” Fifty-eight per cent of the Italian-speaking minority and 40 per cent of francophones assented, and only 29 per cent of German-speakers. Despite less agreement with the following statement, language affiliation shaped answers: “I achieve my professional goals faster because I graduate from recruit school.” Saying yes were 37 per cent of Italian-speaking, 28 per cent of Frenchspeaking, and only 16 per cent of German-speaking soldiers. It appears that soldiers with a migration background and soldiers from a linguistic minority assume more often that military service carries advantages. The greatest approval is found among persons from Italian- or French-speaking regions with a migration background. For instance, 65 per cent of Italian-speakers with a migration background anticipated a better chance with jobs, but only 27 per cent of German-speakers. Table 2.1 illustrates this finding in more detail. More soldiers from a social minority expected personal benefit from service. Although they are all Swiss citizens, recruit school seems particularly useful for soldiers with a migration background and those from smaller language regions. This means that both groups may search for similar incentives in military service to succeed in civilian life.

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Table 2.1 Expectations for integration in society: Language regions and migration background     German-speaking majority French-speaking minority Italian-speaking minority Overall     German-speaking majority French-speaking minority Italian-speaking minority Overall     German-speaking majority French-speaking minority Italian-speaking minority Overall

I think my personality is strengthened by military service. Without M B With M B 51% 54% 59% 63% 70% 76% 52% 57% Do you think that you will have better chances on the job market after military service? Without M B With M B 27% 34% 35% 46% 51% 65% 29% 39% I achieve my professional goals faster because I graduate from recruit school. Without M B With M B 13% 22% 22% 36% 35% 40% 15% 26%

Summed agreement of the answers “tends to be true,” “is true,” and “is completely true” on a scale of six answers. MB = migration background.

What does military service offer so specifically to these two types of recruits? Without having empirical evidence, we may only speculate. First, through military service, both experience a personal challenge with cultural differences, which is not comparable to the majority of native-born German-speakers. For instance, many soldiers with a migration background cannot rely on the military experience of their relatives, and minority-language soldiers may struggle with the ­unfamiliar dominant language. This coping may well strengthen their personalities. Second, and related, completion of recruit school may serve as a sign to others, indicating the effort of which they are capable. Moreover, doing that while a member of a minority group taught them some practical skills and behaviours (like language). Thus c­ompletion of recruit school may imply their abilities and character.

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Native-born German-speakers with deep roots in the country may not need such a stamp of approval. Third, recruit school offers new relationships and a broader network. Especially for a person from a minority group, getting to know people from a different region or origin can be advantageous. discussion

Swiss society is clearly shaped by immigration. Although naturalizations have increased in recent years, only a small proportion of ­immigrants become citizens. The integration process must already be at an advanced point in order for someone to obtain citizenship. Are there none the less distinctions during military service between soldiers of foreign origin and long-time citizens? Soldiers with a migration background link military service much more often with better job prospects (see table 2.2). They expect it to speed them to their professional goals. A military career has more reputation and more value on the job market for them. As a result, at the end of recruit school, slightly more of them are still motivated and feel that their personality has been strengthened by service. From a theoretical perspective, this means that military service promotes structural integration into Swiss society. The greater involvement of such people is thus largely beneficial, both for the SAF and for society as a whole. One of our findings is that this structural integration applies also to the country’s linguistic minorities. As minorities, both Swiss people of foreign origin and non-German-speakers can use military service to demonstrate their abilities. Social integration also plays a role, enlarging personal networks. Military service plays a further, decisive part in integrating people with a migration background through the perception of their becoming “truly Swiss.” Many such soldiers reported being perceived as “more Swiss” (see table 2.2). Another finding: the military environment seems clearly more ­inclusive than the civil context. The vast majority of soldiers judged characteristics such as origin, religion, and skin colour less important in the military than in civilian life, regardless of one’s own origin. However, these characteristics increased in importance during service. Moreover, persons with a migration background perceived racism more markedly over time.

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Table 2.2 Differences and similarities between soldiers with and without migration background Similar opinion Necessity of the armed forces Satisfaction with service Military perceived as more inclusive than civilian life Feeling Swiss

Different opinion Perceived reputation of military career (M B +) Troubles with racism (M B +) Being perceived as more Swiss by others (M B +) Perceived better chances in the labour market (M B +)

M B = migration background.

conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to find out how S AF recruits with and without a foreign background differ in their expectations of military service and to explore whether that service eases their i­ntegration into society. Despite all being Swiss citizens, recruits with and without a migration background expect different things from military service. The former enter more often anticipating better job opportunities. In addition, they tend to see their personality strengthened by military service. Furthermore, they are more likely to believe that others p ­ erceive them more as Swiss afterwards. These are clear signs that military service fosters integration into society. Hence, these results yield the following conclusion: in a multicultural country like Switzerland, compulsory military service plays a valuable integrative role for young citizens with migration backgrounds. This holds true even though only Swiss citizens are admitted, which means that cultural, emotional, social, and structural integration is already very high for everyone. In what way does recruit school specially help integrate migrant recruits into Swiss society? Military service has a special meaning for them because completing it is a signal to others. The theory of ethnic boundaries portrays ethnic affiliation as a matter of negotiation in everyday life. Military service helps the “new Swiss” to cross the socially constructed border and to be perceived now as “true Swiss.” Completion highlights a person’s abilities, the strains they endured, and, above all, their internalized

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values. This kind of stamp of approval is more valuable to cultural minorities than to members of the majority, as it entails “general” characteristics rather than particular traits, like origin. In this respect, military service enhances the broad social acceptance of a person with a migration background. In this way, it opens the door to better career opportunities and makes equal chances possible. Finally, this results in a higher level of social and structural integration. To conclude, this integrative role is possible only because the SAF enjoys a high level of acceptance among the population. The military is still widely recognized as an important institution, precisely because of its latent, identity-creating function. This understanding allows recruit school to serve as an unofficial stamp of approval for a young adult. When discussing the further development or abolition of ­conscription, this aspect should be taken into account. What happens to this latent function, when fewer people complete military service and the acceptance of compulsory service decreases? New global threats, developments in technology, and economic demands are increasingly challenging the ability of the Swiss military system. From the perspective of social integration, it might be reasonable to preserve the unifying force of compulsory service.

notes

  1 These are typical native Swiss names.   2 This is a possible typical name of an immigrant in Switzerland.   3 “Integrative role” means that military service may help persons with ­foreign backgrounds to become part of society.   4 “Naturalized Swiss” refers to persons who were not born citizens, but became so after procedures to obtain Swiss nationality.   5 For women, military service is voluntary.   6 “Lifestyle” refers, for instance, to a person’s living situation.   7 This means just a Swiss citizen on paper (passport) but not from birth on.   8 The share of enlisted women is below 1 per cent. Therefore, ­sex-­disaggregated data are not available.   9 The first time was set in the second week of basic military training, the second, between weeks five and seven, and the last, in weeks 15–18. Data were collected at each location when it was most ­appropriate for the training program.

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The Swiss Armed Forces 53 references

Altermatt, Bernhard. 2004. “Der Umgang der Schweizer Armee mit der Mehrsprachigkeit: Proportionalität und Territorialität.” Schriftenreihe der Eidgenössischen Militärbibliothek und des Historischen Dienstes, Nr 15. Esser, Hartmut. 2003. “Ist das Konzept der Assimilation überholt?” Geographische revue 5, no. 2: 5–22. – 2010. “Integration, ethnische Vielfalt und moderne Gesellschaft.” In Johannes Wienand and Christiane Wienand, eds, Die kulturelle Integration Europas, 143–69. Wiesbaden: V S Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation. 2020. Acessed 20 Nov. 2021. https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19995395/ index.html. Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport. 2019. “Armeeauszählung 2019, Kurzfassung.” Personelles der Armee. Federal Government. 2013. “Bürgerrechtsgesetz.” Accessed 20 Nov. 2021. https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/19520208/ index.html. Federal Statistical Office. 2019a. “Acquisition of Swiss Citizenship.” Accessed 20 Nov. 2021. https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/­ statistics/population/migration-integration/citizenship/acquisition-­ citizenship.html. – 2019b. “Erwerb des Schweizer Bürgerrechts.” Accessed 20 Nov. 2021. https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/bevoelkerung/­ migration-integration/buergerschaft/erwerb-buergerrecht.html. – 2020a. “Arbeitsmarktstatus.” Accessed 20 Nov. 2021. https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/bildung-wissenschaft/ bildungsindikatoren/themen/wirkung/arbeitsmarktstatus.html. – 2020b. “Bildungsstand.” Accessed 20 Nov. 2021. https://www.bfs. admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/wirtschaftliche-soziale-situation-­ bevoelkerung/gleichstellung-frau-mann/bildung/bildungsstand.html. – 2020c. “Citizenship.” Accessed 20 Nov. 2021. https://www.bfs. admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/population/migration-integration/­ citizenship.html. – 2020d. “Foreign Population.” Accessed 20 Nov. 2021. https://www.bfs. admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/population/migration-integration/­ foreign.html.

