The Power of Distributed Perspectives 9783110493351, 9783110482645

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The Power of Distributed Perspectives

Berlin Studies in Knowledge Research

Edited by Günter Abel and James Conant

Volume 10

The Power of Distributed Perspectives

Edited by Günter Abel and Martina Plümacher

Series Editors Prof. Dr. Günter Abel Technische Universität Berlin Institut für Philosophie Straße des 17. Juni 135 10623 Berlin Germany e-mail: [email protected] Prof. Dr. James Conant The University of Chicago Dept. of Philosophy 1115 E. 58th Street Chicago IL 60637 USA e-mail: [email protected]

ISBN 978-3-11-048264-5 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-049335-1 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-049210-1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress. Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2016 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck ♾ Printing on acid free paper Printed in Germany www.degruyter.com.

To Bernd Mahr We, the editors, dedicate the present book to our colleague and friend Professor Dr. Bernd Mahr who died on April 12, 2015. During many years we had the chance to work together with Bernd Mahr. This was the case not only in the context of the “Innovationszentrum Wissensforschung (IZW)/Berlin Center for Knowledge Research”, but also in a number of other connections. The idea of the research project “The Power of Distributed Perspectives” goes back to dialogues with Bernd Mahr. He strongly inspired the character of the present volume. Without his good sense for intellectual challenges, his creativity, and his interest in transdisciplinary research (in particular at the interface of informatics, cognitive science, philosophy, and art history) the present volume would not have been possible. Thanks to Bernd Mahr’s spirit the book’s subjects were chosen such that they go beyond disciplinary boundaries and try to meet new and innovative horizons of research. The discussions with Bernd Mahr on the topics of our volume were always full of his intellectual open-mindedness and strength of argument as well as of his friendliness, good sense of humor, and integrity. Martina Plümacher and Günter Abel

Berlin, March 2016

Table of Contents Günter Abel and Martina Plümacher Introduction 1

Part I: Structures Martina Plümacher Distributed Perspectives in Perceiving, Thinking, and Acting

13

Günter Abel Distributed Types of Knowledge, Epistemic Perspectives, and Creativity 35 The Case for Architecture Christoph Lütge Wettbewerb im unternehmerischen Handeln

61

Part II: Interplays Reinhard Wendler On the Perspectivity of Model Situations

79

Sigurd Rompza Sehen in der Kunst aus dem Blickwinkel von Produktion und Rezeption Von meiner künstlerischen Praxis zu deren Reflexion 91 Thiemo Breyer Too Much or Not Enough – Psychopathological Limits of Distributed Perspectives 103

Part III: Organization Roman Boutellier Distributed Perspectives in Future Workspaces

119

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Table of Contents

Julia Warmers und Christoph Gengnagel Neue Dynamiken durch Kooperation – die Hybrid Plattform als inter- und 137 transdisziplinärer Denk- und Forschungsraum Scott Reeves and Ruth Harris Interprofessional Teamwork in Health and Social Care: Key Tensions and Future Possibilities 173 Gerd Folkers On Re-Positioning

189

Horst Nowacki Verteiltes Arbeiten und Standardisierung in den 215 Ingenieuranwendungen

Part IV: Dynamics Albert Vollmer, Michael Dick, Stefan Gross and Theo Wehner Constructive Controversy as a Prime Example of “The Power of Distributed 245 Perspectives”: New Developments in Application and Research Gesine Schwan Multiperspectivity as Contribution to “Good Governance” Experiences from the Humboldt-Viadrina Governance Platform Michael Bongardt The One True Faith On the Dynamics of Interreligious Conflicts and Attempts at Reconciliation 289

Part V: Conflicts Elena Ficara Two in One

319

Juan Carlos Velasco From National Sovereignty to Interdependence: New Perspectives of Distributive Justice in the Age of Globalization 329

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Table of Contents

Index of Persons Index of Topics

355 361

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Introduction

In their perceiving, speaking, thinking, and acting people always refer to fellow human beings: they communicate and cooperate with other persons; they collaborate; develop products for clients or recipients; try to convince others of something and win them over for activities; they argue for positions; want to be good friends, loved partners, or caring family members. Regarding all this, their own perspectives as well as the perspectives of other persons are important for them, for example, what other people perceive, how they interpret it, and due to what motives they understand things in a specific way. Human activities and social life obviously takes place in scenarios of reciprocally distributed perspectives. The diversity of perspectives is often starting point and incentive for the interplay of perspectives – in the communication and interaction between persons as well as in the thinking and acting of individuals. This interplay can be highly productive. The change of perspectives can lead to new perspectives, clarify limitations of previous views, contribute to creative problem solving, and evoke new design thinking. It is a desideratum of research to clarify the described relations and mechanisms of interplay between different and distributed perspectives, to determine the problems and challenges involved, and to optimize problem-solving strategies. This volume’s papers serve this goal. They address different aspects of the dynamic interplays of the correlated perspectives of communicating, acting, as well as interacting persons. Subjects of detailed analyses are: the structures of distributed perspectives; the mechanisms of interplay between different perspectives; the active designing and shaping of relations of distributed perspectives; the coordination of distributed perspectives (e. g. in teamwork); the conflicts of perspectives and the types of conflict solution; and the dynamics within the interplays of reciprocally distributed perspectives. With its focus on the interplay of reciprocally distributed perspectives this volume breaks new ground. The ‘classical’ analyses regarding the perspectivity of persons treat perspectives as an expression of viewpoint-dependent perceptions, fixed attitudes, and individual assumptions of persons. In such a view, the perspectives seem to be determined in advance and persons seem to be trapped within their perspectival horizons. However, the major fact that human beings, in their perceiving, speaking, thinking, and acting, are always already involved in and coordinate interplays of perspectives has not yet been in the focus of attention until now. Accordingly, neither the mechanisms and productivities of the interplays of reciprocally related perspectives, nor possible strat-

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egies of an active designing of these interplays have been closely analyzed and promoted. The title The Power of Distributed Perspectives addresses the productivity of distributed perspectives. The central idea of this volume is the twofold thesis that the interplay of perspectives is of great importance for new insights and ideas as well as for successful organization of our thinking and acting. When in a vivid discussion different viewpoints can easily enter the reflection, new innovative ideas often emerge. The knowledge of different viewpoints already helps us reflect more precisely about problems and challenges. Alternative perspectives particularly encourage new ways of thinking and acting. Creativity is required, for example, when satisfying solutions for intellectual, organizational, and social problems need to be found. In those cases, the different perspectives and viewpoints of the persons involved should be considered in finding solutions. However, in the interplay of perspectives and viewpoints not only new ideas and insights emerge. The interplay is fundamental in every cooperation of persons with, e. g., different tasks and different specializations. When we focus on the way interacting persons synchronize and coordinate their different perspectives, the social competencies of persons also come into focus. In this respect, there is an important difference to the cognitivistic theories as well as the theories of sociology of science in the field of distributed cognition. When we are dealing with the social and creative competencies of persons the question (that some of this volume’s papers explicitly go further into) arises of how the social and institutional conditions have to be in order to strengthen these competencies and their innovative potential. In the present volume’s contributions, different aspects of the productivity of distributed perspectives are described, analyzed, and modeled. The contributions concern interprofessional teamwork as well as inter- and transdisciplinary cooperation, the competition and contention of positions, and finding acceptable solutions to problems. Many papers not only emphasize the productivity of distributed perspectives, but also point out obstacles regarding the use of the creative and productive potential of distributed perspectives. Clearly identifying those obstacles is valuable when it comes to finding successful solutions to problems. Hence, the contributions of this volume constitute not only reflections on the potentials of distributed perspectives, but also the current state of the discussion regarding the strategies to better exploit these potentials. In what follows, the structure and content of the present volume will be outlined briefly. The volume is structured into five parts that focus on accentuating different features of distributed perspectives (I. Structures; II. Interplays; III. Organization; IV. Dynamics; V. Conflicts). In terms of content however, the different

Introduction

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papers also interact beyond this heuristic classification, as the following brief presentation of the book chapters show.

Part I: Structures Distributed Perspectives in Perceiving, Thinking, and Acting (Martina Plümacher) Life in social contexts requires people to be able to orient and position themselves in a variety of different perspectives. These abilities essentially characterize the social cognition of human beings. How do people orient themselves in their interactions within distributed perspectives? Martina Plümacher describes processes of understanding the structures of distributed perspectives, i. e. different perspectives related to each other. Structures become clear in the reflection on the respective viewpoints of perspective, interests, social roles and functions, including the current requirements of action, and the assumed commitments. The paper focuses on structures of distributed perspectives that emerge in the course of divisions of tasks and labor. Plümacher illustrates challenges regarding the coordination of perspectives and the evaluation of perspectives – challenges that play a crucial role in our social life and for the designing of social and political processes.

Distributed Types of Knowledge, Epistemic Perspectives, and Creativity. The Case for Architecture (Günter Abel) Günter Abel elaborates the triangular interactions between distributed types of knowledge, distributed epistemic perspectives, and distributed features of radical creativity. He developed his argument with a particular focus on the case for architecture. However, the claim of the approach is more general covering all types of human thinking, acting, organizing and shaping our life and world. In a first step the scope of challenges is marked within the framing idea of the power of distributed perspectives. In a second step it is shown that and in what sense the variety of distributed types of knowledge leads to an expansion and revision of traditional as well as of contemporary epistemology. In a third step the mechanisms of distributed knowledge types and perspectives are described and analyzed more closely. The focus is put on: predominances and coalitions of different knowledge types and perspectives; the distributed and integrated features of knowledge types and perspectives; the relations between scientific and artistic knowledge types; and the internal relations between explicit

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and implicit knowledge. In a forth step the creativity processes of bringing something new into the world are reconsidered in terms of distributed knowledge types as well as distributed epistemic perspectives. This opens up the picture to rethink creativity as emergent offsprings of the interplays between distributed knowledge types and epistemic perspectives.

Competition in Entrepreneurial Acting (Christoph Lütge) In situations of competition, persons refer to each other in their perspectives insofar as they want to and are supposed to compete. Christoph Lütge examines competition using the prime example of entrepreneurial acting and accentuates competition as a principle of orientation of perspectives towards each other. Actors in economic competition do not just take into account what competitors do and what options they have. They also orient themselves towards their clients’ wishes and include their partners’ possibilities. This orientation towards the activities of other persons contains potential for innovation. Because a functioning competition forces the actors to refer to each other in a flexible way and economic competition rewards good and best achievements. An important requirement for this productivity of competition however is the implementation of norms that counteract the erosion of moral in distributed perspectives of competition.

Part II: Interplays On the Perspectivity of Model Situations (Reinhard Wendler) Persons enter an interplay of different perspectives when they look at, examine, and discuss things together, e. g. an architectural model. Reinhard Wendler examines the dynamics of distributed perspectives of such discussions regarding three aspects: 1. in view of the presentation of ideas and plans using concrete models, that always perspectivally emphasizes specific aspects of the model and dismisses others; 2. in view of the contexts of the assessments of the model; 3. in view of how the concrete model leads to the crystallization of further imaginations, expectations, and hopes. Wendler uses examples to illustrate how the different and diverging imaginations that emerge from the concrete object can lead to a dispute over object-identity as well as to a reflection on the differences in the perspectives, with the goal of reaching a consensus regarding the assessment. Wendler emphasizes that within the processes of communication

Introduction

5

the concrete object plays a decisive role insofar as it is the common point of reference of the different perspectives.

Seeing in the Arts from the Point of View of Production and Reception. From my Artistic Practice to its Reflection (Sigurd Rompza) It is known that objects of art are objects that need to be explored in different perspectives. In their process of work, artists already try out different kinds of sensory experience. In the processing of their material they decide what their object can show and reveal. Sigurd Rompza accentuates art as a researching enterprise that provides sensory knowledge. Rompza emphasizes that an artist in his creative process cannot just follow his own perspectives if the art object is supposed to provide the recipient with knowledge. Instead, the artist should approach the recipient’s point of view and examine in this perspective whether his artistic decisions were expedient, i. e. examine whether what was supposed to be shown has been clearly exposed with the object. The recipient on the other hand is required to explore the artist’s offer by attentively observing the art object. Production and reception of art are in this sense essentially related to each other. Artistically pointed offers can help the dialog between the recipients of art productively develop itself.

Too Much or Not Enough – Psychopathological Limits of Distributed Perspectives (Thiemo Breyer) Being able to come to a shared understanding of a common world with other persons is a complex cognitive performance. It requires, among other things, being able to compare one’s own perspectives with the ones of others. This often happens effortlessly and without any problems. Mental illnesses however show that these processes are exposed to disturbances. With reference to psychiatrist Wolfgang Blankenburg, Thiemo Breyer characterizes two forms of disturbances in the interpersonal balance of perspectives: on the one hand a blockade when it comes to changing and questioning one’s own perspective; on the other hand an over-agility in the change of perspectives that makes a person give up his own positioning. In the one case persons have difficulties to take the perspectives of other persons. In the other case, persons take the perspectives of other persons in such a way that they run the danger of losing themselves.

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Part III: Organization Distributed Perspectives in Future Workspaces (Roman Boutellier) Differently specialized experts are increasingly involved in the development of products. If the tasks that need to be fulfilled cannot be split into well-defined subtasks (for instance because the problems are highly integrative), the different perspectives of the experts permanently need to be coordinated and integrated. Under the aspect of innovation management, Roman Boutellier examines the organizational and personnel requirements of a collaboration in which different perspectives need to be combined into an integral perspective. He emphasizes the importance of the cooperation partners’ reciprocal appreciation of their specific roles in the common project. This reciprocal appreciation of one another requires communication, trust, and tolerance. An important source of support of innovative cooperation processes are, according to Boutellier, spaces that are tailored to the different needs of the experts in the cooperation process.

New Dynamics through Cooperation – the “Hybrid Plattform” as an Inter- and Transdisciplinary Conceptual and Research Space (Julia Warmers and Christoph Gengnagel) Many social problems can only be solved taking into account different perspectives. Hence inter- and transdiciplinary cooperation is becoming increasingly more important. Designing these cooperations is a challenge for everyone involved. Julia Warmers and Christoph Gengnagel illustrate the challenge using the example of the “Hybrid Plattform”, a joint pilot project of the Berlin University of the Arts and the Technische Universität Berlin that encourages, supports, and organizes cooperation between scientists, designers, and artists. They argue for the provision of an infrastructure in support of the transdisciplinary project work and the support of a transdisciplinary culture of knowledge and science. Transdisciplinary project work requires specific instruments and methods that need to be developed yet. Warmers and Gengnagel highlight e. g. the use of instruments and methods of presentation and reflection. For the irritations and divergences specifically appearing in transdisciplinary contexts develop their creative potential only if we manage to transform the perspectivally related irritations and divergences into an innovative project work.

Introduction

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Interprofessional Teamwork in Health and Social Care: Key Tensions and Future Possibilities (Scott Reeves and Ruth Harris) Excellent examples for the potential of distributed perspectives as well as for the inner tensions between distributed perspectives can be found in health care. In this field persons from different occupational groups and different institutions work together in the patients’ interest. There are e. g. intersections of collaboration between the medical services, the nursing service, the social service, and the rehabilitation centers. Scott Reeves and Ruth Harris illustrate the expectations, the goals, and the requirements of interprofessional collaboration in health and social care. In their description of the different types of interprofessional collaboration, they focus on interprofessional teamwork, which requires an especially high degree of interdependence. Teamwork essentially presupposes the willingness of the persons involved to be committed to the goals and aims of the teamwork, to jointly plan processes and activities, and to make common decisions. However, teamwork with the challenging task of coordinating distributed perspectives is not just a question of the inner attitude of single persons. The interprofessional processes of communication at the same time require specific institutional frameworks.

On Re-Positioning (Gerd Folkers) Institutional regulations and conventions influence the productive changing of perspectives. They can encourage it as well as complicate it. Gerd Folkers addresses and problematizes the path dependencies of organizations in the course of which alternative perspectives are marginalized and cut out. Using the example of drug development he spells out the importance of a re-positioning, i. e. a deliberate change of perspective in which e. g. multiple effects of pharmaceuticals on the organism come into focus. Folkers advocates specifically creating structures that support the critical reflection of path dependencies and the changing of perspectives. As an example for the creation of a conceptual space with a catalytic effect, he takes the interdisciplinary research center Collegium Helveticum, jointly organized by the University of Zurich and the ETH Zurich. The goal is to establish a platform for exchange for a sustainable coexistence and cooperation of distributed perspectives that encourages innovative re-positionings.

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Distributed Working and Standardization in Its Application to Engineering (Horst Nowacki) Many complex and highly technological products (such as e. g. ships and airplanes) are developed, produced, and distributed in global processes of structured division of labor. During their lifecycle the products are subject to maintenance, repair, and usage-related alteration. In order to guarantee reliable, distributed working with the product, distinctly interpretable product information is required. Enabling this is task of the standardization of resources and methods of technical communication. Horst Nowacki describes the challenge of creating a preferably complete product information that can be digitally processed for random, not always predictable purposes. He reports on the achieved current state of the art and the difficulties regarding the change of product information from graphic to digital presentations that are supposed to be effectively utilized internationally, language- and culture-independently.

Part IV: Dynamics Constructive Controversy as a Prime Example of “The Power of Distributed Perspectives”: New Developments in Application and Research (Albert Vollmer, Michael Dick, Stefan Gross and Theo Wehner) The power of distributed perspectives especially becomes apparent in controversies with underlying conflicting perspectives. Albert Vollmer, Michael Dick, Stefan Gross and Theo Wehner illustrate the potential of the constructive controversy. That is a dialogical procedure in which the persons involved are required to consider themselves also as an advocate of the opposite position and collect arguments for this position. This advocacy principle is supposed to put into focus what seems significant and important in this perspective. The change of perspective connected to the advocacy of an opposite position helps reducing the sociocognitive level of a conflict so that the persons involved are enabled to work on constructive solutions together. The reciprocal and rational interpenetration of different possibilities for action contributes to deliberate and socially robust decisions. In this sense the constructive controversy is predestined for the application in organizations, e. g. for the clarification of decisions regarding organizational development and the solving of conflicts in interprofessional collaboration.

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Multiperspectivity as Contribution to “Good Governance”. Experiences from the Humboldt-Viadrina Governance Platform (Gesine Schwan) As is well known, politics is a field of highly different and conflicting perspectives. This diversity of perspectives is of systematic importance in democracies. For government and parliament face the task of determining where there is need for regulation that is accepted by large parts of society. At the same time they are supposed to write laws and regulations in a way they can be legitimized as fair and oriented towards public welfare. Gesine Schwan emphasizes the tensions between different legitimate particular interests. She argues for strategies of a more intensive dialog between three groups of actors whose perspectives play a special role regarding the negotiation of socially sustainable consensuses. These are perspectives of: state politics, economics, and organized civil society. The goal of this “trialog” is the expansion of perspectives. This concerns on the one hand the long-term and sustainable own interests and on the other hand the requirements of the cooperation between the different social interest groups. The crucial dynamics of the trialog consist of the participants learning from each other to understand the respectively different perspectives of thinking and acting and then implement the results into joint designing processes.

The One True Faith. On the Dynamics of Interreligious Conflicts and Attempts at Reconciliation (Michael Bongardt) The step to an explicit consciousness of distributed perspectives is not to be taken for granted in the world of religions. As long as it is part of the religious self-conception to view one’s own standpoint as absolute and other religions as not only different but also false and bad, an appreciation of the plurality of religions cannot emerge. Michael Bongardt discovers a recurring “choreography” and chance in interreligious processes of communication: identity-establishing demarcations are partly broken open again in the dialog. Surprising similarities as well as new unfamiliarities are discovered. For Bongardt, the appreciation of distributed perspectives in religious questions cannot be separated from the reciprocal appreciation of the differences in the respective perspectives. The appreciation of other perspectives at least requires the reflected insight into one’s own limited perspectivity. The questions and problems regarding the appreciation of distributed perspectives in interreligious dialogs can be productively deployed also for the reflection on other perspectival conflicts.

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Part V: Conflicts Two in One (Elena Ficara) When do different perspectives contradict each other? How can a conflict between incompatible views can be dissolved? Since seemingly contradictory and conflicting views often lead to conflicts between persons, the answer to these questions is not only of theoretical interest. Elena Ficara distinguishes contradictory views from contrary and incompatible views and discusses strategies for solving the conflict between incompatible views, especially parametrization. Parametrization is the technique of specification of the respective parameters under which statements are made. Considering the parameters, it can appear that two seemingly incompatible propositions can be advocated without conflict insofar as they have been articulated from different points of view. Parametrization however fails in the case of moral dilemmas for in this case the different perspectives regarding courses of action are irrevocably joined in one.

From National Sovereignty to Interdependence: New Perspectives of Distributive Justice in the Age of Globalization (Juan Carlos Velasco) When it comes to questions of distributive justice, the opinions in temporary political philosophy differ. While followers of John Rawls’s view consider questions of distributive justice as a purely national matter, opponents argue, in the name of a global justice, for a change of this nationally centered perspective. Juan Carlos Velasco illustrates in what sense in the conflict of these perspectives the viewpoints are different. Consequently, not only different aspects of human social life are brought to the focus of attention. At the same time social developments that are assessed in different ways play a role. The controversy shows how shifts in the perspective can fundamentally change questions and problems. Velasco discusses the advantages, the necessity, and the new challenges of a profound change of perspective regarding distributive justice. Translated from German by Hadi Nasir Faizi

Part I: Structures

Martina Plümacher

Distributed Perspectives in Perceiving, Thinking, and Acting Abstract: Life in social contexts requires people to be able to orient and position themselves in a variety of different perspectives. These abilities essentially characterize the social cognition of human beings. How do people orient themselves in their interactions within distributed perspectives? The article describes processes of understanding the structures of distributed perspectives, i.e. different perspectives related to each other. Structures become clear in the reflection on the respective viewpoints of perspective, interests, social roles and functions, including the current requirements of action, and the assumed commitments. The paper focuses on structures of distributed perspectives that emerge in the course of divisions of tasks and labor. It illustrates challenges regarding the coordination of perspectives and the evaluation of perspectives – challenges that play a crucial role in our social life and for the designing of social and political processes.

In their perceiving, thinking, and acting, people refer to their fellows in multiple ways. They share their perceptions with other persons, think and act in cooperative ways, and take part in the happiness and sorrow of others. They are moved by what other people say and by the attitudes they act with. They precisely observe how other persons perceive them, judge them, and act towards them. They anticipate in their thinking and acting the reactions of their fellows and try to act while taking into account their interests and sensitivities. However, not only cooperating, but also arguing and competing persons refer to each other. Not only their own perspectives, but also the perspectives of others matter to people. In this extensive and fundamental sense, people think and act in distributed perspectives. Their different perspectives are related to each other and interconnected. They constitute the network of distributed perspectives. It depends on grasping, understanding, and appreciating other people’s perspectives whether communication and cooperation are successful. A conversation, e. g., can break off if the conversational partner feels that he or she is not being taken seriously. A lively interplay of perspectives, on the other hand, inspires the conversational partners in their thinking, intensifies their dialogue, and motivates them to joint activity. Starting from descriptions on how people, in their perceiving, thinking, and acting, refer to other people’s perspectives (e. g., how they capture them, rethink

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them, include them in their considerations), structures of distributed perspectives will be illustrated in what follows. Taken as a basis is a term of perspective that captures and highlights “how thinking takes its objects into account”,¹ i. e., how it individuates, categorizes, accentuates them, and which relations it puts them into. In this sense, the term ‘perspective’ means more and also something different than perceiving that is dependent on location. It rather highlights what I would like to call ‘epistemic perspectivity’. Therefore, this paper starts with a clarification of the term ‘perspectivity’. Based on this it will be explained how people consider distributed perspectives in their actions and in what sense structures of distributed perspectives are discussed. Following this, structures of distributed perspectives that arise as a result of task sharing and labor division will be explicated. The paper specifies requirements for cooperative acting and illustrates the importance of acknowledging distributed perspectives. It argues for the thesis that the social cognition of human beings lies in their ability to perceive, think, and act within distributed perspectives.

1 Concepts of perspectivity When speaking of a person’s ‘perspective’, e. g. their ‘view’ on an occurrence, we mean their specific location dependent perception on the one hand and their comprehension of this occurrence on the other hand. The expression ‘perspective’ has been used in this perception as well as comprehension and cognition including sense in Europe since the 18th century.² However, it is helpful to distinguish both types of perspectivity – spatial perspectivity in perception and epistemic perspectivity – in order to further determine and describe the distributed perspectives of interacting persons. For it is possible for two people to have the same approximate visuo-spatial perspective and yet have different epistemic perspectives. The opposite can be the case, as well: They can have the same epistemic perspective while their spatial perspectives of perception diverge. Imagine, for example, two people, Elsa and Paul, who are standing next to each other at a riverside, watching a row of houses on the other side of the river. If their location and direction of view are approximately the same, Elsa and Paul  “[…] wie das Denken seine Objekte in den Blick nimmt” (Kaulbach (), VIII), translated into English by H.N. Faizi.  Grimm/Grimm (), Pfeifer et al. (), König (), Schulte-Sasse (), Sukale/Rehkämper (), Plümacher ().

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have about the same visuo-spatial perspective. However, while looking at the house facades, they can be interested in different objects and aspects. Elsa, for example, admires the color of the setting sun’s rays of light reflected by the windows. Paul, who is an architect, wonders how the architectural overall impression could be improved. Elsa and Paul differ regarding what they focus their attention on. The epistemic perspective manifests itself in the point of view of observation by means of which specific objects and aspects move to the focus of attention. The term of epistemic perspective generally marks a person’s specific relation to an object. This includes the perceptive focusing of a sensual datum as well as the individuation, categorization, and assessment of an object. Two persons who have the same epistemic perspective do not also have to share the same visuo-spatial perspective. This is, e. g., the case when people who are locally far apart from each other coordinate on something with each other (e. g. via telephone) and at the same time focus their view on their respective surroundings. The concept of epistemic perspectivity deployed here can be used in a broad and in a narrow sense. In the broad sense, it captures a person’s directed interest through which certain objects and aspects of objects move to the focus of attention while other objects and aspects of objects remain excluded. In formal terms, the general form of this concept is: person p faces object x in terms of aspect a. This broad sense of the concept comes into play, e. g., when we make a first assessment of distributed perspectives. For being able to orient oneself in distributed perspectives requires examining which objects are important to whom first. However, we are not only interested in what objects and details other persons focus their attention on, but also in the reasons and motives that lead them to do so. For different persons can turn to the same objects for different reasons. In order to conceptually capture this aspect, the concept of epistemic perspectivity has to be specified and the above-mentioned general form of the concept has to be extended: Person P faces object x in terms of aspect a, motivated by y. By adding ‘motivated by y’, the circumstances and conditions of the respective cognition and comprehension move to the focus of attention, for example the person’s specific attitudes or goals.³ Paul (to stick with the above example)  In philosophy, different comprehensions of epistemic perspectivity have been formulated. Differences in comprehension result from differences regarding what is highlighted as circumstances and conditions of perspectivity: a person’s individual knowledge and experience and their specific motivation (e. g. Rescher (), chapter , (), chapter ); the influence of subjective factors on cognition (e. g. Nagel ()); contexts of action (see footnote ); contexts of un-

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is, due to his occupation, specifically aware of architectural shapes. He notices details that non-professionals may overlook. His fondness of minimalism in architecture directs his view to components that he finds unnecessary and interfering. What he finds sensually appealing, what attracts his attention, and what he thinks of it is influenced by his occupational experience as well as his interest in a specific architectural style. The narrow concept of epistemic perspectivity is useful especially for the fine-grained description and analysis of perspectives.⁴ It is important in sciences, arts, and professions wherever not only the perspectives of persons but also the perspectives of projects (e. g. research projects) need to be comprehended and described more precisely. We try, for example, to comprehend how a project’s objective suggests a specific concrete focus; how the respective focus is further specified by presentations of problems and questions as well as presuppositions, premises, and hypotheses; how models and the choice of materials, media, methods, and procedures function in a focusing way; how reference to other projects (e. g. by connecting or excluding and distinguishing them) affects what moves to the focus of interest and what does not.⁵ The narrow concept of perspectivity is related to different factors of perspectivation in perception, cognition, speech, and action, and it can open up the view on the interrelationship among these factors. Goals and aims, e. g., specifically orient perception, cognition, and action. They can be a source of questions and problems that further specify a perspectivation. The search for answers to questions and for solutions to problems affects the choice of methods and procedures. Methods and procedures on the other hand draw attention to what is relevant within their framework. At the same time, other objects and aspects shift away from the focus of attention. Methods and procedures limit what is supposed to be recognized or practically produced. Furthermore, attitudes, presuppositions, expectations, and premises form the specific ‘positions’ in light of which the respectively perceived and practically produced is understood.

derstanding and interpreting signs (e. g. Abel ()). For a more detailed account see: Plümacher ().  In what follows, I will partly draw on passages from an earlier paper, cf. Plümacher ().  On the perspectivity of scientific observing and of scientific theorizing see Giere (), van Fraasen (). On the perspectivity of models cf. Mahr (). On the perspectivating effects of experimental design cf. Rheinberger (). On the perspectivity of ‘epistemic objects’ cf. Abel (), (). The perspectival orientation of thinking via questions already played an important role in ancient rhetoric and is revisited in contemporary philosophy by i.a. Rescher ((), chapter II), Hintikka () and Hockway ().

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The reflection on different factors of the perspectivation can be important as soon as we wish to understand more precisely where there are problems in the mutual comprehension of those persons who, e. g. within the framework of interdisciplinary or interprofessional cooperation, pursue differently perspectivated action plans and try to coordinate them with each other. As soon as we plan interdisciplinary and interprofessional cooperation, it is helpful to reflect on the factors of the perspectivation and the specific distribution of attention and interest in order to be able to precisely determine how the activities can reasonably complement each other, where there might be deficits, and how they can be eliminated. Persons who interact and refer to each other do not unresponsively notice the difference of their perspectives, but include them in their activities and operations. The term ‘distributed perspectives’ refers to this aspect of multiple interconnection of perspectives. Persons who refer to each other and interact do not just perceive objects and occurrences in their own interest but also in view of the meaning it could have for other persons. They think and plan considering the interests and action requirements of other persons. They anticipate agreement as well as conflicts. In joint activities, people coordinate their roles and tasks and communicate what they want to consider within these roles and functions under which aspects. Thus they communicate their different perspectivity regarding the realization of their common goal. Distributed perspectives are specifically established through labor division and the distinction of social roles and functions. For by taking a task, role, and function, people commit to a perspective that corresponds to this role, function, and task and expect each other to take and maintain it during the work processes and interactions. In everyday family life, within circles of friends, as well as in professional life, people are challenged to communicate the distribution of perspectives with others, to coordinate distributed perspectives, and to acknowledge and appreciate them.

2 Distributed locations and views How do people master distributed perspectives? An answer to this question should start by discussing the interaction of persons when faced with distributed perspectives of perception. As illustrated above, human perception is perspectival in a twofold way: On the one hand, it depends on the local position of the perceiving person what he or she can perceive. On the other hand, attention and interest are crucial for perceptions. For not everything that can be perceived is actually being perceived.

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Especially things that arouse a person’s interest move to the focus of attention. Further, a person’s perception also depends on their ability to sensually discriminate objects and to determine facts. A top chef, for instance, is able to taste and identify all the different ingredients of a soup, while a person without cooking experience could probably only identify and name the main ingredients. Also, someone who is an expert at football is more likely to understand the strategic moves of the players than someone who is not interested in football and only occasionally watches a match. Given the difference of epistemic perspectivity in perception, it is virtually impossible to start a conversation with another person about our perceptions without drawing our conversational partner’s attention to what we want to communicate. We have to inform them about the focus of our perceiving, e. g. say “Listen to that cracking sound over there”, before we can make a guess on what could have caused the noise.⁶ Furthermore, we usually instinctively assure ourselves if the spatial position of our conversational partner allows them to perceive what we want to talk about. If there is reason to believe that this is not the case (for example when people in the front rows block the view at the theater), we first ask whether he or she, too, can perceive the object of our interest. We then ask, e. g., “Can you see the dancer on the stage?” Examples from everyday life, like the one above, show that even starting a conversation requires the conversational partners to coordinate their perspectives. The addressed person accepts the invitation to a conversation by adapting to the perspective of the addressing person. When Paul addresses Elsa, for instance, Elsa first of all tries to understand what exactly Paul is referring to and what his intentions are (for example whether he simply wants to share his mood and perception with her, or wants to discuss something with her). Only then can she agree upon a topic with him. Joint orientation on a subject enables conversations about this subject. However, conversational partners by no means have to coincide in their perspectives. On the contrary, the conversation would be over quickly if they were to find such consensus. Conversations are rather kept up by differences regarding the perspectives on a topic. The agreement of the conversational partners on a common conversational topic (e. g. a perceived occurrence) leaves enough room for differences in their perspec-

 The verbal reference can be left out if it is unmistakably clear that the conversational partner oriented his focus of perception in an approximately similar way and hence perceived similar things in a similar way. His facial expression, for instance, could indicate that he, too, heard the cracking sound. In their interaction with other people, children learn very early to pay attention to the direction of view and eye movement of other persons and this way capture their focus of perception (cf. Tomasello i.a. (), ()).

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tivity since one and the same topical matter can be closely examined and analyzed under different aspects. The attraction of a conversation often lies in mutually learning the differences. In a conversation, people can learn what they overlooked, did not hear, or did not take into consideration. They can notice that details they themselves thought to be insignificant are exceedingly important when considered from another point of view. The point of view of another person can introduce new aspects they did not consider before. This way, people can learn from one another. The value of an exchange of views on perceptions, however, does not only consist in the common emphasizing and arranging of prominent features and attributes of the perceived objects. For by exchanging their perceptions, people not only broaden their knowledge on objects. They also broaden and deepen their knowledge on possible viewpoints of consideration and of the effectiveness and function of these viewpoints in specific contexts of action. In conversations they learn which points of view and evaluation criteria are suggested or even dictated by specific practices of action (e. g. the performance of a dance score or the stage design). A costume designer, for instance, is also going to pay attention to aspects that are relevant within her own professional practice when watching a choreography. She might notice details that slip the attention of non-professionals. Latter can learn from her what costume designers find important and what professional standards they deploy. By – following the views of the costume designer – trying to perceive from her perspective, they learn how her points of view animate to examine costumes more closely regarding their effect and function. This way, they might discover details which they had overlooked or at least had not become aware of without these points of view. By experiencing how points of view can direct their attention, people develop a sense for the efficiency and function of these points of view. In distributed perspectives, people do not experience the object world dissociated from the respective practices of action. Rather, they get to know objects as instruments and factors in specific contexts of action. In conversation with other persons as well as in their own acting, people learn how, depending on the type of action, specific objects and aspects of objects (for instance specific object features and object functions) become relevant while others are less or not interesting at all. By learning to understand how different objects and aspects of objects gain attention and are significant relative to interests, goals of action, tasks, and functions, they acquire knowledge on epistemic perspectives and structures of distributed perspectivity. Structures of distributed perspectives have multiple dimensions: (i) Distributed are the locations from which people perceive things. (ii) Persons may differ regarding what shifts to their centre of attention and possibly furthermore (iii)

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regarding their interpretations concerning the respective issue (e. g. because of their diverging knowledge, presuppositions, and preconceived opinions). Against the background of our knowledge regarding distributed perspectivity, we do not question our perception as soon as other persons do not perceive exactly the same as we do. What another person reports about their perception from another location might be compatible with one’s own perception and add to it. A reason to critically examine the difference of perceptions is given only if there is reason to believe that one did not perceive precisely enough. Usually, a different perception can be conceived as an expression of a different point of view or standpoint. We do not instantly take another person’s perspective but register their points of view as well as their specific interests and firm standpoints. Differences within the standpoints (e. g. attitudes and premises) usually make us want to hear other persons with different standpoints regarding the issue in order to get a broad idea of how the perspectives are distributed within the issue.⁷ Knowing from our experience that established practices of action always presuppose specific points of view and perspectives allows us to tentatively associate other people’s perspectives with their occupation as well as their social role and function in order to be able to distinguish and arrange different perspectives. People learn to assess what perspectives achieve, what they indicate and signify, and what remains excluded within them. Not least, people also learn to orient themselves within distributed perspectives and to decide which points of view could be fertile and relevant for their own acting, which experiences, attitudes, interests, and needs of their fellows they should consider, and which attitudes they should object to and oppose. They learn to shape social interactions and distributed perspectives. Due to such abilities acquired through socialization, we, as human beings, by no means experience the plurality of perspectives as an amorphous multiplicity of different viewpoints that leads to an epistemological and moral relativism.⁸ On the contrary, our experience with perspectivations helps us grasp the potential of perspectives, i. e. understand something that, perceived in the light of these perspectives, can be understood, recognized, and realized more precisely.

 We usually do not check other people’s perception reports for accuracy right away. As long as there is no reason for us to mistrust the reporting person or doubt the report, we trustingly acknowledge the perception reports. Furthermore, contextualism in epistemology has instructively illustrated that doubt arises dependent on what is at stake.  On orders of knowledge and their function regarding the comprehension and classification of perspectives cf. Plümacher ().

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Our knowledge of diverging and distributed perspectives accompanies our perceiving. It influences what and how we perceive. We notice, for example, what could be interesting to a friend or colleague. Or it occurs to us that we perceive things through our very own specific view and that other persons (e. g. persons from a different cultural background, people of different age, or people with different professional occupations) do not share our perception as well as our judgment. We then often are in the position to perceive those aspects that would receive depreciation and rejection or appreciation and enthusiasm when viewed with a different mindset. We brace ourselves for possible conflicts by perceiving through the eyes of possible opponents and specifically focusing on what could support our or their position. In domestic as well as in occupational and institutional contexts we consider the people around us: we try to support and help them; we consider possible common goals, joint activities, and cooperation.

3 Distributed roles in cooperation Divisions of tasks and labor generate distributed perspectives. Even in the most simple activities, e. g. when carrying an object, cooperating persons take different roles and their respective perspectives. When carrying a bulky piece of furniture, for instance, the persons involved coordinate who grabs what, who lifts and turns, who moves forward and who backward, and at what speed the combined movement should be carried out. Each person registers the motion of the other and reacts directly to it, balances it out, for instance. Each person also observes the surroundings in view of the partner’s role, e. g. by calling attention to things he or she might overlook – for instance a bump, something one could stumble over, or a fragile object that has a high risk of falling. The persons moving collaboratively only rarely reflect the permanent attention they pay to their partner explicitly. Yet it is an aspect of their joint action. Depending on each other, cooperating persons not only consider their own role and task but also take an interest in the partner’s activity. While collaborating, they register the way they interact. They notice, for instance, whether their interaction is going smoothly or rather inconveniently. They notice what is successful and what leads to coordination problems. When they notice a challenge in their partner’s field of tasks, they are required, in the interest of successful cooperation, to take action, e. g. to inform their partner, to deliberate on the next steps and processes, or to help him or her directly. In cooperation, persons with different perspectives work together. The productivity of the cooperation depends on the distribution of tasks, points of

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view, and aspects that are supposed to be brought into focus. When mutually paying attention to each other, cooperation partners do not take their partner’s perspective of action. Having to pay attention to everything that is or could be relevant within their partner’s field of activity would overburden a person. Instead, while being aware of their partner’s action requirements and points of view, they especially pay attention to things and occurrences that could be relevant for their partner and of which they assume or know that they are not in the partner’s focus. For this, it is important to know where the limits of the partner’s attention are. The partners might be highly focused on certain things and hence not perceive further aspects that are relevant as well. Cooperation partners usually precisely observe how their partners act and notice the emphases in their attention as well as their problems or strong points that could beneficially be applied for the cooperation. Mutual attention and aid are crucial for every cooperation. Both are widely self-evident as long as effect, purpose, and advantage of the cooperation can be directly conceived and reflected in the joint activity. In the context of a complex system of labor division (e. g. in larger corporations) however, it is not possible anymore for all persons involved to keep track of the relations and specific requirements of cooperation within that system. In most cases they are primarily responsible for and focused on their own field of work. As cooperating partners they often successfully communicate spontaneously when it comes to common tasks at the points of intersection of their fields of work. There they observe and reflect the form of their collaboration in order to optimize it. However, even setting up a team of persons with differently profiled positions requires specific measures in order to emphasize the relevance of coordinating tasks, roles, and functions. The different tasks, roles, and functions of the persons, as well as the relevance of their coordination have to be communicated in order to enable all members of a team to practically shape their teamwork. This means, each member of the team should be able to consider how to mutually support each other, make arrangements, assist each other, and considerately work together. Cooperation can differ regarding the level of intensity of collaboration. Some forms of cooperation require the cooperation partners to precisely coordinate their tasks. Others are rather limited to the division of tasks and to occasional mutual help. There can be cooperation without explicit cooperation awareness. For instance, it is rarely made explicit that people already act in a cooperative way in their everyday conversations. This form of cooperation that consists in conversation is barely connected to the consciousness of joint activity.

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We owe the proof that conversation is based on cooperative principles to Paul Grice.⁹ Within conversation, cooperation starts with the reciprocal focus on the content and purpose of the conversation. This can be illustrated with a simple example. Paul wants to discuss work with Maria and wants to know whether this is possible that very day. He asks her: “How long are you going to be in the office?” He chooses a direct question that is easy to answer and avoids a possibly irritating, rambling, or ambiguous explanation. Maria knows that Paul is on his way to a meeting and assumes that he wants to discuss something with her. So she replies: “I am staying until you are done with the meeting”. She spares him (and herself) further communication regarding his wish to discuss work with her. With regard to contexts of action and the intentions of their conversational partners, people are able to focus their communication on the relevant aspects. Our conversations would be prone to misunderstandings and proceed inconveniently more often if we did not consider previous knowledge and contexts of action and if we were not willing to accommodate the wishes and expectations of our conversational partners. How do various types of cooperation differ? And what features characterize the different forms of cooperation? Principles of coordination cannot only be explicated based on descriptions of cooperative behavior. We can also consider what a social world without cooperation would look like and what form of activity is needed in order to create cooperation. For this purpose, let us imagine for a moment that everyone could only consider themselves and their own goals and interests and perceive other persons only in view of themselves. Those persons would hardly be able to interact since they would be unable to adapt themselves to the perspective of another person. Even considering Gricean conversational maxims would cause them difficulties. In a world of purely egocentric people there would be no thinking and acting from the perspective of another person, no mutual help, no expectations in this respect, and certainly no concept of cooperation.

 Grice () dedicated himself to understanding implicatures in everyday conversations and in this context formulated four maxims of cooperation: (i) Maxim of Quantity: “. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange). . Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.” (ii) Maxim of Quality: “Try to make your contribution one that is true. […] . Do not say what you believe to be false. . Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.” (iii) Maxim of Relevance: “Be relevant”, i. e. do not say anything off-topic; do not change the subject. (iv) Maxim of Manner: “Be perspicuous […] . Avoid obscurity of expression. . Avoid ambiguity. . Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). . Be orderly.” (Grice (),  f.) On the significance of the principle of relevance cf. Sperber/Wilson ().

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To help (an aspect of cooperation) means: to offer another person something that he or she needs. This presupposes having perceived the other person in light of their specific situation, needs, interests, and challenges. Only then it can come to mind what is helpful for them, e. g. information, advice, a helping hand, a tool. However, helping someone alone does not create cooperation. After all, we can help another person regardless of their reaction to us. Cooperating however requires the actors to interact. Forms of cooperation differ from each other in the ways of interaction of the partners.

4 Forms of cooperation In conversations people act together in so far as they try to reciprocally understand each other’s concerns by accommodating and helping each other. They also try to coordinate their different perspectives in a conversation in a way so that the conversation can come to a satisfying end. A conversation does not necessarily require an awareness of joint activity. For often there is no common goal beyond the successful conversation and objective communication. The conversational partners can pursue different goals with their conversation. They do not have to agree on the goal of their conversation and usually do not have to explicitly coordinate their roles and tasks.¹⁰ A form of cooperation like, for example, the joint carrying of an object on the other hand requires agreement on the goal and procedure. The persons cooperating have to communicate where the object is supposed to be brought, who grabs which side, and who leads. Jointly carrying and moving the object requires their permanent attention. The actors have to act closely coordinated in order to transport the object undamaged. In this sense the awareness of joint activity is indispensable for this kind of cooperation. In cases of loose cooperation (e. g. agreements in order to coordinate activities or mutual help in case of need) the persons involved do not expect joint and closely coordinated activity. The goals of their actions can be entirely different as is the case with persons of different occupation groups that have to coordinate tasks in a project-related way at the intersections of their activities. Even

 However, sometimes tasks and roles can explicitly be distributed in conversations. Think, for instance, of a conversation at work in which the conversational partners come up with different hypotheses in order to explain a phenomenon and then play through each one of those hypotheses. Every conversational partner is primarily supposed to represent their own version of explanation, but everyone helps the others with the elaboration of the explanation. Conversations of this type can assume a highly intensive form of cooperation.

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competitors make arrangements at times in order to be able to reach their goals more effectively. The cooperation is then narrowed down to an agreement and the adherence to that agreement. As the example of jointly carrying an object illustrated, the most intense form of cooperation does not occur when persons with distributed roles and tasks separately pursue a common goal, but when they try to realize it together and expect their collaboration to have a productive effect. People can also jointly pursue a goal without working together.¹¹ Think of, for instance, the construction of a building that involves many persons who all pursue the goal of completing the building according to schedule. However, not all persons work together. Instead the architect and construction supervisor coordinates the deployment and work of the different technical crews. When people want to cooperatively collaborate in order to achieve a common goal, they first deliberate on how to distribute tasks and attention, what they want to discuss and decide, and what responsibilities the individuals involved have. They then precisely coordinate with each other on their course of action and, during the further process of their collaboration, on the details as well. I.e., they control and form the shape of their collaboration. The way of their collaboration is itself an important aspect of their goal-oriented work process. If the success of the cooperation depends on the quality of the activity of every single partner as well as directly on the interplay of the partners, the cooperation partners are dependent on each other. It is then essential for every partner to exactly know the process of the joint enterprise. Everyone has to know what the others are focusing on in order to be able to decide how to reciprocally support each other, e. g. by informing and assisting the others. The cooperation partners are required to expediently coordinate their own field of work and tasks in view of the partners’ specific requirements in order to do well together. Reciprocal help is indispensable in closely interconnected cooperation, e. g. support through information, assistance, advice, encouragement, or constructive criticism. In order to be able to help, one has to realize what exactly a partner requires in order to fulfill his role and function within the cooperation. Assistance can be ineffective and cause extra work if not coordinated optimally towards the points of view the cooperation partner is supposed to consider within their area of activity. In order to be able to helpfully assist each other and inter Cf. Searle (), Bratman (). Bratman emphasizes three characteristics with regard to which forms of interaction differ and that all together only occur in shared cooperative activity: (i) mutual responsiveness; (ii) commitment to the joint activity; (iii) commitment to mutual support.

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act optimally coordinated, the partners should specifically communicate the respectively relevant points of view to each other. Oftentimes not only the points of view coordinated during the planning phase are relevant for the action. Particular points of view can gain significance through specific expectations and requirements from the cooperation partners’ social networks. Moreover, within interdisciplinary and interprofessional settings, the persons cooperating are obligated to different occupational groups and their ethos and standards of professionalism. They also view their work in light of its subject-specific challenges. Each cooperation partner contributes a different setting of distributed perspectives to the cooperation. Only if the partners reciprocally know their respective settings they can be of optimal help to each other and together master the various challenges. In intense forms of cooperation the plurality of perspectives is not just a challenge. It also contains potential for innovations.¹² Four aspects play a role here. (i) Every cooperation partner contributes different questions and presentations of problems to the teamwork due to their individual knowledge and horizon of experience.¹³ Everyone emphasizes different objects and aspects. In such cases we can learn from each other. Oftentimes the partner’s perspectives lead us beyond the horizon of our reflections. We get to know aspects we did not consider or the significance of which for our field of activity we did not see so far. We might discover new contexts or problems and challenges that could be a starting point for continuative concepts and new ideas for us. (ii) The different requirements and expectations regarding a project (e. g. a research or the development of a product) that the cooperation partners articulate in the light of their respective social networks can also be an innovative factor. The more challenging aspects are supposed to be thought through and considered in the work process, the more important it becomes to put the usual procedures and methods to the test and look for new ways. (iii) Ideas for innovative products, problem solving, and procedures are often found easier in the context of teamwork than through solo effort of individuals. This is mainly because in conversations often a playful way of dealing with perspectives is developed. After all, in communication with several persons we are required to successively take and bring to mind different perspectives, i. e. we have to change perspectives multiple times. In a playful mood, we can anticipate

 On the creativity of distributed perspectives see Abel (this volume).  On the dynamics in knowledge acquisition due to the individual horizon of knowledge and experience cf. Rescher ().

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ways that on first glance may not seem very promising but bring new aspects into the focus of attention. By thinking them through and investigating them more precisely we often find an innovative and realizable alternative. (iv) Last but not least, the teamwork can develop its creative potential in the process of elaborating ideas and plans. For in a well-functioning team none of the cooperation partners is faced with a variety of different perspectives that need to be assessed and judged by them alone. Cooperation partners can and should help each other consider how the different points of view and aspects can productively contribute to everyone’s work. One possibly has to consider how points of view can be evaluated and balanced against each other. Especially when new ground is supposed to be broken, distributed perspectives are very helpful in order to recognize the opportunities as well as the pitfalls. Being able to take and think through a variety of perspectives is a difficult cognitive challenge that adults, however, usually master well, especially when they help each other. In their interaction, people develop extraordinary abilities of taking, advancing, and creatively changing perspectives. In view of this, social psychologist and philosopher George H. Mead emphasized the human ability for social interaction and cooperation.¹⁴ He saw the crucial point of social acting in the ability to anticipate other people’s possible reactions to one’s own acting and to see oneself as a player in social networks. In social networks people are connected because their behavior causes reactions that can have consequences for their further acting. Being able to anticipate possible reactions to one’s own acting and behavior means to understand which options this acting and behavior provides to other people as well as being able to estimate what social roles and motives lead them to choosing one of the options. Hence, knowledge of distributed perspectives is directly relevant for acting.

5 Understanding and acknowledging distributed perspectives Orienting oneself within social networks is not always easy. Not always do we manage to understand other people’s perspectives and actions. Oftentimes we do not know the action context and action requirements of others well enough to understand their intentions. Also, people’s motives for their actions are not always rational. Passions, desires, hopes, as well as apprehensions and fears quite often play an important role. For our orientation in social interactions,  See Mead ().

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knowledge of structures of distributed perspectives is helpful, for instance knowledge of occupational, functional, and culture-bound perspectivations. This knowledge helps us tentatively classify behavior, acting, and statements of other persons and anticipate possible consequences. However, social interaction is a highly dynamic process. Social networks change permanently. New perspectives emerge unexpectedly and with them attitudes, practices, and procedures change. These dynamics consistently present us with new challenges. We are challenged to notice changes, estimate their significance and relevance, and correct our prejudices and preconceived opinions in order to be able to contextually make decisions regarding our acting. Oftentimes motives, interests, and goals of the people around us are not articulated explicitly and clearly, and the challenge consists in identifying them, sorting different perspectives, and estimating their relevance in order to appropriately consider them in our own acting. As illustrated above, we try to identify a perspective by finding out what is important to a person or group of persons and what reasons and motives primarily move them. Attempting to entirely comprehend the motives and reasons of a person, however, would be in vain. Even one’s own motives and reasons cannot be explicated in their entirety. Fortunately, the comprehension of the entirety of personal reasons is not necessary in order to jointly shape social coexistence.¹⁵ For that purpose, it is usually enough to get into conversation with each other. For this it can be helpful to know the social roles and find out the action requirements and obligations of the other persons in order to be able to cooperatively

 We do not have to try to put ourselves in the position of another person (as, for instance, Goldman () suggests) in order to be able to understand, due to personal experiences with similar situations, what this person might perceive, feel, think, and intend. Neither do we have to take a theoretical position in order to be able to hypothesize on the mental attitudes of another person and, on this basis, understand another person (on the criticism of the debate on the social cognition of human beings see Gallagher/Zahavi (), chapter ). Gallagher and Zahavi put emphasis on the role of procedural practical knowledge in social interactions. According to them, embodied practices constitute a direct access to the mental attitudes and intentions of other people. In contexts of action the other person’s body itself offers the opportunity for specific forms of interaction. In a way it invites us to certain interactions. Furthermore, understanding other people “in a detailed pragmatic or social context” requires the ability “to understand that context in a narrative way” (Gallagher/Zahavi (), ). What is it, however, that allows us to tell a story? Where does our interpretation of the other person begin? In my opinion three aspects are crucial: (i) the other person’s focus of attention; (ii) what they articulate as their motives and reasons; (iii) our knowledge regarding practices of action, social roles, and functions, as well as distributed perspectives.

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accommodate them in the conversation and submit proposals for e. g. procedures and rules that meet with approval from their perspective, too. People usually already acknowledge the honest attempt at understanding their perspective as a sign of accommodation and willingness to communicate. For this attempt signals openness to dialogue and, possibly, willingness to negotiate procedures and rules of coexistence in a fair manner. Making this signal is usually far more important than actually correctly understanding the other person. For the other person can interpret this signal as an invitation to articulate and illustrate what is important to them for what reasons and in what respect they were understood correctly, inadequately, or not at all. When people signalize each other that they want to understand their different perspectives and consider them in their acting, it usually creates a cooperative atmosphere in which goals and paths can be discussed and negotiated with each other. Making an effort at understanding the other person is also a form of respect towards them. We owe each other this respectful behavior regarding the perspectives that we are obligated to take due to our different social roles and functions. Respect towards another perspective does not always have to be articulated explicitly. It can also be expressed by not considering our viewpoints as definite but being willing to let others help, advise, and instruct us. By doing so, we signal that the abilities, skills, knowledge, and competence of another person are important and valuable. By doing this, we acknowledge distributed perspectives. In many fields of action it is not enough to comprehend the perspectives of single persons more precisely. Think of, for instance, the fields of action of politics in which we are required to identify different interests and sort a variety of different perspectives in order to be able to structure controversies. Oftentimes it has to be clarified first where exactly there are problems, and where action is required in order to be able to suggest solutions and measures that meet broad acceptance. How can we acknowledge perspectives in such fields of action? Two aspects seem to be important. For one, people want their views and positions regarding a matter to be taken seriously. They expect an attitude of impartiality as Kant illustrates it using the maxim: “Never take someone else’s judgment to be entirely false”.¹⁶ Kant argued that one should, in cases of opposing judgments regarding a matter, find out why the judgments contradict each other and not just go by one’s own judgment when searching for the reason.

 “Für ganz falsch muß man eines andern Urteil niemals halten” (Kant (AA ), , translated into English by H.N. Faizi). Cf. Kant (AA ), § .

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If fallacies alone, e. g. by presuming wrong premises, entailed conflicting perspectives, controversies could easily be solved as soon as the mistakes are disclosed. However, controversies are often caused by diverging interests, different experiences, hopes, and concerns. Taking interests, hopes, and concerns seriously means, above all, considering how to find ways to take them into account in social life. Concerns, e. g., can often be reduced by adequate protective measures and safety precautions. Hopes can, for instance, be taken into account by keeping open or creating chances for the realization of what is anticipated. The attempt to satisfy the different perspectives and positions is indeed a challenge for all persons involved, but it is precisely this challenge that forces them to be creative. In this challenge lies the opportunity of finding new constructive solutions that meet broad acceptance. By taking perspectives and positions seriously and trying to consider them in our acting, we acknowledge them. A second aspect of acknowledging perspectives consist in emphasizing what they achieve. Think of the acknowledgement, e. g., of an unconventional thinker or a scientific research group. We acknowledge the specific role and achievement of the (person’s or group’s) perspective by, e. g., emphasizing what has been developed within this perspective, or what directions of reflecting, acting, and producing it has opened up. We determine its significance and role in social life. With critical intentions, we further try to capture the limits of a perspective more closely. For instance, we not only name the core areas of the fruitful application of this perspective, but also the areas that it does not cover at all or only insufficiently, and we specify in what respects there are possible conflicts. By determining roles, efficiency, and limits of the fruitfulness of a perspective, we usually intensify our comprehension of that perspective. We realize, e. g., what exactly, by putting specific objects and aspects into the focus of perceiving, thinking, and acting, the perspective accomplishes. In view of the limits of its efficiency and fruitfulness (for instance in comparison to other perspectives) it becomes clear however, what aspects get less or hardly any attention within the perspective, and how that perspective eventually should be extended by additional points of view or complemented by other perspectives in order to be able to deal with a topic or problem area more thoroughly. The reflection on the role and efficiency of a perspective tends, with its specific point of view, to ascribe a specific position to this perspective within the framework of distributed perspectives. In the course of this reflection, we may move the structures of distributed perspectives to the center of our attention and try to clarify the different functions of different perspectives on a range of topics. Such reflections can lead to determining the relation between the per-

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spectives more precisely and possibly re-evaluating the significance of single perspectives regarding existing challenges. In the cultural and political life of a society, such an assessment of perspectives in their relations with each other has tangible consequences. Just think of how sciences, researches, arts, and organizations are judged in view of their specific role and function in cultural life and hence find or not find financial support and funding. By being ascribed a productive function for society, a perspective gets the chance to establish itself. It should be noted here, that human culture benefits from the richness of different perspectives in sciences, arts, and professions, since people are able to innovatively bring this variety of perspectives into play with each other. Sometimes we have to deal with tensions between perspectives while trying to direct our controversies into constructive directions. The responsible acknowledgement of perspectives is a crucial requirement for this. Translated from German by Hadi Nasir Faizi

References Abel, Günter (2004): Zeichen der Wirklichkeit, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. Abel, Günter (2010): “Epistemische Objekte als Zeichen- und Interpretationskonstrukte.” In: Stefan Tolksdorf/Holm Tetens (eds.), In Sprachspiele verstrickt. Oder: Wie man der Fliege den Ausweg zeigt, Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 127 – 156. Abel, Günter (2012): “Knowledge Research: Extending and Revising Epistemology.” In: Günter Abel/James Conant (eds.), Rethinking Epistemology, vol. 1, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 1 – 52. Bratman, Michael E. (1992): “Shared Cooperative Activity.” In: The Philosophical Review 101, 327 – 341. Gallagher, Shaun/Zahavi, Dan (2008): The Phenomenological Mind. An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science, London/New York: Routledge. Giere, Ronald N. (2006): Scientific Perspectivism, Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press. Goldman, Alvin I. (2006), Simulating Minds. The Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience of Mindreading, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Grice, Paul (1989): “Logic and Conversation.” (1967) In: Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press, 22 – 40. Grimm, Jacob/Grimm, Wilhelm (1889): “Perspectiv, Perspektive, perspektivisch.” In: Jacob Grimm/Wilhelm Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch, vol. 7, Leipzig: Hirzel, 1568 – 1569. Hintikka, Jaakko (2007): Socratic Epistemology. Explorations of Knowledge-Seeking by Questioning, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Hookway, Christopher (2006): “Epistemology and Inquiry: the Primacy of Practice.” In: Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 93 – 110. Kaulbach, Friedrich (1990): Philosophie des Perspektivismus, Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck).

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Kant, Immanuel (AA 24): “Vorlesungen über Logik. Logik Philippi.” (1772) In: Kants gesammelte Schriften (Akademie-Ausgabe), vol. 24, ed. by Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Berlin: De Gruyter 1966, 303 – 496. Kant, Immanuel (AA 5): Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790). In: Kants gesammelte Schriften (Akademie-Ausgabe), vol. V, ed. by Königlich-preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin: Georg Reimer 1913, 165 – 544. König, Gert (1989): “Perspektive, Perspektivismus, perspektivisch.” In: Joachim Ritter/Karlfried Gründer (eds.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Basel: Schwabe & Co, 363 – 375. Mahr, Bernd (2012): “On the Epistomology of Models.” In: Günter Abel/James Conant (eds.), Rethinking Epistemology, vol. 1, Berlin/Boston: de Gruyter, 301 – 352. Mead, George Herbert (1967): Mind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (1934), ed. by Charles W. Morris, Chicago, Ill./London: The University of Chicago Press. Nagel, Thomas (1986): The View from Nowhere, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pfeiffer, Wolfgang/Braun, Wilhelm/Ginschel, Gunhild/Hagen, Gustav/Huber, Anna/Müller, Klaus/Petermann, Heinrich/Pfeifer, Gerlinde/Schröter, Dorothee/Schröter, Ulrich (1989): “Perspektive.” In: Wolfgang Pfeifer (ed.), Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Deutschen, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1254 – 1255. Plümacher, Martina (2010): “Perspektivität, epistemische.” In: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.), Enzyklopädie Philosophie, 2nd revised and expanded edition, Hamburg: Meiner, 1930 – 1937. Plümacher, Martina (2012): “Epistemic Perspectivity.” In: Günter Abel/James Conant (eds.), Rethinking Epistemology, vol. 1, Berlin/Boston: de Gruyter, 155 – 172. Plümacher, Martina (2017): “Die Perspektivierung der Wirklichkeit.” In: Ulrich Dirks/Astrid Wagner (eds.), Abel im Dialog. Perspektiven der Zeichen- und Interpretationsphilosophie, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter. Rescher, Nicholas (1984): The Limits of Science, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press. Rescher, Nicholas (1993): Pluralism. Against the Demand for Consensus, Oxford/New York: Clarendon Press. Rescher, Nicholas (1994): A System of Pragmatic Idealism, vol. 3: Metaphysical Inquiries, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Rheinberger, Hans-Jörg (1997): Toward a History of Epistemic Things. Synthesizing Proteins in the Test Tube, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Schulte-Sasse, Jochen (2002): “Perspektive/Perspektivismus.” In: Karlheinz Barck/Martin Fontius/Friedrich Wolfzettel/Burkhart Steinwachs (eds.), Ästhetische Grundbegriffe: Ein historisches Wörterbuch in sieben Bänden, vol. 4, Stuttgart/Weimar: Metzler, 758 – 778. Searle, John (1990): “Collective Intentions and Actions.” In: Philip R. Cohen/Jerry Morgan/Martha E. Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication, Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books, MIT Press, 401 – 415. Sperber, Dan/Wilson, Deirdre (1986): Relevance. Communication and Cognition, Oxford: Blackwell. Sukale, Michael/Rehkämper, Klaus (2010): “Perspektive.” In: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.), Enzyklopädie Philosophie, 2nd revised and expanded edition, Hamburg: Meiner, 1925 – 1930.

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Tomasello, Michael (1999): The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition, Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press. Tomasello, Michael (2009): Why We Cooperate, Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press. Van Fraasen, Bas C. (2008): Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Günter Abel

Distributed Types of Knowledge, Epistemic Perspectives, and Creativity The Case for Architecture Abstract: The article elaborates the triangular interactions between (a) distributed types of knowledge, (b) distributed epistemic perspectives, and (c) distributed features of radical creativity. The argument is developed with a particular focus on the case for architecture. However, the claim of the approach is more general covering all types of human thinking, acting, organizing, and shaping our life and world. In part (1) the scope of challenges is marked within the framing idea of the power of distributed perspectives. In part (2) it is shown that and in what sense the variety of distributed types of knowledge leads to an expansion and revision of traditional as well as of contemporary epistemology. In part (3) the mechanisms of distributed knowledge types and perspectives are described and analyzed more closely. The focus is put on: predominances and coalitions of different knowledge types and perspectives; the distributed and integrated features of knowledge types and perspectives; the relations between scientific and artistic knowledge types; and the internal relations between explicit and implicit knowledge. In part (4) the creativity processes of bringing something new into the world are reconsidered in terms of distributed knowledge types as well as distributed epistemic perspectives. This opens up the picture to rethink creativity as emergent offsprings of the interplays between distributed knowledge types and epistemic perspectives.

1 The scope of challenges: knowledge types and epistemic perspectives In this article, I would like to show that and in what sense a number of distributed knowledge types and epistemic perspectives are necessary, at work, and manifest in architecture. Such knowledge types and perspectives are, e.g., practical, theoretical, perceptual, scientific, constructional, artistic, aesthetic, ethical, and, in an architec-

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turally still more specific way: sketch- and model-based as well as urban- and landscape-oriented knowledge types and perspectives.¹ Successful architecture and its elucidating theory are prime examples for the interplays of such distributed knowledge types and epistemic perspectives. Without these interplays, we would not be able to create architectural constructions at all. We also would not come to a comprehensive architectural theory that has to take into account these interplays in its own way of thinking architecture. In the present paper, I will promote the thesis that these interplays are of crucial importance in architecture (and, of course, also in our everyday lives as well as in the other arts and sciences). Given that these interplays always involve creativity, I will promote the additional thesis that the characteristic features of creativity can be described and analyzed by means of the model of distributed knowledge types and epistemic perspectives under development. In the following, the type of epistemology focused on the interplay of the different knowledge types and perspectives prompts the label: Systematic Knowledge Research. One of the main assumptions of this approach is that both knowledge types and epistemic perspectives are indispensable and always already at work in specifying, structuring, understanding, and shaping our experiences, realitites, and artefacts (like, e. g., the constructions of architectural buildings and urban ensembles). There is no architecture without knowledge and perspective. In architecture the actions mentioned take place by adopting, e. g., an aesthetic or a functional, a sensory, an ethical perspective as to real buildings as well as to architectural sketches, blueprints, models, urban plannings, or other architectural construals. Thus, to ascribe a particular importance to one or a combination of different knowledge types goes hand in hand with taking and using a particular and specifying epistemic perspective. Think of, e. g., taking an aesthetic or a functional perspective as the organizing perspective in planning and shaping a building or an urban environment. And vice versa: taking an organizational and hence a specifying, goal-setting, problem- and solutionoriented epistemic perspective goes hand in hand with being committed to particular knowledge types. The latter also includes a reflexive knowledge about the favorite perspective at work. In a complementary and revolving door effect, knowledge types need organizational epistemic perspectives and working epistemic perspectives need knowledge types. Both are reciprocally demanding one another. And in both dimensions (knowledge types; epistemic perspectives)

 In this article, I make (often literally) use of passages and materials that I developed at greater length and with a strategic focus on the interconnection between knowledge research and architectural theory in Abel (),  – .

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it makes good sense to speak of an irreducible plurality of different, distributed, and integrated knowledge types and epistemic perspectives. Concrete examples of epistemic perspectives in architecture and their organizing and orienting role are, among others, the following ones: (i) the aesthetic perspective (focused on style and sensory experiences); (ii) the functionalist perspective (focused on the effectiveness of a building like a house, a museum, or a hospital); (iii) the formalist perspective (focused, e. g., on geometrical forms); or (iv) a purely experimental perspective (alongside, e. g., the question of what all one might be able to do with certain forms and materials, as for instance with squares and circles, or with glass or wood). We necessarily presuppose epistemic perspectives in the processes of our knowing, doing, and acting. The organizational perspectives are of crucial relevance because they execute a number of indispensable functions relevant for our thinking, acting, and having experiences. The most evident of these functions can be seen in the power of (a) organizing, (b) specifying, (c) classifying, (d) orienting, (e) goal-setting, (f) problem-solving, and (g) reflecting our ways of thinking, acting, and having specific experiences. The epistemic perspectives simply put up the viewpoints and horizons for having specified and specifyable actions, constructions, and experiences. In architecture, for instance, these perspectives come into the picture along questions like what, how, and to what purpose we are doing what we are doing, for instance building a house, a museum, or a cathedral. Hence, epistemic perspectives can be considered to be the necessary organizational viewpoints, horizons, and orientations which are always already at work when it comes to thinking, acting, perceiving, experiencing, – and, in architecture, to building. Throughout these organizational functions of epistemic perspectives we obviously also have to do with background knowledge orders. By this I want to address those background assumptions that give orientation to our ways of organizing and classifying knowledge. These orders are the orders that, among other things, make available the frameworks and classifications for the varieties of our knowledge, for our having specific experiences and for our activities of shaping our triangular relations to the world, to other persons, and to ourselves. The contemporary classifications of the different sciences are a good example of the organizational and orienting power of knowledge orders.² Of course, to presuppose such knowledge orders does not at all mean to presuppose a metaphysical or ontological order of once and for all pre-established

 Concerning orders of knowledge as “frameworks of perspectival cognition” cf. Plümacher (),  – , in particular  – .

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classifications, principles, and rules. Not surprisingly, I would like to take knowledge orders not as an ontological web, but as a web of heuristic and dynamic background assumptions. These assumptions are of crucial importance: (a) for having a framework to give descriptions, analyses, explanations, diagnoses, prognoses, and therapies of our dynamic being in the world and with other persons as well as for having the experiences we actually do have; (b) for our practical as well as cognitive understanding of and our orientation in the world, towards other persons, and ourselves; and (c) for our having specified experiential contents in our acting, thinking, feeling, perceiving, and shaping. However, despite all these highly relevant functions, ›knowledge orders‹ should by no means be considered as an ontological and aprioristic order. Rather, their status as well as their dynamics is determined by temporality, history, and culture. Think, e. g., of the actual classification of our sciences, which has not always been that way and which presumably will undergo significant changes in the future. The relation that works like a revolving door between epistemic perspectives and knowledge types can be pointed out as follows: the epistemic perspectives are not additional, but internally presupposed in our specified ways of knowing, acting, feeling, perceiving, thinking, and shaping; and knowledge types are not additional, but internally presupposed and at work in the organizational and sense-making power of epistemic perspectives. That different ways of knowing are important in having specific epistemic and organizational perspectives can easily be outlined. Think, e. g., of the following features: (i) the particular way of knowing how to bring something into the focus of attention in perception, feeling, acting, and thinking; (ii) knowing how and why to classify in a specific way and for specific purposes; (iii) the knowledge involved in fixing the preferences that are normatively relevant and why; (iv) the reflective knowledge of what counts inside an epistemic perspective as relevant or irrelevant, as central or peripheral, and why; and last but not least (v) the knowledge about which changes of perspectives might be demanded, hence meaningful, significant, relevant, revealing, and apt as to the practices and purposes under development. There are two further aspects that I consider epistemologically important (in architecture as well as in our everyday lives and the arts and sciences). Firstly (a) I want to emphasize that the assumption of different knowledge types and epistemic perspectives is (as in the case of the above mentioned ›knowledge orders‹) a heuristic assumption. The assumption is not that there are these knowledge types and perspectives as ontological entities out of which our lived and experienced realities are made and specified. Rather, the assumption is a pragmatic (and not a metaphysical or ontological) one. Further, the assumption’s validity depends on its efficiency in organizing and orienting our experiences, actions,

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and understanding. Secondly (b), I want to emphasize that our factive experiential realities (including the architectural ones) never are such that we have to do with one and only one singular knowledge type and perspective strictly isolated from the others. In reality, we always have to do with fusioned experiences and a variety of knowledge types and epistemic perspectives. Apparently, both of these two aspects (the heuristic as well as the pluralistic and connective one) are relevant in architecture. Think of, e. g., the Elbphilharmonic Hall (still under construction) in Hamburg, the Cathedral of Cologne, or the Colosseum in Rome. Concerning the knowledge types and epistemic perspectives at work in the architectural phenomena, processes, states, and products they always embody fusioned phenomena, processes, states, and products. We have to do with an amalgam of different knowledge types and perspectives with different predominances in different contexts, times, cultures, and attitudes. It is but (a) under the concrete constructional requirements or (b) under the post festum analysis of a building that we dissect the holistic phenomena, processes, and products in pieces and components. The dissections are necessary for technically constructional as well as for intellectually descriptive and explanatory purposes. Think, e. g., of the distributed knowledge types and perspectives demanded in the technical construction of the Elbphilharmonic Hall in Hamburg, such as: the complex steel- and glass-constructional technologies, the acoustic properties of the inner concert hall, or the urban environmental challenges to be met in order to create a successful building, a culturally accepted ensemble, and an outstanding music hall. Without the successful and efficient interplay of distributed knowledge types and epistemic perspectives such challenges could never be met, could not even intellectually and practically be addressed at all. Against that background, the scope of challenges of the present article is of a threefold nature. The challenges are: firstly (i) to give a description of what Systematic Knowledge Research is all about and why it is of epistemic and epistemological value in architecture and in the other arts and sciences; secondly (ii) to denote the different knowledge types and perspectives which are constitutive in architecture; and thirdly (iii) to elucidate the internal relations between creativity and distributed knowledge types and epistemic perspectives with a specific focus on architecture. Hence, the rest of my article proceeds in the following three steps. In the next step (part 2), the concept of Systematic Knowledge Research will be developed in its version as architectural knowledge research. With a focus on the description and elucidation of the different knowledge types and epistemic perspectives, the approach involves an expansion, a revision, and a re-orientation of traditional epistemology. The latter very often has promoted a metaphys-

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ical quest for the trans- and a-pluralistic, the trans- and a-perspectival, the transand a-contextual, and the trans- and a-dynamical patterns presupposed as underlying and governing the processes of human perceiving, feeling, imagining, thinking, doing, and acting. But before being in a position to ask such traditional epistemological questions concerning the limits, validity, justification, grounding, and normativity of knowledge claims, we apparently already have to know what counts as and which are the knowledge types, epistemic perspectives, mechanisms, and interconnections involved and under discussion. In this sense, traditional epistemology can be considered a branch of a comprehensive Systematic Knowledge Research, – not the other way around. In a further step (part 3) some mechanisms of the distributed and integrated knowledge types and perspectives will be described and analyzed with a focus on their role and power in architecture. I will do so by elucidating different epistemic components involved in successful architecture as well as in its theory, sense experiences, aesthetics, cultural framing, and ethics. In a final step (part 4), I will spell out some key features of the throughout relevant internal relationship between creativity and its entanglements in the interplays of distributed knowledge types and epistemic perspectives, illustrated by examples mainly from architecture.

2 Distributed types of knowledge: an expansion and revision of epistemology 2.1 Varieties of knowledge When we start to think about knowledge, it is striking how broad and diverse the meaning of the word ’knowledge’ is. It can be found not just in the sciences, technology, philosophy, and the arts but also in ordinary life-world contexts and of course within architecture and its theory as well. We might think of colloquial expressions such as “knowing that 2 + 2 = 4”, “knowing how to take care of oneself”, “knowing what’s appropriate”, “knowing what’s to be done”, “knowing how to proceed methodically” – and much more. With a specific view to architecture and architectural epistemology, we could add expressions such as “knowing how to draw a sketch and blueprint”, “knowing what a building is, an ornament, an order of columns”, “knowing how to construe a facade and how building materials are made”, or “knowing which building techniques are needed and how they work together”. The spectrum of types of knowledge ranges from everyday and life-world knowledge (e. g., knowing how one moves

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in a house) to artistic knowledge (e. g., knowing how to represent and express something, such as in architecture, music, dance, or painting). And the spectrum ranges from scientific and technical knowledge (e. g., in the case of architecture, how to systematically plan and realize the construction of a building or an urban ensemble) to reflexive knowledge and to reflexive epistemic perspectives (as, e. g., to know how to use different perspectives in their organizational and specifying functions) and furthermore to normative knowledge as to the standards of justification and assessment (e. g., in the case of architecture the normative standards of good and successful building).

2.2 Broad and narrow concept of knowledge It might be helpful to draw a distinction that cuts across this small taxonomy of the knowledge types relevant to architecture between a narrow and a broad concept of knowledge. The narrow concept of knowledge refers to knowledge connected with observational evidence, justification and provability, knowledge acquired through methodically structured procedures. This narrow concept is the focus of the technical training of architects in universities and colleges and determines the lesson plans, modules, and curricula. This is knowledge that a person must be able to express verbally; it is communicable, exchangable, and intersubjectively testable and teachable. This narrow concept of knowledge is characteristic of the sciences above all and thus could also be called scientific knowledge. To the extent that architecture is a science, the narrow concept of knowledge is foundational for architecture. The broad concept of knowledge, within architecture, refers to the wider field of architectural ability, to architectural competences, capacities, skills, practices, and proficiencies. This broad sense of knowledge cannot be reduced to the narrow (scientific) concept and accordingly cannot be deduced or derived from it. The genealogy runs the other way. The narrow sense of knowledge emerges in the course of methodically regulated determinations, stipulations, and restrictions of the broader sense. Without involving the broader concept and without including the concepts of distributed knowledge types and epistemic perspectives in architecture we could describe neither the internal nor the external features and mechanisms of architecture as to buildings, urban ensembles, and landscape environments. And without the distributed knowledge types and epistemic perspectives, we also could not provide a comprehensive theory of architecture, a theory that conceptually permeates the distributed and integrative ac-

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tivities and features of building and the construction of urban environments in the satisfying way of thinking in architecture. As already emphasized the label Systematic Knowledge Research is to refer to the new research approach dealing primarily with the mechanisms, structuring, and shaping of the interaction between various knowledge types and epistemic perspectives. Such interconnective mechanisms are familiar features of the arts and sciences as well as our everyday lives – though the mechanisms are still mostly unknown. In the present article I focus on such distributed activities in architecture, more precisely on how the different knowledge types and epistemic perspectives interact and interpenetrate one another in architectural constructions, experiences, and artefacts. In order to elucidate and underpin the distinctive image and goal of the new epistemic and epistemological approach of Systematic Knowledge Research think about the following three striking and well acquainted examples.³ Deliberately, I take the examples still from outside architecture, taken as examples demonstrating the generality claim of the approach. Systematic Knowledge Research is not limited to architecture and its theory. The examples are: (i) Driving a car – successfully setting a car in motion and steering it requires, inter alia, the technical-functional knowledge of what a steering wheel is and how the gear shift operates, a visual knowledge of the gas gauge and speedometer, practical knowledge expressed as the skillful hand movements required to operate the turn signals, the practical competency involved in using a GPS system. We assume that one must be able to successfully integrate many of these knowledge types and perspectives in order to count as a competent driver. Worth noting that the car driver (or, e. g., a pilot) need not have this entire knowledge ready to hand at all times. Usually, we simply rely on the fluent interplay of knowledge types and perspectives, at least as long as their interaction continues to be frictionless, and breakdowns are righted promptly. (ii) The operation room – Brain surgery, for example, requires the neurosurgeon to connect her view of the monitor (and thus her non-conceptual, visual knowledge) with her deft hand movements (and thus her non-conceptual, haptic knowledge) and to coordinate these with her experience (not least of all with her practice-based experiential knowledge). A neurosurgeon’s activities constitutively rely upon the integrative interplay of different knowledge types and perspectives, and each of her actions presupposes this interplay as a matter of course. In

 I can only offer a very rough sketch of this approach here. For a more thorough and precise treatment see Abel (). See also Abel (), and Abel (). In the following I make use of passages of these texts.

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contrast to the above car driving example, the operating room example not only showcases distributed knowledge types and perspectives inside one and the same person. The operating room example is, besides architecture, my favorite example for distributed and integrated knowledge types and epistemic perspectives among different persons, experts, institutions, and professions (e. g., the neurosurgeon, the technical engineer, the anestheologist, the cardiologists, the respiration specialist). (iii) Laboratories in the sciences – The activities in any experimental laboratory or research lab (in physics, biology, technology, psychology, and many others) showcase a complex interplay of various knowledge types, practices, and perspectives. One need only ask an experimental scientist to learn how multifaceted and distributedly specialized (hence: epistemically perspectivalized) their activities are. In experimental cultures we usually find many specialists cooperatively working together. Such situations can be described as constellations of interplay between distributed and integrated knowledge types, practices, and perspectives, focused on specific objects of investigation in a cooperative and integrative way. The kind of mechanisms and structuring of the interactions of different knowledge types and epistemic perspectives as shown at work in the three examples are clearly operative in architecture as well. In addition, a comprehensive architectural theory can also be seen and developed in these terms as architectural knowledge research. In order to make the concept of knowledge research work in architecture and its theory too, it seems helpful to elucidate the profile of this concept a little bit more closely, already in connection with the epistemic and epistemological challenges in architecture.

2.3 Knowledge research and its objects Apparently, Systematic Knowledge Research is more than just a taxonomy of different types of knowledge (such as, e. g., verbal, pictorial, theoretical, practical, technical, conceptual, scientific, propositional, non-propositional, explicit, implicit, aesthetic, and ethical knowledge). Basically, the focus is on two aspects: (i) that we have to assume an irreducible plurality of different and equally legitimate types of knowledge; and (ii) that we must look at their interactions and the active structuring of the various processes, products, and experiences constitutive for the understanding and shaping of our life-worlds, including architectural artefacts, as well as our relations to other persons and to ourselves. These two aspects are also suited to mark certain of the genuine characteristics of architecture and reflection on architecture and change the way we have

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been seeing them. The fact that we only recently started an intensive engagement with these issues in architectural theory is all the more surprising, given that in the science and practice of architecture we are already intimately acquainted with this interplay between distributed knowledge types and epistemic perspectives. This familiarity manifests itself in architecture, e. g., in the planning and realization of a building or an urban ensemble, across the whole spectrum from the first sketches and outlines to the direction of the construction site. And it also manifests in the integrative cooperation of a number of different professions (as, e. g., the leading architect’s office, the technical engineering experts, a city’s planning department, the building laws and regulations offices, the building client, the customers, and many others). If upon hearing all this someone bluntly asks what Systematic Knowledge Research precisely is and what makes it so valuable, I would say, partly by way of a summary, that we can specify at least five thematic areas and lacunae in architecture and architectural theory. Systematic knowledge research concerns: (i) The clarification of the foundational concepts and individual profiles of the various knowledge types and epistemic perspectives, including those manifested in architecture and architectural theory. (ii) The identification and study of the interfaces between the diverse knowledge types and perspectives that are necessary and effective in architecture in a particularly illuminating way. (iii) The clarification of the mechanisms of interaction and interpenetration between different and distributed knowledge types and perspectives. Analyzing these knowledge types and perspectives is indispensable for a comprehensive conception of both architecture and the theory of architecture. (iv) The registering and modeling of the dynamics of the various knowledge types and perspectives and their interplays (whereby the history of architecture and the history of architectural theory are seen as internally related two cooperative sides of the same medal). (v) The description and active structuring and shaping of the practices, manifestations, and dynamics of different knowledge processes that are of particular interest in architecture and its theory. I would like to emphasize that in this conception, Systematic Knowledge Research defines its domain by way of its objects of investigation. This methodologically central finding also holds for architectural knowledge research. Knowledge research can provide descriptions, analyses, methodical instruments, and cultural diagnoses as well as propose therapies and models in the five respects enumerated above. It seeks to clarify the mechanisms of the processes and phenomena involved, to intervene perspectivally and help to shape them, and thus creatively lead us to new processes, phenomena, products, and artefacts. Knowl-

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edge research is not spinning in the void or aiming at an ahistorical and apriori theory, neither in architecture nor in the other arts, sciences, and life-worlds. And what is the value of knowledge research, conceived this way in architecture as well as in the other areas mentioned? The answer is simple: knowledge research is valuable because the states, processes, and perspectives under its discussion are what constitutes and shapes the fluid functioning of human perceiving, feeling, speaking, imagining, thinking, doing, and acting just as profoundly as they shape the problem-specific and domain-specific activities in architecture and architectural theory, for instance. I hardly need to mention that Systematic Knowledge Research is research on knowing and knowledge and not just research on science, on the production and reception of science. Knowledge research includes the entire spectrum of other types of knowledge alongside scientific knowledge, and it includes them on equal terms. Thus, knowledge research begins with replacing the traditional picture of a pyramid of types of knowledge (with mathematical knowledge, as the most certain type of knowledge, at the very top) with a topological space of diverse knowledge types and epistemic perspectives. Within this topological space scientific knowledge represents a quite important and secure type of knowledge. But this type is not the only one or even the only metaphysically serious one. Practical knowledge, moral knowledge, knowledge by experience, knowledge by acquaintence, or aesthetic knowledge could also easily be distinguished in their central functions for our understanding of the world, ourselves, and others. The case of architecture is in my opinion an exemplary case of the interaction between different and distributed knowledge types and perspectives.

3 Mechanisms of distributed knowledge types and perspectives Obviously, various knowledge types and epistemic perspectives are at work in architecture. In light of this fact I would like to argue for a certain expansion and a different accentuation of architectural theory as architectural knowledge research. The following nine sub-section points shall outline this program.

3.1 A new picture of architecture I would like to argue, not for a meta-theory of architecture, but for a certain understanding of (i) architecture, (ii) the activity of the architect, and (iii) our

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speaking and thinking about architecture, in which architecture is seen as a practice of interaction and interplay between different and distributed knowledge types and epistemic perspectives. In such a view, the works, practices, and processes of architecture can be seen as manifestations of various ways of interplay, as built knowledge and perspectives and be analyzed and evaluated in that attitude. In architecture this change of view goes hand-in-hand with the suggestion to focus less on the older picture of the relation between theory and practice and supplement this picture or even replace it with the newer picture of the interplay between different knowledge types and perspectives. This is in fact the basic proposal I am promoting here. This proposal includes, among other things, suspending the question (that has been dominant so far in architecture) whether we should understand the relation between theory and practice as a causal relation or not. In regards to architecture, the traditional dichotomy of theory and practice has rather tended to narrow and obscure certain of the unique characteristics of architecture than to reveal them. At any rate the concepts theory and practice fail in certain respects to adequately capture many of the interactions between knowledge types and epistemic perspectives that are characteristic of architecture and that I will describe more closely. Even more: in the new picture I am proposing here, from the view of knowledge research, theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge are simply two specific types and orders of knowledge alongside a series of other types and orders that condition efficient architecture and successful building – they are not the only two types, to say the least.

3.2 Knowledge types and perspectives in architecture The types of knowledge that interact in architectural practice, in building, and in the works of architecture and that characterize excellent architects can be ideally listed as follows: knowledge of form; knowledge of function; imaginative knowledge; sensory knowledge; cultural knowledge; material knowledge; structuring and shaping knowledge; knowledge of sketches and blueprints; theoretical knowledge; knowing-how; knowledge of doing and action; experiential knowledge; scientific knowledge; artistic and aesthetic knowledge; creativity knowledge; ethical knowledge; practical and technical knowledge; implicit and explicit knowledge; pictorial knowledge; intuitive knowledge; knowledge of interactive communication and cooperation; knowledge of planning and building laws and regulations – and further types of knowing and knowledge.

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This is whithout doubt a quite sizable, virtually superhuman list of knowledge types and perspectives. Hence we can at least make two restrictions. Firstly, (i) we should emphasize that this is an idealized list of the knowledge types and perspectives involved, a list that would describe the perfect and divine architect. Secondly, (ii) we should emphasize that a specific building does not call for all possible knowledge types and perspectives but rather for a limited number with different priorities and preferences specific to its problems and cultural challenges. Indirectly, this idealized list gives us an idea about the multifarious ways architecture is interconnected with our life-worlds and lives and how much it hence matters for the shape and identity of our lived realities both descriptively and normatively. Building well is internally related to the idea of the good life. Whoever builds commits herself to the regulative idea of building well just as much as a person who secures her physical survival is at the same time committed to the idea of the good life as formulated by Aristotle (in his famous conception of the eu zen). In building, the question of epistemic as well as of ethical normativity (and thus of epistemic and normative perpectivity) does not come into play as a secondary duty or only retroactively after the meaning and value of a building or urban ensemble has come into question. It is in play centrally and constitutively from the very beginning.

3.3 Synchronical and diachronical interactions The interactions of different knowledge types and perspectives in architecture’s works and processes can be viewed in a synchronical (horizontal) as well as in a diachronical (vertical) way. This synchronically involves the interplay of multiple knowledge types and perspectives within a given time, culture, or situation and in light of various challenges (as, e. g., to know whether the challenge is to build a house, an airport, a museum, or a research laboratory). Diachronically, this concerns, firstly (i), the whole path from the first sketch to the organizational work at the construction site, and secondly (ii), the history of architecture from the first rudimentary buildings to the architecture of the present. In an extended approach that draws on the different and distributed knowledge types and perspectives in architecture, architectural theory is no longer an abstracted theory. It is not particularly a theory that could ideally be connected to an axiomatic system of the propositions of that theory. Rather architectural theory now looks more like systematic reflection on the synchronical as well as the diachronical interactions between the architectural knowledge types and perspectives. And in this way architectural theory takes the form of a per-

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spectival reflection upon architectural activities in history as well as in present time. The epistemic architectural perspective as well as the reflexive architectural knowledge are thus focused on what has manifested itself materially and formally in the history of architecture as well as in present-day architectural works, products, concepts, and processes. Methodologically and epistemologically this approach brings out, among other things, the crucial point that architectural theory has to define itself by way of the objects of its investigation – as Fritz Neumeyer⁴ never tires of emphasizing. This is quite a decisive point. Our thought about architecture by no means exhausts itself in a logical analysis of architectural concepts. Starting from the objects of investigation we need reflexive knowledge and epistemic perspective in order to come to a comprehensive and full-fledged theory and philosophy of architecture.

3.4 Predominances and coalitions of knowledge types and perspectives In light of the concrete works of architecture past and present, we should note again that not every work simultaneously embodies and presents all of the knowledge types and perspectives that can be realized in architecture. If this were a condition of successful building, it could only lead to entirely unenjoyable and incomprehensible works. Depending on the goal, function, and intended effect of the specific architectural work we find specific priorities, predominances, and coalitions among certain knowledge types and perspectives within a given time and culture. Moreover, these are only temporary priorities, predominances, and coalitions. We are systematically cut off from an a-epistemic, an a-perspectival, an a-contextual and an a-dynamical architectura perennis et universalis. For the types of knowledge involved in a specific work and under a specific perspective it makes a fundamental difference whether the building emerges, e. g., from a social responsibility, from the available material, from a design, from a function, from an artistic vision, from a customer’s wishes or from other aims and points of view. These components determine the specific form of the architectural work in its era as well as what we would call the epochal character and style of a building.

 See for example Neumeyer ().

