The Political System of Germany 3658413700, 9783658413705

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Tom Mannewitz · Wolfgang Rudzio

The Political System of Germany

The Political System of Germany

Tom Mannewitz · Wolfgang Rudzio

The Political System of Germany

Tom Mannewitz Hochschule des Bundes für öffentliche Verwaltung Berlin, Germany

Wolfgang Rudzio Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg Oldenburg, Germany

ISBN 978-3-658-41370-5 ISBN 978-3-658-41371-2  (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41371-2 This book is a translation of the original German edition “Das politische System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland” by Mannewitz, Tom and Rudzio, Wolfgang, published by Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH in 2022. The translation was done with the help of an artificial intelligence machine translation tool. A subsequent human revision was done primarily in terms of content, so that the book will read stylistically differently from a conventional translation. Springer Nature works continuously to further the development of tools for the production of books and on the related technologies to support the authors. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature. The registered company address is: Abraham-Lincoln-Str. 46, 65189 Wiesbaden, Germany

Preface

The title of this book is not the “state” but the “political system“ of the Federal Republic of Germany. A “system” can be understood as a number of elements that interact with each other more closely than with the rest of the environment, with the goal of the system's self-preservation, or, if necessary, the fulfillment of a function. Thus, in modern, differentiated societies, one can distinguish, among others, an economic subsystem, a cultural subsystem, and a political subsystem, each with specific roles, rules, and tasks. What function does the political system serve? Societies, according to the view of systems theory, face problems that can neither be dealt with individually nor by entirely uncoordinated subsystems, but require binding decisions by society as a whole. It is the function of the political system: to make and enforce such decisions. The central medium for this, comparable to money in the economic subsystem, is power in this or that form—be it legitimacy (e.g. through elections, past success), be it sanctioning power up to violence. In detail, the following individual steps can be distinguished in the transformation of problems into decisions: • • • • • •

Articulation of interests (especially by associations) Aggregation of interests (especially by parties) Rule-making (by government and parliament) Application of rules (especially by administration) Correction of rule applications in individual cases (especially by the judiciary) Communication with the system environment (especially by the media)

Political socialization, the procurement of finances, and the military serve to maintain the system (Almond and Powell 1966, p. 28 f.).

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Preface

What belongs to the political system, and what are its limits? On the one hand, it comprises more than the state and its institutions, on the other hand, less than society as a whole: namely, all activities and role contexts by means of which decisions binding on society as a whole are consciously influenced, legitimately brought about and enforced in society. Understood in this way, the individual does not belong to the political system as a whole person, but in the roles of citizen, voter and non-voter, member of an association or party, demonstrator, member of parliament, civil servant, etc.; analogously, an organized group, insofar as it seeks to influence those decisions. A system representation has not to concentrate on single processes and the current of the day, but on the typically recurring, on lasting structures and behavior patterns. Nor can it limit itself to the bare present, but must include historical aspects that provide the film, so to speak, that ends with the present. Only in this way can a political system be better understood. In addition, the presentation includes brief side glances at conditions in comparable countries—this makes it possible to classify German conditions realistically and not just measure them against the bar of ideal ideas. What is new in the present edition is not only the replaced verification technique. Another change is that the previous sole author Wolfgang Rudzio, who is now 87 years old, handed over the new edition of the book to his younger colleague Tom Mannewitz. The latter has incorporated new literature, the latest data (also from recently digitized data collections) and new accents to bring the presentation up to date. The older parts of the text, on the other hand, were written by the previous author. With this transition, we hope to open a path for the book into the future. Later, Tom Mannewitz will be the sole author of the book. We thank the publisher for having suggested such a transition. Tom Mannewitz Wolfgang Rudzio

Reference Gabriel A. Almond/G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics, Boston

Contents

Part I  Fundamentals of the political system 1

The External Conditions of the Federal Republic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1 Westbindung as a Foreign Policy Basic Decision. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2 Role Search: Germany in the Changed World since 1990. . . . . . . 7 1.3 From Division to German Unity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1.4 The Direction of European Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

2

The Anti-totalitarian Democracy of the Basic Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 2.1 History of the Constitution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 2.2 The Central Constitutional Principles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 2.3 The Legitimacy and Change of the Basic Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Part II  The political field of forces 3

Organized Interests: Between Pluralism and Corporatism. . . . . . . . 47 3.1 The Pluralism of Interests in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 3.2 The Sociology of Interest Organisations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 3.3 Association Influence: Rule of the Associations?. . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 3.4 Interlocking with the State: Features of Corporatism . . . . . . . . . . 67 3.5 Citizen Initiatives and Movements: Supplement or Alternative? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

4

Multi-Party System with Limited Coalition Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 4.1 Germany—a Party State?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 4.2 Changes in the Party System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 VII

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Contents

4.3

Two-Dimensional Multiparty System with Unwanted Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 4.4 The Party Programs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 5

Internal Party Democracy or Rule of Oligarchy?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 5.1 The Organizational Structure of the Parties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 5.2 Inner-Party Democracy in Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 5.3 The Party Members—The Downside of Participation. . . . . . . . . . 143 5.4 Problems of a Fair Party Financing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

6

Voting Behavior: Social Characteristics and Current Orientations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 6.1 Personalized Proportional Representation and Voter Turnout. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 6.2 Social Characteristics: Class, Confession and Age Group Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 6.3 Social Psychological Motivations and Conjunctural Issues. . . . . . 185 6.4 The Economics of the Election Campaign. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196

Part III  Political Institutions: A Complex Multi-Level System 7

The Bundestag: Parliamentary Majority Democracy. . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 7.1 The Dualism of Majority and Opposition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 7.2 The Organization of the Parliamentary Faction Parliament. . . . . . 212 7.3 The Electoral Function: Legitimizing Majority Formation. . . . . . 221 7.4 Control Function and Co-government. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 7.5 Legislative Function: Between a Debating and a Working Parliament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

8

The Federal Government: Problems of Political Steering . . . . . . . . . 243 8.1 Chancellor Democracy, Cabinet and Departmental Principle. . . . 243 8.2 Decision Centre: Cabinet or Coalition Committee? . . . . . . . . . . . 253 8.3 Political Leadership and Ministerial Bureaucracy. . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

Contents

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IX

Institutional Counterweights: Features of Negotiation Democracy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271 9.1 The Federal Council of Germany: Veto Power of the State Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271 9.2 Federal Constitutional Court: Guardian and Shaper of the Constitution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282 9.3 The Federal President: Potentially More Than Just a Representative? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293 9.4 Limits of Parliamentary Majority Rule. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302

10 The German Federalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309 10.1 Federal States and State Parliamentarism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309 10.2 The Interlocking of Politics Between the Federal Government and the States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322 10.3 The Perennial Problems of Federalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333 11 The Municipalities: Between Administration and Politics. . . . . . . . . 339 11.1 The Janus-Faced Nature of German Municipalities . . . . . . . . . . . 339 11.2 Directly Elected Mayors, but Two Models of Democracy. . . . . . . 347 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361 12 Public Administration and Implementation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365 12.1 From Administration to Public Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365 12.2 Enforcement from Within, Protection from Outside. . . . . . . . . . . 377 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385 13 Germany in the European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389 13.1 German Interests in European Politics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389 13.2 The Europeanisation of the Political System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404 13.3 The Reduced German Democracy Within the EU. . . . . . . . . . . . . 413 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420 Part IV  Sociological aspects of German politics 14 The Media as Intermediaries and Actors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431 14.1 Democracy and Mass Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431 14.2 The Dual Media Landscape. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437 14.3 The Media System—Functions and Problems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445 14.4 Welcome Culture: Crisis of Pluralistic Political Mediation?. . . . . 454 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457

X

Contents

15 Political Elite in Democracy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465 15.1 Political Leaders—Not a Mirror Image of Society. . . . . . . . . . . . 465 15.2 Attitudes: Career Patterns and Inconsistency With Voters. . . . . . . 480 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 487 16 Political Culture of the Loosened Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 493 16.1 Development Phases of Political Culture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 493 16.2 Dimensions of Present-day Political Culture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 499 16.3 The Difficult Handling of Political Extremism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 520 17 Social Problems and Fields of Action of Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 531 17.1 Demography and Economy: A Country in Decline?. . . . . . . . . . . 531 17.2 Distribution Structures of a Middle-class Society. . . . . . . . . . . . . 545 17.3 Policy Areas: Different Arenas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 549 17.4 Perspectives of the Federal Republic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 570 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 573

Part I Fundamentals of the political system

1

The External Conditions of the Federal Republic

1.1 Westbindung as a Foreign Policy Basic Decision a. State Foundation in the Cold War At the beginning of the Federal Republic of Germany stood a collapse, such as is rarely seen among modern industrial nations. After totalitarian hubris and violent expansion, the Second World War in Europe ended with Germany’s total defeat, sealed in the unconditional surrender of May 7, 1945. There was no German government anymore, and even authorities and administrative structures had—with the exception of remnants at the local level—disintegrated; similarly, numerous social organizations that had been re-purposed in the spirit of the Nazi regime. The great victorious powers—the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, to which France was added—subjected the entire country to their unconditional occupation regime with a four-power control council as the highest authority. They assigned the German territories east of the Oder and Neisse rivers under Polish administration respectivly the northern East Prussia under Soviet administration and let expel the population into the rest of Germany. The same fate befell the Sudeten Germans as well as the Germans living in Poland, Yugoslavia and Hungary (Potsdam Conference from July 17 to August 2, 1945—Deuerlein 1963, pp. 361–363), a total of 16 million people (Theisen 1995, pp. 20–21)1. In addition, France separated the Saarland in the west in order to associate it. The rest of Germany, divided into four occupation zones of the United States of America, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and France (corresponding to Berlin in four sectors), was soon torn apart by the worldwide confrontation between

1 More

than two million of them died in the process (Theisen 1995, pp. 20–21).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Mannewitz and W. Rudzio, The Political System of Germany, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41371-2_1

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1  The External Conditions of the Federal Republic

Western democracies and Soviet totalitarianism into Western zones on the one hand and the Soviet zone on the other. Soviet vetoes largely paralyzed the four-power control council, while the Soviet military administration in its zone advanced the establishment of a socialist economic system through rigorous expropriations. What was decisive was that the Western powers and the Soviet Union represented completely incompatible political ideas and that, accordingly, the conditions in the Western zones developed into Western democracy, while in the Soviet zone they developed into a Communist dictatorship. Milestones in the development of the Soviet zone were: the forced merger of the local SPD with the KPD in April 1946; the determination of the “Socialist Unity Party of Germany” (SED) formed in this way to Marxism-Leninism in 1948; the formation of a “National Front” of all parties with the mass organizations dominated by the SED. From 1949, only this “anti-fascist” unity front was allowed to stand for election in order to—regardless of the outcome—distribute all parliamentary mandates among themselves in favor of a secure Communist dominance. This development was accompanied by arrests and long prison sentences for those who resisted. A corresponding process took place in the Eastern European countries, where the establishment of Communist dictatorships was completed with the Prague coup of February 1948. The Western democracies have opposed this with gradually increasing determination. Signs of this were President Truman’s containment policy from 1947 and the founding of NATO in 1949. After foreign minister conferences with the Soviet Union in 1947 had not opened up any prospects for agreement on Germany, the three Western powers and the Benelux countries agreed in the spring of 1948 to take the path to state and democracy foundation in West Germany alone. The currency reform of June 21, 1948 in the Western zones—replacement of the worthless Reichsmark with the “Deutsche Mark”—and the request of the Western military governors to the Western state prime ministers of July 1, 1948 to initiate the preparation of a German constitution, were the first consequences of this decision. These steps were accompanied by increasingly violent protests from the Soviet side, the accusation of “division” and brutal pressure. On March 20, 1948, the Soviets left the Four Power Control Council, so that the last veil of a joint administration of Germany was torn. From June 24 on, they imposed a nearly one-year blockade of the western land and water routes to Berlin. The result was the political division of Berlin. Of great psychological importance for the future was that Americans and British defended the freedom and viability of Western Berlin with an airlift and thus found themselves in a common front position for

1.1  Westbindung as a Foreign Policy Basic Decision

5

the first time with the majority of Germans (Lilge 1967, pp. 3 ff.; Vogelsang 1966; Eschenburg 1983). The foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 was therefore not the cause, but the consequence and expression of the division of Germany in the East-West conflict. This was followed almost simultaneously by the formation of the “German Democratic Republic” in the Soviet Zone. b. The need for security policy affiliation The central framework condition for the Federal Republic then became its geographical location on the edge of the Western world for four decades. It was particularly exposed to the Soviet power area and, as a narrow, impregnable belt with a high population density, was “extremely vulnerable” militarily (von Schubert 1978, p. 475). In view of the conventional military superiority of the Warsaw Pact, it was therefore accompanied by a constant, varying feeling of threat from the Soviet bloc until 1990 (Schweigler 1985, p. 183). Therefore, its security needs primarily determined its foreign policy (Grosser 1990, p. 437). Two ways to meet this were available to the Federal Republic: on the one hand, to protect itself by military deterrence policy and, on the other hand, to reduce the likelihood of pressure or attack by detente policy. Even if it has been said here of “two pillars of security” (Haftendorn 1983, p. 719)—primarily one relied on deterrence. In the first place, 79.2% of members of the West German elite still attributed the state of peace in 1980/81 to it.2. These two lines can be assigned to two theoretical approaches that compete with each other in the theory of international relations: detente policy to an “idealism”, deterrence policy to a “realism”. Politicians are paradigmatically named for these schools of thought, namely Woodrow Wilson (US President 1913–21) and Otto von Bismarck (German Chancellor 1871–90). If, in the one view, humanity is a community of brothers (or could be), the other starts from the “homo homini lupus” principle (Schwarzenberger 1955, p. 3). While idealism highlights mutual dependencies, realism emphasizes the anarchy between states and, accordingly, the concepts of peacekeeping differ (see Table 1.1). On what should one rely more, what moves the international actors or what should it move? From an idealistic point of view, it has been criticized that times of European power and balance politics led to military conflicts, from a realistic one that the League of Nations and peace treaties after 1918 did not prevent the Second World War.

2 Elite

survey, n = 615 (Schössler 1983, p. 170).

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1  The External Conditions of the Federal Republic

Table 1.1   Theories of international relations Idealism

Realism

Structure of international politics

Interdependence

Anarchy

Actors

States, international organizations, States “international community”

Motivations

Global public good (interest coincidence)

Peacekeeping

Promotion of democracy and inter- Balance, strength dependence

Interests, power

According to: Gareis (2006, p. 29)

It was clear that the Federal Republic could not create a sufficient deterrent on its own. The lack of its own nuclear weapons, enshrined in the renunciation of ABC weapons in 1954 (repeated in 1990) and the accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1969 (extended in 1995), precludes this. Only within the framework of an alliance, above all with the USA, could an adequate, also nuclear, protective shield be guaranteed. This resulted in a “fundamental dependence” on the Western powers (Johnson 1973, p. IX). It was therefore the Federal Republic that insisted on a forward-defense of NATO and the stationing of allied forces on its territory (Hanrieder 1971, p. 37; Czempiel 1974, p. 573). Not coincidentally, from 1977 it was precisely the German Federal Chancellor who pointed to the new Soviet SS20 missiles creating a Western deterrent gap. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 underlined such concerns. Despite the fierce protests of the peace movement, this led to a missile rearmament of the West. However, with its worldwide policy of confrontation, the Soviet Union increasingly overstretched its economic resources and technological capabilities (Kennedy 1989, pp. 721 ff.). At the same time, communism lost its ideological attractiveness, nor was it able to militarily pacify Afghanistan. So the Soviet giant, which was running out of breath, gradually abandoned its expansive policy of confrontation against the West from the mid-1980s. In 1989/90, the communist regimes in Eastern Europe collapsed. The Soviet Union or its main successor state Russia not only withdrew its armed forces from the former GDR and the Eastern European countries, but also found itself, for the first time, in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in 1990, willing to agree to an equal and controlled limitation of conventional weapons. The decades-long threat constellation for the Federal Republic of Germany had disappeared.

1.2  Role Search: Germany in the Changed World since 1990

7

However, the review would be incomplete if the economic weight of the Federal Republic were ignored. After a longer period of recovery after the war, it moved up to the group of leading economic powers at the end of the 1960s. For a while, its gross domestic product ranked second in the Western world (after the USA), but soon fell behind Japan to third place. Therefore, one spoke—similarly to the case of Japan—of the “economic giant and political dwarf” (Rittberger 1992). However, the Achilles heel of the German economy must be taken into account. Only by exporting a large part of its gross domestic product was the resource-poor country with its narrow domestic market able to earn its wealth. This extreme dependence on exports also means dependence on open markets and uninterrupted raw material imports—thus giving the most pressing reason for caution and restraint in foreign policy (Hacke 1988, p. 451). German interest in free trade has therefore always been central. In this context, the foreign policy behavior of the Federal Republic has been characterized in such a way that it is a “trading state” similar to Japan or Saudi Arabia, which seeks to conduct foreign policy “in the role and style of a ‘trader’” (Rittberger 1990a, p. 17, b, p. 112). In fact, the most important instruments of German foreign policy were economic and financial performance (“checkbook diplomacy”). Its development aid served to prevent states of the Third World from recognizing the GDR, its financial accommodation sought several times to prevent the United States and Great Britain from withdrawing troops from Germany (Hanrieder 1971, p. 37; Czempiel 1974, p. 573), its credits were to move the financially weak GDR to liberalization in intra-German travel, its contribution to the liberation of Kuwait in 1990/91 was exhausted in checks and logistical support (Hellmann 2006, p. 196). The foreign policy basic mood of the Federal Republic until 1990 can be summarized as follows: For her, a militarily highly vulnerable country without nuclear weapons, at the same time a society whose prosperity depended decisively on exports, the military protection of the NATO and the free access to international markets were existential guarantees in the world shaped by the East-West conflict.

1.2 Role Search: Germany in the Changed World since 1990 a. Central position and burdens of the past Since the upheavals of 1989/90, the Federal Republic of Germany has been freed from its dangerous situation. But they do not mean an “end of history”, as Fukuyama (1992) meant.

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1  The External Conditions of the Federal Republic

First of all: In contrast to the old Federal Republic, the united Germany has returned to the old—just as interesting as difficult—geopolitical central position in Europe, between the Western powers and Russia, whose sphere of influence has retreated far to the east. As a result of this central position, Germany has been “a battlefield for foreign armies rather than for its own” (Carlo Schmid 1964 quoted after Schwarz 1994a, p. 87) and potentially always at risk of being “crushed” (Konrad Adenauer 1965 quoted after Schwarz 1994a, p. 87)3. In addition, there is the “critical, unhappy size” of the country—too small for a real superpower, too large for a normal European middle power—on which German foreign policy has also failed in the past (Baring 1988, p. 48). The problem is not solved with the reassuring remark that Germany is today surrounded by friends. Rather, after the floods of the East-West conflict had subsided, shadows of the past came to the fore again. Since the financial crisis of 2008, a “German Power” has been observed throughout Europe, which “resisted” a debt community and “ordered” austerity policies to other states and thus—not only in Greece—revived memories of the Germans of the Second World War. Criticism of German economic relations with China, German moderation towards Iran and the male friendship Schröder-Putin sometimes lead not only to the thesis that the Holocaust has lost its importance for German foreign policy, but also to the “question of whether Germany will remain part of the West in strategic terms” (Kundnani 2016, pp. 9 f., 121 f., 125, 169). So there is also a latent, sometimes virulent mistrust of German policy in parts of Europe today. One may oppose this to the change in German political culture, its population decline and its lower economic weight than before. Nevertheless, this mood remains a fact. It explains some of Germany’s self-restrictions in foreign policy. b. Security and trade in the “global village” Secondly, the world shrinks to a “global village” in which distances lose their importance. Terrorist attacks from afar become easier to carry out, remote attacks possible, as well as distant events have an impact on Germany with its far-reaching trade relations. In view of this, Germany sees its security interests affected by the “global challenges” of terrorism and the “proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”. Accordingly, it wants to contribute to the “strengthening of the international order”, ideally also to the “respect for human rights” (Federal Ministry of

3 Quoted

after Schwarz (1994a, p. 87).

1.2  Role Search: Germany in the Changed World since 1990

9

Defence 2006, p. 28; Federal Ministry of Defence 2016, p. 27). Regional wars, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and risks to trade routes must be prevented and countered multilaterally (Böckenförde 2009, p. 37). The way to corresponding interventions outside the NATO alliance was opened by a 1994 ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, albeit subject to prior parliamentary approval. In this context, Germany has stationed military forces as part of international engagements in numerous places around the world (in particular in Bosnia, Kosovo, Mali). It likes to see itself as a “civilian power” that, in the spirit of idealistic foreign policy, stands up for human rights, supranational institutions and peaceful conflict resolution (Raith 2006, pp. 40 ff.). In fact, however, in 1999 it had to cross the threshold to violent international military intervention against Serbia (Hacke 2003, pp. 468 ff.). And in Afghanistan, a German contingent, like its allies, became entangled in a seemingly endless partisan war (in political science: “asymmetrical war”), in which it could not avoid the dilemma of the militarily superior, who does not encounter an openly fighting opponent: either to exercise “barbarism” against the population or to get involved in a politically difficult to bear confrontation without end (von Krshiwoblozki 2015, pp. 70, 291, 639). The illusion proved to be that one could quickly implant democracies and social structures of Western style in culturally very different countries, which are also ethnically and religiously divided, by intervention. Accordingly, the withdrawal of German troops from Afghanistan in summer 2021 also took place hastily, after the Americans had withdrawn—an end with terror after the terror without end. Because of the development into a global village situation, it is also not indifferent to German foreign policy if nuclear weapons spread around the world— and with them the prospect that a catastrophe will become more likely or nuclear have-nots can be pushed around by everyone. Therefore, it seeks to prevent such proliferation. Multilateral treaties against biological and chemical weapons (in force since 1975 and 1997 respectively) have not been signed by all and are hardly controllable. As nuclear powers, only the great victor powers of the Second World War are recognized under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: the USA, Russia, France, China and Great Britain. De facto nuclear weapon states are also Israel, India and Pakistan. Iran and North Korea are suspected of developing nuclear weapons. In particular, the Islamist Iran has become a conflict case for the Western states, including Germany, trade restrictions have already been imposed, once good relations with Iran have cooled down. Interventions and diplomatic efforts have been and are justified not only idealistically, but also realistically. Defense Minister Peter Struck (SPD) said in the face of the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York that the security of the coun-

10

1  The External Conditions of the Federal Republic

try would also be “defended in Afghanistan”. Even if there are doubts about the success of some actions, one must not overlook an unspoken motive: For the Germans, who are still dependent on the American protective umbrella, it is probably of decisive importance not to be considered “parasites and left alone when they need help themselves” (Münkler 2006). German interests are also of a commercial nature. While Germany ranks 17th in the world in terms of population, it is still one of the leading economic powers. However, measured by gross national income in 2020, it had to content itself with fourth place behind the USA (20.933 billion US-$), China (14.723 billion) and Japan (5049 billion) (Germany: 3803 billion). The global village situation manifests itself economically as globalization. How should this be designed? As an export nation (in third place behind China and the USA), Germany has a strong interest in free world trade. But by no means all trade barriers have fallen so far, and what does “fair trade” mean? While industrialized countries tend to call for the liberalization of industrial markets and the protection of their agricultural markets and intellectual property (patents) at the same time, less developed countries demand “extended market access” in the first world, reduced patent protection and “full value for their raw materials”; not least an end to the “democracy deficit” in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Stiglitz 2006, pp. 102 ff., 144 ff., 114, 205, 343, 91, 97). The election of Donald Trump (and then Joe Biden) as US President has also helped protectionist forces in the USA to break through, so that now export surplus countries such as China and Germany have to conjure up the benefits of free world trade vis-à-vis the USA together with many others. As a German interest, it is realistic to “promote free and unhindered world trade as the basis of our prosperity”, but also idealistic to “help overcome the gap between poor and rich world regions”—the latter recently emphasized to a lesser extent (Federal Ministry of Defence 2016, p. 28; Federal Ministry of Defence 2016). c. Weakened NATO alliance cohesion The third element of the situation after 1990 is that Germany has lost a guiding foreign policy concept (Klages 2017, p. 137) and that the NATO has now become an “alliance without an opponent” (Gareis 2006, p. 131). Its “alliance cohesion” weakened (Magenheimer 1991, p. 21, 29). Militarily, it increasingly lacks uniform, common operational standards that guarantee joint action, the gap in capabilities between American and European military forces is widening, as the withdrawal from Afghanistan showed (Grams 2007, p. 58). Whether a self-image as a “community of values” is sufficient is often doubted as an “all too idealistic image” (Franke 2010, p. 28).

1.2  Role Search: Germany in the Changed World since 1990

11

Against this background, the leading US power has been turning away from multilateral cooperation since President Clinton (Knapp 1999, p. 302). This trend became particularly pronounced in the Iraq conflict in 2002/03, when the USA attacked Iraq, justified by its alleged nuclear armament and its dictatorship. This split the NATO. Germany found itself in a “counter-coalition” in the UN Security Council together with Russia, France and China against the war-willing USA and Great Britain (Schwarz 2005, p. 23, 26). Less dramatic, but in essence similar, was the position taken in the Security Council in 2011 when it came to Libya: Unlike the three Western powers, Germany abstained, as did China, India and Russia. In both cases there were good reasons for the German position—but foreign policy experts note that German-American relations are thinning out, Germany is hesitant in international interventions (Hacke 2012, p. 88f., 98) or pursues a dubious “flirtation” (Maull 2012, p. 134f., 147) with other powers than the allies. This accusation also resurfaced during the Ukraine war, when Germany failed to take decisive action in support of the victim (Friederichs 2022). In the end, the conflict in the Security Council was not continued by either side. But: The NATO security umbrella looked flimsy for a long time. In 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron therefore called the alliance “brain-dead” and called for stronger European cooperation instead (Tagesschau 2019). In addition, Germany seemed to be of little value militarily as an alliance partner: For military purposes, there was a significantly lower percentage (1.4%) of its gross domestic product for defense than the USA (3.7%), Great Britain (2.2%), Poland (2.2%) or France (2.1%) (SIPRI 2021). Russia’s advance into Ukraine woke the alliance from its sleep: On the one hand, the conflicts over Crimea and the Donbas region shook NATO in 2014: The 2% target was unanimously confirmed as a goal for all member states. In view of the Russian “challenge” (Federal Ministry of Defense 2016, p. 4, 13), the priorities were also “to be redefined” and the protection of one’s own country and allies to be given more consideration. Finally, the Ampel coalition, which was created in 2021, even set a 3% target, but for military, diplomatic and development aid together and “in the long term”. On the other hand, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has clearly revealed the lack of readiness of many German armed forces systems. The fact that the ability to meet a military challenge in Eastern Europe was largely lost led to a 100 billion package in 2022. Whether the invasion will change the reserve of German policy towards a ready military in the long term and thus usher in the “turning point” in foreign and security policy promised by Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz in a special session of the German Bundestag in February 2022 remains to be seen, but hardly anyone speaks of a brain-dead NATO today. A rift through the

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1  The External Conditions of the Federal Republic

middle of German politics is visible. If Germany does not change course in foreign and security policy within NATO, it risks remaining a follower with claims to collective protection in the event of insufficient own contribution. It is unclear which priority is given to overseas intervention capability and Central European defense capability.

1.3 From Division to German Unity a. The way to German reunification To understand the Federal Republic, one more aspect must be included in the consideration: its national character. In this context, the fact must be mentioned that the old Federal Republic did not understand itself as a closed, new state, but as a spatially limited continuation of the former German Reich. Accordingly, until 1990, the preamble of its Basic Law stated that the whole German people remained called upon to “complete the unity and freedom of Germany in free self-determination”. In accordance with this self-understanding, the old Federal Republic also took over the obligations and consequences of the old Germany: Reparations to Israel, old German foreign debts and pension payments to former officials, later payments to former forced laborers. This also includes the “open door” (Ulrich Scheuner quoted after Frowein 1987, p. 209) of its citizenship, which offers German citizenship to all citizens of the former German Reich and all German nationals from Eastern Europe. For the same reason, the history of German division and German eastern borders was accompanied by revisionist aspirations and legal reservations of the Federal Republic. Both Adenauer and Schumacher relied on the attraction of economically prosperous and free conditions in the Federal Republic, which would act like a “magnet” on the east (Rupp 2009, p. 58). However, a revision of the status quo seemed less and less feasible the longer it took. So there were first relaxations towards the east from the middle of the 1960s (Meissner 1970). The actual break with previous positions did not take place until 1969 under the heading of “Ostpolitik” in the era of the social-liberal coalition. In the “Eastern Treaties”, the Federal Republic of Germany committed itself to the respect of the “territorial integrity of all states in Europe within their current borders” (Moscow Treaty with the Soviet Union of 1970). It agreed with the GDR in the Basic Treaty of 1972 on “normal good-neighbourly relations”. However, the Federal Republic of Germany did not give up the goal of reunification, reserved the recognition of German borders by international law for a future united Germany (Resolution of the Bundestag of 17 May 1972; BVerfGE 36, pp.

1.3  From Division to German Unity

13

1 ff.). For such a limited recognition of the status quo, she (formally the Western powers) received the assurance of a transit traffic to Berlin “without hindrances” (Four-Power Agreement of 1972). Contrary to further expectations of a “change through rapprochement” (Egon Bahr), Ostpolitik has indeed facilitated the modus vivendi, but not weakened communist rule. The late Federal Republic of Germany seemed to “understand itself as a post-national community”, at least some saw in the “Yes to two-statehood a piece of peace policy” (Winkler 2015, pp. 32 ff.). Nevertheless: At the end of the 1980s, when the Soviet leadership abandoned its policy of confrontation and the external engagement associated with it, the perspective opened up for farreaching changes. The abandonment of the limited sovereignty of socialist states (which had justified interventions to preserve socialism) by the Warsaw Pact in July 1989 as well as liberal developments in Hungary and Poland made it clear in 1989 that communist regimes could no longer count on the support of Soviet tanks. Against this background, dramatic waves of flight from the GDR as well as continuing and increasing mass demonstrations in the GDR led to the collapse of SED rule at the end of 1989. This development was accompanied by the formation of opposition citizen groups and a new social democracy in the GDR, while a inner revolution took place within the bloc parties. Key steps towards German unity were the opening of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 (carried out by the SED confused and “rattled”—Neubert 2008, p. 229), the mass slogan “We are one people”, the first free election to the GDR People’s Chamber on 18 March 1990 and the will of the non-communist GDR government formed as a result to unite. This was carried out on 3 October 1990 by the GDR joining the Federal Republic of Germany. A large majority of Germans in the GDR, as surveys show, strove for unity (Gibowski 1990, p. 18; Noelle-Neumann and Koecher 1993, p. 437). For the citizens of the former Federal Republic of Germany, who were still wavering between confederation and state unity in December 1989, but then welcomed the latter with a large majority4, the change came quickly and often unexpectedly. In the political arena, it was Chancellor Kohl who, in the face of a still reserved public, was the first top politician to set the signals for state unity at the end of November 1989, bypassing confederal structures.

4 In

December 1989, only 37% were in favour of state unity (Union supporters: 47%), 31% for a confederation with the GDR and 19% for two separate German states (Noelle-Neumann/Köcher 1993, p. 439; ipos 1990, p. 68).

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b. The rearrangement of the national state house With the reunification, the foreign policy framework conditions of the Federal Republic of Germany have changed fundamentally. In the Two-Plus-Four Treaty of September 12, 1990 between the two German states and the four great victorious powers of 1945, the conditions were laid down under which the powers accepted German unity. This was by no means self-evident for them, with the exception of the USA (Ritter 2006, pp. 24 ff., 46). The treaty also put an end to post-war history and thus replaced a peace treaty with Germany. In it • Germany promised to recognize the Oder-Neisse line as the border to Poland (which then happened in the border treaty with Poland); • the German side reaffirmed its renunciation of ABC weapons and committed itself to maintaining armed forces of no more than 370,000 men; • Germany assured that it would declare actions in its constitution to be punishable which are intended to disturb the peace or prepare for a war of aggression. In an accompanying letter from the two German foreign ministers, it was also assured that expropriations of the years 1945–49 on the basis of occupation law would be inviolable and that parties which fight the liberal-democratic basic order can be banned. Certainly, the time distance to the expropriation or expulsion made acceptance of these regulations easier. If in 1951 massive 80% of Germans did not want to accept the Oder-Neisse line, in 1969 still 38, in May/June 1990 only 19% of the citizens of the Federal Republic (in the GDR 9%). However, for those with their own origin from the old East Germany, the rejection rate was 43% (Noelle/Neumann 1974, p. 525; ipos 1990, p. 87; Glaab 1999, p. 84). The one-sided arms restrictions for Germany have now been overtaken by the multilateral KSE Treaty and subsequent agreements. The assurances mentioned in the third line were already contained in the Basic Law. As a clear gain, the German side could record that the four powers granted the reunited German people unrestricted sovereignty, Germany was not limited in its future alliance policy (thus it can be a member of NATO) and the Soviet troops left Germany by the end of 1994. As a result, the Federal Republic of Germany has become a definitely limited nation state (with a European perspective). It stands in the tradition of the old Germany—but its international demographic, economic and military position no longer corresponds to its role. There are no prerequisites for a resumption of autonomous great power politics.

1.4  The Direction of European Integration

15

1.4 The Direction of European Integration a. History and motives of integration Another target direction determines the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany: its integration into the European Union. Unlike the German Reich, which saw itself as an autonomous power and concluded changing alliances, the Federal Republic of Germany is comprehensively embedded in the Western world. Its “decision in favor of Western democracy” (Schwarz 1975, p. 310) and its integration into the European Union belong in this context. In addition to the interest in political freedom, all economic interests spoke in favor of a closer relationship with the West, in particular with the USA. They were the ones who, in 1948–52, also made Marshall Plan aid available to the defeated Germans in the amount of 1.6 billion dollars (about half as much as for Great Britain or France) (Knapp 1978, p. 185). From the very beginning, the Federation was able to transfer sovereign rights to supranational organizations in accordance with Art. 24 GG. In this respect, the promotion of international cooperation, in particular European integration, can be seen as a state goal of the Federal Republic. A re-establishment of complete national sovereignty was not sought. Three motives led in this direction: 1. European integration was a peace-securing consequence of the experiences of the first half of the 20th century, which made a return to a world of European, isolated national states appear fatal. Germany’s “readiness to renounce autonomy” (Staack 1998, p. 17 f.) is to be interpreted as a reaction to Germany’s precarious situation in the middle of Europe; it would hardly be manageable with national independence (Schwarz 1994b, p. 47 ff.). For the European partners, it was not least about an “inclusion” of Germany. 2. Secondly, the motive played a role in stabilizing itself and Western Europe in the face of the communist challenge. This could not be done solely by military means, but also required political and economic rapprochement. On the French side, the idea of a third power in addition to the Soviet Union and the USA also played a role (Pfetsch 2005, p. 19, 61). 3. Finally, one wanted to exploit the advantages of economic cooperation in one area for all participants. This was first done in the joint access to coal and steel (which were produced mainly in Germany) in the Coal and Steel Community, which was later expanded to the common market.

16

1  The External Conditions of the Federal Republic

In line with its beginnings, the Federal Republic has integrated into the West and in the process gradually achieved higher levels of sovereignty: with its entry into the Coal and Steel Community in 1951 (relaxation of the occupation status) and its accession to NATO in 1955 (sovereignty with ongoing allied reserved rights). That the Saarland was allowed to return to Germany after a referendum in 1956 facilitated this integration and reconciliation process. The European Community (then “Union”) has successively, predominantly in waves, initially in Western Europe, then in Central and Eastern Europe in 2004 (“eastern enlargement”), taken in more member states beyond the circle of the original contracting parties (France, Italy, Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg), a process that is not yet complete today. The competence boundaries between the EU and its member states are outlined in the Treaty of Lisbon 2009 as follows: • An “exclusive competence” of the EU exists for the customs union, competition rules of the internal market, common trade policy, monetary policy (for the euro) and the conservation of marine resources. • A “shared” between member states and the EU applies to other internal market matters, aspects of social policy, economic and social cooperation, agriculture and fisheries, environment, consumer protection, transport and trans-European networks, space of freedom/security/law, common health care. • In addition, the EU is to draw up and implement programs for research, technological development and space travel (Hartmann 2009, p. 28). Accordingly, the budget of the European Union has grown to €164.3 billion by 2021. It is financed to about 70% from contributions of the member states according to their gross national income, in addition from EU customs duties and taxes (10%) and value-added tax shares of the member states (also about 10%). The EU thus remains predominantly a cost-bearer of the member states. Their expenditure consists mainly of subsidies and grants. So are 2021 planned for: “Natural resources and environment” (= sustainability goals) 35.7%, “Cohesion, resilience and values” (= cohesion goals) 32.2% of expenditure, “Internal market, innovation and digital” (= research and development, digital transformation, strategic infrastructure and internal market) 12.7% as well as “Neighbourhood and the world” (= foreign and development policy) 10.0% (Council of the European Union 2021). Despite its wide and extensive competences, the EU differs from a sovereign state in that it

1.4  The Direction of European Integration

17

• has no competence-competence; • does not reach its final recipients, but only “steers steering actors” and cannot implement decisions itself (Tömmel 2008, p. 22). • Article 50 of the Treaty expressly provides for the possibility of withdrawal from the EU. b. The EU—negotiation democracy or negotiation system? Important political decisions for Germany are therefore no longer made solely at the national, but also at the supranational level. Of interest are therefore the institutional structures of the European Union. Its organs are: • the directly elected “European Parliament” (Dreischer 2006, pp. 113, 119, 127) with now 705 members, elected for five-year terms, with each member state having a certain number of seats (graded according to population size, with relatively stronger representation of smaller states). Within the Parliament, it is not the faction, but in fact the national delegation within it that is the actual political unit within the Parliament (Thiem 2009, pp. 96–97, 169). • the Council of the EU as the representation of national governments (Council of Ministers). Instead of a graduated voting weight of the individual governments, a so-called “double majority” has been gradually introduced since 2014 and has been binding since 2017: at least 55% of the member states, which represent at least 65% of the EU population, must be achieved. A blocking minority requires at least four member states and at least 35% of the population (Wessels 2008b, 664; Schmidt and Schünemann 2009, 92; Große Hüttmann 2020). The Council of Ministers is subordinate to the European Council of Heads of State or Government of the member states. • the government-like “European Commission”, which alone has the right of initiative for EU legal acts and monitors the execution of EU contract law as the “executive” (Wessels 2008b, p. 92). It consists of a President and the Commissioners—one from each member state. The President is proposed by the European Council and elected by the European Parliament, the Commissioners, responsible for certain areas, are appointed by the national governments in agreement for five years and confirmed by the European Parliament. They are mostly former politicians, who are usually appointed according to the proposal of their government. • a European Court of Justice, to which each member state sends a member for six years in agreement. This court decides finally on disputes about EU law. To counteract judgments, the member states would have to agree unanimously on opposite contract amendments—a quite unlikely event. In relation to national

18

1  The External Conditions of the Federal Republic

law, the European Court of Justice has established the primacy of European law (Hartmann 2009, p. 165). • In 1999, the “European Central Bank” was added. It serves, without being subject to instructions, the “primary objective” of price stability, in addition to general economic policy. Its supreme body is the “Council of the European Central Bank”, consisting of six members of the Board of Directors, who are “agreed” by the Heads of State or Government of the EU member states for a term of eight years from experienced personalities. In addition, there are the 17 central bank presidents of the member states of the Eurozone. According to official figures, a total of around 7,500 people work for the European Parliament, 3,500 for the Council of the EU, 32,000 for the Commission and 3,500 for the ECB (as of 2021). A total of around 46,500 people are therefore employed by the European Union. The interplay of institutions does not correspond to a classical model of political systems: The member states decide on the structure and tasks of the EU in inter-state treaties (set constitutional law), the EU Commission has the monopoly on proposals for legislative regulations (initiative monopoly). EU law is partly decided by the European Council alone (in particular with regard to revenue), but in most cases by the Council of the EU (“Council of Ministers”) together with the European Parliament (“co-decision”—Schmidt and Schünemann 2009, p. 195; Wessels 2008a, pp. 344 ff.). Binding legal acts are made in the form of (predominantly) • Directives (set objectives to be implemented by national laws), • Regulations (immediately effective for the entire EU), • Decisions (immediately effective, but narrow field of action or individual case). Thus, although the political system of the European Union does indeed have some features of a parliamentary democracy (vote of no confidence against the Commission and spending powers of the Parliament [Pfetsch 2005, pp. 145, 153, 171, 179], election of the Commission President and confirmation of the Commission, right to sue and control), on the other hand it also has features of a confederation of states. The constitutional classification is additionally made more difficult by the fact that neither Parliament nor Council are composed purely on democratic (population size) or purely federal (equal weight of each state as in Commission and Court of Justice) principles.

1.4  The Direction of European Integration

19

Since the European Commission, the European Council and the European Parliament agree on relevant issues, and in addition national governments have to meet in the Council, “negotiations are the decision-making mode of the EU” (Kohler-Koch et al. 2004, p. 172). Majority decision only plays a role within one organ. In Parliament this often leads to a “kind of grand coalition”, in the Council to negotiations in which negotiation packages are put together. Although in the usual sense certainly “no democracy” (Schmidt and Schünemann 2009, pp. 73 ff., 56, 96), one could well describe the EU as a “negotiated democracy” (Fritz W. Scharpf quoted according to Pfetsch 2007, p. 63; Benz 2009, p. 134) . Its democratic deficit cannot simply be remedied by a reform of the institutions. Because in the face of nations with their own language and history, there is no “politically relevant identity of Europeans as Europeans”, but rather a “plurality of communication, memory and experience communities” (Kielmansegg 2003, pp. 57, 60). In fact, according to surveys, Europeans primarily feel like members of their nation. The “legitimacy of the majority rule” therefore has its limits, and as a result, according to the thesis of the political scientist Graf Kielmansegg (1995, 2009), no democracy, but only a “consensus-oriented negotiation system” can exist in the European Union. How should the principles of democracy and federalism be combined in the European Union one day? However, the question of the finality of the European Union, how much integration and which political structure it is aiming for in the end, has “not been answered to this day” (Thalmeier 2005, p. 200). It is like a train that is heading towards a final destination that neither the driver nor the passengers know; they only agree on the next intermediate goal. To that extent, the indefinite, unfinished nature of the political system of the Federal Republic continues into the future, which has characterized its history so far: • Not the borders of the Federal Republic as such, but rather their significance and the borders of the European Union will be subject to future changes; • also, as a result of possible further transfers of competence to the EU, the sovereignty of the Federal Republic; • likewise, the type of democracy under which the Germans will live in the European Union and—as a result of their feedback—also in their own country. All in all: today’s Germany is again in the difficult middle position in Europe. Despite its unification, it still lacks the prerequisites for independent great power politics, despite its embedding in the now more competent, but hardly actionable European Union, it has to conduct its own foreign policy.

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The external constellation is characterized by the weakening cohesion within NATO and the declining dominance of the USA. Multipolar features and at the same time globalization tendencies increasingly determine the situation. In contrast, Germany’s most important interests have remained the same: external security in the middle of Europe and freedom of trade. Its possibilities are still characterized by a discrepancy between economic weight and military weakness. The path that Germany is taking essentially consists in, in path dependence on the successful westward orientation before 1990, to continue to stay in the Westerndemocratic spectrum—wavering between the distant, but protective-capable USA and the nearby France together with the EU. In addition, Germany, as a militarily weak actor, seeks cooperation with the tendency to “move from defense to world order policy” and to participate in collective, preferably peaceful interventions with money, equipment and, if necessary, military. However, as a whole, a “sober German foreign policy seems to be increasingly relying on realistic concepts” (Roos 2010, pp. 316, 329, 331, 314).

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Gibowski, Wolfgang G. (1990): Demokratischer (Neu-)Beginn in der DDR, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 21 (1), pp. 5 ff. Glaab, Manuela (1999): Deutschlandpolitik in der öffentlichen Meinung, Opladen. Grams, Christoph (2007): Die NATO als Motor der Fähigkeits- und Technologieentwicklung?, in: Riecke, Henning (Ed.): Die Transformation der NATO, Baden-Baden, pp. 51 ff. Große Hüttmann, Martin (2020): Qualifizierte Mehrheit, in: Ders./Wehling, Hans-Georg (Eds.): Das Europalexikon, Bonn. Grosser, Alfred (1990): Geschichte Deutschlands seit 1945, 8th edn., München. Hacke, Christian (1988): Weltmacht wider Willen, Stuttgart. Hacke, Christian (2003): Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Frankfurt a. M. Hacke, Christian (2012): Deutschland in der Weltpolitik. Zivilmacht ohne Zivilcourage?, in: Meier-Walser, Reinhard/Wolf, Alexander (Eds.): Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, München, pp. 87 ff. Haftendorn, Helga (1983): Sicherheit und Entspannung, Baden-Baden. Hanrieder, Wolfram F. (1971): Die stabile Krise, Düsseldorf. Hartmann, Jürgen (2009): Das politische System der Europäischen Union, 2nd edn., Frankfurt a. M. Hellmann, Gunther (2006): Deutsche Außenpolitik, Wiesbaden. Ipos (1990): Einstellungen zu aktuellen Fragen der Innenpolitik 1990, Mannheim. Johnson, Nevil (1973): Government in the Federal Republic of Germany, Oxford. Kennedy, Paul (1989): Aufstieg und Fall der großen Mächte, Frankfurt a. M. Kielmansegg, Peter Graf (1995): Wie tragfähig sind Europas Fundamente?, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung vom 17. Februar. Kielmansegg, Peter Graf (2003): Integration und Demokratie, in: Jachtenfuchs, Markus/ Kohler-Koch, Beate (Eds.): Europäische Integration, 2nd edn., Opladen, pp. 49 ff. Kielmansegg, Peter Graf (2009): Läßt sich die Europäische Union demokratisch verfassen?, in: Decker, Frank/Höreth, Marcus (Eds.): Die Verfassung Europas, Wiesbaden, pp. 219 ff. Klages, Wolfgang (2017): Zeitwende. Strategie und Ziele deutscher Außenpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert, Baden-Baden. Knapp, Manfred (1978): Politische und wirtschaftliche Interdependenzen im Verhältnis USA-Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945–1975, in: ders. et al. (Eds.): Die USA und Deutschland 1918–1975, München, pp. 153 ff. Knapp, Manfred (1999): Die Macht der USA und die Moral der Staatengemeinschaft, in: Berg, Manfred et al. (Eds.): Macht und Moral, Münster, pp. 295 ff. Kohler-Koch, Beate et al. (2004): Europäische Integration – Europäisches Regieren, Wiesbaden. von Krshiwoblozki, Lukas (2015): Asymmetrische Kriege, Marburg. Kundnani, Hans (2016): German Power, München. Lilge, Herbert (Ed.) (1976): Deutschland 1945–1963, Hannover. Magenheimer, Heinz (1991): Zur Neukonstellation der Mächte in Europa, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 18, pp. 21 ff.

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Maull, Hanns W. (2012): Abkehr von vertrauten Pfaden, in: Meier-Walser, Reinhard/Wolf, Alexander (Eds.): Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, München, pp. 133 ff. Mehr Fortschritt wagen (2021): Bündnis für Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit und Nachhaltigkeit, Berlin. Meissner, Boris (1970): Die deutsche Ostpolitik 1961–1970, Köln. Münkler, Herfried (2006): Militärinterventionen in aller Welt, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung vom 9. Oktober. Neubert, Ehrhart (2008): Unsere Revolution, München. Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth/Köcher, Renate (Eds.) (1993): Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1984–1992, München. Noelle, Elisabeth/Neumann, Erich Peter (Eds.) (1974): Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung 1968–73, Allensbach. Pfetsch, Frank R. (2005): Die Europäische Union, 3rd edn., München. Pfetsch, Frank R. (2007): Das neue Europa, Wiesbaden. Raith, Michael (2006): Der rot-grüne Beitrag zur Konfliktregulierung in Südosteuropa, Baden-Baden. Rat der Europäischen Union (2021): Infografik – EU-Haushalt 2021: Hauptbereiche, unter: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/de/infographics/2021-eu-budget-areas/ (zuletzt geprüft am 13. Januar 2022). Rittberger, Volker (1990a): Die Bundesrepublik – eine Weltmacht?, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B4–5, pp. 3 ff. Rittberger, Volker (1990b): Wie friedensverträglich ist ein geeintes Deutschland?, in: Der Bürger im Staat 40 (2), pp. 110 ff. Rittberger, Volker (1992): Nach der Vereinigung – Deutschlands Stellung in der Welt, in: Leviathan 1992/2, pp. 207 ff. Ritter, Gerhard A. (2006): Der Preis der deutschen Einheit, München. Roos, Ulrich (Ed.) (2010): Deutsche Außenpolitik, Wiesbaden. Rupp, Hans Karl (2009): Politische Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 4th edn., München. Schmidt, Siegmar/Schünemann, Wolf J. (2009): Europäische Union, Baden-Baden. Schössler, Dietmar (1983): Militär und Politik, Koblenz. von Schubert, Klaus (1978): Die Sicherheitspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zwischen Systemwandel und Systemkonservierung, in: Schwarz, Klaus-Dieter (Ed.): Sicherheitspolitik, 3rd edn., Bad Honnef, pp. 469 ff. Schwarzenberger, Georg (1955): Machtpolitik, Tübingen. Schwarz, Hans-Peter (1975): Die Politik der Westbindung oder die Staatsräson der Bundesrepublik, in: Zeitschrift für Politik 22 (4), pp. 307 ff. Schwarz, Hans-Peter (1994a): Das deutsche Dilemma, in: Kaiser, Karl/Maull, Hanns W. (Eds.): Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik, Bd. 1, München, pp. 81 ff. Schwarz, Hans-Peter (1994b): Die Zentralmacht Europas, Berlin. Schwarz, Hans-Peter (2005): Republik ohne Kompass, Berlin. Schweigler, Gebhard (1985): Grundlagen der außenpolitischen Orientierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Baden-Baden. SIPRI (2021): Military expenditure by country as percentage of gross domestic product, 1988–2020, Stockholm.

References

23

Staack, Michael (1998): Großmacht oder Handelsstaat? Deutschlands außenpolitische Grundorientierungen in einem neuen internationalen System, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 12/13, pp. 14 ff. Stiglitz, Joseph (2006): Die Chancen der Globalisierung, München. Tagesschau (2019): Macron nennt NATO „hirntot“, unter: https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/macron-nato-101.html (zuletzt geprüft am 17. Juni 2022). Thalmaier, Bettina (2005): Die zukünftige Gestalt der Europäischen Union, Baden-Baden. Theisen, Alfred (1995): Die Vertreibung der Deutschen, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 7–8, pp. 20 ff. Thiem, Janina (2009): Nationale Parteien im Europäischen Parlament, Wiesbaden. Tömmel, Ingeborg (2008): Governance und Policy-Making im Mehrebenensystem der EU, in: dies. (Eds.): Die Europäische Union, Wiesbaden, pp. 13 ff. Vogelsang, Thilo (1966): Das geteilte Deutschland, München. Wessels, Wolfgang (2008a): Gesetzgebung in der Europäischen Union, in: Ismayr, Wolfgang (Ed.): Gesetzgebung in Westeuropa, Wiesbaden, pp. 653 ff. Wessels, Wolfgang (2008b): Das politische System der Europäischen Union, in: Weidenfeld, Werner (Ed.): Die Europäische Union, Bonn, pp. 83 ff. Winkler, Heinrich August (2015): Zerreissproben: Deutschland, Europa und der Westen, München.

2

The Anti-totalitarian Democracy of the Basic Law

2.1 History of the Constitution a. The historical constellation of constitutionalism It facilitates the understanding of a political system if one asks about the historical circumstances under which it arose and the influences that shaped it. This should serve the purpose of a look at the history of the constitution. With the later Federal Republic, in 1945 the Western Allies occupied a country whose cities were largely destroyed, whose transport connections were paralyzed and whose industry was largely at a standstill due to destruction, lack of personnel and lack of raw materials; in 1946, industrial production in the three Western zones reached only just over a third of that in 1938 (Abelshauser 1975, p. 15). A large part of the able-bodied men were in captivity, 4.1 million people had become invalids, orphans and widows as a result of the war, 3.4 million had lost their homes through bombing, and millions of refugees and displaced persons were pressing into the territory (Schmidt 1988, p. 67). Now, after the horrors of the war, hunger began to spread. The daily struggle for food, heating, housing and clothing dominated the lives of the defeated. A relapse into more primitive economic and social forms seemed to be impending for a long time. In addition, the situation was characterized by a spiritual-moral collapse. Not only National Socialism, but also German traditions that had made it possible or at least not prevented it, now seemed questionable or discredited. At the same time, the discussion of the question of guilt—even if one did not accept collective guilt of the German people, but only a collective “political liability”—let numer­ ous shades of personal involvement in the Third Reich emerge (Jaspers 1946, pp. 47 ff.). Certainly, material need also often suppressed a spiritual processing of the past. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Mannewitz and W. Rudzio, The Political System of Germany, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41371-2_2

25

26

2  The Anti-totalitarian Democracy of the Basic Law

From a Western point of view, after two world wars, after National Socialist mass movement and extermination camps of the planned mass murder, the question arose above all how a repetition of all this could be prevented. In doing so, one did not initially rely on the German people. US President Truman explicitly formulated in his directive for the occupation of Germany: “Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated enemy nation.” (Directive JCS 1067 of 26 April 1945 quoted after Greven 2007, p. 21). The answer consisted on the one hand in taking away from the Germans all possibilities for renewed warfare. This line became apparent in the temporary intentions of dismemberment and re-agrarianization of Germany, in the ban on an army, in the dismantling of potential armaments industry, in production restrictions and intentions for the internationalization of the Ruhr area. On the other hand, however, one steered the construction of a more viable democracy in Germany. The latter should serve denazification (183,000 arrests by early 1947— Wunder 1986, p. 1511), re-education (“reeducation”) and a gradual accustoming of the Germans to democratic practice. This positive perspective of the occupation was already expressed in the declaration of the Potsdam Conference of August 1945, it was said that one wanted to “give the German people the opportunity to prepare themselves to rebuild their lives on a democratic and peaceful basis”. Concretely, the registration of political parties, the formation of municipal and state administrations and elections at these levels were announced (Deuerlein 1963, pp. 353 ff.). Since the Four Powers Control Council soon proved to be ineffective due to differences of opinion between the victorious powers, and reconstruction seemed hardly possible with zones cut off from each other, Americans and British at least formed a “United Economic Area” from their zones on January 1, 1947, shortly: the “Bizone”. In 1949, the French occupation zone also joined (the “Trizone”). Germans also worked here under the leadership of the military governments. This predecessor of the Federal Republic, although not a state, already had political institutions above the level of the Länder and zones as of 1947 (headquarters: Frankfurt am Main): • a “Economic Council” (from 1948 on the “Länderrat”), a parliamentary body consisting of representatives of the Landtage elected in 1946/47,

1 In

addition, there were 148,000 political prisoners in the Soviet Zone (not only National Socialists), of whom a large part perished in the camps (Knabe 2005, p. 297).

2.1  History of the Constitution

27

• an “Executive Council” consisting of representatives of the state governments (corresponding approximately to today’s Bundesrat) as well as • a “Administrative Council” resembling a government, consisting of “Directors” for various subject areas (Stammen 1965, pp. 134 ff.). As Director of Economics, Ludwig Erhard took the leap from economic management policy to market economy in connection with the currency reform of June 1948, supported by a majority of the Economic Council consisting of CDU/CSU, FDP and DP. The limited degree of destruction of industry and the gradual reduction in the scope of the dismantling in West Germany were also helpful for the subsequent economic reconstruction (Abelshauser 2005, pp. 71, 76). The process of state formation was initiated by the western military governors on July 1, 1948 with the transfer of the so-called “Frankfurt Documents” to the western state prime ministers. They demanded that they convene a constitutional assembly and made general requirements for the constitution: that of a democratic and federalist state structure as well as guarantees of individual rights and freedoms (Bonn Commentary on the Basic Law). The prime ministers reacted positively to this, but shied away from definite state formation. This resulted in an indication of the provisional character of the new Federal Republic in that only a “Basic Law” (not a “Constitution”) was drafted by a “Parliamentary Council” consisting of representatives of the Landtage (CDU/CSU and SPD each with 27, FDP 5, KPD, Zentrum and DP each with 2 seats; Chairman: Konrad Adenauer/ CDU) instead of by a directly elected National Assembly. At the same time, however, Theodor Heuss (FDP), the future Federal President, emphasized that this was only provisional in terms of space; with regard to content, one was striving for permanence (Feldkamp 2008, p. 36). The foundation of the Federal Republic did not take place in 1948/49 from scratch. Rather, established forces already had an impact on the Basic Law: • These were the “countries” formed by the occupying powers in 1945–47, whose heads of government acted as the highest representatives of the German population. They set up an expert committee to draft the new constitution (Herrenchiemsee Convention from 10 to 23 August 1948). • A influential factor were the political parties, which—allowed by the occupying powers from autumn 1945—had already measured their strength in the local and state elections in 1946/47. If they also formed all-party or broadbased coalitions in the countries at first, soon a left-right confrontation emerged in the Economic Council.

28

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• Of importance were also the churches and the newly founded independent trade unions. The churches’ interest focused on the inviolability of life, the protection of marriage and family, and the parental right to education, the interest of the trade unions on the right to coalition, a supreme labour/ social court and a legal priority of work over property (Lange 1993, pp. 56 ff.; Scholz 2016, pp. 391 ff., 449 ff.). All other social forces were inferior by contrast, the initially not allowed employer organisations (Thränhardt 1986, p. 37) were still in the process of being set up. In addition, this was not a step into unknown territory. Rather, the Germans had long-standing experience with principles, behaviour and procedures of democracy. This included not only the rule of law and federal distribution of power, but also early universal and equal male suffrage for the Reichstag2, comparatively high voter turnout and mass parties already in the Kaiserreich. The supporting parties of 1948/49 looked back on an—interrupted by the Nazi era—80-year history. The only thing that was left behind until 1918, namely the parliamentary dependence of the government, had at least existed in outline as early as 1914, since chancellors needed parliamentary majorities for legislation and also gathered them in the form of a “block” or “cartel” (Norpoth 1999, pp. 87 ff.). b. Constitutional consultations: consensus and controversy In the constitutional consultations of the Parliamentary Council from 1 September 1948 to 8 May 1949, only two points gave rise to significant controversy. First, there was the area of education, where the churches achieved the fixation of a parental right (free choice of school) and religious instruction to be imparted in accordance with the respective church. Secondly, there was a dispute over the extent of federalism. Contrary to the intentions of the occupying powers and committed federalists who aimed at decentralized financial responsibilities, the SPD achieved a compromise solution in the financial constitution with the threat of otherwise rejecting the whole Basic Law.3 In addition, the “Bundesrat” solution closer to the Länder (composition of representatives of the state governments) prevailed over the “Senate” model (representatives of the state parliaments) initially favored by the Social Democrats in

2 Of

the 22 developed OECD democracies, Germany was the third country to achieve universal and equal male suffrage (Lange 2005, p. 41). 3 The SPD was informed in advance about the willingness of the military governors to make concessions (Dörr 2007, pp. 82 ff.).

2.2  The Central Constitutional Principles

29

the Second Chamber (Merkl 1965, pp. 79 ff., 91 f., 153 ff.; Kilper/Lhotta 1996, pp. 79 ff., 93, 98; Niclauß 1998, pp. 226 ff., 326). In the disputed question of the economic order there was agreement that it should be left open in constitutional terms and left to the discretion of future majorities. In general, however, there was—with a few exceptions—a fundamental consensus in favor of democracy. Prevailing was the view that it was a question of drawing constitutional consequences on the one hand from the failure of the Weimar Republic and on the other hand from the current totalitarian threat of 1948/49 (Berlin blockade): “The Basic Law therefore arose from a double confrontation with the National Socialism of the past and the communism of the present” (Kriele 1979). On 8 May 1949, the Parliamentary Council passed the Basic Law in third reading with 53 to 12 votes. With the exception of the communists, however, those who had voted negatively in the matter of federalism (CSU, DP) or education (Center) also signed it at the final act on 23 May (Merkl 1965, p. 74). Previously, the state parliaments had also agreed to the text, with the exception of Bavaria. However, the validity of the Basic Law was initially restricted by the Occupation Statute of 10 April 1949. According to this, foreign relations and supervision of foreign trade, the security of the occupying forces, demilitarization, etc. remained the responsibility of the military governments (Feldkamp 1999, pp. 164 ff.). The Basic Law was limited to the western occupation zones in terms of space. With regard to the precarious situation of West Berlin as an island in the communist power area, its membership of the Federal Republic was subject to restrictions.

2.2 The Central Constitutional Principles a. Constitutional core and resilient democracy The consequences of the failure of the Weimar Republic are particularly evident in the fixation of unchangeable, i.e. non-repealable constitutional principles: the principle of human and fundamental rights, democracy, the rule of law, federalism and the welfare state (Art. 79 para. 3 in conjunction with Art. 1 and Art. 20 GG). The democratic and rule of law components of this inviolable constitutional core are summarized under the term “liberal democratic basic order”. The Federal Constitutional Court included this in the SRP ban decision of 23 October 1952:

30

u

2  The Anti-totalitarian Democracy of the Basic Law

“The respect for the human rights concretized in the Basic Law, in particular the right of personality to life and free development, sovereignty of the people, separation of powers, responsibility of the government, legality of administration, independence of the judiciary, the principle of multiparty government and equality of opportunity for all political parties with the right to form and exercise an opposition according to the constitution” (BVerfG 1952)

In its judgment on the “non-prohibition” of the NPD from 2017, “Karlsruhe” subsumed this core under three principles (BVerfG 2017): the dignity of the human being, the democracy and the rule of law principle. The liberal democratic basic order is thus incompatible with authoritarian and in particular totalitarian regimes, but also with a radical democratic identity without differentiated organs and powers. However, this does not mean that all institutional regulations of the Basic Law are set in stone. The liberal democratic basic order can rather be realized in different forms. So it has been discussed whether, with the preservation of the independence of the judiciary and regardless of its impracticality, it could not be “in principle” also compatible with a council system instead of parliamentary democracy (Oertzen 1973, S. 184; in contrast to Matz 1978, S. 44). Most other European democracies do not know such limits of constitutional amendment (Jesse 2008, S. 344). With this constitutional core, the Basic Law also sets itself apart from the prevailing legal positivism of the Weimar period, according to which what has been decided in a constitutionally permissible manner is considered to be law, and therefore hardly any arguments were available against the “legal” revolution of 1933 (Kelsen 1989, S. 53 f.). In other words: From the traumatic experience with anti-democratic mass movements of the Weimar Republic, the Basic Law has drawn two principle consequences: a appeal to natural law and a multidimensional concept of democracy. The former means that the Basic Law is based on an unmentioned value system (Detjen 2009, S. 43, 54). According to the latter, democracy is by no means defined by popular sovereignty and majority decision alone, but also by power-limiting, liberal-constitutional and human rights components. This requires limits on majority decisions in order to achieve an optimum of all components. As a consequence of this thinking, the Basic Law does not grant the enemies of the liberal democratic basic order the freedom to destroy it. On the contrary, it offers them a number of legal-administrative options:

2.2  The Central Constitutional Principles

31

• the possible enforcement of basic rights (freedom of the press and assembly, freedom of expression, etc.) if they are misused to fight against the liberal democratic constitutional order (Art. 18 GG). • the deployment of police from several federal states and the Bundeswehr in the event of danger (Art. 91 and 87a Abs. 4 GG). • the possible ban on unconstitutional parties by the Federal Constitutional Court (Art. 21 Abs. 2 GG) and the ban on other unconstitutional associations by the interior ministers (Art. 9 Abs. 2 GG). • the loyalty to the constitution demanded of public servants (Art. 33 GG). • the right to “resistance” against anyone who attempts to eliminate the constitutional order—provided that no other remedy is possible (Art. 20 Abs. 4 GG). This unusual arsenal of a “defensive democracy” (Jesse 2006; Jesse 2018, p. 44 ff.) for democratic constitutions has not yet had to prove its effectiveness in the hour of acute danger. It remains uncertain how much these regulations could do against a broad anti-democratic mass movement or a coup d’état. But what they could do in connection with the fixation of the constitutional core would be to take the “mask of legality” away from an anti-democratic revolution (Thomas Dehler quoted after Bryde 1982, p. 240). However, this is opposed by the legitimacy problem of a defensive democracy: Doesn’t a “defensive” democracy represent an “attempt to essentially unconstitutional consolidation of democracy even against the will of the people” (Fromme1960, p. 180)? Although party and association bans as well as the enforcement of basic rights are only possibilities, since the application is at the discretion of political free will—not every anti-democratic grouping has to be charged, the citizen should not be shielded from all anti-democratic influences like under a glass bell. There have always been legal anti-constitutional parties in the Federal Republic. Nevertheless, today, after decades of undisturbed democracy, many people perceive the defensive democracy as problematic or superfluous (Leggewie and Meier 1995). However, it should not be overlooked that constitutions are not made for the day. Other Western democracies also restrict the scope of action of anti-democratic forces when they appear to be dangerous (Klamt 2012). If not the end, then at least a “crisis” of the concept of a defensive democracy has occurred since the 1990s, in that it is increasingly only used against right-wing extremism or “right” and thus loses credibility. In place of anti-extremism, one-eyed anti-fascism arises (Altenhof 1999, p. 176, 179; Gerlach 2012).

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b. Breakthrough to consistent parliamentary democracy The Parliamentary Council also sought to draw constitutional consequences from the failure of the Weimar Republic. This is visible when looking at the concretization of the central principles of the Basic Law—democracy, federalism, rule of law and social state. The Weimar Constitution of 1919 indeed carried out the transition to parliamentary government4, but remained inconsistent in this respect: In addition to the Reichstag, it provided for a directly elected Reich President, and also introduced the popular referendum, thus creating three competing democratic legitimations. In addition, the Reichstag (as a result of the negative vote of no confidence, the presidential appointment of the Chancellor and the presidential emergency powers under Art. 48 WRV) was given the opportunity to escape responsibility—regulations that were to facilitate the self-abdication of parliament and a seemingly “legal” transition to dictatorship in 1930. In the sense of modern state theory, the Weimar Republic was a semi-presidential democracy—like France or Russia today—not a parliamentary democracy. The Basic Law has drawn three conclusions from this (Oberreuter 1980, p. 98): 1. “Assignment of the legitimacy monopoly to parliament”: The Basic Law provides for only one directly democratic legitimacy: that of the election of parliament. All other state organs derive from the Bundestag or the state parliaments and are correspondingly less legitimate. In addition, the Basic Law— with the exception of the revision of state borders—does not provide for any plebiscitary decisions. This anti-plebiscitary attitude was justified with emotionally charged campaigns during referendums or plebiscites of the Weimar period and with the election of the former Field Marshal von Hindenburg as President of the Reich. Characteristic was the statement of the later first Federal President Theodor Heuss (FDP) in the Parliamentary Council that referendums were “in the large-scale democracy the premium for every demagogue” (quoted after Fromme 1970, p. 107)5. The fact that the state constitutions were confirmed by referendums for the most part and contain the possibility of referendums, however, shows that this conclusion of the Basic Law from the experiences of the past was by no means generally considered to be binding (Troitzsch 1979, pp. 86 ff., 93 f.; Niclauß 1992, pp. 3 ff.). 4 Formally,

this transition had already taken place with the constitutional amendment of October 28, 1918. 5 Otmar Jung (1994, pp. 336 ff.) sees behind the rejection of the referendum only “anticommunist” motives.

2.2  The Central Constitutional Principles

33

2. “Consistent introduction of the parliamentary government system”: The Basic Law seeks to enable and stabilize governments solely supported by parliamentary majorities. This serves the purpose that the Federal Chancellor owes his office to an election by parliament; he can only lose it through a “constructive vote of no confidence”, i.e. election of a new incumbent6; the President’s power of ordinance has been completely abolished and that of the Federal Government has been narrowly limited; even in emergency situations, parliamentary decision-making rights and controls remain. 3. “Recognition of the constitutional function of the parties”: While the Weimar Constitution ignored the parties, it mentioned them only once in a defensive way with the formulation that the officials were “servants of the whole, not of a party” (Art. 130 WRV), and resembled other older democratic constitutions, the Basic Law has taken into account the central role of political parties by their inclusion in the constitution (Art. 21 GG). They are no longer just social organizations. Their goals, organization and financing are no longer constitutionally irrelevant. The formulations of the Basic Law are not enough to justify a party state. In summary, therefore, today’s Germany is to be described as a federal, parliamentary democracy with party-state features. c. Federal, not Separating Federalism The federalism of the Federal Republic meant—after the intermezzo of the unitary state during the National Socialist rule—a return to German constitutional traditions. But its actual justification is less in historical traditions than in the fact that, by distributing power, it supports the liberal democracy and meets the security needs of Germany’s neighbors (Laufer and Münch 1997, pp. 23 ff.). In the Catholic area, federalism was also interpreted as the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity, according to which tasks of the lowest social unit are to be assigned, which it can master (Greven 2007, p. 135). German federalism is characterized by two features: • The focus of the competences reserved for the federal states lies less in corresponding legislative competences (under which only educational, cultural and administrative matters are relevant) than in the function of the federal states as

6 This

regulation is primarily due to Carlo Schmid (Pfetsch 1986, p. 10).

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2  The Anti-totalitarian Democracy of the Basic Law

the general executive in the execution of federal law. In this respect, one can also speak of an “executive federalism”. • By the Bundesrat the federal states participate in the central state decisionmaking processes and can thus counter any erosion of state rights. In contrast to the separation federalism as in the USA, where the federal state and the individual states have separate competences, tax rights and their own administrative structure, in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany one speaks of a federalism of association. d. More developed rule of law: the state of fundamental rights After its dissolution in the Third Reich, the rule of law has been restored in the Federal Republic. It is characterized by the independence of the judiciary, equality before the law, the principle of the judge of law, the prohibition of retroactive criminal law and the judicial review of arrests. In addition, the executive branch may only act on the basis and within the framework of the law and the legal control of state action was particularly secured in Germany by administrative courts7. However, the Federal Republic of Germany wants to be more than just a traditional rule-of-law state. The newness of the rule-of-law construction of the Basic Law lies in the prominent role of fundamental rights and in the establishment of a Federal Constitutional Court. In contrast to the positivist understanding of law before 1933, which only measured law by the formal correctness of the law-making process, the Basic Law seeks to “legally” prescribe law to a certain extent by means of fundamental rights and to exempt majority decisions. The inviolability of human dignity guaranteed by Art. 1 GG and a “minimum standard of human rights” are considered unalterable—otherwise changes are permissible (Merten and Papier 2006, p. 169, 182). This took up natural law thinking as it corresponded to the understanding of human rights in the American Republic, but also to German convictions. In Schiller’s “Wilhelm Tell” of 1804 it says: “No, a tyrant’s power has a limit, When the oppressed can find no justice anywhere, When the burden becomes unbearable—he strikes. Climb up bravely into heaven. And fetch down his eternal rights,

7 First

introduced in 1863 in Baden, 1875 in Prussia and Hesse-Darmstadt (Enzmann 2009, p. 451).

2.2  The Central Constitutional Principles

35

Which hang up there unalterably. And unbreakable like the stars themselves…”8

Although the Weimar Constitution already knew fundamental rights and a State Court of Justice. However, their different status in the Federal Republic becomes clear in that • fundamental rights can be changed by a two-thirds majority, but as a principle of human rights they are inviolable (Art. 19 GG); • fundamental rights are “directly applicable law”, i.e. they can be enforced by the courts up to the Federal Constitutional Court (Art. 1 GG); • the Federal Constitutional Court decides binding also on the constitutionality of laws and not only on legal disputes between constitutional organs (Art. 93 GG). However, materially, the fundamental rights do not represent anything new. They belong to the Western, liberal-democratic tradition and can essentially be divided into three groups: • liberal “defensive rights” vis-à-vis the state: protection of personality and human dignity, freedom of religion, freedom of movement, freedom of expression, freedom of occupation, conscientious objection, inviolability of the home, property, citizenship, postal secrecy, equality before the law; • democratic “participation rights” in public life: freedom of opinion, assembly and association, right to petition and vote; • institutional guarantees: freedom of the press, protection of the family and parental rights. e. Social state—but no specific social order At first glance, the fourth constitutional principle, that of the “social” state (Art. 20 para. 1 GG), does not appear to be related to the political disasters of German history. A closer look, however, shows that the Weimar Constitution with its nonbinding social programmatic statements, not least the announcement of economic councils, was predestined to generate high expectations among the political left, which were then disappointed, but to mobilize defense against itself from the

8 So

Werner Stauffacher in Friedrich Schiller’s “Wilhelm Tell” (2nd act, 2nd scene).

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2  The Anti-totalitarian Democracy of the Basic Law

outset among the right. Against this background, a different concept of the social state was developed in 1948/49. The social state in the Basic Law is now hardly carried out. Social claims rights such as a right to work, education or housing does not know it. The formula “property obliges. Its use is also to serve the general welfare” (Art. 14 GG), which imposes a social obligation on property, could be mentioned here without further ado. Potentially significant could be a social state interpretation of fundamental rights in the sense of also socially guaranteed opportunities. In this direction, the Numerus Clausus ruling (on freedom of occupation) of the Federal Constitutional Court pointed in 1972. However, since claims against the state were then placed “subject to the possible in the sense of what the individual can reasonably claim from society” and primarily entrusted to the free decision of the legislature (quoted from Ridder 1975, p. 126), enforceable claims do not appear in this way. Another, occasionally propagated consequence of the social state principle: to interpret fundamental rights also as protective rights against third parties, against social power, was not intended by the Parliamentary Council. What can actually be derived from the social state principle therefore seems limited: the inadmissibility of legislation that would leave the individual to his individual fate without a minimum of social security, in addition the general demand on the legislature to promote social compensation. This means that there is no constitutional mandate to further expand or even realize the social state. Rather, it has been complied with by the current state of social legislation in the Federal Republic. Less would be just as compatible with it as more. In connection with the social state principle, Art. 15 GG is also discussed: u

“Land, natural resources and means of production can be transferred to public ownership or other forms of public enterprise for the purpose of socialization by a law that regulates the type and extent of compensation…”

This article on socialization together with the absence of other statements on the economic order in the Basic Law proves an economic policy neutrality: “A specific economic system,” the Federal Constitutional Court ruled, “is not guaranteed by the Basic Law”; even the “social market economy” is “certainly a possible order under the Basic Law, but by no means the only one” (BVerfG 1954). This is not contradicted by the obligation to compensate for expropriations, since compensation does not necessarily have to reach the market value and can be stretched over time.

2.3  The Legitimacy and Change of the Basic Law

37

Against this view, however, objections are raised. Roman Herzog (1974) believes that the guarantee of property, the right to personality development, freedom of occupation and association constitute a “barrier to socialism” and, at least in “wide areas of economic life”, collide with the constitution. This argumentation is rightly pointing to the need to consider economic orders in the light of these fundamental rights. Overall, the Basic Law leaves a wide scope for the political majority to shape, only excluding a Manchester liberalism on the one hand and extreme collectivist economic and social forms on the other. The social responsibility of property shows its current relevance in the light of the financial crisis of 2009, when the legal possibility of expropriating individual banks was introduced and, in the course of rising rents (Deutsche Wohnen), expropriation was also discussed more intensively in other areas. However, the contracts for the common European market are in the way of classical socialization. Why is this social-political openness of the Basic Law? The KPD, but not the SPD, demanded such social fundamental rights at that time. The Social Democrats were clear that the concrete state of society is to be determined not by the constitution, but by the respective political majorities (Hirscher 1986, p. 228 ff.). In this respect, it seems plausible to interpret the openness of the Basic Law as a “compromise” between different political and social forces (Abendroth 1976, p. 88, 92; Seifert 1976, p. 22). However, the latter is also not quite true, since no attempt was made to stipulate one’s own position as the only one admissible. This is thus a permanently intended open constitutional order, which also leaves legitimate scope for the democratic opponent and thus unfolds its integrative effects. The Basic Law thus bears the imprint of the perspective of power-distributing democracy, also to the detriment of political actionability. The latter can only be achieved again and again by cooperation and consensual politics. A comparison between the English Westminster model (majority democracy) and the consensus model of democracy leads to the realization of a consensual type of democracy in this country (Lijphart 1999, pp. 10 ff.). In other words, the political decisionmaking mode is often not the majority decision, but the negotiation, in which one has to find a consensual solution.

2.3 The Legitimacy and Change of the Basic Law a. Constitutional revision in united Germany The Basic Law of today is not the same as the one from 1949. Over 60 times it was changed in its over 70-year history—and thus doubled in size. Essentially, it was about additions (defence constitution 1954/56, emergency regulations

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1968), changes to the financial constitution (18 changes), legislative competences (18 changes), justice (7 changes) and voting rights issues (5 changes) as well as adjustments to the European integration process (Hönnige 2011; Lorenz 2011, p. 211). However, the basic structures of the constitutional system remained unchanged, because interventions “which affect the division of the federation into states, the fundamental involvement of the states in legislation or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20” (Article Article 79 para. 3 of the Basic Law—socalled. “Eternity clause”) are not permitted. Only the shift to a “cooperative federalism” could be considered a structural change. A fundamental constitutional discussion began in 1990 in connection with German unification. There were efforts by the Left in West Germany to link German unity with a new constitution, which should also contain referendums and social rights (or state objectives) on work, housing and education (Guggenberger et al. 1991, pp. 99 ff.; SPD 1989). Another impetus for constitutional amendments came from the forced European integration, more precisely: from the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. The line of the federal government and the majority in the Bundestag, not to carry out a total revision, but only necessary adjustments to the Basic Law, has already prevailed in the procedural rules of the Treaty of unification. Because it was provided therein that changes were to be made according to the previous procedure by two-thirds majority of the Bundestag and Bundesrat, in fact only with the consent of both major parties (Münch 1990, p. 45 f.). Accordingly, adjustments to the Basic Law were passed in 1992–1994. The unification was affected by the preamble and the distribution of votes in the Bundesrat. However, at the request of the SPD, the statement of Article 146 in the Basic Law, which was originally intended for unification, remained: “It shall lose its validity on the day on which a constitution comes into force which has been enacted by the German people in free decision.” While some constitutional lawyers see this as “a time bomb under the foundation of the Basic Law” (Kriele 1990, p. 5), others seek a harmless interpretation within the framework of the previous rules of constitutional amendment. Opposition revisionary efforts remained unsuccessful. Neither referendums in the federal level nor social rights or state objectives came about (Konegen 1997). Even with the topics of women and environment included in the Basic Law, it was carefully avoided to create enforceable rights. The main result was that the Basic Law was designed to be in line with European law in 1992. In adaptation to the Maastricht Treaty, the rights of the Bundesbank could now be transferred to a European Bank (Article 88 GG), EU citizens have the right to vote municipally (Article 28 GG). The new Article 23 GG is central, which not only provides for the possible transfer of sovereignty (as

2.3  The Legitimacy and Change of the Basic Law

39

before), but also regulates German participation in the European Union. To the extent that European decisions affect the rights of the federal states, these have a graduated right of co-determination in the representation of the German position. In this way, the states seek compensation for the emigration of competences to Europe. b. Legitimatorische Hypotheken? From the outset, the Basic Law has suffered from legitimacy deficits in the eyes of many. The least important in this context is that it came into existence under occupation rule and required the approval of the three Western military governors. In terms of its content, this had only limited consequences, since the occupying powers agreed with German intentions in general terms. In the conflict over the degree of centralization (in particular, financial constitution), the French and American governors, Koenig and Clay, found themselves on one side together with bourgeois German federalists, while the British governor Robertson was on the other side with the Social Democrats (Weber 1997, pp. 73 ff.). Thus, for the first time, the occupation aspect was significant only for right-wing extremist agitation, just as the DKP-related criticism of a “constitution cobbled together under the dictate [of the occupying powers]” was also spoken of (Stuby 1975, p. 55). Secondly, it has been argued that the Western occupying powers—contrary to the will of the people directed towards radical social change—had already made restorative settings for the Federal Republic before its foundation and thus predetermined its social development. “The forced capitalism” and “the prevented reordering” are key phrases here, which are justified by references to occupation vetoes against socialization resolutions of the state parliaments of North RhineWestphalia and Schleswig-Holstein; in addition, there is an alleged ban on socialization in Hesse (Schmidt and Fichter 1971; Schmidt 1970). What is overlooked in this context is that in reality the German opinion on socialization was highly divided and that there was a lack of a parliamentary majority for socialization in the Western zones as a whole. This became apparent in the Bizonal Economic Council, where the turn to a market economy found a majority instead. When Americans and Britons rejected the right of individual countries to socialize on the grounds that such questions were of a national nature, this was a certainly disputable, but nevertheless defensible and also shared by some Social Democrats—all the more so since, at the time of the North RhineWestphalia socialization resolution in August 1948, the process of founding the Federal Republic had already begun (Rudzio 1981). As the third, still legitimate burden of the Basic Law, which is still being lamented today (e.g. Arnim 2008, p. 16), the fact that it was neither elaborated by

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an assembly of representatives elected for this purpose, nor confirmed by a referendum (plebiscitary deficit) is cited. The Parliamentary Council was composed of representatives of the state parliaments elected in 1946/47, and these state parliaments confirmed its work. The reason why the Basic Law was not given the sanctity of a classical constitutional process was above all that German politicians wanted to avoid the impression of a final state foundation in this way. At the same time: The population, preoccupied with pressing material concerns, paid little attention to the elaboration of the Basic Law. As late as December 1949, only 39% of those surveyed in the American Zone knew anything about it at all (Merritt and Merritt 1970, pp. 307, 315; Merkl 1965, p. 143). For the Germans of the GDR, finally, the freely elected People’s Chamber of 1990 confessed to the principles of the Basic Law. With its accession to the Federal Republic, it accepted its validity. Since the election of the People’s Chamber was already taking place in the context of unification, there can be no doubt about its legitimacy for these steps. Thus, legislation has essentially been the task of the political leadership groups, accompanied by passive acceptance on the part of the masses of the population—without it being accurate to describe the Basic Law as “imposed” (Beyme 1970, p. 349). In fact, it only received its actual legitimacy in the aftermath, through the constant election of constitutional parties, through decades of proven effectiveness, and through all-encompassing positive references to its content. This was also aided by the fact that the Federal Constitutional Court could rely on broad trust and, as such, interpretive power in its interpretation of the constitution (Vorländer and Schaal 2002, pp. 345, 368). In this way, the Basic Law has gained more legitimacy than could have been granted to it by a one-time popular vote. In its 60th year of validity, 74% of Germans felt proud (very/quite proud) of the Basic Law, most of them Union supporters and Social Democrats, compared to only 66% of FDP supporters (Vorländer 2009, p. 16). On the one hand, this success has led to the Basic Law becoming one of the world’s most respected constitutions, from which many things are borrowed. Borrowings from it can be found not only overseas, in Brazil, South Korea and Namibia, but also in the new or re-established democracies of Southern (Greece, Spain, Portugal) and Eastern Europe (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic) (Altenhof 2000, p. 322). On the other hand, there are now also doubts. Criticism is widespread that in the Basic Law, the “aspect of control is overrated compared to that of operational capability.” (Sieg 2004, p. 369) It is certainly made worse by some of the “compromises” and “detailed regulations” that have been added to it over time, making it “an increasingly difficult document to read” (Sturm 2013, pp. 364–365) (Table 2.1).

References

41

Table 2.1   The Basic Law—Conclusions from Weimar Weimar Constitution 1919

Basic Law 1949

Understanding of democracy

• n atural law (limitations of • right-positivist (majority decision in accordance with majority decision) • representative the constitution) • representative-plebiscitary

Government system

• Semi-presidential democracy • Individual ministerial responsibility • Proportional representation • Parties extra-constitutional

• Parliamentary democracy • “Chancellor democracy” • ( personalized proportional representation, 5% clause) •P  arties included in the constitution

Federal state

• Reichsrat with suspensive veto power

•B  undesrat also with absolute veto power

Rechtsstaat

• State jurisdiction only • Fundamental rights with appellate character

• Constitutional jurisdiction • Fundamental rights immediately effective

Sozialstaat

• Liberal, social and participation rights

• Only liberal and participation rights

Source: Own representation

References Abelshauser, Werner (1975): Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland 1945–1948, Stuttgart. Abelshauser, Werner (2005): Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte seit 1945, Bonn. Abendroth, Wolfgang (1976): Zum Begriff des demokratischen und sozialen Rechtsstaates im Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in: Kempen, Otto Ernst (Ed.): Sozialstaatsprinzip und Wirtschaftsordnung, Frankfurt a. M., pp. 70 ff. Altenhof, Ralf (1999): Die Entwicklung der streitbaren Demokratie, in: Jesse, Eckhard/ Löw, Konrad (Eds.): 50 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Berlin, pp. 165 ff. Altenhof, Ralf (2000): Herzensdemokratie statt Vernunftrepublik, in: Zeitschrift für Politik 47 (3), pp. 318 ff. von Arnim, Hans Herbert (2008): Die Deutschlandakte. Was Politiker und Wirtschaftsbosse unserem Land antun, München. von Beyme, Klaus (1970): Die parlamentarischen Regierungssysteme in Europa, München. Bryde, Brun-Otto (1982): Verfassungsentwicklung, Baden-Baden. BVerfG (1952): Urteil des Ersten Senats vom 23. Oktober 1952, 1 BvB 1/51. BVerfG (1954): Urteil des Ersten Senats vom 20. Juli 1954, 1 BvR 459, 484, 548, 555, 623, 651, 748, 783, 801/52, 5, 9/53, 96, 114/54. BVerfG (2017): Urteil des Zweiten Senats vom 17. Januar 2017, 2 BvB 1/13. Dörr, Nikolas (2007): Die Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands im Parlamentarischen Rat 1948/1949, Berlin.

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Detjen, Joachim (2009): Die Werteordnung des Grundgesetzes, Wiesbaden. Deuerlein, Ernst (Ed.) (1963): Potsdam 1945, München. Enzmann, Birgit (2009): Der demokratische Verfassungsstaat, Wiesbaden. Feldkamp, Michael F. (Ed.) (1999): Die Entstehung des Grundgesetzes für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949, Stuttgart. Feldkamp, Michael F. (2008): Der Parlamentarische Rat 1948–1949, Göttingen. Fromme, Friedrich Karl (1960): Von der Weimarer Verfassung zum Bonner Grundgesetz, Tübingen. Fromme, Friedrich Karl (1970): „Totalrevision“ des Grundgesetzes, in: Zeitschrift für Politik 17 (2), pp. 87 ff. Galka, Sebastian (2014): Parlamentarismuskritik und Grundgesetz, Baden-Baden. Gerlach, Julia (2012): Die Vereinsverbotspraxis der streitbaren Demokratie. Verbieten oder Nicht-Verbieten?, Baden-Baden. Greven, Michael Th. (2007): Politisches Denken in Deutschland nach 1945, Opladen. Guggenberger, Bernd et al. (Eds.) (1991): Eine Verfassung für Deutschland, München. Helms, Ludger (1999): 50 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland – Kontinuität und Wandel des politischen Institutionensystems, in: Zeitschrift für Politik 46 (2), pp. 144 ff. Herzog, Roman (1974): Sperre für den Sozialismus, in: Die Zeit vom 29. März 1974. Hirscher, Gerhard (1986): Carlo Schmid und die Gründung der Bundesrepublik, Bochum. Hönnige, Christoph et al. (2011): Formen, Ebenen, Interaktionen, in: ders. et al. (Eds.): Verfassungswandel im Mehrebenensystem, Wiesbaden, pp. 8 ff. Jaspers, Karl (1946): Die Schuldfrage, Heidelberg. Jesse, Eckhard (2006): Grenzen des Demokratieschutzes in der offenen Gesellschaft – Das Gebot der Äquidistanz gegenüber politischen Extremismen, in: ders./Backes, Uwe (Eds.): Gefährdungen der Freiheit. Extremistische Ideologien im Vergleich, Göttingen, pp. 493 ff. Jesse, Eckhard (2008): Demokratie in Deutschland. Diagnosen und Analysen, Köln. Jesse, Eckhard (2018): Grundlagen, in: ders./Mannewitz, Tom (Eds.): Extremismusforschung. Handbuch für Wissenschaft und Praxis, Baden-Baden, pp. 23 ff. Jung, Otmar (1994): Grundgesetz und Volksentscheid, Opladen. Kelsen, Hans (1989): Verteidigung der Demokratie, in: Der Bundesminister des Innern (Eds.): Abwehrbereite Demokratie und Verfassungsschutz, Bonn, pp. 47 ff. Kilper, Heiderose/Lhotta, Roland (1996): Föderalismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Opladen. Klamt, Martin (2012): Die Europäische Union als Streitbare Demokratie. Rechtsvergleichende und europarechtliche Dimension einer Idee, München. Knabe, Hubertus (2005): Tag der Befreiung? Das Kriegsende in Ostdeutschland, Berlin. Konegen, Norbert (Ed.) (1997): Revision des Grundgesetzes? Opladen. Kriele, Martin (1979): Die Lektion von Weimar, in: Die Zeit vom 25. Mai. Kriele, Martin (1990): Eine Sprengladung unter dem Fundament des Grundgesetzes, in: Die Welt vom 16. August. Lange, Erhard H. M. (1978): Die Diskussion um die Stellung des Staatsoberhauptes 1945– 1949, in: Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 26 (4), pp. 601 ff. Lange, Erhard H. M. (1993): Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar, Heidelberg. Lange, Thorsten (2005): Zur Wahlgeschichte, in: Falter, Jürgen W./Schoen, Harald (Eds.): Handbuch Wahlforschung, Wiesbaden, pp. 31 ff.

References

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Laufer, Heinz/Münch, Ursula (1997): Das föderative System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bonn. Leggewie, Claus/Meier, Horst (1995): Republikschutz. Maßstäbe für die Verteidigung der Demokratie, Reinbek bei Hamburg. Lijphart, Arend (1999): Patterns of Democracy, New Haven. Lorenz, Astrid (2011): Substanzbezogenes und alternatives Nutzenmaximierungsverhalten von Akteuren und die Auswirkungen auf das Grundgesetz, in: Hönnige, Christoph et al. (Eds.), Verfassungswandel im Mehrebenensystem, Wiesbaden, pp. 76 ff. Matz, Ulrich (1978): Zur Legitimität der westlichen Demokratie, in: Kielmansegg, Peter Graf/ders. (Eds.): Die Rechtfertigung politischer Herrschaft, Freiburg, pp. 27 ff. Merkl, Peter H. (1965): Die Entstehung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Stuttgart. Merritt, Anna J./Merritt, Richard L. (Eds.) (1970): Public Opinion in Occupied Germany, Urbana. Merten, Detlef/Papier, Hans-Jürgen (Eds.) (2006): Handbuch der Grundrechte in Deutschland und Europa, Vol. II, Heidelberg. von Münch, Ingo (ed.) (1990): Die Verträge zur Einheit Deutschlands, München. Niclauß, Karlheinz (1992): Der Parlamentarische Rat und die plebiszitären Elemente, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 45, pp. 3 ff. Niclauß, Karlheinz (1998): Der Weg zum Grundgesetz, Paderborn. Norpoth, Helmut (1999): Elections and Political Change: a German Sonderweg?, in: Merkl, Peter H. (Ed.): The Federal Republic of Germany at Fifty, Basingstoke, pp. 87 ff. Oberreuter, Heinrich (1980): Parlamentarisches System – Stärken und Schwächen, in: Jesse, Eckhard (Ed.): Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Deutsche Demokratische Republik, Berlin, pp. 97 ff. von Oertzen, Peter (1973): Freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung und Rätesystem, in: Bermbach, Udo (Ed.): Theorie und Praxis der direkten Demokratie, Opladen, pp. 173 ff. Pfetsch, Frank R. (1986): Verfassungspolitische Innovationen 1945–1949, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 17 (1), pp. 5 ff. Ridder, Helmut (1975): Die soziale Ordnung des Grundgesetzes, Opladen. Rudzio, Wolfgang (1981): Großbritannien als sozialistische Besatzungsmacht in Deutschland, in: Kettenacker, Lothar et al. (Ed.): Studien zur Geschichte Englands und der deutsch-britischen Beziehungen, München, pp. 341 ff. Schmidt, Eberhard (1970): Die verhinderte Neuordnung 1945–1952, Frankfurt a. M. Schmidt, Manfred G. (1988): Sozialpolitik, Opladen. Schmidt, Ute/Fichter, Tilman (1971): Der erzwungene Kapitalismus, Berlin. Scholz, Bastian (2016): Die Kirchen und der deutsche Nationalstaat. Konfessionelle Beiträge zum Systembestand und Systemwechsel, Wiesbaden. Seifert, Jürgen (1976): Grundgesetz und Restauration, Darmstadt. Sieg, Hans Martin (2004): Weltmacht – Weltordnung, Münster. SPD (1989): Grundsatzprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. Beschlossen vom Programm-Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands am 20. Dezember 1989 in Berlin, Berlin. Stammen, Theo (Ed.) (1965): Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit, München. Stuby, Gerhard (1976): Der Eigentumsbegriff des Grundgesetzes, in: Mayer, Udo/ders. (Ed.): Die Entstehung des Grundgesetzes, Köln, pp. 145 ff.

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Sturm, Roland (2013): Regierungssystem, in: Hradil, Stefan (Ed.): Deutsche Verhältnisse, Frankfurt a. M., pp. 360 ff. Thränhardt, Dietrich (1986): Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Frankfurt a. M. Troitzsch, Klaus G. (1979): Volksbegehren und Volksentscheid, Meisenheim. Vorländer, Hans (2009): Die Deutschen und ihre Verfassung, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 18–19, pp. 8 ff. Vorländer, Hans/Schaal, Gary S. (2002): Interpretation durch Institutionenvertrauen?, in: Vorländer, Hans (Ed.): Integration durch Verfassung, Wiesbaden, pp. 343 ff. Weber, Jürgen (Ed.) (1997): Das Jahr 1949 in der deutschen Geschichte, Landsberg. Wunder, Bernd (1986): Geschichte der Bürokratie in Deutschland, Frankfurt a. M.

Part II The political field of forces

3

Organized Interests: Between Pluralism and Corporatism

3.1 The Pluralism of Interests in Germany a. Development of organized interests in Germany Collective interests arise from social conditions and problems, i.e. subjectively experienced and “behavior-oriented goals and needs of individuals and groups in a social environment” (Weber 1977, p. 31). They form, so to speak, the raw material that enters the political process, is transformed and leads to decisions. Until the French Revolution, interests found their expression in estate-based guild institutions. In Germany, these older forms of interest representation survived to some extent, and only with the freedom of trade in 1869 in the North German Confederation and the freedom of coalition in 1867 in Prussia did the barriers to the free formation of interest groups fall. As a result, a diversified system of organized interests developed in the second half of the 19th century (Varain 1973; Rudzio 1982, pp. 11 ff.). The further history is characterized by an differentiation of interest representation. Until 1933, many associations and organizations were characterized by their close association with certain political parties or churches. Political and social milieus, which carried the larger parties, also included interest groups. Social democracy sought to reach the “whole person” by accompanying him through a wreath of subsidiary organizations “from the cradle to the grave, from proletarian infant care (welfare) to (freethinker) cremation associations” (Neumann 1973, pp. 105 ff.). Such politically and ideologically shaped interest representation has not been restored since 1945—under the influence of social developments and the occupation powers of the Anglo-Americans. Although there is still a different proximity

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Mannewitz and W. Rudzio, The Political System of Germany, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41371-2_3

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3  Organized Interests: Between Pluralism and Corporatism

or distance between certain interest groups and parties, the development towards pragmatic and cool interest representation is clearly visible. This is particularly true in the field of trade unions, where politically independent unions have replaced the former political direction unions. Since the influence of a variety of freely organized groups on state decisionmaking is considered legitimate in the Federal Republic, one can speak of a pluralistic democracy. In it, the common good is not seen as predetermined and recognized by a state or party leadership, but pragmatically as the “resultant” of group conflicts, provided they only meet social and rule-of-law minimum requirements (Fraenkel 1964, p. 21). The activity of organized interests is downright necessary and stabilizing in such a political system: • The free articulation of interests strengthens the democratic legitimacy of political decisions. It makes it easier to perceive and respond to social needs. While the diversity of social interests can be reflected in a variety of interest organizations, this would hardly be possible in a few political parties. • While the aggregation of interests, i.e. the bundling of specific interests by larger interest organizations, is intended to increase their effectiveness, it represents a reduction in complexity for the political system, which makes the interests comprehensible and therefore processable. This is associated with a relief from individual conflicts that were previously fought out within or between interest groups. • By involving interest organizations in decisions, this compels them—if they want to be considered as negotiating partners in the future—to behave in an integrative and pacifying way, namely to the obligation “to explain the negotiation results achieved to their members and to make it clear to them above all that no more could be achieved” (Streeck 1972, p. 131). This is countered by critical questions about interest pluralism: to what extent does it not devalue the inequality of the organization and enforceability of interests, to what extent does a mediatization of citizens take place through autonomous organizations, whether the power of interest groups does not dominate the parliamentary-democratic process? b. The spectrum of organized interests Not every association is an interest organization. Sports, singing, hiking clubs, bowling clubs or scientific associations, for example, serve primarily the common activity of their members and only appear as an interest group towards the outside in exceptional cases, when it comes to public subsidies, allocation of land

3.1  The Pluralism of Interests in Germany

49

for sports facilities, etc. As “associations” on the other hand, one can understand freely formed organizations that primarily serve the purpose of representing interests towards the outside. In addition, public institutions such as Chambers of Industry and Commerce and loose local groups (citizen initiatives) and social movements are to be attributed to the interest organizations. While estimates for citizen initiatives vary greatly (Guggenberger 2020), the total number of actual interest groups in the Federal Republic has been estimated at 3,500–4,000 (Bethusy-Huc 1990, p. 150); one could also count all 6,800 professional associations (Triesch and Ockenfels 1995, p. 13). With German unification in 1990, the number of associations did not increase significantly, since the entire German association system was almost exclusively established by individual or corporate membership from East German side to the corresponding West German associations. For an overview of interest organizations, typologies that divide according to the type of represented interest prove to be particularly suitable; here, Ellwein’s (1974) approach is followed to a large extent. A corresponding overall table is given in the overview “Interest Organizations in Germany”. The large space that interest organizations of the economic and labor sector occupy in the overview corresponds to their number and importance in reality (Oehmer 2014). An older count of the interest organizations officially registered with the Bundestag showed that 49.9% represented economic interests, 12.4 medical or pharmaceutical and 8.2 explicitly political1. a. Companies and self-employed persons are basically organized in three ways. First, they form free industry associations that influence economic, tax and social policy decisions. Viable interests in politics are also represented by the self-employed, who are concerned with fee schedules, tax law issues and access to professions. b. The task of representing companies and self-employed persons vis-à-vis the unions is carried out separately by special employer associations. Here, sectorspecific and regional employer associations lead the wage and salary policy dispute, while the “Federal Association of German Employers’ Associations” focuses on general collective bargaining issues. This separation between industry and employer association is rather a “German specialty” that only exists in Switzerland and partially in Denmark. In addition, there are also

1 As

of 2010 (Oehmer 2014, p. 59).

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3  Organized Interests: Between Pluralism and Corporatism

“mixed associations” in Germany that perform the functions of both industry and employer associations; eleven member associations of the BDI belong to this type (Behrens 2010, pp. 154, 164). c. A third pillar of the representation of companies and self-employed persons is formed by the public-law chambers. By law, one belongs to them, but there is self-government in them. As public institutions, they have legally prescribed tasks: statements on the situation of their economic sectors or occupational groups, control of vocational training, acceptance of vocational qualifying examinations. By expressing themselves on local or regional issues—on trade tax rates and planning as well as on regional spatial planning, transport and economic development measures—they form, in a division of labor, a third interest representation of companies or occupational groups in addition to industry and employer associations. The “Kassenärztliche Vereinigungen” (medical associations), to which all doctors with health insurance must belong and which decide on the distribution of the money paid by the health insurance companies, also belong to this sector.

Interest Organizations in Germany 2021

I. Interest Organizations in the Economic and Labor Sector 1. Corporate and self-employed organizations a) Industry associations: • “Federal Association of the German Industry” (BDI) with 35 industry associations, including “Association of the German Machinery and Plant Construction” with 3200 companies, “Association of the Chemical Industry” with 1600 companies, “Association of the Electrical Engineering, Electronics and Information Technology” with 36,000 companies and “Association of the Automotive Industry” with 640 companies. • “Central Association of the German Electrical and Information Technology Trades” with 19,673 companies, “Central Association of the Motor Vehicle Trades” with 36,600 companies and other trade associations or guilds • “German Farmers’ Association” with 285,000 members. • Medical associations such as the “Hartmannbund” (34,000 members), the “Marburger Bund” of salaried and civil servants with

3.1  The Pluralism of Interests in Germany

128,000 companies; in addition, the “Association of German Engineers” with 150,000 members, the lawyers and others. • “Handelsverband Deutschland” (retail trade) with 100,000 members; “Börsenverein des dt. Buchhandels” with 4500 companies. • Associations of banks, shipowners (180 companies), digital publishers and newspaper publishers (286 members) and others. • “Bundesv. Solarwirtschaft” with 600 companies, “Bundesv. Windenergie” with 20,000 companies. b) Chambers: Regional Chambers of Industry and Commerce, Chambers of Crafts and Agriculture, Professional Chambers of Physicians, Dentists (98,604 members), Architects, Pharmacists, Notaries. c) Employers’ associations: “Federal Association of German Employers’ Associations” with 62 member associations and 6250 sub-organizations 2. Trade unions a) “German Trade Union Confederation” (DGB) with eight individual trade unions and a total of 5,995,437 M., including in the trade unions: IG Bergbau, Chemie, Energie with 607,491 M.; Education and Science with 280,350 M.; United Services Union (ver.di) with 1,987,336 M.; IG Metall with 2,192,115 M.; Food, Confectionery, Catering with 200,000 M.; Police with 190,000 M. b) Other trade unions and employee associations: • “German Civil Service Federation and Tariff Union” with numerous sub-associations (such as “German Police Union” with 10,000 M., “German Philology Association” with 90,000 M., “Union of German Locomotive Drivers” with 35,520 M.) and a total of 1,300,000 M. • “Christian Trade Union Confederation” with 13 affiliated associations and a total of 270,215 M. • “Catholic Workers’ Movement” (90,000 M.) • “Federal Police Union” (10,015 M.) • “German Armed Forces Association” (200,000 M.) • “Association of Cockpits” (9,600 M.), “Air Traffic Control Union” (3,200 M.)

51

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3. Consumer and customer organizations • • • •

“Federal Association of Consumer Centers” with 44 M. “General Patient Association” with 1,211 M. “For Railway” with 4,000 M. “Association of the German Internet” (18,946 M.)

4. Professional associations Numerous associations such as the “German Teachers’ Association” (165,000 M.), the “German Universities Association” (30,800 M.), the “German Journalists’ Association” (32,000 M.), the “Association of German Realschullehrer” (15,500 M.) II. Social organizations 1. War-related organizations • “Social Association VdK” (2 million members) • “Union German War Grave Care” (104,000 members) • “Union of the Expelled People” with 37 sub-organizations (including “Landsmannschaften” of East Prussia with 200,000 members and Silesia with 200,000 members) with a total of 1.3 million members 2. Welfare organizations • “Deutsches Rotes Kreuz” with 3 million members and 180,309 (parttime) employees (as of 2019) • “Arbeiterwohlfahrt” with 312,625 members and around 238,000 (parttime) employees (as of 2019) • “Deutscher Caritasverband” with 500,000 members and around 693,082 (part-time) employees (as of 2018) • “Verband diakonischer Dienstgeber in Deutschland” with 179 employers • “Volkssolidarität” (180,000 members)

3.1  The Pluralism of Interests in Germany

3. Other social organizations • • • • • • • • • •

“Federation of Taxpayers” with 200 000 M. “German Tenants Federation” (1,25 Mio. M.) “V. der Privaten Hochschulen” (84 M.) “Dt. Krebsgesellschaft” (7890 M.) “Eigenheimerverband” (120 000 M.) “Dt. Alzheimer Gesellschaft” (15 000 M.) “Dt. Gesellschaft für Humanes Sterben” (23 000 M.) “V. alleinerziehender Mütter u. Väter” (9000 M.) “Bundesverband Deutscher Gartenfreunde” (910 000 M.) “Lesben- u. Schwulenv. in D. “ (4403 M.)

III. Citizens’ initiatives Predominantly local groups, mostly representing spatial interests. • “Federation Citizens Environmental Protection(BBU) with 120 citizens’ initiatives” • “Transport and Environment Working Group (with 900 citizens’ initiatives) IV. Associations in the leisure sector • “German Olympic Sports Confederation” with 99 org. (incl. “German Shooting Association” with 135,870 members, Football Association with 7,090,107 members, Gymnastics Association) and a total of 27 million active and passive members. • “General German Automobile Club” (ADAC) with 21 million members. • “Automobile Club of Germany” (1.4 million members) • Student associations such as “Cartellverband der Katholischen Deutschen Studentenverbindungen” (26,721 members) • “German Alpine Association” (1,351,247 members) • “German Beekeepers’ Association” (132,500 members) V. Political and ideological associations • “Federation for Environment and Protection of Nature” (440,000 members) • “Federation for Protection of Nature Germany” (750,000 members)

53

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• • • • • • • •

“Greenpeace” (590,000 members) “Peta” (65,000 members) “German Animal Protection Association” (800,000 members) “Union of Victims’ Associations of Communist Tyranny e.V.” (2.2 million members) “Europe Union” (17,000 members) “Society for German Language” (3,000 members) “German Association for Political Science” (1,750 members) “More Democracy” (10,000 members)

VI. Associations of public territorial units • “German Association of Towns and Municipalities” (district-affiliated municipalities) • “German Association of Cities” (members including district-free and other cities) • “German Association of Rural Districts” (294 rural districts as members) M. = individual members; Dt. = German; Org. = organizations; v. = association / club; rd. = round Source: Continuously updated version of the public list of registered associations and their representatives, as of June 8, 2021, in: https://www. bundestag.de/parlament/lobbyliste.

The largest block among the associations of dependent employees is made up of the unions affiliated with the DGB. As on the employer side, here too, organizational weight and wage policy lie with the individual unions. Therefore, the chairpersons of large unions such as the IG Metall (Jörg Hofmann) or Ver.di (Frank Werneke) play a more important role than the DGB chairman (Reiner Hoffmann). In contrast to the situation before 1933, the DGB unions each seek to unite all employees of an economic sector, regardless of profession (principle of industrial union), political orientation and employment law status as workers, employees or officials (principle of unitary union). Since the mergers into larger unions, one can also speak of “multi-sector unions” (Müller and Wilke 2003, p. 132). Whether this has created a “success model” (Keller 2004) or an overextension can

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55

be assessed differently in view of new small unions and declining membership numbers. However, the organizational principles of the DGB are not generally accepted. So the special interests of officials (Association of German Civil Servants) and those of a professional group (such as the locomotive drivers’ union) have a formative character for the association. In addition, there is unease about the political climate in the DGB area; for the “Christian Trade Union Confederation” this seems to be the decisive reason for its existence. In contrast, consumer associations are only weakly developed, although or precisely because they represent general interests. Under the umbrella of the “Association of Consumer Associations”, regional “consumer centers” are gathered together, composed of other associations. The Association is therefore merely a “federation of federations”, mostly financed from public funds. As associations in the social sector one can summarize those which represent material interests outside of the world of work. Homeowners’ associations and welfare associations look back on a long history here. The latter not only take on the role of “advocacy interest representation” (Strünck 2000, p. 185), but above all function as social service providers for the sick, disabled and elderly—an unusual dual role by international standards. Of importance in Germany were also associations that represented war-related interests: such as the War Victims’ Association and the Expellees’ Association. With increasing distance to the Second World War, however, these interests have lost importance. As a result, originally war victim associations have taken on the general interests of pensioners. The German Women’s Council, made up of 59 member organizations, is predominantly made up of women’s sections of other associations. Specific women’s organizations, on the other hand, are traditional women’s associations as well as feminist groups, but with low membership numbers (Biegler 2000). The same applies to youth associations. With recreational associations these are primarily clubs oriented inward, only secondarily with interests outward. After all, their sports umbrella organizations are very much in demand when they advocate for sports promotion or tax benefits for part-time instructors, the ADAC when it opposes high petrol taxes or a general speed limit on motorways. Similarly, ideal associations only partially have the character of interest groups. Climate and environmental protection associations, whose predecessors can be traced back to the 19th century in the form of nature conservation associations, have gained in importance here. Ideal associations find particular media resonance as “public interest groups” and can also achieve considerable attention with lower membership numbers.

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Religious communities occupy a special position. Among them, the Catholic Church with 22.2 million, the Evangelical Church with 20.2 million and Islam with 5.3 to 5.6 million members (German Bishop’s Conference 2021, pp. 70 ff.) stand out due to their size and—in the case of the two Christian churches—their special public law status. The Orthodox Churches (1.5 million members), the New Apostolic Church (approx. 360,000 members) and Judaism (approx. 94,000 members) would also have to be mentioned. Although not primarily interest organizations, they represent values that can prompt them to take committed positions on family, social and school policy issues as well as on the legalization of abortion. According to the position papers of the Evangelical Church in Germany from 1990 to 2010, this appears to be “clearly profiled” politically: in economic, social and foreign policy “clearly left”, in environmental and educational policy “moderately left”, only in social policy “right of the scale center”—“Proximity to the SPD and B90 / Greens” is thus verifiable (Thieme and Liedhegener 2015). What almost all major religious communities have in common and have been weakening for some time is the decline in religious affiliation. c. Problems of organization In the international comparison of association and club membership, Germany ranks among the relatively high participation societies (Northern Europe, Spain and Italy), behind which the Eastern EU falls (World Values Survey 2020).2 Membership of associations is changing as part of dynamic developments. For the period 1991 to 2009, the following picture emerges for Germany: The number of members of environmental organizations has continuously increased, by a total of 60%, as has membership of sports associations, by a total of just under 20%. Membership of social associations rose until 2001 by 10%, then fell continuously to the level of 1991. There has been a continuous massive decline in this period in churches (by a total of around 9 million) and trade unions (by 25%) (Merkel and Petring 2012, p. 111). The reasons for this are to be seen in the secularization of society on the one hand and changes in the world of work (more part-time and temporary workers) on the other. The decline in union membership in Germany corresponds to the trend in other developed countries (Streeck 2013, p. 67).

2 The

question text read: “Now I’d like you to look at this card. I’m going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it.”

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57

Some membership numbers give the impression of more power than there actually is. This is because union membership also includes non-active members, retirees, and unemployed persons. According to 2011 data, retirees make up a total of 21% of union membership. Unions look like clay giants when their membership lists from 2009 include, in addition to unemployed persons, 23% retirees in the IG Metall, 28% in the construction and chemical unions, or even 43.8% in the railway union (Ebbinghaus and Göbel 2013, p. 216; Schroeder and Munimus 2012, p. 122). In general, there are significant differences in the degree of organization, i.e. the proportion of members of interest groups to those whose interests are to be represented. For example, doctor and craftsman organizations encompass the great majority of their respective groups, similarly the German Farmers’ Association the majority of principal farmers, business associations of industry 70–85% of production (Mann 1994, p. 41; Rieger 2007, p. 294), while employees only achieve a much lower degree of organization. In an international comparison of developed industrial countries, Germany ranks with a union degree of organization of 18.3% of employees at about the same level as Japan, Australia, and the Netherlands. A number of states are behind (including France with 7.6, the USA with 11.3, Poland with 15.6, and Spain with 15.9%). In Italy, Great Britain, and Scandinavian countries, for example, employees are much better organized3. Organizational weaknesses and representation gaps are not surprising. This is because the individual has interests in numerous life contexts, which could lead him to just as many interest groups. But this runs into time and cost limits. In addition, improvements that a association may achieve (for example, wage increases, tax relief, better transport connections) are a “collective good” that rewards free riders. They often benefit non-members as well. Another obstacle to membership recruitment is also the temporary nature of some interests. Therefore, the associations always fight against a loss of members. They have four strategies available to them to counter this: • to cultivate a sense of duty or community consciousness. • to achieve a legal obligation to join: in this way, the interests of craftsmen and freelancers are supported by chambers of commerce, as are those of students by mostly public-law student associations.

3 As

of 2011 (Greef 2014, p. 752).

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• services exclusively for members: business and self-employed associations offer their members information on markets, tax law, technical developments and financial matters; unions offer strike pay, legal protection and opportunities for professional education; social associations lure with legal advice, their own recreation and wellness centres, nursing homes, meeting places and meal services (Schroeder et al. 2010, pp. 209 ff., 230, 277). • potentially disadvantages for the unorganized: closed-shop agreements (that only union members are allowed to work in the company) are incompatible with negative freedom of association (that no one can be forced into an association). In practice, however, large associations exercise such influence through their role in chambers of commerce, works councils and personnel councils, social and labour courts, that some may feel dependent and a “certain fear of leaving” (Niemann 2003, pp. 202 f.) may arise. In addition, it is noteworthy how the membership of politically relevant associations is composed. According to an ALLBUS survey from 2008, a number of types of associations (including unions, environmental associations) have a disproportionately high number of members from the top fifth of the population in terms of income. When it comes to voluntary engagement, similar biases can be seen: academics (including university graduates) dominate: not only in adult education and politics with 71 and 72%, respectively, but also in fire brigade organisations with 48%, leisure with 52% and sports with 62% (Schäfer 2015, pp. 169, 173).

3.2 The Sociology of Interest Organisations a. Internal structures of interest associations If interest organisations are to represent their members, it would seem self-evident that there is democracy within the organisation. Accordingly, the statutes of the associations attribute the highest decision-making competence to the general assemblies or the delegate assemblies elected by them. All other bodies—presidia, boards, committees—are subordinate to them and are composed of those elected by them. In reality, however, the actual decision-making processes are characterised by three phenomena: a shift of decisions to smaller committees (presidia, boards, committees), the weight of association bureaucracies (management, professional functionaries) and a widespread principle of proportionality instead of a majority decision.

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59

So in industrial sector associations the voting rights are designed differently: one vote for each member (as in 64.4% of the associations), according to the amount of the contribution or the turnover (in 28.9% of the umbrella associations) or according to the number of employees (in 5.1% of the associations) (Behrens 2010, p. 159). The members’ assemblies mostly take place less often than once a year. Also, some members’ assembly only has to elect about half of the members of the board, while the others are provided by professional and regional suborganisations (Berger 2004, p. 52). The boards are often too large in number and meet too seldom to be able to shape the current association policy. Therefore, this function falls to smaller “presidia” or “executive boards”, as well as committees in which specialists and interested members prepare board decisions on specific issues. The presidium of the BDI, for example, which leads the entire activity of the federal association, comprises in addition to the president one representative each from nine member associations (= vice presidents) and 44 other members (as of 2021). However, consensus is generally sought (Berger 2004, pp. 54ff., 60ff., 65). In addition, there is the weight of the association management, behind which sometimes a considerable apparatus stands. However, this should not obscure the fact that associations on average only employ four full-time employees in their central office (Sebaldt 1996, pp. 669ff.). Similar phenomena can be seen in the unions. Members’ assemblies can naturally take place only decentralised and are mainly limited to elections. The local boards have only limited competences. In addition to volunteers, they include union employees, who, although elected by the base, require confirmation or appointment by the main board of the union for assuming office. The top organisational level is decisive. Here, the union congress, the representation of the members, only meets every three to four years for a few days. As an assembly of hundreds of delegates, it can only decide between proposals formulated elsewhere. In addition, the candidate lists presented for the board elections have long had to correspond to “sophisticated proportions” between regions, industries, party orientations and genders—whoever makes counter-proposals endangers carefully balanced balances. Union congresses are therefore rather seen as confirming organs. This does not exclude that critical voices can also be heard on them and that union boards have to take them into account. The place where decisions are usually made is the main board of a union. It confirms the appointments of the full-time functionaries, decides on contract terminations, referendums and labour disputes. The closer leadership group are those members of the board who exercise their functions as “executive board” on a full-time basis and are in daily contact with the executive apparatus (Witjes 1976, p. 270, 363ff.).

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The union leadership is essentially made up of full-time union officials and released works councils. Recently, 800 people were employed by the DGB, about 2600 by the IG Metall, 900 by the IG Bergbau, Chemie und Energie and 3000 by ver.di—numbers that are rather declining (Prott 2013, p. 287, 299). In contrast to intra-democratic associations, the type of mobilization agency embodied in “Greenpeace” is pronounced. It represents a “highly professional, hierarchically organized and expert-oriented agency for mobilizing protest and financial resources” (Willems 2000, p. 62). Its base consists of supporting members who have no participatory rights (Sebaldt and Straßner 2004, pp. 298 ff.). This type of interest representation is based on professional lobbyists with media campaign skills, members only have a legitimating role for the interest represented. In view of declining membership numbers, this type of agency or NGO seems to be more common (Speth and Zimmer 2015, pp. 40 ff.). b. Limits of intra-association participation What is decisive for the practice of intra-organizational democracy is one thing: the low activity of members, their apathy. Low participation in general assemblies is widely observed. Union assemblies seem to be regularly attended only by minorities, only large majorities are involved in strike referendums. In business associations, not all companies are represented—at least in the past, only around 40% of member companies were represented at the general assemblies of the machine builders (Alemann 1987, p. 111). Apathy is quite understandable. Participation is often experienced as a burden. More active members can be found in organizations that can only be considered interest groups to a limited extent: in sports, cultural, leisure and religious organizations (van Deth 2004, p. 299). The member is also left with the “voting by feet”, the withdrawal from the association. Therefore, association leaders strive to take into account the interests of all members on their own initiative. Participation would therefore be “unprofitable clubbing” (Ilse Gahings quoted after von Beyme 1974, p. 201). The second factor that characterizes the intra-sociology of interest groups is the need for sufficient action and enforcement capacity. This requires a high level of information, constant communication with political addressees, financial resources and credible support from as many members as possible. Concentration of power therefore seems difficult to avoid. Against this background, the older discussion aimed on the one hand to strengthen intra-association democracy through legal regulation (Göhner 1981, pp. 59 ff.). On the other hand, it was argued that it was “without general interest” as long as only the possibility of withdrawal and competing associations existed and the individual association only had a limited importance for the individual (Ellwein 1974, p. 480).

3.3  Association Influence: Rule of the Associations?

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3.3 Association Influence: Rule of the Associations? a. Association influence in parliament The effort to influence is visible in Berlin in hundreds of offices of associations. In summer 2021, 2,297 associations were officially registered with the German Bundestag, resulting in their being taken into account in Bundestag hearings and receiving house passes to parliament and ministries.4 In early 2019, 778 lobbyists had such a pass (Winter 2019). These associations have their interests represented by their own employees (also 140 individual companies maintain permanent offices in Berlin), partly also by about 30 self-employed agencies that see themselves as providing advice, events and contact mediation; lawyers and former politicians are relatively common there. The total number of lobbyists, consultants, etc. in Berlin is estimated at around 6,000 (Dausend and Knaup 2020, p. 262). As the term “lobby” (= entrance hall of parliament, to which non-parliamentarians have access) suggests, their first task is to influence MPs. “They donate, they organize or sponsor events, they finance stands at party conferences, they call politicians onto supervisory boards and advisory boards. But nothing is as successful as personal contact” (Dausend and Knaup 2020, p. 262). They provide “close” parliamentarians with documents and arguments and are, in turn, informed by them about parliamentary developments. For 1987–90, a survey study found an average of 176.8 contacts with interest representatives per MP and year (Hirner 1993). Dausend and Knaup (2020, p. 262) came to no less than 400 letters, emails, faxes and phone calls over two weeks in 2009 for SPD Bundestag MP Marco Bülow; predominantly from profit-oriented companies. However, cases in which parliamentarians are instrumentalized by companies, associations or even foreign governments (e.g. “Azerbaijan affair” involving Karin Strenz and Eduard Lintner, Philipp Amthor’s involvement with a US start-up) are rather the exception. Another indicator of interest influence is the association coloring of parliaments. For example, in the 19th electoral term it was 22.8%—the lowest value since 1990 (German Bundestag 2021). However, this is a somewhat unreliable feature: On the one hand, membership of associations is not required to be reported by members of the Bundestag, on the other hand the association coloring of the Bundestag has been declining for years: “The career paths of politicians today are different, also because the parties are less strongly anchored in

4 Constantly

updated version of the public list of registered associations and their representatives, as of 8 June 2021, in: https://www.bundestag.de/parlament/lobbyliste.

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society.” (Speth 2021, p. 6) Not least: mere membership does not necessarily mean allegiance to the association (Gerstenhauer 2014). For example, the trade union membership of SPD Bundestag members varied between 61.7 and 84.2% between 1990 and 2021, that of the entire Bundestag between 46.8% in 2002 and 2005, which—contrary to the DGB’s negative position—did not prevent the SPD parliamentary group from adopting the Agenda 10 laws.5 Among trade unionorganized Bundestag members, “the loyalty to their own party dominates […] the loyalty to the trade unions.” (Hönigsberger and Osterberg 2014, p. 106). It is also visible that a single interest group does not have a chance to swear in a majority of the deputies. Here, the division of labor in parliamentary operations helps further: The parliamentary will is formed in specialized parliamentary committees and faction working groups, the other deputies usually follow the proposals of these. Accordingly, association influence is concentrated on these parliamentary switchboards. There, in certain committees, members of interested associations, for example DGB trade unionists, are disproportionately represented. Interests therefore have a chance to assert themselves at such nodes of the decision-making process. b. Association influence in the government sector Contrary to expectations that interest influence would mainly focus on parliament as the decisive legislative organ, investigations revealed a different picture early on; for example, in 1985/86, when of 232 BDI submissions, 67.2% were addressed to federal ministries and offices, 8.2% to the EC Commission, but only 15.5% to the Bundestag and its committees and factions (Brodach and von WolffMetternich 1987, pp. 122 ff.). This is not surprising. For laws are usually not created in the Bundestag, but in the bosom of the government and ministries. Interest groups therefore seek to influence the content of future laws and regulations in their early stages of development, the “Referentenstadium”, when they are still relatively easy to change. For this purpose, the interest groups are usually also invited. The basis for this is the Joint Rules of Procedure of the Federal Ministries, which states:

5 For

comparison: The proportion of DGB trade unionists was 62.3% between 2017 and 2021 in the Left parliamentary group, 16.4% in the Green parliamentary group, 1.6% in the Union, 0.0% in the FDP and AfD (DGB 2019).

3.3  Association Influence: Rule of the Associations?

63

u “When preparing laws, the representatives of the involved professional associations or groups can be informed and asked to provide documents, and given the opportunity to make a statement. The time, scope and selection are, unless special provisions exist, left to the discretion. If the draft is to be treated confidentially, this should be noted.” While the associations bring in their interests, the ministries gain information about the effects of planned measures and hear objections that they can take into account. Often, in internal negotiations, a draft is made “association-solid”, i.e. formulated as a compromise that all parties involved can bear. After all, today the parliamentary factions are also to be informed at the same time as the associations. Money in various forms serves economic interests to carry out political “landscape maintenance“and to maintain proximity to politically influential people: There are invitations to large meals, gifts to deputies, disproportionate speaker fees, travel, in individual cases “friendships“and donations. Association influence does not act from case to case. Rather, it is also established immanently through connections between certain associations and ministries. Such connections partly exist • through the same origin and training of ministerial officials and association representatives; • through membership of ministerial officials in associations, as was the case for the majority of state secretaries and department heads between 1949 and 1984 (Benzner 1989, p. 176); • through the constant close contact between ministerial officials and their clientele, so that one observes “regular ‘branch brotherhoods’ between deputies, ministerial officials, interest representatives and scientists“(Patzelt 2014, p. 33). More than that: influence on the government sector is even recognizable or probable in the cooperation of interest representatives in ministries as well as in party changes (the red-green coalition even set up its own program of the same name for this purpose, but it was discontinued after criticism). Between 2017 and 2021, the federal government spent more than 1 billion euros on management consultants and law firms (Jeske 2021); since 2010, the number of external employees in federal agencies has been in the mid-double digits (Federal Ministry of the Interior, for Building and Home Affairs 2020, p. 5). It also causes a stir when individual government members or federal ministers change sides to represent certain

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economic interests on the boards of large companies, trade union leaderships, as the head of an association or a management consultancy. Cases such as Fahimi, Fischer, Gabriel, Kampeter, von Klaeden, Mosdorf, Pofalla, Schröder, Wend, etc. were conspicuous. Of course, not everyone changed immediately, but the time interval usually seems too short not to raise questions about impartial conduct. “The most prominent was probably Matthias Berninger, former state secretary and state chairman [of the Greens] in Hesse, who gave up his mandate in 2007 at the age of 36 [… ] and switched to the US food giant Mars. At the beginning of 2019 he joined the chemical multi Bayer. “(Dausend and Knaup 2020, p. 412) Even journalists, including a party and a government spokesman, were hired as lobbyists by the economy. Switchers bring their political contacts and possibilities into play (Tillack 2015, pp. 8–9, 60–61, 78, 122). In addition, there are activities in addition to the Bundestag mandate: in 2019, for example, 202 of the 707 MPs declared additional income—in an amount of up to 1.4 million euros since the beginning of the legislative period; this practice was most widespread in the FDP parliamentary group (Reyher 2019). Is Germany therefore a “lobby republic“? This is suggested by the criticism of GRECO (Group of States against Corruption) against Germany in 2019 due to missed reforms to combat corruption; this is suggested by the lack of an “executive footprint“in the form of a register of lobbyists who have influenced a specific draft law; this is suggested by sensational quotes such as the following by Gerhard Schick (B’90 / The Greens): “There are certainly a handful of examples where I could prove that the whole work—from the regulatory idea to the formulation—came from lobbyists“(quoted after Dausend and Knaup 2020, p. 270). But how much does this say when there were around 550 laws passed per legislative period in the end? The cases that came into the public spotlight should not obscure the view of normality. The practices mentioned are not common. In addition: In terms of transparency, something is happening—the obligation to declare additional activities was specified on ten levels in 2013; since 2015 there has been a “leave of absence law“according to which ministers and state secretaries can be obliged to notify a change to the private sector and to a leave of absence of up to 18 months; the number of external employees in the ministries has been declining since a few years; and finally, the Lobby Transparency Register will replace the voluntary lobby list (introduced in 1972) in 2022. Since then, contacts with ministries have been subject to registration down to the level of departmental heads. Finally, one thing must be noted: Political decision-makers need information from a variety of areas to produce good legislation. Such information is also provided to them by interest groups—certainly interest-driven and critically to be questioned, but nevertheless introducing into the political decision-making process

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65

aspects and facts that contribute to the quality of the decisions. Consequently, political decision-makers must also have an ear for interest representatives. In this respect, lobbying also has a positive side. c. The struggle for parties and public opinion One first method of influence consists in the use of money or money’s worth. One must distinguish between the support of whole parties and the targeted promotion of individual politicians, sub-organizations and publications. Large donations can create a favorable climate, but in view of state party financing and party membership fees, a larger party can hardly be made dependent. With individually targeted funding, this seems rather conceivable. A second means consists in the personnel penetration of parties. This is countered by the fact that sometimes parties are also interested in association representatives in order to gain their support for an association and expertise for important issues through them. However, those who want to achieve politically interesting party positions in the association must also be anchored in the party. The persons concerned therefore often develop a double loyalty. They become just as much the gateway for party influence into the association as vice versa. Association influence can therefore be associated with “a reciprocal effect“(Wambach 1971, pp. 158 ff.). Finally, large associations try to use the voting behavior of their members. Although hardly ever explicitly called for voting or not voting for a certain party, in member assemblies and association publications, agreements or controversies are brought out with a party. Although this is where the party is most sensitive, the pressure remains limited. Because too many different interests determine the decision of the individual voter, too much has the binding force of unions like churches declined, to be able to promise safe vote packages. The enforceability of interests finally depends on public opinion. Public relations work of interest groups therefore aims at maintaining contacts with journalists, issuing press releases, publishing their own publications and demonstrating. The decisive factor is considered to be a general, long-term “opinion-forming”, dense contact networks, which prepare the ground for successful interest representation in individual cases. In order to achieve this, above all, economic associations have been hiring public relations firms since new, which should facilitate their targeted media influence and provide access to important people in the media and politics. One argumentation pattern in public relations work is to legitimize one’s own interests in the public good and in generally accepted values. Medical associations are concerned about the welfare of patients, industrial associations speak of

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the endangered location of Germany and job losses, the DGB conjures up “social justice“. One sends journalistic “straw men“in a veiled way or gives oneself a scientific flair with institutes (on BDI and DGB side). As much as the public good is instrumentalized here, however, such justifications must contain correct points in order to be effective. Interest influence therefore addresses all stations of the political decision-making process. The intensity of the efforts directed at a specific addressee can almost be seen as an indicator of its relevance. d. The ability of organized interests to assert themselves However, not every interest group has the same influence tools at its disposal. Such an equality of opportunity has never been claimed by pluralism theorists. Interest groups differ in terms of financial strength, membership, position in the system of interest groups (depending on whether there are counter-associations or not) as well as institutional regulations, in that public-law chambers are based on compulsory membership, while civil servants’ representatives do not have the means of a strike. What seems to be decisive above all is the different ability of the association members to put the general public or opponents under pressure through their behaviour. Thus, the investment readiness of companies and capital investors, the strike capability of employees, the potential for conflict of certain occupational groups (e.g. refuse collectors, air traffic controllers, locomotive drivers) are factors that give the corresponding associations power. Social clientele groups have nothing comparable (Winter 1997, p. 138). This corresponds approximately to the older “disparity thesis”, which claimed a “structural privileging“of those interests which can provoke relevant economic risks, i.e. the interests located in the economic and labour sphere (Offe 1969). However, many employees and trade unions have lost some of this advantage as a result of globalisation (Kädtler 2006, pp. 19 ff., 307). The potential for conflict of interest groups leads to another problem: the question of the limits of action of parliamentary politics. With the increasing interdependence in modern industrial societies, their sensitivity to pressure seems to have increased to the point of blackmail. This general problem of Western democracy has two extreme solutions: either the settlement of conflict with the consequence of severe economic damage or restrictions on the freedom of action of interest groups. In Germany, this problem is only mitigated by widespread prosperity, the predominance of middle-class consciousness and regulated conflict settlement. In addition, “the association system of the Federal Republic of Germany differs from that of many Western countries in its high degree of concentration

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and integration“(Groser 1992, p. 23), which makes the associations more confronted with the consequences of their behaviour and therefore more likely to act responsibly than smaller organisations.

3.4 Interlocking with the State: Features of Corporatism a. Public functions of associations In Germany, interest groups are sometimes not purely social organisations, but are interwoven with the public sector: the chambers as public-law institutions, the churches with their special public status (including state tax collection), numerous associations in the social sector, in education and research (Zimmer 2007, p. 115) as well as consumer organisations are examples of this. In addition, numerous associations declared to be “non-profit“enjoy the privilege of the tax-deductibility of the membership fees paid to them. Even more: Interest groups not only take influence on the state as social organisations from the outside, but are also partly involved in the formal setting, implementation and binding interpretation of state law (appointments of judges to labour and social courts by employer associations and trade unions or social associations). Large associations are thus “admitted to the ‘state’; they appear incorporated into the public sphere, that is, included, in order to give public decisions additional legitimacy and make them more successful“(Weber 1968, pp. 541 ff.). The term “corporatism”, which describes these phenomena, is practically a counter-model to pluralism in today’s political science debate (Schütt-Wetschky1997, p. 46 ff.; Lösche 2007, p. 107 ff.). In Table 3.1 the central characteristics of pluralism and corporatism are set against each other. Table 3.1   Pluralism and corporatism

Pluralism

Corporatism

Characteristics of Diversity, voluntariness, interest organizations competing

Limited number, compulsory or customary membership, comprehensive peak organizations

State-interest organization relationship

State recognition, partly promotion, inclusion in policy determination and implementation

No state favoritism, influence from outside on state

Sources: Philippe C. Schmitter according to: Czada (1994, p. 45); Lijphart and Crepaz (1991, p. 235).