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– 2020e. “Registered Unemployed Persons.” Accessed 20 Nov. 2021. https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/work-income/­ unemployment-underemployment-vacancies/registered-unemployed-­ persons-seco.html. Fick, Patrick. 2016. “Does Naturalization Facilitate Integration?” Zeitschrift für Soziologie 45, no. 2: 107–21. F S D S A . 2020. “Fachstelle Diversity Schweizer Armee.” Accessed 20 Nov. 2021. https://www.vtg.admin.ch/de/mein-militaerdienst/­ allgemeines-zum-militaerdienst/diversity.html. Gemperli, Simon. 2014. “Diverskulturelle Copyright-Schweizer.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 29 Dec. Accessed 20 Nov. 2021. https://www.nzz. ch/schweiz/diverskulturelle-copyright-schweizer-1.18451977. Grin, François, Jacques Amos, Klea Faniko, Guillaume Fürst, Jacqueline Lurin, and Irene Schwob. 2015. “Société multiculturelle.” In Eidgenössiche Jugenbefragung ch-x. Glarus / Chur: Somedia Buchverlag, Edition Rüegger. Hainmueller, Jens, Dominik Hangartner, and Dalston Ward. 2019. “The Effect of Citizenship on the Long-term Earnings of Marginalized Immigrants: Quasi-experimental Evidence from Switzerland.” Science Advances 5, no. 12: 1–8. doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.aay1610. Niedermann, Reto. 2009. “Die Integrationsfunktion der Armee für AdA mit Migrationshintergrund.” Bachelor’s thesis. Studiengang Berufsoffizier, Departement für Geistes-, Sozial- und Staatswissenschaften, ETH Zürich, Personal Verteidigung. 2020. “Diversity Management.” Accessed 20 Nov. 2021. https://intranet.vtg.admin.ch/de/wissen/pers-v/fuehrungzusammenarbeit-v/diversity-v.html#dokumente. Reinprecht, Christoph, and Hilde Weiss. 2012. “Migration und Integration: Soziologische Perspektiven und Erklärungsansätze.” In Heinz Fassmann, Richard Potz, and Hilde Weiss, eds, Migrations- und Integrationsforschung. Multidisziplinäre Perspektiven. Band 1, 13–34. Göttingen: V&R unipress. Szvircsev Tresch, Tibor, Andreas Wenger, Julie Craviolini, Esther ­Vogler-Bisig, Elvira Krämer, and Sabrina Pfister. 2014. “Sicherheit 2014 – Aussen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitische Meinungsbildung im Trend.” Militärakademie (M I LAK) an der ETH Zürich und Center for Security Studies, ETH Zürich, Zürich und Birmensdorf. Szvircsev Tresch, Tibor, Andreas Wenger, Stefano De Rosa, Thomas Ferst, and Jacques Robert. 2020. “Sicherheit 2020 – Aussen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitische Meinungsbildung im Trend.” Militärakademie

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(MI L A K) an der ETH Zürich und Center for Security Studies, ETH Zürich, Zürich und Birmensdorf. United Nations. 2017. “International Migration Report.” Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York. Von Matt, Othmar. 2015. “Maurer zweifelt an Loyalität von Secondos.” Schweiz am Sonntag, 12 July 2015. Accessed 20 Nov. 2021. https:// www.schweizamwochenende.ch/nachrichten/ maurer-zweifelt-an-loyalitaet-von-secondos-131062542. Wimmer, Andreas. 2008a. “Elementary Strategies of Ethnic Boundary Making.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 31, no. 6: 1025–55. – 2008b. “The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: A Multilevel Process Theory.” American Journal of Sociology 113, no. 4: 970–1022.

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3 Whose Military Is It Anyway? Transforming the Australian Defence Force into Australia’s Defence Force Jarrod Pendlebury

introduction

Each year, many armed forces across the globe expend significant resources on bolstering “diversity” in their ranks. Usually this d ­ iscourse – at least in liberal-democratic polities – touts the value of representation of “measurable minorities”1 to the organization. As distinct from normative debates surrounding equal pay or Indigenous land rights, proponents of military diversity frequently emphasize increased “­capability” as a justification. Unfortunately, rapid change in key demographics and stubbornly low representation in others prompt questions of the efficacy of current policy. This chapter considers whether unaddressed barriers inhibit efforts to build inclusive militaries that represent their societies. Using the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as a case study and drawing on qualitative data from focus groups with trainee officers in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (US), this chapter seeks to reframe diversity a­ rguments in terms of Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice, and s­ uggests a ­normative case for inclusion that rests on human rights and legitimacy. In sum, instrumental benefits ­notwithstanding, greater minority participation in the ADF represents a deontological o ­ bligation arising from the fundamental rights of Australian liberal democracy.

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57

diversity in the adf

By almost every demographic measure, the ADF is significantly unrepresentative of the broader national society. While gender is the most visible indicator – 50.7 per cent of Australians are female, but only 18.1 per cent of the ADF (Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS] 2016; Department of Defence [D O D ] 2019) – other demographic groups are also underrepresented. For example, 2.5 per cent of residents self-report as Muslim, whereas all followers of Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Paganism, and Sikhism make up 2 per cent of the A DF (A BS 2016; D OD 2019). The ADF collects demographic data on members in various ways. Many of these data, such as those stored in the Personnel Management Key Solution (PMKEYS) system, are not readily available to the public. Every four years, however, an ADF census is released. The most recent published census data contrast markedly with national figures from the A B S. For instance, in 2019, 87 per cent of AD F members were born in Australia, compared with 67 per cent of the broader society, while in 2015, 92 per cent of the ADF spoke only English in the home, but 73 per cent of society writ large. In 2015, only 0.2 per cent of A D F members professed affiliation with Islam, compared with 3 per cent of Australian society (A B S 2016; D O D 2015; 2019). These data are more striking in the context of the Australian ­government and the A D F ’s push in recent years to bring in minority groups. A series of government-initiated reviews combined with Defence-wide and service-specific initiatives have sought to understand and address the issue. For example, the Royal Australian Air Force (R A A F ) has established targets for gender and for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders (ATSIs), reduced initial minimum periods of service for women, and established “recruit to location” initiatives that allow members from select groups (such as First Nations peoples) to serve in locations that reflect kinship and ancestral ties (ADF 1998; AHRC 2012; DOD 2016, 20). The still relatively flat growth in m ­ inority ­participation2 raises questions about such methods, suggesting other reasons behind low minority representation.

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methods

Design This chapter draws on data associated with a broader research project that compared initial officer-training processes in Australia’s R A A F , Britain’s Royal Air Force (R A F ), and the US Air Force (U S A F ) (Pendlebury 2019). I gathered the empirical data through focus groups with officer trainees at five air-force establishments in these three ­countries. Two were academies – the Australian Defence Force Academy (A D F A ) in Canberra and the US Air Force Academy (U S A F A ) in Colorado Springs – where cadets undertake basic military training in parallel with tertiary study. The other three – the RAAF Officers’ Training School, in Victoria; RAF College Cranwell, in Cranwell; and the USAF Officer Training School, in Alabama – are “direct entry” officer-training units providing military training only. My fieldwork aimed to clarify narratives and norms surrounding the inclusion of minority groups in military training, rather than to uncover cultures of exclusion. To that end, while the data presented focus on air forces, I cite them as examples of how narratives of exclusion can form in military basic training. I chose qualitative methods to help unravel the discourse on defence “diversity” by exploring the effects of the intensive socialization associated with initiation into an air force. The fundamental ­hypothesis that drove this research is that current policies aimed at diversifying the A D F achieve little because they are inherently instrumentalist. Policy-makers tend to focus on the benefits to the organization, rather than on minority groups’ realizing normative rights. As well, initial officer training develops identity in crucial ways that form and validate enduring attitudes informing a cadet’s military “identity.” I used focus groups to collect narratives from members training as officers to ascertain whether the ways their military identities were being shaped might be slowing change in representing minorities in the A DF. Data Over the period 2015–18, I conducted thirty-one focus groups with  trainee officers, drawing a body of data from over two hundred­ ­participants (n = 208). In each iteration of the fieldwork, I attempted to collect datasets that included at least one all-male group,

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one all-female group, and one mixed group. I succeeded in all cases except at the two ­academies, where personnel availability and time constraints permitted only mixed and all-male groups. I chose focus groups as the primary method of data collection for two main reasons. First, they provide a useful way of collecting a variety of attitudes relatively quickly from many participants. In each of the institutions that supported my research, the cadets’ time was very constrained. At the USA F Officer Training School, for instance, the course lasts eight weeks, so a method such as focus groups allowed me to collect the attitudes of many participants over a short period. In order to prevent “institutionalism” from skewing the data, I drew participants from across the full spectrum of trainee officers’ ­experience – new recruits, mid-course students, and cadets at the end of their training. Second, focus groups usually generate a dialogue between participants, allowing me to observe “group meanings, processes, and norms” relating to cadets’ experience in basic officer training (Bloor 2001, 4). Unveiling the characteristics and attributes that meant the most to them seemed likely to expose the mechanisms that prioritize certain identities over others, leading to cultures of exclusion and marginalization. I semi-structured all the focus groups, and while discussions followed a set of questions approved by the institutions’ boards of ethics review, there was scope to explore areas of interest as the conversations developed. The audio of each focus group was recorded and subsequently transcribed, allowing for accurate analysis. In facilitating each group, I sought a mood and pace that encouraged “retrospective introspection” (Merton and Kendall 1946, 550). Each group consisted of between three and ten participants – all cadets at the establishment I was visiting – and each discussion lasted approximately one hour. In analyzing the resultant data, I employed content and discourse analyses to better understand both what was said and how these narratives were conveyed. I facilitated each focus group in a similar way, beginning with questions aiming to reveal the b ­ ackground of the participants and their reasons for joining the m ­ ilitary, before moving into their perceptions of diversity, inclusion, and how to address difference in military organizations. While the initial “­ice-breaker” questions helped set participants at ease, they also allowed me to compare reasons for joining across the three air forces. For instance, many USAF members cited a “sense of duty” or a “calling,” and RAAF

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members more pragmatic reasons, such as e­ ducation or particular roles. Once participants’ cultural context was established, the script moved to their views on diversity and inclusion. contemporary discourses on diversity in the adf

The Australian Human Rights Commission’s (AHRC’s) (2012) Review into the Treatment of Women in the Australian Defence Force: Phase 2 Report (the Broderick Review) clearly articulated an argument commonly invoked to support including measurable minorities in military ­organizations. It outlines five key reasons why the AD F should treat minority groups (in this case, women) better: • attract the best talent • reduce cost • increase capability • become a first-class and high-performing employer • take a leadership position (A H R C 2012, 43) By considering only instrumental reasons, the review deploys what I term a “capability” argument. This harnesses an Anglo-American “business-case” model of diversity management, which has been “used extensively to persuade corporate managers to embrace and actively manage a diverse workforce as a ‘melting pot’ of different skills and competencies … supposedly contributing to enhanced organizational performance” (Meriläinen et al. 2009, 232). Within such a model, measurable minorities bring difference, which in turn generates cognitive diversity, resulting in better decisions and, by extension, better performance. In essence, it objectifies members of groups deemed “diverse” as a capability and asset, and has been widely criticized. Sara Ahmed, for instance, observes that framing diversity as something “possessed” by an “other” fails to appreciate historical power ­structures and can work against efforts to reduce inequalities in an organization (Ahmed 2007). Others, such as Deborah Litvin, have pointed to the discourse’s essentializing nature and its presenting of “groups” as homogeneous (Litvin 1997). In the military context, some observers have suggested that military training itself undoes any diversity that candidates may possess: “Regardless of the gender, sexual orientation, or ethnicity of the young