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3.5 Distributed and integrated knowledge types and perspectives Architecture is a revealing example of the mechanisms of interaction within distributed and integrated knowledge types and perspectives. However, not only the buildings and ensembles of architecture as such are manifestations of these components. Every reflexive (and thus perspectival) theory of architecture too must explicitly take up these components in order to count as a comprehensive and explanatory fruitful theory at all. Planning and realizing a building or an ensemble (an open space or a public square, like Alexanderplatz or the Tempelhofer Feld in Berlin) occurs in processes that could not possibly be envisaged, let alone realized, without distributed knowledge types and perspectives among various persons, professions, and institutions. In architecture the problem-oriented and domain-specific cooperation between diverse knowledge types and perspectives is clearly necessary to ensure the functionality of the building or ensemble. None of the people, professions, and institutions involved in building could put together a functioning building or ensemble by themselves with their own characteristic knowledge type, perspective, and instrumental toolbox. The common point of reference for all the knowledge types, perspectives, and instruments involved in building finally is the idea of creating a good and functioning building or ensemble. Today the system of distributed knowledge types and perspectives in architectural constructions includes, among others, the following professions and institutions: architects, building contractors, site managers, construction workers, financial planners, civil engineers, material scientists, designers, city and regional planners, transport connection specialists, and experts on environmental impact, resilience, energy, and sustainability. For the architects, the interplay of knowledge types and perspectives obviously does not start only at the construction site. It begins at home, in first negotiations with the client, at the drawing table or computer, and is required throughout the process from the first sketches to the coordination of the work on the construction site. We need only remind ourselves of activities, internally correlated with different knowledge types and perspectives, for example: the first team meetings of involved persons, professions, and institutions (communicative knowledge); the first architectural sketches (pictorial knowledge); the draft of the whole (drafting knowledge); the formal composition (compositional knowledge); the intended aesthetic (aesthetic knowledge); the involved ethics (moral and ethical knowledge). And today, as a matter of fact, we have to include the computer aided architectural design, which affects architectural creation itself and presupposes, among other things, knowledge of computer graphics. All

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these different and distributed knowledge types include having to do with epistemic and normative perspectives relevant in putting specific components in the focus of our architectural attention. The more complex the proposed building – we might think again of the Elbphilharmonic Hall currently being built in the harbor district of Hamburg – the more diverse the number of experts and the more complex the relations of distributed and integrated knowledge types and perspectives under discussion.

3.6 Sense experience and conceptual reflection In light of all this, a substantial and comprehensive theory of architecture has to satisfy above all the following two demands: (i) It must be a reflection on the comprehensive activity of building, thus a thinking one’s way into the varieties of architectural knowledge types, perspectives, and practices that are operative in actual building. The goal of such reflection is to make the constitutive knowledge types and perspectives explicit concerning their distributed and integrative functions and interplays. This is what makes substantial descriptions, analyses, reflexive knowledge, and evaluations of architectural works and processes possible. (ii) Like every theory of art, the theory of architecture must intensify and expand aesthetic experience. Aesthetic experience (in architecture as well as in other arts and sciences) can be understood as an amalgam of the sensory and the intensification of sense experience through reflection. With its focuses, descriptions, analyses, and evaluations architectural theory contributes to the “maximal deepening of the sense perception”⁵ of the architectural works. To grasp sense, significance, meaning, and relevance of architectural buildings and urban ensembles is, among other things, to grasp reflexively the built architectural knowledge types and epistemic perspectives by ways of sensory experiences and conceptual thinking. In this context we hardly need to mention that both building and living with and in buildings in public spaces have a strongly formative impact on our lifeworld as well as on our personal and social identity. Thus, reflexive architectural

 This formulation comes from H. Paetzold, who used it in connection with Ernst Cassirer’s The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. See Paetzold (), . The formulation and the reference were brought to my attention by a lecture of Sigurd Rompza’s, “Konzeptionelle Kunst versus konzeptuelle Kunst – aus der künstlerischen Praxis zur künstlerischen Reflexion”, held at the Innovationszentrum Wissensforschung (IZW)/Berlin Center for Knowledge Research at the Technical University Berlin on June , .

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theory has a quite important job to do at the interface between sensuousness and understanding, i. e., between the nondiscursive sensuous knowledge and the discursive knowledge of the understanding in the built environment where we spend such a large portion of our lives. Architectural works essentially are part of our life-world, which might be considered in itself as a highly complex web of distributed and cooperative knowledge types and epistemic perspectives.

3.7 Scientific and artistic knowledge in architecture Prevailing since antiquity, architecture is frequently either understood in terms of the conceptual pair of science and art alone, or it alternatively is reduced to either scientific or artistic knowledge. Depending on the spirit of the particular era, either the scientist or the artist gets the upper hand. The heated dispute among both the architects and the architectural theorists as to whether architecture is an art or a science – a dispute that continues today – is evidence of this kind of bi-polarized reduction. Not infrequently both knowledge types and perspectives (science and art) are either set in opposition to one another or seen as an exhaustive dichotomy. Yet both of these positions fundamentally miss the multiplicity and complexity of the interactions between the different knowledge types and epistemic perspectives involved in architecture, in the practice of building, as well as in our perceiving, feeling, thinking, and speaking architecture. Given the broadened view of different knowledge types and epistemic perspectives, the conceptual pair of scientific and/or artistic knowledge is not the only pair that might be relevant in architecture. It also does not involve an either-or relation or a position in between. Rather, phenomenally, practically, and theoretically these two specific knowledge types and perspectives are always already inextricably interfused with one another alongside many others. Moreover it is important to emphasize that science and art as different knowledge types and epistemic perspectives cannot strictly or metaphysically be isolated from one another. It is well possible to argue that, to the contrary, art and science are different knowledge types and perspectives that nevertheless are significantly similar in a number of their procedures (e. g. in analysing, synthesizing, composing, and shaping their materials). In addition, it is worth emphasizing that the distinction between art and science is a heuristic distinction, not an ontological one. Apparently, it makes good sense to draw this distinction. However, it does not represent any logical, meta-

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physical, or ontological gap between the scientific and the artistic knowledge and perspective.⁶

3.8 Thinking in architecture I emphatically agree with Fritz Neumeyer and others that a meaningful architectural theory must be a thinking in and from architecture.⁷ Just like in Vitruvius’s famous challenge to “demonstrare atque exlicare”⁸, architectural theory must describe, clarify, reveal, and explicate the works, phenomena, processes, and practices of architecture from within their characteristic features, knowledge types, and epistemic perspectives. This endeavour also includes spelling out the effective impact of architectural works and phenomena on our ways of sensorily experiencing, perceiving, and feeling buildings and urban ensembles. Buildings always are felt buildings too. A comprehensive phenomenology of architecture is an essential part of this desideratum. Architectural theory should not be an idle aesthetic, a-epistemic, and a-perspectival exercise of metameta-theoretical attitude. Thinking in architecture essentially involves two efforts that complement and facilitate each other. On the one hand (i) one thinks one’s way reflexively into the works and practices of architecture. On the other hand (ii) one must make explicit and reflexively bring out the constitutive knowledge types and epistemic perspectives involved and at work in architecture and architectural theory. When both of these two efforts reciprocally succeed, explication and immersion intensify one another. This intensification takes place by means of sensory experiences as well as by the reflexion on the involved knowledge types and epistemic perspectives.

3.9 Explicit and implicit knowledge in architecture The interaction of explicit and implicit knowledge is of fundamental importance in architecture. Implicit, tacit, and unthematized knowledge deserve more attention that it typically gets.⁹ There is more to the works of architecture and the  For more on this point see Abel (), chapter : “Wissenschaft und Kunst” and chapter : “Logik und Ästhetik”.  As F. Neumeyer has emphasized in many conversations and texts, e. g., in Neumeyer ().  Vitruvius (), Book I, st chapter, .  The following is treated more thoroughly in Abel (), chapter II.,  ff.

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practices of architects than we explicitly know. There is a whole web of distributed and integrated knowledge types and epistemic perspectives, for example: manual crafts; designing abilities; competences; understanding; orientation in situations and contexts; entrenched habits; background conditions; non-cognitive attitudes; goals; purposes; networks of unconscious convictions; habituated patterns; and pre-intentional and unquestioned assumptions concerning, e. g., physical materials and processes, such as assumptions about the solidity and behavior of building materials as wood, steel, or glass – and many more components. All these implicit and unthematized knowledge types and perspectives have to come together in order to make a building possible and to make sense and relevance of it. There is more to architecture than meets the eye and explicit knowledge. However, in any case of successful building there is an effective interplay of the described knowledge types and epistemic perspectives. If that interplay lacks or fails, there is no successful building at all.

4 Creativity in distributed knowledge types and perspectives 4.1 Conceptual clarifications The question of the new and hence creativity plays an important role in architecture. Typically, the generation of something new is highly rewarded. This is the case in our everyday lives, as well as in the arts and sciences, and of course in architecture too. To be creative means to bring something new into the world, not just something different. Obviously, architecture brings forth new buildings and built ensembles that did not exist before. In the following, I would like to promote the thesis that creativity can be understood, in a nutshell, as an offspring of unexpected, bold, and productive interplays between different and distributed knowledge types and epistemic perspectives. Whenever we call persons, processes, and products creative, it turns out that knowledge types and epistemic perspectives play a constitutive role.¹⁰ In order to give a more detailed profile to this general thesis, I would first like to bring into the picture some distinctions we can apply to architecture too. The ways of creativity that I will briefly describe are: novelties; radical creativity;

 Outlines of a philosophy of creativity more extensively elaborated in Abel (),  – , and Abel (),  – . In what follows, I use a few aspects from both of these texts. Cf. in addition Abel ().

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weak, strong, and intuitive creativity. The more specific thesis is that these distinctive ways of creativity can be addressed and reformulated in the light of the general thesis mentioned. Firstly (1), there is an important difference between: (a) mere novelty in the sense of the first appearance of something, for example a novel but traditionally designed office building; and (b) genuine creativity in the sense of generating something radically new, for example by shaping a public space or a whole urban ensemble, district, or landscape in a truly innovative way and different style. Obviously, we can produce many things in the sense of novelties with a different, new value by combining elements that are already known. However, in genuine or radical creativity (for example, in the works of path-breaking artists, scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs, and, obviously, architects), known elements are not just recombined within an already existing system. Instead, new principles and rules come into effect. Materials, forms, and shapes are reorganized. New processes, practices, and artefacts (like, e. g., buildings) are born. Famous examples are the Copernican Revolution, which stated that the sun does not revolve around the earth, but the earth around the sun; the transition to non-Euclidean geometry; the shift to perspectival painting and architecture; and the development of computers and new technical systems and their use, among others, in architecture too. Apparently, architecture is teeming with novelties, but genuine creativity is the exception. However, that which is radically new on the other hand reveals a new positive value that was not there before at all. This description applies to architecure and to the other arts and sciences as well as to our everyday life-worlds and life practices. There are certain questions and proposals which can be seen as indicators of a search for new creative strategies related to the interplay of knowledge types and epistemic perspectives. Think of questions and proposals like “Why don’t we try to solve the problem by bringing together the different types of knowledge A, B, and C under the perspectives X and Y in an up till now unusual way?” or: “Let’s see what happens when we bring such-andsuch knowledge types and epistemic perspectives into interactive and emergent ventures”. Secondly (2), it might be helpful to distinguish three forms of creativity and to apply these distinctions to architecture. One might distinguish: (a) weak creativity in the sense of the above-sketched novelties; (b) strong creativity in the sense of a modification, transformation, and replacement of previous rules, prin-

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ciples, and laws with new ones.¹¹ And I would like to add a third form of creativity to this twofold distinction, namely (c) intuitive or modest creativity. All three forms of creativity can be thematized as being emergent offsprings from the interplays between different and distributed knowledge types and from changes in epistemic perspectives. The expression “intuitive creativity” refers to the creativity in all processes that essentially involve human imagination, without necessarily breaking the rules and principles of previous practices. Examples are easy to be found. Think, e. g., of your perceptual recognition of another person, say of Uncle Paul on the other side of the street, whom you saw a weak ago in London. There is much imaginative and recognitional activity at work which we can call intuitive creativity in order to re-identify Uncle Paul. Or think, e. g., of a native speaker’s competence to use the words of a language relating their actual use with their meaning in previous and different situations and contexts. Apparently, in recognizing other persons as well as in using words at different times and in different contexts, situations, and attitudes, there is always a lot of intuitive creativity at work, involved, and demanded. As to creativity, architects and architectural firms first of all rely on their intuitive and thus basic creativity. This type of creativity is manifest as soon as architects have to bring in, to distribute, and to integrate imaginative perspectives, images, perceptions, and thoughts into a sketch, a blueprint, or a constructional model, for example. Such activities demand imagination from the individual as well as the team- and process-related ability to bring different knowledge types and epistemic perspectives into a current process (such as drawing up a blueprint) where these components are not already actual.¹² This ability is characteristic of imagination, fantasy, and creativity in general and, obviously, of crucial importance in architecture too. Intuitive creativity already goes beyond weak creativity, since it does not just combine given elements in a new way. Rather it calls up currently non-actual components and relates them to what is called a creative solution to a specific challenge or problem. Thus, the creative emergence of the new can, among other ways, be understood as an emerging offspring from the unexpected, unpredictable, and productive interplay of distributed knowledge types and changes in epistemic perspectives. In this context, we can see again that in architecture as well as in the other arts and sciences and in our everyday lives, creativity does not emerge only in

 With emphasis on this aspect, see also Hausman (), .  On these mechanisms, see Abel (), chapter , “Imagination und Kognition”.

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exceptional minds and exceptional firms. In architecture as well as in other areas creativity begins in the normal course of successful architectural work. Creativity is characterized by its bringing into the account features like fantasy, imagination, unexpected, uncalculable thoughts and images alongside the whole spectrum from architectural sketches up to the problem-solving ideas at the construction site. As I said earlier, I am promoting the thesis that going back into the distributed interplays between the different knowledge types and epistemic perspectives may help to give a revealing reaction to the riddle of creativity (which is to know how new knowledge and perspectives are generated, in architecture as well as in the other areas of human activities).

4.2 Creativity as emergent offsprings In architecture we find almost all the characteristics of creative individuals as well as of the creative processes themselves.¹³ In both respects creativity can be described and analyzed as unpredictably emergent offsprings of the interplays of different and distributed knowledge types and epistemic perspectives. That is the main thesis I want to promote and to elucidate along what follows until the end of the given article. Firstly (i), I will name some of the psychological characteristics of creative individuals. Secondly (ii), I will spell out some of the systemic features of creative processes. Both ways of addressing questions of creativity go hand in hand. This distinction too is made only for heuristic reasons. It is not a metaphysical or ontological distinction, and it does not assume a logical gap between the two. (i) Creative individuals, hence creative architects too, show a number of psychological characteristics which are not at all limited to one and only one type of knowledge and perspective. Rather, they are connected with and entrenched in the interplays and overlaps of different and distributed knowledge types and epistemic perspectives. These characteristics include, among others: a well-developed sense of imagination (of, e. g., visual thinking, pictorial and fictional knowledge); a willingness to look for new challenges and to take new perspectives; a disposition to withstand or even welcome situations of uncertainty; an open sense for opening oneself for thought experiments; advanced goal-setting and problem-solving skills (of bringing together, e. g., mathematical, physical, technical, chemical, and biological knowledge); the attitude to prefer creative but not yet watertight solutions; the ability to construe new structures and quick-

 For more details on what follows in this paper, see Abel ().

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ly find regularities in seemingly chaotic situations (in, e. g., cooperatively bringing together different knowledge types and epistemic perspectives for structuring and shaping as well as for coping with new challenges); a willingness to call into question traditional assumptions, standards, and norms (by taking into account, e. g., knowledge types and epistemic perspectives that have not been employed until now for organizing, structuring, and shaping the materials under discussion in a new way); producing surprising visualizations (by using, e. g., visual, pictorial, diagrammatic, perceptual, fictional, and thought-experimental knowledge and perspectives); and last but not least: paying attention to one’s humor, for if you have no sense of humour, fun, and play, you are unlikely to ever be considered creative and innovative. (ii) What applies to the personality traits of creative individuals applies systemically even more to the phenomenology and the mechanisms and structures of creative processes themselves. In what follows I want to offer a brief phenomenology of creativity, the elements of which I call “assumptions about creativity” – the set of requirements that one presupposes as given and satisfied in cases where creativity is acribed to persons, processes, problem solutions, and products. The assumptions about creativity might include the below listed activities which are of a crucial relevance in our everyday lives as well as in the arts and sciences. Hence and apparently they are relevant in architecture too, more precisely in the whole spectrum from first visual ideas, images, and sketches to architectural structuring, shaping, and modeling and up to the organizational work at the construction site. The examples I will be giving in brackets of each of the following creativity assumptions are taken from the field of architecture only. However, I could easily give examples from everday life as well as from the particular arts and sciences. Some of the key-assumptions and characteristics of creative processes are the following: (i) Venturing to combine new problem-solving methods, practices, and strategies in new ways (e. g., by transfering and applying building principles from natural organisms to the construction of architectural artefacts, for instance in transfering stability mechanisms from bionics to architecture). (ii) Thinking and practicing in a more problem-oriented way and with less pre-established discipline-orientation (e. g., by focusing on the specific challenges in construing a museum or a hospital, focusing on design thinking while considering more than just one isolated disciplinary approach. (iii) Venturing sketches and blueprints that have not been realized yet in architecture (e. g., by coming up with a new way of sketching and generating ideas and prototyping them, i. e., to make them visually and conceptually vivid starting points of architectural constructions).

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(iv) Generating multidimensional associations (e. g., by including visual, sensory, material-oriented, aesthetical, functional, constructional, and language-related knowledge and perspectives). (v) Coupling predicates and subjects to unusual judgments and practices (e. g., by bringing together not yet used and not yet realized visual versions of architectural building and shaping of urban environment). (vi) Drawing analogies between widely separate fields, realms, or referents only remotely associated with each other (e. g., by bringing Asian or African components and their incorporated knowledge types and epistemic perspectives into the Western way of doing architecture, like, e. g., the kind of harmony sometimes enactively embodied in Asian buildings and landscape ensembles). (vii) Producing metaphors and transferring them from one area to another in order to organize the materials, forms, ideas, and practices in a new and informative way (e. g., doing architecture by imitating the way organisms shape themselves and their environment, or, e. g., by taking geometrical forms as the basic building elements of building, or, e. g., by pushing constructions to the limits of what can be done with given materials, with wood, steel, glass, or ceilings for example). (viii) Simultaneously activating two or more ideas, images, thoughts, and practices and getting them to interact (e. g., in cases of different challenges, for instance in building a museum or football stadium and the aesthetically correlated types of knowledge and epistemic perspectives). (ix) Prompting thought experiences (e. g., bringing imaginative and fictional ways of knowledge and perspectives into play). (x) Breaking common and traditionally established ways of seeing and visual thinking (e.g, by provoking and guiding our eyes in different ways to see and to read buildings, their perceptual shaping, and other architectural details differently). (xi) Modifying and, if necessary, violating traditional ideas (e. g., by no longer building in a purely functionalist way or in a purely aesthetically dainty or showmanship way). (xii) Risking discontinuities (e. g., by breaking with a purely formalistic or a purely functionalistic style and way). (xiii) Withstanding uncertainties (– as, e. g., in not simply giving up an idea of architectural construction with new materials just because the first attempts did not succeed). (xiv) Changing cognitive perspectives (e. g., by changing from form to material or from a functional to a sensory experiential, to an aesthetical, or to an ethical perspective in building).

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(xv) Changing practical and technical perspectives (e. g., by changing the constructional techniques and procedures, facing new challenges for instance regarding the stability and acoustic features of a music hall). (xvi) Raising new points of view (e. g., by moving from a purely geometrical way of construing buildings to life-world-oriented, environment- and sensory experience-related types of building). (xvii) Juxtaposing methods of one discipline with those of others (e. g., by bringing functionalist and material-oriented methods together with methods of doing construction with new and synthetical materials and techniques or with aesthetical and ethical methods of a good building for a good life). (xviii) Risking category mistakes (e. g., by using visual, fictional, and aesthetical perspectives in concrete material-related architectural activities, for instance by bringing together materials like wood, glass, and steel). (xix) Switching between different epistemic perspectives and descriptive systems (e. g., by switching from visual systems to verbal and semantic descriptions or to aesthetical and ethical descriptions of building and urban environments). (xx) Modifying hidden collusions, rules, and norms (e. g., by changing the background constellations and interplays between for instance a functionalist, an aesthetical, and an ethical assumption and perspective). (xxi) Modifying, transforming, and violating established rules, principles, patterns, and worldviews (e. g., by changing the description system and by importing new rules from foreign knowledge types and epistemic perspectives, and thus establishing new rules and principles). Such and many other features touch on the phenomenologically and struturally intrinsic features of processes of creativity itself, not only on the personality traits of creative individuals. The features sustainably manifest that creativity processes are, among other things, dependent upon the interplay of different and distributed knowledge types and epistemic perspectives. The offspringing creativity can happen along the personality traits in an individual person, in a creative individual. However, at the same time, creativity can systemically be construed as a surprisingly upcoming effect in changes of different and distributed knowledge types and epistemic perspectives. I would like to coin this dimension of creativity “social creativity”. The term apparently does not mean new intelligent ideas in managing challenges in social life or social institutions. The term also does not simply mean a “shared creativity” in the sense of a creativity collectively shared with other persons. Rather, the term focuses on the constitutive role of the public and social space for creativity. This space can be described and analyzed with appeal to, among other things, the interplays of different and distributed knowledge types and epistemic perspectives. When it

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comes to an unpredictable, uncalculable, and always delightful emergence of creativity, these interplays have successfully been at work. Translated from German by Karsten Schöllner and Hadi Nasir Faizi

References Abel, Günter (1999): Sprache, Zeichen, Interpretation, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. Abel, Günter (2006): “Die Kunst des Neuen. Kreativität als Problem der Philosophie.” In: Günter Abel (ed.), Kreativität. Proceedings of the XXth German Congress for Philosophy, Hamburg: Meiner, 1 – 21. Abel, Günter (2008): “Forms of Knowledge: Problems, Projects, Perspectives.” In: Peter Meusberger/Michael Welker/Edgar Wunder (eds.), Clashes of Knowledge. Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Knowledge and Space, Heidelberg, 2006, Dordrecht: Springer, 11 – 33. Abel, Günter (2009): “The Riddle of Creativity.” In: Peter Meusburger/Joachim Funke/Edgar Wunder (eds.), Milieus of Creativity, Dordrecht: Springer, 53 – 72. Abel, Günter (2012): “Knowledge Research: Extending and Revising Epistemology.” In: Günter Abel/James Conant (eds.), Rethinking Epistemology (Berlin Studies in Knowledge Research, vol. 1), Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 1 – 52. Abel, Günter (2013): “Unused Knowledge.” In: W.I.R.E. (Web for Interdisciplinary Research & Expertise), No. 11: The Allure of the New. On the myth of innovation, Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 29 – 36; German translation: “Das ungenutzte Wissen.” In: W.I.R.E., Nr. 11: Der Schein des Neuen. Thesen zum Mythos der Innovation, Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 29 – 37. Abel, Günter (2014) : “Die Wissensformen der Architektur. Plädoyer für eine Vernetzung von Wissensforschung und Architekturtheorie.” In: Dieter Eckert (ed.), Die Architektur der Theorie. Fünf Positionen zum Bauen und Denken, Berlin: Dom Publishers, 39 – 57. Abel, Günter (2015): “Formen des Wissens im Wechselspiel.” In: Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 40, 143 – 160. Hausman, Carl R. (1998): “Creativity. Conceptual and Historical Overview.” In: Michael Kelly (ed.), Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 453 – 456. Neumeyer, Fritz (2002): “Nachdenken über Architektur.” In: Fritz Neumeyer (ed.), Quellentexte zur Architekturtheorie, München: Prestel Verlag, 9 – 79. Neumeyer, Fritz (2014): “Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Theorie für den Architekten.” In: Dieter Eckert (ed.), Die Architektur der Theorie, Berlin: Dom Publishers, 87 – 101. Paetzold, Heinz (1994): Die Realität der symbolischen Formen. Die Kulturphilosophie Ernst Cassirers im Kontext, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Plümacher, Martina (2012): “Epistemic Perspectivity.” In: Günter Abel/James Conant (eds.), Rethinking Epistemology (Berlin Studies in Knowledge Research, vol. 1), Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 155 – 172. Vitruvius (1991): De architectura decem libri [um 30 v. Chr.] – Zehn Bücher über Architektur, translation and explanatory notes by Curt Fensterbusch, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 5th edition, book I.

Christoph Lütge

Wettbewerb im unternehmerischen Handeln Abstract: Competition in Entrepreneurial Acting. This article examines competition using the prime example of entrepreneurial acting and interprets competition as a principle of orientation of perspectives towards each other. Actors in economic competition do not just take into account what competitors do and what options they have. They also orient themselves towards their clients’ wishes and include their partners’ possibilities. This orientation towards the activities of other persons contains potential for innovation, because a functioning competition forces the actors to refer to each other in a flexible way and economic competition rewards good and best achievements. An important requirement for this productivity of competition however is the implementation of rules that counteract the erosion of moral in distributed perspectives of competition.

1 Wettbewerb: Begriffe und Konzepte Das Handeln unter Wettbewerbsbedingungen ist für viele Tätigkeiten zentral. Dafür ist es nicht notwendig, Unternehmerin sein, sondern es genügt, dass man sich in seinem Handeln mit anderen messen muss. Das trifft natürlich besonders auf Akteure in den klassischen ökonomischen Märkten zu, aber auch auf (beispielsweise) Sportler, Mitglieder von Vereinen, und viele andere. Denn der Wettbewerb ist kein primär ökonomisches, sondern ein viel allgemeineres Konzept:¹ Um dies zu verdeutlichen, unterscheide ich den Wettbewerb vom Wettkampf. Wettbewerb ist der Zustand eines Konkurrenzstrebens mehrerer Akteure, das sich allerdings nicht dauerhaft von selbst erhält, sondern Regeln benötigt.Wettbewerb ist damit ein höchst artifizielles, empfindliches Gebilde. Der Wettkampf dagegen – im Extrem der Hobbes’sche Kampf aller gegen alle – entsteht naturwüchsig und führt in der Regel nicht dauerhaft zu wechselseitiger Besserstellung. Diese Unterscheidung findet sich etwa bei Ludwig von Mises: „Es ist nichts als eine Metapher, wenn man den Wettbewerb Wettkampf oder Kampf schlechthin nennt. Die Funktion des Kampfes ist Vernichtung, die des Wettbewerbs Aufbau.“²

 Vgl. Lütge ().  Mises ().

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Sandra Richter hat einen großen Teil der Geschichte der Begriffe Wettbewerb und Konkurrenz aufgearbeitet.³ Schon Grimms Wörterbuch sieht danach den Wettbewerb als einen Schlüsselbegriff des späten 18. und des 19. Jahrhunderts an. Im Englischen wird für den Wettbewerb der Begriff ‚competition‘ verwendet, der sich vom lateinischen ‚competere‘ und ‚competitio‘ herleitet. Es handelt sich dabei um einen Begriff aus dem juristischen Bereich, der eine gerichtliche Forderung und ein juristisches Verfahren um einen strittigen Gegenstand bezeichnet, das festgelegten Regeln folgt. Es unterscheidet sich somit stark von jenem anderen lateinischen Wort ‚concurrere‘, das, etwa bei Caesar, aus der militärischen Sphäre stammt. Im Wettbewerb muss es nicht um Geld, nicht einmal primär um materielle Güter gehen.Wettbewerb kann sich um alles drehen,was die beteiligten Akteure als Vorteile für sich ansehen. Dies entspricht dem modernen Vorteilsbegriff der Ökonomik, der seit den Arbeiten Gary Beckers (1930 – 2014) ein offener ist und sich von der Beschränkung auf monetäre und materielle Vorteile seit langem gelöst hat. Ich unterscheide hier zusätzlich zwischen Markt und Wettbewerb: der Markt ist eine bestimmte ökonomisch-technische Umsetzung und Implementierung des Wettbewerbs. Der Markt lebt wesentlich von Angebot und Nachfrage und benötigt ebenfalls klare und durchgesetzte Regeln, sonst bleibt er nicht dauerhaft stabil. Im Unterschied zu manchen Vertretern der Ökonomik (etwa Becker), die Märkte als universelles menschliches Prinzip des Zusammenlebens ansehen, möchte ich hier aber den Gebrauch des Begriffes ‚Markt‘ auf klassische Bereiche der Wirtschaft eingrenzen, etwa Rohstoffmärkte, Gütermärkte, Aktienmärkte und so weiter. Der Wettbewerb ist dagegen ein viel fundamentaleres Prinzip, bei dem es – in einem viel allgemeineren Sinn – um verteilte ‚Perspektiven‘ geht. Auf den Märkten – genauer gesagt: auf gut funktionierenden Märkten mit Regeln – ist der Wettbewerb für das Handeln von Unternehmern von fundamentaler Bedeutung. Zunächst einmal muss man dabei mit einem weit verbreiteten Irrtum aufräumen: auf Märkten, im Wettbewerb, herrscht nicht in erster Linie Freiheit. Aus der Perspektive der meisten beteiligten Akteure sind Märkte in erster Linie durch Zwänge, Sachzwänge, Kostendruck, Leistungsdruck und dergleichen mehr gestaltet. Dadurch, dass die Anbieter auf den Märkten zueinander in Konkurrenz treten, sind ihre Freiheiten beschnitten. Auf einem gut funktionierenden Markt muss man das anbieten, was die Kunden wollen – man kann nicht nur Trabants und Wartburgs produzieren. Die Freiheit entsteht dagegen auf der anderen Seite des Marktes: auf der Seite der Nachfrage. Die Kunden haben die Möglichkeiten und die Wahl.

 Richter (),  ff.

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Es scheint somit, als habe der Wettbewerb sowohl Vorteile als auch Nachteile. Beide werden im Folgenden näher beleuchtet.

2 Vorteile und Nachteile des Wettbewerbs Die Marktwirtschaft ist kein Selbstzweck. Vielmehr erbringt sie viele ethische Leistungen. Die ordnungsethische Tradition in der Wirtschaftsethik weist seit vielen Jahren darauf hin, dass sich Wettbewerb und Moral keineswegs ausschließen.⁴ Das heißt, dass auch das Instrument Wettbewerb daran gemessen werden muss, welche Leistungen es nicht nur für die Unternehmer oder die „Wirtschaft“ erbringt, sondern für alle von ihr Betroffenen. Und hier sind viele Kritiker (in der Vergangenheit und gegenwärtig) der Meinung, dass der Wettbewerb hauptsächlich von Nachteil ist. So meint etwa Karl-Heinz Brodbeck (Financial Times Deutschland vom 14.09. 2004): „Die Moral aber ist das Gegenteil von Wettbewerb; sie hat die Aufgabe, den anderen einzubeziehen, lehrt das Miteinander, nicht das Gegeneinander.“ Ähnliche Kritik äußern zahlreiche weitere Autoren, etwa Friedhelm Hengsbach oder Hartmut Rosa.⁵ Die grundlegenden Vorteile des Wettbewerbs hat allerdings bereits Friedrich August von Hayek in seinem berühmten Aufsatz „Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren“ herausgestellt:⁶ Zunächst einmal belohnt der Wettbewerb erfolgreiche Innovationen (daher bezeichnet ihn Hayek gerade als Entdeckungsverfahren). Der Pionierunternehmer, der nicht nur eine gute Idee hat, sondern diese in eine Innovation am Markt erfolgreich umsetzen kann, wird mit Pioniergewinnen belohnt. Zum unternehmerischen Erfolg gehört nicht nur eine vielleicht gut gemeinte, aber versponnene Erfinder-Idee, sondern vor allem auch die gelungene Organisation, Strukturierung und Effizienz des Produktionsprozesses einer Innovation. (Das unterscheidet beispielsweise das iPad von seinen durchaus vorhandenen, aber erfolglosen Vorgängern der Tablet-Computer.) Zum zweiten zwingt der Wettbewerb die Mitbewerber, sich an die erfolgreiche Innovation des Pioniers anzupassen. Sie werden damit dazu gebracht, das zu produzieren, was die Kunden wünschen – und nicht das, was die Produzenten gerne hätten.

 Zuerst Homann (), vgl. aktuell Lütge (), Homann/Lütge () sowie Lütge/Mukerji ().  Hengsbach (), Rosa ().  Hayek (/).

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Drittens verarbeitet der Wettbewerb um Größenordnungen mehr Informationen als eine zentrale Behörde. Dieser Aspekt war Hayek besonders wichtig: Nur die einzelnen Akteure im Wettbewerb können wissen, was sie wann, wie und wo benötigen – und kein Fünf- oder Vier-Jahresplan. Und schließlich ist der Wettbewerb auch insofern ein zutiefst demokratischer Mechanismus, als er Machtpositionen systematisch erodieren lässt. Kein Wettbewerber kann dauerhaft sicher sein, dass nicht plötzlich ein neuer Unternehmer in den Markt eintritt und ein Konkurrenzprodukt anbietet, das ihn überflügelt. In funktionierenden Marktwirtschaften mit gut geregeltem Wettbewerb können sich Machtpositionen, die nicht durch Wettbewerbsleistungen erworben sind, nur mit systematischer Unterstützung des Staates behaupten. (Das gilt im Übrigen genauso im politischen Bereich, denn hier konkurrieren Rahmenordnungen selbst miteinander.) Diese internationale Konkurrenzsituation in der Globalisierung wird von vielen als bedrohlich empfunden, und manche Gruppen sehen sich als Verlierer der Globalisierung. Man kommt jedoch mittlerweile nicht mehr an der Erkenntnis vorbei, dass die Globalisierung – bei aller berechtigten Kritik – auch viele positive Seiten hat, in weiten Teilen der Welt die Lebensbedingungen von Milliarden Menschen massiv verbessert hat und noch weiter verbessern wird. Ein letzter Punkt wird besonders von der Wirtschaftshistorikerin Deirdre McCloskey betont:⁷ Funktionierender Wettbewerb steht auch im Dienste der Entfaltung und persönlichen Selbstverwirklichung der Menschen. Ein System ohne Wettbewerb liefert dagegen im Hinblick auf das gerade heute sehr aktuelle Thema Diversity deutlich weniger als ein wettbewerblich verfasstes System. Die Kritiker des Wettbewerbs weisen aber auf tatsächliche oder vermeintliche Nachteile des Wettbewerbs hin. H. Rosa etwa schreibt, der Wettbewerb führe zur „Überschussproduktion“ und stelle „daher eine außerordentlich verschwenderische Form sozialer Organisation dar“.⁸ Dieses Argument hat Hayek im selben Aufsatz bereits widerlegt:⁹ Von unnötiger Überschussproduktion kann man nur sprechen, wenn man im Vorhinein weiß, was von wem produziert werden soll und was jeder einzelne Nachfrager oder Konsument erwerben oder konsumieren will. Das weiß man aber in der Regel nicht. Die vermeintliche Überschussproduktion im funktionierenden Wettbewerb ist damit keine überflüssige, sondern eine notwendige, nämlich um die beste und innovativste Lösung durch den Wettbewerb erst herauszufinden.

 McCloskey (), ().  Rosa (), .  Hayek (/).

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Rosa führt zweitens an, der Wettbewerb verstärke die „natürlichen oder sozialen Ungleichheiten zwischen den Menschen“.¹⁰ Bestehende Bildungs- oder Vermögensunterschiede würden sich durch den Wettbewerb noch weiter vertiefen und vergrößern. Dieses Argument greift zu kurz. Erstens: Es ist zwar richtig, dass der Wettbewerb nicht alle Menschen gleich macht. Die sozialistischen Experimente des 20. Jahrhunderts haben m. E. hinreichend gezeigt, dass eine solche möglichst weitgehende Gleichmacherei nicht wünschenswert ist. Das heißt aber zweitens nicht, dass die weniger gut Ausgestatteten vom Wettbewerb keinen Vorteil haben. Im Gegenteil: Ein funktionierender Wettbewerb stellt eine Win-WinSituation dar. Beispiele dafür finden sich zuhauf: Man wird kaum bestreiten können, dass etwa viele ehemalige Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländer (etwa Südkorea, Taiwan, Brasilien, mittlerweile auch afrikanische Staaten wie Angola oder Mosambik) davon profitiert haben, sich in stärkerem Maße als früher dem Wettbewerb – wohlgemerkt kontrolliert und im Rahmen von Regeln – geöffnet haben.¹¹ Auch auf individueller Ebene nützt der Wettbewerb den schlechter Gestellten: nur bei funktionierendem Wettbewerb können weniger Bemittelte tatsächlich in einer Gesellschaft aufsteigen und den bisher besser Gestellten die Position streitig machen. Die Alternative ist eine sozialistische Gesellschaft oder der traditionelle Ständestaat. Rosas drittes Argument ist, dass sich im Wettbewerb eine gewisse „Stromlinienförmigkeit“ durchsetze, die „kauzige Originalität“ zum Verschwinden bringe.¹² Aber es gibt für viele Probleme nicht nur eine Lösung oder nur einen Weg. Das gilt schon für die biologische Evolution; sie zeigt überall auf der Welt, dass Spezies andere nicht einfach auf ganzer Linie verdrängen, sondern dass es immer verschiedene Lebensräume gibt, die nebeneinander existieren¹³. Biologische Probleme haben ganz unterschiedliche Lösungen. Und genauso ist es im Wettbewerb: ob es um Wohneinrichtungen, Bekleidung, Bierbrauerei, Fahrzeuge, Dienstleistungen wie Friseure, Gastronomie und private Bildungsanbieter sowie auch um Bücher, Kunstgegenstände, Musikstücke u. a. geht, man wird wohl kaum behaupten können, dass Wettbewerb, eine Verteilung der unternehmerischen Perspektiven, in diesen Bereichen zur Uniformität führt. Rosas letztes Argument ist, dass Wettbewerb von einem Mittel zum Selbstzweck eines Systems werden kann. Die „Erhaltung der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit“

   

Rosa (), . Vgl. dazu etwa Moyo () und Shikwati (). Rosa (), . Vgl. etwa Mayr ().

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werde „unvermeidlich zum wert- und zielopportunistischen Selbstzweck“,¹⁴ und deswegen müsse man über eine „radikal wettbewerbsbeschränkende Reform der Sozialorganisation moderner Gesellschaften“ nachdenken. Dieses Argument ist zwar durchaus ernst zu nehmen, aber es übertreibt. Wenn Wettbewerb wirklich systematisch „leer liefe“ und niemandem nützte, so hätte man ein echtes Problem erkannt. Rosa behauptet, Konkurrenz habe „erhebliche, ja totalisierende Konsequenzen für die individuellen Möglichkeiten der Lebensführung“.¹⁵ Dass es im Wettbewerb prima facie auch „Verlierer“ gibt, ist unvermeidlich. Unternehmen müssen auch in Konkurs gehen können. Aber: Einzelne haben in einem funktionierenden Wettbewerb auch die Chance, sich wieder neu zu entwerfen – jedenfalls innerhalb gewisser Grenzen. Es wäre nicht wünschenswert, dass der Wettbewerb überhaupt keine „schöpferische Zerstörung“¹⁶ anrichtete. Das Neue kann nur in die Welt kommen, wenn man sich als Individuen von Althergebrachtem löst und wenn sich Unternehmen – als kollektive Akteure – völlig neu ausrichten und auf veränderte Situationen flexibel einstellen können. Wir alle haben den Nutzen vom System Marktwirtschaft und vom Wettbewerb, von seinen Vorzügen bei der Bereitstellung von Gütern. Dabei fallen gelegentlich auch selektive Nachteile für Einzelne und Gruppen an, die sich – zumindest vorübergehend – als Verlierer der Globalisierung und der Marktwirtschaft fühlen. Diese Nachteile kann man abfedern, was nicht nur einen ethischen, sondern auch einen ökonomischen Sinn hat: Es ist von Vorteil für alle, wenn keine dauerhaften Verlierer entstehen, sondern alle wieder in das ‚Spiel‘ Marktwirtschaft einsteigen können. Aber: Wenn man abfedert, muss es das entscheidende Ziel sein, den Wettbewerb zu verbessern, oder ihn zumindest nicht zu schwächen. Hilfen für Betroffene dürfen nicht in einer Weise ausgestaltet sein, dass sie dazu führen, die Menschen dauerhaft aus dem Wettbewerb, und das heißt: aus der Erwerbstätigkeit, herauszuhalten. Das ist weder ethisch noch ökonomisch vertretbar. Stattdessen müssen Hilfen den Wettbewerb stärken, ihn zum Nutzen aller intensivieren. Der Nutzen und die Produktivität des Wettbewerbs entstehen nicht von selbst, sondern werden durch geeignete Regeln des Wettbewerbs hervorgebracht. Darauf werde ich im Folgenden eingehen.

 Rosa (), .  Rosa (), .  Schumpeter (/).

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3 Ordnungsethik: Regeln des Wettbewerbs Zum produktiven Wettbewerb gehören geeignete Regeln. Es war vor allem der Nobelpreisträger James Buchanan (1919 – 2013), der in Die Begründung von Regeln ¹⁷ die grundlegende Bedeutung von Regeln sowohl für die Politische Ökonomik als auch für die Ethik in der Marktwirtschaft hervorhob. Die legitimen Erwartungen der Einzelnen kommen durch das (demokratische) Regelsystem zustande: erst die Etablierung eines (demokratischen) Regelsystems generiert die Erwartungssicherheit, die auch die Voraussetzung von Gerechtigkeit (im ganz klassischen Sinn) ist. Wenn berechtigte Erwartungen verletzt werden, liegt eine ungerechte Behandlung vor,weil Regeln nicht eingehalten wurden. Kurz: Handlungen unter den verteilten Perspektiven des Wettbewerbs sind dann gerecht, wenn sie Regeln folgen. Regeln ihrerseits sind gerecht, wenn sie Metaregeln, Regeln höherer Ordnung folgen. Buchanans Gedanke einer Hierarchie von Regeln, die in unterschiedlichem Maße Zustimmung benötigen, ist dabei zentral. Hier liegt der entscheidende Unterschied zu einer Konsenstheorie ohne Knappheitsbedingungen (und damit vielen Spielarten der Diskursethik¹⁸): durch die Einführung einer Regelhierarchie wird berücksichtigt, dass ethische Konzepte wie Gerechtigkeit in der Realität unter Bedingungen der Knappheit, d. h. hier insbesondere unter Wettbewerbsbedingungen, implementiert werden müssen. Wenn man Gerechtigkeit nicht nur als abstrakt zu begründendes Konstrukt ansieht, muss man die Bedingungen ihrer Implementierung thematisieren. Man kann hundertprozentige Handlungsgerechtigkeit nicht in jedem Einzelfall verlangen, man kann nicht für alle in modernen Demokratien und Marktwirtschaften anfallenden Einzelfälle eine hundertprozentig ‚handlungsgerechte‘ Lösung verlangen. Man kann aber sehr wohl verlangen, dass systematisch anfallende Gerechtigkeitsprobleme durch die Etablierung gerechter Regeln gelöst werden. Diese Regeln müssen dabei nicht in jedem Fall staatliche, insbesondere nicht zwingend nationalstaatliche Regeln sein. Zum einen kann es sich um überstaatliche Regeln handeln, wie sie etwa auf europäischer oder internationaler Ebene etabliert werden und einen immer größeren Raum einnehmen. Zum anderen können aber auch unterhalb der staatlichen Ebene Regeln, etwa auf Branchenebene, verfolgt werden, die mitunter wesentlich wirksamer sein können als jene, die erst in einem langen nationalstaatlichen Gesetzgebungsprozess zustande

 Brennan/Buchanan (/).  Vgl. Habermas (/). In der Wirtschaftsethik etwa Scherer et al. () und Ulrich (). Siehe dazu auch Lütge (), Kap. ..

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kommen (etwa im stark an Bedeutung gewinnenden Bereich der Corporate Social Responsibility¹⁹). Eine klassische Tugend der ethischen Tradition ist die Mäßigung. Sie war bereits in der Antike eine Kardinaltugend und ist bis heute in der wissenschaftlichen wie auch in der populären Literatur zu finden. R.D. Precht formuliert Mäßigung als Zielvorstellung: danach sollten wir uns alle (und zwar nicht nur ein bisschen) zurücknehmen; wir sollten alle ein bisschen weniger konsumieren. Precht bezieht das nicht nur auf die persönliche Lebensführung, sondern auch auf Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im großen Maßstab: Wir müssten weg von der Wachstumsidee, weg von der insgesamt ständig Neues produzierenden Ökonomie.²⁰ In einer modernen Wachstumsgesellschaft aber kann diese Mäßigung kontraproduktiv sein.²¹ Sparen und andere Arten von Mäßigung können für die persönliche Lebensführung durchaus sinnvoll sein, aber unter Wettbewerbsbedingungen wollen wir gerade nicht, dass Unternehmen sich mäßigen. Denn dann leisten die verteilten Perspektiven im Markt nicht das, was sie für uns alle als Konsumenten sollen. Mäßigung war in der vormodernen Gesellschaft funktional: Die Akteure in vormodernen Gesellschaften waren zwar in der Lage, ihre Handlungen zu kontrollieren, kaum jedoch die Bedingungen dieser Handlungen. Insbesondere blieben Regeln wie Gesetze, Verfassungen, soziale Strukturen, die Marktordnung und andere über Jahrhunderte hinweg unverändert. In modernen Gesellschaften hat sich dies grundlegend geändert. In dieser Lage sollte die Ethik stärker Regeln in den Blick nehmen. Ethische Normen sollten durch anreizkompatible Regeln implementiert werden. Direkte Handlungsanweisungen ohne Änderungen der Regeln führen nur zu einer Erosion der Normenbefolgung. Individuen, die sich ‚moralisch‘ verhalten, müssen – vor allem in Situationen von der Art des Gefangenendilemmas²² – aus dem Wettbewerb ausscheiden. Drei Folgerungen für das ordnungsethische Regelkonzept sind hiermit verbunden: Erstens können nur Regeln die Situation für alle Teilnehmer zum selben Zeitpunkt ändern. Zweitens können nur Regeln, weil sie sanktionsbewehrt sind, die Anreize dauerhaft ändern. Drittens kann der Wettbewerb nur durch ‚Einbau‘ von Moral in die Regeln produktiv werden, nämlich indem die Handlungen der

   

Vgl. Crane et al. (). Precht (), vgl. dazu Lütge (). Lütge (). Vgl. Homann/Lütge ().

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Einzelnen im Prinzip ‚moralfrei‘ ablaufen können. Mit Hilfe der Regeln – der Rahmenbedingungen – können durch den Wettbewerb Vorteile für alle Beteiligten realisiert werden. Dies ist der klassische Gedanke Adam Smiths:²³ Der Markt fördert die Interessen aller, wenn seine Regeln in geeigneter Weise gestaltet sind. Dann können mittels des Eigeninteresses die ethisch erwünschten Handlungen vom Markt hervorgebracht werden. Regeln eröffnen somit neue Möglichkeiten für Handlungen. Vor allem aber dürfen Regeln und Handlungen nicht in Widerspruch zueinander geraten. Moralisches Handeln kann nur erwartet werden, wenn dem keine Anreize auf der Regelebene entgegenstehen. Im Gefangenendilemma kann von den Gefangenen keine Kooperation erwartet werden, weil die Bedingungen der Situation, die Spielregeln, Kooperation mit Defektion des Partners bestrafen. Mit anderen Worten: In Gefangenendilemma-Situationen sehen sich die Akteure dauerhaft der Gefahr der Ausbeutung durch andere gegenüber – und daher beginnen sie gar nicht erst zu kooperieren, sondern greifen zur Strategie der präventiven Gegendefektion.²⁴ Dies führt dann zu einem Ergebnis, das alle Beteiligten schlechter stellt: Es kommt zum ‚Crowding-Out‘ der Moral. Gegner könnten an dieser Stelle einwenden: Die Akteure dürfen zwar im Rahmen der Regeln ihre eigenen Interessen verfolgen, aber beim Zustandekommen der Regeln im politischen Prozess müssen die Einzelnen über ihre eigenen Interessen hinausgehen und moralisch-altruistische Erwägungen berücksichtigen. Die Ordnungsethik begründet jedoch auch – mit Buchanans Figur der Regelhierarchie – Regeln selbst wiederum mit Vorteilen. Die Zustimmung jedes einzelnen Mitglieds der Gesellschaft, jedes Betroffenen, ist das einzige Kriterium für die Auswahl von Regeln. Diese Zustimmung ergibt sich nur, wenn sich die Akteure davon langfristig Vorteile versprechen.²⁵ Nur solche Regeln stabilisieren, die dauerhaft und systematisch allen ihnen Unterworfenen Vorteile nicht nur versprechen, sondern auch tatsächlich liefern. Ein weiterer Aspekt: Die meisten ethischen Theorien, ob konsequenzialistisch oder deontologisch, suchen zuerst nach einer Rechtfertigung für Normen und danach nach Wegen zu deren Durchsetzung. Dabei werden jedoch die sozialen Bedingungen für die Implementierung von Normen, insbesondere die Rahmenbedingungen moderner Gesellschaften, erst in zweiter Linie berücksichtigt. Hier gibt es keinen Raum für den Gedanken, dass eine Norm möglicherweise nicht zu rechtfertigen ist, weil sie sich – dauerhaft und systematisch – nicht durchsetzen  Smith (/).  Vgl. dazu Homann/Lütge ().  Vgl. Buchanan (/) und Brennan/Buchanan (/). Die ethische Dimension von Buchanans Arbeiten wird behandelt in Lütge ().

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lässt. Dieser Gedanke entspricht aber durchaus einer alten ethischen Regel: Sollen impliziert Können. Die Ordnungsethik verändert daher die theoretische Reihenfolge in der Ethik: Implementierungsfragen von Normen werden bereits im Rechtfertigungsprozess gestellt. Moralische Normen können von den Einzelnen nicht Verzicht verlangen, d. h. Verzicht, das Eigeninteresse zu verfolgen. Akteure verzichten darauf, ‚unmoralische‘ Vorteile zu erlangen, nur, wenn die Einhaltung der Normen auf die Dauer, über die jeweilige Sequenz von Handlungen hinweg, größere Vorteile verspricht als die Defektion im Einzelfall. ‚Verzichten‘ heißt dann nicht Verzicht, sondern Investition in höhere Erträge auf längere Sicht. Im Wettbewerb kann keine Ethik vom Einzelnen systematisch und dauerhaft verlangen, seine Vorteilskalkulation auszusetzen. Ethik kann allerdings verlangen, diese Kalkulation zu verbessern, in zweierlei Hinsicht: Zum einen sollte längerfristig statt kurzfristig kalkuliert werden, und zweitens sollten die Interessen der Interaktionspartner ins Kalkül gezogen werden, denn die Akteure in modernen, interdependenten Gesellschaften sind – mindestens – auf die Tolerierung ihrer Handlungen durch andere angewiesen. Die vormoderne Ethik der Mäßigung hatte sich unter den Bedingungen vormoderner Gesellschaften entwickelt und stellte die Frage der Implementierung von Moral nur implizit, denn: Die Implementierung moralischer Normen konnte unter vormodernen Bedingungen noch als unproblematisch angesehen werden. Vormoderne Gesellschaften konnten aufgrund ihrer Face-to-Face-Interaktionen Normverstöße noch direkt sanktionieren. In modernen Gesellschaften dagegen sind Face-to-Face-Interaktionen nur noch die Ausnahme. Der Regelfall ist die anonyme Massenkommunikation,²⁶ in der Regelverstöße nicht mehr direkt geahndet werden können. Daher muss die Implementierungsfrage explizit gemacht und in neuer Weise beantwortet werden. Die Ordnungsethik setzt hier auf Sanktionen zur Durchsetzung anreizkompatibler Regeln. In modernen Gesellschaften müssen Regeln und Institutionen, mindestens zu einem großen Teil, jene Aufgaben übernehmen, die in der Vormoderne von der – mit Face-to-Face-Sanktionen bewehrten – Moral erfüllt wurden. Die Implementierung von Normen unter den verteilten Perspektiven des Wettbewerbs muss dabei der Erosion von Moral vorbeugen, und das heißt, sie muss die systematische Ausbeutung moralischer Akteure durch andere verhindern.

 Vgl. etwa Luhmann ().

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4 Verstärkter Wettbewerb in der Globalisierung Die Globalisierung hat den Wettbewerb der Unternehmen, aber auch vieler anderer Akteure, deutlich intensiviert. Und es stellen sich hier unternehmerische und ethische Herausforderungen in neuem Maßstab. Ein Beispiel möchte ich aus der Fülle von Fällen herausgreifen: Es kann in Zeiten der Globalisierung durchaus möglich sein, dass einzelne Zweige eines multinationalen Unternehmens aus lokaler Sicht noch profitabel wirken, aber nicht in das Gesamtkonzept des Konzerns passen. Es gehört zum Wettbewerb dazu, dass Unternehmen diese Entscheidungen aus dem Interesse ihrer Eigner heraus treffen und sie nicht abhängig von anderen Faktoren machen – es sei denn, diese nutzen dem langfristigen Unternehmenserfolg. Der Fall des Unternehmens Nokia von 2008 sei hier beispielhaft genannt: Nokia kündigte 2008 an, sein Handy-Werk in Bochum zu schließen, die Fertigung nach Rumänien zu verlagern und damit etwa 3000 Mitarbeiter zu entlassen. Die Reaktionen waren heftig, sie reichten von „Subventionsabzocke“ bis zu „Riesen-Schweinerei“²⁷. Aber diese Diskussion wurde weitgehend an den Gegebenheiten des Wettbewerbs vorbei geführt. Denn erstens war Nokia bereits der letzte Handy-Hersteller, der noch in Deutschland produzierte; andere (wie Motorola oder BenQ Mobile) waren bereits vorher abgewandert bzw. hatten die Produktion komplett eingestellt. Zweitens lagen die letzten Subventionen für Nokia schon zehn Jahre zurück. Man kann ein Unternehmen heute – angesichts der Schnelllebigkeit des Wettbewerbs – nicht mit staatlichen Subventionen zehn Jahre lang an einen Standort binden. Drittens wurden in Rumänien etwa 3500 Arbeitsplätze geschaffen: Müsste man nicht gerade mit ethischen Argumenten begrüßen, dass eine wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in bisher benachteiligten Regionen stattfindet? Nach Rawls’ Gerechtigkeitskriterium beispielsweise sollen die am schlechtesten Gestellten einen Vorteil haben – dies müsste dann auch für rumänische Arbeitnehmer gelten. Aber schließlich, und am wichtigsten: Wer sind die „Schuldigen“? Das Unternehmen Nokia wurde an den Pranger gestellt. Aber die eigentlich Verantwortlichen sind – in den verteilten Perspektiven einer Marktwirtschaft – wir alle, als Konsumenten im Wettbewerb. Wir alle wollen günstige und trotzdem stetig verbesserte Handys. Das geht zwangsläufig nur dann, wenn Unternehmen ständig ihre Kosten senken. Und auch wenn Personalkosten nur 5 % der Gesamtkosten betragen, so kann dies bei intensivem Wettbewerb eine Menge ausmachen. Man kann in dieser Situation von Nokia keine Mäßigung oder eine Garantie für Ar Opel-Vertrauensmann Wilfried Moryson.

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beitsplätze verlangen. Denn das würde gerade die Leistung des Gesamtsystems Wettbewerb behindern und seine ökonomische wie ethische Leistungsfähigkeit für alle schwächen. Das System erbringt somit eine ethische Leistung. Nicht Individual-Ethik, sondern eine System-Ethik für den Wettbewerb ist notwendig.

5 Zur politischen Rolle von Unternehmen im Wettbewerb Wettbewerb bringt Verantwortung mit sich, und intensivierter Wettbewerb bringt gestiegene Verantwortung mit sich. Wie bereits erwähnt, können auch Regeln unterhalb der staatlichen Ebene im Wettbewerb eine wichtige Rolle spielen – im eigenen Interesse der beteiligten Unternehmen. In der heutigen Welt der Globalisierung ist die Verantwortung der Unternehmen mit ihren Handlungsmöglichkeiten gewachsen. Nach Karl Homann haben Unternehmen eine dreifache Verantwortung: 1) Zum einen sind Unternehmen im Rahmen der bestehenden Gesetze für ihre Handlungen und deren unmittelbare Konsequenzen verantwortlich (Handlungsverantwortung). Unternehmen müssen sich an Gesetze halten, und sie tragen Verantwortung für ihre Produkte, ihre Marketing-Methoden, ihre Einstellungspolitik, ihre Unternehmenskultur usw. Auch Investitionen in Bildungsprogramme, der Kampf gegen Korruption und Diskriminierung und philanthropische Aktivitäten können hier eingeordnet werden. Diese Aktivitäten sind wichtig, aber meist sind sie nicht zwischen Unternehmen koordiniert, da die Zusammenarbeit mit Konkurrenten oft gescheut wird. Daher lassen sich strukturelle Probleme der Welt wie Hunger, Armut, Terrorismus, Umweltzerstörung nicht systematisch in dieser Weise angehen. 2) Zweitens tragen Unternehmen Verantwortung für die soziale und politische Rahmenordnung, innerhalb der sie arbeiten (Ordnungsverantwortung). Auf der nationalen Ebene ist diese Rahmenordnung leicht auszumachen. Auf der globalen Ebene existieren jedoch bisher bestenfalls Bruchstücke hiervon, und die Aufgabe der Unternehmen kann nur darin bestehen, bei der Verbreitung der Menschenrechte, der Verbesserung von Rechtssystemen, Eigentumsrechten usw. konstruktiv mitzuarbeiten. Hierbei handelt es sich ebenfalls um (langfristige) Investitionen zur Sicherung des nachhaltigen Geschäftserfolgs. 3) Neben der Handlungs- und der Ordnungsverantwortung gibt es noch ein drittes, oft übersehenes Element von Verantwortung: die Diskursverantwortung. Im Diskurs gebrauchte mentale Modelle können Blockaden herbeiführen – politische

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und ökonomische Blockaden; viele Menschen betrachten es als ihre moralische Pflicht, dem Markt und dem sog. Neoliberalismus Widerstand zu leisten. Diese Menschen lassen sich auch nicht durch im engeren Sinn ‚ökonomische‘ Vorteile überzeugen, etwa durch ein erhöhtes Bruttosozialprodukt, sondern nur durch Engagement in einem Diskurs über die sozialen und ökonomischen Strukturen der Welt. Aus der Perspektive einer Ordnungsethik etwa kann man zeigen, dass sich viele traditionelle moralische Ideale besser dadurch fördern lassen, dass man Wettbewerb – innerhalb einer geeigneten Rahmenordnung – intensiviert, statt ihn abzubremsen. Aber dies muss argumentativ gezeigt werden. Die Diskursverantwortung von Unternehmen fordert diese auf, in einen öffentlichen Diskurs über die soziale und politische Ordnung der globalen Gesellschaft einzutreten. Denn jene Menschen, die diese Ordnung nicht mit ihren eigenen normativen Modellen, mental oder sprachlich formuliert, in Übereinstimmung bringen können, werden viele wechselseitig fruchtbare Kooperationen blockieren. In manchen Fällen werden diese Menschen auch noch bestätigt durch schlechte Argumente für den Markt. Hierzu zählt etwa das Argument, dass der Markt doch nicht so schlimm sei, da wir doch auch Tugenden wie Verlässlichkeit und Loyalität im Markt beobachten könnten. Das bestätigt im Übrigen wiederum, dass der Markt selbst im Allgemeinen aber eben doch schlecht und unmoralisch sei. Tugenden seien nur da, um den Markt von seiner Unmoral zu befreien. (Außerdem lassen sich natürlich Verlässlichkeit und Loyalität auch im organisierten Verbrechen finden.²⁸) Ein zweites Beispiel ist der Begriff ‚Soziale Marktwirtschaft‘. Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft wird nicht selten damit gerechtfertigt, dass das ‚Soziale‘ die antisozialen Konsequenzen des Marktes korrigieren soll. Im Gegenzug erscheint der Markt dann natürlich als moralisch mindestens zweifelhaft. Auch für dieses normative Modell könnte Diskursverantwortung übernommen werden, in dem Sinne, dass der Begriff ‚sozial‘ hinterfragt würde: Sozial sind Maßnahmen, die den Markt besser, produktiver und daher ethisch wünschenswerter machen. Sozialversicherungen können in diesem Sinn als echte Versicherungen rekonstruiert werden, die es den Einzelnen erlauben, im Wettbewerb höhere Risiken auf sich zu nehmen, da sie im Fall des Scheiterns auf die Unterstützung durch das soziale System zählen können.Wenn das Konzept Soziale Marktwirtschaft in der globalen Wirtschaft überhaupt überleben soll – und z.T. wurde ja schon das „Ende der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft“²⁹ verkündet – dann muss es sich als produktiver als andere Konzepte erweisen. Und das muss auch kommuniziert werden.

 Vgl. etwa Gambetta ().  Münchau ().

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Allerdings können die Unternehmen ihre Diskursverantwortung nicht allein bewältigen. Die Wirtschaftsethik kann dabei helfen, ethische Grundgedanken aus der Ökonomik zu entwickeln, zu strukturieren und in die öffentliche Debatte hineinzutragen.

Konklusion Für das unternehmerische Handeln in der modernen, globalisierten Gesellschaft sind der Wettbewerb und seine Bedingungen von zentraler Bedeutung. Die Verteilung der Perspektiven setzt Unternehmer zwar massiv unter Druck, führt aber gleichzeitig zu systematischen, strukturellen ethischen Verbesserungen für die Akteure. Dafür ist allerdings eine funktionierende Rahmenordnung notwendig, die allerdings nicht nur von staatlicher Seite, sondern auch von den Unternehmen selbst – aus eigenem Interesse – gefördert werden kann und wird.

Literatur Brennan, Geoffrey/Buchanan, James M. (1985/1993): Die Begründung von Regeln: konstitutionelle politische Ökonomie, Tübingen: Mohr. Buchanan, James M. (1975/1984): Die Grenzen der Freiheit: zwischen Anarchie und Leviathan, Tübingen: Mohr. Crane, Andrew/Matten, Dirk/McWilliams, Abagail/Moon, Jeremy/Siegel, Donald S. (Hg.) (2009): The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gambetta, Diego (1993): The Sicilian Mafia. The Business of Private Protection, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Habermas, Jürgen (1983/1999): „Diskursethik: Notizen zu einem Begründungsprogramm.“ In: Jürgen Habermas, Moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives Handeln, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 53 – 125. Hayek, Friedrich August von (1968/1994): „Der Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren.“ In: Friedrich August von Hayek, Freiburger Studien: gesammelte Aufsätze (2. Aufl.), Tübingen: Mohr, 249 – 265. Hengsbach, Friedhelm (1995): Abschied von der Konkurrenzgesellschaft: Für eine neue Ethik in Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, München: Knaur. Homann, Karl (1990): „Wettbewerb und Moral.“ In: Jahrbuch für Christliche Sozialwissenschaften 31, 34 – 56. [wieder abgedruckt in: Christoph Lütge (Hg.) (2002): Vorteile und Anreize: zur Grundlegung einer Ethik der Zukunft, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.] Homann, Karl/Lütge, Christoph (2013): Einführung in die Wirtschaftsethik (3. Aufl.), Münster: LIT. Lütge, Christoph (2006): „An Economic Rationale for a Work and Savings Ethic? J. Buchanan’s Late Works and Business Ethics“ In: Journal of Business Ethics 66, 43 – 51.

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Lütge, Christoph (2009): „Gegen eine Ethik der Mäßigung.“ In: Katja Gentinetta/Karen Horn (Hg.), Abschied von der Gerechtigkeit: Für eine Neujustierung von Freiheit und Gleichheit im Zeichen der Krise, Frankfurt a. M.: Frankfurter Allgemeine Buch, 99 – 106. Lütge, Christoph (2010): „Der böse Markt oder: Geschichten aus der Gruft.“ In: Focus, 76 ff., http://www.focus.de/magazin/archiv/debatte-der-boese-markt-oder-geschichten-aus-dergruft_aid_574335.html (Zugriffsdatum: 13. 07. 2015). Lütge, Christoph (2012): Wirtschaftsethik ohne Illusionen: ordnungstheoretische Reflexionen, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. Lütge, Christoph (2014): Ethik des Wettbewerbs, München: Beck. Lütge, Christoph (2015): What Holds a Society Together? Order Ethics vs. Moral Surplus, Lanham, Md.: Lexington. Lütge, Christoph/Mukerji, Nikil (Hg.) (2016): Order Ethics: An Ethical Framework for the Social Market Economy, Heidelberg/New York: Springer. Luhmann, Niklas (1989): „Ethik als Reflexionstheorie der Moral.“ In: Niklas Luhmann, Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik. Studien zur Wissenssoziologie der modernen Gesellschaft 3, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 358 – 447. Mayr, Ernst (2003): Das ist Evolution, München: Bertelsmann. McCloskey, Deirdre (2006): The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. McCloskey, Deirdre (2010): Bourgeois Dignity: Why Economics Can’t Explain the Modern World, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mises, Ludwig von (1922): Die Gemeinwirtschaft (2. Aufl.), Jena: Gustav Fischer. Moyo, Dambisa (2011): Dead Aid: Warum Entwicklungshilfe nicht funktioniert und was Afrika besser machen kann, Berlin: Haffmans & Tolkemitt. Münchau, Wolfgang (2006): Das Ende der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft, München: Hanser. Precht, Richard D. (2010): Die Kunst, kein Egoist zu sein. Warum wir gerne gut sein wollen und was uns davon abhält, München: Goldmann. Richter, Sandra (2012): Mensch und Markt: Warum wir den Wettbewerb fürchten und ihn trotzdem brauchen, Hamburg: Murmann. Rosa, Hartmut (2006): „Wettbewerb als Interaktionsmodus: kulturelle und sozialstrukturelle Konsequenzen der Konkurrenzgesellschaft.“ In: Leviathan: Berliner Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft 34 (1), 82 – 104. Scherer, Andreas G./Palazzo, Guido/Baumann, Dorothee (2006): „Global Rules and Private Actors: Towards a New Role of the TNC in the Global Governance.“ In: Business Ethics Quarterly 16 (4), 505 – 532. Schumpeter, Joseph (1912/1952): Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. Eine Untersuchung über Unternehmergewinn, Kapital, Kredit, Zins und den Konjunkturzyklus (5. Aufl.), Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. Shikwati, James (2012): „Die Optimierungsfalle: Warum sich Afrika aus der westlichen und asiatischen Entwicklungshilfe befreien muss.“ In: Kursbuch 171. Smith, Adam (1776/1990): Der Wohlstand der Nationen: eine Untersuchung seiner Natur und seiner Ursachen (5. Aufl.), hg. u. übers. v. Horst Claus Recktenwald, München: dtv. Ulrich, Peter (1997): Integrative Wirtschaftsethik: Grundlagen einer lebensdienlichen Ökonomie, Bern et al.: Haupt.

Part II: Interplays

Reinhard Wendler

On the Perspectivity of Model Situations Abstract: This essay describes a model situation in which several people gather around a model and discuss it. This produces a multiperspective and polymedial dynamic setting that is defined by the following core characteristics: Firstly, the very essence of the object that is conceived of as a model¹ plays a role: a theoretical concept that is conceived of as a model reacts differently to a three-dimensional object that is conceived of as a model. Every way in which the model is constituted triggers another performance. Secondly, how the model is perceived plays a role, that is to say, its concrete relations to its referential entities. One and the same object can be conceived of as a model of and for very different things – and this in perceptibly different ways, for instance, as an isomorphism, representation or simplification, as an example, pattern or rule, as a tentative concretisation, a preliminary reference and much more. Thirdly, further elements in the model situation play a role, such as who perceives the model and with which intentions, expectations and hopes, etc., which other models and people are involved, etc. Each element of a model situation can alter the course of a discussion, judgement, the formation of knowledge or design process. In this dynamic, multifactor system, this essay focuses on the complex of aspects in the interplay of different perspectives on a model, presents two examples of such a situation and discusses some of its special features.

1 People have probably gathered around models and discussed them since classical antiquity. Wolfram Hoepfner conjectures that the lost tracts on the theory of architecture that Vitruvius mentions were produced as a result of such public debates.² There is concrete evidence of such gatherings in the early modern

 The concept of model applied here is Bernd Mahr’s model of models. See Mahr ().  “In klassischer Zeit mußten Entwürfe von Bauten in der Volksversammlung zur Billigung vorgelegt werden. Dabei wurden auch Modelle gezeigt und es kam darauf an, in einen geschliffenen Vortrag zu überzeugen. Solche Vorträge waren höchstwahrscheinlich die Grundlage für die Schriften, die nach Vitruv über bestimmte Bauten von ihren Architekten verfaßt wurden.” (Hoepfner (), ) Translated: “In the classical era, building plans had to be presented to the public assembly for approval. Models were also shown, and it was a case of convincing those assembled with a polished speech. It is highly probable that such speeches formed the

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era, in particular in the medium of images and more rarely in the form of descriptions. A leading example is Vasari’s account of a gathering around Antonio da Sangallo’s model for St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome. In 1546, Michelangelo met with the former colleagues of Sangallo, the recently deceased lead architect of St Peter’s. The subject of the debate was the current design, embodied in a gigantic wooden model. Vasari’s account of the debate about the model is without doubt more concerned with rhetorical effect than giving an accurate representation. But it is precisely its pedagogic character that provides insights into the contemporary understanding of the special perspectivity of model situations. Vasari records that Sangallo’s supporters had presented the model to Michelangelo with the suggestion that it should be used as an “inexhaustible meadow”³. Amongst other things, here the hope is expressed that the new lead architect would not completely discard the previous plans. According to Vasari, Michelangelo replied that it was indeed a meadow but only for oxen and sheep that knew nothing about art. He said the building was so full of nooks and crannies that rapists could impregnate nuns in its dark corners, and it looked so Gothic, that is, antiquated and foreign, and was so complicated that its completion should not be expected before the Last Judgement. With this overstatement, Vasari seeks to idealise Michelangelo as the superior artist whose powerful eloquence rescues the project from the grasps of a mafia-like circle and the clutches of unsuitable planning methods. In Vasari’s account, Sangallo’s model, today located in the Vatican Museums, becomes the object and crystallisation point for opposing perspectives: on one side are Sangallo’s supporters. They want as much as possible of the existing plans to be retained. Their positions, money and functions are linked to specific elements of the model. If the model is changed, the organisational structures and cash flows on the building site would also change. On the other side is Michelangelo’s authority as an artist, backed by the Pope. He wants to create freedom for his own plans not only in relation to the building but also with respect to power relations. A new plan would eliminate both the elements of the old model and the factions clinging to them. The different perspectives give the model two different identities. One of these identities is a model of the beliefs and requirements of the Catholic Church, the Pope and the Curia and for a specific construction project; the sec-

basis for the manuscripts about certain buildings that, according to Vitruvius, their architects wrote.”  Vasari (), .

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ond identity is a model of the interests of the Sangallo clan and for the creation and retention of benefices. The Sangallo clan wants to keep the first model identity; Michelangelo wants to impose the second. The struggle between the perspectives for dominance is expressed in the battle of model identities. Like a picture puzzle it veers back and forth between being a model for the greatest building of Christianity and a “technical image”⁴ of the Sangallo clan’s interests. Until this day, Sangallo’s model poses particular challenges for art historical accounts because several diverging identities are superimposed in it. It does not call for a representation of the production and effects of a planning tool with a specific function; instead it calls for a representation of the struggle between several diverging identities for one and the same object. In the debates of art historians, such as those on the fetish character of Sangallo’s model,⁵ the inner contradictions of a historical model situation have an academic afterlife.

2 Sangallo’s model is no exception. All the great Renaissance architectural models pose a challenge for art historical accounts. None of them can be definitively assigned one particular role or function because they were all the cause and object of diverging perspectives.⁶ However, the phenomenon of multiple model identities is not specific to the early modern era nor to the discipline of architecture. The accumulation of several identities can be observed in other domains, and there too, it is the result of a collision of different perspectives on a model and the struggle for a continuously dominating perception. Wherever models are discussed and argued about: in academia, in planning, in the arts, in design and before the court. Different perspectives always shed light on different sides of the model, project and discussion, and intensify the diverging identities in the object. Vasari’s anecdote about the debate in front of Antonio da Sangallo’s model shows changing model identities in its most exaggerated form. Another example demonstrates that it is not only the gathering that can plunge the model into an identity crisis: the model can also plunge the gathering into one. A material model had such an effect in a case before the Israeli High Court of Justice in 2004. The case concerned the route of the wall between the West Bank and Jer-

 Badiou (), .  Satzinger (),  ff., Bredekamp (), , Bredekamp (), .  Lepik (), Evers ().

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usalem near Beit Sourik. The model commissioned by the lawyer Mohammed Dahla showed three possible routes of the wall in green, blue and red. It concretised a sphere of possibility and simultaneously showed three of the options put forward by the parties to the case. Eyal Weizman has described and analysed the model’s influence on the case in depth. In his book The Least of All Possible Evils. Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza, he writes: [B]ecause the judges bench was too high and the table too low, the judges could not see the model with sufficient clarity from where they sat, and they had to step down to look at it properly. The judges also called the lawyers from both parties to join them.⁷

The specific presence of the model thereby gave rise to new spatial and visual frameworks. Petitioners, respondents and judges assembled around the model. The court descended into momentary disorder. The physical presence of the model disturbed the legal protocol, and introduced its own rules of language.⁸

According to Weizman, the model, initially conceived as a purely legal document, turned the legal process into a design process: By this means and others it was now the model that was the most important agent in the discussion that followed. […] The legal process came to resemble a design session, with the parties making their points on the model, sometimes balancing their pens on its miniature topography to try out alternatives.⁹

In Weizman’s view, one of the model’s central effects was to make the previously undebatable route of the wall suddenly negotiable: one would say that the model […] has participated in the de-congealing of forces that were previously ossified into the pre-existing form of the wall that the state of Israel started to build. And all of a sudden, in court, the wall becomes elastic, becomes negotiable, becomes prone to push and pull, and that happens within the arena of law itself.¹⁰

 Weizman (), .  Weizman (a),  f., cf. Weizman (), : “Later, Dahla recalled, ‘All of a sudden, no one was using terms such as “your honour” or “my learned friend”’.”  Weizman (), , cf. Weizman (a),  f.  Weizman (b),  f.

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The presence of the model not only altered the positioning of people in the room, their roles and perspectives, the language and negotiability of the wall’s route; it also changed the character and the identity of the gathering as such.

Fig. 1: Court Sketch of the Israeli High Court gathering around the Beit Sourik model, drawn by Christine Cornell. Source: Weizman (2011), 73.

The courtroom artist Christine Cornell captured the arguing parties and a wide spectrum of different reactions and behaviours in her sketches (Figure 1). The raised judges’ chairs in the background are empty; all the parties have gathered around the model and are on the same level. While the woman in the right foreground seems to be rather preoccupied with her own thoughts, like the other woman to the right of the centre and the men at the far left adopting the thinker’s pose, the two groups refer directly to the model in their discussion, talking and touching it. The dialogue in the background may be about both the model and the entire model situation. One of the judges looks directly at those contemplating the image. By means of this visual strategy developed in early modern painting, he involves them in the process of opinion formation and design. The identity change described by Weizman from a legal process to a design process is expressed here in the mixture of two types of image. On the one hand,

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the drawing is a classic courtroom sketch, like the many thousands Christine Cornell has produced in her career. On the other, it is a studio scene in an architect’s practice and hence a typical representative of a widespread type of image from the iconography of architecture.¹¹ From Ludwig Mies van der Rohe via Eero Saarinen to Frank Gehry and Herzog & De Meuron, such photographs have been taken time and time again. They show the architects as conscientious planners; they show the legally significant presentation of a model to the client, etc. The iconographic amalgamation of this type of image with that of a courtroom sketch can be seen as a kind of symptom of the transformation of the legal process described by Weizman. The types of image come together as a result of the dynamics of the process and are superimposed in the style of a palimpsest, just as the legal process and the design process are superimposed.

Fig. 2: Court Sketch of Judge Aharon Barak in front of the Beit Sourik model, drawn by Christine Cornell. Source: Weizman (2011), 74.

 Wendler ().

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This interrelationship can also be observed in a second image (Figure 2). It shows Justice Aharon Barak bending over to the side of the model and closing one eye to get an impression of how one of the planned routes of the wall would be positioned in the landscape. Such poses have been well known in the field of architecture for centuries. They show the architect as an expert who plans carefully and does not act without reflecting. In this case, it shows a judge in the role of an architect and concerned with planning issues instead of legal questions. Visually and in the imagination, lowering the angle of vision miniaturises the viewer by enlarging the model. The aim is to gain an impression of the possible future presented by the model from the perspective of a passer-by in the model landscape. Aharon Barak attempts to look into the future like an architect who is planning a building. Here too, the image type “courtroom sketch” is overlaid with the image type “the architect deliberately planning”, and the phenomenon of iconographic fusion reflects the transformation from negotiation to design.

3 In the model situation in 1546 described by Vasari, the identity of the gathering as an argument about who was to have ultimate authority for the planning of St. Peter’s remains comparatively stable, while the model assumes two competing identities. By contrast, in the model situation in 2004 described by Weizman, the identity of the model as a sphere in which possibilities have been ordered remains comparatively stable, while the gathering assumes two competing identities. On the issue of the perspectivity of models, this indicates that firstly a model’s performance changes as perspectives shift and interact, and secondly the model influences the way in which it is perceived. This results in a circular influence or, more accurately, a spiral influence. Wartofsky has pointed out that these kinds of processes by no means only affect secondary aspects. In his essay Models as modes of action (1968), he writes: [S]ome models […] transform the total vision of those who involve themselves in the model. They are radical and revolutionary in their effect. They are modes of action which act by infection upon an age and its consciousness, and they help release energies and possibilities of the imagination and mind beyond anything that the model itself exemplifies. That is, the model produces more than it contains.¹²

 Wartofsky (), .

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The effect of the Beit Sourik model follows this pattern. It may have been intended to merely represent the landscape of Beit Sourik, but in the process, it acted as a “revolutionary model” in Wartofsky’s sense of the term and changed the “total vision” of those involved. In this way, the model indirectly influences itself, changes its performance and its effect on those involved. The revolutionary models in Wartofsky’s sense and those involved with them move forward in tandem, always mutually transforming each other in new and different ways. Examining similar interactions, Karen Moon wrote in 2005 that material models are “sympathetic to the psychology of a group meeting”.¹³ She described the interaction between two perspectivities. Firstly, that of the three-dimensional object that looks different from different positions. There is no position from which all parts of the model can be seen at once. Secondly, she describes the perspectivity of the people surrounding it. Each one of them looks at the model and judges it from an angle of view that is unique to them, brings different experiences to bear and follows different interests. Here too, no angle on the project can capture all its aspects. However, the “sympathetic” relationship observed by Moon exists not so much in the similarities between the two perspectivities but rather in their effects. The object conceived of as a model says this and that, just like the people surrounding it. Because of its inexhaustible multiplicity of aspects, the model object can ultimately take on all the perceptions imposed upon it, concretise them and give a visible and tangible form to the very fleeting structure of diverging angles of view, experiences and interests. By binding the fleeting to its material, its flight is slowed. Its differences and tensions can be examined more closely. Moreover, a search for solutions becomes possible, but there is also an awareness that this lies out of reach. The multiplicity of aspects can make those involved aware that it is possible to change perspective. Because it lends form and colour not only their own views but also to those of others, it invites them to consider others’ opinions. By viewing the model together, the distances between opinions can be assessed aesthetically, as it were. Are they, metaphorically speaking, on opposite sides of the object or are they right next to each other? Where are the points of contact, the borders, the conflict zones? The people gathered around a model generally do so in different roles: as an architect, client, representative from the building control authorities, model maker or neighbour, as a judge, prosecutor or lawyer, plaintiff, respondent, owner or spectator, as a researcher, project manager, PhD candidate, examiner or colleague. Within the framework of these roles, their perspectives on the

 Moon (), .

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model are endowed with more or less authority. An architect’s perspective on his model, for instance, can be put forward with a claim to being accepted as the continually dominating perspective. The others then feel called upon to adopt his perspective to a greater or lesser degree. The client can make a similar claim and seek to impose his view of things. Views endowed with less authority are often disregarded when they identify fundamental problems or feasible solutions. A further important factor is that even a single person does not see a model in only one way. Instead, this person runs through a series of different views or perceptions depending on his or her personal background, angle of view on the model, the reason for the meeting, the others present and what is currently happening in the discussion. The views influence each other through personal presence, glances, pointing gestures, through what is said, facial expressions, the actual positioning of people in the room, their authority, etc. As a result, the model situation is so fragile that even the slightest changes can influence the entire course of the discussion. But the fragility and complexity of the model situation are perceived by those involved only to a lesser extent. Instead, by means of convenient fictions, the belief dominates that the discussion is at least intended to have one determinable goal, revolves around one project and one model with one stable system of references. This belief creates real freedom of movement in the jungle of perspectives and roles. The model object itself plays a leading role in this pragmatic fiction. To the extent that it is perceived as a single and uninterrupted material object, it has a ‘sympathetic’ relationship to the belief that it has a single role and that the discussion is coherent. The object thereby concretises, depending on one’s viewpoint, at once unambiguity and continuity and yet simultaneously competing perspectives and multiple identities. On this level, the object itself is contradictory and perspective-dependent, and at the same time it concretises its identity conflict and makes it perceptible. The complexity of the perspectivity of model situations is therefore not determined by the large number of potential and actual core elements but rather by the unresolved coexistence and confusion of identities of the model and the gathering, of the roles and perceptions of the people involved. In the “complex web of effects and reactions”¹⁴ of model situations all elements are potentially or actually in transformation. Describing such a situation calls for a conceptual framework and terminology that are capable of following these interwoven transformation processes.

 “komplexe Gespinst von Effekten und Rückwirkungen” (Bredekamp (), ).

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Analysing the perspectivity of model situations can make evident how different perspectives compete with each other in academia, engineering, the arts and before the court. By focusing on the changing and mutually influencing perspectives on a model, the object under examination remains negotiable. In this way, it can assume an exemplary quality that enables conclusions on related issues to be drawn. Similar processes in other epistemic objects can be inferred from the shift in the model object’s identities. Here too, layerings of different identities can be described and can be related to different perceptions. The same applies to the reaction of the model to the perspectives of those viewing it. Moreover, its example enables us to understand the perspectivity of other objects, such as tools, works of art and goods. All these objects are characterised by superimposed identities and simultaneously react to all the perspectives to which they are subject. Translated from German by Daisy Waites

References Badiou, Alain (2007): The Concept of Model. An Introduction Into the Materialist Epistemology of Mathematics, Melbourne: re.press. Bredekamp, Horst (2005): “Modelle der Kunst und der Evolution.” In: Sonja Ginnow (ed.), Modelle des Denkens. Streitgespräch in der wissenschaftlichen Sitzung der Versammlung der Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften am 12. Dezember 2003, Berlin: Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 13 – 20. Bredekamp, Horst (2008): St. Peter in Rom und das Prinzip der produktiven Zerstörung, Berlin: Wagenbach. Bredekamp, Horst (2010): Theorie des Bildakts, Frankfurt a. M. Suhrkamp. Evers, Bernd (ed.) (1995): Architekturmodelle der Renaissance. Die Harmonie des Bauens von Alberti bis Michelangelo, Munich/New York: Prestel. Hoepfner, Wolfram (1984): “Masse – Proportionen – Zeichnungen.” In: Bauplanung und Bautheorie der Antike [Diskussionen zur archäologischen Bauforschung 4], ed. by Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, Berlin: DAI, 13 – 23. Lepik, Andres (1994): Das Architekturmodell in Italien 1335 – 1550 [Römische Studien der Bibliotheca Hertziana Band 9], Worms: Wernersche Verlagsgesellschaft. Mahr, Bernd (2015): “Modelle und ihre Befragbarkeit. Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Modelltheorie.” In: Erwägen Wissen Ethik 26/3, 329 – 342. Moon, Karen (2005): Modeling Messages. The Architect and the Model, New York: Monacelli. Satzinger, Georg (2005): “Die Baugeschichte von St. Peter.” In: Jutta Frings (ed.), Barock im Vatikan. Kunst und Kultur im Rom der Päpste II. 1572 – 1676 (exhibition catalogue), Leipzig: Seemann, 45 – 74.

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Vasari, Giorgio (1962): La vita di Michelagnolo nelle redazioni del 1550 e del 1568, vol. I, Milan/Naples: R. Ricciardi. Wartofsky, Marx William (1979): “Telos and Technique. Models as Modes of Action.” (1968) In: Marx William Wartofsky, Models. Representation and the Scientific Understanding, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Reidel, 140 – 153 Weizman, Eyal (2011): The Least of All Possible Evils. Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza, London/New York: Verso. Weizman, Eyal Forensic (2012a): “Architecture. The Thick Surface of the Earth.” In: David Chipperfield (ed.), Common Ground – A Critical Reader, Venice: Marsilio, 235 – 254. Weizman, Eyal (2012b): “Excess of Calculations.” In: Godofredo Pereira (ed.), Savage Objects, Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional Casa Da Moeda, 86 – 99. Wendler, Reinhard (2014): “Heads, Hands, Hunters, and Models.” In: Jozef Wouters/Pol Matthé (eds.), All Problems Can Never Be Solved, Amsterdam/Brugge: Les presse du reel/IDEA Books.

Sigurd Rompza

Sehen in der Kunst aus dem Blickwinkel von Produktion und Rezeption Von meiner künstlerischen Praxis zu deren Reflexion¹ Abstract: Seeing in the Arts from the Point of View of Production and Reception. It is known that objects of art are objects that need to be explored in different perspectives. In their process of work, artists already try out different kinds of sensory experience. In the processing of their material they decide what their object can show and reveal. This article accentuates art as a researching enterprise that provides sensory knowledge. It emphasizes that an artist in his creative process cannot just follow his own perspectives if the art object is supposed to provide the recipient with knowledge. Instead, the artist should approach the recipient’s point of view and examine in this perspective whether his artistic decisions were expedient, i. e. examine whether what was supposed to be shown has been clearly exposed with the object. The recipient on the other hand is required to explore the artist’s offer by attentively observing the art object. Production and reception of art are in this sense essentially related to each other. Artistically pointed offers can help the dialog between the recipients of art productively develop itself.

Als Künstler verfolge ich eine Kunst, die gekennzeichnet ist durch: – Die Thematisierung insbesondere von Farbe in Verbindung mit natürlichem und hergestelltem Licht als ‚Gegenstand‘, insofern Farbe durch Licht Veränderung erfährt. – Intermedialität. Die Arbeiten sind nicht allein Malerei, Zeichnung oder Relief, vielmehr werden die unterschiedlichen Medien zueinander in Beziehung gesetzt. Malerei oder Zeichnung werden an reliefartigen Gebilden vollzogen. – Die Exemplifikation als eine besondere Weise des Symbolisierens. Exemplifizieren heißt vereinfacht ausgedrückt: als Merkmal herausstellen, z. B. Eigenund Darstellungswert. – Präsentation/Eigenwert und Repräsentation/Darstellungswert. Mein Umgang mit der Farbe, als matte und als glänzende, führt dazu, dass das ursprünglich

 Dem Text liegen Überlegungen in der Form von Arbeitsgesprächen mit Dietfried Gerhardus zum Thema ‚Von der künstlerischen Praxis zu deren Reflexion’ zugrunde.

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präsentierend angelegte Objekt in einzelnen Fällen auch als repräsentierend wahrgenommen werden kann. Die Gestaltung der künstlerischen Arbeiten in der Art, sensuelle Erkenntnis zu ermöglichen. Von Bedeutung ist deshalb sowohl aus dem Blickwinkel von Produktion wie Rezeption insbesondere das Sehen. Daher nenne ich meine Arbeiten ‚Sehstücke‘. Autorschaft. ‚Autorschaft‘ meint Autoreigenschaften, die auch als Bildeigenschaften deutlich werden können, indem der Rezipient zwar im Produktionsprozess berücksichtigt aber nicht am Prozess beteiligt wird. Eine Künstlertheorie. Die Theorie entsteht in direkter Auseinandersetzung mit der eigenen künstlerischen Arbeit. Sie ist zudem Selbstreflexion im Sinne von prüfendem Nachdenken über die eigenen Handlungen, bezieht sich aber auch auf das Leben. Künstlerische Arbeit entsteht in der Auseinandersetzung mit der jeweiligen Gesellschaft. Meine Künstlertheorie findet ihren Niederschlag in Form von schriftlichen Darstellungen, Arbeitsnotizen und Aufsätzen.² Die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Rezipienten ist für mich hinsichtlich meiner künstlerischen Handlungen von Bedeutung.

Künstlerische Werke müssen eine besondere Zeigefunktion erfüllen. Für mich als Künstler, dessen Interesse einem Arbeiten mit und an Farbe in Verbindung mit natürlichem und hergestelltem Licht als Gegenstand gilt, weil Farbe insbesondere durch Licht Veränderung erfährt, stellt sich deshalb immer wieder die Frage: Wie wird Farbe zum Thema künstlerischer Arbeit und wie lässt sich Sehen in den Objekten für den Betrachter thematisieren? Sehhandlungen kommen nämlich sowohl beim Produzenten/dem Ausführenden als auch beim Rezipienten/dem Aufnehmenden vor. In der Ästhetik als Theorie der Wahrnehmung, die sich mit dem sinnlichen Erkennen befasst im Unterschied zum begrifflichen Erkennen, werden die beiden Blickwinkel als ‚Perspektiven‘ bezeichnet und als Produktionsund Rezeptionsästhetik unterschieden.³ Aber wie werden beim künstlerischen Schaffen die beiden Perspektiven berücksichtigt? Und was heißt überhaupt ‚sehen‘ in der bildenden Kunst? Bei dem Versuch der Beantwortung dieser Fragen gehe ich von eigenen künstlerischen Arbeiten aus. Die von mir angestellten Überlegungen sind künstlertheoretische und nicht kunsttheoretische. Theorie ist hier im Sinne von Aristoteles zu verstehen, als ‚denkende Betrachtung‘ der Dinge. Sie ist ein wesentlicher Teil künstlerischen Arbeitens. Die Überlegungen sind keine Rechtfertigung sondern dienen der gedanklichen Durchdringung der Arbeiten.

 Vgl. Rompza ().  Vgl. Gerhardus/Gatzemeier (),  – .