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In particular, corporatist phenomena appeared spectacularly effective in the Federal Republic of Germany, when the government, employers’ associations and trade unions tried to find and implement common guidelines for wage and economic policy or solutions to the country’s problems together in the “Coordinated Action“or in the “Alliance for Work“; similarly also in large “chancellor’s conferences“of the Kohl era (1988–92) and commissions at the time of Chancellor Schröder (Mann 1994, pp. 185 ff.). A consensual decision-making process involving all important forces was supposed to lead to success (Streeck 2000, p. 57)—often, however, falling short of expectations. The organized involvement of lobbyists in the government’s work on draft laws, among other things, is also to be mentioned here. Similarly, in the implementation of laws. Representatives of associations sit, inter alia, on the supervisory boards of the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau and on the broadcasting councils. A third-parity participation model of government/ trade unions/employers’ associations, as in the Federal Employment Agency, is paradigmatic. The participation of welfare associations is provided for by law in the application of social security and youth welfare laws. Welfare associations and churches maintain the majority of kindergartens, youth and educational institutions, numerous hospitals—a total of over 100,000 social institutions with 1.5 million full-time employees (Schmid 2020)—with the help of public subsidies. Only recently has competition from commercial social enterprises developed here with the EU internal market. Indirectly, interest groups also exercise public functions by appearing as successful candidate groups in numerous public institutions with self-government. In agricultural chambers, the influence of the Farmers’ Association predominates, in chambers of industry and commerce that of business associations, in student associations that of political student groups, in works councils that of trade unions, in medical chambers and medical associations that of medical associations. Of particular importance are the internal employee representatives. Their rights restrict the private disposal or governmental powers to an unusually farreaching extent. These are • the staff councils in the public service, which have a say in personnel matters and the regulation of working conditions. • the works councils, which exist in 9% of companies in Germany and which have a say in personnel matters such as working conditions and which partly advise on economic matters.—The proportion of employees with a works council has been falling for some time and was 42% in the West and 35% in

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the East in 2018 (Ellguth 2019). Mostly present in large companies (Dribbusch and Birke 2016, p. 107), 8325 works council members are legally exempt from work, another 1412 partly. Of the around 156,000 elected works council members (voter turnout 76%) at least 59% are members of DGB trade unions, 3% members of other trade unions and 32% not unionized (Demir et al. 2019, p. 7). In practice, cooperation with management prevails, with occasional conflicts and finger-pointing in individual cases. • the employee representatives on supervisory boards, where they hold half the seats according to the Co-Determination Act of 1976 and the Mining Co-Determination Act of 1951 in capital companies with more than 2,000 employees. In 2020, a total of 651 companies were subject to co-determination (Institute for Co-Determination and Corporate Governance 2020). At times, the representatives’ assemblies at some social insurance carriers (public old-age, accident and health insurance) have developed into a field of competition among associations. The so-called “peaceful election“predominates in their elections, i.e. the entitled organizations agree and as a result an election is dispensed with. In social elections, a trend often continued in which trade unions prevailed. Limits of willingness to be represented by associations became apparent. b. The state-regulated system of collective bargaining agreements Collective bargaining agreements, i.e. agreements between employers and trade unions on working conditions and wages, did not gain widespread acceptance until after the First World War. However, Germany only began to live without state mediation after the beginning of the Federal Republic. The system of collective bargaining agreements, as developed by labor law jurisprudence, contains a tendency to place trade unions and employer associations in a quasi-public role. In this system, strikes are only permissible after the expiration of the respective—usually one-year—period of the collective bargaining agreement and in the following framework (1994): • Negotiation phase • In case of disagreement at the end of the “peace obligation“; in case of interest of both sides: arbitration phase • In case of disagreement: labor dispute phase (with ballot, strike, possible lockout) • New negotiation phase and, in case of no agreement, new or continued labor dispute.

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Strikes may only be directed against collective bargaining opponents. Sympathy and political strikes are not permissible. In regular collective bargaining strikes, trade unions are protected from damage claims, strikers from dismissal. Against targeted focus strikes, by which a trade union would become overpowering, employers may impose appropriate lockouts (1991). In general, however, trade unions seek out the most favorable point, in the case of the IG Metall the tariff areas of Baden-Württemberg or North Rhine-Westphalia, in order to achieve a breakthrough there, which can then be more easily transferred to other areas. The courts have ruled that only trade-eligible associations can be the organizers of regular strikes and parties to collective bargaining agreements. These associations must be “freely formed, non-partisan, independent, and organized on a cross-company basis“as well as eligible to strike, although they do not necessarily have to be ready to strike (BVerfG 1964). This privileges the organizational form of the sectoral union. Competition among unions appears to be “factually impossible“(Pauly 2005, p. 166). However: the right to form coalitions, as guaranteed in the Basic Law, also applies to professional unions (Art. 9 GG), and in recent years, even small professional unions like locomotive drivers and pilots have gone on strike. The existing model of the privileged sectoral union is thus challenged at its core, and the door is opened to competition among unions. The “Act on Promoting Collective Bargaining Unity“of the Grand Coalition of 2015 sought to stabilize the sectoral model in the event of competing unions in one workplace—by giving priority to the collective bargaining agreement of the union with the most members. This was accepted by the Federal Constitutional Court in 2017 with the proviso that the interests of the minority are “seriously and effectively“taken into account in the collective bargaining agreement and that the right to strike does not create a “liability risk for a union in the event of industrial action“(BVerfG 2017). These are vague safeguards which, in individual cases, have to be concretized by the labor courts. Among the collective bargaining agreements are those of companies and of sector-wide associations, in addition to long-term framework agreements on working conditions (working hours, vacation, benefits in kind). Some of the collective bargaining agreements are declared generally binding by a committee of representatives of unions and employer associations, appointed by the Federal Minister or the Federal Minister for Labor (or the state ministers). Such agreements are binding also for non-organized employees and employers, so that here the decisions of the parties to the agreement take on a public character. Overall, the collective bargaining system obliges the parties to the agreement, but also gives them a de facto monopoly on negotiation and strike action (subject to the restrictions of 2017), and thus stabilizes their organization and willingness

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to compromise (Streeck 1979, pp. 246 ff.)—to a much greater extent than in the USA, in Great Britain and in France, but less than in Scandinavia. Together with the financial strength of German unions, the existing system has contributed to a relatively low frequency of strikes in the Federal Republic. During the period 2007–16, only seven working days per 1,000 employees were lost due to strikes and lockouts in Germany. Fewer were lost, for example, in Japan and Slovakia (both 0), and in Switzerland (1), while more were lost in France (123), Denmark (118) and Canada (87). Countries with a similar number of strike days as Germany included the Netherlands and the USA (Lesch 2017). However, since 1998 there has been an erosion of nationwide collective bargaining agreements in Germany. Many companies feel overwhelmed financially by the collective bargaining agreements. In contrast, company agreements with their own workforce, which would also have to bear the consequences of a shrinking company, are gaining increasing support. As a result, a “flight from tariffs“by companies from employer associations has set in, particularly in the new federal states. In total, 43% of employees are covered by sectoral collective agreements—more in the public administration and social security sector, less in the information and communication sector (Institute for Employment Research 2021). This development is accompanied by an “OT membership“in employer associations, i.e. without collective agreement coverage, but with the otherwise usual service of the respective association. Almost 40% of member companies of the West German metalworking employer associations are such OT members, although with only 9.1% of the sector’s employees (as of 2008). This status is apparently particularly attractive for medium-sized companies (Silvia 2010, p. 177). Is the tariff coverage in Germany extremely low? This cannot be said in international comparison: In Anglo-Saxon and Eastern European EU countries it is significantly lower than in Germany, but in Western and Northern European countries it is significantly higher6. The changes in strike law and the shrinking of collective agreements point to profound change: more enforcement of conflict-prone special interests, weakening of the large sectoral unions. Corporatism seems to be slightly weakened. On the one hand, it includes the involvement of those affected or specifically interested, democratization, relief for political parties and governments—on the other hand, it carries the risk of mediatization and a restriction of individual freedom by the weight of autonomous, privileged and possibly overpowering interest organizations.

6 As

of 2009/10 (Greef 2014, p. 753).

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Germany is therefore less pluralistic than Great Britain, France, the USA or Ireland. It belongs to the North and Central European countries with stronger corporatist features, although to a lesser extent than in Austria or Sweden (Arend Lijphart after Reutter 2012, p. 33).

3.5 Citizen Initiatives and Movements: Supplement or Alternative? a. Citizen initiatives as local one-issue groups With the emergence of citizen initiatives from the end of the 1960s, the forms of interest representation in Germany were expanded. Citizen initiatives can be characterized ideally by: • their focus on a single issue, such as urban development, environmental protection, education (kindergartens, playgrounds, schools) or traffic; • representation of local interests outside the workplace; • a small, manageable number of participants in an informal organizational structure. The spread of such citizen initiatives seemed immense at the beginning of the 1970s, but all figures fluctuate greatly due to the rapid emergence and disappearance of such groups. Citizen initiatives promised—unlike established and hierarchical associations—to express the unadulterated, immediate will of the citizen. As a whole, citizen initiatives supplement interest groups, fulfilling local functions specifically related to municipal politics. Expectations from the left that citizen initiatives would become an anti-system organization through illegal methods (occupations, blockades, sabotage) and a criticism of capitalism focused on the “reproduction area“(Offe 1971), have not been fulfilled. Without being entirely unsuccessful, it seems that initiatives hardly manage to reach a “continuous, supra-regional, mass media public“. As a whole, thus, American forms of participation seem to have taken over in Germany, an expression of the fact that the increased ability to participate of the middle class can do without full-time professional association apparatuses—often with the result of increasing distance from politics (Marg 2017, p. 215 ff.). Since about 2006, some regional, long-term mass protests seem to be opening a new chapter in the development: not directed at “left“goals, no longer composed of young people, supported by broad support in their region. The impulse came from the energy transition (Hoeft et al. 2017)—resistance to wind turbines

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and overhead power lines, in addition to new railway and motorway routes in densely populated countries (Bräuer 2017, p. 24, 293, 301). They and some others have been summarized as activities “of older, well-educated, well-situated and successful citizens“with “unwillingness to put once-won privileges to the test“(Butzlaff 2016, p. 89). Three examples from recent history that have gained some prominence only partly confirm this picture: In Berlin, the protests against the construction of Berlin’s new airport that began in 2006 consisted of only 6% of people under 35, but of 70% of people over 45 years of age (Butzlaff 2016, p. 89). Remarkably, in 2017 the FDP initiated a referendum that (with high turnout) resulted in 56.1% in favor of the old Tegel airport, a slap in the face for the city leadership with Mayor Michael Müller (SPD). However, a district-based analysis leaves unclear to what extent one can speak of defended “privileges“when, for example, in the affluent Steglitz-Zehlendorf district 69.2% voted in favor of Tegel: Is proximity to an airport really an advantage if you live under its flight path? In Hamburg it was an initiative of parents, which in 2010 achieved a referendum against the introduction of a six-year primary school (instead of the four-year primary school). It remains open to what extent a movement emerged. Whether the preservation of the 9-year-old grammar school “secures privileges“or a tried and tested educational institution should at least be allowed as a question. The referendum rejected the primary school in 2010 with 56.2% (voter turnout 39.3%), although the proposal of the black-green senate was supported by all parliamentary parties. The political upheaval is unmistakable: On the day of the referendum, Mayor von Beust resigned, and in the 2011 parliamentary elections the CDU fell from 46.3 (2008) to 21.9%. The third example concerns the initiative “Deutsche Wohnen & Co. enteignen“. It has achieved a referendum in 2021 on the expropriation and nationalization of private companies with a total of 243,000 apartments in Berlin. The trigger was the discontent of the population about rising rents and the lack of renovations. On the day of the federal election, 59.1% voted in favor—only in Steglitz-Zehlendorf and Reinickendorf there was no majority. This has put the Berlin Senate, elected on the same day, under some pressure. First, he set up an expert commission to examine the legal and practical possibility of expropriations. b. Social Movements: Changing Form of Action? An alternative form of action are “social movements“- apparently new, actually as a term as well as a phenomenon known since the workers’ movement or the peasant movement before 1933. In public, the term experienced a renaissance in

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the sense of “new social movements“from the days of the 68er student movement (Roth and Rucht 1991). They … • “consist of a broader network of organizations and non-formal groups as well as a multitude of mobilized but not necessarily organized people.” • “are a relatively structured and permanent web of action […] structurally and symbolically stabilized by collective identity markers.” • “exercise […] criticism of society, politics and culture and are thus programmatically oriented towards social change.” • are characterized by “collective actions of public protest”, in which “a wide repertoire of action forms is used”, partly up to “demonstrative, confrontational and violent activities“(Lahusen 2013, pp. 717f.). With the emphasized self-designation as a “movement”, since 1968 in the Federal Republic of Germany, the opinion is often associated that movements offer themselves next to or instead of parties, associations, etc. as a better, more democratic form of political action. However, formal organizations often play a role in them—as in the peace movement the organizations represented in its “coordination committee” (Rudzio 1988, pp. 153 ff.). The internal structure of the movements is formed by concentric circles: a core of “elites or cadres,” consisting of representatives of key organizations and celebrities; further a circle of activists,” which work in a “web” of local groups and key organizations; finally an outer unlimitednumber of “supporters,” up to occasional participants or only feeling belonging (Rucht 1984). The communication of the core with the outer circle takes place via the media and in the action itself. An influence of the supporters on the course of the movement is only possible by staying away, no more inner democracy is apparent. The question of the social basis of the movements always led to the same layer in the past: a “participation elite” of younger people with higher education. Not only in the student movement, but also in the peace movement, the anti-nuclear power movement and the women’s movement, this group made up far more than half of the active participants (Küchler 1984, p. 335; Zwick 1990, p. 169). In addition, there were far-reaching agreements in the political orientation, as well as personnel overlaps (Zwick 1990, p. 175; Pappi 1990, p. 174). Trade unions, associations and churches served as organizers, since the student movement also initiatives, groups and “networks”. Blockades and occupations as well as violence decreased relatively; from the beginning of the 1980s, “a tendency towards more militant protest forms” (Neidhardt and Rucht 2001, p. 36, 46, 54 f.) could be observed.

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After a certain “lull in movement” (Raschke 1999, p. 64), social movements have been experiencing a renaissance in recent years—first perhaps represented by the protest against “Stuttgart 21”. It shows how monothematic, locally limited citizen initiatives can become social movements, in turn organized regionally in networks and aimed at a greater societal change. The subject was the reconstruction of the train station and railway facilities in the Stuttgart area. Since 2003, voices have been raised against the plans of Deutsche Bahn and the state, supported by all parties except the Greens and the Left (Bebnowski 2013, p. 135). What provoked active engagement were above all the rejection of a citizen referendum and then the demolition of a side wing of the train station. Demonstrations of up to 10–20,000 participants, accompanied by individual incidents and public media attention (including Facebook activities on both sides) were arenas of conflict that peaked and ended in 2010–11. Was it a rather conservative citizen protest, as the media claimed? Separate surveys of demonstrators by the Social Science Research Center Berlin (with 858 randomly distributed and answered questionnaires on October 18, 2010) and the Göttingen Institute for Democracy Research provide essentially identical answers: It was predominantly people of working age (“predominantly not young”), including 14% over-65-year-olds, a total of only 3.8% unemployed, and only 7.8% students and pupils. About half had a university degree (Göttingen Institute: “Protest of the Highly Educated”). The respondents rated themselves as 54.4% left / left-leaning, 36.5 in the middle, and only a small part as conservative. Also noteworthy was the loose alliance of ten supporting organizations, among which BUND, the customer association Pro Bahn and the Greens stand out. In 2010, when asked by the Göttingen Institute, 80.1% of demonstrators would have voted for the Greens. Even if the data may be distorted by the unusually high willingness to provide information of the highly educated and politically active, everything speaks for the conclusion: The Stuttgart movement turns out to be green and left-leaning, carried by an older and more bourgeois green-left potential. No less than 85% of those surveyed admitted to having participated in peace or environmental demonstrations in the past. Conflict resolution through mediation remained unsuccessful, the movement was limited to the Stuttgart area, so that in a statewide referendum 58.7% supported the financial involvement of the state (Bebnowski 2013, pp. 128–142; Baumgarten and Rucht 2013). But in the state elections in 2011, the Greens gained ground; in Stuttgart they achieved more than double the number of votes, namely 34.5%, now the strongest party there. The decadeslong CDU dominance in Baden-Württemberg came to an end (Brettschneider and Schwarz 2013, pp. 263, 295).

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The outrage over “religious wars on our streets” (between Muslim refugees and immigrants) was the starting point for the Dresden protest movement Pegida7 from the beginning had a nationwide issue that gave it attention beyond the region and initially “great sympathy” (Hans Vorländer et al.) in the population. In some other large cities, too, Pegida offshoots emerged, but they were smaller and more radical, so that one can still speak of a regional protest movement. Its starting point was a Facebook group from Dresden and its surroundings, its initiator the advertising entrepreneur Lutz Bachmann (previously convicted of breakins). The Pegida organizational team consisted of twelve people, including nine small business owners from the service sector and one each previously active in AfD, CDU and FDP. Pegida appeared on the Internet, but above all through rapidly swelling “Monday demonstrations” in Dresden, starting with 350 demonstrators on 20 October 2014, after four weeks already with 3200, finally peaks on 15 December with 15,000 and on 12 January 2015 with 25,000 participants (against 9000 counter-demonstrators). The movement culminated in January/February 2015 when its regular rhythm was interrupted by a police ban on demonstrations due to a “planned attack” and the Pegida organizational group broke up. After that, the demonstrations (exception: the Dutch politician Wilders attracted 10,000 participants), only 2–3000 demonstrators, to finally dwindle. What did Pegida want? Statements by individual speakers or demonstrators are not enough for this, as there were different guest speakers. A better starting point are the published orientation papers of the Pegida organizational committee. It was about • a different immigration policy after the “Swiss or Canadian model”, for deportations of asylum seekers not recognized and the “obligation to integrate” (against Islamization); • citizen decisions and a rejection of job cuts at the police; • a normalization of relations with Russia; • an EU as a community of “strong sovereign nation-states in free political and economic self-determination” as well as a rejection of the TTIP trade agreement. Approaches from the NPD side met with “little interest” from Pegida, the relationship with the AfD remained despite “overlaps in content” (as Frauke Petry

7 Abbreviation

for “Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident”.

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at the time) burdened by personal antipathies. This did not stop well-known AfD politicians (such as Andreas Kalbitz and Björn Höcke) from giving speeches at Pegida; not to mention personnel overlaps. To this day (2021), Pegida, classified as right-wing extremist by the Saxon Constitutional Protection Agency, is not on the AfD’s incompatibility list. Where did the Pegida demonstrators stand? For this there are separate investigations by Dieter Rucht, Franz Walter, Werner Patzelt and Hans Vorländer with employees, partly with surveys of several demonstrations, but each with low numbers of respondents. With handbills that invited to online surveys, the Walter team reached a total of 727 respondents, the highest number. Questions and results differ, but provide a plausible overall picture in general (Vorländer et al. 2016, S. 5–10, 16,18, 34 ff., 41 ff., 54 ff.; Geiges et al. 2015, pp. 11–16). Walter sees an average age of 44 years, socially a solid middle with a secondary school leaving certificate at a considerable proportion of university and college graduates, the majority employed as employees, with children and satisfied with their personal situation. Politically, 78% of the demonstrators surveyed declared themselves to be very / rather satisfied with democracy, but only 5% with its practice in Germany. Above all, they stood up for more law and order, national interests, non-violence and referendums. In the 2013 federal election, 47.3% voted for the AfD, 24.8 for the CDU, 8.6 for the Left Party and 6% for the SPD (Geiges et al. 2015, pp. 63 ff.). Patzelt (similar to Rucht) located themselves as left / rather left 7.9%, middle 65.2, rather right 22.5 and very right 4.4%. This meant that they were not clearly to the right of the Germans as a whole (2014: 61.1% middle, 15.5 rather and 1.9% very right) (Patzelt 2018, S. 116). Even some who only see “a combination of nationalist and xenophobic attitudes” in Pegida participants see “hardly” any difference to the population as a whole (Herold and Schäller 2016, pp. 266 ff.). Very soon, the relationship between Pegida on the one hand and journalists and established politicians on the other hand developed into mutual contempt. Against this background, the Pegida demonstrators, asked about their central motivation, mentioned above all asylum policy and the distance between the people and the politicians, followed by media coverage and the political system of the Federal Republic, only then the Islam. All in all: Pegida was “not a unified movement”, at its peak rather to be described as a “right-wing populist protest movement” (Vorländer et al. 2016, pp. 18 ff., 34 ff., 65, 67, 139, 145). The new party on the right wing also followed the federal election in 2017 with the collapse of the CDU in Saxony and the rise of the AfD to the party with the most votes in the state.

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Protests in the course of the so-called “refugee crisis”, which peaked in 2015 and 2016, were probably of higher intensity but shorter half-life. The demonstrations took place in many places—mostly where the political will to accommodate refugees met resistance in the population. The discontent was directed against local politicians, against the (politics of the) federal government, against planned refugee accommodation and the refugees themselves. Nationwide attention was attracted, inter alia, by the riots in Freital, Heidenau and Dresden as well as the protests in Clausnitz—all of them places in Saxony (Kleffner and Meisner 2017). That in the course of this the number of anti-refugee violence increased, underlines two things: that social movements are not necessarily non-violent; and that the protests were stoked and instrumentalized in parts by the extreme right scene (Mannewitz 2020). However: After a decline in the number of refugees, protest and violent events also decreased. The event, described by the former AfD chairman Alexander Gauland as “a gift from heaven” for his party, was a political earthquake that brought new supporters to the new party on the right. This is less the case for the climate protests of 2018 and beyond, which were largely carried by the youth grassroots movement Fridays for Future (FFF). The social movement of pupils and students, initiated by the Swedish pupil Greta Thunberg and with branches in many countries, demanded measures to comply with the 1.5-degree target on their demonstrations, which always took place on Fridays. The person of Thunberg, the left-liberal-green motif of the movement and finally the “skipping school” or the “school strike” (depending on the interpretation) contributed to the polarization from the beginning. The protests, 59% female, 50% of school age and 52% younger than 20 years, are a child of the upper middle class, in addition according to the self-conception further left than the total population (but further right than, for example, the G20 protests) and with pronounced sympathies for the Greens (35.9%) or the party Die Linke (12%) (Sommer et al. 2019). The FFF protests had hardly reached their peak when the Covid-19 pandemic brought them to a sudden end. The necessary contact restrictions made large demonstrations a danger of infection. Nevertheless, they also fueled the so-called “anti-corona protests”, which, from around March 2020, were directed against the restriction of individual freedom rights by the state’s Corona protection measures. In several large cities, a highly heterogeneous protest scene emerged, of which the group “Querdenken” founded in Stuttgart under Andreas Ballweg became the leading group. In terms of content, this amalgamated highly different things: moderate demands for a loosening of the measures, vaccination opponents, fundamental criticism of the political system (“corona dictatorship”), but also antiSemitic conspiracy theories and false information about the virus circulated here

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(Kleffner and Meisner 2021). Its highlights included the movement’s demonstrations in Berlin (1 and 29 August 2020 with 30,000 and 38,000 participants according to police figures), which were also advertised by right-wing extremists (such as the III. Way and parts of the AfD) as well as in Leipzig on 7 November 2020 (with 20,000 participants according to the police) and the disturbance on and in the Bundestag on 18 November 2020. Who demonstrated? The protest scene was more diverse than on previous occasions. “Reichs- and Rainbow Flags” (Speit 2021) were sometimes waved at the same event. The Berlin administration saw “ideological points of contact for right-wing extremists, in particular for right-wing extremist Reich citizens”, not least because “isolated right-wing extremists, NPD members, conspiracy theorists, vaccination opponents and esoterics” were present (Peter 2020). The connections of the leadership of “Querdenken” to Reich citizens and right-wing extremists prompted the Office for the Protection of the Constitution to observe them. According to a first survey (Nachtwey et al. 2020), the average age of the general participants in the “anti-corona protests” was 47 years, 34% had a university degree, there were more self-employed people than in the total population, the majority felt belonging to the middle class. Particularly conspicuous: In terms of party preference, the “Others” (i.e. those who would receive less than 5% of the vote in an election) came to 61%, followed by the AfD with 27%. Widely spread were—not only Corona related—conspiracy theories and anthroposophical thoughts; less widely spread, however, xenophobia, authoritarianism, NS relativization. Comparatively speaking, it can be determined: first, unlike in Stuttgart, the focus in Dresden was not on a local event, but on questions of national importance. This also applies to the anti-asylum, climate and Querdenken movements. Secondly, there were no umbrella organizations in Pegida, in contrast to Stuttgart, while the other two cases are probably in between (FFF and Querdenken were only founded while right-wing extremists tried to hijack the refugee protests). Thirdly, the positive aspects include the legally compliant behavior of the movements and the peace-building effect of citizen decisions or referendums—at least in Stuttgart. In the other movements, violations of law, partly also violence, played not only a minor role. Finally, the Stuttgart movement and the climate protests can be classified as “left”, Pegida and the anti-asylum protests as “right”, partly also as right-wing extremist (at the end of Pegida, structurally a minority in the anti-asylum protests). Although open to the right (and in the leadership with contacts to right-wing extremists), the Querdenken movement as a whole does not fit into a clear category. What remained is a fundamental division and mis-

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trust of politics among parts of society: “The days when top politicians could just show up on a market square during an election campaign and start talking are over. Nobody appears without bodyguards anymore.” (Lau 2022).

References von Alemann, Ulrich (1987): Organisierte Interessen in der Bundesrepublik, Opladen. Baumgarten, Britta/Rucht, Dieter (2013): Die Protestierenden gegen „Stuttgart 21“– einzigartig oder typisch? (basierend auf einer Studie des Wissenschaftszentrums Berlin für Sozialforschung), in: Brettschneider, Frank/Schuster, Wolfgang (Eds.): Stuttgart 21, Wiesbaden, pp. 97 ff. Bebnowski, David (2013): Der trügerische Glanz des Neuen (fußend auf empirischen Studien 2010/11 des Göttinger Instituts für Demokratieforschung), in: Brettschneider, Frank/Schuster, Wolfgang (Eds.): Stuttgart 21, Wiesbaden, pp. 127 ff. Behrens, Martin (2010): Strukturen der Interessenvertretung in den Verbänden der Wirtschaft, in: Schroeder, Wolfgang/Weßels, Bernhard (Eds.): Handbuch Arbeitgeberund Wirtschaftsverbände in Deutschland, Wiesbaden, pp. 148 ff. Benzner, Bodo (1989): Ministerialbürokratie und Interessengruppen, Baden-Baden. Berger, Ulrike (2004): Organisierte Interessen im Gespräch, Frankfurt a. M. Bethusy-Huc, Viola Gräfin (1990): Verbände, in: Gerlach, Irene/Robert, Rüdiger (Eds.): Innenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Münster, pp. 141 ff. von Beyme, Klaus (1974): Interessengruppen in der Demokratie, 4th edn., München. Biegler, Dagmar (2000): Kontinuität und Wandel in der Landschaft der Frauenverbände und Faktoren ihrer politischen Schwäche, in: Willems, Ulrich/von Winter, Thomas (Eds.): Politische Repräsentation schwacher Interessen, Opladen, pp. 221 ff. Bräuer, Marco (2017): Energiewende und Bürgerproteste: eine Untersuchung der Kommunikation von Bürgerinitiativen im Themenfeld Netzausbau, Ilmenau. Brettschneider, Frank/Schwarz, Thomas (2013): „Stuttgart 21”, die baden-württembergische Landtagswahl und die Volksabstimmung 2011, in: Brettschneider, Frank/Schuster, Wolfgang (Eds.): Stuttgart 21, Wiesbaden, pp. 261 ff. Brodach, Georg/Frhr. von Wolff-Metternich, Hermann (1987): Der Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, Düsseldorf. Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat (2020): Neunzehnter Bericht über den Einsatz externer Personen in der Bundesverwaltung, Berlin. Butzlaff, Felix (2016): Die neuen Bürgerproteste in Deutschland. Organisatoren – Erwartungen – Demokratiebilder, Bielefeld. BVerfG (1964): Urteil vom 6. Mai 1964, 1 BvR 79/62. BVerfG (1991): Beschluss vom 26. Juni 1991, 1 BvR 779/85. BVerfG (2017): Urteil vom 11. Juli 2017, 1 BvR 1571/15, 1 BvR 1477/16, 1 BvR 1043/16, 1 BvR 2883/15, 1 BvR 1588/15. Czada, Roland (1994): Konjunkturen des Korporatismus, in: Streeck, Wolfgang (Ed.): Staat und Verbände, Opladen, pp. 37 ff. Dausend, Peter/Knaup, Horand (2020): „Alleiner kannst Du gar nicht sein”. Unsere Volksvertreter zwischen Machst, Sucht und Angst, München.

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van Deth, Jan W. (2004): Soziale Partizipation, in: ders. (Eds.), Deutschland in Europa. Ergebnisse des European Social Survey 2002–2003, Wiesbaden, pp. 295 ff. Demir, Nur et al. (2019): Trendreport Betriebsratswahlen 2018. Entwicklungstrends der betrieblichen Mitbestimmung, Marburg. Deutsche Bischofskonferenz (2021): Katholische Kirche in Deutschland. Zahlen und Fakten 2020/21, Bonn. DGB (2019): Datenanalyse: Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft im Deutschen Bundestag, in: Einblick 4/2019, pp. 6. Dribbusch, Heiner/Birke, Heiner (2016): Trade Unions in Germany, in: Artus, Ingrid et al. (Eds.): Developments in German Industrial Relations, Cambridge 2016, pp. 93 ff. Deutscher Bundestag (2021): Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages, Berlin, unter: https://www.bundestag.de/datenhandbuch (zuletzt geprüft am 28. Februar 2022). Ebbinghaus, Bernhard/Göbel, Claudia (2013): Mitgliederrückgang und Organisationsstrategien deutscher Gewerkschaften, in: Schroeder, Wolfgang (Ed.): Handbuch Gewerkschaften in Deutschland, 2nd edn., Wiesbaden, pp. 207 ff. Ellgut, Peter (2019): Ist die Erosion der betrieblichen Mitbestimmung gestoppt?, unter: https://www.iab-forum.de/ist-die-erosion-der-betrieblichen-mitbestimmung-gestoppt/ (zuletzt geprüft am 25. Oktober 2021). Ellwein, Thomas (1974): Die großen Interessenverbände und ihr Einfluß, in: Löwenthal, Richard/Schwarz, Hans-Peter (Eds.): Die zweite Republik, Stuttgart, pp. 470 ff. Fraenkel, Ernst (1964): Deutschland und die westlichen Demokratien, Stuttgart. Geiges, Lars/Marg, Stine/Walter, Franz (2015): Pegida. Die schmutzige Seite der Zivilgesellschaft? Bielefeld. Gerstenhauer, Daniel (2014): Parlamentarier und Interessenverbände – Lobbying im Bundestag?, in: von Winter, Thomas/von Blumenthal, Julia (Eds.): Interessengruppen und Parlamente, Wiesbaden, pp. 71 ff. Göhner, Reinhard (1981): Demokratie in Verbänden, München. Greef, Samuel (2014): Gewerkschaften im Spiegel von Zahlen, Daten und Fakten, in: Schroeder, Wolfgang (Ed.): Handbuch Gewerkschaften in Deutschland, 2nd edn., Wiesbaden, pp. 659 ff. Groser, Manfred (1992): Verbände im vereinigten Deutschland, in: Sonde 25 (1), pp. 15 ff. Guggenberger, Bernd (2020): Bürgerinitiativen, in: Andersen, Uwe et al. (Eds.): Handwörterbuch des politischen Systems der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 8th edn., Heidelberg, pp. 149 ff. Herold, Maik/Schäller, Steven (2016): Der neue Rechtspopulismus auf der Straße, in: Korte, Karl-Rudolf (Ed.): Politik in unsicheren Zeiten, Baden-Baden, pp. 261 ff. Hirner, Manfred (1993): Der Deutsche Bundestag im Netzwerk organisierter Interessen, in: Herzog, Dietrich et al. (Eds.): Parlament und Gesellschaft, Opladen, pp. 138 ff. Hoeft, Christoph et al. (Eds.) (2017): Bürgerproteste in Zeiten der Energiewende, Bielefeld. Hönigsberger, Herbert/Osterberg, Sven (2014): Gewerkschafter im Bundestag, in: von Winter, Thomas/von Blumenthal, Julia (Eds.): Interessengruppen und Parlamente, Wiesbaden, pp. 93 ff. Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (2021): Tarifbindung nimmt in Deutschland weiter ab, unter: https://www.iab.de/de/informationsservice/presse/presseinformationen/ tarifbindungabnahme.aspx (zuletzt geprüft am 25. Oktober 2021).

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Institut für Mitbestimmung und Unternehmensführung (2020): Mitbestimmte Unternehmen in Deutschland, unter: https://www.imu-boeckler.de/de/mitbestimmte-unternehmen-indeutschland-19328.htm (zuletzt geprüft am 25. Oktober 2021). Jeske, Ann-Kathrin (2021): Ausgaben für externe Berater drastisch gestiegen, unter: https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/bundesregierung-ausgaben-fuer-externe-berater-drastisch.1766.de.html?dram:article_id=493990 (zuletzt geprüft am 25. Oktober 2021). Kädtler, Jürgen (2006): Sozialpartnerschaft im Umbruch. Industrielle Beziehungen unter den Bedingungen von Globalisierung und Finanzmarktkapitalismus, Hamburg. Keller, Berndt (2004): Multibranchengewerkschaft als Erfolgsmodell, Hamburg. Kleffner, Heike/Meisner, Matthias (Eds.) (2017): Unter Sachsen. Zwischen Wut und Willkommen, Berlin. Kleffner, Heike/Meisner, Matthias (Eds.) (2021): Fehlender Mindestabstand. Die Coronakrise und die Netzwerke der Demokratiefeinde, Freiburg. Küchler, Manfred (1984): Die Friedensbewegung in der BRD, in: Falter, Jürgen W. et al. (Eds.): Politische Willensbildung und Interessenvermittlung, Opladen, pp. 328 ff. Lahusen, Christian (2013): Soziale Bewegungen, in: Mau, Steffen/Schöneck, Nadine (Eds.), Handwörterbuch zu Gesellschaft Deutschlands, 3rd edn., Wiesbaden, pp. 717 ff. Lau, Mariam (2022): Die Alleshasser, in: Die Zeit Nr. 20 vom 12. Mai. Lesch, Hagen (2017): Internationaler Arbeitskampfvergleich, IW-Kurzberichte 71. 2017, Köln. Lijphart, Arend/Crepaz, Markus M. (1991): Corporatism and Consensus Democracy in Eighteen Countries, in: British Journal of Political Science 21 (2), pp. 235 ff. Lösche, Peter (2007): Verbände und Lobbyismus in Deutschland, Stuttgart. Mann, Siegfried (1994): Macht und Ohnmacht der Verbände, Baden-Baden. Mannewitz, Tom (2020): Anti-Asyl-Proteste während der „Flüchtlingskrise“ 2015/16. Sachsen im interregionalen Vergleich, in: Backes, Uwe/Kailitz, Steffen (Eds.): Sachsen – Eine Hochburg des Rechtsextremismus? Göttingen, pp. 255 ff. Marg, Stine (2017): „Ich kann einfach nicht mehr vertrauen”, in: Hoeft, Christoph et al. (Eds.): Bürgerproteste in Zeiten der Energiewende, Bielefeld, pp. 207 ff. Merkel, Wolfgang/Petring, Alexander (2012): Politische Partizipation und demokratische Inklusion, in: Mörschel, Tobias/Krell, Christian (Eds.): Demokratie in Deutschland. Zustand – Herausforderungen – Perspektiven, Wiesbaden, pp. 93 ff. Müller, Hans-Peter/Wilke, Manfred (2003): Gewerkschaftsfusionen, in: Schroeder, Wolfgang/Weßels Bernhard (Eds.): Die Gewerkschaften in Politik und Gesellschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Wiesbaden, pp. 102 ff. Nachtwey, Oliver et al. (2020): Politische Soziologie der Corona-Proteste. Grundauswertung, Basel, unter: https://edoc.unibas.ch/80835/1/20210118133822_6005813e51e0a. pdf (zuletzt geprüft am 26. Oktober 2021). Neidhardt, Friedhelm/Rucht, Dieter (2001): Protestgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1950–1994, in: Rucht, Dieter (Ed.): Protest in der Bundesrepublik, Frankfurt a. M., pp. 27 ff. Neumann, Sigmund (1973 [urspr. 1932]): Die Parteien der Weimarer Republik, 3rd edn., Stuttgart. Niemann, Eckehard (2003): Das Interessengeflecht des Agrobusiness, in: Leif, Thomas/ Speth, Rudolf (Eds.): Die stille Macht. Lobbyismus in Deutschland, Wiesbaden, pp. 186 ff.

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Oehmer, Franziska (2014): Ausmaß und Muster der inneren Lobby. Eine Analyse der Interessenbindungen zwischen Verbänden und Abgeordneten der 17. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestages, in: von Winter, Thomas/von Blumenthal, Julia (Eds.): Interessengruppen und Parlamente, Wiesbaden, pp. 47 ff. Offe, Claus (1969): Politische Herrschaft und Klassenstrukturen, in: Kress, Gisela/Senghaas, Dieter (Eds.): Politikwissenschaft, Frankfurt a. M., pp. 155 ff. Claus Offe (1971): Bürgerinitiativen und Reproduktion der Arbeitskraft im Spätkapitalismus, in: Grossmann, Heinz (Ed.): Bürgerinitiativen – Schritte zur Veränderung? Frankfurt a. M., pp. 152 ff. Pappi, Franz Urban (1990): Neue soziale Bewegungen und Wahlverhalten in der Bundesrepublik, in: Kaase, Max/Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (Eds.): Wahlen und Wähler. Analysen aus Anlaß der Bundestagswahl 1990, Opladen, pp. 143 ff. Patzelt, Werner J. (2014): Interessengruppen und Parlamente, in: von Winter, Thomas/von Blumenthal, Julia (Eds.): Interessengruppen und Parlamente, Wiesbaden, pp. 15 ff. Patzelt, Werner J. (2018): Pegida-Demonstrationen und Deutschlands Demokratie, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 48 (1), pp. 111 ff. Peter, Erik (2020): Alu mit Bürgerrechtsfassade. Köpfe der Corona-Relativierer, unter: https://taz.de/Koepfe-der-Corona-Relativierer/!5681132/ (zuletzt geprüft am 26. Oktober 2021). Prott, Jürgen (2013): Funktionäre in den Gewerkschaften, in: Schroeder, Wolfgang (Ed.): Handbuch Gewerkschaften in Deutschland, 2nd edn., Wiesbaden, pp. 283 ff. Pauly, Uwe (2005): Der Flächentarifvertrag als Kartellierungsinstrument, Frankfurt a. M. Raschke, Joachim (1999): Machtwechsel und soziale Bewegungen, in: Klein, Ansgar et al. (Eds.): Neue soziale Bewegungen, Opladen, pp. 64 ff. Reutter, Werner (2012): Einleitung, in: ders. (Eds.): Verbände und Interessengruppen in den Ländern der Europäischen Union, 2nd edn., Wiesbaden, pp. 11 ff. Reyher, Martin (2019): Das sind die Nebeneinkünfte der Bundestagsabgeordneten, unter: https://www.abgeordnetenwatch.de/blog/nebentaetigkeiten/das-sind-die-nebeneinkuenfte-der-bundestagsabgeordneten-1 (zuletzt geprüft am 18. Oktober 2021). Rieger, Elmar (2007): Bauernverbände, in: von Winter, Thomas/Willems, Ulrich (Eds.): Interessenverbände in Deutschland, Wiesbaden, pp. 294 ff. Roth, Roland/Rucht, Dieter (Eds.) (1991): Neue soziale Bewegungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2nd edn., Bonn. Rucht, Dieter (1984): Zur Organisation der neuen sozialen Bewegungen, in: Falter, Jürgen W. et al. (Eds.): Politische Willensbildung und Interessenvermittlung, Opladen, pp. 609 ff. Rudzio, Wolfgang (1982): Die organisierte Demokratie, 2nd edn., Stuttgart. Rudzio, Wolfgang (1988): Die Erosion der Abgrenzung. Zum Verhältnis zwischen der demokratischen Linken und Kommunisten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Opladen. Schäfer, Armin (2015): Der Verlust politischer Gleichheit. Warum die sinkende Wahlbeteiligung der Demokratie schadet, Frankfurt a. M. Schmid, Josef (2020): Wohlfahrtsverbände, in: Andersen, Uwe et al. (Eds.): Handwörterbuch des politischen Systems der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 8., aktual. edn., Heidelberg, pp. 1025 ff. Schroeder, Wolfgang et al. (2010): Seniorenpolitik im Wandel, Frankfurt a. M.

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Schroeder, Wolfgang/Munimus, Bettina (2012): Alternde Mitgliedschaften als Herausforderung und Auftrag für Gewerkschaften, in: Kohler, Harald/Schmid, Josef (Eds.): Der demografische Wandel als europäische Herausforderung, Baden-Baden, pp. 115 ff. Schütt-Wetschky, Eberhard (1997): Interessenverbände und Staat, Darmstadt. Sebaldt, Martin (1996): Interessengruppen und ihre bundespolitische Präsenz in Deutschland. Verbandsarbeit vor Ort, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 27 (4), pp. 658 ff. Sebaldt, Martin/Straßner, Alexander (2004): Verbände in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Wiesbaden. Silvia, Stephen J. (2010): Mitgliederentwicklung und Organisationsstärke der Arbeitgeber-, Wirtschaftsverbände und Industrie- und Handelskammern, in: Schroeder, Wolfgang/Weßels, Bernhard (Eds.): Handbuch Arbeitgeber- und Wirtschaftsverbände in Deutschland, Wiesbaden, pp. 169 ff. Sommer, Moritz et al. (2019): Fridays for Future. Profil, Entstehung und Perspektiven der Protestbewegung in Deutschland, ipb working paper 2/2019, Berlin. Speit, Andreas (2021): Reichs- und Regenbogenfahnen, in: Kleffner, Heike/Meisner, Matthias (Eds.) (2021): Fehlender Mindestabstand. Die Coronakrise und die Netzwerke der Demokratiefeinde, Freiburg, pp. 192 ff. Speth, Rudolf (2021): Ziele und Notwendigkeit von Public Affairs aus Sicht von Interessengruppen, in: Röttger, Ulrike et al. (Eds.): Handbuch Public Affairs. Politische Kommunikation für Unternehmen und Organisationen, Wiesbaden, i.E. Speth, Rudolf/Zimmer, Annette (2015): Von der Hierarchie zum Markt, in: dies. (Eds.): Lobby Work, Wiesbaden, pp. 31 ff. Strässer, Christoph/Meerkamp, Frank (2015): Lobbying im parlamentarischen Bereich – Politiker im Lobbyfokus, in: Speth, Rudolf/Zimmer, Annette (Eds.): Lobby Work, Wiesbaden, pp. 217 ff. Streeck, Wolfgang (1972): Das Dilemma der Organisation, in: Meißner, Werner/Unterseher, Lutz (Eds.): Verteilungskampf und Stabilitätspolitik, Stuttgart, pp. 130 ff. Wolfgang Streeck (1979): Gewerkschaftsorganisation und industrielle Beziehungen, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 20, pp. 241 ff. Streeck, Wolfgang (2000): Von Nutzen und Nutzung des Korporatismus in einer Gesellschaft im Wandel, in: Bührer, Werner/Grande, Edgar (Eds.): Unternehmerverbände und Staat in Deutschland, Baden-Baden, pp. 53 ff. Streeck, Wolfgang (2013): Gekaufte Zeit. Die vertagte Krise des demokratischen Kapitalismus, Berlin. Strünck, Christoph (2000): Das Honorar der Advokaten, in: Willems, Ulrich/von Winter, Thomas (Eds.): Politische Repräsentation schwacher Interessen, Opladen, pp. 185 ff. Thieme, Daniel/Liedhegener, Antonius (2015): „Linksaußen”, politische Mitte oder doch ganz anders? Die Positionierung der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland (EKD) im parteipolitischen Spektrum der postsäkularen Gesellschaft, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 56 (2), pp. 240 ff. Tillack, Hans-Martin (2015): Die Lobby-Republik. Wer in Deutschland die Strippen zieht, Bonn. Triesch, Günter/Ockenfels, Wolfgang (1995): Interessenverbände in Deutschland, München. Varain, Heinz Josef (Eds.) (1973): Interessenverbände in Deutschland, Köln.

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Vorländer, Hans/Herold, Maik/Schäller, Steven (2016): PEGIDA. Entwicklung, Zusammensetzung und Deutung einer Empörungsbewegung, Wiesbaden. Wambach, Max (1971): Verbändestaat und Parteienoligopol, Stuttgart. Weber, Jürgen (1977): Die Interessengruppen im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Stuttgart. Weber, Werner (1968): Die Sozialpartner in der Verfassungsordnung, in: Forsthoff, Ernst (Ed.): Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Sozialstaatlichkeit, Darmstadt, pp. 526 ff. Wilke, Manfred (1994): Tarifpolitik und Wirtschaftsverbände, in: Rüther, Günther (Ed.): Politik und Gesellschaft in Deutschland, Köln, pp. 206 ff. Willems, Ulrich (2000): Probleme, Bedingungen und Strategien der Organisation moralischer Forderungen, in: ders./von Winter, Thomas (Eds.): Politische Repräsentation schwacher Interessen, Opladen, pp. 61 ff. Winter, Sabrina (2019): Neue Hausausweisliste: Diese Lobbyisten können jederzeit in den Bundestag, unter: https://www.abgeordnetenwatch.de/recherchen/lobbyismus/neuehausausweisliste-diese-lobbyisten-koennen-jederzeit-in-den-bundestag (zuletzt geprüft am 24. März 2022). von Winter, Thomas (1997): Sozialpolitische Interessen. Konstituierung, politische Repräsentation und Beteiligung an Entscheidungsprozessen, Baden-Baden. Witjes, Cl. Winfried (1976): Gewerkschaftliche Führungsgruppen, Berlin. World Values Survey (2020): World Values Survey Wave 7: 2017–2020, Madrid und Wien. Zimmer, Annette (2007): Vereine – Zivilgesellschaft konkret, 2nd edn., Wiesbaden. Zwick, Michael (1990): Neue soziale Bewegungen als politische Subkultur, Frankfurt a. M.

4

Multi-Party System with Limited Coalition Options

4.1 Germany—a Party State? a. The scope and limits of the parties A party (lat. pars = part) is, according to Max Weber, a group based on voluntary membership that seeks power within a larger association in order to “provide its leaders within the association with power and its active participants with opportunities (for the implementation of substantive goals or the acquisition of personal advantages or both)” (Weber 1956, p. 167). Its tasks include representing the conflict lines present in society, steering politics through state formation and decision-making, legitimizing the democratic principle of participation, and recruiting or socializing political elites (Decker 2018a, p. 37). Democracy can then, according to Schumpeter’s “realistic” theory, be defined as follows: “The reins of government are to be handed over to those who have more support than the other competing individuals or teams” (Schumpeter 1950, p. 433). These “teams” are the parties competing in elections. Even those who feel that parties are a “political evil” (Henry Bolingbroke quoted in Sartori 1976, p. 6) will hardly be able to deny their structuring function in modern mass democracies. How else could the immense variety of opinions and interests be condensed into a limited number of voting-eligible positions? How else could an election be possible as a political decision on direction? Given the importance of parties, efforts have been made in the Federal Republic of Germany to draw legal (Basic Law, Party Law) and democratic consequences from this. The Party Law of 1967 assigns the following tasks to the parties:

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Mannewitz and W. Rudzio, The Political System of Germany, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41371-2_4

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• to participate in elections by nominating candidates (recruitment of political personnel); • to develop goals in the form of programs (policy formulation); • to influence public opinion and the formation of citizen’s will (opinion formation); • to exert influence on politics in parliament and government (influence). The minimum function on which the legal recognition as a party depends is participation in elections1. However, there are differences of opinion about what “influence” means and how far the power of parties should extend. On the one hand, political scientists such as Wilhelm Hennis and Dolf Sternberger operate on a strictly representative understanding of democracy. According to them, elections are an “act of trust” in people who then exercise power for a limited time (Sternberger 1962, p. 185)2. According to this view, parties are merely “organizations for procuring government personnel” and for organizing elections (Sternberger 1970). The “party state theory” developed by the constitutional lawyer and constitutional judge Leibholz is quite different: it sees in elections content-related directional decisions and in the parties the actual “political units of action” with the result that only “bound party representatives” meet in parliament (Leibholz 1958, pp. 20, 76, 90 ff., 104). Although the party state theory can be countered in many ways, Leibholz has nevertheless decisively influenced the discussion with the construction of two alternative ideal types and given it orientation points. However, the “party state” positively connoted by him has been pejoratively coloured in recent times, especially when critics associate it with an exaggerated influence of the parties, a party-political penetration of the public service (“The state as prey”) and a burgeoning party financing by the state (“self-service”) (von Arnim 1993, 2017). Is the Federal Republic a party state? Answering this question also outlines the role of parties in Germany. In detail: 1. Incorporation into the constitution: Parties have long since become “integral parts of the constitutional structure and of the constitutionally ordered political life” (BVerfG 1952a). Article 21 of the Basic Law does indeed include the parties in the constitution, but does not make them state organs in the proper

1 “An

association loses its status as a party if it has not participated in a federal or state election with its own proposals for six years.” Party Law of 28. 1. 1994, in: BGBl. I—1994, p. 142 ff. 2 Similarly Hennis (1968, p. 52).

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sense. The intention of the Basic Law is to prevent party prudery, to safeguard the democratic character of the parties, not to establish a party state. 2. Election of parties:In the Federal Republic, parties are primarily elected, sometimes a well-known top politician, but hardly the individual members of parliament as such. This is evident in the small differences between first and second votes (personal and list votes) in federal elections, which must also be predominantly interpreted as expressions of coalition preferences. This corresponds to the German proportional representation system and the low level of knowledge of voters about local candidates. The party election is a political directional decision, but also has aspects of trust. In fact, key decisions in the history of the Federal Republic—the turn to the social market economy in 1948, the decisions on rearmament in 1952, the Ostpolitik from 1970 to 1972, the “turnaround” of 1982, German reunification in 1989/90, not least the handling of numerous recent crises (Corona, energy crisis)—have been made by parliamentary majorities without having previously been the subject of an election campaign. Only afterwards, at the next federal election, did the people then give their quasi-plebiscitary approval. 3. Parties as units of action: Although political will formation usually takes place along party lines, the parties only influence the formation of public opinion as one, albeit central, factor alongside others. The media, interest groups, political movements, etc. also play a role. 4. Binding to party decisions: Art. 21 GG, according to which the parties participate in the formation of political will, stands in a “tension” (BVerfG 1952b) to Art. 38 GG, according to which the deputies are “not bound by orders and instructions” (free mandate). Accordingly, on the one hand, In case of a party ban the loss of mandate lies in the line of thinking of the party state. On the other hand, radical consequences of the party state such as the recall or liability of dissenting mandate holders are averted by the free mandate. Even the factual binding of party decisions, often supposed or accepted, remains of limited relevance. Imperative bindings occur, rather with parties of the left, where members or delegates’ assemblies claimed the right to binding decision. But at the same time, the Green parliamentary group defied party conference decisions in 1996 with respect to the Bosnia intervention. Contrary to the SPD decision-making situation, Chancellor Schröder initiated the course change to the “Agenda 2010” in 2002/03 (Holtmann 2017, pp. 233 ff.). In general, the fact that a party will can only be articulated for a limited number of problems due to limited capacity of party bodies and therefore, in particular, complex legislative matters can escape their reach, sets a limit to all dreams of steering by party bodies (Rudzio 1976, p. 123). Parties are considered to be “deficient” because of

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“insufficient processing of problems and operational capacity” (Wiesendahl 1980, p. 23). 5. Recruitment of political personnel: Unlike in countries like the USA, careers in Germany are usually pursued within party ranks, the so-called “bullock tour”, before political mandates and offices are achieved. The parties are the sole channel of ascent for political personnel. As a result, when they took office, only three of the 141 federal ministers between 1949 and 1992 were not affiliated with a party, half of the members of the federal executive board were members of their party (Helms 1993, p. 640). 6. Penetration of the public service:It is hardly possible to overlook to what extent the parties penetrate the public service. Not only in the appointment of “political officials”, but also in the appointment of higher judges, heads of agencies and schools as well as leading journalists in public media, party political considerations play a role. All parties show tendencies towards such a “partybased economy” (von Arnim 2008, p. 92). However, the principle of career civil service forms a certain barrier. 7. State party financing: Due to the “relative upper limit”, German parties are financed to less than 50% from state funds (these may not exceed the parties’ own resources), but when taking into account the tax benefits of donations and membership fees, this limit could be exceeded. The distribution of state subsidies is based on the number of voters (and, however, the amount of donations and membership fees raised). Since 2017, constitutionally hostile parties may be excluded from state funding. Thus, the Federal Republic of Germany neither corresponds to the model of a purely representative parliamentary democracy nor to that of a party state. It does indeed have party state features, but it is not a party state in the full sense of the term. There are democracies in which parties play a less important role (such as in the USA or France), and those with more pronounced party state features (such as in Italy or Austria). b. Constitutional law: democracy and equality of opportunity The importance of parties in modern democracy, especially the experience of Weimar, made it advisable to legally secure a system of democratic, equally competing parties. Equal opportunities are to be guaranteed by regulations on party financing and the equal treatment of all parties by the holders of public office (Party Act). The latter means that the parties are to be treated equally in the use of public premises, streets and squares, in the allocation of public advertising space and in the

4.1  Germany—a Party State?

91

allocation of free broadcasting time for election campaigning. Differentiations according to voter numbers remain permissible (BVerfG 1957, 1977). Article 21 GG contains a democratic principle for parties: “Their internal organization must correspond to democratic principles”. The Party Act specifies: Member assemblies, executive boards and arbitration courts must exist as autonomous party organs with certain rights. In addition, it prescribes an appropriate territorial subdivision and secret internal party elections for a maximum of two years. A “leader principle” like in the NSDAP would be inadmissible. In addition, Article 21 para. 2 GG highlights a positive relationship to democracy with the possibility of party dissolution: u

“Parties that, according to their goals or the behavior of their members, aim to impair or eliminate the liberal-democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany, are unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court decides on the question of unconstitutionality.”

Corresponding party dissolution proceedings have been carried out four times so far: against the right-wing extremist Socialist Reich Party (1952), against the Communist Party of Germany (1956) and twice against the National Democratic Party of Germany (2001–2003 and 2013–2017). The first two led to the party being dissolved, while the latter two failed because even in the party’s leadership bodies there were agents of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution or because, although anti-constitutional, they did not pose a danger because of their weakness. The yardstick by which a party is measured is its relationship to the liberal-democratic basic order alone. However, it remains unaffected that changes to the Basic Law or to the social order can be sought within this framework. In order to fulfill its protective function, a party ban must be imposed as a “preventive measure”. As such, it does not require a concrete attempt at overthrow, nor the use of violence, but rather the intention to “fundamentally and permanently tendentially” fight the liberal-democratic basic order3. The decision on the unconstitutionality and the ban of a party lies solely with the Federal Constitutional Court. The Bundestag, the Bundesrat or the Federal Government only have the right to submit the application for initiation of proceedings. Whether

3 On

the other hand, a party is not unconstitutional just because it does not recognize principles of liberal democracy, “it must rather be an active, aggressive attitude” against them (BVerfG 1956).

92

4  Multi-Party System with Limited Coalition Options

they do so is left to their free, political discretion, even if they are convinced of the unconstitutionality of a party. In this way, the confrontation with anti-democratic positions can primarily be fought out politically and argumentatively and a ban can remain a last resort. With the stabilization of democracy, the idea of banning anti-democratic parties faded into the background. The only exception to this were the requests for bans on the NPD since 2000 (Meier 2015). Criticism of this was partly due to the all-or-nothing principle of party bans; it was argued for flexibility, for example in the form of exclusion from party financing without a party ban (Weckenbrock 2009, p. 73, 172). The Federal Constitutional Court and the legislature have since moved in this direction, which some have described as “a sign of lack of social openness and therefore not very convincing” (Jesse 2012, p. 311).

4.2 Changes in the Party System a. 1945–51 continuity and new beginning In political science, the term “party system” refers • to the totality of the parties of a country, • their relationships with each other • and their function in the political system. In the simplest approach, party systems are distinguished by the number of parties—­one-party, two-party and multi-party systems. In order not to take into account all parties without regard to their size, one is limited to parliamentary represented parties, to parties with a minimum share of votes or to so-called “effective” parties. The latter are calculated using an index that indicates the fragmentation of the party system into differently sized voter segments.4 Even then, much is still missing: the content-programmatic differences between the parties, their relationships with each other. In particular, coalitions need not only a quantitative majority, but also a relative political proximity of the partners to each other in order to be workable. In order to represent the

4  The

so-called “Laakso-Taagepera index” of effective party numbers is used. It corresponds to the actual number of parties if all parties are of equal size, but approaches 1 if one party dominates (e.g. more than 90%).

4.2  Changes in the Party System

93

p­ rogrammatic positions, a left-right scale is often used, on which each party is assigned a certain place. With the help of a so-called polarization index, the ideological distance can then be measured (Lane and Ersson 1991, p. 178). Even this still means simplification, as differences can exist in several, independent dimensions. It is therefore more appropriate to compare party programs with respect to several dimensions (e.g. “modernization—traditionalization” and “welfare state—market liberalism” or “progressive vs. conservative social policy attitude” and “left or right economic policy attitude”). A ideological distance between two parties thus established in the n-dimensional space is then the Euclidean distance = square root of the sum of the squared products of the relative weight of a policy dimension and the difference between two parties in this dimension (Linhart 2014). Two difficulties have to be overcome here: on the one hand, to transfer the programmatic statements into numerical values by means of appropriate coding, on the other hand, to grasp the weight of a policy dimension for a certain party in a number. The distance two-dimensionally can be represented as the distance between the locations of the parties in the plane or three-dimensionally as the distance in space (for an empirical example, see Thomeczek et al. 2019). Under these restrictions and taking into account the different party sizes, one can speak of the ideological range of party systems. In 15 Western democracies, this went back from the 1950s to the 1980s of the 20th century, in the Federal Republic of Germany it reached its maximum after Saalfeld in 1957. In contrast, the number of effective parties in Western democracies increased until the 1990s (Detterbeck 2011, p. 126, 160). Central a party system in parliamentary democracy has the task of enabling the formation of government and opposition and thus representation in the long term. This only succeeds sustainably “if in fact the vast majority of the spectrum of public opinion and preferences is covered by the party system as a whole— but of course not by each individual party.” (Patzelt 2018a, p. 33) In this respect, the Weimar Republic with its fragmented multiparty system, which mostly only produced minority governments (Alemann 2018, p. 37), was already in a precarious state long before the breakthrough of National Socialism. The Republic failed endogenously less because of its constitution than because of its party system. In this respect, it was of great importance which party landscape would emerge after the Second World War under the licensing policy of the occupying powers and immediately afterwards until 1951. Features of a new beginning stood next to continuities. On the one hand, 1945 saw the emergence of a group of four national parties that are still familiar to the German citizen at the beginning of the 21st century:

94

4  Multi-Party System with Limited Coalition Options

The “Social Democratic Party of Germany” (SPD) continued the Weimar SPD. The first post-war chairman (1946–52), the former Reichstag deputy Kurt Schumacher, was the regional motor of the re-foundation. Likewise, the “Communist Party of Germany” (KPD) continued the Weimar party of the same name. Their identification with the Soviet Union and the SED regime isolated them from all other parties. The “Free Democratic Party” (FDP) brought together the traditions of the former liberal parties. The former DDP Reichstag deputy Theodor Heuss was the first federal chairman. The most important innovation of the German party system was the “Christian Democratic Union” (CDU), in Bavaria the “Christian Social Union” (CSU). Unlike the Catholic Centre Party, they saw themselves as interconfessional Christian parties (“Union”). They also included liberal and conservative-Protestant currents. In addition, a left-wing from the Catholic workers’ movement gave the Union parties the character of people’s parties. Konrad Adenauer, the former mayor of Cologne and a Centre politician of the late Wilhelmine and Weimar periods, was elected chairman of the CDU. In addition, other parties stood by. Parts of the old center stayed away from the CDU. The existence of other parties also made it clear that numerous political-social conflict lines, so-called “cleavages” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), had retained their party-founding power after the world economic crisis and the Third Reich (Grotz and Schroeder 2021, p. 157): The conflict clericalism/secularism found its expression in the foundation of Christian-democratic parties in the early 19th century, the legacy of which is carried forward today by the CDU and the CSU. The conflict between labor and capital in the late 19th century called forth a number of socialist or social-democratic parties; the one between reform and revolution within this camp gave birth, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, to a number of decidedly Communist parties. The conflict between materialism and post-materialism (Inglehart 1977) in the second half of the 20th century called forth green parties, while the one between open and closed society at the beginning of the 21st century, in turn, primarily right-wing populist formations. Other conflicts, such as the one between centralized and regional orientation, which gave rise to the existence of regional parties (Bayernpartei and Niedersächsische Landespartei, from 1947 “Deutsche Partei”) (Flechtheim 1963, pp. 238 ff., 374 ff.; Meyn 1965, pp. 136 ff., 149), or the conflict of interests between natives and expellees, party-forming for the “Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten” (BHE)—it strove for a “peaceful revision” of the borders and a “just distribution of war damages” (program of 1952 quoted after Mommsen 1960, pp. 726 ff.)—soon lost its importance.

4.2  Changes in the Party System

95

Overall, the conflict dimensions initially produced a party system reminiscent of the Weimar Republic. A comparison of the Reichstag election of 1928 as the last “normal election” before the world economic crisis with the election to the first Bundestag in 1949 reveals—when summarized into main streams—a striking continuity of voter behavior. Together with specific continuity in certain regions (Urwin 1974, p. 130; Schmid 1990, p. 44), these results point to a massive return of voters to their political traditional camps. Soon there was—in contrast to Weimar—a clear polarization between government majority (CDU/CSU, FDP, DP) and democratic opposition (SPD, Z), a confrontation that was intensified in 1950 with the dispute over a German defense contribution and embodied in the party leaders Adenauer and Schumacher. Unlike their parties, both rejected a grand coalition, wanting “crystal clear fronts” (Görtemaker 1999, pp. 86 ff.). They could be seen as the fathers of the moderately polarized party system of the Federal Republic. However, this system soon ran into crisis: The government majority lost significant numbers of votes in the state elections of 1949–51, without the opposition parties gaining—instead, the previously unregistered BHE and the right-wing extremist Socialist Reich Party (SRP) were successful. Therefore, in 1950/51, it seemed as if the party system of the Federal Republic was about to “head towards Weimar” (Ferdinand A. Hermens quoted after Kaltefleiter 1975, p. 3) (Jesse 2001; Kaack 1971, pp. 155 ff.). b. The concentration of the party system 1952–61 However, three transformation processes have then brought about the transition to an alternative party system: This was firstly the absorption of smaller parties by the CDU/CSU up to the mid-sixties. The KPD and SRP were banned, but were— like other smaller parties—in an advanced or foreseeable decline. At the end of this trend was the amazing parliamentary concentration on CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP. Current factors were partly responsible for this: the polarizing dynamics of the governing party and the social democratic opposition, the “economic miracle” and the introduction of the nationwide five percent clause. Previously, party-based conflict lines also faded, which gave the concentration an irreversible character: • The progressing secularization made Catholic-Protestant differences appear secondary and deprived the center of its basis. • Regional special awareness eroded, caused perhaps by unifying effects of war, increased mobility and nationwide mass media.

96

4  Multi-Party System with Limited Coalition Options

• Functionality and economic success of the new democracy deprived systemhostile parties like KPD, SRP and DRP of protest voters. In the sunshine of the “economic miracle” radical dissatisfaction melted away. • The divide between natives and expellees lost importance as a result of economic prosperity. The second, transforming the party system took place unspectacularly: the almost continuous increase of the SPD to 45.8% of the votes in 1972 and thus to the quantitative alternative to CDU/CSU. In favor of the SPD, the decline of the selfemployed share, church attendance (Pappi 1977, p. 220) and the reduction of social-psychological barriers between employees and workers had an effect (Conradt 1972, p. 41). This increase was facilitated by a change in the SPD’s program, which in 1959 presented itself as a value-based, citizen-addressing people’s party. Also the emphasis on foreign policy “togetherness” and domestic policy “community tasks”, with which the SPD tried to “no longer the big alternative, but the ‘better’ party” (Klotzbach 1982, p. 495 ff.), may have reduced inhibitions. She lost her character as a class party based on milieus, now appeared as the second people’s party—critically referred to by Otto Kirchheimer as a “catch all party” (Bernauer et al. 2009, p. 250). The third factor changing the party scene was a position changeof the FDP. The party, socially and economically to the right of CDU/CSU, was for a long time on the federal level the natural coalition partner. A change set in during the FDP opposition 1966–69 and found its expression in a “social liberalism”. Instead of the shrinking number of self-employed, the dependant middle class was now the priority target group of the party. In 1972, the switch to new voter groups was largely successful (Conradt and Lambert 1974, p. 68, 77 f.) (Table 4.1). c. The moderate bipolar party system 1961–83 As a result of the concentration of voters on the parties constantly represented in the Bundestag, the politics of those years were shaped by these alone. They interacted essentially with each other and thus formed a closed system that fulfilled all the functions of a party system in parliamentary democracy: • In its most extreme form, one can speak of a two-and-a-half-party system if one values the Union parties as a single political force and wants to express the lesser weight of the FDP. • In addition, this party system was now only determined by two conflict dimensions: the socio-economic conflict (CDU/CSU and FDP versus SPD) and the

Voter KPD, turnout DKP, PDS, Linkea)

9,4

5,7

2,2

0,2

1,9

1,3

0.6

0,3

0,3

0,2

0,2

–

70,5

Elections

LTW 1946–49

BTW 1949 78,5

BTW 1953 86,0

BTW 1957 87,8

BTW 1961 87,7

BTW 1965 86,8

BTW 1969 86.7

BTW 1972 91,1

BTW 1976 90,7

BTW 1980 88,6

BTW 1983 89,1

BTW 1987 84,4

8,3

5,6

1,5

–

–

-

–

–

–

–

–

–

B90/ GR

37,0

38,2

42,9

42,6

45,8

42.7

39,3

36,2

31,8

28,8

29,2

35,0

SPD

0,1

–

–

–

–

0.0

–

–

0,3

0,8

3,1

3,4

Center

9,1

7,0

10,6

7,9

8,4

5.8

9,5

12,8

7,7

9,5

11,9

9,3

FDP

44,3

48,8

44,5

48,6

44,9

46.1

47,6

45,4

50,2

45,2

31,0

37,7

CDU/ CSU

–

–

–

–

–

0.1

–

2,8

4,6

5,9

–

–

0,1

–

–

–

–

0.2

0,2

–

0,5

1,7

4,2

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

3,4

3,3

4,0

2,6

BHE, Bayern- DP GDP/2013 Partei AfD

0,6

0,2

0,2

0,3

0,6

4.3

2,0

0,8

1,0

1,1

1,8

0,2

DRP, NPD, DVU, REP

(continued)

0,6

0,0

0,1

0,3

0,0

0.2

0,3

0,1

0,3

1,5

9,1

2,5

Other

Table 4.1   The Bundestag elections. In percent of the valid votes (second votes), with voter turnout in percent of the eligible voters. Respective federal state

4.2  Changes in the Party System 97

4,4

5,1

4,0

8,7

11,9

8,6

9,2

4,9

BTW 1994 79,0

BTW 1998 82,2

BTW 2002 79,1

BTW 2005 77,7

BTW 2009 70,8

BTW 2013 71,5

BTW 2017 76,2

BTW 2021 76,6

14,8

8,9

8,4

10,7

8,1

8,6

6,7

7,3

5,1

B90/ GR

25,7

20,5

25,7

23,0

34,2

38,5

40,9

36,4

33,5

SPD

0,0

0,0

–

–

–

–

Center

11,5

10,7

4,8

14,6

9,8

7,4

6,2

6,9

11,0

FDP

24,1

32,9

41,5

33,8

35,2

38,5

35,1

41,5

43,8

CDU/ CSU

10,3

12,6

4,7

–

–

–

–

–

–

0,1

0,1

0,1

0,1

0,1

0,0

0,1

0,1

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

BHE, Bayern- DP GDP/2013 Partei AfD

0,1

0,4

1,3

1,9

2,2

1,0

3,3

1,9

2,4

DRP, NPD, DVU, REP

8,6

5,0

5,0

3,9

1,7

2,0

2,6

1,5

1,4

Other

a) 1957–60 Bund der Deutschen (BdD), 1961–69 Deutsche Friedens-Union (DFU), 1969 Aktionsgemeinschaft Demokratischer Fortschritt, ab 1990 PDS, 2005 Linkspartei/PDS, 2009 Die Linke. Source:www.wahlrecht.de.

2,4

Voter KPD, turnout DKP, PDS, Linkea)

BTW 1990 77,8

Elections

Table 4.1   (continued)

98 4  Multi-Party System with Limited Coalition Options

4.2  Changes in the Party System

99

conflict between traditional-religious and individual-secular value orientations (CDU/CSU versus SPD and FDP) (Pappi 1977, p. 195). • The distance between the two large formations was reduced by the fact that both CDU/CSU and SPD saw themselves as “people’s parties” as they had done before. Their programs therefore tended to make pragmatic statements without completely losing the features of social and ideological trend organizations (Mintzel and Oberreuter 1990, p. 370). • With the growth of dependent middle classes and the disintegration of political and social milieus, a pronounced self-assignment of citizens to the political center corresponded. This drift caused the policy of the larger parties to gravitate around the center of public opinion in the middle of the spectrum. One could therefore speak of a moderate bipolar party system with centripetal tendency (Sartori 1966, p. 138). Although the SPD approached the CDU/CSU in number in the 1960s, even surpassing it in 1972, it was not elections, but coalition changes of the FDP that caused government changes in the federal government until 1998. For this purpose, it appeared predestined for two reasons: first, because of its middle position in the party spectrum, and second, because it lived with the fact that it had to win over about half and more of its voters on the basis of current decisionmaking issues anew and therefore had to show “a special sensitivity to new trends and intellectual currents”. The FDP was thus the movable and moving element in the party system. In this context, it fulfilled two functions: that of a “medium for power change” and that of a “corrective” within the governments, with the consequence that political course changes in the Federal Republic did not turn out to be radical, not unmediated. Voter potential then felt frustrated and became the bearer of an ascending challenger party: the right-wing extremist National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) 1966–68 after many years of Union dominance at the federal level, the left-wing Greens 1979–83 after a long SPD dominance, the Republicans in 1989 during a period of Union-led federal government, and the AfD from 2013. d. 1983–2005: Two-party group system with regional system East Three factors changed the party system from 1983: With the entry of the Greens into the Bundestag in 1983, first of all, the party system developed into a two-party group system, in which CDU/CSU and FDP on the one hand and SPD and Greens on the other hand faced each other as alternative government coalitions. The party system was thus extended by an ecological-

100

4  Multi-Party System with Limited Coalition Options

economic conflict dimension. Despite initial bursting state coalitions in Hesse and Berlin, the two left-wing parties have slowly adjusted to each other. With German unity, the party system was supplemented by a regional threeparty system in the new federal states. The SED renamed the “Party of Democratic Socialism” (PDS) was able to survive in the east with new leadership. By establishing itself there as the third major party, it can be said to be a special, regional party system. In 1998 she was able to form a government coalition with the SPD in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania for the first time, and then in Berlin in 2001. Thirdly, the party system was characterized by a loosened binding of citizens to the parties. Nor did the large people’s parties dominate as before. A weakness of the parties was expressed in the declining participation in federal elections since 1980, as well as in the declining share of the large parties in the valid votes. The number of people switching parties increased, while identification with a party declined in the long-term trend (Schoen and Weins 2014, p. 275). In this context, it also belongs that protest and populist parties could achieve surprising electoral successes from time to time (Schill party in Hamburg), as well as extremist ones (such as REP, DVU and NPD) (Pfahl-Traughber 2018, pp. 313 ff.). An example of the latter was the NPD’s success in the state elections in Saxony in 2004, where the party found resonance with younger people with lower educational qualifications and in areas with higher unemployment or proximity to the external borders with its anti-Hartz IV and anti-EU enlargement agitation (Steglich 2005, p. 31, 42, 53).

4.3 Two-Dimensional Multiparty System with Unwanted Governments The shock that was supposed to bring down the two-party group system into crisis was, after the 2002 election, the sudden change of direction of Chancellor Schröder towards the “Agenda 2010”. In view of high unemployment, it provided for labor market reforms and social cuts. This not only aroused grumbling within the SPD (where the chairman for employee issues denounced an “unsocial democratization of the SPD”) (Schreiner 2007), but also protests by DGB trade unions. Angry trade union functionaries collected supporters for a new voter group. For the federal election in 2005, their “election initiative for work and social justice” joined forces with the PDS to form an election alliance, to which the former SPD chairman Lafontaine also joined (Vollmer 2013).

4.3  Two-Dimensional Multiparty System with Unwanted Governments

101

2005: Instead of the four percent of the PDS from 2002, now 8.7% of the votes were achieved, while the SPD lost more than four percentage points. The PDS had succeeded in breaking through its regional restrictions. Even more: Neither SPD and Greens nor CDU/CSU and FDP had achieved a parliamentary majority. The previous two-party group system had been undermined. Could one cooperate with the PDS or the Left? Memories of the SED regime, its rejection of NATO, questionable democracy concepts and excessive social demands act as dividing factors. The only way out was the grand coalition between the Union parties and the SPD. This could point to declining unemployment figures and cushion the financial crisis in 2008/09 to such an extent that its effects on the labor market remained low. Even its final phase she experienced as a “sanitation alliance” (Probst 2006). Nevertheless: In the federal election 2009, both coalition partners suffered losses, the SPD almost catastrophic—in contrast, FDP and Linke won. This could be seen as a consequence of a grand coalition of the “middle” (Schmitt and Franzmann 2017, p. 89, 111), at the SPD additionally effects of the Agenda 2010. 2009: However: The election result 2009 made a government majority possible, carried by CDU/CSU and FDP. The problems of the new constellation were thus temporarily concealed. The black-yellow government worked with weak cooperation, soon had majority problems in the Bundesrat and was under the continued pressure of the euro crisis. However, what was more important for the development of the party system was that within the CDU “leftward shifts” continued (Korte and Switek 2013, p. 5 f.). When it came to crisis decisions, the CDU leadership left the former party course: This applied to the abrupt withdrawal from nuclear energy and the, albeit hesitant, entry into a debt community in the eurozone. These were strong signals to bring a black-green coalition into the realm of the possible—i.e. to move further away from the two-party group system. The CDU had observed a certain bourgeoisification of the Green voters. These now form a high-income electorate that, in 2009, ranked together with the supporters of the FDP and the CDU/CSU in terms of social security and income differences—far from those of the SPD and the Left (Neu 2009, p. 17 f.). Also in the question of the priority of freedom or equality, in 2008 the supporters of the Greens were together with the supporters of the Union and the FDP at those who mostly opted for freedom, while at SPD and Left the preference for equality prevailed (Petersen 2011, p. 115). However, the party was not yet so far programmatically (Spier 2013, p. 381), and in 2015 a clear equality tendency of the Green supporters became apparent again (Petersen 2016, p. 82). At least—the Greens, only “culturally belonging to the left camp” (Korte 2009, p. 4), seemed conceivable as a CDU coalition partner.

102

4  Multi-Party System with Limited Coalition Options

2013: The 2013 federal election brought the Union almost half the seats in the Bundestag—explainable in view of the flourishing German economy in contrast to the majority of the Eurozone. But the FDP had not been able to deliver on tax relief, had been trumped by the Chancellor on the nuclear phase-out (which contradicted the coalition negotiations) and Euro rescue policy (on which the FDP membership almost split in the middle) (Jun 2015, p. 119; Saalfeld 2015, p. 204)—it fell below five percent and thus out of the Bundestag, while the AfD, previously excluded from coalition politics by all parliamentary parties anyway, narrowly failed. The trigger for the new party were the credit guarantees for Greece. The issue played a considerable role in 2013 behind unemployment (Niedermayer 2015, p. 841). In addition, the new party also took positions to the right of the CDU on energy supply, family and immigration. It occupied vacated, unrepresented positions, thus a “representation gap” (Patzelt 2018b). The Union thus received competition from the right, analogous to how the SPD already had it from the left. Because the party foundation nevertheless (just) missed the entry, CDU and CSU were alone in the Bundestag facing a left majority. But this too remained hypothetical, as the SPD’s ditch to the left seemed too deep, a cooperation had previously been ruled out again. The solution was once again a grand coalition. This was not too difficult in substance, since the two were not far apart. The SPD sought to drain the water with a minimum wage, retirement at 63 and corrections to the “Agenda 2010” of the Left Party. But the further development was determined by a dramatic change in the relevance of the issues: While unemployment was continuously seen as less of a central problem, the Euro crisis fluctuated between 10 and 20 percent of those surveyed, the topic of refugees/ asylum became the most important issue from 2013 to 2015, quickly reaching 50 percent in the spring and 85 percent in the fall of 2015 (Niedermayer 2015, p. 841). The decision of the Chancellor for a culture of welcome with open borders (“We can do it”), supported by all parliamentary parties, the prevailing media tone, churches and numerous associations, deepened the ditch against the AfD. This achieved breakthrough successes in all state elections from 2016 onwards, only smaller where there was a confrontation between CDU and SPD in the country. 2017: In the 2017 federal election, both partners of the grand coalition suffered losses, the opposition Greens and Left gained slightly, but the real winners were the FDP returning to the Bundestag and the AfD. The circumstances favored the latter:

4.3  Two-Dimensional Multiparty System with Unwanted Governments

103

• a grand coalition that meant profile weaknesses for the big parties (Schmitt and Franzmann 2017), • a dominant, content-useful topic on which the closed front of all parliamentary parties made their own position the distinguishing feature (Decker 2017a; Debus 2017), • and a broad, outraged public that drove the new foundation’s protest voters. Coalitions were now much more difficult to form than before: Neither the left nor the right old party grouping achieved a majority, not even “red-red-green”. Numerically possible, but politically excluded by CDU/CSU, was a coalition of CDU/CSU, FDP and AfD. The attempt at a Jamaica coalition of CDU/CSU, FDP and Greens failed, the unloved way out was, once again, a grand coalition. 2021: As in 2017, the German party system remained anchored in moderate and polarized pluralism after the 2021 federal election (Jesse 2021, p. 369). The election was particularly dynamic: it was the first in which there was no chancellor bonus to distribute—after 16 years Angela Merkel did not stand again. For the first time in 70 years, the South Schleswig Voter Association has made it into the Bundestag (with one seat). And for the first time in 70 years, there was again a three-way alliance at federal level, the first ever cross-party—namely between the SPD, the Greens and the FDP. This was mainly due to the Union’s election campaign, whose top candidate Armin Laschet made several mistakes (worst result of CDU/CSU), and to the unimpressive candidate of the Greens, Annalena Baerbock (however: doubling of the election result from 2017). In spring 2021, the Union and the Greens still seemed to be in the lead (in May the latter were still 2 percent ahead of the former with 25.9 percent—Pollytix 2021), but both subsequently had to give way: the strength of the SPD represented by Olaf Scholz5 was the weakness of the other two. The people attributed to him by far the decisive chancellor qualities and to the SPD the greatest competence in the most important issue: social policy (Jesse 2021, p. 371; Tagesschau 2021). On the second most important issue, environment and climate, the Greens were in the lead. Both wing parties represented in the Bundestag so far had to accept setbacks: The Left did indeed move back into the Bundestag with a parliamentary group, but only because of three direct mandates (basic mandate clause), it was at 4.9 percent. And the AfD, which had no issue of its own after the migration debate

5 Not:

“led”—the unpopular chairmen Saskia Esken and Norbert Walter-Borjans remained in the background.

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subsided, sold its losses of about two percentage points as a sign of its establishment. The result is the largest Bundestag to date with 736 members (598 are actually planned), mainly due to the CSU’s overhang mandates. The “small” electoral reform of 2020 has to be corrected. In summary: It has become increasingly clear since 2005 that a party system has emerged, which is characterized by three features: 1. In quantitative terms, one can speak of a “fluid” multiparty system in the sense of Oskar Niedermayer (2006, p. 130). The constellation is “fluid” in that the electorate is mobile, considerable shifts take place until smaller parties fail at the five percent hurdle. The number of those belonging to the party system is variable. 2. It is still characterized by two policy dimensions, a socio-economic and a socio-cultural one. The two major parties are only slightly apart from each other, but surrounded by four smaller parties that occupy all extreme positions in both dimensions. The city-country divide, which has long been declared dead and which encompasses both dimensions, seems to be experiencing a revival (Haffert 2022) . This means the objective relative proximity of the large parties, while the smaller parties hold external “pole” positions in the two central policy dimensions: • socially and economically, the FDP, with consistent market economy, takes one extreme position, the Left with state interventionism and egalitarian social policy the other; • socially and culturally, the Greens occupy one extreme position with libertarian universalism, the AfD the other with traditional values and nationalism (Jun 2017, p. 103). 3. Excluded, i.e. for coalition governments at the federal level in the view of all other federal parliamentary parties and a majority of citizens by no means up for discussion6, are two of the smaller parties, together representing 15% of voters. This exclusion, although justifiable from a democratic point of view, has the consequence of limiting the options for coalition formation, so that the probability of unwanted and inhomogeneous coalitions is high. Intended

6 At

the same time: The SPD and the Greens ruled out an alliance with the Left in the 2021 election campaign.

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are in particular cross-party, more than two-partner alliances, such as blackgreen (Weckenbrock 2017) or the so-called “traffic light coalition” in office since 2021. This could cause governing parties to lose contours and credibility, voters to see clear alternatives only with opposition parties and to feel that their vote is not implemented (in the sense of the programme of the governing party). Instead of the election, the unpredictable results of a “coalition lottery” decide (Korte 2009, p. 3). For a long time, the charm of liberal democracy is lost: a majority-capable opposition and a majority-supported, action-capable government. The legislative output also loses quality as a result of torturedoverstretched compromises. The latent crisis of the party system threatens to turn into an acute crisis of the political system in times of economic hardship. The risks of an exclusion policy are therefore considerable. The polarization of debates, pursued on both sides, is probably one of them—with worrying consequences7. So what can be done? In the event of an impossible majority, the suggestion has been made to form minority governments instead of grand coalitions (e.g. Koß 2021, pp. 175 et seq.), and also of referendums (Decker 2017b, p. 37). Both solutions were already practised in the Weimar Republic, which suffered from the same malady—ultimately without success, at least as soon as the economic crisis came. As far as the federal political exclusion of the Left is concerned, it seems to be slowly eroding. The argument that today’s Left is not the SED of 30 years ago and that the political environment today is different cannot be dismissed. As far as the AfD is concerned, it is today more radical than at the time of its formation— above all because of the increased importance of the nationalist wing around Björn Höcke, which is particularly strong in the east, and the withdrawal of moderate forces (such as Jörg Meuthen). Since leading politicians stand out because of racist remarks, the delegitimization of the elected government, the ethnicization of the concept of the people, anti-Semitism, the relativization of National Socialism, a disturbed relationship to freedom of religion and the press, and connections to relevant right-wing extremists (Pfahl-Traughber 2019), the exclusion by other parties is not foreseeable here for good reasons.

7 Among

other things, these tensions find their expression in proven cases of vote-rigging in the Bremen city council elections in 2015 and the North Rhine-Westphalia state elections in 2017 to the detriment of the AfD. For the federal elections in 2017, a statistical analysis by the political scientist Wagschal (2018) suggests justified suspicion of manipulation to the detriment of the AfD in twelve named constituencies and 321 other voting districts.

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While the exclusion question is posed differently in Great Britain and France than in Germany due to the majority voting system, the proportional representation system in other countries offers better comparison possibilities: There is exclusion, practiced temporarily or permanently (as in Sweden), there a bourgeois minority government can be supported by the right-wing populists (example Denmark) or conservative governing parties take right-wing populists as coalition partners (as in Norway, Finland and Austria); a socialist party has also practiced the latter (Mannewitz 2018). On the one hand: The success record of the different strategies with a view to curbing the smaller competitors varies, also depends on the timing (Heinze 2020, p. 135); and democracy has not collapsed in any of the countries. On the other hand, there is a constant warning of a “mainstreaming”, i.e. the legitimation of the fringe parties and the adoption of their positions, and thus a gradual erosion of democracy (Mudde 2019). Either way: “Overreactions” and “hysteria” are music to the ears of a party that first provokes and then stages itself as a pariah (Nölke 2018). To what extent do different dimensions determine the party system? It has already been shown in the past that many respondents do not think in simple left-right categories. This should not come as a surprise because left/right is not a clearly defined term pair, but can also be understood as the opposite of socioeconomic equality/inequality (Seymour M. Lipset) as well as the opposite of individual emancipation/“natural communities” (Helga Grebing)8. Both aspects do not necessarily correlate, so that it makes sense to distinguish between a socioeconomic and a socio-cultural dimension. Both represent a simplification of the “cleavages” mentioned above. Accordingly, the parties are arranged from “left” to “right” as follows (Decker 2018b, p. 24): • to the socio-economic conflict: Left, Green, SPD, AfD, CSU, CDU, FDP; • to the socio-cultural conflict: Green, Left, SPD, FDP, CDU, CSU, AfD. Both dimensions together result in the image of two party camps: Left, Green, SPD on the one hand, CDU, FDP, CSU on the other hand9. This becomes visible

8 Natural

communities include family, neighborhood and nation (Klingemann and Pappi 1972, pp. 10, 18). 9 Since the socio-economic conflict runs through the AfD (Thomeczek et al. 2019, p. 275), it can only be clearly assigned to the right camp with regard to the socio-cultural conflict line.

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in two-dimensional political coordinate systems for 2013 and 2017—members of the same camp are closer to each other than to others (Thomeczek et al. 2019, p. 274). Likewise, differences between party supporters in the ranking of certain values become visible: While supporters of the three left-wing parties value “solidarity” more highly than “performance”, they are considered to be about the same for the Union and the FDP. “Obedience to rules” ranks significantly (just below those of the Left) for supporters of the Union, SPD and FDP before “autonomy”/ self-realization—only with the Greens it is the other way around (Roßteutscher and Scherer 2011, p. 139). To the extent that unemployment in Germany declined and immigration increased, according to opinion polls, the importance of the socio-cultural dimension has increased. But both conflict dimensions remain important for understanding party goals. It can be difficult to classify a new party without a past and with only one supporting theme at the beginning—like the “Pirates” with the theme of copyright, socio-culturally not far from the Greens (Niedermayer 2013, p. 65; Debus and Faas 2013, p. 195).

4.4 The Party Programs Party systems are also determined by content-related distances between the parties. A look at their programs and self-conceptions should therefore be added. Despite all skepticism about the program loyalty of parties, election programs nevertheless provide indications not only of self-conception, but also of the action of a party. So it turned out in a study that covered numerous democracies over four decades that government policy corresponds quite well to election programs—of course not to the program of a party alone in the case of coalitions (Klingemann et al. 1994). “The question ‘Do Programs Matter?’ can be answered with a clear ‘Yes’” (Rölle 2001, p. 43, 90). The synopsis of the election programs (see below) confirms the above-mentioned rankings in economic and social issues (economic, distribution, energy policy, scope of the state) as well as in socio-cultural value issues (family, immigration policy, individual emancipation/natural communities)10.

10 With

social benefits/taxes or immigration policy as criteria.

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a. CDU and CSU: Christian values and social market economy In accordance with the character of CDU and CSU as collection parties of different political directions, Catholic, liberal and conservative-Protestant ideas have influenced their programmatic: • The Catholic social doctrine: Developed in the social encyclicals of the popes (starting with “Rerum Novarum” from 1891), it seeks to combine the free development of the individual with social responsibility, property with its social binding. The principle of “subsidiarity” is also central, according to which tasks should lie with the smallest social community that is capable of solving problems. The role of the family in education, social assistance through free providers, a “priority of private initiative” and small property (Gundlach 1933; Welty 1961) are emphasized. • The neo- or ordoliberalism: A number of liberal economists (Wilhelm Röpke, Walter Eucken, etc.) interpreted the world economic crisis not as a consequence of capitalist market economy, but as a result of political interventions and economic concentration of power. They therefore assign the state the task of actively securing the market economy. For this purpose, cartel laws are to serve. Building on this, the term “social market economy” was coined; in it, it is also the task of the state to cushion the social consequences of the market through social policy measures (Wenzel 1979, pp. 300 ff.; Buchhaas 1981). • Conservative-Protestant currents: These are particularly effective in the north German-Protestant area, but more through traditional attitudes (such as appreciation of natural communities) than through programmatics. With the leadership of the federal government from 1949, the practice of government then shaped the image of CDU and CSU: economic miracle, social laws and West integration became their trademark. Only after the loss of power in 1969 did they again make programmatic efforts. After the regained German unity, CSU 1993 and CDU 1994 gave themselves new basic programs. The CDU represented a balance between market and performance on the one hand and social compensation on the other. In this context, it took up recent developments: in the self-image as a party of “Christians and non-Christians”, in the striving for actual equality of women while maintaining the family, in the commitment to European unification while preserving national identity, in the securing of the economic location Germany in a free world economy. Similarly, the CSU saw in “Christian human image, self-responsibility in solidarity and subsidiarity” its order principles (CDU 1994; CSU 1993).

4.4  The Party Programs

109

On its Leipzig party congress in 2003, the CDU propagated an economic liberalism (Schlieben 2007, pp. 186, 194), but then hardly pursued it. In fact, since 2005, it has carried out a “programmatic realignment” through social policy “leftward shifts”, through a “coup-like change of course” away from nuclear energy and through its departure from the conservative family image (childcare, homosexual partnerships)—regardless of the basic program adopted in 2007. This was followed by the welcome culture for immigration. “Explanation-poor pragmatism” is what Korte (2015, p. 19) attributes to the CDU as a governing party for decades. At its side is the CSU, which presents itself as a “regional party with national political aspirations” (Deininger 2020, p. 102) (with its own profile in EU, mothers’ pension and immigration policy), without breaking with the larger sister party (Table 4.2). b. SPD: Social and ecological transformation The old Social Democracy has declared itself to be Marxist. It understood society as a capitalist class society and expected, as a result of economic crises that were inevitably becoming more severe, the transition to a socialist society with public ownership of the means of production, economic planning and equality of social opportunities (Walter 2018, pp. 7 ff.). The development of Western industrial societies, including the experience of National Socialism, then fundamentally undermined confidence in a “scientific socialism”. Demands for nationalization of the heavy industry, as still raised by the party in the post-war period, lost resonance in the face of the economic revival. Instead, the SPD (1959) saw itself in the Godesberg Program as a community of people “coming from different religious and ideological backgrounds”. It emphasized the primacy of the market over planning and saw public ownership only as a last resort to “tame the power of big business”. A left-wing faction, as it emerged from the left turn of the Young Socialists in 1969, tended to question much. However, it was not until 1989 that a new, Berlin-based program was adopted (SPD 1989). In it, the SPD described itself as a “reform alliance of old and new social movements”. In addition to demands for more social equality, the goal of an “ecological transformation” of society was now of equal importance. In other respects, however, it remained more in the traditions of Keynes. So the party took on the character of a redistributive “economic stimulus party” (Lösche and Walter 1992, pp. 102 f.) for good times. After taking over the government in 1998, a new line has been introduced by Chancellor Schröder and those close to him in the sense of a “new” social democracy. The focus is shifted from mere welfare benefits to an “increase in employability” (Vorländer 2001, pp. 16 ff.)—if you will, to a supply policy for the factor

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4  Multi-Party System with Limited Coalition Options

Table 4.2   The party programs in 2021 compared

Field of study

CDU/CSU

SPD

Self-conception/central goals “powerful restart after the crisis”, “growth”, “Christian view of man and social diversity”; “economic competitiveness”, protection of natural resources, “cohesion”

Goals: “Future, respect and a solidarity-based Europe”, “a society that is inclusive and solidarity-based and makes participation in social life possible for all citizens”; SPD is “peace party”

State/immigration

“Germany as a cultural nation”; one wants “controlled and targeted immigration”, “ordered” and “based on clear rules”, rejects “illegal migration”, advocates for the fight against the causes of flight, incl. expansion of safe countries of origin, rejection of the expansion of family reunification; reform of the EU asylum and refugee policy, for “attraction of skilled workers”

Goal: “modernize the General Equal Treatment Act”, accepted “multinationality”, equalization of family reunification of subsidiary beneficiaries to refugees, shortened duration of stay for naturalization, voting rights from 16 years, “fight the causes of flight. better integration; Goal: parity laws for the parliaments

Inner security

For video technology in public danger areas, extension of minimum sentence for physical attacks against police officers to 6 months, “zero tolerance strategy against clans”, extension of data retention, combating “every form of extremism”

Continuation of the “Pact for the Rule of Law”, Constitutional Protection as a “early warning system”, combating right-wing extremism in security agencies, rejection of “extremism, political hatred and social incitement” (continued)

4.4  The Party Programs

111

Table 4.2   (continued)

Field of study

CDU/CSU

SPD

Economic policy

Social market economy; “sustainable growth”, target: full employment, “more flexibility in working hours”, increase in mini-job limit to 550 €, controlled skilled worker immigration, more recognition of foreign qualifications

Targets: “competitiveness and sustainable employment”, state as “strategic investor” of the “socialecological change” v. a. by means of the KfW, association right of action of the trade unions, no “unjustified fixed-term contract”, temporary workers pay like regular staff, tariff binding in handicrafts

Tax and social policy

With “solid finances into the future”, debt brake, “performance must pay off”, against wealth tax and against higher inheritance tax, abolition of solidarity surcharge, “competitive corporate taxation” (capping corporate tax 25%), digitalization of tax return and applications, retirement at 67 by 2030

Target: “tax justice” u. a. by millionaires’ tax 3% from 250 000 € and soli for top earners, wealth and financial transaction tax, no more joint taxation for newly married couples, increase in the low-wage sector to 1600 €, for this pensions: an increase in the regular retirement age, min. 48% pension level, increase in the exemption limit for the unemployed

Climate and energy policy

“Climate neutrality by 2045”, abolition of the EEG surcharge, promotion of photovoltaics, European emissions trading, expansion of renewables, technological further development and innovation, “Make Germany the hydrogen country No. 1”, expansion of fast-charging stations on long-distance routes, promotion of CCS

Climate neutrality by 2045, electricity from 2040 exclusively from regeneratives, commitment to hydrogen, where green electrification is not possible (Dtl. by 2030 lead market for hydrogen technology), target: “a solar system on every supermarket, every school and “every town hall”, abolition of the EEG surcharge by 2025, electrification of 75% of the rail network and at least 15 million E-cars by 2030 (continued)

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Table 4.2   (continued)

Field of study

CDU/CSU

SPD

Health policy

For free choice of doctor and therapy and interaction of statutory and private health insurance, against “unified insurance”, no commercialization of assisted suicide; no “legalization of illegal drugs”, strengthening of the WHO

For the introduction of a citizen’s insurance (also in nursing care), regulated sale of cannabis to adults in model projects

Educational policy

“Every child should be promoted from the beginning according to his or her abilities.” For dual vocational training, strengthening of digital skills, flexibility of the Bafög, construction of a national education platform

Legal entitlement to voluntary service for those under 27 and full-time offer in primary school age, more Bafög

Family/Equal Treatment

Expansion of the partner months for parental leave from 14 to 16 months; financial relief for families/single parents with children, e.g. when purchasing a home; striving for child splitting

“Four-pillar model for more family time” (including two weeks of parental leave after birth, child basic security consisting of infrastructure (including free daycare and all-day care in schools) and income-related child benefit (until 250 E), equal treatment of men and women by 2030 (including the Equal Pay Transparency Act), equal representation of women in economic leadership positions in all publicly traded companies, focus on state prosecutors for femicides, abolition of 219a StGB, commitment to “shared responsibility”, opposed “on all levels of the anti-gender movement” (continued)

4.4  The Party Programs

113

Table 4.2   (continued)

Field of study

CDU/CSU

Foreign, European and secu- The German armed forces are rity policy to grow slowly to 203,000 personnel and to 2% of GDP, development aid to 0.7%. For a European “defence union”, for NATO. Support for EU countries particularly affected by Corona, but against a “debt union”

SPD 0.7% of GDP for development aid; “fight the causes of flight, not refugees” (including implementing the Global Compact for Migration), strengthening the WTO, commitment to an initiative for state insolvency proceedings, for unmanned armed drones, goal: nuclear-weapon-free world, for stronger arms control outside the EU/ NATO

SPD, Aus Respekt vor Deiner Zukunft. Das Zukunftsprogramm der SPD; CDU/CSU, Das Programm für Stabilität und Erneuerung. Gemeinsam für ein modernes Deutschland

of work. However: More than a tendency within the SPD has not become of it. Traditional and ecological currents have remained influential. The high turnover at the party leadership, which began after Willy Brandt, is evidence of the “fragmentation” of the SPD (Grunden 2017, pp. 57–59). Many of the “left behind” of the old SPD milieu felt that the labor market reforms of their own government were “incompatible” (Grunden 2017, p. 42) and associated with a long-term orientation crisis, which was partly sought to be reversed in the Grand Coalition after 2013, now also in the coalition of the Greens, the FDP and the SPD (“Citizen’s money”). Nevertheless: Many “left behind” of the old SPD milieu have remained estranged even after the correction of the “Agenda 2010” (Walter 2018, pp. 271 ff.) (Table 4.2). c. The liberalism of the FDP The German liberalism, which formed itself in the 19th century as a great driving force, has written the principles of the free economy, the liberal rule of law and— with varying degrees of emphasis—the parliamentary government on its flags. Until the end of the 1960s, the FDP tended to represent the principles of the market economy on the basis of private ownership more consistently than the CDU and CSU. It also rejected clericalism unanimously. For the most part,

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it regarded Adenauer’s foreign policy—at least as far as reunification was concerned—with skepticism (Dittberner 2014, pp. 55 ff.). When the party revised its position in opposition and then in the social-liberal coalition, this was expressed in the concept of a “social liberalism”. This is not only concerned with “freedoms and rights as mere formal guarantees of the citizen vis-à-vis the state, but as social opportunities in the everyday reality of society” (Flach et al. 1972, p. 58). In general, the FDP is content with partial programs for each relevant field. While newer basic statements were sometimes too abstract-general (Dittberner 2010, pp. 83 ff.), the party’s positions are clearly formulated in its more recent federal election programs. In contrast to social-state ideas, the FDP emphasizes the individual’s self-responsibility and provision, insists on market-based instruments in environmental protection, emphasizes the individual and accepts alternative lifestyles. The national-liberal legacy was temporarily evident in North Rhine-Westphalia (Lösche and Walter 1996, pp. 31 ff.). Currently, one could assign the party members who are critical of the EU to such a tradition. They rejected the rescue package for Greece in 2010 and were able to win 44.2% of the voters for their position in a referendum—a real test of strength. In contrast to EU trends, the FDP advocated the master’s certificate as a prerequisite for self-employment (Treibel 2013, pp. 57, 117, 119, 182 ff., 210, 227). Furthermore, the party has repeatedly got into existential crises on coalition changes and was able to end a vote of no confidence in the Bundestag for the first time by means of an almost triumphant return (and even almost completely forget it in 2021)—a flexible, risktaking liberal force (Table 4.4). d. Ecological Left Party: The Greens With candidacies for municipal and state elections from 1977/78, the Greens have entered the stage of politics. Their organization as a party preceded a movement of citizen initiatives for environmental protection. It could be said that green life orientations extended, tangible in concepts such as self-realization and participation, participation and recognition. In addition to “green roots”, the Greens also have a “red root” in the form of leftists who participate in them with anti-capitalist motivation—from former social democrats to cadres from left-wing extremist splinter parties (van Hüllen 1990, pp. 155 ff., 255, 316). In addition, ideas from the peace, women’s and third world movements are at home with the Greens. In addition, the citizen movement from the GDR in the form of Bündnis 90 “played a key role in the association with the West German Greens” (Probst 2017, p. 202) (Table 4.3 and 4.4).

4.4  The Party Programs

115

Table 4.3   The party programs in 2021 compared

Field of study

The Left

B 90/The Greens

Self-conception/ central goals

“Our goal: a society of the good life for all.”, “We leave no one behind”, “Make Germany more democratic and socially just”

“We have a clear goal for this decade in front of us: climatefriendly prosperity.” Goal: into the “age of climate neutrality”

State/immigration

Right of residence for victims of right-wing violence, right to vote for all those living here permanently, decentralized accommodation of refugees, no deportations, German citizenship for all those born here, right to multiple citizenship, “right to naturalization” after 5 years

Digitalization of authorities, transparency in lobbying and parliamentary side incomes, “citizen councils for more participation”, right to vote from 16, municipal voting rights for third-country nationals, citizenship for all those born here, “new access routes for educational and labor migration”, “right to free access to matching, easily accessible and federally funded language and integration courses”, decentralized accommodation, secure right of residence for those with a residence permit after 5 years, “safe and legal escape routes”

Inner security

“against racism, anti-Semitism, anti-Gypsyism and neo-Nazis”, for “antifascism”, dissolution of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, “investigation priorities for right-wing terrorism”, “democratization of the security authorities”, ban on neo-Nazi organizations, more critical police research

“offensive in the occupation of open positions” at the federal police and BKA, identification of federal police officers (anonymized), creation of a federal police commissioner, “independent scientific studies on right-wing extremism, anti-Semitism and racism in the security and law enforcement agencies”, creation of a European criminal office, reform of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, “combating right-wing extremism”, “protecting against terrorism”, minimizing the availability of lethal firearms, introduction of class action lawsuits (continued)

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Table 4.3   (continued)

Field of study

The Left

B 90/The Greens

Economic policy

“create one million good-paying jobs by 2025”, transfer of temporary work, mini- and midi-jobs into regular employment relationships, 30-hour work week, collective bargaining in all sectors, right to file class action lawsuits, capping of manager and executive salaries, stop of without-cause dismissals, legal entitlement to 36 days of vacation, abolition of the debt brake

“decade of future investments”, investment write-offs of at least 25%, introduction of the right to repair, promotion of sustainable start-ups with start-up capital of 25,000 euros, withdrawal of the state from non-sustainable investments, transformation of the debt brake in favor of 50 billion euros per year for digitization, climate protection and research

Fiscal and social policy

Minimum wage 13 euros/hour, pension level 53% (1200 € minimum pension) in O. and W., retirement at 60/65 years, “rent cap throughout the federal territory”, construction of 250,000 apartments/year, reintroduction of wealth tax up to 5%, income up to 1200 euros/month taxfree, state pension insurance for everyone, tax-free subsistence minimum 14,400 euros/year, wealth tax from 260,000 € 60%, from 1 million 75%; individual taxation instead of joint taxation of spouses

Minimum wage 12 euros/hour, increase in basic allowance for income tax, top tax rate of 45% from 100,000 and 48% from 200,000 €, wealth tax of 3%/year from 2 million euros, “security guarantee instead of Hartz IV” without sanctions, supplement of pay-as-you-go by capital-funded pension, pension level 48% (if necessary, tax subsidies), “guaranteed pension” that benefits more people than the “basic pension”, nationwide rent cap

Climate and energy Targets: “for a socio-ecological policy system change”; economy and infrastructure climate-neutral by 2035, state industrial transformation fund of 20 billion euros/year for ecological transformation of industry, free local transport, transformation to ecological agriculture, “railway for all!”, speed limit 120 km/h, 25% of agricultural land for organic agriculture by 2030, reduction of VAT for repairs

Coal exit and CO2 reduction by 70% by 2030, reform of the EU emissions trading system, “only emission-free cars to be newly registered from 2030”, CO2 price of 60 euros/tonne from 2023, energy money, climate bonus for low-income earners, 1.5 million new solar systems in four years, 2% of the area for wind turbines, railway expansion to make domestic flights superfluous, 130 km/h motorway (continued)

4.4  The Party Programs

117

Table 4.3   (continued)

Field of study

The Left

B 90/The Greens

Health policy

“100,000 more nursing staff in hospitals and 100,000 more nursing staff in nursing homes and 500 € more basic salary”, “solidary health insurance”, against contribution ceiling and co-payments, decriminalization of drugs

“Climate protection is health protection”, 1% of health expenditure for public health service, “citizen’s insurance”, digitalization of the health system, legalization of cannabis

Education policy

“200,000 additional educators”, “comprehensive all-day care”, “100,000 new positions for teachers and social pedagogues”, “inclusive education”, more kindergartens, free of charge with food, “community school” with longer joint learning

“diverse and inclusive schools”, “gender and sexual diversity and diversity in teaching and educational plans”, right to allday place at elementary schools, reform of BAföG in basic security for students and trainees, more permanent positions in the academic middle class, further development of tenure-track procedures

Family/Equal Opportunities

“Child basic security”: €328 child allowance + supplement of up to €302, free all-day care offer for children, extension of parental leave to 24 months and increase of the minimum amount to €400, no offsetting of parental leave against transfer benefits, more days of child sickness, introduction of the right of choice of relatives, women’s quota in management positions i.H.v. 50%, ” (care) work and time redistribute ”, “offensive and social for LSBTIQA *”

“Child basic security”, which bundles up existing benefits, child sickness benefit 15 days/ year, women’s quota on the boards of listed companies i.H.v. 1/3, supervisory boards 40%, repeal of the Transsexuality Act, 50% women in international negotiations

(continued)

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Table 4.3   (continued)

Field of study

The Left

B 90/The Greens

Foreign, European and security policy

Ban on arms (factory) exports, against foreign deployments of the Bundeswehr, dissolution of KSK, No to combat drones and nuclear weapons, support of refugees from war zones, for disarmament, for rescue at sea and “for the full restoration of the right to asylum”, “for a different European Union that takes and defends fundamental rights seriously”

“firmly committed to strengthening Europe as a community of values democratically”, rejection of the two-percent target, armed drones to protect soldiers, strengthening of the WHO, 0.7% of GNI for development cooperation

The Left, time to act! For social security, peace and climate justice. Election program for the federal elections 2021; B90/The Greens, Germany. Everything is in it. Election program 2021

Against this background, the development of green programmatics began in 1980 with the federal program of the year. In addition to ecological goals, it also contained social-egalitarian, pacifist-neutralist and alternative lifestyles. Older reservations about representative democracy have disappeared, but inclinations have remained to give high priority to resistance from “affected” and environmental protectionists. With the entry into parliament, the question of a coalition with the SPD became the main point of contention in the internal party dispute between “Realos” (realpoliticians around Joschka Fischer) and coalition-hostile “fundamentalists” (Raschke 1993, p. 460 ff.). A new phase in their development began for the Greens with German unity. Although the Left continues to prevail at their party conferences, the actual course of the party has been pushed in a more moderate direction (Kleinert 1992, Veen and Hoffmann 1992). A new study locates the current Greens through three positions (Stifel 2018, pp. 47 ff., 53, 62, 65, 71, 106, 114, 119 ff., 154, 174 ff., 178 ff., 281): • First, their commitment to sustainability and ecology (“determining guiding principle”), which in the population provides outstanding competence assignments in environmental policy and competing high in energy policy. • Second, they are neither for capitalism nor socialism. In questions of redistribution, they stand between the Union and the SPD. The competence attributed to them for economic policy and social justice is low.

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Table 4.4   The election programs of the parties in 2021 in comparison (continuation)

Topic area

FDP

AfD

Self-concept/central “Unleash the forces of the social “preserve the cultural identity of goals market economy and world-class Germany”, “German Leitkultur instead of ‘multiculturalism’” education for prosperity, freedom and upward mobility” State/immigration

Clear separation of flight and immigration, Basic Law as an integration policy guideline, citizenship after 4 years (citizenship tests, commitment to the Basic Law and citizenship celebrations), dual citizenship in the event of a decision-making compulsion from the grandchild generation, points system for immigration, stronger digitalization (incl. own ministry, financed by the sale of state Post and Telekom shares), reform of public broadcasting, term limit for Federal Chancellor to two legislative periods, extension of the legislative period to 5 years

Citizenship according to the principle of descent, for “direct democracy” incl. “referendums according to the Swiss model”, for free list election separation of office and mandate, term limit, against politician pensions, civil servant status for originally sovereign tasks, reform of party financing (incl. foundations), asylum applications only “with proven identity and citizenship”, for “deportation offensive”, expansion of the number of safe countries of origin, against family reunion, humanitarian aid in crisis regions instead of flight, exclusive qualified entry according to Japanese model, reform of public broadcasting

Inner security

against “any form of extremism”, “Quick Freeze instead of data retention”, against automated facial recognition in public space, against NetzDG, for right of information of victims of internet crimes, improved control of intelligence services, strengthening of the right to privacy in the digital space

“Resolutely combating left-wing violence” and “effective combating of foreign crime”, “protection of personal freedom from digital attacks”, reform of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, orientation of the federal police on border protection, against NetzDG (continued)

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Table 4.4   (continued)

Topic area

FDP

AfD

Economic policy

Flexibilization of working hours, strengthening of mobile working by entitlement to discussion, state debt ratio below 60%, for reform of the WTO, start-up grant of 300 € for 15 months, future fund for start-ups, coupling of mini and midi job limits to minimum wage

“We want to completely free the economy from politically imposed burdens.” (“Blue Deal”), flexibilization of labor law, subsidy reduction, relief for the Mittelstand, for minimum wage, strengthening of MINT subjects, national pharmaceutical and medical competence cluster, development of technologies and business models for space utilization

Tax and social policy

Reduction of corporate tax to 25%, abolition of trade tax, reduction of tax and social security rates (=taxes and social security contributions) to below 40% and lower tax burden for small and medium incomes, maximum tax rate only from EUR 90,000 income, against increase of top tax rate and inheritance tax, abolition of solidarity surcharge, capping of federal social spending at 50% of the budget, flexibility of retirement age, for occupational pension, abolition of sparkling wine/ beer/coffee/intermediate product tax, introduction of “Easy Tax” (pre-filled tax return)

Goal: reduction of tax and social security burden, focus on sales and income tax with abolition of property, wealth, inheritance, gift, trade and smaller consumption taxes, introduction of a sales-based digital tax, family splitting, AL-money I-payment duration after period of employment, “activating basic security”, increase of own contribution in ALG-II calculation, “freedom in retirement age”, for pay-as-yougo pension

Climate and energy Expansion of emissions tradpolicy ing in connection with stateprescribed CO2 quota, refund to citizens via “climate dividend”, against speed limit on highways and diesel bans, retention of combustion engines (with E-fuels), abolition of E-car subsidies, expansion of fast-charging stations, further privatization of the railway

Against target of climate neutrality and expansion of renewable energy, termination of Paris climate agreement, abolition of CO2 taxation, against EU “Green Deal”, for “preservation of the native landscape” at the expense of wind farms, re-establishment of nuclear research centers, strengthening of air traffic, against speed limit on highways (continued)

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Table 4.4   (continued)

Topic area

FDP

AfD

Health policy

For competition among health insurance companies, digitalization of the health care system, for legalization of cannabis, abolition of § 219a StGB, for “self-determination also at the end of life”, “three-pillar model for nursing care”

Merger of social nursing care insurance and statutory health insurance, individual budget for hospitals, against per-capita payments, area-wide collective agreement for nursing staff, strengthen medical care in rural areas, against vaccination obligation, reform of WHO

Education policy

“Rise independent of origin”, 2.5 billion euros annually for education (financed by 1% of VAT), centralization of final exams with increasing autonomy for schools, German tests for all children 1 year before enrollment, for needblind BAföG (200 € for all + 200 € for voluntary work + interestfree loans)

“differentiated school system”, reintroduction of the diploma and Magister, abolition of Islamic theology chairs, against “early sexualization” and for German in daycare, against “ever higher percentages of high school graduates”, special needs and vocational schools to be retained, “strengthen vocational education”, first four school years free of digital media, against inclusion classes, against confession-based Islamic instruction, “no money for ‘Gender Studies’”

Family/Equal treat- Family is where “people ment permanently and obligingly assume responsibility for each other”, recognition of multiple parenthood and parental agreements, adoption rights for all, commitment to liberal feminism, increase in parental leave partner months to 3 months, against quotas and for self-commitment by companies, strengthening the rights of LGBTI persons, for “partner protection” (analogous to maternity protection) 10 days after birth, for public evaluation of gender pay gap from 500 employees

Family “consists of father, mother and children”, increase in child allowance, “full tax deductibility of child-related expenses” and reduction of VAT for child-related items. Against anti-discrimination laws and “any form of quotas”, exemption of 20,000 euros/child from pension contributions, child benefit for the first 3 years, “marriage start credit” for family formation, subsidized land for families, “child-friendly society” as a state goal

(continued)

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Table 4.4   (continued)

Topic area

FDP

AfD

Foreign, security and European policy

For a “legally binding constitution with a basic rights catalog and strong institutions” and a strengthening of the EU’s strategic sovereignty (including the EU army, the EU foreign minister and the principle of majority voting), the upgrading of the European Parliament and the transnational party list election; the end of accession negotiations with Turkey, the European Monetary Fund instead of the ESM, the “strengthening of the community of democracies”, international disarmament and arms control, EU sanctions against Russia

Withdrawal from the EU and the establishment of a “European Economic and Interest Community”, the return to border controls and “physical barriers” at the borders, the withdrawal from the “Transfer Union”, against EU debts and the euro, against the “communitisation of European foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the European External Action Service”, membership of NATO and an active role of Germany in the OSCE “central”, against Russia sanctions, against EU accession of Turkey, participation of at least 51% of partner countries in development projects, reintroduction of conscription

FDP, There has never been more to do. Election program of the Free Democrats; AfD, Germany. But normal. Program of the Alternative for Germany for the election to the 20th German Bundestag

• Basic democracy versus representative democracy was the “third ideological pillar”. In the meantime, however, one has given up basic democratic structures as impractical, just as one has given up “nonviolence” as a governing party towards the outside with the Kosovo conflict (and later with the demand for arms deliveries to Ukraine in 2022) and internal security practically puts citizens’ rights first. One may argue whether the change is partially exaggerated here. Certainly, however, the Greens have carried out an “adaptation” that has made them “a fundamental alternative to a complementary part of the established party system”. Their voter potential is not carried by one generation alone, but by higher education and post-materialism orientation. e. The Left: From real to democratic socialism? The “Party of Democratic Socialism” (PDS) was the renamed, greatly reduced, new-led and programmatically changed continuation of the former state party of

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the former GDR, the SED. Its history can be traced back to the KPD founded in 1918/19 through this. After the collapse of real socialism in Europe, the PDS appeared in the east as an “anachronistic cadre and milieu party”, in West Germany, however, as a “sectarian party” (Neu 2003, S. 260). After differences of opinion had already torn the PDS apart (Schnirch 2008, S. 223 ff.), various leftwing currents have come together with the fusion of PDS and WASG to form “The Left”. Although the West German partners’ origin from the SPD, trade unions and left-wing extremist groups has considerably extended the Left Party’s political spectrum, this seems to have strengthened the radical left in the party for observers (Prinz 2010, S. 342, 346 ff.). In its Erfurt Program of 2011, the Left Party presents itself as a democratic socialist party that intends to achieve a different, dignified social and “democratic economic order” through socialization and democratic control with the “subordination of the economy to solidary development”. The crucial question of how the party deals with democracy (Pfahl-Traughber 2020, S. 119 ff.), which is obvious in view of its origin, has not yet been answered. The statement that the revolution in Germany was “crushed with the help of the SPD leadership” after 1918 is confusing—not a word about the fact that the civil war opened by Luxemburg, Liebknecht and their KPD was directed against the election of the National Assembly and against the Weimar democracy (Knabe 2009, S. 19 ff.). For the GDR, the thesis is put forward that the unification of SPD and KPD was desired by both sides, about social progress and equal opportunities, but also about “experiences of arbitrary state power and restricted freedoms”. Such a “Stalinism” one does not want again—leaving unclear how one stands to Leninism. In view of such a half-way overcoming of the past and of some partial organizations observed by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, some of the Left Party’s programmatic goals make others suspicious (The Left 2011, pp. 4 ff., 33, 46 ff.): How can the demanded possibilities for political strike be reconciled with the same political rights of all citizens? Does that not mean all power for those who are active in economic key positions? What does the demanded “democratization of all areas of society” mean for their performance (e.g. in the economy, science or culture)?—does this possibly hide political Gleichschaltung? What legitimacy should “economic and social councils” have? What does the party mean by “democratic socialism”? And how far should the “system change” demanded by it go? If, on the other hand, one concentrates on the day-to-day politics of the Left Party, it appears to be concentrated on two issues: social justice and representation of East German interests, as a result “rather a regional than an extremist

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party” (Koß 2007, p. 132, 152). This is also how its practice in municipalities and state governments works. For some time now, so-called reformers and orthodox have been struggling for the party line within the party, in particular with regard to possible government participation at state level (Oppelland and Träger 2014, pp. 115 ff., 132, 223; von Lucke 2015, p. 86). Although decades have passed since the Wende and practical local and regional politics have certainly promoted pragmatism, political science assessments have remained skeptical-critical. In particular, when looking back, one sees “no real engagement with the understanding of political freedom and no consistent break with the history of the SED” (Neugebauer and Stöss 2008, p. 189). The impression remains of a “smart extremism” which is not excluded, knows how to behave and does not appear to be dangerous (Jesse and Lang 2012, p. 20 f.) (Tab 4.3). f. The AfD as a right-wing populist outsider The “Alternative for Germany” was founded on 6 February 2013, at the core of former euro-critical CDU and FDP members. It became big in a time of grand coalitions, like so many parties of this spectrum before it (Nölke 2018, p. 332). Among the former CDU members in the AfD were Alexander Gauland and Konrad Adam, Jörg Meuthen was considered national-liberal. Others come from or sympathize with smaller circles such as • the fundamental-Christian network “Zivile Koalition”, which campaigns for the preservation of the family and against the equal treatment of homosexuals (Beatrix von Storch); • the national-neo-right “secession” from the Institut für Staatspolitik. Although its leading head rejected the formation of a party (before he applied for membership in 2014), others like Björn Höcke went to the AfD. • the “Identitarian Movement”, which campaigns for the preservation of Europe and against Muslim immigration. However, in 2016 an incompatibility resolution was passed against the Identitarians (Weiß 2017, pp. 83 ff., 86 ff., 91 ff.). Of the deputies of the first ten AfD state parliamentary groups, around 60% had no party card before. Among those who were previously in another party, former Union politicians accounted for 46.3%, FDP members for 12.2% and Social Democrats for 9.8% (Schroeder et al. 2017, pp. 20 f.). The AfD began with its rejection of credit for Greece during the Euro crisis. On other central issues, especially asylum/immigration and family, it took

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positions contrary to the other parties. Almost unanimous outrage and criticism came from politics, media, churches and unions, mostly ignited by statements from individual members. In spite of this, the AfD was able to clear the five percent hurdle in all state elections from 2014 on, especially when it moved the current issue of asylum/immigration to the foreground in 2015 and took a stand against the Chancellor’s welcome policy. At the same time, there were disputes within the party, in which personal animosities, power struggles and political differences of opinion hardly played a role. They ended with stalled party procedures and a number of party withdrawals (including former party leaders Bernd Lucke and Frauke Petry). A group branded as völkisch-nationalistic in public remains clearly visible in eastern Germany, especially in Saxony and Thuringia, under the now formally dissolved “wing” (Lewandowsky 2018). Due to its constant change, classifying the party poses some challenges, but one direction is clearly recognizable: the boundary to right-wing extremism is eroding more and more, the nationalist-völkisch wing of the party is gaining strength, while moderate forces are further lagging behind. The boundaries of the AfD to extremism were initially more clearly recognizable—the party congress in 2016 dissolved the state association Saarland due to contacts with the right-wing extremist scene, a state parliamentarian criticized for anti-Semitic statements was sidelined. Basic programs and election programs do not show any signs of right-wing extremism, rather of right-wing populism. Here the party takes positions contrary to the other parties: for example, on Euro rescue policy (where only part of the FDP thought similarly), on climate protection policy, on asylum/ immigration policy and on family policy. Overall, the program is based more on conservative-national principles, liberal-affirmative to market economy, hardly formulated on social policy. If one counts “communities” that give identity to right-wing populism, this is the German people here, in addition, elites and media are experienced as opponents (Bender 2017, p. 182). However, there are no “charismatic leader figures” as well as a “movement-like organizational character” (Spier 2010, pp. 21–22). With regard to the relationship to right-wing extremism, in addition to the programmatic, statements by individual politicians (not “backbenchers”, but in leading positions) are to be taken into account, in which a problematic attitude towards National Socialism, freedom of the press, religion and opinion, and racism are expressed, as well as the connections to the right-wing extremist scene (for example, to the Institute for State Policy, which is observed by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, to the Identitarian Movement) and the past of some politicians (Pfahl-Traughber 2019) (Table 4.4).

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Neu, Viola (2009): Demokratieverständnis in Deutschland. Auswertung einer repräsentativen Umfrage, Sankt Augustin. Neugebauer, Gero/Stöss, Richard (2008): Die Partei DIE LINKE, in: Niedermayer, Oskar (Ed.): Die Parteien nach der Bundestagswahl 2005, Wiesbaden, pp. 151 ff. Niedermayer, Oskar (2006): Das Parteiensystem Deutschlands, in: ders. et al. (Eds.): Die Parteiensysteme Westeuropas, Wiesbaden, pp. 109 ff. Niedermayer, Oskar (2013): Die Wähler der Piratenpartei, in: ders. (Eds.): Die Piratenpartei, Wiesbaden, pp. 63 ff. Niedermayer, Oskar (2015): Halbzeit. Die Entwicklung des Parteiensystems nach der Bundestagswahl 2013, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 46 (4), pp. 830 ff. Nölke, Andreas (2018): Politische Irrwege beim Umgang mit dem Rechtspopulismus, in: Becker, Karina et al. (Eds.): Arbeiterbewegung von rechts? Frankfurt a. M., pp. 325 ff. Oppelland, Torsten/Träger, Hendrik (2014): Die Linke. Willensbildung in einer ideologisch zerstrittenen Partei, Baden-Baden. Pappi, Franz U. (1977): Sozialstruktur, gesellschaftliche Wertorientierungen und Wahlabsicht, in: Kaase, Max (Ed.): Wahlsoziologie heute. Analysen aus Anlass der Bundestagswahl 1976, Opladen, pp. 195 ff. Patzelt, Werner J. (2018a): Parteien und Bürger – erreichen die Parteien noch die Bürger?, in: Morlok, Martin (Ed.): Parteienstaat – Parteiendemokratie, Baden-Baden, pp. 25 ff. Patzelt, Werner J. (2018b): Mängel in der Responsivität oder Störungen in der Kommunikation? Deutschlands Repräsentationslücke und die AfD, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 49 (4), pp. 885 ff. Petersen, Thomas (2011): Das Trennende ist geblieben, in: Kronenberg, Volker/Weckenbrock, Christoph (Eds.): Schwarz-Grün. Die Debatte, Wiesbaden, pp. 108 ff. Petersen, Thomas (2016): Zusammenwachsen oder Auseinanderdriften?, in: Kronenberg, Volker (Ed.): Schwarz-Grün. Erfahrungen und Perspektiven, Wiesbaden, pp. 73 ff. Pfahl-Traughber, Armin (2018): Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in: Jesse, Eckhard/Mannewitz, Tom (Eds.): Extremismusforschung. Handbuch für Wissenschaft und Praxis, Baden-Baden, pp. 303 ff. Pfahl-Traughber, Armin (2019): Die AfD und der Rechtsextremismus. Eine Analyse aus politikwissenschaftlicher Perspektive, Wiesbaden. Pfahl-Traughber, Armin (2020): Linksextremismus in Deutschland. Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahe, 2nd edn., Wiesbaden. Pollytix (2021): Pollytix-Wahltrend, unter: https://pollytix.de/wahltrend/ (zuletzt geprüft am 28. Oktober 2021). Prinz, Sebastian (2010): Die programmatische Entwicklung der PDS, Wiesbaden. Probst, Lothar (2006): Große Koalitionen als Sanierungsmodell? Erfahrungen aus Bremen, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 37 (3), pp. 627 ff. Probst, Lothar (2017): Bündnis 90, in: Decker, Frank/Neu, Viola (Eds.): Handbuch der deutschen Parteien, 3rd edn., Wiesbaden, pp. 200 ff. Raschke, Joachim (1993): Die Grünen. Wie sie wurden, was sie sind, Köln. Rölle, Daniel (2001): Wahlprogramme und parlamentarisches Handeln, in: ders. et al. (Eds.): Politik und Fernsehen, Wiesbaden, pp. 5 ff. Roßteutscher, Sigrid/Scherer, Philipp (2011): Ideologie und Wertorientierungen, in: Rattinger, Hans et al. (Eds.): Zwischen Langeweile und Extremen. Die Bundestagswahl 2009, Baden-Baden, pp. 131 ff.

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Rudzio, Wolfgang (1976): Parlamentarische Parteiendemokratie – oder was sonst?, in: Guggenberger, Bernd et al. (Eds.): Parteienstaat und Abgeordnetenfreiheit, München, pp. 117 ff. Saalfeld, Thomas (2015): Koalitionsmanagement der christlich-liberalen Koalition Merkel II, in: Zohlnhöfer, Reimut/ders. (Eds.): Politik im Schatten der Krise. Eine Bilanz der Regierung Merkel 2009–2013, Wiesbaden, pp. 191 ff. Sartori, Giovanni (1966): European Political Parties, in: LaPalombara, Joseph/Weiner, Myron (Eds.): Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton, pp. 137 ff. Sartori, Giovanni (1976): Parties and party systems, Cambridge. Schlieben, Michael (2007): Politische Führung in der Opposition. Die CDU nach dem Machtverlust 1997, Wiesbaden. Schmid, Josef (1990): Die CDU. Organisationsstrukturen, Politiken und Funktionsweisen einer Partei im Föderalismus, Opladen. Schmitt, Johannes/Franzmann, Simon T. (2017): Wie schädlich sind große Koalitionen?, in: Bukow, Sebastian/Jun, Uwe (Eds.): Parteien unter Wettbewerbsdruck, Wiesbaden, pp. 89 ff. Schnirch, Carina (2008): Die PDS als Kommunalpartei, Marburg. Schoen, Harald/Weins, Cornelia (2014): Der sozialpsychologische Ansatz zur Erklärung von Wahlverhalten, in: Falter, Jürgen W./Schoen, Harald (Eds.): Handbuch Wahlforschung, 2nd edn., Wiesbaden, pp. 241 ff. Schreiner, Ottmar (2007): Gegen die Entsozialdemokratisierung, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung vom 10. September. Schroeder, Wolfgang et al. (2017): Parlamentarische Praxis der AfD in den deutschen Landesparlamenten, WZB Discussion Paper SP V 2017–102, Berlin. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1950 [urspr. 1942]): Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie, Bern. SPD (1959): Grundsatzprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. Beschlossen vom Außerordentlichen Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands in Bad Godesberg vom 13. bis 15. November 1959. SPD (1989): Grundsatzprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. Beschlossen vom Programm-Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands am 20. Dezember 1989 in Berlin geändert auf dem Parteitag in Leipzig am 17.04.1998. Spier, Tim (2010): Modernisierungsverlierer? Die Wählerschaft rechtspopulistischer Parteien in Westeuropa, Wiesbaden. Spier, Tim (2013): Realisierbare Koalitionsoption im Zeithorizont 2013/2017?, in: Decker, Frank/Jesse, Eckhard (Eds.): Die deutsche Koalitionsdemokratie vor der Bundestagswahl 2013, Baden-Baden, pp. 369 ff. Steglich, Henrik (2005): Die NPD in Sachsen. Organisatorische Voraussetzungen ihres Wahlerfolgs 2004, Göttingen. Sternberger, Dolf (1962): Grund und Abgrund der Macht, Frankfurt a. M. Sternberger, Dolf (1970): Stadtregierung und Stadtnebenregierung, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung vom 21. Februar. Stifel, Andreas (2018): Vom erfolgreichen Scheitern einer Bewegung. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen als politische Partei und soziokulturelles Phänomen, Wiesbaden. Tagesschau (2021): Welche Themen entschieden die Wahl?, unter: https://www.tagesschau. de/wahl/archiv/2021-09-26-BT-DE/umfrage-wahlentscheidend.shtml (zuletzt geprüft am 28. Oktober 2021).

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5

Internal Party Democracy or Rule of Oligarchy?

5.1 The Organizational Structure of the Parties a. The organizational levels The statutes and organizational statutes of the parties provide for a formation of will emanating from the members. They thus follow a democratic-participatory norm, the feasibility of which has been doubted. As early as 1911, Robert Michels (1957) came to a devastating result in a world-famous study of three socialist parties, which were more than all others sworn to that norm, including the SPD: Even in these parties, the members were led from above. Michels’ explanations: Size of the organization, professional advantages, leader-orientedness of the masses were so impressive that one still speaks of his “iron law of oligarchy” (Hague et al. 2016, p. 258) today. Is inner-party democracy therefore impossible? Does it have to be defined differently? What conditions are favorable for it? These questions still occupy research today. They also guide the following considerations. Even the formal organization of the parties creates different opportunities for influence. In order to ensure their unity and operational capability both centrally and locally despite their large geographical extent, parties are divided into several organizational levels. In Germany, these are the following, based on the structure of public territorial bodies: • Local associations (or “city and district associations” for the CDU, “local associations” for the SPD): They each include the party members of a political community. According to their own statements, the SPD has around 9000, the CSU 3000, the CDU about 10,000, the FDP about 2200 and the Greens about 1800 local associations. Even parties with many members cannot ­muster

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Mannewitz and W. Rudzio, The Political System of Germany, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41371-2_5

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enough members for a local association in every community; on the other hand, parties also form several local associations in larger cities. • District associations correspond to the district and rural districts and thus include several local associations. For the SPD, these are “subdistricts”, identical to districts or several combined. In smaller parties, district associations often form the lowest level of organization. • State associations correspond to the federal states. In Lower Saxony, the CDU structure also knows the state associations of Hanover, Oldenburg and Braunschweig (following the state structure of 1946). “Districts”—smaller than federal states, but larger than districts—exist with CDU and FDP with little importance, while they play an important role in CSU and SPD (in Lower Saxony and Hesse) (Bukow 2013a, p. 119). • Federal Association: It is the highest organizational level (with the CSU: state association) with the state associations (or districts) as subunits. Above the federal level, there are only party associations at the European level. b. Party organs and majority-favoring election procedures A second cut through the party organizations results when one looks at the organs of the individual territorial units. Their respective powers imply different possibilities for influence in concrete decisions. In detail: • The members’ or representatives’ assembly (general assembly, party conference or “federal delegates’ conference”), consisting of the members or the representatives elected by them (delegates), is “the highest organ of the respective regional association” (§ 9 Party Act). It decides on questions of statutes, programme and political line. In addition, it elects the members of the other organs of the same regional association as well as delegates for the next higher level of organisation. • The board leads the party subdivision within the framework of the resolutions of the members’ assembly or the party conference. This means making necessary individual decisions, managing financial resources, organising election campaigns and other activities, and representing the regional association to the outside world. In order to be able to act quickly and to carry out ongoing business, larger boards often form a closer executive board. • An general party committee varies considerably in its designation. At federal level it appears as “federal committee” (CDU), “party committee” (CSU), “federal main committee” (FDP), “state council” (Greens) or “party council” (SPD, Left Party). It is an organ representing the respective regional subdivisions, in addition to party organisations for CDU, CSU and the Left Party.

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Its functions are partly advisory in nature, partly those of a replacement party conference with decision-making powers. • A party arbitration court has to decide on questions of statutes and election challenges as well as to impose “disciplinary measures”—warnings, temporary bans on functions, party expulsions—on individual members or party sub-divisions. The aim is to comply with the principles of the rule of law by ensuring that members of the arbitration court are not also members of the executive board or regularly receive income from their party. In addition, there are appeals to arbitration courts at higher levels. In addition, § 10 Party Act sets high barriers for party expulsion: “A member can only be expelled from the party if he intentionally violates the statutes or grossly violates the principles of the party’s order and thus causes serious damage to the party”1. The position and importance of a party organ also depend on how and by whom its members are elected. For internal party elections, • that they take place in secret and the voter usually has to tick as many candidates as there are positions to be filled, but at least half as many (in the case of the board elections for the CDU Federal Executive, even three quarters) if his vote is to be valid. This majority voting (mitigated only in the case of the Greens) allows a majority acting in concert to fill all delegate or executive positions alone. • that the delegates to the federal party conferences are elected in different ways: with the Greens exclusively at the district level, with the Left Party in delegate constituencies, with the CDU, CSU and SPD partly also at district, sub-district and county party conferences. Only in the case of the FDP do state party conferences alone elect these delegates (Bukow 2013a, p. 142 ff.). This allows for more direct influence from below and weakens the political screening effect of a staged election. • The number of delegates a subdivision sends to a party conference (delegate key) is primarily based on the ratio of membership numbers. In addition, the number of votes achieved in public elections can also be taken into account. According to the latter principle, one fifth of the delegate seats at the federal party conference are allocated to the CDU, half to the FDP and one fifth to the

1 At

federal level, among the parties represented in the Bundestag, there were a total of 730 proceedings from 1990 to 2000, including 81 party expulsion proceedings (Büdding 2003, p. 247, 249).

