The Political Impact of African Military Leaders: Soldiers as Intellectuals, Nationalists, Pan-Africanists, and Statesmen (Contributions to Political Science) 3031314263, 9783031314261

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Contributions to Political Science

Sabella Ogbobode Abidde Felix Kumah-Abiwu   Editors

The Political Impact of African Military Leaders Soldiers as Intellectuals, Nationalists, Pan-Africanists, and Statesmen

Contributions to Political Science

The series Contributions to Political Science contains publications in all areas of political science, such as public policy and administration, political economy, comparative politics, European politics and European integration, electoral systems and voting behavior, international relations and others. Publications are primarily monographs and multiple author works containing new research results, but conference and congress reports are also considered. The series covers both theoretical and empirical aspects and is addressed to researchers and policy makers. All titles in this series are peer-reviewed. This book series is indexed in Scopus.

Sabella Ogbobode Abidde  •  Felix Kumah-Abiwu Editors

The Political Impact of African Military Leaders Soldiers as Intellectuals, Nationalists, Pan-­Africanists, and Statesmen

Editors Sabella Ogbobode Abidde Department of History and Political Science Alabama State University Montgomery, AL, USA

Felix Kumah-Abiwu Department of Africana Studies Kent State University Kent, OH, USA

ISSN 2198-7289     ISSN 2198-7297 (electronic) Contributions to Political Science ISBN 978-3-031-31426-1    ISBN 978-3-031-31427-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31427-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

Right after I coedited the book on Fidel Castro and Africa’s Liberation Struggle – a book to which Felix Kumah-Abiwu, my coeditor for this book, contributed a chapter – I knew it was only a matter of time before we worked together. The connection and the chemistry were there. Years earlier, I had been thinking about “why Rawlings, Sankara, Ghaddafi, and Nasser are different calibers of military and political leaders?” Of the four, Gamal Abdel Nasser was the oldest and the first to die in 1970 at the age of 52. Thomas Isidore Noël Sankara was the youngest and was assassinated in 1987. Muammar Gaddafi was killed in 2011 at the age of 68; and within a decade, Jerry John Rawlings succumbed to illness on November 12, 2020. For many Africans, November 2020 signaled the end of an era insofar as African politics and leadership were concerned. Several months after the passing of Rawlings, Felix (in Kent, Ohio) and I (in Montgomery, Alabama) were having a series of conversations relating to our professional careers, the legacy of Rawlings, and some other matters of importance. But then the conversation kept drifting back to the life, time, and legacy of Rawlings. How do you talk about Rawlings without bringing Thomas Sankara into the conversation? And then Muammar Gaddafi and Abdel Nasser. Thereafter, we surveyed the continent. But alas, there was no one else to include on the list that one could say had the combined attributes of a “Soldier, Intellectual, Nationalist, Pan-Africanist, and Statesman.” This, essentially, was how we came about this volume that interrogates the political impact of African military leaders. The first volume, for which Felix is the lead editor, is solely on Jerry John Rawlings: Leadership and Legacy – A Pan-African Perspective. Coediting both books has been a privilege for us. A huge privilege! In the first place – despite the role and place of Jerry Rawlings in Africa and global politics – there are very few books about him by African scholars. And second, there is not a single book that examines the role, place, and legacy of four exceptional political/ military leaders in Africa. Fortunately, this will not be the last of such book by us (as we intend to examine the role, place, and legacy of African nationalist leaders such as Kenneth Kaunda, Julius Nyerere, Obafemi Awolowo, Seretse Khama, and Léopold Sédar Senghor). African studies, African history, and leadership studies v

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will benefit immensely if many more scholars take it upon themselves to examine and reexamine military and political leadership on the continent. More than in any other continent – and more than at any other time – Africans must pay attention to the type of men and women at the helm of leadership. Africa, contrary to prevailing views and narratives, is not poor. Human and natural resources are in abundance. What is sorely lacking is first-rate, essential, visionary, and capable political leadership to harness the resources, formulate good policies, set the agenda, and help advance and develop the continent. Capable leaders would be able to withstand the pressure from domestic and foreign predators. They would know and understand the role and essentiality of impartial institutions, the rule of law, and what it means to be human and humane and make it possible for the citizens to live, thrive, and die in dignity. In a couple of months, we intend to begin the process of working on two other books on other political leaders but taking the same approach as the first of the two books. Africa’s political leadership matters, and so does the future of a continent that has to struggle greatly to modernize and provide basic and essential political goods and services to its teeming populations. Montgomery, AL, USA Kent, OH, USA Spring 2023

Sabella Ogbobode Abidde Felix Kumah-Abiwu

Introduction

As with many colonized societies, independence did not come easy for states and societies on the African continent – with many achieving independence by way of armed struggle; negotiated settlement; or a combination of low-intensity conflict and negotiations. But within a decade or two of independence, many of these countries were engulfed in instability and uncertainties. They were confounded by ethnic and/or religious conflicts, economic downturns and social unrest, third-rate leadership and fragmented institutions, civil wars, military insurrections, or outright military coup d’états. For many African countries, therefore, the first and second decades of independence were rough. And while some have recovered or seemed to be recovering, many others still suffer from the residual effects of the miseries and limitations of the early years. Adding to the privations and limitations are the motives, machinations, and practices of hegemonic powers in both western and non-western societies. Even with the aforesaid – other than the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade and colonization – nothing in the recent past has had more insidious effects on the continent than the type and quality of leadership states and societies on the continent have had. Leadership matters. Quality leadership! Africa has all the tangible and intangible resources other enslaved, colonized, and exploited societies have. But what states and societies on the continent lack the most are visionary, educated, committed, selfless, and patriotic leaders. With quality leadership comes the ability to build, among other things, strong and impartial institutions and the provision of law and order. We have the Four Asian Tigers (i.e., Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) because of the quality of leadership they had. China was able to move millions of its citizens out of poverty and create one of the largest middle classes in the world all within five decades because of its leadership quality. The oil-producing states in the Middle East are today on the move because of the caliber of the men and women who run those countries. However, it is important to also note that some scholars have continued to critique the authoritarian nature and leadership styles of these countries. But not so in Africa where, in almost every country, there has been a crisis of accountability, crisis of institutions, a crisis of effective management, and vii

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an excruciating and incapacitating crisis of leadership. One out of every two African countries has a crisis of leadership. It is these crises that in nearly all cases triggered the coups that were once fashionable and readily accepted in many parts of the continent. Regrettably, many of the military coups that were intended to resolve the crises compounded the situation. This was the case in places like Gambia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Liberia, Uganda, and Mali. What this means is that coup leaders can themselves be misguided, self-aggrandizing, and short-sighted. In many cases, they worsen the conditions which, in some cases, led to countercoups and or tenure elongation and the delegitimization of the political and governing process. It needs remembering that for more than four decades, beginning in the early 1950s through the tail-end of the twentieth century, Africa was the bastion of military coups bested perhaps only by Latin America. Coups and counter-coups in many parts of the continent were planned and executed. These sudden and extralegal overthrows of governments were so routine that many came to view coupists as unprofessional and unpatriotic members of the military that were ill-equipped to govern modern states and their various institutions. Nonetheless, there were exceptions to the typical: soldiers who transformed their immediate communities and, by extension, the continent. While the military’s role in politics is still a subject of intense debate in the scholarly/public domain, it is indisputable that some of Africa’s former military leaders went on to become icons and respected leaders of their and other eras. During the “coup decades,” and for many decades after that, four soldiers and coup plotters  – Jerry Rawlings (Ghana), Moammar Gaddafi (Libya), Thomas Sankara (Burkina Faso), and Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egypt)  – were rarities. They made a difference in the lives of their citizens and on the continent. All four went on to become “global citizens”  – recognized and respected at home, regionally, and abroad. They were at once intellectuals, nationalists, pan-Africanists, and statesmen. Their exceptionality is the reason for this edited volume. Of the four personalities, Thomas Isidore Noël Sankara – a Marxist–Leninist – was the most enigmatic having spent fewer years in office. He was assassinated at the relatively young age of 37 in 1987. Nonetheless, 35 years after his assassination, he continues to capture the imagination of several generations across the continent. Jerry John Rawlings was larger than life: Charismatic, brilliant, and an excellent orator. He successfully transited from a military head of state to becoming a civilian president of Ghana in 1993. Muammar Muhammad Abu Minyar Gaddafi was for most of his life universally known as Colonel Gaddafi. Not only was he in office the longest (42 years), but he was also the most reviled by the western media and western capitals. His overthrow and assassination were, by some accounts, encouraged and endorsed by some western capitals. Gamal Abdel Nasser was the prime minister (1954–56), and later the president of Egypt (1956–70). His priority was the sovereignty of Egypt, then the Arab world. In later years, he turned his attention to Sub-­ Saharan Africa where he found a kindred spirit in Kwame Nkrumah (one of the giants of Pan-Africanism).

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How did these men  – Rawlings, Sankara, Ghaddafi, and Nasser  – shape and influence the African world? What made them different from all the other soldiers who staged successful military coups on the continent? What was their leadership style and legacy? What do we know about their personality, intellect, ideology, and commitment to the emancipation, growth, and development of the continent? What were the criticisms against these men? We know some, but there are many more we do not know about them. There are three indisputable facts about Africa. First, many modern African countries began on a fragmented foundation  – bedeviled by internal fissures that persist several decades after independence. One of the problems centered on governance and leadership. Second, at the time of their independence, many of these countries had democratically elected governments. And even if the level and strength of democracy were questionable, they were nonetheless elected in a political process. And third, within a decade of independence, a significant number had experienced extralegal military activities: military mutinies, attempted coups, or successful coups. Military coup d’état, therefore, is one of the enduring legacies of the African political space. In many instances, the top coup leader goes on to lead the new military government (military junta or military regime with fancy names like The Supreme Military Council). These leaders, for the most part, looked, behaved, and sounded alike and had similar training and worldview. Put another way, there was not much difference between a military leader in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo-­ Kinshasa), Chad, Tunisia, Mali, Uganda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, The Gambia, or the Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville). However, the four military leaders under examination  – Jerry Rawlings, Thomas Sankara, Muammar Gaddafi, and Gamal Abdel Nasser – were different. They were the exceptions, the rarities. Their collective difference, compared to their contemporaries, previous and later military coup leaders, and heads of state, is primarily what this book is about. And because this is an area that has not been methodically studied over time, there are no universally tested and accepted theories. It is indisputable that the four soldiers who went on to become military heads of state were “apart and different from the norm,” and therefore exceptional. However, the theory of exceptionalism or any other theory does not convincingly fit the subject matter. Essentially, therefore, there is no overarching theory for the book, but contributors were given the leeway to integrate any relevant theory in their respective chapters. Even so, several questions are salient. For instance: 1. Across the continent, how many of these leaders went on to espouse ideologies that are pan-Africanist in nature? 2. How many were public intellectuals? 3. How many were nationalists; and how many went on to become statesmen? A handful was enigmatic and charismatic, i.e., General Murtala Mohammed (Nigeria). But he was not in the same class as Rawlings, Sankara, Gaddafi, and Nasser.

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It is rare for any military leader to possess these key attributes – more so on the African continent where many of her leaders are gravely wanting and inadequate in terms of leadership and the running of a modern state and society. Individually, these leaders have been studied, but not as a group. Hence, the originality and significance of this treatise engage in the critical but systematic examination of their personality, leadership style, official performance, legacy, and continuing impact on the future and political destiny of the continent. The African continent has been the subject of many scholarly inquiries in terms of its economic and political performance. In this instance, however, the key focus is on four of Africa’s former leaders who were populists, enigmatic, provocative, and polarizing and who were most beloved by the domestic audience but mostly viewed with suspicion and hostility by foreign audiences and many western governments. In addition to “getting to know” them, we began by examining some aspects of military rule and military engagement on the continent, i.e., the colonial origins of the military on the continent, a brief survey of coups, and elite contestation for power on the continent. So, here we go: In Chap. 1  – The Colonial Origins of African Military and Its Implications for African Politics  – Emmanuel Ogbonna, Olusoji Odeyemi, and Adebukola Ayoola assert that the military in most African states were products of European colonial adventures in Africa. And that across many colonized states, the militaries were armies created for the effective occupation of the colonial state; an instrument of conquest and dominance. Theoretically, while the internal engagement of the military encouraged the innumerable coups registered in Africa, factors like modernization, political entrepreneurship, external influence, and so on have been useful in explaining the military in African states. The authors also argued that the independence bequeathed to the colonies was structurally defective as the key institutions of the state were tainted and compromised by the politics and machinations of the departing colonial government bent on retaining influence in the new states. More so, the emergent political leaders of the newly independent African states found for their use an already existing military that was tailored towards dictatorship and other political deviations that became a defining political culture of African politics. On the other hand, the military rejected the subsidiary role the civilian political leaders were charting for them and promptly arrogated to themselves the additional role as the guardian of national interest and promptly shove aside the civilian political leaders in a rash of coups. Samuel Darkwa in Chap. 2, Military Coup D’états in Africa: A Survey, provides an overview of military rule in Africa by analyzing some of the reasons for military intervention in politics which are the interaction of complex internal and external factors. He also examines the effects of military rule in Africa and argues that, generally, the effects of military intervention in African politics are a mixture of positives and negatives, but the negatives far outweigh the positives. Nonetheless, there have been some exceptions, i.e., the exceptionalism of Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, Moammar Gaddafi of Libya, Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso, and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. While acknowledging the exceptionalism of these leaders, the chapter is quick to remind the reader not to conclude that such a position is an endorsement or approval of military regimes; instead, the author recommends that

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efforts must be made to help safeguard democracy in the African continent against military adventurism. He recommended that democratic advancement must be complemented by economic advancement for people to enjoy democratic dividends. Second, political leaders who would like to temper their constitutions to govern beyond the presidential term limit must be opposed. Finally, the author suggested that political leaders must aggressively fight corruption in order to discourage military adventurism. In Chap. 3, Political Economy of Colonial and Post-Colonial African Military, Gbensuglo Alidu Bukari elucidates the undercurrents of the political economy of the African military from the perspective of historical ascendancy from a marginal arm of the colonial government, and important only as the coercive arm of the colonial administration into a bureaucratic institution recognized as an integral part of the democratic process. The author employs the political-economic analytical framework and complemented it with a review of the conceptual literature. He then problematizes the political economy of the post-African military and interrogates the interface of politics and economic dialectics of the new African armed forces in the new democratic order. The author concludes by arguing that the social environment and the evolving role of the military in a modern liberal democratic society and the economic and political systems contribute to shaping the economic and political role of the African armed forces in the new democratic ideal. Therefore, total commitment to democracy and constitutionalism should be the hallmark of African armed forces in the democratic order as this will guarantee political stability and continuity, ensure full enjoyment of human rights and civil liberties, and lastly advance the growth of political institutions of the emerging African democracy. Chris Agoha, in Chap. 4 – Post-Colonialism and Elite Contestation for Political Power in Africa – discusses the post-colonial nationalist leadership and governance in Africa and how the hopes and aspirations of the population were raised in expectation for development. He explores the emergence of the post-colonial elite and their desire to attain political power and also examines military intervention and rule in Africa drawing examples from the leadership of Jerry Rawlings of Ghana. Overall, his chapter is divided into six sections. Section one is the introduction which highlights the attainment of independence by many African countries, and heralded optimism and hope for the population. Section two discusses nationalist ideology and how this brought development to many African countries. Section three examines military leadership and engagement in politics and the process heightened five theories that compel military intervention in politics. In this section, the author explained the leadership roles of Jerry Rawlings of Ghana and applauded it to be good, effective, responsive, and unique leadership in promoting economic growth and political development. The author noted that although Rawlings faced some daunting challenges, typical of criticisms from opposition groups, this did not vitiate his achievements. Section four discusses elite contestation for power. It explores the character of the African elite, their location within society, and their relationship with the ordinary masses. The section also highlights the manipulative power of the elite in seeking self-interest and the subordination of national interest. Section five examines the developmental ethos of the African elite. It argued that the

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African elite and leaders are non-developmental in their character and attributes. The final section is the conclusion where the author posits that the African elite is regenerative and refuses to relinquish power and political leadership. Their leadership styles have continued to impoverish mass of the population, and therefore the author argued that Africa needs transformational leaders such as Jerry Rawlings who can inspire the population and bring about development. Chapter 5 – Leadership, Constitutional Changes and Functions of Governments in East Africa – is by George Katete wherein he posited that the current leadership and their performance in fulfilling functions of government in the nations of East Africa are determined by constitutionalism and capacity questions in terms of rolling out welfare and development programs, security of the state, and social cohesion. There are commonalities and differences in regimes in terms of observing constitutional requirements. Kenya and Tanzania, having come from single-party regimes, have some commonality regarding what kind of leadership should be maintained in line with the ruling elites’ demands and not necessarily determined by electoral politics. Whereas in Uganda, total defiance and dictatorial rule are attributed to the past leadership style, given the military forms of rules, coups, and counter-coups that led to the suspension of constitutions and the use of decrees. In the current era, regimes in these nations have preserved personalized rules which although given the context of the state, and elections held are still predetermined and a mockery of democracy has thrived. In Kenya, few indicators spell optimism in terms of the capacity and independence of the judiciary, given the action to nullify President Uhuru’s win in 2017 and calling for a repeat of elections. A similar independent power of the judiciary was also seen when the supreme court ruled against the regime’s constitutional change through the president-led popular initiative known as the building bridges for Kenya, in what analysts suspected was to benefit the ruling elites eyeing to retain and influence next government by creating structures that would add political positions to be occupied by selected elites. This in retrospect was seen as a way of undermining constitutionalism. In Chap. 6, Jerry Rawlings and Thomas Sankara: Intellectuals, Populists, Revolutionaries, Pan-Africanists, Sabella Ogbobode Abidde asserts that intellectuals, populists, and revolutionaries have always been a part of Africa’s political, leadership, and rhetorical space and that many went on to play major role in the Pan-Africanist movement. Within the context of pre-independent and post-­ independent African political space, public intellectuals were also considered radicals by the colonialists. Many of these intellectuals  – including Sam Nujoma, António Agostinho Neto, Kwame Nkrumah, Seretse Khama, Jomo Kenyatta, Kenneth Kaunda, Julius Nyerere, Albert Luthuli, Marien N’Gouabi, and Nnamdi Azikiwe – went on to lead their respective countries. On the other spectrum were military leaders who were also intellectuals, populists, and revolutionaries. Although few in number, they were also Pan-Africanists. Thomas Sankara, Jerry Rawlings, Abdel Nasser, and Muammar Gaddafi belonged in this august group. They entered the political and leadership space many years after their countries gained independence – speaking truth to powers and in the process firing their people’s imagination and making their countries better.

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In Chap. 7, Third Era of Jerry Rawlings as a Democratic President (1993–2001): Ideology and Leadership Style, Emmanuel Graham and Kafui Tsekpo examine the emergence of Jerry John Rawlings as a democratic ruler. Ghana’s Jerry John Rawlings is arguably one of the most charismatic leaders to have ruled an African country in contemporary times. His charisma and leadership style helped to transit Ghana from political and economic decadence in the 1980s to constitutional rule and economic recovery in the 1990s. Although he was a coupist, Rawlings became an icon and a respected leader in Ghana, Africa, and the World during his term of office as Head of State and President. Rawlings’ ideology and leadership style were a mixed bag of approaches grounded in his belief in the principles of probity and accountability. The authors further examine how Rawlings emerged as a transformational leader in Ghanaian politics, African and world politics at large. They furthered their goals by unpacking his ideology and leadership style from 1993 to 2001 and in the process show that Rawlings’ goal was to rid Ghana of corruption and decentralize the decision-making process and enable an institutional process for development that centered around the people at all levels of governance. According to Nada Halloway, in Chap. 8  – Thomas Sankara: Ideology and Leadership style – this proclamation has stood the test of time as Sankara, in death, has become the lodestar for Africans looking for a change from corrupt, inept, and rudderless leaders. By 1983, when he became President of Upper Volta, which he subsequently names Burkina Faso, he was well aware of the failures of other African Presidents who had attained power only to economically bankrupt the countries they had inherited. When Sankara became President of Burkina Faso, the small landlocked country which had been colonized by the French was nothing but a reservoir for workers. As a result of this massive exploitation by the colonial government, Burkina Faso, as opposed to other African States, did not see much economic development but like other African nations relied on foreign debt to fund the personal lifestyles of whatever leader was in power. Sankara saw this debt as a form of neocolonialism, and in his speech to OAU in 1987, Sankara would outline his opposition to debt. As he observed, “debt’s origins come from colonialism.” Those who lend us money are those who colonized us. They are the same ones who used to manage our states and economies. Under its current form, controlled and dominated by imperialism, debt is a skillfully managed reconquest of Africa, intended to subjugate its growth and development through foreign rule. Sankara’s opposition to foreign debt was quite simple: loans from the IMF created a false sense that such funds would lead to modernization when the fact was and is quite different: these loans were and are a form of neocolonialism that allowed foreign powers to exploit countries of their resources while dictating how such funds should be spent. A key tenet of Sankara’s agenda was self-reliance and an economy that focused inward. It is under the aforestated context and subtext that the author examines a handful of Sankara’s key speeches to flesh out his ideology and leadership style. October 15, 2017, marked the 30th anniversary of the assassination of Thomas Sankara, the Head of State of Burkina Faso. Thirty years – a generation – after his demise is a reasonable occasion to re-examine the history of Sankara as one of Africa’s few influential revolutionary soldier leaders and intellectual statesmen of

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the post-colonial period who determinedly created and/or adopted revolutionary intellectual statesmanship ideologies and praxes in their effort to engineer sociopolitical and economic transformations within continental and diasporic African communities. Although Sankara did not author a book, he articulated highly intellectual notions to shape the educational, cultural terrain and general outlook of his country, Burkina Faso. Speaking such thoughts to the public and ensuring that those notions were practiced within the public domain, Sankara manifested the vocation of intellectual activism. Hence, in Chap. 9  – Thomas Sankara: An Intellectual Statesman in Power, Culture, and Education in Burkina Faso, 1983–1987  – A Review After 30 Years – De-Valera Botchway and Moussa Traore take a detour from extant studies about the political ideology and praxis of Sankara. The authors argue that Sankara’s intellectual activism and statesman vision guided his country to pursue a holistic revolution – the Burkinabè Revolution – with educational and cultural dimensions from 1983 to 1987. It is for this reason that they examine the inner logic, intellectual activism, and practical guidance that Sankara deployed as a statesman to make the Burkinabè Revolution a cultural and educational one and a significant part of the processes and histories of world revolutions too. In Chap. 10  – Thomas Sankara’s Ideology and Political Leadership  – Felix Kumah-Abiwu argues that the enduring quest for Africa’s development through effective political leadership and governance has renewed scholarly interests and policy debates on the importance of re-visiting the ideology and leadership styles of some of Africa’s prominent leaders whose ideas for the continent’s total liberation are arguably still relevant in our contemporary era. Leaders such as Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso and Jerry Rawlings of Ghana are a few of these transformational leaders. While the background and leadership styles of these leaders were military, it will be out of place to completely disregard their major achievements. Thomas Sankara was one of those extraordinary political leaders whose ideology and leadership are still being debated in political spaces, public spheres, and halls of the academy in terms of the way his ideology and strategies of development can be revisited to help address the challenges of development facing Africa. To explore these issues, the author examines Sankara’s ideology and leadership within the context of his impact as a military officer, nationalist, statesman, and Pan-Africanist. The chapter argues that Sankara’s ideas and strategies of development are still relevant to the discourse on Africa’s development agenda. In Chap. 11, Thomas Sankara: Mixed Legacies of a Charismatic Statesman, Barthelemy Bazem states that since the 1960s, military regimes have been a dominant feature of the political landscape of most African states, either through forcefully assuming state power or by wielding veto rights on decision-making institutions and the core policy orientations of civilian-led governments. In this regard, Burkina Faso’s case serves as a perfect illustration. Since its independence, the army has firmly held an entrenched monopoly on political processes except for three civilian presidents. This iron grip on national politics has entrenched the routinization and the formal legitimization of military rule as the de facto form of political government. The army’s long politicized tenure has been broadly cast at best as mediocre and at worse as dismal for the gross abuses and for undermining the

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democratization efforts of Burkina Faso. Nevertheless, the army has produced an iconic statesman Thomas Isidore Noël Sankara (1949–87), one of the finest minds in African political leadership, driven by a radical political philosophy championing the decolonization aspirations of Africa. As a result, the author attempts to unpack the salient characteristics of Sankara’s political philosophy and praxis, his servant leadership style, and the relevance of his dedicated life of service and abnegation, which compellingly speaks to the leadership and governance deficit experienced across Africa today. Gloria Emeagwali, in Chap. 12, Muammar Gaddafi: An Assessment, proposes that the genocidal atrocities of Italian occupation, and the fragility of the Sanusiyya Order, led to the 1969 coup d’état staged by Muammar Gaddafi and his comrades. She argues that Gaddafi’s initial intentions were rational, in an era of anti-colonial activism, and the quest for true sovereignty, but his execution of policies fell devastatingly short of the democratic intentions that he and his comrades initially expounded in The Green Book and elsewhere. Even so, Gaddafi would be appreciated by Pan-Africanists for challenging the excesses of colonial occupation, and NATO’s intervention in 2011 would be viewed as a violation of Libya’s territorial integrity. The challenges for the regime posed by a wide range of jihadists such as The Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS), The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), The Revolutionary Shira Council (BRSC), and the Muslim Brotherhood are also discussed in the chapter, and the chapter concludes with a brief reference to the ongoing power struggles between the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army (LNA). In Chap. 13, NATO, EU, and Libya: A Decade of Turmoil, Cserkits Michael presents the reader with the unease and complicated relationship between the three actors of NATO (with the USA as the most potent member and playing a special role) – EU – and the Libyan state. As Ghaddafi’s perception in Europe had changed continuously from a rouge leader (following the Lockerby incidents) to a source of stability and lastly to one of instability, his removal during the Arab Spring led to severe discussions throughout military circles all over the continent. Starting in the year 2000, the author covers the events of various EU-Africa summits and continues to present the decline of the EU/NATO–Libyan relationship during the decade, with a look at the conceptions NATO/EU had. And in Chap. 14, Psycho-biographical Analysis in International Politics: A Focus on Moammar Ghaddafi of Libya, Idowu Johnson examines how the behavior of individual political leaders impacts a state’s foreign policy decision-making process. Psycho-biography is an attempt to match the psychological profile of a nation with the biographical examination of its leadership. Moammar Ghaddafi was selected based on interest value, his uniqueness, and as a controversial figure in global politics. Using the Psycho-biographical perspective as a framework of analysis, the author argues that for almost four decades Ghaddafi was a major actor in the international community and so explores and analyzes Ghaddafi’s personality development across his lifespan. His life history is uncovered in this Psycho-­ biographical case study through the systematic and consistent collection, analysis, and interpretation of materials that highlighted some significant historical periods of

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this controversial figure. There is no doubt that Ghaddafi and his politics were dependent on his upbringing and childhood experiences. Finally, Idowu Johnson insists that although Psycho-biographical study is a powerful historical and psychological tool in explaining individual behavior, it has helped to build multidisciplinary knowledge in the field of Anthropology, Psychology, Sociology, and Political Science. The author concludes his chapter by asserting that an investigation into the socio-cultural history of Moammar Ghaddafi within the context of a Psycho-­ biographical study is very crucial in interpreting his behavior in global affairs. And Nikša Minić, in Chap. 15, Gaddafi, Tito, and Libyan Non-Aligned Policy, analyzes Libyan non-aligned policy during the 1970s. For the analysis, the context of Libya’s relations with Yugoslavia, one of the founding members of the Non-­ Aligned Movement, with which Libya fostered active political and economic cooperation, was taken into account. Their leaders, Josip Broz Tito and Muammar Gaddafi, often visited each other and held talks on various international issues. Based on archival documents which are kept in the Archives of Yugoslavia in Belgrade and the Croatian State Archives in Zagreb, published literature, and newspaper articles, the author sheds light on the appearances of Libyan delegations at Conferences of the Non-Aligned Movement in Lusaka 1970, Algeria 1973, Colombo 1976, and Havana 1979, on the relationship between Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito and Muammar Gaddafi and their talks, which reveal the views and opinions of the Libyan leader on the Non-Aligned Movement. The author concludes that although the Libyan leadership had proclaimed positive neutrality and non-­ alignment as pillars of his foreign policy, Muammar Gaddafi was prone to actions that threatened to destabilize the Non-Aligned Movement, and Libya was ultimately defined by Yugoslavia as one of the radical members of the NAM. In Chap. 16, Gamal Abdel Nasser: A Hero in the African and Arab World, Timothy Adivillah Balag’kutu examines the role of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s iconic revolutionary hero, continental liberation, and unification as well as regional cooperation, building on his nationalist political activism. Using personality and leadership symbolism, the chapter interrogates the significance of Nasser’s involvement in the geopolitics of Pan-Arabism and Pan-Africanism, and in relations between the two regional blocs. The author demonstrates the relevance of Nasser’s legacy in the international politics of the regions to which he dedicated his public service, as an important source of knowledge on leadership and international relations both broadly and concerning Africa and the Arab world. And in Chap. 17, Gamal Abdel Nasser: Hero in Arab Maghreb and Mashreq, Elizabeth Bishop states that the noun “hero” can be defined as “a person who is admired or idealized for courage, outstanding achievements, or noble qualities: a war hero”; certainly, Egypt’s president Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein (born 15 January 1918, died 28 September 1970) is identified as such a “hero” in Africa and the Arab world. While he is not a sole or unique stature, it is exemplary: historian Joel Gordon titled his profile, Hero of the Arab Nation, for Omar Khalifah, Nasser was a legendary hero from early on in his political career, and for Lahouari Addi he was the hero of the crowds from Baghdad to Casablanca. In the context of regional developments of the Arab world’s Maghreb and Mashreq, as well as such international developments as

Introduction

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the unfolding Cold War; thus, the author addresses militarized “heroism” and military intelligence and states that during World War II, Cairo was the center for Allied operations in, for example, occupied Yugoslavia: this experience raised expectations for those in Egypt’s armed forces who were subsequently known as “Free Officers,” and established revised expectations for “heroism” in the post colony. In Chap. 18, The Sons of the Revolution: Umm Kulthum, Abdel Halim Hafez and the Nasserist Regime – Between Artistic Agency and Nationalism, Omar Bortolazzi states that the 1950s and 1960s in Egypt represented a period perceived as the “golden era” of culture due to the immense popularity of Egyptian arts and media scenes. Singers and performers like Umm Kulthum, Abdel Halim Hafez, Fareed al-­ Atrash, and Mohammad Abdel Wahab were the symbols of Egypt’s cultural talent. This artistic agency was directly linked to its political agenda, embedded in President Gamal Abd al-Nasser’s rapidly spreading pan-Arab, anti-imperialist, socialist policies. Artists and filmmakers’ work was politicized by Nasser’s aims, taking on themes of decolonization, de-westernization, and everyday suffering of the common population. Both were personally acquainted with Nasser, who called Abdel Halim “the son of the revolution.” Nasser’s speeches were frequently broadcast right after Umm Kulthum’s and Abdel Halim’s concerts, taking advantage of a large audience, already listening. These monthly concerts emptied the streets across the Arab world as people hurried to tune in to their radios. The propagandistic “Voice of the Arabs” – the first and most prominent Egyptian transnational Arabic-language radio service – helped Nasser to spread Pan-Arabism and anti-colonialism not only in Egypt but throughout the region as well. Nasser was in the perfect position to utilize these prominent artistic figures to bridge the gap between state ideology and cultural ideology. Through an analysis of Umm Kulthum and Abdel Halim’s less-­ known but numerous patriotic artistic production, the author shows how their careers reflected the political environment at the time in Egypt, as well as the national dreams and visions, and aims to understand the extent of Umm Kulthum’s and Abdel Halim’s role in the immense success of Nasserist ideology, by examining the correlations between the singers’ productions and Nasser’s political agenda. And finally, in Chap. 19, Egypt and the Arab World: Five Decades After Nasser, Najib Ghadbian writes that nearly five decades after Nasser, Egyptian leaders have shown elements of continuity and variation in their approaches to domestic and foreign policy. The consistent theme in Egyptian governance, including under Nasser, is to prioritize preserving regime security and the privileges of the military. Perhaps the most variance was brought forth in President Anwar Sadat’s policies (1970–1981), which moved away from Nasser’s domestic socialism, and abandoned the strategy of non-alignment, of which Nasser was an architect. Sadat’s most important decision was to ally Egypt with the USA, which he perceived was key to solving foreign policy issues, including the conflict with Israel. Changes in Egypt’s internal and external orientations cost Sadat his life. As Hosni Mubarak (1981–2011) continued to follow Sadat’s path, a fundamental divergence emerged in his efforts to reintegrate Egypt into the political sphere of the Arab world after its membership in the Arab League was frozen. Mubarak’s selective application of his policies and repression of human rights sparked the popular protest movement that forced him to

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abandon his rule. After 2 years of failed democratic transition, the military took direct charge of political power. Its leaders exploited the incompetence of President Mohamed Morsi (2012–2013) and the failure of political elites to agree on the new rules of the game. The military assumed power based on restoring stability and dealing with deteriorating social and economic conditions. President Abdul Fattah al-­ Sisi (2014–present) has succeeded in preserving his power due to hefty financial provisions from the Arab Gulf states and with US and Israeli support. Sisi’s rule is a major setback for democracy and human rights, which his regime stipulates as needing to be sacrificed to improve the living conditions of Egyptians. Because Sisi relied on foreign aid from Gulf countries and the International Monetary Fund, Egypt has lost its role as a leading country in the Arab world. The foremost challenge facing Sisi’s rule is Ethiopia’s Blue Nile Dam project. The dam is likely to affect Egypt’s water allotment. This development has prompted the regime to turn towards African neighboring countries to pressure Ethiopia to accept a peaceful solution that would protect an Egyptian water share. Failure to defend Egypt’s rights is likely to further undermine the position of the regime domestically and regionally. This volume  – The Political Impact of African Military Leaders: Soldiers as Intellectuals, Nationalists, Pan-Africanists, and Statesmen  – was not and is not intended as a biography and neither was it or is it intended to serve as a glorification of military coups or military rule. No. Never. While the military’s role in politics is still a subject of intense debate in the scholarly and public domain, it is indisputable that some of Africa’s former military leaders went on to become icons and respected leaders of their time. The aim of this volume, therefore, is to examine why and how Rawlings, Gaddafi, Sankara, and Nasser became rarities in African and world politics. It also seeks to understand their enduring legacies – how their lives and policies continue to impact the African psyche and worldview. Since 2020, there has been a handful of coups, attempted coups, and or failed coups in some African countries, i.e., in Mali, Sudan, Niger, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Central Africa Republic, and Sao Tome and Principe. Does this signal the return of coups? Not really. There is no evidence to support the “return of coups” theory on a continent that was the bastion of extra-legal removal of governments. There are several reasons for this. In the first place, the military in many former coup-states seems to have grown wary and weary of coups. Second, elites and citizens in some of the coup-states have also outgrown coups. Third, the international community has also begun to, in no uncertain terms, condemn coups. And fourth, countries like the USA, Russia, France, and the UK that were once in the habit of supporting or fomenting mutinies and coups have, since the end of the Cold War, gradually stayed away from such insidious activities. Perhaps the only exception is France where Élysée Palace seems bent on the continuing colonization of Francophonie Africa. Whether in a decade or more coups and attempted coups will become a thing of the past is difficult to predict or support with any kind of systematic data or evidence. This is so because the economic and political conditions in many states and societies in Africa are still grim. Such conditions can and do trigger coups. So, one of the ways Africans can help themselves is to pay greater attention to the issue of political leadership and strong governing institutions.

Acknowledgment

Writing a book can be challenging and stressful. Edited volumes are especially so because of the unpredictability and uncertainties that come with them; nonetheless, the satisfaction and rewards come in many folds. This book is no exception. Along the way, we incurred many debts. Our first gratitude goes to Ms. Lorraine Klimowich. As always, she was good-natured, approachable, thoughtful, and generous with her time and kindness. Without her, this project would not have come to fruition. Thanks, Lorraine! We would also like to thank Springer and the Editorial Board for approving our book proposal and the publishing contract. Anonymous reviewers are central to academic work: they widen the path of possibilities and allow authors and editors to “see things clearly.” To them, we express our sincere appreciation. Our gratitude also goes to Kirthika Selvaraju, Mahalakshmi Saravanan, Ben Ingraham, and the rest of the able and conscientious production staff at Springer. Thank you all! Although much of what we do, we do it in isolation, we are at the same time never alone. We have friends and family members to rely on for support and encouragement. Directly and indirectly, colleagues are also involved in the process. So, we owe our friends, family, and colleagues at Alabama State University and Kent State University, a world of gratitude. Thank you! Our thanks also go to all the contributors for believing in us, and for responding to our call for this voluntary but important endeavor. Thank you, thank you, and thank you so very much. And finally, I (Sabella Abidde) would like to thank Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield for granting me permission to revise/modify and reprint one of my chapters – Sankara, Rawlings and Gaddafi: Intellectuals, Populists and Revolutionaries as Pan-Africanists – that was originally published in a book I coedited with the late Professor Olayiwola Abegunrin in 2016 entitled, Pan-Africanism in Modern Times Challenges, Concerns, and Constraints. Ms. Rachel Twombly helped to facilitate the process. And to Professor Elisha Jasper Dung for assisting with formatting challenges. Thank you all!

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Contents

Part I Military Engagement and Leadership in Africa 1 T  he Colonial Origins of African Military and Its Implications for African Politics ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������    3 Emmanuel Chijioke Ogbonna, Adebukola Olubunmi Ayoola, and Olusoji Alani Odeyemi 2 M  ilitary Coup D’états in Africa: A Survey��������������������������������������������   21 Samuel Kofi Darkwa 3 P  olitical Economy of Colonial and Postcolonial African Military������   39 Gbensuglo Alidu Bukari 4 P  ostcolonialism and Elite Contestation for Political Power in Africa����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   53 Chris Agoha 5 L  eadership, Constitutional Changes, and Functions of Governments in East Africa����������������������������������������������������������������   69 George Katete Part II The Revolutionary Comrades in Ghana and Burkina Faso 6 T  homas Sankara and Jerry Rawlings: Intellectuals, Populists, Revolutionaries, and Pan-Africanists����������������������������������������������������   89 Sabella Ogbobode Abidde 7 T  hird Era of Jerry Rawlings as a Democratic President (1993–2001): Ideology and Leadership Style����������������������������������������  105 Emmanuel Graham and Kafui Tsekpo 8 S  tatesmen: Burkina Faso and the Dream Deferred: Ideology and Leadership Style ������������������������������������������������������������������������������  121 Nada Halloway

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9 T  homas Sankara: An Intellectual Statesman in Power, Culture, and Education in Burkina Faso (1983–1987): A Review After 30 Years ��������������������������������������������������  133 De-Valera Botchway and Moussa Traore 10 T  homas Sankara’s Ideology and Political Leadership ������������������������  155 Felix Kumah-Abiwu 11 T  homas Sankara: Mixed Legacies of a Charismatic Statesman ��������  169 Barthelemy Bazemo Part III The Colonel and the Iconoclast in the Desert 12 M  uammar Gaddafi: An Assessment������������������������������������������������������  191 Gloria Emeagwali 13 N  ATO, EU, and Libya: A Decade of Turmoil����������������������������������������  207 Cserkits Michael 14 P  sychobiographical Analysis in International Politics: A Focus on Moammar Ghaddafi of Libya������������������������������������������������������������  221 Idowu Johnson 15 G  addafi, Tito, and Libyan Non-aligned Policy��������������������������������������  235 Nikša Minić Part IV A Soldier from the Cradle of Civilization 16 G  amal Abdel Nasser: A Hero in Africa and the Arab World��������������  251 Timothy Adivilah Balag’kutu 17 Hero in Arab Maghreb and Mashreq������������������������������������������������������  269 Elizabeth Bishop 18 T  he Sons of the Revolution: Umm Kulthum, Abdel Halim Hafez, and the Nasserist Regime Between Artistic Agency, Propaganda, and Nationalism����������������������������������������������������������������  293 Omar Bortolazzi 19 E  gypt and the Arab World: Five Decades After Nasser ����������������������  317 Najib Ghadbian Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  335

About the Editors

Sabella Ogbobode Abidde  is a Professor of Political Science and a member of the graduate faculty at Alabama State University. He holds a BA in International Relations from Saint Cloud State University, Minnesota, an MA in political science from Minnesota State University, Mankato, and a PhD in African Studies, World Affairs, Public Policy, and Development Studies from Howard University. His edited/coedited volumes on Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean include Xenophobia, Nativism and Pan-Africanism in 21st Century Africa: History, Concepts, Practice and Case Study (Springer, 2021); Human Trafficking in Africa: New Paradigms, New Perspectives (Springer, 2021); The Challenges of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Springer, 2020); Fidel Castro and Africa’s Liberation Struggle (Lexington, 2020); and Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean: The Case for Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation (Lexington Books, 2018). Dr. Abidde is the Series Editor of Lexington Books African Governance, Development, and Leadership and Springer’s Africa-East Asia International Relations. He is a member of the Association of Global South Studies (AGSS), the African Studies and Research Forum (ASRF), and the American Association of Chinese Studies (AACS). Professor Abidde is the coeditor of Jerry John Rawlings: Leadership and Legacy  – A Pan-African Perspective. He was for many years a weekly OP-ED columnist for Nigeria’s newspaper of record, The Punch. Felix  Kumah-Abiwu  is an Associate Professor in the Department of Africana Studies at Kent State University, Ohio. He is also the Founding Director of the Center for African Studies at Kent State and Non-Resident Fellow (Governance and Democracy) at Nkafu Policy Institute in Cameroon. He received his PhD in Political Science from West Virginia University and an MA in Communication and International Development from Ohio University, USA. He also obtained his BA in Political Science from the University of Ghana as well as an MA in International Affairs from the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), University of Ghana. His research focuses on political leadership in Africa, elections/democratization, foreign policy analysis, African security issues, narcotics policy, Black males/public education in the African diaspora, and African-­centered xxiii

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About the Editors

theories. In addition to his published books, scholarly book reviews, encyclopedia entries, and several book chapters, Dr. Kumah-Abiwu’s scholarly articles have appeared in the Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, Journal of Pan African Studies, West Africa Review, International Journal of Public Administration, Urban Education, Journal of Men’s Studies, Journal of Economics/Sustainable Development, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, and African Security Review. Dr. Kumah-Abiwu is the co-editor of the recent book titled Jerry John Rawlings: Leadership and Legacy – A Pan-African Perspective.

Abbreviations

AFRC AFRICOM AL ANC APARC ARFC ASA AU AZAPO BASC BBI BRSC CA CCM CCP CDA CDR CIA CNR CPP CSO DA DCI DOP DP DPP EAC EACC ECOMOG ECOWAS ENM

Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Africa Command Arab League African National Congress African Presidential Archives and Research Centre Armed Forces Revolutionary Council African Students Association African Union Azanian People’s Organization British Army Staff College Building Bridges Initiative Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council Consultative Assembly Chama Cha Mapinduzi Convention Peoples Party Camp David Accords Committees for the Defense of the Revolution Central Intelligence Agency National Council of the Revolution Convention People’s Party Civil Society Organizations Districts Assembly Director of Criminal Investigation Discours d’Orientation Politique (The Political Orientation Speech) Democratic Party Director of Public Prosecution East Africa Community Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group Economic Community of West African States Egyptian Nationalist Movement xxv

xxvi

ERP ERPs EU EUCOM FDC FESPACO FGM FOM FORD FUOM GC GDP GET Fund GNC GNP IEBC IMF IRA ISIS JJ JSCSC KADU KANU LAR LAS LDP LIFG LNA ME MPLA NAK NAM NARC NASA NATO NCD NDC NLC NPP NRM NRP NTC

Abbreviations

Economic Recovery Programs Economic Reforms Programs European Nations European Command Forum for Democratic Change Festival Panafricain du Cinéma et de la Télévision de Ouagadougou (Panafrican Film and Television Festival of Ouagadougou) Female genital mutilation Free Officers’ Movement Forum for Restoration of Democracy Free Unionist Officers Movements Gold Coast Gross Domestic Products Ghana Educational Trust Fund Government of National Accord Gross National Product Independent Electoral and Boundary Commission International Monetary Fund Irish Republican Army Islamic State of Iraq Jerry John/Junior Jesus Joint Services Command and Staff College Kenya African Democratic Union Kenya African National Union Libyan Arab Republic League of Arab States Liberal Democratic Party Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Libyan National Army Middle East People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola National Alliance Kenya Non-Aligned Movement National Alliance Coalition National Super Alliance North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Commission on Democracy National Democratic Congress National Liberation Council New Patriotic Party National Resistance Movement National Reform Party National Transition Council

Abbreviations

NUGS NUP OAU ODM PDA PDP PLO PNDC PNP PNU PP PPD R2P RAB RCC REC SACEUR SAPs SHAPE SIS SMC SSNIT SU SWAPO TANU TSCTI TUT UAR UDA UDS UfM UGCC UN UNDP UNIA UNICEF UNSC US USA USSR VAT WA WANS

xxvii

National Union of Ghanaian Students National Unity Platform Organization for African Unity Orange Democratic Movement Preventive Detention Act People Democratic Party Palestinian Liberation Organization Provisional National Defense Council Peoples National Party Party of National Unity Progress Party Popular Development Program Responsibility to Protect Royal Academy of Benghazi Revolutionary Command Council Regional Economic Community Supreme Allied Commander Europe Structural Adjustment Programs Supreme Headquarter Allied Powers Europe Secret Intelligence Service Supreme Military Council Social Security and National Insurance Trust Soviet Union Southwest Africa People’s Organization Tanganyika African National Union Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative Third Universal Theory United Arab Republic United Democratic Alliance University of Development Studies Union for the Mediterranean United Gold Coast Convention United Nations United Nations Development Program United Negro Improvement Association United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Security Council United States United States of America Union of Soviet Socialist Republic Value Added Tax West Africa West African National Secretariat

xxviii

WASU WB WHO WMD YEP

Abbreviations

West African Students Union World Bank World Health Organization Weapons of Mass Destruction Young Egypt Party

Part I

Military Engagement and Leadership in Africa

Chapter 1

The Colonial Origins of African Military and Its Implications for African Politics Emmanuel Chijioke Ogbonna, Adebukola Olubunmi Ayoola, and Olusoji Alani Odeyemi

Introduction The expansion of Europe beyond its borders significantly altered the trajectory of world history and seriously impacted the lives of millions of people all over the world. More importantly, it laid the foundation for European ascendancy and hegemony in the world (Parry, 1977). The expansion, spurred by the crusading ethos of the Europeans geared toward undermining their Arab Muslim rivals, led to the search for alternative sea routes bypassing the land routes through the Arab land from where Europe got spices and other products of Asia that it badly craves (Hussay, 1964). The discovery of the sea route around Africa enabled European colonization, conquest, and domination of lands on all the other continents outside Europe. European ascendancy and hegemony have significant consequences for the world and Africa. It enabled Europe to build a worldwide hierarchical economic system that served her interests and needs. It enmeshed Africa in the brutal slave trade that took millions of Africans forcefully away to the new world to work the plantations that produce the wealth that sparked the Industrial Revolution in Europe (Williams, 1994). It made possible Africa’s disadvantageous forceful incorporation into the world capitalist system as mere producers of raw materials or primary goods necessary for the manufacturing industries of Europe and America (Nkrumah, 1968).

E. C. Ogbonna Nigerian Army University, Biu, Borno State, Nigeria A. O. Ayoola Bowen University, Iwo, Osun State, Nigeria O. A. Odeyemi (*) Upland College of Education, Ipesi Akoko, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. O. Abidde, F. Kumah-Abiwu (eds.), The Political Impact of African Military Leaders, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31427-8_1

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Colonialism was the mechanism for the forceful incorporation of Africa into the structural architecture of the world system European powers erected to effectively impose their economic, political, and social hegemony on the emerging world capitalist system. Betts (1961) highlights the centrality of colonialism in the nineteenth century to France’s socioeconomic development when he states that: The rush overseas is a salient characteristic of the history of Europe in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Almost every European nation of importance engaged in the activity, and all converged on the one area still open to intensive penetration, Africa. Jule Ferries, the French prime minister at the time, also acclaimed overseas possessions as the outlets, the necessary markets, for French goods, and as places for the investment of capital. (p. 2)

Colonialism is central to understanding the nature and characteristics of the contemporary African military, and indeed the social, economic, and political structure of contemporary African states. What, therefore, is colonialism and why is it so central to nineteenth-century Europe? It has been defined as the policy and practice of a strong power extending its control territorially over a weaker nation or people (Oxford, 2002). Colonialism highlights the unequal power relations that exist between the colonizer and the colonized in which one possessed the capacity to inflict violence on the other without suffering unacceptable consequences. The differential power equation between Europe and the rest of the world is the culmination of technological advances and innovations, science as well as sociocultural development which first emerged in Britain and later in Germany and France. The advances radically leapfrogged material production beyond anything man had been capable of achieving with human labor. A humongous quantity of products were turned out in the factories far above what human labor could produce. The factories require enormous raw materials, and the output has to be sold. Herein lies the importance of colonies to the continuing development of capitalism. The colonies were both sources of raw materials and products as well as ready markets for the outputs of the industries of the European nations (Rodney, 2009). The control of colonies, therefore, assured the metropolitan powers a ready supply of the raw materials of the colonies, a captive market, and cheap labor (Lenin, 1977). It also provided almost “inexhaustible” real estate for the settlement of the surplus population of Europe (Kohn & Reddy, 2017). Hobson (1902) argues that imperialism and colonialism emanated from what he called maladjustments within the capitalist system in which a wealthy minority, the capitalist, saves, and the majority are impoverished. The maladjustment constituted a dilemma and an albatross on further capitalist development in Europe as they faced the twin crisis of overproduction and underconsumption. In effect, the capitalist faced the unpleasant crisis of not getting back his investments. Correcting the crisis of overproduction and underconsumption falls into three categories. Increasing the purchasing power of the workers, curtailing production, or encouraging the state to secure overseas territories. The third option led to imperialism and colonialism (Hobson, 1902). Various other factors have been used as alternative reasons for European colonization of lands outside Europe. The expansion of Europe to other parts of the world

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has been attributed to an important development in the internal politics of Europe, new economic conditions, and a fundamental alteration in European attitudes to non-European people. Europe at the time witnessed the rise of Germany and that led to the destabilization of the existing balance of power and led realignment in European politics. Germany encouraged France to make up for the territories she lost to Germany and Egypt she lost to Britain elsewhere in Africa (Webster, Boahen, & Idowu, 1974). However, Germany, King Leopold of Belgium, and other European powers also showed interest in acquiring overseas territories in Africa. The various conflicting interests led to the scramble for territories in Africa. To discourage conflict or war in Europe over territories in Africa, Bismarck convenes the infamous Berlin West Africa conference in 1884 where Africa was parceled out among the powers without African representation or participation. They also argue that racism prevalent in nineteenth-century Europe was also a factor. The idea that Africans were inferior to Europeans had gained ground due to centuries of the transatlantic slave trade (Webster et al., 1974). The doctrine of absolute superiority developed in Europeans culture and became dominant. It proclaimed that Africans were inferior to Europeans and that neither education nor Christianity could overcome the inborn inferiority of Africans. It was therefore the duty of European to subjugate Africans to their rule which to them was the greatest privilege that Europe could bestow upon Africans (Webster et  al., 1974). The study acknowledges that several factors enabled European colonization of Africa and as Ake (1981) notes, it would be crude to reduce colonialism to a single motive, but economic factors played the central role. Science and technology arising from the flowering of the enlightenment in Europe and the subsequent industrial revolution enabled Europe to dominate the world. Technology empowers man to better manage his resources and create hitherto unknown tools and machines. The creation of these new tools, machines, and weapons confers qualitative advantages to those that possess the technology. Inferior weapons of war had been responsible for the collapse of civilizations and Africa had been at the short end, over centuries, of foreign forces inflicting humiliating defeats on large indigenous forces as a result of superior military weapons and tactics the local forces lacked. The Songhai empire army of 30,000 men fell disgracefully to a mere 1000 better armed Moroccan army which fielded firearms and cannons at the battle of Tondibi in 1591 (Bovill, 1968). Technology was again decisive in the defeat and subjugation of Africans almost three hundred years later in the late nineteenth century. The weapons the Europeans possessed were far superior to the antiquated Dane guns Africans paraded. Consequently large African armies were routed by small European-led colonial forces armed with Gatlin or Maxim repeater rifles and other lethal weapons of war (Webster et al., 1974). Whatever the motive for coming to Africa, the European presence was predicated on violence. As Fanon has remarked, the exploitation of the native by the settlers from Europe was carried on by dint of a great array of bayonets and cannons (Fanon, 1980). European colonization was a brazen assertion of the dictum that might is right, superior forces were unleashed to overwhelm the resistance of the Africans. Not only were African forces defeated, but the defeat was also total and

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decisive that it shocked and awed the Africans so much that they were persuaded and convinced that further resistance was futile since the Europeans have got the maxim gun and they have not. The colonial army though small was nevertheless potent and this was amply demonstrated in the ruthless destruction of the Nupe cavalry in their charge against Goldie gun emplacements (Webster et al., 1974) or the emphatic demolition of the large, formidable Ijebu army in a single day (Johnson, 2001). The colonial army consisted largely of Africans and was led by a few Europeans. The task of subjugating Africa was carried out mainly by Africans recruited into the colonial army. The colonial army was essentially an army of occupation steeped in tradition essentially primed to dispense violence on the subjugated natives with which they bore little or no affinity. These obnoxious characteristics of the colonial army survived the transition to independence and therefore constituted a serious challenge to civil-military relations and politics.

Literature Review The issue of the colonial origin of the African military has generated and continued to dominate series of discourse in the literature over decades. Having looked at the different rationale behind this irregular transformation from their traditional security assignment to becoming statesmen, there is also the need to compare and contrast the varying views in the literature concerning this issue and how it also impacted civil-military relations across Africa. Contrary to the general belief that military coups are no longer fashionable and  has become a thing of the past in Africa, the continent recently witnessed a series of coups. Salihu (2016) contends that in the last decade up till 2021, no less than 12 coups had taken place across Africa more than half a century after decolonization. This clearly demonstrates the saliency of the military to African politics. On colonial legacies of African military and civil-military relations, while Ogueri (1973), Bechir (1997), Jenkins and Kposova (1992), and Salihu (2016) all agreed that the colonial experience greatly influences the nature of the African military,  they  however presented differing  factors  as critical elements of the  colonial legacies. On colonial demarcation of Africa into colonies, scholars agree that the creation of states without due consideration of the various ethnic, religious, and cultural differences of the people was the genesis of African contemporary problem. According to Bechir (1997) and Ogueri (1973), the forced cohabitation of people of different ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds became a fundamental problem that continues to affect contemporary African states.  European powers at that time were more concerned about administrative convenience and their interest rather than that of the people of the colonies. And to achieve their primary objective they both argue that violence  was necessary to forcefully impose their will and  consolidate their territorial gains. The military force needed for their project were largely raised from the indigenous population albeit from specific areas and ethnic group considered

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martial. They are then used in areas far from their ethnic areas. There was the use of force whereby the local people who were recruited into the army were trained to only enforce the colonial rules and regulations over their own people. Here the recruits were also blindfolded with egocentrism in which they see themselves as superior to their fellow locals simply because of their social status as white men officials with a special uniform. Bechir (1997) insists that colonial powers deliberately undermined civil-military relations through this conscious policy of alienating the military from the citizens. The creation of the state also created ethnic tension among the people, and this has continued to dictate their relations across all levels. Ogueri and Salihu at different periods share a similar view on this. They both agree that ethnic differences or diversities have continued to affect relations politically, economically, and socially across the continent. While Salihu (2016) emphasized the recruitment pattern into the army as favoring one ethnicity over another group, this he claimed started with the colonial eras divide and rule policies used  mainly to gain domination  Africans. Ogueri (1973) on the other hand agreed with Salihu (2016) that undue favoritism of one ethnic nationality over the other across the continent by the colonial powers gave undue advantages to such tribes that enable them to continue to dominate others even after independence; he cited the Fulani ethnic group in Nigeria and Hutus in Rwanda as examples of such favored groups. These favored nationalities now see themselves as “born to rule,” that is, destined to rule forever, and as such always seek to retain power by all means. Jenkins and Kposova, agreeing with this assertion, posit that many of the coups that took place early after independence across Africa were rooted in ethnic plurality and competition which they blamed on the colonial legacy of divide and rule. They argue that the coup in Nigeria in January and July of 1966 sparked the civil war. Bechir (1997) blamed colonial administrative policy on education as a factor that created the climate for inequality, distrust, and fear of domination among the ethnic nationalities. He asserts that the European powers focus was directly on administrative convenience and were less concerned about educating the people of the colonies. Education rather became the prerogative of the missionaries who used the platform as a medium of evangelism where many of the natives accept the religion as an open access to educated. This created first large converts to Christianity, and second, a large western educated citizens. This became contentious in Nigeria as the western educated people are from the southern region. The northern region was however shielded from the missionary activities thereby excluding the citizens from the area from acquiring western education.  Allen (2018), Bechir (1997), Ogueri (1973), Jenkins and Kposova (1992), and Salihu (2016) all agreed that the colonial legacy of authoritarian rule contributed largely to African military dictatorial disposition. European colonial powers ruled their colonies in Africa with an iron fist and the colonial army was that fist. The absence of civil society, human rights, and rule of law in the colonial era further entrenched authoritarianism while the local recruits in the colonial armies were trained purposely to dehumanize and abuse their fellow natives in the interest of their colonial masters. This orientation, they contend,

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continued into the postcolonial era and is responsible for the contemporary disposition and character of African militaries. Apart from the colonial legacies, there are other factors adduced for the interest of the military in political affairs and the takeover of powers across Africa. Argument has been advanced that the psychological make up of African favor despotism and sit tight mentality (Bechir, 1997; Ogueri, 1973; Salihu, 2016; Jenkins & Kposova, 1992; Allen, 2018). Providing a more comprehensive analysis, Chekole (2016), Assensoh and Alex-Assensoh (2001) have emphasized that African leaders themselves are autocratic. Chekole (2016) did a comparative study of Ethiopia (a country that was never colonized) and Nigeria (that was colonized by Britain) and conclude that the African military was only interested in maintaining power rather than fulfilling the wishes of the people for peace and political stability. He points out that authoritarianism is already embedded in African nature bearing in mind that Ethiopia was never colonized. Assensoh and Alex-Assensoh (2001)  concur citing the example of Ghana and Nigeria that African political elites have inherent dictatorial tendencies and that they resort to extreme  repressive measures  to quash opposition  in order to remain in power. They alluded to Kwame Nkrumah’s repressive bill in Ghana “Avoidance of Discrimination Bill” which made his opposition leader Professor K.A, Busia liken his regime to the famous Animal Farm and Orwellian-type politics. There was also the Preventive Detention Act (PDA) in 1958. J.B. Danquah was also jailed for his political activities and his denounciation of Nkrumah regime as dictatorial. All these dictatorial and sit-tight attitudes coupled with other factors they claimed made military intervention very attractive but they also noted that the military class did worse than the civilian (Assensoh & Alex-Assensoh, 2001). Other factors include outright corruption and overwhelming mismanagement of human, natural, and material. Many of the postcolonial African leaders were  ill equiped to manage the  economy  and as such  catastrophically  mismanaged their nation’s resources and thereby resorted to repression and oppression to silence critics (Assensoh & Alex-Assensoh, 2001). They butress their arguement by pointing to sit tight dictators that dominate several countries in Africa such as  Gnassingbe Eyadema who ruled Togo for 38 years until he died in office and his son taking over power, Robert Mugabe ruled Zimbabwe for 37 years while Bongo and his family has turned Gabon to their personal fiefdom. While complaining about the failure of the political elites, the military has not fared better. The military worsened the  already bad situation by  escalating the repression of the populace. Military regimes grossly mismanage the treasury and other resources, accountability is absent, no rule of law, abuse of human rights, unlawful detention of opposition without trial. Many also transmuted from military to a civilian  rulers to retain the office. Eyadema, Mobutu Sese-Seko in Congo Kinshasa succeded while General Sani Abacha and Ibrahim Babangida in the quest transmute to civilian dictators in Nigeria, Jerry J. Rawlings of Ghana succeeded and was accused as corrupt and brutality (Chekole, 2016; Assensoh & Alex-Assensoh, 2001; Okeke, 2018; Asante, 2020; Allen, 2018; Jenkins & Kposowa, 1992).

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The aligning factor to the various views expressed by different authors on this issue is the call to protect the “national interest” as earlier discussed in the theoretical framework as the “unique duty to protect national interest.” According to Morgenthau (1949), national interest is anything that has to do with the survival of a nation. That is the protection of physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachment or any form of attack from another state. It could also include any form of activity from within the state that can jeopardize any of the abovementioned classified as national interest. Ogueri and Chekole shared a similar view on this but with little differentiation. Illustrating the words of Claude Welch on “unique duty to protect national interest,” Ogueri (1973) sees coups or military take over as inevitable when there is the need to protect the national interest. This he called an inevitable alternative to an irresponsible civilian government that has failed the state. The inevitability could be motivated by any of or combination of the following, genuine motives for change, rape of the constitution by civilian political elites, and extravagances. In other words, military intervention could mean well for the nation to save it from the impending danger of maladministration and prevent a total breakdown of law and order that can endanger its national interest. While agreeing with Ogueri (1973) on the need to safeguard the survival of a state and maintain peace and order as the primary assignment of the military, Asante (2020) differs a little. He referred to the African struggle when the nationalists felt compelled to agitate for self-­ government in which their struggle could be referred to as in the interest of a nation. He posits further that many of the African leaders’ postcolonial behavior betrayed the struggle by their repression of their own people. African leaders became more brutish in their approach to political opposition than the colonial powers. Even though he agreed that duty may beckon on the military to protect the national interest, it should not be to take overpower and rule (Asante, 2020).

Theoretical Framework The military has had a disproportionate impact on African politics. The military have, until the democratization wave after the end of the cold war and for much of the period of these nations’ independence, taken over the direct administration of their respective nation and sidelined the civil authorities who were constitutionally empowered to be the political head. This has been made possible by the military control of the coercive machinery of the state. In other words, they control and monopolize the state’s instrument of force. The monopoly of force set the military institution apart and they did not shy away from exploiting their advantage to snatch and monopolize power for themselves. Several theories have been advanced to explore and explain the phenomenon of the incursion of the military into the domestic politics of African states. These include ethnicity (Pakenham, 1991; Ogueri, 1973; Nnoli, 1980, 1995; Jenkins & Kposowa, 1992; Okeke, 2018), modernization (Pye, 1962; Pauker, 1962), sit tight attitude, and monarchical tendency of African leaders (Bechir, 1997; Salihu, 2016;

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Allen, 2018; Assensoh & Alex-Assensoh, 2001). The colonial origin of the military however best explains the saliency of the military in African politics and their incessant intervention in the domain they accept is legally outside their purview and constitutional mandate. Dwyer (2019) emphasizes that the colonial origin of the African military is a direct consequence of the African military incessant interference in politics. The militaries have their roots in colonial armies and aspects of this history have shaped postcolonial armed forces throughout Africa. Colonial security forces, which were primarily comprised of police and armies (and gendarmeries in French and Belgian colonies) were used to maintain law and order within colonial territories. Units and individuals that made up these security forces during colonialism were often directly transitioned into the armies and police forces of independent colonial territories (as well as within territories), one overall trend was that colonial armies served to implement the policies and protect the interests of European powers. The domestic focus of colonial armies is a trend that extended into the armies of newly independent African states. The maintenance of internal security remained a key function of most African militaries after independence and contributed to the politicization of the armed forces. This symbolizes the internal focus many militaries still maintain.

The internal focus of the African military is further reinforced by the absence of external aggression as African nations have agreed to maintain the sanctity of the European borders they inherited at independence (Amadife & Warhola, 1993; Griffiths, 1986). Freed of external pressures, the military focuses solely on internal duty. More importantly, they arrogate to themselves the role of guardian and protector of the state. Siollun (2013) reported the speech of the officer that announced the first military coup of the 1980s in Nigeria who declared that “I and my colleagues in the armed forces have, in the discharge of our national role as promoters and protector of our national interest, decided to effect a change in leadership of the government of the Federal government of Nigeria…” This mindset and disposition of the military highlights and explains the recurrence of military intervention in politics as well as the root of their psychological trait and behavior.

The Origin and Evolution of the African Military The contemporary African military in all its structure is a product of colonialism. By the turn of the nineteenth century, the occupation of foreign lands was becoming an attractive and lucrative alternative for the slave trade. The industrial revolution soon rendered the slave trade obsolete, and European nations that were at the saddle of the drive-in industry soon became interested in other viable alternatives. Acquiring overseas territories became the thing (Ocheni & Nwankwo, 2012, p. 46). European powers found themselves in a morbid competition for overseas territories. This sets them on a collision course against each other. To avoid the unpleasant friction arising from contests over overseas territories, especially in Africa to degenerate into conflicts, Otto von Bismark of Germany convened the European powers at a conference in Berlin. It was at this 1884/1885 conference that the modalities for proof of

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control and ownership of colonial territories were agreed upon (Heath, 2010). One such was “effective occupation.” Immediately the clause of effective occupation was introduced to show ownership of abroad territories by the Berlin West African Act of 1885, the use of military power found corresponding justification. To this extent, it is important to mention that the discourse about the evolution of the military in African politics, draws from two strategies of the colonial acts. First is the initial intention to subdue the locals, while the second is the use of the military in enforcing obedience of the colonized peoples of Africa. The nature of the military before colonialism was one that is characterized by efforts to protect its territory, as such, externally convoked. In most instances, they protected their territories, and trade routes and in most cases embarked on an expansionist drive. In this instance, the military triumphant was dubbed warriors (Mazrui, 1977). It is not out of place to state that the advent of colonialism as well as its nature and purpose transited the functions of the military to that of the machinery of state coercion (Raftopoulos & Mlambo, 2009). The military in the territories that now constitutes the African states before colonialism held its boundaries well established in quelling a rebellion against the state, and such were properly established in enforcing sovereignty. The colonial rule in Africa contrived its own military frame, and largely altered the direction of military development in Africa. A snapshot of colonial African states reveals the following characteristics (Geisler, 2012; Mosime, 2015; Tadei, 2018): 1. Authoritarian 2. Bureaucratic systems 3. Had its origins in military conquest 4. Extractive as defined by the quest for raw materials 5. Racist in ideology due to the nature of the imperialist enterprise One significant aspect of the colonial origin of the African military was the nature of recruitment. The colonial template for recruitment into the military remains in line with the divide-and-rule strategy that has far-reaching implications for African politics to date. It is argued that areas that gave the colonial masters their best cooperation in colonial rule had the highest recruitment into the army (Ejiogu, 2007). Such policy transited unchanged to postcolonial period and negatively impacted politics in most African states to date. Certain other demographic conditions include recruiting the top military officers from the areas with the highest level of education while recruiting the ranks and files from the porous and least educated zones (Nugent, 2012). As Dwyer (2019), notes, as a fallout of what the colonial army simulated as a persisting practice that lasted and became a feature of the postcolonial African military, interstate conflict has been rare in sub-Saharan Africa and militaries often do not fit the image of a force focused on external threats. Instead, they have often been heavily engaged in domestic politics, regularly serving as regime protection and in most instances effecting regime change or enforcing military dictatorship. Importantly, while the postcolonial African military is a creation of colonial objectives, there are as well variations in the ways that African countries won

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independence, and so too are their differences in the origins of African armed forces. The reality is, with the gradual obliteration of colonial cribs, especially drawn from nationalist activities that saw more and more involvement of the locals, the entire architecture of the military was speedily changing. At this point, the locals have been massively recruited into the armies of the colonial masters as well as first-hand bearers of the unfair conditions of service and the need for independence. Some militaries, such as those in former Portuguese colonies and Algeria, emerged following bloody liberation struggles. Armies in these states consisted largely of former insurgents that had won guerrilla wars against the colonial powers. Yet, in much of the African continent, militaries have their roots in colonial armies and aspects of this history have shaped postcolonial armed forces throughout Africa. Colonial security forces, which were primarily comprised of police and armies (and gendarmeries in French and Belgian colonies) were used to maintain law and order within colonial territories. Personnel and units that made up these security forces during colonialism were often directly transitioned into the armies and police forces of independent African states (Dwyer, 2019). One overall trend was that colonial armies served to implement the policies and protect the interests of European powers. As such, these forces were regularly used to counter local rebellions and movements, however, with evolution beyond colonialism at independence, many of the African states started the Africanization of their military. Already a structure, template, and behavioral code have been established and handed down.

I mpact of Colonial Origin of African Military on Postindependence Politics Contemporary African states are the creation of European colonial activities on the continent. The state’s boundaries, languages, and legal as well as economic institutions are creations and legacies of European colonial administration in Africa. The half-a-century of formal independence have not altered this dominance of Western culture and institution in the more than 50 independent African nations. The colonial origin of the military impacted significantly not only  on the structure of the military but also its culture and orientation. Dwyer (2019) categorically asserts that one overall trend was that colonial armies not only served to implement the policies of the European powers, but to also protect their interests in the colonies. This interest rests solely on the forceful and violent imposition of European will, order, and dominance on the Africans. European interest ostensibly is the eradication of the transatlantic slave trade they had introduced, promoted and engaged in for 400 years. Economic interest however has been identified as the motivating factor in the rush for the colonization of Africa (Ocheni & Nwankwo, 2012). Physical occupation and exploitation of the native land and people by a foreign nation was not a peaceful transaction. It was achieved by dint of violent military action euphemistically christened “pacification” by the European colonizers (Klein, 1998).

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This war on African sovereignty was waged by a colonial army consisting largely of Africans led by a few European officers. The significant historical factor is that Africans were recruited either from within the colony or elsewhere in the colonizers’ far-flung empire. Colonial recruitment within colonies is concentrated on “martial tribes” who are then deployed to other parts to enforce the colonizers’ agenda. The nucleus of the Lagos constabulary in southern Nigeria that later became part of the British West African forces consisted mainly of Hausa. This later formed the nucleus of the Nigerian army. This Hausa constabulary played a significant role in the British forceful incorporation of hitherto independent Yoruba kingdoms, starting with the defeat of the Ijebu forces, in 1892 into the colonial state later named Nigeria (Johnson, 2001). The colonial army was mainly used for the suppression of revolts, rebellions, uprisings, and agitations against colonial rules. The colonial army’s role was mainly internal, maintenance of domestic colonial order. This focus on internal security and guaranteeing the colonial order was transferred to the newly independent African nation’s military who then see themselves as the defender of national security and national interest. As Siollun (2013) observes, it (the Nigerian Military) regarded itself as the so-called patriotic defender of the national interest. It is this disposition that pervades other African military perception and it largely conditioned their role in the postcolonial African. Arrogating to themselves the self-appointed role of the defender of national interest and national stability, the military soon after independence, and for a long period thereafter, stepped into politics accusing the civilian inheritors of the postcolonial African nations of corruption through coup d’état. McGowan and Johnson (1986) documented 71 attempted and 60 successful coups, as well as 126 reported plans, in which elements of African military, police, or security forces played a major role. Many more coups occurred between 1986, the year of the study, till military rule became unfashionable with the wave of democratization that spread through Africa inspired by the insistence of Western Powers led by the United States of America following the collapse of the bipolar world and the ascendancy of liberal democracy in the 1990s. Military intrusion into politics spanned about a quarter of a century after independence and it had serious consequences for African politics then and even now under a democratic dispensation. Meddling by the military undermined political development, hindering the growth of popular participation and democratic growth. They never allowed the democratic governments room to learn on the job as they present themselves as better alternatives to the civilian politicians they accused of corruption and inefficiency. Siollun (2013, p. 7) points to a typical example of intense meddling in democratic government when he asserts that “some senior military officers drafted a list of government ministers they wanted President Shagari to remove and nominated their preferred replacements. They delegated their boss, Lt-General Wushishi to submit to Shagari on their behalf.” Such interference often leads to bad blood as the civilians resent the undue illegal demands and the military or affected faction feels slighted if such demands are not honored. Mutual suspicion between the two groups made the task of governance difficult. The military often bid their time and strike at opportune times. Meanwhile, when the situation is not ripe for a coup, the military often

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engages in coup baiting, a term employed to describe the deliberate preparation of civil and military-political opinion for a coup (Siollun, 2013). This constant threat of intervention and meddling contributes to the instability of the democratic regimes and a general sense of insecurity in the country. Military regimes project themselves as redeemers concerned with correcting the abuse and corruption of the civilians, except for a few, who are no better than the civilian regime they replaced. Kala (2020) reflecting on the performance of the military in power in Nigeria concludes that “while it is true that civilians often mismanage the economy, it cannot be said that the military is better managers. While it is also true that the civilian governments are corrupt, soldiers have hardly fared any better to the extent that the people have seen that their military ‘messiahs’ are no better than the civilians.” Few military regimes in Africa made fundamental socioeconomic changes in the development of their nations. Thomas Sankara was an exception, he took power in the then-Upper Volta and demonstrated development is possible if an ideologically committed and highly patriotic leader wields power on behalf of the people. Thomas Sankara formulated and pursued a revolutionary agenda aimed at a radical transformation of the economy of the nation rated as the poorest in the world. Harch (2013) concludes that in the four years he was president, he demonstrated repeatedly that great initiatives that were imaginable could at least be set in motion. He did so by convincing many ordinary people that they had the capacity to act. He successfully raised the enthusiasm of the people for a revolutionary transformation of their society and the outcomes of their efforts have been adjudged remarkable (Brittain, 1985; Harch, 2013; Murray, 2018; Kumah-Abiwu & Odeyemi, 2018). To further strengthen the enthusiasm of the masses and imbue them with the confidence to tackle the enormous tasks of development, he changes the name to Burkina Faso meaning the “land of the upright people.” The name drawn from the two main languages of the country reaffirms pride in the African identity of the new country he wishes to build. Burkina Faso under Thomas Sankara relies on mass mobilization and self-help and not reliance on foreign aid as a strategy for development. The country achieved some success, but the experiment was cut short by the assassination of the revolutionary leader Sankara. In Ghana, the military overthrew the independence pan Africanist leader Kwame Nkrumah in 1966. They inherited a difficult economy but the successive regimes through sheer ineptitude, corruption, and incompetence made the bad economic situation worse. By 1979, Ghana’s economy was in shambles, factories and industries shut down due to shortages of raw materials’ spare parts, and scarcity of foreign exchange. Millions sought refuge in other West African nations especially Nigeria and in every part of the world. John Jerry Rawlings, a junior officer of the air force, disenchanted with the massive corruption, ineptitude, and indifference of the successive military regimes staged a coup. He was unsuccessful and was promptly slammed into jail. At his trial, Rawlings highlighted the failings of the three military regimes he accused of bringing the country to ruins. His defense swayed public opinion and another coup, this time successful, brought him to power.

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The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) under the leadership of Jerry Rawlings embarked on a series of radical measures to revamp the economy and restore normalcy. Four high-ranking military officers, two of whom were former heads of state, adjudged to be corrupt were executed. The market women who were accused of hoarding had their goods confiscated. The actions endeared Rawlings to the masses, and he successfully mobilized the people, especially the youths, for development. He, however, allowed the earlier transition to civil democratic rule to continue. He handed over to the successful power after 4 months. Rawlings returned to power through another coup accusing the civilian regime of ineptitude. Ruling through the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), he continued the radical left-wing policies of the AFRC but failed to stem the economic decline. Pragmatically he altered course and pursued an IMF-inspired structural adjustment program that eventually stabilized the economy. Ghana was therefore a classic case of the military assuming the mantle of leadership to save the nation from ruin but ended up damaging the country more than they met it. It took drastic measures by this radical junior officer of the military to stem the decline and stopped Ghana from becoming a failed state. Nigeria did not escape military intervention in politics and this also had its roots in the culture and tradition established under colonialism. The focus of the colonial army was on maintaining law and order, this was inherited by the post-independence Nigerian army, the absence of external security threats reinforce the focus on the domestic. The Nigeria army maintains this focus and also arrogates to themselves the role “national governmental custodian, and an emergency rescue team that could be called out to depose the civilian government anytime the public got fed up with its policies” (Siollun, 2013, p. 7). Nigeria has had five successful coups and numerous unsuccessful attempts since 1966. Their intervention in politics has had a significant impact on Nigeria’s political and economic development. The first coup was seen as an attempt to alter the status quo, the North perceived it as an attempt by the South especially the Igbo to overthrow the Northern hegemony. A successful Northern officer-led countercoup occurred in July 1966. Thousands of Igbo were massacred to avenge the death of Northern politicians and army officers killed in the first coup. Nigeria fought a 30-month civil war and an estimated three million died in the war. After an unbroken 13-year rule, the military handed power to the civilian regime, the experiment was again aborted as the military again overthrew the regime a little after 4 years. The civilians did not get to power until 1999. The long years of military rule preclude the development of a virile political culture despite the belief that military rule is an aberration and therefore a short interregnum to allowing the military to carry out “necessary corrective measures” (Okeke & Chukwuka, 2013). The long-guided transition program of the Babangida regime ended in a fiasco and it further nurtures the perception that the Northern elites did not want to allow a southern politician to rule Nigeria as the election, adjudged free and fair were annulled. The military failed spectacularly in contributing meaningfully to the political development of Nigeria and the ills they condemned deteriorated further under their watch. The perceived imbalance in the structure of the federation that the military failed to adequately address and which

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they were accused of protecting fueled further instability and seriously reduced the possible integration of the nation. Corruption and other financial crime grew exponentially under the military.

Conclusion The military in African states is no doubt a critical component of the political structure of the continent and has come to become indispensable in analyzing the continent’s political ecology. This is majorly owed to not only the colonial origin of the military formations on the continent but the nature of the colonial project. While a lot of theories have been advanced to grasp and interpret the nature and act of the military in African politics, one fact remains that the context of the establishment of the military in African states and its transitions to its current status says a lot about the current features of the military. As has been established, the concept of effective occupation adopted at the Berlin West African Conference of 1884/85 sanctioned the use of the military force to first, conquer resisting Africans on one hand, and on the other, coerce and enforce internal obedience of the citizens of the conquered territories. As was the trend in colonial practice in Africa, the natives were soon recruited into the military where they promptly acquired colonial orientation, purpose, and project. It is  the same military with its colonial structure that was transferred to the independent states. While European colonialism created and transposed the military in African states to its current posture, it was so created for the singular purpose of the colonial agenda. That the military in African states continues to collude with the drive and quality of democratization in Africa has a rich explanation in its colonial (Ogbonna, 2020). The colonial origin of the African military as such has remained the foundational viable explanation for the current nature of the military in Africa as compared to some other continents. The regime of coups and countercoups in Africa is connected to the singular concentration on domestic security concerns by the military under colonialism. The greatest threat to democratization has ever since remained on how to keep the military back in the barracks  to avoid  interfering in politics. Nonetheless, this is achievable only when a self-enforcing political structure is contrived by the citizens.

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Morgenthau, H. J. (1949). National interest and moral principles in foreign policy. The Primacy of the National Interest, 18(2), 207–212. https:/www.jstor.org/stable/41205156 Mosime, S. T. (2015). Media control, colonialism and the making of an authoritarian postcolonial African state: The case of Botswana. African Journalism Studies, 36(2), 45–58. Murray, A. (2018). A Certain Amount Of Madness: The Life, Politics and Legacies of Thomas Sankara. Pluto Press. Nkrumah, K. (1968). Neocolonialism: The last Stage of Imperialism. Heinemann. Nnoli, O. (1980). Ethnic Politics In Nigeria. Fourth Dimension Publishers. Nnoli, O. (1995). Ethnicity And Development in Nigeria. Avenbury. Nugent, P. (2012). Africa Since Independence: A Comparative Study. Palgrave Macmillan. Ocheni, S., & Nwankwo, B. C. (2012). Analysis of colonialism and its impact in Africa. Cross-­ Cultural Communication, 8(3), 46–54. Ogbonna, E. C. (2020). Social mobilisation and critical citizenry in the democratisation. Process: the evolving Nigerian experience. Ibadan. Ogueri, E. (1973). Theories and motives of military coups d’état in independence African states. African Spectrum, 8(3), 280–230. Okeke, V.  O. S., & Chukwuka, U. (2013). Nigerian political culture: The saga of militarism. Review of Public Administration and Management, 2(3), 84–97. Oxford. (2002). Concise dictionary of politics. Oxford University Press. Pakenham, T. (1991). The scramble for Africa: White Man’s Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912. Random House. Parry, J. H. (1977). Europe and the Wider World 1415–1715. Hutchinson. Pauker, G. (1962). The role of political organizations in Indonesia. In J.  J. Johnson (Ed.), pp. 185–230. Pye, L. (1962). Armies in the process of modernization. In J.  J. Johnson (Ed.), The role of the military in underdeveloped countries. Princeton. Raftopoulos, B., & Mlambo, A. (Eds.). (2009). Becoming Zimbabwe. A History from the Pre colonial Period to 2008: A History from the Pre-colonial Period to 2008. African Books Collective. Rodney, W. (2009). How Europe underdeveloped Africa. Panaf Publishing. Salihu, N. (2016). The colonial legacy of civil-military relations and democratic stability in west Africa. ACCORD. Accord.org.za Siollun, M. (2013). Soilders of Fortune: Nigerian politics from Buhari to babangida, 1983–1993. Cassava Republic Press. Tadei, F. (2018). The long-term effects of extractive institutions: evidence from trade policies in colonial French Africa. Economic History of Developing Regions, 33(3), 183–208. Webster, J. B., Boahen, A. A., & Idowu, H. O. (1974). The Revolutionary Years: West Africa Since 1800. Longmans Group Ltd. Williams, E. (1994). Capitalism and slavery. University of North Carolina Press. Emmanuel Chijioke Ogbonna  is a lecturer and head of the Department of Political Science, at Nigerian Army University Biu (NAUB). He studied Political Science at MSc and PhD levels at both the University of Ibadan and Babcock University, respectively. In 2006, he was the recipient of the Babcock University Merit Award for being the best-graduating student in his department. Before his appointment at NAUB, he held lecturing appointments at Wesley University, Ondo, Nigeria; Babcock University, Ogun State; and most recently, Adeleke University, Ede, Nigeria, where he was also the director of the Centre for Remedial and Continuing Education from 2017 to 2021. His specific research domain is on Africa and Third World countries with a specialization in comparative politics and state-­society relations. Adebukola Olubunmi Ayoola  obtained her PhD in International Relations from Obafemi Awolowo University, Nigeria. She was formerly with Wesley University, Ondo, where she taught courses in political science and international relations. She is with the Department of History and

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International Relations, Bowen University, Nigeria. She is interested in international economic relations, focusing on how insecurity affects the economic relations of states. She is also interested in Human Rights as well as International Law. Her research output has been published in scholarly journals and book chapters. Olusoji Alani Odeyemi  teaches at the Department of Political Science at Upland College of Education, Ipesi Akoko. Nigeria. He was previously a lecturer at the College of Social Science Wesley University, Ondo, Nigeria, where he taught courses in Political Science and International Relations. He holds an MA in International Relations from the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. His area of interest is foreign policy analysis, Nigeria foreign policy, and African politics. His research activities have led to several publications in scholarly journals, book chapters, and presentations at conferences in Nigeria and Europe.

Chapter 2

Military Coup D’états in Africa: A Survey Samuel Kofi Darkwa

Introduction The recent resurgence of military coups in parts of Africa has revamped global scholarly attention on the causes of military intervention in politics and the consequences of military rule on the African continent. It must be emphasized that it is an understatement to say that military coups were in vogue in Africa between the 1950s and the late-1980s. Military coups were so rampant and were the most common way of carrying out regime change in many African nations in the past. As a result, Johnson et al. (1984) described the study of African politics as the study of military intervention and military rule. They also argued that military coups were the most frequent means of regime change in Africa (Johnson et al., 1984). Although military rule, in general, is seen as a bane to Africa’s democratic and economic development (Hyden, 2012; Oquaye, 1980), scholars are divided on whether there is a value for military regimes to Africa’s peace, stability, and development (McKinlay & Cohan, 1975; Nordlinger, 1970). As part of this important book that seeks to examine the exceptionality of former ex-military leaders; Rawlings, Sankara, Ghaddafi, and Nasser, it is essential to analyze the causes and consequences of military rule. It is also a necessity to examine what makes the four ex-military leaders exceptional. This is what this chapter seeks to explore as part of its contribution to this book on the exceptionality of Rawlings, Sankara, Ghaddafi, and Nasser. While recognizing the exceptionalism of these leaders, the chapter would like to remind readers that the author of this chapter, as others in the book, do not condone or endorse military regimes. The chapter is structured into four main parts. The next section gives an overview of military coups in Africa and details some of the reasons that have accounted for military coups in Africa. It S. K. Darkwa (*) Institute of Economic Affairs, Accra, Ghana © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. O. Abidde, F. Kumah-Abiwu (eds.), The Political Impact of African Military Leaders, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31427-8_2

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also touches on the consequences of military coups which in general have been detrimental to Africa’s socioeconomic and political development. The third section explores what makes Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, Moammar Gaddafi of Libya, Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso, and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt unique among their peers. Finally, section four, the concluding part, sums up the discussion and provides recommendations for averting military coups, especially in light of the reemergence of coups in parts of the continent.

Overview of Military Coups in Africa Scholars have sought to explain and predict the likelihood of military coups in African states in the early years of the postindependence in the 1950s till now. They have explored the phenomenon from diverse possible perspectives. Often what they emphasize as causal mechanisms or agents depends on their background, training, and what they are looking for. Consequently, the literature on military intervention in African politics represents a complex mix of historical, political, personal, economic, military, social, ethnic, and cultural factors as well as their interaction with external factors. Thus, the determinants of coups in African states can be viewed from the complex interplay of internal and external factors. The internal factors can be categorized into social, political, and military determinants on one hand. The external factors, on the other hand, can be classified into the effects of the ideological rivalry between the world’s superpowers during the Cold-War era, the presence of foreign troops, and the effects of the integration of African states into the global political economy. Since context is a very important factor for military intervention in politics, societal characteristics have often been cited as one of the major causes of coups in a given nation. It must be pointed out, however, that scholars have conflicting views on the effects of societal characteristics on military coups. One such area where scholars differ on societal factors affecting coups is social mobilization. Whereas Finer (1962, pp. 86–88) and Putnam (1967, p. 85) argue that increased social mobilization is likely to decrease the probability of military intervention, Huntington (1968, pp. 32–59) on the other hand argues that increased social mobilization will cause military intervention if the government is unable to establish political institutionalization. Building appropriate political institutions had been the problem of many African states even till now. Cultural pluralism is another societal characteristic that correlates with military coups. Proponents of the relationship between cultural pluralism and coup occurrence argue that in culturally diverse societies, there is bound to be competition among different groups. This competition is likely to lead to political conflicts and political instability. Consequently, the military is likely to intervene to defuse the negative effects of cultural pluralism and threats to national security from competing for social forces. Thus, the more culturally heterogeneous a society is, the higher the likelihood of identifications based on linguistic, religious, or ethnic ties which

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produce competition. Stated differently, the more culturally homogeneous a society is, the lesser the probability of a coup. Therefore, homogenous societies are less likely to experience military coups while heterogeneous societies are more likely to experience military coups (Deutsch, 1961, 501; Jackman, 1978; 1263). Coleman (1960, p. 368) on the other hand argues that a rich pluralism can counter the negative effects of cultural pluralism and therefore, is less likely to experience a military coup. Finally, Jackman (1978, p. 1270) argues that the presence of a dominant ethnic group in a society is likely to cause instability. Another aspect of societal characteristics identified by scholars is coup experience. The main argument of scholars who emphasize coup experience is that previous coup experiences will increase the probability of coups all things being equal. O’Kane (1981, p. 301) observed that a coup is more likely to recur in a country where there has been a previous coup. The political determinants of military coups can be classified into political mobilization, political institutions, and legitimate access to political power. The relationship between political mobilization and instability or military coup is both positive and negative. It has been found that high rates of political mobilization/ participation accompanied by the presence of dominant political parties often lead to political stability (Jackman, 1978, pp.  1262–74). However, high rates of social mobilization and the presence of a dominant ethnic group are likely to cause military coups (Jackman, 1978, 1262–74; Nordlinger, 1977, 78–85). The reason is that often where there is a dominant ethnic group and political parties are formed based on ethnic lines, minority groups are less likely to have access to political power and this can motivate military coups. Scholars have also found that the absence of effective political institutions in developing countries is likely to produce military coups. This is because the absence of effective political institutions causes people to do what they want. This is aptly captured by Huntington (1968, 32–59) as he observed that the absence of effective political institutions causes the rich to pay bribes, and students, to demonstrate their displeasure, and workers to go on strike. This creates political instability and eventually, the military organizes a coup to clear the mess it clearly shows a failure on the part of civilian governments. Thus, a higher level of political instability reveals the failure of the government and is likely to lead to military coups in less developed nations. Political corruption has also been cited as one of the reasons for military intervention in politics. Almost all military coup leaders have cited corruption on the part of the ruling elites as at least one of their reasons if not the main reason for their action (Gordon & Gordon, 2007; Hyden, 2012). Others have argued that military coup leaders who have cited political corruption on the part of the civilian leaders become more corrupt in office (Hyden, 2012; Oquaye, 1980). Nevertheless, political corruption must be checked by the political elites with the support of civil society organizations and state institutions if we want to prevent military coups. The final type of political determinant of military coups is the absence of legitimate means of effecting regime change. For a nation to have political stability, there should be a level playing field for all political actors and there must be a multiparty system where at least two political parties contest periodic elections in a free and fair manner. However, where there are no legitimate ways of changing a government

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either because political parties are banned or political opponents of the government are eliminated, there is a likelihood of a military coup. In the early years of independence, many African states passed laws to have a one-party state. The one-party system was justified as a national unifier necessary for development (Hyden, 2012; Nyerere, 1968, 1973). Unfortunately, this act closed the door to legitimate ways of changing governments. It has been argued that the 1966 coup that toppled Nkrumah’s government of Ghana was partly because Ghana was operating a one-party system. The proponents of this argument assert that there was no legitimate way of effecting a regime change. Unfortunately, the only way of changing the government was through a military coup (Gordon & Gordon, 2007; Hyden, 2012). Otherwise, every election in a one-party state is a mere exercise to confirm the existing government. Other internal determinants of military coups in African states are military factors. The military factors exclusive of the presence of foreign troops can be analyzed under two main headings: military centrality and military corporate interests. Proponents of military centrality observe that states where the military played a central role because they were often called on to quell riots, maintain internal order, and suppress political opponents of the government experienced the most military coups. This is because the military has been involved in politics and feels they have a legitimate right to take political power to maintain order, especially where they perceive that the political elites are unable to maintain order (Johnson et al., 1984; Bennett, 1973, 667–70). Related to military centrality is military dominance. The main assumption that underpins the military dominance theory is that in states where the military organization is the most dominant institution, it is likely to stage coups in support of its grievances and those of the segment of the society. Thus, the higher the level of military dominance, the more likely it is for the military to stage a coup. The second type of military determinant of political instability is military corporate interests. Here the military organization acts to protect its collective interest in the sight of any threat to the institution as a whole. The military as an institution follows hierarchical discipline (command) and seeks autonomy, honor, security, and adequate financial support. Any interference in the operations of the military is highly likely to lead to a military coup for the military to assert itself and reset to at least normal (Bennett, 1973, 667–72). Also, where the political elite creates a rival military unit to protect the president or favor a particular unit within the military, there is a likelihood of military intervention. Bennett (1973, 660) observed that the 1965 Algerian coup is explained by military corporate interests. In that instance, Houari Boumedienne led a group of soldiers to topple Ben Bella’s government when the latter attempted to interfere in the operations of the military by increasing the importance of the ruling party within the military (Bennett, 1973, 660–661). In Ghana too, the governments of Nkrumah and Busia were removed from office for similar reasons (Bennett, 1973, 667–72). As indicated above, the external factors of African military intervention can also be classified into the effects of the ideological rivalry between the world’s superpowers during the Cold-War era, the presence of foreign troops, and the effects of globalization. It has been argued that the Cold War contributed immensely to the

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occurrence of coups in parts of Africa. The ideological conflict between the Soviet Union led by Communist Russia and Western Capitalism led by the United States played a huge role in the occurrence of coups in the African continent. Though Russia and the United States never fought directly, they fought proxy wars by pitting one state against the other and Africa was one of the places where such proxy wars were fought. Also during the Cold War era, many dictators such as Idi Amin of Uganda, Mobutu Sese Seko of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Jean-­ Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic were all supported by either of the superpowers to promote their interests. At times both the United States and the Soviet Union supported coups and countercoups on the African continent for their ideological advancement. The presence of foreign troops in a particular country is likely to reduce military intervention in that country, especially where the foreign troops have more resources than the official military of that country (Higgott & Fuglestad, 1975; Luttwak, 1979). Scholars such as Luttwak (1979, 44) argue that where a target nation does not have any influence from a foreign power in its internal politics, there is a high likelihood of military intervention because there will be fewer obstacles. On the other hand, where there is the presence of foreign troops that are capable of combat, the probability of staging a coup is reduced. Thus, the presence of foreign troops that are capable of combat will reduce the probability of coups in that country. On the contrary, Higgott and Fuglestad (1975, 383) observed that the presence of the French military in Niger during the presidency of Diori was the major factor in his downfall in 1989. This was because the military and the rest of the society saw the continuous French military presence as an affront to Niger’s independence. The integration of African states into the global political economy has had a huge influence on the ability of governments in many African countries to maintain political order. This is because the structure of most countries’ economies has been conditioned to produce cheap raw materials in exchange for expensive manufactured products from developed countries. Aside from this, the prices of raw materials from African countries are dictated by developed countries. Moreover, the prices of these products are subject to price fluctuations. As a result of this, most African states are economically underdeveloped compared to the rest of the world. This notwithstanding, African governments are expected to improve the economic well-­ being of their people. However, because of the unfavorable terms of international trade, many African governments are unable to deliver economic development which is a major yardstick with which citizens and the rest of the world measure the performance of governments. Lack of economic development has its own associated problems such as unemployment and socioeconomic retardations. This often promotes citizens’ agitations, and the military takes advantage to interfere in politics. For instance, Nelkin (1967, 231) who studied African military coups of the mid-1960s observed that the ease of military access to power relates to economic circumstances and their social consequences. Indeed, it has been observed that the probability of a military coup rises with a perceived worsening of economic conditions in a country if followed by a belief that the government is responsible for it or cannot resolve it (Bennett, 1973, 667–72). Scholars have also observed that where

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there are worsening conditions, the military may be compelled to act for two reasons. In the first place, the military itself may be affected by deteriorating economic conditions that may lead to a cut in their budgets (Johnson et al., 1984; Bennett, 1973, 667–72). Second, worsening economic conditions may result in social unrest such as strikes and violent demonstrations. The military may be brought in to quell the situation and where the military sees that the government is not on top of the situation, it may likely remove the government through a coup. Thus, economic deterioration increases the likelihood of military coups.

The Consequences of Military Coups in Africa The effect of military rule in Africa is a mixture of positives and negatives but the negatives far outweigh the positives. It has been found that in most African states where the middle class is small; there is a positive relationship between military rule and Gross National Product (GNP). That is military intervention produces positive economic change as a result of the military’s interest in the improvement of agricultural productivity and industrialization as well as leadership commitment to economic development. This is because as most officers are part of the middle class, they intervene in politics to protect their class interests and thus work hard to industrialize the economy for the benefit of the middle class. Nordlinger (1970, 1131–1148) investigated this assertion and found that in tropical Africa where the middle classes are small, there were positive relationships between military rule and the rate of GNP growth, industrialization, and improvements in agricultural productivity. McKinlay and Cohan (1975, 1–30) also found that in low-income countries, military governments do better in the area of economic development. Other works show countervailing findings in respect of the relationship between military rule and economic growth (see Oquaye, 1980; Meredith, 2011; Gordon & Gordon, 2007). It is not only the case that the relationship between military rule and economic development is weak and insignificant, but military rules also have negative consequences on the economy. In many instances, military governments tend to increase defense expenditure, and this has a huge impact on the economy. Apart from paying themselves huge salaries, they recruit more personnel such that the level of military manpower per 1000 working-age population increases significantly during military rule (Hill, 1979, 371–77; Zuk & Thompson, 1982, 60–70). Idi Amin for instance is on record for tripling the size of Uganda’s army. Aside from this, military governments in general engage in corrupt practices; they siphon funds from the nation and deposit them in foreign accounts to enrich themselves. Examples include General Sani Abacha of Nigeria, Mobutu Sese Seko of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Idi Amin Dada Oumee of Uganda (Meredith, 2011; Gordon & Gordon, 2007). In general, military leaders could not draw a line of difference between public funds and private funds and as a result tend to spend and eliminate anyone that stood in their way (Wiseman, 1996, 917–940). As they increase defense spending and loot the nation’s coffers, they decrease nondefense expenditures such as education and

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health care thereby setting their nations in reverse gear concerning socioeconomic development. It has also been argued that military regimes are often nationalistic. Unlike their civilian counterparts who often decrease the national share of their nations’ natural resources, military governments often increase their national share and at times nationalize them for the benefit of their people. Consequently, they position themselves and their countries in such a way as to benefit from their dealings with the rest of the world (Meredith, 2011; Gordon & Gordon, 2007; Wiseman, 1996, 917–940). In respect of this, military regimes often stress value addition to their major national export commodities and pursue pragmatic policies such as cutting trade ties with say the West and trade with the East or vice-versa. Military governments also have a weaker commitment to international trade than their civilian counterparts (Meredith, 2011; McKinlay & Cohan, 1975, 1–30; Oquaye, 1980). Their weaker commitment to international trade makes them breach trade agreements and debt obligations. As a result, they often attract sanctions from the international community as a deterrent to would-be defaulters of international treaties. Again, military regimes and other forms of authoritarian regimes attract sanctions for many reasons, as a result, these types of governments and their citizens often undergo extreme socioeconomic challenges. Furthermore, their nationalistic attitude encourages them to nationalize multinational businesses and deport foreign nationals from their countries. Consequently, military governments are often blackmailed and sanctioned according to international trade protocols and other treaty regulations. It has also been argued that the military institution was a modernizing force because it was the most efficient institution in advancing modernization in many less developed nations, they operate in. They are also viewed as effective in maximizing stability and control largely because political parties in less developed nations were weak and inefficient to advance modernization in society. This is because parties in less developed nations were weak and less resourced compared to the military. Also, the civilian politicians in those nations were corrupt or perceived to be corrupt (Gordon & Gordon, 2007; Jackman, 1976; Nordlinger, 1970, 1131–1148). It has been observed that military governments in general are associated with the abuse of fundamental human rights. In many countries that the military governs, there is a serious erosion of civil and human rights, high levels of political restrictions, and brutal repression. Political parties are officially or legally prohibited from operating. The national constitutions are canceled, the legislature is abolished, and the military governs by decree. They also interfere with the judiciary. Not only do they impede judicial independence, but they also murder judges who do not compromise and retire others prematurely to intimidate the remaining few to throw out their ethical code of conduct. Censorship of the press is another ill of military rule in many countries where the military governs. Often media outlets that are critical of military regimes are banned and their owners and employees are executed, tortured, and at best imprisoned without trial (McKinlay & Cohan, 1975, 1–30; Oquaye, 1980; Wiseman, 1996, 917–940).

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Although some military governments like that of Jammeh of Gambia, Sankara of Burkina Faso, and Gaddafi of Libya empowered women by increasing the number of women in public office, their critics think that such military leaders see women as less of a potential challenge (Gordon & Gordon, 2007; Wiseman, 1996, 917–940). Thus, in general, due to the adverse consequences of military governments, military leaders do not have the respect of their citizens and the rest of the world. How then are Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, Moammar Gaddafi of Libya, Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso, and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt considered exceptional?

 he Exceptionalism of Rawlings, Gaddafi, Sankara, T and Nasser This section presents a brief overview of four African ex-military leaders; Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, Moammar Gaddafi of Libya, Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso, and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and shows how they distinguish themselves from their counterparts. Rawlings’ importance to Ghana’s political history is briefly summed up by one of his critics, “Jerry John Rawlings is, without doubt, the most dominant figure in Ghana’s politics since independence” (Gyimah-Boadi, 2001). Rawlings is undeniably a very key personality in Ghanaian politics and one of his critics thinks he is the most dominant person in Ghana’s politics since independence. This is in recognition of Rawlings’ role in Ghanaian politics especially with respect to ending the military rules of the 1970s and his exemplary role in Ghana’s Fourth Republic, though controversial and at times contradictory. As a result, he is hated and admired by many Ghanaians and even non-Ghanaians. What makes many people love Rawlings was how he burst onto the Ghanaian political scene in 1979 to remove the military government of the second Supreme Military Council (SMC II) and carried out what he termed a “house-cleaning-exercise.” He also observed the already planned election timetable in place by supervising the 1979 elections and handed over power to the democratically elected government all within 3 months (3rd June 1979 – 24th September 1979). The 1979 election supervised by Rawlings is considered to be one of the most credible elections in Ghana’s electoral history (Frempong, 2017). However, what makes many people had mixed perceptions about him is that just within 27 months after handing over power to the democratically elected government, he removed that same government from office on 31st December 1981 in a military coup. He is also admired by many for his role in returning Ghana to democracy in 1993. He set the record of respecting the two-term limit of the presidency by handing over power to his successor from a different political party (Agyeman-Duah, 2005; Boafo-Arthur, 2006; Haynes 2023; Kumah-Abiwu & Darkwa, 2020). Thus, he has led two successful coups and has also been twice elected as president in multiparty elections. These different shades of Rawlings and some of his pronouncements such as “I do not believe in democracy” make him very controversial and contradictory.

