The Political Economy of Iran under the Qajars: Society, Politics, Economics and Foreign Relations 1796–1926 9780755611287, 9781848856721

Citation preview

To individuals and organizations that support a developed, democratic, just and independent Iran.

LIST OF TABLES

3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 4.1 4.2

4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13

Population Estimates Urban Population: Selected Cities Percentage of Shares of Urban, Rural and Nomadic Population in Total Population Growth Rates of Urban, Rural and Nomadic Population Transportation Condition, 1892 Estimates of Land Taxes, Agricultural Output and Gross National Product Partial List and Number of Looms and Workshops for Selected Industries and Selected Places in the Midand Late Nineteenth Century Partial List of Iranian Manufacturing Industries, 1850–1925 Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation and Its Composition Imported Capital Goods Russian Capital Investment in Iran as of 1914 British Capital Investment in Iran as of 1914 Companies, Trading Houses and Sarrafis Established at the End of the Nineteenth Century Expenditures on Private Commercial and Industrial Real Estates Composition of Government Revenues The Iranian Currency: Debasement and Depreciation Kran: Exchange Rate and Debasement, 1800–1914 Annual Average Exchange Rates and Parity

18 19 25 26 27 34

38 42 44 44 44 45 48 49 55 66 68 69

x

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

4.14 Price Changes in City of Tabriz 4.15 Wages 5.1 Revenue of Selected Provinces 5.2 Composition of Government Revenues 5.3 Government Revenues and Expenditures 5.4 Total Government Expenditures for Selected Years 5.5 Foreign Debt: Loans and Advances, 1892–1925 5.6 Consolidated Debts and Service Charges 6.1 Iranian Students Abroad, 1810/1–1930/1 6.2 Modern Elementary Schools and Enrolment, 1910–25 6.3 Literacy Rates for Selected Places in the 1920s 7.1 Iranian Exports 7.2 Custom Revenues, 1836–1926 7.3 Foreign Trade through Trebizond Route 7.4 Trade with Russia, 1830–1914 7.5 Composition of Foreign Trade: Percentage Distribution of Various Categories 7.6 Imperial Bank of Persia: Branches, Assets, Deposits and Value of Notes in Circulation 7.7 Domestic Consumption of Oil Products 7.8 Yearly Values and Percentage of Foreign Trade with Russia, 1901/01–1912/13 7.9 Percentage of Foreign Trade with Various Countries, 1900–24 7.10 Distribution of Foreign Trade in Iran; Selected Commodities, 1904 7.11 Annual Distribution of Consumption of Imports, 1904

70 74 84 85 88 90 93 94 114 117 121 151 152 153 154 155 162 165 175 176 177 178

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

(The Persian words in the glossary are translated to approximate their meaning and usage during the Qajar period.) ADALAT AMEL AMIR AMIRTOUMAN AMMIYOUN AMNIYEH ANDAROUN ANJOMAN ANSHAHRIKS AQA ARANSHAHRIKS ARBAB ARTAISHTAR ARZI ASHAIER ASHRAFI ASIAB ASNAD ATABAK

Justice Representative Local ruler Military rank, theoretically in charge of 10,000 men Literally, the commoners; Democrats in Ejtema´iyoun-e Ammiyoun (Social Democrats) Police Literally, ‘the inside’; the private quarters of a Persian house Society or circle Foreign slaves Literally, ‘Mister’; Sir; also initial part of a male person’s name Domestic slaves Landlord (an Iranian feudal hierarchy) Military personnel Related to land, territorial Transhumant pastoralists; tribs A gold coin Mill Documents A minister, also a member of the dynasty of Atabakan Athravan Priest

xii

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

AZALIS BABI BAHA´I

BARAT BARDEGI BARZIGAR BAST BIGLARBEGI BOLOUK BONEH BONIAD BOZORGAN CHAPAR CRORE CTISPHONE

DABIR DAFTAR DAFTARI DAHYU DAHYUPATIS DARBAR DAROUQEH DARVAZEH DASTOUR

The followers of Sobh-e Azal in the Babi Movement A follower of the socio-religious movement founded by the Bab A follower of Baha’ ol-Lah’s movement which became the dominant branch of the Babi Movement; also the Baha´i faith itself Bill of exchange Slavery Farmer, cultivator Seeking sanctuary usually in a holy place; also used as a form of social protest The post of the military chief of a city or region during the Qajar period A certain geographic jurisdiction in Iran Labour in agriculture; also plough-land Foundation The nobles or the elite Post service on horse Half a million The capital of Parthians and that of the Sassanids; currently located south of the modern city of Baghdad Government functionary, secretary Office Related to or a member of the governmental bureaucracy Province Chief of province Royal court Head of the police of a city or sometimes the mayor Gate to a city An order, also title of a religious-governmental official in the Sassanid period

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

DAULAT DAULATI DEHQAN

DIHGAN DIVANBEGI

DIVANI E`TEDALIYOUN ECBATANA EDAREH EJTEMA´IYOUN ELTEJA´ EMAM EMAMIYEH EQTA` ESLAH ESMA´ILIS

ESTE`MAR ESTIFA ETTEFAQ ETTEHAD FEDA`IS

XIII

Civil government Governmental Minor landowner in the Sassanid and early Islamic periods; in the Sassanid period; also Dihgan (see Dehqan) A government post in charge of execution of special orders and sometimes with judicial powers Related to or a member of governmental bureaucracy Social Moderates Capital of the Medes; near the modern city of Hamadan Bureau, office Socialists Taking someone under protection Leader; in Shi’ism, the just successor of the Prophet A branch of Shi’ism including the Twelvers and the Esma´ilis The act of giving land (with limited ownership) to a party by the ruler Reform A branch of Shi’ism believing in the existence of seven Emams as the just successors of the Prophet Colonialism The duties of mostaufi, a regional tax and financial officer Unity, often in idea Solidarity, often in action One who is willing to be martyred; title used by a group of the revolutionaries during the constitutional period

xiv

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

FARAMOUSHKHANEH

FARHANG FARMAN FATVA FOTOVVAT HAJI

HAKEM HAQQ HAUZEH HEZB HOKOUMAT HOQOUQ HOROUFI

HUITI IL

ILBEGI ILKHANI JAME`EH JANBAZ

JANGALI

Literally, ‘forgetten or forgetting lodge’; The name Miza Malkom Khan had given to the Freemason lodge he had established Culture A royal or governmental decree or order A decree given by a religious authority Generosity, manliness One who has made pilgrimage to Mecca; sometimes the initial part of a title or a person’s name; Hajj means Mecca Governor of a city or region The right of a person A small territory; Houzeh is also the name for religious schools A political party Rulership or governorship The rights of a person; plural of Haqq A member of the Horoufiyeh movement established during the reign of Tamerlane; a faction of Shi’ism believing in the esoteric interpretation of letters (horouf) of the Qu’ran Artisans and workers A confederacy of ashaier under an ilkhani (see below) or Khan (see below) usually along kin relations The second and sometimes first position in the leadership of an Il The position of leadership of an Il Society Literally, ‘sacrificer of soul or body’; a soldier belonging to a specific division in the early Qajar period A member of the Jangal (woods) anti-monarchist movement in the Caspian region, led by Mirza Kouchek Khan

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

JAZIYEH KADKHODA KALANTAR KARGAR KARKHANEH KETABCHEH KHAL’AT KHALESEH KHALIFEH KHAN

KHARAG KHARAJ KHARVAR KHASHTHRA KHASSEH KHAVAREJ

KHAZANEH KHORRAMDINS

KHOSHNESHIN KHOSOUSI KOBRA KOMITEH

XV

A poll tax on non-Muslims Head of a village Head of the police or the mayor of a city Worker Factory Notebook An honorary robe given to high-ranking government officials Property belonging to the royal family or government Caliph Lord; owner of land; leader of an II; also generally used as a title for military or civil officials Also Kharaj, land tax, tribute (see Kharag) A unit of weight equivalent to about 300 kilogrammes Nation Crown land A faction in the early history of Islam whose members were initially among the followers of Imam Ali during the battle of Seffin, but opposed him later and formed a separate group Treasury A group of Iranians mostly from Azerbaijan having Mazdakite-Zoroastrian beliefs which challenged the Arab rule. The movement gained momentum under Babak Khorramdin, its most influential leader Peasants who neither own land nor have any rights to any share of the produce Private Grand Committee

xvi

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

MAAREF MADAKHEL MADRASA MAJLES MAJMA` MAKHAREJ MAKHFI MAKTAB MALEK MALIYEH MARKAZ ` EH MASHRU MASHROUTEH MELLAT MELLI MELLIYAT MIRZA ` TADEL MO MOBASHER MODAVVAN MOHTASEB MOJAHED

MOJAZAT MOJTAHED MOLK MOLLA MOLOUK MONSHI MOQTA` MOSAVAT MOSTAUFI MOZARE`EH

Sciences, non-religious thinking Earnings, often through corrupt means Traditional and usually theological school Literally, ‘assembly’; the Iranian parliament A society or circle Finances, expenses; opposite of Madakhel Secretive; underground Traditional elementary school Landowner Financial, fiscal Centre Constitution based on Shar´ (Islamic law) Constitution based on Orf (common law) Nation National Nationality Prince, if it appears after first name; title of a learned man, if it appears before the first name Moderate Overseer (of land) Collected or arranged Police officer Holy warrior; title used by a group of revolutionaries during the Constitutional Revolution Punishment Highest-ranking Islamic clergy Property, land Low-ranking clergy Rulers Secretary Property (land) given to a party by ruler Equality Finance and tax officer Sharecropping

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

NA´EB NAZM NEZAM OKHOVVAT OLAMA OMMAT OMOUMI ORF PADESHAH PISHKESH QABCHOUR QANAT QANOUNGOZARI QANOUNNAMEH QAT’EH RA`IYAT

ROUHANIYAT RESALEH ROKN ROUZNAMEH SAHEB SARMAIEH SARRAF SARTIP SEIIED SENF SHABNAMEH SHAHI SHAMSI SHAR´

XVII

Lieutenant; second in charge Order Military, regime Fraternity Clergy; plural of alem Islamic nation Public Custom; common law as opposed to Islamic law King Gift Land and head taxes in the Ilkhanid period An irrigation system of connected underground wells Legislative Collection of legislation Property (land); a piece of land A category of landowner in Iranian type of feudalism who stood between a peasant and a serf Clerical establishment Treatise Pillar Newspaper Owner Capital Moneylender Brigadier Title used by those claiming descent from Prophet Mohammad Guild Leaflet distributed clandestinely A monetary unit in the Qajar period Solar (calendar) Islamic law

xviii

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

SHARIK SHAURA SHEIKH SHEIKHIYEH

SONNAT SOURSAT SOYORQAL TAHRIM TAJADDOD TAMADDON TAMKHA TAMLIK TANBAKOU TANZIMAT TARAQQI TAS´IR TAZIK TEJARAT TOJJAR TOLLAB TOUMAN TOUTOUN TOYOUL VA`EZ VALI VAQF VASTRIA

Partner Consultative assembly Literally, ‘elder’; a title used by some clergymen A movement within the Twelver Shi’ism founded by Sheikh Ahmad Ahsa`i, believing in the necessity of an intermediary between the believers and the Emams Traditions of Islam based on the speech and practice of Prophet Mohammad Food and other supplies taken by military; purveyance A property (land) given to a person by the king instead of salary Literally, ‘forbidding’; boycott Modernization, progress Civilization Dues on merchandise; capital levy, town levies To own Pipe tobacco Reforms, especially in the late Ottoman Turkey Progress To establish a price Also Tajik, a Persian Commerce Merchants Theology students A Qajar monetary unit A kind of tobacco used in water pipe Land grant for tax farming Preacher Governor of a city or region Religious endowment Peasant

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

VATAN VAZA`EF VEZARAT VIS VISPATIS VOKALA YASA ZALEM ZAMIN ZANTU ZANTUPATIS

XIX

Homeland Responsibilities Viziership; ministry Clan Chief of clan Representatives in the parliament; plural of vakil Mongolian code of conduct Oppressor Land Tribe Chief of tribe

NOTE ON IRANIAN CALENDAR YEAR AND TRANSLITERATION

The Iranian solar (Hejri-ye Shamsi) calendar year, which starts around 21 March, has been converted to the Gregorian calendar by adding 621 to the solar year. Thus, the Iranian year 1355, which corresponds to the period 21 March 1976 through 20 March 1977, is equated with 1976, and so on for other solar years. To simplify the system of transliteration used in this book, all consonants are used as in English, including CH and SH, except: KH close to the original Scottish pronunciation of the English word ‘loch’ Q close to the original French pronunciation of the English word ‘rendezvous’, but more guttural G as in ‘go’ H as in ‘house’ J as in ‘television’, as well as in ‘job’ Y as in ‘you’ Vowels have the following sounds: A AU E I O OU

as as as as as as

in in in in in in

‘father’ and as in ‘fat’ ‘boat’ ‘end’ ‘seed’ and as in ‘void’ ‘more’ ‘you’

No diacritical mark is used, with the exception of the ain ( `) and hamzeh (’) when they appear in the middle or the end of a word. Persian and other words of foreign origin are spelled in accordance with the Webster’s Third International Dictionary, Webster’s New Geographical Dictionary, or as they commonly appear in ordinary English usage. Keen-eyed readers will note random inconsistencies in the system, but such is the character of transliteration format and language.

PREFACE

This book offers a comprehensive view of the Iranian political economy during its initial transition from pseudo-feudalism to proto-capitalism between the 1800s and the 1920s. The study brings together a critical analysis of the developments in Iran’s social, economic, political, spatial and ideological institutions as well as international relations. Aside from their historical significance, a better understanding of the many changes that took place during this timeframe is critically important for a deeper comprehension of the contradictions in Iran today. This will enable me to formulate a more productive response to the challenges the nation faces for transition to a more harmonious and democratically developed future and normalization of relations with the international community, the West in particular. The study answers a key question here: why, despite extensive historical, human and natural resources, Iran has failed to develop economically, become a democracy, and establish a positive relationship with the outside world? I will endeavour to shed light on the reasons why an ‘Islamic Revolution’ could have happened in twenty-first-century Iran. Based on the findings in this study, it seems safe to assert that the primary causes were leadership failures and foreign interventions. Other contributing factors included the oppressive ruling elite, the alliance of the bazaar and the religious authorities, an obsolete political culture that encouraged ideological factionalism, a convoluted top-down nation-building process that discouraged unity and nationalism, and an intelligentsia that often prematurely politicized the nascent civil society. In particular, the study finds that, contrary to the conventionally held view, the economic productive forces in the studied period grew somewhat stronger. However, their increasing development towards productive capitalism was stopped by forces and factors that acted against progress. Thus, instead of making the transition from subsistence agriculture to manufacturing, the Iranian economy became entangled in foreign trade and

xxii

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

real estate. Failure of the nascent bourgeoisie to industrialize the economy re-empowered the unique Iranian feudalism, leading to the establishment of a dictatorship in place of traditional absolutism. A coalition of the dictators and foreign powers then repeatedly defeated the nationalist and democratic forces who were struggling for national development, independence and freedom. The conceptual framework of this book is informed by the political economy of transition, its epochal transition theory and dialectical method in particular. The conceptual framework, outlined in the concluding chapter, is both deduced from the study and was its guiding force behind research, argument and presentation. This inductive–deductive dialectics has helped avoid unfounded generalizations and obtuse empiricism. The primary sources of data and information for this study are the historical documents available in the British Public Record Office and the India Office in London. Documents available in Farsi in various collections privately held and available through public institutions in Iran have also been consulted. Secondary sources in English and Farsi have also been widely consulted, including the available translations of Russian documents on the period. This book is a product of many years of research, writings and rewritings. It began with my PhD dissertation at Cornell University in 1982, continued at Rutgers University where I teach, and was completed in 2009 at the University of Oxford where I spent a year as a Senior Associate Member of St Antony’s College. Throughout these years of labouring over the book, I have been advised, aided and supported by many, including my professors, colleagues, students, friends, and family. They are too many to name and most are too humble to require mention. Nevertheless, I am obliged to acknowledge a few who have contributed to the production of this book in diverse ways and enormously. To start with, I am grateful to Professor William W. Goldsmith of Cornell University whose shrewd advice and support made the research possible. I also appreciate the criticisms and suggestions of Professor Sidney Saltzman and Professor Tom C. Davis, both of Cornell. I thank the late Professor Charles Issawi of Princeton University who read parts of the original manuscript and offered encouragement and instructive criticisms. I also wish to acknowledge the most valuable and extensive assistance I have received from David Gladstone, Nebahat Tokatli, Pooya Alaedini all my PhD students, now teaching in universities in the United States, Turkey and Iran. Without their extensive contribution to this book, it would have still remained a dissertation thesis. David and Pooya, in particular, helped with

PREFACE

XXIII

additional research and several revisions of the original manuscript. Maryam Zarnani, another PhD student, helped with the updating of the bibliography. At Rutgers University, I was privileged to have the full support of the Vice President, Dr Raphael J. Caprio, who generously helped me with a grant that made additional research for the book possible. I was also fortunate to receive generous financial support from my friend Mr Marshall P. Cloyd, Chairman of the InterMarine Incorporated, which I used during my stay at Oxford University. Marshall and his great family has also been a most inspiring influence in my academic and professional life. At St Antony’s College, Oxford, I was fortunate to work with Dr Eugene Rogan, Director of the Middle East Centre, with whom I am now a friend. He and colleagues at the Centre, including Dr Homa Katouzian, were most hospitable and generous with comments and advice. I am also indebted to many reviewers of the book and to my editor at I.B.Tauris, Dr Lester Crook. He and Iradj Bagherzade, the chairman at I.B.Tauris, have been most generous with their time and have patiently laboured with me to produce the book. Finally, my profound gratitude goes to Dr Zahra Beheshti, my wife, and Roxana Amirahmadi, my daughter, without whose love, endurance, and encouragement this book could hardly have been completed. I am also grateful to my late parents and humble siblings in Iran who have given me years of sustained and unconditional support. Notwithstanding these collective efforts and friendships that have produced this book, I remain solely responsible for any errors and omissions, and I am looking forward to comments from the readers and reviewers of the book.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

History is a mirror of the past, a lesson for the present, and a light for the road to the future. A Persian proverb To better understand the contradictions of Iran today and respond to the challenge of its transition to a more harmonious and democratically developed country, it is imperative that changes in the Iranian political economy during its formative years (1800s–1920s) are comprehensively and critically re-examined. This study proposes to undertake such an investigation by bringing together, in one comprehensive book, a critical analysis of developments in Iran’s social, economic, political, spatial and ideological institutions as well as international relations. Although many publications exist on various aspects of Iranian society in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, none offers a similarly comprehensive and critical analysis of Iran’s political economy in the period. Using the concepts of epochal transition (see Chapter 9), the present study will not only help fill this gap but also assist in answering the key question of why an Islamic revolution could have happened in twenty-first-century Iran. The book will also help with a better understanding of two continuing challenges facing Iran today: democratic development and normalization of international relations. European travellers have often characterized nineteenth-century Iran as a backward and devastated nation whose peasantry and handicraftsmen were ruined by ‘regular’ rent and taxes and ‘irregular’ exactions.1 It is generally argued that the onerous oppression of Iranian producers was carried out by all

2

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

members of the ruling classes including the state officials, landlords, religious authorities, merchants and usurers. This study has no conflict with such an account except for three points. First, the travellers of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century had tended to compare Iran’s socioeconomic conditions with those of Europe at that time rather than with Iran’s own earlier socioeconomic conditions. This then had led them to the mistaken observation that Iran made no progress whatsoever during the whole of the nineteenth century. Second, these same travellers, looking at ‘things’ through quantitative lenses, had failed to recognize that the misery of the peasants and handicraftsmen towards the end of the nineteenth century was a completely new phenomenon and dissimilar to their oppression in the earlier years, which they knew through the travel accounts of earlier travellers in Iran. As will be shown in the succeeding chapters, the new process of pauperization was an aspect of the process of ‘primitive accumulation’ that reached a significant level between the years 1860 and 1880, and continued up to 1926 and after. Finally, these travelling Western observers failed to note the important role that foreign powers played in arresting Iran’s development by altering its (Adam Smithian) ‘natural’ progression from improvement in subsistence agriculture to expansion of internal commerce to advancement of indigenous industries. This study will demonstrate that nineteenth-century Iran, though yet underdeveloped and in many respects similar to the Iran of the preceding century, was nevertheless a new phenomenon only due to a relatively stable feudal state, the increasing intervention of the imperialist powers, and the struggles of the rising progressive forces against imperialism, absolutism and backwardness. However, the changes and developments between 1796 and 1926, the time span of this study, were neither uniformly distributed nor of the same nature. Indeed, the combined effect of the change-influencing forces was acceleration at one time period and retardation at another time period. It is, therefore, of prime importance that we carefully periodize the time span of this study into more or less distinguishable segments. Iran under the Qajars is often divided into four phases.2 The first phase (1796–1834) was a period of rapid recovery, extensive hoarding by the shah’s treasury and rapid growth of foreign trade. The second phase (1834–64) is distinguished by rapid and continuous growth in foreign trade, the introduction of cash crop plantations and the increasing imports of European manufactured goods. The economy was still growing. The third phase (1864–90) was the period of catastrophes and regress: muscarinic disease

INTRODUCTION

3

reduced silk production, a series of droughts and diseases plunged the country into disarray, and there followed a continuous devaluation of the national currency and inflation. Foreign trade was still growing, but with negative implications for the country. The fourth phase (1890–1926) witnessed Iran’s gradual incorporation into the world economy. This period was characterized by increasing trade deficits. In addition, the oil industry was established, as were many financial institutions and industrial enterprises. However, the end result of this period was an underdeveloped and dependent Iran. The above periodization is focused on developments in the economy and is based on available economic data that are not often plenty or reliable. Nevertheless, the periodization provides a useful chronological segmentation of economic developments under the Qajars. However, I believe that approaching the periodization from an economic point of view is not sufficiently comprehensive and analytical. It is the purpose of this study to show that it makes more sense to use the political–economy framework to periodize the Qajar rule in terms of the level of development of the productive forces, the corresponding social relations, the nature of imperialistic interventions, and class contradictions and struggles. This means that the Qajar reign may be variously periodized depending on the particular social sphere under investigation, a methodology that has been followed in this book. Yet, on the basis of the political–economy criteria, and from the perspective of the transition of the Iranian society from pseudo-feudalism to proto-capitalism (see Chapter 2), it is also possible, and even more appropriate, to categorize the social, political and economic developments of Iran since the 1800s into three distinct periods with overlapping boundaries. These are the simple capitalist cooperation period (1796–1880), which went hand in hand with the processes of primitive accumulation; the transitional capitalist manufacturing period (1881–1963) within which the years between 1881 and 1926 constituted the beginning phase; and the post-transitional machine-factory or modern industry period from 1963 to the present. The last period falls outside the scope of this book. Simple capitalist cooperation is the starting point of the transition from a pre-capitalist to a capitalist mode of production.3 It begins when a number of workers, who basically perform the same task, are brought together by an inspiring capitalist to ‘cooperatively’ produce a given product, often under one ceiling. This cooperation results in ‘scale economies’ but it is not geared towards enhancing division of labour or task specialization. The simple capitalist cooperation system is also a simple reproduction system in

4

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

which capital accumulation is yet a ‘primitive’ idea and the tasks involve minimum machinery and maximum hands, i.e. it is labour intensive rather than capital intensive. The period of manufacture is marked by a form of cooperation in which different specialized workers are employed so that each worker performs a certain set of operations, primarily by hands but also by the application of simple machineries.4 Manufacture can arise in two ways: when independent craftsmen who were previously involved in different crafts are brought together and made to work on specific tasks involved in a given product; and when a production that was previously undertaken by unspecialized workers is divided into a set of specialized tasks. In the period of manufacture, the specialized worker performs a single specialized task so that this limited manual skill is perfected to an extent that was previously impossible. The period of modern industry is marked by the introduction of machinery into the production process.5 In industry, the machine supersedes the workman (who handles a single tool) by a mechanism that utilizes multiple similar tools put in motion by a single motive power. The period of modern industry is characterized by specialized division of labour and thus signals a radical change in the mode of production. More importantly, in modern industry, a change in one segment of a given industry reverberates into its other operations, setting in motion a dynamic change not just in that same industry but in all related productive processes. Modern industry signals the arrival of the capitalist mode of production. These demarcations are based on the understanding that the central issue of the societal transition is the changes and developments in its economic sphere. This approach can be true but it can also lead to the economic reductionism as it has in the case of the Iranian transition studies focused on the Qajar period (see Chapter 2). The main source of error here is essentially ideological in nature but it is also methodological. Viewing ‘economics’ in purely quantitative terms, the transition studies on Iran have often neglected the qualitative changes. Yet, a quantitative regression of the economy may not correspond to its qualitative development even if the quality could look deformed and distorted. Writing within the political–economy tradition, some have argued that the Iranian political economy between 1796 and 1926 experienced a gradual ‘technical regress’ as a result of the destructive effect of the imperial powers and their native allies within the ruling elite. The consequences for the Iranian economy were a shift away from accumulation of industrial capital and towards investment in trade. Therefore, the process of primitive

INTRODUCTION

5

accumulation was ‘blocked’ and neither the ‘industrial bourgeoisie’ nor the working class could be created. It then logically follows that the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 cannot be characterized as a ‘bourgeois revolution’. Instead, the revolution ‘was a struggle by ‘‘subjects’’ and ‘‘servants’’ – including landlords, merchants, and others alike – to become not so much citizens ... as persons.6 This view, though essentially misguided, is internally consistent. Others writing within the same political–economy framework have made a similar argument except that they believe the consequence of the technical regression of the economy was the creation of a ‘merchant bourgeoisie’ that emerged out of the trading class. The group then proceeds to characterize the Constitutional Revolution as ‘bourgeois–democratic’.7 The inconsistency of this view is further demonstrated when we are told that the primitive accumulation in Iran essentially took place years after the first ‘bourgeois– democratic’ revolution of 1906. To avoid the inconsistency, a few propose a ‘dependent development’ scenario, but hard facts are difficult to come by for convincing support of the thesis. Iran became dependent but not developed in the transitional period. Although both of these ‘regression’ views argue that capitalism in Iran is essentially a foreign product, they differ somewhat as to how this came about. The first position has a mechanistic view of the impact of the imperialist forces on Iranian society in which the weaker Iran was slowly dominated and destroyed by the forces that operated outside it. According to this view, capitalism was imported to Iran. The second position, on the other hand, does not see the Iranian formation as a system existing outside the imperialist world economy but one that is incorporated into it as a ‘peripheral’ capitalist system. It is for this reason that it can characterize the Iranian Constitutional Revolution as ‘bourgeois–democratic’ without demonstrating the existence of capitalism in Iran. The methodological inconsistencies of the authors writing within the political–economy tradition pale in comparison to others who have refused to employ even a cursory analytical methodology, reducing their accounts of why Iran remained undeveloped to characteristic descriptions. Most mainstream Western historiographies of Iran’s development fall within this category. A good example of an Iranian author in this tradition is Ziba Kalam. In his otherwise useful book on Maa Chegouneh Maa Shodim (how we became what we are), he rejects the Marxian materialist dialectics, denies that Iran was ever a feudal society and relieves imperialism of a role in Iran’s underdevelopment. While offering no analytical alternative, he applies a

6

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

descriptive methodology to argue that the prime factors responsible for Iran’s backwardness were geographic dispersion of human settlements, tribal life style and despotic politics. A sound approach to the transition in Iran should correct these inconsistencies and methodological defects and then advance a theoretical framework that enables us to characterize, for example, the Constitutional Revolution as bourgeois–democratic without falling into the trap of the ‘merchant bourgeoisie’ or ‘dependent development’ theses. In particular, it must be demonstrated that, though Iranian society suffered a quantitative regress in some of its spheres of life as a consequence of the plundering activities of the internal feudal ruling classes and their imperialist allies, it nevertheless managed to advance a large section of its internal material and, particularly, human forces both quantitatively (at least in some spheres) and qualitatively (in many, if not all, spheres). Indeed, this book will demonstrate that from a pseudo-feudal society in the early nineteenth century, Iran developed into a dependent and backward proto-capitalist country by the mid-twentieth century. In particular, the study finds that the economic productive forces grew somewhat, rather than regressed, but their further development towards capitalism was arrested. By the time of the Constitutional Revolution, Iran had, to a large extent, left the period of the simple capitalist cooperation behind and entered the transitional period of capitalist manufacturing. This result was obtained because of the forward movement of the nationalist forces and, in part, the ‘progressive’ role of imperialism despite its disastrous and regressive impacts. Obstructionism of the absolutist feudal rulers was an additional impediment. Thus, by the end of the study period, the foundation of the proto-capitalist mode of production was enacted inside the feudal formation, next to the dominant pseudo-feudal mode of production. However, the transition from the subsistence agriculture to the capitalist manufacturing that had begun decades ago was retarded and the Iranian economy became entangled in foreign trade and real estate businesses instead of becoming industrialized. The end result was an underdeveloped and dependent Iran. Failure of the nascent bourgeoisie to industrialize the economy, in turn, re-empowered the unique Iranian feudalism, leading to the establishment of a dictatorship in place of absolutism by the end of the study period. Consequently, Iran failed to develop economically, become a democracy and establish a beneficial relationship with the outside world. The two arresting influences were thus the oppressive and corrupt feudal ruling classes and the intervention of foreign powers, the Russians and the

INTRODUCTION

7

British in particular. These forces made sure that every struggle of the indigenous progressive forces for socioeconomic development and democracy was blocked and defeated. Other contributing factors included a troubled history characterized by losing wars that has made Iran a victimized religious nation, an obsolete political culture that knew no ethics and encouraged intolerance and ideological factionalism, a convoluted top-down nationbuilding that discouraged unity and nationalism, and a middle class that often prematurely politicized the nascent civil society and failed to master the art of politics. The Iran of the transition period also suffered from a dominant and oppressive public sphere that recognized no right whatsoever for the private spheres of families and individuals. Given these conditions and culture, a coalition of despotic rulers, dependent merchants, traditional clergies and selfish foreign powers repeatedly defeated the nationalist and democratic forces who were struggling, as they are today, for national development, independence and freedom. Thus, from the perspective of this study, it was the combined practices of the internal and external forces, rather than any of the two in isolation, that led to Iran’s economic underdevelopment, foreign dependency and political dictatorship (as opposed to the traditional absolutism) by the end of the study period in 1926.

CHAPTER 2

PRE-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS

Persia ... has been subject to those developments and revolutions which alone manifest a historical condition. G.W.F. Hegel Generally speaking, those who have studied Iranian history have expressed two basic positions. One group has argued that this history is characterized by nothing but continuity. This is the position of most Western Iranologists, including Frye and Olmstead. Their explanations of Iranian history are organized along dynastic lines and demonstrate tremendous fascination for Persia’s glorious heritage – a heritage characterized by empire-building, wars and civilization in general. The second group has argued that both continuity and discontinuity characterize the history of Iran. However, this latter group is divided over the nature, extent, causes and consequences of the discontinuity. In particular, their views regarding the pre-capitalist modes of production including the one that immediately preceded capitalism in Iran divide them into various sub-groups. The first are the Soviet Iranologists (e.g. Pigoulevskaya, Petrashevsky and Ivanov) and many Iranian Marxists and radicals (e.g. Jazani, Saudagar, Mo´meni, Tabari, Shaian and Nomani) who characterize the pre-capitalist mode of production as communal, slavery and feudal in a linear historical development. This group, although aware of the specificities of feudalism in Iran, has basically been concerned with its general features following an essentially ‘economic-reductionist’ approach. They do not, therefore, draw a definitive line between Iranian feudalism and Western feudalism. While

PRE-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS

9

criticizing the theoretical framework of Soviet Iranologists and Iranian Marxists (as well as the other positions mentioned below), a recent study by Vali reaches similar conclusions that Iran’s pre-capitalist period was feudal.1 The second group characterizes pre-capitalist Iran as semi-feudal or semicolonial. This group includes the Maoists and is represented by Ricks and Benab, among others. The third group follows Wittfogel in characterizing pre-capitalist Iran as ‘Asiatic’ (the so-called hydraulic society). It underscores the significance of public work for water provision but denies the existence of slavery in Iran. This group also borrows from Weber, Durkheim, Parsons and other sociologists. Khanji and Ashraf represent this group. The fourth group is best represented by Lambton and Keddie, both of whom view feudalism as a political structure and not as an economic system. Both also make distinction between Iranian feudalism and Western European feudalism. Keddie represents those who are less insistent in making this distinction and who give a more dynamic view of pre-capitalist Iran. Lambton, on the other hand, has provided the most elaborate explanation of land ownership in Iran thus far. The fifth group denies that Iran was ever a feudal society. This group is best represented by Ziba Kalam. The position that views the immediate pre-capitalist Iran as ‘feudal’ is well established and dominates the literature. The present study also supports this position but maintains that the specificities of Iranian feudalism were more important than its generalities in understanding the dynamics of pre-capitalist Iran. Similarly, the study maintains that capitalism that emerged from the transition in Iran was also different from its classical European version. Thus, to distinguish the Iranian feudalism and capitalism from the classical European types of these political–economy systems, the study has used, though not consistently, the prefixes of ‘pseudo’ and ‘proto’ for Iranian feudalism and capitalism, respectively. In what follows the study will decipher the origins and evolution of Iranian pseudo-feudalism, including its supporters and detractors. For a more complete and historical understanding, the exposition will begin with the Safavid dynasty (1501–1722). This period is also selected for its significance for understanding Iran today: the Safavids established the first powerful Shi’a theocratic state in Iran and made, for the first time, Shi’ism an official state religion, a tradition that has ever since survived. The Safavids can indeed be considered not just a precursor to but a role model for the current Iranian theocracy called the Islamic Republic. The short survey should also help Iran watchers better understand the origin and evolution of the Iranian state and its theocratic dispositions in the modern times.

10

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Origins of the Modern State, Theocracy and Feudalism The Safavid dynasty, which derived its name from the leader of the fourteenth-century Safaviyeh Sufi order, Sheikh Safi ol-Din, was established in 1501 by Shah Esma´il, with Twelver Shi’ism as its official religion. Shi’ism had become the major ideology of popular uprisings throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, manifested mostly through madhistic extremist movements. The Safavids drew their support from a confederacy of extremist Shi’ite (and mostly Turkic) fighters called Qezelbash (Red Heads). Therefore, their victory represented the triumph of extremist Shi’ite beliefs, which ultimately gave way to the consolidation of orthodox Shi’ism in the country. With the granting of the status of official state religion to Shi’ism, the Safavid dynasty sharpened the caesaropapist features of the Iranian polity that would eventually be transformed into the later dualistic Qajar polity with an autonomous Shi’ite hierocracy.2 Under Safavid rule, Iran was once again politically united. This was due primarily to the widespread acceptance (sometimes by force) of Shi’ism and the creation of something like a one-party system.3 Yet Iran under the Safavids did not become a nation-state in the modern sense.4 The Safavid theocratic state represented a decaying feudalism whose survival depended on absolutist rule. However, the state’s tendency towards centralism was reversed several times by the Safavids and their successors as a result of contests among feudal lords or between them and the central government. In 1576, the first series of these struggles began, and it was not until 1587 that the country was again united under Shah Abbas I (called the Great), reckoned as one of the most powerful of the Safavid kings. This stable and progressive period was followed by a succession of inexperienced and badly trained princes whose lack of practical and military skills led to disintegration of Safavid power. It was Ashraf, an Afghan feudal ruler, who ultimately brought down the dynasty in 1722. Power over Iran fell back to the Afghans (themselves of the Iranian stock), Ottomans, Russians and Uzbeks striving to create an imperial state. A military man, Nader Shah, later the founder of the Afshar dynasty, rose to power in 1736. He regained the lost territories, united Iran and spent almost the entire period of his rule in feudalistic wars against neighbouring states including India. His death in 1747 was followed by a new wave of intra-dynastic wars that culminated in the victory of Karim Khan, the founder of the Zand dynasty and a reformer (1763). Another dramatic war over succession and a civil war followed Karim Khan’s death in 1779, ending

PRE-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS

11

in the final victory of Aqa Mohammad Khan in 1794, and the establishment of the Qajar dynasty. Between 1500 and 1800, a bureaucratic state apparatus came into existence. Besides a king, the country had a Supreme Majles (assembly) whose members included a prime minister and his deputy, a supreme judge, a treasurer general, the chiefs of the royal properties, and the commanders of the cavalry, artillery and musketeers. The general commander of the army was not a member of the Supreme Majles. Territorially, a hierarchy also governed the country, including governors (valis), provincial chiefs (biglarbegis) and local chiefs (maleks and khans). The religious organizations also had their own hierarchies and were intermingled with the state apparatus. The political leadership, which originally rested in the hands of chiefs of confederacies, was transferred to the state bureaucrats towards the end of the sixteenth century. With a change in the composition of the landholding classes, the pattern of land ownership also changed. Though all previous types of land ownership continued to exist, the amounts of soyorqal and molk were reduced in favour of yourt and toyoul (state land and crown land). This reflected a new policy of centralization. Yourt was a non-hereditary, conditional and essentially pastoral land right. Toyoul was of two kinds: those assigned to particular government offices as payment and those assigned to particular persons as a lifetime gift. The Toyoul system represented an attempt to return to the early eqta` system. By the eighteenth century, Toyoul was transformed into soyorqal. The peasants were either tenant farmers or ra`iyats who were connected to the sharecropping system (mozare`eh system).5 The land in their possession was hereditary. They paid land rent to their immediate overlords and mostly in kind. Only those near the cities paid in cash. Generally speaking, the peasants’ condition was intolerable.6 The foreign policy of the period can be summed up as war with neighbouring states and trade with Russia and, to a lesser extent, Western Europe. Wars between the Safavids and the Ottoman Empire were waged under the banner of the Shi’ite–Sunni struggle. At stake, however, were the Volga–Caspian trade route, agricultural territories and particularly the Iranian silk-growing areas.7 These wars covered at least five distinct periods: 1543–55, 1578, 1603–12, 1638 and 1743–6. Iran was mainly on the defensive, though in the third and the last period Iran initiated hostilities in an effort to regain territories. Alongside the English, Iran also fought a successful war against the Portuguese in 1622 after they seized the Iranian island of Hormoz in the

12

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Persian Gulf. Nader Shah for the obtainment of booty and the appeasement of his feudal lords aggressively waged the war against the people of India. It is estimated to have cost the Indians about 700 million rupees, including the two grand diamonds Kouh-e-Noor and Daria-ye Noor of the royal treasures.8 However, Czarist Russia did the same thing to Iran and took over the silkgrowing areas of the north in 1722–4. These areas were partially regained by Nader Shah in 1732. This marked the beginning of a series of interventions by Czarist Russia in Iran. The earlier wars against the Uzbeks were of an aggressive nature, but in the later years had turned basically defensive. While trade relations with Russia were well established at this time, trade relations with Western Europe remained insignificant. Because the Portuguese and Spaniards controlled the Persian Gulf, English merchants had to use the dangerous and costly Ottoman or Volga–Caspian trade routes. It was only after the Portuguese were defeated by the joint forces of Iran and England in 1622 that the English merchants, the East India Company in particular, began receiving trade concessions from Iran.9 During the whole of the seventeenth century, Britain remained second only to Holland in terms of the volume of its silk trade with Iran. Holland in 1670 exported 11,000– 13,000 toumans worth of raw silk from Iran. Silk trading was a monopoly of the king, and he decided that only Armenian, British and Dutch merchants could export it.10 Though raw silk remained the most important export of Iran,11 other items were also exported. These included different kinds of textiles, leather, carpets, tobacco, porcelain, and bows and sabres. Iran’s imports included textiles (English baize in particular), various luxury items such as metal products, window glass, sugar and paper. At this time, foreign imports did not yet destructively compete with domestic production, which was protected or enjoyed a large enough market. However domestic policies of the period were very complicated, erratic and mostly irresponsible. Only during the reign of Shah Abbas I (1587–1629) did Iran experience a measure of effective reform. He centralized his administration, formed a permanent army,12 solved the foreign policy crisis and repressed popular uprisings mercilessly. He then turned his attention to the productive forces. Taxes were reduced and in some cases abolished altogether. Trade and industry were given the full support of the administration; security on the roads was restored; new roads, bridges and irrigation networks were constructed and the old ones were repaired; and to solve the problem of labour shortages, a policy of forced migration was strictly enforced.13 As a consequence, the economy grew as industry and

PRE-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS

13

agriculture flourished. The economic momentum was later lost, and by the third quarter of the sixteenth century, Iran was again experiencing an overall economic decline. In this period, the guilds in the cities also made progress. Nevertheless, they were still subject to the same controlling factors as before. New regulations concerning taxes, whether paid in kind or cash, were constructive. The major products were textiles, carpets, pottery, leather, metal, paints, glass, paper, soap and porcelain. Besides individual artisan shops, there were state factories whose workers were paid a wage (usually assigned land revenue), gifts and food. The artisans working in these shops enjoyed many privileges, including insurance, leave and job security. The state had become increasingly like a modern capitalist state.14 The reforms had other consequences. They expanded commodity exchange, money relations, internal market and foreign trade. These developments in turn led the feudal lords to demand more money. Meanwhile, the reforms eroded the tax base of the feudal lords. In addition, a period of peace prevailed, which meant no booty (towards the end of the seventeenth century when wars began again, Iran was often the loser). There was only one source where the feudal lords could turn: taxes. Thus, from 1694, existing taxes were increased and new taxes were introduced. The question was no longer one of robbing the peasants of their surplus production, it increasingly became one of robbing them of their very subsistence.15 Of course, this could only be done through the use of violence.16 Mass migration followed and cultivated lands were deserted. The reinforcement of the bondage system could not solve the problem and, as a result, the income of feudal lords further decreased. Artisans were no better treated. Their taxes also increased, reversing their production trends and economic gains.17 In particular, trade and crafts industries declined and, with them, silk production and the silk trade. Insecurity along the trade routes made the trade situation even worse. Foreign trade came virtually to a standstill. Added to all of this was the forced labour and forced migration policy of the king. For instance, workers in a cannon factory and an iron foundry were all forced labourers.18 Only usury made great progress, ruining peasants and landlords alike. Ultimately, the feudal lords began expropriating each other and Nader Shah, in turn, expropriated many of them. The embryonic capitalist relations that were just beginning to develop were thus retarded. Political crisis, popular uprisings and the foreign invasion followed this. The rise of Nader Shah solved the political crisis but only temporarily. After loot India, he ordered a three-year tax exemption for all,

14

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

but later on reversed this policy and demanded the collection of unpaid taxes for the previous six years all at once (1743). The collection was made through pillage and torture. It is reported that 200,000–300,000 peasants had either been jailed and tortured or physically maimed.19 Yet, the treasury of the king was full of gold, silver, money and jewellery. By this time, Iran was approaching depopulation. The majority of the population had migrated, been killed in wars, taken as slaves, or else died of starvation. Cities were also destroyed, looted and depopulated. Esfahan, Shiraz, Qazvin, Yazd and Tabriz, the biggest cities in the country, lost twothirds of their inhabitants. Karim Khan tried to restore some vigour to the economy by reducing taxes, supporting crafts industries and improving irrigation networks and road systems. His reforms offered too little too late: the productive forces of Iran had been destroyed beyond repair. The repressive policies of the feudal kings did not go unchallenged. Particularly during the eighteenth century, Iran was the scene of numerous uprisings characterized by an anti-Shi’ite ideological orientation and peasant– artisan class composition. As early as 1523, the Qezelbash revolted, which led to the reforms in the army. There followed a series of rebellions by local lords in the 1520s and 1530s, sometimes supported by the masses (e.g. in Gilan, Kalhor and Estarabad). However, the revolt by the people of Berat was of a revolutionary nature, waged by the artisans, poor city dwellers and peasants of surrounding areas. The most serious of all these revolts was a series of uprisings by the people of Gilan defending their autonomy in the second half of the sixteenth century. The most important of these uprisings was led by Shirzad Maklavani in 1571 which went far beyond the question of regional autonomy and was supported by the peasants and the poor city dwellers. There followed the revolt of the people of Tabriz led by Pahlavan Yari in 1571. It was a struggle between the urban masses and the feudal–merchant coalition. The people of Gilan were once more in revolt between 1592 and 1593, followed by the uprisings of the Talesh and Lor people in 1593. In 1596, Seiyed Mobarak rebelled in Ardabil while independent local dynasties rebelled in Mazandaran. These revolts were put down with the utmost cruelty as, for example, when Shah Abbas I ordered the massacre of all members of the Jik of Gilan. The people of Gilan waged the most important revolt of the seventeenth century in 1629. The whole of Gilan had been transformed into crown land and now the people of Gilan and Talesh, united under the leadership of Qarib Shah-e Gilani, were fighting not only to regain their regional autonomy, but also to overthrow the exploitative order.20 The eighteenth century began with

PRE-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATIONS

15

the uprisings of the oppressed Armenians and Georgians in 1700. Then followed a series of revolts by the Tabrizis in 1709, Daqestanis in 1711, Kurds in 1715, Afghans in 1717, Lors in 1720 and Balouchis in 1721. By 1722, Iran had been invaded not only by Afghans (who were also of the Iranian stock) but also by Ottomans, Uzbeks and Russians; and the Armenians were once again in revolt. The struggle of the Iranians against the invaders lasted about a decade. Afterwards Iran again became the oppressor. The uprisings of the peoples of Khwarezm, Balkh and Shirvan (1740–3) were put down with the utmost cruelty. Between 1743 and 1747, Iran became the scene of numerous revolts and uprisings including those of the peasants of Fars, the Qajars, the Kurds, the Arabs, the Lors, the Bakhtiaris and the Balouchis, as well as the uprisings of the people of Khorasan, Kerman and Estarabad. There followed a series of feudal wars between 1747 and 1763, which ended with the victory of the Zands. The feudal wars between 1779 and 1796 ended with the victory of the Qajars who established the Qajar dynasty. All this indicates that feudalism in Iran acquired important specificities. Among these were the frequent breaks in the land tenure system and the changing composition of the landed aristocracy due mainly to frequent wars and nomadic invasions, the spread of Islam, the dominant position of the urban-residing landlords, the growth of military land holdings and the existence of huge tracts of communal land. Moreover, the importance of rent in kind, the absence of domain land and the importance of large-scale public works, particularly irrigation, all added to the uniqueness of Iranian feudalism. The development of cash crop agriculture, the non-autonomous development of cities and the rigid structure of guild corporations were equally specific to the Iranian system. Finally, factors contributing to the uniqueness of Iranian feudalism were the growth of a relatively closed commodity market, the increased participation of the landed nobility in commerce and city-based activities (the so-called absentee landlordism), the political alliance between the landlords, the merchants and the religious authorities, the despotic nature of the political superstructure, and the arbitrary form of government in the absence of law, private property and even a private domain. These specificities could not but affect the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Iran, making it also somewhat unique in terms of form and content as well as outcomes and consequences for the future of the nation. Indeed, and as the study will show, the Iranian pseudo-feudalism could not but lead to the Iranian protocapitalism.

CHAPTER 3

POPULATION, URBANIZATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

This chapter examines the ‘general conditions’ of Iran’s transition from feudalism to capitalist manufacturing in the period under review (1796– 1926): population, urbanization and infrastructure (limited here to transportation and communication). Population growth, increased rates of urbanization and adequate provision of infrastructure are all essential preconditions of the transition to capitalist manufacturing under ‘normal’ conditions (as in the case of the West European countries). Population growth, for example, is indicative of improved living standards wrought by industrialization – both in terms of medical and technological advances and in terms of higher productivity of agriculture. And a growing population represents an increase in labour power, or a potential increase of a country’s productive forces. Likewise, urbanization – or the rise of cities as places of residence and production – encourages innovation and tends to lower the costs of production and in this way provides a major impetus to the industrialization process. And with a rising share of a larger population living and working in urban areas, infrastructural improvements (transportation and communication in particular) take on added importance in the context of the transition to capitalist manufacturing. Iran only met these three essential preconditions of industrialization in a limited way. The country’s population grew, a larger share of the population was living in cities in 1926 than in 1796, and Iran’s rulers were partially successful in expanding the country’s transport and communication networks. However, the rates of change with respect to population, urbanization and

POPULATION, URBANIZATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

17

infrastructure were not sufficient to propel the country into auto-centred economic growth. Additionally, the changes in population, urbanization and infrastructure that did take place in Iran did not occur within the context of a normal industrialization process (as in England), but in the context of Russian and British intervention and Iran’s subordinate role in the capitalist world system of the nineteenth century. The result was an uneven and erratic development process that in many ways did not take advantage of these preconditions, leading rather to the country’s gradual underdevelopment.

Population Historically, and under normal conditions (as in England), the transition to capitalist manufacturing is accompanied by significant demographic shifts. In particular, rising birth rates and falling death rates result in an increase in both the rate of population growth and the size of the population. Demographers refer to this phenomenon as part of the demographic transition, a model of population change based on the experience of the European countries. According to the theory of demographic transition, a successfully developing country will pass through four stages of population growth and decline. In the first (or pre-industrial) stage, both birth rates and death rates are high. During this stage, population grows slowly, if at all. In the second (or manufacturing) stage, birth rates remain high while death rates begin to drop, largely due to increased food production and medical advances. The result is a fairly rapid increase in both the rate of growth and size of the population. In the third (or industrial) stage, population growth begins to level off as society becomes urbanized and as couples face increasing opportunity costs of raising children. During the fourth (or post-industrial) stage of the demographic transition, birth rates decline even further, eventually resulting in zero population growth or even population decline. In what follows attempts will be made to ascertain the degree to which Iran’s population dynamics in the period under study (1796–1926) correspond to the later phases of the first stage and the early phases of the second stage of the demographic transition. It is important to see if this condition had been met in Iran because if the country was in a transitional phase between feudalism and capitalist manufacture throughout the nineteenth century, then Iran should have experienced some population growth. Given the extremely scattered and unreliable nature of the estimates available on the population and its composition for the years 1796–1926, one must be very cautious in drawing any definitive conclusions about

— 800 — — 1,000 — 1,964 1,500 2,250 — 2,070 2,140 2,220 2,300 2,410

1800a 1812b 1838b 1858b 1867c 1869b 1884d 1888e 1891f 1894b 1900g 1905g 1910g 1915g 1921g — — — — 1,700 — 1,910 1,500 2,250 — 2,470h 2,561 2,650 2,745 2,847

6,000 5,000 6,000 5,000 4,400 5,000 7,654 6,000 9,000 7,500 9,860 10,210i 10,580j 10,960 11,420

Total — 16.00 — — 22.73 — 25.66 25.00 25.00 — 20.99 20.96 20.98 20.99 21.10

% Share Urban Population — — — — 38.64 — 49.39 50.00 50.00 — 53.96 53.96 53.97 53.97 53.97

% Share Rural Population — — — — 38.63 — 24.95 25.00 25.00 — 25.05 25.08 25.05 25.04 24.93

% Share Nomadic Population — 20.00 20.00 20.00 12.00 12.00 54.00 22.00 50.00 17.00 31.00 3.60 3.60 3.60 4.20

% Change of Total Population

Sources and Notes: aEstimated by Malcolm, History of Persia, 2, p. 372. See also Curzon, Persia, 2, p. 492. Gardane estimated a population of about 9 million in 1807. Commenting on this, Issawi, in Economic History, p. 25, wrote that this figure ‘is probably much too high, although it includes the transcaucasian provinces lost to Russia in 1813.’ bEstimated by Bemont, Les Villes de l’Iran. Rawlinson’s estimate for 1850, about 10 million, is undoubtedly too high. His estimate of 6 million for 1875 accounts for the famine of 1871–3. See Curzon, Persia, 2, p. 492. cEstimated by Thomson, ‘Report on Persia’, pp. 247–50, 255–8. dEstimated by Huotum-Schindler, ‘Persia’, p. 617. See also Curzon, Persia, 2, p. 493. eEstimated by Zolotarev, ‘The Area and Population of Persia’, p. 120. fCurzon, Persia, 2, p. 494. gEstimated by Bharier, ‘The Growth of Towns and Villages in Iran, 1900–1966’, p. 335. Chirol estimated 6.5 million for 1900 in his The Middle Eastern Question, p. 95. hThe figures for the rural population of 1900 and 1910 are calculated by deducting the population of cities and nomads from the total population given in Bharier, ‘The Growth of Towns’, pp. 335, 338. For the calculation of the rural and nomadic population for the years 1905, 1915 and 1921, I assumed that the ratios of the year 1900 hold for 1905 and the ratios of the year 1910 hold good for 1915 and 1921. iMaclean’s estimate of total population for the years 1903/1904 is 10 million, which is in accord with Bharier’s estimate of 10.21 million for 1905. See Maclean, ‘Report on the Conditions and Prospects of British Trade in Persia’, pp. 2–9. jBemont’s estimate for 1910 is 8 million. See his Les Villes, p. 65. For 1909, Medvedev estimated a population of 10 million, slightly lower than Bharier’s estimate of 10,510,000 for the same year. Medvedev’s estimates for the population of cities, villages and nomadic areas were 2.5, 5, and 2.5 million respectively. See Medvedev, Persiya, p. 390. Shuster put Iran’s total population in 1909 at 12 million. See his The Strangling of Persia. See also Issawi, Economic History, p. 33; Bharier, ‘The Growth of Towns’, p. 335; and Fateh, The Economic Position of Persia, p. 2.

— — — — 1,700 — 3,780 3,000 4,500 — 5,320h 5,509 5,710 5,915 6,163

Nomadic

Urban

Years

Rural

Population Estimates (1,000)

Table 3.1

19

POPULATION, URBANIZATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

demographic trends. The difficulty is magnified by the fact that the population of Iran during 1796–1926 was frequently subject to various cyclical influences, such as mass political killings, mass migration (to the neighbouring states), famine, disease and government oppression. This being the case – and since my concern is with the long term rather than the short term – some tendential and suggestive figures can still be established. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrate the general population trends of the 1796–1926 period in some detail. The population seems to have been steadily growing, save for the years between the 1840s and 1900 during which time changes in population growth rates were highly erratic, exhibiting periods of Table 3.2 Citiesa

Urban Population: Selected Cities 1867b

1900c

1913d

200,000 200,000 100,000 75,000 75,000 60,000 60,000 50,000 60,000 40,000 60,000 40,000 35,000 15,000

350,000 300,000 80,000 70,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000

135 82 67 7 88 100 100 67 200 60 140 122 17 17

75 50 20 7 33 17 17 0 17 0 50 38 43 0

312 173 33 — 25 67 67 67 150 60 20 39 33 17

591,000 1,070,000 1,180,000

81

10

100

Tehran 85,000 Tabriz 110,000 Esfahan 60,000 Mashhad 70,000 Yazd 40,000 Kerman 30,000 Kermanshah 30,000 Hamadan 30,000 Khoy 20,000 Qazvin 25,000 Shiraz 25,000 Rasht 18,000 Urumiya 30,000 Bushire 18,000 Overall Average Annual Growth Rates

—

—

—

% Change % Change % Change 1867–1900 1900–13 1867–1913

2.45

0.77

2.17

Sources and Notes: aCities of Nishapour, Shahroud, Mohammarah and Shustar were each reported having 10,000 inhabitants. bEstimated by Thomson, ‘Report on Persia’, pp. 247–50, 255–8. The total population of ‘the principal cities’ was put ‘at about 850,000 souls’. cEstimated by Bharier, ‘The Growth of Towns’, pp. 333– 4. dEstimated by Sobotsinskii, pp. 11–18. See also Issawi, The Economic History, p. 34.

20

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

decline and recovery.1 Overall, however, and even during the 1840–1900 period, the population increased. While most Iranologists agree that the population had been growing steadily during the 1796–1926 period,2 there is little agreement over the rate at which it grew. Curzon, Sobotsinskii and Bharier seem to accept Schindler’s figure of 0.75 per cent (compounded, average per annum) for the years between 1796 and 1913.3 Issawi’s figure for the same period is about 0.5 per cent (compounded), with a ‘higher’ rate for the second half of the period.4 According to Katouzian, however, average annual rates of growth had been about 1.6 per cent (or 0.96 per cent compounded) during the nineteenth century. He has argued that from 1800 to 1870 the ‘population remained stationary’ due to a ‘series of cholera outbreaks’.5 Using Table 3.1, one may calculate an overall population growth of about 128.4 per cent for the 1812– 1926 period, which gives an average annual growth rate of about 0.76 per cent (compounded). The average annual growth rate (compounded) for the first phase of capitalist manufacturing (1884–1926), about 1.09 per cent, shows a nearly 85 per cent increase over the average annual rate (compounded) of growth of the simple capitalist cooperation period (1812–1884), which was about 0.59 per cent.6 Therefore, the assertion that the population grew, rather than declined, during the 1796–1926 years and that the rate of growth was higher in the later years of the period tends to be acceptable. The question remains, however, to what specific factors we may attribute Iran’s population dynamics. In other words, we need to determine what factors were responsible for the country’s limited population growth and, by implication, what factors were chiefly responsible for Iran’s population not growing more rapidly during the nineteenth century than it actually did. The factors responsible for Iran’s increasing rate of population growth during the period in question are notable chiefly because of their impact on birth rates and death rates. Medical advances led to lower infant mortality rates and a decrease in premature deaths due to diseases. Increased agricultural production and an overall improvement in the country’s economic position likewise exerted a positive influence on the country’s population growth by reducing the incidence of chronic malnutrition and starvation deaths. One of the most important factors (in many ways responsible for the positive impact of all the others) was Iran’s political stability throughout much of the period under review. After 1826 (and apart from two wars with Russia), Iranian society was not subjected to any significant political or military convulsions. However, Iran’s population growth rate did not increase as rapidly as models of demographic change (which are based upon the European

POPULATION, URBANIZATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

21

experience) would predict. In addition to the factors responsible for the limited increase in the country’s population growth rate, there were numerous factors that prevented the population from growing more rapidly. Aside from the territorial losses to Russia (under the Treaties of Golestan, 1813, and Torkmanchai, 1828), which reduced Iran’s population by some 20 per cent, extermination in wars, the unfavourable position of women7 and the oppressive practices of government, there were three principal factors responsible for limiting Iran’s population growth rate during the 1796–1926 period: disease, famine and migration to neighbouring states. Disease and famine went hand in hand. As early as 1810, some provinces were experiencing famine,8 but it was only after the 1830s, i.e. after the preparatory phase of the simple capitalist cooperation period, that disease and famine took on a national character and became a fact of life in Iran. Writing in 1903, Chirol states that ‘hardly a year passes in which there is not a famine in some province of Persia’.9 Between 1835 and 1861, there were at least nine cholera outbreaks which, coupled with famine, continued to decimate the population and led to the first incidence of population decline between 1840 and 1868.10 After a short period of recovery, a second devastating epidemic and famine ravaged the country between 1871 and 1873. According to St John, ‘the actual deaths from disease and starvation exceeded half a million’,11 and a Persian source put the death toll at five crores (2.5 million).12 Shortly afterward, in 1876, the country was ravaged by a plague that took a tremendous toll in human lives.13 After a short interval, a less severe series of epidemics broke out in the 1884–8 period, causing a slight decline in the population. This was followed by a severe cholera epidemic and the famine of 1892 which, according to the French physician Tholozan, was both ‘severe’ and ‘widespread’, and which ‘killed 10,000 persons in Gilan’ province alone.14 No wonder that the population shows a decline in 1892–7. Outbreaks of famine and epidemics also continued during the period 1900–26. However, only the influenza epidemic and famine of 1917–18 were very serious and devastating. For example, Fars province lost half of its population and its largest city, Shiraz, lost over ‘10,000’ of its inhabitants.15 In Tehran, Balfour wrote that a ‘quarter of the agricultural population had died during the famine [of 1918]’.16 The famine was so severe that ‘people began eating the corpses of their dead children and the corpses of [other] dead’.17 If famine and disease were among the principal causes of population decline in some periods, what caused the famine and disease? Most authors

22

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

refer to ‘drought’, ‘lack of transport facilities’, ‘low productivity of agriculture’, ‘poor sanitary conditions’, lower birth rate, higher death rate and the like. Without denying the influence of these and other factors, the causes of the famine and the epidemics were the shift from subsistence to cash crop agriculture, intervention by the imperialist powers, black market practices by the ruling classes and their merchant allies, and extra-tax oppression and expropriation of the peasantry. Concerning the shift from subsistence to cash crop agriculture, the British consul at Bushehr (or Bushire as British then spelled it) had this to say: A few years ago the profits of the opium attracted the attention of the Persians, almost all available or suitable ground in Yazd, Esfahan, and elsewhere, was utilized for the cultivation of opium to the exclusion of cereals and other produce ... [this] combined with drought and other circumstances resulted in the famine of 1871–2.18 It should be noted that by ‘the Persians’ the author means state officials, landlords and big merchants, because, as we will see in the discussion of cash crops, peasants had neither the ability nor the will to shift to this farming. They did so only under duress. Concerning the second part of the proposition, namely the intervention of the imperialist forces, the best ‘demonstrative’ example is perhaps the famine of 1918 that followed the First World War, during which the British, Russian, German and Ottoman forces fought on Iranian soil – irrespective of Iranian neutrality. As a result, the few existing transport routes were disrupted and prices rose as the available supply of goods was bought up and accumulated by the foreign armies.19 Finally, concerning the third part of the proposition, namely the black marketeering of the ruling class, Shahri notes that during the famine of 1918–19, while the price of wheat had increased from a kharvar, four toumans, to 400 toumans and a 100 mans of barely from two toumans to 200 toumans, the owners and the speculators were not yet ready to sell.20 Another principal cause of population decline, particularly in the later years of the period under investigation, was migration of expropriated producers to the neighbouring states. As early as 1880 there were well over 100,000 Persian migrants in the Ottoman lands and 90,000 in Russia.21 In 1891 Curzon spoke of ‘thousands of acres of agricultural land lying idle’22 and in 1900 Gordon put the number of Persian migrants abroad at up to 1 million.23 Writing in the earlier years of the twentieth century, Abdullaev claimed that each year

POPULATION, URBANIZATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

23

hundreds of thousands of migrants in search of work were forced to go to other countries.24 It included ‘mass movement of Iranian poor to the southern part of Russia [as a result of which] in Transcaucasia, there was a constant Iranian population of some hundreds of thousands’.25 Aside from Russia and Ottoman Anatolia, there were mass movements of dispossessed peasants and poor to India (Karachi in particular), Herat and other cities of Afghanistan, Muscat, and ‘even the Zanzibar islands’.26 It is clear that these mass movements of population out of Iran could not but affect its population size. One cause of this mass migration of Iranians to neighbouring countries was the expropriation of the peasantry. Agriculture became increasingly commercialized in Qajar Iran as agricultural land passed from the state and toyoul-holders to the merchant classes and the olama. Traditional subsistence crops such as wheat and rice gave way to cash crops such as opium, indigo and tobacco – crops that provided a better return to the landowners residing in the urban areas. Increasing commercialization of agriculture in Qajar Iran went hand in hand with increasing indebtedness and an overall immiseration of the peasantry. Bankrupted peasants moved en masse to the urban areas, to the southern oil fields and to neighbouring countries. Another factor fuelling the exodus of Iranians to neighbouring states is directly related to the imperialist practices of Britain and Russia. In particular, Iran was forced to lower tariffs on the import of European manufactured goods. Iran’s incorporation into the capitalist world system on extremely adverse terms led to the inexorable decline of its handicraft sector which proved unable to compete with cheaper European imports. Bankrupted artisans and handicraft producers from the urban areas were thus forced into the urban underclasses or like many Iranian peasants were forced to seek work in neighbouring states, Russia in particular. The net effect of both positive and negative influences on Iran’s population growth rate was a steadily increasing population during the course of the nineteenth century. Yet even though the country experienced a net population gain, the increase was not sufficient for the country’s takeoff into auto-centred economic growth. In addition, Iran’s population did not increase uniformly in spatial terms, but some regions grew more rapidly than others, some grew at the expense of others (as a result of changes in trade routes, for example), and cities grew more rapidly than rural areas. Since urbanization is a crucial element of any development process, it is to this subject that the discussion now turns.

24

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Urbanization Historically the transition to capitalist manufacturing is accompanied by increasing levels of urbanization. The spatial concentration of productive forces (labour and capital) in urban areas allows for scale and agglomeration economies to take root, which in turn leads to lower production costs and higher levels of innovation output. In addition, the concentration of population in urban areas often means a different way of life for the steady stream of migrants from the rural areas. As the migrants become accustomed to the new industrial rhythms, productivity improves and economic growth accelerates. For most developed countries, urbanization and industrialization have gone hand in hand. In developing countries, however, urbanization has often taken place at a much faster rate than industrialization, leading to the formation of the so-called informal urban sector, high levels of urban unemployment and underemployment, and severe shortages of affordable housing for the incoming migrants. Urbanization is rooted in three distinct (and historical) processes. The first is directly related to the increases in agricultural productivity. As agricultural techniques improve, less labour is required to produce the same level of farm output. The resultant rural labour surplus provides a major impetus to ruralto-urban migration. A second factor contributing to the growth of the urban sector is, as mentioned above, the expropriation of peasant producers as agriculture becomes commercialized. Third, the natural increase of the urban population tends to grow at a rapid rate – at least during the initial stages of capitalist industrialization. Thus, one indication of Iran’s transition to capitalist manufacturing is an increase in the country’s urban population. And indeed, this does seem to be the case, as these three processes were present in Iran during the period under study. For the period before 1867, no reliable data are available regarding the distribution of total population among urban, rural and ashaieri27 areas, as opposed to the rate at which the population grew.28 Table 3.3 suggests a small decrease in the share of the urban population between 1867 and 1926, most likely due to famine, epidemics and mass external migration. The average annual rate of urbanization for the period was about 1.64 per cent (see Table 3.4). Most of this urban growth took place between 1867 and 1900, the period for which the decline in the share of urban population is also higher. The major urban centres (about 100 of them were counted in 1913)29 were also growing at a higher rate between 1867 and 1900 than between 1900 and 1913 (see Tables 3.2 and 3.5).