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SPD. In the case of the Left Party, only membership numbers are taken into account in the delegate key, but “associations” within the party send additional delegates. • In addition, “ex-officio” members, i.e. those who automatically hold a position by virtue of another public or party office, sit on party boards alongside elected members. Up to one fifth of ex-officio members are allowed for party conferences and party executive committees, and up to one third for party committees, according to the Party Constitution. This means that all members of the SPD party executive automatically belong to the federal party conference, while only honorary chairpersons of the party, members of the party executive, chairpersons of the working groups and districts, CSU government members and parliamentary group leaders belong to the CDU. The Left Party, the Greens and the FDP do not have ex-officio members. • Finally, women’s quotas apply in executive committee elections: 40% of those elected must be women in the case of the CSU, and 50% in the case of the SPD, CDU and Left Party. At least one third of the members of the Green Party Federal Executive must be simple members of parliament (Bukow 2013a, p. 142 ff., 145). Similar quotas apply to candidate lists. This gives more women the opportunity to take on functions, but restricts the freedom to choose. In addition to the general organizational structure, which captures all members according to their place of residence and forms the basis for the formation of will within the party, larger parties also have auxiliary organizations. With their help, certain categories of members are sought to be addressed in particular. For example, the Union parties have “associations” (CSU: “working groups”) such as the Young Union, the Women’s Union, the Christian Democratic Workers’ Association (CDA) and the middle class association. Within the SPD, these correspond to the “working groups”, such as the Young Socialists, the Women’s Group, 60 plus (seniors), the Lawyers’ Group, the Self-Employed, the Group for Employee Issues, etc. In the case of smaller parties, only the Left Party has a comparable number of auxiliary organizations (Oppelland and Träger 2014, pp. 111–123). The task of the affiliated organizations is, according to the party statutes, to campaign for the party with certain target groups, but on the other hand—explicitly in the CDU—“to preserve the special interests of the groups represented by them in the politics of the CDU” (CDU quoted according to Trefs 2007, p. 208). In fact, only a minority of the party members addressed are involved in the respective affiliated organizations. For example, in the CDU, the workers’ group CDA comprises only around 18,000 members, the middle class ­association

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around 30,000, the Junge Union 125,000, the Frauen-Union 150,000 and the group of expellees and refugees 25,000 (Lepszy 2013)2. At the same time, nonparty members have the opportunity to participate in affiliated organizations. The character of affiliated organizations as a forefield is even further strengthened if they are formally outside their party—as is the case with the “Economic Council” of the CDU. The legally completely separated forefield also includes the party-related foundations: Konrad-Adenauer- (CDU) and Friedrich-Ebert- (SPD), Hanns-Seidel(CSU), Friedrich-Naumann- (FDP), Heinrich-Böll- (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), Rosa-Luxemburg- (Die Linke) and Desiderius-Erasmus-Foundation (AfD). State-financed3 they employ, according to their own statements, more than 3200 employees4. They can be referred to as “think tanks” with the task of producing and disseminating important ideas and information to their party, promoting young elites (scholarships for students), and also developing “suggestions for political action” (Gerhard Hirscher/Seidel-Stiftung). Their representatives abroad are to cooperate with closely related political currents and serve economic and democratic development. As such, the foundations represent “worldwide unique organizations” (Heisterkamp 2014, p. 118). The statutory structure of the parties is democratic in so far as all party organs derive from the will of the members, party assemblies or party conferences are subordinate to the other organs and judicial functions are separated from others. The necessary operational capability justifies the free delegate mandate, the intra-party majority voting right and the ex-officio memberships. Deviations from this basic model are shown above all in the statutory law of the Greens. Unusually, they provide for the incompatibility of an MP mandate and a board position at federal and state level, with the order being increasingly softened in the end. The same applies to the ban on re-election after two two-year terms in the federal executive board (rotation). Finally, the Greens have a women’s council with directive competence, a federal women’s conference and a gender-balanced composition of all offices (Probst 2013, p. 520). The intention behind these regulations is to counteract the concentration of power and the under-representation of women. Democracy from below, not

2 In

some cases, additional contributions have to be paid, which explains some membership figures. 3 Exception: the Erasmus Foundation (as of January 19, 2022). 4 Only the number of employees of the Erasmus Foundation is (still) not public.

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oligarchy—that is the goal. However, this comes at the expense of professionalism, operational capability and legitimacy. As a result, the provisions on rotation have now only “remnants” in statutory law, offences against rotation of mandates and paid state speakers are widespread, the incompatibility of party office and public mandate is observed differently. In most cases, the basic democratic regulations have “given way to the compulsion of success” (Stern 2004, p. 72). And where basic democracy is practiced, at state party assemblies of the Greens, sometimes only small minorities appear. The members’ party conferences of the early AfD are also only attended by minorities, so that the actual role of the members does not appear to be strengthened in this way (Koschmieder 2017, p. 183, 194). It is common practice among the Greens and other parties to pay a salary to elected chairpersons at state or federal level if the person concerned does not hold a political mandate with allowances. This, quite useful practice for an internal party democracy, is gradually expanding in the direction that holders of timeconsuming party leadership positions also receive a certain additional income in the event of allowances. The line between voluntary party function and paid party employees is blurred, the elected and paid party secretary of yesteryear seems to be making a comeback. In addition, the feeling of discontent within and across parties has led to the fact that everywhere one approached the idea of more opportunities for non-members (“trial membership”), inner-party direct elections and member votes. Thus, the SPD party chairman Scharping (1993–95) was the first federal chairman of a major party to owe his function to a member vote, as did several top candidates of the SPD for state elections and a top candidate of the CDU in NRW. In the FDP, member decisions were made on the so-called “big ear attack” and on Euro politics, in the Greens on the separation of party office and mandate. The participation of members was around 50%. After the statutes of CDU and CSU, member surveys on factual and personnel issues are possible (most recently in the election of Friedrich Merz as CDU and Saskia Eskens as well as Norbert Walter-Borjans as SPD federal chairmen), in other parliamentary parties member decisions on factual and in SPD and Greens also on personnel issues (Bukow and Poguntke 2013, p. 199). The conditions and triggering instances differ from party to party (Decker 2018, p. 286). On state level, 16 member decisions on party chairpersons or top candidates took place in the SPD and five in the CDU between 1994 and 2012, with an average participation of 45%. No trend towards more direct member decision-making is discernible (Detterbeck 2014, p. 121, 128). However, there is resistance among party activists to the decision-making rights of nonmembers (Bukow 2013b, p. 240). At the same time, clear member majorities call for the primary election of Bundestag candidates and referendums on issues (Ale-

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mann and Laux 2012, p. 253)—one does not want to leave everything to elected representatives.

5.2 Inner-Party Democracy in Practice a. The empirical picture of inner-party processes After previous differences between the mass and integration party SPD on the one hand and the character of CDU, CSU and FDP as rather loose groups determined by prime ministers, parliamentary groups and interest groups on the other hand (Wildenmann 1974, p. 356) have been levelled out (a massive increase in membership in the 1970s allows one to speak of a “belated party formation” in the Union parties) (Scheer 1977), relatively general statements can be made about inner-party practice. When it comes to intra-party democracy, it should first be noted that only 45% of party members actually want to influence the political course of their party— whether the others agree with their line or shy away from the effort of active participation. 14% (up to 35-year-olds: almost 30%, similarly to party office) express an interest in a public mandate (Klein and Spier 2011, pp. 38 ff.). A party member initially has to deal with his local association or the basic structure of a subsidiary organization. In the relationship between the different party levels, it is customary that higher instances prescribe guidelines and program decisions to lower ones, but that each local association decides independently on local issues and each state association on state issues. In general, work is done more side by side and “relatively isolated” on the different party levels (Kaack 1971, pp. 692 ff.). Accordingly, the activities of a local association concentrate on local politics. Overall, even in a party like the SPD, more than half of the local associations carry out a maximum of two political events per year (Totz 2012, pp. 77 ff.). Local party assemblies are only visited by a more or less strong minority of members. Studies only see 10% regularly active members (Florack et al. 2005, p. 100). In a 2009 survey, i.e. in an election year, 27% of party members described themselves as “very active”/“somewhat active”. Members of the Left Party (36%), the FDP (34%), then the Greens and the SPD (both 30%) have an above-average level of activity, on average the CDU (27%) is below average, the CSU with its high membership density is below average (24%) (Spier 2011a, p. 99). However, the attendance at the assembly varies: it seems to be highest in the case of intra-party conflicts and in smaller local associations (Niedermayer 1989, p. 20; Vorländer 1992, p. 310), high also in the new federal states (but with low membership numbers) (Hallermann 2003, p. 61).

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According to findings of the SPD, already in the year 2000 70–100,000 active members had to fill 50,000 intra-party functions and parliamentary mandates (Bartels and Machnig 2001, p. 221). This means little choice. In rural areas, therefore, candidates for the municipal council are also recruited outside the party membership, especially in the new federal states, where small community sizes meet a thin membership density of the parties. The “high number of non-party members” on the candidate lists of the parties is to be valued as a “sign of the shortage” (Werz 2000, p. 9; Hallermann 2003, p. 63). The reality is determined by a second factor: In larger local associations, member assemblies are too large for resolutions or candidate lists from their midst. It is therefore customary to hold preliminary consultations in a smaller circle, in the executive committee or at informal meetings of active members. Agreed preliminary decisions are then represented by the participants in the member assembly and—if no competing circles exist—enforced. The member assembly remains the supreme body of the local association, but the place of actual decision-making is often shifted to smaller leadership circles. What can be observed at the base continues similarly on higher party levels: that the actual decisions are made in smaller committees, while democratically particularly legitimized party conferences only appear acclamatory. This is not only indicated by some studies of the middle party levels, but above all by analyses of the course of older federal party conferences. For these it was shown that • Members of the party leaderships are disproportionately often given the floor—at least this is how counted cases of party conferences of the SPD and the Greens5; • Motions from party executive committees have by far greater chances of being accepted than those from regional associations or delegates. However, motions from “below” are often taken into account in summary executive committee motions and declared “settled” with their acceptance; • the candidate proposals submitted by party leaderships are usually accepted with only a few changes. In summary, it has therefore been “constantly observed for party conferences early on that the party leaderships have a political advantage over the delegates” (Dittberner 1973).

5 Protocols

of SPD party conferences 1986 and 1988 (Raschke 1993, p. 538).

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Even in the nomination of candidates for federal elections, there are few changes to the proposal lists of the state executive committees, hardly any counter-candidates against incumbent candidates in the constituencies. Proposal lists are shaped by proportional rules that restrict free competition and “in the worst case turn intra-party democracy into a farce” (Höhne 2017, p. 245). Nevertheless: “In addition to Alliance 90/The Greens, who continue to let their members decide in the city-states and in Hesse as well as the Left in Bremen and Saarland, the AfD (with the exception of North Rhine-Westphalia and Saxony) and the FDP in Hamburg now also held state member assemblies”, with an average of 1.8% of members taking part (Schüttemeyer and Pyschny 2020, p. 202). And also in the constituencies, the practice changed in recent years: In 2017, for example, two thirds of the CDU candidates, one third of the SPD candidates, all of the Green and AfD candidates and almost all of the FDP and Left candidates were nominated in member assemblies—by an average of 7.8% of the members (Höhne 2017, p. 235 ff.). On the whole, the selection of candidates appears to be more based and controversial than before, which does not exclude the influence of local and district executive committees, but does restrict it. The trend is countered in Baden-Württemberg by the Greens and the CDU, who—instead of the previous election of all state parliamentarians from the direct candidates—also wanted to introduce state lists (as in the other states) (Soldt 2018). This would improve women’s chances, but also strengthen the influence of middle and higher party functionaries on the selection of candidates. b. The law of oligarchy or anticipated reaction? Where does the general shift of power to top management come from? A first cause of this is to be seen in capacity limits of large committees: The more members a committee has, the more difficult it is to develop majority-capable proposals and candidate lists within a short period of time. In addition, there is the rule: The larger the committee, the less often it can meet. This is especially true for the federal party conferences, which are legally powerful. According to their own statements, 1001 delegates take part in the CDU, 600 in the SPD, 662 in the FDP, 820 in the Greens and 580 in the Left Party; advisory members and guests are also included. For this reason, the large party conferences of the Union and the SPD are also usually largely uneventful (Korte et al. 2018, p. 96 ff.). Other party bodies can also suffer from this problem, such as the federal executive committees (CDU over 60, CSU 52, SPD maximum 34, FDP minimum 45, Left 44, Greens 6, AfD 14 or 15); in addition, there are several participants without voting rights. The large presidiums are rather “forum

142

5  Internal Party Democracy or Rule of Oligarchy?

for negotiation processes” (Uwe Jun quoted according to Korte et al. 2018, p. 79). Only the small presidiums can be considered as action-capable leadership bodies (as of January 2022: 23 members in the CDU, 14 in the SPD, 12 each in the FDP and the Left). Secondly, there is an information and communication gap within the party: While simple delegates only bring personnel knowledge to their own regional association, there are others who maintain cross-regional contacts, have farreaching personal knowledge and can therefore make prior arrangements; such as members of executive committees and parliamentary groups, but also the “delegate aristocracy”, which has already attended several party conferences (Raschke 1993, p. 551). Finally, only top representatives of a party have access to the mass media and thus the chance to reach the mass of delegates and voters through media-broadcasted statements. This makes the “plebiscitary shoulder-to-shoulder of the party leaders” (Wiesendahl 1997, p. 375) possible with the voters bypassing the delegate and committee party. This also applies to the regional conferences introduced by the CDU. In general, the relevance of media mediation has given rise to the type of media-savvy “star politician” (Schmid 2010, p. 84), whose selfpresentation talent says little about his problem-solving competence. Is the formation of will in parties carried out unilaterally from top to bottom? Is it only about “rubber-stamping” decisions made elsewhere (Christine Hohmann-Dennhardt quoted according to Weigl 2013, p. 141)? Against such a view speak internal party conflicts, voting battles and occasionally also defeats of party leaderships—and that already in the early phase of the Federal Republic, which is often retrospectively assessed as conflict-averse. In fact, not always a closed leadership and only individual delegates face each other. Often internal party groups appear: such as associations of the CDU, working groups of the SPD, regional party units, internal or directional groups. The Left Party conference in 2011 was characterized by “current compromises” (Oppelland and Träger 2014, pp. 115 ff.), while a “peace treaty” (Switek 2012, p. 209) was ensured by informal quotas for important positions among the Greens. In the course of the protracted conflicts within the SPD from 1970 onwards, directional groups of the Left and the “Seeheimer Kreis” of the Right played a central role (Müller-Rommel 1982; Gebauer 2005, p. 248); within the CDU, internal currents are based on associations, in particular the CDA and the Mittelstandsvereinigung like to make “opinionated political statements” (Bösch 2005, p. 174; Trefs 2007, p. 213 f., 219). In an established state party like the CSU, “power centers” such as the state government, party leadership, parliamentary group and “state group” in the Bundestag compete; the district chairmen also

5.3  The Party Members—The Downside of Participation

143

play a central role (Kießling 2004, p. 342; Hopp and Zeitler 2020, p. 218 ff.). In sum, it is not an exaggeration to speak of “alliances of fragmented subgroups” (Korte et al. 2018, p. 109) in view of the internal contradictions within parties. A second restriction of the oligarchy thesis results from the question of whether the high success chances of board proposals necessarily imply that members or delegates are dominated by oligarchic leaderships. Those success chances, those missing open conflicts can be explained in other ways: that leadership groups that are carefully concerned about their base and that feedback to the will of the majority (or what is still tolerable to them) formulate, so to speak, the wishes of members and delegates in advance (principle of anticipated reactions6). The result: Neither does an inner-party democracy of equals exist, whose will formation takes place from bottom to top, nor does an inner-party oligarchy prevail. Rather, there is a decentralized, representative-democratic structure that is realized in the leadership through professional and communicative advantages, but also through anticipatory reactions. This is an expression of the adaptation of democracy to the requirement of actionability. However, overall, inner-party relations and processes lose importance in the face of further increasing (social) media communication.

5.3 The Party Members—The Downside of Participation The quality of inner-party democracy and the role of the parties also depend on how many and which citizens belong to the parties. The total number of party members in Germany today is about 1.2 million. Until 1948, this number first increased rapidly, then fell during the 1950s, stagnated and increased again at the major parties from the mid-1960s. Since reunification, the number has halved again. As Table 5.1 shows, the previously large membership advantage of the SPD over the Union parties during the social-liberal coalition (1969–82) has almost shrunk to equality. Since 1983, a general downward trend can be observed, which is not offset by the addition of the Greens and the (still) membership-weak AfD (Schulze-Fielitz 2015).

6 This

“rule of anticipated reactions” was already pointed out by Friedrich (1970, p. 71).

144

5  Internal Party Democracy or Rule of Oligarchy?

Table 5.1   The development of party membership (in thousands)

Year

AfD

CDU

CSU

FDP

SPD

B90/Grüne

DKP/ab 1990 PDS/ab 2007 Die Linke

1947a

400

82

55

875

–

–

1952

200

52

83

627

–

–

1960

255

53

80

650

–

–

1970

329.0

93.0

57.0

820.0

–

30

1980

693.0

172.0

85.0

987.0

15.0

40

1989

663.0

186.0

65.0

921.0

41.0

18.7

1990

789.6

186.2

168.2

943.4

41.3

280.9

2000

616.7

181.0

62.7

734.7

46.6

83.5

2010 2015

16.4

505.3

153.9

68.5

502.1

53.0

73.7

444.4

144.4

53.2

442.8

59.4

59.0

2016

25.0

431.9

142.4

53.9

432.7

61.6

58.9

2017

27.6

425.9

141.0

63.1

443.2

65.0

62.3

2018

33.5

414.9

138.4

63.9

437.8

75.3

62.0

2019

34.8

405.8

139.1

65.5

419.3

96.5

60.9

2020

31.9

399.1

136.0

66.0

404.3

107.3

60.4

dar. Women (in%)

18.1

26.6

21.5

21.1

33.0

41.7

36.6

a The data for the period before 1970 are mostly to be valued as estimates. Other differing data are due to different survey dates or subsequent corrections. Sources: Hübner and Rohlfs (1990, p. 312 f.); Niedermayer (2021).

The development of membership has sometimes been different for government and opposition parties during certain phases, but more often (as since 1983) all parties have been subject to the same trend. In the new federal states, there is also a reaction to the totalitarian over-organization that has lasted for decades; the former SED, which counted 1,464,000 members at the time of its rebranding to the PDS in December 1989, is a particularly striking, but by no means typical, case here. As a result, there is a particularly thin membership base in the new federal states. In comparison, the degree of organization of the German parties, i.e. the number of party members in relation to the electorate, does not appear to be unusual:

5.3  The Party Members—The Downside of Participation

145

it is significantly higher than in Anglo-Saxon democracies, France and the Netherlands, but lower than in Italy, Spain and smaller European countries. The downward trend also does not appear to be unusual. The decline in parties was much steeper in Great Britain, Italy and other countries (Detterbeck 2011, p. 135; Florack et al. 2005, p. 97). This is often seen as a sign of “party disenchantment” (Alemann et al. 1998, p. 31). Whether the recent increase in liberals and Greens marks a turning point remains to be seen. The members of political parties, a small minority of the population of 1.7% (as of 2020), do not reflect this representatively. This already applies to demographic characteristics: • Gender: The significant under-representation of women is only slowly being dismantled. As Table 5.1 shows, the proportion of women is significantly higher in left-wing parties than in others. • Age: Middle years between 30 and 60 years of age make up a large block of party members, but are now facing high proportions of older people. In 2020, the average age in the CDU and SPD is 61 years, in the CSU 60, in the Left 54, in the FDP 51 and among the Greens 48 years. Among the FDP, Greens and Left, around one in five is under 30 years old (trend recently slightly increasing), among the other parties it is not even one in ten. Within the AfD, the proportion of those under 35 is 12%. Observers speak of a “aging” of party membership (Wiesendahl 2006, p. 53). Is an “old republic” looming? The German Party Membership Study 2009 shows that those over seventy years of age make up 31% and 23% of party members in the CDU and SPD, respectively, but a much lower proportion of local and district executive members. And those aged 60 to 69 were only slightly over-represented among local and district executive members of the CDU and significantly under-represented in the SPD (d’Antonio and Munimus 2017, p. 319). The old, although very numerous, do not dominate. Among the criteria of social stratification, party members also appear to be unrepresentative. 1. Occupational groups: In the parties, employees and probably housewives are massively under-represented, while the public sector and academics/freelancers are strongly over-represented. Table 5.2 shows that the imbalances are otherwise quite party-specific: Among the “welfare state parties”, workers are overrepresented, among the “market economy parties” self-employed people.

146

5  Internal Party Democracy or Rule of Oligarchy?

Table 5.2   The occupational structure of party members in 2017 in percent of members

SPD

CDU

FDP

CSU

Grüne

Linke

Bevölkerung

Arbeiter

16

7

3

9

5

17

9

Employees

29

33

32

28

28

32

68

Officials/public employ- 44 ees

30

27

29

44

35

11

Independent

25

23

28

13

10

9

6

15

6

9

6

2

7

Academics and freelanc- 4 ers

Source: German Party Members Study 2017 (survey), according to: Klein, Markus et al. (2019): The social structure of German party membership. Empirical findings of the German Party Members Studies 1998, 2009 and 2017, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 50 (2019) H. 1, p. 81 ff.

2. The educational level of party members is higher than that of the general population. While the latter is to be expected to have a share of those with a university or college degree of less than 18%, it is 44% among party members (and has even increased over time). This is significantly above average for the small parties (Greens 72, FDP 63 and Left 51%), but 43 for the CDU, 34 for the CSU and 41% for the SPD (Klein et al. 2019, pp. 88 f.). As with the electorates, but at a higher level, the “educated” smaller parties are opposed to the less educated mass parties. 3. Older studies on the incomes of party members showed a marked line of demarcation between FDP and CDU/CSU members with higher incomes and those of the left-wing parties with lower incomes (Gabriel and Niedermayer 2001, p. 290). There is a lack of recent surveys, as the information provided is considered unreliable. A certain replacement is provided by self-classifications into social classes. “In 2017, 21% of the respondents classified themselves as belonging to the lower class or the lower middle class. Among party members, only twelve percent did so. At the same time, one third of party members classified themselves as belonging to the upper middle class or the upper class, while the corresponding proportion in the population was only 21%.” (Klein et al. 2019, p. 93). The FDP deviated most from this (upper middle class and upper class 51%), the Left the least (lower middle class and lower class 34%). At the same time, the question of the validity arises—the debate about Friedrich Merz’ self-classification as a member of the middle class (with a fortune of millions) in 2018 (Bemmer 2018) underlines this exemplary.

5.3  The Party Members—The Downside of Participation

147

Table 5.3   The confession of party members in 2017 in percent of the respective party members

CSU

CDU

SPD

FDP

Grüne

Linke

Catholic

78

52

23

23

21

8

Evangelisch

15

38

47

41

33

12

Sonstige/keine

7

11

30

36

47

80

Source: Deutsche Parteimitgliederstudie 2017 (Befragung), nach: Klein et al. (2019).

There are still significant, persistent differences in the religious affiliation of members. This is made clear in Table 5.3. The proportion of non-believers increases continuously from right to left in the party spectrum, but makes a big jump to Die Linke; Catholics dominate the Union (CSU stronger than CDU), Protestants are (with the exception of the Left) a large group everywhere. The SPD is closest to the total population in terms of religious composition. In essence, the situation is similar with party members by region. “For the CDU (with the exception of Thuringia), the SPD and the Greens, the eastern German states still lag behind, for the FDP Bavaria and Bremen are added. The Left Party is still very much an eastern German regional party […]. However, it does not even come close to the recruitment potential of the CDU, CSU and SPD in the West in its eastern German strongholds. For the AfD […] the values shift in favor of the eastern German states […] In total, all parties have the highest proportion of party members in Saarland. […] The laggards are Saxony and SaxonyAnhalt” (Niedermayer 2021, p. 375). Does the population, if not demographically and socially, at least reflect its political basic views in party members? This is not entirely the case either. As early as the 1970s, surveys showed that members and functionaries of the SPD tended to be “left” more often, while members of the CDU and CSU tended to be “right” more often than voters of their parties (Feist et al. 1977, p. 266, 277; Schmitt 1992, p. 142). This picture has recently been confirmed (Spier 2011b, p. 129; Neu 2017, p. 12): Party members are moving outward, voters are gravitating more towards the center. In all this, the inner-party leading role of professional or semi-professional politicians must be taken into account. Already at the local level—as mayors or as department heads—full-time political actors appear, in addition to semi-professionals who combine trade union functions or careers in the public service with local political activity. This professionalization tendency is more pronounced at the state and federal level through holders of mandates, government offices,

148

5  Internal Party Democracy or Rule of Oligarchy?

political civil service positions and salaried trade union functions7. Should one, in order to strengthen inner-party participation, impose limits on the “professional politician rule”? Wiesendahl (2012, p. 151) pleads here for “strict office term limits”, considers the separation of office and mandate and advocates inner-party primary elections in order to expose politicians to a “greater risk of failure”—proposals that have already been tried and largely abandoned, especially among the Greens. As a result, professionalization reduces the relevance of the social and political aspects of party membership in two ways: • It goes hand in hand with a greater voter orientation among the politically decisive professional politicians, since for these, public elections are not only about the victory or defeat of their party, but also about their personal advancement. • The politicians dissociate themselves from the social group they come from: The interest in one’s own political career leads to taking on all interests that promise votes and support. In summary, Lösche (2000) has diagnosed the SPD, in view of its membership, as “calcified-bourgeois-professionalized”. Something similar could be said about the Union parties. Those who regard the younger generation as a “seismograph of social change” and take into account its greater distance to parties (Glaab 2003, p. 133) with the result that few new members join the parties, are faced with the perspective of a generally thin membership base like in the new federal states and a “professionalized media communication party” (Jun 2013, p. 137 ff.).

5.4 Problems of a Fair Party Financing a. The eventful history of party financing Before 1933, political parties were essentially financed through membership dues and donations. Only in the Federal Republic has party financing been subject to statutory regulations and supplemented by state funds. This has a centralizing effect within the parties and weakens the influence of donors. The regulations on

7 The

full-time party apparatus (up to about 1200 people at the CDU and 1008 at the SPD in 1992—Niclauß 2002, pp. 165 ff.), remains outside the scope of this, as it has no political power.

5.4  Problems of a Fair Party Financing

149

party financing have a long and controversial history. It can be summarized in four sections: First: The entry into the donation benefit 1949–58. In the beginning there was the memory of the failure of the Weimar Republic, of the financing of the National Socialists by circles of the heavy industry (Kulitz 1983, p. 21 ff.). This prompted the Parliamentary Council to the provision of Article 21 of the Basic Law, which stipulates that “parties must give public account of the origin of their funds”. This remained merely a postulate at first, as it was not until the Grand Coalition in 1967 that the necessary implementing legislation was enacted. Instead, funds from the economy played a significant role again. Funding societies collected tax-deductible donations and distributed them to certain parties according to a key in order to influence their policy (Dübber 1962, p. 41 ff.; Breitling 1961; Braunthal 1965, p. 139, 201). Second: The era of the “wild” state financing 1958–67. A change began when, in 1958, the Federal Constitutional Court declared the unlimited tax deductibility of party donations to be unconstitutional (because this would “sharpen an already existing factual inequality of opportunities”—BVerfG 1958). When donations then decreased, the parties turned to state financing. The floodgates to unregulated self-service from the state treasury were opened. Third: The dominance of campaign cost reimbursement 1967–83. Even this practice was discontinued by the Federal Constitutional Court: • In 1966 it put a stop to it by only allowing a state reimbursement of campaign costs. • In 1968, the court lowered the minimum number of votes from which campaign cost reimbursement can be claimed from 2.5 to 0.5% of the valid votes. A cementing of the status quo seemed more threatening than a fragmentation of the parties. In the Party Law of 1967, annual accountability of the parties to the public regarding the origin of their funds as well as reimbursement of campaign costs were introduced. Contributions and donations could only be deducted from taxable income up to an amount of 600 DM (from 1980: 1800 DM). These regulations also got into a crisis. The parties tried to channel donations through intermediate “money laundering facilities” (non-profit organizations, professional associations) in order to make them tax-deductible and thus attractive in an unlawful manner (Ebbighausen et al. 1996, p. 266 ff.). But numerous court proceedings against these practices in the early 1980s led to a drastic decline in donations (Wewer 1990). The FDP, which did not receive any donations from

150

5  Internal Party Democracy or Rule of Oligarchy?

1969 onwards due to its coalition with the SPD, was also heavily indebted to a daughter of the trade union-owned Bank for the Common Good (Lösche and Walter 1996, p. 148). Fourth: Increased deductibility of donations 1983–93. Given this situation, the Bundestag chose 1983 with a large majority to introduce additional basic and equalization payments, to exempt donations and membership fees from tax up to a maximum of 60,000 DM per person and year, and to require donors to be named only from 40,000 DM per year. A tax deduction of 50% for small donations and contributions was to compensate for the disadvantage of low-income earners (Party Act 1989). However, a lawsuit by the Greens led in 1992 to a “complete reversal” (Naßmacher 1993, p. 81) by the Federal Constitutional Court, which declared the donation limit, basic amount, equalization of opportunities and publicity limit to be unconstitutional. A review of the case law over the decades makes four fundamental principles clear, which Karlsruhe sought to oblige the financing of parties to weigh against each other: the securing of • • • •

functionality of the parties, equal opportunities for the parties and equal opportunities for citizens, state independence and financial transparency of the parties.

b. The new system of party financing and party finances In 1993, a new legal regulation of public party financing followed with the votes of CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP. The most important points (as of 28 June 2002) are: 1. the introduction of an “absolute upper limit” for the total amount of state benefits paid to the parties: its amount was set at DM 230 million per year and may only be adjusted for price developments8. If the claims of the parties exceed the upper limit, they will be capped proportionally. 2. a reduction of the publicity limit for donations to EUR 10,000 per year, i.e. for higher amounts the donors must be named in the accountability reports. 3. a reduction of the tax-advantaged limit for donations and membership fees to EUR 1650 per person and year in the interest of equal opportunity. Corporate

8 In

2020, for example, the absolute upper limit was already EUR 197.5 million (German Bundestag 2021a, Annex 2).

5.4  Problems of a Fair Party Financing

151

donations (i.e. from companies) are fully taxable. Donations from public bodies or charitable organizations, from anonymous sources or from abroad are not allowed; nor are donations “evidently made in expectation or in return for a certain economic or political advantage” (“influence donations”). 4. a binding of the state benefits to both the number of voters and the donations and revenue of the parties: for each list vote in federal, European and state elections, parties receive 0.70 € annually (for the first four million votes 0.85 €). In addition, a party receives 0.38 € for each euro it has raised as a donation, membership fee or mandate fee, in order to strengthen its social “roots”. 5. Anyone who deliberately makes false statements in the accountability report, splits a donation into partial payments or accepts forbidden donations commits a criminal offence9. For a false statement, a party has to pay twice the amount. Accordingly, in 2009 the FDP expected 3.46 million euros (FAZ 2009), in 2011 the NPD 1.27 million euros (RP Online 2019), in 2020 the AfD 572,000 euros in fines (Röbel and Wassermann 2020). An assessment of this system requires a first look at the actual financing conditions of the parties. Their accountability reports showrecognize three main sources of income: membership fees, state subsidies and donations (Table 5.4). There are also relative income and expenditure peaks in election years, so that meaningful statements can only be made for entire electoral periods. In general, the share of German membership fees in Western Europe is considered quite high (Adams 2005, p. 252). In particular, it should be noted that relatively high fee rates for the SPD and CDU (now also the Left Party) are relatively high in comparison to donations for the FDP and CSU. While companies and economic associations do appear as major donors (some in favor of all the larger parties), the individual data show that donations from legal entities exceeding 10,000 € make up only a small proportion of their total income for the bourgeois parties. For all parties, the vast majority of donations required to be reported come from natural persons, often holders of mandates. Under the perspective of the principles set out by the Federal Constitutional Court, the following picture emerges: First of all: The functionality of the parties appears to be guaranteed under the absolute upper limit. Because this only fixed the actual amount of state subsidies from the years before the new regulation. Due to the inflation-related upper

9 BGBl.

I 1994, p. 142 ff. and 2002, p. 2268 ff.

156.8

156.8

166.1

172.4

169.2

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

138.1

143.4

144.8

156.7

147.3

152.6

2010

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

CDU:

147.2

149.2

119.4

163.9

129.3

121.5

120.1

159.3

141.5

181.2

141.3

133.7

127.2

Total (million euros) Income a Expenses a

2010

SPD:

Year

189.0

185.6

157.6

164.8

149.2

111.9

242.7

233.0

201.9

217.6

202.1

174.8

Net Worth

24.6

25.6

24.0

26.0

26.7

29.7

31.4

31.2

31.1

31.4

31.6

31.1

13.8

14.1

12.8

13.4

13.0

13.0

15.5

15.3

15.8

16.3

16.2

15.2

1.4

1.2

1.3

1.6

2.9

3.3

5.8

8.6

7.3

5.6

5.7

11.1

Income from (in %)b Member- Mandate Assets/ ship Dues Fees Companies

8.8

9.2

8.2

8.8

8.6

9.1

6.2

5.8

7.0

6.9

7.9

8.8

Events/ Publications

10.7

8.2

14.4

10.4

9.3

8.3

6.6

4.6

6.9

5.7

5.1

5.3

natural persons

Donations

4.8

3.4

8.1

4.9

4.5

4.4

1.3

0.9

1.9

1.3

1.2

1.2

35.4

38.1

30.9

34.2

34.4

31.1

32.9

32.9

29.6

32.4

31.9

26.5

(continued)

legal persons

State Funding

Table 5.4   Party financing 2010–2019. Total income and expenditure as well as assets in million euros, otherwise in percent of total income

152 5  Internal Party Democracy or Rule of Oligarchy?

59.1

38.9

43.4

45.4

48.0

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

34.4

25.8

27.2

38.7

35.7

38.0

2010

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

FDP:

35.0

35.0

27.6

39.4

26.1

22.5

27.5

43.1

44.9

45.2

36.0

44.6

30.5

Total (million euros) Income a Expenses a

2010

CSU:

Year

Table 5.4   (continued)

18.4

15.4

7.2

7.8

6.8

5.9

43.3

38.4

38.0

39.8

36.9

28.5

Net Worth

25.5

25.3

20.3

25.3

25.1

23.3

21.5

22.8

23.8

25.2

16.6

26.2

7.7

7.6

5.4

6.4

6.0

10.1

7.6

8.1

8.5

9.4

6.1

8.9

1.0

4.1

1.3

1.7

1.9

2.9

1.4

1.9

2.8

0.8

31.6

1.0

Income from (in %)b Member- Mandate Assets/ ship Dues Fees Companies

4.0

3.8

3.5

4.6

4.5

6.5

12.5

13.6

14.4

16.3

10.9

20.7

Events/ Publications

15.5

12.0

27.0

20.4

20.5

12.2

17.1

12.7

12.6

10.2

6.4

9.8

natural persons

Donations

5.5

4.7

11.9

7.0

7.3

5.2

8.4

10.1

10.2

6.6

3.7

5.8

40.6

42.1

30.3

33.9

34.4

39.0

30.6

30.3

27.2

31.1

22.7

27.5

(continued)

legal persons

State Funding

5.4  Problems of a Fair Party Financing 153

40.0

42.3

43.5

48.4

59.7

2016

2017

2018

2019

27.9

27.9

29.7

31.6

33.1

34.2

2010

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

Left:

31.2

2015

34.2

25.9

33.3

25.8

22.4

23.0

50.3

38.8

47.3

39.7

31.0

25.6

Total (million euros) Income a Expenses a

2010

B90/ Greens:

Year

Table 5.4   (continued)

38.6

38.6

31.3

33.0

29.1

23.6

60.6

51.2

41.6

45.4

42.8

26.0

Net Worth

30.5

31.6

31.8

32.5

33.5

35.9

25.5

23.4

22.5

21.5

22.2

21.1

15.3

15.3

15.3

15.6

15.2

14.1

18.5

20.5

22.4

23.0

24.1

22.3

0.2

0.1

0.4

0.3

0.4

0.7

0.2

1.5

0.4

0.3

0.3

0.6

Income from (in %)b Member- Mandate Assets/ ship Dues Fees Companies

0.5

0.6

0.8

0.9

0.9

0.7

1.7

1.8

1.6

2.1

1.6

3.2

Events/ Publications

8.1

5.9

8.5

7.4

6.8

7.4

9.8

8.7

11.3

10.5

9.0

11.2

natural persons

Donations

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

1.2

1.4

2.2

1.7

1.5

1.7

42.1

43.5

38.6

38.8

39.2

38.9

40.2

39.7

36.4

37.5

37.8

36.5

(continued)

legal persons

State Funding

154 5  Internal Party Democracy or Rule of Oligarchy?

12.6

14.8

15.6

18.4

28.5

26.3

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

23.8

16.0

21.9

11.1

8.9

10.7

5.4

26.0

23.5

11.0

14.6

10.0

4.2

2.3

Net Worth

b

Income and expenditure without intra-party transfers Surplus to 100% = other income Sources: German Bundestag (2021b, p. 56 ff.).

a

7.7

Total (million euros) Income a Expenses a

2013

AfD

Year

Table 5.4   (continued)

15.3

12.9

16.3

14.9

14.9

19.1

19.9

7.7

5.1

3.6

2.4

1.2

0.4

0.0

0.1

0.4

1.2

3.5

16.3

20.6

0.0

Income from (in %)b Member- Mandate Assets/ ship Dues Fees Companies

0.4

0.5

0.2

0.8

0.2

0.3

0.1

Events/ Publications

24.3

18.0

35.9

37.2

30.7

16.0

53.7

natural persons

Donations

0.5

0.3

0.9

1.2

0.9

0.4

2.2

legal persons

38.8

35.5

41.1

39.3

35.2

43.0

24.0

State Funding

5.4  Problems of a Fair Party Financing 155

156

5  Internal Party Democracy or Rule of Oligarchy?

limit, the dress for the parties should not become tighter. On the other hand, it is ensured that state subsidies to parties do not grow faster than their costs.10 However, all this seems to be a thing of the past. Because the government majority is looking for an increase in the upper limit in an unexpectedly quick process without insightful justifications and thus destroying a central legitimation of German party financing. Arbitrary self-service, this accusation will probably accompany the relevant discussion in the future. The open flank of the law is still a regular source of criticism: Only the parties themselves, but not those affiliated with them, fall under the upper limit. It is about the public subsidies to the parliamentary groups, which amounted to 120 million euros in 2020 (Federal Court of Auditors 2021), about high allowances and flat-rate expenses for members of parliament, which enable them to make considerable deductions to their parties (so-called “party tax”). In addition, there are publicly financed employees of the members of the Bundestag (mostly deployed in the constituency) in the amount of 261 million euros in 2021 (Haas and Eckstein 2021). The party-related foundations are also mentioned in this context: In 2021 they received 660 million euros from public funds (Ogorek 2021)— almost three times as much as the parties. Von Arnim (2015, p. 11 f. 91) speaks of a “hidden party financing” and estimates this at almost 900 million euros per year. Criticism is sometimes voiced of the possibility of splitting up donations (9999 € cannot be mentioned) or the sanctioning by a body (Bundestag presidency) in which the parties themselves are represented (Decker 2007, p. 42). Second: The lowering of the publicity limit and the refinement of the requiredincome categories and asset declarations improve the transparency of party income required by the Basic Law. This degree of transparency is “not even approached by any other Western democracy” (Naßmacher 2001, p. 165). However, hidden financial support from private sources, such as campaigns in favour of a party, sponsorship, advertising campaigns or advertisements in party publications, remain unrecorded. Sometimes private parallel advertising, which remains in the dark, benefits political directions. Here one comes up against the limits which are characteristic of a free society, in which everyone is allowed to express his opinion publicly. Do violations of the law make all transparency futile? Certainly there was Helmut Kohl’s black box with 2 million DM in donations from several years, the hidden assets of the Hesse CDU (18 million), the

10 In

the past, their income has grown faster than at least the cost of living (Landfried 1994, p. 92).

5.4  Problems of a Fair Party Financing

157

collection of donations from the SPD treasurer Nau without indication of origin (7.6 million). However: The two CDU cases led to scandals, with those exposed as the political and financial victims. The introduction of personal liability is likely to have a deterrent effect. Moreover, whoever takes into account the order of magnitude in Table 5.3 will only be able to recognize limited transparency deficiencies in the scandalized cases. Greater lack of transparency existed rather in the case of asset declarations of the SPD. It only gave the book value of 12.8 million DM for its press holding, while the market value was estimated at hundreds of millions. Meanwhile, a correction has been made, in 2003 participations worth 165 million euros were given (German Bundestag 2005, p. 63). Thirdly, the reduced tax benefits of donations strengthen equality of opportunity. From the perspective of the Constitutional Court, it is only a question of not exacerbating existing social inequalities even further through state regulations. Payments of up to 1650 € per year may seem unlikely for the average citizen, but they are possible. Improved equality of opportunity between the parties can be seen in the fact that donations from public institutions and companies with public participation are now prohibited and other corporate donations remain fully subject to tax. While it would be conceivable to completely ban donations, this is not mandatory. The majority of them consist of small donations, while large donations only make up a small proportion of party income. Equality of opportunity between the parties is promoted by “degression”, i.e. a higher valuation of the first four million votes of a party in the distribution of state funds. This takes into account the fact that decreasing marginal costs in advertising, shipping, development of advertising strategies and other typical party activities have a positive effect on large parties. Fourthly, the introduction of public benefits based on the number of voters and the self-generated revenue (donations and membership fees) encourages parties to raise their own revenue; in this respect, their independence from the state is promoted. This has been concretised in constitutional court rulings to the effect that direct public benefits may not exceed the parties’ self-generated revenue (“relative ceiling”). As a whole, the efforts to achieve a fair and widely accepted party financing system have over time led to a comprehensive system of rules. It now rubs up against the volunteerism of intra-party activity: “Our treasurers” in the thousands of party units, as the then SPD treasurer Inge Wettig-Danielmeier (2001, p. 533) probably on behalf of all parties, “cannot apply a highly complex system”, This is an argument for limiting personal liability to intentional violations.

158

5  Internal Party Democracy or Rule of Oligarchy?

Table 5.5   Dimensions of cartel parties System role

Turning to the state sphere; erosion of social ties

Competition

Cartelization of privileges; limitation of policy alternatives

Organization

Dominance of public office-holders; stratarchy in the relationship of party affiliations

Source: Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair after: Detterbeck (2016, p. 114).

The necessity of not absolutely achieving a target value, but of aiming for an optimum between transparency, equality of opportunity, functionality, intra-party democracy and free society, also makes a final, ideal solution unlikely. Quite rightly, the Federal Constitutional Court has emphasised that disclosure of party finances is “always only to be achieved approximately”. So we will have to live with imperfections. Nevertheless, the system of party financing has contributed to the fact that parties of different types can exist and the financial strength of individual parties is roughly in line with their voter strength (Federal Constitutional Court, quoted after Rudzio 2000, p. 436). Whether the total of public benefits is too high is difficult to answer. Despite state funding, German parties are not the most expensive. They are rather in the middle range of 18 democracies—measured by the number of eligible voters taking into account the respective gross national product. Countries such as Israel, Mexico, Austria, Italy and Japan are far behind, three other countries (Sweden, Poland, Spain) are still significantly higher than Germany, while the Anglo-Saxon democracies in particular have much lower party expenses (Naßmacher 2009, pp. 344–345, 115). How can one summarize the phenomena mentioned in connection with the party state (Sect. 4.1) and the internal structures of today’s parties? Political science offers to designate them with the term “cartel parties” (Table 5.5). Loosening of ties with churches, unions, employer associations, the weight of state party financing, weakened programmatic differences, shrinking party membership, the autonomy of the local, state and federal level of the parties (stratarchy) for their respective level, the dominance of professional politicians—all this can be subsumed under this term.

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6

Voting Behavior: Social Characteristics and Current Orientations

6.1 Personalized Proportional Representation and Voter Turnout a) The right to vote and its variants in Germany In democracies, the right to vote plays a central role. It regulates how politicians come to power to make decisions on behalf of the people for a limited period of time. For this, it must give the elected ones legitimacy. The Basic Law outlines these conditions of legitimacy with the words that the parliaments must arise from “general, direct, free, equal and secret elections” (Art. 38 para. 1 and 28 para. 1 GG). Within this framework, as long as each vote has the same value, everything else can be regulated differently. Basically, one distinguishes between majority and proportional voting rights, but there are numerous variants and mixes in addition to these two basic models. In not a few democracies, there is a proportional voting right within multi-member constituencies (i.e. not at national level, example: Spain), elsewhere a part of the seats is filled by proportional voting right, another by majority voting right (so-called trench voting system, example: Italy since 2017), also There are voting systems in which replacement preferences of the voters are taken into account (as in Ireland). More for this or that voting right speaks, depending on what should have priority (Nohlen 2014): • the election of persons or the election of parties; • whether the voter opinions should be reflected in parliament as primarily as possible or whether a government should be elected by the election; • whether one understands the whole country, the region or the constituency as the most important unit. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Mannewitz and W. Rudzio, The Political System of Germany, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41371-2_6

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6  Voting Behavior: Social Characteristics and Current Orientations

In Germany, until 1918 there was a majority voting right with a second ballot if no candidate had won an absolute majority in the first (as is the case today in France). But this voting right worked because the constituencies (also as a result of industrialization-related population shifts) were of unequal size, unfair and did not fit well with the actual party vote. So it was replaced in 1919 by a proportional voting right (similar to what had happened before in several Nordic countries), which has taken deep roots in today’s Germany. Nevertheless, it was repeatedly the subject of intense debate. In 1955, the CDU/CSU aimed for a “trench voting system”, in 1966 the Grand Coalition for a “majority-forming” voting system1. The background was the thesis vehemently represented by one direction of political science that the proportional voting right had contributed decisively to the fragmentation of the parties and to the failure of the Weimar Republic; it would be incompatible with a functioning democracy (Hermens 1951; Sternberger 1964). In the end, however, all initiatives remained without result, to get away from it. The right to vote for the Bundestag, as it has been essentially unchanged since 1956, can be described as a personalized proportional representation. According to this, half of the members of parliament are elected in 299 (from 2024: 280) singlemember constituencies by simple majority, the other half via state lists of the parties. Each voter has two votes: With the first vote (personal vote) he/she decides on the member of parliament from the constituency, with the second vote (party vote) on the distribution of the mandates between the parties. According to their share of second votes, each party is allocated a proportionate share of mandates, which are then filled—after deduction of the directly elected constituency mandates—from their state lists in the given order. With this voting system, Germany is unique in the world (Decker 2011, p. 140). Under this voting system, it is possible for a party to already receive more mandates in the constituencies than it is entitled to in a federal state. These “overhang mandates” remained without compensation until 2013, and therefore there was a kink in the proportional representation. For example, in 2009 the Union parties received 24 such overhang mandates. Another annoyance: The list seat distribution could lead to the paradoxical result of more votes for a party in the wrong place leading to a loss of seats or vice versa—as in 2005 in Dresden and Hamburg (“negative weighting of votes”). Such paradoxes had to be excluded,

1 “Trench

voting system” means not to take into account the direct mandates won in the distribution of the list mandates according to the ratio of the second votes.

6.1  Personalized Proportional Representation and Voter Turnout

167

according to the Federal Constitutional Court, as possible solutions to the problem were: • in addition, to introduce compensatory mandates (as in state elections) until the ratio is restored; • instead, to deduct list seats from the benefiting parties elsewhere until the proportionality principle is established (which violated the federal principle); • to lower the overall share of direct mandates so that overhang mandates would become less likely (Grotz 2009, p. 173 ff.; Behnke 2007, p. 196 ff.); • to introduce two-mandate constituencies throughout, which would reduce the likelihood of overhang mandates. The last two proposals were rejected because they did not exclude those offensive effects, and so in 2013 the Bundestag decided in favor of the most convenient solution: to introduce additional compensatory mandates. The double task of allocating the mandates to the countries according to their population figures on the one hand and allocating the mandates to the parties according to the share of second votes in the Bund on the other hand has remained, which leads to considerable problems in a federal state with lower voter turnout and higher share of votes of failed parties. If this, as in 2013, applies to Bavaria with the regional party CSU, then regardless of the overhang mandates, further compensatory mandates are required for the equalization between the countries. The grotesque consequence: The equalization of four overhang mandates brought no less than 29 compensatory mandates into the world. In addition to its lack of clarity, the electoral law suffers from this inflationary tendency. Therefore, it remains “a task of political design” (Grotz 2016, p. 89)—as the federal elections in 2017 (709 instead of 598 planned parliamentarians) and 2021 (736 instead of 598 planned parliamentarians) confirmed with their inflation. The small electoral reform of 2020 is unlikely to change this (Weinmann and Grotz 2020), which is designed to prevent an enlargement of the Bundestag by providing for compensatory mandates only from the fourth overhang mandate, partly crediting direct mandates to list mandates of the same party in other federal states and (but not until 2024) reducing the number of constituencies from 299 to 280. If in the past the non-compensated overhang mandates represented a premium for the strongest party, which increased the chance of a government majority, this effect is eliminated as a result of the compensation. In view of the large and other unwanted coalition formations, the search for an electoral system that promotes majorities has led to various considerations (Behnke et al. 2017). The most provocative proposal comes from Volker Best (2016, p. 217 f.), who, following the

168

6  Voting Behavior: Social Characteristics and Current Orientations

Italian example, wants to grant the strongest party a “majority premium”, i.e. additional mandates in addition to the proportionality principle. The problem of the proportional electoral system, which makes it more difficult to form majorities as a result of party fragmentation, is actually alleviated by the five percent hurdle. According to this, state lists are only taken into account in the allocation of mandates if the party concerned has achieved at least five percent of the valid second votes in the Federal Republic or has won at least three constituency mandates directly (“basic mandates”). However, since in 2013 more than 15% of the valid votes did not find any representation in the Bundestag due to the five percent clause, there are increasing political science statements in favor of only one Bundestag vote, supplemented by a “substitute vote” in the event that the elected party remains below five percent (Jesse 2016; Decker 2016, p. 464 f.; Sacksofsky 2016, p. 114). The same basic principles apply to the election of state parliaments: proportional electoral system and five percent hurdle (see Table 6.1). However, there are differences in other respects. For example, voters in some countries only have one vote. While “closed” state lists are usually offered, which can only be ticked off as a whole, the electoral law in Southern Germany and the Hanseatic cities also allows a targeted selection of persons. The right to vote is generally from the age of 18, only in Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein from the age of 16. The proportion of direct and list mandates varies from country to country: They range from parity—as in Brandenburg, Hesse, Saxony and Thuringia—via a majority of direct mandates (Baden-Württemberg, Berlin, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, NRW) to only list mandates in Bremen and Saarland. The electoral period is generally five, only four years in Bremen. Similarly, the regulations of the Municipal Election Laws vary from state to state. Although they too follow the principle of proportional representation, they range from rigid list voting procedures as in North Rhine-Westphalia, Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein to personal voting with three votes (as in Lower Saxony, the new federal states, etc.) to personal voting that gives the voter as many personal votes as there are seats to be filled (Schleswig-Holstein and four southern German states). Personal votes can be cumulated (i.e. piled up on one candidate) and panachéd (i.e. distributed among candidates from different lists) to varying degrees. The electoral term is generally five years, only six years in Bavaria and four years in Bremen. The five percent hurdle (Zicht 2021b) has now been abolished for municipal elections across the board. Overall, it is clear that personal voting and fragmentation (as well as referendums) are all the more possible the further down from the federal level one goes.

6.1  Personalized Proportional Representation and Voter Turnout

169

Table 6.1   Federal and state electoral law 2022

Land

Wahlperiode

ListenWahlsystem/ form Stimmenzahl

Verhält- Mandate 5%nis nach direkt/ Hürde/ Liste Grund- Ausmandate gleich

Federal

4 years

Pers. VW/2

Landeslis- SainteLague ten, geschlossen

299/299

Ja Ja (Bund)/3

Baden-Würt- 5 temberg

Pers. VW/1

SainteUnterLague legene WK-Kandidaten

70/50

Ja/nein

In RB

Bavaria

5

Pers. VW/2

Open

Hare-N

91/89

Yes/no

In RB

Berlin

5

Pers. VW/2

Closed

Hare-N

78/52

Yes/1

Yes

Brandenburg 5

Pers. VW/2

Closed

Hare-N

44/44

Yes, except Sorbs/1

Yes

Bremen

4

VW/5

Open

SainteLague

0/84

No Yes, separate: Bremen, BHV/no

Hamburg

5

Pers. VW/10

Open

SainteLague

71/50

Yes/no

Yes

Hessen

5

Pers. VW/2

Closed

Hare-N

55/55

Yes/no

Yes

Mecklenbg.- 5 Vorpommern

Pers. VW/2

Geschlos- Hare-N sen

36/35

Ja/nein

Ja

Niedersach- 5 sen

Pers. VW/2

Geschlos- D’Hondt 87/48 sen

Ja/nein

Ja

NRW

5

Pers. VW/2

Geschlos- Saintesen Lague

128/53

Ja/nein

Ja

Rheinld.Pfalz

5

Pers. VW/2

Geschlos- Saintesen Lague

51/50

Ja/nein

Ja

Saarland

5

VW/1

Closed

D’Hondt 0/51

Yes/no

No

Sachsen

5

Pers. VW/2

Closed

D’Hondt 60/60

Yes/2

Yes (continued)

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6  Voting Behavior: Social Characteristics and Current Orientations

Table 6.1   (continued)

Land

Wahlperiode

ListenWahlsystem/ form Stimmenzahl

Verhält- Mandate 5%nis nach direkt/ Hürde/ Liste Grund- Ausmandate gleich

SaxonyAnhalt

5

Pers. VW/2

Closed

Hare-N

41/42

Yes/no

Yes

SchleswigHolstein

5

Pers. VW/2

Closed

SainteLague

35/34

Yes, except SSW/1

Yes

Thuringia

5

Pers. VW/2

Closed

Hare-N

44/44

Yes/no

Yes

Abbreviations: Hare-N. = Hare-Niemeyer; kumulier. = cumulative; Pers. = Personalized(s); RB = Government districts; VW = Proportional representation; WK = Constituency; BHV = Bremerhaven. Source: Zicht, Wilko (2021a): Overview of the voting systems for state elections, under: www.wahlrecht.de (last checked on February 2, 2022).

b) Voting rights and their tactical use Every electoral system acts in two directions: It not only determines the distribution of mandates given a vote, but also influences the decisions of the electorate in reverse. How do German voters react, how do they use the possibilities of the right to vote? The effects of the five percent clause and the tactical, partly also uninformed use of first and second votes are well known and much discussed. As far as municipal electoral systems allow a personal vote, it is used intensively. However, as Table 6.2 shows, in federal elections, the second-vote voters of the large parties place their first vote almost exclusively with the same party. With smaller parties, however, an increasing splitting of votes can be observed (Förtsch 2019, p. 27). This usually does not indicate a personal vote, but is explained by the concern about the “lost” first vote. Its submission for the candidate of a large party therefore rather signals the second party preference and a kind of coalition vote (Hilmer et al. 2000, p. 194). However, there are also tactical “loan votes” from supporters of a large party that are intended to help a desired smaller coalition partner over the five percent hurdle (Herrmann 2015, p. 90). Finally, the election results at the different political levels—federal, state, local—differ from each other to a considerable extent. This is “mainly due to different degrees of political mobilization” (voter turnout), only to a lesser extent

6.1  Personalized Proportional Representation and Voter Turnout

171

Table 6.2   Splitting of votes as an indicator of party distances

Of each 100 received belowsecond-vote vot- mentioned party ers of the: first votes:

in the federal elections (in % of the valid votes):

SPD

SPD

86.7

CDU/CSUa

3.3

4.5 4.6/0.8

FDP

1

GRÜNE PDS/Linke CDU/CSU a

FDP

B90/Die Grünen

2013b

2017b

2021

82.4

78.0

5.3/1.1

5.9/1.3

1.1 0.5

1.4

2.0

5.3

5.2 5.1

4.4

7.1

2.5

2.4 2.7

2.9

2.3

2005

2009

85.8 84.1

AfD

–

SPD

2.9

4.1 4.4/2.4

CDU/CSUa)

90.9

87.6 89.8/92.3

FDP

3.5

4.8 1.5/1.3

GRÜNE

0.9

PDS/Linke

0.5

AfD

–

SPD

7.1

CDU/CSUa)

60.2

FDP

29.0

GRÜNE

– 0.3

1.2

0.9

5.6/3.5

3.7/2.7

85.2/87.3

88.7/89.6

3.3/2.6

3.2/2.2

1.7 1.6/1.1

3.1/2.6

1.5/1.2

0.7 1.1/0.2

1.1/0.4

0.3/0.1

0.7/0.7

1.3/0.8

8.4

8.2

45.8 53.8/9.3

33.0/6.1

21.6/

44.8 27.4

43.6

55.3

0.4

2.1 1.2

2.7

3.1

PDS/Linke

1.4

1.1 0.6

1.3

0.8

AfD

–

– 0.5

2.1

2.6

SPD

56.7

CDU/CSUa

4.6

FDP GRÜNE

– 0.3/0.3 4.8 5.4

26.1

17.0

6.1 6.5/1.3

11.1/2.4

4.3/1.0

1.1

2.1 0.6

1.8

1.5

34.7

53.6 51.4

51.7

69.3

PDS/Linke

2.0

3.6 3.2

4.3

3.9

AfD

–

– 0.2

0.4

0.1

PDS or Die Linke SPD

17.3

33.3 34.4

15.8

14.5

CDU/CSUa

3.9

12.8 15.7 2.7 5.5/0.5

4.2/0.6

2.0/0.2

FDP

1.5

1.7 0.4

1.3

1.4

GRÜNE

2.8

4.8 4.7

6.7

11.8

PDS/Linke

72.1

75.7 69.2

66.5

63.8 (continued)

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6  Voting Behavior: Social Characteristics and Current Orientations

Table 6.2   (continued)

Of each 100 received belowsecond-vote vot- mentioned party ers of the: first votes: AfD

in the federal elections (in % of the valid votes): 2005

2009

2013b

2017b

2021

AfD

–

– 0.5

1.9

1.4

SPD

–

– 13.9

4.7

2.8

CDU/CSU

–

– 19.5/3.0

5.7/1.8

4.2/0.9

FDP

–

– 2.6

3.0

2.8

GRÜNE

–

– 2.9

0.5

0.2

PDS/Linke

–

– 9.0

2.6

0.7

AfD

–

– 30.0

78.5

83.7

a

Since 2013, CDU and CSU have been shown separately by a slash. The statement value for AfD in 2013 is low because the party only ran in 158 constituencies. Source: The Federal Returning Officer (2021, p. 27).

b

also “due to system-level differentiating voting behaviour” (Kevenhörster 1976, p. 280). Differences between the shares of votes in state elections and those in the previous federal elections can be traced back to various factors: inter alia to structural and economic influences (context effects), to the time interval between federal elections (election cycle), to varying policy preferences, to the lower popularity of candidates at state level (coattail effect) or to attempts to provide counterweights to the ruling federal party at state level (balancing effect) (Völkl and Heyme 2019). The thus provoked “midterm loss of the government parties”, as it is also known in the USA, makes a political discrepancy between a majority in the Bundestag and in the Bundesrat almost probable (Dinkel 1977, p. 358). In fact, a party vote that differs between system levels can only be demonstrated to a limited extent—for example, when elections coincide (for example, the state and local elections in 1975 in North Rhine-Westphalia or the federal and local elections in 1976 in Lower Saxony) and the voter turnout is almost equally high (Kevenhörster 1976, p. 243). However, locally different problem priorities and different election trends remain clearly visible (Bovermann 2002, p. 138). The electoral system plays only a peripheral role here, although personal selection options and the lack of a five-percent clause in local elections could influence the results (Reiser et al. 2008, p. 143).

6.1  Personalized Proportional Representation and Voter Turnout

173

There are considerable differences in voter turnout between age groups, regardless of institutional regulations. The voter turnout curve for the different age groups has the shape of an inverted large U—but skewed in that an average voter turnout is not reached until the age of 40 and the peak not until the age of 60–69, only then does the decline set in (The Federal Returning Officer 2021, p. 10 ff.). c) The socially unequal voter turnout However, the general, decades-long decline in voter turnout in Germany, which can also be observed in other Western democracies, is predominant (Detterbeck 2011, p. 46). Whether 2017 and 2021 represent a turning point will have to be seen in future elections. In the 2013 federal election, however, it should also be noted that due to the five-percent clause, no less than 15.7% of the valid votes were not taken into account—mainly due to the narrowly failed AfD and FDP. The 18th Bundestag therefore represented only 59.5% of those entitled to vote. The legitimacy function of elections came into debate (Siegmund and Münch 2015, p. 38, 54 ff.). It was observed that in the 2013 federal election the voter turnout was low among workers and those with lower secondary education, accompanied by low political interest and low satisfaction with democracy (Abendschön and Roßteutscher 2016, p. 82). The decline in voter turnout was, according to the thesis of the political scientist Armin Schäfer, correlated with the increasing income inequality in the OECD countries from 1987 to 2005, where (in countries without compulsory voting) the voter turnout correlated with the Gini inequality coefficient with r = −0.49—i.e. the greater the social inequality, the lower the voter turnout. A disproportionately large number of non-voters were economically weaker, as could be seen in Germany, • how the non-voters were distributed among the income quintiles in the 2013 federal election: only 7% belonged to the top quintile, 12% to the second, 19% to the third, 23% to the fourth and 39% to the bottom. • If one looked at the federal election constituencies and city districts of large cities, it became apparent that with higher unemployment and lower proportion of school leavers, voter turnout declined. The author attributes this “asymmetrical decline in voter turnout” on the one hand to a lack of confidence in one’s own competence and “lack of belief” in the political possibilities of effect, on the other hand to the party offer—among workers,

174

6  Voting Behavior: Social Characteristics and Current Orientations

Table 6.3   Voting decision by occupational group Bundestag election-second votes as a percentage of occupational groups, excluding absentee voters

CDU/CSU SPD

FDP

Grüne

Linke

AfD

2017 2021 2017 2021 2017 2021 2017 2021 2017 2021 2017 2021 Overall

32.9

24.1 20.5 25.7 10.7 11.5 8.9

14.8 9.2

4.9

12.6

10.3

Worker

29

23

23

28

8

9

5

8

10

5

18

16

Employ- 33 ees

22

21

26

11

13

10

17

9

5

11

9

Officials 35

28

21

24

12

9

12

23

6

4

9

6

Inde34 pendent

29

12

17

18

18

12

17

9

4

12

9

Retiree

40

34

25

35

9

7

5

8

9

4

10

8

Unemployed

17

14

22

28

7

9

12

13

15

7

17

18

Own occupation or that of the head of household. Remaining: Other. Source: German Bundestag (2021).

the decline in voting corresponded to the decline in the SPD in the state elections from 1978 to 2011 (Schäfer 2015, p. 67 ff., 79, 87, 94, 98, 104, 120 ff., 140, 152 ff.; Petersen et al. 2013). It becomes clear: A considerable part of the lower classes in Germany have given up voting, a distance to politics has arisen. The fact that voter turnout has recently increased again is due to the AfD, which was able to mobilise workers, unemployed people and former non-voters to a greater extent than average (cf. Table 6.3). According to Schäfer, this has led to the “political equality” being lost. He also sees that the trend towards lower political participation is “not to be broken in the short term”. In essence, he therefore recommends not more direct democracy (with its “social imbalance of participation”), but the introduction of compulsory voting in order to “guarantee equal voting participation” (Schäfer 2015, p. 188, 237, 239). This is not going to achieve much, as experience shows and as the author sees it. What remains decisive is that in democracies outside Germany, people with higher educational qualifications and higher occupational status are associated with above-average voting participation, as well as with greater political interest and higher satisfaction with democracy (Niedermayer 2005, p. 206 ff.).

6.2  Social Characteristics: Class, Confession and Age Group Choice

175

6.2 Social Characteristics: Class, Confession and Age Group Choice a) Social class and party preference Election research distinguishes three theoretical approaches (Falter and Schoen 2014), which try to explain voting behavior.2 These are: • the sociological approach, as pointed out by Paul Lazarsfeld et al. (1968, p. 27): “A person thinks, politically, as he is socially. Social characteristics determine political preference”. Accordingly, section 6.2 investigates relationships between social characteristics and party choice in Germany. • the social psychological approach by Angus Campbell et al. (1960), according to which primarily variables such as party identification, issue orientations and candidate evaluations determine the voting decision. In a causal funnel (“funnel of causality”), factors of the voter are taken into account to a greater extent the closer they occur to the election date. This approach is followed in Sect. 6.3. • the rational choice theory (“rational choice”) in the sense of economics, namely that voters try to choose the most favorable alternative for them under cost-benefit considerations. The best-known representative of this view is Anthony Downs (1968). It is based on the presentation in Sect. 6.4. The question of motives and factors of voting behavior, of the transformation of social problems and interests into party preferences, does not lead to a final answer. Despite the secrecy of the vote, one can get closer to clarification by means of two methods: first, by means of surveys on the basis of representative samples, and second, by means of correlations between local census data and election results. The older way of speaking of workers’ and bourgeois parties initially points to different voting behavior according to social class, as defined by the criteria of occupational group, income and level of education. The federal election data presented here by way of example show a picture that is similar to other federal, state and European elections. If we look at occupational groups, Table 6.3

2 The

voting geography approach (Falter and Winkler 2014) could also be mentioned.

176

6  Voting Behavior: Social Characteristics and Current Orientations

shows3: The Union does better than average with civil servants, self-employed people and pensioners; the SPD with workers and pensioners; the FDP with selfemployed people; Bündnis 90/Die Grünen with civil servants; the Left with workers and employees; the AfD with workers and unemployed people. Older data, which further break down occupational groups, additionally point to class-specific voting behavior, i.e. more in favor of the bourgeois parties at higher positions and more towards the SPD4 at lower positions. Nevertheless, one must not lose sight of the fact that all parties find voters in all occupational groups. Above all, the Union’s workers’ electorate and the broad distribution of employees across all parties blur the contours. Thus, the tangible data show different social priorities, but in the meantime no longer any sharp class or social class boundaries (Elff and Roßteutscher 2022). The NPD of the 1960s could be referred to as a “people’s party en miniature” (Kevenhörster 1969, p. 328). As far as the later parties of the extreme right are concerned, such as the national populist Republicans, the DVU and the NPD, for a long time they were dominated by voters with a medium level of education, workers and unemployed people (Arzheimer 2008, p. 386). The differences appear to be more pronounced among groups outside of working life: Among pensioners, the two major parties do better than average, while unemployed people have long been disproportionately inclined towards the political left, and more recently also towards the AfD. Difficulties arise when it comes to the question of the incomes of party supporters. The willingness to provide information on this is reserved, so that election research has to do without questions. Scientific surveys sometimes only relate to household income or only differentiate between broad income classes. Here we refer to an ALLBUS survey which, for 2012, collected the averages of the respondents’ individual net monthly incomes. The result: For supporters of the Left 1426 €, SPD 1537, Grünen 1711, CDU/CSU 1751 and FDP 1762 (Stifel 2018, p. 168). This reflects the fact that supporters of the Greens are more likely to belong to the right-wing camp than to the left-wing parties in terms of their financial situation.

3 It

should be noted here and with some of the following tables that the data are based on election day surveys, i.e. the increased share of postal voters is not taken into account. Distortions are therefore possible (Lichteblau and Wagner 2019, p. 171). The situation is different with the representative election statistics, which have been including postal voters since 2002. 4 In addition to older: IfD surveys 6065–67 from September 1998.

6.2  Social Characteristics: Class, Confession and Age Group Choice

177

Table 6.4   Educational attainment and voting behavior in 2021 as a percentage of educational strata, without absentee voters

CDU/CSU

SPD

Grüne

FDP

Linke

AfD

Total (% of voters)

24.1

25.7

14.8

11.5

4.9

10.3

Hauptschule

31

35

5

8

2

12

Intermediate level

26

26

10

11

4

14

High school diploma/Abitur

20

23

19

14

6

8

University degree

20

20

27

14

6

5

Source: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (2021a).

The supporters of the Greens regularly stand out significantly due to their higher level of education from those of the major parties. The Greens, FDP and Left owe their election result disproportionately to voters with a higher level of education, while the two major parties and the AfD are more successful with lower levels of education, with the latter reaching its highest share among people with a lower secondary education (see Table 6.4). This was already observable in previous federal elections (Eith and Schlipphak 2020, p. 83). This has led election research to a new conflict line, but there is still uncertainty about its naming and meaning (Decker 2019). “It has been described as the opposite of post-materialist, libertarian, globalization-friendly or cosmopolitan attitudes on the one hand, and materialist, authoritarian, globalization-hostile or communitarian positions at the other pole” (Schmitt-Beck 2021, p. 12; Merkel 2017; Goodhart 2017; Hooghe and Marks 2018). The two extreme positions are occupied by the AfD and the Greens in the German party system—just as those parties that are rather voted for on the countryside or in the urban centers, which is why, for example, Lukas Haffert (2022, p. 42 ff.) speaks of a new city-country conflict line in the party system, which exists in a similar form, for example, in France, where Emmanuel Macron represents the bloc bourgeois (Pausch 2022). “Their effectiveness in the 2021 federal election is shown above all by the fact that less educated people tended to vote for the AfD, highly educated people, but also younger voters rather voted for the Greens” (Schmitt-Beck 2021, p. 12). Among the criteria of occupational group, income and education, one could place the voters of CDU, CSU and AfD in a socio-economic context between SPD on the one hand and FDP and Greens on the other. It is more difficult to locate the Left, which is educationally “above”, but according to occupational groups and income rather below. In addition, distinctions between service professions continue, insofar as the administrative service class tends to the Union,

178

6  Voting Behavior: Social Characteristics and Current Orientations

while social/cultural services rather prefer the Greens (Müller and Klein 2012, p. 89, 97). In summary: The party electorates differ socially from each other, but not sharply enough to attribute the party preferences in Germany solely to the “social class” factor. Class voting has, in Germany as well as in the USA, in Great Britain and France and other countries, continuously lost the importance it once had after the Second World War (Dalton 2014, p. 161).5 b) Confession as an independent determinant The fact that only class characteristics determine voter behavior is contradicted by the confessionally different party preferences. Catholics are constantly overrepresented in the electorate of CDU/CSU, non-Catholics in that of all other parties6. Surprisingly, voting behavior also differs in the new federal states—with the difference that here the CDU is in the lead with Catholics (44%), Protestants (37%) and non-denominational people (24%). On the one hand: The AfD (23%) and the Left Party (21%) are close behind them with the latter group. On the other hand, Catholics only make up four percent and Protestants only 19 percent of the electorate in the east (Neu 2021, p. 7 ff.) (Table 6.5). Even more: As the example of the 1990 federal election clearly shows, the parties also achieved highly different vote shares within the individual occupational groups depending on their confession. This phenomenon could be observed throughout the history of the Federal Republic of Germany (Gibowski and Kaase 1991, p. 16 ff.; Pappi 1973). The religious affiliation, even more so the religious affiliation, measured by the frequency of church attendance, therefore acts as an independent factor next to that of the social class. It signals certain values in intangible matters (family, nation, education, abortion). Under such value aspects, CDU and CSU, as more traditional-religious parties, stood opposite the more laicist party group SPD, Greens, FDP and Left Party. Such confessional differences in voting behavior are not a German peculiarity, but existed or still exist in other democracies (Dalton 2014, p. 167 ff.). All in all, the voting behavior seemed to be primarily determined by a “socioeconomic class vote” on the one hand and a value-based “confessional vote” on the other hand, by a two-dimensionality, as it also corresponds to the party pro-

5 Class

voting measured according to the Alford index = difference between the proportion of workers and the proportion of middle class voters who vote for a left-wing party. 6 Data for 1949–2002 from Schoen (2014a, b, p. 215).

24

15

33

Evangelisch

No confes- 24 sion

17

24

18

23

30

23

25.7

2021

Sources: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (2017a).

35

44

Catholic

24.1

32.9

20.5

2017

2017

Overall

2021

SPD

CDU/CSU

11

11

11

10.3

2017

FDP

12

11

11

11.5

2021

9

10

8

8.9

2017

Grüne

18

15

13

14.8

2021

15

7

5

9.2

2017

Linke

Table 6.5   Confession and voting orientation 2017/2021 in percent of valid votes (without postal voters)

8

4

3

4.9

2021

17

11

9

12.6

2017

AfD

14

9

8

10.3

2021

6.2  Social Characteristics: Class, Confession and Age Group Choice 179

180

6  Voting Behavior: Social Characteristics and Current Orientations

grams: “The German party system”, formulated Franz U. Pappi (1977, p. 196, 198), “is asymmetrical because one party does not face a primarily economically conservative party opposite a party with a trade union economic ideology, but a religious traditional party”. The party preferences within the social classes, occupational groups and confessions remained remarkably stable over the decades (Schoen 2014a). However, it must not be overlooked that the confessional differences in the party preferences have decreased significantly in Germany since the 1960s, similar to the USA (Elff and Roßteutscher 2022; Detterbeck 2011, p. 77). The confessional factor, although present, has lost much of its importance— on the macro level because of the declining social church affiliation even more than on the micro level. However: As late as 2017, for example, the proportion of Catholics in West Germany was 10 percentage points below that within the West German CDU electorate, and the proportion of Protestants in East Germany was 7 percentage points below that within the group of East German Green and FDP voters (Neu 2021, p. 6 ff.). c) Demographic characteristics and postmaterialism Demographic factors are not consistently relevant. For example, a numerical relationship can be observed between population density and voting behavior. In general, the Union parties and the AfD do better in sparsely populated areas, while the Social Democrats and the Greens do better in urban areas (The Federal Returning Officer 2022, p. 7). In fact, other factors are hidden behind this, in particular higher self-employment rates, agricultural sideline occupations and stronger religious affiliation in smaller communities. In the early Federal Republic, the electorates of the parties showed considerable gender-specific differences. CDU and CSU were voted for more by women, SPD and FDP more by men. However, these differences have been leveled off to such an extent that since 1972 they have appeared to be marginal. For the most part, they can be traced back to a governmental orientation of women. The less a party is accepted in public (opposition parties, extreme parties), the more it lags behind among women. An exception is the Greens, whose early attractiveness for younger, better-educated women could not be explained earlier. This is in line with the increased popularity of Union, SPD and Greens among women observed during the 2021 federal election, while AfD and FDP were clearly ahead among men (The Federal Returning Officer 2022, p. 5). In contrast, it was already early on that one spoke of a “deepening of generational differences” (Liepelt and Riemenschnitter 1973, p. 572) in German voting behavior. As a rule, as was the case in 2017 and 2021 (cf. Table 6.6), CDU and CSU perform worse among younger voters, but can record above-average shares

7.5

4.6

7.2

Overall

4.7

12.0

3.7

13.1

15.3

16.0

13.7

11.2

10.3

10.7

12.9

12.4

17.4

19.9

16.7

8.2

7.0

8.7

12.8

2021

25–34 years 2017

Source: The Federal Returning Officer (2021).

4.5

AfD

12.3

11.7

8.1

Green

The Left

13.5

6.0

8.8

CSU

FDP

3.3

6.5

5.3

SPD

CDU

2021

18–24 years

2017

Age

BT-Wahl

16.2

13.1

16.3

14.1

12.7

12.2

10.1

13.3

2017

18.8

13.6

17.5

15.0

11.2

10.6

10.3

13.8

2021

35–44 years

35.6

29.8

34.8

28.5

27.0

27.5

28.8

29.6

2017

33.4

22.7

26.7

26.6

25.7

25.8

26.6

27.0

2021

45–59 years

17.1

18.6

12.5

15.7

16.1

16.6

18.6

16.4

2017

18.6

17.8

14.3

14.2

20.5

19.4

22.1

18.0

2021

60–69 years

13.5

15.1

8.6

19.2

27.0

28.0

25.3

20.7

2017

12.1

16.5

9.3

14.0

30.6

34.0

27.7

20.8

2021

 ≥ 70 years

Table 6.6   The party electorates by age group in percent of the second votes of the respective party. Overall = share of the age group in the total population

6.2  Social Characteristics: Class, Confession and Age Group Choice 181

182

6  Voting Behavior: Social Characteristics and Current Orientations

of the vote as voters get older. The electorate of the Greens and the FDP, on the other hand, is made up of younger voters—and even more so in 2021 than in previous years. The SPD electorate, once quite representative of all age groups, has slowly but surely also become more age-dependent. The AfD seems to be more popular among middle-aged voters. The rise of the Greens has contributed significantly to the increase in the importance of age differences. With them, a party developed that propagated ecological goals, pacifism and self-realization. They thus corresponded to a “postmaterialism” as it is diagnosed in political sociology (Inglehart 1977; Inglehart 1989): namely, that for parts of the population of wealthy countries an economic saturation point has been reached, which for them no longer material interests and security, but post-material needs for more personal self-determination, freedom of speech, beautiful cities and nature to the top of their needs. The post-materialism thesis is based on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (according to which satisfied needs are perceived as less important), on the one hand, and on the generation thesis of socialization research, according to which basic attitudes develop in younger years and remain relatively stable over time. It would therefore be precisely in Germany that many of the younger and middle generations—brought up in prosperity and open to post-material values—would be shaped by quite different experiences than the older generation of the war and post-war period. Meanwhile, however, it has been shown that postmaterialist orientations do not necessarily increase constantly. They rose from 1980 to 1991, then remained at a lower level, before rising again from 2009 to 2016 (Stifel 2018, p. 189). With the rise of the Greens, the party system has been expanded by another conflict dimension: the opposition between post-materialism and traditional political goals. In the present, the Greens, as well as the Left and SPD, find disproportionately large numbers of post-materialists—at the same time 38% of these tend towards Union and FDP (Dalton 2014, p. 176–177). Postmaterialism does not provide a sharp dividing line. Taking into account the socio-cultural and demographic factors, various (and continuing) differences in voting behaviour between East and West can be explained: “The Social Democrats are weaker in the East than in the West and while the Greens have continuously increased their share of the vote in the West, they have hardly been able to gain a foothold in the East. On the other hand, the Left Party has been able to establish itself as the third- or even second-strongest force in the East, while its success in the West has been very limited. Finally, right-wing and populist parties have always been more successful in East Germany, most recently the AfD. (Elff et al. 2022, p. IX; Elff 2022).

6.2  Social Characteristics: Class, Confession and Age Group Choice

183

d) The shrinking of political milieus Social class and religious affiliation become behaviour-determining particularly when they are coupled with corresponding organisational ties—to trade unions or churches. Regular churchgoers tend more than others to vote for the Union parties, union members and their relatives more than other employees for the SPD. Accordingly, 32.1% of those who are unionised also voted for the SPD in the 2021 federal elections—more than 6 percentage points higher than in the total electorate (DGB 2021). However: “Overall, the effects are rather small. […] So self-employed people make up only about 6–7% of the electorate, Catholic churchgoers make up about 7% of the population, unionised workers make up just over 4%, younger well-educated people make up about 10%. Against this background, socio-demography can only have a very limited impact on election results” (Weßels and Schoen 2019, pp. 8–9). In addition, primary groups such as family, friends, colleagues, club brothers and sisters, and neighbours influence an individual’s voting behaviour. Conformity to one’s immediate environment promotes, according to a study in 1990, an adaptation to the prevailing opinions there (Schmitt-Beck 1994, p. 206). In agreement, 69.6% of people in the old federal states see themselves in agreement with their spouse or life partner (in the new federal states: 64.7%) and 51.8% with friends (48.3%). Divergence is only perceived by around half of the others. In 2009 this seems to have remained similar (Westle 2012, p. 206). Where organizational ties, local media, and primary groups support a certain political climate of opinion, one could long speak of a politically-social milieu characterized by special values, patterns of behavior, and communication networks (Pappi and Brandenburg 2010). However, the importance of the classical trade union-social democratic and Catholic milieus has declined in recent years. Therefore, election research today focuses in part on the empirical analysis of political preferences in individual social milieus (Neugebauer 2007). Accordingly, the Union scores best among the conservative-established, the SPD among the young adaptive-pragmatic, the FDP mainly among the liberal-intellectual educated elite, the Left among the experience-oriented lower middle class, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen in the cosmopolitan, expeditious milieu, and the AfD mainly in the precarious and in the bourgeois milieu (Vehrkamp and Wegschaider 2017). One also speaks of ”socio-political camps“ such as a radical-democratic, a socialintegrative, a skeptical-distant, a disappointed-authoritarian, and a traditionalconservative (Geiling and Vester 2007, p. 471). However, these approaches play hardly any role at all in empirical election research—partly for practical reasons, partly because their distinctions smell of scientific constructs.

184

6  Voting Behavior: Social Characteristics and Current Orientations

40

35

35 30

27

25

20

20 15

21 16 13

12

15 12

8

10

4

5

0

0 SPD

CDU/CSU

Left Russian-Germans

Greens

FDP

AfD

German Turks

per group. Achim Goerres et al, Immigrant German Election Study, after: Der Spiegel,

Fig. 6.1   Voting in immigrant milieus 2017 in percent of voters of the groups of origin. Source: Mayer et al. 2019, p. 84

Overall, the importance of organizational and milieu ties is declining. In the new federal states, political areas of tradition from the time before 1933 were still recognizable in 1946, but not in 1990 after generations of real socialism (Schmitt 1993). In general, they are weakened by supra-regional media and supra-regional traffic, as well as by the development towards a post-industrial society, the secularization process loosens church ties. Among all voters in West Germany, only 5% identified themselves as weekly churchgoers in 2017 (Neu 2021, p. 6). In the future, Union parties and social democracy will therefore be able to rely less and less on such mediated ties (Weßels and Schoen 2019, p. 10). Finally, the voting preferences of naturalized immigrants are gaining in importance (Fig. 6.1). Has a new milieu type emerged that is based on origin and supra-regional communication? As a result of their considerable number, the inclinations of the late resettlers towards the Union parties and of the other naturalized citizens, in particular the Muslims, towards Red-Green were already clearly visible a few years ago (2002 63% Union voters or 80% red-green voters—Wüst 2005, p. 143). These orientations correspond to the openness of ethnic Germans from Russia CDU/CSU on the one hand, and the immigrationfriendly basic attitude of the Greens and the SPD on the other. However, the ties have decreased: While the SPD still dominated among Germans with a

6.3  Social Psychological Motivations and Conjunctural Issues

185

Turkish migration background in 2017 (35%), it was now followed by Die Linke (16%) and the Greens (13%). And among ethnic Germans from Russia, the Union had to give way (27%)—Die Linke came in second (21%), followed by the AfD (15%). The scattering of votes among ethnic Russians hardly suggests a milieu vote anymore (Mayer et al. 2019, p. 84). However, the fact that the voting participation of migrants is around 15 to 20 percentage points below that of nonmigrants has nothing to do with migration-specific factors, but with the same ones that also lead to non-voting: low education, lack of party identification, absent political conversations.

6.3 Social Psychological Motivations and Conjunctural Issues a) Increasing of situation-dependent voting behavior Long-term structural analyses of elections are increasingly coming up against limits. An increasing proportion of voter behavior can no longer be explained by social characteristics. To the extent that factors continue to correlate with the election of certain parties, they lose weight: so churchgoing, so the proportion of workers. Therefore, decades ago, research on elections spoke of an “progressing decoupling of social structure and voting behavior” (Veen and Gluchowski 1988, p. 245). Is this the great time of the social psychological approach, which tries to explain voting behavior from party identification, candidate and issue orientation? However, the first explanatory factor of this approach is also weakening. For it is clearly shown that there is an decline in party identification (party affiliation), which decreased from 80 (1970s) to around 60% (1990s) in the old federal states. It has since remained at this level, while in the east it is now only about five percentage points below this (Arzheimer 2017, p. 51 ff.). That in the new federal states initially far fewer people identified with a party gave the overall development of society an additional boost (Schmitt 2001, p. 105). Germany is thus in good company with other large democracies such as the USA, Great Britain and France (Dalton 2014, p. 195). The decline in party affiliation corresponds to the fact that the proportion of respondents who intend to vote for a different party than last time in a federal election has increased over time (Schoen 2014b, p. 498)—in 2017 it was 46% (Schoen 2019, p. 158). In 2021, according to opinion polls, just under 40% of voters seemed to have made up their minds only in the last few days (Hallam 2021). However, one easily gets an exaggerated impression of the openness as

186

6  Voting Behavior: Social Characteristics and Current Orientations

a result of the high proportion of “undecided” or non-voters between federal elections, which is mainly due to the “popularity cycle” of government parties (slumps between main elections) (Erhardt 1998, p. 78 ff.—see Sect. 6.1b). Conclusion: The melting of party ties leads to an increase in the turnover rate and the proportion of those who make up their minds at the last minute over time. However, “significant shifts” (Neundorf 2012, p. 247) are more likely within the ideological camps (Schoen et al. 2017, p. 213). For the short-term, election-related analysis, this suggests a higher explanatory power of the social psychological than the sociological approach to election research. Protest voting is also worth mentioning in this context. The strong, situationdependent fluctuations in the vote for extreme right-wing parties are a glaring example. Earlier, the election of extremist parties was fed by protest and a certain degree of content-related proximity (Arzheimer 2014, p. 555). This means that it is not enough to have a diffuse political dissatisfaction with politics or the system in order to vote for such a party (“pure protest vote”)—there is always a certain degree of content-related proximity as well. And so it is also with the AfD, which seems to need the protest sentiment no less than a well-founded asylum, migration and eurocritical attitude on the part of part of the electorate (Bieber et al. 2018, p. 456; Pickel 2019). Of course, this does not necessarily mean that these voters also had a right-wing extremist attitude pattern. b) Does problem-solving competence decide? When dealing with policy issues, two questions arise: Which issues do voters consider important (problem relevance) and which party do they think is most likely to solve them (problem-solving competence)? The answer to this should determine the decision of movable, rational voters. Answers to these questions change over time. Surveys have shown a permanently high importance of price stability and old-age security since 1961, a medium and changing level of education, and a declining rank of foreign policy by the end of the seventies. The issue of job security became a top issue after the recession of 1974. Competence allocations to parties are also variable. In addition to topics that always have a certain party most trusted, there are questions where confidence fluctuates: for example, in price stability, similar to old-age security and external security (Klingemann and Taylor 1977, p. 343 ff.). The success of populist parties seems to be more clearly related to problem weights and -competencies than that of other parties with a wider range of topics and long government practice. In the 2001 Hamburg parliamentary elections, crime was by far the most important issue. The new party Ronald Schill was then assigned the highest competence by 19%, which precisely matched its election

6.3  Social Psychological Motivations and Conjunctural Issues

187

result (Horst 2002, p. 50, 55). For a long time, the Republican voting intention also clearly correlated with the relevance of the issue of immigration/asylum; it was the most important issue in spring to autumn 1989 and again in 1992 to 1993 (Bürklin and Klein 1998, p. 176). The AfD was indebted to its success in 2017 to the dominance of the issue of immigration. But what about the success and failure of other parties with a wider range of topics and long government practice? When the majority changed in 1998, the SPD led on social issues and the fight against unemployment, the Union on crime and debt reduction. However, the Union parties were able to maintain their lead in this area (Noelle-Neumann 1998). In 2002 and 2005, “unemployment” was at the top, so that the Union parties focused their election campaign almost monotonously on the economy. Although they maintained their lead in this area, they lost in the election campaign. How can this be explained? • Dominant problem relevance is not to be interpreted in terms of sole election determination: It would be surprising if the many who consider unemployment the most important problem were not themselves affected and made their voting decision primarily on this basis. The electorate does indeed distinguish between the most important problems for Germany on the one hand and the issues that decide their own vote on the other. • Other topics remain relevant and can be decisive together. This is how it seemed to have happened in the 2002 election campaign. • Of great importance for the fact that the favorable poll results for CDU/CSU at the end of the election campaign fell in 2005 (the opposite for the SPD), seems to be a phenomenon already mentioned: the tendency of previously disappointed and estranged government voters to return. The “undecided” before the election were ”to a significant extent not really uncommitted voters“, but brought with them from their attitudes a “tendency to return” to their former parties (Erhardt 1998, p. 77). Traditionally, important problem competencies are primarily assigned to certain parties in Germany (Table 6.7): economic upswing, crime prevention, jobs and reduction of public debt by CDU/CSU, social justice by SPD and environmental protection by the Greens; in East Germany with the difference that there the Left is most often expected to achieve social justice (Gabriel 2013, p. 331 ff.). What characterized the most recent federal election campaigns? The 2013 election campaign lacked suspense. The SPD, with a massive rejection of a redred-green coalition by citizens (only 7% desired it a few days before the election) in mind (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 2013), could not offer a credible power

188

6  Voting Behavior: Social Characteristics and Current Orientations

Table 6.7   Problem competence of the parties 2021 in percent of the respondents, shortly before the federal election (without indication—no values)

Problem Most important problems

Problem competence

CDU/ Here percent- CSU age of all respondents

SPD

The Left B90/The Greens

FDP

AfD

No party

3

4

5

18

Environ- 47 ment, climate, energy transition

11

12

43

Corona- 28 virus

27

24

2

5

5

9

29

Foreign- 13 ers, integration, refugees

19

19

6

10

5

13

24

12 Social inequality

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

Pensions 10

18

32

6

4

6

7

23

Formation

7

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

Costs, prices, wages

5

11

25

9

5

5

7

16

6 Economic situation

34

22

1

4

13

7

15

Source: Most important problems: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen cited according to: Neu (2022).

6.3  Social Psychological Motivations and Conjunctural Issues

189

alternative. But what spoke in favor of CDU/CSU? It was the economic situation, which stood in impressive contrast to the rest of the eurozone. While in 2009 only 12% rated the general economic situation in Germany as (very) good, 87% rated it as less good/bad, in 2013 74% rated it as (very) good and only 26% as less good/bad (Infratest dimap 2013). Usually, economic growth correlates positively with gains made by ruling parties (Steiner and Steinbrecher 2012, p. 322). In addition, the Union was clearly ahead on the issues considered important. However, the “social gap” that was dangerous for them was only considered important by ten percent of respondents (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen cited according to Neu 2022). The FDP, which was part of the ruling coalition, did not profit from this, so that the previous government majority was lost. The causes of the FDP’s fall appear to be manifold: disappointment with government policy contrary to FDP expectations (nuclear power phase-out, lack of tax relief, Greek loans), rejection of tactical voting by the Union (Faas and Huber 2015, p. 757 ff.), additional competition from the AfD. The result of the 2017 German federal election was determined by a revolution of topics. Instead of the three most important issues mentioned in polls in 2009—the labour market, economic and social policy (with inner security at one percent and immigration policy not even mentioned—GLES 2009, quoted after Rudi 2011, p. 182)—the citizens of 2017 saw the problem situation quite differently: Now “refugees/asylum” dominated by far, while jobs and the economy (because in good form) lagged behind. “Social justice”: far behind. All in all: The big party’s election winners had lost their momentum, while opposition criticism of Merkel’s immigration policy drove voters to the AfD and—to a limited extent—the FDP. 2021 saw the second revolution—because for the second time, none of the classic election topics was in the foreground. Rather, the election took place in the shadow of the Corona pandemic and the climate crisis (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, quoted after Neu 2022).—both of which, although considered secondary only a few years earlier or even non-existent, were the decisive issues: Before the election, 28% of respondents considered the former to be the most important, 47% the latter. It came as no surprise that most people considered the Greens to be the most competent party in terms of environmental protection. They also ended up in the federal government. However, the fact that the Union was just ahead of the Social Democrats in pandemic containment did not help. They were punished. The SPD, on the other hand, was considered the most competent party in terms of pensions—did that help them in the end? The fact that the FDP was nowhere to be seen as a competence winner and yet made it into the government (with a vote increase especially among younger people) shows how much the

190

6  Voting Behavior: Social Characteristics and Current Orientations

most important issues in combination with the competence attribution can mean. In total, this makes it clear that each election takes place in a unique constellation, and even leading problem competence in the most relevant area does not automatically lead to victory. c) Personality or incumbency bonus? The question remains: How important is the image of the candidates, the “image”, that the voters make of them in comparison? Certainly—the average constituency or list candidate hardly penetrates the voter’s consciousness, but top personnel are very much noticed. Attitudes towards them seem to be more important than towards policy issues in state elections (Völkl 2009, p. 263). However, when assessing them, assessments of their policy and their personality flow together inextricably. On the side of the election winners, problem competence often coincides with candidate advantages—as in the 1998 federal election in favour of the SPD, as in numerous state elections. The decisive role of a policy issue (citizenship law) could only be clearly seen in the 1999 Hesse election (Schmitt-Beck 2000). It remains difficult to answer whether the more competent person is preferred to the more sympathetic or more citizen-friendly candidate: In state elections, apparently competent prime ministers like Stoiber (1998) and Teufel (2001) won against two candidates perceived as sympathetic (Gabriel 2002, p. 20), but in the 2002 federal election, the more sympathetic/more citizen-friendly Chancellor Schröder won against his challenger, who appeared more competent on economic and employment issues (Roth and Jung 2002, p. 13). It is to the credit of the respondents that they value leadership qualities, integrity and issue competence above politically irrelevant personal characteristics when it comes to top candidates (Brettschneider 2002, pp. 132, 204). In the 2013 and 2017 federal elections, this was not a problem, as the incumbent chancellor clearly outperformed her SPD challengers on both counts (Wagner 2014, p. 271; Glinitzer and Jungmann 2019, p. 252). And in 2021—unusually in that for the first time there was no incumbent candidate, while there were now three candidates who could realistically hope to become chancellor during the course of the election year—some indications suggested that the Union candidate Armin Laschet might even have poached voters from his own party, while the SPD benefited from Olaf Scholz’s candidacy—namely because he followed in the footsteps of the former chancellor, whose supporters now switched to the SPD in significant numbers (SchmittBeck 2021, p. 12 ff.). Many cases can also be explained differently: with a preference for politicians in government positions (office bonus). On a local level, mayors and district

6.3  Social Psychological Motivations and Conjunctural Issues

191

Table 6.8   The office bonus of the federal chancellor in percent of the respondents or the second votes of the parties

1990

1994

1998

2002

Chan- Kohl cellor

Kohl

Kohl

Schröder Schröder Mer- Mer- Merkel Laschet kel kel

42

36

58

54

51

58

56

22

41.5

35.1

38.5

34.2

33.8

41.5

32.9

24.1

Merkel

Stein- Stein- Schulz Scholz/ meier brück Baerbock

47 Party 43.8

Can- Lafon- Scharp- Schröder Stoiber didate taine ing 32 Party 33.5

2005

2009 2013 2017

20.211

31

57

34

35

36

32

32

48/15

36.4

40.9

38.5

35.2

23

25.7

20.5

25.7/14.8

Sources: Gibowski and Kaase (1991, p. 14); Noelle-Neumann (1994); Gabriel/Brettschneider (1998, p. 23); Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (2002; 2013; 2017b; 2021b); infratest-dimap (2009).

councillors appear, on a regional level prime ministers and ministers, in the federal government the federal chancellor and well-known government members are surrounded by the aura of their office and appear more often in the media. Normally they achieve a popularity advantage. Table 6.8 shows this for the federal chancellor, who usually leads in the question of who to prefer as chancellor and is usually above the attractiveness of his or her party. This office effect was particularly pronounced in the case of Brandt, who only achieved 28% as a chancellor candidate in 1969, but was already preferred by 45% of respondents at the end of the year after taking office (Kaltefleiter 1973, p. 6). This governmental orientation of the electorate, which can also be found in other democracies, promotes the tendency to replace parliamentary candidates who are not in government positions with state prime ministers: thus in 1960 Ollenhauer by Brandt, 1976 Barzel by Kohl, 1980 Kohl by Strauß and 1987 Vogel by Rau, followed by the state prime ministers Lafontaine, Scharping and Schröder. The candidate Merkel, who campaigned in 2005 without any government flair, is conspicuous in this respect. She was followed by Olaf Scholz, a Hamburg mayor and federal finance minister. Contrary to media impressions, surveys since the 1960s have shown that voters’ orientation towards persons has not increased. Although voters regularly state that the decisive voting criterion for them are policy issues, followed by interests or group affiliation and party affiliation, while candidates are hardly mentioned (for 2009 Blumenstiel and Rattinger 2012, p. 261). In fact, so far, identification with a party has always been the strongest,

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6  Voting Behavior: Social Characteristics and Current Orientations

followed by general content-ideological proximity, the perceived government balance and candidate preference—only then did specific policy issues come into play (Scherer 2019). Everything points to the fact that it was no different in 2021—on the contrary: the trend towards personalization has increased (SchmittBeck 2021, p. 16). This is indicated by the success of the SPD, which was less due to its competence profile than to its top candidate, who benefited from an incumbency bonus. Even though these results cannot be transferred to every election without further ado, it can currently be stated for the national level in Germany: The voting decision depends primarily on the party affiliation of the electorate, on the perceived competence of the parties and the top candidates, and only then on very specific policy issues.

6.4 The Economics of the Election Campaign Effective election campaigning in mass democracies is subject to several requirements. First and foremost: one vote counts as one vote. This makes it more profitable to address more people superficially than a few intensively. It is not expected to achieve fundamental conversions in the election campaign, but rather attempts to build on already existing attitudes as much as possible in its design. For this reason, parties have been consulting opinion polls for a long time— CDU/CSU used to like the Allensbach Institute for Demoscopy, SPD rather Infratest dimap—in order to explore the popularity of people, the relevance of problems and the problem competence of parties. Among the opinion research institutes, “Infratest” (subsidiary “Infratest dimap”) is a large company, EMNID a medium-sized company, while the others are relatively small: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (Mannheim), Institut für Demoskopie (Allensbach) and Forsa (Berlin). In addition to employees, up to 2000 part-time interviewers are employed by the individual institutes on election days. The primary field of work is usually market research (except at Forschungsgruppe Wahlen and Infratest dimap). However, election research is considered immensely important for method development, public reputation and thus contract opportunities (Gellner 1996, p. 174; Gallus 2004, p. 125). Opinion poll publications hardly influence voting behavior. Rather, they seem to have “passed by the people almost unnoticed”, only influencing coalition expectations (Hoffmann and Klein 2013, p. 240). However, the election campaign is designed and conducted taking into account the opinion poll results. The parties also hire “spin doctors” as gurus for a successful election campaign—for

6.4  The Economics of the Election Campaign

193

example, the former editor-in-chief of “BamS” Michael Spreng with Stoiber (2002), the head of the SPD “Kampa” election campaign leadership (1998 and 2002) Matthias Machnig with the SPD (Falter 1998; Esser 1999). The trend continues: In 2021, Raphael Brinkert, former advisor at Jung von Matt, advised Olaf Scholz; Tanit Koch, former editor-in-chief of Bild, the CDU; and Michael Scharfschwerdt, from the management consulting firm Kearney, Annalena Baerbock. Problems on which a party scores well in the eyes of citizens are given priority by this party. The ruling party of the Chancellor seeks to use the Chancellor’s office bonus by highlighting it (“It depends on the Chancellor”, 1969; “Chancellor of Trust”, 1972; “We elect the Chancellor”, 2009; “Chancellor of Trust”, 2013). In contrast, it is considered advantageous for opposition candidates for Chancellor to be surrounded by a respectable government team. Secondly, those who want to receive many votes must win over voters with different interests and views—the so-called “median voters”. This has the consequence that parties often flee to general statements or concentrate their election campaign on a unifying theme or person. They do this by reducing the complexity of politics to brief election slogans such as “No Experiments” (CDU 1957), “We Create the Modern Germany” (SPD 1969) or “Freedom or Socialism” (CSU 1976) (Toman-Banke 1996). Merkel’s Union campaign strategy was based on an “asymmetric demobilization” from 2009 onwards (Jung 2019), by taking controversial issues such as nuclear energy, minimum wages, retirement age or childcare, same-sex marriage and a welcome culture for refugees out of the debate—by means of social policy measures or announcements that could have come from the SPD (Schmidt 2014, p. 568). The more the own strengths could shine: Merkel’s European policy in comparison to the social democratic/green one and the favorable economic situation in comparison to other EU countries (Tils and Raschke 2013, pp. 21, 24). Thirdly, the election campaign has to take into account that for average citizens the act of voting is only on the periphery of their life interests, not worth taking in intensive information for its own sake. Especially rational voters will behave like this. The campaigning parties therefore have to compete for attention. Above all, emotionalization, general entertainment elements up to the portrayal of politics as dramatic theater, should provide access to the voter. Television talk shows, but also illustrated reports also offer the opportunity for top candidates to engage in personal sympathy advertising without explicit political messages. If in the party’s election spots the sequences without substantive policy issue made up a good 30% in the nineties, more than ever before (exception 1961), this also points to an emotional appeal to a broad audience (Holtz-Bacha 2000, p. 175).

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6  Voting Behavior: Social Characteristics and Current Orientations

Finally, one knows that party advertising is hardly read, election meetings rather small, mostly already convinced minorities, and election booths hardly visited. Much more important seem general media. The election campaign must therefore be carried into the homes through media independent of the party, in the form of reports, reports and comments on the parties. Since television still has the largest reach, television campaigns are considered the “core” (Schulz 1998, p. 383 ff.) of the election campaign—even today. That television duels of the top candidates can actually decide an election is only to be expected in close races (Maurer and Reinemann 2003, pp. 207, 221 f.; Maier and Faas 2019, p. 87 ff.). Election meetings, press conferences, public appearances of all kinds often only take place in order to create occasions for media reports (“pseudo-events”). Thus, the mass media form a filter that, according to its rules, selects and presents information in order to reach viewers, listeners and readers in turn. As in other Western democracies, this also means in Germany that media tend to personalize, emotionalize and dramatize. The closer the election day, the more horserace aspects move into the foreground on television in particular (Schulz and Zeh 2010, p. 317). The election campaign then appears entertaining like a horse race, substantive issues move into the background. Also in the online election campaign 2013 the course of the election campaign and the elections as such dominated with 59%, while the strongest substantive issues were foreign and social policy each only 6%, taxes 3, education policy 2 and energy/environment policy 1% of the space (Stärk 2015, p. 60). Thus, federal elections in the Federal Republic of Germany are—similar to other Western democracies—characterized by • limited information intake and emotionally influenced decisions by voters, which from their perspective can be considered rational; • media that push themselves between advertising parties (or candidates) and citizens. • an increasing use of social media by politicians and voters (Staudt and Schmitt-Beck 2019; Stier et al. 2019), which circumvent this filter effect and create filter bubbles (Gärtner and Wuttke 2019). A drama of election campaigns results from mood changes, as they become visible in opinion polls. Often, supporters of the respective government tend to be disappointed with indecision or protest, “hang” government parties and chancellors in opinion polls, while the opposition begins to triumph. Not least, the election campaign is therefore about mobilizing this potential voter—often with the

6.4  The Economics of the Election Campaign

195

Table 6.9   Voter migration balance federal election 2021/17 balances, in thousand votes

CDU/CSU

SPD

CDU/CSU

(11.060)

SPD

1530

(11,910)

B90/Die Grünen

920

260

Left

−20

FDP

490

AfD

−80

Non-voters

50

−1530

−640

−180

−260

−520

Grüne −920

−260

(6820) −480

−240

−60

−300

Linke 20

FDP −490

AfD 80

Nichtwähler −50

640

180

260

520

480

240

60

300

(2260)

−110

−90

−320

110

(5300)

210

40

90

−210

(4770)

−180

320

−40

180

(14,740)

Reading instructions: In the respective line, the balances of the line party opposite the parties or non-voters in the columns. The values above and below the diagonal are therefore identical. In brackets: Number of voters of the party 2021. For example, the Union has lost 1,530,000 voters from 2017 to 2021 to the SPD. Source: Infratest-Dimap, according to: Tagesschau (2021): How the voters migrated, under: https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/btw21/waehlerwanderung-bundestagswahl-103.html (last checked on February 11, 2022).

result that the ruling party catches up or overtakes at the end. This effect could be observed in 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2005 (Feist and Hoffmann 1999, p. 219, 227; Brunner 1998, p. 273, 276; Schultze 2004, p. 75). It was no different in 2021— of course with the difference that Vice Chancellor Olaf Scholz benefited from an kind of Chancellor’s bonus due to the absence of a defender. Nevertheless, mobilization of previously undecided voters during the election campaign has been shown for the federal elections in 2009 and 2013 (Schoen 2017, p. 130 ff., 208). Explanations for this “catch-up” (Harald Schoen) are called: the return of voters to their long-term party preferences, an increasing importance of candidate orientation at the end of the election campaign, occasionally a change of topic during the election campaign (based on 2002 Schoen 2004, p. 23 ff.). Although voter migration balances are not considered to be precise, the one for 2021/17 (Table 6.9) shows that relevant changes take place. New voters and those who have died or emigrated are not included. Remarkable for the election in 2017 are the massive losses of the Union in favor of the SPD, the Greens and the FDP. They also benefited far above average from accessions of former nonvoters. Although election campaigns mobilize already existing basic attitudes, the changes indicate their relevance for parties and majority gains.

196

6  Voting Behavior: Social Characteristics and Current Orientations

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Niedermayer, Oskar (2005): Bürger und Politik, 2. edn., Wiesbaden. Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth (1994): Das Kräftemessen mehrt das Ansehen, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung vom 19. Oktober. Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth (1998): Wahlkampf seit November 1995, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung vom 30. September. Pappi, Franz U. (1973): Parteiensystem und Sozialstruktur in der Bundesrepublik, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 14 (2), p. 191 ff. Pappi, Franz U. (1977): Sozialstruktur, gesellschaftliche Wertorientierung und Wahlabsicht, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 18 (2/3), p. 195 ff. Pappi, Franz U./Brandenburg, Jens (2010): Sozialstrukturelle Interessenlage und Parteipräferenzin Deutschland, in: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 62 (3), p. 459 ff. Pausch, Robert (2022): Von oben herab, in: Die Zeit Nr. 20 vom 12. Mai. Petersen, Thomas et al. (2013): Gespaltene Demokratie. Politische Partizipation und Demokratiezufriedenheit vor der Bundestagswahl 2013, Gütersloh. Pickel, Susanne (2019): Die Wahl der AfD. Frustration, Deprivation, Angst oder Wertekonflikt?, in: Korte, Karl-Rudolf/Schoofs, Jan (eds.): Die Bundestagswahl 2017. Analysen der Wahl-, Parteien-, Kommunikations- und Regierungsforschung, Wiesbaden, p. 145 ff. Reiser, Marion et al. (2008): Präsenz und Erfolg kommunaler Wählergemeinschaften im Bundesländervergleich, in: Vetter, Angelika (ed.): Erfolgsbedingungen lokaler Bürgerbeteiligung, Wiesbaden, p. 123 ff. Roth, Dieter/Jung, Matthias (2002): Ablösung der Regierung vertagt: Eine Analyse der Bundestagswahl 2002, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 49–50, p. 3 ff. Rudi, Tatjana (2011): Sachthemen und politische Streifragen, in: Rattinger, Hans et al. (eds.): Zwischen Langeweile und Extremen. Die Bundestagswahl 2009, Baden-Baden, p. 179 ff. Sacksofsky, Ute (2016): Reform des Wahlrechts zum Deutschen Bundestag, in: Mörschel, Tobias (ed.): Wahlen und Demokratie. Reformoptionen des deutschen Wahlrechts, Baden-Baden, p. 101 ff. Schäfer, Armin (2015): Der Verlust politischer Gleichheit, Frankfurt a. M. Scherer, Philipp (2019): Die Wahlentscheidung in der Gesamtschau, in: Roßteutscher, Sigrid et al. (eds.): Zwischen Polarisierung und Beharrung: Die Bundestagswahl 2017, Baden-Baden, p. 345 ff. Schmidt, Manfred G. (2014): Erfolg der „asymmetrischen Demobilisierung“? Deutschlands Sozialstaat, die schwarz-gelbe Sozialpolitik und die Bundestagswahl 2013, in: Jesse, Eckhard/Sturm, Roland (eds.): Bilanz der Bundestagswahl 2013. Voraussetzungen, Ergebnisse, Folgen, Baden-Baden, p. 549 ff. Schmitt, Karl (1993): Politische Landschaften im Umbruch, in: Gabriel, Oscar W./Troitzsch, Klaus G. (eds.): Wahlen in Zeiten des Umbruchs, Frankfurt a. M., p. 403 ff. Schmitt, Karl (2001): Wählt der Osten anders?, in: Eith, Ulrich et al. (eds.): Gesellschaftliche Konflikte und Parteiensysteme, Wiesbaden, p. 96 ff. Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger (1994): Vermittlungsumwelten westdeutscher und ostdeutscher Wähler, in: Rattinger, Hans et al. (eds.): Wahlen und politische Einstellungen im vereinigten Deutschland, Frankfurt a. M., p. 189 ff. Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger (2000): Die hessische Landtagswahl vom 7. Februar 1999, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 31 (3), p. 3 ff.

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Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger (2021): Wahlpolitische Achterbahnfahrt. Wer wählte wen zur Bundestagswahl 2021?, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 47–49, p. 10 ff. Schoen, Harald (2004): Der Kanzler, zwei Sommerthemen und ein Foto-Finish, in: Brettschneider, Frank et al. (eds.): Die Bundestagswahl 2002, Wiesbaden, p. 23 ff. Schoen, Harald (2014a): Soziologische Ansätze in der empirischen Wahlforschung, in: Falter, Jürgen W./ders. (eds.): Handbuch Wahlforschung, 2. edn., Wiesbaden, p. 169 ff. Schoen, Harald (2014b): Wechselwahl, in: Falter, Jürgen W./ders. (eds.): Handbuch Wahlforschung, 2. edn., Wiesbaden, p. 489 ff. Schoen, Harald et al. (2017): Election Campaigns and Voter Decision-Making in a MultiParty System, Baden-Baden. Schoen, Harald (2019): Wechselwähler, in: Roßteutscher, Sigrid et al. (eds.): Zwischen Polarisierung und Beharrung: Die Bundestagswahl 2017, Baden-Baden, p. 157 ff. Schultze, Rainer-Olaf (2004): Strukturierte Vielfalt als Wählerentscheidung heute?, in: Jesse, Eckhard (eds.): Bilanz der Bundestagswahl 2002, Wiesbaden, p. 71 ff. Schulz, Winfried (1998): Wahlkampf unter Vielkanalbedingungen, in: MP 1998, p. 378 ff. Schulz, Winfried/Zeh, Reimar (2010): Die Protagonisten in der Fernseharena. Merkel und Steinmeier in der Berichterstattung über den Wahlkampf 2009, in: Holtz-Bacha, Christina (ed.): Die Massenmedien im Wahlkampf. Das Wahljahr 2009, Wiesbaden, p. 313 ff. Siegmund, Jörg/Münch, Ursula (2015): Kritische Anmerkungen zur Schlüsselinstitution unserer Demokratie, in: Münch, Ursula/Oberreuter, Heinrich (eds.): Die neue Offenheit, Frankfurt a. M., p. 29 ff. Stärk, Marie-Therese (2015): Der Wahlkampf im Internet, in: Holtz-Bacha, Christina (ed.): Die Massenmedien im Wahlkampf, Wiesbaden, p. 41 ff. Staudt, Alexander/Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger (2019): Nutzung traditioneller und neuer politischer Informationsquellen im Bundestagswahlkampf 2017, in: Roßteutscher, Sigrid et al. (eds.): Zwischen Polarisierung und Beharrung: Die Bundestagswahl 2017, Baden-Baden, p. 63 ff. Steiner, Nil/Steinbrecher, Markus (2012): Wirtschaft und Wahlverhalten in Westdeutschland zwischen 1977 und 2007, in: Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger (eds.): Wählen in Deutschland, Baden-Baden, p. 321 ff. Sternberger, Dolf (1964): Die große Wahlreform. Zeugnisse einer Bemühung, Köln. Stier, Sebastian et al. (2019): Die Nutzung sozialer Medien durch Kandidaten im Bundestagswahlkampf 2017, in: Weßels, Bernhard/Schoen, Harald (eds.): Wahlen und Wähler. Analysen aus Anlass der Bundestagswahl 2017, Wiesbaden, p. 415 ff. Stifel, Andreas (2018): Vom erfolgreichen Scheitern einer Bewegung. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen als politische Partei und soziokulturelles Phänomen, Wiesbaden. Tagesschau (2021): Wie die Wähler wanderten, unter: https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/ btw21/waehlerwanderung-bundestagswahl-103.html (zuletzt geprüft am 11. Februar 2022). Tils, Ralf/Raschke, Joachim (2013): Strategie zählt, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 48–49, p. 20 ff. Toman-Banke, Monika (1996): Die Wahlslogans der Bundestagswahlen 1949–1994, Wiesbaden. Veen, Hans-Joachim/Gluchowski, Peter (1988): Sozialstrukturelle Nivellierung bei politischer Polarisierung, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 19 (2), p. 225 ff. Vehrkamp, Robert/Wegschaider, Klaudia (2017): Populäre Wahlen. Mobilisierung und Gegenmobilisierung der sozialen Milieus bei der Bundestagswahl 2017, Gütersloh.

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Völkl, Kerstin (2009): Reine Landtagswahl oder regionale Bundestagswahl?, BadenBaden. Völkl, Kerstin/Heyme, Rebekka (2019): Nebenwahlen, in: Faas, Thorsten et al. (eds.): Politikwissenschaftliche Einstellungs- und Verhaltensforschung, Baden-Baden, p. 572 ff. Wagner, Aiko (2014): Spitzenkandidaten, in: Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger et al. (eds.): Zwischen Fragmentierung und Konzentration. Die Bundestagswahl 2013, Baden-Baden, p. 267 ff. Weinmann, Philipp/Grotz, Florian (2020): Reconciling parliamentary size with personalized proportional representation? Frontiers of electoral reform for the German Bundestag, in: German Politics (online first), https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2020.1790531. Weßels, Bernhard/Schoen, Harald (2019): Die Bundestagswahl 2017. Mehr vom Selben? in: dies. (eds.): Wahlen und Wähler. Analysen aus Anlass der Bundestagswahl 2017, Wiesbaden, p. 3 ff. Westle, Bettina G (2012): Geschlecht und Stimmverhalten bei Bundestagswahlen, in: Gabriel, Oscar W./dies. (eds.): Wählerverhalten in der Demokratie, Baden-Baden, p. 183 ff. Wüst, Andreas M. (2005): Einstellungen von Parlamentskandidaten gegenüber Einwandererminoritäten in Deutschland und den Niederlanden, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 36 (1), p. 142 ff. Zicht, Wilko (2021a): Übersicht über die Wahlsysteme bei Landtagswahlen, unter: https:// www.wahlrecht.de/landtage/ (zuletzt geprüft am 3. Februar 2021). Zicht, Wilko (2021b): Übersicht über die Wahlsysteme bei Kommunalwahlen, unter: https://www.wahlrecht.de/kommunal/ (zuletzt geprüft am 3. Februar 2021).

Part III Political Institutions: A Complex Multi-Level System

7

The Bundestag: Parliamentary Majority Democracy

7.1 The Dualism of Majority and Opposition a) The transformation of the function of parliamentarism Democracy, understood as direct rule by the people as in ancient Athens, was considered impossible in large countries for many centuries: After all, the people could not meet. Only new ideas, such as those developed by the English House of Commons with the claim to speak for the whole country, broke the spell. These were • the principle of “representation”, according to which the actions of representatives of a larger whole are attributed and accepted as legitimate by this whole (Weber 1922, p. 171)1—Representatives can make decisions on behalf of the represented (Marschall 2018, p. 23 ff.). • second, the free mandate of the deputies, which released them from previously customary instructions from their local base and thus created the prerequisite for a functioning and committed parliament to the whole. • Thirdly, since Bolingbroke’s opposition in early 18th century England, the idea of a legitimate opposition with the accepted goal of taking over the government by—neither rebellion (in the eyes of the ruling) nor resistance to illegitimate rule (in the self-conception of the opposition) (Kluxen 1956, p. 1 ff., 158 ff.).

1 In

contrast, Rousseau (1959, p. 81): “Every law that the people have not ratified in person is null and void; it is not a law.”

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Mannewitz and W. Rudzio, The Political System of Germany, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41371-2_7

205

206

7  The Bundestag: Parliamentary Majority Democracy

Together, these three inventions made it possible to settle political differences in civilized forms and to establish a parliamentary (= dependent on the parliamentary majority) government. This meant a lot—but not democracy. For the right to vote for the British House of Commons remained restricted to minorities for a long time. Parliamentary representation thus provided an institutional framework that was only later democratized by the English extension of the franchise—similarly to the USA and France, which had already given representative constitutions in 1787/88 and 17912 but only much later said goodbye to census suffrage and slavery. Democracy in the extensive state thus became reality in the form of representative democracy. Wherever it exists today, it is in this form. The representative principle also prevails where referendums play a complementary role— Switzerland may be an exception. The more representative legitimacy depends on election, the more responsiveness is required, i.e. receptivity and willingness to take on the questions and problems of the electorate. In this context, the deputies mutate into “political mediators” (Knaut 2011, p. 61, 103), who are supposed to receive demands, explain decisions and extend their communication networks into the whole society. Accordingly, the parliament, the Bundestag (in the federal states the state parliaments), is at the center of political institutions in today’s Germany. As the only federal institution, it is directly elected by the people and therefore has the decisive democratic legitimacy. It fulfills the following functions (based on Thaysen 1976, p. 12 ff.): • It is responsible for the personnel of other central state institutions, directly or indirectly, partly together with representatives of other institutions (electoral function). • It controls the governmental actions (control function). • It is responsible, with the participation of the Bundesrat, for legislation (legislative function). • It should express the opinions existing in the people (articulation function). However, the changed role of parliament in the parliamentary government system is decisive for how these tasks are actually fulfilled. Once primarily representa-

2 The

French Constitution of 1791 formulated: “The nation, from which all powers emanate, can only exercise them by delegation. The French Constitution is a representative constitution.” Quoted from Kempf (1986, p. 441 ff.).

7.1  The Dualism of Majority and Opposition

207

tion of the people vis-à-vis an authoritarian government, parliament itself is now, more precisely: the parliamentary majority, through persons of its trust, the government. It acts in the sense of the Principal-Agent model as “agent of the assembly majority” (Matthew Shugart quoted after Blumenthal 2009, p. 14). Instead of classical separation of powers, there is, as Bagehot already stated, a “nearly complete fusion of executive and legislative powers” (Bagehot 1963, p. 65). Instead of a dualism of parliament and government (“old dualism”), a “new dualism” of parliamentary majority (including government) and parliamentary opposition has emerged. In the context of this, the functions of election and legislation are in the foreground for the parliamentary majority, while for the opposition it is control and articulation. Such a duality could not develop in the Weimar Republic. It was excluded due to the strength of anti-democratic parties, which also repeatedly forced the democratic forces outside the government to at least “tolerate” them; unlike in the Federal Republic. Favorable conditions for this were the clear confrontation between the two major parties since 1947 as well as the weakness of extremist parties. Although the social democratic opposition remained numerically inferior in view of the “economic miracle” (1949–60), it then chose the path to government power through a policy of commonalities and a Grand Coalition (1960–69) and achieved the first change of government in 1969 (Friedrich 1962). In 1982 and 1998, one of the two major parties was able to replace the other in government with smaller coalition partners. The model of alternative government and opposition had established itself. (cf. Table 7.1). With an ungovernable party, the PDS or the Left, the alternative model has been called into question for some years. After narrowly missing a key parliamentary position of this party in 1994, this case actually occurred in 2005 and 2013. In 2017, with the AfD, another party that was not considered a possible coalition partner by any side entered the Bundestag. The consequence: sufficiently homogeneous coalition formations between the remaining parties are unlikely, large and inhomogeneous coalitions and minority governments more likely. Excessive compromise pressures erode governing parties, the opposition is incoherent and without a majority chance. This prompted the majority to help the weak opposition in the Bundestag 2013–17 to be more effective by exception by requiring only 120 MPs to set up an investigation committee or a subsidiarity complaint before the European Court of Justice, among other things. (Cancik 2017, p. 534). In view of the large coalitions, the talk of a “dissolution of dualism” between government majority/opposition was in the air (Niclauß 2015, p. 417, 426). Will the coalition of 2021 be the swallow that doesn’t make summer yet?

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7  The Bundestag: Parliamentary Majority Democracy

Table 7.1   Government coalition and opposition number of Bundestag mandates (until 1990 without Berlin) or government members of the parties

Government

Coalition

1. Bundestag (1949–53): BK Adenauer (CDU): 6 CDU, 3 CSU, 3 FDP, 2 DP

CDU/CSU 139, FDP SPD 131, BP 17, 52, DP 17 KPD 15, WAV 12, Z 10, DReP 5, SSW 1, Independent 3

2. Bundestag (1953–57): BK Adenauer (CDU): 1953–56: 8 CDU, 2 CSU, 4 FDP, 2 BHE, 2 DP, 1 ptl.; 1956–57: 10 CDU, 3 CSU, 2 FVP, 2 DP

CDU/CSU 243, FDP SPD 151, Z 3 (ab 48, DP 15, BHE 27 1956 auch FDP und BHE)

3. Bundestag (1957–61): BK Adenauer (CDU): 12 CDU, 4 CSU, 2 DP CDU/ CSU 270, DP 17

SPD 169, FDP 41

4. Bundestag (1961–65): BK Adenauer (CDU) 1961–63: 12 CDU, 4 CSU, 5 FDP; BK Erhard (CDU) 1963–65: 13 CDU, 4 CSU, 5 FDP

CDU/CSU 242, FDP SPD 190 67

5. Bundestag (1965–69): BK Erhard (CDU) 1965–66: 13 CDU, 5 CSU, 4 FDP; BK Kiesinger (CDU) 1966–69: 8 CDU, 3 CSU, 9 SPD

CDU/CSU 245, FDP SPD 202; ab 1966: FDP 49; ab 1966: CDU/ CSU, SPD

6. Bundestag (1969–72): BK Brandt (SPD): 12 SPD, 3 FDP, 1 ptl

SPD 224, FDP 30

CDU/CSU 242

SPD 230, FDP 41 7. Bundestag (1972–76): BK Brandt (SPD) 1972–74: 13 SPD, 5 FDP; BK Schmidt (SPD) 1974–76: 12 SPD, 4 FDP

CDU/CSU 225

8. Bundestag (1976–80): BK Schmidt (SPD): 12 SPD, 4 FDP

CDU/CSU 244

SPD 213, FDP 39

Opposition

CDU/CSU 226; ab 9. Bundestag (1980–83): BK Schmidt 1982: SPD (SPD) 1980–82: 13 SPD, 4 FDP; BK Kohl (CDU): 9 CDU, 4 CSU, 4 FDP SPD 218, FDP 53; ab 1982: CDU/CSU, FDP 10. Bundestag (1983–87): BK Kohl (CDU): 9 CDU, 5 CSU, 3 FDP

CDU/CSU 244, FDP SPD 193, Grüne 27 34

CDU/CSU 223, FDP SPD 186, Grüne 42; 11. Bundestag (1987–90): BK Kohl (CDU): 10 CDU, 5 CSU, 4 FDP; Okt.– 46; ab Okt. 90: CDU/ ab Okt. 90: SPD 226, B90/Grü- ne 48, PDS CSU 305, FDP 57 Dez. 90: 13 CDU, 5 CSU, 5 FDP 24, U. 3 (continued)

7.1  The Dualism of Majority and Opposition

209

Table 7.1   (continued)

Government

Coalition

Opposition

12. Bundestag (1990–94): BK Kohl (CDU): 10 CDU, 5 FDP, 4 CSU

CDU/CSU 319, FDP SPD 239, PDS 17, 79 B90/Grüne 8

13. Bundestag (1994–98): BK Kohl (CDU): 11 CDU, 4 CSU, 3 FDP

CDU/CSU 294, FDP SPD 252, B90/Grüne 47 49, PDS 30

14. Bundestag (1998–02): BK Schröder (SPD): 12 SPD, 3 B90/Grüne, 1 parteilos

SPD 298, B90/Grüne CDU/CSU 245, FDP 47 43, PDS 36

15. Bundestag (2002–05): BK Schröder (SPD): 11 SPD, 3 B90/Grüne

SPD 251, B90/Grüne CDU/CSU 248, FDP 55 47, PDS 2

16. Bundestag (2005–09): BK Merkel (CDU): 8 SPD, 6 CDU, 2 CSU

CDU 180, CSU 46, SPD 222

FDP 61, Linke/PDS 54, B90/Grüne 51

17. Bundestag (2009–13): BK Merkel (CDU): 8 CDU, 5 FDP, 3 CSU

CDU 194, CSU 45, FDP 93

SPD 146, Grüne 68, Linke 76

18. Bundestag (2013–17): BK Merkel (CDU): 6 CDU, 6 SPD, 3 CSU

CDU 255, CSU 56, SPD 193

Linke 64, Grüne 63

19. Bundestag (2017–21): BK Merkel (CDU): 6 CDU, 6 SPD, 3 CSU

CDU/CSU 246, SPD AfD 92, FDP 80, 153 Linke 69, Grüne 67, Unabhängige 2

20. Bundestag (2021–): BK Scholz (SPD): SPD 206, B90/Grüne CDU/CSU 197, AfD 7 SPD, 5 B90/Grüne, 4 FDP 118, FDP 92 80, Linke 39, Unabhängige 4 (davon 1 Zentrum, 1 SSW) Source:f Statistische Jahrbücher für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland; Jesse (1989, p. 492); diverse Presseberichte

b) Parliamentary patterns of behaviour of majority and opposition In general, not only in Germany, government, government factions and heads of ministerial bureaucracy form a political unit of action. Government factions live on proposals from the government and information from ministries, their members cover the government in plenary and committees of the Bundestag. Even the distinction between government and faction proposals in the Bundestag is sometimes only of a formal nature: “There were cases observed”, Domes reports on the practice of the years 1953–61 (as still practised today), “in which government drafts were actually suggested by members of the majority faction and could be discussed to a large extent, on the

210

7  The Bundestag: Parliamentary Majority Democracy

other hand, in the period under investigation, there were initiative drafts of the majority faction, to which the most important suggestions came from the administrative apparatus of certain ministries” (Domes 1964, p. 135).

The opposition is basically faced with the question of whether to concentrate primarily on the settlement of public controversies or more on influencing government policy. The answer was mostly a mixed strategy of the major opposition parties. The settlement of conflict remained intact in the case of high-ranking issues. Even the competitive SPD opposition in the 1st German Bundestag only rejected 14.1% of all legislative proposals, but was able to influence the content of legislation through co-operation (Kralewski and Neunreither 1963, p. 84 ff., 168 ff.). During the cooperative opposition at the beginning of the 1960s, the proportion of legislative proposals that also found the approval of the SPD rose to over 90% (Loewenberg 1969, p. 465). The SPD faction concentrated on “a modification of policy in the committees” of the Bundestag (Hereth 1969, p. 16). Similarly, the CDU/CSU opposition 1969–82: At the beginning, it agreed to about 93% of all legislative proposals in the Bundestag. However, in the role of an “opposition as legislator and co-ruler”, it failed in that its own legislative proposals failed and its participation in the Bundestag committees hardly opened up any influence (Veen 1976, p. 48, 65, 76 ff., 187, 191, 202). It was only given more consideration when a majority of union-led states existed in the Bundesrat. However, this also meant shared responsibility for unwanted laws: How could one have failed a tax reform if it also contained tax cuts for broad strata? Another strategy aimed at total confrontation that was pursued by the Greens, who were newly elected to the Bundestag in 1983. If, in 1983–90, only 15–17% of the laws passed were passed unanimously (Schindler 1994, pp. 845 ff.), this was one of the effects of their opposition. For the Social Democrats in the Kohl era, however, with the increasing weight of SPD-led governments in the Bundesrat, a constellation gradually developed that released them from complete powerlessness, but from the middle of the nineties onwards presented them with the alternative of blockade or co-responsibility; some things were now allowed to fail. Faced with the red-green government of Schröder 1998–2005, the CDU/ CSU initially pursued a confrontational opposition, although there was also opposition support for the government against green criticism in the Kosovo policy. But from February 1999 the number of Christian Democrat-led state governments and the corresponding votes in the Bundesrat increased, with the result that the two major parties could not close themselves off to negotiations on some issues (Helms 2000, p. 529 ff.). This is still the case today.

7.1  The Dualism of Majority and Opposition

211

In summary, it can be said that the powers of the Bundesrat and the role of the Bundestag as a committee parliament counteract purely conflict-oriented opposition strategies. If an opposition-led majority exists in the Bundesrat, there is pressure for cooperation, which can bring an opposition into focus. In fact, given the system of proportional representation and the multi-party system, the Federal Republic of Germany cannot be a majority democracy à la Great Britain. But within these limits, the new duality was taken into account: • While government members were once able to speak at any time in the Bundestag without their speaking time being credited to the government factions (which corresponded to the old duality of government/parliament), this has not been the case since 1972 (Blischke 1984, p. 62). • Since 1969, the Rules of Procedure of the Bundestag provide that the order of speakers should also correspond to the principle of “speech and counterspeech” and that, after government members, a “dissenting opinion” should be heard3. • The control rights of the Bundestag have also been made more manageable for the opposition minority. The widespread use of “legislative” and “executive”, which corresponds to the old dualism, remained inconsistent. It remained irritating that the dualism of government majority and opposition found little resonance in the minds of the members of parliament. According to a survey study from 1988/89, 85% of the members of parliament saw that the dualism determined reality—but only 34% also wished it (Herzog et al. 1990, p. 103 ff.)4. A similar understanding of parliament emerged in 1994 among members of parliament, state parliamentarians and European parliamentarians surveyed (Patzelt 1996, p. 471)5. This is currently not relevant because, as a result of the changed party system since 2005, parliamentary reality has also become different.

3 §

28 Rules of Procedure of the German Bundestag of 16 December 2021, available at: www.bundestag.de (last accessed 28 February 2022). 4 N = 325. 5 N = 856.

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7  The Bundestag: Parliamentary Majority Democracy

7.2 The Organization of the Parliamentary Faction Parliament a) Tasks and capacity limits of the members of parliament If one examines how and to what extent the Bundestag fulfills its functions, one must take into account its primarily temporal capacity limits (Bergner 2018, p. 127). Here one has to start from the working situation of its members, the individual members of parliament. They are, similar to the members of state and local parliaments, involved in two, partly three different fields of action: • on the one hand in the work in parliament: There the member of parliament is confronted with a flood of documents of the German Bundestag (draft laws, motions, reports, etc.), approximately 12,000 pieces of different sizes per fouryear electoral period (e.g. federal budget with over 3000 pages), which the parliament has to process. In the 19th legislative period there were even over 31,000 documents. • on the other hand in the extra-parliamentary political public, i.e. mainly in the constituency (also the great majority of the members elected from the state lists stand for election in a constituency or have one to “look after”). Contacts with local party friends, citizens and journalists are routine. This includes, as one member of parliament reported, the “evening meetings and Sunday morning drinks in the constituency. There you have to talk about all the issues of politics […]. Busy study of the local press is part of everyday existence, despite regional media concentration this is 10 newspapers a day in my constituency.” (Sperling 1976, p. 18) For some members of parliament, professional activity is also added. This applies above all to freelancers and self-employed people (such as lawyers and farmers), but also to some employees in business and organizations. Regardless of this, usually hundreds of members of parliament act as board members or similar. Working hours such as in Table 7.2 were mentioned in surveys of members of parliament, state parliamentarians and European parliamentarians in 2005 and 2011 (Pontzen 2013, pp. 180 ff., 293): This results in 65.7 hours per week in the Bundestag (outside the weeks of sessions 52.8), 60.6 hours in state parliaments (or 51.1) and 58.6 hours in the European Parliament (or 50.6).6 According to another survey of members of parliament, the working time related to the

6 N

= 901 (2011) or 429 (2005) “basically” representative.

7.2  The Organization of the Parliamentary Faction Parliament

213

Table 7.2   The time budget of members of the Bundestag (in hours per week) Sitzungen

Sitzungswoche

Sitzungsfreie Woche

28.1

4.9

Bundestagsplenum

5.5

–

Bundestagsausschüsse, -arbeitskreise einschl. Vorbesprechungen

9.3

–

Bundestagsfraktion, Fraktionsgremien

9.6

–

Parteigremien u. sonstige Sitzungen

3.7

4,9

Informations- und Kontakttätigkeiten

19.1

33.2

Information, press and contact talks, working lunches

7.1

2.8

Supervision of visitor groups, voter advice bureaux

1.5

4.8

Representative duties

2.1

6.5

Reports and discussion

1.8

4.1

Party events

–

6.5

Telephone calls, other

6.6

8.5

Administrative and routine activities

15.7

11.4

Sorting and processing of mail

8.1

6.1

Meeting with personal staff

3.7

–

Reading

3.9

5.3

Innovative activities

6.6

11.9

Drafting speeches and articles

2.7

4.1

Professional and political preparation, participa- 3.9 tion in congresses/seminars

7.8

Total working time

61.4

69.5

Survey 1988/89 with 167 (session weeks) or 155 (non-sitting weeks) Members of the Bundestag. Source: Herzog et al. (1990, pp. 85–91) (partially summarized).

mandate is 59–67 hours for members of the Bundestag, 47–58 hours for members of state parliaments (Best and Jahr 2006, p. 67)7. A significant burden is visible. Above all, it is striking how little time is left for informative and innovative 7 2003/04.

214

7  The Bundestag: Parliamentary Majority Democracy

activities. Against the background of this time shortage, the acquisition of information using employees, scientific services and interest representatives as well as the division of labor within the faction are to be seen (Bergner 2018, p. 230, 239, 257, 280, 339). The member of parliament primarily appears as a participant in meetings and events, as a contact person and consensus seeker. He/she is involved in a “discussion marathon” of the parliamentary committees dealing with the same issues over and over again in the everyday parliamentary life, while the “miracle of omnipresence” is expected of him/her in the constituency (Blüm 1976, p. 24). Ripped between the role as a local kingpin, an actor in the parliamentary process and partly privately employed, an MP can therefore only use a part of his/her working capacity for work in parliament. In addition, the qualifications that help him/her to be nominated and elected are by no means predestined for parliamentary work. Only through “training on the job” does he or she work him/herself into the role of MP (Patzelt 1997, p. 72). b) Relief through division of labor and auxiliary services At least division of labor relieves the MPs. First of all: The Bundestag is divided into Permanent Committees of the Bundestag, which mostly correspond to the area of responsibility of a federal ministry. In terms of the number of committees, the Bundestag ranks among the top fourth of parliaments in the 21 OECD countries—an indication of its role as a committee parliament (Schnapp 2004, p. 279)8. The Permanent Committees deal with all relevant matters in order to submit finished drafts to the Bundestag plenary for final decision. Each MP only belongs to one or two committees, preferably those in which he/she is particularly interested and versed in terms of professional background or political inclination. The Foreign Affairs Committee and the Budget Committee are considered to be important and attractive—the latter especially because of its career option and its power: “The Chancellor can decide what she wants. The ministries can work out legislative proposals. The parties can agree. But as soon as it comes to numbers and expenses, no one gets past the Budget Committee. That’s where the big directions are decided, it’s accelerated and slowed down, there’s little argument and a lot of deal-making, there are winners and losers; no minister and not even the Chancellor is authorized to intervene here. […] And he is allowed, another peculiarity, to summon all ministers. In turn, they do well to follow the invitations. […] No other committee therefore carries so much self-confidence with it”

8 1970–98.