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Rawlings is noted for his role in empowering women and the underprivileged in Ghanaian society. He was attracted to the masses especially to women and children because he demonstrated respect and concern for their issues. Among other things, he demonstrated this by allowing women to form part of the Consultative Assembly (CA) which was formed to draft the 1992 constitution. The National Council on Women’s Development was allotted ten seats on the CA to table women’s concerns and make sure their issues were captured in the 1992 Constitution that governs Ghana. It must be noted that sections of the Ghanaian public including students and civil society groups boycotted the activities of the CA because, in their view, its composition was filled with supporters of the ruling government. It has also been argued that the women on the CA were not true representatives of Ghanaian women but sympathized with Rawlings and his Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) government. He also formed the National Democratic Congress (NDC), a center-left social democratic party that has governed Ghana for 16  years out of about 30 years of Ghana’s Fourth Republic (1993–2022) to “champion” the needs of the masses. Rawlings demonstrated a strong stance against corruption by adopting the two key principles; probity and accountability which found their way into the 1992 constitution. They were also made part of the principles of the NDC, the political party he formed in 1992 to contest that year’s election. He devoted a substantial part of his political career to these principles and echoed them during important events when he addressed the nation. In his lifetime, he had constantly called on the masses to demand transparency, integrity, and democratic accountability from public officeholders. Although some of his critics think his oft-cited ideals of probity and accountability were hoaxes and as such, they must be thrown into the garbage of history because he does not believe in them. They also claimed that he escaped accountability by putting into the 1992 constitution the indemnity clause to absorb himself and his cronies from what they did in government. However, one of his former vociferous critics, President Akufo-Addo, thinks they were something Rawlings devoted much of his political time to and constitute the foundational principles on which Ghanaian social order is to be developed (Akufo-Addo, 2021). Rawlings’ contribution to the economic stability of Ghana stems from some of the pragmatic policies he pursued during the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) era. Rawlings was initially leaning toward the East during the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the early days of the PNDC. Some of the policies pursued in those days hurt the economy badly. However, as a pragmatic leader, he quickly made a U-turn and adopted the World Bank and IMF’s economic liberalization policies (privatization, reduced bureaucracy, realistic currency exchange rates, free trade, and marketization) when he faced domestic and international pressure (Asamoah, 2014; Gyimah-Boadi, 1994, 75–86; Mazrui, 2012). Under his watch, the Ghanaian economy which had plummeted in the 1970s due mainly to bad policies by the successive military regimes were restored to health to the admiration of the World Bank and the IMF. This was largely due to Rawlings’ leadership and strong character (Asamoah 2014; Darkwa  2022;  Mazrui, 2012; Shillington, 1992). Rawlings’ Ghana was one of the benchmarks the IMF and the

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World Bank used in the 1990s to measure their success story in their economic liberalization policies in developing countries (Darkwa 2022; Haynes 2023). This was because by the early 1990s Ghana had one of the highest growth rates in Africa. Rawlings’ actions were not just limited to Ghana. He was an African nationalist and took a keen interest in all matters concerning the wider African continent and the West African sub-region. He was vociferous on issues involving foreign interference and control of Africa’s destiny. He played an active role in the African Union (AU) and was the Head of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) when he was Ghana’s leader (Asamoah, 2014; Gyimah-Boadi, 1994). He also built the Du Bois Center in honor of W.E.B. DuBois who was considered the “father of Pan-Africanism.” The next ex-military leader, Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso was a charismatic, Pan-Africanist, anti-imperialist, communist, and anti-corruption crusader. In late 1981, the government of the Military Committee of Recovery for National Progress led by Colonel Saye Zerbo appointed Sankara as the Minister of Information to boost its legitimacy and credibility. Colonel Zerbo’s regime was then facing problems with the trade unions and had corruption issues as well and thought the eloquent Sankara could defend his administration. Though Sankara was the Minister of Information, he did not support the corrupt acts of the government. Instead, he exposed the government and resigned, and was later put in detention under frivolous charges. Some young soldiers who abhorred the actions of Colonel Zerbo’s regime and admired the bravery of Sankara removed Colonel Zerbo’s government and made Sankara the Prime Minister in 1983 (Harsch, 2013, 358–374). As a Pan-Africanist, anti-imperialist, and communist, Sankara often called on African leaders to build Pan-African unity by involving the continent’s peoples to fight the spread of imperialism and neoliberalism. He openly rejected the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank programs because, to him, they were one-size-fits-all and were designed to make African countries and other developing countries poorer. At his time, his top priority was the liberation of people of African descent from racism, injustice, apartheid, and any such things Africans have been going through (Harsch, 2013, 358–374). He was all the time against the African debt crisis and when he got the opportunity to address the AU in Addis Ababa about African debt, he spoke with passion and condemned imperialism, and demanded that Africa should be “unchained” to redefine its world. During his leadership, he nurtured many citizens with a strong sense of pride in their African identity. Even many years after Sankara’s national leadership, quite a lot of citizens of his country are proud Burkinabes and Pan-Africanists. Furthermore, he was against the West in using aid as a handout for Africa. He advocated that aid must go in the direction of strengthening our sovereignty and not undercut it. To him, Africa must not accept aid that makes it dependent and kills its sense of humanity and initiative (Murrey, 2020, 193–208). Like Rawlings, Sankara had a strong stance against corruption. This is evidenced by his resignation from Colonel Zerbo in the early 1980s. He abhorred corruption and ostentatious living by government officials. Instead, he advocated for frugality and integrity as a guide for public officeholders in poor nations. Public officials

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involved in corrupt acts were tried and sentenced. His officials and ministers were made to use small inexpensive cars such as Renault or Peugeot. Leading with the example, he made his own children attend public schools to avoid the temptations of indulging in corruption. He chose to lead a simple lifestyle and it was no wonder when a group in South Africa called on their leaders to emulate Sankara by giving up their expensive mansions and luxurious lifestyles (Harsch, 2013, 358–374). Sankara was a strong advocate of women’s empowerment. He demonstrated his passion for women’s empowerment through action-oriented policies that removed the structural and traditional effects of patriarchy that hold women’s advancement. He empowered women to champion their freedom for themselves as they best know what holds them back rather than allowing men to grant them what they think women deserve. In his list of national priorities, women’s empowerment and advancement always come before the economy. This was more than just rhetoric. He has women-specific programs such as support for women’s cooperatives and market associations, antenatal facilities in primary health units in each village, and literacy classes for women aimed at advancing women’s welfare. In addition, a family code was developed to set a minimum age for marriage which abolished the practice of child marriage. It also ensured that divorce was to be legally granted by mutual consent. Unproductive widowhood rites were abolished, and widows were given the right to inherit their deceased husband’s estates. Female genital mutilation (FGM) was prohibited as well as exorbitant bride price. Furthermore, there were forceful public campaigns against FGM, forced marriage, and polygamy. Though there were pushbacks, and much progress was not made especially in the rural areas, women were empowered at the national level and there was the political will to punish violations against women and the family code in Burkina Faso. Women empowerment received a significant boost when Sankara named several women as ministers and cabinet members. For instance, the Minister for Family Affairs, the Minister of Budget as well as the Minister for Culture and Health were all women (Harsch, 2013, 358–374; Murrey, 2020, 193–208). Gaddafi is yet another important ex-military leader to be discussed. He came to power on September 1, 1969, when King Idris’ government was toppled in a military coup organized by a group of military men at a time the King was in Turkey for medical treatment. Captain Muammar Gaddafi was made head of the military government. He ruled Libya from September 1, 1969, till October 20, 2011. Among other things, King Idris was removed from office for his alliances with the United States and Britain and for the socioeconomic challenges the country was facing at the time (Morris, 2012; 1–35). During Gaddafi’s leadership, Libya experienced unprecedented economic development. As a pragmatic leader, Gaddafi used oil wealth to support citizens to improve their living. For instance, he made education and healthcare services free for all citizens. Furthermore, state-subsidized housing and other necessities to advance the citizens’ standard of living. Compared to the rest of Africa, Libyans enjoyed a higher literacy level and standard of living. Libya’s standard of living was higher than most Middle East countries. This culminated in a higher life expectancy rate in Libya which had risen by years since 1960. It is worth pointing out however that not

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all Libyans enjoyed higher human development as social fragmentation which is a major challenge in Libya played into the enjoyment of benefits (García & Echeverría, 2018, 4–25). In fact, during Gaddafi’s rule, Libya ranked ahead of several other oil-producing countries in terms of per capita GDP and human development. For instance, in the area of education, the nation’s educational attainment indicators were much higher than the regional average. Libya achieved universal enrollment in primary education. About 86% of the population was literate which was higher than the regional average of 66% (14% illiteracy rate as against 34% regional average). Also, the healthcare sector saw improvement in comparison with the rest of African and Middle Eastern countries. Though few countries such as Turkey, Israel, and Saudi Arabia were ahead of Libya with respect to their healthcare sectors, Libya’s healthcare sector under Gaddafi was an enviable one (García & Echeverría, 2018, 4–25). All these were necessary because Gaddafi made pragmatic economic policy reforms that made a significant impact on the country’s oil sector. As a result of these policy reforms, the country’s GDP increased from $3.8 billion in 1969 to $13.7 billion by 1974. By 1979, Libya’s GDP rose to $24.5 billion. Consequently, Libya’s per capita income shot from $40 in 1951 to $8170 in 1979; a figure that was well above that of the United Kingdom and Italy (Totman & Hardy, 2015, 1–6). Gaddafi was an ardent promoter of Pan-Africa and Pan-Arab movements. He started as a promoter of the Pan-Arab Union during his early days however, he turned his attention to Africa after what he considered the end of Pan-Arabism. He committed his attention and resources to build the African Union when he became its President between 2009 and 2010 not long before his death in 2011. Gaddafi pursued a radical and aggressive policy toward the Western presence in Libya and asserted his authority to claim his nation’s sovereignty. In the area of international trade, he participated mainly in Russia, China, Italy, and Germany. He, however, maintained a lesser trade relation with England and the United States. Gaddafi’s ideology was Jamahiriya, a socioeconomic and political concept that emphasized the “authority of the people as the solution to the economic and political problems facing Libyan society.” Jamahiriya, also referred to as the “state of the masses” or “people’s republic,” gave power to the individuals over those of state institutions. Individuals were seen as superior to state institutions and must as such be empowered to defend the state. Though Jamahiriya sought to empower the individuals, the unfortunate reality was that very weak state institution was created under Gaddafi (García & Echeverría, 2018, 4–25). Gaddafi wrote several books to forcefully project his political ideology, his private life, childhood, philosophical reflections regarding social transformations, political ideology, philosophy, and religious beliefs. These books include My Vision, Green Book, Escape to Hell, etc. In some of the books, he critiqued capitalism and communism. He also rejected representative democracy and promoted Islamic socialism. Furthermore, he highlighted his vision for African unity under the African Union in his writings. Unlike Rawlings and Sankara, Gaddafi was considered corrupt and did not differentiate his private wealth and the national wealth.

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Finally is former President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt who came to power in 1952 through a military coup that toppled the government of King Farouk. President Nasser was a unique statesman who is long gone but remembered for his pioneering role in Arab unification and Egyptian advancement. Nasser was the single most powerful Arabic political leader between the 1950s till his death in 1970. He boosted his political power through his adoption of news media and his ability to unite and influence the Arab world. At a time when radio stations did not exist in the Arab world, he developed one and used it domestically in Egypt and internationally to gain the needed support to develop his nation and the entire Arab world (Alahmed, 2011, 1–30; Meredith, 2011). Nasser was one of the founding fathers of the Nonalignment Movement and pioneered many liberation movements in African and Middle East countries. As an anti-imperialist, he used his radio to fight for the complete eradication of imperialism in nonaligned countries, Africa, and the entire Arab world. He fought colonialism passionately with all his might and with every resource available to him. In his book, The Philosophy of the Revolution, Nasser outlined his vision for Egypt. Capitalizing on the strategic location of Egypt and its role in international transportation, he positioned Egypt to influence the African, Arabic, and Islamic worlds as well as the nonaligned countries (Meredith, 2011; Sharnoff, 2017, 1–3). Nasser skillfully used the Nonalignment Movement to play off the two superpowers of the cold war. In this way, he maximized his country’s benefit politically, economically, and militarily and offered fewer concessions. For instance, in 1955 when Israeli troops raided Gaza, he sought the support of the Eastern bloc to fight Israel when he realized that the West was supporting Israel. In his days, he was able to extract concessions from Washington and Moscow more than many leaders of his time (Sharnoff, 2017, 1–3). Economically, under Nasser’s leadership, Egypt developed and gained its political and economic independence. This feat was made through the construction of the Aswan Dam which was built with financial support from the Soviet Union. The construction of the dam stopped the perennial flooding that Egypt had experienced for a long time. It boosted economic activities and accelerated the country’s industrialization drive. This soon changed the socioeconomic condition of the citizens. A new middle class quickly emerged to take up the political and economic positions which were once held by foreigners such as Italians, Greeks, French, and Britons. Nasser expanded the right to vote for citizens who did not have those rights in the past and that whipped up a new political consciousness among the citizens. Thus, political rights were extended to many. Women were also accorded more rights than they had ever had in the history of Egypt. Nasser also tackled corruption by launching a successful campaign against corruption in the early years of his reign. It must be noted however that Nasser and his associates from the “movement of free officers” that overthrew King Farouk in 1952 did so for their abhorrence of the corruption in the royal Egyptian government. Therefore, when he and his men established their rule, they fought corruption with passion. In sum, Nasser was one of the greatest leaders in Egypt and Africa as well as the Arab world. His greatness emanates from what he stood for and did for his people

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(the Arab world, Africa, and Egypt). He brought unprecedented economic development to Egypt for the country to gain its true political and economic independence. The political and economic positions occupied by foreigners were regained by the indigenes. There was a successful fight against corruption during the reign of Nasser. He also skillfully played the world superpowers against each other for the benefit of his country and made the most from the two blocs. He also empowered women economically and politically and was a key figure in the African Union, the Pan-Arab Union, and the Nonaligned Movement. Notwithstanding all these achievements, there were some drawbacks to the leadership of Nasser. For instance, Egypt under Nasser was a police state where mail was opened, and telephones were tapped. As a result, people did not have the confidence to communicate through the mail or the telephone system. The media were highly censored such that top newspapers were nationalized. Visitors’ rooms were searched to the extent that people virtually did not have any privacy. Egypt had a one-party system where candidates for political office were handpicked by Nasser and his close associates. Furthermore, political opponents of the government were imprisoned. It must be stated however that, the Arab world in particular, and Africa in general have forever missed President Nasser for his outstanding leadership. After he died in 1970, other leaders of the Arab world such as Qaddafi, and Saddam tried without success to match what Nasser had achieved for the Arab world.

Conclusion This chapter has provided a brief survey of military coups in Africa. It has analyzed the determinants of military coups which are the interaction of complex internal and external factors. The internal factors can be categorized under societal characteristics, political factors, and military factors. Each of these factors has its own sub-­ factors that explain why and when the military may interfere in politics. The external factors include the effects of globalization on the local economy, the presence of foreign troops, and the influence of other nations in the local state. This played out greatly during the Cold-War era when the world superpowers though did not directly fight; they influenced wars between nations and regime change in other states. The chapter also touched on the consequences of military coups in Africa which were largely detrimental to the political and economic advancement of the continent. These include abuse of fundamental human rights, judicial interference, media censorship, corruption, and economic retardation. Finally, the chapter gave reasons for how the four ex-military leaders; Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, Moammar Gaddafi of Libya, Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso, and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt were different from their counterparts on the continent. These were the outliers that defied reality in many significant ways. They were exceptions to the typical soldiers. It must be noted, however, that opinion differs on how these leaders are viewed from within their own countries and internationally. However, one important thing about

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these leaders is that even their principal critics have at least one good thing they cannot take away from them. This chapter would like to recommend that Africans within the continent (especially civil society organizations [CSOs]) and outside, the global community as well as watchers of democracy should help safeguard our democracy against military interventions. The African political class must watch out for things that attract the military into politics and avoid them in light of the recent reemergence of military coups in parts of the continent. Some issues of concern must be addressed immediately if we are to avert the resurgence of military coups in parts of the continent. First, democratic advancement must be complemented by economic advancement especially given the adverse impact of covid-19 on many African economies. The gains that African countries have made in the fight against poverty have been eroded by the negative effects of covid-19 such that the issue of unemployment and underemployment is now in vogue in many countries. Unfortunately, instead of playing down affluence and tackling the economic problems effectively, many of the political elites are complacent and living in affluence and telling the rest to tighten their belts. Second, the citizenry, and especially CSOs must resist the political elite from blocking the way for a legitimate change of government. For instance, the ruling elites should not make it very difficult for the opposition to participate competitively in elections. As some unscrupulous politicians have already changed their national constitutions for them to stay in office beyond the constitutional term limit. Indeed, countries such as Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Comoros Island, Djibouti, Uganda, Chad, Cameroon, Rwanda, and Burundi have altered their constitutions to allow their leaders to exceed their term limit. This should not be allowed to become the new norm. The AU and regional bodies like the ECOWAS must enforce their protocols that bar political elites from carrying out such acts. The recent coup in Guinea for instance was precipitated largely by President Alpha Condé’s decision to change the country’s constitution and run for a third term. There are many similar examples even in the West African sub-region. Third, the ruling elite must have the political will to fight corruption. Corruption is a perception-related phenomenon, therefore those in power must be seen and seem to fight corruption with will and effective efforts. They must empower state institutions to do their work without fear or favor. The political opponents of the government should also not make corruption allegations without basis. Since corruption is more of a perception, the political opponents of governments often make such allegations for the government to lose legitimacy and to increase their chances of being voted out of power. What they must know is that the government may not be voted out of power; instead, there may be a military coup which would mean that the constitution would be thrown out and the legislature abolished. In this case, the government and the opposition as well as the entire nation would lose. Therefore, it is in the best interest of politicians in government to fight corruption and those in opposition to refrain from making baseless corruption allegations. Finally, politicians should do their best not to trigger any of the military factors discussed above that make the military intervene in politics. These include

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meddling in the affairs of the military such as creating wings of political parties in the military, cutting the military budgets, premature retirement of military personnel, and the creation of rival military units or special forces to guard the president. Also, when the military is used to repress the political opponents of the government, brutalize demonstrators, or is used in ways contrary to the military’s mandate, there is a likelihood of a military coup.

References Agyeman-Duah, B. (2005). Elections and electoral politics in Ghana’s fourth republic. No. 18. Ghana Center for Democratic Development. Akufo-Addo, A. D. (2021). Jerry John Rawlings Tribute by Nana Addo Dankwa AkufoAddo. Accessed on May 11, 2022 https://presidency.gov.gh/index.php/briefing-room/ speeches/1857-jerry-john-rawlings-tribute-by-nana-addodankwa-akufo-addo Alahmed, A. (2011). Voice of the Arabs Radio: Its effects and political power during the Nasser Era (1953–1967). pp. 1–30. Asamoah, O.  Y. (2014). The political history of Ghana (1950-2013): The experience of a non-­ conformist. AuthorHouse. Bennett, V. P. (1973). The motivation for military intervention: the case of Ghana. Western Political Quarterly, 26(4), 659–674. Boafo-Arthur, K. (2006). Voting for democracy in Ghana: The 2004 elections in perspective (Vol. 1). Freedom Publications. Coleman, J.  S. (1960). The politics of Sub-Saharan Africa. In G.  A. Almond & J.  S. Coleman (Eds.), The politics of the developing areas. Princeton University Press. Darkwa, S. K. (2022). One-party rule and military dictatorship in Africa. In F. Kumah-Abiwu & S. O. Abidde (Eds.), Jerry John Rawlings: Leadership and Legacy: A Pan-African Perspective (pp. 35–47). Cham: Springer International Publishing. Deutsch, K. W. (1961). Social mobilization and political development. American Political Science Review, 55(3), 493–514. Finer, S. E. (1962). The man on horseback: The role of the military in politics. Frederick A. Praeger Publisher. Frempong, A.  K. D. (2017). Elections in Ghana (1951–2016): (elections in Ghana 1951–2012 revised & updated). Digibooks Ghana Limited. García, S. E., & Echeverría, M. P. D. (2018). Muammar Gaddafi’s legacy: A domestic & intellectual approach. Journal of Pan African Studies, 11(3), 4–25. Gordon, A.  A., & Gordon, D.  L. (2007). Understanding contemporary Africa. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Gyimah-Boadi, E. (1994). Ghana’s uncertain political opening. Journal of Democracy, 5(2), 75–86. Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2001). A peaceful turnover in Ghana. Journal of Democracy, 12(2), 103–117. Harsch, E. (2013). The legacies of Thomas Sankara: A revolutionary experience in retrospect. Review of African Political Economy, 40(137), 358–374. Haynes, J. (2023). Revolution and Democracy in Ghana: The Politics of Jerry John Rawlings. Routledge. Higgott, R., & Fuglestad, F. (1975). The 1974 Coup d’État in Niger: Towards an explanation. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 13(3), 383–398. Hill, K. Q. (1979). Military role vs. military rule: allocations to military activities. Comparative Politics, 11(3), 371–377. Huntington, S. P. (1968). Political order in changing societies. Yale University. Hyden, G. (2012). African politics in comparative perspective. Cambridge University Press.

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Jackman, R. W. (1976). Politicians in uniform: military governments and social change in the Third World. American Political Science Review, 70(4), 1078–1097. Jackman, R. W. (1978). The predictability of coups d’etat: A model with African data. American Political Science Review, 72(4), 1262–1275. Johnson, T. H., Slater, R. O., & McGowan, P. (1984). Explaining African military coups d’etat, 1960-1982. American Political Science Review, 78(3), 622–640. Kumah-Abiwu, F., & Darkwa, S. K. (2020). Elections and democratic development in Ghana: A critical analysis. Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development, 11(2), 1–12. Luttwak, E. N. (1979). Coup d’Etat: A practical handbook (2nd ed.). Harvard University Press. Mazrui, A.  A. The end of the Cold War and the Rise of Democracy? Between Africa and the West 2012. McKinlay, R. D., & Cohan, A. S. (1975). A comparative analysis of the political and economic performance of military and civilian regimes: A cross-national aggregate study. Comparative Politics, 8(1), 1–30. Meredith, M. (2011). The fate of Africa: A history of the continent since independence. Hachette UK. Morris, K. (2012). The Arab Spring: The rise of human security and the fall of the dictatorship. Internet Journal of Criminology, 1–35. Murrey, A. (2020). Thomas Sankara and a political economy of happiness. In The Palgrave Handbook of African Political Economy (pp. 193–208). Palgrave Macmillan. Nelkin, D. (1967). The economic and social setting of military take-overs in Africa. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 2(3), 230–244. Nordlinger, E. A. (1970). Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western States1. American Political Science Review, 64(4), 1131–1148. Nordlinger, E. (1977). Soldiers in politics: Military coups and governments. Prentice-Hall. Nyerere, J. K. (1968). Freedom and socialism: a selection from writings and speeches 1965–1967= Uhuru na Ujamaa. Nyerere, J. K. (1973). Freedom and development: Uhuru Na Maendeleo. A selection from writings and speeches 1968–1973 (Vol. 412). Oxford University Press. O’Kane, R. H. T. (1981). A probabilistic approach to the causes of coups d’etat. British Journal of Political Science, 11(3), 287–308. Oquaye, M. (1980). Politics in Ghana, 1972–1979. Tornado Publications. Putnam, R. D. (1967). Toward explaining military intervention in Latin American politics. World Politics, 20(1), 83–110. Sharnoff, M. (2017). Nasser’s legacy on the 50th anniversary of the 1967 war (pp. 1–3). Begin-­ Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. Shillington, K. (1992). Ghana and the Rawlings factor. Macmillan. Totman, S., & Hardy, M. (2015). When good dictators go bad: Examining the ‘transformation’ of colonel Gaddafi. International Journal of Interdisciplinary Global Studies, 10(2), 1–6. Wiseman, J. A. (1996). Military rule in The Gambia: an interim assessment. Third World Quarterly, 17(5), 917–940. Zuk, G., & Thompson, W. R. (1982). The post-coup military spending question: A pooled cross-­ sectional time series analysis. American Political Science Review, 76(1), 60–74. Samuel Kofi Darkwa  is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Economic Affairs, Ghana. He received his MA and PhD in Political Science from West Virginia University. He also has an MA in Linguistics and Literature from the University of Wisconsin, Madison. His research focuses on electoral politics and democratization, public policy and administration, comparative foreign policy, and African Diaspora. He is the author of several journal articles and book chapters. His recent work, “Historical Bases for Policymaking and Administration in Africa,” appeared in the Routledge Handbook of Public Policy in Africa.

Chapter 3

Political Economy of Colonial and Postcolonial African Military Gbensuglo Alidu Bukari

Introduction The military as an integral institution is as old as organized societies and communities in modern nation-states. As societies started becoming organized through the modernization process, they needed protection from other organized societies which might have wished to absorb or subjugate them (Huntington, 1966; Heywood, 2007). Consequently, the philosophy behind the creation of armed forces in modern society was underpinned by protection, the pivot of which was the “soldier.” The primary purpose of the military was to serve as an instrument of war that can be directed against other states. Today, the armed forces belong to a more sophisticated structure in modern society, where there are clearly defined organizational frameworks into which its members are recruited, trained, and administered by states and governments (Huntington, 1966; Heywood, 2007; Ejiogu, 2007). In a modern liberal democracy, the state is represented by the government which has a monopoly over the use of legitimate force. This function of power by the state is exercised through the military (armed forces) which are traditionally under the control of governments in modern democratic states (Huntington, 1966; Heywood, 2007). Besides, it was through the military that the colonial governments perfected the art of governing a varied collection of “natives,” whose culture and customs were foreign to them and whose ways of life were vastly different from that of the colonials that the only effective way to create efficiencies and camaraderie was through a command-and-control system. Arguably, the development of the modern military institution can be traced back to the period following the “Middle Ages” when the European powers started to develop a standardized form of military organization as part of the modernization G. A. Bukari (*) University for Development Studies, Tamale, Ghana © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. O. Abidde, F. Kumah-Abiwu (eds.), The Political Impact of African Military Leaders, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31427-8_3

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process and development (Huntington, 1966; Heywood, 2007; Straus, 2012; Abrahamsen, 2013). For instance, during the nineteenth century, the military became a specialized institution with professional leadership separate from the rest of the society. European colonialism in turn ensured that the military model was adopted all over the world, turning the military into a near-universal component of state organization in modern nation-states (Gutteridge, 1967; Huntington, 1966; Heywood, 2007; Ejiogu, 2007; Straus, 2012; Abrahamsen, 2013). Debatably, precolonial Africa was not governed by democratic institutions, but colonial rule came with specific administrative functions such as administrative, legal, defense, and education. These colonial administrative institutions and structures became training grounds for the future of public administration of the newly independent African states. Besides, the history of armed forces in Africa can be largely described as a “Colonial Heritage.” The newly independent African states were taught methods of military tradition during the colonial period, and how to organize their national armies, and they (armed forces) were mainly formed with the assistance of colonial masters. Also, the social environment and the evolving role of the military in society, and the economic and political systems contribute to shaping the new face of African armed forces, and their role in the democratic system. Again, the African armed forces have changed to conform to the changing nature and shape of African societies (Gutteridge, 1967; Ejiogu, 2007; Straus, 2012; Abrahamsen, 2013). Also, structuralists contended that the transition that took place between the colonial and postindependent African armed forces was in the form of organization, equipment, command, and funding of African armed forces (Hutchful & Bathily, 1998). The scholarly discussions have established and explained the relationship between colonialism in Africa and the African Armed forces (Martin, 1975). Thus, structuralists are of the view that continuity between the precolonial military organizations in African states, and the formation of military systems produced after the independence. Subsequently, the formation of armed forces in Africa was part of the newly state-building processes of the newly independent African states after colonialism. The armed forces were formed to play a leading role in the modernization of structures inherited from the colonial past (Lefever, 1970; Ouedraogo, 2014). It is therefore apt to conclude from the trajectory that after decolonization the African armed forces evolved under the impact of domestic and external political factors as suggested by scholars such as Martin (1989), Straus (2012), and Abrahamsen (2013). Further, some scholars have also argued that colonialism was synonymous with the exploitation of African states and that democracy and the formation of African armed forces were not part of the colonial administration agenda. Africa went through colonial rule, and it is the continent that has also witnessed the worst form of military coups, dictatorships, authoritarianism, and civil wars culminating in political instability and setbacks after attempts at democratization and socioeconomic development in Africa. Others have also argued that toward the development of African development and democratic ideal, the military has become the political facilitator. For instance, in the recent cases of Mali (since 2002), Burkina Faso (2014), Sudan (since 2019), and more recently the case of Guinea (2021) and

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Burkina Faso (2022). In all the cases, the political crises between the ruling class and the opposition, the military stepped in as the political facilitator to ensure democratic order within as stipulated period by instituting a transitional government in these troubled African states. In the liberal democratic order, the armed forces are seen as the embodiment of the sovereignty of nation-states, even if they are sometimes neglected by the political power; they are occasionally used as a tool for development or law enforcement in a state (Bat, 2015). Moreover, some recent studies on African armed forces such as those of Côte d’Ivoire (Aning & Salihu, 2013) and Mauritania (Evrard, 2013) have provided further and elaborative insight into the role of colonialism and the birth of African armed forces in the new African democracies. These scholarly works corroborated some older studies such as Luckham (1970) and Ogot (1972) on the evolutionary process of African armed forces from the colonialism model to the model of the postcolonialism era. These earlier scholars seemed to have a convergence argument which suggests that one cannot understand the nature and role of the armed forces in postcolonial Africa without studying the nature and role of military power in the precolonial and colonial African periods, and why many of the postindependent African civilian Head of States or Presidents have to rely on the military for the survival of their regimes (rule by decree or unconstitutional order) and governments (rule by the people or constitutional order) respectively. A lot of lessons can be drawn from these studies and scholarly discussions on the transition of the African armed forces from the colonial model and the emergence of the military power elite model in the immediate post-at independence Africa. However, the discussions on a model of armed forces more suited to the neoliberal democratic form of African society, and the emerging contemporary social, political, and economic order in the continent have not received much scholarly attention. Also, the historical ascendancy of the African armed forces from a marginal arm of the colonial government and important only as the coercive arm of the colonial administration into a bureaucratic institution recognized as an integral part of the country’s political process has not been adequately traced. Therefore, understanding the changing nature and role of the African armed forces in the new democratic ideal underpins the relevance and analytical framework of this article. The article is an addition to the existing literature, and thus contributes to filling the knowledge gaps in the contemporary politics and economics discourse (political economy). Thus, a close examination of the political economy of colonial and postcolonial African military can further illustrate this debate, and thereby further stimulates the academic discourse on the political economy of colonial and postcolonial African armed forces. The opening section of the article provides a general introduction and background information bringing out the motivation underpinning the trajectory. The immediate section after the introduction is the analytical framework. The third section is about the military in the colonial period, followed by independence and the emergence of the military power elite in Africa. The final section then problematizes the political economy of the African military and interrogates the economic and political dialectics of the African armed forces in the new democratic order, and this is followed by concluding remarks and references.

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The Analytical Framework The existing analytical framework explaining African colonial and postcolonial armed forces is that of historical account generating sterling argument in the academic discourse. The existing discourse is underpinned by several opposing models and conceptual views explaining the postindependent African armed forces. The earlier scholars for instance catapulted their argument from the perspective of modernization theory. This perspective reflects the understanding, and the conceptualization of transitioning of various armed forces in Africa from an independence-era model to a model more suited to modern African society (Huntington, 1965). In supporting Huntington’s proposition, Lefever (1970) asserted that the new national armed forces in Africa have often been seen as direct products of the colonial period. Contemporary scholars have also supported this modernization analytical trajectory and conceptualization of the new African armed forces and argued that the military play a leading role in the modernization of structures inherited from the colonial past (Heywood, 2007). The underlying relevance of the existing framework analysis of the African military is the change or the evolutionary process of the African military of the colonial past and postcolonial era. Though the modernization scholarly debate and the analytical framework of the relationship between African armed forces and modern society remain relevant, the analytical lens of this article departs from this trajectory to one that is centered on the political-economic model of the armed forces in the phase of global political and democratic revolution beginning in the 1990s (Huntington, 1991a, b). The analytical model offered here seeks to challenge the modernization perspective and is tailored toward the economic and political discourse questioning the role of the African armed forces in the new democratic ideal that is sweeping across the globe. Though this has generated very stimulating and sensational debate in the economic and political lexicon, the appropriate conceptualization of the military in the new democratic ideal remains inconclusive. This is grounded in the emergence of African armed forces from a marginal arm of the colonial government, and important only as the coercive arm of the colonial administration into a bureaucratic institution recognized as an integral part of the public administration in the contemporary social, political, and economic order in the postindependent Africa and the world. The political economy model then problematizes the change and the evolutionary process of the African military of the colonial past and postcolonial era and seeks to interrogate the underlying relevance of the military power elite model in the emerging economic and neoliberal democratic order in Africa.

Military in the Colonial Africa The African armed forces trace their origins to the constabularies established by trading companies and colonial administrators at the end of the nineteenth century in Africa. As the coercive arm of the colonial state apparatus, the force was made up

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largely of uneducated indigenes in the ranks commanded by expatriate commissioned and noncommissioned officers (Haywood & Clarke, 1984; Lee, 1969; Wilson, 1977; Aboagye, 1999; Assensoh & Alex-Assensoh, 2002). The colonial armed forces were used in internal security operations against nationalist agitators, and to subdue the subjects in the colonial territories across Africa. In the British West for instance, the colonial regiment or the constabularies were part of the Royal West African Frontier Force, which was employed to defend British colonial interests. The colonial military establishment was thus, perceived to be a fearful and despised alien institution employed to brutalize and oppress the people into submitting to the colonial authority (Lefever, 1970; Wilson, 1977; Gordon & Gordon, 2013). The military, then made up of only the Army, also did not see itself as a defender of the local people, but behaved as an agent of colonial imperialism. Military personnel presented an overly aggressive and repressive posture that severely married their relations with the local population. Rather unfortunately the sordid image, characterized by brutality, which attracted negative reactions from the civilian public in colonial Africa was carried into the days after independence (Haywood & Clarke, 1984; Lee, 1969; Lefever, 1970; Wilson, 1977; Aboagye, 1999).1 The military did not get involved actively in colonial politics. But a historical account in Ghana (then Gold Coast) has it that the country’s politics was on 28 February 1948 marked by protest. On this fateful day, the ex-servicemen who fought for the colonial government in the second world war protested against the colonial administration in demand of better conditions of service promised to them. The ex-­ colonial soldiers clashed with a contingent of the colonial police in what has since become known as the “Christianborg Crossroad’s incident” in Ghana. In this incident, three of the protesters mainly ex-servicemen (they were Sergeant Nii Adjetey, Corporal Attipoe, and Private Ordartey Lamptey) were shot dead sparking off a spate of nationwide violent riots and looting of shops and boycott of all Europeans imported goods into the Gold Coast (Van den & Pierre, 1970; Pinkney, 1971; Decalo, 1989). It was a clear instance of a nonpolitical activity sparking and fulfilling an eminent political junction. The nationalist politicians in the Gold Coast, then led by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah to further the cause of prevailing agitation for independence promptly seized the initiative. Now conscious of their political strength, the ex-servicemen quickly found the nationalist politicians good allies and rallied with them to promote the aims and objectives of the independence movement. This development marked a significant turning point in the struggle for Ghana’s political independence, and many Africa colonial-controlled colonies or states followed suit (Van den & Pierre, 1970; Pinkney, 1971; Wilson, 1977; Decalo, 1989). However, the active servicemen in colonial Africa, particularly in the then Gold Coast did not become involved in the anti-colonial movement per se, but they were awakened to the fact that they had a stake in the country’s political destiny. The role

 In spite of efforts to improve the image of the armed forces, occasional instances of hostility and negative reactions are still encountered and rather unfortunately given publicity especially by the private press. 1

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of the military in public administration and national affairs in Africa soon after independence confirmed how profound this political initiation of the military was.

Military Model in the Postcolonial Africa The African military after independence is discussed from the perspective of structuralism. The structural aspects of independent African armed forces such as organization, equipment, command, and funding, and other aspects of how the transition took place in Africa have received considerable scholarly analyses and discussions (Wilson, 1977; Decalo, 1989). For instance, Hutchful and Bathily (1998) argued that the norms and structural organization of African armed forces are formed either from colonial or postcolonial practices. They also said that these armed forces were mainly formed with assistance from external actors (Assensoh & Alex-Assensoh, 2002). Besides, Straus (2012) and Abrahamsen (2013) in their study of the African military in peacekeeping operations have concluded that the “African armed forces also changed to conform to the demands of external and domestic conflicts.” They, therefore, adjusted to the changing nature and shape of the African conflict (Paul, 2014). African armed forces also evolved under the impact of domestic and external political factors (Wilson, 1977; Martin, 1989). Whereas some scholars have argued that African armed forces are hybrids of the independence process and state-building (Martin, 1975), other scholarly works corroborated the argument and asserted that African armed forces are the modernization of structures inherited from the colonial period (Lefever, 1970). The historical ascendancy of the African armed forces from a marginal arm of the colonial government as an integral part of Africa’s political process attracts the attention of scholarly interests. Emphasis has been focused on the evolutionary process of the colonial armed forces to a model more suited for an economic, and political role in the new democratic ideal. The social environment and the evolving role of the military in society and the economic and political systems contribute to shaping the new face of the African armed forces.

Independent Africa and Military Power Elite The state, represented by the government, has a monopoly over the use of legitimate force in modern liberal democratic states. This function of power is exercised through the armed forces, which are traditionally under the control of elected governments. Being the institution legally charged by law to employ the use of arms, the armed forces are conventionally obliged to be politically neutral in their function. However, this not notwithstanding the universal understanding of this role of the armed forces, they have taken over political power and control on different

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occasions beginning in the early 1960s in many of the postindependent African states.2 The conditions leading to the intervention in public administration by the armed forces in Africa and other third-world countries were generally a combination of intramilitary grievances, widespread economic malaise, and political dissatisfaction with the governments then in power after independence (Afrifa, 1967; Kraus, 1970; Owusu, 1971; Hansen, 1982; Assensoh & Alex-Assensoh, 2002). The situations arising out of these have given the African armed forces the motive and legitimacy to take over the reign of government. For instance, General Afrifa, one of the principal architects of the 24 February 1966 Ghanaian first coup, that overthrew the First President of the first Republic of Ghana led by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah summed it up succinctly that “A coup d’état is the last resort in the range of means whereby the government may be overthrown” (Afrifa, 1967: 93). Also, Kraus’ (1970: 242) analysis of the Ghanaian 1966 coup, observed that the military and police action were occasioned by the government’s disregard for the professional autonomy and interests of the armed forces and police. In a forecast of the future political status of the military, Kraus, further observed that “a fundamental problem of the future civil-military relations is how a civilian government can handle and maintain, in subordinate status, military and police which have been ruling directly and retired willingly” (Kraus, 1970: 242). Subsequent developments were to prove Kraus largely right in his assertion as the African armed forces, on several other occasions got directly involved in politics thereby establishing themselves as significant power brokers in many of the immediate postindependent African states (Owusu, 1971; Assensoh & Alex-Assensoh, 2002). Therefore, the political dimensions and implications of the military interventions in the post-Africa political administration are the dominant concern of the chapter. In Africa, the immediate postindependence was inundated by the emergence of the military power elite in the continent. Thus, upon the attainment of political independence, the role of the military shifted overnight from being an agent of imperial colonial power to becoming an embodiment of national pride and sovereignty (Assensoh & Alex-Assensoh, 2002: Bah, 2010). Under a reformation program, the largely illiterate force was increasingly infused with literate personnel. A policy of Africanization of the officer corps was also completed in many African countries. The drastic transformation of the military was undertaken to reflect the anti-­ imperialist and Pan-Africanist stance which the Ghanaian first President of the First Republic (Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, 1960–1966) sought to project in all aspects of national life in the immediate postindependent Africa (Assensoh & Alex-Assensoh, 2002: Bah, 2010). Besides, the significant quantitative and qualitative development within the African military soon after independence greatly improved the status of the establishment of the force in the continent. There is also the unintended effect of projecting the African armed forces, and the officer corps within the military in particular as a power elite in a relatively

 Military governments have been established not only in Africa, but in other parts of the Third World. 2

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young and unsophisticated political system in the continent, where power bases were not firmly established (Welch, 1970; Owusu, 1971). The realization of the military of their growing political strength was soon to be exploited to influence the direction of the newly independent African states’ political machinery when the opportunity presented itself. The military coup d’états and political instability became the order of the day throughout postindependent Africa beginning 1960s, until the 1990s when the continent returned to democratic rule (Huntington, 1991a, b; Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997; Assensoh & Alex-Assensoh, 2002; Bah, 2010). Also, the hegemony of the African military in the political sphere appears not to have been too difficult to establish. In poor and developing continents like Africa, where poverty is widespread and endemic, there is a high degree of correlation between the legitimacy of governments in Africa and the ability of these governments to practically satisfy the material needs of the governed (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997, Heywood, 2007). Consequently, in Africa and other developing economies when past governments became unpopular because they were unable to fully satisfy the social, economic, and political expectations of the people, the armed forces, which possess the ability to influence the political process, took the initiative to assume the reign of government (Austin, 1964; Kraus, 1970; Assensoh & Alex-­ Assensoh, 2002; Bah, 2010; Debos & Glassman, 2012; Bat, 2015). Again, the threat of military coup d’états in Africa appeared immediately after independence in the continent sour civil-military relations. For instance, in Ghana, in January 1959 the then second highest-ranking Ghanaian military officer, Major Benjamin Awhaitey, Commander of the then Giffard Camp in Accra, and others were dismissed from the Army (Welch, 1970; Owusu, 1971). This followed a court martial in which it was alleged that they failed to report an assassination plot involving some opposition politicians in December 1958 against Prime Minister Dr. Kwame Nkrumah (Austin, 1964). This incident was the first sign of potential danger to civil-military relations in the first black African politically independent African state. Soon, frustrations felt by the military as a result of their commitment to the Congo crisis in the 1960s were to compound the already sour civil-military relations in Ghana. Then began an era of repression by the Dr. Kwame Nkrumah government in an attempt to stifle opposition, and counteract clandestine moves to get rid of the government (Austin, 1964; Lefever, 1970; Kraus, 1970; Debos & Glasman, 2012; Bat, 2015). This phenomenon was unique in many postindependent African states and was respectively described as the “First Wave” and “Second Wave” of coup d’états in Africa from the 1960s to 1970s and 1980s to 1990s.

Military and Democracy Debate in Africa This final section teased out political and economic dialectics toward the democratic ideal and the role of the military. The scholarly debate surrounding the intervention of the military in politics provides innovative thinking regarding the debate over the transformations of African armed forces in the democratic order. The relationship

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between African armed forces and political power is a key issue and remains relevant today. For instance, Debos and Glasman (2012) have argued that the various armed forces in Africa have transitioned from an independence-era model inherited from the colonial masters to a model more suited to today’s needs, particularly to deal with the form of conflicts in African continents. The direct involvement in government by the armed forces permanently changed the continent’s political landscape. Today, Africans are taking bold advantage of the lessons of the military’s involvement in politics and public administration. People have ceased being mere spectators of decisions of national ways to help shape such decisions. Equally important is the fact that the military regimes in the continent, the consequent disruption of political and economic activities, and the popular mobilization contributed to the decline in the political orientation of the continent (Welch, 1970). Also, the mass social and political mobilization embarked upon by the military regimes in Africa helped to expand the political consciousness, and participation in national development discourses has promoted democratic practices in many of the African countries beginning in the 1990s. The emerging multiparty democracy in Africa is regarded as good governance, and the developed Western World and multinational donors require adherence to it as a precondition for their continued assistance. Besides, with the contemporary trends favoring democratic governance and the positive social, economic, and political strides made under the “Third Wave” of democratization (Huntington, 1991a, b), the attraction for the intervention of armed forces directly in politics, and governance of the state has since diminished. To complement this development, the political environment now is highly supportive of the rule of law and the promotion of democratic government. Also, the “Independent Constitutions” in Africa which control legitimate political activities, have guidelines that seek to preserve the armed forces as a politically neutral institution subject to civil authority. Also, whereas the new African Constitutions do not assign the armed forces any active political role, tacit political functions are implicit, and may indeed be implied in their traditional roles. The members of the armed forces can, therefore, play a special role in supporting the government. Firstly, the country’s security policy, which is the basic responsibility of the armed forces, encourages them to preserve the country’s independence and sovereignty, safeguard the basic values of the society, and guarantee the country’s political capability. Also, the armed forces serve the state as a civic society, protect the state’s independence status, and also promote the state’s role as a member of the international community. Besides, the armed forces provide the state with opportunities for influencing international decisions affecting the country and protecting it from risks and threats to society. Above all, the new African armed forces ensure a credible independent defense capability, guarantee that no part of the state territory becomes the object of military speculation, and ensure that no breakdown in security results from the threat of force of any kind from any quarter, be it internal or external aggression. Further, exponents of the view that the military is a modernizer and nation builders have emphasized the sensitivity of the military elite to the overriding goals of

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social and political change in their societies as well as their modernizing skills and capabilities for functioning as agents of modernization. According to this scholarly conception, military interventions in the political administration of Africa and expanding roles of the military are attributed to an urgent need for modernization, especially in the Third World, and also the inability of the civilian governments to lead their respective countries along the path of development in Africa. The argument stresses further that armed forces have certain positive qualities which supposedly enable them to deal with political, economic, and social change more effectively than other organizations in modern nation-states. Finally, a country’s best political interests cannot be better served in any other way by its armed forces than their support for the legally established government as has been spelled out above. It must, however, be pointed out that it would demand mutual goodwill, and sincere understanding from all concerned to guarantee that the new African armed forces‘political influence in the contemporary democratic era is positively articulated and harnessed for Africa‘s political and socioeconomic development stability.

Concluding Remarks This article examined political-economic issues as related to the evolutionary process of the new African military from the colonial model to the model more suited to the democratic ideal. Before Africa‘s political independence, military involvement in the political administration of the continent was insignificant. The military remained a largely nonpolitical institution subject to the control and direction of the then-colonial governments across the colonial colonies in the continent. As a marginal arm of the colonial government at that time, it was important only as the coercive arm of the administrative machinery of the colonial states. However, the political independence revolution in the early 1960s in Africa brought a perceptible improvement in the military’s prestige and political image as a result of a radical reformation, which sought to link it to national sovereignty. From a politically marginal position at the dawn of political independence, the military steadily gained influence to a point where its potential political power became recognized, and its role became intimately associated with the political administration in the newly independent African states. The conditions for the military interventions in public administration were provided by the weaknesses in postindependence civilian governments, existing political institutions, and the decline in legitimacy that they suffered. Also, the failure of political leadership and maladministration in the immediate postindependent Africa led to the widespread devaluation of their skills of governance. This accentuated the alienation of large sections of the elite in the society, including the civilian governments not only made them easier to overthrow, but also provided the military with the motive and justification to intervene in the public administration. A case-­by-­case study of the military takeovers in Africa would reasonably suggest that they were all

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as inevitable as they were necessary. Examination of the people’s attitude toward the military coups also gives the impression that the people lose confidence in a government once it is unable to perform to their expectations. A review of the takeovers has highlighted this significant relationship. The military, on the other hand, had taken decisive advantage of the unpopularity and failures of governments and offered themselves as the needed political alternative to the civilian governments they overthrew. And, quite expectedly, the military had initially enjoyed popular support for dismantling corrupt governments and political institutions and for initiating changes to reverse the political and economic damages incurred. It is not intended to suggest that all is well when the military overthrow an elected civilian government. It must be conceded that democracy suffered immeasurably whenever the military dismissed established governments, abrogated constitutions, banned political activities, and subjected the body politic to rule by administrative decrees. The sweeping away of political liberties and democratic institutions affected the people’s ability to express themselves. The result was that the problems that caused the displeasure often did not get the desired attention. The spate of military interventions in the political administration in Africa, and the associated frequent change and reversals of government policies and programs, created a disturbing sense of political instability and negatively affected the socioeconomic development of the country. The good intentions that compelled the initiation of the coups could not materialize, and the military was unable to find stable social and political bases for their rule. Attempts in several African countries to institutionalize permanent military participation in government through a concept called the “Union Government” in Ghana, and to create local and workplace defense committees to perform the functions of political parties did not succeed. Generally, the armed forces set out, though a little haphazardly to destroy the apparatus of political patronage and control. They tried to rid the state of both corruption and politics. The emphasis was however on changes in the personnel of government institutions, rather than on structural reforms. Positive changes in the structure and functioning of government machinery have therefore been limited. Once the military acquired political power, its performance became subject to judgment by the people. The military governments fall victim to the same problems which afflicted the civilian governments they overthrew. The military, therefore, at one time or another became the object of popular hostility. Such hostility sometimes spilled over into the military establishment itself and led to countercoups. In some respects, the frequent military interventions in governments rather aggravated the already fragile political situation that existed in Africa. Despite the shortcomings of the armed forces in public administration in the context of Africa, it may be pointed out that militarization of politics did not spiral out of control and had not precipitated spectacular upheaval and violence of the kind that happened in some countries in the Third World. In Ghana, for instance, the armed forces have performed the “facilitator” role in Ghana’s present political setup. The military, under the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) era, nurtured a mass social and political mobilization, which has given birth to a high sense of political awareness and participation in the country.

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Today, in Africa the potential political influence of the armed forces is now fully recognized. However, active participation of the military in national politics is considered out of tune with current democratic expectations. The general feeling is that the armed forces should preserve their political neutrality, support the popularly elected governments, and promote the country’s defense policy. The establishment of self-sustaining mature functional political institutions in Africa is a slow and long process. The aspirations and hopes of new countries at their inception have without a doubt always been imbued with a strong sincere desire to chart a path of an orderly and stable political process after political independence from the colonial masters beginning in the early 1960s. A system of government would best allow the flushing of a just society and the sustained socioeconomic development in the continent. Politics by definition and implication, deal with the goals of state policy. Competence in this field consists of having a broad awareness of the elements and interests that go into a decision, and processing the legitimate authority to make such a decision. Therefore, there is a generally held view among scholars and certain sections of society that politics is beyond the scope of the military, and the participation of the military in the political and public administration undermines their professionalism, curtails their professional competence, divides the profession against itself, and substitutes intravenous values for professional values. The military should therefore remain outside the pole of politics. The military itself in the western developed societies has come to accept this and for over a century now has kept itself from direct participation in the nation’s politics and public administration. However, this should not be so in the contemporary democratic ideal. This is because, the military has a crucial role to play in the political life of nations, particularly in Africa. The military is a universal institution and an integral part of a nation’s political system. The armed forces can therefore not remain completely aloof from national politics. As a vital institution in the polity of society in the neoliberal world, it can hardly be wished out of participatory bounds. At least it exercises legitimate influence on the political process as an institutional pressure group. The role of the military in politics ranges from minimal influence through recognized channels in the political system and formal responsibilities assigned within the political system to the other extreme of total involvement in the civilian government through overt military intervention in politics. But, overt military interventions as a legitimate institutional pressure group could not influence the direction of politics through established channels. The contributions of the postindependent African military in the new democratic ideal as has been argued are not only economic, but the military also serves as an agent in the political process. At the minimum level, this implies that the armed forces become a device for deepening a sense of identity, a social psychophysical element of national unity which is especially crucial for African countries that are struggling to incorporate diverse ethnic and tribal groups. At the other end of the scale, this implies that experience in military services is compatible with or essential for economic development. It can therefore be concluded that in the Third World, for that matter Africa, the proposition that a military is a tool for the economic, political, and social development of societies has relevance. Also, the

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assumption that the tractional role of armed forces is territorial defense and support of foreign policy objectives is cardinal and valid. Politically, the postindependent African military coups have contributed to the instability in the formulation, implementation, and sustained pursuit of political and economic development policies in the continent. If the armed forces should make a substantial contribution to the political development of Africa, they should return to their traditional role of being protectors of democracies. This means absolute commitment to democracy and constitutionalism should now be the hallmark of African armed forces in the democratic ideal. A return to both traditional roles of the armed forces will in itself be a major contribution to the political, social, and economic development of Africa. First, it will guarantee political stability and continuity. Secondly, it will ensure the full enjoyment of human rights and civil liberties, and lastly, advance the growth of the democratic political institutions of the emerging African democracy.

References Aboagye, F. (1999). The Ghana Army: A concise contemporary guide to its centennial regimental history 1897–1999. Sedco Publishing Limited. Abrahamsen, R. (2013). Conflict and security in Africa. James Currey. Afrifa, A. A. (1967). The Ghana coup. Frank Cass. Aning, K., & Salihu, N. (2013). Interrogating the northern problem: Postcolony, identity and political (in)stability in Côte d’Ivoire and Togo. In S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni & B. Mhlanga (Eds.), Bondage of boundaries and identity politics in post-colonial Africa: The ‘northern problem’ and ethno futures (pp. 110–116). Africa Institute of South Africa. Assensoh, A. B., & Alex-Assensoh, Y. (2002). African military history and policies: Ideological coups and incursions 1900–present. Palgrave Macmillan. Austin, D. (1964). Politics in Ghana 1946–1960. Oxford University Press. Bah, A. (2010). Democracy and civil war: Citizenship and peacemaking in Côte d’Ivoire. African Affairs, 109(437), 597–615. Bat, J. P. (2015). Rôle comparé de l’armée dans les processus politiques (Afrique francophone) l’IRSEM, no. 5. Bratton, M., & Van de Walle, N. (1997). Democratic experiments in African regime transitions in comparative perspective. Cambridge University Press. Debos, M., & Glasman, J. (2012). Politique des corps habillés. État, pouvoir et métiers de l’ordre en Afrique. Politique africaine, 4(128), 5–23. Decalo, S. (1989). Modalities of civil-military stability in Africa. Journal of Modern African Studies, 27(4), 547–578. Ejiogu, E. C. (2007). Colonial army recruitment patterns and post-colonial military coup d’états in Africa: The case of Nigeria, 1966–1993. Scientia Military, 35(1), 99–132. Evrard, C. (2013). Transfer of military power in Mauritania: from Ecouvillon to Lamantin (1958–1978). https://doi.org/7228/Manchester/9780719089305.003.007. In book, Francophone Arica at fifty. pp 90–104. Gordon, A., & Gordon, D. L. (2013). Understanding contemporary Africa (5th ed.). Lynne Rienner Publishers. Gutteridge, W. (1967). The political role of African armed forces: The impact of foreign military assistance. African Affairs, 66(263), 93–103. Hansen, E. (1982). The military and revolution in Ghana. Journal of African Marxists, 2, 4–21.

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Haywood, A., & Clarke, F.  A. S. (1984). The history of the west African frontier force. Gale and Polden. Heywood, A. (2007). Politics (3rd ed.). Palgrave Macmillan. Huntington, S., P. (1965). Political development and political decay. World Politics, 17(3), 386–430. Huntington, S. P. (1966). Political modernisation: America versus Europe. World Politics, XVIII, 378. Huntington, S. (1991a). Democracy’s third wave. Journal of Democracy, 2(2), 12–34. Huntington, S. P. (1991b). The third wave of democratization in the late 20th century. Oklahoma University Press. Hutchful, E., & Bathily, A. (1998). The military and militarism in Africa. CODESRIA. Kraus, J. (1970). Ghana without and the winter of discontent. In I. L. Markovitz (Ed.), African politics and society. The Free Press. Lee, M. (1969). African armies and civil order. Chatto & Windus for the Institute for Strategic Studies. Lefever, E.  W. (1970). Spear and scepter: Army, police, and politics in tropical Africa. The Brookings Institution. Luckham, R. A. (1970). The Nigerian Military: Disintegration or Integration. In Nigerian politics and military rule: preltuk to be civil war, ed. S. K. Panter-Brick, London: Athlone Press. Martin, M. L. (1975). La Militarisation des systèmes politiques africains (1960–1972). Une tentative d’interprétation. Sherbrooke: Naaman. Martin, M. L. (1989). Le Soldat africain et le politique. Presse de l’Institut d’études politiques de Toulouse. Ogot, B. A. (1972). War and Society in Africa. F. Cass. Ouedraogo, E. (2014). Advancing military professionalism in Africa (Research Paper No. 6). Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Owusu, M. (1971). Uses and abuses of political power: A study of continuity and change in the politics of Ghana. Chicago University Press. Paul, D. W. (2014). Peacekeeping in Africa after the cold war: trends and challenges. In James Hentz (ed.), Routledge handbook of African security. New York: Routledge. Pinkney, R. (1971). Ghana under military rule 1966–1969. Methuen. Straus, S. (2012). Wars do end! changing patterns of political violence in sub-Saharan Africa. Africa Affairs, 111(443), 179–201 Van den, B., & Pierre, L. (1970). The military and political change in Africa. In C. Welch (Ed.), Soldier and state in Africa: A comparative analysis of military intervention and political change. Northwestern University Press. Welch, C. (1970). The roots and implication of military intervention. In C. Welch (Ed.), Soldier and State in Africa. A comparative analysis of military intervention and political change (pp. 1–61). Wilson, H. (1977). The imperial experience in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1870 (Vol. 3). The University of Minnesota Press. Gbensuglo Alidu Bukari  is a Political Economist, and a Lecturer at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, University for Development Studies. He holds PhD in Development Studies (Political Economy Module), MA (Democracy, Governance and Law), M.Sc. (Development Planning and Management (SPRING)), PGdip (Public Administration), BA (Development Studies) and Diploma (Public Administration) with several professional development qualifications to his credit. He is an Alumni of DAAD Centres for African Excellence, and did his Post-Doctoral Research Fellowship at Merian Institute for Advanced Studies in Africa (MIASA). He is a quantitative researcher, and his areas of research span the fields of political economy, democratic studies, development studies and defence studies. His research interests include; quantitative research methods and techniques of statistical analysis, political economy, political economy of elections, political economy of development, political economy of governance, democracy, comparative politics, economic policy, public policy, elections, politics, defence management, defence intelligence and security.

Chapter 4

Postcolonialism and Elite Contestation for Political Power in Africa Chris Agoha

Introduction The attainment of independence by most African countries in the 1960s aroused in the mind of most Africans a feeling of happiness and hope. Most Africans thought that their conditions were going to shift from poverty to prosperity since the destiny of the continent is now in the hands of their citizens who promised a better future for the continent. The sense of euphoria was raised to greater heights by the lavish promises of nationalist politicians campaigning for power, pledging to provide education, medical care, employment, and other socioeconomic benefits to the population. For instance, Kwame Nkrumah had told his followers, “seek ye first the political kingdom, and all else shall be added unto you.” Indeed, given the extent of the vast mineral resources that Africa was known to possess, such as gas, oil, uranium, bauxite, diamond, gold, etc., the potential for economic development seemed enormous. On the global stage, African states excited the attention of the world’s rival power blocs. The position that each newly independent country adopted in its relations with the West and East was viewed as a matter of crucial importance. The dominant disposition of African countries toward the West and East at this period was the adoption of nonalignment. Yet, they considered Africa to be too valuable a prize to lose. However, the negative influence of neocolonial machinations working through unelected African leaders cannot be overstated and this factor effectively left African populations at the mercy of Western capital, as evidenced in the reign of such unelected leaders as Mobutu Sese Seko, Jean-Bedel Bokassa, Gnassingbe Eyadema, Hissein Habre, Houphouet-Boigny, Omar Bongo, and Juvenal Habyarimana, etc. Stated differently, the actions of some of these dictators were to serve and C. Agoha (*) Country Manager, Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, Abuja, Abuja - FCT, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. O. Abidde, F. Kumah-Abiwu (eds.), The Political Impact of African Military Leaders, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31427-8_4

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implement foreign policy interests, generally managed by Western intelligence organizations, whilst each of the leaders lined their own pockets (Rupiya, 2007). As they set out to achieve economic development and social progress, African leaders settled on a variety of blueprints for the future. Most believed that development and modernization depended on strong government control and the direction of the economy, a strategy inherited from the colonial era and encouraged by an influential school of Western development economists (Meredith, 2006). However, the most favored by African governments and development economists alike was industrialization, which was thought would enable African states to break out of their colonial trading partners, ending their dependence on a narrow range of commodity exports and manufactured imports (Meredith, 2006). Huntington (1991) called the new transition in Africa the “Third wave of democratization.” In this period according to him, since the 1990s, more than 30 democratic elections were held on the continent. The result of these “elections” has, however, been disastrous as a result of the fragility of political systems and the absence of the pillars of a “liberal democratic society.” Instead of ushering in peace and tranquility, the political terrain now demonstrates increased ethnic strife and collapsed or weak states.

Postcolonial Nationalist Elite Ideology After independence, several African countries embarked upon state-controlled economic development policies, involving central planning and a large public sector. Right after independence, Ghana, Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, and later Ethiopia embraced socialist ideology and embarked on a centrally planned socialist development strategy (Kumssa & Jones, 2015). The growing appeal of socialism and the central planning model in general, and of public enterprises in particular, arose from the recognition that the public sector is a very important instrument at the disposal of the state for the achievement of sustainable development. Moreover, nationalist African leaders embraced a state-controlled development strategy because it allowed them to control private and foreign enterprises, which they viewed as agents of exploitation and domination (Kumssa, 1996). African leaders saw the colonial countries that clung to power as predominantly capitalist. This perception may not have been entirely accurate since England in large measure and America more reluctantly was moving toward a welfare system of governance in the sense that both had in place the social safety nets to protect workers, their families, and the unemployed in an urbanized industrial economy. Four countries in particular illustrate the socialist policy approach. Ghana, Zambia, Angola, and Mozambique adopted centralist strategies with mixed results (Osie-Hwedie & Osie-Hwedie, 2000). In Ghana, the government of Nkrumah, from 1961 to 1966, followed a socialist strategy with state ownership of industry and land. Based on a centralized economy, the Ghanaian government offered free or largely free primary, secondary, and tertiary education, as well as other subsidized

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social services. From 1964 to 1982, Zambia had a semi-socialist economy based on centralized planning with capital-intensive import substitution industries, to the neglect of agriculture. When Angola achieved independence in 1975, the government embraced a socialist development strategy with the collectivization of agriculture and partial nationalization of industry, except for the oil industry. Around the same time, Mozambique in its postindependence adopted a plan that involved the government nationalizing assets in the land (through state farms), banking, industry, healthcare, education, and housing. This pattern of socialism, frequently under heavy authoritarian rule, was repeated over and over again, with different timing and degrees of authoritarianism in other sub-Saharan nations, such as Tanzania with its Socialist and Self-Reliance Principles outlined in the Arusha Declaration (Kumssa & Jones, 2015). But much more significant is the personal inordinate ambition and authoritarian disposition of nationalist leaders. Kwame Nkrumah’s ambition soared above all others. Believing himself to possess a unique ability, capable of achieving for Africa what Marx and Lenin had done for Russia and Mao Tse-tung for China, Nkrumah created an official ideology called Nkrumahism and built an ideological institute in his name. “Nkrumahism” was defined as a “complex social and political philosophy” to which Nkrumah would add from time to time. A few years later, it was said to be based on “scientific socialism.” Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute announced that: Nkrumahism is the ideology for the New Africa, independent and absolutely free from imperialism, organized on a continental scale, founded upon the concept of One and United Africa, drawing its strength from modern science and technology and from the traditional African belief that the free development of each is conditioned by the free development of all (Meredith, 2006).

Gamal Abdel Nasser controlled Egypt through what was known as “Nesserism.” Nasserism was neither a movement nor an ideology but a system of personal rule. The organization of the state and its policy was determined by his will alone. All power was concentrated in his hands, and every aspect of government came under his remit. He decreed the nationalization of industry, transport, financial institutions, and large hotels and department store, and introduced central planning of the economy, all enhancing his ability to control the state (Meredith, 2006). In Guinea, Sekou Toure similarly defined himself. His main title was Guide Supreme de le Revolution (Supreme Leader of the Revolution), but he is also liked to be known as “The Great Son of Africa”; “The Terror of International Imperialism, Colonialism, and Neo-Colonialism”; and “The Doctor of Revolutionary Sciences” (Meredith, 2006). He was portrayed as an expert in every field. No major decision could be taken without his approval, and he was the source of all authority, ruling by decrees. Hastings Banda of Malawi’s grip on the country extended not just over the government and economy of the state but even over the moral standards under which the population was required to live. He ran Malawi as his fiefdom, demanding not just obedience but servility. In directing affairs in the country he was said to have stated, “Everything is my business” (Meredith, 2006). In Cote d’Ivoire, Houphouet

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Boigny’s “reign” was more benign but similarly autocratic. An avid admirer of Charles de Gaulle of France, he took control at independence in 1960 under a constitution that he had designed to ensure that one-man rule prevailed. He remained unapologetic about his style; noting that: “Democracy is a system of government for virtuous people, and in a young country such as ours, we need a chief who is all-­ powerful for a specific period of time” (Meredith, 2006). In their quest for greater control, the device they commonly favored was the one-party system. Further, independent Africa has a record of long-overstaying rulers. Omar Bongo led Gabon for 42 years up until he died in 2009. He was followed by Gnassingbé Eyadéma of Togo, who also died in office in 2005 after 38 years in power. In both cases, the rule was so personalized that, after they died in office, the two presidents were quickly replaced by their sons Ali Bongo Ondimba and Faure Gnassingbé. Many other African leaders ruled their countries for 20 years or more years and their rule stretched across profoundly different political eras. For example, Mobutu Sese Seko took power in the Congo when Lyndon Johnson was in the White House, and he was only ousted at the time of Boris Yeltsin’s second term in post-Soviet Russia. José Eduardo dos Santos was Angolan President and ruled the country despite being inaugurated when Leonid Brezhnev was in the Kremlin (Carbone, 2013). It may thus not come as a surprise that a few postindependence African rulers, including Hastings Banda of Malawi and Francisco Macías Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, declared themselves “Presidents for Life” (Carbone). Besides the overstay tendency of many African rulers, however, several countries in the region were notoriously affected by the opposite syndrome, namely the instability of leadership produced by frequent military coup d’état.

Military Engagement in Politics and Leadership Military involvement in politics either through military rule sometimes referred to as military government or military regime is a political phenomenon that has been characteristic of many societies, especially in Africa. While it is regarded as a political aberration across the globe in recent times, it has continued to threaten many societies in Africa even in this era of global “project democracy” (Edeh & Ugwueze, 2014). Indeed, military rule is not a recent phenomenon because it predated even the praetorians of Roman times and was rampant during the feudal era as well as regular interregnum in the constitutional struggles of many societies, including Africa and other Third World countries, especially after their political independence (Igwe, 2005). Consequently, military interventions in politics are very common both in democratic and totalitarian regimes. The “national guard” function of the military makes it very powerful and sometimes unquestionable when it begins to exert an almost unrestrained influence in government; the height of which may involve a direct takeover of the institutions of governance. Military intervention in politics, in this context, can be seen as an unconstitutional takeover of political power from civilians by the armed forces by brute force.

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Armed forces here include the army, the navy, the air force, the secret police, and other sabotaging law enforcement agencies (Acemoglu et al., 2010). It is unconstitutional because there are no defined rules of engagement stated anywhere as the established mechanisms on how the people can change their government. It can appropriately be called coup d’état. Coup d’état implies violent (or by whatever means) military overthrow of an elected civilian government or a constituted monarchy. The region’s long string of military takeovers was inaugurated as far back as 1963 when soldiers ousted and murdered Togo’s first president Sylvanus Olympio. The countries that were most affected by this phenomenon in the years that followed include Nigeria, Mauritania, Comoros islands, Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Sierra Leone Burundi, Niger, Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic, Lesotho, Mali, Sudan, and Uganda. In countries such as Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia, or Chad, direct military interventions seemed to be virtually the only way power could be passed on from one leader to another. There are five prevailing theories of military intervention and engagement in politics (Onder, 2010), and these include: • • • • •

Socio-economic development theory. Political development theory. The centrality of military theory. The conflict theory. Regional differences theory.

The Socioeconomic Development Theory argument of military intervention in politics and subsequent military rule is that the density of military interventions in politics is more likely to decrease with increased socioeconomic development status. A further argument is that “nations with high socioeconomic situations have higher urbanization, industrialization, and literacy level, and so have increased mass participation into the social activities” (Onder, 2010). Socioeconomic development creates awareness of political events and spurs political actions. It is important to note that, industrialization reduces the propensity of military interventions since the increased socioeconomic complexity puts public administration beyond the skills of the armed forces. But the general argument here is that poverty, and inadequate socioeconomic development can be a very important variables for military interventions and military rule in any society, thus, the reason why African countries have witnessed more military coups. Political Development Theory is closely related to socioeconomic development but it is quite distinct from it. Political development as used here is synonymous with a strong civilian government, strong democratic values, and strong political institutions. Where these indicators of political development are found, there is a high degree of fundamental human rights imbued with freedom (except for those freedoms that infringe on others’ rights), rule of law, equity, and justice. Where these variables are prevalent, military intervention is usually very difficult, but where they exist in a breach, society is prone to military intervention and rule. African and other less developed countries have been advised to build strong

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political institutions to combat this scourge and fight underdevelopment as well (Obama, 1996). The Centrality of Military Theory posits that, in all political systems, the military possesses certain advantageous characteristics which allow it to intervene in the political process. Accordingly, Murat Onder (2010) argued that the centrality of the military to the state’s claim of legitimate violence makes it prone to use this to dominate politically, especially if civilian institutions are weak. Acemoglu et  al. (2010), argued that the creation of a powerful military is a double-edged sword for the elite. On the one hand, a more powerful military is more effective in preventing transitions to democracy. On the other hand, it also necessitates either greater concessions to the military or raises the risk of a military takeover (Acemoglu et al., 2010). Indeed, a powerful military is not only effective in preventing a transition to democracy, especially in societies where they have gained control of political power but also creates a political moral hazard problem because it can turn against the elite and take direct control of the government and consequently wield political power (Acemoglu et al., 2010). The Conflict Theory is part of human history and the military is also insulated in this history. Interestingly, ethnic antagonisms including cultural diversities, ethnic dominance, and ethnic competitions are largely responsible for military interventions in politics, especially in Africa. The second military coup in Nigeria which brought General Yakubu Gowon to the corridors of power is inescapably linked to this conflict theory. It was believed by the Northerners that the coup, not only ousted Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa but also killed him along with other prominent Nigerian politicians of northern and western extractions, was masterminded by the Igbos of the South East region and that the subsequent ascension to power by General Aguiyi Ironsi was a grand design to establish Igbo dominance in Nigeria, thus, a countercoup was imperative (Edeh & Ugwueze, 2014). Further, Morrison and Stevenson (1972), argued that the greater the number and cultural diversity of groups, the greater the elite instability and the greater the military intervention. However, this argument could be misleading because if military intervention is synonymous with societal heterogeneity, then the United States would have recorded the highest case of military rule in the world. Nevertheless, such is not the case. Perhaps, there is a close relationship between a society’s inability to subsume its heterogeneity into a harmonious union and the military intervention in that society. Therefore, the problem is not heterogeneity per se but the inability to explore and harness the diversities into a harmonious composite union. Regional Differences Theory is closely related to the conflict theory because what often generates conflict, the type that leads to military intervention, usually issues from geographical locations, and differences of the ruling class who continually explore all possible avenues to establish their dominance (Edeh & Ugwueze, 2014). Consequently, one or a combination of the above theories could explain recent military intervention/takeover in Guinea, Sudan, or Niger where a coup was thwarted in March 2021 just days before a presidential inauguration. In April this year, after the death of the Chadian leader Idriss Déby, the army installed his son as interim president leading a transitional military council. His opponents called it a

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“dynastic coup.” The African States tried diarchy; military-headed governments with civilian technocrats in key sectors of the public service, as ministers, special advisers, members of parastatals, etc., side by side with their military counterparts. A good example of this symbiotic relationship was Samuel Doe’s government in Liberia, which relied heavily on pro-democracy activists. In some contexts, however, the military has demonstrated patriotism and a genuine desire to pursue a development path. In this regard, it is important to examine, arguably one of the most successful military leaders in Africa which later continued within a democratic space. This is no other personality than the quintessential Jerry John Rawlings of Ghana. To evaluate Rawlings, it is necessary to understand the degree to which both economic and political institutions had deteriorated by the time of Rawlings’s 31 December 1981 coup. Ghana achieved independence in 1957 with a per capita income roughly equal to South Korea’s. Over the next 25 years, however, disastrous import-substitution strategies, sagging export revenues, rampant corruption, and statism laid waste to the economy. Between 1974 and 1981, for example, GDP dropped 15%, and cocoa exports, the leading source of foreign exchange, shrank by more than 40% (Lyons, 1997). The independence movement in Ghana was led by Kwame Nkrumah and his Convention People’s Party (CPP). In 1966, after a decade of increasingly authoritarian rule, a coup toppled him. Following an election 3 years later, the military returned power to civilians. The winners of this election, Prime Minister Kofi A. Busia, and his Progress Party ruled for just over 2 years. Senior military officers retook power in early 1972. In June 1979, then-Flight Lieutenant Rawlings led the Armed Forces Revolution Council in a junior officers’ putsch. Later that year, Rawlings handed power over to President Hilla Limann and his People’s National Party (PNP), the winners of national elections. It was Limann whom Rawlings overthrew on the last day of 1981 (Brenya et al., 2015). Ghana has served as the preeminent test case of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in Africa. Following the virtual collapse of the formal economy in the early 1980s, the Rawlings government reversed its populist policies and adopted an SAP with the strong encouragement of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and bilateral donors. The results were dramatic. The country’s GDP grew at rates of 6–7% annually from 1984 to 1988, the highest in sub-­ Saharan Africa at that time. These considerable economic accomplishments, however, began to stall in the early 1990s. The disputed 1992 elections and the subsequent opposition boycott of parliament raised questions about stability and made private investors wary (Lyons, 1997). On 7 December 1996, Jerry Rawlings won a second multiparty election in Ghana completing another important step in building sustainable political and economic institutions. Previous elections in 1992, ended in charges of fraud and an opposition boycott of the 200-seat, unicameral National Assembly. This time, however, important reforms in the electoral system and a spirited campaign by an opposition collation gave Ghanaians a meaningful choice on election day. The opposition won a third of the seats in the Assembly and used this to scrutinize the Rawlings government to build a more effective political party for subsequent elections.

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While the election received less attention than it deserved in international media, Ghana offered a series of hopeful lessons for African states struggling with the challenges of macroeconomic structural adjustment programs and the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The case of Ghana also highlights the tendency in several African countries for soldiers who seized power through coups to reinvent themselves as democratic leaders. In such West African states as Niger, Togo, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and The Gambia, military leaders remained in power in part by manipulating elections or by forcing the opposition to withdraw. But Rawlings was a glaring contrast, he cultivated a rural base of support that allowed him to go from a coup leader to winner of two multiparty elections while steering the country through a difficult period of economic reform. The current stability enjoyed by the country and Rawlings’s transition from a socialist military dictator to a democrat to return Ghana to a democratic government raises an academic curiosity on factors that influenced the metamorphosis of Rawlings and his role in sustaining democracy in the fourth republic (Brenya et al., 2015).

Elite Contestation for Power and Governance This section contextualizes the African power elite and their governance modus operandi. An elite has been defined as those persons who were Western-educated and wealthy to a high degree relative to the mass of the population (Lloyd, 1966). This definition is restrictive and may not be universally accepted, although it falls within the purview of the varied definitions espoused by scholars attempting to situate the concept of the elite in its proper perspective. Elites are also described as the superior group in an open society. Few would use the term upper caste or hereditary aristocracy. Perhaps, one would say that the more socially mobile a society is, the more appropriate the use of the term “elite” to designate its superior members. The most significant component of the concept of the elite defines the relationship with its counterpart, the masses. The elite influences the behavior of the masses; it is an imitable body of persons (Lloyd, 1966). Influence is here distinguished from power and authority. Randrianja (1996) observes that the elites are those who originally promoted nationalism. But he was quick to point out that elites should not be perceived only as a simple creation of colonization or the transmission belt of colonial interest. They are also cultural intermediaries, cultural entrepreneurs, or culture brokers, who have managed to reconcile collaboration with, and resistance to, the colonial power in the management of their interests. They succeeded in gaining recognition not only as the spokesman for their compatriots but also as agents of the colonial state in such a way as to reap the benefit of independence. But, in his book titled “The Power Elite,” Wright Mills (1957) posits that: Elites are in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of modern society. They rule the big corporations. They run the machinery of the state and claim its prerogatives. They direct the military establishment. They occupy the strategic command posts of the

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social structure, which are now centered on the effective means of power and wealth, and the celebrity which they enjoy.

Thus, if we can say that a society is highly centralized, then its elite certainly must be, or at least it must have a central elite, as well as various subordinate, sectoral, local, or peripheral elites. However, competition is inherent within the power elite. Elites are not entirely homogeneous and cohesive. There exist divisions and fractionalizations within the elite. The factionalist struggle generally takes place within the party system. Sometimes, such a struggle leads to the emergence of political counter-elite who recruits their members mainly from the party that has made a political comeback. Does the power elite exist in Africa? African societies may originally have been relatively differentiated, but now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, they have come to form sophisticated ensembles that include formidable hierarchies. In every African country, there is a striking contrast between the fortified villas of the most privileged classes and the huts of peasants in the more isolated rural areas, not to mention in the overpopulated towns and cities (Randrianja, 1996). This perhaps is a testimonial commentary on the visibility and dominance of the elite in Africa. The power elite is predominantly composed of political, economic, and military men, but this instituted elite is frequently in some tension: it comes together only on certain coinciding points and only on certain occasions of crises (Wright, 1957). However, we must always be historically specific and open to complexities. The simple Marxian view makes the economic man the real holder of power, while the liberal view makes the political man the chief of the power system. And some would view the warlords as virtual dictators. Each of these is an oversimplified view. It is to avoid them that the term “power elite” is used here rather than “ruling class” (Wright, 1957). The ruling class is a badly loaded phrase. “Class” is an economic term, and “rule” is a political one. African elite had long recognized that capturing state power was a golden road to personal riches and, at the same time, enriching others. The state could not only expropriate, but through its legitimate functions of securing development for its citizens and maintaining the safety of its citizens from internal disorder and external aggression, it has also become the largest dispenser of wealth and privilege among the elite. According to Couloumbis and Wolfe (1986), one is tempted, when dealing with complex concepts such as power, to paraphrase Supreme Court Justice Byron White, and say about power what he said about obscenity: “I cannot define it, but I know it when I see it.” Elaborating on the African power elite, Horowitz and Mills (1966) ascribed the following characteristics to a “power network” controlled by a minority exercising huge decision-making powers over the nation: • “The occupational and status position of power groups is completely removed from ordinary activities. They are located at the command posts of majority institutional hierarchies. • Individuals may be unaware of the full extent of their power, but they are nonetheless led to acting in concert to defend their power under menacing conditions. This range of power is objectively ‘there’ and not necessarily subjectively ‘felt’.

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• Power can be measured objectively, and is, therefore, not determined by the self-­ reflection of the powerful. • Despite differences in the sources and intensity of power, the backgrounds of the powerful reveal striking similarities in family standing, religious affiliation, educational achievements, and attendance at educational institutions. These similarities and occupational exigencies lead to formal and informal interaction, providing increased opportunities for reinforcement of a felt common interest. • There is relatively complete control of the powerful over entry into their ranks since recruitment is regulated utilizing power. They set their standards of entry with which aspirants to their ranks must comply. • The decision-making range is vast though exercised by a small number. Decisions made by the powerful provide the social context for all other sectors of the population. • The range of decision-making is set by the three major institutional hierarchies: the state, corporation, and army (or polity, economy, and military). The interrelated activities of these institutions create a base for solidifying the aims of the powerful. Their decisions, activities, and interdependent skills further link areas of polity and economy. • The interrelatedness of these institutions and the consequent interdependence of decision-making leads to interchangeability in top hierarchical positions, thus heightening power as an objective phenomenon. The distance the powerful can establish between themselves and the mass or the public enables them to function with a relatively high degree of secrecy. Their activities are generally unclear or unknown even to the informed public. • Various theories of power consensus, from conservative to radical, project such consensus in terms of cohesive class interest and/or conspiratorial - manipulative control on the part of owning or managing upper-class groups.” African elite is fractionalized mainly along ethnic, regional, religious, and institutional lines, being the product of the uneven development and the rivalry Western colonial administration fostered among the different segments. It has accordingly built its support constituencies from communal, ethnic, religious, and regional groups depending on the level of contestation, and has sought to manipulate and exploit the differences and anxieties arising from unequal size and population to further its interest. Consequently, the integration of Africa into the international capitalist system and the monetization of the economy had far-reaching implications for social, particularly, class relations. The leadership had to respond to these social changes, and authority and influence began to assume the form of the ownership of wealth and property. In this regard, much of the focus on leadership assumes the form of the quest for wealth and power. Power is seen as a means to the acquisition of wealth and the protection of such wealth, while wealth enables the individual to gain access to power. The quality of leadership has had a tremendous impact on Governance. Governance is hardly a new expression in the extant political science literature, for it generally refers to the task of running a government or any other organized entity.

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But the attempt to make conceptual use of the expression was made popular in the literature on African development by the World Bank publication titled: “Sub-­ Saharan Africa: From Crises to Sustainable Growth” (1989), which saw the African political and economic problems as the Crises of Governance. Mark Robinson (1996) refers to governance as the process of political management that embraces “the normative basis of political authority, the style in which public affairs are conducted and the management of public resources.” Central to Robinson’s definition are three issues namely; accountability, legitimacy, and transparency. The World Bank identified the cause(s) of frequent crises in Africa as the result of bad governance, implying that development will take place only if political leaders abandon their authoritarian practices. The Bank thus broadly defined governance as “the exercise of political power to manage a nation’s affairs” (World Bank, 1989). Also commenting in line with the World Bank position, Mbaya Kankwenda et.al (2000), the former UNDP resident representative in Nigeria, observed that governance is the exercise of political, economic, and administrative power in the management of public affairs; good governance implies managing public affairs in a transparent, accountable, participatory, and equitable manner, showing due regard for human rights and the rule of law. It encompasses every aspect of the state’s dealing with civil society and its responsibility for the equitable division of resources. These basic characteristics of good governance are conspicuously lacking in elite leadership in Africa, and many countries coming under the heavy influence of neocolonialism, a situation that has subjected that mass African population to abject poverty, penury, and pervasive insecurity.

Development Ethos of Africa Elite Developmental elite and nondevelopmental elite exist in any society (Agoha, 2012). Elites are at the forefront of transformation. They are the custodian of societal values, social goals, and ideals. The developmental elite is those elites who are ready to take up development issues and lead their society on a sustainable path. The developmental elite is those who, if are not careful in managing the resources of the state, might find their position change. The nondevelopmental elite is a self-interest-­ seeking elite, dependent and consumerist, but they cannot mobilize the masses for genuine development. Their interest lies in realizing the objectives of the elite group and not the interest of the generality of public. The self-serving ethos of the colonial administration, which had been the very foundation of the colonial state, had ingrained in the mentality of the emerging African elite its self-seeking ethos, and this, with a devastating effect, had formed the basis of development orientation in the postcolonial African state (Schatz, 1977). Actual development, if it came about at all, was only incidental to it, and, in any case, it served the interest of the elite, being only a palliative to the masses who alone felt the pinch of reality. The reality is that for the generality of the ordinary people of Africa, the past decades, and in some countries, the long period of military

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rule has brought more misery than comfort, which development should give. Poverty amid plenty necessarily afflicted the masses. When the elite come into power, various self-seeking measures are adopted. First, the political party (in the case of civilian rule), the vehicle that brought the elite into power, had to be strengthened. But more importantly, and even more poignantly, the entire strategy for national development efforts had to change to cater to the interests of the new ruling elite. But one point needs to be made. The colonial regime, despite its self-directed motives, built several structures such as the railway system by “direct labor.” But when the new African elite came to power, everything, from the purchase of office pins to the laying of highways, went to contractors. The contractors today have become the most conspicuous and generally the most important subgroup of the elite category in Africa. The politically highly assertive and self-seeking elite who took over power from the departing colonial authorities transferred individual African states into their private estate, and spread their ethos of self-aggrandizement to affect every public office and officer. Abdullahi Smith (1976) spoke penetratingly of this lamentable development when he said: The paradox which we have to solve is this. We all accept the overriding need for development: development of education, development of industry, development of agriculture, development of communication and commerce, development of public health services, development of administration, community development, and so on. And we devise large-­ scale and complicated plans for achieving these. But when we get down to putting these plans into action, we find that the implementation of great development programs rapidly creates facilities not so much for the development intended, but for social corruption of all sorts. The greater the size of the plans, indeed the larger the scale of corruption which their implementation encourages, and the greater the opportunity for the profiteer, the embezzler, the usurer, and the thief to move in and take control, diverting the efforts that are being made for the benefits of the community to their private gain at the community’s expense. So that in the end, the only development we see is the development of corruption, involving ever more sophisticated and effective ways of evading the legal consequence.

Today, in Africa, we have an impressive corpus of data that reveal to us both the way and manner in which the trend of corruption and a corrupt behavior pattern have been perpetrated. Individual African countries who care to investigate corruption cases have data to be found in the numerous commissions of inquiry, some judicial others administrative. The African elite is largely antidevelopment and antidemocracy. Consequently, because the African elite has not been developmental in their outlook, leadership, and governance questions have gained corresponding significance. Good leadership determines the trajectory of governance and development. The problem of leadership in Africa is traceable to the immediate postindependent era. At independence, the nationalist elite limited their vision of the leadership role only to political succession from the colonialists. As Olusanya (1986) observed: The nationalist leaders had no vision of the society they hoped to lead after they shall have achieved independence. All they wanted was to destroy colonial rule. What kind of society would be constituted for it received no attention whatsoever.

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The poverty of vision, the lack of ideological clarity, and what Olusanya referred to as the poverty of imagination and creativity robbed the nationalist elite of the capacity to play an effective leadership role beyond the zero-sum politics of succession.

Conclusion The process of transcending elite problems in Africa must begin with a proper understanding of the challenges of leadership and governance as posed by the collective hopes and aspirations of the population. The ruling (political) elite is not in a position now to relinquish power. Elites have a network of membership, which is protective and regenerative, with attendant accumulative tendencies. The vicious circle of elite dominance can only be challenged and deconstructed through the pursuit of the associational life alternative (Olukoshi, 1996) which gained prominence and was effective in fighting military regimes in some African countries including Nigeria. It is hoped that civil society groups can also make a difference in a skewed democratic setting. There is perhaps one exception in the leadership interregnum in Africa, and this is in Ghana under the leadership of Jerry Rawlings. The democratic governments of many postcolonial developing countries were overthrown by military interventions or became one-party states at one point in their history and this had a toll on political and economic development in general. In the case of Ghana, the military rule under Rawlings took the necessary steps to give back power to a democratically elected government. In an attempt to characterize the leadership competencies which Rawlings possesses, Brenya et al. (2015) asserted that four fundamental qualities have remained constant over time in leadership: character, vision, behavior, and confidence. They observed the leaders who need to be followed are the ones who can spark the imagination with a compelling vision of a worthwhile end that puts people beyond what is known today and translates that idea into achievable objectives. These are the takeaway from the leadership of Rawlings in Ghana. There are two models of leadership namely “secular libertarian” or pluralistic systems and “sacred-collectivity” or mobilizing systems (Brenya et al., 2015). The “secular-libertarian model entails a diversified leadership and power, compromise, and bargaining as typified by a liberal democracy such as the United States of America. The sacred-collectivity model is characterized by personalized and strong charismatic leadership, political religiosity, and the organization of a mass party.” Brenya et al. noted that the latter reflects the leadership aura of Rawlings in mobilizing the masses, particularly the youth in rallies and demonstrations, a leadership quality that engendered grass-roots participation in the Ghanaian political arena. Kelvin Shillington (1994) noted that, upon handing over power back to a new civilian leader, there was little doubt among Ghanaians that Rawlings had been the most wildly popular Head of State since Nkrumah in his earlier years. This is backed by his formation and organization of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) as a widespread and important political party in Ghana. Almond (cited by Brenya et al.,

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2015) put forward that a political system achieves a higher level of political development when it improves in any of five key capabilities namely extractive, regulative, distributive, responsive, and symbolic. In the extractive sense, Rawlings’s ability in utilizing human and material resources from the environment was outstanding. This was because he commanded greater heights in mobilizing the people for development and civic responsibilities such as communal labor and demonstrations against the corrupt and ineffective governments that ruled the country. In terms of the regulative capabilities, Rawlings’ military inclinations aided albeit sometimes harsh in controlling individual and group action where expedient. This instilled some form of discipline and social order among Ghanaians concerning the limits of one’s freedom if there was any, and the exercising of one’s right. Whereas in hindsight, political experiences have been marred by severe tensions and an unhealthy battle of words between political parties coupled with the overly uncouth insults leveled against political leaders, the same could not be done during the Rawlings era. The distributive capability demands the allocation of values through specialized institutional structures and procedures that will facilitate development. In this sense, Jerry Rawlings created some key institutions to allocate national resources to ensure equity in the sharing of the “national cake.” Nonetheless, the way and manner with which this distribution of developmental benefits in line with those he appointed to supervise and control the allocative machinery also signaled a dent in his capabilities. This is because, with the level of trust people reposed in him for fighting against corruption and his preconception of socialist ideals, one would have thought that indeed he will identify with the have-nots in society. Yet in due time, the state structures he created became partisan and a “milking ground” for his cohorts. Concerning responsiveness, there is a need for political leaders to make informed decisions and policies that reflect the felt needs of their citizenry. After conceding to hand political authority to Hilla Limann considering public outcry from Ghanaians and the International community, it cannot be gainsaid how Rawlings expedited action to react to the demands of Ghanaians for value allocations toward the civilian rule. John Adedeji (2001) makes the following observation about Rawlings’s leadership aura which was crucial for Ghana’s development: Many Ghanaians equally believe that Rawlings is a man of strong emotions, convictions and driven by a passion for moral justice, intellect, and integrity. On the intellectual front, they maintain that he is the first leader of charisma and stature since Nkrumah (in his early days). Several people in Ghana believe that Rawlings’ achievements in the political and economic realm were possible only because of his tenacity, honesty, clear objectives, and sense of direction.

Postcolonial Africa remains trapped in the neocolonial mentality and is characterized by leadership and governance deficit. Corruption has become not only endemic but also “fashionable” as the political elite with power engages in corrupt practices with impunity. But in reminiscing about good leadership in Africa, there are a few examples to be cited. Good leadership has become a sine-qua-non for democratic governance in current times. It is to this end that Rawlings’s leadership and political authority were delved into to provide useful information and nuances that come

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with the onerous responsibility of political leadership. Jerry Rawlings, undoubtedly has a far overarching positive impact on Ghana’s politics, within the continent, and beyond. African countries need Pan-Africanist, patriotic, and transformational leaders who can restore the hopes and aspirations of its population that reached a crescendo at independence. While the legacies of Rawlings will be remembered posthumorously, Africa looks forward to the Pan-Africanist and patriotic leadership of Paul Kagame who is taking Rwanda into an extraordinary trajectory of development.

References Acemoglu, D., et  al. (2010). A theory of military dictatorships. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2(1), 1–42. Adedeji, J. (2001). The Legacy of JJ Rawlings in Ghanaian Politics 1979–2000. African Studies Quarterly, 5, 1–27. Agoha, C. (2012). Elite, leadership, and governance: The triple dilemma of democratic development in Nigeria. In S. Randrianja (Ed.), The Africa power elite: Identity, domination and accumulation (p. 152). CODESRIA. Brenya, E., et al. (2015). The Rawlings’ factor in Ghana’s politics: An appraisal of some secondary and primary data. Political Sciences & Public Affairs, 2. Carbone, G. (2013). Leadership turnovers in Sub-Saharan Africa: From violence and coups to peaceful elections? Analysis, 192, 4. Couloumbis, T., & Wolfe, J. (1986). Introduction to international relations: Power and justice (3rd ed., p. 86). Prentice-Hall. Edeh, H., & Ugwueze, M. (2014). Military and politics: Understanding the theoretical underpinnings of military incursion in third world politics. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 5(20) MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy, 2047. Horowitz, I., & Mills, W. (1966). The power elite: A critical commentary (pp.  7–8). American R.D.M. Corporation, Publishers. Huntington, S. (1991). Democracy’s Third Wave, Journal of Democracy, Spring. University of Oklahoma Press. Igwe, I. (2005). Politics and globe dictionary. Eagle Publishers. Kankwenda, M., et  al. (2000). Poverty eradication: Where stands Africa? (New York: United Nations Development Program) (p. 191). Economica. Kumssa, A. (1996). The political economy of privatization in Africa. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 62(1), 75–87. Kumssa, A., & Jones, J. (2015). Post-independence African Policy: African Socialism and the Organization of African Unity. Public Administration Research, 4(1), 13. Canadian Center of Science and Education. Lloyd, P. (1966). “The new elites of tropical Africa” (paper presented at the sixth African seminar at the University of Ibadan) (p. 4). Oxford University Press. Lyons, T. (1997). Ghana’s encouraging elections: A major step forward. Journal of Democracy, (John Hopkins University Press), 8(2), 65–77. Meredith, M. (2006). The state of Africa: A history of fifty years of independence (p.  143). Free Press. Morrison, D., & Stevenson, H. M. (1972). Cultural pluralism, modernization, and modernization and conflict. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 5, 82–103. Obama, B. (1996). President’s speech to Ghana’s parliament, Saturday, July 11, 2009. https://www. huffpost.com/entry/obama-­ghana-­speech-­full-­t_n_230009. Accessed on 23 November 2021.

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Olukoshi, A. (1996). Associational life. In L.  Diamond et  al. (Eds.), Transition without end (p. 450). Vantage Publishers. Olusanya, G. (1986). Attempts at nation-building in Nigeria: A study in poverty of imagination and creativity, Social Science Council of Nigeria, Annual Lecture Series, No. 3, p. 17. Onder, M. (2010). What accounts for military interventions in politics: A cross-national comparison? (pp. 3–5). Florida State University. Osie-Hwedie, K., & Osie-Hwedie, B. (2000). Structural adjustment and social service provision: Lessons from four African countries. In J. F. Jones & A. Kumssa (Eds.), The cost of reform: The social aspect of transitional economies (pp. 226–251). Nova Science. Randrianja, S. (1996). Nationalism, ethnicity and democracy in Africa now. In S.  Ellis (Ed.), Peoples, policies and institutions (p. 23). Heinemann Publishing. Robinson, M. (1996). Governance. In A. Kuper & J. Kuper (Eds.), The social science encyclopedia (pp. 347–348). Routledge. Rupiya, M. (2007). Review of Martin Meredith’s “The state of Africa: a history of fifty years of independence”. African Security Review, Institute for Security Studies, 16(1), 126. Schatz, S. (1977). Nigerian Capitalism (p. 151). University of California Press. Shillington, K. (1994). Ghana and the Rawlings Factor. The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 27, St. Martin’s Press, pp. 166–168. Smith, A. (1976). ‘Development of Corruption’, First Ali Akilu Memorial Lecture, delivered on 21 January 1976, and published in the New Nigerian Newspaper on, 26 January. World Bank. (1989). Sub-Saharan Africa: From crises to sustainable growth, Washington, DC, USA. Wright, M. (1957). The power elite. Oxford University Press. Chris Agoha  holds a dual master’s degree in International Law and Diplomacy, and Political Science, from the University of Lagos, Nigeria. He earned his PhD in Peace Studies from the University of Bradford, UK. Agoha worked as a Political Affairs Officer with the United Nations Missions in Liberia and South Sudan. He served as an adjunct professor at the Graduate School of International Affairs, University of Liberia, from 2006 to 2012. His publications include “The Making of the Liberian Diasporas and the Challenges of Postwar Reconstruction,” in The New Africa Diaspora in the United States edited by Toyin Falola and Adebayo Oyebade, Routledge 2017; and “Africa and AFRICOM: USA Security Interest in Africa,” in Security Africa: Local Crisis and Foreign Interventions, edited by Toyin Falola and Charles Thomas, Routledge 2013.

Chapter 5

Leadership, Constitutional Changes, and Functions of Governments in East Africa George Katete

Introduction While addressing the subject of leadership, constitutional changes, and functions of governments in East Africa, this chapter answers the following question. “How does changing the constitution of a state affect leadership and functions of a government?” This question is addressed while focusing on leadership in East Africa and examining how changes made in the constitutions affect the functions of a government. Using evidence drawn from the literature that accounts for the past and present political occurrences in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, the chapter maintains that the differences that are striking in these three countries have to do with pull and push eminent in the constitutional politics in Kenya, the militaristic style in Uganda and the modest approach of leadership in Tanzania. The three countries were under British colonial rule and gained independence over the same period in 1961, 1962, and 1963  in the order of Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya, respectively. The three nations are the founding members of the East Africa Community (EAC) formed first in 1967, then rejuvenated in 2001 upon the collapse of the first EAC in 1977. The EAC, which is a Regional Economic Community (REC) in Africa, is premised on what integration scholars Karl Deutsch (1954) and Ernst Hass (1961) refer to as a regional integration scheme—a community that aspires to facilitate joint solutions to problems experienced by East Africa states and their people by working toward their stability, prosperity, identity, and other multipurpose goals. Given the commonalities that these nations share, it is of interest to explain in this chapter how significant politics of constitutional change shape leadership and government functions in twenty-first-century East Africa and the disparities G. Katete (*) University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. O. Abidde, F. Kumah-Abiwu (eds.), The Political Impact of African Military Leaders, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31427-8_5

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inherent in them. Writers including Potholm (1979) explained the differences by drawing on the ideological leanings of the founding fathers whereby Jomo-Kenyatta of Kenya subscribed to the African version of capitalism, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania pursued Africanized version of socialism, while Uganda’s first two leaders Milton Obote, then Idi Amin Dada premised their leadership on military despotism, with vicious political and socioeconomic plans that entrenched widespread instability in Uganda from the 1960s, spilling over to the present generation. All these regimes and their respective leaders targeted their constitutions to change them in order to accommodate their political aspirations. Hayek (2011), and other scholars of constitution and constitutionalism talk of values inherent in a constitution by emphasizing how a constitution contains substantive rules, provisions regulating derivation of authority, and general principles which are to govern the acts of the appointed and elected legislatures (emphasis added). Today, constitutions account for the ethos and the bill of rights which are fundamental as pro-people clauses are spelled out within the constitution under consideration. Constitutionalism, then means that all powers rest on understanding that they will be exercised according to commonly accepted principles. This spirit largely interests reformists when constitutional changes would mean those acts directed toward constitutions with intentions that have a goal to cure structural and historical problems as attested by conventional scholarship on a constitutional state. The contrary meaning of constitutional change would refer to antireform clauses that are forced into previously existing constitutions when those actions to change the constitution are ill-­ intentioned such as confining absolute powers of the state to the occupier of the office of head of state and government to create what the Greek scholar Aristotle refers to as a perverted or abnormal state (Aristotle translated by T.A.  Sinclair 1962). A perverted state fulfills the selfish interests of the ruler, a class of elites, or a ruling mob at the expense of the majority whose interests and welfare should be granted. The normal state is sometimes referred to as a pure state and functions for the good of the majority citizenry. We see the actions by president Museveni of Uganda to force changes in the constitution of Uganda by removing the two-term presidential limits to remain in power as being ill-intentioned thereby creating a state which is not pure. This is similar to President Paul Kagame’s action to change the constitution to extend the presidential term for 7 years by using his authority as a powerful leader in East Africa. To give an account of patterns of constitutional politics in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, a review of the contemporary and past trends of politics of constitutional change is presented in the next section, giving case reviews and comparative experiences.

 Review of the Politics of Constitutional Change in East A Africa: Contemporary and Past Patterns The constitutions of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania have gone through tremendous changes over the years since the beginning of their self-rule in the 1960s. These changes involve amendments made on provisions of the constitution; repeal of

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sections of the constitution, reviews of the constitution to accommodate contentious changes, or even a total overhaul of the constitution to come up with a new one—as part of the renewal of a state’s journey to deal with structural problems in a state. Politics of constitutional changes in the three East African nations give a detailed account of similarities and differences in state transformation as can be seen in case analyses that follow.

The Kenyan Case Kenya has gone through long periods of constitutional politics since the 1960s which culminated in a new constitution that was promulgated in the year 2010. The Kenyan new constitution which is referred to as constitution 2010, was an overhaul of the 1991 constitution which was repealed after Kenya was taken to a single-party state by founding father Jomo-Kenyatta and the entrenchment of the same by Daniel Moi. For long periods, Kenya was ruled using the colonial constitution but its overhaul came recently with the promulgation of the 2010 constitution to abolish draconian clauses and include several provisions meant to transform leadership, include devolution, and affirm government functions. This transformation in Kenya however came against the backdrop of many years of resistance from President Daniel Arap Moi who was the second president of Kenya and who ruled for 24 years, following the demise of the first president Jomo-Kenyatta in 1978. When President Mwai Kibaki came to power as the third president in 2003, his initial rule was positively welcome since he came into office with political goodwill and a transformational spirit lacking during Moi’s long periods of rule. But once in office, Kibaki’s first-term government adopted a condescending attitude toward constitutional change and regressed on the promised war against corruption, which was the key pillar in the manifesto of his Democratic Party (DP). Corruption, inefficiency, and negative ethnicity among other socioeconomic vices stood out as major hindrances to service delivery in Kenya at the time when Kibaki was assuming office. Kibaki had gone as far as making a promise in his charged and last public rally before the election, that within a period of one hundred days in office, his government would jail those suspected to have looted the country’s coffers. But once he settled in office, his own “kitchen” cabinet, a group of politicians who long stood with him were the leading suspects in grand corruption cases and high-level scandals never experienced in Kenya’s history. Indeed Kibaki’s government lost popularity as a result of backtracking on constitutional change which was highly needed at the time to resolve long-standing structural and historical problems in Kenya but gained traction afterward when he joined forces with the opposition group to foster the idea of reforms and helped to deliver a new constitution in 2010. Analysts point out that many years since the end of the colonial era, Kenya, unlike its two East African counterparts, has remained in a constitutional moment. Recent political events (in 2018–2022) demonstrate the continuity of interests shown to review the Kenyan new constitution to address problems that impair

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leadership, integrity, and cohesion. This is evidenced by new political dynamics when the government and opposition sides adopted friendly relations for the sake of preparing the nation for a constitutional referendum that was planned by the leading political class which was quashed by the Supreme Court in 2022. In this occurrence, it should be noted that the government of President Uhuru Kenyatta in 2018 hatched a new plan that was meant to change the 2010 constitution when he reached out to the opposition leader, former prime minister Raila Odinga to support the idea of instituting changes through a political program that came to be known as the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI) of Kenya.1 This intention, as pointed out, was however halted in early 2022 after a section of Kenyans and some key leaders in the government and opposition side including civil society groups, who contested the legality of the process, filed a case in court to stop the process. The Kenyan Supreme Court which finally ruled on the dispute, resolved in favor of the anti-BBI team, terming the process as having flaws in the procedure on how to initiate constitutional change and therefore rendering it null and void. Critics note at the same time that divisions and polarization in the Kenyan state are deep and require a political process that is not hotly politicized. Constitutional change agenda in the public domain in Kenya is blamed to split communities and elite groups and causing hostilities among Kenyans given the hardline stand spearheaded by the political class (Katete, 2021; Okoth-Ogendo, 1972). Okoth-Ogendo writing in 1972, observed that the inability of Africans to run constitutional systems partly contributed to constant stalemates in the past, a situation that we see today that contributes to confusion surrounding normative definitions prescribing the functions of government, which elevate differences instead of cohesion when the topic of constitutional change is discussed in the public domain. Kenya’s contestations in constitutional politics are truly embedded in her past vicious leadership during the era of Jomo-Kenyatta and then Daniel Arap Moi. When Jomo-Kenyatta was at the helm of the first era of independent Kenya, he speeded Kenya’s rule to a Kikuyu Oligarchy, premised on state capitalism, and a pro-western orientation. This was made possible by targeting the constitution which was changed from the colonial constitution which had provided for a multiparty system before independence. As the first president, Kenyatta weakened the opposition party namely KADU, and used his powers to create a one-party state.  The BBI was an initiative that grew out of handshake between President Uhuru Kenyatta and former Prime Minister Raila Odinga in 2018 after tense and hostile relations out of the bitter election competition in 2017 that consequently led to stalemates in the Kenyan nation. It will be remembered that the Kenyan Supreme Court nullified Uhuru victory following allegations that the elections were not conducted in a free and fair manner. The opposition had filed a case in the court challenging Uhuru and Jubilee party that the victory was erroneous, and the opposition won the case. But the opposition party NASA coalition, led by Raila Odinga boycotted the repeat election on account that IEBC preparedness for the process of election was not transparent and favored the incumbent. In healing the nation, the ten-point agenda in BBI was meant to build national cohesion embedded on political goodwill created by the two most influential leaders in Kenya at the time. This would culminate in changing the constitution with a view to accommodate a new system of government—the parliamentary system from the presidential system. 1

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Political loyalty was then the hallmark of his KANU regime where government positions were apportioned based on ethnic lines, whereby in this first regime the Kikuyu dominated the ranks of government positions. This oligarchic rule was then followed by Daniel Arap Moi Kalenjin-led authoritarianism which also an oligarchic regime was given the increased corrupt practices and abuse of office by key ministers from president Moi’s backyard. The state then endured mixed results, from the end of colonial rule there is a conservative pattern in leadership and government, continuity in terms of constitutional and economic change, party splits, murder, assassination, politically driven ethnic clashes, corruption, and mass civil disobedience (Branch, 2011). Kenya’s past problems of tribalism and ethnicity and land questions stand out as specific challenges that set it aside from other East African nations. Leadership and government weaknesses have been closely linked to a lack of national harmony, elite corruption, and high levels of politicization of ethnicity. In the early years of postcolonial rule, there was a contest between two parties on the constitutional direction and state structure represented by KANU and KADU. The election to form the first independent government in Kenya was won by KANU.  This party envisioned the nation-state as dominated by a centralized government responsible for implementing development policy. The opposition party, KADU by contrast, advocated a devolved system of government with powers passed to local authorities. Earlier on at independence, KANU and KADU had been forced to share power as a result of constitutional negotiation with the British colonial regime. The government did not help in the redistribution of land that had been vacated by the European settlers, and much of the Kenyan land problem and inequality originated from the government‘s failure to adopt a policy of land redistribution to the original communal owners amid expectations aligned to the traditional land tenure system. The president held that land was to be paid for through the fruits of hard work and those who had land title deeds proving property ownership whenever would be protected by the government as rightful owners of such land (Oyugi et al.2003). Jaramogi Odinga, who was the opposition leader under KADU, on the other hand, sought for redistribution of the formerly owned European land to the landless peasants without delay. He was calling for a development policy based on individual initiatives other than state assistance. Leadership during this postcolonial era and government did not lead to positive scores. For KADU, the colonial provinces would become semi-autonomous regions with their own parliaments and presidents. The powers of the central government would be weakened and control of resources such as land would be vested in regional assemblies. It called for an independent constitution that recognized the integrity of their lands and their rights to allocate their land to whomever they wished. It is a policy that came to be known as majimboism after a Swahili word for the region. Kenyatta was determined to see devolution destroyed. Personalized power on the president himself was then institutionalized. When Moi came in, he consolidated his grip on power by adopting the Kenyatta system of rule and went further to target groups of people who were critical to his regime including members of the clergy, university lecturers, trade unionists, politicians, student leaders, and civil society activists among others. KANU survived for

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long periods as a sole party unchallenged under Moi not until early 1990 when multiparty politics was reintroduced after the repeal of section 2A of the Kenyan constitution. This change then witnessed a growing number of opposition parties in the political space, the major ones being FORD, FORD-Kenya, and DP which participated in the 1992 and 1997 presidential and parliamentary electoral politics. Since then, opposition politics in Kenya has seen a plethora of opposition parties whereby in 2002, parties coalesced under NARC to defeat the independent party KANU. Several opposition parties that included LDP, DP, NAK, Ford Kenya, Ford Asili, and others became part of the government but due to calls for constitutional reforms, they parted ways when a new political formation namely ODM drawing membership from individual politicians who were pro-reform, pressurized the Kibaki government to approve a referendum for constitutional reforms. Indeed, the 1991 constitutional amendment led Kenya to have a more democratic constitution than the other two East African countries, although as observed, this did not necessarily translate to democracy on the ground—it remained so on paper (Tusasirwe, 2005). Kenya’s politics of constitutionalism has been far-reaching even after this pluralism associated with the amendment of section 2A, with a call associated with FORD party opposition politics which began in 1997, that sought to have a thorough reform of the entire constitution, culminating with a new constitution that was promulgated in 2010. This long constitutional reform process was a painful period that involved forceful resistance by the government side, which associated such a reformed constitution with a loss of power on the side of the executive. Kenya’s constitutional moment has been intense and is a departure from the moments that Uganda and Tanzania have experienced as I review the experience of Uganda below then followed by the Tanzanian case.

The Ugandan Case Uganda too has had its share of constitutional politics during different periods under different regimes stretching from Milton Obote I, Idi Amin Dada, and Milton Obote II to Museveni’s long periods of rule. Uganda as a state has remained under the rulership of dictators and different forms of dictatorships, a rule of one man as elaborated in the book by Ezrow and Frantz (2011), which has given a depth of theoretical and conceptual understanding of such rules that have bedeviled most countries in the world including African countries. In this classification of dictatorship, Uganda had gone through a military dictatorship which transitioned into a Bossism and strongman dictatorship under Museveni. Museveni’s entry into top leadership after a coup in 1986 was viewed as a turning point in Uganda’s leadership history since no other military coup has occurred although his extensive grip on power is rooted in authoritarianism. However, given the state’s ability to transform military leadership structures to civilian-based leadership in Uganda, since then is a political transformation that developed structures and institutions of government that have planted political culture and consolidated state-society relations that resulted in

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predictability and formal processes required in a state. Museveni had announced his desire to bring fundamental change in Uganda when he came to power by observing that he wanted to change the political culture of Uganda’s political elites from cheap, backward, and myopic politics to a principled, disciplined, and scientific management of the state (Rubongoya, 2007). In 1987, Museveni’s NRM came up with a ten-point program that outlined a political agenda to restore democracy and establish a government for the people, of the people, and by the people. However, Museveni’s grip on power in the next 5 years was consolidated by his vision of no-­ party democracy under the rubric of a movement political system. The fact that Uganda operated under the “no party” political system led observers to dismiss leadership in Uganda as lacking merit of political competition and merely a consolidation of authoritarianism (Reid, 2017; Rubongoya, 2007). Even though the regime’s move to take the nation toward election gave legitimacy to the NRM party and the candidates who won elections in 1989, the situation was a charade since there was no voter registration, no secret balloting, no open campaigning, and political party participation was banned. We, therefore, see quite a lot of illegitimate actions undertaken by the leaders out of their resolve to use retrogressive constitutional provisions in dispensing their leadership and the results of these have obstacles in prudence and lack of fulfillment of core government function. Unlike Kenya and Tanzania in Uganda, the state took the route of military despotism in an unexpected turn of events preceding the optimistic democratic start which saw the initiation of elective politics and the vibrant beginning of parliamentary leadership. In particular, it was during the reign of Amin that Uganda firmed up the path of a military regime, where the state institutions were militarized. In the 1970s, military directives and decrees were issued after the suspension of the constitution. The prominent decree established a defense council and administration of urban authorities that dissolved district, municipal, and town councils (Rubongoya, 2007). Military decrees then became substituted to a legal framework that was based on constitutional provisions. Military officers then replaced civilian members of the cabinet and parastatals. Parliament was suspended henceforth. Institutions that Amin’s regime created such as the Public Safety department did not protect the public as the name implies, instead turned into one terror unit to deal with imagined enemies of the state (Omara-Otunnu, 1987). Amin’s regime then established a policy known as economic war which was meant to return all the means and sectors of production to Ugandans leading to the expulsion of Asian entrepreneurs to deceive the population that he was their defender in this so-called Amin’s version of Africanization. There was then a rent-seeking behavior where the hoarding of essential commodities, smuggling, black marketeering, price gouging, and looting of personal items crept in after the state elites marginalized Ugandan business people who were earlier apportioned the Asians’ properties. The black market economy known as the magendo in Kiswahili was an economy that meant the survival of people in urban areas after the retreat of the government from the rural areas and difficulties experienced by the majority in urban Uganda. State-Society linkages were further weakened and the government had to devise threat-related approaches to force compliance. Corruption and cronyism became an integral part of Ugandan culture.