25

POPULATION, URBANIZATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Table 3.3 Percentage of Shares of Urban, Rural and Nomadic Population in Total Population

Urban Rural Nomadic Total

1876

1900

1913

1921

22.72 38.64 38.64

20.99 53.96 25.05

21.00 53.93 25.07

21.10 53.97 24.93

100

100

100

100

Source: Compiled from various sources including Bharier’s ‘The Growth of Towns’.

During this latter period, massive external migration took place. The huge increase in the share of rural population in the 1867–1900 period was compensated by a drastic decline in the share of the tribes (ils). The subsequent years experienced no major change in their respective shares. Both of these categories were growing (though at a decreasing rate) between 1867 and 1926, with the rural population growing at a higher rate than that of the ils (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4). If the data are to be trusted, it may be suggested that a rapid process of sedentarization of the ils took place during the 1867– 1926 period. However, given the limited extent of the present level of knowledge of nineteenth-century Iran, it is not possible to cite significant evidence in favour of this proposition, except to say that most sources indicate a steadily increasing tendency for sedentarization of the ils throughout the period. The process of the peasants’ expropriation accelerated in the second half of the nineteenth century, causing a constant flow of the peasant migrants into the surrounding towns. This phenomenon accounted for the higher rate of urbanization in the period between 1867 and 1900. However, because the industrial activities of the cities were not growing in the same proportion as the influx of the peasants from the rural areas, a lumpen class was created in the cities of Iran whose plight was the material basis for most of the struggles occurring in the urban centres between 1867 and 1900. Seeing that the cities in Iran did not offer better life prospects than their villages, the peasants began moving into the cities of the neighbouring states towards the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. The immediate consequence was a reduction in the level of urbanization between 1900 and 1926. Regardless of all these circumstances, ‘compared with most European countries in the pre-industrial period’, wrote Issawi, ‘Iran ... was rather highly urbanized’ though ‘no seaport attained a considerable size’.30

26

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Table 3.4

Growth Rates of Urban, Rural and Nomadic Population (%)

Areas

1867–1921 Overall Growth Rate

1867–1900 Average Annual Growth Rate

1900–21 Overall Growth Rate

Average Annual Growth Rate

Overall Growth Rate

Average Annual Growth Rate

141.00 262.53 67.47 159.55

1.64 2.41 0.96 1.78

107.00 212.94 45.29 124.10

1.36 2.14 0.69 1.51

16.43 15.85 15.26 15.82

0.28 0.27 0.26 0.27

Urban Rural Nomadic All Areas

Source: Calculated on the basis of Table 3.1.

Infrastructure Historically the transition to capitalist manufacturing is accompanied by increasing improvement of transportation and communication. Population growth, the monetization of the economy and the gradual extension of market forces throughout the national territory require an adequate infrastructural network to facilitate the increasing flows of information, commodities and investment capital. In Iran, the period between 1796 and 1926 witnessed some degree of improvement in transportation and communication, and evidence suggests that the roads were sufficiently secure for significant internal trade.31 However, further improvement – particularly of internal networks – was obstructed by the rivalry of the imperialist powers, as in the case of railway construction. There were, of course, geographic obstacles in the way of the development of transportation and communication as well: intractable mountain ranges, huge tracts of desert, short coastal lines, lack of navigable routes (except for a short distance along the Karoun River and Oroumiyeh Lake) and the huge distances that separated many provinces. Externally, before the 1830s, Iran was linked to Europe through the Persian Gulf (via Bushire), through Russian Transcaucasia (via the Caspian– Volga route) and through Constantinople (by way of the Black Sea). In the 1830s, the Tabriz–Trebizond trade route opened, effecting a significant shift in trade from the above-mentioned trade routes to this new one that was, in terms of cost, the most efficient at the time. Tabriz consequently became ‘the great emporia’ or the ‘entrepots’ of European trade.32 But the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 made the Persian Gulf trade route more cost efficient and the consequent shift in the trade route made, this time, Esfahan and Shiraz

27

POPULATION, URBANIZATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

the new ‘entrepots’ of European trade. The effective incorporation of Iran into world capitalism should also be dated from this time. Before effecting any serious changes in the internal transport networks of Iran, European colonialists (the terms ‘colonialist’ and ‘imperialist’ are used interchangeably) began incorporating the country as a whole into their world market by improving and extending their own transportation and communication networks across Iranian borders. The extension and improvement of the services of the newly operational steamships of Russia and Britain in the Caspian Sea (1861) and Persian Gulf (1862), respectively, along with the efforts of the two imperial powers to extend telegraph lines into Iran, opened the doors of Iran wide to the imperialist forces. By the 1880s, Iran was well equipped with telegraph lines, having 3,966 miles of line, 6,266 miles of wire and 84 stations. By 1913, the lines were increased to 6,000 miles and the wires to about 9,726 miles. During the First World War, the miles of line were increased by 18 per cent and the wires by 28 per cent.33 The incorporation of Iran into the world capitalist market through the extension of the imperialists’ steamer and telegraph lines was completed in 1884 – the beginning of the manufacturing period – after the extension of the Russian railway to the Caspian Sea coast. However, Britain was obstructed by its imperialist rivals and was unable to extend a railway line into southern Iran. Table 3.5 From Tehran to Tabriz Rasht Mashhad Esfahan Shiraz Bushire Yazd Kerman Bamadan Kermanshah

Transportation Condition, 1892 Distance in Miles

Day’s Journey by Post

Day’sa Journey by Caravan

350 200 558 245 530 700 412 640 200 330

4 3 8 4 8 13 8 12 3 5

17 10 24 12 27 37 21 32 9 14

Source and Note: Rabino, ‘Banking in Persia’, Journal of the Institute of Banking, 13 January 1892. aRelates to the transport of goods.

If the external incorporation of Iran into the world capitalist market was facilitated by the extension of the imperialist powers’ transport and

28

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

communication networks across Iranian borders, the internal development of the transport system was blocked, or postponed, by the rivalry of the same forces. These impediments to the development of a viable transportation and communication system took the form of ‘concessions’ and a series of joint ventures between the Iranian ruling class and the imperialist powers. The imperial powers would generally provide some of the funds and expertise required for the construction and operation of telegraph lines and railroads. In return, they would be granted an operating monopoly for the transport route or telegraph line in question. Generally, the Iranians would receive a percentage of the profits generated from ongoing operations, although in many cases the Iranian ‘share’ of profits amounted to very little – if anything at all. Clearly, the numerous concessions granted to the imperial powers contributed only slightly – if at all – to the industrial development of Iran. In many respects, the granting of concessions exercised a negative, detrimental influence on the country’s development, and at a great cost to the Iranian people. The first series of concessions Iran granted to Britain and Russia concerned transportation and communications, by which telegraph and railway lines were the first to be requested and concessioned out. The process began in 1863 when the British Indo-European Telegraph Department obtained a concession (these were called ‘conventions’) from Iran to construct the Khaneqein–Tehran–Bushire telegraph lines. Iran agreed ‘to assign the necessary funds for the construction and purchase of material’, which had to be ‘purchased from the English Government’. Britain controlled the lines, which were to be put ‘under the superintendence of an English engineer officer’. This was followed by another concession for the construction of a second line between Bushire and Khaniqin ‘to be used solely for international messages ... under the supervision of an English engineer officer and staff’.34 Two concessions were granted in 1868, one to Siemens (Indo-European Telegraph Company) for the construction of the Jolfa–Tabriz–Tehran telegraph lines and the second to the Indo-European Telegraph Department for the construction of the Gwadur–Jask–Bandar Abbas lines. This same department was also granted the last of this series of telegraph concessions in 1872. It was for the construction of three lines, one for ‘local traffic’ and two for ‘international traffic’. The lines were to remain ‘under the superintendence’ of the English government. The Persian government was to pay ‘10,000 toumans, in ten annual installments, toward the expenses’. There were specific ceilings put on the rates to be charged and the amount of receipts to be credited to the Persian Treasury. ‘The debt to England, on account of

POPULATION, URBANIZATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

29

materials and erection of the first and second wires, amounted in the end of 1869 to 47,217 [pounds sterling].’35 The conclusion of the 1872 concession signalled both the beginning of direct British intervention in Iran and Iran’s incorporation into the world market. Tehran was now connected to London, Bombay and tens of other large European capitals and industrial/commercial centres. Telegraph offices were established in many parts of Iran, staffed and controlled by British officials, making them ‘mini-legations’ with the British flag erected upon them.36 They also increased the chances of British military involvement in Iran: under the pretext of protecting the offices, the British turned them into small military garrisons. According to Avery, the British ‘penetrated into the country in a manner unprecedented for foreigners’; the system symbolized ‘very dramatically how Iran was being opened up to the outside world’.37 Moreover, as Ricks has remarked, ‘the new communication system increased possibilities for a centralized autocratic state’,38 one that was very much desired by Britain and Russia. Ironically, the same telegraph offices became sanctuaries for the political struggle against the autocratic and reactionary state. The Reuter Concession also included an absolute monopoly of railroads and tramways, as well as all future enterprises relating to roads, telegraphs and post offices. Although Reuter did not succeed in realizing his imperialistic scheme, the British government used the cancellation of the concession as a pretext for the exaction of more concessions from Iran, particularly after the 1880s. Moreover, the Russian government used the Reuter concession to further its interests in the country. A vivid example of this is the Falkenhagen Concession of 1874, which projected construction of a railway line between Jolfa and Tabriz, among other undertakings. However, the Russian government failed to provide the company with the necessary funds and the concession lapsed.39 Other concessions granted to Britain and Russia (and their citizens) between 1872 and 1890 included the 1881 concession to the Russian government for the exploitation of telegraph lines between Chikishlar and Estarabad; Russian control of the telegraph offices between Jolfa and Chikishlar; the 1886 concession to the Russian government for the exploitation of the Jolfa–Chikishlar telegraph line; the 1888 concession leading to the opening of Karoun River to navigation (to Britain); and various roads and tolls concessions from 1889 onwards. The story of railway construction in Iran provides a vivid example of how these and other concessions, along with inter-imperialist rivalry, inhibited the country’s development. Attempts by concession-hunters in the 1850s, the

30

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

1860s, 1872 (Reuter Concession), 1874 (Falkenhagen Concession), 1878 and 1888 ended in the construction of only six miles of railway between Tehran and Shah Abd ol-Azim by the Belgians in 1888. From this time on the rivalry between Russia and Britain over the construction of railways in Iran intensified, ending in the 1890 ‘sterilizing’ agreement between Russia and Iran which was ‘welcomed’ by British imperialism. The agreement dictated that ‘the Persian Government engages for the space of 10 years ... neither itself to construct a railway in Persian territory nor to permit nor grant a concession for the construction of railways to a company or other persons’.40 This ‘sterilizing’ agreement was renewed in 1900 and remained in effect until 1910. In 1911, Russia signed the Potsdam Agreement with Germany,41 according to which German imperialism agreed not to extend its railway construction schemes into Persia and abstain from asking for road and navigation concessions. In return, Russia agreed not to oppose the building of the Baghdad railway by the Germans. At the end of the period under study, no railway was built in Iran save for the Julfa–Uumiya and Zahidan–Nuskki short lines; these were built in the border areas by Russia and Britain, respectively, during the First World War – basically for their own use. By 1890 road construction had not made any headway. In 1892 no more than 80 miles per day could be travelled by post, and for caravan the figure was even less, i.e. 25 (see Table 3.5). Road construction, however, took a new turn in 1890. Between 1890 and 1910, the so-called ‘Paved Road Period,’ many roads were constructed by concessionaires,42 in particular the Russian Discount and Loan Bank in the north and the British Imperial Bank of Persia in the south. By 1926, the following major roads were in use, some of which could be used for ‘motor transportation’: Enzali–Rasht–Qazvin–Tehran, Ahvaz–Esfahan, Esfahan–Buroujerd, Qazvin–Hamadan–Baghdad, Tabriz– Jolfa, Tehran–Qom–Arak–Ahvaz, Bushire–Shiraz and Balouchestan–Mashhad. By 1912, while the speed of transport had slightly improved, the cost was not yet sufficiently low. According to Djazaeri: Basing oneself on average speed, it may be estimated that one could not make more than 30 kilometers in one day, and that transport costs ranged from 1 to 2 krans per ton-kilometer [.45 to 0.90 francs]. At that time (1912) in France, the speed of transport of merchandise varied from 35 to 40 kilometers an hour, and the cost was 0.20 to 0.30 francs.43 Attempts were also made to improve waterways. The Karoun River was opened in 1888 under pressure from Britain, for it ‘should result in an

POPULATION, URBANIZATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

31

enormously increased import into Persia of British and Anglo-Indian goods’.44 Meanwhile, improvements were made in the important ports of Bandar Abbas, Bushire, Khorramshahr, Enzali and Bandar-e Gaz. The Oroumiyeh Lake was also opened to navigation in 1914. In conclusion, it seems safe to assert that the conditions of transportation and communication between 1796 and 1926 had to some degree improved. The improvements were, however, essentially external rather than internal in orientation, as a result of which the internal movements of raw materials, commodities and services faced tremendous difficulties and costs. This imperialist-designed transportation and communication system became a major reason for the failure of the Iranians to create conditions for economic integration and to establish modern manufacturing. It also became a crucial factor in the development of a foreign trade and finance-oriented economy in the country.

CHAPTER 4

ECONOMIC FORCES AND TRANSFORMATIONS

This chapter details economic developments that took place during the period under investigation and the extent to which such changes transformed pseudo-feudalism into a new articulation of productive forces and production relations. It examines developments in various economic sectors and general economic conditions of the country. My conclusion is that despite many impeding forces, including the feudal state and imperialist forces, the productive forces made some progress by 1926, but these changes were distorted and deformed such that the country remained backward and became dependent on foreign markets. In particular, the failure of the emergent industrial bourgeoisie to develop Iran’s productive capacity and democratize the country’s politics resulted in the transfer of capital to investment in foreign trade and land and the establishment of dictatorship in place of absolutism. On the basis of their economic contents, the Qajar period may be divided into four phases. The first phase (1796–1834) was a period of rapid recovery, extensive hoarding by the shah’s treasury and rapid growth of foreign trade. The second phase (1835–64) is distinguished by rapid and continuous growth in foreign trade, the introduction of cash crop plantations and the increasing imports of European manufactured goods. The economy was still growing. The third phase (1865–90) was the period of catastrophes and regress: muscarinic disease reduced silk production, a series of droughts and diseases plunged the country into disarray and there followed a continuous devaluation of the national currency and inflation. Foreign trade was still

ECONOMIC FORCES AND TRANSFORMATIONS

33

growing, but with negative implications for the country. The fourth phase (1891–1926) has witnessed Iran’s gradual incorporation into the world economy. This period was characterized by increasing trade deficits. In addition, the oil industry was established, as were many financial institutions and industrial enterprises. However, the end result of the period was underdevelopment, dependency and dictatorship.

Changes in the Productive Forces ‘Productive forces’ here mean working people and their means of production broadly defined. People as productive forces have a quantitative and a qualitative dimension. The former includes the size and growth rate of the population, among other physical characteristics, whereas the latter refers to productivity, experience, skill, knowledge and the like. Therefore, to demonstrate that the productive forces of a particular society are developing is partly to show that its people are quantitatively and qualitatively making progress.1 I have already shown that the population of Iran and the overall level of its physical features (e.g. urbanization and infrastructure) were growing during the period under investigation. The development of other ‘non-economic’ characteristics of the people are described in the following chapters. The means of production includes, of course, the tools and the raw materials the producers use and the general material and the natural conditions that they face. To demonstrate that the productive forces of a particular society are developing is, at least in part, to show that the means of production are making progress. As was shown, conditions of transportation and communication and the level of urbanization, which are among the general material conditions of production, had been slowly improving. Regarding the natural conditions of production and the raw materials, such as land, sea, river, irrigation water, industrial water resources, forests, mines and fisheries, inter alia, Iran is neither rich nor poor. In general, improvements must have been effected in some of these areas. According to Issawi, in the second half of the nineteenth century, agricultural output increased considerably as indicated by greater export of agricultural produce despite population and consumption increases and, I may add, unbearable land taxes (see Table 4.1).2

34

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Table 4.1 Estimates of Land Taxes, Agricultural Output, and Gross National Product (10,000 Rials) a

Land tax Agricultural outputb Gross national productc

1800s

1836

1867

1886

1888–9

17,000 113,333 141,666

20,918 139,453 174,316

27,190 247,933 309,916

41,220 274,800 343,500

41,110 274,066 342,583

Source and Notes: Katouzian, The Political Economy of Iran, p. 44. aLand-tax figures have been calculated on the assumption that they constituted 85 per cent of public revenues (excluding customs). bAgricultural output has been calculated on the assumption of a 15 per cent weighted average rate of land tax. cGross National Product has been estimated on the assumption that the share of agriculture in total output was 80 per cent. The remaining 20 per cent represents the share of industry and services.

Changes in the mining sector were equally significant. As early as 1836, attempts were made to use the steam engine and skilled European workers in Iranian mines. However, these and many subsequent attempts by the Europeans failed to transform the sector. Meanwhile, attempts by the Iranians themselves were more successful. For example, the efforts of Tajer Arbab, a Persian entrepreneur, resulted in extensive mining operations employing hundreds of workers and involving a fairly extensive technical division of labour. In 1888, Abbott reported that 200 workers were employed in a turquoise mine in Nishapour in eastern Iran. By the mid-1920s, he wrote, ‘about sixty-five small, primitive mines of various types had been developed’ from which about 800,000 krans of royalty was collected by the government. Of this, 300,000 krans came from turquoise mines, and the rest from salt, copper, coal, lead, sulphur and alum mines. The total yearly production did not exceed 3 million krans.3 While quantitative change in mining remained insignificant, the sector’s organization was transformed into an incipient manufacturing type by 1910. Mining was also concessioned out to foreigners. In 1890, the British Imperial Bank of Persia established a company called the Persian Bank Mining Rights Corporation with a capital of 1 million pounds sterling. These rights included the monopoly of all state-owned iron, copper, lead, mercury, coal, petroleum, manganese, borax and asbestos mines.4 The company was dissolved in 1894 on the pretext of unprofitability due to prohibitive transport and energy costs. A Belgian company also shut down its operation in 1895 for similar reasons.

ECONOMIC FORCES AND TRANSFORMATIONS

35

Although the Qajar kings did not show any enthusiasm for public works, some measure of improvement was nevertheless effected in the country’s irrigation system. Evidence for this trend includes the construction of the Naseri Dam on the Karkheh River in Khouzestan province, the numerous Qanat repair works ordered by the reform-minded Prime Minister Amir Kabir in 1848–50,5 and the irrigation projects that were undertaken in some provinces, including the diversion of the Shah Pir River in Fars (c. 1845–8), which involved several thousand workers.6 Forests were also exploited, mainly by concessionaires, as were fisheries. In 1890, a Greek firm, Koussis and Theophilaktos, was granted a monopoly for the exploitation of the northern forests. By 1900, the company’s investment in lumbering was estimated at 500,000 rubles or more.7 After 1907, other foreign firms entered the lumber business. Forests were also farmed out to Persian entrepreneurs. The concessions, unsupervised by the state, led to a significant deforestation in many parts of the country, in the northern region in particular. As early as the 1840s, fisheries were farmed out to Persian businessmen, but because these were viewed as unclean by the clergy, they did not develop until the Armenians came into the picture in 1873. In that year, a ‘notorious’ Russian, Liazonov, received a concession for the northern fisheries at a rate of 41,000 toumans per annum. In subsequent years, the concession was several times renewed at a slowly rising rent. The total capital investment by Liazonov was about 10 million rubles and included a telephone system and an electric power station. The company employed about 2,000 people (including seasonal fishermen), the greater part of whom were Russians. Liazonov’s profits in 1913 were estimated at 510,000 rubles.8 It is important to note that mining, forestry and fisheries were parts of the export sector of the Iranian economy and the interest of the concessionaires in them was limited to the extent that there was a profitable market for their products in Europe. In the case of mining in particular, the Iranian market was not considered. This was because manufacturing industries had not developed in Iran, and as a result an internal market for mines did not exist. This outward-looking mining strategy, in turn, caused further underdevelopment of Iranian industries in subsequent years. While the domestic market remained limited, external markets for the products of the Iranian mines remained insufficient to develop further the sector because of higher transport costs inside Iran. The European manufacturers were able to get the comparable raw materials at a lower cost from their colonies elsewhere.

36

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Of other major developments in the means of production, transformation in tools used by the direct producers can be very revealing for indicating the extent and expanse of the transition from feudalism to a new production system. Given the paucity of data, information on tools used and the changes they underwent is only partially possible. To begin with, changes in agricultural production tools remained insignificant throughout the nineteenth century. However, this does not mean that the techniques of agricultural production also remained unchanged. There were, for example, improvements in fallowing, ploughing and weeding. The introduction of cash crops led to the development of new techniques for cultivation, maintenance, harvesting and storage in the agricultural sector. Changes of this kind must have been both numerous and substantial given the fact that production of cash crops was new to the Iranian peasantry, and that new techniques, if not new tools, had to be devised for the new production. The British consul at Bushire in southern Iran, writing in 1880, identified the main agricultural instruments in use as follows: the nail plough, ‘a machine consisting of sharp-edged discs, used for separating grain from husk’, the winnowing fork, sickle, sack, spade, two or three sieves, pannier and ropes. According to the author, ‘a supply of at least 50 krans worth of implements being required for each ‘‘gao’’ [the extent cultivated with one ox and requiring about 2009 pounds of grain seed] is furnished by and appertains to the ra`iyats’.9 To this list of agricultural instruments may be added harrows, draught and pack animals, canals, wells and quanats. Towards the end of the period, between 1910 and 1918 in particular, some agricultural machinery was introduced10 and, writing in 1926, Millispaugh, commenting on agriculture of Iran, stated that ‘American, British, and Russian agricultural machinery is being imported and successfully employed’.11 Thus, Iranian peasants produced raw materials for the world capitalist system using these relatively primitive tools, and that the imperialist market forces imposed cash-cropping on the peasantry without effecting any significant changes in the peasants’ instruments of production. What really mattered to the foreign buyers was the fact that the purchased commodities were the embodiment of surplus value, and that these commodities could be bought cheaply enough to guarantee a higher rate of profit.12 Indeed, as we shall shortly see, many of the changes that took place in the relations of production in agriculture occurred through the introduction of financial transactions – monetization – and only secondarily through changes in the productive forces in this sector. This economic policy of preserving the traditional forces was also followed by the imperialist forces in Iran

ECONOMIC FORCES AND TRANSFORMATIONS

37

until the 1950s. To grasp the depth of the tragedy resulting from unchanging productivity in agriculture, we must recall that this sector of the Iranian economy produced the highest share of GNP in the 1950s. The reduction in European exports caused by the Napoleonic Wars, however, led to a revival of Iranian industry, which once more began to supply domestic and foreign markets.13 As early as 1820, ‘a superintendent of iron works, two furnace men, a glass worker, two miners and a cloth manufacturer’, all from Britain, were employed in state-owned industries and a ‘steam engine was sent from England to Iran’.14 This was followed by improvements in the production of armaments in Tabriz where by the 1830s industries producing silk, cotton, textiles, soap, leather, porcelain and powder were established.15 Around the same time, Kashan had 8,000 silk looms and 14,000 brocade-producing plants,16 and Esfahan had over 1,000 silk workshops.17 These workshops, according to Abdullaev, were called ‘fabric’ or ‘Karkhanaa’, implying that they were large-scale and modern.18 Tables 4.8 and 4.9 list additional industries and productive instruments that were introduced in Iranian pseudo-feudal society during the 1848–1925 period. In terms of industrial products, a report from around 1870 is informative: The manufactures and produce of Persia are silk, brocades, carpets, manufactures of steel, sword blades, spearheads, gun barrels, glass, rose water, alter of roses, cotton cloths, some shawls, sheep skins dressed in a very superior manner, raw silks, some indigo and tobacco, rhubarb, irak, drugs of different sorts, dried fruits, cotton, mines of iron and copper, wool of the kirman sheep, in small quantities, wines, marble and some trifling articles; to which must be added Persian and Turkish coins, Venetian chequins, German crowns, and gold and silver in bars.19 To this list may be added velvets, taffetas, calicos and copperware. This list indicates the extent of the development of productive forces, the social division of labour and, as a consequence, market relations in Iran in the 1870s. The list also shows that not all the commodities were produced for the international market, although it is evident that the export sector was dominant. This fact is shown even more clearly in Table 4.2 where production of silk, cotton products, shawls and carpets, among the main manufactured export items of Iran, is shown to have experienced growth. Further, the producer-goods sector (e.g. steel manufacturing) was growing

545 woollen looms

2,200 shawl looms

1,800 silk workshops

1,000 shawl looms 700 woollen looms 1,000 carpet looms

2,000 cotton looms

1,300 cotton looms

Kerman

2,000 silk looms

300–350 silk looms

80 cotton workshops

800 cotton workshops

400 silk workshops

2. 200 of the 700 woollen looms belonged to the town of Nain 3. 352 of the 545 woollen looms belonged to surrounding villages 4. Kerman had 5,000 carpet looms in 1920

Data for the late nineteenth century seems doubtful, or else the case is an exception to the general rule 1. Silk workshops employed up to 9,000 people

In the early nineteenth century, the city had 1,250 silk workshops

12 silk workshops

2,000 cotton looms

Yazd

Silk workshops: 486 (during 1834–48) 240 (during 1848–80s)

200 silk looms

8 brocade-producing In the early nineteenth century the plants, 100 cotton city had 8,000 silk looms factories

Number of Workshops

Comments

200 silk looms

Number of Looms

Esfahan

14,000 brocadeproducing plants

Number of Workshops

Late Nineteenth Century

800 silk looms

Number of Looms

Mid-Nineteenth Century

Kashan

Selected Places

Table 4.2 Partial List and Number of Looms and Workshops for Selected Industries and Selected Places in the Mid- and Late Nineteenth Century

N/A

N/A

N/A

Qainat

Tabriz

3,000 carpet looms

2,000 carpet looms

2,000 carpet looms

5,000 carpet looms

204 silk looms

N/A

N/A

N/A

150 villages [workshops]

116 silk workshops

10,000 villages were involved in the industry

12,000 villagers were involved in the industry

10,000 villagers were involved in the industry

1. Four silk looms and 16 silk workshops belonged to the town of Nishapur 2. In 1908, the number of carpet looms is reported at 150 with a total workforce of 1,500

Sources: Compiled from various sources including Abbott, ‘Notes on the Trade, Manufacturers, and Production of Various Cities and Countries of Persia’; Abdullaev, Promyshlennost, pp. 58, 78, 87–98, 112–22, in Issawi, Economic History, pp. 267–8, 299, 302; Curzon, Persia, 1, pp. 52, 167, and 2, pp. 242–5; M. Sutudeh, Juqrafiya-ye Esfahan, pp. 93–104; ‘Tabriz’, Accounts and Papers, 1875, p. 75, and 1899, p. 101; Aubin, La Perse d’Aujourd hui; Maclean, ‘Report’, Accounts and Papers, 1904, p. 95; English, City and Village in Iran, p. 29; Adamiyat and Nateq, Afkar-e Ejtema´i, p. 270; and Issawi, Economic History, p. 303.

0

N/A

Kurdestan N/A

N/A

N/A

650 silk looms N/A 320 shawl looms

Sultanabad N/A

Mashhad

40

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

although it was certainly small relative to the size of the consumer-goods sector. However, the preceding quotation is misleading because it implies that the Iranian industries were advancing in the 1870s. In fact, Iranian crafts and industries were far more numerous in 1850 than in 1870, as is evident from Table 4.2 and Gobineau’s observation in the 1850s. After enumerating commodities produced through ‘large production’ in the past, and acknowledging the existence of ‘many branches of manufacture’, Gobineau observes that ‘today [1850s] all this is far from having survived, but nevertheless a little remains of everything’.20 It must also be noted that this evaluation of the condition of Iranian industry was made after extensive attempts by the reform-minded Prime Minister Amir Kabir to revive Iranian manufacturing production (see Table 4.3). However, these attempts or those made afterwards did not succeed in changing the situation to any significant degree. A writer in 1876 gives a number of examples of such attempts that failed. For example, he documents that large sums of money were lost in the attempt to establish rope and candle-making factories.21 Writing in 1877, another complained about the plight of Esfahan’s weavers stated that ‘at least one-tenth of the guilds in this city were weavers, of whom not even one-fifth have survived’.22 A similar view was expressed in the 1880s: ‘all the silk factories of Azerbaijan are, now for thirty years, closed and have become obsolete’.23 There was a more dramatic complaint in 1897: ‘In Fath Ali Shah’s time [1830s] Kashan alone had 14,000 brocade producing plants. But two years ago [1895] . . . only 8 workshops had remained.’24 These scattered pieces of information should give the reader some sense of the extent to which Iranian industries had developed (1800–34), struggled for survival (1835–65) and were subsequently (1865–80) and gradually, but systematically and selectively, destroyed. Silk, shawl and brocade production were the first to develop, followed by the cotton and woollen goods industries. They were also the first to be destroyed and almost in the same order as they developed. Yet the production of raw silk and particularly raw cotton continued to grow, until the first one was destroyed to a significant degree by the muscarine disease in the 1860s and the second one was partially destroyed by the extension of opium production after 1880.25 The decline of these industries in the 1850s coincided with the growth of the carpet industries, but carpet production made no significant progress until the 1890s.

ECONOMIC FORCES AND TRANSFORMATIONS

41

By the beginning of the twentieth century, carpet industries developed into ‘workshops of manufacturing type’ as evidenced by the ‘large carpetmaking enterprises in Tabriz’. It was not uncommon for such industries to employ up to 1,500 workers.26 Moreover, firms employing more than 100 workers were to be found in other carpet-making centres. Many of these enterprises were owned by foreign nationals.27 It is clear, then, why the carpet industry developed: it had a good market in Europe and North America and its market could easily be controlled by foreign agents. Furthermore, after the decline of the wool industry, there were many investment opportunities involving the use of raw wool. Europe did not need this raw wool nor could they weave carpet. Moreover, the skilled exweavers in the Iranian cities, after the decline of the aforementioned industries, were available cheaply in thousands.28 In Table 4.3, the list of manufacturing units is impressive despite the fact that it excludes the carpet-making industries, oil industries and ‘several other factories’. It is clear that considerable effort was directed towards the establishment of a manufacturing base. The rising bourgeoisie, though failing to industrialize the country, nevertheless was able to pass into the ‘stage of manufacturing’. This is evident from the modernity of the instruments employed, the large-scale character of the operations and the implied technical division of labour. In the absence of hard data, it is not possible to measure the value of the invested capital. Despite the extensive list of items in Table 4.3, the total investment as a proportion of total GNP for the whole period must have been small (see Table 4.4). In 1900, out of 300 million rials of gross domestic fixed capital formation (GDFCF), 39 per cent was invested in capital goods. Only 2 per cent of this amount included imported capital, i.e. modern machinery and equipment. By 1926, the change in total GDFCF was small. However, there was a drastic change in its composition: the share of capital goods had increased to 52 per cent, out of which imported capital goods accounted for 24 per cent. However, imports of capital goods as a percentage of the total value of imports remained small (see Table 4.5). Foreign investment in manufacturing industry was very negligible except in export industries (see Tables 4.6 and 4.7). In fact, investment in the manufacturing sector came essentially from the rising Iranian bourgeoisie. The feudal state, except for Amir Kabir’s period (1848–51), was not interested in this sector and its negligible investment went to military industries and lighting.

Table 4.3 Partial List of Iranian Manufacturing Industries, 1850–1925 [Excluding the carpet, oil, mining and fishery industries] Date of factory Information concerning kind, place and builders or owners construction 1848–51 1848–51 1848–51 1848–51 1848–51 1849 1850–1 1850s 1850s 1850s 1850s 1853 1860s 1860s 1861–2 1868–9 1870–1 1876 1887–8 1880–1900 1880–1900 1880–1900 1890s

1890–1

1891–2 1891–5 1894–5

Two sugar factories in Mazandaran by reforming Prime Minister Amir Kabir, produced refined granulated and lump sugar One calico-weaving factory in Tehran One four-storey spinning factory in Tehran: ‘implements and instruments were imported from Europe’. Adamiyat, Amir Kabir, pp. 218–26 One silk-weaving factory in Kashan One paper factory One pottery factory One rifle factory in Tehran, produced 1,000 rifles per month; by government One cut-crystal factory in Tehran; planned by Amir Kabir One cast-iron factory in Mazandaran; planned by Amir Kabir Two arsenals in Tehran and Esfahan; by government One textile factory; planned by Amir Kabir Two paper-making factories in Tehran and Esfahan; planned by Amir Kabir One spinning mill in Tehran, capital cost 950,000 rails, used steam engines One candle-making factory in Tehran, shut down due to unavailability of the raw materials One paper factory in Tehran One percussion-cap factory One glass factory in Tehran; ‘Later had to close down for lack of the necessary materials’. Jamalzadeh, Ganj-e Shaigan, p. 93. It was managed by a ‘foreigner’ One gas-lighting factory in Tehran, at a cost of 30,000 Pounds Sterling; by Amin ol-Zarb; taken over by Belgians; closed because of unavailability of coal One rope factory One glass factory in Tehran; by Amin ol-Zarb One linen-weaving factory in Esfahan; made uniforms for troops One silk-reeling factory near Rasht; by Russians One gunpowder factory, C80 used steam engines; by government Two porcelain factories in Tehran and Tabriz; by Amin ol-Zarb and Haji Reza, respectively. The latter ‘had to close down because of Russian intrigues’. Jamalzadeh, Ganj-e Shaigan, pp. 93–4 One match factory near Tehran, capital cost 20,000 Pounds Sterling (1 million krans), ‘under the auspices of a Russian Company’. It shut down because of the foreign ‘competition’. Jamalzadeh, Ganj-e Shaigan, p. 94 One glass factory in Tehran; by Belgians. Had to close down because of ‘the difficulty of finding the raw material’. Lorini, La Persia Economica, pp. 159–60 One gas-lighting factory in Tehran; by Belgians One spinning mill in Tehran; by Sani ol-Dowlah; used ‘expensive machinery.’ It ‘could not compete with cheaper foreign goods and closed down.’ Jamalzadeh, Ganj-e Shaigan, pp. 94–5

1895 1895–6

1900 1900s

1900s 1900s

1900s 1900s 1900–25 1900–25 1900–25 1900–25 1900–25 1902–3 1907–8

1908–9 1910 1910 1912 1912–13 1913–14 1914–18 1915 1924 1900–24

One ‘modern’ olive factory in northen Iran; by a Greek concessionaire One sugar factory in Kahrizak; by Belgians. But ‘high costs of raw materials and unexpected expenses forced it to suspend operations in 1317 [1899/ 1900]. Jamalzadeh, Ganj-e Shaigan, p. 94 One cloak factory; by M.S. Tabatabaii One silk-reeling factory in Gilan; by Amin ol-Zarb; equipped with machinery from France; shut down in 1916, after the owner went bankrupt under heavy borrowing from the Discount and Loan Bank of Russia. Investment equalled 3,000,000 rials Two electric power plants in Rasht and Tabriz; the latter one by Amir Touman One brick-making plant near Tehran; by Amin ol-Zarb; shut down in 1916 after Amin ol-Zarb had gone bankrupt under heavy borrowing from the Discount and Loan Bank of Russia One calico-weaving plant near Tehran One small electric plant in Tehran; by government One cotton textile plant One saw-mill plant One knitting factory Two match factories A number of large-scale brick-making, rail-manufacturing and paper-product factories; henna and opium workshops One electric power plant in Mashhad; cost of capital 80,000 rials; by Haji Milani (Rizaiov) One electric power plant in Tehran; by Amin ol-Zarb; shut down in 1916 after the owner went bankrupt under heavy borrowing from the Discount and Loan Bank of Russia One spinning mill in Tabriz; by Haji Rahim One toilet soap-making plant in Tehran; by Rabizadehja concessionaire One brewery in Tehran Two cotton ginneries in Barfrush and Sari; by Russians One spinning mill; by Germans One brick-making plant in Urumiaya, ‘fitted with a steam mill’; installed by Germans. Jamalzadeh, Ganj-e Shaigan, p. 96 One sugar factory in Mazandaran One brewery in Tehran One arsenal in Tehran; ‘large-scale and modern’ Several other factories. Jamalzadeh, Ganj-e Shaigan, p. 96

Sources: Compiled from various sources including: Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 47–8, 211, 261, 276, 293, 305–10; Abdullaev, Promyshlennost, pp. 125–60; Jamalzadeh, Ganj-e Shaigan, pp. 45, 93– 6; Polak, Persien, 2, pp. 163–90; ‘Notes on Olive Cultivation’, Accounts and Papers, 1897, p. 88; Lorini, La Persia, pp. 159–63; Bharier, Economic Development, p. 171; Shahri, Tehran-e Qadim, p. 117; Adamiyat, Amir Kabir, pp. 218–26; Ministry of Labour, Statistical Survey of Major Industrial Plants of Iran, 1947.

Table 4.4 Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation (GDFCF) (Billion Rials) and its Composition (Percentage) GDFCF Year

1900 1900–10a 1911–20 1921b

Composition

Current Constant Current Imported Domestic Housing Other building Capital (Factor Capital (Market (1965 goods goods cost) Prices) prices) 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4

— 5.3 6.3 7.5

— 0.3 0.4 0.4

2 6 17 24

37 35 32 28

47 44 38 32

14 14 13 17

Sources and Notes: aRow’s total is 99; it should be 100. bRow’s total is 101; should be 100. Compiled from various sources, mainly from Bharier, Economic Development, pp. 50, 54.

Table 4.5 Year 1900–27

Imported Capital Goods (Million Rials) Value

% of total imports

442

3

Source: Bharier, Economic Development, p. 107.

Table 4.6

Russian Capital Investment in Iran as of 1914 (Rubles)a

Telegraph Banque d’Escompte, Share Capital Enzeli Road Company Enzeli Port Company Qarajadaq Mines Leanozoy Fisheries Julfa-Tabriz-Qazvin Road Company Petroleum Transport, Enzeli-Tehran Julfa-Tabriz-Qazvin Railway Company, Share Capital Debentures Shares of Belgian Railways Held by Russians (50 per cent) Forestry (Greek Company with Russian Capital) Shipping Companies, Trading Firms Total

1,000,000 11,800,000 10,000,000 1,300,000 500,000 10,000,000 4,600,000 100,000 4,690,000 14,260,000 2,000,000 500,000 20,000,000 71,250,000b

Source and Notes: Litten, Persien, pp. 102–9, 185–90. a‘Rough estimates’. bIn addition, about 92.5 million rubles was transferred to Iran as loans, mortgages and consolidated debt. The figures also exclude all Russian military expenditures in Iran.

45

ECONOMIC FORCES AND TRANSFORMATIONS

Table 4.7

British Capital Investment in Iran as of 1914 (Pounds Sterling)a

Indo-European Telegraph Department Indo-European Telegraph Company (with total capital of 3,000,000 pounds sterling) Imperial Bank of Persia, Share Capital Persian Transport Co. (Lynch Brothers) Anglo-Persian Oil Co. Persian Railways Syndicate Ziegler & Co. Oriental Carpet Manufacturers Ltd. Shipping Lines and Trading Firms Total

275,000 50,000 1,000,000 100,000 2,747,905 3,000,000 200,000 200,000 400,000 7,972,905b

Sources and Notes: Litten, Persien, pp. 102–9, 185–90. a‘Rough estimates’. b‘In addition, 1,704,281 pounds sterling was transferred to Persia as ‘loans’ and ‘advances’. The figures also exclude British military expenditures in Iran.

It is also of interest that the rising Iranian bourgeoisie invested in importsubstitution and, to some extent, in the basic industries. It was, I propose, this domestic orientation of the nascent Iranian bourgeoisie, rather than the struggle against imperialism, that gave it a national character and transformed it into a ‘national’ bourgeoisie (see Chapter 7). Surprisingly enough, in the period from the 1920s to the 1960s, the Iranian bourgeoisie followed the same policy of import-substitution, this time not in opposition to imperialism but through its generous help.29 Another observation to be made from Table 4.3 is the concentration of investment in Tehran. The rapid urbanization of Tehran was basically due to this tendency (see Table 3.2). This policy was both inevitable and necessary: inevitable because of the backward character of transportation and communication and the small size of the investments, and necessary because of the economies associated with localization and its progressive effect on urbanization. Surprisingly enough, this same policy was also carried out in the post-1926 period, but its excessive character soon diminished any agglomeration economies and progressive effects. The most important observation to be made from Table 4.3 is the fact that the struggle for import-substitution industrialization and the development of basic industries failed to a large extent. Over and against this, it can be seen that the state-run industries and most of the large-scale export industries (controlled mainly by foreigners) succeeded. Why then did the national bourgeoisie fail to maintain its investments in manufacturing?

46

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

The major reason for the failure of the national bourgeoisie to firmly establish itself was competition from foreign powers. Dumping practices do not seem to have been a critical tactic of imperialists. In fact, they did not need to practice dumping in a society where it had either destroyed the supply side of the economy or created all necessary conditions for the stagnation of the supply side. Policies of colonial forces concerning transportation, communication and mining discussed above and in Chapter 3 are examples of these practices. Moreover, the imperialist trades of the nineteenth century did not stand in contradiction to the export sectors of the less-developed societies. Quite the reverse, they were complimentary to those sectors. Foreign producers or traders, therefore, did not need to compete against the society as a whole but with a definite part of it, namely the import-substitution sectors. This made the competitive struggle much easier. There were, of course, other means available to the colonial powers that they could use against indigenous manufacturers. One was the export of inferior goods that could be sold at a cheaper price without any loss.30 This was a different dumping practice for it did not reduce the price but the quality, and as the quality of Iranian products was higher, costs of production were higher and, thus, their prices were also higher. In the presence of an extremely favourable customs tariff imposed by foreigners through wars, treaties and various loan concessions, and in the absence of any protective measures,31 there was no need for dumping practice of any kind. Instead of dumping or any other market practice, imperialism essentially used the feudal state to undermine Iranian producers, who had to cope with excessive taxation and arbitrary expropriation and confiscation.32 Besides foreign competition, there were numerous other factors contributing to the failure of the indigenous bourgeoisie. These included the general insecurity and poverty of the population, lack of development of a national market, scarcity of capital, high interest rates, lack of development of a credit system, the high profitability of agriculture and, as a result, the diversion of investment from manufacturing to agriculture. However, the two major causes of the failure of the Iranian national bourgeoisie were the unavailability or high cost of raw materials and the lack of a transportation and communication network necessary for a manufacturing transformation of the economy. The two causes were interrelated and both had their roots in the policies of imperialism as explained previously. As population, instruments of production and factories are part of the productive forces, so are the institutions of commerce. Moreover, the development of an industrial bourgeoisie is inconceivable in the absence of a

ECONOMIC FORCES AND TRANSFORMATIONS

47

merchant bourgeoisie and vice versa. Therefore, it is not surprising that parallel to the development of manufacturing, the rising bourgeoisie also made serious efforts to organize the new institutions of commerce in order to facilitate the circulation of both money and commodity capital. The merchant class is at least as old as written history. But a faction of Iranian merchants, in about 1880, became a different phenomenon than they had been: they became bourgeois. How this came about is the subject of the next section. At this point, I shall briefly explain what they accomplished. According to Abdullaev: The 1880s saw the appearance of the first national, united, merchant capital investments, engaged in large-scale internal and foreign trade. In this period the first attempts were made by the nascent national bourgeoisie to restrict the dominance of foreign capital in Iran.33 These attempts resulted in the formation of a number of companies, trading houses and sarrafis (the first form of banking), and similar institutions (see Table 4.8). By 1906, according to Habl ol-Matin, ‘10 to 12 big companies and trade channels had been founded in the various Iranian cities.’34 Moreover, besides these large-scale commercial banking institutions, there were numerous other smaller institutions. Curzon put the number of Mashhad’s sarrafs (private bankers and usurers) at 114 with a capital of 931,000 toumans.35 These developments further increased the specialization among traders and moneylenders, expanded the existing social division of labour and helped form a national market.36 However, the difficulties created by the pseudo-feudal institutions combined with the practices and the power of the imperialists, prevented the gradual development of these institutions and the formation of the national market, just as they had prevented manufacturing from developing. For example, Amin ol-Zarb, with a fortune of some 25 million toumans, went bankrupt in 1908 ‘under the extortionate pressure of the Shah, who consistently demanded large sums from him’, and the Discount and Loan Bank of Russia to whom he owed about 5 million rubles at the time of bankruptcy.37 The Iranian big sarrafs fared no better. This faction of the rising bourgeoisie, which even organized syndicates to counter the British Imperial Bank, succumbed to the power of this bank and the Discount and Loan Bank. The Imperial Bank and the Discount and Loan Bank constituted the main and fundamental obstacles in the sarrafs’ path. In addition, the struggle

48

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Table 4.8 Companies, Trading Houses, and Sarrafis Established at the End of the Nineteenth Century Year estimated

Name

1882 1886 1889 1890 1892 1896 1897 1898 1898 1900 ? ?

Amini Company Commercial Company of Iran Omumi Company Jahanian Trading House Mansuri Company Fars Company Ettehad Company Mas‘odi Company Islami Company Toumanian Trading House Jamshidian Trading House Sarrafs’ Syndicate

1912

Sharq Company

Capital (10,000 Rials)

Comments

— 350 1,000 — — — — — 150 — — — —

— — in Tehran

— in Yazd in Shiraz survived for 15 years in Esfahan

in Tehran: ‘to counteract the British Imperial Bank’ in Tehran

Sources: Abdullaev, Promyshlennost, pp. 32–42; Glukhoded, Problemy, p. 41. See Issawi, Economic History, pp. 44–8, 303.

between Britain and Russia for domination of the financial system of Iran had adverse effects on government finance and exchange rates, which in turn destroyed the sarrafs.38 Meanwhile, a fraction of the merchant bourgeoisie, due to its historic alliance with the landlords, made large investments in cash crops, raw materials and real estate. ‘Like other trading enterprises’, wrote Abdullaev, ‘Jamshidian also invested a certain amount of capital in agriculture, and bought large plots of land’. Similarly, Amin ol-Zarb also invested in real estate not only in Iran but also in Russia and elsewhere.39 After the failure of the merchant bourgeoisie, the process of commecialization was intensified at the expense of the country’s industrialization. From 1900 to 1920, the expenditure on private commercial buildings was 20 times larger than the expenditure on private industrial buildings (see Table 4.9). However it should be emphasized that not all members of the bourgeoisie followed this path. Others stayed firmly in place and there were many successful cases. An important change seems to have taken place in the investment policy of this industrializing faction of the rising bourgeoisie: in order to escape the attention of the imperialist intruders, it shifted to small-scale operations using the

ECONOMIC FORCES AND TRANSFORMATIONS

49

Table 4.9 Expenditures on Private Commercial and Industrial Real Estates (Million Rials) Year 1900–20 1921–30

Commercial

Industrial

40 36

2 12

Source: Bharier, Economic Development, p. 235.

experience, know-how, technique and even the machinery and equipment of the failed manufacturers. According to Bharier: Development of large-scale industry took place against a background of a lack of integration in the economy and a generally low level of customs duties (about 4–5 percent) on imported manufactures, not to mention a series of political changes. But it was compensated to some extent by the proliferation of small-scale industry within the larger cities. In Tehran, for example, over 5,000 industrial workshops had been established by 1928, employing about 15,000 workers and producing a wide range of goods.40 Above are set out the most important productive forces of Iran during 1796– 1926. But before a general conclusion can be made, there needs to be specific conclusions regarding each aspect of the productive forces, and these include both the human and material means. As for the former, the population had grown both quantitatively and qualitatively. As for the material means, there has been a quantitative (but not technical) regress. But a technical – or in a broader sense qualitative – regress, understood as a transition to a lower stage, does not seem to have taken place, due perhaps to the fact that the quantitative regress had not been dramatic enough to effect this backward transition. Yet, it is evident that the qualitative aspects of Iranian productive forces were, to a great extent, both deformed and distorted.

Changes in Production Relations Relations of production define interactions among people within the production process, and these include property relations, class relations and market relations. If productive forces are held to be the sole cause of change and development in a given society, relations of production will be the result.

50

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

But the process is reiterative, i.e. the cause and effect become interlinked. Therefore, the changes and developments of a particular society are manifested through both production relations and the productive forces. That is why relations of production are used to demarcate different stages or periods in the development of social life; they can only do this in relation to the productive forces. Class relations are one aspect of the relations of production. A class is a group of people with common economic interests. This is called, in Marxian terminology, ‘a class-for-itself’. However, a class-for-itself develops only in the process of class struggle with the aim of capturing political power. If a group does not manifest this behaviour, it cannot be called a class, but only a group on hostile terms with other groups, at best a ‘class-in-itself’. There existed many groupings of people in Iran in the period under investigation. The ruling groups included courtiers, state officials, feudal lords, khans of ils and religious authorities. The subjugated groups included peasants, ils, craftsmen, lower mollas, urban poor, traders, sarrafs, merchants, usurers, shopkeepers, intelligentsia, emerging labourers and emerging bourgeoisie. The ruling groups constituted the ruling classes, whose general interest was to reproduce feudal relations, regardless of their intra-class intrigues and rivalries. They were a class in and for itself insofar as they had common economic and political interests evidenced by their constant oppression of the rest of society. Although this class constituted no more than perhaps 3 per cent of the population, they were dominant because they owned and controlled most of the material and spiritual wealth of the society. The most oppressive and corrupt faction of the ruling class consisted of the kings and the courtiers. ‘[W]hen the cycle of sovereignty reached Naser odDin Shah a gang of pampered, poor-spirited courtiers, bereft of honor, encouraged the autocratic tendencies of the king, revealed their ingrained baseness of character, plundered the people’s property like robbers and sold their homes piecemeal to foreigner.’41 State officials – provincial governors in particular – were no less oppressive and corrupt than the kings and courtiers. Sykes found that ‘every governor is a robber’, and went on to stress that ‘the governing class . . . is sucking the lifeblood of Persia’.42 The oppressive and corrupt character of the ruling classes was even acknowledged by the grand vizier in 1872: It is an age-old custom for the nobles of Persia to call the illness of avidity those ‘revenues’ which they collect from the subjects of the state

ECONOMIC FORCES AND TRANSFORMATIONS

51

by three means. The first of them is bribery: they pay a sum of money (haq-e mazlumi) [i.e. the oppressor’s fee] to an official (zalem) [i.e. the oppressor] and receives something in return. The second is pishkesh: the governorship of a district is conferred upon a deceitful man, and one closes eyes to his oppression and tyranny. The third is present (hadiya): timid people, out of fear of the officials, send the governor the first-born of cattle, well-tasting dishes, or horse outfits as tributes.43 The courtiers and state officials included some of the landlords and, insofar as some of the chiefs of the ils came to be also appointees of the state, a part of the ils’ chiefs. The oppression of the rest of the landlords and ils’ chiefs was not, relatively speaking, high unless they had been made subject to the upper echelons of the oppressive official hierarchy. Moreover, the power of the local landlords vis-a`-vis the peasants greatly increased towards the end of the period.44 Among the oppressed classes, the plight of the peasantry was far worse. I have already enumerated and explained various extra-economic obligations to which the peasantry was subjected. The peasants’ condition grew worse than ever by the end of the nineteenth century due to excessive taxation, expropriation, shift to cash crop agriculture, depreciation of the currency, famine and disease. This is evident from higher rates of taxation, mass migrations, higher prices for necessities and increased mortality rates. Therefore, Keddie is correct to assert that ‘the period of Western impact has seen a worsening of peasant conditions’.45 By the end of the eighteenth century, the peasantry was differentiated into various categories. A peasant could be a private landowner or a landless labourer. In either case, he could be a ra`iyat, a ra`iyat cultivator, a non-ra`iyat or a non-ra`iyat cultivator. A ra`iyat owned the land as his private property and was considered to be the peasant of the king (ra`iyat-e padeshah).46 The village occupied by this category of the peasantry was called ra`iyati, in which a group of ‘landless men termed sitters in the sun, aftab nishin’, lived and ‘engaged as laborers and look[ed] after the bath, etc.’.47 A ra`iyat could be ‘poor’ or ‘wealthy’.48 In either case, he had to pay his taxes in cash as opposed to a non-ra`iyat who paid his taxes in kind.49 This was considered a case of extra-oppression, for to convert his produce into cash – demanded usually before the harvest or immediately after it – the ra`iyat had to pre-sell or to sell his products immediately and that could be only done with great losses. In 1880, a poor ra`iyat paid about 60 krans in cash each year to the government while a wealthy ra`iyat paid about 1,000 krans annually.50 Other measures of extra-

52

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

oppression against ra`iyats included a discriminatory tax on his water property and an obligation, at least for a section of the bat class, ‘to buy at 30 percent above market value a certain portion of the produce received by government as taxes’.51 Towards the end of the nineteenth century, a great majority of the ra`iyats lost their land. Thereafter the concept of ra`iyat referred almost exclusively to the landless peasants. A ra`iyat cultivator did not own any land, but was treated in much the same way as the ra`iyat. He was in most cases a share cropper but also worked as hired labour, particularly in cash crop cultivation.52 A ra`iyat cultivator engaging in neither cash crop agriculture nor other activities as hired labour constituted the khoshneshins or the poor reserve army of the unemployed. The ra`iyat cultivators lived mostly in the Arbabi (landlord) villages. The nonra`iyats were either landowners or landless villagers. As compared to ra`iyats, this group of villagers lived a better life and were less oppressed. They paid tax in kind and the tax on their water was one-half compared to two-thirds in the case of the ra`iyat. However, they were small in numbers and numerically and socially far less significant than the ra`iyats. In all cases, ‘it [was] not at all a paying thing to be a farmer in Persia, unless, however, the proprietor [was] a really influential man, or a ‘‘mulla’’ or a ‘‘mojtehid’’’.53 Property relations are relations of production expressed legally, either through laws or through customs and traditions. They determine the specific form of ownership of the means of production, i.e. the relation of people to the means of production and to each other. Property relations further determine how the means of production and the direct producer should be combined in the production process, i.e. they dictate the relations of control and exploitation. Throughout the period under investigation, the dominant property relations remained feudal. As early as the tenth century, the mozare`eh (sharecropping) system had developed in Iranian agriculture; as more and more peasants lost their lands, it became the predominant production relation. Although still predominant during the 1796–1926 period, the system underwent some changes, particularly in the cash crop sector. Mozare`eh was a contractual relation between a landowner and a landless ra`iyat.54 Regardless of regional variation, the basic form of the system was very much the same. A contract was entered into by a landowner and a ra`iyat according to which the share of each party was determined by the ownership of five factors: labour, land, water, seed and animal. In theory, each received one-fifth of the produce. However, in practice, land and water (owned by the landlords) received more and ‘the landowners, who exercised almost

ECONOMIC FORCES AND TRANSFORMATIONS

53

uncontrolled power on their estates, often divided the crop at their own discretion’.55 Mozare`eh led to a gradual shift from subsistence agriculture to cash crop production. As a result, the production of necessities declined. Some of the reasons for this development included the effective foreign demand for agricultural raw materials, the higher productivity and profitability of cash crops, the state’s interest in the development of money relations and the failure of the emerging bourgeoisie to industrialize the economy. Cash crop agriculture was, therefore, detrimental to the socioeconomic condition of the ra`iyats. It also held back the development of capitalist relations in the villages as it tied the peasant to the soil and increased the power of the landlords.56 The shift from subsistence to cash crop agriculture effected change in the relations of production. This was despite the fact that cash crop agriculture remained very small in proportion to the subsistence sector and the attempt to transfer the mozare`eh relations of production to the new system was for the most part successful. As early as the 1840s, the fixed-rent system, capitalist farming and the lease system were being introduced alongside the mozare`eh system. Reporting from the Caspian areas in 1844, Abbot wrote that: Estates are farmed in several ways. Sometimes the landowner pays all expenses and government claims, hires laborers whose reward is one-half the produce whether of silk, rice, or other articles. [However this] is not a general [arrangement]. Frequently the landowner lets his estate to the peasantry for a fixed amount of produce. The poor peasant is sometimes actually a loser by this method. Occasionally the proprietor farms the land himself hiring laborers.57 Among these new relations of production only the capitalist system developed but in a distorted way: while the market relations were essentially capitalistic, the production relations had remained that of a distorted sharecropping system. In the case of silk production, the foreign importer of eggs advanced to the landowners a small sum with no interest. In return, he was sold the cocoons slightly below the market price. The landlord, in turn, advanced money to the farmer who used it to pay the expenses of production including the expenses for his family’s consumption. The advanced money was repaid in the same order – in cocoons and cash. In the 1860s and 1870s, one-third of the crop went to each participant. This was called mosaleseh.58 But as competition among importers and the relative power of the landowner increased, the landlord abolished the mosaleseh and introduced

54

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

another system called morabe`eh according to which one-quarter went to the importer, the farmer’s share remained unchanged, with the difference appropriated by the landlords.59 The system continuously changed in this direction and with each change the importer was given a smaller share (onefifth, one-sixth, etc.) until it no longer paid the importer to make the deal.60 This arrangement was, of course, more detrimental to the farmer than to any of the other partners. In 1860, a commentator wrote that: It is current in Gilan that for the [re-]payment of the landowner’s advance [qest], the ra`iyat, forced by necessity, borrows with an interest of two thousands [dinars] and two rials per touman. For this reason the peasant is forced to presell his silk which would be worth twelve toumans in the gathering time, to the traders of foreign government, for six or seven toumans.61 Therefore, the new relation in silk production was a contractual relation involving cash payment, credit and interest charges. The system seems to have advanced further by 1906: ‘Since 1906, it would seem that cash sales have been exclusively used.’62 In 1910, a group of traders called tavvafs were engaged in the cash advance purchase of cocoons from the villagers. Some days later, they returned and received back their advances in cocoons sold to them at a rate of two krans below the market price prevailing that day in Rasht, keeping the two krans as a commission.63 The smaller tavvafs then sold the cocoons to larger tavvafs who in turn sold them ‘to silk merchants on six-month credit; no interest [was] charged for the first three months, but for the last three a rate of 12 percent of the value of the goods [was] paid’.64 Thus, by 1910, commodity exchange relations had been introduced in the cash crop sector of Iranian agriculture. This development could only have repercussions on the economy: payment in cash, for example, was becoming more widespread.65 Subsistence agriculture was also affected: the transition from rent in kind to money rent (see Table 4.10) is indicative of this. The transition, detrimental as it was to the well-being of the peasantry, became an instrument for the transfer of not only the surplus but also part of the subsistence of the peasantry and contributed to their further misery. The ‘primitive accumulation’ (see below) could not have progressed without this transition, which was so forcefully reinforced by the state.66 Despite these important changes, on the eve of the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, pseudo-feudalism was still the predominant mode of production. The Constitutional Revolution and the reforms of the first Majles in 1906 further

(2) Land rent and other revenues in cash

1,813d 3,825b 3,897c 13,830e

(1) Customs revenues in cash

269d 537b 800c 6,809e

379a 551b 1,010c 2,232e

(3) Land rent and other revenues in kind 2,461a 4,913b 5,707c 22,871e

(4) Total (1)þ(2)þ(3)

2,082a 4,362b 4,697 20,639

(5) (1)þ(2)

Composition of Goverment Revenues (10,000 Rials)

2,192 4,376 4,906 16,062

(5)

(6) (2)þ(3)

10.9 10.9 14.0 29.8

(4)

(7) (1) as % of

12.9 12.3 17.0 33.0

(5)

(8) (1) as % of

73.7 77.9 68.3 60.5

(4)

(9) (2) as % of

87.1 87.7 83.0 67.0

(5)

(10) (2) as % of

15.4 11.2 17.7 9.8

(4)

(11) (3) as % of

18.2 12.6 21.5 10.8

(5)

(12) (3) as % of

84.6 88.8 82.3 90.2

(4)

(13) (5) as % of

Sources and Notes: aFigures given in Issawi, Economic History, p. 361. bFigures given in Thomson, ‘Report on Persia’, Accounts and Papers, 1867–8, 19. cFigures given in Curzon, Persia, 2, p. 481. Slightly different figures are given by Rabino, ‘Banking in Persia’. Following changes were made in Curzon’s figure as given in ibid., p. 481: (1) in converting krans into rials, figures were rounded; (2) Curzon’s figure for ‘other sources’, as well as the figures he gives in a footnote on the same page (481) were added to his figure for ‘Taxes Paid in Cash’, bringing this last figure up to 3,896,854 as given in Column (2) for year 1888–9. dCalculated on the assumption that the percentage for 1867–8, between (1) and (4), also holds good for the year 1836–7. This may well be true due to the fact that after 1863, silk production, and as a result, silk exports, declined because of the muscardine disease, causing a decline in its share of customs in total revenues. eFigures from Millispaugh, The Financial and Economic Situation of Persia, p. 29. In converting Millispaugh’s figures from krans into rials, rounding is applied. Except for ‘Kind (Taxes and Domain)’ and ‘Custom’, all other Millispaugh’s figures are collapsed into a single figure given in column (2).

1836–7 1867–8 1888–9 1922–3

Years

Revenues

Table 4.10

56

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

undermined the feudal relations of production. However, the defeat of the revolution enabled the feudal lords not only return to their former practices but also augment their holdings using new means: the Constitutional Law (sanctifying private property) and their ability to take advantage of a highly weakened central government. However, the expropriators were soon taken over by Reza Khan, a new dictator dressed in constitutional garb. This led only to further concentration of property under the domination of a tottering feudalism without helping to prevent further economic disintegration. It is also important to examine the condition of the Iranian ashaier. The ashaier accounted for about 25 per cent of the population in 1926 (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4). This quantitative advantage combined with the organized nature of ashaieri relations gave them powerful leverage in the power structure of the country, an advantage they retained until 1926. Writing in 1917, Sykes noted that there was a tendency for ashaieri lifestyle in Iran due essentially to the political power of the ils.67 Economically, the power of the ils had been reduced to a significant degree by 1926, due to a decline in the number of livestock. Other than war – the First World War in particular – there were other reasons for the declining power of the ils, such as the introduction of cash crops, disease and famine. In addition, the economic condition of the ashaier was made even worse by oppressive taxation, the introduction of commodity relations in the ashaieri areas and the shift from tax in kind to tax in cash. These factors combined to make the ashaier prey to such disasters as epidemics and famine. For example, it was reported that during the famine of 1872, among the ashaier ‘and in the districts [of Fars] many people died from hunger’.68 Moreover, the ashaier seem to have gone through the same process of increasing misery as the peasants, though to a lesser degree. The introduction of the oil industry in the south, for example, enabled the ashaieri population of the surrounding areas to become employed as labourers, guards, technicians and the like.69 If the peasants were the main class in the rural areas, the handicraftsmen constituted the main class in the urban areas, and their conditions also underwent change during the period 1796–1926. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the great majority of handicraftsmen were legally free producers engaged in craft activities and ‘additional employment in market gardening and truck-farming’.70 In large towns, they usually formed a guild (senf), and in small towns some sort of federation. They paid numerous taxes – both direct and indirect – through their unions upon which a fixed sum of each particular tax was levied.