7.2  The Organization of the Parliamentary Faction Parliament

215

(Dausend and Knaup 2020, pp. 70–71). The Petitions Committee is rated much lower; in the former, old-timers gather, in the latter, newcomers are pushed aside (Münzing and Pilz 2001, pp. 67–68; Pilz 2007, p. 17). In addition, the Bundestag sets up special committees for specific issues, as well as Enquete Committees (consisting of MPs and up to nine experts selected by the factions) to clarify complex issues such as digital society, sustainable economy and artificial intelligence. Although the political selection of experts relativizes their independence and the commission’s internal dividing lines are political, these commissions offer the chance to incorporate scientific expertise (Altenhof 2002, pp. 336–340). Hearings of experts by Bundestag committees can also serve this purpose. However, this only applies to a limited extent, since a distinction is made between politically desired “consulting knowledge” and “academic knowledge”—the former is “negotiated” (Korinek and Veit 2014, p. 265; Buzogány and Kropp 2014) and is intended to serve political decision-making, the latter to find the truth. Parliamentary control instruments are the Investigative Committees, which attract media attention—for example, to the final disposal of Gorleben or to the right-wing extremist terrorist underground group NSU. The position of the committees in the organizational structure of the Bundestag is clear from Fig. 7.1 and Table 7.3.

Bundestag Presidium (Federal President and 5 Vice Presidents)

Bundestag administration (approx. 2,600 employees)

Council of Elders (Bundestag Presidium and 23 other members)

selects/appoints/forms prepares decisions belongs to Chairwoman of the Parliamentary Group and Parliamentary Managing Director

Bundestag plenary 709 deputies

Special committees

Investigation Committees

Enquete commissions

Parliamentary party caucuses: CDU/CSU 35, SPD 38,B90/GR 6, FDP 10, Left approx. 12, AfD 11

Parliamentary groups (CDU/CSU 246, SPD 153, AfD 92, FDP 80, Left 69, B90/GR 67)

Auxiliary services of the political groups and subdivisions

23 Permanent Bundestag Committees (14-49 Member) Subcommittees (only for some committees)

Working groups (CDU/CSU 21, SPD 23)

Fig. 7.1   The fractional parliamentary 2018. Source: www.bundestag.de [Accessed: 17. February 2018]

216

7  The Bundestag: Parliamentary Majority Democracy

Table 7.3   The Bundestag—organs and activities

Number

1998–02

2002–05

2005–09

2009–13

2013–17

2017–21

Plenary sessions

253

187

233

253

245

./

Average duration (hours: minutes)

7:46

7:01

7:36

7:46

7:27

./

Elders’ Council meetings

88

59

78

82

75

81

Standing Commit- 23 tees

21

22

22

24

24

Sessions (with subcommittees)

1841

2678

3106

./

./

Investigative com- 1 mittees

2

2

2

5

3

Enquetekommissionen

5

2

1

2

2

2

Öffentliche Anhörungen

336

240

403

574

./

./

Fractions

5

4

5

5

4

6

665

945

986

774

1138

2848

Sessions (including 1098 boards)

Source: German Bundestag (2021).

Within the factions, “working groups” or “working groups” are set up for the various areas of politics for the different areas of politics. While the former are almost mirror images of the composition of the Standing Committees of the Bundestag, the working groups span larger policy areas. In these bodies, one clarifies one’s own position, in particular for sessions of the Bundestag committees, and develops templates for the faction. Despite such division of labor, the individual members of parliament would hardly be adequately prepared in terms of content. Of course, one can question ministerial officials in the Bundestag committee. But can one expect to receive information from them that is contrary to the line of their minister? Therefore, the Bundestag has sought to make itself independent of government information. A big step in this direction was taken during the Grand Coalition 1966–69, when the majority found itself in a more distant relationship to the government than usual:

7.2  The Organization of the Parliamentary Faction Parliament

217

• Since then, every member of parliament can make use of the Scientific Services of the Bundestag, about 100 of the approximately 3000 employees in the Bundestag administration (Scientific Services 2018, p. 5)9, in order to obtain information; a library, a press documentation and a parliamentary archive are also available in this context (Schöler and Winter 2015). • In addition, the individual factions of the Bundestag have publicly salaried parliamentary assistants, who are selected by the faction leaderships themselves and decide on their use. These fraction assistants work for the faction boards, working groups and task forces. In the 19th electoral period, for example, a total of 1159 parliamentary employees were employed, including 549 in the higher service (German Bundestag 2021). In total, the Bundestag factions had almost 120 million euros in 2020 (German Bundestag 2021)—trend rising. • Last but not least, individual members of parliament can also employ publicly salaried own employees (for a total of up to 23,205 euros per month)10. Recently, this category included 5430 employees, of whom just under half were employed in the constituency, 2308 worked as research assistants; they are mostly members of political parties, often political scientists. They see their position as a transit station or “career springboard” (Barthelmes 2007, p. 66, 76, 97 ff.; Bergner 2018, p. 215). The multi-track nature of parliamentary support services is therefore explained by the fact that while specialization would speak for an attachment to the Bundestag as a whole, often a political relationship of trust seems to be required. Overall, parliamentary support services in the Federal Republic of Germany are among the most developed of their kind. c) Political complexity reduction—the faction parliament The size of the Bundestag with its current 736 members represents a burden. This is considerable by international standards, even taking into account population numbers, but—measured against the population—not excessive (Zeh 2018, p. 748 f.). The Bundestag would hardly be able to take decisions if the members were to act as individual actors. The parliament’s ability to act is therefore determined by its division into factions as parliamentary action units—visible in the fact that

9 As

of 2018. of 2022.

10 As

218

7  The Bundestag: Parliamentary Majority Democracy

they usually vote as a bloc. The members submit to party discipline (not: “compulsion”) from the realization that they can only form majorities on the issues that are important to them in compromise with others. Only in grand coalitions does deviant voting behavior occur more often. The conformity of voting behavior can be explained by intra-party socialization—and the pressure from above: “Normally, members who want to deviate from the party line have to report to the party leader or parliamentary managing director in advance, where they receive that individual conversation, which they would rather do without. Because the members have to explain themselves, and the leaders are usually not in the mood for small talk ”(Dausend and Knaup 2020, p. 398). Members who often deviate also have less chance of obtaining a party or government office (Saalfeld 1995, p. 356 ff.; Dausend and Knaup 2020, p. 399). The fractionation of the Bundestag is also made clear in: • fractional internal decision-making processes: Open discussion and decisionmaking are shifted behind the closed doors of the party rooms. In the plenary of the Bundestag, only established positions are usually presented, the voting result is already fixed before the debate. The plenary debate therefore has the “function of a notarial public” (Lohmar 1975, p. 91), which passes formal resolutions and provides justification for citizens. • the emptiness of the plenary: Accordingly, the plenary is of little interest to the members. As long as the majority ratios do not change or nobody questions the quorum (which always exists as long as it is not questioned, by the way, with more than 50% attendance)11, it is also irrelevant whether one is absent. Laws and other resolutions are passed if a majority of those present agree. Only if the majority ratios change is it of interest to call friends from other factions in order to question the quorum. The exception to this are systematic obstructions by so-called “anti-parties” (Koß 2021, p. 6), which call the parliament’s functioning into question as a whole. • the (due to always pressing “time pressure”) “contingent debate” (Lipphardt 1976, p. 9), in which each faction is allocated certain speaking times. The faction decides who may speak on its behalf, with main speakers being allowed more time (up to 45 minutes), while others are normally allowed 15 minutes. This corresponds to the fact that draft laws and motions require the support of

11 §

Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure of the German Bundestag of 16 December 2021, available at: www.bundestag.de (last accessed 28 February 2022).

7.2  The Organization of the Parliamentary Faction Parliament

219

a faction or of at least 5% of the members of parliament (currently: 36 parliamentarians) in order to prevent futile motions by lone wolves or small groups from paralyzing the Bundestag. • the personnel composition of the organs of the Bundestag by the factions: According to the rules of procedure or agreement, the factions name the members of the Bundestag committees, the Council of Elders and the Presidium of the Bundestag. This obviates lengthy voting procedures and fruitless conflicts—at least until the AfD entered the Bundestag. In the 19th electoral period, the party went through no less than six candidates for the Vice-President of the Bundestag and remained without office until the next federal election; in the current legislature, none of the factions has been elected as committee chairman.12 That a committee chairman (here: Legal Affairs Committee) was voted out in November 2019 had not happened in the 70 years of the Bundestag either. The shares of the factions are otherwise actually based on their size ratio. As a rule, the President of the Bundestag (who is conventionally nominated by the strongest faction) and the Vice-Presidents of the Bundestag are elected by agreement. Together with 23 other members, nominated by the factions in proportion, they form the “Council of Elders”, which is intended to bring about “an agreement between the factions on the posts of committee chairmen and their deputies as well as on the work schedule of the Bundestag”13. The Parliamentary Managing Directors of the factions play an important role in this, elected and additionally remunerated members of parliament who manage their factions (Petersen 2000; Schüttemeyer 1997; Heer 2015). However, the size of the Bundestag also makes it more difficult for its committees, at least the more important ones, to engage in in-depth discussion. As attractive as the rights of the individual may seem—only as a faction parliament can a large body like the Bundestag achieve decision-making capacity. This is inevitably bought at the price of the mediatization of parliamentarians by their factions. Inner-faction decision-making processes therefore take on even greater importance. But even the factions usually have too many members to do without organs. So the full faction assemblies elect from their midst faction executive

12 As

of October 2022. 6 of the Rules of Procedure of the German Bundestag of 16 December 2021, available at: www.bundestag.de (last accessed on 28 February 2022).

13 §

220

7  The Bundestag: Parliamentary Majority Democracy

committees, composed of a chairman and deputy chairman, parliamentary managing directors, legal advisers and other members. The executive committees have two main tasks to perform: • They secure the cohesion of their factions to the outside by bringing about a formation of will of the faction for pending decisions of the Bundestag and developing a course of action for the procedure in the Bundestag. • They plan and distribute the work of the faction by forming faction-internal working groups or -groups and making proposals for the personnel composition of these bodies as well as the committees of the Bundestag. In particular, the faction leaders see their faction leadership role between moderator and designer, with an integrative understanding of office predominating, which is concerned with the external effect of the faction (Schindler 2019, p. 167). However, the problem remains that some executive boards are also too large to actually fulfill these tasks. The decision-making process is then shifted to smaller circles: in “managing boards” (= faction leaders, their deputies, parliamentary managing directors and members of the Bundestag presidium), occasionally also in informal bodies. Thus, there is a faction hierarchy. The floor leaders of a faction in the Bundestag committees, the rapporteurs of the Bundestag committees in the plenary and generally specialists and committed people can then lead the faction on their own topics—as long as it does not concern high-ranking, controversial issues (Schüttemeyer 1998, pp. 301–328). However, the scope of the faction leaders is limited by the existence of inner-faction groupings. In addition to the CSU state group, there are several groups in the CDU/CSU faction based on internal “associations” of the two parties. The SPD faction knows direction groups like the right-wing “Seeheimer Kreis” and the “Parliamentary Left” (Ismayr 2013, pp. 98–106). It is not surprising that there was an initiative of members of parliament in the 1980s to address the “powerlessness of the individual” and to regain the right of individual members of parliament to speak and make motions in the plenary. In fact, the faction discipline was generally high in 16 western democracies examined, but by no means particularly pronounced in the Federal Republic (Detterbeck 2011, p. 174). By ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, individual members without faction were given the right to participate in the work of the Bundestag committee with the right to make motions, but without voting rights, as well as to speak in the plenary. This can hardly be more than a marginality.

7.3  The Electoral Function: Legitimizing Majority Formation

221

7.3 The Electoral Function: Legitimizing Majority Formation a) The central election of the Chancellor It would be conceivable that a representation of the people would also take over the government functions. There have been temporary approaches to such a “congressional government” (Loewenstein 1959, pp. 75–85) in phases of the French and English revolutions. However, the government as its own organ prevailed as a practicable and constitutionally-divided thinking adequate. Thus, the formation of government, as it takes place in the Federal Republic with the election of the Federal Chancellor or the Federal Chancellor, is a central function of the Bundestag. While according to the Weimar Constitution the appointment of the Chancellor was solely up to the President of the Reich and the Reichstag was limited to the vote of no confidence, the Basic Law strengthened parliament. Among democracies, the Bundestag is one of the few parliaments with the right to elect the head of government or the head of government before he/she is formally appointed14. In addition, he has to fill other bodies with personnel by • the election of the Federal President, together with the same number of representatives of the state parliaments (= “Federal Assembly”); • the election of half of the Federal Constitutional Court judges and the judges of the highest federal courts, carried out by a voting body of the Bundestag or the Judicial Election Committee (16 Bundestag members and 16 state ministers); • the filling of two thirds of the seats in the “Joint Committee” (emergency parliament), with the representatives of the Bundestag to be “determined according to the strength ratio of the factions” (Art. 53 a GG); • the filling of half of the seats in the “Mediation Committee”; • on the proposal of the Federal Government the election of the President of the Federal Audit Office (together with the Bundesrat), of the Commissioner for Stasi Files (until 2021) and of the Data Protection Officer; • the election of the Wehrbeauftragten; • furthermore, of members of the supervisory boards of Deutsche Welle, Memory Foundations, etc. (Feldkamp 2011, p. 1133 ff.).

14  So

also the parliaments in Ireland, Spain and Finland. Characteristic of parliamentary democracies is only that a parliament can bring down the government (Ismayr 2009, p. 101).

222

7  The Bundestag: Parliamentary Majority Democracy Case 1

Case 2 If Bundestag has not entspr. case 1 has chosen:

Case 3 If Bundestag also has not voted entspr. case 2:

Candidate proposal by the Federal President

Candidate proposal now from the center of the Bundestag

Candidate proposal now from the center of the Bundestag

Bundestag elects candidate by absolute majority of its members

Bundestag elects a nominee by an absolute majority of its members

Bundestag elects a nominee by simple majority vote

Federal President to appoint the elected person as Federal Chancellor

Federal President to appoint the elected person as Federal Chancellor

Federal President may appoint the elected person as Federal Chancellor Federal President can dissolve the Bundestag (New Elections)

Fig. 7.2   The chancellor election procedure under the Basic Law. Source: own representation

The procedure in the event of a vacancy in the Office of the Federal Chancellor is regulated in Art. 63 of the GG. Fig. 7.2 illustrates the three possible cases that can occur successively here. Accordingly, if the candidate proposed first by the Federal President fails, the Bundestag has 14 days to elect the Chancellor freely in accordance with Case 2. If no candidate is elected in this way, a vote takes place in accordance with Case 3, with seven days remaining for the Federal President to make the decision then lying with him/her: to appoint the elected person or to dissolve the Bundestag. However, in the previous constitutional practice of the Federal Republic, a promising candidate has always been proposed, so that only Case 1 has occurred. However, as the results of the Chancellor’s elections show, on several occasions Case 2 was only narrowly avoided. For example, in 1949 Adenauer just received the minimum number of votes required, namely the majority of the members of the Bundestag (not those present!), Brandt in 1969 two votes, Schmidt in 1976 one vote, Kohl in 1987 four votes more than required. Again and again it becomes clear that, during the secret Chancellor’s election, coalition MPs have had to withhold their vote from the candidate or candidates. (Schindler 1999a,

7.3  The Electoral Function: Legitimizing Majority Formation

223

p. 1018 ff.) In 2013, Ms Merkel was missing at least 39 votes from the coalition factions. The election is therefore sometimes referred to as a “nail-biter”. Sometimes it’s about getting through, sometimes about more reputation. The Basic Law also provides for a constitutional novelty with regard to the replacement of a Chancellor or Chancellress in office: the “constructive vote of no confidence” (Pfetsch 1990, p. 400). According to this, the overthrow of a Chancellor or Chancellress (of the government) can only be achieved by the election of a new Chancellor. A mere negative majority, united only in the rejection of the incumbent, is therefore not enough to overthrow him. The constructive vote of no confidence has so far been successfully used to replace governments in the event of a change of coalition in the federal states, once at federal level, namely in 1982 when the government of Schmidt was replaced. However, a constructive vote of no confidence against Federal Chancellor Brandt in 1972 failed. This regulation, intended as protection against the destruction of governments by mere negative majorities, also stabilizes the Chancellor or Chancellress against a potential positive majority. Because the hurdle it sets is high: a kind of conspiracy in favour of a specific successor or successors. A change of person by one’s own party, as was the case with Adenauer from 1961 and Erhard in 1966 (Beyme 1970, p. 623 ff.), is at least made more difficult. In addition, the constructive vote of no confidence has also been the subject of fundamental criticism. With it, as Karl Loewenstein (1959, p. 92 ff.) put it, the Federal Republic became a “semi-authoritarian” system with “controlled parliamentarism”. This verdict, passed from a distance, has over time found less and less agreement. Meanwhile, the constructive vote of no confidence is rather seen as an attractive regulation and has been adopted by democracies such as Spain and Belgium. b) Question of confidence and early dissolution of the Bundestag If a Federal Chancellor does not feel safe in his/her majority, he/she can, according to Art. 68 GG, take the initiative and put the question of confidence to the Bundestag. If the confidence is refused without subsequently electing a new Chancellor the Federal President can, within 21 days, dissolve the Bundestag and call for new elections at the suggestion of the Chancellor. But the Federal President does not have to do this. The question of confidence may thus clarify a situation that has become uncertain, but also drive deputies to the side of the incumbent Chancellor in the event of an impending new election. In the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, it has so far become virulent six times:

224

7  The Bundestag: Parliamentary Majority Democracy

In the autumn of 1966, when Chancellor Erhard had lost his majority through the defection of the FDP, the SPD applied to have him put to the vote of confidence. A motion by CDU/CSU to declare this inadmissible was defeated with 246 to 255 votes. In fact, Erhard was pronounced the mistrust (Knorr 1975, p. 60 ff.). When the Brandt government (SPD/FDP) no longer had a majority in 1972, but the constructive vote of no confidence in favor of Barzel (CDU) failed, the vote of confidence was used as a way out of the impasse. The government’s abstention led to its defeat and opened the way to an early new election of the Bundestag (Busch 1973). At the beginning of 1982, Chancellor Schmidt (SPD) put the question of confidence in view of the dwindling agreement with the FDP, which was answered positively. However, the process of dissolution of the coalition continued. At the end of 1982, Chancellor Kohl (CDU) brought about his formal defeat by a vote of confidence, in which the government majority abstained, in order to trigger an early new election of the Bundestag. In 2001, Chancellor Schröder (SPD) linked the dispatch of troops to Afghanistan with the vote of confidence; he achieved that the number of dissenters from the red-green coalition remained low. When, as a result of the state elections in NRW in 2005, a massive opposition majority had arisen in the Bundesrat, Schröder achieved a decision by the Federal President in favor of early new elections by deliberately refusing confidence. So far, the vote of confidence has hardly had the intended effect of stabilizing the majority or clarifying the majority situation, but primarily opened the way to early new elections. In this sense, the precedents of 1972, 1982 and 2005 are to be understood. This means more power for the Chancellor (with the consent of the Federal President), but also a way out of the impasse. In comparison to the Weimar Republic and other parliamentary democracies, the Bundestag has so far successfully exercised its electoral function, i.e. produced majority-supported governments. While the cabinets of the Weimar Republic lacked a parliamentary majority for 58% of their time and had an average term of office of only 287 days (Erdmann 1959), the Federal Republic only experienced governments without a majority in transitional phases. Only with the change of the party system has the formation of a majority become a problem since 2005.

7.4  Control Function and Co-government

225

7.4 Control Function and Co-government a) Parliamentary control instruments and their use The control of government authorities has played an important role in the history of parliamentarism, and experiences with totalitarian and authoritarian systems of the 20th century have sharpened awareness of this (Höpfner 2004). However, “control” is not to be equated with action, but rather with ongoing monitoring of an actor with the possibility of sanctions by the controlling party15. This therefore means the right to look over the shoulders of the governing party and to intervene (Krause 1999). The Bundestag, its committees and bodies have investigative rights for this purpose, such as the summoning of government members, questioning the government, summoning witnesses, demanding evidence (such as files), up to and including the right of access and questioning of the so-called G 10 Commission and the Parliamentary Control Committee in relation to intelligence services (Bräcklein 2006, p. 56, 86, 95). Parliamentary control takes place in three directions: • as political directional control, in which the majority and opposition judge politically; • as efficiency control under the question of whether the government uses appropriate and effective means economically; • as legal control, in which it is checked whether the government’s actions are within the law. Of course, the government majority and opposition fulfill these control tasks to different degrees. It is also not surprising that control instruments are used disproportionately by the opposition. Complaints to the Federal Constitutional Court against government action have so far only been filed by opposition factions 2001, with the exception of individual critics from among the government parties. The “Major Inquiry”, which must be submitted in writing by at least five percent of the members of parliament, is used almost exclusively by the opposition (see Table 7.4). Opposition “Major Inquiries” serve as political directional control.

15 “Control” = “contrarotulus” (lat.) = Counter-roll, i.e. counter-recording for verification purposes (Gehrig 1969, p. 3 ff.).

226

7  The Bundestag: Parliamentary Majority Democracy

Table 7.4   The use of parliamentary control instruments. Number per legislative period, including opposition alone as a percentage of the respective instruments

Large requests 1980–83

32

Incl. from Small opposi- requests tion 75.0

295

Incl. from Questions Incl. from opposi- from opposi- Current tion deputies tionb) hoursa 85.4

14,384

61.1

12

1983–87

175

84.6

1006

95.9

22,864

65.9

117

1987–90

145

86.2

1419

98.5

20,251

70.1

126

1990–94

98

85.7

1382

98.1

20,880

66.1

103

1994–98

156

89.7

2070

89.1

18,480

80.9

103

1998– 2002

101

95.1

1813

99.1

15,147

96.3

141

2002–05

65

100.0

797

99.7

13,623

98.9

71

2005–09

63

98.4

3299

100.0

15,603

94.1

113

2009–13

54

96.3

3629

98.9

26,305

94.7

131

2013–17

15

100.0

3953

98.9

17,131

91.2

91

2017–21

35

100.0

11,677

100.0

30,821

96.8

139

a

Including those filed by the opposition only 1998–2002 81.6%, 2002–05 69%. Until 2009, only individual oral requests were considered. Sources: Schindler (1999a, p. 2644, 2639, 2706, 2759, 4378 f.); German Bundestag (2021)

b

“Minor Inquiries” by also at least five percent of the members of parliament, as well as “Current Hours”, often have the character of efficiency control or bring grievances before and therefore have political significance. Oral or written questions from individual members of parliament, on the other hand, serve as “instruments of regional and local allotmen garden work”, often only for “profiling” locally (Thaysen 1976, p. 58; Witte-Wegmann 1972, p. 201 ff.). The counts also show here an above-average use from the opposition side. Many numerical changes can be explained against the background of the respective situation. Thus, grand coalitions have an effect, the inflationary increase in inquiries from 1983 is due to the Greens, who here acted as a new parliamentary opposition particularly intensively. From their side, no less than 48.4% of all major and 83.5% of all minor inquiries came from 1983–90 (Schindler1999a, p. 2640 ff.). In general, in view of the flood of requests, the question arises as to whether their results are still being processed and in what proportion to the effort; quite apart from the considerable resources that tie them up in the

7.4  Control Function and Co-government

227

ministries. In part, it also seems that swollen staffs of the factions and deputies are looking for an area of activity here. The parliamentary investigative committee is sometimes a spectacular control instrument. It can be set up at the request of one quarter of the members of the Bundestag (in the 18th electoral period, due to the small opposition, a quorum of 120 deputies was sufficient on the demand of the Greens and the Left). This de facto “opposition right”, proposed by Max Weber, is considered a “German invention” that has been “adopted” by a number of European states. Of a total of 39 investigative committees of the Bundestag 1949–2013, 33 owe their existence to such a “mandatory minority motion”16. With an investigative committee—until 2021 there were 48 of them—the Bundestag draws the information acquisition to itself, since it can force witnesses to testify and request information from authorities like a court. The investigation usually concerns scandals, corruption allegations in arms procurement or in the vote on the constructive vote of no confidence in 1972; scandal-related were also the Flick, the party donations and the Wirecard committees. However, clarification is subject to limitations if the criminal justice system is investigated in parallel, since then potentially accused persons can refuse to testify as witnesses (Wolf 2005). Investigative committees are mostly requested by the opposition (German Bundestag 2021). Their problem, however, is that they can achieve the setting up of such committees, but the majority there lies with the government’s followers: “We’re not going to shoot ourselves in the foot,” is the memorable phrase with which the chairman of the Fibag committee once summed up the interests of the majority (Matthias Hoogen quoted after Rausch 1976, p. 295). It is therefore not surprising that the instrument of the investigative committee is sometimes referred to as the “sharpest wooden sword of parliamentary democracy” (Chacón et al. 2019). But it does generate public attention for the subject of the investigation—an important effect. b) Mix of control and co-determination Special control problems arise in certain areas. So the implementation of a budget plan with its countless individual items overcharges monitoring authorities Even the organ created for this purpose, the Federal Audit Office, can only carry out spot checks (Heuer 1989, p. 120). In recent years, however, it has tended to examine not only the regularity (conformity with the budget plan), but also the

16 In

the National Assembly of 1919, already one fifth of the deputies could set up an investigative committee (Szabo 2015, p. 328 f.).

228

7  The Bundestag: Parliamentary Majority Democracy

economy of the expenditure. Critics, however, see this as a “shady criterion of examination”, which leads to a “politicization” of the examinations (Holtmann 2000). In addition, the time lag of the audit reports and the overload of the Budget Committee have the consequence that the reports cause press articles for one day, but otherwise little happens (Diederich et al. 1990, p. 23, 254). The Budget Committee of the Bundestag does not only control retrospectively. Rather, it is involved in budget preparation and execution, notably in a “brake function on expenditure” vis-à-vis the government and specialist committees, which are “trying to distribute benefits” (Sturm 1988, p. 43, 66). Anyway, unexpected revenue and expenditure developments lead to the “permanent revision of the plan in execution”. The Budget Committee secures itself through “blocking notices” for certain budgetary items a participation in their expenditure. Such a “accompanying budgetary control” (Sturm 1997, p. 654) is routine practice (Mandelartz 1980, p. 30 ff.). The mix of control and participation is no less pronounced in the field of defense and security. Control efforts prompt the Defense Committee to give a de facto approval to important procurement orders of the Ministry of Defense (formally “taking note” of them) and thus to intervene in the decision-making process (Mandelartz 1980, p. 28 f.)17. A control problem arising from secrecy is the monitoring of intelligence services. For this purpose, a currently (since 2021) 13-member (including deputies) Parliamentary Control Commission has been created, which itself also works in secret. Interference with the secrecy of letters, postal and telecommunications traffic is also to be reported continuously to the eight-member “G 10 Commission” (because of Art. 10 GG), which “decides” on their admissibility and necessity, as the relevant law states (German Bundestag 2021). Here too, a participation is visible which goes beyond subsequent control. In contrast, the Defence Commissioner of the German Bundestag, who was introduced in 1956 following the Swedish model of the military ombudsman and is responsible for control tasks with regard to the internal leadership of the Bundeswehr, remains in an observing position vis-à-vis the Bundeswehr. The result is firstly: In view of the decisive duality of government majority— opposition, it is not surprising that parliamentary control rights are predominantly used by the opposition.

17 Faktische

Zustimmung bestreitend: Berg (1982, p. 175 ff.).

7.5  Legislative Function: Between a Debating and a Working Parliament

229

Secondly: The mixture of control and co-determination, as it is visible in financial, security and defence policy, does indeed puncture the distance between parliament and government, which is a prerequisite for control. However, if one assumes that parliaments should decide for themselves to what extent their working capacity is sufficient and takes into account that subsequent control would often be ineffective in the face of accomplished facts, this practice appears to be justifiable. Thirdly: Government action is by no means controlled solely by parliament, but also by investigative media such as “Der Spiegel”, relevant investigative TV formats such as “Monitor” and “Frontal” or interest groups such as the “Bund der Steuerzahler” (Federal Association of Taxpayers). The actual sanction threat also lies with the electorate.

7.5 Legislative Function: Between a Debating and a Working Parliament a) The formal legislative procedure Art. 76 GG defines the starting point of the formal legislative procedure at federal level: according to this, only the federal government, the federal council and members of the federal parliament have the right to submit legislative proposals to the federal parliament (initiative right). However, before they reach the federal parliament, proposals from the federal government must first be submitted to the federal council, and those from the federal council to the federal government (Fig. 7.3). Rationalisation needs have led to the fact that the federal parliament no longer practises the classical three readings (plenary debates with votes). Although the name has retained these stages, their function has changed since 1969: • General debates only take place on the recommendation of the Elders’ Council or at the request of a faction or five percent of the deputies. Debate and voting on individual items of a proposal take place in the 2nd reading. A single debate in the 3rd reading is only possible for the amendments made in the 2nd reading and on recommendation or request. • A single debate in the committees therefore only takes place between the 1st and 2nd readings.

230

Initiative phase

7  The Bundestag: Parliamentary Majority Democracy

Federal Ministry prepares draft in consultation with associations, states, ministries At least 5 % of the members of the Bundestag introduce a bill

Federal government adopts bill, comments on Bundesrat opinion

Consulting phase

Federal Council Opinion

Bundestag: After formal 1st reading, consultation and amendment in committees and 2nd reading. Amendments and decision in 3rd reading

Federal Council passes bill Federal government opinion

Simple Decision phase Acceptance

Rejection Non completion

Federal Council No consent in the case of consent law

Consent Approval

No referral to the Mediation Committee

Federal Government Bundestag Decision phase with mediation

Appeal to the Mediation Committee Mediation Committee does not change design

modified draft Bundestag Rejection

Federal Council Consent Approval

Simple law objection

No consent in the case of consent law

Bundestag Overruled objection Enactment

Overruled objection not

Federal Government: Signature by Federal Chancellor and responsible ministers Signature by Federal President Promulgation in the Journal of Laws

Fig. 7.3   The legislative process at federal level. Source: own illustration

7.5  Legislative Function: Between a Debating and a Working Parliament

231

• In addition, it can be decided by a 2/3 majority to immediately follow the 2nd and 3rd readings with the previous one, i.e. to dispense with further committee deliberations. For the 3rd reading, this is already possible for urgent proposals of the Federal Government with the majority of the deputies18. If the Bundestag has adopted the proposal in the 3rd reading, it goes to the Bundesrat. If this agrees with it or accepts it without objection, the proposal passed only needs to be signed by the Chancellor or the responsible Federal Minister and then by the President. After this confirmation of its correctness, it is published in the Federal Gazette and comes into force. The procedure is more complex if the Bundesrat raises objections. In this case, a distinction must be made between matters for which laws require the consent of the Bundesrat (laws requiring consent) and others. In the former case, the Bundesrat has an absolute veto, in the latter only a suspensive right of objection. In any case, the Basic Law seeks to promote agreement between the majority of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, namely through the Mediation Committee. This body, which can be called upon by either side, consists of 16 members each sent by the Bundestag and Bundesrat for the duration of a legislative period. Its proposal for agreement—and this gives it weight—can only be accepted or rejected unchanged by the Bundesrat or Bundestag. The average total duration of the legislative process—from introduction to announcement—comprises (1st to 17th legislative period) 210 days (Karow and Bukow 2016, p. 79). b) Government stage—the overplayed parliament? Every legislative initiative that reaches the Bundestag already has a history behind it. Of particular interest here is the early stage of government initiatives, as most laws can be traced back to them. The impulses can, as a review for one third of the political key decisions showed, come from outside, from the EU, international politics, the Constitutional Court or committees (Beyme 1997, p. 185). Various stages of the intergovernmental decision-making process have to be gone through:

18 §

80, 81 and 84 Rules of Procedure of the German Bundestag as of 16 December 2021, available at: www.bundestag.de (last accessed 28 February 2022).

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7  The Bundestag: Parliamentary Majority Democracy

• First, the responsible department head within a ministry works on the instructions of superiors or after consultation with them to produce a draft law (“departmental draft”). For this purpose, it contacts other departments concerned, ministries and interest groups. • She then obtains formal statements on the draft from other affected departments and from interest groups. • As a result, revised drafts are produced, the last of which contains the current state of intentions. These drafts also include suggestions and specifications from superiors (department heads, etc.). • If the minister finally adopts the draft, it is forwarded to the cabinet as a government proposal. In most cases, only a formal decision is made in the cabinet, as top representatives of the coalition partners negotiate in case of controversial issues (Ismayr 2013, p. 227 ff.). • In some cases, it is ministerial officials who select alternative solutions and seek public consensus. If a draft law has been carefully secured in this way, ministers and the cabinet are reluctant to call it into question by making radical changes. In summary: “Politics prevails over administration whenever the minister, the government, parliament, parties or the public can focus their attention on a particular decision-making issue” (Scharpf 1973, p. 17), while the weight of ministerial bureaucracy and relevant interest groups increases to the extent that the issue remains in the shadows of public interest. c) The dominance of the majority initiative In general, the federal government takes the initiative on legislation. Its proposals also have a much higher chance of success in the Bundestag than those from the Bundestag itself or from the Bundesrat. So in the period from 1949 to 1998, 75.7% of the laws passed were based on initiatives from the federal government (Schindler 1999b, p. 963) (see Table 7.5 for the subsequent period). The fact that laws passed are mostly based on government proposals is not a German special phenomenon, but is common in almost all Western European countries (Ismayr 2008, p. 20). Often this is interpreted as a dominance of the executive and a corresponding loss of function of the Bundestag or its mere acclamatory role. However, such an interpretation is wrong because, according to the functional logic of the parliamentary government system, it is of secondary importance whether an initiative comes from the Bundestag or the federal government.

7.5  Legislative Function: Between a Debating and a Working Parliament

233

Table 7.5   Legislative initiatives and their success

2002–05

2005–09

2009–13

2013–17

2017–21

Drafts introduced in the Bun- 643 destag under that on the part of (in %)

905

844

788

870

Federal government

49.8

59.3

57.3

67.3

56.0

Bundestag

32.1

29.2

32.9

18.8

36.4

Bundesrat

17.4

11.5

9.7

14.0

7.6

Enacted laws int. introduced by (in %):

384

611

543

548a

543

Bundesregierung

70.9

79.6

78.8

88.0

81.0

Bundestag

20.3

13.9

15.5

9.5

17.7

Bundesrat

5.1

3.1

3.1

1.6

1.3

EU-Vorlagen

2491

3950

4258

3861

1863b

a All

introduced/co-introduced by the government factions, in one case non-partisan Only proposals that were dealt with in the EU Committee are taken into account. Percentage remains: initiatives of several bodies or otherwise not attributable. Sources: German Bundestag (2021); German Bundestag (2022).

b

Accordingly, if one differentiates between initiatives from the majority or from the opposition camp, the following results for the first group. Part of the parliamentary majority initiatives are in reality those of the federal government, which only dress them up as parliamentary initiatives for reasons of time—in order to save the lead time required for government proposals at the Bundesrat. Conversely, numerous government proposals are based on political impulses from the majority factions, which have only left the government with the legal drafting. When initiatives that both actually come from the majority factions and are formally introduced by them, often closely related ministerial officials work advisory. Government and majority factions operate as a political action unit. Of the 543 laws proclaimed in the 19th electoral period, 17.7% were initiated by the Bundestag (N = 96). Of these 96 initiatives, 92.7% were jointly submitted by both government factions (N = 89) (Table 7.5). If the 440 successful government proposals are added, 97.4% of the laws were based on majority initiatives. The other parliamentary legislative initiatives are those of the opposition. Their fate seems frustrating for the opposition: If they are popular proposals, the

234

7  The Bundestag: Parliamentary Majority Democracy

majority tends to quietly hold them back in order to take over attractive content with their own initiatives. This means that stranded opposition initiatives can be “indirectly successful” in terms of content. But the show is stolen, and it has contributed nothing to the success of the opposition (Sebaldt 2001, pp. 122–145). In the end, opposition initiatives fail because of the government majority. The success rate of opposition drafts in the period from 1972 to 1983 was still 9.9% (Nienhaus 1985, p. 168). During the Christian-liberal coalition 1983–90, only one law was passed out of 262 opposition drafts (Schindler 1994, pp. 823–825), while during the red-green government 1998–2002 and the grand coalition 2005–09 no single one out of 310 opposition legislative initiatives was passed (German Bundestag 2021). Opposition initiatives have the best chance if the opposition controls the Bundesrat and if they are of secondary importance (Sebaldt 1992, pp. 251–259). Long-term oppositions have learned from this and have limited themselves to selected initiatives over time: “Our task is not,” Opposition leader Barzel explained in 1972 (cited after Veen 1976, p. 201), “to oppose the government’s proposals with those of the opposition every day and on every issue, to anticipate them. ” However, such changes in behavior were not recognizable among Social Democrats and Greens in the 1980s: their output of proposals remained high— either due to competition from opposition parties or due to larger staffs. It is therefore not significant to distinguish between government and parliamentary initiatives, but rather between majority and opposition initiatives. The dominance of the majority initiative becomes clear: Of the laws proclaimed 1990–2017, 88.8% were based on majority initiatives (= all majority factions or government), while only 0.1% were based on those of the opposition (N = 4); the rest came from Bundesrat and joint initiatives (German Bundestag 2021). It is the majority that exercises the legislative function of parliament, and this is quite appropriate for a parliamentary government system. With this dominance of the majority initiative, it is difficult for smaller factions to assert themselves publicly. The successful ones have consistently occupied one or a few issue areas and have thus profiled themselves: for example, the FDP with economy and taxes, the Greens with ecology and pacifism, the BHE long with expelled people and the PDS with eastern German interests. Such “niches” make survival possible (Kranenpohl 1999, pp. 180–185). d) The committee phase—features of a working parliament After the—usually only formal—1st reading in the plenum, a bill is referred to the competent parliamentary committees for processing:

7.5  Legislative Function: Between a Debating and a Working Parliament

235

• The lead parliamentary committee obtains opinions from other affected committees and discusses the draft step by step. It decides on changes. • The committee version of the proposal thus elaborated forms the basis for the 2nd (and 3rd) reading in the plenum. There, a rapporteur of the committee reports its decisions and the justifications. Amendments and votes in the 2nd reading are previously discussed in faction meetings, which take place between the conclusion of the committee deliberations and the 2nd reading. The parliamentary committees are therefore the place where proposals, not least those on which there are differences of opinion within the government camp or where no final clarification has taken place beforehand, can still experience certain changes. Certainly, this is mostly about changes in secondary matters. The “focus of parliamentary work” is therefore in the Standing Committees of the Bundestag, the decisions of which “are actually mostly decisions” (Ismayr 2009, p. 101). If one sets the type of the “working parliament”, which works through and formulates the legislative proposals in detail, against the “speech parliament” of the British model, in which the government brings its legislative proposals unchanged and the parliamentary treatment of which primarily consists in the rhetorical confrontation for the public, then the Bundestag is referred to as a “hybrid form” (Steffani 1967). e) Bundesrat and mediation phase The procedure in the Bundesrat is, due to the tight treatment deadlines set—six or three weeks in the case of urgent laws—more concise than in the Bundestag. Proposals go directly to the committees and are then dealt with and decided in a plenary session. Pre-clarifications and feedback shape the actual course of events: • During the deliberations in the committees (where each state has a seat), their members coordinate with their responsible state departments, their state’s plenipotentiaries in the Bundesrat and their state’s chancellery. • The committee recommendations are then discussed in the state cabinets, which determine the position of the state. • In the case of politically sensitive issues, the plenipotentiaries of the same political color have previously sought a common line. • In the final plenary session, one then contented oneself with the presentation and justification of one’s own position; polemical attacks are not customary (Schmedes 2019, pp. 45 ff.).

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7  The Bundestag: Parliamentary Majority Democracy

In the event of a disagreement between the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, if the Bundesrat refuses to give its consent to a law passed by the Bundestag, the Bundestag often appeals the Mediation Committee. In some electoral periods there have been more than 100 such appeals (Kropp 2010, p. 62). While the counterpart of the Mediation Committee, the US Conference Committee, is composed anew on a case-by-case basis, this is an all-competent body. Given its size, actors see the need to prepare it with a “small negotiating round” in order to find compromises (Struck 1994, p. 504). In the past, continuity, confidentiality, independence, not least pragmatic attitudes have enabled the committee—even though it is also divided into “party blocks” in the preliminary deliberations—to find “compromises achieved through a trade-off” again and again, which are then to be accepted or rejected unchanged by the Bundestag and Bundesrat (Hasselsweiler 1981, pp. 201, 208, 282 ff.). In general, the fact that one needs the consent of both legislative bodies to reach a compromise seems to have also contributed to argumentative discourses (Spörndli 2004, p. 59, 176 f.). The success rate of compromises, 100% until 1972, fell in the following two legislative periods to 93 and 83%, before reaching 100 again (Lhotta 2001, p. 102 ff.). However, from 43 laws for which the Bundesrat refused its consent, 19 failed definitively between 1990 and 1998 (Ziller 1998, p. 14). f) Limits of parliamentary decision making The Bundestag’s decision-making competence is not unlimited. In addition to the limits set on it in a federal constitutional state with judicial review and a second federal chamber with often absolute veto power (formerly in the case of almost half of all federal laws—Amm 2005, p. 97), as a parliament in the EU it is competence-related restricted. There are also several specific limitations: First of all, the Bundestag comes up against the veto right of the federal government against parliamentary resolutions increasing expenditure or reducing revenue, which is laid down in Art. 113 GG, in the area of budgetary affairs. This regulation is directed against an excessively generous Bundestag. Secondly, as is customary in other states, the government has the right to conclude international treaties which only require ratification for their validity. In this case, parliament can only vote yes or no. Changes are not permitted, because otherwise, if many parliaments involved wanted to change something, the conclusion of multilateral treaties would be practically impossible. Furthermore, the legislative role of the Bundestag is reduced in the event of its inability to act. According to Art. 81 GG, if there is a lack of a governmentsupporting majority in the Bundestag, the Federal President can declare the “state of emergency” for an urgent legislative proposal at the request of the federal government and with the consent of the Bundesrat. This has the consequence that the proposal can become law solely by the consent of the Bundesrat. It is clear here

7.5  Legislative Function: Between a Debating and a Working Parliament

237

how the Basic Law seeks to prevent a shift of power out of parliament, while at the same time trying to enable necessary decisions. The Basic Law pursues the same goal in the case of defense, if the Bundestag cannot convene. In this case, a “Joint Committee” consisting of one free representative each from each federal state and twice as many members of the Bundestag (elected in proportion) takes over the functions of the Bundestag and Bundesrat (Art. 53a and 115e GG). In conclusion, it should be noted: 1. The claim of the Bundestag to represent the German people is undisputed and justified by free elections. Surveys only point to desires for plebiscitary supplements, in particular with regard to the transfer of competences to the EU. The Bundestag is strengthened in its representative role by a generally satisfactory legislative output so far, and in terms of its responsiveness by its party structure. 2. The dualism of government majority—opposition could be considered as an empirically verifiable reality with regard to the functions of the Bundestag (electoral function, control, legislation). Since 2005, the formation of government has been made more difficult by the restricted possibilities for coalition (changed party system!). Unwanted coalitions with an excessively high need for compromise not only imply an unsatisfactory legislative output for the governing parties, but also for the Bundestag. Minority governments, even tolerated ones, were hardly a better solution. The German Bundestag is a powerful parliament according to the constitution in terms of competence, as Martin Sebaldt (2009, p. 58, 227, 239 ff.; the same. 2013, p. 223, 226 ff., 235, 248) showed in a comparative study of 23 established democracies (based on more than 30 individual variables). It ranks ninth, while the parliamentary representatives of Japan, India, Canada, the USA, Great Britain and France rank 17 to 23. An example of how a powerful parliament can unnecessarily impair “effective state action” seems to be the Italian, which takes third place among the powerful parliaments. Moreover, oversize is likely to be a performance-reducing factor (the largest parliaments in democracies are Great Britain, Germany and Italy—larger than those of the USA, India or Japan). For the Bundestag as a parliament in the EU community, it should be added that its legislative power decreases as legislative competences migrate to the European Union. If this is taken into account, it would probably be—like other parliaments in the EU—downgraded in the power ranking.

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Kralewski, Wolfgang/Neunreither, Karlheinz (1963): Oppositionelles Verhalten im Ersten Deutschen Bundestag 1949–1953, Köln. Kranenpohl, Uwe (1999): Mächtig oder machtlos? Wiesbaden. Krause, Joachim (1999): Der Bedeutungswandel parlamentarischer Kontrolle, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 30 (2), p. 534 ff. Kropp, Sabine (2010): Kooperativer Föderalismus und Politikverflechtung, Wiesbaden. Lhotta, Roland (2001): Konsens und Konkurrenz in der konstitutionellen Ökonomie bikameraler Verhandlungsdemokratie, in: Oberreuter, Heinrich et al. (Eds.): Der Deutsche Bundestag im Wandel, Wiesbaden, p. 93 ff. Lipphardt, Hanns-Rudolph (1976): Die kontingentierte Debatte, Berlin. Loewenberg, Gerhard (1969): Parlamentarismus im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Tübingen. Loewenstein, Karl (1959): Verfassungslehre, Tübingen. Lohmar, Ulrich (1975): Das Hohe Haus. Der Bundestag und die Verfassungswirklichkeit, Stuttgart. Mandelartz, Herbert (1980): Das Zusammenwirken von Parlament und Regierung im Haushaltsvollzug, Frankfurt a. M. Marschall, Stefan (2018): Parlamentarismus. Eine Einführung, 3. edn., Baden-Baden. Münzing, Ekkehard/Pilz, Volker (2001): Aufgaben, Organisation und Arbeitsweise des Auswärtigen Ausschusses des Deutschen Bundestages, in: Oberreuter, Heinrich et al. (Eds.): Der Deutsche Bundestag im Wandel, Wiesbaden, p. 63 ff. Niclauß, Karlheinz (2015): Kanzlerdemokratie. Regierungsführung von Konrad Adenauer bis Angela Merkel, 3. edn., Wiesbaden. Nienhaus, Volker (1985): Konsensuale Gesetzgebung im Deutschen Bundestag. Zahlen und Anmerkungen zur 7. bis 9. Wahlperiode, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 16 (2), p. 163 ff. Patzelt, Werner J. (1996): Deutschlands Abgeordnete. Profil eines Berufsstandes, der weit besser ist als sein Ruf, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 27, p. 462 ff. Patzelt, Werner J. (1997): German MPs and Their Roles, in: The Journal of Legislative Studies 3 (1), p. 55 ff. Petersen, Sönke (2000): Manager des Parlaments, Opladen. Pfetsch, Frank R. (1990): Ursprünge der Zweiten Republik, Opladen. Pilz, Volker (2007): Der Auswärtige Ausschuß des Deutschen Bundestages und die Mitwirkung des Parlaments an der auswärtigen und internationalen Politik, Berlin. Pontzen, Daniel (2013): Politiker in der Medialisierungsspirale? Eine Abgeordnetenbefragung auf Landes-, Bundes- und EU-Ebene, Marburg. Rausch, Heinz (1976): Bundestag und Bundesregierung, 4. edn., München. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1959 [1762]): Staat und Gesellschaft – „Contrat Social“, München. Saalfeld, Thomas (1995): Parteisoldaten und Rebellen. Fraktionen im Deutschen Bundestag 1949–1990, Opladen. Scharpf, Fritz W. (1973): Planung als politischer Prozeß, Frankfurt a. M. Schindler, Danny (2019): Politische Führung im Fraktionenparlament. Rolle und Steuerungsmöglichkeiten der Fraktionsvorsitzenden im Deutschen Bundestag, Baden-Baden. Schindler, Peter (1994): Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages 1983 bis 1991, Baden-Baden.

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Schindler, Peter (1999a): Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages 1949 bis 1999, Baden-Baden. Schindler, Peter (1999b): Deutscher Bundestag 1980 bis 1998, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 40 (4), p. 956 ff. Schmedes, Hans-Jörg (2019): Der Bundesrat in der Parteiendemokratie. Aufgabe, Struktur und Wirkung der Länderkammer im föderalen Gefüge, Baden-Baden. Schnapp, Kai-Uwe (2004): Ministerialbürokratien in westlichen Demokratien, Opladen. Schöler, Uli/von Winter, Thomas (2015): Die Wissenschaftlichen Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages, in: Andersen, Uwe (Ed): Der Deutsche Bundestag, 2. edn., Schwalbach/ Ts., p. 161 ff. Schüttemeyer, Suzanne S. (1997): Manager des Parlaments zwischen Effizienz und Offenheit, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 36–37, p. 8 ff. Schüttemeyer, Suzanne S. (1998): Fraktionen im Deutschen Bundestag 1949–1997, Opladen. Sebaldt, Martin (1992): Innovation durch Opposition, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 23 (2), p. 238 ff. Sebaldt, Martin (2001): Oppositionsstrategien im Vergleich, in: Hirscher, Gerhard/Korte, Karl-Rudolf (Eds.): Aufstieg und Fall von Regierungen, München, p. 113 ff. Sebaldt, Martin (2009): Die Macht der Parlamente, Wiesbaden. Sperling, Dietrich (1976): Die Anpassung der Anpassungsmechanismen, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 38, p. 16 ff. Spörndli, Markus (2004): Diskurs und Entscheidung, Wiesbaden. Steffani, Winfried (1967): Amerikanischer Kongreß und Deutscher Bundestag – ein Vergleich, in: Kluxen, Kurt (Ed): Parlamentarismus, Köln, p. 230 ff. Struck, Peter (1994): Diskussionsveranstaltung der Deutschen Vereinigung für Parlamentsfragen, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 25 (3), p. 494 ff. Sturm, Roland (1988): Der Haushaltsausschuß des Deutschen Bundestages, Opladen. Sturm, Roland (1997): Aufgabenstrukturen, Kompetenzen und Finanzierung, in: Gabriel, Oscar W./Holtmann, Everhard (Eds.): Handbuch Politisches System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, München, p. 619 ff. Stüwe, Klaus (2001): Das Bundesverfassungsgericht als verlängerter Arm der Opposition? Eine Bilanz seit 1951, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 37-38, p. 34 ff. Szabo, Zsolt (2015): Der zwingende Minderheitsantrag eines parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschusses, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 46 (2), p. 328 ff. Thaysen, Uwe (1976): Parlamentarisches Regierungssystem in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Opladen. Veen, Hans-Joachim (1976): Opposition im Bundestag, Bonn. Weber, Max (1922): Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Tübingen. Werner, Camilla (1990): Wo sind die Rebellen im Parlament?, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 21, p. 404 ff. Wissenschaftliche Dienste (2018): Die wissenschaftlichen Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages. Funktion, Struktur, Arbeitsweise, unter: https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blo b/575586/75fcdf8e0ec4a094f3dbcf5a7e120a%20cb/wd-1-026-18-pdf-data.pdf (zuletzt geprüft am 18. Oktober 2022). Witte-Wegmann, Gertrud (1972): Recht und Kontrollfunktion der Großen, Kleinen und Mündlichen Anfragen im Deutschen Bundestag, Berlin.

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8

The Federal Government: Problems of Political Steering

8.1 Chancellor Democracy, Cabinet and Departmental Principle a) Problems of governing The political need for regulation and decision-making, which complex societies have, can hardly be satisfied by large assemblies (such as parliaments). This fact functionally justifies the differentiation of a political steering organ, the government. Historically, however, it is nothing other than the continuation of the cabinet from the times of monarchy. Parliamentary governments have two basic functions to fulfill. First, a steering function: The government should bring the political intentions of a parliamentary majority into the form of concrete legislative proposals and help them to become law. It is the task of the government to pursue a policy that moves within the limits of possibilities and is reasonably free of contradictions. Secondly, an executive function: In addition, the government should, by means of complementary legislation (ordinances) and organizational, personnel and material measures, ensure the implementation of those laws (law enforcement). However, not every individual decision falls within the competence of the government. Rather, according to the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court, decisions of major importance—for example the introduction of sex education in school lessons—are reserved for the parliamentary legislator (“substantiality theory”—Kloepfer 1989, p. 190). Political decisions must meet three conditions in order to be successful: They must follow a “rationality of the matter” (i.e. offer a reasonable solution to the problem), a “rationality of power” (i.e. be politically achievable) and an

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Mannewitz and W. Rudzio, The Political System of Germany, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41371-2_8

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a­ dministrative rationality (i.e. be implementable) (Grunden 2009, p. 19 f). However, the international comparison shows that “in general, governments come to power with • inconsistent and vaguely defined action programs; • that they are plagued by lack of time, information, expertise, energy and other resources; • that their decision-making space is limited by obligations inherited from their predecessors; • that their plans are often disrupted by events that require immediate crisis management; • that, in view of the risks of new, waiting and inaction, often seems to be a reasonable alternative.” As a result, democratic governments are rarely associated with profound changes in policy output. Such reform governments only appear to be possible in the event of a severe crisis and strong voter mandate, and even then they require a comprehensive program, competent leadership and a longer term of office (Keeler 1993, p. 434 ff.; Schmidt 2005, p. 52 ff.). The normal case is therefore an incrementalism of democratic politics with small, often also corrected steps instead of the big throw. This is not to be negative, if one follows Karl Popper, who warns of the illusion of a comprehensive human calculation capacity (Popper 1971). In addition, a “restrictive [s] understanding of politics” also speaks in view of self-referential social subsystems that political will of design comes up against limits: “Political action can ‘initiate’ economic, scientific, educational etc. Action, but not determine it in a target-oriented manner; because these areas obey another operational mode, thus another rationality and causal structure than political action.” (Willke 1991, p. 46). In the Federal Republic of Germany, political steering appears to be particularly difficult. Certainly—the diversity and complexity of the problems is the same as that with which politics also has to deal elsewhere in modern-differentiated societies. But extraordinary is the political power distribution (Steffani 1997), as it exists today in Germany. First: The proportional representation almost always leads to coalition governments. In the Federal Republic, the minimum winning coalition predicted by the economic coalition theory dominate: Oneparty government only came into play when a coalition broke down (1966 and 1982—both times on the initiative of the FDP)—and that only for a few weeks. And the last great coalition ended in 1960 when the DP left the coalition led by Adenauer. All this creates considerable intergovernmental compromise. This can,

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as in 2009, be bridged during government formation by “dilatory formula compromises” sometimes only apparently, but actually continue to exist (Saalfeld 2010, p. 200, 206). Secondly, institutional veto players such as the Bundesrat and the Federal Constitutional Court, interest groups play a role in decisions (including in the health sector) or decide in the context of collective bargaining autonomy itself (constitutional and decisive separation of powers). Thirdly, the federal policy must operate in a political multi-level system (federal separation of powers), in which it shares competences with other levels (municipalities and states) and in particular has to take into account decisions of the European Union (policy interlocking—Scharpf et al. 1976). Conclusion: Every government policy is threatened by blockades, obstacles and restrictions. Decisions are therefore often made by “negotiation” instead of “majority”, so that one also speaks of negotiation democracy (Czada 2003, p. 53, 57). That federal governments achieve rather small-scale political results can therefore not be surprising. The most comprehensive and sustainable switches were probably left by the chancellorship of Adenauer (with West orientation, market economy, social legislation). It could rely on clear majorities and operated in a situation of new beginnings. Later governments, even with reformist claims, have not had such effects. It was lacking—fortunately—of severe crises that could have triggered radical changes. b) The Chancellor Principle—actually dominating? Organization and competence regulations of the federal government seek to equip it for their difficult task. The legal structure of the federal government can be represented on the basis of three, partly conflicting principles: Chancellor, cabinet and departmental principle. Several competences give the Federal Chancellor or the Federal Chancellor an outstanding leadership position among the members of the government. They include • the formation of the federal government: By the federal chancellor alone being elected by the Bundestag and replaced by the election of a successor by the Bundestag (Art. 63 and 67 GG)—federal ministers, on the other hand, being appointed and dismissed by the president on his proposal (Art. 64 GG)—he alone has legitimacy through election within the federal government. The Bundestag cannot force him to appoint or dismiss certain ministers. Finally, it is also the federal chancellor alone who, according to Art. 68 GG, can raise the issue of confidence and, under certain circumstances, an steer towards dissolving the Bundestag or declare a state of emergency.

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• the federal chancellor’s guideline competence according to Art. 65 GG: “The federal chancellor determines the guidelines of politics and bears responsibility for them”. This means that the chancellor cannot have a line of the federal government imposed on him by a majority decision of the cabinet. The guideline competence is supported by the right of the chancellor to propose the dismissal of ministers (a proposal which the president has to follow), as well as by the fact that he is responsible for the business of the federal government and has to be informed about all relevant measures and projects in the ministries. • the organizational power of the federal chancellor: According to the rules of procedure of the federal government, the federal chancellor determines the number and business areas of the federal ministries. The focus on the chancellor is intended to serve the unity and effectiveness of the federal government. However, formal powers do not necessarily mean their free and unbiased exercise by the chancellor. How much leeway he/she actually has depends mainly on circumstances: on the position in his/her own party, the coalition constellation and personal skill. This already applies to the selection of ministers. It is common practice for coalition partners to leave certain cabinet seats and their personnel to them. An unusual exception was that Adenauer refused to make Thomas Dehler (FDP) Justice Minister again after his attacks on the Constitutional Court. Even within his own party, a chancellor has to take into account groups if he does not want to provoke resistance and endanger his own position. In general, he has to take into account a party, regional and gender proportion, also when filling the positions of parliamentary state secretaries (Derlien 2001, p. 44 ff.). German federal chancellors have only used the power to dismiss ministers sparingly, in contrast to reshuffles in Great Britain. If it is about politically strong ministers and differences in content, the normal procedure seems to be: conflict of the minister with the cabinet majority, isolation in the cabinet, finally the offer or implementation of resignation by himself—so and similar with Heinemann’s conflict 1950 about rearmament, with Lücke 1968 because of the right to vote, Schiller 1972 because of economic policy and Lafontaine 1999 because of financial policy. How the Federal Chancellor exercises his/her competence in guidelines also depends on the political constellation. Already the openness of the term “policy guidelines”—interpretable as mere coordination (Eschenburg 1971, p. 365, 369) up to the “entire political leadership” (Knöpfle 1965, p. 860)—excludes their understanding as an enforceable claim. It was only Konrad Adenauer’s monocratic style of government, based on exceptional conditions (connection monop-

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247

oly to the Allied High Commission, little experience of the post-war ministers (and one minister: Elisabeth Schwarzhaupt from 1961)—Baring 1969, p. 65, 168), which led to an exaggerated understanding of the competence in guidelines in the Federal Republic in many cases. After the lower perception of the competence by Ludwig Erhard was still more than an individual psychological problem, the understanding was reduced with the Grand Coalition of 1966. Conrad Ahlers spoke (referring to Kiesinger) of the Chancellor as a “walking mediation committee” (quoted after Görtemaker 1999, p. 446). In fact, the importance of the competence in guidelines can only consist in the development of government goals involving the Federal Chancellor, who then declares them to be his/hers. In order to exercise the possible leadership, the Federal Chancellor needs his/ her own apparatus, the Federal Chancellery. Without this, he/she would be a “pitiful invalid” in comparison to cabinet members with large ministries in the background (Hennis 1964, p. 19). While the Reich Chancellery only comprised 70 positions in 1932, including 35 officials (Knoll 2004, p. 71; Busse 2005, p. 19), the Federal Chancellery was larger from the outset and has assumed the size of a ministry over time (cf. Table 8.1). Since Adenauer, coordination and control of the government process have been supported by the fact that • a referent system with subject-related areas of responsibility was set up in the Federal Chancellery parallel to the one in the ministries (“mirror offices”), which makes it easier to follow the inter-ministerial work; • a regular conference of the state secretaries (whose career is tried to be controlled from the Federal Chancellery) promotes the flow of information and partially converts the state secretaries into instruments of central control. Later attempts, in particular under Chancellor Brandt, to turn the Chancellery into a dominant control center, however, failed due to the resistance of self-confident ministers and jealous departmental bureaucracies. In the present—smaller and larger reorganizations after changes of government are common—the head of the office consists of the personal Chancellor’s Office (speeches, submissions, press relations, media) and the Office of the Chancellor’s Chief of Staff; most recently (and only for five months in 2022) supplemented by a “Corona Crisis Staff”. Seven departments and four “state ministers” (coordination of federal-state relations, culture/media, migration/ refugees/integration and eastern Germany/equal living conditions—Press and Information Office of the Federal Government 2022) are subordinate to the management level. The actual office is subordinate to the Federal Minister of the Chancellery or the Federal Minister of the Chancellery, who is

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8  The Federal Government: Problems of Political Steering

Table 8.1   Personal and expenses of the federal ministries 2021 (occupied positions)

Personala

Expenses

direct

subordinate

Office of the Federal Chancellor

1707

2400

(Billion Euros)

Federal Foreign Office

7153

608

Federal Ministry of the Interior

2166

82,319

the Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protectionb

1530

3953

the Ministry of Finance

2102

47,634

8.7

the Ministry of Defence

1785

74,157

46.9

for economy and energy

2185

7420

10.4

for nutrition and agriculture

1065

3669

7.7

for work and social

1470

1359

164.9

for traffic and digital infrastructure

1464

24,329

41.2

for health

854

2188

36.3

for environment, nature conservation, construction and reactor safety

1215

3011

2.7

for family, seniors, women and youth

803

3.7 6.3 18.5 1.0

1397

13.1

for economic cooperation and development 1014

–

12.4

for education and research

1356

6

In total

33,277

254.479

20.8 498.6c

a Subordinate are federal offices, federal police, senior finance directors etc. At federal agencies outside the government, 238 people work in the Federal Presidential Office, 2771 in the Bundestag, 214 in the Bundesrat, 174 in the Federal Constitutional Court, 1162 in the Federal Court of Auditors, 347 in the Data Protection Officer. 678 professors of various departmental affiliation and 198,102 posts for soldiers are added. b Not included here are the judges of the federal level, a total of 638 positions. c Not assignable to individual ministries are the federal debt (10.8 billion euros debt service) and the General Financial Administration (92.2 billion euros). Expenditures for federal agencies outside the government are added. Source: German Bundestag (2020, p. 18, 69–81) (partly conversions).

also the Commissioner for the Federal Intelligence Services. The departments are currently divided into a total of 59 sections. The most important functions of the office are: information of the Chancellor, delivery of political impulses, coordination of the ministries, which are a cabinet secretariat, interface in the legislative

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249

process, distribution of parliamentary questions to the departments (Busse and Hofmann 2017, p. 48 ff.). To what extent the Federal Chancellery could develop its own solutions to larger problems remains doubtful. However, the fact that the head of the Chancellery—initially a state secretary—has repeatedly also held the rank of a minister can be seen as a sign of its importance (e.g. 1964–66, 1969–72, 1984–98, since 2005). Beyond the formal hierarchy, some officials are considered close collaborators and confidants of a Chancellor—in Merkel’s case the “morning situation” from around twelve people, mostly from the Federal Chancellery, plus representatives of the Union parliamentary group (Korte 2011, p. 132; Grunden 2011, p. 266). Such a “kitchen cabinet” serves as a “consultation circle” (Müller and Walter 2004, p. 10, 195), but is not a power center. The Federal Intelligence Service (BND), which is directly subordinate to the Chancellor, gives little additional weight, especially as the service is only responsible for foreign affairs. To a certain extent, the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, shortly “Bundespresseamt” (Borucki 2021), which is also subordinate to him/her, could offer opportunities to present government policy. For some time now, the top has represented the entire coalition. The parties of the governing coalition of traffic lights, which has been in office since 2021, agreed on Steffen Hebestreit (government spokesman—SPD), Wolfgang Büchner (deputy government spokesman—FDP) and Christiane Hoffmann (deputy government spokeswoman—Bündnis 90/The Greens). The term “chancellor democracy”, introduced into the German public in the 1950s and adopted by political science, seeks to capture both the constitutional and the factual position of a strong Chancellor. Criteria for this are said to be: actual exercise of the Chancellor’s rights, leadership of the largest government party, engagement in foreign policy, strong media presence of the Chancellor, etc. (Niclauß 2015, p. 64 ff.). Some authors limit the term to the Adenauer era (Doering-Manteuffel 1991, p. 4). For the time afterwards, one speaks of a “coordination democracy”, in which the Chancellor only plays a coordinating role (Jäger 1988). In fact, the previous chancellors and the chancellor have exercised their office differently. In addition to Adenauer and Schmidt, who worked systematically with the administrative apparatus, there were Brandt and Kohl with their more personal and informal working style (Müller-Rommel 1994, p. 112 ff.). While Adenauer, Kohl and Brandt were strong chairmen of the largest government party, Schmidt, Erhard and later Schröder lacked such support. While chancellors like Adenauer from 1961, Erhard, Schmidt, Kiesinger, Merkel and to a large extent Kohl were involved in coalition talks, early Adenauer, Brandt and Kohl at times had more individual scope for action (Rudzio 2005, passim). Important is

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whether a coalition partner has alternative coalition options or not. In Schröder and Brandt, media resonance also strengthened their position (Korte and Fröhlich 2004, p. 344 f.). The media image of Brandt was “divided”: charisma on the one hand, skepticism with regard to factual work on the other hand (Klecha 2012, p. 101). Schröder’s style of government lacked, according to a knowledgeable observer of his politics, above all “patience and perseverance” (Hennecke 2005, p. 18; Hennecke 2003). Merkel’s style, according to her own presentation “on sight”, otherwise presidential and media-savvy (Langguth 2009, p. 32), made the best of her position at the head of a grand coalition. But her style at the time “efficient principlelessness” (Korte 2010, p. 115) also continued during the black-yellow coalition 2009–13. On important decisions, another trait became apparent in her: to make them suddenly—also without law or vote of parliament. This is how it went with the Fukushima disaster in 2011, when she initiated the withdrawal from nuclear energy 72 hours after the accident; with the Greek Euro crisis in 2008, at first hesitantly, then quickly taking on obligations after shifts in public opinion; in the face of the refugee crisis in 2015, turning around completely from the Chancellery; but also with a view to the government crisis in Thuringia in 2020. She always followed the prevailing media tone, always the representative democracy was “overthrown” (Weidenfeld 2016, p. 123 ff.). However, the style changed during the Corona pandemic, Merkel was described as an “efficient principlelessness” (Korte 2021) that was trying to win broad approval and appealing to the insight of citizens. Werner Patzelt (2017, p. 27 ff.), on the other hand, highlights the consequences of her entire policy, which he sees as “drifting apart of Europe”, “overstraining” of the German immigration society, “deprofiling” of the CDU and accepted establishment of the AfD. c) Cabinet Principle and Bottleneck Problem In contrast, the cabinet construction of the Basic Law makes the federal government appear more like a collegial body. This is spoken for: • collective powers of action towards the outside: Not the Federal Chancellor, but only the Cabinet as a whole is entitled to act as the “Federal Government” in the legislative process by means of legislative initiatives and statements on draft laws of the Bundestag (Art. 76 GG). Similarly, the Federal Government as a collective or individual ministers may be authorised to issue ordinances (Art. 80 GG), it may only issue general administrative regulations with the consent of the Bundesrat (Art. 93 para. 1 GG) and give its consent to costeffective laws that change its budget (Art. 113 GG).

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• collective powers of action within the government: “Disputes of opinion between the Federal Ministers shall be decided by the Federal Government”, says Art. 65 GG, which excludes a role of the Federal Chancellor as an arbitrator. Furthermore, the Cabinet has to decide on proposals for the appointment of political and higher officials of the Federal Government. The Federal Cabinet consists of the Federal Chancellor and the Federal Ministers. In addition, the heads of the Federal Chancellery and the Federal Press Office as well as, on occasion, certain members of the coalition factions, among others, also take part in its meetings. As a rule, it meets once a week, on Wednesday morning. In addition, there are occasional longer retreats for the purpose of discussing larger perspectives. In routine meetings, first draft laws, ordinances, reports and answers which do not require any oral debate are decided. This is followed by discussions and decisions on draft laws requiring discussion, personnel matters, the international situation and the situation in the Bundesrat. Depending on the subject matter and the leadership style of the Federal Chancellor, the consultations can be extensive and discursive—as under Erhard, Kiesinger and Brandt—or more focused on the final decision. The resolutions are usually passed unanimously; consent is given if no one objects (Busse 2005, p. 81 et seq.). Formal votes are the exception, which is avoided especially in sensitive matters out of consideration for the smaller coalition partners. If such an event occurs—for example, when the CDU/CSU government passed a vote of no confidence against the SPD ministers in the question of DM revaluation in May 1969—this indicates the imminent end of a coalition. Also, the different political weight of the members of the Cabinet speaks against decisions by vote. Another problem of cabinet decision-making practice arises from the constant time pressure on overloaded government members. This excludes a higher frequency of cabinet meetings and makes it easy for decisions to accumulate. The Cabinet deals with about 800 items per year, i.e. on average 20 agenda items per meeting with 40 meetings (Müller-Rommel 2000, p. 89). In the government apparatus, therefore, a system of inter-ministerial committees and cabinet committees has developed in order to clarify and pre-decide issues in advance, in order to resolve differences of opinion before the Cabinet as far as possible. Also, conversations of the Federal Chancellor with one or more ministers can help to resolve differences, and ministers also seek them out in order to support their interests. The Minister of Finance plays a similar role in other democracies, with his or her crosscutting competence for the budget. This ministry is to be involved in the preparation of all financial draft laws and is often referred to as the “reserve chancellor” in the government—for example, Schäffer, Stoltenberg, Lafontaine and Schäuble.

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That most proposals are finally uncontroversial in the cabinet and can often be dealt with in writing as a result of good coalition climate seems to be the result of such pre-clarifications outside the doors of the cabinet room. Standing committees of the cabinet also play a role. They each consist of several government members—representing neighbouring competencies, in addition to the various coalition parties. While there were twelve cabinet committees at times, their number has been declining for some time. The Federal Security Council, with its own rules of procedure, inter alia approves Germany’s arms exports. The more recent cabinet committees include the “climate cabinet” (2019) under Angela Merkel, her (small and large) “corona cabinet” (2020) and the cabinet committee “to combat right-wing extremism and racism” (2020). Such relief is bought at the expense of a certain shift of decisions to ministerial bureaucracy. Ministerial officials are not only in the inter-ministerial committees among themselves, but also play a considerable role in the meetings of the cabinet committees (Brauswetter 1976, p. 157 ff.; Lepper 1976, p. 437). But on the whole, cabinet committees play a far less important role in Germany than, for example, in Great Britain or Canada. d) Principle of Departmentalisation and Ministries The principle of departmentalisation as the third principle of government structure states that ministers work independently in their area of competence: ​​ “Within these guidelines [of the Federal Chancellor], each Federal Minister manages his department independently and under his own responsibility” (Art. 65 GG). The Federal Chancellor cannot therefore intervene in a ministry over the head of ministers. Thus, the ministries represent clearly distinguishable units. They reflect the fields of action of the state. In addition to the older classical departments, which primarily serve order and security functions—interior, exterior, justice, finance, defence—later ministries for economics, labour and agriculture were added, while others such as for education/research, for economic cooperation, for environment, for family or for transport only came into existence more recently. The allocation of responsibilities and the delimitation of competences between the ministries are always also determined by political considerations. For example, the establishment of a ministry for women and youth, families and seniors was intended to signal the importance attached to the issue. The inflation of “commissioners”—for data protection, for integration, etc.—apparently serves the “symbolic representation of problem groups” and promotes “further softening” of the principle of departmentalisation (Derlien 1990, p. 97 ff.). In the government formation of 2021, the allocation of responsibilities changed once

8.2  Decision Centre: Cabinet or Coalition Committee?

253

again—by organisational decree of the Federal Chancellor of 8 December 2021—a further change in the allocation of responsibilities: The responsibility for “housing, urban development and construction” was taken away from the Ministry of the Interior and entrusted to its own ministry; climate protection moved from the Ministry of the Environment to the Ministry of Economics. The topic of “homeland” remained with the Ministry of the Interior. The number of employees in the individual ministries is essentially determined by the extent to which a department itself also fulfils executive functions in addition to legislative tasks. Creating ministries for pure legislation is rejected with the argument that implementation experiences provide important suggestions for legal corrections.

8.2 Decision Centre: Cabinet or Coalition Committee? a) Structural weaknesses of the cabinet As part of the functional logic of the parliamentary government system, one would expect the cabinet to play a role as a political decision-making center, thus a body that makes decisions and enforces them until they are formally binding. Does the cabinet actually fulfill this function in the Federal Republic? With regard to the countless matters that are not in the spotlight of political interest, it has already been shown that decision-making processes are partly shifted to ministerial bureaucracy, inter-ministerial and cabinet committees (Fig. 8.1). For the sake of relieving the cabinet, this can be accepted. The question can therefore be narrowed down: What role does the cabinet play in politically relevant and controversial, i.e. important for the continued existence of the government, issues? In this respect as well, due to structural weaknesses, the cabinet is not able to play the role of a decision-making center. Rather, its function has been characterized in such a way that in it decisions “are approved rather than made” and are only subject to a “final political check” (Müller-Rommel 1988, p. 181); it is “more of an acclamation organ than a decision-making body” (Helms 1996, p. 704). One first cause of this is its construction as a political leadership body and at the same time “assembly of independent agency heads” (Hüttl 1967, p. 10; Rudzio 2005, passim). The latter also leads, among other things, politically less influential people into the cabinet. Appointing ministers from outside parliament is due to weaknesses in the parliamentary personnel offer and sometimes to a lower importance of the factions, as long as a chancellor is popular with the party and the public. So since 1949 a total of not fewer than 59 cabinet members were without a Bundestag mandate (Deutscher Bundestag

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8  The Federal Government: Problems of Political Steering

Ministerial bureaucracy Forms of informal decisionmaking centers:

Federal Government

Requirements for informal decision centers:

• Coalition committees, coalition talks

• Political and factual information

• Meeting of the party leaders

• Decision-making ability • Enforcement potential

• Negotiating groups in government formations

Decision center

nt p ve Go

gro u ps

p Op

e rnm

ties par

osit ion

fac tion s

ion osit

Op p

ver n

es arti

Go me nt

Functions of informal decision centers: • Factually binding decision on central issues that are prone to conflict • Settlement of conflicts within the government camp • Government formation and political commitment to legislative programs

Fig. 8.1   Informal decision-making centers. Source: own representation

2021). It is also consequential that government members also have to deal with departmental work of marginal political importance. The time for political networking becomes shorter. Secondly, the conditions for decision-making must be described as suboptimal because the size of the cabinet with 15 to 20 members clearly exceeds the number of six to eight members, which is considered favorable according to findings of organizational sociology for decision-making bodies. In addition, subordinate questions burden the sessions. The cabinet thus becomes a body that can hardly do without pre-decisions. Finally, a third cause: A decision must also be enforced. This should not mean that political decision-making is to be equated with finding the resultant of a political force parallelogram. This would be opposed not only by the conscious

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255

design will of political actors, but also by the inevitable imperfection of political information. Consequently, the chances of enforcement also depend on the weight of the deciding body itself, i.e. that one is willing to follow its decision because it is its decision. In this respect, the cabinet has a structural weakness in that it does not include political heavyweights of the government parties. These include, a priori, the chairpersons of the government factions, as well as, from time to time, the chairpersons of government parties—such as Mende/FDP, Strauß/CSU, Brandt/SPD, Gerhardt/FDP, Müntefering et al./SPD, Stoiber/CSU and until 2017 Seehofer/CSU. The problem seems hardly solvable. Because while the decision-making ability of a body increases with its reduction and political homogeneity, strong enforcement potential requires exactly the opposite, the inclusion of as many politicians as possible and different political forces. There have been efforts in the history of the practice of the federal German government to strengthen the cabinet institutionally. They began with Adenauer’s attempts to overcome the duality of government and party leadership: on the one hand by the participation of the chairmen of the government parties in important cabinet meetings, as later practiced by the social-liberal coalition (Brauswetter 1976, S. 141), on the other hand in 1953 by the introduction of special ministers without portfolio, each of which represented a coalition party and was supposed to link this with the cabinet (Friesenhahn 1971, S. 139). However, because they were devalued as ministers without portfolio, the disappointing result was that “as soon as a member of a faction … became a special minister, his influence and reputation in his faction declined sharply,” as Konrad Adenauer said on January 19, 1956. The enforcement potential of the cabinet was hardly increased. Later federal ministers without portfolio remained a temporary phenomenon associated with German unification. In another form, the line of strengthening the cabinet was taken up again with the introduction of parliamentary state secretaries after the British model. The law institutionalizing them outlined their role in 1967 as follows: “Members of the federal government can be given parliamentary state secretaries to support them; they must be members of the German Bundestag”1. When Chancellor Schröder wanted to appoint the non-parliamentarian Naumann as “state minister” for cultural affairs, the parliamentarian requirement for the offices of Chancellor and Foreign Minister was deleted from the law (Hefty 2005, p. 124). The number of

1 They

are appointed and dismissed by the Federal President on the proposal of the Federal Chancellor in agreement with the competent federal minister (Laufer 1969, p. 105 f.).

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8  The Federal Government: Problems of Political Steering

parliamentary state secretaries and -secretaries increased continuously from seven in 1967 to 33 in 1991, then declined for a while, before growing again (2022: 37). In principle, parliamentary state secretaries (in the Federal Chancellery and Foreign Office with the title “State Minister”) relieve their ministers in two ways: by taking over tasks in the ministry and by representing the minister in the political, in particular the parliamentary, field. Parliamentary state secretaries and -secretaries quickly answered almost half of the oral questions. The answer to small questions remained with the ministers for the most part and the large questions were completely reserved (Laufer 1969, p. 112). The assumption of tasks in the ministry, on the other hand, met with resistance, especially from the civil servants. For the most part, parliamentary state secretaries have not been able to gain fixed responsibilities. Instead, at times a third function of the office, training junior ministers, has become effective—especially under the chancellorship of Helmut Schmidt, when new ministers were recruited mainly from the ranks of parliamentary state secretaries. Under Merkel, Altmaier, Braun, Gröhe, Hendricks, Lambrecht, Müller, Scheuer, Schmidt, Steinmeier, Zypries (who had already been a minister before), and under Scholz only Lambrecht (who had already been a minister before) came from this group. A fourth function, mutual control of the coalition partners by coupling a parliamentary state secretary with a minister from another party, is only occasionally and partially visible in German government practice. During the 19th electoral period from 2017 to 2021 there was no such constellation (German Bundestag 2021), in the legislature before that it only existed in the Federal Chancellery and Foreign Office (Saalfeld et al. 2019, p. 275 f.). The extent to which and whether parliamentary state secretaries are needed at all remains controversial. According to a recent study, the institution has “not proven itself” (Hefty 2005, p. 289). At least for the stabilization of governments, however, it does not seem uninteresting, because with the award of well-paid positions to members of parliament, governments can be strengthened and relationships between coalition partners can be balanced. But in general: The central problem of the lack of enforcement power of the cabinet was not solved by an institutional solution. b) Coalition Committee as an informal decision-making center Instead, an informal body, usually called the Coalition Committee, filled this gap (Fig. 8.1). It serves, with varying composition and success, as a federal political decision-making center—a kind of supergovernment without legal basis and legal authority. Not mentioned in the Basic Law, it is one of the most important organs of the actual constitution.

8.2  Decision Centre: Cabinet or Coalition Committee?

257

As early as the years 1953–61, the question of where the “most important political decision-making center” could be found led to an informal body: a circle of 6–7 cabinet members and 7–10 other leading members of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, as well as the state secretary in the Federal Chancellery. A total of 118 sessions of this decision-making center, in which politically particularly explosive issues were decided, could be proven (Domes 1964, p. 162 ff.). The “Coalition Committee” introduced first, which only included members of the parliamentary group but not members of the government (such as Adenauer, Strauss, Erhard), proved to be a stillbirth. The role as a decision-making center was then taken over by the “Coalition Talks” from 1962–66, in which both members of the cabinet and parliamentary leaders were involved. After an unsuccessful intermezzo with the cabinet as a decision-making center, this function was then taken over by the “Kreßbronn Circle” from 1967–69, consisting of four to six influential government members and the chairmen of the coalition factions (Marx 2013). Table 8.2 shows how this steering center of the Federal Republic has developed over time. It becomes clear that • how the composition was expanded several times in learning processes in order to finally link the government, the government factions and the government parties with each other. In doing so, the group grew beyond the optimal size, collapsed in terms of its decision-making ability and had to be reduced. • Even independently of their composition and agreed upon importance, coalition committees can languish in relative insignificance—for example in the Schröder era, when the green coalition partner had no “blackmail potential” in the form of a coalition alternative and its party spokespersons had little political weight (Helms 2001, p. 1505 ff.; Kropp 2003). • The trend towards ever more detailed coalition agreements also becomes visible, in which the actions of the coalition partners are specified in detail. As a result, coalitions require less and less of a decision-making center at the beginning. For example, the Merkel III government did not need a meeting of the Coalition Committee for the first year. However, unforeseen and changed problem areas then require new decisions by a Coalition Committee. The coalition agreement of the newly formed Ampel coalition from 2021 also regulates coalition management: “The coalition partners meet monthly for coalition talks in the coalition committee to discuss fundamental and current political issues with each other and to coordinate future work planning. In addition, they meet on all matters of fundamental importance that need to be coordinated between the coalition partners, as well as on matters that one of the coalition

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8  The Federal Government: Problems of Political Steering

Table 8.2   Coalition management in the Federal Republic of Germany

Interparty meetings

Interfractional cooperation

Responsible Partially cabinet members and party leaders

No

Yes, and extended cabinet

Cabinet and CDU/CSU party leaders from

Yes

No

Agreed, not actual

No

Yes

complemented (600); 1965 unpublished agreements

Cabinet and Yes, limited party leaders efficient

No

Yes

1966–67

government declaration

Cabinet

No

Yes

1967–69

still valid

Cabinet and Yes party leaders (including party chairmen)

No

Yes

1969–

Detailed agreements

? Cabinet (including party leaders)

?

Yes

Approx. 1974–82

Agreements (1 980) treaties (1200)

Yes Cabinet, parliamentary group and party leaders

Yes

Yes

Time period Coalition agreements (number of words, from 2009 the pages)

Participants in coalition talks/oalition committee

1949–57

Correspondence

1957–61

Unpublished agreement

1961–62

Only party Agreement with coalition leaders committee (2 500)

1962–66

Decision center = coalition committee

Inefficient

(continued)

8.2  Decision Centre: Cabinet or Coalition Committee?

259

Table 8.2   (continued)

Decision center = coalition committee

Interparty meetings

Interfractional cooperation

Time period Coalition agreements (number of words, from 2009 the pages)

Participants in coalition talks/oalition committee

1982–88

Treaties (3 900, 2700); individual agreements (7500)

Cabinet and Yes parliamentary group leaders (from 1983)

“Coalition summit”a

1988–98

Agreement (16 800, 13 900)

Cabinet, fac- Yes? tion and party leaders

?

1998–2005

Cabinet, fac- ContractuAgreement tion and party ally yes, not (13 200, 26 real (rather leaders 700) with Chancellorcoalition comFischer) mittee

No

Yes

2005–09

Yes Cabinet, fac- Yes, in a Agreement with annexes tion and party smaller circle leaders (52 800)

Yes

2009–13

Agreement (134 p.)

Cabinet, fac- Yes, weekly Coalition tion and party (!), inefficient summits leaders

Yes

2013–17

Agreement (185 p.)

Cabinet, fac- 1 year withtion and party out, then a few sessions leaders

Coalition summits

Yes

2018–2021

Agreement (179 p.)

Yes, as probably cabinet, fac- needed tion and party leaders

Coalition summit

Yes

2021–

Agreement (177 p.)

Cabinet, fac- Yes, at least tion and party monthly leaders

Coalition summit

Yes

a Coalition summit = meeting of party leaders Sources: Domes (1964, p. 162 ff.); Hennecke (2017, p. 239 ff.); Marx (2017, p. 135 ff.); Horst (2015, p. 257); Rudzio (2005, p. 78–247); Rudzio (2008); Coalition Agreement of 2009, 2013, 2018, 2021; Saalfeld (1997, p. 74 ff.); Saalfeld (2015); Schindler (1999, p. 1167 ff.).

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8  The Federal Government: Problems of Political Steering

partners wishes to consult on. The coalition committee prepares the guidelines for the work of the coalition.” Furthermore, unified voting is recorded in the Bundestag; in the cabinet, no coalition partner may be overruled (More Progress Dare— Coalition Agreement, p. 174 ff.). The text is reminiscent of that from 2017 and 2013. Even if there is no explicit mention of decision or decisions, it is the factual decision by the coalition committee. With regard to the personnel composition of the committee, one apparently wants to be flexible, which is also possible, since there can be no overruling of a partner there anyway. In summary: 1. In the history of the Federal Republic, informal coalition committees keep appearing, which in turn lead to coalition-internal agreements. Such bodies can be found analogously in coalitions in federal states and also in other Western European democracies (Heinrich 2022; Kropp 2001, p. 289 ff.; Saalfeld 1997, p. 74; Müller and Ström 2000, p. 574, 583). So these are not randomly isolated phenomena. 2. In Germany, the decisions of such coalition committees have a high degree of factual bindingness. The cabinet and coalition factions follow them, implement them in the form of laws, etc. Although only an informal agreement without legal force, the agreement in the coalition committee de facto represents that decision which is then implemented by subsequent legally binding resolutions. Not parliament or government, but the coalition committee is the real seat of decision. Why is this shift to an informal body? The actual cause must be named the fragmentation of power, as it characterizes the political system of the post-totalitarian Germany in particular. As a result, it is extremely difficult to make enforceable decisions. By the most important coalition politicians from government, coalition factions and parties participate in coalition committees (Federal Chancellor and politically outstanding ministers, the chairpersons of the government factions and their first parliamentary managing directors, the chairpersons of the coalition parties and occasionally their general secretaries), separate power factors are represented—the federal states occasionally in happy personal unions. This combination owes its factual bindingness to the decisions. But why informality, why no formal institution instead of such coalition committees? The central causes for this are obviously that

8.2  Decision Centre: Cabinet or Coalition Committee?

261

• that the political and personnel power constellation of government to government changes, one should therefore not finally fix the circle of those involved; • Secondly, informality facilitates the conclusion of compromises. It allows for more casual negotiation in a smaller circle, also with unrelated junktimations. Flexibly, someone can be brought in for the individual case, also preparatory expert groups can be used to cope with factual complexity. In fact, this is also practiced. This resembles informal relationships in companies, which are considered “complementary to formal structures” and whose functions support each other in a positive way (Lang 2004, p. 498 ff.). Informality is the grease in the gear (Bröchler and Grunden 2014) (Fig. 8.1). Is a coalition committee therefore not an over-government outside the Basic Law, does the illustrated practice of decision-making not violate the constitution? In fact, it was argued that the external steering of constitutional organs (Federal Chancellor, Federal Government and Bundestag) by coalition committees constituted a “violation of the law”, since the Basic Law and the Rules of Procedure of the Federal Government regulated the legislative process “legally exhaustively” (Schüle 1964, p. 124 ff.); at least, however, the “decision-making process is relocated to a collegium unknown and unaccountable to the constitution” (Junker 1965, p. 63). To this day, state lawyers object to a parliamentary “self-empowerment” (Hans-Jürgen Papier quoted after Miller 2009, p. 131). It can be countered that the integration of at least leading cabinet members and leaders of the coalition parties is quite in line with the logic of the parliamentary government system. Moreover, the Basic Law does not contain any provisions on the “internal process of will formation of the individual functionaries”, it does not shield them from political influence. Therefore, it is irrelevant whether decisions are actually made elsewhere—as long as they are only adopted by (not unconstitutionally required) constitutional organs as their own, the constitution is fulfilled (Kewenig 1965, p. 183, 198). Especially in democracies, the decision-making centres of which have to find a delicate optimum between further consensus-building and high decisionmaking capacity at the same time, political leadership will inevitably be a highly informal process. These are not decisions imposed from the outside, since they are made by the leading representatives of the government, coalition parties and factions in the coalition committee. Of course, afterwards coalition members of parliament or ministers are then faced with a kind of ratification decision, in which a rejection would also disavow their own leaders, not to mention the possible consequences for the coalition. But such compulsions determine political decisions in general. Also with regard to proposals of their own faction, the member is in a similar situation.

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8  The Federal Government: Problems of Political Steering

Despite all the separation of functions: In modern parliamentary systems, government, parliamentary majority and the parties supporting them form a unit, which finds its expression in the activity of a coalition committee. In this way, decision-making capacity can be achieved more easily in coalitions, and with it a value which, although not explicitly anchored in constitutions, is actually of high rank. c) Governing with Commissions There is still the view of a practice of governmental steering that is sometimes practiced. The starting point is the question of how a federal government can successfully regulate if unions and business associations decide on wages and thus influence prices like investments? During the first economic recession, Economics Minister Karl Schiller comprehensively addressed the problem. He called for a “Concerted Action” (1967– 77) from the government, unions and business associations in order to achieve coordinated action in economic and wage policy through exchange of information and negotiation. Later, Chancellor Schröder took up this line again with the “Alliance for Work, Training and Competitiveness”. Like the Concerted Action, it was tripartite in composition and, under the banner of the alliance, nine top-level talks took place between 1998 and 2003, but the unions rejected the treatment of wage policy, while “retirement at 60” (DGB demand) and part-time work for older people (employers) were left to their fate. The alliance remained without constructive results (Behrends 2002, p. 29 ff.; Fickinger 2005, p. 133, 167, 177). In addition, there were numerous other commissions set up by the Chancellor or Ministers—for example, on armaments, unemployment administration (Hartz Commission), immigration, health policy, pensions and biotechnology (“National Ethics Council”). Interest group representatives and experts served as members of the commission. In this way, it would have been possible to bring more expertise into the political process in other ways; currently there are 300 advisory boards at the federal ministries, in addition, numerous “think tanks” offer their policy advice (Husted et al. 2010, p. 18 ff.). However, the task of the commissions mentioned here went further: They were supposed to present a solution, a decision on controversial issues. However, the proposal was provided with the consecration of scientific expertise or consensus (by taking into account different interests). It thus gained considerable public impact. Did the Bundestag “only have to nod” (Leggewie 1999, p. 20 ff.)? It was critically said that there was a “migration from the constitutional institutions” (Blumenthal 2003). However, the sense of the commissions seemed to be to relieve

8.3  Political Leadership and Ministerial Bureaucracy

263

the government: It could stay in the background and observe the reactions to commission solutions. The government certainly had influence by choosing the participating associations and experts. Then you already know where the rabbit will run. Von Weizsäcker represented the CDU on armaments, Süssmuth on immigration, while a “dissenter” and work director apparently represented the IG Metall in the Hartz Commission (Hassel and Schiller 2010, p. 219 ff.). In general, a government technique became apparent that was supposed to enable unpopular reforms to be carried out. The traffic light coalition also relies on commissions: It continues the voting rights, construction cost reduction and child protection/processing commissions (p. 11, 89, 99) of the Grand Coalition and is based on a minimum wage, social benefits, health insurance, hospital, freedom commission, one for reproductive self-determination, one for anti-Gypsyism, a “Future Commission Fisheries” and a “Acceleration Commission Rail” (Mehr Fortschritt wagen 2021—Coalition Agreement, p. 77, 81, 86, 109, 116, 120, 47, 49). Are small coalition committees growing or are they suppliers of templates as in Schröder’s time?

8.3 Political Leadership and Ministerial Bureaucracy a) Organizational principles and practice in ministries The Federal Government is at the top of a large government apparatus that is supposed to prepare government decisions and ensure their implementation. The individual federal ministries and the Federal Chancellery are divided into departments, sub-departments and offices (see Table 8.3). Outside of this line organization, ministers and state secretaries are supported by offices and staffs directly assigned to them. The interaction between the organizational units is traditionally determined by two principles: • Each unit is assigned a specific area of responsibility, and each higher authority is assigned an overarching task area. • In dealings between organizational units, the chain of command must be followed, according to which communication takes place basically through the superior authority. Since the number of offices has increased step by step and thus the need for coordination between the areas of responsibility has also increased, that formal structure would create lengthy and cumbersome processing routes. In fact, the offices often work more independently and actively than planned, while steering

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8  The Federal Government: Problems of Political Steering

Table 8.3   The personnel hierarchy in the federal administration 2021. Federal Chancellery, federal ministries and other supreme federal authorities (civil service positions)

Function

Service group

Rank

Number

State Secretary

Political Officials

State Secretary

37

Head of Department

Political Officials

Ministerial Director

171

Subdivision head

Grade B officials

Ministerial director

460

Section head

Grade B officials

Ministerial Counsellor/Ltd. 1547 Reg.-Dir

Referrer

Higher Service

Government director up to Reg.-Rat

Clerk

Elevated Service

Senior administrative 7745 officer up to Reg.-Inspector

9340

Office and clerical workers Intermediate service

Inspector of the office to Reg.-Assistent

4097

Messengers, porters, drivers, etc.

Oberamtsmeister to Amtsgehilfe

823

Simple service

As employees, 9056 employees are added. In the subordinate area there are: 1140 civil servant positions of the B-salary, 19,727 positions of the higher, 65,895 of the senior, 70,187 of the intermediate and 1359 positions of the simple service; in addition 96,173 employee positions, including 74 non-tariff. Source: Federal budget (2021, p. 18, 69–81) (partly conversions).

management levels are limited to coordinating and controlling functions. Sometimes “one of the most scarce resources” are the guiding statements of the political leadership of the ministry (1973, p. 203). b) Personnel structures and political function How motivats a minister who is only temporarily in office to get a large, permanent apparatus to work in his/her sense? The negative sanctions available are weak. The majority of the staff consists of career officials or long-term employees who cannot be demoted or dismissed. As a result, the only positive incentive is promotion. The personnel power (limited by civil service law and the participation of works councils) only goes as far as there are vacant positions. It is the promotion of a high-ranking person from the house that sets off a chain of successor promotions.

8.3  Political Leadership and Ministerial Bureaucracy

265

The minister has more power of sanctions against state secretaries and department heads as well as press and personal secretaries: He can retire them from their positions at any time without giving any reasons. It is therefore likely that personnel changes among political officials occur especially during government changes. The fluctuation rate among the top ranks of ministerial administration is high when taking early retirement and tranfers into account: Among state secretaries and ministerial directors, it was 33% in 1969/70, 37.5% in 1982/83 and even 52.2% in 1998/99. Surprisingly, the fluctuation only affected 15.6% during the government change in 2005/06. However, if the entire legislative period from 2005 to 2009 is included, 63.8% were replaced, which was far-reaching. However, as in 1998/99, half of the successors come from the ministries themselves, one third from the administration of the federal states and only the rest from outside the public service, which is especially true for parliamentary staff and members of parliament (Derlien 2001, p. 50 ff.; Ebinger and Jochheim 2009, p. 333 f.). A total break in administrative continuity does not seem to be associated with government changes. Of course, this steering tool is criticized for the purge of unpopular officials and the complaint of the opposition and the Taxpayers’ Association about how expensive early retirees are for the citizens. The differences in fluctuation can partly be explained by the complete or incomplete change of the government parties and partly by a trend towards “increasing party politicization” of the ministerial leadership. In fact, studies show an increasing party affiliation of leading ministerial officials for some time now. Above the heads of department, the proportion of non-party members decreased continuously from 72 to 40.4% between 1970 and 1995. Then it surprisingly rose again to 73.5% by 2009. Explanations for this kink may be sought in the constellation of a grand coalition (Ebinger and Jochheim 2009, p. 334 ff.). At the same time, the proportion of career officials with uninterrupted civil service careers has decreased among the administrative elite (state secretaries and department heads); as early as 1999, only 41.1% belonged to this group (Derlien 2003, p. 405). A similar change took place in the self-conception. Since the government change in 1969, the type of the “classical bureaucrat” who understands himself as unpolitical and neutral seems to have receded into the background and to have been replaced to a large extent by a type who accepts political imperatives for his own activity and no longer adheres to the self-conception of his own nonpartisan attitude (Putnam 1973, p. 281 ff.; Steinkemper 1974). Despite the similarity, there are still differences to elected politicians: Top officials of the ministries are

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8  The Federal Government: Problems of Political Steering

still less power- and more policy-oriented than politicians, they work primarily in meetings, document studies and conceptual work, while the latter two activities play a major role for only a few politicians. Although mostly party members, only a few top officials are politically active, they still differ in education and career patterns from politicians (Derlien 2003, p. 405) (Table 8.3)2. Among federal state secretaries and department heads, 52.6% are lawyers, followed by 17.2% economists, 12.9% political and social scientists and 7.8% natural scientists (as of 2009). A “Weberian administrative culture” is emphasized (Ebinger and Jochheim 2009, p. 331 ff.).What can be seen from this is a competent, politically close, party-affiliated leadership layer in the ministries, which plays a significant role in concretizing and implementing party political ideas, but has not mutated into the type of politician. Only with their help can the narrow political top of the government apparatus fulfill its functions. Does the legal personnel power of German ministers suffice? Unlike in the USA with stronger personnel exchange possibilities during a change of president or in France, where a minister temporarily gathers a staff around him/her (a “cabinet”), which also disappears with him/her, in Germany (as in three other of a total of 21 countries) ministers and parliamentary state secretaries stand opposite relatively much more leading ministerial officials opposite than elsewhere (Schnapp 2004, p. 244 f.). But the figure of the “political official” offers the way out to implement a politicization under the hand and political changes at the top of the ministries—even if this creates public costs and bad blood among other officials. c) Political planning and information gathering Governments are often expected to act in a coordinated manner over the long term, in addition to individual decisions. Such ideas became increasingly prevalent in the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1960s. One indication of the planning and information needs in the government sector are scientific advisory boards and planning councils. However, their activities, which serve the purpose of providing information and developing recommendations (Murswieck 1994, p. 110), generally have little impact on political decision-making. More recently, governments (and parties) have sought to make use of external expertise in other ways, by commissioning business-oriented consulting firms such as Roland Berger or McKinsey & Co to develop proposals, for example, for outsourcing in the German armed forces or savings potential in a state budget.

2 The

proportion of non-party members among federal state secretaries was 55.5% between 1949 and 1999, and among department heads 86.9% (Derlien 2008, p. 318).

References

267

References Baring, Arnulf (1969): Außenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie, München. Behrends, Sylke (2002): Niederschmetternde Erfahrungen mit der korporativistischen Wirtschaftspolitik, in: Orientierungen zur Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik (3), p. 25 ff. von Blumenthal, Julia (2003): Auswanderung aus den Verfassungsinstitutionen, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 43, p. 9 ff. Borucki, Isabelle (2021): Staatliche Öffentlichkeitsarbeit/Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, in: Andersen, Uwe et al. (Eds.): Handwörterbuch des politischen Systems der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 8. edn., Wiesbaden, p. 853 ff. Brauswetter, Hartmut H. (1976): Kanzlerprinzip, Ressortprinzip und Kabinettsprinzip in der ersten Regierung Brandt 1969–1972, Bonn. Bröchler, Stephan/Grunden, Timo (Eds.) (2014): Informelle Politik, Wiesbaden. Busse, Volker (2005): Bundeskanzleramt und Bundesregierung, 4. edn., Heidelberg. Busse, Volker/Hofmann, Hans (2017): Bundeskanzleramt und Bundesregierung. Aufgaben, Organisation, Arbeitsweise, 6. edn., Bonn. Czada, Roland (2003): Konzertierung in verhandlungsdemokratischen Politikstrukturen, in: Jochem, Sven/Siegel, Nico A. (Eds.): Konzertierung, Verhandlungsdemokratie und Reformpolitik im Wohlfahrtsstaat, Opladen, p. 35 ff. Derlien, Hans-Ulrich (1990): Regierungsorganisation – institutionelle Restriktion des Regierens? in: Hartwich, Hans-Hermann/Wewer, Göttrik (Eds.): Regieren in der Bundesrepublik, Opladen, p. 91 ff. Derlien, Hans-Ulrich (2001): Personalpolitik nach Regierungswechseln, in: ders./ Murswieck, Axel (Eds.): Regieren nach Wahlen, Opladen, p. 39 ff. Derlien, Hans-Ulrich (2003): Mandarins or Managers?, in: Governance 2003/3, p. 401 ff. Derlien, Hans-Ulrich (2008): Die politische und administrative Elite der Bundesrepublik, in: Jann, Werner/König, Klaus (Eds.): Regieren zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts, Tübingen, p. 291 ff. Deutscher Bundestag (2020): Gesetzüber die Feststellung des Bundeshaushaltsplans für das Haushaltsjahr 2021(Haushaltsgesetz 2021), unter: https://www.bundeshaushalt.de/ static/daten/2021/soll/BHH%202021%20gesamt.pdf (zuletzt geprüft am 13. Dezember 2022). Deutscher Bundestag (2021): Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages, Berlin, unter: https://www.bundestag.de/datenhandbuch (zuletzt geprüft am 28. Februar 2022). Doering-Manteuffel, Anselm (1991): Strukturmerkmale der Kanzlerdemokratie, in: Der Staat 1, p. 1 ff. Domes, Jürgen (1964): Bundesregierung und Mehrheitsfraktion, Köln. Ebinger, Falk/Jochheim, Linda (2009): Wessen loyale Diener?, in: der moderne staat, p. 327 ff. Eschenburg, Theodor (1971): Die Richtlinien der Politik im Verfassungsrecht und in der Verfassungswirklichkeit, in: Stammen, Theo (Ed.): Strukturwandel der modernen Regierung, Darmstadt, p. 361 ff. Fickinger, Nico (2005): Der verschenkte Konsens, Wiesbaden.

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8  The Federal Government: Problems of Political Steering

Friesenhahn, Ernst (1971): Parlament und Regierung im modernen Staat, in: Stammen, Theo (Ed.): Strukturwandel der modernen Regierung, Darmstadt, p. 109 ff. Görtemaker, Manfred (1999): Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, München. Grunden, Timo (2009): Politikberatung im Innenhof der Macht, Wiesbaden. Grunden, Timo (2011): Das informelle Politmanagement der Regierungszentrale, in: Florack, Martin/ders. (Ed.): Regierungszentralen, Wiesbaden, p. 249 ff. Hassel, Anke/Schiller, Christof (2010): Der Fall Hartz IV, Frankfurt a. M. Hefty, Julia (2005): Die Parlamentarischen Staatssekretäre im Bund, Düsseldorf. Heinrich, Gudrun (2002): Kleine Koalitionspartner in Landesregierungen, Opladen. Helms, Ludger (1996): Das Amt des deutschen Bundeskanzlers in historisch und international vergleichender Perspektive, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 27 (4), p. 697 ff. Helms, Ludger (2001): Gerhard Schröder und die Entwicklung der deutschen Kanzlerschaft, in: Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 11 (4), p. 1497 ff. Hennecke, Hans Jörg (2003): Die dritte Republik, München. Hennecke, Hans Jörg (2005): Von der „Agenda 2010“ zu „Agenda Merkel“?, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 32–33, p. 16 ff. Hennecke, Hans Jörg (2017): Koalitionsmanagement der Regierung Schröder 1998– 2005, in: Gassert, Philipp/ders. (Eds.): Koalitionen in der Bundesrepublik, Paderborn, p. 203 ff. Hennis, Wilhelm (1964): Richtlinienkompetenz und Regierungstechnik, Tübingen. Horst, Patrick (2015): Das Management der dritten Großen Koalition 2013 bis 2015, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 46 (4), p. 852 ff. Husted, Thurid et al. (2010): Wissen ist Macht?, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 19, p. 15 ff. Hüttl, Adolf (1967): Koordinationsprobleme der Bundesregierung, in: Der Staat, p. 1 ff. Jäger, Wolfgang (1988): Von der Kanzlerdemokratie zur Koordinationsdemokratie. Für Wilhelm Hennis zum 65. Geburtstag, in: Zeitschrift für Politik 35 (1), p. 15 ff. Junker, Ernst Ulrich (1965): Die Richtlinienkompetenz des Bundeskanzlers, Tübingen. Keeler, John T. S. (1993): Opening the Window for Reform, in: Comparative Political Studies (January 1993), p. 433 ff. Kewenig, Wilhelm (1965): Zur Rechtsproblematik der Koalitionsvereinbarungen, in: Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, p. 183 ff. Klecha, Stephan (2012): Bundeskanzler in Deutschland, Opladen. Kloepfer, Michael (1989): Wesentlichkeitstheorie als Begründung oder Grenze des Gesetzesvorbehalts?, in: Hill, Hermann (Ed.): Zustand und Perspektiven der Gesetzgebung, Berlin, p. 187 ff. Knoll, Thomas (2004): Das Bonner Bundeskanzleramt, Wiesbaden. Knöpfle, Franz (1965): Inhalt und Grenzen der „Richtlinien der Politik“ des Regierungschefs, in: Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt, p. 857 ff. Korte, Karl-Rudolf (2010): Präsidentielles Zaudern, in: Bukow, Sebastian/Seemann, Wenke (Eds.): Die Große Koalition, Wiesbaden, p. 102 ff. Korte, Karl-Rudolf (2011): Machtmakler im Bundeskanzleramt, in: Florack, Martin/ Grunden, Timo (Eds.): Regierungszentralen, Wiesbaden, p. 123 ff. Korte, Karl-Rudolf (2021): Kuratiertes Regieren: Bausteine der Resilienz, in: Florack, Martin et al. (Eds.): Coronakratie. Demokratisches Regieren in Ausnahmezeiten, Frankfurt a. M./New York, p. 25 ff.

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Korte, Karl-Rudolf/Fröhlich, Manuel (2004): Politik und Regieren in Deutschland, Paderborn. Kropp, Sabine (2001): Regieren in Koalitionen, Wiesbaden. Kropp, Sabine (2003): Regieren als informaler Prozeß, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 43, p. 23 ff. Lang, Rainhart (2004): Informelle Organisation, in: Schreyögg, Georg/von Werder, Axel (Eds.): Handwörterbuch Unternehmensführung und Organisation, 4. edn., Stuttgart, p. 497 ff. Langguth, Gerd (2009): Das Machtprinzip der Angela Merkel, in: Machnig, Matthias/ Raschke, Joachim (Eds.): Wohin steuert Deutschland? Hamburg, p. 29 ff. Laufer, Heinz (1969): Der Parlamentarische Staatssekretär, München. Leggewie, Claus (1999): Böcke zu Gärtnern?, in: Arlt, Hans-Jürgen/Nehls, Sabine (Eds.): Bündnis für Arbeit, Opladen, p. 13 ff. Lepper, Manfred (1976): Die Rolle und Effektivität der interministeriellen Ausschüsse für Koordination und Regierungspolitik, in: Siedentopf, Heinrich (Ed.): Regierungspolitik und Koordination, Berlin, p. 433 ff. Marx, Stefan (2013): Der Kreßbronner Kreis, Düsseldorf. Marx, Stefan (2017): Bildung und Management der Großen Koalition unter Kurt Georg Kiesinger 1966–1969, in: Gassert, Philipp/Hennecke, Hans Jörg (Eds.): Koalitionen in der Bundesrepublik, Paderborn, p. 113 ff. Mayntz, Renate/Scharpf, Fritz (1973): Vorschläge zur Reform der Ministerialorganisation, in: dies. (Ed.): Planungsorganisation, München, p. 201 ff. Mehr Fortschritt wagen (2021). Bündnis für Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit und Nachhaltigkeit – Koalitionsvertrag 2021–2025 zwischen SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen und FDP, unter: https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Koalitionsvertrag/Koalitionsvertrag_2021-2025.pdf (zuletzt geprüft am 4. März 2022). Miller, Bernhard (2009): Informelle Einflußnahme?, in: Schöne, Helmar/von Blumenthal, Julia (Eds.): Parlamentarismusforschung in Deutschland, Baden-Baden, p. 129 ff. Müller, Kay/Walter, Franz (2004): Graue Eminenzen der Macht, Wiesbaden. Müller, Wolfgang C./Ström, Kaare (Eds.) (2000): Coalition Governments in Western Europe, Oxford. Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand (1988): The centre of government in West Germany, in: European Journal of Political Research 16 (29), p. 171 ff. Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand (1994): The Chancellor and his Staff, in: Padgett, Stephen (Ed.): Adenauer to Kohl, London, p. 106 ff. Murswieck, Axel (1994): Wissenschaftliche Beratung im Regierungsprozeß, in: ders. (Ed.): Regieren und Politikberatung, Opladen, p. 103 ff. Niclauß, Karlheinz (2015): Kanzlerdemokratie, 3. edn., Wiesbaden. Patzelt, Werner J. (2017): Wohin steuert die Union?, in: Plickert, Philip (Ed.): Merkel, 6. edn., München, p. 27 ff. Popper, Karl R. (1971): Das Elend des Historizismus, 3. edn., Tübingen. Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (2022): Organisationplan des Bundeskanzleramts, unter: https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/974430/773044/ d31524b73a0e0e04a5d59e37e40d1b56/druckversion-organigramm-bkamt-data. pdf?download=1 (zuletzt geprüft am 3. März 2022).

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Putnam, Robert D. (1973): The Political Attitudes of Senior Civil Servants in Western Europe, in: British Journal of Political Science, p. 257 ff. Rudzio, Wolfgang (2005): Informelles Regieren, Wiesbaden. Rudzio, Wolfgang (2008): Das Koalitionsmanagement der Regierung Merkel, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 16, p. 11 ff. Saalfeld, Thomas (1997): Deutschland: Auswanderung der Politik aus der Verfassung?, in: Müller, Wolfgang C./Ström, Kaare (Eds.): Koalitionsregierungen in Westeuropa, Wien, p. 47 ff. Saalfeld, Thomas (2010): Regierungsbildung 2009, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 41 (1), p. 181 ff. Saalfeld, Thomas (2015): Koalitionsmanagement der christlich-liberalen Koalition Merkel II, in: Zohlnhöfer, Reimut/ders. (Eds.): Politik im Schatten der Krise, Wiesbaden, p. 151 ff. Saalfeld, Thomas et al. (2019): Koalitionsmanagement der Regierung Merkel III, in: Zohlnhöfer, Reimut/ders. (Eds.): Zwischen Stillstand, Politikwandel und Krisenmanagement: Eine Bilanz der Regierung Merkel 2013–2017, Wiesbaden, p. 257 ff. Scharpf, Fritz W. et al. (Eds.) (1976): Politikverflechtung. Theorie und Empirie des kooperativen Föderalismus in der Bundesrepublik, Kronberg/Ts. Schindler, Peter (1999): Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages 1949 bis 1999, Bd. I, Baden-Baden. Schmidt, Manfred G. (2005): Politische Reformen und Demokratie, in: Vorländer, Hans (Ed.): Politische Reform in der Demokratie, Baden-Baden, p. 45 ff. Schnapp, Kai-Uwe (2004): Ministerialbürokratien in westlichen Demokratien, Opladen. Schüle, Adolf (1964): Koalitionsvereinbarungen im Lichte des Verfassungsrechts, Tübingen. Steinkemper, Bärbel (1974): Klassische und politische Bürokraten in der Ministerialverwaltung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Köln. Steffani, Wilfried (1997): Gewaltenteilung und Parteien im Wandel, Opladen. Weidenfeld, Ursula (2016): Nur in der Krise kommt das Land voran, in: Korte, Karl-Rudolf (Ed.): Politik in unsicheren Zeiten, Baden-Baden, p. 117 ff. Weßels, Bernhard (2000): Die Entwicklung des deutschen Korporatismus, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 26–27, p. 16 ff. Willke, Helmut (1991): Regieren als Kunst systemischer Intervention, in: Hartwich, HansHermann/Wewer, Göttrik (Eds.): Regieren in der Bundesrepublik, Opladen, p. 35 ff.

9

Institutional Counterweights: Features of Negotiation Democracy

9.1 The Federal Council of Germany: Veto Power of the State Governments a. Power sharing and history of the Federal Council The development towards a liberal democratic constitutional state has not only been determined by the struggle for legitimate representation and its position, but also by the concern for the protection of minorities and the freedom of the citizen. In view of the relevant weaknesses of ancient Athenian democracy, the American constitutional fathers who published the “Federalist Papers” in 1787/88 (Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, etc.) saw the danger of a tyrannical majority: “If angels ruled over men, neither an inner nor an outer control of the government would be necessary” (Federalist Papers No. 51, quoted according to Wasser 1991, p. 27). Following Montesquieu’s recognition that “the power restrains the power” (quoted according to Schwan 1993, p. 217), they sought to divide power primarily through separation of powers, federalism and strong bicameralism. The judicial review of laws with regard to their conformity with the constitution (judicial review), already practised by courts since 1787, was invoked by the Supreme Court in 1803. Finally, the US Constitution was supplemented by amendments on fundamental rights, i.e. also content-related limitations were set for legislation (Shell 1975, pp. 22 ff.). In addition to the British principle of parliamentary government, this American model of democracy with checks and balances, i.e. limited majority decision, has had an impact on the German Basic Law. This is where its anti-totalitarian principle becomes apparent. At the same time, it also referred to German federal, bicameral and rule-of-law traditions. Important decision-making powers in the

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Mannewitz and W. Rudzio, The Political System of Germany, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41371-2_9

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Federation do not lie solely with the parliamentary majority and the government. Their power is rather limited by several institutions: • the Federal Council, which, as a representative of the federal principle and a general co-ruler in federal legislation, participates in federal legislation, ordinances and administration; • the Federal Constitutional Court, which, as an interpreter of the constitution, checks and, if necessary, annuls laws and other decisions for their conformity with the constitution; • the Federal President with the task of acting as a formal control and reserve institution in the event of a parliamentary majority not being formed. The Bundesbank belonged in this series until it lost its essential tasks to the European Central Bank. Even though it was created in terms of personnel by the Bundestag, the Federal Government and the state parliaments and thus certainly politically influenced, these institutions nevertheless form counterweights which every government has to take into account. This is especially true for the Federal Council. As a federal institution, it participates in federal legislation, ordinances and administration according to Art. 50 and Art. 80 GG, elects half of the federal constitutional judges according to Art. 94 para. 1 GG and can call on the Federal Constitutional Court according to Art. 93 GG, represents an important federal modification of the parliamentary government system. His powers make him a second chamber of relatively strong power in international comparison, which expresses the federal division of powers in Germany (Steffani 1997, pp. 44 ff.) New is such an institution in the German constitutional history not. Its predecessor can be seen already 1663–1806 in the ambassador’s Congress of the perpetual Reichstag of the old Reich, then in the “Bundestag” of the German Confederation, finally in the “Bundesrat” of the empire from 1871 (Amm 2005, p. 90; Rührmair 2001, pp. 18 ff.)—always a representation of the territorial lords (Boldt 1990, p. 65) or the official governments of the individual states. Without the consent of the Bundesrat no law was possible in Bismarck’s empire, so that he could also serve to block unwanted, from the democratically elected Reichstag passed laws. He has been referred to as the “Vetomacht of the ancien regime” (Peter Graf Kielmansegg quoted after Eith 2000, p. 78). Its successor, the “Reichsrat” of the Weimar Republic, was in contrast back on a overruled right of objection. Also the former dominance of Prussia in the Bundesrat was weakened (“lex antiborussica”), by only half of the Prussian representatives were sent by the

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273

Prussian state government, the other by the individual provincial administrations (Eschenburg 1974, pp. 41, 46 ff.). In the constitutional debate of the years 1948/49 then two alternatives competed with each other: the model of the Bundesrat as a representation of the state governments and that of a “Senate” after the American model, the members of which would have been elected by the people or by the state parliaments in the individual federal states. It was agreed on a Bundesrat, although not as a completely equal second chamber next to the Bundestag. As a result, the current Bundesrat is a special German, “a unique body in the world” (Theodor Eschenburg quoted after Morsey 1974, pp. 67 ff.; Laufer and Münch 1997, pp. 63 ff.). He is the only second chamber, which consists solely of instructed representatives of the federal state governments (Bußjäger 2003, pp. 19 ff.). Only in Russia and South Africa, the second chamber is staffed up to half as well, elsewhere usually by election of the citizens or state parliaments (Watts 2010, p. 36). b. The inner life of the Bundesrat The Bundesrat consists “of members of the governments of the states which order and recall them”. They are subject to cabinet instructions (imperative mandate) and have to vote uniformly for their state. It is thus a federal second chamber, not one of personal “respected revisors” (Bagehot 1963, p. 137), which is to correct an imprudent people’s representation. Since members of the Bundesrat can be represented, often a leading politician votes with the vote package of his/her state alone; “sometimes” he/she is the only present representative of the state (Laufer and Münch 1997, p. 113). If the vote is not unanimous, the votes of a federal state are invalid. An attempt by the Bundesrat President Wowereit, in the vote on the immigration law in the year 2002 (Brandenburg had voted unanimously differently), was unconstitutional. The distribution of votes in the Bundesrat is an expression of a compromise between the federal perspective of equal states and the democratic one of an equal representation of citizens. So neither every country has the same number of votes (as in the US Senate) assigned, nor a number of votes that would be proportional to the population. After the German unification a “vote spreading” (Bohley 1991) was carried out in favor of the populous federal states, now each federal state is entitled to at least three votes, states with more than two million inhabitants have four, those with more than six million have five and those more than seven million inhabitants have six votes (cf. Table 9.1). Nevertheless, the population of the new federal states is overrepresented. If one measures the disproportionality of the Bundesrat with the Gini index, it lies with the value 0.32 between

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9  Institutional Counterweights: Features of Negotiation Democracy

Table 9.1   The distribution of votes in the Bundesrat

Federal state

Population (million, Number of votes in Government parties 31. 12. 2020) the Bundesrat end of 2022

North Rhine-Westphalia

17.9

6

CDU, Greens

Bavaria

13.1

6

CSU, Free Voters

Baden-Württemberg

11.1

6

Grüne, CDU

Niedersachsen

8.0

6

SPD, CDU

Hessen

6.3

5

CDU, Grüne

Sachsen

4.1

4

CDU, Grüne, SPD

Rheinland-Pfalz

4.1

4

SPD, Grüne, FDP

Berlin

3.7

4

SPD, Grüne, Linke

Schleswig–Holstein

2.9

4

CDU, Grüne

Brandenburg

2.5

4

SPD, CDU, Grüne

Saxony-Anhalt

2.2

4

CDU, SPD, FDP

Thuringia

2.1

4

Left, SPD, Greens

Hamburg

1.8

3

SPD, Greens

Mecklenburg-Western 1.6 Pomerania

3

SPD, Left

Saarland

1.0

3

SPD

0.7

3

Bremen Insgesamt

81.2

SPD, Grüne, Linke 69

SPD, Grüne, FDP

Source: Federal Statistical Office (2022).

the higher inequality of the second chambers in the USA or Switzerland (0.49 or 0.46) and much lower as in India or Austria (at 0.1) (Decker 2011, p. 248). The President of the Bundesrat, who is also the Vice President of the Federal President, is elected by the Bundesrat for one year. However, the agreement provides that the office of President should rotate between the heads of government in the order of the population size of the states. To a considerable extent, officials are involved in the ongoing work of the Bundesrat. The reason for this is the overload of the members of the Bundesrat, who—in addition to their activity as members of a state government—would like to deal with all the proposals to be dealt with in the Bundesrat themselves. During the 2017–2021 legislative period, the Bundesrat advised 546 legislative proposals and dealt with numerous

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ordinances and administrative regulations of the federal government (Bundesrat 2021a). It is therefore common practice that only formal decisions are made at the plenary sessions of the Bundesrat, which take place in a three- to four-week cycle, while the decision-making process is shifted to the 16 federal committees, which meet more often and in which ministerial officials and—instead of cabinet members—mainly ministerial officials participate. Pre-decisions made there cannot be overturned by a state cabinet due to time pressure (Kilper and Lhotta 1996, pp. 118 ff.). The party political fronts were long reflected in the fact that governments led by the Union or SPD met for separate preliminary talks and tried to coordinate their approach in the Bundesrat (Renzsch 1989). However, a cool, “quiet tone” prevails in the plenary sessions of the Bundesrat (2022a). c. Limits for the expansive Bundesrat? Due to its competence, the following tasks can be assigned to the Bundesrat: • to bring administrative aspects into the decision-making process of the federal government; • to shield federalism from being eroded by the federal legislature. • to exercise general participation of a second chamber. The first two tasks correspond to the fact that only with the express consent of the Bundesrat can such laws and ordinances be passed (laws requiring consent) which change the constitution (Art. 79 para. 2 GG) or affect the federal-state relationship. These include federal laws that • are carried out on behalf of the federal states and contain regulations on administrative organization, public service and administrative procedure (Art. 85, 87, 104a, 108, 120a GG); • taxes with state shares, the financial equalization, the financial administration or otherwise the finances of the states, including the basic principles of budgeting for the federal government and the states (Art. 104a–109, 134–135 GG); • regulate the exercise of federal jurisdiction by courts of the states (Art. 96 GG); • change territorial status, transfer sovereignty or affect state participation in the EU (Art. 29 para. 7 or 23 GG); • provide for regulations in the event of defense or emergency legislation (Art. 115a, c and 81 GG). In addition, the list of countries considered to be persecution-free under the asylum article and the exercise of federal force against a state require approval. In

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9  Institutional Counterweights: Features of Negotiation Democracy

general, every piece of legislation requiring approval must be mentioned as such in the Basic Law (enumeration principle). For all other laws passed by the Bundestag, the Bundesrat only has the right of objection (objection laws). If the objection is passed by a majority of the Bundesrat, the Bundestag can reject it with a majority of its members; an objection with a two-thirds majority also requires a two-thirds majority of the members of the Bundestag to be rejected (Art. 77 GG). A veto right for the second chamber, corresponding to German approval, applies throughout the USA, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Italy and India (except for financial laws), is limited to certain policy areas or only to constitutional issues in Germany, the Czech Republic, Austria, France, Spain and Belgium. Otherwise, the second chamber is limited to a suspensive veto (Sturm 2015, pp. 82, 174). Formally, Germany therefore belongs to the middle group. However, what significantly shapes the real conditions is the question of whether and to what extent administrations of the federal states have to implement federal laws—a particularly pronounced interlocking in federal Germany. The Federal Council’s general political right of co-determination, which goes beyond the protection of the interests of the Länder, is of central importance for its role. This is evidenced by its general right of initiative and objection, its participation in the emergency parliament (Joint Committee) and its role as a reserve legislator in the event of a legislative emergency (Art. 81 GG). The “point of entry” through which the general right of co-determination was realized was Art. 84 para. 1 GG, according to which laws which were to be executed by the federal states and which contained provisions on administrative organization and administrative procedure required the consent of the Federal Council. From this it was concluded that there was a “total responsibility” for these laws, i.e. a need for consent for their entire content (Fromme 1976, pp. 154 ff.). A ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in 1974 decided in favour of the Federal Council: It could refuse its consent to a law even if “it was only not in agreement with the material regulation”. A federal government was only left with the attempt to circumvent the Federal Council hurdle by splitting into material and procedural laws—as the Schmidt government did with the Budget Structure Act 1975 and the Marriage Act 1975/76, as well as the Brandt government in 1971 with the Tenancy Act (excerpts from the “Federal Council Judgment” and the “Dissenting Opinions” of the Federal Constitutional Court of 25 June 1974; Fromme 1976, pp. 160 f.). This has been referred to as the “art of dividing laws” (Fromme 1990). The limits of the need for consent are still occasionally disputed between the Bundestag and the Federal Council. According to the Federal Council, 49% of all laws issued between 1949 and 2021 were subject to consent (Bundesrat 2022b). In most cases, the need for consent was derived from the administrative role of the Länder, with

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277

another large part coming from the financial interdependence between the federal government and the Länder (Dästner 2001, pp. 293, 296). The Federal Council’s position is also not insignificant in the case of objection laws. For it is often not easy for a government majority to mobilize the majority of members of the Bundestag (not just those present!) which is necessary in order to reject the objection. It becomes even more difficult to overcome the high hurdle of a two-thirds majority of its members. Not every objection of the Federal Council is rejected (cf. Table 9.2). All in all: The veto power of the Bundesrat was so far-reaching that the Federal Republic of Germany seemed hardly governable against it. Is a state reformand decision-capable if such situations occur again and again? In view of this, the Grand Coalition 2006 cut that veto power. Favorable for this was that both, Union as well as SPD, could make hopes for a future majority led by them alone. Rawls’ (1979) “veil of ignorance” in front of the future facilitated the step—generally a favorable prerequisite for fair solutions. Together they brought about the federalism reform I, which abolished the need for consent for federal laws which are to be carried out by the Länder as their own affair. However, the federal government had to pay for this by the fact that in these cases the Länder now “regulate the establishment of the authorities and the administrative procedure”—i.e. the federal government has bought itself free from the need for consent by renouncing the control of the execution of the law. If such a federal law provides for implementing regulations, the Länder may “adopt divergent regulations”; corresponding new federal laws do not come into force until six months after their promulgation, etc. The later regulation shall apply. In exceptional cases, the federal government may regulate the administrative procedure without possibility of deviation—but then needs the consent of the Bundesrat again (Art. 84 para. 1 GG). In the event that the federal government does not want to give up the execution entirely, a back and forth between different administrative regulations has arisen, at the end with the way out of a federal law with the consent of the Bundesrat (so-called ping-pong process). Nevertheless, the reform had a certain charm for the federal government. It reduced the share of laws requiring consent from 50.6% (2002–2005) to 37.8% (2017–2021)1. Even more: In case of dispute about the control of the execution,

1 So

in the view of the Bundestag (Deutscher Bundestag 2006, 2022). Small deviations in the literature are probably due to different numbers of Bundestag and Bundesrat as well as recounts etc.

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9  Institutional Counterweights: Features of Negotiation Democracy

Table 9.2   The Federal Council—a blockade instrument? In terms of the number of laws or ordinances

1998–2002 2002–05

2005–09

2009–13

2013–17

2017— 2021

a) Legislation: Calls to the Mediation Committee

75

100

18

43

3

7

By Federal Council

66

90

17

34

2

4

i.e. not law

12

12

0

9

1

0

Disallowances

19

21

1

14

2

4

i.e. not law

7

5

0

4

2

1

Objections of the Bundesrat

5

22

3

1

0

0

Therefore not rejected

3

0

0

0

b) Regulations:

504

436

468

454

400

365

i.e. consent fails

3

4

3

1

1

2

General administrative regulations

58

30

44

29

31

26

1

2

0

0

0

0

Consent refused

–

–

Source: Bundesrat (2021b).

the deviation model has the advantage that the federal government and the deviating Land have to present their administrative concepts and thus expose them to public discussion. d. Negotiation-Democratic Consequences of the Federal Council’s Power The power of the Bundesrat has three far-reaching consequences in political practice.

9.1  The Federal Council of Germany: Veto Power of the State Governments

279

First: The Bundesrat acts paradoxically as “transmission belt for the unitarization of the Federal Republic of Germany” (Fabritius 1976). Just because he can considerably restrict the scope of action of the parliamentary majority in the federal government, the federal government is highly interested in a Bundesrat majority pointing in the same direction. State elections and coalition formation in the states therefore often have federal political significance. In the Bundesrat you can distinguish three groups of states: those with a government only from parties that are also involved in the federal coalition (so-called R-states), secondly the states governed only by opposition parties (so-called O-states) and thirdly the mixed states, i.e. those led by governing and opposing parties in the federal government (so-called M-states). As a rule, “mixed” states give the decisive vote. Majorities of the federal states only existed continuously from 1962–66, 1967–69, 1983–89 as well as during short phases, for example at the beginning of the red-green coalition and predominantly during the first grand coalition under Merkel. On the other hand, the social-liberal coalition from 1972 was handicapped by clearly opposition majorities in the Bundesrat, the government of Kohl in its final phase, as well as the redgreen government of Schröder in its second half (Kropp 2010, p. 60; Jun 2011, pp. 120 ff.; Busch 2008, p. 114). In the corresponding years 1976–82, 1997/98 and 2003–05 there were creaking noises during the legislation, the share of laws finally failing in the Bundesrat rose to over 2% (Kropp 2010, p. 63). This particularly affected politically sensitive projects. But the increase in M-state majorities in the Bundesrat in recent years also has its consequences, because those states often abstain in controversial approval laws—and are then counted as no votes, which can lead to a kind of negative blockade. As of autumn/winter 2022, there are only three state governments (the Rhineland-Palatinate with 4, the Saarland and the Hamburg with 3 seats each in the Bundesrat), in which only parties of the current Ampelkoalition are involved. The great majority of the seats in the Bundesrat are in the hands of “mixed” state governments (cf. Table 9.1). If parties that face each other in the federal government form a coalition, they usually agree on a federal clause, according to which the federal state’s votes should only be cast in consensus, otherwise they will abstain. In individual cases, however, prime ministers (Diepgen 1992; Teufel 1995) have set themselves above this and taken the risk of a coalition break-up (König 1998, p. 486). An unusual solution, in case of divergence to let the vote decide, was found in Rhineland-Palatinate. As a second consequence of the key position of the Bundesrat, it must be assessed that in the Bundesrat, party political aspects always play a role alongside state interests. Although in its self-conception “not an arena for party politi-

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9  Institutional Counterweights: Features of Negotiation Democracy

cal struggle games” (Bundesrat President von Hassell quoted after Rummel 1974, pp. 27, 35), the Bundesrat is also the scene of party political disputes. This became clear in 1969 at the beginning of the CDU/CSU opposition with the announcement of the former Chancellor (quoted after Lehmbruch 2000, p. 133), the Bundesrat would be “an important instrument for the opposition”. In fact, objections from the Bundesrat against laws passed by the Bundestag increased, plenary sessions became party-politically coloured (developmental problems in the relationship between Bundesrat and Bundestag 1976, pp. 295, 305, 315). The governing Social Democrats were outraged by an “opposition record of reformprevention” by means of the Bundesrat, which lacked legitimacy to block majority decisions of the Bundestag (quoted after Schindler 1974, pp. 157, 165). After a change in government at the federal level in 1990, very similar tendencies became apparent—with only the roles reversed. The social democratic parliamentary group in the Bundesrat (upper house of parliament) took a confrontational approach to its legislative proposals, and when the Kohl government lost control of the Mediation Committee in 1994, the SPD chairman announced that the SPD would make use of its “strong position” in the Bundesrat and its “majority of votes” in the Mediation Committee (Scharping 1994). In the final phase of the Kohl government, the Bundesrat blocked the Tax Reform Act (Renzsch 2000, pp. 69ff.). Which prevails: state-level substantive policy or party interests? An analysis of 42 controversial votes in the Bundesrat between 1990 and 2005 came to the conclusion that while there were some cases in which the voting behaviour in the Bundesrat could be explained “only poorly in terms of the state-level policy interests”, this was not the case for the majority. Apparently, state interests still dominate (Bräuninger et al. 2010, pp. 245f.). Such a contrast between the Bundestag and the Bundesrat—and thus the possibility of a blockade—is to be expected time and again because of the decline of the ruling party at state elections. But precisely this danger of blockade has so far—as the third consequence of the power of the Bundesrat—mostly strengthened consensual democratic practices in the political system of the Federal Republic. Although there has been an increase in abstentions and appeals to the Mediation Committee by the Bundesrat in cases of political discrepancy, in the vast majority of cases the relevant laws were finally able to be proclaimed. However, in a few—but politically highly significant—cases, no compromise could be reached and they failed (Ziller et al. 1998, pp. 138 ff.; Lhotta 2001, p. 108). Blockades occurred, but they were limited to a few blatant cases. How can this—numerically—modest “blockade balance” (Stüwe 2004, pp. 29 f.) be explained? On the one hand, from the fact that the government

9.1  The Federal Council of Germany: Veto Power of the State Governments

281

majority sometimes gave in to the Bundesrat, and also from efforts to refrain from regulation in laws that could justify a need for approval. On the other hand, a majority in the Bundesrat can sometimes not afford to simply block something. This would appear too embarrassing in terms of democratic legitimacy. Moreover, with parts of a law that one actually wants to reject, other, acceptable, popular or urgent content is often linked. In addition, there are state-level interests. The prime ministers of the states do not simply behave like “figures on the chessboard of the federal parties” (Abromeit 1992, p. 64; Kropp 1997, p. 255). State interests led to the fact that during the Kohl government, the prime minister of Lower Saxony, Albrecht (CDU), joined forces with SPD-led states and, in exchange for his approval of the tax reform, secured increased supplementary allocations in favour of financially weaker states such as Lower Saxony (Renzsch 1989, pp. 339ff.). Similarly, the SPD-led government of Brandenburg broke away from the SPD phalanx in 1991 and voted in favour of the Tax Amendment Act of the Kohl government, on the condition that certain revenues would flow into the “German Unity” fund (Renzsch 2000, p. 61). Similarly, the red-green government of Schröder also prevailed in the Bundesrat through trade-offs or achieved compromises (Kropp 2006, pp. 247ff.). In addition to the party-political frontline in the Bundesrat, state-level conflict lines can be identified: new vs. old states, financially strong vs. fiscally weak states, land vs. city states. As long as German politics is not characterised by radical conflict orientation, but by a centre orientation in the electorate, the power position of the Bundesrat will time and again force compromises. The Bundesrat institution thus promotes features of a negotiation democracy (Lehmbruch 2000, pp. 24ff.). However, this blurs the differences between government and opposition, as well as responsibilities. Political change also appears possible in this context only in the form of incremental adaptation, but hardly in the form of consistent reform. In the other case, with massive conflict orientation, the Federal Council actually mutated into an instrument of blockade. This would be favorable for a clear confrontation of the political positions, but would lead to fatal decision-making incapacity of the political system. Other federal states also know this problem, to the extent that their second chamber has an absolute veto right, as in the USA and Latin American countries. There too, such a construction proves to be majorityrestricting, and instead of blocking, “often enhanced ‘consensus’ democracy” is the result (Watts 2010, p. 45; Leunig 2009, p. 293). Three ways are repeatedly discussed to weaken the veto power of the Federal Council:

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9  Institutional Counterweights: Features of Negotiation Democracy

• To no longer measure majorities by the number of members of the Federal Council, but to consider relative majorities as sufficient2; • To reduce the scope of matters requiring approval according to the current constitutional situation (which was done with the financial reform of 2006); • To directly elect the members of the Federal Council from the people in the states and give them a free mandate (Schmidt 2006, pp. 327, 349). All three require amendments to the Basic Law, for which a two-thirds majority of the Federal Council itself is also required. The third solution would also require the highly unlikely consent of the state governments to their own expulsion from the Federal Council.