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Uganda faced a new onslaught after the ouster of Amin and the coming in of Obote II whereby the militarization of Politics and the politicization of the military thrived thus undermining chances of stabilization of civilian rule. It can also be observed that Obote had allowed the ethnic factor to undermine the coherence of the military and its capacity to defend the nation. It is worth pointing out that earlier on, in his first tenure in office, the Obote government abrogated the 1962 federalist constitution, deprofessionalized the police, neutralized the judiciary, and centralized economic activities through the nationalization program. The history of constitution-­making in Uganda has been clarified. The 1962 constitution has been noted to be illegitimate because it was inherited from colonialists and a small group of Ugandan compatriots. This constitution was then amended to create a ceremonial president to replace the governor general but shortly abrogated it to an interim constitution then changed the interim constitution to create a unitary state, abolishing traditional kingdoms and federal system and retaining executive power. This consolidation of power was geared toward banning opposition parties, governing with ordinances, and power to detain without trial. As pointed out by Ngozi (2003), Uganda’s moment of constitutional amendment is perceived with the amendments for the 1995 constitution to realize twin objectives where on the one hand, an attempt to open up the political space and to shift from no-party or movement state to a multiparty political system on the one hand, and amending of Article 105(2) of the Uganda constitution to do away with the presidential term limit and enable president Museveni to seek another term on the other hand. However today the opposition has pressurized the regime into a presidential and parliamentary competition which succeeded in installing new leadership in the house of parliament and introduced hope and optimism for a political future of garnering a vibrant legislature. However, the Election competition has a lot to suggest about how coercion by Museveni’s NRM threatens and oppresses political opponents with arrests and illegal detentions leading to some opposition leaders bowing out of political space. Opposition under the leadership of Robert Kyagulani Ssyentamu famously known as Bobi wine of National Unity Platform (NUP) who has stood as the fiercest critic of Museveni and Kizza Besigye under the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) party and former compatriot of Museveni have weathered due to state reprisal and hostility akin to symptoms of military forms of the leadership of 1970s and early 1980s political environment in Uganda.

Tanzanian Case Tanzania, which has gone through the leadership of six presidents, ruled under the CCM party—starting with Julius Nyerere, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, Benjamin Mkapa, Jakaya Kikwete, John Pombe Magufuli and now Suluhu Hassan has managed to follow the constitutional order founded on the doctrine of Ujamaa socialism that conserved national unity at the behest of economic growth. The founding father of Tanzania, president Julius Nyerere who took over the mantle of leadership from

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British rulers brought the country into a single-party regime to build a nation whose priority was premised on consolidation of communal land ownership and joint wealth possession especially agricultural projects and forms of subsistence farming (Michaela von Freyhold, 1979; Bjerk, 2015). The Ujamaa was a commercialization of farming as a precondition for the Agricultural revolution. This political economy determined how the administration was structured from the local administrative units, sub-district, district levels, provincial, and then to national levels. Unlike Kenya, where ethnicity determined the regional distribution of resources from the government, the Tanzanian structure of administration was premised on development needs unique to each locality. This was based on an understanding of socialism, which was Nyerere’s philosophy for dispensing his leadership and government. The regime of Ali Hassan Mwinyi was simply a continuation of Nyarere. When Benjamin Mkapa took power, multiparty politics was introduced not because of pressure from internal political operatives, but as a response to the wave of democratization that was by then sweeping across the continent, where at the neighborhood there were already changes introduced in constitutions and parliamentary politics, as we have seen with the experiences in Kenya. The enactment of the constitutional provision that allowed for pluralism brought Tanzania to the fold of party politics. The Tanzanian case of constitution review has been described as constitution-making without constitutionalism. The authoritarian single-party regime in Tanzania and Ujamaa philosophy was largely against constitutionalism since consensus was sought outside the legal framework where the public would be convinced about government programs by the regime. Ndumbaro in a work published in 2003 focuses on the Tanzanian constitutional review spearheaded by a constitutional conference held at the University of Dar Es Salaam. The conference went through issues affecting the constitution of Zanzibar and that of Tanzania, which included electoral matters, political parties, the presidency, and vice-­ presidency, and the central government and its relationship with the local government, legislature, and judiciary. The organs that were involved in the constitutional review in Tanzania included the Zanzibar electoral commission, the national electoral commission, commission of Human rights, and Good governance. The long periods of single-party rule under Nyerere and the introduction of a multiparty state during Mkapa were however a calm moment and the push for multiparty politics was not a bloody affair as we see with the Kenyan situation during Jomo-Kenyatta and Daniel Moi in Kenya. As observed by Bjerk (2015), at independence, small opposition parties in Tanzania struggled under a political system which was by Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) with Nyerere at its head pushing for a one-party state. The prominent opposition party by then ANC was banned repeatedly from holding public meetings; rival politicians were given promotions outside the country or even absorbed into Nyerere’s fold. Later on, another fringe party PDP occupied a short stint of political space but did not survive the onslaught of the organized ruling party. Nyerere had a strong belief that it was only through the politics of a one-party state that his nation would deal with thriving challenges including racial problems for which PDP and ANC exploited as agendas for political advantage. Under British colonialism, ethnic identity and the political structure

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attached to it were harnessed under a government using the policy of indirect rule which pronounced these tribal belongings as political units distinct from each other. President Nyerere’s government and leadership maintained that Tanzania needed a single-party government for the next 15 years after independence and that a sustainable democratic system was not to be found in constitutional safeguards, and that democracy could only work in a consensus based on people and leaders within the nation-state. His regime maintained a shallow constitutional tradition he sought a popular philosophy of basic civil and economic rights balanced with the ideology of citizen obligation that would define what is to be a Tanganyikan and so settled on Ujamaa as a foundational socialism ideology for Tanzanians. In this philosophy, Land was vested in families at the local level. Nyerere’s major statements about Ujamaa always referred to land. Access to land was an emblem of political rights. Family, land, and citizenship were social institutions that needed to be fused as a national ethos. Ali Hassan Mwinyi’s short stint in power was a gatekeeping regime of Nyerere’s policy. It had no significant departure from the aspirations of the founding father’s wishes for the republic of Tanzania.

 onstitutionalism and Government Functions: Reviewing C the Trends and Outcomes in East Africa In the majority of democratic states and some  transitional democracies, it is the constitution and the spirit of constitutionalism that influences the performance of leaders, which in turn directly affects how a government fulfills its functions. How a properly constituted government coordinates its work is well known—that it functions through its constituent arms, namely the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary and their corresponding supportive institutions. The independence of each institution and its interdependence is a critical requirement for a government to move in one direction for the good of the state and its people. Considering that all three arms of government are treated as being equal in the eyes of a constitution, it is paramount to observe that no particular arm can operate in isolation and fulfill its functions without facing hitches either constitutional or procedural if adherence with the rule of law is anything to go by. Leadership in the executive needs the judiciary and the legislature to create a viable environment from which laws, policies, and government agendas can be satisfactorily fulfilled. This principle where independence and interdependence of three arms should be fulfilled is known as the doctrine of separation of power, which many political scholars have expounded on over the years as read from the works by Carolan (2009) and Möllers (2013). Analysis of how constitutional changes influence government functions in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania shows similarities in that the executive on many occasions interferes with the operations of the judiciary and legislature which in turn hinder the smooth flow of government functions. In these three cases, the judiciary and legislature are not independent as far as leadership and functions are concerned.

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Although experiences across the cases show the existence of in-depth differences considering the levels of interference of the executive on legislature and judiciary. Neither can we say that legislature and judiciary cooperate as expected since they too are faced with their own rivalries and supremacy battles especially spearheaded by the executive arm of the government? In Kenya, we see some progression and bold decisions from the judiciary and even in the legislature, whereby in some cases the judiciary has made courageous decisions and taken positions that counter the executive but with lots of controversies that have slowed government programs and even stalled its operations. This is not the case in Uganda, where a lot of coercion from the executive arm subdued leadership at the judiciary and the legislature, whereas, in Tanzania, the legislature and judiciary have to adopt and work with the executive mimicking the spirit of larger Tanzanian society buttressed on accommodative politics and consensual practice as read from section two of this chapter. But there are striking differences as far as the relationships of the three arms are concerned about the three cases of East Africa. As described earlier, Kenya remains a dynamic oligarchic state, Uganda a static tyranny, and Tanzania an aristocracy. This description depicts how the government in each of the three cases, subject to the functionality of the three arms and leadership, crystallizes into delivering services or not. Since 2000, we see how these governments struggle to fulfill their roles. Since Kenya got the new constitution in 2010, there has been a mixed bag of progress and drawbacks, as the implementation of the constitution took shape over the past decade. The most important changes that have led to progression are linked to devolution whereby the introduction and functionality of county governments which involved decentralization of financial and administrative duties of governments closer to the people at the grassroots have bore fruits. Today several historical problems that regressed the economy and development in several parts of Kenya are being addressed by these governments whose leaders are governors, county assemblies, and senators, a dispensation which is a departure from the administration that was available during Jomo-Kenyatta, Moi, and Kibaki rule. Significant changes and goodwill have therefore been informed by how devolution is operationalized. Before the promulgation of the new constitution, Kenyans banked on the personality characteristics of their leaders but this determination for delivery was challenged in particular when President Mwai Kibaki came to power in 2003. There were high hopes that the court system would be strengthened, independence of the legislature and judiciary would be restored and efficiency adopted, given that the Narc government led by Kibaki came into office against the background of war against corruption, and to deal with the backlog of cases and institution of judicial reforms to make judiciary efficient and measure with Kenya’s present needs. A new chief justice who came in with the appointment from president Kibaki promised what he called a radical surgery, where he indicated that the judiciary would target the big fish in corruption and also slay the dragon of corruption, meaning those involved in grand corruption would be prosecuted once and for all. But contrary to this expectation, it was during the first term of Kibaki’s regime that a big case of corruption that came to be known as Anglo leasing involving tenders to purchase security

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equipment and military vehicles occurred. The culprits who came to be identified as powerful government ministers including the finance minister and the internal security minister were close friends of the president. The judiciary did not take action in prosecuting the cases, yet Kenya lost huge amounts of money in what the opposition pointed fingers at the executive complacency and because the constitution protects certain office bearers. This creates a situation where constant violations of the functions of governments by individuals who should take responsibility hide behind the stipulated constitutional provisions and law. In Uhuru’s regime, the challenge of lack of collaboration between the subordinate staff and senior staff or rivalry between and among leaders in the government increased and became unmanageable. This situation slows down the government agenda and seriously undermines the execution of duties and fulfillment of welfare required by the public who remain helpless and hopeless. The justice system remains weak due to a lack of professionalism from individual magistrates from the lower and higher courts who have been accused of taking bribes and thereby defeating justice. And being the main lawbreakers in the country, the situation gets out of control since they protect each other and politicize investigation leading to chaos in the society. Unlike in democracies where even if the president is found to have committed a crime, then justice takes its course and he or she can be prosecuted based on evidence, this political culture is systematically defeated by legislators who mainly pledge their loyalty to individuals who sponsored them to parliament and not to the government and the majority citizens who they should serve. This act of corruption, both petty and mega is against the spirit of constitutionalism and undermines proper leadership as well as the fulfillment of government functions. Compared to Kenya, Tanzania’s Judiciary has limitations in performing its duties without getting executive guidance. The Judiciary accommodates executive wishes with no or very few disputes and many commentators associate their lack of visibility with the Tanzanian state structure which has been influenced by the Ujamaa socialism ideology. Since the Nyerere era, Judiciary serves as an appendage of the executive, and its functionality is reduced to supporting the executive. The executive seems to have had full control over the judiciary and the relation is nonconfrontational. The same relationship can be said for the legislative arm of government which is indeed an extension of the executive given that the composition of the house is made up of the majority of CCM party members, a situation that goes back to the founding father, Julius Nyerere’s reign. Amin (1983) points out that the legislature is simply a rubber stamp organ and it has little control over the executive branch. As Fimbo (1995) observes how the executive branch dominates over the legislature and the judiciary even with the advent of the eighth constitutional amendment of 1992 that introduced multipartyism in Tanzania. Kijo-Bisimba and Maina (2005) gave insights on the contribution of what they consider activist judicial officers who at one point in Tanzania’s political history have engaged by courageously making rulings without caring about government intimidation and became instrumental in elevating the relevance of judiciary. But we find that still opposition parties have been subdued and are relevant only during election periods. In as much as

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democracies should conform to the spirit of separation of power, in the Tanzania case, this attribute is not visible. Pundits have argued that in this case, the legislature always reads the mood of the executive and supports it by passing every government bill to be signed into law to allow implementation by the executive without any hindrance. Few corrupt activities touch on the judiciary, legislature, and executive which differ from the Kenyan case. The state of Tanzania remains what I refer to as an Aristocracy given that with the cooperation of its institutions, the population gets satisfied by the existence of the government. The executive is seen to be in charge, the legislature supports the executive by passing the bills of the government and the judiciary is not visible in its operations since it has been accommodated by the executive. In Uganda, the regime forcefully subdued the other two arms—the judiciary and the legislature. Although the legislative assembly has over the years changed its composition whereby the opposition party members have increased, the executive has still gotten ways of passing bills using constitutional loopholes and intimidation. This means that the strong executive and the machinery of the government are always readily rolled out whenever preferred. Even when constitutional provisions are to be changed, the executive arm overwhelms the legislature to realize its objectives. This is also experienced in the relationship that unfolds between the judiciary and the executive in the Ugandan government. Judicial independence is questionable to the extent that its major functions are undertaken by weighing what the executive wishes. In Kenya, a new complicated scenario crept in during Uhuru Kenyatta’s regime where government operations have been dragged by rivalries within the executive and legislature has created a situation where the population remains confused about where the government is headed to. Office bearers both in the executive and legislature and even in the judiciary are conglomerates of individuals who are not loyal to the government, but to key leaders and can undermine government responsibilities for the sake of maintaining loyalty to the patrons in politics. Pundits argue that this situation is promoted by the creation of offices where the leadership has tenure and is protected by the constitution including the Independent Electoral and Boundary Commission (IEBC), Director of Public Prosecution (DPP), Director of Criminal Investigation (DCI), and Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC). The leadership of these executive and judicial entities has an office of tenure, but at the same time politicized in the process of execution and legislation. Complications have also been seen in the legislature on several occasions, where government bills can be frustrated when voting patterns take ethnic consideration against the merit of the bill debated upon. The same problem of governance is observed in unscrupulous trade by government officials: Imports and exports in the country are run by government officials in Kenya, they take advantage of this and their goods escape the quality control system—are not searched hence they use it as a way to conduct crimes like drug trafficking and selling of under standardize goods in the country. The issue of ethnification of Kenyan society has not been addressed since it manifests itself within political parties which are instruments for politics and negotiations for power by key political leaders. In Kenya, political parties have often

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been organized by ethnic interests and ethnic groupings. The net result has often been personal or regional interests being advocated for in government rather than the coveted rule of law. Political parties such as Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) have been associated with the Luo nation, the Party of National Unity (PNU) was associated with the Kikuyu nation, WIPER is associated with the Kamba nation, and the UDA is associated with a section of the Kalenjin, since the independent party KANU is still influential in some parts of the Rift valley and Kalenjin communities. And when any of these parties win a majority to form the government, often we have seen that regional politics takes root rather than constitutional priorities. The spirit of constitutionalism is frustrated because in Kenya we have porous institutions of government that are easily penetrated by law offenders. For instance, the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) is a body designed to fight corruption and it is a constitutional body deriving its power from the Kenyan constitution. We have seen that in the past these institutions have often been compromised and leaders found with corrupt practices getting approval to vie for an office look, are still cleared to run for public office against the constitutional provision in chapter VI which dwells on the integrity of persons required in public offices. In a case where such leaders have ended up in power, they may never look up to the constitution because they have benefited from the constitutional loopholes. Lack of adherence to good leadership requirements and to be consistent with leadership and integrity as provided in the chapters of the constitution has seen leaders with questionable characters and with poor records including lack of basic education qualification becoming a mockery of leadership to occupy important cadres of government and political positions. Several populist individuals rise to power. Several such leaders devised academic credentials yet did not meet the requirements to qualify for such positions. Public trust in institutions responsible for vetting leaders, therefore, becomes low and the majority view these acts as a compromise to the constitution and a dangerous trend for stability and good governance. Many politicians and political commentators have advanced the notion that unlike in Tanzania, Kenya, and even in Uganda, it is believed that to deal with the socioeconomic failures and political injustices as well as cohesion and integration challenges, then entrenchment of proreform provisions to safeguard positive change in the nation is mandatory. These similarities and differences conform to the detailed work by Maxon (2009), where the author implies that the governments in East Africa exhibit several similarities and inherent differences that have been impacted by their past political economy, externalities, and internal struggles. The constitution affects relations of power. Power influences structure and identity relations. As Oyugi (1994) observes, the function and service provision of east African governments have become undermined by the so-called interventionist state, a situation which in recent periods remains as such. Leadership and government functions in the postcolonial nations of East Africa were characterized by several administrative and policy drawbacks amidst high expectations brought by the self-­ rule that succeeded colonial rule in the early 1960s. Oyugi (1994) points out that the quest for socioeconomic and political changes in East Africa was inspired by a set

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of goals and values that leaders held in order to reorganize the colonial order and to benefit the citizenry but with several years having passed, the development ideas by the state in Africa did not translate into desired fruits. The author blames this stalemate on the lack of efficacy of the East African state as an instrument of development, which determined its functions borrowing from the colonial laws that imposed restrictions and regulations that were antigrowth, and for which successive governments adopted. The structure of the government and its functions still faces limitations as a result of the colonial rule and policies that it advanced in Africa and East Africa. The postcolonial governments created and legitimized weaknesses exhibited in the nature and type of governments that we have to date, where the function of governments in these nations was hindered by structural and historical political events as we read from the works by scholars including Mamdani (1996) and Tordoff (1997). As I observed elsewhere, the intrinsic and instrumental values that these nations aspire to achieve are obstructed by the limitations of constitutionalism (Katete, 2013). This study is compatible with Writings in the past on leadership and government functions in East Africa showing how Kenya and Tanzania can generally be described as those states that followed a pattern of single-party rule and clientelism, bureaucratic politics, and nations that luckily, were not affected by military coups as was witnessed for the case of the neighboring Uganda, where government and leadership collapsed into a series of military coups stretching from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s (Rubongoya, 2007). These political changes involving military rules are significant in understanding Uganda’s present administrative priority and evasive nature of the functionality of legislature and judiciary as well as accountability of institutions of government. As observed by Hornsby (2012), Kenya has its specific incidence and accidents in leadership associated with the retention of strong and powerful leaders at the helm and the creation of a coercive bureaucracy built to defend the ruling elites‘interests, and repress the violent revolt. We can see that though these nations were all under the British protectorate and gained their independence almost within the same period (1961, 1962, and 1963), their political paths, leadership, and government functions have been determined by their constitutions and constitutionalism.

Conclusion As understood from the preceding section, the executive arm of the government of respective East African governments has over the years and across the regimes exercised power over the legislature and the judiciary, a practice that remains unconstitutional and a deliberate abuse of power that undermined service delivery as suggested by different experiences. Weak institutions of the judiciary have undermined the functioning of the courts and the judges. At the same time, legislative assemblies that are overshadowed by the executives have been unable to come up with laws and bills as well as a poor representation of the interests of their respective

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constituencies. But much change and analysis have been drawn from the specific attempts on how these states deal with their constitution’s shortcomings or even when the executive targets to change the constitutions to consolidate more power for the self-serving interests of the rulers and a small group of elites. This political change has been pursued by institutions of government as well as opposition groupings and civil society groups during different phases of state formation. Following the second wave of democratization, parties formally registered to take part in politics have contributed, although at different scales and levels to changes required in the constitutions. At the same time, governments themselves have been apprehensive about allowing sweeping changes out of fear that each harbors on opening space for political participation and that taking such actions will undermine their absolute power and politics. Observers have also shown how governments sometimes succeed to institute changes through parliament to increase the duration of their life for the sake of forcing the populace to extend the term of the serving leader and their cronies. The Tanzania case shares certain similarities with the Kenyan situation of single-­ party regimes in the earlier postindependence period but differs concerning the constitutionalism of the Tanzanian regimes and the Tanzania government. Three regimes of past rules namely of Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, Hassan Mwinyi and premised their rules on account of national cohesion. The Ujamaa philosophy was the foundation of this national unity course which unlike Kenya was prioritized over private ownership of property. The government planned to promote the understanding that strengthening people’s social ties would lead to a unique way of solidification of the state where institutions of government would not be viewed as problematic since friendly relations were key and the government programs would not be opposed. CCM alone was therefore seen as a party that would institute change when need be and without putting undue pressure on internal and external entities. The confidence built by virtue of a larger population having on the party would translate to confidence given to the government since the party consisted of a manifesto and agenda guiding the government‘s plan. The constitution in this manner is not seen as a central feature of government but resonates with what is given on the account that the government project oscillates around the independence party CCM which is already seen as revolutionary and trusted to institute change commensurate to people’s wishes over time. Executive, judiciary, and legislature do not harbor mistrust since power is understood as retained by the legitimate authority residing in the executive institution.

References Amin, B. S. (1983). Institution building for democratic government in Tanzania. In Constitutional Reforms for Democratization in Tanzania (pp.  66–87). University of Dar es Salaam and Freidrich Naumann Stiftung. Aristotle/T.A. Sinclaire (Translated). (1962). Aristotle: The politics, revised and re-presented by Trevor J. Saunders. Penguin Classics.

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Bjerk, P. (2015). Building A peaceful nation: Julius Nyerere and the establishment of sovereignty in Tanzania. 1960–1964. University of Rochester Press. Branch, D. (2011). Kenya: Between hope and despair 1963–2011. Yale University Press. Carolan, E. (2009). The new separation of powers: A theory of the modern state. Oxford University Press Inc. Deutsch, K. (1954). Political community at the international level: Problem of definition and measurement. Doubleday and Co.. Ezrow, N., & Frantz, E. (2011). Dictators and dictatorships: Understanding authoritarian regimes and their leaders. Continuum. Fimbo, M. G. (1995). Towards separation of power in a new democracy: Tanzania. The African Review: A Journal of African Politics, Development and International Affairs, 22, 1. Hass, E. (1961). International integration: The European and universal process. International Organisation, 15(4), 366. Hornsby, C. (2012). Kenya: A history since Independence. I.B Tauris and Company. Katete, G. (2013). Fifty years of democratization and peacebuilding in eastern Africa. In Addis Ababa: Report commissioned by AU and UNDP in Addis Ababa in celebration of OAU/AU fifty year’s existence. AU. Katete, G. (2021). Digital elections and the problem of liquid Trust in the Kenyan Electoral Management Institution. International Journal of African Renaissance Studies - Multi-Interand Transdisciplinarity, 16(1), 165–176. Kijo-Bisimba, H., & Maina, C. P. (2005). Justice and rule of law in Tanzania. Selected Judgements and Writings of Justice. Legal and Human Rights Center. Mamdani, M. (1996). Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism. Princeton University Press. Maxon, R. M. (2009). East Africa: An introductory history. West Virginia University Press. Möllers, C. (2013). The three branches: A comparative model of separation of powers. Oxford University Press. Okoth-Ogendo, H. W. O. (1972). The politics of constitutional change in Kenya since independence, 1963-1969. African Affairs, 71, 282. Omara-Otunnu, A. (1987). Politics and the military in Uganda 1890–1985. Palgrave Macmillan. Oyugi, W. (1994). Politics and Administration in East Africa. East African Educational Publishers. Oyugi, W., Wanyande, P., & Odhiambo, M. (2003). The politics of transition in Kenya: From KANU to NARC. Heinrich Böll Foundation. Potholm, C. (1979). Who Killed Cock Robin? Perceptions concerning the break up of the East African Community. World Affairs, 142(1), 45. Reid, R. (2017). A history of modern Uganda. Cambridge University Press. Rubongoya, J. (2007). Regime hegemony in Museveni’s Uganda: Pax Musevenica. Palgrave Macmillan. Tordoff, W. (1997). Government and politics in Africa. Macmillan Press LTD. Tusasirwe, B. (2005). Constitutionalism in East Africa: Progress, challenges and prospects in 2003. Kituo cha Katiba. Fountain Publishers. Von Freyhold, M. (1979). Ujamaa villages in Tanzania: Analysis of social experiment. Heinemann Educational Books. von Hayek, F.  A. (2011). 1899–1992. The constitution of liberty: The definitive edition. The University of Chicago: Chicago University Press. George Katete  is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi, where he teaches and supervises graduate and undergraduate students in the areas of political science, public administration, international relations, and conflict and peace studies. Dr. Katete holds a PhD in International Relations from the University of Bremen, Germany. He has written extensively on regional dimensions of conflicts, democratization, and peacebuilding in Eastern Africa. He was a consultant for the UNDP under the auspices of AU agenda 2063, particularly in writing expert reports on peacebuilding and democratization in the wake of the celebration of 50 years of democratization and peacebuilding on the continent.

Part II

The Revolutionary Comrades in Ghana and Burkina Faso

Chapter 6

Thomas Sankara and Jerry Rawlings: Intellectuals, Populists, Revolutionaries, and Pan-Africanists Sabella Ogbobode Abidde

Introduction Human history began in Africa, and according to all available historical, biological, and anthropological sources and understanding, it is the origin of modern humans. However, things have not gone well for the continent and many of its people. Beginning in the fifteenth century, the continent had been ensnared by a succession of calamities and iniquities, which include the Euro-American slave trade and colonization. And while Africa was not the only continent that suffered such inhumanities, she seems to have suffered more and the negative impacts seem more lasting and troubling. Beginning in 1957, and more rapidly in the 1960s, political independence came in quick succession. Even so, conditions on the continent seem not to have improved significantly. For instance, transiting from agrarianism to modernity, the modernization of the economy, and the issue of governance and leadership seem to be the three main problems faced by the continent. However, the inability to get the question of leadership right have hindered the continent’s progress. It is also the unresolved question of leadership that worsened ethnic, regional, sectional, and religious cleavages, which finally leads to conflicts and wars and military coups in many areas of the continent. Essentially, therefore, many of the coups were byproducts of poor leadership  – with the military and their civilian accomplices thinking that they could offer better and more effective leadership. Ironically, this was not always the case. In many instances, military regimes exacerbate an already bad condition. And, in nearly all cases, they are characterized by abysmal human rights records; the abrogation of the constitution and the rule of

S. O. Abidde (*) Alabama State University, Montgomery, AL, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. O. Abidde, F. Kumah-Abiwu (eds.), The Political Impact of African Military Leaders, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31427-8_6

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law; and the excessive emphasis on defense spending as opposed to championing political and economic goods and services. The second irony is that military regimes, in nearly all cases, usually turn out to be more detrimental and disadvantageous than the civilian administrations they criticized and removed from power. Even so, there were a few exceptions to the norm as was the case in Egypt, Libya, Ghana, and Burkina Faso. What made the difference was the type and essence of military leaders at the helm of affairs. Leaders, who in addition to their high administrative and leadership skills and acumen, were also intellectuals, revolutionaries, Pan-­ Africanists, and statesmen. This chapter is not about their life histories, their biographies or about an examination of their public policy and how they executed those policies. It is not an analysis of their social programs, military training, or skills. But simply, this is a potpourri of how they are viewed – their legacies, especially within the continent. Furthermore, this is not an argument about whether military regimes are preferred, or that the military leaders under discussion were saints and angels and had no leadership or administrative blemishes. No. The point simply is that Jerry Rawlings (Ghana) and Thomas Sankara (Burkina Faso) were rarities in African military leadership in that they transcended what many scholars and observers usually associate with African military leaders: barely literate, acted like buffoons and savages, bled and at the same time mortgaged their countries to ravenous internal and external actors and institutions.

Definition and Understanding of Terms This quartet of African military leadership  – Abdel Nasser, Thomas Sankara, Muammar Gaddafi, and Jerry Rawlings  – arrived in the leadership space several years after their countries had gained independence. But once at the helm of state affairs, they spoke truth to power and in the process fired their people’s imagination, becoming targets of hateful propaganda and/or assassination in the hands of foreign entities and domestic collaborators. Despite the danger they faced, intellectuals, populists, and revolutionaries have always been present in Africa’s political and rhetorical space – playing a major role in the development of their respective countries and the continent as a whole.

Intellectuals The late intellectual maestro, Ali A. Mazrui, considered an intellectual to be a person who can be fascinated by ideas and has the prerequisite skill to handle many of them effectively (Mazrui, 2003). The true intellectual, therefore, is always an outsider. He or she speaks to, as well as for, a public, necessarily in public, and is properly on the side of the dispossessed, the un-represented, and the forgotten (Jennings & Kemp-Welch, 1997). Essentially, intellectuals are the life and essence

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of any civilization. They advise humanity on how to conduct its affairs. A society, and indeed, any society without a bourgeoning class of intellectuals, gadflies, and radical and revolutionary-minded class cannot truly flourish. Such a society may stagnate, disintegrate, or die. Indeed, Johnson, the rise of the secular intellectual, has been a key factor in shaping the modern world (Johnson, 1989, p. 1). In this regard, the western world has had no shortage of intellectuals and gadflies, and neither has Africa. While western society boasts of personae like Lillian Hellman, Henrik Ibsen, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Bertolt Brecht, Norman Mailer, James Baldwin, Jean-Paul Sartre, Noam Chomsky, Victor Gollancz, Ernest Hemingway, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Edmund Wilson, Africa can point to brilliant and fearless minds like Ali Mazrui, Fela Anikulapo Kuti, J.P Clark, Kole Omotosho, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Wole Soyinka, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Issa G. Shivji, Kalu Ezera and of course, Chinua Achebe. Every great nation, or at least, nations of any consequence all have men and women at the vanguard of knowledge and intellectualism. They stir things up as did Nasser, Ghaddafi, Rawlings, and Sankara. They were the conscience of the continent and their respective countries.

Populists Populism as a political doctrine is very common in the developing countries of Africa and Latin America. The late Hugo Chavez of Venezuela was a classic populist, and so was Jerry Rawlings of Ghana and Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso. Populists are usually firebrands and charismatic. Populism involved putting the ordinary person in society to the fore. It is the idea that the individual must be engaged in the political process, and that governing institutions must be more responsive to their needs. Generally, populist movements evolve when existing governments have become too self-absorbed, and they have as their objective the return of power to the people (Thomson, 2023). Similar to their counterparts in South America, the Caribbean, and elsewhere in the Global South, Abdel Nasser, Thomas Sankara, Muammar Gaddafi, and Jerry Rawlings, all had common objectives and aspirations: (1) freedom from control and domination; (2) be able to interact with other nation-states on equal footings; (3) the need to terminate the theft and exploitation of their human and natural resources; and (4) embark on the economic and socio-political development of their country and people.

Revolutionaries Despite the enormity of human suffering and the institutional and societal rot that characterize Africa, revolutions are not part of the continent’s experience. By revolution, I mean that swift and violent act that seeks not only to establish a new

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political system but to transform an entire society. One cannot even point to slow but sweeping transformations that take several generations to materialize. But instead, African societies have been slow to change. Hence, many parts of the continent seem stuck in the nineteenth century  – stuck because many are afraid of violent change. Violent change aside, the continent is not even known for silent revolutions. Revolutions – violent or silent – are not part of the African experience; but military coup d’état is and were plentiful. Coups happen largely due to a convergence of factors, i.e., ethnic rivalry; leadership vacuum; predatory domestic politics; the collapse of professionalism within the military; external meddling; and breakdown of law and order. And of course, there have been times when coups have happened for no good reason (Decalo, 1980). Beginning in Egypt (1952), and Togo (1963); and between 1950 and 2000 much of Africa was a stormy sea of coups, countercoups, attempted coups, and rumored coups (Abidde, 2022 p. 71–72). During the Cold War era, there was nothing politicians in Africa feared the most. This fear was implied in Léopold Sédar Senghor’s ironic appreciation: “After God, it is above all to our armed forces that I must express the gratitude of the nation” that there were no coups or other interferences. Since the end of the Cold War, Africans have come to view military regimes as something of an aberration. It could be a generational shift. It could be the result of globalization. Or perhaps the military overplayed its hands to the point where it is now considered a nuisance. Whatever it is, many now believe that the best military regime is worse than a mediocre civilian administration. Generally, military officers who take over the reign of government (after a coup) do not speak of or warm towards Pan-Africanism. However, there have been exemptions. While Gamal Abdel Nasser (of Egypt) was a patron of Pan-­ Arabism, Ghadaffi, Rawlings, and Sankara were patron saints of Pan-Africanism: they advocated, encouraged, and vigorously encouraged the unity of Africans and the Africans in the diaspora.

Pan-Africanism Pan-Africanism is a well-known concept and idea in many parts of Africa – especially since the 1960s. For others, much earlier. Pan-Africanism was the rallying cry, not just against colonialism, but a way to look beyond ethnonationalism, ethno-­ regionalism, and primordial sentiments. Pan-Africanism gave African leaders the chance to challenge and confront colonial powers. Pan-Africanism reverberated all over the continent and beyond. If Africans had nothing to look forward to, at the very least, they looked forward to the day when they would be united: united in common purpose and common aspiration. One of the several ways that continental and Diaspora-Africans has tried to dull the impact of slavery is through the spatial, physical, and mental bonding of Africans the world over. As with many other social phenomena, Pan-Africanism does not lend itself to a clear, single, or universally acceptable definition. How scholars and practitioners view and define it depends on the period and place. However, what seems clear is that it has several dimensions

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which include political, cultural, religious, and economic; and it also has geographic, anti-imperialist, philosophical, and social components. Here and now however, Pan-Africanism is defined as an effort to unite Blacks to (1) confront Western domination and exploitation of the continent and its human and natural resources; (2) give global Africans the voice, the courage, and the wherewithal to improve their economic, social, and political lots; (3) enrich and empower global Africans to take their rightful place in the global system; and (4) to achieve one of the central tenets of the Abrahamic religions: that all men are created equal, and are not to be exploited, subjugated, and or dismissed. According to Michael Williams (2019), there are two strands of Pan-Africanism: Continental Pan-Africanism and Diaspora Pan-Africanism. While the former is primarily concerned with issues originating in the continent; the latter is chiefly concerned with people and issues outside of the continent. However, there are interconnecting threads and agendas. And in the end, Pan-Africanism is about the complete well-being of Black people wherever they may live. Williams went on to posit that Pan-Africanism is based on the belief that African people share common bonds and objectives and that advocates unity to achieve these objectives; and that it is a cooperative movement among peoples of African origin to unite their efforts in the struggle to liberate Africa and its scattered and suffering people. Also, Appiah (2005) tells us, Pan-Africanism is the political project calling for the unification of all Africans, but in its vaguer, more cultural, forms, Pan-Africanism has pursued literary and artistic projects that bring together people in Africa and her diaspora. You cannot think of the history of the continent and not think it matters. You cannot honestly examine the place of Africans and Africans in the Diaspora and not believe that there is a need for a united force – or at least a cooperating force. You cannot interrogate our current world and not think it is necessary for all Blacks, wherever they may be, to be their brother and sister keepers. That we live in a world that is increasingly borderless and globalized does not mean that the need for bilateral and multilateral endeavors between continental and diasporic Africa is no longer necessary. A world without borders and globalization are the two factors that make Pan-Africanism important now more than ever.

Ideas, Ideologies, and African Leaders In the years before and immediately following political independence, African leaders were in the habit of making promises concerning how they would lead and govern their countries. Most of these leaders couched their promises and visions in one form of ideology or another. Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia for instance espoused Humanism; Seretse Khama had a policy and ideology of Harmony; Muammar Gaddafi pursued Arab-Islamic Socialism; Marien N’Gouabi of the Congo was interested in Scientific Socialism; and Julius Nyerere was all about Ujamaa-Socialism and Rural Development (Damachi, 1976). Rare was an African leader without a philosophy or a worldview (Weltanschauung). Their positions were generally

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well-­enunciated and well received; but due to endogenous and exogenous reasons, most of these leaders failed – to some degree or another – in the pursuit of their economic, social, and political agenda. Most of their promises came to naught primarily because a pledge is not performed, and philosophies are easier to articulate than to put into practice. Likewise, a declaration of good principles is not a promise of good intentions. (Isbister, 2014). Many of these and subsequent leaders did not keep many of the promises made to their people. But rather, they wrought tyranny and terror, poverty and illiteracy, ignorance and defeat, and an environment severely lacking in basic human needs (Ibid.,).

Leaders and the Pan-African Ideals To understand this chapter, it is necessary to comment on the issue of leadership. To truly understand where Africa was, is and where it is headed, it is important to understand two of the continent’s most significant deficits: leadership and institution. Weak institutions and half-baked and corrupt leadership are two of the gravest dangers that have befallen the continent. Other factors that have severely impacted the continent are, for the most part, externally situated. For millions of non-­Africans, their belief and understanding of the African continent begin with a preconceived image of the continent. They see a continent steep in social and economic deficits and a political and governing system that does not serve her people well. And even for discerning Africans, the continent can appear to be in constant disarray – with injurious phenomena such as corruption, maladministration, ethnonationalism, secession fervor, drawn-out wars, and calamities wrought by iniquitous leaders. Leaders in Africa look for ways and then vigorously go about weakening public and private institutions. They manipulate the poor and the uneducated; they play regional and sectional politics; they are the masters of ethnic and religious politics; they draw no boundary between public and private interests, thereby illegally enriching themselves; they have no respect for the rule of law, for human life and human dignity; and they rely on coercive agencies to do their biddings. And in so doing become masters of survival strategies and strategies of survival and divide-­ and-­rule. All of the aforesaid have caused unmitigated sorrow. But every so often, there come leaders that have the goodness and well-being of their people at heart. Every so often, leaders emerge – not saints – but leaders with human frailties who bring forth hope and stability, and decency. Since 1945 or thereabout, many of the leaders that have come to the fore have been intellectuals, radicals, populists, and revolutionaries. Unfortunately, their numbers have been small. Many ended up being betrayed or they become victims of domestic and international machinations. When it comes to the issue of leadership, therefore, the consensus is that great leaders  – truly great leaders are hard to come by; hence the anarchy, poverty, sadness, and hopelessness that are commonly associated with the continent. But of course, there are exceptions to the bad leaders’ chorus. In this instance, Chief Obafemi Awolowo was a regional leader, and premier of Nigeria’s

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western region. That Awolowo was an intellectual, a radical and fearless leader, a populist, and a revolutionary was evidenced in his leadership and stewardship, his pronouncements, numerous writings, and how he lived his life. At the time, he introduced many of his signature political, economic, social, and humanitarian programs  – free education, free healthcare, subsidized housing, First Television in Africa, etc. – no other government in Africa had done so. And he was not only a federalist; he was a Pan-Africanist: a believer in freedom, in the emancipation of people, and ultimately, in the unity of all people in Africa and with Africans and their cousins in the United States, Latin America, the Caribbean, and other parts of the world (Abegunrin, 2015). Awolowo is the prototype leader. He did not get to be the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, but his programs, ideas, and ideals benefitted and impacted all those who called Nigeria home when he was the Premier of the Western Region of Nigeria. Though he was a regional leader, he towered above all his contemporaries in all parts of the continent. Close are Nelson Mandela (South Africa); Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana); and Kenneth Kaunda Gaddafi (Zambia).

Duo of African Military Leadership Since the end of the Second World War, or at least since 1960, Africa has had some exciting, compelling, and provocative leaders. (Effectiveness is something else) Leaders who roamed the continent with swagger. But few, very few captured the imagination of Africans as much as Nasser, Gaddafi, Rawlings, and Sankara. What follows is a slightly opened window to the life and legacy of the latter two.

Thomas Isidore Noël Sankara Thomas Sankara was the third of ten children born to Joseph and Marguerite Sankara. His father was a gendarme and of mixed Mossi-Fulani descent. Sankara’s mother was of pure Mossi origins. He was born Thomas Isidore Noel Sankara on December 21, 1949, in Yako, French Upper Volta, into a Roman Catholic family. He was primarily brought up in Gaoua, where his father was posted as an auxiliary gendarme, and so had a comfortable childhood as a son to one of the few and rare African employees of the colonial state of France. He had his primary school at Bobo Dioulasso. He attended church regularly and was excellent at French as a language. At one point, he was encouraged to join a seminary school after primary school. Although Sankara embraced the seminary idea, he chose to attend a secular school (Danso, 2022, p. 29–30). Sankara was in office from August 4, 1983, until October 15, 1987, and was just 37  years old when he was assassinated during a

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palace coup. Like Patrice Lumumba,1 Amilcar Cabral2, and Murtala Mohammed3 before him, no one knows what would have become of his legacy had he lived long and presided over the affairs of his country for a much longer period. While he was alive, he was a military officer, an intellectual, a revolutionary, and a Pan-Africanist. In the public domain, records about him are scant. Nonetheless, several decades after his assassination, his record, and reputation endured. Africans, of all ages and socio-economic standing, remember him fondly as if his passing was only yesterday. Amongst the younger generation, he is considered Africa‘s Che Guevara (Smith, 2014; Brunet, 2021). According to Chika Ezeanya, “Perhaps, more than any other African president in living memory, Thomas Sankara, in 4 years, transformed Burkina Faso from a poor country, dependent on aid, to an economically independent and socially progressive nation…purging the deeply entrenched bureaucratic and institutional corruption in Burkina Faso. He slashed the salaries of ministers and sold off the fleet of exotic cars in the president’s convoy, opting instead for the cheapest brand of car available in Burkina Faso, Renault 5. His salary was $450 per month, and he refused to use the air conditioning units in his office, saying that he felt guilty doing so since very few of his country’s people could afford it” (Ezeanya, 2013). Ezeanya went on to list his other achievements: 1. Within the first year of his leadership, Sankara embarked on an unprecedented mass vaccination program that saw 2.5 million Burkinabe children vaccinated. From an alarming 280 deaths for every 1000 births, infant mortality was slashed to below 145 deaths per 1000 live births. 2. Sankara preached self-reliance; he banned the importation of several items into Burkina Faso and encouraged the growth of the local industry. It was not long before Burkinabes were wearing 100% cotton sourced, woven, and tailored in Burkina Faso. 3. From being a net importer of food, Thomas Sankara began to aggressively promote agriculture in Burkina Faso, telling his country’s people to quit eating imported rice and grain from Europe. In less than 4 years, Burkina Faso became self-sufficient in food production.

 Patrice Lumumba (born July 2, 1925) was a Congolese independence leader and the first democratically elected leader of the Congo. He was in office from June 24, 1960-September 14, 1960, when he was deposed and then executed on January 17, 1961. He was 35 years old. More than five decades after his death, he is still well-regarded in the continent. 2  Amílcar Cabral (September 12, 1924  – January 20, 1973) was a Guinea-Bissauan and Cape Verdean writer, and a nationalist thinker and political leader. In his heydays, he was considered by many as one of the continent’s leading thinkers and anti-colonialists. He was assassinated 8 months before Guinea-Bissau achieved independence. Fidel Castro considers himself “one of the most lucid and brilliant leaders in Africa.” He was 48 years old when he was killed. 3  Murtala Mohammed (born November 8, 1938) was the military ruler of Nigeria from July 30, 1975, until his assassination on February 13, 1976. Millions of Nigerians still have a fond memory of him. His legacy still resonates in the mind of Nigerians. He was 37 years old at the time of his death. 1

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4. Thomas Sankara utilized various policies and government assistance to encourage Burkinabes to get an education. In less than 2 years as a president, school attendance jumped from about 10% to a little below percent, thus overturning the 90% illiteracy rate he met upon assumption of office. 5. Within 12 months of his leadership, Sankara vigorously pursued a reforestation program that saw over ten million trees planted around the country in order to push back the encroachment of the Sahara Desert. 6. Uncommon at the time he lived, Sankara stressed women’s empowerment and campaigned for the dignity of women in a traditionally patriarchal society. He employed women in several government positions and declared a day of solidarity with housewives by mandating their husbands to take on their roles for 24 hours (Ibid.,). Chika Ezeanya went on to assert that “Thomas Sankara was a pan-Africanist who spoke out against apartheid, telling French President Jacques Chirac, during his visit to Burkina Faso, that it was wrong for him to support the apartheid government and that he must be ready to bear the consequences of his actions. Sankara’s policies and his unapologetic anti-imperialist stand made him an enemy of France, Burkina Faso’s former colonial master.” (Ibid.,). His African-centered idea for Africa’s self-­ sufficiency from Western influence and economic domination was to reinforce the concept of African identity and emancipation for Africans. In addition to his inspiring political ideas, Sankara’s social and economic achievements are most often remembered. For example, he established a national literacy campaign, which saw Burkina’s literacy rate inclination from 13% to about 73% within 4 years. Several of Sankara’s policies were also progressive and transformational. He vaccinated about 2.5 million children to augment the fight against meningitis, yellow fever, and measles (Danso, p. 31). In life and death, Sankara was a man of profound popularity. His populist, revolutionary, and Pan-Africanist credentials remain unassailable. And there is not an Africanist anywhere in Africa, or elsewhere, who does not believe that Thomas Sankara is wholly against imperialism or that he is a Pan-Africanist. None! His actions, policies, and statements speak to this fact. “As a committed Pan-Africanist,” said Justin Williams (2014), “Sankara’s death has deprived the Pa-African movement of potential and badly needed land bases on which the Pan-African movement could be better coordinated and consolidated.” It is difficult, if not impossible, to think of Jerry Rawlings, and not think of Thomas Sankara – or vice versa. Williams observed that: When Captain Thomas Sankara’s revolutionary coup took hold in the Upper Volta in 1983, the observers of African politics were quick to compare him to Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings, who came to power in Ghana roughly two years earlier…Both promised their populations some form of revolution and attempted to engage the African diaspora with their radical rhetoric. The two even became political allies and friends based on their similarities (p. 8).

Decades after his assassination, Sankara remains a near-mythical hero for many young people in his country and across Africa. They idealize the image of a

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committed, self-sacrificing rebel, who for 4 years as a leader sought to improve the lives of ordinary people while at the same time projecting the country onto the international arena. More significantly, ideas from the Sankara era are often raised as alternative solutions during times of acute crisis. They are proposed not only by those who view themselves as followers of the Sankarist tradition but also by liberals, nationalists, and others exasperated with the country’s affairs (Harsch, 2013).

Jerry John Rawlings At independence, Ghana was once the richest of the British colonies in West Africa, but by the time Rawlings came to power, it had become economically unviable and insolvent. The citizens, the victims of years of mismanagement, official corruption, and other malfeasance, had to devise systems of adjusting to the reality of a failing state. Many fled the country and sought economic opportunities elsewhere, especially in Nigeria. (Odeyemi, 2022, p.  56). The situation was such that a military coup d’etat seemed like the rational option. Flt Lt. Jerry John Rawlings was born on June 22, 1947, to a Scottish father, James John, and a Ghanaian mother, Victoria Agbotui, a Ewe from Dzelukope, Keta, in the Volta Region of Ghana (Danso, p. 26). When Africans think of modern Ghana, they think of Kwame Nkrumah and Jerry Rawlings. If Kwame Nkrumah was the father; Rawlings was the son. The former was its nationalist leader; the latter its liberator – the man who liberated and freed Ghana from ruins and servitude. And both men were avowed Pan-Africanists. In the last several decades, no former or current President has been idolized and idealized as much as Jerry Rawlings. He is most likely the only African, aside from Nelson Mandela, who when he was alive, could have won elections or popularity contests in multiple African countries. As a military head of state, he was in power from June 4, 1979, until September 24, 1979; and again, from December 31, 1981, until 7 January 7, 1993. And as the democratically elected president of Ghana, he was in office from January 7, 1993, until January 7, 2001. When military coups d’état were a staple of African politics, millions of young Africans wished that coup plotters in their own countries could do what Rawlings did in Ghana: clean up the mess, Do a Rawlings! As millions of Africans in the 1980s knew, Rawlings and his colleagues tried and executed former heads of state and notable Ghanaians whom they believed undermined the well-being of Ghana and its national interest.4 However, unlike Thomas Sankara who rejected and was hostile to the offerings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Jerry Rawlings embraced it when it became clear that his administration may not survive without  Those who were executed included General Akufo, Gen. I. K. Acheampong, and Gen. Afrifa, Air Vice Marshall Yaw Boakye, and General Utuka. Although the public and the coup plotters were in favor of the executions, Rawlings has since said he had no power to stop their execution and has since regretted what happened. Please see: http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/ NewsArchive/Rawlings-Regrets-1979-Executions-143683 4

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such an embrace. Nonetheless, he was an anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist, nationalist, Pan-Africanist, and peacemaker. His “contribution to Pan-African consciousness” cannot be underestimated. In the late 1980s, a global Pan-Africanism consciousness commenced in Ghana through Rawlings’ leadership when he built upon Nkrumah’s notion of cultural nationalism to advocate for a transformed version of Pan-Africanism. As a starting point in this Pan-Africanism revival, Rawlings erected several monuments of Pan-Africanists, including the W.  E. B.  Du Bois Memorial Centre for Pan-African Culture and the Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park, in 1986 and 1992, respectively (E. Annan-Aggrey et al., 2022, p. 12). As a nationalist cum peacemaker, Rawlings played an important role in conflict resolution and political stability in several African countries such as Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone. For instance, in 1994, in his capacity as the ECOWAS Chairman, he presided over the signing of the Akosombo Accord to serve as a roadmap towards a lasting resolution in Liberia’s first civil war (1989–1996). In 1992 and 1996, his administration was instrumental in the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), by providing troops to help calm tensions in war-torn Liberia and Sierra Leone. Following the successes of the ECOMOG missions, Rawlings initiated the Kofi Annan International Peace Keeping Centre in Accra, Ghana. In his post-presidency, Rawlings continued to offer leadership to foster peace throughout Africa. He served as the African Union envoy to Somalia and brought his experience in conflict management to bear as he mobilized African leaders and the international community to contribute to securing peace and reconciliation in Somalia. Rawlings advocated for a new constitution and called on corporate institutions to invest in the peace process in Somalia (Ibid., pp. 13–14). Rawlings’ legacy of continental leadership and development is imprinted on the hearts and minds of the people of Africa. Whereas opinions about his leadership and legacy vary because he caused some discomfort by the nature of his entry into national leadership and the length of his stewardship over Ghana’s affairs; however, in the larger continental and global African community, Rawlings was revered and recognized as a champion of peace, security, and democratization (Balag’kutu, 2022, p. 266). Like all political leaders, Jerry Rawlings also had his flaws and many limitations as a leader, which need to be underscored. Issues with his authoritarian style of leadership as well as the human rights abuse that occurred during the AFRC and PNDC eras are well-known and documented in the literature. Nonetheless, Africa is  endowed with political leaders who have been pragmatic and transformational and saw potentialities and possibilities for the continent’s greatness (Danso, 2022, p. 29).

Most Controversial of Them All In the last fifty years at least, no African head of state or head of government has been as controversial and or as polarizing as Muammar Gaddafi. He was loved and adored by millions; yet was also despised by multitudes. Muammar Gaddafi was

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born in June 1942. In September 1969, he led a group of young Turks to overthrow the conservative regime of King Muhammad Idris, and promised a new era of civil liberties, growth, and prosperity for all Libyans. In the same year, he forced the United States to abandon the Wheelus Airbase near Tripoli. The British military was also kicked out. In the intervening years, Gaddafi was a constant presence, and a major player, in African and Arab politics. Praised by Louis Farrakhan and Nelson Mandela, and condemned by others, his name and persona evoked emotion around the world. Hated or loved, feared or admired, Gaddafi was a man with universal name recognition. He has survived coups, assassination attempts, bombings, and UN embargoes. After renouncing weapons programs in 2003, and subsequently resolving the Lockerbie affair, he gradually inched his way back into the comity of nations until he and his regime were engulfed by the Arab Spring, 2010–2011. Ultimately, it was the Europeans and the Americans  – under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which finally forced him out of power and made it possible for him to be killed by insurgents/terrorists (Roberts, 2016; Campbell, 2013). Muammar Gaddafi was not your typical African leader. His removal and eventual death reverberated all over the Middle East and Africa – dividing the African public, its establishment, and political and intellectual class into several camps. The implication of his death, and why millions of Africans were angry, can only be understood if (a) one takes the history of the region and Africa’s colonial experience into account; (b) one understands the territorial ambition of the west; (c) takes into account western nations’ thirst for oil and access to the Suez Canal; (d) the West’s penchant for lording over weak countries; and (e) the several decades of romance between western nations and blood-letting dictators. For millions of Africans, his removal and killing have nothing to do with freedom, democracy, or human rights. It was all about western tendencies: control of resources and sovereignty. Meaning that the West, under the guise of freedom and democracy, simply wanted to get rid of Gaddafi and then recolonize, or puppetries Libya. Africans and millions of people in Latin America and other spots in the developing world/nations had a soft spot for Gaddafi. After all, this was a man who, despite his alleged eccentricities and supposed mercurial nature, vigorously railed against imperialism and inequality; and who sponsored social movements, insurgencies, anti-colonial and anti-­apartheid groups, and who also seem to be a genuine Pan-Africanist and Pan-Arabist. Gaddafi, in the opinion of many, had done more for his people than any of his contemporaries. He was said to have distributed Libya’s oil wealth in a just and equitable manner. And so, whatever Gaddafi’s shortcomings might have been, they were willing to ignore them and forgive him. What’s more, Gaddafi was seen in the same light as Thomas Sankara, Jerry Rawlings, Fidel Castro, Patrice Lumumba, Amílcar Cabral, and other fire-brand anti-colonial and anti-imperial leaders many African intellectuals romanticize. Africans love firebrands, they love populists, they love revolutionaries, and they love men like Hugo Chavez and Muammar Gaddafi. The Libyan leader established his Pan-African credentials long before he was deposed. For instance, anti-colonial and liberation groups like the African National Congress (ANC); the Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO); the South West

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Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO); and the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), all received training and assistance from him (Meldrum, 2011). And indeed, no higher a commendation and acknowledgment came from one of the world’s beacon and best-known statesmen, Nelson Mandela, who visited Muammar Qaddafi in Libya in 1990 (LA Times, 1990). During Ghaddafi’s lifetime, he was a Pan-Arabist who later became a Pan-­ Africanist and then went on to champion many causes within and outside of the continent. His motives were not always clear, but again, the records are there to show that many of his policies, actions, and pronouncements helped further Pan-­ Africanism and noble causes within the continent. For instance, Adekeye Adebajo (2011), stated: Gaddafi established a $5bn fund that invested in hotels, mobile phone companies, mosques, and mining companies across Africa. He also did more than any other leader to ensure the creation of the African Union (AU) in 2002, hosting several meetings, and forcing Nigeria and South Africa to react to his frantic drive toward creating a federal body. The “Brother Leader’s” quixotic vision of a United States of Africa – an all-African army and common monetary union – was, however, rejected by most African leaders.

Adebajo went on to say that Gaddafi’s ambitions often failed to match political realities on the ground: all seven regional integration schemes that Gaddafi attempted in Africa failed (Ibid.,). That was Gaddafi: a man of many contradictions. But ultimately, he was a Pan-Africanist whose footsteps and reputation loomed large within and outside of the Global South. On the other hand, he failed in some aspects because some of his contemporaries were suspicious of him; and some were not true believers in the total emancipation of the continent.

Conclusion During the colonial era, many Africans, many of whom were in their twenties and thirties became the conscience of their respective communities, countries and of course, the continent. They argued tirelessly for an end to colonization, they railed and fought against what they perceived to be man’s inhumanity to man. Many did so by way of armed struggle, while others engaged in this exercise through intellectualism. In the end, many lived long enough to achieve their aim. During this period, some opened another front: Pan-Africanism. However, how Pan-Africanism began, and who came up with the idea are not that important. What was important, and remains important is that continental Africans and Africans in the Diaspora are uniting, even if incrementally, to forge a common bond and common front. This unity and cooperation are important because of their shared history and common experience. A generation or two after independence, a new generation of leaders came to the force. The intellectuals were not completely displaced; but radicals, populists, and revolutionaries began to occupy some of the political and rhetorical space. The most notables were Abdel Nasser, Muammar Gaddafi, Jerry Rawlings, and Thomas

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Sankara. In addition to their inspirational style, they were also Pan-Africanists. While Thomas Sankara did not live long enough to reveal all his colors truly and completely, Pan-Africanists the world over regarded him as a true and faithful disciple and leader. Muammar Gaddafi was the most controversial, the most polarizing. Nonetheless, his Pan-African credentials cannot be challenged. Jerry Rawlings on the other hand roamed the global stage. Of the three, he was the most energetic and most exciting. Whatever Ghana is today is, in the opinion of many, the handiwork of Rawlings. Until his passing, he remained popular and well-loved. Today, the African continent lacks leaders in the mold of the triumvirates. Intellectualism, populism, revolutionary zeal aside, and Pan-Africanism aside, only a handful of leaders – military or civilians – can be called honest, international, and visionary. The good news is that Pan-Africanism lives on and is undergoing a resurgence and metamorphosis.

References Abegunrin, O. (2015). The political philosophy of Chief Obafemi Awolowo. Lexington Books. Abidde, S.  O. (2022). On the Question of Governance: Has Africa Seen the Last of the Coup Years? In F. Kumah-Abiwu & S. O. Abidde (Eds.), Jerry John Rawlings: Leadership and legacy: A Pan-African perspective (pp. 63–78). Springer Nature. Adebajo, A. (2011, August 26). Gaddafi: The man who would be king of Africa. The Guardian. Retrieved January 12, 2023, from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/aug/26/ gaddafi-­legacy-­meddling-­africa Annan-Aggrey, E., Kutor, S.  K., Bandauko, E., & Arku, G. (2022). Leadership-Institutions-­ Development Nexus in Africa: A Jerry John Rawlings Perspective. In F.  Kumah-Abiwu & S. O. Abidde (Eds.), Jerry John Rawlings: Leadership and legacy: A Pan-African perspective (pp. 3–21). Essay, Springer Nature. Appiah, A. (2005). Pan-Africanism. In A.  Appiah & H.  L. Gates Jr. (Eds.), Africana: The Encyclopedia of the African and African American experience. Essay, Oxford African American Studies Center. Balag’kutu, T. A. (2022). Post-Presidency of Jerry Rawlings and the African Union. In F. Kumah-­ Abiwu & S. O. Abidde (Eds.), Jerry John Rawlings: Leadership and legacy: A Pan-African perspective (pp. 253–269). Essay, Springer Nature. Brunet, R. (2021, October 10). Suspects face trial in 1987 murder of ‘African Che Guevara’ Thomas Sankara. France 24. Retrieved January 10, 2023, from https://www.france24.com/en/ africa/20211010-­murder-­trial-­of-­african-­che-­guevera-­thomas-­sankara-­to-­finally-­begin Campbell, H. G. (2013). Global Nato and the catastrophic failure in Libya: Lessons for Africa in the forging of African unity. Monthly Review Press. Damachi, U. G. (1976). Leadership ideology in Africa: Attitudes toward socioeconomic development. Praeger. Danso, R. (2022). Africa’s nationalist and transformational leaders: A survey. In F. Kumah-Abiwu & S. O. Abidde (Eds.), Jerry John Rawlings: Leadership and legacy: a Pan-African perspective (pp. 21–34). Essay, Springer Nature. Decalo, S. (1980). Coups and army rule in Africa: Studies in military style. Yale University Press. Ezeanya, C. (2013, October 15). Thomas Sankara and the assassination of Africa’s memory by Chika Ezeanya. Sahara Reporters. Retrieved January 11, 2023, from http://saharareporters.com/2013/10/15/thomas-­s ankara-­a nd-­a ssassination-­a frica%E2%80%99s-­m emory-­ chika-­ezeanya

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Harsch, E. (2013). The legacies of Thomas Sankara: A revolutionary experience in retrospect. Review of African Political Economy, 40(137), 358–374. https://doi.org/10.1080/0305624 4.2013.816947 Isbister, J. (2014). Promises not kept: Poverty and the betrayal of third world development. Kumarian Press, Inc. Jennings, J., & Kemp-Welch, T. (1997). Intellectuals in politics from the Dreyfus Affair to Salman Rushdie. Taylor and Francis. Johnson, P. (1989). Intellectuals. Harper & Row. Los Angeles Times. (1990, May 19). Mandela visits Libya, thanks Kadafi for helping train ANC. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved January 9, 2023, from http://articles.latimes. com/1990-­05-­19/news/mn-­168_1_mandela-­visits-­libya Mazrui, A. A. (2003). Pan-Africanism and the intellectuals: Rise, decline and revival. Codesria. Meldrum, A. (2011, August 25). South Africa sticks by Gaddafi. The World from PRX. Retrieved January 10, 2023, from https://theworld.org/dispatches/globalpost-­blogs/africa-­emerges/ south-­africa-­sticks-­gaddafi Odeyemi, O. A. (2022). Kwame Nkrumah, Obafemi Awolowo, and Jerry Rawlings: Continuity and change of political leadership. In F. Kumah-Abiwu & S. O. Abidde (Eds.), Jerry John Rawlings: Leadership and legacy: a Pan-African perspective (pp. 49–61). Essay, Springer Nature. Roberts, H. (2016). The Fall of Muammar Gaddafi: Nato’s Unnecessary War in Libya. Verso. Smith, A.  D. (2014, April 30). ‘Africa’s Che Guevara’: Thomas Sankara’s legacy. BBC News. Retrieved January 11, 2023, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-­africa-­27219307 Thomson, A. (2023). An introduction to African politics. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. William, M. (2019). The Pan-African movement. In M. J. Azevedo (Ed.), Africana studies: A survey of Africa and the African Diaspora. Carolina Academic Press. Sabella Ogbobode Abidde  is a professor of political science and a member of the graduate faculty at Alabama State University. He holds a BA in International Relations from Saint Cloud State University, Minnesota, an MA in political science from Minnesota State University, Mankato, and a PhD in African Studies, World Affairs, Public Policy, and Development Studies from Howard University. His edited/coedited volumes on Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean include Xenophobia, Nativism and Pan-Africanism in 21st Century Africa: History, Concepts, Practice and Case Study (Springer, 2021); Human Trafficking in Africa: New Paradigms, New Perspectives (Springer, 2021); The Challenges of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Springer, 2020); Fidel Castro and Africa’s Liberation Struggle (Lexington, 2020); and Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean: The Case for Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation (Lexington Books, 2018). Dr. Abidde is the Series Editor of Lexington Books African Governance, Development, and Leadership and Springer’s Africa-East Asia International Relations. He is a member of the Association of Global South Studies (AGSS), the African Studies and Research Forum (ASRF), and the American Association of Chinese Studies (AACS). Professor Abidde is the coeditor of Jerry John Rawlings: Leadership and Legacy – A Pan-African Perspective. He was for many years a weekly OP-ED columnist for Nigeria’s newspaper of record, The Punch.

Chapter 7

Third Era of Jerry Rawlings as a Democratic President (1993–2001): Ideology and Leadership Style Emmanuel Graham and Kafui Tsekpo

Introduction In Ghana, between 1966 and 1981 after the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah, the country witnessed six different regimes: two constitutional and three military administrations. The governance style, policy approach, support base, and footprint on the society among these regimes differed markedly (Pellow & Chazan, 1986). However, a common thread that can be discernible in all these administrations was their lack of capacity to contain the social and economic forces of the period and reverse the declining social and economic capital of the country (Norman, 2014; Pellow & Chazan, 1986). The unsatisfactory governance under these administrations is variously symbolized by the thirst for authoritarianism, ethnic favoritism, general intolerance, and poor decisions over economic issues. While the Rawlings administration, during the period 1993–2000 cannot be wholly absolved from ­governance anomalies, he creditably demonstrated a mindset in navigating the ­contradictions in the Ghanaians state-society space, even if with limited success. However, the overall effect of such a leadership mindset and resolve was the firm foundation laid for the country’s most resolute Republic thus far. The mindset of leaders is an important aspect of studying leaders across time and space (Olonisakin, 2017). According to Norman, the agency of leaders as reflected in their political orientation, values, worldview, and ideology are significant identifiers in understanding leaders or engaging in any form of assessment of their administration (Norman, 2014). Such an approach helps to avoid a one-size-fits-all or E. Graham (*) York University, Toronto, ON, Canada e-mail: [email protected] K. Tsekpo Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Legon Accra, Ghana © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. O. Abidde, F. Kumah-Abiwu (eds.), The Political Impact of African Military Leaders, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31427-8_7

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reactionary account of a person’s leadership. It offers a framework for students of leadership to collect, analyze, and understand from different nodes of materials the context-specific and situational currents that condition the relational dynamics of leaders during any given period. By focusing on the mindset of leaders through channels of information such as public speeches, interviews, archival documents, and observation, one can map the ideological underpinning of a leader’s approach to the broad issues of governance. Prior to ascending the political scene in Ghana, Chairman Rawlings had been an avid learner of the conditions that shape social, economic, and political relations in Ghana. This demonstrable understanding of the socio-political history of Ghana, which he picked through formal education and social interactions formed the basis of his ideological cast that guided his role in the realm of the presidency. Ideology in this context refers to the formation of one’s ideas arising from reflections, and experiences, containing propositions about facts and inferences from past and prevailing socio-economic conditions (Mafeje, 1978). This proposition presents a fluid space for one to think and refine ideas about reality and how to deal with such (Adedeji, 2001; Norman, 2014; Pellow & Chazan, 1986). Consequently, reflecting on the leadership of President Rawlings: deducing from his speeches, public acts, and both academic and other writings, one can say he operated on a pragmatic ideology embedded in consensus building. Rawlings, cognizant of the economic and socio-political context preceding his rise to political leadership was careful about how to exchange influence with the citizenry to enable him to pursue the agenda of the time. For instance, previous governments after 1966 had attempted various economic reforms, which somehow resulted in their overthrow. Specifically, the government of the Second Republic devalued the cedi by 78%, from 1.01 to 1.82 against the US dollar. Partly the effect of this decision sparked the military coup by General Acheampong, who reversed the policy. Still conscious about prevailing general conditions in the country, Rawlings was equally aware of the inability of the Third Republican government to successfully negotiate economic reform and support programs with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1979. This failure to stem the worsening economic and general living conditions played a role in the overthrow of the administration. Unlike his predecessors from 1966, Rawlings understood more clearly the difficult circumstances he faced in leading the country from 1981 given the catastrophic levels of the social and economic crises of the time (Adedeji, 2001; Ibrahim, 2003; Norman, 2014). Subsequently, his pragmatic approach to problematizing and dealing with the difficult years of economic recovery succeeded in giving life to the Ghanaian economy and restoring national pride (Adedeji, 2001). As observed by Chazan “without Rawlings” strength of character and unwavering determination, Ghana would not have survived the Economic Recovery Programs (ERPs) of the 1980s put in place by the ruling Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) (Chazan, 1983).  The “success” of the ERPs and other social, political, and economic policy interventions by the PNDC administration under Chairman Rawlings to stabilize, and prepare the country for democratic constitutional rule projected him as a leader with the capability to navigate clumsy situations during uncertain

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periods. It follows that Rawlings gleaning from various public utterances, perceived his leadership role to be that of a guardian for the citizenry, and sought to use his position to reorder society in addressing problems of incompetence, injustice, and corruption (Adedeji, 2001). After several years of attempts by both civilian and military administration to reverse the worsening economic situation in the country without success, the Supreme Military Council on May fifth, 1979, suffered an attempted coup by Flt Lt. Jerry John Rawlings. He was subsequently arrested and detained to face trial. During one of his appearances at the trail, he remarked: “I am not an expert in economics, and I am not an expert in law, but I am an expert in working on an empty stomach while wondering when and where the next meal will come from. I know what it feels like going to bed with a headache, for want of food in the stomach.”- J. J Rawlings (CGTN Africa, 2014). These were the words of Rawlings at trial for his failed 1979 coup, it also become the words that boosted his popularity as the “Junior Jesus (JJ/Jerry John)” of Ghana. They say a man is trapped by his own words, the pronouncements by Rawlings set the stage for his leadership of the 31 December coup, which truncated the ineffective leadership of Hilla Limann. In announcing the coup, he said: Fellow Ghanaians, as you will notice, we are not playing the national anthem. In other words, this is not a coup. I ask for nothing less than a REVOLUTION – something that will transform the social and economic order of this country. Fellow citizens, it is now left to you to decide how this country is going to go from today. We are asking for nothing more than the power to organize this country in such a way that nothing will be done from the Castle without the consent and authority of the people. In other words, the people, the farmers, the police, the soldiers, the workers you – the guardians– rich or poor, should be part of the decision-making process of this country.

Chairman John Jerry Rawlings ruled Ghana for 19 years as the head of a military administration, and later constitutionally elected government. As the leader of the PNDC, adopted a variety of strategies to connect governance to the people. He paid attention to specific areas – usually very deprived areas regardless of ethnic ascriptions. As a democratically elected leader, his instrumentality in setting the constitutional and institutional foundation of the Fourth Republic to give it the needed stability as of the present is noteworthy. For instance, he is the only President in the history of the Fourth Republic to have successfully set up effectively the mandatory constitutional institutions in his first term. Successive governments as and when new legislations call for such institutional creations have used an average of 6 years to do the same. Besides, he remains the only democratically elected leader to have a truly ethnically balanced administration in his two conservative terms as President. Against this backdrop, this paper will unpack the leader Rawlings as the head of a civilian government between 1993 and 2001, and how his period as the Head of State and Government contributed to the advancement of the country Ghana. In doing this, we examined how he managed to exchange influence with the citizenry under a new democratic dispensation. What are the factors that occasioned his rise and performance as a political leader, heading the affairs of the state? How did this translate or contribute to the making and advancement of the Fourth Republic, socially, politically, and economically? To help enhance our knowledge of this, we

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relied on various sources of both secondary and primary materials to construct a narrative that chronicles Rawlings’s leadership and its effect on contemporary Ghana. This chapter is divided into the following sections: after the introduction, we define and conceptualize leadership, this is followed by a reflection on the social, political, and economic development in Ghana between 1966 and 1983, we then move to the section on “Rawlings: Context and Leadership Emergence” discussing his leadership emergence within the context of the prevailing situation in Ghana, in the penultimate section we make a case that Rawlings was a transformational leader. The last section is the conclusion where we point out a few of Rawlings’s limitations as a leader.

Defining and Conceptualizing Leadership In both academic and non-academic texts, the question of leadership is often presumed from the starting point of personal behavioral traits that one possesses or the position an individual occupies in a formal or informal setting (Grint, 2010; Northouse, 2021). This approach to understanding political leadership assumes an organizational character, whereas Rost notes one is seen as a leader when the person “initiates and maintains groups or organizations to accomplish group or organizational goals” (Rost, 1991, p. 59). Similarly, Moore is of the view that leadership is about “the ability to impress the will of the leader on those led and induce obedience, respect, loyalty, and cooperation” (Moore, 1927, p. 124). This conception of leadership places currency on control and domination as anchors of leadership. Hence, one’s role as a leader is to be appreciated when the person can exert coercion to elicit compliance. The domination by the leader makes her what she is. While not discounting the usefulness of this approach to understanding political leadership, there is the need to give room to the context in which individuals operate as leaders. This liberal approach to understanding the praxis of political leadership discounts the essence of contextual influences (Grint, 2010). Political leadership within any given state is shaped by the forms of interactions within the social, political, and economic streams of the country. Thus, leadership is a result of the outcome of the combination of many interactions that occur in any given context (Hollander, 2012; Pierce & Newstrom, 2003). Therefore, it is noteworthy to examine how a person who is seen as a leader influences his contemporaries and those who look up to her in a manner that achieves both individual and collective goals. Burns thus conceptualize leadership as the “reciprocal process of mobilizing by persons with certain motives and values, various economic, political, and other resources in a context of competition and conflict to realize goals independently or mutually held by both leaders and followers” (Burns, 1978, p. 425). Hence, leadership has evolved to connote how collective goals are reached with the emergence of a figurehead. More directly, the present-day approach to understanding leadership emphasizes the context, process, and outcome in a mutually inclusive manner. This way, the

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researcher must pay attention to the situation that conditions a person to take on the leadership role in any given context. Again, how the leader arose to become the figurehead given the interactions between various social, political, and economic forces at play is consequent upon any form of assessing leadership. Precisely, the interactive means through which influence is exchanged: the communication or sharing of ideas to get followers to work towards the attainment of a common goal is important for our understanding of political leadership (Grint, 2010). Hence, the outcome of what the figurehead does is evaluated against the situation that gives rise to a leader and the process of exchanging influence. The series of transactional occurrences between leaders and followers is a useful prism for understanding leadership beyond the formal position occupied by a person. Rather, a robust means for understanding the effectiveness of leadership in society is by examining the nature of the interactive processes between leaders and followers/citizens (Northouse, 2021). In Ghana, the emergence of President Rawlings onto the political scene was primarily shaped by social, political, and economic forces at play  after the first decade of  the overthrow of President Nkrumah, and later by the situation of the 1980s. His leadership of the country was further bolstered when Ghana took a turn to constitutional rule in 1992. Hence, a cardinal question that remains to be answered in the academic literature on political leadership in Ghana is how Rawlings exchanged and sustained influence as a democratic leader, given the situation at the time. And what lessons can be teased out for both students of leadership and politicians among others.

Social, Political, and Economic Development; 1966–1983 To better understand the place and leadership of Flt. Lt. John Jerry Rawling in Ghanaian politics, we need to first understand the socioeconomic conditions that preceded his rise to the political scene in Ghana. The first post-independence government under Nkrumah clearly couched its development agenda in a socialist outlook influenced by contextual historical experiences and elements of Marxism (Ninsin, 1989; Owusu, 1972). In this reflection, the evolving political system and its socioeconomic policies and programs were competently designed with the state as the primary driver of human progress. This was to be done with the somewhat participation of the private sector. Thus, Ghana’s economic and social development was ideologically driven with a capable leadership structure influenced by Kwame Nkrumah’s variant of socialist ideology. This development trajectory was centered around improving the human condition of the Ghanaian through social policy programs while at the same time setting the institutional and economic bedrock for which the government’s industrialization agenda was to be realized. This socialist-­ led socioeconomic and political framework aimed to make the Ghanaian non-­ inferior and capable of competing anywhere in the world. The situation that influenced the ideological disposition of the government at the time was the nature and negative effects of colonialism, the socialization of

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Nkrumah, and the evolution of the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) and its base that was rooted in the youth, artisans, market women, and other business actors who were marginalized by the colonial system (Ninsin, 1989, p. 4). Therefore, the socioeconomic policies of Nkrumah were aimed at dismantling the poverty trap created by colonial policies by enhancing the human capacity of Ghanaians, a critical requirement for transforming the economy. Equally important for the CPP administration was laying the fundamental infrastructures to provide the “big push” for the transformation of the Ghanaian economy through import substitution industrialization as the driver of the market (Steel, 1972). However, the global economic conditions of the 1960s began to impact negatively on the inchoate economy that was yet to realize the returns on investments, especially in the social sector. The Nkrumah government had embarked on an ambitious development agenda to modernize Ghana through investment in the social and economic sectors. However, while these investments were yet to fully materialize their potential, the Ghanaian economy has begun to experience shocks. This arose primarily from the failure of the government to maintain a macro balance. This situation worsened with the price fixing regime of foreign exchange earnings and cocoa at the time, which did not favor holders of money, and export-earning assets such as cocoa trees and mineral deposits were thus altered dramatically by the state (Owusu, 1972; Steel, 1972). Even if those returns were subsequently restored to their initial rates, the response would be tempered by the knowledge of the risks that experience had demonstrated. The leaders of the coup that ousted Nkrumah in early 1966 installed a government called the National Liberation Council (NLC), which was heavily dominated by military officers. Several justifications for the coup were offered, including the oppression of political critics, the corruption of government officials, and economic mismanagement. The political system developed by Nkrumah was dismantled, and a commission of inquiry into corruption was launched. The most pressing economic problem facing the NLC on taking over from Nkrumah was the balance of payments, for the foreign exchange reserves were slipping rapidly, despite the continued use of import-licensing and exchange controls. By the end of 1966, net foreign assets in the monetary system were negative (Owusu, 1972). Yet there was little recognition of the fact that the balance of payments pressure arose fundamentally from excess demand due to loosen fiscal and monetary policies. Rather, the NLC blamed the problems facing the Ghanaian economy on the poor management and corruption of the Nkrumah government. The government appeared to believe that it was possible to construct a more equitable and carefully managed control system. The overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966 by the NLC accelerated the process of economic decline in Ghana after independence. The military administration led by General Afrifa had not been able to stabilize the declining fortunes of the country, and neither did the succeeding Progress Party government under Kofi Busia (Steel, 1972). The NLC administration pursued a liberal economic policy while neglecting the social sectors of the economy. This policy agenda began the acceleration of foreign domination of the Ghanaian economy post-independence. With the return to democratic rule in 1969, the liberalization of the economy took a different turn

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under the Busia government. It began with the expulsion of many foreigners Nigerian, Lebanese, and Asians from the country to limit foreign participation in the small-scale business sector (Owusu, 1972). Somewhat, the policy directive was aimed at curbing unemployment and economic decay in the country. As such, the Busia administration sought to tackle the country’s precarious economic situation. The policies were popular because they forced out of the retail sector of the economy those foreigners, especially Lebanese, Asians, and Nigerians, who were perceived as unfairly monopolizing trade to the disadvantage of Ghanaians. Many other Busia moves, however, were not popular. The decision by Busia’s administration to introduce a loan program for university students, who had hitherto received free education, was challenged (Owusu, 1972; Steel, 1972). To opponents of the policy, this represented what they deemed as introducing a class system into the country’s institutions of higher learning. The National Union of Ghana Students was the principal opposition to this policy, using all available means to unpopularize the government. Another decision by the administration of the Second Republic which slowed the socioeconomic progress of the country was its decision about the country’s currency. Busia’s devaluation of the national currency and his encouragement of foreign investment in the industrial sector of the economy as conservative ideas that could undermine Ghana’s sovereignty (Ibrahim, 2003; Pellow & Chazan, 1986; Steel, 1972). The administration however did not complete its mandate before it was truncated by the Supreme Military Council (SMC). Ghana’s economic decline during the period after the First Republic, causing hardship and a decline in the quality of lives of Ghanaians continued without any mitigation in sight. The SMC administration with its tough stance on debt repudiation and seeking contextual solutions to Ghana’s socio-economic problems yielded some results in sectors such as Agriculture but could not reverse the tide of economic stagnation. By the dawn of 1981, when the tenure of the Third Republic was forcefully expired, Ghana’s economic situation was grim, experiencing stagflation. The Liman administration like its predecessors had struggled with policies to staunch and (re)build a degenerating economy with icky consequences on lifelong living (Norman, 2014; Pellow & Chazan, 1986).

Rawlings: Context and Leadership Emergence The emergence of John Jerry Rawlings onto the Ghanaian political scene was conditioned by the social, economic, and political situations in Ghana in a manner that was action-oriented. Understanding the pragmatic or action-oriented nature of Rawlings’s leadership requires one to unpack the context of the prevailing situation in the country. By the end of the 1970s available records from multiple sources show Ghana was experiencing economic “stagflation.” Every sector of the economy was in serious difficulty. The leadership of the Third Republic had offered little policy response(s) to address the situation. In particular, the leadership at the time

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did little in exchanging influence with the Ghanaians on how it intended to overcome the challenges of the time and what role it expected citizens to play. This culminated in a situation of despondency and a potential disintegration of the country, with many citizens living without a sense of purpose. The emergence of Rawlings’ leadership onto the Ghanaian political scene was thus occasioned by the socioeconomic and political decay, together with the clumsy leadership at the time that had exhibited inability to address the situation. Besides Rawlings’ leadership in mitigating the economic crises of Ghana in the 1980s and early 1990s, his political leadership is worthy of note, which we shall examine in the subsequent sections.

Transition to Democracy and 1992 Elections Part of Rawlings’s charisma and leadership abilities enhanced his achievement and contribution to African democratic development, for example, his facilitation of arguably one of the most successful political transitions from the military into democracy through various institutional foundations from 1990 to 1992 and beyond. There were three crucial steps taken by the Rawlings administration; there was a referendum in April 1992, the presidential elections in November, and the parliamentary elections in December 1992 (Frempong, 2017). To begin with, there were several regional fora held and the government set up National Commission on Democracy (NCD), which submitted its report on 25th March 1991, with the government‘s White Paper response on May 10, 1991 (Gyimah-Boadi, 1991). This White paper as Gyimah-Boadi pointed out established a committee of experts who were mandated to draft the connotational provision for the new republic. The committee drafted a proposed constitution that considered the achievement of the PNDC government, this draft was laid before a 260-member Consultative Assembly (CA), which comprised 117 representatives from various assemblies both district and metropolitan, there were also 22 government officials and 121 representatives of many renowned public institutions. The chairman of the committee was S. K. B. Asante, who was the Director of the United Nations (UN) Centre for Transnational Corporations and a former Solicitor General. Other renowned members included Nana Agyeman Badu chief of Dormaa, Justice Annie Jiaggie who was a retired judge of the Courts of Appeals, Charles Jebuni, Afari Gyan, and E.V.O. Dankwa all from the university of Ghana (Gyimah-Boadi, 1991, p. 6). Despite these efforts by the PNDC administration to facilitate a democratic transition in Ghana, it was vehemently criticized for packing the process with many “pro-government organizations and individuals” without using an independent body for example, the CA, district, and metropolitan assemblies were “loaded with PNCD partisans” (Boafo-Arthur, 2006, p. 6). This could be a contributing factor to the various limitations pointed out by Gyampo and Graham on Ghana’s constitutional hybridity and the winner takes all politics which continues to undermine Ghana’s fourth republican governance and development (Gyampo & Graham, 2014, 2017). The point must be made that, although Rawlings contributed to the democratic transition in Ghana through the

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introduction of the 1992 constitution, like many constitutions in the world, it has its limitations that need to be addressed. We must therefore give credit to Rawlings for facilitating it at the time it was and for the purpose it served and continues to serve. Scholars are divided on the reason why Rawlings decided to transition into a democratic leader, as pointed out by Boafo-Arthur (2006). A lot of people were surprised by the swiftness with which Rawlings, a military leader decided to democratize, nonetheless, after nearly a decade of PNDC military rule, a transition began when Chairman Rawlings announced in his new year’s message to the nation that “our eyes are now firmly set on the final phase of our journey as a provisional government and on the road towards establishing for Ghana a new constitutional order” (People’s Daily Graphic January 1991 cited in Gyimah-Boadi, 1991, p.  5). Eventually, the PNDC returned to democratic rule in 1992 by metamorphosing into a democratic party name the National Democratic Congress (NDC) to contest the 1992 general elections. The various constitutional and transitional arrangement was made possible by the PNDC administration for multiparty democracy to return with the introduction of the 1992 constitution and which offer the Transitional provision under section 34 (1) (Government of Ghana, 1992). Elections were held in 1992 with the president in November, and the parliamentary in December, although there were several controversies surrounding the transparency and legitimacy of the elections (Adedeji, 2001; Boafo-Arthur, 2006, 2008). Rawlings was declared the winner of the presidential elections with 58.3% of the national votes with (the New Patriotic Party) NPP’s Adu Boahen obtaining 30.4% (Frempong, 2017, p. 142). The Commonwealth Observer Group reported that “these elections mark an important advance in the democratic process in Ghana. Overall, they have been well-planned, organized, and conducted. Significantly, all parties were determined to contest the elections and they did so vigorously. The people of Ghana have demonstrated their commitment to the democratic future of their country” (Onadipe, 1997, p. 191). However, the opposition NPP rejected the election of Rawlings and boycotted the parliament election in December 1992 (Adedeji, 2001). This gave NDC an overwhelming majority in parliament by gaining 189 seats out of 200 (Boafo-Arthur, 2006, p. 264). The opposition NPP went ahead to write a book titled The Stolen Verdict in which they listed electoral malpractices from 100 constituencies out of the total of 200 constituencies (Frempong, 2017, p.  148). Despite all these, the 4-year period from 1992 to 1996, which was Rawlings’s first time was relatively peaceful and limited political and social acrimony (Adedeji, 2001).

 awlings and Democracy in Ghana from the 1996 Elections R to the 2000 Elections Besides winning the foundation presidential elections of the Fourth Republic in 1992, the NDC led by Rawlings won the 1996 elections in December with 57.4% of the votes, while NPP’s Kufuor obtained 39.6% of the votes (Frempong, 2017,

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p. 165). This time around all the opposition parties took part in the parliamentary elections, the NPP obtained 61, whilst the NDC won 133 seats it lost 55 seats, a reduction from 189 in 1992, the People’s National Convention obtained one seat (Frempong, 2017, p. 177). Given this second mandate, Rawlings and the NDC were poised to make a difference by serving his second term of office and finally arranging for the next election in 2000 (Adedeji, 2001). His electoral victory could not only be due to his incumbency advantage, availability of resources, and access to the media amongst others yet his popularity and leadership abilities, charisma, and popularity compared with the other political party presidential candidate. Rawlings won 1996 elections because of his people-centered  projects and programs such as the rebuilding of Ghana’s old roads and other infrastructure such as hospitals and rural electrification (Onadipe, 1997). Additionally, younger voters were impressed with some of his achievements  in the social sectors such as the improvement in nutritional status of newborns, children under 5 years, and lactating mothers; the school health program; the near eradication of Buruli ulcer in especially the middle sectors of the country; and the expansion of both primary and secondary schools’ infrastructure with scholarship schemes to assist needy but brilliant students voted for him rather than the opposition they did not know. These youngsters loved him and his approach to things, they felt a strong connection with him since the revolution days when they called him Junior Jesus (JJ)/Jerry (Adedeji, 2001). The NDC also focused on the rural area, Rawlings targeted these rural areas because they lacked several infrastructures, hence having the national resources to his advantage he provided roads, electricity, water, hospitals, clinics, and several other social interventions. The NDC campaign motto was “Let there be light for rural people, for they are Ghanaians too!” (Adedeji, 2001, p. 18). After the elections, in 1998, Rawlings obtained what Boafo-Arthur called a “diplomatic triumph” when the president of the USA visited Ghana and Africa for the first time, he visited six African countries (Boafo-Arthur, 2006, p. 265). He further argued that it was a way to show that the USA expected Ghana to maintain democracy (Boafo-Arthur, 2006). It was a “diplomatic triumph” because Rawlings was also showing strong signs of his commitment to democratization and good governance. The 2000 elections were unique, it was the first time an incumbent president was no longer eligible for elections because he had completed his two-term constitutional mandate (Frempong, 2017). Rawlings was no longer eligible and so he had to honor the constitutional provision. He was, nonetheless, influential on the NDC campaign trail, his charisma and oratorial abilities were not questionable, and he still had strong support from the rural areas. He publicly declared his support for his vice president Prof John E. A. Mills, this gesture did not sit well with some leading members of the NDC, which led to a movement within the NDC known as the Reform Movement, which eventually became the National Reform Party (NRP) (Frempong, 2017). The 2000 elections hand to go into a run-off when none of the presidential candidates obtained 50% of the votes, overall, after the run-off on 28th December 2000, the NPP candidate John A. Kufuor obtained 56.9% of the votes and Mills 43.1% (Frempong, 2017, p. 192).

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Although NDC’s presidential candidate Mills lost the elections, several commentators were not sure if Rawlings was going to hand over power to Kufuor on the day of the swearing-in. In an interview with BBC, Audrey Gadzekpo and Professor Gyimah-Boadi responded to many questions regarding Ghana’s future with Rawlings as an ex-president. Dr. Gadzekpo stated that “In view of Rawlings’ young age as a former head of state (54 at the time), energetic and with lots of ideas, Ghanaian would have to deliberate on the means of taking care of him in a manner that would ‘dissuade’ him from coming back” (Adedeji, 2001, p.  19), Professor Gyimah-Boadi stated that “there is a lot to love about Rawlings and also a lot to hate him for; in short he is a polarizing figure”, he further stated that in terms of the post-­ Rawlings era “as far as the public is concerned, what will happen to Rawlings out of power has a lot to do with the kinds of activities he decides to get involved in that would be befitting to a man of his stature” (Adedeji, 2001, p.  19). Admittedly, Professor Gyimah-Boadi mentioned that “there has to be a sense of gratitude to Rawlings…for presiding over two terms of an elected administrations, and for following constitutional provisions on the presidential term limits and handing over power to a victorious party after elections” (Adedeji, 2001, p. 19). Indeed, credit has to always be given to Rawlings for showing leadership at such a crucial time in Ghana’s politics.

Rawlings and Decentralization in Ghana Under the leadership of Rawlings, Ghana had two distinctive forms of governance, the one which was at the national level a constitutional multi-party democracy, which was solidified with the introduction of the 1992 constitution. The second form of governance was on the district or local level, which was based on the Districts Assembly (DA), a decentralized form of government that was “non-­ partisan” this was incorporated into the 1992 constitution through the District Assemblies Common Fund (Crook, 1999, p. 114). DA was a community-based participatory approach to governance at the local level. It has been argued that DA was preferred by Rawlings due to his populist rhetoric and attack on corruption and hostility towards Western forms of political representation, such as parliamentary elector democracy. He proposed a system that would work for Ghana due to its failed attempts at Western democratization since independence. PNDC under Rawlings immediately mandated the NCD to form programs that would facilitate “true democracy” for Ghanaians (Crook, 1999, p. 116). In the view of NCD, “self-­ government must mean that political authority shall be in the hands of all communities who shall exercise it for their own benefit” (Crook, 1999, p. 118). The goal of the DA as espoused by the PNDC was to bring “power to the people” (Crook, 1999, p. 118). The main role of DA as envisioned by Rawlings was changed when the PNDC government adopted electoral democracy.

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Rawlings: Footprints of a Transformational Leader Rawlings can be said to be one of Africa’s transformational leaders for the following reasons. To begin with, Rawlings had a “bottom-up” approach to governance which is popularly known as the grassroots approach. In doing so, Rawlings involved citizens in several political and social interventions and initiatives even during his military days as the chairman of PNDC.  On the 28th of April 1992, Rawlings allowed for a Referendum to be held on the 1992 constitution, which was the bedrock for Ghana’s fourth republic. The PNDC in 1990 July as their process of facilitating the transition to democracy established and tasked the NCD to hold several seminars in all the ten regional capitals of Ghana to involve and gather the citizen’s views on the prospect of the democratic transition and new constitutions (Frempong, 2017). Rawlings did all this to ensure the participation of ordinary citizens in the building of a new nation and their future. This led to a new constitution that restored electoral democracy in Ghana. Rawlings can be credited for not only facilitating the restoration of democracy in Ghana but for sustaining, defending, and ensuring that human rights were protected during this period. The fact that he won the 1992 elections and was re-elected in 1996 showed that he had a close connection or “close relationship” with the people of Ghana, although there were some limitations or challenges (Blondel, 2019, p.  130). Many were skeptical as to whether Rawlings was going to hand over power to J.A. Kufuor after the 2000 general elections like the other long-serving leaders in Africa (Boafo-Arthur, 2006). Subsequently, Rawlings was a visionary leader in several ways. In an interview with Rev. Jesse Jackson on CNN, when Rawling was asked if he saw himself as a visionary leader, he said: “yes”, and he explained “I knew that Ghana would not be brought out of the political abyss of 1981 without a visionary, but more importantly, the people were yearning for nothing less than a popular democracy. They were asking for nothing more than the power to be part of the decision-making process of their country. In other words, they wanted a voice in deciding their everyday life, as it is done in the West, and not for politicians to be dominant and who are all-­knowing to be at the helm of affairs of everyday life in Ghana” (Adedeji, 2001, p. 20). These were his reasons for facilitating democracy in Ghana where Ghanaians were in charge of their affairs. Additionally, as a visionary leader Rawlings in the late 1980s in his quest to attract foreign investment and Pan-Africanism, he launched many developmental initiatives which were necessary for “heritage tourism” for economic and social developments (Engmann, 2021). Rawlings was interested in African Americans returning to Ghana for entrepreneurial purposes, he even went on to propose dual citizenship for Black Americans who wanted to stay in Ghana (Taylor, 2019). Rawlings’ vision of heritage tourism continued to be pursued by various presidents after Rawlings for example president Kufuor and the NPP launched the “The Joseph Project” and the “Homecoming Summit” which was to mark Ghana’s 50th independence anniversary (Engmann, 2021). A similar recent initiative was the Year of Return 2019, which marked the 400th anniversary of slavery, the current president

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Nana Akufo-Addo stated that “we believe that we have a responsibility to extend a hand of welcome back home to Africans in the diaspora” (BBC News, 2020). This event attracted several celebrities such as Naomi Campbell, Idris Elba, Steve Harvey, and Cardi B (BBC News, 2020). The government granted 126 people citizenship, and the Minister of Tourism Barbara Oteng mentioned that Ghana gained about USD 1.9 billion into the Ghanaian economy (BBC News, 2020). Ghana further launches 2020 “Beyond the Return” which is a 10-year project with the theme “Decade of African Renaissance 2020–2030” (Engmann, 2021, p. 734). Finally, Rawlings also was an influential leader internationally. On the continent of Africa, when Rawlings was the chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), he was instrumental in several peacekeeping projects. As the Chairman of ECOWAS, he held many peace talks on the Liberian conflict, this was important for the region’s development and growth economically. His approach led to the signing of the Akosombo and Accra Accords with the warring factions on September 12 and December 13, 1994 (Boafo-Arthur, 2007). He also convinced the international community particularly the USA, to offer support to the ECOMOG, which was the ECOWAS regional monitoring group, due to his persistence the UN in October 1995 puts together a special forum that focused on Liberia, the meeting which was held at the UN headquarters in Geneva was chaired by the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali, the Liberian National Transitional Governments’ chairman Wilton Sankwaulo and Rawlings (Boafo-Arthur, 2007). Rawlings was also instrumental in the Abuja accords of August 19, 1995, he was influential in the Liberian conflict because through these meetings he was able to secure a grant of USD 900,000 for the armed forces of Ghana to help in the quest for peace in Liberia (Boafo-Arthur, 2007). Rawlings was influential even when he became an ex-president, Rawlings was transformational. The then UN secretary General Kofi Anna appointed him as the eminent person for the UN (Modern Ghana.com, 2001). Due to this mandate, he was involved in many international travels such as attending a conference on topics of great concern to the continent such as malaria, HIV/AIDS, and corruption. Some of the countries he visited as a result of his UN mandate were Ethiopia, Guinea, Tanzania, Kenya, and Botswana, all these counties he visited as a result of his anti-­ AIDS campaigns. He engaged with many health workers and officials where they discussed appropriate modes of dealing with the continent’s predicaments such as the AIDS pandemic, he also led a group of UN heads who volunteered to test for AIDS, which was televised nationally (Boafo-Arthur, 2006).

Conclusion Late former President Rawlings remains a household name in Ghana, many still believe he is unparalleled in Ghanaian politics and history apart from Kwame Nkrumah, his charisma and leadership abilities led Ghana through economic hardship in 1983 to economic recovery and democratization. Chazan mentioned that

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without his type of leadership strength in character and unshaken determination, Ghana perhaps would not have survived the ERP of the IMF and World Bank (Chazan, 1983). Yet, like any charismatic leader, Rawlings had his downside too, one of such was his sour relationship with his Vice President Arkaah. The tension between the two men became a public secret, it was alleged that during a cabinet meeting on December 1995, Rawlings physically assaulted him over a statement he made at a party meeting the previous week (GhanaWeb, 1995). The vice president was selected from National Convention Party (NCP), which was in alliance with NDC and Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere (EGLE) for the 1992 general elections (Frempong, 2017). This ultimately led to Rawlings changing his running mate to J.E.A Mills for the 1996 elections. Another issue has to do with Rawlings’s constant critique of the Kufuor administration when Rawlings became the ex-president in January 2001, these criticisms became known as the “boom speeches”. These were a series of speeches in which he accused the NPP of being corrupt, in some cases, he attacked President Kufuor for constantly traveling outside of Ghana, and he accessed the NPP administration of intimidating the NDC party members. These speeches brought several speculations that he could be up to another coup since he was similar to what he did during President Limann’s era (Boafo-Arthur, 2006). Despite these limitations, Rawlings in our view remains a unique transformational, visionary, and effective leader in Ghana since Kwame Nkrumah.

References Adedeji, J. L. (2001). The legacy of J.J. Rawlings in Ghanaian politics, 1979-2000. African Studies Quarterly, 5(2), 27. BBC News. (2020, January 30). African diaspora: Did Ghana’s Year of Return attract foreign visitors? BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-­africa-­51191409 Blondel, J. (2019). African presidential republics. Routledge. https://doi. org/10.4324/9780429029806 Boafo-Arthur, K. (2006). Rawlings’ former presidency: A threat to democracy in Ghana? In R. Southall & H. Melber (Eds.), Legacies of power: Leadership change and former presidents in African politics. HSRC Press. Boafo-Arthur, K. (2007). The Liberal Ghanaian state and foreign policy: The dynamics of change and continuity. In K.  Boafo-Arthur (Ed.), Ghana: One decade of the Liberal state. CODESRIA Books. Boafo-Arthur, K. (2008). Democracy and stability in West Africa: The Ghanaian experience. Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. Burns, J. M. (1978). Leadership (1st ed). Harper & Row. CGTN Africa. (2014, October 27). Faces of Africa- The Jerry Rawlings story. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ikHpFgKJax8 Chazan, N. (1983). An anatomy of Ghanaian politics. Managing political recession, 1969-1982. Westview Press. Crook, R.  C. (1999). No-party’ politics and local democracy in Africa: Rawlings’ Ghana in the 1990s and the ‘Ugandan model. Democratization, 6(4), 114–138. https://doi. org/10.1080/13510349908403635

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Engmann, R. A. A. (2021). Coups, castles, and cultural heritage: Conversations with flight lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings, former president of Ghana. Journal of Heritage Tourism, 16(6), 722–737. https://doi.org/10.1080/1743873X.2020.1817929 Frempong, A. K. D. (2017). Elections in Ghana (1951–2016). Digibooks. GhanaWeb. (1995). President beats vice. GhanaWeb. https://www.ghanaweb.com/ GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/President-­beats-­Vice-­439 Government of Ghana. (1992). Constitution of the republic of Ghana. Ghana Publishing Corporation (Print. Division). http://www.ghana.gov.gh/images/documents/constitution_ghana.pdf Grint, K. (2010). Leadership: A very short introduction (1st ed.). Oxford University Press. Gyampo, R. E. V., & Graham, E. (2014). Constitutional hybridity and constitutionalism in Ghana. Africa Review, 6(2), 138–150. https://doi.org/10.1080/09744053.2014.916846 Gyampo, R.  E. V., & Graham, E. (2017). Reviewing the extensive appointment powers of the president as solution to winner-takes all politics in Ghana. Ghana Social Science Journal, 14(2), 252. Gyimah-Boadi, E. (1991). Notes on Ghana’s current transition to constitutional rule. Africa Today, 38(4), 5–17. Hollander, E. (2012). Inclusive leadership: The essential leader-follower relationship (1st ed.). Routledge. Ibrahim, J. (2003). Democratic Transition in Anglophone West Africa [Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University]. http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/1700 Mafeje, A. (1978). Science, ideology and development: Three essays on development theory. Africana Publishing Company. Modern Ghana.com. (2001). Ex-president Rawlings becomes an eminent person. Modern Ghana. https://www.modernghana.com/news/12182/ex-­president-­rawlings-­becomes-­an-­eminent-­ person.html Moore, B. V. (1927). The May conference on leadership. The Personnel Journal, 6(1), 124–128. Ninsin, K. A. (1989). Notes on landlord-tenant relations in Ghana since 1982. Institute of African Studies Research Review, 5(1), 69–76. Norman, M. (2014). The quest to reform the African state: The case of William R.  Tolbert Jr of Liberia, and Jerry Rawlings of Ghana. In B.  G. Jallow (Ed.), Leadership in postcolonial Africa: Trends transformed by independence (pp. 61–95). Palgrave Macmillan US. https://doi. org/10.1057/9781137478122_4 Northouse, P. G. (2021). Leadership: Theory and practice (8th ed.). SAGE Publications. Olonisakin, F. (2017). Towards re-conceptualising leadership for sustainable peace. Leadership and Developing Societies, 2(1), 1–30. https://doi.org/10.47697/lds.3435001 Onadipe, A. (1997). Democracy in Ghana: The Rawlings mystique endures. The Contemporary Review, 270(1575), 190–195. Owusu, M. (1972). The search for solvency: Background to the Fall of Ghana’s Second Republic, 1969-1972. Africa Today, 19(1), 52–60. Pellow, D., & Chazan, N. (1986). Ghana: Coping with uncertainty. Westview Press. Pierce, J., & Newstrom, J. (2003). Leaders and the leadership process (6th ed.). McGraw Hill. Rost, J. (1991). Leadership for the twenty-first century (reprint edition). Praeger. Steel, W. F. (1972). Import substitution and excess capacity in Ghana. Oxford Economic Papers, 24(2), 212–240. Taylor, S. J. L. (2019). Exiles, entrepreneurs, and educators: African Americans in Ghana (illustrated edition). State University of New York Press. Emmanuel Graham  is a PhD candidate at York University Department of Politics in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. His scholarly focus is on the political economy of the extractive sector and energy politics in West Africa. He is also interested in the social and political thoughts of Kwame Nkrumah and Karl Marx. His research has also been on electoral politics, political vigilantism, and democratic consolidation in Ghana and West Africa. He has some publications in international peer-reviewed journals such as Extractive Industry and Society, Africa Review, Insight on Africa, and Journal of African Elections.

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Kafui Tsekpo  is a political sociologist whose research interest straddles leadership, security, governance, and social policy. He is currently a PhD fellow with the South African Research Chair in Social Policy at the University of South Africa, Pretoria, and an affiliate of the African Leadership Centre, King’s College London. Prior to his doctoral studies, Kafui taught at the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana. He is a member of the International Public Policy Association, Development Studies Association, South African Sociological Association, and the Ghana Studies Association. He has consulted and provided research support for several organizations locally and internationally on security and peacebuilding, governance, humanitarianism, and social policy interventions.

Chapter 8

Statesmen: Burkina Faso and the Dream Deferred: Ideology and Leadership Style Nada Halloway

Introduction At 4:30 p.m. on October 15, 1987, Thomas Sankara walked out of the headquarters of the old Conseil de l’Entente, where he and his aides had gathered for a meeting and which had served as an office of the National Conseil national de la révolution (CNR), into a hail of bullets. The meeting, which started at 4:15 had barely gotten underway when they heard gunfire. Sankara’s aides quickly took cover, but Sankara got up and told his aides to stay inside for their own safety. “It’s me they want,” he told them and left the room, hands raised, to face his executioners. Those were the last words he said before he was shot several times and, on that day, after the silence of the guns, the brief presidency of one of the most charismatic leaders in Africa came to an end. By 10 p.m. that night, he had been buried as if to hide a secret, and his one-time friend and the suspected assassin had assumed the presidency. For the next 27 years, Compaorè would undo the work that Sankara had begun and plunge his country further into debt to line his bank account. Because Sankara did not publish anything, this chapter will focus on his speeches which were published after his death to flesh out his leadership style. His political intervention and his desire to change his country cannot be understood outside of his personal views and his background. He sought to break the longstanding tradition of corruption that gripped the country while promoting women’s rights. He also sought to liberate his country from the grip of foreign aid and foreign loans with crippling interest rates that allowed these same countries to have a say in the workings of Burkina Faso. Sankara assumed the presidency of Upper Volta, later to be renamed Burkina Faso (Land of Up Right Men), on the fourth of August 1983, on the heels of a military coup led by his colleague and friend, Blaise Compaoré. The country that N. Halloway (*) Manhattanville College, New York, NY, USA © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. O. Abidde, F. Kumah-Abiwu (eds.), The Political Impact of African Military Leaders, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31427-8_8

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Thomas Sankara inherited was one of the poorest countries in the world. The lack of growth and limited access to water for agriculture meant that this particular African country which the French had colonized in 1919, would become the labor force for much of Africa. By the time Sankara became president, it ranked second behind South Africa in the sheer number of migrant laborers that left the country for other parts of Africa. This drain in its most important resource, human capital, meant economic stagnation, vast structural underdevelopment, and poverty for the majority of the country’s citizens. It was unavoidable then that the people would agitate for change.

Thomas Sankara: A Brief Biography Sankara was born on December 21, 1949, to Joseph and Marguerite Sankara. He was the third of eleven children and the oldest son in the family. Burkina Faso, which was then called Upper Volta, was still a French colony and Sankara’s father was a police officer under the colonial regime. Because of his father’s position within the colonial regime, Sankara would have lived a somewhat privileged life in comparison to other Upper Voltans. The family lived in a secluded area in Gaoua that was reserved for the local members of the police force. Sankara would become aware of the differences between his life and those of his classmates when he started school. He would also become aware of the differences between the lives of the French administrators and colonists who resided in Upper Volta. He noticed how privileged these Europeans were in comparison to the Upper Voltans and it was this early observation that would shape his political ideology. Sankara was eleven when Upper Volta gained its independence from France. A few days before the ceremony that would grant Upper Volta independence, Sankara and some friends organized their own independence ceremony and proceeded to lower the French flag and raise the colors of the new nation. He excelled in school, and at the age of seventeen joined the military. As with his education, he excelled in his training and was chosen to attend a military officer’s training in Madagascar in 1970, where he witnessed the Madagascans’ revolt against the French-backed Philibert Tsiranana (Harsch, 2013, 2018). He would continue his training in France in 1972, and it was here that he would turn his attention to the Marxist theory and the revolutions that were happening in different parts of the world (Harsch, 2013, 2018). When he returned to Upper Volta, he was stationed at the Po military Base and according to Victoria Brittain, became a household name because of his leadership style. According to Brittain, “Captain Sankara organized the commando unit under him in a new way. The soldiers were encouraged to integrate with civilians—they worked together. Formed an orchestra and played together” (Brittain, 1985, p. 42).

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Thomas Sankara: Ideology and Leadership Style This change came in the form of a combined coup and wide-scale social protest for change. At 10 pm on August 4, 1983, Thomas Sankara would address his people and, in that address, pointed to the corrupt regime that preceded his presidency. It was a brief address, but it justified the military coup and would set the tone for Sankara’s presidency. As he noted, Once again, soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers of the national army and the paramilitary forces found themselves compelled to intervene in the running of state affairs in order to restore independence and liberty to our country and dignity to our people…The patriotic and progressive objectives that justified the formation of the Council of Popular Salvation on November 7, 1982, were betrayed on May 17, 1983—that is, only six months later—by individuals vehemently opposed to the Voltaic people’s interest and their aspirations for democracy and liberty (Sankara Speaks, 2007, p. 68).