ECONOMIC FORCES AND TRANSFORMATIONS

57

The guilds were strictly hierarchical: the naqib stood at the top of the hierarchy and ensured that the laws, traditions and customs were being observed. He was followed by the guild elders, who were responsible for fiscal affairs and tax collections. The guild elders took orders from the merchants and divided them among the masters, the next group in the hierarchy.71 Each craft had a master and one or two apprentices. Hired workers appeared towards the middle of the nineteenth century, indicating the development of simple capitalist cooperation, characterized by the absence of a technical division of labour and where ‘each craftsman complete[d] by himself both the constituent parts of the product and the product itself’.72 This simple capitalist cooperation declined gradually due to competition from the imperialist centres. Meanwhile, demand had increased and ‘workshops based on simple capitalist cooperation were no longer in a position to satisfy [it]’.73 By the 1880s (see Table 4.3), constant efforts were made towards the transition to capitalist manufacturing. In terms of the relations of production, this system seems to have been established in most of the export industries by 1900 – including carpet and leather. In 1904, Maclean reported that: The bulk of the carpet industry [was] carried on in the weavers’ homes, the women and children doing the weaving. The so-called manufacturer supplies to the weaver the design and the quantities of wool in different colors required for one carpet. He also advances sums to account for the price arranged, the balance being paid on delivery of the finished article.74 This ‘putting-out system’ already had the germ of capitalist manufacture within it. In the same report, Maclean added that: In Tabriz . . . the weaving is done by the boys who attend to the factories. Wages are about 12 krans per month, and the midday meal is another 12 krans per month. There is a foreman at, say, 50 krans per month.75 He even suggested that ‘it would not be difficult to get women weavers to attend a properly appointed factory’.76 In 1913, Sobotsinskii wrote that ‘a large number of enterprises employing five to ten workers [are] changing into manufactories’.77 Given the level of development of the productive forces at that time, it is clear that Sobotsinskii is referring to capitalist manufacturing relations. Every indication seems to

58

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

suggest that the establishment of capitalist manufacturing relations of production had intensified from 1910 onwards. Examples of this intensified development were to be found in the carpet-making centres of Tabriz and elsewhere: here enterprises employing up to 100 workers were not uncommon.78 Though this development was taking place in the export sector, it was not confined to the carpet industries alone. Other export industries included leather, opium, henna and other manufacturing workshops. It must be added that some of these manufacturing workshops belonged exclusively to foreign capital while some were held in partnership with domestic capital. However, many were owned by Iranians.

‘The Primitive Accumulation’ The so-called primitive accumulation or the accumulation of wealth that immediately preceded capitalism and subsequently became ‘capital’ in the hands of the capitalist class had two dimensions: capital in its quantitative dimension and capital as a new form of social relations. This latter form resulted from the separation of direct producers from their means of production. Capital in its quantitative dimension appears essentially in the form of money and the means of production. As money, it was the wealthy merchant class that held the capital of Iran. According to Gobineau, as early as 1850, the merchants were ‘the most respectable part of the population [holding] most of the capital of Persia’.79 The merchants performed banking and brokerage functions and lent funds to the government – often demanding collateral in the form of government monopolies and lands.80 Therefore, the merchants’ interest in land was not because of the result of their alliance with the landlords and the imperialist forces, the profitability of cash crops and the failure of attempts for industrialization, rather it was due to their relations vis-a`-vis the cash-hungry kings and courtiers. This may have even been a more profitable business: the regular rate of interest was 24 per cent and could go as high as 60 per cent if delays in payments occurred. In case of default, the law authorized expropriation.81 Besides these sources of income, because merchants were considered respectable, even ‘distrustful people [did] not hesitate to entrust merchants with [their] money for investment’.82 By 1890, many merchants had fortunes ranging from 50,000 to 100,000 toumans and more. Amin ol-Zarb’s fortune was put at 25 million toumans in the early 1900s.83 ‘Until 1880’, wrote Atrpet, ‘there were few millionaires and rich property owners, but in 1900

ECONOMIC FORCES AND TRANSFORMATIONS

59

one could count them in the hundreds.’84 Having no political power, however, the merchants were subject to all kinds of arbitrary abuses including confiscation and forced bankruptcy. Yet, the dominant trend in their development was towards further accumulation of wealth and acquisition of political power. It is therefore safe to assert that the main source of money capital in the early period of capitalist development in Iran was the money accumulated by the merchants. In addition to the merchants, state officials were also amassing wealth – essentially through corruption and oppressive practices. In 1809, the vizier of Fars – Mohammad Nabi Khan – was accused of committing large-scale corruption and was made to pay 150,000 toumans from the money he had acquired through ‘trade and through his post as ambassador to India’.85 In 1895, the foreign minister – Mirza Nasr ol-Lah Khan-e Moshir od-Dauleh – ‘in a relatively short time . . . became the owner of crores of wealth, such that he paid 100,000 touman only [to retain] the post of the foreign ministry’.86 And the recipient of this money, Prime Minister Amin od-Dauleh, also acquired tremendous wealth through similar practices including a forceful extraction of ‘1,000 toumans per day from the butchers and bakers of Tehran’ as ‘gifts’.87 Much of the wealth of the state officials – including the kings and courtiers – included properties acquired through confiscation of their rivals and expropriation of small landowners and peasants. In this sense, they were no different from the feudal lords, khans, big merchants and higher religious authorities. But land is not part of money capital. It is rather one component of the means of production – another aspect of the quantitative dimension of capital. In 1848, the fortunes of Haji Mirza Aqasi, the grand vizier, was put at 1,438 villages, hamlets and fields.88 According to Lambton, ‘around 1880 the greatest part of the land belonged to large landlords’.89 Writing in the 1900s, Atrpet observed that ‘in the shortest time many owners of villages appropriated almost all the riches of the country and became large capitalists’.90 Perhaps Atrpet called them large capitalists because they were wealthy landlords who had settled in towns and who performed trading functions91 or perhaps because the ‘owners of villages’ were merchants. In any case, the fact remains that ‘few landlords acquired tremendous holdings while the peasants were squeezed dry’.92 This process of concentration continued unabated between 1907 and 1914, due to the disintegration of the feudal state following the Constitutional Revolution. According to Sykes, ‘during these seven years [1907–14], the

60

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

grandees battened on the country as governors, as landowners who refused to contribute to the revenue [of the central government], and as ‘‘eaters’’ of pensions’.93 This trend continued up to 1926 and after. This wealth concentration took place through various means. A report written in 1844 suggests that ‘plague’ and over-exaction of taxes were two means of expropriating the peasants: When the property belongs to the peasant the governor of the district [of Gilan] extracts almost what he pleases or is able to get from him, for at present the poor man has no one to appeal to for redress – he therefore often finds it more advantageous to be without than with landed property of his own and accordingly makes the best bargain he can with his Chief for the disposal of it and in this way much property has changed hands from the poor to the rich man. After the plague also a great deal of land which had become almost untenanted was purchased by the wealthy inhabitants and in these two ways the landed property of the province [of Gilan] in the possession of the upper classes has increased probably to eight-tenths of the whole.94 Another means through which wealth (largely land) concentration took place was the khaleseh (crown) lands. In 1876, it was reported that ‘the khaleseh lands in their present situation were at least worth two crores but if they are developed they will be worth four crores’.95 It is then evident that the khaleseh lands were both small and neglected. However, the situation subsequently changed in favour of the khaleseh lands due to the state’s growing need for an assured source of income. Already in the 1870s the king was making expensive trips to Europe, the Cossack brigade was being formed and there was increasing tax usurpation by feudal lords feeling the pressure of luxurious, European lifestyles for which they had limited resources at their disposal. To cure the cash dilemma, the court formulated a contradictory policy: the policy provided for an increase in the rate of rent and taxes and the sale of the government offices to the highest bidder at fixed sums. However, as more revenue resources were sold, less remained for the state regardless of the rate of rent or tax. The increase in the rates only benefitted the landlords, increasing their power vis-a`-vis the state. This contradiction was temporarily resolved by the forceful increase in khaleseh lands. Land was either confiscated, seized for tax arrears, or acquired through compulsory purchase.96 However, the state did not need the land as in theory all lands belonged to the king. Rather, the state needed cash. Therefore, the sale of khaleseh

ECONOMIC FORCES AND TRANSFORMATIONS

61

followed. At the same time that it was being augmented, a great part of the khaleseh was being transferred to large landowners and contributed to the concentration of wealth.97 This took place from about 1890 onward. The recipients were not confined only to ‘large landowners’; they also included notables, government officials and the clergy. Fees paid were negligible: ‘by giving up a hundred ashrafis (the Qajar’s gold coin), they obtained lands worth over one hundred thousand toumans’.98 Yet what is important was the consequence of these sales because the buyers of the khaleseh lands – lands that had almost no definite boundaries – began annexing the surrounding lands as part of the purchased khaleseh. This practice did much damage to the smaller landowners whose lands were subsequently expropriated.99 Ironically, false claims as a means of expropriation had precedent in Iran. In 1880, the British consul at Bushire reported that: The difficulties experienced by a proprietor are as follows: want of protection against the robberies of the ra`iyats; the heavy government taxation, ordinary and extraordinary, and the constant and false claims set up against the property. This last is a characteristic feature in Persia . . . . Many bona fide landowners therefore have been utterly ruined. Such false claims are always tolerated both by the government and priesthood as it constitutes a sure source of income to them.100 Other mechanisms included raising the land tax, artificially inflating the prices of subsistence food items and increasing the interest rate on outstanding debts. In 1913, according to Atrpet, ‘rent ha(d) risen tenfold [over] the previous thirty years’.101 ‘High government officials,’ wrote Abdullaev in the 1900s, ‘by constantly accumulating produce in storehouses, artificially raised prices and made huge fortunes.’102 Between 1870 and 1895, wheat prices rose from 2 toumans a kharvar to 4 toumans a kharvar and the price of wheat rose sixfold from 1895 to 1905.103 In addition, two other practices had led to an increased concentration of wealth: the abrogation of the rights of the peasants to certain common lands – due to the introduction of private property – and the pre-harvest selling practice imposed on the peasantry as a consequence of the transition from rent in kind to money rent.104 This latter practice meant that peasants sold their harvest at lower imposed prices and had to repurchase it when prices were higher. In this way, the peasantry became increasingly indebted and had to use their lands to secure additional loans. ‘Unpaid debts’ could mean the loss of land which ‘could also tie the peasant to a landlord’s property, since

62

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

landlord and moneylender were often one and the same.’105 It is important to note that while the primitive accumulation had begun in the 1850s, it became a force only from the 1880s onward – from the beginning of the manufacturing period. The concentration of wealth in the hands of the ruling classes was made possible only by the concentration of misery in the lower classes and the peasants in particular. The essence of this process was the separation of the direct producers from their means of production, and it is this process of dispossession that constitutes the primitive accumulation properly. The end result of the process was the creation of a class of wage labourers and the formation of a national market. However, due to obstacles put in the way of the process of primitive accumulation in Iran, both of the above phenomena remained in their infancy during the period under investigation. These obstacles were generally the products of either specificities of Iranian feudalism or specificities of the colonial-imperial powers. Regardless of the difficulties that the process of primitive accumulation faced, by 1926 its achievements were sufficient to push Iranian society towards the first phase of capitalist manufacture. In addition to the evidence given above, I shall explore the creation of a proletariat and a national market as further evidence of this claim. Concerning the formation of a proletariat – though very small in number – three phenomena should be noted: the wage workers in the workshops and in the capitalist manufactories, the poor in the streets of the large cities and the migration to the neighbouring states. Bharier put the number of ‘industrial workers’ at 30,000 in 1926.106 I think this is an underestimation, unless ‘industrial workers’ are taken to mean those working exclusively in modern large-scale manufacturing. But, as Bharier has observed, after the failure of large-scale manufacturing, small-scale industries proliferated in the large cities. By 1928, Tehran alone had nearly 5,000 industrial workshops employing 15,000 workers.107 In addition, Bharier states that only eight modern plants built between 1900 and 1925, which employed about 3,500 workers.108 First, there were more than eight modern plants built during the 1900–25 period (see Table 4.3). According to Abdullaev, in 1910 ‘establishments of up to one hundred workers and over were to be found in several carpet-making centers. Such enterprises often belonged to representatives of foreign capital’.109 Second, the figure of 437 workers per plant (eight plants, 3,500 workers) may well be an underestimation. For example, in 1910 a large carpet-making factory in Tabriz employed 1,500 workers.110

ECONOMIC FORCES AND TRANSFORMATIONS

63

Indeed, by 1914 it is estimated that there were 65,000 workers employed in carpet-making industries, 20,000 in weaving and 15,000 in other branches of the simple capitalist cooperation-type workshops. Moreover, 400 worked in cotton ginneries, 300 in sugar plants and 7,000–8,000 in the AngloPersian Oil Company, to which should be added 5,000 (including Russians) working in Russian enterprises in Iran and 800 in other areas of the capitalist manufactories.111 These figures account neither for the seasonal workers – so important in the case of cash crop-oriented workshops, extractive industries and sugar plants – nor for the plants built between 1914 and 1926 which, according to Bharier, were constructed to take advantage of wartime profit opportunities.112 Any estimate of the number of workers in Iran in 1920 must also take into account the large number of labourers working in the building sector – a sector that accounted for 49 per cent of gross domestic fixed capital formation (see Table 4.4). According to Abdullaev, the poor in the large urban areas were the third source of the Iranian proletariat, the first being peasants and the second handicraftsmen.113 Abdullaev bases this on travellers’ accounts that ‘abound in material showing that the streets and bazaars of Iranian towns, especially the large commercial centers, were overcrowded with poor and unemployed persons, ready to sell their labor for a piece of bread’.114 Leaving the travellers’ accounts aside, the Persian sources themselves are full of materials relating to urban poor, referred to by bourgeois historians as porters, the poor, criminals, widows, orphans, rabble, indigents, hungerers, people of humbler rank, rascals and ignoble men.115 There exist no statistics concerning the size of this section of the population. However, judging from the extent of their participation in the class struggles in the cities and their weight in these struggles (see Chapter 8), their numbers appear to have been very significant. This phenomenon of the urban poor demonstrates the significance of internal migration from the rural to the urban areas. However, the most important consequence of the primitive accumulation was the external migration of hundreds of thousands of dispossessed Iranians to the neighbouring states. As early as 1880, there were well over 100,000 Persian migrants in Turkey and 90,000 in Russia. In 1900, Gordon put the number of Persian migrants abroad at up to 1 million.116 In the 1910s, Abdullaev claimed that each year hundreds of thousands of migrants in search of work were forced to go to other countries, and he stated that ‘in Transcaucasia, there was a constant Iranian population of some hundreds of thousands’.117 Aside from Russia and Turkey, there were mass movements of dispossessed peasants and poor to India, Karachi, Herat, Afghanistan, Muscat

64

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

and the Zanzibar Islands.118 In about 1910, Sykes wrote that ‘thousands of the Khorasan peasants go to work in Russian Turkestan during the winter and thus supplement their income’.119 In 1915, the oil mines of Sabounchi and Balakhani in Caucasia employed close to 10,000 Iranian migrants.120 In a famous letter to Mozaffar od-Din Shah in 1906, Tabataba`i – a religious authority in the time of the Constitutional Revolution – wrote about the plight of the ra`iyats whose property was taken and who lived in misery, finding no other way to ‘relax’ than by migrating out of Iran by thousands. He gave the example of 10,000 Qouchani ra`iyats who had fled to Russia. A rough chronology of the official migration of the Persians to Russia is as follows: in 1891, over 26,855 fled Iran through Tabriz alone. In 1903, the number was 32,866, while in 1904 the number had gone up to 54,846. In 1905, as many as 300,000 fled Iran to work in Russia, and in 1911 the number is put at 193,000, of whom 160,000 returned home.121 Though Persian migrants were engaged in all kinds of employment in these nations, the extent of their participation in industry was significant. In 1912, 27.5 per cent of the workforce of a copper-smelting plant in northern Russia were Persians, and in 1913 the percentage of Persians in the workforce of the oil industries of the same region is put at 29.1 per cent.122 The high demand for Persian workers may have been because the Persian worker is able, ingenious, skillful and, in his way, even hardworking . . . .[He] is always attracted by the thought of a kind of work he has never done before . . . and carries it out with an astonishing amount of intelligence and promptness.123 The loss of this able workforce, following the failure of industrialization in Iran, was undoubtedly a major reason for the backwardness of Iran. It meant not only a loss of productive labour power but also an equally important loss to the national market. The formation of a national market was also hampered by the failure of the specialization process, the restriction on the growth of an extended social division of labour and the external orientation of Iranian trade. Additionally, the undeveloped conditions of transportation and communication networks, and the low rate of population growth and urbanization, prevented demand from growing and adequate distribution channels from developing. Among other inhibiting factors were chronic deficits in the balance of payments, depreciation and scarcity of currency, inflation, the poverty of masses, low wage rates, famine and cyclical catastrophes. Yet, regardless of all these

ECONOMIC FORCES AND TRANSFORMATIONS

65

obstructing factors, by 1926 a relatively united national market had developed. Causes contributing to this development were the primitive accumulation process, differentiation among the peasantry, the introduction of commodity and money relations, some degree of market specialization and a regional social division of labour.

The Economic Base The economic base of a society is the total sum of its relations of production. What this means is that the economic base reflects the general conditions of the economy including its production and market relations. The following sections examine the national currency, prices, profits, rents, taxes and wages. The formation of a strong national currency and a rise in prices, profits, rents, taxes and wages are prerequisites of the transition from feudalism to capitalist manufacture. Yet the transition can only be successful if the emerging bourgeoisie can keep the wages of labourers sufficiently low by any means, by productivity growth in particular. To what extent these preconditions were met in Iran during the period under investigation? The Currency Question A major problem with the Iranian economy during the nineteenth century that acted as an obstacle to the transition from feudalism to capitalism was the scarcity and depreciation of the Iranian silver kran. Between 1800 and 1900, the Iranian currency was depreciated by nearly 410 per cent (see Table 4.11). What were the factors contributing towards this depreciation? The first cause was the official and unofficial debasement. In the early years of the nineteenth century, gold ceased to be the circulating medium in Iran and was replaced by silver rials equivalent to one-eighth of a touman. The rial was later reissued as the kran, equivalent to one-tenth of a touman. The kran at this point contained about 9.2 grams of silver.124 In the course of time, however, the silver content of the kran was debased.125 As can be seen in Table 4.11, a 50 per cent official debasement took place between 1800 and 1900, with 25 per cent occurring within the first 20 years. The percentage distribution of debasement is shown in Table 4.11. Forty per cent of the total debasement took place during the first 50 years (1800–50). The next 20 years accounted for the remaining 10 per cent with the last 30 years (1870–1900) accounting for approximately 4.1 per cent. This fact suggests that debasement was the main cause of the depreciation until about 1870; thereafter, debasement played a negligible role.

50.0 40.0 45.9 5.9 10.0 4.1 — — —

Total 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 — — —

Average per Annum

(1) Percentage Distribution of Debasement

410 120 160 140 290 250 260 100 150

Total 4.1 2.4 2.3 2.0 5.8 8.3 2.8 4.5 18.8

Average per Annum

(2) Percentage of Currency Depreciation

The Iranian Currency: Debasement and Depreciation

360.0 70.0 114.1 34.1 280.0 245.9 210.0 96.0 146.0

Total

3.6 1.4 1.6 1.7 5.6 8.2 2.3 4.4 18.7

Average per Annum

(3) Percentage of Currency Depreciation ‘Net’ of Debasement

Sources: Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran, p. 36. Column (1) was constructed based on Sa’id Nafisi, Tarikh-Ejtema´i va Iqtisadi, pp. 20–1, 220–1; Column (2) based on Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 343–4; and Column (3) based on (1) and (2). In Katouzian’s book, (1), (2) and (3) are presented in separate tables.

1800–1900 1800–50 1800–70 1850–70 1850–1900 1870–1900 1800–92 1870–92 1892–1900

Period

Table 4.11

ECONOMIC FORCES AND TRANSFORMATIONS

67

Why was the currency debased? Katouzian suggests that ‘in pre-industrial economies debasement [is] the standard method for an arbitrary expansion of the money supply’.126 In this way, the feudal state could spend more with the resulting inflation acting as an invisible tax on the masses. Additionally, the mint was farmed out to the highest bidder and no mechanism existed for the court to exercise control over either the quality or the quantity of what was minted. The mint farmer had every reason to cheat and in a condition of scarcity he feared no loss of demand. In 1885, a French official wrote that ‘in Tehran, silver coins of one and two krans [are in circulation] which, because of their high lead and copper content, are hardly more than counterfeit’.127 Table 4.11 indicates that the currency depreciated by more than 250 per cent between 1870 and 1900. However, the currency was debased by only 4.1 per cent during this period. This suggests that other factors were involved in the depreciation of the Iranian currency and that these forces were strongest towards the end of the period under consideration. One factor was the fall in the price of silver relative to gold after 1870. According to Table 4.12, between 1863 and 1889, the price of silver relative to gold fell by about 30 per cent. The table does not indicate the drastic fall in the price of silver between 1889 and 1893, when silver prices relative to gold fell by over 47 per cent!128 Therefore, between 1889 and 1893, the total fall in the price of silver relative to gold was 77 per cent out of 100 per cent for the whole of the century. Returning to Table 4.11, the average annual percentage rate of currency depreciation net of debasement for the period from 1800 to 1870 had been 1.6 per cent, while during this same period the price of silver relative to gold was rising. However, the average annual percentage rate of currency depreciation net of debasement for the period of falling price of silver was as high as 8.2 per cent – suggesting one effect of the fall in the price of silver. Yet we cannot fail to observe that the annual percentage rate of currency depreciation for the period between 1892 and 1900 – during which the silver prices did not fall more than 23 per cent – was 18.7 per cent, i.e. the highest of any 8-year period during the century. This suggests that while the effect of the fall in the price of silver on the currency depreciation cannot be denied, it cannot also account for the total depreciation net of debasement. Therefore, there can be only one other important cause of depreciation – particularly towards the later years of the nineteenth century – the chronic balance of payments deficit. As can be seen from Tables 4.12 and 4.13, the exchange rate of krans per pound sterling had fallen 80 per cent between 1800 and 1914, with most of the fall occurring in the later years of the century (particularly between 1880 and 1894). These were the years during

10.00 13.60 17.60 20.00 22.50 21.20 24.70 22.65 24.50 26.56 27.75 30.75 33.00 36.25 38.00 50.00 51.20 52.50 55.50 54.50 55.00

— — — — — 61.38 16.13 60.50 59.25 56.88 52.25 50.75 45.38 42.69 — — — — — — —

— — — — — 25.05 25.15 25.41 25.95 27.03 31.88 32.72 36.60 38.85 — — — — — — —

— — — — — — 3.50 1.45 3.30 5.30 6.55 9.55 11.80 15.05 — — — — — —

Depreciation of Krans Measured by Exchange Rateb — — — — — — 0.10 0.36 0.91 1.98 6.83 7.67 11.55 13.80 — — — — — —

Depreciation of Krans Measured by Price of Silverc

Sources and Notes: Compiled from Rabino, ‘Banking in Persia’ and Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 343–5. aTotal fall in price of silver (1863–89), 30.45 per cent. bTotal depreciation of Krans (1863–89), measured by exchange rate, 41.5 per cent. cTotal depreciation of Krans (1863–89), measured by price of silver, 35.52 per cent.

1800 1824 1825 1834 1848 1863 1866 1871 1873 1875 1880 1884 1886 1889 1892–3 1894 1897 1901 1902 1911-12 1913-14

Intrinsic Value of Krans Calculated by Legal Weight and Fineness

Average Exchange Rate (Krans per Pounds Sterling)

Year Average Price of Silver per Oz.a

Kran: Exchange Rate and Debasement, 1800–1914

Table 4.12

69

ECONOMIC FORCES AND TRANSFORMATIONS

which the balance of trade deficit had increased dramatically. For example, the trade deficit in 1868 was about 2.5 million pounds sterling.129 Table 4.13 shows that the kran rate per pence had fallen over 46 per cent between 1875 and 1906. Only immediately after the First World War was there an improvement, but it was short-lived. According to Sykes, the improvement was due to ‘the flooding of northern Persia with paper rubles, the rise of the value of silver, the curtailment of minting and the restrictions to trade’.130 Table 4.13

Annual Average Exchange Rates and Paritya

Year

Kran Rate in Pence

Parity in Pence

Deviation from Parity in Pence

% Deviation

1875 1900 1904 1906 1910 1914 1916 1918 1919 1921

9.06 4.57 3.60 4.36 4.40 3.82 6.18 8.66 9.61 4.86

— 4.15 3.89 4.54 3.62 3.72 4.60 7.00 8.40 5.43

— 0.42 –0.29 –0.18 0.78 0.10 1.58 1.66 1.21 –0.57

— 10 –7 –4 21 3 34 34 14 –10

Sources and Notes: Adapted from Bharier, Economic Development, p.122 (figure for 1875 from p.11), quoting Yaganegi, Recent Financial and Monetary History of Persia. aParity is calculated by multiplying the silver content of the Kran by the average Pound Sterling price of silver in London.

And there is the question of scarcity. Owing to the fall in the price of silver, the nominal price of the kran was higher than its metallic value. This meant that the mint farmer could and did make money by over-minting. Then why the scarcity? There were at least three reasons: chronic balance of payments deficits, hoarding and the profitable trade in Iranian silver. Leaving the first reason aside – more obvious than the other two – here is some evidence for the latter two. In 1872, Rabino wrote that ‘the circulating medium has for ages been below the wants of the country, and that one of the causes of this lack of coin is the hoardings of the government, and doubtless also of the people’.131 About the trade in Persian silver coin, a Persian in 1898 wrote that: Since the Russian . . . merchants have a big trade in Marv and Bokhara, banks and sarrafs take the newly minted Iranian white [silver] coin to

70

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

those places, and Bokhara’s merchants need the white money for the purchase of cotton and other goods, and instead pay [for coins] in paper money and manati bills of exchanges and those who sell the Iranian white money . . . make 5 to 6 percent profit. During the last two years a great deal of the Iranian white money has been sent to those places.132 The harmful effect of depreciation on foreign trade needs no elaboration. But for a transitional economy, nothing could be more harmful than to have a scarce depreciated currency, particularly when the economy was already integrated in the world market. Depreciation was not only harmful to trade, but it also harmed the masses in Iranian cities and villages as it pushed up prices, lowered real wage rates and obstructed the development of the national market. The latter was also hampered by the shortage of the circulating medium. The indirect effect of this shortage of kran coupled with profitable mint farming led to an increased circulation of copper currency, decreasing its value ‘much to the distress of the workers who were paid in this coin’.133 Inflation Inflation in nineteenth-century Iran was caused by, inter alia, a shift in production from subsistence agriculture to cash crops, chronic balance of payment deficits, the official and unofficial debasement of the currency, the decline in the role of exchange, the fall in the price of silver relative to gold in world markets and the growth of the black market. Furthermore, inflation had provided momentum for primitive accumulation and served as an invisible tax on the masses. What remains to be presented is a chronological study of inflation (see Table 4.14). Table 4.14

Price Changes in City of Tabriz (Shahis per Manna)

Goods

1845

1847

1872

1873

1900

Barley Bread Wheat Rice Meat Mutton

— 5 4.2 — — —

— 6.33 4.35 27.20 — 23

28 28 55 70 40 80

14 — 22 — 50 —

51 64 36 201 173 —

Source and Note: Compiled from Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 339–42. was equal to 10 lbs.

a

Tabriz Mann

ECONOMIC FORCES AND TRANSFORMATIONS

71

In 1833, Fraser reported that ‘food is cheap’.134 In 1857, the British consul at Tabriz reported that in the previous year the price of bread had gone up 70 per cent, barley 50 per cent, candles 66 per cent, charcoal 30 per cent and meat was unchanged. In 1861, he reported that between 1854 and 1861 the price of bread had risen 100 per cent, meat 140–200 per cent, rice 144–54 per cent, fowl 277–357 per cent, eggs 50 per cent, milk 20 per cent, butter 25 per cent and charcoal 75 per cent.135 For the period 1843–61, another report concluded that in Tehran, on average, prices had risen from 70 to 150 per cent.136 In 1866, Fasa’i wrote that ‘in the winter of that year [1866–7] the prices of grain and victuals went up at Shiraz and the districts of Fars . . . causing a riot and a hunger revolt’.137 The same author reported a sharp price rise in Shiraz after ‘hunger and epidemic spread’.138 In 1898, a report noted that expenses have risen by at least 100 per cent,139 and another report stated that because of the rise in the ‘price of prime necessities . . . the lower classes in Tabriz were at the starvation point’.140 According to Lorini, the price of bread in Tehran in 1898 compared to that of 1847 had risen 500 per cent, and mutton about 300 per cent.141 Moreover, the price of bread in 1914 compared to that in 1847 registered an 800 per cent increase, mutton 350 per cent and rice 500–800 per cent.142 According to Atrpet, the wheat price doubled between 1870 and 1895, while between 1895 and 1905 the price of wheat rose sixfold.143 Abdullaev, writing in the 1900s, observed that high government officials, ‘by constantly accumulating produce in storehouses, artificially raised prices and made huge fortunes’.144 Also Ra`in observed that in 1906 shortages of bread and excessive printing of paper money by the Imperial Bank of Persia were correlated.145 Rise in the Rate of Rent and Taxes Oppression suffered by the producers of Iran resulted from the unjust system of rent and taxes and these revenue items of the feudal state increased steadily – this has, to some degree, been demonstrated in Table 4.1, but there are some other aspects of this phenomenon. Travellers’ accounts as well as Persian and non-Persian sources all refer to two kinds of taxes or rent: ‘regular’ or ‘ordinary’ and ‘irregular’ or ‘extraordinary’. The former type was the only ‘legal’ tax and rent levied on the subjects of the king. Yet, the

72

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

illegal taxes were not much less than the legal ones. Katouzian estimates the following weighted average rates of land tax:146

Regular taxes Irregular taxes Total

1800–69

1869–1900

15–20 10 25–30

20–25 10–15 30–40

From the table, it can be seen that irregular taxes were very high and that rents towards the end of the period increased. The increase in taxes provided momentum for the process of primitive accumulation as has been noted. The increase in tax rates was, no doubt, the result of the state’s and landlords’ need for additional funds – a need that arose out of the introduction of the money economy and that grew with the increase in foreign trade. Though any history of nineteenth-century Iran undoubtedly will contain a reference to this tax oppression, most are general in their accusations and give little detail. However, from scattered observations, a chronology of tax oppression can be provided. In 1833, Fraser gave this relatively clear picture of the peasantry: ‘The high rate of wages proves that the profits of agriculture are high, while food is cheap.’147 By 1842, the situation seems to have taken a turn for the worse: one English observer reported that ‘the system of financial government is becoming every year more vicious than before’.148 In 1859, Stevens reported that ‘a tax of five krans per horse-load on all goods arriving at Tabriz, which was abolished during the reign of Fath Ali Shah, has been reestablished’.149 Reports in the 1850s enumerate 22 kinds of taxes paid only by the peasants, exclusive of the ‘irregular’ items levied on the ils, the craftsmen and the merchants. In 1871, another report notes that while the annual silk crop of Gilan had decreased significantly, the province is still taxed on the basis of the old assessment.150 In 1867–8, a different report observed systematic oppression, ‘illegal taxes’ and ‘the present unjust system of financial administration’. Taxes were levied on villages as a whole but ‘wealthy and prosperous villages worth 50,000 krans are known to pay only 300 to 500 krans per year, whereas smaller and less prosperous villages are subjected to a payment of 10,000 to 12,000 krans per year’.151 Discriminatory and regressive taxation was not confined to the villages. Individuals were also subject to this practice. In 1897, a Persian observer complained that ‘the old peasant who has an income of 10 toumans per year has to pay 15 toumans in taxes [while] there are wealthy people who have

ECONOMIC FORCES AND TRANSFORMATIONS

73

150,000 toumans income per year and do not pay even a dinar [literally a penny] in tax’.152 And as for the country as a whole, another Persian complained that with a population of 22 crores in 1830, the total taxes were about 5 crores, while in 1860 – with a population of 14 crores – the taxes amounted to 8 crores.153 I will sum up these developments with Atrpet’s assessment in 1913 that ‘rents had risen tenfold in the previous thirty years’.154 Wages Table 4.15 has been compiled to demonstrate the trends in skilled versus unskilled labourers’ wages. It appears that Fraser’s 1833 assessment of ‘the high rate of wages’ does not apply to the wage rates in 1842. Was there a decline or was Fraser over-optimistic? Perhaps the latter is the case. In any case, the wages of unskilled labourers were twice as much as were needed to reproduce the workforce and these were no less than one-half the wages paid to skilled labourers. In the course of time, the money wages of both categories rose, though they also suffered occasional declines. As can be observed from Table 4.15, the wages of unskilled labourers rose no more than 300 per cent between 1842 and 1926, about one-half of the increase occurring after 1913. Considering the rates of inflation documented above for food items, this increase is negligible. In fact, the real wage decreased substantially. The increasing poverty of the lower strata of the newly emerging wage labourers was the inevitable result of the absence of a well-developed labour market, the increasing proletarianization of the agricultural producers and the lack of demand for the dispossessed people in the urban areas. Migration did not help reduce the pool of the reserve army of unemployed in Iranian towns. The case of the skilled labourers was no better, although they were getting paid, in absolute terms, more than twice the wages of unskilled labourers. During the 1842–1926 period, the money wages of skilled labourers increased by about 175 per cent, which, in the face of inflation rates, is negligible and shows a decline in real terms. Therefore, the overall picture was very bleak insofar as the working classes were concerned. For those accumulating wealth, however, the situation was rewarding. It may be safely concluded that these wage rates for a society going through a primitive accumulation were highly favourable and in fact it was. Yet insofar as this cheap labour force could not be used in the productive sectors of the economy due to factors enumerated throughout this chapter, no real gain was made by society.

1.50 krs. 1.50 krs. — — — — 1.50–2 krs.

2.50 krs.

5 krs. 2–4 krs.

3.50 krs. 3.50 krs.

1.50 krs. 3 krs. 3–5 krs. 2 krs. 3–5 krs.

4–10 krs.

1893

1893–8 1902–3

1907

1913

1925

2–3 krs.

3–2 krs. 1 kr.

1.50 krs

1 kr.

0.8 krs.

unskilled labourers’ wages were twice as much as their expenditure on food day labourers in Rasht plus 6 Dinar/day for rations and other advantages–agricultural wage labourer in Ahwaz ad Mashhad: ‘skilled’ worker referred to masons, carpenters and blacksmiths in Rasht: ‘skilled’ workers include masons and carpenters, unskilled are ‘common’ labourers and tillers prices rose 1,000 per cent so did the wages in Rasht in Mashhad: ‘skilled’ refers to mason, and carpenters, unskilled to ‘common’ labourers and tillers in Bushire: ‘skilled’ refers to mason in Rasht: silk-reeling factory workers. Dinar/day Rates for women were 1/2–3/4 krs., for children, 7/10 krs. weavers-women’s wage was 1 kr., children’s 1/2 krs. miners lumber industry; Russian workers’ wage: 5–10 krs. fisheries: Russian workers’ wage 5–10 krs. skilled: masons and carpenters; unskilled: labourers on share, and coolies on board ships. Unskilled workers also received subsistence food skilled: ‘skilled craftsmen such as gold – and silver – smiths and inlayers, etc.’ Unskilled: agricultural labourers, workers in transport and public projects

Comments

Sources and Notes: Data compiled from Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 40–2. The figure for 1925 is from the League of Nations, Commission of Enquiry, p. 35.

1872 1878 1890

0.50–0.75 krs.

1 kr. 12 shahis 3 krs. 13 shahis 1 kr. 3 krs. 1.50–3 krs.

1840

Unskilled

Skilled

Wages, Krans/Day

Year

Table 4.15

ECONOMIC FORCES AND TRANSFORMATIONS

75

After considering the currency, taxes, rent, inflation and the wage rate, my conclusion is that – apart from the devaluation and shortage of the currency – the changes and developments that took place in nineteenth-century Iran were highly favourable for a primitive accumulation to proceed. These factors are not to blame for the obstruction of this process in later years. The agents responsible for this hampered process of primitive accumulation were the feudal and imperialist forces. In summary, while feudalism during the 1796–1926 period remained predominant, it was increasingly disintegrating, giving birth to ‘surplus agriculture’ (cash cropping), simple capitalist cooperation and capitalist manufacturing. As a result of these changes, ‘the country,’ as Gordon noted in 1900, was ‘advancing in general improvements, slowly but yet moving forward; not standing still or sliding back as some say’.155 Indeed, Bharier put the 1900s overall economic growth rate at ‘at least 10 percent’.156 This improvement took place, partly due to the overall development of the internal productive forces and partly due to the impact of external forces, British and Russian imperialism in particular. The gradual dissolution of feudalism in Iran was also facilitated by a series of major crises of reproduction along with the oppressive and tyrannical methods that the feudal forces and their external allies used to solve them. These changes notwithstanding, the transition to productive capitalism was blocked in the face of feudal oppression and colonial exploitation. Failing to develop the productive forces significantly, the emergent bourgeoisie transferred capital to investment in foreign trade and land speculations and supported a modern dictatorship that replaced the old absolutism.

CHAPTER 5

POLITICAL SYSTEM AND PUBLIC POLICY

This chapter investigates the extent to which the superstructure of the state underwent change and development in the 1796–1926 period. In particular, it briefly examines the monarchy and its governmental institutions, including the administrative state apparatus (the bureaucracy, public finance, budget and its deficit), and the repressive state apparatus (the army and the judiciary). The countervailing forces to the state and its policies, including developments in Iranian civil society, along with various forms of ideological conflict and attempts at administrative reform, are more fully addressed in the subsequent chapter.

The Institution of Monarchy The institution of monarchy in Iran is as old as the nation’s history. However, this continuity is superficial as the institution has undergone profound changes over the centuries. By the time of the Qajar dynasty, the kings had become absolute monarchs and in certain period monarchy as a state form disappeared altogether (e.g., under the Arab rule). They were, according to Malcolm, ‘the most absolute in the world’.1 Their power was unlimited and arbitrary save for tradition and religious considerations. For the king, nothing was ‘subject to the law’ and hardly any ‘law’ existed before the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. Malcolm wrote in the 1880s that: There is no assembly of nobles [as existed under the Parthians], no popular representation, no ecclesiastical council of Oulamah [religious

POLITICAL SYSTEM AND PUBLIC POLICY

77

authorities] in Persia. It is a maxim that the king can do what he chooses, and is completely exempt from responsibility. He can appoint and dismiss ministers, judges, and officers of all ranks. He can also take away the property or the life of his subjects.2 By 1891, when Curzon had visited Persia, ‘remarkable change’ had occurred and the king had become a ‘moderate despot’.3 Nevertheless, in 1891 Curzon had this to say of the monarch: In his person are fused the threefold functions of government legislative, executive, and juridical. No obligation is imposed upon him beyond the outward observance of the forms of the national religion. He is the pivot upon which turns the entire machinery of public life.4 The obedience of the shah’s subjects was also absolute. In this sense, no inequality existed between the poor and the wealthy or between the lower and the upper classes: they all had to obey the monarch’s decrees (farmans) and proclamations. For example, a powerful minister, Mostaufi ol-Mamalek, is said to have remarked: ‘If the Shah should say, ‘‘I want to throw myself off the roof of the house onto the ground,’’ I would reply, ‘‘Whatever the Shah wills is of course correct’’.’5 Indeed, in this pre-constitutional period, as during most of Iran’s Islamic time, the kings had all the rights but no obligations while the people had all the obligations but no rights. If Naser od-Din Shah was ‘a moderate despot’ compared to his predecessors, his successor Mozaffar od-Din Shah was even more moderate. This has often been ascribed to his personal peculiarities but this ignores the socioeconomic changes that were taking place in society. His successor Mohammad Ali Shah was even less successful in imposing an effective absolutism on Iran, despite his constant struggle for absolute rule. His defeat by the people was also the defeat of absolutism, and his successor Ahmad Shah, the last king of the Qajar dynasty, was virtually a constitutional monarch. The Constitutional Revolution changed the ‘rights–obligations’ relations between the king and the people. Now, people also had rights though their obligations remained primary. By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, absolutism had virtually disappeared, only to reappear in the late 1920s in the form of dictatorship. Apart from the costs associated with the maintenance of the monarchy – including its extravagant court and harem – it is not difficult to see the costs

78

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

associated with absolutism itself.6 It has always been a barrier to the socioeconomic, political, ideological and intellectual development of Iranian social formation. Indeed, absolutism ran right through society, determining the general attitude to land, trade and industry as well as to politics and social systems including the family. Iranian society has been the victim of absolutism for centuries. It has crippled society and has suppressed whatever may have been viewed as innovative. Absolutism is the main enemy of innovation, and without innovation no society can hope for genuine development.

The Institutions of Government The early Qajar institutions of government were very different from those of the later Qajar. Institution often refers to laws, rules and regulations, but in this chapter it also stands for organization. The term ‘institution’ can hardly be applied to the primitive offices of the early Qajar period when there were hardly any ‘rule’ and what existed was unilaterally and arbitrarily made by the king. In fact, it was not until the early twentieth century that these primitive offices were institutionalized, that is they were provided with rules and legal frameworks. The forces that brought about this institutionalization were basically internal although external forces played a major role. The 1906 Constitutional Revolution marked the turning point in the institutionalization of the Iranian state, ushering in a new era of nationbuilding and citizenship. Of the many institutions that existed and changes they experienced, developments in the administrative and repressive state apparatus are examined in this chapter. Another important institution, the ideological state apparatus, is examined in the next chapter. The Administrative State Apparatus Although the administrative state apparatus includes many functionally distinct organizations or offices, often uncoordinated or even disjoined, this section focuses on some of its main offices and functions, including their rules, attitudes, and operational policy and efficacy. These include the tire bureaucracy, corruption and public finance including the general budget and deficit. A discussion of the attempted reforms and the resulting changes in these institutions are left for the next chapter where the ideological state apparatus is taken up.

POLITICAL SYSTEM AND PUBLIC POLICY

79

Tire Bureaucracy and Corruption All government institutions were regarded as the private offices of the king. Not only the employees but also the ministers themselves were the ‘subjects’ of the king, over whose life and property he had unquestionable sovereignty. If the services of ministers did not please the king, they risked losing not only their position but even their life. Furthermore, no one but the king could appoint, promote, demote and dismiss those at the top of the rigid hierarchy. A rigid hierarchy was very much in evidence during the Qajar period. However, it existed more among the institutions and offices than it did within them. The country was divided into several provinces, each headed by a governor-general known as a hakem (vali in the case of four regions). They were either sons of the shah or a member of the royal family. Hakems worked under the general but indirect supervision of the prime minister. Each province was in turn divided into bolouks (districts) headed by a lieutenantgovernor known as a na´eb ol-hokoumet. Further down the hierarchy came darouqehs (heads of police), kalantars (mayors of cities) and kadkhodas (heads of wards or villages). A somewhat different administrative arrangement existed for the ils, whose chief (ilkhani) stood immediately under the hakem, and under whose supervision served ilbegis, khans, sheikhs and toushmals. From the kadkhodas or toushmals up to the monarch, a brutal hierarchy existed, characterized by the ‘arbitrary exercise of authority’, which had to be strictly observed at every level.7 In the absence of a well-developed social division of labour, this hierarchy was based more on personal than functional relations. What essentially characterized this administration, however, was neither its hierarchy nor the existence of personal relations but the economic relations that were built into it. One important road to wealth, security and social status was in holding some form of government office. These were normally purchased as it was a socially accepted practice for the feudal state to farm out its offices. The office farmer was always the highest bidder when there was more than one candidate, which was almost always the case. Upon his appointment, the would-be governor received the ketabcheh, i.e. the official statement of the revenues of the province. At this point, the purchaser had paid the purchase price and had to remit to the central government a fixed sum of the collected taxes, rent and other levies as specified in the ketabcheh. But the farmer’s obligation went far beyond this. He had to pay a particular sum as a gift (pishkesh) to the king and to the prime minister. This gift – from the receiver’s point of view – was known as madakhel.8

80

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

The term of the farming was for one year and to retain the office the farmer had to compete with those eager to pay a higher price. This payment always amounted to a large sum and was required of the office holder.9 Upon the confirmation of his continuance in office, the official received a royal robe of honour (khal´at) for which the recipient had to pay an unspecified sum known as khaf atbeha.10 But even then the farmer was not totally secure, particularly in the face of the universal intrigue prevailing among the ruling classes. A further sum was then needed to secure the position. But the list did not end here. The official could be accused of committing unspecified offences against the central government and for which the payment of a ‘voluntary fine’ was required.11 The list of payments by office holders is exhaustive and demonstrates the incredible sums that were received by the royal treasury upon the sale of an office.12 Upon the purchase of the office, the provincial governor – the farmer of the provincial offices – was in the same position as the king: after dividing the province into various geographical units, he farmed out each unit to a particular official who had more obligation to the provincial governor than the latter had to the king. This subfarming continued down the hierarchy with each lower level committing itself to further obligations.13 Assuming that the officials at each level of the hierarchy had to recover the payments they had incurred, pay for their extravagant living expenses and retain some profits for amassing wealth, the extent of the extraction from the lower classes – the peasantry in particular, on whose shoulders the whole system stood – can be easily seen. Lewis Pelly, the British Resident at Bushire, concluded in a report written in 1874 that: One of the consequences of this system of farming is that the agriculturalist is called on for a much larger rent than the State receives from him; e.g. A farms a governorship from the Shah for an amount B plus C the douceur (the term of the annual contract remaining a constant quantity, while the douceur varies). A in turn farms his circle of villages, of which D takes one circle. D again sublets a hamlet or one of his villages to E who deputes F to collect the rents. Each, of course, expects a profit on his contract, and consequently the agriculturalist, instead of having to pay the amount B which benefits the State, is called upon for his share of B þ C, þ D’s þ E’s þ F’s profits. He cannot pay. F complains to E and E to A, who is dunned for his contract sum from the capital. A gives to his subfarmers permission to collect the revenue by force. This is done; next year some of the peasants have fled, some of the

POLITICAL SYSTEM AND PUBLIC POLICY

81

land is lying waste. The country, in brief, is revenued as if the government were to end with the expiry of the governor’s lease.14 The farming system was by no means confined to agriculture; almost every office of the state was farmed, including the post, telegraph, customs and mines. Consequently, madakhel became one of the more important practices of Qajar society. However, madakhel was still an effect, the causes of which included the court’s need for cash and the upper class’ need to satisfy its thirst for a more extravagant lifestyle. The sale of offices and the introduction of madakhel were above all the consequences of the state’s growing need for cash. This was due to the introduction of the money economy in Iran, resulting from the growth of trade and the shift to cash crop agriculture (see Chapter 4). The need for cash was also reinforced by the changing lifestyle of the ruling households and the kings’ expensive trips to Europe.15 The change towards a more luxurious life was not accompanied by a corresponding change in the traditional extravagant lifestyle of the Iranian ruling classes. As late as 1891, ‘a functionary of rank or position [held] from 50 to 500’ retainers.16 The expenses of the ruling classes must have increased to a new high, making them more needful of money. The growing need for cash was accompanied by a corresponding growth of an inefficient and inflated bureaucracy. In 1891, Curzon observed that: Every minister, every governor, every official, is surrounded by an immense staff of munshis, mirzas, and mustofis, i.e. clerks, secretaries, and accountants. There is no proper division of labor; confusion and lack of system prevail everywhere. This enormous staff of civil servants justifies itself by no reports, and produces no statistics; official returns, tables, schedules, or calculations either do not exist at all or, if they do, exist in a deceptive shape.17 Six years later in 1897, a Persian social critic had this to say: ‘the High Divan has about 600 mostaufis, of whom 300 work in the offices of ministries and nobles (bozorgan) and the rest are idle’.18 This growing army of ‘idle’ bureaucrats had to be paid even though there was no cash. Faced with a chronic cash shortage, the state could not pay ‘the bulk’ of its ‘bureaucratic horde’, and ‘the salaries of the higher officials [were] fixed at a notoriously inadequate figure’.19 Moreover, ‘even the fixed and official salaries [were] frequently in arrears, or [were] not paid at all’.20 Instead, they all were

82

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

expected to remunerate themselves. Madakhel then became the means for ‘remuneration’. The practice of madakhel flourished under the rampant and widespread corruption so characteristic of Qajar society. Since I have examined this aspect of the ruling classes in the preceding chapter, I make only some general remarks here. In the 1800s, Malcolm had observed that: Nor is virtue or liberal knowledge to be expected in men [‘the ministers and chief officers of the Court’] whose lives are wasted in attending to firms; whose means of subsistence are derived from the most corrupt sources; whose occupation is in intrigues which have always the same objects, to preserve themselves, or ruin others; who cannot without danger, speak any language but that of flattery and deceit; and who are in short condemned by their condition to be venal, artful, and false.21 In 1891, Curzon, praising Malcolm for the above ‘observations’, commented that ‘to a large extent they hold as good of the present as of the old generation’.22 Two years later, in 1893, Amin os-Soltan, the prime minister, had this to say to Lascelles: ‘Do not expect any patriotism from us. It does not exist in the country. Self-interest, greed, and avarice abound. Beyond that no one cares what happens.’23 As pointed out in the preceding chapter, there was no substantial change in the general attitude of the Iranian ruling classes towards their society right up to 1926 and after. In 1917, Sykes remarked that ‘every governor is a robber’ and went on to stress that ‘the governing class . . . is sucking the life-blood of Persia’.24

Public Finance and Budget Deficit ‘There have been in Asia’, wrote Marx, ‘generally, from immemorial times, but three departments of Government: that of Finance, or the plunder of the interior; that of War, or the plunder of exterior, and finally, the department of Public Works’.25 Under the Qajar rule, the last was to a significant degree neglected, and even, in the case of agriculture, destroyed; the department of war ceased to function as ‘the plunder of the exterior’; and the department of finance fell increasingly under the domination of private interests and foreign powers. The administration of finance under the Qajars was originally simple but effective. However, it was corruption that led to its gradual usurpation by private interests and external plunderers. The most general features of the

POLITICAL SYSTEM AND PUBLIC POLICY

83

system under the rule of Naser od-Din Shah (1848–96) may be summarized as follows: the whole of the financial affairs of government was handled by the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of the Treasury and the administrations of local governors, all of whom were either directly or indirectly under the control of the prime minister and the shah. The Finance Ministry consisted of several departments among which the daftar-e estifa was the most important. The daftar assessed taxes; drew up the tax registers; prepared various budgets for ministries, departments and provinces; and conducted the year-end audit of the accounts of the various government agencies. On the basis of the annual budgets, the daftar issued a dastour ol-amal, or recipe, to each governor or department head, listing the anticipated revenues of the province or office and all authorized expenditures. Receipts for the payments were obtained and the surplus was remitted to the Ministry of the Treasury via another department. This latter department further investigated the documents concerning the revenues and expenditures of the province or office, collected the difference and remitted it to the treasury. However, a check was built into the process: for major authorized expenditures, a barat had to be obtained bearing the signature of the vazir-e daftar (head of the estifa department who was usually also the finance minister), the prime minister and the shah. If the parties desired to act as a check on each other, they could do so unless they were not strong enough to withstand the other’s pressure. This was apparently the case during the last decade of Naser od-Din Shah’s reign as will be explained below. To prepare the dastour ol-amals, the daftar-e estifa relied upon his local agents (mobashers) who worked with the local governor’s financial agents in the field and who served as checks on the governors. The financial agents prepared the preliminary financial reports of their respective locales, passed them on to the governor or his deputy, whose mostaufis then drew up the final dastour olamals. The main function of the governor’s agents was to collect taxes. In theory, tax-collection procedures were subject to specific rules; in practice, however, it was an arbitrary affair. Every governor also had a representative (vakil) in Tehran, whose job was to make sure that the list of income and expenditures for the previous year – as prepared and presented by the governor – was ratified. The finance minister stood half-way between the treasurer and the local governors and he was therefore in a position to check on both of them if he wished to do so – although this was seldom the case. Actual authority rested with local governors who were, for the most part, tax-farmers. However, the

84

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

treasury could serve as a strong check against governors since it issued vouchers against their receipts. The whole system was bound to the barat, which had to be signed by the prime minister. This gave him considerable power and influence. His power, however, could be considerably weakened by a strong man in the Finance Ministry or in the Treasury Department. Passing from form to substance, I shall now turn to the financial resources of the state. Judging from the descriptions given by Malcolm 180926 and Curzon about 80 years later,27 the main items comprising the revenue of the state were not that significant and, as indicated in Table 5.1, the revenue was largely extracted, at a growing level, from major provinces of the country. Throughout this period, the regular fixed taxes (maliyat) and the irregular taxes (soursat) exacted from the peasantry remained the backbone of the state’s revenue. Judging from the figures given by Millspaugh, however, from 1890 to 1922 the major sources of state revenue shifted.28 The contribution from land taxes, cash and kind, although remaining the major source of state revenue (responsible for about 38 per cent), saw its relative share decline as income from customs and ‘other resources’ grew. These latter sources together contributed about 62 per cent of taxes collected. The ‘other sources’ accounted for about 32 per cent of the state’s revenue and came from oil royalties, post, telegraphs and road tolls (see Table 5.2). Table 5.1

Revenue of Selected Provinces (10,000 Rials)

Province 1835–6a 1867–8a 1888–9b 1912/13a % Change % Change % Change 1835–89 1888–1913 1835–1913 Tehran Khorasan Azerbaijan Esfahan Gilan Qazvin Buroujerd Fars Kerman Hamadan

39 172 496 304 193 50 35 397 38 38

210 220 620 420 440 70 60 380 210 30

431 659 967 404 345 116 70 669 291 91

1,242 1,185 824 389 276 231 173 167 161 106

1,005.1 283.14 94.96 32.89 78.76 132.00 100.00 68.51 665.79 139.47

188.17 79.82 17.35 3.86 25.00 99.14 147.14 300.60 80.75 19.78

1,084.6 588.95 66.13 27.96 43.01 362.00 394.29 137.72 323.68 178.95

1,762

2,660

4,043

4,754

129.46

17.59

169.81

Sources: aData taken from tables given in Issawi, The Economic History, p. 362. Persia, 2, p. 480.

b

Curzon,

1,812.82 3,825.00 3,607.68 6,493.80

379.22 550.84 1,010.10 2,232.45

268.71 536.66 800.00 6,809.33

— — 257.18 7,335.86

(4) Other Sources 2,460.75 4,912.50 5,706.95 22,871.43

(5) Total (1)þ(2) þ(3)þ(4) 73.67 77.86 63.22 28.39

(1) as % of (5)

15.41 11.21 17.70 9.76

(2) as % of (5)

10.92 10.92 14.02 29.77

(3) as % of (5)

— — 4.51 32.07

(4) as % of (5)

Sources and Notes: aSee Table 4.10. bSee Table 4.10. cCurzon, Persia, 2, p. 481. To Curzon’s figures for ‘other sources’ are added items the author gives in a footnote on the same page. Included in Curzon’s ‘other sources’ are mint, telegraph, post, passport, various rent, exactions from tribes, road taxes, mines, presents, royal garden, Mashhad Shrine, brick kilns of Tehran and slaughter houses of Tehran. Figures are rounded. dMillispaugh, The Financial and Economic Situation of Persia, p. 29. I have collapsed ‘Direct Taxation, Cash’, ‘Opium’, ‘Tobacco’, and ‘Other Indirect Taxes’ under (1) and the following items under (4): Mint, Passport and Chancellory, Police Department, Judicial Income, Post, Telegraph, School Fees, Stamps and Antiquities, Oil Royalties, Imperial Bank of Persia, Discount Establishment, Oxide of Iron, Road Tolls, Railways, Navigation, Mines, Forests, Electric Light, Telephone, Fisheries, Dye School, Parliament and Miscellaneous. Among these items Oil Royalties, Post, Telegraph and Road Tolls were responsible for about 81 per cent of the ‘Other Sources’. Figures are rounded.

1836/7a 1867/8b 1888/9c 1922/3d

Year

(3) Customs in Cash

(1) Taxes (Land, Others) in Cash

(2) Taxes (Land, Others) in Kind

Composition of Government Revenues (10,000 Rials)

Table 5.2

86

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Aside from these changes, it is important to expound the ‘traditional’ tax structure of the Qajar period, as this will indicate the extent to which the state was involved in plundering the economy and the peasants in particular. Generally speaking, for most of the Qajar period, the two major sources of state revenues were fixed ‘regular’ taxes and ‘irregular’ taxes (soursat).29 The former included regular taxation, revenues of crown lands, customs, rent and ‘other sources’. Regular taxation, in turn, included taxes on private landholdings (vaqf and toyoul lands were exempt); taxes on animals, flocks and herds; and taxes on shopkeepers, artisans and traders. These taxes were often farmed out for a lump sum and levied on villages and towns as a whole, often on the basis of arbitrary and centuries-old assessments. The producers and traders of the towns were required to pay about 20 per cent of their profits to the state, on top of a poll tax and other extortions.30 Extortion was also used against the ils, whose main obligation was the payment of taxes on flocks and herds.31 Taxes on crown lands were levied as a fixed percentage of the produce per a ‘contract’ between the state and the cultivator. Customs were farmed out to the highest bidder who obtained a profit of about 20–5 per cent in 1889. Although there were established government tariff rates, the actual rate was always determined by negotiation between the farmer and the importers or merchants. Owing to competition among customs houses, farmers usually charged less than the notoriously low tariff on foreign imports fixed by the Torkmanchai Treaty at 5 per cent ad valorem.32 Finally, rent and profits were realized from the sale and lease of state institutions and from concessions made to foreign powers. Soursat or ‘irregular’ revenue were sums arbitrarily and suddenly levied to meet some temporary need. They often became permanent and passed into ‘tradition’ or precedent. Although in theory they were also levied on the ruling class, the actual contributors were the peasants. Soursat included public requisitions, gifts (pishkesh) and ‘extraordinary’ pishkesh, which included fines, bribes, confiscations and gratuities.33 Above is the outline of the administration of ‘public’ finance and the sources of state revenue, and the following will look at the size of this revenue and the expenditures made against it. This will involve consideration of the state’s budget deficit. In 1890, the Iranian government incurred a debt that was thereafter to grow very large. In previous decades, occasional deficits appeared, but they were not a chronic feature of the budget (see Table 5.3). By the eve of the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, the state deficit had reached nearly 3 million toumans which, due to the reform measures taken

POLITICAL SYSTEM AND PUBLIC POLICY

87

immediately after the revolution, was subsequently reduced to 502,000 toumans. The deficit continued to grow again after the defeat of the revolution in 1911 and grew to about 5,931,000 toumans in 1912–13. A deficit is, of course, the relation between revenue and expenditure; it develops simply because the former does not grow in the same proportion as the latter, assuming an initial balance. The first task is to inquire into the forces that prevented the revenue from growing as it could or should have; then consider the structure of expenditures and sketch out the causes of their increase; and, finally, inquire into the attempts made by the state to cope with the problem and the contradictions developed therein. Table 5.3 shows that the primary problem with the deficit lay on the expenditure side. For example, between 1867 and 1888, state revenue grew by an average annual rate of 0.61 per cent. Yet a surplus was left after all the expenditures had been paid off. The average annual increase in expenditures for the same period was as low as 0.60 per cent. The revenue during the next period (1888–1907) grew at a faster average annual rate of 2.2 per cent. Yet the state had developed a deficit of about 3 million toumans by the end of the period (an increase of about 8.6 per cent per annum), due to an increase in expenditures. The situation during the next period (1906–23) was no better. During this period, revenue grew at an average annual rate of 12.19 per cent. Yet the deficit at the end of the period amounted to 2,636,000 toumans, a reduction from the 1906 level of 3 million. But the reduction was due less to an increase in revenue than to a decrease in the average annual rate of growth of expenditures, which was 8.58 per cent. While the main cause of the deficit lay on the expenditure side, the slow growth of revenue between 1888 and 1907 cannot be completely ignored. As I pointed out in the preceding chapter, the process of expropriation, tax oppression, inflation and the shift to cash crop agriculture virtually ruined the Iranian lower classes. This most assuredly included the peasants who, leaving the lands deserted, fled to the surrounding towns and the neighbouring countries or just preferred to remain idle as khoshneshins in their villages. The effect on the state revenue was disastrous, though the process concentrated much wealth in the hands of feudal lords, state officials, a group of merchants and a section of the religious authorities. The state was left with a ruined peasantry whose ability to even pay its regular taxes – not to speak of irregular extortions – had been virtually reduced to nought. This process paralleled the practice of farming offices and tax collections, which further reinforced the poverty of the lower classes. Yet, the practice of sales-farming meant, above all, that the state would have received only a

Table 5.3

Government Revenues and Expenditures (10,000 Rials)

Year

Total Revenue Regular

1807–8a 1808–9b 1836–7c 1839–40d 1853–4d 1867–8e

2,000.00 3,000.00 2,461.00 3,453.00 3,367.00 4,912.50

5,070.00 1876–7d 5,080.00 1884–5d c 1886–7 5,500.00 5,537.00 1888–9f 6,000.00 1890–1d 6,700.00 1892–3g 1906–7h 7,750.00 8,000.00 1907–8d 1910–11i 14,116.00 1912–13d 13,069.00 22,871.40 1922–3j

Total Surplus (þ) Expenditures or Deficit ( )

3,750.00

1,162.50

4,750.00

330.00

4,223.00

1,314.00

7,000.00 10,750.00

–300.00 –3,000.00

14,618.00 19,000.00 25,508.00

502.00 5,931.00 2,636.60

Commentary

plus 1,000 extortions plus 3,000 extortions plus irregular exaction plus irregular exaction plus irregular exaction plus irregular exactions of about 4,900 plus irregular exaction plus irregular exaction plus irregular exaction plus 770 irregular exactions plus irregular exaction plus irregular exaction plus irregular exaction plus irregular exaction plus irregular exaction plus irregular exaction plus irregular exaction

Sources and Notes: aGeneral Gardane to Minister of External Relations, 24 December 1807. In Issawi, Economic History, p. 25. bMalcolm, History of Persia, pp. 336, 343. Malcolm’s figures are given in pounds sterling which was almost equivalent to 10 rials (one touman) in 1808. Commenting on his figures, Malcolm stated: ‘‘Perhaps the total amount (i.e., 6,000,000 toumans) is somewhat exaggerated.’’ cIssawi, The Economic History, pp. 337, 361. dJamalzadeh, Ganj-e shaigan, pp. 118–19. Expenditure figure for 1884–85 is from Issawi, Economic History, p. 337. Issawi gives 47,500 rials as revenue of the year 1876. Figure for expenditure of 1912–13 is estimated. See Issawi, Economic History, p. 338. Figures for 1839, 1853 and 1876 are also given in Rabino, Banking in Persia. eThomson, Report on Persia. fCurzon, Persia, 2, p. 483. gFigure for deficit is from Bakhash, Iran, p. 279. The author indicates that the figure ‘did not include the annual installment required to write off the Regie debt’. Ibid. Figure for total revenue is the average annual revenue for the period 1890–1910, given by Bharier, Economic Development, p. 6. Figure for total expenditure is obtained using the revenue and expenditure figures. hKasravi, Tarikh-e Mashrouteh, 1, p. 205, and 2, p. 487. See also Browne, Persian Revolution, p. 240. iJaza’eri, Qavanin-e Maliyeh, pp. 65–9, 79–81. j Millispaugh, The Financial and Economic Situation of Persia, p. 28.

POLITICAL SYSTEM AND PUBLIC POLICY

89

small portion of what had been actually exacted from the taxpayers. The extent of the foregone revenues can be judged from the fact that Nazem osSoltan paid 23,000 pounds sterling to secure the governorship of Fars province. Moreover, Amin os-Soltan, another ruthless ruler, was making between 70,000 and 100,000 pounds sterling from the mint, customs and sales of offices.34 To this list of factors contributing to the slow growth of revenue, I shall add the depreciation of the Iranian silver currency and the chronic balance of payments deficit. These factors received further encouragement after 1890 as the shah increasingly became indifferent to the affairs of the state. His indifference was the consequence of his failure to secure the cooperation and support of his ministers, officials and the olama to reform state institutions; the humiliation he suffered from the cancellation of the Tobacco Concession (see Chapters 7 and 8); and the debilitating effect of Anglo–Russian rivalry (see Chapter 7). The more the shah became indifferent to the affairs of the state, the more his power became fragmented and the stronger local governors and state officials became. As a result, the amount of tax remittances to the central treasury declined and the possibilities for further corruption and abuse in state institutions were enhanced. The effect was twofold: the more the shah grew ‘indifferent’ to the affairs of the state, the more grew the claims on the slow-growing state revenue, among which the army, the court and pensions accounted for the most (see Table 5.4). Above all, it was the shah himself who was responsible for the huge increases in state expenditures. The shah’s retreat to his court and harem (andaroun) proved disastrous for an already ruined country. In the andaroun, the shah ‘surrounded himself with sycophants, many of them mere youth, whose one thought was to enrich themselves and whose conduct outraged the moral sense of the people’.35 An example was a certain Malijak, the nephew of a favourite wife of the shah, who at the age of nine received ‘the title of amirtouman, the highest rank the army could confer’.36 The practice seems to have become widespread and developed into what was called ‘Malijakmania’. In 1890, E´temad os-Saltaneh remarked that, ‘our government has not only grown young; it has become a child and mere infant’.37 He then makes his charge more specific: ‘The minister of court and treasury (maliyeh) is 27 years old; the mostaufi ol-Mamalek is twelve; the colonels and generals are seven and eight years old. May God ... grant this goodly king a few old and experienced servants, for the era of youth is destroying the soul of Persia.’38

90

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Table 5.4

Total Government Expenditures for Selected Years (10,000 Rials)

(1) Total expenditures (2) Military expenditures (3) Court and harem (4) Pensions Percentage share of (2) in (1) Percentage share of (3) in (1) Percentage share of (4) in (1) Total share of (2), (3) and (4) in (1)

1867–8

1888–9

1910–11

1922–3

375.00 175.00 50.00 25.00 46.67 13.33 6.67 66.67

422.30 181.00 80.00 100.00 42.86 18.94 22.68 84.48

1,461.80 373.24 67.49 — 25.53 4.62 — —

2,550.80 984.23 38.48 456.92 38.59 1.51 17.91 58.01

Sources and Notes: See various sources listed in Table 5.3.