9.2 Federal Constitutional Court: Guardian and Shaper of the Constitution a. The development of constitutional jurisdiction In the context of classical separation of powers theory, it is only the task of the judiciary to check reality against the given standard of set law and to judge it. It thus represents a “kind of judicial executive” (Robert Leicht). However, the Supreme Court of the USA has asserted a far-reaching function since 1803, namely the judicial review of laws with regard to their conformity with the constitution. Peter Graf Kielmansegg (2013, pp. 161, 163) speaks of this “practice of constitutional power in permanence” as a “fourth power in its own right”. Since the First, and to a greater extent since the Second World War, a constitutional-oriented review right in the wake of the USA or a special constitutional jurisdiction in the wake of the Austrian model (1920) has also spread to other states (Brünneck 1988, pp. 221 ff.; Brünneck 1992). At present, there is a constitutional jurisdiction in 174 states, including 85 with a special constitutional court like in Germany, 53 with a judicial review right of the supreme court like in the USA, and 36 with a mixed system (Bernauer et al. 2015, p. 491). In Europe, the special constitutional court prevails (Hönnige 2007, pp. 103 ff.; Kneip 2008, pp. 635 ff.). Different procedural types are admissible, in Germany all except for a preventive-abstract control of norms, i.e. procedures against a law not yet proclaimed

2 This

absolute majority rule is unusual in federal states with bicameralism, only still valid in Belgium within Europe (Sturm 2015, p. 82).

9.2  Federal Constitutional Court: Guardian and Shaper …

283

(Steinsdorff 2010, p. 487). While the American Supreme Court only checks the constitutionality of laws in the context of specific cases of litigation as a general supreme court of appeal, the German Federal Constitutional Court (“Bundesverfassungsgericht”) serves only the constitutional jurisdiction (Bryde 1982, p. 100). The idea that democracy does not exhaust itself in majority rule, but that certain principles must remain beyond its reach, plays a central role in the constitutional thinking of the Federal Republic of Germany—after the traumatic experiences with anti-democratic currents of the Weimar period. This corresponds to the position of the Federal Constitutional Court. On application, it also checks the constitutionality of norms independently of individual cases. Overall, its competence was considered “the most comprehensive” (Laufer 1970)3 internationally at times. It is “often considered a model and role model” (Schlaich and Korioth 2015, p. 4) internationally. As a federal state, Germany also knows constitutional courts for the individual federal states in addition. b. Institution and personnel of the constitutional court The Federal Constitutional Court is constituted as an independent constitutional body with constitutionally secured competences (Art. 93–94, 98 ff. GG) and its own administration. The special position of the court is reflected in the appointment of the eight judges of each of its two senates, the so-called Basic Rights Senate and the State Constitutional Court. They are elected by the Bundestag (represented by a twelve-member election committee) and the Bundesrat (represented by the state justice ministers) with a two-thirds majority. According to the Federal Constitutional Court Act (as of 11 August 1993, last amended on 20 November 2019), anyone who is at least 40 years old and has the judicial qualification, i.e. full legal training, is eligible for election4. They are elected for a term of twelve years (up to the age of 68 at the most) with no possibility of re-election, with three judges in each senate being former judges of the federal supreme courts. The aim is to counteract self-selection of the judiciary by political bodies as electoral college, political majority decision by election by two different political bodies and the requirement of a two-thirds majority, lay judgments by the requirement of full legal training, opportunistic majority orientation of incumbent constitutional

3 In

the meantime, Spain and Hungary have introduced a similarly strong constitutional jurisdiction in the wake of Germany. 4 Non-lawyers are often eligible to be state constitutional judges, as the SPD originally wanted for the federal level (Schlaich and Korioth 2015, p. 28; Wesel 2004, pp. 38 ff.).

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9  Institutional Counterweights: Features of Negotiation Democracy

judges by the ban on re-election (since 1971), to promote judicial experience and distance from politics by a secure proportion of professional judges. These requirements, which restrict political selection, form a strong “filter” in favour of quality assurance (Steinsdorff 2009, pp. 287, 291) by comparison with other European countries. They are by no means widespread elsewhere, “often a simple majority in the first or second chamber of parliament is sufficient for election” (Kneip 2016, p. 367). This is based on the thesis that restrictions on majority decisions, even eligibility requirements, contradict democratic principles. Even if, as elsewhere, the election of constitutional judges in Germany takes place through political bodies, there are nevertheless unusually strong obstacles here to the implementation of purely party-political selection criteria and political majorities. Expertise seems to be given relatively high value in German constitutional law thinking (Hailbronner 2015, p. 40). Nevertheless, the composition of each judicial office in Germany is also a political issue, which often cannot be resolved without conflicts and compromises, mostly fought out in informal and protracted negotiations (Helms 1999, p. 148). Complaints have been made about the practice of a “undemocratic and completely opaque procedure” for the selection of judges, in which, instead of the Bundestag or Bundesrat, small, confidential committees elect the judges (Landfried 2015, pp. 374 ff.). Since no one has been able to impose themselves on either of the two major parties so far, they have divided the seats equally between themselves, thus creating informal “hereditary fiefdoms” (Schlaich and Korioth 2015, p. 31; Vanberg 2005, pp. 83 ff.). This could soon be a thing of the past with the decline of the major parties. Public election is practised in the USA. However, there are several arguments against public assessment of people who are not politicians and have not put themselves forward as candidates. It is also important that Art. 94 GG excludes the election of members of the Bundestag, the Bundesrat and the federal government as well as corresponding state bodies, but according to the prevailing opinion a smooth transition is possible—as was the case in 2011 when electing a Prime Minister. Ten of the 16 judicial positions could be filled by politicians. They would only have to give up their previous office the day before. The professional background of the federal constitutional judges elected in this way is given in Table 9.3 Information. For 2022, one gets a clear picture, since seven of the seven judges and nine women judges were mainly active in research and teaching, six at a federal court and three in politics: the president of the Federal Constitutional Court Stephan Harbarth (previously in the parliamentary group of the Union in the Bundestag), Peter Müller (former prime minister of Saarland) and Peter Huber (for a short time Thuringia’s interior minister, actually university professor). The failure of the civil servants, who are most likely

9.2  Federal Constitutional Court: Guardian and Shaper …

285

Table 9.3   The origin of the federal constitutional judges. In percent of the constitutional judges or senate members

Profession at the time of the elec- 1951–83 tion:

2022 Party affiliation: 1975–2000 In total 1.Senate 2. Senate

Judge

30.2

37.5

CDU/CSU

31.7

27.4

36.0

Lawyer

15.1

0

SPD

34.3

37.4

31.2

FDP

5.1

6.0

4.3

Civil servant

32.1

0

Professor

13.2

43.8

Politician

18.9

18.7

Association activity

3.8

0

Sources: Landfried (1984, p. 44); Wagschal (2001, p. 881); Federal Constitutional Court (2022).

to have the administrative implementation of judgments in view—for example, mass individual case-by-case examinations in Hartz-IV money or asylum applications—seems regrettable. The party affiliations of the judges who held office from 1951 to 1983 reflect the political conditions of the time. According to the status of 2022, three judges each are appointed on the proposal of the SPD or the Union as well as one judge of the FDP or one judge of the Greens in the First Senate, four judges in the Second Senate on the proposal of the Union, three on the proposal of the SPD and one on the proposal of the Greens. The composition results from the fact that the large parties granted a seat to their smaller coalition partner (Kneip 2009, pp. 195 ff.). The jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional Court (Table 9.4) includes the binding decision • in disputes between constitutional organs (e.g. between the Bundestag and the Länder); • on the constitutionality of laws, other legal norms and individual decisions (constitutional review, constitutional complaint); • on measures to safeguard democracy (principle of the rule of law). Quantitatively, constitutional complaints by citizens far outweigh other matters. In these cases, the Court is often called upon as a supreme appellate court. Most of the other proceedings are constitutional review proceedings, which in turn predominantly concern questions of economic, social, professional and tax law.

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9  Institutional Counterweights: Features of Negotiation Democracy

Table 9.4   Jurisdictions and practice of the Federal Constitutional Court. Decisions from 1951 to 31 December 2019

Subject

Basis

Applicants

Number of decisions

Constitutional disputes between constitutional organs (organizational dispute, federal-state dispute) Norm control

Art. 93 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 Federal organs, state 166 und 3; Art. 84 Abs. 4 governments, possibly parties Nr. 2 GG

Art. 93 Abs. 1 No. a) “Abstract” norm control (compatibility 2 GG of legal norms with the Basic Law or federal law)

Federal government, 120 state governments, 1/4 of the Bundestag

Art. 100 Abs. 1 GG b) “ Concrete” norm control (in the concrete case: compatibility of legal norms with the Basic Law) Constitutional complaints

All courts (in case of 1361 doubt)

After exhausting the nor- Art. 93 Abs. 1 No. 4 a Everyone (affected citizens and municimal legal process, review and b GG palities) of law and decisions for compliance with the Basic Law Democracy and rule of law a) party ban proceedings and (since 2017) exclusion from party financing

Art. 21 para. 2 and (since 2017) 3 GG

210 567 (dar 206 450 by committees/ chambers)

Federal Parliament, 6 Federal Council, Federal Government; State Governments 3

b) forfeiture of fundamen- Art. 18 GG tal rights

Bundestag, federal government; state governments

c) impeachment of the president

2/3 majority of Bun- 0 destag and Bundesrat

Art. 61 GG

d) indictment against fed- Art. 98 para. 2 and eral or state judges 5 GG

Bundestag or state parliament

0 (continued)

9.2  Federal Constitutional Court: Guardian and Shaper …

287

Table 9.4   (continued)

Subject

Basis

Applicants

Number of decisions

e) Election review procedure

Art. 41 Abs. 2 GG

Affected members of 321 parliament, voters, Parts of the Bundestag

Overall (incl. other procedures)

215,500

Other matters (withdrawal of complaints, lawsuits, etc.)

24,522

Source: Federal Constitutional Court (2021). Excluded are matters disposed of in other ways.

Given the number of only 16 Federal Constitutional Court judges, these are threatened to drown in a flood of constitutional complaints. This is countered by committees or chambers of fewer judges who can dismiss complaints without justification and, since recently, also grant them if this is in line with the established jurisprudence of the court. The overwhelming majority of constitutional complaints are dismissed by such chambers, only the rest is heard, and at the end only 2.3% of the complaints filed are successful5. The desire to file a constitutional complaint is also dampened by fees for “abuse”. Nevertheless, the overload leaves its mark: weaker formulations and unconsidered aspects. This is particularly due to the “chamber jurisprudence” and preliminary work by scientific staff6. c. The political relevance of jurisprudence The importance of the court is visible in its sensational judgments: 1. On the political order: Usually invoked by the opposition, the court has repeatedly ruled against the wishes of the ruling majority. After the longstanding dispute over the defense contribution of the Federal Republic had led to fruitless lawsuits by the SPD opposition and successful lawsuits by the

5  Annual

statistics 2016 of the Federal Constitutional Court, in: www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de (Accessed 23. 12. 2017). 6 Hans H. Klein, Das Parlament im Verfassungsstaat, Tübingen 2006, p. 437; FAZ, 24. 8. 1995.

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9  Institutional Counterweights: Features of Negotiation Democracy

federal government against referendums on nuclear armament (Laufer 1968, pp. 379 ff., 435 ff.), then a lawsuit by the Hessian SPD government provoked the television ruling of 1961, which declared a federal television station unconstitutional and established principles for media structures that are still valid today. Notable since German unification are judgments in favor of: changes in party financing (1992), “out of area” deployments of the Bundeswehr with the consent of the Bundestag (1994), a classification of traffic blockades not as violence (1995), the admissibility of overhang mandates without offsetting (1997), the unconstitutionality of the joint administration of Hartz IV by municipalities and the Federal Employment Agency (2007), increased parliamentary involvement in the German representation in the Council of the EU (2009). In 2017, the court rejected a ban on the NPD because it was anti-constitutional but unsuccessful. It referred a lawsuit against the ECB’s bond-buying program to the European Court of Justice for a “preliminary ruling”. In the first case, it switched to the line of the European Court of Justice, in the second it awaited its opinion. It is clear that the court has lost autonomy7. 2. To the economic and social order: Here, the court has mostly been active due to constitutional complaints. It has also decided on fundamental questions. Decisions that seem noteworthy include the investment aid ruling of 1954 (which underlined the economic and social policy neutrality of the Basic Law), rulings on the balancing of property rights and public interests, the pharmacy ruling of 1958 (freedom of establishment), and rulings of 1954 and 1964 on wage policy, which set the framework for the German system of collective bargaining agreements (BVerfG 1954; BVerfG 1958; BVerfG 1964). Since German reunification, the following rulings can be considered outstanding: in favor of equal notice periods for workers and employees (BVerfG 1990), the continued validity of expropriations in the Soviet Zone 1945–49 (BVerfG 1991a), the permissibility of proportionate lockouts (BVerfG 1991b), “the tax-exempt minimum subsistence level” (BVerfG 1992) and thus (Menzel 2000, pp. 654 ff.) indirectly also in favor of higher child allowances also for married parents (1998), the unconstitutionality of a wealth tax that treats unequally (1995), a restricted inheritance tax on business assets (2014). In 2021, Karlsruhe declared the Berlin rent cap to be incompatible with the Basic Law. 3. To social coexistence: Several rulings on the equality of men and women (pension law), a ruling on abortion (1975), rulings on the balancing of the

7 On

judgments concerning the design of democracy, see Wöhst (2017).

9.2  Federal Constitutional Court: Guardian and Shaper …

289

freedom of expression and other rights are of importance. Rulings that are considered relevant may be those that contributed to the democratization of social areas, in which, in the case of co-determination, property rights, in the case of university constitution, academic freedom, were to be taken into account as limiting legal goods. A ruling of 1989 (BVerfG 1989) on asylum law, which defines the concept of political persecution, also belongs here. In united Germany, there were rulings in favor of taking partner income into account when claiming unemployment benefits (1992), for abortion, according to which the right to life of the unborn is to be “maintained and strengthened in public awareness”, without having to enforce it with penalties (BVerfG 1993); for the possession of small amounts of hashish without penalty (1994), for the right to say “soldiers are murderers” (1994), for spousal splitting also for homosexual couples (2013), for a ban on headscarves for teachers in schools only if there is otherwise a “concrete danger” to school peace (2015). In 2017, a ruling was issued that is to make the award of medical study places less dependent on the final grade than before—with possible consequences for other subjects. In 2020, the Federal Constitutional Court even defined suicide as a human right, according to which “the general right to personality as an expression of personal autonomy includes the right to take one’s own life, to seek help from third parties for this purpose and, if offered, to avail oneself of it” (BVerfG 2020). And in 2021, the judges declared the regulations of the Climate Protection Act to be insufficient (BVerfG 2021). Constitutional jurisdiction does not only belong to the realm of politics by virtue of its subject matter. Rather, because the Basic Law—like other constitutions— does not represent a “complete system of norms” with ready-made answers to every problem, it always has to make precarious constitutional interpretations (Kimminich 1979, pp. 73 ff.), i.e. • question the intention and meaning of a norm (telos), • make trade-offs between conflicting norms (interdependence), • concretize general norms (interpolation), take into account the change in social reality (Hesse 1976, pp. 19, 22 ff.). In the interpretation of general norms, the Federal Constitutional Court often develops more specific “intermediate norms”, for example a right to data protection (“informational self-determination”), to suicide or to a minimum subsistence level that is to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Interpretations that place individual articles in the context of the Basic Law inevitably lead the F ­ ederal

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Constitutional Court beyond mere constitutional application into an active shaping role. On the other hand, it “finds it difficult to collect evidence” (Lepsius 2011, pp. 176, 207, 214, 231)—just think of the judgments on the continued validity of the expropriations in the Soviet Zone, for which Gorbachev’s statement was not clarified. Here the limits of the court become visible. In summary, the well-known constitutional scholar Rudolf Smend (cited according to Lembcke 2004, p. 396) therefore stated that the “Basic Law now practically applies as the Federal Constitutional Court interprets it”. d. Justiciability of politics? German constitutional jurisdiction opens itself up to its inclusion in the political process because abstract norm control (unlike in the USA) makes it possible for a political minority to transform a political conflict directly into a constitutional procedure (Kommers 1994, p. 474). As a result, the respective opposition tends to help its views to victory by going to Karlsruhe—sometimes the “anticipated process to Karlsruhe” (Grotz and Schroeder 2021, p. 339) is enough. Around twothirds of abstract norm control procedures and constitutional disputes arise from opposition lawsuits, especially those filed by state governments. Between 1951 and 1999 the latter were more successful in winning lawsuits (32.3% complete success and further 30% partial success) than lawsuits filed by opposition parliamentarians (20% and 17%). Measured by the number of their lawsuits, the CDU/ CSU opposition did better than the SPD, which sued more often (Stüwe 2001, pp. 162 ff.). Also for the future, an “instrumentalization” of the Federal Constitutional Court by the opposition is being diagnosed (Stüwe 2006, p. 227). Forty percent of high-ranking political decisions of the Bundestag were referred to the court (Beyme 1997, p. 302). It has declared invalid or incompatible with the Basic Law no less than 198 federal laws (in addition to other legal norms) from 1951–90, and given a constitutional interpretation to further laws. In total, about five percent of all federal laws fell under the guillotine of the court (Landfried 1995, p. 308). Also in 1990–2012, the court annulled an average of 9.8 norms per year (Kneip 2015, p. 277). This inevitably radiates on the political process and leads to a constant sidelong glance at how Karlsruhe might react. This “judicialization of politics” (Loewenstein 1969) also leads to the prospect of an increasing number of valid and increasingly comprehensive judgments over time, so that “a progressive restriction of legislative action” would follow in the end (Laufer 1968, p. 23). If the Federal Constitutional Court went beyond the constitutional review of the concrete case presented in its judgments, i.e. if it expressed itself on further questions or sketched a constitutional solution itself (e.g. judgments on university, abortion, party financing and child allowance), this

9.2  Federal Constitutional Court: Guardian and Shaper …

291

would further intensify this constricting development and raise it to the level of the “substitute legislator” (Landfried 1990, p. 88). In fact, areas of politics such as media, party financing and labour law are largely shaped by judge-made law, to name just a few “guidelines” for future inheritance tax, asylum law, child benefit, combating terrorism and wearing headscarves (Weidenfeld 2017, pp. 109 ff.). Even if many of the solutions formulated by the court appear to be well thought out and welcome, especially when the legislator is personally affected (questions of salaries, party financing), the arguments speak in favour of a reserved approach to adjudication. Respect for the principle of democracy requires “abstinence” from the court, as even its former president once put it (Limbach 2001, p. 55). Of course, the court is limited in that it can only deal with a topic if it is sued. It can also only review the constitutionality, not the expediency, of a regulation. However, it shows restraint of its own accord when, in judgments, it only recognises partial unconstitutionality of a regulation or tries to give it a constitutional, but binding, interpretation. The fact that the court has not always considered a “judicial review” of the factual situation to be possible can be seen as a form of selfrestriction (or refusal to act?)—as in the case of the Schleyer kidnapping in 1977 and the expropriations in 1945–49 in the Soviet Zone (Säcker et al. 1999, p. 23). It is also criticised that what continues in constitutional adjudication is merely party politics in disguise. Allegations of political bias on the part of the judges, a “deficit of reality” with the consequence of really unrealistic application of norms (Zweigert 1976, pp. 74 ff.)—this and similar criticisms are levelled. However, the party affiliations of the judges should not be overestimated. They are generally not very pronounced in those who come from judicial or academic careers. This could change if the appointment of federal judges became more politicised. In addition, the two-thirds majority required for election makes it more difficult for fanatical party members to gain access. Moreover, the elevated and secure position as a federal constitutional judge, usually the culmination of a personal career, reduces temptations to take political considerations into account (Bryde 1982, pp. 178 ff.). Everyone knows: “This is my last office,” from which my image will be shaped.8 On the other hand, it is true that the personnel composition of the Federal Constitutional Court is determined by political forces and that political constellations are also reflected in judgments. As mentioned, for a long time the two major parties each had half of the seats. The resulting 4:4 ratio in both senates either led

8 A

judge said this (Kranenpohl 2010, p. 457).

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to a blockade or to a compromise—the latter at least to the extent that the transfer of at least one judge from the other side is necessary. This basic constellation explains the compromising, not always elegant, but peace-making judgments that the Federal Constitutional Court has made over the course of its history. It seeks consensus (Kranenpohl 2010, p. 181, 329), often moves on a line of the middle and served as a mediation committee between the major political forces. Coalition politics can modify this picture. For a long time, the participation of a judge proposed by the FDP in socio-cultural value issues has created a “left” majority (4 SPD plus 1 FDP proposal) in the First Senate (the Basic Rights Senate). This is likely to explain its practice in the “soldiers are murderers” judgment and the “blockade is no violence” judgment (Wewer 1991, p. 333). Beyond a change of personnel, this constellation persisted and in 2006 led to a corresponding majority judgment against Bavarian regulations. Currently, seven judges owe their office to the nomination by the Union, six by the SPD, two by the Greens, one by the FDP. Concerned voices, also from the Constitutional Court, mean that a left (or right) majority would not be good for the public acceptance of the court. These could be tendencies that sometimes prevent the court from being seen as the “public protector of a more comprehensive idea of just society” with the Basic Law as a “roadmap” (Hailbronner 2015, p. 44)—covered by an incorrect interpretation of the Basic Law in the sense of a society-changing mission. In political science, the functions of control, further development of the constitution, integration and legitimation, but also a “substitute legislation” (if the legislature does not act) are assigned to the German constitutional law (Kranenpohl 2004, p. 44). All in all, three main effects of the Federal Constitutional Court on the political process can be observed: 1. It has proven itself as an institution that protects the constitution and limits power, and thus plays a stabilizing role for the political system. High levels of trust that it achieves in polls are beneficial for German democracy as a whole. 2. However, the expansive reach of its jurisprudence occasionally restricts the scope of the parliamentary majority quite considerably. One problematic consequence is the legislature’s premature obedience to the constitutional guardian, another is the occasional tendency to “pass the buck” to the Constitutional Court (Schlaich and Korioth 2015, p. 385)—as was once the case in Weimar with the Reich President. 3. The court, previously a quasi-parity body of the major political parties, generally reaches compromise verdicts and often hovers near the political center. In this respect, it is another institution, alongside the Bundesrat, which

9.2  Federal Constitutional Court: Guardian and Shaper …

293

s­ trengthens the negotiating democratic features of the federal republic. However, in socio-cultural matters, there is also a tendency towards interpretations of fundamental rights that are hardly likely to be close to the political center.

9.3 The Federal President: Potentially More Than Just a Representative? a. The trimmed presidential office According to the Weimar Constitution of 1919, which did not rely solely on parliament, the Reich President held the position of a quasi-replacement emperor: Elected directly by the people for seven years and thus endowed with a democratic legitimacy independent of parliament, the Reich President had supreme command of the Reichswehr, appointed and dismissed the Reich Chancellor and—on his proposal—the Reich Ministers. In addition, he was entitled to dissolve the Reichstag and to issue emergency decrees (Art. 41 ff. WRV). Even if the President sometimes needed the countersignature of members of the Reich government, the Weimar Republic is to be classified as a semi-presidential democracy (like the Fifth Republic of France). This concept with a strong president did not at all stem from an authoritarian way of thinking and actually proved to be stabilizing for the politically torn and endangered Weimar democracy—also under the presidency of Hindenburg until 1932. However, later the memory prevailed that in 1925 the people had elected the former Field Marshal as Reich President and that he had used his powers in a disastrous way from 1932 on (Rudzio 1999, pp. 49 f.)9, culminating in Hitler’s appointment as Reich Chancellor, in the “Ordinance of February 4” and in the Reichstag Fire Decree of February 28, 1933. Against this background, there was wide agreement during the constitutional consultations of 1948/49 that one did not want such a presidential position again. So the basic decision for a consistently parliamentary government system also implied the weakening of the head of state. The Federal President received neither supreme command nor emergency powers. Similarly, the other presidential functions were cut back as far as possible—with the result that the President in the history of the Federal Republic has so far only formally fulfilled the role of

9 Of

Art. 48 WRV (emergency decree power) Ebert made use of 133 times from 1919 to 1924, Hindenburg only 67 times from 1930 to 1932 (Hartmann and Kempf 1988, pp. 18 f.).

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representative of the state. But in political crises, his or her role could extend further. The Federal President—“Representative or politician?” (Winkler 1967) This is the point: whether he has independent political options. Several political scientists even consider it superfluous (Höreth 2015, p. 307). The reduced democratic legitimacy appears to be the fundamental reason for the comparatively weak position of the Federal President. Instead of being directly elected by the people, he/she is elected by the members of the Bundestag and an equal number of representatives of the state parliaments (together: the Federal Assembly) for a period of five years (Art. 54 GG). A majority of the members of the Federal Assembly is required for his election, in the third ballot the relative majority is sufficient. The previous presidential elections (Table 9.5) show that the office has indeed been filled by the political majority on a party-political basis. All elected candidates—with the exception of Köhler and Gauck—were previously active politicians. Most incumbents owed their initial election to a government majority or an opposition majority and, often only narrowly, prevailed against competing candidates. Steinmeier, previously Foreign Minister, supported by the Grand Coalition, had four opponents in his election and received only slightly more votes in 2017 than the SPD, CDU and CSU counted. Only for von Weizsäcker and Gauck as well as for re-elections there were larger majorities. From his assumption of office, the Federal President would therefore hardly be a counterweight to the parliamentary majority. b. Presidential Competencies: Between State Notary and Political Actor It is less the view of practice than the view of the constitution that allows us to see which competences the Federal President has. In the context of the parliamentary government system of the Federal Republic of Germany, it is primarily about “reserve functions” similar to those of the English king or queen, i.e. functions that only become virulent in the event of a failure or weakness of other constitutional organs (Kaltefleiter 1970, pp. 33, 48 ff.). Thus, Federal President Steinmeier—“I expect everyone to be ready to talk” (The Federal President 2017)—contributed to bringing an end to the impasse after the 2017 federal election, when the Jamaica talks were abruptly broken off (Jesse 2018). So in times of clear parliamentary majorities, the Federal President only has a “notarial” (Roman Herzog) or “certification” function (Klaus Stern) (Schlaich 1987, pp. 551 ff.). This becomes visible first of all in his/her role in government formation. According to Art. 63 GG, the Federal Chancellor is elected by the Bundestag on the proposal of the Federal President. This means that if the Bundestag were to reject the candidate proposed by the Federal President and then elect

9.3  The Federal President: …

295

Table 9.5   The election of the Federal President

Election year

Elected candidate (party)

Number of votes Number of (election) members of the Federal Assembly

Main opponent

1949

Prof. Theodor Heuß (FDP)

416 (2.WG)

804

Dr. Kurt Schumacher (SPD)

1954

Prof. Theodor Heuß (FDP)

871 (1.WG)

1018

(Prof. Alfred Weber)

1959

Heinrich Lübke (CDU)

526 (2.WG)

1038

Prof. Carlo Schmid (SPD)

1964

Heinrich Lübke (CDU)

710 (1.WG)

1042

Ewald Bucher (FDP)

1969

Dr. Gustav Heinemann (SPD)

512 (3.WG)

1036

Dr. Gerhard Schröder (CDU)

1974

Walter Scheel (FDP)

530 (1.WG)

1036

Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker (CDU)

1979

Prof. Karl Carstens (CDU)

528 (1.WG)

1036

Annemarie Renger (SPD)

1984

Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker (CDU)

832 (1.WG)

1040

Luise Rinser (für die Grünen)

1989

Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker (CDU)

881 (1.WG)

1038

–

1994

Prof. Roman Her- 696 (3.WG) zog (CDU)

1324

Johannes Rau (SPD)

1999

Johannes Rau (SPD)

690 (2.WG)

1338

Prof. Dagmar Schipanski (CDU/CSU)

2004

Dr. Horst Köhler 604 (1.WG) (CDU)

1205

Prof. Gesine Schwan (SPD)

2009

Dr. Horst Köhler 613 (1.WG) (CDU)

1224

Prof. Gesine Schwan (SPD)

2010

Christian Wulff (CDU)

1244

Joachim Gauck (für SPD, Grüne)

625 (3.WG)

(continued)

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9  Institutional Counterweights: Features of Negotiation Democracy

Table 9.5   (continued)

Election year

Elected candidate (party)

Number of votes Number of (election) members of the Federal Assembly

Main opponent

2012

Joachim Gauck

991 (1. WG)

1240

Beate Klarsfeld (for Linke)

2017

Dr. Frank Walter 931 (1. WG) Steinmeier (SPD)

1260

Prof. Christoph Butterwegge (for Linke)

2022

Dr. Frank Walter 1 045 Steinmeier (SPD)

1425

Prof. Dr. Gerhard Trabert (for Linke)

Source: Scholz and Süskind (2004, pp. 37 ff.); newspaper reports.

one from its midst, the Federal President would have to orient himself/herself to the majority of the Bundestag. Corresponding preliminary talks with representatives of the parliamentary factions are therefore common, always conducted by federal presidents in this sense. The appointment of the Federal Chancellor, which the Federal President has to make, then only has a formal character. It could only be refused in the event of an unconstitutional election. Even if a candidate with anti-constitutional views were to be elected, the Federal President would probably call on the Federal Constitutional Court. The same applies if, on the proposal of the Federal Chancellor, he/she appoints and dismisses the Federal Ministers (Art. 64 GG). Regardless of this, he/she is free to raise political or moral concerns informally. The Federal President does not even have a political examination right in the appointment of officials. According to Art. 60 GG, he/she does indeed appoint and dismiss federal judges, federal officials and soldiers (by law only those of higher rank), but this requires the countersignature of the competent government members and, as they assume political responsibility, only their decision in practice. More than a refusal on formal legal grounds is not available to him/her here, even if the first two federal presidents—Heuß and Lübke—were able to successfully ward off appointments on political-moral grounds in individual cases. In most cases, this was about Nazi affiliations (Morsey 1996, pp. 236 ff.).10 10 This

was probably not just about membership of the NSDAP. This also applied to the federal presidents Scheel and Carstens (Winter 2004, p. 163).

9.3  The Federal President: …

297

The role of the Federal President in the legislative process is no different. In order for a passed law to be proclaimed, Art. 82 GG requires its execution (signature). He/She can only issue a law if competent government members (Federal Chancellor and competent ministerial department heads) countersign. Accordingly, the presidential examination right in legislation is determined: The Federal President may not refuse the act of execution of the signature for political, but— according to undisputed and practiced opinion—only for legal reasons, which relate to • the procedural correctness of the previous legislative procedure, or • the conformity of the content of the law with the constitution. In the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, presidents have only vetoed eight laws in this way (Rütters 2011, pp. 872f.). In 1976, President Scheel vetoed a law on conscientious objection due to lack of consent from the Bundesrat, and in 1962 President Lübke vetoed a law on employee trading due to a violation of the right to free choice of profession. At the beginning of 1991, President von Weizsäcker refused to sign a law on privatisation of air traffic control because, according to the Basic Law, such sovereign tasks should lie with the public service. Köhler refused to sign a new regulation of air traffic control and a law on consumer information (Strohmeier 2018, pp. 180f.). Although Frank Walter Steinmeier did not generally refuse to sign two laws in 2020 (Combating Hate Crime and Right-Wing Extremism; Restructuring of Customs), he suspended the procedures—a novelty in German legislation, the constitutionality of which was disputed. Critics argued that the President was only allowed to finally reject unconstitutional laws, not to suspend the procedure. The reason for Steinmeier’s step was a ruling from Karlsruhe that came too late for the legislature—he wanted to spare the Bundestag from embarrassment. The President does not take on the role of a replacement Constitutional Court. Such a role would overwhelm him/her and his/her staff. If a law as a whole appears to be unconstitutional, he/she should not simply have it proclaimed. He/ She can only filter out the most blatant, obvious constitutional violations and primarily act as a “guardian of procedural rules” (Kaltefleiter 1970, pp. 260ff.). This is why President Rau was also able to sign the Immigration Act in 2002, even though the unconstitutional way it came about was hardly in doubt. This is quite different in a crisis, when presidential reserve functions are of great importance. In the event of an external emergency, if Parliament cannot convene, the powers of the Bundestag and Bundesrat are transferred to the Joint Committee of both, while the President remains in his/her notary role. However,

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in the other form of crisis mentioned in the Basic Law—lack of parliamentary majority—he/she mutates into an important political actor. If the Bundestag does not elect a Chancellor with an absolute, but only a relative majority of its members, the President has the alternative of appointing him/her within seven days or dissolving the Bundestag for the purpose of new elections (Art. 63 para. 4 GG). Similarly, if an incumbent Chancellor or Chancellor fails to find a majority in a vote of confidence in the Bundestag and suggests to the President the dissolution of the Bundestag: The President can reject this proposal or follow it within 21 days—unless the Bundestag has meanwhile elected a new Chancellor or Chancellor with the majority of its members. In both cases, the President therefore has to make a political decision on how to find a way out of the parliamentary crisis: whether new elections are likely to lead to an acceptable majority or whether it is better to stay with an incumbent minority government (cf. Chap. 7/Fig. 7.2). In political constellations such as 1930–33, he/she would therefore have made important decisions. In a similar critical situation, Federal President Steinmeier would have been confronted for the first time in 2017/18, had he not actively moved the party leaders to form a majority coalition. But there have also been situations in the past in which the Federal President came into play and made political decisions: in the three votes of confidence in which the Chancellor deliberately brought about his defeat in order to achieve early elections: in 1972 in the face of a parliamentary impasse, in 1983 when Kohl saw no stable majority, and in 2005 when Chancellor Schröder put the question of confidence (cf. above Sect. 7.3b). In all cases, the respective Federal President decided in favour of new elections. However, he could also have held on to an incumbent minority Chancellor or appointed a Chancellor candidate with only a relative majority and, if this failed with a bill proposed as urgent in parliament, declared the “legislative emergency” under Art. 81 GG on the application of the Federal Government and with the consent of the Bundesrat. For six months it is then possible to pass laws rejected by the Bundestag alone with the consent of the Federal Government and the Bundesrat. The Federal President would then appear as a decision-making actor, who could of course only practice the state of emergency in cooperation with the Federal Government and the Bundesrat. A presidential regime of the Weimar type would be excluded. But the Basic Law does not shy away from regulations for the case where parliament is unable to act, the heartbeat of parliamentary democracy stops, but action must be taken. Given the departure from the semi-presidential system, this role in crisis justifies the office.

9.3  The Federal President: …

299

c. Representative function: integration or spiritual leadership? In normal times, only formal powers of the President remain. Nevertheless, his/ her representative function seems interesting to him/her—the public appearance on ceremonial occasions, the representation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the outside in international law, also the award of orders11. He/she is given scope by his/her public speeches and addresses, which do not require prior examination or approval. Here he/she is free, can morally admonish, recommend or demand what is popular or publicly hardly contestable (Rausch 1979, pp. 111 ff.), without being responsible for its implementation. In this way, he/she can express general moods, gain popularity and influence public opinion. In summary: In terms of powers (“potestas”), the Federal President has little (except in crisis), in terms of influential, personal authority (“auctoritas”), “he [or she] can gain a lot” (Patzelt 2012, p. 155). However, this only goes so far as he does not violate his/her role as an integration symbol. If a federal president exceeds this invisible boundary, he/she takes sides in controversial issues, thus risking counter-statements and endangering the expected integration function. The office of former federal presidents was therefore predominantly characterized by distance to day-to-day political conflicts. To the extent that this allows the sober political culture of the Federal Republic, integrative effects of the office have indeed developed. The holders of office always achieve a high degree of popularity, the office is positively assessed by citizens12. Such an integration, which makes it possible to gain reputation across political borders, is functional in so far as it can help to increase acceptance of his/her decisions in times of crisis. The role of the public speaker can, as the example of President von Weizsäcker shows, also extend further. Weizsäcker, although a member of the CDU, rather left-liberal oriented, during his presidency not only criticized the policy of the Kohl government from time to time, but also tried to influence the general mood in the country. Exemplary were his speech on the 40th anniversary of the day of the German capitulation, in which he interpreted the 8th of May 1945 as the “day of liberation”, as well as his severe criticism of the parties and party politicians (Scholz 1992, pp. 453–62; Weizsäcker 1992, pp. 139, 146 ff.). To his credit were polished rhetoric and media applause, which was given to the

11 Even

in the latter, he does not act autonomously, since his orders and dispositions according to Art. 58 GG require the countersignature of the Federal Chancellor or the competent Minister. 12 For the early Federal Republic see Schmidtchen (1977, p. 235).

300

9  Institutional Counterweights: Features of Negotiation Democracy

left-liberal. He himself finally propagated the direct election of the President, and his office has been brought to the formula “authority without power” (Dönhoff 1990). Presidency, although without competences in calm times, but as spiritual leadership was here as a possibility. However, such an exercise of office would rub against the logic of parliamentary democracy. President Köhler not only wanted to represent and integrate, but also to “motivate” and help the country out of its crisis (Köhler 2004, pp. 127 and 194). But he, the economist, was criticized as the “prisoner of a narrow economic thinking”, he, who described his motivation as “gratitude towards Germany and the concern for the future of our children”, was given too national a view of history (Langguth 2007, pp. 227, 299, 307). Integrating and moving seem to be difficult to combine. In addition, he remained “foreign” to the political class (Langguth 2012, p. 281) and withdrew despite re-election. It is noteworthy that the major parties—after the failure of the presidency of a party politician in the meantime—with the election of Gauck once again turned to a candidate who is politically close but does not come from the professional class of politicians—in this sense an “outsider” (Schwarz 2012, p. 303). The election of Steinmeier means a return to the ranks of former active politicians in the presidency. His first term of office indicated that he sees himself as a “fighter for democracy” and, in view of the crisis in government formation, acts actively but discreetly. Nevertheless, he sometimes comes under criticism: whether because of the suspension of two laws, because of his support for a concert (“We are more”) in September 2018, on which also a band appearing in the Verfassungsschutzbericht played.

9.4 Limits of Parliamentary Majority Rule By reducing the president to a minimum competence, one can speak of a consistently parliamentary system of government for the Federal Republic of Germany. However, other political institutions (Bundesrat, Federal Constitutional Court) have now been strengthened to such an extent that this statement appears rather formal. Because the majority in the Bundestag and the federal government are confronted with a deeply layered system of institutional checks and balances. As a result, parliament and counterweight institutions can diverge not only on the basis of different party political majorities. Rather, the view and the conditions of action of a party member as a federal judge or member of the Bundesrat remain incommensurate with those of his/her party friend in the Bundestag and

9.4  Limits of Parliamentary Majority Rule

301

the federal government. In political science, one therefore speaks of veto players, as George Tsebelis (2002, p. 19) has defined them: “Veto players are individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo.” The checks and balances have a reduced transparency of the decision-making processes and the responsibilities, potentially also risks for the operational capability of the political system as a result. Remarkably, however, this distribution of power—together with the voter drift to the center—has provoked less blockades than rather contributed to a political system whose decision output is characterized by incremental change rather than radical change. In view of the recurring phases in which the scope of action of a political majority is restricted by veto players and limited coalition possibilities, the call for institutional changes that should enable greater and more clear-cut reform steps has become louder. So the intention to reduce the veto power of the Bundesrat led to the reform of federalism. So far, only modest changes have been achieved. The system seems to remain anchored in its built-in inclination to incremental change. In the end, it is not only institutional arrangements that guarantee an appropriate functional performance of the aforementioned institutions. In addition, this requires a democratic understanding that does not exhaust itself in the majority decision, and a political culture in which party orientations are not the only determining factor. What is needed is a concentration on their task, a specific “ethos” of the members of the institutions (Kennedy 1991, pp. 6 ff., 28). Tasks such as the protection of state interests and constitutional norms may not be beyond the reach of democracy on the one hand, but on the other hand require a certain distance from party political confrontation. This is the narrow line on which power-distributing institutions can fulfill their functional meaning in democracy. They contribute to the fact that democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany has not only majority democratic, but also strong freedom- and minorityprotecting features, with the result of a negotiation-democratic imprint. Under negotiation democracy one understands a system, “in which essential decisions are not made by a majority of votes, but by way of negotiation processes” (Czada 2000, p. 23). Similar statements are made by the terms concordance and consensus democracy, even if they are associated with additional connotations. Negotiation-democratic features are based in the Federal Republic of Germany on the counterweights presented here, further on the German participatory federalism, the tariff autonomy and the proportional representation. In international comparison, Germany has therefore also been referred to as a “closet consensus democracy” (Abromeit and Stoiber 2006, p. 135).

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Hartmann, Jürgen/Kempf, Udo (1988): Staatsoberhäupter in westlichen Demokratien, Opladen. Helms, Ludger (1999): Entwicklungslinien der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der parlamentarischen Demokratie der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in: Jesse, Eckhard/Löw, Konrad (Eds.): 50 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Berlin, pp. 141 ff. Hesse, Konrad (1976): Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 9th edn., Heidelberg. Hönnige, Christoph (2007): Verfassungsgericht, Regierung und Opposition, Wiesbaden. Höreth, Marcus (2015): Vom “Kustos” zurück zum “Gestous”, in: Zohlnhöfer, Reimut/ Saalfeld, Thomas (Eds.): Politik im Schatten der Krise, Wiesbaden, pp. 303 ff. Jesse, Eckhard (2018): Die Bundestagswahl 2017 und die Regierungsbildung. Zäsur im Wahlverhalten, im Parteiensystem und in der Koalitionsbildung, in: Zeitschrift für Politik 65 (2), pp. 168 ff. Jun, Uwe (2011): Der Bundesrat und die politischen Parteien, in: ders./Leunig, Sven (Eds.): 60 Jahre Bundesrat, Baden-Baden, pp. 106 ff. Kaltefleiter, Werner (1970): Die Funktionen des Staatsoberhauptes in der parlamentarischen Demokratie, Köln. Kennedy, Ellen (1991): The Bundesbank, London. Kielmansegg, Peter Graf (2013): Die Grammatik der Freiheit. Acht Versuche über den demokratischen Verfassungsstaat, Baden-Baden. Kilper, Heiderose/Lhotta, Roland (1996): Föderalismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Opladen. Kimminich, Otto (1979): Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und das Prinzip der Gewaltenteilung, in: Kaltenbrunner, Gerd Klaus (Ed.): Auf dem Weg zum Richterstaat, Freiburg, pp. 62 ff. Kneip, Sascha (2008): Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit im Vergleich, in: Gabriel, Oscar W./ Kropp, Sabine (Eds.): Die EU-Staaten im Vergleich, 3rd edn., Wiesbaden, pp. 631 ff. Kneip, Sascha (2009): Verfassungsgerichte als demokratische Akteure, Baden-Baden. Kneip, Sascha (2015): Von rügenden Richtern und richtenden Rügen, in: Zohlnhöfer, Reimut/Saalfeld, Thomas (Eds.): Politik im Schatten der Krise, Wiesbaden, pp. 273 ff. Kneip, Sascha (2016): Verfassungsgerichte in der Vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft, in: Lauth, Hans-Joachim et al. (Eds.): Handbuch der Vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft, Wiesbaden, pp. 361 ff. Köhler, Horst (2004): “Offen will ich sein und notfalls unbequem”, 3rd edn., Hamburg. Kommers, Donald P. (1994): The Federal Constitutional Court in the German Political System, in: Comparative Political Studies/January 1994, pp. 470 ff. König, Thomas (1998): Regierungswechsel ohne politischen Wandel?, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 29 (3), pp. 478 ff. Kranenpohl, Uwe (2004): Funktionen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 50–51, pp. 39 ff. Kranenpohl, Uwe (2010): Hinter dem Schleier des Beratungsgeheimnisses, Wiesbaden. Kropp, Sabine (1997): Die Länder in der bundesstaatlichen Ordnung, in: Gabriel, Oscar W./Holtmann, Everhard (Eds.): Handbuch Politisches System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, München, pp. 245 ff. Kropp, Sabine (2006): Rot-Grün im Reformkorsett?, in: Jesse, Eckhard/Sturm, Roland (Eds.): Bilanz der Bundestagswahl 2005, Wiesbaden, pp. 235 ff.

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Kropp, Sabine (2010): Kooperativer Föderalismus und Politikverflechtung, Wiesbaden. Landfried, Christine (1984): Bundesverfassungsgericht und Gesetzgeber, Baden-Baden. Landfried, Christine (1990): Rechtspolitik, in: von Beyme, Klaus/Schmidt, Manfred G. (Eds.): Politik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Opladen, pp. 76 ff. Landfried, Christine (1995): Germany, in: Tate, C. Neal/Vallinder, Torbjörn (Eds.): The Global Expansion of Judicial Power, NY, pp. 307 ff. Landfried, Christine (2015): Die Wahl der Bundesverfassungsrichter und ihre Folgen für die Legitimität der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, in: van Ooyen, Robert Chr./Möllers, Martin H. W. (Eds.): Das Bundesverfassungsgericht im politischen System, 2nd edn., Wiesbaden, pp. 369 ff. Langguth, Gerd (2007): Horst Köhler, München. Langguth, Gerd (2012): Köhler—der scheue Patriot, in: van Ooyen, Robert Chr./Möllers, Martin H. (Eds.): Der Bundespräsident im politischen System, Wiesbaden, pp. 275 ff. Laufer, Heinz (1968): Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und politischer Prozeß, Tübingen. Laufer, Heinz (1970): Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit als politische Kontrolle, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift Sonderheft 2/1970, pp. 226 ff. Laufer, Heinz/Münch, Ursula (1997): Das föderative System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bonn. Lehmbruch, Gerhard (2000): Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat, 3rd edn., Wiesbaden. Lembcke, Oliver (2004): Hüter der Verfassung, Diss. Jena. Lepsius, Oliver (2011): Die maßstabsetzende Gewalt, in: Jestaedt, Matthias et al. (Eds.): Das entgrenzte Gericht, Berlin, pp. 159 ff. Leunig, Sven (2009): Fazit: Zweite Kammern in föderalen Systemen, in: ders. (Ed.): Handbuch Föderale Zweite Kammern, Opladen, pp. 285 ff. Lhotta, Roland (2001): Konsens und Konkurrenz in der konstitutionellen Ökonomie bikameraler Verhandlungsdemokratie, in: Oberreuter, Heinrich (Ed.): Der Deutsche Bundestag im Wandel, Wiesbaden, pp. 93 ff. Limbach, Jutta (2001): Das Bundesverfassungsgericht, München. Loewenstein, Karl (1969): Verfassungslehre, Tübingen. Morsey, Rudolf (1974): Die Entstehung des Bundesrates im Parlamentarischen Rat, in: Der Bundesrat (Ed.): Der Bundesrat als Verfassungsorgan und politische Kraft, Bad Honnef, pp. 63 ff. Morsey, Rudolf (1996): Heinrich Lübke, Paderborn. Menzel, Jörg (Ed.) (2000): Verfassungsrechtsprechung, Tübingen. Patzelt, Werner J. (2012): Warum lieben die Deutschen den Bundespräsidenten und verachten ihr Parlament?, in: van Ooyen, Robert Chr./Möllers, Martin H. (Eds.): Der Bundespräsident im politischen System, Wiesbaden, pp. 143 ff. Rausch, Heinz (1979): Der Bundespräsident, München. Rawls, John (1979): Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, Frankfurt a. M. Renzsch, Wolfgang (1989): Föderale Beziehungen im Parteienstaat. Eine Fallstudie zum Verlust politischer Handlungsmöglichkeiten, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 20 (3), pp. 331 ff. Renzsch, Wolfgang (2000): Bundesstaat oder Parteienstaat, in: Holtmann, Everhard et al. (Eds.): Zwischen Wettbewerbs- und Verhandlungsdemokratie, Wiesbaden, pp. 53 ff. Rudzio, Wolfgang (1999): The Federal Presidency, in: Helms, Ludger (Ed.): Institutions and Institutional Change in the Federal Republic of Germany, London, pp. 48 ff.

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The German Federalism

10

10.1 Federal States and State Parliamentarism a. Federalism and its functions The term “federalism” is derived from the Latin “foedus” = alliance. It prevailed because the “foederati” of the Roman Empire (permanently allied with autonomy and army succession obligations) appeared as an ancient example of what was meant (Harman 1992, p. 337). In modern political science, federalism is understood to be “two (or more) levels of government which combine elements of shared rule through common institutions and regional self-rule for the governments of the constituent units”(Watts 1996, p. 7). This means that sovereignty is shared between the federal state and the member states—in contrast to the confederation, where it remains with the member states (as in Switzerland until 1847, in the German Confederation before 1866), and to the decentralized unitary state, where it lies with the central state (examples: France, Great Britain). Functions of federalism that it is supposed to fulfill are: • the integration of units that are historically, ethnically, culturally or economically different, • a division of power that serves to protect minorities and freedom, and • a better consideration of regional differences and preferences or the realization of subsidiarity. The constitution of a federal state must answer how it distributes legislative and executive competences between the federal state and the member states, how the political levels are financed and how to proceed in case of disputes. These

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Mannewitz and W. Rudzio, The Political System of Germany, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41371-2_10

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310

10  The German Federalism

q­ uestions are answered differently, but two basic types of federalism can be distinguished: • a separation federalism (or dual federalism), in which the federal state and the member states are responsible for legislation in separate policy areas, which they also implement through their own authorities (examples: USA, Canada, Australia); • a functional (or executive, cooperative) federalism, in which legislation is predominantly the task of the federal state and execution is predominantly the task of the member states (examples: Germany, India, Austria, Switzerland). In general, the right to levy taxes lies predominantly with the federal state, and in many cases there are discrepancies between tax distribution and assignment of tasks—vertical financial transfers are therefore common in one form or another (Watts 1996, pp. 32–37; Krumm 2015). For decision-making processes in cooperative federalism, “informal networks” and negotiations prove to be important. “Co-operative bargaining” as in India (Benz 1995; Hardgrave 1980, p. 89) makes such federalism workable. b. The political and social profile of the federal states The roots of federalism in Germany go back a long way. Nevertheless, its restoration after 1945 was neither due to historical tradition nor to ethnic or state integration. Although formally founded by the Länder, the whole people form the actual basis of legitimacy for the Federal Republic (Hanebeck 2004, pp. 136, 183). Federalism was restored and strengthened after 1945 primarily as a principle of power sharing, as a means of stabilizing democracy and securing peace. Significantly, the current federal states can only partly join unbroken state traditions. Only the “Free Hanseatic Cities” of Hamburg and Bremen, the “Free State of Bavaria” (the latter losing the former Bavarian Palatinate) and the “Free State of Saxony” continue German states with historical tradition with only minor border corrections. The other federal states, on the other hand, are of younger age: Thuringia is a product of the Weimar Republic (extended by parts of the province of Saxony), the Saarland is the result of French separation attempts since 1918, Baden-Württemberg was only created in 1952 from the then states of Baden, Württemberg and Württemberg-Hohenzollern. The other states were created by the occupying powers after 1945. Berlin was a common creation (divided 1948–90). The British created the following states in 1946:

10.1  Federal States and State Parliamentarism

311

• from the province of Brandenburg (after the withdrawal of Berlin and the area east of Oder and Neiße) the state of the same name, • from Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz and the part of Pomerania west of the Oder (with the exception of the area around Stettin) the state of Mecklenburg, today “Mecklenburg-Vorpommern”, • from Thuringia and a smaller Prussian area the state of Thuringia, • as well as from the province of Saxony, the Free State of Anhalt and a Brunswick enclave the state of “Saxony-Anhalt” (Stammen 1965, pp. 33 ff.; Hartmann 1994; German Bundestag 1990). As this overview shows, the inner-German map has changed deeply compared to the Weimar Republic. Prussia with its provinces has been dissolved, historical units and patchwork areas have been combined into new units in many places. The size of North Rhine-Westphalia is not an unusual problem. Greater size differences of its constituent states are known in the USA, Canada and Switzerland. On the whole, the occupying powers have tried to take into account cultural and spatial connections. The fact that—with the exception of the southwest—the possibility of revision of the territorial post-war order, as Art. 29 GG opened up by plebiscites, was not used anywhere successfully, speaks for the post-war solutions (Laufer and Münch 1997). Schleswig- ThurSaxony SaxHolstein ingia onyAnhalt

Hesse

Meck- Lower North Rhine- Saarlenburg- Saxony Rhine- land- land West- PalatiWestern phalia nate Pomerania

6.3

1.6

8.0

17.9

4.1

1.0

4.1

2.2

2.9

2.1

21.2

3.4

16.3

36.3

38.7

54.6

3.7

3.2

5.9

7.5

31.6

14.2

41.1

23.0

25.9

16.8

17.2

11.4

42.2

20

16.9

4.8

5.4

29.31

20.09

5.2

7.6

5.5

7.3

10.1

8.6

8.9

12.4

8.4

8.8

8.6

10.9

6.8

10.0

7.2

47.5

41.1

54.2

43.7

58.0

64.7

34.6

78.7

87.2

77.9

76.2

81.0

83.1

69.0

80.5

9.9

13.8

11.8

11.8

5.3

5.3

8.6

25.03

26.75

25.31

24.34

21.39

20.83

23.71

5.0

6.8

5.9

7.3

5.6

5.6

10.5

17.6

0.9

10.7

12.1

7.9

9.5

9.1

6.7

45.1

53.3

45.3

84.4

76.2

20.51

312

10  The German Federalism

2018

2021

2017

2022

2021

2022

2019

2021

2022

2019

19.8

39.6

36.9

26.7

35.7

43.5

7.7

8.4

15.6

8.2

27.0

13.3

33.6

35.7

27.7

28.6

32.1

37.1

43.4

21.8

7.5

5.8

7.5

5.9

5.5

4.8

4.5

6.4

6.4

5.0

19.8

6.3

8.7

18.2

9.3

5.0

8.6

5.9

18.3

5.2

6.3

9.9

4.6

2.1

2.5

2.6

10.4

11.0

1.7

31.0

13.1

16.7

6.2

5.4

8.3

5.7

27.5

20.8

4.4

23.4

137

79

137

195

101

51

119

97

69

90

Sources: Federal Statistical Office (2021a, p. 119; 2022a; 2022b; 2022c; 2022d); Federal Agency for Civic Education (2020); Federal Employment Agency according to the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg (2022); Mannewitz and Vollmann (2019, p. 41); Zicht (2022).

However, the following remains true: The responsibilities and the constitutional structure overwhelm the strength of some smaller federal states. From a financial point of view, a territorial reform would be appropriate. Corresponding discussions flare up from time to time. However, the weight of the factual, decades-long acclimatization in the West, has never made anything of it. With the unification process and the re-establishment of the post-war states in the East, the opportunity for change seems to be over for the time being. Today’s state borders do not radically separate different areas from each other. However, the data in Table 10.1 reveal differences in economic, social and confessional structures that provide the background for special state policy profiles. If one looks at gross domestic product per capita, unemployment and debt ratios, a west-east economic divide as well as a north-south divide within the former Federal Republic and within the new federal states becomes apparent. The latter developed from 1950 to the present. On the one hand, this was due to a continuous relative lag of North Rhine-Westphalia, which used to be in the lead among the flatland states, and on the other hand to a continuous rise of Bavaria and Hesse. Baden-Württemberg maintained an above-average position (Ottnad 1997, p. 21). In addition, there are considerable confessional differences in that the Catholic share is strongest in the south and west, while atheism predominates in the new federal states. Measured by the number of all state elections, the SPD emerged as the strongest party most often in the Hanseatic cities, Hesse, Lower Saxony, Brandenburg and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania until 2007, the Union parties in the other federal states; in Berlin and Schleswig-Holstein there is a dead heat between the

10.1  Federal States and State Parliamentarism

313

Table 10.1   The profile of the federal states 2020/21 Federal Baden- Bavaria Berlin Branden- Bremen Hamburg burg Repub- Württemberg lic Population 2020 in million

83.2

11.1

13.1

3.7

2.5

0.7

1.9

Catholics 2018 in %

26.7

31.7

46.9

8.4

3.6

9.5

9.4

Protestants 2018 in %

24.3

28.3

17.2

14.3

13.9

30.8

23.6

Foreign share 2020 in % 12.7

16.1

13.7

19.6

5.2

19.0

16.8

Gross hourly earnings 2020 in EUR.g)

26.48

28.56

28.31

27.05 21.12

27.20

20.20

Unemployment rate 2021 in %

5.7

3.9

3.5

9.8

5.9

10.7

7.5

Debt/inh. 2019 in thou. EUR.a)

8.5

4.8

2.0

14.8

7.3

43.9

18.3

Minimum security quote 8.3 2020 in %e)

5.3

4.5

16.3

7.7

17.7

13.3

Owner share 2018 in %

46.5

52.6

51.4

17.4

47.8

37.8

23.9

Affinity with own state (“somewhat”/“very”) 2017 in %

79.3

82.3

85.2

78.2

68.8

73.3

80.3

Landtagswahlergebnisb) 2021d)

2021

2018f)

2021

2019

2019

2020

SPD

11.0

9.7

21.4

26.2

24.9

39.2

25.7

CDU or CSU

24.1

24.1

37.2

18.0

15.6

26.7

11.2

FDP

11.5

10.5

5.1

7.1

4.1

5.9

5.0

B90/Green

14.8

32.6

17.5

18.9

10.8

17.4

24.2

Left

4.9

3.6

3.2

14.1

10.7

11.3

9.1

AfD

10.3

9.7

10.2

8.0

23.5

6.1

5.3

Number of representatives

736

154

205

147

88

84

123

a)

Countries and municipalities a percentage of valid votes c) The South Schleswig Voter Association received 3.3% of the valid votes d) Federal: Other 8.6% e) Proportion of the population that receives minimum security such as social assistance, basic security, Hartz IV, asylum seeker money f) Free voters 11.6%, Bavarian party 1.7% g) Earnings of employees including civil servants in manufacturing and service industries b) As

314

10  The German Federalism

two major parties (Reutter 2008, p. 88). In the course of time, a different picture emerges. The once seemingly unshakable hegemonic position of a major party in certain federal states is hardly to be found anymore. For a long time, CDU and CSU had a generally stronger position in the southern German states and in the southern new federal states, while SPD generally had a stronger position in northern Germany. However, the Greens (Baden-Württemberg) or the AfD (Saxony, Thuringia) are shaking these certainties. In general, narrower majorities and stronger voter swings indicate that the idea of a party’s homeland has lost its reality. This does not mean that the federal states governed by a party no longer play the role of fortresses where one can weather times of opposition in federal politics. c. The government system in the federal states According to Art. 28 GG, the constitutional order in the federal states must “comply with the principles of the republican, democratic rule of law in the sense of this Basic Law”. This is intended to ensure a basic agreement of the constitutions, as it existed at the time of the Basic Law’s creation, also for the future. This does not exclude constitutional variants. For example, the state constitutions contain different catalogues of basic rights, in part also social basic rights or state objectives (work, housing, education, social security, equality of women, environmental protection). However, this is of little importance—on the one hand because the promising rights are mostly formulated in a cautious and general way, on the other hand because federal law overrides state law. Therefore, such basic rights or state objectives must be attributed to symbolic politics. However, relevant differences arise from the fact that the state constitutions also determine the relationship between the people, parliament, government and head of government differently: 1. Participation of the people: While traditionally the representative of the people, the parliament, is elected for a period of four years, its election period has been extended to five years in almost all federal states (with the exception of Bremen). This weakening of the voter influence is offset by an expansion of plebiscitary possibilities. Popular initiatives and referendums, which have already been provided for in the majority of the West German federal states, are now possible everywhere in matters of state (with the exception of finances and salaries). In six federal states, the state parliament can also be dissolved by popular vote. However, regulations and experiences vary considerably (Reutter 2008, p. 252 ff.; Kost 2005). Some popular initiatives already fail due to the required

10.1  Federal States and State Parliamentarism

315

minimum participation. But at least 17% of the popular initiatives were taken over by the state parliament1. Cases in which a successful popular initiative prompted the state politics to give in included an initiative in 1973 for broadcasting autonomy in Bavaria and one in 1978 against the “cooperative school” in North Rhine-Westphalia. Up to 2021, 25 referendums initiated from “below” took place, including six in Bavaria and seven each in Hamburg and Berlin (most recently “Expropriating Deutsche Wohnen & Co.”). Questions of state order and education were in the foreground (Schiller 2007, pp. 124 ff.). Spectacular was the successful, accompanied by the resignation of the mayor Beust, citizen referendum against the six-year primary school in Hamburg. For spectacular, the state politics changing cases, reference is made to Sect. 3.5. In general, the legitimatory weakness of the referendum is that the voting participation is usually well below 50%. Therefore, approval quotas apply to the binding nature of a decision: usually at least 20 or 25% of the eligible voters who have to agree. Outliers to the downside are Bavaria, Saxony and Hamburg, which do not even know a quorum (but Hamburg only if the vote takes place parallel to an election), also NRW and Schleswig-Holstein with only 15%. Higher requirements apply, inter alia, to constitutional amendments, but only in Bavaria, Berlin, Bremen and Hesse is each constitutional amendment to be submitted to the people for decision by means of an obligatory constitutional referendum (Weixner 2006, p. 20; Schiller 2007, p. 119; Leunig 2012, pp. 236, 241). 2. Formation of the government: In all federal states, the head of government is elected by the state parliament. Most federal states have regulated the procedure for the formation of the government as in the federal system: The state parliament only elects the Prime Minister, who then decides alone on the composition of his cabinet. A few states provide—in addition to the election of the head of government—for the confirmation of the government by the state parliament before taking office. In Bremen, even each member of the government (member of the “Senate”) is elected by the people’s representatives. It is also common for a later appointed individual minister to require confirmation by the state parliament. 3. Dismissal of the government: Eleven federal states know the constructive vote of no confidence as in the federation: The head of government can only be removed from office by new elections, and with him the rest of the government

1 Initiatives

up to 2002 (Rehmet 2002, pp. 112 ff.).

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10  The German Federalism

falls. It was successfully used in 1956 against Arnold and in 1966 against Meyers in NRW. In the other states (Bavaria, Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland and Berlin), the government is toppled by simple negative votes of no confidence. In addition, in Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate (formerly also in Berlin and Hamburg), votes of no confidence against individual government members are also possible, while in Bavaria, Lower Saxony, RhinelandPalatinate, Hesse and Saarland the dismissal (but also the appointment) of a minister requires the consent of the state parliament (Reutter 2004, p. 21)2. 4. Guideline competence: The competence to issue binding guidelines for the work of the government lies with the head of government in all federal states and Hamburg—but in Berlin with the Governing Mayor after approval by the Senate and in Bremen with the Senate. It is clearly visible here—as already with the election and dismissal modes—that the mayors in Berlin and Bremen only raise themselves a little over their senate colleagues. Traces of older collegial governments can also be seen in the fact that the organizational power (the right to make decisions on jurisdiction in the government sector) lies with the entire senate in Hamburg and Bremen; elsewhere (in Berlin and southern Germany), it is exercised by the state parliament together with the government or the head of government (Decker 2004, p. 5). 5. Head of state functions: Since the state constitutions do not know a separate head of state next to the head of government, the question arises as to whom they assign classical head of state functions such as representing the state externally, the pardon power, the appointment and dismissal of officials. Here too, the answer differs: While at least five constitutions clearly assign all three competences to the head of government, they are held by the senate throughout in Bremen and Hamburg. Other countries such as Bavaria, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Saarland and Hesse attribute them partly to the Prime Minister, partly to the state government. 6. Constitutional jurisdiction: The statehood of the federal states is underlined, among other things, by their own state constitutional courts. These differ in terms of their composition (usually a mixture of professional and lay judges, in four states only lawyers), election (by a two-thirds or simple majority of the state parliament) and competences (Leunig 2012, pp. 171, 173 f.). They are increasingly making headlines with controversial judgments: in Lower Saxony

2 In

Baden-Württemberg, individual cabinet members can be brought down by a two-thirds majority (Reutter 2008, p. 200; Leunig 2012, p. 194).

10.1  Federal States and State Parliamentarism

317

against financial equalization arrangements between the state and municipalities, in North Rhine-Westphalia against the five percent blocking clause in municipal voting rights and against new indebtedness in the state budget (most recently in 2013), in Thuringia on state parliamentarians’ salaries, in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania against the formation of five large districts. In 2020, negative judgments on the gender-balanced composition of state parliament election lists were added in Thuringia and Brandenburg. The majority of judgments between 1996 and 2005 were based on constitutional complaints (approx. 850), followed by approx. 150 constitutional review decisions (Flick 2008a, p. 255). The strongest state constitutional court is probably the Bavarian, while Schleswig-Holstein is the only state to refer its constitutional disputes to the Federal Constitutional Court (Freitag and Vatter 2008, p. 315). The government systems in the federal states therefore range from forms of chancellor democracy like in the federal government to a collegial government closely linked to the parliament(Pestalozzi 2005). d. State parliaments in practice The composition of the state parliaments is similar to that of the Bundestag. What is striking in comparison with established democracies is the extent of the turnover, which at an average of 39% in the east and 35.5% in the west appears to be quite high (Heinsohn 2014, pp. 24, 32). It is the 40- to 59-year-olds who make up the majority of parliamentarians everywhere. The proportion of women in state parliaments has increased over time and reached an average of 32.7% in 2007. In terms of occupation, parliamentarians come from the public sector to a far greater extent than the average (Flick 2008b, pp. 166, 168 f.; Reutter 2008, pp. 121, 124, 128). The career path they have taken before leads through the parties. Their time budget is also similar to that of federal parliamentarians: in session weeks, an average of 31.4 hours per week is needed for parliamentary work (15.4 hours in non-sitting weeks), for constituency work and other political activities 17 (26.7) hours, and for contacts with interest groups and media 7.3 (9.2) hours per week3. In addition, 41% of state parliamentarians in western federal states (22% in eastern states) also have professional activities, mainly as self-employed4.

3 Survey 4 Six

2008, n = 456 representative (Tenscher 2011, p. 388). states 1989–92 (Reutter 2008, pp. 138, 114).

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10  The German Federalism

Regardless of all constitutional variants, it is the government majority that controls legislation in all countries. Legally, parliament, government and people are entitled to initiate legislation, but this is mainly carried out by the government, as was already apparent from a count of 17 legislative periods in five federal states for the 1950s and 1960s (Mielke 1971, p. 83). This has not changed since then—despite increased staff for state parliaments. In the second half of 1996, a survey in 14 federal states showed that 81% of all draft laws originated from the government majority (Kalke and Raschke 2004, p. 91; Eisele 2006, pp. 141, 162; Mielke and Reutter 2012, p. 29). The majority of successful legislative initiatives is even higher (Schukraft 2019, p. 242). The explanation lies in the decisive dualism of government majority and opposition, accompanied by high party discipline in voting (Stecker 2011, pp. 440 f.). Even the primary use of parliamentary control instruments by the opposition fits into this pattern. A recent overview of 4–8 state parliaments for the years 1990–2009 shows that, depending on the country, 69–87% of oral questions, 77–90% of minor interpellations, 69–90% of major interpellations (only “outliers” Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania with 40%) and 68–87% of question periods (except Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania with 43%) were initiated by the opposition. The “new dualism” majority / opposition dominates (Reutter 2013, p. 262; Leunig 2012, p. 238). This also applies with regard to the investigation committees in NRW, which are mostly imposed by the opposition alone5. Like in the Bundestag, investigation committees of state parliaments often deal with scandalous topics such as telephone surveillance, Stasi activities and Pfeiffer/Barschel affair, dealing with increased dioxin values or corruption cases (Harenberg 1994, p. 467; Plöhn 1991). The situation of state parliamentarism can only be grasped if another aspect is also taken into account: the erosion of the legislative parliamentary function. Its importance is diminished by two developments: 1. The federal government has intensively cultivated the wide range of competing legislation, thus narrowing the field for relevant state legislation to administration, police, broadcasting, and education/culture, the latter of which shrank further due to the softening of the so-called cooperation ban as part of the “Digital Pact for Schools” in 2018/19. These are the only competence areas assigned to the Länder which were comprehensively regulated by legis-

5 So

1985–95. Information from the NRW state parliament administration, 23 August 1995.

10.1  Federal States and State Parliamentarism

319

lation at an early stage in the Federal Republic. Although the number of laws passed remained considerable, they now form the “lion’s share of implementing and amending legislation” (Mielke and Reutter 2004, p. 43). The new federal states, historically conditioned, were an exception here for a while. 2. In the extensive cooperation between the federal government and the Länder, cooperation at government level inevitably comes at the expense of the parliaments. If, for example, an agreement negotiated with numerous other partners is presented to an individual parliament, it is “usually faced with a fait accompli”, as the only alternative is rejection or acceptance. In order to avoid torpedoing necessary regulations, state parliaments tend to agree to treaties with the federal government and other Länder (Kilper and Lhotta 1996, pp. 198 ff.). The conflict between Saxony-Anhalt and the other Länder in 2020 over the increase in the broadcasting fee (decided by the Federal Constitutional Court in 2021 to the detriment of the eastern German federal state) is likely to be the exception. All in all: The Länder are in the process of “withering into regional administrative provinces” (Linck 2004, p. 1231). What conclusions should be drawn from their meager legislative role? Two positions face each other on this question. One proposes the disestablishment of the Länder, i.e. adapting their status to their diminishing legislative importance. This is associated with demands for the direct election of the Prime Ministers6, for political officials at the head of state offices (instead of ministers and ministries), for the incompatibility of a mandate as a member of parliament and an office in government—in sum, a move towards the mayoral constitution in municipalities (Backmann 2006). But doesn’t that mean a transition to a decentralized unitary state, which the Basic Law excludes? The other line aims to strengthen the state parliaments on the contrary, namely by: • their early involvement in planning and negotiations on treaties, • their involvement in important, formally executive decisions (e.g. nuclear power plant construction), • a reduction of the federal government’s role in legislation (Martin 1984).

6  As

early as Wilhelm Hennis and Theodor Eschenburg, recently Frank Decker (2021, pp. 32 ff.)

320

10  The German Federalism

In practice, the state parliaments seek replacement by exercising a contributing control and thus working “as critical companions of ongoing executive decisions”. Except for major tasks, they were early on considered as executive-related working parliaments (Friedrich 1975, pp. 20 ff., 26, 30). Their representatives act as representatives of their constituency, where they often participate as municipal council members and seek subsidies for them (Patzelt 2006, pp. 110 f.; Gunlicks 2003, p. 249). It is also noteworthy that a significant proportion of government members do not come from the state parliament (Reutter 2008, p. 208), as one would expect in parliamentary government systems—a sign not only of constitutional requirements (as in Bremen and Hamburg), but also of the political and personnel exhaustion of the parliaments? If we turn to the government side, the first question that arises is whether there are regularities according to which majorities come together and governments are formed. As a set of hypotheses, a coalition theory is available, which derives minimal winning coalitions with ideologically coherent coalition partners from the assumption of rational-economic action. With regard to the German state governments, two political science theses with slightly different accents can be seen. One states that for the formation and stability of coalition governments in the states, not only party-political interests, but also personal sympathies, informal bodies and contacts between the actors play a role (Kropp 2001, pp. 290, 295). Since the smaller own competences determine the coalitions in the states less than in the federal level (Jun 1994, p. 235), the mentioned aspects are also important here. This is in line with the fact that only 51.6% of the coalition formations in the states corresponded to the model of the minimal majority coalition of ideologically related parties between 1994 and 2006 (Debus 2008, pp. 71, 73). In contrast, the other thesis sees the game-theoretical coalition theory confirmed in the state coalitions with slight modifications: Using logistic regression analysis, it is shown for 1990–2007 that small (not smallest) winning coalitions including the strongest party (the modifications!) formed the government in 66 out of 69 cases, with policy differences reducing the probability of coalition. Based on the state election programs, it is shown that only the socio-economic policy dimension is effective. The socio-cultural remains irrelevant (Bräuninger and Debus 2008, pp. 330 ff.). In addition, the election programs indicate that federal and state parties sometimes differ programmatically from each other. “With regard to the differences between federal and state associations, a separation in socio-economic policy can be seen in Bündnis 90/Die Grünen—similar to the Union in social policy questions—which is slightly to the right of the position of their federal election programs in terms of content. [… In addition], it becomes clear that the social

10.1  Federal States and State Parliamentarism

321

democratic state associations appear significantly more moderate in economic and social policy than the federal party.” (Bräuninger et al. 2020, p. 74) Accordingly, the following can be said about state coalitions: The game-theoretical coalition theory is confirmed with some modifications. The irrelevant role of the socio-cultural conflict dimension in coalition formation appears remarkable, although the states have their own competences precisely in education and culture. How do the heads of government exercise the leading role that most national constitutions assign to them? A head of government with popularity, at the same time chairperson of the largest government party, of course has greater scope for action than if he/she lacked that. The personal style of government can also differ. Both aspects can be illustrated in North Rhine-Westphalia, where Prime Minister Rau held office with “presidential aura” and strong support from the SPD government party, while his successors Clement and Steinbrück proved to be “energetic manager types” with less party support (Korte et al. 2006, p. 322). Every head of government can find support in an expanded State Chancellery7, the heads of which, above all CdS (= head of the chancellery), office manager and government spokesman, belong to the “advisory circle of prime ministers”, without their own “power”, but “influence” (Grunden 2009, pp. 16, 149 ff., 59). Ultimately, the way in which and to what extent a head of government can use his/her policy-making competence and his/her right to choose ministers depends above all on the coalition constellation, to what extent coalition-stabilizing factors are present and which alternatives are conceivable. Forms of informal decision-making in which the head of government is involved range from a coalition committee to “two-axis” relationships between the head of government and deputy head of government as well as the chairpersons of the coalition factions (in Rhineland-Palatinate 1996–2001) to a “network” of different circles as in the red-green minority coalition of Saxony-Anhalt 1994–98 (Kropp 2001, p. 266 f.). Coalition committees are now common. The influence of smaller coalition partners apparently depends on which partner shows unity in the matter, in the case of two-coalitions, on who brings one of the other partners to his side—at least according to four new federal states.8

7 The

staff size of the chancelleries was between 99 (Hamburg) and 400 (Bavaria) or 375 employees (NRW) in the west in 1999 (Schneider 2001, p. 297). 8 1990–94 (Putz 2008, pp. 412 ff., 417).

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10  The German Federalism

On the government side, coalition constellation, his/her role in the leading government party and his/her public office bonus are more decisive for the actual position of the heads of government than constitutional powers.

10.2 The Interlocking of Politics Between the Federal Government and the States a. Legislative competence: shifts to the federal government Federalism means both separation and cooperation between central state and federal states. In Germany, both aspects determine the relationship between the federal government and the federal states in the legislative, executive and financial fields. Fundamentally, legislation is determined by the fact that, according to the Basic Law, legislative matters are divided into several categories: • an area of exclusive federal legislation: Foreign Affairs, Defense, Citizenship, Foreign Trade, Intellectual Property, Nuclear Energy, Railroads, Postal Service, Telecommunications and Aviation, Civil Service Law, Weapons and Explosives, Regulations for Cooperation in Constitutional Protection and Criminal Prosecution, etc. (Art. 71 and 73 GG); • the area of “concurrent legislation” in which the states have legislative powers, “as long as and to the extent that the federal government has not made use of its legislative competence” by law: Civil and Criminal Law, Judiciary, Status Law of State and Local Officials (except career paths, salaries and pensions), Economics, Labor Law, Social Affairs, Transportation, Environment, Health, etc. (Art. 72 and 74 GG). • the “community tasks” in which the federal government participates in the performance of tasks of the states: Improving the regional economic structure, agricultural structure and coastal protection. In addition, the federal government and the states cooperate in educational planning and research funding (Art. 91a and b GG). Since 2015, the federal government can also participate in university financing, provided all states agree (Sturm 2015, p. 14). • the area of exclusive state legislation: Culture, Education, Press and Broadcasting, Police, Local Constitution, Assembly, Home and Higher Education Law, Salaries and Pensions of State and Local Officials, and all other matters not expressly assigned to the other categories (Art. 70 GG). A large part of domestically interesting subject areas therefore belong to the area of concurrent legislation of the federal government and the states

10.2  The Interlocking of Politics Between the Federal Government …

323

However, the federal government can no longer fully play its priority in concurrent legislation. Recently, it has been subject to a restriction by the so-called “needs clause” of Art. 72 GG, according to which the federal government is only allowed to act in favor of “equal living conditions” or “legal and economic unity” in a number of legislative areas. The search for a compromise in the federalism reform I of 2006 has also led to an original solution for some matters of concurrent legislation: the right of the states to legislate differently from the federal government, which can be replaced by a federal law after half a year—and so on (“Ping-Pong legislation”) (Katz 2006, p. 79). The federalism reform, aimed at a separation of legislative powers between the federal government and the states, also transferred a number of matters into the exclusive state legislation. Since then, there have been particularly different regulations in the states for nursing care, civil servant salaries, restaurants and prisons (Leunig and Pock 2010, pp. 163 ff.; Decker 2011, p. 236). But now there are also divided fields such as higher education law, which now lies with the states, but university admission and graduation as well as “the promotion of scientific research” are subject to concurrent legislation. Similarly, the general status law of state and local officials is the responsibility of concurrent legislation, but their career paths, salaries and pensions are the responsibility of the individual states (Art. 74 GG). Contexts are torn apart. Overall, it becomes clear that separations have only been partially successful, many new potential areas of friction have arisen (needs clause, Ping-Pong legislation, fragmentation of contexts). b. Federalism What the states lack in terms of legislative competence, they are all the more entitled to in terms of execution of the law. The federation only has its own executive agencies for a few areas of responsibility: the Foreign Service, the Federal Armed Forces and Federal Police, the Federal Maritime and Aviation Administration. In addition, there are a few federal corporations, such as the Federal Employment Agency, the Federal Finance Administration and the Federal Criminal Police Office, the latter two of which are dependent on cooperation with corresponding state authorities. The normal case is therefore federal laws that are executed by state authorities (and their auxiliaries: by municipal administrations). This can be done as a matter of course for the states or on behalf of the federal government. In the end, it is the municipalities and districts that execute around 80% of all federal and state laws (Ismayr 2009, p. 555). Depending on which form of implementation the law provides, the federal government’s ability to influence the implementation of the

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10  The German Federalism

Table 10.2   The implementation of federal laws

As a matter for the states (Art. 84 GG)

On behalf of the By federal admin- As a joint task (Art. federation (Art. 85, istration (Art. 86 ff. 91a GG) 87c and 104a GG) GG)

Federal supervision Federal supervision Implementation by with regard to legality with regard to legality own subordinate and appropriateness authorities Comprehensive No federal directives Federal directive, (except as provided generally to the high- federal directives est state authorities by law)

Federal participation through joint framework planning

Federal government organizes its own agencies and appoints executive personnel

Administrative procedures are a state matter. If regulated by federal law, deviations by the state are possible, after 6 months federal regulation, etc. Without deviation only with the consent of the Federal Council

As with own affairs, furthermore: training regulations and consent of the federal government for the appointment of heads of intermediate authorities

Administrative costs with the state. If necessary, money benefits for citizens can be borne by the federal government (Art. 104a GG)

Federal government Federal government bears all costs bears administrative costs. A lower proportion of money benefits for citizens may be borne by the state

Federal government bears at least half of the costs, the rest is shared between the federal states and the federal government

law is measured (Table 10.2). In the future, the execution of federal laws is likely to become a matter of course for the state, since, since the federalism reform of 2006, no approval is required in this case. The administrative procedure is regulated according to the ping-pong legislation. A special case are the joint tasks (new since 2009: information technology, administrative evaluation; since 2010: execution of federal laws in the field of basic security for job seekers). In general, the principle applies: The more influence the federal government wants to retain, the higher the proportion of costs it has to bear in the execution of the law. Since Germany has a three-tier political-administrative structure—federal government, states, municipalities (districts and municipalities)—the execution of the law is actually even more complex. The interplay of these institutions is regulated

10.2  The Interlocking of Politics Between the Federal Government …

325

in the execution of numerous federal and state laws in such a way that the execution is entrusted to the municipalities (mostly the districts) as their own or commissioned task, with similar influence rights of the state as those of the federal government in relation to the states. The affected citizen thus usually only comes into contact with the executing municipal administration. The respective higher political levels borrow the administrative organs of the lower ones, so to speak (“organ loan”). Against this background, one can speak of a functional or executive federalism. It includes “a functional separation under which the federal government is assigned the bulk of legislative power while the states exercise most administrative powers” (Heidenheimer 1966, p. 172). c. The dominant financial federation Basically, the financial constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany assumes that the federal government and the states have separate revenues, finance their tasks separately and are “independent of each other” in their budgetary management (Art. 109 para. 1 GG). This corresponds to the separate responsibility in front of the electorate. However: The states hardly have any “revenue autonomy”, an independent right to levy taxes (Abromeit 1992, p. 130). Even a sharp separation of tax revenues would contradict the “uniformity of living conditions in the federal territory” (Art. 106 para. 3 GG) because they would differ regionally. As a result, the separation principle is repeatedly broken. It is noteworthy that a financial equalization did not exist from the beginning of the Federal Republic, but was introduced as a horizontal equalization in the 1950s and as a vertical one only with the financial reform of 1969. The transition from the initial separation system to the dominant tax federation (1955/56 initially for income and corporate taxes, 1969 additionally for value added taxes) was justified by the fact that one wanted to reduce the dependence of individual system levels on particularly cyclically sensitive taxes, as well as that of municipalities on trade taxes, and thus exclude silent weight shifts between the political levels (Lehmbruch 2002, p. 101; Hidien 1998, pp. 264, 304). A increasingly complex system of financial interlocking between the federal government, the states and the municipalities has emerged, which can be represented in four levels. The first is the division of taxes between the political levels. A distinction is made between federal, state, municipal and community taxes, the revenue from which the respective system level should have. An overview is provided by Table 10.3. Accordingly, the more important consumption taxes and duties, the motor vehicle tax and the wealth tax are assigned to the federal government, while the

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10  The German Federalism

Table 10.3   The tax revenue

1960 Total revenue (bn. DM, from 2008: bn. EUR)

1989

2008

2020

66.6

535.5

561.2

739.7

1. Community taxes

36.7

74.1

70.6

73.0

Income and wage tax

25.6

40.8

31.1

36.3

1.3

2.4

5.4

3.8

Of which in percent:

Capital gains taxa) Corporate tax Value-added taxb) Import VATb)

9.8

6.4

2.8

3.3

22.3

12.7

23.3

22.8

2.0

11.9

8.1

6.9

37.9

11.4

15.4

14.3

Tobacco tax

5.3

2.9

2.4

2.0

Alcohol-f) and sparkling wine tax

1.6

0.9

0.5

0.3

4.0

6.2

8.1

5.1

0.3

0.8

1.9

2.0

2.7

0.7

2.3

2.5

2. Federal taxes

Energy taxes (petroleum, gas, Insurance

electricity)c)

taxb)

Solidarity surcharged) 3. State taxes

6.8

4.5

3.9

3.8

Property and inheritance taxe)

2.0

1.5

0.8

1.2

Motor vehicle tax (from 2009 federal tax)

2.2

1.7

1.6

1.3

Beer tax

1.1

0.2

0.1

0.1

Real estate transfer tax (until 1989: other state taxes)

1.2

1.1

1.0

2.2

14.5

8.6

9.3

8.3

Basic taxes

2.4

1.6

1.9

2.0

Trade taxes

11.2

6.9

7.3

6.1

5. EU tariffs

4.2

1.3

0.7

0.7

4. Municipal taxes

a)

2008 and 2020: Withholding tax and non-assessed tax on income Turnover and import turnover tax were federal taxes until 1970, insurance tax state tax c) Until 1989 only petroleum tax d) Until 1989 other federal taxes e) Wealth tax has been abolished f) Until 2017 spirits tax Other small taxes not listed individually Sources: Federal Statistical Office (1962, p. 446); Federal Statistical Office (1990, p. 452); Federal Statistical Office (2021b). b)

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327

states are mainly responsible for the property tax (reformed in 2019; in force from 2025). But what is particularly striking is the massive imbalance of the community taxes (of the “tax union”), the distribution of which is only decided by the actual revenue of the federal government, the states and the municipalities: • First, the European Union receives the revenue from customs duties, valueadded tax shares and allocations based on the size of gross national income (2020: EUR 32.8 billion = 4.4% of German tax revenue). • Then, from the income and wage tax revenue, the municipalities receive 15%, the federal government and the states each 42.5%, in accordance with Art. 106 GG and federal regulations. • For the interest deduction, 44% each go to the federal government and the states, and 12% to the municipalities. • The corporate and capital income tax revenue is divided equally between the federal government and the states. • The distribution of trade tax revenue changes almost every year—in 2020, the federal government received 3.5% of the 45.29 billion euros, the states 5.3%, the rest 91.2% to the states (Federal Ministry of Finance 2021, p. 28). • Since 2020, 52.8% of value-added tax revenue goes to the federal government, 45.2% to the states and 2% to the municipalities (Scientific Services of the German Bundestag 2021, p. 4). In a second step, the revenue is distributed to the individual federal states. In this way, each state receives the income and corporate tax shares that were collected in its territory. A third dimension of entanglement was the federal-state financial equalization until 2019. It was always controversial in its design. Several “poor” federal states have repeatedly brought actions for judicial review before the Federal Constitutional Court, in 1998 Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg and Hesse as “rich” states. Above all, they criticized redistribution criteria and the degree of equalization (Arndt 1999, p. 30; Mackenstein and Jeffery 1999, p. 171). On the one hand, solidarity and equal living conditions were invoked, on the other hand, leveling was criticized, which would reduce the incentive for effective state economic policy and tax collection9. After a general judgment, which tended to be more favorable to the plaintiffs, the financial equalization was slightly corrected in 2005.

9 In

the sense of the latter Peffekoven (2013).

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10  The German Federalism

But in 2017, the federal government and the states agreed to abolish the “bone of contention” “federal-state financial equalization” and to switch to another equalization system (“financial strength equalization”) from 2020. One impetus for this may have been that the “Solidarity Pact II” expires in 2019, under which the new federal states have so far received special supplementary payments from the federal government. Under the new equalization system, 1. the share of revenue from value-added tax (45.2%) is to be divided equally between the countries on the same basis as before. The measure of a country’s financial strength is its tax revenue plus 75% of local government revenue, divided by a modified population figure. It is modified by multiplying the population figure for the city-states by a factor of 1.35 (so-called “population enhancement” because of the jobs and infrastructure it provides for the surrounding area), as well as for three sparsely populated countries. On this basis, 63% of the financial strength above or below the average is to be compensated for by surcharges and discounts in the distribution of value-added tax. 2. In addition, the federal government pays – indefinite aid for the restructuring of Bremen and Saarland (800 million euros per year), – federal supplementary allocations for small countries with relatively high costs of political leadership and central administration (so-called “costs of smallness”); – allocations to countries with less than 95% of the average for research funding. Finally, a termination option is noteworthy as of 31 December 2030. After that, the federal government or three federal states may require new negotiations, which, if they fail, will result in the new system being void (Art. 143 ff. GG). Three federal states, this quorum is achieved by the new federal states, the former donor states in southern Germany, the city-states, etc.—whoever wants to maintain the system, will then have to take into account every considerable interest group. According to Wolfgang Renzsch (2017, pp. 768 ff.), this compensation system increases “the gap between financially strong and financially weak countries […]”. The distribution of value-added tax revenue is not a “peace-making solution”. Secondly, the federal government has extended its influence to the detriment of the states, above all by participating in the use of its financial aid (Art. 104 para. 2 GG) and by participating in the Stability Council for the monitoring of federal and state budgetary policy (Art. 109a GG). In sum: it is the states

10.2  The Interlocking of Politics Between the Federal Government …

329

that have “empowered themselves for more money”, resulting in a “distorted constitution”. The constitutional policy is also critical, but the distribution policy is opposite the judgment of Roland Sturm (2017): He sees himself in the face of the federalism reform of 2017 in a “country without federalists”, in which more equality finds more resonance than federal “diversity”. Losses of autonomy of the individual state have been suffered by the state parliaments, not by the state governments, which participate in federal legislation through the Bundesrat. What remains is “the hollowed-out democratic structure of German unitary federalism”. The conclusion of Hanno Kubes (2019, p. 391): “Lack of transparency, verticalization and centralization”. In fact, the problem of an appropriate distribution of tax revenue continues. Apart from different views of what federalism should achieve: It cannot be denied that the ratio between primary tax revenue (income and corporate tax) and gross domestic product per capita varies from state to state. These discrepancies can be explained by commuter flows, the principle of domicile in income tax, the location of companies, etc., which are probably not compensated for by the redistribution mechanisms (Renzsch 2013, pp. 120–121, 124–125). But how to capture and correct this without creating other problems? Further, in the context of federalism, unavoidable entanglements arise from mixed financing of community tasks. In addition, there are payments from the federal government for the implementation of federal social security laws. Examples are social assistance, housing allowance and child benefit as well as training support. There is always a struggle over the question of how much compensation the federal government has to pay for this, especially since the costs are not always foreseeable in advance (right to a kindergarten place, asylum accommodation). Finally, the Federalism Reform II of 2009, with the so-called “debt brake,” restricted the fiscal policy leeway, especially for the states. Thus, the newly worded Art. 109 GG stipulates that “in principle” the federal government and the states have to base their budgets on balanced budgets (i.e. without taking on debt). This applies rigidly to the states, while there are back doors for the federal government: • Its budget is considered balanced if credit taken does not exceed 0.35% of gross domestic product; • In the event of difficult economic conditions, natural disasters and extraordinary emergency situations (e.g. during the Corona pandemic from 2020 onwards), it may incur higher debts, which it has to repay in the following period.

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The 0.35% credit will probably be used up, it is difficult to draw a precise line between cyclical and unallowable structural debt, so that Sturm (2013, p. 411) sees “the most important political back door” for new debt here. An analysis for 1995–2006 came to the result that in the states debt increases above all when there is high power dispersion within the government (grand coalitions or 3-party coalition governments), less when there is sharp competition between the large parties or left-wing dominance. This rather points to the primacy of a “re-election-oriented” than a “structurally forced” debt (Hildebrandt 2009, pp. 104, 118–119, 123, 149, 152). Referendums for credit are recommended, as well as insolvency proceedings for federal states (which destroy creditworthiness beforehand). But that would mean leaving the path that has been taken for decades. Overall, the German federalism is plagued by the federalism disease of a constantly contested and complex financial transfer system, the purpose of which is seen differently.

10.3 The Perennial Problems of Federalism The following can be said in favor of federalism in Germany: • The importance of federalism has remained considerable. If one uses the proportion of central government to total state revenue as a measure, Germany fares quite well with 41% compared to pronounced federal states such as Switzerland with 33% and the USA with 40% (Heise 2010, p. 65). • The decentralization of decision-making powers ensures that state decisions are more locally based and also leads to a wider spatial distribution of public institutions than in centralized states. • Since reunification, federalism has fulfilled an important integration function. • It has gained approval from the population. However, when it comes to specific issues, massive majorities tend to favor nationwide regulations, leaving no room for state autonomy. For example, 84% found that the different educational policies of the individual federal states were disadvantageous.10 Federal state reforms have not led to a centralized system, but have resulted in a shift to a “cooperative federalism” (Halstenberg 1974, p. 139). It is characterized

10 Ipos

survey 2000 (Bürklin and Jung 2001, p. 691).

10.3  The Perennial Problems of Federalism

331

by losses in legislative state competencies and financial state autonomy, accompanied by an intensification of federal state participation in federal politics and numerous cooperations. The forms of this cooperation are hardly comprehensible anymore: • In the Bundesrat, the federal states participate in federal legislation and administration, in financial aid programs and in budget coordination. • Conferences of government leaders (e.g. the federal-state conferences in the context of the fight against Corona from 2020 onwards) and ministerial conferences of the federal government and the federal states form a second level of cooperation. Although they are informal meetings, their resolutions have binding effect in practice (Gebauer 2006, p. 131). • Bund-state committees are highly diversified at a lower ministerial level. • Planning councils of the federal government and the federal states, to which also third parties belong, have a special character. The “Science Council” for science funding, for example, includes representatives of the federal government, state governments, universities and scientific organizations, industry, etc. This not only means “intertwining of politics” (Fritz Scharpf) between the federal government and the federal states, but also “self-coordination of the federal states” (Heinz Laufer), which even in their federal-free areas of responsibility ensure uniformity. Why this unison also in the reserves of federalism? The idea behind it is to catch the popular pressure in favor of uniform solutions through self-coordination. Federalism tries to save itself here by depriving itself of its actual charm, the possibility of different solutions. The bodies through which this self-coordination takes place correspond to those of federal-state cooperation; only the federal government is left out. The highest level is formed by the conferences of the prime ministers, which conclude federal state treaties and important administrative agreements, for example for the unification of the school system or for broadcasting. Below this level there are conferences of ministers responsible for specific policy areas as well as numerous working groups, commissions, etc., in which ministers and officials from the federal states cooperate. The conference of ministers of education has become particularly institutionalized in this respect (Laufer 1992, pp. 178 ff.; Hepp 2006, p. 248). The cooperation therefore takes place at the executive level—the state parliaments are left out (Decker 2021, p. 85). Since German reunification, the payments to the new federal states have thrown all efforts at financial disentanglement back, and the outflow of state competences to Europe has driven the states to compensate for this in the new Article

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10  The German Federalism

23 of the GG by means of participation rights in the representation of Germany in the EU. The result was a “further expansion of participatory federalism” (Zimmer 2010; Kisker 1991, pp. 133, 119). The unmissable defects of this participatory federalism are manifold. It represents a system interwoven in administrative, financial, and political ways that is dependent on cooperation and coordination: 1. The efficiency of cooperative structures is often not achieved. Rather, the involvement of divergent actors and interests leads to arduous negotiations. Since majority decisions are excluded, this often results in unenlightening, not always justifiable compromise solutions (Lehner 1979, p. 7). The financial entanglement creates constant disputes over tax shares. To some observers, “the suspicion seems justified that the federal government and the states increase their debt in order to improve their position in the distribution battle over tax shares” (Renzsch 1998, p. 41, 43). 2. Party political differences burden the implementation of federal laws by states under the leadership of the federal political opposition. This was once the case with countercyclical fiscal policy (Lehmbruch 2000, p. 149). Later, there was friction in the implementation of federal laws in the areas of nuclear energy, asylum, and genetic engineering. 3. Cooperation is also associated with depletion of state autonomy. The individual federal state only acts as part of a whole in the coordination and participation. In addition, subsidies from the federal government sometimes have the fatal effect that a state does not promote the right projects according to its own knowledge, but rather seeks success as a clever “subsidy maximizer” (Grube et al. 1976, pp. 101 ff.). 4. Finally, such federalism raises legitimation problems. On the one hand, it is a “cooperation system of the executive”, in which the state parliaments cannot refuse their consent in the face of multilaterally negotiated state treaties (Lehner 1979, p. 7; Decker 2021, p. 85). On the other hand, the question arises as to who is actually responsible for a decision in the face of political entanglement in the multi-level system. As a result of entanglement and cooperation, the question arises in this federation: Does it make any difference in the federal states whether this or that party is in power? Studies point to different heights or shares in employment, structural and social policy spending (Schmid et al. 2007, p. 50), but much of this could be explained by different problems in the states. A comparison of states with longer CDU government periods with those with longer SPD government periods shows

References

333

that the former have higher police numbers and higher clearance rates, as well as stronger hospital funding, while the latter bring more pupils with university entrance qualifications and stronger youth welfare to the table. However, the level of social spending depends primarily on socio-economic variables, in addition there is a general convergence of the states in municipal constitution and school policy (Wolf and Hildebrandt 2008, pp. 364, 366). In general, the abolition of state party strongholds makes it difficult to assign them to parties. There are apparently differences depending on the governing party, but they do not seem to be clear and are limited to a few fields. In view of the veil of compromises and intransparency, the question arises as to whether the state-legal and political status of the federal states is still appropriate. Trends towards a competitive or federalism tend to oppose ideas of “federal solidarity” among the poorer states. They point out that burdens and structural weaknesses would have to be compensated so that not divergence would split the country11. The more the latter tendency prevails, the more difficult federalism seems to be to legitimize. The federalism reforms since 2006 make steps towards decoupling and financial responsibility, but garnished with many caveats. In the end, no far-reaching reform has been achieved. As a whole, we remain on the long-established path of a federal federation. The approach of “historical institutionalism” with its path theory therefore proves to be useful (Kropp 2010, p. 239). The economic federalism theory, which calls for congruence between decision-makers, beneficiaries and payers as well as clear responsibilities (Blankart 2006), seems to have been dismissed. However, the problems remain. The federalism is also questioned by the pressure for direct federal aid for municipalities with controls, as well as by the silent pressure of the EU (where German federalism is almost unique). The German federalism, secured by the Basic Law and the “vested interest” of the state politicians, remains in latent crisis.

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11 “The

stronger would become even stronger”, paper by nine states on financial equalization, in: Frankfurter Rundschau of 24 August 1999.

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Backmann, Jan L. (2006): Direktwahl der Ministerpräsidenten, Berlin. Benz, Arthur (1995): Verhandlungssystem und Mehrebenen-Verflechtung im kooperativen Staat, in: Seibel, Wolfgang/ders. (Eds.): Regierungssystem und Verwaltungspolitik, Opladen, pp. 83 ff. Blankart, Charles B. (2006): Reform des föderalen Systems, in: Wohlgemuth, Michael (Ed.): Spielregeln für eine bessere Politik, 2nd edn., Freiburg, pp. 135 ff. Bräuninger, Thomas/Debus, Marc (2008): Der Einfluss von Koalitionsaussagen, programmatischen Standpunkten und der Bundespolitik auf die Regierungsbildung in den deutschen Ländern, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 39 (2), pp. 309 ff. Bräuninger, Thomas et al. (2020): Parteiensysteme und Parteienwettbewerb in den Bundesländern von 1990 bis 2019, in: ders./Debus, Marc (Eds.): Parteienwettbewerb in den deutschen Bundesländern, 2nd edn., Wiesbaden, pp. 69 ff. Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2021): BMF Dokumentation. Die Entwicklung der Gewerbesteuerumlage seit der Gemeindefinanzreform 1969, unter: https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Oeffentliche_Finanzen/ Foederale_Finanzbeziehungen/Kommunalfinanzen/Dok-Gewerbesteuerumlageseit1969.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=6 (zuletzt geprüft am 25. März 2022). Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (2020): Kirche nach Bundesländern, unter: https:// www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/zahlen-und-fakten/soziale-situation-in-deutschland/61562/ kirche-nach-bundeslaendern/ (zuletzt geprüft am 28. März 2022). Bürklin, Wilhelm/Jung, Christian (2001): Deutschland im Wandel, in: Korte, Karl-Rudolf/ Weidenfeld, Werner (Eds.): Deutschland-Trend-Buch, Opladen, pp. 675 ff. Debus, Marc (2008): Parteienwettbewerb und Koalitionsbildung in den deutschen Bundesländern, in: Jun, Uwe et al. (Eds.): Parteien und Parteiensysteme in den deutschen Ländern, Wiesbaden, pp. 57 ff. Decker, Frank (2004): Das parlamentarische System in den Ländern, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 50–51, pp. 3 ff. Decker, Frank (2011): Regieren im „Parteienbundesstaat“, Wiesbaden. Decker, Frank (2021): Baustellen der Demokratie. Von Stuttgart 21 bis zur Corona-Krise, Bonn. Deutscher Bundestag (1990): Die Länder der DDR, Bonn. Eisele, Hansjörg (2006): Landesparlamente—(k)ein Auslaufmodell?, Baden-Baden. Flick, Martina (2008a): Landesverfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, in: Freitag, Markus/Vatter, Adrian (Eds.): Die Demokratien der deutschen Bundesländer, Opladen, pp. 237 ff. Flick, Martina (2008b): Parlamente und ihre Beziehungen zu den Regierungen, in: Freitag, Markus/Vatter, Adrian (Eds.): Die Demokratien der deutschen Bundesländer, Opladen, pp. 161 ff. Freitag, Markus/Vatter, Adrian (2008): Die Bundesländer zwischen Konsensus- und Mehrheitsdemokratie, in: dies. (Eds.): Die Demokratien der deutschen Bundesländer, Opladen, pp. 309 ff. Friedrich, Manfred (1975): Landesparlamente in der Bundesrepublik, Opladen. Gebauer, Klaus-Eckart (2006): Landesregierungen, in: Schneider, Herbert/Wehling, HansGeorg (Eds.): Landespolitik in Deutschland, Wiesbaden, pp. 130 ff. Grube, Frank et al. (1976): Politische Planung in Parteien und Parlamentsfraktionen, Göttingen. Grunden, Timo (2009): Politikberatung im Innenhof der Macht, Wiesbaden.

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Gunlicks, Arthur B. (2003): The Länder and German federalism, Manchester. Halstenberg, Friedrich (1974): Die Fortentwicklung der bundesstaatlichen Struktur seit 1949 und ihre Auswirkungen auf den Bundesrat, in: Der Bundesrat (Ed.): Der Bundesrat als Verfassungsorgan und politische Kraft, Bad Honnef, pp. 127 ff. Hanebeck, Alexander (2004): Der demokratische Bundesstaat des Grundgesetzes, Berlin. Hardgrave, Robert L. (1980): India, 3rd edn., New York. Harenberg, Bodo (Ed.) (1994): Aktuell ’95, Dortmund. Harman, Grant (1992): Intergovernmental Relations, in: Hawkesworth, Mary et al. (Eds.): Encyclopedia of Government and Politics, London, pp. 336 ff. Hartmann, Jürgen (Ed.) (1994): Handbuch der deutschen Bundesländer, 2nd edn., Bonn. Heidenheimer, Arnold J. (1966): The Governments of Germany, 2nd edn., New York. Heinsohn, Till (2014): Mitgliederfluktuationen in den Parlamenten der deutschen Bundesländer, Berlin. Heise, Axel (2010): Bündische Solidarität oder föderaler Wettbewerb? Baden-Baden. Hepp, Gerd F. (2006): Bildungspolitik als Länderpolitik, in: Schneider, Herbert/Wehling, Hans-Georg (Eds.): Landespolitik in Deutschland, Wiesbaden, pp. 240 ff. Hidien, Jürgen W. (1998): Der bundesstaatliche Finanzausgleich in Deutschland, BadenBaden. Hildebrandt, Achim (2009): Die finanzpolitische Handlungsfähigkeit der Bundesländer, Wiesbaden. Ismayr, Wolfgang (2009): Das politische System Deutschlands, in: ders. (Ed.): Die politischen Systeme Westeuropas, 4th edn., Wiesbaden, pp. 515 ff. Jun, Uwe (2004): Koalitionsbildung in den deutschen Bundesländern, Opladen. Kalke, Jens/Raschke, Peter (2004): Regierungsmehrheit und Opposition in den bundesdeutschen Landtagen, in: Holtmann, Everhard/Patzelt, Werner J. (Eds.): Kampf der Gewalten? Wiesbaden, pp. 85 ff. Katz, Alfred (2006): Bundesstaatliche Finanzbeziehungen und Haushaltspolitik der Länder, in: Schneider, Herbert/Wehling, Hans-Georg (Eds.): Landespolitik in Deutschland, Wiesbaden, pp. 50 ff. Kilper, Heiderose/Lhotta, Roland (1996): Föderalismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Opladen. Kisker, Gunter (1991): Die Bundesländer im Spannungsfeld zwischen deutsch-deutscher Vereinigung und europäischer Integration, in: Hesse, Joachim Jens/Renzsch, Wolfgang (Eds.): Föderalstaatliche Entwicklung in Europa, Baden-Baden, pp. 117 ff. Korte, Karl-Rudolf et al. (2006): Regieren in Nordrhein-Westfalen, Wiesbaden. Kost, Andreas (Ed.) (2005): Direkte Demokratie in den deutschen Ländern, Wiesbaden. Kropp, Sabine (2001): Regieren in Koalitionen, Wiesbaden. Kropp, Sabine (2010): Kooperativer Föderalismus und Politikverflechtung, Wiesbaden. Krumm, Thomas (2015): Föderale Staaten im Vergleich, Wiesbaden. Kube, Hanno (2019): Schleichender Abschied vom Föderalismus?, in: Zohlnhöfer, Reimut/ ders. (Eds.): Zwischen Stillstand, Politikwandel und Krisenmanagement: Eine Bilanz der Regierung Merkel 2013–2017, Wiesbaden, pp. 373 ff. Laufer, Heinz (1992): Das föderative System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bonn. Laufer, Heinz/Münch, Ursula (1997): Das föderative System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bonn. Lehmbruch, Gerhard (2000): Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat, 3rd edn., Wiesbaden.

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Lehmbruch, Gerhard (2002): Der unitarische Bundesstaat in Deutschland, in: Benz, Arthur et al. (Eds.): Föderalismus, Wiesbaden, pp. 53 ff. Lehner, Franz (1979): Politikverflechtung—Föderalismus ohne Transparenz, in: Bürger im Staat, pp. 3 ff. Leunig, Sven (2012): Die Regierungsysteme der deutschen Länder, 2nd edn., Wiesbaden. Leunig, Sven/Pock, Martin (2010): Landespolitik nach der Föderalismusreform I, in: von Blumenthal, Julia/Bröchler, Stephan (Eds.): Föderalismusreform in Deutschland, Wiesbaden, pp. 157 ff. Linck, Joachim (2004): Haben die deutschen Landesparlamente noch eine Zukunft?, in: Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 14 (4), pp. 1215 ff. Mackenstein, Hans/Jeffery, Charlie (1999): Financial Equalization in the 1990s, in: Jeffery, Charlie (Ed.): Recasting German Federalism, London, pp. 155 ff. Mannewitz, Tom/Vollmann, Erik (2019): Muster regionaler Demokratieunterstützung in Deutschland 2017, in: Bertelsmann-Stiftung (Ed.): Schwindendes Vertrauen in Politik und Parteien. Eine Gefahr für den gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt?, Gütersloh 2019, pp. 22–61. Martin, Albrecht (1984): Möglichkeiten, dem Bedeutungsverlust der Landesparlamente entgegenzuwirken, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 15 (2), pp. 278 ff. Mielke, Siegfried (1971): Länderparlamentarismus, Bonn. Mielke, Siegfried/Reutter, Werner (2004): Länderparlamentarismus in Deutschland—Eine Bestandsaufnahme, in: dies. (Eds.): Länderparlamentarismus in Deutschland, Wiesbaden, pp. 19 ff. Mielke, Siegfried/Reutter, Werner (2012): Landesparlamentarismus in Deutschland—Eine Bestandsaufnahme, in: dies. (Eds.): Landesparlamentarismus, 2nd edn., Wiesbaden, pp. 23 ff. Ottnad, Adrian (1997): Föderaler Wettbewerb statt Verteilungsstreit, Frankfurt a. M. Patzelt, Werner J. (2006): Länderparlamentarismus, in: Schneider, Herbert/Wehling, HansGeorg (Eds.): Landespolitik in Deutschland, Wiesbaden, pp. 108 ff. Peffekoven, Rolf (2013): Das angenehme Leben im Steuerkartell, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung vom 15. Februar. Pestalozzi, Christian (2005): Verfassungen der deutschen Bundesländer, 8th edn., München. Plöhn, Jürgen (1991): Untersuchungsausschüsse der Landesparlamente als Instrumente der Politik, Opladen. Putz, Sebastian (2008): Macht und Ohnmacht kleiner Koalitionspartner, Baden-Baden. Rehmet, Frank (2002): Direkte Demokratie in den deutschen Bundesländern, in: Schiller, Theo/Mittendorf, Volker (Eds.): Direkte Demokratie, Wiesbaden, pp. 102 ff. Renzsch, Wolfgang (1998): Wer beutet wen aus?, in: Politische Bildung 1998/2, pp. 39 ff. Renzsch, Wolfgang (2013): Finanzreform 2019. Irrungen, Wirrungen und tatsächliche Herausforderungen, in: Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 23 (1), pp. 117 ff. Renzsch, Wolfgang (2017): Vom “brüderlichen” zum “väterlichen” Föderalismus: Zur Neuordnung der Bund-Länder-Finanzbeziehungen ab 2020, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 48 (4), pp. 764 ff. Reutter, Werner (2004): Landesparlamente im kooperativen Föderalismus, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 50–51, pp. 18 ff. Reutter, Werner (2008): Föderalismus, Parlamentarismus und Demokratie, Opladen.

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The Municipalities: Between Administration and Politics

11

11.1 The Janus-Faced Nature of German Municipalities a. Functions and position in the political system The self-government of municipalities and districts, as guaranteed by the German constitution, can look back on a considerable tradition in Germany. Although the late medieval city freedom, with a few exceptions, did not survive the age of absolutism, the roots of the municipalities as their own political level go back to the Prussian Municipal Code of 1808, followed by the Bavarian Municipal Code of 1818, among others. Similar to federalism, two different models of municipal structures emerged: • a separation model, in which state and municipal administrations are separated from each other (Great Britain and Sweden with large municipalities stand for this in the European space); • secondly, “administrative integrated models”, in which the municipalities both implement (under state supervision) and make and implement municipal decisions. This integrated model, originally introduced in France in 1790, was adopted in the German-speaking world. The German municipalities are thus characterized by a two-faced “Janus-facedness”: on the one hand as an implementing body of state decisions (where the head of the administration or a small collegial body has sole responsibility), on the other hand as self-government of the municipality, where the elected council

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Mannewitz and W. Rudzio, The Political System of Germany, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41371-2_11

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11  The Municipalities: Between Administration and Politics

90

83

80

% of public employees

70 60

53

56

54.7

51

50 35

40

30

30 20

19

16.8

12

17

13.6

10

3.8

0 Germany

France Central State

Italy Regional

Great Britain

Sweden

Local

Fig. 11.1   Public employees by political levels 2005. Percentage residues: Public economic sectors. (Source: Bogumil 2010, p. 229)

or the municipal citizens have the say, whose decisions are also implemented by the municipal administration. The size of the municipal administrative apparatus therefore depends on the assignment of tasks/responsibilities and the federal or central state character of the state. Municipalities are relatively task-rich in Sweden, Great Britain and Germany, limited in France and Italy (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2013, pp. 31–33). As Fig. 11.1 shows, in Germany as a federal state, the majority of public employees work at the federal state level, so that its municipal employee share lies between that of the centralized Romance states and that of the municipally decentralized Sweden or Great Britain. However, the share of own tax revenue in municipal revenue does not correspond to the models: Although high in Sweden at 63.6%, it is only 12.9% in Great Britain, but in Germany it is in the European average at 39.6% (as of 2009). In addition, municipalities are dependent on various transfers from the state, which takes some of the shine off municipal autonomy in the British separation system.

11.1  The Janus-Faced Nature of German Municipalities

341

The advantages of municipal autonomy, which are not exhausted by the implementation of state decisions, can be: • • • • •

More locally based and thus needs-based decisions, Problem relief for higher political levels, Innovation impulses from preceding municipalities, Political power dispersion as well as more political participation opportunities (Naßmacher and Naßmacher 2007, p. 22 ff., 53).

Specifically for Germany: Although praised as a school of democracy, the municipalities and districts are only the backwaters of the federal states. They have no say in legislation, only the state parliaments have the power over municipal constitutions and boundaries. The federal government and the states decide among themselves what share of taxes goes to the municipalities. In this respect, the Federal Republic of Germany knows three political levels with their own representative bodies, but only two levels of statehood. In this context, German municipalities and districts fulfill their dual function: according to Art. 28 GG “to regulate all matters of the local community within the framework of the laws on their own responsibility” and at the same time to function as a lower administrative institution for the federal government and the states (“loan of organs”). In the European comparison of this level, it becomes clear that this dual role only exists in three of 13 states (Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium), but only in Germany is the municipal chief administrative officer not appointed by a higher authority (Bertrana and Heinelt 2011, p. 314). What do municipalities have to decide on, to what extent can the state intervene? Irrespective of smaller differences and terminological variants from state to state, the following task division applies: 1. Self-government matters (only under state legal supervision): – voluntary tasks (theater, museums, swimming pools, sports facilities, public transport, economic development, youth hostels, etc.); – non-binding mandatory tasks (municipal roads, development plans, school buildings, etc.); – mandatory tasks according to instruction, i.e. also under state expediency supervision (building supervision, primary schools, landscape conservation, fire protection, waste disposal). 2. Transferred scope of activity (commission matters under state legal and expediency supervision): Execution of federal and state laws such as the Federal

342

11  The Municipalities: Between Administration and Politics

Social Assistance Act, the Youth Welfare Act, the Housing Allowance Act, the Infection Protection Act and the Immission Control Act, nature conservation and food law (Schmidt-Eichstaedt 1998, pp. 326–327). Accordingly, the municipal parliament is not responsible for commission matters within the municipality, even though the execution of state laws makes up the majority of municipal administrative activities—after all, 75–90% of the federal laws requiring execution are implemented by municipalities (Bogumil and Holtkamp 2013, p. 8). It can be seen how state rights reach into municipal administration in a graded and different way. In non-legal access, one can define self-government matters as “citizen-oriented provision and small-scale control of urban development” and subdivide them into: institutions of education (schools, adult education centers, theaters, libraries), social assistance (kindergartens, youth clubs, hospitals, nursing homes, etc.), technical provision (water supply, gas, waste disposal, public transport, slaughterhouse, etc.) and recreation (parks and sports facilities, swimming pools, etc.) (Naßmacher and Naßmacher 2007, pp. 67, 97, 111). Some of these tasks are no longer processed solely by the traditional municipal administration as part of the New Public Management (cf. Sect. 12.1), but partly by autonomous units or private companies. For example, nursing homes and day-care centers have been outsourced, even cemetery administrations were not spared from “outsourcing” (Naßmacher 2000, pp. 94–95). According to a 2006 survey of 1963 municipalities and districts, • about 22 (ordering) and 28 (creation of services)% of the municipalities privatized the public transport by private companies; • 36.5% have privatized waste collection, 45.9% have privatized waste processing and 46.7% have privatized dumps, • the water supply was privatized in 11.8%, • the gas supply was privatized in 24.3%, • the energy supply was privatized in 46.3% (Bogumil and Holtkamp 2013, p. 94). From a comprehensive privatization the municipalities are thus far away. On the contrary, a “Rekommunalisierungsbewegung”, a trend back to municipalization, is noticeable, which acts as a “privatization brake” and also by referendums to bring back supply areas in municipal hands (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2013, pp. 194 f., 199). Especially in the new federal states municipalities were lagging behind in the implementation of New Public Management (Albayrak et al. 2003, pp. 26 f., 37).

11.1  The Janus-Faced Nature of German Municipalities

343

In the west, the reservations of municipal employees as well as of volunteer municipal politicians increased (Kleinfeld 1996, pp. 157 ff.; Kersting 2004, p. 115). They include that the municipal parliaments lose intervention rights and are limited to general target setting and control. Critical observers see in them also a questionable “customer orientation” instead of political, “overall societal goals” (Naßmacher 1999, pp. 336 f.) occur. b. Community size as a framework condition Can municipalities fulfill their tasks at all? This question arises in view of the size of many municipalities. In 1967 there were 24,438 municipalities in the Federal Republic, of which 44.6% had a population of less than 500 people (Beer 1970, p. 11). Lack of full-time and specialized staff, limited financial resources and lack of utilization of service facilities led to the fact that small municipalities could not fulfill many tasks. This has always been a problem of municipal self-government. For a long time one has helped oneself with the transfer of tasks to districts. Some federal states introduced “offices” as an administrative support level between municipality and district (“Kreis”), many municipalities formed voluntary associations for the joint performance of tasks (such as water supply, waste disposal, public transport); similarly, districts that are landscape associations in NRW or district associations in Bavaria, for example, are the operators of nursing and care homes. These include regional associations such as those in Hanover, Saarbrücken and Stuttgart with surrounding municipalities as well as the Rhein-Neckar region; elsewhere, metropolitan cities have only been able to bring their surrounding municipalities into loose cooperation (Bogumil and Grohs 2010, p. 98). Against this background, the wave of municipal territorial reforms that began in the early 1970s and transformed the municipal world can also be explained. The desire for larger units led to a significant reduction in the number of municipalities in the Federal Republic by 1985. At the same time, the number of districts almost halved, and the number of urban districts also decreased (Federal Statistical Office 1986, pp. 53, 60; Thieme and Prillnitz 1981). A similar land consolidation did not take place in the GDR. Only after the reunification was the number of urban and rural districts reduced, while the problem of small municipalities was initially addressed more through administrative communities in the form of offices (Schmidt-Eichstaedt 1993). One of the most recent territorial reforms is the transition to only six large rural districts in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania in 2010 (while a similar project in Thuringia was stopped in 2018 due to criticism). As a result, today’s Germany comprises a total of 10,787 municipalities, 294 districts and 106 urban districts (Federal Statistical Office 2022).

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11  The Municipalities: Between Administration and Politics

Germany thus belongs to the Nordic European space, where large municipalities with high population numbers predominate. Only eastern federal states and parts of southern Germany lag behind with smaller municipalities, similar to the municipalities with fewer inhabitants in southern Europe (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2013, pp. 33 ff.). If one sought to pursue two goals at the same time in the territorial reforms, • that of maximizing administrative performance through greater efficiency and financial strength of larger units, • and that of taking into account a sense of belonging, comprehensibility and participation opportunities, although large units have been created in many cases that are considered administratively optimal (Wagener 1974, pp. 482 ff.), they nevertheless entail a clearing of institutionalized participation opportunities. As experiences with older large municipalities suggest, municipal political awareness is likely to continue to focus on localities. “Partial localism” survives (Schneider 1991, p. 220). c. Financial dependencies Another framework condition for municipal political action is the financial endowment of the municipalities. In the long-term trend from 1985 to 2004, the share of cities and municipalities in the expenditure of public territorial bodies has decreased from 24.5 to 21.9%1. The revenue is composed, as Table 11.1 shows, primarily of taxes, fees and state allocations. The municipalities have leeway in the amount of the fees they charge. Although these may not exceed the costs, they may very well fall short of them. In the old federal states, for example, the cost coverage by fees was 92.1% for waste, 87.7% for wastewater disposal, 69.6% for street cleaning, 71.2% for cemeteries, but only 34.7% for adult education, 21.4% for baths, 11.6% for theatres, 11.9% for kindergartens, 6.8% for museums and 6.8% for libraries in 2005 (Naßmacher and Naßmacher 2007, p. 142). With regard to the second block, state financial allocations, the municipalities are dependent on the Bundesländer (states). The current allocations are indeed allocated to the municipalities according to general rules, but these are set by each federal state. The situation is different, however, with the earmarked allocations: With these, the state promotes specific purposes. Depending on the fund-

1 Data

for old federal states (Vetter and Holtkamp 2008, pp. 23 ff.).

11.1  The Janus-Faced Nature of German Municipalities

345

Table 11.1   Municipal finances in 2020 In billion EUR. Without city-states, estimated (differences to the sums due to rounding)

Income Total

Expenses 277.6

Including:

Total (Billion EUR)

274.9

Including:

Tax revenue

Personnel expenses

68.6

a) Trade taxes

37.7

Cost of goods sold

55.6

b) Income tax share

38.1

Social benefits

61.9

Construction investment

26.3

c) VAT share

8.3

d) Property taxes

13.1

Acquisition of assets

8.4

Fees

19.1

Interest on debt

2.0

112.9

Other expenses

52.1

Current allocations Investment allocations

10.8

Other (sales, etc.)

36.6

Source: Federal Ministry of Finance (2021).

ing programme, the federal government also contributes a share of the costs. The problematic aspect of this friendly practice of dotation is that the municipality’s priority setting is distorted by golden reins. Thirdly, with regard to tax revenue, it should be noted that • in addition to the municipal real taxes (trade and property taxes) and smaller municipal consumption taxes (e.g. dog tax), the municipality itself can decide on the amount within certain predetermined limits (tax rates), • the larger block belongs to the joint taxes, to which the municipalities contribute (15% of income and 2.2% of sales tax). Interesting for the municipalities is above all the considerable trade tax. 80.2% of its revenue goes to the respective municipality.2. Its importance lies in the relative independence from the population. Its height, i.e. the local surcharge, is in the hands of the municipality, which can also promote local industry. Whether a municipality is considered rich or poor therefore depends primarily on its local

2 Cf.

Sect.  10.2c.

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11  The Municipalities: Between Administration and Politics

income: whether it collects trade taxes per inhabitant of 3572 € like Gräfelfing or only 55 € like Forst in Lausitz (German Association of Towns and Municipalities 2017)3. The trade tax effect is dampened by the municipal share of 15% of the income from income tax (Table 11.1). This—as well as efforts to offer an attractive local job market (income tax share!)—drives municipalities and districts into a competition as a business location. This is fought with the help of low trade tax rates, expanded infrastructure, offers of subsidized commercial property and tolerance for environmental pollution. Politicians sometimes develop a certain “willingness to serve” (Hähnig 2022) in dealing with investors. Even if established companies cannot move away without loss, this makes business promotion a central task of municipal politics. Economic development ranks at the top of their priorities4. The local surcharges for trade tax show both tax-weak and tax-strong cities in the top group with high rates, but also at the bottom with low rates. It seems that the strategies of the city politicians are different—whoever has little business may decide in favor of attractiveness for new settlers or for sucking out what he (still) has. However, all differences are overshadowed by the financial gap between the municipalities in the West and the East as it exists in their own revenues. Nevertheless, it is possible to reduce the strong tax deficit in the new federal states (2020: 840 € per inhabitant compared to 1364 in the West) by higher transfers from the state/federal government, fees, etc. As a result, the municipalities have 3893 € per inhabitant in the West and 3536 in the East at their disposal (Bertelsmann Foundation 2021, p. 18 in section C).5 The municipalities in the East can improve their infrastructure, but “with continued weak tax revenue, they are dependent on state subsidies” (Karrenberg and Münstermann 1994, p. 142). The much-lamented lack of municipal financial autonomy has therefore worsened with German unity. In western Germany, continuously rising social benefits weigh on the municipalities, especially if only low trade taxes and income tax shares, as in a number of Ruhr region cities, are due. They accumulate municipal debts cumulatively, which at the end of 2020 in the Federal Republic amounted to 1721 € per head

3 As

early as 1911, the municipal tax revenue per head of 62 marks in the prosperous Frankfurt am Main spread over 40 marks in the middle field (as in Königsberg or Magdeburg) to 25–27 marks in workers’ cities such as Herne or Königshütte (Zielinski 1997, p. 119). 4 Survey of 2003 quoted after Egner (2007, p. 149). 5 Only landlocked countries.

11.2  Directly Elected Mayors, but Two Models of Democracy

347

(total 132.4 billion), in Rhineland-Palatinate even 3189 and in Saarland 3148 € per head (Bertelsmann Foundation 2021, pp. 50 ff. in section C). All in all, when considering finances, it becomes visible that although municipalities also benefit from the current flood of public money (surplus revenue in 2020, Table 11.1), they are significantly dependent on state financial allocations and commercial tax revenue. The latter still largely decides, despite mitigation through municipal income tax shares, whether a municipality is considered wealthy or not.

11.2 Directly Elected Mayors, but Two Models of Democracy a. The municipalities—to what extent a field of party politics? Like federalism, municipal self-government long did not carry an actually democratic character: Rather, it only formed a limited scope of action of the liberal bourgeoisie within the absolutist state, shielded from a dominance of the broad masses by voting restrictions (Heffter 1950; Frey 1976). It was not until the introduction of the same municipal voting rights in 1918 that this changed. When the Weimar Republic collapsed, the fate of its democratic municipal self-government also collapsed. After 1945, the occupying powers sought to democratize the municipal constitutions more strongly through the transfer of their own models: the Americans through town meetings and elements of direct democracy, the British through a municipal constitutional reform that concentrated all decision-making powers in the municipal parliaments and relegated the municipal administrative leaders to a merely executive role (Rudzio 1968). Although local issues always found considerable public interest, for a long time the municipal level was considered rather apolitical in Germany. This understanding, which is based on the widely individualized character of municipal decisions and on the fact that they often concern spatial and thus less party political interests, has not completely disappeared even today. Parts of the municipal science literature were also long characterized by a defensive attitude towards the role of political parties in the municipal sector, since “the municipal problems are overwhelmingly factual” and not “party political” in nature (Ziebill 1954, pp. 26 ff.; Ziebill 1972, pp. 62 ff.). As late as the early 1970s, 74.4% of citizens believed that parties should not play a role in municipal politics (Oel 1972, p. 72).

348

11  The Municipalities: Between Administration and Politics

In the meantime, however, a more political view of the municipalities has taken root. This is reflected in terminological shifts—from the traditional concept of “municipal self-government” to “municipal politics”, from “municipal representation” to “municipal parliament” -, but above all in the call for parliamentarization of municipal constitutions as well as in the adoption of municipal party programs by the larger parties for the first time in 1975/76. Even more significant seems to be a differentiation of specifically municipal political action systems from local society. As signs of such a development, the following can be considered: First, the advance of parties in the municipal sector: With the decline of free voter groups, whose share of votes in 1977 was only 14% in Baden-Württemberg, 5% in Bavaria and 4% in Rhineland-Palatinate (Klein 1979, pp. 100 ff.; Haller 1979, pp. 347 ff.), the political parties achieved a monopoly of candidate presentation in the municipal sector to a large extent—also with regard to administrative positions, whereby professional civil servants are “degraded” (Weidenfeld 2017, p. 138). However, the development did not continue in a straight line. Rather, free voter groups have stabilized again in southern Germany and achieved voter shares of 37.8% in Bavaria, 31.7% in Baden-Württemberg, 17.5% in Rhineland-Palatinate, 12.1% in Hesse, even 8% in Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia in the 1999–05 municipal elections (Gehne 2008, pp. 55 f.). Regardless of how far membership of a party has been established as a prerequisite for nomination, personal popularity, social reputation and local affiliation still play a major role in nomination and election. Wherever the municipal voting rights offer the alternative of list and personal voting, voters often prefer the latter and prefer candidates from their own district (Czarnecki 1992, p. 100). In seven cities in Baden-Württemberg it can be seen that smaller parties, in particular non-ideologically extreme ones such as the Free Voters, the Greens and the FDP, benefit disproportionately from panachage6. Municipal councillors in Baden-Württemberg attribute their election primarily to their level of awareness, further to their involvement in clubs and only thirdly to their party activity (Köser 1991, p. 146). In mayoral elections, independents are also successful, not least in the new federal states. In summary, one can speak of a party politicization of municipal politics, but one that is limited and weaker in rural areas. Second, the emergence of citizen initiatives since the early 1970s: Previously, local “citizens’ associations” articulated local interests of the population, only

6 Period

1980–2014 (Nyhuis 2016, p. 665, 669).

349

11.2  Directly Elected Mayors, but Two Models of Democracy Table 11.2   Task preferences of council members 2008

Rank by importance (1–10) FDP

CDU

CSU

SPD

Grüne

Linke

Other

Settlement of economic activities

1

1

1

1

4

1

1

Creating high-quality jobs

2

2

2

2

3

4

2

Better traffic infrastructure/ services

3

3

3

5

7

7

4

Measures for environmental protection

8

6

5

4

1

8

3

Measures against exclusion/ poverty

7

9

8

3

2

1

6

Preservation of social security 9

7

6

6

5

3

9

Other = Free Voters and Others Source: Written questionnaire of council members in 120 representative communities (>10,000 inhabitants), n = 894 (response rate), in: Egner et al. (2013, p. 80).

incidentally also other clubs and organizations—up to and including shooting and sports clubs. With the citizen initiatives, specifically municipally politically engaged groups appeared for the first time. They also became a new phenomenon in local politics through forms of their unconventional participation. Meanwhile, their sensational character has weakened, but a certain municipal political relevance has remained (Roth 1994). Third, an increased awareness of conflict: Once a “harmony model” prevailed in municipal politics (Kevenhörster 1976, p. 244), this now indicates changes in factual differences and political majority formations. Municipal politics became more conflict-prone when the Young Socialists discovered a lever for social change in municipal politics in 1971 and, through citizen initiatives or the Greens, the tension between environmental protection and economic development was addressed. Currently, the survey of members of municipal councils of representative municipalities shows party-political differences in which tasks are given priority (Table 11.2): • In economic terms (tasks 1–3), the FDP, CDU and CSU members of the Council agree completely, while the Greens are far behind with rank 4, the Left and the Greens with highly qualified jobs, and finally the SPD with transport. It is clear that in economic matters the SPD can still cooperate with the right-wing parties.

350

11  The Municipalities: Between Administration and Politics

• Within both camps, there is a lack of agreement on environmental protection, with the extreme Greens on rank 1 having the least distance to Others and SPD. • In the social dimension, one can clearly distinguish between exclusion/poverty on the left and right, while municipal social services have a high rank only for the Left Party. So there are different task and thus also goal preferences among the members of the council recognizable by parties, which justify a party political structuring of the municipal field from the matter. In addition, the council members arrange themselves on an eleven-digit left-right scale so that the parties appear in the usual Linke-Grüne-SPD-Free Voters-FDP-CDU-CSU sequence—with the exception of the Left with wide ranges (Egner et al. 2013, p. 77). The latter points to overlaps between the parties. In the new federal states, too—as in 1997, a survey of municipal faction leaders—CDU and FDP parliamentary groups differed significantly from those of the three left-wing parties: by promoting private home ownership, fewer social benefits, emphasis on internal security (police), promotion of individual traffic and rejection of foreign immigration (Pollach et al. 2000, pp. 50, 100, 231). b. The inner compromise of the municipal constitutions Every municipal constitution has to answer the central question: How can municipal democracy and administrative efficiency be guaranteed at the same time? In addition, every municipal construction must move within a reasonable cost framework. It cannot afford to be able to replace a municipal administration head at any time by a council resolution—then to face the dilemma of either paying hardly affordable severance payments or having to do without qualified candidates. Where there is a separation model between state and municipal administration, one can—as in Great Britain—design the constitution more in favor of local democracy: as a monistic model, which entrusts all decision-making powers to the council and leads to “government by committee”. Administrative staff and their head have no decision-making powers of their own under law. The British sought to implant this concept in Germany after the Second World War. Given the lower efficiency of this model, especially in large cities (all-competence of volunteers—Rudzio 1968, p. 200 ff.), it is not surprising that the other basic concept, the dualistic municipal constitution, under which the council and the administration head retain separate, own powers, persisted in other democratic states, including Germany.