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Kunst ist für mich ein erkenntnisstiftendes Unternehmen. Die von mir angestrebte Erkenntnis ist nicht eine diskursive wie in der Wissenschaft sondern eine sensuelle. Man kann deshalb bei meiner künstlerischen Arbeit von ‚Forschung‘ im sensuellen Bereich reden. Gegenstand/Thema der künstlerischen Handlungen ist seit längerem die Veränderung von Farbe durch natürliches und hergestelltes Licht, ‚Farb-Licht-Modulierung‘, so der Titel der Wandobjekte (Abb. 1, 2). Das Licht war von Anbeginn meiner künstlerischen Tätigkeit ein wesentlicher Bestandteil der Arbeiten. Es wurde von mir jedoch nicht immer deutlich gezeigt. Oft forderten andere Bildprobleme meine Aufmerksamkeit stärker.

Abb. 1: Farb-Licht-Modulierung 2009 – 14, 30 x 90 x 4 cm, Acrylfarbe und Lack auf MDF. Foto: Dirk Rausch

Ausgangspunkt ist für mich beim Arbeiten Stoff. D. Gerhardus stellt bezugnehmend auf W. Schapp⁴ fest: „Stoff im weitesten Sinne des Wortes verstanden ist in unser Handeln ‚verstrickt‘ […]“⁵ und weiter Schapp: daß erst in der Tätigkeit und mit der Tätigkeit Stoff auftaucht und daß die Bestimmtheiten des Stoffes nur verständlich werden aus dieser Tätigkeit heraus und schließlich sogar gleichsam einen geschlossenen Kreis bilden mit den verschiedenen Arten der Tätigkeiten.⁶

 Schapp ().  Gerhardus (), .  Schapp (), zitiert nach Gerhardus (), .

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Abb. 2 Farb-Licht-Modulierung 2014 – 1, 32 x 48 x 24 cm, Acrylfarbe und Lack auf MDF. Foto: Dirk Rausch

Kommentierend hierzu Gerhardus: Daß Stoff ‚auftaucht‘, heißt, Stoff widerfährt uns im Handlungsvollzug, und zwar in dessen passiver Dimension; ‚Bestimmtheiten des Stoffes‘ werden ‚nur verständlich‘ aus ‚dieser Tätigkeit heraus‘. Die Chance aufzutauchen erhält der Stoff im Ausführaspekt der Tätigkeiten, wo er hantierend modifiziert und entsprechend, zum Beispiel im Sinne produktiver Materialgestaltung, gegliedert wird. Bestimmtheiten des Stoffes werden verständlich im Vorführaspekt der Tätigkeiten, wo der Ausführende auch noch die Rolle übernimmt, darauf aus zu sein, herauszubekommen, ‚wie eine Handlung‘, zum Beispiel Schwimmen, ‚geht‘.⁷

Stoff sind im Bereich der Gestaltung die bildnerischen Mittel. Stoff ist für mich primär die Farbe in Verbindung mit natürlichem und hergestelltem Licht. Handelnd ist zu erproben, wie je unterschiedlich Farbe an der Oberfläche bei unterschiedlicher Beleuchtung aussieht. Sie kann heller, dunkler, bläulich, rötlich wahrgenommen werden. Der Grund hierfür ist unter anderem die Sonneneinstrahlung, die blaue Himmelsfarbe oder die je unterschiedlich farbige elektrische

 Gerhardus (), .

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Beleuchtung.Wichtig ist auch, wie eine Fläche zum Licht ausgerichtet wird,wie sie Beleuchtung erfährt. Das Relief ist deshalb als Träger für die Farben besonders geeignet. Im Umgang mit den Farben stellt sich die Frage, ob die Farb-LichtModulierung nur mit wenig gesättigten Farben, stark mit Weiß aufgehellten Farben möglich ist oder auch mit gesättigten. Und in welchem Farbtonunterschied kann eine zweite Farbe und wie kann sie formal in die Gestaltung einbezogen werden? Farbe ist immer auch Form, sie kann nicht losgelöst von der Form untersucht werden. Diese ist weitgehend bestimmt durch den reliefartigen Gegenstand. Die unterschiedliche Plastizität der Farbe verbinde ich mit und ordne sie an dem Relief. Farbe und Form können unterstützend, sie können aber auch im Kontrast zueinander eingesetzt werden. Rot z. B. unterstützt die in den Raum vordringende Form, Schwarz tritt in Kontrast zu dieser, es drückt die Form auf die Wand. Das Relief ermöglicht zudem die Modulierung der Farben durch das Licht. Seit einiger Zeit beziehe ich neben der matten auch glänzende Farbe in die Gestaltung mit ein. (Abb. 2) Sie erlaubt es in besonderer Weise aufgrund von Spiegelung das künstlerische Objekt zum präsentierenden oder repräsentierenden zu machen, den Eigenwert der Farben zu exemplifizieren oder den Darstellungswert zu denotieren. Die angesprochenen Probleme sind nur einige von vielen, die sich mir zu Beginn des Gestaltens stellen und die handelnd erprobt werden müssen. Es wird deutlich, dass im Vorfeld des Arbeitens die Widerfahrnis und die Gliederung des Stoffes, die erst die bildnerischen Mittel (zum Teil neu) liefert, lediglich in der Theorie jedoch nicht in der Praxis streng getrennt werden können. In diesem Vorfeld des Herstellens der künstlerischen Arbeiten stellt sich bei mir schon immer die Frage – manchmal allzuschnell – , woraufhin etwas erprobt werden soll und was sich damit zeigen lässt. Es ist ein stetes Hin und Her zwischen erprobendem Handeln, Gliederung des Stoffes (Erarbeitung der bildnerischen Mittel) und der Frage, wie hieraus letztendlich künstlerische Handlungen werden können. Bei der Vorführhandlung steht die Farbe zwar als bildnerisches Mittel, d. h. in sensueller Hinsicht gegliedert zur Verfügung, jedoch erst durch Exemplifizieren wird die Vorführhandlung zur Zeigehandlung und die Farbe so zum Gegenstand/Thema künstlerischen Arbeitens. Zeigehandlungen, d. h. zeigen als Konfrontation mit der Sache und nicht zeigen durch Hinweisen auf die Sache,⁸ stellen sich innerhalb meines künstlerischen Arbeitsprozesses als Problem dar unter der Fragestellung:Was kann dem Rezipienten mit dem Farbrelief von mir wie gezeigt werden?⁹ Das ‚Was‘ und insbesondere das ‚Wie‘ bedingen in der Zeigehandlung die sensuelle Erkenntnis, das Werk kann zum Kunstwerk werden. Ins-

 Vgl. Wiesing (), .  Wiesing (),  ff.

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besondere durch das ‚Wie‘ können sich künstlerische Arbeiten voneinander unterscheiden, wenn Autoren an ähnlichen bildnerischen Problemen arbeiten. Um das Problem des Symbolisierens besser verstehen und für mich lösen zu können, habe ich mich mit der Symboltheorie N. Goodmans beschäftigt. Nach Goodman ist die Exemplifikation eine wichtige und vielverwendete Weise der Symbolisierung innerhalb und außerhalb der Künste.¹⁰ „Exemplifikation ist Besitz plus Bezugnahme.“¹¹ Auf das Problem eines Stoffmusters verweisend führt Goodman aus: Zu haben ohne zu symbolisieren, heißt bloß zu besitzen; zu symbolisieren ohne zu haben, heißt dagegen, auf irgendeine andere Weise als durch Exemplifizieren Bezug zu nehmen. Das Stoffmuster exemplifiziert nur die Eigenschaften, die es hat und auf die es zugleich Bezug nimmt.Wir können von ihm sagen, daß es den Ballen oder die Bahn exemplifiziert, nämlich in dem elliptischen Sinne, dass es die Eigenschaft von dem Ballen genommen zu sein, exemplifiziert.¹²

Exemplifizieren heißt also Merkmale eines Gegenstandes deutlich herausstellen. Nur was mit dem Kunstwerk von mir deutlich gezeigt wird, das kann vom Rezipienten aufmerksam gesehen und erkannt werden. Bedingt durch das selektive Sehhandeln des Menschen kann nicht alles zugleich gezeigt werden. Deshalb versuche ich hinsichtlich dessen, was gezeigt werden soll, eine Auswahl zu treffen und entscheide, was in den Vordergrund bzw. in den Hintergrund gerückt wird. Im Vordergrund steht die Farbe, die als matte und als glänzende vorkommt. Exemplifizierend wird an ihr in Verbindung mit dem Relief als Träger gezeigt: Die Modulierung durch Licht, die Räumlichkeit (Flächenfarbe), der Darstellungswert, wenn Spiegelungen von Gegenständen gesehen werden, der Eigenwert, u. a. wenn die Farbe glänzend (nicht abbildend) oder als solche matt gesehen wird oder als matte am Objekt eingesetzt ist. Das Relief steht im Hintergrund. Es hat eine dienende Funktion. Die bisherigen Überlegungen waren vor allem auf meine künstlerischen Handlungen, ausgerichtet, das heißt der Produzent/Autor stand im Mittelpunkt. Der Autor ist jedoch nicht nur Ausführender,vielmehr sind im Autor die Positionen des Ausführenden und des Aufnehmenden vereint. Als Zeigender unterscheidet sich der Autor von demjenigen, dem etwas gezeigt wird. Wenn der Autor auch Aufnehmender ist, so bedeutet das allerdings nicht, dass er hinsichtlich des Zeigens die Position dessen einnehmen kann, dem etwas gezeigt wird, da „[…] das Zeigen ein Sehen-lassen von etwas Intendiertem ist.“¹³ D. h., man kann sich nicht selbst etwas zeigen sondern immer nur einem anderen. Der Autor als Aufneh-

   

Vgl. Goodman (),  ff. Goodman (), . Goodman (), . Wiesing (), .

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mender muss also hinsichtlich des Aufzunehmenden vom Rezipienten als Aufnehmendem unterschieden werden. Da ich dem Sehen in meinen künstlerischen Arbeiten eine wichtige Stellung beimesse, muss es vor allem dem Nicht-Autor als Aufnehmendem/Rezipienten ermöglicht werden, an den Kunstwerken Sehhandlungen auszuführen. Insofern muss ich als Aufnehmender/Produzent mich dem Blickwinkel des Aufnehmenden/Rezipienten nähern, um zu prüfen, ob die bildnerischen Entscheidungen hierfür taugen. Schon bei den Ausführungen zum exemplifizierenden Zeigen wurde deutlich, dass meine künstlerischen Arbeiten in der von mir beabsichtigten Weise gesehen werden sollen, was Mehrdeutigkeit nicht ausschließt. Ich strebe dies an, indem ich auf die Handlung des Zeigens großen Wert lege und das Zeigen als ein SehenLassen von etwas Intendiertem begreife. L. Wiesing bemerkt hierzu: „Wer sich mittels eines Bildes etwas zeigen lässt, muss eine fremde Intention nachvollziehen und verstehen; er muss das Bild in einem Sinne verwenden, wie es gedacht war, dass es so verwendet wird.“¹⁴ Was hier absolut anmutet, das schließt unterschiedliche Interpretationen von Kunstwerken nicht aus, denn nicht nur der Produzent sondern auch der Rezipient wird zu ‚Probehandlungen‘ aufgefordert, insofern das Verfahren der Exemplifikation nicht (ein)eindeutig ist.¹⁵ Die folgenden Überlegungen betreffen insbesondere das Sehen in der Kunst, wobei verstärkt der Rezipient und sein Blickwinkel Berücksichtigung erfahren. Er ist im Gegensatz zum Produzenten (Ausführender und Aufnehmender) nur Aufnehmender. Als solcher ist er jedoch in besonderer Weise gefordert: Will er das Gezeigte verstehen, so muss er über Sehweisen, Umgangsformen überhaupt nicht nur verfügen sondern sie auch erfinden. Hierbei spielt die Wortsprache eine wichtige Rolle. Der Künstler stellt neue Erfüllungen bereits ‚vertrauter‘ wortsprachlicher Schemata her, und er erfindet im Material bildliche Unterscheidungen, für die wortsprachliche Schemata erst gefunden werden müssen. Dadurch fordert er unser wortsprachliches Unterscheidungsvermögen heraus, und in diesem Sinne sind Bilder Experimente, denen durch Zuordnung wortsprachlicher Unterscheidungen erst Sinn gegeben werden muß. Der Test der Bilder findet in der Wortsprache statt.¹⁶

 Wiesing (), .  Vgl. Goodman (),  – .  Philippi (), .

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B. Philippi deutet mit dem Hinweis auf die Bedeutsamkeit der Wortsprache an, dass der Rezipient Bildkompetenz besitzen muss. Für das Verstehen von Bildern hat O. Scholz ein Stufenmodell vorgestellt.¹⁷ Das unschuldige Auge gibt es nicht. Sehen ist nicht passiv sondern aktiv. Sehen ist ein Handeln. Handlungen kann man unterscheiden in Anführ-, Ausführ-, Vorführ-, und Zeigehandlungen.¹⁸ Während man zum Beispiel Schwimmhandlungen und Sehhandlungen ausführen kann, können lediglich Schwimmhandlungen angeführt werden (man kann sie sehen), Sehhandlungen hingegen können nicht angeführt werden: Sehen sehen ist nicht möglich. Folglich können Sehhandlungen auch nicht gezeigt werden. Durch die Praxis des Zeigens jedoch können Menschen andere Menschen etwas sehen lassen, insbesondere wenn sie hierzu Bilder als Instrumente verwenden.¹⁹ Beim künstlerisch-praktischen Arbeiten wurde mir immer klarer, dass man mit den Augen etwas machen kann, was man mit den anderen Sinnen nicht ohne weiteres kann. Der Sehsinn kann im Unterschied zu anderen Sinnen Leistungen übernehmen, z. B. Leistungen des Tastsinns. Das Auge kann eine Oberfläche daraufhin abtasten, ob sie rau, weich, glatt oder bucklig ist. Hingegen kann die Hand eine Oberfläche auf feine raue Unebenheiten besser abtasten als das Auge. Auf die Verbindung des Sehsinns mit anderen Sinnen bei der Wahrnehmung von Farben hat W. Kandinsky hingewiesen.²⁰ Das Sehhandeln wird unterschieden in eine geregelte Anordnung und eine bedeutungshafte, ein Sehen wie etwas geordnet wurde und ein Sehen von etwas.²¹ Aus meiner künstlerischen Erfahrung stellt sich jedoch die Frage, ob in der Praxis des Sehens ein rein syntaktisches Sehen (ein reines Formen Sehen, ein reines Farben Sehen) überhaupt möglich ist. Sehen hat offenbar immer semantische Anteile, umso mehr ist das Sehen ein Bedeutung erkennendes Sehen. Als Betrachter kann ich jeden Gegenstand – selbstverständlich auch ein Kunstwerk – zu einem ästhetischen machen, wenn es mir bei der Betrachtung um den Gegenstand um seiner selbst wegen geht, d. h., die Betrachtung ist dann durch

 Oliver R. Scholz führt als Stufen des Bilderverstehens an: () Perzeptuelles Verstehen, () Plastisches Verstehen, () Etwas als Zeichen verstehen, () Etwas als bildliches Zeichen verstehen, () Verstehen des Bildinhalts, () Verstehen des denotativen Sachbezugs, () Verstehen nicht-denotativer Bezüge: Exemplifikation und Ausdruck, () Modales Verstehen: Erfassen der kommunikativen Rolle des Bildes, () Verstehen des indirekt Mitgeteilten. Vgl. Scholz (),  – .  Vgl. Gerhardus/Kledzik/Reitzig ().  Vgl. Wiesing (), .  Vgl. Kandinsky ().  „Ich sehe syntaktisch, indem ich keine Bedeutung zuschreibe, sondern nur das ›Wie‹ des Sichtbarseins eines Gegenstandes wahrnehme.“ (Schürmann (), ).

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Genuss bestimmt. Ob der Gegenstand im Betrachten zu einem künstlerischen oder ästhetischen wird, ist nach E. Wind durch unterschiedliche Urteile bestimmt: Das kritische Urteil geht aus einem Begründungszusammenhang hervor und bezieht sich auf einen durchaus rationalen Gegenstand. Es arbeitet mit Gründen und rechtfertigt sich durch Gründe. Ihm ist auch mit Gründen zu begegnen. Das ästhetische Urteil hingegen steht seiner Bildung nach jenseits aller Begründungs- und Aufweisungszusammenhänge. Sein Gegenstand ist irrational und isoliert, und es läßt sich aus keiner Beziehung zu irgendwelchen rationalen Momenten herleiten. Es ist nur der begriffliche Ausdruck für eine Gefühlsbestimmung; und die Geltung der Gefühlsbestimmung läßt sich (da die ›Echtheit‹ des Gefühls ihre einzige Instanz ist) durch Gründe weder erweisen noch widerlegen.²²

Mit meinen Arbeiten fordere ich das kritische Urteil des Betrachters heraus, das ästhetische Urteil sei ihm jedoch unbenommen. Da meine künstlerischen Gegenstände speziell für sensuelle Erkenntnis hergestellte sind, den Rezipienten auf Erkenntnis hinlenken, und sie nicht durch Beliebigkeit gekennzeichnet sind, die in der heutigen Kunstpraxis vorherrschend ist, kann ich sie für das Sehen thematisieren, indem ich sie für das Sehen einrichte, durch Zeigen andere etwas sehen lasse. (Sehstücke!) Es geht in meinen Arbeiten jedoch nicht um ein feststellendes Sehen. Dieses kommt unter anderem in Grundlehren vor, wenn Studierende Grauwerte herstellen oder sie nach der Helligkeit ordnen. Meine künstlerische Tätigkeit verstehe ich als eine forschende. Insofern fordert sie sowohl in der Produktion als auch in der Rezeption kein feststellendes sondern ein forschendes Auge, so schon E. Gombrich. Das forschende Auge hat er ein Buch betitelt und merkt hierzu an: Der Titel […] ist natürlich metaphorisch gemeint. Das Auge kann so wenig forschen wie das etwa ein Fernglas kann, aber das Auge kann zum Instrument unserer Forschung werden, wenn wir aufmerksam in die Welt blicken. Ich habe diesen Titel vorgeschlagen, weil es mir von Anfang an darum ging, den aktiven Anteil, den wir stets am Seherlebnis haben, zu betonen, im Gegensatz zu der Alltagsüberzeugung, daß die Wahrnehmung genauso passiv vor sich geht wie die Registrierung der Lichtstrahlen auf dem photographischen Film.²³

Diesen aktiven Teil am Seherlebnis beschreibt P. Valéry wie folgt: „Sehen, was jedermann sehen kann, aber nicht sieht.“²⁴ Mit dieser Auffassung verwandt ist L. Wittgensteins ‚Aspektsehen‘, das er als ein ‚Sehen als‘ versteht. Er führt als Beispiel hierfür an: Der Betrachter einer Zeichnung kann diese sowohl als Hasen als auch als Ente sehen (Abb. 3).

 Wind (), .  Gombrich (), .  Valéry (), .

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Abb. 3: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Hase-Ente-Kopf

Der Rezipient meiner Arbeiten kann diese Weise der Betrachtung u. a. an meinen ‚Farb-Licht-Modulierungen‘ vollziehen, indem er Farben in ihrer Veränderung durch das Licht sehen kann. In den Farb-Licht-Modulierungen bildet der Grat des Reliefs die Grenze zwischen der Licht- und der Schattenseite. (Abb. 1) Da die Begrenzung der Farben diagonal über den Grat des Reliefs geführt wird, befindet sich dieselbe Farbe sowohl auf der Licht- als auch auf der Schattenseite des Reliefs. Auf der Lichtseite wird sie heller als auf der Schattenseite wahrgenommen und erscheint auch hinsichtlich der Farbrichtung und der Sättigung verändert. Zwei Farben erscheinen wie vier, lässt man die Seiten des Reliefs unberücksichtigt. Hinzu kommt, dass der reliefhafte Grat und die Begrenzung der Farben, zwei unterschiedliche lineare Bildmittel, abhängig vom Beleuchtungslicht oft nicht zu unterscheiden sind. Sie werden dann beide als gleichartig lineare Begrenzungen der Farben gelesen, der Grat wird als Relief nicht wahrgenommen. Die Erfahrung zeigt, dass Rezipienten jeweils von neuem hierüber überrascht und bereit sind, diese Erfahrung zu genießen und das Bildobjekt für das Sehen zu gebrauchen. Hiermit verwandt ist das Sehen der matten Farben als präsentierende oder der glänzenden als präsentierende oder repräsentierende, jeweils abhängig vom Standpunkt des Betrachters (Abb. 2). Mehrdeutigkeit nicht Eindeutigkeit beim Sehen ist intendiert. Vom „sehenden Sehen“ spricht M. Imdahl, wenn der Betrachter eines Kunstwerks sich beim Sehen der Struktur des Sehens bewusst wird.²⁵ K. Lorenz und D. Gerhardus schlagen hierfür den Begriff „wissendes Sehen“ vor. Gerhardus hat in einem Text zu meinen Arbeiten speziell die Bedeutung dieses Sehens abgehandelt und dargestellt, welche Bedeutung es im Verhältnis Künstler – Objekt und Betrachter – Objekt spielt. Er bemerkt hier: In seinen Wandobjekten thematisiert Sigurd Rompza Sehen, indem er letztlich Anlässe, Vorwände für wissendes Sehen stiftet, Anlässe, Vorwände für den Erwerb von sensuellem Wissen durch tätiges Sehen. Er macht künstlerisch zugespitzte Sehangebote, zu denen der interessierte

 Imdahl ().

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Betrachter geeignete Sehvorschläge machen kann, um wissendes Sehen zu genießen. Dies verschwisterte Miteinander von Produktion und Rezeption ermöglicht einen offenen visuellen Dialog zwischen uns, den Betrachtern, und den Wandobjekten des Künstlers.²⁶

Literatur Gerhardus, Dietfried (1999): „Die sensuelle Erschließung der Welt. Vom Widerfahrnisphänomen zur symptomischen Erkenntnisform.“ In: Kai Buchholz/Shahid Rahman/Ingrid Weber (Hg.), Wege zur Vernunft. Philosophieren zwischen Tätigkeit und Reflexion, Frankfurt a. M./New York: Campus, 107 – 119. Gerhardus, Dietfried (2005/2008): „Drei Reden zu den Arbeiten von Sigurd Rompza: Rede im Kunstverein Speyer, Kulturhof Flachsgasse.“ (2004) In: Jo Enzweiler (Hg.), Sehstücke – Sigurd Rompza, Saarbrücken: Galerie St. Johann, 3 – 17. Gerhardus, Dietfried/Gatzemeier, Matthias (2005): „Ästhetisch/Ästhetik.“ In: Jürgen Mittelstraß (Hg.), Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie, Bd. 1, Stuttgart/Weimar: J.B. Metzler, 264 – 266. Gerhardus, Dietfried/Kledzik, Silke M./Reitzig, Gerd H. (1975): Schlüssiges Argumentieren, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. Gombrich, Ernst H. (1994): Das forschende Auge: Kunstbetrachtung und Naturwahrnehmung, hg. v. Gennaro Ghirardelli, Frankfurt a. M.: Campus. Goodman, Nelson (1993): „Wie Bauwerke bedeuten.“ In: Nelson Goodman/Catherine Z. Elgin (Hg.), Revisionen: Philosophie und andere Künste und Wissenschaften, übers. v. Bernd Philippi, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 49 – 70. Goodman, Nelson (1995): Sprachen der Kunst: Entwurf einer Symboltheorie, übers. v. Bernd Philippi, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. Imdahl, Max (1981): „Cézanne – Braque – Picasso. Zum Verhältnis zwischen Bildautonomie und Gegenstandssehen.“ In: Max Imdahl, Bildautonomie und Wirklichkeit. Zur theoretischen Begründung moderner Malerei, Mittenwald: Mäander, 9 – 50. Kandinsky, Wassily (1973): Über das Geistige in der Kunst, Bern: Benteli. Philippi, Bernd (1985): „Finden durch Erfinden. Probehandlungen in der künstlerischen Praxis.“ In: Dietfried Gerhardus/Silke M. Kledzik (Hg.), Vom Finden und Erfinden in Kunst – Philosophie – Wissenschaft, Saarbrücken: Universität Saarbrücken, S. 9 – 28. Rompza, Sigurd (2011): Künstlerische Reflexionen, hg. v. Hochschule der bildenden Künste Saar, Heidelberg: Kehrer. Schapp, Wilhelm (1953): In Geschichten verstrickt. Zum Sein von Mensch und Ding, Hamburg: Meiner. Scholz, Oliver R. (2009): Bild, Darstellung, Zeichen, Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann. Schürmann, Eva (2008): Sehen als Praxis, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. Valéry, Paul (2011): Ich grase meine Gehirnwiese ab. Paul Valéry und seine verborgenen Cahiers, hg. u. ausgewählt v. Thomas Stölzel, Frankfurt a. M.: Eichhorn. Wiesing, Lambert (2013): Sehen lassen. Die Praxis des Zeigens, Berlin: Suhrkamp.

 Gerhardus (/), .

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Wind, Edgar (2011): Ästhetischer und kunstwissenschaftlicher Gegenstand, hg. v. Pablo Schneider, Hamburg: Philo Fine Arts.

Thiemo Breyer

Too Much or Not Enough – Psychopathological Limits of Distributed Perspectives Abstract: This paper deals with the notion of distributed perspectives from a phenomenological angle, analysing the distribution of perspectivity by differentiating between noetic and noematic aspects of intentional acts as well as their doxic modalities. In intersubjective situations, when subjects in interaction share modes and/or objects of intentional reference, there can be various noetico-noematic congruences and incongruences. A further distinction between having a perspective and taking a perspective is introduced: Having a perspective means the pre-givenness of a perceptual point of view due to the embodied nature of perception. Taking a perspective, on the other hand, requires more than kinaesthetic activity, namely the active cognitive engagement with something that transcends this original perspective. The phenomenological notions are then used to interpret delusions as disturbances of distributed perspectives. Hyper- and hypo-flexibility are conceptualised as shifts or gradual modifications on the spectrum of perspectivity.

1 Introduction What do we mean by “distributed perspectives”? The term might sound odd at first, because we tend to think of a perspective as a point of view on the world that can be had only by one subject at a time. In the case of the perception of an external object, the perspective on it is determined first and foremost by the perceiving subject’s location in space. This location cannot be occupied by any other subject, simply because the bodies of both subjects would have to merge in order to achieve that the exact same perspective could be shared. If we think of the distribution or sharing of perspectives in terms of intentionality as basic structure of consciousness, we can distinguish the intentional act from the intentional content and thus four basic cases in which these aspects can relate to each other in an intersubjective situation. If we consider the simple case of an intersubjective dyad of subjects A and B, being perceptually directed to objects X or Y, we get the following schema of noetico-noematic congruences or incongruences:

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(1) Same mode of intentional access and same object, e. g. A views X and B views X. (2) Same mode and different object, e. g. A views X and B views Y. (3) Different mode and same object, e. g. A views X and B hears X. (4) Different mode and different object, e. g. A views X and B hears Y. The intentional mode of being directed towards an object can be characterised by the act quality, e. g. the appearance by way of perceiving, remembering, or imagining, on the one hand, and the doxic modality, determining how we take the object to be, e. g. as possible, probable, doubtful, or necessary, on the other. In the natural attitude, an object of (external) perception appears to us with the modality of necessity in the sense of being necessarily there in front of us when we perceive it. The existence of the object is taken to be independent of our conscious access to it. The existence of a remembered or an imagined object is taken to depend more on the conscious activity of representing such objects, they appear with varying degrees of necessity. A remembered object may appear as probably there in the sense that it is likely that we remember correctly and represent the object’s perceptual reality or givenness at a certain moment in the past in an adequate manner. An imagined object, in contrast, may appear as improbable or only possible, because we are freely combining elements of perceptual reality to form a new and hitherto unseen object. What is interesting in the case of perception, now, is that every perceptual act is necessarily perspectival, and every perspective necessarily only provides one among many possible views of the object. The realisation and acceptance of the fact that the current perspective is the necessary one that I have right here right now from my embodied position, but only one among many possible other ones, is at the centre of the discussion below about the psychopathological disturbances of perspectivity. As will be illustrated with the example of delusion, the intentional-perspectival relationship between the modalities of necessity and possibility can be disturbed in such a way that the subject in delusion takes its perspective to be necessarily the only possible (or possibly true) one, and discards the perspectives of all others. The notion of perspectivity implies possibility in the sense that it suggests a manifold of possible viewpoints on the same object or state of affairs. In delusion, however, a singular perspective becomes auto-immunised and believed to be a necessity. The possibility of “distributed perspectives” is in such cases obviously endangered. The question, then, will be on which level of perspectivity a psychopathological shift takes place. If we do not restrict ourselves to perception, as in the table of noetico-noematic congruences and incongruences above, we could construe cases of a more cognitive sharing of perspectives, where “perspective” would mean the attitude a

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subject displays towards an object or state of affairs. The following ideal-typical differentiations can be made: (1) Same intentional attitude and same intentional content, e. g. A hopes that X and B hopes that X. (2) Same attitude and different content, e. g. A hopes that X and B hopes that Y. (3) Different attitude and same content, e. g. A hopes that X and B fears that X. (4) Different attitude and different content, e.g. A hopes that X and B fears that Y. A distributed perspective in this table would amount to sharing an attitude with the other with respect to a certain object or state of affairs (1). If both A and B hope that X should be the case, then the hope that X should be the case can be said to be distributed among them. However, this does not yet tell us anything about whether A and B are aware of the jointness of their hoping and its possible implications for joint action, e.g. in trying to bring X about. An awareness of the jointness of the distributed perspective often requires taking the other’s perspective. A distinction seems necessary here, namely between having a perspective and taking a perspective. Having a perspective, in this way of speaking, means the pre-givenness of a perceptual angle due to the embodied nature of perception, i. e. the original perspective from the bodily zero-point as mentioned above. Taking a perspective, on the other hand, requires more than kinaesthetic activity, namely the active cognitive engagement with something that transcends this original perspective (e. g., the other and his mental states, or myself as represented in different times or places by memory or imagination). In the case of intersubjective perspective-taking, which lies at the core of many definitions of empathy and social cognition, two modes can furthermore be distinguished: egocentric and allocentric perspective-taking. The egocentric mode can be articulated with the question “What would it be like for me to be in the other’s situation?”, while the allocentric mode would yield the question “What is it actually like for the other to be in her position?”.¹ The question of how successful especially the second mode of perspective-taking can be is an open one, in need of a clarification of more basic and more complex cases. Furthermore, there are cases where one subject adopts another’s perspective unwillingly, i. e. not by active engagement, but by passive taking-over (e. g. through insinuation or habitualisation). One might not notice the take-over at first, either because it is due to a strategy of the other or to an implicit process of getting used to certain patterns. A cognitive perspective such as a political at-

 Peter Goldie has termed the egocentric mode “in-his-shoes perspective-shifting” and the allocentric one “empathetic perspective-shifting” (Goldie (), ).

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titude towards a certain issue can be distributed among the members of a group during a process by which an opinion is formed and internalised. Yet another class of cases is the one where one’s own original (even perceptual) perspective is up-rooted or disturbed (e. g. in drug-induced states or psychopathological states). Here, one can even loose the sense that the bodily position is the anchor of one’s being-towards-the-world. Taking and taking-over can enter into a dynamic process where a mutual perspective might be the goal of an interaction. Think of a dialogue where the partners in communication mutually try to get a better grasp of the other’s perspective and intentions regarding a certain theme. If both are willing to take the other’s perspective in the sense of allocentric transposition, a joint perspective can emerge in which the original perspectives are still concious as constituents. In the following case example of delusion, we will see how the possibility of such communicative understanding collapses.

2 Perspectivity in phenomenological psychopathology On the basis of these preliminary considerations I would like to introduce in the following a few basic ideas of the German psychiatrist Wolfgang Blankenburg, who worked in the Heidelberg tradition of phenomenological psychopathology, as initiated by Karl Jaspers. His concern was primarily with what he calls the “loss of natural self-evidence” (Verlust der natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit) in psychotic states. The concept of perspectivity plays a crucial role in this change of experience. Blankenburg refers heavily to Husserl, the founder of the phenomenological movement in philosophy, and other authors in this tradition. Here is a classic quote from Husserl in which the relationship between perspectivity, orientation and kinaesthetic ability is described. These aspects will be of importance for the following considerations. A thing is given to me perceptually as a continuously being thing in a synthetic coherent unity of perception, in whose sequence the thing is conscious as one and the same thing; but in each phase of perception I have it in a particular mode of ‘how’ it is given, in changing orientations of close and far, left and right, etc. With the change of orientation goes hand in hand a change of perspectival appearance; the thing appears in ever new aspects. In a constant flow, perceived and co-perceived, that which is apprehended in selfpresence and that which is only anticipated alongside with it, are differentiated. Varyingly, I am co-active in this process and move my eyes, my touching hands etc. in the mode of “I can” and have the consciousness of the belonging of the flowing visual aspects to the re-

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spective positions of the eyes, of the tactual aspects to the corresponding orientations of the hands and fingers.²

With the phrase “I can” Husserl expresses that perceptual processes are guided by kinaesthetic motivations – each adumbration or perspectival aspect motivates going beyond it and moving on to another adumbration. This affective beingdrawn-to and redirected-to other appearances marks the passive-synthetic element of perception. At the same time, it is also necessary to have an element of actively being there, of the co-activity of the subject in this process. I have to be able to let myself be affected by what appears and I have to change my bodily orientation to achieve new views on things. Perception thus does not happen to me in a purely pathic mode, but I actively shape it by moving my body, by acting out my kinaesthetic motivations. The phenomenological structure of perspectivity involved in perception has been described by Husserl and others as a horizonal unity of indexical references – not in a linguistic sense, but in the sense of something having a meaningful connection with something else and this connection being readily observable. This perspectival indication takes the form of an interplay between intra- and transobjectivty: By this I mean what Husserl calls the inner and outer horizon of the perceptual givenness of a thing.³ Intraobjectively, an object is adumbrated and appears in ever changing aspects. Each of these aspects is embedded in retentionally retained and protentionally anticipated aspects of the same object. Transobjectively, the object as a whole is embedded in a field of co-present objects. The transobjective indication can lead from a currently focussed object in different spatial directions to other objects in the surrounding. In a temporal sense such movements can be understood either as a forward-movement to

 “Ein Ding ist mir wahrnehmungsmäßig gegeben als dauernd daseiendes in einer synthetisch einstimmigen Wahrnehmungskontinuität, in deren Abfluß das Ding kontinuierlich als das eine und selbe bewußt ist; aber in jeder Wahrnehmungsphase habe ich es in einem besonderen Wie seiner subjektiven Gegebenheitsweise, in wechselnder Orientierung des Nah und Fern, des Rechts und Links usw. Mit dem Wechsel der Orientierung geht im Ganzen Hand in Hand ein Wechsel der perspektivischen Erscheinungsweise; das Ding erscheint in immer neuen Aspekten. Immerfort scheidet sich dabei eigentlich Gesehenes und nur Mitgesehenes, relativ Selbsterfaßtes und nur antizipierend Miterfaßtes. Wechselnd bin ich dabei mittätig und bewege im freien ‚Ich kann‘ meine Augen, meine tastenden Hände usw. und habe das Bewußtsein der Zugehörigkeit der ablaufenden visuellen Aspekte zu den jeweiligen frei zu wählenden Augenstellungen, der taktuellen Aspekte zu den jeweiligen Lagen der tastenden Hände und Finger” (Husserl (),  f., translation here, and in the following by Breyer).  Cf., e. g., Husserl (), § .

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something that has not been paid attention to or as a backward-movement to something that has previously been the focal theme already. The body obviously plays a crucial role in the constitution of the horizonal field of references. The body is the centre of this perceptual structure and a horizon can only be functional because the body cannot locate itself in the periphery. The unobtainability of the horizon is one side of a double-structure, of which the centrality of the body is the other. And in a certain sense, this central standpoint (the zero-point of perceptual gravitation) is itself unobtainable, because I always already am the body that stands there in the midst of things. Horizonality of consciousness furthermore means that the lived presence expands into the past and the future – and there are plenty of everyday examples that show how meaningful connections appear as temporal gestalts of indexical reference. The set table lets us anticipate the supper that is soon to be enjoyed, the vapour trail in the sky shows us that an aircraft has just passed by, and so on. As we will see in the following, there is a characteristic overemphasis of the anterograde indication in delusion: there, everything appears as a sign for an approaching horror.

3 Delusion and perspectivity According to Blankenburg, the perspectivity of perception is narrowed down in delusion to one single perspective. He describes this as a psychological “Wahrnehmungs- und Denkregel” – a rule for perception and cognition – constituting a form of normativity that is in conflict with what counts as perceptual normality for those who do not experience a delusional state. What appears in such a state is not the world in the plurality of perspectives one might have on it, but a monotonous and, if you will, frozen picture of reality. This type of constriction can be illustrated with amourous paranoia: here, the subject interprets every act and utterance of the loved person – and especially when they are negative and rejecting – as secret hints and expressions of their unadmitted love. Another example are delusions of persecution: here, any triviality may be understood as malicious attempt of the others to deceive the self-proclaimed victim. “A life-theme”, writes Blankenburg, “metamorphoses into a delusion-theme, or more precisely: an unovercome life-thematic is transformed into an experience-thematic which does not disclose (erschließen) reality anymore, but closes it off (verschließen). We call this experience-thematic delusion.”⁴ The autonomi-

 “Ein Lebensthema metamorphosiert sich in ein Wahnthema, d. h. genauer: eine unbewältigte

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sation (Verselbständigung) of the delusional content is not simply a special emphasis placed on a theme by selective attention, but the staging of a situation in which this theme can unfold a life of its own and infiltrate whole spheres of life. Blankenburg recalls the case of a patient who found a pocket watch on the street and missed to take it back to the lost-property office in due time. Little by little, he begins to hear voices or misinterprets actual utterances in a way that suggests that others have identified his negligence and take offence at it. Colleagues, friends and eventually even his own wife are suspected of talking badly about him behind his back. As Blankenburg assumes, there is an important psychodynamic connection between these prodromal symptoms and a marked sense and appreciation of justness and lawfulness, which could be reconstructed from the patient’s past, reaching back even to childhood. It is in the context of this personality trait that the neglect to take back the watch to the office within the legally stipulated period of time brings the patient to think of himself as a wrongdoer and preys on his conscience. Considering the development of the psychosis, the issue with the watch is just the initial, though decisive, impulse to perceive a whole persecution staged for the patient.⁵ From here onwards, his whole life begins to be projected onto this central theme. The deluded subject focuses exclusively on something that might have been only a marginal element of his consciousness previously. In this state, the subject is lost in his projections to such a degree that it becomes impossible for him to make the counter-bracing of different perspective projections thematic.⁶ In Heideggerian terminology one might say that the autonomisation of the pocket watch theme amounts to a transformation of projectiveness (Entworfenheit) to thrownness (Geworfenheit). Caught in the thrown project (geworfener Entwurf), the patient is no longer receptive to alternative projects. The character of unconditionality is a structural feature of thrownness; but here in the case of delusion it is peculiar because it is constituted by the deluded subject himself, not by external forces or factors such as historicity, sociality or biological organicity. How can this process, which leads from a project to a self-generated thrownness, be described in more detail? In the case of Blankenburg’s patient, an element of his everyday rationality, namely the pursuit of legality, is turned into an absolute norm. After reading in the newspaper that there exists a legally prescribed time limit for returning lost property, he more and more orients his attention towards detecting evidence about the possibility that others might know about his behavLebensthematik wandelt sich in eine – die Realität nicht mehr erschließende, sondern verschließende – Erfahrungsthematik, die wir ‘Wahn’ nennen.” (Blankenburg (b), ).  Blankenburg (), .  Blankenburg (),  f.

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iour. The attentional resources are more and more shifted automatically to elements in the perceptual field that pertain to this theme. He investigates everything with respect to possible connections with it, and accumulates more and more details for speculation. This attentional process is governed top-down at first, but then becomes a perceptual habit. The explicit positing of a rule turns into an implicit normativity by means of restructuring the sphere of attention. The subject does not seem to be able to keep the threefold structure of theme, context, and margin – as described by Aron Gurwitsch – in balance.⁷ Rather, the focal theme seems to extend beyond measure, dominating the rest, making it less and less plausible for any element coming from the margin to attract attention. Nothing appears as being irrelevant to the theme anymore, the field of perceptual meanings is contracted to the middle. Or taken the other way around: the theme becomes so expansive that it constitutes the horizon for new objects appearing as themes. Blankenburg illustrates this development with the gestalt-theoretical concepts of figure and ground. In delusional perception, he sees a rivalry between objective intentionality (Gegenstandsintentionalität) and horizonal intentionality (Horizontintentionalität). A figure normally contrasts with the ground, or an object contrasts with the horizon, because it differs in at least one decisive aspect from it, or is not anchored in it. In delusion, this foundational difference attains a different quality: On the background of an uncanny world of possible persecution the factually experienced triviality of the comments and utterances of friends contrast as downplaying. Their comforting attempts are not misunderstood physiognomically, but appear in [the patient’s] eyes as appeasement gestures.⁸

This still rather cognitive process of interpretation shifts towards perception as the psychosis becomes more serious. The attentional routine of scanning appearances to detect their connection with the delusion-theme then also begins to shape the perceptual givenness of objects, persons and situations. The hypothesis that was previously put to an experiential test now becomes a thesis, a positioning of a reality which does not remain in the realm of thoughts and assumptions, but which permeates perception itself. The others have now actually changed

 Gurwitsch ().  “Von dem Hintergrund der auf Unheimlichkeit hin entworfenen Welt möglicher Verfolgung hebt sich die faktisch erfahrene Harmlosigkeit der Bemerkungen und Reden der Freunde als Verharmlosungen ab. Ihre Beruhigungsversuche werden als solche physiognomisch nicht verkannt, stellen sich aber in seinen Augen als Beschwichtigungsmanöver dar.” (Blankenburg (), ).

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their look, their knowledge about the patient’s failure is written large in their faces. The subject in such a delusional state “literally becomes the visitor of a theatre performance or a film projection put on by his senses without knowing what kind of play is going on.”⁹ In a further step in the psychotic process, the constitution of objectivities with subject-relative meanings is transposed into the external world and attributed to a secret force which seems to pull the strings of the world theatre. It is this force which is believed to collect, connect and present the already fragmented adumbrations to the subject according to its own caprice. The intentional accomplishment is thus transferred from the subject to the external sphere – Thomas Fuchs has called this an “inversion of intentionality”¹⁰. It is not the subject anymore who performs its intentional acts, but it is itself the object of intentional acts that come from outside and are directed towards it. Part of the compensatory mechanism is then also that the uncanniness of the world is converted into a homeliness of the delusional world. When the paranoid world-constitution (Weltlichung) is fully psychotic, everything appears as being part of a coherent, even though heteronomous delusional world, which provides the subject with a certain security in interaction with others, yet without distributed perspectivity. Let us now look at how Blankenburg conceptualises perspectivity, following this ideal-typical case description. First of all, Blankenburg points out the paradoxical nature of perspectivity: “On the one hand, the subject-relativity that [perspectivity] stands for, seems to mean ‘subjectivity’; on the other hand, taken as perspectivity, i. e. by integrating it, it shows us the way to overcoming ‘subjectivity’ as such.”¹¹ Continuing this line of reasoning, we can distinguish between a functioning or operative perspectivity on the one hand, and a reflective perspectivity on the other. With the first term I mean the operative embodied structure inherent in our kinaesthetic connection with the world. With the second I mean the higher-order mental perspective on this operative perspectivity, from which its structure becomes thematic as such. The reflective perspectivity makes us aware of the fact that perception always presents objects in adumbrated and perspectivally incomplete fashion and that a plurality of perspectives is required to allow us an ‘objective’ view on things. The free dealing with perspectives, be they acquired from one’s own intuition – as when one walks around an object and

 Fuchs (), .  Fuchs (), .  “Einerseits scheint die Subjektbezogenheit, für die sie steht, ‘Subjektivität’ zu bedeuten; andererseits weist Perspektivität – als Perspektivität genommen, d. h. gerade durch ihre Einbeziehung – uns den Weg zu einer Überwindung der ‘Subjektivität’ schlechthin.” (Blankenburg (a), ).

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looks at it from different sides – or be they adopted from others, is an ability that originates from the insight into perspectivity as such. This at least would be Blankenburg’s position. I leave it open to discussion whether such a position would have to commit itself to a higher-order theory of the mind, which is problematic from a phenomenological standpoint. First consider how the two suggested levels of perspectivity relate to each other in delusion. The operative perspectivity of perception is certainly in place, otherwise there could be no appearances of individual objects. Concerning the reflective perspectivity, however, the difference between delusional and non-delusional perception consists in the gradual flexibility with which one can pragmatically switch between perspectives on the operative level. On the one hand, delusion appears like a radicalisation of perspectivity in the sense of concentrating everything on one theme, on the other hand it can also be described as an a-perspectivity in the sense that the psychotic subject is not in control of his perspective and possible changes of perspective any longer. If Blankenburg characterises the world of delusion as an a-perspectival world – a mode of speaking he adopts from thinkers like Eugène Minkowski and Ludwig Binswanger – then we have to specify this and say it is an a-perspectivity of the second degree, i. e. on the reflective level. What is impaired in delusion is the ability to recognise the perspectivity and thus relativity of one’s own attitude and view on the world and to compare and negotiate these with the attitudes and views of others. The own orientation towards the world is made into an absolute framework. What seems to be lacking in delusional states is the possibility of perspective contrast, as Blankenburg calls it. “Each perspective by itself cannot even be deceptive; it does not convey anything. It is the contrast of perspectives by which something becomes accessible to us as something.”¹² This is certainly true for the perception of objects. Objects of perception appear through continuous series of adumbrations. Now if delusion is really a fixation of perspective, as Blankenburg intends to show, then the constitution of objects should not be possible for the subject in delusion at all. But surely it is not meant this way. The subject of delusion constitutes a whole world of objects that carry meanings they do not have in our world of common sense. As mentioned above, the functioning or operative perspectivity and the intentional relation to objects needs to remain intact. Which type of perspective contrast is then impossible in delusion? – Evi-

 “Jede einzelne Perspektive für sich allein genommen ist nicht einmal trügerisch, sondern sie vermittelt überhaupt gar nichts. Der Perspektivenkontrast ist es, wodurch uns etwas als etwas zugänglich wird.” (Blankenburg (b), ).

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dently the one that mediates between perspectives as perspectives. But is it really the case that the deluded subject does not perceive the contrast of perspectives? Contrast means that something stands out against the background of something else. In delusion one experiences precisely the fact that the perspectives of others stand out against one’s own or are in conflict with them. Whenever another person tries to convince the deluded subject with arguments or empirical evidence of the falsity of the delusional assumptions, this is experienced by the deluded subject in an intensified way as a foreign perspective and is subsequently denied. Therefore, the deluded subject has an awareness of the difference of perspectives. So why should there be no contrast of perspectives, as Blankenburg claims? Because the deluded subject is only able to recognise those perspectives cognitively, but cannot actively adopt any of them. So it is a question not only of theoretically understanding the fact that others have perspectives that differ from one’s own, but of pragmatically agreeing to the fact that they are necessary for a common world constitution and of assuming them for oneself. This discrepancy of theoretical and practical dimensions is characteristic of delusion and implies a great loss of personal freedom.

4 The spectrum of perspectivity: hypo- and hyperflexibility I would like to suggest that we should not understand delusion as a state of aperspectivity, but consider gradual modifications on the spectrum of perspectivity. The question is then how much balance is achieved between different perspectives and to what degree perspectivity as a structure attains an intensified or diminished characteristic in different psychopathological states. Delusion would then not amount to a mere negation of a putative normality of consciousness. If it were that, it would be completely inaccessible to our understanding. Rather, and this is something that phenomenological psychiatrists have often emphasised, it should be seen as a modification (sometimes radicalisation) of aspects that are structurally given also in what counts as the shared world of common sense and “normal experience”. Two such modifications could be called hypo-flexibility and hyper-flexibility. Hypo-flexibility means that there is very little perspective flexibility, or a fixation to one single perspective, as in the case above. Hyper-flexibility on the other hand means that there are many perspective changes, which according to Blankenburg implies the danger of losing oneself (Selbstverlust). As examples

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you can take the expansion of thoughts (Gedankenausbreitung) or the delusion that the psychological life of others is completely transparent to oneself. Furthermore, one could think of the histrionic personality disorder, in which Blankenburg sees an abnormal flexibility of perspectives. Subjects with this disorder will put on many different masks, playing many different social roles, changing like a chameleon in correspondende with changes in the situation. Relating Blankenburg’s case example to the differentiation of noetico-noematic congruences and incongruences in the introduction, it is clear that the subject in delusion has difficulty in taking the perspectives of others. There is not enough intersubjectivity in the sense of hypo-flexibility in perspective-taking. It could also be said that there is not enough distribution of perspectivity. Especially when the same object or state of affairs, i. e. the same noematic content is given, sharing the same perspective or attitude, i. e. the same noetic access to it, becomes more and more difficult. In the case of histrionic personality disorder, on the other hand, there seems to be too much broadcast or distribution of perspectivity. Perspectives maintained by others are easily taken-over, become transparent and loose the meaning of being “foreign” perspectives. Even when there are different noematic references, a particular (noetic) perspective or attitude of another subject can be internalised and “applied” to any object or state of affairs that may appear or occur.

References Blankenburg, Wolfgang (1991a): “Einleitung – Perspektivität als interdisziplinäres Konzept.” In: Wolfgang Blankenburg (ed.), Wahn und Perspektivität. Störungen im Realitätsbezug des Menschen und ihre Therapie, Stuttgart: Enke, 1 – 3. Blankenburg, Wolfgang (1991b): “Perspektivität und Wahn.” In: Wolfgang Blankenburg (ed.), Wahn und Perspektivität. Störungen im Realitätsbezug des Menschen und ihre Therapie, Stuttgart: Enke, 4 – 28. Blankenburg, Wolfgang (2007): “Die Verselbständigung eines Themas zum Wahn.” In: Wolfgang Blankenburg, Psychopathologie des Unscheinbaren, ed. by Martin Heinze, Berlin: Parodos Verlag, 25 – 68. Fuchs, Thomas (2005): “Delusional Mood and Delusional Perception – A Phenomenological Analysis.” In: Psychopathology 38, 133 –139, DOI:10.1159/000085843 (accessed 7, 1, 2015). Goldie, Peter (2011): “Anti-Empathy.” In: Amy Coplan/Peter Goldie (eds.), Empathy. Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 302 – 317. Gurwitsch, Aron (1974): Das Bewußtseinsfeld, trans. by Werner D. Fröhlich, Berlin/New York: De Gruyter.

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Husserl, Edmund (1959): Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion, in: Husserliana: Edmund Husserl – Gesammelte Werke, vol. 8, ed. by Rudolf Boehm, The Hague: Nijhoff. Husserl, Edmund (1966): Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten (1918 – 1926), in: Husserliana: Edmund Husserl – Gesammelte Werke, vol. 11, ed. by Margot Fleischer, The Hague: Nijhoff.

Part III: Organization

Roman Boutellier

Distributed Perspectives in Future Workspaces In the absence of perspective there is triviality. – Whitehead (1968), 79.

Abstract: Design and development of new products need experts who are more and more specialized. Whenever the task cannot be split into well-defined, independent sub-tasks, the different perspectives of the experts have to be permanently coordinated and integrated. Considering innovation management, the article focuses on the organisational and personnel requirements of such a cooperation. It stresses the importance of the mutual understanding of the roles the cooperating partners must have in a common project. This reciprocal understanding of each other requires communication, trust and tolerance. One of the most important enablers of such an innovation process is the architectural layout of office spaces that supports the different needs of the experts.

“Innovation has become the industrial religion of the late 20th century. Business sees it as the key to increasing profits and market share. Governments automatically reach for it when trying to fix the economy.” So far The Economist, February 18th 1999.¹ Indeed innovation is today’s name of the business game. When asked what they think the greatest innovation of the last 200 years is, many scholars of management reply: Innovation!² Up to the middle of the 19th century, innovation meant trial and error. Some innovations even contradicted existing natural sciences. George Stephenson’s locomotive was impossible under the laws of thermodynamics in 1814. Natural sciences made big progress over the next 50 years and innovation culminated in Edison’s laboratory in Menlo Park, where developments of new products like the tungsten lamp were carried out systematically in a well-defined process that lead in three steps from basic ideas to sales in a specific market: Preliminary development, somewhat untidy, produces a specification list that is handed over to disciplined product-developers, mostly engineers who draw ‘blue prints’ and produce bills of material. The last phase, today usually the most expensive one, is the market- introduction

 Special Report ().  Whitehead (),  in: Postman (), .

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where you have to convince customers and your own employees. Innovation has become a routine in many industries. Every year we expect new models of skis, new clothes, new cars, and more efficient processes as well.

1 Modularity Today’s industrial paradigm says that the innovation-process is under pressure and has to become much faster in the future. Globalization, competition and ever faster technology cycles push for ever shorter innovation cycles. This is certainly true for some industries and for incremental improvements: Everybody who can program a code is able to start a business. Just write an ‘app’, hand it over to Apple and become rich through the millions of downloads on iPhones. Many try, the big majority fails, thus try again. Software development goes through a revolution because of modularization: You can download subroutines, junks of software from publicly available libraries, mend them together with API’s, application program interfaces, and distribute your product over the Internet. Why not become the next owner of a business like Twitter? A similar development has taken place in the hardware-business. Modules of mobile phones, locomotives, cars or machine tools have become smaller and smaller. Geometric restrictions become less and less demanding and standard interfaces allow ‘Lego-type-innovations’, architectural innovation in lingo. Even a small company can develop complex products in short time. Distribution can be handed over to companies like Amazon. Manufacturing is reduced to buying components and assembly. Cost and time for setting up a global business are falling. Technical universities are measured by the number of start-ups they create per year, and the ‘serial entrepreneur’ replaces the old ‘patron’ who spent his whole life pushing one idea to the market. Modularity speeds up innovation. Every company follows its own narrow perspective. Planning at the level of economics, the balance of offer and demand, is taken care of by the free market, which is the global market. But this is not the whole story: We still have many products that resist modularization, that still need an integral design, an integration of many perspectives. The challenge of developing a new airbus, a new drug against high blood pressure, or the realization of a new hospital is not technological progress or global competition. It is the combination of perspectives that are represented by various specialists, not only engineers!

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2 Integral designs The richer we get the more we are concerned about our future. Thalidomide, Bhopal, Exxon-Valdez and the financial crisis of 2008; all these incidents have led to more regulation. Companies active in fields critical for safety and security are forced to take more and more precautionary measures. To avoid all the traps in these regulatory jungles they need specialists, lawyers who understand both, the business and the law. Small and medium enterprises can manage the first steps of innovation, but expensive market introduction becomes the business of the big companies. In pharmaceuticals we see this division of work: Basic research is carried out by universities, small biotech companies are heavily involved in the early steps of innovation, and ‘Big Pharma’ takes over the very expensive clinical tests, market introduction, distribution and sales.³ Designing drugs depends heavily on the general understanding of diseases. Kuhn’s paradigms are the hidden strategies of research and development. When you see microbes as the enemies of your health, you search for microbe-killers as Pasteur did in the 19th century. Why not wash your hands or sterilize your equipment? When you take the perspective of chemistry as the basic principle of human life, you look for disruptions of physiological processes and correct them with chemical agents. Today’s paradigm sees a disease as a genetic predisposition triggered by lifestyle and environment, a very broad perspective. Thus more and more specialists have to work in big teams to get useful results. Genetics, environments and lifestyles are complex and their interaction cannot be described with Newtonian laws. The big data approach tries to overcome this gap with simple models and an abundance of data and statistics: A strategy that gets a new revival every time we have a new class of sensors or a new, more powerful class of computers. We do not see anymore the chemist who works for dozens of years on one group of compounds in the hope to get a useful drug as a spillover of basic research. Some companies have changed their research strategy completely: They do not go for diseases anymore that have a market potential of at least 200’000 cases in the US per year but look for ‘orphan diseases’, diseases that occur only very rarely and have no treatment at all. Patients agree in these cases quite often to serve as test cases. This can be done with intensive care, with specialized medical doctors only, and the need for ever more specialists increases again. Science relies heavily on precise measurements. But precision equipment is expensive, needs specialists who are able to design, build and realize tests. Last  See Drews ().

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but not least the interpretation of these tests needs specialists as well: who understands Nuclear Magnetic Resonance-machines or is able to interpret measurements achieved with genetically modified mice? Expensive equipment is nowadays often centralized in ‘technology platforms’ together with the personnel needed.⁴ E. g. in hospitals ‘human imaging’, laboratories and X-ray treatment for cancer are each centralized and will not move to the ‘bed side’ in the near future. All these specialists need special training. The consequences are clear: The problem in medical therapies or design of complex products is not technological process, but the technology scope. And since every technology needs its specialist, we have more and more specialists involved in the design of a car, a new drug, or the realization of a new laboratory building. Many specialists means an abundance of different perspectives. Since in many cases the bottleneck-technology is not known at the beginning of a new development and may even change during the development of a new product, every specialist may become important;we cannot prioritize perspectives from the beginning. Le Corbusier has once remarked that “a house is a machine for living in”.⁵ That was close to one hundred years ago. How right he was! The cost structure of today’s laboratory buildings for university research shows that about two thirds of the total cost are used for building technology and one third for the hull, the ‘architecture’ of the building. And these buildings are prototypes. The needs of the users and building-technologies change so fast that plans become obsolete within years. Dozens of planning specialists and dozens of ‘persons skilled in the art’ have to be integrated to get an acceptable result. Building itself only takes around two years, the same as 200 years ago. But experience shows that such buildings need at least two years, eight seasons, to run smoothly. Cristal Palace, the first large building constructed of metal and glass, was created in 1851 in seventeen weeks and cost £ 200’000. It was designed with mathematical regularity and all care was taken to reduce cost and make the construction as easy to build as possible. The chief engineer was able to understand all technologies involved, all methods used. In today’s buildings even maintenance of the systems used cannot be done without specialists. Today’s challenge of integrating many different specialists, many different perspectives, becomes even greater when we think about new drugs where we run into projects that may cost more than one billion euros until a company has a decent market share and is sure that all side effects and regulations are under control.

 See Andereggen ().  Le Corbusier (), .

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Thus we have two types of integration of specialists: Whenever it is possible to split a problem into well-defined subproblems that can be dealt with separately, we are able to modularize, to combine what is already available. A small team, a small company is able to do the combination, to build up a complete system. As soon as we have highly integrated problems, a new idea somewhere in the ‘architecture’, somewhere in the system, has a domino effect on many other components: Perspectives have to be integrated as early as possible. It is not enough to understand the functionality of a part of the system; one always has to check the whole system to check all ‘side effects’.

3 Generation of perspectives “There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective knowing, and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our ‘concept’ of this thing, our objectivity be.”⁶ Nietzsche stresses the importance of different alternatives, different views for understanding or problem solving in his Genealogy of Morals. Time and time again we have engineers, specialists in their field, coming up with a unique solution to a specific problem that turns out to be suboptimal in later stages of an innovation. But where do the different alternatives, the different perspectives come from? At Roche, one of the big pharmaceutical companies that spends more than 10 billion euros per year on research and development (R&D), retired scientists tell a remarkable story: After WW II, Roche had a library in the basement of its R&D-building with one copying machine. It was the only copying machine available within the R&D department. Thus there was always a queue behind the copier, people met at random, by pure chance, and started talking to each other. “That was the place where all the blockbusters of Roche were invented!” We made ourselves a survey at Novartis, the other Swiss giant in pharmaceuticals. The two most important sources for important creative ideas turned out to be intensive discussions with colleague-scientists and deep thinking in self-chosen solitude. Only few people mentioned all the fancy creativity enhancing tools and techniques like brainstorming, singing under the shower or De Bono’s six coloured thinking hats. Intensive discussions are fruitful only as long as there is not too much competition between the employees. Compensation and promotion become big is-

 Nietzsche (), .

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sues in R&D-teams. They can be resolved only with a deep involvement of managers or independent peers. Models based on individual merit do more harm than most result-oriented managers think. Deep thinking is hard work: Our brain uses some 35 % of our energy-intake. Deep thinking works only with intrinsic motivated people, another reason why fair compensation is so important. Research has shown time and time again that extrinsic motivation, motivation through money, can destroy intrinsic motivation.⁷ The examples of Roche and Novartis show that different perspectives mean more than having different skills or complementary know-how. As soon as an integral approach is needed, we cannot just allocate task specific talents along a well-defined process. What all the members of a development team need is a deep understanding of each other’s contribution to the overall target. This can only be achieved through intensive communication, built on trust and tolerance for other opinions. This gives some ideas about the limits of ‘freelancers’, a new wave seen by many scholars of management as the new efficient way to deliver services, including creative tasks like R&D or legal advice. Indeed, freelancing is growing fast. It makes sense whenever a task can be split into subtasks or when only small teams are needed for a short time. For complex integrated work freelancers are not efficient because they have to be trained to understand the big picture behind an R&D project, and they are mostly extrinsic motivated; their perspectives are not the perspectives of the company. It is difficult to buy creativity for big, highly integrated projects. The other extreme, overfamiliarity, has two big disadvantages: Whenever people work together for a long time they have the same experiential background; no big news can be expected in discussions between employees. A knows perhaps not all the details that B knows. But A knows where their opinions diverge and cannot be used to develop a new perspective: A does not listen anymore to B’s proposals that are different, and, even worse, B and A do not give each other any feedback. One has tried too often to change the other’s opinions without any success. In a family only children still believe to be able to change their parents perspectives, the parents themselves do not try anymore. Close familiarity leads to strong ties. People know each other very well. But we need weak ties as well. As Granovetter has remarked about the strength of weak ties: More novel information flows to individuals through weak than strong ties. Because our close friends tend to move in the same circles that we do, the information they receive over-

 See Deci ().

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laps considerably with what we already know. Acquaintances, by contrast, know people that we do not and, thus, receive more novel information.⁸

Thus to support creativity, it makes sense to position people in a big project physically such that they are in close contact with the other project members but also to make sure that they still live in ‘different worlds’ from time to time, that they still have the opportunity to develop their own perspectives. Whenever technology develops fast in a scientific community, engineers working on a project together must keep close contacts to their scientific colleagues. In many cases this can only be achieved with a two-dimensional matrix organization. Groups of engineers in a fast moving field need a critical size just to be able to absorb new knowledge created in the scientific community outside the company. This is the technical dimension of the organisational matrix; the other is given through the projects. Employees need strong ties for coordination and weak ties for creating new ideas. They need intensive discussions, even periodic formal meetings to coordinate and exchange perspectives, but they also need solitude to be on their own, to develop their own conscious position. Anecdotic evidence for solitude is provided by Sir Isaak Newton: He had to go back to his native village Woolsthorpe in 1665 because Trinity College had closed as a precaution against the Great Plague. At the top of the epidemic London counted close to 7’000 deaths in one week! During this year of the big disaster, his annus mirabilis, he invented calculus, his theory of colour and the law of gravitation. After this he studied the then known theories of Descartes, Kepler and Aristoteles in small intensive classes in Cambridge for four years. Because he had only an approximate estimate of the distance between the earth and the sun at his disposal, he did not publish his gravitational theory until 1687, twenty years after he invented it. His Principia is seen as the beginning of the ‘precise natural sciences’. It is written in the language of mathematics and nothing shows how Newton found his famous gravitational law: written language in science places emphasis on logical and coherent argument, not on the detours and mistakes committed during the elaboration of the results. Kepler is one of the very few famous scientists who explains in his publications all the detours and mistakes he had until he came up with his famous laws. Most readers skip these diversions, go directly to the results and use these for their own research. As long as they do not encounter inconsistencies, they do not bother whether the primary results are ‘proven’ or not.

 Granovetter (), .

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This is the big advantage of written, printed text: It is precise and can be checked by third parties, one of the big achievements of Gutenberg: The original author takes full responsibility of the printed text and there are no copying errors we encounter in the books the monks copied and recopied in generations of tedious, boring work. Science is self-correcting, not immediately but over decades. This ongoing improvement is hugely enhanced once the results are printed and published. But “biologically, we are all oralists. Our genes are programmed for spoken language. Literacy on the other hand is a product of cultural conditioning”.⁹ We should never forget, that Socrates did not publish anything at all. He asked questions and argued orally. Nobody can ‘prove’ what he actually said! There were only human witnesses, no machines, no recording devices. His pupil Plato was still sceptical about written text and was convinced that learning had to be done orally. Text was for him not for remembering, only to remind what you already know: Plato expressed his concerns about written sources in his famous story about Thoth and Thamus: Thamus, the king of Egypt, tells Thoth, the Egyptian God of writing, measuring and calculation: You have not discovered a potion for remembering, but for reminding, you provide your students with the appearance of wisdom, not with its reality. Your invention will enable them to hear many things without properly taught, and they will imagine that they have come to know much while for most part they will know nothing.¹⁰

Today we live in a society that is sceptical about what is known by memory only, everything has to be codified, be it in a written memo, in a database or in a computer program. The reasons are manifold: In business and in science, it is sometimes better to be wrong for the right reason than to be right for the wrong reasons. In any case in business, like in science, written text can be criticized and presents itself to improvement.

4 Written text versus open discussion This huge improvement over the old copies with their innumerable errors comes with a big disadvantage: Precision kills creativity! Nobel laureate Max Delbrück asks for “limited sloppiness” in his famous principle: “If you are too sloppy, you never get reproducible results, you can never draw stringent conclusions. If you  Havelock (),  f.  Plato (),  f.

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are a little sloppy, then you see something startling you… nail it down.”¹¹ You have a change of perspective; something new has become important. In the words of A.N. Whitehead: Transcendence of mere clarity and order is necessary for dealing with the unforeseen, for progress, for excitement. Life degenerates when enclosed within the shackles of mere confirmation. A power of incorporating vague and disorderly elements of experience is essential for the advance into novelty.¹²

When scientists make an experiment, they guess about the outcome, they have a hypothesis. But it may well be that the outcome is a surprise, especially when the experiment is not set up too precisely. Precision is a must for the final tests, once a new, useful result has been found. Werner Heisenberg is convinced that a scientist has to be able to discuss his experiments in natural language: Precise mathematics is not enough in his view.¹³ In spoken language much of the meaning depends on the context; shared knowledge is being built up. “Listeners may tend to recall more of the gist of the story”.¹⁴ Intensive discussions between researchers take place in natural language, and deep thinking is like speaking to oneself, in natural language as well. In face-to-face discussions Delbrück’s sloppiness is present: Natural language is neither very precise nor has it fixed definitions and meanings!

5 Face-to-face Modern technology has overcome distance to a great extent. Telephone and videoconferences make it possible to speak in real time to everybody at any time in our global village. But companies have made additional experiences: Whenever people have to exchange complex messages, they have to communicate face-toface. Integration of different, distributed perspectives is difficult and needs faceto-face contacts. IBM, XEROX and many more of our global leaders know this from big projects: Whenever a bigger issue has to be resolved, team members have to use the plane, meet personally in one place and speak face-to-face. Since expats, employees from headquarters working abroad, are extremely expensive, difficult to recruit and retain, more and more multinationals build up

   

Delbrück, cited by Grinnell (),  f. Whitehead (), . See Heisenberg (). Hildyard/Olson (), .

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multicultural experience with short global improvement projects. People meet four to five times over the course of one year, socialize, discuss, exchange perspectives and improve a specific process or product of the company. Nonaka studied these innovations, these knowledge creating processes in Japanese companies and summarized his experience in his famous SECI model, published in 1991 and presented with the example of an apprentice learning bakery which lead to the innovation of the home bread making machine: 1. First, she learns the tacit secrets of the Osaka International Hotel baker (socialization). 2. Next, she translates these secrets into explicit knowledge that she can communicate to her team members and others at Matsushita (articulation, in later publications externalization). 3. The team then standardizes this knowledge, putting it together into a manual or workbook and embodying it in a product (combination). 4. Finally, through the experience of creating a new product, Tanaka and her team members enrich their own tacit knowledge base (internalization). In particular, they come to understand in an extremely intuitive way that products like the home bread making machine can provide genuine quality. That is, the machine must make bread that is as good as that of a professional baker.¹⁵ The SECI-model shows how four major steps lead to a shared perspective: Socialization, speaking to each other in direct contacts; externalization transfers tacit knowledge into a written statement; combination of ones perspective with other perspectives; and finally internalization where new knowledge merges and becomes a routine, an efficient tool for further innovations. The SECI-model has become an important brickstone in the never-ending building of systematic innovation. It stresses the importance of communication and face-to-face contacts in the early stages of innovations.

6 Buildings and creativity Edison did his systematic research and development in a two-story building, one big room on each level. No separate rooms for management, no separate lab for specific equipment. Socialization and combination were guaranteed through physical proximity. Today’s teams are much bigger, and the question arises how modern IT and architecture can support creativity, the build-up of new use-

 Nonaka (), .

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ful knowledge, how different distributed perspectives can be integrated. An important parameter is physical distance. Tom Allen has measured the impact of distance on communication. It falls off fast. Above a certain distance the probability to meet unplanned is close to zero and remains at the same asymptotic low level. Our measurements at Novartis show that there is no big difference between open space and cell space and that the limit is achieved already at a distance of 20 to 25 meters. A back-of-the-envelope calculation gives a circle with a surface of some 2000 m2. Filled with American cubicles, it provides space for approximately 150 employees. This is consistent with the well-known figure from biology that the human brain is able to cope with a maximum of 150 personal contacts. Below 150 we know who knows what, we do not need ‘yellow pages’ and we do not need any artificial knowledge-management. Many managers know the SECI-model and most architects appreciate the need for intensive communication, planned and random. R&D-managers know about weak and strong ties, and most are aware of the disadvantages of communication through IT, with mails and videoconferences. The debate about open space versus cell space and function oriented versus object oriented organization is never ending. But deliberation about the design of workspaces is traditiondriven and in some cases space for employees is even deteriorating under heavy cost pressure. According to The Economist, some 40 million North Americans work in cubicles. From 1994 to 2010 average cubicle space fell from 8 square meters to below 7 square meters!¹⁶ Fortunately humanity or even a manager stumbles from time to time on new insights; we act before we think: The building 20 at MIT was constructed as part of the emergency war effort. A wooden structure, hot during the summer, cold during the winter, sturdy, never a prime space. It was built “as a war measure, the life of said building to be for the duration of the war and six months thereafter”, as McCreery, the architect, remarked.¹⁷ But it was flexible and since it was always seen as a temporary structure, everybody felt free to modify it and was able to do so because of the wooden ceilings and wooden walls. ETH in Zurich tried to copy it shortly after 2000 with its big chemistry building on the new campus just outside Zurich, a metal-concrete-structure with no flexibility at all. Until 2015 Novartis has spent over 2 billion Swiss Francs for its new Campus in Basel. It pushed architects to accept recent knowledge about human communication and creativity. Novartis introduced colocation, the centralization of specialists working on a specific

 Holland ().  McCreery (), .

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project, and replaced its old function oriented organization in some fields with an object-driven setup. A first study after the move from cell spaced offices to open space¹⁸ was a big surprise: Time without communication went up by a factor 5 to 7 despite far more interactions. It seems that open space encourages people to enter short interactions very often but to keep them much shorter than the discussions behind closed doors. Visibility of colleagues reminds you of open issues and leads to informal contacts as long as these colleagues are not too busy. And since you do not want to disturb all the others, you keep discussions short. Managers at Novartis are convinced that efficiency has increased, last but not least since best practices spread much faster among lab-technicians. But we know that intensive discussions are only one of the two most important sources of creativity in labs. Researchers need privacy as well. This and the general needs of research and development management lead to seven specific types of rooms.¹⁹ Today’s multi-option society wants to have not only many options in life, but multi-option working spaces as well. 1. Offices, not too far from lab-zones 2. Laboratories 3. Technology-platforms (special lab zones) 4. Meeting rooms, well separated from all other rooms 5. Stairs to connect different levels 6. Coffee-zones for recreation 7. Retreat-zones

6.1 Office zones Offices are for individual work: In the US usually cubicles, in Europe cell space and slowly more open space. Some companies like IBM have introduced nonpermanent office spaces. Our comparison of this approach in several multinationals showed that people accept to rotate – if it makes sense. At IBM-sales or at Mc Kinsey, employees spend most of their time at customers’ offices. Thus they accept to take another seat every Friday. At Novartis, R&D-employees do not like to look for an individual place every morning. Thus some arrive very early, take the best positions and defend them. R&D-employees expect a permanent setup based on merits and seniority. Managers are more concerned about

 Boutellier et al. ().  Boutellier et al. ().

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who should communicate with whom. Thus the final setup has to be managed, self-organization leads to endless hidden discussions. Open space has the big advantage of visibility and a high frequency of short interactions. Extreme cases are low-paid workers in call centres in developing countries and the big trader-rooms of multinational banks for traders with an average income above one million British pounds before the financial crisis in 2008. These trading centres are crowded with several hundred employees, each with five to six computer screens in front, always prepared to react within seconds whenever an opportunity pops up. As soon as creativity prevails over speed of reaction, people need more space, more square-meters. Compared to US cubicles office workers at Novartis or BMW have two to three times more space at their disposal. Cell space is not an appropriate tool to save floor space!

6.2 Laboratories Depending on the needs of the users and regulations, labs have to be separated from offices. Whenever you work with toxic materials or with animals, you cannot combine labs with offices. Nevertheless Novartis went ahead with the Swiss authorities in Basel and was able to combine labs with offices: A strict air-flow from desks to lab-space made it possible to remove the walls between labs and offices. Rather surprising was the improved discipline in the use of glasses and white clothes. It may well be that visibility increases group pressure. Since longer discussions now take place either in the meeting rooms or at the office desks, work in the labs has gained in concentration and intensity. Noisy equipment had to be concentrated in specific spaces, what resulted in an additional meetingspace where people meet outside the contacts dictated by the R&D-process: A welcome opportunity to exchange perspectives.

6.3 Technology-platforms R&D moves with experiments and feasibility studies. Experiments have to be designed, built, tested and interpreted. With increasing sophistication of the equipment and methods used, every step, including interpretation, needs specialists. Thus distributing all these technologies and specialists over many R&D-groups gets expensive and inefficient. High-speed throughput screening, electron microscopy, nuclear magnetic resonance or mice are typical examples that are concentrated in ‘technology platforms’. They are an opportunity to work in parallel with the same methods on different problems. People with different backgrounds

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meet at random and weak relationships develop. Technology platforms have been introduced at ETH in Zurich. Every platform has its management team responsible for the services provided. The scientific directions are given through an independent board of researchers representing the different research groups. These technology platforms are one of the major pillars of interdisciplinary work in the rather static world of the scientific communities represented in the departments of ETH and most other technical universities.²⁰

6.4 Meeting rooms Meeting rooms provide the opportunity to work in groups for several hours and to celebrate the formal meetings typical for every big organisation. These rooms should be isolated acoustically from all other rooms. They should be close to the working places of the employees. Reservation should be as simple as possible. Paper solutions are better accepted than IT-solutions. Some companies that have switched to open plan also provide very small meeting rooms where people can have long bilateral conversations or long telephone calls without disturbing everyone else To overcome the general disadvantage of noise in an open plan environment, companies have to develop a ‘code of conduct’. Our experience shows that R&D-employees want to have a say in the development of such rules. Thus management can focus on providing the resources needed and the setup of the process that leads to rules followed by everybody. Novartis has introduced lamps that turn red when someone speaks too loud on the phone. It takes at least six to twelve months until employees develop and follow the rules. Our experience shows that open-plan setups need much less formal meetings. Visibility and an increased frequency of bilateral communications reduce the need for formal coordination. Some meeting rooms stay empty most of the day and are used as individual retreat zones.

6.5 Stairs Buildings have a natural partition for communication: Horizontal distances are mastered easily; vertical distance works as a heavy barrier. Novartis tried everything, elevators and nice stairs, but employees rarely move over more than one

 See Andereggen ().

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level. ‘One floor, one team’ is a strong rule. Thus team sizes bigger than one floor need intensive management attention. Today’s hospital planners know this. If you want to achieve high efficiency even during night shifts, one level should have ‘two stations’, double the size a care-team is able to manage during day shifts. In R&D buildings the only way to overcome vertical separation seems to be the concentration of special equipment on one floor. So employees have to move like at Roche many years ago. What helps as well is the design of stairs as ‘social rooms’ where it is easy to sit down on the steps and talk to each other in a relaxed atmosphere. Semper, the great architect of big public buildings in Leipzig, Vienna and Zurich was well aware of this: His staircases are huge, compared to todays’ standards, full of light, colours and structured walls. Sunlight supports orientation in his buildings.

6.6 Coffee-zones Employees meet in coffee-zones, and employees introduced to each other for the first time start to talk about business, not personal items! Only when they have built up a certain level of mutual trust do they talk about their hobbies, their families and their worries.²¹ At Novartis two thirds of all unplanned interactions take place around the coffee-machines. Here people develop plans, make acquaintances, discuss professional issues and listen to others. Coffee-zones are a source of new ideas, of creativity. Perspectives are exchanged in a natural, non-binding way. Thus coffee-zones need far more attention from planners, architects and managers. Unfortunately miniaturization has made it possible to install coffee-machines everywhere. These decentralized, individual coffee-zones compete with the official ones. The central places can win, but only if they are well placed and well designed.

6.7 Retreat-zones For creativity, for an efficient interplay of different perspectives, it is important to have space for intensive interaction, space for unplanned encounters and last but not least, space for self-chosen solitude, for deep thinking. R&D-people

 See Erni Baumann/Boutellier ().

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need retreat zones as a source for new ideas. Experiments at Novartis and ETH Zurich show that this can be achieved in a library-style environment. All over the world, libraries are digitized, but everywhere reading rooms are fully occupied. This separation of meetings and solitude is not new. It is the typical pattern of monasteries for almost 2000 years: In the cloister you walk, you meet and you are supposed to communicate. In your cell you are alone, you have time to think, to argue with yourself. One person becomes two persons, as Hannah Arendt has remarked.²² Medieval monasteries have been seen for a long time to be the contrary of an innovative environment, but new research has changed the view: Medieval monasteries developed our technical knowledge about wine, the three-field system and agriculture in general. All our technical gadgets from iPhones over emails to videoconferencing and telephones have not changed our basic habits of work. Internet and all the modern IT equipment certainly have made us far more efficient but not more innovative when it comes to basic innovations. It may well be that we have lost to a certain extent the ability to develop our own perspective; we do not take the time to be alone and think on our own for hours. All the overwhelming information is luring us into the search for the latest news, even if it has no enduring value for us at all.

Conclusion In a society driven more and more by science and technology, integration of many perspectives in the sense of Nietzsche may be the only way to avoid disaster, to avoid ‘Technopoly’, the surrender of culture to technology.²³ This integration cannot be achieved through codified text alone, today’s scientists and engineers need face-to-face contacts as much as the monks in medieval monasteries. We need trust, tolerance and direct exchange of information for creativity: The architectural design of R&D places, the design of workspaces can help to improve socialization and with it the exchange of different perspectives. Some companies and universities know this and try to build new R&D spaces to enhance innovation. The principles to be followed are known, nothing new under the sun! Modern technology has changed much of our business environment, but creativity seems to stick to old habits. Modern IT has had a big impact on efficient coordination, much less so on creativity, which is still driven by intensive discussions, weak relationships and deep thinking.

 See Arendt ().  See Postman ().

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Thus the modern workspace in a creativity-dependent organization has to support not one dimension, but many different life-styles and work-styles. It is not the unlimited choice of the multi-options-society,²⁴ it is rather the selection of a few selected options together with strong rules of conduct, a sophisticated balance between discipline and individual initiatives. And since this balance is never a final one, human beings change, the balance has always to be developed together to be improved and adapted continuously.

References Andereggen, Stefan (2012): Technologieplattformen an Universitäten (PhD thesis), Zürich: ETH Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule. Arendt, Hannah (1970): On violence, San Diego/New York/London: Harcourt. Boutellier, Roman/Ullmann, Fredrik/Schreiber, Jürg/Naef, Reto (2008): “Impact of office layout on communication in a science driven business.” In: R&D Management Journal 38, 372 – 391, DOI:10.1111/j.14679310.2008.00524.x (accessed 7, 1, 2015). Boutellier, Roman/Coradi, Annina/Heinzen, Mareike (eds.) (2014): “Neue Arbeitsräume für die F&E-Abteilung – Die sieben Zonen.” In: Jürgen Gausemeier (ed.), Symposium für Vorausschau und Technologieplanung, Paderborn: W.V. Westfalia Druck, 279 – 292. Deci, Edward L. (1971): “The Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation.” In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 18 (1), 105 – 115. Drews, Jürgen (1998): Die verspielte Zukunft. Wohin geht die Arzneimittelforschung?, Basel/Boston/Berlin: Birkhäuser Verlag. Erni Baumann, Claudia/Boutellier, Roman (2012): “Chance Encounters.” In: Juan Gabriel Cegarra (ed.), Proceedings of the 13th European Conference on Knowledge Management. Universidad Politécnica de Cartagena, Spain: Academic Publishing International Limited, 48 – 56. Gies, Frances/Gies, Joseph (1995): Cathedral, Forge and Waterwheel, Technology and Invention in the Middle Ages, New York: Harper Perennial. Granovetter, Mark (2005): “The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes.” In: Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, 33 – 50, DOI: 10.1257/0895330053147958 (accessed 7, 1, 2015). Grinnell, Frederick (2009): “Discovery in the lab: Plato’s paradox and Delbrück’s principle of limited sloppiness.” In: Gerald Weissmann (ed.), The FASEB Journal 23, 7 – 9, DOI: 10.1096/fj.09 – 0102ufm (accessed 7, 1,2015). Gross, Peter (1994): Die Multioptionsgesellschaft, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. Havelock, Eric A. (1980): “The Coming of Literate Communication to Western Culture.” In: Journal of Communication 30, 90 – 98, DOI:10.1111/j.1460 – 2466.1980.tb01774.x (accessed 7, 1, 2015). Heisenberg, Werner (2000): Physics and Philosophy. The Revolution in Modern Science, London/New York et al.: Penguin Classics.

 See Gross ().

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Hildyard, Angela/Olson, David R. (1982): “On the Comprehension and Memory of Oral vs. Written Discourse.” In: Deborah Tannen (ed.), Spoken and Written Language. Exploring Orality and Literacy, Norwood, NJ.: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 19 – 33. Holland, Michigan (2015): “Inside the box.” In: The Economist, 45 – 46, http://www.economist.com/news/international/21637359-how-workers-ended-up-cubesand-how-they-could-break-free-inside-box (accessed 7, 1, 2015). Koester, Arthur (2014): The Sleepwalkers. A History of Man’s Changing Vision of the Universe, London/New York: Penguin Classics. Le Corbusier, Seuphor, Michel (1925): Vers un architecture, Paris, Crès, 73. McCreery, George (1998): “Celebrating Building 20, History.” In: MIT libraries, archives. https://libraries.mit.edu/archives/mithistory/building20/history.html (accessed 1, 16, 11, 2015). Nietzsche, Friedrich (2000): On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, trans. by Walter Kaufmann, New York: Modern Library, 555. Nonaka, Ikoriju (1991): “The Knowledge-Creating Company.” In: Harvard Business Review 96, 6, Nov.-Dez., 96 – 104. Plato (1997): Phaedrus. In: Plato Complete Works, ed. by John M. Cooper, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. Postman, Neil (1993): Technopoly, New York: Vintage Books. Special report (1999): “Industry gets religion.” In: Economist, February 18, http://www.econo mist.com/node/186620 (accessed 7, 1, 2015). Special report (2014): “Tech startup – A cambrian moment.” In: The Economist, January 14, http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21593580-cheap-and-ubiquitous-build ing-blocks-digital-products-and-services-have-caused (accessed 7, 1, 2015). Whitehead, Alfred North (1985), Science and the Modern World, London: Free Association Books, 120. Whitehead, Alfred North (1968): Modes of thought, New York: The Free Press.

Julia Warmers und Christoph Gengnagel

Neue Dynamiken durch Kooperation – die Hybrid Plattform als inter- und transdisziplinärer Denk- und Forschungsraum Abstract: New Dynamics through Cooperation – the Hybrid Plattform as an Interand Transdisciplinary Conceptual and Research Space. Many social problems and complex scientific questions can only be solved taking into account different perspectives. Hence inter- and transdiciplinary cooperation is becoming increasingly more important. Designing these cooperations is a challenge for everyone involved, but the cooperations hold valuable potentials for prospective thinking. The article illustrates the challenge using the example of the “Hybrid Plattform”, a joint pilot project of the Berlin University of the Arts and the Technische Universität Berlin that encourages, supports, and organizes cooperation between scientists, designers, and artists. It argues for the provision of an infrastructure in support of inter- and transdisciplinary research and the support of a transdisciplinary culture of knowledge and science. Transdisciplinary project work requires in its iterative processes specific instruments and methods that need to be developed yet or combined in new ways. The paper highlights e. g. the use of instruments and methods of communication, moderation, and reflection. For the irritations and divergences specifically appearing in transdisciplinary contexts develop their creative potential only if we manage to transform the perspectivally related frictions into an innovative project work.

1 Kontext: Zusammenführung wissenschaftlicher und künstlerisch-gestalterischer Perspektiven Wer das Gebäude der Universität der Künste Berlin am Einsteinufer in BerlinCharlottenburg betritt, bewegt sich auf Albert Einsteins Spuren. Zumindest begrüßt die Hochschule ihre Gäste und Mitarbeiter, Lehrenden und Studierenden mit einem Aphorismus des berühmten Physikers und Humanisten: „Wir können überhaupt nicht denken, ohne unsere fünf Sinne zu gebrauchen.“ Die Wahrnehmung der Umwelt, von Objekten, Personen, Situationen und des eigenen Subjekts erfolgt visuell, auditiv, olfaktorisch, gustatorisch und taktil, oftmals ohne dass sich ein Bewusstsein hierüber einstellt. Diese Erfahrung ist nach Einstein

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zwingende Voraussetzung vom Denken – und wir dürfen ausgehen vom konkreten wie abstrakt-logischen Denken. In diesem Prozess werden Informationen gefiltert aufgenommen, verarbeitet, interpretiert und in einen subjektiv sinnvollen Zusammenhang gestellt. Was Bedeutung erlangt, wird nicht allein individuell zugewiesen, sondern erweist sich als kulturell und sozial bedingt. Die sozial-kulturelle Verfasstheit der Perspektiven gilt auch für wissenschaftliche Disziplinen¹ mit ihren Distinktionskriterien (Gegenstände, Methoden, Theorien, Paradigmen, Vokabulare usw.): „Wahrnehmung und Verarbeitung von Wissen [werden] weitgehend durch die disziplinäre Identität vorstrukturiert.“² Daher liegt es nahe, den von Karin Knorr Cetina eingeführten Begriff der „epistemischen Kulturen“³ in Bezug auf die Praxis der Wissensgenerierung und -validierung zu verwenden. Für Gaston Bachelard ist diese Kultur elementare Grundbedingung der intellektuellen Leistung. Er definiert sie „als ‚Zugang zu einer Emergenz‘, das heißt, als ein Milieu, in dem sich Neues ereignen, in dem Unvorhergesehenes passieren kann.“⁴ Bachelard unterstreicht den innovationsbefördernden Charakter des Wissenschaftssystems und begrüßt die fachliche Spezialisierung. Jene evoziert durch eine Fokussierung der Wahrnehmung, eine Verdichtung von Komplexität und enge methodische Handlungsrahmen neue Erkenntnisse, die aufgrund gemeinsamer Werte und eines disziplinären Referenzsystems Anklang finden. Andererseits liegt hierin für Ludwik Fleck ein innovationshemmender Wesenszug der „Denkkollektive“ mit ihren „Denkstilen“,⁵ die – genau entgegengesetzt interpretiert – aufgrund der Einschränkung der Aufmerksamkeit, einer Reduktion von Komplexität und der Begrenztheit der Modellauswahl die Entstehung neuen Wissens behindern. Inwiefern liegt eine historische Bedingtheit und kulturelle Verfasstheit von Wahrnehmung und Wissensproduktion auch bei ästhetischen Strategien vor? In der soziologischen Perspektive auf die zeitgenössischen Künste wird zunehmend die Praxis künstlerischen und gestalterischen Arbeitens in den unterschiedlichen Feldern, Genres und Milieus der Künste in den Blick genommen. Auch wenn  Die Diskussion um die Begriffe Disziplin und Fach, ihre Unterscheidung in der Bedeutung oder synonyme Verwendung, erscheint für den Kontext der hier verhandelten Inter- und Transdisziplinarität weniger relevant. Der in diesem Aufsatz verwendete Terminus der Disziplinarität schließt akademische Fächer mit ein.  Stadie (), .  Knorr Cetina (). Der Begriff verweist auf die kognitive Dimension wie auf die strukturbildende Funktion, die sozial-kulturelle und psychologische Bedingtheit der Disziplinen sowie auf ihre historische Kontinuität, die neben bestandserhaltenden Tendenzen vor allem eine höchst dynamische Wandelbarkeit aufweist.  Rheinberger (a),  f.  Fleck ().