The demoralized king also became avaricious: the number of his wives increased to about 200, the court expenditures became more extravagant than ever, and he began making frequent and expensive trips within Iran on the top of his three expensive trips to Europe in 1873, 1878 and 1889. When the shah went to Arak in central Iran in 1892, for example, he was accompanied by a camp of over 5,000. At Mahallat, the royal party was joined by Zell osSoltan who had come up from Esfahan with over 6,000 followers to greet the shah. To finance this short trip, the shah had drawn 100,000 toumans (29,000 pounds sterling) from the royal treasury and had borrowed another 85,000 toumans (24,500 pounds sterling) from the British Imperial Bank in Tehran. Zell os-Soltan, who hoped to secure new appointments from his father, had spent an additional 125,000 toumans (35,000 pounds sterling).39 Courtiers, princes, big landlords and high state officials also lived extravagantly – a luxurious lifestyle that they were most interested in maintaining. As taxpayers were ruined and new items of revenue entered the list of state revenue, these ‘rascals’ began usurping state offices, extending their control over as many of them as they could; and appropriating to themselves and their relatives what could be exacted. As this practice became a more viable source of accumulating wealth in the absence of the shah’s effective control over his bureaucracy, the rivalry within the ruling class intensified. By 1890, the two most powerful rivals were Kamran Mirza, the shah’s young son and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and Amin os-Soltan, the prime minister, who had under his direct or indirect control many ministries including court, interior, treasury, finance and foreign affairs, as well as a number of offices including the administration of the southern

POLITICAL SYSTEM AND PUBLIC POLICY

91

ports, customs and the mint. He had directly farmed the customs from the shah and had influenced the shah’s decision to farm out the mint to Amin ol-Zarb.40 For Kamran Mirza to abuse the financial affairs of the army, it was necessary to secure the independence of army finances from the Finance Ministry and the treasury, both of which were under the influence of his rival, the prime minister. This was granted to him by his father in 1893. Afterwards, Kamran Mirza managed the army as if it was his private office. To see what this entailed for the country, it should be noted that the share of army expenditures in the total expenditures of the years 1867–8, 1888–9, 1910–11 and 1922–3 was 46.67, 42.86, 25.53 and 38.59 per cent, respectively (see Table 5.4).41 Moreover, between 1867 and 1889, army expenditures increased at an average annual rate of only 0.16 per cent, while the corresponding rates for the periods 1888–1911 and 1910–23 were 4.83 and 13.64 per cent, respectively. From the percentage share and annual averages given above, we can see the weight the army carried in the state finance. It seems safe to assert that the army expenditures were the main factor contributing to the public deficit. However, the interesting point is that this huge state enterprise had become a private office for its commander-in-chief who used and abused it as he wished. As Bakhash has correctly remarked: ‘The bulk of this expenditure now went to enrich Kamran Mirza himself or remained in the pockets of paymasters, officers and others who handled army funds.’42 A similar situation also prevailed in the ministries and offices held by Amin os-Soltan and others. Amin ol-Molk, Amin os-Soltan’s brother, was the minister of the treasury, who ran it ‘as a private banking operation’.43 The government barats, for example, ‘were left unpaid for eight or nine months while the funds of the treasury were loaned out at high interest by the minister. This was generally accomplished through the agency of sarrafs, or moneylenders, in the bazaar.’44 Moreover, ‘creditors were always willing to accept a ten to thirty percent discount to ensure early payment of their bill’.45 Pensions were also a fiscal burden on the state. ‘Fear of disorder’, wrote Bakhash, ‘meantime, led the government to grant reductions on taxes and dues and to increase the list of those, particularly among the olama receiving pensions, stipends, and allowances.’ This was ‘to buy off opposition leaders’.46 The share of pensions in the total expenditures of the years 1867–8, 1888–9 and 1922–3 was 6.67, 23.68 and 17.91 per cent, respectively. Of course, pensions went to enrich their recipients among

92

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

whom were the mollas, princes, government officials, Persian nobles and other members of the ruling class. By 1890, the Qajar State had come to require increasing amounts of cash due to the introduction of a money-economy, the shah’s expensive trips to Europe and the elite’s cultivation of European luxuries. The need for cash was further compounded by the slow growth of revenues and the rapid increase in expenditures overall. Naturally, the state began looking for remedies. Offices were farmed out; ranks, medals, titles, pensions, and promotions were sold; confiscation augmented the crown lands which were then sold; taxes were increased; and national resources were concessioned out. Yet by 1900, it was clear that all of these remedies had themselves become a source of trouble: they either reduced the revenue of the state (e.g. sales of offices) or increased the expenditures (e.g. pensions). The whole problem was also complicated by the increasing depreciation of the kran and the growing balance of payments deficit (discussed above and in Chapter 7). As internal sources became exhausted, the state began looking for outside assistance. The search for ‘loans’ and ‘advances’ began. I shall explain this process in Chapter 7 in detail. For now I simply point out that many loans and advances were obtained (Table 5.5). Nevertheless, the situation did not improve. In fact, it grew worse: for example, the 1892 loan went directly to Regie Company as compensation for its cancelled Tobacco Concession (see Chapter 8). The interest on the loan, however, went to augment the list of state expenditures. The 1900 and 1902 loans were spent on two European trips of Mozaffar od-Din Shah. The interest charges, likewise, went to augment the expenditures of the state. The interest charges for 1909, 1913 and 1920 were 360,000, 537,000 and 319,850 pounds sterling, respectively (see Table 5.6). However, cash was as scarce as it had been before obtaining the loans and advances. By 1926, the public deficit seemed to have no remedy. It had acquired such a common feature in the state budget that it hardly attracted any attention save for the foreign banks and the domestic moneylenders. The Repressive State Apparatus In this section the judiciary system and laws and the military institution are considered. Both institutions underwent important changes, particularly the military, which gradually developed into a regular army by the end of the period under investigation. Developments in the institution of the judiciary and law were very slow until the Constitutional Revolution, beyond which significant changes were introduced despite continued resistance from

Britain (excluding interest charges)

Total:

Loan/40 Loan/75 Loan/75 Loan/15 Loan/18 Loan/50 Consolidated Loan/15 Advance Advance/2 1/2 Advance Advance/3 Advance Advance Advance Advance Advance Advance Advance Advance

Type/ Duration (year)

9,575,966

3,450,000

4,580,482

750,349

l

k

1,223,061f 583,679 140,000 200,000 100,000 166,670h 50,000 817,000 20,000i 1,850,000j

3,122,317d 180,421

5,330,831l

South Customs North Customs North Customs South Customs South Customs South Customs North Customs South Customs South Customs South Customs North Customs South Customs South Customs South Customs South Customs APO Royaltiesn APO Royalties APO Royalties APO Royalties

100,000a 2,250,000 1,000,000 314,281 — 1,250,000 1,111,000e 140,000 200,000 100,000 200,000g 50,000 817,000 20,000i 1,850,000m 770,404 320,000 250,000 200,000

Outstanding as of 1920

13,025,966k

Security

Original Amount

1,724,346

1,724,346

116,667

62,959 1,171,387 cancelled in 1921 140,000 200,000 100,000 cancelled in 1921 50,000

cancelled in 1921

Outstanding as of 1925

Sources and Notes: Data compiled from the following sources: Sykes, A History of Persia, 2, p. 523, who quotes The Statesman’s Yearbook for 1921; Millispaugh, The Financial and Economic Situation of Persia, p. 34; J.E.F., ‘Memorandum to Persian Government Laws,’ 27 November 1912, Public Record Office, FO 371/1711. See also Jamalzadeh, Ganj-e Shaigan, p. 155; and Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, ch. 5. The table excludes interest charges and floating debt to arms suppliers which was in original sources: a5000,000 rials. b22,500,000 rubles. c1,000,000 rubles. d31,223,170 rubles. e60,000,030 krans. f31,524,501 krans. g1,891,500 rubles. h1,576,250 rubles. i1,000,000 krans. j92,500,000 krans. kconsolidated figure is excluded to avoid double-counting. lYears 1900 and 1902 figures for outstanding loans (Russia) are excluded to avoid double-counting. They are already included in the consolidated figure. mI have provided the figure. In original sources, only the outstanding figure appears. nAPO stands for Anglo-Persia Oil Company. oIBP stands for Imperial Bank of Persia.

Russia (excluding interest charges)

Total:

6 5 5 5 7 5 7 7 7 7 7 7 — — — 7 7 9 7

Interest Rate (%)

Russia and Britain (excluding interest charges)

IBP (British Capital) Russian Government Russian Government India (Brit. Government) IBP (British Capital) IBP (British Capital) Russian Government Anglo-Indian (Brit. Gov.) British Government British Government Russian Government British Government British Government British Government British Government IBP (British Capital) IBP (British Capital) IBP (British Capital) IBP (British Capital)

Lender

Foreign Debt: Loans and Advances, 1892–1925 (Pounds Sterling)

Total:

1892 1900 1902 1904 1910 1911 1911 1912 1913 1913 1913 1914 1915–17 — 1918 1923 1925 1925 1925

Year

Table 5.5

94

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

religious forces. The military, on the other hand, was a candidate for reform for a long time, beginning with the Russian–Iranian wars at the turn of the nineteenth century.

The Judiciary System and Laws The Qajar judiciary, for the most part, recognized no rights of any significance for the ‘ruled’ while collaborating, legitimizing and protecting the unlimited and absolute – though undeclared – rights of the ruling class. Indeed, before the Constitutional Revolution, the Iranian people had no rights but had all the obligations while the king and his court had all the rights and no obligations. In theory, however, no government institution underwent so drastic a change as did the Qajar judiciary, due mainly to the Constitutional Revolution. Indeed, after the Revolution, the rights–obligations balance changed in favour of the people though the development was short lived. The Qajar feudal judicial system was founded upon Islamic laws as expounded in the Qu’ran and proclaimed in the Sonnats and the unwritten ‘common laws’ based on custom, tradition, precedent and practice. Hence, the duties of the clergy and the judge were, for the most part, combined. In practice, however, justice was administered in two relatively distinct modes. The Shar´ (i.e. Islamic laws) constituted the branch of the judicial system administered by the religious authorities of numerous ranks and confined to cases, such as religious ceremonies, inheritance, marriage, divorce, contracts, sales and all other civil matters. Criminal cases were also brought to Shar´, but it was the Orf (i.e. the unwritten common laws) that ultimately decided these matters. The Orf constituted the second branch of the judicial Table 5.6

Consolidated Debts and Service Charges (Pounds Sterling)a 1909

1913

1920

1922

1925

Consolidated debt 6,000,000b 6,754,000b 5,330,831 5,590,000b 1,724,346c Service charges 360,000b 537,000b 319,850d 335,400d 103,461d Floating debt to — — 275,654c arms suppliers — 900,000b Sources and Notes: aFigures are highly approximate (except those indicated by ‘b’). b c Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 370–2, quoting various sources. Issawi gives 2,000,000 pounds sterling as the consolidated debt for 1925. I believe a portion of the figure includes the floating debt to arms supplies, as indicated in this table. dCalculated assuming an average interest rate of 6 per cent.

POLITICAL SYSTEM AND PUBLIC POLICY

95

system and was administered by secular magistrates. They were to judge – on the basis of precedent and custom – matters such as murder, fraud, theft, corruption, every crime of capital importance and every case that could be called a breach of the public order. Though separate and distinct, the practices of the two branches frequently overlapped and caused constant conflict and struggle. The one always tended to penetrate the practical sphere of the other and made every attempt to secure a dominant position. This ideological struggle has been present in Iranian society ever since the invasion of Iran by the Arabs. During the Qajar period, the stronger tendency was for ‘the gradual reassertion of the civil authority’,47 the best evidence of which are the laws promulgated during the Constitutional Revolution. In theory, the king stood above any law, whether Islamic or customary. In practice, however, he was always drawn into the conflict between the Shar´ and the Orf. In the final analysis, the shah always took the side of the Orf as did the secular ruling class as a whole. After all, the Orf was directly administered and effectively controlled by this faction of the ruling class and accorded with their fundamental socioeconomic interests, including extortion, oppression, theft, fraud and corruption. These were among the most common traditions and practices of the Iranian feudal states ever since their formation. Ironically, it was these very practices that were in the jurisdiction of the Orf. The conflict between the shah and the higher religious authorities was, therefore, inevitable; during the period under investigation, the shah as well as the secular faction of the ruling classes remained predominant. The conflict between the secular and the religious factions of the ruling class as manifested in the conflict between the Shar´ and the Orf was, above all, a superstructural one. It was essentially a struggle for state power. However, the economic interests of the two factions coincided; this is primarily what accounted for their coexistence. Being economically predominant, the secular faction was successful in containing the frequent encroachments from the religious faction, retaining its hegemonic position in the power bloc while subordinating the Shar´ to the Orf. It is not, therefore, difficult to see why a secularizing tendency should have been predominant during the Qajar period. Aside from their frequent collision, the Shar´ and the Orf were complementary. While the Shar´ was essentially concerned with the systematization of a lawful religious system and its protection and legitimation, the Orf saw that the system was reproduced in the best interests of the ruling class as a whole. To the extent that the activities of the Shar´, in the last analysis, accorded with this reproductive process, its conflict

96

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

with the Orf was overshadowed by its cooperation with it. After all, the two modes of the administration of the judicial system under the Qajar rule were no more than two aspects of one and the same repressive judiciary apparatus of the feudal state. The changing economic conditions of the Iranian social formation towards the end of the nineteenth century were increasingly making the Shar´ and the Orf obsolete. The new forces required a broader scope for their development, which they could not find within the existing judicial system. The need for reform and the introduction of new laws and codes also arose from the fact that the growing social division of labour was forcing a corresponding division of labour within the ‘power of the realm’ who had combined in his person the legislative, executive and judicial powers. But a change in this direction also meant a corresponding change in the institutions of the Shar´ and the Orf. Before the 1906 Constitutional Revolution, few attempts were made at reforming the judiciary and all were failures. The feudal apparatus was proving more resilient than it seemed to the reform-inspired shah. In 1875, after his return from Europe, Naser od-Din Shah ordered the establishment of a ‘Councils of Administration’ which was supposed to ‘check injustice or corruption [and] counteract the legal prerogative of the clergy. But the mullas ... created such a storm of opposition that the project was abandoned’.48 In 1878, upon returning from his second trip to Europe, Naser od-Din Shah sought to abolish the institution of sanctuary (bast) and to establish ‘courts of justice’.49 The attempt failed and the institution of sanctuary became a powerful force in bringing about the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. The next attempt in the direction of reform was made in 1888 when the following royal proclamation was issued: We do proclaim that all our subjects are free and independent as regards their persons and property; it is our will and pleasure that they should, without fear or doubt, employ their capital in whatever manner they please, and engage in any enterprise, such as combination of funds, formation of companies for the construction of factories and roads, or in any measures for the promotion of civilization and security.50 A decree (farman) followed the proclamation, which was sent to all provincial governors binding them to ‘the strict observation of the edict’. In the following year, the shah ordered ‘the codification of the law’. But as Curzon observed in 1889, ‘official circles in the capital were stirred to their

POLITICAL SYSTEM AND PUBLIC POLICY

97

foundations by the intelligence that the king had ordered to the Council of State the task of creating a new body of law for the regulation of justice’.51 As usual, the whole scheme was abandoned under pressure from the guardians of the Shar´ and the Orf. From 1890 onwards, the shah abandoned all thoughts of reform; after his assassination in 1896, the situation remained unchanged until the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 brought about a qualitative change in the institution. It must be emphasized that the failure of these reforms did not lie only with the civil officials and the religious authorities. The shah himself was an uncommitted and hesitant reformer. While sensing the growing need for reforming his declining power apparatus, he feared that any serious attempt in that direction would only weaken his own position within the hierarchy. This contradiction was ever present in the shah’s reforming thoughts and it always resolved itself in favour of the status quo.52 In August 1906, before the constitutional movement had been radicalized to a significant degree, a constitution was ‘granted’ by a decree from Mozaffar od-Din Shah. Subsequently (between 1906 and 1909), four very important sets of laws were promulgated signifying a drastic change in the feudal institutions of the Qajar State. I will briefly discuss the impact of these laws on state institutions and reserve a discussion of their class significance for Chapter 8. The Electoral Law of 9 September 1906 gave a conditional right to specific classes to elect members (or to be elected) to the future National Consultative Assembly.53 It debarred others including governors, assistant governors, the police and those employed in the military. Moreover, government officials and employees – if elected as a representative – had to quit their jobs and had ‘no right to intervene or concern themselves in their former office or in any [similar] service’. For the supervision of the election, the law required that a provincial and a local council (anjoman) be formed under the supervision of the governor or his deputy in every place where elections were carried out. Further, the law required that ‘the National Assembly of Electors [or the ‘Court of Electors’] shall be established in all towns where there is a resident Governor’. Where the ‘written or spoken statements’ of a member of the National Consultative Assembly are considered ‘contrary to the public good . . . [he] shall be brought before the Court of Cassation’. All these institutions were new to the Iranian feudal formation and their impact on society was significant. The Electoral Law of 1906 was changed into the New Electoral Law of 1 July 1909 ‘[i]n accordance with the requirements of the time’. Among other modifications, the law required the formation of a ‘Council of Supervision’ (Anjoman-e Nezarat) in every electoral

98

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

centre. In the new ‘Council of Supervision’, the governors played a supervisory role and members all hailed from the upper classes. The Fundamental Laws of 30 December 1909 envisaged the establishment of a National Consultative Assembly ‘to promote the progress and happiness’ of the kingdom and the people, and recognized the rights of ‘each individual ... to participate in choosing and appointing the members of this Assembly by popular election’. They called ‘for the creation, modification, completion, or abrogation of any law’ by the Assembly and authorized the ministries to draft and revise ‘new laws which were needed’ and after which the approval of the Assembly could be put into action. Moreover, the ‘regulation of all financial matters’ (including the budget), the public expenditure, ‘changes in fiscal arrangements’, the formation of the Inspectorship of Finance, the transfer or sale of natural resources or the delegation of control over them, ‘granting of concessions of any kind’, ‘conclusion of treaties’, and the construction of railroads were made subject to the ‘approval’ of the Assembly. The Fundamental Laws also called for the formation of a Senate. According to the Supplementary Fundamental Laws of 7 October 1907, no legal enactment of the Assembly of the ‘Persian nation’ could ‘be at variance with the sacred principles of Islam’. Otherwise, it must be ‘rejected or repudiated’ by the members from the olama and ‘the Proof of Islam’. The laws recognized the equality of the people before the law; ‘protected and safeguarded the lives, property, homes and honor of all individuals’; forbade summary arrest, illegal punishment, exile and the ‘confiscation of the property or possession of any person’. All these cases were qualified by the statement: ‘Save in conformity with the law.’ Moreover, ‘compulsory instruction’ was to be regulated, ‘all publication, except heretical books and matters hurtful to the perspicuous religion [of Islam] were to be free, and exempt from censorship’. Likewise, the ‘societies (anjomans) and associations (ejtema´at) which are not productive of mischief to Religion or the State’. The most important proclamations were, however, those related to the ‘powers of the realm’. These were divided into three separate branches: the legislative branch, which concerned with the ‘making or amelioration of law’ and whose power derived from the king; the judicial branch, belonging ‘exclusively to the ecclesiastical tribunals in matters connected with the ecclesiastical law, and to the civil tribunals in matters connected with ordinary law’; and the executive branch, which pertained the king and was ‘carried out by the Ministries and the State officials’. These officials were solely

POLITICAL SYSTEM AND PUBLIC POLICY

99

responsible before the Assembly as the king was exempt from any accountability. The honorary title of ‘minister’ was entirely abolished. In 1907, four civil courts were also established. These included the Court of Property and Financial Claims, the Criminal Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. In the absence of any code, however, these civil courts had to use the Orf and Shar´ procedures. In 1908, another court was created to deal with matters of dispute between the civil and the Shar´ courts. The attempt to codify the law proved a difficult task, involving a struggle with the clergy.54 In 1909, the Law of Pension, which sought to curb payments to princes and religious authorities, proved ineffective. However, the reform attempts continued. In 1910, the Office of Attorney General was created. The Salt Law was also passed in the same year which, due to opposition from the masses, was immediately abolished. Three other tax laws were also introduced in 1910: the Law of Tax on Means of Transport, the Law of Sheep Intestines (intestines of all sheep slaughter came to be the property of the government) and the Law of Public Accounts and Office of Accounts.55 During 1911, a series of laws were also introduced. The Supplementary Law of Pension was enacted and was relatively effective. A law was passed by the Assembly, authorizing the Treasurer General to control the money borrowed from the Imperial Bank in 1911. A second law was enacted concerning the organization of the ‘financial system of the Persian Empire’.56 Meanwhile, the Law on Opium Restriction was enacted, imposing a fine on unauthorized use of opium. The judicial system was reorganized, the old Ministry of Justice was dissolved and a new one was created. A committee was formed ‘to consider experimental codes, and a committee of experts under the guidance of a French jurist, Adolph Perni, was charged with the task of formulating a civil code’.57 Between 1911 and 1915, the Assembly was closed. In 1915, a commercial code was promulgated and the Real Property Tax, the Gum Tragacanth Tax and the Tobacco Duty were introduced.58 In the constitutional era and after, a civil judiciary system evolved and the Shar´ was increasingly pushed into the background. It was hoped that the swift changes introduced would drastically modify the institutions of the Qajar State. Yet the new civil laws faced many problems and the judicial institutions were not subsequently transformed into those of the rising bourgeoisie. Aside from the resistance and hindrance of the clergy and the ruling class, the courts were faced with a shortage of skilled manpower and ‘the system of capitulations that put aliens outside the reach of Iranian law and permitted foreign consulates to interfere with the courts’.59

100

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

The Military Institutions In feudal society – particularly in its early and middle period – the most repressive of all state forces were religion, the courts, tradition and custom. These forces gradually lost their grip over the masses and were replaced by the police and the army. The army in the early-to-middle feudal period was basically used for the plunder of the exterior and the protection of the territories of a feudal lord – or those of many lords – from external aggression. Its deployment against internal class struggle was secondary although at times very crucial. The situation, however, changed drastically towards the end of the feudal period when the army was increasingly deployed to quell internal unrest. It was a marked characteristic of the transitional period that the use of force – by the police and the military – against the opposition was excessive. If the crisis-ridden feudal state did not manage this use of force, then it would have been left to the rising bourgeoisie. It was due to this fact that the army became the subject of numerous reform attempts and ate up a huge share of the state’s revenue. In this way, the feudal army of the early Qajar period gradually developed into a semi-bourgeois army by the end of the Qajar rule. According to Malcolm, the early Qajar army was composed of the following three units: ‘a considerable body of irregular horse’, ‘a numerous irregular militia’, and ‘a corps of infantry and artillery’.60 The ‘irregular horse’ was drawn from the military ils who ‘performed military service in return for grants of land and liberty of pasture’.61 Up to 80,000 of the ‘irregular horse’ could be mobilized. They were commanded by their il chiefs and received provisions for themselves and their horses plus a small annual payment when employed.62 The ‘irregular militia’, an infantry force, was formed from the armed population of the ils, towns and villages. Their immediate responsibility was to guard and defend their own homes. They were called upon during emergencies and were bound to comply. ‘When employed with the army, or in distance garrisons, they received pay from the government.’ They provided their own clothing and arms including ‘matchlock, sabre, and dagger’. The ‘militia [had] no further discipline than that of obeying their own officers’ and, according to Malcolm, up to 150,000 of them could be mobilized when needed.63 The regular infantry and artillery consisted of about 20,000 men. According to Malcolm, a part of these were ‘clothed, armed, and paid by the government’. ‘The disciplined infantry consisted of two great divisions, the

POLITICAL SYSTEM AND PUBLIC POLICY

101

Sarbaz or the resolute and the Janbaz or the condemners of life. The Sarbaz who numbered about 12,000 were mobilized and supported by Abbas Mirza, the heir apparent.’ Abbas Mirza also commanded a regular cavalry brigade of 1,200 men and a corps of horse artillery. These men were all mobilized from the military ils and their pay was ‘superior’ to those of other corps. The officers received, according to Malcolm, 40–500 toumans a year and the common soldiers 10 toumans plus ‘certain articles of dress and rations when on service’. They were also granted crown lands on favourable terms. The Janbaz force, about 8,000–9,000 men, was also drawn from distinct ils but were not so well paid, clothed or disciplined.64 The king also had his personal army, the ‘royal guard’, composed of about 3,500 Georgian slaves and the sons of the Persian nobility. They were, according to Malcolm, ‘well-mounted, and well armed, at the public expense’. Their pay was high and they were ‘employed on every service likely to add to their fortune’.65 The slaves, therefore, did not play as important a role in the army of the Qajar period as they did in 800–1700.66 This was the state of the army in 1809. At the outset, all reforms in the army originated with foreign forces, who made it another arena for their rivalry. Already in the 1800s a number of ‘Russian renegade officers’67 served as instructors of ‘the simplest platoon exercises’68 in Abbas Mirza’s army. In the early nineteenth century, Fath Ali Shah tried to benefit from the antagonistic relations among France, Russia and Britain. Napoleon considered Iran a strategic point for his expansionist aims in the area. Under the terms of the Finkenstein Treaty (1807), Napoleon undertook to reform the Iranian army. Following this development, 70 French army officers were sent to initiate the reforms (Gardane’s mission). Before they could take any significant steps, however, they had to leave the country: Napoleon had come to a new understanding with Russia and Britain whereby the latter undertook to provide Iran with a subsidy of 200,000 toumans per year and reform the army. Subsequently, in 1809 and 1811, a number of British officers (Jones’s, Malcolm’s and Ouseley’s missions) were sent to Iran ‘to discipline the Persian infantry’. In 1812, Britain and Russia reconciled their differences and British officers in the service of the Iranian army – which was at war with Russia – were withdrawn from the war. Iran was defeated and the Golestan Treaty was imposed on Iran in 1813. After the treaty was concluded, Britain again began showing an interest in reforming the army. With the help of Iranian officials, a new treaty was signed whereby Britain was ‘to supply officers for drill and discipline, arms and munitions of warfare, and the material and workmen for

102

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

a [munitions factory] at Tabriz’.69 The dispute over the subsidy Iran was to receive from Britain for the treaty ended with the termination of the first round of British involvement in the Iranian army. There followed ‘a long period of apathy’ as Abbas Mirza was frustrated in his attempts to reform the army. Five Persians were sent to Europe to learn the military and other sciences. After the Iranian army was defeated by Russian troops in the second war in 1826 and the Treaty of Torkmanchai was imposed on Iran, the British showed enthusiasm again to help the Iranian army. However, nothing major was done until 1832–4, when a ‘considerable supply of arms and accoutrements’ was sent to Iran from Britain, followed by ‘a large detachment of officers and sergeants from India, with ample provision for every branch of the military service’. An Englishman (Bethune) was put at the command of the army and ‘two thousand rifles and accoutrements and 500,000 flints were dispatched from England as present for the Shah’.70 In 1836, Britain again betrayed Iran, this time over the question of Herat, and the shah subsequently ordered the dismissal of British officers in the service of his army. Following this development, France again appeared on the scene but withdrew before effecting any significant change in the army. In the last year of his reign (1834), Fath Ali Shah, fearing the increasing power of the ils and the feudal barons and knowing that an alternative power base had been created, set out to change ‘the feudal basis’ of the army.71 The ils were subsequently ‘deprived’ of the right to perform military service in return for the use of pasture land.72 This policy adversely affected the ils and might have led to the fall in their share of the total population between 1876 and 1900 (see Table 3.3).73 But the situation of the ‘feudal barons’ remained the same; their relation to the central government changed little in the years that followed. Amir Kabir’s internally oriented reform attempts, like the previous externally directed reforms, also failed to bring about radical change either in the material basis or in the organization of the Iranian army. This was due to the intrigues of the feudal magnates who feared the centralizing policy of Amir Kabir and his determination to put an end to their regional power. Nevertheless, Amir Kabir introduced an important measure in the army: ‘As part of its tax quota, each town or village was required to provide a certain number of soldiers for military service.’74 According to Lambton, a consequence of this policy was that ‘the army was no longer composed mainly of contingents furnished by the local governors and landowners, whose loyalty was to their own commanders and not to the state’.75 Amir Kabir also established the Dar ol-Fonoun college where military science was

POLITICAL SYSTEM AND PUBLIC POLICY

103

taught. The schemes became distorted but remained intact after Amir Kabir’s murder in 1851. By 1852, a small number of Italian ‘refugees’, Hungarians, Austrians and Russians were all that remained as relics of the externally oriented policies of the pre-Amir Kabir period to help reform the army among other government forces and bureaucracies. In 1859, another French mission arrived at Tehran and left the country in 1861, accomplishing little. Meanwhile, Naser od-Din Shah, inspired by Amir Kabir’s ideas, continued to demand the reform of the army. Several decrees were proclaimed between 1850 and 1870, and in 1867 the Military Council (Majles-e Tahqiq-e Divan-e Nezam) was formed.76 These were: To end corruption and ensure that pay and rations reached the troops; to prevent the sale of military offices and restrict traditional hereditary rights to military rank; to ensure the good order of arms factories and arsenals; and to end common malpractices such as the maintenance of large personal households and the use of soldiers as servants by the officers.77 However, neither this nor the shah’s desire to end corruption was carried out to any successful conclusion. The measures introduced during Moshir od-Dauleh’s premiership (1871–3) were also directed towards the reform of the army. In particular, as Bakhash wrote, they intended ‘to prevent speculation of pay and rations, to assert central control over army finances, to end nepotism, and to improve the quality of the army by the appointment of capable officers, the employment of foreign instructors, and the purchase of more modern weapons’.78 Although Moshir od-Dauleh ordered ‘a review of military stores and put back into operation cannon-casting and other arms factories that had long remained idle’, his most important innovation was to introduce ‘conscription’ and fix the term of ‘compulsory service’ at 12 years. Nevertheless, the state of the army did not change very much.79 In 1874, Piggot observed that the army was inefficient due to ‘the speculation, the utter worthlessness of the native officers, meager[ness] of the soldier’s pay [which was] several years in arrears’ and the fact that they were ‘badly fed and clothed, and lodged in wretched barracks’. He also observed that ‘commissariat [were] given to the highest bidder’ and the soldiers [were] continually to be seen where the hardest work [was] going on, staggering through the bazaars under huge loads, digging water courses or building

104

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

walls.80 Piggot’s sorrow must have reached a low when he found the following description of Iranian soldiers from an English colonel in the service of the Iranian army: The Persian soldier is active, energetic, and robust, with immense power of enduring fatigue, privation, and exposure. He is full of intelligence, and seems to have a natural aptitude for a military life. Half clothed, half fed, and not even half paid, he will make marches of twenty-four miles day after day, and when need be will extend them to forty miles.81 In 1878, the shah, in Vienna during his second visit to Europe, received a warm welcome from the government of Austria. Subsequently, ‘a large staff of Austrian civil and military officials was again placed at his disposal’. They arrived in Tehran in l879.82 The Austrians failed to change anything, but during this time the notorious Cossack Brigade was formed in Tehran by a group of Russian officers. The Cossack Brigade came to play an important role in the subsequent political and class struggle of the late Qajar period. Meanwhile, 1,000 rifles and some steel cannons were given to the shah by the Russians. Concerning the scientific side of the military, Amir Kabir established a college (Dar ol-Fonoun) in which military science was taught. In 1873, upon his return from his first trip to Europe, the shah established a second staff college, which did not amount to anything significant. In 1885, another college was established whose curriculum was ‘exclusively military’.83 Yet by 1891, the state of the army was little different from Malcolm’s description of the institution. Save for the royal bodyguard, the army still consisted of an irregular cavalry composed of members of ils; an irregular infantry militia mobilized and supported by the cities, villages and ashaieri areas; and a ‘semi-regular army of infantry, cavalry, and artillery’. This latter force (which included the Cossack Brigade) had become ‘the bulk of the defensive forces of the kingdom’ and their instruments were not comparable, in quality and quantity, with those of the 1800s.84 The soldiers seem to have received less pay, in real terms, while the officers had not gained much save for corruption.85 Corruption also continued to grow. The ‘superior ranks’ who came from ‘men of good family’ were ‘the greatest rascals in the world’.86 For them, ‘patronage and promotion’ were ‘marketable commodities’ and they sold commissions to their subordinate officers, and exemptions from service and

POLITICAL SYSTEM AND PUBLIC POLICY

105

discharges to their soldiers. They even made madakhel out of the rations and pay. To grasp the extent of the corruption, it will suffice to note that in 1891, Curzon had found that ‘a child of eleven years of age was a field marshal’.87 Throughout the 1890s and after, regardless of the attempts made by the Constitutionalists, corruption remained characteristic of Iranian army officers. The case of Kamran Mirza, the commander-in-chief of the army in the 1890s, is illuminating. He first separated the army budget from the ordinary state budget. Consequently, both the treasury and the daftar-e estifa ceased to look after the affairs of the army. This done, Kamran Mirza began charging the state for an army of 90,000–100,000 men while in actual fact he did not have more than 30,000, ‘perhaps as few as 15,000’.88 Even the pay and rations of these men were not paid or paid in arrears, while ‘money was lent at high rates of interest in the bazaar to native Sarrafs’.89 He also sold military titles and positions. Army accountants bought their posts for as much as 1,000 toumans.90 He seems also to have involved himself ‘in an illicit traffic in arms’.91 Kamran Mirza, however, was not alone. Every one of the army officers seems to have been involved in similar operations. The army, of course, suffered from these malpractices; what suffered even more was the state revenue. From 1890, the shah grew increasingly apathetic to the affairs of state and practically gave up all attempts at reform. Nevertheless, the shah, his successors and the Russian government took care that the Cossack Brigade grew in strength, becoming an 8,000-strong force despite the declines it suffered due to internal and external opposition.92 The increasing interest of the shah in the Cossack Brigade was due to several factors: the disintegration of the feudal order, the weakening position of the shah vis-a`-vis the feudal magnates, the increased dependency of the shah on the Russian government, and the intensification of the class struggle. The feudal organization of the army had become obsolete and ineffective and the need for the use of violence against internal forces was growing. The Cossack Brigade was the only force that had been created with an eye to this problem. Yet by 1911 it was apparent that the Cossacks alone might not be able to withstand an offensive from the rising revolutionary forces. Moreover, people were resentful of the Cossack Brigade as it was commanded and controlled by Russian officers. There was yet another problem: Mr Shuster, an American Treasurer General of Iran for a period of time, had put together a new financial organization whose success depended on the ability of the state to collect its taxes. As Shuster himself put it:

106

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

I planned, therefore, to build up a department to be known as the Treasury Gendarmerie, which should be an integral part of the office of Treasury-General. It was hoped within a year to enlist and instruct several thousands of men . . . with which it would be possible to practically assure the collection of the entire revenue nominally due to the Government. The Persian peasants, laboring classes, and small property-owners are not intractable in the matter of paying their dues to the Government, but the peculiar condition in that country demanded that the Government should be able to show the necessary force with which to exact the taxes before it could hope to receive them on the mere demand of civilian officials.93 The ‘peculiar condition’ to which Shuster referred in his statement was the fact that the ‘peasants, laboring classes and small property-owners’ were increasingly resisting the extortionate policy of the government and refused to pay taxes. It was also evident that these classes were increasingly becoming restless over their plight. The Gendarmerie, as ‘planned’ by Shuster, was organized by Swedish officers in 1911 and, as Rudolph has pointed out, ‘its primary mission was to safeguard internal security’.94 The force had about 8,400 men towards the end of the period under investigation. The new force could not but annoy the Russians. Britain, however, was neither satisfied nor worried. The Gendarmerie could become a rival for the Cossack Brigade, but it could not become a tool in the hands of British imperialism whose initial attempts to reform and control the Iranian army had ended in failure but not in despair. The fact that the British were not so hopeless was proven by their determination to create the 6,000-man South Persia Rifles.95 In summary, by 1926, the army consisted of the following four major forces: the Cossack Brigade (8,000 men), the Gendarmerie (8,400 men), the South Persia Rifles (6,000 men), and the traditional royal bodyguard (the Nezam; 2,000 men). Besides these forces, the army also had several provincial and il forces to call in times of emergency; but in many cases, the provincial and il ‘forces fought government troops enforcing centralization’.96 In 1926, Reza Khan, then war minister, and subsequently Reza Shah combined all these forces into a 40,000-man single national army – the first in Iranian history. By 1925, it was reported that the army was ‘equipped with motor trucks, a few armored cars, tanks and aeroplanes, and a high-power

POLITICAL SYSTEM AND PUBLIC POLICY

107

wireless station with branch station in the provincial centers’. Moreover, besides the regular army, there was a ‘unified police force’ in larger cities, a ‘Road Guard’ (Amniyeh) and a small naval force in the Persian Gulf.97 It was to this newly organized regular army that Reza Shah owed his speedy ascendancy to the throne, his power base and the subsequent centralization of the newly formed Pahlavi Dynasty. Towards the end of this period, the army was increasingly used against internal opposition. As well stated by Rudolph: The army was used [by Reza Shah] to put down ... rebellions, break strikes, and uphold the authority of the central government. Although the mission of the army was officially presented as defense against external aggression, it in fact acted to defend the Shah’s regime against any and all opposition.98 Without these developments in the army, capitalist manufacturing could not have moved to its second phase in the post-1926 period.

CHAPTER 6

CIVIL SOCIETY AND IDEOLOGICAL ENCOUNTERS

This chapter focuses on the ideological state apparatus and the emerging civil society, including schools and newspapers, administrative reforms and the struggle among various emerging ideological orientations. Civil society is the public sphere between the state and individual citizens. It is the realm of organized and autonomous social associations that are bounded by a common purpose and a set of shared rules. Civil societies are primarily intended to reduce abuses by the state and organized groups. Civil society is distinguished from political society in that it either controls the state power or seeks to control it. In the late Qajar period, the civil society became politicized and was often indistinguishable from the political society. For this reason, the two terms ‘civil society’ and ‘political society’ are interchangeably used in this chapter. It will be shown that despite continuous attempts, the state at the end failed effectively to utilize its institutions of legitimation and control, particularly education and reform. Indeed, secularization of education and administrative reforms, which were gradually introduced in the hope of prolonging the Qajar reign at a time of significant reform movements in other parts of the world, produced the opposite result causing administrative incoherence and unmanageable changes that ultimately led to the state’s disintegration. This partly happened because the same movement produced a civil society that became increasingly strong and political. But, this emergent civil society was not capable of sustaining its strength against the state and was eventually destroyed as it became increasingly politicized.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND IDEOLOGICAL ENCOUNTERS

109

Education and the Media Initially, the Qajar State was able to control the media and legitimize itself through an alliance – at times tenuous – with the religious authorities who controlled religious educational institutions known as madrasa and maktab. Through these institutions, a ‘ruling ideology’ was gradually established in the course of a very bitter and protracted struggle between the exploited and the exploiting classes. The state reliance on the religious establishment for reproduction of its ruling ideology was at the same time a main source of its vulnerability. It was in line with reducing this vulnerability that during the course of the nineteenth century, the religious institutions of education were gradually transformed into semi-secular institutions of education controlled directly by the state. However, this same success became a new force in the disintegration of the Qajar dynasty. Shi’ism was the official religion of the Qajar State. It also formed the ruling ideology and as such it was maintained and defended by the state. Thus, when the Babists attempted to undermine Shi’ism, they were massacred by government troops. As the ruling ideology, Shi’ism influenced every state institution. It held a predominant position in the judiciary and an absolute monopoly in education. Shi’ism did not only inform the state institutions; its sway extended over the whole of Qajar society. After all, it was commonly regarded as the ‘guardian’ of the oppressed, and in playing this role it legitimized its own existence, perpetuated the Qajar oppression and diffused discontent. In short, it caused, along with other forces, the reproduction of the feudal state.1 However, Shi’ism was more than just a ruling ideology. It permeated the socioeconomic, political and cultural system, and struggled to secure the political power. Therefore, its coexistence with the secular ruling class of the state marked nothing but its relative weakness. Few relations at that time were as contradictory as this coexistence, in spite of the shared economic interests of the high religious authorities and the ruling class. But, this subordination of religion to the secular state was incomplete and in due course resulted in a compromise over the administration and control of the state institutions. In particular, the religious forces gained control of the judiciary and educational systems. That the Shi’ite religious authorities were able to monopolize these two types of institutions for most of the nineteenth century bears testimony to this ruling compromise.2 Of course, the state did not relinquish control of the judiciary and educational institutions without demanding something in return. What the

110

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

state demanded – and received – from the religious forces was ideological legitimization. Even so, the tension between the two forces never ceased. On the one hand, the religious authorities wanted to control at least a part of the state’s economic resources, which was not a simple feat by any means. On the other hand, the secular state, being in increasing financial trouble, never ceased to encroach upon the economic resources of the religious institutions. These resources were secured partly through endowments and partly through various other legal and extra-legal means. This struggle became especially marked towards the end of the Qajar period and more so thereafter. However, the main struggle between the two forces during the Qajar rule went far beyond the financial question. The struggle came to involve the very institutions of education and judiciary over which a historic compromise had been reached. Specifically, the growth of the productive forces necessitated the reorganization of state institutions. This, in turn, required new bureaucratic and technocratic forces, scientific methods and research. But the educational institutions that could help achieve these new tasks were either absent or the monopoly of the religious faction. Neither the progress of the productive forces nor the reform of state institutions was possible without secularizing education, that is without freeing education from the control of the religious authorities. This could only have been achieved gradually with much persistence and determination. However, the struggle turned out to be more than just one between the secular state and the religious authorities. The struggling forces split into two great camps. On the one side were the progressive forces, including the newly formed and developed urban middle classes, and on the other side were the conservative forces consisting mainly of the aristocracy. A corresponding split also took place within the religious forces: on the basis of their class interest, they entered into alliance with either the progressive or the conservative forces. Some history is illustrative here. The earlier Islamic period was characterized by burnings of books, destruction of libraries and similar acts. However, these practices ended soon, and a new era of ‘collecting and translating manuscripts’ began,3 ushering in a period of tolerance for diversity and critical thinking. The assertion of Sunni centralism under the Saljouqs led to a new state system of higher education (Nezamiyeh). The new system was introduced to the Islamic world by the Persian vizier (minister) Nezam ol-Molk in 1066. The development marked the beginning of what Fischer calls religious involution.4 This process reached its peak during the

CIVIL SOCIETY AND IDEOLOGICAL ENCOUNTERS

111

fanatical period of the Safavid rule, when intolerance for freedom of expression reached unparalleled heights. By the time of the Qajars, many scriptural schools (madrasa) had been built. The system was strictly hierarchical: a student had to start with his (seldom her) local maktab and then move to a bigger maktab or perhaps a smaller madrasa in a provincial centre. Finally, he would enter a well-known madrasa – usually located in a large urban area – where renowned scholars lectured. Moreover, under the Safavid rule, Shi’ism for the first time became the official state religion. This significantly reduced the state interference in the administration of the educational system. Thereafter, the madrasa subsequently acquired relative autonomy vis-a`-vis the state.5 Their autonomy was further reinforced as religious endowments increased. In this way, the madrasa became free from the state control and this led to a duality of power in Iranian society. ‘For Islam the political problem had been endemic’, wrote Fischer, ‘because there have been two sources of authority, located in the court and in madresehs.’6 A similar duality existed in the judicial system between the Shar´ and the Orf. These two problems are interrelated since the madrasa ‘[was] also a kind of legislative [body] and judiciary’.7 Before the Qajar rule, struggle between the two forces – though at times fierce – ultimately ended in compromise. The situation, though, was to change in the nineteenth century. The growth of the productive forces and the increasing demand for creative education and a secular system of thinking and learning rendered the madrasa system obsolete in the eyes of many Iranians.8 The struggle to free education from the madrasa, and thus the state from religion, began. This process was reinforced by what Arasteh calls ‘administration reorganization’9 which had become – in the wake of economic change – a vital necessity. The need for technocratic and bureaucratic officials became clear during early attempts at reforming the army (see Chapter 5). Incidentally, ideas of reforming state institutions led to the development of college-level education a full 50 years before any attempts were made to develop modern elementary education. It was also – as opposed to the initial development of elementary schooling – initiated by the state itself. Insofar as the religious authorities had a limited interest in these top-down reforms and their position was not directly affected, they remained essentially indifferent to the limited development of higher education. Therefore, no major conflict arose between state and religious leaders (olama) over the initial attempt to develop a secular educational system. There was also little mass

112

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

participation in the process. At best, it remained the business of the secular ruling classes. During the Russo-Persian wars, Persians recognized the fact that they were behind the Europeans in science and technology. This became an area of concern for the reform-minded Abbas Mirza, the crown prince and the commander of the army. As a result, in 1811, two students were sent to England for training. One student, who later died in England, studied the art of painting (for military purposes), and the other studied medicine and chemistry. Following this, a second group of five students was sent to England in 1915, among which Mirza Saleh-e Shirazi distinguished himself for his later services in Iran. Mirza Saleh pursued his studies in history, philosophy, Latin and French. The others studied engineering, military science and technology. A few other students were also sent to France and Russia in this period to learn modern crafts.10 During Mohammad Shah’s reign, a group of five students was sent to France. This group stayed in Paris from 1845 to 1848, and returned to Iran as a result of the 1848 Revolution in France. Among the five students, one was to study the infantry and artillery sciences, one to become an engineer, one to be trained in the sugar industries, one to study medicine and one to work in the mining industries. Also in this period, another student was sent to England to study medicine. Another two were sent to Russia and Italy to study crystal-making and the art of painting, respectively. To this list may be added those who were sent to Europe by their enlightened parents to study, among whom Mirza Malkom Khan is notable.11 In the reign of Naser od-Din Shah, Amir Kabir, who was pursuing a policy of acquiring modern crafts and industries, sent five students to Moscow and four to St Petersburg to learn modem crafts. Two other students were also sent to Istanbul to complete their training in the silk crafts. The development of higher education and technical training took a new turn in 1851 with the opening of Dar ol-Fonoun, a polytechnic college. The curriculum included military science, medical science, physics, chemistry, geometry, mathematics, geography, mineralogy, fine arts, foreign languages, music and theatre. The last two were eventually eliminated due to hostility from the mollas.12 Those enrolled in Dar ol-Fonoun were generally chosen from the ranks of the aristocracy, landlords and top government officials.13 Dar ol-Fonoun, whose idea and plan was conceived by Amir Kabir, was opened after his deposition and a few days before his death. Most of the teachers of this college were hired from European countries – mostly from Austria. The language of the studies was Persian and French. Several of the

CIVIL SOCIETY AND IDEOLOGICAL ENCOUNTERS

113

students of the first class of Dar ol-Fonoun were sent abroad to pursue their studies further. They constituted a part of the group of 42 students that was sent to France in 1859.14 Amir Kabir’s purpose in establishing Dar ol-Fonoun was to provide training in modern, technical and military sciences as well as crafts. For this reason, at first, science and practice were closely linked together in Dar olFonoun. For instance, a candle-making factory, a pharmaceutical laboratory, a cement factory and a paper mill as well as a printing house were attached to the college. Moreover, geography students not only made their own maps but were also involved in surveying activities for governmental projects. However, over time, Dar ol-Fonoun became more and more a governmental institution, and the purpose of its founder was for the most part lost. Nevertheless, among the major contributions of the college were the publication of newspapers and books, social awakening and technical training for more than 1,100 men during its 40 years of existence.15 The number of students studying abroad during the Qajar period is given in Table 6.1. This study abroad program was for the most part an upper class phenomenon geared towards fulfilling the government’s technocratic and bureaucratic needs. No matter what the intent, it was a progressive phenomenon and some individuals made important contributions as teachers, reform-inspired bureaucrats and social activists. For example, Mirza Saleh-e Shirazi, Ja´far Khan-e Moshir od-Dauleh, Hosein Khan-e Sepahsalar and Malkom Khan – some of the forerunners of the liberal movement in Iran – were among those sent abroad in the first half of the nineteenth century. Demand for administrative reforms from the urban middle class, among them ‘merchants, intellectuals, and heads of guilds’,16 led to the establishment of several other colleges and schools between 1850 and 1925, including a school of language (1873), two military colleges in Esfahan and Tehran (1883 and 1886), a school of political science (1901), a college of agriculture in Karaj (1902), a school of fine arts (1911) and a school of law (1926).17 Bharier has put the number of colleges at seven in 1924,18 a figure that excludes the colleges and schools I have enumerated for the pre-1900 period. By 1924, there were 12 established (though not necessarily operative) institutions of higher education in Iran. Although the madrasa were not opposed to a limited system of higher education, they were most definitely opposed to any reform of the elementary educational system. Moreover, the ruling class had no interest in developing an educational system that would have benefitted the lower classes and awakened them to their inhumane plight. It is therefore not surprising that

114

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Table 6.1

Iranian Students Abroad, 1810/1–1930/1

Year

Number of Studentsd

Country

Purpose of Study or the Place of Employment

1810a

1

England

1811b 1815b

2 5e

England England

to prepare himself for a medical career.

1818a 1844a,b 1851c 1861a,b

5 5 29 cumulative 42

England France Europe France

1911a,b

30

Europe

1918a,b 1930c

900 cumulativef 1,500 cumulative

Europe Europe

to be educated and instructed in various branches of science and mechanics. to study modern science. upon return ‘they received newly created positions in the government.’ to study military science, agriculture, and various social sciences.

Sources and Notes: aArasteh, Education, pp. 29 and 39. bIssawi, The Economic History, p. 23. Fischer, Iran, p. 58. cThis figure may include a ‘group’ of students that was sent to Russia by Amir Kabir in 1851 for technical education and two more to Istanbul between 1848 and 1851. See Arasteh, Education, pp. 48–9. dThose sent abroad between 1810–61 and 1911 were sponsored by the government. Figures for the remaining years include those sponsored by the government and students’ ‘families’. See Arasteh, Education and Issawi, The Economic History. eI am not sure if these are the same five students who went abroad to study in 1818. f200 of whom were in France, 33 in England, 9 in Germany, and the rest in Switzerland and other countries. In Arasteh, Education, p. 40.

the movement for a public school system did not begin until the late nineteenth century; when it did, it developed around reform-minded citizens. The most conservative mollas had, of course, every reason to oppose the new movement as it was directly opposed to the maktabs. In Tabriz, for example, they rushed into the Roshdiyeh School (1886) and broke ‘all the benches and boards’ and in the process destroyed the building itself.19 Nevertheless, the productive forces had by this time outgrown the maktab system of education; what was needed was a mass education system concerned with training the labour force, mobilizing the country’s resources and promoting the study of sciences.20 Recognizing this reality, enlightened religious authorities such as

CIVIL SOCIETY AND IDEOLOGICAL ENCOUNTERS

115

Tabataba´i and Najmabadi began to throw their support behind the new movement and thereby made a split within the religious forces inevitable. From the 1890s, the traditional elementary school system increasingly gave way to a secular system of education.21 The first modern elementary school was established by Roshdiyeh in Tabriz in 1889, and came to be known as the Roshdiyeh School. The founder later became known as ‘the Father of Public Education’.22 After years of struggle, Roshdiyeh’s school eventually was ruined by the conservative mullahs and he was forced to flee Iran. He returned a decade later and established ‘an explendid school’ in Tabriz. In 1897, he went to Tehran to establish schools there.23 In 1898, the Society for the Development of Public Education (Anjoman-e Ma´aref) was organized by the reform-minded Amin od-Dauleh, Daulatabadi, Ehtesham os-Saltaneh and Amin ol-Zarb. Their aim was to organize and lead the movement for public education.24 The enlightened clergy also participated in the movement and one of them, Tabataba´i, established an ‘Islamic School’ in Tehran in 1899.25 The public seems to have been very enthusiastic: they made pecuniary contributions, directed the schools, and paid their children’s tuition on time and with generosity. The schools, in turn, provided a reasonable programme. In 1900, Habl ol-Matin wrote that: ‘The program of study consists of: elementary reading, writing, reading of Persian texts, religious instruction, ethics, history, arithmetics, geometry, and such handwork as watch repair, shoe-making, sewing, agriculture, and commerce.’26 It is interesting to note that craft activities were being incorporated into the school’s programme of study. The need for a trained labour force must have necessitated this development. On the eve of the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, about 30 schools were established in Tehran and the large provincial centres (see Table 6.2). The state’s involvement during this period remained negligible. The movement was almost exclusively aided and funded by individual citizens. However, with the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, the movement took a new turn. The Supplementary Fundamental Laws of October 1907 stated that: Article 18. The acquisition and study of all sciences, arts and crafts is free, save in the case of such as may be forbidden by the ecclesiastical law. Article 19. The foundation of schools at the expense of the government and the nation, and compulsory instruction must be regulated by the Ministry of Science and Arts [renamed later the Ministry of Education]

116

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

and all schools and colleges must be under the supreme control and supervision of that Ministry.27 The laws ended – at least in theory and for the time being – the monopoly of the clergy in the administration of education. These laws further provided for ‘the supreme control and supervision’ of the government over the educational institutions. However, it was not until 1910 that the government became significantly involved in public education. In that year, the Majles passed the Administrative Law of the Ministry of Education, Arts and Endowment, which made the Department of Public Education an integral part of the Ministry of Education. This was followed by the Fundamental Law of the Ministry of Education (1911), which specified the functions and responsibilities of public and private schools.28 Thereafter, government involvement in public education grew rapidly, and in 1918, due to public demand for education, the ministry doubled its annual budget from 1.34 million rials to over 2.6 million rials.29 However, this last figure was still only 2.64 per cent of the total army expenditures in 1922–3 or 6.97 per cent of military expenditures in 1910–11 (see Table 5.4). As insignificant as the budget was, it was nevertheless revolutionary in the area of public education. By 1932, the number of modern elementary schools had reached the significant figure of 3,285, enrolling about 109,000 boys and girls (see Table 6.2). Neither the shah nor the public was as enthusiastic about secondary education as the former had been for higher education and the latter had been for elementary schooling. Nevertheless, the demand for high school education grew due to three factors: the increasing demand from graduates of the elementary schools, the need for elementary school teachers and the need for qualified candidates for the institutions of higher education. The first high school, the School of Science (Madraseh-e Elmiyeh), was opened in Tehran in 1898; the second, the Army School (Madraseh-e Nezam), was opened a few years later in the same city. After the Constitutional Revolution, high school education expanded. Although it received encouragement from the new educational laws and the growth of elementary schooling, the development of secondary schooling was hampered by the First World War. In 1918, eight high schools and the Boys’ Normal School were established to train elementary and high school teachers. By 1925, ‘there were in all of Iran only 56 private, public, and missionary high schools with a combined enrollment of 8,346 students’. In the same year, ‘the number of traditional madrasas [was] 282 with a total enrollment of 5,984 students’.30

CIVIL SOCIETY AND IDEOLOGICAL ENCOUNTERS

Table 6.2 Year

1901a

Modern Elementary Schools and Enrolment, 1910–25 Total Number of Elementary Schools 21

1898–1906b 31 cumulative

Total Number of Enrolment

Comments

—

17 located in Tehran. ‘All have been started and financed by individuals.’ Arasteh, p. 70. 10 were built during the period by the Society for the Development of Public Education, aided by the government. 1/3 were girls’ schools. ‘Almost all of these schools were directed by individuals with the financial support from the community.’ 40 new schools were built in Tehran. ‘Other cities showed similar gains.’ Arasteh, p. 74.

—

1910b

113

10,531

1918b

—

20,000

— 3,285

40,000 108,959

1922c 1924–5b

117

Sources and Notes: aKasravi, Tarikh-e Mashrouteh, p. 38, and Arasteh, Education, p. 70. bArasteh, Education, pp. 70, 73, 74, 79. Bharier gives the figure 638 for the number of ‘Primary Schools’ in 1924, which is, in my view, a gross underestimation. See Bharier, Economics Development, p. 38. cIssawi, The Economic History, p. 24.

Just as in the case of elementary schooling, neither the mollas nor the wealthy made any effort to develop high school education. And in the absence of significant interest on the part of the state, the middle classes again took the initiative. The director of Elmiyeh had observed that ‘the well-to-do parents were less eager to pay tuition for their sons than the shopkeepers who kept up their payments, even though it often meant great personal sacrifice’.31 However, the state’s interest in education was to become dominant. ‘With the rise of Reza Shah to power in 1925, all forms of education in Iran became state directed.’32 One consequence of these developments in education was the appearance of a great number of newspapers. There were two broad divisions of newspapers: official and non-official. The official newspapers for the most part reported neither foreign politics nor the domestic policies of the state but were mainly

118

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

concerned with ministerial appointments, the movement of the court and the glorification of the king. They nevertheless and at least initially played an important role in the awakening of the society. Non-official newspapers, on the other hand, became the voice of opposition to the state and foreign interventions. Mirza Saleh-e Shirazi, one of the first students sent abroad, is credited with establishing the first Persian newspaper under the protection of the reformminded Abbas Mirza, as well as the reintroduction of the art of printing to Iran. He had learnt this art himself during his stay in England. He also sent at a ‘great expense’ an individual by the name of Mirza Asad ol-Lah to St Petersburg to learn the art of printing.33 The first issue of Mirza Saleh’s newspaper, called Kaqaz-e Akhbar (The Paper of News), appeared in 1837. It reported accounts of the deeds of the shah and the government as well as some foreign news. This newspaper lasted only a few years and, after Abbas Mirza’s death, Mirza Saleh was not able to continue his efforts and, during Mirza Aqasi’s premiership, he was left idle.34 In 1851, by the command and under the direction of Naser od-Din Shah’s reform-minded premier Amir Kabir, a weekly newspaper entitled Rouznamehe Vaqaie`-e Ettefaqiyeh (The Newspaper of Current Events) was founded. Subscription to this newspaper for government officials, down to a certain rank, was compulsory. It changed names a few times and for many years was printed in the workshops of the state printing press in the College of Dar olFonoun.35 In 1866, the first issue of another newspaper entitled Rouznameh-e Mellati (Citizens’ Newspaper) was published in Tehran. This trend was followed by the publication of Fars in Shiraz (in 1872), Farhang (Culture) in Esfahan (in 1879, by the order of the shah’s eldest son Zell os-Soltan) and Tabriz in Tabriz (also in 1879, by the order of the then crown prince Mozaffar od-Din Mirza).36 The first daily newspaper to be published in Iran was entitled Kholasat olHavades (Summaries of Events) whose first issue appeared in Tehran in 1898. It contained ‘foreign telegraphic news, derived from the telegraphic summaries of current events transmitted from Europe to India by Reuter’s Agency’.37 As for other official newspapers published before the constitutional period, Iran (1888), Ettela’ (Information, 1888) and Tarbiat (Education) are worth mentioning. During their existence, these official and semi-official papers were published under a number of different names. Generally speaking, the non-official newspapers were of two broad kinds: those printed outside Iran and those published inside the country. Both were, with some exceptions (for instance, Soraiia), pro-constitutional.38 Those

CIVIL SOCIETY AND IDEOLOGICAL ENCOUNTERS

119

published abroad appeared sooner, were more freely critical and were smuggled into Iran by merchants and travellers. The most important of those published abroad were Akhtar (The Star, in Constantinople, 1875), Qanoun (The Law, in London, 1900), Habl ol-Matin (in Calcutta, 1893), Parvaresh (Education, in Egypt, 1898–1902), Hekmat (Philosophy, in Cairo, 1892–3) and Mosavat (Equality, in Istanbul, 1900s). ‘Akhtar was always in each period of its existence the lamp of all assemblies of cultivated men and the centre round which rallied the most accomplished and enlightened of the Persian exiles, and was maintained by the literary co-operation of patriotic scholars.’39 Among the contributors to Akhtar were Mirza Aqa Khan-e Kermani and Sheikh Ahmad-e Rouhi, two martyrs of the cause of freedom. Qanoun was published by Mirza Malkom Khan. Its ‘simple style of writing’ and introduction of terms such as qanoun (law), tanzimat (reforms) and osoul-e edareh (principles of administration) to the everyday Persian vocabulary ‘made people eager and desirous to read it’.40 Both Habl ol-Matin and Hekmat were published for a considerable length of time and contributed greatly to Iranian awakening. Due to political repression, before the 1906 revolution, the opposition inside Iran could only print and distribute underground leaflets and nightly letters (Shabnameh). Following the proclamation of the Constitution and immediately after the revolution, however, many newspapers suddenly cropped up, among which Majles (Parliament, 1906), Neda-ye Vatan (The Call of Homeland, 1906), Tamaddon (Civilization, 1907), Habl ol-Matin (Firm String, 1907), Sour-e Esrafil (The Trumpet of the Angel Esrafil, 1907) and Mosavat (Justice) were important. According to Browne, by 1909, ‘ninety or a hundred papers were being printed in Iran’.41 One could surely count another 100 for the period between 1909 and 1926, including those published in the provincial centres. Besides this tremendous growth, Persian newspapers began to specialize. For example, Danesh (Knowledge) was written especially for women and Chanteh-e Paberahneha (The Beggars’ Wallet) was directed at the peasants and lower classes. Some also became partisan or were established as party organs. Hezb-e Demokrat (The Democratic Party) published Iran-e Nou (New Iran), Shafaq (Twilight) and Naubahar (New Spring); Hezb-e´tedaliyoun (The Social Moderates) published Shaura (Consultation); Hezb-e Ettefaq va Taraqqi (The United and Progressive Party) published Mo´tadel (The Moderate) and Eslahtalab (The Reformer); Khiabani’s Democratic Movement published Tajaddod (Modernism); the Jungal Movement published Jangal; and the Communist Party published Kamounist (Communist).

120

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

If the quantitative growth of newspapers was significant, their names were even more so. They were published under names such as The Star, The Law, Education, Civilization, Equality, Knowledge, The Beggar’s Wallet, New Iran, Consultation, The Moderate and The Reformer. All manifested a desire on the part of the people for change, development and democracy. The call for progress, democracy, justice, equality and independence was a call at the same time for the overthrow of the absolute monarchy and the corrupt and oppressive ruling classes and an end to foreign intervention. The appearance of scientific periodicals in Persia in the Persian language began with the publication of the Rouznameh-e Elmiyeh-e Daulat-e Alliyeh-e Iran (The Scientific Newspaper of the Sublime State of Iran) in 1863. This gazette was published for the administration of Dar ol-Fonoun. Another periodical, Rouznameh-e Elmi (Scientific Newspaper), was already in circulation by 1876. Ganjineh-e Fonoun (Treasury of Arts), the first scientific magazine (as opposed to newspaper), was founded in Tabriz in 1903. Among the other periodicals ‘worthy of esteem and praise in their respective spheres’ were Falahat-e Mozaffari (Mozaffari’s Agriculture), Majmou´eh-e Akhlaq (The Collection of Ethics), Daulat-e Haqq (State of Righteousness), which was a religious periodical, Bahar (Spring), which was a literary journal, and Aftab (Sunray), a scientific and literary publication.42 The publication of satirical papers began with the appearance of Tolou´ (Sunrise, published in Bushire in 1900) and gained importance during the constitutional period. Satirical and comic papers such as Kashkoul (Navicular Porringer), Tanbih (Punishment), Hasharat ol-Arz (Insects of the Earth), Bohloul (A Satirical Character), Sheida (Lovesick), and Sheikh Choqondar (Mr Idle) and the Charand-Parand (Nonsense) portion of Sour-e Esrafil (written by Dehkhoda or ‘Dakho’) contributed equally to the public awakening and the literary evolution in this period.43 By the eve of the Constitutional Revolution, the schools, press, books, various societies (anjomans), the revolutionaries and reformers, the daily experience with corruption and oppression, and news of foreign developments had raised the political consciousness of the masses as well as their level of understanding, comprehension and articulation. In 1900, literacy was only 1 per cent (Bharier put the figure at 5 per cent); by 1920, it was 10 per cent (see Table 6.3). In 1900, only a few newspapers existed, but in 1920 more than 200 were being published. The changes from a religiously dominated educational system to a secular and modern one, from a few official newspapers to many critical ones, and from absolutism to constitutionalism were indeed phenomenal. Moreover, such change could not have occurred

230,000 65,000

Makou-Khoyb Uroumiyac male female

women: 2

hardly 5 per cent men: 5

10

Overalld Rate

100 70

30

— —

7

Officials

100 30

30

most 60

12

Landlords

100 20

30

all —

15

Clergy

90 20

30

most 60 ‘small merchants’

51

Traders/ Merchants

— —

30

2 10

13

Craftsmen

3 0.5

30

— 2

—

Workers

1 nil

2

none 5

2

Peasants

Sources and Notes: aTable is compiled from Issawi, The Economic History, p. 24, who quotes ‘estimates made by Soviet observers’ in the late 1920s. bThe original figures are given as follows: ‘in the towns 30 per cent and in the villages 2 per cent’. cAs there were no women clergy, the figures seem to refer to the wives, daughters, etc. of the respective classes. dFor the pre-1906 period, Kasravi estimates an overall (for the nation) literacy rate of about 1 per cent and for 1920 Issawi gives 10 per cent. See Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashrouteh, p. 41, and Issawi, The Economic History, p. 24. Kasravi’s figures seem doubtful. Bharier for 1900 gives 5 per cent for the literacy rate. See Bharier, Economic Development, p. 5.