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Officer Cadet arriving at A D F A [the Australian Defence Force Academy], by the time they reach A C S C [Australian Command and Staff College, a mid-career period of education for officers] (and [are] thus earmarked to progress on the Command and Leadership ­pathway) the Army will have put them through the same set of education and training courses as all of their peers, in effect training out the very diversity that they initially brought into the organisation” (Colton 2020). Here, Greg Colton encapsulates a little-noted but fundamental paradox about diversity and inclusion policies, and helps explain why such policies appear ineffective. For instance, if, as the Broderick Review suggests, high-performing organizations need diversity, why do militaries continue to demand uniform experience in career progression? Of more interest here: does the tendency towards homogeneity – borne of the insistence on ­common career pathways, as observed by Colton – prevent the building of inclusive and representative militaries? In the military, the treatment of minority groups as “capabilities” threatens to solidify barriers to increased participation. In military organizations, a capability is typically acquired following careful consideration of need and resources. Even in the US – the current global leader in defence spending – capabilities are deferred or ­cancelled for a variety of reasons, such as budgetary pressure (Alexander 2012). Viewing measurable minorities as a capability risks their worth being weighed against other military priorities and ­therefore subject to the vagaries of resource constraints. More broadly, would a capability argument support minority participation if it did not affect the achievement of operational goals? Finally, the capability argument has proven versatile and is frequently deployed by those arguing against increasing minority groups in the military. “Full sexual integration would seriously undermine military effectiveness, which should be the sole touchstone of manpower policy. The sexes differ on an array of physical and psychological dimensions. Many traits in which the sexes differ are critical in combat, including physical strength and endurance, physical aggressiveness, willingness to kill strangers, willingness to expose oneself to physical risk, and some cognitive abilities” (Browne 2007, 6). The capability argument’s drawbacks have not dampened its enthusiastic use, and government and defence discourse cite it, most of all, to promote inclusiveness. Some official discourse demonstrates a common usage of “diverse” that distinguishes those who diverge from

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a particular homogeneous norm, thereby implicitly reinforcing that norm’s legitimacy (Holmes 2015):3 Our Diversity and Inclusion Strategy envisages a Defence ­organisation where individual differences are recognised, respected and embraced as an opportunity to learn and enhance capability … We maximise our capability by drawing on the diversity of our people. (Australian Government 2013, 4)   We need to be absolutely unambiguous: inclusivity and ­diversity are crucial to Defence’s ability to operate at peak ­performance and demonstrate maximum capability. (Australian Government 2013, 16)   A diverse workforce provides a greater range of ideas and insights to challenge accepted norms and will help strengthen our capability and our operational effectiveness. (Payne 2017) But surely developing policy primarily by conceptualizing ­measurable minorities as a capability can work against “diversification.” For instance, of the Broderick Review’s twenty-one recommendations, nineteen relate to growth targets (or “quotas”), policies with respect to women, or monitoring mechanisms (AHRC 2012, 24–37). Such an approach, which instrumentalizes minorities, seeks readily m ­ easurable outcomes, such as quotas, to supplement under­represented groups. This type of approach, however, presents inclusivity and representation as goals rather than as tools to measure values and legitimacy. Positing diversity as an end to “achieve” can drive narrowly focused behaviours that inhibit genuine inclusion and representativeness. As I discuss later, it seems that elements within Australia’s defence organization remain unconvinced by the existing arguments for including underrepresented groups in the A D F . Their scepticism fuels attitudes and behaviours that work against the intended outcomes. a lt e r n at i v e pat h way s t o c h a n g e

In contrast to collecting data on gender-based goals, the ADF censuses until recently did only minimal reporting on ethnicity and race (Riseman 2013). Even in the newer censuses, participants could choose “prefer not to answer” or “no answer” vis-à-vis ancestry and religion,

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unlike on gender (which, notably, included “X (intersex / ­indeterminate / unspecified)”) (DOD 2015). So too, the AD F ’s main personnel management system P MK E Y S, delineates mandatory data fields (such as age, marital status, and sex) and discretionary ones (including ancestry and religion4). Thus the A D F ’s data for how “to develop strategies to increase ethnic diversity” (R A A F 2019a) are incomplete. In considering alternate frameworks for inclusivity strategies, I therefore identify two principles. First, as I suggested above, the ADF should de-emphasize “diversity,” given its problematic othering and the ADF’s slim data. Second, it should enable equal representation as much as possible in a liberal democracy, downplaying short-term, quantitative targets to increase “capability” in favour of understanding the reasons behind the low representation of measurable ­minorities. Moreover, a shift away from othering these minorities could help challenge attitudes rooted in essentialist stereotypes, while emphasizing how inclusivity fits with the state’s underlying political philosophy, to counter views of increased representation as tokenistic. To maximize the chances of enduring change, initiatives should also be values-based. Here, I follow Morris Janowitz on military-civil relations by arguing that an armed forces representing a liberaldemocratic government must hew as closely as possible to the “goals of democratic political control” (1960, 440). Thus the ADF needs to, first, provide an environment that – as much as possible – enshrines individual rights and, second, be viewed as legitimate. I call this first characteristic the “normative rights” argument. Any branch of the government should embody its values about ensuring equal opportunity. Clearly, not all Australians can serve, nor would they want to. For example: physiometric requirements for aircrew flying ejection-seat aircraft are essential. However, Parliament having recently permitted women’s service across the ADF (Thompson 2011), the ADF should work to make its social norms and practices inclusive towards measurable minority groups. Changing the rules – in effect, altering the Bourdieu-type social field – is not sufficient. The slow increase in minority representation flowing from the capability argument – as in the Broderick Review’s recommendations – suggests a need to do more to enshrine ­minorities’ normative right to serve. The second, “legitimacy” argument considers how more demographically representative forces might have greater legitimacy. Hanna Pitkin (1967) describes four ways an entity can represent something

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absent – authorization, acting for, symbolic, and descriptive. First, in “authorization,” the entity can be enabled and authorized to act by a governing body (39). The A DF , like most state-sanctioned forces, draws its legitimacy from legislative mechanisms, such as the Defence Act 1903 and the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982. Second, in “­acting for,” a proxy entity “stands in” for another (Pitkin 1967, 113). Again, the A D F , from its legislative origins and being the only statesponsored entity that may apply lethal military power in conflict, clearly acts on behalf of the government. Third, “symbolically,” as with “acting for,” an entity can represent an absent authority (Pitkin 1967, 92). Symbolism and iconography are vital to the military, and its use of government symbols in insignia (such as the crown on badges and the service ensigns, which draw on the flag) indicate that the ADF represents Australia. More broadly, the AD F on occasion embodies national values and people, as seen in emotive recruitment posters during times of conflict, as well as the public support for commemorations such as Anzac Day. Fourth, “descriptive” representation refers to something being a “mirror” of what it represents (Pitkin 1967, 61). As the census data above indicate, descriptive representation is low in the A D F . Thus the R A A F does not reflect the broader society (A B S 2016; D OD 2015). In utilitarian terms, this is of little concern (Peters 2004; Turner and Norton 2001). However, a purely utilitarian argument fails to concede how liberal democracies limit the military. For instance, a wide variety of international law restricts the AD F ’s application of force (Pendlebury 2017). For scholars building on Pitkin’s work, increasing descriptive ­representation adds to legitimacy by allowing an institution to better serve under-represented groups (Phillips 1995; Sapiro 1981). Whereas the capability argument relates solely to what is good for the organization, descriptive representation, I argue, enhances legitimacy and serves both the organization and measurable minorities. The latter ­consideration may resemble the type of essentialist argument I ­discounted, but shared experiences are quite different from shared characteristics. As Virginia Sapiro explains: We would not suggest that business people or consumers can adequately represent the interests of [labour] simply because they too are somehow involved in the industrial enterprise. Nor does our working definition of an interest group mean that all of the potential members of that group are consciously allied, or that

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there is a clear and obvious answer to any given problem ­articulated by the entire group that differs substantially from answers articulated by others … Studies of women (and other oppressed groups) demonstrate that part of the political ­relevance of some groups is that they have been systematically denied the means with which to form themselves into an interest organization: self consciousness and identification. (1981, 703) In essence, recasting the argument from a capability to a normative basis stands to provide the ADF with a dual benefit. Both approaches seek better representation of minority groups, but the normative aims to explain their low representation, so as to construct a more cohesive approach separate from their “value.” Ultimately, a representative organization in a liberal democracy must be more than instrumentally effective to enjoy legitimacy. To that end, the ADF, though legitimated through some of Pitkin’s lenses, should seek to be descriptively ­representative, not based on essentialist calculations of a minority group’s worth. I advocate for the ADF recasting itself as not merely the “Australian Defence Force” – authorized by, acting for, and symbolizing the federal government – but as “Australia’s Defence Force,” also reflecting the complex and pluralist society that peoples it and that it serves. The  ­difference here is subtle, though powerful. To be labelled “Australian” conveys only origin or citizenship; one may be described as “Australian” in any number of contexts. In contrast, to be “Australia’s” carries far deeper meaning, evoking pride and ownership that transcend mere citizenship. For example, labelling the tennis player Chris Evert as “America’s Sweetheart” conveys a singular and far stronger link with the US cultural fabric than simply describing her as “an American Sweetheart” (Spencer 2003). bourdieu and social practice

Thinking about how to enable enduring, meaningful cultural change in the ADF, I searched the sociological literature for a suitable framework to make sense of the current disjuncture between policy and practice. Bourdieu’s theory of practice looks promising, even though it is rarely harnessed vis-à-vis military culture, despite its application in sociological studies of institutions as disparate as firefighters (Desmond 2006), police (Chan 1997), and local government (Jones et al. 2016).