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verbindliche Traditions- und Geschichtsmodelle im 21. Jahrhundert in den Künsten keine Gültigkeit mehr zu scheinen haben, so arbeiten Künstler (Literaten, Musiker, Darstellende und Bildende Künstler wie Gestalter und Architekten) in Bezugnahme zu bisherigen Werken und Ideen sowie zur Gesellschaft, in der sie verhaftet sind und – mit Pierre Bourdieu gesprochen – „als Medium (sozialer und psychologischer) Strukturen […] agieren“.⁶ Die kulturhistorisch geformten und wandelbaren epistemischen und ästhetischen Kulturen lassen sich über das praktische Tun der Künstler, Gestalter und Wissenschaftler in Beziehung zueinander setzen. Paul Feyerabend unternimmt dies anhand der disziplinären Stilformen des Wahrnehmens, Denkens und Handelns: Die Wahl eines Stils, einer Wirklichkeit, einer Wahrheitsform, Realitäts- und Rationalitätskriterien eingeschlossen, ist die Wahl von Menschenwerk. Sie ist ein sozialer Akt, sie hängt ab von der historischen Situation, sie ist gelegentlich ein relativ bewußter Vorgang […], sie ist viel öfter direktes Handeln aufgrund starker Intuitionen. ‚Objektiv‘ ist sie nur in dem durch die historische Situation vorgegebenen Sinn: auch Objektivität ist ein Stilmerkmal.⁷

Die Analysen der Verhältnisse zwischen den Wissenschaften und den künstlerisch-gestalterischen Fächern haben in den letzten Jahren eine Konjunktur erlebt, die zwischen den Polen einer postulierten Wesensgleichheit und einer strikten Dichotomie oszillieren. Hans-Jörg Rheinberger betont die anhaltende „Notwendigkeit, die jeweiligen Konfigurationen wissenschaftlicher und künstlerischer Hervorbringung in der ihnen eigenen Geschichtlichkeit auszuloten und sie unter Dauerreflexion zu stellen.“ In der konkreten Zusammenarbeit sollte es darum gehen, „einen kulturellen Boden [zu] schaffen, [um] sich gegenseitig genauer auf die Finger zu sehen.“⁸ Das pointiert formulierte „sich auf die Finger Sehen“ in den Erkenntnisprozessen bildet die grundlegende Komponente im Zusammenspiel der Künste und Wissenschaften – daran knüpft die Hybrid Plattform an. Die Relevanz liegt in der Bedeutung der Wissensproduktion: In der Wissensgesellschaft des 21. Jahrhunderts sind die Hervorbringungen ästhetischer und wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse die zentralen Produktionsfaktoren, insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Zukunftsfähigkeit der Gesellschaft. Wenn gesellschaftliche Problemstellungen einer weitgefassten Aufmerksamkeit, unterschiedlicher Herangehensweisen und sich ergänzender Theorien und Methoden bedürfen, um zu neuen Lösungen zu gelangen, erscheint eine disziplinenübergreifende Zusammenarbeit in der Erkenntnisgewinnung erforderlich. Weiterhin können auch in-

 Bourdieu (), .  Feyerabend (),  f.  Rheinberger (b), .

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nerwissenschaftliche Forschungsfragen von künstlerisch-wissenschaftlicher Kooperation und einer ganzheitlichen Betrachtungsweise profitieren. Die Vielfalt der Perspektiven auf Phänomene und die kulturelle Bedingtheit der beteiligten Expertisen aufzuzeigen, heißt sie fruchtbar zu machen, um gemeinsam Fragen aufwerfen zu können und prospektives, alternatives Denken zu fördern.⁹ Welche Bündnisse zwischen den Künsten, der Gestaltung und den Wissenschaften können Wissens- und Erfahrungsinhalte zur Auslotung komplexer Fragestellungen adäquat generieren? Was passiert, wenn Denkkollektive und -stile bei interdisziplinärer Zusammenarbeit kollidieren oder kooperieren? Wie lässt sich der Transfer der unterschiedlichen Wissenskulturen zielführend gestalten? Mit diesen Fragen zu Wechselwirkungen wissenschaftlicher und ästhetischer Wissensformen beschäftigen wir uns in diesem Beitrag, und zwar anhand der von der Universität der Künste Berlin und der Technischen Universität Berlin eingerichteten Hybrid Plattform, einer Projektplattform auf dem Campus Charlottenburg zur Beförderung inter- und transdisziplinärer Forschung und Lehre. Im Jahr 2015 endete die vierjährige Pilotphase der Hybrid Plattform und es gilt die Erfahrungen auszuwerten, wie neue Dynamiken durch Kooperation entstehen können. Zunächst werden der Aufbau, die Aufgaben und das Selbstverständnis der Hybrid Plattform und ihre Projektformate erläutert (2). Hiernach sollen die Begriffe und die Bedeutung von Inter- und Transdisziplinarität erörtert (3) und im hybriden Kontext dargelegt werden (4). Ausgehend von der Analyse, inwieweit etwas Neues entsteht, wenn Vertreter der verschiedensten Disziplinen zusammenarbeiten (5), werden zukunftsgerichtet die für uns elementaren Voraussetzungen inter- und transdisziplinären Arbeitens in den Blick genommen (6). Abschließend werden die vielfältigen Ergebnisse und der spezifische Mehrwert dieser Arbeitsformen und disziplinären Konstellationen ausgewertet (7).

2 Konstitution der Hybrid Plattform auf dem Campus Charlottenburg Der Campus Charlottenburg gilt als eines der größten innerstädtischen Universitätsareale Europas. Er ist Standort der Technischen Universität Berlin und Universität der Künste Berlin, die zusammen nahezu das gesamte Spektrum der bildenden und angewandten Künste, der naturwissenschaftlichen und technischen Disziplinen sowie Ökonomie und Geisteswissenschaften abdecken. Darüber hinaus weist der Campus eine hohe Dichte an außeruniversitären Forschungs Vgl. Joly/Warmers (), XI.

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einrichtungen, forschungsintensiven Unternehmen und Ausgründungen der beiden Universitäten auf. An der Schnittstelle von technologisch-wissenschaftlich geprägten Vorgehensweisen und künstlerisch-gestalterischen Strategien, von Forschen und Lehren ist die Hybrid Plattform seit dem Jahr 2011 als gemeinsame Einrichtung beider Hochschulen angesiedelt.¹⁰ Die unmittelbare Nachbarschaft der zwei Universitäten ist ein besonderes Element der Erzeugung und Vermittlung von Wissen. Trotz eines globalen Systems der Wissensproduktion, das insbesondere durch neue digitale Technologien überall, jederzeit und unabhängig voneinander neue Erkenntnisse generiert, bleibt für die „konkrete, problembezogene Integration dieses Wissens jedoch die lokale Leistungsfähigkeit einer Organisation ausschlaggebend“.¹¹ Die beiden Hochschulen können auf eine langjährige Zusammenarbeit zurückblicken, wofür der Campus Charlottenburg gute räumliche Rahmenbedingungen bietet. Gleichwohl wird diese räumliche Nähe von den Hochschulangehörigen nicht konsequent zur Vernetzung genutzt. Allein aus der Nähe zueinander und der existierenden Diversität entspringt keine kreativ-innovative Wirkungsfähigkeit. Es ist Aufgabe der Hybrid Plattform als strategisches Instrument der beiden Hochschulen, dieses Potenzial komplementärer Kompetenzen zu erschließen, dass es sich entfalten und als hybride Kultur in zukünftige Forschung und Lehre integriert werden kann. Hybrid bezeichnet etwas von zweierlei Herkunft, das sich aus Verschiedenartigem zusammensetzt.¹² Als Leitbild des Unterfangens Hybrid Plattform ist der Begriff in zweifacher Hinsicht zu verstehen. Er verweist zum einen auf die komplexen Ausgangsfragestellungen, wie Thomas Jahn darlegt: „Charakteristisch für solche hybriden Probleme sind die Komplexität von Wirkungsprozessen, die auf unterschiedlichen räumlichen, zeitlichen und sozialen Skalen verlaufen“.¹³ Zum anderen steht er für die Zusammenführung verschiedener akademischer Welten, um Antworten auf die vielschichtigen Phänomene geben zu können, wie Michael Hagner konstatiert: „[D]ie Geschichte der Wissenschaften ist voll von Beispielen, in denen solche hybriden Konstellationen überhaupt erst neue Erkenntnisse er-

 In der Pilotphase wurde die Hybrid Plattform vom Europäischen Fonds für regionale Entwicklung innerhalb der Initiative „Projekt Zukunft“ der Senatsverwaltung für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Forschung Berlin bis zum Jahr  gefördert.  Stadie (), .  Der Begriff wird als Fachterminus insbesondere in den Naturwissenschaften und der Technik verwendet, aber auch für die Beschreibung kultureller wie sozialer Phänomene herangezogen.  Jahn (), .

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möglicht und zu unvorhersehbaren Verschiebungen der Forschungsgegenstände und ‐dynamiken geführt haben.“¹⁴ Die Ermöglichungsfunktion der Hybrid Plattform liegt darin, experimentelle Studienprojekte in der Lehre und gemeinsame Forschungsvorhaben von Angehörigen der beiden Universitäten sowie in Kooperation mit Unternehmen und anderen Forschungseinrichtungen zu befördern. Die zugrundeliegende Idee ist, dass aus der Kollision eine Kooperation entsteht,¹⁵ wenn über die Grenzen der heterogenen Disziplinen und Institutionen hinweg Wissenschaftler und Forscher, Künstler und Gestalter, Professoren und Studierende, wissenschaftliche und künstlerische Mitarbeiter zusammenarbeiten. Die bisherigen Erfahrungen in Projekten der Hybrid Plattform, obgleich sie sämtlichen künstlerischen und wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen offensteht, wurden vor allem gemacht mit Vertretern der angewandten Künste (Architektur, Produktgestaltung, Visuelle Kommunikation) oder technikaffinen Künste (experimentelle Musik) sowie mit Vertretern der Ingenieurwissenschaften und Mathematik, weniger der Geistes-, Sozial-, Kultur- oder Naturwissenschaften. Neben den universitätsinternen Akteuren sind in den Projekten und Veranstaltungen der Hybrid Plattform auch Partner aus der Praxis¹⁶ involviert. Der Einbezug von Praxisexperten bedeutet eine weitere Herausforderung für transdisziplinäre Forschung und soll, auch aufgrund einer geringeren Repräsentanz in den Projekten der Hybrid Plattform, in den weiteren Ausführungen nur ansatzweise berücksichtigt werden. Der Vielfalt der Fachgebiete an beiden Universitäten entsprechend ist die Hybrid Plattform selbst thematisch offen gehalten. Sie wird gestaltet durch die Beteiligten der Veranstaltungen und insbesondere der Projekte, die sich im Spannungsfeld von Wissenschaft und Technologie, Gestaltung und Künsten bewegen. Dadurch entsteht ein Experimentierfeld, das im Idealfall Synergien aus Erfindungsgeist, Innovativität und Kreativität befördern sowie ungewöhnliche und neuartige Ergebnisse ermöglichen soll. Diesen Möglichkeitsraum gilt es den verschiedenen Akteuren aufzuzeigen und zugänglich zu machen. In dem Experimentallabor – im ideellen Sinne wie im konkreten Raum „Hybrid Lab“ –, werden Impulse für inter- und transdisziplinäres Arbeiten durch verschiedene Formen der Begegnung und des Austauschs gegeben und noch nicht etablierte Formen der Zusammenarbeit in temporären Projekten initiiert und erprobt.  Hagner (), .  Oppen/Müller ().  Es handelt sich um Experten aus verschiedensten Bereichen: freischaffende Künstler, Wissenschaftler von außeruniversitären Forschungsinstitutionen, Start-ups der Kreativszene, KMUs, städtische Einrichtungen usw.

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Infrastrukturell wurde mit dem Hybrid Büro eine in die beiden Hochschulen vernetzte Beratungs- und Koordinationseinheit mit Projektleitern und -koordinatoren und einer Projektadministration eingeführt. Als Multiplikator und Anknüpfungsstelle für externe Partner zur Entwicklung gemeinsamer Vorhaben wurde ein Verein gegründet. Somit wurde eine schlank aufgestellte institutionelle Basis geschaffen, damit Projekte initiiert, begleitet, dokumentiert und die Ergebnisse zugänglich gemacht werden. Die Hybrid Plattform lässt sich zusammengefasst beschreiben als – organisatorischer Adapter zwischen Hochschulen und anderen Kooperationspartnern, – akademischer Inkubator für neue Ideen im vernetzten Forschen, – reflexiver Intermediär in der Koordination und Moderation kooperativen Arbeitens, – kommunikative Schnittstelle zwischen den Universitäten, dem Campus, der Kreativwirtschaft und der Öffentlichkeit.

Abb. 1: Quelle: Hybrid Plattform

Das Kernelement der Hybrid Plattform bilden die Projekte, in denen Experten aus verschiedenen Fachgebieten zusammenarbeiten und die bezüglich der Themen, des methodisch-theoretischen Ansatzes, der Art der Zusammensetzung und der Form der Kooperation divergieren. Sie reichen von großen Forschungsprojekten mit Teilgruppen, an denen zahlreiche Fachgebiete der Hochschulen be-

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teiligt sind,¹⁷ bis hin zu der engen Zusammenarbeit zwischen einem Wissenschaftler und einem Künstler.¹⁸ In ihnen wird komplementär an Fragestellungen gearbeitet oder mit gemeinsam entwickelten Methoden und Instrumenten geforscht. Grundsätzlich handelt es sich weniger um Entwicklungsprojekte als vielmehr um Forschungsprojekte, die zumeist experimentell und in Teilen ergebnisoffen angelegt sind. In den bisherigen Hybrid Projekten zeigt sich die Technik als thematisches Bindeglied zwischen den Künsten und den Wissenschaften: An den Zukunftsentwürfen, die durch wissenschaftliche und technische Innovationen ausgelöst werden, sind Wissenschaftler wie Künstler und Gestalter gleichermaßen beteiligt.¹⁹ Die inter- und transdisziplinären Projekte mit einem hohen Grad anwendungs- und technikbezogener Forschungsfragen entsprechen der spezifischen Standort-Qualität des Campus Charlottenburg. Inter- und transdisziplinäres Forschen wird im wissenschaftstheoretischen Diskurs verhandelt mit einer Ausrichtung auf akademische Disziplinen der Wissenschaft, teils unter Einbeziehen der Zusammenarbeit mit außerwissenschaftlichen Wissensträgern. Künstlerische und gestalterische Disziplinen werden in der Regel nicht berücksichtigt, dabei kann das Wesen des offenen, experimentellen Forschens im interund transdisziplinären Kontext für wissenschaftliche und ästhetische Strategien angewendet werden: Nach Rheinberger lässt sich das Forschen „als eine Suchbewegung charakterisieren, die sich auf der Grenze zwischen dem Wissen und dem Nichtwissen bewegt.“²⁰ Mit einem solchen Forschungsbegriff zielt das Zusammenwirken der Künste, Gestaltung und Wissenschaften im Rahmen der Hybrid Plattform weder auf eine „Verwissenschaftlichung“ ästhetischer Praktiken noch auf eine „Poetisierung“ wissenschaftlicher Methoden. In den Kollaborationen geht es zunächst um eine Wahrnehmung der Wissensgrenzen, um einen gleichberechtigten, aber andersartigen und daher sich sinnvoll ergänzenden Zugang zu relevanten Fra-

 Das Projekt „Rethinking Prototyping“ beispielsweise umfasst drei interdisziplinär besetzte Forschergruppen, die sich mit Bedeutungen und Gebrauchsformen von Prototypen auseinandersetzen und neue Sichtweisen auf die Begriffe Prototyp und Prototyping generieren.  Exemplarisch sei auf das Projekt „Mashine for Sustainable Living“ verwiesen, in dem die installative künstlerische Arbeit einer Architektin mit Erkenntnissen der ökotoxikologischen Grundlagenforschung eines Biologen verknüpft wurde.  Beispielhaft genannt seien das Projekt „Decycling“, in dem Gestalter, Architekten und Forscher im Bereich Anorganische Chemie neue Potenziale des Thermoplast-Ersatzstoffes Biokohle untersuchen; das Projekt „UseTree“, in dem Psychologen, Arbeitswissenschaftler und Designer Usability-Maßnahmen gemeinsam mit mittelständischen Unternehmen erforschen; das Projekt „Design, Development and Dissemination of New Musical Instruments“ mit einem interdisziplinären Verbund aus Musikwissenschaft, musikalischer Akustik und Musiktechnologie, Komposition, Computational Art und Designwissenschaften.  Rheinberger ().

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gestellungen und während der gemeinsamen Wissenserzeugung um die Reflexion von künstlerischen, gestalterischen und wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisprozessen.

3 Verständnis von Inter- und Transdisziplinarität in den Wissenschaften und Künsten Inter- und transdisziplinäre Forschung und Lehre finden zunehmend Eingang in Hochschulen (in Form von Instituten, Forschungsschwerpunkten, Kompetenzclustern und Studiengängen), in Politikleitlinien und Förderprogramme. Mit einer wachsenden Literatur wird versucht, inter- und transdisziplinären Arbeitsweisen auf den Grund zu gehen, Methodenkataloge aufzustellen und Qualitätskriterien zu etablieren. Die terminologischen Unterscheidungen zwischen Inter-, Transdisziplinarität und weiteren Kategorien²¹ belegen anstelle einer Eindeutigkeit eine eher „verwirrende Vielfalt“.²² Im Wesentlichen steht der Begriff der Interdisziplinarität für Arbeitspraktiken in Forschung und Lehre, an denen Vertreter von mindestens zwei Disziplinen beteiligt sind. Sie zielt ab auf eine Integration der beteiligten Wissensbestände, eine Erweiterung der wissenschaftlichen Aufmerksamkeit und Selbstreflexion. In Abgrenzung zur Transdisziplinarität wird oftmals betont, dass in interdisziplinären Initiativen zwar grenzenüberschreitend geforscht und gelehrt wird, die Disziplinen aber als solche bestehen bleiben. Einem solchen kumulativen Typ der Interaktion und der Konzeption von Wissen steht die transformative Interdisziplinarität gegenüber: Kumulative Modelle konzeptualisieren ein aus Teilen zusammengesetztes Gesamtwissen. Beim transformativen Typ wird Wissen als aus einander beeinflussenden, ja irritierenden Herangehensweisen bestehend gedacht. Die Differenz dieser Herangehensweisen wird produktiv, wenn durch interdisziplinäre Teams neue, disziplinär nicht beantwortbare Fragen gestellt werden.²³

 Philipp W. Balsiger hat beispielsweise ein ausführliches Glossar zu den verschiedenen Begriffsabwandlungen erstellt: Interdisziplinarität, disziplinenübergreifend, Co-disziplinarität, Crossdisziplinarität, Kondisziplinarität, Infradisziplinarität, Intradisziplinarität, Pluridisziplinarität, Multidisziplinarität, Transdisziplinarität. Vgl. Balsiger (),  – .  Jungert et al. (), .  Berger et al. (), .

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Als transformativer Typ zeigt sich der Terminus der Transdisziplinarität, in seinem heutigen Verständnis von Erich Jantsch in den 1970er Jahren eingeführt,²⁴ dynamischer bezüglich der Wissensproduktion und Perspektivenänderung. Gemeinsamer Nenner der Definitionen ist das Verständnis von einer die Disziplingrenzen überschreitenden, in der Regel projektbezogenen Vorgehensweise in Forschung und Lehre, bei der sich disziplinäre Methoden und Theorien beeinflussen und (abgewandelt) integriert werden. Transdisziplinäres Forschen ist nach Jürgen Mittelstraß deshalb nicht ein eigenständiges Theorie- oder Methodikprinzip, sondern ein Forschungs- und Wissenschaftsprinzip, folglich bestimmt dieses Denken und Handeln die Arbeits- und Organisationsform.²⁵ Forschungsgegenstand sind Fragestellungen, die sich nicht einer Disziplinarität zuordnen lassen, sondern sich vielschichtigen Problemlagen stellen. Hierbei lassen sich zwei Varianten ausmachen: Beim innerwissenschaftlichen Prinzip werden die Fragestellung und Problemlösung aus den Wissenschaften heraus disziplinenübergreifend generiert (Mittelstraß bezeichnet das wissenschaftsinterne Forschen als „theoretische Transdisziplinarität“). Beim außerwissenschaftlichen Motiv („praktische Transdisziplinarität“²⁶) wird eine Fragestellung behandelt, die außerhalb des akademischen Zirkels benannt wurde und an deren prospektiver, anwendungsorientierter und systemübergreifender Problemlösung nicht-wissenschaftliche Akteure partizipativ beteiligt werden. Letztgenanntes Prinzip wird häufig allein mit Transdisziplinarität gleichgesetzt, nämlich als ein beidseitiger Wissensaustausch zwischen Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft: Wissenschaftliche Aufgaben und Kenntnisse sollen einer Öffentlichkeit vermittelt und Interessierten ein Einblick in die Welt der Wissenschaft ermöglicht werden, außerdem sollen gesellschaftliche Impulse sowie das spezifische Wissen von Laien in die wissenschaftliche Praxis aufgenommen werden. Mit der theoretischen wie praktischen Transdisziplinarität ist die Erwartung verbunden, dass transdisziplinäres Forschen eine dauerhafte Rückwirkung auf die institutionellen Disziplinen, ihre methodischen und erkenntnistheoretischen Ansätze sowie ihre Organisation und Koordination ausübt. Inwiefern lässt sich dieses Forschungsprinzip auf die gemeinsame Arbeit von Wissenschaftlern, Gestaltern und Künstlern übertragen? Aufgrund gesellschaftlich-lebensweltlicher Fragestellungen als Ausgangspunkt transdisziplinärer Vor-

 Vgl. Jantsch (). Der Begriff entstammt ursprünglich einem Nachhaltigkeitsdiskurs. Im deutschsprachigen wissenschaftstheoretischen Kontext wurde er in den späten er Jahren aufgegriffen, u. a. durch Jürgen Mittelstraß und Jürgen Kocka, und von ihnen selbst und anderen Autoren in folgenden Jahren modifiziert. Vgl. Mittelstraß (), Kocka ().  Vgl. Mittelstraß (), .  Mittelstraß (), .

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haben ergibt sich für Wolfgang Krohn eine ganzheitliche „Gestaltungsaufgabe“ der Wissenschaften: Weil die Wissenschaft für einen spezifischen Problemfall eine umfassende Lösung erarbeiten muss und daher gezwungen ist, „in ihren Modellierungen und Interventionen mit verqueren Größen, Widerständen und Überraschungen umzugehen, steht sie der künstlerischen Forschung nicht nur nahe, sondern kann von ihr lernen und mit ihr kooperieren.“²⁷ Das Prinzip der offenen Kooperation existiert traditionell in vielen Formen der künstlerischen Zusammenarbeit: Bildende und Darstellende Künstler sowie Gestalter und Musiker kooperieren in konstant bestehenden Künstlergruppen als paradigmatischer Form kollektiver Kreativität. Weiterhin arbeiten sie in temporären, situationsspezifischen Projekten mit Vertretern anderer Kunstgattungen oder wissenschaftlicher Disziplinen, mit Repräsentanten der Wirtschaft oder in partizipativer Weise mit Bürgern der Gesellschaft. Diese Kollaborationen werden in der Regel nicht als transdisziplinär bezeichnet, auch wenn sie entscheidende Charakteristika transdisziplinären Forschens aufweisen – der Begriff findet in den Künsten und der Gestaltung kaum Anwendung. Hinsichtlich der Zusammenführung wissenschaftlicher und künstlerisch-gestalterischer Arbeitspraktiken erscheinen die Ausführungen von Andreas Mayer und Alexandre Métraux zu korrespondierenden Praktiken weiterführend. Beim „Korrespondenzverhältnis, in dem es zu Entsprechungen auf der Ebene der experimentellen Praktiken kommt“, handelt es sich nicht um eine Übereinstimmung der künstlerischen und wissenschaftlichen Prozesse oder gar Wesensverwandtschaft, vielmehr um einen Transfer von Praktiken zwischen den Disziplinen, wenn sich „ästhetische und wissenschaftliche Diskursfragmente, Auffassungen und Zielsetzungen miteinander verknotet haben.“²⁸ Dabei muss die mehr oder weniger ausgeprägte inter- und transdisziplinäre Kooperationsfähigkeit der wissenschaftlichen wie der künstlerischen und gestalterischen Disziplinen und ihrer Vertreter berücksichtigt werden.²⁹ Jene Wissenschaften und Künste erscheinen korrespondierend, die mit ihren (Gedanken‐)Experimenten Neues wagen, und damit „auf Praktiken gründen, für die Übertretungen, Neuerungen, gelegentlich

 Krohn (), .  Mayer/Métraux (), , . Sie machen anhand von historischen Fallbeispielen drei unterschiedliche „Verhältnisse“ wissenschaftlicher und künstlerischer Praktiken aus: das Konkurrenzverhältnis, eine mimetische Beziehung und das Korrespondenzverhältnis.  Vgl. Stadie (),  – . In Kooperationen ist ebenso nach Integrationstypen zu unterscheiden: nach den Arten von Wissensbeständen und Verfahrensweisen, die integriert werden (Nähe oder Entfernung zwischen den Disziplinen), und der Weise,wie diese integriert werden (z. B. zwischen den Polen additiv oder gemeinsame Theorieentwicklung). Vgl. Bergmann et al. (), ,  ff.

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spekulativ ausufernde Vorstellungen, aber auch Ungewißheiten, Zweifel, Unschärfen charakteristisch sind.“³⁰ Zu berücksichtigen ist bei den Termini und den damit verbundenen Praktiken, wie Mittelstraß einräumt, dass es sich bei Mono-, Inter- wie Transdisziplinarität um „idealtypische Formen wissenschaftlicher Arbeit“³¹ handelt – und es ließe sich hinzufügen: künstlerischer und gestalterischer Arbeit –, die in der Regel als Mischformen auftreten. Sämtliche Arbeitsformen sind mitunter eine Herausforderung an Diskurse und Systeme des Wissens und stehen in einem wechselseitigen Verhältnis zueinander.

4 Prinzipien von Kooperationen im hybriden Kontext Aufgrund ihrer thematisch offenen und flexiblen Struktur ermöglicht die Hybrid Plattform eine Kombination inter- wie transdisziplinären Arbeitens. Die Projekte changieren je nach Forschungsgegenstand, Problemstellung, den beteiligten Akteuren und methodischen Vorgehensweisen zwischen einer inter- und einer transdisziplinären Arbeitsweise. Inhaltlich wurde sich bisher – vornehmlich mit Repräsentanten der gestalterischen Fächer und Technikwissenschaften – mit neuen Technologien, Instrumenten, Materialien und Verfahrensweisen sowie mit der Gestaltung urbaner Räume auseinandergesetzt. Die Zusammenführung wissenschaftlicher und künstlerisch-gestalterischer Disziplinen sowie externer Expertisen geht auf die Grundannahmen zurück, dass die heutige Lebenswelt in sämtlichen Erkenntnis- und Erfahrungssphären von einer hohen Komplexität gekennzeichnet ist und dass es daher unabdingbar ist, „wissenschaftlich geregelt und reflektiert mit hybriden Problemstellungen umzugehen“.³² Bei der gemeinsamen Anstrengung der verteilten Perspektiven und Integration verschiedener Wissensbestände handelt es sich gemäß Mittelstraß „nicht um ein modisches Ritual […], sondern um Zwänge, die sich durch die Problementwicklung selbst stellen.“³³ Aus dieser Notwendigkeit heraus folgen die weiteren Grundannahmen, dass das gemeinsame Weben von Wissen zu kreativen Ansätzen und neuen Erkenntnissen führt, dass die Ergebnisse innovativ hinsichtlich der Beantwortung

   

Mayer/Métraux (), . Mittelstraß (), . Bergmann et al. (), . Mittelstraß (), .

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der Aufgabenstellung sind und der Prozess an sich dynamisch auf die Beteiligten und ihre disziplinäre und institutionelle Umgebung wirkt. Die hohen Erwartungen gehen einher mit einem Bewusstsein der Fragilität dieser sozialen und epistemischen Prozesse, weil die Zusammenführung unterschiedlicher Expertisen und Aktivitäten, Perspektiven und Interessen nicht nur zu sinnvollen Ergänzungen und neuen Einsichten, sondern auch zu Unverständlichkeiten und neuen Ungewissheiten führt: „Kategorien wie Unsicherheit, (wissenschaftliches) Nicht-Wissen oder strittiges Wissen [werden zu] entscheidenden Größen im Prozess der Problembearbeitung.“³⁴ Dies auszuhalten und produktiv zu gestalten kann nur gelingen, wenn disziplinäre Professionalität, Fachkenntnisse und handwerkliches Wissen der Akteure gegeben sind.³⁵ Methoden, Theorien und Modelle müssen beherrscht werden, um mit ihnen arbeiten, sie kritisch überprüfen und für den konkreten Projektverlauf anpassen zu können. Entsprechende Qualitätskriterien, wissenschaftliche Standards und künstlerische Ansprüche sollten von Beginn der Zusammenarbeit an für erfolgreiche Problemlösungsstrategien ausreichend berücksichtigt werden. In den Kooperationen ist daher die Anerkennung der Expertise aller Beteiligten und ihrer Souveränität ein entscheidendes Kriterium, unabhängig von etwaigen Leitdisziplinen der Kollaboration. Eine sich ergänzende Zusammenführung der Disziplinen kann mit dem Komplementaritätsprinzip veranschaulicht werden. Der Quantenphysiker Niels Bohr führte den Begriff der Komplementarität in den 1920er Jahren ein, um den Welle-Teilchen-Dualismus des Lichts zu veranschaulichen, denn je nach Theorie und Versuchsanordnung lässt sich ein Elektron als Teilchen oder als Welle sichtbar machen. Beide Modelle schließen einander aus, beschreiben aber für sich genommen das Phänomen ausreichend. Hieran zeigt sich, dass nicht die Forschungsgegenstände an sich die Disziplinen bestimmen, sondern die Standpunkte der Beobachtung und Versuchsanordnungen. Komplementäre Perspektiven erfordern demzufolge eine interdisziplinäre Auseinandersetzung im Sinne eines Denkens in Komplementarität, nicht unmittelbar eine Synthese der künstlerischen und wissenschaftlichen Praktiken. Eine solche Zusammenführung der spezifischen Wissensbestände führt zu einer ganzheitlichen Betrachtungsweise. Damit entspricht das Komplementaritätsprinzip der Beobachtungspraxis des Rheinberg’schen „sich auf die Finger Sehen“ in interdisziplinären Erkenntnis-

 Jahn (), .  Vgl. Stadie (), .

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prozessen. Hierfür hat die Hybrid Plattform neben Projekten verschiedene Formate der Begegnung und des Austauschs entwickelt.³⁶ Einen intensiveren Grad der Integration der verschiedenen Wissensbestände sehen transdisziplinäre Erkenntnisprozesse in Hybrid Projekten vor, in denen die Funktionseinteilung der Disziplinen relevant bleibt, aber sich die disziplinären Grenzen im Verlauf des Projekts lockern mit dem Ziel der Generierung eines neuen anschlussfähigen Wissens. Jahn bezeichnet diesen Ansatz als integratives Forschen, das einen lebensweltzentrierten Zugang mit einem wissenschaftszentrierten verbindet. Für ihn „liegt der besondere Reiz darin, beide, zunächst analytisch getrennte, Zugänge zu verknüpfen.“³⁷ Die Herausforderung transdisziplinären Arbeitens besteht in den Integrationsleistungen der einzelnen Projektphasen,³⁸ wobei insbesondere zu Beginn und während der Durchführung der Projekte die Integrationsarbeit für ein Gelingen des Wissenstransfers von essentieller Bedeutung ist. Zu diesen Integrationsleistungen, die sich gegenseitig bedingen, zählen – die kommunikative Dimension (Klärung der Begriffe, gemeinsame Redepraxis), – die soziale und organisatorische Dimension (Aufeinanderbeziehen der Interessen und Aktivitäten, Teamführung, Lernbereitschaft) sowie – die kognitiv-epistemische Dimension (Verknüpfen disziplinärer Wissensbestände bis hin zu gemeinsamer Methoden- und Theorieentwicklung).³⁹ Bezogen auf die Integration alltagspraktischen Wissens, aber ebenso gültig für die Zusammenführung der Wissenschaften mit künstlerischem und gestalterischem Wissen, bedeutet dies, „dass mit Wissen umgegangen werden muss, das in unterschiedlich gefasster und gesicherter Form vorliegt.“⁴⁰ Künstlerisches und gestalterisches Wissen – als „implizites, habitualisiertes, inkorporiertes und prozessorientiertes Wissen“⁴¹, das ganzheitliche Systeme betrachtet – und kodifizierbares, ins Detail gehende Wissen der Technik- und Ingenieurwissenschaften in Kooperationen wirksam zu machen, erfordert eine besonders intensive Integrationsarbeit. Daraus folgert sich, „dass es nicht beim Sichten und Zusam-

 Auf informeller Ebene angesiedelt ist das Format der Hybrid Talks, bei denen Vertreter verschiedener Disziplinen ein Thema aus ihrer Perspektive beleuchten.Weiter zugeschnitten auf eine individuell-persönliche Problembearbeitung über Disziplingrenzen hinweg wirkt das Format der Hybrid Tandems, bei denen in Zweierteams eine gemeinsame Projektidee erarbeitet wird.  Jahn (), .  Vgl. Jahn (),  – .  Vgl. Bergmann et al. (), ,  f.,  f.  Bergmann et al. (), .  Graduiertenkolleg „Das Wissen der Künste“, http://www.udk-berlin.de/sites/graduiertenkolleg/content (Zugriffsdatum: . . ).

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menführen dieser Wissensbestände bleiben kann, sondern dass es auch darum geht, ‚bis zu einer gemeinsamen Methodenentwicklung und Theoriebildung vorzudringen‘.“⁴² Eine derartige Zusammenarbeit in Hybrid Projekten bedarf spezifischer Parameter, wie sie später erläutert werden sollen. Auch hier gilt es anzumerken, dass es sich bei den vorgestellten Zusammenführungen um idealtypische Zugänge zum inter- und transdisziplinären Arbeiten handelt. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit diesem hybriden Ansatz ist für sämtliche Formate und Projekte der Hybrid Plattform notwendige Voraussetzung, als dass alle Beteiligten ihr eigenes Verständnis von Inter- und Transdisziplinarität, von der Gestaltung der Zusammenarbeit sowie von den dort verhandelten Forschungsfragen mitbringen. Ein Konsens muss und kann sich zumeist in der Praxis nicht zwangsweise für alle Projektdetails einstellen, aber Kernelemente müssen gemeinsam vereinbart werden, auf die sich alle beziehen können – wenn nicht bei sämtlichen inhaltlichen Fragen, definitiv hinsichtlich der Arbeitsform. Es ist evident, dass „der Prozess des Forschens für die generierten Resultate konstitutiv ist, […] es ist von Beginn an nicht nur transparent, dass es so ist, sondern Programm.“⁴³

5 Wo und wie entsteht Neues in der Kooperation? Damit die Integrationsleistungen beim inter- und transdisziplinären Arbeiten mit dem Ziel der Erkenntnisgewinnung fruchtbar ansetzen, stellt sich die Frage, wie sich neue Erkenntnisse im kollektiven Prozess einstellen. Rheinberger hat sich, ausgehend von der Geschichte der Molekularbiologie, eingehend damit beschäftigt, wo und auf welche Weise sich neues Wissen generieren lässt. Materielle Experimentalsysteme sind für ihn die „Orte [der Emergenz], an denen sich in den empirischen Wissenschaften das Neue ereignet [mit ihren] Vorkehrungen zur Erzeugung von unvorwegnehmbaren Ereignissen.“⁴⁴ Für die Geisteswissenschaften gilt ihm der Schreibprozess als experimentelle Anordnung und folglich als „die wichtigste Quelle des Neuen“.⁴⁵ Und was sich in den „Räumen des mo-

 Bergmann et al. (), .  Krainz/Ukowitz (), .  Rheinberger (). Der experimentelle Geist des Forschers erweist sich für die Erkenntnisgewinnung als erforderlich, aber in enger Beziehung zum Gegenstand stehend. Daher sind bei der Erkundung epistemischer und ästhetischer Dinge die „Konfigurationen von Materialien, Instrumenten, Arrangements und kognitiv-praktischen Listen“ relevant (Rheinberger [b], ).  Rheinberger ().

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dernen Labors ereignet, steht den Produktionen des Ateliers näher als man zumeist annimmt.“⁴⁶ Gemäß der Relevanz von disziplinären Orten der Wissensproduktion – das Labor, Büro, Archiv, Atelier und die Bibliothek mit ihren Anordnungen und Instrumenten als Agenden der Erkenntnisprozesse – müssen für inter- und transdisziplinäre Konstellationen spezifische hybride Räume geschaffen werden. Hier wird das Wissen integrierend zusammengeführt, an etwas Neuem gearbeitet, das dann von dieser „Zwischenwelt“ aus in die verschiedenen Erkenntnissphären wieder eingespeist wird. Es handelt sich um „ein Kernelement des transdisziplinären Forschungsprozesses: die Gestaltung von geschützten ‚hybriden Räumen‘“,⁴⁷ die sowohl eine Loslösung aus den disziplinären und institutionellen Kontexten (und damit von den gewohnten Ritualen, Instrumenten etc.) erlauben wie zugleich einen Anschluss an die Anerkennungssysteme garantieren. Somit entstehen „entschleunigte Orte und Zeiten der gemeinsamen Verständigung“⁴⁸ und Erkenntnisgewinnung. Die Wissensproduktion in den Laboren – so argumentiert Rheinberger mit einem Zitat des Molekularbiologen François Jacob – wird determiniert von disziplinären Prinzipien experimenteller Forschung, die zwar einerseits die Wahrnehmung und den Handlungsraum beschränken, sich zugleich aber als „der durch nichts zu ersetzende Motor der modernen Forschung“⁴⁹ erweisen: Bei der Untersuchung eines Problems sieht sich der Biologe gezwungen, sich auf einen Ausschnitt der Realität zu konzentrieren, auf ein Fragment des Universums, das er willkürlich isoliert, um einige seiner Parameter zu bestimmen. In der Biologie beginnt daher jede Untersuchung mit der Wahl eines ‚Systems‘. Von dieser Wahl hängt die Marge ab, innerhalb derer der Experimentator frei verfahren kann, die Art der Fragen, die ihm zu stellen erlaubt ist, und nicht selten auch die Art der Antwort, mit der er sich begnügen muß.⁵⁰

Dies verdeutlicht nochmals die Verfasstheit der Perspektiven und die Wirkungsmacht der jeweiligen Experimentalsysteme, die in inter- und transdisziplinären Kollaborationen aufeinandertreffen und deren heterogene Wissensformen integriert werden müssen. Es ist daher naheliegend, dass diese Integrationsleistung insbesondere bei unkonventionellen disziplinären Kombinationen intensiv und zirkulär verläuft. Im klassischen Projektverlauf mit vier Phasen – Initiierung/Konzipierung, Kon    

Rheinberger (a), . Weisz et al. (), . Heimerl et al. (), . Rheinberger (). Rheinberger (a),  f.

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stitution/Beginn, Realisierung, Abschluss mit Ergebnissicherung und -distribution – werden für inter- und transdisziplinäre Wissensproduktionen besonders häufig iterative Schleifen ausgemacht. So können typische Elemente einer Antrags-/Vorbereitungsphase in die Phase der Durchführung übertragen werden. Das ist mehreren Parametern geschuldet: erstens der neuen Art der Zusammenarbeit, bei der eine hohe Wertevielfalt gegeben ist und manche Divergenzen erst in der Kooperation zur Sprache kommen; zweitens dem Umstand, dass angesichts der neuen Problemstellung kein vorheriges Wissen vorliegt, auf das sich berufen werden kann, oder ein zwischen den Projektbeteiligten großes Wissensgefälle besteht; und drittens der experimentellen Vorgehensweise mit vielen Ungewissheiten, sodass sich beispielsweise Themenschwerpunkte im Prozessverlauf verschieben können. All dies geschieht auch in mono-disziplinären Anordnungen, aber der Grad des Umfangs ist in transdisziplinären Projekten wesentlich höher. Von Interesse ist, an welchem Punkt nun in diesen Anordnungen das Neue in die Welt kommt. Forscher wie Künstler suchen laut Rheinberger nach den „dem System inhärenten Möglichkeiten“: „Um zu neuen Dingen vorzustoßen, muß das System destabilisiert werden – aber ohne vorherige Stabilisierung produziert es nur Geräusch. Stabilisierung und Destabilisierung bedingen einander.“⁵¹ Krisen, Irritationen und Überraschungen sind demnach Teil des geplanten Experiments oder Schreibprozesses – es sind die Momente, in denen sich Neues eröffnet. Das Denken in Form des „gesunden Menschenverstandes“ ist deshalb laut Einstein der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis nicht hilfreich. Damit bezeichnet er das „Denken, wie es sich entwickelt und herausbildet, wenn ihm nichts auffällt und ihm nichts dazwischen kommt.“⁵² Kreatives Denken vollzieht sich hingegen, aus Sicht der Kreativitätsforschung „oftmals nicht als gewollter Akt, […] als das Zulassen von aufsteigenden Ideen oder Änderungen der Wahrnehmung.“⁵³ Überraschen und Erstaunen, also mithin das Entdecken von neuem Wissen, wird von Erschütterungen von Bekanntem ausgelöst. Bachelard formuliert dies folgendermaßen: „Eine wissenschaftliche Erfahrung ist eine Erfahrung, die der gewohnten Erfahrung widerspricht.“⁵⁴ Gleichsam verhält es sich mit den ästhetischen Erfahrungen, denn – so konstatiert Martin Rennert – „in der Kunst entsteht Erkenntnis durch Vielfalt plus Reibung.“⁵⁵ Momente der gegenseitigen Irritation und Reibung in Kooperationen mit Künstlern, Gestaltern und Wissenschaftlern sind mannigfaltig. Solche kreativen     

Rheinberger (a), . Fischer (), . Brodbeck (), . Bachelard (), . Rennert ().

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Prozesse sind „durch eine hohe Achtsamkeit charakterisiert, […] jener Aspekt, an dem sich Bedeutungen entzünden“.⁵⁶ Auf das Zulassen neuer Ideen und das Ändern der Wahrnehmung muss eine Auswahl des Neuen folgen, die den kreativen Prozess erst vollendet.⁵⁷ Insofern bedürfen diese Prozesse einer reflexiven Praxis, denn es sind flüchtige Momente, die es nach Donald A. Schön einzufangen gilt: It is through surprise, that we come to generate new forms of understanding. The surprise interrupts the routine, spontaneous activity. And then in response to surprise, the inquirer reflects both on the surprising phenomenon and on how she has been thinking about it. Thus thought turns back on itself and on the phenomenon being thought about. And one then restructures how one was thinking about this phenomenon. […] These are idealised moments. The whole process can go very quickly, and I might add, can take place without words.⁵⁸

Wenn von einem Zusammenhang zwischen inter- und transdisziplinärem Forschen und einem erhöhten Potenzial an Kreativität und Innovation bei der Erzeugung neuen Wissens auszugehen ist, dann sind die Konfigurationen des Arbeitens in den genannten Umgebungen entscheidende Kriterien eines erfolgreichen transdisziplinären Konzepts. „Was wirklich neu ist, muss sich einstellen, und man muss Bedingungen dafür schaffen, dass es sich einstellen kann.“⁵⁹

6 Konstitution von Kooperation – die Handlungsfelder der Hybrid Plattform Die Bedingungen des Wissenstransfers und der -generierung in Kooperationen zwischen den Wissenschaften, der Gestaltung und den Künsten sollen genauer in den Blick genommen werden. Es handelt sich um vielseitige institutionelle, organisatorische, methodische und akteurspezifische Komponenten, die eine gelingende Kooperation der verschiedenen Wissensformen ermöglichen. Kein Modell eignet sich als Standard für inter- und transdisziplinäres Forschen, weil sich die kontextspezifischen Projekte und disziplinären Verbindungen einer Vereinheitlichung entziehen. Die Handlungsfelder der Hybrid Plattform sind entsprechend vielfältig und subsumieren sich unter die drei grob gefassten Bereiche Infrastruktur und Kommunikation, Projektinitiierung und -begleitung sowie transdisziplinäre Weiterbildung. In ihrer Gänze können die einzelnen Aktivitäten in diesem Kontext nicht abgebildet werden. Den

   

Brodbeck (), . Vgl. Brodbeck (), . Schön (),  f. Rheinberger ().

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vorherigen Ausführungen folgend, inwieweit sich neue Erkenntnisse in Kollaborationen einstellen, soll der Fokus gelegt werden auf die Möglichkeitsräume, die reflexive Begleitung der Kooperationsprozesse sowie auf die transdisziplinären Kompetenzen ihrer Akteure.

6.1 Denk- und Forschungsraum Auf die „herausragende Bedeutung [der] Kollokation für kreative Prozesse und transdisziplinären Wissenstransfer“ weist die Begleitforschungsstudie der Hybrid Plattform hin und bezieht sich auf Erkenntnisse der Innovationsforschung.⁶⁰ Mit der Hybrid Community wurde zunächst ein virtueller Raum der Begegnung und des informellen Austauschs geschaffen – eine Online-Präsentations- und Vernetzungsplattform, auf der die Mitglieder ein interdisziplinäres Netzwerk aufbauen und direkt miteinander kommunizieren können. Die Etablierung eines konkreten Raumes, des Hybrid Labs, nahm weitaus längere Zeit der Vorbereitung, Planung und Abstimmung mit beiden Hochschulen in Anspruch.⁶¹ Die Bezeichnung als Labor knüpft an experimentelle Versuchsanordnungen sowie an die Idee an, spielerisch-experimentell und praxisorientiert Möglichkeiten der Produktion und Vermittlung von Wissen zu erproben. Das Hybrid Lab soll nach innen identitätsstiftend wirken für eine hybride Kultur auf dem Campus Charlottenburg und als Schaufenster nach außen einer interdisziplinären, breiten Öffentlichkeit Einblicke in aktuelle Forschungsprojekte und hybride Themen geben. In den hier stattfindenden Ausstellungen, in der Regel als „Showcases“ angelegt, und Veranstaltungen werden die (Zwischen‐)Ergebnisse der Projekte als Modelle, Prototypen und Artefakte und die von Wissenschaftlern, Künstlern, Gestaltern und Experten der Praxis verhandelten Fragen und damit die Vielfalt des Campus präsentiert.Vielmehr jedoch geht es um das Sichtbarmachen von work in progress in transdisziplinären Erkenntnispro Oppen/Müller (), , vgl.  f. In der Begleitforschung wurden die Kooperations-, Kommunikations- und Koordinationsformen innerhalb der Projekte sowie zwischen der Hybrid Plattform und den Projekten evaluiert.  Das Hybrid Lab war von Oktober  bis Frühjahr  im Erweiterungsgebäude der Technischen Universität Berlin in einem großzügigen Raum untergebracht, der zentral auf dem Campus, aber weniger öffentlich präsent gelegen war. Als Veranstaltungsort hatte er sich etabliert, als Arbeitsort konnte er aufgrund der spät in der Pilotphase erfolgten Einrichtung von vielen Forschungsprojekten kaum verwendet werden. Nach einem Umzug in größere Räumlichkeiten in der Villa Bell, die mittig auf dem Campus Charlottenburg gelegen ist, wird das Lab für öffentliche Veranstaltungen und insbesondere für Arbeitstreffen in der Projektanbahnungs- und Implementierungsphase sowie für interdisziplinäre Lehrprojekte genutzt.

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zessen sowie die gegenseitige Inspiration und Vernetzung für ein informelles Anbahnen neuer gemeinsamer Projektvorhaben. Als geschützter Denk- und Forschungsraum für die Projekte muss das Hybrid Lab verschiedene Kriterien erfüllen und dialogische und partizipatorische Qualitäten aufweisen: Ästhetisch ansprechend gehalten, mit beweglichen modularen Elementen, basalen Arbeitsmaterialien und einem 3-D-Drucker ausgestattet, lässt das Lab viel Freiraum für unterschiedliche Verwendungsmöglichkeiten. Diese Offenheit drückt sich auch in der Größe des Raumes aus und ist mitnichten zu unterschätzen für freies Bewegen und Denken und eine konzentrierte Arbeitsatmosphäre. Der Raum zeigt sich wandelbar gemäß den Bedürfnissen der Nutzergruppen – die Akteure sollen das Lab gemeinsam für ihr Projekt und ihre Arbeitsprozesse gestalten können. Das Adjektiv geschützt geht einher mit den Attributen neutral und transparent: Einerseits grenzt sich das Hybrid Lab von den Herkunftsorganisationen der Projektbeteiligten ab und kann institutionelle Einflüsse tradierter Strukturen und Routinen relativieren.⁶² Andererseits werden die Arbeitsprozesse transparent angelegt, und zwar in einem Raum mitten auf dem Campus, um einen offenen und produktiven Austausch zu befördern und die Anschlussfähigkeit an die Fachwelt und Öffentlichkeit zu bewahren. Somit erweist sich das Hybrid Lab als Möglichkeitsraum für kreatives, innovatives Denken und Handeln. Losgelöst vom Lab als konkretem Raum und dem virtuellen Begegnungsort der Hybrid Community stellt die Hybrid Plattform an sich einen Denk- und Forschungsraum als Einrichtung beider Hochschulen auf dem Campus dar. Die Anerkennung auf institutioneller Ebene trägt wesentlich dazu bei, dass sie als Territorium für die experimentellen Auseinandersetzungen fungieren und „Vernetzung auf niedrigstem institutionellen Niveau“⁶³ herbeiführen kann. Organisatorisch verortet sich die Plattform in dem Hybrid Büro als zentraler Koordinierungs- und Beratungsstelle, die sich den gleichen Anforderungen zu stellen hat, die Marion Stadie für die Organisationsstruktur der Projekte ausführt: Sie muss die Integration disziplinärer Wissensbestände sicherstellen, Innovationen ermöglichen, flexibel sein und eine zügige Anpassung an eine dynamische Umwelt gewährleisten, […] in finanzieller, intellektueller und evaluativer Hinsicht über ebenso starke Anreize verfügen wie die disziplinäre Forschung [und] sich auf die Bearbeitung der Schlüsselherausforderung beziehen.⁶⁴

 Vgl. Weisz et al. (), .  Mittelstraß (), .  Stadie (), .

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Der Entstehungsprozess von neuem Wissen und die Entwicklung transdisziplinärer Kompetenz sind die Kernelemente der Hybrid Projekte. Das Hybrid Büro sollte im Rahmen seiner Ermöglichungsfunktion diesen Prozess begleiten, um ihn zunächst zu realisieren, zu reflektieren und ihn offen zu gestalten zwischen den Beteiligten und für eine gewisse Öffentlichkeit.

6.2 Reflexive Prozessbegleitung In der Pilotphase der Hybrid Plattform lag der Tätigkeitsschwerpunkt auf der Initiierung von Hybrid Projekten, die nach erfolgreicher Konstitution eigenständig bezüglich ihrer Organisation, Kommunikation und Dokumentation agieren. Die Erfahrungswerte zeigen, dass dieser Scharnierfunktion auf dem Campus und den zahlreichen Dienstleistungen in der Anbahnung von Kooperationen eine bedeutende Rolle zukommt. Durch ihre Vernetzung zu den einzelnen Fakultäten und Servicebereichen der Universitäten kann die Hybrid Plattform disziplinären und institutionellen Restriktionen entgegenwirken, wichtige Informationen kommunizieren und helfen, Organisationsstrukturen für die Projektrealisierung aufzubauen. Zudem ist ein Ergebnis der Prozessevaluation der Hybrid Plattform, dass ein Bedarf an fortgesetzter Begleitung und Moderation der Projekte in Form einer dialogisch orientierten Begleitforschung besteht.⁶⁵ Erwartet werden eine Auswirkung auf die erfolgreiche Entwicklung der Projekte (durch Abstimmung der Akteure, Reflexion und Optimierung der Prozesse) und durch diese reflexive Prozessbegleitung ein wesentlicher Beitrag zur Qualitätssicherung der transdisziplinären Arbeit. Die Spannungsfelder und Reibungsflächen der Wissenschaften, Gestaltung und Künste führen in den Projekten zu Kontroversen und zu (produktiven) Differenzen – „die Intelligenz des Vorgehens besteht in der Entwicklung und Steuerung eines sozial-interaktiven Prozesses, der diese Differenz vermittelt“.⁶⁶ Die zuweilen dichotomen Perspektiven zu analysieren und aufeinander zu beziehen, ist das Tätigkeitsfeld einer speziellen wissenschaftlichen Projektkoordination,⁶⁷ für die in größeren Projekten Koordinationsstellen vorgesehen sind. Die Vorgänge zu gewährleisten ist Aufgabe des Hybrid Büros, das damit zwei Ziele anvisiert: disziplinenübergreifendes Arbeiten innerhalb der Projekte zu befördern und die Akteure inter- und transdisziplinär weiterzubilden.

 Vgl. Oppen/Müller (), .  Krainz/Ukowitz (), .  Vgl. Defila/Di Giulio (), .

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Die maßvolle Begleitung und punktuelle Moderation der Projekte zielt ab auf eine gute Kommunikationspraxis und beabsichtigt eine Vermittlung der Differenzen – der „kooperative Gewinn [besteht] nicht im Kompromiss, sondern in der Koordination heterogener Komponenten.“⁶⁸ Insofern erscheint eine Prozessanalyse hilfreich, die jene Momente der Differenzwahrnehmung und Organisation der diffizilen Wissensintegration beschreibt. Arno Bammé und Armin Spök stellen ein kontextübergreifendes Drei-Phasen-Modell für Forschungsvorhaben mit Interventionscharakter vor: – Phase der Unsicherheit, der interpretativen Flexibilität, – Phase der Konsensbildung, Schließung, – Phase der Stabilisierung des erzielten Konsenses und die Implementierung des Projektgeschehens in das weitere soziale Umfeld.⁶⁹ In der Phase der Unsicherheit kann zum Beispiel die Formulierung der konkreten Forschungsfrage offen gelassen werden, in der Phase der konsensualen oder kontroversen Schließung kann sich auf eine gemeinsame Interpretation des Sachverhaltes oder eine Re-Definition des Problemhorizonts verständigt werden, was anschließend im Falle eines stabilen Konsenses als vorläufiges Wissen in die Phase der Stabilisierung und weitere Wissensverwertung übergeht. Insbesondere das häufige Changieren zwischen den ersten beiden Phasen der Flexibilität und Schließung überrascht nicht angesichts der iterativen Schleifen, wenn „aus unsicherem Wissen konsolidiertes Wissen“⁷⁰ wird. Eine Kenntnis dieser Situationen inter- und transdisziplinärer Projekte, die im idealtypischen Projektverlauf (Initiierung, Konstitution, Realisierung, Abschluss) stets wiederkehren, sensibilisiert für den sozial-interaktiven Prozesscharakter der Wissensgenerierung und ist wertvoll für einen gezielten Einsatz der Instrumente der Koordination und Moderation. Bei den Verständigungen im Rahmen des „Übersetzungsprozesses“ geht es um die vielen das kooperative Projekt essentiell bestimmenden Punkte: Problemfeld identifizieren, Forschungsfragen formulieren, Finanzierung einholen, Auftragslage klären, Akteure einbeziehen und Team bilden, Arbeitsteilung abstimmen, Projektdesign und Organisationsstruktur entwickeln, Zielvereinbarungen festlegen, zeitliche Rahmen definieren, gemeinsame Sprachebene finden, Analyse und Interpretationsinstrumente auswählen, Form der Ergebnisse festlegen etc. Bei diesen Festlegungen sind neben Sachargumenten sowie (hochschul‐)

 Krohn (), .  Vgl. Bammé/Spök (),  – .  Bammé/Spök (), .

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politischen und ökonomischen Rahmenbedingungen soziale Mechanismen einflussreich wirksam. Diese bleiben gerade bei Reibungen nicht aus und sind vielfältiger Art: explizite und implizite Interessen der Akteure, Deutungs- und Geltungsansprüche, Wertesysteme, Verbündete, informelle Netzwerke, gruppendynamische Aspekte, formale Macht, Zuschreibungen, Vertrauen, Persönlichkeit der Akteure, rhetorische Strategien, sprachliche Barrieren, Forschungstraditionen, Verständnis von Objektivität und Subjektivität usw. Dies gilt für mono-disziplinäre Zusammenarbeit, vermehrt gleichwohl für inter- und transdisziplinäre Kooperationen. Für die Koordination sind die „damit verbundenen Fragestellungen […] alles andere als trivial“.⁷¹ Die aufgeführten Komponenten inter- und transdisziplinären Forschens bedürfen einer Kommunikationskultur, die in Diskursen das Potenzial verteilter Perspektiven entfaltet, Kontroversen erlaubt und Konsens ermöglicht. Die moderierende Ausgestaltung der Kommunikation sollte aufgrund der Erfahrungen der Hybrid Plattform von mehreren in das Projekt involvierten Personen übernommen werden. Neben den Projektleitern wie Koordinatoren sollten weitere Projektbeteiligte diese Verantwortung mitübernehmen. Zum einen kann hiermit die Definitionsmacht der Projektsprecher ausgeglichen und zum anderen können transdisziplinäre Kompetenzen bottom up innerhalb des Teams eingefordert werden. Außerdem erscheint eine Begleitung des Prozesses durch einen externen Intermediär⁷² sinnvoll, der nicht selbst in inhaltlicher Weise aktiv in die Übersetzungs- und Integrationsprozesse eingebunden und damit nicht parteiisch, vielmehr dem Wesenszug der Inter- und Transdisziplinarität verpflichtet ist. Diese Person sollte selbst qualifiziert sein, disziplinenübergreifend zu forschen, oder „mit divergierenden Weltsichten und Produktionsbedingungen von Wissen vertraut“⁷³ sein, auch um von der Forschungsgruppe akzeptiert zu werden. Die Leistungen des Intermediärs liegen je nach Bedarf in der Moderation von Workshops, in der Beratung zu inhaltlichen Fragen, methodischen Instrumenten und operativen Elementen, in der Evaluation oder in der permanenten reflexiven Begleitung zur Förderung der transdisziplinären Kultur. In den Arbeitstreffen der Projektgruppen kristallisieren sich die gelingende oder misslungene Kommunikation und Zusammenarbeit. Diese Zusammenkünfte mit ihrem explorativen Charakter stetig zu planen sowie offen, zielführend und effektiv zu gestalten, obliegt der Koordination und einer Moderation mit dialo-

 Berger et al. (), .  Vgl. Oppen/Müller (), .  Oppen/Müller ().

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gischen Methoden.⁷⁴ Hierfür muss eine genügende Ressourcenallokation (finanziell, personell, zeitlich) berücksichtigt werden. Entsprechend der Projektspezifika, den speziellen Problemfällen und beteiligten Akteuren kommen validierte Methoden bei den Arbeitstreffen in angepasster Weise zum Einsatz oder müssen Methoden neu entwickelt werden. Bei den Methoden lassen sich zwei Kategorien unterscheiden – die transdisziplinäre Methodik mit wissenschaftlichen und ästhetischen Verfahren und Analyseinstrumenten zur Wissensintegration sowie die sozial-interaktive Methodik mit moderierenden, beratenden und koordinierenden Verfahren und Reflexions- und Steuerungsinstrumenten. Die Anwendung von disziplinären Methoden der ersten Kategorie und ihr Transfer – also die Aneignung, Kombination und Modifizierung – bilden ein wichtiges kreativ-innovatives Vorgehen der Akteure im transdisziplinären Forschen. Aufgrund der beteiligten akademischen und nicht-wissenschaftlichen Bereiche steht ein großer Pool an Methoden zur Verfügung, deren Neukombination und Integration in anderen Wissenskontexten neue Erkenntnisse befördern. Es gibt nicht die transdisziplinären Methoden und Konzepte – so unterschiedlich die Projekte sind, so verschieden eigenen sich einzelne methodisch-theoretische Ansätze. Ähnlich verhält es sich mit der zweiten Kategorie der reflexiven Methoden, die zugeschnitten auf die Prozesse, Situationen, Beteiligten und thematischen Problemfelder eingesetzt und daher kontextspezifisch entwickelt werden. Auch für diese Methodik existiert kein standardisierter Katalog an Instrumenten aufgrund der Vielseitigkeit der Austauschprozesse (verbal-diskursiv, praktisch-experimentell, partizipativ). Hilfreich erscheinen Methodensammlungen, die in Handbüchern in jüngster Zeit in stetig wachsender Zahl erscheinen und Orientierung bei der Wahl des Instruments anbieten.⁷⁵ Sie stellen ein als Anregung gedachtes Methodenrepertoire vor, das auf Erfahrungen aus transdisziplinären Projekten fußt, die zumeist wissenschaftliche Disziplinen im Verbund mit einem partizipativen Ansatz aufweisen. Die Schwierigkeit für die Autoren besteht in der dekontextualisierten Beschreibung integrativer Methodenentwicklungen, damit sie die Rezipienten in neuen Anwendungskontexten nutzbringend einsetzen können.⁷⁶ Rico Defila und

 Vgl. Defila/Di Giulio (), . Die Autoren verweisen auf die Notwendigkeit einer ergebnisorientierten Koordination und Gestaltung der Arbeitstreffen anhand einer eindrücklichen Rechnung: „diskutieren  Personen während  h, entspricht dies einer halben Arbeitswoche, und wenn sich  Personen für  h treffen, sind das  Stunden potentieller Arbeitsleistung!“ (Defila/ Di Giulio [], ).  Vgl. Bergmann et al. ().  Vgl. Bergmann et al. (), .

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Antonietta Di Giulio plädieren deshalb dafür, vielmehr Prinzipien inter- und transdisziplinärer Arbeitstreffen zugrunde zu legen.⁷⁷ Von diesen ausgehend müssen die eingesetzten Methoden stets überprüft und neu angepasst werden. Eine derartig reflexive Methodik als Monitoring ist ein „evaluierendes Moment der Qualitätssicherung“: Sie bietet einen „kontinuierlichen Reflexions-, Lern- und Unterstützungsprozess[…]“,⁷⁸ gibt Anregung für transdisziplinäres Forschen und unterstützt die Entwicklung eigener Qualitätskriterien. Eine prozessbegleitende Evaluation betrachtet „Probleme und Umwege in der Zusammenarbeit dezidiert nicht als ‚Fehler‘, sondern als Impulse und Ansatzpunkte für Veränderungen und Lernprozesse“.⁷⁹ Ein rekursives Vorgehen ist Teil der inter- und transdisziplinären Praxis. Erkenntnisse lassen sich ziehen aus den Gründen für Momente des Scheiterns, deshalb sollen diese Erfahrungswerte bei der Initiierung und Realisierung zukünftiger Vorhaben nutzbar gemacht werden. Viele Projekte überstehen nicht die Anbahnungsphase mit ihrer ausgeprägten Phase der Unsicherheit, weil beispielsweise die starke Reibung keine Konsensfindung bei der Verständigung auf einen Problemhorizont ermöglicht, das Team aufgrund divergierender Interessen auseinanderbricht, Akteure den Aufwand und damit die zeitlichen/personellen Ressourcen unterschätzt haben, keine Fördergelder für das Vorhaben eingeworben werden können. Zahlreiche Ideen konnten auf der Hybrid Plattform aufgrund jener und weiterer Hürden bisher nicht verwirklicht werden und blieben trotz Energieaufwandes einiger Unterstützer in den mitunter zermürbenden Anfängen stecken – sie warten noch auf den richtigen Zeitpunkt und die passende Gruppe von Akteuren.

6.3 Transdisziplinäre Kompetenz in Forschung und Lehre Eine hybride Kultur benötigt Möglichkeitsräume und günstige Infrastrukturen sowie eine gute Kommunikationspraxis und reflexive Begleitung transdisziplinärer Prozesse, doch letztlich gelingt sie nicht ohne die Bereitschaft der Akteure, sich auf diese besonderen Arbeitsformen einzulassen, und die Fähigkeit, transdisziplinär zu arbeiten. Diese Kompetenz stellt die entscheidende Wertschöpfung der experimentellen Kooperation dar, die sich von den Akteuren auf die Disziplinen, ihre Institute und den Campus übertragen lässt. Im Einklang mit den Integrationsdimensionen transdisziplinärer Projekte nach Jahn lassen sich für uns  Vgl. Defila/Di Giulio (),  – . Sie weisen elf Prinzipien transdisziplinärer Workshops auf.  Bergmann et al. (), .  Oppen/Müller (), .

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akteurspezifische Ebenen transdisziplinärer Kompetenz ausfindig machen, die sich wie die Integrationsdimensionen gegenseitig bedingen: – kommunikative Kompetenz (zugängliche Formulierung der Forschungsfragen, Klärung von Fachbegriffen, Kommunizieren über disziplinäre und hierarchische Grenzen hinweg, Dialog- und Vermittlungsfähigkeit), – soziale Kompetenz (Engagement für Transdisziplinarität, Bereitschaft sich einzubringen und zu lernen, Akzeptanz anderer Perspektiven, Respektieren der Expertisen,Vertrauen, Teamverständnis, Konflikt- und Konsensfähigkeit), – kognitiv-epistemische Kompetenz (Interesse an komplexen Problemstellungen und Forschungsfragen an den Rändern der Disziplinen, Offenheit für andere Praxisformen und Wissensbestände, Erproben anderer Praktiken, gemeinsame Methoden- und Theorieentwicklung, Zulassen von Interferenzen, Anerkennung wissenschaftlicher und ästhetischer Werte, professionelle Forschungsprinzipien, Intuition, Imagination, Achtsamkeit, Empathie,⁸⁰ Reflexionsfähigkeit, divergentes Denken⁸¹). Diese Kulturtechniken, deren Auflistung als ergänz- und wandelbar zu verstehen ist, sind für eine produktive Gestaltung der Kommunikationspraxis und der gemeinsamen Problemfindung wie Lösungsentwicklung beim transdisziplinären Forschen hilfreich. Sie verdeutlichen die soziale Konstruktion von Wissen und die Fragilität transdisziplinärer Prozesse, die oftmals mit großen Anstrengungen auf allen Seiten einhergehen. Hybride Forscherpersönlichkeiten sind Idealtypen grenzüberschreitender Forscher. In der Praxis können die Projektbeteiligten transdisziplinäre Kompetenzen bereits mitbringen oder sich im Verlauf des Projekts aneignen beziehungsweise jene erweitern. Auch die strenge Aufteilung zwischen Wissenschaftlern, Gestaltern, Künstlern und Experten der Praxis hebt sich manchmal auf – viele Projektbeteiligte üben verschiedene Rollen aus, beispielsweise als praktizierender Architekt mit eigenem Büro, Lehrender an einer Hochschule, Forscher im Verbundprojekt in Personalunion. Sie bewegen sich bereits zwischen den Welten und können Brückenbildner im Prozess sein.

 Interessant für unseren Kontext ist das Verständnis von Empathie als „kognitive Operation der Perspektivenübernahme zum Verständnis von Handlungen und Motiven des Anderen“ (Lux [], ).  Die Kreativitätsforschung benennt kreativitätsrelevante Persönlichkeitsmerkmale, die mit Attributen transdisziplinären Forschens deckungsgleich sind und im „divergenten Denken“ münden – „eine Form der Reflexion, die bei der Bearbeitung von Problemen unterschiedliche Lösungsansätze präferiert“ (Stadie [], ).

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Erschwerend für das Engagement in transdisziplinären Projekten sind ausbleibende Anreize der Herkunftsdisziplinen, wenn sie Leistungen an den disziplinären Rändern geringer wertschätzen oder außer-disziplinäre Erfahrungen im Leistungsprofil nicht anerkennen. In solchen Fällen erscheint transdisziplinäres Forschen für den beruflichen Werdegang problematisch. Hinderlich ist ebenso eine persönlich fehlende Motivation: Einige Gestalter, Künstler und Wissenschaftler stehen transdisziplinären Ansinnen kritisch bis ablehnend gegenüber, weil sie sich beispielsweise als reine „Dienstleister“ in einer hierarchischen Kooperationsstruktur wähnen oder keinen ernsthaften Wissensaustausch „auf Augenhöhe“ erwarten. Diesen Befürchtungen muss in der Phase der Projektinitiierung begegnet werden. Neben arrivierten Wissenschaftlern, Gestaltern und Künstlern, die bereits im System anerkannt sind und es sich „erlauben“ können, unkonventionell gemeinsam zu forschen, soll dies auch Nachwuchswissenschaftlern und jungen Künstlern zu Beginn ihrer Karrierewege ermöglicht werden. Dann können transdisziplinäre Kooperationen zukünftig beeinflussen, wie sich Wissenschaft und Forschung, Gestaltung und Künste an den Hochschulen und darüber hinaus organisieren in Bezug auf Strukturen, Forschungsförderung und Ressourcenplanung, Reputationssystem und Qualitätsmanagement.⁸² Aus dem Bildungsauftrag der Universitäten folgert sich eine noch weiter einzulösende Aufgabe der Hybrid Plattform: inter- und transdisziplinäres Arbeiten vermehrt in der Lehre und Nachwuchsförderung zur Geltung kommen zu lassen. Der Ansatz und die Ergebnisse temporärer Forschungsprojekte sollten im Sinne einer kontinuierlichen Wertschöpfung in andere organisatorische Zusammenhänge des Lehrens und Lernens übertragen werden. Das lässt sich in einigen, vornehmlich den künstlerisch-gestalterischen Disziplinen gut umsetzen, die in der Lehre eigenständige freie Projektarbeit und praktisches Tun in Projektgruppen vorsehen. Hybride Lehrvorhaben, die unterschiedliche Bildungswege an der Technischen Universität Berlin und der Universität der Künste Berlin verbinden wollen, treffen jedoch auf strukturellorganisatorische und administrative Widerstände (Zulassung universitätsexterner Studierender, Anerkennung der Credit Points etc.). Sie haben sich zudem inhaltlichgestalterischen Herausforderungen zu stellen, die sich zwischen den Polen einer reinen Stoffvermittlung und einer individuellen Förderung und Betreuung bewegen. Hier sind interdisziplinäre Studiengänge denkbar, die sich spezifisch transdisziplinärem Forschen widmen und dessen Erkenntnisse und Erfahrungen in universitätsübergreifende Lehre aufnehmen. Neben epistemischem und ästhetischem Wissen, ihren Analyse- und Interpretationsinstrumenten und methodischen Vorgehensweisen steht in diesem Bildungsauftrag die Schulung in „integrativen

 Vgl. Heimerl et al. (), .

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Sichtweisen“⁸³ im Mittelpunkt: „Möglicherweise nichts,was sich deutlich beschreiben ließe, sondern eben die Fähigkeit der ‚Identifikation von Wissenslücken […] und immer wieder die Bereitschaft, Entscheidungen unter Unsicherheit zu treffen‘“.⁸⁴ Eine inter- und transdisziplinäre Ausbildung ermöglicht den Studierenden, Nachwuchswissenschaftlern und jungen Künstlern Perspektivwechsel als neue Schlüsselqualifikation.

7 Ergebnisse hybrider Kooperationen Die Ergebnisse von inter- und transdisziplinären Kooperationen, bei denen intellektuell neue Wege beschritten werden, sind mannigfaltig: neue Forschungsfragen, innovative Methoden- und Theorieentwicklungen, kreativ-experimentelle Arbeitsformate, gezielte Lösungen für spezifische Forschungsaufträge sowie offene Zukunftsentwürfe für diffizile Problemlagen, integrative Sichtweisen und neue Perspektiven auf anderes Denken und Handeln.⁸⁵ Die Ergebnissicherung erfolgt zu verschiedenen Zeitpunkten im Verlauf des Projekts: als finale Projektresultate beim Abschluss sowie zuvor als Zwischenbefunde durch Konsensbildung (in Berichten, Prototypen usw.). Dabei stellt sich die Frage nach den passenden Formaten der Ergebnissicherung angesichts einer Zusammenführung von künstlerisch-gestalterischen Strategien und wissenschaftlichen Vorgehensweisen, von ästhetischen und wissenschaftlichen Darstellungsformen und Ansprüchen an Erkenntnisvalidierung und -distribution. Die Anschlussfähigkeit des in transdisziplinären Projekten generierten Wissens an Wissenstraditionen der Disziplinen ist in mehrfacher Hinsicht von Bedeutung ist: für die wissenschaftliche Identität und berufliche Reputation der beteiligten Forscher und weiterhin für die Vermittlung der Ergebnisse in die jeweilige Disziplin und damit erfolgreiche Evaluation des Projekts, sofern weiterhin maßgeblich mit disziplinären Maßstäben beurteilt wird. Schließlich ist es auch grundsätzlich wichtig, weil das Wissen nicht um seiner selbst willen gesucht und gefunden wird, sondern erst im Einklang mit bewährten Wissensbeständen zur Wirkung kommt. Dabei sind inter- und transdisziplinäre Ergebnisse in Form

 Bergmann et al. (), .  Bergmann et al. (), .  Erwähnt sei, dass transdisziplinäre Ergebnisse ebenso wie mono-disziplinäre Resultate im Kunst- und Wissenschaftsbetrieb stets Produkte der Umstände sind und durch ökonomische, politische, technologische, institutionelle Kontexte – Strukturen, Kapazitätsressourcen, Kostenbudgets, Hierarchien, Erwartungen der Auftraggeber etc. – konfiguriert werden.

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„neuen, innovativen Wissens […] strengeren Kriterien unterworfen“.⁸⁶ Was für die Wissenschaften und die Anerkennung der Ergebnisse durch eine scientific community gilt, erweist sich auch im künstlerischen System, dessen Wissen sich in anderer Weise artikuliert und vermittelt, aber ebenfalls einen Referenzraum zur Wirkungsentfaltung benötigt. Auch wenn mono-disziplinäre Ergebnisdistribution den interdisziplinären Charakter der zugrundeliegenden Erkenntnisgewinnung abschwächt, sind wissenschaftliche Artikel in Fachzeitschriften, Monografien und Sammelbände ebenso wie künstlerische Artefakte, Aufführungen, Ausstellungen und Publikationen essentielle Leistungen transdisziplinärer Projekte. Relevant ist, dass sich die Erfahrungen und das Wissen im verbal-schriftlichen Diskurs wie im praktischen Handeln in verschiedenen Formen (Text, Objekt oder Aufführung) manifestieren, sodass sie in allen beteiligten Bereichen kommuniziert werden und „das erlebte Wissen auch auf der Seite der Rezeption zum Klingen gebracht wird“.⁸⁷ Es ist eine Herausforderung für transdisziplinäre Projekte, bei der In-WertSetzung von Wissen in allen beteiligten Sphären Nutzen zu stiften, und zwar über die Fachzirkel hinaus. Insbesondere im Falle partizipativer, anwendungsbezogener Projekte, die einen konkreten Beitrag zur Problembewältigung leisten wollen und sich damit in den öffentlichen Dialog stellen, spielt die Anerkennung der Ergebnisse durch unterschiedliche Fachpublika und eine breitere Öffentlichkeit eine gewichtige Rolle. Eine gemeinsame Ergebnissicherung eröffnet die Möglichkeit, die Resultate kollektiver Kreativität und damit den transdisziplinären Erkenntnisprozess widerzuspiegeln. Solche Mischformen können ein Aggregat einzelner Beiträge darstellen, wobei die Leistung des Autors oder einzelner Autorenkollektive kenntlich gemacht wird. Interessant erscheint es, neue Formate der Darstellung transdisziplinären Wissens zu entwickeln, an denen sämtliche Akteure in enger Zusammenarbeit mitwirken. Kollektiv erstellte Objekte oder Open-Access-Publikationen, um nur zwei Beispiele zu nennen, entstanden in gemeinsamer Autorenschaft, repräsentieren ein Wissen, das weiter entwickelt und angewendet werden und insofern als boundary object dienen kann. Boundary objects (Grenzgegenstände) bezeichnen „Kristallisationspunkte gemeinsamer Erkenntnisinteressen, Methoden, Theoriebestände oder Werkzeuge“,⁸⁸ auf die sich alle Projektbeteiligten beziehen können und die damit ohne vorherige Transferleistungen verbindend wirken. Diese Definition wollen wir erweitern, denn häufig finden sich in den Grenzgegenständen Transferleistungen wieder –

 Stadie (), .  Krohn (), .  Bergmann et al. (), .

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wenn sich an ihnen Ideen, Fragen,Verständigungen, Bedeutungen, Revidierungen entzünden – oder werden sie erst durch Transferleistungen geschaffen. Insofern fungieren sie als Integrationsleistung am Anfang und im Verlauf der Projekte sowie als transdisziplinäres Ergebnis am Projektende, das identitätsstiftend wirkt und als stets vorläufiges Wissen zugleich den Ausgangspunkt für weitere interund transdisziplinäre Vorhaben in Forschung und Lehre markiert. Die Ergebnissicherung und deren Bewertung werfen die Frage nach Qualitätskriterien inter- und transdisziplinären Arbeitens auf. Mono-disziplinäre Evaluation in der Forschung (wie das Peer-Review-Verfahren) und vor allem eine zunehmende „‚Qualitätsvermessung‘ – verbunden mit der Publikation von immer kleineren Bausteinen von neuem Wissen“⁸⁹ –, lassen zentrale Resultate hybrider Projekte unberücksichtigt. Eine unzureichende Beurteilung kann negative Auswirkungen auf die Förderung inter- und transdisziplinärer Forschungsvorhaben haben.⁹⁰ Neben den traditionellen Referenzsystemen und quantifizierbaren Erfolgskriterien müssen daher weitere Qualitätskriterien⁹¹ entwickelt werden, die dem Ansatz inter- und transdisziplinären Arbeitens gerecht werden und zugleich deren vielfältige Formen berücksichtigen. Die Wertschöpfung transdisziplinären Forschens liegt im Sinne der Hybrid Plattform zum einen in den bereicherten Perspektiven, die sich in den monodisziplinären wie gemeinsam erstellen Ergebnissen darlegen, die nur durch die Zusammenführung der Wissenschaften, Gestaltung und Künste erzeugt werden konnten. Zum anderen äußert sich der Mehrwert in der transdisziplinären Kompetenz der Akteure, die in den kreativen Kulturen des Kollektiven entscheidende Kulturtechniken der reflexiven Selbst- und Fremdwahrnehmung und der Integration verschiedener Wissensformen erproben. Dabei geht es auch darum, die Konfigurationen und Wissensgrenzen kontinuierlich zu verdeutlichen sowie die Konsequenzen mono-, inter- und transdisziplinären Arbeitens zu hinterfragen. Das langfristige Ziel der Hybrid Plattform ist, dass von diesem Erfahrungswissen zukünftige Forschungs-, Entwicklungs- und Lehrprojekte profitieren und die erlernten Techniken und erweiterten Kompetenzen in einer transdisziplinären Campus-Kultur münden.

 Berger et al. (), .  Vgl. Stadie (), .  Vgl. Bergmann et al. (), Oppen/Müller (), Defila/Di Guilio (),  f.

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8 Fazit: Hybride Kultur Nehmen wir noch einmal Bezug auf Einstein: Jener verweist in dem eingangs genannten Zitat auf den engen Zusammenhang zwischen dem Prozess der Wahrnehmung durch die fünf Sinne und der Fähigkeit, konkret und abstrakt zu denken. Alternierend mit diesem Gedanken findet sich im Eingangsbereich der Universität der Künste Berlin auch folgender Aphorismus des „Welterklärers“: „Wichtig ist, dass man nicht aufhört zu fragen.“ Beide Aussagen treffen auf die Techniken des transdisziplinären Forschens zu, wenn mono-disziplinär nicht beantwortbare Fragen gestellt werden. Diese Kulturtechnik äußert sich – beim verbal-dialogischen Austausch und der gemeinsamen experimentellen Praxis des Machens – in der Wahrnehmung des Eigenen und Anderen, der Analyse von Dissens und Konsens, der gemeinsamen Integration der gleichrangigen Perspektiven und in der Achtsamkeit für das Neue. Die Bereitschaft, sich auf diesen Prozess des Dialogs und der gemeinsamen Praxis mit allen Sinnen einzulassen, sowie die kritische Reflexion der Wissensgrenzen wie Möglichkeitsräume sind unabdingbar für inter- und transdisziplinäres Denken und Handeln. Aus diesen Kompetenzen heraus entstehen neue Dynamiken in Forschung, Lehre und Kooperation. Die entscheidenden Voraussetzungen der disziplinenübergeifenden, und in diesem Fall universitätsübergeifenden Zusammenarbeit bilden die zentralen Handlungsfelder für die Etablierung einer hybriden Kultur: Zunächst muss ein Denk- und Forschungsraum geschaffen werden, der einen neutralen Boden bereitet für eine konzentrierte und experimentelle Zusammenarbeit in geschützter Atmosphäre. Dieser Raum muss zugleich offen sein für einen Dialog mit den Herkunftsdisziplinen und der Öffentlichkeit, um Erkenntnisprozesse transparent zu gestalten, einen Wissensaustausch voranzutreiben und neue Ideen zu generieren. Eine Begleitung temporärer inter- und transdisziplinärer Zusammenarbeit sollte in allen vier Projektphasen – von der Initiierung über die Konstitution und Realisierung bis zum Schluss –mit besonderer Beachtung der Prozessphasen der Unsicherheit, der Konsensbildung und der Stabilisierung wirksam werden, um mit Serviceleistungen und Beratung die Projekte überhaupt zu ermöglichen und transdisziplinäres Arbeiten zu gewährleisten. Hierbei spielen Methoden der Koordination als Reflexionsinstrumente sowie wissenschaftliche wie ästhetische Methoden der Wissensintegration eine wichtige Rolle. Was Rheinberger für die Konfigurationen wissenschaftlicher und ästhetischer Hervorbringung einfordert, nämlich eine permanente Reflexion, gilt auch für Kooperationen zwischen Wissenschaftlern, Gestaltern und Künstlern, die einer Reflexionsinstanz bedürfen, welche Impulse gibt für inter- und transdisziplinäres Forschen. In der gemeinsamen Entwicklung von Methoden der Wissensintegration durch Wissenschaftler

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und Forscher, Gestalter und Künstler erkennt Krohn eine „zentrale epistemische Qualität transdisziplinärer Forschung […]. Mit dieser Integrationsleistung übernimmt die transdisziplinäre Forschung eine Leitfunktion für die Entwicklung der Wissensgesellschaft.“⁹² Wichtig sind daher die Dokumentation und Auswertung der Prozesse und Ergebnisse der Projekte, sodass die Erkenntnisse weiteren Vorhaben zur Verfügung gestellt werden können. Zur Erschließung und Weiterentwicklung des Campus tragen neben der Projektarbeit und den Veranstaltungen vor allem Lehre und Nachwuchsförderung bei, die eine besondere transdisziplinäre Bildungserfahrung ermöglichen. In der Wahrnehmung alternativer Perspektiven auf Phänomene der Wissenschaften und Künste wie gesellschaftlich-lebensweltlicher Problemlagen und in der Schulung integrativer Sichtweisen spiegelt sich ein zukunftsweisender Bildungsauftrag der Universitäten. Die Ausbildung transdisziplinärer Kompetenzen in kooperativen Arbeitsformen ist neben den wissenschaftlichen und ästhetischen Erkenntnissen, den neuen Ideen und kreativ-innovativen Lösungsansätzen der Mehrwert und damit langfristige Gewinn – eine Investition in die Zukunft. Im Vergleich zu mono-disziplinärer Praxis benötigen Forschung und Lehre mit der Teilnahme zahlreicher Spezialgebiete und damit Reibungsgewinn wie -verlusten mehr Ressourcen: Inter- und transdisziplinäre Integrationsprozesse bedürfen eines höheren Aufwandes (zeitlicher, personeller, finanzieller, räumlicher Art), neuer Qualitätskriterien (jenseits der zunehmend kleinstteiligen quantifizierbaren Erfolgsprinzipien) und brauchen angesichts der Knappheit der Mittel „kluge Verteilungsentscheidungen.“⁹³ Diese Leistungen müssen die Hochschulen bereit sein zu investieren, und zwar in einen akademischen Ort des Austauschs als entscheidender Beitrag zur Weiterentwicklung des Campus Charlottenburg, der mit einer hohen Dichte an Wissenschaft und Forschung, Kunst und Gestaltung über eine günstige Ausgangslage verfügt. Risiken, wie die Gefahr des Scheiterns von Projektideen, sind verbunden mit der Investition in Vorhaben, die zumeist experimentell und in Teilen ergebnisoffen angelegt sind. Doch ist dies nicht genau das Risiko, das in der Förderung und in der Praxis der Künste und der Forschung stets aufs Neue eingegangen wird – die Langzeitinvestition in eine black box, in eine experimentelle Auseinandersetzung mit unsicherem Wissen und einem ungewissen Ausgang? Personeller wie institutioneller und hochschulübergreifender Aufwand werden aufgewogen durch einen Mehrwert, der für Forschung und Lehre, Wissenschaften und Künste, Campus und Gesellschaft erwartet wird – eine dynamische, eben hybride Kultur.

 Krohn (), .  Heimerl et al. (), .

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Rheinberger, Hans-Jörg (2005b): „Nachschrift“. In: Andreas Mayer/Alexandre Métraux (Hg.), Kunstmaschinen. Spielräume des Sehens zwischen Wissenschaft und Ästhetik, Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 203 – 213. Rheinberger, Hans-Jörg (2007): „Man weiss nicht genau, was man nicht weiss. Über die Kunst, das Unbekannte zu erforschen.“ In: NZZ Online (05. 05. 2007). http://www.nzz.ch/aktuell/ startseite/articleELG88 - 1.354487 (Zugriffsdatum: 30. 03. 2015). Schön, Donald A. (1995): „Reflective Practice: Its Implications for Classroom, Administration and Research“. University of Melbourne, Melbourne. http://www.uni.edu/~eastk/109/ sp08/270905.pdf (Zugriffsdatum: 30. 03. 2015). Stadie, Marion (2012): Transdisziplinarität als Aspekt innovativer Universitäten, Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovač. Weisz, Ulli/Karner, Sandra/Grossmann, Ralph/Heintel, Peter (2014): „Zwischen Welten. Transdisziplinäre Forschungsprozesse realisieren.“ In: Gert Dressel/Wilhelm Berger/Katharina Heimerl/Verena Winiwater (Hg.), Interdisziplinär und transdisziplinär forschen. Praktiken und Methoden, Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 121 – 134.

Scott Reeves and Ruth Harris

Interprofessional Teamwork in Health and Social Care: Key Tensions and Future Possibilities Abstract: Over the past 30 years global attention has been placed on the need for different health and social care professionals to work in teams to improve the quality of care they provide to patients and clients. This interest has been reflected in a significant amount of attention from educators, administrators, researchers and policy makers, across the world, in a range of different publications. As a result, improved interprofessional teamwork is a near-universal aspiration of health and social care practitioners, managers and organisations. Indeed, it is often assumed that an interprofessional teamwork is the core model in which health and social care should be organised and delivered. However, the interprofessional literature still only provides a relatively limited understanding of its complex nature. This chapter explores the literature advocating the use of interprofessional teamwork between health and social care providers. In doing so, it examines the complex array of professional, organizational and contextual issues which affect the ways in which professionals work together. The chapter discusses a range of concepts and theories which help to illuminate and understand the nature of teamwork. In addition, it describes and assesses the growing evidence base for the effects of teamwork interventions across different clinical contexts. Finally, the chapter offers a range of ideas in relation to developing the conceptual, empirical and theoretical understanding of interprofessional teamwork in health and social care settings.

1 Core concepts and principles Based on the literature, interprofessional teamwork across health and social care settings can be seen to have a number of key aims.¹ First, this type of work is focused on bringing together different professionals to use their collective skills and knowledge in the care of patients and service users. Second, teamwork requires the sharing of information about the organization of care to ensure pa-

 Adair (), West (), Drinka/Clark (), Borrill et al. (), Jelphs/Dickinson ().

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tients’ needs are well met. Third, teamwork needs to achieve continuity of care through on-going communication and discussion. Fourth, through communication, interprofessional teamwork aims to reach agreement about apportioning and ensuring responsibility for patient care. Fifth, teamwork aims to encourage shared work to ensure resource planning is undertaken in a mutually agreed manner. Finally, teamwork aims to foster a joint approach to work which ensures that health and care services are delivered in a coordinated and effective fashion. To achieve these aims, the literature suggests, interprofessional teamwork needs to rest upon a number of underlying elements.² Specifically these include: – A common purpose – individual practitioners need to agree and share a common purpose or aim for their collaborative work. – Effective interprofessional teamwork depends upon each professional having a clear role in their group or team, and also a series of meaningful tasks that they undertake. – There needs to be mutual interdependence of different health and social care professionals in their collaborative work. – As no single practitioner can meet the range of needs from their patients, there needs to be a reliance on the clinical and professional expertise of others to provide care. – Regular interaction is a must. Professionals need to regularly interact with one another in both a synchronous and asynchronous manner to agree how to provide care together. – Communication needs to be undertaken in a flexible manner using both formal and informal mechanisms such as team meetings and more casual conversations. – Also, there needs to be a balance of leadership and democracy. We know that the hierarchical division of labour within and between the health professions can undermine interprofessional relations. Therefore effort needs to be made to ensure that these arrangements are offset with local arrangements that encourage a more horizontal or flatten approach to leadership in teams. Other important underlying elements which interprofessional teamwork rests upon include: individual willingness – individual practitioners need to be willing to engage in teamwork and support its aims and goals. Shared planning/decision-making – there needs to be agreement, reached by negotiation, that professionals will adopt a shared approach to planning and decision-making in their collaborative work. There also needs to be organisational support, to ensure

 Reeves et al. (), Harris et al. ().

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that senior management invest in the resources required to nurture and promote teamwork. Interprofessional education is needed to provide opportunities for colleagues to collaboratively learn together to enhance their understanding and skills of how to collaborate effectively as a team. Regular feedback on a group or teams’ performance is key. This ensures that practitioners can discuss joint approaches to overcoming any shortfalls identified, and share their successes. There also needs to be time spent together to agree a common, shared philosophy to working together, which can form an explicit part to how interprofessional teamwork is shaped between professionals. Finally, there needs to be a mix of respect, trust and humour between colleagues. Trust and respect are in many ways cornerstones of good interprofessional teamwork – ensuring a mutually agreed approach. But humour is also vital, as one needs to be able to standback and laugh together.³ Based on the factors outlined above, Henneman and colleagues have argued that effective teamwork “requires many types of sharing: shared knowledge, shared values, shared responsibility, shared outcomes and shared visions”.⁴ Moreover, Kraus has stated that teamwork is “a cooperative venture is based on shared power and authority. It is non-hierarchical in nature”.⁵ Building on this work describing and defining interprofessional teamwork, Reeves et al., provide an analysis of the different notions and ideas about interprofessional practice which exist in the literature.⁶ Through this work, Reeves and colleagues developed a typology which offers a more holistic approach to understanding interprofessional teamwork (see Figure 1). In this typology interprofessional teamwork as regarded as only one way of working in an interprofessional manner. Whereas interprofessional teamwork is the most ‘focused’ of activities which demands high levels of interdependence, integration and shared responsibility, other approaches to interprofessional work – collaboration, coordination and networking – are increasingly broader with more ‘looser’ arrangements in relation to interdependence, integration and shared responsibility. Based on this typology, the notion of ‘adaptation’ in the form of a contingency approach – a way of working together which can shift from teamwork to collaboration, to coordination based on the needs of the patients in their care tra-

 Stark et al. (), West (), West/Markiowicz (), Jelphs/Dickinson (), Xyrichis/ Lowton ().  Henneman et al. (), .  Kraus (), .  Reeves et al. ().