200,000 381,000

2,100

Population

Literacy Rates for Selected Places in the 1920sa

DarehgazKalat Astarabad Gilan

Place

Table 6.3

122

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

unless the economic conditions for its realization existed. To the degree that these economic changes were limited, distorted and inadequate, the superstructural changes also remained restricted, deformed and isolated. These and other points are discussed below as I examine the relation between ideological struggle and administrative reform and reorganization.

Ideological Struggle, the Reformers and the Reforms Chapter 4 demonstrated that despite numerous obstructions – both internal and external – the economic structure of Iranian society underwent significant change. This development in turn necessitated changes in the institutions of the state, as shown in Chapter 5. Alongside these developments, important changes were also introduced in the educational system and print media. The consequence was the emergence of a nascent civil society. Overall, these changes were significant even if inadequate to support further development of the capitalist manufacturing. Their key impact was on the initiation of a reform movement that gradually developed into a full-scale Constitutional Revolution. The main characteristics of the reform movement up to 1890 were as follows: (1) the reforms were led by the state itself via its liberal-minded members, whose inspiration for reform – though reflecting internal socioeconomic change – came largely from political developments in Europe; (2) the reforms did not go beyond the upper echelons of the hierarchy, and the reformers did not believe in any measure of radical change; (3) the reforms were targeted towards particular institutions, leaving others untouched; and (4) the reforms were largely made dependent on the will of European countries. These reforms aimed at centralizing the state apparatus, modifying the relations among the members of the ruling class, mitigating the burden of oppression against the lower classes, satisfying the demand of European countries for stability and bureaucratic efficiency, and securing the independence of the country. The reforms ended in failure mainly because of the shah’s own wavering support and contradictory attitude, resistance from the conservative olama and the conservative members of the ruling class, and rivalry among the imperialist forces. After 1890, interest in reform shifted from the king to the public. The failure of reform from the top led to the demand for reform from the bottom. But as the opposition to absolutism and imperialism grew, the demand for reform changed into a demand for revolution. By the early 1900s, the

CIVIL SOCIETY AND IDEOLOGICAL ENCOUNTERS

123

question was no longer one of reorganizing the absolutist state; it was rather one of abolishing it altogether. The struggle for nationhood, justice, equality, law, order, freedom, independence and economic development led to the Constitutional Revolution and the gradual reshuffling of the state apparatus. As early as 1806, Fath Ali Shah reformed the government by establishing a body called Four Vizier which included a prime minister, a finance minister, a chancellor of the Empire and a minister of the army.44 Thereafter, and until the accession of Naser od-Din Shah to power in 1848, every major reform attempt was directed towards the army. In 1829, commenting on these efforts of the Persian government to form a regular army, Malcolm remarked that ‘a total change in the government must take place, before the new system of defense can do more than paralyze the old’.45 This diplomatic advice aside, the Persian opposition was demanding justice, separation of church and state, and a government of ‘reason’.46 Moreover, the prevailing discontent and the desire for change was nourishing the Babist social movement. It was under these circumstances that Amir Kabir was appointed prime minister. A man of genius and determination, Amir Kabir pushed through a programme of centralization which was aimed at the reorganization of the army. He balanced the budget that had been corrupted by his predecessor Mirza Aqasi. Attempts were made to revive Iranian industry, develop higher education, curb bribery and corruption, extend the jurisdiction of the Orf and reduce that of the Shar´ courts, restrict the influence of the olama and put down the Babist revolution.47 Only the last was successful; it was the only goal the olama and the conservative elements of the ruling classes shared with Amir Kabir. The reform-minded and nationalist prime minister eventually became the victim of his drive for a strong independent Iran free from the influence of the olama and the foreign powers. The intrigue against him was led by Britain and the conservative olama, and the anglophile Aqa Khan-e Nouri who subsequently became prime minister.48 With Amir Kabir murdered, his reforms also perished. The Iranians had been badly humiliated in wars against Russia (1812 and 1828) and Britain (1857). They also came to believe that the superiority of European states was the result of their orderly, lawful and democratic form of government. These characteristics were completely alien to the administration of Nouri, regardless of the fact that even this demagogue felt the need for ‘a code of law’.49 The shah dismissed Nouri in 1858, and instead of appointing another prime minister, he chose to establish an advisory council called the Majles-e Shaura-ye Daulati (Governmental Consultative Assembly). This council was composed of 11 men, among whom six were portfolio-

124

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

holding ministers. A year later, the shah established a second advisory council called the Maslahatkhaneh (The House of Consultation), which was composed of 26 middle-ranking state officials. According to the reform-minded Mirza Ja´far Khan-e Moshir od-Dauleh, these were supposed to be the counterparts of European parliaments. The ministries included Foreign Affairs, Finance, Interior, War, Functionaries (Vaza´ef) and Science. The Majles and the Maslahatkhaneh were among the first political organizations with laws and regulations of their own, including a parliamentary agenda. However, they were purely consultative, with no legislative or executive power (all power was vested in the shah). The members of the Maslahatkhaneh could freely criticize ministers, express their views and propose programmes regarding internal socioeconomic development. However, they were barred from interfering in foreign policy. Any programmes approved by the Maslahatkhaneh went to the Majles, and if passed and then signed by the shah, would become ‘the absolute State order’.50 Meanwhile, to enhance the power of the central government, the shah issued a decree in 1858 that asserted ‘the authority of central divan over the provincial courts’. The aim was to centralize the judicial system, extend the Orfs jurisdiction at the expense of the Shar´ courts and restrict the power of the Olama, which might have interfered in the affairs of the new councils. Moreover, watchdogs (Divanbeggis) were to control the provincial governors and oversee their practices. The decree was subsequently abolished as a result of local opposition coming from the mollas and the governors. The Maslahatkhaneh was abolished in 1860; soon after, the Majles-e Shaura-ye Daulati was likewise abolished. The main reason for the failure of the councils was held to be ‘the autocratic tendencies of the Shah, the timidity of the members, bureaucratic rivalries, and conservative officials’.51 Hostility from the conservative olama and foreign powers should also be added to the list of reasons. To protest against the councils’ purely consultative function and the lack of a division of power (legislative, judicial and executive), Malkom published his Ketabcheh-e Qeibi in 1858–9.52 He demanded the rule of law, the separation of the three branches of state power and major changes in government administration. Meanwhile, another social critic Akhoundzadeh had published his Maktoubat-e Kamal od-Dauleh in which he condemned absolutism and praised the parliamentary institutions and constitutional government. In Maktoubat, Akhoundzadeh also reiterated his view that Islam is incompatible with justice and liberty and is a barrier to progress. He demonstrated his strong sense of nationalism by glorifying pre-Islamic Iran.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND IDEOLOGICAL ENCOUNTERS

125

There were many others who criticized the taxation policy of the government, the toyoul system (what some referred to as ‘the governmental cancer’) and the shah’s extravagance.53 In 1860, Malkom published his Daftar-e Qanoun in which he again praised the law and reiterated his view that central to the well-being and independence of Persia was a government modelled along European lines. Malkom’s emphasis on administration (edareh) and order (nazm) was constant and consistent. About the same time, Malkom established the Faramoushkhaneh, a secret society in which only those seriously opposed to absolutism and advocates of reform and progress were accepted as members.54 The Faramoushkhaneh was a secret society modelled on the Freemasonry houses in Europe. In creating the Faramoushkhaneh, Malkom’s ‘purpose was clearly to create a nucleus of like-minded and influential men in the country to forward his reform projects.’55 According to the philosophy of the Faramoushkhaneh, a perfect man was one who promoted good and avoided evil, sought and spread knowledge, lived in harmony with others, encouraged unity and opposed despotism. The Faramoushkhaneh’s members also believed that a just social order should be based on the principles of ‘liberty, security of person, security of property, equality of right, freedom of thought and religion, freedom of speech, freedom of the pen, freedom of assembly, and the merit system’.56 It is evident that the Faramoushkhaneh was calling for a complete bourgeois-democratic revolution. However, it should be remembered that the members of the Faramoushkhaneh belonged to the ruling classes and were not opposed to the state per se. They were neither proposing the overthrow of the shah nor did they believe that his overthrow was the only alternative. On the contrary, they were looking to the shah for reform and sincerely believed that he could affect it. They thought the shah was a genuine reformer, who needed ideas and help to move forward. However, they did believe that their proposed reform agenda were so needed that if the shah were to oppose it, he would risk his throne. This wishful thinking soon proved wrong. In 1861, the shah banned the Faramoushkhaneh, accusing it of being a Freemasonry house of the European type whose members were rogues and cads.57 According to Ra´in, the Faramoushkhaneh was banned because of the shah’s increasing suspicions about its activities, the strict secrecy under which its members acted, the intrigue of the conservative olama (calling it a Babist centre), the intrigue from the Russians who viewed it as an anglophile organization and the Faramoushkhaneh’s call for freedom and resistance against absolutism.58 The

126

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

role the conservative members of the ruling class played in banning the Faramoushkhaneh should not be underestimated. Following the ban of the Faramoushkhaneh and Malkom’s exile to Europe in 1861, a ‘secret letter’ was distributed in Tehran. Believed to have been written by Mirza Ya´qoub (Malkom’s father), the letter accused conservative members of the ruling class (e.g. Mostaufi ol-Mamalek and Mo´aiier olMamalek) of amassing wealth at the expense of the poor and called on the shah to end injustice immediately: ‘Shah! By God, the time for thy being a man is fast passing, and the misery of the people has already passed all bounds . . . Yet, a few days are left thee.’59 Mirza Ya´qoub was subsequently expelled from Iran but the ideological struggle did not end. For example, writing in 1861–2, Badaie`negar levelled harsh criticism against the state (saltanat) and the government (daulat), accusing the first of doing nothing but ‘masonry and palace-making, and appointing and discharging’, and the second of ‘collecting four shahis of taxes in kind and cash [from] the orphans and widows and the poor and giving them to . . . the rogues’.60 He then went on to describe the harsh reality of a ruined economy, with craftsmen and merchants becoming either the agents (amel) of foreign firms or else ending up beaten in the bazaars and alleyways.61 This same theme and the call for economic development became increasingly widespread in writings of the following years. In particular, social critics called for the construction of railways and roads, the establishment of banks and joint companies, and the exploitation of the mines. Meanwhile, the call for a ‘government of law’, administrative reorganization, and an end to corruption and oppression continued. Writing in 1868, Eshraqi-ye Ansari remarked that the progress of European countries had come about because of their ‘government of law’ (hokoumete qanoun), internal reform, security, and scientific and industrial development. He then went on to demand the establishment of similar conditions in Iran.62 Meanwhile, the call for a centralized judicial system and an end to the unrestricted power of the Shar´ court continued. This was by no means a struggle against Islam itself. On the contrary, some social critics (Malkom and Yousef Khan-e Mostashar od-Dauleh among them) were using ‘the garb of religion’ to get their message across to the masses and to ward off any accusation of their being infidels or Babists. Yousef Khan-e Mostashar od-Dauleh, in particular, had written his Yek Kalemeh to show how Islamic law was not opposed to a modern state. However, in practice, he was proven wrong.63 Others were not as concerned with Islam as they were with the organization of the state. For instance, in 1870, Dabir ol-Molk argued that

CIVIL SOCIETY AND IDEOLOGICAL ENCOUNTERS

127

‘any order not based on four pillars . . . will not remain firm and established’. The four pillars were the balance of revenues and expenditures; discipline in the army; the welfare of peasants (ra`iyats) and an increase in crafts, industry, trade; and government politics. He then went on to remark that ‘no people are more subservient and ready to accept order than the Iranian people’.64 The ideological struggle arising from the harsh economic realities of Iran and the shah’s own instinct for reform brought about a series of minor administrative reorganizations in the 1860s, particularly towards the end of the decade.65 From 1871, the shah – faced with a devastating famine and increased oppression and corruption on the part of the ruling classes – began a process of reforming the administrative apparatus. As he had not appointed a prime minister since 1858 and a council of state existed only nominally, the shah decided to appoint a full cabinet that could help him reform the state apparatus. He recalled the liberal reformer Hosein Khan-e Moshir od-Dauleh (Sepahsalar) from his post as ambassador in Istanbul, and appointed him prime minister. Giving him the required support and encouragement to reorganize the government, the shah – at the behest of Moshir od-Dauleh – appointed a new advisory council called Dar osh-Shaura-ye Kobra (Upper Consultative House), which was to act as a legislative body. A year later, a cabinet of nine viziers was formed, most of whom were the reform-minded friends of the prime minister himself. The ministries included Finance, War, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Court, Justice, Stipends, Education, and Commerce and Agriculture. The last four were new. The Ministry of Science, established in 1858, seems to have been dropped and its functions transferred to the other ministries. The cabinet was later on reconstituted as Darbar-e A´zam (The Great Court). Thereafter, a series of reforms were carried out among which the reforms in public finance and the judicial system were fairly extensive. Concerning public finance, the number of pensioners was ‘considerably reduced’, salaries of state officials were tied to the actual performance of duties, bribery was to some extent restricted, royal expenses were reduced and pressure on the provincial government for the remittance of collected taxes was increased.66 Evidently, the aim was to raise the revenue of the central government since revenue was badly needed to finance the reorganization of the state apparatus. Concerning the judicial system, a series of courts was organized including a court of appeal (Divan-e Mazalem), a high court (Divan-e A´la), an investigative court (Divan-e Tahqiq), a commercial court (Divan-e Tejarat) and a legislative court (Divan-e Qanoungozari). The legislative court was immediately abolished and the others, though they survived a little longer, were all gradually dissolved.

128

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Central to Moshir od-Dauleh’s reform programme was his drive for centralization. He believed that the reforms could only be carried out with the help of European countries – England in particular. This last belief, reinforced by the advice he was receiving from his old friend Malkom, led him to sign the infamous Reuter Concession which surrendered Iranian resources to foreigners for more than 70 years. Ironically, this concession became the pretext for his overthrow. When the shah and Moshir od-Dauleh were on their way back to Iran from Europe in 1873, a coalition of the olama and the conservative members of the ruling class was formed in Tehran against Moshir od-Dauleh. Reinforced by Russian intrigue, the coalition succeeded in forcing the shah to discharge his reforming prime minister even before he arrived in Tehran.67 The fall of Moshir od-Dauleh did not end the struggle for reform. Social critics continued to criticize the state and the government and to propose concrete plans for an administrative reorganization. In his Menhaj al-Ala, written in 1872–3, Abou Taleb Behbahani discussed legal orders, European laws and security, and went on to stress that ‘our money has no credit, our promise has no credit’, and that these are due to ‘lawless government’, ‘the consequences of absolutism, and the weakness of this state’. He then proposed a ‘new law’ and a ‘lawful government’ whose realization depended on the establishment of two Majleses, one legislative (Majles-e Qanoungozari or Majles-e Shaura) and the other whose duty was ‘to correct the law’ (Majles-e Sena). The author then discussed three kinds of freedom: personal freedom, political freedom and patent right. The progress of the West, he argued, was due to the ‘public security’ and the recognition of human rights as incorporated in a ‘constitution’.68 The concern for ‘the security of body and property’ was also the subject of another article written in 1874. In the same year, another Persian, Hosein Khan-e Sartip, had demanded ‘reform’ and ‘parliament’ and used harsh words to criticize the prevailing injustice and the growing gap between the rich and the poor.69 From the mid-1870s onward, much was written on economic matters, including public finance, national income, private and public investment, the public deficit, formation of ‘companies’, and construction of industries, shops, roads and railways.70 Meanwhile, social and political questions had not been neglected. In 1880, an article written in the form of a dialogue between a ‘knowledgeable Mirza’ and a ‘conscious commoner’ accused the state and the government of widespread oppression against the peasants and craftsmen, bribery, usury, forceful accumulation of wealth, lack of law and majles, and low level of skill in industry. They called for a constitution (Qanounnameh),

CIVIL SOCIETY AND IDEOLOGICAL ENCOUNTERS

129

a military code (Qanoun-e Nezam) and a consultative assembly (Majles-e Shaura).71 Another article, ‘Sheikh Va Shoukh’, written in 1882, discussed civilization, politics and law. The author argued that ‘law’ should be substituted for ‘Islamic law’. In his view, the law should have a ‘republican’ attribute and be formulated by the collective efforts of the ‘wise’. The author praises Western education, but is harshly critical of Persians educated in Europe who, in the author’s view, are ‘all unwise . . . all irreligious, all the enemy of science, [and] all usurpers of public property’.72 Meanwhile, Malkom had been pardoned by the shah and appointed to various posts in Europe. Nevertheless, he continued his struggle for reform. His associate in the shah’s court, the liberal-minded Amin od-Dauleh (a man Curzon regarded as ‘a true lover of reform’73) also intensified his struggle for persuading the shah of the urgent and indispensable need for reform. Both Malkom and Amin od-Dauleh seem to have come to the belief that internal reform should be linked to external policy. This belief, coupled with his pro-British stand, led Malkom to ask the British government to help Iran reform its socioeconomic and administrative structures. Malkom argued that these reforms were vital in the face of increasing threats posed by Russia to the independence of Iran. However, Malkom and Amin od-Dauleh did not succeed in bringing about any radical change in the attitude of either the shah or Britain. The shah’s wavering support for reform had always been made conditional on the attitude and the degree of resistance of the conservative members of the ruling class and the olama, and Britain’s policy was not coordinated with Iran’s needs but rather with the policies of its Russian rival. The failure of these attempts disillusioned Malkom as to the shah’s intention of effecting any genuine reform. On the practical side, the shah had not yet given up his hope for reform after the fall of Moshir od-Dauleh. Between 1873 and 1882, the shah again chose to rule without a prime minister. In 1874, the shah appointed another Darbar-e A´zam, composed of six viziers with enhanced power to carry out their duties. However, this body was dissolved just six months later. In 1875, the shah seemed to have ordered the reform of two consultative bodies created during Moshir od-Dauleh’s premiership, the Dar osh-Shaura-ye Kobra and the Majles-e Tahqiq. In the same year, a new Tanzimat-e Hasaneh was also launched to reform provincial governments. Each ministry was directed to establish its own Majles-e Tanzimat in the provinces. This scheme was also abandoned. In 1880, the shah ordered Amin od-Dauleh to write a code of law for the state, but in the end this also proved to be without the shah’s support. In 1882, a Committee of Five was formed to evaluate the workings of the

130

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

state and propose particular measures for reform. The committee included Malkom and Amin od-Dowleh. There was still no serious commitment from the shah for implementing the recommended measures. The most important reform measures during the 1880s were the formation of the Majles-e Tahqiq-e Mazalem in 1882 and the Majles-e Tejarat in 1883. The first dealt with the affairs and complaints of the lower classes and the second was concerned with establishing order in commercial and trade activities. Over the six years of its existence, the Majles-e Tahqiq-e Mazalem received more than 2,000 complaints, two-thirds of which came from the peasants and the rest mainly from the craftsmen. The complaints were basically centred on tax oppression and expropriation. The aim of the Majles-e Tejarat (or Majles-e Vokala-ye Tojjar-e Iran) was to plan for economic development and the extension of foreign trade. The Majles marked the beginning of the united action of the Iranian merchants as a class. It had legal and political status and acted as a body representing the merchant class. Nevertheless, the Majles soon came into conflict with the state over the political rights it had been granted. It also came into conflict with the Olama. It was abolished in less than two years.74 No other major reform measures (except those directly relating to the army, judiciary and education) were introduced in the remaining years of Naser od-Din Shah’s reign (the shah was assassinated in 1890). In 1891, when Curzon visited Iran, he had this to say about what remained of the attempted administrative reforms: The Persian Council of State, as it at present exists, has no ministerial responsibility and no collective authority, either executive or legislative. It is a purely consultative body, convened sometimes to advise the Shah beforehand, more commonly to discuss the fulfillment of his orders when already delivered. Its sole executive power is that of the individual men composing it, who are the Shah’s servants, and can be shifted, promoted, or dismissed without any relation to their colleagues. There is a titular president of the Council who summons the meetings, but has no other presidential functions. He neither takes the chair nor puts question to vote. Indeed, no speeches are made nor votes taken, the discussion is purely formal and conversational, and each minister is in the habit of privately reporting to the Sovereign.75 Even this body was not tolerated and it was abolished by Amin os-Soltan in 1892–3. Amin os-Soltan became prime minister in 1886 and played a very reactionary role in Iranian politics until he was assassinated in 1907. During

CIVIL SOCIETY AND IDEOLOGICAL ENCOUNTERS

131

his term in office, Amin os-Soltan reversed almost every reform measure that his predecessors had introduced. From 1890, the shah grew ‘indifferent’ to the affairs of state and became increasingly corrupt and oppressive. The ruling classes also became corrupted on a large scale and began intolerably to oppress the masses. Therefore, it is not surprising that from 1890 onward a new period began in the history of the ideological struggle and the movement for socioeconomic, political and administrative change. In this period, the interest in reform shifted from the king to the public. The failure of the reforms from the top led to the demand for reforms from the bottom. But as the opposition to absolutism and imperialism grew, the demand for reform changed in to a demand for revolution. In 1890, the cancellation of a lottery concession given by the shah to Malkom became the pretext for the latter’s break from the former. Subsequently, Malkom published Qanoun which came to constitute ‘a serious challenge to the status quo in Persia’.76 The publication was smuggled into the country by merchants and other travellers and read by individuals from various classes, although Qanoun primarily addressed itself to the ‘middle classes’. But the classes Malkom specifically mentioned and those he foresaw playing a major role in the new Persia were not the urban masses, the peasants or even the petit bourgeoisie.77 They were the upper class or upper-middle class. Nevertheless, Malkom wrote: So little any longer is the cruelty of our administration hidden from view that not only the grocer of Tehran but even the cultivator and farmer of Nahavand has become aware [of it] . . . I see that most of the people from classes from which there was no such expectation are saying certain things and have grown determined to save the fatherland. It is the first stage of the people’s awakening.78 Qanoun was ‘Islamic in tone’.79 But Islam, as Malkom himself had acknowledged, was used as ‘a garb’80 to protect him from the charges of ‘irreligious republicanism’.81 Malkom’s main purpose was to raise the consciousness of the people, and his book succeeded in building a mass movement that could effectively press for radical reform in the ‘fatherland’. Its frequent use of the words mellat (nation), melliyat (nationality) and melli (national) was designed to strengthen the patriotic feelings of the people and prepare them for united action. This is even more evident from the fact that Qanoun asked its readers to get together and ‘draw up a ‘‘national plan’’ ’.82

132

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

When Malkom returned to Iran in 1881, he managed to organize a second secret society called the Majma´-e Adamiyat. Malkom’s stay in Iran was short and upon departing he entrusted the management of the Majma´ to his friends and followers. By 1890, it had become known that Qanoun was an organ of the Majma´. According to the principles of the Majma´-e Adamiyat, every man should strive to enter the Alam-e Adamiyat (the World of Humanity) but only a man of the following attributes could be called an Adam: one who eschews evil, does good, fights oppression, promotes unity, seeks knowledge, promotes the principle of Adamiyat and preserves order.83 These and other principles of Adamiyat were published in Qanoun and explained in detail. In its 24th issue, Qanoun published a declaration that called upon the ‘spiritual brothers’ to unite and rise up against oppression of all kinds; it stressed that law does not come about unless the legislative, executive and judicial powers are separated. The emphasis was, however, on unity.84 This declaration was signed by the Majma´-e Adamiyat. By 1889, the Majma´ had published a declaration (distributed in Tehran) that, among other things, demanded ‘the security of body and property’, government by the ‘learned people’ (Afazel-e Mellat), and ‘the expenditure of taxes for the protection of the rights of people (mellat) and as the means for the development of the country’. It also called for the establishment of a great national consultative assembly (Majles-e Shaura-ye Kobra-ye Melli) with the participation of ‘the high Olama and the famous wise men of the country,’ where ‘the rights of the state (Daulat) and the people (mellat)’ are determined ‘in accordance with the principles of the Shar´ of God’.85 In Qanoun, the duties of members of the assembly and other members of the future government were proposed and explained. Saiied Jamal od-Din-e Asadabadi (i.e., al-Afghani) was another social critic who contributed towards the social awakening of Iran. Saiied, like Malkom, was originally, a friend of the shah. His Pan-Islamic Movement intended to unite Islamic countries under a single caliph. He even promised to make the shah caliph of the Islamic world. Later he gave the same promise to the Ottoman sultan. In any event, Saiied was expelled from Iran in 1890 after the shah became suspicious of his activities. He tried to persuade the shah that he was mistaken but to no avail. Thereafter, Saiied wrote about oppression and corruption in Iran and accused the government of overriding and destroying the ‘Holy Law’. In 1892, he wrote: The government has overridden and destroyed the Holy Law, detests and repudiates civilized administration, despises and ignores the laws of

CIVIL SOCIETY AND IDEOLOGICAL ENCOUNTERS

133

reason and common sense. Passion alone holds sway, greed alone dominates, violence and brute force alone rule. The sword, the scourge and the branding-iron only govern. It delights in the shedding of blood, glories in dishonor, and exults in robbing widows and orphans of their possessions. In those lands there is no security, and their inhabitants see no means to save their lives from the teeth of tyranny save by flight. A fifth of the Persians have fled into Turkey or Russia. The governor and his satellites . . . hang up women by their hair, put men in sacks with savage dogs, nail their ears to wooden boards, or put a leading rein through their noses and then parade the wretched in such pitiful plight through the streets and markets.86 In 1896, a devoted follower of Saiied assassinated Naser od-Din Shah; it is believed that the assassin carried out the killing on the orders of Saiied. Aqa Khan-e Kermani was among those who radicalized the ideological movement against the Qajar rule. In Istanbul, he became acquainted with Malkom and Saiied Jamal od-Din – men with whom he subsequently communicated and collaborated. Meanwhile, according to Bakhash, Kermani ‘gradually moved toward skepticism, disbelief, and even an aggressive atheism in religion; toward rationalism and materialism in philosophy; and toward the ideas of Montesquieu and Rousseau in politics’.87 In the process of his intellectual development, Kermani also became ‘an ardent and sometimes extreme nationalist’, and, like Akhoundzadeh, tended to glorify pre-Islamic Iran. His activities against the Qajar rule were to cost him his head. Mention should also be made of two important books which were to a large extent responsible for the social awakening of the Persians. They were Talebof’s Ketab-e Ahmad and Maraqa´i’s Siahatnamah-e Ebrahim Beg. These books were for the most part educational. Their aim was to point out the backwardness of Iran and to instill in the people a sense of Persian nationalism. The basic idea both books contained was that material development was the key to a Persian renaissance and that this could not come about so long as the country was crippled by absolutism and imperialism. On the practical side, they called for national unity.88 A third book by Mohammad Ali Foroughi on Osoul-e Elm-e Servat (Principles of Wealth Science) published in 1905 introduced Western Liberalism and market capitalism as the only political-economy system that could make Iran prosper.

134

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Besides the concept of nationalism, which was increasingly apparent in writings after 1890,89 a second development was a growing antiimperialist feeling. For example, in his Oanoun-e Mozaffari, Sepehr called for the banning of all foreign goods.90 A similar demand was made by Khan Khanan in his Siasat-e Modavvan, where he describes the ruinous effect of foreign trade on Iranian production.91 A different development was a tendency to glorify socialism or, at the very least, social democracy. As early as 1878, Akhtar had published an article on socialism, which was reprinted in Iran in 1880.92 A utopian version of socialism was presented in the works of Talebof and the Siasat-e Modavvan mentioned above.93 Among women, besides Tahereh – a true revolutionary and one of the leaders of the Babi Movement – there was also Taj os-Saltaneh, the enlightened daughter of Naser od-Din Shah who demanded the equality of women and categorically declared that ‘today we have no thought freer and more extensive than socialist thought’.94 From 1900, ideological struggle became an aspect of the class struggle and was inseparable from it. The beginning of this new period was marked by the formation of a series of secret societies called Anjoman-e Makhfi. While some of these associations were formed to advance reform and defended the right of the Iranian people against the exploitative activities of the foreign powers, others were organized to defame the anti-reform personalities or anyone they happen to dislike. The Anjomans used all types of media to disseminate their propaganda, including leaflets, underground newspapers, rumours and the grapevine. Because they were secret, the Anjomans could propagate any news or ideas and instigate people against anyone without fearing accountability for such actions or ideas. From 1890 to the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, no major reform programme was carried out. However, the Constitution brought about drastic changes in the structure of the absolutist state. These included the formation of a National Consultative Assembly (Majles-e Shaura-e Melli) and a would-be Senate (Majles-e Sena), separation of the three branches of power, and specification of the duties of the shah, the ministries, the ministers and important offices such as justice, public finance and army. The first ‘legal cabinet’ of Iran was formed and included the following eight ministries: Justice, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Finance, War, Science, Public Works and Commerce. Meanwhile, the Assembly began its inquiry into the state budget and subsequently abolished toyoul, madakhel and tas´ir. It also attempted to reduce the number of pensioners and the expenses of the royal court. No major changes of any significant degree took place after these initial reforms due to the defeat of the revolution in 1911. The only change involved a limited

CIVIL SOCIETY AND IDEOLOGICAL ENCOUNTERS

135

reorganization of the ministries. In 1920, the eight ministries still existed, though certain changes had been made in their names and organization.95 For comparative purposes, consider the programme of the Qavam cabinet (formed in 1926): it called for reinstituting the Majles, expanding and developing the army, facilitating construction of roads, developing and reforming the agricultural sector, reactivating the Discount and Loan Bank, and developing national sources of wealth (such as mines). Additionally, the Qavam cabinet called for securing resources and credit internally, reforming the financial system, reducing unnecessary expenses, balancing revenues and expenses, eliminating the nation’s deficit, developing the educational system, reforming the judiciary and annulling all capitulations.96 This programme undoubtedly shared many objectives and problems with its predecessors, yet it was different from the earlier programmes because it emphasized economic development. Although some of its declared aims were not realized, for example, the emphasis it placed on internal borrowing and the cancellation of capitulation, the programme nevertheless reflected the aspirations of the rising bourgeoisie whose share of state power still remained negligible in 1926. To conclude, the years 1796 and 1926 are, politically speaking, best divided into four periods: the first period (1796–1848) was characterized by centralization and repeated attempts at reforming the army without taking any measures to effect change in the other institutions of state; lack of any effective ideological struggle against the existing order, save for the age-old conflict between the religious and secular institutions; and the relative stability of state institutions. The second period (1848–90) was characterized by further centralization, mounting institutional problems and numerous reform attempts directed at state institutions, increasing ideological struggle by the emerging forces and the growing instability of the state apparatus. The third period (1890–1906) was characterized by decentralization, state reforms and increased struggle for the preservation of the existing order; the intensified struggle by newly emerging forces to bring about revolutionary change in the superstructure; the intensification of rivalry among the ruling classes; and the relative dominance of the opposition. The fourth period (1906–21) was characterized by further decentralization and intense class struggle involving direct intervention of the imperialist forces. This period was also characterized by various attempts at reforming state institutions and the struggle over the direction of the proposed reforms. At the end of the period, an almost complete disintegration of the feudal order resulted but the ultimate victory was with the forces that defended the status quo and/or demanded cosmetic changes.

CHAPTER 7

FOREIGN TRADE, INTERVENTIONS AND POLICY

The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the imperialists’ penetration into and domination over Iranian pseudo-feudal society and the formation of exploitative relations of dependency between Iran and world capitalism.1 To begin with, imperialism was a force external to Iran. Yet over time, it became practically inseparable from the internal forces. Indeed, it was the interaction of the internal reaction and imperialism that produced a backward, dependent and dictatorial Iran. To be sure, such dependency relations could not have been effected and maintained without violence and brute force on the part of the imperialist forces, notwithstanding the ‘peaceful’ garb with which a substantial part of the process was clothed. However, the process did not escape the attention of the people and their progressive allies, whose heroic resistance and struggle are discussed in Chapter 8. This chapter ignores all but two external forces that came to shape the early phases of the transition in Iran: British imperialism and Russian expansionism. This omission is warranted because of the undisputed fact that Britain and Russia were the main rival forces in nineteenth-century Iran and their rivalry – though saving the country from full colonization – crippled, deformed and distorted the normal path of growth and development in Iran during the crucial early phases of the transition to capitalism. The practices (and the rivalry) of these two imperialist/expansionist forces did not remain static over the 1796–1926 period. They changed with astonishing regularity and definite direction. When taken as a whole and in

FOREIGN TRADE, INTERVENTIONS AND POLICY

137

terms of their long-term orientation and broader objectives, these practices may be used as the basis of a periodization somewhat different from the one I proposed regarding economic and superstructural change. The first period, 1796–1870, may be called the period of imperialist penetration. During this period, the process of penetration – consisting of both peaceful and violent means – was completed and the stage was prepared for the domination of Iran by imperialism. This period corresponded to the period of simple capitalist cooperation and a centralized state apparatus. The second period, 1870–1926, may be termed the period of imperialist domination. Its marked characteristic in the 1870–1907 phase was the cutthroat rivalry between Britain and Russia. Their rivalry ended with the 1907 Convention in which the two imperialist powers divided Iran into their respective spheres of influence. This phase corresponded to an increasingly weakened state following the 1906 Constitutional Revolution and the emergence of capitalist manufacturing whose development, as I suggested in Chapter 4, was blocked in its inception. The second phase of this period, 1908–26, was marked by the direct intervention and cooperation of the two imperialist powers in Iranian politics. This phase corresponded to an intensified class struggle (which increasingly took a regional dimension), political disintegration and the First World War. Towards the end of the period, after the Russian Revolution in 1917, the British imperialism had rival in Iran. However, the attempt in 1919 to make Iran a ‘protectorate’ of Britain failed to materialize and the 1919 Convention was subsequently nullified. Yet, by 1926, Britain believed it had ‘its man’ in power and could subsequently withdraw its forces from Iran.

Imperialism and Penetration: 1796–1870 The imperialist forces affected Iran in different ways. Britain, as well as the United States, Germany, France and other Western European countries, chose to control Iran by apparently ‘peaceful’ means such as trade, treaties, concessions, ‘subsidies’, diplomatic and military missions, establishment of consulates, formation of trading houses and companies, capitulation (extraterritoriality), introduction of cash crops and other raw material production, alliance with local forces, corruption, orientalism,2 freemasonry,3 and payment of loans and advances. However, as early as 1857, Britain had resorted to the use of force in the form of the Anglo-Persian War. Russia did not wait so long before resorting to overt force. On the contrary, war and aggression were from the outset the basic means of their penetration

138

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

into Iran. Nevertheless, the Russians neither ruled out the use of ‘peaceful’ means of penetration, nor did the British rule out the use of force. The difference in approach may have been due to the differences in their socioeconomic structure: in the 1860s, Britain was already a developed capitalist country while Russia was still a feudal state. Also, by the end of the century, Britain had already entered the imperialism stage of capitalism, and Russia had not yet become a developed capitalist country and was a semifeudal expansionist empire. Thus, it was inevitable that they were to follow two distinct foreign policies. Despite their difference in approach, both had pursued a common goal in Iran: the domination of the country and its resources. Religious missionaries were also agents of influence, and Britain and Russia seem to have followed a similar policy. Contrary to the practices of the United States and France in particular, Britain and Russia did not attempt to create Christian enclaves. Instead, they preferred ‘to exploit the existing religious differences in Iran and to use pre-existing religious minorities in the country for their own ends’.4 By 1870, the imperialist forces had to a large extent completed their process of penetration and increasingly engaged in the process of domination. However, the former process did not stop after 1870, and the latter was not absent in the pre-1870 period. Because of this fact, some of the means enumerated above for penetration were introduced in the post-1870 period (e.g. loans and advances), while the others continued to be employed up to 1926 and after. It was also the case that the same means used for penetration in the pre-1870 period were among those used for the later domination of the country. However, it was only in the post-1870 period that they acquired the needed characteristics for use as means of effective domination. This presupposed a different and higher level of development, intensity and scale, which they came to acquire only in the post-1870 period. Commercial relations between Iran and Russia date back to the midfifteenth century. However, it was not until the opening of the Volga–Caspian trade route in 1556 that trade between the two countries became significant. From the second half of the seventeenth century, Russian merchants were granted ‘the right to free trade and exemption from taxes and tariff duties in the whole of Iran’.5 These concessions led to a considerable increase in trade between the two countries. Persian luxuries – silk products in particular – were highly demanded by the Muscovite elite and by European merchants dealing in the Muscovite market.6 Meanwhile, two particular developments were taking shape that would strongly affect manufacturing in Iran and

FOREIGN TRADE, INTERVENTIONS AND POLICY

139

encourage raw material production. The first was the growth of the Russian textile industry, which gradually expanded the demand for Iranian raw silk and cotton; and the second was the British search for an overland trade route with Central Asia.7 Already in 1553 the British Moscovy Company had been founded ‘for the conduct of the overland trade through Russia with the lands lying to the east and south of the Caspian’.8 In 1555, a group of British adventurers – among whom was Anthony Jenkinson – were dispatched by the company ‘to explore and to open the projected trade routes with Central Asia’.9 The company’s purpose was to ‘include Persia within the sphere of its operations’, mainly for two reasons: to grab the Persian silk trade from the Portuguese and ‘to tap the mysterious resources of Hindustan by overland caravan routes’.10 The group returned after flying ‘the British flag ... upon the Caspian ... for the first time’.11 In 1562, a second mission headed by Jenkinson was again sent to Persia bearing ‘jewels as well as woollen cloths’ and a letter from Queen Elizabeth for the Safavid king’.12 Jenkinson received an audience but was declined any commercial privileges. However, in 1566, Shah Tahmasb granted the company’s third mission an exemption from all tolls and customs, and freedom of transit.13 Subsequently, the head of the mission informed the company that woollen cloth and other manufactured products should be sent to Persia in exchange for raw silk, rice and other crops.14 The next three expeditions were not as successful, though the fourth, in 1568, was granted another decree (farman) amplifying the rights that had been given to the third mission15 and the fifth, in 1568, ‘had succeeded in effecting a good sale and in securing most of [its] requests’.16 During these six hazardous expeditions, many of the adventurers were killed or died of unnatural causes and the company was forced to abandon its business operations after 1581. Although the Moscovy Company gave up its hope, the British did not. In 1600, Anthony Sherly – with his brother and 26 other men – reached the court of Shah Abbas. Because of his antagonistic relations with the Sunni Ottoman Empire, the shah decreed the opening of his ‘dominions’ to ‘all Christian people’, to exempt ‘all Christian merchants’ from ‘tolls and customs’ and to delegate to them privileges of extraterritoriality.17 The scheme proved abortive, but it was soon followed by the next British adventurers: the British East India Company. With the Persian Gulf still under Portuguese control, the East India Company initially tried to open a northern route. Before any of these attempts was successful, an alliance between Persia and Britain in 1622 ended Portuguese supremacy in the Persian Gulf. Thereafter, the customs of

140

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Hormoz port were equally divided between the two countries, the British merchants became ‘free of all duties in perpetuity’,18 and the East India Company, which had already acquired two commercial concessions in 1615 and 1617 and had built a factory in Jask, began to establish roots in the Persian Gulf. A grant of capitulation (extraterritoriality) by Shah Safi to England in 1629 completed the first phase of British penetration into lran.19 The hope for a Moscow–Astarkhan–Caspian trade route could not be allowed to wane, for the ‘Persian question from the point of view of the English was the silk question’20 and this crop was almost wholly produced in the Caspian Sea area. Nevertheless, there was little that the British could do to change the ‘troubles’ that had led to the closing of the Volga–Caspian route in the 1670s after half a century of operation. Meanwhile, Russo–Persian trade had greatly suffered and this unfavourable condition did not escape the attention of Peter, the Czar of Russian. While the British were busy forming the Russian Company as a new means to be used for the expansion of their trade with Persia through the northern route, Peter signed a treaty with Iran that granted Russian merchants the right to freedom of transit throughout Iran.21 The Russian government was also allowed to establish consulates in Iran and it promptly opened three.22 The British–Russian Company was not successful in its attempts to expand the northern trade, despite the very liberal policies of Peter and his successor towards foreign merchants trading in or through Russia. As opposed to the British, the Russians had intensified their activities in Iran, and Peter, inspired by the wealthy silk-producing regions of the country, took advantage of the political dismemberment of the Safavids. Under the pretext of blocking Ottoman expansion into the north and the northwest of Iran, he invaded the northern regions in 1722 and took over Derbent, Baku and parts of Gilan. This was the first in a series of wars that were fought between Iran and Russia. At stake were fertile agricultural lands and the peasants living on them, plunder of the public treasury and the levy of tribute, among other things. A treaty was negotiated in 1723, and Iran was forced to accept the sovereignty of Russia over the conquered territories.23 Peter, who had invaded Iran on the pretext of saving it from Ottoman expansionism, recognized the Ottoman sovereignty over the western part of Iran under the Treaty of 1724.24 Thus, a further step was taken towards the dismemberment and weakening of Iran. Iran was later able to regain her territories lost to Russia, under treaties negotiated in 1733 and 1735, the last of which gave Russian merchants the privilege of free trade and transit throughout Iran, plus exemption from having to pay tariffs and customs

FOREIGN TRADE, INTERVENTIONS AND POLICY

141

duties. By 1796, the dispute over the Caucasus, including Georgia, remained the principal point of contention between Iran and Russia. While the Russians were involved in overt violent penetration, the British were ‘peacefully’ – but with resolute determination – penetrating the country from the south. Their basic tool had come to be the East India Company. However, the process was not without difficulties. For instance, the Persians were not going along with the Hormoz agreement and the British government could do nothing but follow a ‘policy of protest and petition’.25 After all, the Persian kings had not yet become their puppets. On the contrary, the British still feared them recalling that in 1739 Nader Shah had conquered India. Nevertheless, Britain’s successful process of penetration continued and expanded with every new trade agreement and concession, among them a stipulation granting the East India Company the right to erect a factory at Bushire in 1763.26 By this time, the British had established themselves in Bushire, which subsequently became their commercial and political ‘capital’ in the Persian Gulf. By the 1790s, they controlled a substantial part of the trade between the Persian Gulf and India. In the years between 1450 and 1796, raw silk remained Iran’s principal export item despite the fact that cotton exports were also on the rise. By the mid-seventeenth century, silk exports were worth 1–2 million pounds sterling.27 About 100 years later, imports (mainly woollen manufactures) into Persia from Europe were valued at about 175,000 pounds sterling and Persian exports of raw silk to Europe have been put at 95,000 pounds sterling, creating a deficit of about 80,000 pounds sterling.28 The trade situation with Russia was much better. Between 1758 and 1760, the total value of Russian exports into Iran amounted to 243,454 rubles. By 1792, exports had increased 44 per cent to 352,310 rubles. This represented about 10 per cent of total Russian exports into the Asian market. Total Iranian exports into Russia, on the other hand, were about 321,215 rubles between 1758 and 1760, and by 1792 the figure grew 55 per cent to 511,360 rubles. In both periods, Iran enjoyed a surplus.29 Therefore, trade with Russia was advantageous to Iran, while even in those very early years, the terms of trade with Britain ran against Iran. Overall, however, Iran’s foreign trade produced a sizable surplus. The economic effects of penetration do not seem to have been very significant. Politically, the dismemberment of Iran was temporary. Ideologically, no change of any significance took place, although the ideological struggle between the Shi’ite Safavids and the Sunni Ottomans led the shahs increasingly open Iran to ‘Christians’. The price of an alliance with

142

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Europe against the Sunni Ottomans was the subjection of the country and its people to the worst of all concessionary measures: extraterritoriality.30 Meanwhile, the political turmoil that ensued after the death of Karim Khan-e Zand in 1779 culminated in the rise of Aqa Mohammad Khan-e Qajar, the founder of the Qajar dynasty. However, by this time, Aqa Mohammad Khan had not yet dealt with the Khorasanis’ and the Georgian’s claims for independence. It was felt that the Khorasani question was on the wane, while the Georgian question had become aggravated. Meanwhile, in keeping with her expansionist designs, Czarina Catherine had constantly given the Georgians ‘moral’ support and encouraged them to become a protectorate of Russia. The Georgian people – oppressed by the Persian feudal lords and conservative religious authorities, since the Georgians were largely Christian, thought of the idea as fit and liberating. The design materialized itself in an agreement between the Georgian sultan and the Russian Czarina in 1783. However, the expansionist designs of Catherine were not confined to the Georgian question. The thought of annexing the whole of Caucasia and penetrating into the eastern states of Iran, Afghanistan and India had ever occupied her. It was in keeping with this last design that she had requested from Aqa Mohammad Khan (in 1781) the right to build a ‘commercial’ centre on the southern shore of the Astarabad Gulf. However, shortly afterwards, Aqa Mohammad Khan felt that ‘commercial’ was a disguise for the political and military designs of the Czarina and he subsequently ordered the destruction of the Russian fortifications. This action could not only anger the Czarina and create a pretext for Russian intervention in the affairs of Georgia, but the Iranian feudal lords were also determined to put down the Georgian ‘national liberation movement’. Their pretext was the 1773 agreement between the Czarina and the sultan of Georgia mentioned above. However, the Georgian people had a different aim than their treacherous sultan; they disliked their current Persian masters as much as they hated their would-be Russian overlords. However, they chose to fight the Persians first. In 1795, Aqa Mohammad Khan invaded Georgia. After a ‘heroic struggle’ by the Georgians,31 he took over the capital city of Teflis and ordered a largescale massacre of the city inhabitants. He soon had to abandon Teflis and return to Persia, if not out of fear of direct intervention by the Russians and the rapid growth of the national liberation movements of the people of Caucasia, then at least in order to pacify the growing unrest in the heartland.32 Nevertheless, the king carried off about 20,000 Georgians into slavery.33 However, his retreat did not prevent the Russians from invading Caucasia in 1796 and taking over the city of Derbent, among others. After a

FOREIGN TRADE, INTERVENTIONS AND POLICY

143

year’s lapse, Aqa Mohammad Khan responded to the Russian invasion by invading Georgia a second time. Before the king could consolidate his position, he was murdered in a plot organized by his feudal lords. The Persian army returned home where the feudal lords were fighting over the question of succession to the throne. Eventually, Fath Ali Khan, the nephew of the assassinated king, was proclaimed the shah. Because of internal disturbances during the first seven years of his reign, Fath Ali Shah did not pay serious attention to the Georgian question. Meanwhile, Catherine had died (in 1798) and was replaced by Paul I, who ‘took advantage of the situation and, by a decree, annexed Georgia in 1800, which was confirmed with his successor, Alexander’.34 To materialize the decree, the Czar ordered the invasion of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Gilan in 1803. Over the next nine years, a series of wars were fought between the Iranian and Russian armies culminating in the relative defeat of the Iranians. According to the Treaty of Golestan signed in 1813, Iran ceded to Russia the whole of the provinces of Georgia, Qarabaq and Daghistan, and a number of Caucasian territories including Shirvan, Derbent, Shaki, Kobek, Baku, Shourgil, Achouk, Mingrelia, Abtichar, Bash, Gouria and part of Talesh. The treaty also deprived Iran of the right to maintain a naval force in the Caspian Sea and obliged the Russian government to support Abbas Mirza in his accession to the throne after his father – the only price paid by the Russians. On the commercial side, the existing rights to free trade and transit in and through the two countries were emphasized, but no new measures were introduced.35 The Treaty of Golestan was a purely political and strategic one. It dismembered and weakened Iran, while improving the Russian position vis-a`-vis her enemies, particularly the Ottoman Empire. The treaty materialized part of the expansionist designs initiated by Czar Peter in 1722. In the seventeenth century, the European nations viewed the Ottoman Empire as their main enemy. Thus, Britain sought an alliance with Persia and Russia against the Ottomans. Peter’s accession to the throne and the development of his expansionist policies alarmed the British and subsequently changed their attitude towards the Russians. Consequently, in the eighteenth century, Britain sought an alliance with Persia and the Ottoman Empire against Russia (witness the 1736 peace treaty between Persia and the Ottoman Empire). Towards the end of the century, Britain also pursued a ‘policy of inducing Persia to intervene in Afghanistan’,36 whose ruler, Zaman Shah, was seen as a threat to the security of India, which had become the most profitable colony of Britain.37 A third development was

144

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

also of concern to the British: the increasing threat posed by Napoleon to the security of India. With these political objectives in mind, and with a view to expanding trade between the two countries, Malcolm arrived at the court of Fath Ali Shah in 1800 with a ‘variety of gifts’. In 1801, two treaties were concluded between the two countries. The Political Treaty was designed to play Persia off against Afghanistan and France and to protect the security of India, whereas the Commercial Treaty was aimed at boosting the position of the East India Company in Iran. It exempted British merchants and commodities from duties and taxes and granted them all that was needed for a sound commercial operation: free transit through Iran, liberty of settlement wherever they desired, security against robbery, guaranteed payment of debt and freedom for building houses and shops.38 In 1804, as noted above, Iran was dragged into the war against Russia. Fath Ali Shah sought the British aid in the war; he did not receive it because Britain and Russia had reached an ‘understanding’ with regard to Napoleon, who had already conquered Egypt (1798) and was contemplating going to war against Russia and Britain in India. Thus, Fath Ali Shah and Napoleon saw in the other a sound ally. The Treaty of Alliance (the Finkenstein Treaty) was signed between the two countries in 1807. According to the treaty, France recognized ‘Georgia as belonging legitimately’ to Iran and declared her readiness to help the shah to retake it from the Russians. Iran undertook ‘to sever all diplomatic and commercial relations with England’ and to help Napoleon ‘attack English possessions in India’.39 Nothing could have been as frightening to the British as these statements. Yet they lost neither their temper nor their hope. Instead, they went to work against the treaty in a ‘diplomatic’ way. Their chance of success in playing Persia off against France was greatly enhanced by the fact that about two months after signing of the Treaty of Alliance, Napoleon entered an alliance with Russia at Tilsit (1807). Although important, this was not enough to revive the lost ‘friendship’ between the two countries. Nevertheless, a treaty of friendship, which also emphasized the joint effort of Britain and Iran against Russia, was written in England and handed to Harford Jones, who arrived in Tehran in 1809. To ensure Iran’s acceptance of the treaty, Jones immediately set out to bribe the court, to ‘freemasonize’ as many of the members of the ruling class as possible, and to use the Hindustan Institution of Endowments (Auqaf) as effectively as he could. Concerning the first, he presented the shah with a piece of jewellery worth 25,000 toumans and ‘the Shah bestowed favors and

FOREIGN TRADE, INTERVENTIONS AND POLICY

145

honors upon him’.40 Concerning the second, he wrote that ‘of the Persian nobles, I made freemason anyone that I could and prepared the ground for the coming of Sir John Malcolm’.41 Concerning the third, i.e. the Hindustan Institution of Endowments, Jones wrote that ‘this money in my hands was a powerful lever with whose power I could shake and put in motion everything’.42 It was paid to the students of Shi’ite religious schools and the olama to buy their support and favour for England. Jones’s efforts paid off and the Preliminary Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was signed. The treaty made all the previous treaties with any European power ‘null and void’ and obligated Iran to provide military assistance to Britain in case the Afghans or any other power attacked India. In return, Britain promised ‘a subsidy with warlike ammunition’ and ‘undertook not to intervene in any hostilities between Persia and Afghanistan unless requested by both parties to mediate’.43 The treaty was sent to London (carried by Morier who was accompanied by Mirza Ab ol-Hasan Khan-e Garrousi, the first Persian envoy to London) to be made into a ‘definite treaty’. Following Jones’s negotiations, Malcolm arrived at the shah’s court with ample gifts and presents in 1810. He was followed by Ouseley in 1811, the man most responsible for the creation of an ‘anglophile’ faction of the Iranian ruling class. He had already made a freemason and a puppet out of the Iranian envoy to London, Mirza Ab ol-Hasan Khan, who had by now returned to Iran accompanying Ouseley. Ouseley himself was the Grand Mason of the London Freemasonry Lodge. He set out to do what Jones had done but on a larger scale and with a definite plan. By that time, some of the high-ranking members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been made freemasons and, for their ‘services’ to the British government and the East India Company, were receiving fixed monthly payments. Among them was Mirza Ab ol-Hasan Khan who ‘served’ in the Foreign Ministry, as a high-ranking official for 35 years (he became foreign minister twice) and was receiving from the East India Company 1,000 rupees a month for life.44 Another recipient of such money was Mohammad Nabi Khan, the ambassador to Calcutta. His payment was also 1,000 rupees a month for life. Ouseley also distributed gifts and presents (pishkesh) to many members of the ruling class – the courtiers in particular. His presents to the shah alone included a diamond worth 25,000 toumans. The shah’s favourite wife was also presented ‘with a perfume bottle studded with jewels worth 20,000 toumans as a gift from the English Queen’.45 However, the most important gift to the shah was the news that the ‘subsidy’ promised in the Preliminary Treaty at 120,000 toumans a year had

146

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

been increased to 200,000 toumans and that Ouseley had brought with him 600,000 toumans for the years 1810–12. Another 200,000 toumans were also paid to Iran in 1813, but after the Treaty of Golestan was negotiated, the ‘subsidy’ was dropped: the payments had in effect been subsidizing the Persian war against the Russians. The last in this series of subsidies was paid to Iran in 1828.46 Regardless of these subsidies, Ouseley’s mission was very costly to Iran because he, in cooperation with the freemason Ab ol-Hasan Khan, managed the negotiations of the Treaties of Golestan and Torkmanchai, both of which took away large parts of Iranian territory and placed them in the hands of the Russians. Ouseley’s main objective was to weaken Iran, particularly as concerned India.47 Ouseley’s efforts also paid off in 1814 when the Definitive Treaty was signed between the two countries. The treaty amplified the Preliminary Treaty signed in 1809. Both treaties were politicostrategic and ‘defensive’.48 Mainly as a result of these treaties, Iranian foreign trade through Bushire (i.e. the East India Company dominion) increased from approximately 5 million new Persian rupees (about 1/133 of a pound sterling) in 1817 to 12.5 million new Persian rupees in 1823, a total increase of about 150 per cent or an average annual increase of about 25 per cent.49 Iranian imports through Bushire increased from about 3 million new Persian rupees in 1817 to 9 million new Persian rupees in 1823, an increase of about 200 per cent over only six years, giving an average annual increase of over 34 per cent. However, Iranian exports did not increase in the same proportion. The figures for 1817 and 1823 are put at 1,991,854 and 3,545,556 new Persian rupees, respectively, an increase of only 78 per cent over six years, or an average annual increase of about 13 per cent. This unbalanced trade could not but create a deficit. Total Iranian exports through Bushire for the 1817–23 period amounted to 20.5 million new Persian rupees while its imports for the same period and from the same trade route were as high as 38 million new Persian rupees.50 Therefore, the Iranian trade deficit was equivalent to about 85.5 per cent of the total exports. Once more, it is seen that the terms of trade with Britain, or more precisely with the East India Company, ran against Iran. In the absence of data for trade between Persia and Russia in the same period, the Persian trade performance with Russia is based on the 1830 trade data, which predates the improved commercial position of the latter that had resulted from the imposition of the Treaty of Torkmanchai (see below). Total Persian exports to Russia in this year amounted to 5.6 million gold rubles while its total imports from that country for the same period were at 5.4 million gold rubles, leaving a surplus of 1.2 million gold rubles.51 This

FOREIGN TRADE, INTERVENTIONS AND POLICY

147

was enough to pay for the deficit with Britain and still leave a surplus. These figures suggest that Britain and Russia pursued two different goals in their early relations with Iran. Britain’s design for Iran was largely commercial, whereas Russia’s design was essentially politico-strategic and territorial. However, it must be emphasized that Britain was not ignorant of her politico-strategic interests in Iran, and Russia never relinquished its hope for economic domination. Russia again invaded Iran in 1825. Factors contributing to the invasion included British intrigue against Russia in the Persian Court, the conclusion of the 1814 Definitive Treaty, the negotiation of the Treaty of Erzurum with the Ottoman Empire in 182352 and the vagueness of the Treaty of Golestan over the issue of the border between Iran and Russia. Afterwards, a second series of wars broke out between the two countries, culminating in the Treaty of Torkmanchai in 1828. As in the first series of wars between Iran and Russia, the declaration of holy war (jehad) by the olama did not help Iran win.53 It indeed made Iran lose because the ‘fetwas’ prevented Abbas Mirza to make the necessary compromise it was contemplating. According to the Treaty of Torkmanchai, Iran ceded to Russia all the territories north of the Aras River, including the provinces of Yerevan and Nakhjavan, the district of Lankaran and other parts of Talesh. This included all the inhabitants of these areas. Iran paid a ‘pecuniary indemnity ... fixed at ten kupours of silver toumans or 20,000,000 silver rubles’; reaffirmed the rights granted to Russia in the Treaty of Golestan relating to navigation in the Caspian; and gave the Russian government ‘the right of appointing consuls or commercial agents wherever the good of commerce will demand it’. Simultaneously, a Commercial Treaty was also signed according to which Iran had to accept a 5 per cent ad valorem tariff and the extraterritorial rights of the Russian subjects.54 The Treaty of Torkmanchai signalled not only the politico-strategic interests of Russia, but also its increasing interest in the Iranian economy. Yet overall, Russia was moved more by political than economic objectives. For the Iranian feudal lords, the loss of agricultural land, peasants and other sources of exploitation and extraction was disastrous. But there was little they could do to change the situation. All that the Iranians had gained from the treaty was Russian recognition of Abbas Mirza as the successor to the throne after his father. What a great price the Russians were made to pay. At the conclusion of the Treaty of Torkmanchai in 1828, the state treasury was empty even though the shah’s personal treasury possessed sizable amounts of cash and precious metals. The wars (including the extra expense of the

148

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Holy War) cost Iran millions of toumans and the governors of the provinces did not remit collected taxes to the central government. For instance, the governor of Fars did not remit the taxes of the province for three years – taxes that amounted to 600,000 toumans.55 To this was added a new burden: a war indemnity of 500,000 toumans, the first foreign debt that Iran had ever incurred. British diplomacy, which had offered its ‘good offices’ to bring about the Treaty of Torkmanchai, now manifested even more guile. Articles 3 and 4 of the Definitive Treaty (1814) had become an annoyance to Britain. According to these articles, the two countries agreed to assist each other in ‘repelling the aggression of enemies’. Britain agreed to send forces to Persia to fight against ‘any European nation’ and pay the Persian government an annual subsidy of 200,000 toumans towards the expenses of such a war. Already in 1826 Britain had betrayed Iran by not sending troops in the war against Russia. The pretext was that Persia was the aggressor.56 But the fact was that the ‘European nations’ had arranged a peace among themselves, the preservation of which was worth more than the integrity of Persia. Britain was therefore contemplating declaring Articles 3 and 4 ‘null and void’, which would have also meant the abrogation of Articles 6 and 7. The Persian debt of 500,000 toumans to the Russians provided the British with the required opportunity. A certain MacDonald was sent to negotiate the purchase of the two articles for a sum not greater than 200,000 toumans. Given the fact that the Persian government was in serious financial difficulty, it had no choice but to surrender to the British blackmail. We [Abbas Mirza], the heir apparent to the Persian throne ... promise that if the British Government will assist us with the sum of two hundred thousand toumans toward the liquidation of the indemnity due by us to Russia, we will expunge, and hereafter consider as annulled, the third and fourth articles of the Definitive Treaty between the two states, concluded by Mr. Ellis, and obtain the royal sanction to the same.57 Abbas Mirza – whose orderly accession to the throne had been guaranteed by the Czar in both 1812 and 1828 – died in 1833. The position of heir apparently went to his son Mohammad Mirza, who was to become shah in 1834 when his grandfather died. But there were other pretenders to the throne. Fortunately, Mohammed Mirza could count on the generous financial help of Britain, whose ‘ambassador put the sum of 70,000 toumans at the

FOREIGN TRADE, INTERVENTIONS AND POLICY

149

disposal of the crown prince’. The Englishman Lindsay also commanded the Prince’s army against the forces of Farmanfarma, the son of the dead Shah and a pretender to the throne.58 It was therefore natural that the British expected the shah to pay special attention to their interests in Persia and elsewhere in the region. However, subsequent developments were to prove the British wrong. The Iranian feudal lords had lost considerable territories and peasants to Russia; the result was a financial crisis. To solve this, they contemplated seizing Herat or at least making its ruler accept ‘Persian Suzerainty and pay tribute to her’.59 This obviously could not be tolerated by Britain. However, the shah could not resist the demands of the ruling class, and in any event his pro-Russian grand vizier Mirza Aqasi was not overly concerned with British interests. The shah attacked Herat in 1836 and continued to lay siege to the city for two years. He was forced by the British to give up. Throughout this period, the British were actively plotting against the shah. They had given asylum to three Qajar princes, made them freemasons and were paying each an annual pension of 2,000 pounds sterling.60 In return, the princes were doing all they could to undermine the court and the country. Britain also stirred up the Bakhtiaris. The 1836 plague helped as it killed many of the shah’s soldiers. Meanwhile, pretending to act as mediators, the British secretly told the Herat rulers to resist and paid them 10,000 toumans in cash. But in the end, only the military muscle of Britain forced the shah to give up his siege of Herat.61 In doing so, Britain was in fact protecting India. Immediately after the war, Britain began repairing its damaged relations with Persia. These attempts culminated in the signing of the Treaty of Commerce in 1841.62 The need for the treaty had been suggested by Ellis in his letters to Palmerston in 1836.63 According to Ellis, the shah believed that because ‘the balance of money trade was against Persia, any measure that encouraged the extension of the trade with manufacturing nations would be injurious [to Persian industries]’. Ellis called this assertion of the shah ‘a commercial dogma’ and urged Britain to force a treaty on Persia that would ‘force the Shah to abandon his commercial dogma’. Such a treaty, according to Ellis, would have placed ‘the trade of British subjects on the footing of the most favored nation’. The basis of this has to have been the ‘Russian Treaty [of Torkmanchai], forced upon Persia at the point of the bayonet’. If Ellis had added that Britain should be allowed to have more ‘commercial agents’ residing in particular places, then his letters could have been substituted for the text of the Treaty of Commerce concluded between the two nations five years later.

150

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Mohammad Shah died in 1848 and was succeeded by Naser od-Din Shah. His first grand vizier Amir Kabir (1848–51) followed an independent foreign policy. During most of his grand viziership, he acted as foreign minister and directed his efforts towards the institutionalization of various loosely structured offices in the Foreign Ministry. During Amir’s term in office, no treaty or agreement of any significance was signed between Iran and foreign nations. One example of his nationalist policy was his refusal to ratify a treaty that was signed between his predecessor and France, which granted the French merchants the same privileges enjoyed by merchants of the most favoured nations. Amir’s pretext of rejecting the treaty was that it had not been signed by Mohammad Shah.64 Amir paid no attention to the requests made by the British to solve the question in favour of France.65 Thus, it is not surprising that the British envoy in Tehran should have allied himself with Aqa Khan-e Nouri, a freemason who succeeded Amir as grand vizier in 1851.66 The same Nouri was subsequently to play a major role in concluding the Paris Treaty in 1857. After the conclusion of the treaty, he is said to have remarked, ‘Thank God that the English will no more insist in my deposal.’67 In the wake of the Anglo-Russian rapprochement of 1839–41, Persian– Afghan hostilities subsided for about a decade. Hostilities resumed in 1851 when the ruler of Herat sought the protection of Persia against the khans of Kabul and Qandahar. The British, concerned with the security of India, could not allow any Persian influence in Afghanistan and in 1853 they sought assurances from Iran that it would ‘not ... send troops on any account to the territory of Herat’.68 The Persian army nevertheless marched on Herat in 1856 and took the city. The British immediately declared war against Iran and occupied some Persian Gulf ports including Mohammareh (presently Khorramshahr). A peace treaty was negotiated in Paris according to which Britain undertook to evacuate the Persian ports and Iran undertook to immediately withdraw its forces from Herat and elsewhere in Afghanistan. Iran also agreed to relinquish all claims of sovereignty over Afghan territory and to recognize the country’s independence.69 If the Treaties of Golestan and Torkmanchai represented the loss of Iran’s Caucasian provinces, then the Treaty of Paris represented Iran’s loss of Afghanistan. These treaties were in a sense complementary, and the process of weakening Iran was virtually complete. On the economic front, between 1830 and 1868, the foreign trade of Iran doubled (see Table 7.1). The accuracy of this assertion may be cross-checked by the growth of customs revenue for roughly the same period (see Table 7.2).