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Across a number of his major works, Bourdieu developed and refined his theory of social practice. For him, a complex interplay between habitus (the dispositions that guide social engagement), capital (social “currency”), and field (the social environment) underlies social interaction. His Distinction (Bourdieu 2010, 95) presents a simple formula: [(habitus)(capital)] + field = social practice Bourdieu argues that the interaction of habitus and capital within the social field determines social practice, which suggests a holistic approach to cultural change in an institution such as the A D F . By holistic, I mean policy that encompasses habitus, capital, and field. Let us look at each element in turn. First, Bourdieu’s habitus is a complex social attribute – a series of “transposable dispositions” that guides and informs the strategies available to individuals within that social environment (1977, 72). The habitus informs how the individual navigates the social environment in a way that is neither completely habitual (or unconscious) nor completely intentional. Rather, it constrains agency in terms of a “toolbox” of dispositions. Bourdieu draws on the analogy of football. For the player, a ­combination of skill (capital) and structural constraints (broadly, the field or the game’s rules and physical boundaries) affects and informs the player’s navigation. Played out on the field, a game is governed by rules that constrain, but do not force a player’s actions, and Bourdieu describes the most successful players’ – or social agents’ – “proleptic adjustment to the demands of the field … a ‘feel for the game’” (1990,  66). So too in the social environment, this “feel  for the game” results from experience informed by structures represented by law and regulation, wherein understanding the rules is just a start. Second, capital moulds and shapes both habitus and field. As distinct from a Marxian, instrumentalist understanding of financial capital, Bourdieu applies the term much more broadly. While the two philosophers invoke it to articulate a sense of value, for Bourdieu, capital is multi-layered, both circumscribing differences between social groups and helping make distinctions within them (Moore 2008). In the former usage, attributes (ethnic, for example) of various social agents may be arbitrarily “elevated above those of others in a way that confers special social advantage” (Moore 2008, 102). In the latter,

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capital can denote “differences in forms of consciousness within ­different social groups” (102). The nuance here is best described with reference to the habitus. For Bourdieu, power relations are affected both by the possession of capital and by how it shapes the habitus. As I discuss below, this inherent duality may help explain why some measurable minorities find that – despite performing well – acceptance remains elusive. Third and finally, for Bourdieu the field represents the environment in which social activity is played out, “a structured social space, a field of forces, a force field. It contains people who dominate and others who are dominated” (1998, 40). Some scholars have built on the concept of play and structure to liken Bourdieu’s field to a s­ porting field (Thomson 2008), emphasizing its structured nature, which helps determine the outcome of the social game. The military resembles a Bourdieu-type field in a tangible sense, by virtue of the physical ­structures that keep soldiers and secrets in, and outsiders out, as well as through the countless rules and regulations that govern members and operations. discussion

Having touched on the three components of Bourdieu’s theory of practice, I now use it to explore why diversity initiatives have made little headway towards an inclusive, representative ADF. An ­overriding desire to enact widespread, rapid, and measurable change seems to drive policy-makers to changes that merely alter the social field. As we saw above, I argue that the field can encompass both physical and intangible aspects of military control and governance, such as codified instructions, orders, and publications. This is not surprising; of Bourdieu’s three elements, the field represents the least illusory and most easily modified. As well, most orders and regulations arise due to a cascade effect of an instruction issued at the very highest level of command. Bourdieu’s formulaic representation supports my argument that altering the social field cannot transform the culture, as is often desired. To do that requires a shift away from a purely instrumental approach to focus on the often-neglected habitus and capital. The data I collected supports this argument: explicitly addressing members’ habitus and the types of capital most meaningful in the military social field would not only display the government’s espoused normative

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principles, but also help correct some problematic attitudes and behaviour hidden in the fabric of the field. My fieldwork therefore sought to decipher the military officer’s habitus through the lens of those undergoing the primary process for forging it: initial training. During my fieldwork, cadets’ narratives about the ideal officer yielded problematic social understandings that, as Ahmed (2007) argues, have survived despite efforts to “diversify.” For instance, at the USA F A , some cadets described how their racial identification attracted comments suggestive of attitudes working against inclusion: They [fellow cadets] made fun of me because of cultural ­differences … They’ll be like, “You know … I think the only ­reason why black people here are is because it’s more of a pity thing and not because you guys got here on your own merit.” So they’re like, “Yeah, you got the double threat, it’s like you were black and you were female, and that’s how you got in here” … You still see it a lot. (Female senior cadet, U S AF A, 2015) I grew up for over a decade in the Caribbean. … Coming to the States from that [in order to join the military] … I never knew racism until I came to the States. (Male U S AF O T S cadet, 2018) At the A D F A , several women provided evidence of similar attitudes, focusing on their gender: As a female pilot, I got told by a guy that was on my flight screening course in Y OF T [Year One Familiarization Training] that the only reason I was here was because I was female, the only reason I got into the Defence Force was because I was a female and that hit hard, and I still hold a grudge. (Female cadet, A DF A , 2017) At the start of the first year, we had a few Army guys I know in my Div [Division: a … grouping of cadets (or their) ­accommodation block … ] that would outright say, “Women shouldn’t be in Defence”, which I was kind of like, “You are a few decades behind”, but, like, they have that attitude so we kind of felt like we had to prove ourselves. (Female cadet, A DF A , 2017)

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Another common observation was about remarks that suggested a “token” status to measurable minorities’ service: I actually have someone who told me that I’m getting into the Defence Force just because … they’re trying to meet a quota. (Female R A A F OT S cadet, 2018) I think it [diversity] is seen as a dirty word in Defence. I think it is seen as a very, very dirty word in Defence if you use it as a ­reason for something, then it is your excuse to do something. It’s not well taken in Defence. It may have been at the start, but not anymore. (Female cadet, A D F A, 2017) Echoing arguments against the racial integration of African-American servicepeople in the US military, other narratives critical of minority participation in the A DF focused on a perceived threat to cohesion brought about by inclusion of those demonstrating divergent racial or religious characteristics. The words of a former Australian army intelligence officer speak volumes: Generally speaking, if a military installation in a Western nation is the target of a terrorist threat, a bunch of Muslims will be planning it. With all that in mind, generally speaking, if you increase the number of Muslims in Western countries you will probably see more of these atrocities in the future. And if you are dumb enough to put these people into uniform, then there is also a fair chance the military will change as well. Not for the better, either. (Gaynor 2014) As well, systemic barriers reinforce perceptions of otherness ­associated with those deemed less “Australian.” For example, the ADF’s citizenship requirements are particularly stringent. A potential recruit must be a citizen, and, while “in exceptional circumstances, if a position cannot be filled by an Australian citizen the citizenship requirement may be waived,” this is for only a permanent resident eligible for citizenship or members of certain foreign militaries with relevant skills and experience (ADF 2019). Unlike in the US military, military service offers no pathway to citizenship, nor does the ADF  enlist Commonwealth residents like Britain (Marsh 2018; USCIS 2019).

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The process for security clearance also limits potential recruits with “diverse” backgrounds, particularly new arrivals. “Applicants [must] have a background of at least 10 years, which can be directly verified by the Defence Security Agency … [i.e.,] applicants who have been living in Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom or the United States … Applicants from other countries require more specific and lengthy vetting procedures, which may preclude their appointment being considered” (RAAF 2019b). These attitudinal and structural impediments reveal an instrumental approach to diversity (Meriläinen et al. 2009). This, combined with consistently modest progress towards diversity targets (Deruy 2016; DOD 2016; Lim et al. 2014), shows that more can be done to support measurable minorities. pat h way s t o p o l i c y c h a n g e

In his seminal Asylums, Erving Goffman (1961) introduced the term “total institution” to describe those with an “encompassing” character, “symbolized by [a] barrier to social intercourse with the outside,” a category into which he places the military (1961, 4–5). In the military, the all-encompassing culture helps explain the difficulty of enacting widespread and enduring cultural change. In this chapter, I explore little-known alternatives as foundations for cultural change. As we saw above, in Bourdieu’s sense, the military usually alters its social field – instructions, orders, procedures, regulations – to initiate cultural change, as in the Broderick Review’s recommendations. In this final section, I sketch some practical applications for my theoretical arguments. I provide two examples of terra incognita on which to focus, which I draw from Bourdieu’s theory of practice: capital and habitus. Capital Explicit displays of capital are ubiquitous in military life. A D F ­uniforms convey much about the wearer and represent “embodied” capital (Moore 2008, 105). In an air force, the ­presence (or absence) of particular accoutrements signals the bearer’s relative power within the social field. For instance, ribbons or medals worn above the chest pockets denote war service and the brevets of aircrew members from whose ranks the most senior leaders are almost exclusively selected convey their status.

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In the ADF, each embodied element of capital reinforces a particular identity, and the order of precedence within the Australian honours system reflects the relative value of particular types of service. For instance, of the fifteen most prestigious awards, over half mark acts of “gallantry,” “courage,” “bravery,” and “distinguished command and leadership” on warlike operations (Pendlebury 2019, 15). Such heavy emphasis on a specific skillset – primarily close-quarter ­combat – sends a clear message, detailing what capital the organization esteems. The pecking order of embodied capital is rarely challenged, so people rethinking non-inclusive military cultures might wish to ­redesign the rewarding of particular identity traits and behavioural norms. If few can gain access to particular elements of capital, which carry disproportionately strong value, tinkering with the structural field may not facilitate inclusive, diverse membership. This is not to suggest that awards for bravery and courage have no merit, but a more nuanced appreciation of the value of all military service that advances the national strategic effect may generate a deeper sense of belonging and worth for those contributing in other areas. Habitus As the toolbox of transposable dispositions that facilitate navigation in a given field, a compatible habitus is a crucial product of basic military training overlooked by reforming policy-makers. As typified in the Broderick recommendations, even when critics delineate particular cultural issues, traditional approaches tend merely to address their symptoms. Thus a dizzying labyrinth of rules and regulations may aim to punish transgressions, absent a clear understanding of the underlying social dynamics. Just as certain types of capital increase a social actor’s relative power, a habitus that most closely resonates with the military culture is key to navigating the social environment. This is problematic when perverse incentives to “perform” particular identity characteristics are created, where the purpose of the performance is to nullify difference (Pendlebury 2020). As a female RAAF pilot observed: “I changed my gestures. When you sit, when you talk, the way you gesticulate, the way you slide your shoulders, the way you go drinking, the way you slap somebody’s back … I behaved as if I were a boy. I drank with the boys, I outdrank them, I played sports with them, team sports, touch footy and as much as I hated it … I did it” (Gibbon 2014, 124).