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Fig. 1: Teamwork Typology. Source: Reeves et al. (2010).

jectory was developed.⁷ For example, upon admission into a hospital, a patient with an acute problem will require high levels of interdependence and integration between health professions – this is where a teamwork approach is needed. However, as they get better, during their rehabilitation phrase, a collaboration or coordination approach (which requires less interdependence and integration between professions) may be more useful. Linked to this, the notion of ‘team tasks’ which centre on issues of predictability, urgency, complexity can help understand how the nature and flow of work changes when undertaking different types of interprofessional work (e. g. teamwork, collaboration, networking). For example, in clinical settings such as operating theatres, where tasks are typically unpredictable, urgent and complex, professionals need high levels of interdependence, integration and shared responsibility. As a result an interprofessional teamwork approach is required. In contrast, in settings such as outpatient clinics, where team tasks are generally more predictable and less urgent, a different type of interprofessional work is needed, such as collaboration or coordination. Lemieux-Charles and McGuire also provide a useful holistic conceptualization of interprofessional teamwork in which to fully understand this form of work one needs to view it from three different levels: the practice level (which focuses on tasks, composition of groups/teams, and interprofessional processes); the organisational level (which focuses on local context in the form of support and resources); and also the systems level (which focuses on the nature of interprofessional teamwork within broader the social and political context).⁸ Finally, there are a number of elements that are assumed when we employ an interprofessional teamwork approach. In general, one expects that the use of

 Reeves et al. ().  Lemieux-Charles/McGuire ().

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interprofessional teamwork will lead to improvements in interprofessional communication and coordination of services, which will in turn lead to enhancements in the delivery of care.⁹ However, when one looks closely at the evidence for interprofessional teamwork direct links to improved outcomes are limited in nature. For example, the findings from reviews of the effects of teamwork has revealed rather than causal links, there is more uncertainty about this type of intervention and its effects.¹⁰ Furthermore, the evidence available tends to focus on the outcomes for staff working as part of the team with considerably less evidence of impact on outcomes and experience of care for patients and service users.¹¹ Interprofessional team effectiveness may be perceived differently by team members, care organisations and patients/service users and carers and so although staff satisfaction and well-being are important they do not provide the full picture of team effectiveness. Therefore, the importance of evaluating patient/service user outcomes needs to be emphasised. Interprofessional teams in health and social care are also becoming increasingly complex as patient care and treatment often extend the boundaries of individual service and organisations. Patients/service users are often cared for by several interconnected and networked teams during their treatment and recovery.

2 Emergence of interprofessional teamwork Over the past 25 years, it is possible to identify a number of global developments which have helped support the emergence of interprofessional teamwork across health and social care settings. Below we outline a number of key developments.

Quality and safety Improving the quality and safety of care has, in recent years, been a key driver for effective interprofessional teamwork. The publication of the Institute of Medicine’s report, To Err is Human, was a major driver of both public and professional interest in safety and the reduction of error around the world.¹² As a result, many countries have established their own national patient safety agencies to monitor and improve quality and safety.¹³  Firth-Cozens (), Ingram/Desombre (), Reeves (a), Rivera et al. ().  Zwarenstein et al. ().  Harris et al. ().  Kohn et al. ().  Reeves et al. ().

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Patient centred care There is a growing literature arguing for the adoption of patient-centred care in the delivery of health and social care services.¹⁴ The inclusion of the patient in the care process is viewed as important to as it allows professionals to collaborate to tailor their care to respond to the different needs of different patients.

Chronic care In the past 25 years we have experienced a shift from acute to chronic illnesses such as arthritis, hypertension and diabetes. This is linked to shifting demographics, as people are living longer, which has resulted in the need for care to be more collaborative and team-based to meet these complex demands.

Rising costs Every year the cost of providing health and social care services rise. These budgetary increases have been an important element in various governments’ interest in interprofessional teamwork. Reorganising services to provide a more coordinated, collaborative, team-oriented approach has been seen as an important way of reducing duplication, improving efficiency and effectiveness as well as helping to contain costs.¹⁵

Education and training Due to the factors outlined above, there continues to be a pressing need for professionals to be able to collaborate in an effective interprofessional manner. As a result, educational providers have been increasingly offering a range of learning activities which aim to provide students and professionals with the attributes to help them understand the principles of interprofessional teamwork, as well as be able to perform effectively in a collaborative manner.¹⁶

Media coverage The mass media is extremely powerful in shaping the way that people perceive the world. The media’s role in affecting health and social care policy, and in

 Herbert (), Sidani/Fox ().  Frenk et al. (), WHO World Health Organization ().  Barr et al. (), Reeves et al. ().

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changing the public’s perceptions of care has been regarded as critical. Today, the media often provides reports of adverse care due to poor interprofessional teamwork, which has resulted in increased awareness of teamwork problems and demands for them to be resolved.

3 Interprofessional collaboration successes and tensions Having outlined some of the core concepts and elements of interprofessional teamwork and also described its emergence, the chapter now considers a number of the key tensions and possibilities for this type of work. In regards to interprofessional teamwork successes, evidence has suggested that for the health and social care professionals a number of gains can be realized. Importantly, these focus on improved mutual support with colleagues from different professions, perceptions of enhanced quality of interprofessional relations and gains in staff morale due to improved interprofessional teamwork. At this level, West’s notion of team reflexivity is useful to note.¹⁷ He states that a key issue for achieving effective teamwork is ‘team reflexivity’. Specifically, it “involves the members of the team standing back and critically examining themselves, their processes and their performance to communicate about these issues and to make appropriate changes”.¹⁸ At the patient care level, growing evidence has suggested that a number of improvements to patient care can be achieved when interprofessional teamwork is effectively employed. These include gains in health professionals’ collective responsiveness to patients needs, reduction of clinical error (and near misses) through improved communication, improved patient safety practices and improved quality of care.¹⁹ Finally, at the systems level, it has been suggested by a number of studies that the implementation of interprofessional teamwork can result in improved coordination of services, less duplication, lower costs, and more effective resource use – within systems which are continually financially strained.²⁰ However, one needs to be aware of the existence of a wide range of interprofessional teamwork tensions which can impede these successes. Importantly,

   

West (). West (), . Zwarenstein et al. (). Onyett (), Rivera et al. ().

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one needs to be mindful of how temporal-spatial issues can affect interprofessional teamwork. For example, Handy found that placing colleagues on two different floors in a building can reduce interactions by 30 %.²¹ In addition, heavy profession-specific workloads can limit time for interprofessional meetings and interactions, which in turn can undermine the quality of interprofessional teamwork. Collectively, difficulties related to time-space can result in emergence of what Engeström and colleagues termed as ‘knotworking’²² – arrangement in which professionals’ interactions are like threads of activity, which are temporarily tied, untied and re-tied, as they work. This type of working practice can be seen as a useful response to working interprofessionally over time and space.²³ The size of an interprofessional team can also affect the quality of teamwork. In large teams, for instance, members can face increased difficulties with communication, coordination and decision-making, as it can take time to include all members of the team. Ideally, West states, an interprofessional team which consists of between 10 and 12 members can usually strike the correct balance of diversity and effective communication.²⁴ In relation to team size, West goes on to state, “small teams are informed. Big teams infer”.²⁵ However, interprofessional teams in health and social care are often considerably larger than this, particularly in acute care services, reflecting the range of professionals and numbers of staff required for 24/7 care provision. Clarity of leadership, which has been found to be highly predictive of overall team performance, was reduced in large teams.²⁶ The notion of exchange within interprofessional teams is important to note. As Hudson states, one needs to remember that the act of collaboration is not an altruistic one.²⁷ As such, it requires mutual gain (or pay-off) between parties (or professionals) who are collaborating. Given its importance to effective interprofessional teamwork, one needs to make the notion of exchange explicit within teams, to ensure individuals are more aware of the nature of their collaborative work. Risk is another key issue to consider. Working in interprofessional teams is often an unpredictable process. As a result, one usually begins a collaborative relationship with a set of uncertain outcomes and the possibly of failure. There-

      

Handy (). Engeström et al. (). Reeves/Lewin (). West (). West (), . Harris et al. (). Hudson ().

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fore, the notion of risk needs to be made explicit to help generate a more comprehensive understanding of this particular teamwork tension. One also needs to be mindful of the issue of competing interests when engaging in interprofessional teamwork. For example, as Beattie et al. state, “when individuals and groups come together […] there is representation of different and often competing interests [which] can generate tensions and conflicts”.²⁸ Janis’ work on groupthink helps one see another possible tension connected with interprofessional teamwork.²⁹ Through studying decision-making in teams and groups across a range of settings, including the Kennedy administration during the Bay of Pigs crisis (when the United States almost bombed Cuba from fear that it was amassing nuclear arms from Russia), Janis found that in times of tension, a groupthink situation can occur. This resulted in a high level of agreement among members, which in turn produced a lack of opposing viewpoints and an absence of critical feedback, and therefore poor decision making outcomes. Reeves drew on this approach to explore how groupthink can adversely affect interprofessional collaboration in a health education setting.³⁰ Finally, and in some ways most significantly, one needs to be aware of the range of professional issues that exist, which can undermine interprofessional teamwork. Indeed, given the historical development of the different health and social care professions, and their differing types of professional socialization, each profession generates individuals with a differing set of profession-specific values and ideologies – many of which are not conductive to interprofessional teamwork.³¹ Also, again, due to the different historical development routes taken by the health professions their interprofessional relations are marked by socio-political and economic inequalities which have resulted in discernable imbalances of power and authority.³² Drawing upon the literature presented above, as well as other wider teamwork sources, Reeves and colleagues developed a conceptual framework for interprofessional teamwork.³³ (See Figure 2)

     

Beattie et al. (), . Janis (). Reeves (b). Kitto et al. (). Freidson (), Abbott (), Witz (). Reeves et al. ().

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Fig. 2: A conceptual framework for interprofessional teamwork. Source: Reeves et al. (2010)

4 Interprofessional collaboration in action: an empirical example To help illuminate the issues discussed above, this section of the chapter provides an example of interprofessional teamwork in action. It is based on a meta-synthesis of three interprofessional teamwork studies which has been published.³⁴ The focus of this work was upon both exploring the nature of interprofessional collaboration and teamwork, and how it was enacted across three different contexts. The actual synthesis was generated from primary studies which were conducted in South Africa, the United Kingdom (UK) and Canada. The settings of these studies were all general internal medical (GIM) wards based in large acute teaching hospitals located in urban settings. All the studies adopted an

 Reeves et al. ().

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ethnographic approach which consisted of participant observations and semistructured interviews. A thematic analysis and then a synthesis of the data were conducted with the three studies, which generated the following findings. First, across the three sites, there was a high frequency of interprofessional interactions involving all different health and social care professionals based in the GIM wards. Second, it was found that, although interprofessional relations across the sites were generally genial in nature, underpinning these relations were strong uniprofessional team cultures (e. g. nursing, medicine, occupational therapy). In addition, it was found that each of the sites held regular interprofessional meetings where GIM staff had the opportunity to come together in a formal gathering to discuss patient care issues. However, the synthesis revealed, that in general across the sites, interprofessional interactions involving physicians (with for example nurses or therapists) were terse and largely unidirectional – typically the physician requesting a task, or asking for an update on a patient. This contrasted, quite starkly to interprofessional interactions involving the nurses, therapists and social workers, which were more positive – lengthier, involving open communication and at times social content. Furthermore, the synthesis indicated that although all the sites held regular interprofessional meetings, attendance was varied. Often senior medical and nursing staff did not attend, which meant that decision-making on patient care issues was difficult to do. Also, rather than use these meetings for generating a rich level of interprofessional discussion and problem-solving, many interactions during the meetings were ritualistic in fashion – following quite fixed routines about who could speak at certain points. As a result, many GIM staff used more informal and surreptitious channels interprofessional communication, and would often interact along corridors or at the nurses’ station if they saw another professional who could assist them. What was particularly striking was the similarity in terms of interprofessional processes across these three different locations. As the synthesis suggested, interprofessional activities in South Africa, the UK and Canada shared a number of characteristics. Also, while the synthesis identified some positive elements of collaboration in these settings, its level appeared more like ‘knotworking’ – with only brief interprofessional interactions. Given this situation, one needs to think how to move forward to attempt to enrich the nature of interprofessional teamwork.³⁵

 Reeves et al. ().

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5 Some ways forward There are a number of possible ways forward for strengthening and improving interprofessional teamwork activities. These cluster around developing, implementing and influencing a range of interprofessional interventions linked to: – Interprofessional education – interventions that could aim at delivering formal collaborative learning activities such as simulated learning or team retreats, as well as informal learning activities. – Interprofessional practice – interventions aiming at changing the nature of interprofessional meetings to ensure they have more opportunities for shared problem solving, the development of interprofessional checklists and pathways, and the use of information technology to support interprofessional activities that span time and space. – Interprofessional organization – interventions could produce organizationalwide guidelines and procedures that strengthen teamwork, as well as reconfiguring workplace space to foster more opportunities for interprofessional interaction and communication. – Interprofessional policy – attempting to influence the production of regional and national health policies to ensure an explicit focus on interprofessional teamwork, and also similarly target professional regulatory bodies and accreditation agencies to lobby for the adoption of more team-based approaches in policies and regulations. Rather than focusing efforts on implementing single interventions, which can only generate limited results, there is a need to design, implement and evaluate multiple interventions consisting of interprofessional education, practice and organizations activities. As such, possible impact can be further reaching and hopefully more sustainable.

6 Concluding comments In advancing the use of interprofessional teamwork activities and improving our understanding of this form of work, the following issues need to be considered. First, we need to ensure we have a focus on generating robust outcomes in relation to team performance and patient care. Second, we need to gather good quality qualitative data on the processes of teamwork to better understand the nature of outcomes gathered. Third, there needs to be an effort made on generating better inferences, extending work from single site studies, to larger, multi-institu-

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tional studies of interprofessional teamwork. Fourth, more work is needed to understand the economic dimensions of teamwork in terms of measuring its costs and its benefits. Finally, further work is needed to generate and apply more social science concepts and theories when studying interprofessional teamwork. For example, the use of Figures 1 and 2 provide some useful ways of illuminating the nature of interprofessional collaboration and teamwork, which could help generate a more informed understanding of its complexities.

References Abbott, Andrew (1988): The System of Professions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Adair, John (1986): Effective Teamworking, London: Pan Macmillan. Barr, Hugh/Freeth, Della/Hammick, Marilyn/Koppel, Ivan/Reeves, Scott (2005): Effective Interprofessional Education: Argument; Assumption and Evidence, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Beattie, Jill/Cheek, Juhanne/Gibson, Tern (1996): “The Politics of Collaboration as Viewed Through the Lens of a Collaborative Nursing Research Project.” In: Journal of Advanced Nursing 24, 682 – 687. Borrill, Carol S./Carletta, Jean/Carter, Angela J./Dawson, Jeremy F./Garrod, Simon/Rees, Anne/Richards, Ann/Shapiro, David/West, Michael A. (2001): The Effectiveness of Health Care Teams in the National Health Service, Birmingham: Aston University. Drinka, Theresa J.K./Clark, Phillip G. (2000): Health Care Teamwork: Interdisciplinary Practice and Teaching, Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group. Engestrom, Yrö/Engestrom, Ritva/Vahaaho, Tarja (1999): “When the center does not hold: the importance of knotworking.” In: Seth Chaklin/Marianne Hedegaard/Uffe J. Jensen (eds.), Activity Theory and Social Practice, Aarhus: Aarhus University Press. Freidson, Eliot (1970): Profession of Medicine: A Study of the Sociology of Applied Knowledge, New York: Harper & Row. Firth-Cozens, Jenni (1998): “Celebrating teamwork.” In: International Journal for Quality in Health Care 7, 3 – 7. Frenk, Julio/Chen, Lincoln/Bhutta, Zulfiqar/Cohen, Jordan/Crisp, Nigel/Evans, Timothy/Fineberg, Harvey/Garcia, Patricia et al. (2010): “Health professionals for a new century: transforming education to strengthen health systems in an interdependent world.” In: The Lancet 376, 1923 – 1958. Handy, Charles (1999): Understanding Organizations (4th edition), London: Penguin. Harris, Ruth/Sims, Sarah/Hewitt, Gillian/Joy, Mark/Brearley, Sally/Cloud, Geoff et al. (2013): “Interprofessional teamwork across stroke care pathways: outcomes and patient and carer experience.” Final report. In: Tom Walley (ed.), NIHR National Institute for Health Research, Southampton: Service Delivery and Organisation Programme. Henneman, Elizabeth A./Lee, Jan/Cohen, Joan (1995): “Collaboration: A concept analysis.” In: Journal of Advanced Nursing 21, 103 – 109. Herbert, Carol P. (2005): “Changing the culture: Interprofessional education for collaborative patient-centered practice in Canada.” In: Journal of Interprofessional Care 19, Supp. 1, 1 – 4.

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Hudson, Bob (1987): “Collaboration in social welfare: a framework for analysis.” In: Policy & Politics 15, 175 – 182. Ingram, Haydn/Desombre, Terry (1999): “Teamwork in health care: Lessons from the literature and from good practice around the world.” In: Journal of Management in Medicine 13, 51 – 58. Janis, Irving L. (1982): Group Think: A Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascos (2nd edition), Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Jelphs, Kim/Dickinson, Helen (2008): Working in teams, Bristol: Policy Press. Kitto, Simon/Chesters Janice/Thistlethwaite, Jill/Reeves, Scott (2011): A Sociology of Interprofessional Healthcare Practice: Critical Reflections and Concrete Solutions, New York: Nova Science Publishers. Kohn, Linda T./Corrigan, Janet M./Donaldson, Molla S. (eds.) (2000): To err is human: Building a safer health system, Washington, D.C.: Institute of Medicine. Kraus, William A. (1980) Collaboration in organizations: alternatives to hierarchy, New York: Human Sciences Press. Lemieux-Charles, Louis/McGuire, Wendy L. (2006): “What do we know about health care team effectiveness: A review of the literature.” In: Medical Care Research and Review 63, 263 – 270. Onyett, Steve (2003): Teamworking in Mental Health, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Reeves, Scott/Lewin, Simon (2004): “Hospital-based interprofessional collaboration: strategies and meanings.” In: Journal of Health Services Research and Policy 9, 218 – 225. Reeves, Scott (2008a): “Working in a team.” In: Jenni Spouse/Michael J. Cook/Carol Cox (eds.), Common Foundation Studies in Nursing, Edinburgh: Elservier, 333 – 353. Reeves, Scott (2008b): Developing and Delivering Practice-Based Interprofessional Education, Munich: VDM publications. Reeves, Scott/Lewin, Simon/Espin, Sherry/Zwarenstein, Merrick (2010): Interprofessional Teamwork for Health and Social Care, London: Blackwell-Wiley. Reeves, Scott/Perrier, Laure/Goldman, Joanne/Freeth, Della/Zwarenstein, Merrick (2013): “Interprofessional education: effects on professional practice and healthcare outcomes.” (update) In: Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 3, DOI:10.1002/14651858.CD002213.pub3 (accessed 6, 29, 2015). Rivera, Josette/Aronson, Louise/Reeves, Scott (2014): “The interprofessional team.” In: C. Seth Landefeld/Anna Chang/Brie Williams (eds.), Current Geriatrics Diagnosis and Treatment, Purr Ridge: McGraw-Hill Companies. Sidani, Souraya/Fox, Mary T. (2014): “Patient-centered care: clarification of its specific elements to facilitate interprofessional care.” In: Journal of Interprofessional Care 28, 134 – 141. Stark, Sheila/Stronach, Ian/Warne, Tony (2002): “Teamwork in mental health: rhetoric and reality.” In: Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing 9, 411 – 418. West, Michael A. (1996): Handbook of Work Group Psychology, Chichester, New York: John Wiley and Sons Ltd. West, Michael A. (2004): The secrets of successful team management: How to lead a team to innovation, creativity and success, London: Duncan Baird Publishers. West, Michael A./Markiowicz, Lynn (2004): Building Team-based Working: A Practical Guide to Organisational Transformation, London: British Psychology Society, Blackwell.

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Witz, Anne (1992): Professions and Patriarchy, London: Routledge. WHO World Health Organization (2010): Framework for action on interprofessional education and collaborative practice, Geneva: Health Professions Network Nursing and Midwifery Office. Xyrichis, Andreas/Lowton, Karen (2008): “What fosters or prevents interprofessional teamworking in primary and community care? A literature review.” In: International Journal of Nursing Studies 45, 140 – 153. Zwarenstein, Merrick/Goldman, Joanne/Reeves, Scott (2009): “Interprofessional collaboration: effects of practice-based interventions on professional practice and healthcare outcomes.” In: Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 3, DOI:10.1002/14651858.CD000072.pub2 (accessed 6, 29, 2015).

Gerd Folkers

On Re-Positioning Abstract: Repositioning is a frequent management tool nowadays. It is effected due to a failure of a brand to reach its marketing objectives. In relation to drug development repositioning twists into a second perspective. By reconsidering the ‘side-effects’ of a drug as future opportunity for a main therapeutic effect, the very same active ingredient of the drug is re-developed for a new target. The economical advantage is evident. But changing the perspective – even more in its metaphoric meaning – is most difficult. All kinds of barriers impede the process that is often combined with a change of the physical position of a person. Cultural tradition, administrative regulation, fears and trust, beliefs and advice from elsewhere, all of those confounding elements prevent change of perspectives. Interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary exchange platforms are needed to foster re-thinking, re-positioning and re-evaluating inherited structures, concepts and processes. Independent institutions like the Collegium Helveticum may serve as physical materialization of such exchange platforms where new forms of discourse may create new perspectives.

1 Introduction In front of the gates of Trastevere, on the opposite side of the magnificent building of Academia dei Lincei, lies Villa Farnesina, facing the bank of the Tiber and overlooking a citrus park. At the beginning of 16th century, on the bel étage, Baldassare Peruzzi adorned the walls of the Sala delle Prospettive with frescoes. They are masterpieces of perspective painting. In a continuation of the tiled floor, they capture the vanishing lines and extend them to the nearby hills on the horizon. The Rome of those times spreads out in front of you: Chiesa di Santo Spirito can be found among the low town houses. The view leads to Porta Settimiana and to the small mountain villages in the hills. Someone standing alone in the room – which, given the swarms of tourists, is almost impossible – would intuitively position himself so as to allow the linear perspective to continue uninterrupted. Yet in the crowds of visitors, one can hardly find a spot that leaves the perspective undisturbed. During my last visit, this prompted a slightly mocking, half suppressed comment from one of the visitors: “Not even the perspective is right.” The remark did not escape the clever guide, and with the characteristic wit of a Roman he pointed out to the visitors the importance of person-

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al location. “If you would just move over a little, you will see how perfectly the linear lines run.” This brief anecdote most aptly illustrates the subject matter of this article and the importance of repositioning oneself in relation to other perspectives, though it remains an open question whether the perspectives taken up are also the right ones. ‘Perspective’ has become a non-word. It shares its fate with the ‘philosophy’ that is inherent in any marketing, the ‘energy’ flowing through apples and solar plexus and the ‘interdisciplinarity’ that every project is based on. A wise and insightful use of the word may be found in a recent essay by the philosopher Marcel Hénaff on the function and importance of perspective as protagonist on the ‘stage of power’ (Bühne der Macht).¹ He argues that, in Il Principe, Niccolò Machiavelli developed a new perspective for a stage of power that initiates a break with the traditional view of things without justifying or condemning this view. According to Hénaff, this new spatial organization and its models of representation ² constitute an inspiration for the (re) positioning of the Machiavellian Prince. To illustrate, once again, how such a perspective is designed, it is best to quote Hénaff’s line of argumentation: The construction of perspective defines a privileged site of vision, called distance point, [it can be imagined as] the tip of a pyramid, with the image appearing as its cross section (il taglio). From this privileged point of observation, the tip of the other pyramid [joined to the first base to base, as it were] presents itself best. This point is called vanishing point, (…) [while] the distance point is also called the point of origin, that which classical metaphysics referred to as principle. ³

As the prince (principe, prince, Prinz, principium: principle) assumes this privileged position, he overlooks the political scene and its theatrical performances. To stand at the distance point clearly constitutes a position of power in as much as it is occupied by a single person. Yet is it also the right position? Does the stage reflect reality? As it is characteristic for theatrical stages, it does not. For assuming the unique position at the distance point depends on an essential con-

 Hénaff ().  Hénaff (), .  Hénaff (), : “Die Konstruktion der Perspektive definiert einen privilegierten Ort des Sehens, Distanzpunkt genannt, das heißt die Spitze einer Pyramide, als deren Schnittfläche das Bild erscheint (il taglio). Von dieser Stelle der privilegierten Sicht des Betrachters aus erscheint die Spitze der anderen Pyramide am besten, die Fluchtpunkt genannt wird, (…) der Distanzpunkt wird auch Ursprungspunkt genannt, das, was in der klassischen Metaphysik just ein Prinzip genannt wurde.”

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dition: the assertiveness necessary to achieve this position. Once it has been achieved, this point of origin offers not only an exclusive point of view, but also agency, since, according to Machiavelli, it is important to preserve as well as to secure this position dynastically. It seems to be a short step to modern conditions. Both academia and industry offer the same picture. Rigid structures at universities or in large corporations are often compared to principalities. The situation in present-day politics is rather different – not because excessively democratic structures encumber the positioning;⁴ as, again, Hénaff points out, it is rather the new media which destroys the stable perspective of absolute power. Even if in the academic landscape and the economy the influence of the new media is still relatively small, it is clearly increasing. Top positions in banks and insurance companies or hospitals have recently become subject to wide debates in the media. Reorientation or failure are ultimately a matter of perspective, and these areas concern jobs and health, the things that are dear to our proverbial heart. In this essay, I will analyze the issue of positioning and of assumed particular perspectives as well as the possibility of calling them into question from two different, yet overlapping areas of personal experience. Firstly, from the experience of a traditional university career in an ‘applied’ discipline, namely in drug development. Secondly, from a personal change in perspective experienced through the re-positioning from disciplinary specialist to the head of an institution that is committed to an interdisciplinary and trans-disciplinary approach and aims to live this also empirically. The next two chapters focus on the question of how new findings result from re-positioning and finally lead to innovation in the market. To this end, the first step is to consider various mechanisms of drug research.

2 Main or side effects is a matter of perspective In the course of the last decade or more, re-positioning has become a buzzword for research-based pharmaceutical companies.⁵ What exactly does the term mean and where does it come from? The basic idea is quite simple: Drugs that have proved effective on the market for years, obviously due to the fact that patients get a noticeable benefit from their application, seldom work on the basis of  “Der Landesfürst, der Kanzler hätte werden können” was the headline of an article in the newspaper Die Welt about Brandenburg’s Prime Minister Matthias’ resignation on  July  (see Sturm ()).  Ashburn/Thor ().

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a single, molecularly precise effect. In many cases, the reactions accompanying the intended biochemical effect produce the side effects extensively listed in the package insert. A side effect that must be accepted for the benefit of the medication may be an interesting cellular response whose significance was either not recognized, neglected, or simply misjudged when the drug was developed. If the company’s pharmacologists manage to convert a special side effect into a main effect for another disorder, this may produce an extraordinary economic success, particularly if the patent of the medicinal product concerned is also owned by the company. This economic success is urgently needed, particularly considering the wide gap that has opened up between investments in basic research and the financial gains made from them. To an ever greater extent, new drugs are failing on the market. The lack of efficacy has become the specter of the research industry. It was therefore logical to deal with the further development or repositioning of well-known and familiar pharmaceutical substances. The success of such re-positioning approaches is sometimes impressive. The well-known Aspirin® is a prime example for this, given that it is used both to reduce fever and as a prophylactic agent in cardiovascular diseases. Its aggregation inhibition for certain blood components, which was initially unwanted and later tolerated, may prove a life-saving prevention in case of imminent heart attack. Far more spectacular, though historically charged, are the multiple effects of Contergan® (Thalidomide). After its tragic end as a ‘natural’ sleeping pill due to the disastrous misjudgment of its potential to cause deformity in unborn children, Thalidomide is now the most effective antibiotic against leprosy. Moreover, it is just starting a new career in the treatment of complex brain tumors, severe immune disorders, and multiple myeloma.⁶ The re-positioning of Thalidomide for leprosy treatment almost coincided with its distribution as a sleeping aid. The dermatologist Jacob Sheskin treated severe, painful cases of leprosy in Jerusalem. To calm his patients, he prescribed Thalidomide and found that, after only four doses, complaints of leprosy infection dramatically declined.⁷ Is chance at work? Yes and no. In such cases, a concept manifests itself that has dominated the development of new drugs for thousands of years: serendipity. I will get back to this. But first I would like to analyze the current challenge of drug development. It is paradigmatic for the use of perspective as described by Hénaff, and in this sense Machiavellian.

 Teo/Stirling/Zeldis ().  Greenstone ().

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2.1 Path dependencies The concept of path dependency is attributed to the economist and Nobel Prize laureate Douglass North,⁸ who in the nineteen-nineties worked on the theory of institutional change. Business enterprises often follow paths of development that in retrospect turn out to misjudge the launch of the developed product on the market. It seems that the organization followed a ‘path’ which it could not leave or was not ready to leave.⁹ There are numerous examples of this: Be it the QWERTZU keyboard, which from the typewriter was adopted by modern data processing, analog photography as a favorite of some – no longer existing – camera manufacturers, meticulously refined combustion engines, or the persistence of antiquated operating systems to which machines and users have to subordinate. The reasons, too, are many. Managers, whose actual task lies in steering the company into the future and in devoting all their attention to the exploration of new, unknown paths in areas where there is still something to ‘win’, suddenly find themselves taking on work with high upfront investments, corporate tradition, internal know-how, brand awareness, and routines. From a bird’seye view ¹⁰ (sic!), misguided considerations are supported in a fatal manner and are cemented by positive feedback effects. Duly followed in-house processes, insufficient critical scrutiny of brand positioning, and close relationships with employees place a manager in the position of the prince’s point of origin, which presents him a perfect view of the stage, but also seduces him into (dynastically) solidifying his position based on positive feedback. Intersections with other possible paths are missed, divergences go unperceived due to the high momentum produced by the positive feedback. The decision-makers are caught in their own system, which resembles the locked-in syndrome in medicine. The physical correspondence is inertia or sluggishness: a body remains in a state of motion until significant external influences deflect it from its path. The regularity of institutional operations contributes decisively to institutional inertia. Ubiquitous quality assurance standardizes and certifies processes, confirming rituals and blocking the smallest deviations, despite originally positive intentions. Nationwide matching of school curricula in the context of the Bologna process may serve as an example along with the ISO certification of business enterprises or the listing of buildings, cities, and landscapes as sites of

 See Pierson ().  See Geissler ().  See Geissler ().

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World Cultural Heritage. All such processes are based on a fiction that seeks to avoid divergence, spontaneity, and emergence. The process of drug development is a prime example of a rule-governed process. Considered historically, for very good reasons. Its ideal is – the right medicine, – at the right time, – in the right form, – in the right dose, – delivered to the right patient. After the shock of the Thalidomide catastrophe, government agencies and institutions decided to determine the ‘right’ way. Drug laws were changed or introduced in the first place, powerful authorities (today, FDA¹¹ and EMA¹²) were put in place. Their committees of experts have established a detailed set of rules for which the national pharmacopoeia provides a legal basis while its enforcement is guaranteed through regular worldwide audits. Ranging from the version of the software used, the type, number, and keeping of the test animals, internal documentation, packaging, and labeling, the study design and the ‘claims’¹³ to the architecture of the factory buildings, the authorities control the path of discovery and marketing of a new drug. All this is based on the fiction that there is a complete determinism, at least within this subsystem of drug development, which can be understood and mastered by careful observance of all the rules derived from this process. Government authorities could be said to provide the grammar. As in the case of the grammarian Panini, who established over 4000 rules for Sanskrit,¹⁴ integrating all possible variations, to ascertain command of the whole language, it is here believed that a set of rules can map the entire system. The part that is forgotten is the semantics.¹⁵

 U.S. Food and Drug Administration.  European Medicines Agency.  A product claim advertisement names a drug, states what condition it treats, and talks about both its benefits and its risks. An advertisement must present the benefits and risks of a prescription drug in a balanced fashion. Balance depends on both the information provided in the advertisement itself and on how the information is presented. In this particular advertisement, the benefits and risks are presented to give a balanced impression of the drug. (http:// www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/PrescriptionDrugAdvertising/ ucm.htm) (accessed , , ).  See Bod (),  – .  It is no coincidence that bio-semiotic syntax and semantics are differentiated in the explanation of the placebo effect. See Schönbächler ().

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The attitude is mirrored in the research departments themselves. A high degree of automation reduces cost and coincidence and increases efficiency. This, at least, is the belief. With the help of complex static procedures, populations can be screened, their (statistically relevant) features can be identified and used as starting point for a possible therapeutic intervention. The statistical significance that must be produced is the Achilles heel. ‘Outliers’ are eliminated, although they are potentially a source of greater insight and often more closely related to ‘common sense’ than the correlation obtained.¹⁶ The special features found statistically usually accompany biochemical-measuring parameters, such as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ blood fat¹⁷ or a mutation in the biochemical pathway of a tumor cell. Based upon these parameters, a hypothesis about a possible target is formulated that may constitute the aim of a molecular intervention. This target needs to be found and validated, i. e. its utility with respect to a particular disease needs to be demonstrated. Once this also meets with success, the next step is to develop theoretical models in virtual space where potential molecular candidates may be extracted from large databases or by design (Drug Design). At this level, we should reintroduce the Machiavellian perspective. The target assumes the role of the prince in the point of origin of the pyramid. From here, the scenario unfolds until it reaches the patient in the distance.¹⁸ And just like the prince, it develops a dynastic persistence, reducing the entire scenario to its point of view. At this point, the complex interaction of the target with its physiological context is usually not known. The search paths, with which it was identified on a molecular level, resemble giant magnifying glasses that hide the context. Through the microscope, the target is cut out with a scalpel, as it were, and transferred to the lab to its princely position. Here it also operates independently. Candidates of molecular interaction are presented to it in high throughput screening. The target selects its partners from among those offered to it. Are they the ‘right’ ones from the perspective of pharmacopoeia? This question is not answered until much later, perhaps in the phase of clinical trials, which themselves only represent a selection; at the very latest, it is answered on the global market, where the drug risks facing the fate of the lack-of-efficiency. Of course, there are exceptions. If the choice of partners is left largely to ‘natural’ conditions, chances for the drug to have positive effects are very high. Of course, ‘natural’ means in this case the construction of a monoclonal antibody, a large protein molecule, which is also found in bodily immune reactions and

 Ziliak/McCloskey ().  Otto ().  Folkers ().

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which is formed in the laboratory and can be controlled along the same endogenous biochemical principles. This class of drugs is the youngest and, as far as may be assessed, also the most potent weapon to fight diseases. So, is the problem solved? As the question suggests: no. Patients carrying the target can usually be treated successfully with the drug developed against the disease. Yet the target may also be present without the disease breaking out in the patient’s lifetime, or vice versa, the disease can befall a patient who is not carrier of the target. From the perspective of mono-causal molecular relationships, it is then no longer really the same disease; yet in terms of phenotype, it remains breast cancer. Another limitation hampers drug research: the phenomenon of resistance. What is known about infections and the use of antibiotics, and on the grounds of incorrect use and careless diversity is increasingly becoming a problem, proves tragic in relation to tumors. Resistance against the highly specific antibodies often develops after a single treatment session. How this resistance comes about and how to deal with it is one of today’s most urgent research topics. May we assume a coherence between the extreme precision of the instrument and its rapid ineffectiveness? In fact, scientists have speculated whether instead of a precisely targeted attack that constitutes a clear causal path, a less precise and less radical agens that attacks many different places of the body may represent an alternative.¹⁹ Constructing such an alternative in a rational way requires a method that we currently lack. A change of perspective is needed. And again Thalidomide provides us with a historical example worth considering. How many of this drug’s multiple effects on the organism were overlooked, not discovered, or deliberately ignored along the path of its development and are now waiting for serendipity? Established paths are restricted to grammar, to syntax, they avoid discussion of semantic meaning. If the institutional functioning and the success of a company are equated with its ‘oiled’ paths, the result is dependency. Here the often praised tacit or implicit knowledge must be subjected to some criticism.²⁰ As is so often the case, the coin has two sides. A ‘skill’ acquired through long tradition and experience, which cannot be made explicit, is often nothing more than a path dependency. While this might be required from a tailor or a blacksmith in order to carry out/perfect his craft, knowledge-based practices like drug development require caution. “Detours enhance familiarity with the environment”: this common saying may be seen as a counter-model to path dependency. While it may involve

 Russo et al. ().  See Polanyi (), ().

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costs, it nevertheless offers the opportunity to make new discoveries. It is difficult to predict or plan such new discoveries. Yet time and again, success stories²¹ are predicated on what in drug research is labeled the ‘serendipity’ effect.²² In a letter to Horace Mann, Walpole first used this term in connection with a Persian fairy tale to describe a variety of unforeseen discoveries. Three small Persian princes from Serendip (present-day Sri Lanka) on their journey²³ to a “life in a foreign land” stumbled upon unexpected treasures for which they had never consciously (that is, systematically) looked. Penicillin and Viagra, Aspirin and ‘The Pill’ as well as the resurrection of Thalidomide based upon new uses are among the most prominent treasures in the domain of medical drugs that serendipity has given us. To follow serendipity in a world of established, solidly paved and well-maintained paths, comparable to the certified and marked Alpine climbing routes, takes independence and courage. In the ordered bustle of companies today or in the publication-driven world of academia – further instances of path dependencies – they seem nearly to have ceased to exist. However, as external influences become severe, such as lack of innovation, declining revenues, lack of solutions for the grand challenges (hunger, water, air, energy), management is taking action to break the inertia. Detours and serendipity are becoming part of the prescribed top-down process. Research funding requires science to use interdisciplinary approaches; the economy pursues “disruptive” strategies.²⁴ This mode of translating the threats experienced into new opportunities for academia, the economy, and society is in the best sense a marketing strategy that introduces a targeted change of perspective to ensure the survival of disciplines, institutions, and companies.

2.2 Marketing or change management The re-positioning of a drug offers new profit opportunities in a highly competitive market as well as an increase in therapeutic options for the company. Repositioning can be understood as Change Management. Key elements include the observation and reflection of established processes, as well as taking

 That these success stories are then rewritten and ascribed to a planned process, so that they never figure as what they actually are, namely the product of chance, is a socio-scientific and socio-economic phenomenon that would merit a study of its own.  See Folkers/Kut/Boyer ().  See Armeno ().  Manyika et al. ().

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action.²⁵ These require time and space and the (mental) freedom to use them. A company’s intention to earn money by means of a re-positioning and to secure markets is trivial and completely justified. No governmental organization will be able to fill this gap. The crux lies in the implementation. It is necessary to create space and time for a project with a very uncertain outcome. This entails risky investments. Furthermore, it is necessary to find people willing to break out of their own path dependencies so as to engage in such activities. What comes to mind here are keywords such as flexibility, creativity, out-of-the-box thinking, curiosity, pioneering spirit and the likes. Not everyone is endowed with these characteristics. On the contrary, well-trodden and easy paths tempt people to linger on them. Alternatively, people are actively discouraged from taking an active course, a fact not unheard of in the service sector.²⁶ Providing mental and material resources for a re-positioning is not easy. Academic research seems predestined for this. However, there appears to be a strange aversion to dealing with ‘old’ things. Scientific careers are associated with ultimate novelty and therefore do not offer great incentives on molecular structures and mechanisms that are already known when it comes to writing publications or applying for funding. Re-evaluations are seldom rewarded. In view of the fact that the repetition of an experiment is one of the keystones of empirical research, this strikes as a socio-scientific paradox. Is it not often the case that we gain new insights as we reread a text because our perspective has changed? To relinquish facts validated through practice and to attend exclusively to the new leads to a downright cementing of path dependencies. Academia is facing more obstacles that are pragmatic. On the one hand, it is not easy to access ‘old’ substances. They are subject to patent laws, their use is protected, and the proprietor may have no interest in further research. On the other hand, university research lacks resources. In the university context, unlike the research industry, it is impossible to build large test systems and to maintain them; moreover, today’s streamlined career system from PhD to professorship can no longer provide large-scale services, as they are required for the synthesis of drugs in larger quantities, for instance. Then again, the investment costs of the industry have already been mentioned. The last expedient is cooperation. There are some notable instances. Public-private enterprises have been established to study rare diseases, to create vaccines for third-world countries, or, as is still rare, to facilitate re-positioning. And it is often the young, daring thinkers who

 Berger/Chalupsky/Hartmann ().  Folkers (a).

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hurl themselves into the adventure of a start-up company. History is written only by the successful. This analysis shows that it is mainly legal, administrative, scientific, as well as corporate cultural barriers that prevent a change of perspective. Financial barriers are only secondary. On the market, every good idea usually still receives funding. Yet the question remains why all those new advancements in drug research and the astonishing discoveries of basic research do not manage to provide a strong lever for reassessment of the old.

2.3 Basic research and change of perspective The debate on whether it is basic research or applied research that has higher social merit has fueled political debate for decades. A lot of money is at stake. Nation states submit themselves to rankings regarding their research spending. They do so in the firm belief that high research investments are an indicator of a prosperous nation. This is undoubtedly so, but it is disputed whether excellent research contributes to the economic welfare of a society, or whether a rich nation can afford to spend more on research. It is one consequence of such a development that individual disciplines are increasingly assessed from a utilitarian perspective. ²⁷ The taxpaying ‘citizen’ allegedly wants to know exactly on what kind of research tax money is spent and what benefits this reaps. Yet whether the public really requires such a rigorous disclosure of accounts has not been reliably established, neither has the assumption that cutting-edge research is relevant for the positive development of the economy. On the contrary, the number of Nobel laureates hardly correlates with a country’s economic performance, but rather with the amounts of chocolate consumed as a comparison with Switzerland may suggest. No causal link, only one of the many correlations that, on closer examination, prove to have a dubious connection.²⁸ The utilitarian view is a perspective with an angle narrowed in two dimensions: Both in terms of the temporal dimension and depth of resolution. If the discussion turns to the usefulness of research, a utilitarian view would require the research in question to prove useful within the lifetime of those involved in the debate and, ideally, for them personally. The argument considers a time span that is inadequate for research projects, because among those involved there is hardly any misunderstanding about the fact that research will prove useful someday; after all, the

 Folkers ().  See Maurage/Heeren/Pesenti ().

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amount of successful practical uses of research results has been overwhelming in the last hundred years. Utilitarians prefer an argumentation period of 10 to 20 years for ‘new’ research to enter the market as ‘innovation’. The lack of in-depth resolution points to a complex issue and leads to my thesis on the indispensability of basic research for a change of perspective, which is also the driving force for innovation. In very few cases it is possible to prove the contribution of basic research to a technological innovation that entail social change. Undoubtedly, the invention of the transistor is a salient example. In the majority of cases however, the relation remains hidden. Indeed, it is often not even known which exact mechanisms led to a change of perspective; the fact that such a change has taken place can only be reconstructed partially in retrospect.²⁹ Here, too, an example from the field of life sciences may be offered in illustration. Biacore® technology now belongs to the basic equipment of every biomedical laboratory, both in universities and the research industry. This technology allows scientists to quickly and accurately check interactions of potentially therapeutically active molecules of the body’s own binding partners. Hence, it is an ideal instrument for pharmaceutical research. Designed and marketed towards the end of the last century within the framework of a collaboration between a university and pharmaceutical research company,³⁰ the underlying Plasmon resonance effect was first described almost one hundred years before.³¹ Evidently, neither the scientific nor the economic context at the time was suited to absorb this news and turn it into an innovation. Accordingly, today’s ubiquitous innovation programs represent an attempt to shape the current context in a way that may enable change management, i. e. a change of perspective, to happen faster. Given the fact that doing research and science means expecting the unexpected, such a top-down approach of innovation management seems helpless; unless it aims to address a much deeper phenomenon, namely path dependency. In order to do so, this approach would need to break down encrusted structures of disciplinary research with its publication rituals, and it would need to increase the risk appetite among entrepreneurial investors to give ‘their’ researchers time and space to create a change of perspective. Not least, it would be important to create places where such a change of perspective may be practiced, for it is naive to believe that an established ‘thought style’ can change without effort, practice, and incentives.

 The principle of ‘emergence’ is often used to explain the unpredictable.  Liedberg/Nylander/Lundstrom ().  Wood ().

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Basic reflections on this can be found throughout the works of Ludwik Fleck, who described the phenomenon of thought styles as a form of path dependency in his 1935 publication Die Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache (Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact).³² Fleck argues convincingly that, when a community (a “thought collective” in Fleck’s terminology) holds on fast to an agreed path of thinking, this virtually prevents a change of perspective.

3 Interdisciplinary exchange platforms and re-positioning If we think about this scenario in the context of contemporary drug research and try to generalize, we logically arrive at the claim that university graduates must be taught already from ‘the cradle’ to reflect critically on their position and to take action accordingly. Here, too, it would be important to create space and time to practice developing critical positions. However, there are many circumstances which counteract such an ideal. A change management of the postmodern era, also apostrophized as new public management, has contributed substantially to this. Universities are increasingly organized based on entrepreneurial principles. On no account must this be misunderstood as a call in support of sovereign power for full professorships; we rather need to scrutinize the excesses of continuous auditing. ³³ Measurements that appear sensible for business enterprises, primarily in the financial sector and particularly in view of modern IT, can have fatal effects on higher education and the research landscape. Under the pressure of a permanently called-for reporting, researchers take the most obvious solutions in order to justify its existence. All reports document progress. The least problematic index (in the sense of the parameter most easily measured) for academic progress is the number of publications. In the faithful belief in a metaphysically omniscient peer review system, which detects every wrong path and eliminates any deception, the number of annual publications serves as a justification for excellent research. It is trivial to use this approach as a basis for academic rankings and thus establish a quantitative evaluation that can be easily correlated with the amount of research funding awarded.³⁴ This

 See Fleck ().  Vasarhelyi/Chan ().  See “Economization” of Science, Swiss Science and Technology Council Report (/).

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correlation, in turn, plays a role in negotiations on professorships and strategic decisions about the direction of research. Another stable path is established. This makes clear how tempting it is to break free from this conflict situation, at least temporarily, to consider one’s own position. There are personal careers at stake, as well as the ‘reputation’ of the university that risks falling behind in the international rankings when the number of publications dwindle. Institutions that demand such timeouts hence often encounter a deep-seated mistrust. Despite all this, the awareness is slowly ripening that the global grand challenges require solutions which cannot be provided by one discipline only. Two possible paths are opening up. Firstly, a ‘prescribed’ interdisciplinarity on measures of research funding is not the worst solution. It creates incentives for cooperation that in the disciplinary structure would not necessarily have evolved and thus harbors the potential seeds for a change of perspective. Naturally, such incentives may be ruthlessly exploited, just as the entire system may be undermined, especially since, as has been stated, the success of such a process sometimes becomes visible only decades later. Even if ‘only’ the transfer of scientific methodology stands in the foreground of such interdisciplinary co-operations, an added value is clearly visible. Brain research provides excellent examples for this. The other way open is a change management of mindsets, a reflection of the thought styles.

4 Development of new perspectives in project-related processes of disciplinary exchange The endeavor to bridge the gap between humanities and natural sciences in 1997 led to the founding of the Collegium Helveticum at ETH Zurich. Its central purpose is to serve as a forum for academic dialogue and knowledge exchange between the sciences as well as to encourage a mutual understanding between the natural and technical sciences, the humanities, and social sciences.

4.1 Setting the stage Until 2004, the core work of the Collegium Helveticum centered on a numerically small graduate program for young academics of the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich. The graduate students, who were selected for their interdisciplinary interest and for the scientific quality of their research project, spent two semesters at

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the Collegium Helveticum. During that time, they continued to be mentored by their dissertation supervisors. The multidisciplinary environment was intensified by internationally renowned guests from science, literature, and the arts, who were invited to stay at the observatory for a semester. Since 2004, the ETH Zurich and the University of Zurich have been managing the Collegium Helveticum as a joint initiative. This also marked the beginning of the institute’s present structure with five-year fellowships offered to professors of the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich who then do research on an agreed topic of interest. The Collegium is supervised by a board of trustees with members from the executive boards of its two sponsor universities and a representative of the Academy of Sciences. This setup makes it independent of internal university structures, such as faculties and departments.³⁵ The construction is based on the premise that creating a different kind of thinking space produces a catalytic effect, as people and disciplines are brought together in a unique way. This facilitates a change of perspective that may lead to new insights. This concept is not so new: ‘learned societies’ and scientific academies have been following this approach since the Enlightenment, and the emergence of the new was at least a welcome side effect. Yet the ambitions of the Collegium go beyond that. Rather than relying on new emergence to arise from a benevolent chaos, the organization of the Collegium focuses on structuring and incentives. All Fellows are appointed to the Collegium at the same time. All elected Fellows are the sole representatives of their disciplines. The selection is made strictly upon application and on the candidate’s personal inclination to cross disciplinary boundaries and engage with different concepts. Most important of all: the ability to think and act in an interdisciplinary manner crucially depends on scholars’ thorough expertise in their own discipline. The first task the Fellows are confronted with is to choose a common theme that they want to pursue in discussion and research for the following five years. The part-time organization of the fellowship is of great importance. The Fellows have an average of one day a week at the Collegium to devote to their projects. The advantage of such a set-up is, first of all, to balance the involvement of the natural sciences and humanities, social sciences and technology as much as possible. No ‘laboratory scientist’ will leave her area for a full year, unless she is planning a re-positioning of her research. This is seldom the case. However, if scientists are allowed to remain in their customary working environment, they usually highly welcome such additional freedom for reflection. Secondly, the

 See the website of Collegium Helveticum: http://www.collegium.ethz.ch/de/ueber-uns/col legium-helveticum/geschichte/ (accessed , , ).

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five-year period gives the fellows the possibility to supervise doctoral students and thus to further the new research projects for a longer time. Progress is, in turn, measured with the common performance indicator: publications. It may be objected with good reason that this structure restricts the newly gained freedom, since it depends on well-established disciplinary practices. Yet experience shows that the initial phase in which a shared topic of interest is defined already brings about a decisive change of perspective. In this phase, the new Fellows visit each other quite pragmatically in their research environments and try to understand the conceptualization of the other discipline within its respective context. With similar pragmatism, the Collegium funds research projects initiated by at least two Fellows as long as they fit into the framework of the agreed general topic. The Fellows then share their insights, their research results, and their incomprehension in monthly meetings. They also regularly attend research colloquia organized for their employees and support their interaction. The community of Fellows can choose a circle of assistant fellows and, where required, expand this circle to fill voids in competency needed to approach the selected research topics. A special feature of the program is the presence of the arts. Each fellowship period is supported by freelance artists who are sponsored by the Collegium Helveticum for one-year visiting professorships. The purpose of this setting is to encourage a change of perspective through the distinct contrast between artistic approaches of describing reality and the established procedures of the sciences, both the humanities and the natural sciences. It is important that this exchange can take place on an equal footing and that it offers the artists the same rights and obligations as the Fellows, be it only to counter the charge of abusing the arts as a mere decorative element for the sciences. A major discrepancy lies in the duration of the artists’ assignments. So far, no solution has been found for this. While some artists favor a timeframe equal to the one of the Fellows, others would feel restricted in their spontaneity of thought through such a long-time commitment. The scenario illustrates why the Collegium is referred to as the ‘laboratory for transdisciplinarity’ and makes clear why it also tries to maintain the particular character of the laboratory. It is an experiment – with the risk and right to fail.

4.2 Conflict situations Life with interdisciplinarity is not without conflict. Indeed, this is neither expected nor intended. The most interesting conclusion to be drawn from observing conflict situations in such a setting is that conflicts tend to arise more from the Fellows’ personalities, the strategic preferences of the university manage-

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ment, and the measures they take vis-à-vis the fellows, rather than from controversial content or disciplinary concepts. The basic problem lies in the position that such an interdisciplinary institute occupies within the organizational chart of a university. In the case of Collegium, the situation is more acute as it is under the authority of two universities of different organizational structures and cultures: the one established and supervised on a cantonal level, the other on a federal level. A part-time commitment automatically poses a conflict as it depends on the premise that the Fellows be temporarily relieved of administrative tasks. The Fellows may in part be (or may feel to be) unable to escape the pressure of fulfilling their main task, their disciplinary research, for one day per week. Consequently, fellows may easily ‘sacrifice’ the day at the Collegium if their disciplinary research and teaching appears to require it. This might be considered as a possible fault in the program of this structural arrangement. However, a priority setting in favor of the Collegium is not always possible since the exemption of the Fellows at the institutional, departmental, and faculty level sometimes proves to be a mere exercise on paper. At this structural level, the exemption is often regarded as an addition to the full-time professorial obligations. Thus, when it comes to changing course schedules, adjusting exam dates, or arranging more flexible doctoral and financial regulations, there are major obstacles to overcome. In these cases, the director needs to search for an appropriate solution, which in turn takes a lengthy decision-making process to be approved. University boards often set priorities in a similar way. While the existence and activities of an institution like the Collegium are welcomed, the strategic targets of the university are given precedence. This may have the consequence that, during their research stay at the Collegium, the Fellows are integrated in research areas too vital to be neglected, especially with a view to their influence on the Fellow’s academic life after the fellowship at the Collegium. For this reason, a number of institutions that offer such areas of freedom in various forms and which are typically called institutes of advanced study (IAS) have positioned themselves strictly outside of universities. They are often set up as foundations, which gives them the advantage of fundamental independence. However, it seems to me that the disadvantages of such an organization are the lack of academic links in terms of content and an imbalance between natural and human sciences. Of course, not all IASs have defined strict interdisciplinarity as their main agenda. For those that have, the aim is the academic practicing of interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity, and this, I am convinced, is best done in the form of project-based collaboration among disciplines and between disciplines and practice.

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The Fellows who come together at an institution like the Collegium are naturally shaped by their disciplinary affiliation. In the long course of their career, they have internalized, adapted, and actively formed the concepts in their field. It is not to be expected that these may be stripped off as they walk through the Collegium’s main entrance. Adherence to the disciplinary jargon marks the problem most accurately. It takes a long time to engage in the technical language of another discipline and at the same time to carefully reorganize one’s own vocabulary, providing access not only to the disciplinary grammar but (if at all possible) to the semantic nuances as well. Especially when it comes to making an argument in favor of a fellowship stretching over several years it is easier and quicker to learn a foreign language through contextual immersion than through theoretical studies. The willingness and the ability to follow one’s good intentions varies. Here age and experience play a role. A good mixture between successful, relatively young professors and the growing equanimity that usually comes with a certain seniority seems promising. The exchanges with jointly mentored doctoral students tends to create more flexibility about hard disciplinary positions than the initial confrontation in the circle of Fellows. Here one may observe the emergence of interdisciplinary negotiation zones. External studies describing the mechanism at the Collegium have shown that, whereas initially all research proposals, suggestions, and wishes depend on the main initiator, with time there is an increasing degree of self-organization.³⁶ Interdisciplinary communication thus improves. However, at a later stage of implementation, there is often a trend toward disciplinary procedures.³⁷ The ‘currency’ of publication claims its due. Interdisciplinary journals are rare. And they do not rank in the top league of citation frequency. When their academic career is at stake, doctoral students, too, will prefer to give the fruit of their labors high visibility. A return to established paths, i. e. disciplinary methods, to produce work worthy of publication seems the natural way to go. For an empirical scientist, co-authorship of a book that presents his research results is ‘worth less’ than an article in a prestigious journal. Conversely, a scholar from the humanities will typically opt for the book, as this is still the standard in the field. This dilemma is difficult to overcome. In this way, significant path dependencies, including misunderstood and misapplied quality assurance measures, manifest themselves in the universities, which should be free of them.

 Ulbrich ().  Ulbrich ().

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4.3 Positions of success The outcome of interdisciplinary exchange platforms is not easily measurable. One reason for this is the lack of predictability regarding the moment in time and the contexts in which the initiated change of perspective begins to take hold. Undoubtedly, the planning and implementation of a joint project as such are a good start, even if it is not yet possible to predict the added interdisciplinary value that needs to be achieved. Therefore, a first important parameter lies in checking whether collaborative research approaches ‘survive’ a fellowship period and whether the willingness to change perspective still persists when the Fellows return to their disciplinary environment. There are in fact positive indications for this. They manifested themselves in joint research proposals to government funding agencies up to several years after the fellowship was concluded, as well as in sabbatical leaves that are applied for after the fellowship period with a view to pursuing ideas developed there and bring them to maturity. A second parameter concerns the positioning of doctoral students. The fundamental question is whether doctoral students trained in an interdisciplinary context possess sufficient disciplinary background to qualify for jobs in industry or academia. Again, there are positive indications. In the world of business where interdisciplinary and intercultural networking become increasingly imperative in order to meet global challenges, numerous positions that entail mediating between disciplinary perspectives open up. Banks, insurance companies, consulting firms, the pharmaceutical industry, and the global creative enterprises represent potential employers. Academic positions in the natural sciences are obtained less frequently since there specialization at an early stage is the measure of all things and ‘interdisciplinary’ dissertations as well as the publication output of doctoral students often do not meet the requirements. This may also have to do with a certain type of selecting of doctoral students. Those interested in doing a PhD in an interdisciplinary context are mostly young people who do not want to pursue a traditional academic career, especially a career in the empirical sciences, which is subject to rigorous publication and disciplinary integration rituals as well as age limits. These young people tend to see their professional future as less career-oriented than interest-led. For them, a professional life in large institutions or companies is not a desirable goal. Instead, they follow a growing structural change and find interesting positions in small, often newly founded companies positioned on the borders of science and the public. Areas of activity include, for example, studies on new technologies, the implementation of public science initiatives, or internal communication strategies. More successful are applications in scientific fields that require an inherent questioning of established research methodologies. These include the sociology of science, tech-

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nology assessment, and specialized fields of the newly created research practice of the arts.

5 Conclusions on a future strategy Embracing a different perspective to expand one’s horizon should be the ideal of every scientific professional, whereas regulating the number of ‘dynastic prince points’ lies in the interests of the university management. The dynamic implementation of these objectives requires an anchoring in the strategic guidelines of academic institutions.

5.1 Compensating or eliminating structurally wrong incentives Establishing exchange platforms on which interdisciplinarity can be practiced is only a small part of what is needed for a sustainable coexistence of distributed perspectives. In the current structure of a university, the management creates incentives in accordance with economic indicators which counter this ideal. The excesses of this system may be found in reward mechanisms that allow scientists to waive teaching hours in exchange for prominently published manuscripts or to attain annual bonuses. Such models are fatal, especially for young PhD students, and may also be conducive to dishonest behavior. Above all, they encourage the fight for first authorship, a phenomenon that, particularly in the life sciences and medicine, has produced strange results.³⁸

5.1.1 Rethinking publication behavior and its assessment Interdisciplinarity requires, above all, a high level of competence in one’s own discipline combined with an ability to think far beyond this discipline. However, high competency today often manifests itself in a prolific publishing activity that is assessed according to the all too familiar quantitative methods. Combined with the immense specialization of academic journals, this produces a situation where interdisciplinary manuscripts, no matter how solid the expertise of their authors, often do not meet the expectations of peer reviewers and ‘end up’ in less prominent journals

 Folkers (b).

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with low citation rates. This starts a vicious circle. A low number of citations may lead to reduced funding, which in turn permits less freedom of research. Here it is essential to rethink the peer review system for the future. At present, this produces a conservative structure that aims to preserve disciplinary ‘purity’ rather than promote cross-disciplinary collaborations. These are, by their very nature, explorative in character and pursue more ambitious goals, admittedly with higher risk. In order to stimulate a fruitful change of perspective in science, it cannot be a solution, in the long run, to establish interdisciplinary journals for publications that are not recognized by established science. The aim must rather be an increase in editorial openness among prominent journals.

5.1.2 Scrutinizing research funding While many institutions have their doors wide open for the advancement of interdisciplinary approaches in science and research, the crux lies in the assessment system. As already stated, it is on the one hand far from easy to establish the added value of interdisciplinary projects within project periods; on the other hand, the assessment of interdisciplinary proposals proves difficult. The number of reviewers brave enough to make a written response to concepts outside their strictly defined area of expertise is constantly dwindling. Here, the effect is similar to that of the peer review system of the journals in as much as the selection of reviewers determines the audience addressed. The Society for Neuroscience seeks a way out of the dilemma as it urges all journals that contribute to publications on brain research in the broadest sense to unite into a consortium and to share reviewers. Ostensibly, this leads to a more efficient handling of manuscripts. However, it also testifies to the awareness that in a very heterogeneous and interdisciplinary field of research a wide range of disciplinary journals may produce a more adequate assessment of manuscripts submitted.³⁹ In the area of research funding, major foundations currently seem to be expanding their strategies in exploratory directions.⁴⁰

 See nprc – Neuroscience Peer Review Consortium: http://nprc.incf.org/ (, , ).  An interesting example that is worth imitating: http://www.volkswagenstiftung.de/foerderung/herausforderung/experiment.html (accessed , , ).

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5.2 Evaluating demarchy approaches Demarchy offers a radical approach to enabling a change of perspective. Originally a concept from the political structures of ancient Greece and later the Venetian Republic, this form of alternating responsibility is now being discussed again in the area of management.⁴¹ The random selection of supervisory committees and senior management positions, experts and policy makers has decisive advantages. It avoids excessive political correctness as well as nepotism as long as there is access to a group of competent and committed people. The willingness to submit to the lottery requires not only the ability to fill a position; above all, the position must be earned. This requires both an awareness of the particular perspective assumed by the organization as well as bringing in one’s own perspective and making possible contradictions fruitful. A considerable advantage of random choice lies in the simpler legitimacy of a change in perspective: […] random selection procedures are likely to be accepted more readily in cultures that emphasize equality of opportunities. Where cultural beliefs associate random selection with irrationality, it may be helpful to emphasize the instrumental benefits of random selection procedures, especially when compared to representative voting.⁴²

5.3 Listening internally Perspectives that differ from the one inherent to the system are often filtered out through vertical lines of communication. It is therefore necessary to organize exchange platforms at all levels that sense other perspectives as early as possible, register them as potentially fruitful, and measure them against externally initiated perspective changes.

5.4 Promoting careers Places that allow and encourage disseminated perspectives often find themselves confronted with the fact that young interdisciplinary researchers run into a one-way street. Their insufficient specialization places them at a disadvantage when it comes to obtaining professorships. In the last few decades, the academic mid-level faculties have fallen victim to downsizing. Many posi Zeitoun/Osterloh/Frey ().  Zeitoun/Osterloh/Frey (),.

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tions are only occupied temporarily. Yet it is precisely academic mid-level faculty, who would have to deal with the academic supervision to a great extent, which would offer time and space to allow for a change of perspective. In the life sciences and medicine, with their paradigmatically interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary modern orientation,⁴³ members of the mid-level faculty constitute an important link between the disciplines. But their broad promotion hardly considers the necessary definition of interfaces between disciplines or of staffing institutions with scientists who are trained in viewing projects from different perspectives and have access to the relevant networks. Re-positioning is not only a valuable economic tool in drug development, but it may serve as a metaphor for a desirable renewal of a scientific culture, whose modern structures, much like those of large companies, are too much focused on efficiency in the market. Owing to hard allocation struggles and the resulting pressures to innovate, in many cases such companies have recognized the sign of the times. It is now up to the universities to stop playing the most conservative link in the chain, to disengage economization so as to reintroduce risks through multiple perspectives. This will allow for surprises, the real ‘spark’ of science. Translated form German by Dr. Ladina Bezzola

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 Programmatic projects such as from bench to bedside or translational medicine dwell on the trans- and interdisciplinary links between the natural sciences, medicine and social sciences.

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Horst Nowacki

Verteiltes Arbeiten und Standardisierung in den Ingenieuranwendungen Abstract: Distributed Working and Standardization in Its Application to Engineering. The task of distributed working in a technical context is, in the information age, still in a state of transition from classical information carriers of product and process descriptions to modern, digitally communicable media of representation and methods of design, production, and operation. This also requires a new, comprehensive and reliable standardization of all describing and documenting technical contents. The article illustrates the requirements of this standardization process, the solutions achieved so far, and mentions important side effects of this change as well as future goals. It discusses the state of application using the examples of several technical application areas.

1 Einleitung Arbeitsteilung mit verteilten Aufgaben und Rollen ist in den technischen Anwendungen fast ausnahmslos die Regel. Denn selten sind der Entwickler, der Hersteller und der Nutzer eines technischen Produkts identisch und am gleichen Standort tätig. Die Arbeitsteilung dient der Effektivität des Arbeitsablaufs, der Qualität und der Sicherheit des Produkts sowie der Gewährleistung und technischen Betreuung von Produkten und Prozessen über deren gesamte Lebensdauer. Eine solche Arbeitsteilung herrscht auch in kleinen, einfachen Anwendungen vor; bei komplexen, industriell organisierten Produktionen und Dienstleistungen ist sie unabdingbar. Arbeitsteilung erfordert Kommunikation zwischen den beteiligten Partnern. Die Kommunikation übermittelt Informationen mit produkt- und prozessbeschreibenden Daten sowie Kommentaren dazu. Der Inhalt der Kommunikation soll eindeutig interpretierbar sein. Die Bedeutung der übermittelten Nachrichten soll beim Empfänger genauso verstanden werden wie vom Absender beabsichtigt. Dafür sind Vereinbarungen notwendig, die möglichst für einen weiten Anwenderkreis und über lange Zeit gelten. Solche Vereinbarungen sind der Gegenstand nationaler und internationaler Standardisierung. Ein zuverlässiges, verteiltes Arbeiten ist also ohne Standardisierung der Kommunikationsmittel und -methoden nicht realisierbar.

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Die Kommunikation und Standardisierung sollen alle austauschbaren und relevanten Daten umfassen. Dazu gehören für alle Teilaufgaben der Produktentwicklung, Produktherstellung und -nutzung zumindest diejenigen Informationen, die entscheidungsrelevant, qualitäts- und sicherheitsrelevant sowie vertrags- und gewährleistungsrelevant sind. Dieser Umfang von Informationen hat sich in den einzelnen Branchen über lange Zeiträume eingespielt. Die Standards sind also insofern anwendungsabhängig, sollen jedoch kompatibel zu einer möglichst allgemeingültigen Methodik der Informationsdarstellung sein. Traditionell bildeten über viele Jahrhunderte Zeichnungen, d. h. grafische Darstellungen mit textuellen Kommentaren, das vorherrschende Medium für die Kommunikation von Produkt- und Prozessdaten. Für diese Darstellungsform gab es und gibt es weiterhin einschlägige Standards. Technische Objekte in Zeichnungsdarstellung können auch heute nach zeichnungsorientierten Standards digitalisiert und übertragen werden. Aber diese Darstellung ist primär lückenhaft und kann auch mit viel Rekonstruktionsaufwand nicht immer eindeutig in vollständige, dreidimensionale Produktbeschreibungen konvertiert werden. Daher ist vor allem eine maschinelle Interpretation und automatische Weiterverarbeitung von zeichnungsbasierten Produktdarstellungen nur eingeschränkt möglich. Im Informationszeitalter geht grundsätzlich der Trend also dahin, von vornherein dreidimensionale, möglichst vollständige Produktinformation zu erstellen, die für beliebige, nicht immer vorhersehbare Zwecke digital weiterverarbeitet werden kann. Auch das setzt eine entsprechend vollständige, digital basierte Standardisierung voraus. Die Anforderungen an diese neue, digital standardisierte Produktdarstellung gehen weit über die traditionellen Normen des Zeichnungswesens hinaus und die Standards hierfür waren im Wesentlichen neu zu schaffen. So ist der Umbruch vom Medium Zeichnung, d. h. von der grafischen Darstellung, zum Medium Computer, d. h. zur digitalen Darstellung, die Ursache für eine seit langem andauernde, noch fortschreitende Welle neuer Standardisierung. Der Übergang von zeichnerisch-grafischen zu digitalen Darstellungen technischer Objekte, ggf. mit zusätzlichen grafischen Dokumenten, ist weit fortgeschritten, aber noch nicht abgeschlossen. Der vorliegende Artikel berichtet von der neuen Aufgabenstellung, dem erreichten Stand, von Schwierigkeiten und offenen Fragen. Er soll einen allgemeinen Überblick über die Herangehensweise an die Standardisierung der Kommunikation über technische Gegenstände geben, wie sie im Informationszeitalter zur Unterstützung verteilter Arbeits- und Betriebsabläufe notwendig geworden ist. Beispiele werden, wo erforderlich, überwiegend aus Anwendungen der Schiffstechnik zitiert, mit denen der Verfasser am besten vertraut ist. In diesem überschaubaren Bereich lassen sich allgemeine Trends recht klar erkennen und leicht extrahieren.

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2 Der neutrale Kommunikationsprozess Der Kommunikationsprozess dient in der Technik dem Austausch von Informationen, die ein Produkt oder eine Dienstleistung beschreiben, sowie über die Prozesse, die seine Entwicklung, Herstellung und seinen Betrieb begleiten. Modellhaft kann man die digitale Kommunikation zwischen zwei Partnern nach Abb. 1 beschreiben:

Abb. 1: Der neutrale, digitale Kommunikationsprozess

Ein Absender will einem Empfänger eine technische Mitteilung senden. Beide benutzen, wie wir voraussetzen, lokale Computersysteme, in denen die Produktdarstellung in lokaler Darstellung verschlüsselt vorliegt bzw. aufgebaut werden soll. Diese Darstellung entspricht den lokal verwendeten Produktmodelliersystemen. Diese Systeme und ihre Produktmodelldarstellungen sind beim Absender und beim Empfänger gewöhnlich nicht identisch, sondern heterogen. Daher muss ein allgemeingültiger Standard für die neutrale Datenübertragung in jedem Falle die Übertragung zwischen Systemen mit heterogenen Darstellungen bewältigen. Das geschieht am effektivsten über eine „neutrale“, d. h. standardisierte, Zwischendarstellung der Produkt- bzw. Prozessinformationen (Abb. 1). Dabei wird die Darstellung zweimal konvertiert, erstens vom Preprozessor des Absenders, einem Softwaresystem, in die Standarddarstellung, zweitens im Postprozessor des Empfängers vom neutralen Modell in dessen lokale Darstellung. Pre- und Postprozessoren müssen für jedes sendende und für jedes empfangende System gesondert entwickelt werden. Der Funktionsumfang und die Begriffswelten der heterogenen, lokalen Systeme, die sich ja getrennt und unabhängig voneinander entwickelt haben, sind gewöhnlich markant unterschiedlich, selbst wenn sie gleichartige Objekte beschreiben. Der Standard soll möglichst eine umfassende Klasse aller jetzt und in Zukunft auftretenden Begriffe umfassen, in denen die lokalen Begriffswelten äquivalent enthalten sind. Dann können die Darstellungen in den Pre- und Postprozessoren bis auf numerische Ungenauigkeiten im Prinzip ohne Informationsverlust umgewandelt werden. Hat das Absendersystem höhere Begriffe, als der neutrale Standard unterstützt, müssen diese im Preprozessor durch verfügbare Konstrukte approximiert

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werden. Bietet das Empfängersystem Begriffe, welche der Absender nicht senden kann oder welche der Standard nicht voll unterstützt, so muss der Postprozessor bei Bedarf fehlende Attribute rekonstruieren bzw. per Default setzen. Das Grundproblem der verlustfreien Kommunikation zwischen Systemen unterschiedlichen Leistungs- und Begriffsumfangs kann also durch eine Standardschnittstelle allein nicht gelöst werden. Aber es wird in der Praxis der Standardisierung dadurch gemildert, dass man mehrere Leistungsklassen (conformance classes) der Systeme für die Standardschnittstelle bildet, die jeweils nur Teilmengen der Standard-Begriffe umfassen, so dass sich die Partner auf eine Leistungsklasse verständigen können, die beide beherrschen, und so dass nicht jeder den vollen Umfang des Standards implementieren muss. Der Informationsaustausch erfolgt bisher noch meist statisch, d. h. über den relativ sicheren Weg des File Transfer, tendiert in Zukunft aber außerdem auch zum dynamischen Zugriff über Rechnernetze. Diese Darstellung beschreibt bisher die bilaterale Kommunikation zwischen Partnern mit heterogenen lokalen Systemen. Nach dem gleichen Schema kann aber auch der multilaterale Informationsaustausch mit allen Partnern erfolgen, die z. B. in einem Netz miteinander verbunden sind und jeweils passende Pre- und Postprozessoren besitzen. Damit lässt sich solcher Austausch weltweit praktisch ohne Abhängigkeit vom Standort und von der Übertragungszeit organisieren. Hochleistungsnetze, ggf. mit Massenspeicherausstattung, sind dafür prädestiniert.

3 Umfang der Informationsmodelle Mit dem Inhalt technischer Informationsmodelle beschäftigt sich die Produktdatentechnik (PDT). In Anlehnung an das EU-Projekt PDTAG-AM (ESPRIT 9049) kann man den Umfang der Produktdatentechnik wie folgt definieren: „PDT umfasst die technische und wissenschaftliche Methodik der Produkt- und Prozessbeschreibung für alle Aspekte im Lebenszyklus des Produkts. PDT liefert damit eine einheitliche Perspektive für die gesamte Informationsverarbeitung des Produkts einschließlich seiner Konzeption, modellhaften Beschreibung, Verarbeitung, Speicherung und Archivierung, für den Austausch und für das Management von Produkt- und Prozessinformation“.¹ Die Produktbeschreibung enthält eine statische Sicht auf alle Eigenschaften, wie sie zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt in der Lebensdauer bei der Entwicklung und Nutzung des Produkts bestehen. Die Prozessbeschreibung besteht aus einer

 Owen/Nowacki (),  (Executive Summary).

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dynamischen Sicht der Zustände des technischen Objekts, wie sie unter dem Einfluss von Veränderungen durch Ereignisse sich zeitlich entwickeln. Eine zunehmende Bedeutung gewinnt die Forderung nach einer informationstechnischen Begleitung des Produkts über seine gesamte Lebensdauer, ausgedrückt in dem Begriff Product Lifecycle Management (PLM). Dadurch, dass das Produktmodell stetig über alle Phasen des Lebenszyklus fortgeschrieben wird, jedenfalls in seinen relevanten Eigenschaften, entsteht eine neue konsistente Basis für alle Servicedienstleistungen nach seiner Auslieferung wie Inspektion, Wartung und Reparaturen, Betriebssteuerung und Sicherheitsüberwachung, Optimierung der Betriebsabläufe etc. Die Standardisierung solcher dynamischen Produktmodelle für den Lebenszyklus steckt jedoch noch in den Kinderschuhen, auch wenn es bereits einzelne Anwendungen gibt. Informationsmodelle für die Produktdatentechnik sollen dementsprechend den vollständigen Bereich der Produkt- und Prozessbeschreibung über den gesamten Lebenslauf des Produkts umfassen. Abb. 2 zeigt diesen Umfang und die darin enthaltenen Schritte der Produktbeschreibung an einem für viele Produkte typischen Ablauf. Die Schritte folgen aufeinander, auch wenn es Fälle einzelner überlappender Aktivitäten geben mag, und jeder Schritt reichert den Inhalt des Produktmodells um seinen Beitrag an. Prozessinformation ist in diesem Bild latent enthalten, sowohl in den methodischen Schritten innerhalb jeder Phase als auch in der Definition derjenigen zeitabhängigen Merkmale, denen das Produkt im Laufe seiner Entwicklung und seines Betriebs unterliegt. Das Zusammenwirken von Produkt- und Prozessdaten im Lebenszyklus des technischen Objekts wird in Abb. 3 am Beispiel des Produkts „Schiff“ illustriert. Das Bild zeigt, dass bestimmte kreative, „synthetische“ Arbeitsprozesse Entscheidungen bewirken, die zu Festlegungen von Daten im Produktmodell führen, sei es zunächst provisorisch, sei es später endgültig. Das Produktmodell gliedert sich nach den thematischen Gruppen der Schiffsbeschreibung in Merkmalbereiche mit verwandten Daten. Auf jeder Ebene der Entwicklung und des Betriebs werden die kreierten Produktdaten durch Analyseprozesse auf Zulässigkeit und Zweckmäßigkeit geprüft und bei Bedarf korrigiert. So entsteht nach mehrmaligem Durchlaufen einzelner Entwicklungsschritte allmählich ein immer vollständiger werdendes Produktmodell, das sich „vom Groben zum Feinen“ fortentwickelt. Das Produktmodell wird fortlaufend aktualisiert und vervollständigt. Die Reihenfolge entspricht der gängigen Entwurfs-, Fertigungs- und Betriebspraxis. Es versteht sich, dass das Diagramm in Abb. 3 keine chronologische Reihenfolge vorgeben soll, sondern dass die Reihenfolge an sich beliebig ist und nur durch die Zweckmäßigkeit effektiven Arbeitens und die Verfügbarkeit von Vorgängerergebnissen bestimmt wird, wofür provisorische Daten ausreichen. So lässt sich durch Parallelisierung von Arbeitsgängen (concurrent engineering) eine bedeutende

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Abb. 2: Phasen der Informationsentstehung im Lebenslauf des Produkts

Zeitraffung erzielen, die bei den kurzen Entwicklungszeiten im Schiffbau (Motto: One week ship design) auch ein wichtiger Konkurrenzvorteil sein kann. Voraussetzung dafür ist, dass die einstweiligen Ergebnisse des Entwicklungsvorgangs im Produktmodell den übrigen Beteiligten zur Verfügung stehen. Die endgültigen Ergebnisse des abgeschlossenen Prozesses unterliegen dann der Prüfung durch Klassifikations- und Sicherheitsinstitutionen sowie durch die Bauaufsicht. Die Vorgänge im Betriebsablauf des abgelieferten Schiffes lassen sich noch wesentlich untergliedern und verfeinern. Abb. 3 soll hier nur besagen, dass der Reeder im Schiffsbetrieb grundsätzlich auf eine wichtige Teilmenge des Produktdatenmo-

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Abb. 3: Gliederung der Daten des Produktmodells und der methodischen Prozesse für das Produkt „Schiff“. Quelle: Nowacki (1988), 345.

dells des Herstellers, z. B. für Wartung und Reparaturen, zurückgreifen kann, wenn ihm diese zur Verfügung gestellt werden. Dazu mehr in Abschnitt 6. In anderen Branchen gelten oft analoge, ziemlich ähnliche Verfahren und Produktmodellbildungen, z. B. in den verwandten Disziplinen der Landfahrzeugund Luftfahrzeugtechnik.

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4 Anforderungen an die Standardisierungsaufgabe Die digitale Produktdatentechnik stellt nach Umfang, Inhalt und Struktur ihres Informationsmodells neue, höhere Anforderungen an ihre Produktbeschreibungen, als die bisherigen Standards technischer Zeichnungen hergeben. Sie erfordert einen eigenen Beschreibungsansatz mit eigenen Konventionen und Standards. Die neue Methodik muss daher begrifflich solide fundiert, formal möglichst streng formuliert, praktisch erprobt und international standardisiert werden. Die neuen Standards der Produktbeschreibung in Informationsmodellen sollen grundsätzlich folgende Anforderungen erfüllen: – Gültigkeit für den vollen Lebenszyklus – Vollständigkeit durch Erfassung aller Attribute eines Produkts – Voll digitale, d. h. nicht-grafische, Darstellung des Produkts – Erstreckung auf alle Produkttypen und Industrie-Sektoren – Offenheit für alle Kommunikations- und Speichermedien – Verabschiedete, internationale Standards mit Erweiterungsmöglichkeit – Koexistenz mit anderen Standards Die Erfüllung dieser Anforderungen in der Standardisierung von Produkt- und Prozess-Informationsmodellen schreitet allmählich voran, wenn auch nur langsam, da die Entwicklung internationaler Konventionen zu so umfangreichen Themen notwendig ein sehr zeitaufwendiger Vorgang ist. Die Entwicklung des anspruchsvollen Standards der Produktdatentechnik ISO 10303, bekannt unter dem Namen STEP („Standard for the Exchange of Product Definition Data“) begann mit einer Initiative von ISO TC 184/SC 4 in Washington im Juli 1984. Die Standardisierungsaufgabe hat inzwischen zu wichtigen Teilergebnissen geführt, und Teile des ISO-Standards sind verabschiedet, implementiert und im Einsatz. Über STEP und seinen Status wird in Abschnitt 5 berichtet. Aber das Programm dieser Standardisierungsaufgabe ist noch keineswegs vollständig abgeschlossen. Dennoch können die Anforderungen an STEP hier exemplarisch für die Ansprüche an die Produktbeschreibung in modernen Standards stehen. Die Produktbeschreibungen in STEP sollen mindestens die folgenden Eigenschaften besitzen: – Eindeutigkeit – Vollständigkeit (im deklarierten Wissensbereich) – Computerinterpretierbarkeit (ohne Semantikverlust) – Kommunizierbarkeit (Übertragung ohne Semantikverlust) – Langfristige Gültigkeit (durch Standards) – Sprachunabhängigkeit – Wiederverwendbarkeit (in beliebigem Kontext)

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Zulässigkeit von Mehrfachsichten auf die Produktinformation

Die formale Strenge und damit Nachprüfbarkeit stellt darüber hinaus folgende Ansprüche: – Ein geordnetes methodisches Vorgehen der Modellbildung – Eine übersichtliche Begriffswelt mit elementaren Grundbegriffen (axiomatisches Framework) – Eine semantische Verankerung der Begriffe des Wissensgebietes (ontological commitment) – Semantische Treue (Nähe zur Wirklichkeit) – Logische Widerspruchsfreiheit Zu den Anwendungsgebieten von Produktmodellen zählen u. a.: – Verteilte Produktentwicklung (team work) – Verteilte industrielle Fertigung – Kommunikation Hersteller/Zulieferer (supply chain) – Kommunikation Hersteller/Vertrieb/Kunde (distribution chain) – Lebenszyklus-Dienstleistungen (z. B. Produktwartung und -reparatur) – Soll-/Ist-Vergleich (Qualitätssicherung) – Zustandsüberwachung (Sicherheitstechnik) Die Entwicklung und Einführung digitaler Produktbeschreibungen verursachen erheblichen Aufwand bei vielen Beteiligten. Der angestrebte ökonomische Nutzen, der dem gegenübersteht, soll sich u. a. aus folgenden Elementen ergeben: – Schnelle, zuverlässige Erstellung, Verarbeitung, Speicherung und Kommunikation von Produktinformation in Informationssystemen – Spontaner Zugriff auf Produktinformation unabhängig von Ort und Zeit – Flexible Unterstützung neuer Partnerschaften (virtual enterprise) – Erweiterung des Potentials für Firmenkooperationen und Aufgabenteilungen – Trennbarkeit von firmeninternem und öffentlichem Produktwissen – Einstieg in die Entwicklung von Produktwissensbasen Viele dieser geforderten Eigenschaften und Funktionen sind in der Standardisierung noch im Entstehen. Dennoch werden die damit ausgesprochenen langfristigen Ziele bereits intensiv verfolgt und in aktuellen Systemen berücksichtigt. Es gibt zu dem allmählichen Übergang auf voll digitale, standardisierte Produktbeschreibungen auch keine praktischen Alternativen. Den Stand der verfügbaren und sich entwickelnden Lösungen beschreibt der nächste Abschnitt.

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5 Stand der Lösungen 5.1 Geschichte Die ersten Bemühungen um Konventionen für den Austausch von Produktmodelldaten zwischen heterogenen Systemen waren im Umfang beschränkt, vor allem auf geometrische Modelle, und beruhten auf nationalen Standards wie z. B. IGES (USA), SET (Frankreich) und VDAFS (Deutschland) mit syntaktischen Beschreibungen von Schnittstellen. Manche dieser Standards sind in ihrem beschränkten Umfang noch im Einsatz, andere laufen aus. Die Erkenntnis der Grenzen dieser Vorläufergeneration führte 1984 zur STEP-Initiative.² Anfangs von 1984 bis etwa 1990 war das primäre Ziel der Entwicklung des ISOStandards ISO 10303 (STEP: Standard for the Exchange of Product Definition Data) der Datenaustausch zwischen heterogenen PDT-Systemen über ein Physisches Dateiformat (physical file data transfer), das auf einer standardisierten und damit systemunabhängigen externen Darstellung von Produktdaten beruhte. Die Entwicklung resultierte im Dezember 1994 in der Verabschiedung des Initial Release³, d. h. von den ersten 12 Teilen von STEP. Datenaustausch mit Hilfe von Physical File-Formaten von STEP ist inzwischen weit verbreitet. Zwischen 1990 und ca. 1995 verlagerte sich die Priorität in der STEP-Entwicklung auf den dynamischen Datenzugriff zwischen Systemen zur Laufzeit und auf die System-Integration durch Kopplung heterogener Systeme über STEPSchnittstellen wie SDAI (Standard Data Access Interface). Diese Funktion dient der Prozessketten-Integration über Systemgrenzen hinaus. Spätestens seit 1995 und bis heute hat sich die allgemeine Zielsetzung weiterentwickelt und soll die weltweite, effektive Kommunikation von Produktdaten über Netzwerkmedien umfassen, um moderne Kommunikation auch über Unternehmensgrenzen hinaus und damit innerhalb von ad hoc gegründeten Virtuellen Unternehmen zu ermöglichen. Somit haben sich die Inhalte der Produktdatentechnik über die letzten Jahrzehnte auch in STEP evolutionär erweitert, während die Anwendungsszenarien stark zugenommen haben.

 Vgl. Owen ().  ISO IS  ().

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5.2 Definitions-Methodik Das Produktmodell wird im Zusammenhang von STEP als ein logisches Schema durch die Definition von Entitäten (entities) mit ihren Attributen (attributes), Beziehungen (relations) und Nebenbedingungen (constraints) aufgebaut. Eine Entität für einen Begriff wird deklariert durch Angabe ihrer Attribute, Beziehungen und Nebenbedingungen, z. B. für Gültigkeitsbereiche. Insoweit folgt die Produktmodellbildung der aus der Datenbanktechnik bekannten Entity-AttributeRelationship-Methode (EAR method). Jede Entität enthält Deklarationen für ihre Attribute, welche durch Verweis auf einen Basisdatentyp (wie integer, real, usw.) oder auf eine andere, im Modell definierte Entität beschrieben werden. So lassen sich Pools von Begriffen als Entitäten aufbauen. Jede Entität kann dabei auf andere Entitäten verweisen und funktionale Abhängigkeiten durch Relationen berücksichtigen. Nebenbedingungen dienen der Gültigkeitsprüfung von Daten des instanziierten Modells. Darüber hinaus können Entitäten als supertype/subtype-Relation verknüpft werden. Das stellt eine Beziehung zwischen Oberbegriff und Unterbegriff her, so dass der subtype alle Merkmale des supertypes erbt. So entstehen Begriffshierarchien, aber auch -netze, welche das Modell noch aufgliedern und modular zerlegen lasen. Auf jeder Begriffsebene enthalten Entitäten dann nur ihre eigenen Pflichtattribute und verweisen ggf. auf andere Entitäten. Für Produktmodelle sind aber häufig mehrere Sichten auf den Datenbestand erforderlich, z. B. für verschiedene Berechnungen. Diese ergeben sich bei Bedarf aus mehreren Einstiegs-supertypes mit verschiedenen Vererbungspfaden, da ein subtype mehrere supertypes besitzen darf. Die Unterstützung solcher Mehrfachvererbungen ist also Voraussetzung für die selektive Mehrfachverwendung von Produktmodellinhalten. Damit gilt als Ansatz der Datenbanktechnik für nichthierarchische Modelle das logische Paradigma⁴ (Abb. 4). An der Basis von so gebildeten Begriffsketten stehen Definitionen entweder durch vorgegebene Basis-Datentypen (base types), z. B. für Zahlen, oder durch axiomatisch vorgegebene Begriffe aus einem vereinbarten Pool von Entitäten (Modellier-Ressourcen), die als Grundbausteine des Modells dienen sollen (siehe Abschnitt 5.4). Solche axiomatischen Vereinbarungen von Basis-Entitäten sind notwendig, um das bekannte Dilemma von Kreisdefinitionen zu vermeiden (bzw. den infinite regress). Die Aufgabe der Produktmodellierung reduziert sich damit auf die Ab-

 Nowacki ().

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Abb. 4: Mehrfachklassifikation: Die Entität X gehört zu den Mengen A und B und gleichzeitig zu β, aber nicht zu α.

bildung aller höheren produktbeschreibenden Begriffe (Entitäten) auf Basisbegriffe (base type and resource entities).

5.3 EXPRESS Der ISO-Standard STEP verwendet als Deklarationssprache für Produktmodelle die textuelle Beschreibungssprache EXPRESS, die als Part 11 von ISO 10303 standardisiert ist.⁵ Es gibt auch eine grafische Fassung der Sprache in EXPRESS-G, die jedoch den Funktionsumfang von EXPRESS nicht vollständig abdeckt. In EXPRESS wird das Gedankenmodell einer Produktbeschreibung deklariert, dagegen nicht seine Instanziierung. EXPRESS umfasst im Wesentlichen folgende Konstrukte: – Schema (für ein Themengebiet) – Type (für vor- und selbstdefinierte Datentypen) – Entity (mit Attributen, Relationen und Bedingungen) – Rule, function, procedure (nur zur Angabe von Bedingungen (constraints) des Modells). EXPRESS unterstützt den Mechanismus der supertype/subtype-Bildung und erlaubt damit den Aufbau von Vererbungsstrukturen. Mehrfach-Vererbungspfade sind zulässig. In EXPRESS erben Entitäten die Attribute und Bedingungen (constraints) ihrer

 Vgl. ISO IS  –  ().