Table 7.1

Iranian Exports (1,000 Pounds Sterling)

Year

Non-Oil Exports

Oil Exports

Total Exports

1800a 1820–1b 1830c 1857d 1868e 1878f 1889g 1900h 1901–2i 1903j 1905 1907 1909 1911 1913 1915 1917 1919 1921

— — — — 2,500 5,250 3,778 5,000 5,469 7,264 7,283 7,556 8,185 10,459 11,764 8,590 8,670 12,600 12,200

— — — — 1,500 4,000 2,053 3,000 3,780 4,811 5,528 5,870 6,870 7,725 8,291 6,981 6,277 7,360 10,040

2,500 — 2,000 6,000 4,000 9,250 5,831 8,000 9,249 12,075 12,811 13,426 15,055 18,184 20,055 15,571 14,947 19,960 22,240

Sources and Notes: Constructed on the basis of data given in: aMalcolm, The Melville Papers. The figure is the sum of imports, exports and re-exports, the last of which accounted for ‘over one half of the total’. See Issawi, Economic History, p. 130. bFraser, p. 290, in Issawi, Economic History, p. 130. According to Issawi, Fraser’s figure is doubtful for it suggests no increase since 1800. cBrant, in Issawi, p. 130. According to Issawi, the figure is probably under-estimated. dBlau, Commerzielle, pp. 164–8. On this figure Issawi commented ‘unlikely’ and gave an estimate of 5,000 pounds sterling. See Issawi, Economic History, p. 131. eThomson, ‘Report on Persia’, Accounts and Paper, 1867–8, p. 69. The drop in trade relative to previous periods was due to muscardine disease which f Rabino, ‘Banking in Persia’. The figure seems to be greatly reduced silk production. g overestimated. Curzon, Persia, 2, pp. 559, 561. Curzon’s figures are in toumans (10 rials) which have been converted to Pounds Sterling using the ratio 1:3.625. See Table 4.12 (on Kran: Exchange Rate). hKatouzian, The Political Economy, pp. 38–9. Also Bharier, Economic Development, p. 105. iIssawi, The Economic History, p. 131. jData for 1903–21 from Bharier, Economic Development, pp. 105, 111, 114. Bharier’s Rial figures are converted into Pounds Sterling. Issawi gives the following figures for 1912–13 and 1913–14, respectively: import ¼ 10,320 and export ¼ 7,933; import ¼ 11,767 and export ¼ 8,288 (in Pounds Sterling). See Issawi, Economic History, p. 131. Again, according to Issawi, using a deflator of 150 for 1800, ‘in real terms trade rose about threefold between 1800 and the 1850s and quadrupled again by 1914, a total rise of about 12 times’ during the 1800–1914 period. See his Economic History pp. 131–32.

152

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Table 7.2

Custom Revenues, 1836–1921

Year a

1836–7 1867–8 1878–80b 1880–1 1881–2 1884–5 1886–7 1888–9 1901c 1903 1905 1907 1909 1911 1913 1915 1917 1919 1921

Toumans (10 Rials)

Pounds Sterling

Krans per Pound Sterling

268,714 536,660 606,400 708,629 785,290 806,000 850,000 800,000 2,300,000 3,400,000 3,000,000 4,600,000 3,700,000 4,300,000 4,700,000 2,900,000 2,400,000 3,600,000 5,100,000

134,357 217,271 236,400 257,700 281,600 264,262 253,730 235,294 438,095 641,509 566,038 851,852 685,185 788,991 854,545 537,037 444,444 720,000 1,020,000

20.00 24.70 27.63 27.50 27.86 30.50 33.50 34.00 52.50 53.00 53.00 54.00 54.00 54.50 55.00 54.00 50.00 50.00 50.00

Sources and Notes: aFor 1836–68, see Table 4.10 (on Composition of Revenues). bFor c 1879–89, see Curzon, Persia, 2, p. 476. For 1901–21, see Bharier, Economic Development, p. 71.

With the tariff remaining almost unchanged at 5 per cent ad valorem, the increase in customs revenues can be attributed to the increase in the volume of the trade. However, these positive figures do not reveal the actual situation. As foreign trade grew, so did the Persian trade deficit. By 1868, it amounted to about 1 million pounds sterling (Table 7.1). Two interesting observations arise. First, up to 1857, Iranian foreign trade had enjoyed a surplus of about 250,000 thalers (one-seventh of a pound sterling) judging from the data in Table 7.3. Second, between 1830 and 1869, Persian imports from Russia decreased by about 31 per cent while Persian exports to Russia over the same period increased by 52.6 per cent (Table 7.4). From these figures, it can be concluded that in terms of foreign trade the Treaty of Torkmanchai did not benefit Russia. Its objectives were solely politicostrategic. Trade with Russia was not responsible for the Persian trade deficit. This assertion is also supported by the figures given in Table 7.3: the

3,709,000

2,894,000 4,148,000 3,487,000 — — — 4,202,200 —

Persia’s Exports to

1,700,000

— — 1,795,200 1,590,092 — 1,732,590 — 1,500,620

Persia’s Imports from

Russiab

7,000,000

— — 5,565,694 6,067,390 — 7,285,446 8,404,400 —

Persia’s Exports to

1,000,000

— — — — — — — —

Persia’s Exports from

Turkey

2,500,000

— — — — — — — —

Persia’s Exports to

b

Sources and Notes: From Blau, Commerzielle, pp. 164–8. aThe rate of exchange during that period was about 7 Thalers per Pound Sterling. Official figures provided by Blau are doubled to account for smuggling, as Blau instructs us to do, and as he himself did for his average figures. cTotal average exports ¼ 13,200,000; Thalers; Total average imports ¼ 12,950,000; Surplus ¼ 250,000.

1,025,000

8,681,000 11,825,000 9,642,000 — 8,743,000 — 12,393,000 —

1847 1850 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857

Averagec

Persia’s Imports from

Europe

Foreign Trade through Trebizond Route (Thalers at Current Prices)a

Year

Table 7.3

154 Table 7.4 Average)

Year 1830–4 1835–9 1840–4 1845–9 1850–4 1855–9 1860–4 1865–9 1870–4 1875–9 1880–4 1885–9 1890–4 1895–9 1990–4 1905–9 1910–14

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Trade with Russia, 1830–1914 (Millions of 1896 Gold Rubles, Yearly (1) From Persia

(2) To Persia

(3)

(4) % Change Over Previous

Exports

Imports

3.80 3.60 4.70 5.30 5.00 5.70 6.00 5.80 5.60 6.30 7.50 9.40 11.50 19.70 24.00 26.40 38.50

2.60 1.30 1.20 0.90 1.20 1.40 1.60 1.80 2.10 2.70 3.80 6.50 10.90 16.00 24.60 29.00 49.20

(5) Trade

Total

Yearly Average

Balance

6.40 4.90 5.90 6.20 6.30 7.20 7.60 7.60 7.80 9.00 11.30 15.90 22.40 35.70 48.50 55.40 87.70

— 23.44 20.41 5.08 1.61 14.29 5.56 — 2.63 15.38 25.56 40.71 40.88 59.38 35.85 14.23 58.30

1.20 2.30 3.50 4.40 3.80 4.30 4.40 4.00 3.50 3.60 3.70 2.90 0.60 3.70 0.60 2.60 10.70

Source: Columns 1–3 compiled from Entner, Russo-Persian Commercial Relations, pp. 8–9. The original source gives annual figures, for 1830–1914 period, in millions of gold rubles, and, for 1830–96 period, in millions of account rubles.

Persian deficit from trade with Europe, using the average figures for the decade 1847–57, was 6,550,000 thalers or 935,714 pounds sterling; after the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris (1857) – despite the fact that it was not a ‘commercial’ treaty – Persian trade deteriorated (the 1841 Treaty of Commerce may have partly been responsible). Indeed, Persian trade with European nations other than Russia and the Ottoman Europe (see Table 7.3) was solely responsible for the Persian trade deficit. Finally, Europe’s interest in Persia during this period was primarily economic (with the exception of Russia and the Ottoman Europe). Judging from Table 7.5, by the 1850s, Iran’s primary exports made up only 19 per cent of the country’s total exports, the balance consisting of

FOREIGN TRADE, INTERVENTIONS AND POLICY

Table 7.5 Categories

155

Composition of Foreign Trade: Percentage Distribution of Various 1850s

Imports Cotton Woollen and silk cloth Total Cloth Imports Tea Sugar Metal goods Kerosene Cereals Others TOTAL IMPORTS Exports Silk and products Cotton and woollen cloth Total Cloth Exportsa Cereals Fruits Tobacco Raw cotton Opium Total Primary Exports Carpets Others TOTAL EXPORTS

1880s

1911–13

43 23 66 9 2 2 — — 21

48 15 63 2 8 2 1 — 24

30 5 35 6 24 2 2 4 27

100

100

100

38 23 61 10 4 4 1 — 19 60 20 100

18 1 19 16b 6 5 7 26 4 17 100

5 1 6 12b 13 1 19 7 52 12 30 100

Sources and Notes: Constructed from Katouzian, Political Economy, p. 41, and Issawi, Economic History, pp. 135–6. aThis should include raw silk. bMainly rice.

manufactured goods. Iran’s imports of manufactured products accounted for 66 per cent of total imports. This suggests that by the 1850s Iran had not yet become a raw material producing country but was increasingly moving in that direction (see Table 7.5). The main primary products were cotton, raw silk, tobacco, opium, rice and fruit. Cotton output increased until the 1840s.70 Foreign competition began to destroy cotton handicrafts from the mid-nineteenth century (see Table 4.2), causing a corresponding decline in cotton production. However, the

156

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

American Civil War created a ‘cotton famine’ in Europe, which led the British to encourage its production in Iran. With the cessation of hostilities in the United States, Iranian production of cotton declined.71 Silk remained the single most important export item up to the 1860s. In 1864, silk production in Gilan alone peaked at over 2 million pounds with a value of 1 million pounds sterling.72 However, in 1873 production fell to 210,000 pounds; the decline was caused by an outbreak of muscarine disease. The production of both rice and opium seems to have increased during the 1860s. In 1867, only 130,000 pounds of opium were exported, while the figure for 1869 was 250,000 pounds.73 Similarly, in 1865 rice production was about 74,000 tons, reaching a high of 210,000 tons in 1872.74 Rice production seems to have been substituted for silk after the outbreak of muscarine disease in the province of Gilan. As a result of foreign trade, from the mid-1830s certain problems began to develop in the Iranian economy. For instance, it was reported that the ‘trade of Tabriz flourished until 1836’. Thereafter, a ‘crisis in trade and a decline in credit’ resulted from the importation of foreign goods on ‘credit’. The credit crisis developed because ‘even Persian merchants of the first rank [did] not have a capital of over 150,000 silver [rubles] and [had] to make gains through credit’. Then ‘many bankruptcies followed in Tabriz’ and in 1837 the Persian merchants’ ‘predominant’ position was undermined. ‘After that date foreign merchants, including Russian [merchants], were preponderant.’ ‘In these circumstances, so favorable for a newly arrived capital, the trading house of Ralli was founded in Tabriz’ with an agency in Rasht, and subsequently ‘English manufactured goods ... soon flooded the cities of Iran and sold on ‘‘generous credit’’ terms’.75 Abbott, the British consul at Tabriz, reported in 1840 that Persia is [being] drained of its wealth but still the consumption of our [British] manufactures have experienced no decline as yet – and their introduction has so greatly diminished the production of many articles of native industry that Persia must now depend on us chiefly for her supplies of such goods.76 Four years later, the same author wrote that the Persian merchants and manufacturers have presented a ‘memorial’ to the king asking him for ‘protection’ against ‘European merchandise’.77 In the same year, another British resident in Tabriz reported a similar incidence. He wrote that ‘the ruin [of] Persian manufactures ... by the constant and immense importation of

FOREIGN TRADE, INTERVENTIONS AND POLICY

157

foreign goods’ had led the merchants to ask the native authorities ‘to prohibit imports of European manufactures’.78 Four years later, Abbott again reported to his superiors in London that ‘the manufactures of England have in a great measure superseded the use of cotton and silk fabrics of this country, owing to their cheapness’.79 Just a year later, the same consul again took up the issue: ‘The manufactures of Persia’, he reported, ‘have ... rapidly declined for some time past in consequence of the trade with Europe which had gradually extended into every part of the Kingdom to the detriment or ruin of many branches of native industry.’80 Many similar reports testify to the incipient decline of Persian manufactures as a consequence of trade with Europe and England in particular.81 There were a number of reasons for the gradual deterioration of Iran’s economic position relative to Europe’s. These included the privileges granted to the European merchants by Iran’s corrupt ruling class (e.g. extraterritorial rights and a 5 per cent ad valorem tariff).82 The European producers were more efficient, enjoyed the unconditional support of their mercantilist governments and were bent upon expansion at any price. Additional reasons included the lack of similar advantages for Iranian merchants and producers and the oppression they suffered at the hands of the corrupt ruling class. Coupled with political defeat in the hands of the same imperial powers, the deteriorating Iranian economy became the source of its gradual absorption in the world capitalist system. The major consequence of this was Iran’s subordination to imperialism at a later date.

Imperialism, Domination and Dependency: 1870–1926 After the Treaty of Torkmanchai (1828), Russia consolidated its position vis-a`-vis Iran and began extending its grip over the Iranian economy. Britain did likewise, particularly after the Treaty of Paris in 1857. Russia began developing capitalist relations of production after the reforms of 1861 and Britain was gradually moving towards the stage of imperialism. Russia’s need for capitalistic expansion and Britain’s need for direct imperialistic investment forced a change in their policies towards Iran. Instead of dismembering Iran through wars of aggression or penetrating the country through trade and similar devices, the two European powers began biding for the direct control of Iranian natural and developed resources. Meanwhile, the Iranian economy continued to deteriorate and, as the money economy grew, the demand of the ruling class for cash increased. Since they had exhausted every possibility of raising money within their own realm, they began to look

158

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

for external sources. The expense of administrative reform further exacerbated the cash crisis of the feudal state. These and other parallel developments resulted in a series of joint ventures between the Iranian ruling class and the imperialist powers. These are generally known as ‘concessions’. The period between 1870 and 1900 witnessed many of these joint ventures and they are popularly known to have had a deteriorating impact on the Iranian economy. It is also a fact that over these concessions the diplomatic rivalry of Britain and Russia intensified. Towards the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, the political economy of concession led to what may be called the political economy of loans and advances. The same banks that had been founded by concessionaires now paid the loans and advances. The imperialist powers redirected their diplomatic rivalry to account for this new development. Subsequently, a new burden of debt service was added to the already existing intolerable burden shouldered by the Iranian masses, and economic conditions went from bad to worse. The first series of concessions granted to Britain and Russia concerned transportation and communications. Telegraph and railway lines were the earliest to be requested and concessioned out. The imperialists were motivated by the prospect of extending their own telegraph and railway networks to the Iranian border areas in order to incorporate Iran, as a whole, into their world market. However, the development went farther than this initial objective. The process began in 1863 when the British Indo-European Telegraph Department obtained a concession (these are called ‘conventions’) from Iran to construct the Khaneqein–Tehran–Bushire telegraph lines. Iran agreed ‘to assign the necessary funds for the construction and purchase of material’, which had to be ‘purchased from the English Government’. Britain controlled the lines, which were to be put ‘under the superintendence of an English engineer officer’. This was followed by another concession for the construction of a second line between Bushire and Khaneqein ‘to be used solely for international messages . . . under the supervision of an English engineer officer and staff’.83 Two other concessions were granted in 1868, one to Siemens (IndoEuropean Telegraph Company) for the construction of the Jolfa–Tabriz– Tehran telegraph lines and the second to the Indo-European Telegraph Department for the construction of the Gwadur–Jask–Bandar Abbas lines. This same department was also granted the last of this series of telegraph concessions in 1872. It was for the construction of three lines, one for ‘local traffic’ and two for ‘international traffic’. The lines were to remain ‘under the

FOREIGN TRADE, INTERVENTIONS AND POLICY

159

superintendence’ of the British government. The Persian government was to pay ‘10,000 toumans, in ten annual installments, toward the expenses’. There were specific ceilings put on the rates to be charged and the amount of receipts to be credited to the Persian Treasury. ‘The debt to England, on account of materials and erection of the first and second wires, amounted in the end of 1869 to 47,217 [pounds sterling].’84 The conclusion of the 1872 concession signalled both the beginning of direct British intervention in Iran and Iran’s incorporation into the world market. Tehran was now connected to London, Bombay and tens of other large European capitals and industrial/commercial centres. Telegraph offices were established in many parts of Iran, staffed and controlled by British officials, making them ‘mini-legations’ with the British flag erected upon them.85 They also increased the chances of the British military involvement in Iran: under the pretext of protecting the offices, the British turned them into small military garrisons. According to Avery, the British ‘penetrated into the country in a manner unprecedented for foreigners’; the system symbolized ‘very dramatically how Iran was being opened up to the outside world’.86 Moreover, as Ricks has remarked, ‘the new communication system increased possibilities for a centralized autocratic state’,87 one that was very much desired by Britain and Russia. Ironically, as discussed in Chapter 8, the same telegraph offices became sanctuaries for the political struggle against the autocratic and reactionary state. The Reuter Concession was defined by Curzon as ‘the most complete and extraordinary surrender of the entire industrial resources of a kingdom into foreign hands that has probably ever been dreamed of, much less accomplished, in history’.88 The concession included an absolute monopoly of railroads and tramways, government forests and all uncultivated lands; the exclusive working of mines (except those of precious metal); the exclusive construction of all kinds of irrigation works; ‘the first refusal of a natural bank’; all future enterprises relating to roads, telegraphs, gas, mills, factories, workshops, forges and pavements; and all other public works relating to the urban areas, post offices and customs. Moreover, the company was allowed to raise 6 million pounds sterling in capital – in whatever way it pleased – and Iran guaranteed a 5 per cent return on any capital invested. The company was exempted from the payment of all taxes, duties and customs. In return, the government was to receive 20 per cent of the net profit of the projected railway and 15 per cent of the net proceeds from forests, mines and irrigation works.89

160

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

The concession had been negotiated and signed by the shah’s reformminded grand vizier, Mirza Hosain Khan Moshir od-Dauleh.90 After the conclusion of the concession, the shah and the grand vizier left for Europe. Meanwhile a coalition of conservatives, merchants, the middle-class intelligentsia and the olama was formed in Tehran against Moshir od-Dauleh and the concession. The public outcry became so loud that it made Britain withdraw support for the concession. Britain did not want to support this ‘impossible undertaking’ also because of pressure from the Russian government. The shah was equally concerned about the fallout from the concession. In his return to Iran, he deposed the grand vizier and later on cancelled the concession.91 Although Reuter did not succeed in realizing his imperialistic scheme, he was nevertheless able to create a precedent that lay behind the formation of the Imperial Bank of Persia and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. In fact, the British government used the cancellation of the concession as a pretext for the exaction of more concessions from Iran, particularly after the 1880s. Moreover, in the same way that the Treaty of Torkmanchai had become a pretext for the British to exact commercial privileges from Iran, the Russian government used the Reuter concession to further its interests in the country. A vivid example of this is the Falkenhagen Concession of 1874, which projected construction of a railway line between Jolfa and Tabriz. The concession also conferred upon the concessionaire the exclusive exploitation of mines lying within 50 miles of the lines. Iran exempted the company from taxes and customs duties and guaranteed a minimum return of 3 per cent. The term of the concession was for 40 years. The Russian government failed to provide the company with the necessary funds and the concession lapsed.92 Other concessions granted to Britain and Russia (and their citizens) between 1872 and 1890 included the 1881 concession to the Russian government for the exploitation of telegraph lines between Chikishlar and Estarabad; Russian control of the telegraph offices between Jolfa and Chikishlar; the 1886 concession to the Russian government for the exploitation of the Jolfa– Chikishlar telegraph line; the 1888 Liazonov Concession of the Caspian Fisheries; the 1888 concession leading to the opening of Karoun River to navigation (to Britain); the 1889 abortive Lottery Concession; various roads and tolls concessions from 1889; the 1890 concession to a Greek firm for the exploitation of forests; and the second Reuter Concession leading to the formation of the Imperial Bank of Persia in 1889. This last concession was the most important development since the first Reuter Concession.

FOREIGN TRADE, INTERVENTIONS AND POLICY

161

The Imperial Bank of Persia was established by Reuter in 1889 with a capital of 1 million pounds sterling. Its main shareholders were the leading British firms in Iran. The bank had a 60-year exclusive right for issuing notes. The bank was also granted the exclusive right of exploiting all mines including oil, but excluding precious metals.93 In time the bank acquired ‘very considerable power throughout the country’94 and became the main instrument of British foreign policy in Iran.95 It rapidly expanded its operations by purchasing existing branches of the New Oriental Bank and establishing new branches throughout the country (see Table 7.6). The bank engaged in industrial, commercial and financial activities, and acquired various concessions for the construction of roads and the exploitation of tolls.96 After the formation of the Imperial Bank of Persia, the Russians naturally became alarmed and soon began their campaign for the establishment of a Russian bank. This was acquired in 1891 in the form of a concession granted to Poliakov, the Reuter of Russia. Poliakov organized the Banque des Prets with a capital of 1.875 million gold rubles.97 Poliakov could not compete with his rival, the Imperial Bank of Persia, and so he decided to negotiate a merger. The Russian government immediately stepped in, however, and took over the bank,98 though nominally it still remained in the hands of Poliakov. The Bank was renamed Banque d’Escompte de Perse, and came to be known as the Discount and Loan Bank. From this time on, ‘the bank became pure and simple an instrument of Russian policy’.99 Its capital was raised to 30 million gold rubles and it began establishing various branches in major cities of Iran.100 The bank’s operations included financial, commercial and industrial activities.101 It paid loans to the government, delivered silver to the mint, sold drafts and discounted bills at less than the market rate, acted as a commercial agent, as a merchant, or just as a broker, financed export and import trades, and was actively involved in the concession hunting business, particularly road construction and tolls.102 The concessions that led to the formation of the two banks were undoubtedly the most successful foreign policy designs of the two imperial powers and the most serious blow to the Iranian economy. Yet it was the Tobacco Concession that actually became the start of an anti-feudal, antiimperialist alliance that eventually led to the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. Most if not all of the previous concessions had involved the

Table 7.6 Imperial Bank of Persia: Branches, Assets, Deposits and Value of Notes in Circulation (Column 3 in Million Pounds Sterling; Columns 4 and 5 in Thousand Pounds Sterling) Branches

Total

Value of Notes

Year

Iran (1)

Abroad (2)

Assets (3)a

Deposits (4)b

in Circulation (5)

1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921

8 8 12 12 12 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 15 15 15 17 18 18 18 17 17 17 17 17

2 2 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 3 3

1.80 2.10 2.10 2.20 1.90 1.40 1.90 1.60 2.00 1.20 1.40 1.40 1.50 1.50 1.90 2.00 2.00 2.20 2.20 2.40 2.80 3.10 3.00 3.30 3.10 2.50 2.70 4.40 7.70 10.40 8.30 7.20

113 225 357 286 269 238 226 217 220 179 280 279 282 226 410 427 528 549 608 687 746 776 725 906 695 703 728 1,188 1,789 2,830 3,228 2,805

— 28 55 59 96 73 82 38 73 117 206 264 330 347 481 526 461 395 430 635 684 805 859 962 832 208 180 562 667 1,109 670 733

Sources and Notes: Bharier, Economic Development, pp. 238, 240, quoting Imperial Bank of Iran, Balance Sheet, London, 1890–1951 and 1890–1951. aIncludes some deposits outside of Iran. Conversion from krans to pounds sterling made at average rates for each year. bThe values of fixed assets were usually converted from rials (krans) to sterling at current rates of exchange. For some early years (up to 1917), the assets were those given by individual branches.

FOREIGN TRADE, INTERVENTIONS AND POLICY

163

undeveloped resources of Iran and did not actually affect the daily life of the people. The Tobacco Concession was, however, very different. It dealt with a product on which hundreds of thousands depended: peasant cultivators, landowners, small traders, big merchants and users. It could not, therefore, go unchallenged.103 The concession granted a monopoly in the production, sale, purchase and trade (internal and foreign) of all the tobacco and toutoun (used in water pipes) in the country. In return, the concessionaire was to pay to the shah or the government an annual sum of 15,000 pounds sterling plus one-quarter of the net profit. The term of the concession was for 50 years.104 The Imperial Tobacco Corporation of Persia was formed to take over control of production, but its offices were attacked and destroyed in many areas. To grasp the extent of the enterprise involved, it is useful to note that the total production of tobacco in the 1880s was about 9.4 million kilogrammes out of which 5.4 million kilogrammes was used domestically and the rest exported.105 Mass protest and struggle against the concession eventually led to its cancellation in 1892. Just like the Reuter Concession, it proved a fiasco for British foreign policy. Unlike the Reuter Concession, however, the government now had to pay the high price of 500,000 toumans. This was the second foreign debt that Iran had incurred. Because the government had no money, it had to borrow from the Imperial Bank of Persia to pay the debt. The debt service on this loan could not be paid and so that too was borrowed. Although the concession had been cancelled, the country was trapped in a mountain of debt.106 From 1891 to 1910, the most important concessions (apart from the 1901 D’Arcy Concession for the exploration of oil) involved road construction and tolls. Most of these were granted to the Imperial Bank of Persia and the Discount and Loan Bank. The term of the Caspian Fisheries Concession was extended and concessions were granted to the Russian government for the exploitation and control of telegraph lines in northern Iran and for mining (e.g. the Qarachehdaq mines).107 The D’Arcy Concession was one result of the Reuter Concession of 1872. Except for the northern areas, which had to be excluded due to Russian objections, the concession covered almost all parts of the country. It conferred a 60-year right on oil exploration, production and export. Also, the exclusive right to build pipelines was granted. In return, Iran was to receive 16 per cent of the net profit, 20,000 fully paid shares of 1 pound sterling each and 20,000 pounds sterling in cash.108 Oil was discovered in 1908; by 1909 the AngloPersian Company was formed with an initial capital of 2 million pounds sterling. Iran began exporting oil in 1912. In 1914, the British government

164

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

became involved in the enterprise and became the principal shareholder of the company and its single most important contractor. The British Navy was considering the use of oil as fuel for its warships. The company was eventually forced to work out a security agreement with the local khans. If British interests in Persian oil arose from the desire to secure a source of oil independent of the United States, the Russian interest arose mainly from the potential loss of the Persian oil market and those of the countries throughout the Persian Gulf.109 Russia had reason to fear the D’Arcy Concessions for it could take over the market Baku so desperately needed. Moreover, a decrease in Russia’s market share would lead to a decrease in its political influence in the Middle East. The Russians therefore began negotiating with Iran for the construction of a kerosene pipeline across Persia in 1901 (Russia already had a number of small oil refineries in Iran). Under pressure from Britain, however, they gave up the scheme and instead extended a loan to Iran, the granting of which had earlier been conditioned on obtaining the kerosene concession. The Russians subsequently lost the Persian market just as they had predicted. Again in 1916 Russia tried to secure a concession for the production and refining of oil (Khoshtaria Concession) but the scheme failed to materialize. The oil market was lost to Britain, whose ‘total gain’ from its original investment of 2.2 million pounds sterling amounted to over 21 million pounds.110 Table 7.7 lists the production, exports, royalties, profits and assets of the Iranian oil industry between 1912 and 1926.111 These and other concessions did not help the central government raise money and solve its cash crisis. In fact, the treasury was even further burdened by the debt service and other expenses resulting from the concessions. In 1889, the government had entrusted the administration of Iranian customs to the Belgians. They were to reform the office and increase custom revenue. This decision seems to have been taken under external pressure because repayment of European loans and advances was secured by custom revenues. Despite this and other attempts the cash crisis and the crisis of the public deficit continued and led to inflation and misery for the masses. But what determined the need for more foreign loans was not the plight of the economy but the shah’s planned 1900 trip to Europe, for which he was busy making preparations. The search for a loan had already begun in 1897. In this year a coalition of anglophile courtiers and high state officials succeeded in overthrowing Amin os-Soltan, the russophile prime minister. The new cabinet, headed by Amin od-Dauleh, soon began the search for a 40 million franc loan. The initial

43 80 — 273 275 449 644 — 897 1,106 1,385 1,743 —

— 85 — 240 37 20 43 — 39 23 23 26 —

— — — 25 96 176 10 — 30 70 351 361 —

APOC Sales — — — — — — — — — — 160 342 —

Imports — — — 25 96 176 10 — 30 70 511 703 —

Total — — — 5,822 3,409 2,825 2,874 — 2,168 2,417 3,375 3,858 —

APOC Sales 38,088 34,223 — 43,243 35,501 35,934 44,782 — 17,954 35,489 3,914 19,251 —

Imports

Kerosene

38,088 34,223 — 49,065 38,910 38,759 47,656 — 20,122 37,906 7,289 23,109 —

Total — — 27 — — — — 780 — — — — 3,779

APOC Net Profite — 3 — 16 33 35 106 — 224 420 469d 585 —

to Iranf

1,600 1,700 1,700 — 1,700 2,800 na 5,400 —

—

APOC Fixed Assetsg

Royalties in 1,000 Pounds Sterling

Sources and Notes: aThe above figures do not include the Anglo-Persian Oil Company’s own consumption in Persia or the Company’s sales in Iraq and the Persian Gulf States. Bharier, Economic Development, p. 160, quoting Unofficial Data Provided by the British Petroleum Company, Ltd., London. bThe year runs January to December. cBharier, Economic Development, pp. 157–8, quoting Longrigg, Oil in the Middle East, p. 22 ff; Ministry of Mines, Industry and Mines Statistical Yearbook, p. 50. dExcluding 1 million pounds sterling supplementary payment. eFesharaki, Development of Iranian Oil Industry, p. 17. fMillispaugh, The Financial and Economic Situation of Persia, p. 31, for year ending 31 March. gBharier, Economic Development, p. 163, quoting ‘Annual Accounts of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.’ Year end figures, at cost less depreciation.

1912 1913 1913–14 1914 1915 1916 1917 1917–18 1918 1919 1920 1921 1921–2

Tonsc

Benzene

Production in 1,000 Long

Yearb

% Increasec

Domestic Consumption of Oil Products (1,000 Long Tons)a

Table 7.7

166

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

attempts to raise the loan from the French, the Dutch and the Belgian markets were all frustrated and blocked by Russia and Britain.112 The British had already secured an ‘assurance’ from the Persian government to the effect that ‘the customs of southern Persia ... will never be placed under foreign supervision and control’.113 The Russians were in de facto control of the northern customs. Because the customs were the only reliable source of government revenue that could be used as security against a possible loan, the British and the Russians could effectively use their control over the customs, as well as their influence in Europe, to block the loan efforts. Consequently, they were left as the only two sources from whom the loan could be obtained. Russia was the first to offer the loan. But the anglophile cabinet wished to raise the loan in the London market or borrow the money from the British government. The British government, however, was interested in preserving the status quo: a loan from Britain would have angered the Russians and led them to take unforeseen measures. Thus, Britain turned down the Iranian request on the pretext that the government could borrow the money from the shah’s treasury (not from Russia). The government then turned to the apparently ‘private’ Imperial Bank of Persia for a loan of 400,000 pounds sterling. The bank sought the guarantee of Britain, which was refused despite an ‘extraordinary’ concession on the part of Amin od-Dauleh and a parallel reduction in the amount of the loan requested (250,000 pounds sterling). As guarantee, the anglophile government was offering to transfer complete administration of the customs of Mohammareh and Kermanshah. According to the British envoy in Tehran, ‘the sum asked for is small, and the guarantee could not be better’.114 As Kazemzadeh remarked, ‘for the first time Persia was prepared to turn over to foreigners one of her government departments’.115 Eventually Hardinge, the prime minister’s best British friend, was able to extract 50,000 pounds from the bank (not as a loan) in exchange for the transfer of the revenues and the ‘supervision’ of the customs of Kermanshah and Bushire to the bank. Such was the price Amin od-Dauleh had to pay for receiving so very little in return.116 Amin od-Dauleh secured the necessary funds to save his administration from collapse. Nevertheless, he was not able to stand the mounting pressure coming from the shah, the Russians, Amin os-Soltan’s supporters and the olama.117 After an interim takeover by Mohsen Khan-e Moshir od-Dauleh (another anglophile), the office of prime minister was again ceded to Amin osSoltan, a russophile. Subsequently, Russia offered Iran a 15 million ruble loan

FOREIGN TRADE, INTERVENTIONS AND POLICY

167

against ‘the revenues of all customs’ as security against default. Naturally, the British were alarmed and immediately made a counter proposal. But Amin os-Soltan was ready ‘to sabotage the proposed British loan’.118 Britain then turned to the shah for a new ‘assurance’ about the southern customs, which was promptly given.119 The Russians did not object to the move for they felt that the revenues of the northern customs were more than enough for the repayment of the debt.120 Instead, they imposed the heaviest conditions possible. Thus, in 1900 the first Persian loan in the twentieth century, in the amount of 22.5 million rubles (more than the original offer) at 5 per cent with a sinking fund and repayable over 75 years, was received from the Russian government (the Discount and Loan Bank). The loan conditions included: Iran agreed not to take loans from any other country, except Russia, until the Russian loan was fully repaid; Iran undertook to pay off all previous foreign debts including that of the Imperial Rank of Persia (about 500,000 pounds sterling); Iran could not repay the loan sooner than ten years; Iran agreed not to reduce tariffs; Iran guaranteed the loan with the revenues of all customs except those of Fars and the Persian Gulf ports (the British dominions); and should annual payments made by Persia fall below the minimum of 1,156,288 rubles, the bank would have the right to ‘exercise effective control’ over customs’ receipts (Article 6). If the Persian government continued to be late in its payments, the bank would have the right to take over the direct administration of all Persian customs, except those of Fars and the [Persian] Gulf Ports.121 In case of an administrative takeover, the bank agreed to maintain the Persian personnel (but could employ 25 non-Persians) and to pay a ‘legal tariff’, and accepted Persian control of the bank’s administration of customs and the payment to the Persian government of any revenues remaining after the deduction of the bank’s expenses and debt services.122 The Persian government also agreed to ‘renew the previous engagement and undertake that for another ten years excepting the Russian government no other Government will be given a concession to build railway in Persia’.123 Britain used the loan to tighten its grip over the southern customs and to revive the Lottery Concession. Nevertheless, the loan was ‘a severe blow to Britain’s position in Iran’.124 Its position after the D’Arcy Oil Concession in 1901 greatly improved. This concession was, in turn, a severe blow to

168

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Russia’s position in Iran. It must be remembered that during these years (1897–1900) Britain was involved in the South African question and her position in Iran was not as strong as that of Russia. As soon as the loan was received, the shah left on his first European tour, leaving behind a huge increase in the public debt, inflation and misery for the common man. Moreover, the grip of foreign powers over the Iranian economy tightened. A huge step had been taken towards subordination and dependency. To see what the loan meant to the Iranian economy, it is enough to note that the amount of the loan (22.5 million rubles) was 1.5 times larger than the total revenues of Iran in the same year. The loan, according to Sykes, was ‘disastrous’.125 After its previous foreign debts were paid, Iran was left with no more than 1 million pounds sterling,126 out of which the expenses of the shah’s first trip to Europe, the regular government expenditures and the domestic debts had to be paid. In less than a year, the government was again out of cash. In 1901, the government needed to raise more than 1.2 million pounds in order to meet its obligations. In particular, a second loan was urgently needed to pay for the following: budgetary deficit for 1901 (300,000 pounds sterling); debt to the Imperial Bank of Persia (216,000 pounds sterling); debt to the Russian Bank (150,000 pounds sterling); cost of the forthcoming trip of the shah to Europe (300,000 pounds sterling); and construction of the Qazvin–Tabriz– Jolfa road (250,000 pounds sterling). In early 1901, the previously russophile Amin os-Soltan had now become anglophile and approached Britain for a loan with the intention of effecting a balance between the two rival powers in Iran. Soon, however, he also began negotiating with the Russians who gladly announced their willingness to extend a second loan in the amount of 10 million rubles. They linked the loan to four conditions: a pipeline concession, a road concession, a new commercial treaty and the elimination of British influence from the Tehran mint.127 Meanwhile, Britain was attempting to take advantage of the situation. Knowing that Iran was restricted from borrowing from any country except Russia, Britain offered to make a joint loan with Russia, an offer that the Russians rejected. The British became concerned. According to Kazemzadeh, Britain must have had three concerns at the very least: the new customs tariff that had been negotiated between Iran and Russia as part of the deal for the second loan; the shah’s guarantee that ‘Sistan’s revenue would never be ... alienated to a foreign power’; and the growing Russian influence in Iran, which remained a dilemma until the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.128

FOREIGN TRADE, INTERVENTIONS AND POLICY

169

Russia’s growing influence in Tehran was a fact. Russia had, in a short time, realized two of its goals: the signing of a new commercial treaty (the New Customs Tariff) and the elimination of British influence from the Tehran mint. The New Customs Tariff was designed to increase Russian commercial gains vis-a`-vis Britain and to increase the revenue of the customs, against which a Russian loan had already been made and a second was on its way to being concluded. In particular, it reduced the tariff on sugar and petroleum, the two most bulky exports of Russia into Persia from an already low 5 per cent to 2.25 per cent and 1.5 per cent, respectively. The tariff on tea, the most important Persian import from Britain, had risen from 5 per cent to 100 per cent.129 Negotiations for the other two conditions for the payment of a second loan, i.e. a road and pipeline concession, continued for a short time. These problems were also solved. Recognizing that Iran could not possibly grant a pipeline concession due to Article 6 of the D’Arcy Concession, and finding that D’Arcy was genuinely interested in advancing a loan to Persia, the Russian government gave up this request and instead worked towards a road concession, which was subsequently granted (Qazvin–Tabriz–Jolfa road).130 According to Sykes, ‘certain rights to work petroleum and coal were also acquired’.131 Thus, the second Russian loan in the amount of 10 million rubles – on the same terms as the first loan, plus the newly added conditions – was paid into the treasury of Iran. Afterwards, the shah left on his second tour of Europe. The British lost the battle over the loans, but the Russians suffered heavy losses over the pipeline concession. The Russian loan prevented the British from making the second loan but the D’Arcy Concession prevented the Russians from receiving a pipeline concession. The effects of the New Customs Tariff were also eliminated after a commercial treaty was negotiated between Iran and Britain. In the years that followed, Britain gradually took the upper hand: out of 10 loans and advances that Iran received from the two rivals between 1904 and 1917, eight were made by Britain (see Table 5.5). The politics behind these loans and advances were essentially the same as the first and the second loans: all involved imperialist rivalry and anglophile–russophile struggle among Iranian ruling elites, and in each case the customs had been ceded as security (after 1912, it was substituted by oil royalties). The loans were spent on non-essential government expenditures and were used by the lenders to blackmail Iran and to extract further concessions. In addition, the loans aggravated the cash problem, increased the public debt, had a negative impact on inflation, foreign trade,

170

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

balance of payments, currency depreciation, corruption and bribery,132 and contributed towards Iran’s subordination to the imperialist powers. By 1914, Russia’s capital investment in Iran amounted to 71.25 million rubles (or about 7.12 million pounds sterling) excluding loans, mortgages and the like (see Table 4.6). The comparable figure for Britain was 7,972,000 pounds sterling, excluding loans and advances (see Table 4.7). Britain’s capital investment was therefore larger (by about 847,905 pounds sterling). The fact that Britain’s capital investment in Iran grew larger relative to that of Russia after 1914 is undisputed. The investment in oil made up most of the difference (see Table 7.7). Moreover, Iran’s outstanding debt to Russia in 1920 was about 750,000 pounds, while the outstanding debt to Britain was more than 4 million pounds. Iran’s debt to Britain in 1920 was six times larger than its debt to Russia. Assuming a uniform 6 per cent rate of interest, the interest charges due to Britain in 1920 amounted to 274,828 pounds, six times larger than the interest charges due to Russia. After the Russian Revolution in 1917, all Russian capital in Iran was transferred to Iran, and all of Iran’s debt to Russia was cancelled. Therefore, in 1925 Iran’s debt to the Soviet Union was zero while its debt to Britain – despite payments from the oil revenue – was nearly 2 million pounds sterling (see Table 5.5). These facts suggest that, despite the initial Russian gains in Iran, British imperialism rapidly surpassed it in economic terms. Even before the Russian Revolution, Britain had become the dominant imperialist force in Iran, at least economically. Politically, Russia dominated up to 1904. From 1800 to 1890, Britain followed a policy of preserving the status quo in Iran.133 In 1844 Ouseley believed that since Britain’s objective was to secure India, her policy towards Iran should have been one of preserving the country’s present state of ‘weakness’ and ‘barbarism’.134 After 1860, the rivalry between Britain and Russia grew ‘more acute’.135 It was not until 1890, however, that they ‘finally realized that they could no longer maintain a wall around Persia high enough to exclude the onward drive of expanding capitalistic states’ and that ‘there were forces on the march [that] could not be strayed by the will of British diplomats’.136 Coming to this realization, they changed their attitude and began ‘the scramble for control of the development of Persia’.137 This led to even more acute rivalry between Russia and Britain. In the late nineteenth century, Britain was involved in the South African War and could not counter Russia’s growing influence in Iran. From 1890 to 1905, Russia actually dominated the political scene in Tehran. Towards the end of the 1890s two theories were being proposed in British foreign

FOREIGN TRADE, INTERVENTIONS AND POLICY

171

policy circles: a policy of ‘firmness’ advocated by ‘activist imperialists’ such as Curzon, and a policy of ‘accommodation’, advocated by those who ‘felt that Britain at best could hope to hang on to her possessions but should on no account extend her commitments’.138 The latter view prevailed. There were losses and gains on both sides. Britain lost the first two loans to Russia, the Tobacco Concession and the Reuter Concession were cancelled and new tariffs were levied against British interests. British gains, however, were not insignificant: these included the D’Arcy Concession, the Imperial Bank of Persia, a number of telegraph lines and the establishment of a number of consulates. The Russians were in a similar loss/gain position: for example, they floated two loans but lost a pipeline concession; they gained a bank but lost the Falkenhagen Concession. In 1904 the situation changed. Britain’s South African involvement had ended and Russia had been defeated in war with Japan. There followed the 1905 Russian Revolution and a series of internal disturbances in the country. Russia’s position had weakened in comparison to Britain. Sykes wrote that ‘after the Russo–Japanese war, Russia modified her policy in direction of an understanding with Great Britain’.139 After a series of ups and downs, of friction and accommodation, the two powers eventually came to an understanding over the ‘Persian question’. The acute rivalry changed into cooperation, the best reflection of which is the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. According to the Convention, Iran was divided into three parts: south, centre and north. The south was recognized as Britain’s exclusive sphere of influence and the north as the exclusive sphere of influence of Russia. The centre became the sphere of influence of both powers. Russia could not seek any concession of a political or commercial nature (such as concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, road and transport) in the south, and Britain could not seek similar concessions in the north. Both were free, however, to seek concessions of any kind in the centre. The customs offices were similarly divided between the two powers. The convention was concluded without the prior notification or consent of Iran. Iran immediately declared it illegal but was ignored by both powers. For Britain, the fate of Persia was second to the balance of power in Europe.140 The convention reduced the rivalry between Britain and Russia in Iran – to which Iran had come to owe her independence – and increased the possibilities for further exploitation of the country. It also became the main deterrent of the revolutionaries and constitutionalists in Iran and equally strengthened the position of the reactionaries.141

172

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Between the Anglo-Russian Convention and the Russian Revolution, relations between Britain and Russia – save for minor disputes and disagreements – were essentially cooperative. Their coalition had been necessitated by the growing anti-imperialist struggle after 1907. During the period of 1907–17 (including the First World War), their basic activities involved fighting the revolutionaries and the nationalists in Iran. It was during this period that they intervened militarily in Iran’s domestic politics for the first time. As I shall discuss these processes in the following chapter, I shall refrain from delving into the subject matter here. The most important developments after the Russian Revolution were the Anglo-Persian Agreements of 1919 and the Treaty of Friendship between Iran and the Soviet Union in 1926. After the withdrawal of the Czarist forces from Iran, a ‘power vacuum’ was created, which the British immediately moved to fill. Curzon, one of the ‘activist imperialists’, was the acting British foreign secretary and was moving to realize his ‘dream’ of creating ‘a chain of vassal states stretching from the Mediterranean to the Pamirs’ among which Persia was the weakest but ‘the most vital link’.142 British policy was directed to this goal, and the agreements were to serve this very purpose. In short, Iran was to become a ‘protectorate’ of Britain. According to the Political and Military Agreement, Britain was to supply ‘expert advisors’ to Iran ‘at the cost of the Persian government’. The experts were to ‘engage in contracts and endowed with adequate powers’. Britain was also to supply officers, ‘munitions and equipment of modern type’ for the ‘formation of a uniform force’ to be used ‘for the establishment and preservation of order’. To finance the reforms, ‘a substantial loan’ was to be arranged; the security would consist of ‘the revenues of the customs or other sources of income’. To improve ‘communications’, particularly railways for ‘the extension of trade’, an ‘Anglo-Persian enterprise’ was to be established. Finally, ‘revisions’ were to be made in ‘the existing custom tariff’. The Loan Agreement foresaw the payment of a 2 million pounds sterling loan at 7 per cent against the customs receipts of certain offices, ‘after the British financial advisor shall have taken up the duties of his office at Tehran, as provided for in the aforesaid agreement’.143 As opposed to these predatory ‘agreements’, the Treaty of Friendship between Persia and the Soviet Union (1926) renounced Czarist policy as ‘tyrannical’ and ‘criminal’, and declared its refusal to participate in any action that might destroy or weaken Persian sovereignty.144 The Soviet Union regarded ‘as null and void the whole body of treaties and conventions concluded by the former Russian Governments’. It renounced the ‘lending’

FOREIGN TRADE, INTERVENTIONS AND POLICY

173

policy of Czarist Russia undertaken ‘for purposes of political subjugation’. It therefore renounced ‘its rights in respect of the loans granted to Persia by the Tsarist Governments’. It regarded ‘the debts due to it as void’. Having repudiated ‘the colonial and capitalist policy’ of Czarist Russia, it ceded ‘to the Persian government the full ownership of all funds and of all real and other property which the Russian Discount Bank possesses on Persian territory, and likewise transfer[red] to it all the assets and liabilities of that bank’. Having ‘abandoned the colonial policy, which consisted in the construction of roads and telegraph lines more in order to obtain military influence in other countries than for the purpose of developing their civilization’, the Soviet Union ceded free of charge to the Persian government all means of transportation and communication owned by the Czarist governments. For decades Iran had given concessions to the various Czarist governments. At last Iran was receiving a part of them back. How did Iran’s foreign trade perform during this period (1870–1926) of imperialist domination? In the remaining part of this chapter, I will provide an answer to this question. From Table 7.1 it appears that the foreign trade of Iran increased from a low of 4 million pounds sterling in 1868 to a high of 22.24 million pounds sterling in 1926, an increase of 456 per cent. The increase, however, had not been steady. Total trade declined from a high of 20,055,000 pounds sterling in 1913 to a low of 14,947,000 pounds sterling in 1917, a 34 per cent drop in just four years. the First World War was mainly responsible. After the war, trade increased again and surpassed the previous peak in just four years, reaching a high of 22,240,000 pounds sterling. Despite these growth figures, however, the foreign trade of Iran went from bad to worse. Imports grew from a low of 2.5 million pounds sterling in 1868 to a high of 12.2 million pounds sterling in 1926, an average annual growth rate of 73 per cent. During the First World War imports seem to have slackened. Total exports increased from 1.5 million pounds sterling in 1868 to 22,240,000 pounds sterling in 1926. Exports seem to have declined during the First World War. Up to 1913 non-oil exports increased steadily. Thereafter they rapidly decreased. Ironically, 1913 – the first year of oil production – was also the year in which non-oil exports declined. Thereafter, oil exports grew rapidly, compensating for a corresponding decline in non-oil exports. This is an important phenomenon and had far-reaching effects on the Iranian economy. The economy was gradually taken over by oil. Regarding the trade balance, from 1868 to 1926 there was not a single year with a surplus balance of trade; the deficit grew even worse in later years.

174

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Using non-oil exports, the deficit grew from a low of 1 million pounds sterling in 1868 to a high of 8.62 million pounds sterling in 1926, more than an eightfold increase. The oil rent helped, as can be seen from Table 7.1. It did not, however, turn the deficit into a surplus. Thus, Iranian foreign trade increasingly deteriorated. But who was more responsible for this phenomenon, Russia or Britain? Tables 7.4 and 7.8 indicate that Iranian trade with Russia was steadily growing and only developed a deficit in about 1900, the date of the first Russian loan. The initial deficit was small, but over the next 14 years or so it grew into a huge deficit. Trade with Russia cannot, therefore, be blamed for the pre-1900 deficit. Even in the post-1900 period, their contribution to the deficit was relatively small. The bulk of the pre-1900 Iranian trade deficit resulted from trade with Britain. This is so obvious a proposition that it needs no proof. Yet until 1900 Britain was Iran’s second largest trading partner after Russia (see Table 7.9). In the post-1900 period Britain increased the volume of its trade with Iran. By 1919, Britain’s share of Persian imports had increased to 61 per cent (compared to 37 per cent in 1900–4 period). Britain’s exports from Iran did not increase in the same proportion, and Britain’s share of Persian exports was not significant compared to Russia (see Table 7.9). A trade deficit with Britain – which had developed ever since its trade with Iran began – was therefore inevitable. In the absence of data for the later years of the period under investigation, and to give only one example of the extent of the Persian trade deficit with Britain, the 1904 figure showed a deficit of 1.5 million pounds sterling (see Table 7.10). Iranian foreign trade also deteriorated in terms of its composition. This is evident from Table 7.5 and needs no explanation. It suffices to remark that the share of manufactured products (excluding carpets) in Iran’s total exports declined from a high of 61 per cent in the 1850s to a low of 6 per cent in 1911–13. To complement Table 7.5, I have also provided Tables 7.10 and 7.11. They are also self-explanatory and require no comment. The main question, however, concerns not whether Russia or Britain was to blame for Iran’s foreign trade deficit. They both were undoubtedly responsible, as historical study and analysis of their predatory practices in Iran show. Russia and Britain were both acting as colonial or imperial powers. Plunder is not, however, specific only to capitalism, as is demonstrated by the practices of pre-1861 Russia. Capitalism is unique in having introduced a ‘civilized’ form of plunder and it was at this stage that the country was blackmailed by the imperialist powers through the neatly written clauses of so many treaties,

44.60 85.60 57.00

63.00 30.60 48.60 52.80 35.50 67.30

69.60 35.00 50.30

Source: Entner, Russo-Persian Commercial Relations, 1828–1914, p. 63.

All Foreign Trade 80.80 With Russia 36.40 Percentage with Russia 45.00

45.90 28.00 61.00

69.30 33.30 48.00 63.60 40.60 63.80

77.60 40.00 51.60 57.10 36.50 63.90

73.50 34.40 45.60 58.70 41.40 70.50

67.00 32.20 48.10 66.90 47.30 70.70

79.60 40.60 51.00

83.20 115.20 107.60 122.30 141.20 130.60 125.80 146.50 43.70 61.20 57.20 70.50 80.60 70.90 73.60 88.00 52.60 53.10 53.10 57.70 57.10 54.30 58.50 61.30

34.00 22.20 65.30

Persian Exports To Russia Percentage to Russia

27.10 15.10 58.70

49.20 21.50 43.70

154.80 86.70 56.00

67.60 47.20 69.80

87.20 39.50 45.30

178.40 99.40 55.70

75.70 57.20 67.60

102.60 48.20 47.00

180.70 113.40 62.80

78.50 54.20 69.00

102.10 59.20 58.00

1901–2 1902–3 1903–4 1904–5 1905–6 1906–7 1907–8 1908–9 1909–10 1910–11 1911–12 1912–13

Yearly Value and Percentage of Foreign Trade with Russia, 1901/02–1912/13 (Million Rubles)

Persia Imports 53.70 From Russia 20.40 Percentage from Russia 38.00

Table 7.8

11 10 15 18 37

Persia’s Exports

37 36 32 61 67

Persia’s Imports

UK & India

73 67 72 67 33

Persia’s Exports 45 50 53 28 12

Persia’s Imports

Russia/USSR

— — 2 3 15

Persia’s Exports — — — — 1

Persia’s Imports

USA

Percentage of Foreign Trade with Various Countries 1900–24a

— — 1 — —

Persia’s Exports 1 2 4 — 2

Persia’s Imports

West Germany

16 23 10 12 15

Persia’s Exports

17 12 11 11 18

Persia’s Imports

Otherb

Sources and Notes: aImport figures include only non-exempt tangible imports and export figures include only non-oil tangible exports. Compiled from Bharier, Economic Development, pp. 108, 113. b‘Others mainly included Turkey, France, Austria-Hungery, Belgium, Afghanistan and Italy. During the 1900–24 period, no trade existed with Japan. See Entner, Russia-Persian Commercial Relations, p. 64. May contain a small element of oil exports.

1900–4 1905–9 1910–14 1915–19 1920–4

Periods

Table 7.9

500,000

2,000,000

0.50 0.25 0.25

1,500,000

0.83 0.17

rest’ 34,397 34,342

500,000

chiefly’ resta

Britain

0

1,000,000

— — Rest

1,000,000

Rest —

Others

Carpets and some silk tissues for

a

1,500,000

2,000,000

Source: Compiled from Maclean, ‘Report on Conditions and Prospects of British Trade in Persia’, pp. 2–9. India.

Total per annum

1. Sugar, Tea, etc. 2. Cotton Tissues and Yarn 3. Other Manufactures

Total per annum

1. Raw and Agricultural Products 2. Manufactures

Russia

Distribution of Foreign Trade in Iran; Selected Commodities, 1904

Balance (Deficit)

Imports

Exports

Table 7.10

178

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Table 7.11 Head)

Annual Distribution of Consumption of Imports, 1904 (10 Shahis per

Distribution by Country

Distribution by Commodities

Russia 4S. Britain 4S. Others ¼ 2S.

Sugar 2S. 6d. Clothing 4S. 6d. Tea – 6d. Others 2S. 6d.

Total 10S. per head

Total 10S. per head

Source: Compiled from Maclean, ‘Report on Conditions and Prospects of British Trade in Persia’, pp. 2–9.

concessions and conventions, all with the full cooperation of the dominant segment of the internal reactionary ruling class. In sum, imperialism undoubtedly played a major role in Iran. Even though imperialism tended to operate behind the scenes of foreign trade, it was nonetheless a resolute force, which hindered the development of transportation, mining, agriculture, manufacturing, banking and trade. It was also one of the many causes of plague, famine, inflation, oppression and corruption. Imperialism stood behind the failed reforms of the army, administration and financial system; and large state deficits resulted from its many loans and advances. The aggressive, destructive, oppressive and corrupt role that imperialism has played in the less developed capitalist societies is complemented by the equally destructive, repressive, oppressive and corrupt role that the internal ruling forces have played in shaping the events that forced these societies into their present underdeveloped and dependent position. Imperialism and internal reaction were in many ways complementary. This was certainly the case in Iran where the two worked in close association. However, as shown in Chapters 4–6, it was the internal forces that played the primary role in Iran. The ruling classes were crucial in early phases of the transition: they oppressed the people, corrupted the administration, opposed reform, suppressed innovative ideas, sold out the nation’s resources to imperialist forces, blocked the development of capitalist manufacturing and were responsible for thousands of other malicious, mischievous and treacherous practices. In short, the Iranian ruling class was the primary agent of backwardness and the pivot upon which imperialism forced the nation into a dependent and underdeveloped position.

CHAPTER 8

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

The class struggle in Iran during the transition period was marked by the bitter struggle of the feudal state, foreign forces and their allies on the one hand and the urban middle classes and their allies on the other hand. However, this generalization is only approximate: an analysis of the class struggle during the transition period necessitates careful consideration of the specificities involved. The previous chapters discussed the socioeconomic, political and ideological background of the classes during l796–1926. And Chapters 3 and 4 conclude that despite many impeding forces, including the feudal state and imperialism, the productive forces of Iranian society slightly progressed. It is also suggested that as population and urbanization increased, progress was made in transportation and communication, new techniques were introduced in the agricultural sector, and new tools and techniques were introduced in Iranian industry. The process of primitive accumulation resulted in the concentration of wealth in the hands of a small minority and the concomitant impoverishment of the masses. This process altered the social relations of production and created a significant number of propertyless people who either migrated to neighbouring states or moved to the urban centres and swelled the ranks of the lumpenproletariat. Only a few remained in the rural areas. Nevertheless, the rising bourgeoisie, despite favourable preconditions for industrialization (high prices, low wages and the formation of a commodity market), failed to industrialize the economy. This was mainly due to the predatory practices of the feudal state and the intervention of the imperialist forces. Subsequently, the

180

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

wealthier section of the bourgeoisie – the ‘dependent’ bourgeoisie – shifted most of its investment to foreign trade, cash crop production and real estate, and joined forces with the feudal state and imperialism. The other section of the bourgeoisie – the ‘national’ bourgeoisie – continued to struggle for industrialization. In alliance with the urban middle classes – and at times with the rural population – the national bourgeoisie waged numerous struggles against the reactionary forces. Chapters 5 and 6 show how state institutions and the officials controlling them were oppressive and corrupt. The demand for changes in the structure of these institutions forced the state to introduce some reform measures, and although these attempts largely failed to materialize – due to the opposition from the conservative and imperialist forces – they were nevertheless responsible for bringing about change in the army, administration, judiciary, the media and in the educational system. This resulted in a qualitative improvement of the productive forces, increased social awakening and the formation of an intelligentsia. The new forces engaged in ideological struggle and demanded law, order, security, freedom, equality, justice, centralization and national independence. Because these demands were not met, these forces became increasingly hostile to the feudal state and its imperialist allies. The role of imperialism in contributing to the backwardness of Iran and reducing the country to a position of dependency – and why the progressive forces in Iran waged so many struggles against it – has been discussed in Chapter 7. It is shown how the foreign forces penetrated the country through ‘peaceful’ and ‘violent’ means and how, by forming an alliance with the internal forces and imposing numerous political and commercial treaties on Iran, they dominated the country. Politically, the treaties weakened the position of Iran; economically, they opened its market to foreign trade. By means of a 5 per cent ad valorem tariff and extraterritoriality, among other measures, the treaties strengthened the competitive position of the foreign traders and destroyed Iranian nascent industries. Also, on the basis of an alliance with the feudal forces, the imperialist forces obtained numerous concessions for the exploitation of the natural and developed economic resources of Iran and made various loans to the cash-hungry feudal state. The burden fell on the shoulders of the Iranian masses, on top of the already heavy burden of ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’ exactions of innumerable varieties. Despite these regressive practices, imperialism also played a progressive role in Iran: it contributed towards both qualitative change in the productive forces and the social awakening of the population. However, this unintended progressive role of imperialism stood in stark contrast to its intended regressive role.

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

181

In short, the productive forces made progress between 1796 and 1926, but their further development was hindered by the predatory practices of the feudal state and the intervention of foreign forces. To have effected further progress, the defeat of these forces would have been necessary. Thus, the class struggles during most of the 1796–1926 period were distinguished for their anti-absolutist and anti-imperialist content. However, due to the alliance between absolutism and imperialism, these struggles were only periodically successful. Their ultimate defeat translated into backwardness and dependency for Iran, as well as continuation of absolutism in the new form of state dictatorship. To account for specific features of the class struggle during the period under review, a new periodization is suggested based on the form and content of this struggle. Generally speaking, the 1796–1926 time span can be divided into three periods. The first period (1796–1890) was essentially characterized by a series of wars with Russia and Britain, the Babi Movement, struggles among members of the ruling class, a series of urban-based bread riots, anti-absolutist uprisings or ‘civil wars’, and limited anti-imperialist struggle. Moreover, the official religion, Shi’ism, came increasingly under attack. Since the religious authorities were in a relatively weak position – especially in the earlier decades of the period – the state was compelled forcefully to defend it. The struggle against absolutism also took the form of a reform movement that demanded law and order, freedom, security, justice and similar measures. Nevertheless, it was only the violent uprisings that led to the introduction of reforms and not the struggle for reform per se. The second period (1891–1911) was ‘the revolutionary period’. It was marked by the urban-based Tobacco Movement and the Constitutional Revolution – the first in a series of bourgeois-democratic revolutions. Both these movements were anti-absolutist and anti-imperialist. The period between the Tobacco Movement of 1891–2 and the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 included a series of urban-based bread riots, radical and nationalistic ideological struggle, and the formation of a series of secret societies and other forms of revolutionary organization. However, the major struggles were fought immediately after the Constitutional Revolution and resulted in its defeat by Russian and British soldiers in 1911. The period was marked by several armed struggles waged largely by the urban middle classes. The influence of the religious authorities, which had increased since the 1860s, reached its zenith during this period. As the Constitutional Revolution became radicalized, however, a significant part of the constitutionalists, as well as the religious authorities, began turning against it.1

182

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

The third period (1912–26) was marked by direct military involvement of the imperialist forces in the class struggle, the First World War and a second series of regionally based bourgeois democratic revolutions (1918–26). The period began with the armed intervention of Russia and Britain in 1911. This put an end to the Constitutional Revolution, and was followed by the formation and collapse of a series of governments. The First World War devastated the country and led to a new heightening of the class struggle. The Russian Revolution put an end to the Russian Empire’s repression of the Iranian people and gave new impetus to the revolutionary forces. The result was a significant increase in the activities of the leftist forces. British imperialism, on the other hand, resolutely opposed this second round of bourgeois-democratic revolutions, and actively worked with the central government in defeating them. A pro-British coup d’e´tat in 1926 brought this period to an end in 1926.

Class Alliance and Struggle, 1796–1890 After Karim Khan’s death in 1779, the feudal lords became disunited. It took 17 years of constant struggle for Aqa Mohammad Khan, the first Qajar king, to assert his power throughout the whole of Iran. His conquest of Georgia in 1795 and of Khorasan in 1796 was particularly important. In both instances, the shah acted with the utmost cruelty. He was reported to have ordered the massacre of the defenders of Teflis, the capital of Georgia, to have carried off about ‘twenty thousand’ of them into slavery and to have tortured the defeated ruler of Khorasan until he revealed ‘the secret hiding places of his hoarded wealth’. According to Sykes, ‘the celebrated ruby of Aurangzeb was produced only when a circle of paste had been put upon his head and molten lead [was] poured onto it’.2 A year later, in response to the Russian invasion of Georgia, the shah invaded that province a second time. In the event, he was murdered in a plot organized by his feudal lords. Before Fath Ali Shah could firmly establish his rule, he had to put down a number of rebellions led by feudal lords contesting his ascension to the throne. Among these lords were his uncle Ali Qoli Khan, who had taken over a fortress near Tehran; the khans of Larestan; and Sadeq Khan-e Shaqaqi, who was creating disturbances in Azerbaijan. Although the shah was successful in putting down these revolts by 1797 and was able to celebrate his coronation in 1798, his rule continued to be challenged by the feudal lords. Revolts led by Hosein Qoli Khan, the governor of Fars (1798–1801), and Nader Mirza, the governor of Khorasan (1796–1803), were not easily put down.