11.2  Directly Elected Mayors, but Two Models of Democracy

351

The federal states seek to solve this problem in different ways. They have in common that the municipal council (or district council)—the elected local representative body—acts as the highest and deciding body (principle of representative democracy). The municipal voting rights usually seek to give the voter influence on the personnel composition of the council through personal elections. Even small candidate groups have a chance, as the five percent hurdle no longer applies. The possibility of targeted personnel selection is also used extensively. As studies of the municipal elections in 1999 and 2001 in Baden-Württemberg, Rheinland-Pfalz and Hesse showed, more than half of the voters cumulated or split their votes. As a result, only a minority of the candidates retained their place on the list. The weight of the parties appears to be pushed back, the party discipline weakened (Behr 2004). The democratic leadership of the municipalities is realized essentially through the municipal parliaments (councils). In all municipal constitutions they elect the administration head („elected officials“) for a fixed longer period of time. They are also superior to the administrations as decision-making bodies. However, this does not apply to the area of administrative competence, the boundaries of which are drawn differently. Early parliamentary elections are excluded. As a result, there is the problematic and also realistic possibility from a parliamentary-democratic point of view that a municipal council of a certain political character will face an administrative team of a different color over the years. The former municipal constitutions solved this problem differently. In the South German Council Constitution, the mayor was elected as head of the administration and chairman of the council by the citizens and thus received original legitimacy. Even the Rhinelandic Mayor’s Constitution gave the mayor, although only elected by the council, the dominant position. In contrast, the monistic North German Council Constitution (British origin; NRW, Lower Saxony) assigned the council executive management competences as well, while the head of the administration (“municipal director”) was only intended as an executive instrument. The “pseudeo magistrate constitution” mitigated the problem by a collegial administrative management team, which consisted of half-time professional and honorary short-term members. The municipal constitution introduced by the GDR People’s Chamber in 1990 provided for a four-year election period for the municipal council and the administrative team; but no state remained with this solution. All of this is now history. In the 1990s, a “triumphant march of the plebiscitary mayor’s constitution” took place and all other, especially representative constitutional types were swept away (Bovenschulte and Buß 1996, pp. 36), starting with Schleswig-Holstein in 1991 (the first state after Baden-Württemberg, which

352

11  The Municipalities: Between Administration and Politics

has been based on the constitution since 1956). Everywhere, the direct election of the mayor as a full-time head of the administration prevailed, mostly combined with the possibility of his/her early dismissal. In most cases, the position of the mayor was also strengthened, both in relation to the municipal council and within the administrative apparatus. In summary, one could also speak of a “presidential municipal constitution” (Holtkamp 2008, pp. 21, 23)—in analogy to the mayor as a directly elected president with executive powers and next to the parliament. However, many regulations have remained different, regional traditions have an effect—especially with regard to the distribution of competences between the municipal assembly and the mayor and district administrator, the term of office of the mayor or the district administrator as well as the framework conditions of citizen initiatives and citizen referendums (Bogumil and Holtkamp 2013, p. 32) (Table 11.3): 1. The unchanged Southern German Mayor’s Constitution: In it, the directly elected mayor acts as head of administration and at the same time chairman of the council. In addition, he has a right of veto against council decisions. This type of constitution is based on the integration of the democratically legitimized council and mayor under the leadership of the latter. 2. A variant of this is the dualistic mayor’s constitution. In it, the leadership of the municipal parliament remains in the hands of a member of the council. This emphasizes the independence of the council. In many cases it remains open whether this type differs practically from the South German model only symbolically. 3. The council constitution with a popularly elected mayor can be characterized by the North Rhine-Westphalian and Lower Saxon municipal constitutions. They basically postulate an all-competence of the council, also in the administrative area—the British reform sends its greetings. But the term of office of the mayor is as long as elsewhere. 4. Analogously, the pseudo magistrate’s constitution with a popularly elected mayor in Hesse reminds of the past. It does indeed give the directly elected mayor the organizational power in the administration, but it cements him in a collegial, administrative magistrate and leaves him little room for manoeuvre in the event of a conflict. An index of mayoral competences provides results which support the above statements. They correlate negatively with the council competences, provided that one leaves out Saarland, where the mayor is weak (Bogumil and Holtkamp 2016, p. 30), without the council being strong—the smallness of the country could be the

11.2  Directly Elected Mayors, but Two Models of Democracy

353

Table 11.3   Differences in the municipal constitutions

Type/federal state

Enacting body: municipal council/district council

Term of office

Citizen referendum

Administrative leadership:

Chairper- Council District (approval Body son compe- council quorum) (term of tenciesa) compeoffice) tenciesa)

Election by (dismissal quorum)

Southern German mayoral constitution: BadenWürttemberg

5 J

Mayor/ County Council

0.10

0.50

Bayern

6 J

Mayor/ County Council

0.33

0.60

Rheinland- 5 J Pfalz

Mayor/ County Council

0.29

0.45

Saarland

5 J

Mayor/ County Council

0.36

0.50

Saxony

5 J

Mayor/ County Council

0.23

0.40

Thuringia

5 J

Mayor/ County Council

0.35

0.30

Dualistic Mayoral Constitution: Branden5 J Council 0.47 burg Member/ HonoraryMayor Council 0.47 Mecklen- 5 J Member burg-Vorpommern

Yes (25 %)

Mayor/ County Council (8 y.) Yes Mayor/ (10–20 %) County Council (6 y.) Yes Mayor/ (20 %) County Council (8 y.) Yes Mayor/ (30 %.) County Council (8 y.) Yes Mayor/ (25 %) County Council (7 y.) Yes Mayor/ (10–20 %) County Council (6 y.)

0.50

Yes (25 %)

0.55

Yes (25 %)

Mayor/ County Council (8 y.) Mayor/ County Council (7–9 y.)

Citizen/ KT (n/a)

Citizen (n/a)

Citizen (30 %)

Citizen (30 %)

Citizen (50 %)

Citizen (30 %)

Citizen/ KT (25%) Citizen (25 %)

(continued)

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11  The Municipalities: Between Administration and Politics

Table 11.3   (continued)

Type/federal state

SaxonyAnhalt

Enacting body: municipal council/district council

Citizen referendum

Administrative leadership:

Term of office

Chairper- Council District (approval Body son compe- council quorum) (term of tenciesa) compeoffice) tenciesa)

Election by (dismissal quorum)

5 J

Council 0.31 Member/ Honorary Mayor

0.65

Yes (25 %)

Mayor/ County Council (7 y.)

Citizen (30 %)

Council Member

0.75

Yes (20 %)

Mayor/ County Council (6–8 y.)

Citizen/ KT (20 %)

Yes (25%)

Mayor/ District head (8 years)e)

Citizens/ KT (25%)

Schleswig– 5 J Holstein

0.53

Constitution with democratically elected mayor: Lower Saxony

5 years

Council member

0.42

0.30

0.60 Mayor/ District Administrator

0.55

Council member

0.55

Yes Mayor/ Citizens (10–20%) District (25%) Administrator (6 Y.)f) Unreal Magistracy Constitution with democratically elected mayor: 5Y North RhineWestphalia

Hessen (Bremerhaven)

5Y

0.69

Yes (25%)c)

MagCitizen istrate/ (30%)d) County Committeeb)

Abbreviations: Y. = year(s); KT = Kreistag a) Index 0 (= no powers at all) to 1 (= all powers) for rat power formed on the basis of 12 coded rat competences (Egner/Krapp/Heinelt 2013) or on the basis of 10 competences for the powers of the district councils (Egner and Heinelt 2016, see sources) b) With mayor and district administrator elected by citizens for 6 years c) In Bremerhaven 30%, in city of Bremen 20%, in Berlin districts 15% d) In Bremerhaven election by council e) In Lower Saxony in addition administrative committee from mayor and council representatives f) In North Rhine-Westphalia administrative board from mayor + full-time deputy mayors. Sources: Bogumil and Holtkamp (2013, pp. 30 ff.); Bovenschulte and Buß (1996); Buß (2002, pp. 82 ff.); Egner and Heinelt (2016); Egner et al. (2013, pp. 40 ff., 48, 54); Kost and Wehling (2010, pp. 406–408).

11.2  Directly Elected Mayors, but Two Models of Democracy

355

explanation. Modifications of the municipal constitution are provided for by the municipal ordinances for small municipalities. This is mainly about the honorary mayor. This is made possible by the transfer of administrative functions to administrative communities; this is the case with the majority of small municipalities (Bovenschulte and Buß 1996, p. 36). c. Mayor, Council and Citizens’ Assembly in the Decision-making Process The constitutional practice in the municipalities is characterized by the problem to what extent the municipal parliaments are actually able to fulfill the functions assigned to them of deciding, controlling and partly also administering. The difficulty lies in an overload of the honorary members of the council. Publicly financed fractional services and managers support the fractional work of the council in larger cities (Naßmaßer 1989, p. 68; Kempf 1989, p. 127), but this does not solve the problem. This is reflected in the time budget of the council members. A 2008 survey that representatively surveyed 120 German municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants showed that the council members required an average of 43 h monthly for their political activity inside and outside the council; the council work grows with the population of the municipality7. When limited to the council member function, they require 38 h, which is significantly lower than the average of 48.5 h in the European 16-country comparison (Verhelst et al. 2013, p. 43). The allowances appear hardly attractive in view of this time expenditure. For example, in North Rhine-Westphalia, from 2007 on the monthly council member allowances in cities with 20–50,000 inhabitants were 252 €, with 50–150,000 whole 336, with 150–450,000 inhabitants 418 and in larger cities 501 € (Holtkamp 2011, p. 108). As a result, the factor “livelihood” becomes increasingly important for the composition of the councils. Although self-employed and leading employees from the private sector still make up a considerable 22% of all council members (including only 2.3% farmers), at least 24.7% are officials and teachers, to which public employees are added—the public service is strongly represented. The third large group are 19.4% pensioners, the fourth other employees with probably more than 10%. Workers, employees and women are underrepresented (their council member share: 21.7%). In total, 54.9% have a university or college degree, another 13% have the A-level or equivalent (Egner et al. 2013, pp. 58, 63, 66). Thus, professional background, educational level, age of entry into the

7 Of

4,036 addressed council members, 894 answered (Egner et al. 2013, pp. 12 ff., 98).

356

11  The Municipalities: Between Administration and Politics

council and the proportion of women of German council members do not seem to be far from the average of council members from 16 European countries8. In four German metropolises with more than 400,000 inhabitants, almost all council members have release or reduced working hours as well as more flexible working hours, but only 35% reach the release 80 and more percent of the working time (Reiser 2006, pp. 149, 158, 166). Such reliefs for employees are, to a lesser extent, also to be assumed in other municipalities in order to make the low-paid mandate bearable. But whether with or without such help: Especially in larger and economically stronger municipalities, the council work almost requires a “half-day job”, which also promotes professionalization tendencies on this level (Reiser 2017, p. 104). More recently, there has also been an investigation into the composition of district councils in terms of personnel. Unfortunately, it has not been representative; it also does not provide any information on professions. Nevertheless, clear similarities with the members of the council are recognizable: an average age of 53.8 years (54.1 for municipal council members), the proportion of women of 22.4% compared to 21.7% for council members, a slightly higher level of education with 63.2% of university and college graduates (compared to 54.9% for council members), confessions close to those of the population, above-average 28.2% trade union members and 12.6% members of employer and business organizations9. With regard to political attitudes, the members of the district councils place themselves on a left-right self-assessment between 1 and 10 in such a way that a usual party sequence results: Left (1.68)—Green (3.28)—SPD (3.31)—FDP (5.52)— CDU (6.36)—CSU (6.44). The largest gaps are therefore between the Left and the Greens as well as between the SPD and the FDP. On average, 13.5 years lie between party membership and the first election to the district council—shorter in the new federal states. And, again close to the members of the council, they give 10.6 hours per week as the time spent on their mandate (Egner and Heinelt 2016, pp. 75, 86, 96). All in all: The municipal representatives in towns and districts, close to the lower executive level of German laws, decide on municipal services and facilities, forming a hinge between the professional political class and the electorate—standing between the two, close to both. In the field of political science, three theses compete with regard to the question of how municipal political decision-making is carried out in this

8 Survey 9 Return

2007, n = 11,962. Verhelst 2013, p. 35. n = 1645 (Egner and Heinelt 2016, pp. 11, 14, 65, 67 ff., 70, 72, 109 ff.).

11.2  Directly Elected Mayors, but Two Models of Democracy

357

c­ ontext. At the beginning was the thesis of municipal “Politics under executive leadership”(Kevenhörster 1977). This was followed by the thesis of an informal circle of influential “deciders”, composed of leading representatives of the political majority from both the political and administrative spheres (Banner 1972; Winkler-Haupt 1988, p. 187). The third thesis, developed from comparative empirical studies between the practice of the council constitution of British origin in North Rhine-Westphalia and the southern German model in Baden-Württemberg, sets out two polar models in opposition to each other, between which municipal political practice in Germany is located. This approach is presented below. d. Practice in the context of mayoral leadership How can the practice under the direct democratic new mayoral constitutions be described? If one goes through the legal powers of the municipal executive (mayor, magistrate), the results agree that they are the furthest-reaching in BadenWürttemberg and Saxony-Anhalt, while in the case of magistrate constitutions (Hesse) and the council constitution with a mayor elected by the people (NRW, Lower Saxony) they are the weakest. All other countries are located between the two poles (cf. Council competences in Table 11.3—Buß 2002, p. 107; Egner 2007, p. 97). Accordingly, the mayors and parliamentary group leaders of the two major parties in cities or municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants see the practice in two different ways: • The mayor is the decisive figure in the politics and administration of the city: 48.5% of respondents in Baden-Württemberg say “yes”, compared to only 27.4% in NRW. • 57.7% of respondents in Baden-Württemberg and 88.5% of respondents in NRW agree that the deliberations in the council are only a “formality” because decisions have already been made in the factions. Of course, there are different power constellations on site within a federal state. In particular, the now independent direct democratic legitimation of mayor and council (or district administrator and district council) contains the dangerous possibility of a “divided government” of the American pattern—if, for example, mayor and majority in the council diverge, but neither of them can determine the course alone. Depending on the local constellation, compromises, contradictory decisions, blockades and the playing down of one side are conceivable. In summary, this points to considerable differences depending on the local constitution: legally as well as in reality, decisive majority factions occur more

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11  The Municipalities: Between Administration and Politics

often in North Rhine-Westphalia, while leading mayors occur more often in Baden-Württemberg. Analogous differences can be seen in the politicization of parties. Significantly more often, the use of party logos in the local election campaign and party discipline in the council were mentioned in North Rhine-Westphalia10. In a comparison of all German federal states, North Rhine-Westphalia (together with Saarland) actually turns out to be the “motherland of party politics” in local politics, while Baden-Württemberg forms the opposite pole (Gehne 2008, pp. 59, 101). Apart from that, local elections have been the level for years in which voter groups without connection to a state or national party have been successful (Holtkamp et al. 2015)—above all because of their anti-party character, from which they benefit in politically deprived communities (Juen et al. 2021). Differences can also be seen in the recruitment of mayors. Although a shift towards the Baden-Württemberg model is recognizable, this is still the case: In NRW, the mayor spends more time on faction and party work than his/her counterpart in Baden-Württemberg (Bogumil et al. 2003, pp. 14, 64). For all of Germany, a representative survey of mayors of communities with more than 10,000 inhabitants carried out in 2003 showed that • about half of them have a completed administrative training, • 80% are party members, but only 46% held party functions before. It is noticeable that in Baden-Württemberg, only 56% of the mayors were party members and only 22% had previously held party functions.11 When asked about the influence of the local party organization on the city council faction, the North Rhine-Westphalian city council members on average estimate it to be significantly higher than that of the Baden-Württemberg members. However, the local party influence is rated higher in Schleswig-Holstein, Saarland, Hesse and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania than in NRW, on the other hand, it is rated lower in Brandenburg and Saxony-Anhalt than in Baden-Württemberg12. In this respect, the two opposed states therefore do not appear as the extreme poles.

10 Survey

2003, response rate 69–75% (Holtkamp 2003, pp. 31ff.; Gehne and Holtkamp 2005). 11 N = 629 (Egner 2007, pp. 43, 45, 126ff., 155). 12 Survey 2008, in: Egner et al. (2013, p. 76).

11.2  Directly Elected Mayors, but Two Models of Democracy

359

In summary: In general, party affiliations of mayors have weakened. Instead of “party soldiers and shooting kings”, the future seems to belong to the type of “administrative professional”(Holtkamp et al. 2002). It is difficult to see what role the strengthened sovereign, the community people, plays in the municipal decision-making process. After 1990, the possibility of municipal citizen referendums has spread throughout all federal states. If the older experiences pointed to a rather marginal role of citizen referendums, participation in referendums has now grown. By 2022, there were a total of 4408 citizen referendums, of which 2305 were successful (“in favor of the petition” or “accepted by majority vote”). If citizen initiatives are included, a total of 8,184 direct democratic procedures can be mentioned (Lietzmann et al. 2022). Financial and organizational questions may not be the subject matter—with the exception of Bavaria, the Mecca of municipal referendums. Nevertheless, the procedures now also spread widely in terms of content, affecting (among the 10,183 procedures reported by 2022) public social and educational institutions (13.1%), transport projects (16.2%), economic projects such as supermarkets (18.1%), public infrastructure and utility facilities (13.1%), territorial reform (8.6%) and planning regulations (4.5%). There are two critical points to citizen referendums: First, that referendums in Switzerland and the USA tend to result in more bourgeois-conservative positions. This does not necessarily apply to municipal citizen referendums in Germany, because different issues have to be decided at the local level. Of course, the “not in my backyard” interest that is common in the USA can hinder local changes (Holtkamp and Brockmann 2016, pp. 24–28, 47–48). The second critical point is the voting participation, which is supposed to give legitimacy to a decision. It ranges from 10 to 80% in Germany and is lower the larger the municipality is. However, there is a quorum of 20–30% of the eligible voters, which must comprise a majority (possibly lower only in Bavaria, NRW, Thuringia, see Table 11.3) and with which the rule of small minorities is excluded. Spectacular are decisions against the majority in the city council: for example rejections of privatizations—as in 2006 in Freiburg against the sale of 8900 city-owned apartments or in 2008 in Leipzig against the sale of city companies and stakes in the field of public services. Also, some large projects fail because of the citizens—as in 2017 in Duisburg, where a large designer outlet center, decided by the city council, was brought down by a narrow majority (but with a 60% participation) in a citizen referendum. Certainly, the direct effects of successful citizen initiatives (in view of the large number of municipalities) are so rare that they seem rather negligible—but it is noteworthy that possible citizen initiatives are taken into account preventively.

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11  The Municipalities: Between Administration and Politics

Observers therefore note a certain loss of power for the city council and the mayor, because they often respond to citizen concerns (Bogumil and Holtkamp 2013, p. 119). In North Rhine-Westphalia, the “sword of Damocles” of the citizen initiative (Jörg Bogumil) leads to the fact that about a quarter of the citizen initiatives are largely taken over by the majority in the city council and decision-makers often refrain from parking fees, privatizations and swimming pool closures (Holtkamp 2008, pp. 265, 267). The right to early dismissal of a mayor is used relatively rarely. Until 2007 there were 52 failed and 46 successful dismissal processes (28 of them in Brandenburg and Saxony-Anhalt), some of them initiated by the city council. Particularly spectacular were dismissals in Potsdam, Görlitz, Hanau and Cottbus. The central problem is seen to be a sufficient level of participation (Fuchs 2007, pp. 54, 62, 77). If one tries to process these diverse phenomena, the distinction between “communal concordance and competition democracy” is offered as an ideal type, the former characterized by • low party politicization in administration and city council (the latter by strong party politicization), • candidate nomination according to social reputation (vs. inner-party probation), • low organizational level of the parties (vs. high), • unanimous city council decisions (vs. non-unanimous), • concordant value concepts of the city council members (vs. competitive democratic), • hardly any fixed coalitions (vs. fixed coalitions) (Bogumil and Holtkamp 2005, p. 47). Plebiscitary tendencies can probably be assigned to the concordance model13. Whether political practice corresponds more to one or the other model, i.e. is more or less shaped by party politicization, depends on the municipal constitution, the size of the municipality and the organizational level of the parties. If these three factors are taken into account, the chances for concordance democratic municipal politics seem favorable in Baden-Württemberg and in the new

13 In it, there are more citizen initiatives and compromises with their initiators, and the participation rates are higher (Holtkamp 2016, p. 208).

References

361

federal states (with the exception of Brandenburg), while competition democratic practice seems more likely in North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, Saarland and Hesse. Analogously, the influence of the mayor is not only due to the municipal constitutions, but also due to the regional political culture (party politicization, etc.) relatively high in southern Germany, relatively low in Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia and Hesse (Holtkamp 2008, pp. 121, 105).

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Deutscher Städtetag (2017): Gleichwertige Lebensverhältnisse von Aachen bis Zwickau. Schlaglichter aus dem Gemeindefinanzbericht 2017 des Deutschen Städtetages, unter: https://www.staedtetag.de/files/dst/docs/Publikationen/Beitraege-zur-Stadtpolitik/ Archiv/beitraege-zur-stadtpolitik-111-gleichwertige-lebensverhaeltnisse-schlaglichtergemeindefinanzbericht-2017.pdf (zuletzt geprüft am 30. März 2022). Egner, Björn (2007): Einstellungen deutscher Bürgermeister, Baden-Baden. Egner, Björn et al. (2013): Das deutsche Gemeinderatsmitglied, Wiesbaden. Egner, Björn/Heinelt, Hubert (2016): Kreistagsmitglieder und Landräte, Baden-Baden. Frey, Rainer (1976): Kommunale Selbstverwaltung im Verfassungsstaat, in: ders. (Hg.): Kommunale Demokratie, Bonn, pp. 9 ff. Fuchs, Daniel (2007): Die Abwahl von Bürgermeistern—ein bundesweiter Vergleich, Potsdam. Gehne, David H. (2008): Bürgermeisterwahlen in Nordrhein-Westfalen, Wiesbaden. Gehne, David/Holtkamp, Lars (2005): Fraktionsvorsitzende und Bürgermeister in NRW und Baden-Württemberg, in: Bogumil, Jörg/Heinelt, Hubert (Eds.): Bürgermeister in Deutschland, Wiesbaden, pp. 87 ff. Hähnig, Anne (2022): Fürchtet Euch!, in: Die Zeit Nr. 13 vom 24. März. Haller, Hans-Martin (1979): Die Freien Wähler in der Kommunalpolitik, in: Köser, Helmut (Ed.): Der Bürger in der Gemeinde, Bonn, pp. 335 ff. Heffter, Heinrich (1950): Die deutsche Selbstverwaltung im 19. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart. Holtkamp, Lars (2003): Parteien in der Kommunalpolitik, Hagen. Holtkamp, Lars (2008): Kommunale Konkordanz- und Konkurrenzdemokratie, Wiesbaden. Holtkamp, Lars (2011): Professionalisierung der Kommunalpolitik?, in: Edinger, Michael/ Patzelt, Werner J. (Eds.): Politik als Beruf, Wiesbaden, pp. 103 ff. Holtkamp, Lars (2016): Zum Zusammenspiel von Konkurrenz- und Direktdemokratie, in: ders. (Eds.): Direktdemokratische Hochburgen in Deutschland, Wiesbaden, pp. 207 ff. Holtkamp, Lars/Brockmann, Nils Arne (2016): Direkte Demokratie, in: Holtkamp, Lars (Ed.): Direktdemokratische Hochburgen in Deutschland, Wiesbaden, pp. 11 ff. Holtkamp, Lars et al. (2002): Bürgermeisterkandidaten zwischen Verwaltungsprofis, Parteisoldaten und Schützenkönigen, in: Andersen, Uwe/Bovermann, Rainer (Eds.): Im Westen was Neues, Opladen, pp. 55 ff. Holtkamp, Lars et al. (2015): Kommunale Parteien und Wählergemeinschaften in Ost- und Westdeutschland, in: Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft 9 (1/2), pp. 1 ff. Juen, Christina-Marie et al. (2021): Abstiegserfahrungen in der Kommune und der Aufstieg Unabhängiger Wählergemeinschaften. Neue Befunde aus einem Mehrebenen-Kommunalpanel, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 52 (1), pp. 59 ff. Karrenberg, Hanns/Münstermann, Engelbert (1994): Gemeindefinanzbericht 1994, in: der städtetag 3/1994, pp. 134 ff. Kempf, Thomas (1989): Organisation der Fraktionsarbeit, in: ders. et al. (Eds.): Die Arbeitssituation von Ratsmitgliedern, Berlin, pp. 111 ff. Kersting, Norbert (2004): Die Zukunft der lokalen Demokratie, Frankfurt a. M. Kevenhörster, Paul (1976): Parallelen und Divergenzen zwischen gesamtsystemarem und kommunalem Wahlverhalten, in: ders. et al. (Eds.): Kommunales Wahlverhalten, Bonn, pp. 241 ff. Kevenhörster, Paul (Ed.) (1977): Lokale Politik unter exekutiver Führerschaft, Meisenheim.

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Public Administration and Implementation

12

12.1 From Administration to Public Management a. Administrative model: Rational administration or New Public Management? The functions of a political system include enforcing binding decisions and procuring means of self-preservation (money, legitimacy, armed forces). Once the reach of a governing body exceeds the limits of face-to-face communication, i.e. governing officials can no longer enforce their will directly, an organizational problem arises: an intermediary between political leadership and those subject to rule is necessary, an administration, in order to • enforce the political will, i.e. in modern societies also complex objectives, precisely (enforcement), • advise the political leadership (policy preparation), • whereby costs are minimized (cost minimization) • and no autonomy is to arise (political controllability). Four administrative models can be distinguished as relevant for German development (cf. Table 12.1). These are firstly patrimonial structures as they existed in the fief system of medieval Germany: instead of money for office-holding there was the fief, personal ties dominated, only simple objectives were to be enforced. The weakness of the system consisted in the increasing autonomy of the intermediaries (dukes and counts). The second can be referred to as “political” administration when political leadership or the ruling party seizes control of the administrative offices—in the

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Mannewitz and W. Rudzio, The Political System of Germany, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41371-2_12

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Table 12.1   Comparison of administrative models

Social context

Patrimonial structures

Political admin- Rationalistration instrumental administration

New public management

Traditional society

Modern; transitional society

Modern, market economy

Modern

Primary function Security of rule

Arm of the party/ Precise execuEconomic the president tion of legal acts achievement of predetermined goals

Organisation

Hierarchical structure, party interlocking

Hierarchical Corporate-like offices structure units

Selection criteria Origin for personnel

Political loyalty

Professionalism Professional(especially legal) ism (especially economic)

Examples

USA (especially France, Germany Great Britain, 1829–83), Nazi (so far), Singa- New Zealand, Canada Germany, China pore

Personal ties

Saudi Arabia, medieval German empire

esp. = especially Source: supplemented and modified according to Heady (1996, p. 222).

USA of the 19th century understood as a democratic solution (“spoils system”), but also suitable to support a one-party dictatorship. This is paid for with losses in professionalism. In contrast, in the third, the rational-instrumental model, politics and administration are seen as separate from each other. This model, which originated in ancient Egypt or ancient China, concentrates all decision-making powers with the respective political leadership (ruler, government), while the administration, which is subordinate as an instrument, is oriented towards professionalism and controllability. A change in political leadership is therefore possible without endangering administrative continuity. Even the modern Prussian-German administrative tradition up to the Federal Republic is shaped by the principles of such a rational organisation in the sense of Max Weber. These are (Mayntz 1978, pp. 109 ff.): • a detailed and permanent distribution of responsibilities, • a commitment to law and administrative internal rules, • a written form of administrative decisions,

12.1  From Administration to Public Management

367

• a concentration of all responsibility and powers at the head of an authority, • a commitment to annual budget plans approved by parliament. Such an organisation also corresponds to the continental European rule of law culture, which originates from Roman law, and which distinguishes between public and private and provides for comprehensive codification of law, sees administration as enforcement of law and obliges it to legality, equality of treatment and neutrality of interests. It differs from another, Anglo-Saxon administrative tradition influenced by common law, such as in Great Britain, Ireland or Malta (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2013, pp. 20 f., 24, 26). A predefined political will can be reliably, controllably and effectively carried out by a rational administration. However, the hierarchical bureaucratic structure also creates problems. On the one hand, there are efficiency losses, because this structure is associated with a division of competence-based competence, long processing times and internal administrative regulation. Critics speak of an “all-encompassing regulatory flood” (Gutjahr-Löser 1998, pp. 29 ff., 126). Also the annual and detailed allocation of funds through the budget plans often leads to uneconomic behaviour. In administrative practice, one makes do: superiors do not necessarily take every decision themselves, but delegate tasks. Coordinations often take place through more or less informal horizontal contacts between subordinate members of different departments or authorities—in the “short-circuited service path” (Mayntz 1978, pp. 112 f.); also more independent action by subordinate units is considered necessary (Lane 2000, pp. 3 f.). Another problem arises from the fact that the tasks of the public service extend beyond law enforcement functions and also include a large number of services and shaping tasks. The obligation to strictly apply the rules is then no longer sufficient as an instruction. Rather, “purpose programs” are appropriate, i.e. instructions to act in such a way that certain goals are achieved as optimally as possible. Otherwise, it seems hardly possible to control the professionally trained specialists working in the public service—the teachers, social workers, soldiers, engineers, doctors, scientists—in a less rigid way. The consequence: less rigid leadership and control by administrative heads (Mayntz 1973, pp. 100 ff.), which, however, contradicts the principles of rational organization. For the latter, the administration personnel trained in compliance with the rules, at its head the administrative lawyers1. Tensions between these two groups of staff are t­herefore

1 About

two thirds of top administrative positions in the Federal Republic of Germany were occupied by lawyers (Schwanke and Ebinger 2006, p. 233).

368

12  Public Administration and Implementation

widespread. Dysfunctional paragraph riding by the one or uncontrolled selfempowerment by the other—these accusations face each other. These problems and not least the Anglo-Saxon trend towards a fourth model of public administration, the “New Public Management”, have led to a reform movement in Germany in the 1990s. One speaks of the “New Public Management Model”, which is to lead to a “anchoring of business principles, instruments and techniques” in public administration (Czerwick 2008, p. 73). Governance should be based less on compliance with ever more refined rules than on results-based success criteria. This means in detail: First of all, the performance, the offer of a “product”, should be economically successful, with cost-benefit analyses and ongoing controlling. This includes comparisons of agencies and nationwide performance evaluations, market competition between different providers, outsourcing of tasks to private service providers (“contracting out”)—activating competition elements to “energize” the structures (Bogumil 2001, p. 115). This also affects self-employed providers such as the social institutions of the welfare associations, which are affected by the new wind that brings them competition instead of cost coverage (Heinelt and Mayer 1997). In place of the legal style of thinking, the economic style of thinking. In personnel terms, this means reducing the dominance of lawyers in management positions in the public service, especially in favor of those with business training. In place of the chamber accounting, the commercial double-entry bookkeeping (“double-entry bookkeeping”) is introduced. The advantage of this is that it not only sets income and expenditure against each other, but also includes assets and depreciation, so that resource consumption and thus costs are recorded. In addition, the task arises of also including the spun-off or privatized former in-house companies of municipalities. A comprehensive “consolidated balance sheet” in this sense was presented by Solingen as the first German city. At the level of the federal states, Hamburg introduced double-entry bookkeeping in 2003, Bremen also switched (Pergande 2007; Pergande 2012). At present, double-entry bookkeeping is being implemented in 12 of the 16 federal states. Berlin has an extended chamber accounting, Bavaria, Thuringia and Schleswig-Holstein leave the municipalities the choice between double-entry bookkeeping and chamber accounting forms. The fundamental difficulty, however, is to define appropriate success criteria for each public task and to establish competition structures. How is success in internal security, educational success, or good transport infrastructure to be defined? Quantitative evaluations would often have dysfunctional consequences: Could the policeman evaluated by the number of traffic tickets and case closures act appropriately? Would the department with the most graduates be the best?

12.1  From Administration to Public Management

369

Secondly, political governance should be based on predetermined goals, not include the steps towards them. This implies a separation between politics, which only sets goals, provides means and controls, on the one hand, and an implementing management that acts under economic imperatives, on the other. Elected politicians, hitherto “burdened with a wealth of individual decisions that have only marginal connection to political leadership” (Werner Jann quoted after Lorig 2001, p. 292), are relieved. They only set political goals by means of “target agreements” (contracts) with executive units. The term agreement is somewhat euphemistic in that it usually means a “prescription” (Hill 2001, pp. 33 ff.). But can politics and implementation really be separated? “The manner of implementation determines the political result to a large extent,” say skeptical critics (Bogumil 1997, p. 35). The question also remains to what extent parliaments are not drawn into implementation issues after all by means of controlling procedures. At least the early experiences do not allow for any certain judgments, since target agreements between politics and administration only existed in 14.8% of 804 municipalities surveyed, in 24.3% between the administrative leadership and the administration, and only 10.9% had set up decentralized controlling bodies (Bogumil and Holtkamp 2013, p. 81). The mayors seem to expect support from the New Public Management Model. Three quarters of them are in favor of the separation between goal definition by municipal politics and task fulfillment by the administration (Egner 2007, p. 155), while at least members of city councils in large cities would like to deal with individual issues in order to be close to the citizens. Only a small proportion of them assess New Public Managment positively. (Reiser 2006, p. 205, 207). According to a survey from 2009, members of city councils from the large parties are more likely to support the separation of responsibilities, while members of city councils from the smaller parties are more distant (Egner 2013, p. 141). More independent administration and direct election of the mayor—between these two, municipal councils face a “sandwich situation” (Holtmann 2012, p. 163). Thirdly, more “delegated result responsibility” instead of “input-oriented detailed governance” leads to global allocations of resources for task areas (global budgets with far-reaching temporal and material transferability of resources) (Hill 2001, p. 43; Reichard 1994, pp. 34 ff., 51). As early as 1997, general budgetary law in Germany had been opened up for such changes (Jessen 2001, pp. 18, 25). Global budgets, as practiced in one third of municipalities surveyed in 2005 (Bogumil and Holtkamp 2013, p. 82), offer opportunities for more flexible, efficient use of resources, but also mean: “The greater the executive’s scope for design and decision-making in budgetary execution is, the smaller the political governance and control capability of parliament will be, i.e. the less significance

370

12  Public Administration and Implementation

parliamentary budgetary law will have.” (Ockermann 1998, p. 98) Moreover, in municipal practice, even global budgets are exceeded, as answered by budget freezes from the part of the treasury, which in turn ignites the old familiar “December fever” among the organizational units (i.e. emptying their cash registers at the end of the year) (Holtkamp 2007, p. 47). Fourth: The New Public Managment Model tends to entrust the implementation to as autonomous organizational units as possible. In the federal and state governments, the aim is to shrink ministries to ministries of legislation and to transfer the execution of laws to autonomous federal and state offices, corporatist and private organizations (Konzendorf and Bräunlein 1998; Derlien 1995a, pp. 419 ff.). The Anglo-Saxon “agency” serves as a model, which acts autonomously within the framework of legal regulations. The best-known example of this is the “Federal Employment Agency”, which works under a third-parity administrative board (employers, trade union and government representatives). If one considers that in Germany alone, in the mid-1990s, about 50 semi-autonomous units outside the ministries were already operating on the federal level (Derlien 1995b, p. 65), then their multiplication and self-sufficiency indicates a departure from Max Weber’s administrative model (Lorig 2001, pp. 136, 143; Wollmann 2001, pp. 44 ff.). Some of these units have already shown a tendency to intervene in the political process through public statements. This increases the temptation for those in power to appoint political confidants at the top of such agencies—if only to be sure of their policy implementation. And if an established agency does not fight for its budget with political arguments? The corresponding US agencies are considered “political actors” (Döhler 2007, p. 123). The interest in the growth of the budget of one’s own unit is also likely to be problematic for autonomous units. With it, after all, the career prospects of those employed there improve. Already today, every authority strives to consume approved budgetary funds and to find further needs with the best of conscience (Niskanen 1971, pp. 38 ff.)—the teacher fights for better education, the social worker for the socially weak, the female finance officer for effective tax collection. The outsourcing in small and medium-sized towns and districts has mainly covered the supply of electricity, gas, water and district heating, in addition to savings banks, public transport, hospitals and waste disposal. This has been done in different legal forms: as an in-house operation, public utility or GmbH. In cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants, the municipal participation in GmbHs clearly prevails with 73.4% compared to only 9.2% in-house operations and 4.9% in stock corporations. However, 51% of all outsourced companies are majorityowned by municipalities in the 30 largest German cities (Killian et al. 2006,

12.1  From Administration to Public Management

371

pp. 29, 32, 37, 63 ff., 96). For transport infrastructure such as bridges, roads, etc., “Public Private Partnerships” are spreading. As expected, members of the FDP vote for outsourcing and privatization, while those of the Union parties and the Free Voters take a neutral to slightly positive position, while the representatives of the three left-wing parties, in particular the Left Party, vote negatively here (Egner et al. 2013, p. 151). In summary, Bogumil and others conclude from their surveys of the administrations of 870 municipalities that although two-thirds of the municipalities have introduced individual elements of the New Public Management, only 16.1% orient themselves to its overall concept (Bogumil and Holtkamp 2013, pp. 78 ff.). All in all: The reform balance is “sobering”. The “customer orientation” has grown, but a “loss of influence” of the city council and widespread “frustration” among municipal employees have been found (Bogumil et al. 2007, p. 98, 316; Möltgen and Pippke 2009, p. 218). The public administration in Germany is still anchored in the rational administrative model, but is increasingly showing features of the New Public Management. In addition, there are still problems with the traditional administrative structure. They have led to recent developments in which two federal states offer different solutions for the middle state level: Baden-Württemberg has indeed retained the three levels of state government—state intermediate instance (government presidents)—commission administration through the districts, but has integrated special administrations located outside of these levels (“concentrated three-tier”). Alternatively, Lower Saxony proceeded in a way that abolished the government presidents and switched to a “two-tier” state-municipal level (Reiners 2008, p. 26, 29 f.). The variety of administrative structures has increased as a result of the small size of most federal states. Administrative districts only exist today in four federal states. Another, more recent innovation that originated from coalition political compromises was the 353 working groups between the Federal Employment Agency and interested municipalities for the placement of long-term unemployed people. This administrative unique selling proposition (an “o’clock in the morning beer coaster compromise”, as the head of the employment agency called it) was declared unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court in 2007. It represents an “unconstitutional mixed administration” under the Basic Law (Wollmann 2008, p. 169 f.). This was done in anticipation of future growth. b. Personnel prototype: From civil servant to service provider Today’s Germany has a comparatively lean public service. The outsourcing of the railway and postal services from the public sector, but also restrained personnel

372

12  Public Administration and Implementation

35 29.3

Percent of all employees

30

26.2

25

21.9

20

17.4 14.6

15

14.3

12.3

12 9.7

10

9.7

9.6

5

an y m

nd la itz er

Ge r

d an Sw

s rla

Po l

nd

n Sp

ai

he Ne t

ly Ita

US A

Br it

ai

n

ce at

an

Gr e

Fr

en ed Sw

No r

w

ay

0

Fig. 12.1   Publicly employed people in Europe and the USA in 2008. Source: Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2013, p. 102

policy, have contributed to this (cf. Fig. 12.1). The numbers approximately cover the personnel that is subject to public regulation and whose work areas are not exposed to free market competition. If we turn to the public personnel system applicable to this group, we can speak of a civil service system for the Federal Republic of Germany. Developed in the mandarin system of ancient China or with the civil service of monarchical France and Prussia, it found its name in England in the 19th century. It is characterized by three elements: • Selection and promotion of public personnel takes place according to merit and ability—which should exclude arbitrariness, origin criteria and patronage. • The appointment is for a fixed period of time (“tenure”), and an appropriate, lifelong pension is provided by the state, which is intended to support the loyalty of the staff and justify strike bans. • The staff is responsible to the government or superiors. At least holders of higher positions should refrain from political activity. According to the rational-instrumental administrative model, this system is designed to organize the public service as a reliable instrument for the implemen-

12.1  From Administration to Public Management

373

tation of political decisions. This intention finds its expression in the “established principles of the civil service” (Art. 33 GG): in the public-law employment relationship (which excludes collective agreements and strikes), in the duty of loyalty of the civil servant to the liberal-democratic basic order, in the full use of his working capacity, in the principle of lifetime employment and in the duty of care of the employer towards him. However, the guarantee of democratic reliability of members of the public service, also valid for employees and workers by means of collective agreements, has been disputed since the early 1970s and has been demanded to varying degrees (Rudzio 1988, pp. 87 ff.). In the end, this criterion was still in the focus of public attention when dealing with former members of the SED and members of the GDR State Security Service. Recently, it has gained importance in the course of the debate about (right-wing) extremists in the public service, in particular in the security authorities. In addition, the personnel structure is to serve an efficiency of the public service. Accordingly, public service law requires that appointments and promotions be made on the basis of “suitability, ability and professional performance”. Since performance measurements seem to be difficult, in most cases the general level of education is decided as an entry requirement into the (originally valid for everyone) career groups, which are now federalized: Some countries only know two career groups, in addition, the career groups are now called regionally different, which makes comparability more difficult (cf. Table 12.2). The salary and pay groups can serve as a rough orientation. When promoting—so the opinion of the officials questioned—knowledge, performance and leadership skills are used, but also career determinants that are independent of performance, such as length of service, the respective authority’s staff cone and the goodwill of superiors, personnel councils, unions and parties (Pippke 1975, p. 57, 182, 213 ff.; Luhmann and Mayntz 1973, p. 213, 245, 259, 267). Similar to the result of a recent study on the Hamburg administration: The decisive factors for promotions are therefore knowledge (according to 30.9% of the employees surveyed), commitment/ zeal (11.9%), the opinion of the superiors (50.4%) and influences from outside (4.8%)2. In general, the positive performance incentives seem to be limited, even exhausted for the crowds of older people who are piling up in the highest offices they can reach. At the same time, there is also a lack of negative sanctions. It is hardly possible to answer how the traditionally high proportion of lawyers among leading officials in Germany (as well as in continental Western Europe

2 N

= 564 (Auf dem Hövel 2003, p. 141).

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12  Public Administration and Implementation

Table 12.2   Structuring of public service personnel in thousands (as of 30 June 2020) including indirect public service and federal railway property The percentages are based separately on the respective total number in the top row. Remaining items are not assignable

Categories

Total

Federal

States

Municipalities

Social securitya)

Total number of employees

4 968.0

509.9

2 493.3

1596.8

368.0

52.6%

11.8%

7.4%

Civil servants, judges, 34.6% soldiers on active duty

70.9%

Including: Senior officials (B-salary)

0.2

0.7

0.2

0.3

0.0

Judges (R-salary)

0.6

0.1

1.2

X

X

Professors (C- or W-salary)

0.8

0.1

1.5

X

0.0

Including: A13 and higher

4.3

10.0

19.5

2.2

1.1

A9 and higher

15.8

24.4

21.6

6.4

5.8

A5 and higher

5.8

29.6

4.0

2.2

0.3

Simple service (A2 and higher)

0.3

3.1

0.1

0.0

0.0

In training

2.8

2.9

4.5

0.7

0.0

Employees

62.0%

Including: E13 and higher

8.2

E9 and higher E5 and higher

29.2%

47.4%

88.2%

92.5%

2.9

13.1

3.1

4.4

18.5

7.9

12.7

24.9

44.1

21.6

12.2

12.1

38.1

27.0

E1 and higher

5.9

3.3

2.4

12.9

2.7

In training

2.5

1.3

2.0

3.3

3.6

a)

Including Federal Employment Agency Source: Federal Statistical Office (2021a, p. 29).

and Japan) has affected the performance of the public service in comparison with more socially trained people in the USA or more humanities scholars and technicians in Great Britain. Thinking in contexts, a “generalist outlook” as required in these positions, should be achievable on the basis of different training.

12.1  From Administration to Public Management

375

Following the economic perspective of the management model, the efficiency of administrations, for example the costs of tax collection as a percentage of revenue, is queried. If this percentage is 3.1 for value-added tax, 5.7 for income tax and even 10.5% for corporate tax, and if Germany generally has relatively high costs for tax collection in an international comparison (as of 1995), not only questions arise about the more than 100,000 people employed in German finance administrations, but also about their organization and, above all, to what extent the causes are to be found in an extensive, confusing and partly unsystematic tax law, which creates a “flood of regulations”, no longer guarantees the legality of taxation and feeds a army of almost 90,000 tax consultants (Federal Chamber of Tax Advisors 2021). That public construction is not in good shape is shown by cases such as the construction of the Berlin Brandenburg Airport, the construction of the Elbphilharmonie in Hamburg or the construction of the North Rhine-Westphalia State Archives in Duisburg. They are criticized in the media and by auditors and raise the question of a different assignment between politics and executive administration or management. Efficiency and reliability are also threatened by corruption. According to the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International 2021, Germany ranks 10th among the group of corruption-free countries, just behind Switzerland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (Transparency International Germany 2021). Nevertheless, abuse of office and bribery, the acceptance of “gifts”, seem to be no longer excluded in authorities that have to award lucrative contracts or licenses or carry out checks. Transparency International estimates damage in the “doubledigit billion range” for public construction contracts (Scheffer 2005). It is also politicians and parties that—as in Cologne and elsewhere—put their hands out. In some cases, networks of companies, public officials and politicians have been uncovered that have been cooperating corruptly for years (Scheuch 2003). Even if the abuse of office by parliamentarians is not punishable by law (see the “mask affair” in the Corona pandemic), social science defines political corruption rather broadly: as “behavior which deviates from the formal duties of the public role because of private regarding (close family, personal, private clique) pecuniary or status gains” (Nye 1967, p. 419). Finally, to the relationship between politics and the public service: The sharp separation in the sense of the civil service system is not always adhered to in reality. This is already indicated by the high proportion of members of parliament from the public service, which is similar to other comparable countries. A considerable proportion of former top officials who become government members—as in France (Kempf 1997, p. 96) or Japan—is not found in Germany.

376

12  Public Administration and Implementation

In addition, a certain partisanship can be seen in the public service. For example, political orientations sometimes play a role in personnel decisions. The parties, interested on the one hand in expanding their political influence (dominant party patronage), on the other hand in rewarding party activists (providing party patronage), practice a joint “proportional patronage” in local administrations from time to time (Röber 2001). In a survey of members of the Hamburg administration, 71% of those surveyed believe that there is partisanship in the civil service. In favor of this view is the fact that in Hamburg, which has been governed by the SPD for decades, SPD members who have already belonged to the SPD before they entered the public service are actually “significantly promoted” more quickly than others (Auf dem Hövel 2003, pp. 104 ff., 155, 182). This could also apply to other federal states that have been controlled by a party for a longer period of time. In the federal ministries, where laws and political decisions are to be prepared, party political is also observed (cf. Sect. 8.2). In order to meet the legitimate interest in political influence here without giving up the civil service system, two ways are open. One is the French-style ministerial cabinet (cabinet ministeriel), which consists of freely chosen confidants of the minister/the minister, who support him/her and act as his/her arm, eye, ear and think tank in the ministry. Such a ministerial cabinet (as in Romance countries in Western Europe, in the Netherlands and at the EU Commission) is dissolved again with the departure of the minister/the minister, its members return to their old positions in the public service, the others are dismissed. This elegant, also cost-effective reinforcement of the political leadership has the downside that the influence and career opportunities of the members of the cabinet typically lead to tensions between them and the other management staff (Page 1995, pp. 267 f.). The other solution is the “political official” known in Germany, also proven (with side effects) to strengthen political leaders within a civil service system. With the New Public Management, the public personnel system is also to be changed. A departure from the civil service and from principles of civil service is aimed at. The former “closed” personnel system is to be replaced by an “open” one. This means: • not to make appointments on a permanent basis, • to allow new appointments also in management positions, • to require appropriate knowledge (instead of general educational qualifications) as a requirement for the position, • to set a performance-based pay (not rank) within the framework of collective agreements (instead of a statutory salary system) and • to save for old-age provision through contributions to pension funds (Auer et al. 1997, p. 158).

12.2  Enforcement from Within, Protection from Outside

377

If the reform efforts prevail, the prototype of the service provider will determine the spirit of the public service. The loosening of the career law in the federal states is an indication of this. The personnel systems emerging in the process show while still recognizing some retention of the past, but the new accents are clearly aimed at a lower weighting of general educational qualifications and length of service, while performance and position-related skills are to be given greater importance. In place of promotion, application for a vacant position is to take place as far as possible. Overall, more variety and more confusion in public personnel are to be expected. Intentions to eliminate the sole responsibility of governments in personnel decisions (which fit into a civil service system), would limit party-political personnel policy, but seem to be hardly discussed in the reform debate.

12.2 Enforcement from Within, Protection from Outside a. The encounter between administration and citizen What happens when a law is proclaimed, a political decision is made? For a long time, political science has let the flap fall at this point—similarly to love films after the act of the solemn wedding—and contributed to the impression that with that proclamation the reality has already been described. Which problems of administrative organization, resource mobilization and, in the federal state, coordination have to be overcome in order to implement norms and programs in reality, is already shown. Here the focus is on the last station of enforcement, when it hits the addressee. The everyday encounter between authorities and the public apparently used to be accompanied by a “feeling of powerlessness” on the part of the citizen— regardless of whether it was an administrative, receiving or ordering administration (Joerger 1976, p. 75; Mayntz 1978, pp. 235 ff.). The following apparently have a destabilizing effect • the complexity of legislation, which leads to a considerable asymmetry of knowledge (Grunow 1978, pp. 114f., 209ff.; Grunow and Hegner 1978, p. 196). • that administrative jurisdiction, because of its slow and cost-increasing perfectionism (Görlitz 1970, pp. 103ff.), represents a considerable time-related and financial risk for citizens.

378

12  Public Administration and Implementation

The problem in dealing with the state is now alleviated by three factors. First: Even in 1995, although relative majorities of those questioned still believed that one could hardly defend oneself against administrative decisions. But at the same time, only 33.4% of those questioned agreed that one should not get into an argument with an authority even if one were in the right. The feeling of powerlessness seems to have decreased. Secondly, it is generally believed that the authorities work satisfactorily on the whole (1995: 46.8%, opposed to this 30.5% in the West, 50.4 to 30.6 in the East). However, this represents a decrease in satisfaction in the old Federal Republic since 1980. Serious friction could only be detected in the employment agencies (Derlien and Löwenhaupt 1996, pp. 9, 21, 24, 31). Apparently, integrated task processing has a positive effect through “citizen offices” and call centers (Grimmer 2004, p. 81), which are supposed to spare citizens the effort of going to the authorities. Thirdly, as soon as it comes to more important questions, one tries to avoid dealing with the state through professional mediators. Through professional associations and unions, automobile associations, citizen initiatives, tenant and homeowner associations, one learns of specific relevant legal regulations, and through them one lets test cases be tried. Private builders wage the war against the authorities through architects, income tax payers use the help of tax consultants and tax offices. In this way, there are fewer friction points between citizens and the state. At the same time, however, the dynamics of a regulatory technique can develop undisturbed, which goes beyond the understanding and access possibilities of the average citizen. However, the political system cannot implement its norms and decisions without any compromises. Implementation problems already exist with regulatory measures—for example, when environmental protection regulations are only partially and informally negotiated due to undefined legal concepts (“state of the art”, “significant nuisances”) and conceivable risks to jobs (Bohne 1981, pp. 50 ff., 74 ff.; Dose 1997, pp. 406, 416). Two common indicators point to further problem areas: the crime clearance rate, which is too low in the case of home burglaries, and the invisible part of gross domestic product. In the case of the shadow economy in the sense of legal self-employment, favours for friends up to illegal black work, Germany should only occupy a middle position in the international comparison. However, a test carried out by the Federal Employment Agency in 2007 showed that almost half of the unemployed people worked “black”. Audits by the Federal Court of Auditors revealed that in half of the cases where one-euro jobs were approved, the funding requirements were not met (Öchsner 2010). Similar problems arise in tax collection, for example in the case

12.2  Enforcement from Within, Protection from Outside

379

of undeclared income in the catering industry (Rudzio 2014). All of this can still be considered normal in democratic rule-of-law states when compared. In addition, there are other, more publicly noticed phenomena. Cum-cum and cum-ex transactions represent a particularly large chunk, with the help of which the financial authorities were able to claim unjustified tax refunds totalling up to EUR 35.9 billion over many years (Ackermann et al. 2021). Banks, lawyers and consultants from home and abroad were involved. In 2021, the Federal Court of Justice ruled that the transactions constituted tax evasion, by spring 2022 the federal states had recovered EUR 1.8 billion, hundreds of reports had been received (ter/dpa 2022)—but only four people were convicted: two British stock traders, a German banker and a prominent lawyer. The causes of implementation problems are certainly manifold: political priorities, data protection, global openness, legal restrictions, staff shortages, burgeoning complexity of legislation and reduced societal acceptance of law and order. Can one speak of “state failure” (Creutzburg and Jung 2018)? That would still be an exaggeration, but there are obvious weaknesses and failures of politics. b. Judicial enforcement in individual cases The judicial system of a democratic constitutional state has three functions to perform: • to give state law validity in society in individual cases, • to review state action against statutory law, • to interpret state law in individual cases. These functions require independence of the judiciary from governments (unconstrained discretion and irremovability of judges3, standardized jurisdiction of the courts) and safeguards of personal freedom (prohibition of retroactive criminal laws, judicial review of police arrests after a maximum of 48 hours). But— as independent as it seems to some, the judiciary is not independent in liberal democracy either. The nerve center is the question: How do judges get into their office, how are they promoted? In fact, party political influences on the selection of judges are possible and recognizable. This already applies to the majority of judges in the federal states.

3 Except

in the case of deliberate, considerable judicial misconduct by the judge.

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The right to propose their appointment lies generally with the respective Minister of Justice/the respective Minister of Justice, in some federal states he/she decides alone. But mostly judge selection committees have to decide, composed partly majority, partly half of deputies, in addition representatives of the judiciary. In the best case it is a body like in Baden-Württemberg, where six members of the state parliament, one representative of the bar and eight elected judges form the committee, which decides by two-thirds majority. In this case, no one can get around the minister/the minister or incumbent judges or the resistance of the deputies— with the consequence that too politically engaged and weak lawyers have little chance. The competent federal minister/the competent federal minister decides together with a judge selection committee made up of competent state ministers and representatives of the Bundestag on judge appointments to the highest federal courts, with “preliminary discussions” of the SPD or the CDU/CSU members of this body being common (Leonardy 2002, p. 187). So it is only professional politicians, above all from the ruling parties, who select who occupies the commanding heights of the judiciary, including the highest courts. At this nervewracking point it becomes visible on what insecure ground the third power rests. It cannot be an originally autonomous power in democracy, but must be newly created and secured in a delicate selection process. It is clear that, in addition to well-thought-out regulations, everything depends on the political culture of the decision-makers. Party political coloring is—at least with a view to the Federal Constitutional Court—verifiable, but also widely overestimated (Engst et al. 2017). The German judiciary is divided into different branches. In addition to the general (ordinary) courts of different levels, which deal with civil disputes and criminal cases, there are special branches such as family courts, labor courts and a patent court. Administrative, financial and social courts mainly review the legality of acts of public administration or statutory social security schemes—whether law enforcement is carried out correctly. In general, the division into court branches facilitates the work-related specialization of judges. Nevertheless, the judiciary struggles with the overabundance and complexity of legal regulations, but also with partly risk-free—thanks to legal expenses insurance and state cost reimbursement—and widespread willingness to sue. The following stand out: • an impending overload due to increasing numbers of proceedings: in 2020, the general district courts disposed of 856,035 proceedings in first instance, the regional courts 377,374, the higher regional courts 75,109, and the Federal Court of Justice 6269 proceedings (Federal Statistical Office 2021b, pp. 12 ff.;

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Federal Court of Justice 2021, p. 5). Special branches such as family courts also disposed of 551,929 proceedings in first instance, administrative courts 186,020 proceedings, including 101,307 asylum proceedings (Federal Statistical Office 2021c, p. 13; Federal Statistical Office 2021d, p. 14). • relatively high costs and at the same time slow German jurisprudence in comparison with West European countries, which may have inherent reasons but is often attributed to the over-complexity of German law (Karpen 2006). In view of almost five million new criminal investigation proceedings in 2020, the public prosecutors act as a filter, intercepting much before the courts. Only 19% of the proceedings lead to an indictment or a fine, 29% are discontinued for lack of suspicion or incapacity, 9% are referred to administrative authorities or private litigation. 28% of the investigations were discontinued for opportunistic reasons, such as minor offences (Federal Statistical Office 2021e, p. 26). This is the part that raises the question of whether the judiciary does not also contribute to the deterioration of society—or is it rather politics? At the courts themselves, there is a tendency to abbreviate “deals” and to waive some factual investigation. The business point of view demands—understandably—its tribute. In addition, the judiciary, as always, is burdened with the unequal chances that arise in court depending on the financial power of a party: the risk of proceedings is disproportionately deterrent, not everyone can afford qualified lawyers. A general cause of inadequate enforcement of state decisions by the judiciary lies in the liberal basic character of Western democracies, in which low internalisation of norms and high evaluations of individual freedom set limits on state access. c. Bundeswehr: Between defence army and intervention force A special role is played by the military and intelligence services in every state. They are supposed to ensure the protection of a country. It is also the armed power that, due to its monopoly on weapons, is the only one with physical possibilities for a coup d’état or to defend against one4. The control of military power and the securing of its loyalty therefore seemed particularly urgent when building the Bundeswehr, as one remembered the

4 Accordingly,

Art. 87a GG enables the use of the Bundeswehr to protect the liberal democratic basic order also within.

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­ eichswehr of the Weimar Republic, which had refused to protect it against a R coup d’état from the right (Kapp Putsch 1920). This prompted the leading parties of the Federal Republic to take care to ensure the democratic reliability and civilian control of the Bundeswehr: • The primacy of civilian leadership is emphasized. So in peacetime the chain of command lies with the Federal Minister of Defence, in wartime with the Federal Chancellor. • The parliamentary control is comprehensive, in that the Defence Committee of the Bundestag can participate in expenditure decisions and can constitute itself as an investigative committee. • Finally, the soldier is considered as a “citizen in uniform”, to whom—within the framework of military necessity—all civil rights apply. The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces acts as the addressee for his/her complaints. Against this historical background, it was seen as positive that the new army, composed of conscripts, professional soldiers and only a minority of career soldiers for life, seemed immune to a separation from society. For decades, the pressure of the Soviet bloc left no doubt about the task of the Bundeswehr: to defend the country within the framework of NATO against an attack by communist states or to contribute to deterrence, so that such a case does not occur in the first place. It was clear that they could only fulfil this task as an integrated military contribution to NATO, designed “as an army in alliance” (Federal Minister of Defence 1985, p. 73). The collapse of European communism and the end of the Cold War replaced this clear situation with a multipolar world order. Since then, the Bundeswehr has undergone a transformation that ultimately led to a different kind of army: 1. The military became the subject of savings. Its personnel strength, about 500,000 men and women in 1991, has declined to only 198,102 soldiers by 2021. This includes 214 generals (including one woman), 39,316 officers, 95,435 noncommissioned officers and 46,137 enlisted men and women, as well as 12,500 volunteers and 4500 reservists (Federal Budget 2021, p. 82). That the savings measures were not only due to the transformation of the Bundeswehr into an intervention force (point 2), but also went at the expense of its ability to act, was made clear by the sometimes embarrassing behaviour in the context of the Ukrainian war from 2022, which revealed an equipment with which the Bundeswehr was “left empty”, as the Inspector General of the Army put it.

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2. With the changed world situation since the early 1990s, another task came to the fore: the participation in military interventions of the UN or NATO in Europe and overseas. Peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Bosnia and a peace-creating operation in Kosovo 1999 were the first examples here. Others, such as the largest and longest in Afghanistan (2001–2021), have followed. While increasingly weaker armed forces remained oriented towards Central Europe, lighter, more mobile troop units were set up for the new task. New equipment was now primarily used for overseas intervention capability, “intervention forces” form the spearhead of the army (Federal Ministry of Defence 2006, p. 93). Overall, the reorientation of the Bundeswehr meant “a kind of cultural break” for its members (Wiesendahl 2005, p. 18). At the same time, in opinion polls 2006–09, more than half of the Germans, with 69% in 2009, called for the withdrawal of the Bundeswehr from Afghanistan (Bredow 2015, p. 274). 3. The more it became a intervention force, the more the question arose as to whether the general conscription could be maintained. As early as 1999, only a narrow majority of those questioned still considered conscription necessary (Köcher 1999). In fact, since only less than two thirds of those liable for military service were actually drafted, one could speak of a “pseudo-conscription army” (Bredow 2008, pp. 147 f.). The last veil, the conscription, fell, albeit shamefully only suspended, in the year 2011—with it the ability of the Bundeswehr to grow in a crisis and a piece of connection to civilian society. Only individual voices called for a “return to conscription!” in the face of the Ukraine crisis in 2014 (Wolffsohn 2014). Even the illegal Russian invasion of 2022 changed little. For a long time, politics saw the country well protected by its embedding in the Western camp. The capabilities of the Bundeswehr to defend seemed to be of little importance. Although it pointed to a turnaround in 2010 when the distinction between troops for support, stabilization and intervention missions was abandoned, in fact, in 2012, defence expenditure remained at a meager 1.3% of GDP (Dyson 2015, pp. 607, 612), priorities between overseas and continental European perspectives were not set (Bredow 2015, p. 241; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2016). Critics calculate that the Bundeswehr is not prepared for a conventional defence (Sebaldt 2017), press reports point to the technically diverse lack of operational readiness of the Bundeswehr. Even conventional defence capability, in order to create time for possible intervention by a third party, seems to be hardly available anymore. However, the Ukrainian war has led to a—cautious—rethink (“turning point”): The value of a defence-ready army that cannot rely solely on the USA is now appreciated more highly. But does the 100-billion-euro investment

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package suffice for this? At least the two-percent target is to be achieved in the future, according to the Federal Chancellor. 4. In addition, there are internal challenges of the Bundeswehr that raise doubts about the democratic orientation of a—small—part of its soldiers and the efficiency of a pronounced esprit de corps: the discovery of a right-wing extremist Prepper network (“Hannibal”—also involving members of other security agencies) in 2018, the arrest of a suspected terrorist (Franco A.) and the discovery of hundreds of Wehrmacht devotionalia in barracks in 2017, a significant shortfall in ammunition and an association of active and former members of the Bundeswehr led by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution as a suspected case in 2020 (“Uniter”), an amnesty announced orally by the commander of the KSK for the return of ammunition as well as a founding member of the KSK among the “lateral thinkers” in 2021. Even if it may be a small minority: The Bundeswehr faces great challenges. (For the discussion of military policy, see Sect. 1.2 c). Police and intelligence services were also subject to critical observation. In order to prevent usurpations of power, the principles of decentralization and task limitation apply here. The police are structured into independent state police forces. Similarly, the security organs of the federal government are decentralized and limited to certain tasks: • the federal police for the protection of borders and air traffic (Federal Ministry of the Interior), • the Federal Intelligence Service for foreign information (supervision: Federal Chancellery). • the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (independent offices at federal and state level and limited to the observation of anti-constitutional activities, including terrorism and counter-espionage (supervision: the interior ministers of the federal government and the states), • the Military Counterintelligence Service for the protection of the Bundeswehr against espionage and sabotage (supervision: Ministry of Defense). Further control is exercised by the fact that the intelligence services—unlike in many other democracies—do not have executive powers. The “separation principle” applies here as a lesson from National Socialism. At the same time, this does not mean that intelligence services and police forces may not cooperate— this is demonstrated by the Joint Terrorism Defense Center (GTAZ; established in 2004), specializing in Islamist terrorism, the Joint Internet Center (GIZ; estab-

References

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lished in 2007), the National Cyber Defense Center (NCAZ or Cyber-AZ; established in 2011), and the Joint Extremism and Terrorism Defense Center (GETZ; established in 2012), which specializes in the prevention of right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism, foreign extremism and espionage, in which several security agencies cooperate. In addition, numerous control mechanisms are in place here: for example, the now 13-member Parliamentary Control Committee, the G10 Commission, which controls intelligence service interventions in the secrecy of letters, postal and telecommunications traffic, and the Trust Committee, which has budgetary control over the intelligence services.

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Derlien, Hans-Ulrich (1995a): La Modernisation administrative en Allemagne, in: Revue francaise d’administration publique 75, pp. 413 ff. Derlien, Hans-Ulrich (1995b): Public administration in Germany, in: Pierre, Jon (Ed.): Bureaucracy in the Modern State, Aldershot, pp. 64 ff. Derlien, Hans-Ulrich/Löwenhaupt, Stefan (1996): Verwaltungskontakte und Institutionenvertrauen, Bamberg. Döhler, Marian (2007): Die politische Steuerung der Verwaltung, Baden-Baden. Dose, Nicolai (1997): Die verhandelnde Verwaltung, Baden-Baden. Dyson, Tom (2015): Deutsche Verteidigungspolitik in der zweiten Legislaturperiode von Kanzlerin Merkel, in: Zohlnhöfer, Reimut/Saalfeld, Thomas (Eds.): Politik im Schatten der Krise, Wiesbaden, pp. 605 ff. Egner, Björn (2007): Einstellungen deutscher Bürgermeister, Baden-Baden. Egner, Björn et al. (2013): Das deutsche Gemeinderatsmitglied, Wiesbaden. Engst, Benjamin G. et al. (2017): Zum Einfluss der Parteinähe auf das Abstimmungsverhalten der Bundesverfassungsrichter—eine quantitative Untersuchung, in: JuristenZeitung 72 (17), pp. 816 ff. Görlitz, Axel (1970): Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit in Deutschland, Neuwied. Grimmer, Klaus (2004): Öffentliche Verwaltung in Deutschland, Wiesbaden. Grunow, Dieter (1978): Steuerzahler und Finanzamt, Frankfurt a. M. Grunow, Dieter/Hegner, Friedhard (1978): Die Gewährung persönlicher und wirtschaftlicher Sozialhilfe, Bielefeld. Gutjahr-Löser, Peter (1998): Staatsinfarkt, Hamburg. Heady, Ferrel (1996): Configurations of Civil Service Systems, in: Bekke, Hans A. G. M. et al. (Eds.): Civil Service Systems in Comparative Perspective, Bloomington, pp. 207 ff. Heinelt, Hubert/Mayer, Margit (Eds.) (1997): Modernisierung der Kommunalpolitik, Opladen. Hill, Hermann (Ed.) (2001): Parlamentarische Steuerungsordnung, Speyer. Holtkamp, Lars (2007): Perspektiven der Haushaltskonsolidierung und das Neue Steuerungsmodell, in: Bogumil, Jörg et al. (Eds.): Perspektiven kommunaler Verwaltungsmodernisierung, Berlin, pp. 45 ff. Holtmann, Everhard (2012): Der Parteienstaat in Deutschland, Bonn. Jessen, Kai-Olaf (2001): Neuere Ansätze parlamentarischer Steuerung und Kontrolle, Speyer. Joerger, Gernot (1976): Grundzüge der Verwaltungslehre, 2nd edn., Stuttgart. Karpen, Ulrich (2006): Wachhund, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung vom 11. Juli. Kempf, Udo (1997): Von de Gaulle bis Chirac, 3rd edn., Opladen. Killian, Werner et al. (2006): Ausgliederung und Privatisierung in Kommunen, Berlin. Köcher, Renate (1999): Der Kosovo spaltet in Deutschland Ost und West. Die NATO, die Bundeswehr, die Wehrpflicht und was noch gebraucht wird, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung vom 16. Juni. Konzendorf, Götz/Bräunlein, Tobias (1998): Verwaltungsmodernisierung in den Ländern, Speyer. Kuhlmann, Sabine/Wollmann, Hellmut (2013): Verwaltung und Verwaltungsreformen in Europa, Wiesbaden. Lane, Jan-Erik (2000): The Public Sector, 3rd edn., London.

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Leonardy, Uwe (2002): Parteien im Föderalismus der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Scharniere zwischen Staat und Politik, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 33 (1), pp. 180 ff. Lorig, Wolfgang H. (2001): Modernisierung des öffentlichen Dienstes, Opladen. Luhmann, Niklas/Mayntz, Renate (1973): Personal im öffentlichen Dienst, Baden-Baden. Mayntz, Renate (1978): Soziologie der öffentlichen Verwaltung, Heidelberg. Mayntz, Renate (1973): Probleme der inneren Kontrolle in der planenden Verwaltung, in: dies./Scharpf, Fritz W. (Eds.): Planungsorganisation, München, pp. 98 ff. Möltgen, Katrin/Pippke, Wolfgang (2009): New Public Management und die Demokratisierung der öffentlichen Verwaltung, in: Czerwick, Edwin et al. (Eds.): Die öffentliche Verwaltung in der Demokratie der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Wiesbaden, pp. 199 ff. Niskanen, William A. (1971): Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Chicago. Nye, Joseph (1967): Corruption and political development: a cost-benefit analysis, in: American Political Science Review 61 (2), pp. 417 ff. Öchsner, Thomas (2010): Rechnungshof giftet gegen Ein-Euro-Jobs, unter: https://www. sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/hartz-iv-maengel-bei-der-arbeitsvermittlung-rechnungshofgiftet-gegen-ein-euro-jobs-1.1023715 (zuletzt geprüft am 7. April 2022). Ockermann, Jürgen (1998): Die Rolle des Parlaments bei der Modernisierung der öffentlichen Verwaltung, in: Hill, Hermann/Klages, Helmut (Eds.): Die Rolle des Parlaments in der neuen Steuerung, Düsseldorf, pp. 91 ff. Page, Edward C. (1995): Administering Europe, in: Hayward, Jack/ders. (Eds.): Governing the New Europe, Cambridge, pp. 257 ff. Pergande, Frank (2007): Kameralistik ist Absolutismus, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung vom 5. Dezember. Pergande, Frank (2012): Zauberwort Doppik, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung vom 27. Dezember. Pippke, Wolfgang (1975): Karrieredeterminanten in der öffentlichen Verwaltung, BadenBaden. Reichard, Christoph (1994): Umdenken im Rathaus, 2nd edn., Berlin. Reiners, Markus (2008): Verwaltungsstrukturreformen in den deutschen Bundesländern, Wiesbaden. Reiser, Marion (2006): Zwischen Ehrenamt und Berufspolitik—Professionalisierung der Kommunalpolitik in deutschen Großstädten, Wiesbaden. Röber, Manfred (2001): Das Parteibuch—Schattenwirtschaft der besonderen Art?, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 32/33, pp. 6 ff. Rudzio, Kolja (2014): Zu Gast bei Betrügern, in: Die Zeit vom 20. April. Rudzio, Wolfgang (1988): Die Erosion der Abgrenzung, Opladen. Scheffer, Ulrike (2005): Korruption am Bau. Transparancy spricht von Milliardenschäden, unter: https://www.tagesspiegel.de/wirtschaft/korruption-am-bau/593544.html (zuletzt geprüft am 7. April 2022). Scheuch, Erwin K. (2003): Die Mechanismen der Korruption in Politik und Verwaltung, in: von Arnim, Hans Herbert (Ed.): Korruption, München, pp. 31 ff. Schwanke, Katja/Ebinger, Falk (2006): Politisierung und Rollenverständnis der deutschen administrativen Elite 1970 bis 2005, in: Bogumil, Jörg et al. (Eds.): Politik und Verwaltung, Wiesbaden, pp. 227 ff. Sebaldt, Martin (2017): Nicht abwehrbereit, o. O.

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Germany in the European Union

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13.1 German Interests in European Politics a. The EU—an expansive octopus? There is a large discrepancy between the optimal size of economic areas and national states. Numerous cross-border problems, such as environmental or security issues, also defy national solutions. This has led to partial internationalization of governance. In addition to global international regimes such as the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund or the World Trade Organization, connections such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the Organization of American States (OAS) are striving for regional international cooperation in various policy areas (Rittberger et al. 2013). The European Union is an unusually developed example of such a regional regime that bears almost state-like features. Germany is a member state of the European Union, is counted among the progressive “pioneer groups” there, even as a “reluctant hegemon” (Bulmer and Paterson 2019, p. 56 ff.) due to its (reluctant) influence. Important policy areas are entrusted to the Union, directly determined or indirectly influenced by it. Consequently, the political process relevant to the Germans no longer takes place solely within the Federal Republic. The political system of the Germans thus comprises a national and a European component. Participation within the Union, initially within the framework of a prevailing negotiation system (consensus principle), has been taking place increasingly since the early 1990s through participation in binding majority decisions (with voting weights). After the European Union was introduced in the opening chapter, the focus will now be on Germany within the Union.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Mannewitz and W. Rudzio, The Political System of Germany, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41371-2_13

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The first question is: To what extent are decisions on German interests made in the European Union? The competences of the European Union are far-reaching for four reasons: 1. The principle of the European internal market, the “heart” of the EU (European Commission 2018, p. 1), has far-reaching implications with the free and unhindered movement of goods and services, economic operators and capital. In particular, the authorization for measures contained in the Maastricht Treaty to establish such a market prompts the EU to reach out far. “Unity via the back door”—this seems to be the role of the economy in the integration process (Haller 2008, p. 116). 2. Secondly, the treaties of the EU Member States formulate further competences—including for immigration and environmental issues, foreign policy and internal security, including counter-terrorism—in different and partly unclear forms. On a scale of 1 = national autonomy to 10 = European sole decision, one can classify competition, currency and agricultural policy on the 9, environmental and regional policy on the 8, justice and internal policy on the 7, transport policy on the 3 (Sturm 2016, p. 73). 3. Thirdly, the following principle applies: European law breaks national law. This is, in order not to get stuck in a tangle of legal resistance, an understandable principle. Accordingly, in the event of differences of opinion on competences, the European Court of Justice is to rule. It interprets the EU treaties bindingly and conclusively, mostly with the tendency to strengthen the EU. The Court is characterized by “judicial activism” (Katzenstein 2000, p. 65; Roth and Hilpold 2008). 4. Another extension of the EU became apparent in the wake of the Euro financial crisis: a fiscal pact including monitoring of national budgets, a banking union and -control and de facto a monetary economic policy of the European Central Bank. The result: “The EU rules far into the member states; most policy areas are covered; some are even ‘firmly in control’ of EU policy.” (Manfred G. Schmidt quoted after Kohler-Koch 2000, p. 13). Therefore, there is criticism of the EU from Germany, which is increasingly taking over. The principle of “subsidiarity” is intended to form a dam against this, which also found its way into EU treaties. It states that a task should be located at the lowest social unit that is able to deal with it. However, since the member states count between 0.4 (Malta) and 82 million (Germany) inhabitants, what is good for Malta cannot be the same as for Germany—the median is just under 8 million inhabitants (see Table 13.3), i.e.

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one tenth of the German population, and correspondingly set subsidiarity would take away tasks from Germany that it could fulfill itself. Moreover, the European Union’s international legal status is difficult to describe. It certainly represents more than a confederation of states, but less than a federal state. What speaks in favor of the former is that the EU only receives all of its competencies through treaties of the member states and the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) expressly also allows for an exit from the EU (as claimed by Great Britain), in favor of the latter the large scope of EU competencies and the binding majority decision in EU institutions. The Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has been speaking of a “confederatin of states” since 1993, in which the democratic legitimacy is essentially mediated by the national parliaments and the member states remain “masters of the treaties” (Ooyen 2006, p. 253). b. German interests in the EU Since the economic competence area of the EU has been developed stronger and earlier than all other areas, specific interests of individual member states can be identified in it. They arise for Germany as a highly developed industrial, highwage and export country in connection with the internal market of the Union: • The limits of the market, i.e. which areas of social provision and which professions are to be left out, were (and are partly) controversial. While post and rail are privatized and gradually integrated into the market, this does not apply to other areas or only to a limited extent. The German municipalities defend municipal hospitals, public transport and water supply against inclinations of the EU Commission to equate them with any economic goods. • As a high-wage country, Germany is affected by the freedom of services in the EU, which also attracts pseudo self-employed people from Eastern Europe. An EU services directive is about free market access for all, but also about minimum wage regulations, which should exclude wage dumping and thus job losses in Germany (Grunow et al. 2012, pp. 9, 17, 55). However, a selfemployed person is not subject to a minimum wage regulation. • There are fears that German professional qualifications will be devalued by the EU. While long training periods are required for craftsmen in Germany, elsewhere a few weeks’ course is sufficient. The EU Commission sees in the master’s examination (Meisterprüfung) as a prerequisite for self-employed craftsmanship an unjustified market barrier, the same applies to the fee regulations for architects, engineers, tax consultants and auditors. At the end of 2017, the EU Commission sued Germany before the European Court of

392

•

•

•

•

13  Germany in the European Union

J­ ustice because it had not implemented the EU Directive on the Recognition of Professional Qualifications in German law. As an industrial and export country, Germany is repeatedly threatened by EU initiatives that endanger its competitiveness1. An example was the conflict over an EU Commission-initiated review of all 30.000 chemicals used, which only ended after years with a compromise. A current issue is the regulation around climate protection. For years, it has been about emission limits for larger cars, such as those produced in Germany. The German mechanical engineering feared from an EU eco-directive that it could prescribe uniform energy efficiency information and limits. Customs policy is the business of the European Union. Since trade disputes are fought by means of customs duties, it decides what happens. Germany, which has the largest trade with the non-European world, is the main victim. The EU, which deliberately imposes import duties more than the USA, thus serves to protect certain industries and agricultural products—it is clear that there are different interests of the member states. Export nations tend to affirm free trade more than other countries, and it is them who suffer more from the reactions of other states. The cross-border corporation introduced in the EU makes it possible to save taxes by having the company headquarters abroad and to “flee” from German co-determination. An analogous issue is a planned “Europe GmbH”, which may even be registered in another state than it has its seat—this would simply “overthrow” German co-determination, according to the DGB. European competition policy is designed differently from German: individual decisions are opposed to German structural decisions, private lawsuits to German state control, reasonableness / consumer welfare to German market structure as a benchmark (Sturm 2016, p. 74)—much systematics and predictability is lost.

In summary: The interests of a developed high-wage and export country such as Germany are affected in various ways by the EU market establishment and regulation and require active representation in view of the different interests of the EU countries. A second German interest complex results from the fact that the EU internal market radiates far beyond economic policy. Competitiveness also depends

1 Already

Federal Chancellor Schröder complained about this (Sturm 2003, p. 99).

13.1  German Interests in European Politics

393

on taxation, environmental and social policy. So the number of EU legal acts on tax law is growing, and the EU Court of Justice has already made hundreds of decisions in which it had to assess the compatibility of national tax regulations with EU law. National tax policy “is increasingly subject to European regulation” (Genschel 2009, p. 207, 211 ff.). Tax competition exerts a silent but effective pressure on the competitive conditions and drives national policy. In Germany, where relatively high corporate taxes and relatively low value-added tax made German offers more expensive, this was a strong argument for reducing corporate taxes and raising value-added tax to 19%, as happened. However, this rate is still the fourth lowest, while the German corporate tax rate is the fifth highest among the (formerly) 28 EU countries (Schmidt and Schünemann 2013, p. 146, 153). For a long time, companies based in tax havens within the EU were subject to tax rates of 1% and far less—for example, Apple in Ireland. The G20 countries have put a stop to this by 2021 with a minimum tax rate of 15% coordinated by the OECD (Gries 2021), which the EU is to implement. However: The possibility of levying certain goods or services at a reduced value-added rate also promotes tax cuts. The German welfare state is also affected. On the one hand, social security contributions that make work more expensive weaken companies and employees in European competition, on the other hand, higher social benefits act as a “magnet for immigration” (Caldwell 2009). This is not a marginal problem, as German social benefits per inhabitant are among the higher ones in the EU, only in Luxembourg and Denmark are they higher (European Commission 2022a). In addition, there are EU efforts to make social and labor policy regulations in Germany accessible to all EU citizens, to expand or circumvent them. Both the German tax and social system, although formally not under European jurisdiction, are therefore under enormous “pressure to adapt”2. This pressure drives away from direct to indirect taxes, away from the Continental European welfare state model (with insurance systems and higher benefits) towards the liberal Anglo-Saxon model (with low benefits financed by taxes, in addition private provision) (Hanesch 1999). At present, one is, also within the SPD, under the pressure of lower corporate tax rates in the USA and similar intentions in Great Britain, France and Belgium—which could hit German competitiveness hard. However, it would be wrong to make the EU the sole scapegoat here, because pressure on the German social system also comes from the German population decline as well as from the worldwide globalization. The same holds true for taxes, where one can be forced to lower taxes for companies under the conditions of global location competition.

2 With

regard to taxes Schmedes (2008, p. 213).

394

13  Germany in the European Union

A fourth area of interest concerns environmental and energy policy. For 2030, the EU aims for a share of 40% renewable energies (Council of the European Union 2022), the EU Commission (2021a) under Ursula von der Leyen also 40 and the EU Parliament even 45% (Simon and Taylor 2022). The way in which the European Union pursues its climate policy has been the “EU Emission Trading System” since 2005, which means that power plants, energy-intensive industry and airlines within the European Economic Area, which are responsible for around 40 percent of emissions, have to buy one of the limited certificates for each tonne of CO2 emissions. The companies themselves decide whether or not they are worth the emissions—with the elegant result that CO2 is saved at the lowest possible cost. It can be objected that only part of the CO2 emissions are captured. This line is supplemented by the “European Green Deal” by an “Effort Sharing Regulation” (ESR), which contains emission reduction targets within the member states for the sectors transport, buildings and agriculture (responsible for around 60 percent of emissions), requirements for renewable energies and energy efficiency as well as a ban on combustion engines in cars from 2035 (Council of the European Union 2022). Germany, on the other hand, has gone—at least at first—a different way: It combined statutory limits on CO2 emissions in certain areas, the exit from nuclear energy (by 2022) and coal-fired power (by 2038) as well as the EEG3 levy to be paid by the electricity consumers (but only until 2022). With the Climate Protection Act passed in 2019 (and tightened in 2021 due to the Karlsruhe ruling), a monitoring by a climate council and a national emissions trading system for buildings and transport were added. For further details, see Sect. 17.3 d—Environmental policy. Within the European Union, Germany has been in a central position since its eastward enlargement. This makes it a transit country whose roads, railways and waterways should be open to all EU traffic participants without discrimination. However, attempts by the Grand Coalition to involve drivers in the resulting costs through a toll failed in 2019 at the European Court of Justice—because, as a result of the reduction in motor vehicle tax in favor of German cars, foreign vehicle holders would be discriminated against. Result: compensation claims of around 560 million euros from the planned operators of the toll systems (sol/dpa 2022) and a parliamentary committee that is to investigate the accusations against Transport Minister Andreas Scheuer (CSU) who had (without waiting for the ECJ ruling) pressed for a contract conclusion as well as, according to the Federal Audit Office, “violated procurement law” and “violated budgetary law” (Maier 2019).

3 EEG

= Renewable Energy Act.

13.1  German Interests in European Politics

395

Bulgaria Romania Latvia Croatia Poland Hungary Lithuania Slovakia Estonia Greece Portugal Czech Republic Slovenia Spain Italy France Germany (until 1990 former territory of the FRG) Belgium Austria Finland Netherlands Sweden Denmark Ireland 0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000

Fig. 13.1   Gross domestic product per capita in EU countries 2021. (Source: Eurostat (2022a))

Against this, Germany is economically in a peripheral position: at the edge of the relative poverty zone, which has been part of the EU since 2004. The economic differences are recognizable in Fig. 13.1. Although already mitigated, the abyssal distance still appears that separates the gross domestic product per capita in Western Europe (with the exception of Portugal and Greece) from that in the countries of Eastern Europe 4. Such a one also exists in the hourly labor costs in manufacturing (see Sect. 17.1b). It affects Germany and Austria as immediately adjacent countries in particular. It signals economic tensions that seek compensation in cross-border movements of capital, labor and buyers. Fifth, German interests are affected in the area of agriculture, which still today belongs to the largest EU expenditure blocks. Here, since 2003, it has been a

4 Distortions

that arise from the seats of international companies in tax havens play a role here in Ireland; the other EU microstates that are also eligible are not included in the graphic.

396

13  Germany in the European Union

question of moving away from the former policy of price support, which aimed at supply security for the population and income stabilization for farmers. Instead, the switch was made to a “decoupling of agricultural subsidies from production” (EU Commission), i.e. in favor of flat-rate payments to farmers. However, when and to what extent this should happen, the EU left to national decision. With flatrate area and farm premiums, as in Germany since 2013, the “winners” are the farmers with low-yield soils, the losers are the intensive livestock farmers (Bergschmidt et al. 2005, p. 217). The dispute has long focused on the question of how much agricultural subsidies should be reduced for large farms. Germany, with its many large companies, was the main opponent of the EU Commission—the 3,300 largest farms received around one billion euros per year from the funds of the Common EU Agricultural Policy, while the 200,000 smallest farms together only received 690 million euros (epd 2019). With the 2021 reform, however, environmental protection came into focus: a quarter of direct payments will in future be linked to environmental and climate performance. In addition, farmers are to receive more money for their first hectares, which benefits smaller farms (Preker 2021). As a whole, this has replaced a uniform European agricultural order with national variants, which relieves the enlarged EU of various conflicts. Finally, interests arise in the financial EU transfer system. The mechanisms of its redistribution machinery are complicated and controversial. The EU’s revenues consist of around 70% contributions from member states, which are based on their gross national income, EU VAT shares (approx. 10%), customs duties and sugar levies (approx. 10%); for Great Britain there was a reduction in contributions, the so-called “Thatcher rebate” (Schmidt and Schünemann 2013, pp. 182 ff.). The remaining around 10% are made up of taxes and other levies on the salaries of EU officials, bank interest, contributions from non-EU countries to certain programs, late payment interest and fines. For the first time, the EU will also be allowed to take out loans—namely to finance the Corona Reconstruction Fund “NextGenerationEU”—the largest economic stimulus package in history in favor of the southern and eastern European countries which have been particularly affected by the pandemic. From 2023 (in particular for the repayment of the resulting debt), the gradual introduction of new own resources in the amount of around 17 billion euros per year is planned, which are to come, inter alia, from the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and the EU Emissions Trading System (European Commission 2021b). Of the funds, a total of 164.3 billion euros in 2021, are earmarked for: • Natural resources and environment 58.6 billion euros, • Cohesion, resilience and values 52.9 billion euros,

13.1  German Interests in European Politics

• • • • •

397

Internal market, innovation and digital 20.8 billion euros, Neighbourhood and the world 16.1 billion euros, European public administration 10.4 billion euros, Migration and border management 2.3 billion euros, Security and defence 1.7 billion euros (Council of the European Union 2021).

As the most populous of the wealthier EU states, Germany has always been the largest net contributor to the European Union. Like others, it resists the Commission’s efforts to expand the EU budget. In 2020, Germany transferred 15.5 billion euros, followed by the United Kingdom (last time) with 10.2 billion euros and France with 8.0 billion euros; measured by GDP, Germany was in front, followed by Denmark, the UK and Sweden; per capita, Germany was only behind Denmark (228 €). The largest recipients were Poland (13.2 billion euros), Greece (5.7 billion euros) and Romania (4.9 billion euros) as well as Hungary (4.8 billion euros) with a government that has been notoriously critical of the EU for years (Federal Agency for Civic Education 2022). The withdrawal of the United Kingdom means that the third largest net contributor will be lost and its contribution will probably have to be borne by the remaining net contributors. However, it would be short-sighted to focus solely on such payments. Especially an interest policy consideration must not overlook that an industrial and export-strong country like Germany can benefit disproportionately from the common market. So far, at least, the German export industry has been a winner because the EU area offers the Federal Republic “a relatively risk-free export market” (May 1982, p. 34, 55, 293). In general, the interests of southern and eastern European countries are more focused on redistribution by the EU, while the northern countries, including Germany, have a primary interest in the common market. This was already “the main cleavage” (Vaubel 2009, p. 67 ff.) in the Council of the EU before the Eastern enlargement. c. Euro crisis: Power and risk expansions of Europe? Another German field of interest is the European monetary policy. With the common euro currency from 1999/2001, Germany, together with the majority of EU member states, is in a currency policy risk community (euro zone). The common Euro brought low interest rates for government bonds to financially weak states (Streeck 2013a, p. 183).5 Thus, the interest rates for

5 For

further ibid., passim.

398

13  Germany in the European Union

g­ overnment bonds of the Euro countries differed by less than one percent in 2008 (Riehle 2016, p. 161). Therefore, one enjoyed beautiful years of high government deficits and popular spending. Banks granted loans at lower interest rates than before. Similarly, in the early 2000s, labor costs per unit of output rose continuously in numerous Eurozone countries, sometimes even afterwards. In view of this, the current account balances (exports minus imports of goods and services) of the Euro countries drifted apart—unlike northern countries including Germany, four southern European Euro countries and Ireland slid into a deep minus. The end of the “Euro-Party” came, triggered by bad loans in the USA, with the financial crisis of 2008. It was a test of the rules of the common market. Indebted, export-weak states and many banks could only get loans at higher interest rates. And if EU rules did not include state aid to companies and banks, were there not debt limits for state budgets in the Eurozone? In fact, the EU aid rules were interpreted constructively. At the same time, the pressure increased for a “soft” euro that could make debt reduction easier and make radical reforms less urgent. This would also make new Eurozone government borrowing more comfortable to finance, as it continued to do even after 2008 (Riehle 2016, p. 50). The interests of financially weak crisis countries (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Cyprus) are also aimed at debt mutualisation within the Eurozone. The scope and type of financial aid and rescue packages form faits accomplis in their favour, including: 1. Programmes of aid from Eurozone countries: – the temporary “rescue fund” for sick countries (loans granted in 2013: 188.3 billion euros for Greece, Portugal, Ireland), – the permanently established “European Stability Mechanism” (lending amount up to 500 billion euros). 2. Measures of aid from EU institutions: – overdrafts in the Target payment system of the central banks at the expense of Germany of more than 1 trillion euros—German exports are thus “paid for with fresh credit money from the foreign printing presses” (Sinn 2013), – after the European Central Bank had fulfilled all credit requests from the banks—with decreasing safety requirements—it is now making itself felt through a program launched in 2012 to purchase government bonds for economic stimulus. So far, 3 trillion euros have been used for this, mainly in favour of highly indebted countries (dpa 2022). – a banking union under the control of the ECB, which is to serve banking supervision, the winding up of insolvent banks and deposit insurance.

13.1  German Interests in European Politics

399

Is this actually not the jump to the debt community? Two political lines can distinguished. The first is in the credits or the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) of the Euro states recognizable, with which it is certainly about unusually favorable, mostly rotten, but with conditions associated credits of limited scope. The conditions include, in addition to balanced state budgets, financial strengthening, inevitably unpopular reform measures of the credit-taking states, controlled by the Euro state group. The latter is certainly a problem. At least in the case of Greece, the implementation of conditions seemed like a “Greek Satyr Play” for years (Riehle 2016, p. 93), accompanied by hostile emotions towards the donor countries. Subsidized credits were necessary, deadlines were postponed. But this does not apply to other countries. And in any case, the donors remain in control of their aid-with-conditions approach. Committed advocates of this approach are the governments of northern Eurozone countries, led by Germany and the Netherlands. It remains controversial whether, in the case of liability transfers, there is not a “breach of the Lisbon Treaty” (Article 125 which says: “A Member State is not liable for the liabilities of the central governments … of another Member State and does not assume such liabilities” (quoted from Sturm and Pehle 2012, p. 225; Vaubel 2018, pp. 75–91). Only subsequently did the EU Council insert a paragraph into the Treaty to legalize the ESM. In the Eurozone, the insolvency of a member state has thus been effectively ruled out. In contrast to federal states such as the USA or Switzerland, which do not allow bailouts (Riehle 2016, p. 125, 247), the individual Eurozone state hardly bears any responsibility. In summary: The line of the German government was understandable at first, but is not only associated with high financial liability risks, but it also tore down the contractual barrier to irresponsible debt-making. Even more: its “austerity” policy threatens to poison the relationship between the nations of the Eurozone. This is shown by how the policy of conditions as an illegitimate interference in the democracy of the debtor states was perceived by the populations and parts of the scientific community. However, there is also a willingness to accept the criticized “austerity”—depending on the per capita debt (Gründler and Potrafke 2019, p. 12). In addition: The thesis that Germany is the main winner of the euro cannot be proven—after all, German exports to the eurozone fell from 45.7% in 2000 to 36.4% of German total exports in 2015 (Hartwig and Maurer 2016, p. 244). German export success was already present long before the euro. The measures of the EU, on the other hand, are about target overhangs, which are supposed to facilitate the business transactions of the central banks. This system also applies between the central banks of the USA, but balance debts must

400

13  Germany in the European Union

be completely settled in April of each year. In the target system of the eurozone, this obvious clause is missing. Thus, Eurozone countries can make purchases “on credit” indefinitely—result: The Bundesbank sits on 1.17 trillion. Euro Target2 claims in spring 2022 (Deutsche Bundesbank 2022), the redemption of which falls on St. Nevermore’s Day. The second pillar of this political strategy consists in the purchase of government bonds from the eurozone. Actually, the ECB is not allowed to grant loans according to European contract law of the EU and its member states. That is why the ECB does not buy government bonds from the states, but from banks as intermediaries. These have clean hands, because government bonds are always considered safe under EU law, no matter how insolvent the respective state is. The whole thing, according to the ECB, is not state financing. Promptly, the European Court of Justice confirmed this, and EU greats such as the former President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz welcomed the purchase program (Riehle 2016, pp. 200, 180, 192). Allegedly, the purchase program and the zero interest rate policy of the ECB are supposed to boost the economy. However, such an effect did not materialize over many years, nor did the banks grant more loans to the economy. Everything points to a primarily different motif: The purchase of government bonds relieves debtors, makes further borrowing easier and reduces unpleasant reform pressure. Zero interest also helps debtors, as does the declared goal of more inflation. As a result, the government bond purchase program, as Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann already formulated in 2012, leads to a “joint liability for the government bonds purchased” (Riehle 2016, p. 173). A look at two EU institutions makes it clear how debtor interests can prevail there. The ECB Council, the decisive body, consists of six members of the Board of Directors and the 19 central bank presidents of the member states. They are all sent by their governments for eight years. With the central bank presidents, a rotation system applies according to which the five most populous states have four votes (one is outside each month), the remaining 14 only eleven votes. Germany is therefore on average represented by 1.8 votes. Since the six most indebted states hold four of the six Board of Directors seats, the states with higher debt than Germany have twelve of the 21 votes in the ECB Council. In addition, almost all states, including Germany, are heavily indebted and have an interest in zero interest rate policy and the purchase of their bonds—which of course frees up large sums of money for other purposes. This explains why broad ECB majori-

13.1  German Interests in European Politics

401

ties vote in favor of debtor interests, as well as the public silence on the part of ruling parties in Germany6. The second look is at the European Court of Justice. It consists of 27 judges, one from each member state. The nomination proposal by the respective government is actually decisive, only formally the unanimous nomination by the member states. It is quite unusual in rule-of-law states that the judges are only appointed for six years and re-election is possible. Who among these fixed-term employees with the possibility of extension will dare to restrict their government’s financial room for maneuver by declaring the ECB’s purchase of government bonds to be unlawful? In summary: Debtor-oriented policy is characterized by unlimited borrowing possibilities even without the consent of creditors. This is associated with increased European community and conjuring up European solidarity. The carriers are the states according to their level of indebtedness. The development shows that the economic crisis in the euro area had been overcome after the euro crisis. The construction boom as well as the asset inflation were certainly promoted by the flood of money. On the other hand: With the Corona pandemic, the economy in the EU lost momentum again. By 2022, the ECB is again faced with a dilemma: It must fight the enormous inflation rate without choking off the economy. And: The balance of payments and government debt in Table13.1 show that the flood of money and credit has prevented collapses of states and banks, but has not eliminated the crisis causes of 2008, although the measures to combat the economic consequences of the Corona pandemic are to be taken into account here. The ECB does not collect data on the extent and guarantees of real estate loans to private individuals. A large debt elephant remains in the dark side of the room. Apparently without him (and without government debt), the ECB estimates the amount of non-performing loans in the eurozone at 422 billion euros in autumn 2021 (Weise 2021). The flood of money and zero interest rate policy tempts to economically false allocation decisions with capital investments, the consequences of which (e.g. less productivity) only become visible later; the ECB’s policy is like a “drug” (Jens Weidmann quoted by Reuters 2012) encouraging politicians to avoid difficult reforms and delay necessary decisions. Are these all “new tricks” to give the “failed pump capitalism a second spring?” (Streeck 2013b, p. 58) However you look at it: The results cannot be

6 It

is said that Merkel even “approved” the ECB’s government bond purchases in 2012 with her signature, and Finance Minister Schäuble declared them permissible (Vaubel 2018, pp. 27–28).

402

13  Germany in the European Union

Table 13.1   The Eurozone 2021—stabilized after the crisis?

State

Balance of Unemployment payments (% of rate (%) GDP)

Government Government financing baldebt (% of ance (% of GDP) GDP)

Eurozonea)

–

7.7

–3.6 (4th Q.)

95.6

Belgium

–0,4

6,3

−0,2

108,2

Germany

7,4

3,6

7,4

69,3

Estonia

−1,1

6,2

8,1

18,1

Finland

0.7

7.7

0.8

65.8

France

–0.6

7.9

–0.1

112.9

Greece

–5.9

14.7

–3.7

193.3

Ireland

13.9

6.2

13.7

56.0

Italy

2.5

9.5

2.4

150.8

Latvia

–2.9

7.6

–1.4

44.8

Lithuania

1.4

7.1

2.9

44.3

Netherlands

9.5

4.2

9.5

52.1

Portugal

–1.1

6.6

0.7

127.4

Slovakia

–2,0

6,8

Slovenia

3,3

4,8

−0,6

63,1

3,4

74,7

Spain

0,9

14,8

1,9

118,4

Austria

–0.5

6.2

–0.5

82.8

a)

For this and GDP/inhabitant, see Fig. 13.1. The microstates of Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta are not shown. All data refer to 2021. “The balance of payments provides information on a country’s transactions with the rest of the world. It includes all transactions (except transactions in financial instruments) of goods, services, primary and secondary income between resident and non-resident units.” (Eurostat 2022b) “A country’s financing balance corresponds to the sum of the entire balance of payments and capital account in the balance of payments. This overall figure shows (if it is positive) the net amount of funds that the entire economy of the rest of the world makes available to the country concerned, or (if it is negative) the net amount that the rest of the world makes available to the country concerned.” (Eurostat 2022b) Sources: Eurostat (2022b, c, d, e).

called a success of the debtor-oriented strategy, especially since reforms would rather be attributable to the aid-with-conditions policy. A third political line would be the dissolution of the monetary union, more or less represented by right-wing populist parties such as the AfD, as well as a num-

13.1  German Interests in European Politics

403

ber of economists. They consider the euro to be a misfit because it ties together countries with too unequal economic power and divergent interests, while at the same time cutting off financial and export weaklings from the option of currency devaluation. It would inevitably split Europe. Undoubtedly, an exit would be difficult, but possible, at least in the short term with economic losses. This is indicated by experiences with the dissolution of older monetary unions. The EU and French President Macron, as well as the Ampel coalition, are pressing for more European integration. The coalition agreement states that “we want to strengthen and deepen the Economic and Monetary Union”, “complete the Banking Union” and “work for a European reinsurance of national deposit guarantee schemes”, but not without referring to the “further development of the fiscal policy rules” and pointing out that “the budgetary policy in the EU and in the Member States fulfils its responsibility” (Mehr Fortschritt wagen – Koalitionsvertrag, p. 133, 168). In his former capacity, the incumbent Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz said that a German finance minister is a German finance minister—on the one hand obliged to German taxpayers and on the other hand responsible for sound financial management (Ramthun 2020). What is threatened is an end to the hitherto help-with-conditions policy. This means “more Europe” as a response to the crisis and a further shift of power in favour of the debtor-oriented redistribution policy to the detriment of the “market winners”. In consequence, this means less democracy (because the EU is not and cannot be one) and more central regulation (Kielmansegg 2015, pp. 17, 23, 26, 71). The situation of Germany in the European Union will thus deteriorate: • politically, by the loss of influence in the Council of Ministers through Brexit and the changed voting rules from 2014 (simple voting weight for all members, triple majority rule—Federal Government 2014)7is weakened, • economically, by German banks and savers being drawn into a risk community with wavering financial institutions in the south, • in terms of democracy, by the democratically elected Bundestag losing another competence.

7 This

qualified majority is reached if at least 55% of the members of the Council (15 countries out of 27 members) agree and they represent at the same time at least 65% of the EU population (double majority). In addition, there is a blocking minority if at least four Member States, which together represent more than 35% of the EU population, vote against a proposal. The procedure applies to approximately 80% of legislative decisions (Große Hüttmann 2020b).

404

13  Germany in the European Union

With Dieter Grimm (2016, p. 28) it can be formulated: It is another milestone on the way to gradual changes leading to a state which “never stood up for debate”.

13.2 The Europeanisation of the Political System a. The marginalisation of national legislators What effect does the European Union in turn have on the political system of the Federal Republic itself? First of all, the loss of power of the national legislators, the Bundestag and Bundesrat or the state parliaments, is noticeable. All legislative competences of the European Union are derived from their competences. Although new European treaties require the consent of the national legislators, this means that the Federal Government negotiates the treaties with the governments of the other EU countries, while the legislator is only left with the ratification alternative of yes or no. Only the Federal Government as a member of the EU Council is involved in the decision-making process on regulations, directives and decisions of the EU. Only by exerting influence on the Federal Government can the German Bundestag become involved. The conditions for this are laid down in Art. 23 para. 2–3 GG, according to which the Federal Government is obliged to keep the Bundestag “thoroughly and at the earliest possible date” informed of EU affairs in order to give the parliament an opportunity to make a statement, which it “takes into account” in the negotiations in the EU. The European Committee of the Bundestag is a suitable coordinator for influencing (Fuchs 2004). Over time, the number of EU proposals submitted to the German Bundestag has increased sharply, eventually reaching 3861 in the years 2013–17 (Deutscher Bundestag 2021). The new possibility of a subsidiarity objection by at least one quarter of the members of the Bundestag has only been used three times by the Bundestag and eleven times by the Bundesrat by 2017—but without effect (Deutscher Bundestag 2017, p. 16, 35). For a successful objection, one third of the national parliaments in the EU is required, but it does not oblige the EU Commission to do anything. If the objection is carried by the majority of the national parliaments, the Commission is obliged to review its proposal and, if it persists, to justify this. Not once has a German objection been supported by one third, let alone the majority of the national parliaments. Even in the unlikely event of success, the national parliaments would only be petitioners vis-à-vis the European decision-makers (Abels 2013, pp. 90–94; Reiding 2016).

13.2  The Europeanisation of the Political System

405

It is doubtful whether the parliament could—and should—oblige the government to vote in a certain way in the EU Council of Ministers. If this were possible in all EU states, it would be “fatal” for the decision-making ability of the European Union (Töller 2004, p. 49). Reduced to non-binding statements of opinion, to which it usually refrains, the Bundestag, like other national parliaments, threatens to be “marginalized” in its legislative functions (Marschall 2002, p. 388). The parliament is only left with menial tasks in the implementation of Brussels decisions. In theory, the “directives”, which the national legislator has to transpose into national law, offer possibilities for different variants of implementation. In reality, however, the specifications are so detailed that no relevant scope is left. The share of legislation of the Bundestag based on EU impulses is about one third (Töller 2014, p. 9), particularly high in the fields of environment and agriculture, relatively low in the field of social affairs. If one also includes directly applicable EU regulations as well as decisions of the European Court of Justice and the Commission, the Federal Government came to much higher proportions: According to this, approximately 80% of the applicable law originated in Europe (König and Mäder 2008, pp. 439–459; Hölscheidt and Hoppe 2010). The difficulty of the distinction is exemplified by cartel law. Although the national cartel offices continue to operate here, the big fish with a certain turnover fall under EU competence. Since turnover is growing, more and more cases fall under the competence of the EU Commission. As a result, the German cartel office is increasingly “marginalized in content and power politics” by the EU (Sturm and Pehle 2012, pp. 209–219). The situation of the Bundesrat is similar to the one of the Bundestag. It, too, is characterized by the loss of legislative powers. Nevertheless, according to Art. 23 GG, the Bundesrat is “involved in the European political will-formation of the Federation, insofar as it would participate in a corresponding national measure or insofar as the Länder would be nationally competent”. Accordingly, the Bundesrat’s participation is graded in analogy to the national state powers, ranging from non-binding consideration to representatives of the Bundesrat instead of the Federal Government. The formulation of Art. 23 GG seeks to continue the intraGerman federal distribution of power into the European participation of Germany. The Federal Council has, in order to be able to take a position quickly, a socalled European Chamber, “whose resolutions are considered as resolutions of the Federal Council”. In fact, however, this chamber rarely met. Instead, an EU Committee ensures a certain European policy capability of the Federal Council. In the period from 1998 to 2003, it demanded the decisive consideration of its position in 37 cases; the federal government rejected this in 20 of these cases (Sturm and

406

13  Germany in the European Union

Pehle 2012, pp. 89–92). In 2010, the Federal Council was one of the four most active second chambers in the EU; 14 of a total of 34 subsidiarity complaints against EU decisions came from second chambers (Buzogany and Stuchlik 2012). As a result, it becomes clear that the Federal Council is fighting a permanent “defensive battle” for its influence with ever decreasing chances of success (Sturm and Pehle 2012, p. 97). Alone in the case of original state competences (such as education), the states have been able to compensate for this by representatives in EU bodies. The higher activity of the Federal Council compared to the Bundestag can be explained by the fact that there is a political agreement between the majority in the Bundestag and the federal government which makes such activities appear superfluous—in contrast to such an agreement between the majority in the Federal Council and the federal government, which mostly does not exist. b. Federal government: monopoly on participation in the EU The federal government is the only constitutional body that is integrated into the EU institutional system. It names the German EU Commissioner and the German Judge at the European Court of Justice. In practice, this means that it appoints him/her, as the governments of the EU Member States have never interfered in the selection of a government so far. A “mutual non-interference rule” is practiced. The Commissioners are predominantly from national politics, and their five-year term of office makes them dependent on their national renomination (so far achieved by half) or the prospect of a national successor office. In addition, only a minority of all Commission decisions and legislative proposals are actually negotiated in Commission meetings, and the lead Commissioner has “significant influence” on the content of a proposal (Wonka 2008, pp. 49, 97, 105, 113, 117 f., 138, 197; Wonka 2008b). As a result, a government can influence the Commission’s policy in the area of responsibility of its Commissioner, and it is unmistakably pursuing the interests of its country of origin (Wonka 2008b, p. 123 f.). The federal government is directly represented in the Council of the EU. The Chancellor is a member of the European Council, which in practice acts as a “guideline giver” for the EU’s specialist ministerial cabinets (Hartmann 2005, p. 656). Each federal ministry has a department for European affairs. Inter-ministerial conflicts are to be resolved on meetings of the heads of the European affairs departments, the next higher level is a separate secretary of state committee (Beichelt 2016). Coordinations are carried out (unless the Chancellor intervenes

13.2  The Europeanisation of the Political System

407

himself) partly at the Ministry of Economics or Finance, partly at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Große Hüttmann 2007, p. 42 f.). The decision-making practice of the Council of the EU is characterized by the fact that its statements8 are elaborated and negotiated in working groups as far as possible. No less than 70–90% of the decisions to be made in the Council are thus clarified in advance. The Member States are represented by officials or government members (Krax 2010, p. 103). The Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Member States, which consists of national officials and is a “bottleneck and filter” through which all processes in the Council bodies run (Grünhage 2007, p. 105), is superior to the working groups. There, most Council decisions are made, while the Ministers themselves only negotiate remaining controversial points. The Permanent Representative can be overruled in the Committee and is involved in compromise negotiations, but also needs room for manoeuvre for effective influence. Analogously, the federal government is represented by officials in committees of the EU Commission, where they are involved in the preparation of Commission proposals (quasi the legislative initiative) and the implementation of EU legal acts (Wessels 2003, p. 361). The members of these so-called comitology committees usually receive clear instructions from their governments (Huster 2008, p. 271). On the only track on which German institutions can influence European decisions, the federal government, predominantly officials are active, while ministers are only directly active in the event of remaining controversies. c. States, municipalities and administration: Survival despite losses in influence At the level of the federal states, similar consequences of Europeanization can be observed as at the federal level. Here too, competencies are migrating towards Europe, hollowing out German federalism. So while education and administration, the two most important autonomous competences of German state legislators, have not been transferred to the European Union, they are often pierced and overlaid by Brussels (Beissel 2012, p. 196). Such effects arise

8  In

fact, there are ten different ministries with their respective areas of responsibility (Schmidt and Schünemann 2013, P. 90 f.).

408

13  Germany in the European Union

• from the EU’s goal of mutual recognition of certificates and qualifications, with consequences for the education system. • The EU has also set educational policy objectives for schools and vocational students (Hepp 2006, pp. 260 ff.). • The federal states also have to accept competency losses in the efforts to achieve European police cooperation (“Europol”) without being represented in Europol institutions (Frevel and Groß 2016, p. 81). • In 2001–06, EU subsidies accounted for a similar proportion of federal state expenditure on active labor market policy as state funds, exceeding them in seven states (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2007, p. 293)—with corresponding weight of European requirements. In addition, a central profile field of state politics, regional structural and development policy, is threatened to be strangled, because the EU subsidy restrictions, aimed at fair competition, allow only small-scale direct subsidies. Subsidies are only granted generously EU-funded regions, widely financed with EU funds and according to their rules. These golden EU reins must not only be observed by the new federal states, but also by a country like North Rhine-Westphalia if it wants to win EU funding for regions with declining industrial development (Ruhr region) or for rural areas (Jacoby 2005). As at the federal level, so Europeanization also has the effect of shifting weights within the federal states to the detriment of the parliaments, because the involvement of the states in European policy is solely the responsibility of the state governments under Article 23 of the Basic Law. Although parliamentary involvement in European policy is provided for, “the government’s right of final decision remains unaffected”. The respective majority factions are also hardly inclined to restrict these governmental privileges. The well-developed German federalism, an exotic among the EU member states, turns out to be a burden for the German representation in the European Union as well as for the implementation of EU law. As a result, Germany lacks uniform voice in a number of EU bodies due to the involvement of the states according to Art. 23 GG (Wessels and Rometsch 1996; Derlien 2001, pp. 55 ff., 63). In addition, the individual federal states maintain their own representation offices in Brussels with a total of more than 250 employees. The federal government suspects a “parallel foreign policy” of the states (quoted after Sturm and Pehle 2012, pp. 106, 108, 111). The interests of the states are not uniform: While the economically strong federal states want to see the EU competence more limited, for the weak “an essential interest in the maintenance of EU subsidies” is in the foreground (Detterbeck 2007, pp. 18, 23). Finally, the implementation of

13.2  The Europeanisation of the Political System

409

European law poses difficulties for Germany’s federalism. If only one of the 16 federal states does not correctly transpose an EU directive into a national law, the federal government can be sued by the European Commission and fined. Such a case occurred in 1998 due to the non-implementation of the Fauna-Flora-Habitat Directive (nature conservation) (Sturm and Zimmermann-Steinhart 2005, pp. 136 ff.). The “European compatibility” of the German federal state is therefore an issue (Benz 2005), some consider it “not suitable for Europe” (Baier 2006, p. 284). Even the municipal self-government is affected by the European Union. The following topics are of outstanding importance for the municipalities: • The restriction of municipal business promotion: Although municipalities still have a certain degree of leeway in economic development, subsidies for small and medium-sized enterprises (up to 200,000 € in three years) do not have to be reported. In the case of large companies, however, one comes across EU prohibitions. In particular, the sale of municipal property to investors, which is popular as a subsidy, is subject to approval from 100,000 € on and may not fall below the market value by more than 5% (Sturm and Pehle 2012, p. 113). • The open municipal contracting: It should not “favor” local companies, as is popular in municipalities, but rather offer all competitors from EU countries the same chances. So in 2022/23 public contracts with a volume of 215,000 € are to be awarded cross-border, for construction contracts the threshold is 5.382 million euros (Rehm 2022). • The dispute over the limits of the market in public services: In Germany, public service areas are up for grabs, through which municipalities traditionally provided their citizens with energy, water, public transport, savings banks, hospitals, waste disposal, museums, etc. (Henneke 2004, p. 122). This was justified with natural monopoly positions, supply security and social standards. Do such areas not have to be subject to free competition? This question has divided the EU Commission and German municipalities for years and caused uncertainty (Sturm and Pehle 2012, p. 120 ff.). • Even the “local model” of predominantly southern German municipalities, offering building land to local couples with children at preferential prices, has been challenged by an EU lawsuit (Sturm and Pehle 2012, p. 129). Given this widespread concern, it is not surprising that the German municipal associations also maintain “Europe offices” in Brussels. A number of German cities also participate as “Eurocities” in a network of European cities that has its own office in Brussels. There are also “Europe offices” of all kinds for

410

13  Germany in the European Union

d­ istrict-free cities in order to facilitate communication with the EU (Sturm and Pehle 2012, p. 126 ff.; Münch 2006, p. 179, 182). The executive administration, whether located at the federal, state or municipal level, essentially retains its previous function. After all, when it comes to implementation, the EU is dependent on the member states and their administrations, as it does not have its own administrative infrastructure. This is not changed by the—mostly smaller—European agencies that fulfill predetermined tasks (e.g. air traffic safety/Cologne, observation of racism/Vienna); since they are geographically distributed, the member states compete for their location (Fleischer 2007). Implementation and its control are therefore a weak point of the EU. Even the European Statistical Office can usually only build on data from others. In some member states, where there was sometimes a lack of authorities to apply EU law, the European Commission had to urge them to set up such authorities. If there are problems with the implementation of EU law, the Commission is only left with the option of suing the relevant state or imposing fines on companies before the European Court of Justice. This is particularly common in the case of environmental regulations, followed by tax and customs issues. d. Bundesbank and Bundesverfassungsgericht: In the shadow of European institutions Finally, a look should be cast at two German institutions which face, corresponding European institutions and which therefore must clearly be counted among the losers of Europeanisation. First and foremost, there is the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank). Until 2001, it functioned as the “guardian of the currency” independent of the federal government and, for this purpose, had both the issuing of banknotes and the possibility of controlling the volume of credit. Its task description and unusually strong position were explained • on the one hand by the traumatic experience of currency collapse after the First and Second World Wars; money appeared to be too serious a matter to entrust it to the short-term opportunistic considerations of governments. • on the other hand by the conviction that stable money meant a reliable framework for economic behaviour and thus promoted the prosperity of a country. What was ultimately decisive was that, against this background, politics refrained from personal interventions and the members of the Board of Directors, regardless of how and from where they had come into their office, identified with their

13.2  The Europeanisation of the Political System

411

task in a “Thomas Becket effect”9. Not always without conflicts with federal governments, it was possible to make the “Deutsche Mark” one of the most stable currencies and contribute to the economic development of the Federal Republic of Germany. The majority of EU countries agreed to introduce a common European currency and to establish a European Central Bank. Its position, tasks and organisation (see Section 1.3) are modelled on the Bundesbank. Money stability was also its primary task. But what could not be transferred were the ethos of office as well as the German experiences and attitudes towards money stability. The Bundesbank, which still exists, has thus sunk to an executive agency without relevant competences. Vainly, it turns against tendencies to soften the euro from time to time. Regardless of this, Germany has to live with the fact that the German economic situation is no longer decisive for the decisions of the European Central Bank. The monetary policy suit is no longer tailored to Germany. Similarly, the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) also stands in the shadow of a European body, the European Court of Justice. In this position, the Federal Constitutional Court, as observers have said, has taken a “confrontational stance” towards the now higher-ranking European Court of Justice by seeking to protect fundamental principles of the Basic Law, in particular fundamental rights (Büdenbender 2005, p. 286). Finally, in 1993 it permanently waived a review of European law. This looks like a staged withdrawal. At the same time, the Federal Constitutional Court has not always clearly declared its jurisdiction claim to the ECJ—“Solange I and II”, the “Maastricht judgment”, the “Lisbon judgment” (Höreth 2020) as well as recently (2020) a ruling from Karlsruhe, which declared ECB bond purchases partially unconstitutional and brought Germany a (quickly discontinued) infringement procedure, are to be mentioned. However, the Karlsruhe ruling here hits an institution that “cannot be covered by the thesis of the European democratic deficit at all” (Decker 2021, p. 294). Despite such reservations and resistance, the general trend is clearly towards the European Court of Justice asserting the primacy of Union law over any national law and tending towards expansive jurisdiction. In 2005 and 2010, it declared age-related regulations of the Hartz legislation or the Civil Code to be invalid because they violated the European ban on age discrimination. As in other

9 Thomas

Becket, Chancellor and friend of King Henry II of England, raised by him to the Archbishop of Canterbury, then stubbornly defended the rights of the Church against the royal claim to power and was murdered by knights of the king in 1170.

412

13  Germany in the European Union

cases, the European Court of Justice is “a silent revolution through law” (Haller 2008, p. 104). As a result, the task of the Federal Constitutional Court shrinks to the protection of the Basic Law, unless this is contrary to European law. It is in a subordinate role, comparable to the German state constitutional courts vis-à-vis the Federal Constitutional Court. But does Germany go so far as to “specify the primacy of European law in the Basic Law, following the example of other countries, such as Ireland” (Decker 2021, p. 294)? All in all: With the European Union regime, the political system of Germany is changing unnoticedly but drastically: 1. The legislative competences of the Bundestag and Bundesrat, as well as of the state parliaments, are hollowed out. They cannot compensate for their losses of legislative rights through indirect involvement in the formation of the EU’s will to an even remotely similar extent. This also applies analogously to the state parliaments (Hollowing out of national and regional legislatures). 2. Only the federal government retains influence on Brussels decisions with its monopoly on representation, weakened in the future by the exit of the similarly market-oriented United Kingdom (Governmental participation monopoly in the EU). 3. In the course of Europeanization, municipalities and administrations also lose scope, especially in economic development, procurement and public services. However, they remain the general administrative infrastructure for the EU after all (Restrictions on regional and local policy). 4. The Bundesbank has sunk to the level of an executive body within the European monetary system. The Bundesverfassungsgericht is on a similar path. Its jurisprudence and German constitutional law are subject to European law as interpreted by the European Court of Justice. German basic rights only apply to the extent that they do not conflict with European law. The economic policy openness of the Basic Law has become obsolete due to the European internal market (Retreat of the Basic Law and the Federal Constitutional Court). A silent revolution is taking place. Germany’s political system is being transformed and its institutions are increasingly transferring relevant power to Europe. Given the uncertain finality of European integration, it is not possible to predict how far this process will progress.

13.3  The Reduced German Democracy Within the EU

413

13.3 The Reduced German Democracy Within the EU a. Weak integration into European politics Finally, the third guiding question: What is the state of direct German involvement and their influence on the European Union? One institutionalized starting point for interest groups is the “Economic and Social Committee” of the EU— but its statements usually only influence decision-making processes “marginally”, and who is allowed to hold one of the German seats there is effectively decided by the federal government. The European Commission, for its part, financially nurtures certain interest groups—consumers, environmentalists, unions, etc.— from time to time in order to strengthen the “democratic legitimacy of the EU” (Eising 2012, pp. 842–855). Regardless of this, organizations representing interests from the member states have formed approximately 900 “European federations” (Sebaldt and Straßner 2004, p. 272), in which the national spectrum of economically interested associations is reflected. These are heterogeneous federations of national associations. Here and there, individual companies are also direct members of a European federation, such as chemical companies and some automobile companies. If it is a question of specific company interests, then 454 representatives of individual companies, including German conglomerates, also act directly or indirectly on the European stage through professional lobbying firms (Sturm and Pehle 2012, p. 166; Wessels and Schäfer 2007, p. 206). In total, over 12,000 organizations are currently registered in the European Transparency Register, including 1,638 from Germany. There are 50 consulting firms and law firms, 522 interest groups, 376 non-governmental organizations, 85 think tanks and research institutes, nine church representatives and 21 public institutions based in Germany (European Commission 2022b). Their primary target for their efforts to influence is the European Commission. Since it is the EU’s quasi-governmental body and also has the monopoly on initiative for European legal acts, this corresponds to the situation within Germany. In order to improve its information level, the Commission is also quite willing to communicate with both European federations and national associations and individual actors. Interested parties therefore work in committees of the Commission, maintain contact with the EU administration, and of course speak to the committee rapporteurs of the European Parliament (Sebaldt and Straßner 2004, p. 261).

414

13  Germany in the European Union

All in all: The important economic interests have access to the European decision-making process, quite similar to what happens within individual states. It is more difficult for German welfare associations, which have to struggle in the EU to gain understanding for their dual role as an interest group and a non-profit provider of social services—not quite fitting into the free market for private service providers (Winter 2016, p. 199). The German party system is hardly affected by European integration. The European parties to which the German parties belong are only relevant for the delineation of the transnational factions in the European Parliament: for example, the Party of European Socialists, the European People’s Party—Christian Democrats, the European Liberal and Democratic Reform Party. But outside of parliament, such parties are only umbrella organizations for national parties, which formulate their European election programs and conduct their European election campaigns separately. The “Spitzenkandidatenmodell” (lead candidate model), which was first used to a greater extent in 2014 and 2019, is designed to raise cross-border identification and interest in the EU among electorates, but is considered a “slow constitutional change and now a kind of customary law”, which lost a greater part of its sparse legitimacy in 2019 through the presentation of Ursula von der Leyen due to the lack of majorities for the actual election winner Manfred Weber (Große Hüttmann 2020a). What the parties can or cannot do anyway: “Programmatic coherence and goal finding” (Leinen 2013, p. 170). Accordingly, the influence of national parties on their delegations dominates within the European parliamentary factions, since the renomination and political career of the members of parliament primarily depend on their national party leadership. In particular, the leading members of parliament act as “agents of the national party leadership”. There is therefore a lack of cohesion within the European factions (Thiem 2009, pp. 97, 121, 168f.; Martin 2009, p. 116). There can be no question of a real European party system, and the contact of European parliamentarians with German citizens etc. is considerably weaker than that of other members of parliament. Just as little can one speak of a “European public”. There are no public forums where opinions and arguments about EU policy would be exchanged across language barriers. An evaluation of the quality press in France and Germany comes to the conclusion that the “degree of Europeanization” is low (Dietzsch 2009, pp. 61, 115, 159), nor can other research projects detect any development towards a “European public” or a “Europeanization of the national public” (Dingwerth et al. 2011, p. 101, Nieland 2011). This image is completed by the election of German members to the European Parliament. Even their nomination takes place, outside of party members, through

13.3  The Reduced German Democracy Within the EU

415

Table 13.2   European elections in Germany. In percent of the eligible voters or the valid votes

Election year

Voter turnout

DKP, PDS, Left

GREEN

SPD

FDP

CDU/ CSU

AfD

Other

1979

65.7

0.4

3.2

40.8

6.0

49.2

–

0.4

1984

56.8

1.3

8.2

37.4

4.8

46.0

–

2.3

1989

62.4

0.2

8.4

37.3

5.6

37.8

–

10.5

1994

60.0

4.7

10.1

32.2

4.1

38.8

–

10.1

1999

45.2

5.8

6.4

30.7

3.0

48.7

–

5.4

2004

43,0

6,1

11,9

21,5

6,1

44,5

–

9,9

2009

43,3

7,5

12,1

20,8

11,0

37,9

–

10,8

2014

48.1

7.4

10.7

27.3

3.4

35.4

7.1

8.9

2019

61.4

5.5

20.5

15.8

5.4

28.9

11.0

12.9

Source: Zicht (2022)

electors, i.e. 90% local and regional party leaders, plus 5% national. At best, party boards submit their proposals to delegates at the state level. Important for the selection are regional representation, gender, only to a limited extent relevant party direction (Höhne 2013, p. 153, 248, 269). However, something seems to be slowly changing: While in 2009, the top candidates of the major parties were only known to two or six percent of the citizens (Höhne 2013, p. 124 f.), in 2019 only 45% of the respondents did not know any of the nine candidates (Inhoffen 2019). In addition, the scope of election coverage increased over time (Leidecker-Sandmann and Wilke 2020). Even the voter turnout could show a reversal of trend: In 2014 it increased for the first time (probably because of the AfD’s entry); in 2019 it even exceeded 60% for the first time in decades (probably because of the Brexit-related election perceived as a fateful decision). Nevertheless: The democratic legitimacy of the European Parliamentarians still appears to be quite weak (Table 13.2). One can explain voter abstention from concrete causes: The European Parliament lacks the full rights of a parliament, even though these have been considerably strengthened in the meantime. In addition, there was consensus between the permanent parliamentary parties in European policy, which seems to have been disturbed only by deviations from the Left Party and only with the AfD. The weight of German voters, little known, is unlikely to explain voter turnout. Two reasons seem to be essential:

416

13  Germany in the European Union

• This is first of all the linguistic, cultural and historical rooting of the Germans (like other European peoples) in a 1000-year-old national community. The European Union is separated by language barriers. • In addition, the loss of competence to the EU is only partially perceived and central life interests—such as the economic location and social security—are actually linked to the nation state. The “distance” between German citizens and the EU Parliament is “very large” (Weidenfeld 2013, p. 225). However, the majority of Germans support their country’s membership in the EU, three out of four Germans believe that their country benefits from membership (RND 2022). b. The European democracy deficit to the detriment of the Germans The weights of the states according to population, votes in the Council, seats in parliament, commission and court in the EU can be seen in Table 13.3 The allocation of parliamentary seats is “not based on the principle of democratic equality, but follows the power calculation of a proportionality considered ‘appropriate’.” (Steffani 1995, p. 38) The parliament is “not a representative body, but a state assembly” (Isensee 2009, p. 259). Complete equality of the member states, on the other hand, has been in force since 1 November 2014 in the European Council, but also in the Commission and Court of Justice—one seat each for Malta with 0.5 as for Germany with 83.2 million inhabitants. As a result, the great ones in the EU are tied up by the threads of a multitude of small ones like in Jonathan Swift’s “Gulliver’s Travels”. This can hardly be otherwise, given the continued awareness of nationality. In summary, one can speak of only a weak integration of the Germans into the European will-formation and decision-making process. Even if the European Citizens’ Initiative, the strengthening of the European Parliament, new control rights of national parliaments in EU projects and also the introduction of “lead candidates” in the European elections should give the EU democratic legitimacy— approaches to a fully developed European democracy have not developed any further so far, but, on the contrary, a “policy crisis of the EU” ( Abels 2020, p. 1) has. The losses in domestic influence rights brought about by the integration process are not compensated for in the EU system. Against this background, complaints against the Treaty of Lisbon led to a ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG 2009), which left the Treaty untouched, but insisted,

13.3  The Reduced German Democracy Within the EU

417

Table 13.3   Germany in the European Union 2021

Member State

Population (mil- European EU CommisEuropean lion, 2021) Parliament 2021 sion (members) Court of Jus(seats) tice (members)

Germany

83.2

96

1

1

France

67.4

79

1

1

Italy

59.3

76

1

1

Spain

47.4

59

1

1

Poland

37.8

52

1

1

Romania

19.2

33

1

1

Netherlands

17.5

29

1

1

Belgium

11.6

21

1

1

Greece

10.7

21

1

1

Czech Republic

10.7

21

1

1

Sweden

10.4

21

1

1

Portugal

10.3

21

1

1

Hungary

9.7

21

1

1

Austria

8.9

19

1

1

Bulgaria

6.9

17

1

1

Denmark

5.8

14

1

1

Finland

5.5

14

1

1

Slovakia

5.5

14

1

1

Ireland

5.0

13

1

1

Croatia

4.0

12

1

1

Lithuania

2.8

11

1

1

Latvia

1.9

8

1

1

Slovenia

2.1

8

1

1

Estonia

1.3

7

1

1

Cyprus

0.9

6

1

1

Luxembourg

0.6

6

1

1

Malta

0.5

6

1

1

European Union 447.0

705

27 + 1

27

Sources: Federal Statistical Office (2022); European Parliament (2020).

418

13  Germany in the European Union

1. that the EU is a connection of “sovereign remaining states” in which democratic legitimation emanates from citizens (the EU must not be designed “not state-analog” in democratic respect); 2. that delegations of competence to the EU are also possible in the “simplified” procedure by the Council of the EU, but must remain in responsibility of the legislative bodies inside Germany; 3. that the European integration must not go so far that the member states cannot “shape the economic, cultural and social living conditions”; 4. that the court would examine whether EU legal acts stay within the limits of the “allowed sovereignty” (ultra-vires control) and whether the “core content” of the Basic Law is maintained when changes occur (identity control). The smoldering conflict with the European Court of Justice thus continues. Following the verdict, the Bundestag decided on new regulations for point 2. According to these, the German government representative may only agree or abstain in the “simplified” procedure for changes of competence and voting modalities of the EU, “after” the Bundestag and, if necessary, the Bundesrat have decided accordingly; otherwise, he/she must reject it. On the request of one fourth of its members, the Bundestag or Bundesrat is to file a lawsuit for violated subsidiarity with the European Court of Justice. Proposals for judges and advocates general for the European Court of Justice are to be made “in agreement with the judge selection committee” (Deutscher Bundestag 2009). Competence shifts in the fast procedure in favor of the EU have thus been possible for more than a decade only with the explicit agreement of the Bundestag and, if necessary, the Bundesrat. But the daily EU decision-making process can still bypass the legislative bodies of Germany. Here, not much seems to be expected, a corresponding legislative proposal for the general binding of the government representatives in Brussels has not been made (Auberger and Lamping 2009, p. 287 f.). The reasons for the silence are probably • the fact that the majority of the Bundestag indeed supports the respective federal government, trusts it and would rather keep the parliamentary opposition outside – a hunting dog that one would have to carry along for the hunt. • In addition, specifications causee inflexibility, complicate compromises with other states before votes in the EU – one loses influence there, damages one’s own interests. Experiences of Austria and Denmark, which know a binding of their governments to parliamentary decisions, seem to point in this direction (Huber 2009). Finland and Sweden have therefore only given their parliaments guiding options (Pehle and Sturm 2008, p. 167).

13.3  The Reduced German Democracy Within the EU

419

The political system of the European Union is unfinished, only legitimized by negotiation compromises in its voting weights and characterized by constant change. The crises of the last decade – the Euro crisis 2011, the migration crisis 2015, the pandemic from 2020 – put the existence question each time (Ladurner 2022). The project seems to be carried by a nation-building idea according to which common institutions create a national sense of community (Zürn 1996, pp. 45 ff.) – regardless of all the problems of multi-ethnic states. Even the borders of the European Union are unfinished – not only further Balkan countries, but also Turkey (and since 2022 probably also Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova) are at the door. Where the European integration process will lead remains open. On the one hand, the mentality of self-confident nations such as the French speaks for the fact that the nation-states maintain their own weight. On the other hand, the logic set in motion by the internal market and the euro, supported by the attractiveness of a large economic area, pushes for more and more areas of European regulation (Bulmer and Paterson 2019, p. 55)—most recently, for example, the scope of large digital companies (Digital Markets Act/Digital Services Act). There seems to be a certain willingness in Germany to let one’s own country dissolve in Europe, with a negative view of its history since 1871. As a result, the perspectives of the elites diverge: The German idea is described as “maximum integration with some kind of federalism”, while the French integration “with control by governments” (Schmedes 2002, p. 171). The political system of Germany in the European Union is no longer simply the democracy of the Basic Law. If one tries to describe it in a nutshell, one comes to the following results: 1. The European Union of States is not democratically constituted, but is subordinate to other political levels within the framework of the European treaties. It is the lack of a European people, a community consciousness sufficient to stabilize the political system, which excludes a democracy of the same citizens at the European level (Miliopoulos 2018, pp. 107–109). Although therefore only negotiated decisions seem possible (Scharpf 1993), the EU has essentially moved to majority decisions with weightings in favor of smaller countries, up to equal votes for each state, Germany as well as Malta (in the powerful Commission, the Council and the Court of Justice). 2. With the transfer of competences to the EU, in particular for the establishment of a common, fair market and for EU financial funds to promote various Union objectives in the Member States, a distortion of the political system of the Federal Republic of Germany has taken place, in that the Bundestag

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and Landtage lose legislative competences and the Basic Law has no validity vis-à-vis EU law. The democracy of the Basic Law continues, but is de facto largely hollowed out. This is also not compensated for by the German citizens’ democratic participation rights within the EU, especially since the European democracy deficit is particularly to their detriment (Rudzio 2013). 3. There is an inhomogeneity of institutions and competence order between the levels, since the European level has neither equal voting rights nor rules of parliamentary democracy, while the federal and state levels are democratically constituted and the municipalities are characterized by separate electoral periods of parliament and directly elected administrative leadership. 4. One can therefore speak of an integrated political four-level system (Europe— Federal Republic—Länder—municipalities) for Germany, in which there are interlocking competences between the levels and the European level encroaches on the competence areas of lower levels; however, the execution lies with the lower levels. It is difficult to bring the entire system under one concept: an integrated negotiated democratic multi-level system, the decision-making ability and transparency of which are limited. It is legitimate despite the democracy losses of the citizens, insofar as the advantages of a common, large market with supportive payments for the weaker Member States predominate. However, further challenges are looming on the horizon, which reveal another type of democracy deficit in the EU: In 2017, the European Parliament initiated proceedings against Poland and in 2018 against Hungary under Article 7 of the EU Treaty—here due to concerns about the independence of the judiciary, freedom of opinion in the country, corruption, minority and migrant rights; there because of the reform of the judiciary. Financial penalties are threatened from 2021 due to the so-called “rule of law mechanism”.

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Vaubel, Roland (2009): The European Institutions as an Interest Group, London. Vaubel, Roland (2018): Das Ende der Euromantik, Wiesbaden. Weidenfeld, Werner (2013): Die Europäische Union, 3. Aufl., München. Weise, Tamara (2021): Summe der faulen Kredite bei Banken im Euroraum im Frühjahr gesunken, unter: https://finanzbusiness.de/nachrichten/banken/article13345816.ece (zuletzt geprüft am 27. April 2022). Wessels, Wolfgang (2003): Beamtengremien im EU-Mehrebenensystem – Fusion von Administrationen?, in: Jachtenfuchs, Markus/Kohler-Koch, Beate (Eds.): Europäische Integration, 2. Aufl., Opladen, p. 353 ff. Wessels, Wolfgang/Rometsch, Dietrich (1996): Conclusion, in: dies. (Eds.): The European Union and member states, Manchester, p. 330 ff. Wessels, Wolfgang/Schäfer, Verena (2007): Think Tanks in Brüssel, in: Dagger, Steffen/ Kambeck Michael (Eds.): Politikberatung und Lobbying in Brüssel, Wiesbaden, p. 197 ff. von Winter, Thomas (2016): Die Europapolitik der deutschen Interessenverbände, in: Böttger, Katrin/Jopp, Mathias (Eds.): Handbuch zur deutschen Europapolitik, Baden-Baden, p. 187 ff. Wonka, Arndt (2008a): Die Europäische Kommission, Baden-Baden. Wonka, Arndt (2008b): Die Europäische Kommission in EU-Entscheidungsprozessen, in: Selck, Torsten/Veen, Tim (Eds.): Die politische Ökonomie des EU-Entscheidungsprozesses, Wiesbaden, p. 111 ff. Zürn, Michael (1996): Über den Staat und die Demokratie im europäischen Mehrebenensystem, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 37 (1), p. 27 ff.