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supertpye-Oberbegriffe. Subtypes können disjunkte oder nicht disjunkte Unterbegriffe definieren. Zu weiteren Einzelheiten sei auf die Literatur verwiesen.⁶ Im Fazit ist EXPRESS i.W. äquivalent zur Sichtweise des logischen Paradigmas. Es wird mitunter auch als „objektorientierte Deklarationssprache“ bezeichnet, trifft jedoch keine besonderen Vorkehrungen zur Handhabung zeitabhängiger Objekte. Abb. 5 illustriert an einem Beispiel „Rechteck“ die Beschreibung eines geometrischen Objekts in EXPRESS und in EXPRESS-G. Das EXPRESS-Schema Geometry enthält die Entity-Definitionen für Rectangle, Line und Point. Rectangle verweist auf Line, und Line verweist auf Point. In Point stehen die beiden Koordinaten x und y, die vom Base Type real sind. Beim Instanziieren des Schemas, z. B. für die Übertragung von Rechteckdaten im Physical File-Format, also als Datei, sieht das System vier Eckpunkte und vier Berandungs-Linien von eigener Identität vor und sorgt dafür, dass die Linien die richtigen Punkte als Anfangs- und Endpunkte erhalten. Jede Entity enthält nur die eigenen Pflichtattribute. Die Syntax des EXPRESS-Schemas ist wohl fast ‚selbsterklärend‘.

5.4 Der Standard STEP Der internationale Standard ISO 10303 (STEP) ist seit 1984 in fortlaufender, intensiver Entwicklung. Nach dem Initial Release⁷ von 1994 mit den ersten 12 STEPParts, der die wesentlichen Grundlagen enthielt, sind viele weitere Teile (Parts) von STEP verabschiedet worden. Ziel des Vorhabens ist die Entwicklung eines internationalen Standards für Produkt- und Prozessbeschreibungen (Produktdatenmodelle) für einen möglichst vollständigen Bereich von technischen Disziplinen für Produktinformationen im gesamten Lebenszyklus des Produkts. Der Standard STEP ist das umfangreichste, weit in die Zukunft zielende Standardisierungsvorhaben auf diesem Gebiet. Die Entwicklungen sind noch nicht abgeschlossen, auch liegen umfangreichere Erfahrungen mit Implementierungen von STEP bisher nur für einige wichtige Anwendungsbereiche vor, wo sich der Standard auch praktisch bewährt hat. Einen guten Überblick über den gesamten Funktionsumfang von STEP gibt das STEP Application Handbook, Version 3 aus 2006 von SCRA.⁸ Den aktuellen Stand der STEP Parts von 2013 findet man auch schon in Wikipedia⁹ (Anhang I). Hier beschreiben wir nur die Grundstrukturen.    

Vgl. Owen (), Schenck/Wilson (), ISO  –  (). Vgl. ISO  (). STEP Application Handbook ISO . Vgl. Liste der STEP-Teile (ISO ).

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Abb. 5: Beschreibung eines Rechtecks (oben) durch ein EXPRESS-G-Diagramm (Mitte) und durch ein EXPRESS-Schema (unten)

Die STEP-Entwicklung, die natürlich in erster Linie auf dem Einsatz der Informationstechnik in allen Anwendungen beruht, wird u. a. von folgenden Industriezweigen mitgetragen und eingesetzt: – Bauwesen und Architektur – Elektrotechnik, Elektronik – Fahrzeugtechnik – Luft- und Raumfahrt – Maschinenbau – Möbelindustrie – Robotik – Schiffs- und Meerestechnik – Verfahrenstechnik, Anlagenbau Der STEP-Standard gliedert sich in thematisch spezialisierte Teile, die STEP Parts, deren Inhalte, die Produktmodelle und Modelliermethoden, meist in EXPRESS

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APPLICATION PROTOCOLS Configuration Controlled Design 203

Mechanical Design Using Surfaces 205

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INTEGRATED RESOURCES

General Concepts 31

Explicit Draughting 201

APPLICATION RESOURCES

DESCRIPTION METHODS

Kinematics 105

GENERIC RESOURCES Geometric and Topological Representation 42

Representation Structures 43

Product Structure Configuration 44

Materials 45

Visual Presentation 46

Shape Tolerances 47

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CONFORMANCE TESTING

Finite Element Analysis 104

Draughting 101

EXPRESS 11

Fundamentals of Product Description and Support 41 IMPLEMENTATION METHODS Clear Text Encoding 21

Standard Data Access Interface 22

Language Bindings 23–25

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Abb. 6: Teilestruktur des Standards STEP (unvollständig), schematisch nach Gruppen Quelle: STEP Application Handbook ISO 10303

beschriebene Schemata sind. Die Hauptgruppen des modular organisierten Gefüges sind (Abb. 6): – Beschreibungsmethoden (z. B. EXPRESS, EXPRESS-G), Parts 11– 19 – Implementierungsmethoden (z. B. für den Dateiaustausch oder im direkten Zugriff), Parts 20 – 29 – Konformitätstests (für die einzelnen Softwarelösungen), Parts 30 – 39

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Generische Ressourcen (anwendungsunabhängige, integrierbare Produktmodelle (z. B. für Geometrie, Topologie, Material, Produktstruktur etc.), Parts 41– 61 Anwendungs-Ressourcen (Produktmodelle mit anwendungsnahen Hilfsbegriffen), Parts 101– 199 Anwendungsprotokolle: APs (Produktmodelle für Anwendungsthemen), Parts 201– 299 Anwendungs-Referenzmodell (ARM): Aus Anwendersicht beschriebenes Produktmodell in Anwenderbegriffen. Teil eines AP: Anwendungsinterpretierte Modelle: AIMs, in EXPRESS-Beschreibung durch Begriffe aus den Ressourcen-Modellen und durch AICs interpretierte Produktmodelle des AP. Sind im AP ohne eigene Numerierung enthalten. Anwendungsintegrierte Konstrukte: AICs (aggregierte Hilfsmodelle von Produktmodell-Attributen, die in mehreren APs auftreten und wiederverwendet werden sollen, in EXPRESS-Darstellung).

Bei der Entwicklung von Produktmodellen für ein Anwendungsprotokoll (AP) in STEP ist ein zweistufiges Vorgehen kennzeichnend, um eine unabhängige und redundanzfreie Arbeitsteilung zwischen Anwendungs- und GrundlagenbegriffsEntwicklern zu ermöglichen. Erstens werden auf der Ebene von Hilfsbegriffen (Ressourcen) sogenannte generische und anwendungsnahe Begriffsschemata als STEP-Teile zur Verfügung gestellt (generic and application resources), die in den Anwendungskontext integrierbar, aber auch wiederverwendbar sind. Zweitens werden ‚unabhängig davon‘ aus der Sicht des Anwenders anwendungsspezifische Produktmodelle in Anwendungsbegriffen, die sog. Application Reference Models (ARMs), definiert, welche die Begriffe eines Anwendungsbereichs umfassen. Das AP enthält dann auch eine Mapping Specification (MS), d. h. eine Vorschrift, wie die Begriffe des ARM auf die verfügbaren Hilfsbegriffe der Ressourcen sowie der AICs abbildbar sind. Aus der Interpretation des ARM durch die Ressourcenbegriffe entsteht dann ein formal in EXPRESS beschreibbares, anwendungsinterpretiertes Modell, das AIM. Ein Beispiel für diesen Vorgang zeigt Abb. 7 für die Modellierung der Wasserlinie (WL) eines Schiffes. Die WL wird aus Ressourcenbegriffen interpretiert als eine ebene Kurve für einen bestimmten Tiefgang (Entfernung vom Kiel) und eine bestimmte Schwimmlage (Trimmwinkel) des Schiffes. Die WL ist als solche Kurve mit STEPRessourcenbegriffen und zusätzlichen Attributen für Entfernung und Trimmwinkel interpretierbar. Generell geschieht die Interpretation durch Hinzufügen von Attributen und Bedingungen sowie durch Zusammenfügen von Entitäten. Inzwischen erlaubt STEP die Aufteilung eines AP in mehrere disjunkte Anwendungsmoduln (AM). Dann besitzt jeder Modul seine eigene Abbildungsspe-

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zifikation (MS) und anstelle des AIM sein eigenes modulinterpretiertes Modell (MIM): Eine solche Aufteilung ist z. B. nützlich, wenn Konformitätsklassen (CC) vereinbart werden, so dass die Implementierung nur eine Teilmenge des AP unterstützen muss. AP Usage Scenario Class

UoF

ARM WL

PUoF 1:n Root Schemas or Entities

Curve AIM B-Spline AIC

Base Type

Leaf Schemas or Entities

Conformance Class

Abbreviations: AIC: Application Interpreted Construct UOF: Unit of Functionality PUOF: Primitive Unit of Functionality WL: Waterline Abb. 7: Aufbau eines Anwendungsprotokolls (AP) aus Anwendungs-Referenzmodell (ARM) und anwendungsinterpretiertem Modell (AIM)

Der Stand der Standardisierung von Produktmodellen kann summarisch anhand der Liste der von der ISO verabschiedeten und anwendbaren STEP-Anwendungsprotokolle beurteilt werden, Anhang I, Stand 2013 (nach Wikipedia).¹⁰ In der Praxis haben sich bisher die APs 203 (Mechanical Parts and Assemblies) und 214 (Automotive Mechanical Design) durch viele Implementierungen besonders hervorgetan (mit AP 201 und 202 als Untermengen). Darin steckt einerseits die Unterstützung der Softwarehersteller von CAD/CAM/CAE-Geometrie-Modelliersystemen, deren Produktmodelle als Front End für viele Anwendungen dienen, andererseits die starke Nutzung von STEP in der Automobil-Industrie mit ihren  Vgl. Liste der STEP-Teile (ISO ).

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Zulieferern und Partnern. Viele andere Branchen sind noch in der Anfangsphase der STEP- Nutzung. Die Automobil-Industrie gehört zu den Pionieranwendern, Aber auch große Unternehmen der Luft- und Raumfahrt und des Maschinenbaus wenden STEP erfolgreich in der Produktion an. Die weitere Entwicklung wird davon abhängen, wie stark die potentielle Nutzergemeinde ihren Einfluss auf die Softwareanbieter ausüben kann, um STEPInvestitionen auch für das Anwendungsprofil des industriellen Verbrauchers nützlich zu machen.

5.5 Kritik an STEP Häufig erwähnte Grenzen und Schwachpunkte von STEP beziehen sich mehr auf seine Methodik und grundlegenden Annahmen als auf seine praktisch erreichten Ziele. Sie betreffen die wissenschaftlichen Ausgangspunkte der Modelliermethodik. Hier seien erwähnt:

a) Ziele Die Zielsetzungen von STEP sind so universell hinsichtlich von Produkttypen, Produkteigenschaften, Industriesektoren, Lebenszyklusphasen, Produktanwendungen usw., aber auch datentechnisch hinsichtlich von Eindeutigkeit, Modularität mit hoher Granularität, Mehrfachsichten usw., dass die vollständige Realisierung nur langfristig möglich erscheint, und dies auf einem Migrationspfad, der noch nicht spezifiziert ist. Es werden pragmatische Kompromisse zwischen der geforderten Funktionalität und den datentechnischen Realisierungsmöglichkeiten gefunden werden müssen, um die wachsende Komplexität zu beherrschen.

b) Qualität Der Standard und seine Implementierungen bedürfen auf allen Ebenen einer strikten, möglichst formalen Qualitätskontrolle. Hierunter fällt die Genauigkeit der Definitionen, die Konformität der Implementierungen, die Fehlerfreiheit der Übertragungen und das automatische Überbrücken von Funktionalitätsunterschieden zwischen kommunizierenden Systemen durch Rekonstruktion und Approximation fehlender Elemente, jeweils in einer Konformitätsklasse. Die Kernforderung ist die Automatisierung solcher Qualitätskontrollen und -korrekturen.

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c) Semantische Strenge Die Grundelemente, d. h. die Primitiva des Modellierens, sind in STEP in den Integrierten Ressourcen nur verbal-textuell, nicht formal streng, z. B. in einer logischen Sprache, definiert. Es wird axiomatisch vorausgesetzt, dass jeder diese Grundbegriffe intuitiv gleich interpretiert. D. h. die Bedeutung der definierenden Wörter bleibt unbestimmt, und die Begriffe sind daher im Zweifel nicht eindeutig interpretierbar. Notwendige Bedingungen können fehlend, unvollständig oder nicht eindeutig interpretierbar sein. Dies wurde in der Literatur bereits vor einiger Zeit kritisiert, z. B. von Guarino et al.¹¹ und Metzger.¹² Der Mangel ist aber nachträglich nicht leicht behebbar. Eine Alternative wäre die strenge, formale, ontologische Präzisierung, z. B. in prädikatenlogischer Notation, zumindest von wichtigen STEP-Begriffen wie object, region, property, part, process, action usw. Diese Methodik ist aus der Wissensmodellierung in KI-Systemen bekannt. Guarino et al. verweisen auf solche Ontologie-Modelle wie: – Theorie der Teile (mereology) – Theorie der Integrität (topology) – Theorie der Gestalt (morphology) – Theorie der Identität (identity) – Theorie der Abhängigkeit (dependence). Angesichts des Umfangs von STEP-Ressourcen-Begriffen kann man sicher nicht nachträglich alle Begriffe semantisch streng fundieren. Aber es könnte gelingen, wenigstens begrenzte Gebiete für kleinere Module in STEP durch ontologische Modellierung auf wenige, semantisch präzise Grundbegriffe zurückzuführen, wie auch Metzger vorschlägt. Vorerst bedürfen die STEP-Primitiva weiterhin menschlicher, ggf. durch Konventionen abgestimmter Interpretation.

6 Gegenwart und Zukunft Die Entwicklungen in der Produktdatentechnik sind als ein strategisch wichtiges Element der Innovation in der Weiterentwicklung der Gestaltung, Herstellung und Organisation technischer Systeme anzusehen. Die Fortschritte in der Informations- und Kommunikationstechnik werden ein treibender Motor von Neuerungen

 Vgl. Guarino/Borgo/Masolo ().  Vgl. Metzger ().

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in diesen Systemen bleiben. Erst durch Standardisierung auf konzeptioneller und datentechnischer Ebene in dem neuen digitalen Medium kann man die Früchte dieser Entwicklungen ernten. Die Produktdatentechnik muss sich dabei in das Spektrum anderer Neuerungen einbetten. Gegenwärtig sind dabei folgende Trends mit nah- und langfristigen Zielen zu erkennen, die durch Öffnung der Kommunikation zwischen Systemen innerhalb der Unternehmen und mit Partnern weltweit ermöglicht werden.

6.1 Integration Durch Kopplung von CAD-, CAM-, CAE- und CIM-Systemen über neutrale Schnittstellen entstehen neue, digital unterstützte Prozessketten, die im Unternehmen für neue Kooperationsformen sorgen und durch Product Data Management (PDM)-Systeme verwaltet werden. Die Ergebnisse der gesamten Entwicklung lassen sich im Sinne des System Engineering systemübergreifend bewerten. Angestrebt werden Zeiteinsparungen und Qualitätsgewinne für die Entwickler und Anwender der Produkte.

6.2 Kooperation Der neutrale Produktdatenaustausch ermöglicht auch die PDT-Kommunikation mit externen Partnern, Zulieferern und Kunden, und damit den Aufbau einer neuen Aufgabenteilung und Kooperation bis hin zu neuen, ad hoc gebildeten Prozessketten in Virtuellen Unternehmen (Virtual Enterprises).

6.3 Lebenszyklus-Dienstleistungen Die Prozessketten für eine Produktbetreuung können über den gesamten Lebenslauf eines Produkts erstreckt werden, wenn man die Produktdarstellung im Modell entsprechend organisiert. Mit dieser Aufgabe beschäftigt sich das Product Lifecycle Management (PLM). Neu daran ist vor allem der Datenaustausch zwischen Hersteller und Anwender des Produkts. Dazu müssen anwendungsrelevante Produktdaten extrahiert und weitergegeben werden, z. B. für Inspektion und Wartung, vertrauliche Daten dagegen verborgen bleiben. Die Aufgabe läuft also auf das Extrahieren von Produktdaten hinaus, die für eine neue Produktsicht relevant sind. Ein Beispiel aus Schiffbau und Schifffahrt möge dieses Szenario illustrieren. In Abb. 8 sind die wesentlichen Partner gezeigt, die in der Entwicklung und im

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Betrieb eines Schiffes involviert sind. Der Lebenslauf eines Schiffes besteht aus einer sehr kurzen, stark parallelisierten Entwicklungsphase mit intensiver Kommunikation der beteiligten Partner, gefolgt von einer langen, wartungsorientierten Betriebsphase. Diese Konstellation stellt hohe Anforderungen an die Flexibilität des Produktdaten-Managements. Insbesondere sollen und wollen die Reeder für den Schiffsbetrieb von den Werften und der Klassifikation nur diejenigen Informationen erhalten, die sie für Wartung und Reparaturen brauchen.

Abb. 8: Kommunikationspartner und -wege in Schiffbau und Schifffahrt

Während in anderen Branchen PLM-Systeme bereits Realität sind, existieren sie in Schiffbau und Schifffahrt auf standardisierter Basis noch nicht. Es sind aber von der Germanischen Lloyd (GL) als Klassifikationsgesellschaft und von der ProSTEP AG als IT-Fachleuten bereits Voruntersuchungen und Befragungen angestellt worden, um das Interesse an Lösungen für das Ship Lifecycle Management (SLM), vor allem in der Schifffahrt, festzustellen.¹³ Daraus ergab sich, dass ein latentes Interesse durchaus vorhanden ist, vor allem um die Betriebskosten des Schiffes zu senken und systematisch den Wartungszustand im Lebenszyklus des Schiffes zu dokumentieren. Die Reeder erhoffen sich davon außerdem höhere Zuverlässigkeit  Vgl. Grau/Zerbst/Sachers (), Cabos/Grafe/Grau (), Grau/Wagner/Cabos ().

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(durch preventive maintenance), geringere Ausfallrisiken, eine flexiblere Wartungspolitik, größere Sicherheit und ein besseres Image bei Versicherungen. Auch kann eine gezielte Rückkopplung mit den entwerfenden Instanzen zu Verbesserungen in der nächsten Schiffsgeneration führen. Systemtechnische Ansätze im Schiffsentwurf bedürfen einer Lebenszyklus-Perspektive. Die Schiffbau-Industrie konzentriert sich vorerst darauf, in internationaler Kooperation unter ISO 10303 TC 184/SC4/WG3 (STEP) im Ship Team T 23 mit Partnern aus den USA, Korea, Japan und Europa sowie in europäischen Projekten der EU und von der European Maritime Standards Association (EMSA) dahin zu gelangen, dass die verbreiteten Ship Turnkey- CAD-Systeme durch neutrale Schnittstellen für die STEP-Kommunikation erschlossen werden. Die Voraussetzungen dafür sind in STEP durch die Standards der SHIP-AP-Suite AP 215, 216 und 218 sowie durch den Standard für Distributed Systems AP 227 geschaffen.

6.4 Datenselektion Für den Datentransfer von einer Lebenszyklus-Phase in eine andere, insbesondere vom Hersteller zum Betreiber des Produkts, ist stets eine Abtrennung der transferierbaren, relevanten Information unter Weglassung von geschützter Information notwendig. Daher werden nicht die nativen CAD-Produktmodelldaten übertragen, sondern es werden die nur für Entwurf und Fertigung dienenden Daten weggefiltert (information hiding) und z. B. nur die wartungsrelevanten Daten freigegeben. Dieser Selektionsvorgang ist aufwendig, aber in jedem Falle effektiver als der vollständige Neuaufbau der Informationen beim Betreiber. Im Falle der Wartung des Schiffsrumpfes z. B. genügt es gewöhnlich, dem Reeder die Geometrie der Schiffsteile und die Gliederung der Stahlstruktur zu übermitteln ohne alle Fertigungsinformation. In dem EU-Projekt CAS hat ein Konsortium ein Hull Condition Model (HCM) entwickelt, das einen Standard für diese Information setzt.¹⁴ Das HCM-Format definiert einen reduzierten Teil des Produktmodells ohne vertrauliche Information, den eine Werft ohne Verlust an geschützten Daten einem Reeder liefern kann. Für diesen Zweck wurde im CASVorhaben ein Softwarewerkzeug Open HCM entwickelt, das ein reduziertes Ersatzmodell des Produkts für Zwecke des Reeders aufbaut.¹⁵

 Zu den Einzelheiten siehe auch Cabos et al. ().  Vgl. Open HCM Standard.

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6.5 Schutz von „Intellectual Property Rights“ Die Rechte von Unternehmen und Einzelpersonen an geistigem Eigentum (Patente, Erfindungen, Entwürfe, Betriebsgeheimnisse etc.) sollen beim Datenaustausch, speziell mit externen Partnern und Kunden, vor dem Verlust durch Entwendung geschützt werden.¹⁶ Außer den vielseitigen Maßnahmen zur internen Sicherung von Datenrechten auf der Infrastrukturebene der Systeme sind spezielle Schutzvorkehrungen notwendig, wenn Information den intern gesicherten Schutzbereich durch Datenaustausch verlässt. Dieser Schutz erfordert spezielle Maßnahmen, z. B.: – Passiver Schutz: Markieren der Dokumente bzw. Modelle mit Pflicht-Kommentaren über den Eigentums- bzw. Copyrights-Anspruch. Diese Mitteilung kann Bestätigung durch Rückmeldung erfordern. – Digitales Wasserzeichen: Eine digitale Kennzeichnung der Austauschdaten, die für den Computer, aber nicht für den Menschen lesbar ist. – Inhalts-Reduktion: Maßnahmen des Absenders zur Beseitigung aller Informationen, die nicht für den Empfänger bestimmt sind. Dies kann durch Filtern oder durch Erstellen eines neuen Ersatzmodells geschehen. Für Zwecke des Filterns von Datenmodellen hat die ProSTEP AG einen Knowledge Editor entwickelt, der ein Produktmodell nach vorgegebenen Kriterien ggf. in mehreren Arbeitsgängen filtert, spezifisch und flexibel für jeden Datenaustausch, so dass nur die für den Empfänger bestimmten Informationen bestehen bleiben.¹⁷

7 Zusammenfassung Verteiltes Arbeiten an Ingenieuraufgaben mit effektiver Aufgabenteilung in allen Phasen des Produktlebenszyklus war stets eine Voraussetzung für effektive Teamarbeit und Kommunikation mit dem Produktanwender. Durch den rasanten Übergang von grafischen zu digitalen Medien als Informationsträgern von Produktbeschreibungen hat der Datenaustausch unter den Partnern im Produktlebenslauf noch stark an Häufigkeit und Datenvolumen zugenommen. Ein zuverlässiger Datenaustausch mit präziser Produktinformation ist in digitalen Medien nur durch Standardisierung der produktbeschreibenden Begriffe und der Austauschkonventionen möglich. Der Prozess dieser Standardisierung ist weit vorangeschritten, aber noch nicht abgeschlossen. Vor allem ist der Standard ISO 10303 (STEP) ein monumentales Vorhaben, das 1984 begonnen wurde, bereits vielen technischen Anforderungen  Vgl. Grau/Liese/Stjepandic ().  Vgl. Grau/Liese/Stjepandic ().

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genügt und sich weiter vervollständigt. Unter anderem profitiert die Verbreitung von STEP auch von neuen Dienstleistungen über den gesamten Lebenslauf des Produkts durch PLM, d. h. durch organisatorische Nutzeffekte. Viele Industriezweige haben die strategische Bedeutung der Produktdatentechnik erkannt. Davon zeugen auch Forschungsinitiativen wie das White Paper „Plattform Industrie 4.0“ der Deutschen Akademie der Technikwissenschaften acatech, in welchem vorwiegend aus der Sicht von Maschinenbau, Elektrotechnik, Informations- und Kommunikationstechnik in einem Thesenpapier die Forschungsprogrammatik für das nächste Jahrzehnt diskutiert wird. Darin spielt die Produktdatentechnik eine zentrale Rolle.¹⁸ Grafische und textuelle Produktdarstellungen wie Zeichnungen werden auch weiterhin wegen ihrer Anschaulichkeit eine Bedeutung haben, aber zunehmend eher als Derivate aus digitalen Modellen. Jedenfalls erreichen primär digitale Produktmodelle auch durch die Standardisierung ihres Austauschs allmählich die Verbindlichkeit und Präzision, die sie für rechtswirksame Verträge als geeignet erscheinen lassen. Abgesehen von seiner standardisierenden Wirkung für die technische Anwendungswelt ist das Vorhaben STEP aber auch ideengeschichtlich, wissensgeschichtlich ein bemerkenswertes Ereignis. Es ist im Rahmen von STEP erstmals gelungen, das gesamte Gedankengebäude der technischen Produktbeschreibung, soweit es bisher im Standard STEP enthalten ist, auf wenige Hundert Grundbegriffe zurückzuführen, die in den Integrierten Ressourcen von STEP enthalten sind. Diese Begriffe bilden also die Grundlage, die alle Anwendungsgebiete gemeinsam haben. Dass diese Grundbegriffe hinreichend und notwendig sind, um die Produktdatenwelt der Anwendungen zu modellieren, ist eine axiomatische Forderung, die sich jedoch bisher praktisch bewährt hat.

Dankwort Der Verfasser dankt sehr herzlich allen Personen, die in Gesprächen und durch Unterlagen hilfreiche Hinweise zu seinem Beitrag gegeben haben. Davon möchte er vor allem die Herren Prof. Reiner Anderl (TU Darmstadt, acatech), Mathias Grau (ProSTEP AG), Uwe Langbecker (DNV GL) und Markus Lehne (BALance GmbH) dankbar hervorheben.

 Vgl. Plattform Industrie ., White Paper der acatech.

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Literaturverzeichnis Cabos, Christian/Jaramillo, David/Stadie-Frohbös, Gundula/Renard, Phillippe/Ventura, Manuel/Dumas, Bertrand (2008): „Condition Assessment Scheme for Ship Hull Maintenance.“ In: COMPIT’ 08, 7th International Conference on Computer and IT Applications in the Maritime Industries, hg. v. Volker Bertram/Philippe Rigo, Liège: Office of Naval Research Global, 222 – 243. [http://www.anast.ulg.ac.be/COMPIT08/Files/ Proceeding_Compit08.pdf (Zugriff: 20. 9. 2015] Cabos, Christian/Grafe, Wiegand/Grau, Matthias (2011): „Product Lifecycle Management in the Shipbuilding and Shipping Industries.“ In: ICCAS, Conference Papers, Trieste 2011, siehe Internetseite der Royal Institution of Naval Architects: http://www.rina.org.uk/ICCAS2011_ Papers.html (Zugriff: 20. 9. 2015). Grau, Matthias/Zerbst, Carsten/Sachers, Markus (2008): „Building the business process view into shipbuilding data exchange.“ In: COMPIT’ 08, 7th International Conference on Computer and IT Applications in the Maritime Industries, hg. v. Volker Bertram/Philippe Rigo, Liège: Office of Naval Research Global, 282 – 291. [http://www.anast.ulg.ac.be/ COMPIT08/Files/Proceeding_Compit08.pdf (Zugriff: 20. 9. 2015] Grau, Matthias/Liese, Harald/Stjepandic, Josip (2013): „Intellectual Property Protection in the Maritime Industry – State-of-the-Art Review and Solution Approaches“. In: ICCAS, Conference Paper, Bd. 3, Busan 2013, siehe Internetseite der Royal Institution of Naval Architects: http://www.rina.org.uk/ICCAS2013_Papers.html (Zugriff: 20. 9. 2015). Grau, Matthias/Wagner, Lars/Cabos, Christian (2013): „Product Lifecycle Management in the Shipbuilding and Shipping Industries – An Update.“ In: ICCAS, Conference Papers, Bd. 2, Busan 2013, siehe Internetseite der Royal Institution of Naval Architects: http://www.rina. org.uk/ICCAS2013_Papers.html (Zugriff: 20. 9. 2015). Guarino, Nicola/Borgo, Stefano/Masolo, Claudio (1997): „Logical Modeling of Product Knowledge: towards a Well-Founded Semantics foe STEP.“ In: Proceedings of the European Conference on Product Data Technology Days 1997, Sophia Antipolis: Esprit Project 9049, PDTAG-AM, 180 – 193. ISO 10303: Standard for Product Data Representation and Exchange, Initial Release. Die ersten 12 Teile von STEP, ISO Central Secretariat, Genf: Dezember 1994. (Siehe Internetseite der International Organization for Standardization (ISO): http:/www.iso.org/home.html (Zugriff: 20. 9. 2015). ISO 10303 – 11 (STEP Part 11): „Description Methods: The EXPRESS Language Reference Manual“, International Standard, ISO Central Secretariat, Genf: Dezember 1994. Liste der STEP-Teile (ISO 10303) siehe: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_STEP_(ISO_ 10303)_parts, April 2013 (Zugriff: 20. 9. 2015). Metzger, Felix J. (1996): „The Challenge of Capturing the Semantics of STEP Precisely.“ In Michael Wolf/Ulrich Reimer (Hg.), Proceedings of the First International Conference on Practical Aspects of Knowledge Management (PAKM 1996), Basel: Springer. Nowacki, Horst (1988): „System-Architekturen und Schnittstellen für den schiffbaulichen Konstruktionsprozeß.“ In: Jahrbuch der Schiffbautechnischen Gesellschaft 82, 343 – 351. Nowacki, Horst (2001): „Informationsmodelle zur Produktbeschreibung.“ In: Bernd Mahr/Horst Nowacki/Peter Pepper/Günter Spur (Hg.), Workshop-Bericht zu „Modellbildung in den Wissenschaften und ihre praktische Anwendung“, Berlin: Technische Universität Berlin. Open HCM Standard, http://openhcmstandard.sourceforge.net (Zugriff: 23. 7. 2015).

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Owen, Jon/Nowacki, Horst (Hg.) (1997): „Policy Recommendations for Developments in Product Data Technology.“ In: PDTAG-AM Project (ESPRIT 9049), Del. 1.3, Oktober 1997, 95 Seiten. Owen, Jon (1993): STEP: An Introduction, Winchester: Information Geometers Ltd. Plattform Industrie 4.0, White Paper der acatech, http://www.plattform-i40.de/whitepaperforschungs-und-entwicklungsaktivit%C3 %A4ten-auf-dem-weg-zu-industrie-40 (Zugriff: 16. 7. 2015). Schenck, Douglas A./Wilson, Peter A. (1994): Information Modeling the EXPRESS Way, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. STEP Application Handbook ISO 10303, Version 3, SCRA, North Charleston, SC, www.STEP_application-hdbk_63006_BF.pdf, 181 Seiten.

Anhang I: STEP-Teile nach Wikipedia, 2013:¹⁹ Aktive, verabschiedete Teile von STEP mit Anwendungsprotokollen Part 201 Explicit draughting. Simple 2D drawing geometry related to a product. No association, no assembly hierarchy. Practically a subset of AP202 and 214 Part 202 Associative draughting. 2D/3D drawing with association, but no product structure. Practically a subset of AP214 Part 203 Configuration controlled 3D designs of mechanical parts and assemblies. Mainly used for 3D design and product structure. A subset of AP214, but most widely used. Part 204 Mechanical design using boundary representation Part 207 Sheet metal die planning and design Part 209 Composite and metallic structural analysis and related design Part 210 Electronic assembly, interconnect and packaging design Part 212 Electrotechnical design and installation. Designed as a complement for AP214, but not fully harmonized with it. Part 214 Core data for automotive mechanical design processes Part 215 Ship arrangement Part 216 Ship moulded forms Part 218 Ship structures Part 219 Dimensional inspection information exchange Part 221 Functional data and their schematic representation of process plant

 Liste der STEP-Teile (ISO )

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Part 224 Mechanical product definition for process plans using machining features Part 225 Building elements using explicit shape representation Part 227 Plant spatial configuration Part 232 Technical data packaging core information and exchange Part 233 Systems engineering Part 235 Materials information for the design and verification of products Part 236 Furniture product data and project data Part 238 STEP-NC Application interpreted model for computerized numerical controllers Part 239 Product life cycle support Part 240 Process plans for machined products

Part IV: Dynamics

Albert Vollmer, Michael Dick, Stefan Gross and Theo Wehner

Constructive Controversy as a Prime Example of “The Power of Distributed Perspectives”: New Developments in Application and Research

Abstract: Constructive controversy is a procedure with structured dialogue for the management of conflicts. It is theoretically well-founded and has been extensively tested empirically as well. While constructive controversy has been researched and practiced for many years in the field of educational science, the method has hardly made any inroads into organizational practice. Numerous studies in both fields of research demonstrate the method’s positive effect on decision processes, problem-solving, and learning. Hence constructive controversy is predestined for application within organizations. The procedure can contribute substantially to decision-making as one of the core processes of organizational action. Therefore, we propose opening a new line of research focussing on the application and simultaneous study of this method within organizational practice.

1 Introduction In the working environment of today and in society in general we face increasingly complex problems. Products differentiate themselves more, procedures have to account for the demands of sustainability, and rules of interaction have to meet various demands. In addition, hierarchical regulatory mechanisms are increasingly being replaced by horizontal processes of negotiation. Problemsolving increasingly involves questions that have to be discussed in a common dialogue among many different participants. We live in a world of increasing social interdependence.¹ At the organizational level decisions are increasingly experienced as dilemmas,² and various agents are involved in their solution, even if ‘the line’ is still the final decision-maker. At the economic level there are signs that market

 Wright ().  Neuberger ().

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capitalism is increasingly being supplanted by collaborative commons.³ And at the social-political level the calls for social discourse in the sense of consensus-oriented communicative action⁴ and for a process of deliberation⁵ are getting louder and louder. These developments have a far-reaching significance for industrial and organizational psychology, which ranges in its scope from the analysis and design of work processes to the social conditions in which these are embedded. Alongside establishing structural conditions for productive but also conducive for personal health and development, the focus is increasingly on establishing cooperative and communicative processes.⁶ There is a need, particularly wherever decisions are made in companies, to study the processual character of the decisions and to develop methods to support these processes. In this paper we focus on a specific concept that is directly relevant to these developments and that perfectly exemplifies the “power of distributed perspectives”. It is without a doubt useful for organizational life, but has yet to find any inroads in organizational practice.

2 Constructive controversy Constructive controversy is one of the few concepts that includes a comprehensive theory, a far-reaching empirical foundation and in addition a practical procedure of implementation.

2.1 Theory and empirical data of constructive controversy The theoretical foundations of constructive controversy come from a wide range of sources. The earliest beginnings stem from the social psychology and small group research of the 1930s⁷ as well as Gestalt psychology.⁸ Moreover, the founders have always connected it with organizational psychology, above all to proponents such as Follet⁹ and Maier.¹⁰ In addition the cognitive development theories of Berlyne,¹¹

 Rifkin ().  Habermas ().  Lyon ().  Wehner/Raeithel/Clases/Endres ().  Lewin ().  Koffka ().  Follet ().  Maier ().

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Piaget,¹² Kohlberg¹³ and Vygotsky,¹⁴ behavior-oriented learning theories¹⁵ and the theory of social interdependence¹⁶ form the foundation of constructive controversy. The latter theory in particular has been central for the development of the theoretical foundations of constructive controversy – not least of all because the Johnson brothers were students of Morton Deutsch. Johnson and Johnson¹⁷ have thoroughly described how constructive controversy works and how it is theoretically founded. The first step is to define a specific conflict on which the controversy hinges. The authors use Deutsch’s definition¹⁸ of a conflict as arising from the “incompatible activities” of different people. Activities are considered incompatible when they hinder, block or disturb other persons’ activities or make them less likely. On this basis Johnson and Johnson define controversy as a specific type of conflict wherein “one person’s ideas, information, conclusions, theories, or opinions are incompatible with those of another person, and the two seek to reach an agreement”.¹⁹ Three aspects are particularly important here. Firstly, the authors refer to the conceptual conflict, which occurs within a person when incompatible ideas are present ‘in one’s mind’. Elsewhere the authors speak about an intellectual conflict.²⁰ Hence we are looking here at a specific type of conflict – not primarily conflicts of interest or relational conflicts, but rather conflicts between different theories about how the world works. Secondly, it is part of the definition that the parties in the conflict have to or wish to come to an agreement. Thus, the intrapsychic conflict turns to an interpersonal conflict. Authors like De Dreu and Gelfand²¹ speak about a socio-cognitive conflict generated by controversy and by the incompatibility of the ideas, theories, etc. of different persons. This presents us with two essential characteristics of the controversy, first the different perspectives and their constituents such as different theories, ideas and information, and secondly a conflict that arises between these perspectives and only comes out in their difference or incompatibility. So far, this

          

Berlyne (). Piaget (). Kohlberg (). Vygotsky (). Bandura (). Deutsch (). Johnson/Johnson (). Deutsch (). Johnson/Johnson (), . Johnson/Johnson (). De Dreu/Gelfand ().

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tells us very little about what course controversy might take. The founders of this method now offer the following theory about the process and how it works. Johnson and Johnson describe this process in terms of the way students learn (see figure 1). Children begin a learning process with certain knowledge and experiences concerning a question or problem they have been given. When children are now asked to present what they know and add it to the discussion, they first give it a certain organization (through categorizations, arrangements, inferences). When they are now confronted in these situations with ideas, information, inferences, theories or opinions that contradict their own, this leads to a conceptual conflict. The children experience this as an uncertainty about their own point of view and a feeling of cognitive disequilibrium.²²

Fig. 1: The process of Constructive Controversy. Source: Johnson/Johnson (1979), 52.

The theory explains furthermore that this cognitive disequilibrium leads to an epistemic curiosity²³ that can be satisfied through the search for new information and new experience. This results in a more adequate understanding of the question or the problem – and the more the children understand the perspective and argumentation of other children with opposed ideas and theories, the more ad Piaget ().  Berlyne ().

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equate their understanding will be. The integration of new information into the knowledge they already have leads them to reconceptualize and reorganize their own cognitive schemas,²⁴ which is seen as a learning process. The assumptions underlying this process are made by Johnson et al. (2006) with reference to numerous theoretical and empirical findings from other theories and research. Moreover they have themselves carried out and initiated numerous empirical studies on constructive controversy relating to various features or results of the process and its preconditions.

2.2 Empirical findings To date constructive controversy has primarily been studied within two fields: in educational science and in companies. There are survey articles for both fields describing the state of research. The article by Johnson and Johnson²⁵ above all presents the results of meta-analyses in educational science, conducted for the most part in the context of schooling. The literature review by Vollmer and Seyr summarizes the results of empirical studies in the business context.²⁶ In educational science studies almost exclusively took the form of experimental comparisons of constructive controversy with other discussion formats such as concurrence seeking, individualistic learning, and debate.²⁷ The results demonstrate that constructive controversy is superior to other forms of discussion in various aspects, including in the quality of the decisions, cognitive and moral judgment, the exchange of expertise, the assumption of others’ perspectives, creativity, openness in thinking, the motivation to improve one’s own understanding, the attitude towards a problem or task and towards the method of constructive controversy itself, interpersonal attraction, mutual support, and feelings of self-esteem. The results of empirical studies in the context of companies match those from the educational context to a high degree,²⁸ including the aspects of decision quality, learning and social relations as well as productivity. Typically, these studies investigated specific aspects (decision quality, team performance etc.) using questionnaires. There is however a lack of qualitative or long-term

    

Piaget (). Johnson/Johnson (). Vollmer/Seyr (). See Johnson/Johnson (). See Vollmer/Seyr ().

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studies as well as process analyses and intervention studies. This is where our own research begins. The first author of this paper initiated a research project financed with competitive research grants²⁹ to fill this gap and learn from the application in practice. The project focussed on emerging conflicts in the context of product and process innovations, where the method of constructive controversy was used, the assumption being that it would positively influence the innovation process. An insurance company, an IT company, an innovation services provider, a company from the security industry, and a financial institute took part in the study; hence large, mid-sized and small companies were represented. The study worked with innovation projects relevant to the companies and with anticipated or open conflicts, using internal training sessions, workshops and exchange forums for all those involved. Here we report several of the significant findings from the project.³⁰ The project carried out workshops to support decisions in the innovation projects using the method of constructive controversy. Participants were surveyed with questionnaires before and after the conduction of the controversy to evaluate the workshops and determine to what extent the participants were pursuing common goals, how the controversy was progressing and how this affected the decisions and the innovation process. Results show that the successful resolution of controversies is positively related to the decision quality, participants’ commitment to the decision, and their believe that it will lead to progress in the innovation project. The self-reports of the teams can be interpreted such that most of them see themselves as having overcome negative goal interdependencies and learned how to pursue common goals. Although causal analyses were not possible (due to a lack of long-term data), the study demonstrated positive correlation between constructive controversy and the quality of decisions; hence the method has a positive effect on the innovation process and not just on its result. A qualitative study conducted as part of the project went beyond these quantitative results by considering the process of implementation as well. This study showed that the positive results are framed by real problems with the implementation in the real organizational processes of the various companies. Using nine case studies in various companies the study described how constructive controversy proves in concrete innovation projects. In addition, it worked out a unified strategy for implementing constructive controversy in the form of workshops; the  Financed by the Commission for Technology and Innovation (CTI) of the Swiss Federation (KTI-Projekt-Nr. . PFES-ES).  A more thorough report of the project design and its results can be found in Vollmer et al. ().

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workshops were then accompanied and analyzed by a research team. According to the evaluation of the interview data, the method was well accepted above all in larger companies, by the executives as well as the employees. Often the participants were more satisfied with the method than with the results of the discussion. Throughout all of the workshops the exchange of perspectives and the thorough construction and critical questioning of arguments proved to be effective elements. It was remarked again and again how valuable it is to carefully work through the other party’s viewpoint and understand it better. Evidently there had been no comparable forums or formats to this in the companies previously. On the other hand, the high time investment was seen critically. Ultimately, in light of these results, the case studies make it clear that the implementation of procedures for resolving conflicts in companies cannot be left to take care of itself. Alongside quite productive workshops we also observed reservations, evasive maneuvers and defensiveness. This research project has produced empirical results demonstrating the effect of constructive controversy in concrete application. Besides extensively confirming previous findings, which were not so closely linked to application, this study also demonstrated the difficulties that arise when one wishes to introduce a method into organizational practice. Presumably, this is also related to the method itself. In the following we will take a closer look at the format and its psychological mechanisms.

2.3 The method and its psychological mechanisms As constructive controversy aspires to include theory, empirical data and practice, the founders provided a pragmatic procedure that can be used for academic learning as well as organizational decision-making.³¹ This procedure is instructive to a high degree and aims at supporting the theoretically postulated psychic processes. The theoretically postulated psychological mechanisms are embedded in the course of the process. This way, individual and collective learning processes are being enabled. The procedure begins with the statement of a complex problem (in educational contexts we speak of an object of study or a question). Johnson, Johnson and Tjosvold (2006) postulate that there are always several courses of action that might solve the problem. For reasons of simplicity, generally two alternative sol-

 See Johnson et al. ().

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utions are chosen. Moreover it is assumed that the discussion happens in a group. Tab. 1: Sequence of a constructive controversy according to Johnson et al.³² Step  Step  Step  Step 

Step  Step Step Step Step

   

Define different courses of action. Divide the group into subgroups and assign the different courses of action to the subgroups. Each sub-group prepares a presentation to the whole group of the arguments in favor of its course of action. Discussion within the whole group. First the sub-groups present the arguments for their advocated course of action. In a second step participants ask questions about the understanding and tenability of the other sub-groups’ positions and have the opportunity to defend their own arguments. Sub-groups reverse positions and repeat step , this time representing the other course of action and gathering arguments for it. The group discussion in step  is repeated with positions reversed. The whole group works out a solution and implementation as a whole. Development of the implementation. Reflection on the process.

A series of further constitutive elements of constructive controversy can be identified within this procedure: formulating the courses of action involves an initial structuring of the problem. This clarifies the current state of understanding and can give rise to an agreement about what really needs to be discussed. Assigning the courses of action to the sub-teams sets in motion the so-called principle of advocacy. The participants are challenged to speak for the position given them. Here it is not so important to identify oneself with the course of action or advocate for it without reservations, but rather to work out what speaks in favor of the course of action, i.e. what aspects of the course of action are significant for the problem or the question. The advocacy principle is intended to allow these aspects to be asserted. The characteristic mark of the advocacy principle is first and foremost the rational, argument-based approach. The knowledge and information available should be applied to the advocacy for the course of action and brought together into a logical justification. The arguments are supported by facts and justify, in turn, what speaks for the course of action. This brings out into the open the theory the participants have formulated, which can be brought into the discussion and critically examined. Here proponents’ assumptions either get strengthened or are found to have weaknesses. Hence, the open discussion challenges the jus-

 Johnson et al. ().

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tifications offered to legitimize a position as a response to the problem. It also ensures that the position gets confronted with alternative solutions and the theoretical assumptions connected with them. This is supposed to stimulate the socio-cognitive conflict and at the same time to emphasize the conceptual conflict within the individuals’ ways of thinking. The switch of perspectives takes things a step further. The aim here is for the participants to acquaint themselves thoroughly with the contrary position. Since the participants have to gather arguments for this position as well, support them with facts and bring them into a logical and consistent order, the conceptual conflict goes through a second loop and becomes even more of an intrapsychic challenge. At the same time there is less of a socio-cognitive conflict in this phase, as the others’ arguments will be more relatable when the participants adopt the others’ perspectives, which weakens the “socio” moment of the socio-cognitive conflict (e. g. one sup-group versus another sub-group). It also speaks in favor of a minimizing of the conflict between the parties that the perspective-taking phase is followed by the formulation of a joint solution. The moment of joint decision-making can only come into effect when there is no very pronounced moment of socio-conflict between the parties. The joint decision-making phase is introduced with the instructions to drop the principle of advocacy and turn to finding a solution together. Generally the participants have already begun working towards the decision-making phase from the start of the process, as they have been challenged to work out a solution together as a group. But the more important precondition for the decision-making phase is that the participants have in fact taken both perspectives; it is then possible to develop and integrate different approaches to the resolution of the problem. Whether the advantages and disadvantages of both positions are brought into consideration or their commonalities, whether the most important ideas are collected, in any case the group must deliberate and weigh matters together in order to come to a approbiate decision. These weighing processes are based above all on the learning processes occurring more or less in the background on both the collective and the individual level. The knowledge that participants gain by alternatingly immersing themselves in the different possible courses of action argumentatively and rationally is meant to contribute to more mature and socially robust³³ decisions.

 Nowotny ().

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2.4 Interim summary We have argued that there is a sound theory and an extensive basis of empirical data demonstrating the effectiveness of the concept. There is also a procedure for its practical application in academic and organizational contexts. The psychological mechanisms are embedded in the steps of the procedure and are deployed instructively. With its combination of theory, research, and practice, constructive controversy can be considered a powerful concept. Nonetheless, a look at the research to date shows a gap that is relevant from the perspective of industrial and organizational psychology with its focus on practical application. Constructive controversy had been tested above all in the context of schooling, and primarily in the form of an experimental condition in comparison to other discussion formats. It had never been applied and studied as a step-bystep procedure as formulated by Johnson et al.³⁴ In the organizational context this procedure had also not yet been used and studied in its pragmatic form. This field in particular can be seen as the domain of application par excellence. The available empirical findings all point to the effectiveness of the concept, even though it had so far not been studied as a method. Hence we aimed to expand the research to include the implementation of the method of constructive controversy in organizational practice and the study of its compatibility and effectiveness. Our results support the previous findings and at the same time make it clear what it means to bring a procedure into a company, deploy it within real work processes and study it at the same time. The study showed that constructive controversy is a generally compatible and highly relevant concept for supporting decision-making processes. But it also became clear that the implementation and evaluation of the method needs to be seen as a further field of research.

3 New developments in application and research Our experiences in applying the method of constructive controversy to support innovation processes have shown that the introduction of the method into organizational practice cannot be left to take care of itself. We did ascertain a high level of acceptance and satisfaction and moreover its effectiveness in supporting concrete innovation projects; yet at the same time we found a prevailing organizational dynamic marked by defense mechanisms among other things. Alongside many successful cases we also encountered situations of moderate rele-

 Johnson et al. ().

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vance and situations where the method was not applied. This organizational dynamic prompted us to continue to study the implementation of the method in the field of real organizational action with all of its imponderables. For work and organizational psychology in particular this is a worthwhile perspective, as this discipline is concerned with researching and development organizational activities, structures, and processes. For this reason, we offer in the following section theoretical and conceptual considerations concerning the specific context of organizations. We will then go into the practical applicability of the method.

3.1 Theoretical concretizations on the organization as a field of application and research Central constructs have come to the foreground, as a result of previous research and also in view of the organization as a field of research and the knowledge we have gained there; we aim to concretize these constructs within an expanded theoretical framework.

3.1.1 Organization and decision-making We start from the idea of the organization as a social formation that pursues certain goals and displays formal rules meant to direct the activities of the organization’s members towards these goals.³⁵ Here, we focus particularly on the central process of decision-making and draw out the dynamic of diverse contradictions and dilemmas involved in this process. Person and organization are in tension: on the one hand, the organization extends the limits of the person and creates a higher potential for achievement, on the other hand, the organization curtails the individual’s own development. This fundamental tension gives rise to conflicts. Its structurally conditioned antinomies³⁶ lead to dilemmas in decision-making situations. The problem of integrating individual and organization involves mediating between individual interests and collective goals. Organizations have to find a way to make decisions, to legitimate them and to make them binding for everyone, even when the decisions have some disadvantages for some in-

 Schuler ().  Schreyögg ().

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dividuals. Delegating responsibility can relieve the individual of a burden but can also rob them of agency. In consequence, the fair distribution of resources, tasks and rewards presents itself as a problem. A focus on fairness requires binding regulations and agreements – equal conditions for all. A focus on flexibility and situational responsiveness, however, requires the variable distribution of tasks, resources and rewards. Hence, an internal competition might arise with winners and losers. If the market principle holds, this involves negotiation as well as the legitimation of differences. The development of organizations gives rise to dilemma between continuity and change. ³⁷ On the one hand, organizations are social structures built for the long run that generate reliability and commitment in order to justify trust that a product or a service will continue in the future. On the other hand, organizations should be capable of change in order to adapt to accelerating changes in the environment or to come out on top of these changes through innovation. A clear objective provides orientation in the process of organizational learning, but also restricts the options. A strong identification on the part of those involved ensures loyalty, but also binds them to the status quo and thus reduces the readiness for change. Redundancies create a buffer space for mistakes or errors, but efficiency and the reduction of waste are the cause and goal of change processes. Finally, there is a question whether the greater concern is with the learning process itself or the goal of this process, namely a changed structure. If the goal is in focus, there is a danger of becoming too rigid after it has been successfully implemented. If the process is in focus, the organization might acquire the ability to learn at the cost of provoking change for its own sake. Ultimately, the antinomies of organizations express themselves as leadership dilemmas. ³⁸ Hierarchical leadership or self-guidance, formalized procedures or improvisation, rational (transactional) or emotional (transformational) leadership behavior,³⁹ individual advancement or equal treatment for all, binding employees to the organization or flexibilizing the employment conditions⁴⁰ – there are always good reasons to be found for each of the two poles. These antimonies of integration, distribution, change and leadership cannot be brought into balance by a decision at one point of time; they must be continually renegotiated and have to be capable of being adjusted at any time. Thus, decisions in these dilemmatic structures and in situations of conflicting interests    

Kühl (). Neuberger (), Hope/Bunce/Röösli (). Felfe (). Rousseau/Libuser ().

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are by no means simply processes of rational deliberation and open information processing,⁴¹ but rather social negotiations marked also by fears, defensiveness, avoidance, procrastination or concealment.⁴² Constructive controversy has the potential to improve decision-making under the conditions of structural antinomies. It brings transparency to the decision process and its determinants, it enables participation and encourages the search for information and deliberation. Above all it brings out clearly the disadvantages and negative consequences of a decision and thus makes it possible to deal with them. This facilitates adaptation to new structures even for those who may initially suffer the disadvantages.

3.1.2 Conflict in organizations Dilemmas and antinomies as described above can lead to manifest conflicts in interactions. When an individual or a group perceive differences or oppositions with other individuals or groups involving interests, resources, beliefs, values or practices that concern themselves, then there is a conflict as defined by De Dreu and Gelfand.⁴³ Conflicts are an omnipresent social phenomenon in organizations. Organizations bear a potential for different types of conflicts. The authors distinguish three fundamental types of conflict: socio-cognitive conflicts, conflicts of interest, and relationship conflicts. Socio-cognitive conflicts (also called task conflicts) result from incompatible knowledge or theories about how the world works. Relationship conflicts arise when social identity is threatened, for example due to ideological or value-oriented differences or social injustice.⁴⁴ Conflicts of interest are the result of scarcity of resources and express themselves in the form of conflicts over distribution and goals.⁴⁵ Although we can distinguish between these types of conflict analytically, we have to assume that every conflict situation involves differing interests as well as differing way of thinking and also that every conflict can develop into a relationship conflict. Hence, these types of conflict should be understood as different dimensions of a specific conflict situation. This holds fundamentally in organizations, all the more so in decision-making processes.

    

Kahnemann/Tversky (). Janis/Mann (). De Dreu/Gelfand (), . Montada/Kals (). De Dreu/Gelfand (), Jehn/Mannix ().

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When decisions have to be made in organizations concerning their development, for example new forms of collaboration or innovation, it is increasingly considered important to involve those affected, to make use of their knowledge and account for their interests.⁴⁶ Complex problems in particular depend on a variety of perspectives. However it is without question difficult to bring these perspectives into a dialogue and make use of them for the decision. Empirical studies have shown how worthwhile it is to conduct controversies, that is to engage with socio-cognitive conflicts above all. This type of conflict generally has a positive effect on output quantities such as satisfaction and innovativeness.⁴⁷ Hence, the method of constructive controversy can offer valuable support in this point, as it is a procedure that offers a particular framework for working through such conflicts and hence enables positive effects both in the process as well as in the results. It is the socio-cognitive conflict that is especially predestined to be treated with the method of constructive controversy.

3.1.3 Knowledge, learning and innovation Two constructs are particularly closely connected to the socio-cognitive type of conflict: knowledge and learning. A situation where different people have incompatible ideas and theories expresses itself in these two constructs. People have the fundamental human need for cognitive consistency and for social validation of their theories, insights and understandings of how the world works. Where this is not readily possible to achieve, it leads to a cognitive disequilibrium and an epistemic curiosity.⁴⁸ The satisfaction of curiosity and the resulting expansion of knowledge, for example through gathering information, can be called learning. Hence, conflicts in organizations can be regarded as the starting point for learning and the development of knowledge at the individual and the collective level. This is directly connected with the emergence of the new, or innovation. Theories of how the new arises emphasize both conflict and knowledge as central moments; for example some of them describe dialectical models of thesisantitheses-synthesis,⁴⁹ while others point to conflicting demands on organizational action as the origin of innovation.⁵⁰ Empirical studies on creativity and innovation show us, just in light of the constructs they investigate, that knowledge     

Scholl (). See Vollmer (). Johnson/Johnson (). See Van de Ven/Poole (). Bledow et al. ().

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plays a central role in innovation processes; they investigate above all constructs such as intelligence, expertise, openness for new experiences, and capabilities for divergent and convergent thought in terms of their influence on creativity and innovation.⁵¹ The concept of constructive controversy combines the aspect of conflict with knowledge and learning in terms of the emergence of the new as well. The new results from the incompatibility of ideas, theories and knowledge, and particularly when these are worked through in a constructive process. This is also shown by empirical studies demonstrating the positive influence constructive controversy has on innovation both at the individual level⁵² and the team level.⁵³

3.1.4 Interim summary Our reflections on the organization and its decision-making processes and the antinomies, contradictions and pervasive conflicts this involves, and on knowledge, learning and innovation, have identified specific aspects that need to be dealt with when it is about the acceptance and the compatibility of constructive controversy with organizational practice. These are fields in which constructive controversy can be applied in order to support organizational processes. Theoretically these fields can be connected with the core features and psychological mechanisms of the method. Empirical studies prove the effectiveness of the method, whereas the investigation of its compatibility and effectiveness in concrete application is just beginning. For this reason we need to think about how the method could be introduced into companies and become the object of practical experience and scientific research.

3.2 Ways to make the method accessible for organizational practice One of the central challenges of organizational processes of change, development, and decision-making is to create the space for participation. Constructive controversy offers a methodical procedure that helps participants to bring their individual knowledge to the discussion. This enables decisions to be worked out

 For an overview see Mumford ().  Chen Yi-Feng/Tjosvold/Su ().  Tjosvold/Yu ().

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together and supported by a broad consensus even on controversial topics. In research projects and consulting tasks we have tried out different variations to find ways to adapt the procedure to organizational practice. We see two basic levels of access: At the methodical level an external consultant deploys constructive controversy as a method of team workshop for example in an opening session. This allows the consultant to establish a broad argumentative basis for different perspectives and positions at the very beginning of a long process and with the participation of as many of those affected as possible. The goal is to identify the topics that need to be worked on systematically thereafter. In doing so, the essential aspects of a given problem can be identified that need to be addressed in the following process steps. In addition, the method can also be used situationally, for example when a discussion reveals a basic dilemma concerning whether to choose one or another variant. Even in a one-on-one setting as in coaching, decision situations can be readjusted with this procedure to create the space for new appraisals of a given problem. The way of accessing the procedure on the cultural level follows up on the methodical deployment in a concrete organizational issue and expands the process, even to the point of changing the entire culture of the organization. Here, we see an opportunity in establishing a “Community in Practice” (borrowing the term from Wenger, McDermott and Snyder)⁵⁴ composed of users of the method, executives, participants and professional experts. This community is seen as a forum for experience and learning, where a discussion of practical cases can bring into view the basic dilemma of an organization. If the use of the method and the accompanying reflection can successfully be expanded into a continuous process, then “single-loop learning” turns into “double-loop learning”.⁵⁵ And the immediate use of the method to solve a problem becomes a process of organizational learning. Thinking in terms of controversies and the presence of decision-making dilemmas can become a routine in the organization and profoundly change the communicative behavior and mutual understanding for other positions and perspectives. With its heterogeneous composition the Community in Practice ensures that this treasury of ideas does not remain the exclusive property of the participants of a certain controversy but rather flows into the organization practice implicitly and explicitly through various paths and channels. What does moderation do for the method’s compatibility to organizational processes? The engagement of an external moderator, which in light of our expe-

 Wenger/McDermott/Snyder ().  Argyris/Schon ().

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rience is advisable, puts the planning and guidance of the process in the hands of a third party who accompanies a group discussion and gives structure to its content. This can be helpful even in the very beginning in finding the initial dilemma, in order to stretch the field of topics as broadly as possible and formulate both positions neutrally and in comprehensible terms. During the controversy the moderator with his or her external perspective can make suggestions for focusing the discussion or sorting out the issues, particularly in the consensus phase. It has proven necessary and effective to ask the participants to consistently set their arguments down in writing while working through the positions, so that the written arguments are available for everyone to consult in following steps.⁵⁶ Alongside direct interventions, a moderator can also have an effect in the way he or she sets up the process. For example, in working with larger groups it has proven helpful to plan for a longer break before the consensus phase in order to sort through the results and give all the participants the chance for an informal exchange. Not least of all, in recommending the method to management the external moderator has a different status than the other members of the organization and can argue for trying out the procedure based on its utility and examples of its application. In this context moderation allows not just for concrete questions and problems in the business to be clarified with the method of constructive controversy but also for the general utility of the procedure to be firmly anchored within the organization. What are open questions? External moderation of groups in the constructive controversy procedure has shown how helpful it is to have clearly defined and discrete steps in the process, such as breaking up into sub-groups, switching perspectives by taking over the previous group’s flip chart, updating previous arguments by supplementing and deepening them, coming together as a whole group to try to find a joint solution. It is precisely this last phase where situational interventions on the part of the moderator are necessary in the form of structural aids, work on scenarios, guiding the discussion and focussing on goals. So far, this has been done on the basis of experiential knowledge with tried and tested methods, but the concrete effects of these methods need to be analyzed more thoroughly. Moreover, in our own practical work we have often experienced the paradoxical effect that the procedure not only moves things on the substantial level of the issues in focus but also brings the participants observably closer to one another emotionally. Hence they do not just talk about the issues differently but in fact talk to each other differently – a second aspect that has to be

 Gross ().

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researched further in connection with constructive controversy as the key to organizational change processes.

3.3 Examples of the research on constructive controversy From the beginning of our own research on constructive controversy numerous opportunities have arisen to make use of it. Some of them came from postgratuate professional education courses, some from collaborative partners from the business world or consulting practice who were interested in using the procedure. For example, constructive controversy has been used as the setting in an assessment center of a large finance institute and is thus part of their personnel development procedure at the upper management level. Considering that many assessments are oriented towards individual assertiveness, the use of constructive controversy represents a clear shift towards cooperation as a principle of managerial action.⁵⁷ Postgratuate professional education proved to be another field of application for constructive controversy. The procedure was used in courses for juvenile court judges, social workers and dentists. Value conflicts and contradictions (antinomies)⁵⁸ often arise during interprofessional collaboration on case-based crisis management, which can be reflectively or prophylactically treated with constructive controversy. In addition, constructive controversy is also used to develop critical thinking in a university. The method was in a first step used in a large group event to discuss different ways of how to teach critical thinking. In future, it will be used in courses to develop students’ critical thinking abilities. Hence, constructive controversy is also entering the literature and the repertoire of methods for critical thinking in psychology.⁵⁹ As a final example we should mention dialogue-based school architecture. When educators, architects and the public administration plan and construct a school-building jointly it involves not just common goals but different interests and perspectives which have to be put into the joint effort of a successful process. Constructive controversy thus helps the transdisciplinary social discourse at the community level.

 See Clases ().  Helsper (), Schütze ().  See Dunn et al. (), Sternberg et al. ().

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3.4 The ‘last mile’ in conflict research In another publication we have discussed the desirability and the necessity for researching the route from theory to practice.⁶⁰ By the ‘last mile’ we mean all the efforts to carry out intervention research. Constructive controversy stands out with its theoretical foundation, its wide-ranging empirical evidence, and its practical procedure. Hence, for practice it offers the opportunity of working on critical and controversial topics with a robust procedure, making use of a diversity of perspectives, integrating a variety of knowledge, and prompting learning processes which support decision-making processes. This is very important for executives, project leaders and consultants. Moreover, interprofessional cooperation⁶¹ or the social discourse⁶² can also be enriched in this way. In terms of research this offers the opportunity to study constructive controversy directly in work and collaboration processes. This raises further questions about the organizational conditions, the set-up of the controversy process and which effects can and should be aimed at. From an overarching perspective it is quite open how to integrate the method into the culture and structures of a business organization and make it acceptable and effective. Both sides, research and practice, can learn from studying interventions. Research will profit from the closeness to the reality of practice, and practitioners can draw on the theoretically founded method in order to help reach organizational goals. This cooperation between researchers, practitioners and consultants can open up a forum of reflection in which knowledge and experience can be exchanged and new questions can be raised. Hence, the concern is not just to bring a method into practice but also to discover opportunities of making research in the context of application. In this way we can generate further knowledge in ordert to fathom the relevance of different perspectives in decision-making processes. Translated from German by Karsten Schöllner

 Vollmer (a).  Vollmer ().  Johnson/Johnson ().

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Schreyögg, Georg (1999): Organisation – Grundlagen moderner Organisationsgestaltung. Mit Fallstudien, Wiesbaden: Gabler. Schütze, Fritz (1996): “Organisationszwänge und hoheitsstaatliche Rahmenbedingungen im Sozialwesen: Ihre Auswirkungen auf die Paradoxien des professionellen Handelns.” In: Werner Helsper/Arno Combe (eds.), Pädagogische Professionalität. Untersuchungen zum Typus pädagogischen Handelns, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 183 – 275. Schuler, Heinz (ed.) (2004): Lehrbuch Organisationspsychologie (3rd ed.), Bern: Hans Huber. Sternberg, Robert J./Roediger III, Henry L./Halpern, Diane F. (eds.) (2007): Critical Thinking in Psychology, Cambridge: University Press. Tjosvold, Dean/Yu, Ziyou Y. (2007): “Group risk-taking: The constructive role of controversy in China.” In: Group & Organization Management 32, 653 – 674. Van de Ven, Andrew H./Poole, Marshall Scott (1995): “Explaining development and change in organizations.” In: Academy of Management Review 20, 510 – 540. Vollmer, Albert (2015): “Conflicts in innovation and how to approach the ‘last mile’ of conflict management research – a literature review.” In: International Journal of Conflict Management 26 (2), 192 – 213. Vollmer, Albert (2016): “Die konstruktive Kontroverse in der interprofessionellen Zusammenarbeit.” In: Michael Dick/Winfried Marotzki/Harald Mieg (eds.), Handbuch Professionsentwicklung, Bad Heilbrunn: Klinkhardt/UTB, 370 – 376. Vollmer, Albert/Dick, Michael/Wehner, Theo (eds.) (2015): Die Konstruktive Kontroverse. Konflikte bearbeiten, Entscheidungen treffen, Innovationen fördern, Wiesbaden: Gabler. Vollmer, Albert/Seyr, Sarah (2013): “Constructive controversy research in the business organizational context – A literature review.” In: International Journal of conflict management 24 (4), 399 – 420. Vygotsky, Lev (1978): Mind in society: The development of higher psychological processes, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wehner, Theo/Raeithel, Arne/Clases, Christoph/Endres, Egon (1996): “Von der Mühe und den Wegen der Zusammenarbeit. Ein arbeitspsychologisches Kooperationsmodell.” In: Egon Endres/Theo Wehner (eds.), Zwischenbetriebliche Kooperation. Die Gestaltung von Lieferbeziehungen, Weinheim: Psychologie Verlags Union, 39 – 58. Wenger, Etienne/McDermott, Richard/Snyder, William M. (2002): Cultivating communities of practice. A guide to managing knowledge, Boston: Harvard University Press. Wright, Robert (2000): Nonzero. The Logic of Human Destiny, New York: Virginia Books.

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Multiperspectivity as Contribution to “Good Governance” Experiences from the Humboldt-Viadrina Governance Platform Abstract: As is well known, politics is a field of highly different and conflicting perspectives. This diversity of perspectives is of systematic importance in democracies. For government and parliament face the task of determining where there is need for regulation that is accepted by large parts of society. At the same time they are supposed to write laws and regulations in a way they can be legitimized as fair and oriented towards public welfare. The article emphasizes the tensions between different legitimate particular interests. It argues for strategies of a more intensive dialog between three groups of actors whose perspectives play a special role regarding the negotiation of socially sustainable consensuses. These are perspectives of: state politics, business, and organized civil society. The goal of this “trialog” is the expansion of perspectives. This concerns on the one hand the long-term and sustainable own interests and on the other hand the requirements of the cooperation between the different social interest groups. The crucial dynamics of the trialog consist of the participants learning from each other to understand the respectively different perspectives of thinking and acting and then implement the results into joint designing.

1 Current grave deficits in citizens’ belief in democratic legitimacy A key starting point for the following reflections is a practical political problem symbolized by the ongoing crisis in credibility experienced by our democracies and the increasing deficit in citizens’ belief in the legitimacy of democratic political decisions. I do not consider legitimacy to be an ‘objective’ philosophical or legal justification; instead, I see it as a citizen’s subjective belief in legitimacy. The decline of this belief in legitimacy has its roots in the structural difficulties inherent in our political system, and not simply in the collective personal defeat of politicians and/or the citizenry. The so-called ‘output legitimation’, i.e. the justification of democracies by means of their performance and ability to deliver solutions, continues to decrease significantly. Our societies are becoming increasingly heterogeneous and, over the

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past several decades, the gap between rich and poor has continued to grow. At the same time, however, levels of education have risen, thus making these same societies more capable of expressing criticism. As a result, it has become increasingly difficult to reach decisions that meet with the approval – that is, their voluntary consent rooted in their belief in the legitimacy of these decisions – or at least the acceptance of citizens. Ultimately, it comes down to the age-old problem of justice and the orientation of political actors and institutions towards the common good. Political decisions are characterized by the fact that on the one hand they are controversial, on the other hand are expected to ultimately determine obligatory and binding regulations with regard to the controversial tasks. When decisions appear to be unjust, they undermine the trustworthyness of the democratic system, which citizens generally expect to be just. Without a minimum of justice – which we cannot determine a priori in an abstract manner – politically oriented decisions will not enjoy any legitimizing acceptance in society. We must therefore ask the following question: Considering the current state of affairs, how can we encourage belief in the legitimacy of such binding commitments among citizens? How can we convince citizens that their own thoughts and behavior have an influence on politics (self-efficacy)? How can we show them that they can live out this self-efficacy in an active way and even integrate it into their daily lives as a constitutive element of the democratic process? Indeed, belief in legitimacy and identification by participation go hand-in-hand with the responsiveness of decision makers towards society.

2 The Western democratic tradition The following reflections on the basic conditions of democratic participation as preconditions for a belief in legitimacy are tied to the tradition of democratic theory in the context of pluralistic societies. They contain elements of both the liberal and republican tradition. Non-democratic political systems make no claim to the voluntary empirical consent of citizens; instead, they legitimize themselves in historical-philosophical or religious ways. Such systems will be left out of the present discussion due to the fact that the problem we are dealing with here simply does not exist in these systems, at least in theory. Non-democratic states standardize the empirical plurality of society using transcendent assumptions and/or moral imperatives; for example, in conflict situations, obedience is often physically enforced (an approach that doesn’t always succeed). Of course, our current world is made up of many political systems and power con-

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stellations that approve of and/or practice such uses of force; however, they do not offer any solutions to our question with regard to democratic legitimacy. One of the greatest modern-day challenges to democratic legitimacy is the increasing tendency to favor technocratic decisions that actually serve to invalidate and/or undermine democratic political decisions. However, much like dictatorships, such movements have no claim to any independent democratic legitimacy; instead, they profit from moving undetected within democratic systems and by playing out their ‘expertise’ against democratic politics. Thus they do not represent a democratic alternative to democratic legitimacy. This is an important problem in present European Union. In the tradition of Western theories of democracy, it is the task of institutions and processes to guarantee that legitimate political decisions can be made in pluralistic societies. In keeping with John Locke’s suggestion of a social contract, society chooses representatives for a limited period of time; these representatives hold parliamentary debates and pass laws that are then carried out by the government. At the same time, parliaments must work together with an independent legal authority to monitor the actions of the government. In doing so, ‘representatives’ must ‘keep in mind’ the interests of their constituents, their own individual interests respectively convictions and – in parliament – the interests of the common good. The double meaning of ‘representation’ mentioned here conceals the tension that exists between (legitimate!) vested interests and the ‘just’ common good that democracies seek to achieve simultaneously. In other words, this tension is evidence of the latent ‘seed of discontent’ involved in the theory and practice of democratic representation from the very outset. This situation is mitigated somewhat by Locke’s theory and the subsequent tradition of deeming society – in contrast to Thomas Hobbes’s approach – actually capable and willing to come to necessary common decisions in spite of diversity and opposition of interests. Both in theory and in practice, Western democracies require an a slight surplus of trust in human beings’ ability to reason and communicate in order to balance out any skepticism with regard to these qualities. The various institutions and processes in place to reach agreements are different in each different democracy; however, what they have in common is that they are ultimately designed to put the government and parliament into a position in which they can package the plurality of interests into legitimate, accepted and thus fundamentally just decisions. In this constellation, institutions and processes are also dependent on a political culture that guides the subjective behavior of citizens and public officials in such a way that it remains in line with the spirit and function of the institutions; for example, to make sure that they actually want to unite vested and impartial common interests. A blatant restriction or immersion in a particular interest (see Milton Friedman’s phrase: “The business of business is business”),

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which would leave it up to specialized ‘policymaking’ alone to resolve the tension, cannot do justice to the norm of democratic political culture. This culture includes values such as fairness, moderation, ‘love’ for the political equality of citizens (“l’amour de l’égalité”, Montesquieu), respect for human rights, etc. These are virtues that citizens and political officials should heed and practice in equal measure. Institutions, processes and democratic political culture must therefore work together to ensure legitimate and accepted decisions. Of course, in a historical-empirical context, there have always been clear deficits in the justice of democratic decisions. Indeed, the sheer diversity of interests – combined with the various opportunities these interest groups have to yield their influence – serve to encroach upon the decision-making process. Any attempt to balance out of this situation by means of mobilizing and organizing groups of less powerful individuals (for example, in labor unions or associations) has never been fully successful. In fact, in the past several decades, legitimacy beliefs in most democracies have suffered to an even more dangerous extent than before: this, in turn, is leading to the discrediting of the political system of democracies, at least according to empirical evidence, but partly now in theory as well. Among the warnings signs are significant declines in voter participation (for example, in Germany, where roughly 20 % of society has now ‘tuned out’ of all forms of political participation) and increases in social protests and scattered violence.

3 Systemic reasons for the growing deficit in citizens’ belief in the democratic legitimacy of Western democracies Firstly, the regulatory sphere of nation-state democracies corresponds less and less to the areas in which important trans-national actors are active, in particular the business community. As a result, the external costs of a global economy (unemployment, environmental degradation, resource depletion, inequality dynamics, social conflicts, etc.) can no longer be adequately influenced and dealt with in the national regulatory sphere. And yet, this is precisely what citizens expect their governments to be able to do. Thus, the democratic promise of political equality among all citizens – the equal right to self-determination that would ideally be carried out in the economy and society – can no longer be fulfilled, because every government is subject to the above-mentioned systemic limitations. Secondly, in a parallel manner, we have seen a marked decline in citizens’ consciousness – particularly in the case of economic actors – as active citizens

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(‘citoyens’) obliged to behave in the service of the common good. At the moment, behavior is often highly concentrated on vested interests, i. e. the profit of the company. Using the logic of the division of labor, economic actors want to leave this work just decision making up to elected political representatives. In this sense, Milton Friedman argues that “The business of business is business” but not, somehow, also “social responsibility”. Karl Marx’s argument that capital “has no fatherland” is unexpectedly confirmed in this radical formula that would have not applied in advanced industrial societies even 30 years ago. Today, in an era in which business profits are king, multinational companies can no longer muster any national loyalty. Mind you, this does not in any way preclude a global commitment with regard to universal human and civil rights. Thirdly, national democracies alone are less and less able to handle additional challenges to political activity, primarily with regard to climate change, poverty, migration, financial markets, resource consumption, terror and all security-related issues. Although it might seem obvious that cross-border cooperation between governments could reestablish a balance between the areas of expertise of nation states and political challenges, this is extremely hard to achieve, given that the dynamics of domestic politics tend to narrow down the interests of national political actors to the nation-state perspective: this is the case, of course, because they receive their political power from national, not from transnational elections. As a result, a nation-state will take into account trans-national needs and concerns only if it can transform them into national ones. An excellent example of this dynamic is currently underway in the battle of European countries against tax loopholes for international companies. On the whole, however, the past several years of the “European Council” have, more often than not, confirmed the general logic of nation-state narrow-mindedness. Fourthly, the social complexity mentioned at the beginning of this essay is increasing dramatically and in correlation to the complexity of regulatory matters and the conditions in which they are embedded (for example, in prior legal regulations). Our societies are becoming more confusing and more complex as a result of globalization, migration and internationalization – but also because of the individualization observable since the 19th century. This makes social integration and political consensus-building quite difficult. In the initial decades of democracy after World War II, parties and associations in the pre-state realm were essentially able to integrate different interests and incorporate them into the political decision-making process. This took place not least thanks to confidence inspiring economic growth that promised future rewards where necessary. In this process, lobby groups attempted to influence representatives in parliament and government – in keeping with a ‘traditional’ theory of democracy – while also trying to push forward their political

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views and, first and foremost, their interests. In this context, representatives were still able to fulfill their task, which is to strike a balance between these vested interests and the common good. This success was made possible, ultimately, because at that time the economy had not yet fully unbound itself from the nation state, but still remained connected to it (f.i. “Deutschland-AG”). Today, however, as a result of various social, economic, political and cultural developments, the traditional institutions and processes designed to integrate and prepare a form of democratic politics that is credible and enjoys legitimacy among citizens are no longer sufficient to fulfill their fundamental tasks. The ‘output’ of decisions merely results in increasing levels of mistrust among citizens with regard to political equal opportunity and justice. This is first and foremost the case as the influence of financial power in the lobby system – a degree of power that contradicts the fundamental maxims of political equality of citizens in democracies – is becoming increasingly and more strikingly evident due to growing social inequalities.

4 The counterstrategy: Expansion of the institutions and processes that foster consensus in the pre-state realm One key opportunity to renew citizens’ belief in the legitimacy of democracy would come about if we were able to develop institutions and processes that are favorable to a mutually beneficial social understanding and orientation towards the overall well-being of society, while also developing a new political culture of responsibility that would enable and encourage common understanding with regard to the balance between vested interests and the common good. The challenge here lies in organizing the decision-making process in the pre-state realm in such a manner that it paves the way for basic social consensus with regard to just solutions. This would make it possible in the first place for parliaments and governments to make political decisions that are perceived as sufficiently just and thus legitimate. The perception of justice as a subjective side of legitimacy will not succeed if tangible injustices are too large. However, we cannot a priori determine a precise correspondence between the two. This balance is significantly dependent on the subjective side of participation in generating a basic consensus in matters of justice. In fact, the act of participation itself is already an indispensable and favorable part of an equitable solution. It offers political freedom in the form of co-determination, which is psychologically essential for the perception of justice and

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legitimacy. At the same time, it permits citizens to bring in their own points of view and interests. Indeed, a person who participates in decisions does not feel overlooked and can also represent his or her view of things. As just solutions cannot be derived metaphysically via ‘objective’ indicators in purely theoretical manner, we need institutions and processes that complement – not replace! – traditional parties and associations by effectively contributing a wealth of perspectives that can be integrated in the search for solutions to controversial political issues while also eliminating imbalances and injustices. The idea developed here is not aimed at achieving pure justice; instead, it aims to exclude grave injustices by means of a diversity of perspectives. Within a corridor of solutions that serve the common good, the representative institutions would then make specific decisions; these decisions might be different, but they would still satisfy citizens’ belief in their legitimacy. The following considerations are tied to the basic assumption that society is willing and able to come to an understanding (Locke). Furthermore, it is assumed that deliberation (rational argumentation) can open up opportunities to determine ‘generalizable’ interests (Kant to Habermas). Such multiplicity of perspectives away from particularity should, at least, be able to pave the way for political solutions that don’t damage citizens’ belief in the legitimacy of the system because they avoid clear vested interests The discussion contained below will only briefly examine the complex theoretical implications of these assumptions. Instead, the focus will be much more on the question of how the enlargement of perspectives can be implemented in political practice and what it can bring about.

5 The opportunities and limits of deliberation in generating common understanding in the pre-state realm In early theories of representative democracy, parliaments were the site where a rational argumentative exchange of ‘generalizable’ interests in the service of the traditional common-good took place. Today, however, we see very clearly that the ever-present power perspective in parliamentary debates precludes a debate oriented towards the common good. In other words, debates are no longer oriented towards the well-being of society; instead, they are instrumentalized or at least colored in favor of the desired majority in parliament. Indeed, debates often move away from the exchange of reasoned arguments to more of a mutual lecturing on individual viewpoints. As a result, in addition to the calamitous effect on the diversity of perspectives, the liveliness of the debate also suffers. It is im-

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portant to remember, however, that a certain degree of power orientation is indispensable (and manageable to varying degrees) in order to create the reliable voting majorities without which governments would be unstable. The idea of converting parliaments back to deliberative gatherings devoted to pursuing the truth alone is not very promising; instead, much more success can be found in experiments that attempt to practically implement the concept of a so-called “deliberative democracy” by means of additional subsidiary activities and/or institutions. This idea focuses on the strengthening of basic liberaldemocratic beliefs by means of three approaches: 1. Political solutions that are founded in a variety of perspectives; 2. an argumentative exchange in society; and 3. bringing to bear the solutions generated by initiatives focusing on basic consensus and common understanding in the pre-state realm. So far, we have not come up with a patent recipe for this, and this is due to the different normative goals of deliberation and all associated deficits in implementation proposals and their reach. In other words, the more demanding the normative goal of deliberation, the more difficult and – in case of doubt – the more elitist, that is, less inclusive the implementation. The most far-reaching goals of deliberation postulate that ‘objectively’ the best political suggestions come about by means of an open exchange of arguments in the sense of substantiations and justifications of political preferences Thus, for all intents and purposes, the procedure secures good results. However, this is the case only when the participants actually want mutual understanding, when they all de facto follow the discourse (inclusion) and when they are able to come to an agreement about the basic assumptions of their common understanding. In tangible political reality, hardly any of these conditions is given from the outset. Moreover, it is much more possible and even likely that they will produce, at most, a very abstract consensus on the maxims and principles of argumentation, rather than on individual decisions or even the ‘direction’ of decisions to be made via deliberation. Another ambitious goal is to generate overall political cohesion in democracies by means of (rational) deliberation and, in doing so, to ‘impregnate’ the decisions made by representative institutions. This is precisely where tension arises between political power and what Habermas calls “dominance-free discourse”, which ideally excludes questions of power. The search for truth that underlies deliberation stands in contrast to the task of democratic politics, which is to always be able to involve the aspect of power – under conditions of pluralism and different power potentials representing interests – just as much as a confusing complexity of regulatory matters. However, it must do so in such a way that the concentrated power is not permitted to push its way through without restraint; instead it must be restrained, ‘washed’ or ‘filtered’ by means of a

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truth-oriented discourse. Here, the goal is to find a compromise between two regulatory ‘currencies’: truth discourse and power. Ultimately, the current social and political reality – even in democracies – provides no evidence that democracy and its support by means of deliberation lie empirically in the interest of all citizens or social actors. Here, much has changed since the end of the East-West conflict. For example, in today’s economy, many representatives of one-sided business interests that concentrate entirely on their company’s (short-term) profit tend to give priority to authoritarian political systems – at least they admit so in private conversation. Indeed, authoritarian elites can provide faster ‘rational’ decisions in favor of business (e. g. without environmental considerations and delays) than democracies. This example points to an idea that could be developed further by means of the realistic introduction of deliberative democratic elements; the idea centers on the opportunity to use an argumentative exchange of perspectives to expand the time horizon and push forward towards something de Tocqueville referred to as enlightened long-term self-interest. This self-interest meets with the common good when the time horizon and ‘enlightened understanding’ are broad enough with regard to included viewpoints and/or perspectives. Indeed, in the longer term, authoritarian regimes can in no way offer conditions that facilitate faster and more sustainable decisions, because they leave social problems unsolved, and these have negative longer-term effects on economic investments, for example, with regard to the legal reliability or social peace. Large-scale social unrest in China with fatal consequences is just one example.

6 Developing processes that foster deliberative common understanding in the pre-state realm At the outset, it would seem reasonable in deliberative practice to modestly formulate the agreement by way of social consensus. However, in order for this to work, it would be necessary to show in advance that a pluralistic society actually needs a basic consensus in order to have a common reference level for political conflicts and controversial decisions; a common reference that is systematically accepted by all citizens – even in the case of political defeats – because they have a general trust in the political system. In other words, the joint establishment of an enlightened long-term self-interest would have to be preceded by an insight that such a basic consensus is indeed even desirable in the first place. This insight cannot be imposed on anyone. Only when powerful and globally active business and political actors (democratically elected as well as from

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organized civil society) have understood for themselves that their long-term interest lies in the functioning of social democratic cohesion of national societies – e. g. by means of patient deliberation – will they become willing to form a common understanding about such a basic consensus. In this case, the term ‘sustainability’ – a concept taken from climate and generational debates – provides a helpful bridge. Indeed, its meaning continues to expand and it thus becomes unclear; but this is something it has in common with the related concepts of ‘common good’ from the history of philosophy. While the latter term is considered by many to be old-fashioned and utopian in a negative sense, the term ‘sustainability’ is seen as being adaptable to different discourses and social milieus. This is indeed useful for our purpose of generating common understanding on the basis of fundamental social consensus. As one of the initial goals of the deliberative process, the idea of reaching an empirical common understanding is sufficient – there is no need to impose a theoretical agreement. In addition, the goal of identifying ‘objective’ truths about the process of deliberation must be lowered. In general, the desire to include a diversity of perspectives remains incompatible with a single universal truth. In other words, provisional and carefully considered understandings are, in practice, sufficiently valuable. In deliberative practice, however, the goal of inclusion must be examined precisely. In fact, in practical terms, in a society of millions of citizens, deliberation cannot be practiced as a unified, all-encompassing event. Of course, the goal of inclusion within a deliberation group continues to be a valid one. However, the question arises as to how to reconcile the necessarily limited scope of deliberation – in particular in terms of the number of people involved – with its overall social relevance. Indeed, the end result of democratic deliberation should, in fact, shape social and political decisions in support of justice and legitimacy – even in the weakened form of the enlightened long-term self-interest of individual actors. And yet, deliberative democracy can be practiced effectively only in manageable social units. Considering the ignorance of broad and often particular powerful circles of society with regard to the theoretical foundations of representative democracy and its legitimation principles, it would seem appropriate to convince especially these circles to participate in deliberations by means of appealing to their enlightened long-term self interest. This approach will certainly not succeed in events that are open to the public. Instead, especially when dealing with powerful participants, it is essential to provide the protection of confidentiality in order to gradually achieve openness with the group that prevents a situation in which participants act in an exclusively instrumental way and/or pursue a hidden agenda. The ‘filtering out’ by the public sphere in favor of the relativization of particular perspectives is

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thus the result of the combination of the following factors: confidentiality, patience with regard to those who are not used to arguments and justifications by means of ‘higher’, i. e. more inclusive reasons and who thus initially do not feel up to the task, and the ‘fascination’ that such arguments are interesting and also highly valuable for transparent self-understanding, for enlightened self-interest and for the generation of information that is as wide-reaching as possible – aspects that are highly relevant, for example, for the purpose of future investments. In other words, the public sphere is removed as a central category of deliberative democracy. An exploration of the ways in which the public sphere can be won back in a different manner is one of the ongoing tasks to fulfill. If we consider the various limitations of the original deliberation model with regard to its feasibility, we can draw the following conclusions: – In practice, instead of ‘objective’ results and agreements, we can only achieve the widest possible empirical understandings and agreements. – Instead of the common good, we should set our sights on enlightened longterm self-interests, the concept of ‘sustainability’ and the exclusion of clear vested interests. – Instead of the factual, personal inclusion of all citizens, we have to make a selection of citizens from the outset without excluding individuals within a deliberating circle. – Instead of deliberations open to the public, we must first hold confidential discussions that provide protection and thus enable mutual openness. In other words, the question of the practicability of deliberation places a series of drastic restrictions on the theoretical model. How can we look at deliberation in a practical way, and which questions relating to democracy and the theory of truth provide us with practical models? How can we compensate for the restrictions inherent in practical implementation? These questions will be examined using the example of Trialogs, which were developed over several years at the Humboldt-Viadrina School of Governance and which are continued today at the Humboldt-Viadrina Governance Platform.

7 Democratization and multi-stakeholder dialogues: Historical background and how our Trialogs work Our Trialogs have been in place for five years and are tied to reflections on how to strengthen democracies and democratic politics that were developed in the

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1960s. These approaches came into existence under the names ‘Democratization of Sub-systems (‘Teilbereiche’) of Society’ and ‘Participatory Democracy’ in the context of nation-state democracies. In the 1980s, they were developed globally into an approach involving multi-stakeholder participation. In the framework of nation states, the focus was on ‘underpinning’ representative-democratic systems in sub-systems, such as labor, education, health, culture, etc. Parallel to that, there were several attempts to create ‘councils’ (e. g. business and social councils, corporatism). In these councils, the most important social groups would carry out discussions in parallel to parliaments, the results of which would then flow into the legislative process. The focus here was primarily on agreements between employers and labor representatives, on the one hand, and other social groups, such as consumers, on the other. These, too, already followed a multi-stakeholder approach, even though that term did not figure in the public debate at the time. This approach gradually asserted itself beginning in the 1980s against the backdrop of globalization and the delimitation of entrepreneurial activities. In this period, many companies followed the primacy of ‘shareholder value’ in line with the supremacy of supply-side economics; indeed, they often hardly noticed the ‘stakeholders’ (employees, consumers, social and ecological environment, etc.) at all. The multi-stakeholder movement reacted in this manner to a number of challenges, including the following: – the narrowing of the definition of economic success to the (short-term) profit of the shareholders, on the one hand, – the cross-border activities of multinational corporations, and – cross-border political challenges stemming from nation-state behavior but also from the external costs of multinational corporations. At no point – neither in the first wave of national democratization in the 1960s and 1970s nor in the multi-stakeholder movement since the 1980s – was it clear or in any way ‘derived’ from democratic theory which stakeholders should be involved in these initiatives that ran parallel to parliamentary work. There was also no answer provided to the question of what kind of authority or functions these new groupings should possess: all opportunities were represented, from providing information to participating in decisions. The motivations were also quite different: in fact, they went from goals such as a more effective form of conflict resolution, social integration, the ‘involvement’ (or smoothing) of the opposition until the expansion of citizens’ democratic participation in political decisions on voting rights and levels of representative democracy. Indeed, in the course of the 1990s, the multi-stakeholder movement continued to develop in three key areas: in negotiations on the construction of dams

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(World Commission on Dams), in discussions about water supply and in debates over the war on corruption. More and more, the focus was placed on involving political and business entities and an increasing number of independent experts – and thus an increasing number of representatives of organized civil society – in the global cooperation between states. This took place in order to give more weight to the interests of affected citizens, e. g. to investment decisions with far-reaching consequences. This step was also designed to work against corruption, which often took place to the benefit of politicians and companies’ private profits and led to a destructive misallocation of public resources for unnecessary projects, such as the construction of dams. The challenge facing the new multi-stakeholder approaches at that time was to shape economic globalization in favor of human and citizens’ rights by means of new actors, processes and the help of a network of regulations in which business “had its hands in the game”. One of the results of these efforts was the “Global Compact”, which UN Secretary General Kofi Annan announced in 1999 in Davos. By way of the Global Compact, Annan sought to hold multinational corporations accountable for committing to 10 principles in their respective fields of activity. These principles contained essentially the safeguarding of human rights, civil rights and employment rights alongside with the protection of the environment and the fight against corruption. As a result of this development, not only governments, but also companies were required – and are still required – to voluntarily commit to assuming political responsibility and reporting on any relevant activities to the public sphere. Civil society initiatives, such as the “Global Reporting Initiative”, became necessary in order to verify the accuracy of the information made public by the corporations. Due to the lack of recourse to legal penalties in the case of misdemeanors, the leverage of these new governance forms lies entirely in the threat of a possible public loss of reputation. In the case of corruption, this leverage also comes into effect by means of the exclusion from public procurement opportunities and the subsequent severe economic consequences, e. g., when companies convicted of corruption are put on the ‘black list’ with regard to public tenders. In this manner – that is, for historical and pragmatic reasons – the state, the business community and non-profit organized civil society became the key players in a new form of ‘antagonistic cooperation’ – one that expanded the traditional ‘government’ of representative democracy to a more comprehensive form of ‘Good Governance.’ These three functioned respectively as the initiator, monitor and transparency-creating ‘cleansing sand in the gears.’ Consequently, the levels and means of civic participation in political decisions also expanded; not formally by means of guidelines issued to parliament, but instead by means of the mobilization of the public via information, cam-

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paigns and a growing number of possible solutions, such as the “Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative”. Here, a multi-stakeholder board consisting of representatives of states, multinational corporations and a variety of non-governmental organizations agreed on regulations. These guidelines seek to reveal the sums of money paid by companies to states for the purpose of acquiring the rights to exploit natural resources: they also reveal the related income of countries in order to render them transparent in the context of national budgets and the political decisions taken with regard to the use of these means. Every year, these numbers extend to sums in the double-digit billion range.