This speech to the people was not merely a justification but highlighted the character of the man and the path that he would forge as the president of a nation that had been exploited by a colonial government, ravaged by its own leaders who continued to support the bureaucratic structures that the French regime had implemented because it shored up their interest and tribal hierarchies that continued to foster a class system that Sankara did not support. This speech, while brief, echoed an earlier speech he had made as the prime minister of the Council of Popular Salvation. The speech, given at a rally in Ouagadougou on March 26, 1983, sharply criticized the Burkinabe upper class that colluded with imperialist structures at the expense of the people. “Who are the enemies of the people?” he asked. The enemies of the Burkinabe people and by extension, the people of the African continent, are: The section of the bourgeoisie that enriches itself dishonestly through fraud and bribery, through the corruption of state officials, so they can bring into Upper Volta all kinds of products, whose prices have been multiplied tenfold. These are the enemies of the people…The enemies of the people are also the forces of obscurantism who, under the spiritual cover of tradition, are exploiting the people instead of genuinely serving their moral interests, instead of genuinely serving their social interests…. The enemies of the people are also outside our borders…. These enemies are neocolonialism and imperialism…. It is imperialism that assassinated the Lumumbas, the Cabrals, and the Kwame Nkrumahs (Sankara Speaks, 2007, pp. 52–55).

This speech highlighted the failed promise of independence. Liberation from the many colonial regimes in Africa was supposed to usher in an age of growth and development for Africa and Africans but the reverse happened. Instead of emancipation, leaders like Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone, Hastings Banda of Malawi, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, and the presidents of Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) instituted repressive regimes that pillaged their country’s resources at the same time that they cozied up to their former colonial oppressors. As Sankara pointed out, these regimes were allowed to proliferate because these were leaders who were supported by the imperial powers. This view of the imperial powers as assassins developed pretty early in his childhood as he witnessed the injustices of the French colonial regime in Burkina Faso. As he saw it, the French regime was directly responsible for the

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extreme poverty experienced by the Burkinabe people. As with most colonial holdings in Africa, the wealth resided in the hands of the colonial powers and members of the upper class while the majority of the populations in these societies existed at or below the poverty level. In Burkina Faso, the forced labor system depleted the country of its workforce at the same time that it contributed to the enrichment of neighboring countries like Côte d’Ivoire (aka Ivory Coast). Sankara would fight against this type of exploitation until his assassination in 1987. He was firmly opposed to the “abominable misery suffered by the people while the ruling classes enjoy a life of abusing luxury.” It was to bring some measure of equality to his people that he agitated for change and engineered the “Popular Revolution” of August 3, 1987. On October 2, 1983, Sankara, in a speech titled “Political Orientation Speech,” detailed: It is a democratic and popular revolution. Its primary task is to liquidate imperialist domination and exploitation and cleanse the countryside of all social, economic, and cultural obstacles to keep it in a backward state. From this flow, it is a democratic character. Its popular character arises from the full participation of the Voltaic masses in the revolution and their consistent mobilization around democratic and revolutionary slogans that express in concrete terms their own interest as opposed to those of the reactionary classes allied with imperialism. The popular character of the August revolution also lies in the fact that in place of the old date machinery, new machinery is being constructed that will guarantee the democratic exercise of power by the people and for the people (Sankara Speaks, 2007, 95).

This revolution was, in the words of Sankara, not a military coup but one that was spearheaded by the people and led by the people who assisted some members of the military. This is a crucial distinction as Sankara has been alternatively presented as a military coup. It was also not the mere taking of power for the sake of power. This was a transformative revolution that gave power back to the people and granted the people in power, the tools to transform a society that had functioned on a class-­ based system that no longer worked in this new era where the government was “for the people” and by the people. This revolution would focus on removing all the obstacles to transforming a society that had become moribund. When he assumed the presidency in 1983, Thomas Sankara deviated from other African rulers. He was not only the youngest President on the continent but he was also someone who did not embrace the opulent lifestyle that other African presidents had embraced. The path forward, according to Sankara, was in the hands of the Burkinabè people as well as those in power. One of the first things he did when he became president was to rid the country of corruption, especially among government officials. The first move was to ensure that the ministers as well as members of the civil service earned the same salary of CFA 192,500 per month. This was his salary as well. He explained his plan to balance the country’s budget and even generate a surplus in an interview. Asked by Jean-Phillippe with “58 million CFA Francs and 12 million of that earmarked for repayment of loans, can you really have a financial plan or strategy?” Sankara replied the following: Yes, by simply and very starkly posing the choice between champagne and water. We make every effort to reject unequal allocations. So, what do we find? Out of a budget of 58 billion, 30,000 government employees monopolize 30 billion, and that leaves nothing

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for everyone else. This is not normal. If we want greater justice, each of us must recognize the real situation of the people and accept the sacrifices that each individual must make for justice to be done. Who are these 30,000 government employees? People like me…. We’re the ones who talk about human rights, the drop in buying power, a climate of terror…. we forget that we condemned thousands of children to death because we wouldn’t agree to cutting our salaries just a tiny bit so that a little clinic could be built. And we didn’t stir up international public opinion against the scandal such deaths represent. We’re part of the international complicity of men of good conscience: ‘I’ll forgive you your mistakes if you forgive me mine. I’ll keep quiet about your dirty deeds if you keep quiet about mine, and we’ll be clean together (Sankara Speaks, 2007, pp. 208, 209).

The indictment of the bourgeoisie and the international community is acute as both played a role in the decimation of the country’s resources and infrastructure. What he pointed to was the privileging of the upper middle class during French rule that continued after independence. The upper class and upper middle class, which constituted a minority in such a small country, were not willing to sacrifice to ensure that the country became self-sufficient. Instead, with help from western powers, they were willing to mortgage the lives of the millions of uneducated and poor Burkinabe so long as their lives were not touched by poverty.

In the Eyes of France The hypocrisy that he exposed is quite stunning and one that we see, even today, in many parts of Africa. Members of the elite escape the sufferings that grip the millions that are made to suffer for their leaders’ misdeeds. That the French would view Compaorè as “more moderate” and “fundamentally better disposed to France” than Sankara meant that the French were complicit in Sankara’s death because he refused to go along with the “gentlemen’s agreement.” That the West could view Compaorè as “more moderate,” and “fundamentally better disposed,” proved Sankara’s point that the West did not want an independent Africa. What the colonial powers require is an Africa that will continue to be subservient. An example of this “gentlemen’s agreement” can be found in Compaorè’s net worth after he was ousted and that of Sankara at the time of his death. In 2014, the International Times estimated that Compaorè was worth 20 billion dollars as he frequently transferred public funds to his accounts and awarded himself considerable stocks in state-owned companies. At the time of his death, Sankara owned less than $600.00, a guitar, and an old car. Yet, he was viewed as a radical and an autocrat by western powers while Compaorè was viewed as a partner. It is quite clear from this interview that Sankara’s revolution was of the mind, a decolonization of the mind, and of attitude that was not supported by Western powers. This revolution of the mind and attitude were necessary for the qualitative improvements that he envisioned. His vision was progressive and not grounded in the myths of the past or the kinship systems that proliferated in pre and privileged in post-colonial Africa. While he expressed his disappointment that he had not received adequate support from other African nations, he also understood that they

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too had their problems. His focus was on his people and his desire for them to become self-sufficient and forge their own paths. To Rapp’s question of “learn how to shed the welfare mentality?” Sankara responded thus: Yes. We should get rid of this mentality. Had we not been colonized and therefore Not had relations with France to begin with, how could we possibly think we had a right to expect something of France? Why? In Correze and Larzac, there are those who still aren’t happy. So, we must do away with this mentality, even if, in the name of some of internationalism, we would have liked the aid to go where it should (Sankara Speaks, 2007, pp. 213).

Sankara accurately assessed the welfare mentality as a form of neocolonialism. He was ahead of his time in assessing the damage that this welfare mentality created for Africans. Between 1983 and1987, Burkina Faso saw the economy grow by 4.6% annually. This growth surpassed the growth recorded by Upper Volta when the nation took loans and handouts from the IMF and foreign powers. From 1970–1982, Upper Volta had 3.8% growth. The 4.6% annual growth under Sankara’s leadership could not be accounted for by the World Bank or the IMF (Harsch, 2018, pp. 154). Sankara was therefore correct in his assessment that loans and aids from foreign powers only serve to further destroy the economies of the countries that rely on these loans and aids as they never come without some restrictions or mandates. The IMF, itself, could do nothing but publish its own failures as it conducted a study in 2004 that showed that its’ Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative did not rid these countries of debt. According to a report in modernghana.com An IMF working paper admitted that its initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries began in 1996 had failed to produce the hoped-for results. Twelve heavily indebted African countries - Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia – were selected for the study. With money saved from the suspension of debt, the countries were supposed to increase their spending to attack poverty, including such projects as building schools. The western countries that comprise the IMF have conspired to keep Africa dependent on foreign aid. The study showed that current levels of spending could push them back into debt. The study authors said the countries could scale down their sending, raise more revenue within the country or secure foreign aid grants, all alternatives that had potentially undesirable consequences (Modernghana, 2004)

In 2020, the World Bank reported that 31 of the 37 countries that are heavily indebted to the IMF are eligible for debt relief but it should be noted that debt is not a financial or an economic issue. Rather, it is a political one and its terms are negotiated via the control of the indebted nations. It is neocolonialism and absolute control that is quietly attained through back channels and complicit governments. Countries that accrue this type of debt pay for and enforce their own oppression. It is the type that they will never be rid of. Thomas Sankara understood the dynamics of money and power and tried to wean his people from this type of dependency. Because of the dynamics between money and power and the crushing nature of the debt, his speech at the OAU conference in Addis Ababa in 1987 would analyze the problems of foreign debt for Africa and attempt to rally the other leaders to the cause. As he astutely observed,

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The roots of the debt go back to the beginning of colonialism. Those who lent us the money were those who colonized us. They were the same people who ran our country. They were the same people who ran our states and our economies. It was the colonizers who put Africa into debt to the financiers—their brothers and cousins. This debt has nothing to do with us. That’s why we cannot pay it (Sankara Speaks, 2007, p. 403).

His stance against mortgaging his country to foreign powers never wavered and he was absolutely correct in his assertions that colonialism was the root of the problem. While his call to other leaders was ignored, his message resonates today as sub-Saharan Africa is more deeply in debt than before. Foreign debt has completely crippled much of Africa because the interest has now outstripped the original loan. Because of this debt, Africa is unable to meet the needs of its growing population as more debt means more restrictions and a lack of access to necessities such as health care. Furthermore, European wealth could and should be tied to the exploitation of Africa’s natural resources and its’ human power in the form of slaves that were transported to Europe and America. As he observed, “we cannot repay the debt because, on the contrary, the others owe us something that the greatest riches can never repay—a debt of blood. It is our blood that was shed.” It was, indeed, the blood of Africans that was shed and it was the blood of Africans that enriched European nations. His anti-imperialist stance would anger Francois Mitterrand as Sankara would openly challenge Mitterrand at a reception given in Ouagadougou during Mitterrand’s tour of Africa. The French President had a one-night stopover in Burkina Faso. Sankara would open his welcome speech by noting that the last time that Mitterrand was in Burkina Faso, it was called Upper Volta. The reference to the name that had been given to the country by the colonial powers could not have been lost on the guests. The emphasis on the new name pointed to the path that the young president of Burkina Faso was forging, and it was a path that was independent of Western powers and more so of the French government. It is not difficult to see in the speech that the Sankara was openly challenging them and to a certain extent, shaming Mitterrand in a room full of international dignitaries. Sankara noted that “when speaking of the rights of the peoples of the world—a subject that this dear to you—we say that we have listened to you and have appreciated the calls you have issued, and which you have repeated since May 1981. Each day we also follow and assess what is actually” (Sankara Speaks, 2007, p. 350). What Sankara alludes to is the difference between the speeches and the dealings of government leaders. Why, for example, would Mitterand proclaim his support for peace and human rights but host rulers like Botha who was committed to state terrorism to stop black majority rule in South Africa? It is in this context, Monsieur François Mitterrand, that we did not understand how bandits such as Jonas Savimbi and killers like Pieter Botha, have been allowed to travel up and down France, which is so beautiful and so clean. They have stained it with their blood-­ covered hands and feet. All those who have made it possible for them to carry out these actions will bear full responsibility here and everywhere, today and forever (Sankara Speaks, 2007, p. 351).

To say that Mitterrand was not pleased is an understatement as he looked straight ahead as Sankara takes him to task for collaborating with white supremacists and

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killers (The video can be found on the internet. It shows the young and charismatic Sankara next to an aging Mitterrand. The contrast is striking). The irony would not be lost on the world stage as France would welcome Sankara’s alleged killer— Blaise Compaoré—with open arms after he became the president. His open contempt for the style of foreign policy that would make deals with people like Savimbi and Botha perfectly aligned with the path he began forging toward self-and nation-building. To build a nation that was not reliant on foreign loans and aid, Sankara developed a system for economic growth that relied on internal changes rather than external influences. And to that end, he focused on human capital and argued that this enhancement will lead to economic growth by “means of the development of new forms of technology and efficient and effective means of production.” Sankara would address the inequities that existed through land distribution, reforestation, and women’s rights. All these issues were intimately intertwined. Sankara believed that the emancipation of women was necessary to combat social and political decay. In a wide-ranging interview, he would declare that “posing the question of women in Burkinabe society today means posing the abolition of the system of slavery to which they have been subjected for millennia. The first step is to try to understand how this system functions, to grasp its real nature in all its subtlety, to then work out a line of action that can lead to women’s total emancipation” (Sankara Speaks, 2007, p. 404). This patriarchal system that devalued women made it impossible for women to publicly contribute to the social, political, and economic growth of the country. Sankara felt that women faced multiple tiers of oppression. They were victims of an imperialist social structure that privileged white men, then white women, then black men, and finally black women. This tiering of the social structure saw Burkinabe women inhabit the space of fourth-class citizens behind their men who then abused them because they too were victims of an imperialist structure. His solution to the problem was a complete transformation of the social and political life of Burkina Faso that would allow women to fully participate in the public sphere. Women constituted about 51% of the population during and after Sankara’s presidency, yet they had very limited rights as they were and continued to be forced to marry at a young age. According to the United Nations Women, 51.6% of women aged 20–24 years old who were married or in a union before age 18. The adolescent birth rate is 132.3 per 1,000 women aged 15–19 as of 2016, up from 129 per 1,000 in 2014. In 2018, 11.2% of women aged 15–49 years reported that they had been subject to physical and/or sexual violence by a current or former intimate partner in the previous 12 months. Moreover, women of reproductive age (15–49 years) often face barriers with respect to their sexual and reproductive health and rights: despite progress, in 2020, 52.6% of women had their need for family planning satisfied with modern methods (Country Fact Sheet | UN Women Data Hub).

The data confirm that things have not changed much from the 1980s for women in Burkina Faso. In the 4 years that Thomas Sankara reigned as the president, he endorsed women’s rights by declaring on International Women’s Day, March 8, 1987, that “the revolution cannot triumph without the emancipation of women.” To that end, he banned prostitution, discouraged polygamy, elected to have women from his motorcycle, and appointed five women to ministerial posts in his

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government. Under pining these actions was the knowledge that society could not succeed if half of the population was oppressed both socially and economically. This connection was made early on when he declared on October 2, 1983, that: The weight of age-old traditions in our society has relegated women to the rank of beasts of burden. Women suffer doubly from the scourges of neocolonial society. First, they experience the same suffering as men. Second, they are subjected to additional suffering by men….Our revolution is in the interests of all the oppressed and all those who are exploited in today’s society. It is, therefore, in the interests of women, since the basis of their domination by men lies in the system through which society’s political and economic life is organized. By changing the social order that oppressed women, the revolution creates the conditions for their genuine emancipation (Women’s Liberation, 1990, p. 67).

This speech is an acknowledgment that women hold the key to the economic future of Burkina Faso. In identifying tradition, colonialism, and neocolonialism as the driving force behind the discrimination of women, Sankara hoped that he could get the traditionalists in his country to allow women to engage in the public sphere. Women at the time and even now are the untapped economic force in Burkina Faso and the rest of the African continent. Allowing them to participate at all levels will bring the structural changes needed for growth. By tying women’s emancipation to the economic wealth of his country, he also implied that international organizations such as the IMF are too often engaged in surface changes that failed to address the inequities that patriarchy and tradition consistently reinforce. As he pointed out in his speech on International Women’s Day, women face biases at all levels of society, and eliminating those biases and gender inequality would allow for a progressive society. Sankara was the first African male politician to argue that women’s rights were an essential component of a free and just society. He firmly situated women’s rights as a necessity for this and any post-colonial nation. In this too, Sankara was ahead of his time, and many if not all of the post-­ colonial African leaders failed to address this issue of women’s rights and equality. It might appear that there was no connection between women’s rights, food sovereignty, and reforestation but these were all structural issues that required that they be addressed at the same time if the society was to recover from the failures of colonial exploitation. As Sankara indicated in his earlier speeches, he wanted Burkina Faso to be self-­ sufficient, so he redistributed lands that had been seized from the local chieftaincies and reorganized traditional agricultural labor. The decree turned the lands into a “national estate,” and he emphasized rights of use rather than “first-comer status.” Citing the “complete anarchy of our grain distribution.” He would later explain that “the land today belongs to the Burkinabé state…. [and] the state can entrust the use, management, and cultivation of the land to one who works it (Peterson, 2021, p. 85).” His idea was to invest in the rural areas because that were largely underdeveloped. As a result of this redistribution of land, wheat production jumped from 1700 kilograms per hectare to 3800 kilograms per hectare providing enough food for the people of Burkina Faso. He also campaigned against the importation of apples from France to his country arguing that the country provided its own tropical fruits that could not be sold because of the imports coming in from France. He also urged his people to start wearing clothing made from Burkinabe cotton.

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In addition to promoting Burkinabe products, he also mobilized the workforce to participate in “voluntary” public works projects. The Popular Development Program which he had created to oversee these projects had considerable success in pursuing infrastructure projects. The local population provided the labor and the PPD provided the materials. With 81% of the financing coming from foreign donors and the other 19% from the country, the PPD from October 1, 1984, to December 1985, the PPD succeeded in constructing 351 primary schools, 314 clinics, 88 pharmacies, 2294 new wells, and 274 water reservoirs. Grain banks were also created to supply the people during lean years and the PPD, with the help of the government, started a tree-planting campaign to stop the spread of the desert (Peterson, 2021, pp. 185–186). One of the most impressive campaigns that the Sankara government undertook was the “Commando Vaccination” project announced on November 25, 1984, by the Minister of Health Abdoul-Salem Kabore. The project was aimed at “immunizing three million children against measles, meningitis, and yellow fever in just two weeks.” Nurses were mobilized and trained “using a pyramidal system of training to quickly get the personnel up to speed. In charge of the campaign, Minister Kabore used radio, posters in local languages, and even traveling theater groups to inform the people about the upcoming campaigns.” The World Health Organization and UNICEF provided and funded the vaccine mandate and countries such as Cuba, the Netherlands, and China provided valuable advice on the administration of this type of system. According to Petersen, “the vaccination teams crisscrossed the country from November 25 to December 10, 1984 [and] they were able to vaccinate 1.1 million children against measles, 2.6 million against meningitis, and 2.1 million against yellow fever. Burkina Faso was among the first African countries to embark on such a ‘high voltage’ immunization campaign, and it won praise from the international community and World Health Organization.” The focus on child health care created the boost needed to establish a national health care system. In the 1980s, Burkina Faso was among the few nations in Africa to initiate a national health care system. The government would spend money on building clinics in the rural areas and by 1986, “there were roughly 7,137 new trained village level health care professionals and 7,497 midwives…. public spending on health care increased by 42 percent” (Peterson, 2021, pp. 186–187). The focus on women’s rights, the push to vaccinate children, and the mobilization of the citizens were all significant attempts to create a nation that was independent of foreign influences. It was also an attempt to create a unique identity for his people that was not rooted in colonial ideology. At the center of the revolution was the attempt to bring together the different tribes to embrace an identity that was not rooted in tribal affiliations as that led to divisions within. He understood and acknowledged that the revolution was taking place “in a backward, agricultural country where the weight of tradition and ideology emanating for a feudal-type social organization weighs very heavily on the popular masses,” and the country lacked “an organized-working class, conscious of its historic mission” (Sankara Speaks, 2017, p. 40). He gave his people a distinct identity when he changed the country’s name from Upper Volta, which was designated by the imperialists to

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Burkina Faso which came from two of the country’s tribes and the suffix bè from yet another tribe. In this sense, he gifted his people a strong sense of their identity. Years after his death and the demise of the CNR, the people accepted their identity as Burkinabè. Despite the attempts at nation building and the attempt to create programs that would benefit the rural poor, the Burkinabè economy was still depressed. He has failed to erase poverty in the country, and the country’s loan was still at seven billion pounds 4 years after the revolution. By the time he gave the impassioned speech at the OAU in Addis Ababa, Sankara had become increasingly estranged from his colleagues and his people. Part of his estrangement came from the fact that he refused to mortgage his country accepting the IMF-imposed loan agreement. On July 2, 1987, a cable to the US secretary of state described Sankara’s resistance to take on more debt as the “manifestation of the pride and stubbornness of its president…. Sankara [according to the cable] keeps talking about the conditions the IMF would impose that would erode the sovereignty of the country…. [and] that French structural aid funds would be released only after that agreement was negotiated.” His “priorities,” according to the cable were “given to programs benefitting the rural poor, the illiterate, women, the handicapped and the sick” as the reasons for his refusal of the IMF agreement (Peterson, 2021, pp. 264–265). On July 17, Leonardo Neher, the US ambassador to Burkina Faso met Sankara and during this meeting, Neher attempted to push Sankara to abandon the public works program that he instituted in favor of the private sector as a means to revive the economy. Sankara refused the offer to accept loans from the IMF and ended the meeting by affirming that the country had to “choose its own path of development” (Peterson, 264–265). Three months after this meeting, Sankara would be dead. He must have known that his colleagues were plotting against him. Petersen has noted that Sankara’s family members were concerned but he refused to act. Some have speculated that Sankara refused to act because he “was conscious of being ‘judged by history,’ what he called the ‘refuge of martyrs’…. hold on to power by any means and lose his dignity, or risk losing power and keep an honorable place in history” (Peterson, 2021, p. 265). The question of his death is one that he faced as early as 1985. Asked by J.P Rapp if he was “ever afraid,” he responded by saying “I’ll finish up an old man somewhere in a library reading books, or I’ll meet with a violent end since we have so many enemies. It will happen when it happens” (Sankara Speaks, 2007, pp. 244). From this early interview, one gets the feeling that Sankara knew that he would be a short presidency, and the haste with which he pushed through the public works program was an attempt to leave a legacy that he would be proud of.

Burkina Faso: Thirty-Four Years Later We have come full circle. On October 11, 2021, 34 years after he was assassinated, his killers are now facing justice. The lead defendant in the case, the disgraced former president of Burkina Faso and one-time ally, Blasé Compaorè who is in exile in

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the Ivory Coast, which has rejected all appeals to extradite Compaorè to Burkina Faso was found guilty in absentia on April 6, 2022, for ordering the assassination of Thomas Sankara. While he was sentenced to life in prison for the role he played in Sankara’s death, Compaorè will no doubt not serve this sentence. But the court of public opinion, which continues to revere Sankara has had its final say on Compaorè’s position in history. He has already been judged and found to be guilty. According to the New York Times, “during his tenure, Mr. Compaorè was known as a pillar of “Françafrique,” an arrangement where even after colonialism had officially ended, France continued to pull the political strings of its former African colonies” (Maclean, 2021). The fact that he colluded with the French government in the continued domination of his country is significant to the trial because even though Macron promised to release the files that France has on Sankara, according to the New York Times, “for years, there have been allegations that France was involved in the assassination. President Emmanuel Macron of France said in 2017 that he would lift the secret classification of all documents relating to the Sankara case, and so far, three batches of documents have been sent to Burkina Faso. But none are from the office of François Mitterrand, the French president at the time” (Maclean, 2021). The fact that Macron has not yet released the files from the Mitterrand years pretty much validates Sankara’s aversion to dealing with Mitterrand.

References Brittain, V. (1985). Introduction to Sankara and Burkina Faso. Review of African Political Economy, 12(32), 39–47. Harsch, E. (2013). The legacies of Thomas Sankara: A revolutionary experience in retrospect. Review of African Political Economy, 40(137), 358–374. Harsch, E. (2018). With the People: Sankara’s Humanist Marxism. In A. Murrey (Ed.), A Certain Amount of Madness: The Life, Politics and Legacies of Thomas Sankara (p. 2018). Pluto Press. Maclean, R. (2021). Who Killed African Icon Thomas Sankara? Trial Opens, 34 years after his death. New York Times https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/11/world/africa/thomas-­sankara-­ trial-­burkina-­faso.html) Modernghana.com. (2004). How The IMF’s HIPC Has Failed Africa (modernghana.com) Peterson, B.  J. (2021). Thomas Sankara: A revolutionary in Cold War Africa. Indiana University Press. Sankara, T. (1990). Women’s liberation and the African freedom struggle. Pathfinder Press. Sankara, T. (2007). In M.  Prairie (Ed.), Thomas Sankara speaks: The Burkina Faso revolution 1983–1987 (2nd ed.). Pathfinder Press. United Nations Women: Burkina Faso. Country Fact Sheet | UN Women Data Hub). Nada Halloway  is an associate professor of English at Manhattanville College. She teaches African literature and political thought and focuses on the failures and successes of post-colonial African governments. She incorporates the works of writers like Fanon and Cabral in the classes that she teaches. She has published essays on African women writers, African dictators, and political protest. Her current essay will be published as a chapter in a book titled The Politics of Biography in Africa: Borders, Margins and Alternative Histories of Power.

Chapter 9

Thomas Sankara: An Intellectual Statesman in Power, Culture, and Education in Burkina Faso (1983– 1987): A Review After 30 Years De-Valera Botchway and Moussa Traore

Introduction Some persons within the African environment have made remarkable ventures in the terrain of politics, within the context of governance, by using their intellect to produce ideas to inspire certain physical actions to demand social justice and transform the terms of political and social practices in neocolonial moments in Africa, where an array of problems of underdevelopment and social injustices has been rife. This situation in Africa has witnessed the rise of several heads of state and statesmen who did not only engage in politics, as action, as the physical movement of human bodies and activities, through time and space but as a combination of intentionally theoretically and intellectually generated thought, plans and policies and the practical actions of bodies. Such leaders included civilians like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Sekou Touré of Guinea, and Nelson Mandela of South Africa. However, there have also been leaders of governments who were soldiers who exhibited this character. These included Gamel Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Muammar Al Gaddafi (also spelt Gathafi) of Libya, J.J. Rawlings of Ghana, and Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso. Observably, these leaders exhibited degrees of statesman, Pan-­Africanist, nationalist and intellectual attitudes. In this paper, we focus on Thomas Sankara as an intellectual statesman in power whose intellectual activism and statesmanship shaped some policy developments as they related to nation-building efforts in Burkina Faso in the 1980s. We examine the intellectual activism and guidance that this energetic and articulate junior army officer particularly gave to the practical educational and cultural concerns of the Burkinabè Revolution, also known as the August Revolution, which started in 1983. D.-V. Botchway (*) · M. Traore University of Cape Coast, Cape Coast, Ghana e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. O. Abidde, F. Kumah-Abiwu (eds.), The Political Impact of African Military Leaders, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31427-8_9

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Sankara is an idolized anthropomorphic symbol and visual representation of the Burkinabè Revolution globally because of how he is intuitively and intellectually attuned to creative practical responses to concrete problems of imperialism, neocolonialism, and political and economic exploitation in Burkina Faso in real-time. His intellectual praxis, that is, the melding of theory and practice, and methods for postcolonial nation-building were grounded and contextual. They caused a significant positive transformation in Burkina Faso within the short four-year period of the revolution. Interestingly, Sankara explained his intellectual views about the need for social change and solutions to practical problems in no books of his own authoring but in easy-to-understand speeches and interviews, and endeavored to ‘walk’—practice— his beliefs. While Sankara did not author books but articulated and acted his schemes of theory and pragmatism for effecting change in politics, centering marginalized groups, and engineering socio-economic stability in African societies, other intellectual statesmen wrote down their intellectual plans in the form of books that outlined ideologies and philosophies of action to cause a change in society. For example, Nkrumah authored several books including Consciencism (1964), which was a ‘philosophy and ideology for decolonization and development with particular reference to the African revolution’.1 Gaddafi authored The Green Book in the early 1970s, as a roadmap for achieving direct democracy, or Jamahiriya, economic revolution and social revolution in Libya and Africa as a whole (see Gathafi, 2005), and Nasser wrote Philosophy of the Revolution, (c.1953/54), where he philosophized and forecasted the role that Egypt and Pan-Arabism might play, both among the Arab nations and in the so-­called Third World as a whole. Some of the ideas of the intellectual leaders were original or derivatives of existing socio-political theories and concepts such as nationalism, Pan-Africanism, and Pan-Arabism. Nevertheless, they were all aimed at causing desirable changes in the social spaces that the leaders operated within. Many of these leaders, endeavored to engender an intentional leadership that did not only emanate as an intellectual activity but also as a political rule which qualifies as ‘statesmanship’ when it is examined with the Aristotelian-inspired framework of Coats (1995). This is because, ‘the political’ component in their rule largely possessed ‘a comprehensive or “architectonic” perspective focused on molding character and leading fellow citizens through a stream of contingencies, within the context of fundamental laws, and through primary reliance on a mix of persuasion and coercion called “politics”’ (Coats, 1995, p. 34). On the issue of their leadership being intellectual, we can say that it was because they endeavored to lead the formation of ideas, and intellectual products, to practically engineer and shape societal transformation. They were concerned about reifying thought into action. For such leaders, the label of intellectual statesmen is deemed suitable to describe their character, in the estimation of this paper.

 This is part of the full title of the book.

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Some of the intellectual statesmen gave their praxes names such as Nkrumahism, Ujamaa, and Third Universal Theory, which represented the praxes of Nkrumah, Nyerere, and Gaddafi, respectively. Academics, political followers, journalists, and historians also labelled the praxes of other intellectual statesmen. Such labels included Nasserism, Toureism, and Sankaraism (or Sankarism), which represented the praxes of Nasser, Toure, and Sankara, respectively (Mansfield, 1973; Botchway & Traore, 2018). It is worth noting, however, that Sankara, whose intellectual praxis and statesmanship were underpinned by anti-imperialist, populist, pragmatist, pacifist, Pan-­ Africanist, military nationalist, African Socialist, and Marxian revolutionary and radical ideas and attitudes, did not consciously create an intellectual concept of social guidance which he called Sankaraism. Nevertheless, the practicality and relevance of his intellectual praxis to postcolonial nation-building and restructuring efforts of Burkinabè society and Africa as a whole inspired two groups to revolve around the concept of Sankaraism. They are the Sankarists, who are political partisans in Burkina Faso, and the Sankarians, who are individuals who idolize Sankara, seeing him as a role model, and therefore organize through collective and individual actions, to demand social transformation along the lines of the ideas of Sankara, which they call Sankaraism. The term Sankarism, which emerged after Sankara’s assassination in 1987, however, came into popular knowledge and usage in 2000 when the Union pour la Renaissance/Mouvement Sankariste (Union for Rebirth/Sankarist Movement), whose leader was the lawyer Benewendé Sankara, emerged and started to popularize the term in its political articulations about the relevance of Thomas Sankara’s intellectual praxis to the positive transformation of society (Botchway & Traore, 2018, p. 22). Having underscored the fact that Thomas Sankara was one of the intellectual statesmen of the postcolonial moment in Africa, let us conceptualize him as an intellectual activist, whose vocation in the public domain made him a public intellectual activist. The concept of intellectual activist can be used to describe some persons in academia, and so often, that has been the case. However, non-academic intellectuals can manifest intellectualism and its practical operationalization in the non-academic space—the public space. Nkrumah, Nyerere, Nasser, and Sankara were some head-­ of-­state intellectual activists. Thus, drawing from notions from Christiane Landsiedel (2004) and Steve Fuller (2013), our conceptualization of ‘the intellectual’, within the context of our study of African political leaders, and heads of state, with particular reference to Thomas Sankara, is someone, not necessarily an academic, who is ‘educated … (institutionally educated or autodidactically) who contribute[s] in different ways and to varying degrees to the production and development of cultural goods—in the form of speech, books, music, paintings or sculptures. Intellectuals can be writers, musicians, artists, philosophers, social scientists, clergymen, etc.’. (Landsiedel, 2004). The intellectual takes ‘over a reflective perspective on society, [and] [a]ssuming that intellectuals produce ideas, these ideas can be critical and might induce change’ (Landsiedel, 2004). The intellectual also distributes their ideas. ‘The focus on ‘ideas’ is quite important because it means that the intellectual must be adept at communicating in a variety of media—e.g., not simply academic

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texts—through which ideas may be conveyed’ (Landsiedel, 2004). Additionally, Steve Fuller helps us to understand that the intellectual “develop[s] society’s immune system by challenging taken-for-granted notions so that even if society fails to fully adopt an intellectual’s provocation, it comes away both with a stronger sense of its own identity and greater open-mindedness to the wider world. Second, they are “agents of distributive justice,” in that they often magnify the voice of those minorities or dissenters who might not otherwise receive a fair hearing in society’ (2013). Thus, an intellectual can be a non-academic. The intellectual, who is not an academic, can use their intellect to shape social change. In line with this understanding of the character, attitude, and position of the intellectual activist in society, we deem Thomas Sankara and the other African heads of state that we have mentioned, as examples above, such as Nkrumah, Nasser, and Nyerere as non-­academic intellectuals (Nkrumah and Nyerere, Biney, 2007; Chacha, 2002). Another important point worth mentioning is that, by employing the power of their intelligence and idea in various ways to cause justice in society, they engaged in activism in the public domain. Intellectual activism, as Patricia Hill Collins helps us to appreciate, is ‘the myriad of ways through which people place the power of their ideas in service to social justice [and positive transformation of society]’ (Collins, 2013, p. ix). Sankara was not only an intellectual, but he also engaged in intellectual activism, because as we will subsequently discuss, he intentionally used the power of his ideas to serve social justice and cause positive change in society within the public domain. It is worth mentioning that intellectual activists, who largely operate within the domain of the public, and depend on their intellectual prowess and insight to animate service efforts in order to address social issues important to underserved community members, engage also in public intellectualism. Operating as public intellectuals, they, through their actions and ideas, but aware of the risks involved in challenging the status quo, purposefully push the boundaries of what is considered permissible criticism of the regime or society to cause change. This is what Sankara did when he, in pursuit of an agenda to cause a change in society, challenged the postcolonial African status quo in Burkina Faso. While some of them work to cause social reform on non-violent terms, others go to the extent of engineering and leading violent revolutions to overthrow political regimes and socio-economic systems that they deem authoritarian and/or neocolonial and retrogressive. They proffer alternative paths—social, cultural, economic, and political—for their society and offer guidelines for society as it walks the alternative path. Pierre Bourdieu recognizes that the intellectual has dual and dueling agendas: ‘on the one hand, he [sic] must belong to an autonomous intellectual world; … on the other hand, he must invest the competence and authority he has acquired in the intellectual field in a political action for [social transformation]’ (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 656). In undertaking political action for social transformation, the intellectual activist uses the power of ideas to ‘speak the truth about contemporary social issues’ (Collins, 2013, p. 37) such as inequalities and injustices, while directly advocating for the alternatives. On that trajectory of intellectual action, they candidly and fearlessly exercise the speaking of truth to power; thus, their intellectual activism also

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becomes ‘parrhesiastic’, which is related to the principle of parrhesia of ancient Greece. Sankara did this, as he, to the detriment of his own life, spoke truth to the power of neocolonial and imperial forces in Burkinabè and African affairs. Therefore, in the context of the leadership of postcolonial Africa, Thomas Sankara was an intellectual activist head of state whose ideas and deeds were very instrumental within the public domain in shaping the life and orientation of the Burkina Faso Revolution while it lasted.

 he Life and Afterlife of Thomas Sankara’s: Intellectual T Activism and Revolutionary Statesmanship Sankara was supremely good at articulating and putting complex colonial and postcolonial issues in Burkinabè and African affairs as a whole in very simple language, and very effective in relating to his audience. Being more than just a soldier-­ politician, he was an intellectual statesman; yes, the label statesman is deliberately used here because politicians come and go, but statesmen live on. They live on because the impact of their presence and ideas in society is felt for many years after their death. This is true of Sankara. Additionally, his intellectual character stemmed from the fact that he effectively analyzed the issues that prevailed in his day and articulated ideas that had a lasting impact on those who received them. Popularly known as ‘Africa’s Che Guevara’, because he shared a similar revolutionary zeal for social justice with the internationally renowned Argentine revolutionary icon, quoted him often in admiration, and was assassinated in his 30s in October like Ernesto Che Guevera, Sankara died on October 15, 1987, for a revolutionary path and anti-imperialism project which he charted in and for Burkina Faso in West Africa; he was just 37 years old. The assassination of Sankara, carried out by a cabal of neocolonial-minded Burkinabè soldiers with the tacit support of France, who had exerted a strangling neocolonial control of the country until Sankara became president, brought Blaise Compaoré who used to be Sankara’s close friend and political confidant to power. Compaoré’s junta jailed, tortured, murdered, or drove into exile those loyal to Sankara, allied itself with conservative social elites, and, leaned heavily on foreign aid and neocolonial powers, especially France (Harsch, 2014a). The junta derailed and reversed all the progressive policies of the Burkinabè Revolution, which Sankara had led and intellectually guided, and whose progressive intentions he impressively brought to the attention of the continental and international communities. However, the murder of Sankara martyred him because it indelibly etched the memory about him as a world-historical figure, and key figure, which, in Olsenian terms, is an actor who performs crucial activities for the total system (Olsen, 1978, pp. 25–26), on the minds of many people worldwide. Such people included his admirers and those who misunderstood or hated him. Yes, Sankara knew and even confirmed verbally in an interview in Thomas

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Sankara: The Upright Man (Shuffield, 2006) that he was misunderstood and disliked by many people because of the revolutionary principles that he stood for. Notwithstanding the early death of Sankara, many revolutionary-minded people, especially young continental Africans, have continued to engage his ideas and social vision in their analysis of African affairs since his demise. Various creative artists such as painters, poets, and musicians have celebrated his intellect and projected his charismatic image and persona through and with their artistic works. Ideological and political and cultural groups and individuals, especially young Burkinabè have emerged and labelled themselves as Sankarists and Sankarians (Sankariens) in allusion to their conscious discipleship of Sankara’s intellectual ideas for nation-­ building (Le Jah, 2015). Furthermore, several formal and informal conversations have emerged and continued in the public, artistic, journalistic, political, and academic spheres in Burkina Faso and other places about the life and afterlife of Sankara (Martin, 1987; Wilkins, 1989; Shuffield, 2006; ‘Exclusif! La Grande Interview (avec Valère Dieudonné Somé’, 2017). Other aspects of the discussion have been concerned about Sankara’s significance and meaning to Burkinabè and general African politics and history (Skinner, 1988; Dickovick, 2009; Harsch, 2013; ‘Jazz, rivalry and revolution: Burkina Faso recalls the spirit of Sankara’, 2015; Murrey, 2012, 2017, 2018). When a popular uprising occurred in October 2014 in Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, which forced Blaise Compaoré to resign and go into exile, an event which was described by the Paris daily Le Monde as ‘la revanche des enfants de Thomas Sankara’ (‘the revenge of Thomas Sankara’s children’) (Bensimon, 2014), masses of Burkinabè defiantly occupied the streets of the capital and elsewhere in the country demanding what they called ‘justice’ for Sankara. Consequently, this same demand for justice was conveyed in November 2017 by protesting Burkinabè masses to the notice of the French President, Emmanuel Macron, when he visited their country on his first official tour of Africa (‘Macron to declassify Sankara documents’, 2017). This surely signaled the fact that even after 30 years, a generation, the murder of Sankara had not been forgotten and forgiven by many of the Burkinabè people who valued Sankara’s life and had been influenced by his nation-building ideas Consequently, following continuous calls for justice by sympathizers of Sankara, a court in Burkina Faso tried Compaoré, the leader of the junta that assassinated Sankara, in absentia and found him guilty of murder in 2022 (BBC News, 2022). In confirmation of the strong influence that Sankara exerted on popular memory and visions for a better future for the country, scores of the masses that agitated against Compaoré’s rule in October 2014 did request the leadership of Burkina Faso to revisit and apply some of Sankara’s progressive ideas and policies in national affairs (‘Jazz, rivalry and revolution: Burkina Faso recalls the spirit of Sankara’, 2015). As evidenced by an ‘on the location’ report and analysis of the social clime and mood of the protesters during the uprising, Sankara’s intellectual ideas and revolutionary policies for nation-building were factors that motivated many Burkinabè to engage in the uprising in 2014. Thus, ‘Many of the protesters say the history of the slain 1980s leader (Sankara) partly inspired them to rise against Blaise

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Compaoré, who has been in power for 27 years’ (Kobo, 2014). Corroborating this view, Lieutenant-Colonel Yacouba Isaac Zida, who briefly served as Burkina Faso’s acting Head of State in November 2014, stated that ‘the Burkinabè people’s decision to rise reflected an ‘identity of integrity that we have carried proudly since the August 1983 revolution’ led by Sankara’ (Harsch, 2014a). Many people during the uprising ‘believed things (in Burkina Faso) would be better today if he (Sankara) was still alive, and that sentiment is partly responsible for Thursday’s events (the popular uprising in 2014)’ (Kobo, 2014). A lot of the protestors, especially young Burkinabès, carried and marched with his portrait, chanted his famous sayings and slogans, and played recordings of his speeches through loudspeakers (Harsch, 2014a). Sankara’s ‘policies and vision are still cherished both by some locals who were around when he was in power and, significantly, by many young people who were born since his death’ (Kobo, 2014).

 he Burkina Faso Revolution 1983–1987: With a Leftist T Political Orientation As underscored, Sankara has been central to the concerns of many popular discussions, academic research, and discourses of historians, political analysts, and biographers alike, since 1983; his biography, as some key works demonstrate (Brittain, 1985; Shuffield, 2006; Jaffré, 2007;1997; Harsch, 2012, 2014b; Newstead, 2015; Murrey, 2018; Peterson, 2021), is inspiring; moreover, it immediately exposes and offers views and perspectives about the complexities and contours of African postcolonial and neocolonial leadership and ideological, political and economic struggles, successes, failures, and creativities. This article, which does not aim to rehearse such a theme—biography—or even provide a detailed history of Sankara as a soldier-­politician before he became president in 1983, will subsequently examine Sankara’s intellectual praxis and policies with the issues of culture and education. He deemed these two as key aspects of social life that had to be tackled to engineer and sustain the radical revolution in his country during his presidency from 1983 to 1987. But before delving into his engagement with the issues of education and culture, it is necessary to briefly examine the background of Sankara’s leftist political orientation in order to access a preliminary understanding of the genesis of some of the ideas that shaped and directed his intellectual activist attitude and radical political leadership (for a detailed exploration of this topic, see Botchway & Traore, 2018) and the contexts and points of reference of his thoughts and policies concerning education and culture. Regarding his attraction to Marxism, Sankara disclosed (in an interview with Claudio Hackin in August 1987) that it was: …through discussion[,] friendship with a few men[,] my social experience ….reading, [in Burkina Faso, Madagascar, (where he went for officer training) and France, (where he attended a parachute academy)] but above all [through] discussions with Marxists on the reality of our country [that] I arrived at Marxism. (Sankara, 1988, p. 230)

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The so-called ‘Rawlings factor’ also inspired some of Sankara’s leftist radicalism. J.J. Rawlings was a young Flight Lieutenant in the Ghana Armed Forces who took power in 1979 and 1981, in revolutionary style, to combat corruption and put the needs of the masses at the center of Ghana’s politics. Sankara followed the Rawlings-led events in Ghana closely and Rawlings remained his main ally in West Africa (Martin, 1987). In recognition and memorialization of this revolutionary alliance, Rawlings and his Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) government renamed a major roundabout in Accra as Sankara Circle.2 Sankara headed a military junta government called Conseil National de la Révolution (National Council of the Revolution) (hereafter CNR). The CNR came to power when a confluence of soldier effort—coup d’etat—and popular civilian support in the then Upper Volta overthrew a government that was not only corrupt but a neocolonial puppet regime of France (Sankara’s ‘Struggle for a Bright Future’ speech, 4 August 1983, in Sankara, 1988, pp. 21–23). Upon taking national power, Sankara became a dominant force in the Burkinabè revolutionary political and intellectual scene. Even now with his death, his revolutionary and intellectual influence is still felt. We will try here to look at some of his ideas and policies. As a West African soldier who became a political leader and exhibited the activist attitude of an intellectual, when he was head of state, Sankara did not only show a proclivity for leftist political and economic philosophies, especially that of Marx (Martin, 1987), but also endeavored to present his skills as a public intellectual activist who was part of a transformative movement—the Burkinabè Revolution— to quicken revolutionary consciousness among the masses, and organize forms of ideological and political struggle on the side of and along the oppressed and dispossessed. On the issue of the logic of the revolution, Sankara intellectually explained that ‘comrade militants’ (both soldiers and civilians) acted together to start a revolution that birthed a revolutionary government, the CNR, which valued the role and power of the average citizen. He explicated in ‘The Political Orientation Speech’ that the revolution …logically evolved from the Voltaic people’s struggle against long-standing enemies … imperialism and its national allies; … [and] backward …forces. [It] is the culmination of the popular insurrection. [Therefore], simplistic … analyses limited to repeating of pre-­ established schemas cannot change the reality. (Sankara, 1988, pp. 30–54)

The revolution, he clarified, ‘came as a solution to social contradictions that could no longer be stifled by compromise’ (Sankara, 1988, p. 32). Thus, Sankara intellectually strongly defended and guided this ‘revolution’—which constituted both a change in government and consequent processes of social and economic reconfigurations—and led the politics of his country from 1983 to 1987. As part of the several revolutionary reconfigurations of the so-called August Revolution to the

 The site was called Akuafo Roundabout, in honor of Ghanaian farmers, during Nkrumah’s presidency. It became National Redemption Circle in the post-Nkrumah era. Rawlings renamed it Sankara Interchange in 1999. The name was changed to Ako Adjei Interchange in 2005, to honor of a Ghanaian politician, when the revolutionary years and presidency of Rawlings ended. (See, Kodzo, 2015, pp. 97–112). 2

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political affairs, economic situation, and social conditions of the country, Sankara changed the colonial name of his country—Upper Volta—to Burkina Faso, meaning Land of Upright People, in allusion to a rebirth of the morality, nobility, and confidence and self-determining status of the people and country (Sankara, interview by Sethi, 1984, p. 68). Speaking about the configuration of the country’s name and how, first, it was significantly functional to the creation of a unique national identity, Burkinabè, and, second, kept the memory and life story of Sankara alive, a Burkinabè lawyer, Ishmael Kaboré, explained to Al Jazeera that: When you wake up in the morning and you remember you are a Burkinabè, you automatically recall the person who thought up that local name and stamped it on us … At first, people felt the name Burkina Faso was odd, awkward, and far from the modern and foreign names other countries were bearing in Africa … But they realized after his death that Sankara wanted to give us a unique and special identity that tells our history and depicts our character. (Kobo, 2014)

While Sankara’s revolutionary orientation was largely inspired by socialist philosophies shaped by Marxism, he was also someone whose political philosophy and intellectual praxis was also informed by a plethora of revolutionary and radical ideas (Botchway & Traore, 2018). Thus, in practicing a leftist radical leadership, he was intuitively attuned and pragmatically adaptive. So, in his deployment of Marxist and socialist policies, his concern was principally to address the concrete political and social problems that were specific to the history and cultural ‘real time’ of Burkina Faso in the 1980s. He was not a diehard implementer of a doctrinaire recipe of Marxism and socialism since to him the road to revolution differed depending on the real economic and social composition of each country (see, for example, Botchway & Traore, 2018). His regime rejected any broad facile labelling and unnuanced categorization of the revolution as Socialist. When he was asked if the revolution was patterned after any model, Sankara intellectually explained that while it sought to keep dynamic and creative elements of and from foreign experiences (Sankara, interview by Diallo, 1983, p. 43) it was primarily a ‘revolution of Burkinabè, the people … the result of our specific experiences and history. It cannot be exported, just as we cannot copy other models’ (Sankara, interview by Sethi, 1984, p. 68). Thus, on the issue of different roads to popular revolutions, Sankara was not a deviant of any sacrosanct model even if he claimed to have a personal Marxist proclivity. Even in the context of a Marxist debate, Vladimir Lenin, the renowned intellectual political leader of Russia, held his own and even put his view on this notion in the context of Bolshevism thus: …Marxism differs from all forms of socialism by not binding the movement to any one particular form of struggle. It recognizes the most varied forms of struggle; and it does not ‘concoct’ them, but only generalizes, organizes, and gives conscious expression to those forms of struggle of the revolutionary classes which arise themselves in the course of the movement. Hostile to all abstract formulas and all doctrinaire recipes, Marxism demands an attentive attitude to the mass struggle in progress, which, as the movement develops, as the class consciousness of the masses grows, as economic and political crises become acute, continually gives rise to new and more varied methods of defense and attack. Marxism, therefore, positively does not reject any form of struggle. Under no circumstances does

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Marxism confine itself to the forms of struggle possible and in existence at the given moment only, recognizing as it does that new forms of struggle, unknown to the participants of the given period, inevitably arise as the given social situation, changes. In this respect, Marxism learns, if we may so express it, from mass practice, and makes no claim whatever to teach the masses forms of struggle invented by ‘systematizers’ in the seclusion of their studies. (Lenin, 1906, p. I)

Thus, despite Sankara’s Marxist background and familiarity, the essence of his revolutionary worldview, intellectual vision, and process for Burkina Faso was the flexibility of its tactics and its adaptation to the real needs and the real march of the revolutionary process there.

 ankara as an Educational and Cultural Thinker S and Reformer As we have stated earlier, unlike the revolutionary African leftist leader figures such as Nkrumah and Gaddafi, or even non-African ones such as Lenin and Mao Tse-­ tung, Sankara did not author books outlining sophisticated ideologies exposing the workings of imperialism and neocolonialism in his country and Africa and prescribing avenues for social change. All of the reasons for this are unclear. What is clear is that Sankara was a populist leader, a public intellectual, and an intellectual activist, who was determined to pragmatically reach the Burkinabè masses with his anti-­ imperialist and anti-colonial philosophies, including his insistence on collective work and self-sufficiency. With a grounded political attitude, Sankara used uncomplicated but effective ways to reach and stir a quick motivation to change the neocolonial mindset and attitudes of the masses, particularly in his country at a time when the majority of people did not know how to read. Fundamental to the revolutionary goals of Sankara and the CNR was the idea that the masses must be consciously educated to understand and support the essence of the event and process of social change that started on 4 August so that it does not stagnate. Moreover, Sankara had the objective that the influence of both domestic and international neocolonialist ‘capitalists’ and ‘reactionaries’ on the people in the civil service, judiciary, police, and army should be weakened and removed. A ‘new person’, baptized in revolutionary orthodoxy among the youths, teachers, civil servants, union leaders, and politicians, was required in Burkina Faso. Therefore, his regime deemed the promotion of a program of mass literacy and political education necessary to raise the level of the masses’ nationalist and political awareness to comprehend the historical and contemporary forces that shaped the political, social, and economic situations and issues in Burkina Faso and around the world. As far as his stance and conviction on this broad revolutionary education to the masses were concerned, Sankara, as a revolutionary theorist and practitioner, was not alone in the trajectory of such an idea in the context of twentieth-century African revolutionary political thought and process of decolonization and national renaissance. As shown by their own writings and speeches as well as scholarly works on

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them, militant theorists like Nkrumah and Amilcar Cabral (Nkrumah, 1962a, 1968, 1970, 1973; Hagan, 1975; Cabral, 1970; Chabal, 1983) and Frantz Fanon (2004[1961]) also believed in the relevance of education to the process of the African revolution. Thus, Sankara’s thought shared a semblance with the worldviews of these thinkers and doers about political education generally in terms of what function education should play and the desired result of decolonization that it should produce. Regarding the perspective of a thinker such as Fanon, revolutionary political education was an imperative phenomenon that progressive nationalist political regimes had to offer the masses in the countries in Africa, which Fanon called ‘underdeveloped’, to support any meaningful national liberation or national renaissance procedure. It was necessary for the restoration of nationhood to the people or the creation of a commonwealth process. Similar to what Sankara thought in the context of Burkina Faso, this mass education was a necessary part of such processes to radicalize the intellect of the people against reactionary forces and political inertia, and organize popular support to sustain the processes of positive social change. Thus, to this end, that is, the need for a sort of conscientizing education, Fanon theorized in Wretched of the Earth (2004[1961]) that: ‘The political education of the masses is meant to make adults out of them, not to make them infantile’ (p. 124). He deemed it necessary because ‘[p]eople must know where they are going and why’ (p. 135). The African politician, he cautioned: should be aware that the future will remain bleak as long as the people’s consciousness remains rudimentary, primary, and opaque. We, African politicians, must have very clear ideas about our people’s situation. But this lucidity must remain deeply dialectical. The awakening of the people as a whole will not be achieved overnight. (p. 135)

He further opined that: Our greatest task is to constantly understand what is happening in our own countries…. We must elevate the people, expand their minds, equip them, differentiate them, and humanize them. Once again … every African politician … need[s] to shed light on the people’s effort, to rehabilitate work, and rid it of its historical opacity. To be responsible in an underdeveloped country is to know that everything finally rests on educating the masses, elevating their minds, and on what is all too quickly assumed to be political education….But political education means opening up the mind, awakening the mind, and introducing it to the world. It is as Césaire said: ‘To invent the souls of men’. It means driving home to the masses that everything depends on them, that if we stagnate the fault is theirs, and that if we progress, they too are responsible, that there is no demiurge, no illustrious man taking responsibility for everything, but that the demiurge is the people and the magic lies in their hands and their hands alone…. The masses must realize that the government and the party are at their service. (pp. 137–139)

During the period of Sankara’s militaristic leftist political leadership, Sankara emphasized the importance of education and culture for a revolutionized invention of a ‘new man and a new woman’. This new public would be made up of patriotic and conscious Burkinabè: literate, scientific, professionally skillful, committed to Pan-Africanism, and self-reliant, as opposed to dependent and colonialized. Sankara wanted the revolution to be at once political, educational, and cultural.

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Thus, as a revolutionary theorist, and a bearer and implementer of the message of the CNR and revolution to the masses, Sankara proactively traveled nationwide meeting the people and delivering speeches about the objectives of the revolution with a populist tone. He sought to teach the masses about the revolution as an ambitious program of socio-political and economic transformation agenda and make them aware of the forces of imperialism and neocolonialism that were undermining the revolution. Endeavoring to ‘walk’—practice—his beliefs and policies for political, educational, and cultural change, he molded himself into a servant-leader and teacher (Sankara, interview by Diallo, 1983, p.  46), whose personal ambitions seemed subordinated to the objectives and will of the peoples’ revolution (McDonald, 1986, p. 339). The mixture of his ‘down-to-earth persona with his compelling militaristic leadership, however, exuded the vigor of a savior to many of the masses.3 In pursuing the goals of the revolution, Sankara espoused and initiated practical strategies to revolutionize the terrains of education and culture in his country for national liberation from neocolonialism. Although Sankara was proud of African culture and indigenous knowledge systems, he endeavored not to romanticize and fetishize them. He, therefore, approached them from a dialectical and functional materialist standpoint. He carefully respected aspects of indigenous ethnic customs, art and craft, and languages as well as those inherited from outside cultures, especially from colonial contacts, such as Western formal education and scientific systems, only if they did not divide the people and contribute to their socio-economic exploitation. Thus, Sankara believed that educational and cultural systems that were indigenous or endogenous but had become traditions in his country must not be preserved for all time if they were not beneficial and healthy to the existential needs and realities of his country in the neocolonial and postcolonial moments. Regarding his stance on the review of culture as something that must be considered an integral part of the struggle for any national liberation effort in Africa, his position resonated with Cabral’s culture and African liberation theory. Believing that ‘Culture is simultaneously the fruit of a people’s history and a determinant of history’, Cabral, a Guinea Bissauian and Cape Verdean anti-colonial freedom fighter, African revolutionary theorist, and poet, theorized in his “National Liberation and Culture” (1970) that: In order for culture to play the important role that falls to it in the framework of the liberation movement, the movement must be able to preserve the positive cultural values of every well-defined social group, of every category, and to achieve the confluence of these values in the service of the struggle, giving it a new dimension—the national dimension. Confronted with such a necessity, the liberation struggle is, above all, a struggle both for the preservation and survival of the cultural values of the people and for the harmonization and development of these values within a national framework. (Cabral, 1970)

Thus, Sankara, like Cabral who thought that ‘national liberation is necessarily an act of culture’, did not see the revolution in his country as just a political act. It was  Indeed, this messianic vigor was similar to what Rawlings exuded, which made his supporters to translate his initials J.J. (Jerry John) to ‘Junior Jesus’ during the so-called people’s revolution which he the PNDC government initiated in Ghana in the 1980s. 3

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also cultural and educational and involved the evolution of new forms of cultural and educational resistance to contest imperialism and neocolonialism. It consisted of changes in culture and education, and the creation of new ideas and new ways of seeing reality in the comrades’ spirit to benefit the existential needs and realities of his country. Let us now review some of the ideas, actions, institutions, and policies that Sankara espoused, configured, and reconfigured in the domains of education and culture for the Burkina Faso Revolution.

Education and Ideological Training In the 1980s, Burkina Faso faced severe illiteracy, poverty, and economic mismanagement. The school educational system, being very neocolonial, sustained, and perpetuated a colonial mentality. Sankara believed that the masses should be politically knowledgeable. To reach this political consciousness, an ideological education in radical concepts like Revolution, Democratic Centralism, Marxism, Socialism, and Communism was needed. In this, Sankara reasoned much like Nkrumah who also wanted Ghanaians in particular and Africans in general to comprehend revolutionary political and economic concepts and therefore built the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute to teach such concepts and essentials of Nkrumahism. However, Sankara built no ideological institute. Rather, Sankara and his revolutionary regime conducted a restructuring of the education systems to cultivate responsible citizens who would sustain the ideals of the revolution. State-led formal and informal education programs were implemented to expand literacy and professional skills while consciously training people to hone their intellectual comprehension of neocolonialism. These educational programs sought to dislocate colonial curriculums and discourage antisocial and antinational practices like corruption, exploitation, and abuse of power. At the same time, these programs emphasized some cultural norms, values, and institutions underlying social behavior in Burkina Faso. Mass and rapid literacy and numeracy training programs called Alphabetisation Commando and Alphabétisation Bantaaré were promoted nationwide, especially in rural areas. These exercises were offered in both French and approximately nine Burkinabè languages, educating participants in the revolution’s tenets. Thousands of people learned how to read, write, and calculate in several Burkinabè languages by 1987 (Tabsoba et al., 2000, p. 35; pp. 38–39). In the process, many schools were built between 1983 and 1987, and children and adults of all genders were encouraged to attend without discrimination. Sankara even turned the Prytanée Militaire du Kadiogo (a prestigious military academy for children who were mostly from military families) into École des Cadets de la Revolution (School for Cadets of the Revolution) and later into a public high school. This public school was named Lycée Marien Ngouabi, and any child could be admitted into it to access a decent education and exposure to the essentials of the revolution. This was also a strategy of revolutionary ideological encadrement. Approximately 600 Burkinabè between 10 and 15  years old, of all social

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backgrounds, were also sent to Cuba to study and receive training in revolutionary ideas and technological competence. This would allow these youths to become cadres of the CNR and the Burkinabè revolution. One such trainee, Salifou Sana, disclosed that their instructors told them to ‘become political cadres … competent and ready to work for the CNR’ (Sana, 2012; translation by author). The Committees for Defense of the Revolution (CDR), established by the CNR and chaired by Captain Pierre Ouedraogo, also advanced encadrement by providing literacy and ideological training to citizens. People were encouraged to read Le Discours d’Orientation Politique (DOP), ‘The Political Orientation the Speech’, which was a kind of manifesto of the revolutionary vision of the CNR. The tests administered in the recruitment of civil servants, which were called the Épreuve Politique et Idéologique (Political and Ideological Test), evaluated candidates’ aptitudes regarding the values and core principles of the revolution. Politico-ideological tuition was extended to soldiers too lest they become, in Sankara’s view, potential criminals. Sankara did not think that Burkinabè soldiers, being part of the masses and citizens of the nation, should be exempted from political education. It was in the light of this conviction that he repeatedly opined that ‘un militaire sans formation politique et idéologique est un criminel en puissance’ (a soldier without political and ideological training and background is a potential criminal) (Sankara, interview in Shuffield, 2006). Thus, the newspaper L’armée du Peuple (The Army of the People) carried the motto ‘s’intégrer et s’identifier à son peuple’ (the military must integrate and identify itself with the people) (Tambèla, 2013), which had already been launched in February 1983 through the support of Sankara, who was then the Prime Minister for the country, and Gilbert Diendéré, who became the newspaper’s editor, came to be particularly functional. It was extensively used as a key apparatus to communicate revolutionary ideas and aspirations from and to soldiers and the people after 4 August 1983.

Sankara’s Cultural Policies and Praxis The DOP stated that the revolution would holistically focus on all sectors of Voltaic (Burkinabè) society, including culture. This focus on culture within the revolutionary context displayed the intention to magnify and showcase the dignity, courage, nationalism, great human virtues, and creativity of the people. Institutions were retained, established, and/or removed to effect cultural changes, particularly changes that focused on self-assertion. For example, as a person who said: ‘We seek human dignity, that is our ideology’ when he was questioned about the ideology of the revolution (Sankara, interview by Sethi, 1984, p. 68), Sankara committed himself to challenging and fighting patriarchal notions in order for the revolutionary society to discontinue ethnic customs that suppressed and oppressed women (Murrey, 2012). He foregrounded women in politics (Sankara, 2007). Furthermore, Sankara dedicated himself to opposing cultural norms that inhibited the people from achieving

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the fullest potential of the dignity of their Burkinabè identity and African personality, and positive traditions. Significantly, Sankara’s longstanding conviction that some cultural norms had to give way to new lifeways was articulated in his speech ‘Who are the Enemies of the People?’ even long before he became leader of the CNR. He criticized lingering regressive forces and feudal-type structures of culture, especially in rural areas. Such forces and structures, he argued, were dangerous allies of the reactionary bourgeoisie that simultaneously oppressed the Voltaic people (Sankara, 1988, pp. 11–20). He reiterated these views in the DOP and abolished the practice of making tribute payments (often made in cotton) and obligatory labor by peasants to traditional chiefs. The feudal land tenure system was abolished when Sankara nationalized land and gave cultivatable parcels of state land to small farmers; by so doing he worked against and dismantled the obsolete and exploitative French colonial land tenure system. In addition, he introduced a novel work custom: two times a week, office work stopped about one hour before the normal closing time so that workers could take at least an hour for sports or other physical exercises for fitness and good health. Cities and districts were encouraged to construct sports complexes. These cultural policies aimed to promote social and health benefits, including solidarity and physical fitness as a component of public health, which emerge within a culture of sports. Sankara himself jogged or bicycled regularly publicly. Sankara, who was a hobbyist musician and guitarist, supported the promotion of arts, including the cultural institutions and practices that could help the Burkinabè celebrate their diverse national culture. As a patron of the arts, he asked artists to work for the revolution’s ideals rather than allowing imperialists to enslave their talent for small favors. Sankara even went as far as the UN meeting in 1984 to register his support for artists against any exploitation of their genius of the artist when he lamented: ‘I speak [in protest] on behalf of the artists … good men [and women] who see their art prostituted before the alchemy of show business conjuring tricks’. (‘Speech to the 39th Session of UN General Assembly in Sankara, 1988, p. 87). He advised Burkinabè artists, including singers, to work in promoting the ideals of the revolution and celebrating the pre-colonial past as a way to show a path toward a better future for the nation. Popular theatres and arts centers were built in cities including Koudougou and other areas (Ouedraogo, 2013). The DOP encouraged artists and writers to join popular movements in solidarity so as to work and struggle with the people and, before creating anything, to ask the question: ‘to whom are we addressing our creation?’ If it was for the people, then they must know what and who constitutes ‘the people’ so that they could effectively put their creative genius to the service of the revolutionary aspirations of Burkinabès and the advancement of positive Burkinabè cultural norms nationally and internationally. Consequently, Sankara encouraged artists to participate in national and international art and culture shows to build constructive networks and promote Burkinabè visual and performing arts globally and, more importantly, help to knit national unity and a Pan-African cultural family in both the African continent and African diaspora.

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In addition, the annual Semaine Nationale de la Culture (National Cultural Week) was established and hosted on rotational bases in different provinces for art workers to showcase their work to the public and promote national pride in local manufactures and creativity. State support went to the biennial Festival Panafricain du Cinéma et de la Télévision de Ouagadougou (Pan-African Film and Television Festival of Ouagadougou), popularly known as FESPACO, to attract more participation from local and international participants. Being a benefactor of African cultural advancement, Sankara’s stance resonated with those of Amilcar Cabral who was also an African cultural nationalist apart from being a militant political revolutionary (see, for example, Chabal, 1983), and to some degree Léopold Sédar Senghor who was a foremost advocate of the Negritude dimension of Pan-Africanism and also a president of Senegal. Cabral similarly considered African arts and culture to be powerful aspects of national liberation and nation-building projects (Cabral, 1970). Léopold Sédar Senghor, who helped make Dakar a center of African arts by hosting the First World Festival of Black Arts 1966, shared a related thought about culture and implemented similar culture-centric initiatives. The renaming of Upper Volta as Burkina Faso in August 1984 was another one of Sankara’s momentous cultural policies. The toponym (i.e., the name for the country) and associated demonym (i.e., the name for the people from the country) produced Burkinum, a concept and ‘a polysemic authentic philosophy’ which connoted ‘truth, straightforwardness, justice and integrity’ (Ouedraogo, 2013). It was Sankara’s search for justice, an aspect of Burkinum, which made him seek fairness for females. This respect for matriarchy aimed to make society embrace and revere antiquity, a certain African past, and its lifeways, when women, the mothers of society were respected. Sankara’s policies about the country’s name stressed the urgency of immediate and future nationalistic and patriotic work. At the same time, he shared Nkrumah’s respect for the African past. Indeed, the renaming of the country symbolized Sankara’s effort to delink the country from its neocolonial past and corruption, as well as to invoke and cultivate a revolutionary culture of the values of social justice and moral steadfastness, austerity, and national self-reliance among the people. Sankara gave the country a new flag and a new coat of arms that openly projected symbols that interpreted the values of work, sacrifice, and struggle for revolution in the country. The blazon had a crossed mattock and AK-47, similar to the communist Hammer and Sickle pattern. La Patrie Ou La Mort, Nous Vaincrons! (Our Fatherland or Death, We Shall Overcome!) replaced the earlier motto Unité, Travail, Justice (Unity, Work, Justice), which stood as an echo of French imperialism in the country. Sankara replaced the Hymne National Voltaïque, with a new one, Une Seule Nuit (One Single Night), which, it is believed, he wrote and composed. Also known as L’Hymne De La Victoire, or Ditanyè, it praised the events of 4 August as a revolution with lyrics like, Against …bondage … neocolonialism and its petty local servants …one single night … …an entire people,

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…launched its triumphal march. …of good fortune … Motherland or death, we shall conquer … in the …Revolution, …of the 4th of August … To …liberation and emancipation. Down with exploitation of man by man!

Although these changes can be compared with similar ones orchestrated by other radical leaders elsewhere in Africa, they were ideologically unique. For example, Nkrumah, renamed the Gold Coast ‘Ghana’, after the great African empire, and dropped the Union Jack and British national anthem for a new flag and anthem on the attainment of independence. However, Sankara did not limit himself to recalling the great values of a glorious African empire by renaming his country after such. Nevertheless, by renaming their countries, both Nkrumah and Sankara sought to shape the identity and aspirations of their people. However, Nkrumah endeavored to invoke history about an earlier African Golden Age which preceded colonialism with the hope that it will push his people to repossess it. To this aim, he opined that the name ‘Ghana’ is deeply rooted in ancient African history …It kindles in the imagination of modern African youth the grandeur and the achievement of a great medieval civilization which our ancestors developed many centuries before European penetration and subsequent domination of Africa began. (‘Speech in Legislative Assembly, 1956’, in Nkrumah, 1967, p. 47)

Although Nkrumah was not the author of the name, he deemed that old name as a powerful psychological and historical tool that he could use to resurrect and inspire an aspiration to national greatness and pride for an African people—Gold Coast people—who had gained their independence from British colonial rule. With confidence, he said that: ‘Ghana which is now being reborn will be, like the Ghana of old, a center to which all the peoples of Africa may come and where all the cultures of Africa may meet’ (Nkrumah, 1962b [1961] p. 96). He hoped that the adoption of the name Ghana would create a spirit and confidence in the people for the reconstruction of their pride, mind, and nation in the postcolonial moment. Thus, he declared that: We should aim at even greater glory and majesty than that which existed in the days of ancient Ghana, the land of our forebears …At that time, in the ancient city of Timbuktu, Africans versed in science, arts, and learning were having their works translated into Greek and Hebrew and were, at the same time, exchanging teachers with the University of Cordova in Spain. (Nkrumah, 1957, p. 163)

Conversely, Sankara, while remaining conscious of the positive aspects of the pre-colonial African past, was more interested in the problems of his time, hence creating a new name, Burkina Faso, Land of Upright People, and offering it to the people to transform their attitude and motivate them to deal with such problems. Consequently, Sankara in a novel way devised a linguistic application of the major national languages of his country to create a toponym that represented the larger fight against the dangerous enemies of his country: imperialism and its local allies, colonial mentalities, ethnocentricism, corruption, and lack of dignity. One of

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Sankara’s famous statements, captured by Kwadwo Opoku-Agyemang in his poem ‘For Sankara: Speaking for Himself’ (1996) was that ‘to remember is to resist’. Sankara remembered the national divisions, social corruption, and low self-esteem of many of the people that had been fostered by the colonial and neocolonial regimes and pillagers. He also devised ways to resist them. Thus, Burkina Faso—this new name for the country—was an ingenious product of Sankara’s revolutionary effort to sound a philosophical call and fashion a clever cultural tool to and for the people to use to ‘remember’ not only colonialism but their own nobility and uprightness and, thus, be inspired, strengthened, and equipped to resist and ‘smash’ ethnocentrism and injustice and neocolonialism. Even though Nkrumah and Sankara carried nation-building visions that varied because of the historical moments and places where they worked, both African leaders generally shared a common notion of the urgency of immediate and future nationalistic and patriotic work and respect for the African past. The support of Pan-Africanism, as an idea and movement that emphasizes the oneness of Africa politically and, more importantly, advocates the notion of a fundamental cultural unity of Africa (Diop, 1978; Garvey, 1969; Nkrumah, 2007[1963]), was another central feature of Sankara’s cultural policy. Sankara showed his strong inclination to Pan-Africanism in his speeches during his international travels, for example, his 1984 visit to Harlem, US (see ‘Our White House is in Black Harlem’ in Sankara, 1988, pp. 80–84), and meetings, including that of the UN and OAU, and considered it as a necessary idea and movement needed to unify the Burkinabès and other continental and diasporan Africans and strengthen their political and cultural struggles (see ‘There is only one Color—that of Africa Unity’ in Sankara, 1988, pp. 62–74). Sankara made Pan-Africanism part of the cultural orientation and quest of the revolution. Like Nkrumah, Sankara favored a union, preferably socialist in outlook, among African states, including Burkina Faso. He reasoned that the intricate disruptive webs of international capitalist interests, neocolonialism, and cultural imperialism were stronger than any one African country. A cornerstone of Sankara’s message was Pan-African anti-imperialism (see ‘We must fight imperialism together’ in Sankara, 1988, pp. 101–110), which was necessary to galvanize his people to simultaneously seek true freedom as Burkinabè and cultural empowerment as Africans within a free African world. In this free African world, Africans would view themselves as part of a political team and a Pan-African cultural whole. They would collectively transform the land of their countries to serve their basic needs and ward off any designs of parasitic capitalist forces—countries and organizations and individuals—from Africa. In committing his energies to Pan-Africanism, particularly to its continental political unity dimension, Sankara, thus, became one of the few African leaders of former French colonies to do so. Many others were Pan-­ Africanists who were inclined to the Negritude dimension of the idea and movement.

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Conclusion The influence of Sankara’s revolutionary vision of politics, education, and culture, and the promise that the revolution had are still remembered among many Burkinabè today. After the popular insurrection in October 2014, Valère Dieudonné Somé, a renowned Burkinabè politician and thinker, was asked in April 2017 by Fasozine ‘what should be the way forward for the democratic government that replaced that of [Blaise] Compaoré?’. Looking at the general situation in Burkina Faso, he answered: Il n’ya pas d’autre voie pour parvenir à surmonter les défis qui se posent à notre people que celle tracée sous la présidence de Thomas Sankara en réactualisant ses combats: compter sur ses propres forces, avoir foi en l’initiative créatrice du peuple, qui doit faire de la question du développement sa propre affaire, faire recours aux intelligences et aux énergies des hommes qu’il faut en les mettant aux places qu’il faut; faire de la gestion honnête et lutter contre la corruption, le clientélisme, le favoritisme…mettre l’accent sur la refonte des mentalités, pour faire du Burkinabè ce capital précieux et irremplaçable.

That is, There is no other way to surmount the challenges facing our people today, rather than the one proposed by Thomas Sankara’s regime, and that means re-implementing the core values of Sankara’s combat: relying on oneself, encouraging the creativity of the people, the same people who must see the development program of the nation as their own task; the intelligence of men and women has to be put to work, by placing the right person at the right place; honesty must be the cornerstone of management, corruption must be fought against, as well as begging and partisan politics /favoritism … the reformulation of mentalities is a must so that the Burkinabè can become that precious human and irreplaceable capital/treasure. (‘Exclusif ! La Grande Interview (avec Valère Dieudonné Somé)’ 2017, pp. 13–18; translation by author)

Sankara’s intellectual praxis and revolutionary statesmanship reconfigured Burkina Faso’s politics. However, an immediate effect and abiding part of Sankara’s statesmanship was its equal attention to structuring and restructuring educational and cultural ideas, systems, and institutions in Burkina Faso to sustain the transformational power of the revolution. There were some shortcomings, which he acknowledged, but could not rectify before he was overthrown. For example, some overzealous, but ideologically half-baked, cadres flouted some basic human rights. Additionally, thousands of primary school teachers who demanded better wages and went on strike in 1984 were dismissed and replaced by ‘revolutionary teachers’. Most of these who were simply teacher trainees and who had not gone through the full rigors of their teacher training were not competent to work for the basic education system. Despite these mistakes, it is clear that Sankara generally advanced and implemented some progressive cultural and educational ideas and systems in his effort to make the Burkina Faso Revolution from 1983 to 1987, not only a political one but an educational and cultural revolution too.

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Sana, S. (2012). Interview. https://www.thomassankara.net/les-­bourses-­cubaines-­ont-­ete-­une-­ aubaine-­pour-­le-­burkina-­faso-­la-­quatrieme-­republique-­a-­tout-­simplement-­deshonore-­a-­son-­ engagement-­a-­notre-­egard-­pour-­des-­interets-­politiques-­partisans-­interview/. Retrieved on August 22, 2016. Sankara, T. (1988). Thomas Sankara speaks: The Burkina Faso revolution, 1983–87. Pathfinder Press. Sankara, T. (2007). Women’s liberation and the African freedom struggle. Pathfinder Press. Sankara: cet Homme qui Dérange. Siradiou Diallo’s interview of Thomas Sankara in Jeune Afrique, October 12, 1983. Skinner, E. P. (1988). Sankara and the Burkinabe revolution: Charisma and power, local and external dimensions. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 26(3), 437–455. de Tambèla, A. J. K. (2013). Thomas SANKARA et la Révolution au Burkina Faso: Une expérience de développement antocentré. http://lefaso.net/spip.php?article56526. Retrieved on August 16, 2017. Tapsoba, S. J. M., Tiendrebeogo, A., & Kassoum, S. (2000). Les politiques d’éducation pour tous en Afrique, cadre référentiel et expérience du Burkina Faso. Bureau Régional du CRDI pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest et du Centre. Thomas Sankara: The Upright Man. (2006). Video documentary by Robin Shuffield. ZORN Production. We have to depend on ourselves. P.J. Sethi’s interview of Thomas Sankara in Newsweek, November 19, 1984. Wilkins, M. (1989). The death of Thomas Sankara and the rectification of the People’s revolution in Burkina Faso. African Affairs, 88(352), 375–388. De-Valera Botchway  is currently the Head of the History Department at the University of Cape Coast, Ghana. He has comparative research interests as well as multidisciplinary teaching expertise in several fields of African and African Diaspora history and studies. His publications include the co-authored article, “Military Coup, Popular Revolution or Militarized Revolution? Contextualizing the Revolutionary Ideological Courses of Thomas Sankara and the National Council of the Revolution,” in Amber Murrey (ed.), A Certain Amount of Madness (2018); the monograph Boxing Is No Cakewalk! Azumah “Ring Professor” Nelson in the Social History of Ghanaian Boxing (2019); and two edited volumes, New Perspectives of African Childhood: Constructions, Histories and Understandings (2019) and Africa and the First World War: Remembrance, Memories and Representations After 100 Years (2018). Moussa Traore  is an Associate Professor at the Department of English, University of Cape Coast. He does research in English Literature, World Literature, Literary Theory, Diasporan Studies, and Postcolonialism. He has research interest in writings about the Francophone Caribbean and Afro-­Brazilian returnees in West Africa, and new ways of reading Frantz Fanon. He also interrogates and writes about black resistance and revolutionary actors in literature and history. He coedited the volume Fight for Freedom: Black Resistance and Identity (2017). Dr. Traore also co-authored “Military Coup, Popular Revolution or Militarized Revolution? Contextualizing the Revolutionary Ideological Courses of Thomas Sankara and the National Council of the Revolution,” in Amber Murrey (ed.), A Certain Amount of Madness: The Life, Politics, and Legacies of Thomas Sankara (2018).

Chapter 10

Thomas Sankara’s Ideology and Political Leadership Felix Kumah-Abiwu

Introduction The search for Africa’s development through effective political leadership and governance has continued to attract scholarly interests and policy debates on the importance of re-visiting the political ideology and development strategies of past leaders whose ideas for the total liberation of Africa might still be relevant in our contemporary era. Leaders such as Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso and Jerry John Rawlings of Ghana, among others, are some of the transformational leaders whose ideas/achievements have continued to be discussed (William, 2014). While the background and leadership styles of these leaders were military/authoritarian in nature, it will be out of place to disregard the achievements of these military leaders in Africa’s development. This is where Thomas Sankara’s ideas and achievements become important to be discussed in this chapter. Thomas Isidore Noel Sankara (1949–1987) was one of Africa’s transformational leaders whose political ideas, ideology, and leadership are still being discussed in political spaces, public spheres, and halls of the academy on how his ideas and achievements can be emulated to address Africa’s challenges of development (Kumah-Abiwu & Odeyemi, 2018; Murrey, 2020). Captain Thomas Sankara emerged on the political landscape of Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) with revolutionary ideas that were based on anti-imperialism and how to dismantle Western influence and control of Africa. He also championed the idea of self-reliance of Africans in their efforts toward socioeconomic development (Harsch, 2013; Biney, 2018). Amber Murrey, who could best be described as one of the “scholarly apostles” of Thomas Sankara with the fortitude to advance the knowledge production on F. Kumah-Abiwu (*) Kent State University, Kent, OH, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. O. Abidde, F. Kumah-Abiwu (eds.), The Political Impact of African Military Leaders, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31427-8_10

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him in order to keep the “intellectual fire on Sankara burning,” noted that Sankara was one of the prominent Pan-African revolutionaries of his era. He was a “military captain and a president, an unapologetic anti-imperialist, a critic of patriarchy and a partner in the ‘total emancipation’ of women, a formidable and often amusing orator, and a humble but resolved human committed to the co-creation of a more just world” (Murrey, 2020, p. 194). Thomas Sankara’s revolutionary ethos could explain why he was often referred to as the “African Che Guevara” (Harsch, 2013). Skinner (1988) extended the “Che Guevara” description of Sankara into the African or the African-centered domain. I would describe the African-centered domain or space as the “African giant pot of great/extraordinary leaders” with Sankara occupying a special place within this giant “pot of great/extraordinary leaders of the past.” One is also  reminded of nationalist leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Modibo Keita of Mali, Patrice Lumumba of Congo, and Sekou Toure of Guinea, among many others, who helped to liberate the African continent from European colonial rule and domination. As the case with our courageous past nationalist leaders, Thomas Sankara also led the political movement to dismantle the neo-colonial influence and domination of Africa and its people (Kumah-Abiwu, 2016; Biney, 2018). Most observers share the view that Sankara’s message for Africans to embrace their identity and pursue African-centered development agenda might still be relevant in our modern era. For others, especially the critics of Sankara, the geopolitics of the Cold War era could partly explain his achievements given the strategic options countries had during this era to either tilt toward the East or the West for all kinds of support. For these critics, the post-Cold War era is not only different and complicated, but the strategic options of affiliating with the East or the West are no longer available given the unipolar world we now live in with Western influence/dominance (Kumah-­ Abiwu & Odeyemi, 2018). Notwithstanding, as others have argued, which this chapter also shares, Sankara’s vision and political ideas are still relevant and more likely to be very helpful to Africa’s development challenges. Declan Walsh underscores this assertion in his recent article on Sankara. According to Walsh (2022), Thomas Sankara was not only a charismatic army officer with revolutionary zeal and creative ideas, but he also transformed his landlocked country in just about 4 years in power with policies and programs that prioritized the poor and the marginalized in his society (Walsh, 2022). There is no doubt that Sankara’s strategies and creative ideas are relevant in our contemporary era. To better understand the dynamics of these issues, the chapter examines Thomas Sankara’s ideology and political leadership within the context of his impact as a military officer, nationalist, statesman, and Pan-Africanist. The rest of the chapter is divided into three parts. The first part provides an overview of Sankara’s formative years, his professional life, and the socio-political conditions that propelled him to power. The second part looks at his political evolution and leadership style during his short period in office. The last part explores the ongoing debates on his legacy and the significance of his ideas to Africa’s contemporary challenges.

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Thomas Sankara: The Early Years Thomas Sankara was born in the northern town of Yako on December 21, 1949, into a Silmi-Mossi family in Upper Volta (Burkina Faso). His father’s work as a gendarme in various parts of the country not only exposed him to other cultures, but he also became aware of the socio-economic conditions of poverty across many parts of the country (Ray, 2007). While his childhood was characterized by many problems based on the socio-economic issues facing the country in the late 1970s, Sankara’s parents, like most devoted parents, instilled decent values in him which shaped his political ideas (Murrey, 2018). Sankara’s mother worked hard to instill in her children, including young Thomas, strong moral/ethical values, modesty, and humility. The traits of hard work, dedication, and strong self-worth were also instilled in him (Murrey, 2018). Murrey (2012) captures this idea elsewhere when discussing how women’s issues were at the center of Sankara’s political ideas. He placed women’s issues not only at the center of the revolution, but he also saw women’s struggles for equal rights as an important issue or requirement for a more egalitarian society in Africa (Murrey, 2012). Sankara’s attention to the rights of women could be the result of the formative values he learned growing up to respect women. His respect for his mother and sister, for example, was without doubt transferred into his political life and policy initiatives on women empowerment (Murrey, 2018). Sankara later enrolled in a military high school, the Prytanée Military De Kadiogo (PMK), a school that was established by the French colonial authority in 1951. Following his graduation from PMK, he was among a few selected students who were sent to officer training in Madagascar. It was in Madagascar where he witnessed a popular uprising of workers and students who were demanding their rights (Kumah-Abiwu & Odeyemi, 2018; Murrey, 2018). He was sent to France for further training where he became exposed to left-wing ideas and political ideologies (Ray, 2007). Sankara also had the opportunity to study in Rabat, Morocco, where he developed close relations with Blaise Compaoré, who became the second in command in his regime (Murrey, 2018). On his return from abroad after the completion of his training, Sankara became more aware of the pervasive social injustice and the worsening socio-economic conditions of his country. His frustrations with the socio-economic conditions and his determination to find solutions may have propelled him to become a follower of the ideology of Marxism. Sankara became a self-described Marxist, given what he stated as the failure of the neo-liberal economic programs in his country and the rest of Africa (Harsch, 2013; Wilkins, 1989). His exposure to the ideology of Marxism-Leninism through his associations with several groups of African radical student organizations further deepened his preference for the ideology (Wilkins, 1989). After two  years of Sankara’s exposure to Marxism, he experienced changes as a young military officer and decided not to remain only a soldier without an ideology because of his understanding that Marxism with its socialist strategy could be adopted to address the socio-economic problems facing his country (Harsch, 2013; Wilkins, 1989). The essential question

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of interest is: What has become of Thomas Sankara, the military officer who has been transformed into a “disciple of Marxism”? I address this important question in the next part of the chapter by examining Sankara’s life’s trajectory from a military officer with revolutionary ideas to a military ruler with revolutionary praxis.

Sankara’s Political Evolution Following his return to Ouagadougou in 1974, Sankara participated in meetings held by left-wing organizations, including leading trade unions. He became much more aware of the worsening conditions of poverty in his country. Given his ideological shift and awareness of the exploitative nature of capitalism, he blamed French colonialism and neo-colonial influence as partly responsible for his country’s problems (Wilkins, 1989; Kumah-Abiwu & Odeyemi, 2018). He became convinced that his country’s underdevelopment was the result of two main factors. First, the continuous influence of France in his country’s national affairs. Second, the forced labor system has drained his country’s workforce to neighboring Côte d’Ivoire and other former French colonies (Wilkins, 1989; Kumah-Abiwu & Odeyemi, 2018). Unlike Abidjan, which has been a prosperous capital of Côte d’Ivoire (formally Ivory Coast), Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso had a different story. As Michael Wilkins has observed, Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso: Attracts virtually no foreign-backed industrial investment or development, and the few remaining aid organizations are not only low on funds, but also in morale. At best, Ouagadougou resembles a small-scale Abidjan with an over-large diplomatic community and a minority of wealthy European (mostly French) ex-patriates who lead a life of tedious and isolated luxury. Unlike Abidjan, the prosperous and cosmopolitan capital of the Ivory Coast, Ouagadougou does not, due to its landlocked location, reap the financial benefits of a thriving international port. For this reason and several others, such as the harsh climate and the political instability over the past twenty-eight years, a considerable proportion of the Burkinabe male workforce has emigrated to more prosperous neighboring countries such as the Ivory Coast. This has been a sad but inevitable demographic tragedy that has given Burkina its deserted villages and Ouagadougou the appearance of a ghost town. (Wilkins, 1989, pp. 375–376)

After the overthrow of the first president, Maurice Yameogo’s government, subsequent administrations were seen as puppets of France given the number of French advisers in the country. The successive military regime of General Sangoule Lamizasa was also not different because of its misrule (Brittain, 1985). Lamizasa’s regime was toppled by Colonel Saye Zerbo, but Zerbo’s government was unable to revamp the economic difficulties (Brittain, 1985). Sankara’s taste with political power occurred when he served in Zerbo’s government as Minister of Information, but he resigned from his position over a dispute on radio censorship and the ideological differences between him and the regime (Wilkins, 1989). As a result of his dedication to duty and a sense of being a morally upright politician, Sankara not only gained popularity with the people after he resigned from the Zerbo government, but his popularity provided another opportunity for him to be appointed as

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Prime Minister in the government of Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo (William, 2014; Wilkins, 1989; Kumah-Abiwu & Odeyemi, 2018). In his work on the rise of Thomas Sankara to power, Brian Peterson notes that Sankara’s appointment as Prime Minister in January 1983 opened the political gate for him to embark on many international trips. He traveled to countries such as Libya and North Korea and attended the summit of Non-Aligned Countries in New Delhi, India (Peterson, 2018). Traveling to these communist countries and meeting with revolutionary leaders like Fidel Castro, Daniel Ortega, and Jerry Rawlings cemented his revolutionary ideas. He also took advantage of his position as Prime Minister to intensify his anti-imperialist rhetoric by denouncing neocolonialism while embracing the ideology of Marxism (Peterson, 2018). Soon after his return from his global tours in 1983, as Peterson (2018) notes, Sankara delivered blistering speeches in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso in March and May of 1983, respectively. In these powerful speeches, he intensified his disdain for imperialism and called on the people of his country to mobilize against all negative forces (internal and external) directed at them. Sankara’s radical rhetoric and popularity were seen as a threat to the regime and was arrested on May 17, 1983 (Wilkins, 1989; Peterson, 2018). The goal was to contain his popularity and growing political influence, but with support from his fellow military officers, Sankara staged the August 4, 1983, coup d’état and became the head/leader of the regime (Wilkins, 1989; Brittain, 1985; Peterson, 2018).

Sankara’s Ideology and Political Leadership In her edited volume titled A Certain Amount of Madness: The Life, Politics, and Legacies of Thomas Sankara, Amber Murrey gathered some of the best scholars with interest in Sankara to explore his ideas on anti-imperialism, Pan-Africanism, and Africa’s development. The arguments advanced in the book underscored his political ideas and achievements. As the title suggests, it takes “a certain amount of madness,” as Sankara declared, to achieve a fundamental transformation in Africa (Murrey, 2018). This is a reminder of how committed Sankara was to the transformation of his country and Africa. The question of whether to celebrate or applaud Sankara as a military ruler and others such as Jerry Rawlings has been at the center of the discourse within the field of African politics for a while. For some, post-­ colonial Africa has become a bastion of military coups and coup makers who have been seen as unprofessional and unpatriotic members of the African military. This is where this volume on “The Political Impact of African Military Leaders: Soldiers as Intellectuals Nationalists Pan-Africanists and Statesmen” becomes important in emphasizing the relevance of Sankara’s ideas and accomplishments. I examine these issues within the context of Sankara’s ideology and political leadership in the next few pages. For observers, Sankara was not only complex as a political leader but his ideas and praxis were also radical and transformative. To understand his ideas, the chapter

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draws on the work of Kumah-Abiwu and Odeyemi (2018) for the  discussion. In providing a concise analysis of the evolution of Sankara’s ideas and the factors that have shaped his political/ideological voyage, Kumah-Abiwu and Odeyemi (2018) categorized the factors that have influenced his ideas into two: the external and internal influences. Concerning the internal, most scholars share the view that Sankara’s political ideas were largely shaped by his formative experience growing up. As previously noted, Sankara’s experiences in his formative years, especially his military education shaped his ideas on suffering and its effects on the ordinary person (Ray, 2007). Ray’s (2007) observation of Sankara’s exposure to other cultures when he was growing up and his first-hand experience with poverty had an impact on his political orientation. Externally, Sankara’s experience traveling to other countries such as France and Madagascar for military training also had an impact on him and his ideas. In Madagascar, for example, Sankara witnessed a popular uprising of workers and students and their effects on the society. His experience in France where he became exposed to left-wing ideologies is another example (Ray, 2007). As with other revolutionaries, Sankara’s ideas were intertwined with the history, culture, and his country’s relationship with France, the African continent, and the legacy of colonialism in Africa (Rodney, 1972; Kumah-Abiwu & Odeyemi, 2018). Brett (1973) got it right when he argued that European colonialism not only hastened the exploitation of Africa for the advancement of Europe, but the legacies of European colonialism and oppressive rule/domination are still having a negative impact on the continent after several years of independence (Brett, 1973). As Kumah-Abiwu and Odeyemi (2018) have reminded us, as other scholars (Rodney, 1972; Brett, 1973) have noted elsewhere, independent African countries seem not to be fully liberated given the continued influence of former European colonizers in Africa. The manifestations of socio-economic injustice, underdevelopment, poverty, and human suffering have continued to have serious consequences for the African continent (Rodney, 1972; Brett, 1973). It could be argued that the pervasiveness of the economic challenges, especially the failure (real or imagined) of neoliberal policies in Africa, including Burkina Faso, may have intensified Sankara’s ideas and praxis on socialism and its strategies of development. Two questions of interest are: (i) How can Africa address its worsening economic crises? and (ii) Can lessons be learned from Sankara’s ideas and accomplishments? I reflect on these questions and the debates on the significance of Sankara’s ideas in this final section of the chapter.

 eflecting on Sankara’s Political Ideas R in Contemporary Africa As previously discussed, the appointment of Sankara as Prime Minister in Jean-­ Baptiste Ouédraogo’s government produced two outcomes that might have shaped his political trajectory. First, his appointment increased his popularity with students,

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workers, and ordinary people across the country (William, 2014). Second, being a savvy political strategist, Sankara took advantage of his role as Prime Minister to intensify his anti-imperialist rhetoric by condemning neocolonial practices while tilting toward the ethos of Marxism (Wilkins, 1989; Harsch, 2013). We should note, as this chapter contends, that Sankara’s radical pronouncements of anti-imperialism were not out of the norm, given that his country, like most other African countries, was exhausted from the failures of Western-inspired neoliberal policies. Amid the challenges, Sankara and his other officers staged a military coup on August 5, 1983, leading to the start of the so-called revolution with Sankara assuming the political leadership of his country (Wilkins, 1989; Brittain, 1985). Elliott Skinner’s work on Sankara and the revolution provides further useful insights into the attempt to better understand him as a revolutionary. For example, he declared after the 1983 coup that they were revolutionary leaders and were determined to transform the  society from its socio-economic problems. He developed close relations with other revolutionaries such as Colonel Qaddafi of Libya, Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, and Colonel Mathieu Kerekou of Benin (Skinner, 1988). An interesting aspect of the debate among scholars is the question of how military regimes tend to parade themselves as “revolutions” as seen in many parts of Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. Botchway and Troare (2018) have provided a valuable viewpoint on this debate. To these scholars, the use of the term “revolution” has generally been a misused term. In the case of the Burkinabe “revolution,” Botchway and Troare (2018) argue that Sankara’s “revolution” was perceived by some as a “pseudo-revolution” given the fact that it lacks the core elements of a revolution, as Karl Marx has articulated in his writings. Core elements such as the struggles of the working class and social transformation as articulated by Karl Marx (Botchway & Troare, 2018). I agree with the point raised by Botchway and Troare (2018) on the definitional issues that confront the use of the term (revolution) as Karl Marx has conceptualized it. It is therefore imperative to note that my use of the term (revolution) in this chapter should be understood from a broader standpoint to also include popular support for military regimes. Perhaps the popular support for some military regimes in Africa might have prompted most of these regimes to refer to themselves as revolutions. Notwithstanding the different viewpoints on the conceptual debates about revolutions, it is vital not to overlook Sankara’s achievements in the short period of his rule. For some, Sankara and Rawlings stood out among other leaders in the 1980s. Their leadership and achievements, as others have noted, could be comparable to some of Africa’s great nationalist leaders of the post-colonial era. Leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and Maurice Yameogo of Upper Volta deserve to be emphasized (Kumah-Abiwu & Odeyemi, 2018). While the nationalist leaders were focused on the collective effort to end oppressive European rule in Africa, revolutionary leaders of the 1980s were focused on dismantling the post-colonial exploitation of the continent (Biney, 2018; Kumah-­ Abiwu & Odeyemi, 2018). On Thomas Sankara and Jerry Rawlings, William’s (2014) work on these two leaders will suffice to reiterate. In his analysis of them and the rationale for focusing

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on their policies, William (2014) challenged some existing works that tend to lump Rawlings and Sankara together with an emphasis on their military background, rhetoric, friendship, and proximity to each other. William (2014) may have a point, but we should also note that the “special relationship” between Rawlings and Sankara, and this chapter concurs, has more to do with their military background, political ideology, friendship, and pragmatism. Importantly, as the preceding analyses have shown, various factors that have shaped Sankara’s political apprenticeship and his rise on the political scene. As this chapter reflects on his ideas and extraordinary achievements, this last section of our discussion will underscore the debates on the significance of his political ideas in our contemporary era. In other words, and most importantly, I explore two important issues in this final part of the chapter. First, I underscore Sankara’s accomplishments within the context of the debates on his ideas on Marxism. Second, I examine the importance of his achievements and their relevance. It is noticeable, as seen from our discussions, that Sankara not only identified himself as a Marxist, but the ideology has to a large extent also influenced his rhetoric and political praxis (Harsch, 2013; Botchway & Troare, 2018). While highlighting this aspect of Sankara’s political identity, scholars also disagree on whether he was a “zealous apostle” of Marxism. The emerging question becomes: Was Thomas Sankara “boxed into an ideological space” without any display of political pragmatism? For Harsch (2013), Sankara was pragmatic in the sense that he took careful steps not to impose his Marxist ideology on the revolutionary. He, for example, recognizes the importance of his ideological posture of Marxism, but he was at the same time realistic or better put, pragmatic in his calculus as a leader for his own political survival. Martin (1987) and William’s (2014) captured the calculus idea well when they argued that Sankara, as in the case of Jerry Rawlings, was “burdened with the monumental task of defining his regime’s ideological orientation to appease the domestic forces that brought him to power, while carefully navigating the global politics of the Cold War” (William, 2014, p. 13). Sankara also took the precaution to properly frame his political trajectory as his “own man,” although he also acknowledged being inspired by other revolutionaries. This assertion might help us to better understand why Sankara rejected the notion that his 1983 revolution was patterned after other military regimes (William, 2014; Kumah-Abiwu & Odeyemi, 2018). To Skinner (1988), Sankara and his compatriots wanted to dispel the fears of possible counter-revolutionary forces that could pose a threat to the regime. On the part of Botchway and Troare (2018), Sankara falls within the ideological universe of “Praetorian Marxists” or coup-making African soldiers with a strong posture toward the ideals of African socialism. Leaders such as Marien Ngouabi of Congo-­ Brazzaville, General Mathieu Kerekou of Benin, and Jerry Rawlings of Ghana fall into this category (Botchway & Troare, 2018). With respect to Sankara’s achievements, his emphasis on Africa’s self-reliance, promotion of human dignity, and Pan-African solidarity constituted the central elements of his political ideas (Ray, 2007; Harsch, 2013). In his first speech after he assumes office and subsequent speeches, Sankara emphasized the need for African-­ centered social change on the continent. He stated that the fundamental reason for

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their revolution was to defend the interests of his country and its people and make them realize the importance of their aspirations for liberty and real freedom with socio-economic progress (Botchway & Troare, 2018). Sankara also emphasized the need to change the negative perception of Africa as a place of failures, problems, and deprivation, commonly known as the narrative of Afro-pessimism which has permeated the Western world for centuries (Kumah-Abiwu & Odeyemi, 2018). Gordon and Wolpe (1998) define Afro-pessimism as the negative portrayal of Africa as a region confronted with state failures, severe human problems/challenges, and bad governance practices. One could argue that Sankara’s insight into Afro-­ pessimism and his determination to provide a counternarrative to help deconstruct Africa’s negative images with positive ideas partly explain why he changed the name of his country from Upper Volta to Burkina Faso. Miles (2006) argues that Sankara saw the name Upper Volta as too colonial, but Burkina Faso, which means the “Land of the Upright Warriors,” shows an authentic African name. He followed with his call for the promotion of Pan-African unity and solidarity in Africa and beyond (Brittain, 1985; Harsch, 2013; Kumah-Abiwu & Odeyemi, 2018). Another major element of Sankara’s political ideas is well articulated in Ama Biney’s work on his social/political thought. According to Biney (2018), Sankara was not only a revolutionary that was committed to his ideology, but the philosophical foundation of the strategies he adopted to transform his country during his short time in office was also grounded on the concept of decolonial thinking which emerged from Latin American scholars a few decades ago. We should also note that the concept has been featured in the works of Africa’s prominent post-colonial leaders and thinkers. The writings of Kwame Nkrumah, Frantz Fanon, Ali Mazrui, and Claude Ake, among other post-colonial thinkers, are cases in point. These social thinkers, as (Biney, 2018) have suggested, led to the intellectual efforts in advocating for Africans to decolonize their minds, institutions, laws, and other practices from colonial and neocolonial dominance. This was the case with Thomas Sankara as he envisioned what Ama Biney captures as his readiness to dismantle the “neo-­ colonial state machinery” with a “new machinery capable of guaranteeing the people’s sovereignty” (cited in Biney, 2018, p. 131). In addition to Sankara’s frequent criticisms of the neocolonial influence of his country and the rest of Africa, he also did not spare what he describes as African collaborators who joined external forces to exploit Africa’s human and natural resources (Biney, 2018). For example, Sankara called the Burkinabe bourgeoisie “the parasitic classes” whom he claimed was the enemy of the people (cited in Biney, 2018, p. 131). He followed up his condemnation of these elites by referring to them as Africa’s bankrupt intellectuals who borrow “vocabulary” and “ideas” from “elsewhere,” in this case, from Europe and America (cited in Biney, 2018, p.  132), without necessarily paying attention to the value/importance of African-­ centered knowledge production. He added that it is necessary that Africa’s trained personnel and those who work with the pen learn to pay attention to our African knowledge and values (Biney, 2018). From a praxis standpoint, Thomas Sankara made sure his ideological ideas were put into practice to the benefit of his country and Africa. Within a short time of

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assuming power, Sankara initiated development programs and policy initiatives that had a huge impact on the Burkinabe society. Ray (2007) describes Burkina Faso as one of the world’s poorest countries in Africa and the world with a high-infant mortality rate, poor economic performance, lack of healthcare, poor educational outcomes, and widespread poverty before the rise of Sankara to power (Ray, 2007; Kumah-Abiwu & Odeyemi, 2018). For Murrey (2018), Sankara pursued a revolution that was aimed at addressing his country and/Africa’s problems. With a clear vision and agenda, Sankara wasted no time by initiating several development programs to the extent that he was sometimes seen as moving too fast with impatient ambitious projects (Murrey, 2018). Simply put, as Murrey (2018) has stated, Sankara had a “holistic understanding of transformative social change and sought to engage with all generations and genders, across all regions of the country, for a more thorough and meaningful mode of governance” (p. 81). From a socio-economic standpoint with respect to his achievements, many scholarly works have examined Thomas Sankara’s impact on his country’s development and Africa as a whole. Ama Biney’s succinct description will be useful to reiterate. In the words of Biney (2018): Sankara committed the Burkinabè people—as active agents in their awareness of implementing a social, economic and political transformation of both society and themselves as human beings—in a quest for a different kind of world and society. He wanted the Burkinabè people to commit to ‘nonconformity and possess ‘the courage to turn [their back] on old formulas.’ In the drastically short time that Sankara led Burkina Faso, (from 1983 to 1987), he demonstrated a boldness of political vision and sought to ‘carry out fundamental change’ and would be called a madman for doing so. In these four years, his small country initiated inspiring endeavors to arrest the deforestation of his landlocked country, and a 10 million tree planting campaign was introduced in 1985. (p. 127)

The literacy programs that were undertaken under Sankara’s regime also need to be highlighted (Biney, 2018). He also mobilized Cuban volunteers in a nationwide vaccination campaign for children under the age of 15 against yellow fever, meningitis, and measles. School attendance witnessed a huge increase from about 12% to about 22% in 2 years (Ray, 2007). Sankara and his regime built affordable housing, initiated job-creation programs, and improved water/sanitation, among others. His emancipation of women was also extraordinary (Harsch, 2013). For Biney (2018), Sankara was the “embodiment of a new paradigm of social, political, economic, and ecological justice” (p. 128). His fight for justice was not only reflected in his socio-economic achievements, but the most important legacy he left for his country and Africa has to do with his promotion of African-centered ideas, dignity, and self-reliance. Sankara’s vision and ideas on Pan-Africanist thinking called for a “fundamental break in epistemic dependency, economic dependency on the West and contributes to a transformation in gender relations” (Biney, 2018, p. 128). In short, as Biney (2018) has clearly articulated, and this chapter agrees, Sankara had a new vision for his country and Africa which he summarized as the rethinking of the meaning of development where existing and unworkable strategies of development can be dismantled with the end to foreign assistance (Biney, 2018). He urged Africans to pursue self-reliance as one of the strategies for their

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development and suggested the need for the demise of intellectual bankruptcy in Africa’s ruling class. From a global standpoint, Sankara demanded a fundamental democratic reform of the United Nations (UN), especially the Security Council (Biney, 2018). Sankara’s visionary ideas and leadership for the development of his country and Africa were disrupted when he was assassinated in October 1987 (Harsch, 2013; Murrey, 2018). For more than 30  years after his death, Sankara’s political ideas, strategies, and vision for development have not escaped the attention of scholars and policymakers. The scholarly attention to Sankara’s ideas and praxis and the questions surrounding their relevance to contemporary Africa represent another key element or rationale for this chapter. Biney (2018) got it right by noting that “the initiatives, policies, and intellectual thinking of Sankara remain a major unfinished project” (p. 128). I agree with this assessment and the idea of the “unfinished project” of Thomas Sankara. This is one of the reasons why this edited volume seeks to rethink and reassess the political impact of some African transformational military leaders such as Thomas Sankara and Jerry Rawlings. While recognizing the achievements of these military leaders, as in the case with Sankara, it is vital to note that our objective is not to “glorify” coup makers or military regimes. The author of this chapter and other contributors to this edited book value and respect democratic rights, norms, values, institutions, governance, and other core elements of liberal democracies. To this end, this chapter recognizes that Sankara’s military regime, like other military regimes, was not devoid of accusations of human rights issues and undemocratic practices. Those critical issues cannot be overlooked by scholars, but they need to be discussed and criticized. Alex Duval Smith captured these sentiments very well by stating that Sankara was praised by his supporters and his passionate admirers for his courage, leadership, integrity, and selflessness during his short period in office, but he was also seen by others as an autocrat who emerged on the political landscape through a military coup and valued discipline above human rights (Smith, 2014). At the same time, we also need to recognize the extraordinary achievements and impact of Thomas Sankara’s regime as we re-assess his leadership and legacy as a courageous, pragmatic, and visionary leader; an extraordinary leader of his era who spoke against neocolonialism and its harmful practices of exploitation. He also promoted socio-economic rights for his people by transforming his society within a short period. Above all, he championed African-centered values.