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

183

Meanwhile, in 1796, the shah made his son Abbas Mirza crown prince, an appointment that was challenged by other powerful members of the Qajar court. Abbas Mirza played a major role in Iranian politics, including leading Iranian forces in the wars with Russia, up until his death in 1833. Rivalry and intrigue within the ruling class continued unabated. For example, when Fath Ali Shah made Mohammad Mirza, Abbas Mirza’s son, crown prince, the appointment was violently challenged by Hosein Ali Mirza Farmanfarma, a son of the shah (see below). One important event was the murder of the shah’s powerful grand vizier Haji Ebrahim Khan-e´temad odDauleh. He was arrested on the pretext of conspiring to overthrow the shah and, although he denied the charges, he was nevertheless condemned: before he was murdered, his eyes were removed and his tongue was cut out of his mouth. Moreover, ‘his brothers, sons, and relatives . . . were either killed or deprived of their sight’ and ‘[all] the possessions of the Hashemiya family [i.e. the grand vizier’s family] were confiscated’.3 In 1801, the governor of Fars, Hosein Qoli Khan, revolted a second time. He was soon joined by Nader Mirza, the governor of Khorasan in 1802–3. These revolts were put down by the central government but others broke out in later years. In 1817, the amirs and khans of Khorasan were again in revolt; in 1818, a vizier of the government was murdered in Shiraz by one of his employees who had ‘not received his pay’ and had been ‘incited by agitators’,4 and in 1831 Fars Province was the scene of a power struggle between two sons of Hosein Ali Mirza Farmanfarma. Meanwhile, Shiraz, the capital of the province, was the scene of a struggle between two powerful ruling families, the Qavam ol-Molk and the Moshir ol-Molk (see below). Taking advantage of the situation, an ‘unruly’ khan occupied Behbahan in the same year. The city was subsequently recaptured by government forces. A similar disturbance occurred in Khorasan when ‘unruly’ khans went into revolt, only to be subdued by Abbas Mirza in 1832. Conflict within the ruling class was to become a recurring phenomenon throughout the Qajar rule. The most important events of Fath Ali Shah’s reign were a series of wars fought against Russia in 1803, 1812 and 1826. As I have already pointed out in Chapter 7, these wars ended with the defeat of Iran and the signing of the Treaties of Golestan (1813) and Torkmanchai (1828). Iran was forced to give up the provinces of Caucasia and to extend special commercial privileges to Russian merchants, including a 5 per cent ad valorem tariff and certain extraterritorial rights. During this period, there also occurred a series of anti-feudal uprisings. Abdullaev, quoting Smiranov, has claimed that ‘during the reign of Fath Ali Shah, over 44 great anti-feudal uprisings occurred’ in

184

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

which ‘the plundered poor peasants and the lower urban classes actively participated’.5 One example was Fars province, where in 1806 Aqa Jan Qiri, a former district governor, led a group ranging from ‘the mighty emirs and merchants down to the clay workers’ into revolt against the vizier Charoq Ali Khan-e Nava´i. According to one report, ‘200 people or more assembled on the Midan-e Ark [at Shiraz] raising an uproar and clamor which reached the ears of the Shah’. A number of them submitted a ‘petition’, which described ‘Charogh Ali Khan’s tyranny and injustice’.6 The vizier was subsequently deposed. Another important struggle involved the inhabitants of Zolfabad, a town near the city of Farahan (31 miles from Arak). Zolfabad had both underground and above-ground dwellings. In 1815, ‘the inhabitants of Zolfabad brought their belongings into that subterranean town and rose in revolt against the governor of Farahan’. According to the author of Farsnama, they ‘stole the possessions of the merchants and plunder[ed] the possessions of the Moslems’,7 implying that the inhabitants were sacrilegious. The truth, however, may not be what the Farsnama tends to suggest, especially given the fact that these people were ‘in revolt against the governor’ of their district, an official who was probably as corrupt and oppressive as any other state official of the period. Moreover, the author of Farsnama, himself a member of the ruling class, tends to portray the poor and oppressed people as ‘evil doers’, ‘rabble’ and ‘criminals’. In any case, the central government sent troops against the rebels and ‘[h]earing of this, the inhabitants of Zolfabad marched against the troops’. After being ‘defeated’, they took refuge in the subterranean town. Meanwhile, ‘strong forces occupied the surroundings of the town and cut off provisions. After a few months the people grew weary and asked for pardon.’ Subsequently, they ‘were repelled from that region, and Zolfabad was destroyed’.8 The author of Farsnama reports another movement of about 1820. Ostensibly Sufi in orientation, this movement involved the governor of Gilan (also the shah’s son), Mohammad Reza Mirza, his vizier Ali Khan-e Esfahani and a number of ‘officials’. After hearing the complaints of the ‘theologians of Gilan’, the shah left Tehran ‘to hunt and amuse himself at Tarom’. Upon his arrival there, he summoned the ‘prince’ and ‘the officials of Gilan’. Subsequently, ‘Esfahani was removed from the vizierate of the prince and [a] group of corrupted followers was expelled from Gilan, some of them in fetters.’ Moreover, the shah sent his trustee to Hamadan ‘to confiscate the sum of 1000 touman[s], as a punishment for the crime of Gilanis, from Haji Mohammad Jafar, the spiritual leader of the group’.9 This movement, most probably anti-Shi’ite judging by the complaints made by ‘the theologians of

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

185

Gilan’, seems to have been more important than the Farsnama’s author is willing to reveal. It is perhaps due to this fact that the author accuses the movement of harbouring criminals and refers to its followers as ‘ignorant fools’ and an altogether ‘corrupted group’. Another fact gleaned from the story is the relatively weak position of the Shi’ite leaders and the shah’s determination to preserve and safeguard the official religion and the ideology of the state. In 1832, a series of important struggles took place in the southern provinces of Iran. These had their origins in the rivalry among members of the upper class, but went further than their initial intended purposes. Qavam ol-Molk, on hostile terms with Moshir ol-Molk, the vizier of Fars, formed a coalition with the ilkhani of the Qashqa`i il, and subsequently planned a movement of the Qashqa`i from Fars to Kerman to protest Moshir ol-Molk’s vizierate. The ils were warmly received by Seif ol-Molouk, the governor of Kerman and a supporter of Abbas Mirza the crown prince. Seif ol-Molouk ‘assigned them pasture for summer and winter for 100,000 families’,10 in the hope of winning their support for the crown prince. Farmanfarma, the governor of Fars and a rival of the crown prince, ordered the ilkhani to return with his people to Fars, but received the following message in return: ‘As long as Moshir ol-Molk remains vizier of Fars, none . . . will return to Fars.’.11 Upon receipt of the message, Farmanfarma removed Moshir ol-Molk from the vizierate and sent him to Kazeroun. Satisfied with the actions of the governor, the ilkhani ordered the ils to return, but Seif ol-Molouk sent a detachment to the ashaier of Fars and tried to prevent them from departing.12 After the news reached Farmanfarma, he raised a 5,000-strong ‘musketeer’ force and sent them towards Kerman. A letter was also sent to Seif ol-Molouk, which ‘contained advice and admonition and threats of the Shah’s indignation’.13 Farmanfarma himself also departed for Kerman. Meanwhile, Seif ol-Molouk ‘had departed for a few days [of] hunting, and when he returned, the inhabitants of the city of Kerman closed the gates and entrenched themselves behind the ramparts. A group of them proceeded to Farmanfarma in order to complain of Seif [ol-Molouk’s] bad behavior’.14 Seif ol-Molouk also proceeded to Farmanfarma’s camp and was ‘graciously received’. He was nevertheless deposed ‘because the complaints of the people were overwhelming’. The people of Kerman, who had successfully played off different factions of the ruling class to get rid of a corrupt governor, now made a new demand: Because of our complaints you [Farmanfarma] have deposed Seif olMolouk Mirza and sent him to Shiraz. Now the citadel of the city of

186

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Kerman is in the possession of the princess, the spouse of Seif ol-Molouk Mirza and daughter of Crown Prince Abbas Mirza with the Qaraguzlu general (sartip), Ali Naqi Khan, and 1000 soldiers from Hamadan under her command. Either you evacuate the nobles from Kerman, bringing them to Shiraz or you remove from us the calamity of Ali Naqi Khan’s presence!15 Farmanfarma subsequently wrote to Ali Naqi Khan that ‘you must send the spouse of Seif ol-Molouk Mirza to Yazd!’16 But Ali Naqi Khan refused to obey the order and ‘prepared the defense of the citadel’. The next day, the inhabitants of the city ‘assembled for the capture of the citadel and started shouting’.17 However, before they could take any action, the citadel was overrun by the Qashqa`is. Ali Naqi Khan and the princess were taken from the city, the former was sent to Shiraz and the latter was sent to Yazd. This provided a pretext for the inhabitants of Yazd, who immediately petitioned Farmanfarma complaining about the bad behaviour of the younger brother of Seif ol-Molouk Mirza, Seif od-Daulah Mirza.18 However, they were not successful in having him removed. Upon his return to Shiraz, Farmanfarma ‘entrusted the governorship of [the city of Shiraz and the surrounding area], Sarvestan, Estahbanat, and Fasa to Aqa Mirza Mohammad-e Fasa`i because he had removed [Mirza Ab ol-Hasan Khan] from the governorship when the population of those districts had risen in revolt against the latter’.19 Crown Prince Abbas Mirza died in 1833 and his son Mohammad Mirza became the heir apparent. Mohammad Mirza became shah in 1834 when his grandfather Fath Ali Shah died. However, there were other pretenders to the throne, including Farmanfarma of Fars. In the war between Mohammad Shah’s army (commanded by Lindsay, an Englishman) and Farmanfarma’s army, the latter was defeated, and ‘[t]he defeated troops of Fars did not march as far as Shiraz, but all went home’.20 Subsequently, the princes residing in Shiraz left the city for Basra, carrying out ‘the gold and jewels which they had amassed during a lifetime’.21 Farmanfarma refused to leave the city and his wives, feeling insecure, moved ‘their treasures to the houses of the theologians and nobles of Shiraz’.22 The news of the movement of treasure soon spread throughout the city and the people, seizing upon the opportunity, began expropriating the governor’s wealth. According to one report: When the rabble of the city heard of this, they took away from them most of the treasures, and all the poor became rich and wealthy. Then

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

187

the rabble, not satisfied with this, hurried to the houses of FarmanFarma’s sons and family, which were outside the Vakili palace and carried away as booty everything they found.23 After hearing of ‘the riot’, Farmanfarma attempted to leave the city, but he was stopped by musketeers at the city gates. Unable to leave, he took refuge in the governor’s palace. However, the following day, the situation changed. News reached Shiraz that the shah’s soldiers were commanded by a ‘European’ and that: They killed the people everywhere and plundered their belongings. The rabble and the craftsmen of Shiraz were alarmed by this news, caused a riot, and shouted: ‘We do not want any other shah but our Hosein Ali Shah [Farmanfarma]!’ They assembled in vast numbers on the Meidan-e Ark [in support of Hosein Ali Farmanfarma].24 Farmanfarma subsequently asked the ilkhani of the Qashqa`i il to support his cause, but the ilkhani failed to comply. This created a pretext for the people of Shiraz to expropriate his wealth as well: ‘The rabble . . . plundered the ilkhani’s house and carried away what was to be found, including the door wings, the window gates, and the columns of the gateway’.25 Soon afterward, the shah’s troops occupied Shiraz. Farmanfarma was deposed and taken to Tehran where he soon died. Conflict within the ruling class continued. For example, in 1834, disturbances were being reported in the provinces of Khorasan, Loristan and Khouzestan. In 1835, the shah ‘strangled’ his prime minister Mirza Ab ol-Qasem-e Qa`em Maqam, who ‘did not do anything in accordance with the wishes of the Shah’26 and appointed Mirza Aqasi as his new prime minister. Thereafter, the shah was better able to assert his power and different factions of the ruling class gradually reached an understanding among themselves. The shah subsequently undertook a number of campaigns against the ‘unruly’ ils, particularly those of the Mamassani Lors and the Torkmans of Khorasan (1835–6). It is reported that when the Yomut Torkmans ‘fled, their belongings and cattle came into the possession of the court’.27 The next series of campaigns (1837–8) were undertaken against Afghanistan, resulting in nothing but frustration due to the British involvement. One result of the Afghan campaigns was an intensified class struggle inside Iran, a vivid example of which was the ‘civil war’ in Shiraz in 1839.

188

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

The pretext for ‘civil war’ was provided to the ‘oppressed’ people of Shiraz when Farmanfarma II, the governor of Fars, did not comply with the request of the people to depose his deputy and to terminate the activities of the Azerbaijani ‘gunners and soldiers’. One of these ‘gunners’ joked with a woman who began ‘screaming at the top of her voice’. According to one report: The people of the Bazar-e Vakili came to assist the woman and several gunners and soldiers from Azerbaijan came along to help the gunner; the affair then turned into a brawl. Several people were wounded and the inhabitants of Shiraz shouted in union: ‘If Farman-Farma wants Mirza Ahmad Khan [his deputy], he does not want us!’ The next day they went into the mosques and the houses of the theologians and confirmed their desire to have Mirza Ahmad Khan removed. Most of the men were armed.28 In this way, an armed struggle broke out between the people of Shiraz and the governor of Fars in September 1839. It is noteworthy that ‘the mosques’ were involved and the ‘theologians’ consulted – a rare occurrence in the early to mid-nineteenth century. Farmanfarma, however, did not succumb to the pressure and prepared for the defence of the city. He ordered the installation of breastworks on the roofs of government buildings and placement of soldiers and servants of the Divani behind him. Two canons were placed on the Meidan-e Naqarehkhana opposite the main entrance of the Masjed-e Vakil. When the inhabitants of Shiraz saw this, they banded together and entered the Masjed-e Jame`-e Nau. All the theologians, nobles and merchants assembled for deliberations. Despite many differences of opinion, the decision to resist Farmanfarma II was unanimous.29 The people also prepared for the struggle. Those from the Ne`matikhaneh quarters appointed Aqa Mohammad Hasan, ‘a man combining liberality with boldness’, as their leader. The inhabitants of Heidarikhaneh quarters entrusted their leadership to Ahmad Soltan, ‘major of a detachment of Shirazi soldiers’. They then proceeded to erect . . . breastworks on the roof of the Masjed-e Vakil, which is adjacent to the government buildings, and on the roof of the Madrasa-ye Khan. A number of Shirazi musketeers were placed on the roof and at the entrance of the Masjed-e Vakil, and other Shirazi musketeers under the command of Haji Asad the sword cutler and Mohammad Rahim the dyer were

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

189

placed on the roof and at the entrance of the Madrasa-ye Khan; all of them established themselves behind the breastworks.30 Thereafter, fighting began and continued ‘for some time’. News of the rebellion soon ‘spread and reached the ears of the Shah’, who subsequently sent an envoy, Mirza Nabi Khan-e Qazvini, ‘to inquire into this unfortunate affair’. The envoy arrived at Shiraz in September 1840, almost a year after the outbreak of hostilities. Recognizing that ‘it was not possible to reconcile the two parties’, the shah’s envoy sent Farmanfarma ‘perforce to Tehran and took the administration of the province of Fars into his own hands; the rebels then were calmed down’.31 Therefore, the ‘civil war’ in Shiraz ended in victory for ‘the people’. The increasing activities of the craftsmen and merchants against absolutism and oppression are particularly noteworthy. The merchants, in particular, began a limited campaign against foreign trade in 1844. According to Abbott, the British consul in Tabriz, the merchants and manufacturers presented ‘a memorial’ to the shah in 1844, asking him for ‘protection’ against ‘European merchandise’.32 In the same year, another British resident in Tabriz reported a similar incident. In particular, he wrote that ‘the ruin [of] Persian manufactures . . . by the constant and immense importation of foreign goods’ had led the ‘merchants’ to ask the native authorities ‘to prohibit imports of European manufactures’.33 The merchants were also among the leading participants in the next series of major anti-absolutist struggles, collectively known as the Babi Movement, to which I shall shortly return. Mohammad Shah died in 1848. He was succeeded by his son Naser od-Din Shah who had been made crown prince in 1835. His accession to power proceeded smoothly, but before he could extend his sway over the entire country, he was forced to deal with a number of civil disturbances. Before the new shah arrived at Tehran, disturbances had broken out there due primarily to the activities of Mirza Aqasi, the grand vizier of the deceased Mohammad Shah. However, his supporters were defeated by ‘the people’ of Tehran and he was forced to leave the city for Azerbaijan. Upon his arrival at Tehran, the young shah appointed Amir Kabir as his grand vizier. Amir Kabir subsequently took measures to put down a number of disturbances in the provinces of Mazandaran, Esfahan, Fars and Khorasan, the last of which was quite serious. The ‘civil war’ in Shiraz, however, deserves a short explanation before I turn to the rebellion in Khorasan.

190

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

After learning that the new grand vizier, Amir Kabir, ‘had been a bitter enemy of Hosein Khan-e Nezam od-Dauleh’, the governor of Fars, the people of Shiraz seized upon the opportunity and ‘rose in rebellion against him’. The people subsequently held a ‘meeting’ in which they decided to expel the governor from the province. ‘The best thing for him to do’, the people declared, ‘is to go to Tehran and leave us alone.’ Otherwise, they asserted, ‘he will be the target of shooting!’34 In the ‘civil war’ that broke out, ‘three soldiers and 4 citizens of Shiraz were killed’ in early pitched battles. Thereafter, the governor’s supporters – including the city officials and soldiers – increased their military preparedness as did the people of the districts, ils and the citizens fighting against them. In the next round of fighting, ‘nearly 40 Farsis were killed by the cannon balls [fired by the governor’s forces], while 10 or 12 soldiers were killed by the musket fire of the Farsi musketeers’.35 The fighting halted only after an envoy of the central government arrived at Shiraz and through ‘promises and threats . . . calmed the people’.36 A serious threat to the throne took the form of a rebellion in Khorasan led by Mohammad Hasan Khan-e Salar in a bid to transfer the power from the Qoanlou branch of the Qajar to that of the Davallou branch. His struggle had begun during the last years of Mohammad Shah. The main power base of Salar in his fight against the central government was the Qouchani Kurds and the Torkmans of northern Khorasan. He also had a large following among the people of Mashhad.37 Nevertheless, despite some initial gains, Salar’s forces were defeated in their campaigns against the government forces. The city of Mashhad, under siege for 13 months, fell into the hands of Hesam os-Saltaneh. On the order from Tehran, Salar, his two sons and his brother were all strangled.38 However, it was the Babi Movement that was ‘the most remarkable phenomenon’ of the nineteenth-century Iran.39 The Babi sect was founded in 1844 by Mirza Ali Mohammad, a 24-year-old ‘merchant’ at Bushire, the son of a Shirazi grocer who had been brought up in a merchant family because he was still a child when his father died.40 Mirza Ali Mohammad had left Bushire for Karbala and became a pupil of Haji Saiied Kazem-e Rashti, himself a student and a successor to Sheikh Ahmad Ahsa`i, the founder of the Sheikhiyeh school.41 Upon the death of Saiied Kazem, Mirza Ali Mohammad proclaimed himself the successor. He returned to Bushire in 1844 and declared himself Bab (or Gate), the only one through whom knowledge of the Twelfth Imam could be obtained. After the Zohour (manifestation), he immediately began preaching his new ideology, which combined religion,

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

191

metempsychosis, communistic views on certain aspects of social life (including property relations) and some reformist ideas, which echoed the demands of the merchants and craftsmen. It was due to these teachings and their anti-absolutist tendencies that the sect soon spread among the oppressed peasants and the urban middle classes and became a real threat to the official Shi’ite religion and the absolutist state. It was also due to this fact that the religious leaders and state officials acted in unison to suppress the sect with the utmost cruelty. Already in 1845, the Bab’s apostles were ‘forbidden to preach’ in Shiraz and had the tendons of their feet cut by the order of the governor of Fars, Hosein Khan.42 In the same year, the Bab was arrested and brought to Shiraz, where he remained ‘imprisoned’ for about six months. He escaped and moved to Esfahan, where he was well received by the governor Mo`tamed od-Dauleh.43 Upon the death of Mo`tamed od-Dauleh, the Bab was again arrested and sent first to Tabriz and then to Makou, where he remained a prisoner. He was later put to death at Tabriz on the orders of Amir Kabir in July 1850. While in Makou prison, the Bab wrote his Baian and his followers spread the ideology and made numerous converts. In 1848, all of the Babis and their leaders (Boshravayh, Barforoush, Qorrat ol-Ain and Baha´) gathered in Badasht. In this great gathering, the Babis were asked to disobey the Shar´ and Orf regulations and refrain from paying ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’ taxes. Discussions were held concerning the communal ownership of land and inequality between the rich and the poor. According to Tabari, the new teachings were far more radical than those originally preached by the Bab himself.44 After learning of the gathering, the government used force to disperse it. This episode ended the Babis non-violent phase; thereafter, an armed struggle ensued. The Salar rebellion provided the Babis with an opportunity. The first major Babi insurrection, the Mazandaran Insurrection, took place in 1848. The insurrection broke out immediately after the death of Mohammad Shah. The Babis moved to the Fort of Tabarsi, where they were joined by a ‘great number of peasants and craftsmen’.45 To subdue the revolt, the government sent more than 10,000 soldiers. The government forces were initially repelled. Even when the Babi leader Boshravayh was killed, the government forces could not take over the fort. The commander of the government forces tricked the Babis by making a peace treaty with them according to which the Babis were to be given amnesty. After the Babis put down their arms, ‘the soldiers fell on them on all sides and slew them all’.46 The next major Babi insurrection occurred in Zanjan in 1850. It was led by Mirza Ali-e Zanjani and required a government force of 30,000 soldiers

192

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

several months to put it down.47 The rebels and their families were all subsequently slaughtered. In the same year, Babi insurrections led by Saiied Yahya in Yazd and Neiriz were crushed by an army of about 10,000 soldiers. The rebels and their families were burned, others were killed by cannon balls, many died under torture and many were carried off into slavery.48 The Neiriz uprising was the last armed mass uprising of the Babis. However, they continued their preaching and sustained their opposition to the absolutist state and the olama. Their massacre and persecution by the khans, princes, daulehs, saltanehs, mamaleks and the olama also continued. In 1850, seven of their leaders were put to death in Tehran. Towards the end of 1851, their major foe, Amir Kabir, was put to death by the shah. The shah then became the target of an unsuccessful assassination attempt by the Babis in 1852. There followed a savage and discriminate massacre of the Babis. Among those executed were Soleiman Khan and Qorrat ol-Ain.49 Baha´ was also suspected of complicity in the plot against the shah but was found innocent. He moved to Baghdad in 1850 to join his younger brother (who was also the Bab’s successor), Mirza Yaha Sobh-e Azal. Years after the movement was subdued, the Babis prosecution continued. Thus, in 1862, a great number of Babis were persecuted in Arak. In the same year, Baha´ wrote his Iqan. In 1867, Baha´ proclaimed himself ‘he whom God shall manifest’ and founded the Baha´i sect. Afterwards, a schism between the Baha´is and Azalis became inevitable. Azalis remained faithful to the Bab’s teachings, despite the fact that their leader, Sobh-e Azal, became ‘a pensioner of the British Government’.50 Baha´ism was ‘a new religion’ devoid of any revolutionary essence.51 Nevertheless, the persecution of the Azalis and Baha´is continued throughout the nineteenth century and after. Ever since the rise of the Babi sect (and until recently), the olama and the mollas had accused their debtors, rivals and enemies, as well as Iranian liberals and revolutionaries of being infidel Babis or Baha´is. They never gave up their demand for the persecution, execution and massacre of the Babis.52 The Babi Movement is without doubt a great episode in the history of Iran. Its contemporaneousness with the bourgeois democratic revolutions in Europe was not accidental. As in Europe, feudalism in Iran was slowly disintegrating, although the vestiges of absolutism were more keenly felt in Iran. Moreover, contact with Europe had been established by the midnineteenth century. Babism was influenced both by events in Europe and by the urban revolts of the 1830s and 1840s in Iran. In turn, Babism influenced the subsequent reforms, uprisings and revolutions that took place in Iran after

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

193

the mid-nineteenth century.53 Yet the most important mark the Babis left in Iran was the tradition of heroism. As Browne has noted: ‘If the Babis have done nothing else, they have at least shown how Persians, when exalted by enthusiasm, can meet death and the most horrible tortures imaginable, not merely with stoicism but with ecstasy’.54 While the Babi Movement was underway, the ‘rabble’ of Rasht rose in revolt against the shah’s uncle Isa Khan, the governor of Gilan, in 1851. His house was occupied by the rebels and Isa Khan himself was taken out with ‘a bell . . . on his neck’.55 The governor was then replaced by his brother. After these local revolts and Babi insurrections were put down, the political situation became somewhat peaceful. The war over Herat with Britain (1856–7) changed the political environment again (see Chapter 7). During the war, however, domestic politics remained somewhat unified. The only exception was the situation with the Torkman tribes that were in unrest during 1857. However, from 1858 a number of urban revolts (as well as those of the ils) were reported. In 1858, the craftsmen of Tabriz and Maraqeh rose in revolt.56 In 1859, the Baharlou and Inalou ils of Fars were subdued, as were the rulers of Larestan in 1860.57 Also in 1860, disturbances were reported in Qazvin, where merchants had closed their shops and people had taken sanctuary in a holy place.58 In 1861, the Torkmans, in revolt since 1857, tightened their grip on the city of Sarakhs in Khorasan.59 During the same year, disturbances were reported in Qa`en, another city in the Khorasan province. The mother of the city’s governor killed the shah’s special physician, who had caused the death of her son. The shah forwarded a demand for compensation amounting to 1 million toumans, which were to be collected from the city’s people. Upon the arrival of the governor of Khorasan’s agents, the Qa`en’s people slew all of them and rose up in revolt.60 In 1865, the people of Khamseh expelled the prince along with his vizier and killed the farrashbashi of the divan.61 In the same year, Shiraz was the scene of an even larger revolt. According to Farsnama, ‘the craftsmen and merchants [of Shiraz] were irritated by the poor conduct of the . . . officials’ of the vizier of Fars (Qavam od-Dauleh); ‘they crowded together and occupied the house’ of the vizier. ‘Things passed to the discharging of muskets, until prudent citizens . . . calmed down the anger of the people’. Subsequently, the vizier was removed from his office and the ‘civil war’ ended.62 A year later, Shiraz became the scene of an even larger civil disturbance, the cause of which seems to have been the artificial inflation created by the governor and the

194

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

ilbegi of Fars during the famine of 1866–7. According to one source, during the winter of 1866–7 the prices of grain and victuals went up at Shiraz and in the districts of Fars. The merchants and inhabitants of Shiraz together with the widows, orphans, and gossipy women complained and crowded together on the Meidan and at the entrance of the government buildings, demanding Hosam os-Saltana to lower the price of bread and to increase provisions.63 Subsequent developments led to ‘a riot and a hunger revolt’.64 Some days later, ‘the people crowded together again, assembled at the entrance of the government building, shouting at the top of their voices: ‘‘Hosam os-Saltana is the cause of the high price of bread. We are not content with him. He must leave the town!’’’65 The governor took immediate measures to remedy the situation and even distributed grain ‘among the bakers free of charge’. But the people had increased their demands: ‘We want neither grain nor bread but the governorship of Hosam os-Saltana!’66 Before the situation worsened, the biglarbegi of Shiraz, on the request of the governor, stepped in and subsequently ‘distributed a sum of money out of his own pocket among the people’ and ‘installed bread shops at different spots and provided them with plenty of bread’. The governor also brought in grains from the surrounding areas and ‘distributed at low prices’. ‘The year of famine’, wrote the author of Farsnama, ‘came to an end with low prices’.67 Similar revolts broke out in Talesh and Kermanshah. In the summer of 1869, a ‘great revolt’ occurred in Talesh in reaction to the governor-general’s demand for higher taxes. In just one year, the government of the district had to be changed four times.68 The Kermanshah revolt had ‘a political character’.69 One report states that ‘the people of the city and the districts are disturbed,’ and ‘the whole of [the city’s] people have crowded together, shut the shops and left their jobs’. They were opposed to Emad od-Dauleh and Sarem od-Dauleh, the governor and his deputy. Sarem od-Dauleh, according to the report, ‘has killed three people with the sword of his own hand and has plundered and imprisoned a number [of people] in the city and has detained a number [of people] in the Emadiyeh [building]’. Concerning the size of the uprising, the report states that ‘it is not the job of two people and five people and one thousand people’. The people, ‘men and women’, had gathered in ‘the mosque’ and ‘were demanding the deposition of’ Emad od-Dauleh and Sarem od-Dauleh.

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

195

The shah sent an envoy to Kermanshah to deal with the revolt. The envoy, according to the report, read the following ‘message’ to the people: ‘We will not depose His Highness Emad od-Dowleh because of the profligacy and petition of some rascals and rogues. But we will look into the petition of the ra`iyat.’ The message angered the people, and ‘a thousand women dirt on head and men with Qu’ran’ in hand began crying, ‘we will not accept the governorship of His Highness [Emad od-Dauleh]’, and then wrote a letter to the shah stating that ‘unless you massacre us all, we will not accept the governorship of Emad Od-Dowleh’. In his report to the shah, the envoy advised him to be firm with the people, but warned that the Zanganeh Lors are in ‘confederation’ with the people of the city to expel the governor. The urban revolts of the 1860s were as numerous as were those of the 1840s and 1850s. However, in the 1870s, they suddenly disappeared, and in the 1880s only a few were reported. As the uprisings of the 1840s led to the reforms of the 1850s, so did the urban revolts of the 1860s lead to the reforms of the 1870s. But the relatively peaceful character of the 1870s cannot be solely attributed to the reforms and the reform movements. It was also due to the fact that plagues, epidemics, famine and other social catastrophes killed many people and forced others into a relative passivity. Nevertheless, the 1870s was the decade of social reformers and ideological struggle which has been described in Chapter 6. Another distinction between the 1870s and previous decades is that in the 1870s the anti-imperialist content of the struggles became more pronounced. Moreover, the religious forces took on an increasingly important role, despite the fact that many of the religious authorities had close ties with the court and with imperialism.70 Because the olama were anti-reform,71 they at times broke with the state and joined the people. Despite many differences, the 1870s had two things in common with previous decades: the anti-absolutist content of the class struggle and the lack of any significant peasant uprisings.72 An important event relating to the class struggle in the 1870s was the formation of a coalition of courtiers, princes, conservative officials, the Russian government and the olama against the reforming prime minister Moshir od-Dauleh.73 The coalition was instrumental in Moshir od-Dauleh’s downfall. Another important milestone in the class struggle was popular opposition to the Reuter Concession. This movement included the active involvement of the ‘National Party’74 and resulted in cancellation of the concession. Rivalry among members of the ruling class continued throughout the 1870s, and in 1877–8, the shah was forced to divide power and the government ministries among three powerful rivals: Moshir odDauleh, Mostaufi ol-Mamalek and Kamran Mirza (the shah’s son).75

196

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

The 1880s was similar to the 1870s in that few uprisings were reported. However, during this time, rivalry between members of the ruling class accelerated – this time between Amin os-Soltan, the young grand vizier and Kamran Mirza – and ideological struggle intensified (see Chapter 6). Nevertheless, during the 1880s, the anti-imperialist struggles grew though they still remained unorganized and without direction. However, it was becoming evident that the struggles against absolutism were taking on an anti-imperialist orientation. The most important uprising of the 1880s was that of Sheikh Obeid olLah, which was surprisingly put down with relative ease. In the same year, the rebellions of the Hamarand-e Chalabi, Kalhor and Karandi ils were put down, and in 1886–7, the state did not encounter any major difficulties in putting down another il’s uprising led by Jahanshah Khan-e Afshar.76 The year 1888– 9, according to Algar,77 ‘witnessed a number of disturbances in the capital of a religious nature’, which included opposition to the erection of the shah’s statue in the artillery arsenal at Tehran and an attack on ‘the installations of the railway between the capital’ and Shah Abd ol-Azim. Concerning the statue, the shah was forced to erect his statue ‘in the seclusion of the royal garden’ near Darvazeh Qazvin. Concerning the railway riot, according to Browne, the pretext for the ‘riot’ was provided when a passenger jumped out of the moving train and fell under the wheels’. Subsequently, ‘the outraged passengers . . . started to wreck the coaches and came into conflict with the Belgian officials working the line. One of the rioters appears to have been killed’.78 The destruction was such that ‘the Belgian Embassy’, according to Mo´aiier ol-Mamalek, ‘claimed compensation of 300,000 toumans on behalf of the company operating the railway’. The claim was later withdrawn after Emam Jom’eh intervened.79 Algar’s assertions to the contrary, these ‘disturbances’ were not just ‘religious’ in nature but were predominantly anti-absolutist and antiimperialist. S. Bakhash has remarked that ‘sometimes, seemingly fanatical outbreaks had easily traceable economic causes’. He provides an example: ‘Agitation against Jews in Esfahan, it was discovered, was aimed in fact against Manchester cottons which were sold from door to door by peddlers who happened to be Jews’.80 These kinds of limited anti-imperialist struggles continued. One was organized against the Imperial Bank of Persia in 1889: When the bank was first opened, the native merchants and moneychanger organized a boycott against it, as they had done against the

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

197

New Oriental Bank Agency, and refused to sell it bills in Tehran, with the result that the bank forwarded silver, to the great inconvenience of the hostile party.81

Class Alliance and Struggle, 1891–1911 With the Tobacco Movement, the anti-imperialist and anti-absolutist struggles took a new turn. The Tobacco Movement represented the culmination of decades of struggle and was a prelude to the Constitutional Revolution. It was, after the Babi Movement, the second nationally organized struggle of the Iranian people in which the urban middle classes and the national bourgeoisie took a leading role. The olama and the merchants also actively participated and at times assumed an important role. The movement was essentially urban based, and the role of the peasants and the ashaier remained negligible compared to those of the urban lower classes. These included the workers in the craft industries, the small traders, the lower mollas and the poor in general. The cities involved in the movement were among the larger ones in Iran, and included Tehran, Tabriz, Shiraz, Esfahan and Mashhed. These were also the centres of provinces where most of the tobacco was produced. The ostensible cause of the movement was the Tobacco Concession granted to Talbot, a British subject (see Chapter 7). However, in actual fact, there were many other factors at work. These included intervention by foreign forces; the absolutist nature of the state; the oppressive and corrupt character of state institutions and members of the ruling class (the officials in particular), currency depreciation, inflation, unemployment, extreme poverty and intrigue on the part of the Russian government.82 Most, if not all, of these problems were of concern to the people. However, the national bourgeoisie and the merchants were primarily concerned with imperialism and absolutism. The olama had their own reasons to participate in the movement: the mollas were extremely hostile to the secularizing tendencies incorporated into state reform programmes since the mid-nineteenth century. They also realized that the activities of the foreign forces encouraged these tendencies despite Russia’s hostility towards the reforms. The olama’s concern about national independence and their anti-foreign attitude were also nourished by their anti-secularism. Thus, the olama’s struggle against absolutism and imperialism was a derivative one. They opposed the absolutist state not only because it was

198

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

absolutist, but also because it was moving in the direction of secularism and reform. They opposed imperialism not only because it plundered the national economy and threatened national independence, but also because it engendered secularism and posed a cultural threat to Islam. At best, the olama were fighting for the preservation of the status quo. Likewise, during the Babi Movement, the olama and the state acted in unison. During the Tobacco Movement – and after the concession was cancelled – the olama dissociated themselves from the revolutionary middle class and again sided with the state. Throughout the Constitutional Revolution, the olama maintained their opposition to radical demands for the reorganization of the society. It either sided with the absolutist shah or went with the ‘moderates,’ still attempting to preserve the status quo. Given the opportunity, the religious forces had always tended to support attempts to desecularize the society and the state. They had usually sought to look into the past for a model to develop the future. However, a small number of clerics proved an exception to this rule, among them was Tabataba`i.83 Despite their regressive character, the olama (with the help of the merchants) were sometimes able to assume the leadership of the Tobacco Movement. There were six major reasons for this. First, since the 1860s, a section of the olama distanced itself from the state. This was due to the aborted reform programmes, the increased tension between the Shar´ and the Orf, and the state’s concession-granting policies. Second, the olama and the religious forces were, after the state, the only nationally organized force in Iranian society during the pre-constitutional era. They directed and controlled a nationwide system of courts, mosques, maktabs and madrasas. Third, the olama and the religious forces were economically powerful: they controlled a vast endowment institution (vaqf) and used it as means to lead the opposition. Fourth, the olama and the religious forces had an organized, well-defined and established ideology. Fifth, since they controlled the educational system and a significant part of the judiciary, they were able to exercise ideological hegemony over the movement. Finally, there were few real alternatives to the merchant’s and olama’s leadership. The national bourgeoisie remained weak, and the urban middle classes lacked the means for establishing themselves as the leadership of the movement. The traditional ties between the merchants and the olama also worked in favour of their joint leadership position in the movement. The merchants and the olama were largely independent of the state, and because of their economic position in society, this gave them even more power. Moreover, the bazaar was under the control of the big merchants and the

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

199

sanctuary offered by the mosques, holy places, and the olama’s houses provided a refuge for the oppressed. The weakened position of the state was also a source of power for the olama and the merchants. Any of the anti-absolutist and anti-imperialist struggles outlined above might be considered the origin of the Tobacco Movement. Nevertheless, the argument shall proceed from those early events that are directly related to the movement itself. This account will be detailed because an understanding of the Tobacco Movement is crucial to a better understanding of the olama’s role in contemporary Iran, the Islamic Republic in particular. Indeed, many of the political tendencies and forces of that time are also present in Iran today. From this perspective, the Tobacco Movement is even more important than the Constitutional Revolution that followed it. The contract for the Tobacco Concession was signed on 8 March 1890, after a ‘generous distribution of bribes’ among influential Iranian officials. Feuvrier put the amount of bribes at 2 million francs.84 Early in September 1890, Butzov, the Russian minister in Tehran, protested against the Karoun and Imperial Bank concessions and the Regie (the company formed to exploit the tobacco concession). ‘Despite Butzov’s warnings, all this was immediately reported to Wolff [British Minister in Iran] by the Amin os-Sultan [the grand vizier], along with a plea that the British be more careful in the future not to reveal to the Russians that Wolff was getting such information from him’.85 In the same month, Butzov registered a ‘formal protest’ with the government of Iran in which he characterized the monopoly as ‘entirely contrary to the stipulation of the treaties’ signed between Iran and other nations.86 In July 1890, Qanoun published an article that criticized the concessions in general. In November, Akhtar published an article that specifically attacked the tobacco concession.87 Thus, Iranian liberals were in accord with the profoundly anti-liberal Russian government over the issue of the Regie.88 In January 1891, ‘the first signs of an organized campaign against the government appeared . . . [which] made broader charges . . . [indicating] that the movement was a general one, with causes and goals going beyond the question of the tobacco concession’.89 Early in the month, the shah received ‘an anonymous letter’ accusing him of selling out the country to Britain. Convinced that the letter was circulated by Saiied Jamal od-Din Asadabadi [i.e., al-Afghani], the shah ordered his immediate expulsion from Iran. There followed ‘an anonymous leaflet’ that was ‘circulated at night’ in Tehran, accusing the government of disregarding ‘Islamic religious principles’.90 Talbot arrived at Tehran in February 1891 to inaugurate the Regie. The concession was then, for the first time, publicly announced. Following these

200

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

events, ‘sixty tobacco merchants had met at the home of the leader of the merchants, Malek ot-Tojjar, and had written a petition to the shah offering to pay a tobacco tax which would give him more income than the concession’.91 The petition was transmitted to the shah by Amin od-Dauleh,92 an enemy of the grand vizier Amin os-Soltan. Amin os-Soltan discouraged the shah from favourably responding to the merchants and assured the British that ‘the complaint was not genuine’. The movement was to take a new turn from March 1891. On 6 March, all the tobacco merchants and dealers assembled in the Masjed-e Shah and proceeded to Shahzadeh Abd ol-Azim where they took sanctuary and petitioned the shah not to submit to the British company. One reporter wrote that the ‘Shah is much disturbed and very probably H.M. will repudiate the concessions given to the said company’.93 The reporter’s guess that the shah would repudiate the concession came very close to materializing in March,94 but it seems that Amin os-Soltan prevented the shah from doing so. By now, Amin os-Soltan had acquired ‘some five hundred shares of its [Regie] stock’.95 Meanwhile, Qanoun had intensified its anti-government propaganda. This could only have upset the shah. In March 1891, he denounced its editor, Malkom, ‘as a traitor to his sovereign and his country’, and ordered the withdrawal of all his ‘decorations’. The shah further declared that he would consider any state official holding correspondence with Malkom ‘a traitor’.96 Nevertheless, Qanoun continued to be smuggled into the country and read by various classes, including liberals in the service of the state who continued to hold correspondence with its editor (see Chapter 6). In March, trouble increased for the shah. Saiied Jamal ol-Din’s followers were sending ‘anonymous hostile letters to high members of the government denouncing the government’s policy of concession-granting and noting the evils of the tobacco concession. Anonymous placards began to circulate against this policy in both Tehran and Tabriz’.97 Moreover, ‘printed opposition sheets were also coming from a secret society which had been set up by Jamal ad-Din’.98 The shah subsequently ‘ordered a number of arrests’ including the arrest of an employee of the Austrian legation in the service of Saiied Jamal ol-Din’s secret society; Mirza Reza Kermani, a peddler who later on in 1896 assassinated the shah; Hajj Saiiah, who in conjunction with a number of others had written ‘three open letters, addressed to the shah, the olama and to the Persian nation’; and Mirza Yousef Khan-e Mostashar od-Dauleh, the author of Yek Kalemeh who had also held correspondence with Malkom and ‘several Babis’. A number of state officials were also discharged

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

201

and others came under suspicion, including Amin od-Dauleh.99 According to one account, ‘arrests had by late April reached about thirty’.100 In April 1891, after the Regie ‘agents began to arrive in the various cities and to post a six months’ deadline for the sale of all local tobacco to the Company and for the end of trade in tobacco except by merchants with authorization from the Company’, the protest against the Regie took on a mass character.101 Also in April 1891, ‘one of the chief tobacco merchants of Fars, Hajji Abbas Urdubadi, caused the bazaar of Shiraz to be closed in protest against the monopoly’.102 At the same time, a leading molla of Shiraz, Hajj Saiied Ali Akbar, was preaching against the concession and had called for holy war (jehad). He was subsequently expelled to Samarra, the home of Mirza Hasan Shirazi (popularly known as Mirza-ye Shirazi), the highest Shi’ite authority and a relative of Ali Akbar. Shirazi was to play a major role in subsequent struggles against the Regie. To protest the expulsion, ‘the merchants of the town [Shiraz] gathered in the shrine of Shah Chiragh, where they were fired upon by the troops’.103 According to Keddie, ‘two or more people were killed’.104 Meanwhile, the olama of Shiraz were sending telegrams to the government requesting the return of Ali Akbar. In Shiraz, ‘the Russians [and] large merchants and the powerful mayor of Shiraz, Qavam ol-Molk [a representative of the liberal bourgeoisie], were secretly inciting trouble’.105 In May, Tabriz began to seethe. In July, a ‘placard’ appeared that threatened ‘the olama’ and ‘the Europeans’. It read: Woe to those ulama who will not cooperate with the nation! Anyone of the ulama who will not agree with the people will lose his life. Woe to anyone who may sell one muskal [six grams] of Tobacco to the European! Woe to the Europeans who may wish to enforce these customs of the infidels.106 In August, the Tabrizis began sending telegrams and ‘mass petitions’ to the shah asking him to withdraw the concession and ‘threatening armed resistance if he failed to do so’.107 Responding to the people of Tabriz, the shah sent an envoy with a message and ‘gifts’ for Mirza Javad, a leading molla involved in the Tabriz movement. The people responded to the shah’s communication by hanging ‘a piece of paper round the neck of a dog, and parad[ing] it through the town.’108 The shah’s envoy also ‘found the streets of Tabriz and Mirza Javad’s residence full of armed men, and thereafter

202

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

considered it more prudent to retire after presenting the gifts than to stay and attempt any discussion’.109 The governor of Tabriz, ‘a pliant tool in Russian hands’, and the city’s mayor were strangely quiet.110 By September, the people of Tabriz were running out of patience and the movement had grown beyond the control of the olama and state officials. On 1 September, Kennedy, the British representative, warned that ‘Tabriz is like a forest covered with naphtha, which the slightest spark will set in a blaze’.111 He then stated that ‘the Shah is being publicly denounced as an infidel merchant . . . and that the life of the heir apparent may be endangered’.112 Kennedy’s conclusion was that ‘H.M.’s sovereignty and not the Tobacco Concession was being attacked, and that the other provinces are waiting the mot d’ordre from Azerbaijan, and that his [the shah’s] yielding would be the signal for the rapid spread of the spirit of revolution throughout Persia’.113 The events of 4 September 1891 clearly demonstrated that Kennedy’s concern was genuine. On that day A large crowd, which had earlier been supplied with arms, filled the streets. The Tabrizis apparently had a plan for an armed uprising, and the armed men were divided into three sections, one of which was to go to the crown prince, one to the Amir Nezam, and one to the European quarter. The use of arms was averted only by the arrival of the Shah’s telegram promising cancellation.114 Again on 5 September 1891, ‘the city was full of armed men, and the local authorities had taken no effective action’. Apparently the russophile governor of Tabriz, Amir Nezam, was acting on the order of the Russians who were energetically behind the protest movement. Amir Nezam was also an enemy of the anglophile grand vizier Amin os-Soltan. ‘At first’, it is reported, the chief Mojahed (Mirza Javad) ‘was inclined, through gratitude, to assist’ Amin os-Soltan, but Amir Nezam warned him that Regie was ‘the first step toward introducing European reforms and law which will very materially affect the religious power in Iran’.115 The Mojahed was apparently alarmed and subsequently accepted the governor’s offer to work ‘hand in hand with him to ruin the Tobacco Regie’.116 Contrary to Amin os-Soltan, the shah had apparently been convinced that he could not win the battle, particularly since the Russians were also on the side of his enemies. The shah made the decision to quell the uprising. To buy the satisfaction of the Russian government, in early September, the shah

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

203

authorized the Russian minister in Tehran to inform his consul in Tabriz that ‘the concession would be withdrawn as soon as an agreement on [an] indemnity could be signed’.117 However, the people of Tabriz found the shah disingenuous. They demanded a direct proclamation from the shah. Eventually, the shah yielded to the demands of the people of Tabriz and publicly announced the suspension of the Regie’s operation in Azerbaijan on 30 September 1891. Until this time, the olama’s intervention in the Tobacco Movement had been limited. At the insistence of the exiled Ali Akbar, now in Samarra with Mirza Hasan-e Shirazi, the highest of the Shi’ite olama, Saiied Jamal ol-Din, another exile, wrote a long and persuading letter to Shirazi (according to Browne, possibly immediately after his expulsion from Tehran in January 1891) setting out the corrupt policies of the shah and requesting his support for the struggle against the shah. In particular, he warned Shirazi that: If thou wilt not arise to help this people, and wilt not unite them in purpose, and pluck them forth, by the power of the Holy Law, from the hands of this sinner, verily the realms of Islam will soon be under the control of foreigners, who will rule therein as they please and do what they will.118 In July 1891, Shirazi sent a telegram to the shah protesting Ali Akbar’s expulsion and the tobacco concession. The shah ignored the telegram, but subsequently received a letter from Shirazi (in September 1891) in which he set out in detail his objections to the tobacco concession. Unable to elicit a satisfactory response from the shah, Shirazi wrote to Mirza Hasan-e Ashtiani, the highest of the olama in Tehran, empowering him to act on his behalf in the struggle against the Regie.119 In September 1891, an anti-Regie protest erupted in Esfahan. The mollas, ‘led by the powerful and unscrupulous Aqa Najafi, began to preach in the mosques against the Regie, and the merchants, encouraged by the example of Azerbaijan, presented a petition against it to Zell os-Soltan’, the governorgeneral of Esfahan. In response, the shah’s anglophile son threatened that the merchants, because of their ‘impertinence, deserve to have their heads cut off, in order that no one else be able to say ‘‘Why?’’ and ‘‘Wherefore?’’ in government affairs’.120 Despite this threat, anti-Regie protests broke out again in Esfahan in November 1891. In October 1891, the anti-Regie protest also spread to Mashhad. Earlier in the month,

204

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

many of the merchants and leading men of Mashhad went to the chief mojaheds of the city and declared that the tobacco concession would ruin them, and asked for the mojaheds’ backing. The mojaheds refused to take action and the Russian Consul General . . . attributed this refusal partly to the fact that one of them was an Anglophil[e] and paid by the British.121 The night of that same day, ‘a crowd gathered in the chief mosque’. Despite the Saheb Divan’s request, the crowd did not disperse, but ‘continued to shout against the British Bank as well as the Regie’. They even threatened to shut down all trade in the region and to stop paying taxes. The next day, ‘the bazaars were closed and the streets full of people’. According to one account: The crowd in the mosque attacked both a sayyed who had been deputed to read the Shah’s order and a mojahed who tried to calm them. There were threats of revolt against the government, and even a telegram from the Shah offering to postpone the Regie for six months did not quiet the crowd.122 The protest movement continued for five days and only broke up after the shah ordered the governor to summon the cavalry and infantry of Khorasan, ordered the arrest of the rebels and threatened to put all the rebels to death.123 Nevertheless, the Khorasan merchants, like their Azerbaijani counterparts, continued dealing in tobacco without company authorization. According to the British representative in Mashhad, the Russians were ‘at the bottom of most of what occurred’.124. Towards the end of October, in Kalardasht of Mazandaran, Saiied Alamgir began ‘preaching rebellion even against the religious authorities’.125 Saiied believed that ‘the teaching of the established religion had become corrupt, and his fellow-countrymen were being led astray’. He preached for ‘reform Islamism’.126 Alamgir’s followers (mostly from ils) increased from 1,000 in October to 1,700 in November 1891. Most of these followers were armed. The attempt by the local military forces to suppress the revolt was unsuccessful. The shah sent troops from Tehran under the command of Sa`d od-Dauleh, and on 16 November Alamgir’s revolt was put down, but only after ‘some two hundred of his followers [had been] killed’.127 One report stated that ‘a number of women and children had fought in the ranks of the false prophet’.128 Even though Alamgir’s revolt took place in the midst of the Tobacco Movement and was bitterly anti-Regie, its aims were nevertheless

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

205

broader and more far-reaching. It was the only major anti-Regie struggle that took place outside the urban centres. The anti-Regie movement in Esfahan resumed in November as the deadline for trade in tobacco approached. Aqa Najafi organized ‘two large demonstrations’ and ‘declared tobacco to be unclean’.129 A general boycott of tobacco went into effect in Esfahan and water pipes were smashed. This set a precedent for the nationwide boycott. The most important event during this round of protest in Esfahan occurred when a ‘large Esfahan merchant burned all his tobacco stock rather than surrender it to the Company’.130 In November, the anti-Regie campaign also resumed in Tehran and Tabriz. The month of December was a turning point for the religious forces in their struggle against the Regie. Early in the month, a fatwa appeared in Tehran forbidding the use of tobacco in any form. It was attributed to Shirazi and read as follows: ‘In the Name of God the Merciful, the Forgiving. Today the use of tunbaku [tobacco] and tuton [tobacco for the water pipe], in whatever fashion, is reckoned as war against the Iman of the Age (may God hasten his glad Advent!)’.131 Doubts have been cast upon the authenticity of the document. The widely accepted version is that it had emanated from Malek ot-Tojjar.132 However, the fatva was confirmed by Shirazi. A nationwide boycott of the use or trade of tobacco went immediately into effect. The ban was even observed by the shah’s entourage and non-Muslims. Following the fatwa, several ‘meetings’ took place between the olama and government officials (including the grand vizier) during which Amin osSoltan attempted to negotiate an end to the boycott in return for cancellation of the internal monopoly. He was helped by Behbahani and other leading mojaheds of Tehran. Behbahani, in particular, was energetically supportive of Amin os-Soltan and the British. He had ‘received a large bribe’ from the company and ‘gifts’ from the British. According to Molkara, Behbahani received a large bribe from the president of the Regie.133 When Amin osSoltan announced the cancellation of the internal monopoly in December 1891, the olama sent a deceitful telegram to Shirazi on 18 December. ‘In the telegram’, wrote Lascelles on 22 December, ‘no mention was made of the external monopoly and it is probable that he will understand that the whole concession has been canceled’.134 The olama also asked Shirazi to thank the shah. They hoped that Shirazi would lift the ban. But Shirazi was also receiving telegrams from people who provided him with accurate information and urged him to stay with the movement to the end. The subsequent telegram from Shirazi was despairing of the olama. The telegram thanked the shah but made no mention of the ban.

206

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

While the olama were negotiating with the government, the people of Tehran were trying to prevent them from reaching an agreement by disrupting the affairs. On 25 December 1891, ‘placards were put up in the bazaar threatening that unless the concessions were withdrawn a holy war would be declared after two days’.135 This jehad was ‘falsely’ issued in the name of Shirazi. Nevertheless, the people took the matter seriously. They ‘prepare[d] to fight, gathered arms and provisions, and said goodbye to their families’.136 It was only after the government was faced with this popular threat (not involving the olama) that the government agreed completely to withdraw the tobacco concession. Amin os-Soltan conditioned his agreement on the removal of the jehad and an end to the boycott. Thereafter, ‘the olama did preach against the jehad but did not legalize smoking’ without the permission of Shirazi. The shah’s official proclamation concerning the concession’s cancellation eased tensions in Tehran, but new troubles broke out in other cities including Kermanshah, Yazd and Qazvin. The people were probably aware of the dubious nature of the shah’s proclamation. In early January 1892, the shah ordered Ashtiani to either smoke publicly or leave Tehran. Ashtiani chose the latter alternative but was prevented by the people from leaving the city. The most serious struggle subsequently broke out in Tehran on 4 January. The shops were closed and the people poured into the streets. A crowd of about 4,000 began attacking the citadel (the Ark). They began hurling stones through the windows of Na`eb os-Saltaneh’s (the governor’s) palace. The crowd became gradually more furious and attempted to enter the citadel, from where they could enter the shah’s palace. At this point, the troops were ordered to shoot on the crowd. They did so, leaving ‘seven or more killed’ and several others wounded. But the crowd continued to grow larger and more furious. The shah, fearing that the situation might get out of control, immediately withdrew his order and requested Ashtiani to stay in Tehran. Ashtiani then subsequently ‘told the crowd to disperse’. Nevertheless, ‘smaller hostile crowds continued to occupy the streets’.137 According to Balloy, ‘the events of January 4 were not an uprising but a revolution’.138 On 5 January 1892, negotiations between the government and Ashtiani began. Ashtiani insisted on three conditions: compensation for the families of those killed the previous day, immunity for leaders of the movement and an opportunity for the merchants to buy back, at the price paid to them, the tobacco they had sold to the company.139 None of these conditions were unacceptable to the government. A peace was negotiated, Ashtiani received ‘a brilliant ring’,140 and the ban on smoking was removed (without the authorization from Shirazi).

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

207

At this time, the olama’s involvement in the movement came to an end. For the Regie, the struggle terminated on 3 April 1891, when an agreement was reached on the amount of compensation to be paid to the company by the Iranian government: 500,000 pounds sterling, all cash. The money was later borrowed from the British Imperial Bank at 6 per cent interest.141 However, for the people, it was just the beginning. According to Balloy, already during the talks between Ashtiani and Amin os-Soltan and even after the shah had agreed to remove the monopoly, ‘new placards had been posted threatening death to the Shah, the Amin os-Soltan, Ornstein [the Regie’s president], and Rabino [the manager of the British-owned Imperial Bank], and also demanding the suppression of the Russian Bank after the destruction of the English establishments’.142 The Tobacco Movement was as much a failure for the British as it was a success for the Russians. For the shah, it proved disastrous: he retired to his harem (andaroun) where he grew ‘indifferent’ to the affairs of state. For Amin os-Soltan, it meant a change in masters: he went from serving the British to serving the Russians again.143 For the olama, the Tobacco Movement became a source of power and influence. This development in turn served to increase rivalry within the olama and resulted in a split.144 Like the secular officials, they were divided into a British camp and a Russian camp. In subsequent years, however, the russophile olama entered into alliance with the anglophile officials and thereafter became a partner of the state in corruption and oppression.145 Nevertheless, the alliance between the olama and the state remained conditional, relative and transitory. For the people, the movement was a prelude to more significant change. They learned how to organize and what it meant to act in cooperation and unison. The movement demonstrated the relative weakness of the absolutist state and the growing power of the oppressed. In short, it taught the masses that they could press for change towards a better, more just and humane life. To this end, they continued with their struggle. The Tobacco Movement had already become an introduction to the subsequent struggles for a constitutional order that emerged after the 1906 Constitutional Revolution. Between 1892 and 1895, in many parts of the country – the urban areas in particular – a number of major and minor uprisings, revolts and riots erupted. These were all rooted, more or less, in the same social contradictions I have outlined above. The major factors leading to the uprisings were oppression, food shortages, inflation and currency depreciation. Thus, in 1892, antigovernment riots erupted in Estarabad and Hamadan. In both instances, the governors were forced to flee.146 Disturbances in Hamadan had to be quelled

208

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

by sending in troops from outside the province. In the same year, trouble broke out in Shiraz, with ‘the people [taking] sanctuary in the local post office to protest . . . the high price of bread, the depreciation of the currency, the lack of protection against the looting Arab ashaier, and the depredations of the kalantar, Qavam ol-Molk’.147 The people succeeded in overthrowing Qavam but failed to expel him from the town. ‘When troops believed loyal to Qavam were sent to disperse the crowd, they refused to obey orders and fraternized with the people’.148 Eventually, troops had to be sent from Tehran. Only thereafter was the uprising defeated. In 1893, anti-government and anti-olama riots broke out in Esfahan. Aqa Najafy, the ‘unscrupulous’ mojahed of the city, had formed ‘a sort of partnership’ with the governor Zell os-Soltan, and ‘had established a corner in grain, producing a trebling of grain price, artificial shortages and famine’.149 The people rioted and poured into the streets, placing ‘placards on the walls of the bazaar and caravanserai doors, abusing Aqa Nedjefy and calling him a wheat merchant’.150 The placards similarly denounced ‘the Zell os-Soltan and the government’. Subsequently, ‘three of Zell os-Sultan’s villages were looted and part of his grain stores [were] burned’.151 The uprising was put down only after the ‘corner on grain’ had been broken and a sizable number of troops had been deployed. The Tabriz uprising of 1895 was both extensive and lengthy and had caused the foundation of the government there to tremble. It was also rooted in ‘grain-hoarding practices’, shortages, famine and inflation. Among those responsible for cornering the market in grain were the city mojahed Aqa Mirza Javad and the officials around Crown Prince Mozaffar od-Din Mirza, including Abd ol-Rahim Khan-e Qa`em Maqam. They let ‘the poorer classes in the city to starve while they held back, in their stores thousands of tons of grain’.152 Soon rioting crowds of 30,000 people, ‘half of which were women’, ‘smashed bakery shops, looted the house of the Qa`em Maqam and forced most of the leading members of the crown prince’s government to leave town’.153 A great many people were killed, them were 15 women, and several others were wounded.154 The poorly paid troops were found so unreliable that the government did not dare to let them out from the barracks and had to call on the loutis (a section of the lumpenproletariat)155 to defend the premises of the officials, and those of Qa`em Maqam in particular. Ultimately, with the help of the loutis, the revolt was put down. In 1896, the shah was assassinated. As I noted above, a ‘secret society’ had come into existence immediately before 1891.156 The events surrounding the Tobacco Movement, as well as the ‘indifference’ that the shah developed

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

209

towards the affairs of the state and the resulting tyranny, oppression and corruption, led the ‘society’ to undertake the assassination of the shah.157 The country’s condition in these years is well illustrated by Greene, the British representative in Tehran: The country is falling to pieces as fast as it can, the army is unreliable, the officers are not loyal, the soldiers do not receive their pay, the finances are in disorder, there is no supervision of accounts, there is no money for public needs, there is no law and no justice, corruption is universal, everybody is discontented, and nobody either knows or cares what may happen to the country tomorrow.158 Contrary to Greene’s assertion, the nationalists and revolutionaries did care about ‘what may happen to the country tomorrow’ and were genuinely concerned. Among them was Mirza Reza Kermani, a man of peasant origin who, after having his land expropriated by Vakil ol-Molk, moved to Tehran and became a peddler, ‘selling second-hand articles’.159 Subsequently, he most probably entered Saiied Jamal ol-Din’s ‘secret society’ and started his revolutionary activities. In the beginning of the Tobacco Movement, as I have pointed out, Mirza Reza Kermani was arrested on the orders of the reactionary Prince Kamran Mirza and put in jail where he was tortured. After his arrest, he was betrayed and forced to sign ‘a document’ in which he denounced all the concessions granted to foreigners. Mirza Reza had done so in the hope that, as Kamran Mirza had promised, the ‘document’ would induce the shah to make some needed ‘reforms’. However, after the ‘document’ had been extracted from Mirza Reza, Kameran Mirza and Vakil ol-Molk tortured him in order that he might release the name of his ‘associates’. Mirza Reza declared that ‘this talk is current amongst all’, including the olama, ‘the ministers, the nobles, the merchants, the trades-people, and all other classes’. As the torture was intolerable, he, fearing that he might be forced to release the name of his associates, attempted to commit suicide but was prevented from doing so. During the four years he subsequently spent in jail, and despite the intolerable tortures to which he had been subjected, Mirza Reza never released the names of his ‘associates’. He was finally released from jail in 1895. Afterwards he went to Constantinople, where Saiied Jamal ol-Din lived. There he became convinced that the shah should be murdered and, after receiving instructions to this effect, he returned to Iran in 1896 and carried out the assassination of the shah in Shah Abd ol-Azim.160

210

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

When he was later on asked why he killed the shah, Mirza Reza responded: ‘to cut the root of this tree of tyranny’ and continued: Step forth for a moment from this land of Persia, and you will see in Iraqi-Arab, the Caucasus, Ishqabad, and the borderlands of Russia, thousands of poor Persian subjects who have fled from their own dear country from the hands of oppression and tyranny, and have perforce adopted the most miserable means of earning a livelihood. The porters, sweepers, donkey-men, and laborers whom you see in those regions are all Persians.161 Mirza Reza further believed that ‘all these titled gentlemen’ are ‘low-minded, ignoble, base-bom, vile person[s]’ who deserve to be violently overthrown. ‘Look at the histories of the Frang [Europe]’, he said, ‘so long as blood was not shed to accomplish lofty aims, the object in view was not attained.’162 To divert the people’s attention from the aims for which Mirza Reza had murdered the shah, and to counter the revolutionary opposition to the dynasty, Mirza Reza was simply branded a Babi who had killed the ‘king of Islam’. So were the other associates including Sheikh Ahmad-e Rouhi, Mirza Hasan Khan-e Khabir ol-Molk and Mirza Aqa Khan-e Kermani, the capable editor of Akhtar. These revolutionaries lived in Constantinople and were actively involved in the struggle against absolutism. After the shah’s death, they were suspected of conspiring with Kermani. Upon demand of the Persian government, they were extradited and were secretly ‘butchered’ in the prison at Tabriz on 17 July 1896. About 25 days later, Mirza Reza was publicly hanged. After the death of Naser od-Din Shah and the accession of the feeble Mozaffar od-Din to the throne, Iranian society became somewhat more open, which served to further encourage the national bourgeoisie, the reformers and the revolutionaries to step up their struggle against absolutism. Meanwhile, the olama, whose power and influence had increased since the Tobacco Movement and a faction of which had ‘become partners of the state in oppression’163 and corruption, stepped up their political activities. They split into various anglophile–russophile, liberal–conservative groupings, and entered into various coalitions. In fact, division and rivalry among the olama paralleled the division and rivalry so characteristic of the secular ruling class. The aims of the rival factions were most probably the acquisition of more power and wealth. The coalition headed by grand vizier Amin od-Dauleh against Amin os-Soltan, the coalition of the olama and Amin

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

211

os-Soltan against the reform-minded Amin od-Dauleh in 1897, and the rivalry between Bebahani and Sheikh Fazl ol-Lah-e Nouri are all examples of the intensified rivalry among members of the ruling class. Other than rivalry among members of the ruling class, the year 1897 also witnessed a number of ‘disorders [which] broke out here and there, and minor mutinies in the armed forces’.164 However, a year later, a major bread riot was reported in Tabriz. The olama and the officials had cornered the grain market, producing artificial shortages, famine and higher prices. During the riot, the houses of Nazem ol-olama, Ala’ ol-Molk and other members of the ruling class were looted by the poor people.165 The practice of cornering the grain market and thereby creating artificial shortages, famine and inflation continued in later years and caused what has been called the ‘hungry people’s rebellions’.166 In 1900, disorder broke out in Tehran and other cities of Iran as a consequence of food shortages and inflation. In 1901, a large-scale riot erupted in Tehran in which bakeries and storehouses were smashed and looted. Alongside these developments, from 1900 a number of ‘secret societies’ came into existence and the rivalry among factions of the ruling class further intensified. One such society was a revolutionary secret society that most probably had been organized by Malek ol-Motakallemin and his colleagues. In 1901, another ‘secret society’ was organized. Its membership included state officials, nobles, Pan-Islamic mojaheds, freemasons and intellectuals. Movaqqar os-Saltaneh, Qavam od-Dauleh and Vazir Homayoun were among them. Their main target was Amin os-Soltan, the russophile grand vizier who had negotiated the loans from Russia. The society was probably pro-British. It was soon discovered and a number of its members were imprisoned.167 In 1903 and 1904, the cities of Iran were seething once again. Tehran, Esfahan and Mashhad became the scenes of major bread riots; the rioters attacked and smashed bakery shops, looted warehouses and plundered the houses of state officials. In 1903, the London Times wrote that the ‘events were imminent in Persia which might have serious consequences for that country, these being chiefly due to unbearable economic conditions’.168 In the same year, placards and proclamations appeared in the streets of Iran openly denouncing Amin os-Soltan as a foreign puppet, and demanding his resignation. Meanwhile, the protest movement against the New Custom Tariff began in Yazd, Tabriz, Esfahan and other cities. In Yazd and Esfahan, the mollas massacred a number of Babis, even though the protests were organized

212

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

against foreign intervention and the New Custom Tariff! In Tabriz, the death of a molla during the protest movement there became a pretext in the hands of the merchants who immediately closed the bazaar. The mollas poured into the streets crying: ‘M. Priem [Belgian Chief of Customs] must go, taverns and hotels and schools must close.’ After Mohammad Ali Mirza, the crown prince, was forced to comply with these demands, the mollas looted them all.169 These struggles, aided by the intervention of Tabataba`i and Ain od-Dauleh against Amin os-Soltan, led to the grand vizier’s fall from power towards the end of 1903. Ain od-Dauleh subsequently became grand vizier. In 1904, the Iranian workers and intellectuals in Baku – already organized under the Hemmat Party banner – founded the first social democratic organization of Iran. The party was called Ejtema´iyoun-e Ammiyoun (popular socialists) and it was under the leadership of Nariman Narimanof. In the same year, a number of them, including Hajj Ali-ye Davafroush, Ali Mosio and Hajj Rasoul-e Sadaqiani, moved to Tabriz and founded the group Mojahedin. They adopted a Persian translation of the Bolshevik constitution. The group also founded the Markaz-e Qeibi (Secret Centre) whose aim was to steer the activities of its members and the Tabriz revolutionary movement as a whole. Subsequently, a number of other Iranians in the Caucasian provinces came to Iran, among them was Heidar Amou Oqli, who founded a social democratic group in Tehran. The men were later to become the leaders of the Iranian Communist Party, organized in 1920. By 1907, the Mojahedin group in Tabriz had a membership of about 12,000 and published Mojahid as its periodical.170 In the same year (1904), Malek ol-Motakallemin and Saiied Jamal-e Va`ez organized an unnamed ‘secret society’ in Tehran for which they drew a 16point constitution. They agreed to remain loyal to the slogan of ‘Law and Justice’ and Malek in a lecture emphasized the need to raise the ‘flag of liberty’. Among the important points in the constitution were (1) invitation for more liberals to enter the society; (2) exploitation of the rivalry between Amin os-Soltan and Ain od-Dauleh; (3) inciting ambitious people to turn against the government; (4) communication with the olama of Najaf; (5) cooperation with discontented princes and nobles; (6) exchange of views with the influential and intellectual clergy; (7) profiting from the knowledge of those intellectuals in the service of the state; (8) propagation of liberalism among the people; (9) international publicity for Iranian liberals; (10) distribution of nightly letters among the masses; (11) translation (into Persian) of the history of world revolutions; (12) comparison of the published materials with those of Islamic law in order to prevent conflict with the

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

213

reactionary clergy; and (13) cooperation and communication among expatriated liberals and those residing within the country in order to achieve the goals of the society.171 The merchants, guild members, bureaucrats of the administration, at least two army personnel, the ils’ chiefs and the clergy were involved in this ‘society’. Besides this revolutionary ‘secret society’, a pseudo-freemasonic society, Jame`eh-e Adamiyat, came into existence in 1904. In fact, it was the third society of this type; the first, Faramoushkhaneh, having been organized by Malkom in 1860, and the second, Majma´-e Adamiyat, in 1881. It drew its membership from all classes, but mainly from the upper classes and included the princes, physicians, artists, army personnel, merchants, clergy, nobility and the middle classes.172 Because of its class composition, the Jame`eh’s potential for effective struggle against absolutism was extremely limited. Even the absolutist Mohammad Ali Shah was, later on, accepted as a member. It later split into two societies, with one becoming the Anjoman-e Hoqouq. The principles of the Majma´-e Adamiyat were similar to the principles of Adamiyat propagated by Malkom (see Chapter 6).173 Another pseudomasonic society organized in this year (1904) was the Anjoman-e Okhowat whose membership included the pro-constitutional ‘nobles’. Besides this organizational work, the protest movement also continued in 1904. A picture of M. Naus (the Belgian Director of Customs) in clerical dress was circulated in Tehran and made the olama furious. They preached against him, demanding his dismissal and expulsion from Iran. Meanwhile, the protest movement against the New Custom Tariff continued and bread riots were frequent. The animosity between Behbahani and Ain od-Dauleh, and between Ain od-Dauleh and Amin os-Soltan, intensified and Tabataba`i and Behbahani were united. This last event was significant for the subsequent struggles against absolutism and imperialism. Sheikh Fazl ol-Lah, another one of the influential olama of Tehran, was secretly supporting Ain odDauleh. He was a rival – if not an enemy – of Behbabani. In 1905, Tabataba`i organized the Anjoman-e Makhfi-ye Awal (the First Secret Society), whose membership was drawn from the olama, merchants and the middle class. The Anjoman sought to fight disorder, insecurity, illiteracy, corruption and ‘foreigners.’ Its demands included (1) a constitution and a ministry of justice; (2) limitations on landed property (land reform); (3) regulation and reform of taxation; (4) specification of duties and authorities of the local governors; (5) encouragement of internal trade; (6) expulsion of Naus and other Belgian customs officials; (7) establishment of technical and professional public schools; (8) exploitation of natural resources and the mines

214

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

by the government; (9) specification of the duties of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and (10) specification of the duties and the authorities of the other ministers and state officials on the basis of Islamic principles.174 In addition, it called for the establishment of companies and trade associations. As can be seen, the Anjoman was, in fact, furthering the programme of the Iranian nascent bourgeoisie. The revolutionary activities against absolutism and imperialism reached a new peak in 1905 with the outbreak of the Constitutional Revolution. The protest movements against the Belgian customs officials and continuing oppression in Tehran, Kerman, Qazvin, Fars and Tabriz led to confrontations between protesters and government forces. In Tehran, a number of merchants were bastinadoed (beating with a stick, usually on the soles of the feet) by the reactionary Ain od-Dauleh. They took sanctuary in Masjed-e Shah and were soon joined by Tabataba`i and Behbahani, members of the national bourgeoisie, guildsmen, the poor and the lower mollas. They were later attacked by mobs organized by Tehran’s Emam Jom’eh and were forced to flee to Shah Abd ol-Azim, where they stayed until their demands – including the establishment of a House of Justice (Adalatkhanah) and the dismissal of Naus and Ain od-Dauleh – were accepted by the shah.175 These struggles were supported by Crown Prince Amin os-Soltan and his supporters. But the shah soon forgot his promises and things remained as they were. Tabataba`i subsequently sent letters to both the shah and Ain od-Dauleh in which he reiterated the demands, sought an end to the oppression and emphasized the poverty of the masses. He also received a letter from the technocratic Nasr ol-Molk pointing out that Iran was not yet ready for a constitutional government.176 Tabataba`i was wasting time. In 1906, bread riots broke out in Mashhad and the confrontation between the protesters and government troops in Tehran led to the death of a Saiied (a person of prophet’s descent). The protesters – led by Tabataba`i, Behbahani and a number of merchants – once again sought sanctuary (bast) from the religious authorities. In Masjed-e Jom’eh, where they took sanctuary, troops fired upon them, leaving 15 dead and several others wounded. Ain od-Dauleh had actually launched a coup. Members of the revolutionary middle classes and the poor decided to fight back with ‘whatever means’ they had, but were prevented from doing so by Tabataba`i and Behbahani. Later on, when the government attempted to disperse the crowd, it was aided by these two clergies. With Qu’ran in hand, Tabataba`i and Behbahani implored the people to return home.177 Crying ‘death to Ain od-Dauleh’ and ‘death to absolutism’, the crowd eventually dispersed.