8 The conceptual basis and practical design of our Trialogs In the past five years, the Humboldt-Viadrina School of Governance followed by the Humboldt-Viadrina Governance Platform have used democratization and multi-stakeholder experiences as well as the historical and theoretical considerations mentioned above as a basis upon which to develop Trialogs focusing on three key themes: ‘Partnership Family as a Common Good,’ ‘Reform of Financial Markets’ and ‘Energy Transformation as a Common Effort’. The goal of our Trialogs is to develop consensus-based social agreements and long-term ‘sustainable’ policies in the pre-state realm. In essence, they follow the procedure of deliberation. The Trialogs are multi-stakeholder gatherings that take place over an extended period of time and enable confidential argumentative exchange. Here, various policy-related positions and arguments – the same positions and arguments that are also raised in parliament as in the public sphere – are tested for their durability and soundness in a ‘deliberative’ manner i. e. in the form of an ethical discourse. Using Habermas’ idea of a dominance-free discourse as a theoretical basis, this ‘ethical’ discourse requires the following factors, among others: – mutual respect among participants as responsible citizens – an openness to alternative positions – an orientation towards common understanding – the argumentative substantiation of positions rather than mere assertions – the ability to create links to the arguments and rationales put forward by other participants – an openness to different contexts of meaning, e. g. political and economic ideas of order, but also so-called ‘narratives’ that give meaning to origins

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of problems and positions (for example, with regard to major transformations in energy policy) and develop critical powers of persuasion. As part of our Trialogs, this exchange includes the participation of representatives drawn from the worlds of science and media. Scientists take part not as stakeholders of their own vested interests (i. e. as members of a professional association), but rather as diversely oriented ‘input sources’ who contribute their knowledge to the deliberative social discourse. This is designed to act as a complementary alternative to the standard form of advising social groups and state institutions by means of scientific reports or ‘fireside chats’. The media’s function in this context lies in the public dissemination of the deliberations beyond the circle of participants. However, this dissemination must be carried out in keeping with the Chatham House Rules, i. e. without assigning any of the arguments to individual persons. The principle of confidentiality that marks the discussions has two objectives, i.e., to promote an environment of open exchange and then create a trusting atmosphere among participants. These two objectives have been successfully met in the past five years; indeed, this fact has been proven by accompanying scientific research on the Trialogs. However, it has meant that the principle of the public openness of the deliberations has been deferred in favor of the principle of confidentiality. The goal of the Trialogs moving forward is to systematize anonymous argumentation. In the future, this systematization will enable us to make the results of deliberations accessible to the public in the form of visualizations. In actual practice, the Trialogs have carried out a ‘realistic’ and thus reduced version of the deliberations described above. The difficulty of ‘inclusion’ – a comprehensive openness to the participation of all citizens – was handled in a manner that took into account the experiences of global innovation initiatives and focused instead on the idea of multi-stakeholder participation. In other words, the Trialogs reflected the necessary reduction in the number of participants based on group membership. This means that they moved away from the original idea of deliberation, which emphasized individual citizens rather than groups of actors.

8.1 Organizing multiple perspectives The Trialogs organized by the Humboldt-Viadrina Governance Platform foster a common understanding that serves the common good of stakeholders drawn from the worlds of state politics, corporate sector and organized civil society (accompanied by media and science). This mixture is a key factor in the success of

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each Trialog; in other words, the broadest possible spectrum of controversial social positions is a prerequisite for making use of the positive effects of the diversity of perspectives in the service of the common good. The following question arises: What makes these three actors – in their ‘antagonistic cooperation’, in which the conflicts between them are continually argued out with the goal of understanding – especially suitable for the deliberative preparation of a pre-state consensus favoring sustainable politics? At this point, a discussion of the concept of ‘representativeness’ becomes important, especially considering the ambiguity outlined above, i. e. the representation of vested interests as well as the common good. It is clear that the different interests of these three groups of actors do not cover all possible social groups, nor do they encompass in any way all individuals who have the right to vote. Nevertheless these groups have a particularly important role to play in terms of sustainability: Due to their different functions, practical experiences and power potentials in society, they represent three entirely different perspectives that are constitutive of credible democratic politics. The concept of antagonistic cooperation best illustrates the relationship between the three groups of actors. Although deliberations are carried out with a view to cooperation, the conflicts that inevitably ensue lead to the emergence of a transparency of interests and positions that is absolutely essential for a viable consensus. The prevailing model – in which politics and business alone cooperate – implicitly encourages people to behave in line with the motto ‘one hand washes the other’. In contrast, organized civil society seeks to uncover consensuses at the expense of third parties. Organized civil society is capable of doing this because it is not bound to business interests, political parties or legislative periods. Which is not to say that civil society is always right or always behaves in a moral way. Thus, the first benefit of this constellation of conflict and cooperation designed to strengthen citizens’ belief in the legitimacy of democracy lies in increasing the transparency of decisions that enable trust. In addition, each group of actors contributes their own expertise and resources. Established institutions of state politics and democratic government contribute their fundamental and comprehensive responsibility and obligation to generate the socially binding decisions that legitimize them to take action. This is important because social consensus is supposed finally to arrange for sustainable political decisions. Thus it cannot be applied practically without weighing the constraints that exist in the complex context of government action. Unlike the private sector and organized civil society, government policy cannot be confined to a limited number of objectives and aspects. Instead, it must deal basically with the entire spectrum of interests and bring about their intellectual and practical transfer in the form of a compromise among them. Among the aspects which state politics have to take

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into consideration are their power of social and political sanction (over elections and/or investments), their positive contribution to the common good, their functional legitimizing indispensability and their special professional expertise. Overall, government policy is obliged to lead this confrontation – with all of its opportunities and risks – in order to guarantee its own success and maintain its own power. In other words, its contribution and specific perspective lie in its own comprehensive responsibility. Of course, it always remains somewhat removed from this normative democratic benchmark. Indeed, the potential for social power held by groups and people (for example, large business units) who hold the right to veto ends up to influence state actors and place pressure on them with regard to their vested interests; plus, this influence is also often carried out in a non-transparent manner. In other words, different interests and their related assertive power do not engender a situation that promotes a balance of justice. This is yet another reason why it is necessary for independent stakeholders to uncover democratic deficits in government activity and to offset power imbalances; this can be achieved by means of transparency and an appeal to the public sphere, among others. And this remains a permanent task of democratic politics. Incidentally, we should by no means equate ‘politics’ with ‘party politics’. Although parties contribute decisively to policy formulation and the “forming of political will among citizens” (Art. 21, Germany’s Basic Law) in parliamentary representative democracies, government policy is also influenced by a diversity of other factors and is bound by the constitution to work for the common good. The ‘non-partisan’ ministerial bureaucracy is also bound to work on behalf of the well-being of society. The corporate sector is characterized primarily by the right to defend its vested interests in the economic success of companies. Its specific experience is the handling of uncertainties of doing business in the context of markets that offer both opportunities and severe dangers. With regard to politics, the corporate sector presents an important and both positive and negative power factor. Its interests are focused on creating and maintaining reliable and affordable market conditions for companies. On the one hand, this means protection and security; both provided, if necessary, by the state. Indeed, the corporate sector depends on state regulation in order to have a ‘proper’ chance to succeed in an environment of fair competition. On the other hand, the corporate sector wants to be as independent as possible in terms of its own behavior – from the state and from the market. This allows us to elucidate the reasons as to why the corporate sector stands in conflict with government politics, but also to see its motivation to cooperate. At this point, we can also determine connecting factors for the common good as sustainability and/or enlightened long-term self-interest. Indeed, this requires the ex-

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pansion of the temporal and material horizon of conventional economic vested interests. Conversely, the temptation of the corporate sector to focus entirely on its own vested (short term) interests must be addressed and balanced out time and again. Companies have unique and democratically positive opportunities to influence situations, and they can often achieve more by means of intercorporate mechanisms than nation-states forced to participate in protracted intergovernmental negotiations. Examples of such opportunities can be found in trade organizations that control supplier and customer chains, but also in the realm of human rights. However, what is empirically valid in all cases is that companies act preponderantly in accordance with their short-term interests rather than for the long-term common good. This behavior is grounded in the correlation of economic power and legitimate (capitalistic-business administrative) vested interests. In other words, whoever has power is less willing to cater to other interests. The central task of future democratic politics also lies in further developing incentives as well as sanctions for companies such that they are encouraged to adopt democratic-political responsibility. Whether this succeeds or not depends on the answer to the following secular question: What forces will govern human affairs in the future? Will it be unregulated markets or negotiated policies? The answer to this question will also determine whether human beings become an appendage to the economy or, on the contrary, that the economy works to serve the people. In theory, organized civil society oriented towards the common good has no other interest than to create policies that serve the well-being of society. It is the force most likely to be able to revive the resonance relationship described above – because it has the greatest interest in doing so. Indeed, unlike elected representative political bodies, it can concentrate on specific subjects and social groups as part of its orientation towards the common good. This means, however, that it also runs the risk of narrowing its focus to a particular perspective. And yet, if it seeks to garner and maintain public credibility, it cannot simply put blinders on and limit itself to individual issues without thinking of the consequences for others. In fact, organized civil society has to a great extent become the representative of ‘systemic’ and/or ‘holistic’ thinking. In this role, it publically thematizes the connections and side-effects of political decisions and carries out campaigns to achieve its goals. It is able to do this because it is not dependent on input legitimation. It can act independently of elections and legislative periods which, in turn, is also the reason why it does not enjoy the legitimacy of elected political institutions. It gains its social trust not least by means of conflicts and campaigns. And it is precisely this trust that it can contribute to the credibility of democratic decisions and thus also to the strengthening of democratic legitimacy. Its particularistic temptation lies in the absolutization of its specific commitment to the common good.

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In general, a multiplicity of perspectives does not simply emerge out of nowhere – it has to be organized. And this is precisely where our Trialogs come in. In order to achieve a diversity of perspectives, it is necessary to create a balanced relationship of stakeholder groups as well as different perspectives within these groups with regard to the subject under examination. While a Trialog cannot guarantee that all conceivable positions on a subject will be represented, the goal remains that we nevertheless attain an approximation of the social state of the debate. In order to be able to carry out a targeted acquisition of participants, a significant degree of expertise in terms of content and viable contacts is required. It is also necessary to have a well-prepared mode of address and invitation relating to the content of the gathering. And, finally, we must provide attractive conditions that make it possible – even for highly busy participants – to participate in a full-day event, the results of which are entirely open and cannot be predicted in advance.

8.2 Establishing Arguments The philosophy of the Trialogs takes up John Locke’s basic assumption that members of society are largely capable of communicating and coming to understandings with one another on the basis of their reason and fundamental sociability (Kant calls it “ungesellige Geselligkeit” or “unsocial sociability”). This means that the three groups of actors – political bodies, the business sector and organized civil society – are not hermetically sealed off from one another. This is true with regard to the individuals and their attitudes and goals. In turn, the Trialogs seek to overcome the borders of social sub-system by means of ‘multilingualism’, which involves having the participants learn to have a mutual understanding and appreciation of the logic behind their respective ways of thinking and behaving. We create transparency in discussions by means of argumentative deliberations that are often full of conflict. It is important to us that participants substantiate their positions – only then can we break through the deadlocked political debates that often resemble mere unrelated presentations of positions. In hosting the Trialogs, we pay special attention to ensuring that the different substantiations are related to one another. This allows for the development of discourses that elucidate the most widely possible scope of accepted solutions to political questions and problems. Is there any common ground to be found? At what point exactly can participants agree on a way to approach the subject? Where exactly do the participants’ various enlightened self interests meet and enable a joint perspective that takes into account the common good?

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The substantiation of arguments can also be seen as a benefit resulting from the framework of our Trialogs. Indeed, participants are often simply not used to actually substantiating their arguments and relating them to one another. In contrast to the voicing of opinions and the discussion of (non-personal) points of view, substantiated arguments require much more time and patience. Yet another goal of deliberative discussion is that the various positions and arguments be flexible and that participants are open to being persuaded by compelling content, and also to attempt to persuade others. Many stakeholders consider this process to be unusual and even somewhat risky, for example, when politicians stray from party lines and when company representatives stray from official corporate communication. In such cases, trust is essential, and this trust can only be generated by means of a trustworthy moderator and, ideally, by multiple meetings, e. g. in series of Trialogs. Indeed, the role of our host moderators has proven to be one of the keys to the success of the Trialog process. Our Trialogs offer the opportunity to uncover respective mutual deficits and to find compromises in a constructive manner. These compromises must take into account the minimum requirements expressed by each of these social actors and thus contribute to the creation of a ‘corridor’ for a possible variety of just decisions. At the same time, these compromises represent three fundamentally different social perspectives that result from their functions, power potentials and practical experiences. By virtue of these perspectives, they serve to cover large parts of overall social interests.

8.3 Uncovering Basic Consensus It is especially important to us that the results of our Trialogs are traceable and have a sustainable impact on political decision-making processes. Part of our Trialog concept thus also includes a thorough handling of the results. We used scientific methods – that is, qualitative and methodically reflected text analyses – to identify interfaces among the different arguments. This allows us to determine which of the different stakeholders’ themes, arguments and justifications actually relate to each other and what weight is given to respective issues and arguments. Our goal is to demonstrate valid corridors of consensus so as to show possible solutions, open up paths and pass on the results to political bodies, for example, in advance of policy initiatives and decisions. The uncovering of basic consensuses has a very special relevance for the implementation of the deliberative approach. Indeed, establishing a corridor of consensus cannot take place merely through individual perceptions, reports

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and memories or by means of the subjective perception of the perspectives and arguments in the Trialog. At this point, it is much more essential to maintain – and perhaps even strengthen – the trust outlined in the process by undertaking a truly objective evaluation of the Trialog. For this purpose, our Trialogs are recorded and transcribed. Our employees thus have a verbatim report available to them for scientific evaluation. In addition, we have also developed an evaluation procedure that is aligned with the field of qualitative social research. Of course, we cannot guarantee absolute objectivity; however, a high degree of independent verifiability is generated by means of our methodical and documented approach. In the process of evaluating the Trialog transcripts, we are able to formulate corridors of basic consensus and pass them on to participants, initiators and any other relevant bodies. Trialog events are subject to the Chatham House Rules. This allows us to generate the trust that ensures confidentiality and thus an open discourse. In other words, the evaluations (and also the participants’ reports) made available to the public do indeed contain the content of the discussion, but this content is not allocated to a speaker referred to by name. In the future, we will continue to press forward with regard to the visualization of the Trialogs; in fact, we see here a tremendous opportunity to make deliberative procedures available to a broad public. With this advancement, our goal is to close the gap that exists between the two following points: on the one hand, the process follows the desire to open up a broad area of resonance and encourage participation; on the other hand, successful deliberation requires a manageable group of people and confidential framework. Even after positive experiences in practice, the basic question remains: Can the triad of politics, companies and organized civil society represent all social interests and perspectives? Of course, it cannot. However, the experience of the Trialogs organized by the Humboldt-Viadrina Governance Platform has shown that the triad can indeed embody a representative majority of interests if the argumentation carried out by the three groups of actors follows the rules of deliberation. This form of deliberation allows the range of the three different perspectives to come into play while also illustrating the built-in conflict between them with regard to their functions, practical experiences and power potentials in society. Thus, empirically they serve to embody a representative majority of interests. It is only when a connection is established between the ‘truth discourse’ and the practical-empirical diversity of perspectives of essential social functions and actors that the form of ‘representativity’ is generated that is pragmatically required for basic consensus and a corridor of just solutions.

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9 Summary In order to make democracy attractive and sustainable again, new approaches in the political sphere are needed. The goal of the Humboldt-Viadrina Governance Platform is to foster trust in political decision-making processes and to support decisions oriented towards the common good. Our Trialogs provide a format to do just that. They represent a proven deliberative process designed to enable fair and confidence-building political discussions and to equip decision-making processes in a fundamental manner. In the pre-state realm, our Trialogs offer an arena for the clear articulation of different perspectives, interests and factual arguments among stakeholders, thus making these perspectives highly transparent. In other words, our Trialogs stand in stark contrast to traditional hearings, lobbying efforts and expert conferences. In essence, the success of our Trialogs lies in two dynamic factors that lead to ‘generalizable’ and broad representative interests in the deliberation between the opposing interests held by the three stakeholders: the inclusion of additional temporal and expert perspectives derived from different participants and the differentiation that results from the arguing of their positions. By involving of a broad spectrum of actors, our Trialogs enable a quick and comprehensive overview of different social positions and their associated motivations. They also provide concentrated access to the many facts and facets involved in the current state of social debates. The empirical evaluation of our Trialogs has shown that after a while participants get used to relate their arguments to previously presented ones. This goes along with mutual respect followed by trust building and social integration of the participants fostering the inclusion of further perspectives (i.e. of future generations or differing social strata). The public character of deliberation as a mean to reach the common good can only be realized empirically through a visualizing of the discourses without referring to the individual participants. This further step which also aimes at contributing to a more transparent and mature public opinion oriented towards an idea of public good is still to be done. I am grateful to Dr. Audrey Podann and Katja Treichel M.A. for their critical reading of this article. Translated from German by Julie Hagedorn

Michael Bongardt

The One True Faith On the Dynamics of Interreligious Conflicts and Attempts at Reconciliation Abstract: The step to an explicit consciousness of distributed perspectives is not to be taken for granted in the world of religions. As long as it is part of the religious self-conception to view one’s own standpoint as absolute and other religions as not only different but also false and bad, an appreciation of the plurality of religions cannot emerge. The article explains a recurring “choreography” and chance in interreligious processes of communication: identity-establishing demarcations are partly broken open again in the dialog. Surprising similarities are discovered. But delight at this discovery soon gives way to the insight into lasting, insuperable differences and unfamiliarities. The paper argues, that the appreciation of distributed perspectives in religious questions cannot be separated from the reciprocal appreciation of the differences in the respective perspectives. The appreciation of other perspectives at least requires the reflected insight into the limitation of one’s own perspectivity. The questions and problems regarding the appreciation of distributed perspectives in interreligious dialogs can be productively deployed also for the reflection on other perspectival conflicts.

Even in the eyes of his sharpest critics, Jürgen Habermas could never be open to the charge of being a pious missionary or even a religious zealot. As such, it is all the more remarkable that he has persistently expounded the thesis that there are a number of things that non-religious members of a secular society can and should learn from religion. According to Habermas, religion holds “encapsulated potentials for meaning”, and it is in the interest of secular society, in particular, to discover and to translate this meaning.¹ This thesis also forms the background to the following investigation. Habermas, as a rule, refers to particular matters of belief within religious traditions, such as his frequent mention of the doctrine of man created in the image

 Habermas (), : “Aufgrund dieser Erfahrung der säkularisierenden Entbindung religiös verkapselter Bedeutungspotentiale können wir dem Böckenförde-Theorem einen unverfänglichen Sinn geben”. The term “verkapselte Bedeutungspotentiale” is not included in the official English translation of the text (Habermas (), ).

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of God and the notions of sin and redemption.² By contrast, the observations and reflections presented here primarily concern the self-understanding of religions and how this undergoes transformation. Such transformations are a permanent process, which can be driven from internal as well as external forces. The most interesting changes in religious self-understanding to be addressed here are those closely linked to an increasing awareness of religious plurality and the potential for conflict that resides within this plurality. In today’s world, encountering individuals of other religious faiths is part of the everyday life of many people. Religiously charged conflicts, often spilling over into violence, have determined the political agenda far more frequently than secular observers, with their predictions on the end of religion, would have, up until quite recently, ever deemed possible. Not only are religious people being solicited for assistance, but they must also ask themselves whether and how they can contribute to the resolution of such conflicts. The search for solutions quickly and routinely leads to the very heart of religious self-understanding. This is because it is frequently characterized by the idea that other religions are not only different, but, for this very reason, also false and bad. This viewpoint is also bound up with the anxiety that the affirmation of the other could destroy the certainty of and commitment to one’s own religious convictions. Examining the changes in religious self-understanding with respect to religious plurality, one suddenly discovers a certain ‘choreography’ that recurs with startling regularity. Time and again, the processes of interreligious understanding traverse an apparently natural sequence of various phases. (1) A process of demarcation takes place at the very start of the formation of every religious community and tradition, without which its identity cannot emerge. (2) If the believers can overcome these created boundaries to perception and contact, they discover surprisingly many similarities in other religions. (3) The resultant proximity, however, also permits recognition of differences with the potential for conflict, which, in turn, endanger this proximity. (4) It then remains a matter to decide what attitude to take towards this suddenly once-again alien counterpart and the extent to which one is prepared to make changes in one’s own self-understanding. In the following discourse, these four phases will be presented and analysed. They will be illustrated with the assistance of concrete examples. For the sake of comparison, all of these examples will be taken from the same context, namely, the history of the relationship between Judaism and Christianity, primarily represented here by the Catholic Church.

 Habermas (),  f.

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The process analysed here can, but not necessarily, result in a religious selfunderstanding characterized by an insight, achieved through reflection, into the limited perspective of one’s own faith. This insight – and only this insight – makes possible the recognition of other perspectives, in particular, the perspectives of other religions. As such, observing the process of interreligious dialogue could prove profitable in learning about the development of ‘distributed perspectives’ in other contexts as well. Before developing this briefly introduced thesis, it is necessary to begin by making two preliminary clarifications. First of all, it is necessary to explain how the controversial concept of ‘religion’ will be applied in the following discourse.³ In this context, ‘religions’ are to be understood as specific “symbolic forms”,⁴ which allow individuals to interpret reality and serve as a means to seek orientation. Ernst Cassirer pointed out in his philosophy of symbolic forms that religion, as a horizon of interpretation developed over a long period of time, inseparably encompasses a theoretical interpretation of all things perceived together with practical relevance for everyday life. Religion differentiates itself from other forms of understanding the world, such as the natural sciences, by its reference to a reality that transcends all possible experience and tangibility, an everlasting transcendent reality, which is usually referred to as divine. A religion is only alive when and as long as people understand themselves and the world within the horizon of that particular religious tradition. This is certainly the case today with respect to the great monotheistic religions as well as Asian religions, whereas the Hellenistic pantheon has long since ceased to function in this capacity. ‘Religion’ as such is therefore not an acting subject or even one capable of reflection, but is rather the respective form in which people effec-

 On the debate concerning the scope and content of the concept of religion in the field of religious studies, see Zinser (),  – .  The concept of “symbolic forms” is taken from Ernst Cassirer. He employs it to designate his fundamental insight in the philosophy of culture. Cassirer regards the symbolic form as the link between a ‘sensory sign’ and a ‘cognitive meaning’. According to Cassirer, the experience, understood as interpretation, always takes place within the horizon of pre-existing horizons, which have arisen through previous experiences of the “symbolic forms” in the widest sense of the term. Cassirer’s works will be cited from Ernst Cassirer, Werke. Hamburg Edition (ECW). For the main features of his philosophy, see Cassirer (). On Cassirer’s interpretation of religion as a symbolic form, see Cassirer (), in particular pp.  – , as well as Cassirer (),  –  (the work war originally published  in English as Essay on Man, now: Cassirer (),  – ). On the reception of Cassirer’s philosophy in the fields of the philosophy of religion and theology, see Bongardt (), Höfner (), Korsch/Rudolph (), Moxter (), in particular  – , Richter ().

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tively live and understand their religiosity. Accordingly, the ‘self-understanding of a religion’, the transformation of which will be investigated here, is more precisely formulated as the self-understanding of devout people who regard themselves as members of a particular religion. This can find its expression and orientation in authoritative texts, which, not infrequently, are authorized by religious institutions. Yet, even the most sacred texts of the highest authority, such as the Bible and the Koran, are subject to constant change – not, of course, in the actual texts, but certainly in terms of the interpretations imposed upon them.⁵ This is because the people interpreting these texts live under constantly changing conditions, which also leave a mark on their religious understanding and self-understanding. Consequently, the analysis planned here is both possible and necessary. This analysis is not, however, in itself religious, as it does not seek to theologically interpret the changing forms of religions. This discourse will instead concentrate on providing a cultural-historical description and a philosophical reflection thereof. Secondly, the possible recognition or even appreciation of ‘distributed perspectives’ could result in religions being of interest not only in an interreligious context. From a structural viewpoint, the relationship between various denominations within a particular religion and the conflict between religion and the natural sciences bear a great deal of similarity. For the sake of conciseness of description, the scope of subsequent reflections will be limited to interreligious relations and their repercussions for the self-understanding of religious people.

1 Original demarcation With the publication of his book Moses the Egyptian⁶ in 1997, Jan Assmann, Egyptologist and scholar in the field of cultural studies, sparked an intensive debate in the history of religion as well as in theology. His main thesis is that religious and mythical beliefs in ancient Egypt and the surrounding great empires at the time did not provide any cause for conflicts. Only with the emergence of a religion claiming to worship the one true God did the previously unknown differentiation between one true and all other false religions appear in the world – and with it the potentially violent struggle for and about the true religion.⁷ The debate initiated by this thesis, which, among other concerns, focused on the capacity of monotheistic reli-

 See “Die Bedeutung der Heiligen Schrift”, chapter  in: Dirscherl/Dohmen (),  – .  Assmann ().  Assmann (),  – .

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gions to bring peace, led to conclusions of great significance to the topic under investigation here. These conclusions – and not the course of the debate – should therefore be examined in this context.⁸ Fundamentally, a structure comes into being only through demarcation. A concept is only useful when it is ‘defined’, that is, limited. It has to be made clear what it means and what it does not mean. The personal identity of an individual arises and undergoes change by demarcating it from other individuals. It is not that these constantly confronted boundaries prevent permanent relations with others, but that they are, in fact, what allows relationships to occur in the first place.⁹ The same is true for societal organizations and therefore valid for religions as well. Religions exist only on the basis of the demarcations that they draw – in that they pass down certain myths and not others, in that they practice rites in a prescribed form and in no other, and in that they have set out and implement clear rules for living together, which differ from the rules of other religions. As Assmann clearly shows, the concrete development of religious forms and identities has occurred under a wide variety of conditions. In the epoch he investigated, the formation of religious identity was functionally allocated and subordinated to different processes of demarcation. The primary concern was the differentiation between various tribes and peoples, as well as between their political forms of organization. Religious myths played an important role in ensuring the genesis and significance of the respective social or political unit, as the myths served to guarantee their cohesion and system of social rules. Not least of all, the religious system of interpretation permitted groups to locate themselves within the totality of nature and the cosmos.¹⁰ In the time of these so-called gentile religions, the knowledge that different communities had different forms of religion posed no problem. In fact, it was taken as a matter of course. The religions of the others were regarded as comparable to one’s own, and were even translatable into each other. As an essential argument for the coexistence of different religions, Assmann cites preserved lists of equivalent names of gods that enabled travellers at the time to recognize their own religion

 Important contributions to this debate include Angenendt (),  – ; Walter (), Schieder (). The theological side in these contributions frequently points to the duty to maintain and facilitate peace that is based on monotheism.  Cassirer took notice of and also influenced Gestalt Therapy, the development of which led to the insight that the border is the condition for the possibility of contact. See Perls (), section I..  Assmann (), .

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in that of the others.¹¹ This was possible because a wide-reaching functional equivalence prevailed. Every religion and every mythical world was aware of a multitude of gods, to which were ascribed various functions – from the creation of the world to passing judgement over the dead. Just as natural was the conception that people could expect support from their gods in times of war. As such, the outcome of a war could be interpreted as proof of the strength or weakness of the respective gods.¹² Against this backdrop, it is not only possible to comprehend the fact that military victors usually introduced their religion in conquered territories, but also to see that the necessary transformations were often very easy to carry out. Within this framework, the decision of the Roman Empire to allow its various peoples to continue to practice their (functionally equivalent) religions, on condition that they did not stand opposed to the interests of Roman rule, could be seen as a sensible strategy.¹³ In short, as long as the crucial process of distinguishing between social groups was not based on religious criterion, conflicts would not arise in the sphere of religion. On the contrary, they could even help to pacify borderlands. This does not, however, exclude the possibility that there were developmental processes within and between religions, which resulted in the adoption of originally foreign elements or in the rejection of certain traditional beliefs. Such processes of transformation could have eventually led to certain groups within a religion breaking away from each other as they focused on different gods in their practices of worship. A clearly different situation arises when a religion oversteps the boundaries of a particular political or ethnic group and thereby abandons its role of functional classification in the process of demarcating the group. As soon as this takes place, a religion must determine these boundaries itself in order to obtain its own form. Then it will not only turn against its ties to the former group, but, first and foremost, position itself against other religions. Assmann is thoroughly correct when he sees this turning point in the attempt by Echnaton to introduce strict monotheism in Egypt finally being achieved in the presumably historically related development of Mosaic monotheism.¹⁴

 Assmann ((),  – ) offers numerous examples of such lists.  The perception that the God of Israel manifests his power by helping his people achieve military victory can be found throughout the Hebrew Bible. A prime example is the “Song of the Sea”, the victory song sung after the crossing of the Red Sea (Bible, Exodus : – ).  Losehand () offers a discerning contribution in response to Assmann’s critique of monotheism.  An important distinction must be upheld here. The rule of Echnaton (Amenophis IV, dec.  B.C.) and his attempt to radically transform the Egyptian religion through the introduction of monotheism are historically verifiable and now well researched. The historicity of the

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Assmann refers to the incipient process of religious demarcation and selfdefinition as the establishment of a “counter-religion”.¹⁵ This designation certainly applies to some of the most important aspects of the development of religions. Religions never arise out of a religious ‘void’. There is always a starting point – an already existing system and set of religious beliefs, from which and against which the new religion can set itself apart.¹⁶ Just as Hinduism and Buddhism could not have arisen without their pre-existing Vedic forms, there would be no Christianity without Judaism, and no Islam without them both.¹⁷ Reformers, who in retrospect are regarded as the founders of a religion, were, as a rule, initially themselves members of the ‘old religion’ from which the ‘new religion’ then sought to set itself apart. Christianity can be seen as a special case in that its claimed founding figure, Jesus of Nazareth, was never himself a Christian, but rather always wished to be and remained a Jew. Taking a confrontational stance towards that which preceded it is one of the conditions for the emergence of a religion and becomes a permanent feature of its self-understanding. What is far-reaching for its further development is the fact that the demarcation is usually accompanied by a denigration of the preceding religion, to the point of qualifying it as a ‘false’ religion. This is all aptly captured in Assmann’s concept of the “counter-religion”. Nevertheless, this trenchant concept remains problematic. This is because it obstructs the view of the fact that despite the goal of discontinuity through a conscious break with tradition, there still remains a considerable degree of continuity. Elements from the teachings, rites, and forms of living are adopted. It is not uncommon for reformers to claim that they are even truer to the source than the others who invoke it.¹⁸ Yet, another observation, and one particularly impor-

traditional Biblical figure of Moses is, by contrast, still controversial. And for the people of Israel, the development of a strict monotheism, with its “Mosaic distinction” setting clear borders between the true God and the world of idols, was certainly a process that lasted centuries, which achieved its aims at the earliest during the period of exile (th century B.C.), some  years after Echnaton. In the Biblical tradition, this development is nevertheless closely bound with the person of Moses.  Assmann (), .  According to the preliminary fundamental thesis of the historically as well as hermeneutically thorough investigation by Grünschloß ((),  – ).  The present investigation will repeatedly focus on the reciprocal perception of Christianity and Judaism. Concerning the Jewish and Christian preconditions for Islam, see Neuwirth ().  This also applies to Jesus of Nazareth, who emerged with the claim of reasserting the original understanding of the Torah (Mathew : –  and : – ), as well as to Muhammad, who accused the Jews of falsifying the message of Moses and the Christians of falsifying the message of

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tant to the present discourse and its interest in ‘distributed perspectives’, can no longer be grasped by the concept of a “counter-religion”, namely, that a state of affairs characterized by permanent dissociation from the respective other does not have to remain frozen in confrontation. This significant differentiation to Assmann’s position, however, in no way places into question that new or reformed religions and denominations regularly emerge from previously established religious forms through a process of demarcation. This is particularly well illustrated by the previously mentioned example of the relationship between Christianity and Judaism. It remains the case that Christianity would be unthinkable without Judaism, and not only due to the fact that Jesus of Nazareth, as well as his disciples and most of those who encountered him, were Jews. From the viewpoint of the philosophy of culture, it is apparent that early Judaism provided the interpretive framework in which Jesus of Nazareth understood both himself and his mission, as well as providing the structure with which the early Church attempted to interpret Jesus and his fate. The belief in a God, borne witness to in the Holy Scriptures, who chose the people of Israel as His own and to whom He gave commandments on how to live a life pleasing unto the Almighty, forms foundation that binds the life of Jesus and his contemporaries; the apocalyptical and eschatological ideas of his time form an essential background to his message of the coming kingdom of God; the prophecies of the Hebrew Bible made it possible for the Church to interpret Jesus as the awaited Messiah; and the essential elements of devotional practices developed in the early synagogues were adopted by the Church. And the list does not stop there.¹⁹ Current historical research has made considerable strides in correcting the traditional picture of the development of Judaism and Christianity. Judaism is no longer equated with the (Israelite) religion from which the Hebrew Bible originated. It is much more the case that Judaism developed almost simultaneously with Christianity. Both faiths referred to the Hebrew Bible as the normative basis for their life and beliefs. Yet, they interpret these sources differently. While Christianity employed the prophetic-eschatological line of Old Testament scripture in order to develop its teachings of Jesus Christ, Judaism was primarily concerned about the possibility of liberating the transmitted faith from its fundamental bond to the Jerusalem Temple cult and thereby reform itself, in particular, through the development of its own scriptural piety and erudition. The most recent research demonstrates that the Jesus and who understood the revelation of the Koran as a renewed revelation of the original truth (Koran, Surah : – ).  The hermeneutical function of the Hebrew Bible for Christianity is presented in detail in Dohmen ().

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development of both religions, despite their common reference to the Hebrew Bible, occurred with mutual demarcation as well as massive reciprocal denigration. Forms of theology, ritual, and practical concerns of everyday life were developed in an idiosyncratic mixture of reciprocal adoption and rejection.²⁰ In a remarkable contrast to this practically impossible to unravel “entangled history”²¹ of Jews and Christians are interpretations documented in each tradition whereby the other is declared to be a false religion. The theological interpretation of Judaism from the Christian perspective cannot however ignore the fact that Christianity has Jewish roots or, to be precise, the same roots as Judaism. The Church chose to include the Hebrew Bible as part of its own Holy Scriptures. Yet, quite early on, Judaism, which had been initially recognized, was deemed to lack any legitimacy as soon as it was a matter of the religion’s continued existence. The fundamental thesis was that God revoked his covenant with Israel because the Jews were not prepared to accept Jesus as the Messiah and Saviour – in other words, because they were unwilling to become Christians. The Passion narratives in the New Testament were so interpreted to hold the Jews responsible for crucifying Jesus, thereby bearing the collective guilt of murdering God. The inheritance of disinherited Judaism was then claimed by the Church, with which God had made a new covenant. The broad consensus within the Christian Church, even in antiquity, held that after Christ, Judaism, from which Jesus emerged, had lost its right to exist.²² The terrible consequences of this delegitimation of Judaism, for which new reasons were repeatedly conceived, are well known. Judaism was in a clearly different situation than Christianity in a two-fold sense. From a religious-theological perspective, it was not reliant on Christianity in order to understand itself. It did not have ‘Christian roots’. In terms of politics and society, however, Judaism, quite early on and, subsequently, on a permanent basis found itself in a marginalized minority situation with respect to Christianity. The necessity of drawing an identity-preserving boundary to Christianity ensued from this historical framework, and not out of any motivation from within Judaism itself. In this situation, a structurally comparative anti-Christian selfconstitution of Judaism came about, although, in societal terms, it was practically ineffective. Here, as well, only the two most important arguments were cited.

 Probably the most prominent representative of this line of research is the Jewish historian of religion Daniel Boyarin. See Boyarin ().  This concept, central for current research in history, was introduced by Werner/Zimmermann ().  The most important and comprehensive collection of texts on Christian animosity towards Jews in the German-speaking world remains Schreckenberg (). A concise historical and systematic overview is offered by Henrix ().

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The belief that Jesus of Nazareth was the promised Messiah was rejected by appealing to the same prophets that had also been cited by the Church. The promised Messianic Age, a time in which there would no longer be any suffering or oppression, had evidently failed to arrive. According to the second objection, the dogma of the Holy Trinity, asserting the divinity of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit and which is likewise predicated on a specific interpretation of Jesus of Nazareth, was seen as a renunciation of the monotheism stipulated by the Bible. To the extent to which the rejection and delegitimation of the other religious community found place in each faith’s own interpretation of the world and itself, it became ever more difficult to speak of a common horizon of interpretation. Although it is impossible to pin down a precise date, it is certain that at some point in antiquity came the inevitable admission that the two communities no longer shared a common horizon and that two separate religions had arisen.

2 Surprising proximity Religions serve as systems of orientation. They position their believers within a horizon, which, developed over a long period of time and through its specific religious interpretation, is capable of accounting for all encountered phenomena. This makes possible the necessary interpretation of all events currently confronting the believer. These perceptions are classified within the existing horizon and only then can they be understood. Religiously experienced individuals, who have not had any extraordinary or mystical religious experiences, but who have rather grown into the horizon of their religion over the course of their lives, are hardly aware of the interpretative nature of their religious understanding of themselves and their world.²³ They feel no need to call into question their point of view. On the contrary, it is taken for granted, even to the extent of there being no alternatives. Such a self-understanding can prove to be of considerable advantage for everyday orientation. There is no longer any need to struggle with questions, deliberation, or doubt. The resultant sense of security thereby creates a space in which one’s own life can be shaped in freedom.

 In the early th century, the psychologist William James offered what has since become a long-standing definition of “religious experience,” see James (). It starts from the assumption of an extraordinary experience that fundamentally alters the life and self-understanding of an individual. The definition of “religiously experienced individuals” that I employ here is taken from Haeffner (), particularly – .

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Yet, the advantage of having clear orientation and fundamental certainty also has its dark side. This can be seen, for instance, when a horizon, through which a religion is constituted and passed down, firmly entrenches the previously mentioned denigration and rejection of individuals of a different religious faith. In such a case, the traditional interpretation does not open one’s view to the other, but rather distorts it. There is a commitment to only a single perspective out of variety of possibilities.²⁴ There can come a point when the traditional interpretation has grown so strong and has assumed such a degree of independence that there is even no longer any need of evidence in interpreting reality. The results can be seen in the frequently cited “anti-Semitism without Jews”, “anti-Islamism without Muslims”, and – far beyond the bounds of religion – a “xenophobia without foreigners”. Should an encounter with individuals from one of these incriminated groups actually occur, the traditional understanding of these others comes into play. It demands that defensive measures be taken, all the more so since one assumedly knows that there is more at issue than their clinging to the false faith. They must also be either stupid or evil, as there could be no other reason why they refuse to accept the true faith. Can anything other than animosity be expected from them? Those whose perspective is epitomized by such a dark stereotype yet simultaneously see themselves in the light and right will hardly offer their counterpart a chance to demonstrate that he or she does not correspond to these images. Typically, what is required is another reason, one that lies beyond the sphere of religious self-defence, in order for one to abandon preconceived interpretations and to recognize that the others are not adequately described within the confines of these stereotypes. There have been such reasons and there are many: The intellectual, scientific, or artistic powers of the others can awake the need to learn from them;²⁵ oftentimes, wherever people of different religious faiths share their everyday activities – even when this is necessitated by political

 In his analysis of National Socialism, Cassirer described the commitment to a single world view a being characteristic of myth. According to Cassirer, the variety of symbolic forms develops in the cultural and historical sphere only in and after the overcoming of myth. Reanimated with the most modern technical means, myth was used in an attempt by the National Socialists to suffocate any challenge to their politics and worldview. “It is beyond the power of philosophy to destroy the political myths. A myth is in a sense invulnerable. It is impervious to rational arguments; it cannot be refuted by syllogisms” (Cassirer (), ).  It is helpful here to recall two very different examples: The time of the Crusades is quite rightly regarded as a particularly dark chapter in the history of the Church. Yet, it was not only characterized by the belligerent urge to destroy, but also by a curiosity and fascination driven by a transfer of knowledge in the fields of technology, science, and art, in which Muslim culture was vastly superior to the West. See Antes ().

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circumstances – some of them happen to fall in love and see the other with completely new eyes; and then there is the experience of unexpectedly receiving help in times of adversity or even being saved by someone never remotely imagined as capable of performing such an act.²⁶ Experiences arising from such occasions are usually described as a discovery of unexpected commonalities. It not only becomes clear that the other is a human being with same sort of questions, needs, anxieties, and hopes as oneself, but that life poses similar challenges for everyone. Even with respect to the religious practices and mentality of the other, there are surprising revelations: The belief in a transcendent reality that is bound to mankind is equally a part of one’s own and the other’s tradition; forms of prayer, worshiping God, and even the daily routine are much more similar to each other than expected;²⁷ and persuasive individuals, who, out of religious conviction, do not shrink from aiding the suffering and feel bound to high moral ideals are not exclusively to be found in one’s own religion. Jan Assmann’s concept of “counter-religion” allows for a simple explanation of why it is that namely these commonalities provoke a sense of surprise during the process of getting to know the other. In the process of demarcation, the images of the self and the other are construed as rigidly contrary. In light of this horizon, any similarities encountered in reality have to be a cause of amazement. Structurally speaking, such situations where it proves impossible to incorporate the new encounter into the traditional horizon are of extreme importance. As long as those who see the need to correct former interpretations do not abandon their religion nor are expelled from it, the new interpretations not only enter into the traditional horizon, they also alter it. In this way, the religion regains a sense of dynamism, which is fundamentally inherent in every form of understanding the world. The accumulated interpretations and the new perceptions find themselves in a constant process of mutual interaction and alteration,²⁸ unless this permanent transformation is obstructed by ideology. In almost every epoch in the history of religion, there have been people who have ventured beyond the confines of their own faith community and have abandoned the war of counter-religions. These were individuals who have quite often left behind remarkable works contributing to the renewal of religious life in their

 For example, see the parable of the Good Samaritan (Bible, Luke : – ).  Contact between Europe and East Asia, which grew considerably throughout the th century, also led to growing interest in the spirituality developed and lived in the region, particularly with respect to meditation as a spiritual practice. This exchange also led to the rediscovery of meditative traditions within Western Christianity. See Frambach ().  Cassirer ().

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times and even beyond.²⁹ Nonetheless, they represent unique cases, and they were ultimately unable to radically overcome the antagonism of religious self-understanding. There are signs indicating recent changes in the basic constellation described above. In particular, two factors are responsible. The first is a quite positive effect of globalization. This much discussed phenomenon makes encounters with people of different religions, as well as people who are not religious at all, more and more inevitable. Those constructions of religious identity aimed against outsiders, whether out the need for self-defence or not, increasingly lose their credibility and validation. The other factor is the experience that the construction of religious and cultural differences can result in the development of potential for conflicts, which, when escalated, can not only destroy co-existence but also lead to the loss of life. In this context, it is not surprising that there are a growing number of initiatives striving towards a transformed religious self-understanding. Today and more than ever before, the commonalities between religions are not only discovered by chance but rather are deliberately sought.³⁰ Once again, the development of the relationship between Judaism and Christianity can serve here to illustrate the hitherto rather abstract thesis of the surprising discovery of transboundary commonalities. This is not the place to recount the eventful history between Jews and Christians in Europe and the Mediterranean world. Two contrary objectives were alternatively pursued. On the one hand, there was the attempt by Christians to prevent any encounters with Jews. Measures included everything from regional and societal exclusion to pogroms and attempts at annihilation. On the other hand, there was a steady interest in making use of the knowledge and skills of the Jews. This was accomplished through proclamations of tolerance, which were, however, always limited and bound to strict conditions, not uncommonly demanding that Jews give up their ‘otherness’.³¹ A reciprocal ambivalence can be observed on the Jewish side.  Here we recall only the protagonists who characterized the dialogue between the monotheistic religions form the late Middle Ages to early modern times. On the Muslim side: Ibn Sina (Latinised as Avicenna,  –  C.E.), Ibn Rushd (Latinised as: Averroes,  –  C.E.); on the Jewish side: Moses Maimonides ( –  C.E.); on the Christian side: Pierre Abélard ( –  C.E.) and Nicolaus Cusanus ( –  C.E.).  For instance, the large-scale “Projekt Weltethos” with its programmatic title “No world peace without religious peace” attempts to discover the common core of all religions and use this as the basis of political action. See Küng (), .  The account of the history of the idea of toleration provided by Rainer Forst is strongly characterized by the quite variable preferences of Christian rulers with respect to their Jewish subjects. Forst summarizes the forms of tolerance practiced over long periods of time with what he

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The efforts of demarcation stand in constant conflict with attempts to ‘assimilate’.³² The focus here is set specifically on developments in the late 19th century, which, in many respects, could be regarded as new, if not revolutionary. For many Jews, it was practically inconceivable that all of the efforts and successes of the assimilation movement could be brought to a halt and that racist anti-Semitism would enter into such a fateful alliance with the long tradition of Christian anti-Judaism. This did not start with National Socialism, but rather here reached its culmination. Since the beginning of the 20th century, a number of Jewish historians and philosophers of religion reacted to this situation in a manner that was just as unexpected as it was innovative. They specifically had Christians in mind as their intended readers while conducting their research into the person of Jesus of Nazareth and the emerging Judaism of his time. They thereby drew attention not only to the fact, long ignored by the Church, that Jesus was and always remained a Jew. They also made clear that the development of Christianity began as an internal Jewish struggle, and that the essential beliefs, which the Church claimed to be specifically Christian in contrast to the Jewish “belief in the Law”,³³ were of Jewish origin. Moreover, these ideas, developed in early Judaism, have also characterized Judaism to the present day. Here, in a situation fraught with conflict, Jewish scholars searched for commonalities, upon the basis of which many conflicts could have been resolved.³⁴ Acknowledgement to these approaches by Christians, however, only came decades later, when even the Church recognized how heavily involved it had been in the Nazi rule of terror and developments leading up to it. Beginning in the 1950s, a steadily growing number of members of Christian churches demanded a reappraisal of the relationship of the Church to Judaism. An early consequence of these efforts was a document of the Second Vatican Council. Originally intended as a “Decree on the Jews”, the document was expanded, not least of all due to political pressure, into a “Declaration on the Relation of the Church calls the “permission conception”. A societal minority is tolerated out of purely strategic reasons and disciplined through strict constraints that must be obeyed as a condition of toleration. See Forst (),  – .  See, e. g. Volkov ().  The front line of Christian belief in the mercy of God versus the alleged “legalism” of the Jewish belief in the Law was declared, in particular, by Martin Luther in an exaggerated reading of Paul as the specific characteristic of Christianity. See Kremers (), Von der Osten-Sacken ().  The first in a long line of scholars to be named here is Joseph Klausner (), followed by Martin Buber, Schalom Ben Chorim, Pinchas Lapide, David Flusser, and numerous others. A detailed overview can be found in Grunden ().

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with Non-Christian Religions”.³⁵ It is the first official document in the history of the Catholic Church in which other religions are expressly declared to have positive value. The commonalities shared by these religions with Christianity were sought and found. To cite the text: “The Catholic Church rejects nothing that is true and holy in these religions.”³⁶ With respect to Judaism, it expressly repudiated the teaching of God’s rejection of Israel and also stressed here the broad common features shared by the two faiths.³⁷ Following this council declaration, the search for all that binds Christianity with Judaism, as well as with other religions, finally gathered greater momentum. Initially, the Jewish side reacted to these changes with scepticism – a perfectly understandable position considering the almost two thousand year history of Christians attempting to missionize Jews and the crimes committed against Jews in the 20th century. In 2000, a group of respected Jewish scholars published a document entitled “Dabru Emet” (Speak [the] Truth), which positively assessed the revised attitude of Christian Churches and, for its part, also named common features of the two religions.³⁸ A closer look at Christian-Jewish relations reveals that to the extent to which the religions refrain from defining themselves through an explicit rejection of the other religion, common features and similarities become apparent. Moreover, this permits the discovery of a shared horizon in which both religions can understand themselves together.

3 New foreignness In the autumn of 1769, the Swiss theologian Johann Caspar Lavater found himself taken aback and in a state of incomprehension. He was personally acquainted with the philosophers Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, a Christian, and Moses Mendelssohn, a Jew. The two scholars and their friendship decisively shaped philosophy during the Enlightenment, in particular, the philosophy of religion. Lavater valued the work of both men, which extended beyond the established borders of religion to discover far-reaching similarities. Lavater thus considered it appropriate to dedicate to Mendelssohn his partial translation of a French book purport-

 Second Vatican Council: Nostra Aetate (b). On the genesis of the text, see Oesterreicher () as well as Pesch (),  – . On the reception of this text, see Henrix ().  Second Vatican Council: Nostra Aetate (b), No. .  Second Vatican Council: Nostra Aetate (b), No. .  Documentation with Jewish and Christian commentary on individual theses can be found in Kampling/Weinrich ().

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ing to prove the truth of Christianity through philosophical argument. In his dedication, Lavater publically requested Mendelssohn to either refute the book or to be baptized.³⁹ Mendelssohn found this to be an unreasonable demand and decisively rejected Lavater’s request. He was Jewish and wished to remain a Jew. Lavater could not understand him – even with his subsequent attempts to smooth over the rough waves of public discussion. This episode is recalled here, because it is typical for the dynamics of interreligious relations. The situation cannot simply remain frozen at the point where surprising similarities are discovered. The proximity, which itself makes possible the discovery and the surmounting of traditional strategies of rejection, is precisely what makes the differences and otherness all the more clearer. And these do not have to do solely with matters of faith. Culturally and religiously based customs also differ, and these can range from the allocation of gender roles to the upbringing of children and dietary habits.⁴⁰ Even Muslims who acknowledge that Christians worship the same God as themselves, will remain true to Muslim forms of prayer.⁴¹ Political issues can be viewed very differently and also have religious connotations. The Middle East conflict is but only one example of this. There also remains the difference of whether one regards, as do Muslims and Jews, a righteous life in observance of the laws as the central issue of religious identity, or whether the properly formulated profession of faith is elevated to the key criteria of affiliation, as is the case between Christian denominations and between Christianity and other religions. There is no way to completely harmonize theological arguments and systems when the mandatory

 Lavater (), trans. from French into German with explanatory notes, including the dedication to Moses Mendelssohn and the resultant polemical writings between Messrs. Lavater, Moses Mendelssohn, and Dr. Kölbele; as well as the first discussion by the baptism of two Israelites.  In recent years, many books have been published by non-Muslim women, who report on dramatic experiences with their Muslim husbands. Particularly well-known is the book by the American Betty Mahmoody (). In Germany up until the s, it was usual for one of the partners in a marriage between a Catholic and a Protestant to change confessions. Only since  has Catholic Church law permitted a Catholic man or woman in a marriage with a partner from another denomination to allow the baptism of their child in a Protestant church out on grounds of conscience. The Catholic Church still requires an extraordinary permission from a bishop for a marriage between Catholic and non-Christian partners.  In , Pope John Paul II invited representatives of all world religions and Christian confessions to Assisi for the first World Day of Prayer for Peace. Planning for the event was changed due to pressure from the Vatican, which insisted that a common prayer was not possible on theological grounds. A joint opening event was held, but the individual religious representatives held their own religious services. Criticism of the event can be found in Feldtkeller ().

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standard of reflection is variously chosen to be the Torah, the New Testament account of the life of Jesus of Nazareth, and the Koran. Mendelssohn not only rejected Lavater’s request to be baptized. He also refused to take a stand on the book Lavater dedicated to him. The philosopher felt it sufficient to have recognized Judaism as a religion consistent with reason. His various reasons for remaining a Jew could therefore not be rationally invalidated. They remained decisive for Mendelssohn, just as his friendship with Lessing lasted the rest of his life. Yet, such a manner of dealing with otherness discovered in proximity is not at all a matter of course. The limits of commonalities and the discernment of remaining differences may lead to the drawing of some very different consequences.

4 Between fundamentalism and appreciation The step from the confrontational position of systems of interpretation constituted as “counter-religions” to the discovery of commonalities clearly requires a correction of earlier stereotypes of the opposing religion, but it does not call into question the certainty of the truth of one’s own faith. On the contrary, the consensus with those of other faiths can even strengthen this certainty, as the group of kindred spirits grows. The newly discovered otherness, however, has a completely different effect. It can give rise to anxiety. The realization that various religions will apparently co-exist for the long-term leads to the recognition that one’s own religion is just one among many. The established ‘absolute’ truth of one’s own religion now appears in relation to other claims of truth. This is all the more irritating, since the other claims are based on a foundation of discovered commonalities.⁴² Does not this insight, as supported by rapidly emerging feelings of anxiety, necessarily lead to a relativism,⁴³ which destroys all certainty in and bonds to one’s own faith? One possible and often chosen reaction to this anxiety is that of isolation. Via reference to divine revelation, which, in fact, made the isolation possible in the first place, one’s own point of view is protected from every challenge.

 An important overview of the Christian theological dispute concerning Christianity’s claim to absoluteness is offered by Bernhardt (). The most prominent representative of “pluralistic theology”, referred to in the previously cited title, is the British theologian John Hick (). Citations will be made from the German translation of the text (Hick ()).  Such as the general warning given by Joseph Ratzinger on  April  in his homily during the conclave that elected him pope, in which he uses the concept of a “dictatorship of relativism” to categorize the present day. See Ratzinger ().

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Such an immunization from criticism can lead to a relapse into traditional stereotypes, the very ones that the religion originally used in order to define itself. Obviously, as present-day events have shown, only a small step is required to escalate this situation into violent struggle against other religions and confessions. Religious isolation, however, can also be compatible with the conception of existing side-by-side, yet with strictly drawn borders between denominations and religions.⁴⁴ Such a position was advocated by strict religious groups in America during the country’s formative years, where they had fled in order to escape from control by the state and institutional churches in Europe. They were therefore vehement supporters of the religious neutrality of the state and freedom of religion. Clearly, this example demonstrates that fundamentalist religiosity can be affiliated with political liberalism.⁴⁵ Such a political option can, however, be purely pragmatic and based on one’s own requirement for protection. It does not exclude a radical rejection of other religious faiths.⁴⁶ Yet, there are alternatives to such a demarcation strategy, which makes tactical use of tolerance, but has the potential of turning into aggression at any moment. In the development of the modern conception of human rights, the freedom of religion played an important role as a fundamental human right.⁴⁷ Regardless of certain of its religious roots, this idea could initially develop only out of an external perspective on religions. From such a viewpoint, which here also includes that of the philosophy of culture and religion, religions appear as systems providing meaning and orientation, which although internally consistent and binding for their members, each exhibits a concrete form that is dependent on many factors, and is, therefore, contingent.⁴⁸ For this reason, every On the history and current forms of religious fundamentalism, see Alkier/Deuser/Linde (), Klinkhammer/Frick (), as well as Kienzler ().  Marcia Pally offers a remarkably illuminating investigation of this topic in her book. See Pally ().  Forst ((),  f.) refers to such a constellation as the “coexistence conception” of toleration. It is also – as is the previously mentioned “permission conception” (note ) – a crucial strategic calculation. Yet this “can – in conformity with a ‘liberalism of fear’ [Judith Shklat, M.B.] – be guided by a pragmatic insight into the excessively high costs of confrontation and by insight into the horrors and cruelty of religious conflicts.”  Especially Joas (). Clearer than other accounts of the origins of human rights, Joas presents in detail the highly complex and contradictory connections between political developments and religious traditions.  An important differentiation in determining the relationship between religions as well as between political communities and religions is introduced by Forst ((),  – ), as that between universally applicable moral norms and only internally binding ethical values. This permits a plurality of morals, even by religions, whose claim to be tolerated requires a moral justification. Forst expressly rejects the view that practical reason has the ability to judge on

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one has the right to freely choose their religion – or also no religion, as the case may be. This freedom of religion also includes the right to establish an institutionalized form for the respective community of believers as well as to set down obligatory rules of living for its own members, as long as these do not violate commonly binding moral norms and human rights.⁴⁹ A religious, neutral state, which recognizes and guarantees freedom of religion, has the possibility of promoting religions in an appropriate manner, but, above all, has the duty to ensure that the actual exercise of a religion conforms to the rule of law. Violent attempts at conversion or the punishment of believers with measures that violate their human rights, for instance, would be opposed by the authority of the state.⁵⁰ Far more significant in the context of this discourse than any further comment on the nature of a political community that protects the freedom of religion is the analysis of how religions can conduct themselves in such a social system. Two issues must be distinguished here. First of all, it must be ascertained whether religions bow to the rules of a secular state only because of its monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force or because these rules can also be endorsed on religious grounds. Secondly, it has to be determined if the coexistence of different religions is only tolerated because it is the lesser of two evils in comparison to an on-going struggle or if an enduring diversity of religious can also be valued on religious grounds. From a religious perspective, the affirmation of freedom of religion is not simple and is therefore controversial. The most significant counter-argument can be summarized by the question of whether there can be the right to deny the truth or to commit acts of evil.⁵¹ To the extent to which the members of a religion are convinced that it alone knows the truth and the commandments of God, they find it difficult to permit even a single individual from abandoning

the internal claims of truth of a religion, insofar as these are based on the belief in a “superrational” truth. It still remains the task of reason to mark out the moral framework of what is permitted and, thereby, what can be tolerated. See Forst (), .  An instructive example of how controversial it can be to draw these distinctions is the recent debate on the right of Jews and Muslims to circumcise their male offspring during childhood. See Heil/Kramer (). While the articles in this volume tend to be critical, yet positive towards the tradition of circumcision, those who oppose the toleration of the tradition express their views in Franz ().  Habermas (),  – .  In an encyclical from , Pope Leo XIII expressly stated the judgement of the Church that “the various forms of worshipping God cannot have the same rights as the true religion” (Denzinger (), No. ). Only in taking account of this limitation did he approve of the potentially clever political toleration of other religions.

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these elements of faith. The religious advocates of freedom of religion, however, can similarly put forth an equally substantial argument: Can God approve of a belief and deeds that an individual has not freely chosen?⁵² The greater a religion values the freedom of the individual, the easier it must be for it to recognize the freedom of religion. In fact, however, loud demands for freedom of religion in a political context on the part of a religion are usually only made when that religion finds itself in a powerless minority position. When it demands its rights under such conditions, it must, when it wants to be successful, also admit this right to other religions. And, it must also be prepared to grant that right in situations where it is allied to those with political power.⁵³ The argument for religious affirmation of the freedom of religion, however, gains considerably in strength when it succeeds in refuting the relevant counterargument. As soon as other religions are no longer viewed as falsehoods per se, and as soon as a plurality of religions can be valued from a religious perspective, the freedom of religion can no longer necessarily be regarded as the alleged right to stupidity and evil. At least three features found in every deliberated religious conviction permit and indeed call for such an appreciation. The first is the theological realization of the inconceivability of a ‘divine particularism’. God can only be believed in as a God that desires well-being for all mankind. To rephrase this idea in language less dependent on monotheistic terminology: It is necessary to conceive of the divine reality as a reality that, if it exists, concerns and includes all mankind. Only in this manner can God be thought of and believed in as “something than which nothing greater can be thought.”⁵⁴ Secondly, there is the demand of practical reason that God cannot demand anything from man that is not morally good. An action is not good because God desires it, but rather God desires it, because it is good. The belief in a God who arbitrarily determines the differ-

 Significantly this argument can be found in the same text: “And the Church also takes care to ensure that no one is forced against his will to adopt the Catholic faith” (Denzinger (), No. ). This argument emerged in the early Church, as presented by Forst ((),  – ). Forst, however, draws attention to how easily this argument can be transformed to justify religious coercion.  On the reciprocal justification of toleration, see Forst (),  – . As previously mentioned, the initial political motivation by religions in recognizing freedom of religion played a role in the founding of the United States. This likewise applies to the declaration on freedom of religion by the Second Vatican, which remains to be examined.  The famous definition of the concept of “God” offered by Anselm of Canterbury in his Proslogion . See Anselm of Canterbury (), .

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ence between good and evil is not morally responsible.⁵⁵ Thirdly, every reflected belief has its critical epistemic moment. Since it is possible to think of God as a reality surpassing the powers of comprehension provided by human reason, every religious pronouncement made about God must be aware of its limitations. Believers, therefore, must always be aware whenever they speak about God that their thought and words are limited in so many respects that they can indeed bear witness to, but never comprehend God.⁵⁶ Such a deliberated belief would remain unaltered in its reference to God. Believers will strive to conform their lives and deeds to both the reality of God, which necessarily concerns mankind, and the will of God, which obliges adherence to the good. Nevertheless, their belief also makes possible and even demands that they admit their own limitations and thereby recognize the contingent nature of every specific form of belief, a fact that has also been revealed by philosophical analysis. On the basis of their beliefs, believers can thereby understand the plurality of religions as a domain of ‘distributed perspectives’. It is possible, then, to appreciate other religions, because they open up another perspective on the reality of God. Such an appreciation of the other must not necessarily lead to the adoption of this different perspective, and does not even exclude one from viewing certain aspects of another religion critically or, indeed, regarding them as false, since one can find good reasons to consider them as less appropriate to the divine reality.⁵⁷ Yet, this appreciation of the other, recognized from the perspective of every religion, is a religiously possible, if not required alternative to the struggle that follows from demarcation, and which is constituted by disparagement and rejection. In this manner, religion, as a symbolic form of understanding the world, also achieves the reflected insight into the ambigu-

 This is the main result of Church criticism of the Enlightenment – which should not be confused with a fundamental criticism of religion. See Kant (), B  – , A  – .  The awareness in many religions of the limited nature of man’s knowledge of God is taken by Hick ((),  – ), as a main argument for his “pluralistic hypothesis” that many religions offer an equally valid path to salvation.  A final reference to Rainer Forst’s concept of toleration. According to Forst, a necessary precondition for the maintenance of toleration is that the tolerating party has “good reasons” for regarding that which is tolerated a false. Should this “rejection component” be lacking, then one’s position towards the other has become either one of indifference or complete affirmation. See Forst (),  – . The borders between an “esteem conception” of toleration, which still recognizes grounds for rejection, and complete affirmation are fluid claims Forst ((),  f.).

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ity of all encounters, which allows for the recognition of the possibility of other forms and thereby establishes human freedom.⁵⁸ In order to illustrate the evolving alternatives in relation to religious plurality, we will quickly and for the last time focus on the corresponding developments in the Christian-Jewish relationship. There are a great number of Christian texts providing examples of the ‘isolation’ reaction to the persisting foreignness of the other religion. They hold the conviction that an indispensible element of the Christian faith is that human beings can come to God and hence their salvation exclusively through the belief in Jesus Christ.⁵⁹ From this, they conclude, among other things, the necessity of a Christian mission, which also intends to persuade the Jews to be baptized. On the Jewish side, as regards to dogma, there remains the criticism of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, in particular. More important, however, is the resistance to Christian missionary attempts.⁶⁰ Fundamentally, though, it is easier to recognize other religions from the Jewish perspective as from the tradition of the Church. Very early on, the religion of the Israelites developed an awareness that God had made a special covenant with Israel and with this people alone. This conviction was maintained even after the triumph of monotheism, the belief that there is only one God, the God of all mankind. Judaism sees itself as bound by duty to adhere to God’s special covenant with his people. In this way, all peoples should acknowledge God, without thereby having to become or even merely being able to become Jewish.⁶¹ There are other religions, such as Islam or Christianity, through which non-Jews

 “Human culture taken as a whole may be described as the process of man’s progressive selfliberation. Language, art, religion, science, are the various phases in this process.” (Cassirer (), )  On the Catholic side, one can refer, in particular, to the Papal Declaration entitled “’Dominus Iesus’. On the Unicity and Savic Universality of Jesus Christ and the Church” from  (Verlautbarungen des Apostolischen Stuhls (), see the English version on the Vatican internet sites).The text opposes any attempt to relativize the claim to absoluteness of the Christian faith (compare text No. ). Correspondingly, and despite all the reassurances from the Second Vatican Council that the Church holds other religions in high esteem, the text stresses the necessity of evangelizing missionary work. As such, it met with considerable opposition from representatives of other Christian confessions as well as from other religions. On the Protestant side, especially among the free churches, evangelizing the Jews is stressed as a necessity, which is no longer aggressively pursued by the Catholic Church. See the “Berlin Declaration of the Uniqueness of Christ and on Evangelizing the Jews in Europe” (Evangelical Alliance ()).  Corresponding positions can be found in Fisch ().  On the controversial subject within Judaism as to whether one can convert to Judaism, see Homolka/Seidel ().

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can gain access to the God of Israel.⁶² With respect to Christianity, only two important steps to a ‘distributed perspective’ have been named. The previously mentioned Second Vatican Council, deviating from previous Church tradition, referred to freedom of religion as a God given freedom and called upon the state to guarantee this right.⁶³ This recognition is linked to the commitment of the Church to persuade all human beings to make use of this freedom and adopt the Christian faith. A hitherto rarely reviewed doctrinal text goes much further. It characterizes Judaism and Christianity as two legitimate paths in interpreting the Hebrew Bible as a binding orientation.⁶⁴ Looking back on the history of interreligious relations, it becomes clear not only how difficult the path to recognizing different perspectives can be. It also shows the reasons that these difficulties arise and how they can be overcome. This article is not the place to decide the validity of the thesis that we can learn something from this history that will, in turn, enable us to further advance the concept of “distributed perspectives” in totally different spheres of human knowledge and action. Perhaps, however, a survey of the extremely varied contributions in the present volume will help facilitate this endeavour. Translated from German by John Bergeron

References Alkier, Stefan/Deuser, Hermann/Linde, Gesche (2005): Religiöser Fundamentalismus. Analysen und Kritiken, Tübingen: Francke. Angenendt, Arnold (2005): “Gewalttätiger Monotheismus – Humaner Polytheismus?” In: Stimmen der Zeit. Die Zeitschrift für Christliche Kultur 8, 319 – 328. Anselm of Canterbury (1998): Proslogion, in: Amseln of Canterbury, The Major Works, ed. by Brian Davies/Gillian R. Evens, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Antes, Peter (2007): “Kreuzzüge als ‚Identitätskonflikt’ aus christlicher Sicht. Historisches Geschehen und symbolische Deutung.” In: Hansjörg Schmid/Andreas Renz/Jutta

 On a corresponding concept from Maimonides, who in other places maintains the accusation that the Christian teaching of the Trinity contradicts monotheism, see Poorthuis () and Müller ().  Cf. Second Vatican Council (a): This declaration primarily came about in order for the Church to gain acceptance in Communist countries.  A document from the Pontifical Biblical Commission stated in  that “the Jewish reading of the Bible is a possible one, in continuity with the Jewish Sacred Scriptures from the Second Temple period, a reading analogous to the Christian reading which developed in parallel fashion.” (Verlautbarungen des Apostolischen Stuhls (), No. , see the English version on the Vatican internet sites).

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Sperber/Duran Terzi (eds.), Identität durch Differenz? Wechselseitige Abgrenzungen in Christentum und Islam, Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 147 – 159. Assmann, Jan (1997): Moses the Egyptian. The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Bernhardt, Reinhold (1993): Der Absolutheitsanspruch des Christentums. Von der Aufklärung bis zu Pluralistischen Religionstheologie (2nd edition), Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Mohn. Bongardt, Michael (2000): Die Fraglichkeit der Offenbarung. Ernst Cassirers Philosophie als Orientierung im Dialog der Religionen, Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet. Boyarin, Daniel (2004): Border Lines. The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Cassirer, Ernst (1992): Versuch über den Menschen. Einführung in eine Philosophie der Kultur (2nd edition), translated into German by Reinhard Kaiser, Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer. Cassirer, Ernst (1995): “Zur Metaphysik der symbolischen Formen.” In: Ernst Cassirer, Nachgelassene Manuskripte und Texte, vol. 1: Zur Metaphysik der symbolischen Formen, ed. by John Michael Krois, Hamburg: Meiner, 3 – 129. Cassirer, Ernst (2002): Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, 2. Teil: Das mythische Denken, in: Ernst Cassirer, Gesammelte Werke. Hamburger Ausgabe (ECW), vol. 12, ed. by Birgit Recki, Hamburg: Meiner. Cassirer, Ernst (2003): “Der Begriff der symbolischen Form im Aufbau der Geisteswissenschaften.” In: Ernst Cassirer, Gesammelte Werke. Hamburger Ausgabe (ECW), vol. 16: Aufsätze und kleine Schriften [1922 – 1926], ed. by Birgit Recki, Hamburg: Meiner, 75 – 104. Cassirer, Ernst (2006): An Essay on Man. An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture (1944), in: Ernst Cassirer, Gesammelte Werke. Hamburger Ausgabe (ECW), vol. 23, ed. by Birgit Recki, Hamburg: Meiner. Cassirer, Ernst (2007): The Myth of State (1946), in: Ernst Cassirer, Gesammelte Werke. Hamburger Ausgabe (ECW), vol. 25, ed. by Birgit Recki, Hamburg: Meiner. Denzinger, Heinrich (1991), Kompendium der Glaubensbekenntnisse und kirchlichen Lehrentscheidungen, ed. by Peter Hünermann (37th edition), Freiburg: Herder. Dirscherl, Erwin/Dohmen, Christoph (eds.) (2008): Glaube und Vernunft. Spannungsreiche Grundlage europäischer Geistesgeschichte, Freiburg/Basle/Vienna: Herder. Dohmen, Christoph (1996): “Hermeneutik des Alten Testaments.” In: Christoph Dohmen/Günter Stemberger (eds.), Hermeneutik der Jüdischen Bibel und des Alten Testaments, Stuttgart/Berlin/Cologne: Kohlhammer, 133 – 209. Evangelical Alliance (2008): Berlin Declaration of the Uniqueness of Christ and on Evangelizing the Jews in Europe: http://www.worldevangelicals.org/tc/statements/the-berlin-declaration.htm (accessed 7, 28, 2015). Feldtkeller, Andreas (2002) “Assisi, auf die Melodie von ‚Dominus Iesus’ zu singen.” In: Materialdienst des Konfessionskundlichen Instituts Bensheim 53 (1), 1 f. Fisch, Menachem (2002): “Ein bescheidener Vorschlag: Auf dem Weg zu einer religiösen Politik der epistemischen Demut.” In: Christoph Schwöbel/Dorothee von Tippelskirch (eds.), Die religiösen Wurzeln der Toleranz, Freiburg: Herder, 131 – 159. Forst, Rainer (2013): Toleration in Conflict. Past and Present, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Frambach, Ludwig (1994): Identität und Befreiung in Gestalttherapie, Zen und christlicher Spiritualität, Petersberg, Via Nova. Franz, Matthias (ed.) (2014): Die Beschneidung von Jungen. Ein trauriges Vermächtnis, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Grünschloß, Andreas (1999): Der eigene und der fremde Glaube. Studien zur interreligiösen Fremdwahrnehmung in Islam, Hinduismus, Buddhismus und Christentum, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. Grunden, Gabriele (1996): Fremde Freiheit. Jüdische Stimmen als Herausforderung an den Logos christlicher Theologie, Münster: Lit. Habermas, Jürgen (2003): “Faith and Knowledge.” In: Jürgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature, Cambridge: Polity Press, 101 – 115. Habermas, Jürgen (2005): “Vorpolitische Grundlagen des demokratischen Rechtsstaats?”. In: Jürgen Habermas, Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion. Philosophische Aufsätze, Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 106 – 118. Habermas, Jürgen (2008): “Prepolitical Foundations of the Constitutional State?” In: Jürgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, Cambridge: Polity Press, 101 – 113. Haeffner, Gerd (2003): “Erfahrung – Lebenserfahrung – religiöse Erfahrung. Versuch einer Begriffserklärung.” In: Theologie und Philosophie 78, 161 – 192. Henrix, Hans Hermann (2008) Gemeinschaft wider Willen (2nd edition), Regensburg: Topos. Henrix, Hans Hermann (2006): Nostra Aetate – Ein zukunftsweisender Konziltext. Die Haltung der Kirche zum Judentum 40 Jahre danach, Aachen: Einhard. Heil, Johannes/Kramer, Stephan J. (eds.) (2012): Beschneidung. Das Zeichen des Bundes in der Kritik. Zur Debatte um das Kölner Urteil, Berlin: Metropol Verlag. Hick, John (1989): An Interpretation of Religion. Human Responses to the Transcendent, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Hick, John (1996): Religion. Die menschlichen Antworten auf die Frage nach Leben und Tod, Munich: Diederichs. Höfner, Markus (2008): Sinn, Symbol, Religion. Theorie des Zeichens und Phänomenologie der Religion bei Ernst Cassirer und Martin Heidegger, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. Homolka, Walter/Seidel, Esther (eds.) (1995): Nicht durch Geburt allein. Übertritt zum Judentum, Munich: Frank und Timme. James, William (1904): The Varieties of Religious Experience. A Study in Human Nature, London: Longmans Green. Joas, Hans (2011): Die Sakralität der Person. Eine neue Genealogie der Menschenrechte, Berlin: Suhrkamp. Kampling, Rainer/Weinrich, Michael (eds.) (2003): Dabru emet – redet Wahrheit. Eine jüdische Herausforderung zum Dialog mit den Christen, Munich: Kaiser, Gütersloher Verlagshaus. Kant, Immanuel (2009): Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, translated by: Werner S. Pluhar, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. Kienzler, Klaus (2002): Der religiöse Fundamentalismus. Christentum, Judentum, Islam (4th edition), Munich: C.H. Beck. Klausner, Joseph (1925): Jesus of Nazareth, London: Allen & Unwin. Klinkhammer, Gritt/Frick, Tobias (eds.) (2002): Religion und Recht. Eine interdisziplinäre Diskussion um die Integration von Religionen in demokratischen Gesellschaften, Marburg: diagonal Verlag.

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Korsch, Dietrich/Rudolph, Enno (eds.) (2000): Die Prägnanz der Religion in der Kultur. Ernst Cassirer und die Theologie, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. Kremers, Heinz (ed.) (1987): Die Juden und Martin Luther (2nd edition), Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlagsanstalt. Küng, Hans (1991): Projekt Weltethos (3rd edition), Munich/Zurich: Piper. Lavater, Johann Caspar (ed.) (1744): Herrn Carl Bonnets philosophische Untersuchung der Beweise fü r das Christentum: samt desselben Ideen von der kü nftigen Glü ckseligkeit des Menschen, Frankfurt/Main: Johannes Bayrhoffer. Losehand, Joachim (2009): “The Religious Harmony in the Ancient World. Vom Mythos religiöser Toleranz in der Antike.” In: Göttinger Forum für Altertumswissenschaft 12, 99 – 132. Mahmoody, Betty (1987): Not Without My Daughter, New York: St. Martin’s Press. Moxter, Michael (2000): Kultur als Lebenswelt, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. Müller, Karlheinz (1996): “’Nostra Aetate’ und das halachische Konzept der ‘Sieben Noahidischen Gebote’.” In: Walter Senner/Paulus Engelhardt (eds.), Omnia Disce. Kunst und Geschichte als Erinnerung und Herausforderung, Cologne: Wienand, 104 – 110. Neuwirth, Angelika (2010): Der Koran als Text der Spätantike. Ein europäischer Zugang, Berlin: Verlag der Weltreligionen. Oesterreicher, Johannes et al. (1967): “Kommentierende Einleitung [zur Erklärung über das Verhältnis der Kirche zu nichtchristlichen Religionen].” In: Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, ed. by Josef Höfer/Karl Rahner (2nd edition), vol. 13, Freiburg: Herder, 406 – 487. Pally, Marcia (2008): Die hintergründige Religion. Der Einfluss des Evangelikalismus auf Gewissensfreiheit, Pluralismus und auf die US-amerikanische Politik, Berlin: Berlin University Press. Perls, Frederick S. (1951): Gestalt Therapy. Excitement and Growth in the Human Personality, New York: The Julian Press. Pesch, Otto Herrmann (1994): Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil. Vorgeschichte, Verlauf, Ergebnisse, Nachgeschichte (2nd edition), Würzburg: Echter. Poorthuis, Marcel J.H.M. (1993): “Zwischen Vernunft und Wahnsinn: Maimonides und der Messias.” In: Concilium 29, 42 – 48. Ratzinger, Joseph (2005): “Mass ‘Pro Eligendo Romano Pontifice’” (Homily of His Eminence Card. Joseph Razinger, Dean of the College of Cardinals, Vatican Basilica, Monday 18 April 2005): http://www.vatican.va/gpII/documents/homily-pro-eligendo-pontifice_ 20050418_en.html (accessed 7, 28, 2015). Richter, Cornelia (2004): Die Religion in der Sprache der Kultur. Schleiermacher und Cassirer – Kulturphilosophische Symmetrien und Divergenzen, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. Schieder, Rolf (2014): Die Gewalt des einen Gottes. Die Monotheismus-Debatte zwischen Jan Assmann, Micha Brumlik, Rolf Schieder, Peter Sloterdijk und anderen, Berlin: Berlin University Press. Schreckenberg, Heinz (1982): Die christlichen Adversus-Judaeos-Texte und ihr literarisches und historisches Umfeld, 3 vols., Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang. Second Vatican Council (1967a): “Dignitatis humanae. Declaration on Religious Freedom.” In: Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, ed. by Josef Höfer/Karl Rahner (2nd edition), vol. 13, Freiburg: Herder, 703 – 747 [Also available on: http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_coun cils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html (accessed 7, 21, 2015)].

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Second Vatican Council (1967 b): “Nostra Aetate. Declaration on the Relation of the Church to non-Christian Religions”. In: Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, ed. by Josef Höfer/Karl Rahner (2nd edition), vol. 13, Freiburg: Herder, 488 – 495 [Also available on: http://www. vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651028_nos tra-aetate_en.html (accessed 7, 21, 2015)]. Shklat, Judith (1989): “Liberalism of Fear.” In: Nancy L. Rosenblum (ed.), Liberalism and the Moral Life, Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 21 – 37. Stein, Shimon (2006): Nostra Aetate – Ein zukunftsweisender Konzilstext. Die Haltung der Kirche zum Judentum 40 Jahre danach aus israelischer Sicht, Aachen: Einhard-Verlag, 1 – 11. Verlautbarungen des Apostolischen Stuhls (2001): Päpstliche Bibelkommission. Das jüdische Volk und seine heilige Schrift in der christlichen Bibel, No. 152, ed. by Deutsche Bischofskonferenz, Bonn: Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz. [Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. The Pontifical Biblical Commission, The Jewish People and their Sacred Scriptures in the Christian Bible, available on: http://www.vatican.va/ roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/pcb_documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20020212_popoloebraico_en.html (accessed 7, 21, 2015)]. Verlautbarungen des Apostolischen Stuhls (2007): Kongregation für die Glaubenslehre, Erklärung “Dominus Iesus” über die Einzigkeit und die Heilsuniversalität Jesus Christi und der Kirche, No. 148, ed. by Deutsche Bischofskonferenz, (4th expanded edition), Bonn: Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz. [“Dominus Iesus”. On the Unicity and Salvific Universality of Jesus Christ and the Church, available on: http://www.vat ican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20000806_ dominus-iesus_en.html (accessed 7, 21, 2015)]. Volkov, Shulamit (2001): Das jüdische Projekt der Moderne, Munich: C.H. Beck. Von der Osten-Sacken, Peter (2002): Martin Luther und die Juden: neu untersucht anhand von Anton Margarithas “Der gantz Jüdisch glaub” (1530/31), Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. Walter, Peter (ed.) (2005): Das Gewaltpotential des Monotheismus und der dreieine Gott, Freiburg/Basle/Vienna: Herder. Werner, Michael/Zimmermann, Bénédicte (2002): “Vergleich, Transfer, Verflechtung. Der Ansatz der Histoire croisée und die Herausforderung des Transnationalen.” In: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 28, 607 – 636. Zinser, Hartmut (2010): Grundfragen der Religionswissenschaft, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh.

Part V: Conflicts

Elena Ficara

Two in One Abstract: Conflicts between incompatible or apparently contradictory views can be solved using different devices. In this paper, I focus on a family of techniques that, in philosophical logic, is known as parametrisation. Parametrisation can be seen as a way of distributing knowledge, showing that both a view and its negation hold, but in different circumstances or from different perspectives. I claim that such devices, in some cases, fail and I focus on one relevant example, the one of moral dilemmas. In this case, two incompatible, and more specifically contradictory perspectives seem to be irrevocably joined in one.

1 What is a contradiction? As long as I state “some people lie” and you say “some do not”, or I say “Quentin Tarantino is intelligent” and you reply “Quentin Tarantino is crazy”, our views are not truly incompatible, and do not generate a conflict. The conflict emerges when the two statements actually contradict each other, as it is the case between “some politicians lie” and “no politician lies” or “Woody Allen is a good director” and “No, Woody Allen is not a good director”. Thus, in dealing with the problem of disagreement, and given that incompatible views generate conflicts insofar as they are (seen as) contradictory, the preliminary and somehow central question: “what is a contradiction?” should be addressed.¹ Aristotle’s Metaphysics is the canonical reference point if one wishes to spell out what is a contradiction. Given the different formulations of the Law of NonContradiction (LNC) in the book – brilliantly reconstructed by Lukasiewicz in 1993 – one can, accordingly, distinguish between several meanings of the word “contradiction”. As stated by the ontological (predicative) formulation, the LNC implies that it is impossible that a property belongs and does not belong to something at the same time and from the same point of view (Met. Gamma 3, 1005 b 19 – 20); according to the likewise ontological (but existential) one (Met. Beta 2 996 b 30), it is impossible that something is and is not at the same time. Thus a contradiction

 See for a comprehensive overview on debates about disagreement Feldman/Warfield (). In such debates, the question about the link between contradiction and disagreement is not considered.

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in the ontological meaning would be (according to the predicative formulation) an object that at the same time has and has not the same property, and (in the existential one) an object that at the same time exists and does not exist. The logical formulation of the LNC is “contradictory sentences cannot be true together” (Met. Gamma 6 1011 b 13 – 14). By contradictory sentences (antifatikòs, antikéimenai fáseis) Aristotle means an affirmative (katáfasis) and a negative (apófasis) proposition about the same object and in the same respect, for instance “Juliette is blond, Juliette is not blond”. The conjunction of such sentences is said to be, in Perì Hermenias (6 17 a 32– 35) antífasis (contradiction). The logical formulation of LNC implies, correspondingly, two possible meanings of “contradiction”: “a couple of sentences one of which is the negation of the other” and “a sentence that is both true and false”. The third account is the psychological one. According to it “nobody can believe that the same is and is not” (Met. Gamma 3 1005 b 23 – 26). Consequently, a contradiction in psychological (or epistemic) terms would be the belief that a and not-a. In 2004 Grim fixes four meanings of the LNC, which partially overlap with those individuated by Lukasiewicz, and he hints at the four corresponding meanings of contradiction. The first, semantic one, implies that a contradiction is a sentence which is true if false and false if true; according to the syntactic account a contradiction is a couple of sentences one of which is the negation of the other; according to the pragmatic one a contradiction is the joint assertion of a proposition and its denial; according to the ontological one a contradiction is an object that has and simultaneously has not the same property. A last possible meaning of contradiction, highlighted by D’Agostini 2009, and not mentioned neither by Lukasiewicz nor by Grim, is the practical one, typical of dilemmatic situations: I have to do something and cannot do it. Thus we can recapitulate and list the following meanings of “contradiction”: 1) logical a) syntactic: “the cat is on the mat and the cat is not on the mat” b) semantic: “the cat is on the mat” is both true and false 2) psychological or epistemic: I believe that the cat is on the mat and that it is not on the mat 3) ontological: a) predicative the cat is and is not on the mat b) existential the cat exists and the cat does not exist 4) pragmatic: I simultaneously assert and deny that the cat is on the mat 5) practical: I have to put the cat on the mat but cannot do it.

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It seems that a contradiction as characterised in 4) is simply not possible, and so the LNC is at least pragmatically valid. 2) is somehow ambiguous, since it can mean that I simultaneously believe and not believe that the cat is on the mat or that I believe that the cat is and at the same time is not on the mat. In the first meaning, 2) seems to generate an impossibility similar to 4). How can someone believe and at the same time not believe something? It would be like accepting and at the same time denying something or, as Priest 2004 suggests, like getting in and out of a same bus at the same time. In general, a contradiction occurs when the elements (states of affairs, propositions or sentences) are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive.² Two terms are said to be exclusive if they exclude each other, i. e. when the first is true (happens/is the case), the second is false (does not happen/is not the case). They are jointly exhaustive if there is not a third possibility, they cannot be both untrue (or both not be the case or not happen). For example a light cannot be both on and off (exclusivity) and it has to be either on or off (exhaustivity). A man cannot be both living and dead (exclusivity) or neither (exhaustivity). On the other hand, the two sentences “the rose in the vase is red” and “the rose in the vase is white” exclude each other, but are not jointly exhaustive. If I say that the rose in the vase is red and you say that it is white, we do not agree, but it is possible that we are both mistaken. The rose in the vase could be pink. In these cases we speak about contrariety and not about contradiction. Normally, contradictory relations are expressed by negation (the contradictory of “the rose is red” is “it is not the case that the rose is red” or simpler “the rose is not red”). However, we use “not” not only to express the relation of contradiction. In De Interpretatione Aristotle discusses the different kinds of opposition at stake between quantified propositions, oppositions which were then fixed in the Middle Ages in the quadratum oppositorum (see Fig. 1).

Fig. 1

 For the following discussion see D’Agostini (),  ff.

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The relation between 1 and 2 expresses contrariety: both sentences can be false. For instance, if we substitute Q with criminal and P with cop we obtain “every cop is a criminal” and “no cop is a criminal”, two sentences that are opposed to each other, but that are both false. The relation between 3. and 4. expresses subcontrariety: “some cops are criminals”, “some cops are not criminals” are both true. Contradiction only occurs between 1 and 4 and 2 and 3. In sum, the relation between contradictories (be they simple terms, or nonquantified sentences or quantified sentences) constitutes the exemplary form of every sharp epistemic conflict or situation of persistent disagreement. However, not all seemingly contradictory views are also actually contradictory. In most cases, the contradiction can be eliminated, or easily dealt with.

2 Parametrisation There are several ways of reacting in case of a conflict between incompatible views. In general, it is possible to distinguish between two attitudes: we can either dissolve the conflict, showing that the contradiction is not really a contradiction (i. e. it is not a relation between mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive views, but between merely contrary ones), and that the incompatible views do not hold at the same time or from an identical perspective; or we can simply eliminate the contradiction, or the belief which the contradiction follows from.³ The latter device is used in formal logic and is called reductio ad absurdum. I will focus here on the former, which is relevant for deepening the question about the power of distributed perspectives. In 2002 Priest defines parametrisation as follows: “The stratagem is to the effect that when one meets a (at least prima facie) contradiction [of the form P and not-P] one tries to find some ambiguity in P, or some different respects, r1 and r2, in which something may be P, and then to argue that a is P in one respect […] but not in the other […] I will call this technique parametrisation”.⁴ For example, we can state both that Brad Pitt is tall and that he is not tall if we show that Brad Pitt is tall according to the parameter r1 (if compared to me) and not tall according to the parameter r2 (if compared to Michael Jordan). Parameters can be different perspectives from which we consider reality, or they can be temporal. I can state both a and not-a without contradiction if enough time has

 The distinction between ways of dealing with contradictions is put in these terms (dissolution vs. elimination) by D’Agostini (), .  Priest (a),  – .

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passed between my two assertions, and the circumstances, in the meanwhile, have changed. The two views “Savigny Platz is covered with snow” and “Savigny Platz is not covered with snow” are both true, but at different times: the first holds if uttered in Febraury 2012, the second if uttered in February 2015. The most common way of parametrisation is removing ambiguities. If I say “the devil does not exist”, while Mick says “the devil exists”, we can both be right if we make what we mean by “devil” explicit. While “devil” for me stands for an anthropomorphic being who has direct influence on human actions on earth, for Mick it stands for what is unjust and bad in human actions. Thus both sentences can be stated without conflict, once explained the different meanings of the concept at stake. Parametrisation is thus a way of solving conflicts by distributing knowledge, that is showing that both a thesis and its contradictory opposite are tenable, but from different points of view, or in different contexts, or at different times. If compared to reductio ad absurdum, parametrisation reveals a more tolerant attitude toward contradictions, even if it implies, in the end, that the two contradictory views are shown to be non contradictory. However, there are cases of epistemic conflicts that seem particularly resistant to any kind of solution.