Conclusion Africa is endowed with vast natural and human resources, but the dilemma of a continent so rich, yet poor and underdeveloped has continued to attract scholarly attention and policy debates for several years. For some, the problem of Africa is a problem of political leadership. For others, it is a complex challenge that is grounded on European colonialism and its legacy of neocolonial exploitation of Africa in the

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post-colonial era. Within the broader context of these challenges, some political leaders such as Thomas Sankara and Jerry Rawlings, among others, have distinguished themselves as one of the continent’s transformational leaders whose ideas and achievements have continued to capture the attention of scholars and policymakers (William, 2014). To help us gain a better understanding of Sankara as part of my contribution to this timely/important book, this chapter examined Sankara’s political ideology and leadership in the context of his impact as a military officer, nationalist, statesman, and a Pan-Africanist. To comprehend the factors that have shaped his formative ideas, the chapter discussed Sankara’s formative years, his professional life, and the conditions that propelled him to political power. The chapter also discussed his contributions and achievements to his country and Africa as a whole (Ray, 2007; Harsch, 2013; Kumah-Abiwu & Odeyemi, 2018; Murrey, 2018). On our central question of whether Sankara’s political ideas and achievements are still relevant to Africa’s contemporary challenges, it is apparent that Sankara’s core ideas on self-reliance, African identity, Pan-Africanism, promotion of women’s rights, and overall human development are still relevant and constitute what Biney (2018) describes as the “unfinished projects” of Thomas Sankara. This is where it becomes important for every African on the continent and the diaspora to rekindle Sankara’s  ideas and strategies for the continent’s development.

References Brett, E. A. (1973). Colonialism and underdevelopment in East Africa. The politics of economic change 1919–1939 (1st ed.). Heinemann Publishers. Biney, A. (2018). Madmen, Thomas Sankara and decoloniality. In A.  Murrey (Ed.), A certain amount of madness: The life, politics and legacies of Thomas Sankara. Pluto Press. Botchway, D.  N. Y.  M., & Troare, M. (2018). Military coup, popular revolution or militarized revolution?: Contextualizing the revolutionary ideological courses of Thomas Sankara and the National Council of the revolution. In A. Murrey (Ed.), A certain amount of madness: The life, politics and legacies of Thomas Sankara (pp. 21–35). Pluto Press. Brittain, V. (1985). Introduction to Sankara & Burkina Faso. Review of African Political Economy, 32(12), 39–47. Gordon, D., & Wolpe, H. (1998). The other Africa: An end of afro-pessimism. World Policy Journal, 15(1), 49–59. Harsch, E. (2013). The legacies of Thomas Sankara: A revolutionary experience in retrospect. Review of African Political Economy, 40(137), 358–374. Kumah-Abiwu, F. (2016). Beyond intellectual construct to policy ideas: The case of the Afrocentric paradigm. Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies, 9(2), 7–27. Kumah-Abiwu, F., & Odeyemi, O. (2018). Sankara's political ideas and pan-African solidarity: A perspective for Africa's development? In A. Murrey (Ed.), A certain amount of madness: The life, politics and legacies of Thomas Sankara (pp. 194–208). Pluto Press. Martin, G. (1987). Ideology and praxis in Thomas Sankara's populist revolution of 4 August 1983 in Burkina Faso. A Journal of Opinion, 15, 77–90. Miles, W. F. (2006). Letter from Ouagadougou. The Antioch Review, 64(1), 99–116.

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Murrey, A. (2012). The revolution cannot triumph without the emancipation of women: A reflection on Sankara’s speech, 25 years later. International Journal of Socialist Renewal. Retrieved on October 19, 2022 from http://links.org.au/node/2969 Murrey, A. (2018). Africa’s Sankara: On Pan-African leadership. In A. Murrey (Ed.), A certain amount of madness: The life, politics and legacies of Thomas Sankara (pp. 75–95). Pluto Press. Murrey, A. (2020). Thomas Sankara and a political economy of happiness. In S. Oloruntoba & T. Falola (Eds.), The Palgrave handbook of African political economy (pp. 193–208). Palgrave Macmillan. Peterson, B. (2018). The perils of non-alignment: Thomas Sankara and the cold war. In A. Murrey (Ed.), A certain amount of madness: The life, politics and legacies of Thomas Sankara (pp. 36–50). Pluto Press. Ray, C. (2007). True visionary Thomas Sankara (1949–1987). New African., 8–9. Rodney, W. (1972). How Europe underdeveloped Africa. Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications. Skinner, E. (1988). Sankara and the Burkinabe revolution: Charisma and power, local and external dimensions. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 26(3), 437–455. Smith, A. D. (2014). ‘Africa’s Che Guevara’: Thomas Sankara's legacy. The British Broadcasting Corporation News (BBC News). Retrieved on October 19, 2022 from https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-­africa-­27219307 Walsh, D. (2022). Assassinated in his prime, an iconic African leader haunts a trial and his country. New York Times. Retrieved on October 19, 2022 from https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/09/ world/africa/thomas-­sankara-­assassination-­trial.html William, J. (2014). New Africa in the world coming to Harlem: A retrospective comparison of Jerry Rawlings and Thomas Sankara. The Journal of Pan African Studies, 7(7), 7–25. Wilkins, M. (1989). The death of Thomas Sankara and the rectification of the people's revolution in Burkina Faso. African Affairs, 88(352), 375–388. Felix Kumah-Abiwu  is an Associate Professor in the Department of Africana Studies at Kent State University, Ohio. He is also the Founding Director of the Center for African Studies at Kent State and Non-Resident Fellow (Governance and Democracy) at Nkafu Policy Institute in Cameroon. He received his PhD in Political Science from West Virginia University and an MA in Communication and International Development from Ohio University, USA. He also obtained his BA in Political Science from the University of Ghana as well as an MA in International Affairs from the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), University of Ghana, Legon. His research focuses on political leadership in Africa, elections/democratization, foreign policy analysis, African security issues, narcotics policy, Black males/public education in the African diaspora, and African-centered theories. In addition to his published books, scholarly book reviews, encyclopedia entries, and several book chapters, Dr. Kumah-Abiwu’s scholarly articles have appeared in the Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, Journal of Pan African Studies, West Africa Review, International Journal of Public Administration, Urban Education, Journal of Men’s Studies, Journal of Economics/Sustainable Development, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, and African Security Review. Dr. Kumah-Abiwu is the co-editor of the recent book titled Jerry John Rawlings: Leadership and Legacy – A Pan-African Perspective.

Chapter 11

Thomas Sankara: Mixed Legacies of a Charismatic Statesman Barthelemy Bazemo

Introduction The recent history of Burkina Faso, “the homeland of upright people,” has been inextricably intertwined with the extraordinary heritage of Thomas Isidore Noël Sankara, a charismatic military leader1 and staunch Pan-Africanist whom many scholars, political scientists, and a growing number of African youths have elevated to the pantheon of all-time greats in African political leadership. Three decades after his brutal assassination, there is credible evidence to attest that the currency of Sankara’s political vision and servant leadership style, commonly known as Sankarism,2 has outlived (Wa Ngugi, 2007) systematic attempts to cloud and sully his rich legacies. As the dawn of his political restoration ushers in a new era in light of the recent fundamental shifts in the political ecosystem of Burkina Faso, some of his fierce opponents and implacable foes have raised deep concerns about the backlash of a political vendetta. His enthusiasts, on the contrary, feel energized and inspired to pursue his emancipation agenda in Burkina Faso and across the African continent. Notwithstanding his short-lived tenure in office, Thomas Sankara has emerged as a paragon and a new household name for transformational patriotism, engaged  Grundy (2009) makes a synopsis of the trends of military leaders who got directly involved through coercive means in the political affairs of many African states. Their impact has been, in most cases, dramatic. 2  Sankarism is understood as “A philosophy grounded by the imperative of self-sufficiency and sustainable development that emanates from within and not from without” (Yimovie, 2018: 192). 1

B. Bazemo (*) Africa Faith and Justice Network, Washington, DC, USA © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. O. Abidde, F. Kumah-Abiwu (eds.), The Political Impact of African Military Leaders, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31427-8_11

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Pan-­Africanism, heroic leadership, and visionary statesmanship in Africa. Thus, any undertaking to unpack the wealth of the Sankara effect (Harsch, 2014) and the true extent of its sociopolitical impact remains an uphill task. In this piece, I will attempt to critically assess Sankara’s merits and demerits in the African leadership scholarship. Thus, in keeping with his philosophy of African agency and Afrocentricity, I articulate this paper in three essential steps. The first section presents a potted biography of the military officer who turned into a revolutionary leader. The second part explores the underlying causes of his strained relations with French authorities, which precipitated the end of his political aggiornamento. Finally, in the last section, I evaluate his leadership achievements and gaps, the core tenets, and the impact of his political philosophy on the African governance discourse.

Thomas Sankara in Time and Space Early Life Thomas Isidore Noël Sankara…. What images the name evokes! From east to west, north to south, African audiences pay tribute to this remarkable army officer from Burkina Faso as one of “its best political minds and its most fiery and committed sons” (Wa Ngugi, 2007). From his landlocked homeland at the heart of the West African savannah, Sankara inspired a host of patriotic citizens across Africa and significantly influenced the political leadership discourse by the character of his moral integrity and boldness, extraordinary bravery, and the sacrifices of his heroic political journey. Janvier T.  Chando echoes this sentiment in his book, Fallen Heroes,3 when he asks a probing question4 about the life and enduring legacies of Thomas Sankara in the following terms: So, who was this man who took a landlocked country of Africa out of its impasse, a territory that was the heartland of the Songhai Empire, and showed the people there and their brethren in the rest of Africa the path to a future devoid of the retarding influence of neo-colonialism?

For those who have kept abreast with the recent political history of Burkina Faso, the answer suffers no hesitation. By all accounts, Thomas Isidore Noël Sankara is that iconic hero. He is “the African revolutionary icon, one of those rare contemporary figures which the continent has produced that can be hailed as a model and a figure to identify with” (Chando, 2018, p.  93). President Sankara was born on December 21, 1949, in Yako, a small town on the central plateau of the former French colony, then known as the Upper Volta. He was the third of a family of ten

 The full title is Chando (2018).  Ibid. p. 81.

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siblings born to Joseph and Marguerite Sankara. His devout Catholic parents raised him in the time-honored tradition of Christian values. His father, Joseph Sankara, was a functionary, a gendarme employed by the French colonial administration. As part of the petite bourgeoisie of the colonial state, Joseph spent the early years of his career in Gaoua with his family, which enjoyed a relatively privileged status. Marguerite Kinda, Thomas’ mother, hailed from a direct Mossi ancestry. As for his father, Joseph, being born from a mixed Mossi-Fulani intermarriage, had nothing unusual because the practice of ethnic and religious marriages helped foster the sacred bonds of symbiosis and peaceful coexistence in the country. Sankara attended a public school at Bobo-Dioulasso (the second biggest city in the country) for his elementary education and pursued high school training at the famous Lycée Ouezzin Coulibaly (named after a pro-­ independence nationalist politician of the region). These formative years shaped Sankara’s ideological thinking and moral core. Similarly, at his tender age, the young Sankara braved the challenges and vices of urban life. He considered the priesthood a possible career path at some point in his training but later desisted and joined the army. His inquisitive mind quickly opened him to a world of injustices as epitomized by the economy of plunder and the increased economic inequality in most neighboring colonies (Harsch, 2014). As his contemporaries bore the brunt of hunger, misery, endemic diseases, and ignorance, the young Sankara took stock of all these gross abuses and developed a strong bent for justice and integrity, further honing his growing political consciousness.5 Overwhelmed by the chronic pauperization of people around him, in contrast with the unbounded wealth of their governing elites, Sankara dreamed of offering his people the conditions of a better life and enlarging their opportunities to pursue life goals and the achievement of human dignity.

Military Career Upon completing his secondary education program at the age of 17, Sankara enlisted in the military school of Kadiogo (PMK) in Ouagadougou, with the first intake of 1966. Two years later, he enrolled in the military academy of Antsirabe (Madagascar), where he successfully graduated as a junior officer. While in Madagascar, the young officer witnessed the popular uprisings of workers and students in 1971 and 1972 that toppled the government of Philibert Tsiranana. Although he was not a Malagasy citizen, Sankara was not indifferent to local politics because he knew that the causes of the mass protests had parallels with the political situation in his native country (Leshoele, 2019, p. 12). As Sankara continued his military ascendency, he met the love of his life, Mariam Sereme, who endorsed and supported his political ideals for a better society. They married in the catholic church and were blessed with two

 Ibid. p. 20. It highlights the forging of a rebel against the political status quo in Africa.

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sons: Auguste and Phillipe Sankara. Sankara took a keen interest in the works of leading Marxist theorists like Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin, which fundamentally shaped his worldviews. As a result, the philosophical logic underpinning his ethics and beliefs system, the perception, and understanding of reality underwent a paradigmatic overhaul. As he capped off his training in 1972, Sankara was a completely transformed person with new sociopolitical ideals for his country. The young officer returned home and soon headed for another military training in the Parachute Training Centre in Pau, France, to acquire parachute skills. In France, Sankara got further exposed to the political struggles of the 1970s, one of the most turbulent and divisive decades in contemporary world history, marked by the Cultural Revolution in Europe,6 the civil rights movement in the United States, the unfinished emancipation, and liberation protests in Africa, the Vietnam War, and the emerging “generation gap” in the postmodern era. These experiences shaped and perfected the gist of his anti-capitalist, anti-imperial, and revolutionary thinking (Harsch, 2014, p. 10). In his search to unpack the complex taxonomy of the evils that undermine the development and sovereignty of his homeland, Sankara became active in political advocacy by identifying himself with the left-wing movements (Glickman, 1992) of the students from Burkina Faso in France. With time, Sankara gained considerable experience and celebrity in advocacy circles as he got actively involved in community organizing with the Organisation Communiste Voltaïque (OCV) or the Voltaic Communist Organization (Wilkins, 1989). Upon returning to his country in 1974, Sankara quickly climbed the ranks of the military hierarchy to become a captain and, in 1976, the commander-in-chief of the Commando Training Centre in Pô, the most prestigious military camp in the southern part of the country. Then, in the early 1980s, a series of labor union strikes and military mutinies rocked the regime of President Sangoule Lamizana in power since January 1966, which paved the way for Thomas Sankara’s political fortunes and star to shine on the political stage. His military successes and charismatic leadership stood him in good stead and made him a popular choice for political positions. In 1981, Sankara was appointed Minister of Information in the Military Committee for Reform and Nation Progress (CMRPN) government by President Saye Zerbo, who assumed power after the overthrow of President Lamizana in a coup d’état on November 25, 1980 (Wong, 2016). People applauded the putsch, especially for regime fatigue and the prospect of ending rampant corruption in the country. The presence of Sankara in the cabinet particularly delighted labor unions and civil society organizations. Regrettably, he resigned on April 21, 1982, protesting the new regime’s anti-labor law. Nevertheless, this prophetic move boosted his public standing on integrity and credibility issues. When the government of the Conseil du Salut du Peuple (Council of Popular Salvation) came to power through a coup led by Maj. Dr. Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo on November 07, 1982, Sankara would play another critical role in the cabinet. President Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo

 It is known as the decade of political upheavals and contestation of traditional social norms spearheaded by the sixty-eighters. 6

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appointed him the Prime Minister of his Government in 1983. This new appointment allowed him to interact with influential leaders and prominent actors of the nonaligned movement on the international scene, such as Fidel Castro of Cuba or Samora Machel of Mozambique (Muiruri, 2022). As always, Sankara’s never-ending personal quest to uphold greater accountability and political integrity put him at odds with the leadership of consecutive military governments. Likewise, his iconoclast political views raised concerns in foreign diplomatic circles. As a result, his appointment did not last long for reasons of foreign interference (Chando, 2018, p.  82). Jean-Francois Mitterrand, the son of President Francois Mitterrand, who played the role of his father’s adviser for African Affairs, on an official visit to Upper Volta, forced President Ouedraogo to arrest Sankara for his political ideas conspicuously directed at France. The coup de force elicited weeks of popular uprisings and massive anti-government protests by students and unionists in Ouagadougou. In January 1983, compelled by the groundswell of citizens’ strikes and the sit-ins of a growing number of dissatisfied citizens across the country, President Ouedraogo caved in, and Sankara’s prison sentence was upended. Once again, public pressure played in Sankara’s favor. Hence, the time had come for him to assume the highest office in the land.

Sankara’s Ascension to the Presidency Sankara’s meteoric rise to the highest office on August 4, 1983, was no surprise because his star had already shone in the early days of his career as his outstanding charisma and dedicated life of service compellingly spoke to the leadership crisis perceived in the political landscape of Upper Volta. According to Amber Murrey (2018), Sankara’s ascent to power occurred during a time of upheaval of the Cold War, in tandem with the global recession of 1981–1982, the World Bank-enacted structural adjustment programs, the worsening conditions of poverty, and the sociopolitical cleavages exacerbated by the market economy across the country. To make things worse, the unusual combination of governance deficit and the citizenship crisis which unfolded for several years paved the way for Sankara’s rise to the throne. Sankara’s personality, populist appeal, and aptitude to mobilize citizens were his best assets in the troubled political environment of his country. His political destiny further disclosed the distinctive character of a statesman who built his incomparable reputation on an impressive series of favorable circumstances. Sankara first hogged the limelight of media coverage in 1974 for his heroic performance (Chando, 2018, p. 82) in the border war between the Upper Volta and Mali.7 Sankara became an iconic figure in a war where Mali’s superior firepower shook the foundations of

 The war was fought over the Agacher Strip War (French, Guerre de la Bande d’Agacher) or Christmas War (French, Guerre de Noël) which represents a 160-kilometer-long (100 mi) strip of land. 7

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Upper Volta’s national pride. However, the exceptional bravery of Sankara at the battle rekindled the flame of national pride across the country. In a similar vein, Sankara excelled in other fields. He was a seasoned guitarist who elated many audiences with his contrapuntal jazz music. He was also a keen sportsman who played soccer, organized cross-country tournaments, and rode a motorcycle like most of his fellow citizens. In addition, Sankara was an articulate public speaker who displayed a great deal of wit and charismatic authority in his deeds. In the army, Sankara quickly emerged as the undisputed leader of a group of young officers dubbed le Regroupement des officiers communistes, “the Communist Officers’ Group,” who believed in the capacity of communist ideals to revolutionize and shape their homeland away from the capitalist system of liberal societies. This core group grabbed the limelight of public attention from that time on and dominated political institutions for many decades. Bonds of friendship grew between him and Blaise Compaoré when they met in Morocco during military training and would remain strong until political ambitions put them asunder in a bloody coup d’état. When Sankara was hoisted to the rank of chairman of Upper Volta’s Conseil National de la Révolution (CNR) (The National Revolution Council), the country was in great need of transformational leadership, which Richard Engel (1986, p. 199) defined as “that which articulates visions, embodying values, and creating the environment within which things can be accomplished.” Sankara convincingly incarnated the political momentum that the gravitas of his new office deserved. Furthermore, Sankara understood his office as a turning point to make a difference by attacking the problem at its roots. Hence, he took advantage of the official visit of the French President, Francois Mitterrand, to Ouagadougou on May 17, 1986, to deliver his off-the-cuff remarks: No altar, no belief, no holy book, neither the Qur’an nor the Bible nor the others, have ever been able to reconcile the rich and the poor, the exploiter and the exploited. And if Jesus himself had to take the whip to chase them from his temple, it is indeed because that is the only language they hear. (Prairie, 2007, pp. 331–32)

This speech was a bold declaration for a people-oriented revolution that fundamentally set the country on a path of a true transformation of mentalities (Muiruri, 2022). Unfortunately, some of his contemporaries did not share the same understanding of the Revolution. Scholars like Botschway and Traore (2018) depicted Sankara’s Revolution as a non-classic or “pseudo-revolution” in the strict sense of Karl Marx’s phraseology. This is because Marx conditioned the authenticity of a revolutionary movement to the existence of the stages of class struggles and social transformation with the working class at its center. Although people-oriented, Sankara’s campaign was spearheaded by a group of military officers and could not legitimately merit the classical appellation of Revolution. Nevertheless, it is fair to underline that the domestic politics’ instability, partly driven by the dynamics of Cold War politics, sparked the Sankara phenomenon, which trailblazed the onset of the civic regeneration in Burkina Faso. Furthermore, the change prompted a shift with far-reaching consequences as it openly defied the established norms of his country’s realpolitik vis-à-vis its former colonial power.

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Thomas Sankara and the “France-Africa” Relations In hindsight, it is evident that the landmark independence of African countries in the 1960s did not usher in the much-awaited economic development and political sovereignty anticipated by most de jure independent states like Burkina Faso. On the contrary, the promise of self-rule, freedom, and dignity became “nominal” independence for several francophone countries (Droz, 2003). Thus, a growing number of intellectuals and informed citizens have raised the inevitable question that continues to carry its historic sense of urgency today: What went wrong? How and to what extent has the Françafrique system8 promoted or impeded the development efforts of former French colonies? Or, simply put, what constitutes the insuperable obstacles to Africa’s political and economic sovereignty in general and Burkina Faso in particular? Taking stock of the checkered past of his native country, Sankara drew up a blunt and audacious assessment of France-Africa relations. His analysis highlighted a spellbound twofold dimension of the sociopolitical situation. First, Sankara underlined the internal constraints or homegrown drawbacks chiefly caused by the technocratic hubris, the rapacity, and the unpatriotic behaviors of African elites who unscrupulously mortgage the lives of their people for their selfish gains; he calls them the “enemies of the people” or “the parasitic classes” (Harsch, 2014, p. 54). The second set of obstacles is more sinister and pervasive. Sankara imputes them to the destructive legacies of colonial heritage and ongoing neocolonialism. The latter epitomizes the economy of plunder of the unbridled capitalist system and the political patronage policies, which have become the dominant blueprint of the Françafrique doctrine. From Sankara’s standpoint, Africa has lost its sociopolitical compass by espousing a completely foreign worldview that estranged its people, cultural values, and sociopolitical institutions. As he claimed, the difficulty to tackle first remained the contested statehood of the nation-state inherited from the French colonial administration. As it turned out, many citizens of Upper Volta disapproved of the artificial borders drawn by the colonial state because nearly all frontiers have divided communities across neighboring states. Again, it explains why people do not pledge total allegiance to the state since they do not feel a sense of belonging, ownership, and loyalty to the institution (Englebert, 1996). Hence, the imperative to reimagine and reinvent the state, “an overhauled state to serve the interests of all citizens” (Harsch, 2014, p. 52), became his high priority. To achieve these ultimate goals, Sankara embarked on an ambitious program to profoundly reframe and reconstruct his native Upper Volta to meet the existential needs of its people. Sankara drew his inspiration from the eighteenth-century French

 Françafrique refers to France’s sphere of influence and domination over its former colonies across sub-Saharan Africa. It is expertly condcuted by the French political elites often in close collaboration with African leaders and powerful business networks that pursue the economic and geostrategic interests of France at the expense of poor African countries. 8

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Revolution, which wrought the essential changes the French society needed. As he once remarked, “the French Revolution taught us the rights of man.” Therefore, it logically stands to reason that the French colonial power would understand the freedom struggles of its colonies. In this regard, the radical reforms of Sankara’s vision resolutely charted an “independent path” to the national liberation of Upper Volta without sparking a revolutionary war of the masses because he was aware of the human cost of political upheavals fought with peasant backing as experienced in, the Russian Revolution of 1905 and 1017, the Chinese Revolution of Mao Tseung of 1921, the Vietnamese Revolution, and the Cuban Revolution of 1958–1959. Sankara marked the fundamental shift with a significant departure from the ideological conformity that all French colonies aligned with for fear of drastic reprisals from France. In his opinion, the era of the continuous subjugation of supposedly sovereign African states or the confiscated sovereignty was bygone. Sankara broke from those time-honored traditions to assert his newfound independence and herald a bold start for his country. To be true to his beliefs, President Sankara reimagined the future and dissolved colonial symbols of the French State in an effort to rethink popular imaginaries and representations of African realities. Furthermore, Sankara considered that the time had come to stop kowtowing to foreign interests at the expense of his people’s well-being. Hence, he shunned existing diplomatic arrangements that harmed the welfare of his people and resolved to rewrite the core principles governing the relations between his country and France. As Chando pertinently observed: Sankara pursued a foreign policy that did not condone imperialism and encouraged cooperation based on respect and the recognition of Burkina Faso’s interests as well as the interest of other parties dealing with Burkina Faso. (Chando, 2018, p. 85)

Similarly, Sankara successfully implemented, a year into the Revolution, a nationwide initiative with far-reaching implications when he symbolically rechristened his country’s name from Upper Volta to Burkina Faso, which translates as the Homeland of Upright or Honest People. The new name signaled the beginning of a political aggiornamento driven by a vision of transformation to set people free from the shackles of domination, exploitation, and discrimination. Sankara tailored his political agenda to achieve two overriding goals: the achievement of political freedom and dignity for his people. In a nutshell, in Sankara’s understanding, this initiative meant a conscious effort to deconstruct unjust colonial traditions and demystify their weighty imaginaries and legacies: We have to work at decolonizing our mentality and achieving happiness within the limits of sacrifice we should be willing to make. We have to recondition our people to accept themselves as they are, not to be ashamed of their real situation, to be satisfied with it, to glory in it, even. (interview in 1985)

As homespun wisdom has it: choices have consequences; and to this effect, President Sankara was well aware of the considerable risks he faced by confronting head-on the national interest of a world power, which at the time represented “its largest aid donor,” providing some $55 million US in economic aid (Peter, 2018, p.  43). Different scholars interpreted his untimely death on October 15, 1987, as a lack of

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political wisdom on Sankara’s part. Some like Amber Murray contend that “his brazen diplomatic style and refusal to display deference to former colonial power meant that he was identified early on as a threat to global capitalist powers” (Murrey, 2018, p.  3). A similar view is echoed by Yesufu Shaka (2022), who argued that Sankara may have met his demise because of his country’s nonaligned foreign policy and his relentless anti-imperialist stance. After a 35-year wait, the International Campaign Justice for Thomas Sankara (ICJS) finally brought to justice the perpetrators of his brutal assassination. On April 7, 2022, the 6-month trial culminated in a life imprisonment dawning verdict in absentia for former President Blaise Compaoré, Hyacinthe Kafando, his former spy chief, and Gilbert Diendéré, a General and head of the Presidential Guards Unit.

Thomas Sankara’s Political Thought The political thought of Sankara or sankarism is encapsulated in the grand vision of the burkindlum, which translates as integrity, uprightness, righteousness. The word indicates the focal point of political thinking grounded in the praxis of social transformation for justice, national sovereignty, and increased self-reliance. It calls for self-esteem, self-care, sacrifice for the community, integrity, and a love of justice (Ouedraogo, 2015). Against this backdrop, Thomas Sankara wrought a paradigm shift in the political culture of Burkina Faso by making bold changes to the governance structures, thinking, and praxis. He centered the essence of the Revolution upon the people, with the people, and for the people. Widely hailed by various audiences as one of Africa’s most progressive and dedicated leaders (Wa Ngugi, 2007), Sankara was as well a prominent exponent of “African nationalism,” an anti-imperialist, and Pan-African advocate for Africa’s political sovereignty to achieve true emancipation, equality, self-respect, and full participation in world affairs (Martin, 2012). Sankara articulated his political vision around the core objectives of the African renaissance, which made black people proud of their heritage everywhere. From the start, Sankara understood that he needed to plot a winning strategy to face the fierce battle of his tenure in office (Birmingham, 1995). First and foremost, President Sankara challenged the colonial order with a single-­ minded determination as he strived to deconstruct the narratives of colonial tradition. His people-centered democratic Revolution targeted the afro-pessimism propagated by mainstream media and popular historiographies. To counter these narratives, Sankara initiated l’Institut des Peuples Noirs (IPN) (Glissant, 2019) or Institute of Black People in 1986 and intentionally fostered the firming up of Black identity and Afrocentricity in formulating the “consciousness of race, pan-African unity, and indigenous knowledge for the creation of a new Burkinabe Society” (Murrey, 2018, p. 13). In honing their collective consciousness, people of African descent would ultimately come together to restore their lost dignity (Nébié, 2007), constrained agency, and threatened self-rule, which centuries of the system of

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chattel slavery and brazen exploitation drowned out with no end in sight (Rodney, 1972). Secondly, the driving ambition of his prophetic vision fostered his lifelong dream to renew and build a generation of “patriotic citizens” imbued with the political ethos to transform Burkina Faso into the true homeland of the people with integrity. This was no easy enterprise, especially in Cold War politics and the context of the frantic scramble for African resources. Moreover, he was also up against domestic political cronies and the international political and economic cartels whose sole purpose was to perpetually keep his country in a state of servitude. Hence, to achieve this crucial goal, there was an urgent need for what Sankara called a certain amount of madness when he held a thought-provoking interview with the Swiss journalist Jean-Philippe Rapp in 1985: You cannot achieve fundamental change without a certain amount of madness. In this case, it comes from nonconformity, the courage to turn your backs on old formulas, and the courage to invent the future. It took the madmen of yesterday for us to be able to act with extreme clarity today. I want to be one of those madmen…we must dare to invent the future.

Thirdly, Sankara’s burkindlum momentum aggressively pursued anti-hegemonic resistance politics on the international stage by championing the ideals of the nonalignment movement. For instance, Sankara vehemently defended the rights of self-­ determination of Palestine against Israel in the Middle East and the Black People’s path to freedom against Apartheid in South Africa which the Reagan Administration unswervingly supported for ideological reasons (Peter, 2018, p. 41). As a man of action for the cause of people’s self-determination, Sankara was greatly stimulated by a progressive grassroots agenda; he did not author a book nor publish treatises to expound the tenets of his political ideology because he was conscious of the dangers and risks of self-aggrandizement or the temptation of ideological deviation from the revolutionary project. Despite this lacuna, the wisdom of Sankara’s political thought is well preserved in the impassioned speeches he delivered, for he was known as a prolific public speaker. Michel Prairie (2017) compiled his speeches in a best-selling opus (Prairie, 2007) titled Thomas Sankara Speaks: The Burkina Faso Revolution 1983–1987. In the inaugural and groundbreaking address, The Political Orientation Speech of October 2, 1983, President Sankara developed the essence of his political agenda, which constitutes the fundamental orientation of his CNR9 Government. In the discourse, Sankara affirmed his unwavering commitment to invent a new “Burkinabe people” with upstanding consciousness to reconquer their dignity and national sovereignty. Similarly, he highlighted the unbalanced power relations furthered by the colonial system and now co-opted by the Burkinabe elite cartel organizations (Britain, 1985). Hence, he sought to overhaul the ideological foundations of the political economy to reflect the new era of African economic sovereignty, as expressed in the following lines: Such is the situation of our country after twenty-three years of neocolonialism, a paradise for some, a hell for the rest. After twenty-three of colonialist domination and exploitation,  CNR (Conseil National de la Révolution), The National Revolution Council.

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our country remains a backward agricultural country, where the rural sector – employing 90 percent of the workforce – accounts for only 45 percent of the gross domestic product and supplies 95 percent of the country’s total exports. (Prairie, 2017, p. 84)

So, it was high time that the country’s common good drove the political agenda to instill a new sense of purpose for all citizens. For Agun Mod (2013) from the Pambazuka News, Sankara’s claim to fame stems from his unwavering commitment to give back dignity and honor to his country and impart the ideals of Pan-African solidarity to its youth. Sankara remains one of the leading ideologues of the 1980s West Africa, a fiercely patriotic leader, a role model of selflessness and abnegation for the African youth amid forced neocolonial identities.

An Innovative Development Model Since the first decades of independence failed to produce the much-awaited economic dividends, Sankara embraced an innovative, organic, and community-driven approach based on an endogenous development model. Accordingly, he introduced robust programs aimed at enhancing community autarchy or an “endogenous development,” which Dembele (2013) construed as “the process of economic, social, cultural, scientific and political transformation, based on the mobilization of internal social forces and resources and using the accumulated knowledge and experiences of the people of a country.” President Sankara situated the rationale of the programs in the overall objectives of the grand vision of “development for self-reliance” because, as he stated, “We must learn to live the African way. It is the only to live in peace and with dignity.” He imagined a national economy that would be independent and self-sufficient. This economic thinking prominently featured in the October 2 political orientation speech when Sankara stated that: The construction of an independent, self-sufficient, and planned national economy requires the radical transformation of the present society, a transformation that itself requires the following major reforms: Agrarian reform, Administrative reform, Educational reform, Reforms of the structures of production and distribution in the modern sector. (Prairie, 2017, p. 104)

To achieve these goals, Sankara made agriculture the mainstay of the economy, which became a success story because it reached food security within a short period and was hailed as a development model in Africa. As he once said: “He who feeds you controls you.” Sankara knew that the first step to total freedom must start with food security. His economic agenda was oriented toward fighting corruption, promoting reforestation across the country, stopping famine, and making education and health real priorities. Under his leadership, Burkina Faso vastly reduced infant mortality, improved literacy rates and school attendance, and increased the number of women holding executive posts. In addition, Sankara is credited with planting ten

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million trees in the first year of his presidency to stop the desertification of his country. On the debt burden, Sankara led a relentless campaign to free the continent from the perpetual bondage it had been subjected to. At the General Assembly of the African Union in Addis Ababa on July 29, 1987, Sankara delivered a speech that remains a masterpiece in the fight against the African debt burden. He called for a united front against the control of African economies by foreign financial institutions: Under its current form, that is imperialism-controlled, debt is a cleverly managed re-­ conquest of Africa, aiming at subjugating its growth and development through foreign rules. Thus, each one of us becomes the financial slave, which is to say, a true slave or just plain slave of those who had the opportunity, the craftiness, the deceitfulness to invest funds in our countries that we are obliged to repay… Paying or not paying is not a question of so-called honor at all… The debt cannot be repaid, first of all, because if we do not pay, the lenders will not die… On the other hand, if we do pay, we are the ones who will die. (Prairie, 2017, pp. 375–376)

President Sankara called on his counterparts to shun paying African debt because it was inherently evil and kept African countries in perpetual bondage.

Social Policies President Sankara spearheaded crucial social safety net programs for vulnerable citizens’ feeding, housing, and medical coverage. On October 1, 1984, he abolished poll taxes and launched popular development programs that lasted until December 1985. The same year, he started an effective land reform program to give all citizens the right to own land in urban settings. In addition, Sankara instituted universal primary education for all and fought obscurantism, female genital mutilations, polygamy, and forced marriage, all intending to change the attitudes of his country’s people. Sankara made health care available to everyone with maternal and infant assistance nationwide. In addition, he launched a vast vaccination campaign to eradicate communicable diseases like polio, meningitis, and measles. Within a week, close to three million Burkinabe were immunized, garnering compliments from the World Health Organization. In the housing sector, his government designed large-scale housing and infrastructure projects to remedy the acute problem of decent housing. As a result, urban units were quickly built, and citizens in the main cities could access better living conditions. The new government constructed schools in rural areas and forced parents to send boys and girls to school. In addition, President Sankara encouraged adult literacy, especially in regional and national languages. Similarly, Sankara instituted a national language policy to promote diaglosia or multilingualism. His policies have paid off when we gauge the performance and the merits of the Burkinabe education system in the subregion. In an interview he gave to the Cameroonian writer and essayist Alexandre Biyidi Awala, known under the nom de plume as Mongo Beti, on

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November 3, 1985, Sankara revisited his fundamental quest for the dignity of the African people. Asked about the French language in its overall language policy architecture, Sankara emphatically responded: Unfortunately, it is the Africans who defend it more than the French themselves. It is a paradox, but one that can be thoroughly explained by the acculturation and the complete alienation of those Africans. As for Burkina, we are…. using French as the unifying language of our numerous nationalities and doing so from the standpoint of efficiency and the best way to solve the problem we face. (Prairie, 2017, p. 247)

During the first Francophonie Summit under his presidency on February 17, 1986, in Paris, President Sankara stated his official position regarding French as the medium of expression and instruction in Burkina Faso. The following sums up the essence of his speech: As a result of colonialism, we have become part of the French-speaking world, although only 10 percent of Burkinabe speak the language. When we proclaim ourselves as part of the French-speaking world, we do so with two preconditions: first, the French language is a means of expressing our reality. And second, like any language, French must open itself up to expressing the sociological and historical realities of its own evolution...Today, the Burkinabe people...no longer use the French language as a vehicle of cultural alienation but as a means of communication with other peoples. (Prairie, 2017, pp. 266–267)

On the cultural front, President transformed his country into a cultural hub by promoting international cultural events, among other things, the FESPACO, the biggest film festival on the continent or SIAO, which stands for International Art and Craft Fair, held biennially in Ouagadougou to showcase and promote African art (calabash and jewelry arts, pottery, and ceramics). Furthermore, Sankara instituted music festivals, a national cultural week for all ethnic communities to display and celebrate their cultural identities. According to Novicki (1987), no other African government has made greater use of its cultural wealth in the service of its economic and political social goals than that of Capt. Thomas Sankara. Dance, music, theater, and cinema have all been carefully crafted to buttress Burkina’s revolutionary development model.

Foreign Policy Agenda President Sankara placed his Revolution in the context of the total liberation of Africa and the people oppressed worldwide. He passionately defended the cause of Nelson Mandela, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, African Americans, the Palestinians, women, Indians, Cuba, and Angola, just to mention a few. Sankara fiercely fought the oppression of imperialism and urged Africans to unite toward clinching their total freedom. He delivered to the Young Pioneers movement a powerful: I speak on behalf of the millions of human beings who are in ghettos because they have black skin….. I suffer on behalf of the Indians who have… been massacred, crushed, humiliated, and confined for centuries on reservations. (October 1984)

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Sankara quickly became an international icon for liberation struggles and a hero for his country against colonial exploitation and domination. He believed that he had a universal mandate to push for positive change when he insisted that Burkina Faso embraces the misfortunes of all peoples. The Burkinabe Revolution draws inspiration from all of his experiences to become the heirs of all the world’s revolutions and all the liberation struggles of the peoples of the Third World.

The Stalwart Advocate of Women’s Liberation Sankara also embarked on an aggressive campaign for women’s liberation against a deeply entrenched cultural domination of women that he calls: The weight of age-old traditions that relegated women to the ranks of the beast of burden. Women suffer doubly from all the scourges of neocolonial society. First, they experience the same suffering as men. Second, they are subjected to additional suffering by men. (October 2, 1983)

Thus, Sankara envisioned women’s emancipation not as an act of charity or a surge of human compassion out of a sense of noblesse oblige but as a fundamental necessity to creating the conditions for unleashing women’s fighting initiative (Prairie, 2007). Besides, he fought against the practice of female genital mutilation, polygamy, and forced marriage, to change the attitudes of his fellow citizens. In his programmatic declaration or “Political Orientation Speech” of October 2, 1983, Sankara laid out an ambitious agenda for sociopolitical transformation capable of guaranteeing the democratic exercise of power by and for the people (Prairie, 2017). Apropos his views on women’s emancipation and their role in the democratic and popular movement, Thomas Sankara declared: I speak on behalf of women the world over who suffer from a male-imposed system of exploitation. As far as we are concerned, …we offer to share with all countries the positive experience we have begun, with women now present at every level of the state apparatus and social life in Burkina Faso. (October 1984)

The voices of renowned African feminists like Patricia McFadden and Namakula E. Mayanja have rightly lauded President Sankara’s outstanding and pioneering initiative, which pushed the boundaries of gender justice and feminist agency against the established patriarchal order to new levels of political leverage for gender equality. To this effect, McFadden emphatically asserted: Sankara posed an epistemological and foundationally ontological challenge to all black men. The challenge was to politically redefine the meaning and practice of heterosexual gendered identities. He even went further in his use of the notion of authenticity, arguing that becoming non-patriarchal is the necessary process by which men will become human. (McFadden, 2018, p. 173)

Sankara very poignantly stated the goal of this fight: “Emancipation like freedom is not granted. it is conquered. It is women themselves to put forward their demands and mobilize to win them” (Sankara, 1987). In McFadden’s opinion, Sankara was

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“before his time” because of “his advanced gender-inclusive ideas and policies.” He has left a unique radical feminist legacy that she prides herself on: “a uniquely feminist-inspired radicalism that I am curious about and inspired by as a radical African feminist” (McFadden, 2018, p. 175).

Sankara’s Leadership Legacy Political scientists have diversely appraised Sankara’s monumental legacy in the African renaissance agenda both in domestic politics and beyond the confines of his beloved country. Some view it as a compellingly inspirational story; others, on the contrary, find it as a lean spell without real impact. But truth be told, an interlude of 4 years in the half-century of independence may seem trivial. However, it proved a turning point in the formation of the Burkinabe citizens’ national consciousness. The advent of Thomas Sankara at the country’s helm from 1983 to 1987 elicited a social revolution that lived on to liven up the political reform movement of the October 2014 uprisings to press for political institutions endowed with legitimacy to protect the public interest. Several academics like Mamadou Diallo (2018) and Mubangizi (2019) have equated Sankara’style of leadership with the notion of servant leadership propounded by Robert K Greenleaf.10 In contrast with the traditional autocratic leadership style, Greenleaf’s prototype promotes an innovative governance philosophy that unleashes a leader’s true power and moral authority. Thomas Sankara showed empathy, solidarity, and closeness with his compatriots. For instance, he lowered the salary of well-off public servants, including his, to show the way to good stewardship of the common good. From a dull and marginal nation at the periphery of the world, Burkina became the new child prodigy of anti-imperialism, Third World pride, and the endogenous development model (Englebert, 1996, p.  151). Sankara’s emphasis on the community-­driven collective praxis and a vision for transformation continues to influence anti-imperialist and Pan-Africanist resistance worldwide. His lasting leadership legacy hinges on his creative genius and charisma to stimulate the rebirth of the Burkinabe nation by operating an in-depth transformation of his people’s habits, attitudes, and mentalities. The populist, anti-imperialist, and Marxist-leaning army officer is credited with the grand vision of instilling in his people a sense of dignity and justifiable pride in feeling, being, thinking, and acting as upright Burkinabe citizens. Under his leadership, Burkina Faso made extraordinary strides by achieving key development goals universally recognized by several distinguished scholars and

 The new concept is expounded in Robert K Greenleaf’s seminal book: Servant Leadership: A Journey Into the Nature of Legitimate Power and Greatness (Greenleaf 2002). 10

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Africanists like Glickman, who summarized Sankara’s heritage in the following words: Before the rule of Thomas Sankara, Upper Volta was identified with crushing poverty, uninspiring leadership, and doomed development prospects. During Sankara’s four-year rule, the name of the country was changed to Burkina Faso. Poverty was attacked with a rare combination of revolutionary zeal and pragmatism. The vision he instilled in leadership brought hope to the country’s development prospects… He adopted unorthodox proceeding procedures...He identified with populist demands. He was critical of exploitation from within and imperialism from abroad. (Glickman, 1992, p. 245)

Sankara skillfully mobilized the people of Burkina Faso to embrace his sociopolitical policies and drive the development agenda that achieved tremendous results quickly. Similarly, his political leadership expanded and implemented new governance standards, which Hyden believed, strengthened “the conscious management of regime structures to enhance the legitimacy of the public realm” (2013, p. 7). In the 4 years of his political tenure, Sankara inspired millions of young people. His servant leadership style and ideals resonate with the aspirations of a new generation of African youths pushing for good governance. That is why three decades after his brutal assassination, Sankara remains the kind of leader Africa needs to upend structures that deepen the social inequities of political institutions across the continent. Dubbed the “African Che Guevara,” Sankara is widely celebrated in literature: Thomas Sankara Speaks: The Burkina Faso Revolution 1983–87 (2007), Thomas Sankara: Women’s Liberation and the African Freedom Struggle (2010), Thomas Sankara: We Are the Heirs of the World’s Revolutions (2002), Ernest Harsch: Thomas Sankara: An African Revolutionary (2014), Adriamirado, Sennen: Il s’appelait Thomas Sankara (1989), and Sankara, Le rebelle (1987). Furthermore, Sankara is honored in creative and artistic production like the documentary by the British filmmaker Robin Shuffield: Thomas Sankara: The Upright Man (2006); it is a nuanced account of Sankara’s life: his rise, governing style, reforms, and subsequent assassination. The author revisits the salient achievements of his political tenure legacy, a life that created conditions for a better life for the Burkinabe and all nations he stood for. He spoke and stood for them. Most importantly, he showed the way by living “frugally” and challenging the cumbersomeness of state bureaucracy (Somé, 1990). For instance, Sankara pedaled daily on a bicycle to work rather than driving a state-issued car (Harsch, 2014, p. 40).

The Limits of Sankara’s Burkindlum Dream Despite the momentous achievements of Sankara’s regime, the critics of his rule have called to question the narratives of his much-storied legacies in terms of the gross abuses and structural failures of his leadership. The main stumbling block to the success of Sankara’s revolutionary project flows from the internal dynamics of the paradox of national liberation. As usual, national liberation, Michael Walzer (2015) contends, is an ambitious yet ambiguous project. In any liberation project, “the nation has to be liberated not only from external oppressors – in a way, that is

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the easy part but also from the internal effects of external oppression” (Walzer, 2015, p. 1). Unfortunately, Sankara’s Burkindlum program could not withstand the all-out assaults of the double oppression against his regime. In the same vein, the fundamental blunder of the revolutionary regime, which Loeshole (2018) termed the “currency blind spot,” was to place its monetary policy under the control of France while simultaneously trying to fight neo-imperialism in all its forms. The regime’s failure to decisively act on this critical issue already hampered the effective implementation of its political agenda of restoration. Sankara profusely resorted to the Revolution Defense Committees (CDR) as the local government’s building blocks and mandated officials. The justice system predominantly relied on the TPR (Popular Revolutionary Courts) to try pending impunity cases. These new bodies were emboldened to act for the effective implementation of the sociopolitical programs of the CNR government. Unfortunately, they quickly turned into networks of looting and embezzlement sprees. Besides, Sankara overestimated his compatriots’ revolutionary enthusiasm and commitment to the ideals of his burkindlum. This colossal misstep dealt a severe blow to the survival of the revolutionary project. Another critical pitfall pertains to the hardening stance of the regime. As it faced mounting challenges against its austerity programs and ascetic policies, the revolutionary administration became authoritarian and overly repressive. These perceived abuses quickly gave way to regime fatigue and public disenchantment. Despite the unquestionable results in public health, food security initiatives, and mass education programs, the Revolution of Thomas Sankara in its last years disaffected many Burkinabe citizens, especially the privileged elites (Diallo, 2018). A further perfect illustration is provided in Professor Albert Ouedraogo’s book Democratie et cheffocratie (2014), which paints the presidential tenure of Thomas Sankara as the darkest period for traditional rulers, trade, and labor unions after the colonial onslaught of these critical pillars which constituted the long-standing endogenous political system of governance. These organizations were, in Tyler Dickovick’s parlance (2009, p. 524), “institutional kingmakers” in Burkina society. Benoit Beucher (2018) equally highlighted the missteps of President Sankara in a scholarly article, Republic of Kings, where he criticizes him for failing to capitalize on traditional leaders as “wells of wisdom.” Another telling critique of Sankara’s regime emanates from the emeritus President of Burkina Faso, Dr. Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo, who substantiated his views in the recently published memoirs: Ma part de verité (2020), or My Side of the Truth. He sums up the contested legacy of President Sankara in the following terms: “Thomas Sankara is a hero; however, a hero who is neither an angel nor a demon.” He depicts Sankara as a hero who could pass for an angel or a demon across the political spectrum for his leadership style and political ambitions. By way of an alternative example, Harsch (2014, p. 55) deplored the absence of elections or the insufficient channels through which popular grievances could be aired. Although many African youths revere him, many scholars maintain that his authoritarianleaning populism and propagandist rhetoric cast a shadow on his much-storied legacy.

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Whatever the missteps of his rule or whichever way one stands in the political spectrum, one cannot help but acknowledge that Sankara was a charismatic figure and “one of the few African leaders who continue to be widely admired” (Fofack, 2012). To most of Burkinabe’s new generations, his ideological heritage is monumental and continues to haunt Burkinabe politics. He incarnated the image of a selfless and self-sacrificing leader for his people and will always be remembered as a true son of Burkina Faso for the gift of his life for the freedom of his beloved country.

Conclusion Several leaders have presided over the destiny of the Burkinabe people, but no one has creatively and decisively tackled the growing leadership and governance deficit that plagued Burkina Faso’s political system for many years. On these core objectives, nobody equaled President Sankara’s genius and charisma, who unquestionably merits national recognition for outstanding selfless service and for shaping a shared vision and identity of a proud nation. Unfortunately, he paid the ultimate price for his heroic leadership and visionary statesmanship to achieve Africa’s political sovereignty. He is today remembered as the African Che Guevara. Only leaders who lived in eventful times upheld their people’s aspirations and best interests, and, above all, led by examples could unquestionably be remembered as great and heroic icons. Sankara’s legacy lives on in Burkina Faso, Africa, and beyond the confines of the continent as an inspiration for human dignity and the pursuit of justice and freedom.

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Ouedraogo, L. (2015). Mediated Sankarism: Re-inventing a historical figure to reimagine a future. Africana Studies Student Research Conference. https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/africana_studies_conf/2017/002/2. Accessed on June 13, 2022. Peter, B. (2018). The perils of non-alignment: Thomas Sankara and the cold war. In A. Murray (Ed.), A certain amount of madness: The life, politics, and legacies of Thomas Sankara. Pluto Press. Prairie, M. (Ed.). (2007). Thomas Sankara speaks. The Burkina Faso revolution 1983–1987. Pathfinder Press. Prairie, M. (2017). Thomas Sankara Speaks. The Burkina Faso Revolution 1983–1987. 5th Edition. New York: Pathfinder Press. Rodney, W. (1972). How Europe underdeveloped Africa. Tanzanian Publishing House. Sankara, T. (1987). The upright man: The Thomas Sankara documentary. Online: https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=xgD-jhBIdiQ [*October 2022]. Somé, D. V. (1990). Thomas Sankara : L’espoir assassiné. L’Harmatan. Wa Ngugi, M. (2007). Thomas Sankara lives! The Wayback Machine. https://web.archive.org/ web/20100612085035/http://thomassankara.net/spip.php?page=imprimir_articulo&id_article=418. Accessed on May 28, 2022. Walzer, M. (2015). The paradox of liberation: Secular revolutions and religious counter-­ revolutions. Yale University Press. Wilkins, M. (1989). The death of Thomas Sankara and the rectification of the people’s revolution in Burkina Faso. African Affairs, 88(352), 375–488. https://www.jstor.org/stable/722692. Accessed on June 11, 2022. Wong, D. (2016). Thomas Sankara: Africa’s Upright Man. Kindle Edition: ASIN: B01KD0QUH8. Yesufu, S. (2022). A critical evaluation of Thomas Isidore Noel Sankara’s servant leadership style of Government in Burkina Faso. EUREKA: Social and Humanities, Number 2, Department of Research and Development University of Limpopo, South Africa, pp. 93–102. Yimovie, S. C. (2018). Re-reading Sankara’s philosophy for a praxeology of debt in contemporary times. In A. Murrey (Ed.), A certain amount of madness: The life, politics, and legacies Thomas Sankara (pp. 180–192). Pluto Press. Barthelemy Bazem  holds a PhD in African studies from Howard University in Washington, DC, and a master’s degree in Peace Studies and International Relations from the Jesuits’ Hekima University College in Nairobi (Kenya). His research interests include governance and the foreign policy of African states, religion, and peacebuilding. He has worked for many years as a policy analyst at the Africa Faith and Justice Network, Washington DC., and has done extensive research in Sahel countries and East Africa, where he studied and worked for over ten years. He is also adjunct professor at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Washington, DC. His publications include Africa at the School of Fraternal Humanism. Educatio Catholica, Vatican Press, Rome, 2018; and Plaidoyer dans les corridors du Congrès. Voix d’Afrique, Paris, 2017.

Part III

The Colonel and the Iconoclast in the Desert

Chapter 12

Muammar Gaddafi: An Assessment Gloria Emeagwali

Introduction In the first part of this chapter, the focus is on aspects of Libya’s geopolitical and historical background before the rise of Muammar Gaddafi. The chapter includes references to the French, Turkish, and Italian power struggles that culminated in the Italo-Turkish war of 1911. This is important for the focus on Gaddafi because of its direct impact on the Qadhadifa ethno-regional configuration. Rodolfo Graziani and other Italian fascist occupiers, in the era after World War I, are also of concern, since their genocidal campaigns would have a major impact on Libyans of that era, and no less on the Qadhadifa clan, and Gaddafi. Developments preceding the 1969 coup d’état of Muammar Gaddafi and his comrades, and the dethronement of the Sanusi dynasty, are not disconnected from these events and will be mentioned. The chapter identifies some of the complaints of the 1969 coup makers, and some of the mechanisms that were proposed to solve the various problems. US foreign policy and goals as they affected Libya, before and after the coup, will also be discussed, and so, too, Libya’s foreign policy toward other African countries, after 1969. We shall attempt to answer some of the following questions in the course of the discussion: What would Gaddafi accomplish in the early years of his regime? Did Gaddafi bring to the table intellectual sagesse and erudition, or merely unreflective pragmatism? For example, what was the intellectual context of Gaddafi’s famous Green Book? Of what threat to Gaddafi were the jihadists in the later years of his regime, and what is the nature of his legacy for Libya and the rest of Africa? What explains the rather erratic, anarchist, and somewhat iconoclastic modus operandi of Muammar Gaddafi?

G. Emeagwali (*) Central Connecticut State, New Britain, CT, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. O. Abidde, F. Kumah-Abiwu (eds.), The Political Impact of African Military Leaders, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31427-8_12

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The chapter concludes with an overall assessment of Muammar Gaddafi before his demise on October 20, 2011, based on past and ongoing developments.

The Historical and Geopolitical Background Libya borders six other African countries, namely, Tunisia, Algeria, Niger, Chad, Sudan, and Egypt. This factor has influenced its sociohistorical and geopolitical profile. Rock carvings and images in the region date as early as 14, 000 BCE, and would give us a peak into the demographic profile of the earliest inhabitants of the southern parts of the region (Marymor, 2016). Satellite imagery points to hundreds of ancient settlements in the present-day Fezzan region that the Garamantes and the Tebu occupied, the latter being present not only in Libya but also in contemporary Northern Chad and Niger. Unfortunately, some of these UNESCO-protected sites were vandalized between 2009 and 2014 (Zerboni, 2010; Adel, 2014). In antiquity, the region was not a vacant territory (Isichei, 2000; Tishken, 2000). It was the home of various Indigenous nations and ethno-regional groups, inclusive of the Toubou (Tebu), Lebu, Amazigh, and Tuareg, before European, Turkish, and Arab invasions and migrations into the region  – developments that would generate some of the ethnic struggles discussed in this chapter. Phoenicians of Syrian-Lebanese identity were associated with settler colonies such as Sabratha, Oea, and Labdah in Northwest Libya around 700  BCE, while Cyrenaica, Barce, Eusperides, Teuchira, and Apollonia would be the locus of Greek settler colonists by 632  BCE (Tsetskhladze & De Angelis, 2004). It would take another 500  years, by 146  BCE, for Roman settler colonists to follow suit in Sabratha, Leptis Magna, and Tripoli (Oyeniyi, 2019). Events in adjacent Egypt often affected Libya. At least such is the case of the invasion of Tripoli by Amr ibn al-As, 4  years after his conquest of Egypt in 639  CE.  The demographic consequences were similar. About 200,000 migrants of Arab identity migrated to the North African region, not without stiff resistance from Indigenous populations such as the Amazigh. Uqba ibn Nafi, a general of Arab identity, also called Nafea, would initiate the conquest of Fezzan in the south, 20 years after Amr ibn al-As wielded his sword in Tripoli. It is pertinent to note that Gaddafi, born in 1942, was probably a descendant of one of the Indigenous inhabitants of Libya, arguably being of Tuareg origin.

 urkish, French, and Italian Expansionism T and Power Struggles When Khair al-Din also known as Barbarossa seized Algeria in 1510, he paved the way for future Turkish incursions in the region next door, and the eventual seizure of Tripoli in 1711, by Ahmed Karamanli, a Turkish Officer (Wright, 1981). In 1902,

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France and Italy signed a secret treaty that recognized their special interests in Morocco and Libya, with Tripolitania earmarked for Italy, and the Fezzan for France whose imperialistic vision was to have direct interconnecting links across Algeria, Chad, and Niger, territories that it forcefully incorporated within its expanding colonial empire (Davis, 1988). For the French political elite, the 17-year resistance of Abd al-Kadir and the Qadiriyya Brotherhood, in neighboring Algiers, more than half a century earlier, was not a deterrent to expansionist adventures. On the contrary, France’s successful declaration of protectorate status over Tunisia, in 1882, simply reinforced its aggressive colonial ambitions and fostered rivalry and competition from Italy (Yates, 2018). Italy’s unification by the 1860s would trigger nationalist sentiments and play a significant role in the competitive scramble for African terrain and Italian-French competition, even before Bismarck’s Berlin Congress of 1884 (Dimpflmeier, 2013). Twenty-five thousand Italian settler colonists would move into this region of the continent by 1881, thus heightening the competitive rivalry between Turkish, Italian, and French interest groups and stakeholders. This was no doubt at the colossal expense of the Indigenous inhabitants of Libya. The Banco di Roma would sponsor mineral-seeking expeditions, while the Roman Catholic Church deployed its crusading missionary zeal to save Libyan souls (St John, 2012, p. 59). But Italian imperialist activity in the nineteenth century must also be understood in a wider context that saw Italian invasions and occupations in the 1880s not only of Ethiopia’s northern flank, Eritrea, but also “Somaliland,” an area of 178,218 square miles. Ethiopia’s defeat of Italy in 1896, at the Battle of Adwa, put in check Italy’s ambitions for the colonization of Ethiopia – at least for two decades, but its covetous gaze on Libya was not deflected (Pankhurst, 1951). Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were annexed in 1911 by Italy. Tension grew. The conflict escalated when two French cargo ships, the Carthage and the Manouba, which had reinforcements and military equipment earmarked for the Turks, were seized by Italy. This indeed triggered the Italo-Turkish war that lasted until 1912. There is a suggestion that this conflict ignited the Balkan Wars (Bekele et al., 2018). The power struggles of this era were a reflection of the intense rivalry among France, Italy, the Ottoman Empire, and others. It was a struggle for land, resources, raw materials, markets, and power – that was not unconnected to the transformation of the British economy, and the subsequent multiplier effects on the rest of Europe that wanted to keep up with and even transcend their British rival. British and French imperial expansion served as a stimulus to the newly unified Italy that felt obliged to join the economic and territorial rat race. For Italy and France, colonial expansion through the illegal appropriation of the lands and resources of Indigenous inhabitants; establishment of naval bases and ports for commercial activity; capture of markets for the sale of commodities; and the spread of language and culture utilizing missionary agencies and settler-­colonists were passports to regional dominance, prestige, and power. German anger over Britain’s plan to occupy Egypt and France’s quest to dominate Morocco would be contributing factors (Falola, 2022). Bismarck’s intervention, by his sponsorship of the 1884 Berlin-based Congress, aimed at presiding over a massive illegal territorial

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land grab, the so-called partition of Africa, was an additional catalyst for latecomers such as Italy. Italian occupation of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania was also linked to domestic politics, whereby the Minister of Internal Affairs, Valobrosa Giolitti, sought to divert attention from a left-wing parliamentary agenda. The rise to prominence of the Associazione Nazionalista Italiana, in 1910 and after, has also been noted. This would fail, initially, because by 1918 the Libyan resistors clearly had the upper hand, leading to a peace treaty, the Treaty of Acroma, 1918, between the Libyans and the Italian invaders. Mussolini’s ascent to power in Italy, in 1922, brought about reoccupation, and a new bout of invasions, however. This time around the Libyan rebels and freedom seekers were defeated.

The Qadhadifa Clan Armed conflict between Italy and Turkey over Tripolitania and Cyrenaica culminated in a peace treaty in 1912, and, 7  years later, in 1919, the abovementioned peace treaty, but the new phase of Italian occupation after 1922 was gruesome and the resistance, was intense. For the people of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, the conflict was catastrophic in terms of incarceration, concentration camps, mass deportations, chemical warfare, starvation, executions, trauma, terror, and death (St John, 2012, p.  72). Tanks and artillery, warplanes, and mustard gas were deployed. A 200-mile barbed fence was erected to prevent supplies from outside. Bodies were crushed by vehicles and numerous executions a day took place. Ibrahim estimates that the population around 1900 was 1.6 million but was reduced to 861,000 by 1940 (Ibrahim, 2020). Bruce St. John points to a population of 1.2 million in 1912, reduced to 825,000 in 1933 (St John, p. 83). The Qadhadifa clan lost a grandfather, and 300,000 members of the clan were forced into exile. Members of the clan would resettle south to the Fezzan region to escape Italian colonialism (Ben Lamma, 2017). It was a nightmarish scene of genocide reminiscent of the German occupation of southwest Africa in the 1880s. It should be emphasized that loyalty and solidarity underscored relations among Libya’s “tribal” configurations numbered more than one hundred, with the Qadhadfia, Warfalla, Firjan, Machachiya, Al-Hamamla, Al-Hasoon, and Al-Medan being dominant in the region of Sirte (Lamma, 2017). Lamma estimates that about 30 of the tribal configurations were key players. He points out that an alliance between the demographically powerful Warfallah configuration and the less populated Qadhadfia unfolded between the mid-1970s and 1993. The relationship deteriorated when Warfallah military officers staged an attempted coup d’état. One of the major resistors to the Italian onslaught in the 1920s was Omar al-­ Mukhtar, eventually placed in a concentration camp and assassinated by hanging, south of Benghazi, in 1931 (Moughrabi, 2021; Chorin, 2012, p. 22). He was not a member of the Qadhadifa clan, but his influence on one of its members, Muammar Gaddafi, born a decade after the death of al-Mukhtar, in 1942, would be of lasting significance. Gaddafi sponsored the cinematic tribute to “the lion of the desert” in a

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film starring Anthony Quinn (Amal, 2021). When asked to abandon his resistance and go into exile, al-Mukhtar’s courageous defiant words to General Rodolfo Graziani would be memorable, having a fundamental impact on Libyans of his generation and later. “We will not surrender; We will be victorious, or we will die,” retorted the Martyr (Salabi, 2011). Gaddafi eventually would be accused of concentrating wealth and power in the hands of the Qadhadhifa clan of which he was a member, as well as allied communities such as the Maghraha and Warfalla in Tripolitania and the Fezzan. The Qadhadifa was in charge of security and military institutions, for example. He gained support in Tripolitania, in the west, but not in Cyrenaica, in eastern Libya, given the context of deep regional divisions and historic rivalry. The Tebu, largely located in the Fezzan, in the south – described as “the most original tribe of the country” by Ben Lamma – would remain loyal to Gaddafi to the end (Ben Lamma, 2017).

The Sanusi (Senussi) Factor Any assessment of Gaddafi should pay some attention to the forces that Gaddafi confronted in his rise to political and military dominance. One of these would be the grandson of al-Sanusi, leader of the Sanusiya Order or Sanusiyah in Libya, and eventually King of Libya, in 1951. The Order dates back to the nineteenth century when al-Sanusi, the founding father of the sect, moved into Libya from Western Algeria to lead a religious revival. al-Sanusi created lodges, in Cyrenaica, and encouraged elements of Sufism. He allegedly brought peace and economic stability through the educational establishments, schools, and accompanying lodges established (Bruce St John, 48) while calling for the original teachings of the Prophet Mohammed. The movement proved to be a thorn in the flesh for Turkish, Italian, and French interlopers, though they, opportunistically, wavered between collaboration and resistance in some periods. Like the Karamanli, Muntasir, and Halfuns merchant families, who supported the Italians to protect their interests, the Sanusi were occasional collaborators, initially negotiating through the British. Sanusi was prepared to accept the Italian presence on the coast, in exchange for land tax exemption and recognition in the hinterland (BSJ 69.) For this reason, the Sanusi movement was not trusted by anti-colonial resistors such as al-Mukhtar. With the consolidation of fascism in Italy by the mid-1920s, however, the Sanusi order consolidated their opposition to the Italian colonizers and, by the 1940s, during World War II, became dependable allies of the coalition pitted against the Axis powers. The European belligerents of World War II recognized the strategic location of Libya for their geopolitical expansionist activities. Preemptive occupation of bases on the shores of the Mediterranean and in Fezzan was a priority for the USA and France. Libya’s long Mediterranean coastline of one thousand nine hundred kilometers would not be ignored by policymakers. Wheelus Air Base, close to Mellaha Lake, in Tripolitania, became a major asset for the US Army Air Forces – initially captured by the British from the Axis powers in 1943. But Britain, France, the

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Soviet Union, and the USA had conflicting views about the road to independence for Libya, according to Ronald Bruce St. John. A 10-year trusteeship under Britain, Italy, and France was the preferred model for the USA, namely, the Bevin-Sforza plan (St John, 2012, p.  100). This would be roundly defeated in the General Assembly after widespread Libyan protests, according to Bruce St John. Immediate independence became the nonnegotiable option (Chorin, 2012, p. 24). Should Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan go their own way, independently, or be part of a unitary republic? Should they be part of a federal monarchy, and if so, would this be hereditary, with Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan as states? These are some of the questions that stakeholders were confronted with. Even though two-­ thirds of the Libyan population were in Tripolitania, the pliable Sayyid Muhammad Idris al-Mahdi al-Sanusi of Cyrenaica was declared the head of a federal hereditary monarchy and King of the United Kingdom of Libya. On December 24, 1951, Libya became the second African region to regain its independence from colonial domination, if we recognize the Egyptian Independence declaration of 1922. Not surprisingly many trials and tribulations lay ahead for the fledgling-dependent nation-state.

The Military Coup of 1969: The Foundation Era In 1969, at the age of 27, Muammar Gaddafi and a group of army officers, who identified as the Free Unionist Officers’ Movement, took the bull by its horns and brought about the end of the 18-year-old rule of King Idris I. What exactly did Gaddafi and his accomplices want to achieve, and what would be accomplished by the young Captain of Signals? For almost two decades, state power was in the hands of a few families deemed loyal to the Sanusi palace system and western powers. Was this coup d’état simply an opportunistic power grab, or a genuine attempt to free Libya from the tentacles of great power intrigue, monarchical arrogance, and puppetry? How do we assess Gaddafi’s contributions in the early phase of transformation? The discovery of oil deposits in 1959 did not liberate Libya from the shackles of financial dependency but, as pointed out by Bruce St. John, simply intensified this dependence, given the reliance on western technical expertise to develop the industry (St John, 2012, p. 121). So, was there truth in the claim that Libya may have gained some kind of political independence in 1951, but was in reality economically unfree? The coup makers questioned the unequal distribution of power, and minority control of the nation-state by a tiny “aristocratic” elite, who favored foreign companies. In response to this perceived anomaly, foreign banks were closed and so, too, American, and British military bases. Oil companies were subject to new guidelines for operation. Foreign companies had to give up 51% of ownership (St John, 2012). Companies such as British Petroleum, for example, would be largely indigenized. One of the early actions of Gaddafi and his associate coup makers in 1969 was a declaration in favor of a socialist state, undoubtedly anathema to the West, in the heady days of cold war bipolarity, just a decade after the iconic Cuban revolution.

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Bruce St. John has argued that “if socialism is a redistribution of wealth and resources, a socialist revolution occurred in Libya after 1969 and most especially in the second half of the 1970s” (St John, 2012: 173). He cites the redistribution of wealth in land, housing, and capital, to make the case. A foiled British attempt to use mercenaries to assassinate Gaddafi and restore Idris I to the throne, in the early years, should be noted (Chorin, 2012, p. 31). Notable as well is the attempted coup by French mercenaries sponsored by associates of Alexandre de Merenche in 1980 (Cooley, 2002, p. 80). The influence of Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt on Gaddafi was clear initially. This would show up in some of the early policies, both nominally and otherwise, but this waned after the former’s death. Takeyh points to the influences of the Chinese Cultural Revolution as well. The name of the country was changed to the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah, and, by 1971, revolutionary committees would be established to mobilize the masses (Chorin, 2012, p. 36). Gaddafi’s creativity is reflected in the name of the new republic, if “Jamahiriyah,” was a made-up word, as claimed by Chorin in Exit the Colonel (2012). The class background of the revolutionaries seemed to be similar, namely, non-elitist. They were officers but by no means wealthy. Attempts would be made to pacify Libya’s Islamic clerics, initially (Takeyh, 2000). As in the case of Nasser’s Egypt, however, the Muslim Brotherhood became a major challenger to the Gaddafi regime that, from inception, had made clear its disdain for fundamentalist Islam. The Islamic movement in Cyrenaica would be targeted by the regime in the early years and so, too, in the final days of the regime, when al-Qaida, Isis, and a plethora of fundamentalists consolidated their base in eastern Libya. Contrary to the general wish of fundamentalist Islamic groups, the education of male and female students was declared mandatory by the new regime. Students were given scholarships to study abroad. Illiteracy was almost eliminated. Medical schools, centers, and hospitals were established in Tripoli and Benghazi, and basic health care was guaranteed for all. Life expectancy was extended by 20 years at least (Chorin, 36). These policies were positive for Libya and would be among Gaddafi’s monumental achievements. If Gaddafi had retired by 1974, the “One September Revolution” that he and his comrades had inspired might have been deemed a resounding success, judging by the appreciable socio-economic benefits incurred by most Libyans. The chapter argues that by staying in power well beyond the lifespan and term of office of many a military administration, these contributions to human development and well-being would be substantially tarnished and undermined.

US Foreign Policy and Libya Securing strategic bases such as the Wheeler Air Base in Tripolitania; arranging favorable terms for American oil companies such as Chevron, Exxon, and the Oasis Group of Conoco Phillips, Marathon, and Hess; challenging all forms of socialist

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policy allied to Communism; and consolidating US hegemony in northeast Africa, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean were of major concern for the US administrations that straddled the course of Gaddafi’s years in power. The administrations of Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, H.W.  Bush, George W. Bush, Clinton, and Obama were invariably guided by some of the above considerations. Equally important for the various administrations was the security of Israel, a nation-state that Harry Truman helped to establish by 1948. Libya’s anti-­ Jewish riots of 1945, Jewish-Italian collaboration (Rossetto, 2021), and Gaddafi’s overt support for Nasser’s categorization of the state of Israel as an illegal entity undermined cordial relations between Libya and the Jewish diaspora community. It is not clear whether these factors would remotely influence the military offensive of French President Sarkozy in the coalition against Gaddafi in 2011. It is apparent, though, that Gaddafi’s support for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the African National Congress (ANC), the Polisario, and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), among others, rattled policymakers in Paris, London, and Washington. The steep deterioration of relations between Tripoli and Washington, however, would be played out in various offensive and retaliatory actions, namely, a 1985 air raid during the Carter presidency; the 1986 Libyan bombing of a discotheque in Berlin frequented by US military personnel; the 1986 retaliation by President Reagan by bombing military and civilian facilities in Tripoli and Benghazi; and the 1989 bombing of a Pan Am Airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, by Gaddafi operatives (Cooley, 2002, p. 80). By paying compensation to the victims, and disclosing information on the machinations, and locations of al-Qaida and other fundamentalist operatives, Gaddafi partially exonerated his actions, and temporarily rehabilitated his regime. The 2003 deal signed during the administration of America’s 43rd President, George W. Bush, urged that the Libyan administration would abandon all weapons of mass destruction, notably nuclear capability, and in exchange, would have the US sanctions on the country lifted. New investments would flow in from abroad unhindered. But Gaddafi’s activities in Africa would continue to generate numerous anxieties not only for US policymakers but for several African countries.

Libya and Africa In February 2009, Muammar Gaddafi was elected Chair of the African Union, a 1-year rotational position that extends to each of the 54 member states on the continent. His inaugural and valedictory addresses identified several issues, including relations with Eritrea, Darfur, and, most dramatically, the creation of a United States of Africa. In the United Nations General Assembly, Gaddafi called for a seat for Africa on the Security Council and 7.77 trillion dollars in compensation for Africa, for colonial occupation. Mr. Gaddafi was no doubt inspired to make this bold request by memories of Italian occupation and the devastating encounters experienced by Libya under the fascist occupiers, and the conscientious anti-colonial resistors such

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as Omar al-Mukhtar, to whom we have alluded in the first part of this chapter. His generous support for anti-colonial movements in South Africa, Angola, Mozambique Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Guinea-Bissau would be remembered with gratitude by African anti-colonial nationalists (Campbell, 2021). Gaddafi rejected Sarkozy’s Union for the Mediterranean, considered to be an encroachment on Africa’s territorial integrity. He called for economic integration, and a common currency such as the dinar, a proposal that probably accelerated his downfall, according to some analysts. These moves would be considered positive developments by Pan-Africanists within Africa and its diaspora. The looting of artifacts forced labor, compulsory recruitment to serve in Europe’s wars, beatings, and flagellations, the undermining of Africa’s Indigenous Knowledge, criminalization of culture, plunder of natural resources, concentration camps, land theft, punitive relocations and exile, sexual misconduct, and segregated transportations, residences, and public facilities, during the colonial era, should not go unpunished, they argued. Gaddafi also came under fire, quite rightly, for the destabilization of several African countries, including Mali, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Chad, the Central African Republic, and even Nigeria through the training of opposition forces, and intervention in civil wars. He was militarily engaged in a border war with Chad over the Aouzou Strip, in 1987, a move that led to his break with one of his trusted military officers, General Haftar, when victory in Chad proved elusive. His willingness in the 1990s to erratically support all kinds of groups, on diverse sides of the political and military equation, would lead to carnage. Some skeptics like Nwaezeigwe question Gaddafi’s credibility, arguing that Gaddafi simply continued Nasser’s neocolonial imperialistic agenda (Nwaezeigwe, 2021). It may be argued, however, that while Nasser’s Africa policy was a paternalistic one guided by sentiments of Arab superiority, as Nwaezeigwe himself points out in his illuminating insights on Nasser, in the case of Gaddafi, the motivation may have been largely empathetic, and inspired largely by Libya’s tragic and traumatic colonial history (Nwaezeigwe, 2021). The “mad man” and “mad mullah” tropes have been juxtaposed to explain the enigmatic leader, with theories of narcissism, self-centeredness, megalomania, paranoia, manic-depression, and pathology deployed in explaining the activities of Gaddafi (Chorin, 34). This chapter argues that it was the barbaric brutality of the Italian occupation, and the recollection of its savage treatment of liberation fighters, and freedom seekers such as Omar al-Mukhtar, and others, which would have a major impact on Gaddafi. The memory of exiled and murdered forebears would no doubt affect Gaddafi, turning him into an “iconoclastic anarchist” in his relations with the West, from time to time. Gaddafi disdained western culture and norms in the light of the collective ancestral memory of Italian abuse and barbaric behavior and wanted to destroy what they stood for. His empathy with anti-colonial freedom seekers was one of the direct effects of this experience. Aspects of his iconoclasm can be seen in his Green Book. There is a systematic attempt to portray Gaddafi as a buffoon and a clown, with little or no intelligence or brain power. This chapter argues that such narratives are cheap attempts to vilify and delegitimize the opponent, justify the “mad mullah” trope, or get ratification and nods of approval from powerful opponents of the regime.

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Intellectual Foundations Gaddafi, in his writings, added to the intellectual corpus emanating from the region and tried to demonstrate that the 1969 military intervention was part of a wider social revolution. Though inspired by Nasser, Gaddafi and his comrades set about modifications of the former’s political philosophy (Deeb, 1986). Pan-Arabism was a driving factor in the early years, but after 1976, Gaddafi pivoted to a more overt socialist agenda. He incorporated aspects of Marxism in his thought, in The Green Book, put forward between 1975 and 1979 (Gaddafi, 1976). The text is divided into three sections and would include discussions on the instruments of government, namely, parliaments, the party, plebiscites, popular committees, law, and the press, in the first section. The proposed solution to economic issues would be discussed in terms of housing, income, the means of transportation, land, wage labor, and domestic servants, in Section two. The author concludes with a discussion of the family, tribe nation, woman, minorities, education, music and art, sport, horsemanship, and the stage, in Section three. Interestingly enough, Gaddafi also includes in this section a brief segment entitled, “Black People Will Prevail in the World” – which implied that the demographic superiority of Black people was inevitable for sociological reasons. That Gaddafi implied that the uncontrolled Black population explosion must be utilized to render vengeance “against his erstwhile White colonial masters” is a questionable assumption, however (Nwaezeigwe, 2021). Gaddafi’s statement is descriptive and even predictive – but not prescriptive. It is not clear whether The African American Motorist Green Book of 1940 – crafted in response to the institutional racism of the USA, in that era – influenced Gaddafi (Green, 1940). Gaddafi’s political philosophy was not flawless, and would not outlive him. There were some contradictory elements within the body of thought, along with some simplistic views. For example, in his narrative on gender, despite a powerful opening in support of equality for women, he descends into crude functionalism by the end of the discourse, arguing for innate natural roles of the genders. In terms of actual policy, however, the status of women in Gaddafi’s Libya would be substantially elevated and improved, in comparison with several adjacent countries. Gaddafi rejected the misogyny of fundamentalist Islam and its sectarian offshoots such as Wahhabism and Talibanism. It was an Amazonian Guard, an all-female elite cadre of bodyguards, which protected the president, in an era when security forces around the world were almost exclusively male-dominated, and in some regions, not to be seen or heard in public. In the Green Book, Gaddafi takes a swipe at parliamentary democracy, arguing that parliaments constitute a false solution to the problem of democracy: Parliament is a misrepresentation of the people and parliamentary systems are a false solution to the problem of democracy. A parliament is originally founded to represent the people but this in itself is undemocratic as democracy means the authority of the people and not an authority acting on their behalf…… The most tyrannical dictatorships the world has known have existed under the aegis of parliaments.

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His views on political parties are variations of the above argument. Parties are based on “an arbitrary authoritarian concept,” he posits. They intensify the struggle for power at the expense of socially beneficial plans, and can be bribed and corrupted from within or outside, argued the author. The party system is “a modern instrument of dictatorship.” Gaddafi’s own alternative to parliament and parties was to destroy these conventional social constructs and set up committees of workers. His iconoclasm is reflected here. He argued that “popular conferences and people’s committees are the fruition of the people’s struggle for democracy,” and such committees reflected direct democracy. Workers were encouraged to take over private and public enterprises, and according to Deeb, by 1978, 180 enterprises were run by committees of workers (Deeb, 1986). Gaddafi viewed socialism as admirable in its natural precapitalist state, but proposed mechanisms to accelerate the transformation. The Real Estate Law of 1978 undermined concepts of private property and earned him enemies from the landowning elite. Families in rented homes became instant owners with some compensation to the former owners from the government. Absentee ownership was outlawed. His opponents included clan leaders, royalists, the commercial elite, property owners, and the Islamic establishment, but he succeeded in narrowing the gap between the poor, landless, exploited, and the wealthy. It may be argued that Gaddafi succeeded in bringing to the table, measured thought, as opposed to unreflective pragmatism. Some of his ideas were workable and brought about change. Others were not feasible, and almost impossible to implement without coercion. One of his greatest failures was his total inability to tolerate his opponents. A consequence of this was an appalling record on human rights. Some analysts draw a line of demarcation between Gaddafi in the early years of his rule, and the later decades, particularly after the coup attempts of the 1990s, when human rights violations within Libya, under his watch, probably descended to the level of Chile’s Augusto Pinochet, Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, Suharto of Indonesia, and Mobutu Sese Seko of the Democratic Republic of the Congo – US allies of the 1970s and 1980s. Noted as well is the nepotism involving his family members and members of the Qadhadhifa clan. Gaddafi had challenged the hereditary establishment of King Idris I and the emergent Sanusi dynasty but, in the end, replaced one hereditary government with another, with his sons elevated to prominent positions for future hegemonic roles, in a new “monarchical” dictatorship. Gaddafi’s son Khamis would eventually be put in charge of the 32nd Brigade in the 1990s, a clear example of nepotism in the later years of the regime.

The Jihadist Factor In his testimony to a Congressional Hearing on March 29, 2017, Frederic Wehrey pointed to the intense growth of jihadism following the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011 (Wehrey, 2017). He linked this to the disillusionment following the Arab Spring; porous borders where “logistical hubs and training camps” have been erected; the return of youths from Syria and Iraq to Sirte, Sabratha, and

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Tripoli – joined by jihadists from Tunisia, the Maghreb, and the Sahel – and the self-­protection sought by marginalized and persecuted groups such as the Warfalla and Qadhadfia in the post-Gaddafi era. By 2022, groups such as Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS), in Sirte and Jufra; Ansar al-Sharia, in Benghazi; Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council (BRSC), in Benghazi; Ansar al-Sharia, in Sirte and Tripoli; and the Muslim Brotherhood vie for supremacy (Elhudairi & Isiksal, 2022; Ntaka & Csicsmann, 2021; Pargeter, 2021). The fact is that there were traces of Islamic fundamentalism well before the 2011 demise of Muammar Gaddafi. Some of the followers of the Sanusiya embraced traces of Wahhabism, the teachings of the eighteenth-century scholar-activist and propagandist Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab whose puritanical views on gender and society removed him from moderate Islam. Ibrahim suggests that the Sanusiya diverged from Wahhabism and Salafism to some extent but yet had much in common with the two sects, and would be inspirational for Gaddafi’s archenemy, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) (Ibrahim, 2020). Gaddafi and his comrades would eventually seek to undermine the powers of the clerics and Islamic establishment, in a complex and sometimes contradictory policy framework. Gaddafi’s provocative declarations and policies incurred the wrath of movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Liberation Party, and the Islamic Martyr’s Movement even though Gaddafi had initially made attempts to legitimize the revolution by appealing to the clerics (Takeyh, 2000). It may be incorrect to suggest that Gaddafi was a committed, diehard Muslim throughout his career, but he did sense the need to retain a public pro-Islamic façade in his largely Muslim country, for political reasons. Unlike several neighboring countries that became suppliers of thousands of trainees for the US war in Afghanistan against the Soviets, Libyan jihadists amounted to about 300, according to Cooley (p.178). They would constitute the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). The Islamists threatened Gaddafi’s regime on several occasions, in the 1980s and 1990s, including a planned bombing by Gama’a al-Islamiya in 1993 (Cooley, 2002, p.  159). Abdel Hakim Belhaj, supported by Qatar at one point, would be one of these anti-Gaddafi Islamists. Al-Qaida’s Zawahiri sent operatives to recruit and train fighters during the 2011 uprising against the regime, with Derna, in eastern Libya becoming a major training ground.

Gaddafi’s Legacy Gaddafi’s fiery advocacy for Africa at the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2009, 2 years before his demise, proved that even after being in power for about four decades, he still retained elements of revolutionary fervor. His credentials as a Pan-Africanist seemed to increase with time, and so, too, his commitment to a united Africa. His election as chair of the African Union in 2009 enhanced the possibility of a continental Africa and regional integration. As a patriotic Libyan nationalist, Gaddafi’s commitment was unflinching and remained so throughout his rule.

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In accouterments and culture, Gaddafi’s embrace of his Libyan identity was consistent. An unorthodox interpretation of statesmanship characterized his years in power. It is important to note that the per capita income of Libya in 2010 was $12, 065 with 120 billion dollars in the Treasury, and a flourishing sovereign wealth fund of 65 billion dollars (Laessing, 2020). Tatenda Gwaambuka points to an email sent to Hillary Clinton by Sidney Blumenthal on April 2, 2011, among the unclassified email documents of the Secretary of State, in which it is stated that “Qaddafi’s government holds 143 tons of gold and a similar amount in silver,” stocks that would be moved from the vaults of the Libyan Central Bank in Tripoli to the border with Niger and Chad during the conflict (Gwaambuka, 2016). The unending political strife in Libya since Gaddafi’s demise over a decade ago points to the various fault lines in Libyan society. The wide chasm between quasi-­ secularism and moderate Islam in Tripolitania, west Libya, and fundamentalism and monarchy in the east, in Cyrenaica, would manifest itself in various post-Gaddafi configurations. It is also pertinent to note that Gaddafi had ample time and opportunity to bridge these gaps and forge unity in the body politic so he has to bear some responsibility for this failure. The 2009 Tunisian uprising would have direct repercussions in Benghazi in the Cyrenaica eastern flank. Gaddafi’s call to smash the opposition and the potential secessionists would be met by collaborative interventionism from Western countries. Responsibility to Protect (R2P), itself a perpetrator of the atrocities it tried to pre-empt, and a justification for intervention and force, became the new mission, and would eventually metamorphize into regime change (Lamma, 2016). The pact made with Bush, Blair, and Berlusconi, in 2013, turned out to be a Faustian one. The iconoclastic anarchist would come face to face with an unlikely triumvirate inclusive of “praetorian guards,” and a recipient of illegal campaign financing. The imposition of a no-fly zone followed, with NATO supplying arms to anti-­ Gaddafi forces, beyond its original mandate, accelerating the fall of the regime. The morbid mannerisms and comments of the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, stunned political observers. The various failed attempts at governance in the fractious and politically charged environment of post-Gaddafi Libya continue to defy all good intentions for peace and democratic governance on various fronts (Laessing, 2020). Recall the assassination by jihadists of Egyptian and Ethiopian Coptics (Lamma, 2017) as well as the attack in Benghazi, eastern Libya, instigated by Abu Khattala of the Abu Obeida bin Jarrah Brigade, an Al-Qaida sympathizer, which killed the US Ambassador, Chris Stevens, and others on September 11, 2012 ISIS consolidated its activities in the region (Beccaro, 2022). Assassinations, terrorist attacks, and the proliferation of militia groups, such as the Islamic State, in control of banks, public institutions, and companies, have undermined the Government of National Accord (GNA) that was conceptualized by the Skhirat Agreement of 2015 (Elhudairi & Isiksal, 2022). Human trafficking has intensified, affecting even Indigenous Black inhabitants as well as migrants from elsewhere, in official and unofficial detention centers (Al-Dayel et al., 2021).

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The effect on the African Sahelian region has been devastating with armed terrorists from Libya becoming a major source of regional instability (Oladimeji, 2022). Rival governments, each claiming legitimacy, backed by foreign mercenaries, and European, and Turkish stakeholders with eyes on Libyan oil, and in search of regional stability, continue to negotiate for presidential elections. On one side of the equation is the United Nations-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), formed in 2015 and supported by Turkey and Qatar, with Italy and Chadian dissidents among the early supporters under the Tripoli-based Fayez al-Sarraj. The GNA has the support of the Muslim Brotherhood through its affiliate the Libya Dawn coalition, the Sanusiya-influenced General National Congress (GNC), and the House of Representatives (HoR) (Ibrahim, 2020). The Libyan National Army (LNA) of General Khalifa Haftar, now an American citizen, and an ally of Gaddafi who fell out of favor, would toss a monkey wrench in the early deal, however, and attract to his fold Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and a few other silent brokers hedging their bets. Khalifa Haftar, Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, and Saif al-Islam Gaddafi were presidential hopefuls in 2022, but no one knows for sure if, or when, these elections would ever take place, given their cancellations on two occasions.

Conclusion With every passing hour there lurks for a few Libyans, a nostalgic yearning for the era that went before, needless to say, however, Muammar Gaddafi had overstayed his time in power by a few turbulent decades. His was a regime probably instigated by the genocidal atrocities, chemical warfare, and concentration camps of Italian occupation, and the inability of the Sanusiya to assert genuine independence – and liberate itself from the clutches of British and American oil companies and bases. Gaddafi’s initial intentions were rational, in an era of anti-colonial activism, and the quest for true sovereignty, but his execution of policies fell short of whatever democratic intentions he and his comrades initially expounded. A new generation of Libyans should now take center stage.

References Adel, J. (2014, June 17). Libya Herald. Ministry of Tourism decries vandalism to national treasures. Libyaherald.com Amal, A. (2021). Media Images are never transparent or innocent windows onto the world. Langues, Discours et Inter Cultures, 5(2), 93–124. Al-Dayel, A., Anfinson, A., & Anfinson, G. (2021). Captivity, migration and power in Libya. Journal of Human Trafficking., 1–19. Beccaro, A. (2022). ISIS in Libya and beyond, 2014–2016. The Journal of North African Studies, 27(1), 160–179. Bekele, S., Dirar, U., Volterra, A., & Zaccaria, M. (Eds.). (2018). The first world war from Tripoli to Addis Ababa (1911–1924). Centre Français des Etudes Ethiopiennes.

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Campbell, H. (2021). Gaddafi, Muammar (1942–2011). In C. Z. Nessi (Ed.), The Palgrave encyclopedia of imperialism and anti-imperialism. Palgrave Macmillan. Chorin, E. (2012). Exit the colonel. The hidden history of the Libyan revolution. Perseus Books Group. Cooley, J. (2002). Unholy wars. Pluto Press. Davis, J. (1988). Libya politics: Tribe and revolution. UCLA. Deeb, M. (1986). Radical political ideologies and concepts of property in Libya and South Yemen. Middle East Journal., 40(3), 445–461. Dimpflmeier, F. (2013). On the shaping of the Italian identity of the second half of the nineteenth century. The Eurasia Studies Society Journal, 2, 2. Elhudairi, A., & Isiksal, H. (2022). The role of ISIS as a religious terrorist group in the instability of Libya in the post-Gaddafi era: The case of Sirte. Religions., 13(6), 516. https://doi. org/10.3390/rel13060516 Falola, T. (2022). Africa and the world before the Second World War. In S. Oloruntoba & T. Falola (Eds.), The Palgrave handbook of Africa and the changing global order. Palgrave Macmillan. Gaddafi, M. (1976). The Greerjr. People’s Committee. Green, V. (1940). The Green Book (the negro-motorist Green Book). Snowball Publishing. Gwaambuka, T. (2016, April 6). The real reason Gaddafi was killed. The Africa Exponent. Ibrahim, A. (2020). Rise and fall? The rise and fall of ISIS in Libya (p. 913). Monographs, Books, and Publications. https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/913 Isichei, E. (2000). A history of African societies to 1870. Cambridge University Press. Laessing, U. (2020). Understanding Libya since Gaddafi. Oxford University Press. Marymor, L. (2016). Rock art studies: Bibliographic database North Africa, Libya, including the Libyan Desert. Lamma, B. (2017). The tribal structure in Libya. www.frstrategic.org Lamma, B. (2016). The responsibility to protect in Libya: Back to square one? Revue Internationale et Strategique, 101(1). Moughrabi, F. (2021). Genocide in Libya: Shar, a hidden colonial history. Arab Studies Quarterly, 43(4), 371–376. Nwaezeigwe, N. (2021). An African union without Muammar Gaddafi: Challenges and prospects of strong Arab-black Africa cooperation. Miṣriqiyā, 1(2), 1. Ntaka, B., & Csicsmann, L. (2021). Non-state armed groups and state-building in the Arab region: The case of post-Gaddafi Libya. South Africa Journal of International Affairs, 28(4). Oladimeji, T. (2022). The fall of Muammar Gaddafi and the contemporary security debacle in West Africa: An examination of interconnectedness. KIU Journal of Social Sciences, 8(1), 119–125. Available at: https://ijhumas.com/ojs/index.php/kiujoss/article/view/1414. Date accessed: July 14, 2022. Oyeniyi, B. T. (2019). The history of Libya. Greenwood. Pankhurst, S. (1951). Ex Italian Somaliland. Greenwood Press. Pargeter, A. (2021). Libya’s Islamists: A fragmented landscape. Current trends on Islamist ideology (Vol. 29). Hudson Institute. Rossetto, P. (2021). We were all Italian: “The Construction of a sense of Italianness” among Jews from Libya (the 1920s–1960s). History and Anthropology, 1. https://doi.org/10.1080/0275720 6.2020.1848821 Salabi, A. (2011). Omar al Mokhtar: Lion of the Desert. Al-Firdous. St John, R. (2012). Libya: From colony to revolution. One World Publications. Tsetskhladze, G.  R., & De Angelis, F. (Eds.). (2004). The archaeology of Greek colonisation. Oxford University School of Archaeology. Takeyh, R. (2000). Qadhafi’s Libya and the prospect of Islamic succession. Middle East Policy Washington., 7.I55.2, 154–164. Tishken, J. (2000). North Africa: Peoples and states. In Falola (Ed.), Africa: African history before 1885. Carolina Academic Press. Wehrey, F. (2017). The challenge of violent extremism in North Africa: The case of Libya. March 28.Carnegieendowment.org/files

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Wright, J. (1981). Libya: A modern history. Taylor and Francis. Yates, D. (2018). France and Africa. In D.  Nagar & C.  Mutasa (Eds.), Africa and the world. Palgrave Macmillan. Zerboni, A.(2010). UNESCO World Heritage Site vandalized. Report on damages to Acacus Rock art (SW Libya). Gloria Emeagwali  holds an MA in History from the University of Toronto and her PhD in History from Ahmadu Bello University [Nigeria] in 1985. She joined the CCSU faculty in 1991. Before her arrival, she taught at the University of Ilorin (Nigeria), the Nigerian Defense Academy, and Ahmadu Bello University. She was the founding coordinator of the African Studies Program at CCSU, serving from 1992 until 1997. She was a visiting scholar and senior associate member at St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, in 1990–91, and a visiting scholar at Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, in the Spring of 2000. Dr. Emeagwali’s teaching interests include world history, African history, and specific courses on the African Diaspora in the Caribbean, the History of South Africa, and African History through Film. She is the recipient of the 2014 Distinguished Research Excellence Award, from the University of Texas, Austin, and the 2019 Distinguished Africanist Award, from the New York African Studies Association.

Chapter 13

NATO, EU, and Libya: A Decade of Turmoil Cserkits Michael

Introduction In the following chapter, I will present the strategic constellation between the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States (US), and the Arab Republic of Libya in the timeframe between 2000 and the fall of Muammar al-Gaddafi in 2011. Already at the beginning, I would like to mention some restrictions and constraints regarding this work. Much literature had been written about the military intervention, the coalition-led air raids, the turmoil and violence that wreaked havoc within the country, and the problematic situation with the uncontrolled flow of migrants and refugees through the Mediterranean route toward the EU. But instead of wrapping up all those facts, I would like to present the reader with a more nuanced way of how the situation within these 10  years had changed in so many ways most people had already forgotten. Starting with the early 2000s, when Libya was still a pariah in the Western world, a slow but steady decline happened which found its climax in the official visit of al-Gaddafi to Brussels and his speech in front of the European Commission (a fact that is not often communicated in Europe), which led a new path to the reintegration of the country in a European-led project which offered peace and prosperity. Although the motivations of the European Union as a supranational institution are only vague to reconstruct, I would like to insist that the views and actions set in motion by the EU are not necessarily contingent on national policies, not to mention those of other institutions. As most nations of the EU are also members of NATO (with Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland and Malta, being the only exceptions), one could assume that both supranational institutions, the EU and NATO, would have coexisting goals that are roughly the same when it comes to a safe and secure C. Michael (*) Independent Researchgefer, Pixendorf, Austria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. O. Abidde, F. Kumah-Abiwu (eds.), The Political Impact of African Military Leaders, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31427-8_13

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environment, especially in what is called the “near neighborhood.” But as we will see throughout this chapter, this assumption is rather the exception than the rule. As diverging interests between supranational institutions and individual interests of member states are complicated enough, the role of the USA (as the most potent member of NATO) is of such importance (and diverging from the previous examples), that a thorough examination of US-Libyan relations could fill a whole book, but, again, their somewhat “troublesome” relation will be of importance and only be looked upon in the mentioned timeframe of the last 10  years of the al-Gaddafi regime. In bringing together these three big players and their conflicting perceptions, vision, and approach toward a country that has been isolated for decades from the rest of the world, I aim to present a vivid picture from a new angle toward this inglorious chapter in terms of military intervention, and will roughly sketch in the last subchapters how the intervention was planned to work, how it was conducted, and what outcome was produced. With a short outlook on the country, this chapter will finish by presenting the military-political complex and strategic relationships in the “decade of turmoil.”

EU-Libyan Relationship The idea of creating a common platform for individual states to act together, such as the European Union, was not limited to the old continent. Beginning in 1995, the EU started the so-called Barcelona Process (Barcelona.com, 2021), which aimed to integrate the countries of the Maghreb and Mashriq into a greater economic zone, which would be transited into the “Union for the Mediterranean” (UfM) in 2008 (ufmsecretariat.org, n.d.). It is important to note that even after the normalization of the relationship between the EU and Libya, al-Gaddafi refused to join the UfM as he feared that such a step would juxtapose his dream of a United Africa (Zoubir, 2009a, p. 406). Already at the beginning of the Barcelona Process, peace and security was the second biggest topic besides the economic integration and promotion of European values. Libya played at this time in the whole process a minor role, as it got, due to its international seclusion and sanctions, only observer status and was not able to interfere directly (Abbott, 2018). Tripoli reacted immediately at the intentions of the EU to integrate parts of Africa in a, out of their perspective inapt and unequal, community. In 1999, al-Gaddafi invited the Heads of State of the African Nations to Sirte, where he engaged them to release the “Sirte Declaration” (1999). This declaration, spiked with praise for his person and achievements, can be seen as a direct reaction to the “Barcelona Process,” as al-Gaddafi aimed to build what we know as today’s African Union and African Economic Community. In order to counter the European influence, the Sirte document, which is not as prominently present as European documents, had mirrored the European encounter with Northern Africa and presented the African Head of State with an alternative – especially those of sub-Saharan and Southern Africa – which were at this point of no high priority for Brussels.

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But as al-Gaddafi’s vision of a United Africa, may it be in terms of security or economy, presented an unknown counter-narrative to the until then uncontested European integration discourse, the reaction at the diplomatic level came swiftly. In 2000, the EU held her first EU-African Summit in Cairo, between herself and the then-active OAU (Organization for African Unity) which encompassed (except for Morocco1) all 53 African Nation states. According to the European Commission (2000), the main emphasis of the first summit lay heavily on international cooperation. In deepening the relations between the EU and the African continent, peace and prosperity should flow from the global North to the South. Only some aspects are mentioned in a distinct national sphere, such as budgets, policies for education and training, as well as close cooperation between indigenous actors (EC, 2000, p.  12), countering AIDS and national sustainable development or environmental issues (EC, 2000, p. 13). To sum up, the spirit of the first EU-Africa summit could be seen as similar to the first EU Security Strategy released in 2003, where from the view of Brussels a “ring of friends” surrounded the Union and the main goal was to promote European values across the globe, mainly with financial inducements (Council of the European Union, 2003). Migration was only mentioned two times in the declaration, but the context was quite different from today, as migration was seen as an African problem that caused a “brain drain” (EC, 2000, p. 8). For the nation-state, it seemed that at least in this declaration the main problems were seen in the deeper integration of regional economic communities, international financial exchange, and regional capacity-building in dealing with environmental issues. But all in all, it seemed that the EU was quite fond of its counterpart and the current modus operandi (leaving aside the fact that Muammar al-Gaddafi was still in charge). At least a small note on the role of intranational terrorism on the African continent could be seen as a “hint for improvement” (EC, 2000, p. 10), and the Sirte Declaration was mentioned two times in unimportant side-sentences. Faced with the tremendous economic power of the EU, al-Gaddafi made several important decisions that brought Libya away from the confrontation course to normalization, especially with Europe. After joining the “Global War on Terror,” which definitely altered the relationship with the USA, the abandonment of its nuclear program made it possible for al-Gaddafi to get a piece of the economic cake and participate formally and officially in a broader integration process. Viewing these circumstances from a present-day perspective, one could say that the reintegration of Libya into the economic sphere of Europe went faster than the speed of light, proving that al-Gaddafi had made the right strategic decisions. But his most prominent public staging had yet still to come when he visited EU institutions in April 2004. Interestingly, not very much material is available about the details of the meeting (besides the official press statements), and during the recherché, the impression came up that this part of European history is not as loud communicated as others. As Zoubir (2009a) had analyzed the then ongoing economic

 Morocco had left the OAU in 1985 to protest against the formal entry of Western Sahara in the organization, and returned after 33 years in 2017 to the AU. 1

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pressure from the EU toward Libya, “Europe indicated that its objective remained the integration of Libya into the Barcelona Process via the negotiation and conclusion of an association agreement, provided that Libya accepted the Barcelona acquis” (p. 407). After joining the Barcelona Process (until its dropout in 2008 with the transition to the UfM), diplomatic relations, especially with France, Germany, and the UK, boosted thoroughly, and the decision to compensate the claims of victims from terror attacks that Libyan agents supposedly conducted took the last bargain chip away from Europe (St John, 2008, p. 58). After the normalization in 2004, the reintegration at the economic level, and the reinforcement of diplomatic charming offensives, the EU immediately switched to its next point on the agenda: migration. Beginning in 2006 with the “Conference on Migration and Development” in Tripolis, the securitization of migration started. “In Libya, as elsewhere, the EU is unable (or unwilling) to adopt a long-term vision and an integrated approach to handling migration in practice, despite repeated assurances to the contrary” (Hamood, 2008, p. 37). Rather than addressing the root causes, the EU did not hesitate to change the rhetoric of potential sanctions from the (no longer) threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to illegal migration. Faced with such irritating claims, as there had not been any serious steps taken to help Libya in dealing with the incoming migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, al-Gaddafi found himself betrayed again. Finding himself in the center of Europe’s security interests, al-Gaddafi had suddenly nothing to gain, but everything to lose. As Lutterbeck (2009a) had analyzed, even collaborations in the forced pushback of migrants from Italian waters to Libyan shores did not create the level of positive feedback that al-Gaddafi had awaited, but rather found himself confronted with accusations of using illegal migration as a weapon from 2008 onward, especially from Italy (p. 172). But to simply blame one side is a too easy solution, as both players share their burden in the events that would come: “The Libyan regime, like his neighbors, has understood that paying lip service to reforms, as it has done since March 2008, is enough for Europe and the US to lessen their calls for democratization and concentrate on the lucrative commercial and security deals that serve their interests” (Zoubir, 2009a, p. 414).

NATO-Libyan Relations Similar to the European change in perception of the Mediterranean sphere, and especially the Maghreb, from a source of instability to one of providing security, NATO did approach the Maghreb states after 9/11. Beginning in 1994, the “Mediterranean dialogue” (MD) encompassed Morocco, Tunisia, and Mauretania (Benantar, 2006, p. 169) to foster stability and security cooperation and later coordinate in the Global War on Terror. As the political level did rejoice over the initial success of the initiative, Egypt, Jordan, and Israel as well as Algeria followed, closing Libya’s left and right flank. Libya, which was excluded until it abandoned the WMD program, did negotiate with NATO about possible participation, but, as the

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pace of future events would show, never managed to officially integrate into the partnership. One argument for the long exclusion of “rouge” states such as Libya and Syria (which is excluded until the present day) is that the most potent members of NATO, the UK, and the USS did not see any reason at a diplomatic level to launch any campaigns in the country. One of the main goals of the MD is to “dispel any misconceptions about NATO among Dialogue countries” (NATO, 2015); this goal was, even in recognizing Libya’s reentering of the diplomatic scene, far from achievable, as both al-Gaddafi and the Libyan population had still not forgotten the pictures of destroyed houses from an air bombardment, Operation “Eldorado Canyon” in 1986 (Rivers, 2004, p. 56). It is noteworthy that during the air raid not only military and civilian targets had been hit but also incidentally the French embassy, which led to slight disgruntlement between the two NATO members. As the air package did cover more than 100 airplanes, including electronic-warfare aircraft, the first usage of laser-guided precision bombs and other sophisticated material, the swift and devastating effect of Operation “Eldorado Canyon” was a humiliating strike at the Gaddafi regime, which its leader, despite all later efforts to normalization, did not forget. Aside from the collective memory of the – from a Libyan perspective illegal raid that violated international law – Libya was even after a decade of an international arms embargo (UN Security Council Resolution 748 as a reaction to the alleged bombing of a British and French airliner by Libyan agents) still capable to defend against its potent neighbors, Algeria and Egypt, and maintain order in its territory. As Benantar wrote, “Libya does not need security assistance from NATO or Europe. It is simply seeking its rehabilitation and the demonstration of its utility in the matter of counter-terrorism in the Sahel-Saharan region and illegal emigration in the Mediterranean” (2006, p. 179). The high capability of the Gaddafi regime to maintain a potent Armed Force despite an international embargo is grounded in its history. Already under the reign of King Idris’ from 1951 to 1969, the USA and the UK were the main weapon exporters to the country, counting for more than 90% of all weapon imports in this era (Lutterbeck, 2009b, p.  506). After the decline of relations with the West, al-­ Gaddafi turned toward the Soviet Union, where he purchased massive amounts of military equipment, and eventually became the tenth biggest army in the world with more than 3000 main battle tanks and an air force the same size as France (Lutterbeck, 2009b, p. 509). What fewer scholars take into account, besides the research of pure numbers and statistics in the rearmament of the Libyan state, is the fact that aside from the incorporation of Soviet equipment is also inseparable from the respective doctrine, at least at the beginning of the implementation of a new weapon system. In the decades from 1980 till the weapon embargo in 1992, the massive prop on Soviet material influenced the corps of the armed forces in training, doctrine, and tactics to make the best use of the purchased material. As al-Gaddafi was suspicious of both – Capitalism and Communism, which he viewed as both sides of a coin – it is not an unsubstantiated assumption that Soviet doctrines were fully incorporated in the officer’s cadre to effectively and efficiently use the Warsaw Pact arms. Out of this tradition, NATO doctrines, contrary to the Warsaw Pact’s understanding of the

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battlefield, and ways of thinking war would have had more than a rough start if deeper cooperation would have have ever been installed. Unlike Morocco or Egypt, close allies to the USA and UK, the Libyan officers would have been confronted with a completely new way of dealing with the battlefield, but one could only guess if this reason alone was convincing enough that NATO never started on the journey to implement cooperation with the country. The noncoherence of NATO toward Libya falls in the same category as the one of the EU. As both international organizations consist of individual nation-states, they do not always share the same agenda as the community they are part of. As already mentioned in the introduction, national policies and interests always played a role for European powers when dealing with Libya and influenced the approach of multinational bodies, as well as vice versa. A good example of this hypothesis is the immediate retaliation of Libya for Operation “Eldorado Canyon,” where it fired ground-to-ground missiles toward the Italian island of Lampedusa on US military installations (Varvelli, 2010, p. 119) and caused major diplomatic tensions between the two countries. Albeit the fact that such an act of aggression against a NATO member would have been reason enough to call for a collective act of defense, Italy acted with outstanding calmness due to the dependency on Libyan gas. The incident was forgotten very fast, and even in 2008, 3 years before the fall of the regime and in an already declining climate of Libyan-European relations, Italy signed a bilateral “Treaty of friendship.” In this treaty, the special relationship between the two countries is emphasized, and Italy offered an investment of $5 billion for the next years to come (Ronzitti, 2009, p.  128). Even in the last months before the total degrading of diplomatic relations in the wake of the Arab Spring, Italy did still, in close connection with Malta, cooperate with Libya in terms of repatriating migrants on an informal agreement setup immediately after the country had reentered the international diplomatic sphere (Mateos, 2005).