Part IV Sociological aspects of German politics

The Media as Intermediaries and Actors

14

14.1 Democracy and Mass Communication a. Public opinion and mass media An understanding of a political system also includes social relationships, ways of thinking and behaviour, in which its institutions, organisations and rules are embedded and from which their functioning is influenced. First of all: The quality of a democracy depends to a large extent “on the way in which its society communicates” (Sell 1980). The opinions prevailing in public at any given time, the “public opinion”, strongly influence the political behaviour of citizens as well as politicians. Already David Hume (1711–76) saw in it the actual source of political power: “It is […] on opinion only that government is founded.” (quoted after Noelle-Neumann 1990, p. 188) A role of public opinion is also intended in the theory of representative parliamentary democracy, since it does not at all assume a secluded formation of the will of parliament. The requirements that the process of public opinion formation should meet are visible in different variants of the concept of “public opinion”: • In the sense of the older liberal tradition, “public opinion” is to be understood on the one hand as the result of public opinion formation, which is responsible and open to counter-arguments by certain persons or organisations (Hennis 1957, p. 27). Normatively, this requires the rational, truth-oriented character of the opinion-forming process1. 1 One

can speak here of “public as discourse” (Ulrich Saxer), which Habermas also propagates as an “enlightened” and accessible to everyone discourse with the result of a consensus (Kiefer 2010, pp. 46 ff.).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Mannewitz and W. Rudzio, The Political System of Germany, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41371-2_14

431

432

14  The Media as Intermediaries and Actors

• On the other hand, “public opinion” is defined empirically as the views “which one can express publicly without isolating oneself” (Noelle-Neumann 2001, p. 91). Then it all depends on how far the freedom of expression is resistant to conformity pressure. • Democratic majority orientation finally emerges when “public opinion” is equated with majority opinion in the sense of opinion poll research. The fact that governments and parties repeatedly commission representative opinion polls indicates democratic feedback. Today, the media have become the central carriers of public opinion formation. More than ever, information and opinions are conveyed through them. This happens mainly and inevitably indirectly, publicly and one-sidedly. Only communication via social media is not subject to these conditions a priori. While direct political communication is declining and political-social milieus are further disintegrating, the reach of mass media has expanded significantly over many years. It has been changing structurally for some time now due to digital offers and has even been declining slightly for about 15 years, averaging nine and a half hours a day in 2020. Linear television is now only consumed for 165 minutes a day (2010: 220 minutes); radio for 136 minutes (2010: 187 minutes); the “classic” daily newspaper is no longer captured in the ARD/ZDF long-term study—the most comprehensive study on German media consumption habits—but is split up: printed newspapers and magazines consume receive 15 minutes, online articles 22 minutes (Breunig et al. 2020, p. 421) of daily attention. Nevertheless: Other forms of visual, auditory and text media are gaining ground—media libraries, video streaming services and other platforms, podcasts. Television consumption is in the middle of the European comparison, for example, outperformed by Portugal (approx. 350 minutes), Serbia and Romania (Weidenbach 2022). Since the end of the nineties, Internet usage has spread rapidly, so that in 2021 76% of Germans are online every day, 14–19 year olds even 100% (Beisch and Koch 2021, p. 488 f.). As a result, the “media Internet” has gained massively in importance, i.e. the consumption of videos, audio formats and texts that were previously either only played via the classical media (individual newspaper articles or programmes) or did not even exist (e.g. self-made YouTube videos or podcasts). In contrast, newspapers are losing importance: In 2020, printed newspapers and magazines consume exactly half the time (15 minutes) as ten years ago; online articles of the large newspaper houses only come to six minutes (Breunig et al. 2020, p. 423), so they cannot make up for the loss. Accordingly, the number of copies sold declined from 29.0 million in 1998 to 13.4 million in the first quarter of 2022; the same applies to weekly newspapers. At the same time, the

14.1  Democracy and Mass Communication

433

relevance of e-papers and paid-content offers is increasing steadily: For example, with daily newspapers, the year-on-year increase in circulation is 12.5% (IVW, 2022a). In addition, Germany (as of 2009) can still be considered a country of newspaper readers, as international comparisons of newspaper density (= newspapers per 1,000 inhabitants over 14 years) show, although it ranks behind leaders such as Japan, Norway, Switzerland and Austria, but almost on a par with Great Britain and the Netherlands as well as significantly ahead of the USA, Canada, France, Poland and Italy (Statista 2022a). However, this does not take into account those who only read a newspaper online. In addition to personal conversations, TV, radio and local newspapers are still of great importance for public opinion formation (Schüler et al. 2021, p. 6). Mass media therefore still form the “bridge to politics” (Brettschneider 1997a, p. 286) for most people even in the age of social media (YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Telegram, etc.). At the same time, there is an age effect: The younger the people, the more important social media are for their political information (Engel and Rühle 2017); YouTube is even on a par with newspapers in terms of importance for people under 29. In terms of daily use of newspapers and television news for political information, Germany ranks in the upper half of the EU comparison, only outperformed by Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Luxembourg2. The – public service – television (70%) enjoys the greatest trust among Germans, followed by regional newspapers (63%), national daily newspapers (56%), private television (23%) and tabloid newspapers (7%). The Corona pandemic has changed little about this: “There are good reasons to believe that the media’s ability to orientate is appreciated as a whole in times of crisis, but that individual offerings or genres do not stand out in particular.” The bottom of the list is made up of news in groups of messenger services (e.g. Telegram) and in social networks (e.g. Facebook) (each 5%) (Jakobs et al. 2021, pp. 157 ff.). However, one should not overestimate the role of public service media—it seems that the political offerings on public television are “avoided” by many viewers and that news is only swallowed up as part of a “colourful mix of topics” (Maurer 2009a, p. 148). b. Freedom of opinion and media in constitutional law The freedom of opinion and information anchored in Art. 5 GG is formulated as a fundamental right that is media-related and individual-related. According to it, everyone has the

2 Eurobarometer

2006 according to: Tenscher (2008, p. 437).

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14  The Media as Intermediaries and Actors

“right to express and disseminate his or her opinion freely in words, writing and pictures and to obtain information from generally accessible sources without hindrance. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by radio and film are guaranteed. There is no censorship.”

Art. 5 GG and the regulations derived from it seek to ensure free public opinionforming primarily through protection against state interventions, as the history of the liberal constitutional state suggests. In particular, this applies to • the inadmissibility of a penalty for expressions of opinion; • the prohibition of censorship or restrictions on freedom of information (e.g. by prohibiting the listening to foreign broadcasters); • the freedom of expression for everyone, from which the free access (without examinations or approvals) to journalistic professions is also derived; • the duty of the authorities to provide information to the media, which is intended to prevent the starvation of disliked media outlets; • the right of journalists not to give evidence in court, which – with the exception of the prosecution of serious crimes – they are not obliged to reveal to their informants (since 1975). In addition, the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) also affirms protection against social power by declaring economic boycotts of media companies – such as economic pressure on kiosk owners to prevent them from selling a particular publication – to be inadmissible. Political calls for boycotts, however, are not excluded as long as they are not accompanied by pressures (BVerfG 1969). The freedom and plurality of public organs also serve the rationality and truthfulness of the opinion-forming process. The underlying philosophy does not rely on the reliability of the individual organ, but on the constant process of expression and counter-expression, of mutual correction and control. Therefore, an attempt is not made to legally oblige the individual organ to truth. Accordingly, a person reported on has the right to reply with regard to the factual assertions concerning him/her without clarification of the facts. Such a competing variety was not possible for a long time for technical reasons with the broadcast media. Therefore, the Federal Constitutional Court derived from Art. 5 GG that in the individual institution all important groups must have influence; the programs (not necessarily the individual broadcast) must have diversity and “balance” in content according to the 1st and 2nd Broadcasting Decisions (BVerfG 1961; 1971). When the bottleneck loosened on the frequencies, the court

14.1  Democracy and Mass Communication

435

obliged the legislature in the 3rd Broadcasting Decision (BVerfG 1981) to ensures that “the overall offer of domestic programs corresponds to the existing diversity of opinion to a significant extent” when approving new private program operators. This line was continued in the 4th (BVerfG 1986), in the 5th (BVerfG 1987) and in the 6th Broadcasting Decision (BVerfG 1991), according to which • the public broadcaster must guarantee a “basic supply” in the offer; therefore, it has a “guarantee of existence and development”; • the requirements for plurality do not apply to the same extent to private broadcasters as to public broadcasters; • the dual system with public and private broadcasters is not the only possible order of the broadcast media under the Basic Law. Some time ago, a state treaty between the states responsible for media policy filled this framework to the effect that the duality between private and public broadcast media is maintained; the latter is expressly guaranteed to continue to exist and develop. Freedom of expression is only limited by general criminal offenses such as defamation, slander and treason. This also includes, among other things, Holocaust denial in Germany (§ 130 para. 3 and 4 StGB). The Federal Constitutional Court considers such a restriction on a specific opinion to be legitimate on the basis of the “identity-forming importance of German history” (BVerfG 2018). This is different with the amendment to § 130 StGB, which was passed in autumn 2022, according to which the approval, denial and downplaying of genocide and war crimes (not only of National Socialism) will be punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment. With this, Germany implements EU requirements that were introduced at the urging of Eastern European countries—with the intention of putting a stop to the denial of Stalinist crimes. Overall, the judiciary tends to draw the line widely. Not every polemical campaign statement should be subject to criminal prosecution. This is unlikely to be different with the new paragraph in § 130 StGB. However, it is more difficult to weigh up against the right to personal honor and privacy. Here, the Federal Constitutional Court increasingly rules in favor of freedom of expression or art, which, for example, allows a severely injured reserve officer to be referred to as a “born murderer” (BVerfG 1992). With the primacy of freedom of expression and press freedom, the judiciary has given the media a powerful position. The Internet has also deeply changed communication—not just political communication. However, the hope that came with it for the democratization of the discourse through free, unfiltered exchange of opinions was quickly shattered by

436

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the dark side of the net, as extremists (Ebner 2019) and market-dominant social media platforms profit from it, echo chambers and filter bubbles (Rudolph 2019) are added, as well as the digital divide. Questions of access and network provision for citizens, market entry barriers, copyright and privacy protection, the integration of traditional media actors into the online media landscape and transparency issues need to be clarified—and this in the face of a phenomenon that genuinely exceeds the limits of national sovereignty. Regulating the Internet has therefore become an equally important and complex field of action for national and international political efforts (Greef 2017)— not least because of the increased “power of the platforms” (Seemann 2022). Beck (2018, p. 296) speaks of “institutions of co-regulation”, in which the federal government and the states (general regulation of public online communication), the EU (e.g. regulation of competition and consumer protection), users (technical and behavioral norms), the Voluntary Self-Control Multimedia and the large platforms (e.g. AGB) participate. Relevant legal bases are: • the Telemedia Act (2007; last amended 2021)—it regulates in particular technical and economic questions (e.g. the duty to provide an imprint) as well as the unification of media and internet law, which had become necessary due to the convergence of telecommunications and journalism; • the Youth Media Protection Treaty—it prohibits, inter alia, “extremist propaganda, calls for hatred, violence, discrimination and crimes”, but also the trivialisation/glorification of “Nazi crimes, violence, war and inhumanity”; children and young people may not be “portrayed in an unnaturally genderstereotyped posture” and the content may not be indexed (Beck 2018, p. 316); • the Media State Treaty of 2020, which replaced the Broadcasting State Treaty in force since 1991—it creates a uniform legal framework for all news media (print, radio and internet media) and regulates the requirements for “media intermediaries” such as Google, Facebook and Wikipedia (including the algorithm-based selection of information); • the Network Enforcement Act of 2017 (last amended 2021)—it obliges social networks to remove hate speech and fake news as soon as they become aware of them and to forward individual content with a criminal offence to the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt)—it is controversial: First of all, for example, in the context of the vague § 130 StGB (“incitement to hatred”), the question arises as to how an expression must be formulated in order not to be considered “suitable” to “incite someone to hatred against an ethnic or religious group”. Secondly, the draconian fines of the law make the networks, avoiding risks, decide in doubt for deletions. Thirdly, finally, is the

14.2  The Dual Media Landscape

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right to freedom of expression still guaranteed if private companies are to make deletions instead of the state? • the Service Provider Act of 2021—it implements an EU Directive of 2019 into national law and makes large internet platforms such as Youtube liable for copyright infringements (and thus makes upload filters almost inevitable, which the coalition agreement of the Ampelkoalition, however, rejects (More Progress—Coalition Agreement, p. 110). Overall, the area of online media is not yet regulated to the same extent as that of traditional media. Proposals by the EU—such as the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act, which are intended to safeguard digital competition and strengthen user rights—are to be seen as expressions of ongoing regulatory needs.

14.2 The Dual Media Landscape a. The press: leading media and regional newspapers A look at the media landscape reveals its division into two different areas: the variety of private printed products (daily newspapers, weekly magazines, etc.) on the one hand and the limited number of public service broadcasters and private radio and television stations on the other. This makes the German media system different from both liberal-private media systems (USA, Great Britain, Canada, Ireland) and polarized-pluralist systems with state-controlled broadcasting and politically committed newspapers (France, Southern Europe) (Helms 2007, pp. 121–123). Germany is considered the “birthplace of the newspaper” (Wilke 2009, p. 505), the first known newspaper appearing in Strasbourg from 1605/09. However, its present-day press has been significantly shaped by the occupying powers after the Second World War. While one type of newspaper predominated before 1933, which each addressed a specific socio-ideological public, the American occupying power only allowed newspapers with politically mixed editorial boards, while the British allowed mostly “party newspapers”, but did not entrust them to parties, but to individuals (Pürer and Raabe 2007, pp. 47, 108). The advantage these newspapers had could not be made up for by newly founded newspapers after the end of the licensing compulsion in 1949. However, the social democratic press fell to a total circulation of one million by 1975 (Pruys and Schulze 1975, Appendix), a trend that continued in the following period.

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14  The Media as Intermediaries and Actors

Overall, the press in the Federal Republic is therefore characterized by the fact that independent, mostly regional daily newspapers each address all citizens. Partial publics, cut off from other opinions, have disappeared. There is a variety of levels and political directions among daily newspapers and weekly newspapers. The following types can be distinguished: • National daily newspapers with an accentuated political line and a demanding level, which can be considered the most important carriers of argumentative public opinion at the national level. These include the right-wing “Die Welt”, the liberal-conservative “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” and the left-liberal “Süddeutsche Zeitung”. • Regional daily newspapers with a high total circulation, which have the character of informative newspapers with regional political weight. They tend to be majority in the political center or with little political profile. • Local daily newspapers, whose distribution is limited to one or more city and district. They also report on local events, as do local editions or parts of other newspapers. Politically, they usually show little profile. • Boulevard newspapers with thinner information content. These include the nationwide “BILD” newspaper, as well as metropolitan newspapers such as “BZ” (Berlin), Express (Cologne) or Abendzeitung (Munich). • Political weekly magazines with an accentuated political tendency. The most influential are the left-liberal news magazine “Der Spiegel” and the left-liberal “Die Zeit”, as well as the right-liberal “Focus”. • Illustrated and other entertaining, professional and association political weekly or monthly periodicals. The “Stern” can be considered politically committed and relevant. It is of great importance that many journalists from other media orient themselves to the “elite” of the media, to the flagship newspapers at the national level (Köcher 1985, p. 57). In 2005, political journalists frequently used the following medie for their work: Süddeutsche Zeitung 35%, Spiegel 34%, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 15%, ARD-Tagesschau 19% and Die Zeit 11%.3 Analogously, with regard to web offers used by them 53% of the journalists named the Spiegel, followed by the Süddeutsche Zeitung (9.8%), the Tagesschau (9.5%), Bild (9.2%)

3 Survey

2005 with 1536 journalists, according to Weischenberg et al. (2006, pp. 134–135).

14.2  The Dual Media Landscape

439

and the Welt (5.5%)4. More recent and slightly differently formulated, but of similar importance is a survey among members of the economic, political and administrative elite: Which newspaper/magazine do you consider to be a particularly good source of information on political events? 66% name the Frankfurter Allgemeine, 38% the Süddeutsche, 31% the Spiegel, 20% Die Welt, 14% Die Zeit, 12% the Handelsblatt (Steltzner 2015)—it is obvious that political journalists use these newspapers for their work. Newspapers can only operate profitably with a certain minimum circulation. Therefore, in the long term, concentration processes have taken place. After the abolition of the licensing requirement in 1949, the number of independent newspapers rose from 187 to 755, the number of political editorial offices from 225 in 1954 to 121 in 1975 (Diederichs 1973, pp. 53, 55, 59; Scriver 1975). Then the concentration process came to a standstill. For 2017, 120 publishing units in the sense of editorial independence, i.e. full editorial offices, are counted in united Germany. The publishing plurality is therefore lower than one might suspect from the 1497 newspaper titles (Beck 2018, p. 162). In addition, firstly, the selective effect of news agencies, “the central sources of national and international reporting”. As more and more is being saved on newspaper editorial offices, the relevance of the German Press Agency (dpa), the German Foreign Press Service (dapd), Associated Press (AP), Agence France Presse (afp), Reuters and other agencies is increasing (Beck 2018, p. 55), whose reports or complete contributions are often taken over unchanged for resource reasons. Secondly, the dpa has a dominant role, which further reduces the publishing plurality. The picture could therefore be more diverse. Compared to other Western democracies these are not (yet) alarming numbers, given the supra-regional diversity of publications. Although the large publishers were able to strengthen their position in the course of German unification, the largest, Springer-Verlag, has left its peak behind and is prevented from further expansion by cartel law. An overview is provided in Table 14.1. What did spread, however, are local newspaper monopolies, where only one daily newspaper reports on local affairs. While only 8.5% of the population lived in a city or district with only one local newspaper in 1954, this was the case for 44% of the population in 2012 (Decker et al. 1976, p. 37; Pürer 2015, p. 84). In addition, circulation is continuously declining; in some federal states there is only

4 Survey

p. 101).

2007, n = 601 journalists working on a daily basis, according to Krüger (2013,

440

14  The Media as Intermediaries and Actors

Table 14.1   The printed media in the Federal Republic of Germany 2022. Sales in thousand copies, 1st quarter 2022

I. Daily Newspapers (Sales Volume of 13.41 Million Copies) 1. National Newspapers (here also lower editions considered) BILD (AS)

1 180

Süddeutsche Zeitung (SMWH)

309

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (F)

199

Tageszeitung (Genossenschaft)

49

Handelsblatt

127

Die Welt (AS)

86

Neues Deutschland (Die Linke 50 %) 17 Der Tagesspiegel 2. Regional newspapers (from 70 000 sales circulation) Baden-Württemberg:

102

Allgäuer Zeitung (AA)

87

Schwäbische Zeitung

140

Badische Neueste Nachrichten

104

Schwarzwälder Bote (SMWH)

100

Badische Zeitung

124

Stuttgarter Zeitung (SWMH)

171

Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung

70

Südkurier (AA)

106

Heilbronner Stimme Bavaria:

72

Augsburger Allgemeine (with Allgäuer) (AA)

280

Münchner Merkur (IP)

176

Donaukurier

72

Nürnberger Nachrichten

209

Main Post (AA)

106

Passauer Neue Presse

149

Mittelbayerische Zeitung Berlin:

92

tz-München (IP)

90

B. Z. (AS) Brandenburg:

88

Der Tagesspiegel

100

Märkische Allgemeine (Ma) Bremen:

88

Weserkurier Hamburg:

119

Hamburger Abendblatt (FM) Hesse:

135

Hessische./Niedersächs. Allgemeine (IP) Mecklenburg-Vorpommern:

168

Frankfurter Rundschau (IP)

./

Ostsee-Zeitung (Ma) Lower Saxony:

110

Braunschweiger Zeitung (FM)

87 (continued)

14.2  The Dual Media Landscape

441

Table 14.1   (continued)

I. Daily Newspapers (Sales Volume of 13.41 Million Copies) Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung (Ma)

130

Niedersächsisches Tageblatt

80

Nordwest-Zeitung North Rhine-Westphalia:

94

Aachener Zeitung (RP)

83

402 Westdt. Allgemeine Ztg. + Neue Ruhr + Westfalenpost + Westfälische Rundschau

Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger +Kölnische Rundschau + Express (D)

242

Westfälischer Anzeiger

104

Rheinische Post (RP)

247

Westfalen-Blatt

93

Neue Westfälische (SPD) Rhineland-Palatinate:

125

Die Rheinpfalz (SMWH) Saarland:

233

Rhein-Zeitung

151

Saarbrücker Zeitung (H) Saxony:

102

Freie Presse (SMWH)

203

Leipziger Volkszeitung (Ma) Saxony-Anhalt:

134

Sächsische Zeitung (SPD 40 %)

186

Mitteldeutsche Zeitung Schleswig-Holstein:

136

Volksstimme

142

Kieler Nachrichten (Ma) Thuringia:

72

Thüringer Allgemeine (FM) 114 II. Weekly Newspapers (Selected Examples) Bild am Sonntag (AS)

695

Das Parlament (Frankfurter Societät)) 14

Focus (Hubert Burda)

247

Russkaja Germanija/Berlin

der Freitag (der Freitag Mediengesellschaft)

25

Der Spiegel

(Spiegel-Verlag)a)

58 723

Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszei- 212 tung (FAZ GmbH)

Stern (Gruner + Jahr)

343

Junge Freiheit (JF Verlag)

Welt am Sonntag (AS)

332

28

(continued)

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14  The Media as Intermediaries and Actors

Table 14.1   (continued)

I. Daily Newspapers (Sales Volume of 13.41 Million Copies) Katholische Sonntagszeitung (Medi- 26 engruppe St. Ulrich)

Die Zeit (Holtzbrinck)

611

Kurier am Sonntag (Bremer Tageszei- 118 tungen AG) a)The Spiegel-Verlag has 25.25% shares in Gruner & Jahr, 50% of the newspaper’s employees, 23.75% of the Augstein family and the Rudolf-Augstein-GmbH 1%. Majority shares (50% or more) of the 10 largest publishers 2020: SWMH = Südwestdeutsche Medienholding (total circulation share 2020 of daily newspaper circulation: 11.5%); AS = Axel Springer SE (10.7%); FM = Funke-Mediengruppe (7.5%); IP = Verlagsgruppe Ippen (5.8%); Ma = Verlagsgruppe Madsack (5.4%); AA = Verlagsgruppe Augsburger Allgemeine (3.9%); RP =  Rheinische Post Mediengruppe (3.6%); SPD = Deutsche Druck- u. Verlagsgesellschaft (3.4%), Verlagsgruppe Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung (3.2%); D = Verlagsgruppe DuMont (2.2%) Sources: IVW (2022b); Statista (2022b).

one newspaper with a larger circulation (see Table 14.1). The situation is similar with the boulevard and Sunday papers, which have an overall oligopolistic situation (Beck 2018, p. 167). The situation is only alleviated in that at least local monopoly papers tend to be politically reserved (Noelle-Neumann 1976, p. 193; Zoll et al. 1974, pp. 201 ff.). A more recent study also comes to the conclusion that in local reporting neutral “court reporting or announcement journalism” prevails—whether out of consideration for local elites or advertising customers, out of lack of competence or time of the journalists (Neller 1999, p. 92, 94). Remarkable since 1990 is a renewed advance of party property in the press sector. Here it plays less of a role that the Left with the “Neues Deutschland” and the Greens with the “tageszeitung” actually have a newspaper. Much more, the SPD came back to a “media empire” with the restitution of 1933 lost press property in Central Germany, which includes considerable participation in a number of newspapers. Although these are mainly minority stakes such as 23.1% in the Hannover Madsack newspaper group and 40% each in the Sächsische Zeitung and the Morgenpost für Sachsen as well as 30% in smaller newspapers; but also 100% in the Neue Westfälische. The SPD treasurer responsible for the SPD participation company once said reassuringly: “We have no decisive influence”. Restrictively: “Even where we only have 30% or 40% of the shares, nothing can happen without us in principle. But we only reserve the right to influence the business plan and the composition of the management” (O. A. 2000). The muchvaunted separation between media and parties is partly full of holes.

14.2  The Dual Media Landscape

443

b. The dualism of public and private broadcast media There are public and private broadcasters next to each other in radio and television. The public sector consists of a regionally structured system of public institutions, which finance themselves through license fees from all households and companies with radio in their area. According to the borders of the federal states or several states together, there are institutions of different sizes: the Westdeutscher Rundfunk (North Rhine-Westphalia), the Südwestdeutscher Rundfunk (Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate), the Norddeutscher Rundfunk (Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein), the Bayerischer Rundfunk, the Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk (Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia), the Hessischer Rundfunk, the Rundfunk Berlin Brandenburg (Brandenburg, Berlin), the Saarländischer Rundfunk and Radio Bremen. These broadcasting institutions together with Deutsche Welle form the “Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Rundfunkanstalten Deutschlands” (ARD). Within the ARD, a financial equalization is made in favor of financially weak, smaller broadcasters. Together, the ARD broadcasters are the carriers of ARD television (First Program), in which the individual broadcasting institutions take over certain broadcasting shares. Outside are the federal Deutsche Welle and the Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF). In accordance with the constitutional demand that radio and television may not be entrusted to a government or a social group alone, the supervisory boards of the broadcasting institutions and the ZDF are made up of political representatives (government, parliamentary and party representatives) and representatives of social groups. You have to distinguish here between the broadcasting council, which is supposed to control the program design, and the director (=leader) of the institution, and the administrative board with business-administrative tasks. The shares of the different groups in the broadcasting councils vary from institution to institution. However, there is always a numerical majority of representatives of social groups. For example, the ZDF television council consists of: • 20 representatives of politics: 16 of the state governments, 2 of the federal government and 2 of the local associations. • 23 representatives of social organizations: 5 of the churches/Jewish communities, 4 of the welfare organizations, 3 of the unions (including the civil servants’ union), 1 each of the employers’ organizations, the German Industry and Trade Association, the Farmers’ Association, the Crafts, the newspaper publishers, the German Journalists’ Association, the German Olympic Sports Association, the European Union, the German Association for the

444

14  The Media as Intermediaries and Actors

­ nvironment and Nature Conservation, the Nature Conservation Union, the E Association of Expellees, the Association of Victims of Stalinism. • 16 people from “areas” (including 1 from each federal state): consumer protection, digitalism, internet, seniors/family/women/youth, science/research, music, migrants, civic engagement, Muslims, media industry/film, inclusive society, art/culture, voluntary civil and disaster protection, homeland/tradition, regional and minority languages, LGBTTIQ (ZDF 2022). For a long time, the associations (unlike the religious communities) each proposed three candidates for each seat, from which the prime ministers appointed one; 16 representatives from “areas” were even selected solely by the prime ministers. The Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG 2014) put a stop to this. Since then, only one third of the television council may be state-related, and associations and organizations have gained influence. The supervisory boards of the public institutions were politically contested for a long time, which sometimes led to the dubious reputation of the “Red Radio” or “Black Radio”. However, the supervisory boards do not have much more influence on the management of the institutions than personnel influence. This is because busy association representatives and politicians in the broadcasting councils cannot control the programming of large broadcasters against a prevailing journalists’ opinion. 76% of the members of the broadcasting councils themselves said that, for reasons of other professional obligations, they actually could not act constructively, 39% mentioned a lack of expertise. Almost two thirds of them tend to the view that large organizations such as public television stations are not controllable by amateur boards (Kepplinger 1989, pp. 13, 20f., 79). This is a strong indication that there is a self-government of journalists in public institutions—with well-known consequences (Schlesinger affair 2022). The motor of change in the broadcast media became the private broadcasters from 1984. They have conquered audience and market share from small beginnings. Since the mid-1990s, there have been nationwide private radio stations; in addition, local radio programs are offered. A special category are so-called “open” radio and television channels that distribute local or regional non-professional contributions from the population; their carriers are state media institutions or non-profit organizations. Despite the considerable shares of the private sector, however, significantly more ARD radio programs are heard. The group of private television broadcasters is more manageable. They quickly increased their audience share, but now show a trend towards fragmentation. The audience shares of the larger providers listed in Table 14.2 are therefore almost always decreasing. Of the most important private television broadcasters, Pro7,

14.3  The Media System—Functions and Problems

445

Table 14.2   The television providers: On the way to fragmentation? Audience shares in percent, 14 years and older (2005 without this information, 2021 from 3 years and older) Public: 1990

Private:

ARD

ZDF

40.0

28.7

RTL

SAT.1

PRO7

RTL2

VOX

Kabel 1

11.7

1.2

N/A

–

N/A

1994

25.9

18.4

17.3

14.8

8.3

2.9

1.8

3.0 (1995)

1997

26.3

13.4

16.1

12.8

9.4

4.0

3.0

3.8

2001

26.8

13.1

14.8

10.2

8.1

4.0

3.1

5.1

2005/1. Hj

27,2

13,7

13,2

10,8

6,8

4,4

4,2

3,9

2008

26,6

13,2

11,8

10,4

6,6

3,9

5,4

3,6

2012

24,9

12,6

12,3

9,4

5,9

4,0

5,8

3,9

2016

24,3

13,1

9,8

7,3

5,0

3,5

5,2

3,8

2021

25,8

14,7

7,2

5,2

3,7

2,5

4,9

3,2

Sources: Media Perspectives – Basic Data (several years).

SAT1 and Kabel 1 belong to an investor group, WeltN24 to Axel Springer Verlag, RTL, Vox and n-tv to the RTL Media Group, RTL 2 is split between Heinrich Bauer Verlag and several consortia (MP—Basisdaten 2021, p. 27). In addition to these, which are financed by advertising, there are private pay-TV providers such as Sky. In reality, however, the political importance of private providers is less than it appears to be from their share of viewers. Their share of the total broadcasting time for information with election-related content, for example, remained at 23% in 2017, well behind the 78% of public service providers (Michael et al. 2018, p. 18). In addition, viewers rate the programmes of public service providers as more credible than those of private providers (Schüler et al. 2021, p. 11).

14.3 The Media System—Functions and Problems a. Media-related distortion of reality In the process of opinion formation, the following tasks are often assigned to the media: • Information about events and opinions; • Articulation of opinions as they exist in the population; • Criticism and control of governments, parties, etc. (Aufermann 1975).

446

14  The Media as Intermediaries and Actors

There is no doubt about the first two functions where the media only act as an intermediary. However, with regard to their role as critical and controlling actors, this is opposed by the thesis that publishers, directors and journalists lack the democratic legitimacy for such an actor role; they should only act as “moderators” (according to Glotz et al. after Aufermann 1979). Even then, they would inevitably have to choose the topics and news. If we turn to the question of how the media fulfill the functions assigned to them, a number of strengths, but also weaknesses and problems come to light: 1. In the media coverage of politics, a trend towards simplification, personalization and emotionalization is observed, especially on television and in the tabloid press: “The dramaturgical necessities—suspense, abbreviation, simplification—leave continuity and rationality on the road”, Oberreuter (1989, p. 37) summarized the television coverage of politics already decades ago. In this way, superficial involvement and unjustified self-confidence are created in the public, but also corresponding public behaviour by politicians. Politicians often develop a “symbiotic relationship” with journalists, in which “information is exchanged for publicity”, but at the price of only media-produced events and a bold and simple language (Glaab 2018, p. 164; Patzelt 1991). The unscientific nature of election campaigns would therefore “come more from journalists themselves than from politicians” (Brettschneider 2009, p. 531). 2. Similarly problematic is a second structural condition of media coverage, journalistic selection according to “news factors”. These include: the (high) status of an actor, the conflictual nature and the relevance of a topic for many people, the identification (thanks to proximity and emotionalization), the drama and affinity of the event (Schulz 2011, p. 91). As a result, the atypical is given priority over the normal, the new over the repetition (neophilia), the affectively appealing catastrophe or the scandal over orderly conditions (videomalaise). As necessary as this is to gain attention, it has the consequence that, over time, consumers develop a systematically distorted image of the world (Bergsdorf 1987, p. 576; Rhomberg 2009, p. 120 f.). 3. In general, the media are credited with determining the topics of politics and discussion (agenda setting)5. They tend to place relatively strong emphasis on political constellations and persons (horse-race aspects) at the expense of

5 In

what the population considers “generally important”, it largely follows television news (Kepplinger 2009a).

14.3  The Media System—Functions and Problems

447

substantive issues in elections (Hüning et al. 2002, pp. 299 ff.; Kepplinger and Maurer 2005, p. 67). The result of a content-analytical study of the 2005 election is characteristic: specific party goals were conveyed to the least extent in television news, only to a limited extent in daily newspapers, talk shows and political speeches—in their majority “not at all” (Maurer 2009b, p. 165, 168). In “media-centered democracies” such as Germany, individual actors are preferred over parties, horse-race aspects over substantive issues in election campaign reporting, and it is characterized by “negative tenor” and “staged events” (Lengauer 2007, pp. 11, 315 ff.). Accordingly, Sarcinelli (2011, p. 314) regards the media portrayal of parties as “organizationally blind and prominence-heavy”, and Patzelt (2006, p. 159) the “distorted media reality” as a “weakness” of the democratic constitutional state. This view of scientific observers is shared by many politicians. For example, a survey of state parliamentarians revealed that overwhelming majorities believe that the media are far too focused on people, but too little on content, do not illustrate the consequences of political decisions and also try to make politics themselves6. In addition, the media convey politics as “a heap of events weakly connected to each other and to the past” (Meyer 2015, p. 106). Providing more context is primarily the role of weekly newspapers, which should also be the task of public service media. Are journalists and media really responsible for this? If we assume rational voters who make cost-benefit calculations, it must appear unprofitable to them to incur the costs of painstaking information gathering because of their hardly decisive voter voice. Only a few find it enjoyable. Rational voters are therefore reached primarily through entertaining aspects, which are also preferred by journalistic selection criteria. As Downs (1968, p. 292) already noted: The rational voter is not the informed one. Voter behavior therefore does not testify to stupidity—the same people show foresight and obtain information when making important decisions, when buying their car or building their house. The media are therefore not irrelevant. That they influence public opinion and voting behavior has been demonstrated in particular by Noelle-Neumann (2001, passim), who sees the decisive moment of effect here as the media-mediated impression of a certain majority, which leads to corresponding adjustments. Such an effect, which is associated with the tendency to silence on the part of the opinion suppressed by the media (“spiral of silence”), could be demonstrated for

6 N

= 568 (Marx 2009, pp. 67 ff., 121 ff.).

448

14  The Media as Intermediaries and Actors

topics such as nuclear energy, conscientious objection to military service, genetic engineering, defense policy and the Oder-Neisse line (Brettschneider 1997b, p. 589). This is problematic from a democratic point of view: on the one hand because of the disintegrative effect that populist parties try to exploit (Lanius 2020); on the other hand because of the impairment of political equality of opportunity and democratic learning ability (Mannewitz 2018). Although the stringency of such arguments is occasionally questioned, it can only be about the effectiveness of the media. Certainly: The media cannot arbitrarily control or “manipulate” the audience. The media effect varies according to policy fields, it shifts attention (Koch-Baumgarten and Voltmer 2009, p. 313). But it is important how the media present a topic, including the choice of words (framing) (Schulz 2011, pp. 148 ff.). Opposing influences are ineffective because the media significantly shape the cognitive world view of individuals (Donsbach 2009; Price et al. 1997; Schmitt-Beck 1994, pp. 163, 176). The share that metaphors and certain interpretive frameworks have on our political opinions is estimated at up to 80% in some places (Lakoff and Wehling 2016). Exaggeratedly, but accurately for people with little own knowledge and world experience, Luhmann (1995, p. 5) formulated: “What we know about our society, indeed about the world in which we live, we know through the mass media.” b. Social psychological and economic pressures Critics see the causes of failure in the media primarily in their profit and market orientation. Habermas (1969, pp. 185 ff.) has historically outlined a media trend that, especially pronounced in television and radio, has led to “loosened change, illustration and entertainment elements also in the daily press”. The “politically relevant news” would be “pushed back”. With this “mixtum compositum”, which “tendentially replaces reality by consumer readiness”, the media paid for the maximization of their circulation. An investigation of election reporting on five federal elections based on three quality newspapers, two regional newspapers and one tabloid newspaper followed this trend. The “unpolitical” share (i.e. not related to substantive issues) of the reports varies for the quality papers, in 2013 generally particularly high (Frankfurter Allgemeine 23%, Süddeutsche Zeitung 28, Die Zeit 27), for the regional papers (Passauer Neue Presse 22%, Sächsische Zeitung 28) and the tabloid (Bild 46%). The significantly lower share of the subscription papers compared to the tabloid and the conservative papers (FAZ, Passauer Neue Presse) is clearly shown—ratios that also applied to the previous elections. It remains debatable whether one should count poll results for “horse-race journalism” or election

14.3  The Media System—Functions and Problems

449

campaign organization across the board as unpolitical reportage. While these two categories make up the majority of the “unpolitical” share in the other papers, it is “celebrity stories” and “Around the election” articles that make up 64% of the unpolitical share in Bild. Overall, the study concludes a “flattening” of the reporting since 1953, recently driven by the introduction of private television and “competition from online media” (Reinisch 2017, pp. 29, 126, 145, 147, 274, 281, 339). However, it should be noted that media that want to be read, heard and seen cannot do without entertainment elements. The programmes of public service media and the election advertising of the parties are also—because they too are fighting for the attention of citizens—permeated by emotional appeals, personalization and factual simplifications. Targeted influences could arise from the dependence on advertising revenue. In general, the media are struggling for the advertising cake, of which television swallows 20.6% overall, the shrinking newspapers 7.2%, radio 3.3% and the Internet—with a rising trend—41.9% (Möbus and Heffler 2021, p. 361). Once, in 1980, the daily newspapers drew 42.7% of the net advertising revenue to themselves (Pürer 2015, p. 182). However, even today, advertising revenue accounts for a large part of the total revenue of subscription newspapers in West Germany: 40.1%7, more in the tabloid newspapers and weekly newspapers8. But from 1975 to 2000 it had averaged about 60% for subscription newspapers (Pürer 2015, p. 178)—the decline is clearly visible. For private television, with the exception of pay TV, advertising revenue is the only source of income. Public broadcasters are quite different: ARD and ZDF live from the broadcasting fee, which all private households and numerous companies have to pay. This gave them revenues of 8.1 billion euros in 2020 (ARD ZDF Deutschlandradio Beitragsservice 2021, p. 8), to which advertising revenue is added. This makes them, as critics (most recently the state of Saxony-Anhalt) regularly complain, among the most expensive public broadcasting media in the world. Their money also flows to private production companies for broadcasts, and their payments for broadcasting rights decide the professional existence of entire sports (Altmeppen 2008, p. 81). To what extent interests in sales and advertising, to what extent political guidelines from publishers and editors-in-chief towards journalists are actually enforced and thus shape public opinion, is difficult to clarify. Conflicts within

7 As 8 As

of 2011 (Pürer 2015, p. 177). of 2009 (Beck 2018, p. 116).

450

14  The Media as Intermediaries and Actors

e­ditorial offices, as they occurred in regional subscription newspapers, only provided indications (Noelle-Neumann 1977, p. 74, 23, 63). In view of the migration of advertising to the Internet—this is the only media area with constant advertising growth rates, especially due to search engine advertising and banner advertising)—the importance of advertisers, as a survey of 260 editors of daily newspapers shows, has increased in recent times; four-fifths report consideration, more than half even editorial contributions to support an advertiser or an industry (Gerhardt et al. 2005). In view of the shrinking newspaper market, newspaper publishers are rivalling with the extensive Internet offerings of public broadcasters. They criticize that these attract a part of the advertising revenue and that their “basic offer” is to be expanded even further beyond the existing 21 television and 66 radio stations. Here public media, backed by a kind of media tax, compete with private newspapers and broadcasters who have to earn their money on the market. Even the (unclear) ban on “press-like” offers from the public on the Internet appears to be threatened (Koldehoff 2017). The newspapers have the advantage that without them the danger of shrinking media plurality grows dramatically. c. Journalists as political actors Surveys in communication science have—with sometimes small, but sufficient samples since 1993—always brought to light one phenomenon: that journalists position themselves politically significantly to the left of the population (Table 14.3). This journalistic orientation is fraught with danger, because a majority of German journalists in the seventies attributed “an avant-garde role” to and underTable 14.3   Journalists’ party preferences (2009: political journalists) CDU/CSU

1993

2005

2009

12

9

9

SPD

25

26

16

FDP

9

6

7

B90/GRÜNE

19

36

27

PDS

4

1

4

Sonstige

1

3

1

No party affiliation

30

20

36

Sources: 1993 and 2005 Weischenberg et al. (2006); 2009 Lünenborg und Berghofer (2010, p. 13).

14.3  The Media System—Functions and Problems

451

stood themselves as mediators of new ideas and as critics, but at the same time as neutral reporters (Donsbach1979). More than 50% held it to be right to warn of dangerous trends. So Renate Köcher (1985, p. 17, 92, 121, 209) spoke of a “missionary journalism”. If the self-assessment of journalists from other Western democracies also classified them in a position to the left of the center (Patterson and Donsbach 1996), then in Germany that politically active professional understanding seemed to be added. In 2005, journalists also seemed to be susceptible to missionary journalism—40% wanted to convey positive ideals, 24% wanted to control politics, and 19% wanted to present their own views.9 At that time, however, professional news value criteria had priority for the younger generation of journalists, even though 36% of them would have refrained from reporting on foreign crime in order not to feed resentment.10 Although journalists are probably more left-wing and also significantly greener than the majority of the population (recently: Schumacher et al. 2021)—for example, because of the “young, bourgeois, urban, academically educated people”, the critical professional ethic and the lower importance of material career motives (Hoffmann 2021)—, effects on reporting have only been observed to a limited extent in this country (Reinemann and Baugut 2014, pp. 503–504). In this context, it turns out that the—depending on the counting—48,000 to 70,000 full-time journalists (including 26,000 freelancers and about 3,000 trainees)11 form their own social group (Kaiser o. J.), whose members orient themselves to each other. They take over agency reports, information from colleagues, orient themselves to leading media, follow the same news value criteria. As in a “circle”, views are formed and maintained, also diverging from those of citizens and from reality (Kepplinger 1998, p. 39, 77). These professional selection criteria and group orientations correspond to the fact that the mass communication system in modern societies is to be understood as “a self-referential-closed operating, relatively autonomous functional system” with the task of transforming non-public into public. This social subsystem works with the medium of public, just as politics works with the medium of power and the economy with that of money (Marcinkowksi 1993, p. 107, 146f.). It follows its own rules (here: news values) and must constantly select the important from the unimportant. It is also a fact, summarised by the communication scientist Schulz (2011, p. 67), that “the

9 N = 1

536 (Weischenberg 2006, p. 279). (Ehmig 2000, pp. 149, 155, 161). 11 As of 2012. 10 n = 491

452

14  The Media as Intermediaries and Actors

mass media do not represent and certainly do not reflect reality. The reports of the media are often one-sided, inaccurate and distorted, they sometimes offer an extremely tendentious view of the world.” The causes for this are media’s “structural inability” to reproduce reality and political-ideological one-sidedness. Sometimes this leads to a “refusal of outrage” on the part of the population in the face of—only journalistically perceived—scandals that remain “stuck in the self-referential space of the media” (Korte and Bianchi 2014, p. 111). d. Media and politicians: A difficult relationship The sociologist Ulrich Beck put it bluntly: “Who decides on the admission of topics to the public has political power.” (quoted from Thiel 2013) In fact, politicians and their politics depend on how gatekeepers—in other words, journalists and media owners—grant them public attention. Taking advantage of this “publication monopoly”, journalists sometimes tend to play the role of “co-politicians”, rather than that of “objective and fair mediators” (Meyer 2015, p. 13, 19, 62). It should be added, however, that • the monopoly does not lie with one individual, but with a media system consisting of competing journalists and media. Fewer appeals to journalistic professional ethics, but rather plurality and competition among the media can here limit illegitimate political power; • the relationship between politics and journalism is not quite so one-sided, but often characterised by “exchange”: publication in return for information. At the same time: Given the journalistic gatekeeper function, the chance of new recipients and more target group-oriented communication, is it surprising that politics is increasingly trying to communicate without the press (Schwanholz and Busch 2016; Stier et al. 2019)? Via Facebook, Twitter and also Instagram, politicians are increasingly in direct exchange with the population. Politicians, however, remain dependent on the public. Surveys of members of parliaments (Bundestag, state parliaments, European Parliament) showed a split in the middle: some see politics as more dependent on the media, while others see an interdependence between media and politics12 – hardly anyone gave a statement of more media dependence on politics.

12 2005

and 2011, n = 1330 (Pontzen 2013, p. 192).

14.3  The Media System—Functions and Problems

453

So politicians and other decision-makers tend to orient themselves to the media. They run the risk of becoming victims of a “deception” that the media represent the distribution of public opinion in a scale-appropriate way, and “that the majority consumes similar high doses of media with similar interest as they themselves” (Kepplinger 1998, p. 152). This results in phenomena that are subsumed under the term “mediocracy” (Müller 1999). In it, the media not only influence voting behavior, but politicians behave media-adapted and perceive the published opinion as the popular will. Others, however, see no such “submission” of politics to media logic (Pfetsch and Marcinkowski 2009, p. 30). In any case, politicians strive to influence the communication system in their interest. It is significant that most members of the Bundestag consider journalists to be “close acquaintances” (Kepplinger 2009b, p. 80). In Berlin, the elite of journalists often meet with those about whose work in politics and business they write (Krüger 2013, pp. 149–151). Even members of state parliaments state that they spend an average of three hours a week maintaining contacts with journalists, which sometimes also includes joint meals and background conversations (Marx 2009, pp. 8, 134, 139). And where that is not enough, politics sometimes intervenes more directly, as the CSU media scandal of 2012 and the reactions of prominent journalists revealed. It was “common for politicians to call simple editors to exert pressure on reporting,” said Nikolaus Brender (quoted in Caspari 2012) about one of the practices between media and politics. At first, media policy was mainly about the private press. The—ultimately unsuccessful—direction of the political left was aimed at weakening the position of publishers, editors and chief editors through more internal press freedom (codetermination rights and autonomy of editors) and abolition of the protection of tendencies (which exempts media from the full co-determination of their employees). Then the public service radio and television came into the focus of media policy debates. The Union parties here demanded compliance with the constitutional principle of balance. The SPD countered this with the thesis that “critical and provocative contributions” should not be “sacrificed to a comfortable balance” (SPD party program 1990, pp. 30–32). It was clearly aiming at “critical” journalists, i.e. those close to the SPD/Greens, who should be given as much leeway as possible. The fight for the public service media lost importance when technological developments made a variety of programs possible and thus a private competition for the public service could no longer be stopped. The debates about the growing importance of Internet media, which still confront the legislator with entirely new challenges, have shifted completely. Here, the political conflict line is not as clear between the Union and the SPD, but rather stronger between proponents and opponents of regulation.

454

14  The Media as Intermediaries and Actors

14.4 Welcome Culture: Crisis of Pluralistic Political Mediation? The massive immigration of 2015/16 into the Federal Republic of Germany occupied the German public intensely. The image that a study of journalistic reporting on the “refugee crisis” within the large leading media (Die Welt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Süddeutsche Zeitung) and 85 regional and local newspapers from February 2015 to March 2016 draws, reveals critical points in the media landscape. According to this, thousands of articles on the subject show that 1. the newspapers consistently conveyed a “welcome culture” in “euphemistically persuasive diction”, with the tenor that it is “social basic consensus” and “not to be questioned”. This was done in “consonance” with the Chancellor and in emphasized “proximity” to the political elite. 2. Around half of the articles did not report objectively and neutrally. Almost half of the leading media reports on events of the refugee crisis did not mention any conflicts or differences of opinion. To the extent that party members were mentioned as actors or speakers, 83.3% were representatives of the government parties, the opposition was represented by the Greens with 8.7%, the Left with 3.1% and the FDP with only 1.3%. The NPD was 0.9% and the AfD, which is represented in several state parliaments, was 0.1%. 3. It was possible to determine a “break in the social discourse”, for which one held responsible rioting protesters and radicals, but—as the study shows—also the leading media promoted this, “by simply excluding people with different opinions” and declaring them to be xenophobic. Hardly any comment distinguished between concerned citizens and right-wing radicals. 4. Until the Cologne New Year’s Eve 2015/16, the leading media remained “fixed” on the political elite, then the tone became “more reserved” (Haller 2017, S. 16, 101, 137, 40, 134, 104, 135, 139). It can be assumed that a look at the (not examined) public media would have resulted in an even sharper image. This is how large parts of the population saw it: In October 2015, 47% of respondents called the media coverage of the refugee situation one-sided (Köcher 2015). When the Institute for Demoscopy asked in October 2016 whether “the media portray refugees accurately”, 53% said no, 22 were undecided, only 25% found it accurate. Almost every second person called the coverage one-sided (Haller 2017, pp. 142–143). However, these statements only refer to the refugee issue. In general, the picture is much brighter. When asked whether they were satisfied with the media coverage of politics and current

455

14.4  Welcome Culture: Crisis of Pluralistic Political Mediation?

Refugee Crime

73

Refugee count

67

Social differences

55

Terror threat

57

Econom. Location/Eurozone

53

Large construction projects

44

AfD

45

Labor market situation

46

Economic situation

35

Situation in region

19 0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Fig. 14.1   Distrust of reporting 2017. In percent of respondents. (Source: Köcher 2017)

events, 55% said yes, 31% said they were less satisfied, only 7% were not satisfied at all. However, when asked about which topics the media report credibly, the answers vary greatly depending on the topic. The media are considered relatively credible on “the situation in the region” and “the economic situation”, but much less credible on issues such as refugee crime and refugee numbers (see Fig. 14.1). What remained: The trust in the media on certain topics and among certain parts of the population has been scratched, even if the general trust in the media has gradually stabilized again since 2015: from 28% to 56% in 2020 (Jakobs et al. 2021, p. 153). “The ‘lying press’ hysteria subsided [thus]” (Ziegele et al. 2018). Regarding the dependence on topics: Today, relatively little trust is placed in Islam (2020: 39%) (Jakobs et al. 2021, p. 155), in the crime of refugees (2019: 33%) and the AfD (2019: 36%) coverage (Schultz et al. 2020, p. 328). However, a majority of people trust coverage on topics such as the housing shortage (2019: 55%), climate change (2020: 55%) and the Corona pandemic (2020: 63%). Where pronounced opinions prevail, especially on the right, and the topics are perceived as identity-forming, the trust suffers. To split of society: The attitude towards the media divides society—possibly one of the most problematic legacies of the 2015/16 crisis: For example, among AfD supporters, the accusation of the lying press is almost three times as

456

14  The Media as Intermediaries and Actors

­ idespread in 2018 as among supporters of other parties (34%), the general trust w in the media is about a third lower (34%), the trust in the public service broadcasters is about a quarter lower (53%), the trust in the social media is four to six times higher (25%), the feeling of estrangement from the media is about twice as high (60%) (Ziegele et al. 2018, p. 153). At the same time, the use of Youtube and “alternative” media such as Politically Incorrect, Compact, Deutsche Wirtschaftsnachrichten or Russia Today is still lower, the public service broadcasters and the daily newspapers are less widespread (Schultz et al. 2021, p. 68, 73). As far as the public service broadcasters is concerned, there are further, party-political independent patterns—their trust and credibility are noticeably lower among East Germans, among people who identify themselves as politically right-wing, among younger people (up to 49 years), among people with lower and middle education and among those dissatisfied with democracy (Infratest dimap 2019, p. 20 f.). As a result, the media—including the public service broadcasters—enjoy considerable social trust in the field of public information and opinion formation, but now a relevant minority of the population—especially one with right-wing populist attitudes—sees the public service broadcasters as politically influenced state broadcasters, which they reject and which make alternative offers attractive (Baum and Haberl2020). Regaining trust, or at least not dismissing this part outright, is the task of the media. If attempts by the public service broadcasters to improve their own communication with the help of framing their image come to light (as in 2019), which could be interpreted as manipulation of the public—for example the framing study of the ARD (Beckedahl and Dobusch 2019)— this is counterproductive. The German media system, designed to protect public freedom of expression from restrictions by the state or economic power, generally does so. The division between public and private broadcasters, as well as the relative number of newspapers that address all citizens, have basically proven themselves. But political communication in Germany suffers from four problems: • This is a sociocultural left-wing tendency among journalists. It narrows down political opinion formation and makes effective problem-solving more difficult on certain issues. This was particularly evident in 2015/16 when it came to the issue of refugees, when a journalistic majority, the federal government and parliament were heading in the same direction. A strong pressure of opinion hardly allowed other voices in traditional media. Not least, this feeds media skepticism in part of the population. • Secondly, the withdrawal of the younger generation from reading newspapers and the expansion of public broadcasters continue to reduce newspaper sales.

References

457

This means weakening of a media sector that is important for plurality and quality. It is uncertain whether existing online newspapers or magazines will generate viable revenues. • Thirdly, the popularity of social media threatens to break up the public space into many sub- and counter-publics (Wallner 2018, p. 5, 32, 113), which makes it more difficult for social communication across political and social borders and often takes place without journalistic (or other) quality filters— false reports, polarization and conspiracy theories are thus given a breeding ground. Democracy is facing a “new structural change in public opinion” (Habermas 2022), a threat to the quality of deliberation and its arena-like character, as Jürgen Habermas put it. However: Was the deliberative democracy ever more than a myth? • Finally, the regulation of the Internet still faces immense tasks, including not only the restriction of the market power of large digital companies and laws against hate speech, but also for providers and users sufficiently practicable laws (keyword: cookie banner in the context of the GDPR).

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Köcher, Renate (2017): Interessen schlagen Fakten, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung vom 22. Februar. Krüger, Uwe (2013): Meinungsmacht, Köln. Koldehoff, Stefan (2017): „Keiner will den Öffentlich-Rechtlichen Textelemente verbieten“. Mathias Döpfner im Gespräch mit Stefan Koldehoff, unter: https://www. deutschlandfunk.de/mathias-doepfner-keiner-will-den-oeffentlich-rechtlichen-100.html (zuletzt geprüft am 6. Mai 2022). Korte, Karl-Rudolf/Bianchi, Matthias (2014): Haben die Medien die Wahl entschieden?, in: Jesse, Eckhard/Sturm, Roland (Eds.): Bilanz der Bundestagswahl 2013, Bonn, p. 89 ff. Koch-Baumgarten, Sigrid/Voltmer, Katrin (2009): Policy matters – Medien im politischen Entscheidungsprozess in unterschiedlichen Politikfeldern, in: Marcinkowski, Frank/ Pfetsch, Barbara (Eds.): Politik in der Mediendemokratie, Wiesbaden, p. 299 ff. Lakoff, George/Wehling, Elisabeth (2016): Auf leisen Sohlen ins Gehirn. Politische Sprache und ihre heimliche Macht, 4., ed., Heidelberg. Lanius, David (2020): Meinungsfreiheit und die kommunikative Strategie der Rechtspopulisten, in: Schultz, Tanjev (Ed.): Was darf man sagen? Meinungsfreiheit im Zeitalter des Populismus, Stuttgart, p. 75 ff. Lengauer, Günther (2007): Postmoderne Nachrichtenlogik, Wiesbaden. Luhmann, Niklas (1995): Die Realität der Massenmedien, in: ders. (Ed.): Die Realität der Massenmedien, Wiesbaden, p. 5 ff. Lünenborg, Magreth/Berghofer, Simon (2010): Politikjournalistinnen und -journalisten. Aktuelle Befunde zu Merkmalen und Einstellungen vor dem Hintergrund ökonomischer und technologischer Wandlungsprozesse im deutschen Journalismus, unter: https:// www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/kommwiss/arbeitsstellen/kommunikationspolitik/mitarbeiterinnen/sberghofer1/DFJV_Studie_Politikjournalistinnen_und_Journalisten-1.pdf (zuletzt geprüft am 6. Mai 2022). Mannewitz, Tom (2018): Warum Konformitätsdruck der Demokratie schadet. Die „Tyrannei der Mehrheit“ auf dem Prüfstand, in: ders. (Ed.): Die Demokratie und ihre Defekte. Analysen und Reformvorschläge, Wiesbaden, p. 289 ff. Marcinkowski, Frank (1993): Publizistik als autopoietisches System, Opladen. Marx, Dorothea (2009): Landtagsabgeordnete im Fokus der Medien, Baden-Baden. Maurer, Torsten (2009a): Fernsehen – als Quelle politischer Information überschätzt?, in: Marcinkowski, Frank/Pfetsch, Barbara (Ed.): Politik in der Mediendemokratie, Wiesbaden, p. 129 ff. Maurer, Torsten (2009b): Wissensvermittlung in der Mediendemokratie, in: Marcinkowski, Frank/Pfetsch, Barbara (Eds.): Politik in der Mediendemokratie, Wiesbaden, p. 151 ff. Mehr Fortschritt wagen (2021). Bündnis für Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit und Nachhaltigkeit – Koalitionsvertrag 2021–2025 zwischen SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen und FDP, unter: https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Koalitionsvertrag/Koalitionsvertrag_2021-2025.pdf (zuletzt geprüft am 28. April 2022). Meyer, Thomas (2015): Die Unbelangbaren, 2. ed., Berlin. Meyn, Hermann (1975): Publizistische Mitbestimmung durch Redaktionsvertretungen, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 48, p. 33 ff. Michael, Udo et al. (2018): Die Bundestagswahl im öffentlichen und privaten Fernsehen, in: Media Perspektiven 1/2018, p. 16 ff

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Möbus, Pamela/Heffler, Michael (2021): Werbemarkt 2020 (Teil 2): Werbestatistik mit deutlichem Minus für 2020, in: Media Perspektiven 6/2021, p. 360 ff. MP Basisdaten (2021): Basisdaten. Daten zur Mediensituation in Deutschland 2021, unter: https://www.ard-media.de/fileadmin/user_upload/media-perspektiven/Basisdaten/Basisdaten_2021_Internet_mit_Verknuefung.pdf (zuletzt geprüft am 26. Oktober 2022). Müller, Albrecht (1999): Von der Parteiendemokratie zur Mediendemokratie: Beobachtungen zum Bundestagswahlkampf 1998 im Spiegel früherer Erfahrungen, Opladen. Neller, Katja (1999): Lokale Kommunikation, Wiesbaden. Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth (1977): Umfragen zur inneren Pressefreiheit, Düsseldorf. Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth (1990): Politikwissenschaft und öffentliche Meinung, in: Mols, Manfred et al. (Ed.): Normative und institutionelle Ordnungsprobleme des modernen Staates, Paderborn, p. 185 ff. Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth (2001): Die Schweigespirale, 6. ed., München. Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth et al. (1976): Streitpunkt lokales Pressemonopol, Düsseldorf. Oberreuter, Heinrich (1989): Mediatisierte Politik und politischer Wertewandel, in: Böckelmann, Frank E. (Ed.): Medienmacht und Politik, Berlin, p. 31 ff. O. A. (2000): SPD bleibt Medienkonzern, unter: https://www.welt.de/print-welt/article507165/SPD-bleibt-Medienkonzern.html (zuletzt geprüft am 6. Mai 2022). Patterson, Thomas E./Donsbach, Wolfgang (1996): News decisions: Journalists as partisan actors. Political Communication 13 (4), p. 455 ff. Patzelt, Werner J. (1991): Abgeordnete und Journalisten, in: Publizistik 1991/3, p. 315 ff. Patzelt, Werner J. (2006): Regierung und Parlament, in: Kamps, Klaus/Nieland, Jörg-Uwe (Ed.): Regieren und Kommunikation, Köln, p. 139 ff. Pfetsch, Barbara/Marcinkowski, Frank (2009): Problemlagen der „Mediendemokratie“, in: Marcinkowski, Frank/Pfetsch, Barbara (Eds.): Politik in der Mediendemokratie, Wiesbaden, p. 11 ff. Pontzen, Daniel (2013): Politiker in der Medialisierungsspirale? Marburg 2013. Price, Vincent et al. (1997): Switching Trains of Thought. The Impact of News Frames on Readers’ Cognitive Response, in: Communication Research 24 (5), p. 481 ff. Pruys, Karl H./Schulze, Volker (1975): Macht und Meinung, Köln. Pürer, Heinz (2015): Medien in Deutschland, Konstanz. Pürer, Heinz/Raabe, Johannes (2007): Presse in Deutschland, 3. ed., Konstanz. Reinemann, Carsten/Baugut, Philip (2014). Alter Streit unter neuen Bedingungen. Einflüsse politischer Einstellungen von Journalisten auf ihre Arbeit, in: Zeitschrift für Politik 61 (4), p. 480 ff. Reinisch, Kerstin (2017): Wahl ohne Wissen?, Baden-Baden. Rhomberg, Markus (2009): Politische Kommunikation, Paderborn. Rudolph, Steffen (2019): Digitale Medien, Partizipation und Ungleichheit: Eine Studie zum sozialen Gebrauch des Internets, Wiesbaden. Sarcinelli, Ulrich (2011): Politische Kommunikation in Deutschland, 3. ed., Wiesbaden. Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger (1994): Politikvermittlung durch Massenkommunikation und interpersonale Kommunikation, in: Jäckel, Michael/Winterhoff-Spurk, Peter (Eds.): Politik und Medien, Berlin, p. 159 ff. Schüler, Ruth M. et al. (2021): Politisches Informationsverhalten: Gespräche und traditionelle Medien liegen vorn (IW-Report No. 2/2021), unter: https://www.econstor.eu/ bitstream/10419/228884/1/1745152180.pdf (zuletzt geprüft am 4. Mai 2022).

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Political Elite in Democracy

15

15.1 Political Leaders—Not a Mirror Image of Society a. Questions of political elite research The term elite, and thus the political elite, is considered to be loaded in Germany. The reason for this seems to be that it was used in the 19th century to justify aristocratic rule. Even more effective is its boom around the turn of the 20th century, when it became the central term for Italian elite theorists such as Gaetano Mosca to unmask popular rule as an illusion. What is still causing offence today are his theses that • there is always a ruling and an oppressed class, even in democracy; • the rulers, in whatever form of state, are the power of an “organized minority”; • their rule is “based on a moral principle”, in democracy it is the “illusion of the people […,] that democracy is a reality.” Thus, the theses were a criticism of identitarian democratic ideas, not because they were bad, but because they were utopian. Analogously, elite theorists also explained a just social order (socialism) as impossible (Mosca 1950, pp. 43, 53 ff., 63, 67 ff., 238, 268)1. If one held the theses to be true, only two conclusions remained: Either one accepted a representative democracy with competing leadership groups, or one rejected democracy altogether and found the way from identitarian-democratic positions to Mussolini’s fascism—as did the Duce himself, and

1 “Class”

and “elite” are not clearly distinguished here.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Mannewitz and W. Rudzio, The Political System of Germany, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41371-2_15

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as did in Germany Robert Michels, at first still a left-wing sociologist and author of a pessimistic classic on intra-party democracy (Michels 1989). What is interesting about the political elite? If one follows research and public discussion, there are three questions above all: 1. To what extent is the political elite representative of the people it leads? It must also be examined in detail whether the leadership groups of individual parties are representative of their electorate. The question appears to be important from a democratic point of view. It is divided into two sub-questions: whether the political elite reflects society in its sociological composition and whether it reflects the citizens in its political ideas. 2. Does the political elite have characteristics that qualify it for political leadership? Even if there is no consensus on the necessary skills, a tension can be seen under this aspect with the demand for representative mirroring. 3. Finally, the selection process by which one enters the circle of the political elite is of interest: to what extent is it open, through which channels and stations does it lead? Access to power is decisive for the democratic character of a representative system, as is the leadership quality of those selected. However, empirically one comes across difficulties: The political elite, that is, the circle of those who make or significantly influence political decisions, is not easy to identify. An examination of a representative number of decision-making processes in order to find out who prevailed in them (decision-making approach) would encounter work-economic limits and difficulties of empirical access. A second approach is to ask informed persons who they consider to be politically particularly influential (reputational approach)—but who do you ask? In empirical studies, the holders of certain top positions are therefore usually considered to be the political elite (positional approach). However, the limit up to which position one speaks of a political elite has to be set by oneself. The following remarks are based on the elite studies conducted by Wildenmann in 1968, 1972 and 1981, as well as the more recent ones by Bürklin (1997) and Hartmann (2013). They are based on a positional approach and distinguish between a political elite in the narrower sense (e.g. members of the cabinet, parliamentary state secretaries and party leaders at federal and state level) and an administrative elite (state secretaries, department heads in ministries, etc.), a trade union elite (presidents of the trade unions at federal and state level), media, business, cultural elites, etc. The further explanations are determined by the three questions mentioned. However, from the perspective of democracy, what was of interest in view of the

15.1  Political Leaders—Not a Mirror Image of Society

467

political system breaks in Germany was above all the question: To what extent was there continuity or discontinuity of elites? In fact, the early Federal Republic began in the political-administrative area with a new democratic leadership. Created in a kind of “artificial revolution” of the occupying powers (denazification, appointments), its composition was subsequently shaped by election results. Unlike in business, churches, etc., where there was continuity of elites across the year 1945, the holders of political and administrative leadership positions only came into their offices after the Second World War (Edinger 1960, p. 59, 66). Of the deputies of the 1st Bundestag, 122 had suffered severe persecution in the Third Reich (long-term imprisonment, emigration), another 79 had disadvantages such as forced retirement, occupational damage and short imprisonment. Only in the case of about ten was a clear commitment to the Nazi regime recognizable (Hess 1989, pp. 729 ff.). A break in continuity was also remarkable with regard to the Weimar Republic. Its political leadership did not return. So of the 402 members of the 1st German Bundestag, only 61 had parliamentary experience from the time before 1933, of which only 26 as Reichstag deputies (Loewenberg 1969, pp. 50 ff.). Socially, the proportion of academics and the—previously below-average—proportion of Catholics among the political elite increased, while entrepreneurship, nobility and large landowners lost importance (Zapf 1965, pp. 170 ff.). Further changes in the political leadership then only took place in 1966/69 in connection with the Social Democrats’ advance into the center of government power. A third wave of change was triggered in 1990 by German unification, when, after a long period of communist rule in the new federal states, a new political leadership emerged. b. Antechamber and Preselection: The political class In general, one does not come directly from non-political life into the political elite. On the way there, political parties form the most important channel of upward mobility in Germany. This also means social selection. For example, political interest and participation, which are usually a prerequisite for party membership, increase significantly with higher class membership. This is reflected in the occupational composition of party membership in comparison to the population. On the way to a Bundestag mandate, which is often the most important stop on the way to the top, another social screening takes place. This has already been shown for the SPD, CDU and FDP in studies for the seventies and eighties, but probably also applied to other parties (Becker et al. 1983, pp. 59 ff., 133 ff.; Barton 1984, p. 199; Vorländer 1990, p. 270).

468

15  Political Elite in Democracy

Table 15.1   Composition of the Bundestag factions. In percent of the deputies or faction members

CDU/ CSU

SPD

FDP

B’90/ Linke Grüne

AfD

2.8

8.2

2.5

4.5

3.2

The ten most common previous occupations (“last main occupation before entry into parliament” in the sense of occupational classes)a): Teachers (all)

5.7

Scientific staff

2.8

7.1

2.5

7.5

2.9

2.1

Lawyers

14.2

7.1

22.5

6.0

2.9

9.6

Administrative professionals (total)

11.3

14.1

5.1

7.5

1.4

4.3

21.3

5.0

35.8

50.7

12.8

Party/trade union/association functionar- 6.1 ies Political/politically related professions d) 15.4

8.4

7.6

3.0

1.4

3.2

Management consultants

1.3

13.8

3.0

0

11.7

3.7

Entrepreneurs and managing directors

7.0

1.2

15.0

0

0

11.7

(leading) bankers/building societies

3.2

1.3

1.3

0

0

1.1

Farmers

4.1

0

0

1.5

0

0

84.9

83.4

./

96.8

89.1

./

Evangelicalc)

34.0

33.0

34.8

21.2

7.7

9.8

Catholicc)

57.4

15.0

22.8

11.9

./

14.6

Higher education qualificationsb): University degree Other aspects:

Muslimc)

./

2.4

1.1

0.8

./

./

Average age (years)c)

49.2

46.2

47.7

42.5

50.3

51.3

Womenc)

23.4

41.7

23.9

59.3

53.8

13.3

Married and

childrenc)

56.9

43.2

54.3

44.9

28.2

45.1

Union membershipa)

1.6

68.0

0.0

16.4

62.3

0.0

Germana)

13.4

7.9

11.3

11.9

36.2

20.9

4.1

17.0

5.4

14.4

28.2

7.2

East

Migration backgroundc) a)19th

WP WP c)20th WP d)19th WP. Members of Parliament, Presidents, Ministers, Senators, Election officials Sources: German Bundestag (2021); Kintz and Cordes (2019); Mediendienst Integration (2021). b)18th

15.1  Political Leaders—Not a Mirror Image of Society

469

If one looks at the Bundestag as one of the most important recruitment fields for the federal political elite with regard to the occupational background and education of the deputies, Table 15.1 shows for the present that • the Bundestag has a relatively stable average age of around 50 years in comparison to previous electoral periods (the AfD and the Left are slightly higher, the other factions lower)—it is thus significantly older than the population (which is why the “post-reunification generation” is hardly represented), but due to the ageing of the population, an approximation has taken place; the Greens have always been the youngest faction; • the proportion of women has increased over the decades to about one third, but women are still massively underrepresented, but mainly among the Union and the Liberals; • “traditional” families with children are more common among conservative factions than among progressive ones; • parliamentarians are recruited to a considerable extent from political and politically related professions (Schöne 2010), more union-affiliated on the left, more from an (election) office on the right, with entrepreneurship also more strongly represented here; • the proportion of academics is far above the population average; • East Germans are represented to some extent proportionally (15.4% in the 19th electoral period)—but differently among the factions: under-represented among the CDU, SPD, FDP and Greens, over-represented among the Left and AfD; • people with a migrant background are appropriately represented only in the Left faction; but they are not most strongly under-represented in the AfD, but in the Union; • the Christian confession is much more widespread among the Union, SPD and FDP than among the Greens, the Left and the AfD, whereas the Muslim faith is underrepresented everywhere. In addition, there is an overrepresentation of urban, university-influenced regions. Although the direct election districts and the proportional state lists in theory ensure that Germany’s different regions are equally represented in the Bundestag, the successful list candidates—here the parties with few or no direct mandates (Left, Green, FDP, AfD, SPD in Bavaria and Saxony) are particularly relevant— do not come mainly from the rural areas. In the end, 45% of parliamentarians (Haffert 2022, p. 138) speak for the “more rural” half of the constituencies (and

470

15  Political Elite in Democracy

thus 46.4% of the population or 48.5 of the eligible voters2). Although descriptive representation—unlike political viability and responsiveness—is neither necessary nor always desirable (Höhne and Kintz 2017, pp. 263 ff.), parliamentarians (including those elected via lists) represent the interests of the constituency in which they stand to a much greater extent than other concerns (Manow 2013; Zittel et al. 2019), just as “representatives are particularly committed to the needs of those with whom they share certain characteristics” (Fortin-Rittberger and Kröber 2021, p. 35). Urban constituencies also have a better chance of setting agendas, influencing opinion formation in factions and placing one of their own in leadership roles (Haffert 2022, pp. 140 ff.), which, due to varying attitudes between city and rural residents (Pokorny 2020), should contribute to a slight political distortion of the Bundestag as a whole. The trend towards professionalization of politics is reflected in longer political careers, specific career paths and selection criteria (Höhne and Kintz 2017, p. 273), which is always also a “social closure of democracy” (Borchert 2003, p. 37): Mainly academics, civil servants, lawyers and increasingly from the pool of parties and youth organizations are recruited (Kintz 2014; Kintz and Cordes 2019; Reiher 2019, pp. 295, 371). You can call the majority of the people who live off politics “political class,” which Arnim (1997a, pp. 36 ff., 134)—although now two decades ago—estimated at about 17,000 people; the circle is likely to be larger today (for example, due to the bloated Bundestag and the increased number of employees in the factions). However, no matter how the “political class” is defined—its majority is certainly not part of the influential political elite. However, it works for this, communicates with it and serves as a recruitment reservoir for it. Therefore: Motherland and arena of the political elite, one could summarize their role. Until the end of the seventies, changing to politics was particularly interesting for members of the public service: risk-free, because you could always return to your old job, attractive, because you were transferred to retirement on taking up the mandate with two-thirds of your salary and could thus earn nice incomes together with allowances. This came to an end with a ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1975. It ruled that the activity of a member of parliament in the federal parliament (and to a large extent in the states) had the character of a full-time “public office,” which made it incompatible with the tax exemption of allowances and simultaneous pension benefits (BVerfG 1975).

2 According

to Lukas Haffert in a personal correspondence on May 15, 2022.

15.1  Political Leaders—Not a Mirror Image of Society

471

What has followed this judgment to this day: the gradual increase in the monthly salaries of Members of the Bundestag to currently 10,324 € plus 4,584 € tax-free flat-rate expenses allowance – supplemented by funds for employees (2022 up to 23,205 € monthly) and an established office, free use of means of transport, free use of communication tools in the office, transitional payments on leaving and pension provision (German Bundestag 2022) – underlines the professionalisation of the work of Members of Parliament and has made Members of the Bundestag (similar to Members of the European Parliament) among the bestpaid parliamentarians in an international comparison. Their gross salaries were – as of 2013 (adjusted for purchasing power) – in fourth place in a European-US comparison of 18 states behind those of parliamentarians in the USA, Italy and Austria, but ahead of all others (Schüttemeyer and Haas 2014, p. 178). The state parliaments are following suit. According to information from the parliaments, their salaries lie between 3,555 € in Hamburg and 9,602 € monthly in North Rhine-Westphalia (as of 2022). The glaring difference arises because the “evening parliaments” (Schorr 2015) in Hamburg (but also in Bremen) entail less effort for the Members of Parliament; but there are also considerable gaps in the federal states: the allowance in Thuringia, for example, is only two-thirds of that of their North Rhine-Westphalian colleagues at 6036 €. It should be noted that, in addition to this, neither tax-free expenses allowances nor pension provision are paid in North Rhine-Westphalia, nor are any separate expenses allowances paid in Schleswig-Holstein – unlike in other states and at the federal level. Additional funds are paid to the Presidents of Parliament, the leaders of parliamentary groups and the Parliamentary Secretaries. Members of the government receive a combination of salaries and allowances, but with deductions. If one takes into account that government offices, committee chairmanships, politically motivated supervisory board seats (in public institutions, in public companies and in co-determined companies) and municipal functions can also bring in additional income, the picture of a professional class of politicians is rounded off, with the political elite being embedded in a top group. Similar conditions can be found among the members of state parliaments. The situation is different for municipal councillors. In large cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, the average monthly allowances were 521 € (lump allowance including meeting allowance) in 2006, with leaders of parliamentary groups also receiving more (Reiser 2010). The fluctuations were considerable, ranging from 187 € (Erfurt) to 2,460 € (Stuttgart). Despite subsequent increases, only a few people can live on their council mandate. An investigation in two federal states suggests that, in particular in large cities, these are mainly people

472

15  Political Elite in Democracy

from politically related previous occupations (public administration, parties, mass organisations) (Geißel 2006, pp. 90 ff.). In summary, therefore, for the central recruitment fields of the political elite, parties and parliaments, social selection leads to an over-representation of academics, civil servants and former party/parliamentary/trade union employees, and an under-representation of people from East Germany, migrants, workers, housewives and employees in the private sector. Politics is a well-paid profession. If one does not want to leave politics to honourary members in the sense of Max Weber – those who can live on politics without having to live off it – this is also a consequence of modern mass democracy in principle. The question of how highly paid and in what form professional politicians should be paid remains controversial. Despite this adequacy, “the profession of politician can be characterised as a precarious employment relationship, but not as a profession. It is insecure, episodic, unclear in the definition of the professional field, the qualifying requirements and the career path. (Best and Jahr 2006, p. 79) You remain dependent on the party and the election result, and so a considerable minority of the members of parliament also pursue another profession on the side. In the Bundestag elected in 2017, this applied to 32% of its members. (Andreoli 2021). The typical ”top-up“ politician is a male CDU lawyer on a corporate supervisory board (Osterberg 2021). Partially, this creates grey areas, for example when a lawyer gets lucrative mandates because of his political position. When working as an employee of companies or associations, the suspicion arises that there are dependencies—”When does the member of parliament speak? And when does the lobbyist?“, ask the media (Fuchs and Zimmermann 2022). In all cases, the question arises how these members of parliament can still fulfil their duties in parliament and in their constituency. Even leaving politics can be problematic: ”the quick changers“ from political leadership positions behave legally but questionably on lucrative positions in an economic sector that they previously dealt with politically. In response to the demand for ”post-office sabbaticals for politicians“ (von Arnim 1997b), the German government reacted in 2015 with a corresponding law, which entrusted its own committee with the task of detecting possible conflicts of interest and, if necessary, recommending a sabbatical to the government3. Educational qualifications including professional experience, political practice and professionalisation can be seen as the three factors that determine

3 In 2022 it is occupied by Krista Sager (Alliance 90/The Greens), Andreas Voßkuhle (former Federal Constitutional Court judge) and Norbert Lammert (CDU, former President of the Bundestag).

15.1  Political Leaders—Not a Mirror Image of Society

473

the qualification profile of professional politicians. In some respects, the political staffing level seems scarce—for example in terms of economic knowledge, experience in leading organisations or technical-scientific or nursing knowledge. Furthermore, a political elite needs people who can collect and influence majorities, which is trained in parties, local politics and parliaments. Critical voices such as that of the former Federal President von Weizsäcker (1992, p. 150 et seq.) complain that ”on important specialist topics in politics, for example, we have far too few real experts. At the same time, they admit that professional politicians must be “generalists”—but are primarily “specialists in how to fight political opponents” as a result of the internal party selection. c. The composition of the political elite If you go up to the upper deck of the actual political elite, studies have shown for decades that this overwhelmingly came from the middle class4 or “small-town conditions”—unlike all other sub-elites (except the trade union), whose background was more influenced by upper class/upper middle class or bourgeoisie. The political and economic elite of the Federal Republic thus showed a “very different social recruitment”. Germany thus differed from Great Britain, France or Spain, where the sub-elites had a common bourgeois background, habitus and attitudes (Hartmann 2006, p. 196 et seq.). It also lacks the “explicit elite education institutions” that exist in other leading industrialised countries (e.g. the Grandes Écoles in France, elite universities in the USA and Great Britain) and there produce a coherent establishment with a common social background, habitus and attitudes (Hartmann 2004, p. 109). For the old Federal Republic, segregated sub-elites were characteristic (Grieswelle 2004, p. 228 et seq.). If you look at the elites based on their fathers’ professions (Table 15.2), then that middle class thesis for the political elite no longer appears convincing. In any case, the bourgeoisie provides the relatively largest share of top politicians. Within the political elite, it is also possible to identify a stronger bourgeois background of government members in comparison to the members of party and parliamentary leaders. A similar change is claimed for the heads of government of the German states and the party leaders of the SPD and CDU/CSU. As a result, the sociologist Michael Hartmann (2007, pp. 221 ff., 242) concludes that there has been a “bourgeoisification of the political elite” in Germany and Italy in recent decades. This is explained by the shrinking membership of the people’s parties and by changed

4 Social

class defined by occupation, income and education.

474

15  Political Elite in Democracy

Table 15.2   Social background of the elites 2012. According to the father’s professional position, in percent of the respective elite

Upper classa) Economy

Bourgeoisiea)

Middle class

Working class N

38.5

37.4

18.3

5.9

405

Economic Asso- 33.3 ciations

50.0

16.7

0

14

Politicsb)

5.5

37.3

35.5

21.8

134

Executive/Bund 7.3

48.8

31.7

12.2

Executive/ Länder

2.8

38.9

33.3

25.0

Legislative/ Bund u. Party Leadershipn

5.6

22.2

41.7

30.6

44.7

31.1

6,8

of which.

Administrationg 17.5

163

Judiciaryz

25.5

40.5

23.4

10,6

77

Military

8.3

33.3

50.0

8.3

20

Media

6.3

59.4

21.9

12.5

46

Science

8.2

51.0

30.6

10.2

54

Unions

0

0

23.5

76.5

17

Churches

0

25.0

25.0

50.0

15

Others

6.3

37.5

43.8

12.5

25

Overall

22.6

39.6

25.6

12.2

958

a)Upper

class = entrepreneurs with> 100 employees, board members/CEOs of companies with> 500 employees, officials/soldiers from A 16, chief physicians; Middle class = entrepreneurs with 10–99 employees, senior employees, higher officials and officers, academically trained freelancers; Middle class = officials up to senior, employees, small selfemployed, farmers except large farmers; Workers = unskilled workers up to master b)Political elite (a total of 137 positions) = members of the federal government, parliamentary state secretaries in the federal government, federal and Bundestag presidents, parliamentary group and committee chairs of the Bundestag, prime ministers and finance ministers of the federal states, interior and justice ministers of the 5 largest federal states, federal chairpersons and federal managing directors of the parties represented in the Bundestag. Source: Hartmann (2013, p. 48, 30 f., 65)

15.1  Political Leaders—Not a Mirror Image of Society

475

career paths away from the party-internal “slow uphill grind” (Hartmann 2006, pp. 198 ff.). If this is the case, then a deep-seated change, an approximation to Anglo-French establishment structures can be observed. However, one should not overlook the fact that the social background of the political elite is still significantly lower in comparison to the economic elites, the judiciary and administrative elite. In addition, the social change (expansion of education, decline in manual occupations, underclassification by immigrants) has to be taken into account, as well as the narrower definition of political elite than in earlier studies. The political elite has a similarly high level of education as most other elites, with almost 90% of them having a university degree. However, it may be that some qualifications are lacking—for example, in economics or technical and natural sciences, or in experience in managing large organizations. On the other hand, the top politician does not necessarily have to be a suitable specialist, but should be able to work in various problems. The traditional strengths of the political elite in Germany are still recognizable, but have weakened. This is especially true for the former exclusion of women. For the political elite as a whole, the proportion of women is now around 30%—far higher than for any other elite (Table 15.3). Within the federal Table 15.3   Educational qualifications and proportion of women in the elites, in percent of the respective elite or of the respective elite

Elites:

Study

Applied law

Applied Applied Applied economics engineering other suband natural jects sciences

Economy

90.4

16.8

44.1

31.7

7.4

1.5

Economic 92.9 Associations

7.7

53.8

30.8

7.7

0.0

Politics

Female share

89.6

38.3

12.5

8.3

40.8

28.3

Administra- 98.0 tion

57.2

17.9

6.2

18.6

15.3

Justice

98.7

0.0

1.3

0.0

18.2

100.0

Military

50.0

0.0

10.0

10.0

80.0

0.0

Media

87.0

21.6

16.2

0.0

62.2

15.2

Science

98.1

13.5

7.7

55.8

23.1

13.0

Unions

70.6

8.3

0.0

0.0

91.7

17.6

Other

88.9

21.2

3.0

9.1

66.7

Source: Hartmann (2013, p. 78, 230).

N/A

476

15  Political Elite in Democracy

g­ overnment, this includes parliamentary state secretaries or state ministers, as well as parliamentary group leaders and first parliamentary secretaries, the proportion is 50.0%—which, with a proportion of 34.8% of women in the Bundestag (2021), are quite impressive figures. The protestant-secularist influence on German leadership has only slightly weakened in the old Federal Republic. In 2006, top politicians differed greatly in their religious affiliation according to party: While 92% were non-religious among the Greens and the Left, religious affiliation seemed to “still be in good taste among the bourgeois parties” (Gruber 2009, pp. 95–96). The SPD elite, 46% non-religious, 31% Catholic, and 23% Protestant, was somewhere in the middle. The traditional dominance of lawyers has not disappeared, but it has weakened considerably. In the 1970s, more than 50% of all elite members had a law degree from university (Neumann 1979, p. 201). In the federal governments from 1949 to 1999, 40.1% of ministers and 28.9% of parliamentary state secretaries were lawyers, followed by 18% and 21.8% respectively of economists and social scientists (Derlien 2008, p. 302). The political elite of 2013 includes 38.3% ofuniversity graduates with a law degree, 12.5% with an economics degree, and 8.3% with a natural science or engineering degree (Table 15.3). This means first of all that law is still seen as an education for the general public, which qualifies for top positions, second that lawyers play an above-average role among the right half of the political spectrum (cf. Table 15.1), and third that a significant part of the political elite has gone and been shaped by their law faculties during a part of their educational journey. One own—and attention-grabbing—topic concerns people with a migrant background and East Germans in the elites: On the one hand, the conclusion of the 1995 elite study was that, for a long time after 1990, “the scientifically and technically intelligent from the sub-elite management and expert positions” of the former GDR dominated within East German leadership positions. More than three quarters of the members of this elite have changed their field of work as a result of unification (Bürklin et al. 1997, pp. 2 ff.; Wollmann 1996, pp. 124 ff.). Even later, engineers, natural scientists and medical doctors were conspicuous among members of state governments and deputies in the east (Plöhn 2004, pp. 148, 151). On the other hand, migrants and East Germans are still underrepresented in the federal and East German elites: In 2015/16, East Germans made up only 70% of prime ministers and ministers, 46% of state secretaries, 6% of the judicial elite, 39% of the business elite, 19% of the scientific elite and 28% of the mass media elite—in the east (Bluhm and Jacobs 2016). The elite transfer from West to East that was necessary as a result of reunification has been slowed down but not

15.1  Political Leaders—Not a Mirror Image of Society

477

stopped (Kollmorgen 2020, p. 34). With a view to the West German elites, the situation looks even darker: Raj Kollmorgen (2017, p. 57) estimates the proportion of East Germans in the approximately 350-strong “top elite” of politics, administration, business, media, military, judiciary, science and society at only 2.8%— with glaring differences, however: Governments, the leadership of the Bundestag and parties are still reasonably representative, while the management boards of business, administration, judiciary and mass media are almost exclusively occupied by West Germans. Attitude differences between the East German population and (mainly West German) elites in East Germany, for example with regard to the design of direct democratic elements, the role of the welfare state, gender issues, the EU, globalization and migration (Best and Vogel 2011; Vogel 2017), raise the fear that a distance will develop between East Germans and their leadership, which will be transferred to the supporting social institutions and thus undermine social integration (Kollmorgen 2020, p. 37). The responsibility for the underrepresentation of East Germans is attributed, among other things, to the pathfounding elite transfer from West to East in the 1990s, power networks, which are difficult to penetrate for East Germans, but also social structural problems (such as the “subordination” of the east) and the “loser stigma” that is attached to the east and often goes hand in hand with a lack of elite habitus (Kollmorgen 2020, pp. 38 ff.). More promising than a quota that is probably doomed to fail due to legal (Who is East German?), political (lack of majorities) and social (stigmatization as a “quota Ossi”) questions therefore seem to be a “transformation [of] discourses, a problematization of the problem of East Germany and the East Germans”, which of course does not take effect overnight. The gap is even more pronounced in people with a migrant background. Lars Vogel and Sabrina Zajak (2020) come up with a relatively broad concept of elites (approx. 3000 positions) on migrant shares between 0.0 (security), 1.3 (justice) and 2.0 (military)% on the one hand and 25.6 (religion)% on the other hand, with the latter being an exception—in total, migrants made up only 9.2% of the social elite, in politics 7.7%.5 Again, the fact that the Bundestag is not a reflection of social realities does not have to be an indicator of an interest representation with

5 President,

Chancellor, Ministers, Party Chairman, Parliamentary State Secretaries (federal and state level), Prime Ministers, Presidents of the Federal and State Parliaments, Committee Chairman, Fraction Chairman, Chairmen of municipal associations (e.g. German Association of Towns and Municipalities), Mayors/District Administrators in cities/districts with more than 500,000 inhabitants, EU Commissioner, Vice-President of the European Parliament (Vogel and Zajak 2020, p. 25).

478

15  Political Elite in Democracy

a bias, even if, for example, migrant parliamentarians are more likely to represent the interests of people with similar socialization (Saalfeld 2011). The fact that the places of strong under-representation differ between East Germans and people with a migrant background points to “different recruitment routes, opportunities and obstacles to advancement in the individual areas” (Vogel and Zajak 2020, p. 12). If one compares the political elite of Germany with that of non-European democracies (Table 15.4), two things become apparent: on the one hand, the high proportion of lawyers among the closer top of politics in other countries and, on the other hand, the lower proportion of upper class offspring in Germany. Some statements about bourgeoisification and the proportion of lawyers among the German political elite are therefore relativized. A look at two politically close sub-elites may supplement the picture. The administrative elite consists of 57.2% lawyers and 17.9% economists, while all other disciplines only make up small percentages (Table 15.4). Their relatives, looked at from the immediate previous position, are in the great majority from the public administration. There is no way into politics from the administrative elite—even the seven civil servants who became federal ministers (most recent cases: Brigitte Zypries and Frank-Walter Steinmeier) turn out to be almost exclusively political outsiders in the administration. In their great majority, therefore, the administrative elite consists of a group of lawyers and economists who make their way up in the administration and stay there. Despite some tendencies towards politicization, the “boundary between the two sectors [politics and administration] has remained stable and largely impermeable” (Derlien and Lang 2005, p. 124, 129; Lang 2005, p. 173,224 ff.). However, a change has taken place in the trade union elite, which traditionally sent personnel to the political elite via the SPD. While in the past, university graduates were a rarity in trade union executive boards, their share among male Table 15.4   Political elites in international comparison 2012. As a percentage of the respective elite Proportion of lawyers

Brazil

India

USA

Germany

38

51.5

44.8

50

Proportion of those with doctorates

33.3

10.8

10

40.6

Upper class background

83.3

79.2

55

29.0

Small samples, in the case of Germany n = 32 Source: Schneickert (2015, pp. 159, 210, 212, 215).

15.1  Political Leaders—Not a Mirror Image of Society

479

executive board members has increased to about one third, and among female executive board members to four fifths. Pacesetters here are the GEW and Verdi due to higher proportions of academics among their members, as well as the IG Metall due to its opening to the student movement (Hassel 2006, pp. 215 ff.). In view of the discrepancy between the social and demographic composition of the political elite/parliamentarians and the citizens, the question arises as to whether this does not constitute a deficiency of German democracy. However, short-term descriptive representation deficits do not necessarily mean that the interests of underrepresented groups are neglected (substantial representation). And conversely, the probability that all interests will be taken into account does not automatically increase with the increasing representativeness of parliaments (Childs and Krook 2009; Dingler et al. 2019). Professional politicians do not always act as representatives of their own social background. However, the composition shapes the style of politics and makes it more difficult in the long term for underrepresented population groups, but also the acceptance of democratic procedures, to emotionally identify with democracy (the former low relevance of social and demographic representation deficits in the attitude budget of the population (Herzog et al. 1990,p. 56 ff.) has given way to a certain sensitivity to representation issues (Vogel and Zajak 2020, p. 17)6: • 74.7% (underrepresentation East) or 72.9% (underrepresentation of people with a migrant background) are concerend about the substantial representation of the respective group, • 64.9% (underrepresentation East) or 58.1% (underrepresentation of people with a migrant background) believed that society would benefit from the experiences of the respective group, • 63.4% (underrepresentation East) or 61.8% (underrepresentation of people with a migrant background) saw in the underrepresentation of the respective group an injustice. • 60.7% (underrepresentation East) or 54.9% (underrepresentation of people with a migrant background) saw in the underrepresentation of the respective group a problem because it would give them the feeling of being citizens of 2nd class.

6 N

= 1766, stratified and quoted random sample of the German population.

480

15  Political Elite in Democracy

15.2 Attitudes: Career Patterns and Inconsistency With Voters a. Career: Internal party tour and faster ways But how does one get to the very top? If you follow the political science study by Reiher from 2019, which looks at the parliamentarians of the 18th electoral period of the Bundestag, then the ascent of the political elite to the top positions usually takes place via the following stations: 1. The average pre-political professional activity of later top politicians in parties, parliaments and governments lasts 15.3 years. 86% of them have a university degree, 18.2% of which have been completed with a doctorate. At the time of their switch to full-time politics, the future climbers were mainly working as officials (29.0%), in political/social professions (19.7%, including: work in party and faction), in the economy (14.7%) and in free professions (13.8%, including notaries and lawyers) (Reiher 2019, p. 256, 251, 261 ff.). 83.7% look back on politically related previous occupations. This all points to • membership of the educated middle or upper class; • proximity to the public/state sector, but distance to the free economy. 2. The normal case is joining a party or its youth organization—with party membership on average at the age of 25.1 years, slightly later for CDU, SPD, Left and Greens, much earlier (22.8 years) for the CSU—mainly for individual career motives (Reiher 2019, p. 285 f., 288). For 31.3% of parliamentarians, the youth organization of the party therefore also plays the role of “incubator” in their political career (Reiher 2019, p. 295, 297), which they join at the age of 17.6 years. 3. For manypolitics as the main occupation is preceded by politics as a side job: party offices are considered an “advancement prerequisite” (Reiher 2019, p. 302), but also as a place of visibility for political candidates and security during the mandate: 91.0% of parliamentarians have gone through this “apprenticeship”, which today takes just as long as it used to (function assumption about eight years after party membership, then another nine years until the first mandate). 67.0% had municipal political experience, 25.8% had a parallel office at the local level in addition to the Bundestag mandate (Reiher 2019, p. 318), which most of them end in the 3rd electoral period (Gruber 2009, p. 174). 4. The switch to professional politics then usually took place in the early 40 s, with 33.7% for whom the Bundestag mandate was not the first full-time office: at the very top are state parliament mandates (12.7%), work in a faction/party (7.6%) and municipal election offices (5.6%).

15.2  Attitudes: Career Patterns and Inconsistency With Voters

481

As the most important ascent channels by which one can reach the political leadership level in the Federal Republic, political party organizations, municipal politics and parliaments therefore play a role. Dietrich Herzog (Herzog et al. 1990) introduced a distinction between three different career types, which has proven itself in general to this day, but has been supplemented by two more types (Reiher 2019, pp. 342 ff.): • Type 1—the side entry: 9.1% of parliamentarians represent this cross-over career. These are people who have achieved a senior position and/or qualifications in a non-political area and are then appointed directly (relatively quickly after joining the party, but relatively late in life compared to the other career types) to a top political position—often without party or municipal office. Membership of a party is sufficient, sometimes even dispensed with7. These represent therefore the quickest, but latest ascent. Among them are experts and opinion leaders (examples Dahrendorf, Biedenkopf), interest representatives and figureheads (Schily, Riester) as well as careers of change (Carlo Schmid, Merkel) (Lorenz and Micus 2009, pp. 5 ff.). The side entry is relatively common among state ministers, of whom no less than 44.9% did not previously hold a parliamentary mandate (Gruber 2009, p. 195; Vogel 2009, p. 47). A wider study of 3170 politicians in the Federal Republic of Germany 1949–2009 came to 6% side entries (Küpper 2013, p. 345). Reiher (2019) also includes parliamentarians who came into parliament through the WASG, then Die Linke, as well as the special careers in the former GDR, which found their way into professional politics through the upheaval of 1989/90. • Type 2—the local politician: Only 10.0% of the MdB represent politicians who are members of a party but have not taken on any functions there, but have earned their political spurs as mayors, long-standing members of the municipal council, county councillors or department heads—in other words, “the longest ascent to full-time politics” (Reiher 2019, p. 362). • Type 3—the party politician: A third type (29.2%) acquires his/her political capital as a pure party functionary, often combined with activities in his/her own youth organization or an association. The early professionalization corresponds to the young age at which the first political mandate is achieved (38.9 years).

7 Lorenz

and Micus (2009, p. 487) define the/the side entry somewhat further than someone without “party political donkey tour”.

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15  Political Elite in Democracy

• Type 4—the party and local politician: This type represents Herzog’s “standard career”. It, in which party and municipal office are combined, makes up 39.2% of parliamentarians, making it the largest group. For the most part, they come from the party-political-parliamentary area and have a gradual ascent or a “long and intensive probationary period” (Gruber 2009, p. 225) behind them, i.e. the “donkey tour”, when they reach a top political position at the age of 45. • Type 5—the employee: This type makes up 12.5% of the members of the Bundestag, more among the smaller factions. It stands for career-oriented politicians and corresponds to Herzog’s “pure political career”. The full-time activity in the party is often combined with full-time work in the youth organization and other associations of the party or in voluntary local politics. The standard career is still the usual way into the Bundestag. But among the political elite at the federal level, the pure political career seems to be increasingly common. A study of the 17th Bundestag revealed 9.8% outsiders (without previous party career or political engagement) and 25% career politicians (who have spent little time in non-political professional life) (Bailer et al. 2013, pp. 57, 128). Does the analysis of young MPs, no more than 40 years old, allow a glimpse into the future? Among them, the “pure political career” (44.3%) dominates, in which party membership takes place very early and only eight years pass between the first party office and the Bundestag mandate (Reiher 2019, p. 366). The answer to the question “From the lecture hall to the plenary hall?” is probably a resounding “Yes” here (Langguth 2012). Each type has advantages and disadvantages. While the standard career may arrive at the top job with political and professional experience, but perhaps too routine-honed, outsiders bring more non-political qualifications—but they lack experience in politics, also parliamentary anchoring. The fact that 25% of firsttime ministers and prime ministers from 1990 to 2009 were without previous party position or mandate suggests unusually many outsiders (Vogel 2009, pp. 47, 52 ff., 115). The career politician, experienced in political business, is unfamiliar with the non-political world of work and an unknown retreat. If he/she also comes to the top via the intermediate station of an adjutant to an established politician, this means coming to one’s own mandate from a favorable position and with the support of those above—in short: being more co-opted from above than elected from below. With the dominance of party-political and parliamentary recruitment, the question of the selection criteria for political climbers is also answered. These are identical to the requirements in this area: in addition to the right conviction,

15.2  Attitudes: Career Patterns and Inconsistency With Voters

483

also articulation and those for self-presentation in conversation, in meetings and assemblies; general knowledge or skills for their acquisition, in order to deal with political diversity; skills for majority building and social integration. b. Socialization of the political elite What experiences do those who will lead the country politically undergo? The socialization factor “family home” seems to be significant for elite attitudes. This is already the case for entry into politics: according to the 1972 elite study, no less than 71% of members of the political elite came from politically engaged family homes, which made up only 23% of the population. Similarly, agreements with the political orientations of the parents also speak for the transmission of basic political attitudes (Kaltefleiter 1976, pp. 246 ff.). In the 2013 elite study of the WZB, 71.5% of all elite members (probably even more of the political elite) said that political discussions played a big role in their family homes (Hartmann 2013, p. 49). In this way, too, differences in attitudes within the elite along the lines of social origin speak for a shaping by the family home (Hartmann 2017, pp. 292 ff.). In addition, there are formative experiences of one’s own. Above all, during the long career paths, which begin in early adulthood and are filled with political communication, which have to be mastered before the ascent to the political top, attitudes are further formed. The exchange of opinions in the special milieu of a political party is likely to act in the sense of party political integration, democratic selection may also produce “extremely adaptable and flexible people” (Laufer 1977, p. 112) or promote them to the top. More politely put, people who have learned to deal with different interests and to seek majority-based decisions. Older studies already showed that new members of parliament go through a socialization into a parliamentary “subculture”. In a significant way, within three years of experience in the Bundestag, attitudes changed: for example, towards the necessity of public committee meetings, the influence of ministerial bureaucracy, the informedness of the press, the blocking of reforms by interest groups, the desirability of referendums and the existence of class differences—ideas that were shared much less often than at the time of entry into parliament after the end of a legislative period (Badura and Reese 1976, p. 69, 44 ff.; Reese 1976). Similar changes in attitude can also be seen in recent times. Among those who entered the Bundestag in 2002, after three years it was possible to detect a shift towards the view that referendums lead to bad laws, as well as a move towards the left-right positioning of one’s own party (Wüst 2009, p. 335 ff.). Among the members of the Greens and the PDS, their parliamentary work promoted “a constructive attitude, an orientation towards the practically possible” (Spöhrer 1999, p. 230). Apart from that, the perceptions also regularly shift in other parliaments

484

15  Political Elite in Democracy

with the first entry, caused by the considerable presence and integration effort, which leaves less capacity for citizen contacts and municipal political engagement (Reiser 2018, pp. 121 ff.). That in addition the content priorities shift towards personal profiling (and away from constituency-specific interests), party discipline gains in importance and the distance between citizens and politicians (on both sides!) is perceived to grow, explains the “alienation and decoupling” complained of everywhere (Reiser 2018, p. 122). In general, the result is a positive integration effect, whether in favor of the institution of parliament or in favor of one’s own party, which shapes the attitudes of the members of parliament and thus also of the elite members who come from their ranks. c. Politicians and the people: incongruent attitudes Politicians and journalists live in their own subsystems, the political and communication systems, where they work and communicate primarily with their peers. When an older media sociologist says that “politicians and journalists live in a bubble” (Weischenberg 2018, p. 161), he means just the “alienation and decoupling” examined in more detail by Marion Reiser (2018). This leads to the question: Where does the political leadership stand in comparison to the citizens it represents? There are two general answers to this. On the one hand, studies from 1981 came to the result that the political leadership groups of the parties represented in the Bundestag at all times position themselves “left” of their party’s electorate (Hoffmann-Lange 1992, p. 251). A different picture is provided by a survey from 2002/03: 60% of the SPD candidates surveyed described themselves as “left”, but only 30% of the SPD electorate (Greens: 75 to 49%; PDS: 100 to 49%), while 41% of the Union candidates and only 21% of the voters saw themselves as “right”. Only the FDP danced out of line: 10% of the candidates, but 29% of the voters, described themselves as right. The voters of all parties showed strong inclinations towards the “middle” (Schmitt and Wüst 2004, pp. 308, 319). The representatives therefore appear to be more extreme than their respective electorate (extremity thesis). Apparently it all depends on which questions with which weighting one uses to define “left” or “right”. This problem is avoided if one keeps specific questions separate. In the course of a survey from 1988/89, the extremity thesis was confirmed in the areas of economic and social policy as well as abortion. On the other hand, on issues such as “peace and order” and restrictions on the right to demonstrate, representatives of all parties clearly positioned themselves “left” of their respective electorate, while representatives of all left-wing parties positioned themselves left of their voters on environmental protection (Herzog 1990, p. 38 ff.).

15.2  Attitudes: Career Patterns and Inconsistency With Voters

485

A similar approach is a contemporary comparison of a survey of parliamentarians from 2010 with a survey of the electorate from 2009/10—both divided by party. The results of their two questions with the blatant difference between representatives and citizens as well as two questions with moderate differences are selected in Table 15.5. Included are two statements on two central political issues: social policy and immigration. First of all, it becomes clear that CDU, FDP and CSU representatives advocate less social policy than their voters, while representatives of the “left-wing” parties SPD, Left and Greens advocate significantly more social policy than their electorates. This corresponds to the extremity thesis. However, on immigration, the same applies to all parties: the party supporters are significantly more critical of immigration than their representatives. If one sees immigration approval as “left”, one can confirm the thesis of a leftward shift of the political leadership here. Given the central importance of the issue, this could be seen as a representation weakness. Table 15.5   Distances between MPs and voters 2010, opinion (average): 4 fully agree, 3 somewhat agree, 2 somewhat disagree, 1 completely disagree

CDU/CSU

FDP

SPD

Die Linke

B90/Grüne

insgesamt

a) Soziale Sicherung stärker in Verantwortung des Einzelnen legen 1,46

1,81

2,41

Partisans 2.92 3.06 2.36 2.42 b) Elites determine the reality of social development

Abgeordnete

3,02

2.36

2.61

Members of Parliament

2.76

3,46

2.66

2.64

2.49

2.67

Party supporters 3.01 3.17 3.11 c) The parties exercise too much influence

3.16

2.67

3.01

Members of Parliament

2.22

1.92

1.89

Partisans 2.70 2.55 2.64 2.89 d) Limit immigration from countries outside the EU

2.63

2.74

1.84

2.58

1,71

1.97

1.78

Members of Parliament

2.58

1.68

1.60

1.22

1.32

1.93

Party supporters

3.10

2.88

2.53

2.65

2.22

2.74

Parliamentary survey: approximately 650 evaluated interviews with weights to establish representativeness. Survey of the eligible population, random sample, n = 2190 Source: Vogel (2016, pp. 145 f., 381, 384, 386, 389)

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15  Political Elite in Democracy

The other differences between voters and MPs, on elite and party influence (Table 15.5b and c), can be explained by the position of MPs as successful insiders of party operations. Political dynamite could also be hidden in these two distances, should movements or direct democratic activities (such as those in Sect. 3.5) collide with political institutions or parties. As a result, theme-specific incongruities arise between MPs and voters, while on individual questions different constellations arise, sometimes in the sense of the extremity thesis (welfare state), sometimes in the sense of the left-wing shift thesis (immigration). Which sympathies do the individual political directions enjoy among social elites, where can they count on support? In elite surveys of 1972 and 1981, people were asked about party affiliation, with the result that the Union parties were clearly preferred by military, economic and association elites; FDP inclinations were represented in all elites (exception: trade unions) to an above-average extent, while SPD inclinations were, in comparison to the SPD voter share, represented to a below-average extent in all elites (with the exception of trade unions, SPD-dominated state administrations and in 1972 in the media) (HoffmannLange 1992, pp. 166 et seq.; Hoffmann 1976, p. 156). This pointed to an imbalance among elites to the disadvantage of the SPD. In contrast, a similar survey in 1995, however, now based on party membership, produced a different picture: According to this, there is no such imbalance, but the SPD dominates among the trade union elite, CDU/CSU among the economic associations, the administrative elite seemed divided between the two, and by far the majority of elites were nonparty members (Schnapp 1997, p. 116). From a methodological point of view, the question of party affiliation may have proved to be unproductive, while the question of “inclinations” may have been more appropriate. Returning to the questions formulated at the beginning, the following can be summarized: 1. Even in German democracy, the existence of a political elite is confirmed, which – as an expression of professionalization – does not mirror the people in terms of its social composition or its political ideas. 2. The leadership qualifications of this elite are, with regard to skills in forming a majority and influencing people, tested and trained within the framework of a prevailing standard career in parties, local politics and parliaments; today, top-level politicians’ professional competence is almost exclusively acquired through higher education, only to a very limited extent through professional experience; top positions in the private sector or management experience are rare.

References

487

3. The selection process appears to be democratic in the case of the normal standard career, controlled by the display of special competence in the case of side-enterers, and characterized by co-optation in the case of a purely political career. It is noteworthy that relatively segregated elites exist in Germany, thus the political elite is separated from other leadership groups. Transitions from the political elite to the economic one (cf. Chap. 3) also point to dissolution phenomena.

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15  Political Elite in Democracy

Reiser, Marion (2010): Ressourcen- oder mitgliederbasiert? Zwei Formen politischer Professionalisierung auf der lokalen Ebene und ihre institutionellen Ursachen, in: Edinger, Michael/Patzelt, Werner J. (Eds.): Politik als Beruf: Zum politischen Führungspersonal in der modernen Demokratie, Wiesbaden, p. 121 ff. Reiser, Marion (2018): Abgehoben und entkoppelt? Abgeordnete zwischen öffentlicher Kritik und Professionalisierungslogik, in: Brichzin, Jenni et al. (Eds.): Soziologie der Parlamente. Neue Wege der politischen Insitutionenforschung, Wiesbaden, p. 111 ff. Saalfeld, Thomas (2011): Parliamentary Questions as Instruments of Substantive Representation: Visible Minorities in the UK House of Commons, 2005–10, in: Journal of Legislative Studies 17 (3), p. 271 ff. Schmitt, Hermann/Wüst, Andreas M. (2004): Direktkandidaten bei der Bundestagswahl 2002, in: Brettschneider, Frank et al. (Eds.): Die Bundestagswahl 2002, Wiesbaden, p. 303 ff. Schnapp, Kai-Uwe (1997): Soziodemographische Merkmale der bundesdeutschen Eliten, in: Bürklin, Wilhelm/Rebenstorf, Hilke (Eds.): Eliten in Deutschland. Rekrutierung und Integration, Opladen, p. 101 ff. Schneickert, Christian (2015): Nationale Machtfelder und globalisierte Eliten, Konstanz. Schöne, Helmar (2010): Ungewählte Repräsentanten? Aufgaben, Selbstverständnis und Karrieren von Fraktionsmitarbeitern im Deutschen Bundestag, in: Schrenk, Klemens H. (Ed.): Analyse demokratischer Regierungssysteme, Wiesbaden, p. 321 ff. Schorr, Natalie (2015): 2.600 hier, 8.600 da: Was Abgeordnete in Deutschland verdienen, unter: https://detektor.fm/politik/politik-diaeten-von-landtagsabgeordneten (zuletzt geprüft am 13. Mai 2022). Schüttemeyer, Suzanne S./Haas, Johannes (2014): Abgeordnetenbezüge im internationalen Vergleich, in: Schüttemeyer, Suzanne S./Schmidt-Jortzig, Edzard (Eds.): Der Wert der parlamentarischen Repräsentation, Baden-Baden, p. 173 ff. Spöhrer, Jochen (1999): Zwischen Demokratie und Oligarchie, Baden-Baden. Vogel, Lars (2009): Der Weg ins Kabinett, Frankfurt a. M. Vogel, Lars (2016): Zwischen Übereinstimmung und Distanz: politische Repräsentation in Deutschland als asymmetrische Beziehung von Repräsentationseliten und Bevölkerung, Jena. Vogel, Lars (2017): (Ostdeutsche) Politische Eliten zwischen Integration und Repräsentation, in: Deutsche Gesellschaft e. V. (Ed.): Ostdeutsche Eliten. Träume, Wirklichkeiten, Perspektiven, Berlin, p. 45 ff. Vogel, Lars/Zajak, Sabrina (2020): Teilhabe ohne Teilnahme? Wie Ostdeutsche und Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund in der bundesdeutschen Elite vertreten sind (DeZIM Research Notes 4/20), unter: https://www.dezim-institut.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Projekte/Eliten/ResearchNotes_04_201030_ansicht.pdf (zuletzt geprüft am 16. Mai 2022). Vorländer, Hans (1990): Die FDP zwischen Erfolg und Existenzgefährdung, in: Mintzel, Alf/Oberreuter, Heinrich (Eds.): Parteien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bonn, p. 237 ff. Weischenberg, Siegfried (2018): Medienkrise und Medienkrieg, Wiesbaden. von Weizsäcker Richard (1992): Richard von Weizsäcker im Gespräch mit Gunter Hofmann und Werner A. Perger, Frankfurt a. M. Wollmann, Hellmut (1996): Institutionenbildung in Ostdeutschland, in: Kaase, Max et al. (Ed.): Politisches System, Opladen, p. 47 ff.

References

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Wüst, Andreas M. (2009): Zur Sozialisation von Neuparlamentariern im 15. Deutschen Bundestag, in: Gabriel, Oscar W. et al. (Eds.): Wahlen und Wähler, Wiesbaden, p. 328 ff. Zapf, Wolfgang (1965): Wandlungen der deutschen Elite, München. Zittel, Thomas et al. (2019): Geographic Representation in Party-dominated Legislatures. A quantitative Text Analysis of Parliamentary Questions in the German Bundestag, in: Legislative Studies Quarterly 44 (4), p. 681 ff.

Political Culture of the Loosened Bindings

16

16.1 Development Phases of Political Culture a. 1945–66: Aftermaths of older traditions In everyday understanding, the term “political culture” is associated with “a civilized way of dealing with each other in politics, fairness, adherence to rules” (Sarcinelli 1990, p. 31). In political science, on the other hand, “political culture” comprises value-neutral • first of all cognitive, affective and evaluative attitudes towards the political system and political roles (Almond and Verba 1965, pp. 12 ff.; Almond and Powell 1966, pp. 23 f., 50 ff.); • in addition typical patterns of behavior in politics, ranging from patterns of participation to elite recruitment and the “modalities of political regulation of social conflicts” (Lehmbruch 1967, p. 13), i.e. non-normatively fixed, nevertheless also behavior patterns characterizing a political system; • even further, a definition that also includes lifestyles, world views and mentalities, orienting ideas and symbols (Rohe 1993, pp. 215 ff.). Germany was initially counted as the type of the continental European political culture as well as France and Italy. These are characterized as “fragmented political cultures”, in which different political and social milieus with their own ideological value orientations exist side by side (Almond 1956)—as in the German Empire and in the Weimar Republic, when the milieus of the conservative agrarians, the liberal bourgeoisie, the socialist working class and the Catholic minority existed side by side with different value concepts. However, as a result of the

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Mannewitz and W. Rudzio, The Political System of Germany, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41371-2_16

493

494

16  Political Culture of the Loosened Bindings

Table 16.1   Indicators for democratic attitudes. In percent of those who answered affirmatively

Year

Party plurality

Power distribution

Own resistance to new NS takeover of power

1950

53

–

25 (1953)

1955

74

55

25 (1956)

1960

79

62

27 (1959)

1967

81

61

34

1972

88

66

44

Source: Noelle and Neumann (1967, p. 293; 1974, pp. 222, 224, 231)

upheavals of the Third Reich, the Second World War and the occupation regime, the traditional milieus in Germany were broken up to a greater extent than in other continental European countries. Its present political culture can no longer be classified as “continental European”. Above all, however, the years 1945–66 were characterized by the restoration and consolidation of democracy.1 Democratic practice quickly became established, which the Germans had actually known before 1933. Democratic attitudes grew, as the data in Table 16.1 on the affirmation of party pluralism and power distribution show. Political interest was only declared by about a third of those surveyed (Merritt and Merritt 1970, pp. 44, 314; Noelle and Neumann 1974, p. 213), a share that hardly seemed to grow. Although high voter turnout was achieved, active participation remained the preserve of limited minorities. Politicians and political activity were widely distrusted; 70% of those surveyed in 1955 would not have liked it if their son became a politician, only nine percent would have liked it (Noelle and Neumann 1957, p. 49). For a long time, therefore, the question remained open to what extent the re-established democracy in the minds of the Germans really has roots and can also assert itself under adverse conditions. Nostalgic memories of the empire, of “good” years and aspects of the Third Reich, as they emerged in surveys, not least temporary electoral successes of the SRP and NPD, gave that question new and current interest again and again.

1  For

political culture in the GDR, there was, for obvious reasons, no public opinion research, but in the course of so-called “proxy surveys” that came to light in 2014, at least sketchy reconstructions are possible (Holtmann and Köhler 2016).

16.1  Development Phases of Political Culture

495

Political sociological publications answered these questeions skeptically until the 1960s. Almond and Verba came to the conclusion in 1959 that in the Federal Republic of Germany “a passive subject orientation” continued, the Germans were more interested in the output side of politics. Their diagnosis: “In Germany the lack of commitment to the political system that is relatively independent of system output suggests that the stability of the system may be in doubt if the level of output becomes less satisfactory.” (Almond and Verba 1965, pp. 362, 364) Even if European participation forms were underestimated here and the social psychological situation of a people who had just overcome long years of material need was not adequately taken into account, the significant difference in attitude towards the political system seemed worrying, which emerged in comparison to the AngloSaxon democracies. This also prompted other observers to attribute a “fragility of its cultural roots” to democracy in Germany. (Edinger 1968, pp. 117, 121) But: While sharp external and economic policy contrasts dominated the scene, politics was successfully able to respond to the needs for external security and economic reconstruction—and thus contribute to the long-term legitimation of democracy. b. 1967–82: Strengthened participation and legitimacy doubts A second phase of the political culture of the Federal Republic was initiated by the student movement of 1967/68. Although it failed in its external course, it seems to have promoted profound changes in political thinking and behavior as “a kind of Western cultural revolution” (Sontheimer 1979, p. 27). The criticism of the “Socialist German Student Union” (SDS) led movement was based on “authoritarian” conditions in politics and society. The targets of their attacks were the representative democracy, the “oligarchic” conditions within the parties and the “ordinary university”. In addition, the thesis that capitalism leads to fascism was added. The action forms ranged from “reprogramming” of university courses, demonstrations, occupations of public buildings and traffic blockades to individual acts of violence. At first the movement had more of an “anti-authoritarian” left-wing character, accompanied by the search for alternative forms of life (communes, anti-authoritarian education, rejection of the “performance society”), then increasingly also Marxist orientations up to dogmatic positions (Langguth 1983; Kraushaar 2008). The effects of the movement appear ambivalent. On the one hand, doubts about legitimacy developed not only in relation to the social order, but also to the democracy of the Federal Republic. Four lines of argumentation played a role. Fundamental was the thesis of a shaping of consciousness by socialization and media. They conveyed capitalism-compatible attitudes and obscured the view

496

16  Political Culture of the Loosened Bindings

of social reality from the people in the external prosperity of “late capitalism”. Usual party politics could not break this circle, could not lead to social liberation (“emancipation”) (“Critical Theory”). It was therefore a logical conclusion that • voting decisions could not truly legitimize political rule. For some, such as Herbert Marcuse (1968, pp. 110, 117, 127), the right to “resistance” seemed to be given in Western democracy and a “democratic educational dictatorship” of enlightened minorities seemed conceivable. • in strategic terms, relevant changes could not be considered possible through the political system, but primarily from the “base”, through changes in socialization, milieus and values. A second line of democracy criticism was carried by Marxist “state theory”. According to this, socio-economic and political system—concretely: capitalism and democracy—form a coherent overall system (Offe 1973; Duve 1973). The conclusion was obvious: Whoever rejects capitalism must also turn against “bourgeois” democracy. A third variant of criticism went back to the radical democratic position of Rousseau and was directed against the representative character of Western democracy. This had a delegitimizing effect in connection with utopian ideas of participation, under which reality appeared to be far removed from true democracy (such as council, base or plebiscitary democracy). Finally, the popular argumentation pattern was to represent constitution and constitutional reality as contradicting each other. This approach is delegitimizing when it is associated with a “normative transcendence of constitutional principles” (Sontheimer 1990, p. 52). Such legitimacy doubts hardly caught on with the population as a whole, but did with parts of the younger generation, in particular the better educated (Bürklin 1980, p. 228; Rudzio 1984). Left-wing extremist groups gained strong positions in student parliaments, their ideas reached into the Young Socialists and the DGB youth (Vilmar and Rudzio 1981). In view of the lack of voter majorities, but a broad “peace movement”, later opinions seemed to find resonance, “deep-seated value conflicts” about missile armament, environment, etc. should not be decided by majority decisions. Otherwise, the “limits of majority democracy” would be reached (Guggenberger and Offe 1984, pp. 12, 17 f.). All in all: Cancellations of the democratic rule consensus and the erosion of the unity of the democrats against left-wing extremism signaled a disturbing change in political culture. The Federal Republic was now characterized by a split between majority and minority protest culture, by an “absolute divorce

16.1  Development Phases of Political Culture

497

between the Left-wing intellectual climate and the popular outlook.” (Smith 1976, p. 404). On the other hand, democratization impulses also went hand in hand with the 1968 movement. The authority-determined relationships were dismantled right down to the families. This is reflected in the change of educational goals: While only 31% of those surveyed pleaded for an education to “independence” in 1964 (25% for an exercise in obedience and subordination), 45 (or 14) did so in 1972 and 52 (or 8) as early as 1981 (Fürstenberg 1978, pp. 50 ff.; Klages 2001, p. 730). In addition, the “interest in politics”, as respondents declared, increased from about 30% in 1960 to 50% at the beginning of the seventies, only to fluctuate between 40 and over 50% by the end of the eighties (Noelle-Neumann and Köcher 1997, p. 783). At the same time, institutionalized participation also increased: • The voter turnout rose, interpreted as a “participatory revolution” (Kaase 1982), from 78.5 to 91.1% in federal elections from 1949 to 1972, from 73.3 to 83.9% in state elections; • the number of party members, less than 1.1 million in 1960, increased to around 1.3 million by 1970 and to over 2 million by 1980 (Rausch 1980, p. 21); • associations recorded increases in membership, which increased their number of members and the number of active members (Conradt 1980, p. 255). Overall, the Federal Republic reached a participation level in the early seventies that was on a par with that of Western democracies such as Great Britain, the USA or the Netherlands (Greiffenhagen and Greiffenhagen 1979, pp. 361 f.). But was the 68 movement really the cause of these developments? For example, the thesis that it was only with it that enlightenment about the Nazi regime and its crimes began is incorrect. In fact, in the 1950s, a historical and political science literature on this topic appeared, the Central Office for the Investigation of Nazi Crimes was established, the Auschwitz trials took place from 1963 to 1965 (Aly 2008, pp. 154 ff.)—long before the student movement began. Political participation also increased before the student movement, as did the educational goal of independence, which had already gained ground in the 1950s. In view of this, the 68er movement should rather be interpreted as a spectacular expression or part of a broader social change. Instead, Conradt (1980, pp. 221 ff., 258) named three other factors as the causes of the political cultural change: the post-war socialization and the fading of older alternatives to liberal democracy; the effective performance of the political system, which delivered economic prosperity, internal and external security as well as social balance over time, which in turn promoted support for democracy

498

16  Political Culture of the Loosened Bindings

regardless of success; finally social modernization, which led to the growth of dependent middle classes and parts of the higher educated—precisely the layers that tend to be more liberal in their attitudes and participation in general. Not surprisingly, the social upheaval was also an expression of a generational conflict. According to the theory of the “silent revolution”, the first post-war generation, due to the material security experienced in its formative phase (“economic miracle”), tended to post-materialist, participatory attitudes more than their parents’ generation, which had grown up in the years of war and rubble characterized by physical need and therefore attached greater importance to order and security (Inglehart 1971). All in all, the Federal Republic has grown into the normality of Western democracies during these years. In retrospect, one can speak of a more participatory, but also more insecure democracy for the years 1967–82. c. Since 1983: Political culture of weakened engagement The long-term effects of the 68er movement are likely to be based on the diffusion of its ideas, including the professional careers of its protagonists. Of 120 activists studied, “35% landed in the media, 25% on professorships, 15% in politics” (Wehler 2009, p. 317). But the fascination of radical alternatives has declined. It is significant that the supporters of the Greens—an important carrier group of the criticism emanating from 1968—increasingly declared themselves to be “very” or “rather satisfied” with democracy in Germany. Their level of satisfaction increased from 38 (1984) to 60% in 1995 in the old Federal Republic and was thus only 8 percentage points below the average (Ipos 1995, p. 30). Another central change since the early 1980s is seen in a decline in political participation. It is tangible • in a party identification that has fallen since 1976 and has stabilized at a lower level since the early 1990s (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen cited according to Niedermayer 2005, pp. 81, 83), • in continuously declining party membership numbers, • in similarly declining voter turnout in other democracies (Wiesendahl 1997; Dalton 2014, p. 41), • as well as in drying up “new social movements” (Statistisches Bundesamt 1997, p. 603; Gabriel 1997, p. 463). With German unification, this characteristic trend of today’s political culture intensified even further. In the new federal states, there is—albeit for reasons

16.2  Dimensions of Present-day Political Culture

499

of the past socialist realist—a lower voter turnout, a thinner party membership density and a critical distance to politics from the West. In general, political engagement is no longer “in” as it once was (Köcher 1992). But political interest persists. The shrinking political participation in connection with the declining trust in institutions, which can also be observed in other Western democracies (Pharr and Putnam 2000; Putnam 2000, pp. 31–64), has sometimes been interpreted as a symptom of growing political apathy (Maier 1994), or even a legitimacy crisis of democracy (Watanuki et al. 1975), but rather only reflected an effectiveness crisis of democracy, which went hand in hand with a matured political culture with higher standards for politics (Putnam et al. 2000, p. 21) and a changing “orientation of many intellectuals to partly utopian standards” (Jesse 2008, p. 171). Thirdly, since the early 1990s, a new value change has occurred. This is noticeable not only in public discourse, where the hegemony of sociological thinking has now been replaced by that of economic thinking, by a “turn to more market-oriented thinking” (Mayer 2002, p. 13). Traditional educational goals such as thrift, appreciation of technical understanding have also regained ground in surveys since 1990 (Noelle-Neumann and Petersen 2001, pp. 19 ff.). Politeness and good manners as an educational goal were rated by 77% of respondents in 2011, working neatly and conscientiously by 89%—that is, by higher proportions than was the case before the student movement—(76 or 85%) (Petersen 2011). This is an indication that Inglehart’s forecast of a progressive post-materialization of society was not quite right (Klein and Pötschke 2000).

16.2 Dimensions of Present-day Political Culture a. Political community: little national pride The jellyfish-like concept of political culture can be better handled if it is broken down into different dimensions: Attitudes towards the political community, the political system, the extent and forms of political participation, political decision-making patterns and degree of homogeneity. Following this subdivision2, the political culture of today’s Germany will be presented. The German people as a linguistic, cultural and historical community in the sense of Herder can be traced back to 786 AD (theodiscus = vernacular) as

2 A

slightly different subdivision in Westle (2009, p. 45).

500

16  Political Culture of the Loosened Bindings

a state community at least until the early 10th century. Even if it was not yet a nation in the modern-democratic sense (Kronenberg 2006, pp. 41 ff., 64), this means that the political community of the Germans goes back a long way. After the Second World War, the Germans of the early Federal Republic hardly felt proud of their political system, namely just 7%. They only valued their social legislation to a small extent, but their economy (33%), their national characteristics (36%) and German science/art (26%) to a great extent—more than in the other three countries part of the comparison(Almond and Verba 1965, p. 64). A certain pride was recognizable, but it did not refer to the democracy of the country. Later and current surveys show far-reaching changes. Over the decades, pride in the German political system has increased, while pride in being a nation has declined. In the latter respect, at the end of the nineties, the Germans were at the bottom of the world (World Values Survey cited after Klingemann 2000, p. 279). Today, too, little has changed: According to the latest, 92-country wave of the World Values Survey (2017–2020), there is even less national pride only in the state of Andorra, in Brazil and in the special administrative zone of Hong Kong (EVS and WVS 2021). In 2003, a question was asked in 20 European democracies that shed light on the mental situation: When it came to pride in one’s own democracy, the West of the Republic was in the European average, the East rather at the lower end; when it came to pride in one’s own economic achievements, East and West were about in the middle; when it came to pride in one’s own social security, East and West were similar; the national history proved to be not at all identification-prone and also the national sense of belonging positioned Germany rather at the lower end of the table—overall, the values in the East were consistently worse than in the West (Table 16.2). Simply put: The West is proud of the Basic Law and the welfare state, the East of the cultural heritage (Conradt 2015, p. 261; Molthof and Mohr 2019, p. 18). Overall, there is relatively little pride in national identity in Germany, so the state can find less support in it than in other Western democracies. There were outliers in surveys, such as in 1991, when the Germans declared themselves to be “very patriotic” just as often as the citizens of other European nations (Beyme 1994, pp. 194–195)—an expression of temporary unification euphoria or the result of a formulation without the difficult term “pride” in German? In addition, older accentuations are visible. Older people, for example, express more national pride with regard to political, economic, cultural, historical and landscape aspects than younger people, people with lower educational levels more often than highly educated people, more often people with a right-wing political orientation than left-wing orientation (Herdegen 1987; Veen and Zelle

16.2  Dimensions of Present-day Political Culture

501

Table 16.2   National pride in twenty European countries in 2003

Very proud/proud of

Very proud of

Democracy of the country

Economic Social secu- National performance rity history

To belong to a nation

Switzerland

84

71

71

22

36

Denmark

82

68

77

31

34

Austria

72

79

76

31

50

Great Britain 69

69

53

50

46

Spain

66

72

69

24

45

France

58

32

78

40

31

Germany/ West

58

57

63

9

16

Germany/East 33

48

43

6

12

Czech Repub- 28 lic

15

20

38

22

Poland

23

28

12

28

47

20-country average

56

52

47

29

34

Source: Haller (2008, p. 219)

1995, p. 27; Noelle-Neumann and Köcher 1997, p. 484). It was therefore not surprising that in 1990 sympathies for unity were significantly lower with younger, left-wing people (IfD survey from February 1990 cited in Scheuch 1990, p. 740). Also noteworthy is that in 2016 the question of whether there is a German national character is not radically, but still clearly answered affirmatively from left to right by party supporters (Petersen 2016). The once fatal confrontation between right/national on the one hand and left/non-national on the other hand becomes visible here—but also observable in other democracies. Given the weak pride in one’s own nation, it may seem advisable to establish emotional ties to the state of the Federal Republic of Germany not by historical and cultural community, but by a “constitutional patriotism” (in the style of Switzerland or the USA). But this remained an intellectual idea without mass resonance and without an answer to the question of what would then distinguish one from citizens of other democracies. Sternberger, who introduced the term in Germany, understood constitutional patriotism as an additional bond to the

502

16  Political Culture of the Loosened Bindings

country, only Habermas as an alternative to national patriotism (Vorländer 2009, pp. 21–22). What actually should be community-building is controversial. The main causes of the lack of national pride seem to be the historical burdens of the Nazi crimes and the defeat in the Second World War (Westle 1994, pp. 484, 488). Intensive efforts to “come to terms with the past” and to remember shameful events in particular stand in contrast to the tradition of unbroken national consciousness—the view of history is almost a weak point of political culture, according to one interpretation (Jesse 1987). On the other hand, it is increasingly being emphasized that the Germans, according to Timothy Garton Ash (2002), half ironically, half appreciatively, have set “DIN standards […] in the field of historical processing”. The Nazi past is now no longer only used as a negative point of reference, but, on the reflexive level, also as a positive factor of identification: 14% of Germans see the historical awareness of their own nation as a reason for pride in their own country (Molthof and Mohr 2019, p. 18). In any case, tensions characterize the middle of German society, including • the “singularity” of the Nazi crimes, which forbid any comparison (in contrast to voices for a “historicization” of National Socialism and—most recently— for an elaboration of colonialist traditions of the Holocaust3); • the explanation of German history primarily from a failed “special path” or from the difficult German “central position” in Europe (Kailitz 2001, pp. 178, 186 f., 224 f., 293); • the interpretation of the end of the war primarily as a “liberation” or as a catastrophe (Kailitz 2001, p. 38; Noelle-Neumann and Köcher 1997, p. 527). The tendency to move the latter positions closer to right-wing extremism is countered by the accusation of “popular educational patterns” (Jesse 1988, pp. 35 f.) against the difficult—but improving (Mannewitz and Thieme 2021, pp. 170 f.)— relationship of Germans to national pride: The attachment to one’s own country is no different than in most European countries (Mannewitz and Thieme 2021, p. 169). In almost all 16 federal states, Germany “stands out” from other possible places of identification (Mannewitz and Thieme 2021, p. 175). At the societal level, the national community (79% attachment) is just ahead of one’s own place of residence (78%), one’s own federal state (74%), one’s own neighborhood (62%) and Europe (57%) as a place of attachment.

3 For

an overview of the debate Bajohr and O’Sullivan (2022).

16.2  Dimensions of Present-day Political Culture

503

b. Political system: Acceptance of Western democracy The acceptance of the principle or the idea of democracy is considered one of its central preconditions in a country. That the local political culture is carried by broad consent is confirmed again and again by large-scale survey studies— for example one of the Bertelsmann Foundation (2017). It shows that 76% of respondents nationwide agree “somewhat” or “completely” that democracy is the best form of government; most in Lower Saxony (84%), least in Brandenburg (61%), as Table 16.1 shows. With isolated double-digit rejection values (Berlin 10%, Saxony 13%, Brandenburg 15%), this results in a “slight east-west gradient” (Mannewitz and Vollmann 2019, p. 41), which underlines the tenacity of a democracy reserve resulting from the autocratic phase in East Germany and transformation hurdles (Fig. 16.1). By contrast, attitudes towards the constitutional design, i.e. “democracy as laid down in the constitution”, are more critical. In 2020, 78% of those surveyed agreed—67% in the east and 80% in the west (Pickel et al. 2020, p. 98). The explanation for these results is likely to be found in different ideas of democracy. Surveys repeatedly show that large parts of the population consider referendums and smaller income differences to be essential components of democracy. If we go one step further and inquire about the attitudes towards the actual practice of democracy in Germany, the picture darkens even further. Only 59% of all respondents are very/rather satisfied with it (41% in the east, 63% in the west). Such an east-west difference—no artefact, but also confirmed by a regional comparison of the federal states (Mannewitz and Vollmann 2019, pp. 43 ff.)— has been observed since 1990 (Mannewitz and Thieme 2021, p. 195). How much these evaluations reflect the current situation is shown by the fact that the assessment of the practice of democracy was much better in view of the favourable economic situation in 2013: At that time, 67% of those surveyed were very satisfied with it, a further 15% were rather satisfied (Petersen et al. 2013, pp. 16 f.). And the stabilising democracy satisfaction in the east in 2015/16—despite the “refugee crisis”—refers to the effect of substantial representation by the AfD, whose supporters had previously not felt sufficiently represented in and by politics, but now had a mouthpiece (Mannewitz and Thieme 2021, p. 196; Reinl and Schäfer 2018). Slight differences in evaluation are usually also apparent between supporters of the government and the opposition (Noelle-Neumann and Köcher 1997, p. 657; Fuchs et al. 1997, pp. 4 f.). All in all, one can say: The political system finds wider support in the west than in the new federal states. In both parts of Germany it is supported most by supporters of the respective government, followed by those of the opposition parties.

504

16  Political Culture of the Loosened Bindings

In percent Bremen Bavaria Saarland Lower Saxony Saxony-Anhalt North Rhine-Westphalia Schleswig-Holstein Hamburg Hesse Baden-Würemberg Germany total Rhineland-Palanate Thuringia Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania Berlin Saxony Brandenburg

not true at all / true a lile

partly/partly

fairly true / completely true

Note: Shown is the percentage distribuon of trust in pares according to responses to the queson, "How strongly do you agree with the following statements? Democracy is the best form of government." Source: Bertelsmann SŠung 2017; weighted results; own presentaon.