3 Two in one In literature on paraconsistent logic paradoxes, in particular the (semantic) ones involving truth, are typical situations in which parametrisation fails. In the case of the Liar-sentence, the sentence that says of itself to be false, we cannot argue that it is true in some cases and its negation is true in some other cases or times or from some other perspective. In Liar-like cases, the two contradictory sentences seem to be true at the same time, from the same perspective and in the same circumstance.⁵ Typically, the cases of the semantic paradoxes are special ones, concerning some special properties and sentences, cases that do not normally occur in our everyday language and experience. In what follows I focus instead on one kind of resistant contradiction occurring at the core of our everyday linguistic and epistemic life, the one of the socalled moral dilemmas.⁶ In dilemmatic situations we are asked to choose between incompatible courses of action.⁷

 For an analysis of the failures of parametrisation in Liar-cases see Priest (a),  ff.  On moral dilemmas see Foot  and Gowans . On moral dilemmas as cases of true contradictions see Priest (b) and Bohse-Nehrig ().

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Moral dilemmas are practical contradictions, they imply a cognitive situation according to which “I have to do A, and I cannot do A”. Their form goes back to the logical inference rule called constructive dilemma, which says that if we have a disjunction (P or Q) and from P it follows R and from Q it follows S, then we have the further disjunction R or S. The constructive dilemma is thus as follows: P or Q From P it follows R From Q it follows S therefore: R or S Let us consider the situation hypothesized by Socrates in Book I of Plato’s Politeia: Cephalus borrows a knife from a friend, and wants to return it, but his friend is now not in his right mind. What should Cephalus do? Perhaps he should return the knife, acting following the principle: A: repaying one’s debts is more valuable than protecting others from harm. Perhaps he should not, and act upon the rule: B: protecting others from harm is more valuable than repaying one’s debts. Thus we have the following scenario: either Cephalus returns the knife or he does not (a or not-a); if he does, he observes the rule A, if he does not, he follows the rule B. a or not-a from a follows A from not-a follows B therefore: A or B The two truly conflicting elements, which stand in a relation of mutual exclusion and joint exhaustion are the two actions a and not-a: returning the knife and not  Moral dilemmas are dealt with in deontic logic, i. e. the logic which studies the operators “it is obligatory that”, “it is permissible that”, “it is forbidden that”. For the present purposes, I am interested in a basic reconstruction of dilemmatic reasoning as conforming to the classical logical rule known as constructive dilemma. In this, I follow D’Agostini (),  – .

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returning the knife, and not the moral principles: repaying one’s debts and protecting others from harm. Under normal circumstances, we can easily follow both principles, but the specific dilemmatic situation seems to join them in an inextricable way. Other moral dilemmas present sharper cases, in which a choice seems to be impossible. Here I will discuss two classic examples: the trolley problem, presented by Philippa Foot⁸ and the dilemma told by William Styron in the novel Sophie’s Choice. According to the first, a trolley is running down a track. In its path are five people who have been tied to the track. You could flip a switch, which will lead the trolley down a different track. But tied to that track there is one person. The two options are: flipping and not flipping the switch (s and not-s). If you flip the switch you act according to a principle of this kind: F: saving many lives is morally more valuable than saving one If you do nothing, you are probably acting upon the principle: O: actively doing something which causes the death of someone is morally despicable So we have, again: s or not-s from s follows F from not-s follows O therefore F or O Under normal circumstances, you could act following both principles (they are not mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive), but in the dilemmatic situation they are truly incompatible, because they immediately follow from the two contradictory options s and not-s. Similarly, in Styron’s novel Sophie, a Polish woman, is arrested by the Nazis and sent to Auschwitz. Since she is not a Jew, once arrived at the death camp she is given a choice: one of her children will be spared the gas chamber if she chooses which one. At first she is paralised and cannot choose, but in the end, while the guards are taking both children away, she decides: they can take her  Foot (),  ff.

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daughter, who is a small kid, and spare her son, who is older and stronger. Even in this case, choosing between the two options (rescuing the son or the daughter) and acting upon one of the two corresponding principles, denying the validity of the other, seems to be impossible. In sum, in most cases of epistemic conflicts or disagreement we can solve the conflict using the technique that in philosophical logic is known as parametrisation, and which has, as I have showed, different declinations, namely temporalisation, disambiguation and the distribution of perspectives. The case of moral conflicts seems to be more difficult. In moral dilemmas we always have to do with ourselves, i.e. the two options are in one, are already “from one and the same perspective”. At least the parametrisation intended as distribution of perspectives should, in principle, fail. We are the ones who have to choose between a and not-a. The dilemmatic situations force us to think about ourselves: we are forced to understand ourselves as actors of two possible actions a and not-a. Returning or not returning the knife, rescuing one or five people, rescuing the son or the daughter. What is more, actions are performed in the present. So the first device (introducing different perspectives) does not work. It could be objected that, also in the dilemmatic cases, the distribution of perspectives does work, one could say that F (saving 5 people) is better for me, while from someone else’s point of view it is not. However, the point here is that if I act according to the principle F this means that I completely endorse F, and completely refuse every other point of view. The fact that the two principles are forced into a contradictory relation means that we do not have many points of view anymore. All the possible points of view are forced into the two contradictorily opposite ones F and Q. Also the second device, temporalisation, seems to fail in dilemmatic situations. If I act, I act at the present time. In the present only one action can be performed, and only one principle can be followed. I am only one, and cannot perform and not perform simultaneously an action or follow and at the same time not follow a same principle.⁹ I could opt for A (rescuing other people from harm) at a first time, and for B (repaying my debts) later (once my friend is in his right mind again). However, once I have decided not to return the knife I have acted following A, implicitly dismissing the validity of B for the situation at stake. In the sharper cases of moral dilemmas it is evident that I cannot even think about rescuing five people first and then rescuing one, or saving my daughter first, and then saving my son. From my rescuing 5 people first, it immediately follows that the possibility of rescuing one person is ruled out and vice versa.

 In this sense, we are stuck here with the same impossibility emerging within pragmatic contradictions.

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Finally, in morally dilemmatic situations the terms at stake (“flipping the switch”, “rescuing my children”, “returning the knife”) are clearly unambiguous, and disambiguation would be out of place. It is as if I started to ask “What do you mean by ‘switch’?”, instead of simply flipping or not flipping it (rescuing or not rescuing the 5 people). A last canonical device for eliminating contradictions and solving conflicts (which I have only hinted at in the previous section) is the reductio ad absurdum, which consists in eliminating the contradiction (or the thesis from which the contradiction follows). For instance, if from the thesis “all women are stupid” I derive that Angela Merkel is a woman and she is not stupid (i. e. a view that contradicts the premise of my argument), I can dismiss the first (contradictiongenerating) premise. In the trolley case a reduction would consist, perhaps, in eliminating the person who has forced me in the inconvenient situation (of having to flip or not to flip the switch) or who has tied the people to the tracks. Clearly, eliminating the source of the problem does not seem to be a solution. In the dilemmatic situations all possible different perspectives are reduced to two, which in turn are joined irrevocably in one. From the point of view of someone who holds F, s is preferable, while from the point of view of those who favour O, not-s is preferable. However, we cannot opt for “both” because we are one, the action we pursue is one, the time in which we pursue it is one. The fact that parametrisation fails means that one of the two courses of action has to be chosen, and the other dismissed as wrong; that one of the two principles has to be given the primacy, and the other has to be set aside as wrong or unjust. While in the case of “Brad Pitt is tall” and “Brad Pitt is not tall” I can easily say: both are true given different parameters, in the case of flipping the switch or not flipping it I could consider all the perspectives under which it would be good to flip it and those under which it would not. But all different perspectives are reduced to two, and the two are, further, to be brought back to one, given my being one. The dilemmatic situation is so conceived that the choice is difficult: given the circumstances, both actions are equally wrong and equally right. It is both completely wrong and completely right to flip the switch. One could argue that, given that both parametrisation and reduction fail, then one action has simply to be right and the other wrong. But in the truly dilemmatic situation, discriminating between the two options is impossible. Why? The problem is that choosing to pursue action a in a circumstance in which both a and not-a and neither a nor not-a should be pursued is simply a radical mistake. We have a complex situation (more precisely, a double situation) and we are forced to reduce it, to cut it, illegitimately privileging one half over the other. Both the only person on the track and the 5 people, the son and the daughter should be saved. As a

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matter of fact, once I have chosen a or s, acting following the principle A or F, I have, in principle, declared not-a or not-s wrong. But if both two actions, a and not-a, s and not-s, have the same right to be pursued, and both principles, A and B, F and O have the same right to be followed, then privileging one and so dismissing the other is an irretrievable mistake.¹⁰

References Bohse-Nehrig, Helen (2013): Moralische Dilemmata als wahre Widersprüche, Paderborn: Mentis. D’Agostini, Franca (2009): Paradossi, Milano: Carocci. Feldman, Richard/Warfield, Ted A. (2010): Disagreement, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Foot, Phillippa (2002): Moral Dilemmas and other Topics in Moral Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gowans, Christopher W. (1987): Moral Dilemmas, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Grim, Patrick (2004): “What is a Contradiction?” In: Graham Priest/Jc Beall/Brad Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. New Philosophical Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 49 – 72. Lukasiewicz, Jan (1993): Über den Satz des Widerspruchs bei Aristoteles, transl. by J. Barski, Hildesheim/Zurich/New York: Olms. Priest, Graham (2002a): Beyond the Limits of Thought, 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press (first edition 1995). Priest, Graham (2002b): “Rational Dilemmas.” In: Analysis 62/273, 11 – 16, DOI: 10.1111/1467 – 8284.00322 (accessed 7. 1. 2015).

 For helpful comments I am grateful to Juliette Weyand.

Juan Carlos Velasco

From National Sovereignty to Interdependence: New Perspectives of Distributive Justice in the Age of Globalization Abstract: This article defends the need of a cosmopolitan perspective within the contemporary debates in Political Philosophy, a perspective from which the demands of distributive justice can be consistently enforced. This point will be addressed in four parts. In a first step, we will present the unavoidable background of contemporary thought about justice: globalization (1). Next, the decidedly state-centered perspective related to the still hegemonic idea of social justice will be highlighted (2). The third part will take note of globalist reactions to the prevailing methodological nationalism (3). And finally, we will emphasize the need to design minimal global institutions that make it possible to implement the universalist requirements of justice with a cosmopolitan slant (4).

Only four decades ago, John Rawls developed his theory of justice for a world that, to a great extent, is already the world of yesterday. The same could be said of an entire current highly influential in contemporary political philosophy inspired by him. The world of today is increasingly only one world, with a high degree of interdependence among all of its parts, which is virtually without precedent. Just as the consequences of actions and omissions in domestic affairs no longer distinguish national borders, the possible answers to multiple challenges also overflow the bounds of territorial limits within which each State exercises its function of government. In the age of globalization, analyses that assume obligations of distributive justice valid only for those who are part of the same political community are not only useless in practical terms, but also inappropriate in theoretical terms, because the limits between the internal and the external relative to national borders have been erased in contemporary political action, and the distinction between interior and exterior has become extremely vague. With that context, this article will defend the need to add a cosmopolitan perspective from which the demands of distributive justice can be consistently enforced. This point will be addressed in four parts. We shall begin by presenting the unavoidable background of contemporary thought about justice: globalization (1). Next, the decidedly state-centered perspective adopted by the still-hegemonic idea of social justice

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will be highlighted (2). The third part will take note of globalist reactions to the prevailing methodological nationalism (3). Lastly, we will emphasize the need to shape minimal global institutions that make it possible to implement the universalist demands of justice with a cosmopolitan slant (4).

1 Globalization as backdrop of justice The thick lines that one sees drawn on maps and which serve to demarcate the physical perimeter of territory under the control of each State generate the illusion of a world fragmented into closed units that enjoy autonomy and power. However, for some decades now, we have had a representation of Earth provided by artificial satellites which more truly reflect reality. In an era when reality is visually constructed, these photographs, profusely reproduced, serve as an icon of a way of thinking which has gradually taken root in the collective consciousness. The image of our planet moving through space reveals to us that the whole of humanity is embarked on a unique voyage which binds us to a common destiny. All human beings share ‘one world’: a limited spherical surface. This powerful physical image of the Earth is, moreover, fully compatible with the recurring and contradictory phenomenon of globalization, taking this key term in its most descriptive meaning, namely, as the growing interrelationship between different regions of the planet as a consequence of different processes by which goods and services, as well as ideas and information, and ultimately also persons, cross national borders at an unprecedented speed. The social space where human interactions take place has as such ostensibly expanded and its limits become coextensive with the physical limits of the planet. The ubiquity of the term globalization in the language of our time does not mean that its reference is a phenomenon that suddenly appeared at the end of the 20th century. Instead, it is a long historical process initiated at the beginning of modernity and of which in recent decades we have witnessed a renewed and powerful impulse, brought about to a large extent by the revolution of information and communication technologies. As Ortega warned in 1929, features of this process were already visible centuries earlier: “Since the 16th century, all of humanity has become involved in a gigantic process of unification, which in our time has reached its insuperable end. There is no longer any part of humanity which lives separately; there are no islands of humanity”.¹ The astonishing technological development of recent decades has made some unprecedented dynam-

 Ortega (), .

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ics of interconnection possible, refuting the Madrid philosopher’s assertion that this process had already come to “its insuperable end”. In any event, with this term one alludes not so much to a result as to a process of intensification and acceleration of cross-border relations in the most disparate environments. This process reveals not only the interconnection, caused by the extraordinary mitigation of distances and communicative immediacy, but also the interdependence, between different regions and inhabitants of the world. Globalization reveals itself to us not only as a social change and, consequently, an external process, but as a profound change of perspective in the self-perception of human reality, to the point that it can be conceived as the doorjamb upon which the image of the era turns. Also associated with the set of events, processes and experiences subsumed beneath the term globalization is the idea of progressive elimination of borders, in the most physical meaning and also in another, more metaphorical meaning: in the way that the fundamental problems of human survival no longer know borders and that, as such, the conceptual dichotomies that unequivocally imply borders, as do inside/outside and interior/exterior, have lost much of their explanatory potential. That is why the adoption of a vision with a much broader view, a cosmopolitan perspective, has acquired enormous potential, not only theoretical but also practical, as a way to respond to challenges posed by cross-border processes that end up placing all of us in a situation of common exposure with regard to global threats. Given that the main threats are deterritorialized, their solution also requires going beyond the classical territorial fixation from which the traditional national viewpoint suffers.² That is why, in the context of globalization, cosmopolitanism has ceased to be a mere philosophical notion or moral value and has become the indispensable perspective for any rigorous socio-historical analysis: “Mankind, which for all preceding generations was no more than a concept or an ideal, has become something of an urgent reality”.³ This new cosmopolitanism, more than a more or less shared feeling, is a methodological focus whose consistent adoption entails a ‘Copernican turn’, so the initial understanding that the real space of our actions is much greater than the short distances of the space of our local and national ties and affiliations should give way – at least in the realm of political philosophy – to the replacement of the polis by the cosmopolis as a priority frame of reference. With the latest wave of globalization, we have seen the failure to adapt to current times by the political construct that was shaped, in a strictly European first

 See Innerarity (),  – .  Arendt (), .

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phase, with the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and which began to spread to other continents after the revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries. The international order began to form around States, to which it attributed exclusive powers of decision for internal order as well as for external representation: this is basically what the notion of sovereignty consisted of. Meanwhile, and especially since the end of the 20th century, the Westphalian construct, that is, the consideration that the modern State – a territory-based, autonomous political unit that maintains the monopoly of violence – represented the appropriate frame of political action has lost much of its value and use, to the point that it is increasingly difficult to point out an exclusive sphere of State conduct given the multiplication of spaces which are difficult to regulate and whose responsibilities are not entirely clear.⁴ There are no longer many affairs that are manageable in the strict space of the State. States, even the most powerful ones, never reach the critical dimension required in the era of globalization. And yet – and herein lies the crux of the matter – this old framework has not been replaced by any alternative model. Therefore, whoever confronts issues related to the social and political articulation of our world often has the disturbing sensation of making one’s way with outdated maps that prevent them from locating and orienting themselves with a minimum of rigor in a still-insufficiently explored environment: We are like travelers navigating an unknown terrain with the help of old maps, drawn at a different time and in response to different needs. While the terrain we are traveling on, the world society of states, has changed, our normative map has not.⁵

Following this topographic metaphor, it is becoming more urgent to have new cartography – new normative in addition to cognitive maps – that enable one not only to locate oneself in them but also give information about what takes place in the new constellation, in that globalized, closely interconnected, densely interdependent world which contains areas of ambiguous sovereignty, and be able to react with the least bit of clarity. We certainly do not have the right tools: “We have entered the new century without a compass”,⁶ as Maalouf states. In this theoretical-practical context, holding on to the old concept of state sovereignty is naive, as the vast majority of supposedly sovereign States lack the necessary means to autonomously decide their fate. To the extent that nation-states have ceased to be the main subjects of history, policies of a strictly national scope lead to a dead end:

 See Innerarity (), .  Benhabib (), .  Maalouf (), .

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From now on, the overriding concern of administrators and politicians can no longer be to enhance the scope, power, and glory of those centralized national institutions that took shape and worked unfettered in the heyday of the nation-state, when sovereignty was its own reward.⁷

Interdependence is now raised above sovereignty as an active principle of international politics.⁸ Beyond the unavoidable imperatives of a globalized economy, there has arisen a whole series of questions and challenges whose etiology and possible solution exceed state boundaries. It is not merely the sum of individual, although important issues, but instead something more serious and important: that the whole of the human species seems to be a community that, like it or not, is exposed to global risks,⁹ a consciousness reached after experiences of common vulnerability and mutual dependence. With the greatest conceivable risk shared by the entire community of humanity, that is, with the possibility of the destruction of life on the planet, one questions the ability of States to confront problems whose effects do not stop at the spatial frontiers between countries nor at the temporal borders between generations. To allude only to wellknown challenges that affect basic interests, neither the AIDS pandemic, nor the hole in the ozone layer, nor acid rain, nor the repeated collapses of financial markets, nor mafias, nor terrorists, nor nuclear accidents confine their effects to just one country; they can spread to any State, whether or not it is responsible for their genesis and reproduction. No doubt some of these heterogeneous phenomena will even have an impact on generations yet to be born. In light of “the disabling effects of globalization on the decision-making capacity of the state governments”,¹⁰ whose room for maneuvering has been considerably decreased, the obsolescence of the State as a functional framework for the political management of the collective risks, inequalities and challenges of our world is even more obvious. The difficulties in confronting problems which are not confined to borders and in assuming responsibility for those problems is exacerbated by the fact that different globalizing processes – globalization is not a single process, but rather a multi-dimensional phenomenon which affects several spheres of action – do not all advance at the same pace, and as such produce enormously dysfunctional imbalances. While economic globalization and especially the globalization of financial markets can be qualified as wonderful (regardless of the assessment

 Toulmin (), .  See Innerarity (), .  See Beck ().  Bauman (), .

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that this fact deserves), the advance of globalization in the political sphere is rickety and completely disheartening. While communications and the economy have grown to planetary dimensions, politics is still anchored to the limited territory of different States. We share only one world, but when it comes to acting politically, we are separated from each other by the territorial borders of States. This breeds a whole series of asymmetries and exclusions that are difficult to justify, as “the impact of this globalization is felt most by those who benefit from it least”.¹¹ The obvious advantages of said processes and their undeniable disadvantages certainly do not spread in an even way: “from an economic point of view, it remains the case that globalization brings not a leveling but a hierarchical ordering of global space”.¹² The global increase of wealth does not manage to make up for the constant growth of economic inequalities and, consequently, distributive disparities among different regions of the world. In this context, moral indignation grows in view of “the monstrous injustice of a highly stratified world society in which even elementary basic goods and life chances are today unevenly distributed in an intolerable way”.¹³ The almost instant access to information – a defining trait of our time – makes it increasingly harder to hide these inequalities so that they do not become the subject of public debate.

2 The State as framework for the traditional notion of justice The aforementioned imbalances among the different spheres of the globalizing process have noticeable effects on the real options of people’s welfare and their ability to access the Earth’s finite resources. In that context, matters related to distributive or social justice surface without it being possible to scorn them for being inadmissible. The very act of considering this cause entails recognizing from the start that “we do not live in a just world”,¹⁴ an affirmation that, according to Thomas Nagel, is probably “the least controversial one could make in political theory”. To assert the contrary would maintain a false image of a tragic phenomenon in which the whole of humanity is involved. It is not surprising, then, that among the genuinely urgent issues and challenges of our day is the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger. In fact, it is the first of the “Mille-

   

Hobsbawm (), . Sachs/Santarius (), . Habermas (), . Nagel (), .

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nium Development Goals” that the United Nations General Assembly defined and approved on paper in the year 2000 to be attained in 2015. This is a goal which, because of most countries’ apathy, is today by all rights unreachable, but which does not diminish by one iota the urgency of the indicated goals. To address the question of justice in today’s world, that new broadened outlook referred to earlier is also required, as the traditional treatment of the subject is fundamentally inappropriate because of its lack of focus. Attention was given to established political communities or, expressed in contemporary language, to States, as a basic unit not only of understanding but also, and above all, of performance and redistribution of wealth: the frontiers of justice coincide with the borders of each State. This theoretical perspective, which we can rightly name the state-centric approach, corresponded basically to the experience of most mortals up until only a couple of centuries ago. The horizon on which their lives moved, as well as their area of real operations, barely transcended the provinces or regions where they lived. From this, a deeply-rooted, autocratic mentality was fueled. If this image was ever a reliable representation of what actually happened, today there remain hardly any reasons to continue to maintain it. Since the 19th century, and above all, with the technological advances of recent decades, there is no distance that presents an insurmountable obstacle for any kind of exchange between human beings. It seems that now geography matters less than ever because everyone can be virtually everywhere at the same time. The feeling that all of us are more or less close neighbors, to share and help as well as compete and harm, is becoming more and more real. In fact, the regulations and decisions of a State have noticeable effects on the life and level of well-being of the citizens of other States. Thus, to give an example, ordinary economic measures like export subsidies, tariff policies or decisions in international financial organizations – made by State representatives – can have disastrous consequences on third countries and their inhabitants. The state-centric approach found its historical recognition in the Westphalian model, whose basic principles were formal equality among all States in the international sphere, the principle of self-determination of the State and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States. If it is true that, thanks in part to the consciousness of globalization, now there are postWestphalian perspectives, it might also be true that the right framework is being created to substantially modify the way to address political matters in general and the issue of justice in particular.¹⁵ In this regard, the wedge that the elaborate international system of human rights inserts in the until-recently pre-

 See Fraser (),  – .

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dominant model is more than remarkable. Now human rights condition and question the sovereignty of States, as the guarantee of said rights is no longer a mere internal matter, but instead a task that is also the responsibility of the international community.¹⁶ Although States are, in principle, the only signatories to the different international agreements about human rights, the responsibility to protect them is not, therefore, exclusively theirs, but instead it is shared. The serious violation of human rights by any particular State activates the duty of the international community to intervene.¹⁷ Globalization, understood as a reorganization of the space-time framework of human action, then turns into an opportunity to deeply rethink the notion of justice in order to adjust it to the cosmopolitan consciousness that has been establishing itself. The processes of globalization would thus constitute the background of experiences and conditions for the coordination of a noncompartmentalized conception of justice. Thus, certainly, a cosmopolitan focus, a viewpoint capable of overcoming the myopic differentiations between what is national and what is international and eliminating the apparent dichotomies between inside and outside is advantageous. In the realm of political philosophy (and in the social sciences in general), adopting this focus would imply leaving aside some rooted points of view, such as the one represented by explanatory or methodological nationalism (a widespread analytical perspective whose meaning will be detailed in the next section), and thus opening up to new perspectives from which one may orient oneself in the labyrinth of social inequalities and injustices that flood contemporary life and spill over national borders.

3 The globalist turn of philosophy of justice Most theories of justice present a handicap: they are designed for nationally constituted societies. Their thinking has as its basis a territorially demarcated society, whose architecture is guaranteed by the state and whose members are held together by social cooperation and shared basic values.¹⁸

Moral and political philosophy has hardly addressed the meaning of national borders, and as such, has ignored the fact that its clarification is a basic point in conceiving a theory of social justice. Contemporary conceptions of justice, be-

 on  

See Article  of the Charter of the United Nations or Article  of the International Covenant Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See Beitz (),  – . Sachs/Santarius (), .

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ginning with John Rawls’s carefully crafted version, normally assume that any true articulation of a political organization that applies some principles of distributive justice will be based on the preconception that the subjects of rights and the beneficiaries of just order are almost exclusively the citizens of the country in which those articulations are carried out. Justice would thus regulate institutions and the internal regime of each State and would stipulate the principles and rules that are in force in citizens’ relationships with each other and with their authorities. With respect to the distribution of goods and services, the perspective becomes even more strictly state-oriented. Rawls’s political philosophy, his liberal egalitarianism, is, as is well known, an unavoidable reference in the contemporary treatment of justice. This North American philosopher must be recognized for his extraordinary labor of intellectual unrest, and for having his genuinely seminal analysis place the reflection about justice on a level of theoretical argumentation and foundation that is enormously solid and exacting. In his masterpiece, A Theory of Justice (1971), he managed to give an articulate response to the capital issue of minimum standards that a society has to meet to qualify as being reasonably just. His analysis, however, is along traditional lines, as it limits the range of the question to the interior of each of the politically established societies without extending its basic plan of analysis beyond their territorial borders. According to this analysis, justice would be a value that only measures social relationships inside States. Rawls, questioned at length about this by his critics, took into account the possible extension of his constructive procedure of justice to the international stage in one of his last publications: The Law of Peoples (2001). However, motives for frustration were already served, as the author was not seeking a new formulation of the theory of justice valid for the whole planet, but instead to respond to the question of how a just and liberal society must mix with other societies and what the degree of tolerance that can and must be adopted is. To that effect, he made a significant change with regard to what had constituted his typical approach in matters of justice: at an international level, the “parties” involved in the “original position” (the thought experiment which supports his entire theory) would not be individuals but rather different States, or more precisely, their representatives. The international sphere is like a scenario of autonomous States, of juxtaposed sovereignties, which negotiate precise matters without ever agreeing on a stable framework for close cooperation. Among the most controversial passages of The Law of Peoples, there is one which asserts that the lack of a minimum of welfare in certain nations is not due to the existence of unequal conditions of exchange and political domination in the international realm, but instead to the scarcity of natural resources and fundamentally to the character of the political culture of some peoples (oppressive

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governments and corrupt elite classes, in particular), as well as the lack of diligence, probity and ability of its members.¹⁹ The determining causes of poverty in a country would as such be strictly endogenous. From a socio-economic perspective, it is rather difficult to believe this explanation is valid, as it is more than doubtful that poor countries are ultimately responsible for their miserable situations, which to a considerable degree instead stem from complex institutional factors which, through incentives and regulations, shape a structurally unjust world economic order.²⁰ The Rawlsian explanation recalls, apart from that, the fallacious argument of conservative liberalism, which tries to explain social inequality inside States by assuming that all individuals begin under equal conditions and that, as such, every individual must be personally accountable for having less. The most valuable resources are in fact, as always, found in the hands of a few and each person’s chances of development depend on the environment (not only the family environment, although sometimes it is determining) they were born into. And from a global perspective, everyone’s fate corresponds in large part to the circumstances of the country where they were born; its geographic location and supply of natural resources, among many other factors, are totally random.²¹ Almost immediately, different authors in the Rawlsian orbit believe that the incursion of their master into the global sphere is not only erroneous, but also contradictory to his own suppositions. In the present conditions of interdependence, state societies are not, they argued, separate nor self-sufficient entities.²² If we still have not understood it, we have to understand that everyone’s interests are so mixed up with everyone else’s, even with the interests of those who live very far away, that there is no place for individual solutions. Neither climate change nor world poverty, to mention just two important cases, are matters whose solution can be addressed satisfactorily in the international sphere. Critics decry as unacceptable – if not downright perverse – that world poverty and therefore the situation of those in a state of pressing need should be faced not as a solvable matter in terms of justice but rather in terms of “humanitarian aid” (bearing in mind what Rawls calls “duty of assistance”, which is nothing other than a moral duty). As a result, and to state it graphically, but not wholly imprecisely, on the publication of the above-mentioned essay, a noticeable breach opened within the field of so-called egalitarian liberalism, in which until then Rawls himself reigned as undisputed champion. On one side of the    

See See See See

Rawls (),  – . Young (). Shachar (), Milanovic (),  – . Beitz ().

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breach, there were those who could be called liberal nationalists, with Rawls himself at the head and a few others (over time, Nagel, Miller and Seleme, among others, would join this group). They maintain that one of the criteria of a just society must be that there is a relationship between each State and its citizens. On the other side, we would find the cosmopolitans or globalists (Beitz, Shue, Barry, Pogge, van Parijs and Risse, among others), who cannot follow Rawls on this point, as they emphasize, precisely in the name of the principles he himself proposed, a broader sense of justice which exceeds the fenced-in land of a closed society and, as a result, they aspire to open up the frontiers of justice. This way, the cosmopolitan version of the theory of justice, with “a much larger domain than Rawls’s country-by-country approach”,²³ would become a promising research program with which one would try to design a theoretical-normative framework apt for a world that is increasingly ours, a world in which individuals share and are conscious of sharing, directly or indirectly, one finite natural environment. One way to distinguish the different positions about the reach of justice within the Rawlsian universe is provided to us by the different ways that its respective members have of characterizing the “basic structure of society”. This notion, in which Rawls includes the main political, social and economic institutions that shape a unified system of social cooperation, is central to his theory of justice, whose object is none other than the moral or normative evaluation of said structure. Liberal nationalists believe that the demands of justice can only be applied inside sovereign States and, as such, do not consider any provision for justice with an inter- or transnational scope, as they feel that the society of nations does not constitute a plan of cooperation of mutual benefit and that there is no social product that can (or that must) be distributed as an object of social choice. In the lack of “global governance”, as was verified with the last big global and systemic financial crisis, which is still enduring, they find an additional reason to deny the existence of a “global basic structure”. This position is challenged by the cosmopolitans, who feel that the first aim of justice is relationships between all human beings, such that individuals and not States would be the basic unit of distribution. Thus, they assume the existence of a “global basic structure”, in such a way that the sphere of application of the principles of justice would have to be planetary so that available resources are treated and managed on an equally global scale. Among other arguments, this idea would gain credence by the existence of global public assets that would be difficult to link to a single State, such as environmental assets, medicines, knowl-

 Sen (), .

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edge or communication technologies. They also emphasize the fact that the network of international trade is already so dense and vast that it can be inserted without violence into all countries in a single cooperative plan (as the Rawlsian proposals demanded), and highlight the evidence that the world economic order is so important that it now palpably conditions the lives of individuals, for better or for worse. They would conspire, in short, in favor of the surmounting of every kind of “methodological nationalism”, that cognitive error which Rawls and so many other theoreticians fall into, consisting of conceiving of the national State as the model of political and social organization par excellence and, above all, as the basic unit for the study of social processes, so that all analyses have to be adjusted to this primary framework of reference.²⁴ The withdrawal of this explanatory supposition is a basic condition for being able to promote a globalist turn that inverts the inveterate priority that national interests enjoy over global obligations, a turn that entails a revolution in the theory of justice, and therefore, in political philosophy. Only if one stops thinking in self-referential terms and adopts the perspective that all of us live in a single society of global scope will we be able to learn to manage the interdependencies that we have with each other. In Rawls’s reluctance to apply his own principles to the global realm, his critics see the risk of inanity that threatens the entire Rawlsian analysis. This analysis could be developed in vacuo insofar as the high degree of abstraction it inhabits – for example, in defining the conditions of a well-ordered, and therefore, just society – is completely disconnected from what occurs in the real world. This distancing is especially obvious in a requirement that Rawls imposes on the parties in the original position: they must choose principles of justice under the assumption that in the country where they are destined to live, it will be sustainable in economic terms. He does not take into account the possibility that a country, for example, “even if it religiously adheres to the difference principle in its internal affairs, will be so poor that the worst off will be at best barely above the subsistence level and at worst lacking some basic essentials”.²⁵ This unsettling contingency, which Rawls should have addressed, is not only perfectly imaginable, it is in fact the description of what happens in more than one place. Therefore, it makes sense to talk of failed States. One possible application of the Rawlsian principle of difference to a global scale – a possibility completely discarded by the author – would imply that any increase in global inequality could only be justified if it benefited the planet’s poorest countries.

 See Pogge (),  – , Beck (),  – .  Barry (), .

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In all other respects, from the proliferation of this last kind of objection, one infers the strong commitment to the practical dimension of political philosophy that encourages different globalist authors. Although expressed in an academic language, the most serious attempts supporting the conceptualization of global justice – and on this point Thomas Pogge’s work²⁶ would undoubtedly be paradigmatic – are joined to the eminently practical interest in eradicating poverty and thereby doing justice to humanity in those human beings who are suffering unjust privations: “What moves us, reasonably enough, is not the realization that the world falls short of being completely just – which few of us expect – but that there are clearly remediable injustices around us which we want to eliminate”.²⁷ Globalists would look for the way to eliminate or mitigate the specific injustices detected or, in other words, make real societies more just – and not so much a theory of perfect justice or an ideal institutional design. The real challenge all of these authors face would then be to leave the realm of State societies and shift the focus of attention to the basic structure of a more or less integrated global society, without losing along the way either conceptual rigor or the normative requirement that the Rawlsian theory had met.

4 Global institutions for a global world Never in history has the need for a global rule of law based on a universalist understanding of justice been more acutely felt and yet at the same time perceived as an elusive chimera.²⁸

The path towards global justice is still not clear, but rather dotted with mines, some of them enormously lethal. Leaving aside the current that is critical of legal and institutional globalism, which scorns the option of a normative-institutional architecture of planetary scope, considering it a dangerous instrument in the hands of hegemonic powers,²⁹ we encounter some objections of indisputable weight which some believe have found the Achilles heel of the conceptions of global justice. In short, it refers to determining to what extent the world as a whole can be considered an appropriate “context of justice”³⁰ The required reference on this point would undoubtedly be the thesis formulated by Nagel;³¹ au-

     

Pogge (). Sen (), vii. Ferrara (), . See Zolo (). See Forst (), . See Nagel ().

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thors like Pogge, Sen and Habermas take it very seriously. Nagel, making use of a known Hobbesian argument, understands that the very notion of justice is intrinsically linked to the existence of the State and that outside of it, there can hardly be aspirations of justice in merely moral terms. The demands of distributive justice would be acceptable only among those who belong to the same political community and are subjected to a common authority, that is, among those who are subjected to the same center of coercive power capable of imposing the demands and responding to possible claims. Stated more clearly, it is only fitting to speak properly of obligations of redistribution in intra-state contexts with solid associative ties, whose cooperative interdependencies are the corresponding assumption of political responsibilities. Like it or not, outside of the context of the State, it is not feasible to demand justice, as “where there is no Commonwealth, there nothing is Unjust”, as Hobbes noted in chapter XV of the Leviathan. According to this associativist formula that exudes a refined political realism³², the requirements of justice are inexorably linked to a political community and to the sovereignty that this community exercises over a territory, such that “if Hobbes is right, the idea of global justice without a world government is a chimera”,³³ and therefore must be rejected. The normative importance of the State as a habilitating condition is of such magnitude that without a world State, one cannot so much as form an intelligible notion of global justice. Given that there are no power structures of global scope, the demands of a just world cannot be addressed politically in a global context. Against Nagel’s strict statism, it is appropriate to point out that, actually, individuals are not subjected exclusively to the political power of their respective States, which partially coincides with the arguments put forward by Cohen and Sabel.³⁴ And this perception can be empirically verified. First of all, certain countries impose their will on others through perhaps informal means, but with an effect that is no less real. Secondly, there is an entire dense network of economic and institutional ties, which narrowly limit the sphere of influence of particular States and, therefore, of the individuals who comprise them. It is therefore not certain that all States are in a condition to set priorities and make effective decisions in the economic sphere. Some countries, the most powerful ones, impose their will on the rest. Sometimes, it is true, they are not States, but international organizations and agencies, like the World Bank, the IMF or the WTO, which impose rules and conditions on everyone. In particular, the WTO is invested with

 See Seleme (),  – .  Nagel (), .  See Cohen/Sabel ().

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important powers: an arbitrating court – perhaps the strictest and most effective ever created by international law – and a sanctioning power over matters of trade. One verifies, then, the existence of a world economic order, which is neither equitable in social terms nor legitimate in political terns, but which could well be understood as the basic structural framework required to be able to formulate demands of global distributive justice. One can even share Nagel’s thesis that the measures of distributive justice are obligatory if in their favor one can offer a justification that is acceptable for everyone involved as free and equal subjects. According to democratic logic, the policies of distributive justice must certainly be justified on the basis of reasons acceptable to those who are affected by them. The perspective of States is certainly not the only one that matters when it comes to dealing with matters related to distributive justice. Just as pertinent is the perspective of those who de facto enjoy or suffer its effects. One principle described as a power of justice would be the so-called all-affected principle, whereby “all those affected by a given social structure or institution have moral standing as subjects of justice in relation to it”.³⁵ It would try to take into account the repeatedly verified fact that a decision made within a State has direct and indirect effects on those who are not part of it, and consequently, did not take part in the decision-making processes. Without a superior decision-making authority, inequality in the distribution of responsibilities is inevitable. One could, therefore, turn around that argument presented by Nagel as an aporia – because the possible solution, the existence of a world State, is described as an even greater evil – and use it against the intentionality specified by its author: given that global politics, and therefore, global justice, can only be conceived as a possibility within the context of a world republic or similar entity which serves as the necessary institutional framework, what has to be done is to get down to work. This way was already suggested in Nagel’s text: “We are unlikely to see the spread of global justice in the long run unless we first create strong supranational institutions that do not aim at justice but that pursue common interests and reflect the inequalities of bargaining power among existing states”.³⁶ Of course, it will be necessary to raise those institutions as gradually as one considers appropriate, and with respect for the principles of federalism and subsidiarity with the goal that they do not degenerate into global tyranny.³⁷ The reality of globalization and the consequent shaping of global society – still in progress – pres-

 Fraser (), .  Nagel (), .  See Höffe ().

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ents us with two great philosophical challenges: the challenge of a legitimate institutional order for the world and the challenge of a just distribution of the wealth;³⁸ it is necessary to face these two challenges together, for although these two subjects are analytically distinguishable, it is difficult to solve them separately. The ideal of a global regulatory framework and a corresponding, credible international authority does not necessarily have to be specified in the institution of a unified government of planetary scope (in short, a world State), which replaces existing States. Actually, few things could be worse than the constitution of a world State, as that would entail the assertion of just one center of power, without a possible counterweight and without options for reaching an acceptable level of accountability to citizens. More than a beneficent giant, the world State could end up being an unrivalled Leviathan, a totalitarian delusion.³⁹ But certainly, “one thing is to normatively reject the goodness of a world State […] and another is to reject any possibility of strong reciprocity outside of the State”.⁴⁰ There are other more encouraging options, like the constitutionalization of the international sphere, as Habermas advocated.⁴¹ This proposal, indebted to the Kantian idea of a cosmopolitan constitution, prefigures a multi-level political architecture that does not concentrate power but instead diffuses it in a coordinated manner. The institutional arrangements designed with a similar intention by David Held⁴² are equally inspiring. In any case, the establishment of a global agency – or of multiple thematic or sectorial global agencies – capable of preventing the chaos that globalization is generating is an option that must necessarily be considered in this interdependent world. Globalization cannot continue without rules. The challenge, at least from a democratic perspective, would then certainly be of a formidable complexity, for, as this German philosopher recognizes, those who defend it “must at least develop models for an institutional arrangement which can secure a democratic legitimation for new forms of governance in transnational spaces”.⁴³ There is, hence, still much to say about how to articulate democracy with the governance of a globalized world. The global reality that has emerged over the last few decades – a dense scheme of economic, political, social and cultural relations – still lacks democratic governance on par with that development. Perhaps the most well-known

     

See Guariglia (),, . See Arendt (),  – . Puyol (), . See Habermas (),  – , (), (),  – . Held (). Habermas (), .

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case is the one involving the big business corporations and transnational investment funds, whose decisions can determine the fate of the population of numerous countries. Their management, nonetheless, transcends the control that any State can exercise. In this regard, the expansion of representative regimes all over the planet, achieved in recent decades, is reduced to a mere nominal advance, as effective power has been displaced outside the realm of state action.⁴⁴ In an era marked by the severity of the economic crisis, when numerous political regimes evolve towards forms of post-democratic governance and technocratic governments abound while social inequality increases, new forms of resistance staged by very diverse social movements have sprouted.⁴⁵ Thanks in large part to his conscientious work, there has been increased focus on the need to inspire a radical change of perspective in the way we understand and confront the challenges posed by the emerging global reality. The new focus driven by the recent globalist turn of the theory of justice would aim not only at the diagnosis of new forms of injustice in a globalized world, but also the composition of a social, political and institutional perspective from which it is possible to articulate new answers.⁴⁶ Global justice thus becomes an essentially political subject which possesses unavoidable institutional and legal dimensions. The intense global interdependence – a fact that nobody can ignore without paying a high price – pressures in favor of cooperation on a grand scale to solve global problems. Any realistic proposal in this direction is unthinkable without a system of rules and international institutions with regulatory powers, that is, capable of disciplining or even governing the globalizing dynamics. All in all, it requires some form of institutionalization of a global power that at least reduces the negative effects of globalization. The notion of global justice is today little more than a programmatic idea that hardly serves as a guide on this voyage the whole of humanity is embarked on, an ambitious idea towards which it is reasonable to express a prudent skepticism in view of the world political situation, where autocratic tendencies are still hegemonic. Without scorning more demanding proposals, in its minimalist formulation, and making use of the Rawlsian oxymoron, the global justice program would represent a realistic utopia, that is, a proposal that, in going beyond the status quo, either forcing it or transgressing it, is conceived within what is politically viable, or said another way, within the limits of practical politics. In this regard, one should never lose sight of the fact that the limits of what is pos-

 See Rodrik ().  See Habermas ().  See Velasco ().

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sible do not coincide with the limits of what really exists, for what is real, in addition to contingent, is changeable.⁴⁷ In any case, placing global justice as an objective that guides political action is not the same as trying to messianically conduct humanity to a false paradise, but instead trying to prevent it from falling into an authentic hell. There is the risk of attributing miraculous virtues to this idea, suggesting that its implementation would bring with it the overcoming of all the evils of the world. To avert this destructive drift and prevent global justice from becoming a mere rhetorical expedient and even less in a fetish expression, but irrelevant, there is no better remedy than to nourish with arguments the debate over its suitability and viability in the global public sphere which is being shaped from the convergence between the spectacular increase in the possibilities of communication without borders and the more modest but perceptible expansion of democratic values. In an interdependent world, distributive justice will have to be focused globally or it will fail everywhere. Translated from Spanish by Robert Lavigna

References Arendt, Hannah (1968): Men in Dark Times, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. Barry, Brian (1989): Theories of Justice, Berkeley: University of California Press. Bauman, Zigmunt (1998): The Globalization: The Human Consequences, New York: Columbia. U.P. Beck, Ulrich (1998): World Risk Society, Cambridge: Polity Press. Beck, Ulrich (2006): Cosmopolitan Vision, Cambridge: Polity Press. Beitz, Charles S. (1979): Political Theory and International Relations, Princeton: Princeton U.P. Beitz, Charles S. (2009): The Idea of Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford U. P. Benhabib, Seyla (2004): The Rights of others, Cambridge: Cambridge U.P. Benhabib, Seyla (2006): Another Cosmopolitanism, Oxford: Oxford U. P. Carrillo Salcedo, Juan Antonio (1998): Dignidad frente a barbarie, Madrid: Trotta. Castells, Manuel (2000): La era de la información 1, Madrid: Alianza. Cohen, Joshua/Sabel, Charles (2005): “Extra Rempublicam nulla Iustia?” In: Philosophy & Public Affairs 34 (2), 147 – 75. Ferrara, Alessandro (2008): The Force of the Example, New York: Columbia U. P. Forst, Rainer (2007): Das Recht auf Rechtfertigung. Elemente einer konstruktivistischen Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. Fraser, Nancy (2009): Scales of Justice, New York: Columbia U. P. Guariglia, Osvaldo (2010): En camino de una justicia global, Madrid: Marcial Pons.

 See Rawls (), .

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Habermas, Jürgen (2005): Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. Habermas, Jürgen (2008): “The Constitutionalization of International Law and the Legitimation Problems for World Society.” In: Constellations 15 (4), 444 – 455. Habermas, Jürgen (2012): The Crisis of the European Union: A Response, Cambridge: Polity Press. Habermas, Jürgen (2013): Im Sog der Technokratie, Berlin: Suhrkamp. Hobsbawm, Eric (2007): Globalization, Democracy and Terrorism, London: Little, Brown. Held, David (2010): Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities, Cambridge: Polity Press. Höffe, Otfried (1999): Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, München: Beck. Innerarity, Daniel (2013): Un mundo de todos y de nadie, Barcelona: Paidós. Maalouf, Amin (2009): Le Dérèglement du monde, Paris: Grasset. Milanovic, Branko (2010): The Haves and the Have-Nots, New York: Basic Books. Miller, David (2007): National Responsibility and Global Justice, Oxford: Oxford U. P. Nagel, Thomas (2005): “The problem of Global Justice.” In: Philosophy & Public Affairs 33 (2), 113 – 146. Nussbaum, Martha (2006): Frontiers of Justice, Harvard: Harvard U. P. Ortega y Gasset, José (2008): La rebellion de las masas [1929], Madrid: Tecnos. Pogge, Thomas (2002): World poverty and Human Right, Cambridge: Polity Press. Puyol, Ángel (2011): “El derecho a subistier y la justicia global.” In: Ideas y Valores: revista Columbiana de Filosofia 147, 177 – 208. Rawls, John (1971): A Theory of Justice, Harvard: Harvard U. P. Rawls, John (2001): The Law of Peoples, Harvard: Harvard U. P. Risse, Mathias (2012): On Global Justice, Princeton: Princeton U. P. Rodrik, Dani (2011): The Globalization Paradox, Oxford: Oxford U. P. Sachs, Wolfgang/Santarius, Tilman (2007): Fair Future: limited Resources and Global Justice, London: Zed Books. Seleme, Hugo O. (2011): Las fronteras de la Justicia distributiva, Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales. Sen, Amartya (2009): The Idea of justice, Harvard: Harvard U. P. Shachar, Ayelet (2009): The Birthright Lottery. Citizenship and Global Inequality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard U. P. Singer, Peter (2002): One World, New Haven: Yale U.P. Toulmin, Stephen (1990): Cosmopolis: the hidden agenda of modernity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Velasco, Juan Carlos (1997): “Ayer y hoy del cosmopolitismo kantiano.” In: Isegoría 16, 91 – 117. Velasco, Juan Carlos (2010): “El giro globalista de la filosofia de la justicia.” In: Oscar Nudler (ed.), Filosofia de la filosofia, Madrid: Trotta/CSIC, 395 – 422. Young, Iris M. (2010): Responsibility for Justice, Oxford: Oxford U. P. Zolo, Danilo (2001): I Signori delle Pace. Una critica del globalismo giuridico, Roma: Carozzi.

Notes on Contributors Günter Abel is Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the Technische Universität Berlin, and director of the Center for Knowledge Research (IZW). His areas of research are: epistemology, philosophy of language, non-linguistic symbol systems, philosophy of cognition and creativity. Among his numerous publications are: Interpretationswelten (2nd ed. 1995), Sprache, Zeichen, Interpretation (1999), Zeichen der Wirklichkeit (2004), “The Riddle of Creativity” (2009), “Knowing-How” (2012), “Systematic Knowledge Research” (2014), “Formen des Wissens im Wechselspiel” (2015), “Rethinking Rationality” (2016). He is the main editor (with James Conant) of the book series Berlin Studies in Knowledge Research. Michael Bongardt, born 1959, Professor and member of the Institute of Philosophy at Freie Universität Berlin. His special interest lies in the periphery of philosophy, theology and social science, while the focal points of his studies are the works of Søren Kierkegaard, Ernst Cassirer, Hans Jonas and Jürgen Habermas. The concept of freedom, interreligious and intercultural issues, and the ethical foundations of pluralist, secularized societies lie at the heart of his research. Roman Boutellier PhD is since October 2008 Vice President of Human Resources and Infrastructure of ETH Zurich. He is professor and leads the Chair for Technology and Innovation Management at the Department of Management, Technology and Economics (D-MTEC) at ETH Zurich since 2004. In 1999 Roman Boutellier moved from industry to the University of St. Gallen (HSG) as a full professor in innovation and logistics. In 1979 he received his PhD in mathematics and worked as postdoctoral fellow at Imperial College in London. His works appeared in R&D Management, Harvard Business Manager, ZFO and Drug Discovery Today. Thiemo Breyer is junior professor and head of the research group “Transformations of Knowledge” at the a.r.t.e.s. Graduate School for the Humanities, Universität zu Köln. He is a fellow at the Mahindra Humanities Center of Harvard University as well as at the center for interdisciplinary research of the Universität Bielefeld. Publications i.a.: On the Topology of Cultural Memory (2007), Attentionalität und Intentionalität (2011), Verkörperte Intersubjektivität und Empathie (2015). Prof. Dr. Michael Dick, psychologist, holds the chair of Corporate Education at the Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg (OVGU), Germany. His research covers organizational development, continuing professional development, the management of experiential knowledge, and the quality of work. He studied and

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graduated in Hamburg, worked as an assistant professor in Magdeburg, and as a full professor for applied psychology in Olten, Switzerland. An important focus of his work lies on further academic education. In 2014 he became the elected dean of the faculty of humanities at the OVGU. Elena Ficara is Juniorprofessor at the University of Paderborn. She was lecturer at the Technische Universität in Berlin and visiting scholar at the University of St Andrews and at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. Her PhD dissertation on Kant’s Ontology was published in German (2006), her MA dissertation on Ontology and Transcendental Philosophy in Heidegger and Kant was published in Italian (2010). Her area of specialisation is theoretical philosophy, in particular metaphysics and metaphilosophy. Her current research interest is contemporary philosophy of logic and metaphysics. Among her recent works are: Contradictions. Logic, History, Actuality (ed., 2014), “Dialectic and Dialetheism” (2013). Gerd Folkers was appointed in 1991 as Professor of Pharmaceutical Chemistry at the ETH Zurich. He is President of the Swiss Science Council and a member of the Swiss Academy of Technical Sciences, has co-founded two start-up companies and is (co‐)author and editor of numerous scientific articles and books on drug discovery and development. From 2004 to 2015 Gerd Folkers headed the Collegium Helveticum, an institution jointly operated by the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich for transdisciplinary approaches on complex problems. Christoph Gengnagel is Professor of Structural Design and Technology and director of the Institute of Architecture and Urban Planning at the Berlin University of the Arts. He has been publishing internationally on structural design and engineering. His recent publication as co-editor, Rethink! Prototyping: Transdisciplinary Concepts of Prototyping (2016), describes the findings derived from interaction and cooperation between scientific actors employing diverse practices. Since 2011 he has been leader of the Hybrid Plattform, a common initiative of the Berlin University of the Arts and the Technische Universität of Berlin. Stefan Gross, is leading the Communication & Facilitation team at the Institute Neuland & Partner, Development and Training in Fulda, Germany. He studied Education, Psychology, Social Sciences and Philosophy at the University of Wuerzburg, where he received his PhD in 2009. Besides his work as a trainer, consultant and coach, Stefan Gross is a visiting faculty member at the University of Applied Sciences and Arts Northwestern Switzerland (FHNW) and at the Kathmandu University, School of Education (KUSOED). His major focus is on facilita-

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351

tion in conflicts and decision-making-processes, the quality of meeting-culture and the impact of visualization in communication. Professor Ruth Harris is Professor of Health Care for Older Adults in the Florence Nightingale Faculty of Nursing and Midwifery, King’s College London, UK. Her academic background and research is interdisciplinary, focused on the areas of health service innovation and evaluation and the impact of the nursing and the multiprofessional workforce on processes of care and patient outcomes particularly for older people and those with chronic conditions. She is an established principal investigator with experience and expertise in leading large nationally funded studies that make a significant international contribution. She has a clinical background in acute medical nursing and care of older people. She is an associate editor of the International Journal of Nursing Studies, a Fellow of the European Academy of Nursing Science and a member of the UK Royal College of Nursing Research Society Steering Group. Prof. Dr. Christoph Lütge studied philosophy and business informatics and earned his PhD in 1999. From 1999 until 2007 he was research fellow and, respectively, assistant at the Chair of Philosophy and Economics of the LMU München where he also qualified as a professor in 2005. Research stays led him to the University of Pittsburgh and the University of California, San Diego. In 2003 he was teaching as visiting professor at the Venice International University. From 2007 until 2010he held chairs in Witten/Herdecke as well as in Braunschweig and was awarded a Heisenberg Scholarship. Since 2010 he has been holding the newly created Peter Löscher endowment chair for Economic Ethics at the TU München. Prof. Horst Nowacki, born in Berlin in 1933, studied naval architecture at the Technische Universität of Berlin (TU Berlin). He obtained his doctorate from TU Berlin in 1963 on a topic of ship hydrodynamics. He served as a professor of naval architecture and marine engineering at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, USA from 1964 to 1974. He then returned to TU Berlin as a professor of ship design from 1974 to 1998. In his research and teaching activities during these periods he worked on multitudinous topics, notably in ship hydrodynamics, ship design, computer aided ship design and optimization, geometric modeling for ships, standardization of ship object models, history of ship sciences. Martina Plümacher is Professor of Philosophy at the Technische Universität Berlin. Her areas of research are epistemology, philosophy of signs and language, and ethics. She has published on Ernst Cassirer, Edmund Husserl, Gestalt theory, philosophical theories of perception and representation, and on pictorial semi-

352

Notes on Contributors

otics. Her publications include Wahrnehmung, Repräsentation und Wissen (2004), Speaking on Colors and Odors (co-ed., 2007), “Wissen und Repräsentation” (2011), “Erfahrung und Wissen” (2012), “Epistemic Perspectivity” (2012), “Erkenntnisperspektiven und ihre Kontexte” (2015). Scott Reeves is a social scientist who has been undertaking health professions education and health services research for over 20 years. He is currently Professor in Interprofessional Research at Kingston and St George’s, University of London and also Editor-in-Chief, Journal of Interprofessional Care. He spent a decade in North America at the University of Toronto then at the University of California, San Francisco. His main interests are focused on developing conceptual, empirical and theoretical knowledge to inform the design and implementation of interprofessional activities. To date, he has received grants from a range of funding bodies across the world and has published numerous peer-reviewed papers, chapters, books, editorials and monographs. Many of his publications have been translated from English into other languages including French, Spanish, Portuguese, Japanese, Norwegian and Russian. Sigurd Rompza, born 1945, first studied at the Pädagogische Hochschule des Saarlandes/Peter Wust, then studied painting and theory of art under Prof. Dr. Raimer Jochims at the Städelschule (Academy of Arts)/Frankfurt a. M., where he has been a Meisterschüler. 1981– 1994 teaching art education at the Universität des Saarlandes, 1994 – 1999 Professorship for design fundamentals at the Hochschule der Bildenden Künste/HBK-Saar, 1999 – 2011 Professorship for painting at the HBK-Saar. Since 1972 artistic production of reliefs, since 1985 of colored reliefs and wall objects. About 450 solo exhibitions or contributions to exhibitions. A significant number of works in public and private collections. Since 1973 author of art- and artist-theoretical articles. Gesine Schwan, born 1943, studied Romance studies, history, philosophy, and politology at the Freie Universität Berlin and the Universität Freiburg. From 1977 until 1999 professor for Political Science at the Otto-Suhr-Institut of the Freie Universität Berlin, from 1999 until 2008 president of the Europa-Universität Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder; currently president of the Humboldt-Viadrina Governance Platform in Berlin. 2004 and 2009 candidate for federal president (Bundespräsident). Since 2014 chairwoman of the basic values commission (Grundwertekommission) of the SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany). Publications in the field of democracy and governance, political culture, Europe, education, social democracy, and the normative fundamentals of politics.

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353

Juan Carlos Velasco is Senior Tenured Scientist at the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC). His main research areas are philosophy of law, ethics and politics, with a special focus on human rights, justice, migration and democracy. He was Research Fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. Among his numerous publications are: La teoría discursiva del derecho (2000), Habermas. El uso público de la razón (2013), El azar de las fronteras (2016), and, as co-editor, Global Challenges to Liberal Democracy. Political Participation, Minorities and Migrations (2013). Prof. Dr. Albert Vollmer is work and organizational psychologist and lecturer at the University of Applied Sciences and Arts Northwestern Switzerland, School of Applied Psychology. He earned his PhD at the University of Zurich. He is dedicated to teaching, further education, and research. He is the director of a Master of Advanced Studies in Business Psychology and co-director of a Certificate of Advanced Studies in Conflict Management. His research interests are new forms of working and co-operation in the context of organizations as well as of interorganizational networks. Topics are co-ordination and co-operation, conflict, constructive controversy, knowledge, and innovation. Julia Warmers is coordinator of the Hybrid Plattform at the Berlin University of the Arts, an inter-/transdisciplinary project platform in close collaboration with the Technische Universität Berlin. From 2010 to 2013, she taught in the Department of General and Interdisciplinary Studies at the Munich University of Applied Sciences. She has held lectures on the interrelation of arts, sciences, humanities, and business in Germany and abroad. Among her publications is Kunstforschung als ästhetische Wissenschaft. Beiträge zur transdisziplinären Hybridisierung von Wissenschaft und Kunst (co-editor, 2011). Prof. Dr. Theo Wehner held the chair of Work and Organizational Psychology at Hamburg University of Technology from 1986 to 1997. From 1997 to 2015 he held the chair of Work and Organizational Psychology and was the leader of the center for organizational and occupational science at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich. Currently, he is a guest professor at the University of Bremen. His research topics are the development of the new (creativity and innovation), the “truth of human error” (error friendliness and safety) the relationship between experience and knowledge (cooperation and exchange), and serving the public good (personal and corporate volunteering). Reinhard Wendler is researcher of the Kunsthistorisches Institut in Florenz – Max-Planck-Institut at the project “Bilderfahrzeuge. Warburg’s Legacy and the

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Future of Iconology” based at the Warburg Institute London. Wendler is co-director of the Society for Model Research based at the cluster of excellence Image Knowlegde Gestaltung at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Among his publications is Das Modell zwischen Kunst und Wissenschaft (2013).

Index of Persons Abbott, Andrew 181 Abel, Günter 1, 3, 16, 26, 35 f., 42, 52 f., 55 f. Abélard, Pierre 301 Adair, John 173 Alkier, Stefan 306 Allen, Tom 129, 319 Andereggen, Stefan 122, 132 Anderl, Reiner 238 Angenendt, Arnold 293 Annan, Kofi 279 Anselm of Canterbury 308 Antes, Peter 299 Arendt, Hannah 82, 134, 331, 344 Argyris, Chris 260 Aristotle 47, 92, 125, 319 – 321 Armeno, Christoforo 197 Ashburn, Ted T. 191 Assisi, Francis of 304 Assmann, Jan 292 – 296, 300 Bachelard, Gaston 138, 153 Badiou, Alain 81 Balsiger, Philipp W. 145 Bammé, Arno 158 Bandura, Albert 247 Barak, Aharon 84 f. Barr, Hugh 178 Barry, Brian 339 f. Bauman, Zigmunt 333 Beattie, Jill 181 Beck, Ulrich 62, 333, 340 Beckers, Gary 62 Beitz, Charles S. 336, 338 f. Ben Chorim, Schalom 302 Benhabib, Seyla 332 Berger, Michael 198 Berger, Wilhelm 145, 159, 166 Bergeron, John 311 Bergmann, Matthias 147 f., 150 f., 160 f., 164 – 166 Berlyne, Daniel 246 – 248 Bernhardt, Reinhold 305 Bezzola, Ladina 211 Binswanger, Ludwig 112

Blankenburg, Wolfgang 5, 106, 108 – 114 Bledow, Ronald 258 Bod, Rens 139, 167, 194 Bohr, Niels 149 Bohse-Nehrig, Helen 323 Bongardt, Michael 9, 289, 291 Borgo, Stefano 233 Borrill, Carol S. 173 Bourdieu, Pierre 139 Boutellier, Roman 6, 119, 130, 133 Boyarin, Daniel 297 Boyer, Martin 197 Bratman, Michael E. 25 Bredekamp, Horst 81, 87 Brennan, Geoffrey 67, 69 Breyer, Thiemo 5, 103, 107 Brodbeck, Karl-Heinz 63, 153 f. Buber, Martin 302 Buchanan, James M. 67, 69 Bunce, Peter 256 Cabos, Christian 235 f. Caesar, Gaius Iulius 62 Cassirer, Ernst 50, 291, 293, 299 f., 310 Chalupsky, Jutta 198 Chan, David Y. 201 Chen Yi-Feng, Nancy 259 Clark, Phillip G. 173 Clases, Christoph 246, 262 Cohen, Joshua 342 Cornell, Christine 83 f. Crane, Andrew 68 Cusanus, Nicolaus 301 Da Sangallo, Antonio 80 f. D’Agostini, Franca 320 – 322, 324 Dahla, Mohammed 82 De Dreu, Carsten K. W. 247, 257 De Meuron, Pierre 84 De Tocqueville, Alexis 275 Deci, Edward L. 124 Defila, Rico 157, 160 f., 166 Delbrück, Max 126 f. Denzinger, Heinrich 307 f.

356

Index of Persons

Descartes, René 125 Desombre, Terry 177 Deuser, Hermann 306 Deutsch, Morton 238, 247 Di Giulio, Antonietta 157, 160 f. Dick, Michael 8, 245 Dickinson, Helen 173, 175 Dirscherl, Erwin 292 Dohmen, Christoph 292, 296 Drews, Jürgen 121 Drinka, Theresa J.K. 173 Dunn, Dana S. 262 Echnaton 294 f. Edison, Thomas Alva 119, 128 Einstein, Albert 137, 153, 167 Endres, Egon 246 Engeström, Yrö 180 Erni Baumann, Claudia 133 Evers, Bernd 81 Faizi, Hadi Nasir 10, 14, 29, 31, 60 Feldman, Richard 319 Feldtkeller, Andreas 304 Felfe, Jörg 256 Ferrara, Alessandro 341 Feyerabend, Paul 139 Ficara, Elena 10, 319 Firth-Cozens, Jenni 177 Fisch, Menachem 310 Fischer, Ernst P. 153 Fleck, Ludwik 138, 201 Flusser, David 302 Folkers, Gerd 7, 189, 195, 197 – 199, 208 Follet, Mary Parker 246 Foot, Phillippa 323, 325 Forst, Rainer 301 f., 306 – 309, 341 Fox, Mary T. 178 Frambach, Ludwig 300 Franz, Matthias 307 Fraser, Nancy 335, 343 Freidson, Eliot 181 Frenk, Julio 178 Frey, Bruno S. 210 Frick, Tobias 306 Friedman, Milton 269, 271 Fuchs, Thomas 111

Gallagher, Shaun 28 Gambetta, Diego 73 Gatzemeier, Matthias 92 Gehry, Frank 84 Geissler, Cornelia 193 Gelfand, Michele J. 247, 257 Gengnagel, Christoph 6, 137 Gerhardus, Dietfried 91 – 94, 98, 100 f. Giere, Ronald N. 16 Goldie, Peter 105 Goldman, Alvin I. 28 Gombrich, Ernst H. 99 Goodman, Nelson 96 f. Gowans, Christopher W. 323 Grafe, Wiegand 235 Granovetter, Mark 124 f. Grau, Matthias 235, 237 f. Greenstone, Gerry 192 Grice, Paul 23 Grim, Patrick 320 Grimm, Jacob 14, 62 Grimm, Wilhelm 14, 62 Grinnell, Frederick 127 Gross, Stefan 8, 135, 245, 261 Grunden, Gabriele 302 Grünschloß, Andreas 295 Guariglia, Osvaldo 344 Guarino, Nicola 233 Gurwitsch, Aron 110 Gutenberg, Johannes 126 Habermas, Jürgen 67, 246, 273 f., 280, 289 f., 307, 334, 342, 344 f. Haeffner, Gerd 298 Hagedorn, Julie 288 Hagner, Michael 141 f. Handy, Charles 71, 180 Harris, Ruth 7, 173 f., 177, 180 Hartmann, Frank 198 Hausman, Carl R. 55 Havelock, Eric A. 126 Hayek, Friedrich August von 63 f. Heeren, Alexandre 199 Heil, Johannes 307 Heimerl, Katharina 152, 163, 168 Heisenberg, Werner 127 Held, David 344

Index of Persons

Helsper, Werner 262 Hénaff, Marcel 190 – 192 Hengsbach, Friedhelm 63 Henneman, Elizabeth A. 175 Henrix, Hans Hermann 297, 303 Herbert, Carol P. 178 Herzog, Jaques 84 Hick, John 305, 309 Hildyard, Angela 127 Hintikka, Jaakko 16 Hobbes, Thomas 61, 342 Hobsbawm, Eric 334 Hockway, Christopher 16 Hoepfner, Wolfram 79 Höffe, Otfried 343 Höfner, Markus 291 Holland, Michigan 129 Homann, Karl 63, 68 f., 72 Homolka, Walter 310 Hope, Jeremy 30, 256 Hudson, Bob 180 Husserl, Edmund 106 f. Ibn Ruschd – Averroes 301 Ibn Sina – Avicenna 301 Imdahl, Max 100 Ingram, Haydn 177 Innerarity, Daniel 331 – 333 Jacob, François 152 Jahn, Thomas 141, 149 f., 161 James, William 67, 298 Janis, Irving L. 181, 257 Jantsch, Erich 146 Jaspers, Karl 106 Jelphs, Kim 173, 175 Jesus of Nazareth 295 f., 298, 302, 305 Joas, Hans 306 Johnson, David W. 247 – 249, 251 f., 254, 258, 263 Johnson, Roger T. 247 – 249, 251 f., 254, 258, 263 Joly, Jean-Baptiste 140 Jungert, Michael 145 Kahnemann, Daniel 257 Kals, Elisabeth 257

Kampling, Rainer 303 Kandinsky, Wassily 98 Kant, Immanuel 29, 273, 285, 309 Kaulbach, Friedrich 14 Kepler, Johannes 125 Kienzler, Klaus 306 Kitto, Simon 181 Klausner, Joseph 302 Kledzik, Silke M. 98 Klinkhammer, Gritt 306 Knorr Cetina, Karin 138 Kocka, Jürgen 146 Koffka, Kurt 246 Kohlberg, Lawrence 247 Kohn, Linda T. 177 König, Gert 14 Korsch, Dietrich 291 Krainz, Ewald E. 151, 157 Kramer, Stephan J. 307 Kraus, William A. 175 Kremers, Heinz 302 Krohn, Wolfgang 147, 158, 165, 168 Kühl, Stefan 256 Kuhn, Thomas 121 Küng, Hans 301 Kut, Elvan 197 Langbecker, Uwe 238 Lapide, Pinchas 302 Lavater, Johann Caspar 303 – 305 Lavigna, Robert 346 Le Corbusier, Seuphor, Michel 122 Lehne, Markus 238 Lemieux-Charles, Louis 176 Lepik, Andres 81 Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim 303, 305 Lewin, Kurt 246 Lewin, Simon 180 Libuser, Carolyn 256 Liedberg, Bo 200 Liese, Harald 237 Linde, Gesche 306 Locke, John 269, 273, 285 Lorenz, Kuno 100 Losehand, Joachim 294 Lowton, Karen 175 Luhmann, Niklas 70

357

358

Index of Persons

Lukasiewicz, Jan 319 f. Lundstrom, Ingemar 200 Lütge, Christoph 4, 61, 63, 67 – 69 Luther, Martin 302 Lux, Vanessa 162 Lyon, Arabella 246 Maalouf, Amin 332 Machiavelli, Nicolò 190 f. Mahmoody, Betty 304 Mahr, Bernd 16, 79 Maier, Norman R. F. 246 Maimonides, Moses 301, 311 Mann, Horace 197 Mann, Leon 257 Manyika, James 197 Markiowicz, Lynn 175 Marx, Karl 271 Masolo, Claudio 233 Maurage, Pierre 199 Mayer, Andreas 147 f. Mayr, Ernst 65 McCloskey, Deirdre N. 64, 195 McCreery, George 129 McDermott, Richard 260 McGuire, Wendy L. 176 Mead, George Herbert 27 Mendelssohn, Moses 303 – 305 Métraux, Alexandre 147 f. Metzger, Felix J. 233 Michelangelo 80 f. Mies van der Rohe, Ludwig 84 Milanovic, Branko 338 Miller, David 339 Minkowski, Eugène 112 Mises, Ludwig von 61 Mittelstraß, Jürgen 146, 148, 156 Montada, Leo 257 Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu 270 Moon, Karen 86 Moryson, Wilfried 71 Mose 292, 295 Moxter, Miachel 291 Moyo, Dambisa 65 Muhammad 295 Mukerji, Nikil 63

Müller, Claudia 142, 155, 157, 159, 161, 166 Müller, Karlheinz 311 Mumford, Michael D. 259 Münchau, Wolfgang 73 Nagel, Thomas 15, 334, 339, 341 – 343 Neuberger, Oswald 245, 256 Neumeyer, Fritz 48, 52 Neuwirth, Angelika 295 Newton, Isaak 125 Nietzsche, Friedrich 123, 134 Nonaka, Ikoriju 128 North, Douglass 129, 193, 337 Nowacki, Horst 8, 215, 218, 221, 225 Nowotny, Helga 253 Nylander, Claes 200 Oesterreicher, Johannes 303 Olson, David R. 127 Onyett, Steve 179 Oppen, Maria 142, 155, 157, 159, 161, 166 Ortega y Gasset, José 330 Osterloh, Margit 210 Otto, Vivianne 195 Owen, Jon 218, 224, 227 Paetzold, Heinz 50 Pally, Marcia 306 Panini 194 Pasteur, Louis 121 Perls, Fredeerick 293 Peruzzi, Baldassare 189 Pesch, Otto Herrmann 303 Pesenti, Mauro 199 Pfeifer, Wolfgang 14 Philippi, Bernd 97 f. Piaget, Jean 247 – 249 Pierson, Paul 193 Plato 126, 324 Plümacher, Martina 1, 3, 13 f., 16, 20, 37 Podann, Audrey 288 Pogge, Thomas 339 – 342 Polanyi, Michael 196 Poole, Marshall Scott 258 Poorthuis, Marcel J.H.M. 311 Pope John Paul II 304 Pope Leo XIII 307

Index of Persons

Postman, Neil 119, 134 Precht, Richard D. 68 Priest, Graham 321 – 323 Puyol, Ángel 344 Raeithel, Arne 246 Ratzinger, Joseph 305 Rausch, Dirk 93 f. Rawls, John 10, 71, 329, 337 – 340, 346 Reeves, Scott 7, 173 – 178, 180 – 183 Rehkämper, Klaus 14 Reitzig, Gerd H. 98 Rennert, Martin 153 Rescher, Nicholas 15 f., 26 Rheinberger, Hans-Jörg 16, 138 f., 144, 151 – 154, 167 Richter, Cornelia 291 Richter, Sandra 62 Rifkin, Jeremy 246 Risse, Mathias 339 Rivera, Josette 177, 179 Rodrik, Dani 345 Rompza, Sigurd 5, 50, 91 f., 100 Röösli, Franz 256 Rosa, Hartmut 63 – 66 Rousseau, Denise M. 256 Rudolph, Enno 291 Russo, Patricia 196 Saarinen, Eero 84 Sabel, Charles 342 Sachers, Markus 235 Sachs, Wolfgang 334, 336 Santarius, Tilman 334, 336 Satzinger, Georg 81 Schapp, Wilhelm 93 Schenck, Douglas A. 227 Scherer, Andreas G. 67 Schieder, Rolf 293 Scholl, Wolfgang 258 Schöllner, Karsten 60, 263 Scholz, Oliver R. 98 Schön, Donald A. 154 Schönbächler, Georg 194 Schreckenberg, Heinz 297 Schreyögg, Georg 255 Schuler, Heinz 255

359

Schulte-Sasse, Jochen 14 Schumpeter, Joseph 66 Schürmann, Eva 98 Schütze, Fritz 262 Schwan, Gesine 9, 267 Searle, John 25 Seidel, Esther 310 Seleme, Hugo O. 339, 342 Sen, Amartya 339, 341 f. Seyr, Sarah 249 Shachar, Ayelet 338 Sheskin, Jacob 192 Shikwati, James 65 Shklat, Judith 306 Shue, Henry 339 Sidani, Souraya 178 Smith, Adam 69 Snyder, William M. 260 Socrates 126, 324 Sperber, Dan 23 Spök, Armin 158 Stadie, Marion 138, 141, 147, 149, 156, 162, 165 f. Stark, Sheila 175 Stephenson, George 119 Sternberg, Robert J. 262 Stirling, David I. 192 Stjepandic, Josip 237 Sturm, Daniel Friedrich 191 Styron, William 325 Su, Fang 259 Sukale, Michael 14 Teo, Steve K. 192 Thamus 126 Thor, Karl B. 191 Tjosvold, Dean 251, 259 Tomasello, Michael 18 Toulmin, Stephen 333 Treichel, Katja 288 Tversky, Amos 257 Ukowitz, Martina 151, 157 Ulbrich, Sebastian 206 Ulrich, Peter 67

360

Index of Persons

Valéry, Paul 99 Van de Ven, Andrew H. 258 Van Fraasen, Bas C. 16 Van Parijs, Philippe 339 Vasarhelyi, Miklos A. 201 Vasari, Giorgio 80 f., 85 Velasco, Juan Carlos 10, 329, 345 Vitruvius 52, 79 f. Volkov, Shulamit 302 Vollmer, Albert 8, 245, 249 f., 258, 263 Von der Osten-Sacken, Peter 302 Vygotsky, Lev 247

West, Michael A. 81, 173, 175, 179 f., 275, 299 Whitehead, Alfred North 119, 127 Wiesing, Lambert 95 – 98 Wilson, Deirdre 23 Wilson, Peter A. 227 Wind, Edgar 99 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 99 f. Witz, Anne 181 Wood, Robert Williams 200 Wright, Robert 245 Xyrichis, Andreas

Wagner, Lars 235 Waites, Daisy 88 Walpole, Horace 197 Walter, Peter 293 Warfield, Ted A. 319 Warmers, Julia 6, 137, 140 Wartofsky, Marx William 85 f. Wehner, Theo 8, 245 f. Weinrich, Michael 303 Weisz, Ulli 152, 156 Weizman, Eyal 82 – 85 Wendler, Reinhard 4, 79, 84 Wenger, Etienne 260 Werner, Michael 297

175

Young, Iris M. 338 Yu, Zigou 259 Zahavi, Dan 28 Zeitoun, Hossam 210 Zeldis, Jerome B. 192 Zerbst, Carsten 235 Ziliak, Stephen T. 195 Zimmermann, Bénédicte 297 Zinser, Hartmut 291 Zolo, Danilo 341 Zwarenstein, Merrick 177, 179

Index of Topics action/Handlung 3, 8, 10, 13 – 17, 19 – 29, 36 – 38, 42, 46, 67 – 70, 72, 85, 92 – 98, 105, 162, 182, 197 f., 201, 233, 245 f., 251 – 253, 255, 258, 262, 269, 282, 301, 308, 311, 323 f., 326 – 329, 331 – 333, 336, 345 f. aesthetics of production/Produktionsästhetik 92 aesthetics of reception/Rezeptionsästhetik 92 application 8, 30, 120, 191, 203, 207, 215, 227, 229 f., 241, 245, 250 f., 254 f., 259, 261 – 263, 339 f. architecture 3, 16, 35 – 58, 79, 81, 84 f., 122 f., 128, 194, 262, 336, 341, 344 artist theory/Künstlertheorie 92 aspect 1 f., 4, 6, 10, 15 – 17, 19, 21 – 30, 38 f., 43, 53, 55, 79, 85 f., 103, 106 f., 110, 113, 247, 249, 252, 259 – 261, 274, 277, 282, 295, 309 big data 121 boundary objects 165 buildings 36, 41, 47, 49 f., 52 – 54, 58 f., 80, 122, 128, 132 f., 193 f. business ethics/Unternehmensethik 67, 70 boundary object 165 catalytic effect 7, 203 change management 197, 200 – 202 collaboration 6 – 8, 22, 25, 175 f., 179 – 183, 185, 200, 205, 209, 258, 262 f. common good 268 f., 271 – 273, 275 – 277, 280 – 285, 288 common societal ground 269, 276 common values 270 communication/Kommunikation 1, 4, 6 – 9, 13, 23 f., 26, 46, 106, 119, 124, 128 – 130, 132, 137, 142, 154 f., 157, 159, 174, 177, 179 f., 183 f., 206 f., 210, 215 – 218, 222 – 224, 234 – 237, 286, 289, 330, 334, 340, 346 competition/Wettbewerb 2, 4, 61 – 74, 120, 123, 256, 283

concept 14 – 16, 23, 26, 39, 41, 43 f., 46, 48, 79, 106, 110, 123, 173, 179, 185, 189, 192 f., 203, 205 f., 209 f., 246, 254, 259, 274, 276 f., 282, 286, 291, 293, 295 – 297, 300, 305, 308 f., 311, 323, 331 f. conception 9, 44, 47, 289, 294, 302, 306, 309, 336, 341 conflict 1 f., 8 – 10, 17, 21, 30, 86 f., 108, 113, 181, 202, 204 f., 245, 247 f., 250 f., 253, 255, 257 – 259, 262 f., 268, 270, 275, 278, 282 – 285, 287, 289 f., 292, 294, 301 f., 304, 306, 317, 319, 322 f., 326 f. consensus 4, 9, 18, 246, 260 f., 267, 271 f., 274 – 276, 280, 282, 286 f., 297, 305 – basic 272, 274 – 276, 286 f. – sustainable 9, 276, 278 constructive controversy 8, 245 – 252, 254, 257 – 263 contradiction 81, 210, 255, 259, 262, 319 – 323, 327 – logical 320 – ontological 320 – practical 320, 324 – pragmatic 320, 326 – psychological 320 contrariety 321 f. cooperation/Kooperation 2, 6 f., 9, 13, 17, 21 – 27, 44, 46, 49, 69, 73, 119, 137, 140, 142 f., 147 – 151, 153 – 155, 157, 159, 161, 163 f., 167, 198, 202, 234, 236, 262 f., 267, 271, 279, 282, 336 f., 339, 345 – artistic-scientific/künstlerisch-wissenschaftliche 140 coordination 1, 3, 13, 21 – 23, 49, 125, 132, 134, 175 – 177, 179 f., 336 cosmopolitism 339 – 331, 336, 339, 344, 346 f. creativity 2 – 4, 26, 35 f., 39 f., 46, 53 – 57, 59 f., 123 – 126, 128 – 131, 133 – 135, 198, 249, 258 f.

362

Index of Topics

decision-making 174, 180 f., 183, 205, 245, 251, 253 – 255, 257, 259 f., 263, 270 – 272, 286, 288, 333, 343 deliberation 129, 246, 257, 273 – 277, 280 – 282, 285, 287 f., 298 delusion 103 f., 106, 108 – 110, 112 – 114, 344 demarchy 210 differentiation 105, 114, 288, 292 f., 296, 306, 336 disambiguation 326 f. distributed perspectives 1 – 9, 13 – 15, 17, 19 – 21, 26 – 30, 35, 61, 103 f., 119, 127, 129, 208, 245 f., 289, 291 f., 296, 309, 311, 322 division of labor/labor division/Arbeitsteilung 8, 14, 17, 22, 158, 174, 215, 230, 271 drug design 195 drug development 7, 189, 191 f., 194, 196, 211 economic ethics/Wirtschaftsethik 63, 67, 74 egalitarian liberalism 338 epistemic cultures/epistemische Kulturen 138 exchange platforms 189, 201, 207 f., 210 exemplification/Exemplifikation 91, 96 – 98 experimental research/experimentelle Forschung 152 face-to-face

127 f., 134

gathering 79 – 81, 83, 85, 87, 183, 252, 258, 274, 280, 285 globalization 10, 120, 271, 278 f., 301, 329 – 336, 343 – 345 global justice 10, 341 – 343, 345 f. health 7, 121, 173 f., 176 – 181, 183 f., 191, 246, 278 horizon 1, 26, 37, 107 f., 110, 189, 208, 275, 284, 291, 298 – 300, 303, 335

identity crisis 81 innovation 4, 6, 26, 61, 63, 119 – 121, 123, 128, 134, 144, 154, 156, 191, 197, 200, 233, 250, 254, 256, 258 f., 281 intentionality 103, 110 f., 343 inter- and transdisciplinarity/Inter- und Transdisziplinarität 138, 140, 145, 151, 159 interdisciplinary/interdisciplinarity 7, 17, 26, 132, 189 – 191, 197, 201 – 211 interreligious dialogue 291 intervention 147, 173, 177, 184, 195, 250, 261, 263 judgment

21, 29, 58, 249

knowing how 38, 40 f. knowing that 40 knowledge 2 f., 5 f., 15, 19 – 21, 23, 26 – 29, 35 – 46, 48 – 52, 54, 56 – 58, 79, 91, 111, 125, 127 – 129, 137, 173, 175, 196, 202, 237, 248 f., 252 f., 255, 257 – 259, 261, 263, 281, 293, 299, 301, 309, 311, 319, 323, 340 – aesthetic/ästhetische Erkenntnis 168 – artistic 3, 35, 41, 51 f. – explicit 46, 53, 128 – implicit 4, 35, 52, 196 – moral 45 – practical 28, 42, 45 f. – reflective 38 – scientific/wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis 41, 45 f., 139, 153 – sensory/sensuelle Erkenntnis 5, 46, 91 f., 95, 99 – technical 41, 46, 134 – theoretical 46 knowledge integration/Wissensintegration 158, 160, 167 knowledge orders 37 f. knowledge research 36, 39 f., 42 – 46, 50 knowledge types 3, 35 f., 38 – 59 – distributed 3 f., 35 f., 39 – 41, 43 – 47, 49 f., 53, 55 f., 59 – integrated 37, 40, 43, 49 f., 53 law of non-contradiction 319, 328 liberal democracy 268, 274, 353

Index of Topics

market economy/Marktwirtschaft 63 f., 66 f., 71, 73 market/Markt 62 – 64, 68 f., 73, 119 – 122, 191 – 193, 195, 197 – 200, 211, 245, 256, 271, 280, 283 f., 333 material/Stoff 5, 16, 36 f., 40, 46, 48 f., 51, 53 f., 57 – 59, 81, 86 f., 91, 93 – 95, 97, 119, 131, 198, 230, 241, 284 methodological nationalism 329 f., 336, 340 methods/Methoden 6, 8, 16, 26, 57, 59, 72, 80, 122, 131, 137 – 139, 144, 146, 149 f., 160 – 162, 164 f., 167, 206, 208, 215, 246, 261 f., 286 modality 104 model/Modell 4, 16, 36, 44, 55, 72 f., 79 – 88, 98, 120 f., 124, 128 f., 138 f., 145, 149, 154 f., 173, 190, 195 f., 208, 212, 217 – 228, 230 f., 233 f., 236 – 239, 241, 258, 266, 277, 282, 332, 335 f., 340, 344 moderation/Mäßigung 68, 70 f., 137, 143, 157 – 159, 260 f., 270 modularization 120 modulation of colors and light/Farb-Licht-Modulierung 93 – 95, 100 multifactor system 79 multi-stakeholder 277 – 281 national state 340 negation 113, 319 – 321, 323 noematic 103 f., 114 noetic 103, 114 obligation 28, 204 f., 282, 329, 340, 342 oralist 126 ordering ethics/Ordnungsethik 67, 69 f., 73 organization 2, 6 – 8, 31, 117, 125, 129 – 131, 135, 173, 178, 184, 190, 193, 198, 203, 205 f., 210, 245, 248, 255 – 261, 263, 280, 284, 293, 335, 337, 340, 342 parametrization 10 path dependency 193, 196, 200 f. patient centred care 178 patient safety 177, 179

363

perception 1, 13 f., 16 – 21, 38, 50, 55, 81, 86 – 88, 103 – 108, 110 – 112, 179, 272, 286 f., 290, 294 f., 298, 300, 331, 342 perspective(s) 1 – 10, 13 – 24, 26 – 31, 35 – 59, 61, 79 – 81, 83, 85 – 88, 91, 103 – 106, 108 f., 111 – 114, 119 – 125, 127 f., 131, 133 f., 137, 189 – 192, 195 – 204, 207 – 211, 247 – 249, 251, 253 – 255, 258, 260 – 263, 267, 271, 273 – 276, 281 – 289, 291, 297, 299, 306 – 311, 319, 322 f., 326 f., 329, 331, 335 – 338, 340, 343 – 345 – aesthetic 37 – distributed 1 – 9, 13 – 15, 17, 19 – 21, 26 – 28, 30, 35, 61, 103 – 105, 119, 129, 208, 245 f., 289, 291 f., 296, 309, 311, 322 – epistemic 3 f., 14 f., 19, 35 – formalist 37 – functionalist 37 perspectivity 1, 4, 9, 14 – 17, 19, 79 f., 85 – 88, 103 f., 106 – 108, 111 – 114, 289 – distributed 19 f., 111 – epistemic 14 – 16, 18 – visuo-spatial 14 f. phenomenology 52, 57 pluralism/plurality 9, 20, 26, 37, 39, 43, 108, 111, 268 f., 274 f., 289 f., 305 f., 308 f. pluralistic theology 305 point of view 5, 10, 15, 19 f., 22, 25 – 27, 30, 48, 59, 91, 103, 191, 195, 248, 273, 286, 298, 305, 319, 323, 326 f., 334, 336 practice 5, 19 f., 28, 38, 41 – 44, 46, 50 – 55, 57 f., 84, 130, 175 f., 179 f., 184, 196, 198, 200 f., 204 f., 208, 245 f., 250 f., 254, 257, 259 f., 262 f., 269 f., 273, 275 – 277, 281, 287, 293 f., 296, 300 pragmatic fiction 87 process modeling/Prozessmodellierung 215 f., 219 product lifecycle management/Produktlebenszyklus-Management 219, 234, 237 product modeling/Produktmodellierung 217, 221, 224 f., 228, 231, 236 product representation/Produktdarstellung 216 f., 234, 238

364

Index of Topics

psychopathology 106 public good 288 quadratum oppositorum

321

reductio ad absurdum 322 f., 327 reflection 2 – 7, 9, 13, 17, 26, 30, 43, 47 f., 50, 137, 197, 201 – 203, 252, 259 f., 263, 267 f., 277, 289 – 292, 305, 337 religion 9, 119, 289 – 311 religious freedom 307 f., 311, 314 re-positioning 7, 189, 191 f., 197 f., 201, 203, 211 representation 79 – 81, 181, 190, 215, 240 f., 269, 282, 330, 332, 335 research/Forschung 1, 6 – 8, 16, 26, 30 f., 36, 39 f., 42 – 47, 50, 93, 99, 121 – 123, 125, 128, 130, 132, 134, 137, 161 – 164, 166 – 168, 140 f., 144 – 148, 151 f., 155 f., 158, 191 f., 195 – 209, 245 f., 249 – 252, 254 f., 259 f., 262 f., 287, 296 f., 302, 339, 349 – 351, 353 f. – experimental research/experimentelle Forschung 144, 152 – integrative research/integratives Forschen 150 rules/Regeln 29, 38, 54 f., 59, 61 f., 65 – 70, 72, 82, 132, 135, 194, 245, 255, 281, 287, 293, 307, 337, 342, 344 f. secularism 284, 289, 307 seeing aspects/Aspektsehen 99 self-serving interests 275 – 277, 283, 285 serendipity 192, 196 f. situation 4, 24, 28, 43, 47, 53, 55 – 57, 65 f., 68 f., 71, 79 – 81, 83, 85, 87 f., 103, 105, 109 f., 114, 137, 139, 158, 160, 181, 183, 191, 202, 204 f., 208, 248, 254 – 258, 260, 268 – 270, 276, 283 f., 294, 297,

300, 302, 304, 306, 308, 320, 322 – 327, 331, 338, 345 social care 7, 173 f., 177 – 181, 183 space of thoughts and research/Denk- und Forschungsraum 137, 155 f., 167 standard ISO 10303 (STEP)/Standard ISO 10303 (STEP) 224, 227, 237 standardization/Standardisierung 8, 215 f., 218 f., 222 f., 231, 234, 237 f. standpoint 9, 20, 108, 112, 289 symbolic forms 50, 291, 299 target 124, 184, 189, 195 f., 205 task sharing 14 team 22, 27, 49, 55, 121, 123 f., 127 f., 132 f., 145, 158 f., 161, 173 – 181, 183 f., 223, 236, 249 – 252, 259 f. teamwork 1, 7, 22, 26 f., 173 – 177, 179 – 182, 184 f. – interprofessional teamwork 2, 7, 173 – 185 technology platform 122, 131 f. temporalization 326 theories 2, 125, 173, 185, 246 – 249, 257 – 259, 269, 273, 336 theory of justice 329, 337, 339 f., 345 tolerance 6, 119, 124, 134, 301, 306, 337 transdisciplinary/transdisciplinarity 2, 6, 137, 189, 204 f., 211, 262 trust 6, 119, 124, 133 f., 175, 189, 256, 269, 275, 282, 284, 286 – 288 truth 274 – 277, 287, 296, 303 – 305, 307, 323 utilitarianism

199 f.

vision/Sehen 48, 64, 69, 85 f., 91 f., 96 – 101, 139, 149 f., 175, 190, 331 world poverty

338