US-Libyan Relations No research about the strategic relation between Libya, Europe, and NATO would be complete if the US point of view would not have taken into account. Being a most potent member of NATO, the US position toward the country did shape NATO’s and EU’s position to a great extent, although in the wake of the turmoil in Libya, after the “day of rage” on 17 February, the speed of policy change to al-­ Gaddafi was that fast that it could be stated that the USA did not want al-Gaddafi to fall. A British officer, who served in SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) during the strategic planning phase regarding the events in Libya, supported my assessment and told me that it was never NATO’s intention to instigate a regime change,2 but only to install a no-fly-zone hinder the Libyan air force of  This conversation took place during one of my operational exercises, where I happened to talk with the respective high-ranked officer about this project and gained his permission to use this information, if his identity isn’t revealed. 2

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delivering their sorties against rebel groups. As the USA provides most of the manand combat power in the NATO structure, I assume that their intention was the same, given the fact that the final blow against al-Gaddafi was a combined British and French operation, finalized by rebels on the ground. To get a clearer picture of the US position these days, one must remember that operation “Iraqi Freedom” to topple the Saddam regime had unprecedented second-­ order effects. As the “Coalition of the Willing” formed with the closest allies of the USA (mainly British and Australian forces, as well as small contingents from other NATO countries), Germany and France openly disagreed with the operation, leaving a heavy fracture within the coalition and dividing the position in Europe as well. Gedmin (2003), for example, analyzed the strategic break in fundamental questions of such bearing in a very negative way, claiming that European countries are putting their national interests over the sake of the alliance. Despite such subliminal attacks against the US declaration on the “Global War on Terror,” the US-General James L. Jones, who was in his second role as the SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) of NATO, told during an interview with the New York Times only 1 year later in 2004: “Libya, assuming this conversion is genuine and long-lasting, could certainly become an important player, certainly because of its geostrategic location” (Schmitt, 2004, p. 7), and envisaged a partnership with the country that the USA had with other allies. As SACEUR is in his first role also the US-led EUCOM (US European Command) and AFRICOM (US Africa Command), this statement can be seen as valid for both the positions at that time: NATO and the USA. As the relationship between the USA and Libya had changed at a pace similar to the position of the EU to the country, the perception of al-Gaddafi as irrational, unpredictable, and bizarre had turned to a more problem-centric and realistic picture of him. As analysts in those days wrote, the main cause for the change in the relationship between the two countries was diplomacy, not power politics, making it an example of a peaceful solution to differences in a post-Cold War world (Nmoma, 2009). The comment of the General was then supported by a row of other events, such as the massive uprising of US oil companies in the newly opened Libyan energy market, with the Occidental Petroleum Corporation (often abbreviated as Oxy) and Chevron Oil as the big sole winners of the 2004 auctions (Fattouh, 2008, p. 6). Other sources confirmed that oil consortiums with US participation won 13 of a total of 15 bids (Khodadad, 2005, p. 34). With such a huge investment volume, the USA entered the country, at least on the economic floor, after isolating it for more than two decades. Libya’s contribution to the war on terror, the indirect participation in the US-led Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), and the official invitation of the USA to join it in 2009 (Warner, 2014, p. 24) made it clear that until the wake of the Arab spring, a rational and diplomatic approach was the method of choice from Washington. Only a few criticized the new American approach as hypocritical, as the USA, just as many European countries, sought to benefit from the Libyan wealth in oil and gas, spoke openly about democratization and human rights, toppling regimes in the name of those values, yet leaving al-Gaddafi and his authoritarian regime out of the picture (Zoubir, 2009b).

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Strategic Development In the wake of the so-called Arab Spring, the uprising that started with the self-­ incineration of a Tunisian street vendor, several states in Northern Africa and the Middle East faced severe civilian protests. Some found a peaceful way out of the crisis, and some even held democratic elections and toppled long-term dictators. And some reacted with even more state violence, as in the case of Libya. Muammar al-Gaddafi, leading the country as a dictator since the mid-1970s, mobilized his army and security forces to end the beginning social uprising in his country even before it had gained speed. But even the tight grip of Gaddafi’s hand could not suppress what started with a few demonstrations in early February 2011 in Benghazi (Wester, 2020, p. 96). As the revolution got more and more encouragement by the developments in nearby Egypt and Tunisia and monitored the beginning of resistance against the al-Assad regime in Syria, even Gaddafi was forced to react. In one of his last infamous public speeches on television, he openly addressed the revolution as alien and warned them that he would go to the utmost possible solution and “cleanse” the country if necessary (p. 101). In publicly addressing his intentions “… Qadhafi not only substantiated claims the opposition made about atrocities the regime had committed or would commit, but he also provided the international community with additional arguments to be vigilant – and eventually take action against Libya” (p. 101). And the international community did react. Even if the skepticism, especially from the USA, was exceptionally present,3 the situation in the country escalated within weeks. What had begun as civil unrest turned into a full-scale civil war in March 2011. As Gaddafi’s troops relentlessly marched toward Benghazi, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1973 (UNSC, 2011, p. 3) on 17 March 2011 and imposed a no-fly zone over the country to help the rebels and assure the protection of civilians. Only 2 days later, on 19 March 2011, the US-led operation “Odyssey Dawn” started to attack Gaddafi’s forces through a coordinated naval and air campaign; 2 weeks later, the mission was integrated into the NATO-led air campaign “Unified Protector” (Weissman, 2016, p.  673) and effectively crushed Gaddafi’s offensive capabilities. Already at this point, several authors accuse NATO of the misuse of the Security Council Resolution, like Kuperman (2013), who had traced the air raids. In his conclusion, the primary aim of the intervention was not the protection of civilians but rather a regime change in the country (p. 113). Despite several cease-fire offers from the Libyan regime – which would inevitably help or at least mitigated the situation for civilians caught between the warring parties – the rebels, backed by NATO, declined all of them. “To the contrary, all available evidence indicates that NATO‘s primary objective, starting early in the intervention, was to help the rebels overthrow Qaddafi, even if

 According to the former Director of US National Intelligence, James Clapper, any US intervention should be avoided, as the outcome might be “… a divided country or even a Somalia-like mess” (Chivvis, 2014, p. 47). 3

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this escalated and extended the civil war and thereby magnified the threat to Libya’s civilians” (p. 115). NATO’s role in the conflict is more than worth a discussion. But to think that the USA used this institution to avenge the Lockerbie incident4 is far too narrow. As Ceccorulli and Coticchia (2015) had shown, Italy’s role in the military campaign is also far from being just a handmaiden of American interests. Italy’s participation in the conflict stems from its long intertwined history with the country, and the multidimensional raison d’être is somewhere between strategic issues, domestic interests, economic influence, and to a certain extent the self-perception in enforcing international laws (p. 316). Finally, the heavy air-centric intervention is somehow a case sui generis, as some authors argue that the expansive interpretation of the Resolution 1973 (like the use of Special Forces even if “ground forces” are explicitly forbidden) may weaken the legitimacy of future military interventions (Egnell, 2014, p. 230). Gaddafi, for his part, had not to worry about such issues. On 20 October 2011, two French fighter aircraft attacked his convoy, followed by a British “Reaper” drone which heavily injured the dictator. As nearby rebels chased ground, Gaddafi tried to hide but was found by the militia and executed right on the spot – filmed live with a cell phone (Chivvis, 2014, p. 168). After his death, the country descended into an abattoir of several armed rebel groups and two different governments which are still quarreling with each other. The unregulated migration from Libyan shores reached unexpanded heights, and the spoils of Gaddafi’s weapon storages got proliferated to countries all over the continent. This nourished all sorts of rebels, self-­ proclaimed freedom fighters, and religious fundamentalists and was one of the sparks that would later incinerate Mali.

Bring in the Turmoil As the country had destabilized to an unpredicted extent, the EU did what it thought would be the best  – intervene and train. With the decision of the Council of the European Union (2013) from 22 May 2013, the Training Mission EUBAM Libya (European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya) started. The four objectives of the mission are: … (a) through training and mentoring, to support Libyan authorities in strengthening the border services in accordance with international standards and best practices; (b) to advise the Libyan authorities on the development of a Libyan national IBM strategy; (c) to support the Libyan authorities in strengthening their institutional operational capabilities. (p. 1)

 The Lockerbie incident refers to the terroristic attack on Pan-American World Airways flight on 21 December 1988. 189 US citizens died, and it is said that Libyan Intelligence Officers had conducted the assault, even if the government never took responsibility for it. 4

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It can be, like in similar cases of Mali and CAR already seen, that two distinct features are of utmost importance for the EU: First, the – again – attempt to stabilize a country through enforcing law and order (in this case integrated border management, IBM) which had already been labeled “static” and proofed to be inept. Second, the reactive nature of the mission has to be highlighted. Already when an issue, like migration, is pressing single governments to gain EU-wide support (as Italy wasn’t capable and willing to share the bulk of refugees from the Mediterranean Sea), they can constitute a conservative solution. But in this case, the intervention came too late. As Libya’s internal structure felt more and more apart during the year 2013, “… militia has also begun to seize government property and act like an independent security agency rather than a spontaneously formed militia” (Gaub, 2013, p. 3). That these developments were rather surprising for the officials in Brussels is shown in an in-depth study about the country’s political options (Fedtke, 2017) conducted 3 years after Gaddafi’s demotion. As there was still no decision if the future government should be more federal or unitary, more and more former revolutionaries got disenchanted and joined the ranks of those who promised rapid change. This development wasn’t stopped either by the EU or its mission – albeit the fact that it had neither the will nor the capabilities to do so – and led to a de facto split of the country between Islamists in Tobruk, secular forces in Tripoli (Gaub, 2015) and a political bankruptcy. As the different factions made no sign to negotiate about the future of the country, the EU invested around €120 million in 2017 for improving living conditions for the countless refugees and internally displaced persons (European Commission, 2017). Another €60 million had been allocated for the stillrunning border management mission EUBAM, which is currently running until 20 June 2023 (Council of the European Union, 2021, p. 1), but due to the unchanged migration and security situation is likely to be extended into an unknown future.

Conclusion: Desperate Outlook So what was achieved through the combined US-EU-led intervention in 2011, aside from a country torn apart? Facing the unexpected amount of migration from the country, Cusumano (2019) estimated that between 2014 and 2017, around 13,000 persons died en route from Libya to Italy, making the southern frontier one of the deadliest in the world (p. 1). But rather to present long-lasting solutions that aim to help people on the spot and reduce the necessity to gamble on an uncertain journey across the sea, the EU is more concerned with taking measures to simply block this particular route (Cserkits, 2020). In doing so, it is no surprise that recent literature labels the EU as a “hypocritical actor” and the rhetoric around the use of military vessels along the known migration routes as “organized hypocrisy” (Cusumano, 2019, p. 6). Further, the toppling of Gaddafi has to be seen in a broader context, as the destabilization of Libya, with its vast and distributed weapon storages, offered the capability of reinforcing other violent actors in the whole of Maghreb.

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This hostile environment has, according to Anderson (2018), two non-intended effects on potential migration: First, neighboring countries criminalize migration in order to receive further aid and donor courtesy from the EU, but through this step, they facilitate to an extent the potential of illegal smugglers who offer their services to the despair. “[S]econd, a fundamental undermining of regional labor mobility options for migrants who fit the irregular ‘profile’, including many sub-Saharan foreigners simply targeted because of their physical traits” (Anderson, 2018, p. 132). The exportation of the European notion of migration as a potential threat and the adaption of this view from most Northern African states (to be first in line for receiving the EU’s goodwill) is one of the greatest problems to become in the next decade. Additionally, atrocities against civilians – the main aim to prevent and the reason to intervene in the first place – continue on an even larger scale (O’Sullivan, 2018), and neutral assessment of claimed crimes against humanity is, due to the dire security conditions, often impossible. And exactly because the envisioned new nation-­ state had never come into existence, new actors fill its role, some with questionable motives. Just like investigative journalist Greenwald (2016) had forecasted several years ago: the first intervention was such a success that new ones had to follow. As the country is now war-torn for over a decade, killing means nothing to the different factions, as O’Sullivan dryly states: “The actions of the Misratan rebels were not a challenge to liberal norms, but a logical extension of the script of humanitarian intervention that states that it is entirely justified to kill outside a legal framework as long as you know that those you are killing are already guilty” (2018, p. 175). Such a framework is the prelude for ethnic cleansing, one that hopefully will never come. Despite the EU’s permanent repetition of the promotion of values, especially in its neighborhood, all approaches remain centered around or aim directly at migration, as a discoursive analysis of policy papers has shown (Ekiz, 2018). EUBAM, still in action and trying to contribute to a more regulated border control management, hasn’t changed even in light of the different situation than after Gaddafi’s fall. “But EUBAM Libya faces challenges that are beyond its mandate; the poor infrastructure, the lack of awareness when it comes to law enforcement, the military mindset of many border guards which stands in contrast to largely civilian European perceptions of border management are all challenges that will require time – time Libya possibly does not have” (Gaub, 2014, p. 50). The case of Libya can therefore serve as a prime example of an intervention without a plan. Not only did Europe, the European member states, and those who are double-headed as NATO and EU members experimented with a country they had no idea about how to pursue, they made the situation for people even worse. I do neither want to defend Gaddafi’s rule nor the crimes he committed against his citizens. But the current humanitarian situation is even worse than under his rule, and like O’Sullivan (2018) has argued, one has to question if there is a responsibility to protect if there should also be the possibility to refuse interference for good.

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References Abbott, S. G. (2018, November 28). The EU and the Middle East: From the Euro-Mediterranean partnership to the Union for the Mediterranean. E-IR. https://www.e-­ir.info/2018/11/28/ the-­e u-­a nd-­t he-­m iddle-­e ast-­f rom-­t he-­e uro-­m editerranean-­p artnership-­t o-­t he-­u nion-­f or-­ themediterranean/ Anderson, R. (2018). Europe’s failed ‘fight’ against irregular migration. In M. Kaldor, I. Rangelov, & S. Selchow (Eds.), EU global strategy and human security. Rethinking approaches to conflict (pp. 123–141). Taylor & Francis Routledge. Benantar, A. (2006). NATO, Maghreb and Europe. Mediterranean Politics, 11(2), 167–188. https:// doi.org/10.1080/13629390600682891 Ceccorulli, M., & Coticchia, F. (2015). Multidimensional threats and military engagement: The case of the Italian intervention in Libya. Mediterranean Politics, 20(3), 303–321. https://doi. org/10.1080/13629395.2015.1042245 Chivvis, C. S. (2014). Toppling Qaddafi. Libya and the limits of Liberal intervention. Cambridge University Press. Council of the European Union. (2003, December 8). A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-­15895-­2003-­INIT/en/pdf Council of the European Union. (2013). COUNCIL DECISION 2013/233/CFSP of 22 May 2013 on the European Union Integrated Border Management assistance mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya). https://eur-­lex.europa.eu/legal-­content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:3201 3D0233&from=EN Council of the European Union. (2021). COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2021/1009 of 18 June 2021 amending decision 2013/233/CFSP on the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya). https://eur-­lex.europa.eu/legal-­content/EN/TXT/ PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020D0903&from=EN Cserkits, M. (2020). Europe towards Imperialism 2.0?  – A critical review of legitimizing military intervention with the case example of EUTM MALI. [Doctoral dissertation, University of Vienna]. Cusumano, E. (2019). Migrant rescue as organized hypocrisy: EU maritime missions offshore Libya between humanitarianism and border control. Cooperation and Conflict, 54(1), 3–24. Egnell, R. (2014). Conclusion: Lessons and consequences of operation unified protector. In K. Engelbrekt, M. Mohlin, & C. Wagnsson (Eds.), The NATO intervention in Libya. Lessons learned from the campaign (pp. 221–235). Taylor & Francis Routledge. Ekiz, S. (2018). EU strategy in Libya: Discourses vs actions. European Foreign Affairs Review, 23(3), 405–426. European Commission. (2000, April 4). Africa-Europe Summit under the Aegis of the OAU and the EU. Cairo, 3–4 April 2000. Cairo Declaration. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/ detail/en/PRES_00_901 European Commission. (2017). EU action in Libya on migration. https://ec.europa.eu/home-­ affairs/sites/default/files/what-­w e-­d o/policies/european-­a genda-­m igration/20171207_ eu_action_in_libya_on_migration_en.pdf Fattouh, B. (2008). Bassam Fattouh considers the history of foreign oil companies in Libya. Oxford Energy Forum, 73, 5–9. Fedtke, J. (2017). Comparative analysis between the constitutional process in Egypt and Tunisia – Lessons learnt – Overview of the constitutional situation in Libya. Publications Office of the European Union. Gaub, F. (2013). Libya: The struggle for security. European Union Institute for Security Studies, 25, 1–4. Gaub, F. (2014). The EU and Libya and the art of the possible. The International Spectator, 49(3), 40–53. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2014.937093 Gaub, F. (2015). Libya: Law(s) and disorders. European Union Institute for Security Studies, 13, 1–2.

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Gedmin, J. (2003). In love with Libya. The American Spectator, 40–41. Greenwald, G. (2016, January 27). The U.S. intervention in Libya was such a smashing success that a sequel is coming. The Intercept. https://theintercept.com/2016/01/27/ the-­u-­s-­intervention-­in-­libya-­was-­such-­a-­smashing-­success-­that-­a-­sequel-­is-­coming/ Hamood, S. (2008). EU–Libya cooperation on migration: A raw deal for refugees and migrants? Journal of Refugee Studies, 21(1), 19–42. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fem040 Khodadad, N.  L. (2005). Libya launches second exploration tender. Project Finance Newswire, 34–39. Kuperman, J. (2013). A model humanitarian intervention? Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign. International Security, 38(1), 105–136. Lutterbeck, D. (2009a). Migrants, weapons and oil: Europe and Libya after the sanctions. The Journal of North African Studies, 14(2), 169–184. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629380802343558 Lutterbeck, D. (2009b). Arming Libya: Transfers of conventional weapons past and present. Contemporary Security Policy, 30(3), 505–528. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260903327451 Mateos, E.  S. (2005). Libya’s return to the international scene. Mediterranean Politics, 10(3), 439–445. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629390500289680 Nmoma, V. (2009). Power and force: Libya’s relation with the United States. Journal of Third World Studies, 26(2), 137–159. North Atlantic Treaty Council. (2015, February 13). NATO Mediterranean dialogue. https://www. nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_60021.htm? O’Sullivan, S. (2018). Military intervention in the Middle East and North Africa. The case of NATO in Libya. Taylor & Francis Routledge. Rivers, B. P. (2004). EW in history. Journal of Electronic Defense, 24(2), 56–57. Ronzitti, N. (2009). The treaty on friendship, partnership and cooperation between Italy and Libya: New prospects for cooperation in the Mediterranean? Bulletin of Italian Politics, 1(1), 125–133. Schmitt, E. (2004, March 27). U.S. general envisions Libya as possible ally. New  York Times. https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=43wien&id=GALE|A114657337&v=2.1&it=r&sid =bookmark-­AONE&asid=b0780051 Sirte Declaration. (1999, September 9). African Union. Retrieved July 7, 2021, from https:// archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/2475/1999_Sirte%20_Decl_%20E.pdf?sequenc e=1&isAllowed=y St John, R.  B. (2008). Reforming the economy, not the polity. In Y.  H. Zoubir & H.  Amirah-­ Fernández (Eds.), North Africa. Politics, region and the limits of transformation (pp. 53–70). Routledge. The Barcelona Process or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. (n.d.). Barcelona. Retrieved July 7, 2021, from https://www.barcelona.com/barcelona_news/the_barcelona_process_or_euro_ mediterranean_partnership ufmsecretariat.org. History of the Union for the Mediterranean. (n.d.). Union for the Mediterranean. Retrieved July 7, 2021, from https://ufmsecretariat.org/who-­we-­are/history/ UNSC.com. (2011). Resolution 1973 (2011) was Adopted by the Security Council at its 6498th meeting, on 17 March 2011. https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/1973%20(2011) Varvelli, A. (2010). Italy and Libya: Renewing a special relationship. The International Spectator, 45(3), 117–130. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2010.504627 Warner, L. A. (2014). The trans Sahara counter terrorism partnership. Building partner capacity to counter terrorism and violent extremism. Center for Naval Analysis. https://www.cna.org/ cna_files/pdf/crm-­2014-­u-­007203-­final.pdf Weissman, S. R. (2016). Presidential deception in foreign policy making: Military intervention in Libya 2011. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 46(3), 669–690. Wester, K. (2020). Intervention in Libya. The responsibility to protect in North Africa. Cambridge University Press. Zoubir, Y. H. (2009a). Libya and Europe: Economic realism at the rescue of the Qaddafi authoritarian regime. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 17(3), 401–415. https://doi. org/10.1080/14782800903339354 Zoubir, Y. H. (2009b). The United States and Libya: From confrontation to normalization. Middle East Policy, 13(2), 48–70.

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Cserkits Michael  is an independent post-doc researcher. After graduating from the Austrian Military Academy in 2011, he began studying at the University of Vienna. He holds an MA in Sociology and an MA in Social and Cultural Anthropology. He completed his PhD in African Studies in 2020 with a critical assessment of EU policy papers dealing with the changing relationship between the EU and Mali from 2012 onward. He is now an independent post-doc researcher and publishes for think tanks and journals alike. His research interests range from Military Studies and Leadership in different cultural contexts towards Visual Culture and Media Studies. Currently, he works in the research fields of security issues relating to the Sahel zone, EU-African cooperation in combating terrorism as well as Anthropological theory in terms of cultural restraints and perception.

Chapter 14

Psychobiographical Analysis in International Politics: A Focus on Moammar Ghaddafi of Libya Idowu Johnson

Introduction In analyzing modern history, it is imperative to note that the world has witnessed unusual political leaders whose actions and politics had or have meaningful consequences for both the destiny of his or her nation and the international community as a whole. Such individuals emphasize the importance of personality in politics because it is difficult, if not impossible, to critically evaluate the behavior of the countries that they lead without understanding their own personalities, motivations, and the historical circumstances that shaped their attitudes. It is this reality that has given credence to psychobiography as a tool of analysis. Quite obviously, such is the case of Moammar Ghaddafi of Libya. For almost four decades, Ghaddafi was a major actor in the international community, evoking mixed reactions all over the world. However, it is very difficult to critically evaluate the behavior of Libya which Ghaddafi governed without understanding Ghaddafi’s childhood experience, education, personality, and crucial moments of personal trajectory which influenced his perception of the world that later shaped his attitude or his public decisions (Pondi, 2013). It is in this context that this paper is using a psychobiographical framework (process) in analyzing Ghaddafi’s personality and behavior in international affairs. The psychobiographical case study was utilized to holistically investigate the personality development of this controversial individual, and thus reinterpret Ghaddafi’s psychological movement through life. In a global society that experiences many challenges and changes, the past – and its exceptional figures – may be useful to the understanding of contemporary society (Schultz, 2005; Chase, 2009). Thus, psychobiography is basically an attempt to match the psychological profile of a nation with a biographical examination of its I. Johnson (*) University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. O. Abidde, F. Kumah-Abiwu (eds.), The Political Impact of African Military Leaders, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31427-8_14

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leadership. It analyzes the childhood and environmental experiences of a country’s leader in the belief that those factors often determine the direction of the nation (McAdams, 1988). The main thrust of this paper is to investigate the sociocultural history of Moammar Ghaddafi and his contribution to the dynamics of international politics.

Methodological Considerations The paper adopts a qualitative research design to gain insight into the analysis of psychobiography and its linkages with history, biographical, and narrative research. Life history is a style of research that advocates engaging individuals, accurately describing the way they express their understanding of the world and an analysis of such expressions. Life history research and its derivative, psychobiography, may thus be seen to embody the true spirit of the qualitative approach to the study of human behavior (Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p. 286). In the same vein, biographical research is presented in various forms, such as life history, life story, memoirs, autobiography, and case study (Denzin, 1989). Carlson (1988) observed that life history materials, such as psychobiographies, are ideal for testing the relevance of various theories of development. Data sources related to the life history of Moammar Ghaddafi consisted of biographical and historical materials. The collected materials were mainly through secondary sources. Secondary sources included various published books, biographies, newspapers, articles, as well as Internet materials. The collected materials on Moammar Ghaddafi were qualitatively analyzed in a descriptive format. To achieve its objective, this paper is divided into six sections. Section one is the introduction, which is followed by the methodology as the second section. Section three comprises a conceptual discourse of psychobiography, followed by a theoretical framework of analysis which is the Erikson psychosocial theory of development in section four. The fifth section examines Moammar Ghaddafi’s phenomenon. The sixth section is the conclusion.

Conceptual Discourse The concept of psychobiography is situated within the discipline of political psychology. Political psychology refers to the study of how human psychology – our thought processes, personalities, beliefs, and so on – affects politics, and it can be thought of as the area where the academic disciplines of political science and psychology overlap and intersect (Hougton, 2011, p. 51). However, the concept of psychobiography is viewed and analyzed from different perspectives by different scholars. Bromley (1986) described psychobiography as a biographical study wherein psychological concepts, methods, and findings play a major role. For

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McLeod (1994) psychobiography can be understood within the context of a qualitative narrative case study, which is concerned with clarifying and understanding the stories people tell about their life experiences. According to Howe (1997), psychobiography is a way to conduct psychological research through the extensive use of biographical data in order to examine the growth of original thinking, creativity, and productivity in unusual individuals. Anderson (1981) argued that psychobiography involves both longitudinal and cross-cultural research of the psychological dimensions of a historical figure through the application of psychological theory, usually developed in the twentieth century to cross-culturally investigate subjects of an earlier era. More importantly, psychobiography according to Hougton (2011) focuses on the personality characteristics of political leaders and how these characteristics affect their performance in office. Thus, psychobiography fundamentally serves to shed light on both inner and subjective experiences and the connection between life and theory (Schultz, 2005). Van Niekerk as cited in Kertzer and Tingley (2018, p. 376) indicates that an overview of various descriptions of psychobiography suggests that the following universal characteristics are common to psychobiographical research, namely: • Psychobiographies, in most cases, utilize qualitative data. • Psychobiographers prefer a comprehensive and longitudinal approach to the study of an individual’s lifespan, rather than compartmentalized episodes or phases within their development. • The subjects of psychobiographies are always identified by name as opposed to those in quantitative research where participants in the majority of cases enjoy anonymity. • Psychobiographers utilize biographical data, in the majority of cases have been collected by other researchers such as historians and biographers. • Psychobiographers do not collect data to necessarily solve preset research problems per se, but rather because the information is inherently interesting and valuable and enjoys historical and psychological significance. Although various dimensions and interpretations are utilized in the description of the concept, the essence of psychobiography was encapsulated by McAdams: The study of an entire life, from birth to death, with the aim to discern, discover and formulate the central story of the entire life, a story structured according to psychological theory. (McAdams, 1994, p. 12)

Theoretical Background: Erikson Psychosocial Development Erikson’s (1977, 1993) theory of psychosocial development was used to uncover and reconstruct Ghaddafi’s development throughout his lifespan. Erikson viewed humans as biological, psychological, and social beings that are shaped by a mix of interactive forces. Psychosocial development theory allows for lifelong

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development and a degree of personal freedom that ascribes a greater role to social influences on development (Erikson, 1977). Erikson conceptualized human development and behaviors in terms of an epigenetic principle and interaction with the environment. After decades of research, Erikson concluded that “the psychoanalytic method is essentially a historical method” (Erikson, 1977, p. 14). Furthermore, he started a groundbreaking experience, when he tried to capture the interaction of individual personality and historical milieu by analyzing life stories (Kovary, 2011). Erikson focused on ego development, which marked a move “upward” in consciousness from Freud’s emphasis on unconsciousness drives (Erikson, 1977). He described the ego as an executive element of personality that makes coordinated or planned functioning possible. At each developmental stage, the ego chooses between the different developmental possibilities and tries to formulate creative solutions to the developmental crises (Hoare, 2002). Erikson first presented his solutions in Childhood and Society (1977) through a psychoanalytical interpretation of the young manhood of a historical (Adolf Hitler) and a literatury (Maxim Gorky) (Kovary, 2011, p. 752). Similarly, Erikson’s psychosocial theory focuses “outward” to the social world that provides opportunities for identity development by providing personal, work, and civic roles (Hoare, 2002). Erikson (1977, 1993) recognized the influence of social factors on development and emphasized the vital interplay between the individual and the context. The psychosocial perspective posited an intra- and interpersonal view in which external culture and society enter the psyche to preside over norms, views, adaptation, and behavior (Hoare, 2005). Erikson (1977, 1993) maintained that in order to understand the complexity of development, the individual must be viewed within the sociocultural and historical context. Erikson (1977) argued that social history and personal psychology converge in the concrete behavior of “great” individuals and that one disciplinary focus could help in the clarification of another. Erikson’s psychobiographies on Martin Luther (1958) and Mahatma Gandhi (1969) are prime examples of the necessity to view an individual’s involving psychosocial identities within the entire sociocultural and historical context across time. Despite some criticisms against psychobiography, it is very useful to shed some light on political behavior. As noted earlier, it is difficult to explain the history and behavior of certain countries at a particular point in time without emphasis on the leadership variable. Such is the case of Moammar Ghaddafi of Libya. Applying Erikson’s psychosocial theory, Ghaddafi’s life is illustrated below within the context of historical and developmental periods.

Ghaddafi’s Phenomenon This section analyzes the man called Ghaddafi and his politics with particular emphasis on the extent to which both have been dependent on his upbringing and childhood experiences. To this end, a chronological life of Ghaddafi is presented below.

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The Early Years of Ghaddafi Moammar Ghaddafi’s firebrand personality had been forged in the heat of the Arab-­ Israeli conflict. Born on June 7, 1942, at Qasr Abu Hadi, a rural area located some 18 miles southwest of Sirte (Pondi, 2013, p. 23). According to many biographies, his family belongs to a small tribe of Arabs, the Qadhadhfa. They are mostly herders that live in the Hun Oasis. His parents, a young Bedouin couple, lived among 60 or so cousins, uncles, and parents spread over four generations, from forefathers to children. They traveled with their herds (camels, goats, rams, and ewes) from encampment to encampment, beneath the implacable light of the desert, bypassing rocks, in search of thorny bushes, stalks of plants growing miraculously in the arid landscape, limitless space, dunes hanging from the horizon, without flowers or streams, grass, or trees (Jouve, 2005, p. 7). The tribe where Ghaddafi came from is a social school whose members relate from childhood to the high ideals that gave birth to a learned social behavior for life. As the only boy in his family, he experienced a tumultuous childhood, punctuated by the sound of cannons and bombing airplanes, circumstances that the toddler at that time could not grasp and understand (Pondi, 2013). In the mind of Ghaddafi, such things as war, travel, troops and even resistance were always present. It was far from a gilded and romantic youth for whom to grow would rhyme with the discovery of the self, the environment, and others. At the age of 9 years, the young Ghaddafi was admitted to the primary school of Sirte and thus began writing a new page in the history of his family. Since the dawn of time, he was the first offspring of his clan to have ever set foot in a school. Doubtless, his parents, aware of his intelligence and capacity for observation, wanted to give him an education that would enable him to understand the complexities of Western society in the postindustrial era, rather than leave him forever with the soul of a shepherd (Jouve, 2005, p. 10). The young Ghaddafi was a very quest, intelligent boy who loved listening to stories about the struggle of his people with the colonizers after the First World War. He listened over Radio Cairo to the impassioned speeches of Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, which filled him with visions of Arab unity. Pondi (2013) observed that Ghaddafi was addicted to the Egyptian leader and developed boundless admiration for his defense of the three ideals of Pan-Arabism, Arab culture, and Arab dignity. The young Ghaddafi admired Abdel Nasser and looked to him as a hero during his rise to power in 1952. Attacks of the Americans, British, and Israelis were all seen by the peoples of the Arab world as feats that raised Abdel Nasser to the prestigious status of “anti-imperialist hero.” Thus, Ghaddafi started to talk about a revolution when he was only 14. A revolution he had concluded was the only way to unite the Arabs and remove all imperialist influence in the Arab world. The imperialists were, as the stories he had heard and what he had experienced as a youth, the worst enemies of his people. As a youth, Ghaddafi looked up to Nasser for his personality and the magnetism he exercised over young Arabs.

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Military Training In the years Ghaddafi spent in school at Sebha (1956–1961), he had few friends with whom he began his activities as an agitator, organizing political demonstrations without authorization from the school. His activities and the controversies they generated culminated in his expulsion from the school. He led his friends to demonstrate over Patrice Lumumba’s death in the Congo, the explosion of the French atomic bomb in the Sahara, the Algerian revolution, and any other event he felt was the handiwork of imperialists in the Arab world and African continent (Bianco, 1975). While in Sebha, he was briefly a member of scouting. Ghaddafi’s political activism at Sebha and his unconcealed desire to emulate the example of his Egyptian hero joined the Royal Academy of Benghazi and the Libyan Military in 1963. He proceeded to create a secret revolutionary group whose name was reminiscent of a similar structure erected some years ago on the banks of the Nile, “the Free Unionists Officers Movements.” To be sure, the purpose of joining the movement was not to learn the art of military science but rather to prepare the officers for the overthrown of the Libyan monarchy considered pro-Western by most of its members. According to Ghaddafi: When we decided to enter the military academy, it was not to become professional soldiers but to infiltrate the institution and prepare for the revolution. Our country was occupied by foreign forces. At that time, there were on Libyan soil, five U.S. military bases and an equal number of British bases and barracks. To all these was added the permanent presence of the Italian army of colonization. Our duty was to liberate our land from occupation. (Ghaddafi as cited in Pondi, 2013, p. 27)

Upon his graduation in 1965, he was sent to Britain for further training at the British Army Staff College, now the Joint Services Command and Staff College, returning in 1966 as a commissioned officer in the Signal Corps.

The Libyan Revolution of 1969 Ghaddafi’s earlier association with the Free Officers Movement prepared the ground for his revolutionary inclination. Most of his future colleagues on the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) were fellow members of his graduating class at the military academy. The frustration and shame felt by Libyan officers by Israel’s massive defeat of the Arab armies on three fronts in 1967 fueled their determination to contribute to Arab unity by overthrowing the Libyan monarchy. On September 1, 1969, a small group of junior military officers led by Ghaddafi staged a bloodless coup d’état against King Idris of Libya while the king was in Turkey for medical treatment. The revolutionary army officers abolished the monarchy and proclaimed the Libyan Arab Republic.

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Ghaddafi’s Policies, Objectives, and Principles On assumption of office, Ghaddafi did not promote himself to the rank of General upon seizing power but rather accepted a ceremonial promotion from Captain to Colonel, a rank he remained at throughout his life thereafter. However, on September 16, 1969, only a few days after he came to power, Ghaddafi announced, at a public meeting, the five basic principles that would govern the policies of his administration, namely: 1 . Complete evacuation of foreign bases. 2. Positive and complete neutrality. 3. National unity. 4. Worldwide Arab unity. 5. The suppression of political parties (African Concord, 1986, pp. 8 & 9). In addition, Ghaddafi based his new regime on a blend of Arab nationalism, aspects of the welfare state, and what Ghaddafi termed “direct, popular democracy.” He called this system “Islamic socialism.” He also imposed a system of Islamic morals, outlawing alcohol and gambling. To reinforce the ideals of this socialist – Islamic state – Ghaddafi outlined his political philosophy in his Green Book, published in three volumes between 1975 and 1979. In less than a year, his administration accomplished all the objectives, except for the Arab unity, which he continued to serve as the guiding spirit of Libya’s foreign policy. As for Islam, he perceives religion as the vehicle for the construction of a new Arab man. After Nasser’s death, he attempted to become the leader of Arab nationalism. He wanted to create a “Great Islamic State of the Sahel,” unifying the Arab states of North Africa into one. As early as 1969, Ghaddafi contributed to the Islamization of Sudan and Chad, granting military bases and support to the FROLINAT revolutionary forces (Darfur: The ambiguous genocide-Google Books. June 15, 2005). Thus, Ghaddafi sees his work in Libya as merely the first step in the process of Arab unification. More importantly, Ghaddafi has been smart enough to realize that if he wants his country to play a major role in world affairs, he would need the coercive strength of a modern and well-equipped defense force to back up his outspokenness. He thus built an arsenal that is perceived by his various antagonists to be more than his defense needs. Despite this criticism, Libya’s capacity to defend itself against aggression is not in doubt. All Libyans begin to receive military training in preparatory school roughly at the age of 12. Once in secondary school, such training becomes specialized as the youth is trained either for the Air Force, the Navy, or the Army (Time, 1986, p. 13). In this regard, Ghaddafi brought into being a form of people’s militia to sustain his policies, particularly in the Arab world. This now leads us to examine some of his policies in the Arab world, Africa, and the superpowers. (i) Ghaddafi and the Arab World As earlier indicated, Ghaddafi’s major goal is the unity of the Arab world, and he strives for its attainment in strange ways. Ghaddafi believes that since the two rival

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blocs, communist and capitalist, have reached a more or less equal level of scientific achievement, their next struggle can only be in developing countries. Therefore, the next ideological battle will take place in Africa and Asia, and since the Arab world lies between the two continents, it will have an important role to play in an attempt to prevent this ideological spread or battle. When Ghaddafi took over power, frustrated Palestinians flocked to his country, and he immediately gave his full financial and moral support to Yasser Arafat and his Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Ghaddafi is a radical who believes that if the Arabs would unite under one government, they would succeed in eliminating the Jews from the Middle East. This “radical” stance of Ghaddafi has frightened conservative Arab states like Morocco, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia. Ghaddafi has proposed mergers with Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria twice, only to see the union fail. However, Ghaddafi’s image in the Arab world was damaged severely in 1978, when Shia Imam Musa al-Sadr disappeared en route to Libya (Blandford, 2011). The Libyan government consistently denied responsibility, but Lebanon held Ghaddafi responsibly and continues to do so. Furthermore, Ghaddafi’s poor image among Arab states plunged in 1982 when he advised Yasser Arafat to “commit suicide rather than accept shame” (Newsweek, 1982, p. 26) at the hands of the Israelis in Lebanon. While Abu Nidal and other Palestinians looked upon Ghaddafi as their benefactor, several other Arabs did not perceive things in the same way. Ghaddafi complicated this image problem with certain actions. For instance, in early 1986, despite his message of Arab unity, he expelled thousands of foreign workers, mostly Arabs from his country, causing untold hardship. The reaction of the Late President Mubarak of Egypt that Ghaddafi would pay for his actions was just one indication of the displeasure that this move incurred. Essentially, Ghaddafi’s strong commitment to the right of the Palestinians and anti-imperialist stance forces him to ridicule Arab leaders who he feels are not helping these causes. This inevitably brought him into conflict with the pro-Western Anwar Sadat (former president of Egypt) and Jaafar Nimeiry (former president of Sudan). The Camp David Accords signed between Egypt and Israel was regarded by Ghaddafi as an insult to Arab people. Thus, after Sadat’s death, Ghaddafi told Egyptians that Libya would normalize relations with their country if only their new leader would renounce the Camp David Accords. At different times during the tenures of Nimeiry and Sadat, the two men accused Ghaddafi of plotting to overthrow them. These accusations seemed probable as Ghaddafi in a speech on February 10, 1974, stated that those Arab regimes which oppose Arab unity will be blown away like “straws in the wind” (Bianco, 1975, p.  90). It is worth emphasizing that Ghaddafi’s animosity with Sadat was so high that in 1981, he declared Sadat’s death a national holiday and called it a just “punishment” for his role in the Camp David Accords (Stanik, 2002). Also, in 1995, Ghaddafi expelled some 30,000 Palestinians living in Libya, a response to the peace negotiations that had commenced between Israel and the PLO. Given the above, Ghaddafi engaged in high-profile diplomacy in his policies toward the Arab world and has in the process made several enemies and incurred the

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wrath of the Western nations. He has been a source of inspiration and simultaneously a danger to Arab unity because his policies have been sharply divisive. (ii) Ghaddafi and Africa Ghaddafi’s foreign policy toward Africa is inspired by the deep-rooted belief that the Arabs and black Africans are bound together by ancient relations. Historically these relations were established through the process of migration, religion, culture, and commerce. He believed that these historical relations are based on the fact that the Arab-African struggle is the same as they have struggled against common enemies who usurped their lands in Palestine and Southern Africa. In his speech “Africa for Africans” at the Second Pan African Youth Festival in Libya, Ghaddafi said: “We are Africans. We are part of Africa. Africa is our continent. Peace in Africa is our aim and the victory of freedom in it is ours” (Samura, 1985, p. 44). At the beginning of the 1969 Libyan revolution, Ghaddafi imposed a boycott on South African goods and services. Libya has aided and trained the South-West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) and African National Congress (ANC) guerilla in continuation of Ghaddafi’s support for freedom fighters all over the world. The Libyan government sees both Israel and South Africa as settler states which have collaborated militarily and economically to continue the oppression of Arabs and Africans. Libya has on several occasions condemned the USA and its Western allies for repeatedly vetoing the adoption of stringent measures against the South African minority regime. In the early 1980s, Ghaddafi played a key role in the Anti-­ Apartheid Movement in South Africa. His image as a revolutionary inspired many South Africans to fight for their liberation, and he was largely responsible for funding and arming the Anti-Apartheid Movement as it fought the Apartheid regime and white minority rule. In his characteristic manner, Ghaddafi 1998 turned his attention away from Arab nationalism. He eliminated a government office in charge of promoting Pan-Arab ideas and told reporters: I had been crying slogans of Arab Unity and brandishing the standard of Arab nationalism for 40 years, but it was not realized. That means that I was talking in the desert. I have no more time to lose talking with Arabs… I am returning to realism… I now talk about Pan-­ Africanism and African Unity. The Arab world is finished … Africa is a paradise… and it is full of natural resources like water, uranium, cobalt, iron, manganese. (http:www.oocities. org/damawi/ News Sept 17 – Gaddafi.html)

According to Jouve (2005), Ghaddafi thought that it would be possible to work with others in order to exploit the riches they had in common. Thus, Ghaddafi studied the map of Africa: the Congo, Egypt, Sudan, Chad, Mali, Senegal, and South Africa are irrigated by rivers and watered by rain (Jouve, 2005, p. 63). These countries according to Ghaddafi are blessed with important water resources. The Libyan leader even went ahead to say: “I would like Libya to become a black country. Consequently, I recommend to Libyan men to marry only black women and to Libyan women to do the same with black men” (Daniszewski, 1998). Following his Pan-Africanist ideology, Ghaddafi was elected the Chairman of the African Union from 2009 to 2010. The involvement of Libya in the financial

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investment in projects in Africa is very significant. Besides the 15% statutory funding by Libya under Ghaddafi, in terms of contribution to the regular budget of the African Union, at least 30 countries spread across the 5 subregions of the continent benefited from heavy investments from Tripoli (Pondi, 2013, p.  83). Moreover, despite Ghaddafi’s commitment to the survival of the African Union, most of the leaders in African states are worried by Ghaddafi’s devotion to Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism and are suspicious about his intentions regarding the future of the AU. (iii) Ghaddafi and the Superpowers Ghaddafi’s hatred for both capitalism and communism led him to propose an alternative system which he calls the “Third Universal Theory.” His rejection of Zionism and America, which he regarded as an imperialist power, led him to believe that the former Union of Soviet and Socialist Republics (USSR), forced to fight against them, had finally started to behave in the same way. However, Ghaddafi sees the USA as an ally of Israel. He was somewhat hostile to the USA and other Western countries because he saw them as part of the Zionist conspiracy to rid the Palestinians of their land. Indeed, it was the support of these Western countries that enabled the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. However, France and Libya still maintain economic and military ties, and this may be one of the reasons why France has shown remarkable restraint in its military attitude toward Libyan forces in Chad and why it refused to allow American bombers to refuel in France during their raids in Libya. As early as 1981, Ghaddafi was having a problem with President Ronald Reagan’s administration of the USA. He feared that the Reagan administration would combat his leadership and sought to reduce his maverick image. With the 1986 bombing of Libya, Ghaddafi intensified his support for anti-American government organizations. He financed the Nation of Islam, which emerged as one of the leading organizations receiving attention from Libya, and Al-Rukn, in their emergence as an indigenous anti-American armed revolutionary movement (Bodansky, 1993). Members of Al-Rukn were arrested in 1986 for preparing to conduct strikes on behalf of Libya, including blowing up US government buildings and bringing down airplanes. The reluctance of the former USSR to come to the aid of Ghaddafi during or after the US air raids on Libya was defended by the Soviet Union because the USSR was not under obligation to defend Libya. Soviet behavior in this context showed the world that Libya’s ties with the Soviets had been exaggerated. Ghaddafi’s anti-Western sentiments stem more from his perception of Libya’s historical exploitation by Italy, France, Britain, and the USA than from any particular pro-Soviet learning. He refused to give the Soviets a military base in Libya but used the blackmail of going under the Soviet umbrella as a weapon to check the activities of the USA. However, if the unconditional support of Ghaddafi to the biggest world terrorist organizations undoubtedly fueled by the animosity he aroused in most Western capitals, his conduct vis-à-vis the “world leaders” did not contribute further to making him a man of a good company according to diplomatic behavioral criteria (Pondi, 2013, p. 41).

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Following the fall of Soviet client states in Eastern Europe, Libya appeared to reassess its position in world affairs and began a long process of improving its image in the West. In 1994, Ghaddafi eased his relationship with the Western World, beginning with his atonement for the Lockerbie bombings. He wrote the United Nations Security Council by formally accepting “responsibility for the actions of its officials” concerning the Lockerbie bombing. Ghaddafi agreed to pay up to US $2.7 billion to the victims’ families and completed most of the payout in 2003. Later that year, Britain and Bulgaria co-sponsored a UN resolution to remove the UN sanctions entirely (BBC News, 2003). In addition, Ghaddafi met with the then US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, in September 2008, where she pressed him to complete his payout for the Lockerbie bombings. Libya and the USA finalized their 20-year standoff over the Lockerbie bombings in 2008 when Libya paid into a compensation fund to victims of the Lockerbie bombing, the 1986 Berlin bombing, and American victims of the 1989 UTA flight bombing. In exchange, President Bush signed Executive Order 13477 restoring the Libyan government’s immunity from terrorism-related lawsuits and dismissing all of the pending compensation cases in the USA (BBC News, 2008). Also, on September 23, 2009, Ghaddafi addressed the UN General Assembly in New  York. In 2010, he agreed to pay US $3.5 billion to the victims of Irish Republican Army (IRA) attacks he assisted during the 1980s (Irish News, 2011). Finally, it is important to recognize that the international actions carried out by Moammar Ghaddafi in the West were generally perceived very negatively. It helped to point out the former Libyan leader as an agent of systematic provocation toward the West. His positions, his investments in causes of destabilization, and his challenge of established rules of international law often contributed to tarnishing the image of Libya and its leader among European leaders and populations (Pondi, 2013, p. 47). Even more pertinent is the fact that Ghaddafi has developed and nurtured an unpredictable image that even his few friends in the international community are always cautious in their dealing with him.

Ghaddafi’s Death After popular movements overturned the rulers of Tunisia and Egypt, its immediate neighbors to the west and east, Libya experienced a full-scale uprising beginning in February 2011. By 20 February, the unrest had spread to Tripoli. As of late February 2011, much of Libya had slipped out of Ghaddafi’s control, falling to the anti-­ Ghaddafi forces (Garland, 2012). The protest escalated into an uprising that spread across the country, with the forces opposing Ghaddafi establishing a government based in Benghazi. This led to the 2011 Libyan Civil War, which included a military intervention by a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and led a coalition to enforce a Security Council resolution calling for no-fly zone protection of civilians in Libya. Unfortunately, Ghaddafi and his forces lost the battle of Tripoli in August, and on September 16, 2011, the newly formed government took Libya’s seat at the

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UN, replacing Ghaddafi. He retained control over parts of Libya, most notably the city of Sirte, which it was presumed had fallen. Although Ghaddafi’s forces initially held out against the National Transition Council’s advances, Ghaddafi was captured alive as Sirte fell to the rebel forces on October 20, 2011, and he died the same day under unclear circumstances, thus ending the four-decade rule of a controversial figure in global politics.

 n Evaluation of Psychobiography in Understanding A Ghaddafi’s Life, Personality, and Policies The psychobiographical analysis is not functioning without focusing on emotional questions that essentially determine the formation of a life story. A careful study and analysis of the childhood and environmental experiences of a country’s leadership is conducted to determine how these early experiences of the person have helped shape his later personality, policies, and ultimately the direction in which his country moves in the international community. This paper analyzes Ghaddafi’s Libya from this perspective. The central theme of this paper is that the peculiar behavior, international policies, and controversy generated under Moammar Ghaddafi as a Libyan leader cannot be fully comprehended without an in-depth examination of the character of the man who was in the realm of affairs. Thus, the psychobiographical study reflected the value and importance of studying individual lives within their sociocultural and historical contexts. This psychobiographical study on Ghaddafi illustrated the value of uncovering his psychosocial and individual personality development against the background of the larger societal contests that influenced Ghaddafi’s life. As evidenced in this psychobiographical study of Moammar Ghaddafi, he made it clear that the paramount objective of his government’s international policies is the eradication of Zionism and imperialism. He sees himself first and foremost as an Arab and Muslim. These traditional and religious beliefs of Ghaddafi have their origin in his desert and strict Islamic upbringing. As a child, Ghaddafi witnessed the humiliation suffered by the Arab countries at the hands of the Jewish state of Israel, which the young Ghaddafi felt was an illegal occupant of Arab lands. Ghaddafi in his youthful days listened over Radio Cairo to the impressive speeches of Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, which filled him with visions of Arab unity. Therefore, Ghaddafi set out to finish Nasser’s uncompleted task. Quite obviously, Ghaddafi used Libyan petrodollars to build an extensive social welfare system based on his Third Force (as contained in the Green Book) and the Koran. According to Jouve (2005), The Green Book states that man will have to take responsibility for achieving radical change in his own condition. Indeed, Ghaddafi’s image put Libya on the global scene, where Libya commands international respect and fear that is expected of a country with its limited population. The thrust of this paper is that Libya’s position in global affairs is the product of Ghaddafi’s

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worldview and his policies, shaped mainly by his childhood psychosocial configurations, which affected his feelings toward the West. Consequently, psychobiography has been applied in the evaluation of Moammar Ghaddafi in an attempt to understand his life, personality, and policies. As demonstrated in the psychobiographical study of Ghaddafi, there is much value in studying the life of this great and controversial figure in global affairs. As Pondi rightly observed: Colonel Qadhafi was a fearless flag bearer of the voiceless for some and a dangerous and irresponsible demagogue for others. Such is the contrasting image of a man whose words, actions, and ideological options left no one indifferent for four decades. His constant contribution to the anti-colonial struggle had always been recognized by his “comrades in arms.” (Pondi, 2013, p. 45)

Conclusion This paper instigated a new approach in the analysis of Moammar Ghaddafi’s life history. Erikson’s theory enables us to chronologically explore, analyze, and reconstruct Ghaddafi’s development within a structured conceptual framework. By adopting the psychobiographical method, the paper reflected the value and importance of studying Ghaddafi’s life within his sociocultural and historical contexts. The study noted the importance of Ghaddafi’s social being on his personality development and the survival and adaptation required to maintain his functioning in society. It has been observed that Ghaddafi’s desert origins and his strict Muslim upbringing made him resolve to restore Arabs and Muslims to their “lost” glory. His Pan-Africanist stance and unification of the continent earned him great respect within the circle of African leaders. From the inception of his administration, he became a prominent and controversial figure in global politics. Ghaddafi’s consistency and tenacity have inevitably brought him into conflict with the Super Power countries. When writing the history of African Pan-Africanist leaders, Ghaddafi’s name cannot be forgotten. Just like other African Pan-Africanist leaders died violently in the hands of non-­ African agents and sponsors, Ghaddafi was eliminated by an agent of Western imperialism, coordinated by NATO in 2011.

References African Concord. (1986). (74), January 23. Anderson, J.  W. (1981). The methodology of psychobiography. Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 11(3), 455–475. Babbie, R., & Mouton, J. (2001). The practice of social research. Oxford University Press. BBC News. (2003). London: 22 August. http://news.bbc.co.uk BBC News. (2008). London: 31 October. http://news.bbc.co.uk Bianco, M. (1975). Ghaddafi: Voice from the desert. Longman.

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Blandford, N. (2011). Is the missing Shi’ite Cleric Imam Musa Sadr alive in Libya? TIME. http:// www.time.com. Bodansky, Y. (1993). Target America and the west: Terrorism today. S.P.I. Books. Bromley, D. B. (1986). The case-study method in psychology and related disciplines. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Carlson, R. (1988). Exemplary lives: The uses of psychobiography for theory development. Journal of Personality, 6, 227–242. Chase, S. E. (2009). Narrative inquiry: Multiple lenses, approaches, voices. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincloln (Eds.), The handbook of qualitative research (3rd ed.). Sage. Daniszewski, J. (1998). Time. Denzin, N. K. (1989). Interpretative biography. Sage. Erikson, E. H. (1977). Childhood and society. Paladin Grafton Books. Erikson, E. H. (1993). Young man Luther. Norton & Company. Garland, L. (2012). 2011 Libyan civil war. White Word Publications. Google Book (2015). Hoare, C. H. (2002). Erikson on development in adulthood; new insights from unpublished papers. Oxford University Press. Hoare, C.  H. (2005). Erikson’s general and adult development revisions of Freudian thought: “Outward, forward, upward”. Journal of Adult Development, 12(1), 19–31. Hougton, D. P. (2011). Political psychology. In J. T. Ishiyama & M. Breuning (Eds.), 21st-century political science. Sage. Howe, M. J. A. (1997). Beyond psychobiography: Towards more effective syntheses of psychology and biography. British Journal of Psychology, 88, 235–248. Irish News. (2011). http://www.irishcentral.com Jouve, E. (2005). My vision: Muammar Gaddafi. John Blake. Kertzer, J. D., & Tingley, D. (2018). Political psychology in international relations: Beyond the paradigms. Annual Review of Political Science, 21, 1–23. Kovary, Z. (2011). Psychobiography as a method. The revival of studying lives: New perspectives in personality and creative research. Europe’s Journal of Psychology, 7(4), 739–777. McAdams, D. P. (1988). Biography, narratives, and lives: An introduction. Journal of Personality, 56(1), 1–18. McAdams, D.  P. (1994). The person: An introduction to personality psychology (2nd ed.). Harcourt Brace. Mcleod, J. (1994). Doing counselling research. Sage. Newsweek. (1982). (23), August 16. Pondi, J. (2013). Life and death of Muammar Al-Qadhafi: What lessons for Africa. Afric’ Eveil. Samura, M. O. (1985). The Libyan revolution: It’s lessons for Africa. International Institute for Policy and Development Studies. Schultz, T. W. (2005). How to write a psychobiography. In T. W. Schultz (Ed.), Handbook of psychobiography. Oxford University Press. Stanik, J.  T. (2002). El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s undeclared war with Qaddafi. US Naval Institute Press. Time. (1986). (127), April 7. Idowu Johnson  received his BSc, MSc, and PhD degrees in Political Science at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. He is currently a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, specializing in international relations. His research interests cover foreign policy, African politics, peace and conflict resolution, and strategic and development studies. He is the author of Diplomacy, Conflicts, Bargaining and Peacebuilding in International Relations (Gratia Associates International Press, 2015). He has chapter contributions in Africa After Fifty Years: Retrospections and Reflections (Africa World Press, New Jersey, 2013), Nationalities, Identities, and Terrorism: The Nigerian Experience (John Archers, 2013), and Global Peace Leadership Summit 2007: Africa and the Diaspora (Theological Seminary Press, USA, 2008). He is an honorary Research Fellow at the French Institute for Research in Africa (IFRA), University of Ibadan.

Chapter 15

Gaddafi, Tito, and Libyan Non-aligned Policy Nikša Minić

Introduction After coming to power in Libya on the first day of September 1969 until his overthrow and assassination on October 20, 2011, Muammar Gaddafi represented a controversial figure in international relations. During his first years in power, guided by the ideology of Arab socialism and Pan-Arabism, he advocated the unification of all Arabs, unconditional support for the Palestinian struggle and the right of its people to self-determination, and the elimination of the state of Israel. While the latter two goals persisted during the 1970s, Arab unification was de facto abandoned in 1974, despite subsequent agreements with Algeria in 1982 and Morocco in 1984. Instead, the second half of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s were marked by more pragmatic Libyan foreign policy. Libya tried to establish and expand various forms of bilateral cooperation with the Soviet Union, France, Italy, West Germany, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. At the same time, and especially after the Fifth Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Algeria in 1973, Libya became more active within the Movement. Immediately after coming to power, the new regime in Tripoli began to build diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia due to ideological closeness, economic motives, similar views on international issues, and the pragmatic need of both countries for a political partner in the Mediterranean. During the 1970s, Gaddafi and Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito had frequent meetings in the form of official state visits and private meetings at non-aligned summits. Josip Broz Tito and Muammar Gaddafi met seven times: in Tripoli on February 25–27, 1970; in Algeria on September 8, 1973; in Belgrade on November 18–23, 1973; in Colombo on September 18, 1976; in Tripoli from 18 to 21 January 1977; N. Minić (*) University of Juraj Dobrila Pula, Pula, Croatia © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. O. Abidde, F. Kumah-Abiwu (eds.), The Political Impact of African Military Leaders, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31427-8_15

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at Brijuni Islands from 21 to 25 June 1977; and in Tripoli from 31 May to 3 June 1979. During those meetings, the two leaders exchanged their views on international issues and the role of the Non-Aligned Movement. Naturally, this type of intensive cooperation between the two countries produced a wealth of archival material. By analyzing archival sources from the Archive of Yugoslavia which refer to the Summits of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers Conferences, and official state visits between Tito and Gaddafi, the main goal of this chapter will be to define the characteristics of Libyan non-aligned policy. In order to achieve this goal, in this chapter I will use the approach that the participation of countries in the Non-Aligned Movement was a voluntary option in the broadest sense of the word. No uniformity in the Non-Aligned Movement would reduce non-aligned countries to the same ideological, political, economic, and civilizational platform. Therefore, each of them had a special position not concerning one general line, but in the mutual relationship and attitude toward participation in joint activities and achieving the principles and goals of non-alignment (Petkovic, 1985, pp. 51). In line with this approach, the purpose of researching the specifics of Libyan non-aligned policy is not to determine attitudes toward any rules of conduct but to identify factors that make Libyan participation in the Non-Aligned Movement specific to any other non-aligned country. By analyzing Libyan attitudes and opinions on international issues that were of great importance to the Non-Aligned Movement, this paper will try to determine the factors that made Libyan participation specific toward Yugoslav participation in Non-Aligned Movement and thus provide the answer on what were the characteristics of Libyan non-aligned policy during the 1970s.

Diplomatic Relations Between Libya and Yugoslavia After coming to power, Gaddafi took over the doctrine of positive neutrality from Egyptian President  Gamal Abdel Nasser as one of the pillars of Libya’s foreign policy. “The foreign policy of my country in the revolutionary era is, in brief, positive neutrality, non-alignment, and support for all liberation causes and freedom in the whole world.” A month later he clarified the meaning of this doctrine concerning the great powers and their opposing blocs. “We believe in positive neutrality and peaceful co-existence. In our foreign relations, we do not differentiate between East and West except based on the unconditional help each state offers and mutual respect and relations of equality” (Middle East Journal, 1970, pp. 211–212). Later, he would describe positive neutrality, non-alignment, and peaceful coexistence as the central concepts of his Third Universal Theory. Nevertheless, Gaddafi’s neutralism was never uniformly neutral. His basic external commitment was to fight imperialism, defined in terms of Western colonialism and political intervention. He rejected foreign control of any type and promised vigorous ideological and operational hostility to imperialism wherever it was found. Generally, his approach was to befriend states with similar viewpoints while confronting those who opposed it.

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Like Nasser, Gaddafi also sought a leadership role in the Non-Aligned Movement, an ambition he was not able to satisfy (St. John, 1987, p. 72). The Palestinian issue was a focal point of Libyan foreign policy after 1969. Libya’s bilateral and multilateral relations were largely defined in terms of how other states approached the issue and its resolution. Salah Bashir, Libyan Unity and Foreign Affairs Minister reiterated this stance by issuing two statements shortly after the 1st September coup. During his speech at the Arab Cultural Center in October 1969, he stated that “He who supports the Palestine cause is a friend to the Arabs, and he who supports Israel is an enemy to them.” A month later he issued a statement to al-Thawrab saying: “The Arabs who are sincere in working for the Palestine cause must build their relations with other states based on their position on this very cause” (Middle East Journal, 1970, pp. 211–212). Yugoslavia, due to its non-aligned foreign policy orientation and understanding of the Palestinian issue in the Middle East crisis, has proven to be a very acceptable partner for the new government in Tripoli. On the other hand, the authorities in Belgrade were aware of the statement of the new government in Tripoli that it would respect all previous international agreements, be an active participant in resolving the crisis in the Middle East, and provide unreserved support to the Palestinian Liberation Organization. It was important to Yugoslavia that the Libyan leadership expressed its intention to maintain good relations with all countries based on the principles of non-alignment, mutual respect, and noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries (the Libyan Arab Republic, 1970, p.  5). Tito’s visit to Libya in 1970, just 4 months after the change of government, can be interpreted as an act of direct support for the Revolutionary Command Council and Muammar Gaddafi. Yugoslavia began to build relations with Libya from the very beginning of its independence (1951). Before the proclamation of the independent Kingdom of Libya, Belgrade supported the demand and the right of the Libyan people to self-­ determination at the UN. Diplomatic relations at the embassy level were established in 1963. The Permanent Yugoslav Diplomatic Mission in Libya was opened in 1960, and the Libyan one in Yugoslavia in 1965 (Yugoslav Review, 1965, p. 407). However, after the establishment of diplomatic relations with the King Idris regime, political cooperation continued to lag significantly behind economic cooperation. During the last years of the Idris regime, several Libyan officials began expressing a desire to improve political cooperation between Yugoslavia and Libya (Libyan Arab Republic, 1970, 9). The new Libyan regime’s attitude toward countries that had diplomatic missions in Libya before the coup did not prevent Muammar Gaddafi from inviting Josip Broz Tito to pay an official visit to Tripoli, which the Yugoslav president eventually did in February 1970, making him the first non-Arab statesman to visit Libya after the regime change (Vuković, 1970, p. 2). Although the political cooperation between Yugoslavia and Libya was significantly strengthened during the 1970s by virtue of similar views on many international issues (non-­ aligned foreign policy, Arab-Israeli conflict), different opinions were also present on certain topics, mostly on the definition of non-aligned policy and the criteria according to which a state can become a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. The Libyan leadership, due to its lack of experience in running state affairs, has

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often acted more radically in terms of foreign policy without taking into account the objective circumstances in which the modern world has developed. Tito’s first visit to Libya in February 1970 was part of an African tour undertaken by the Yugoslav president in preparation for the Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Lusaka, scheduled for September 1970. As part of the tour, before visiting Libya, Tito visited the Egyptian president Nasser, who had already at that time sent a request to Tito to explain to the young Libyan leadership what the real international situation is. Therefore, one of the tasks of the Yugoslav leadership and President Tito was to remind young Libyan revolutionaries of the objective circumstances in which international processes took place (Memorandum of Conversation, 1970, p. 11). During the same period, mutual economic cooperation was enhanced not only due to more frequent meetings between the Yugoslav and Libyan heads of state but also due to meetings between the prime ministers and representatives of the sociopolitical and economic organizations of both countries. After 1971, exchanges of economic delegations between the two countries intensified, establishing longer-­ term and more systematic cooperation. The Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation, signed on July 7, 1971, agreed on broad economic cooperation with a clause by which both countries recognized each other’s status as the most favored state both in terms of customs and customs’ formalities and in the treatment of ships in ports such as taxes and port regime (Reminder for Conversation, 1971, p. 1). The Libyan market was important to the Yugoslav economy due to the wide placement of Yugoslav goods (construction materials, furniture, textiles, various metal structures, vehicles, machinery, chemical products, cement), but also for the regular supply of Yugoslav refineries with Libyan high-quality crude oil. This development of cooperation has elevated Libya to the position of one of the most important Yugoslav economic partners in Africa and among developing countries. This claim is supported by the fact that in the Yugoslav foreign trade with African countries, Libya ranked second, among developing countries fourth, while it ranked first in terms of the volume of investment work performed (Information about Libyan foreign and domestic policy, 1977, p. 8). Along with Egyptian President Nasser, Josip Broz Tito represented a statesman to whom Colonel Gaddafi showed sincere admiration and respect. The biography of the Yugoslav president included participation in World War I and captivity in Russia, interwar illegal political activity and imprisonment by the regime of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, organization and leadership of the largest popular resistance against Nazi occupation in World War II, and postwar split with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin which led to Yugoslav exit from the sphere of the socialist camp and orientation toward the policy of non-alignment, to which Yugoslavia, as one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement, actively contributed. Based on this biography, it can be concluded that in Gaddafi’s view, the Yugoslav president represented a figure of a true revolutionary alongside Turkish statesman Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Chinese statesman Sun Yat-sen, whose biographies the Libyan leader read in his early youth (St. John, 2012, p. 137). This is supported by a toast given by Colonel Gaddafi on the occasion of the reception of the Yugoslav president during their first meeting in Tripoli in late

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February 1970. “Today, when we have taken on important political functions and responsibilities, we have been allowed to turn our admiration for President Tito into solid cooperation between Yugoslavia and the Arabs. We consider President Tito one of the greatest leaders in the policy of positive neutrality and the third world in the twentieth century, and a great contemporary who played a significant role in issues of peace and unity of peoples” (President Gaddafi’s toast, 1970, 1).

 ibya at the Non-Aligned Summits in Lusaka 1970 L and Algiers 1973 Libya officially joined the Non-Aligned Movement at the Cairo conference  in 1964, but it was not until the change of government in 1969 that it began to play a more active role in the Movement. Revolutionary Command Council and Gaddafi himself recognized that NAM’s conferences, according to Dinkel (2018, p. 160), provided all attendees with an opportunity to address their specific national interests and discuss them in an international setting. During the Yugoslav president’s first visit to Libya in February 1970, while talking to the Yugoslav leadership, Gaddafi inquired about the date of the next non-­ aligned conference in Lusaka, and during the talks, he expressed the view that countries associated with the West are not non-aligned and that their participants are weakening non-alignment policies. He cited Libya during the reign of King Idris as an example of such a country. He added that Tripoli recognizes as neutral only those countries that are neutral, that are non-aligned, and that there is Libyan interest in the conference provided it is open only to those who pursue a neutral policy. “There are clear criteria in terms of participation,” replied Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Mirko Tepavac, and Tito added that “we must take into account, above all, the essential things, what we can agree on” (Memorandum of Conversation, 1970, pp. 6–7). Tepavac was referring to the membership criteria that had already been drawn up at the meeting in Cairo in June 1961 which was intended to lay the foundation for the Belgrade conference in September 1961. It sought to determine whether a country could participate in a conference of non-aligned states and thus become a member of the movement. These often mentioned five principles of the non-aligned states were as follows: the country should have adopted an independent policy based on the coexistence of states with different political and social systems and non-alignment or should be showing a trend in favor of such policy; the country concerned should be consistently supporting the movements for National independence; the country should not be a member of multilateral military alliance concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts; if a country has a bilateral military agreement with Great Power, or is a member of a regional defense pact, the agreement of pact should not be one deliberately concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts; if it has conceded military bases to a foreign power, the concession should

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not have been made in the context of Great Power military conflicts (Dinkel, 2018, pp. 162–163). Colonel Gaddafi’s regime believed that the criteria must be stricter, so the emphasis was put on quality, not on the mass of the Movement. The quality criterion implied that a non-aligned country should not have signed contracts with one or both superpowers, or foreign military bases on its territory. Gaddafi paid great attention to the issue of the presence of foreign military bases. Immediately after taking power, the Revolutionary Command Council raised the issue of withdrawing US and British military forces from Wheelus and Al-Adem air bases. Negotiations on the withdrawal of foreign troops from Libyan territory were still ongoing at the time of the Yugoslav president’s visit. The British eventually left Al Adem on March 28, and the Americans left Wheelus on June 11, 1970 (St. John, 2012, p. 142). Although the Libyan delegation eventually participated at the Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Lusaka in 1970, Gaddafi did not personally attend the conference, which can be interpreted for two reasons. The first reason was the absence of Egyptian President Nasser, whom the Libyan leader considered a political and an ideological role model, and the second reason can be found in the still active process of consolidating the new Libyan government. The fact that the Libyan media attached very little importance to the conference speaks in favor of the second reason (Preparations for Conference, 1970, 1). Instead, Libyan Unity and Foreign Affairs Minister Salah Bashir was the head of the Libyan delegation at the Lusaka conference in September 1970. The Libyan delegation showed the greatest activity in the discussions on the crisis in the Middle East, in which it expressed support for the PLO, while at the same time emphasizing that the new regime in Tripoli does not recognize the existence of the state of Israel and rejects any US proposal to resolve the crisis in the Middle East (Documentation for Conference, Libya, 1970). Libyan foreign minister pointed out that Libya opposes foreign interference, both from the east and from the west; he sharply attacked colonialism, foreign bases, racial discrimination, and interventions in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. He gave support to the Palestinian struggle and the right of its people to self-­ determination (Bulletin no. 5, 1970, 2). During the general debate at the Lusaka conference, the Libyan foreign minister said he had nothing to add to previous speakers, most notably President Tito’s speech. In his closing remarks, the Libyan foreign minister specifically mentioned Yugoslav President Tito, acknowledging his historic role in the development of non-alignment (Bulletin no. 7, 1970, 2). In its report on the Third Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Yugoslav Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs assessed that the causes of Libyan extremism during the conference were internal movements and the needs of the regime to consolidate its power in the country (Report on Third Conference, 1970, 4). The Fourth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Algeria in 1973 was the first that Gaddafi personally attended as head of the Libyan delegation. Before the conference, at a meeting held on August 21, 1973, in Brdo near Kranj, the Yugoslav leadership raised the issue of Gaddafi’s possible arrival at the conference. Close associates of Yugoslav President, Edvard Kardelj and Stane Dolanc openly said that

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it would not be a pity if he doesn’t attend the conference; moreover, it would be better if he doesn’t come because he would give “a Muslim speech” (Discussions about Algiers Conference, 1973, 21). A few days later, at another meeting of the Yugoslav delegation ahead of a non-aligned conference in Algeria, held on Vanga Island on August 30, 1973, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Milos Minic told Tito that Gaddafi could cause some problems at the conference, but no one would not take him seriously and suggested to Tito that it would be good to meet with Gaddafi (Memorandum of Delegation Meeting, 1973, 1). Already at the 1972 Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers  Conference held in Georgetown, Guyana, Libya had  proposed three amendments to the summit agenda: (a) to introduce a new agenda item on redefining non-alignment and drafting a Charter of Non-Aligned Countries; (b) on the withdrawal of fleets from the Mediterranean and the removal of foreign bases from the territories of Mediterranean countries; and (c) compensation for damage caused by former colonial powers and imperialists. During the Algiers Conference the Libyan delegation has on several occasions tried to raise the issue of redefining non-alignment policies. However, the Libyan idea of a possible redefinition met with resistance from the vast majority of countries, including Yugoslavia (Bulletin no. 3, 1973, 2). The Yugoslav delegation concluded that the Libyan initiative to redefine non-alignment and adopt a non-alignment charter in the light of new developments in international relations provoked a reaction that showed the will of the vast majority of member states to preserve non-­ alignment and strengthen existing values without changing the essential features of the non-aligned policy, which not only does not exclude but also implies its further strengthening in the direction of activation and efficiency of continuous action (Bulletin no. 2, 1973, 6). Gaddafi also gave a speech at the conference in which he pointed out that the Non-Aligned Movement had suffered defeats after many years of existence and that non-alignment in the true sense of the word had been defeated by the will of member states and great powers. He stated that the countries that were the founders of the non-aligned movement, due to force majeure, received obligations that Libya cannot accept or approve and that those countries even maintain alliances with the great powers. He acknowledged that Libya has also resorted to armed forces in resolving its own conflicts. He pointed out that despite his friendship with the Soviet Union, he banned access to Soviet warships after the liquidation of American bases in Libya because “I am committing an act of non-alignment.” In his speech, he said that on the European continent, Yugoslavia is the only country he considers non-aligned (Gaddafi’s Speech, 1973, 1–3). During the conference, at the suggestion of the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, Tito and Gaddafi met on September 8, which the Yugoslav president used as an opportunity to emphasize that despite Gaddafi’s pessimistic speech on the state of the movement, the conference should be considered significant and it also demonstrated that non-alignment policy has not been overcome and that non-aligned countries will play a significant role on the international stage in the future (Memorandum of Conversation, 1973, 1). Tito also noted that it is not good to introduce ideological problems and conflicts at the summit because there is much more

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among the non-aligned countries that they have in common and on which they can build their unity (Memorandum of Conversation, 1973, 8). Ahead of Muammar Gaddafi’s first visit to Yugoslavia in November 1973, documentation prepared for the Yugoslav president’s talks with the Libyan leader offered an analysis of Libya’s non-aligned policies. Libya’s role at the Non-Aligned Ministers Conference in 1972  was assessed positively because of Gaddafis regime  commitment to establishing a just peace in the world that would not be imposed by the great powers and would not be at the expense of small countries. It was pointed out that Libyans call the policy of non-alignment the conscience of mankind. However, it is stated that the inexperience of the Libyan new leadership in conducting state affairs, both domestically and abroad, represents the biggest problem in Libyan foreign policy which leads to radical appearances in terms of foreign policy. It was concluded that because of this, Libyans believe that the criteria for belonging to the policy of non-alignment should be stricter, hence their preference for the quality and not the mass of the movement. Libya is objectively instructed in a policy of non-alignment in order to escape the influence of the former colonial powers. Preoccupied with the problems of its internal development and preservation of its independence as well as the problems of the Maghreb, Mashreq, the Middle East crisis, and the PLO, Libya did not pay enough attention or expose much on the issue of the Vietnam problem although it did condemn American imperialism which was in line with Gaddafi’s general position toward capitalism and foreign domination (General Information about Libya, 1973, 15).

From Colombo 1976 to Havana 1979 At the Conference of Non-Aligned Movement in Colombo in 1976, Libya submitted several proposals, resolutions, and amendments, but exclusively on political issues. Her delegation insisted on the views some of which her leadership had already set out at the Algiers  Conference (compensation for damage caused in World War II, return of cultural goods to the countries from which they were taken). In the draft resolution on Zionism, the Libyan delegation strongly condemned the countries that support Israel but also introduced religious components, without mentioning non-alignment, probably because it counted on the support of Islamic countries. Also, in the amendment of the political declaration, Libya demanded the exclusion of Israel from the UN and, in the draft resolution on the right of veto in the UN, demanded its abolition because it diminishes the role of this world organization. However, in an amendment to the political resolution related to Cyprus, Libya omitted support for the Cypriot government as well as the position on the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of Cyprus (Conference Documentation, 1976, p. 1). The Yugoslav delegation viewed these Libyan proposals and positions through the prism of the efforts of Islamic countries to act at the Colombo Conference from the position of the 1974 Islamic Conference. Libya and Saudi Arabia encouraged

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the activities of the Islamic group of states, which led to the deepening of bilateral and regional conflicts at the conference in Colombo and a more pronounced presence of the process of regionalization and grouping. In this way, this group of countries sought to impose the views of the 1974 Islamic Conference and influence the decisions of non-aligned countries (Conference Report, 1976, p. 4). In the conclusion of the Yugoslav delegation, it was assessed that at the conference in Colombo, more than before, the phenomena of regionalization and grouping of countries in various forms (geographical, religious-Islamic countries, landlocked countries, radical countries of Africa, etc.) came to the fore. These groups could not, except in exceptional cases, perform monolithically due to differences of opinion. However, it was noted that the phenomenon of regionalization within the Non-­ Aligned Movement, if developed and strengthened, may in some situations jeopardize NAM’s cohesion. Although these views and differences could not be overcome and posed a certain burden, they did not impose themselves as a central issue of the conference nor did they jeopardize agreement and decision-making on the most important issues on which common views were built. However, these problems posed a danger to Yugoslavia because they could be used to break the unity of non-­ aligned countries and could serve for the wider action of the great powers in combating the policy of non-alignment. The Yugoslav delegation concluded that the phenomenon of regionalization requires special attention in the coming period (Conference Report, 1976, p. 26). The initiative of Pakistani Prime Minister Ali Bhutto to hold a Third World Conference to discuss economic issues was one of the dangerous phenomena of regionalization for Yugoslavia. Gaddafi and Tito discussed the initiative during the Yugoslav president’s visit to Libya in January 1977 and Gaddafi’s return visit to Yugoslavia in June 1977. In talks in Tripoli on January 18, 1977, the Yugoslav president expressed the view that Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto’s initiative was directly aimed against the unity of the Non-Aligned Movement and that non-aligned countries should take concrete action to thwart that intention. Gaddafi agreed that the Non-Aligned Movement faces great dangers and that everything should be done to consolidate the Movement, but that Pakistan’s initiative should be carefully considered in order to turn the initiative in favor of strengthening the Non-Aligned Movement (Memorandum of Conversation, 1977, pp. 1–2). For the Yugoslav president, the Pakistani initiative was illogical because all non-aligned countries belong to the Third World, and non-aligned countries have their own conferences, and what will a conference do for them when all non-aligned countries are part of the Third World? Tito considered such an initiative a dangerous attempt to find a surrogate instead of non-aligned countries that have adopted principles based on which huge successes have been achieved. Tito attributed the proposal to reactionary forces that want to infiltrate non-­ aligned countries, break them up, and pursue a policy that suits imperialism. He noted that Yugoslavia would fight against this and that he expected the Libyan statesman whom he considers a friend to take such Yugoslav action seriously because by the next conference in Havana, good preparations should be made and unity on basic principles should be ensured (Memorandum of Conversation, 1977,

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p.  13). Gaddafi considered that a clear position should be taken regarding Ali Bhutto’s initiative, at least between Yugoslavia and Libya, because perhaps the idea of holding such a conference may be acceptable for some countries in the world. Gaddafi believed that such a conference would include non-aligned countries and countries that cannot be in the Non-Aligned Movement due to established criteria, such as Pakistan, Iran, or, for example, Turkey, which cannot be a member of the Non-Aligned Movement due to NATO membership (Memorandum of Conversation, 1977, p. 16). Tito reiterated his position during talks with Gaddafi on the Brijuni Islands in June 1977, saying that the Pakistani initiative was directed against the unity of non-aligned countries and aimed at breaking them up because all non-­ aligned countries are Third World countries at the same time. The Colombo Summit gave a clear response to Pakistan’s action, and the Yugoslav leadership firmly believes that such a conference would be detrimental, and the Yugoslav leadership strongly opposed it (Memorandum of Conversation, 1977, p. 11). Gaddafi then informed Tito that before he visited Yugoslavia, Pakistani Prime Minister Ali Bhutto had suddenly come to visit Libya. Gaddafi and Bhutto discussed together the issue of his conception of the Third World, during which Bhutto complained that he had a hard time thinking that his initiative was assessed as an attack on the unity of non-aligned countries. With this initiative, he only wanted to harmonize the attitudes of developing countries on vital economic issues. Tito reacted to this explanation that it should be borne in mind that developing countries have a Group of 77, which brings together more than 100 developing countries and which allows such issues to be successfully considered in that composition. In addition, non-aligned countries have thoroughly elaborated on this matter at their numerous conferences, especially at recent summits in Algeria and Colombo. In such conditions, it would not be useful to create a new structure of non-aligned or developing countries, concluded Tito (Memorandum of Conversation, 1977, p. 14). The Yugoslav president visited Libya as part of a foreign policy tour before going to the Sixth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Havana in 1979. In the preparatory documents for the talks with Gaddafi, the emphasis was placed on the topic of non-alignment policy. It was pointed out that Libya is always willing to emphasize its commitment to the principles of non-alignment policy, which they believe should be in the function of defending the independence of any non-aligned country. However, it was concluded that Libya’s behavior and its political criteria, for example (how much each country is non-aligned), and its attitudes toward certain international issues often deviate from the proclaimed principles. According to official Libyan sources, Colonel Gaddafi intended to submit a list of “authentic non-­ aligned countries and those that are not” at the conference in Havana, because, in his opinion, there are many countries that have joined the movement and are working to overthrow it. In this group, Gaddafi included countries associated with the United States, primarily Egypt. The Yugoslav analysis reiterated that the Libyan leadership believes that it is not the number of non-aligned countries that matters but the quality. It was pointed out that the Libyan views, more or less, blend in with the views of Cuba, so it is not excluded that they will support the Soviet thesis about the anti-imperialist

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orientation of the movement (Information for President, 1979, p. 8). The events in Cyprus have been taken as an example that the Islamic dimension has an advantage for Libya over the development of friendly cooperation between the two non-­aligned countries (Information for President, 1979, p. 6). Therefore, it was concluded that Libya has recently been working on the line of Islamization in the Non-Aligned Movement, on the creation of a separate Movement in the movement, which is justified by seeking natural allies to defend its independence and security and strengthen Arab unity (Information for President, 1979, p. 10). During the last meeting with Gaddafi, the Yugoslav President once again emphasized that he attaches great importance to strengthening the unity and role of non-­ aligned countries, as this is also a factor in the defense and security of each non-aligned country individually. That is why all attempts to split the Non-Aligned Movement should be resolutely fought. What would happen if there was a split in the Movement, he wondered, and immediately offered his prediction. A smaller group of non-aligned countries would become a natural ally of the Soviet Union, while most other non-aligned countries would side with or be exposed to great Western pressure (Memorandum of Conversation 1979, p. 2). Then, Tito moved on to the issue of excluding Egypt from the Non-Aligned Movement. He noted that the practice of suspending a non-aligned country has not existed in the Movement so far. In doing so, one should also start, above all, from the desire to preserve the unity of non-aligned countries. He went on to say that it would not be bad for Sadat to come to Havana, to see the mood of non-aligned countries toward the policy he is pursuing, and to experience harsh criticism (Memorandum of Conversation, 1979, p.8). After Nasser’s death, Muammar Gaddafi declared himself the successor and guardian of his pan-Arab policy, and by the mid-1970s, he had actively but unsuccessfully tried to achieve unification with several Arab states. The most important attempt at unification was with Egypt. By signing the Benghazi Declaration on August 2, 1972, the Egyptian and Libyan heads of state announced a plan to unite the states they ruled, not later than September 1, 1973. It was supposed to be the beginning of Gaddafi’s ultimate goal, the unification of all Arabs, but insurmountable differences soon emerged, that did not lead to unification but to open antagonism. The most important differences were manifested in the way the foreign policy was conducted and the temperament of the two statesmen. While Sadat sought to pursue a policy of reconciliation and Arab solidarity, Gaddafi selectively chose political partners in the Arab world and was openly intolerant of governments he considered unacceptable. In seeking a solution to the Palestinian question, Sadat began to be open to negotiations with Israel, while Gaddafi did not give up on a military solution and the elimination of the Israeli state. Such differences of opinion caused Sadat to begin to view Gaddafi as mentally unstable, while Gaddafi was no longer convinced that Sadat, like his predecessor, was a true revolutionary fully committed to resolving the Palestinian question. Finally, on December 1, 1973, Libya severed diplomatic relations with Egypt, and Gaddafi ranked among the fiercest critics of Sadat and

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Egyptian foreign policy. Muammar Gaddafi did not attend the conference of non-­ aligned countries in Havana. Instead, Ali Treki, the Libyan foreign minister, was present as the head of the Libyan delegation. In his speech at the general debate on September 7, he devoted most of his time to Egyptian politics and the Middle East. Treki spoke most strongly and sharply about Egypt, President Sadat, and US imperialism. (“It is a shame to sit in this same hall with Egypt,” “Those who oppose the exclusion of Egypt from the NAM are allies of Israel,” “Egypt‘s presence in NAM is the way to the gradual liquidation of the Movement.”) Although he made a formal remark that the Non-­ Aligned Movement has achieved great success during the period from Colombo and Havana, he also gave a pessimistic picture of the situation in the Movement and concluded that imperialism had separated some non-aligned countries from the Movement (Bulletin no. 11, 1979, p. 2).

Conclusion Libyan non-aligned policy during the 1970s as well as the appearances of its delegations at Conferences of the Non-Aligned Movement in Lusaka 1970, Algeria 1973, Colombo 1976, and Havana 1979 reflected the most important foreign political goals of the Gaddafi regime. Recognizing the Non-Aligned Movement and its conferences as an opportunity to highlight its own foreign policy goals in the international environment, Muammar Gaddafi and other members of Libyan delegations were most active during debates on the Middle East crisis stating their support for PLO while at the same time condemning colonialism, foreign interventions, and the presence of foreign military bases. Although the Libyan leadership has proclaimed respect for the principles of non-aligned politics and the Non-Aligned Movement, Muammar Gaddafi has been prone to actions that threatened to destabilize the Non-­ Aligned Movement. Redefining the criteria for membership in the Non-Aligned Movement was constantly present in his actions during the 1970s, and in the second half of the decade when Islam began to play a greater role in Libyan foreign policy, Libya began to lean toward the regional interests of Islamic countries within the Movement. It is questionable to what extent Gaddafi personally accepted the non-aligned policy defined at the conferences in Belgrade in 1961 and Cairo in 1964, given the constant tendency to revise the basic concepts of non-alignment although these aspirations can be seen as attempts to discredit the member countries of the Non-­ Aligned Movement that did not agree with its regime, especially Egypt in the second half of the 1970s. Given these Libyan tendencies within the Non-Aligned Movement, Yugoslavia ranked Libya as a radical member of the Movement and did not support any revision of the membership criteria nor did it support regional groups within the Movement to which Libya was inclined. In talks with Gaddafi, the Yugoslav leadership, and especially President Tito, sought to emphasize the

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importance of preserving the unity of the Non-Aligned Movement and to point out the dangers that would follow if that unity were disrupted.

References Bulletin no. 5, Archive of Yugoslavia (Box 837, Cabinet of President, I-4-a/9, Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Lusaka 1970), Belgrade, Serbia. Bulletin no. 7, Archive of Yugoslavia (Box 837, Cabinet of President, I-4-a/9, Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Lusaka 1970), Belgrade, Serbia. Bulletin no. 3, Archive of Yugoslavia (Box 837, Cabinet of President, I-4-a/15, Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Algiers 1973), Belgrade, Serbia. Bulletin no. 2, Archive of Yugoslavia (Box 837, Cabinet of President, I-4-a/15, Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Algiers 1973), Belgrade, Serbia. Bulletin no. 11, Archive of Yugoslavia, (Box 837, Cabinet of president, I-4-a/35, Conference of the non-aligned movement in Havana 1979), Belgrade, Serbia. Conference Documentation, Archive of Yugoslavia (Box 837, Cabinet of President, I-4-a/26, Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Colombo 1976), Belgrade, Serbia. Dinkel, J. (2018). The Non–Aligned Movement: Genesis, Organization, and Politics (1927–1992). Brill. Discussion about Algiers Conference held on 21st August 1973, Archive of Yugoslavia (Box 837, Cabinet of President, I-4-a/15, Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Algiers 1973), Belgrade, Serbia. Documentation for Conference, Libya, Archive of Yugoslavia (Box 837, Cabinet of President, I-4-­ a/9, Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Lusaka 1970), Belgrade, Serbia. Gaddafi’s Speech at the Algiers Conference, Archive of Yugoslavia (Box 837, Cabinet of President, I-3-a69/13, Muammar Gaddafi’s visit to Yugoslavia 18.-23. 1973), Belgrade, Serbia. General Information about Libya, Archive of Yugoslavia (Box 837, Cabinet of President, I-3-­ a69/13, Muammar Gaddafi’s visit to Yugoslavia 18.-23. 1973), Belgrade, Serbia. Information about Libyan foreign and domestic policy, Archive of Yugoslavia (Box 837, Cabinet of President, I-3-a/69-18, Muammar Gaddafi’s visit to Yugoslavia 21.  – 25. June 1977), Belgrade, Serbia. Information for President’s visit to Libya, Archive of Yugoslavia (Box 837, Cabinet of President, I-2-76/2, Josip Broz Tito’s visit to Libya 31. May - 3. June 1979), Belgrade, Serbia. Libyan Arab Republic, Archive of Yugoslavia (Box 837, Cabinet of President, I-2-44/8, Josip Broz Tito’s Travel to Libya, 25. – 27. February 1970) Belgrade, Serbia. Memorandum of Conversation between Tito and Nasser, Archive of Yugoslavia (Box 837, Cabinet of President, I-2-44/7, Josip Broz Tito’s Travel to the United Arab Republic 23. – 25. February 1970), Belgrade, Serbia. Memorandum of Conversation between Tito and Gaddafi, Archive of Yugoslavia (Box 837, I-2-4/8, Josip Broz Tito’s visit to Libya 25. – 27. February 1970), Belgrade, Serbia. Memorandum of Delegation Meeting with President of the Republic, Archive of Yugoslavia (Box 837, Cabinet of President, I-4-a/15, Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Algiers 1973), Belgrade, Serbia. Memorandum of Conversation between Tito and Gaddafi in Algiers 8th September 1973, Archive of Yugoslavia (Box 837, Cabinet of President, I-4-a/15, Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Algiers 1973), Belgrade, Serbia. Memorandum of Conversation between Tito and Gaddafi in Tripoli on 18th January 1977, Archive of Yugoslavia (Box 837, Cabinet of President, I-2-69/1, Josip Broz Tito’s visit to Libya 18. -21. January 1977), Belgrade, Serbia.

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Memorandum of Conversation between Tito and Gaddafi in Tripoli on 19th January 1977, Archive of Yugoslavia (Box 837, Cabinet of President, I-2-69/1, Josip Broz Tito’s visit to Libya 18. – 21. January 1977), Belgrade, Serbia. Memorandum of Conversation between Tito and Gaddafi in Tripoli on 22nd June 1977, Archive of Yugoslavia (Box 837, Cabinet of President, I-3-69/18, Muammar Gaddafi’s visit to Yugoslavia 21. – 25. June 1977), Belgrade, Serbia. Memorandum of Conversation between Tito and Gaddafi in Tripoli on 1st June 1979, Archive of Yugoslavia (Box 837, Cabinet of President, I-2-76/2, Josip Broz Tito’s visit to Libya 31. May 3. June 1979.), Belgrade, Serbia. Odnosi Jugoslavije i Libije [Yugoslav and Libyan relations] (1965). Jugoslavenski pregled [Yugoslav Review],10, 407–408. Petković, Ranko (1985). Nesvrstana Jugoslavija i suvremeni svet [Non Aligned Yugoslavia and Contemporary World]. Školska knjiga. President Gaddafi’s toast, Archive of Yugoslavia (Box 837, Cabinet of President, I-2-44/8, Josip Broz Tito’s visit to Libya 25. – 27. February 1970), . Preparations for Conference, Archive of Yugoslavia (Box 837, Cabinet of President, I-4-a/9, Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Lusaka 1970), Belgrade, Serbia. Reminder for Conversation with Yugoslav ambassador to Libya Boro Rafailovski, Croatian State Archive (Box 53, HR-HDA-1409, Council for Foreign Affairs of Socialist Republic of Croatia, Arab Countries, 1971), Zagreb, Croatia. Report on Third Conference of the Non–Aligned Movement, Archive of Yugoslavia (Box 837, Cabinet of President, I-4-a/9, Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Lusaka 1970), Belgrade, Serbia. Report on Fifth Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, Archive of Yugoslavia (Box 837, Cabinet of President, I-4-a/26, Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Colombo 1976), Belgrade, Serbia. St. John, R. B. (1987). Qaddafi’s World Design Libyan Foreign Policy 1969–1987. Saqi Books. St. John, R. B. (2012). Libya from Colony to revolution. Oneworld. The Libyan Revolution in the Words of Its Leaders. (1970). Middle East Journal, 2, 203–219. Vuković, P. (1970). Srdačan doček u Tripoliju [A Warm Welcome in Tripoli], Borba, 2. Nikša Minić  is currently employed as the Head of Study Administration Office at the University of Juraj Dobrila in Pula, Croatia. He is a PhD candidate at the University of Zagreb where he will defend his doctoral dissertation under the proposed title Yugoslav Arab Ally  – Yugoslav-Libyan Relations During the Detente. His research interests include Cold War History, Yugoslav foreign policy, and Non-­Aligned Movement. He is co-author of the book Medulin Riviera Tourism: Past and Present of Tourism in Towns of Medulin Municipality and author of several scientific papers and book reviews in Croatian scientific journals and has participated in Croatian and International scientific conferences, including the Fifth Congress of Croatian Historians and the Fourth International Conference Socialism on the Bench. He has also participated in several international projects such as the project “Burnt in Memories” (2015–2017) and “The Holocaust and Genocide in Contemporary Education – Curricula, and Pupils’ Perceptions in Comparison” (2016–2018).

Part IV

A Soldier from the Cradle of Civilization

Chapter 16

Gamal Abdel Nasser: A Hero in Africa and the Arab World Timothy Adivilah Balag’kutu

Introduction Gamal Abdul Nasser (or Jamal Abdel Nassir) was an iconic historical figure in national, continental, and regional geopolitics. He played leading roles in the political histories of Egypt, his home country, Africa, and the Arabic Middle East. He led the Egyptian Revolution that ended monarchical and British imperial rule and, subsequently, the establishment of an indigenous constitutional republic. He championed anti-colonial and liberation struggles as well as continental unification in Africa, and the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (now African Union (AU)). Nasser was also instrumental in organizing the Arab world and restructuring the Arab League (AL) or League of Arab States (LAS). Despite many intra-regional challenges and disagreements among members of the AL, Nasser successfully convened and hosted the League’s historic first summit in 1964, nearly 20 years after its founding in 1945. With an early desire and sense of responsibility for the liberation of Egypt from imperial rule, Nasser quickly developed a larger purpose for his life and vision for his country. Nasser’s politics would eventually – or rather speedily – take a global turn. Beyond championing national liberation, Nasser led Egypt into an important and lasting strategic actor in regional and global geopolitics. Arab-Africa relations may have become less vibrant over the years, but Nasser’s shadow in the life of the two regional blocs and his footprints in the path(s) that connect them are significant and provide lasting sources of essential lessons and knowledge, as well as inspiration for leaders and peoples of the two blocs, separately and in relations between them.

T. A. Balag’kutu (*) University of Professional Studies, Accra (UPSA), Greater Accra Region, Ghana © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. O. Abidde, F. Kumah-Abiwu (eds.), The Political Impact of African Military Leaders, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31427-8_16

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Nasser attracted both admiration and notoriety, making him a subject of great controversy among scholars and observers of the politics of Egypt, the Arab world, and Africa. Nonetheless, even by the very nature of the eruption of Egyptian streets in his funeral procession, the people of Egypt left no doubt in the world community that they loved and admired their charismatic revolutionary leader. Indeed, popular admiration of Nasser showed even much earlier, when Nasser, in a rare and honorable act, sought and failed to resign from office following Egypt’s devastation in the 6-day war between Israel and her Arab neighbors. Modern Egypt’s revolutionary hero also attracted admiration from the larger world communities to which he belonged. For the ordinary people of Egypt, Nasser symbolized hope and inspiration, and liberation and unification in Africa and the Arab world. Memories of Nasser in the Arab world, Africa, and in relations between the two regions speak volumes about the relevance of his life and immortalized statesmanship to the peoples and lands of the two blocs between and within which he worked, and to which he remained committed and loyal in equal measure all his life. In his many leadership roles, domestically and internationally, Nasser demonstrated among many traits of dependable leadership, erudite diplomacy, and strategic alliance formation. Based on leadership personality and symbolism, this chapter examines Nasser’s exploits in Pan-Africanism, Pan-Arabism, and Afro-Arabian relations (or Afro-Arabism), building on his nationalist political foundation. What is the significance of Nasser, the personality and symbolism, to the geopolitics of Africa, the Arab world, and in relations between the two regional geopolitical blocs? The analysis draws on historical archival data as well as genetic information that details the life of Egypt’s revolutionary leader, as a nationalist and internationalist. The chapter makes novel contributions to leadership in Africa and the Arab world, as well as international relations between Africa and the Arab world and, thus, the larger body of knowledge on Non-Western International Relations Theory (NWIRT). The rest of the chapter consists of the following: (1) a discussion on leadership personality and symbolism; (2) an examination of Nasser’s heroics in national and international politics; (3) an analysis of the significance of Nasser’s contribution to Africa and the Arab world; and (4) conclusion.

Leadership Personality and Symbolism Drawing on Weberian (1947) charismatic theory of leadership, Tucker (1968) underscores the centrality of the “gifts of grace” (or charisma) in leadership. Charisma sets the individual apart and makes people perceive and treat the one as naturally endowed with exceptional powers or qualities (Tucker, 1968 from Weber, 1947). The ability of an individual to mobilize and win the respect of groups in times of need to effect change enables one to draw an admirable following. Although a charismatic leader has a natural proclivity and a high probability of rising to power, especially given the right (charismatic) setting, charisma is independent of

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power. A genuine charismatic “leader personality” manifests in the pre-power stage, which is before gaining recognized political power: this can be understood from such genetic sources as memoir literature, letters to and from family and close associates, and interviews, among others (Tucker, 1968). This stage is critical to understanding charismatic leadership. Tucker (1968) asserts further that the manifestation of a leader’s charisma requires and rests on a (charismatic) movement and vice versa – because the two phenomena are inseparable. Sometimes, a charismatic leader emerges from the environment of an existing social movement or creates one when groups are in distress and need a leader with extraordinary qualities. The emergence of a charismatic leader (sometimes by self-appointment) in the context of a social movement often results from natural leadership proclivity and ability, and/or that one’s charisma inspires followers in distress with enthusiasm. Sergiovanni (1981) also observes that in leadership theory and practice, the focus is often on instrumentalism and the behavior of the individual (leaders). Contrary to this common trend in scholarship, however, leadership is “more shadow than substance, more inferential than factual, more intangible than tangible, more subjective than objective, more cultural than behavioral and indeed, more akin to social meanings than social facts” (Sergiovanni, 1981, p. 3). Although symbolism and culture tend to attract little relevance or disappear altogether in leadership theorizing and scholarship, symbolism is central to the essence, impact, and influence of a leader(ship) on the people or followership  – and sometimes more than actual actions. Through unplanned and spontaneous actions and utterances, a leader establishes standards and symbolism in various informal and behind-the-scenes settings (Sergiovanni, 1981). In this respect, leadership manifests in testing common assumptions, creating and nurturing standards, traditions, and beliefs, as well as establishing and supporting a tradition that dictates, determines, and directs individual behavior and/or group culture. The culmination of this may be more influential in making a leadership symbolism than planned and overt behavior. Moreover, a leader’s and group members’ adherence to cultural standards conveyed in established symbols and meanings are key determinants of patriotism, which drives followership. Sergiovanni (1981) asserts, therefore, that the real value of leadership is in symbolism, and it is this knowledge that influential and great leaders possess and utilize to mobilize and attract the obedience of ordinary people. Thus, to understand leadership, scholarly attention must focus (more) on symbolism (Sergiovanni, 1981, pp. 13–4) (than behavior). Leadership symbolism grows from individual personality. In other words, an individual’s personality creates and shapes a symbol of the individual in the minds of followers. Put differently, personality is that which is symbolized in a leader(ship), and symbolism represents the personality of a leader. The two are mutually reinforcing. Nasser’s leadership (and legacy) reflects this personality-symbolism symbiosis in leadership theory. The next section examines the creation of the symbolism of Nasser(ism), based on his personality as demonstrated in his involvement in national and international political activism.

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 asser: Nationalist Revolutionary N and Internationalist Diplomat Nasser’s family, home community, and city, Alexandria, as well as his upbringing and education, had a profound impact on his future involvement and role in national politics and eventually international geopolitics. Nasser was close to his family, especially his mother, an attachment that influenced his worldview as he recounts in an interview with the Sunday Times reporter, David Morgan: “… Losing my mother was a very sad experience in itself, losing her in that way was traumatic and it left a scar that time could not heal. My personal pain and sorrow I experienced at the time made it very distasteful to me to inflict pain and sorrow on others in the subsequent years” Hailing from a humble peasant community without wealth or influence in national politics, it was Nasser’s hardworking nature and a burning desire for liberation that led him into the national political space. He soon became enmeshed in, and increasingly, leading political activism within Egypt, thereby carving for himself a niche in Egypt’s political history, and establishing a platform that would propel him onto international political stages. Born on January 15, 1918, in Bacchus (18 Qanawat Street) in Alexandria, Nasser had his elementary education at Khatatba and El-Nahassin primary schools in Alexandria and Cairo, respectively. He continued to Al-Nahda al-Masria Secondary School (Abdel-Nasser,  n.d.). By the time Nasser finished secondary school, he developed a conviction in the need for some form of force in the fight to regain and secure freedom in his homeland, Egypt. He was determined to join the army, and despite an initial failure, Nasser maintained the desire and eventually got his chance, when, following the 1936 Treaty between the then Kingdom of Egypt and United Kingdom, the military began a re-enforcement exercise to meet security demands (Abdel-Nasser,  n.d.). This time, Undersecretary of the Ministry of War, General Ibrahim Khairy, became convinced by and admired Nasser’s openness, nationalist spirit, and determination to join the military. This turn in events  facilitated Nasser’s entry into the military. Nasser then abandoned his law studies, which he opted for after his initial failure to join the military, to become a professional soldier – and with a vision for a higher purpose. Nasser had an early drive for the necessary knowledge and experience to become a leader, initially in the military (and perhaps, quietly still, nationally). He worked hard and soon gained the confidence of the military as a worthy potential military leader. He rose quickly through the ranks and became Captain in 1942, after only 6 years into the military. He continued to develop his craft and increase his knowledge in the art of military, war, politics, and diplomacy. Hoda, Nasser’s daughter, notes in a sketch on the life of his father that Nasser studied renowned military writers such as Liddell Hart and Clausewitz, as well as such political and diplomatic writers as Cromwell and Churchill (Abdel-Nasser, n.d.). His military duties served him well in his political ambition and organization. He had the immense opportunity to travel around the country and interact with citizens, especially the peasantry, as well as develop relations that proved essential in his and the country’s political future. Notable among these relations  were Zakaria

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Mohieddin, Abdel Hakim Amer, and Anwar El-Sadat, who later succeed him. The military also allowed him to begin his forays into international, especially Pan-­ Arabic, politics, especially when he was able to obtain a transfer to Sudan. Nasser was not just a political activist but also an intellectual. His intellectualism, like that of his contemporary and close associate, Kwame Nkrumah, was purposeful, drawing from and informing his worldview and politics. Nasser’s love and choice of literature – in both its production and consumption – are informed about how his politics and intellectualism converged and re-enforced each other. Nasser showed great interest in revolutionary thought, studying literature on the French Revolution as well as various revolutionary writers (Nasser, n.d.). A staunch Moslem, Nasser also read extensively about the Islamic Prophet Muhammad and other renowned Muslim figures. A great influence on Nasser’s political vision was the great Egyptian political leader and writer, Moustafa Kamel, from whom he quoted in an emphatic and somewhat prophetic letter to Hassan El-Nashar, his close friend: “If my heart were to move from left to right, or the pyramids were to change their place, or the Nile was to change its course, I would never abandon my principles” (Nasser, 4 September 1935 in Abdel-Nasser, n.d.). The works of Tawfiq al-­ Hakim, especially his Awdat El-Rouh (Restoration of the Spirit), which discusses the emergence of a unifying leader in anti-imperial, liberation, and national revival struggles, were probably the most immediately impactful on Nasser’s politics and vision. Nasser also developed an early interest in writing and often wrote on freedom in his School Paper (The Citizen, 2018), and eventually, among other informative writings, Egypt’s Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution (1955). Nasser’s intellectualism served him effectively as a leader, diplomat, and statesman. Politics was the driving force in Nasser’s life. The founding and objective of Nasser’s politics was national liberation and human dignity – initially, for Egyptians. Following his political aspiration, Nasser tried political organization, joining and leaving various groups, including during his youthful beginnings, Young Egypt Party (YEP); he is even known to have contacted the Muslim Brotherhood (Abdel-­ Nasser, n.d.) – who later orchestrated an assassination attempt on his life. Nasser had the sense of a higher calling early in his public life and regarded the military as an essential vehicle in that regard. Indeed, he saw the military as the only viable means to fight the course of Egypt’s liberation in the then-imperial democracy. He used his military experience and training to build the foundation for his politics. Ultimately, Nasser’s involvement with the anti-colonial struggles from early on formed him into a strong, ardent, vocal, and towering nationalist – and eventually, an influential internationalist as well.

Nationalist Revolutionary A deep sense of nationalism drove Nasser’s politics from the onset. Even while in school, Nasser took a great interest in nationalist politics. Nasser’s sense of nationalism was, in fact, notably frightening from an early age. Hoda, Nasser’s daughter,

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recounts how the increasingly political young Nasser alarmed officials of his school, compelling Nasser’s father to send his young political activist son to Cairo, away from the vortex of Egyptian and Arabian politics in Alexandria (Abdel-Nasser, n.d.). He encountered and interacted with members of Egypt’s main nationalist parties in his school days, including, Wafd, the National Party, and the Misr El-Fatah (Adi & Sherwood, 2003). His desire to see a free and dignified Egypt put him at the forefront of student protests in 1935 (Adi & Sherwood, 2003), from which he experienced his “baptism of fire” into Egyptian national politics. Nasser’s nationalist politics only continued to progress then, from that of a young civilian citizen (student) to a politically-minded military officer and leading national liberation activist and revolutionary – and eventually, to a respected and influential international political figure. Events in Alexandria, Nasser’s home, and the cosmopolitan port city of Egypt caught Nasser’s attention and infused him with a strong nationalist sentiment. The cancellation in 1930 of the 1923 constitution in a decree by Prime Minister Ismail Sidky ignited student demonstrations. Nasser joined the demonstration without initially knowing or understanding why – nor did he need a reason to, given the prevailing political environment. He recounts in an interview with David Morgan of the Sunday Times: “While crossing the Manshiya Square in Alexandria, I noticed clashes between some demonstrating students and the police, I did not hesitate: I immediately joined the demonstrators not knowing anything about the cause of demonstration for I found no reason to ask” (Sunday Times, 1962 quoted in Abdel-­ Nasser, n.d.). Nasser only learned later in prison, while receiving treatment for a head injury inflicted by the police during the demonstration, that it was an anti-­ government protest led by the Misr El-Fatah (Young Egypt) society. As he recollects, his zeal (and perhaps delight) in joining the demonstration and his subsequent arrest and detention turned into anger in jail, and perhaps sowed the ripe nationalist seed in him: “I went to jail filled with zeal and came out fuming with anger” (Sunday Times, 1962 quoted in Abdel-Nasser,  n.d.).  Nasser’s experience in the 1935 anti-colonial government protest heightened his sense of duty to national liberation. He was injured, but for him, the scars of that demonstration represent “a mark of honor” and a reminder of his “national duty” that spur on his “resilience to free the nation” (Nasser, November 15 1952 speech in Cairo University – in Abdel-Nasser, n.d.). Later in 1954 (October 26) in the famous Manshiya Square speech (when he survived an assassination attempt), he would recount the events of the 1935 demonstrations with nostalgia, a sense of destiny, and nationalist responsibility: As I began to speak today in Manshiya Square, I went back to the remote past when I was young and remembered Alexandria's struggle, when I called out for freedom and dignity in the name of Egypt for the first time in my life. We were shot at by the bullets of colonialism and its agents: some died, some were wounded; but among them emerged a young man who enjoyed the sense of freedom and promised himself to fight for the freedom he so fervently called for without truly knowing its meaning for he felt it deep inside, echoing in his soul, running in his blood. (Nasser, 1954 in Abdel-Nasser, n.d.). 