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Here is the dilemma confronting measurable minorities. With strong incentives to “fit in” and “be one of the boys” (Gibbon 2014, 124), this pilot learned new ways of being, to add more “usable” transposable dispositions to her habitus. Such performative adjustments are risky, however: I know a lot of people who ... still have a problem with women being here. Not outwardly, it’s not as if anybody would walk up to a girl and say ‘You shouldn’t be here,’ but I think they’re judged a little bit more harshly in their leadership ­positions, because [You’re], a) a push over, or ... for want of a better word ... pardon my French ... a bitch. And so I think it’s very rare that a female has the same leeway as a man might ... from my experience, the criticism in general is a little bit more ­aggravated if you’re a woman. (Female senior cadet, U SA FA , 2015) Thus measurable minorities can experience a double bind when their replicating ideal identity markers seem inauthentic to a h ­ egemonic group. Again, policy that focuses on structural elements can overlook how habitus generates social practice. Bourdieu’s work can help agents of cultural change identify how particular initiatives might reshape habitus by broadening the types of dispositions for engaging in the military. The RAAF’s (2020) Air Force Strategy (AFSTRAT ) (unusually within the military) reframes the social environment to enable congruence with a broader set of dispositions. It sets out a series of lines of effort (LO E s) that broadens the organization’s value proposition in support of joint strategic effect. LOE number four focuses on “Evolving Air Force Culture,” so that the R A A F can become “culturally and organisationally prepared to deliver its full air and space power potential as part of the joint force” (R A A F 2020, 13). More specifically, it outlines a need to ensure that: The Air Force SL T [Senior Leadership Team] contains a broad mix of the best leaders and thinkers in the organisation, ­irrespective of their tactical and technical background. Air Force [must be] seen as legitimate through the eyes of the Australian Government and society by reflecting values that create cultures of inclusion and belonging. Air Force [must possess] deep ­cultural understandings that inform and shape the way it plans

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and conducts its activities. The development and reward of future leaders [must be] targeted and systematic so Air Force develops the best thinkers and strategic leaders who are capable of projecting air and space power on behalf of the Defence organisation. (13)

A F S T R A T seeks to invert this traditional socialization, which has individuals conform to a set of ideal characteristics, so the military instead can appreciate, process, and – most important – harness the talents and contributions of the widest cross-section of society. As I argue throughout this chapter, Bourdieu’s theory provides alternative perspectives for policy-makers to reimagine cultural change. As well, habitus must factor into these deliberations, in addition to how capital and the field help generate social practice. conclusion

In this chapter, I reframe thinking on diversity management in the A D F . In doing so, I argue that current policy and process manage measurable minorities in terms of “capability,” judging the difference they bring in order to assess how to promote their inclusion. Moreover, while the capability argument has increased minority participation, policies tend to address structural barriers in Bourdieu’s social field while neglecting other inputs to social behaviour. Further, such an approach limits the achievement of an inclusive and representative military. By invoking instead normative rights and legitimacy, we may articulate alternative pathways by drawing attention to Bourdieu’s habitus and capital, which are generative of social practice. Through such a lens, basic training becomes a locus of research, since it ­inculcates and reinforces ideal identities, thereby forming social ­practice in the A D F . As my research has uncovered, problematic gender, racial, and religious attitudes continue to exist there and should be a focus for future cultural change.

notes

  1 I use this term to describe people with distinctive characteristics (such as sex, religion, or ancestry) that lend themselves to classification.

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  2 For example, since the first ADF census in 1991, at the time of publication, female participation in the RAAF has increased by 6 per cent (i.e., an ­average of just 0.2 per cent per year) (AI FS 1991; DOD 2015; DOD 2018; DOD 2019).   3 Typically, the Department of Human Services (2016), Workplace Diversity and Inclusion Strategy: 2016–19, declares: “23% of our ­people are from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds” (13).   4 Federal legislation enshrines an individual’s option not to answer ­questions about religious affiliation (ABS 2017). references

A B S (Australian Bureau of Statistics). 2016. “2016 Census QuickStats.”” Accessed 25 Nov. 2020. http://www.censusdata.abs.gov.au/census_­ services/getproduct/census/2016/quickstat/036. – 2017. “Census of Population and Housing: Understanding the Census and Census Data, Australia, 2016: Religious Affiliation.” Accessed 25 Nov. 2020. https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/[email protected]/Lookup/2900. 0main+features100752016. A D F (Australian Defence Force). 1998. Report of the Review into Policies and Practices to Deal with Sexual Harassment and Sexual Offences at the Australian Defence Force Academy. Canberra, A C T: Australian Defence Force. – 2020. “Australian Defence Force, Defence Jobs: Citizenship.” Accessed 25 Nov. 2020. https://www.defencejobs.gov.au/joining/cani-join/citizenship. Ahmed, Sara. 2007. “The Language of Diversity.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 30, no. 1: 235–56. A H R C (Australian Human Rights Commission). 2012. Review into the Treatment of Women in the Australian Defence Force: Phase 2 Report. (Broderick Review.) Sydney, NSW: Australian Human Rights Commission. A I F S (Australian Institute of Family Studies). 1991. Australian Defence Force 1991: Families Census Public Report. Canberra, A C T: Australian Institute of Family Studies. Alexander, Mona. 2012. “The C-27J Spartan Procurement Program: A Case Study in U S AF Sourcing Practices for National Security.” Air Force Institute of Technology. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Air University. Australian Government. 2013. Defence Diversity and Inclusion Strategy: 20122017. Canberra, ACT: Defence Publishing Services.

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Bloor, Michael. 2001. Focus Groups in Social Research. London: Sage Publications. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. – 1990. The Logic of Practice. Cambridge: Polity. – 1998. On Television and Journalism. London: Pluto Press. – 2010. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. London: Routledge. Broderick Review. See AHRC 2012. Browne, Kingsley. 2007. Co-ed Combat: The New Evidence That Women Shouldn’t Fight the Nation’s Wars. New York: Sentinel. Chan, Janet. 1997. Changing Police Culture: Policing in a Multicultural Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Colton, Greg. 2020. “Enhancing Capability through Diversity: An Equation of Two Parts.” Cove. Accessed 25 Nov. 2020. https://cove. army.gov.au/article/enhancing-capability-through-diversity. Department of Defence. See DOD. Department of Human Services. 2016. Workplace Diversity and Inclusion Strategy: 2016–19. Canberra, ACT: Department of Human Services. Deruy, Emily. 2016. “The Tricky Pursuit of Diversity in the U.S. Air Force Academy.” Atlantic. Accessed 30 Nov. 2020. https://www.theatlantic. com/education/archive/2016/05/ why-the-air-force-academy-held-a-forum-on-ferguson/482895/. Desmond, Matthew. 2006. “Becoming a Firefighter.” Ethnography 7, no. 4: 387–421. D O D (Department of Defence). 2015. Defence Census 2015: Public Report. Canberra, ACT: Australian Government. – 2016. Women in the ADF : 2015–16. Canberra, A C T: Defence People Group. – 2018. Women in the ADF : 2017–18. Canberra, A C T: Defence People Group. – 2019. “ADF Census 2019: Public Report.” Accessed 30 Nov. 2020. https://www.defence.gov.au/defencecensus/_Master/docs/DefenceCensus-2019-Public-Report.pdf. Gaynor, Bernard. 2014. Enlisting the Enemy. Accessed 30 Nov. 2020. https://www.bernardgaynor.com.au/2013/08/02/enlisting-the-enemy/. Gibbon, Deanne. 2014. “Unexpected Turbulence: The Cultural, Genderbased Challenges Facing Female Pilots in the Australian Defence Force.” In Donna Bridges, Jane Neal-Smith, and Albert J. Mills, eds, Absent Aviators: Gender Issues in Aviation, 115–46. London: Ashgate.

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Goffman, Erving. 1961. Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates. Garden City, NY : Anchor. Holmes, Anna. 2015. “Has ‘Diversity’ Lost Its Meaning?” New York Times, 17 Oct. Accessed 25 Nov. 2020. https://www.nytimes. com/2015/11/01/magazine/has-diversity-lost-its-meaning.html. Janowitz, Morris. 1960. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. Glencoe, I L: Free Press. Jones, Greg, Claire Beattie, Graham Bowrey, and Ciorstan Smark. 2016. “The Big End of Town Meets the Local Council: The Investment Habitus of Four Sets of Australian Councils during the GFC .” Australian Journal of Public Administration 75, no. 4: 441–56. Lim, Nelson, Louis T Mariano, Amy G. Cox, David Schulker, and Lawrence M. Hanser. 2014. Improving Demographic Diversity in the U.S. Air Force Officer Corps. Santa Monica, C A : R A ND Corporation. Litvin, Deborah. 1997 “The Discourse of Diversity: From Biology to Management.” Discourse and Organization 4, no. 2: 187–209. Marsh, Sarah. 2018. “Foreign Nationals to Be Allowed to Join British Army.” Guardian, 5 May. Accessed 25 Nov. 2020. https://www.­ theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/nov/05/foreign-nationals-to-beallowed-to-join-british-army. Meriläinen, Susan, Janne Tienari, Saija Katila, and Yvonne Benschop. 2009. “Diversity Management versus Gender Equality: The Finnish Case.” Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences 26, no. 3: 230–43. Merton, Robert, and Patricia Kendall. 1946. “The Focused Interview.” American Journal of Sociology 51, no. 1: 541–57. Moore, Robert. 2008. “Capital.” In Michael Greenfell, ed., Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts, 101–18. Stocksfield, England: Acumen. Payne, Marise. 2017. “New Campaign Launched to Build a Diverse A DF.” Accessed 25 Nov. 2020. https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/ marise-payne/media-releases/new-campaign-launched-build-diverse-adf. Pendlebury, Jarrod. 2017. “Moving Past the Capability Argument for an Inclusive Military.” In The Central Blue. Accessed 30 Nov. 2020. http:// centralblue.williamsfoundation.org.au/moving-past-the-capability-argumentfor-an-inclusive-military-jarrod-pendlebury/. – 2019. “The Dawn Horizon: Constructing an Air Force Identity during Initial Officer Training in Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom.” PhD dissertation, University of Sydney. – 2020. “‘‘This Is a Man’s Job’: Challenging the Masculine ‘Warrior Culture’ at the U.S. Air Force Academy.” Armed Forces and Society 46, no. 1: 163–84.