Bertelsmann Foundaon

Fig. 16.1   Democracy as the best form of government in 2017. “How strongly do you agree with the following statements? Democracy is the best form of government.” Source: Mannewitz and Vollmann 2019, p. 43

A more differentiated picture can be obtained if one asks about trust in individual political institutions. Here, two general observations can be made throughout: • The institutions or organizations involved in political disputes are generally trusted less than others (Fig. 16.2). Surveys repeatedly confirm these results, similar ones exist for other democracies (Zmerli 2012, 2016; Dalton 2014, p. 264). • In trend, since the early 1980s, only the “party state” institutions have lost trust (Reuband 2012, p. 12), but in general the thesis of a general decline is not tenable (Gabriel et al. 2015, pp. 103–110, 163–166). Universities and research institutions have always enjoyed great appreciation with 83% mentions, among the political institutions, with 67% trust, the judiciary and courts are in the lead (Decker et al. 2019, p. 39). The parties have always been at

16.2  Dimensions of Present-day Political Culture

505

Universities and other research institutions Justice and courts Non-governmental organizations Unions Bundestag Federal Government Media large companies and employers' associations Parties Internet blogs

Very high confidence

great confidence

little trust

no trust at all

Source: Survey FES/University of Bonn 2019

Fig. 16.2   Trust in institutions 2019. Study by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung/University of Bonn, four-point scale, approx. 2400 respondents. Source: Decker et al. 2019, p. 39

the bottom (23%), but also politicians: it is said that they promise more than they can keep (89% agreement), they only think until the next election (84%), they speak an incomprehensible language (46%). Only 43% believe that they have the best interests of our country at heart, 27% that they care about the concerns of “normal people” (Decker et al. 2019, p. 44). In fact, in Germany—as in the USA or France—this opinion has increased since the early 1970s. A cynical (or realistic?) view is widespread (Dalton 2014, p. 261). In politicians, political conflicts are sharpened. It comes as no surprise then that this profession ranks at the bottom of the trust scale globally (GfK Verein 2018, p. 14). Professions that are socially perceived as valuable (firefighters, paramedics, nurses, etc.) are at the top in this country, while those that are publicly exercised, confer power and have knowledge asymmetries (such as politicians, insurance brokers and advertising professionals) are at the bottom (GfK Verein 2018, pp. 28–29). In general, therefore, the higher the degree of satisfaction or affirmation, the more abstract the object is: the highest in the principle of democracy, already less in terms of its constitutional form in Germany, the least when one approaches the

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nitty-gritty of political debate. The dissatisfaction visible in this is, however, not dramatic. Other Western democracies also live with a lot of dissatisfaction about their practice, there too institutions and political actors/actresses enjoy little trust (Marien 2013; Boda und Medve-Bálint 2014; Weßels 2021, p. 399). Moreover, in Germany the institutional form of democracy, above all the parliamentary system of government, is neither generally understood nor consistently desired (Patzelt 1998), without this leading to considerable aversion to democracy. What democracy in Germany apparently lacks, however, are symbols, traditions, a historical myth to which it could emotionally connect. References to democratic aspirations in the 19th century remain pale, the tragic Weimar Republic does not seem to be a good enough role model, resistance to National Socialism (20 July 1944) and Communism (17 June 1953) failed. The national anthem hardly evokes any feelings of pride, there is no moving day of remembrance (Herdegen 1987, pp. 215). It seems as if the history of German democracy has been too much one of defeats, the positive aspects of which (early mass parties, early universal suffrage and high voter turnout, rule of law and federalism traditions) would have to be considered unimportant. c. The downside of political participation Political participation is generally understood to mean all activities undertaken by citizens voluntarily in order to influence political decisions. Its goal-oriented character is usually (not always) accompanied by political interest. In 2018, 51% of West Germans and 52% of East Germans express interest in politics (Gabriel 2020a, p. 157), which, on the one hand, fluctuates enormously over the decades (it has been recorded since 1969), but, on the other hand, is today as high as ever, even higher than at the time of reunification in 1990, influenced inter alia by generational change, the rising level of education and the change in values (Gabriel 2020b; Weßels 2021, pp. 380 f.). Those with below-average interest in politics are usually female, younger people under 30 (a trend that began in the 1990s), people with a lower level of education, the unemployed, people with low incomes and those with a migrant background (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 2021, p. 475; Weßels 2021, p. 380). In the European 29-country comparison, the Germans are in third place in terms of the proportion of people interested in politics (behind Denmark and Sweden), while the countries with relatively low proportions of people interested in politics are almost exclusively in Southern Europe (European Social Survey 2019). Table 16.3 shows to what extent different forms of political participation are actually carried out in today’s Germany. It shows that—with the exception of voter turnout, which is actually quite high in Germany by international standards

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Table 16.3   Political participation in Germany 2002 and 2018. In percent of respondents, each based on the last 12 months

AusgeübtePartizipationsform:

2002

2018

West

Ost

West

Ost

Politician(s) contacted

14

14

20

19

Signature collection participation

31

35

40

36

Demonstration participation

10

13

9

9

Party work/citizens’ initiative

4

4

5

6

Work in association/organisation

18

20

32

32

Voter turnout in last federal election

81

77

73

73

Internet contact with politician/pol. Institution

7

4

Blog or forum with political content

8

9

Use of local online offers

15

12

Share political content

16

13

Online petition or vote

24

20

Sources: Weßels (2021, p. 391); Gabriel (2020a, p. 195)

(IDEA 2021) and from which small parties are benefiting (Gabriel 2020b)— all forms of participation are the preserve of minorities, even those used online (although a comparison over a longer period of time is not possible here). Since the 1970s, the repertoire of political action has become more diverse, with traditional and newer forms of participation often overlapping—those who, for example, also vote are more likely to make use of unconventional participation (Gabriel 2020a, 188 f.), it is not an either-or. It is seen as an expression of the increased desire for self-determination and individual realization in the population, to which politics in Germany, not just in Germany, reacted by introducing new, plebiscitary and consultative forms of participation (Qvortrup 2018; Bächtiger et al. 2018), also on a digital level (Schwanholz and Zinser 2020). Compared to other democracies, German participation can be considered normal, some differences (e.g. to the USA) can be explained by different voting rights and party roles, fewer unofficial strikes than in France or Great Britain by weaker unions there (Dalton 2014, pp. 47, 54, 56). The almost consistently slightly lower participation rates in the new federal states are typical for all post-socialist societies, but are becoming more and more similar to the West. If one distinguishes, as is common in political sociology, between “conventional” participation (institutionally provided and customary) and “unconventional”

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p­ articipation (not customary, not always legal)4, then the latter also plays a considerable role in its legal forms. But who participates? With regard to conventional participation, the same bias can be seen as with the distribution of political interest: Conventionally, Germans with higher education levels, men, members of the upper middle class participate to a greater extent. With regard to age, conventional participation is scattered in the sense of an inverted U; the highest participation rates are in the middle age groups between 35 and 60 years (Schäfer 2015, pp. 94 ff.; Weßels 2021, p. 392; Gabriel 2020b). The same bias can be seen in other Western democracies (Gabriel 2013, pp. 29 ff.). Political sociology explains it from unevenly distributed resources for participation (articulation ability, knowledge, time, money, etc.), different political socialization and different belief in one’s own chances of success. Significantly, in today’s Germany 45% of those surveyed from the lower social class believe that nothing can be achieved through political engagement, while this proportion falls to 18% with increasing class membership. This has consequences for voter turnout, namely apparently growing. While in 1983 the difference in participation between the top and bottom fifths of income was only five percentage points, this difference continued to widen to 19 percentage points by 2009. For the 2013 federal election, for example, the proportion of non-voters by income quintiles (starting with the highest) was 7%, 12, 19, 23 and 39%. If one also takes into account the fact that the composition of party membership is not socially representative (Schäfer 2015, pp. 20 ff., 52 ff., 97 ff., 121; Petersen et al. 2013, pp. 11, 20 ff., 52 ff.) as well as the fact that extremist parties are disproportionately voted for by members of the lower class, this points to an increasing proportion of the lower class that is outside the democratic process and alien to it. German democracy now has socially exclusive features that it did not have in the past—at least to this extent (cf. Sect. 6.1b). There are also disadvantages to unconventional forms of participation. In general, unconventional participation is carried out by younger and better-educated people to a greater extent (Bürklin and Klein 1998, p. 166; Weßels 2021, p. 392). Higher education, younger age and left-wing orientation predestine people in Germany, as in the USA, Great Britain or France, to protest participation (Dalton 2014, p. 75). In Germany, too, the top two income quintiles are more involved in

4 Participation

in petitions, demonstrations, boycotts, unofficial strikes, occupations, blockades, damage, violence against persons is considered unconventional (Barnes and Kaase 1979, p. 590).

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initiatives, petitions, demonstrations, public discussions, online protests and boycotts than the bottom three quintiles (Schäfer 2015, p. 175). The low level of participation of a second large group is also relevant: people with a migrant background (Müssig and Worbs 2012; Müssig 2020). Even the interest in politics here is almost 20 percentage points below that of people without a migrant background (Research Department of the German Council of Economic Experts 2020, p. 23). At the 2017 federal election, their voter turnout was also around 20% below that of people without a family immigration history. In general, it is lowest in the first generation of immigrants, among people with European origin, women, younger people and people without a completed education; the preferences were rather for the SPD (especially among people of Turkish origin), followed by the Union (especially among “Spätaussiedler”) and the Greens (Arsu et al. 2017, pp. 15 ff.). Non-electoral participation looks similar. As a result, residents with a migrant background are underrepresented on the councils of German cities, in state parliaments and in the Bundestag—as well as in countries such as Great Britain, France or Sweden (Müssig and Worbs 2012, p. 17; Arsu et al. 2017, pp. 15 ff.). The practice of unconventional participation in West Germany cannot be understood without reference to the 68er movement and the “new social movements” that it spawned from the 1960s onwards, which have intermittently influenced German politics since then. On the one hand, their contribution to political culture consists in an expansion of the repertoire of participatory action, on the other hand in crossing the boundaries of argumentative confrontation. Since recently, state-civic activity under the heading of “citizen or civil society” has attracted attention. According to the variant of Michael Walzer (2002, p. 35), it is characterized by the fact that the citizens themselves are responsible for shaping their lives, but also take care of the whole with a sense of community and develop social activities: “Civil society is (ideally) a realm of free choice, community, and participation”. This includes public interest groups as well as voluntary social engagement as an expression of civil society. Measured by membership in associations, Germany (together with Great Britain and France) belongs to the middle group in Europe with 50–60%, while Southern and Eastern Europe have lower and Northern European countries have higher organizational levels (Ackerman and Freitag 2016, p. 276). Volunteer activities in Germany are most common in sports/leisure and churches, but appear to be less common than in some comparable countries (Westle 2008, passim) when it comes to education and social issues. The level of voluntary engagement also varies considerably, at 39% in 2019, lower among older people, people with less formal education, migrants and people from Eastern Germany (Simonson et al. 2021, pp. 15 ff.). S ­ peaking

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of “citizens” also makes sense because engagement is clearly correlated with higher income and education; workers are the least likely to participate (Blanke and Schridde 2001, p. 122; Westle and Gabriel 2008, p. 62; Schäfer 2015, pp. 169, 173). Even if such self-activity is mostly not aimed at influencing political decisions, it has a reducing effect on the tasks of the state. In addition, there is an effect on something that research refers to as social capital: the triad of social trust, norms of reciprocity and social networks (Putnam 2000, pp. 18 f.). Where club life is weak, there are fewer social networks and less social capital—which would lead to increased social inequality and integration, radicalization and polarization (Putnam 2000, pp. 336 ff.) A fundamental problem of participation remains worldwide: With all forms of political participation one always comes across its social imbalance, the more demanding the participation, the more socially unequal it is carried out—always below average by social lower classes (2016, p. 175). “More participation means less democracy”—this is how Roland Roth (2016, pp. 59, 71) has brought this dilemma to an irritating formula. Despite all empirical experience, he believes that “socially unequal participation” is “not an inevitable natural law”. d. Decision pattern: between majority decision and negotiation The political decision-making process in Germany oscillates between majority and negotiation decisions. Although it is designed more as a competition democracy due to its parliamentary government system, the Federal Republic of Germany also has clear features of a negotiation democracy with strong veto players such as the Bundesrat, the Federal Constitutional Court and the European Union. After all, the centre-orientation of the electorate (Fig. 16.3) causes the large parties to gravitate towards the centre, even if the individual candidates for the Bundestag may deviate from this. Since the centre is strong, compromises or incremental changes are often reached. The flip side is that conflicts are often blurred and (extremist) fringe parties gain popularity because they are perceived as an alternative in terms of content. As a result of policy interweaving and compromises in a four-level system, average citizens have difficulty assigning responsibility for specific decisions to specific parties. Furthermore, the question arises as to whether Germany might not fall into a “stagnation through excess of concordance” (Schulze-Fielitz 1984, pp. 21 ff., 110 ff., 147). As a second characteristic of German decision-making, the role of public opinion in the sense of prevailing opinion is to be valued—at least in socio-cultural questions, where there is often a public consensus that results from the prevailing media tone and the convictions of the political elite, but leaves little room for divergent opinions. Even governments sometimes seem to be swimming like

16.2  Dimensions of Present-day Political Culture

511

25

Percentages

20

15

10

5

0 1

2

3

4

6 7 5 Left-Right Dimension Candidate population

8

9

10

11

Electorate

Fig. 16.3   Ideological self-classification 2017 (1 = far left, 11 = far right). Source: Giebler and Melcher 2019, p. 51

corks on the waves of public opinion—at least that is the impression of some political scientists (Dittberner 2006, pp. 227 f., 230). Thirdly, the juridification of politics is typical of German politics, the tendency to regard political disputes as legal ones and to take them to court, in particular the Federal Constitutional Court. Its strong position, as well as the numerous international and human rights obligations of the Federal Republic of Germany, invite this. Such materially loaded constitutional interpretations or legal definitions initially have the “gathering of the legislature or the legislative majority for constitutional enforcement” as a problematic consequence, in which legitimate decision-making space is lost (Vorländer 1981, pp. 13 ff.). In addition, the Damocles sword of going to Karlsruhe, which lies in the hands of the opposition, leads to a further orientation towards consensus in politics, because the government factions have to adapt their plans to expected reactions (Sternberg et al. 2015) (Table 16.4). e. Limits of homogeneity: Regional special culture in the east? For historical (influence of two dictatorships) and socialization-related (triple— economic, political and social—transformation, economic decline) reasons, a political culture developed in East Germany after 1990 that differed in several respects from that in the West and whose traces are still effective today:

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Table 16.4   Overview of political culture

Dimensions

Determining characteristics Weaknesses

Settings for the state Low national pride community

Burdens from the past

Settings for the political system

Principled democracy, less satisfaction with democracy reality

Divergent attitude to left- and rightwing extremism

Participation

Normal participation

Rule consensus not general, lower class little participating

Decision patterns

Traits of majority as well as negotiation democracy

Intransparency, blurred responsibility

Homogeneity

Homogeneity of political culture, mostly pragmatic orientations

“double difference”: regional special culture in the east + contrast between shock and winner regions

Source: Own representation

• Although democracy is basically affirmed, the concrete form of the German democracy finds less approval. Skeptical, insecure and negative attitudes towards it are widespread (cf. Sect. 16.2b). The ideas of democracy seem to be less driven by individual responsibility and liberal ideas in the East than in the West (Conradt 2015, pp. 265 f.; Mannewitz 2015a). Also, national pride in the East is significantly less related to the Basic Law (32% to 36%) and the welfare state (22 to 31%), but significantly more than in the West to cultural heritage (46 to 24%) (Molthof and Mohr 2019, p. 18). • Value preferences differ from those in the West: Economic growth, technical progress and public security have a higher priority than in the West, more state provision is expected (Fuchs 1997, p. 7; Ipos 1995, pp. 22, 25; Gabriel et al. 2015, p. 143). Up to the present day, older people in the East more often wish for state responsibility in various policy areas than in the West. This difference apparently disappears with the generation change, because among those under 35 years of age it no longer exists (Konzelmann et al. 2014, p. 197; Gabriel et al. 2015, pp. 157 ff.). Similarly, with regard to post-materialist value change, it is mainly older people who still differ significantly (Scheuer 2016, pp. 417 ff.) and make the East a more materialistically shaped region. At the same time: With regard to the women’s model, the East—probably due to the role distribution lived in the GDR—is more progressive than the West (Gabriel et al. 2015, pp. 94 ff.). With regard to the conflict between freedom and social equality, people in the new federal states give priority to

16.2  Dimensions of Present-day Political Culture

513

the latter, unlike in the West (John Stuart Mill Institute for Freedom Research 2011, pp. 7 f.; Gabriel et al. 2015, p. 85). In any case: The generational change grinds down the differences in attitudes and values (Gaiser and de Rijke 2019). • The party-related political participation (party membership, party identification and voter turnout) is significantly lower. Also, voluntary engagement in social organizations or groups is slightly lagging behind (Jaeck 2020; Gabriel 2020a; Simonson et al. 2021). • The political knowledge about the political system and political content has been weaker in the East than in the West over the years—due to political-cultural (democracy satisfaction, feelings of political self-efficacy, party identification, political trust) and socio-structural differences (gender composition, educational level, subjective class membership, income, media consumption, age—De Souza 2022). • The party system in the east differs from that in the west, with the role of the Left and the AfD, but also the greater weakness of the Volksparteien, although convergence tendencies are visible. The (so far) strong position of the Left, now the AfD, has been accompanied since the end of the nineties by a stronger polarization of the east German compared to the west German population, measured by the left-right self-classification (Roose 2021, pp. 35 ff.). • Media usage differs from that in the west: print media and public service news programs are used less intensively in the east, while news on private television receives greater support; subjectively, the Internet plays a more important role, print media a less important one than in the west (Maier 2020, pp. 296 ff.). Although these features of political culture still allow us to speak of a regional special culture—especially due to the economic situation in the east, the feeling of relative deprivation in comparison to the west and an east identity based on experiences of devaluation (Pickel and Pickel 2020, pp. 484 ff.)—their importance is decreasing, regional cultures are growing that run across the East-West border. Indications of new fault lines that relativize the East-West opposition are provided by the party system (Decker 2022), social cohesion (Arant et al. 2017; Unzicker 2022), attitudes towards democratic-constitutional principles (Mannewitz 2015b) and socio-political basic attitudes (libertarianism and cosmopolitanism versus fear of identity loss; Hilmer 2020). They bring the importance of regional influencing factors such as economic power and structure, average age, confession, infrastructure, urbanization, political tradition and settlement structure into the foreground and indicate that “the edge of economic development does not always run exclusively along the former inner-German border” (IWH

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16  Political Culture of the Loosened Bindings

2019, p. 5). The sharpening contrast between “shock” and “winner regions” here and there complements the division between old and new Bundesländer—as a result, the image of a “double difference” (Holtmann 2020, pp. 496 ff.) arises.

16.3 The Difficult Handling of Political Extremism There is no doubt an acceptance of democracy. But dissatisfaction with its practice gives rise to the question of which alternatives might be legitimate or acceptable. In international comparison, the proportion of those who are inclined towards democracy is similarly high, while the proportion of those who can imagine a (leader or military) dictatorship is similarly low, for example in Switzerland, Norway and Finland (Dalton and Shin 2014, p. 107). But perhaps these reassuring data at first glance are only distorted by the questions of the surveys, people would also have shown higher approval for alternative models. In this context, research has been paying more attention to social attitudes towards technocracy/ “stealth democracy” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002) for some time: “The government of a Stealth Democracy is made up of neutral, unelected and disinterested experts rather than partisan political actors. Political decisions are made objectively, without tumult, quickly and effectively by public-spirited and wellinformed people. These can be scientific experts, independent commissions or successful businessmen. […] The government is therefore a technocratic, bureaucratic apparatus that, in the interests of a higher public good, makes all political decisions for a country. […] The fact that the government members are not elected has the consequence that they are not guided by special interests, financial incentives or side incomes and can therefore act more in the interests of the general public. In place of different party interests and ideological debates, expert opinions and efficient political processes therefore dominate” (Ackermann 2018, p. 27). Survey results indicate that a majority of people in this country can imagine such a political system (Gherghina and Geissel 2017; Landwehr et al. 2017; Mannewitz 2015b, pp. 233 ff.). This speaks for a certain “output orientation”, a “postdemocratic” tendency in the population (Mannewitz 2015b, p. 241). Good results are more important than unrestricted democratic participation, one could say. In the event of a corresponding situation, entry points for fundamental changes could therefore open up. Even more irritating, since not only hypothetically asked, are accepted restrictions on basic rights, when majorities of 63.9% accept them for freedom of expression, 87.7% for freedom of assembly and 74.8% for freedom of asso-

16.3  The Difficult Handling of Political Extremism

515

ciation. Behind this is an anti-extremist impulse, but rather one-sided, since only 30.9% deny the freedom of assembly to left-wing extremism, but 86.2% to rightwing extremism. “Anti-right-wing extremism is part of the consensus, anti-leftwing extremism is not”. Participation rights are protected by the state, but only accepted by the people with “exclusivity” (Mannewitz 2015b, pp. 236 ff., 240, 245). This is in line with the fact that, according to the current Leipzig Mitte study (Pickel et al. 2020, pp. 106 ff.), 88% perceive right-wing extremism as a threat (East 79, West 90%), but only 73% left-wing extremism (East 77, West 75%). This is confirmed if one approaches the problem differently. How does public opinion stand, which, according to Noelle-Neumann, decides what one can express without isolating oneself or getting into difficulties? To what extent does actual tolerance prevail in the political opinion-forming process? According to an IfD survey from 2019, an absolute majority of respondents, 63% (and thus more than 20% more than in 2013), believe that there are a number of topics on which one has to be careful what one says—23% do not see it that way. Sensitive topics include refugees, Islam and Muslims, Jews, Hitler and the Third Reich (all with more than 50% approval) (Petersen 2013; Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach 2019).Taboos in the name of political correctness have also been observed in the past, for example on topics such as nation, immigration, population policy, situation in Eastern Germany (Peter Glotz quoted after Grieswelle 2004, p. 233). Social media play a central role here. The fact that 27% believe that one has to be careful on some topics on the net, 36% on many topics, speaks of the fear of so-called “shitstorms”, which publicly and repeatedly affect politicians and other public figures. Less the personal freedom of private opinion appears damaged, but rather the political problem-solving in public on taboo topics. All in all: The liberal democratic ceiling looks thin here and there, at least if extremism from the right seems to be or is growing: With the AfD, not only the political importance of the right-wing fringe has grown, but also the intolerance towards it. When considering the extremist threat, the following picture emerges today. In the past, left-wing radicalism represented a fundamental criticism, as it began in 1968, often wandering and accompanied by some breaches of law, without representing a majority anti-democratic attitude. Since the early 1980s, it has lost importance. As of 2021, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) estimates a left-wing extremist potential of approximately 34,700 people. Of these, 10,300 are considered violent, mainly “autonomous”, who are responsible for the majority of 987 left-wing extremist acts of violence in the year (Federal Ministry of the Interior and for Home Affairs 2022, pp. 34, 125). They appear as a militant vanguard at demonstrations against

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“fascism”, “repression”, capitalism, etc., attacking police and—actual and supposed—right-wing extremists there, but also in the form of clandestine violence (Mannewitz and Thieme 2020, pp. 68 ff., 111 ff.; Pfahl-Traughber 2020, pp. 182 ff., 189 ff.). Rejected by the public, they usually only attract attention temporarily. With regard to the stability of democracy, relevant parties and potential attitudes in the population generally represent a greater risk than extremist violence. In the beginning, only the KPD was of importance on the left; the party Die Linke (The Left) leaves some question marks regarding its tradition and the concrete design of the future social political system (4), but it no longer appears as a whole party in the annual report of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution since 2012 (only individual sub-organizations). Even if these sub-organizations remain influential up to the leadership of the party, left-wing extremism is marginalized politically, a similar picture can be seen with regard to attitudes: The potential is estimated at around three percent in the West and five to ten percent in the East (Jungkunz 2019, p. 113). With regard to internal security and democracy protection, right-wing extremism currently represents the significantly greater problem: The personnel potential is indeed slightly lower (33,900), but the violent spectrum is larger (13,500 people) than in the left-wing spectrum. And if the total numbers refer to a slightly lower level of violence in comparison to left-wing extremism (945 in 2021), the intensity must always be taken into account: Bodily injury and (attempted) homicide make up 786 offenses; in left-wing extremism there are “only” 363. Depending on the counting method, between 110 and 218 people have been killed by right-wing extremists since 1990 (Amadeu Antonio Foundation 2022), four in left-wing extremism (Katapult editorial staff 2021). In addition, there is the recently increased threat from right-wing small cell (NSU, Old School Society, Freital group, Revolution Chemnitz, S group) and lone wolf terrorism (knife attack on Henriette Reker in 2015, attack in the Munich Olympia shopping center in 2016, murder of Walter Lübcke and attack in Halle in 2019, Hanau in 2020— Pfahl-Traughber 2021). Right-wing terrorism is today a relevant problem for internal security, but can also look back on a long history in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. Deutsche Aktionsgruppen, Hepp-Kexel-Gruppe, Wehrsportgruppen). In the history of the Federal Republic, right-wing extremist parties (with the exception of the early phase) never achieved nationwide political importance: The strongest nationwide election result of a clearly right-wing extremist party was achieved by the NPD in 1969 with its (to date) unrivaled federal election result of 4.3% of the second votes—it failed at the five percent hurdle. Voter turnout, which occasionally helped an extreme right-wing party to clear the five percent hurdle at a state or European election and thus gave it parliamentary representa-

16.3  The Difficult Handling of Political Extremism

517

tion, almost always pointed to a protest vote. Because of their public taboo, rightwing extremist parties offer themselves as a valve to express outrage effectively. Since the AfD’s entry into the Bundestag in 2017 and its continued radicalization (in particular through the departure of moderate members and the increased importance of the “Flügel” spectrum), which the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution sees as “sufficient factual evidence of anti-constitutional activities within the party”, the problem has been completely new. Politically isolated, the AfD not only represents a frustrated protest, but also a voter share that is in agreement in content (Pickel 2019, pp. 157 et seq.). It is unlikely to leave the party system anytime soon, especially because it has already taken the first hurdles of establishment; but also because of the solid base of right-wing extremist attitudes in the population, which has fluctuated fairly evenly between five and ten percent for years (higher in the east, lower in the west; Decker et al. 2019, p. 51; Küpper et al. 2021, pp. 90 et seq.; Berning and Ziller 2022), and the expected global south-north migration in the coming decades as a result of climate change, civil wars and poverty. The German public finds it more difficult to deal with phenomena that pursue a strategy of the dissolution of boundaries—on the left as well as on the right. This refers to the attempt to become socially acceptable and to radicalize and win people outside of one’s own ranks by occupying currently widely discussed topics (e.g. climate protection, Covid) and by pursuing an alliance strategy that includes democratic groups. The most active in this direction is currently the post-autonomous Interventionist Left in the left-wing extremism (including “Ende Gelände”, “Deutsche Wohnen enteignen”, “Rheinmetall entwaffnen”; Currle 2020; Inden 2021), in right-wing extremism attempts to appropriate the so-called “refugee crisis” of 2015/16 by relevant right-wing extremists (including NPD, JN), but also Querdenken protests involving neo-national socialists as well as relevant organizations (Freie Sachsen) bear witness to a boundary dissoluting strategy. The extremely heterogeneous scene of the Sovereign citizen movement (Reichsbürger and Selbstverwalter) (2021: 21,000 people, of which 1150 are right-wing extremists) comes to 184 acts of violence in 2021 (in particular extortion and resistance offenses), religious extremism (in particular Islamism) to 49 acts of violence (mostly bodily harm). While the former is a danger mainly due to their affinity for weapons and violent overthrow plans (eviction in Reuden, police murder in Georgensmünd 2016 and uncovering a nationwide terrorist cell in winter 2022), the latter’s danger results from terrorist attacks (including an attack on a regional train near Würzburg, a bomb attack in Ansbach and on the Berlin Christmas market in 2016, a knife attack in a grocery store in Hamburg in 2017 and on two men in Dresden in 2020). The danger posed by both scenes to democ-

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racy is, unlike the threat to public safety, negligible. The Ampelkoalition wants to, inter alia, achieve EU-wide harmonization of databases and definitions, collect data on politically motivated crime in more detail than before, and remove rightwing extremists from public service more easily (Mehr Fortschritt wagen—coalition agreement, pp. 107, 150). In general, extremism has become less clear and tangible than it once was. Instead of clearly outlined and ideologically easy to locate parties, increasingly undogmatic movements or mixed scenes such as the “(post-)autonomous” from the left or local neo-Nazi, rocker and hooligan-minded “brotherhoods” from the right are appearing. Even more difficult to grasp is Islamist extremism, which is internationally networked and rarely organized. The extremism field appears more confusing, gray areas are growing (Jesse and Mannewitz 2018): because dogmatic, highly ideological left-wing and right-wing extremists are on the retreat, whereas pragmatic, boundary dissoluting approaches are gaining ground; this also applies to legalistic ways, mimicry and discourse shifts, which are labeled “metapolitics” on the right and “cultural hegemony” on the left (PfahlTraughber 2019, p. 7). As a whole, the forces of extremism do not appear to be (yet) threatening in terms of quantity. On the side of the Left, the waning momentum of left-wing movements and the collapse of European communism are at play, on the Right the memory of the Nazi dictatorship and public isolation. The Federal Constitutional Court has rejected a ban on the NPD, which has been recognized as anti-constitutional, because it is too insignificant to pose a threat (criterion of “potentiality”; Backes 2017)—or did it only follow European jurisprudence, in the line of which such a judgment lies? In any case, party bans, which are considered the sharpest sword of German militant democracy, have become unlikely: the potentiality is lacking, the chances of success of an application are low; if it is given, an application appears to be politically less opportune. This explains the diversionary movement in particular to more violent neo-Nazis towards the party model (Die Rechte, Der III. Weg, Neue Stärke Partei, Freie Sachsen). In any case, this sword was rarely drawn: the SRP was banned in 1952, the KPD in 1956; the NPD was not banned (2003, proceedings previously brought by the federal government, and 2017, proceedings previously brought by the Bundesrat). A similar picture emerges with the forfeiture of fundamental rights: the four proceedings (against the right-wing extremists Otto Ernst Remer, Gerhard Frey, Thomas Dienel and Heinz Reisz) brought before the Federal Constitutional Court have all been rejected. The situation is different with the ban on associations, which can be imposed by the interior ministers but need not be. The federal government alone has imposed 20 bans on right-wing extremism, one on left-

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wing extremism, 15 on Islamism, 33 on organized crime and biker gangs, and two on other matters since the Association Act came into force in 1964 (previously the legality principle applied: what was extremist was banned)—the number at state level is many times higher, also shows wave-like movements (Gerlach 2012; Philippsberg 2015). Similarly important for the defense of democracy is probably the intelligence service, which, in addition to the prevention of dangers in the field of internal security, regularly provides public enlightenment in the form of reports and publications on various forms of extremism. The separation model (police and intelligence services have separate powers), which has become the norm in the EU, the federal structure of the intelligence service as well as the extensive reporting system characterize the intelligence service (Backes 2022), whose failure in the NSU, however, led to many reform discussions (Lange and Lanfer 2015; Grumke and van Hüllen 2016). Despite all the reform needs in the political center, there is no fundamental doubt about the necessity of its existence. Its strongest democratic protective force is exerted in the form of reporting, which sometimes has not only warning, but also stigmatizing effects (Backes 2022). What remains is the possibility that anti-democratic dynamics could develop in a crisis-ridden future—similar to 2015/16 during the so-called “refugee crisis”, which the AfD politician Alexander Gauland rightly called a “gift from heaven”, and during the Corona pandemic, from which all sorts of right-wing extremists sought to profit. However, this is countered by (still) the pacifying effects of economic and social conditions and the “stickiness of the parliamentary government system” (Agnoli and Brückner 1967, p. 77) feared by its critics for everyone who gets involved with it. It is undeniably a problem for the resilient democracy if it only proceeds against one form of extremism and lacks equidistance (Jesse 2006). This does not mean to talk about the left when something happens on the right (or vice versa), but to apply the same standards. The latter can only be the protection of their foundations for a resilient democracy; violence and crime in general, however, are the business of the law enforcement agencies. The fact that “right” is often used instead of “right-wing extremism” points to other motives than democratic concern. A trend towards “a one-sidedly stigmatizing “republicanism” with an “antifascist and left-liberal” orientation seems to be spreading” (Miliopoulos 2015, p. 210), regardless of the fact that the main danger lies in right-wing extremism. The punishment of some propaganda offenses as well as tendencies to take away the right to assembly from extreme right-wingers touch fundamental rights more than necessary in a resilient democracy (Jesse 2007). Also, the practice of banning associations seems “questionable” to some observers in terms of

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effects and sustainability (Gerlach 2013, pp. 547 ff.). Some of the attractiveness of liberal democracy, which should also radiate to supporters of extremist ideas, is in danger of being lost.

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Molthof, Luuk/Mohr, Magali (2019): The Fading Taboo of Germany’s National Pride. Implications for Open Society Attitudes (Voices on Values Report February 2019), unter: https://dpart.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/VoV_German-report.pdf (zuletzt geprüft am 19. Mai 2022). Müssig, Stephanie (2020): Politische Partizipation von Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund in Deutschland. Eine quantitativ-empirische Analyse, Wiesbaden. Müssig, Stephanie/Worbs, Susanne (2012): Politische Einstellungen und politische Partizipation von Migranten in Deutschland (hrsg. v. Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, unter: https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/WorkingPapers/wp46politische-einstellungen-und-partizipation-migranten.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=11 (zuletzt geprüft am 25. Mai 2022). Niedermayer, Oskar (2005): Bürger und Politik, 2nd edn., Wiesbaden. Noelle, Elisabeth/Neumann, Erich Peter (1957): Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung 1957, Allensbach. Noelle, Elisabeth/Neumann, Erich Peter (1967): Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung 1965– 67, Allensbach. Noelle, Elisabeth/Neumann, Erich Peter (1974): Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung 1968– 1973, Allensbach. Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth/Köcher, Renate (1997): Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1993–97, München. Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth/Petersen, Thomas (2001): Zeitenwende, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 29, pp. 15 ff. Offe, Claus (1973): Strukturprobleme des kapitalistischen Staates, 2nd edn., Frankfurt a. M. Patzelt, Werner J. (1998): Ein latenter Verfassungskonflikt?, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 39 (4), pp. 725 ff. Petersen, Thomas (2011): Die Bewältigung der Diktatur – in den Familien, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung vom 16. März. Petersen, Thomas (2013): Tatsächliche und gefühlte Intoleranz, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung vom 20. März. Petersen, Thomas (2016): Was ist deutsch?, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung vom 22. September. Petersen, Thomas et al. (2013): Gespaltene Demokratie, Gütersloh. Pfahl-Traughber, Armin (2019): Der Extremismus der Neuen Rechten. Eine Analyse zu Diskursthemen und Positionen, Wiesbaden. Pfahl-Traughber, Armin (2020): Linksextremismus in Deutschland. Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme, 2nd edn., Wiesbaden. Pfahl-Traughber, Armin (2021): Die Entwicklung des deutschen Rechtsterrorismus vor und nach dem NSU. Ein vergleichender Blick auf eine besondere Form rechtsextremistischer Gewalt, in: Zeitschrift für Politik 68 (1), pp. 87 ff. Pharr, Susan J./Putnam, Robert D. (Eds.) (2000): Disaffected Democracies. What’s Troubling the Trilateral Countries?, Princeton. Philippsberg, Robert (2015): Demokratieschutz im Praxistext. Deutschlands Umgang mit extremen Vereinigungen, Baden-Baden.

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Pickel, Gert et al. (2020): Zersetzungspotentiale einer demokratischen politischen Kultur: Verschwörungstheorien und erodierender gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt?, in: Decker, Oliver/Brehler, Elmar (Eds.): Autoritäre Dynamiken. Alte Ressentiments – neue Radikalität, Bielefeld, pp. 89 ff. Pickel, Susanne (2019): Die Wahl der AfD. Frustration, Deprivation, Angst oder Wertekonflikt?, in: Korte, Karl-Rudolf/Schoofs, Jan (Eds.): Die Bundestagswahl 2017. Analysen der Wahl-, Parteien-, Kommunikations- und Regierungsforschung, Wiesbaden, pp. 145 ff. Pickel, Susanne/Pickel, Gert (2020): Ost- und Westdeutschland 30 Jahre nach dem Mauerfall – eine gemeinsame demokratische politische Kultur oder immer noch eine Mauer in den Köpfen?, in: Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft (30) 3, pp. 483 ff. Putnam, Robert D. (2000): Bowling Alone. The Collapse and Revival of American Community, New York. Putnam, Robert D. et al. (2000): Introduction: What’s Troubling the Trilateral Democracies?, in: Pharr, Susan J./Putnam, Robert D. (Eds.): Disaffected Democracies. What’s Troubling the Trilateral Countries?, Princeton, pp. 3 ff. Qvortrup, Matt (2018): Referendums around the World. The Continued Growth of Direct Democracy, London. Rausch, Heinz (1980): Politische Kultur in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Berlin. Reinl, Ann-Kathrin/Schäfer, Constantin (2018): Hilft populistisches Wählen gegen Demokratiemüdigkeit? Einfluss der Bundestagswahl auf die Demokratiezufriedenheit von AfD-Wählern, unter: https://www.pw-portal.de/meta-ticker-bundestagswahl2017/40846-hilft-populistisches-waehlen-gegen-demokratiemuedigkeit (zuletzt geprüft am 22. Mai 2022). Reuband, Karl-Heinz (2012): Vertrauen in die Polizei und staatliche Institutionen: Konstanz und Wandel in den Einstellungen der Bevölkerung 1984–2011, in: Soziale Probleme 23 (1), pp. 5 ff. Rohe, Karl (1993): The State Tradition in Germany, in: Berg-Schlosser, Dirk/Rytlewski, Ralf (Eds.): Political Culture in Germany, London, pp. 215 ff. Roose, Jochen (2021): Politische Polarisierung in Deutschland. Repräsentative Studie zu Zusammenhalt in der Gesellschaft (hrsg. von der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung), unter: https://www.kas.de/documents/252038/11055681/Studie+Politische+Polarisierung.pdf/ a36c964d-1d6a-66d1-288b-b22629110fd7 (zuletzt geprüft am 30. Mai 2022). Roth, Roland (2016): Mehr Beteiligung bedeutet weniger Demokratie, in: Glaab, Manuela (Ed.): Politik mit Bürgern – Politik für Bürger, Wiesbaden, pp. 59 ff. Rudzio, Wolfgang (1984): Systemaversionen bei linksorientierten Jugendlichen, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 50, pp. 27 ff. Sarcinelli, Ulrich (1990): Auf dem Weg in eine kommunikative Demokratie?, in: ders. (Ed.): Demokratische Streitkultur, Bonn, pp. 29 ff. Schäfer, Armin (2015): Der Verlust politischer Gleichheit, Frankfurt a. M. Scheuch, Erwin K. (1990): Die Suche nach der Besonderheit der heutigen Deutschen, in: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 42 (4), pp. 734 ff. Scheuer, Angelika (2016): Werte und Einstellungen. Auszug aus dem Datenreport 2016, unter: https://www.wzb.eu/system/files/docs/sv/iuk/14_dr2016_160421.pdf (zuletzt geprüft am 30. Mai 2022). Schulze-Fielitz, Helmuth (1984): Der informale Verfassungsstaat, Berlin.

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Schwanholz, Julia/Zinser, Lavinia (2020): Exploring German Liquid Democracy – OnlinePartizipation auf der lokalen Ebene, in: Zeitschrift für Politik (30) 2, pp. 299 ff. Simonson, Julia et al. (2021): Freiwilliges Engagement in Deutschland. Zentrale Ergebnisse des Fünften Deutschen Freiwilligensurveys (FWS 2019) (hrsg. v. Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend), unter: https://www.bmfsfj.de/ resource/blob/176836/7dffa0b4816c6c652fec8b9eff5450b6/frewilliges-engagement-indeutschland-fuenfter-freiwilligensurvey-data.pdf (zuletzt geprüft am 25. Mai 2022). Smith, Gordon (1976): West Germany and the Politics of Centrality, in: Government & Opposition 11 (4), pp. 387 ff. Sontheimer, Kurt (1979): Die verunsicherte Republik, München. Sontheimer, Kurt (1990): Deutschlands politische Kultur, München. Statistisches Bundesamt (1997): Datenreport 1997, 2nd edn., Bonn. Sternberg, Sebastian et al. (2015): Zum Einfluss der öffentlichen Meinung auf Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts: Eine Analyse von abstrakten Normenkontrollen sowie Bund-Länder-Streitigkeiten 1974–2010, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 56 (4), pp. 570 ff. Unzicker, Kai (2022): Gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt und soziales Vertrauen im vereinten Deutschland (Dossier Lange Wege der Deutschen Einheit der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung), unter: https://www.bpb.de/themen/deutsche-einheit/lange-wegeder-deutschen-einheit/504566/gesellschaftlicher-zusammenhalt-und-soziales-vertrauenim-vereinten-deutschland/#footnote-target-18 (zuletzt geprüft am 30. Mai 2022). Veen, Hans-Joachim/Zelle, Carsten (1995): Zusammenwachsen oder Auseinanderbrechen?, Sankt Augustin. Vilmar, Fritz/Rudzio, Wolfgang (1981): Politische Apathie und Kaderpolitik, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 46, pp. 13 ff. Vorländer, Hans (1981): Verfassung und Konsens, Berlin. Vorländer, Hans (2009): 60 Jahre Grundgesetz – 30 Jahre Verfassungspatriotismus?, in: Liedhegener, Antonius/Oppeland, Torsten (Eds.): Parteiendemokratie in der Bewährung, Baden-Baden, pp. 19 ff. Walzer, Michael (2002): Equality and Civil Society, in: Chambers, Simone/Kymlicka, Will (Eds.): Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society, Princeton, pp. 34 ff. Watanuki, Joji et al. (1975): The Crisis of Democracy: Report on Governability of Democracy to the Trilateral Commission, New York. Wehler, Hans-Ulrich (2009): Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte 1949–1990, Bonn. Weßels, Bernhard (2021): Politische und gesellschaftliche Partizipation. Auszug aus dem Datenreport 2021, unter: https://www.destatis.de/DE/Service/Statistik-Campus/Datenreport/Downloads/datenreport-2021-kap-11.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (zuletzt geprüft am 22. Mai 2022). Westle, Bettina (1994): Nationale Identität der Deutschen nach der Vereinigung, in: Rattinger, Hans et al. (Eds.): Wahlen und politische Einstellungen im vereinigten Deutschland, Frankfurt a. M., pp. 453 ff. Westle, Bettina (2009): Weiterentwicklungen des Konzepts der Politischen Kultur in der empirischen Sozialforschung, in: dies./Gabriel, Oscar W. (Eds.): Politische Kultur, Baden-Baden, pp. 40 ff. Westle, Bettina/Gabriel, Oscar W. (Eds.) (2008): Sozialkapital, Baden-Baden.

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Wiesendahl, Elmar (1997): Noch Zukunft für die Mitgliederparteien?, in: Klein, Ansgar/ Schmalz-Bruns, Rainer (Eds.): Politische Beteiligung und Bürgerengagement in Deutschland, Bonn, pp. 349 ff. Zmerli, Sonja (2012): „Soziales und politisches Vertrauen“, in: Keil, Silke I./van Deth, Jan W. (Eds.): Deutschlands Metamorphosen. Ergebnisse des European Social Survey 2002 bis 2008, Baden-Baden, pp. 139 ff. Zmerli, Sonja (2016): „Vertrauen in Institutionen. Die Bedeutung politischer Unterstützung angesichts krisenhafter Entwicklungen“, in: Bertelsmann Stiftung (Ed.): Der Kitt der Gesellschaft. Perspektiven auf den sozialen Zusammenhalt in Deutschland, Gütersloh. pp. 175 ff.

Social Problems and Fields of Action of Politics

17

17.1 Demography and Economy: A Country in Decline? a. The writing on the wall of the birth deficit One of the central tasks of political systems is to master social problems. These form the material that requires political decisions and enforcement from the political system. If it fails conspicuously and continuously, its effectiveness and legitimacy will suffer in the short term and its replacement will be on the agenda in the long term. Therefore, a look at various policy areas should follow a sketch of social conditions and problems. “Nothing is”, as Meinhard Miegel (2002, p. 13) stated, “for a country as detrimental in the long run as the development of its population”. This development is problematic in Germany. The starting point is the German history of the first half of the 20th century, which ended in the total defeat of 1945. The losses of people or the birth deficit as a result of world wars, inflation, world economic crisis and post-war misery could be read off for a long time from the change between relatively strong and weak cohorts—comparable to rings in tree trunks (Fig. 17.1). A second, far-reaching factor are flight and migration movements that took place in connection with the Second World War and the division of Germany: • At the beginning there were the flight and expulsion of Germans from East Germany and Eastern Europe (1944–47). According to the 1974 census, refugees and expellees alone in the then Federal Republic counted 9.4 million people (Henke 1985, p. 33; Federal Statistical Office 1990, p. 74).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Mannewitz and W. Rudzio, The Political System of Germany, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41371-2_17

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17  Social Problems and Fields of Action of Politics

Age structure of the populaon in Germany by demographic event (2019) Age in years

Surplus of women Low birth rate during the Great Depression around 1932

Low birth rate during the world economic crisis around 1932

Birth low end of World War 2

Baby boom generaon

Birth low end of the 2nd world war

Men

Second decline in birth rate 1965 ll 1975

Women

Baby boom generaon

Second decline in birth rate 1965 ll 1975

Surplus of men Birth Low New Countries

Number in 1,000 Federal Instute for Populaon Research (BiB)

Birth Low New Countries

Number in 1,000 Data source: Federal Stascal Office

Fig. 17.1   Age structure of the population in Germany and demographic events, 2019. Source: Federal Institute for Population Research 2022a

17.1  Demography and Economy: A Country in Decline?

533

• A prolonged inflow were the Spätaussiedler (ethnic German repratriates). These are Germans who remained in the areas of expulsion and Eastern Europe (especially the Soviet Union, Poland and Romania) and later came to Germany (4.5 million; Federal Office of Administration 2022, p. 6). • A third group were Germans who migrated from the GDR to the Federal Republic of Germany between 1949 and 1990, mostly before the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 (about 3.7 million; Federal Statistical Office 1990, p. 20). As a result, these movements and a birth surplus that began in the 1950s led to the population in the area of the old Federal Republic growing from 43 million inhabitants in 1939 to 62.1 million in 19741. There were great difficulties at first to supply this increased population with food, jobs and housing despite the war damage. The early Federal Republic, which proved to be a dynamic growth society in the long term, succeeded in this. At the same time, it also became one of the most densely populated countries in Europe—after the Netherlands, Belgium and Great Britain (with the exception of micro-states; Federal Agency for Civic Education 2018a). Since 1974 at the latest, however, the factor has been clearly visible that determines the future of the country: the high and continuous birth deficit that makes the resident population of the Federal Republic of Germany shrink. At first there was a rapid and continuous decline in births from 1963, from almost 1.1 million births then to less than 600,000 in 1978 (Federal Statistical Office 1980, p. 61). The birth rates then fluctuated with 1.3 to 1.4 children per woman at an extremely low level, since about 2015 between 1.5 and 1.6 (Federal Statistical Office 2021a). This means that from generation to generation the population decreases by about one third. So the 21st century faces a constant, significant decline in its resident population, a high excess of deaths. “The demographic development of the Federal Republic of Germany”, the French Germany expert Alfred Grosser (1989, p. 665) already diagnosed in the 1980s, “is the most dramatic problem it has to face in the next few decades”. The consequences are far-reaching. First, the relative ageing of society associated with a lack of offspring means that the social systems of old-age, health and long-term care insurance become unaffordable in their current form. Secondly, the labour force will shrink, and in the long term also the German sales market—

1 Including

guest workers (Federal Statistical Office 1980, p. 50).

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17  Social Problems and Fields of Action of Politics

already visible in the shortage of skilled workers. The comparison with other developed societies that also have birth deficits points to general social causes. But examples such as France (1.86 children per woman), Romania (1.77), Ireland and Sweden (both 1.71) with significantly higher birth rates show that this is not an inevitable fate of modern societies at least in this drama (Federal Statistical Office 2022a). All Anglo-Saxon and all Nordic countries achieve significantly higher birth rates than Germany, in Western Europe also France, Belgium and the Netherlands, while Southern Europe is mainly below the Western European-continental average. Higher birth rates go hand in hand with higher religiosity (Sandmann and Preisner 2017), but also with the compatibility of family and work achieved through social acceptance, non-family family care and public family services (Bujard 2011, pp. 24, 87, 399, 433 f.; Hering 2018). These correlations point to connections that could be relevant for a birth-promoting policy. But in Germany, for more than four decades, birth promotion remained “largely a taboo subject” (Federal Institute for Population Research 2004, p. 17), whose relevance one did not want to admit: “We politicians have—with a few exceptions—long suppressed the significance of demographic change”, a leading politician confessed (Steinbrück 2005, p. 28). Whether the cause was shortsighted, election-oriented thinking, false learning from the Nazi past or simply fatalism, remains to be seen. It was not until 1998 that the Federal Constitutional Court enforced that the existence minimum of children should no longer be taxed (thus also increasing child benefit), and in this respect at least one organ of the political system reacted. But while the employment rate of mothers is above the EU average (higher in Sweden, Denmark, Slovenia and Lithuania (Federal Statistical Office 2022b), Germany is still far behind many other European countries in terms of family policy, in particular in terms of infrastructure such as day-care centres. In 2016, the care rate for children under three years of age was 32.6%— and thus around half of Denmark (70.0%)—a total of eleven countries were then ahead of the Federal Republic (European Commission 2018, p. 12). In this respect, a change is apparent from the right to public child care that has been in force since 2013, although it is motivated more by a shortage of labour and accompanied by a shortage of carers. In addition, there is increased financial support for families with children (child benefit, tax allowance, parental leave), especially for single parents (e.g. through the tax relief for childcare), people in training (increase in the exemption limit for BAföG as well as child allowance) and low-wage earners (child benefit supplement as well as tutoring, free lunch, free school transport, subsidies for school supplies and for leisure activities under the “Strong Families Act”). In recent years, female employment has increased and the pre-school care offer for children has become a public issue. Are dec-

17.1  Demography and Economy: A Country in Decline?

535

ades of “structural ruthlessness” (Franz-Xaver Kaufmann quoted in. Kreyenfeld 2015, pp. 31, 26) of social conditions towards parents coming to an end? Since 1994, when the German birth rate was at its lowest (1.24 children per woman), it has risen to 1.60 children in 2016 (trend since then: slightly falling)—a silver lining on the horizon? It must be noted soberly that the higher birth rates of foreign women in Germany (2019: 2.06 children) are included. That of German women by nationality is only 1.43 children (Federal Institute for Population Research 2022b). Even this result would still mean massive shrinkage per generation over the years. Although the goal of a higher birth rate is not mentioned in the coalition agreement of 2021, the coalition government wants to campaign for a 1:1 care by midwives during births as well as a two-week, paid leave of absence for partners after the birth (Mehr Fortschritt wagen—Koalitionsvertrag, pp. 85, 101). b. Immigration: More enrichment or more burden? Since 1960, after full employment was reached in the Federal Republic of Germany, there has been a net immigration of foreigners into the Federal Republic of Germany (Federal Agency for Civic Education 2020a): • It all started with the recruitment of foreign workers from Southern Europe and Turkey who came to the Federal Republic of Germany as “guest workers” in search of work. They formed a mobile mass of workers for low-skilled or physically demanding jobs. Together with their family members who followed them, they are a group of millions that is differently integrated in Germany. The peak was therefore reached in 1974 with 4.1 million foreigners in the Federal Republic of Germany—and not significantly reduced by the “recruitment stop” of 1973 (Oltmer 2016). • Another group are asylum seekers. The number of asylum seekers rose to 438,191 in 1992 alone as a result of the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc and the Yugoslav Wars. After a change to the Basic Law in 1993, which excluded anyone from asylum who enters from a safe third country, their number decreased step by step—until 2015 (476,649) or 2016 (745,545) when the numbers suddenly rose sharply due to the Syrian conflict (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2017, p. 11). As of December 31, 2021, 43,684 people were entitled to asylum (threat of political persecution by the home country), 760,918 refugees according to the Geneva Refugee Convention (threat of persecution by state or non-state actors), 255,671 people with subsidiary protection (threat of serious harm, such as the expected death penalty, torture or arbitrary violence), 136,156 people with a deportation ban (e.g. due to the threat of violating the European Convention on Human Rights) and 239,000 people who

536

17  Social Problems and Fields of Action of Politics

were granted protection for other reasons (e.g. due to professional activity in Germany). In addition, there were 215,841 pending asylum cases and 186,640 people subject to deportation with a rejected asylum application (German Bundestag 2022, pp. 33 ff., 57), with the latter number to be treated with great caution due to the conditional persecutability (Ghelli 2018). The talk of an “enforcement deficit” is often exaggerated, as many of those affected are tolerated (Meier-Braun 2018, p. 109). As a result of the so-called “refugee crisis”, by 2017 the vast majority of refugees in the EU were in Germany—namely 1.4 million (Federal Agency for Civic Education 2018b). However, the war in Ukraine is likely to lead to a considerable shift—with a view to the main target country (Poland) and of course the main countries of origin (Mediendienst Integration 2022a). • Since the freedom of movement for workers from other EU countries, which has also been valid for Germany since 2004, workers from other EU countries have been migrating to the Federal Republic of Germany in search of work, mainly from Eastern and Southern Europe, with Poland and Romania in the lead (Federal Statistical Office 2022c). The immigration from outside, long seen as a temporary stay (“guest workers”), has actually become permanent and has changed the composition of the population. The wave of right-wing violence in the early 1990s and the asylum compromise of 1993 still speak of Germany’s self-image as not being an “immigration country” (Lindhoff 2019). However, this did little to change the ongoing immigration. The left parties, which welcomed this more, advocated for a “multicultural society” and said: “Cultural diversity enriches us” (Tietze 2008, pp. 182, 79). The CDU, which had been braking for a long time, gradually abandoned its positions to largely adopt the line of its left-wing rivals by 2015. Immigration not only affects questions of national identity (Chaps. 4 and 6) and democratic stability (Dahl 2020, pp. 151 ff.; Mounk 2022), but also those of benefit orientation: For a long time, it has been debated whether and in what form immigration is needed in Germany in order to continue to prosper economically— mainly to compensate for the “home-grown” shortage of skilled workers and to reduce the burden on social systems. While the prospects for short- and mediumterm relief of social security look bleak (Werding and Läpple 2019, pp. 14 ff.), the economic consequences in the long term are better: Germany therefore needs a total of 260,000 immigrants by 2060, of which 146,000 would have to be covered by immigration from third countries outside the EU according to the forecast (Fuchs et al. 2019, pp. 70 ff.). This poses the challenge of actually attracting economically viable and linguistically and socially integrated immigrants.

17.1  Demography and Economy: A Country in Decline?

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What is the situation? Some of the immigrants have now naturalized (109,900 people in 2021 alone), not a few2 while retaining their old citizenship. Their “dual citizenship”, at least as a mass phenomenon, is politically controversial—because it would mean double loyalty and cross-border choice of residence. The foreign population in Germany—as of December 2021—totals 11.8 million people (Federal Statistical Office 2022c): 41.4% of them come from other EU countries (such as 7.4% from Poland, 7.1% from Romania, 5.5% from Italy), 12.3% from Turkey, 9.0% from other Europe (Russia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine, UK), 5.5% from Africa, 2.6% from America and 22.2% from Asia (7.3% from Syria, 2.6% from Afghanistan). The circle of those who have a migration background (= themselves or at least one parent not born with German citizenship) is much wider, because it includes foreigners: 22.3 million, or 27.3% of the population (Federal Statistical Office 2022d). They are ethnically and culturally diverse and at the same time remain significantly more often without a vocational qualification than people without a migration background (27.9 versus 11.2%). Germany, like other developed countries in Europe, is expecting increasing immigration pressure in the future—mainly due to population growth in Africa and the Arab world, the global North-South divide in wealth, climate change and civil wars. Where 1.3 billion people live today, there will be 2.4 billion in 2050 and 4.2 billion in 2100 (Federal Institute for Population Research 2022c). The population there is growing faster than the number of jobs, which cannot be reversed by aid. To what extent are immigrants integrated in Germany, to what extent have they found work? Contrary to initial expectations in politics, business circles and the media, Table 17.1 shows a rather grey picture3. It compares people with a migration background to the total population, i.e. differences between the population without and with a migration background would be greater. The left-hand column is decisive. It shows: People with a migration background are more than twice as likely as the total population to have no school leaving certificate, almost twice as likely to have no vocational training and twice as likely to live on unemployment benefit. In addition, there are slight over-representations at higher educational levels—to what extent this can be explained by foreign students in Germany, qualified immigrants and non-comparable educational certificates in countries of origin, must remain open.

2 There

are no exact figures. The census of 2011 estimated the number of dual citizens at 4.3 million, the micro census of 2021 at 2.6 million (Mediendienst Integration 2022b). 3 Older comparative data in: Geißler (2014, pp. 271, 289, 300).

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17  Social Problems and Fields of Action of Politics

Table 17.1   Population and immigrants compared 2020/21

In % of the two groups 1) School graduation

Without school graduation

Hauptschule

Realschule

(Fach-) Hochschulreife

Gesamtbevölkerung

3.8

21.8

20.8

30.6

Mit Migrationshintergrund

10.2

17.1

17.2

30.3

2) Vocational edu- Without a degreea) Apprenticeship cation degrees

Master

Diploma/Bachelor/Master

Total population

15.8

38.1

7.9

14.8

With a migrant background

27.9

22.3

5.3

13.4

3) Mainly subsist- unemployment ence from benefits

employment

relatives

pension

Total population

4.0

47.0

22.0

22.8

with migrant back- 8.2 ground

44.5

30.3

10.5

The numbers do not always add up to a hundred, as smaller categories are not included a) In training are in turn 21.1 (total population migrant background) percent Source: Federal Statistical Office (2022d, 2022e, 2022f)

However, a look at selected integration indicators of the Federal Statistical Office (2022g) does not reveal a clear trend—there are upsides and downsides, but also stagnation. To the negative developments: • The proportion of people with a migrant background without a school leaving certificate has increased from 10.6 to 13.5% between 2005 and 2019. • The migrant share in the public service has fallen from 10.8 to 9.0%. On the positive side, however: • The proportion of people without a vocational qualification has fallen from 11.5 to 9.4% between 2005 and 2019. • The proportion of migrants with (vocational) higher education entrance qualification has increased from 14.0 to 29.4% in the same period. • The proportion of people who live in a household with an unemployed person has fallen from 16.9 to 11.6%.

17.1  Demography and Economy: A Country in Decline?

539

• The unemployment rate has fallen from 17.9 to 5.7%. • The average apartment size has increased from 34.6 to 36.4 square meters between 2006 and 2018. • The ownership rate among migrants has increased from 23.3 to 25.6%. On the other hand, they have remained more or less constant: • the employment gap to people without a migrant background (around 11 percentage points) and • the at-risk-of-poverty rate (approx. 28%)4. The proportion of the population with a migrant background is growing, reaching 40% among the under-five-year-olds, which allows for a cautious extrapolation of the trends that are already available; in addition, there is the problem of linguistic integration, which manifests itself primarily in the low language skills of children with a migrant background (Haug 2008, pp. 5, 16 ff.) and adults, primarily among Turkish migrants (Haug 2008, p. 28). The integration of people with a migrant background remains a central challenge for democracy, society and the economy. It is extremely prone to frustration in all of this: Although crime statistics give a distorted impression of the crime burden on migrants for various reasons (for example, because foreigners are recorded instead of migrants, because there are crimes that cannot be committed by natives, because the group of foreigners consists to a much greater extent of young men, who are particularly deviant in all societies, because the probability of reporting increases when the perpetrator is perceived as foreign, or because the probability of police control and thus the accidental discovery of a crime is higher among migrants), the concentration of theft offences among certain migrant groups points to a “massive inequality in wealth between Southeast and Western Europe, unstable social conditions and the marginalization of population groups in the countries of origin, precarious living conditions and the unfavorable prospects of some immigrants in Western Europe as well as cross-border gang structures” (Walburg 2020); violent offences, especially among young migrants, allow “stressful living conditions and educational differences to come into view. In addition, it is pointed out that the origin from societies that are more strongly shaped by patriarchy and have a

4 At

the same time: The increase in the at-risk-of-poverty rate says little about the material living standards of those living below it (because it is overall increasing), but rather about the share in social wealth.

540

17  Social Problems and Fields of Action of Politics

less developed state monopoly on violence can favor violent behavior.” (Walburg 2020) Youth crime, finally, thrives primarily under “conditions of social marginalization. Marginalization perceptions can result from lower economic resources and less favorable educational and occupational prospects. […] In addition, for young people of foreign origin, individual and intra-family difficulties in acclimatizing to a new cultural environment as well as experiences of exclusion can intensify the feeling of not belonging and thus contribute to promoting deviant norms, self-images and life paths.” Keeping all these challenges of successful integration in mind, economists like Hans-Werner Sinn (2014) and sociologists of demography like Gunnar Heinsohn (2010) argue for stronger control of immigration—they thus articulate, according to Karl-Rudolf Korte (2017, p. 9), the demand of the political center for “regaining national sovereignty, streamlining the European apparatus and controlled immigration”. It should not be primarily immigrants who decide who comes to Germany, but primarily the receiving country—and from an economic point of view, these are above all (highly) qualified workers. While Germany is considered to be a very liberal country in terms of immigration opportunities for highly qualified people, there are gaps in the immigration opportunities for professionally qualified staff (Expert Council of German Foundations for Migration and Integration 2018, pp. 29 ff., 41 ff., 51 ff.). At the same time: That the separation required for targeted measures between such (voluntary employment) migration on the one hand and flight from war, repression and expulsion on the other hand has not yet been carried out everywhere in the public debate points to the long way to becoming an immigration country that Germany still has ahead of it. c. Economy: The unstable wealth of an export nation It has been an important stabilizing factor for the democracy of the Federal Republic of Germany that it has been able to show a continuous economic success story. The democracy initially generated satisfaction from it, later lasting legitimacy. While the Federal Republic of today, with its gross domestic product, important industrial and technological indicators, does not come close to the position of old Germany, it does occupy a considerable fourth place (behind the USA, China and Japan) in the world. Its balance of payments with the outside world, negative in 1991–2000, has been positive since 2001 (Deutsche Bundesbank 2022, p. 8), currently (2020) to an extent that places Germany second after China (Urmersbach 2022). One might wonder whether this can be a healthy and sustainable state of affairs, but the fact that such surpluses can also fall on countries with high wage levels like Germany (similar to Japan, the Netherlands or Switzerland)

17.1  Demography and Economy: A Country in Decline?

541

speaks for their qualities. The most important German export industries are the automotive industry, mechanical engineering, the chemical and electronics industries (Federal Ministry of Economics and Energy 2021, p. 2). In general, the share of manufacturing in the total economic performance plays an outstanding role in Germany. As of 2021, it is approximately 20% in Germany—more than in the other large economies of the EU (Statistical Federal Office 2021b). The fact that Germany is in fourth place with 884 patent applications per million inhabitants—well behind Switzerland, Japan and South Korea, just behind China, but still ahead of the USA—speaks for quality (Statistical Federal Office 2021c). Its success is possible thanks to high capital investment per job, high educational levels and high expenditure on research and development5. It owes its well-trained skilled workers to its dual vocational training, its natural scientists and engineers. 19% of its graduates study a STEM subject (mathematics, engineering, natural sciences, technology) (OECD 2021, p. 246)—a comparable high proportion was only found in Greece (also 19%) as well as Estonia, Portugal and the United Kingdom (each 18%). The numerous programs and initiatives to increase the (female) student population show how important these subjects are to the German economy: MINT-Nachwuchsbarometer (acatech/Joachim Herz Foundation), MINT-Qualitätsoffensive (Körber Foundation), MINT-Aktionsplan 2.0 (Federal Ministry of Education and Research), “Komm, mach MINT” (Competence Center for Technology-Diversity-Equal Opportunities) and countless regional initiatives underscore this. On this basis, the country can afford high, if not exorbitant, wages and social contributions. The hourly labor costs in manufacturing are €41.90 in Germany in 2021—less than in Denmark, Sweden and Belgium, but 45% higher than the EU average (Statistical Federal Office 2022h). The pension insurance system is a heavy burden despite high wages due to the German age pyramid. However, when the incentives for early retirement were abolished, the employment rate of 60- to 64-year-olds in Germany increased significantly and reached 58% in 2018. In the European Union, where a number of countries are also suffering from a birth deficit, Germany ranks second behind Sweden (EU-wide share: 43%). Among those aged 65–69, the figure is 16% (rank 10; EU-wide share: 13%— Statistisches Bundesamt 2018, pp. 66 ff.). Fortunately (from the perspective of

5 With

R&D spending, Germany ranks second only to Switzerland, Sweden, Israel, Japan and South Korea, with 3.1% of GDP. This is a decline in the ranking in recent years, although a higher percentage is spent on this sector than before (Statistical Federal Office 2021d).

542

17  Social Problems and Fields of Action of Politics

social systems), the introduction of the pension at 63 years of age in 2014 (with 45 years of contributions) did not lead to a reduction in the average age of retirement. In 2020, it is 64.1 years for men and 64.2 years for women (Demography Portal of the Federal Government and the Länder 2022). All in all, it must not be overlooked that Germany’s economic position is highly vulnerable due to its dependence on exports and division of labor with other countries. The decline in the trade balance as a result of the global economic and financial crisis in 2008 and during the Corona pandemic in 2020 confirm this. The record-high share of exports in gross domestic product among major industrial nations implies severe dependencies on the world market, on international relations and on the continued existence of the European Union. Problems of economic growth, international competitiveness and finance must therefore always be in the foreground of German politics. In any case, the demographic development acts as a heavy economic burden in the long term, which rather speaks for a slow lag of the country. In connection with the technological and economic development, working world and social structures have also changed. This is shown in Table 17.2 for the distribution of the employed on the different economic sectors. After the development of an industrial society had reached its climax around 1970, increasingly features of a service and knowledge society emerged. Behind the global data, however, dramatic changes in individual industries are sometimes hidden—such as the shrinkage of the coal mining industry from 587,000 employees in 1955 to 0 in 2018 (Tagesschau 2008). The new federal states had to follow such structural changes at an accelerated pace, supported but with social upheaval. A second global trend that accompanied this structural change was the percentage decrease in self-employed/assisting and workers, while the proportion of employees increased. As a result, a policy that opposed bourgeoisie and workers lost its basis. The non-self-employed middle class had been predominant for decades, Germany had become the “leveled middle-class society” (Schelsky 1954), whose core was a small-bourgeois middle class with similar socio-cultural ideas. In addition, since the 1980s, there have been more life partnerships, longer educational courses, interrupted work biographies, women employed long-term, greater variance in retirement age, and single mothers (2004, p. 85)—with the consequence that instead of occupational group affiliations, such circumstances often determined the social situation of individuals. The economy and society of the GDR have gone through a different process. The GDR economy suffered from the “burden of system change” (displacement of entrepreneurship), obstacles due to autarky, and brown coal as the only energy source (Abelshauser 2005, pp. 363–381, 389). Cut off from the world market,

17.1  Demography and Economy: A Country in Decline?

543

Table 17.2   The socio-economic development of the Federal Republic

1950

1989

DDR 1990a)

2010

2020

50.0

61.9

16.2

79.4

81.9

Including with migrant – background i.e.S. (million) Data on the world of work:

–

–

14.7

20.0

Employed persons (% of 45.9 population)

48.1

54.8

54.6

55.9

7.2 Unemployed persons (% of civilian employed persons)

6.8

7.1

7.7

5.9

Women’s share of employed persons (%)

35.7

38.9

48.9

66.0b)

71.8b)

Apprentices (million)

1.0

1.6

0.3

1.5

1.3

Students (million) 0.1 Sectors in % of the employed:

1.5

0.1

2.2

2.9

Year Demographic data: Population (million)

Agriculture and forestry 24.6

3.8

10.8

1.6

1.3

Manufacturing

42.6

38.7

47.0

24.4

24.0

Trade/transport (from 2010 in services)

14.3

19.2

17.7

–

–

Services, state 18.4 38.3 Occupational groups as a % of the employed:

24.5

74.0

74.7

Self-employed (with helpers)

31.5

10.9

4.6

11.5

8.6

Officials

4.2

9.0

–

5.4

5.4

Employees, workers, 64.2 trainees Economy, energy and prosperity:

80.1

95.3

83.2

85.6

Gross domestic product (billion euros)

1200.7

207.9

2564.4

3367.6

Export quote (exports as 8.5 a % of GDP)

28.4

n. a.

42.2

43.4

Primary energy con3970 sumption (in petajoules)

11,219

3777 (1986)

14,217

11,899

49.7

(continued)

544

17  Social Problems and Fields of Action of Politics

Table 17.2   (continued)

Year

1950

1989

DDR 1990a)

2010

2020

dar. Mineral oil (in petajoules) Prosperity:

150

4489

404 (1986)

4684

4087

Human Development Index

0.733c)

0.808 (1990)

k. A.

0.927

0.947 (2019)

a) Accession territory (formerly GDR), partly converted to 2nd half of 1990. Economic sectors, educational groups and GDP of 1989 b) Here, the employment rate of women (in%) c) Only partially comparable due to changed HDI calculation method Sources: Federal Ministry for Internal Affairs (1988); Federal Ministry of Economics (1990); AG Energiebilanzen (2021, p. 10); Federal Statistical Office (2022g;i;j;k;l;m;n;o); Federal Employment Agency (2022); Federal Agency for Civic Education (2020b); Heske (2009, p. 248); Kahlert (1989, p. 104); Council of Economic Experts (2015); UNDP (2020, p. 3); Wagner (2003, p. 188)

socialist economic activity led to the fact that labor productivity lagged far behind that of West Germany over the decades (Horstmann et al. 1991, p. 306). Finally, a high degree of concentration in industry and agriculture, which often exceeded the economic optimum, was remarkable. In addition, there was wear and tear of machinery and infrastructure—the GDR lived at the expense of the future. After German unification, the task of an economic and social modernization revolution arose. It involved restructuring, including job cuts. It was accompanied by an economic fiasco caused by inappropriate currency conversion, hasty income approximation to the West, and the collapse of the trading partner Soviet Union (Patzelt 2008, p. 48; Ritter 2006, pp. 106, 121, 201–206). What characterizes today’s society in terms of sociocultural aspects? The transition to a post-industrial knowledge society (evident in the increased importance of the service sector), the digitalization of the world of work and life, as well as the expansion of emancipatory values, which have brought individuality and authenticity to the center of social interaction, have resulted in what the sociologist Andreas Reckwitz (2017) calls “the society of singularities”. It is characterized by individualization, self-development and self-presentation. This has created a culture of uniqueness that prioritizes one’s own identity. The new urban, academic middle class, which in the three-thirds society thus differs socio-economically and -culturally from the other two classes (the old non-academic middle class and the lower class), is the carrier of this lifestyle. Typical of the new middle class is a pronounced desire for distinction in quite everyday practices

17.2  Distribution Structures of a Middle-class Society

545

such as eating, living, sports, education, training and movement, but also a special relationship to the body and work, which never—as with the lower class—only serves one’s own livelihood, but is always also used for self-development and self-presentation. The dominance of the new, self-culturalizing middle class and the devaluation of the lifestyle of the lower class lead to a polarization of society, also recognizable in concrete political oppositions between groups that one could describe with Wolfgang Merkel (2017) as cosmopolitans and communitarians.

17.2 Distribution Structures of a Middle-class Society If one looks at the distribution of income, several differences become apparent at first glance: • This is first of all the case for such by occupational groups: At the top of the annual incomes are pilots, managers, doctors, flight attendants, auditors, at the very end, however, people from cleaning professions, gastronomy, animal husbandry, floristry and food preparation (Federal Statistical Office 2020a, pp. 495 ff.). • In addition, there are regional disparities that correlate with the level of unemployment. The new federal states, the southwest of Palatinate and parts of Upper Franconia are considered “structurally weak” areas (Zeit Online 2018). • In addition, there are industry-specific differences (Federal Statistical Office 2020a, p. 354). An overview of the income situation by occupational groups is given in Table 17.3. These are always averages, in addition median values (= give the point at which half of the households are above and below): • The greater the difference between the average and the median, the greater the differences within the group. For example, the large difference in income and net assets among the self-employed is striking. It points to abysses between large and small self-employed. • As is known, income rises until the age of about 55, then slowly declines; the development of assets is similar, only that the turning point here is only at the age of 65. This explains the favorable assets situation of pensioners, even more of retirees.

546

17  Social Problems and Fields of Action of Politics

Table 17.3   Gross income and net assets of private households 2017 In euros/year

Income Region: Federal territory

Wealth

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

53,000

40,100

232,800

70,800

East

42,000

32,200

93,200

23,400

South (BY, BW, HE)

49,300

38,900

205,600

60,300

Social status: self-employed

81,600

55,300

712,600

211,000

Officials

78,900

67,300

294,200

170,500

Employees

67,300

53,100

216,100

76,900

Workers

45,400

42,000

114,900

26,900

Unemployed

25,100

19,500

35,000

600

Retirees

35,500

27,800

223,800

87,700

Pensioners

54,000

47,900

403,800

353,200

Vocational education: no degree

28,000

21,900

71,300

3800

Dual vocational training

48,200

37,600

196,100

59,800

Vocational school diploma

60,100

49,500

397,900

195,000

FH degree

66,900

50,200

280,300

78,500

University degree

81,700

68,300

377,400

175,400

Nationality: German

54,500

41,400

253,300

87,100

Others

45,100

34,400

108,500

11,000

N = 4942 households Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2019, pp. 33, 42)

• Income and assets have not increased over time for all social groups: There was an average income loss compared to 2014 in Southern Germany, asset losses in the East, among the self-employed, unemployed and people with a university degree. • The value of the table is limited because the number of household members is not taken into account. Therefore, in addition: The income of couples with children is higher than that of childless couples, single or single parents— which does not mean that parents with children achieve a higher standard of living. With regard to assets, they are far behind childless couples (Deutsche Bundesbank 2019, pp. 33, 42). • Neither the share of public transfer payments, nor taxes and social security contributions are included.

17.2  Distribution Structures of a Middle-class Society

547

However, differences between the occupational groups of the main earners, as well as between the regions, the relevance of vocational training and nationality, are visible. With regard to income, pensioners and unemployed lag behind, generally unqualified in terms of profession. There are mainly differences between East and West with regard to pensions: In 2020, men in East Germany received an average of 1249 € in pensions, men in West Germany 1179; women in East Germany received 1065 €, women in West Germany 741 (Statista Research Department 2022). This initially surprising imbalance in the distribution of individual purchasing power can be explained by the pension insurance obligation for the most highly paid professions (self-employed, entrepreneurs and freelancers) in the GDR, the inclusion of the GDR supplementary pensions in the current claims in the east and the significantly higher number of officials, selfemployed and freelancers in the west, who often only paid into the pension fund for a short time, but then disappeared from it again (and either provided for themselves or paid into the pension fund, but can still fall back on their minimal pension claims). This is reflected in two numbers: In the east, 94% of old-age income comes from the state pension, in the west only 68% (Frenzel 2021). If one asks about the distribution of individual purchasing power, a different approach leads further. In this approach, one divides the household’s net income by the sum of the “weighted needs” of the household members (1 for the main earner, about 0.7 for other adults and age-related weights for children) and obtains the so-called net equivalent income of the household members. On its basis, the Gini index, which ranges from zero (= complete equality) to one (= absolute inequality), indicates the degree of inequality prevailing in society. The 6th Federal Government Report on Poverty and Wealth states the following about this: “After inequality increased until about 2005, it has remained relatively stable since then. The Gini coefficient of income distribution in Germany was around 0.29 in the years up to 2017. The upper half of the distribution had 70% of all incomes, the lower half 30%.” (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 2021a, p. 44). The tenth of the population with the highest incomes has around 23% of the total income of households, the tenth with the lowest incomes only around 4%. The fact that the Gini index rose by around 0.05 points at the beginning of the 2000s indicates an increase in income inequality. In international comparison, Germany is on a par with Hungary, Poland, Sweden, France, Ireland and the Netherlands, but still behind some countries in Eastern Europe (Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic) and Scandinavia (Norway, Finland, Denmark—OECD 2022). The USA and Great Britain are far behind Germany in this respect, which occupies approximately a middle position.

548

17  Social Problems and Fields of Action of Politics

But what about assets, more specifically net assets? “Assets are distributed much more unevenly than income: here the Gini coefficient was about 0.71 (net assets of households) or 0.78 (individual net assets) in the last available year. Households in the upper half of the distribution had around 97.5%, people in the upper half of the distribution around 99.5% of the total assets. The 10% of the population with the lowest assets had negative assets, that is, more debts than assets, other parts of the population had no assets, but also no debts. Positive assets only began in the third or fourth decile. Starting from the values in the early 2000s, inequality in assets initially increased, but did not continue in the decade after 2010.” (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 2021a, p. 44). So asset distribution in Germany is more unequal than income distribution. In comparison with the countries of the Eurozone, the Germans are in the middle with their net household assets of 232,800 €—clearly outperformed by the Luxembourgers, Maltese, Belgians, Cypriots, Irish, Italians, Spaniards, French and Finns, Slovenes, Austrians and Portuguese (Grabka and Halbmeier 2021, p. 254). This surprising fact is mainly due to the 44% of households with the lowest proportion of home or property ownership in the EU (late consequences of war destruction and displacement), with the notorious German aversion to stocks, with the—compared to Southern Europe—smaller household sizes in Germany and the often foreign DAX company owners. All comparisons should be enjoyed with caution—we are moving in a partially illuminated world here, as business assets are not taken into account. How do these relationships reflect in people’s consciousness? Today’s Germany shows—on a scale of four layers—the image of a pure middle class society. 61% of West Germans and 66% of East Germans concentrate in the middle class. There were considerable shifts in the New States in the almost three decades after reunification: The middle class has gained 30 percentage points here, while the working class has lost them (Bünning 2021, p. 276; Fig. 17.2). A more differentiated picture of society is created by the social milieus in Germany, which use social positions and the basic orientations of people to cluster society. In 2021, no less than ten milieus are created, all representing between eight and 12% of the population—from the precarious milieu (lower class with traditional appreciation of duty and order) via the adaptive-pragmatic middle (middle middle class with preferences for individuality, self-realization and pleasure) to the expeditious milieu (upper class with the values of multi-optionality and new syntheses—Sinus Institut 2021). The greatest socio-cultural dynamics are currently taking place in the middle of society: “The worlds of life and values are drifting apart. The status-optimistic part modernizes and looks up. The harmony-oriented, larger part sees its lifestyle and principles devalued by society,

549

17.3  Policy Areas: Different Arenas

Under class

Working class

Middle class

Upper middle/ upper class

West Germany

East Germany

Data basis: ALLBUS 1980-2012 cumulative; ALLBUS 2018

Fig. 17.2   Layer self-classification 2018. Source: Bünning 2021, p. 276

withdraws bitterly and increasingly delimits itself downwards and upwards.” One driver of this trend is the omnipresence of the sustainability and diversity topic, which both meet with unqualified approval in the cosmopolitan leading milieus, but with rejection, “concern for participation” and the fear of high costs in the lower half of society. While the former hedonistic milieu erodes, another has taken root: that of the “neo-ecological”. Only slightly exaggerated: Germany is changing from a fun to a post-growth society.

17.3 Policy Areas: Different Arenas a. Indicators for political processing Which social problems and policy areas are dealt with by politics, how is this done and with what effect? The image of the liberal night watchman state, which is limited to ensuring order and security, exaggerated the reality. But in fact, an increase in the importance of the political system can be observed, whose decisions now shape its social environment to a greater extent. The reason for this is seen in an increased interdependence in modern differentiated societies, which for the individual leads to a “loss of the [individually] controlled living space” (Forsthoff 1968, p. 147) and an increased need for collective orders and services. The indicators “expenditures” and personnel of the public sector appear to be significant. In terms of expenditures, the area of social security leads by far,

550

17  Social Problems and Fields of Action of Politics

followed by education/science. With higher interest rates, the debt service would also make up a significant proportion of expenditure (cf. Chap. 8, Table 17.1). As of December 31, 2020, public debt amounted to 2172 billion euros, including 1403 billion euros of federal debt, 636 billion euros of state debt, and 133 billion euros of local government debt; in addition, 44 million euros of social security (Federal Statistical Office 2021f). The debt brake introduced in 2011 was suspended due to the financial costs of the Corona pandemic, and since 2020, debt has been rising again for the first time in several years. Under the criterion personnel deployment, the area of education/science/culture (schools and universities!), followed by central administration/political leadership, health/sport/recreation and defense (Table 17.4).If one orientates oneself by expenditure and personnel deployment, the Federal Republic of Germany is primarily to be characterized as a social and educational state (included: social security). Political science has also been increasingly concerned with the study of specific policy areas for some time. What has been produced under the heading of “policy research” provides an increasingly comprehensive picture. The following are some examples of policy areas. b. Economic policy: concepts and practical policy The goals, forms and intensity of state intervention in the economic process have changed considerably over the history of the Federal Republic of Germany. At the beginning there was the administrative management practice of the first post-war years, when one tried to cope with the shortage of food, coal and housing by means of state steering of economic resources, state-regulated prices and wages as well as rationing of most goods (Abelshauser 1975, pp. 66 ff.). The currency reform of 1948 then marked the transition to the “social market economy” of ordoliberal orientation, as represented by the then economic director of the Bizone, Ludwig Erhard, and adopted by the CDU and CSU in 1949. Although there were compromises in the implementation of this concept, for example by gradually bringing transport, land, energy and housing policy closer to market conditions. In general, however, one could speak of a market economy, which was supported on the one hand by the Act against Restraints of Competition (GWB) of 1957 and on the other hand by social security laws. These were subject to multiple changes—the GWB, for example, is in its tenth amendment—without the basic idea being watered down. The “Ministerial Authorization” introduced in 1973, which allows the competent ministry to approve mergers against the vote of the Federal Cartel Office, has so far only been granted in 10 out of 23 cases.

17.3  Policy Areas: Different Arenas

551

Table 17.4   Public sector personnel by selected task areas. Thousands of full-time equivalent, only territorial authorities

Area/Year

1993 old federal territory

Territorial authorities

Federal

States

Municipali- Federal ties

States

Municipalities

504.4

1535.2

1010.5

509.9

2493.3

1596.8

72.4

214.7

195.2

89.1

292.1

345.3

–

–

242.2

X

X

116.1

590.8

141.4

5.5

178.5

X

1503.5

186.1

23.6

193.7

Totalb) Political leadership, central administration including financial administration Defense

350.9

2020 Germany

Police/public security and order

30.6

220.2

71.6

Legal protection

4.4

143.3

–

Formation, science, culture

10.8

687.6

119.3

16.9

Social security

3.7

47.6

95.7

9.1 0.0

10.0

249.4

1.2

67.8

282.9

9.1

47.3

208.4

–

28.2

138.8

0.0

17.4

109.1

Daycare Health, sports, recreationa) Housing, urban development, spatial planning a)

2020 also: environment Remaining shares to the respective column sum: Other In 2020, the public sector employed 4,968,000 people, including 368,000 at social security institutions including the Federal Employment Agency. In addition, there are still shares of public servants at Deutsche Bahn and Post Sources: Federal Statistical Office (1995, pp. 519 ff.; 2021e)

b)

552

17  Social Problems and Fields of Action of Politics

This policy was supplemented when, in 1967, in view of the first post-war recession and with the participation of the Social Democratic Party in government, a social market economy with “global steering” was introduced. The turning point was marked by a Keynesian interventionism. The equally important goals were: price stability, full employment, balance of payments and steady growth (“magical quadrangle”). From the end of the 1960s, this policy was supplemented by regional and sectoral structural policy (Grosser 1981). But the Keynesian global steering failed to combat the recession of 1974 (oil price shock). So the Christian-liberal government from 1982 relied on supply policy, i.e. primarily sought to improve the competitiveness of companies, in particular through deregulation and tax relief (von Bandemer et al. 1998). Globalization also called for a supply-oriented approach. Chancellor Schröder, on the other hand, committed himself to an economic policy mix, which in practice, however, remained little systematic—the red-green economic policy appeared “unsystematic and erratic” (Zohlnhöfer 2006, p. 307). Only with massive tax cuts for companies and a labor market reform (“Hartz IV”), which forced the unemployed to high “willingness to compromise” when accepting jobs (Hassel and Schiller 2010, p. 38), did Schröder in his final phase still set the course for a reduction in unemployment. Parties and governments played a role in German economic policy in that the changes of course were associated with changes of government. There were also fluid transitions—as in the late phases of the Schmidt and Schröder governments. Other actors were the industrial and employer associations as well as the trade unions. As thought leaders, economic scientists were active, including from the prominent Council of Economic Advisors, whose members often take up prominent positions after leaving (for example Lars Feld as Personal Representative of the Federal Minister of Finance for Macroeconomic Development or Isabel Schnabel in the ECB Directorate). Although the fate of governments often depends on this policy area, federal governments only have some of the levers in their hands. Accepting this, the coalition formed in 2021 has set itself the task of making Germany a social and ecological market economy through an offer- and demandoriented economic policy. Points 1) to 3) address (presumably) the companies, 4) to 6) the consumers: 1. By expanding solar and wind energy, 80% of the energy demand is to be met from renewable energy by 2030, for example by allocating 2% of the land area to wind energy, mandatory solar roofs on commercial buildings, the acceleration of planning and approval procedures, but also an investment bonus (“super deduction”) for climate protection (Mehr Fortschritt wagen—Koalitionsvertrag, pp. 56, 164).

17.3  Policy Areas: Different Arenas

553

2. Regional transformation clusters are to strengthen key industries of the future, including semiconductors (Mehr Fortschritt wagen—Koalitionsvertrag, pp. 25 ff.). 3. Electromobility (15 million E-cars by 2030) is to be strengthened by “framework conditions and subsidies” (Mehr Fortschritt wagen—Koalitionsvertrag, p. 51). 4. The EEG levy will be finally abolished in 2023 (suspended as of July 2022) and a climate levy introduced in order to relieve electricity customers (Mehr Fortschritt wagen—Koalitionsvertrag, pp. 62 ff.). 5. 400,000 apartments are to be built annually, of which 100,000 are publicly funded—responsible for this: a separate Ministry of Building (Mehr Fortschritt wagen—Koalitionsvertrag, p. 88). 6. The minimum wage is to be increased to 12 €, mini- and midi-jobs are to be extended from 450 to 520 or from 1300 to 1600 €, a child basic security is to relieve single parents and low-income families, the new citizen’s money is to relieve the unemployed. (Mehr Fortschritt wagen—Koalitionsvertrag, pp. 6, 70, 75, 100). The relief of citizens in the course of the inflation of the year 2022, caused by the Corona pandemic (production and delivery bottlenecks caused by lockdowns in China), the Russian war in Ukraine (shortages of foodstuffs such as grain and oil, sanctions against Russia) and the ECB’s government bond policy (increase in the amount of money in circulation) underlines the demand-oriented side of economic policy: reduction of the energy tax on fuels (“tank discount”) and 9-euro ticket in summer 2022, increase in the flat-rate allowance for commuters, increase in the standard deduction and the basic allowance, heating cost subsidy, energy price flat-rate and one-time payments for transfer recipients are among the relief packages of the federal government, in addition an electricity and gas price cap. “Scholzonomics”, which means “the announcement of large sums to calm the population in general, without having prepared their efficient distribution sufficiently in advance”, was criticized by Die Zeit in winter 2022 (Pletter 2022, p. 25)—the once clear separation between supply-oriented and demand-oriented economic policy has meanwhile lost importance not only in Germany. c. Social policy: policy between social welfare models? Germany, with the Bismarckian social legislation of 1883–89, belongs to the early “pioneer countries” of social security (Schmid 2010, p. 129). It developed a social system in which pension, health and accident insurance with contributions from employers and employees first created rights for industrial workers, and

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17  Social Problems and Fields of Action of Politics

Table 17.5   Basic types of the welfare state

Conservative-continental-European model (Bismarck)

Liberal-AngloSocial-democraticSaxon model (Bev- Scandinavian eridge) model Entire population

Insured persons

Insured workers

Financing

Contributions accord- State tax revenue ing to income

Tax revenue/public insurance

Benefits

Different according to Uniform-flat rate previous income

Equal

Performance level/ extent

Medium

High

Administration

Groups, decentralized Public

Public

Examples

Germany, Austria, France, Italy

Sweden, Norway, Denmark

Low

USA, Canada, Australia

All citizens

Sources: Schmid (2010, pp. 101, 108, 489); Pilz (2009, pp. 49 ff.)

then also for employees. Over all political breaks, this social system has been preserved and further developed (Schmidt 2005, pp. 24 ff.). In addition, the progression of income tax has an equalizing redistribution effect. Other states followed the path to the welfare state, but often gave it different structures. According to Gösta Esping-Andersen, there are three basic types (see Table 17.5), without overlooking that in reality mixed6 and in many countries (Third World) no social security systems exist. While the southern European countries today have a share of social spending like the continental European (slightly below 30% of GDP), it is 20% in Anglo-Saxon countries (Häusermann 2015, p. 592). In Germany, social security systems can be divided into three categories. The first are social benefits based on the insurance principle, i.e. those that are granted to recipients on the basis of previously paid contributions. However, they are only based on the insurance principle in terms of the relative level of pensions. This category includes old-age pensions (except for the new minimum pension), accident pensions, statutory health insurance, nursing care benefits, and unemployment benefits. In addition, and occupational pensions are added, which are to be expected for about half of the employed in Germany—similar to Great Britain,

6 Manfred

G. Schmidt (2012, p. 37) also includes the German.

17.3  Policy Areas: Different Arenas

555

Japan or the USA (Ebbinghaus and Schulze 2008, p. 291). In contrast to the other social insurances, however, the benefits for health and nursing care insurance are the same for everyone, regardless of the contribution amount; they also apply to children and other family members without income; the same applies to surviving family members of deceased pensioners. In this respect, there are solidarity and family effects. A second group of social benefits follows the principle of care, i.e. is granted on the basis of the recipients’ need. This includes social assistance, which represents the minimum social safety net for every needy person, unemployment benefits II (“Hartz IV” or the new citizen’s income), asylum benefits, housing benefits, training benefits and social housing construction. Child care benefit and child benefit are in a special position and are paid regardless of need (but according to income). The third category of social benefits is based on the principle of provision. This includes civil servants’ pensions and war victims’ benefits. In total, social security systems, as shown in Table 17.6, redistribute almost 30% of gross domestic product. With this social expenditure, the Federal Republic of Germany belongs to the “top group of welfare states” (Schmidt 1990, p. 126), its social peace was always preserved. In general, the SPD tends to include all citizens in a social pension system, the primary financing of which comes from the public budget and thus from the Scandinavian social welfare state model. The development of social policy in the Federal Republic of Germany can be divided into the following phases: 1949–66: A phase characterised by Christian Democratic foundation and war damage compensation. 1966–75: This was followed by a second, Social Democratic-dominated phase of consolidation and expansion. 1975–84: This was followed by a “social policy of the ‘lean years’”. Since then, the question has increasingly arisen as to how far Germany can afford its current social security system. Economic globalisation and birth deficit create reform pressure, which drives politics: How can work be made cheaper (limiting social security contributions), how can pensions be financed in the future, how can excessive use of social benefits be countered? Thus, one can speak of a phase of further consolidation and Christian-democratic accentuation for the years 1985–98: mother support (child-rearing p­ eriods

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17  Social Problems and Fields of Action of Politics

Table 17.6   The Federal Republic of Germany as a welfare state

Performance type/year

1970

1989

2007

2021

Total social benefits: in billion DM/Euro

174.7

678.5

742.1

1161.9

in % of GDP

25.7

30.0

29.8

33.1

Employee social security contributions (% of gross salary)

13.3

18.0

n. a.

21.65d)

Statutory old-age pensions

54.5

217.6

242.0

352.4

Statutory health insurance

23.8

134.4b) 152.6

276.2

Expenditure in areas (bn. DM, from 2007 €)

Accident insurance

4.9

12.9

11.6

15.0

Unemployment benefit/-assistance (from 2011: unemployment benefit/basic security)

2.1

25.8

34.1

53.5/49.2

Child-/parental allowance (up to 2006: childcare allowance)

2.9

11.2

40.8

47.6/8.3

Social and integration assistance/dar. Asylum seeker money

3.3

28.8

22.9

43.9/3.7

Housing allowance

0.6

3.4

1.0

1.6

– 18.3

51.9

Care benefits

–

Social compensation for victims of violence (up to 2007 only war victim support) 6.6

10.6

2.8

0.7

Recipients (millions) of: Old-age pensionsa)

10.2

14.8

24.7

21.1

Accident pensions

1.0

0.9

1.0

0.8

Unemployment benefits (from 2011: unemployment allowance/basic security)

0.1

1.4

7.2c)

1.1/5.7

Child/parental allowance (up to 2006 childcare allowance)

6.9

9.2

9.8

10.0/1.9

Social and integration assistance/asylum seekers’ allowance

1.5

3.3b) N/A

2.7/0.4

Households receiving housing allowance

0.9

1.9b) 0.6

0.7 (2020)

– –

4.3 (2020)

Recipients of nursing care benefits

–

(continued)

17.3  Policy Areas: Different Arenas

557

Table 17.6   (continued)

Performance type/year Social compensation for victims of violence (until 2007 only war victim benefits)

1970 2.6

1989 1.4

2007

2021

0.5

0.07

a) As a result of pension accumulation, the number of pensions exceeds the number of pensioners b) As of 1988 c) Federal Statistical Office, according to: FAZ, 15. 11. 2013 d) Pension and nursing care insurance rate Other items included in the social budget are, inter alia: compensation for Nazi victims, pensions, training grants, asset formation, supplementary pension for employees in the public sector, old-age security for farmers, youth welfare, benefits for asylum seekers. Sources: The Federal Minister for Labour and Social Affairs (2002); Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2021b, pp. 83, 264, 266, 288, 290, 293, 295, 298, 299, 303, 337); Federal Statistical Office (1990, pp. 421 ff.; 2009, pp. 201 ff., 152; 2022p;2022q); Techniker Krankenkasse (2022)

in pension law, child benefit, reduction of the minimum insurance period for oldage pensions) and nursing care insurance from 1995 (Schmidt 1990; Hockerts 2011, pp. 304 f.). Frank Nullmeier (2019, p. 22) speaks of the late Kohl years as a “point of entry into the exit” from the welfare state as a result of the economic crisis of 1993/94. But above all, the Schröder government (1998–2005) was under pressure to consolidate in the face of high unemployment. If old-age provision was to be stabilized by the transition “from income-oriented to incomeoriented old-age security policy”7 (supplemented by capital-funded private pension provision), flanked by a minimum pension level and a maximum contribution rate, one could see this as a “conversion” (Stoy 2013, p. 40) to a low basic security pension—steps towards a tax-financed Beveridge welfare model? This, “Hartz IV” and massive cuts in capital gains tax appeared like a break with “traditionally social democratic and trade union positions” (Gohr 2003, p. 45). Left criticism here complains of a “trend towards the re-privatization of social risks”, while bemoaning a “drastic reduction in the level of pensions” and increased “social fall height” through “Hartz IV” (Butterwegge 2005, pp. 21, 211, 195).

7 The

absolute level of pensions was “income-oriented” up to 2003 on the income of the working generation (“generational contract”), since then it has been oriented towards income (Pilz and Ortwein 2008, p. 248).

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17  Social Problems and Fields of Action of Politics

As a result, the grand coalition of 2005 to 2009 was characterized by a piece of “reverse reform” in that older employees were granted longer unemployment benefits (Trampusch 2009, p. 195). With the new grand coalition of 2013, the SPD introduced a statutory minimum wage, the rent brake and early retirement at 63 years of age without deductions, while the CDU/CSU introduced a child allowance of €25 more per child for mothers with children born before 1992 (which raised it to two-thirds of the pension for later mothers). In addition, the nursing care insurance was improved and extended, inevitably with higher contributions. At least the first two changes represent a departure from the reforms. In view of the good financial situation, the grand coalition of 2018 quickly agreed on relief and additional social expenditure: For most taxpayers, the solidarity surcharge is now history, the “basic pension” of 10% above the basic security level was decided, the contribution parity in statutory health insurance (abolished in 2005) came back, child benefit and child allowance were increased. In the end, there was only one hardship fund for DDR pensions (mainly for the benefit of women divorced in the DDR). What social policy does the coalition of the so-called “Alliance for [..] Justice”, as it is called in the subtitle of the coalition agreement, pursue? In addition to smaller reforms, such as the increase in the minimum wage to 12 € from 2022, the increase in the limits for mini and midi jobs, the securing of the pension level at 48% with a contribution rate of no more than 20%, without additional increase in the retirement age and with partial capital coverage, the coalition has a child basic security, which combines previously family policy benefits, as well as a revision of “Hartz IV”, to be replaced by a “citizen’s money”, announced. The latter probably represents not only a verbal and view to the emphasis of respect (“advice on an equal footing”, “relationship of trust”) as its own resource of social policy a break: “In the first two years of the citizen’s money we grant the benefit without taking into account the assets and recognize the appropriateness of the apartment. We will increase the protected assets and streamline, digitalize and pragmatically simplify their review.” In addition, a participation agreement is to replace the previous integration agreement (including a six-month probationary period), the priority of placement is to be abolished in favor of further education and qualification and earning opportunities are to be improved—in sum another step towards the dismantling of the Hartz reforms, even if the Bundesrat finally demanded concessions: The protected assets were set at 40,000 instead of 60,000 €, of the six-month probationary period nothing remained. “In sum, the development of social security systems is shaped by the respective economic and financial situation and by the political color of the govern-

17.3  Policy Areas: Different Arenas

559

ment. The former decides whether the social security system expands or shrinks as a whole (“consolidation”), the latter, which specific benefits are increased or reduced. With the SPD and CDU/CSU, “two large social state parties” determine the development (Schmidt 2006, pp. 138, 149). While CDU/CSU and FDP try to counter leveling tendencies in the interests of a performance-related distribution, the SPD and the Greens rather plead for the preservation of social benefits and for uniform regulations. In addition, trade unions, employers’ associations, social associations and the “Association of German Pension Insurance Institutions” influence the discussion. The high relevance of social policy results from the fact that around 40% of those entitled to vote derive their livelihood from social benefits. This is a massive “welfare state clientele” (Schmidt 2012, p. 32). If only those who receive social minimum security are taken into account, the proportion shrinks to 8.3% (as of 2020—Federal Statistical Office 2020b). Beyond all political guiding principles, it is increasingly the demographic problem pressure that dictates the social policy agenda and sets the trend “from the social insurance to the basic security state” (Nullmeier 2019, p. 33). d. Education Policy: Equal Opportunities or Education Quality? The history of educational policy in the Federal Republic of Germany can be divided into conflicts. These were partly fought out by the parties themselves, in the seventies almost as “true wars of faith about curricula, peace education and professional bans”. But also in the field of education, committed associations are profiled, such as the “German Teachers’ Association”, parent groups and the “Association of Universities” of professors rather conservative, the “Trade Union Education and Science” left (Thränhardt 1990). If you look at the central issues, the positions can be contrasted as follows: structured school system versus comprehensive schools, classical-humanistic education versus life-world competence, performance principle versus social learning, specialist knowledge versus interdisciplinarity and project, frontal teaching versus self-directed learning. Currently, there is a tendency towards a “two-pillar model”, in which two types of secondary modern school are to be merged. As a result, since each federal state is autonomous, there is “growing fragmentation and confusion” in the school system: Bremen, Hamburg and Saxony have progressed furthest in two-tier systems, a purely three-tier system (intermediate and secondary modern school, grammar school) has Bavaria—in all other countries there are integrated comprehensive or community schools, combined with one or more of the “classical” school types. The fact that a referendum in Hamburg in 2010 prevented the transition to a sixyear primary school at the expense of grammar schools and secondary modern

560

17  Social Problems and Fields of Action of Politics

Table 17.7   Germany’s 15-year-old schoolchildren in international comparison 2018. In points

Natural Sciences

Reading Comprehension

Mathematics

OECD Average

489

487

489

Germany

503

498

500

OECD Top 5

530 (Estonia)

523 (Estonia)

527 (Japan)

529 (Japan)

520 (Canada)

526 (Korea)

522 (Finland)

520 (Finland)

523 (Estonia)

519 (Korea)

518 (Ireland)

519 (Netherlands)

528 (Canada)

514 (Korea)

516 (Poland)

N = approx. 600,000 15-year-old students (5451 from Germany) Source: PISA study 2018, according to: Federal Ministry of Education and Research (2019)

schools, speaks in favour of taking the opinion of the citizens (Hepp 2011, pp. 71, 171, 220–225) seriously. Since the turn of the millennium, the quality of education has been given greater prominence. The impetus for this came from the internationally comparative PISA studies of the OECD, which attributed only moderate performance in mathematics and below-average language competence to pupils in Germany. This was followed by further tests: IGLU, TIMMS, IQB-Bildungstrend. In addition, it was politically explosive that federal states ruled by the Union for a long time performed better than those dominated by the Social Democrats—both in the PISA studies and in the Education Monitor of the Institute of the German Economy and the Initiative New Social Market Economy (Knauß 2017). In the meantime, the German pupils have lost some of the ground they have gained over the past five to ten years (Federal Ministry of Education and Research 2019): The reading skills of fifteen-year-olds are by no means as bad as they were in 2000, rather as in 2009, while the performance in mathematics declined significantly and remained relatively stable in the natural sciences (Table 17.7). Overall, Germany, like Australia, Belgium, France, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, Great Britain and the USA, is slightly above the OECD average. The strong link between socio-economic family status and the educational success of girls and boys is still seen as critical—this also applies and above all to those with a migrant background, even if their performance has improved over the long term. Their share has increased from 18 (2009) to 22 (2018) percent.

17.3  Policy Areas: Different Arenas

561

A study of fourth-graders in Germany (completion of elementary school) from 2017 was alarming, showing weaker performance than in 2011: Only two-thirds meet the regulatory standards for reading and listening, only 62% in mathematics and half in spelling. Similar to previous years, students in the city-states, Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia are lagging behind, while Bavaria and Saxony are performing best—one of the reasons: the increasing heterogeneity of the student body, e.g. through migration (Stanat et al. 2017). Even more alarming was the report from 2022, which showed the consequences of school closures during the Corona pandemic: Between 2016 and 2021, the proportion of those who fall below the respective minimum standards of the competence examined has increased by 6 to 8%—this corresponds to a learning loss of one quarter to half a school year (Stanat 2022). The intensified focus on educational quality was flanked by a general public debate on the child- or family-friendliness (“compatibility of work and family life”) of Germany, increasingly understanding kindergartens as educational institutions (Nullmeier 2019, p. 33). Its effect was seen in an agreement reached in 2007 by the federal government, the states and the municipalities to expand childcare places (initially for children under 3 years of age). This was followed by no less than five investment programs of the federal government, which stamped 750,000 childcare places out of the ground, the Child Benefit Act (2008), the legal anchoring of a childcare place for children from one year of age (2013) and the Good-KiTa Act (2019)—the federal government has jumped into the breach where municipalities and states lacked resources (Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth 2021). As a result, however, there are still large disparities: In the east, 53% of children under three years of age visit a kindergarten, in the west only 31; in the west, there is also a looming shortage of skilled workers (in the east only to a limited extent)—but the quality of childcare is higher in the west (measured by the childcare ratio—Bertelsmann Foundation 2021). Overall, educational policy is currently trying to emulate Anglo-Saxon and West European models. This includes the political goal of 50% of high school graduates, which in practice benefits from—the teacher’s association complains—grade inflation. The reduction of the duration of the grammar schools to eight years should also serve to align, partly supported by the abolition of compulsory subjects. Another innovation is the inclusion of children with disabilities in regular school lessons instead of the previous special schools. Parents see things differently in surveys. 69% find the school classes too large (more in Rhineland-Palatinate), 64% demand compensation for lesson cancellations (more

562

17  Social Problems and Fields of Action of Politics

in Rhineland-Palatinate), 54% want ability-based promotion; 71% hold the teaching staff responsible for poor school performance, 39% find “G 8” too short, only 24% think it is a good thing (much more positively in the east, where such models have already been practiced before). 61% want a centralization of school policy. In total, the school policies of the federal states receive a “three minus” at best (Vodafone Foundation Germany 2010). In the meantime, almost ten percent of pupils in Germany attend a private school (school year 2018/19—Federal Statistical Office 2020c, pp. 4 ff.). With the 8-year grammar school, there have been widespread retreats of educational policy in the meantime, the problems of student heterogeneity seem to be suppressed. A break was also looming with the a judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court, which no longer accepts the final grade as the sole criterion due to unequal grading. And the PISA tests remain a thorn in the side of educational policy. The ministers of education apparently tortured themselves through the development of uniform educational standards (no federal central final examination) in 2012, and the “National Education Council” did not even start its work because individual states withdrew. Overall, the primary goals of greater equality of opportunity and good educational outcomes compete with each other. In higher education, German politics has taken a consensus-based departure from the group university model of the 1970s since 1998 in order to reorganize it along Anglo-Saxon lines (Bologna reform). Externally appointed university councils, strong presidents, global budgets and autonomy have largely replaced academic selfadministration (Hepp 2011, pp. 234–241). In addition to strictly planned, schooled bachelor’s programs, graduate schools and “excellence clusters” are supposed to promote top performance (Wolf 2006). Has the reform really been a success story, is the bachelor’s degree becoming the norm? The model has become the rule, three quarters of the students are in the bachelor’s or master’s degree, the duration of study has been reduced by 2.6 semesters (bachelor’s and master’s degree together vs. diploma degrees 1998), the drop-out rate is 28% in the bachelor’s degree (11% in the university master’s degree, 7% at the university of applied sciences), 53% of the university of applied sciences bachelor’s degrees and 77% of the university bachelor’s degrees continue (contrary to intention) with a master’s degree, the unemployment rate of bachelor’s graduates is three (university of applied sciences) or 2 (university) percent (Federal Ministry of Education and Research o. J.). Critics among university teachers—and there are not a few of them—complain about the increased bureaucracy, inflexible teaching and the decline in independent thinking among students (Petersen 2017). In any case, the universities of applied sciences did not want to sacrifice their “diploma engineer” on the “altar of a supposed internationality” (Hepp 2011, pp. 256–260), the lawyers and medical doctors resisted a bachelor’s-master’s degree.

17.3  Policy Areas: Different Arenas

563

The development is accompanied by a “grade dumping” at the universities, incited by the widespread introduction of the assessment of professorships according to the number of their graduates. Working conditions at universities are diverging: In Hesse, the W3 professor (as of April 2022) initially earns 1,234.51 euros less than in Baden-Württemberg. Due to varying experience levels and basic benefits in the federal states and in the federal government, this gap widens even more towards the end of the term of office (but then between Saxony and Lower Saxony—German Rectors’ Conference 2022a). The quality of teaching also varies, measured by the supervision ratio: In Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Thuringia, 52 students are enrolled for each university professor, in North Rhine-Westphalia 89 (a slight improvement compared to ten years ago—German Rectors’ Conference 2022b). Nevertheless, the mechanisms of cooperative federalism lead to the fact that the German educational system has remained more or less uniform. The central mediation institution is the Conference of Ministers of Education (KMK) with 220 employees (Conference of Ministers of Education 2022), in which numerous agreements are negotiated. It seems that the CDU has largely withdrawn from educational policy and hardly has any contours left, so that the dominant conflict line runs rather between governments and stubborn parts of the teaching profession and parents. e. Policy areas: health, law, family, climate protection Health care: Health care is a complex policy area with both private (selfemployed physicians, pharmaceutical industry, private clinics and insurance companies) and public sector (mainly hospitals, statutory health insurance companies) components. Its relevance arises from its size: In the first “corona year” 2020, expenditure amounted to 441 billion euros (new record), with statutory health insurance companies shouldering the lion’s share (Federal Statistical Office 2022r). In addition, there are 5.65 million employees, including 2.3 million in doctor’s offices, pharmacies and outpatient care and 2 million in (partially) stationary facilities (Federal Statistical Office 2020d). Development is characterized by expansions of the statutory insured population in the 1970s, but since then by conflicts over disproportionately rising costs, financial distributions and savings. Cost drivers are the development of medicine and the aging of the shrinking population. Health policy is increasingly subject to a “primacy of stable contribution rates” (Perschke-Hartmann 1994, p. 47). Under cost pressure, policy-makers and health insurers are trying to restrict the financial scope of action of doctors and the demand for services of insured persons by means of budgeting (fixed global sums for certain types of services)

564

17  Social Problems and Fields of Action of Politics

and cost-sharing (Blanke 1998; Bandelow 1998). The Kohl government also introduced a risk equalization between health insurance companies due to their different membership. It was a turning point when the red-green coalition reduced co-payments. The extent of the pressure can be seen, inter alia, in the reduction of hospital beds by about 180,000 since 1991 and the halving of the length of stay of patients in hospitals to about seven days (Federal Statistical Office 2022s). The reform introduced by the Grand Coalition in 2007 had a compromise character. In the context of this reform, a health fund was set up to which health insurance contributions are paid and then distributed to the individual statutory health insurance schemes according to their number of members and risk structure. Private health insurers have to offer basic tariffs with statutory benefits to their voluntary policyholders, and former policyholders have to be taken back at this rate (Illing 2022, pp. 228 ff.). One can see in this system steps towards a single citizen’s insurance for all, as the SPD strives for, but also in favour of a fair health insurance market including private health insurance companies. With the freezing of the employer’s share, employers were exempted from future contribution increases, and specialist doctors can also opt out of the collective bargaining system with the statutory health insurance schemes (Stoy 2013, p. 33). The next major reform of 2011 included an increase in health insurance contributions, the introduction of the possibility of additional contributions, the obligation of pharmaceutical companies to prove the benefit of their products, and the linking of GP fees to other medical fees. So these are small twists to different dials that run through the health sector. The big bang, such as a “citizen’s insurance” for all (election goal of the left parties) or something else, could hardly be expected from a Grand Coalition. The financing gap in hospitals has also remained unanswered. They try to finance investments from current income, but they have to “expect a gradual erosion of substance” (RWI 2017, p. 123). In spite of this, there is a lot of grumbling. Individual health insurance companies need additional contributions from their policyholders, individual provisions of the risk equalization are controversial, there are complaints about medical preferences for private patients (who generate more fees), there is a shortage of doctors in rural areas, price regulations for drugs are controversial. The COVID-19 pandemic has brought to light the large gaps in the health system: the sluggishness of a federally structured health sector in epidemics and the lack of attractiveness of the nursing profession, which is suffering from problematic working conditions and a shortage of staff. The Grand Coalition reacted to this with quickly introduced—and sometimes harshly criticized—laws; other reforms (e.g. digitalization of the health system, appointment service points for faster appointment scheduling) are unlikely to be remembered (Illing 2022, pp. 341 ff.).

17.3  Policy Areas: Different Arenas

565

The coalition parties wants to join here, formulates “a precautionary, crisisproof and modern health system, which makes use of the opportunities of biotechnological and medical procedures, and combats age-related diseases as well as rare or poverty-related diseases”, as one of the six central future fields (Mehr Fortschritt wagen, p. 19). This includes, among other things, the improvement of nursing working conditions, the strengthening of the public health service and the digitalization of the health care system (Mehr Fortschritt wagen, pp. 81 ff.). In total, a powerful, modern and efficient health care is achieved. The special feature of this policy field is that the service providers are partly private, partly public institutions. The consequence is that not only parties, parliaments and political majorities decide. To a considerable extent, rather, bargaining and wrestling takes place between health insurance companies, statutory health insurance companies, the pharmaceutical industry, associations and the federal government—also across the board of lawyers, agencies and foundations (Klenk 2019, p. 45). Since a conflict would be difficult to fight, so far mostly solutions have been sought through agreements (Illing 2022, pp. 13 ff.). Legal policy: An example of a policy field in which state access is limited to regulatory functions, is finally the legal policy. If legal policy is understood to mean conclusions from constitutional principles and other norms, then one can first recognize a phase of CDU-dominated governments until 1966, in which the consequences of war were in the foreground. This was followed by the social-liberal phase until 1982, during which reforms of child, divorce and sexual law as well as the right to demonstration took place. The “Extremistenbeschluss” of 1972 also falls into this period (Mannewitz et al. 2018, pp. 206 f.; Rigoll 2013; Jesse 2016). In contrast, the Christian-liberal coalition of 1982–98 only made minor modifications to divorce and demonstration law (Landfried 1990), including the “big eavesdropping”, for which the Minister of Justice Sabine LeutheusserSchnarrenberger (FDP) threw in the towel in 1996. This makes the role of the leading government party at the time clear, limited only by coalition partners and jurisprudence. The course changes remained moderate. However, the style of argumentation, legal discussion and influence of both left-liberal intellectuals and the churches characterize this policy field. Despite more far-reaching ideas, the red-green government policy has only emerged on this field through individual innovations, such as a life partnership law (2001) for homosexual couples. However, the anti-terror laws (2002 and 2007) and the debate about the Air Security Act (2005) also belong to this era (Mannewitz et al. 2018, pp. 207 f.), which was followed by a phase in which politics concentrated on “the core area of ​​state security” (Glaeßner 2010, p. 173), but “did not lead to a substantial change in policy” (Busch 2010, p. 404), probably mainly because the conflict lines on this issue

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are less between left and right, but between freedom by versus freedom before the state. Either way: In Germany there is a gap between objectively quite high security and subjective feelings of insecurity (Hummelsheim-Doss 2017; Thieme 2018). However, the trend towards the legal clarification of conflicts has been leading for some time to the overburdening of the courts, which are suffering from a chronic shortage of staff and are facing a wave of retirements (Fiebig 2021). The “Pact for the Rule of Law” agreed between the federal government and the federal states in 2019 was a response to this: 2700 new positions were created, court proceedings were accelerated by simplifying the Criminal Procedure Code, the Civil Procedure Code and the Administrative Court Code. The coalition plans to build on this: by extending and supplementing the pact with the digitalization theme, by a digital and a practice check for new laws, a “Center for Legistik” and a digital legislative portal, which shows in which phase the projects are. Court proceedings are to become faster and more efficient, collective legal protection is to be strengthened, organized crime is to be given priority (Mehr Fortschritt wagen, pp. 9 ff., 105 ff.). Family and Equal Opportunities Policy: In the past, the Union parties defended the traditional, partnership-based family, also sought to support the role of the mother, while social-liberal policy achieved divorce without fault and equality of non-marital children. The end of the development seem to be the “marriage for all” (2017) and the legal approximation or equality of different lifestyles with traditional family (2018, pp. 11, 19, 22 ff.). This is underlined by the fact that the grand coalition formulated that“no particular family model” is to be preferred, that the“equality” of women work life and “children’s rights” in the Basic Law will be achieved, and that violence against women and children as well as “sexism” will be fought(Coalition Agreement, pp. 11, 19, 22 ff.). With the broadly based antidiscrimination policy of the SPD, the gender quota of management positions, the “marriage for all” and the one or the other judgment from Karlsruhe (for example, 2017 to the third gender) went the “consolidation of the modernization course in family and equal opportunities policy” (Henninger and von Wahl 2019, p. 469) forward, as it had begun in 2005–09. For a long time, the costs of children were insufficiently taken into account. Only in the nineties a ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court led to the fact that the subsistence minimum of children was no longer taxed; this also triggered increases in child benefits. In addition, there was a parental allowance as a wage replacement benefit. Since then, the compatibility of work and parental role has become the central family policy issue. Although there is a corridor of commonality between most parties (expansion of day-care centers, financial strengthening of families with children), two different trends can be seen: one more collective,

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according to which children should be in day-care centers or all-day schools before the third year of life and mothers should dedicate themselves to employment, on the other hand a more traditional one, which would like to keep mothers and children together at least until kindergarten age or wants to keep the choice open. The former are the left-wing parties, the latter the CSU and the AfD. Where the development is going will also depend on the financing of a care system and the women. According to the political provenance of the three coalition partners, these, inter alia, want to promote inclusive education, anchor children’s rights in the Basic Law, drive the expansion of day-care centers, agree on a right to all-day offers, support focus schools, promote the digitalization of schools, introduce a child benefit, provide a two-week, paid leave after birth for the partner, extend the partner months in the parental allowance, simplify adoption and parenthood recognition for non-traditional families and expand the “small custody” for social parents (Mehr Fortschritt wagen, pp. 93 ff.). Environmental policy: Environmental policy has existed long before the Greens. It was introduced into a federal election campaign in 1961 with the SPD slogan of “a blue sky over the Ruhr.” Its development phases were more in line with economic conditions than with the party-political coloring of the government majorities (Weidner and Jänicke 1998): • An “establishment phase” until 1974 with the passage of the Federal Immission Control Act and the establishment of the Federal Environment Agency; • a “phase of defensive environmental policy” after the recession of 1974; • a “recovery and consolidation phase” since the early 1980s, when the Kohl government introduced emission limits and catalysts; • after 1990, German unity, job and financial problems pushed environmental policy into the background. • It was not until the end of the 2010s that the issue came to the fore, spurred on above all by climate protection agreements and laws as well as increased public attention to the issue, noticeably reflected in worldwide protests. The red-green government 1998–2005 introduced energy taxes (“ecotaxes”), a gradual withdrawal from nuclear energy, rejection of genetic engineering and a levy on all electricity consumers in favor of renewable energies (EEG surcharge). Although the Greens no longer belonged to the federal government for a long time afterwards, their legacy remained untouched. In addition, the Merkel governments pushed things further: by shutting down nuclear power plants prematurely (decided in 2011) in the wake of Fukushima, the decision in 2020 to end coal-fired power generation by 2038, a motor vehicle tax introduced in 2021

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based on CO2 emissions, and promotion of electric mobility. Climate protection has become the central environmental policy goal in Germany as a result of international congresses. But the problems are growing. Although the “Renewable Energy Sources Act” is “generally” considered a “success story” (Böcher and Töller 2012, p. 61), the levy on electricity consumers is increasing along with the amount of green power. This power, which is fed into the grid with priority by law, achieves rather low prices; when wind and sun fail, traditional power plants have to step in, but they are no longer profitable as mere fillers. The German expansion of power lines and networks is also lagging increasingly behind the growth of subsidized green power, so that this is sometimes without a power connection. The beneficiaries are the owners of wind turbines and solar roofs, to whom the law guarantees high risk-free profits over many years. As a result, electricity prices for private households in Germany are highest in Europe (Eurostat 2022). The Ampel coalition reacted by abolishing the EEG surcharge. The costs of promoting renewable energies are now borne by the “Energy and Climate Fund” of the federal government. With the Climate Protection Act of 2019, the Grand Coalition sought to transpose the Paris Climate Agreement (“2-degree target”) of 2015 into national law. The key points were: reduction of greenhouse gases by 2030 by 55% compared to 1990, greenhouse gas neutrality by 2050, annual emission targets for all sectors (e.g. transport, agriculture, industry) with continuous success control and possible immediate readjustment, climate-neutral federal administration by 2030 (The federal government 2019). Part of this was also a reduction in value added tax on train tickets. The most important element was the introduction of its own, national emissions trading from 2021 for the sectors of buildings and transport. After criticism from the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG 2021), that the freedom of future generations would be severely restricted by the delay in CO2 reduction, the government improved: The savings are to be 65% by 2030 and 88% by 2040, greenhouse gas neutrality is to be achieved by 2045, the annual emission targets have been further reduced and extended to 2040 (Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Nuclear Safety and Consumer Protection 2021). The law was flanked by an immediate programme of EUR 8 billion, inter alia for building renovation, climate-friendly social housing and climate-friendly energy. The coalition of the SPD, the Greens and the FDP has put the pedal to the metal again—not in terms of targets (65% CO2 reduction by 2030/climate neutrality 2045), but in terms of implementation: increase of the share of renewables from planned 65 to 80% by 2030, expansion of gas power plants as a transitional solution, “ideally” preference for the coal phase-out by 2030, lower limit for the CO2 price, increase of the share of E-cars by 2030 to 15 million vehicles (Mehr Fortschritt wagen—Koalitionsvertrag, pp. 51, 56, 58 f., 164).

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However, the achievement of the international climate target of 2 or 1.5 °C is facing a number of challenges: In the meantime, first of all, a variety of interest groups are appearing. Private and industrial electricity consumers, companies with their own electricity generation, producers of renewable energies, new investors, federal states with more renewable energy on the one hand and other federal states (Wurster and Köhler 2016), producers of traditional energies, European Commission, not least environmental protection associations and parties are among these. They all play an active role and can pursue their interests essentially not via the market, but only as influential lobbyists in a complex political decision-making process. Secondly, natural conditions are still in the way: The fact that electricity cannot be stored or transported over long distances in large quantities makes it more difficult to achieve the electricity mix of the future and the construction of power lines, because Germany’s energy-rich north is facing an energy-intensive south. Thirdly, politicians can formulate ever more ambitious goals and promote the climate-friendly transformation of the economy and society through financial means or by changing legal framework conditions. However, they have little influence on many relevant factors: the war in Ukraine, which has focused on natural gas (in order to become less dependent on Russian imports), the shortage of skilled workers and raw materials, both of which are needed for wind turbines, photovoltaic systems or climate-friendly housing, finally the “Nimby” attitude (“not in my backyard”) of residents, who do not want a wind turbine, no power line, no railway tracks in front of their house. The massively fluctuating raw material prices are another variable. Fourth, there are the enormous economic and social costs of the “Great Transformation”, recognizable in the permanent conflict over the financing of climate protection against the background of the debt brake, but also in the population’s concerns about high costs and disadvantaged regions being left behind in the energy transition (Fröhlich et al. 2021). Against this background, more efficient use of resources in the sense of a more comprehensive CO2 pricing would be desirable: “Emissions trading is the most efficient instrument for achieving climate targets. Any other policy, such as bans on combustion engines or gas and oil heating, makes climate policy more expensive overall.” (Wambach 2022, p. 113) Finally, fifth, the energy transition is not achieved through the efforts of a single country, especially if it only emits such a small proportion of global greenhouse gases as Germany (1.9%). However, large energy consumers such as the USA or China have no intention of regulating their emissions along German lines. The attitude of many countries is not only based on economic considerations or the pressure of growing populations, but also on the prioritization of short-term economic

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success and the free rider problem. However, the moral counter-argument is that Germany’s CO2 per capita emissions are also twice as high (9.7 t) as the global average; in addition, Germany has contributed almost five percent to global warming since the Industrial Revolution. Finally, “if all countries that emit less CO2 than Germany also came up with the argument that their share of CO2 emissions was so small, this would be fatal for climate protection. Half of the world’s CO2 emissions would then remain unchanged.” (Franck 2021). However, since moral gains should not offset the economic costs of a transformation, a “climate club” of ambitious states has been discussed for some time, which, according to the ideas of William Nordhaus (2015), establishes carbon taxes and a CO2 border adjustment system and thus contributes to a climate-friendly industrial and economic transformation also outside the club (Schieritz 2021).

17.4 Perspectives of the Federal Republic The history of the Federal Republic is—especially in comparison with the Weimar Republic—considered a success story. This is certainly true for its first phase 1949–69, when an impressive reconstruction took place from the desperate starting position to an economically strong, liberal-democratic and militarily protected country (albeit only in the west of the old Germany). Certainly, undamaged production potential, training qualifications and the military umbrella of the USA in particular contributed to this, but German politics did its part, above all with West orientation, market economy and social security. Democracy achieved an acceptance that was not least due to this reconstruction. The second third of its history, 1969–90, can be characterized as an era of quieter expansion and consolidation. Although coal, Germany’s former ace, lost importance and some production in the country became unprofitable due to higher wages, it was possible to preserve the industrial base. Unemployment could be cushioned socially, nerve-wracking crises of the Cold War were overcome with moderation and fortitude. However, with two turning points at that time, a slight deterioration set in. These were the decline in births 1963–73 to an extremely low and since then stagnating level, on the other hand a certain departure from natural sciences and technology in education. Since 1990, in the youngest third of its history, the Federal Republic has been freed from Soviet pressure, the German people have been reunited in peace and freedom, but under the challenge of increased socio-cultural and -economic heterogeneity in society and considerable transformation pains in the east. The German unification was followed by a deepening of the European Union, which has placed Germany in a semi-sovereign position.

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In this context of a stable and prosperous country, changed external framework conditions and created burdens, German politics must deal with today’s problems: 1. It must find its role in foreign policy in the changed international environment (foreign policy determination). Following its previous development, the Federal Republic is seeking its future alongside Western democracies with its trade interests and its need for military affiliation. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has raised the question of alliance orientation, more precisely: its own contribution to NATO and the EU (Krause 2019). 2. The Federal Republic lives in the European internal market and with the common European currency (European integration). In addition to their positive effects, more and more differences in interests are emerging within a economically quite heterogeneous association, which could lead to a redistribution and debt community. At the same time, with each loss of competence to Europe, the problem of an hollowed-out democracy for the citizens of the Federal Republic increases, without this increasing the cooperation ability of the actors. This has been shown by financial, euro, refugee, corona (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2018), and most recently the Ukraine crisis, in which the EU rarely spoke with one voice. 3. The consequences of the decades-long birth deficit are becoming increasingly clear: a declining proportion of younger people and a population shrinkage with the consequence of a declining labor force potential and unaffordable social security systems at the present level. A future demographic stabilization is not yet in sight. 4. In addition, the fragile prosperity of the export nation Germany must be reearned on a globally expanding market (economic location of Germany). Interest in natural sciences/technology seems to have grown again. However: Shrinking labor force potential, rising energy costs, costs of social state and immigration, plus disruptions in trade markets—these are likely to be problems with which German politics must deal. 5. The increase in economic disparities, which are also (but not only) regionally visible in disadvantaged and flourishing regions (no longer just: east and west), still tests the demand for “establishing equal living conditions”, in the future probably also because the Great Transformation will not only produce winner regions. The emerging and system-transferred polarization between urban, academically shaped and cosmopolitan as well as rural, more communitarian regions is likely to solidify, including “distribution and recognition conflicts” (Grotz and Schroeder 2021, p. 411)

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6. In addition, there are those challenges that arise from Germany’s growing status as a country of immigration and the south-north migration that is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. The social integration efforts required for social cohesion, economic strength, social systems and liberal democracy are among the greatest challenges of the 21st century. Given these challenges, what is the state of the country’s political system? Can it shoulder the problems without losing legitimacy and stability? It makes sense to examine the practice of the political system with regard to • Input-legitimation through participation, consent; • Throughout-legitimation through transparency, in particular accountability; • Output-legitimation through effectiveness, problem-solving ability (Heinelt 2008, pp. 33 ff.). First, with regard to participatory legitimacy: The changes in political culture, the weakened trust in politicians, the reduced party affiliation and voter turnout do not lead to any current-alarming crisis phenomena, despite an increase in protests of different colors in the last decade. They are not accompanied by a comprehensive dissatisfaction with democracy. However, the willingness to change party preferences and to abstain from voting increases the instability of majorities, indeed of the existing party system as a whole. These changes are similar to those observed in other democracies. Democratic participation appears to be devalued as a result of the increase in publics, the dramatically reduced possibility of homogeneous government coalitions and the European democracy deficit. You can express your preferences when you vote, but you have less influence on the political results. In addition, parties and clubs are losing their integration power. Can the addition of direct democratic elements remedy this? Secondly, decision-making competencies are transferred to the European level and the character of an autonomous national system is increasingly lost. If one takes into account the already high degree of complexity of the German political system with its three political levels and checks and balances, the addition of the European level results in the average citizen’s view of an unclear complexity of the German-European multi-level system, intransparent, increasingly less targeted and (see combating the Corona pandemic) less efficient. It is becoming more and more difficult to answer who is responsible for what and where effective influence can be exerted. The possibility of a democratic legitimacy crisis cannot be ruled out, especially in the face of alternative media, in which the public service’s duty to inform takes on particular importance. The fact that the

References

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Bundestag is often reluctant to reform itself (keyword: voting rights, transparency rules) does not make the matter any easier. The increased social sensitivity to representation issues also challenges the political system as a whole. Finally, to the problem-solving ability: The negotiation democratic features of the political system hardly allow for large, decisive solutions, but only incremental changes. This has the advantage of gradual, corrective reforms in the sense of Karl Popper (1971, pp. 47 ff.), which correspond to the limited human capacity for calculation and avoid the great mistake. But the political system contains— with divergences between the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, the declining power of parties and associations and inhomogeneous governments—the danger of too small solutions and insufficient decision-making ability. This is particularly true for the European Union. The question arises as to whether this political overall system guarantees an appropriate and democratically legitimized decision-making ability. Severe and persistent performance weaknesses, like any political system, could also be dangerous for the Federal Republic of Germany. An intensification of international economic competition, cultural conflicts within society or the illiteracy of a socio-ecological transformation—such political stressors for the local democracy are easily imaginable. The vulnerability of an exceptionally export-dependent country is also to be taken into account. Disillusionment with voters due to political frustration and transparency deficits could then prove fatal. But the Federal Republic still differs a lot from the Weimar Republic: the absence of economic crises, fundamental criticism of democracy and endogenous political violence. Unlike this, the latter has proven to be as resilient as consenting under several crises.

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582

17  Social Problems and Fields of Action of Politics

tliche-Finanzen/Schulden-Finanzvermoegen/Tabellen/31-12-2020-jaehrliche-schuldenoeffentichen-gesamthaushalt.html (zuletzt geprüft am 14. Juni 2022). Statistisches Bundesamt (2022a): Zusammengefasste Geburtenziffer im EU-Vergleich, unter: https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bevoelkerung/_Grafik/_Interaktiv/geburten-geburtenziffer-eu-vergleich.html (zuletzt geprüft am 6. Juni 2022). Statistisches Bundesamt (2022b): Erwerbstätigkeit von Müttern: Deutschland über EUDurchschnitt, unter: https://www.destatis.de/Europa/DE/Thema/Bevoelkerung-ArbeitSoziales/Arbeitsmarkt/Erwerbstaetige_Muetter.html (zuletzt geprüft am 6. Juni 2022). Statistisches Bundesamt (2022c): Ausländische Bevölkerung nach Altersgruppen und ausgewählten Staatsangehörigkeiten, unter: https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/ Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bevoelkerung/Migration-Integration/Tabellen/auslaendische-bevoelkerung-altersgruppen.html (zuletzt geprüft am 6. Juni 2022). Statistisches Bundesamt (2022d): Bevölkerung in Privathaushalten nach Migrationshintergrund und höchstem beruflichem Bildungsabschluss, unter: https://www.destatis.de/DE/ Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bevoelkerung/Migration-Integration/Tabellen/migrationshintergrund-beruflicherabschluss.html (zuletzt geprüft am 7. Juni 2022). Statistisches Bundesamt (2022e): Bevölkerung in Privathaushalten nach Migrationshintergrund und höchstem allgemeinem Schulabschluss, unter: https://www.destatis.de/DE/ Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bevoelkerung/Migration-Integration/Tabellen/migrationshintergrund-schulabschluss.html (zuletzt geprüft am 7. Juni 2022). Statistisches Bundesamt (2022f): Bevölkerung in Privathaushalten nach Migrationshintergrund und überwiegendem Lebensunterhalt, unter: https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/ Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bevoelkerung/Migration-Integration/Tabellen/migrationshintergrund-lebensunterhalt.html (zuletzt geprüft am 7. Juni 2022). Statistisches Bundesamt (2022g): Migration und Integration, unter: https://www.destatis. de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bevoelkerung/Migration-Integration/_inhalt.html ;jsessionid=83AED3BF9747C2A8D228A5FB7C4521F9.live721#sprg233648 (zuletzt geprüft am 8. Juni 2022). Statistisches Bundesamt (2022h): EU-Vergleich der Arbeitskosten, unter: https://www. destatis.de/Europa/DE/Thema/Bevoelkerung-Arbeit-Soziales/Arbeitsmarkt/EU_HoeheArbeitskosten.html (zuletzt geprüft am 8. Juni 2022). Statistisches Bundesamt (2022i): Erwerbstätigenquoten 1991 bis 2021, unter: https://www. destatis.de/DE/Themen/Arbeit/Arbeitsmarkt/Erwerbstaetigkeit/Tabellen/erwerbstaetigenquoten-gebietsstand-geschlecht-altergruppe-mikrozensus.html (zuletzt geprüft am 8. Juni 2022). Statistisches Bundesamt (2022j): Auszubildende nach Ausbildungsberufen, unter: https:// www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bildung-Forschung-Kultur/Berufliche-Bildung/Tabellen/liste-azubi-rangliste.html (zuletzt geprüft am 8. Juni 2022). Statistisches Bundesamt (2022k): Studierende insgesamt und Studierende Deutsche nach Geschlecht, unter: https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bildung-Forschung-Kultur/Hochschulen/Tabellen/lrbil01.html (zuletzt geprüft am 8. Juni 2022). Statistisches Bundesamt (2022l): Erwerbstätige im Inland nach Wirtschaftssektoren, unter: https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Wirtschaft/Konjunkturindikatoren/Lange-Reihen/ Arbeitsmarkt/lrerw13a.html (zuletzt geprüft am 8. Juni 2022).

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