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The year 1935 ushered a period of turmoil in Egypt, with a mixture of despair and hope, but laced with a strong desire for liberation  among the Egyptian people. Nasser’s dream to see a “dramatic change” that would “awaken” the nation from its slumber under imperial rule led him not just to another secondary school student demonstration (on November 13) against the colonial administration, but, this time, the forefront. He once again sustained injuries from shots by the British police and, once again, survived. The incident shot him into fame as he was officially launched on the national scene by Al-Gihad, the “nationalistic” newspaper, where he had been rushed to for rescue (Al-Gihad, 1935 from Abdel-Nasser,  n.d.). Concerned about threats that the 1935 (December 12) annulment of Egypt’s 1923 constitution posed to the nation and society, young Nasser together with fellow students continued their efforts in a door-to-door campaign for unity. The action was fruitful and compelled the colonial administration through a royal decree (December 12, 1935) to reinstall Egypt’s 1923 constitution. Subsequently, the Egyptian Nationalist Movement (ENM) was born in 1936. Nasser had by now become firmly rooted in nationalist politics and was certainly on his way to performing a leading role in the fate of his country hence. This was a defining period in Nasser’s nationalist revolutionary vision and the history of Egypt. A feeling of despair and apparent hopelessness engulfed him during these times, but also inspired a burning desire to take up serious roles in the life of his country. He observed rather reflectively, questioningly, and perhaps prophetically, in a letter to his close friend, Hassan El-Nashar: Where is the man who will change all that and take Egypt back to the days of glory when it ruled the world? Who can bring up a new generation capable of standing up for their rights instead of sullenly accepting their fate, never fighting oppression? …. This is but a long prelude to an even longer struggle; we have frequently spoken of a great action that would bring a dramatic change to the nation and awaken it from its slumber, however, nothing has been done yet. (Nasser, 4 September 1935 in Abdel-Nasser, n.d.). 

By now, Nasser was convinced about the need for liberation – of both the military and the nation. The 1936 Treaty between the Egyptian political elite and the imperial British establishment both shocked him and cemented his revolutionary mindset and resolve. The Treaty maintained that (even as the British left) British military forces would remain in Egypt to provide “protection” for the Nile Valley and the Suez Canal against any potential transgressions. The occupying forces, according to the provisions of the Treaty, were to remain in Sudan. Moreover, in the event of any war, Egypt – including its ports, airways, and roads – would all be under the control of Britain (Adi & Sherwood, 2003). Nasser found it shocking that the nation’s political elite agreed to a virtual complete occupation and ownership of Egypt by a foreign power (even in absentia). Moreover, the native military at Minkabad, especially those in the high echelons of power, were found (at least in Nasser’s opinion) to be compromised by the imperial system, inefficient at their job, and mostly corrupt. He was alarmed that the military establishment was basking in imperial servility and servitude, without a vision for the country and neither cared about its fate. Besides, a self-interested political elite focused on personal gain rather than national emancipation and development.

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Nasser discovered upon return from an international mission in the 1948 Palestine liberation war, which followed the September 1947 UN General Assembly decision (UN Resolution 81) to divide Palestine between Arabs and Jews, a shocking pattern of betrayal by Egypt’s political elite. Politicians busily amassed wealth by trading in weapons that were meant for the liberation wars in Palestine: they bought weapons for cheap and sold them to the military to use in the Arab course (Abdel-­ Nasser, n.d.). Thus, Nasser’s idealistic vision encountered challenges and frustration even from within the army that he hoped would be the vehicle for liberation. The frustrating reality, however, only inspired Nasser to remain principled and committed to the idea and course of Egyptian liberation. In a letter in which he recounts the deplorable situation in the military to Hassan El-Nashar, Nasser concludes, “As for me, I will adhere to my principles, no matter what…” (Nasser, 1941 in Abdel-Nasser, n.d.). These discoveries also enabled him to understand the nature and magnitude of the work of liberation that lay ahead. Reformation of the army, to him, was imperative to succeed in the mission of liberating Egypt and the vision of freedom and dignity for the Egyptian people. The main concern then for Nasser was to organize trusted and trustworthy, young, and enthusiastic officers with the conviction and aspiration for national emancipation. Between the late 1930s and early 1940s, Nasser along with some of his colleague young officers began preparation, leading to the establishment in 1945 of the Free Officers Movement (FOM) as the main vehicle of national liberation. Their objective was to end British occupation and get rid of the corrupt and emerging comprador classes that began to establish and/or assimilate within the corrupted political system. FOM was so resolute that Nasser, himself confident of the plans and their ultimate impact, wrote in 1942 that “once the Imperialist realizes that Egyptians are ready to shed their own blood and meet force with force, he will beat a hasty retreat like any harlot rebuffed” (quoted in Adi & Sherwood, 2003, p. 138). Subsequent events only added impetus to his quietly contemplated desire and bolstered his resolve. In early 1942 (February 4), British imperial forces and tanks accompanied the British ambassador, Sir Miles Lampson, to the Abdeen Palace in Cairo and forced King Farouk to establish a puppet pro-Britain government under the leadership of Moustafa El-Nahas. That may have been the last straw that broke the camel’s back in Nasser’s revolutionary fervor. As he observed in a letter to his friend, Hassan El-Nashar, the rest of the Egyptian army also, then, awoke to the reality that Egypt could be taken easily away: “this blow managed to awaken the slumbering spirit within some bodies and taught them that there was a national dignity they had to fight for” (Nasser, 16 February 1942 in Abdel-Nasser, n.d.).  The event spurred Nasser onto full action – now with more practicality than idealism. Although he had excelled as a lecturer at Arkan Harb College, Nasser found a better course and more fulfillment in FOM, following his shocking discoveries about the military and political elite. He composed a panel of the Movement consisting of individuals he found and knew to be of high integrity and dedication, as he was, to the course of the liberation of Egypt and the Arab world. With himself as head, the panel included Kamal El-Din Hussein, Abdel Hakim Amer, Hussein Ibrahim, Salah Salem, Abdel Latif Al-Bughdadi, Khalid Mohy Eldin, Anwar

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el-Sadat, Hussein Alshafii, Zakariya Mohy Eldin, and Gamal Salem. This panel oversaw the vision of Egypt’s liberation Movement and became the ruling Security Council in 1950, 1951 (Abdel-Nasser, n.d.). Having become a Major in the military  in 1951, Nasser began to utilize his authority to mobilize and train volunteers, and, with the FOM, engage in military action against British forces in the Suez Canal region. The commandos’ war, as it was called, lasted till early 1952, when the revolutionary forces extended their actions to include propaganda campaigns against the colonial administration and its indigenous puppets. Reforms in the army at the time favored the revolutionary atmosphere, and the revolutionary forces took advantage of the situation and speeded up their action. On July 23, 1952 (instead of the previously planned date of 1955), the revolutionary forces occupied the High Commandment in Kubri Alkuba and arrested government leaders, who, then, were planning to pounce on FOM. King Farouk abdicated the throne to his son Ahmad Faud 3 days later and went into exile; the son was also deposed on June 18, 1953, when Egypt became a Republic. Nasser became Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Interior Affairs (but later renounced the latter). Nasser’s  popular nationalist appeal and excellent diplomacy enabled him and Egypt to survive revolutionary tensions in its early shaky period. Disputes within the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) led to the resignation in February 1954 of Mohammed Naguib, following which the Council nominated Nasser as Chairman of the Council and Prime Minister. The positions brought more challenges to Nasser, and with them, more resolve to live his vision for Egypt. A failed assassination attempt on his life later (October 26) that year during the famous Manshiya Square speech by elements of the Muslim Brotherhood with suspicious instigation from Naguib (who then occupied the less-prominent role of President) placed Nasser firmly and almost divinely in charge of the affairs of the Council and hence Egypt – as Command of the Council, Prime Minister, and President. He was formally elected President on June 24, 1956, following the 1956 constitution, the first of the Revolution. Later, on February 22, 1958, Nasser became President of the United Arab Republic (UAR), comprising Egypt and Syria. He occupied this position till September 28, 1961, when following a conspiracy by members of the Syrian Army, the union split. Nonetheless, Egypt maintained the name, UAR with Nasser as President till his death. Nasser had become an (if not the) force to reckon with in Egyptian politics, and with considerable clout both within the revolutionary army and among the citizenry. Nasser’s nationalistic and revolutionary sentiments were not unique. He was among a generation of Egyptian youth concerned about the future of their country, and pondering ways to help chart its course in the right direction – as befitting the interest of a free Egypt. The collective nationalistic sentiment among young Egyptian army officers found a common expression and grounding in their individual and collective vision for national liberation. Nasser’s charismatic personality, principled, dedicated, and diplomatic leadership, as well as his symbolic presence, distinguished him from the rest. He would go on to become an influential voice in global politics – at least, about Africa and the Arab world.

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Internationalist Diplomat Nasser, while an ardent nationalist, also developed into a formidable internationalist. His international inroads were reflective of his domestic struggles and aspirations for the Egyptian people. Events in global geopolitics, particularly the two European wars (for power and/through territory) and the ideological Cold War between the USA and USSR, were significant triggers of Nasser’s international politics. The impact of these events on the politics of Africa and the Arab world informed Nasser’s internationalist political stances  – much as they triggered his domestic politics. Nasser became an influential figure in global geopolitics, or at least regional and intercontinental politics of solidarity against imperialism, as well as unification and cooperation. Nasser was also a notable and influential figure in the global non-aligned movement (NAM) of the Cold War era (Adi & Sherwood, 2003). Thus, Nasser’s politics transcended Egypt and onto regional (African and Arabian) geopolitics, making him an ardent Pan-African and Pan-Arabian, as well as an erudite diplomat and alliance strategist in regional and global geopolitics.

Pan-Arabism Nasser was committed to the course of the Arab world, the unification of Arab (and largely Moslem) states, and efforts to rid the region and its peoples of imperialism. Nasser’s Pan-Arabism was intrinsic and started to manifest very early as a student, when he participated in the yearly November 2 protests by high school students against the Balfour Declaration’s promise of a home in Palestine for Jews. Following the end of World War II in 1945, Nasser began to forcefully and purposefully direct his energies to the ideals of the Arab world. He notes in an interview with David Morgan that “Up till 1948 my focus was on the formation of a nucleus group of people who were as angry as I was with the way things were going in Egypt and who were possessed of enough courage and determination to bring about the crucial change” (Naser, n.d.). Egypt’s revolutionary hero then became instrumental in the politics of the Arab world. The September 1947 UN decision to divide Palestine led FOM to support the defense of Arabs in Palestine. Initially, Nasser failed to win the approval of the Palestinian Mufti, then in exile in Egypt, to engage the opposition forces because the Egyptian government, which the Mufti thought needed to approve first, refused to support the idea. Nasser decided to take personal measures to join the course of the war since he could not earn any official approval. However, as fate would have it, the Government of Egypt later decided officially to engage its army in the war for Palestine and the Arab world, enabling Nasser to join the war effort in 1948 (May 16), then a Major in the army. Heroic exploits in the war earned Nasser injury on two occasions during the war and, in 1949, the honor of the Military Star for his distinguished contribution to the war effort (Abdel-Nasser, n.d.). 

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His experience of the war inspired him to even higher leadership of the Arabic world. He found a serious lack of leadership and discipline among the Arab forces in the war effort, which culminated in the defeat of the Arab course. He observed: …there was a lack of organization among the Arab forces, the commandment was almost nil; even the weapons were mostly corrupt. Not just that, but in the middle of the battle, the engineering weaponry was asked to build a chalet for King Farouk in Gaza. (Nasser in Abdel-Nasser, n.d.).

Nasser’s exploits in the Palestinian war also brought him more influence and renown. The turn of events inspired the idea and subsequent formation of the UAR on February 22, 1958, composed (initially) of Egypt and Syria, with him as President of the new internationalist republic. Although the union ended in 1961 due to a Syrian military conspiracy and thus the end of Nasser’s Presidency of an international polity, he remained known (till his death in 1970) as the President of the UAR (then only referring to Egypt). Nasser remained committed to the unification and peaceful coexistence among the Arab states. It was during this course that he died on the fateful evening of September 28, 1970. He had convened an Arab League Summit to facilitate peace between the Jordanian Government and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and shortly after bidding his last guest farewell, Nasser succumbed to a brief heart attack (Adi & Sherwood, 2003). Millions of mourners, shocked and despondent, poured out on the streets of Cairo in his funeral procession. Thus, Nasser died not only as a (or rather the) hero of Revolutionary and Republican Egypt but also of Pan-Arabism - and indeed, Pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism According to Adi and Sherwood (2003), Pan-Africanism, an idea rooted in unity, is the understanding by African peoples of a sharing in common interests over time and place, regardless of specific temporal and geographic variations in aspirations. A Pan-African upholds the ideals and is committed to the realization of Pan-­ Africanism. In other words, a Pan-African is an individual whose life and work focus on the “social and political emancipation of African peoples and those of the African diaspora” (Adi & Sherwood, 2003, p. vii). Egypt’s revolutionary hero was committed to the African liberation struggles, continental unification, and dignity of African peoples. Nasser had an organic commitment to the liberation and unification of Africa, his homeland, becoming a key founding father of continental unity (Adi & Sherwood, 2003). On two occasions at the Casablanca Conference and the third All African Peoples Conference in 1961 during deliberations on the fate of Africa and/or manner of continental unification, Nasser made a strong call and case for unity. In the wake of the Congo crisis also, Nasser criticized global imperialist interests that sought to sow and perpetuate disunity among African states. In the interest of African unity, Nasser did not spare even the United Nations (Adi & Sherwood, 2003).

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Egypt, under Nasser, became a noteworthy (or for some, notorious) actor in continental liberation and unification. For Nasser, Africa was a fateful part of his political and indeed personal life. He observed in Egypt’s Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution that Egypt was by fate a part of Africa and vice versa and would stand with the rest of Africa in the struggle for liberation from imperialism (Nasser, 1955; Tawfik 2016). He states: “We cannot, even if we wish to, in any way stand aside from the dreadful struggle in the heart of Africa between five million whites and two hundred million Africans” (Nasser, 1955, 69 in Tawfik, 2016, 302). In the first Conference of Independent African States held in Accra, Ghana, in 1958, which took a strong position on African liberation and anti-colonialism, Nasser not only participated but was vocal, drawing global attention to Egypt, among such other states as Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Algeria because of their strong anti-imperial positions. The leaders of these states  (and their states  themselves) were, as a result, branded as radical. Nasser was pragmatic in his advocacy for continental liberation and unification. From his immediate Northern African neighbors such as Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, Nasser supported Africa’s liberation struggles with any resources he could offer. Adi and Sherwood (2003) note that Nasser’s Egypt became an important center for African liberation – much as other states such as Tanzania and Ghana provided a haven and/or training space for liberationists across the continent. With “Voice of Free Africa” broadcasting from Cairo in various key (regionally widely-­ spoken) languages such as Hausa, Swahili, and Amharic, Nasser’s Egypt helped to conscientize and rally the ordinary African populace against colonialism (Adi & Sherwood, 2003, p. 140). Nasser also provided a refuge in Egypt for African liberation fighters from, among others, Angola, Cameroon, Somalia, South Africa, and Uganda. As Adi and Sherwood (2003) indicate, Nasser supported the young government of Patrice Lumumba’s newly independent Congo by sending UAR troops as part of a UN contingent. In the aftermath of the coup that overthrew Lumumba, Nasser took a retaliatory stance against Belgium and nationalized Belgian property in the UAR. Moreover, already known for its rich history in learning, Egypt under Nasser became a major center of learning for students across Africa as well as a venue for anti-colonial conferences, including the first “Quit Africa” congress (Adi & Sherwood, 2003, p. 140). The Egyptian revolutionary icon was instrumental in the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (now African Union) in 1963  in Addis Ababa, along with other notable gallant liberationist Founding Fathers, such as Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, Ethiopia’s Haile Selassie, Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, Guinea’s Ahmed Sekou Touré, Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta, Tunisia’s Habib Bourguiba, Algeria’s Ahmed Ben Bella, and Mali’s Modibo Keita. Through his instrumental diplomacy and dedication to the course of the peoples and continents to which he belonged, Nasser facilitated a gradual recognition and acceptance of a common fate and destiny among the people of the Arabic North and the rest of the African continent. This development, by extension, gave strong impetus for the growth of relations between the African continent and the Arab world. Thus, Nasser’s internationalist political leadership was instrumental in the founding of Afro-Arabian relations (Adi & Sherwood, 2003).

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Afro-Arabism Mohamed Fayek (1984) asserted that until 1952 (July 23) Egyptian Revolution, which was led by Nasser, Egypt had no deliberate relationship with the rest of the continent of Africa – despite being a geographic part of it (Bankie & Mchombu, 2008, p. 224). According to him, the African anti-imperial movement had roots in the politics of anti-segregation in America by its Black population. The Black American struggle against segregation was based on the quest for dignity and freedom of Black people, and a return to their (Black) African roots was their rallying call. In this struggle, then, skin color was the main connection with the continent of Africa. Consequently, the notion of “Africanism” was associated with only Black Africa, as well as a nostalgic feeling and desire for the resurrection of the ancient Empires in a United Africa (Fayek, 1984 in Bankie & Mchombu, 2008). Egypt and the rest of North Africa were thus without a significant political connection to the idea of Pan-Africanism from the start of the movement. Nasser changed that trend and not only got Egypt deep into the African struggle but also played a leading role in Africa’s anti-imperial and independence movements, as well as continental unification. Further, Nasser even began to foster relations between Africa and the Arab world. Nasser understood the common fates of the two regions to which he belonged. He also understood that his position and the position of Egypt were fatefully (politically and geographically) strategic. Thus, his aspirations and long-term focus on the geopolitics of the two regions transcended liberation and emancipation. For Nasser, solidarity between Africa and the Arab world and strong Arab-Africa relations were essential in the anti-colonial movement and, indeed, the end of colonialism in the two geopolitical communities that he straddled  – politically and geographically. Like Kwame Nkrumah, Nasser was visionary in his outlook on the development of the two regions. Nasser and Nkrumah (among other early independent African leaders) had their sights beyond financial and economic cooperation and held a common position in global geopolitics to address the political and economic marginalization of African and Arabic peoples. Western imperialism was as much a threat to Africa as it was to Arabian interests, and the two leaders recognized the importance of a common front against such global threats (Bankie & Mchombu, 2008). Thus, a unique insider in both regions with direct responsibility and leadership, Nasser used his position to work toward forging closer geopolitical ties between Africa and the Arab world. By his conviction and political actions, Nasser belonged to the category of leaders described as “Ideological Afrabians,” a term coined by Professor Ali Mazrui to refer to individuals who intellectually believed in and politically sought solidarity between Arabs and Africans or Arab Africans and Black Africa (Bankie & Mchombu, 2008; International University, 2006). Notable ideological Arabian leaders were Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sekou Touré of Guinea (Conakry), and Nasser of Egypt. Given his strategic position between the two regions and peoples, Nasser played a significant role in advancing the ideology and its realization in his internationalist political endeavors.

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 iplomacy, Intellectualism, and Statesmanship: D of a Personality and Symbolism A sense of responsibility and bond with his people led Nasser onto national and international political platforms. As a student, soldier, revolutionary, and nationalist political activist, Nasser’s experiences prepared him for national leadership and placed him on a strong platform that propelled him onto the international political stage. He performed key roles in the geopolitics of Africa and the Arabic world, two regions that suffered imperialist exploitation. Nasser’s personality and symbolism undergirded his evolution, gradual elevation, and eventual influential voice in global geopolitics. Egypt’s revolutionary hero possessed a powerful charisma that facilitated his entry into and rise in national and international politics. One can say, power found Nasser – in/through his political activities – but he did not deliberately seek it. Of course, he felt a sense of responsibility early in his life to his homeland and people, and that required leadership. Nasser may have harbored political (like power) ambitions but, unlike many a modern politicians, only for the liberation of the ordinary and oppressed people. Thus, he ultimately represented to the people, the savior revolutionary leader they long longed for but lacked for long. Nasser’s politics was defined by ideals that resonated with the people. His was politics not in the quest of power and parochial interests, nor the politics of demagoguery, which have become characteristic and in many instances, the norm, of Africa’s third-wave democratization (Balag’kutu, 2022). Indeed, in a rather unique fashion, Nasser’s politics is what drove him to join the military – with a clear vision of how to utilize his training for a higher purpose. His was politics of liberation and empowerment of the ordinary people of Egypt, to whom he felt eternally bound and for whose course he felt a sense of national responsibility. Internationally, Nasser represented an anathema to imperialist exploitation. Nasser was also in word and deed separately but simultaneously Pan-African and Pan-Arabian at heart, a rarity in global geopolitics. He was a dedicated Afrabian, committed to a strong bond and solidarity between the African and Arab worlds. Thus, Nasser (and Nasserism) – the symbol – was associated with a much-needed and anticipated national liberation, as well as the timeless ideals of emancipation and unification, of the people of Egypt, the Arab world, and Africa. Nasser was an enigmatic personality, who, to his following, was endowed with rare abilities and destined to lead Egypt’s liberation. He survived near-death experiences in nationalist political activism even before becoming a (national) leader. Nasser’s life and upbringing portray not only a charismatic personality but also (appear to conspiratorially create) a destined leader. Tucker (1968) contends that the pre-power stage of a leader is critical to understanding charismatic leadership. Besides, a charismatic leader and a charismatic movement are two inseparable phenomena (Tucker, 1968). Genetic information on Nasser’s pre-power life, which Tucker (1968) emphasizes is essential to understanding a leader’s personality, reflect a born charismatic personality. Besides, Nasser had always contemplated and

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felt responsible and destined to lead Egypt’s liberation from imperial occupation and domination, and was also eventually “blessed” with an environment that required the charismatic leadership he provided. Thus, in line with Tucker’s (1968) exposition on charismatic leadership, Nasser emerged from the charismatic environment of his days and continued to recreate and extend it. Nasser’s charismatic personality (Tucker, 1968) facilitated the cultivation, knowledge, and acceptance of a symbolism (Sergiovanni, 1981) of Nasser(ism). Hayward and Dumbuya (1983) assert that leadership images and symbols serve to present one as possessing special qualities and as different from other humans. Sometimes, such leaders draw perceptions about possessing mystical capabilities that make them indispensable. They attract perceptions of and/or exude such qualities as heroic, noble, attractive, charismatic (which give personal legitimacy); wise, efficient problem-solver, energetic in dealing with crises (substantive legitimacy); and associated with admired values such as liberation and unity (procedural legitimacy). Society tends to use, among others, edifices, artworks, songs, and other timeless expressions to glorify and immortalize such individuals. However, the importance of political symbols depends on what they evoke in the minds of people (Hayward & Dumbuya, 1983) because the meanings of a symbol(ism) are what matter (Edelman, 1985). Further, Sergiovanni (1981) contends that a leader’s knowledge of the impact and significance of the symbolism of leadership and the ability to utilize that symbolism contributes to effective leadership. In both spontaneous and deliberate actions and utterances, Nasser effectively conveyed this symbolism of his leadership and himself as the destined liberator and unifier of the Egyptian people, and an anathema to imperialism in the two regions. Nasser’s personal qualities (or personality), the rationale behind his actions and position, and the values, ideals, and beliefs (symbolism) he pursued in the interest of the people of Egypt, Africa, and the Arab world, drew the support and respect every leader needs from his followership. As characterized by Hayward and Dumbuya (1983) respectively as personal, procedural, and substantive legitimacy, Nasser’s enjoyment of this legitimacy provided a strong base for his involvement and vocal role in Arabian and African geopolitics. Nasser’s complex presence and participation in global politics attracted both loathe and admiration  – perhaps, in equal measure. The domestic dislike of Nasserism led to an assassination attempt on his life. As he would observe, the ideals he stood for created a symbolism that was a threat to his opponents, especially imperial Britain. Nasser, the influential and (branded) radical leader, also became problematic for America’s interests in the Arab world. Osman (2017) observes that the USA was anxious about the threat the Egypt-Syria unity/union posed to Western political/ideological and economic interests. An expanded Egyptian state that includes Syrian territory threatened Western access to Persian Gulf oil resources through the Suez Canal and Syria. Nasser’s politics undermined the US-engineered Baghdad Alliance and US interests but appeared to favor Soviet Union policy and ideological interests in the region (Osman, 2017). Also, Lebanon’s Maronite Christian President Camille Chamoun, who faced a rebellion by the Muslim

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population and Nasser’s Christian sympathizers, blamed Nasser for the rebellion and accused UAR of smuggling arms for the rebels, a claim United Nations inspectors failed to corroborate (Reidel, 2018). Nevertheless, Nasser enjoyed overwhelming admiration and respect at home and across the Arab world, and in Africa. Despite fierce international (or effectively, Western) criticism and dislike, Nasser was popular and cherished by the people of Egypt, and commanded considerable respect and following from the Arab world and Africa. Many even adored the name, person, and symbol of Nasser. For the same reasons, however, others held a contrary view of Nasserism. Yet Nasser upheld his values without compromise, and neither did he attempt to take undue advantage of his position, towering personality, and dreaded symbolism to exploit his people. Thus, Nasser (and/or Nasserism) became an influential symbol of Arabian and African liberation and a geopolitical phenomenon that stroked global geopolitical contests. Furthermore, Nasser possessed admirable qualities that defined his leadership and either added or gave rise to his popularity and overwhelming legitimacy in Egypt. Nasser proved himself a distinguished statesman (in the making) throughout his public career, resisting the enticement of absolutism (at all costs) and remaining committed to the interest of the ordinary citizen. He resigned from or renounced positions of power that he made possible in the first place: for instance, he resigned from the leadership of the revolution and renounced the additional role of Minister of Interior Affairs of the Republic. In another rare display, Nasser tried unsuccessfully due to resistance from the ordinary people of Egypt, to resign as President. Moreover, but for the environment that may have propelled him, Nasser was a pacifist as he notes, from his first experience in war: “I felt from the depths of my heart that I hated war. … the idea of war itself. I felt that humanity does not deserve the honor of life if it does not strive with all its heart in the cause of peace” (Nasser quoted in Khalidi, 1973, p. 32). The life and leadership of Egypt’s revolutionary icon make for a distinguished statesman, and through his involvement in the geopolitics of Africa and the Arab Middle East, Nasser also proved himself to be an erudite diplomat and alliance strategist. Overall, Nasser left a significant mark and a lasting presence in the geopolitics of the Arab and African worlds. Nasser was a hero to the people with whom and for whom he lived, worked, and fought. He was at the same time a villain to those whose politics, ideologies, and values differed from his. An early understanding of the history, politics, and fate of his homeland, Egypt, made Nasser an enduring visionary with a practical mission to make a difference in society. Freedom and emancipation from imperialism, unification of his people, intercontinental collaboration, cooperation, and solidarity drove him from the beginning and throughout his public activism, as each subject and stage demanded his attention along the way. These values founded his personal and public life and informed his position on national and international politics.

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Conclusion Nasser represented a force to reckon with in regional and, indeed, global geopolitics. Given his rather mystical history of survival from very early on and throughout his nationalist political career, the life of the Egyptian revolutionary leader proved designed, destined, and (divinely) preserved for liberation leadership, and unification of a distressed people, and subsequently diplomacy and strategic alliance formation among marginalized, exploited, and repressed peoples of Africa and the Arab world. He did lead Egypt’s emancipation and contribute to laying the path of unification of Africa and the Arab world, as well as relations between them. Although he had a sense of national calling from very early on, Nasser may still have been awed by the turn of events and where they eventually placed him: from humble and non-influential beginnings, he soon became a prominent voice of reason with a towering international stature. He would be rightly justified in feeling that he symbolized dread, especially to his opponents (Nasser, 1959). With his kind of leadership and legacy, Nasser is very worth learning about and from. Nasser’s legacy is an essential reference in national liberation leadership, continental unification, as well as regionalism, and interregional cooperation. Nasser has left, through his life and leadership, an important source of knowledge on African, Arabian, and Afro-Arabian geopolitics. For academics  – students and teachers  – with an interest in African, Arabian, and Afro-Arabian politics, as well as non-­ Western international relations, Nasser’s internationalist legacy is an important and rich resource of knowledge. This chapter has sought to underscore this fact through Nasser’s involvement in the politics of Egypt his home, as well as the geopolitics of the Arab Middle East, Africa, and in relations between the two blocs, whose histories provide a rich source of knowledge in global relations, and (especially) non-­ Western theorizing of the world.  For scholarship on continental and global leadership,  Pan-Africanism, Pan-Arabism and Afro-Arabism, and  international relations broadly, another source of significant insight is Nasserism.  

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Fayek, M. (1984). The July 23 revolution and Africa. In K. E.-D. Haseeb (Ed.), The Arabs and Africa (pp. 90–91). Croom Helm. Hayward, F. M., & Dumbuya, A. R. (1983). Political legitimacy, political symbols, and national leadership in West Africa. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 21(4), 645–671. International University of Africa. (2006). African universities congress, interaction and interrelation in Africa. Academic Conference Research Papers (2), Khartoum – Sudan. Khalidi, W. (1973). Nasser’s memoirs of the first Palestine war. Journal of Palestine Studies, 2(2), 3–32. Nasser, G. A. (1959). Where I stand and why. Embassy of the United Arab Republic. Nasser. (n.d.). Sunday Times Reporter Interview with President “Gamal Abdel Nasser”. Nasser. Retrieved from http://nasser.org/Common/SundayTimesInterview_en.aspx?lang=en Osman, D. S. R. (2017). The attitude of The United States of America towards the coup against Egyptian-Syrian unity in 1961. International Journal of Social Science and Humanities, 7(1), 6. Reidel, B. (2018). 1958: When America first went to war in the Middle East. BROOKINGS. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-­from-­chaos/2018/ 07/02/1958-­when-­america-­first-­went-­to-­war-­in-­the-­middle-­east/ Sergiovanni, T. J. (1981). Symbolism in leadership (what great leaders know that ordinary ones do not). ERIC. Retrieved November 23, 2021, from https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED228694 Tawfik, R. (2016). Egypt and the transformations of the pan-African movement: The challenge of adaptation. African Studies, 75(3), 297–315. The Citizen. (2018). Egypt’s Nasser: The failed vision of united Africa- P.1. Retrieved from https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/magazines/political-­reforms/egypt-­s-­nasser-­the-­failed-­ vision-­of-­united-­Africa-­p-­1-­2653522 Tucker, R. C. (1968). The theory of charismatic leadership. Daedalus, 731–756. Weber, M. (1947). The theory of social and economic organization (Translated by AM Henderson and Talcott Parsons. Edited with an introduction by Talcott Parsons.) The Free Press of Glencoe Collier-Macmillan Limited. Timothy Adivilah Balag’kutu  is a researcher/scholar in democratization and governance in Africa, as well as environmental sustainability and extractives. He is currently deputy director of Research at the Institute for Sustainable Development and Natural Resources, a research fellow at Earth System Governance, a member of ORCID Research Advisory Council, as well as co-founder and executive director of Center for Citizen Engagement in Governance (Ghana). He has taught courses on contemporary Africa, international relations, and environmental governance at Babson College. He holds a PhD in Global Governance and Human Security from the University of Massachusetts Boston and two masters’ degrees in Political Science and International Affairs from Ohio University. His work has appeared in Routledge Handbook of Environmental Conflict and Peacebuilding; A Research Agenda for Global Environmental Politics; Corporate Social Responsibility and Canada’s Role in Africa’s Extractive Sectors; The Extractive Industries and Society; African Studies Quarterly; and Commonwealth and Comparative Politics.

Chapter 17

Hero in Arab Maghreb and Mashreq Elizabeth Bishop

Introduction This chapter addresses militarized “heroism” and military intelligence, in the context of regional and international developments. The noun “hero” can be defined as “a person who is admired or idealized for courage, outstanding achievements, or noble qualities: a war hero”; certainly, Egypt’s president Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein (born 15 January 1918, died 28 September 1970) is identified as such a “hero” in Africa and the Arab world. While his is not a sole or unique stature, it is exemplary: historian Joel Gordon titled his profile, Hero of the Arab Nation (2012), for Omar Khalifah, Nasser was “a legendary hero from early on in his political career” (2016, p. viii), and for Lahouari Addi he was “hero of the crowds from Baghdad to Casablanca” (2018, p. 41). Among the many characteristics which distinguished him, Nasser was a particularly keen consumer of intelligence (Sirrs, 2013, p. 235). This chapter, by narrating the origins and early years of Egypt’s Military Intelligence and Reconnaissance Administration (Idarah Al Mukhabarat Al Ḥarbiya Wal Istitla͗ ) as context for a model of heroism derived from Nasser’s public persona and as a model for other intelligence services in Africa, draws on such concepts as “information,” “political warfare,” “propaganda,” “psychological strategy,” and “psychological warfare” (Haight, 2008). In addition to government records, this discussion traces the evolution of tradecraft by means of radio and television broadcasts in Cairo and Alexandria, films, public speeches, newspapers, and theatrical plays, as well as works of philosophy. This specific term which acknowledges the wide recognition of Nasser’s heroism, “from Baghdad to Casablanca” (echoing, as it inverts Nasser’s own description of E. Bishop (*) Texas State University, San Marcos, TX, USA © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. O. Abidde, F. Kumah-Abiwu (eds.), The Political Impact of African Military Leaders, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31427-8_17

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the League of Arab States, “from the [Atlantic] Ocean to the [Arabian] Gulf”), indicates support from this region’s entire expanse. Residents of both the mashreq (Iraq, as well as Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen), as well as the maghreb (including Morocco, as well as Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia), were familiar with elements of Nasser’s heroism, and, by extension, its imbrication with the new powers of Egypt’s revolutionary state. Just as Nasser came to represent a model of heroism recognized in all regions of the Arab world, this chapter will also discuss alternatives to this model of heroism, as well as failures in its transmission to other states, to recognize multiple forms of nation-state modernity in the region.

Philosophy of Revolution In Philosophy of the Revolution (Falsafat al-Thawra, 1955), Nasser later described his experiences as an adolescent: “I led a demonstration at the Renaissance (el-­ Nahda) School and screamed from the bottom of my heart asking for complete independence, the crowds repeated after me. But our screams were in vain, for they were drowned by the wind which turned them into faint echoes that cannot move mountains nor break rocks….” Previously, we defined “hero” as “a person who is admired or idealized for courage, outstanding achievements, or noble qualities;” credited to Mohamed Hassanein Heikal as ghostwriter, Philosophy of Revolution a specific definition of “heroism” so as to reflect specifically on Egypt’s head of state, and this person’s role in Africa and the Arab world (Holland, 1996, p. 54). One passage of the Philosophy frames this key question: The annals of history are full of heroes who carved for themselves great and heroic roles and played them on momentous occasions on the stage. History is also charged with great heroic roles for which we do not find actors. I do not know why I always imagine that in this region in which we live, there is a role wandering aimlessly about seeking an actor to play it…

Even as these three sentences have been quoted numerous times, establishing a lasting metaphor for heroism in “this region” (Barnes & Feldman, 1972; Peevers, 2019), they raise questions: Are categories of heroism universal, and are there models of heroism which are specific to Africa and the Arab world? After a brief digression, the source text resumes on what may be an elucidating point, which appears to eliminate Nasser from the category “hero”: …this role is not a leading role. It is one of interplay of reactions and experiments with all these factors aiming at exploding this terrific energy latent in every sphere around us and at the creation, in this region, of a tremendous power capable of lifting this region up and making it play its positive role in the construction of the future of humanity.

Such contemporary developments offer a helpful complement to a critical reading of heroism in philosophy. Acknowledging that revolutionary circumstances demanded inclusive definitions of the word “hero,” this chapter discusses the

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“interplay of reactions and experiments” as indexed by the establishment and development of a military intelligence service in Nasser’s Egypt (which came to serve as a model for similar services elsewhere in Africa).

Soldier as Intellectual Taking as an initial cue the “interplay of reactions and experiments,” let us recognize that while still a student in secondary school, Nasser read Tawfiq al-Hakim’s novel Restoration of the Spirit (‘Awdat El-Rouh, 1933). Both the author of this text and its reader were from Alexandria, Egypt’s second-largest city, with its significant European community (Tignor, 1980). Educated in France, al-Hakim witnessed across the Rhine a surge of Nazi power (which culminated in Adolf Hitler’s accession to the chancellorship and would yield Germany’s union with Austria 5 years later). al-Hakim’s novel envisions the rise of an Egyptian leader who would unite Egyptians and inspire them to fight for their freedom of the national spirit (Gerges, 2019, p. 156). At this time, residents of the Nile valley were divided. The landowning aristocracy, residing in urban areas on rents from rural estates, was connected with a royal family descended from an Ottoman Turkish-speaking aristocracy; rural agriculturalists, with severely limited opportunities for secondary education and employment in the civil service, spoke Arabic. After completing his secondary education, Nasser applied to the Staff College and passed the medical examination. However, on account of his humble social background (while his father was a civil servant, he was employed as a mere postman), Nasser failed the interview. Consequently, the would-be officer joined Cairo University’s Faculty of Law, as Tawfiq al-Hakim had in Paris. Suddenly, and unexpectedly, the 1936 bilateral treaty permitted “social rank” to be removed from categories necessary for admission to the Staff College (Abdel-­ Nasser, 2018); hopeful candidates would be accepted with sponsors’ assistance. Married to a member of the royal family, Undersecretary of State for National Defense General Ibrahim Khairy pasha represented “the cream of the aristocracy.” Another cadet of modest social background (similarly suddenly eligible for admission to staff college) later recalled: “it eventually dawned that my father had a friend… who happened to be working for Khairy; one morning, my father took me to the pasha’s palace…. We entered the smart house and stood in the hallway; that was the arrangement, the pasha had to pass by us on his way out, would notice our presence, and ask what we wanted. The pasha did in fact come down a few minutes later” (Shabka, 2018). On such a basis, the General sponsored Nasser’s admission in 1937 (Abdel-Malek, 1968; Lacouture, 1973).

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Egyptian Command and Staff College After Egypt’s bilateral treaty with Great Britain increased enrollment in the Egyptian Command and Staff College, five men (Nasser, Salah Salem, Zakaria Mohieddin, ‘Abd al-Hakim ‘Amer, and Tharwat ‘Ukashah) attended together (Gordon, 1991, p. 43). They graduated and began their service during World War II when a British instructor at the Egyptian staff college informed Julian Amery that plans were being hatched for a coup; Anthony Eden replied dismissively “he had been assured by the department concerned that the Army was loyal to the King” (Lucas & Morey, 2000, p. 98). During November and December of 1943, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with Chinese President Chiang Kai-shek and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill; while President Roosevelt invited Egypt’s King Farouk to board the USS Quincy in the Great Bitter Lake in the Suez Canal, he was not invited to take part in the Allies’ Cairo Conference. Consequently, even as the Allies’ military intelligence services worked closely with local journalists and representatives of foreign governments in exile (“psychological operations”) (U.S. National Archives, Records of the Office of Strategic Services), armed forces under King Farouk’s command lacked such modern military’s capacities to influence public opinion (Cooper, 2015). At the same time as Cairo was at the center of the Allies’ operations in occupied Yugoslavia (Ford, 2000; Lindsay, 1993; Riccardi et al., 2020), these five Egyptian men enrolled in the staff college studied military arts which conspicuously lacked officially sanctioned connections with local journalists and consequently able to influence public opinion, as well as any active counterintelligence program. In Cairo at that time, the local military intelligence service merely regulated military officers’ foreign travel, investigated documents to prove officers’ loyalty, and prepared a formal analysis of other states’ military capabilities (Sirrs, 2010, p.  30). While local government radio (Egypt’s “home service”) lacked the shortwave capability and only 72 kilowatts of medium-wave power (Boyd, 1975), the UK Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) maintained a radio station in Cyprus, called “The Near East” (Sharq al-Adna) as the basis for its covert propaganda operations in the region, including black propaganda (“fake news”) (Lashmar, 2020). The organizational shortcomings of Egypt’s military became catastrophically evident during the Palestine campaign of 1948. During military operations in which the five recently graduated Egyptian officers took an active role (Abou-El-Fadl, 2018; Mostafa, 2016; Talhami, 2007), they were overwhelmed by the success of militias’ terrorist campaigns among civilian populations (Hughes, 2019, p.  95; Khalidi, 1971, p. lxxii; Makdisi, 2008, p. 251). While psychological operations contributing to the exodus (nakba) of Palestinian civilians are beyond the current work, let us simply acknowledge these particular historical events in the context of the Allies’ activities in Cairo during World War II, as well as a part of the five men’s experiences in Egypt’s military during the 1948 war (Schleifer, 2006; Tolan, 2015; Makdisi, 2008).

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“Heroism” displayed by members of Egypt’s “Free Officers” includes the subsequent administrative extension of this new form of military power, based on the experience of foreign powers which deployed psychological operations teams in Cairo during World War II (Defty, 2004, p. 60; Smith, 1980). The British intelligence service MI6 was preoccupied with key political figures within the royal court and Egyptian journalists, leaving “Free Officers” free to develop contacts with the US Embassy in Cairo (Beisner, 2009, p. 562). After 1948, in an attempt to prevent another outbreak of war in the future, France, the UK, and the USA agreed to refrain from selling major weapons systems to any of the Middle Eastern states. The possibility of cooperation in other fields of military endeavor, however, was more open to flexibility, and these years witnessed the growth in communications, logistics, and scientific research which could be represented as “civilian.” After January 1952 riots in Cairo and Alexandria, Americans responded favorably to requests from the Egyptian military for cooperation in the field of intelligence: US Secretary of State Dean Acheson had already noted daylight between Egypt’s monarchy and their British military advisors (Hopkins, 2017). Both the US Department of State and the newly established Central Intelligence Agency considered Egypt key to the region’s affairs (Jeffreys-Jones & Stafford, 2014). Meanwhile, in Cairo, events developed quickly. News leaked of King Farouk’s plan to overturn the results of the election for the military club’s leadership, leading a group of “Free Officers” to launch plans for a coup on a preemptive basis.

Tentative Allies When the five men and their supporters in Egypt’s military who described themselves as “Free Officers” informed Assistant Air Attaché David Evans they were ready to move, US Ambassador Jefferson Caffery gave a thumbs-up; after the coup, the “Free Officers” invited Evans to join celebrations at their headquarters (Gordon, 2012, p. 164). On 23 July 1952, a group of Egyptian Army officers overthrew King Farouk. The Officers’ successful takeover marked the dissolution of the monarchy’s internal security apparatus (with its British advisors). The success of “Free Officers” correlated with the fall of foreign advisors in Egypt’s intelligence community: “almost all of the British service’s sources were within the ‘old guard’ of the monarchy and the Wafd party… MI6, relying on these rather biased informants, failed to appreciate the significance of the ‘Free Officers’”. Within months of the “Free Officers” coup, US Intelligence Officer Kermit Roosevelt met Nasser and his four colleagues regularly (Kandil, 2016, p. 238). A new military intelligence service heralded Egypt’s entry into Arab and African affairs. Of the “Free Officers,” Zakaria Mohieddin was tasked with protecting the “political work of the revolution at home and abroad” (James, 2006b). William Lakeland of the US Central Intelligence Agency enjoyed a regular channel with the

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officers as a group and Ali Sabri, Chief of a new Air Force Intelligence as well (Kandil, 2016, p.  238). Zakaria Mohieddin is credited with founding Egypt’s Military Intelligence in 1952. Of the Officers, another particularly close to the Americans—‘Ali Sabri—trained with the US Federal Bureau of Investigations (in which quantitative indices were as important to agents’ careers as qualitative indices). By October 1952, the CIA claimed to have taken over intelligence training in Egypt (Sirrs, 2010, p.  32). The nominal President of this new government, Mohammed Naguib, sent US President Dwight D. Eisenhower messages outlining British actions against Egypt’s government (U.S. National Archives, Dwight David Eisenhower Presidential Library, John Foster Dulles Papers). The “Free Officers” who started to rule Egypt’s new Republic took legal measures against the former royal family. Six sections of Law no. 178 of 1952 expropriated landholdings in excess of 84 HA (200 feddan), which—by specifying tenants’ rights and landlords’ responsibilities—threatened wealth accrued among the Royal family and their extended networks. While Article 2 of the 1923 constitution of Egypt’s monarch prevaricated, “Egyptian nationality should be determined by law,” law no. 598 of 1953 empowered the Ministry of Justice “to handle claims against members of the Mohamed Aly dynasty, including ex-King Farouk,” which included stripping them of their citizenship. With their assets and legal status threatened in this way, a number of plots eventually emerged among members of the former royal family and their supporters (Bardakçı, 2018). These measures gave rise to strong resistance among members of the former royal family and their supporters. While seldom considered “political warfare,” “propaganda,” or “psychological strategy,” Tawfiq al-Hakim’s play Soft Hands (al-­ Aydi an-Nā’ima, 1953) expressed an optimistic confidence that Egypt’s class stratification would be easily solved, and a new nation forged from brotherly love and shared toil (Vatikiotis, 1968, p.  175). Serving as evidence the “Free Officers” quickly mastered both techniques of “psychological operations” and counterintelligence, the Egyptian army and air force intelligence supplied foreign allies with allegations that Egyptian communists were planning sabotage against US bases and oil pipelines across the Middle East (Hashimoto, 2017). Within weeks of the signature on a US-brokered treaty between Egypt and Great Britain, the CIA offered Egypt $40m in military aid and $3m to train a personal guard for the new head of state opposite formal diplomatic permission for a US military mission on Egyptian soil. Meanwhile, the Egyptian army and air force intelligence continued to dismantle the monarchy’s political service in each governorate as well as within the Ministry of the Interior (Stephens, 1972). The following spring, it appeared as if the US had replaced Great Britain as military advisors to Egypt when the US Embassy sent a representative to weekly briefings with Nasser, Ali Sabri, and Heikal (author of the Philosophy of Revolution) (Lucas & Morey, 2000, p.  98). Eventually, a film version of Soft Hands (directed by Mahmoud Zulfikar, with an all-star cast) was released; the fact that it received Egyptian cinema’s top award 10 years later attests to a continuous commitment to constructive class politics among the “Free Officers” (Fawal, 2019, p. 43).

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“Voice of the Arabs” While these broadcasts initially complemented the BBC (Zamir, 2014), such blatant use for psychological operations eventually had the unintended effect of eroding confidence in the BBC’s independence among listeners to its Arabic language service (Webb, 2014). Shortly after the promulgation of Egypt’s new land law, on the first anniversary of the coup or “July Revolution,” Dr. Mohammed Abdel-Kader Hatem of Egypt’s Ministry of Communications launched the “Voice of the Arabs” (Sawt al-Arab) shortwave radio service. Initially a half-hour program on Cairo Radio, it soon featured local news enunciated by journalists fluent in the local dialects spoken within and outside Egypt, as well as Qur’anic recitation and recorded music for 6 hours a day (Al-Jabar, 2020; James, 2006a, b; Nelson, 2015). A year after its initial broadcast, the service’s transmission time expanded to a full 24-hour period, with dedicated services for the major regions of the Arab world (“from Baghdad to Casablanca”), making this the most powerful and widely followed radio station in the region (Bishop, 2023; Rogan, 2012). “Voice of the Arabs” made Egypt the “dominant broadcaster in the Middle East and a major international broadcaster” (Boyd, 1982). As testimony to its reach from Casablanca to Baghdad, Moroccan filmmaker Moumen Smihi’s film, “44, or Tales of the Night” (44 ou les récits de la nuit, 1985), includes a scene in which nine members of one family gather to listen to the Egyptian radio broadcast together (Limbrick, 2020). Egyptian radio supported the successful candidacy of Mohammed V to the Sultanate of Morocco, Habib Bourguiba’s Neo-Destour political party’s triumphant bid for the independence of Tunisia, and allowed its facilities to be used by Algeria’s national liberation front which maintained an effective political office in Cairo (Boyd, 1975, p. 647).

Assassination Attempt From the midst of a crowd gathered to hear Nasser speak in Alexandria in October 1954, eight pistol shots rang out. This represented the first attempt to assassinate this member of the “Free Officers,” which occurred in a public place during a live radio broadcast (Jankowski, 2002, p. 23). “The left breast of Nasser’s uniform grew dark with a stain that looked like blood” (“Egypt,” Time, 8 November 1954). People in that crowd on Manshaya Square seized Mahmoud Abdel Latif Al-Samkari, claiming he was the perpetrator. The news of Egypt spread as far as the USA. In police custody, Al-Samkari confessed to being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB; al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin) political organization. This individual was charged with attempted assassination before a report attributed “the stain in [Nasser’s] tunic turned out to be not blood but a fountain pen leak.” A popular magazine in the USA reported: “as Nasser’s train passed through the Delta cities,

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returning [from Alexandria] to Cairo, huge crowds spontaneously came out to cheer him; at the Cairo railway station, 100,000 people surged against police lines crying, ‘God bless Gamal.’ Besieged by admirers reaching out to embrace him, the Premier needed two hours to make what was ordinarily a ten-minute drive to his office.” The foreign journalist concluded, “Eight wild shots had served him well” toward establishing his image as a “hero” in the Arab world (“Egypt,” Time, 8 November 1954). The assassination attempt gave rise to the formation of a single political party. This Arab Socialist Union (ASU; al-Ittihad al-Ishtiraki al-‘Arabi) offered a regime-­ approved alternative to political parties which had enjoyed a legal identity under the monarchy (such as the Wafd), as well as political groups which the monarchy had denied a legal status (such as the Muslim Brotherhood as well as the multiple communist parties in Egypt). The ASU eventually paralleled the civil service, controlling employment in women’s and youth organizations, daily newspapers, professional associations’ councils, chambers of commerce, and agricultural cooperatives (Hatem, 1994).

“Lavon Affair” A former Egyptian prosecutor observed that, from the beginning, promotion in Mukhabarat was based on the number of cases they resolved (Reimer-Burgrova, 2021, p.  52). Among the Mukhabarat’s early successes was the “Lavon affair,” which took its name from Israel’s Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon. The “Lavon affair” represented an attempt to carry out psychological operations within Egypt. As part of a false flag operation, Israeli military intelligence recruited 12 Egyptian Jews to plant bombs inside American-, British-, and Egyptian-owned cinemas, libraries, and schools (Trenear-Harvey, 2014, p. 133). Allegedly, the conspirators planned to insert homemade bombs (consisting of bags containing acid, placed over nitroglycerine) into books and leave them on library shelves before closing time, and then over several hours, the acid would eat through the bags, detonating the explosives. Indeed, bombs at eight sites (including libraries of the US Information Agency in Alexandria and Cairo, a British-owned theater, the baggage storeroom in Cairo’s railway station, and a post office in Alexandria) detonated in July 1954 (Stein, 2009). As Kai Bird points out, the “selection of American and British targets made it look like the work of anti-Western Egyptian terrorists” (2010, p. 182). Steffen Hahnemann expresses surprise at the “little literature about the ‘Lavon affair’ in spite of its substantial influence” (2014, pp. 137–139). The plan was that these attacks would be blamed on Communists, the Muslim Brotherhood, or “local nationalists” (i.e., members of the former Wafd party and supporters of the former royal family) as a means to discredit the new authorities (Teveth, 1996, p. 93) while

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justifying continued British occupation of Egypt’s Suez Canal zone (Amar-Dahl, 2016, p. 68). Gaining access to files assembled by the monarchy’s political police, Zakaria Mohieddin, ‘Ali Sabri, and Kamal Rif’at named this powerful new organization the Mukhabarat (Sirrs, 2010, p.  32). Within the organization, four departments were devoted to Communism, Foreigners, Internal Affairs (for management of legal cases against members of the dissolved Wafd political party, as well as the illegal Muslim Brotherhood organization), and Zionism. For this discussion of Nasser as a hero in Africa and the Arab World, the “Lavon affair” represented the first success of a Mukhabarat in Egypt, Africa, and the Arab world. The conspirators’ initial successes ended in a startling display of sloppy tradecraft when Philip Natanson accidentally set himself on fire in front of a cinema in Alexandria (Tyler, 2012, p. 53). Egyptian authorities arrested him; in Nathanson’s eyeglasses case, they found a list of accomplices’ names along with other incriminating evidence. When two additional conspirators attempted to bring incendiary materials into a Cairo movie theater, they were arrested as well (Primakov, 2009, p. 28). Eleven were eventually taken into custody and charged. What is significant is that the “Lavon affair” marked a crucial transition: while initially a keen consumer of intelligence, the new intelligence services demonstrated their capacity to produce intelligence, understood as “information,” “political warfare,” “propaganda,” “psychological strategy,” and “psychological warfare” in both domestic and regional contexts. With ruthless efficiency, the intelligence service earned well-deserved notoriety for midnight arrests, grim torture techniques, and interrogations (Sirrs, 2013, p. 236). Two of the conspirators apprehended in the “Lavon affair” committed suicide (or “committed suicide” as was a practice among the French OAS in Algeria) while awaiting trial. During this period, some of the Muslim Brothers arrested in connection with Mahmoud Abdel Latif Al-Samkari charges in the assassination attempt confessed to connections to Mohammed Naguib. In a lengthy trial (which began on 11 December 1954, and lasted until 27 January 1955), two individuals were taken into custody with regard to the “Lavon affair” and were acquitted, two were condemned to execution by hanging, and the rest were sentenced to prison terms. During the 1980s, the birth of military intelligence was serialized for Egyptian television during the sacred month of Ramadan as “Ra′fat al-Haggan” (Rachwani, 17 April 2021). In this, the Egyptian Radio and Television Union established the personal and professional career of an intelligence operative lmpwm as Ra’fat al-­ Haggan (his birth name said to have been Ref’at al-Gammal), his recruitment as an agent, his formative years among members of Alexandria’s Jewish community, his professional work in Tel Aviv, and his relations with women as something of a model for personal heroism.

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Weapons from “Czechoslovakia” When Mohammed Naguib’s appeals to Eisenhower regarding British interference in Sudan proved ineffective, the “Free Officers” placed Naguib under house arrest. Having removed Mohammed Naguib from the presidency, Nasser refused the offer of economic assistance from the USA and is reported to have used the $3m pledged for a Praetorian Guard to build a Cairo Tower (Beattie, 2005, p. 200; Isenstadt & Rizvi, 2011, p. 252; Rodenbeck, 2017). Nasser’s government committed unprecedented resources to the army’s equipment, building Egypt as a conventional power; defense spending increased from 3.9% of GNP in 1950–1951 to 8.4% in 1955 (Costigliola & Hogan, 2013). In what appeared to be a surprise given Cairo’s persecution of local communists, editors at the Soviet newspaper News [Izvestia] praised Egypt’s “opposition to the policy of military alliances with the Western powers” (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-FRB-55-164, 23 August 1955). In Cairo, at an exhibition of military photographs, Nasser announced his country had signed an arms agreement with “Czechoslovakia” for weapons on 27 September 1955 (Holbik & Drachman, 1971, pp. 138–139). This represented a shocking revelation of a new direction that had been developing in secret for 6 months (Shama, 2013, p. 25). Within a month, six Eastern bloc freighters arrived at the ports of Alexandria and Suez, with Soviet-manufactured weapons delivered under this new agreement. A foreign journalist reported that “despite elaborate Egyptian security precautions, it has been definitely established that at least one of the Port Said arrivals carried jet plane wings on deck,” totaling 200 jets, among them MiG-15 fighters and IL-28 bombers, as well as tanks, torpedo boats, “and two submarines” (Norris, 10 November 1955). By October 1956, Egypt had 230 tanks (primarily T34/85s), 200 APCs, 100 SU-100 self-propelled guns, 500 pieces of artillery, and 200 jet aircraft (120 MiG-15 fighters, 50 IL-28 bombers, and 20 IL-14 transports) as well as destroyers and motor torpedo boats. Until Nasser announced a “Czech” weapons agreement, the USA and the UK maintained distinct policies concerning Egypt. It was not only that Egypt was now armed as it never had been during the monarchy. It was also clear that no military response to any of the other four founding member nationstates in the Arab League (“from Casablanca to Baghdad”) was armed with bomber and fighter aircraft, destroyers and submarines, etc. While the “Czech” agreement brought Egypt closer to the USSR and the Eastern bloc, it also brought Cairo to the head of the Arab world, while foreclosing any possibility of military alliance with the USA. After the announcement of a weapons transfer from the Eastern bloc, US and UK policies with regard to Egypt began to converge on the person of President Nasser.

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Operation OMEGA The State Department code-named the Eisenhower administration’s “New Look” policy “OMEGA” (U.S.  Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, 1990, p. 264; Hadley, 2019, p. 44; Leffler, 1985). Just as Great Britain and the USA differed in their responses to the “Free Officers” coup, the announcement of Egypt’s “Czech” weapons deal brought them closer. A distinction remained: for the USA, OMEGA was a means to pressure Nasser, regaining the possibility of building cooperation with Egypt; while responding to Nasser’s role as a hero in Africa and the Arab world, Great Britain wanted him destroyed (McNamara, 2004 p. 47). As OMEGA sought to remove Nasser’s government, at the same time as the “Lavon affair” unfolded, French authorities seized the yacht Athos. OMEGA ranged “from sanctions calculated to isolate Nasser to use of force (both British and Israeli) to tumble Egyptian Govt…” (1996, p. 39; Bardakçı, 2018, p. 236); it included the delay of pledged assistance, as well as greater resources directed to Egypt’s rivals in the region (Smith, 2013, p.  154). This operation would last a “period of many months, there was to be a gradual squeeze on the Egyptian economy in order to ferment popular dissatisfaction” (Cohen, 1998a, p. 177; Thornhill, 2000, p. 15). Later, Nasser claimed budgeted this operation at $500,000, “to get rid of our government and install a government from the imperialist agents” (Gorst & Johnman, 2013).

Suez Nationalization and the Athos Nasser was interested in the Yugoslav experience of nationalization as a means toward the elimination of foreign economic influence (Životić & Čavoški, 2016). He visited the Adriatic island of Brioni (Godsell, 12 July 1956), where he met with Tito (Abel, 15 July 1956), after which Yugoslavia offered Nasser its firm support in the nationalization (Batović, 2010; Bishop, 2022). Nasser announced nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956; while nationalization of the Suez Canal Company brought Nasser’s popularity in Egypt and the Arab world to a peak, in Belgrade, the UK Ambassador was convinced Yugoslavia and the USSR were in “collusion” over the Suez nationalization (U.K. National Archives, Foreign Office). Shortly after this defining moment in Egypt’s postcolonial history, French sailors boarded the motor yacht Athos off Algeria’s coast. A journalist reported from Oran, “in the cabins were pictures of Stalin and President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt” (“Cargo,” 1956, p. 52); the ship’s cargo included 70 tons of war material (6 machine guns, 12 mortars, 50 automatic rifles, 600 submachine guns, 2000 rifles, 300,000 cartridges—and 6 radio receivers) (“L’Inventaire official,” 1956). Announcing the recall of their diplomatic representative (“France’s Ambassador,” 1956), French authorities claimed that the vessel left the port of Alexandria, piloted by an officer of the Egyptian Navy, bound for a nearby military base where uniformed soldiers

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loaded munitions bound for Algerian rebels (“Text of Charge,” 30 October 1956) and alleged  that six French nationals of Algeria “had studied terrorist tactics in Cairo” (“Les Six,” 22 October 1956). For historian Yoram Meital, the “Lavon affair” unfolded at the same time as the public trial of members of the Muslim Brotherhood and Egyptian communists for the assassination attempt in Alexandria; “the defense attorney made reference to the similarities between the offenses [of Muslim Brotherhood members] and the acts of sabotage that were carried out by a terrorist cell operated by Israeli intelligence” (2017, p. 245). Those taken into custody during the “Lavon affair” were held in the same cells as members of the Muslim Brotherhood, and members of the local communist party (Calvert, 2010, p. 197). By such carceral techniques, Egyptian Jews came to be associated with supporters of Naguib, members of the ex-royal family, and other dissidents. With regard to the Athos, inconsistencies emerged regarding the ship’s ownership and the number of people aboard. In Paris, a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry described the 400-­ ton ship as “Sudanese-owned” (“France Asks,” 20 October 1956), while the ship’s owner told journalists it belonged to the Egyptian government (“Passengers and Crew,” 19 June 1957), and the English claimed they’d trained the captain (Survey of International Affairs, 1956, p. 56). While Paris-Presse specified “seventeen crew members and seven passengers” (20 October 1956, p.  1), American journalists counted a captain and a crew of ten (“Algeria,” 29 October 1956); French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau referred to “the owner… and six Algerian passengers” (“The Algerian Problem,” 4 February 1957), contradicting another reference to “six clandestine passengers” (United Nations, Security Council, 25 October 1956). The UK may have sought to facilitate an exchange, in which a member of Egypt’s ex-royal family was released. Journalists noted a coincidence between the boarding of the Athos and the capture of an aircraft with five Algerian leaders (Thiriet, “Mollet Likely,” 24 October 1956; Doty, “New Africa,” 24 October 1956), acknowledged on the floor of the UK House of Commons (U.K. House of Commons, 5 December 1956). Journalists hinted (“a ‘fierce battle’ is going on to rescue the five Algerian nationalists”) at a possible prisoner exchange between Egypt and France (Socialist Commentary, 1956, p.  9; Arnot, “Arabs Want,” 1956). This is a key index to the growth of Egypt’s capabilities in the area of military intelligence. Occurring during Operation OMEGA, the apparent seizure of the Athos may have prefigured subsequent spy exchanges across an equivalent to the Glienicker Brücke. Evidence suggests Ibrahim Khairy pasha’s son (implicated in a conspiracy in support of Egypt’s former royal family) was in the custody of the “Free Officers” at the time; as to how the prisoners might be exchanged, a French newspaper referred to a British parliamentary delegation which responded to capture of the Athos, accompanied by operative Julian Amery (U.K.  House of Commons, 5 December 1956; Churchill Archives Center, Papers of Julian Amery, October 1956). While France’s offer of limited technical assistance in developing a nuclear weapon for Israel is acknowledged (Cohen, 1998a, b, 2010; Hecht, 2010), cooperation between UK parliamentarians and French military intelligence has not yet received the attention it merits.

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Mukhabarat as a Mark of Heroism The President explained to the Philosophy of Revolution ghostwriter that his concern was not the Communists: “the Soviet Union is more than a thousand miles away and we’ve never had any trouble with them. They have never attacked us” (Heikal, 1973, p. 41). Fusing intelligence analysis, intelligence collection, and law enforcement in one agency, the new organization was directly subordinate to a new Ministry of the Interior, with its satellite offices in the governorates reporting to headquarters in Cairo (Sirrs, 2013, pp. 234–235). In the course of the investigation into the “Lavon affair” investigation, Nasser bypassed normal channels by requiring Colonel Salah Dessouki to report directly to him, rather than to the Minister of the Interior (Aburish, 2004, p. 74). After serving 7-year sentences, two of the “Lavon” conspirators were eventually released in 1962. Alisa Douer blames the “Lavon affair” for disrupting “the good relations between Egypt’s Jewish community and the Egyptian leadership” (Douer, 2015, p. 136). Said Aburish credited this case with demonstrating “how Israel forced Nasser to divert his energies toward an external problem instead of the demands inside Egypt… considerably more than an intelligence operation, this was among the major events which profoundly changed the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict,” ranking with the Suez and 1967 wars (2004, p. 62). For Joel Beinin, the “Lavon affair” “became an important symbolic marker connecting the fate of the Egyptian Jews to the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict” (1998, p. 20). This case became central to the administrative capacity and public ideology of the “Free Officers” state. As director of the mukhabarat, Salah Nasr reorganized the agency (1957–1967). To cover the agency’s expenses, Nasr set up Al-Nasr Company, ostensibly an import-export firm, as a front organization; Mabahith ‘Amn al-Dawla established separate divisions for computer, radio, forgery and black operations. Exhibiting a high standard of tradecraft in uncovering and publicizing the “Lavon affair,” the expanded administrative capacities of the “Free Officers” revolution—as exemplified by the new intelligence services—demonstrate the kind of heroism which had been described in Philosophy of Revolution: “this role [the role of a hero] is not a leading role. It is one of interplay of reactions and experiments.”

Un Seul Heros As Mohamed Salama points out, even during his successor’s administration, Nasser continued to be referred to as the “hero of the Revolution” (Batal al-Thawra, 2018, p. xx). For Daniel Sokatch, he remained the “unquestioned hero of the Arab street” (2021), and David Lesch turns to the papers of a US President to find a backhanded compliment in the vague hope that “events [would] deflate the great Nasser hero myth” (2018, p. 143).

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Just as Egypt’s leadership in the region can be credited in part to the success of “Voice of the Arabs,” a strategic press campaign can be credited with the acclamation of Egypt’s president’s heroism. Within this expansive geography, however, Gamal Abdel Nasser is not a unique candidate for the role of “hero” in Africa and the Arab world. Consequently, this chapter will also gesture toward two alternative models for military heroism which coexisted with that of Nasser in Africa and the Arab world. First among these is a black-and-white photograph, which entered circulation in international news media shortly after the Evian accords which marked Algeria’s national independence (1962). Claiming to be set in the casbah of Algiers, the image attributed to Marc Riboud includes a woman and two children walking briskly through public space; on the wall behind them (in block, capital letters, written in French lacking its acute accent) Un Seul Heros: Le Peuple (Only One Hero: The People). Admittedly, the graffito is grammatically ambiguous: while the hero is seul, héros, however, are plural (as is the collective noun, le people). As if offering a key to resolve the ambiguous message, a woman wearing haïk over her short summer dress parades a toddler in front of her, and a school-aged child in a striped T-shirt (intent on his own affairs, without acknowledging the camera) in front of the wall. The women and two children represent a reproductive world as it briefly transits public space, serving as a contrast for the emergence of the Mukhabarat as an institutional intelligence service that Nasser (Un Seul Hero) represents for Africa and the Arab world. Beyond Marc Riboud’s black-and-white photograph, Un Seul Heros: Le Peuple, personnel files in the Ministry of Mujahideen in Algiers serve as sources for understanding the significance of women’s roles in the FLN-ALN and their contributions to the national liberation struggle. Djamila Amrane surveyed 10,949 female participants’ files in the Ministry; the majority of these “fed and housed the militants who were pursued by the police in the towns; in the maquis they nursed, cooked, laundered, and cleaned” (Knauss, 1987). One woman in the maquis out of five was killed during battles… “during the war, women were active in all the fields of battle” (Tchumkam, 2021); “theirs was a monotonous and thankless task, bereft of military glory or heroism, and yet demanding exposure to danger” (Goldman & Harrison, 1982). While Nasser’s government offered Algeria’s National Liberation Front (Front de libération nationale, FLN) limited support by providing an administrative office in Cairo, the majority of Algeria’s Muslim women—both urban and rural—were active participants in the national liberation struggle. As this photograph from Algiers’ casbah, women living in urban environments who were more likely to have received some kind of education constituted about 20 percent of FLN’s total active force; referred to as moudjahidate, they were engaged in political propaganda and welfare work, serving as nurses and logistical aids to male fighters (MacMaster, 2020). Gillo Pontecorvo’s film, The Battle of Algiers (1966), offers a complex representation of such women who are present in almost every scene; these female fighters and servitors of a state which does not yet exist “are visible but resist deciphering, impenetrable and thus separate, distinct” (Aissaoui & Eldridge, 2017).

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While further from the cameras of French photojournalists and Italian filmmakers, “rural women in maquis’ support networks” contained the overwhelming numerical majority of those who participated in the national liberation struggle. Largely without the benefit of formal education, these women’s geographical proximity to l’Armée de libération nationale (ALN, National Liberation Army) operations in rural areas brought them into active support for fighters. Most of the fighting took place in rural areas, where local residents helped armed fighters in numerous ways: buying arms, carrying messages, feeding, guiding, hiding, observing the French army moves, and taking over the arms of killed fighters (Badran & Cooke, 2004). Supporting the principle exemplified by Un Seul Heros: Le Peuple, a family member of a mujahida recalled, “how she and her female family members would walk for hours in the High Plateau area during winter when it snowed without shoes to gather wood for keeping up a fire to cook for the militants” (Laaredj-­ Campbell, 2015).

Hero Among Lebanese Sayyid Musa al-Sadr represents a second, antithetical ideal of heroism, as available evidence documenting his disappearance represents a second, antithetical model for a national intelligence service (one characterized by sloppy tradecraft). Having developed a solid reputation in Qom, Iran, as a talented mujtahid, the Imam was invited by the followers of Seyyed Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din in southern Lebanon to lead them. In a Lebanon which was divided along sectarian lines during the 1960s, Sadr led initiatives for Muslim/Christian dialogue (Guirguis, 2020, p. 200). Instigating a drive for self-empowerment among members of this economically marginalized community during the 1970s, he contributed to the emergence of a secular political movement, Amal (particularly in the South). Such local successes grew in strength with the regional emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran; both contributed to the emergence of Hizballah among Shiites in Lebanon (Khatib, 2013, p. 40). The less Sadr depended on Iran, the more he enjoyed popularity among Arab Shi’i (Reisinezhad, 2019, pp. 98–101 et al.).

“Heroism from Disaster” Inspired by Heikal’s statement, “one of interplay of reactions and experiments with all these factors aiming at exploding this terrific energy latent in every sphere around us,” and informed by the “Lavon Affair” as well as surrounding developments, this chapter concludes by paying particular attention to an example of tradecraft’s failure in military intelligence (whether “information,” “political warfare,” “propaganda,” “psychological strategy,” or “psychological warfare”).

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Acknowledging the existence of alternative models, this chapter’s general position is that these serve as a mark of Nasser’s leadership in Africa and the Arab world, becoming an element of his heroism. Munitions from the “Czech” weapons transfer were destroyed in fewer than 6 days; for weeks, residents of Cairo began to watch the remnants of military units as they returned on foot to the streets and squares of the capital. Subsequently, the 1967 war with Israel came to be known as al Naksa (“the disaster”). In this intelligence failure of catastrophic proportions, 10,000 soldiers (1 of every 10 who had mobilized for the front) were taken as prisoners, in addition to 1500 officers (Abdel Nasser, “Speech,” 23 November 1967). Egypt’s experience of the 1967 war was “the defeat of a political, social and intellectual system, and the defeat of our vision of the world and our place,” and in this desperate context, Nasser turned to multilateral and bilateral diplomacy to rescue his heroic stature (Fahmy, 2017). For historian Khaled Fahmy, “defeat of ‘67 was not ordinary, and it did not only hit the army; in this environment, Nasser reached out to a many-years ally of Egypt” (“Tito Expected,” 17 August 1967). A letter from USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko convened the fifth emergency special session of the UN General Assembly, at which Egypt’s ally Yugoslavia demanded Israel immediately withdraw “all its forces from Jordan, Syria, and the United Arab Republic” (Korany & Dessouki, 2010). While the USSR introduced language condemning Israel as an “aggressor,” the USA introduced language which lacked the emphatic and unconditional “withdraw immediately behind [1948] armistice lines” (Middleton, 3 November 1967). A British Pathé newsreel shows cheering crowds in Cairo, and stevedores with photos of Tito lining the Alexandria harbor to welcome the Yugoslav presidential yacht Galeb; the newsreel also shows Anwar Sadat among those who welcomed the foreign delegation (British Pathé, “Nasser Tito,” 1967). Remaining agents from the “Lavon affair” were freed as a secret addendum to a prisoner-of-war exchange (1968).

Born of Disaster After “the disaster,” after the government sacrificed two remaining agents from the “Lavon affair” for the return of thousands of its native sons, a young Libyan officer met Nasser (Vandewalle, 2018, p. 65). Two years later, Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi led a coup that overthrew the monarchy of King Idris, establishing an Arab Socialist Union (al-Ittihad al-Ishtiraki al-Arabi) on the model of Nasser’s single political party in Egypt, disseminating a Green Book on the model of the Philosophy of Revolution (Oakes, 2011). Such emulation extended to a secret service for Libya, “Intelligence of the Jamahiriya” (Mukhabarat el-Jamahiriya), on the model of Egypt. Libya’s State Security Investigations Service (SSIS, Gihaz Mabahith Amn al-Dawla, known colloquially as mukhabarat) capabilities were central to the identity of a “Free Officers” regime based in Benghazi. Newsreel films from the Libyan leader’s visits to Cairo

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during 1970 suggest the extent to which Nasser instructed him in key elements of “heroism.” During April, the Libyan colonel arrived in Cairo for talks with Egypt’s head of state: while the host was dressed for the public in a civilian suit, the guest wore a short-sleeved military uniform and a beret for a press conference in King Farouk’s library in the Qubba Palace. During June, the Libyan leader arrived in a full uniform with an officer’s hat; again, Nasser was dressed in the suit jacket of a civilian. Again in September, the Libyan leader arrived to celebrate the first anniversary of the Palestinian al-Fateh in a short-sleeved military uniform and service cap; in a reception room in the Qubba, both leaders wearing civilian suits and ties met journalists. Nasser’s death left a profound impact on Ghaddafi. As Heikal narrated, “it was not just that he admired Nasser more than any other living man, but he had always believed in the central role of Egypt in the Arab world [and] when Nasser died he felt that there was a vacuum in the Arab world which was too big for any one man to fill, and he thought that there should be a collective leadership by Egypt, Syria, and Libya” (ElWarfally, 1988, p. 48). During the funeral, a weeping Ghaddafi was photographed at the Qubba Palace in a short-sleeved military uniform and service cap.

Conclusion Egypt’s military defeat, the time Ghaddafi spent in Cairo, and Nasser’s death turn this text by way of conclusion to the issue of Libya’s role in the “collective leadership” of the Arab world. At one point in time, the new intelligence service developed by Egypt’s “Free Officers” developed the investigative skills which were on display in the discovery of the “Lavon affair.” With time, skills learned in Egypt by officers of another jurisdiction were on display as hollow tradecraft and obfuscation. The experiences of charismatic Shi’I cleric Imam Musa Sadr (“the original mobilizer of the Lebanese Shi’a) who accepted an official invitation of Muammar Ghaddafi in 1978 serves as an example (Deeb, 2006, p. 54). Certainly, Sadr created new forms of political expression among Lebanese Shi’i, which engaged and transformed the image of Lebanon among jurisdictions of the League of Arab States (Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2009). Following a breach with Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Musa Sadr received death threats: evacuating his wife and children to Paris, he spent days shuttling between “safe houses” in Beirut (Cooper, 2016, p. 297). Accepting an official invitation from Muammar Ghaddafi to meet with government officials in Libya, al-Sadr and two companions (journalist ‘Abbas Badreddin and cleric Mohammad Ya’qub) left Lebanon on 25 August 1978 (Mallat, 2015, p. 272). The departure of the Imam and his two traveling companions from Beirut marks the beginning of the end for a model of heroism associated with the “Free Officers” revolution, as its implementation failed in a state which depended on Egypt for technical assistance in the area of intelligence (Fahmy, 2000). During his

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visit, the Imam met with the Chief of the Libyan Foreign Relations Office, al-Sayyid Ahmed al-Shahhati, deciding to leave Libya on the eve of a national holiday celebrating Ghaddafi’s coup (Kramer et al., 2019). While Libyan authorities claim they left on August 31 on an Alitalia flight (Ajami, 1986), the Imam and his companions had disappeared without a trace (Schwartz, 2014, p.  114). A Lebanese radio station broadcast a short news item, informing listeners that the Imam “had been kidnapped in the Libyan capital of Tripoli;” Lebanon’s president ordered an inquiry and sent an investigative team to Tripoli, Rome, and Paris (Cooper, 2016, p. 410). In a display of sloppy tradecraft, the passport of the Imam and some of his belongings were discovered in a hotel in Rome, mixed with his colleagues’ clothes. The Libyan authorities appeared to have  lied blatantly and systematically to an Italian investigative judge and his court (Mallat, 2015, p. 272). In an interview with Al Aan TV, Ahmed Ramadan, an influential figure in the Ghaddafi regime and an eyewitness to the meeting between al-Sadr and the Libyan leader, claimed that the meeting lasted for two and a half hours and ended with Ghaddafi saying, “take him.” On the pages of London-based Asharq Al-Awsat, Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri claimed the Libyan leader was responsible for the Imam’s disappearance (27 August 2006). The disappearance of the Imam cast an unflattering light on Libya’s intelligence service, and by association that of Egypt; beyond consuming intelligence generated by regional allies, the comparatively new intelligence services demonstrated the limits of their capacity to produce intelligence (whether understood as “information,” “propaganda,” or “psychological strategy”) in both a domestic and a regional context. Numerous allegations circulate regarding individuals or parties which might benefit from his disappearance (U.S. Congress, 1985, pp. 349ff). It is claimed that Imam Musa Sudr was imprisoned, summarily executed, and buried at an unmarked desert gravesite (Bird, 2014). Eventually, Ghaddafi was indicted by the government of Lebanon for al-Sadr’s disappearance (27 August 2008).

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Jankowski, J. P. (2002). Nasser’s Egypt, Arab nationalism, and the united Arab Republic. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Jeffreys-Jones, R., & Stafford, D. (2014). American-British-Canadian intelligence relations, 1939–2000. Routledge. Kandil, H. (2016). The power triangle: Military, security, and politics in regime change. Oxford University Press. Khalidi, W. (1971). From haven to conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine problem until 1948. Institute for Palestine Studies. Khalifah, O. (2016). Nasser in the Egyptian imaginary. Edinburgh University Press. Khatib, L. (2013). Image politics in the Middle East-The role of the visual in political struggle. I.B. Tauris. Knauss, P. R. (1987). The persistence of patriarchy: Class, gender and ideology in twentieth century Algeria. Praeger. Korany, B., & Hillal Dessouki, A. E. (2010). The foreign policies of Arab states: The challenge of globalization. Oxford University Press. Kramer, M., Bakhash, S., & Bailey, C. (2019). Shi’ism, resistance, and revolution. Routledge. Laaredj-Campbell, A. (2015). Changing female literacy practices in Algeria: Empirical study on cultural construction of gender and empowerment. Springer. Lacouture, J. (1973). Nasser; A biography. Alfred A. Knopf. Lashmar, L. P. (2020). Spies, spin, and the fourth estate. Edinburgh University Press. Leffler, M. P. (1985). Strategy, diplomacy, and the cold war: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952. Journal of American History, 71, 807. Lesch, D. (2018). The Middle East and the United States. Taylor & Francis. Limbrick, P. (2020). Arab modernism as world cinema. University of California. Lindsay, F. (1993). Beacons in the night: With the OSS and Tito’s partisans in wartime Yugoslavia. Stanford University Press. Lucas, S., & Morey, A. (2000). The hidden ‘Alliance’: The CIA and MI6 before and after Suez. In R. Jeffreys-Jones & D. Stafford (Eds.), American-British-Canadian intelligence relations, 1939–2000. Frank Cass & Co. MacMaster, N. (2020). Burning the Veil. The Algerian War and the ‘emancipation’ of Muslim Women, 1954-1962. Manchester University Press. Makdisi, S. (2008). Palestine inside out: An everyday occupation. W. W. Norton & Company. Mallat, C. (2015). Philosophy of nonviolence: Revolution, constitutionalism. Oxford University Press. McNamara, R. (2004). Britain, Nasser, and the balance of power in the Middle East. Frank Cass. Meital, Y. (2017). Revolutionary justice: Special courts and the formation of republican Egypt. Oxford University Press. Middleton, D. (1967). Peace Talks Termed Nearer, New York Times, 3 November. Mostafa, D. S. (2016). The Egyptian military in popular culture: Context and critique. Palgrave Macmillan. Nelson, K. (2015). The art of reciting the Qur’an. University of California. Norris, J.  G. (1955). Egypt to Get Russian Bombers, Washington Post and Times Herald, 10 November. Oakes, J. (2011). Libya: The history of Gaddafi’s pariah state. The History Press. Peevers, C. (2019). International law, the Suez crisis and cold war juridical theatre. In S. Pahuja, M. Craven, & G. Simpson (Eds.), International law and the cold war. Cambridge University Press. Pour la Fondation Hocine Ait-Ahmed Humanité et Droit de l’Homme, 22 October 2017. Primakov, Y. (2009). Russia and the Arabs: Behind the scenes in the Middle East from the cold war to the present. Basic Books. Rachwani, M. (2021). From VHS to streaming: how Ramadan shows became a must-watch for the diaspora. The Guardian, 17 April. Reimer-Burgrova, H. (2021). Politics of violence and fear in MENA. Palgrave Macmillan.

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Reisinezhad, A. (2019). The Shah of Iran, the Iraqi Kurds, and the Lebanese Shia. Palgrave Macmillan. Riccardi, M. T., Dolan, J. P., & Redding, R. W. (2020). OSS Operations in Occupied Yugoslavia: Enduring Principles, Special Operations Journal, 19 March. Rodenbeck, M. (2017). Cairo: The City Victorious. Knopf Doubleday. Rogan, E. (2012). The Arabs: A history. Basic Books. Schleifer, R. (2006). Psychological warfare in the intifada: Israeli and Palestinian media politics and military strategies. Sussex Academic Press. Schwartz, R.  D. (2014). Law, not war: The long, hard search for justice and peace. Better World Books. Shabka, H. (2018). Then and now: Egypt’s story. New Academia Publishing. Shaery-Eisenlohr, R. (2009). Shi’ite Lebanon: Transnational religion and the making of national identities. Columbia University Press. Shama, N. (2013). Egyptian foreign policy from Mubarak to Morsi: Against the national interest. Routledge. Sirrs, O. (2013). Reforming Egyptian intelligence: Precedents and prospects. Intelligence and National Security, 28(2), 235. Sirrs, O. L. (2010). A history of the Egyptian intelligence service: A history of the Mukhabarat, 1910–2009. Routledge. Smith, M. (1980). The secret wars: A guide to sources in English: Intelligence, propaganda and psychological warfare, covert operations, 1945–1980. ABC-Clio. Smith, S. (2013). Reassessing Suez 1956: New perspectives. Ashgate Publishing. Sokatch, D. (2021). Can we talk about Israel?: A guide for the curious, confused, and conflicted. Bloomsbury Publishing. Stein, L. (2009). The making of modern Israel: 1948–1967. Polity Press. Stephens, R. H. (1972). Nasser: A political biography. Penguin Books. Talhami, G.  H. (2007). Palestine in the Egyptian press: From Al-Ahram to Al-Ahali. Lexington Books. Tchumkam, H. (2021). Precarious lives and marginal bodies in North Africa. Lexington Books. Teveth, S. (1996). Ben-Gurion’s spy: The story of the political scandal that shaped modern Israel. Columbia University Press. Thiriet, J. (1956). Mollet Likely to Win, Christian Science Monitor, 24 October. Thornhill, M. (2000). Alternatives to Nasser: Humphrey Trevelyan, Ambassador to Egypt. In S. Kelly & A. Gorst (Eds.), Whitehall and the Suez crisis. Frank Cass. Tignor, R. (1980). The economic activities of foreigners in Egypt; from millet to haute bourgeoisie. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 22, 416. Tolan, S. (2015). Children of the stone: The power of music in a hard land. Bloomsbury Publishing. Trenear-Harvey, G. S. (2014). Historical dictionary of intelligence Failures. Rowman & Littlefield. Tyler, P. (2012). Fortress Israel: The inside story of the military elite who run the country. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. United Kingdom. House of Commons. (1956). Hansard, vol. 561, “The Context of That Was That a Few Days Before the Arms Yacht, the Athos, Had Been Captured by the French Government,” 5 December. United Kingdom. National Archives, Foreign Office, Political Departments: General Correspondence from 1906–1966, FO 371/119139/14211/1709. United Nations. Security Council, Rapport Du Conseil de Securité À L’Assemblée Générale, 25 October 1956. United States. Congress. House. (1985). Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Islamic Fundamentalism and Islamic Radicalism, Hearings. United States. Department of State. (1990). Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, volume XVI, editorial note no. 106, p. 264. United States. National Archives. (1953). Dwight David Eisenhower Presidential Library, John Foster Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda Series, box 1, folder “White House Correspondence 1953 (3), “personal and private,” July 28.

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United States. National Archives. (n.d.). Records of the Office of Strategic Services (Record Group 226), entry 99, box 54, folder 2, “History of OSS Cairo.” Vandewalle, D. (2018). Libya since Independence: Oil and state-building. Cornell University Press. Vatikiotis, P. J. (1968). Egypt since the revolution. Praeger. Webb, A. (2014). London calling: Britain, the BBC world service and the cold war. Bloomsbury Publishing. Zamir, M. (2014). The secret Anglo-French war in the Middle East. Taylor & Francis. Životić, A., & Čavoški, J. (2016). On the road to Belgrade: Yugoslavia, third world neutrals, and the evolution of global non-alignment, 1954-1961. Journal of Cold War Studies, 18(4). Elizabeth Bishop  is an associate professor of modern Arab history at Texas State University, San Marcos. Dr. Bishop joined Texas State's History Department during 2008 with a PhD from the University of Chicago. At Texas State, she teaches undergraduate and graduate courses in the areas of her scholarly expertise – the history of the modern Middle East, Arab history during the colonial and post-colonial eras, and the history of the Global Cold War. She has written extensively on connections between the USSR and the Arab world, including work on the Aswan High Dam and Egyptian regional and global diplomacy during the Cold War. With R. M. Douglas and Michael D.  Callahan, Dr. Bishop is co-editor of the volume Imperialism on Trial: League of Nations Mandate States in Historical Perspective (2006).

Chapter 18

The Sons of the Revolution: Umm Kulthum, Abdel Halim Hafez, and the Nasserist Regime Between Artistic Agency, Propaganda, and Nationalism Omar Bortolazzi

 amal Abd al-Nasser: The Ascendancy and the Consolidation G of al-Rais During the period from 1952 to 1967, Gamal Abd al-Nasser emerged and established himself as the undiscussed leader of the Arab world. Nasser dominated and defined the politics of a whole generation of Egyptians and Arabs. He represented the embodiment of what the Arab world aspired to be: independent and projected toward the construction of a new Middle East free of the imperial and colonial past (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009: 301). When the Free Officers seized power with a coup d’état in 1952, they had a clear strategy: to overthrow the monarchy, remove the British military occupation, undermine foreign political interferences, and curb Egyptian corruption. In the ranks of the Free Officers Movement, there were a few members with some sympathies for the Muslim Brotherhood, while others were leaning toward Marxism. But the greatest majority of them were simply “Egyptian nationalists.” Gamal Abd al-Nasser were among those (Mansfield, 1973, p. 670). When Nasser published his pamphlet The Philosophy of the Revolution in 1954, he described the Egyptian revolution as the fundament of the Pan-Arab supremacy which was, according to himself, bound to ensue. Pan-Arab supremacy would have managed to fulfill the aspirations of the Egyptian people: self-determination, independence, and a sovereign government free of imperialistic influence (Lucie Švejdová, 2014, pp. 164–167). The author would like to thank Malak al-Gohary and Maryam Almazrouei for their contribution. O. Bortolazzi (*) American University in Dubai – Dubai Internet City, Dubai, United Arab Emirates e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. O. Abidde, F. Kumah-Abiwu (eds.), The Political Impact of African Military Leaders, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31427-8_18

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On July 26, 1956, President Gamal Abd al-Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, removing this strategic link that represented one of the main routes of trade between Europe and Asia from British control. This move was the highest point of political conflict between Egypt, Great Britain, and the United States; it shocked the world, sparked the Suez Canal Crisis, and laid the groundwork for the Six-Day War in 1967.1 In any case, the nationalization of the Suez Canal projected Nasser in the position to take up the role that he advocated for himself in his The Philosophy of the Revolution. He soon became the acclaimed symbol of modern Arab nationalism, giving a voice to the Arab masses. Until 1961, Nasser was also the leader who opposed the Baghdad Pact,2 rejected the Eisenhower doctrine, and unified Syria and Egypt (United Arab Republic).3 “The conclusion drawn from these events was that Nasser had produced a new strategic model for the achievement of modernization and development—a strategic conception which could avoid dependency while exploiting the Cold War” (Podeh & Winckler, 2004, p. 45). Nasser’s political initiatives inspired several other Arab leaders, and so dominant was his stature that such terms as “Nasserism” became common political language (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 301). Nasserism did not just define Egyptian politics, but it involved also economic, demographic, social, cultural, and psychological aspects, and it has been one of the most influential political phenomena of the Arab world in the twentieth century. After 1961, with the secession of Syria from the United Arab Republic, Nasserism had come to represent an “alternative ideology.” It was originally developed for anti-Ba’athist purposes, but it was also used by various Egyptian leftists and Sunni movements in Lebanon throughout the civil war (Podeh & Winckler, 2004, p. 46). To some, Nasser was an immense figure, but to others, he was a skillful manipulator and a successful crowd pleaser. Nasserism, though, was seen as a constant reminder that Arab nationalism and Arab socialism were secondary to the national identity and national interests of Egypt and its people: During the Nasser years, his photographs were everywhere. Every government office, store, schoolroom, and business was likely to have one. Newspapers usually published pictures of Nasser every day in the usual sorts of ceremonial activity, standing around in his striped blue double-breasted costume. The general feeling that these photos provided was one of familiarity rather than fear or hero worship. To be sure, at least before 1967, Nasser was

 The Six-Day War (also referred to as June War, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War or the Third ArabIsraeli War) was an armed conflict fought from 5 to 10 June 1967 between Israel and a coalition of Arab states primarily comprising Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. The Suez Canal Crisis led to the SixDay War due to the lack of a peace settlement following the 1956 war and rising of tensions between Egypt and Israel. 2  The Baghdad Pact was a defensive organization founded in 1955 by Great Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and Iran. The main purpose of the Baghdad Pact was to prevent communist incursions and promote peace in the Middle East. Iraq withdrew from the organization in 1959. After that it was renamed the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO. 3  The United Arab Republic (UAR) was a political union between Egypt (including the occupied Gaza Strip) and Syria between 1958 and 1971. Syria pulled out of the confederation in 1961, after a coup d’état. 1

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supposed to represent courage, dignity, independence, strength, wisdom, patience, honesty, modesty, piety, and discipline. (Podeh & Winckler, 2004, p. 66)

In his The Philosophy of the Revolution, Nasser noted that Egypt was in the middle of three circles: the Arab, the Islamic, and the African; Egypt had a strategic geographical location and that entailed that it was meant to play an important role in the region, and the world (Mansfield, 1973, p. 674). Nasser quickly became the undisputed leader of Egypt and Arab nationalism, as he was able to demonstrate great ability in enabling the Arab crowds to restore hope in their countries. Nasserism turned into an “ideology” that shaped an entire generation, though Nasserism cannot be classified as a proper ideology, as it is not consistent with other ideologies, such as liberalism and communism. Nasserism was more properly an umbrella term for Pan-Arabism, anti-colonialism, and Arab socialism. To further highlight Nasser’s rise to power and mass acceptance from the people of the Arab world, Walid Khalidi suggests that Nasserism was a psychological phenomenon that almost became a shared experience by an entire generation of Arabs. To him, Nasserism was an “attitude of mind” that is “eclectic, empirical, radical, and yet conservative” (Khalid, 1958, p. 125). Nasser was indeed able to restore the people’s confidence in themselves, and fill the void and heal the shock that was endured to the loss of Palestine in 1948 (Khalid, 1958, p. 125). Abdel Nasser was intensely charismatic. The way he spoke to the public made him appear to be almost a savior of the Arab people, the one man able to bring out positive change in Egypt and the Arab world. Max Weber made a vital contribution to the discussion on charismatic leadership, especially from the point of view of the interpretation of the followers (Popper, 2005, p. 21). Charisma is based on a social relationship between the charisma holder and the charisma believer. The Weberian perspective is not focused on analyzing the personality of the charismatic leader, but rather on the structure of the charismatic social relationship (Lepsius & Wendt, 2017, p.  89). Weber borrows the religious term “charisma” and extends its use to a secular meaning. According to Weber, charisma refers to: a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and related as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and based on them the individual concerned is treated as a leader…What is alone important is how the individual is acutely regarded by those subject to charismatic authority, by his ‘followers’ or ‘disciples.’ (Weber, 1947, p. 329)

Followers believe that a charismatic leader is closely connected to divine power. Charismatic leaders promise change in the future for society and also change people’s attitudes and values (Lepsius & Wendt, 2017, p. 89); a charismatic leader is not only a person who is given great expectations and trust and to whom special skills are attributed. A charismatic leader constitutes a new leadership, a new structure of social relationships. However, charisma is significantly more unstable than traditional or legal authority. It tends to deteriorate if the leader cannot concretize the changes he promised or when he confronts the contradictory logic of his work.

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Nasserism was created under a blueprint that brought together socialism, Islam, and Arab nationalism.4 Despite Nasser’s assertion of both a narrower Egyptian and a broader Arab national allegiance, the two were not equal loyalties for the leader (Ajami, 1974, p. 41). Nasser’s empathy with Egypt was undoubtedly developed at an early stage of Nasser’s military and political career, and took preference in Nasser’s hierarchy of national loyalties over any Arab affiliation. However, by 1956 his identification with the Arab nation and Arab nationalism reached the highest point. Nasserism represented a set of rules that generated a drive, which was real and unpredictable. It spread throughout the Arab world “as a new nationalism to upset the status quo and threaten the balance of power not only in the immediate area but in the world as well” (Al-Rfouh & Al-Majali, 2007, p. 13). Yet, Nasser’s political fate reached a dramatic turn in 1967 with the Six-Day War. Gamal Abd al-­ Nasser, President of Egypt and the most prominent Arab leader at the time, survived the war, but his leadership never recovered. “The stunning defeat initiated the demise of his brand of secular pan-Arabism that was once an assertive ideological force in the Arab world.”5

Nasser and the Media During the first half of the twentieth century, electronic media grew exponentially. This growth led to levels of mass communication that were previously unimaginable. By the 1930s, homes, cafés, and public places were able to listen to radio broadcasts, and by the 1950s movies and documentaries all became a form of mass entertainment. Unlike in the past, the printed word was no longer the only way to reach the masses. Audio and video channels came into play. This was a revolutionary cultural change, comparable to that of the introduction of the printing press. Unlike the press though, radio and movies were much more widespread and could penetrate well beyond the low percentage of literate citizens.6 The great mass of the population could easily be reached from now on. The beginning of Egyptian broadcasting history dates back to the 1920s. From 1934 the authorities stopped all the private stations and started their own radio

 A study by Morroe Berger suggests that there was no serious opposition to Islam on the part of the regime but an attempt to use it “buttress nationalism, socialism, and the one-party popular democracy” (Berger, 1970: 61; Ajami, 1974: 41). 5  https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-1967-six-day-war [accessed March 2022] 6  Egypt has been playing a central role in the circulation of information and cultural products within the Arab world since the end of the nineteenth century. However, the “Arab literacy rate has always been generally low and thus the broadcasting media has been regarded as having more influence on the masses and a more profound impact on societies than the printing presses” (Chiba, 2012: 48–49). 4

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service with the help of the British Marconi Company (Chiba, 2012, p. 49).7 After the 1952 revolution in Egypt, Nasser and his regime recognized the potential role of the mass media, particularly radio, which was soon to become the official voice of the government.8 Nasser “started to increase the apparatus for broadcasting and set up a more powerful transmitter so that it could reach a wider area” (Chiba, 2012, p. 49). The nationalist leader massively intensified radio promotion and started to sponsor singers and artists (as well as journalists) aligned with the Egyptian government’s vision and with the full support of media producers.9 A conspicuous number of Egyptian cultural and artistic products started to be exported anywhere throughout the Arab world from the Mashreq to the Maghreb, assigning Egypt a dominant role in the circulation of information and entertainment during the 1950s and 1960s.10 Nasser created an “authoritarian state with a populist character” (Dalacoura, 2003, p. 118) in which one of the most prominent players in creating a common sense of Pan-Arab identity was the Voice of the Arabs (Sawt al-Arab). It was the first Arab radio service, attracting the whole Arab world rather than only a small elite.11 This enabled a sense of community that strengthened the Arabs through a shared language, a common space, and a unifying purpose. This also fueled anti-colonial sentiments and spurred nationalist ideologies. Nasser used Sawt al-Arab as a mean to rise against imperialism and to inform the Arab people of their own governments’ faults (Lahlali, 2011). “For this reason, the radio came under the strict ownership and tight control of the government, which used it to bypass the literacy barrier to contact the public” (Gunter & Dickinson, 2013, p. 114). Egyptian radio and TV, as well as most broadcasting systems in the Arab world, went from the strict supervision and control of the British and French colonial powers to the harsh domination of nationalist Arab political regimes, who used them as a tool to mobilize the masses and propagate the official diktat. On one side, Egypt’s success in exporting media products can be explained in terms of the superior quality of its productions; on the  During the 1920s and 1930s, there were over 100 private stations, which were owned by groups of businessmen (see Boyd, 1993). From 1934 to 1947, the Egyptian government signed a 10-year contract with Marconi Company of the United Kingdom to “provide a broadcasting service for Egypt. During this period, radio was under the direct control of the Ministry of Transportation. In 1939, radio’s control was transferred from the Ministry of Transportation to the Ministry of Social Affairs with the cooperation of the Marconi Company” (Gunter & Dickinson, 2013: 114; see also Dabbous, 1994: 60–73; Boyd, 1993). 8  In 1960, Nasser became the first Egyptian president to pass a law concerning the regulation of media and publishing. The editorial monitoring body created by Nasser in 1960 was then dissolved by Anwar Sadat in 1974 (Lamloum & Berqué, 2006: 9). 9  Soon after the revolution, the transmission power of the radio system increased by 28 fold; this provided all of Egypt with clear and good reception, as well as the ability to reach further into the Arab world (Diong, 2015: 5; see also Rugh, 2004: Chapter 9). 10  See also Saleh, 2000; Abdulla, 2003; Rugh, 2004. 11  It is important to note that a significant component of the Egyptian population at the time consisted of fallahin, farmers relatively uneducated. Abd al-Nasser knew that he had to cater to the majority of the population, and thus a program called “With the People” was created. The program was catering to the lower classes by providing them with practical information and political indoctrination (Rugh, 2004). 7

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other, Egypt’s media hegemony can be related to a sense of Arab solidarity, who concretized in welcoming Egyptian cultural products even though their contents were frequently recognized as propagandistic (Chiba, 2012, p. 50). Countries that supported Nasserism were allowed to use Sawt al-Arab to spread their ideas and propaganda. This proved that the ideology spread by the Voice of Arabs was shared by many who identified with and understood the Nasserist movement.12 The radio was utilized in a way to nurture an atmosphere that was heavily centered on Pan-­ Arab ideologies throughout the region. Nasser’s speeches were carefully constructed in terms of word choice and language, which played a significant role in the spreading of his propaganda. Nasser used a language “varied between [an] aggressive and [a] sympatric approach” (Alahmed, 2011, p. 21; Diong, 2015, p. 4). During his broadcasts on the radio, he chose words that would directly target the West and increase any anti-colonial sentiments among Arabs. Another exceptionally propagandistic tool in the hands of Nasser was music. Nasser realized the importance of promotional culture that is spread through music, and he manipulated it to sustain his ideology. Since Egypt was well-known for its talented singers such as Umm Kulthum, Mohammed Abdel Wahab, and Abd Al-Halim Hafez, Nasser was in the perfect position to utilize these prominent figures to bridge the gap between state ideology and artistic agency. Nasser has been known to commission artists, most notably Umm Kulthum and Abd Al-Halim Hafez, to release songs filled with nationalistic and patriotic lyrics. As evidenced by Diong (2015), “the promotion of culture and local identity through music on the radio was […] manipulated to promote politicized sentiments to enable Nasser to intensify the spread of his Pan-Arabian ideology” (Diong, 2015, p. 4). The radio station used music not only as a propaganda tool but also to attract listeners to “serious programs schedule[d] adjacent to the musical programs” (Boyd, 1993, p. 316). Frequently, Nasser’s speeches were delivered after a musical performance by Umm Kulthum, Abdel Wahab, or Abd Al-Halim Hafez.

 mm Kulthum: The Voice of the Arabs, the Voice U of the Regime Umm Kulthum was one of the most prominent singers in the Arab world of the twentieth century. She was “the star of the East,” “the mother of the Arabs,” and “Egypt’s fourth pyramid.” Her career started very early on when she was only a child, and her immense notoriety survived her death in 1975. Millions of people listened to her music, and she has been a household name throughout the Middle East until the present time. Her death brought together a huge amount of people,  It is interesting to underline, for example, how the Voice of the Arabs played an important role during the civil war between the monarchists and the republicans from 1962 to 1970 in Yemen. Abd al Rahman al Baydani, who later became vice president of the Yemen Republic, called for toppling the monarchy in Yemen with a message delivered through the Voice of the Arabs. 12

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with sources claiming that her funeral was larger than that of President Gamal Abd al-Nasser (Shusha, 1976, p. 58; Danielson, 1997, p. 193). For many years, she was considered the “voice and face of Egypt,” and till today, she remains an inescapable figure of the musical life in the Arab world. Umm Kulthum was born Fatmah Ibrahim al-Baltagi in the village of Tamay e-Zahayra, in the Nile Delta in 190413 to a family with a religious background. Her father, Ibrahim al-Sayyid al-Baltagi, was an imam in the village mosque, while her mother Fatima al-Maliji was a housewife. The family’s only source of income came from her father by singing religious songs for weddings and other celebrations in his own and neighboring villages.14 It was from her father that she learned how to sing. She overheard him teachings songs to her brother, who was supposed to accompany his father at the celebrations for which the Shaykh of the village sang. When al-­ Shaykh Ibrahim heard the unusual strength of Fatmah’s voice, he asked her to join the lessons.15 On stage, she wore a boy’s cloak and bedouin head covering in order to disguise her as a boy and alleviate her father’s concerns about her reputation as a public performer. At the age of 16, she was noticed by the modestly famous singer Mohamed Abo Al-Ela. He taught her the old classical Arabic repertoire. A few years later, she met the famous composer and oudist Zakariyya Ahmad, who took her to Cairo. During the 1920s and 1930s, Umm Kulthum began to make commercial recordings and launched her lifelong career with mass media. In 1934, she sang for the inaugural broadcast of Radio Cairo. Her artistic expression later expanded to include cinema, which she began in 1935, and television in 1960. With the massive exposure of Radio Cairo, Umm Kulthum’s influence kept growing and expanding to the extent that the royal family would request private concerts and even attend her public performances. In 1944 King Farouk decorated her with the highest honorific title of orders, the Order of the Virtues (or Nishan al-Kamal), an award for merit reserved exclusively to (male) members of the royal family and politicians.16 Umm Kulthum’s concerts are broadcast on the first Thursday of each month.17 Her performances were flawless due to the intensive training and rebranding of her voice. “Umm Kulthum’s work began to take on a distinctively populist tone, addressing the working class in much of her music. She simultaneously incorporated more classical Arabic into her lyrics, which appealed to the more religious, traditional audience” (Danielson, 1997, p. 121; Prow, 2015, p. 15). Her increasing musical skills and financial success granted her immense control over the organization of her shows. Umm Kulthum was now the producer of her own concerts. She was able to obtain extraordinary agreements and establish relations with key figures of the entertainment business that could further consolidate her career. By the 1940s,  There’s no certainty as to her date of birth, but the most reliable suggestion is May 4, 1904, according to the birth records of the province of Al-Daqahliyah, Egypt. 14  https://thequietus.com/articles/17255-umm-kulthum-queen-of-the-nile 15  Ibid 16  The Order was founded in 1915 and reestablished under the Republic in 1953. 17  “On those Thursdays, “[Egyptians] lived in her world all day … [and] life in the Arab world came to a stop” (Danielson, 1997: 1). 13

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Umm Kulthum dominated the airwaves. She joined the Listening Committee, which selected the music for radio broadcasting. She was in control of almost anything transmitted by the radio: They needed her as much as she did them. The heads of broadcasting did more for Umm Kulthum than anyone else, but someone always gets ahead. There is a good studio at the radio because Umm Kulthum wanted it. It is now there for others to use. She did for broadcasting what Farid al-Atrash did for film – the movie industry could not be what it is if he had not helped to build it. (Danielson, 1997, p. 140)

Umm Kulthum’s live broadcasts helped her positioning in Egyptian culture more than they benefited her financially. Umm Kulthum was able to reach a huge audience within Egypt, as well as internationally. The broadcasts quickly became occasions for gatherings around the nearest radio to listen to the special program “Umm Kulthum Night” and socialize with friends and family. Cairo’s busy streets would empty as people took their seats in front of the radio (Grippo, 2010, pp. 137–162). Even those who were not fans of Umm Kulthum stayed to listen. These concerts became the soundtrack to life in Egypt. Singer Suad Muhammad said that “Umm Kulthum had the entire Egyptian nation, which cared more about her than about its political leader, on her side. She had the entire information ministry at her service” (Danielson, 1997, p. 120). The 1950s was a decade of political growth for Umm Kulthum during which she started to promote social causes and emphasize her modest, popular background. Egypt had a new vision for the future and so did its artists. The revolution allowed Umm Kulthum to start creating more national songs to support the new Egypt and its new regime. Umm Kulthum recorded many songs to praise the greatness of her country even before 1952, such as Misr Tatahaddath An Nafseha (Egypt talks about itself) composed in 1950. But when she received the news of the revolution, she left the summer retreat in at Ra’s al-Barr and went straight to Cairo to commission Ahmad Rami to write her a poem that was then turned into a song. Of course, the tune, Misru Allati fi Khatiri (Egypt the one on my mind), contained highly patriotic lyrics: ‫مرص التى ىف خاطري وىف فمي‬ (Egypt is [always] on my mind and on my lips) ‫أحبها‬ (I love her) ‫من كل روحي ودمي‬ (With all my soul and blood) ‫یا لیت كل مؤمن بعزها‬ (I wish that everyone who believes in her might) ‫یحبها‬ (Would love her) ‫حبي لها‬ (as much as I love her) ‫بني الحمي والوطن‬ (Oh sons of the protected country and homeland) ‫من منكم یحبها مثيل أنا‬ (Who among you loves her as much as I do?)18 18

 English translation by the author

18  The Sons of the Revolution: Umm Kulthum, Abdel Halim Hafez, and the Nasserist…

301

Following the 1952 revolution, Umm Kulthum was rejected by the Egyptian musicians’ guild (of which later she became a member and eventually president) because she had sung in favor of the then-deposed Farouk. Nasser discovered that her songs were banned from being aired on the radio, and he quickly realized the potential of having the singer’s immense following as a passionate supporter of his nationalist project. At this stage, Nasser and Umm Kulthum became personally acquainted, and the two developed a close friendship. As reported by Danielson: Umm Kulthum and Abd al-Nasser had much in common: both were from the lower classes and had utilized opportunities for upward mobility new in their lifetimes. Both were powerful personalities who became skilled at reaching the Egyptian population. Both drew upon similar images for their public identities: fallahiin and abnaa’ il-riif. (Danielson, 1997, p. 167)

According to the same author, “encouraged by the authorities in the new Ministry of Information and National Guidance that set policy for Egyptian Radio, virtually every singer made efforts to record songs in celebration of Egypt and its new regime” (Danielson, 1997, p. 164). Many of those artists who were singing verses in favor of the monarchy before 1952 started praising the Nasserist regime. However, since the state controlled the radio, it was not uncommon for Abd al-Nasser to commission singers to sing tunes that celebrated his ideals (Diong, 2015, p. 5). Almost 1217 nationalistic songs that celebrated Abd al-Nasser were produced from all over the Arab world, “the most important of which [were] songs about the Revolution, [the] nationalization of the Suez Canal, the High Dam, and the Yemen War” (Arabi & Sharara, 2009, p. 89). Songwriters, lyricists, and artists from every part of the Arab world were composing and performing for the Egyptian leader, idolizing Nasser’s name and leadership. One of those artists was Umm Kulthum. From 1952 up until 1960, 50% of Umm Kulthum’s songs contained strongly nationalistic lyrics. This trend continued well into the rest of her career, and after 1960 patriotic songs comprised one-third of her entire repertory. Most of the songs that she produced during this phase were martial in style; those included large orchestral accompaniment and (usually) a men’s choir. Those songs became widely popular, and one of them  – Wallahi Zamaan Ya Silahi (It’s been a long time, oh weapon of mine, 1956)  – was chosen as the Egyptian national anthem until late 1977 (Danielson, 1997, p. 164)19: ‫ شیلوا الحیاة ع الكفوف‬... ‫هموا وضموا الصفوف‬ (Rise and raise a host, With loyal hearts ready for sacrifice) ‫ منكم يف نار املیدان‬... ‫یاما العدو راح یشوف‬ (O! the horror the enemy shall suffer Through the fire of your zeal) ‫ یا اليل اتبنیت من عندنا‬... ‫یا مجدنا یا مجدنا‬ (O! glory of our Country, Achieved with our own efforts alone)

 President Sadat then replaced the anthem with by the less militant Biladi, Biladi (My country, my country) by Sayyid Darwish. 19

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‫ عمرك ما تبقى هوان‬... ‫بشقانا وكدنا‬ (By hard hours of toil, Never to be wasted or endangered) ‫ نحمیها بسالحنا‬... ‫مرص الحرة مین یحمیها‬ (Who shall protect Free Egypt? We shall protect it with our lives) ‫ نفدیها بأرواحنا‬... ‫أرض الثورة مین یفدیها‬ (Land of the Revolution, who will sacrifice for her sake? We will, with our lives)20

There is no doubt that the singer’s relationship with the Egyptian president, Gamal Abd al-Nasser, played a significant role in the creation of Egypt’s postcolonial identity. The new president built on Umm Kulthum’s artistic legacy to construct the “golden era” of Egyptian history and culture. Nasser benefitted from Umm Kulthum’s charismatic authority, while Umm Kulthum commanded substantive media and social power in the Arab world (Prow, 2015, p. 22). Nasser saw her popularity and her politicization as an opportunity to align his legacy with hers and place her in a position of influence within his government. This arrangement was not one-­ sided though, since Umm Kulthum benefitted greatly from Nasser’s support. She gained funding for a state Arab music ensemble, creating a new era of music-­making for Egyptian musicians. As explained by Prow: charismatic authority, by nature, can be shifted, reduced, or augmented by the charisma of those associated with it. Because Umm Kulthum dedicated over half her repertory to nationalist and Nasser-praising music throughout his presidency, Nasser’s charismatic authority increased with every popular move Umm Kulthum made thereafter. (Prow, 2015, p. 22)

As Umm Kulthum devoted the majority of her music collection to ultranationalist purposes throughout Nasser’s rule, his captivating authority and popularity were amplified with every popular move Umm Kulthum made. In 1954, Nasser was giving a speech in Alexandria’s Manshiya Square and eight shots were fired at him. All of them missed their target and Nasser continued his speech to thunderous applause from his listeners. Later that year, Umm Kulthum recorded and performed her song Ya Jamal, Ya Mithal Al-Wataniyah (Oh Gamal, the symbol of nationalism) in which she praised the Egyptian president for his bravery and expressed the people’s gratitude for his safety: ‫ أجمل أعیادنا املرصیة‬...‫یا جامل یا مثال الوطنیة‬ (Oh Gamal, the symbol of nationalism … the most magnificent Egyptian celebration) ‫ ردوا ردوا علیا‬...‫بنجاتك یوم املنشیة‬ (With your survival of the Manshiya incident … answer, answer me) ‫ فرحتنا و حرسة من خانك‬...‫بنجاتك و نجاة أوطانك‬ (With your survival and the survival of your peoples … You brought us joy and you brought woe to those who betray you) ‫ كان قصدو یصیب‬...‫خاین غدّار‬ (Deceitful traitor … He meant to injure) ‫ ىف صدر حبیب‬...‫وتبات النار‬ (The perseverance of the fire … in the beloved one’s heart)

20

 Extract from http://dictionary.sensagent.com/Walla%20Zaman%20Ya%20Selahy/en-en/

18  The Sons of the Revolution: Umm Kulthum, Abdel Halim Hafez, and the Nasserist… 303 ‫ و قفة شجعان ما یوقفها جبان‬...‫واجهت النار بثبات و إیامن‬ (You faced the fire with stability and faith … a courageous stance that a coward can’t stand) ‫ أخذت قلوبنا ویاها‬...‫طلقات عدیدة سمعناها‬ (Several shots were heard … it took our hearts with it) ‫ عدینا وحدة و الثانیة لحد مثانیة‬...‫كانت یا مطوالها ثانیة‬ (It only lasted a second … we counted one, two, until eight) ‫ و بقتلك آیة وطنیة‬...‫رضبتها عنایة إلهیة‬ (The incident was taken care of by God … your assassination would’ve been a national lesson)21

Umm Kulthum was able to influence an entire generation of Egyptians. Diong emphasizes that the use of colloquial Arabic in some of the songs made it possible to connect with them despite what class an Egyptian came from: “the phenomenal effect Umm Kulthum’s singing had […] it was not uncommon to see children, villagers, and uneducated people singing the sophisticated and esteemed poetry written by some of Egypt’s greatest poets” (Diong, 2015, p. 5).22 Umm Kulthum became Nasser’s voice. She embraced the president’s ideals, and they became her own. No one was better than Kawkab Al Sharq (the star of the orient) to lead the Nasserist revolution. Umm Kulthum was already a widely loved and accepted figure in Egypt at the time, so it was rational for Nasser to couple his speeches with Umm Kulthum’s voice. This was a very emotionally effective way to rally the Arab world. Many Arab leaders tried to replicate what Abd al-Nasser did with the media and Umm Kulthum, but they were not as successful (Arabi & Sharara, 2009, p. 90). Abd al-Nasser attended Umm Kulthum’s concerts regularly, and on one occasion the singer gave a speech before her concert directly addressed to the president: Mr. President, I, as a citizen, belong to this region, which I was pleased to honor you. I feel the universal joy that everyone feels in it. And you, Mr. President, make every country you are honored to be happy with your visit. And this is not limited to our Arab homeland, as there are many peoples who share this love and appreciation with us. We have followed with our hearts your successful journey to the friendly countries of India and Pakistan. And we felt proud and honored for the love, hospitality and honor that your great personality received. I was particularly shocked by the Indian artist’s reception of your honor and how they expressed their love for you when they used incense on you and fortified you with prayer. And this, Mr. President, is the highest level of love. And who is more deserving than Egypt, the mother, to immunize her righteous son, she has achieved and is still achieving all the hopes that she aspired to. It fortifies you with the Noble Book of God. I present it to you,

 English translation by Malak al-Gohary  Umm Kulthum is quoted stating: “The fallahin are myself. They are my youth. They are my life. They are the broad foundation from which I emanated” (http://www.kuod-bayani.com/en/bayanioriental-academy/112-oum-kalthum-umm-kalthum-2nd-part). On the other hand, we have Abd al-Nasser stating: “I am proud that I am one of the people of the village of Bani Murr. I am increasingly proud that I was raised by a poor family. My origins are peasant. . . . These two qualities have defined me from my youth until this day as the leader of the July Revolution” (Zuhur, 1998: 118). 21 22

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beseeching God to guard you, take care of you, direct your steps, and keep you a fortress from Arabism and a symbol of its victory.23

In this speech, we can clearly observe that Umm Kulthum saw Abd al-Nasser as a beacon of hope that could have changed not only Egypt but the Arab world as a whole. Umm Kulthum was not just a patriotic singer but rather a diplomat of some sort.