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Peters, Ralph. 2004. “In Praise of Attrition.” Parameters 41, no. 4: 53–60. Phillips, Anne. 1995. The Politics of Presence. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pitkin, Hanna. 1967. The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of California Press. R A A F (Royal Australian Air Force). 2019a. “Diversity in the Air Force.” Accessed 30 Nov. 2020. https://www.airforce.gov.au/our-people/our-­ culture/diversity-air-force. – 2019b. “Overseas Applicants.” Accessed 30 Nov. 2020. https:// airforce.defencejobs.gov.au/joining/can-I-join/citizenship/ overseas-applicants?_ga=2.224769306.1650991857.15050769891740244629.1505076989. – 2020. The Air Force Strategy. Canberra, A C T: Directorate of Strategic Design – Air Force. Accessed 30 Nov. 2020. https://www.airforce.gov. au/sites/default/files/air_force_strategy.pdf. Riseman, Noah. 2013. “Serving Their Country: A Short History of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Service in the Australian Army.” Australian Army Journal 10, no. 3: 11–22. Sapiro, Virginia. 1981. “Research Frontier Essay: When Are Interests Interesting? The Problem of Political Representation of Women.” American Political Science Review 75, no. 3: 701–16. Spencer, Nancy. 2003. “‘America’s Sweetheart’ and ‘Czech-Mate’: A Discursive Analysis of the Evert–Navratilova Rivalry.” Journal of Sport and Social Issues 27, no. 1: 18–37. Thompson, Jeremy. 2011. “Women Cleared to Serve in Combat.” ABC News. Accessed 30 Nov. 2020. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-09-27/ women-on-the-frontline/2946258. Thomson, Patricia. 2008. “Field.” In Michael Greenfell, ed., Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts, 67–82. Stocksfield, England: Acumen. Turner, Lisa, and Lynn G. Norton. 2001. “Civilians at the Tip of the Spear.” Air Force Law Review 51, no. 1: 1–110. US C I S (United States Citizenship and Immigration Services). 2019. “Naturalization through Military Service.”Accessed 30 Nov. 2020. https://www.uscis.gov/military/naturalization-through-military-service.

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4 The Military as a Path to Citizenship, Integration, and Identity: Visible Minorities and Immigrants’ Perspectives about the Military in Canada Grazia Scoppio, Nancy Otis, and Yan (Lizzie) Yan

introduction

Since the 1970s, Canada has been welcoming to immigrants of diverse cultures, ethnicities, languages, and religions, and today it is recognized as one of the most multicultural countries in the world. Despite an aging population and declining birth rates, numbers continue to grow, largely due to immigration (Statistics Canada 2018). Immigrants and non-permanent residents account for 82.2 per cent of the increase, with the majority of newcomers arriving from Africa and Asia, hence enhancing the diversity (I R C C 2019; Statistics Canada 2019). This ethnocultural1 diversity, however, is not reflected in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). One issue identified in research is that several immigrant groups show low interest in military careers (Daley and Bowen 2011; Ipsos Reid 2012; 2014). New permanent residents seeking to join the C A F face many hurdles, including a requirement of Canadian citizenship and a security clearance, which inhibits ­diversification. The C A F ’s challenges in meeting its representation goals for women, Indigenous peoples, and visible minorities (House of Commons 2019) and its struggle to meet recruiting targets for certain occupations have prompted calls for different recruiting policy and eligibility requirements (Office of the Auditor General of Canada 2016).

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This chapter explores the option of Canada opening military service to immigrants / non-citizens as a means to increase the representation of visible minorities in the C A F and address recruiting challenges, while providing newcomers who wish to serve a path towards citizenship, integration, and a Canadian identity. We first outline the immigrant context in Canada and the representation of immigrants and visible minorities in the CAF. The Employment Equity Act of 1995 defines visible minorities as “persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour: (minorités visibles)” (Canada 2022, 1). We use Mary Gentile’s (1996) diversity framework to explain how the CAF has recruited visible minorities and its actions to date towards this goal. Specifically, we examine the C A F ’s organizational responses on this front through Gentile’s four lenses: motivators (the CAF’s motivation to increase visibleminority representation); mindset (how it views and defines diversity); methods (initiatives it has implemented); and measures (how it measures progress or success). Second, we then review select studies on the CAF’s attractiveness as an employer, as well as barriers to joining for various visible minorities and immigrant groups, to identify explanations for the current low representation. Third, we analyze the Canadian Armed Forces Recruiting Survey (CAFRS) to compare Canadian- and foreignborn2 applicants’ s­ atisfaction with recruiting services, factors influencing decisions to contact the CAF, and reasons for joining. Fourth and finally, we discuss our findings through the lens of Gentile’s framework. immigrants, visible minorities, and diversity in the caf

Immigrants in Canada Canada keeps becoming more ethnoculturally diverse. In 2016, approximately three-quarters of population growth was the result of immigration (Statistics Canada 2017), and in 2019, 85.7 per cent (a record). In 2020, the C O V I D pandemic reduced the figure to 58.0 per cent – the lowest in more than two decades, with only 184,370 immigrants arriving (El-Assal 2021), a notable drop from 341,180 in 2019 (Statistics Canada 2021). In late 2020, the g­ overnment announced a revised multi-year plan for 2021–23, aiming for over 400,000 new permanent residents each year, and set up policies and programs to facilitate these goals (I RCC 2021a, 2021b).

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The main source countries of new immigrants have changed over the years. Since 2016, more immigrants have hailed from outside Europe (e.g., from Africa) (I R C C 2020a). This trend has helped spur the growth of Canada’s visible minority population. Indeed, in 2006, 7,674,580 individuals identified themselves as members of visible minorities, or 22.3 per cent of the population, with three in ten born in Canada. By 2036, visible minorities could reach 35.9 per cent of the total (Statistics Canada 2017). Immigrants and their children contribute to the Canadian economy. In fact, due to the aging population and low fertility rates, they are key to ensuring that the population and labour force keep growing, as “immigrant newcomers are, on average, younger than the Canadianborn population” (IRCC 2020a, 5). In 2018, Statistics Canada reported that Canadian-born people declined steadily from 78 per cent of the workforce in 2006 to 74 per cent in 2017 (Yssaad and Fields 2018), while newcomers increased from 22 per cent to 26 per cent. In 2017, for the core working age3 (i.e., 25–54 years old), immigrants created the majority (59.7 per cent) of the increase. Despite this notable shift, these groups remained under-represented in the CAF , at a low and constant level during the last several years. Immigrants, Visible Minorities, and the CAF Since 2002, the CAF, as an element of the Department of National Defence (DND), has been required to conform with the Employment Equity Act, which aims to “achieve equality in the workplace so that no person shall be denied employment opportunities or benefits for reasons unrelated to ability and, in the fulfilment of that goal, to c­ orrect the conditions of disadvantage in employment experienced by women, Aboriginal peoples,4 persons with disabilities, and members of visible minorities,” referred to as the “four designated groups” (Department of Justice 2017, 1). However, the CAF has struggled for over two decades to meet its goals. In 2008, Statistics Canada (Park 2008) reported that only 6 per cent of CAF members belonged to visible minorities, compared with 17 per cent of civilian workers. Similarly, only 6 per cent were immigrants, compared with 21 per cent of the civilian workforce. Jungwee Park (2008) concluded that this “may be related to the citizenship requirement for joining the [CAF]” (21). More than ten years later, despite slight improvements, the CAF has still not met its long-term goal of 11.8 per cent (DND 2018a). As of October 2020, the rate was

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9.2 per cent in the CAF (encompassing both the Regular Force and Reserve Force) (DND 2020). In comparison, the rate in the federal public service was 15.7 per cent, which was higher than workforce availability5 (Treasury Board 2019). While federal civilian jobs require security screening, non-citizens who are either permanent residents or have a work permit can apply for them, unless positions need high-level c­ learance, as in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) (IRCC 2019; CSIS 2020). Likewise, in the private sector, permanent residents may apply for permanent jobs, but other immigrants only for temporary work (Job Bank 2021). Having work in turn facilitates immigrants’ integration into Canadian society and their building of a Canadian identity. In contrast, immigrants who intend to join the military face several barriers and challenges. Phyllis Browne (2011) discussed the two major requirements: citizenship and a security clearance. New immigrants must have lived in Canada for three of the previous five years to apply for citizenship, the process itself can be time-consuming because of processing delays. Browne (2011) described security clearance – a thorough examination of an individual’s life and activities over the previous five to ten years, depending on the security level (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat 2014). The length of time it takes slows recruitment, depends on the complexity of the request and on the type of screening requested, and ranges from seven to 120 days for a properly completed simple request, or longer for more complex requests, as when an applicant has lived outside Canada continuously for six months or longer during the period under assessment (Public Services and Procurement Canada 2020). The prospect of a lengthy security clearance may deter potential candidates, especially those from countries outside of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N A T O ). As Browne states, “While a security clearance may be more delayed and scrutinized for ­foreign-born Canadians, it can be more rapid for potential recruits from N AT O and allied countries than it is for potential recruits from ­non-NATO and non-allied countries” (2011, 15). Therefore, applicants originally from Africa or Asia, for example, where ties with Canada may be ambivalent or non-existent, may have more difficulty and be ruled out unless they have resided in Canada for more than five years. In other words, country of origin probably creates additional hurdles for some applicants and hampers the CAF’s efforts to increase diversity. More streamlined security clearance, especially vis-à-vis countries where Canada has weak ties, would ease these bottlenecks.