Nasser, the Six-Day War and Umm Kulthum’s Support After the Suez crisis and in the years leading up to the Six-Day War in 1967, Nasser had become the undiscussed face of Arab nationalism. He had founded the Arab League, served as President of the UAR (United Arab Republic), and consolidated himself as an ally to the Palestinian people, fully supporting the establishment of the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) in 1964 and opposing the Israeli government and occupation.24 A complete narration of the causes that brought to the 1967 war – and the conflict itself – is beyond the intention of this study, but the chronology of the events followed the timeline described here: On June 5, 1967, Israel launched an air attack on Egyptian airfields and destroyed a large amount of the Egyptian Air Force, seizing el-Arish and cutting through much of Egypt’s defense. Nasser’s Army Chief of Staff, Abdel Hakim Amer, ordered the withdrawal of Egyptian troops from Sinai the next day –much of this decision-making going on without Nasser’s knowledge –and within five days Israel had captured the Gaza Strip, Sinai, Jordan’s West Bank, and Syria’s Golan Heights (Prow, 2015, p. 23)

The Six-Day War and the immense territorial losses on the Arab side represented a true catastrophe for the Nasserist regime. The disastrous war of 1967 weakened the regime to the point that Nasser made a public apology and acknowledged that he had misled the Egyptian army, opening up to public criticism (Prow, 2015, p. 23). Nasser announced on June 9, 1967, in a speech to the people of Egypt, that he would step down from the presidency due to the Egyptian Army’s defeat, recognizing the full responsibility for such loss. He was too humiliated to continue leading the nation. Nonetheless, the Egyptian population reacted immediately, filling the streets and rejecting the resignation, chanting “We are your soldiers, Gamal.” The streets demonstrations led Nasser to retract his resignation. Umm Kulthum proved the political significance of music in times of crisis. When Nasser’s Egypt started to encounter failure, Umm Kulthum’s music played yet again  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gDBEDuTFFiw&ab_channel=DreamTVEgypt [accessed May 2022]. English translation by Maryam al Mazrooei 24  As a consequence of the growing discontent and an urge for autonomous action for the liberation of Palestine among Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, Nasser suggested the establishment of a “Palestinian Entity” starting from 1959. This new political organization was meant to represent the Palestinian national cause in the international arena. 23

18  The Sons of the Revolution: Umm Kulthum, Abdel Halim Hafez, and the Nasserist… 305

a crucial leading role in the public’s response to defeat. As Nasser’s Egypt progressed closer to war, Umm Kulthum made sure that economic and moral support was provided. “She promised special benefit concerts for the armed forces and donated 5000 Egyptian pounds to the war effort” (Lohman, 2010, p. 195). With her unwavering voice, she reassured the Egyptian soldiers: “I am with you, with the millions, in the appointment with victory” (Lohman, 2010, p. 195). Nonetheless, she couldn’t prevent the consequences of the war. Umm Kulthum shared the same feelings as many Egyptians. As the announcement of Egypt’s defeat broke out, Umm Kulthum suffered from severe emotional distress and expressed major concerns about the political situation, which increased with the announcement of Nasser’s resignation. The singer translated her feelings and the emotional state of the Egyptian people in the only way she knew best: music. Umm Kulthum performed a song called Ebqa (Habib El Sha’ab) (Stay, you are the people’s beloved) requesting!!Gamal Abd al-Nasser to maintain his presidential position: ‫قم واسمعها من أعامقي‬ (Rise, and hear it from my within) ‫فأنا الشعب‬ (I am the people) ‫ابق فانت السد الواقي ملنى الشعب‬ (Stay, for you are the protector of the people’s dreams) ‫ابق فأنت األمل الباقي لغد الشعب‬ (Stay, for you are the people’s remaining hope) ‫أنت الخیر وأنت النور‬ (You are the goodness… you are the light) ‫أنت الصرب عىل املقدور‬ (You are the forbearance of what can be achieved) ‫أنت النارص واملنصور‬ (You are the champion and the victorious) ‫إبق فأنت حبیب الشعب‬ (Stay, you are the peoples beloved) ‫قم إنا وحدنا الجمع وتقدمنا‬ (Rise, we have joined together and progressed) ‫قم للشعب وبدد یأسه‬ (Rise and throw away the desperation) ‫وقم وادفعنا بعد النكسة‬ (Rise and push after the setback) ‫وارفع هامة هذا الشعب‬ (Lift the people’s worry) ‫رغم الجرح ومر الكأس‬ (Despite the loss and bitterness) ‫عاشت مرص‬ (Long-live Egypt) ‫وغدا ً ستحى األجراس یوم النرص‬ (Tomorrow the victorious bells shall ring) ‫قم إنا أعلینا الوحدة‬ (Rise and Unit us) ‫فارسم أنت طریق العودة‬ (Draw the way back) ‫وتقدم یتبعك الشعب‬ (Move forward and the people shall follow you)25

25

 English translation by Malak al-Gohary

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The Egyptians were in emotional pain. However, they refused to lose their leader and their hopes for Egypt’s future at the same time. Nasser’s charismatic hold on the population was still partially present, despite facing immense failure. He positioned himself as a flawed leader who was trying his best. He became human rather than a semi-god. His people loved him as a brother, accepted his mistakes, and insisted that he tried again. The Six-Day War could’ve been the end of his presidency and could’ve been the end of a new socialist Egypt. Umm Kulthum used her authority to remind the Egyptian people to keep Nasser in power and made people believe in a new Egypt once again. A new period of ideological change occurred after Nasser withdrew his resignation: the image of a perfect Egypt with a flawless leader no longer existed. Although Nasser’s resignation speech had rapidly provoked the backing of the public, Umm Kulthum launched one of Egypt’s largest support campaigns to restore her leader’s public image. She started giving significant monetary aid to the Egyptian armed forces. Just a week after the military defeat, “Umm Kulthum donated the equivalent of 20,000 English pounds toward Egyptian infrastructure lost during the war and began composing new nationalist repertoire” (Prow, 2015, p. 24). Furthermore, she requested those who worked around her to donate their gold to the war efforts. Umm Kulthum began touring Egypt in August 1967, openly speaking about the failure of the war and addressing the Egyptian people to give contribution to rebuilding the country. Through her music, Umm Kulthum helped the government to manage and contain the people’s diverse sentiments. Also, “… [Her] music allowed for Egyptians to shed the stoicism of the military state and mourn publicly, emotionally, with a mother figure nearby” (Prow, 2015, p. 24). Later that year, she started to prepare for an international tour to raise funds to support Egypt’s economy. The tour allowed Umm Kulthum to perform all across the Arab world and in Paris. Her trip was seen by the Egyptian media as an opportunity to win over the people’s hearts and to reassert Arab nationalism. However, Umm Kulthum cautiously tried to maintain rather apolitical conduct during those concerts. She needed to unite the Arab world in support of Egypt and reassure the media and international audiences that she was just a performing artist, nothing more. The “star of the orient” made sure to address only social concerns without visibly referring to political matters, a technique she had mastered over her long career. Umm Kulthum declared: “The concerts… [are] to display the shared feelings that tie together the Arab people everywhere… and confirm that all of the Arabs are of one heart and one pulse” (Lohman, 2010, p. 55). In her song Haqq Biladak (Your Country’s Right), Umm Kulthum sings “each of us is a soldier in every field” (Prow, 2015, p. 55), and no matter what crisis we face, we must continue to progress: ‫قوم بایامن وبروح وضمیر‬ (Stand with faith, spirit, and conscience)

18  The Sons of the Revolution: Umm Kulthum, Abdel Halim Hafez, and the Nasserist… 307 ‫دوس عىل كل الصعب وسیر‬ (Crush each challenge and march on) ‫حق بالدك وحده علیك‬ (Claim to your country is up to you) ‫عایز منك سعي كثیر‬ (It requires all of your efforts) ‫ده االخالص بایامنا عباده‬ (Fidelity to your work is an act of devotion) ‫ابني لوطنك والوالدك‬ (Build for your country and your children) ‫فكر ابحث ازرع صنع‬ (Think, Research, Farm, and Produce) ‫كمل ملجد الوطن‬ (Continue for your country’s glory) ‫توصل فوق املعجزه واكرث‬ (Reach all miracles and more)26

After the conclusion of this legendary tour in 1969, Umm Kulthum returned to Egypt as a national and political hero yet again. “Her appearances across the Arab world in 1968 exemplified the tactical nature of her career development and image management” (Lohman, 2010: 65). She skillfully maintained an ambivalence between her support to the regime “as selfless acts motivated by a sense of duty to country” (Lohman, 2010, p. 15) while at the same time consolidating her status of undisputed singing legend throughout the Arab region and beyond. Nasser died of a heart attack in September 1970. Umm Kulthum received the news while she was in Moscow to perform. She canceled her concerts and flew back to Egypt immediately. She felt devastated and she secluded herself from public life for some time. The announcement of Nasser’s death left Egyptians and Arabs in a state of shock. On October 1 Nasser’s funeral procession was attended by five million mourners (Aburish, 2004, pp. 315–316) chanting “There is no God but Allah, and Nasser is God’s beloved… Each of us is Nasser.” This massive participation “reinforced the tragic image shaped by the defeat of June 1967 but reaffirmed the deeply emotional bond of identity between Nasser and the Egyptian masses that was not shared with other Arab communities” (Podeh & Winckler, 2004, p. 46). Meanwhile, also Umm Kulthum’s health started to deteriorate. Throughout her life, she struggled with multiple health issues that began in 1937, including liver and gallbladder problems. On January 21, 1975, she suffered the final kidney attack that led to her death on February 3.27 The crowds of Egyptians who attended her funeral greatly exceeded the number anticipated, literally storming the streets of Cairo.

26 27

 English translation by Malak al-Gohary  https://www.cs.rice.edu/~nakhleh/ok.html

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 asser and Abdel Halim Hafez: The Nightingale N of the Revolution At the height of her career, Umm Kulthum was performing in the yearly celebration of the July Revolution at the Officer’s Club. Along with her were the golden voices of Egypt: Abdel Halim Hafez and Mohammed Abdel Wahab. In one occasion, Abdel Halim was supposed to take the stage right after Umm Kulthum. However, it is reported that Umm Kulthum continued to sing for a total of 7 hours. Abdel Halim was furious, and it showed. As soon as Umm Kulthum terminated her performance, the audience left, and Abdel Halim shared her anger with her. After this episode, Abdel Halim was banned from radio stations all over Egypt. It is said that Umm Kulthum had spoken directly to Nasser to make this happen, as Abdel Halim refused to apologize after the stage incident. The ban on Abdel Halim continued for 3 years. The singer also to tried to speak to a Minister friend of his to convince him to talk to the president to revoke the veto, but all his pleas were dismissed. It was Umm Kulthum’s word against his. Abdel Halim soon realized that the only way to turn things around was to apologize to Umm Kulthum, regardless he had not done anything wrong. As soon as he apologized, he kissed Umm Kulthum’s hand and she accepted his apology. Immediately afterward the ban was lifted with one phone call from Umm Kulthum to Abd al-Nasser (Podeh & Winckler, 2004, p. 328). Umm Kulthum’s powerful personality and influence in Egypt and on other artists were incredible. On another occasion, while Abdel Halim was on his way to perform at one of his concerts in Syria right before the plane was about to take off, the doors of the aircraft suddenly opened, and some of the orchestra members were asked to leave. It was the same day that Umm Kulthum was supposed to sing her monthly Thursday concert, and she would not agree to go on air without the musicians that were on Abdel Halim’s plane. Abdel Halim agreed to let them go without any protest because he knew how powerful Umm Kulthum was.28 Abdel Halim Hafez was born on June 21, 1929, in Al-Halawat, Al-Sharkia, Egypt. He was orphaned at an early age. However, he was gifted with a charming voice which made him begin his musical career when he was only 7 years old. He graduated from the Academy of Arabic Music, Cairo, in 1948. Abdel Halim and his sibling Ali were both born with a disease known as schistosomiasis (bilharzia), an infectious parasitic disease. Ali was able to defeat the disease; however, the disease ended up defeating Abdel Halim at 48 years old. In 1952, Hafez performed a series

 Along with her feud with Abdel Halim Hafez, Mohammed Abdel Wahab was no different. Umm Kulthum disliked him because of his modern approach to Arabic music, and he disliked her for holding on to classical styles in a rapidly changing time. In this incident, however, Abdel Nasser was the one to come in between and suggested the two to work together on a song. Mohammed Abdel Wahab would compose and Umm Kulthum would sing. Abdel Nasser was persistent with his request, and the two finally agreed to work together. The work that was produced echoes in the majority of Arab peoples’ minds; Enta Omri (You are my life) is an immortal song, and definitely ones of the most popular songs of Umm Kulthum’s repertoire. 28

18  The Sons of the Revolution: Umm Kulthum, Abdel Halim Hafez, and the Nasserist… 309

of public concerts singing patriotic songs celebrating the victory, and unconsciously he became another voice of the Egyptian revolution. Abdel Halim’s lifelong friend, the colloquial poet Abdel Rahman al-Abnoudi (1938–2015), described Hafez “with his warm voice, dark skin and shiny eyes as the Arab equivalent of Frank Sinatra. He sang many love songs and was often cast in films as a romantic lover. But Hafez was never satisfied with this limited framing and tried to touch upon social issues in his roles.”29 He was able to translate his feelings for the 1952 revolution into music, leaving a huge impact on Egyptian and Arab audiences. Abdel Halim’s undisputed qualities, along with his charismatic personality, were able to attract different poets and musicians such as Ihsan Abd el-Quddu to work with him. Abdel Halim also built a strong relationship with Mohamed Hassanain Heikal. Heikal worked as a ghostwriter for Gamal Abd al-Nasser and played the trait d’union between the singer and the president. Hafez wrote a letter to Nasser, including in it the lyrics of a song he was working on titled Ya Ahlan Belmaarek (Oh Welcome Battles): ‫یا أهال باملعارك یا بخت مین یشارك‬ (Oh, welcome wars, lucky who participates) ‫بنارها نستبارك ونطلع منصورین‬ (With their flame we are blessed and turn out winners) ‫مالیین الشعب تدق الكعب تقول كلنا جاهزین‬ (Millions of people pounding their heels saying ‘we all are ready!’) ‫راجع يف املغربیة شوفت عیون الثوار‬ (Returning in the evening, I saw the eyes of the revolutionists) ‫نظرتهم فكرتني بالضباط األحرار‬ (Their appearance reminded me of the Free Officers) ‫ ونسمع فرحانین‬.. ‫ ویهدى الكل‬.. ‫يف لحظة نطل‬ (One moment we show up, everyone’s quiet, we listen with joy) ‫عبدالنارص حبیبنا … قایم بیننا یخاطبنا‬ (Abd al-Nasser, our lover…standing between us giving us a speech) ‫ قائد ومجندین‬.. ‫نجاوبوه ویجاوبنا‬ (We answer him, he answers us…a leader and his soldiers)30

Three years after the Free Officers’ coup, and a year before the Suez War, Abd al-­Halim had already achieved a very solid career and a reputation as another singer of the revolution and the regime. At this stage, he was collaborating with the most renowned nationalist lyricists and composers (Podeh & Winckler, 2004, p. 309). In the meantime, the relationship between the singer and Nasser grew stronger on a personal level.31 When Nasser announced his daughter Hoda’s upcoming marriage, Hafez requested to perform at their wedding; Nasser didn’t hesitate to approve the singer’s proposal. As soon as he received the leader’s formal approval, Abdel Halim began preparing a new bridal song with lyrics written by Hussein Al Said and musical melodies by Munir Murad.

 https://www.egyptindependent.com/remembering-abdel-halim-hafez-voice-revolution [accessed April 2022] 30  English translation by the author 31  Hafez established strong friendships with many presidents and kings, such as Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser and King Hassan II of Morocco. 29

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Though Abd al-Halim was not just a singer, he was also a silver screen talent, and he appeared in 16 films between 1955 and 1969. His movies were not overt ideological representations of the revolution, but they were certainly portraying the optimism of early Nasserist reformism. “They draw upon pre-revolutionary melodramatic tropes, but carry them a step further to meet the clarion call of the ‘new’ post monarchical era in which class boundaries fall to true romance” (Podeh & Winckler, 2004, p.  311). Hafez was embodying all the elements of Nasserism, personifying “the archetypical Nasser-era hero. His […] stature as the dominant cultural icon of postwar Egypt cannot be divorced from his chronological and ideological positioning in Egyptian political or cultural history” (Podeh & Winckler, 2004, p. 308). When it came to music, Nightingale continued to praise the revolution since its inception in July 1952, until he achieved the status of “an official spokesman for the revolution.”32 Hafez recorded and sang approximately 25 political songs. In the 1950s and 1960s, he began to release his patriotic songs, in which Nasser was depicted as a revolutionary leader, a military figure, and a father for all Egyptians (Mostafa, 2017, p. 46). One of the first ones of this production was written by the famous lyricist Salah Jaheen (1930–1986) to celebrate Nasser’s presidency in 1956, Ihna al Sha‘ab (We, the people): ‫إحــنــــا حــــيــــاتــك وابتســـامتـــك وانــــت حــيــاتـنــــا‬ (We are your life, your smile, and you are our life) ‫إحــنــــا بـنـفـــــرح وأنـــــت بـــتــفــــرح مــن فــرحـتـنــــا‬ (We are full of joy and you are happy with our happiness) ‫كــــل مـــــا نــــكـــبـر قـلـبـــــك يـكـــبـــــر ف مــحبتـنـــا‬ (Whenever we grow, your heart grows due to our love) ‫وإحــنــــا اخـــتـرنــــاك وحنـــــمــشـــــــي وراك‬ (We chose you and we will follow you) ‫يا فــاتـح بـاب الحـريـــة‬ (Oh conqueror the gate of freedom) ‫يـا ريــس يــا كبري القلب‬ (Oh president, you have a great heart)33

In another song, Nasser Ya Hurriyah (Nasser, oh freedom) written by Salah Jaheen in celebration of the Aswan Dam project of the early 1960s, Hafez worships the special status achieved by Nasser in the hearts of the Egyptian people: ‫نارص یا حریة‬ (Nasser, oh freedom) ‫نارص یا حریة نارص یا وطنیة‬ (Nasser, oh freedom, oh mother country) ‫یا حریة یا وطنیة یاروح األمة العربیة‬ (Oh freedom, oh mother country, oh soul of the Arab nation) ‫الشعب یریدك‬ (The people want you)34

 ‫ عاما عىل رائعة العندليب “يا جامل يا حبيب املاليني‬59 ..‫”ىف ذكرى ثورة يوليو‬ ‫ م‬10:12 2017 ‫ يوليه‬23 ،‫األحد‬ ‫كتب رشيف إبراهيم‬ 33  English translation by the author 34  English translation by the author. See also ‫ يوليو‬23 ‫ هدية العندليب لزعيم ثورة‬..”‫ أغنية “نارص يا حرية‬- ‫املواطن‬ 32

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In the previous lyrics, Hafez underlines how Nasser represented freedom, not only freedom but also Arab unity. “Such an image of the military leader who is approachable and much loved by his people—as well as those of Arab and African nations, the non-aligned nations, and all other nations seeking liberation and justice around the world—as the lyrics illustrate, is reinforced over and again in many songs of the 1960s (up until 1967), the years of the height of Arab nationalism and Nasser’s ‘socialist’ ideology” (Mostafa, 2017, p.  46). Nasser as the representative of the Egyptian people; of the Palestinians and the praise for their return to the homeland; Nasser as the embodiment of a united Arab socialist nation; Nasser as the leader of the revolution against oppression, colonialism, and injustice. However, when the political situation started to deteriorate during the period preceding the 1967 war, Hafez released a song called Surah (Picture). The song was broadcast live in 1966. Once again, the lyrics written by Salah Jaheen and by the composer Kamal Al Taweel were meant to glorify “Nasser, the revolution and all social classes under the banner of the revolution. The song is an ideological celebration of Nasserism” (Arabi & Sharara, 2009, p. 89) and the last one with a positive theme before the 1967 catastrophe: ‫صورة… صورة… صورة… كلنا كده عایزین صورة‬ (A picture, a picture, a picture, we all need a picture) ‫صورة… صورة… صورة… تحت الرایة املنصورة‬ (A picture, a picture, a picture, under the winning flag) … ‫یا زمان ص ّورنا… ص ّورنا یا زمان‬ (Oh our time, take a photo of us, take a picture of us) ‫هنقرب من بعض كامن… هنقرب من بعض كامن‬ ‫واليل هیبعد من املیدان… واليل هیبعد من املیدان‬ ‫عمره ما هیبان يف الصورة‬ (We will get even closer, and the one who gets away from the square, will never be in the picture)35

In the aftermath of Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 war with Israel, much of the musical production vacillated between political consciousness and orchestrated propaganda.36 The poet Abdel Rahman al-Abnoudi wrote many songs for Abdel Halim in the late 1960s, especially after the 1967 defeat. These songs, explained al-Abnoudi, evoked feelings of belonging and patriotism like Ibnuk yaqulak yabtil (Your Son Calls You a Hero), ‘Ada al nahar (The day has gone), and Ahlaf bi samaha (I swear by his name).37 Neither Hafez nor his composers or writers ever took money during that period for their work, which often caused Hafez problems with his partners at [the record company] Sawt al-Fan.”38 Each song promoted a very well-crafted  English translation by the author  https://www.madamasr.com/en/2013/08/20/feature/culture/egypts-musical-nationalism-and-alittle-george-orwell [accessed May 2022] 37  Abdel Halim promised to sing “I swear by its name” in all his concerts until the land of Egypt is liberated in the Sinai. 38  https://egyptindependent.com/remembering-abdel-halim-hafez-voice-revolution/ See also https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/32025 35

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mixture of inclusion, nationalism, and patriotism. It’s not surprising that Abdel Halim’s repertoire regained a lot of attention during the 2011 uprisings.39 In any case, regardless of the support received by the media, performers, and the general population, the Six-Day War declared the end of the Nasserist illusion. During the first 4 days of the war, the general population of the Arab world believed in the regime’s fabrications of an imminent Arab victory (Aburish, 2004). On June 9, Nasser made a television appearance to inform Egyptian citizens of their country’s defeat. Even the Voice of the Arabs started to lose its credibility as the radio of the regime. “It was a frustrating moment for Arabs, especially for this radio’s audience. Losing the war was a symbol of how the radio could be untruthful” (Alahmed, 2011, p. 29). In January 1968, the president initiated the War of Attrition to reclaim the territories conquered by Israel the year before, ordering attacks against Israeli positions east of the then-blockaded Suez Canal (Aburish, 2004, p. 280). In June 1970, Nasser accepted the Rogers Plan, a US-sponsored framework for bringing an end to hostilities and an Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory (rejected by Israel, the PLO, and most Arab states except Jordan) (Aburish, 2004, p. 304). Abdel Halim Hafez and Umm Kulthum both died shortly after Sadat ascended to the presidency (1974 and 1975, respectively), and their passing marked the end of Egypt’s “golden age.” “Egyptian music faced a new economy, new technology, and an open market” with Sadat’s new economic infitah policies (Prow, 2015, p. 26).

Conclusion Gamal Abd al-Nasser and the period of his rule, from the 1952 revolution to his death in 1970, left an immense impact on Egyptian and Arab politics and society. Still today, it is not unusual to see the walls of Cairo’s cafés adorned with the images of Nasser, Umm Kulthum, and other singers, actors, performers, and writers of the “golden age.” With the massive diffusion of radio first, and cinema and television at a later stage, songs started to play an essential part in modern Egyptian culture; composers, poets, and singers were collaborating to craft tunes admired by people from very different social and intellectual backgrounds, and their lyrics would become part of the cultural heritage of all Arabs. The Nasser period produced several patriotic songs (referred to as wataniyyat) whose scope was to praise the July 1952 Revolution, the accomplishment of the new nationalist, Pan-Arab, institutionalized-­socialist regime, and Nasser himself (Podeh & Winckler, 2004, p. 324).  Ziad Alk, a political sociologist, explained: “With the deliberately orchestrated parallel that the state media and private media are trying to draw between Nasser and [Abdel-Fattah] El-Sisi, this patriotic section of Halim’s discography is found to be very fitting. And for sure there is a certain mood that is being orchestrated there” (https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/98383/ Egypt/Politics-/Of-leaders,-music-and-patriotism-Halim-rises-throu.aspx) [accessed April 2022]. 39

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Nasserism represented “a feeling, a sense of excitement, a hope for a new Arab future” (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p.  321). Egypt and its new president were bound to be at the forefront of a process of Arab modernization and emancipation from oppression, colonialism, and Western influences. As explained by Kerr, Nasser “symbolized a range of attitudes and actions reaching far beyond Egypt and beyond the particular things he said and did” (Kerr, 1975, p. 41). 1967 presented Nasser with an opportunity to bring Egypt and other Arab States to confront Israel on the battlefield. Nasser took advantage of this opportunity, and in so doing he exposed Egypt and its allies to a devastating military defeat that eventually brought the Nasserist regime (and dream) to an end. The most popular singers in Egypt during the second half of the twentieth century – Umm Kulthum and Abdel Halim Hafez – were undoubtedly the ones most closely associated with the Nasserist regime. Umm Kulthum had already established herself as a performer well before the revolution; Abd al-Halim Hafez grew with the revolution. After the 1952 coup, both artists started to be referred to as “the sons of the revolution,” “the voices of the president,” and “the voices of the revolution”  – and both became personally acquainted with Nasser. Umm Kulthum and Hafez were powerful weapons for the president, and he knew how to make good political use of their performances (Danielson, 1997, p.  166). Nasser, Umm Kulthum, and Abdel Halim were all highly visible public figures. They had a public persona that was able to connect (with different means) to the crowd and see themselves in the people they connected to. In addition, they all mastered the art of communication; no one could speak like Abd al-Nasser, and no one could sing like Umm Kulthum and Abdel Halim Hafez. People listened to Nasser and they believed in him. People listened to Umm Kulthum and Abdel Halim, and they believed they did not just sing poetry: they gave poetry a political and social meaning. Whenever they spoke or sang, they spoke or sang of Egypt in the same way. Nasser, Umm Kulthum, and Abdel Halim Hafez represented the ideal Egyptian populist icons all over the Arab world. They were national treasures bound together in the mind of their people. Both Umm Kulthum and Hafez spoke through their songs to the hearts and desires of the Arab audience during and after Nasser’s era. They were singing for Nasser, for Egypt, and the Pan-Arab dream. Other Arab leaders tried to emulate Nasser’s communication strategies  – Muhammar Qaddafi in Libya or Saddam Hussein in Iraq – but neither their speeches nor the singers and composer they sponsored were able to achieve the relevance of Egypt’s musical production in the 1950s and 1960s. This heritage is still alive today and it cannot be separated from people’s memories of the time.

References Abdulla, R. (2003). The uses and gratifications of the internet among Arab students in Egypt [Unpublished thesis]. University of Miami, Miami. Aburish, S. K. (2004). Nasser, the last Arab. St. Martin’s Press.

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Ajami, F. (1974). On Nasser and his legacy. Journal of Peace Research, 11(1), 41–49. https://doi. org/10.1177/002234337401100104 Alahmed, A. (2011). Voice of the Arabs radio: Its effects and political power during the Nasser era (1953–1967). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2047212 or https://doi. org/10.2139/ssrn.2047212. Al-Rfouh, F. O., & Al-Majali, S. A. (2007). Arab nationalism and Nasserism in perspective and prospective. Journal of West Asian Studies, 21(1). Arabi, A., & Sharara, S. (2009). Nasser the radio star and sound icon in Arab collective memory. https://doi.org/10.14236/ewic/RESOUND19.14. Berger, M. (1970). Islam in Egypt today: Social and political aspects of popular religion. Cambridge University Press. Boyd, D. A. (1993). Broadcasting in the Arab world. Iowa State University Press. Chiba, Y. (2012). A comparative study on the pan-Arab media strategies: The cases of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies, 5(1 & 2), 47–60. Cleveland, W.  L., & Bunton, M. (2009). A history of the modern Middle East (4h ed.). Westview Press. Dabbous, S. (1994). Mass media in Egypt. In Y. R. Kamalipour & H. Mowlana (Eds.), Mass media in the Middle East: A comprehensive handbook. Greenwood Press. Dalacoura, K. (2003). Islam, liberalism and human rights: Implications for international relations (2nd ed.). I.B. Tauris. Danielson, V. (1997). The voice of Egypt. Umm Kulthum, Arabic song, and Egyptian Society in the twentieth century. The University of Chicago Press. Diong, N. J. N. (2015). Sawt Al-Arab or Sawt Al-Nasser? The case of mass media under Gamal Abdel Nasser and the convoluted rise of pan-Arabism. Journal of Georgetown University-­ Qatar Middle Eastern Studies Student Association, 5. https://doi.org/10.5339/messa.2015.5 Grippo, J.  R. (2010). What’s not on Egyptian television and radio! Locating the ‘Popular’ in Egyptian Sha’bi. In Frishkopf (Ed.), Music and media in the Arab world. The American University of Cairo. Gunter, B., & Dickinson, R. (Eds.). (2013). News media in the Arab world: A study of 10 Arab and muslim countries. Bloomsbury. Kerr, M. H. (1975). The political outlook in the local arena. In A. S. Becker, B. Hansen, & M. H. Kerr (Eds.), The economics and politics of the Middle East. American Elsevier Publishing. Khalid, W. (1958). Political trends in the fertile crescent. In W. Laqueur (Ed.), The Middle East in transition: Studies in contemporary history. New York. Lahlali, M. (2011). Contemporary Arab broadcast media. Edinburgh University Press. Lamloum, O., & Berqué, P. (2006). Restructuring radio broadcasting in Arab countries. Institut Panos Paris. http://omec.es/Documentos/dades_med/0073.pdf Lepsius, M. R., & Wendt, C. (2017). Max Weber and institutional theory. Springer International. Lohman, L. (2010). Umm Kulthum. Artistic agency and the shaping of an Arab legend, 1967–2007. Wesleyan University Press. Mansfield, P. (1973). Nasser and Nasserism. International Journal, 28(4), 670. https://doi. org/10.2307/40201172 Mostafa, D. S. (2017). The Egyptian military in popular culture: Context and critique. Palsgrave Macmillan. Podeh, E., & Winckler, O. (2004). Rethinking Nasserism. Revolution and historical memory in modern Egypt. University Press of Florida. Popper, M. (2005). Leaders who transform society: What drives them and why we are attracted. Greenwood. Prow, A. (2015). Tarab to Tahrir: A musicological telling of Egypt’s journey from postcoloniality to popular rebellion, Senior Capstone Projects. Paper 388. Rugh, W. (2004). Arab mass media: Newspapers, radio, and television in Arab politics. Praeger. Saleh, M. (2000). Private broadcasting in Egypt: Prospects and concern a case study [Unpublished MA dissertation]. The American University, Cairo.

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Shusha, M.  A. (1976). Umm Kulthum: I-Iayat Nagham (Umm Kulthum: The life of a melody). Maktabat Ruz al-Yusuf. Švejdová, L. (2014). Egypt’s liberation: The philosophy of the revolution [Review of Egypt’s liberation: The philosophy of the revolution, by G.  Abdel Nasser]. Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, 2. https://www.cejiss.org/images/issues/cejiss-­0214-­ ejournal.pdf Weber, M. (1947). The theory of social and economic organization (A. R. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, Trans.). Hodge. Zuhur, S. (Ed.). (1998). Images of enchantment: Visual and performing arts of the Middle East. American University In Cairo Press. Omar Bortolazzi  is an associate professor of Political Science at the American University in Dubai and Graduate Program director of the Master’s in International Affairs at the same university. Dr. Bortolazzi’s research interests focus on politics in the Middle East; philanthropy, civil society, social and political movements in the Arab and Islamic world and comparative perspective; international relations; and political violence. Among his recent publications are  “From ‘Brain Drain’ to ‘Capital Gain’. Indian Skilled Migration to the United Arab Emirates” (with N. Khan), in Md Mizanur Rahman & Amr Al-Azm (eds), Social Change in the Gulf Multidisciplinary Perspectives. Springer, 2013; Bortolazzi O. and Sarsar S. (eds), De-orientalizing the Arab Uprisings. Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (Special Issue). Vol. 45, No. 4. Summer 2022; Harakat Amal: Social Mobilization, Economic Resources, Welfare Provision. Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 45, No. 1. Fall 2021; “Management Context: Middle East & Northern Africa,” in S. Topler and H. Anheiner (eds.) (2019), Routledge Companion to Nonprofit Management.

Chapter 19

Egypt and the Arab World: Five Decades After Nasser Najib Ghadbian

Introduction: Egypt and the Arab World, the Evolution Gamal Abdel Nasser, the paramount leader of Egypt from (1952–1970), saw his country at the center of three “circles,” the Arab, the African, and the Islamic, with the Arab world being in the natural sphere of influence. Nasser’s priority was deepening Egypt’s independence and completely divesting from British colonial presence, particularly in the Suez Canal. Nasser centered the Arab component of Egypt’s national identity. While Nasser did not start this pro-Arabization nationalist ideology, he elevated it to a new height. In 1948, Egypt found itself in the middle of an anti-colonial struggle against Israel’s expansionist presence and occupation in Palestine. Nasser himself fought in the 1948 war against Israel. He criticized King Farouk for setting up the military for failure, a disillusionment he wrote about in his Arabic text, The Philosophy of the Revolution (1954). This experience led Nasser to form the Free Officers Movement, a military group he used to subsequently overthrow the monarchy. The 1948 war, despite its bitter ending, was the first pan-Arab struggle against the Zionist occupation. His pan-Arab ideology was bolstered by Egypt’s strategic position at the crossroads of Africa and Asia. Nasser saw Egypt’s potential to be the leader of the Middle East (Nasser, 1954, p. 79). The pan-Arab philosophy of Nasser was not the Pan-Arabism of the Ba’ath party, however. Nasser’s Arab nationalism centered on Arab solidarity against colonial hegemony, unity of ranks, and cooperation, rather than a full Arab unity of the existing state. A power struggle erupted between Nasser and the most senior officer and its figurehead leader, Mohammad Naguib. Nasser argued in favor of what he later articulated as a philosophy of Arab socialism and, in particular, widespread land reform. N. Ghadbian (*) University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. O. Abidde, F. Kumah-Abiwu (eds.), The Political Impact of African Military Leaders, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31427-8_19

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The major tension between Nasser and Naguib was over the role of the military in taking the matter of governance directly into their hands. Nasser did not believe in a pluralistic political system, and he was distrustful of the political parties allied with the monarchy and the feudal elite. When Naguib insisted that the junior military officers immediately cede their power to a civilian force, he was forced to resign and placed under house arrest for the rest of his life. Under the new regime, all political parties were outlawed, except the Muslim Brotherhood. During an iconic televised speech in 1954, gunmen attempted to assassinate Nasser on camera. Nasser used this act to justify banning the last popular challenge to his rule – the Muslim Brotherhood. His audacity during the assassination solidified his heroic, charismatic presence as Egypt’s popular leader, against all threats to his rule. Nasser’s charismatic style appealed to the Arab world, particularly through his widespread presence and frequent speeches over the radio waves across the region. Nasser wanted to develop Egypt into a new era. When the World Bank turned down his request to finance a dam project on the Nile that would expand Egypt’s agrarian land, he turned to the Soviet Union, who agreed to finance al-Sad al-`Ali, or the High Dam. Moreover, Nasser realized Western powers would never agree to offer Egypt weapons in the fight against Israel. He turned to the Soviet Union again, to buy weapons in what was later termed the Czech Deal. At the same time, Nasser was advocating for the Non-Aligned Movement, a movement by third-world countries such as India, Yugoslavia, and other countries to refuse to take sides in the political competition of the Cold War. During these strategic moves, Nasser advocated political neutrality while solidifying his allyship with the Soviet Union. In 1956, Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. Britain, France, and Israel declared war on Egypt as a result, which is known as tripartite aggression. The War of 1956 was a military defeat for Nasser but a significant political victory. The United States and the Soviet Union issued a combined ultimatum to the aggressors to withdraw their troops, what many scholars understand as a statement to assert a new world order. By the end of 1956, because of the failure of the tripartite aggression, Nasser emerged as the uncontested leader of the Arab world (Dawisha, 1976). Nasser became a prisoner of his own image. Two major examples include the Egypt-Syria union and the military escalation leading up to the 1967 Israeli preemptive war against the Arab states. In 1958, the leaders of Syria were having major political disagreements over the direction of the country. Motivated by the rhetoric of Pan-Arabism, they asked Nasser to form a union with Syria. Nasser was initially suspicious of the Syrian request. The political and military leaders in Syria appealed to Nasser’s commitment to pan-Arab ideology. Nasser agreed to it, hastily. This Egyptian-Syrian union  – called the United Arab Republic  – lasted until 1961. Because of the impulsive nature of this decision, the failure of this union became a serious setback for the project of pan-Arab unity. The second example of contradictory tension concerning Nasser’s image is his massive defeat in the 1967 War. By the spring of 1967, Israel provoked Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and drew them into the war trap. By that time, an important component

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of the Egyptian army was fighting in Yemen. In 1962, a military coup overthrew the Imamate, the ruling monarchy in Yemen. Nasser sent troops to support the free officers in Yemen influenced by his model against the monarchy and denounced Saudi Arabia’s reactionary support of Yemen’s former government. Nasser’s attempt to organize the Arab world led to backlash. During this period of 1956–1967, the backlash from conservative countries, including Jordan and led by Saudi Arabia, rallied against Nasser’s presence. As Malcolm Kerr writes, this created an intra-Arab “Cold War” that divided the region between progressive and reactionary countries (1971). Because Nasser’s army was weak and fragmented, and mismanaged by his best friend and Commander-in-Chief Abdel Hakim Amer, Nasser asked the UN to pull out troops from the Egyptian-Israeli border, and he closed the Strait of Tiran. Israel considered Nasser’s actions a declaration of war. While Nasser was pushing toward brinkmanship, he did not want a war. He sent one of his associates to the United States to assure the Americans of his intention. Israel took advantage of this escalation and carried out the first strikes of the Six-Day War. The 1967 War was a total defeat for Nasser. In the first few hours, Israel destroyed all of Nasser’s air force on the ground. They occupied Gaza and all of the Sinai Peninsula, leaving the Egyptian army in total disarray. It was estimated 12,000 Arabs died in just 132 hours of fighting. During the war, Egypt and Syria exaggerated their victories in the media while realities on the ground were horrifically contradictory. In addition to Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula, Israel occupied the Golan Heights and then moved for the West Bank, with its most precious prize – Jerusalem. Nasser responded in two ways – by publicly taking responsibility on television and by simultaneously deferring the blame to his commander-in-chief. He announced he would step down and give power to one of his colleagues in the Free Officer Movement and his Vice President, Zakaria Mohiuddin. Spontaneous demonstrations broke out in the streets, calling for Nasser to return and demanding he reverses his resignation. Scholars and political analysts, including Nasser’s colleagues, later argued that the demonstrations were staged by the Arab Socialist Union, Nasser’s political party. Nasser’s other strategy was to blame Abdel Hakim Amer for the military’s defeat, which sparked a power struggle between the two best friends within the Free Officers Movement. Nasser won and forced Amer into house arrest. According to the official record, Abdel Hakim Amer committed suicide a few days after. Was this the end of Nasser? To some extent, it was the end of his bid for Arab leadership. According to Anwar el-Sadat, Nasser’s colleague and successor, Nasser didn’t die in September 1970, but on June 5, 1967, exactly 1  hour after the war broke out (1977, 180). Nasser’s leadership can be divided into two phases. The first is Nasser’s golden era, from 1954 until the early 1960s. During this period, he achieved Egypt’s independence from Britain, nationalized the Suez Canal, stood up to the tripartite aggression, asserted his leadership of the Arab world, and contributed to the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement. Nasser made innovative use of foreign policy, leveraging favor from both the United States and USSR, in order to further Egyptian domestic needs, and entered into a union with Syria for 3 years, becoming the uncontested leader of the Arab world. When Syria seceded, it ushered

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in Nasser’s era of retreat. This was solidified by his 1967 failure (Stephens, 1972; Woodward, 1991). Those who argue for Nasser’s greatness claim that he made a comeback between 1968 and 1970. He did not give up, and he kept resisting until the last day of his life, trying to save what could be saved from his legacy. He invested a lot in rebuilding his armed forces, with increasing support from the Soviet Union, and he kept the war of attrition with Israel. Nasser continued to search for ways to lead the Arab world, to vow support for global liberation movements, and to explore new ways and sources for his global struggle against imperialism and Israel (Nasser, 1970, July 23). Nasser was becoming more mature and seasoned later in these 2 years – correcting the blunders of the 1967 War. In 1970, in the last few days before he died, fighting broke out between the PLO and the Jordanian army in what was known as Black September. Both Yasir Arafat and King Hussein turned to Nasser to find a solution, in recognition of his position as the leader of the Arab world. At the end of the summit that formalized the ceasefire between Jordan and the PLO which Nasser arranged, he was extremely exhausted. The next day, he died of a heart attack at the age of 52.

Drifting Away from the Arab World: The Sadat’s Years On December 19, 1969, shortly before leaving to attend the Arab Summit in Morocco, Nasser decided to appoint Anwar Sadat as a vice president. When Nasser died suddenly, according to the constitution, Sadat was to become the interim president. In his memoir, Sadat asserts that he was reluctant to accept the post. At this point, the majority of Nasser’s inner circle, public officials who included his cabinet and the leadership of the Arab Socialist Union, had to vote to accept Sadat’s presidency (El-Sadat, 1977, pp. 204–8). Sadat was approved by both the leadership of the ruling party and the National Assembly and “won” a national referendum with more than 90% of the vote. President Sadat came with a different conviction from Nasser and brought about major changes both internally and externally. On the domestic front, he sought to enhance his legitimacy by introducing liberal economic and political changes. One of his first acts was to stop the practice of phone taping and eventually ordered the release of members of the Muslim Brotherhood from prison. Sadat also encouraged Islamist students to be active in Egyptian universities to counter the weight of leftists who constituted the main opposition to his rule. He also introduced Islam as the major source of legislation in the 1971 Constitution. These moves earned him the title, Arra’is al-Mu’imin, the “believing president,” meaning he was more committed to highlighting the Islamic component of Egyptian identity than the more secular Nasser. Sadat realized that he could not achieve his domestic and foreign policy visions without getting rid of the ministers and assistants he had inherited from the Nasser era. The former “power centers bloc,” mostly Nasser’s cabinet members and the

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leadership of the Arab Socialist Union, mistrusted Sadat and thought of themselves as the group that would protect Nasser’s legacy. Sadat famously called them “the Soviets’ agents,” and knew he had to get rid of them as they tried to sabotage his early initiatives such as his plan to create a confederation of Arab Republics. Several critics of Sadat would claim that his initial acceptance of forming a confederation with Libya, Syria, and Sudan was an attempt to outmaneuver the true die-hard followers of Nasser among the leadership of the ruling party (Haykal, 1983, p. 97). This process helped prove that he was independent and able to fill the void created by the absence of Nasser’s charisma. Sadat’s power struggle took place between January and May 1971, and by the summer of 1971, he proved himself the uncontested leader of Egypt. In his autobiography, Sadat assessed Nasser’s legacy and was critical of both Nasser’s domestic and foreign policies. Politically and economically, he believed Nasser reigned with a rule of fear and left a bankrupt economy. Externally, Nasser left the country with few friends and lost the Sinai to Israel. Sadat adopted a liberal approach on the economic and political fronts. In 1974, Sadat went against his predecessor’s Arab socialist ideology in order to allow private companies from other countries to invest in Egypt and spark modernization and growth. However, it became clear that most of these investments did not lead to any substantive national development due to issues such as incompetent bureaucratic management. The economic “open-door” policy, which included scaling down the public sector, opening the country to foreign investors, and lifting subsidies, led to serious riots in early 1977. The government had to reverse its decision to raise the price of basic commodities in order to contain the protest movement (Waterbury, 1983; Haykal, 1983, pp. 186–88). Externally, Sadat made three basic changes from Nasser’s era. First, Sadat accentuated the Egyptian national identity, at the expense of the Arab identity. Traditional narratives follow that Egypt is an ancient civilization that was eventually Arabized and has a rich pre-Islamic/pre-Arab history. Sadat highlighted that the most important identity was being an Egyptian, as a descendant of thousands of yearslong civilization revolving around the Nile. His approach undervalued the Arab component of Egyptian national identity, which was Abdel Nasser’s main priority. The title of Sadat’s autobiography, In Search of Identity, reflected a central question in Sadat’s political and personal life. The identity element of Sadat’s Egyptian nationalism had two components: (1) to develop Egypt as a country of peace with (2) Egypt as the main component in his strategy – putting Egypt first, before the other Arab causes, including the Palestinian cause and Nasser’s previous mission of pan-Arab unity. His “search for identity,” both personally and politically, shaped his policies and vision for Egypt’s growing development in the years to come. Second, Sadat shifted away from the Soviet Union and toward the United States. Nasser had become increasingly reliant on the Soviet Union during the Cold War in order to rebuild the Egyptian army and to fight back to regain the Sinai. In his writings, Sadat narrated with a great deal of anguish his complex experiences with the Soviet Union. His policies toward the Soviet Union were contradictory – he fired

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the leftists in Egypt early on while, at the same time, sending messages to the Soviet Union that he was eager to have strategic relations with the USSR. He signed the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship in 1971, which linked Egypt and the Soviet Union in a strong political and economic relationship, at the insistence of the Soviet leaders. However, the Soviets continuously delayed the delivery of essential weapons Sadat needed to defend Egyptian territory. As a result, in July 1972, Sadat expelled about 15,000 Soviet military advisors from Egypt (El-Sadat, 1977, pp. 228–31). This shift sent an open, positive message to the United States that he wanted to strengthen their relationship. The United States had the most “solution cards” to Egypt’s problems, foremost of which was to pressure Israel for the return of the occupied territories. Sadat was pursuing a balancing act between the superpowers. Ultimately, the USSR’s failure to stand by Egypt and provide the necessary weapons was excruciating for Sadat and led him to pivot to a stronger US relationship with Egypt, a key shift away from Nasser’s policies which live in Egyptian politics today. Third, Sadat realized that solving Egypt’s economic problems and proceeding with the development that he dreamed of contradicted the continuing confrontation with Israel. From the beginning, Sadat wanted to pursue a political solution between Egypt and Israel, but he quickly realized that such a solution could only be achieved by initiating a limited war against Israel, followed by peace negotiations. This is what happened. In 1973, Egypt and Syria waged the October War against Israel, with full Arab support. Sadat needed the Arab world to stand by him because he knew Egypt did not have the military capacity to wage war alone. He enlisted financial support from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. Eventually, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia imposed an oil embargo on Western countries after the United States extended a massive military bridge to Israel during this time. The beginning of the October War was successful. The early victory was psychologically significant for Egypt and Syria, who were still dealing with the defeats of 1948 and 1967. Then, Israel stopped the Egyptian and Syrian armies and carried out a counterattack that pushed some of its troops to the West Bank of the Suez Canal and surrounded the Second Egyptian Army. Sadat immediately accepted a cease-fire offered by Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. This was shocking news to the Syrians, who felt that the move was uncoordinated. Many political analysts write that Sadat’s original imperative was not to defeat Israel but to wage a limited war in order to convince Israel they needed to make concessions on the Egyptian front. Among the benefits that Sadat obtained from his limited war is that it granted him internal legitimacy. Sadat became referred to as “The Hero of the Crossing,” referring to the military’s crossing of the Suez Canal from the West Bank to the Eastern front where the Israeli army had one of its strongest fortifications. Given their limited resources and a lack of weaponry, Egypt’s crossing the canal was seen as heroic despite Israel’s counterattack and the new territories they gained in the West Bank. Sadat wanted to lead the political process toward peace. At the regional and international levels, Israel and the United States were convinced that Sadat was serious about peace and that he was ready to do everything to achieve it. Through Kissinger’s meditation, Sadat signed the Disengagement of Forces with Israel.

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Then came Sadat’s shocking visit to the Knesset in 1977, in which he addressed the Knesset and declared that he was ready to go to the end of the world to make peace with Israel. Before he visited Israel, he made a stop by Assad and informed the Syrian leader of his decision to visit. Immediately after his visit, several Arab countries denounced Egypt including Syria, Libya, South Yemen, Algeria, and the PLO.  They joined in the anti-Sadat axis under the name, Jabhet al-Somoud wal Tasadi (The Steadfastness and Confrontation Front). Israel and the United States realized that Sadat was ready for full peace with Israel, so they began to coordinate a framework for acceptable terms at Camp David Summits in 1979. Sadat continued to argue for a full comprehensive peace. Hence, the Camp David Agreement includes (1) a framework for peace for the Palestinians in the form of Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza to be negotiated later and (2) Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, after the two countries signed a full agreement for peace, removing Egypt from any future possibility of war with Israel, and isolating Egypt from Arab surroundings (Camp David Accord, 1979). The more dependent Sadat became on the goodwill of the United States, Israel’s agenda and strategy for peace led by the right-wing Likud Party were centered. This vision included “achieving peace” by requiring Egypt to give up the Sinai in exchange for the required Israeli withdrawal from territories, occupied in the recent conflict (in reference to the 1967 War). In the Arab world, the Camp David Summit was referred to as salam munfarid, a separate peace. This represented how Israel and the United States guaranteed Egypt’s separation from any future confrontations with Israel, ending Arab unity and any potential the Arab world could have one unified negotiating position. Before Camp David, the understanding was that Israel would withdraw from Sinai, the West Bank, and the Golan, and allow for the establishment of a Palestinian state within its capital in East Jerusalem. This was no longer attainable. Israel gave back the Sinai but was not willing to compromise over the other territories. There is no doubt that Sadat, who placed all his bets on the United States, had no choice but to accept the framework that was presented to him at the Camp David Summit, which was a unilateral peace and verbal talk about the possibility of creating self-rule for the Palestinians. After 1977, as a result of his diplomacy in peacemaking, Sadat believed that he had become one of the great leaders of the world. He won the Nobel Peace Prize with Menachem Begin, the Israeli Prime Minister in 1978, and considered Carter his “buddy.” Sadat no longer cared about the great loss that had befallen Egypt in relation to pan-Arab unity. Other Arab countries severed relationships with Egypt. Before Camp David, Arab countries sent Sadat an ultimatum to discontinue the negotiation for a separate peace, and when he proceeded, they expelled Egypt from the Arab League and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. Peace with Israel cost Sadat and Egypt their standing in the Arab world. Most Arab leaders and popular opinion in the Arab world viewed Sadat’s agreement with Israel as a total betrayal. Toward the end of Sadat’s life, by September 1981, he became increasingly intolerable of criticism. In a public speech, Sadat announced he ordered the arrest of

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3000 political figures of all political backgrounds, including Islamists, Copt leaders, leftists, and old political figureheads from the previous regime. Contrasted to early Sadat who vehemently opposed Nasser’s tight control over free speech, Sadat in his later years wanted to protect his status as the greatest leader of Egypt who liberalized Egypt, regained the lost territory, and brought peace to the country. He was convinced that Egypt’s political figures were ungrateful to him and only expressed criticism of his moves toward peace. On October 6, 1981, while celebrating the anniversary of the October War, Sadat was dressed in full military regalia watching the parade. A military truck stopped suddenly in the procession. From it jumped several young officers who opened fire on Sadat. Sadat was assassinated on public television, before the world. The group that carried out the assassination had a primitive plan to not only kill Sadat but to topple the regime. It was a small, secret organization consisting of 200 youths known as the “Jihad Organization,” one of 2 or 3 Islamist extremists that grew under the environment of Sadat’s increasingly despotic regime and in the context of the failed economic liberalization. Egyptian intelligence agencies were able to arrest and try most members of the organization. In a famous photograph, one of the young men who opened fire on Sadat screamed from his cell, “I killed the Pharaoh!” In The Autumn of Fury by Muhammad Hassanein Haykal, the most important journalist in the days of Nasser and his confidant who was dismissed by Sadat and arrested, he analyzed the events leading up to the end of Sadat’s life. He argued Sadat’s assassination happened for two reasons: (1) his “separate peace,” which was perceived by several Egyptians as a betrayal to the Palestinians, and (2) his lack of tolerance for basic criticism of his policies and his evolution into a dictator. When he arrested 1500 political figures from all areas of Egyptian political life, every one of his opponents, he shattered his image of the “believing president,” who cared about the moral and religious standards of his early years. Sadat created a business class that benefited from his neoliberal economic policies that created a large gap of wealth and an increasingly disillusioned working class (Haykal, 1983, pp. 386–7).

Back to the Arab Fold: The Static Mubarak Era Hosni Mubarak was the vice president when Sadat was assassinated. Mubarak was the chief of the air force during the October War. His military performance impressed Sadat, who 2 years later asked him to be his vice president. Mubarak was sworn in as the president in 1981 after the assassination, making him the third president of a military background in Egypt. His priority was to secure the regime from further instability. After a period of tight security, Mubarak decided to relax the state security control over public life. He expanded the space for peaceful dissidence by allowing nominal new political parties to contest the election in the parliamentary elections. The process began under Sadat, in which he changed the Arab Socialist Union to the

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National Democratic Party and allowed semi-opposition on the right and on the left to participate in the People’s Assembly. Mubarak went a step further. He released political prisoners and decided to pursue a very cautious political liberalization as evidenced by two parliamentary elections in 1984 and 1987, in which he allowed members of the opposition, including members of the Muslim Brotherhood, permission to win several seats in the People’s Assembly. Throughout Mubarak’s rule, he pursued a dual strategy toward domestic opposition: (1) cracking down on extremists, such as the Islamic Jihad and al Gama‘a al-­ Islamiyah, and (2) tolerating the social and economic activism of the Muslim Brotherhood and allowing occasional participation in parliamentary elections. Mubarak’s foreign policy did not constitute significant shifts from his predecessor. The Mubarak period can be described as the period of maintaining Sadat’s policies. He did revert to some of the nationalist rhetoric of Nasser about the Palestinian question and Arab solidarity to enhance his legitimacy. Overall, he stuck to Sadat’s strategy of maintaining good relations with Israel and the United States. Mubarak realized Sadat’s extreme disregard for the Palestinian cause and underestimation of the Arab unity cost him his life. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the State Minister for Foreign Affairs, predicted at the beginning of Mubarak’s tenure, that Mubarak being a man of a deep sense of respect for the Egyptian heritage and institutions, “Egypt’s foreign policy will acquire a new style, dominated by a spirit of conciliation and moderation, and characterized by the refusal of the new president to let Egypt be drawn into any kind of political or military adventures” (1982, 788). Mubarak made some changes to Sadat’s foreign policies, including: 1. He placed a priority on returning Egypt to the Arab world, by restoring relations between Egypt and other Arab countries. What helped Egypt restore relations were some regional developments, such as the Iranian Revolution and Iran’s attempt to export the revolution to neighboring Arab countries. By then, in 1980, Saddam Hussein had invaded Iran. Both Iraq and the Gulf countries were looking for an “Arab depth,” that only Egypt could provide several Arab countries to unite against the Iranian threat. Many Arab countries sought rapprochement with Egypt as a result. The Arab League reinstated Egypt after 10 years, in 1990, once Egypt resumed relationships with most Arab countries. The headquarters of the Arab League, which had been in Tunis, returned to Cairo. This reinstatement happened for two reasons: (1) the continued Iranian threat and (2) the failures of countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya to replace Egypt as the center of leadership for the Arab world. Even though Syria and Iraq were ruled by the same Ba’ath party, they had strained relations under Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein. This tension became apparent when Hussein invaded Iran and the Syrian regime took Iran’s side, despite being in the same political party as the Iraqi regime. They needed Egypt to be a stabilizing force in a pan-Arab context. 2. Mubarak continued improving relations with the United States and Israel, but with a different style from Sadat. While some believe that Egypt under Mubarak maintained “cold peace” with Israel, a more thorough examination reveals that Egyptian-Israeli relations during the time frame of 1981–2011 were ­characterized

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by a hybrid blend of cold peace and strategic peace (Aran & Ginat, 2014). As Egypt became reinstated in the Arab League, Mubarak tried to present Egypt as a mediator between the United States, Israel, and the Arab world. By 1990, Egypt joined Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen in creating the “Arab Cooperation Council,” a regional grouping of “moderate” Arab countries. Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait destroyed this new initiative. Yemen and Jordan were closer to Hussein, but Egypt took a strong stance against Hussein’s invasion because of its alliance with the United States. When the United States decided to undo the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Egypt, in addition to Syria, provided the so-called Arab cover for the international alliance that forced Hussein’s troops out of Kuwait. The United States needed an alliance with credible Arab countries. Egypt’s decision to join the international coalition against Saddam was rewarded by massive debt forgiveness by the United States, the Paris Club, and generous financial support from the Gulf countries. 3. After September 11, 2001, Mubarak reintroduced Egypt’s willingness to take part in fighting Islamist extremism. He was appealing to the American audience and the Bush administration’s focus on the War on Terror. Mubarak, however, did not openly support the US invasion of Iraq, unlike the first time in 1991. Part of the reason was that Egyptians took part in demonstrations against the Iraq invasion and popular opinion was against the invasion. Mubarak’s regime was more willing to support the American agenda in the area after the invasion. 4. What followed after this period was that the Mubarak regime came under pressure from the Bush administration when it embarked on the “New Middle East” initiative, following the occupation of Iraq. The Bush administration, after failing to find weapons of mass destruction and connections between Saddam’s regime and Al-Qaeda, shifted its overall strategy to promote democracy in the region (Bush, 2003). The United States pressured Egypt to adopt more political reforms. As a result, Mubarak allowed for less controlled parliamentary elections in 2005, which in the first round led to the Muslim Brotherhood’s victory of winning 20% of the seats. At the same time, Mubarak introduced the first competitive election for the presidency. Before that, the ruling party would nominate him, and his name would be placed for a referendum where the vote was guaranteed in his favor. Mubarak won the first competitive elections by 85.57%. One candidate was arrested later on, and the other was deposed as the head of his opposition party. The Muslim Brotherhood’s victory in Parliament, and, shortly, the Palestinian legislative election in 2006 where Hamas won a majority, eventually led the Bush administration to reconsider its goal of democratization of the Middle East and prioritize regional stability instead. This was a great relief for President Mubarak who felt more competent to present himself as a force of stability and moderation for his American partner. Mubarak’s style which was defined by inertia leading the United States to take Egypt’s support for granted eventually diminished its position for Egypt in global affairs, and ultimately weakened the domestic legitimacy of the regime (Alterman, 2006). 5. In 2010, Mubarak held parliamentary elections at a time when there were rumors that he was grooming his son Gamal to succeed him. Opposition candidates,

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including one Muslim Brotherhood member who ran as an independent, won a total of 16 seats out of 508 in the elections. It was expected that Mubarak would put his name up for a new term as president in 2011. This, in addition to the continued economic neoliberal policies of the regime which favored the business elite and their allies in the military, was the perfect background for the Arab Spring to erupt in Egypt. With the continued protests against Mubarak and other Arab despots, Mubarak tried to offer concessions, including that he would not allow his son to succeed him in the presidency. On February 17, 2011, Omar Suleiman, the head of military intelligence who was just appointed as vice president, announced that Mubarak was stepping down.

 gypt in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring: The Transitional E Period and Morsi There was great ambiguity after Mubarak’s resignation. It was not clear who was the decision-maker, and what were the directions of the new regime. During this period, the Gulf states filled the void through the Arab League and led the Arab world in the crisis of Libya and Yemen, and to a certain extent Syria, but differences soon erupted between these countries. In this 1-year transition, before the Egyptian election, the most powerful institution was the SCAF – the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. This was a newly assembled institution created after the resignation of Mubarak made up of senior military officials who began to make a roadmap for the transition. In that roadmap, they presented a referendum for constitutional changes which allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to have an official political party (they had not been legalized since the days of Nasser). SCAF called for parliamentary and presidential elections, under the pressure of Egypt’s protests. In the first parliamentary election, after the departure of Mubarak, both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis won more than 60% of the parliament. In June 2012, Mohammad Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, was the first runner in multicandidate elections. In the second round, Morsi won 51% of the vote against the regime’s candidate, Ahmed Shafiq, who was Mubarak’s last prime minister. Many Egyptians didn’t trust the Brotherhood, but they despised the old regime’s candidate more. Mohammad Morsi served as president of Egypt for 1 year, from June 2012 to June 2013. Morsi was up against opposition in every sector of political life. Liberal political elites refused to collaborate with him in joining his cabinet. The SCAF mistrusted Morsi. The deep states including the bureaucracy and the judiciary, also made up of the old regime, were willing to fail him. He did not make expected changes such as being more responsive to Egyptian public opinion about what constituted Egypt’s national interests  (Shama, 2013).

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Morsi’s foreign policy initiatives were modest at best, and they encompass the following areas. First, he attempted to lessen Egypt’s dependence on the United States, without severing the relationship or jeopardizing the economic dependency and foreign aid he badly needed from the United States and World Bank. One of the ways Morsi attempted to reduce dependence on Washington was by initiating visits to China and Russia, and by reducing tension with Iran. China promised financial aid to Egypt as a result. Second, Morsi tried to invoke the Camp David treaty by emphasizing its stated commitment to Palestinian autonomy. Despite his rhetoric against Israel and his shows of solidarity for the Palestinian cause, particularly during Israel’s conflict in Gaza in 2012, he found himself playing the same role as the Mubarak regime. He found himself playing mediator between Hamas and Israel, which brought him praise from both sides (Tuhvatullin et al., 2021). Third, on the Arab and Islamic levels, he improved relations with Qatar and Turkey, two countries that provided financial and political support for his regime. He tried not to provoke Saudi Arabia, by announcing he would not be interested in exporting the Egyptian Revolution to other countries. By then, there was the competition between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, so he had to tread carefully, maintaining a balance between the two. Eventually, he did provoke Saudi Arabia when he visited Iran and received President Ahmadinejad in Egypt in an effort to reduce tension and hostility with that country. Because of the pressures of the Egyptian military and other Islamists, Morsi could not restore diplomatic relations with Iran. Fourth, there was strong verbal support for the revolutionary forces in the Arab Spring, especially in Syria, Libya, and Yemen. In fact, in the last 2 months before he was overthrown, Morsi held a massive rally in a stadium in sympathy with the Syrian Revolution where he publicly spoke. It did not contradict Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey’s consensus against Assad. His overenthusiastic support for revolutionaries in Syria was not appreciated by the military because they felt that if Assad were overthrown, he would be replaced by a Muslim Brotherhood leader like Morsi, creating an axis of support in the Middle East. By the spring of 2013, the opposition was growing against Morsi in Egypt. A group calling itself “Tamarud” (rebel) led the opposition against Morsi. They collected millions of signatures demanding Morsi step-down on the first anniversary of his inauguration. The movement was gaining more traction, and some speculated if they were supported financially by the Gulf countries and by the Egyptian military. Morsi allowed a greater span of opposition and freedom of speech, which allowed the opposition to reach a peak by June 2013 when millions took to the streets against him. They demanded Morsi’s resignation. At the last minute, the military intervened and issued an ultimatum calling for security and stability. The ultimatum asked Morsi to respect the demands of the protestors, implying a call for Morsi to step down. Morsi argued that people wait for the next election and vote him out of power. The military, with General Abd al Fattah Sisi at its head, arrested Morsi and escorted him to an unknown location. Morsi’s followers staged sit-ins in Rabaa al-Adawya Square to demand the return of the legitimate president to power and were stormed by the military and military police. This resulted in the death of hundreds, while

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other members of the Muslim Brotherhood were arrested or sought refuge in exile (Human Rights Watch, 2015). Eventually, Morsi’s political party was banned, and the Muslim Brotherhood was listed as a “terrorist organization” by the end of 2014. Morsi stayed in prison until 2019 and was charged with having foreign contact and conspiring with Qatar and Hamas! During one of his trials, while he was brought before a judge, he collapsed from preexisting medical issues and fell to his death on July 17.

Egypt and the Axis of the Counterrevolution: The Era of Sisi Sisi had a role in the anti-Morsi protests in June of 2013, by some accounts, protests that were funded and encouraged by the Egyptian military. After the arrest of Morsi, Sisi held a press conference with other political and religious leaders who were critical of the Muslim Brotherhood and promised a roadmap for democratic transition. The military appointed the head of the constitutional court, Adly Mansour, as interim president, while Sisi served as the defense minister and deputy prime minister. Rumors spread that the military was planning a takeover, which was confirmed in the spring of 2014 when Sisi resigned as defense minister and announced his candidacy for the presidency. The media was cultivating a Sisi cult of personality – “Sisi-Mania” (Abdel Aziz, 2013), which made it easier for him to win 96.9% of the vote in May 2014. The media characterized him as the strong leader the country was yearning for. Popular opinion supported Sisi’s bid for the presidency in hopes of (1) bringing back law and order and (2) ousting the Muslim Brotherhood’s presence in the political scene so other political forces could have better chances of winning future elections. The utmost priority for Sisi was to show that the new regime was capable of stopping the widespread social and economic deterioration in the country (Trager, 2017). This was made easy by a hefty, generous financial gift to Sisi from Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, who provided him with $12 billion for general economic stabilization. Sisi mistrusts civilian technocrats and believes in placing military generals back into politics. Sisi’s other priorities were the following. First, perhaps one of Sisi’s priorities was that he wanted to portray his coup as the culmination of a second popular revolution it targeted an extremist group, the Muslim Brotherhood. Hence, he banned the Brotherhood and classified it as a terrorist group. He conflated extremist jihadist groups in the Sinai Peninsula with the Muslim Brotherhood. Different security agencies and military officials arrested activists and blamed the violence on the MB, including the massacre of Rabaa al-­ Adawya. For Sisi, the fight against extremists also meant a fight against more moderate political Islamists who were beneficiaries of the Arab Spring, a priority he shared with the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Second, financially, Egypt’s Arab relations shifted to a dependence on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and some extent on Kuwait. In the early days of Sisi, Egypt became a more equal and junior partner rather than a leader in the Arab world as it had been in the past. In the first few years of Sisi’s regime, these countries provided

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him with great financial support, which brought about improvement in the economy. By 2016, Sisi tried to assert some independence, and as he became more stable. While he continued to take a stronger stance against Iran, the Saudi leadership was disappointed that Egypt did not send troops to Yemen to fight the Houthis. They suspended their petroleum shipment as a result. That created a strain. Eventually, both sides reached an understanding that they needed each other to deal with domestic and regional challenges. Third, Sisi positioned Egypt with the axis of the counterrevolution of the Arab Spring. Sisi presented his regime as a populist model that became more actively involved in supporting the military in other Arab countries such as Libya, Sudan, and Tunisia. In Libya, Sisi sided with the UAE in supporting General Hafter, a military man from the Gaddafi era who presents as the solution to Libya’s stability. Recent reports also show that Sisi supported the military officers who partnered with other civilian leaders to manage the transitional period after the overthrow of President Bashir. In Tunis, the Sisi regime supported the takeover of President Kais Saied of all legislative and executive powers, after he dissolved parliament, and moved against political parties, especially the Islamist Ennahda movement. Fourth, Sisi manipulates “blackmail legitimacy” the notion that strong men, i.e., dictators, are less evil than Islamist extremism or chaos. Sisi uses the kind of populist rhetoric of Putin and other similar leaders to position himself as antiestablishment. Sisi is one of the first presidents in Egypt who does not believe in a ruling political party so that he alone can rule, alongside a growing military system. This process of the militarization of Egypt took more momentum during the transitional period and continued under Morsi, where different constitutional projects continued to give prerogatives to the military, including that the parliament cannot intervene in the military budget. These prerogatives were further protected in the amendment that Sisi introduced to the Morsi constitution, where the military’s economic projects are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Other issues are that military leadership would keep its military leaders safe from prosecution for executive use of force against protestors, guaranteeing immunity from accountability (Chams El-Dine, 2016). The military would also maintain that they appoint their own defense minister, rather than a civilian-appointed one. In 2019, Sisi introduced a new constitutional amendment that strengthened the status of the military and extended the presidential terms from 4 to 6  years, thereby allowing Sisi to run for two more terms. Finally, there have been reports that Sisi is heavily promoting his son Mahmoud within the ranks of the mukhabarat as a potential successor. Fifth, Sisi continues to strengthen Egypt’s relationship with the United States through the Israeli gate. Trump nicknamed Sisi “his favorite dictator,” and Sisi enjoyed the benefits of this relationship. He was freed from being subjected to criticism about the human rights abuses, a benefit he may no longer receive as Biden’s administration recently suspended $150 of US foreign aid to Egypt because of human rights abuses. Sixth, one of the biggest challenges Sisi faced was the completion of the Nile Dam that Ethiopia built in the last 2 years. The rising pressure on Egypt is connected to filling the dam, which would reduce Egypt’s share of the Nile water. This would

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make it vulnerable to the Ethiopian water policy that could ration Egypt’s current portion. Under Sisi, Egypt has been putting its energy into finding a mutual agreement involving Sudan. Egypt has been reaching out to the African countries surrounding Ethiopia to pressure Ethiopia into a solution. Occasionally, Sisi and the Egyptian media threaten war if Ethiopia does not concede. Sisi’s regime represents the return of a leader who lacks the charisma of Nasser and the grandiose initiatives of Sadat but compensates for that with populist rhetoric. Even though the Arab Spring didn’t start in Egypt, it was the Egyptian Revolution that inspired other Arab countries and gave hope that a new dawn finally had fallen on the Arab world. Under Sisi’s regime, Egypt has become a part of the counterrevolutionary axis in the region that places its priorities on fighting terror, i.e., Islamism, and appealing to the fear around this in Western countries such as the United States. This allowed Sisi to reinforce the regime’s status quo of human rights violations and increased military control. How long can Sisi’s regime cash in this political capital and strategy once this kind of governance reaches its limits?

Conclusion and Findings Nearly five decades after Nasser, Egyptian leaders have shown elements of continuity and variation in their approaches to domestic and foreign policy. Perhaps the most variance was brought forth in President Sadat’s policies (1970–1981), which moved away from Nasser’s domestic socialism, and abandoned the strategy of standing up to the Western imperial power and advocating nonalignment, of which Nasser was an architect. Sadat’s most important decision was to ally Egypt with the United States, which he perceived was key to solving foreign policy issues, including the conflict with Israel. Changes in Egypt’s internal and external orientations cost Sadat his life. As Mubarak (1981–2011) continued to follow Sadat’s path, a fundamental divergence emerged in his efforts to reintegrate Egypt into the political sphere of the Arab world after its membership in the Arab League was frozen. Mubarak’s selective application of his policies and repression of human rights sparked the popular protest movement that forced him to abandon his rule. After 2 years of failed democratic transition, the military took direct charge of political power. Its leaders exploited the incompetence of President Morsi (2012–2013) and the failure of political elites to agree on the new rules of the game. The military assumed power based on restoring stability and dealing with deteriorating social and economic conditions. With the rise of Sisi to power (2014–present), Egypt became more financially dependent on Gulf countries, the United States, and international financial institutions to preserve its regime. Because Sisi relied on foreign aid from these sources, Egypt’s role as a leading country in the Arab world diminished. Alongside Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Egypt formed an important axis of the counterrevolution, which reached its climax in a clear improvement in relations between this axis and the Trump administration. Sisi’s grand infrastructure and development projects,

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such as building bridges, in addition to demonizing political Islam, and playing on a fear of collapse, still do not lessen the great challenges facing Egypt’s political system at the internal, regional, and international levels. One of the foremost challenges facing Sisi’s rule is Ethiopia’s Blue Nile Dam project. The dam is likely to affect Egypt’s water allotment. This development has prompted the regime to turn toward African neighboring countries to pressure Ethiopia to accept a peaceful solution that would protect an Egyptian water share. Failure to defend Egypt’s rights is likely to further undermine the position of the regime domestically and regionally. One of the basic frameworks that analyze the foreign policies of any country focuses on how political leaders frame and conceptualize their country’s national interest by evaluating the opportunities and obstacles that face them (Dessouki & Korany, 1991). Perhaps the Egyptian case is important in applying this model. The Egyptian presidents played, and this is an important element of continuity among all Egyptian presidents  – with a small exception during the transitional period and Morsi’s period – they played a pivotal role in formulating Egypt’s foreign policy, including the relationship with the Arab world. Both Nasser and Sadat were able to dominate in the field of foreign policy, especially after the two leaders got rid of their internal opponents. Perhaps the lack of charisma, and the lack of risk-taking, prompted President Mubarak to rely more on his foreign policy advisers. Today, Sisi is trying to play the role of the leader, in the manner of Nasser and Sadat, but by adopting the populist model, and by emulating the two leaders. The second pivotal point that explains the continuity of Egyptian foreign policy and its relationship with the Arab world is the role played by the military as the strongest institution since the rise of Nasser. All Egyptian presidents, except Morsi, descended from a military background. These presidents have tried to please the military institution, which has amplified its internal economic role over time, to become one of the most important forces that hold the reins of Egypt’s political economy. This is reinforced by the fact that a large part of the US aid goes to the military establishment. Perhaps the greatest inflation in the political and economic role of the military occurred during the period of President Sisi, who believes in the ability of the military to play important developmental roles, and they are the mainstay of his continuation in power. This last point, which is the consistent theme for all Egyptian presidents, including Nasser, is to prioritize regime security, which required absolute power for the person in charge. The big question facing Egypt today is to what extent has the experience of the Arab Spring shaken this conviction?

References Abdel Aziz, L. (2013). Catch the Al-Sisi Mania’. Al-Ahram Weekly. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/ News/4103.aspx. Accessed on 3 Dec 2021. Alterman, J. B. (2006). Dynamics without drama: New options and old compromises in Egypt’s foreign policy. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 18(3), 357–369. Aran, A., & Ginat, R. (2014). Revisiting Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel under Mubarak: From cold peace to strategic peace. Journal of Strategic Studies, 37(4), 556–583.

19  Egypt and the Arab World: Five Decades After Nasser

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Boutros-Ghali, B. (1982). The foreign policy of Egypt in the post-Sadat era. Foreign Affairs, 60(4), 769–788. Bush, G. W. (2003, November 6). Remarks by the president at the 20th anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy. Uploaded on January 28, 2012. https://georgewbush-­whitehouse. archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-­2.html Camp David Accord. (1979, September). Camp David accords: The framework for peace in the Middle East. The Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum. Uploaded January 28, 2022. https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/research/framework_for_peace_in_the_middle_east Dawisha, A. (1976). Egypt in the Arab world: The elements of foreign policy. Macmillan. Dessouki, A. a.-D.  H., & Korany, B. (1991). A literature survey and framework of analysis. In Dessouki & Korany (Eds.), The foreign policies of Arab states. Westview. El-Dine, C. C. (2016). Egypt: From military reform to military sanctuarization. In H. Albrecht, A.  Croissant, & F.  Lawson (Eds.), Armies and insurgencies in the Arab spring (p.  2016). University of Pennsylvania Press. El-Sadat, A. (1977). In search of identity. Harper & Row, Publishers. Haykal, M. H. (1983). Kharef al-Ghadab: Qeset Bidayet wa Nihayet `Asr Anwar el-Sadat [The autumn of fury: The story of the beginning and end of the Sadat’s era]. Shariket al-Matbu’at Linasher wal Tawzi`. Human Rights Watch. (2015, June 8). Egypt: Year of abuses under al-Sisi. New York. https://www. hrw.org/news/2015/06/08/egypt-­year-­abuses-­under-­al-­sisi# Kerr, M. (1971). The Arab cold war. Oxford University Press. Nasser, G. (1954). Falsafet al-Thawra [The Philosophy of the revolution]. Dar al-Ma’aref. Nasser, G. (1970, July 23). The Farwell speech of Gamal Abdel Nasser. [Video]. YouTube. https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=C5oYcL0o0qg Shama, N. (2013). Egyptian foreign policy from Mubarak to Morsi: Against the national interest. Routledge. Stephens, R. (1972). Nasser: A political biography. Simon and Schuster. Trager, E. (2017, March 8). Sisi’s domesticated foreign policy. The Washington Institute. https:// www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-­analysis/sisis-­domesticated-­foreign-­policy Tuhvatullin, A. H., et al. (2021). Egyptian-Israeli relations during the government of Mohamed Morsi (2012–2013). Political Questions, 39(68), 213–224. Retrieved from: https://produccioncientificaluz.org/index.php/cuestiones/article/view/35408 Waterbury, J. (1983). The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The political economy of two regimes. Princeton University Press. Woodward, P. (1991). Nasser. Addison Wesley Longman Limited. Najib Ghadbian  is an associate professor of Political Science and Middle East Studies at the University of Arkansas. He is the author of Democratization and the Islamists Challenge in the Arab World (English 1997 & Arabic 2002) and The Second Asad Regime: Bashar of Lost Opportunities (Arabic 2006). Dr. Ghadbian has published numerous articles, book chapters, and essays in English and Arabic. His research interests include democratization and leadership in the Arab world, Syrian politics, Islamic movements, and US–Mideast relations. He has been a frequent political commentator for several US, European, and Middle East media outlets. Professor Ghadbian has served on the board of several research centers, including the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID) in Washington, DC (2005–08) and the Day After Project (2014–present).

Index

A Abdul Nasser, Gamal, 21, 55, 90, 133, 197, 225, 236, 251, 269, 293, 317 Accountability, 8, 29, 63, 83, 173, 330 Afrabians, 263, 264 Africa, 3–8, 10–14, 16, 21–36, 40–51, 53–67, 69, 83, 89–101, 107, 114, 116, 117, 121–127, 130, 133–135, 137, 138, 140–144, 149, 150, 155–157, 159–166, 191, 194, 198, 199, 202, 208–210, 213, 214, 227–230, 238, 243, 251–267, 269–271, 277, 279, 280, 282, 284, 317 African continent, 226 African leaders, 233 African Union, 229, 230 Pan-Africanists, 233 Pan African Youth Festival, 229 African centered, 97, 156, 162–165 African education and culture, 133–151 African renaissance, 117, 177, 183 African Union (AU), 30, 32, 34, 35, 99, 101, 180, 198, 202, 208, 230, 251, 262 Afro Arabians, 252, 262, 267 Afro pessimism, 163, 177 Akufo-Addo, 29, 117 Alexandria, 254, 256, 269, 271, 273, 275–280, 284, 302 Algiers 1973, 239–242 Al-Hakim, Tawfik, 255, 271, 274 Amazigh, 192 Amer, ‘Abd al-Hakim, 272 Amery, Julian, 280 Anti imperialism, 137, 150, 155, 159, 161, 183

Apartheid Anti-Apartheid Movement, 229 Apartheid regime, 229 Arab, 3, 33, 34, 100, 134, 192, 197, 199, 201, 207, 212–214, 225–229, 232, 233, 235, 237, 239, 245, 251–267, 269–286, 293–304, 306, 307, 309–313, 317–332 Arab-Israeli-conflict, 225 Arab nationalism, 227, 229 Arab unity, 225–229, 232 Pan-Arabism, 225 Arab-Israeli conflict, 225 Arab League (AL), 251, 261, 278, 304, 323, 325–327, 331 Armed forces, 10, 12, 15, 29, 39–51, 56, 57, 59, 92, 117, 140, 211, 241, 272, 305, 306, 320, 327 Arts, 39, 144, 147–149, 200, 226, 254, 272, 313 Awolowo, Obafemi, 94, 95 B Bevin-Sforza plan, 196 Blaise Compaoré, 121, 128, 137–139, 157, 174, 177 Bottom-up, 116 Bureaucracy, 29, 83, 184, 327 Burkina Faso, 14, 22, 28, 30, 31, 34, 35, 40, 41, 57, 60, 90, 91, 96, 97, 121–151, 155, 157, 158, 160, 163, 164, 169, 170, 172, 174–179, 181–186 Burkinabè Revolution, 133, 134, 137, 140, 146

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. O. Abidde, F. Kumah-Abiwu (eds.), The Political Impact of African Military Leaders, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31427-8

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336 Burkindlum, 177, 178, 184–186 Burkinum, 148 C Cabral, Amilcar, 96, 100, 143, 144, 148 Cadres, 82, 146, 151, 200, 211 Cairo, 209, 225, 232, 239, 246, 254, 256, 258, 261, 262, 269, 271–273, 275–278, 280–282, 284, 285, 299, 300, 307, 308, 312, 325 Charisma/charismatic, 30, 65, 66, 91, 112, 114, 117, 118, 121, 128, 138, 156, 169–186, 252, 253, 264, 265, 295, 302, 306, 309, 318, 321 Civil War, 231 Colombo 1976, 242–246 Colonial army, 6, 7, 10–13, 15 Colonialism, 4–6, 10–12, 15, 16, 33, 40, 41, 55, 77, 92, 109, 127, 129, 132, 149, 150, 158, 160, 165, 181, 194, 236, 240, 246, 256, 262, 263, 311, 313 Colonial origin, 3–16 Colonial powers, 7, 9, 12, 45, 60, 92, 124, 125, 127, 174, 176, 177, 241, 242, 297 Colonial rule, 7, 11, 13, 40, 64, 69, 73, 82, 83, 149, 156 Conseil National de la Révolution (National Council of the Revolution), 121, 140, 174, 178 Constitution, 9, 27, 29, 35, 47, 49, 56, 69–84, 89, 99, 112, 113, 115, 116, 256, 257, 259, 274, 320, 330 Constitutionalism, 51, 70, 74, 77–84 Contestations, 53–67, 72 Corruption, 8, 13, 14, 16, 23, 29–31, 33–35, 49, 59, 64, 66, 71, 73, 75, 79, 80, 82, 94, 96, 98, 107, 110, 115, 117, 121, 123, 124, 140, 145, 148–151, 293 Counter-coup, viii, xii Coup baiting, 14 Coup d’état, 226 Coup d’état, military, 13, 21–36, 45, 46, 56, 57, 92, 98, 140, 159, 172, 174, 194, 196, 226, 293 Culture, 7, 12, 15, 31, 39, 60, 74, 75, 80, 99, 133–151, 157, 160, 193, 199, 203, 224, 225, 229, 253, 298, 300, 302, 312 Cyrenaica, 192–197, 203 D Dane gun, 5 Dean Acheson, 273 Decentralization, 79, 115

Index Decolonization, 40, 125, 134, 142, 143 Demagogue, 233 Democracy, 28, 32, 35, 40, 41, 46–49, 51, 56, 58, 60, 74, 75, 78, 80, 81, 100, 112–116, 123, 134, 200, 201, 227, 255, 326 Democratic revolution, 42, 177 Development, 4, 5, 11, 13–15, 21, 22, 24–27, 29, 31, 32, 34, 39–41, 43, 45, 47–51, 53–55, 57, 59, 61–67, 73, 77, 79, 83, 90, 91, 93, 99, 108–112, 116, 117, 123, 128, 130, 131, 133–135, 144, 151, 155, 156, 158–160, 164–166, 172, 175, 179–181, 183, 184, 191, 192, 197, 199, 209, 210, 214–216, 221–224, 232, 233, 238, 240–242, 245, 257, 262, 263, 269–271, 283, 294, 307, 321, 322, 325, 331, 332 Developmental elite, 63 Discours d’orientation politique (DOP), 146, 147 E East Africa, 69–84 Eden, Anthony, 272 Effective occupation, 11, 16 Egypt, 5, 22, 28, 33, 34, 55, 90, 92, 133, 134, 192, 193, 197, 204, 210–212, 214, 225, 228, 229, 231, 232, 244–246, 251, 252, 254–267, 269–282, 284–286, 294–308, 310–313, 317–332 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 274, 278, 279, 294 Elections, 15, 23, 24, 28, 29, 35, 54, 59, 60, 71, 73, 75, 76, 80, 98, 112–116, 118, 202, 204, 214, 273, 324–329 Elite, 8, 9, 15, 23, 24, 35, 41, 42, 44–48, 53–67, 70, 72, 73, 75, 83, 84, 125, 137, 163, 193, 196, 200, 201, 257, 258, 297, 318, 327, 331 Elite political power, 44, 53–67 Emancipation, 95, 97, 101, 123, 128, 129, 149, 156, 164, 169, 172, 177, 182, 257, 258, 261, 263, 264, 266, 267, 313 Epigenetic principle, 224 European Union (EU), 207–210, 212, 213, 215–217 Evolutionary process, 41, 42, 44, 48 Exodus (nakba), 272 F Falsafat al-Thawra, 270 Fanon, Frantz, 5, 143, 163

Index Farouk I, King of Egypt and the Sudan, 33, 259, 261, 272, 273, 285, 299, 301, 317 Fezzan, Tubu, 192–196 Foreign aid, 14, 121, 126, 137, 328, 330, 331 Foreign debt, 126, 127 Foreign military bases, 240, 246 “Free Officers”, 33, 226, 258, 273–275, 278–281, 284, 285, 293, 309, 317, 319 Free Unionist Officers’ Movement (FUOM), 196 G Gaddafi, Muammar Al, 22, 90, 133, 191, 207, 235, 330 See also Ghaddafi, Moammar Gender equity, 182 Ghaddafi, Moammar, 221–233 Ghana, 7, 8, 14, 15, 22, 24, 28–30, 34, 43, 45, 46, 49, 54, 57, 59, 60, 65–67, 90, 91, 95, 97–99, 102, 105–118, 126, 133, 140, 149, 155, 156, 161, 162, 262, 263 Global society, 221 Governance, 7, 13, 47, 48, 54, 56, 60–66, 77, 81, 82, 89, 105–107, 112, 114–116, 133, 155, 163–165, 203, 318, 331 Governance and development, 64 Government, 9, 10, 13–15, 22–31, 33–36, 39, 41–50, 54–60, 62, 65, 66, 69–84, 91, 92, 95, 97, 99, 106, 107, 109–113, 115, 117, 123–127, 129, 130, 132, 133, 140, 143, 151, 158–160, 173, 200, 201, 203, 204, 215, 216, 228–232, 237, 239, 240, 242, 245, 256, 258–262, 269, 272, 274, 278–280, 282, 284–286, 293, 294, 297, 302, 304, 306, 319, 321 Green Book, 32, 134, 191, 199, 200, 227, 232, 284 H Havana 1979, 246 Heikal, Mohamed Hassanein, 270, 274, 281, 283, 285, 309 Hero, 97, 225, 226, 260, 261, 264, 266, 269, 270, 276, 277, 279, 281–283, 294, 307, 310, 311, 322 Hero/heroic, 97, 170, 173, 182, 185, 186, 225, 226, 251–267, 269–286, 294, 307, 310, 311, 318, 322 Heroism, 269, 270, 273, 277, 281–285 Historical circumstances, 221 Human rights abuse, 99, 330

337 I Idarah Al Mukhabarat Al Ḥarbiya Wal Istitla, 269 Ideology, 11, 32, 54–56, 78, 80, 93–94, 105–118, 121–132, 134, 142, 146, 155–166, 229, 235, 263, 266, 281, 294, 295, 297, 298, 311, 317, 318, 321 Imperialism, 4, 30, 33, 43, 55, 97, 100, 123, 124, 134, 140, 142, 144, 145, 148–150, 159, 176, 181, 184, 232, 233, 236, 242, 243, 246, 260, 262, 263, 265, 266, 297, 320 Independence, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12–14, 24, 25, 27, 28, 33, 34, 40, 41, 43–48, 50, 53–56, 59, 60, 64, 67, 69, 72, 73, 77–79, 81, 83, 84, 89, 90, 93, 98, 101, 110, 115, 116, 122, 123, 125, 149, 160, 175, 176, 179, 183, 196, 204, 237, 239, 242, 244, 245, 263, 270, 275, 282, 293, 295, 317, 319, 330 Institution, 9, 12, 22–24, 27, 32, 35, 39–44, 47–51, 55–59, 62, 66, 74, 75, 78, 79, 81–84, 90, 91, 94, 99, 107, 111, 112, 145–147, 151, 163, 165, 174, 175, 180, 183, 184, 195, 203, 207–209, 215, 226, 325, 327, 331, 332 Intellectual activism, 133, 136–139 Intellectuals, 66, 89–102, 133–142, 145, 151, 156, 159, 163, 165, 175, 191, 200–201, 255, 284, 312 Intellectual statesmen, 133–151 International community, 221, 231, 232 Internationalist, 252, 254–263, 267 International Monetary Fund (IMF), xviii, 15, 29, 30, 59, 98, 106, 118, 126, 129, 131 International Women’s Day, 128, 129 Islam, 227, 230 Great Islamic State of the Sahel, 227 Islamic morals, 227 Islamic state, 227 Islamisation, 227 J Jamahiriya, 32, 134, 284 Jihadists, 191, 201–203, 329 Johnson, Paul, 91 Julius Nyerere, 70, 76, 80, 84, 93, 133, 161, 262 K Kermit, 273 Khairym Ibrahim pasha, 271, 280

338 Khalifa Haftar, 204 King Idris I, 196, 201 Kufuor, 113–116, 118 L Lagos constabulary, 13 Land distribution, 128 Land of Upright People, 141, 149 Leadership, 10, 15, 26, 29–31, 33, 34, 40, 56–60, 62–67, 69–84, 89, 90, 92, 94–97, 99, 105–118, 121–132, 134, 137–139, 141, 144, 155, 156, 161, 165, 166, 222, 224, 230, 232, 237–240, 242, 244, 246, 252–253, 258, 259, 261, 263–267, 273, 281, 282, 284, 285, 295, 296, 301, 319–321, 325, 330 League of Arab States (LAS), 251, 270, 285 Lenin, V.I., 4, 55, 142, 172 Liberal democracy, 13, 39, 65, 165 Liberation, 12, 30, 33, 100, 101, 110, 123, 129, 143, 144, 148, 149, 155, 198, 199, 202, 228, 229, 236, 237, 251, 252, 254–259, 261–267, 275, 282, 283, 285, 304, 311, 320 Libya, 22, 28, 31, 32, 34, 90, 100, 101, 133, 134, 159, 161, 191–204, 207–217, 221, 224, 226–232, 235–247, 270, 284–286, 313, 321, 323, 325, 327, 328, 330 Libyan, 226–232 Libyan Revolution, 226–231 Lusaka 1970, 239–242, 246 M Maghreb, 202, 208, 210, 216, 242, 269–286, 297 Marxism, 109, 139, 141, 142, 145, 157–159, 161, 162, 200, 293 Mashreq, 242, 269–286, 297 Maxim gun, 6 Mazrui, Ali, 11, 90, 91, 163, 263 MI-6, 273 Middle East, 31, 33, 100, 178, 198, 214, 228, 236, 237, 240, 242, 246, 251, 266, 267, 274, 275, 293, 298, 317, 326, 328 Migrants, 122, 192, 203, 207, 210, 212, 217 Military, 3–16, 21–36, 39–51, 56–63, 65, 66, 70, 74–76, 80, 83, 89, 90, 92, 95–100, 102, 105–107, 110–113, 116, 121–124, 135, 140, 145, 146, 155–162, 165, 166, 193–199, 211, 212, 215–217, 226, 227, 230, 239, 240, 245, 254, 255, 257–261, 264, 269, 271–274, 276–280, 282–285,

Index 293, 296, 306, 310, 311, 313, 317–319, 322, 324, 325, 327–332 Military engagement, 56–60 Military Intelligence and Reconnaissance Administration, 269 Military intervention, 6, 8–10, 15, 21–26, 35, 45, 48–50, 56–58, 65, 200, 207, 208, 215, 231 Military regime, 8, 14, 21, 27, 29, 47, 56, 65, 75, 89, 90, 92, 158, 161, 162, 165 Modernization, 9, 27, 39, 40, 42, 44, 48, 54, 89, 294, 313, 321 Mohieddin, Zakaria, 272–274, 277 Muslim Brotherhood, 197, 202, 204, 255, 259, 275–277, 280, 293, 318, 320, 325–329 N Nasserism, 55, 135, 264–266, 294–296, 298, 310, 311, 313 National identity, 141, 294, 317, 321 National interest, 9, 10, 13, 98, 176, 213, 239, 294, 327, 332 Nationalists, 9, 12, 30, 43, 53–56, 64, 65, 98, 99, 133, 135, 142, 143, 148, 156, 159, 161, 166, 171, 193, 199, 202, 252, 254–264, 267, 276, 280, 293, 297, 301, 302, 306, 309, 313, 317, 325 Nation state, 39–41, 48, 73, 78, 91, 175, 196, 198, 209, 212, 217, 270, 278 Nkrumah, Kwame, 3, 8, 14, 24, 43, 45, 46, 53–55, 59, 65, 66, 95, 98, 99, 105, 109, 110, 117, 118, 123, 134–136, 142, 143, 145, 148–150, 156, 161, 163, 262, 263 Non-Aligned Movement, 235–247, 319 Nondevelopmental elite, 63 Non-Western international relations, 252, 267 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 100, 203, 207–217, 244 O Oil, 31, 32, 53, 55, 100, 196, 197, 204, 213, 238, 265, 274, 322 Organization of African Unity (OAU), 126, 131, 150, 209, 251, 262 P Pacification, 12 Palestinian liberation movement, 235 Palestinian, 181, 228, 230, 237, 240, 245, 260, 261, 272, 285, 304, 311, 321, 323–326, 328

Index Pan-African, 30, 94–95, 97, 99, 100, 102, 147, 148, 150, 156, 162, 163, 177, 179, 229, 260, 261, 264 Pan-Africanism, 30, 92–93, 99, 101, 102, 116, 134, 143, 148, 150, 159, 166, 170, 229, 252, 261–263 Pan-Africanist, 30, 89–102, 150, 159, 199 Pan-African, 229, 233 Pan-Arab, 32, 34, 229, 245, 293, 297, 298, 313, 317, 318, 321, 323, 325 Peoples’ Committees, 197, 201 Philosophy of the Revolution, 33, 134, 255, 262, 270, 293–295, 317 Political administration, 45, 48, 49 Political economy, 22, 25, 39–51, 77, 82, 178, 332 Political leadership, 48, 67, 106, 108, 109, 139, 143, 155–166, 169, 170, 184, 262 Political parties, 227 Political power, 23, 24, 33, 41, 44, 47–49, 53–67, 158, 166, 253, 331 Political psychology, 222 human psychology, 222 Popular democracy, 227 Populism, 91, 102 Populist, 59, 82, 89–102, 114, 115, 135, 142, 144, 297, 299, 313, 330–332 Positive neutrality, 236, 239 Post-colonial, 125, 129, 159, 161, 163, 166 Postcolonialism, 41, 53–67 Praxes, 135 Pre colonial, 147, 149 President, 13, 14, 24, 28, 29, 32–36, 41, 45, 56–59, 70–73, 76, 78–80, 95–98, 105–118, 122–124, 127, 128, 131, 132, 137–139, 148, 156, 158, 198, 200, 228, 230, 231, 235–246, 259, 261, 265, 266, 269, 272, 274, 278, 279, 281, 282, 286, 294, 296, 299, 301–304, 308–310, 312, 313, 319, 320, 324–332 Probity, 29 Psychobiography, 221–224, 232–233 psychobiographers, 223 psychobiographical, 221, 223, 232, 233 psychobiographical analysis, 232 psychobiographies, 222–224 Psychological profile of a nation, 221 Psychosocial development psychosocial development theory, 223 Psychosocial theory of development, 222 Public administration, 40, 42, 44, 45, 47–50, 57 Public works projects, 130

339 R Rawlings, Jerry John, 8, 59, 90, 105, 133, 155 Reforestation, 97, 128, 129, 179 Regime, 6, 8, 11, 14–16, 21, 23, 24, 27, 30, 34, 41, 56, 64, 70, 73–81, 83, 84, 100, 105, 110, 122, 123, 136, 140–143, 145, 150, 151, 157–159, 161, 162, 164, 165, 191, 197–199, 201–204, 208, 210–214, 227–229, 235, 237, 238, 240, 246, 284, 286, 293–313, 318, 324–332 Responsibility to protect (R2P), 203, 217 Restoration of the Spirit, 255, 271 Revolution, 3, 5, 10, 48, 55, 59, 77, 91, 92, 97, 107, 114, 122, 124, 125, 128–131, 133, 134, 136–151, 157, 161, 163, 164, 182, 184, 196, 197, 200, 202, 214, 225, 226, 229, 251, 255, 259, 263, 266, 270, 273–275, 281, 284, 285, 293–313, 325, 328, 329, 331 Revolutionaries, 14, 15, 29, 55, 84, 89–102, 124, 135, 137–148, 150, 151, 155, 156, 158–163, 170, 172, 174, 176, 178, 181, 184, 185, 197, 202, 216, 226, 227, 229, 230, 236, 238, 245, 252, 254–264, 266, 267, 270, 296, 310, 328 Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), 226, 237, 239, 240, 259 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 272 S Sadat, Anwar, 228, 245, 246, 284, 312, 320–322, 325–327, 331, 332 Salafism, 202 Salem, Salah, 258, 272 Sankara, Thomas, 14, 21, 90, 121, 133, 155, 169 Sankarians, 135, 138 Sankarists, 98, 135, 138 Sanusiyya Order, xv Sayyid Muhammad Idris al -Sanusi, 196 Self-reliance, 55, 96, 148, 155, 162, 164, 166, 177, 179 Slave trade, 3, 5, 10, 12, 89 Social movement, 100, 253 Socialism, 32, 54, 55, 70, 76–78, 80, 93, 141, 145, 160, 162, 197, 201, 227, 235, 294–296, 317, 331 Islamic socialism, 227 Socio-economic development, 57 Sovereignty, 11, 13, 30, 32, 41, 45, 47, 48, 100, 111, 129, 131, 163, 172, 175–178, 186, 204

340 Soviet, 230, 231 Soviet behaviour, 230 Soviet Union, 230 Staff College, 226, 271, 272 Suez Canal, 100, 257, 259, 265, 272, 277, 279, 294, 301, 312, 317–319, 322 T Tawfik, 262 Third Universal Theory, 230 Third World, 45, 48–50, 56, 134, 182, 183, 239, 243, 244, 318 Tito, Father, 235–247, 279, 284 Transformational, 67, 71, 97, 99, 108, 116–118, 151, 155, 165, 166, 169, 174 Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), 213 Tripolitania, 193–197, 203 Tuareg, 192 U Ukashah, Tharwat, 272 Unification, 33, 93, 193, 227, 233, 235, 245, 251, 252, 260–264, 266, 267 United Kingdom of Libya, 196 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 130

Index United States (US), 106, 131, 150, 195, 207, 210–214, 240, 246, 265, 319, 332 Upper Volta, 95, 97, 121–123, 126, 127, 130, 140, 141, 148, 155, 157, 161, 163, 170, 173–176, 184 V Vaccine Commando, 130 Visionary, 102, 116, 118, 165, 263, 266 W Wahhabism, 200, 202 Warfalla, 194, 195, 202 Women’s rights, 121, 128–130, 166 World Health Organization (WHO), 130, 180 Y Young Egypt Party (YEP), 255 Yugoslavia, 235–239, 241–244, 246, 272, 279, 284, 318 Z Zionism, 230, 232 Zionist, 230