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Accordingly, there have been numerous calls to revise recruiting policies. For example, Byrne Furlong, spokesperson for former Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan, stated that “in line with the government of Canada’s objective of raising the numbers of Forces personnel, there are currently initial discussions to review the possibility for foreign nationals’ recruitment beyond [skilled] applicants” (Harris 2018, 1). In addition, in a survey of Canadian experts about ways to strengthen and diversify recruitment, the majority of respondents (65.1 per cent) rated enrolling non-citizens as useful (Otis and Dale 2020). These examples are encouraging and suggest receptivity to re-examining citizenship requirements, along with other useful strategies (e.g., enhancing work-life balance, reducing attrition, taking better care of veterans, and enhancing advertising / communications to ­prospective recruits). Clearly, citizenship requirements and security clearances are barriers for the majority of newcomers who wish to join the CAF. They also prevent the CAF from tapping fully into an underused pool of potential applicants. Indeed, the ability to recruit ­immigrants / non-citizens could substantially increase the representation of v ­ isible minorities and help the CAF meet its recruiting targets (House of Commons 2019; Office of the Auditor General of Canada 2016). In addition, opening recruitment to non-citizens would employ and train recent immigrants, thus easing their integration and their development of a Canadian identity. Indeed, studies have shown that “economic success is a pillar of immigrants’ full p ­ articipation in the receiving society and may also affect their acculturation profiles. Immigrants’ sense of nationhood hinges on their ability to contribute to the receiving country ­economically and live a good life” (Hou, Schellenberg, and Berry 2016, 12). We contacted the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group (C F R G ) in 2020 with five requests: • to obtain information on existing and future policy and r­ ecruiting strategies regarding foreign nationals • to ask about the Skilled Military Foreign Applicant (S M F A) entry plan • to discuss the C A F ’s desire to revise the S M F A in collaboration with the Department of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (I R C C )

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• to inquire about the I R C C ’s point system • to request recent data regarding foreign nationals currently enrolled in the C A F (C F R G 2020) In its response to the authors, the C F RG (2020) reported that it was updating / revising the entry plan to recruit more non-Canadian ­citizens / foreign nationals. Its personnel met with I RCC staffers to discuss how to mitigate the plan’s challenges. Under this program, the CAF can enrol foreign nationals with specialized skills to minimize training costs or fill in-demand job openings (e.g., a trained pilot or doctor). The C A F can process only foreign applicants who meet the IR C C requirements (I R C C 2020b). The I RCC uses a point system to assess and score all applicants wishing to immigrate to Canada (IRCC 2020b; 2019). Thus, the majority of foreign nationals who apply to the C A F under the S M F A entry plan do not meet I R C C eligibility requirements (Harris 2018). When CFRG staff members met with IRCC members to discuss the SMFA process, the latter expressed interest in helping, but suggested incremental changes and investigating how the I RCC system might address these problems. The granting of additional points with a CAF job offer is one option the IRCC is exploring. The IRCC also expressed interest in larger changes, but stated that would need ministerial action. The C F R G’s e-mail to the authors (CF RG 2020) cited a major change in Britain, which has waived the citizenship requirement for foreign applicants. Indeed, in 2016, Britain lifted the five-year ­residency requirement for citizens of Commonwealth countries, such as Australia, Canada, Fiji, India, and Kenya, applying to join the British forces (Coupe 2020). In its e-mail to the authors, the C F R G (2020) also indicated an upcoming meeting with Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC) to discuss changes to the National Occupational Classification (N OC ) codes (C F R G 2020; I R C C 2020c). The information from the C FR G suggests that this change would award CAF applicants going through the SMF A enough points to receive an Invitation to Apply (ITA ) for permanent residency (I R C C 2018). As for recruiting visible minorities and / or foreign-born and / or foreign nationals, the CFRG informed us that “currently the CAF does not have any recruiting strategies to attract SMFAs. There has been a push within the C F R G to indicate that the CAF is accepting S M F As on a case-by-case basis, on the Forces.ca website. Presently, SMFAs are

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finding out about the C A F from word-of-mouth and their own research” (C F R G 2020). We also asked the C F R G for statistics on foreign-national (nonCanadian citizens) applicants, disaggregated by gender and visibleminority status, for fiscal years 2016/17–2019/20 (see figure 4.1). There was a sharp increase in male applicants from 2018/19 to 2019/20 and more male and female applicants in 2019/20, although this information is collected based on country of origin and wouldbe applicants’ names, not on self-identification. Assessing CAF Diversity: Gentile’s Framework According to Gentile (1996), workforce diversity encompasses a range of differences, such as “gender, race ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, physical ability, age, family status, economic background and status, educational background and status, geographical background and status” (226). Her framework offers four lenses for exploring the C A F’s efforts to increase ethnocultural diversity: • motivators • mindset • methods • measures Motivators: Gentile first outlines four types of motivators that may impel organizations to recognize diversity-related behaviour or trends: • legal pressure • competitive pressure to attract and retain talented employees • external pressure from community groups • commitment from the leadership (Gentile 1996) In the CAF, there are three main motivators: the Employment Equity Act, national defence policy, and labour demographic pressures. The Employment Equity Act (D N D 2016) requires policies, programs, services, and practices to better represent visible minorities (Department of Justice 2017). It says nothing about representing immigrants. Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE ) – the recent National Defence Policy (DND 2017a) – sets defence priorities for the next 20 years, including leveraging the distinct skills of a diverse population. The policy reflects

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Military as a Path to Citizenship, Integration, and Identity 85 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

Male Female Visible Minority

2016-2017

2017-2018

2018-2019

2019-2020

5 0

4 0

7 1

100 3

0

0

1

6

Figure 4.1  Number of foreign national prospective applicants by gender and visible minority from fiscal year 2016/17 to 2019/20, derived from data provided by CFRG.

the commitment of CAF leaders, starting with the chief of the defence staff, as acknowledged by the minister of national defence (Prime Minister’s Office 2020). The C A F must reflect the diversity of the country it defends: “we need a military that looks like Canada” (DN D 2017a, 20). The policy framework advances emigration and immigration as key forces for diversity when managed properly. Further, “embracing diversity will enhance military operational ­effectiveness by drawing on all of the strengths of Canada’s p ­ opulation. Building a Defence Team composed of people with new perspectives and a broader range of cultural, linguistic, gender, age, and other unique attributes will contribute directly to efforts to develop a deeper understanding of our increasingly complex world, and to respond effectively to the challenges it presents” (D N D 23). Labour demographic pressures spur the C A F as it competes for qualified personnel with diverse backgrounds and skillsets. For example, the Office of the Auditor General of Canada (2016) found a shrinking C A F Regular Force, a widening gap in training within the forces, and an inability “to attract a sufficient number of qualified applicants for some occupations” (13). Indeed, the CAF must make itself able to attract and recruit enough qualified and diverse ­candidates, while meeting its goals in employment equity. Mindset: Gentile’s second lens on diversity is mindset, an organization’s philosophy and values as it forges its approach – in this case, to diversity and related issues (Gentile 1996). Diversity can have a

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range of meanings. For example, some organizations define it as a problem, while others see it as a competitive opportunity; some define it in relation to certain groups, and others in relation to all individuals in the organization – in other words, reactive versus proactive and goal-oriented. Approaches can centre on education and learning or on structure and control (Gentile 1996). The Canadian Armed Forces Diversity Strategy (DND 2016) insists that the forces reflect the Canadian population and its values, starting with attraction and recruiting, through training and professional development, to retention. It emphasizes that “diversity in the CAF is about championing, respecting and leveraging the unique differences, backgrounds, talents, and cultural perspectives among members to enable an inclusive environment where everyone feels empowered to contribute their full potential in the execution of their military duties” (D ND 2016, 2). Clearly the CAF believes that diversity can enhance military operational effectiveness in an increasingly complex world (DND 2017a). The strategy has five principles. • The C A F as a public institution should be reflective of Canadian society. • Culturally and ethnically diverse military personnel constitute force multipliers in domestic and international operations and increase effectiveness. • The C A F will move beyond a compliance-based model (i.e., the Employment Equity Act) to a values-based model that “will ensure that the military remains proactive in reflecting Canada.” (DN D 2016) • Leaders, by example, will create and foster a culture of respect and inclusion, champion diversity, and be held accountable for implementing the strategy. • Recruiting will continue to be based on selection, and individual advancement will still depend on merit. These principles not only communicate diversity’s value for the CAF, but also outline its approaches to achieving it. Although the strategy does not mention immigrants, it calls for more ethnic and cultural diversity, which suggests possible actions to attract and recruit more immigrants from visible minorities.

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Methods: The third lens Gentile would apply to diversity is that of methods to address diversity and related issues, such as cultural audits, training, and recruiting initiatives; networks / discussion groups / task forces; performance development / career management; and policies on working conditions and benefits (Gentile 1996). The CAF has launched various initiatives to address under-representation of ­designated groups, including action plans to attract more women into non-traditional occupations and increase communication between CAF leaders and the designated communities (DND 2015a). The CAF also integrates diversity training through a mandatory training ­program, including basic training, to enhance the diversity mindset (DND 2019). However, these sessions appear to focus more on policy (e.g., sexual harassment and misconduct) and on employment equity, rather than on diversity and inclusion. In addition, there does not seem to be mandatory diversity education for all C A F members at all ranks. Regarding diversity-recruiting initiatives, the CAF has implemented three programs for Indigenous peoples, namely the Canadian Forces Aboriginal Entry Program, which is a three-week course for Indigenous peoples who are contemplating a military career; the Aboriginal Leadership Opportunities Year – a one-year program at the Royal Military College in Kingston, Ontario, to provide educational and leadership experience; and five summer training programs that ­combine military training with Indigenous cultural awareness, namely: Black Bear, Bold Eagle, Carcajou, Grey Wolf, and Raven (DND 2021). At the end of each program, candidates are given the option of joining the C A F fulltime. In addition, the Women in Force Program (DND 2017b), a targeted familiarization exercise / realistic job preview, was pilot tested in 2017, but no other serials have been run since nor been planned. Unfortunately, the CAF does not offer similar programs to other under-represented groups, such as visible minorities. Moreover, the Office of the Auditor General (2016) found “no comprehensive plan to attract more applicants, particularly women, Aboriginal ­peoples, and visible minorities” (3). Measures: Fourth and finally, the measurements lens on diversity refers to the organization’s goals and its assessment of its initiatives (Gentile 1996). Examples include: • monitoring target goals (e.g., distribution of hires / promotions / retention, by demographic group)

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• evaluating / measuring / rewarding individual performance on management diversity (e.g., hiring and promotion records, ­ratings by employees, mentoring) • measuring the number / scope / frequency / impact of various diversity interventions (e.g., training programs, task forces, advisory groups) • measuring frequency and type of communication regarding diversity (e.g., integrating diversity in mission / value statements, orientation programs) • changes in policies / systems related to diversity • number of complaints / grievances (Gentile 1996) Based on this lens, an organization’s evaluations send signals about its commitment to diversity. The CAF engages in a wide range of diversity measures. First, for example, Gender-based Analysis Plus (GBA+) has been integrated in all defence activities across the CAF, from design to implementation of programs and services that support CAF personnel (Women and Gender Equality Canada 2021). Applying G BA+ to the design of a new program entails, for instance, considering its potential effects on diverse groups of women, men, and people with other gender identities (Women and Gender Equality Canada 2021). GBA+ offers both theoretical grounding and tools for the CAF to assess how much diversity it is achieving. Second, the CAF reviews employment systems to identify any systemic barriers to recruiting, retaining, and promoting these groups. The C A F ’s Employment Equity Plan (2015–20) set representation goals for designated groups – another measure of representation for each group (D N D 2015b). Third, D N D and, through it, the CAF report every fiscal year on their achievement ­vis-à-vis the Action Plan – an interim measure of progress – a ­document that provides a high-level snapshot of progress to date, outlines c­ ompleted activities, and analyzes results and progress (DND 2018b). Fourth, the CAFRS allows comparative analyses by employment equity groups. In this way, it measures and evaluates the recruiting process in order to potentially attract and recruit more diverse applicants. Overall, the diversity measures outlined above are in effect “tools in the diversity toolbox” rather than “perfect solutions.” At times they may reveal limitations or pose challenges, particularly in their implementation. For example, some critics of G BA+ claim that it “starts

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with considerations of gender and sex, to which others are added. Such an additive approach is antithetical to intersectionality, which seeks to capture relationships and interactions between different ­factors of analysis” (Hankivsky and Mussell 2018, 308). Moreover, they believe that it does not address processes and structures of power, or the relationships between power structures and social locations (Hankivsky and Mussell 2018). Just as Gentile’s diversity framework can help explain the C A F ’s responses to diversity, it is equally important to grasp the perceptions and experiences of immigrants and visible minorities in relation to the C A F, based on available research. the caf as an employer: views of immigrants and visible minorities

Within the Canadian context, three public-opinion studies surveyed specific visible minority communities about their career selection and their perceptions of the CAF as an employer (Daley and Bowen 2011; Ipsos Reid 2012; 2014). All three studies found the C A F the leastpreferred career field for all the groups surveyed (i.e., Arab and Asian Canadians; Black, Filipino, and Latin American Canadians; and Chinese Canadians). Generally, health care was the top choice, ­followed by banking / finance, engineering, information technology, and business or entrepreneurship. Although none of the communities sought a C A F career, all recognized that the military offered a broad range of opportunities to gain experience in their chosen fields. The top reasons for avoiding a military career were, in descending order, that it seemed physically risky, “is not interesting,” and “offers little freedom and flexibility” (Ipsos Reid 2012, 42). Other concerns emerged specific to certain ethnic backgrounds. For example, based on Ipsos Reid research (2012), Chinese Canadians generally admire professions that pay well and provide economic security. Traditionally the military has been regarded as a “poverty avenue,” selected usually by people lacking post-secondary education. The C A F ’s Prospect Survey, a “pop-up” online questionnaire ­presented randomly to visitors to the C A F recruiting website, also shed light on barriers. It asked visitors, because they were thinking about joining the C A F but were currently undecided, about factors that would discourage them. Visible minorities were slightly more likely than other groups to indicate doubts about meeting the

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selection requirements, not knowing enough about the Canadian military, finding the recruitment process too long, and considering a C A F career too dangerous (Yeung and Bremner 2019). Studying how visible minority members see CAF recruitment and inclusion, Justin Wright and Felix Fonséca (2016) found that some might sign up for reasons ranging from wanting to serve their country to seeking job security and education. Other respondents were unaware of employment and educational opportunities within the C A F; worried about the lengthy process of application and security clearance; and felt negatively about the military because of attitudes in their country of origin. Some had experienced racial discrimination and felt they would be “singled out” in the C A F community (17). Others considered signing up to integrate themselves and their children into Canadian society (17). Rebecca Nava (2010) reviewed the CAF ’s recruiting strategies for first-generation immigrants and examined the latter’s views of the organization. It seemed that their unfamiliarity with it contributed to their unwillingness to join. Nava therefore suggested programs to expose immigrants to the military, similar to those for Indigenous peoples (DND 2021). Nava (2010) also proposed that the CAF target certain immigrant groups for recruiting, such as Family Sponsorship6 newcomers (i.e., spouses and children). She argued that for skilled immigrants, the C A F could offer a viable career with competitive salaries, health insurance, and a good pension plan. Nava’s (2010) interviews with immigrants serving in the CAF or applying to join uncovered dispiriting challenges, including longer processing times due to security clearances, deployments far from home, negative preconceptions of the military (because of their country of origin), the truncation of rights and freedoms for CAF members, and more civilian job opportunities in the larger cities where newcomers tend to reside. Immigrants appeared more likely to join the CAF when they had family members who also served in the military or had families supportive of the military. As we saw above, members of some ethnic groups tend to see the military in a bad light, and their families may discourage them. In her study of visible minorities and C A F recruiting, Browne (2011) found that “a large percentage of the youth population was born outside of Canada and others are descendants of recent immigrants whose experience with military regimes could overshadow any motivating interest they may have to join the [C A F]” (26).

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Another of Nava’s (2010) key findings is that immigrants are g­ enerally unaware of the benefits of joining the CAF and of how it has promoted inclusion and diversity. For instance, a foreign-born participant mentioned that “immigrants harbour a view of the [CAF] as a ‘white boys club’” (43). The findings above illustrate the views of visible minority and immigrant groups (i.e., youth in the general Canadian population, potential applicants, and C A F members) regarding possible challenges and barriers, which may explain why few people from visible minorities join the CAF. As well, immigrants / non-citizens clearly do not c­ onstitute a homogeneous group, so the CAF should not treat them as such when developing policies, programs, and measures for diversity. cafrs

What about the recruitment experiences of immigrant applicants, their reasons for wanting to join the CAF , and the factors that influenced their decision to approach the CAF ? Our study presents key results of the CAFRS. The CAFRS collects information on demographic factors to enable comparisons of applicants’ experience on the basis of gender, visible minority status, and Indigenous person status, for example. For this chapter, we examined responses by immigration status (i.e., born abroad versus born in Canada). The C A F R S 7 is an online survey that collects data from applicants at the end of the recruiting process to assess attraction and recruiting strategies, and applicants’ satisfaction with Canadian Forces Recruiting Centres or detachments. The survey has been collecting data since 2012 and has been used to monitor satisfaction with the services provided by those centres and detachments over time.  Between March and October 2018, a total of 4,905 applicants were invited to complete the C A F R S. In total, 2,283 people did so, for a response rate of 46.5 per cent. The survey’s demographic section asked respondents if they were a first-generation immigrant – someone born abroad who has immigrated to Canada. Respondents were divided into those born abroad (18.6 per cent) and those born in Canada (81.4 per cent). Independent-samples t-tests were used to compare means between the two groups. As the results showed non-homogeneous variances (as indicated by a significant Levene’s test of equality of variances), an appropriate t-test was used to assess the statistical significance of

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mean differences. Cohen’s d was calculated as a measure of effect size, as follows: 0.2 indicating a small effect, 0.5 for medium, and 0.8 for large (Cohen 1992). Chi-square tests of independence determined whether immigration status affected the frequencies of selected responses for employment preferences. When the test was statistically significant (p < 0.05), follow-up proportion tests decided whether one group selected a particular response proportionally more often than did the other. Given that the groups were large, and the contingency tables small, the tests of independence were not affected by low expected cell counts (McHugh 2013). Cramer’s V was calculated as a measure of effect size, with 0.1 indicating a small effect, 0.3 medium, and 0.5 large (Cohen 1988). All analyses applied the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SP SS) statistics software (version 22). Survey Results Satisfaction with various aspects of recruiting was high for CAF applicants whether born in Canada or abroad (see table 4.1). However, those born abroad were slightly less satisfied with the recruiters’ professionalism, as well as with the resources available to them (see table 4.2). Both groups reported similarly high satisfaction with the recruiting centres as respectful, friendly, and welcoming. Applicants born abroad reported slightly less satisfaction with the professionalism (see table 4.3). In both groups of CAF applicants, most respondents had seen advertising about CAF careers on the Forces.ca website, followed by social media, and internet sites (see table 4.4). Applicants born in Canada were almost twice as likely (30.9 per cent) as foreign-born (16.3 per cent) to have seen T V ads. The difference, though notable, was not statistically significant, likely because of inadequate power (i.e., the small sample of applicants born abroad). Table 4.5 shows that both groups rated the Forces.ca website as the most influential information source, but they differed over many of the other sources. Moderately more applicants born abroad reported greater influence from information brochures, Service Canada,4 and print advertising, with small to medium effect. In addition, they indicated slightly greater influence from the Forces.ca website, recruiting events, CAF social media, and internet advertising, with small effects. Regarding non-C A F information sources, both groups rated their knowledge of other militaries and media (news about the armed forces

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Table 4.1 Degree to which recruiting sources were informative: Born in Canada and born abroad Born in Canada

CAF information sources Recruiters were informative Military-career counsellors were informative The basic training video was informative The occupation videos were informative The recruiting brochures were informative The Forces.ca website was informative

Born abroad

n

Mean

SD

n

Mean

SD

Cohen’s d

1,637

4.4

0.9

384

4.3

0.9

0.07

1,437

4.3

0.8

352

4.3

0.9

0.07

1,462

4.1

0.8

356

4.1

0.9

0.01

1,516

4.2

0.8

364

4.1

0.9

0.09

1,131

3.8

0.9

287

3.8

0.9

0.02

1,661

4.2

0.9

398

4.2

0.9

0.03

Note: Mean influence scores on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = neutral; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree.

Table 4.2 Mean satisfaction with aspects of recruiting: Born in Canada and born abroad Born in Canada Aspects of recruiting

 

Born abroad

n

Mean

SD

n

Mean

SD

Cohen’s d

The level of ­professionalism of the recruiting staff

1,695

4.6

0.7

399

4.4

0.8

0.18

The resources available to you

1,644

4.1

0.8

392

4.0

0.8

0.13

The overall r­ ecruiting process

1,694

3.9

1.0

395

3.9

1.0