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

215

In protest, the olama left Tehran for Qom; the people of Tehran, led by the merchants and bankers, destroyed the shops in the bazaar and took sanctuary (bast) in the British legation. This time, the British ostensibly supported the movement, although, in fact, they were trying to increase their influence. Russia was supporting the court and its reactionary circles. Soon the number of people seeking sanctuary reached 14,000. Over 500 tents were erected by various branches of guilds and the people. They were all fed, and ‘the expenses were paid by the merchants and the craftsmen’.178 Soon a list of demands was prepared by those seeking sanctuary in the legation in cooperation with the exiles in Qom. These demands included the return of the Qom exiles, dismissal of Ain od-Dauleh, promulgation of a code of law (particularly concerning ‘security of body and property’) and the promulgation of a constitution with provision for a Representative National Assembly (Dar osh-Shaura). The gobetweens were the British representative in Tehran, who was on excellent terms with Behbehani, and the Ottoman ambassador. Meanwhile, support for the ‘basters’ was coming from the provincial centres – Tabriz in particular. Even the crown prince was sending telegrams to the shah in support of the demands. The shah ultimately yielded to the pressure and the demands were accepted. On 5 August 1906, a rescript was issued ‘granting’ the constitution and an assembly and Ain od-Dauleh was dismissed. The rescript acknowledged ‘reform’ to be in the ‘public interest’. However, the shah made it clear that what he meant by the ‘public’: We do enact that an assembly of delegates elected by the princes, the mujtahids, the Qajar family, the noble and notables, the landowners, the merchants, and the guilds shall be formed and constituted by election of the classes above-mentioned in the capital Tehran.179 In this way, a constitution was ‘granted’ to the upper and middle classes with the least possible bloodshed. Needless to say, most people could not believe it.180 The fact that the constitution was ‘granted’ before the movement could achieve it became a reason for the failure of the constitutionalists to secure and sustain most of their demands. However, because the rescript did not mention the peasants and the urban poor and because Tehran was singled out instead of the entire country, the protests continued and the shah had to correct the text.181’ Nevertheless, the subsequent Electoral Law (September 1906) excluded the majority of the Iranian population from electing their representatives or being elected. According to Article 2, concerning the electors:

216

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

the landed proprietors and peasants amongst them must possess property of the value of at least one thousand toumans [about 200 pounds sterling]; the merchants amongst them must have a definite office and business; members of trade-guilds amongst them must belong to a recognized guild, must be engaged in a definite craft or trade and must be in possession of a shop of which the rent corresponds with the average rent of the locality.182 Women were debarred from casting votes or being elected. Furthermore, those who wished to run for office had to ‘read and write Persian’, a requirement that ruled out more than 95 per cent of the population. The subsequent struggle over this law led to its modification. The New Electoral Law of 1909 required that the electors: must possess property to the extent of 250 toumans [50 pounds sterling] at least, or must pay at least 10 toumans [2 pounds sterling] in taxes, or must be in receipt of a yearly income or earnings amounting to at least 50 toumans [10 pounds sterling].183 The position of women remained unchanged. Instead, measures were introduced that benefited the upper classes. For example, the number of representatives was reduced from the initial 200 to 120 and the Council of Supervision was instituted to supervise the elections. According to the New Law, the members of the council ‘shall consist of the Governor, the acting governor . . ., one well-known local ecclesiastical authority, one prince, two notables, and two merchants of repute’.184 Following the enactment of the Electoral Law, preparations were made for the election of the representatives of the First Majles (Assembly). As required by Article 9, a number of societies (anjomans) were ‘formed of well-known local representatives of the six classes of electors to supervise the elections’. Subsequently, representatives were drawn from the Qajar princes, the olama, the feudal nobility, the merchants and members of the national bourgeoisie, the landed proprietors and the craftsmen. While this latter category of representatives had a numerical majority over any one (or combination of any other two) of the other categories of representatives, the president of the Majles and the deputies were chosen from the representatives of the feudal nobility and the merchants, respectively. Of course, this demonstrated the power these two classes held in Iranian society at the time.185 Among the representatives, members of the anti-constitutional coalition now pretended

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

217

to be genuine constitutionalists. According to Ra`in, of the 16 Tehran representatives, 13 were freemasons.186 The First Majles was nevertheless, both in terms of its class composition and its practices, the most progressive of all the Majleses that succeeded it. The Majles was able, among other things, to draw up the Fundamental Laws and the Supplementary Fundamental Laws and have them signed by the shah (the first by Mozaffar od-Din and the second by Mohammad Ali), to abolish the practice of toyoul, madakhel and tas´ir (see Chapter 5), and to dismiss Naus and other reactionary officials of the state. The First Majles also brought down the prices of necessities and other provisions in the interest of the middle classes. It helped to establish courts, chambers of commerce and provincial anjomans (societies). However, its attempts to found a national bank were not successful. The First Majles was able to bring about these changes only after a successful struggle against a new coalition of anticonstitutional forces led by the new shah and Sheikh Fazl ol-Lah, a leading mojahed of Tehran. The success of the progressive deputies was mainly due to the mass support they received from the people in the streets. Mozaffar od-Din Shah died at the end of 1906 and was succeeded by his son Mohammad Ali in January 1907. As crown prince, Mohammad Ali had supported the constitutionalists because he wanted Ain od-Dauleh overthrown. Ain od-Dauleh reportedly favoured another prince as the successor to the shah. However, after he became shah, he changed his mind. Already by the beginning of 1907, Mohammad Ali Shah, as well as the feudal nobility and the courtiers, was resisting going along with the constitution. The main issues of dispute between the shah and the First Majles were the Supplementary Laws: by refusing to sign, the shah was attempting to preserve his absolutist authority, a 400,000 pounds sterling loan that the shah wanted to borrow from Russia and Britain, and M. Naus, whom the shah refused to dismiss. The last two indicated the shah’s desire to preserve the interests of the foreign forces. The loan was supported by the British and the Russians while M. Naus was supported only by the Russians. Meanwhile, a split occurred within the religious forces, and a section of them began opposing the constitution. They were calling for Mashrou`eh (a religious constitution) instead of Mashrou`teh (a secular constitution) and for an ‘Islamic Consultative Assembly’ instead of the National Consultative Assembly.187 This religious faction was initially led by Akbar Shah, a ranking religious authority in Tehran. The shah, helped by this faction of the religious forces, a number of deputies from the feudal nobility and the foreign forces – and encouraged by the lack of decisiveness on the part of the leaders

218

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

of the constitutional movement – tried to impose certain demands (among them those mentioned above) on the Majles. Nevertheless, in their first round of struggle against this coalition, the progressive deputies – supported by the masses in Tehran, Tabriz and some other cities – emerged victorious and the shah was forced to comply with the Majles and the constitutional order. In particular, the loan was rejected and M. Naus was dismissed. The Supplementary Fundamental Laws, however, remained a subject of dispute, not only between the shah and the constitutionalists, but also between the constitutionalists and the supporters of Shar´. The shah and his associates subsequently centred their struggle along the lines of this contradiction. Neither the shah and the feudal nobility nor the anti-constitutional olama had given up hope for a return to the old order. But the leaders of the Constitutional Revolution were ignorant of this fact. They urged moderation and patience, without taking any defensive measures. For instance, when in 1907 the Markaz-e Qeibi began arming the people in Tabriz, the deputies in Tehran did not hide their discontent. In particular, Tabataba`i and Behbahani called the Tabrizis ‘instigators of trouble’. Nevertheless, the masses in Tehran, Tabriz, Mashhad, Enzali and elsewhere continued to form organizations and anjomans as well as arm themselves. Among the organizations, the Mojaheds were well organized, armed and enjoyed widespread support. They had already been organized in Tabriz in 1904. In Mashhad, they began organizing in 1907 and in Tehran (also in 1907) they formed an underground armed group called Feda`is. Mojaheds were drawn from various social classes including the petty bourgeoisie, small merchants, lower mollas, petty landowners, craftsmen, peasants, workers and the urban poor. As is evident from the programme of the Mojaheds in Mashhad, they demanded a revolutionary transformation of the society, but fell short of demanding a socialist revolution.188 In 1907, Heidar Amou Oqli also organized a social democratic group in Tehran called Hauzeh-e Khosousi (the Private Realm), which was to extend into a Hauzeh-e Omoumi (the Public Realm). But his project failed to materialize to any significant degree.189 Among the mass organizations were anjomans (societies), and among them the Anjoman-e Tabriz was the strongest. It was formed in 1906 and soon became a mass organization. Despite frequent attempts by different governors of Tabriz to abolish it, the society survived, continued to grow and extended its activities. It could soon successfully intervene in the affairs of the provincial government and impose certain measures in the interest of the people. Following the example of Tabriz, anjomans were organized first in

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

219

the northern cities, and then in the central and the southern cities of Iran. In Tehran alone, 140 anjomans had been formed by 1908. Soon a number of reactionary anjomans were formed to counter the influence of these revolutionary-democratic anjomans. Among them were anjomans organized by Qajar princes, big merchants, freemasons and a section of the Islamic forces. These included the Anjoman-e Eslamiyeh in Tabriz, the Anjoman-e Fotovvat in Tehran and the Anjoman-e Eslami in Shiraz. However, the revolutionary anjomans continued to increase in number and became radicalized. But they soon came into contradiction with the established order. The shah first tried to bring them under control through the organization of a central anjoman headed by a Qajar prince. But this scheme proved unsuccessful and the struggle between the shah and the anjomans continued. Few small-scale workers’ and employees’ organizations must have existed by 1910, which is evident from the number of organized strikes that took place between 1907 and 1910. Already in 1906, the printers of Tehran organized the first labour union in Iran. In 1907, the workers of the telegraph houses organized a strike for higher wages, among other demands. In 1908, the workers of the Enzali Fisheries went on strike and the Cossacks had to be called in. Finally, between 1908 and 1910, the workers of the Port of Enzali and the printing shops, and the employees of the tramways and the ministries went on strike for various demands, including wage increases and better working conditions.190 Meanwhile, the peasants seem to have also been actively struggling against oppression and exploitation. After the constitution was ‘granted’, they began to revolt. Initially in the northern provinces and later on in the southern provinces, the peasants refused to pay taxes, take orders from the feudal lords or obey government officials. Further, in many places, the peasants began looting the houses of the khans and feudal lords and expropriated their grain storehouses, which they proceeded to distribute among the poor and the needy.191 Nevertheless, compared to the uprisings in the urban areas, the peasant uprisings were negligible – save for the Jangal Movement (see below). As a result of the revolutionary activities of the urban middle classes and the urban poor (organized in the anjomans and groups of mojaheds), and due to a wave of worker strikes and peasant revolts, the Constitutional Revolution gradually became radicalized. The movement began to lose its earlier religious tone and became increasingly nationalistic, democratic and antiimperialist. The effect was to be seen in a new marshalling of forces. A further split among the religious forces occurred in 1907. Sheikh Fazl ol-Lah began

220

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

preaching in favour of mashrou`eh and against the mashrouteh and the constitutionalists, whom he referred to as Babis and infidels. He also referred to the anjomans as destroyers of the nation and the state.192 In Tabriz, the city’s mojahed Hajj Mirza Hasan also began preaching against the constitutionalists. Like the city’s Emam Jom’eh, Hajj Mirza Karim, he was expelled from Tabriz by the people.193 Mojaheds in other cities also began opposing the constitution, the mojaheds, the anjomans and other revolutionary organizations. In Najaf, the mojaheds were assisted by the olama. A split also occurred within the deputies of the Majles following the shah’s appointment of Amin os-Soltan as grand vizier. Disguised in proconstitutional garb, Amin os-Soltan began working to effect a split among the deputies, many of whom were his old friends. Among them was Sa`d odDauleh, who was referred to as the ‘Father of the Masses’ because of his early pro-constitutional struggles. Many others left the Majles with him and entered the anti-constitutional alliance that Amin os-Soltan had begun forming, a coalition that was daily becoming stronger and more threatening. By this time, the shah had on his side the feudal nobility, the courtiers, a powerful section of the religious forces, an increasing number of deputies (from the ranks of the feudal nobility, the big merchants and the big landowners), and of course the Russians and the British. At this stage, seeing himself in an advantageous position, the shah made two specific demands: the Majles could only remain a legislative body without any power over the executive branch and all anjomans had to be abolished. However, behind these demands, there was an intention to overthrow the constitution. Despite the formation of this formidable coalition and the increasing likelihood of a counter-revolution, the leaders of the movement – including Tabataba`i and Behbahani – remained ignorant. They still preached moderation, called for negotiation with the shah and took no measures to defend the revolution. While the leaders of the Constitutional Revolution were spending their time in idle talks, the revolutionaries in Tabriz began preparation for the defence of the revolution. They began sending telegrams that denounced the shah, the anti-constitutional religious forces and the amendments to the constitution that were intended to make it conform to the Shar´.194 When they did not receive a satisfactory response, they closed the bazaar and declared a general strike. Subsequently, the Ordibehesht (April) uprising began, one that Kasravi compared to the Paris Commune. The uprising was led by the anjomans and the mojaheds. Soon the demand for the constitution changed into a demand for the overthrow of the shah. Meanwhile, famine broke out in the city of Tabriz, a forestaller was hanged by ‘the poor and the

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

221

hungry’,195 and the city became subject to the plunderous activities of Biouk Khan and Akram os-Soltan, the shah’s mercenaries. It was during the fight against these men that Sattar Khan and Baqer Khan, two nationalists of middle or lower class origin, emerged as heroes from the ranks of the mojaheds. The shah was in Tehran preparing for a coup. He had already lost Amin osSoltan, who was shot by a feda`is, Abbas Aqa, in August 1907.196 Nevertheless, the shah still had many reactionary friends and supporters, among whom were Rahim Khan and Amir Bahador. The Cossack brigade was also ready for action. The Russians and the British had already approved the move.197 In December, a sizable number of troops were placed in the area around the Majles building. They had secret instructions to take over the Majles and destroy the anjomans. However, soon the progressive deputies (representing the national bourgeoisie), the armed feda`is and mojaheds, and the members of Tehran’s anjomans occupied the Majles and the buildings around it. Meanwhile, the feda`is and mojaheds from other cities had begun moving towards Tehran. The shah was taken by surprise and was forced to retreat. He subsequently signed the Supplementary Fundamental Laws and imprisoned some of his reactionary friends. Many of the anti-constitutional courtiers began praising the constitution out of fear of the feda`is. The Majles again chose to accommodate the shah. However, struggle against the shah was kept alive by the anjomans, the feda`is, the mojaheds and the unorganized masses. In February 1908, a bomb exploded near the shah’s carriage but he escaped unharmed the leftist leader. Heidar Amou Oghli was said to have planned the assassination. Thereafter, the shah used the event as a pretext to deeper his protests against the anjomans and other revolutionary organizations. Meanwhile, the political crisis had reached a new peak: cabinet after cabinet came and went, aggravating the crisis even further. By June 1908, the anjomans were asking for the dismissal of a number of reactionaries around the shah. The shah refused and began preparing for a second coup attempt. In the meantime, the following developments occurred: the anti-constitutional olama and mollas returned from Shah Abd ol-Azim, where they had taken sanctuary; the shah’s tugs were daily gathering at the Topkhaneh Square in Tehran calling for the elimination of the constitutionalists; the Russians and the British signed the 1907 Convention that divided Iran into spheres of influence between them; and a series of wars broke out in Azerbaijan between the counter-revolutionaries and the mojaheds along with other revolutionary forces. However, the Majles continued urging moderation and followed the tactic of negotiation. When the anjomans in Tehran tried to assign armed guards to

222

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

the Majles, they were prevented by the deputies from doing so. The shah was nevertheless determined to put an end to the Majles and the anjomans. The Russians and the British urged the shah to act,198 as did his other reactionary allies. On 22 June 1908, the shah ordered the coup. The troops were led by Liakhov, the Russian commander of the Cossack brigade. After meeting little resistance in Baharestan Square, the troops took over the Majles and subsequently detained, imprisoned and tortured a number of deputies and representatives of the anjomans. Two revolutionaries, Malek ol-Motakallemin and Mirza Jehangir Khan-e Shirazi (the editor of Sour-e Esrafil), were immediately strangled. A number of deputies, including Taqizadeh, sought sanctuary in the British Legation. The shah announced the dissolution of the Majles and the anjomans. The anti-constitutional forces in the provinces also attacked the provincial anjomans and tried to shut them down.199 The anjoman-e Tabriz, the mojaheds and the feda`is in Tabriz were already fighting the reaction there. Helped by the mercenaries of Rahim Khan, the reactionaries soon intensified their struggle against the revolutionaries. Despite the numerical advantage of the counter-revolutionaries and their superior weapons, the revolutionaries, led by Sattar Khan and Baqer Khan, fought a 13-month civil war during which they successfully defended the city and many parts of the province.200 In Azerbaijan, the urban middle classes, the urban poor, the peasants and the revolutionaries from the Transcaucasian provinces fought alongside the revolutionaries. A courageous young American by the name of Howard C. Baskerville, a Christian missionary teacher, also joined the revolutionaries and fought alongside them until he was shot and killed by the pro-shah forces. The revolutionaries in Tabriz demanded that the constitution be revived, that the Majles be opened and that the activities of the foreigners who were supporting the shah be ceased immediately. The revolution in Tabriz incited those in the other provinces to rise up against the shah and defend the constitution. In 1909, the Bakhtiaris took over the city of Esfahan, and the revolutionaries in Rasht, influenced and helped by the Russian Social Democrats and organized under the banner of the Komiteh-e Sattar Khan (Sattar Khan’s committee), revolted against the provincial government, killed the governor and took over the city. The revolutionaries in Rasht demanded the dismissal of the shah and the revival of the constitution.201 The people in Mashhad and in the southern cities also rose up in revolt. Meanwhile, the revolutionaries in Tabriz were fighting the counter-revolutionaries. Almost the whole of Iran was in revolt against the shah. In the meantime, the British had landed their forces in the south and had taken over Bushire, Lengeh and Jask ports, and the Russians invaded

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

223

Tabriz and Ardabil, taking over the latter but remaining uninvolved in the former.202 Eventually, the revolutionaries of Rasht and the Bakhtiaris moved and took over Tehran and overthrew the shah in July 1909. Ahmad Mirza, the deposed shah’s 12-year-old son, was chosen to be shah under the supervision of a regent from the royal family; the Second Majles was opened; and a new cabinet was formed in which the leaders of the Bakhtiaris and those of the revolutionaries from Rasht had a leading role.203 Nevertheless, the cabinet proved not to be revolutionary. The fact was that the Bakhtiaris were under pressure from the Russians and the British. Conflict among members of the new government as well as between the government and the revolutionary groups became inevitable. After a short fight, the moderates prevailed; there followed the disarming of the revolutionaries. In the meantime, the revolutionaries began agitating against the moderates, the Russians and the British. They soon organized a number of anti-imperialist demonstrations, boycotts of foreign goods, etc. However, the moderates felt necessary to work with foreign countries in order to affect some reforms in the institutions of the state. Hostile to both the Russians and the British, they chose to work with Germany and the United States, among other neutral countries. They sought a loan from Germany and an advisory group on finance from the United States. The first was dropped because of a warning from the British and the Russians who instead offered a joint loan, which was rejected by the Majles. The American advisory group, however, arrived in Tehran in 1911, and the chief of the mission, Shuster, was placed in charge of Iranian finances. These developments antagonized the Russians and the British. In the summer of 1909, almost immediately after the new government came to power, a new grouping of forces took shape. A number of deputies and those outside the Majles organized the Party of Revolutionaries (also called Democrats), and a second group formed the rival Party of Moderates. The latter was later to become the representative of the dependent bourgeoisie of Iran. The supporters of the old order also formed their own party, called the Party of Royalists. Struggle among these parties gradually developed into serious conflict, and assassinations followed. Among those killed was Behbahani, a supporter of the Moderate Party. Meanwhile, the ex-shah was marching towards Tehran in an attempt to recapture power. In 1910, Sattar Khan and Baqer Khan, under pressure from Russia and Britain, left Tabriz and went to Tehran. There they were made leaders of the

224

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

mojaheds and feda`is. However, soon the armed revolutionaries were disarmed by the moderate government and counter-revolutionary activities of the exshah and his supporters began to increase. However, the latter forces were defeated in a bloody struggle and the ex-shah fled again to Russia.204 The Majles soon passed a law that allowed the expropriation of the properties of the ex-shah and his main associates, including Sho`a` os-Saltaneh. Shuster was charged with the execution of the law. His employees in Tabriz, however, came into conflict with the Russian Bank there, which claimed to hold a mortgage on the properties of Sho`a` os-Saltaneh.205 Following these developments, the Russians and the British were further antagonized. They decided to overthrow the revolution themselves, through direct and armed intervention. In November 1911, the Russians, after consultation with the British, issued two consecutive ultimatums that demanded the expulsion of Shuster,206 compensation for the expenses of Russian troops in Iran (which had been in the country since April 1909), and acceptance of a loan from the British and the Russians jointly. They also demanded that in future no foreign advisors (except from these two powers – Russia and Britain) be invited into Iran without their consent. The ultimatums were rejected by the Majles, and the people began a series of antiimperialist demonstrations, crying ‘death or independence’. The moderates attempted to convince the Majles to accept the ultimatums. However, they failed, and the Russians invaded Iran from the north, the west and the east, and the British invaded from the south. Meanwhile, the discord between the revolutionaries and the moderates became a source of encouragement for the supporters of the old order. Sho`a` osSaltaneh, Salar od-Dauleh and the ex-shah began forming a coalition with the chiefs of ils on the borders and organized a sizable counter-revolutionary force. Supported by the British and the Russians, they began marching towards Tehran from both the north and the south in the autumn of 1911. Feeling that the government was in serious danger, the moderates came to terms with the revolutionaries. Subsequently, the feda`is and the mojaheds were armed; however, conflict soon developed between these revolutionary forces and the feudal khans in control of the government. Despite their hatred for the shah, the Khans did not desire revolutionary change. After all, they were still ranking feudal lords, even if they were liberal. The leadership of the revolutionaries from Rasht had been appropriated by Sepahdar-e A`azam, a liberal feudal lord who had for some time been on antagonistic terms with the shah. The feda`is were led by Yeprem Khan, a member of the Armenian Dashnag Party.207

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

225

The existing cabinet included members of the old ruling class and also a number of the shah’s good friends. Thus, the cabinet reflected the interest of the Iranian feudal lords more than any other class. Ironically, this was also the case with the Second Majles in which, compared to the First Majles, the number of representatives of the feudal lords had increased and those of the democratic forces had decreased.208 The revolutionaries fought a heroic war against the invaders but were no match for the superior force of the imperialist powers. The country was subsequently plundered and the revolutionaries were tortured, massacred and executed – particularly in Tabriz, Rasht and Mashhad.209 In Tehran, a coup was planned and successfully executed by a coalition of moderates and royalists. There followed the massacre of Tehran’s revolutionaries and the closing of the Second Majles. The ultimatums were accepted, Shuster was expelled and a loan was extended. The Constitutional Revolution was defeated and the country came under the full domination and control of Russia and Britain. The 1905–11 bourgeois democratic, anti-absolutist and anti-imperialist Constitutional Revolution came to an end in 1911 after the armed intervention of Russian and British troops. Nevertheless, its failure stemmed from other reasons as well. The working class was small and the peasants’ participation, except in Gilan and Azerbaijan, remained negligible. Similarly, the masses in the smaller towns did not actively participate. The revolution primarily involved the middle classes and the poor in the larger urban centres without coordination among them. Except in Tabriz, Rasht and a few other places, the people were not able to provide leaders from their own ranks or from the ranks of the intelligentsia trained in the social democratic tradition. The lack of democratic leadership gave the liberals (moderates) the opportunity to place themselves in the leadership position of the revolution. This leadership was too compromising, feared revolutionary change and was hardly against foreign interventionist forces. It also accommodated the feudal and absolutist forces and lacked a democratic vision for Iran. In the initial phases of the revolution, the constitutional forces – the olama, the mollas, the merchants, the national bourgeoisie, the liberal landlords, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the urban middle classes, the urban poor, the working masses and the peasants – remained united. Soon, however, a section of the olama turned against the revolution, and soon after a second faction of the olama followed the first. The big merchants and landlords in the Majles followed the olama, which served to further strengthen the counterrevolutionary forces. By 1909, however, the national bourgeoisie still

226

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

remained united. Thereafter, a major split occurred and the forces of the revolution were divided into two camps. The democratic forces (aided and abetted by Iranian and social democrats from Caucasia) – among whom were the working masses, the peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the urban middle classes, the poor, the lower mollas, the small traders and the national bourgeoisie – began demanding radical socioeconomic change and independence. Led by the national bourgeoisie and the middle classes, the democratic forces failed to prevail. This was primarily due to opposition from the imperialist forces and their absolutist allies. The liberal forces – among them the big merchants, the liberal feudal lords and the olama – feared radicalization, preached moderation and favoured accommodation with the imperialist and absolutist forces. Helped by these latter two forces and the anti-constitutional religious forces, the lumpenproletariat, the ils and the liberals were able to defeat the revolution and wipe out the revolutionaries – including the feda`is, the mojaheds and members of the numerous anjomans. The defeat of these forces meant the end of the Constitutional Revolution.

Class Alliance and Struggle, 1912–26 From 1912, Iran became a country dominated by and dependent on Russia and Britain. In 1913, Iran was even forced to accept the 1907 Convention, and between 1911 and 1914 several loans were extended to Iran (see Table 5.5). By 1914, the beginning of the First World War, Iran was an independent country in name only. In 1915, Lenin wrote that Iran had been 90 per cent colonized.210 By the outbreak of the First World War, a large number of Russian and British troops who had invaded Iran still remained there. In November 1914, Iran officially announced its neutrality in the war. Nevertheless, Iran soon became the scene of battles between the imperialist powers, with the Ottomans and Germans allied against the Russians and the British. By 1914, the Third Majles had been inaugurated. Meanwhile, German influence had grown in Iran and a number of deputies sympathized with them. This faction was among the national bourgeoisie that was antagonistic to the Russians and the British. The members of the Democratic Party, also representing the national bourgeoisie, felt the same way as the deputies. So did a number of Mostaufi ol-Mamalek’s cabinet members, including the grand vizier himself. He had already declined the request of the Russians and the British to declare war against the Germans.211

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

227

In the beginning of 1915, war between the Ottomans and the Russians began in Tabriz. The city was soon taken over by the Russians. The 1907 Convention had recognized the central parts of Iran as a neutral zone, but by the beginning of 1915 the Russians had decided to take this part for themselves. This only further antagonized the Iranian nationalists. Meanwhile, the Germans had successfully fought the British forces in the south and had captured a number of important cities including Kerman and Shiraz. The Germans were apparently aided by the Iranian gendarmerie and the nationalists. In November 1915, under pressure from the British and the Russians, the shah dismissed the cabinet and closed the Third Majles.212 The nationalist members of the dissolved Majles and the resigned cabinet then joined together, formed a ‘Committee for the National Defense’ and left Tehran for Qom where they soon organized a new government called the ‘Temporary National Government’.213 At the same time, Russian troops began marching against them and, after several heroic battles, the nationalists were defeated.214 In 1916, the Russians defeated the Ottoman forces in the west and the southwest. By 1917, they had virtually the whole of northern Iran up to Esfahan under their control. The British were, in the meantime, fighting the Germans in the south. Wassmus, a German agent, was successful in helping the southern ils against the British. The British were in trouble, having to deal with the heroic struggles of the Chakoutahi patriots and the Tangestanis led by Ra`is Ali-ye Delvari. Nevertheless, the British were eventually victorious. They conquered the remaining southern parts of Iran beginning with Esfahan. In 1917, therefore, Iran was virtually divided into two parts, each under the control of an imperialist power.215 However, in the same year, the Russian Revolution succeeded in overthrowing the Czar and Russian troops were ordered to leave Iran. On their way out, the troops looted Iranian villages and towns.216 With the Russians withdrawn, the British remained in Iran without rival, since the Ottomans and Germans had lost the war. Iran was devastated during the war.217 Thousands were killed and thousands more were forced to flee their villages and towns. Disease and famine took their toll, particularly in 1917 and 1918. In Tehran alone, nearly 20 per cent of the population died of starvation, due in large part to the suspension of transport.218 Other than people, Iran lost thousands of cattle, sheep and other livestock.219 Agriculture and industry were devastated and the population was frequently looted. The total pecuniary losses of Iran during the war were estimated at well over 400 million toumans.220 This figure is almost 30 times Iran’s revenue for any single year during the war time.

228

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

With the end of the First World War, the second series of bourgeois democratic revolutions began. Foreign intervention and domination, the war, the increasing misery of the Iranian masses, the growth of a proletariat and the influence of the Russian Revolution were among the causes responsible for the revolutionary waves that spread throughout the country between 1917 and 1926. This revolutionary activity was predominantly anti-imperialist and mainly directed at British imperialism. The democratic tendencies of the revolutions were greatly enhanced by the leadership of the national bourgeoisie. Within this leadership were representatives of the newly emerging working class,221 the urban petty bourgeoisie, the peasants, the urban poor and the liberal feudal forces who maintained a share of the leadership. The army and the British forces were on the side of reaction, including a dependent bourgeoisie and the feudal nobility. The leadership gradually passed to the armed forces commanded by Reza Khan. Among the specificities of these revolutions was their regional character. The most important of these revolutions was the Jangal Movement.222 Mirza Kouchek, the leader of the Jangalis, a member of the intelligentsia and the son of a merchant, had participated in the conquest of Tehran in 1909 and had fought the ex-shah in 1911. During the war, he returned to Gilan and organized the intelligentsia, the peasants, the urban poor and the petty bourgeoisie, and initiated an armed struggle against the Russians. The leaders of the Jangal Movement – among whom were a number of merchants and landlords – were nationalists. Mirza himself represented the democratic wing of the Iranian national bourgeoisie. Towards the end of 1917, the Jangalis organized a committee called ‘Ettehad-e Eslam’ (Unity of Islam), which was bourgeois-nationalist with some democratic tendencies. Although Mirza himself was the leader of the movement, the members in the committee were drawn from the merchants and landlords. Their constitution called for freedom, equality and majority rule. The constitution also accepted private property in land (although subject to limitations).223 In practice, the Jangalis reduced rent in kind, but failed to make changes in the prevailing relations between the landlords and the peasants. The Jangalis were essentially anti-imperialist and anti-absolutist.224 In the early years, they fought the Russians and later on (after 1917) the British. At times, the Jangalis also expropriated the properties of the big feudal lords and distributed grain among the poor. The Jangalis seem to have been on good terms with the Ottomans and the Germans; they apparently received arms and military instruction from them, the Germans in particular. The

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

229

Jangalis were nevertheless independent of these foreign forces and acted as they saw fit.225 The turning point in the Jangal Movement occurred in May 1920, when the Red Army – in pursuit of Russian counter-revolutionaries – entered the Iranian port of Enzali. A contract was subsequently signed between Mirza and the Bolsheviks in Enzali according to which a bourgeois democratic and antiimperialist (anti-British) government was to be established in Gilan. Since Mirza was religious, he argued that propagation of communism in Iran was not in accordance with the people’s religious beliefs and asked that the Communists be self-restrained. Soon the ‘Temporary Revolutionary Republic’ was formed in Rasht with the participation of communists from Iran, including Ehsan Ol-Lah Khan. In the same year, the Communist Party of Iran was formed. However, Mirza soon began secret negotiations with the central government concerning the elimination of the communists in Gilan.226 The communists were alarmed, carried out a coup and formed a ‘Revolutionary Government’ with a socialist programme. However, they subsequently made peace with Mirza, and unity was again established. In January 1926, Iran and the Soviet Government worked out a major agreement. The Soviet Government announced that it would pull its forces out of Iran. Those forces included the revolutionaries assisting the Gilan Republic. In February, a coup in Tehran put the anglophile Saiied Zia’ in power.227 In April of the same year, England proclaimed that its troops would soon be pulled out of Iran. In the same month, the attempts of Ahsan ol-Lah Khan (the Gilan Republic’s commander of the army) to conquer Tehran failed. Meanwhile, there were talks going on between the British and the Soviet governments. They soon came to terms over Iran. Thereafter, Rothestein, the Soviet ambassador in Tehran, informed Mirza that due to the changed circumstances, the Gilan Republic must be compromised.228 Soon after, during an internal conflict, Heidar Amou Oqli, the leader of the communists was killed, and the ‘Revolutionary Committee’ disintegrated. Reza Khan, commander of the armed forces, then defeated the Jangalis. Mirza, together with his German companion, froze to death in the northern mountains while escaping the march of Reza Khan’s men. While the Jangal Movement was underway, Sheikh Mohammad-e Khiabani rose up in revolt in Tabriz in 1919.229 Khiabani, a member of the intelligentsia and a merchant, was a deputy in the Second Majles. In 1909, he joined the newly formed Democratic Group. His anti-imperialist speeches against the Russian ultimatums had made him known to the Iranian people. After the Russian Revolution in 1917, the Democrats had become

230

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

active again. Khiabani appeared on the scene in Tabriz and began reviving the Democrats. However, they soon split into a group called the ‘Legal Democrats’ and other groups supporting Khiabani. A second split later occurred, and the Social Democrats were formed in Tabriz. In Tehran, the Democrats were also split into Tashakkoli (pro-organization) and Zedd-e Tashakkoli (anti-organization), the latter being the Social Democrats. In Tehran, a number of Social Democrats organized the Komiteh-e Mojazat (the Punishment Committee) and began assassinating selected members of the ruling class. Meanwhile, famine continued to devastate Iran – Tabriz included. The Democrats took the opportunity and organized a ‘Food Commission’ to help the poor. In the same year, the Tabriz Democrats organized a ‘meeting’ in which the word ‘democracy’ was broached by some. In the meantime, the First World War ended but typhus, typhoid, famine and other consequences arising from the war continued to decimate the population. In 1918, cholera was added to the list of diseases and caused the death of thousands more. The Democrats continued to help people and to organize them in various committees. In the same year, the Turks again began raiding the western border of Iran and the activities of the supporters of Ettehad-e Eslam (Unity of Islam) increased, including the activities of the Jangalis. The Fourth Majles was inaugurated in Tehran. By 1918, Khiabani and the Democrats in Azerbaijan had become stronger and in Gilan the Jangal Movement was underway. Disorder and insecurity prevailed everywhere. The British were among the sources of disorder and, in some areas, they attempted to engineer famines. The objective was to discredit and weaken the central government and make it more dependent on the British army. Under these circumstances, the anglophile Vosouq odDauleh formed his cabinet and subsequently negotiated the 1919 Agreement with the British (see Chapter 7). The struggle against the agreement immediately ensued. Among those who objected to the agreement was Khiabani in Tabriz. Under the banner of the New Movement of Democrats, Khiabani began preaching the necessity of organization, discipline and ‘party struggle.’ He was surely influenced by the Russian Social Democrats although he was himself a Democrat pure and simple. The Iranian Social Democrats soon appeared in Tabriz and began preaching socialism. The central government and the British were alarmed, but before they could take any measures, Vosouq’s cabinet collapsed and the liberal-minded Moshir odDauleh formed a new cabinet in 1920. In April of the same year, Khiabani’s uprising began. After a number of meetings, speeches and demonstrations, Khiabani was in power in Tabriz.

CLASS ALLIANCES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

231

Despite his rhetoric in favour of ‘radicalism’ and condemnation of ‘opportunism’, Khiabani did not take any measures to defend the movement. Instead of organizing people and arming them, Khiabani continued to lecture. Moreover, Khiabani disliked the Social Democrats and had imprisoned Avatis Soltanzadeh, the leader of the Social Democrats in Tabriz. He also disliked the German counsel, Curt Wustrovo, a Social Democrat, and had him killed. While Khiabani was purging his friends, he had left his enemies intact, including the Cossack regiment in Tabriz. Moreover, Khiabani trusted Moshir od-Dauleh and thought of him as a friend. However, the grand vizier was an enemy. In September 1920, an envoy of Moshir od-Dauleh entered Tabriz ostensibly for negotiations but he soon led the Cossacks against Khiabani’s unarmed and unorganized followers. As easily as Khiabani had taken over Tabriz, he lost it. Khiabani was killed and his movement was disbanded. After the Khiabani uprising and while the Jangal revolution was still underway, two other bourgeois democratic and nationalist uprisings broke out in 1926. The Amir Ma`aiied’s uprising in Mazandaran was defeated before it became a serious threat and the nationalist Mo´aiied was subsequently martyred.230 The second uprising, that of Colonel Pasian in Khorasan, turned out to be more serious.231 It was nevertheless put down by the government troops from the capital and Pasian was also martyred during a fight with the reactionaries. While Pasian’s uprising was underway, an uprising of the poor of Shirvan and Qouchan led by the shepherd Khadiv broke out in 1920. It was also defeated by government troops.232 The second series of bourgeois democratic revolutions was thus defeated by 1926. However, before the central government could exercise control over the whole country, a number of feudal reactionary uprisings had to be quelled, among them were the Simitqou rebellion in Kordestan and that of Khaz´al in Khouzestan. The first was suppressed in 1926 and the second in 1924. By 1926, every major and minor revolt, uprising and rebellion against the central government had been crushed by Reza Khan who subsequently assumed the title of Shah and founded the Pahlavi Dynasty in 1926. Afterwards, the dependent bourgeoisie and the feudal nobility – in coalition with British imperialism – fastened their grip over the country. Iran entered the era of neo-colonialism and was thereafter to live as an underdeveloped and dependent nation and ruled by a dictator Shah in place of an absolutist monarch.

CHAPTER 9

EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS

This concluding chapter provides a summary of the study’s empirical findings on the transition from pseudo-feudalism to proto-capitalism in Iran. Since neither feudalism nor capitalism took their classical (European) form in Iran, I have distinguished them here with the prefix ‘pseudo’ and ‘proto’, respectively. The chapter also provides a theoretical structure that is both deduced from the study and was its guiding conceptual framework for research, arguments and presentations. While the empirical conclusions are specific to the Iranian experience during the study period, the theory outlined here may be applicable to a wide range of developing nations with or without similar experience as Iran. People who wish to deduce lessons from the Iranian experience or apply the conceptual framework should account with care for the specifics of the case at hand. Capitalism has developed through the stages of simple cooperation, manufacturing and modern industry of which the manufacturing period is the transitional period.1 However, in this study the transitional period is defined to include the time span between the dissolution of feudalism and the full development of manufacturing capitalism. The key criterion for demarking the two ends of the transitional period is the instruments and procedures used in the labour process.2 While this demarcation methodology has been primarily applied, at times the study has used other criteria.3 In the case of Iran, the transitional period began in about 1800 and, under normal conditions, should have ended in the 1920s. However, in reality, it was extended to about the 1960s. The transitional period is almost always

EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS

233

protracted, and in Iran the struggle between the passing and emerging forces is still in progress at the turn of the twenty-first century.

From Pseudo-Feudalism to Proto-Capitalism – a Summary Iranian feudal society underwent a series of changes between 1796 and 1926 that resulted in the introduction of an underdeveloped and dependent protocapitalist mode of production. This delayed transition occurred in several phases. During the first half of the nineteenth century, a number of small consumer goods industries – organized along the lines of simple capitalist cooperation – came into being. Meanwhile, Iranian producers were subjected to innumerable ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’ tax and non-tax exactions by the feudal ruling class, and the country became increasingly open to foreign trade through wars, treaties, trade concessions and conventions. Then the introduction of a 5 per cent ad valorem tariff and the imposition of extraterritoriality significantly improved the competitive position of foreign traders. These measures politically weakened the position of Iran vis-a`-vis external forces, Britain and Russia in particular, and they economically opened the domestic market to foreign goods. In spite of these external burdens, the Iranian national bourgeoisie was still attempting to save the indigenous industries and introduce manufacturing in the early parts of the nineteenth century. However, by 1880, the traditional industries had been largely ruined because of foreign competition and the oppressive and corrupt practices of the feudal state. At the same time, the rapid growth of cash crop agriculture – largely the result of foreign penetration – began to supplant a good part of the subsistence forms of agriculture. Yet, and notwithstanding the many impeding forces, by 1890, a significant number of small-scale consumer goods industries had been established. However, in the next 25 years, every attempt to develop the industrial base of the economy was frustrated by the feudal state and the foreign forces. Political instability in this period was a third delaying factor. Again, despite these negative influences, productive forces made some progress by the 1920s: population increased and urbanization grew apace; progress was made in transportation; new techniques (not tools) were introduced in the agricultural sector; and new tools and techniques were introduced in the traditional industries. Parallel to these developments, a primitive accumulation was taking place that concentrated wealth in the hands of a small minority and led to

234

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

increasing misery for the masses. This process led to changes in the social relations of production and created a significant number of propertyless people who either migrated to the neighbouring states (with constant reverse migration) or moved to the urban centres, swelling the ranks of the proletariat. Nevertheless, despite these developments and some favourable conditions for capitalist industrialization (including higher prices, lower wages and the formation of a commodity market), the national bourgeoisie failed to industrialize the economy. Consequently, an underdeveloped proto-capitalism emerged that depended on foreign economies for its survival. In particular, the alliance between the cash-hungry feudal ruling class and the foreign forces led to increased foreign trade and an ‘opening up’ of the economy especially after 1890, accomplished primarily through a series of concessions, loans and the establishment of foreign firms. Subsequently, the involvement of Britain and Russia in the political and economic affairs of the country reached unprecedented levels. Moreover, the increasing destruction of capitalist manufacturing in Iran led to increased importation of consumer goods and chronic balance of payment problems. The decrease in the production of some of the most important cash crops further aggravated the trade deficit. The development of a number of export industries in the early years of the twentieth century – oil and carpets in particular – did not help to solve the problem. After 1890, the wealthier sectors of the bourgeoisie shifted most of their investment to foreign trade, cash crop production and real estate and entered into an alliance with the feudal state and imperialism. This section of the bourgeoisie became increasingly dependent on imperialist forces not only for its expansion but also for its very survival. The national bourgeoisie continued its struggle for industrialization and – in alliance with the urban middle classes and the poor, and at times with the rural population – waged numerous fights against the reactionary alliance of the feudal state and its foreign supporters. Even if some of such fights were ‘successful’, they failed to bring about the required transition to a progressive capitalism. Among other factors, an obsolete political culture remained a key obstacle. From 1848, the corrupt and oppressive feudal state had made some attempt to introduce a few reform measures, and despite the fact that such measures were not adequately implemented because of opposition from reactionary and imperialist forces, they nevertheless brought about some changes in the army, the administration, the judiciary and the educational system. These changes improved the quality of the productive forces,

EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS

235

increased social awakening and led to the formation of an intelligentsia. A series of newspapers, books, societies and organizations appeared promoting the arrival of a new civil society, and the new forces engaged in ideological struggle and class struggle involving both peaceful and violent methods. However, these developments did not lead to a new political culture. As civil society developed and became increasingly more politicized, the ongoing chaotic struggle became gradually focused on demand for constitutional order and socioeconomic development. In particular, the reform movement, initiated by a number of liberal reformers in the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century, became increasingly outspoken and critical of the ruling powers. The Babi Movement had already shaken the foundation of the absolutist state. By 1890, the reform movement had developed into a full-fledged nationalist, anti-imperialist and antiabsolutist struggle. Beyond this point, the Tobacco Movement signalled a reassertion of nationalism and it was followed by the Constitutional Revolution in 1906, which led Iran into a new era of nation-building. Until this time, nation-building in Iran had remained a top-down phenomenon whereby the court, the ruling elites, the wealth holders and the high-ranking clergy were the only groups constituting the mellat (nation). The rest were ro’aya (commoners; subjects) with no rights whatsoever. This top-down nation-building paralleled a similar top-down education system where higher education preceded elementary education by almost a century. While there was not even a single secular school in Iran, the country had a college called Dar ol-Fonoun, a technical institution of higher education. Even before Dar ol-Fonoun was established, the court had sent some Iranians abroad to study in specific fields. However, at the beginning of the Constitutional Revolution, nation-building became bottom up and the controlling classes began to address the rights of the commoners. In parallel, education was also gradually moved towards elementary schooling incorporating the base classes (largely peasants, the poor and workers). The top-down nation-building and educational system had created a few very sophisticated politicians in nineteenth-century Iran where secular literacy rate of the general population was close to zero. The gap between the political elite and the masses could only stifle attempts towards meaningful reform. In subsequent decades when education was taken to the bottom of a society dominated by dictatorship and imperialism, a new breed of political Iranians emerged, namely ‘politicized intellectuals’ (roushanfekran-e siasi). These people were very different from the previous breed of political elite who

236

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

were ‘enlightened politicians’ (siasatmadaran-e roushanfekr). The latter group was pragmatic and realist whereas the former group was ideological and romantic. Ever since the Constitutional Revolution, particularly since the beginning of the Pahlavi Dynasty, Iran has continued to produce more politicized intellectuals than enlightened politicians. It is no wonder that the country cannot break through the vicious cycle of dictatorship, revolution and chaos. With the Constitutional Revolution, Iranian nationalism assumed a new form focused on the advancement of citizenship. Earlier, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, it was based on land and was represented by Abbas Mirza, the crown prince. That nationalism had developed in reaction to Russia’s imperial territorial designs against Iran. Around the midnineteenth century, Iranian nationalism began to focus on economic development and rejection of foreign domination and it was represented by Mirza Taghi Khan Amir Kabir. That nationalism developed in reaction to the destructive trade policies of Britain and Russia vis-a`-vis Iran. Although the Constitutional Revolution instigated a new era of Iranian nationalism, its subsequent developments remained limited within the confines of the territory and anti-imperialism. It is no wonder that Iranian nationalism has failed to bring the territorial interests of the country in line with the interests of its people. Only a conceptual change from nationalism (territory-based) to nationism (territory- and people-based) can help integrate both interests. The 1796–1890 period was characterized by a series of wars with Russia and Britain, the Babi Movement, struggles among the members of the ruling class, a series of urban-based bread riots, anti-absolutist uprisings or ‘civil wars’, and limited anti-imperialist struggle. Moreover, the official Shi’ite religion came increasingly under attack and – since the religious establishment was in a relatively weak position in the early decades of the period – the state had to defend it fiercely. The struggle against absolutism also took the form of a reform movement demanding law, order, security, freedom, equality, justice, centralization and national independence. However, in the end, the movement became violent in the absence of a developed political culture and in the face of violent resistance by the feudal state and its anti-development foreign and domestic allies. The Tobacco Movement signalled the beginning of a violent struggle and revival of religious activism. The Constitutional Revolution represented the culmination of that struggle. Thus, the period between 1891 and 1911 was ‘the revolutionary period’. It was marked by the urban-based Tobacco Movement and the Constitutional

EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS

237

Revolution, the first in a series of bourgeois democratic revolutions waged essentially by the urban middle classes and the poor. Both of these movements were anti-absolutist and anti-imperialist. The period between the Tobacco Movement of 1891–2 and the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 witnessed a series of urban-based bread riots, radical and nationalist ideological struggle, and the formation of a series of secret societies and other forms of revolutionary organizations. The major struggles, however, were fought immediately after the Constitutional Revolution; the defeat of the revolution was ensured by the invasion of Russian and British troops in 1911. The years following the Constitutional Revolution were marked by several armed struggles waged largely by the urban middle classes. The influence of the religious authorities, which had increased since the 1860s, reached its zenith during the early years of the ‘revolutionary period’. Towards the end of the period, as the revolution began to radicalize, a significant number of constitutionalists and religious authorities began turning against the revolution. The dependent faction of the bourgeoisie allied itself with the feudal and imperialist forces and turned against the progressive forces – essentially the emerging intelligentsia. This nascent group which had failed to accept a leadership role, widen its demand beyond political freedom, and recognize the basic needs of the working people led to its ultimate defeat. By 1911, the Constitutional Revolution was almost defeated, and none of the many cabinets formed thereafter lasted more than a year or two. Then came the devastation wrought by the First World War and a new upsurge of class struggles. The Russian Revolution of 1917 ended the Russian oppression of Iran and gave new impetus to the revolutionary forces. The result was a significant increase in the activities of communist forces and a series of regionally based bourgeois democratic revolutions between 1918 and 1926. Notwithstanding this ‘progressive’ impact, the introduction of communist ideology in Iran misled the emerging Iranian intelligentsia towards the idea of ‘internationalism’, a development that significantly weakened Iranian nascent citizen-based nationalism that had emerged in the wake of the Constitutional Revolution. Political instability became a hallmark of Iran until the later years of the 1920s. British imperialism resolutely opposed this second round of bourgeois democratic revolutions and helped the central government to defeat them. The British engineered a coup in 1926 and put Saiied Zia’, an ambitious journalist, in power. Dismayed by his arrogance and erratic behaviour, the British subsequently helped Reza Khan, a military commander, to assume

238

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

power. This man later on declared himself Reza Shah and founded the Pahlavi Dynasty after dismissing the last Qajar king Ahmad Shah, a young democratic prince. Reza Shah established the first modern dictatorship in Iran, and under his rule Iran entered into a new era of proto-capitalism and dependent development. These changes allowed the British to fasten their grip on the country. Afterwards, Great Britain ended its direct colonial intentions in Iran and began to enforce a policy of neo-colonialism.

The Political Economy in Theory and Practice In what follows, a conceptual framework is outlined that is both deduced from the study and was its guiding force behind research, arguments and presentations. The conceptual framework is based on the political economy tradition, its epochal transition theory and dialectical method in particular, and is accompanied with empirical statements from the Iranian experience validating the deductions. Political economy is the ‘science’ of social production and reproduction that pertains to any given social formation (e.g. feudalism and capitalism). In particular, political economy is the science of the economic laws of a given formation and the laws that express the interconnectedness and interaction between the material base and the political/ideological superstructures. Because the political economy framework allows for the expression of the concrete in general terms, it is well suited for the construction of a theory of transition from feudalism to capitalism. Within the political economy framework, a theory of transition may be conceptualized as three levels: total abstraction, partial abstraction and placebound. At the first level, the theory accounts for all places, times and social systems.4 Within this form of total abstraction, the theory might be framed to account for given time periods or specific social systems, but it cannot be constrained by geography. At the partial abstraction level, on the other hand, the theory meets the reality and thus any abstract of place, time and social relations is only tangentially removed from the concrete reality they represent. In the case of the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Iran, these two levels of theorization have also been deduced and applied. Yet, the most salient feature of the theory outlined below is the deduction of its abstract concepts from the geographical and historical specificities of the Iranian transition making it ‘place-bound’. This particular methodology has then helped the study delineate several fundamental propositions showing

EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS

239

how and why Iran became an underdeveloped, dependent and dictatorial political economy by the end of the study period. A few fundamental principles govern the transition at the total abstraction level. First, human history is considered as a natural process of progress and that any regress is abnormal and represents a social rupture. Second, social being has primacy over social consciousness not only in philosophical terms but also in actual historical processes. Thus, changes in superstructures are preceded and governed by changes in material substructure. Third, the activities of individuals and their role as the engine of social progress are viewed as purposeful but socially determined. Thus, such activities may not bring the intended results for they are products of complex social interactions and struggles. Fourth, the interconnectedness of social phenomena is considered a part of life’s basic sustaining moment and a defining character of its inner tensions, making transition a permanent reality. Fifth, the unity and contradiction, as well as correspondence and noncorrespondence, between relations of production and forces of production are conceptualized as prime movers of all social motions. Specifically, class struggles and social revolutions are determining characteristics of transitional periods. Similarly, the dislocation between superstructure and economic base is one of the major causes of the crises that precipitate a social transformation.5 Finally, social change is inherently uneven, spasmodic and, inevitably, disharmonious and contradictory. One reason such unevenness characterizes world history is that new social systems emerge before the old have disappeared leading to the coexistence of at least two unequal modes of production.6 A transition period is also defined by its uneven development of class relations and the widening social and technical divisions of labour. A few fundamental principles also govern social change at the partial abstraction level. First, the principles of the total abstraction level are all expressed concretely at this level. Second, the expropriation of direct producers (the so-called law of primitive accumulation) and the differentiation among direct producers have been among the defining features of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Third, the creation of a surplus population and a free labour market also characterizes this political economy transformation. Fourth, the transformation of money into capital and of capital accumulation (concentration) resulting in wealth and misery are also among the constant features of the transitional period. Fifth, the transition is always associated with the development of commodity exchange, the creation of a national monetized market and the transformations of feudal rent into ground rent, capital and tax.

240

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Sixth, unstable centralized national governments emerge and the application of force becomes more pervasive in times of social transitions. The state power is often used for the usurpation of common (state) lands and the use of national debt and taxation as special ‘momenta of primitive accumulation’. The net effect of these forces and developments, where successful, is the gradual evolution of the economy through the stages of cooperation, manufacturing and modern industry. In all cases, the transitional periods are characterized by political chaos that develops following class struggles (sometimes revolutions) and the weakening or collapse of the absolutist power. Indeed, transitional societies are characterized by the never-ending cycle of dictatorships, revolutions and political disorders. Aside from the social developments, contradictions and forces listed above, a fundamental cause of the virulent cycle is the lack of a healthy political culture, itself often a product of a violent history and a tormented geography. The general theory of transition outlined above is essentially place-free as it incorporates space as an abstract. Of course, there can be no place-free transition as the transition occurs in a concrete territory, e.g. in a given country, which is often characterized by certain geographical and historical specificities. The particular conditions of a given territory then influence the transition and modify its laws. The theory at this political economy level – by uniting the abstract and the concrete – becomes place-bound, i.e. it no longer applies to all nations, but only to a given geographical unit, Iran in this case. Thus, the abstract laws outlined above are concretely applied only within the context of a definite geographical unit and under the modifying effects of its historical specificities. Thus, a better explanation of the transition requires a deeper understanding of these specificities. This is so because the concrete features and the sources of anomalies and exceptions of the transition are hidden in these geographical and historical specificities.7 Geographical specificities are a fundamental source of influence on the transition from feudalism to capitalism. There are no two countries alike in terms of their geographical configuration. Every country, including Iran, is territorially specific. Indeed, Iran is among those countries where the geographical specificities are most pronounced. The country has a diverse topography and a variegated but largely arid climate, is surrounded by historic and modern territories and states, has a historical geography characterized by frequent expansion and contraction, is divided into many unevenly developed regions, has a dispersed human settlement system, and is composed of various ethnic regions of definite sub-cultures and tribal communities of diverse identities. These and many other specificities should

EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS

241

be carefully investigated in terms of their effects on the unique Iranian feudalism and its transition to a lopsided capitalist system. The scope of the present study has not allowed the accomplishment of this important task in due detail.8 Next, there are some types of specificities that are collectively termed ‘historical’. Seven categories of such specificities are distinguished in the case of Iran: (1) the unique features of feudalism, (2) the specific circumstances of the rise and development of capitalism, (3) the peculiar role of the state and ideology; (4) the particular composition and role of class and class struggle, (5) the unique political culture of the country, (6) the specific role of colonialism and imperialism and (7) the unique role of the socialist movement. These were not isolated or incidental conditions; rather they were parts of an integrated and purposefully produced social formation called Iran. Thus, their impact on the transition must also be viewed as a network of concrete influences. The forerunners of all the historical specificities were the conditions associated with feudalism in Iran, deshaping it into pseudo-feudalism. The most significant of these were recurrent Iranian defeats in war by imperial powers, frequent nomadic invasions, coexistence of sedentary pastoralist ils and frequent breaks in the land tenure system. Feudalism in Iran was also conditioned by the changing composition of the landed aristocracy (the king was the only real landowner), the dominant position of the urban-residing landlords (absentee landlordism) and the growth of military landholdings. Other conditions that made feudalism in Iran dissimilar to feudalism in (say) Europe were the combination of small-scale peasant tenants and large-scale feudal ownership (nominally on behalf of the king), and the existence of large tracts of communal lands. Besides, the predominance of rent in kind and the absence of demesne and corvee labour set Iranian feudalism apart from the serfdom elsewhere. The importance of large-scale irrigation projects, the rise of a sharecropping system and the dependent development of cities and their guilds were also particular to a geographically tormented Iran. Equally specific to Iranian feudalism were the growth of a relatively closed commodity market in the pre-transitional period, the increasing participation of the landed nobility in commerce and city-based activities, and the alliance of city-based landlords, big merchants and religious leader. Finally, the despotic and arbitrary (lawless) character of the political superstructure, the oppressive and corrupt character of the ruling class, and the unprecedented exploitation

242

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

of peasants and guild procedure gave feudalism in Iran a character that was hardly found in the known cases of classical feudalism in Europe. These specificities, in combination with the relative stability or inertia of feudalism in Iran, the failure of peasant revolts, the relative lack of a centralized political power towards the end of feudalism (1896–1926) and the intervention of foreign forces, distorted the transition and led to its tenacity. The relative stability of feudalism had its main basis in the union of agriculture and cottage industries. That merger delayed productive forces in agriculture, prevented differentiation among the peasantry and hampered peasant organization, leading to the failure of peasant uprisings. Meanwhile, the central government became increasingly weaker, despite its despotic character, leading to the growing power of the local landlords. The historical alliance among the landholding classes, big merchants and religious leaders reinforced this tendency. Additional influences were the intervening foreign power and the shift from subsistence to cash crop agriculture. Foreign forces particularly promoted factionalism and localism as means of reinforcing feudalism and their penetration and domination of the country. Yet, the very forces that reinforced feudalism in the transition period became the prime sources of the system’s total disintegration in the 1926–60 period. The more feudalism was reinforced, the more its productive forces developed, and the more productive forces developed, the more difficult it became to reinforce feudalism in its old form. This contradiction was exacerbated by changes in the structure of production in the imperialist countries. Specifically, the changing structure of their demand for raw materials eventually led to a conflict of interest between the external powers and the feudal lords (c. 1950). The relations of feudal production in Iran came into contradiction not only with the Iranian productive forces, but also with the productive forces in the imperialist centres.9 These relations had to be changed and were changed through a speedy process involving a programme of land reform in 1963. During this phase, a new type of alliance, and consequently a new kind of dependency, was initiated between the ruling internal forces and their external masters. The next set of specificities affecting the transition related to the specific circumstances of capitalist development in Iran. Iranian proto-capitalism originated from trade and real estate rather than crafts and petty commodity production. Industrialization played a peripheral role and so did urbanization and urban development. Agriculture and commerce also did not contribute to capitalist development in Iran as subsistence agriculture was prematurely destroyed and internal commerce was crippled. These sectors played important

EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS

243

roles only after a lopsided and dependent capitalism had already taken root. Indeed, the natural progression of Iranian capitalist development, from improvement in subsistence agriculture to expansion of internal trade to advancement in indigenous industrialization, was interrupted by inimical forces including the absolutist state and imperial powers. Nevertheless, the dissolution of feudalism and rise of capitalism witnessed major changes in the nation’s factors of production, institutions of production and general condition of production. Among the key factors were labour, capital, technology, entrepreneurship and material inputs. Institutions included private property, market and trade, public policy and regulations, and national security and local orders. The key general conditions were population, urbanization, communication and transportation. While all these factors, institutions and conditions are important in the rise and development of capitalism, the most critical players were the labourers and the capitalists. The proletariat had its origins in a variety of previous social classes including slaves, serfs, guild producers, guild master and even ruined landlords. However, it was from only one of these social classes that the bulk of the proletariat originated, namely the peasantry. A significant number of guild producers were also turned into wage labourers. The peasants were proletarianized essentially through expropriation and tax oppression. They were also ruined by means of usury. In contrast, guild producers were largely destroyed by imperialism. This pauperization notwithstanding, and as the workers became numerous, they developed new needs, class consciousness, organizational abilities and bargaining powers. For example, previously the working class had no unique class consciousness, but later it became a class with a definite economic, political and ideological agenda. It became a ‘classin-itself’, and in the course of its political struggle against exploitation, it developed into a ‘class-for-itself’. The capitalist class likewise had its origin in a variety of social classes: usurers, merchants, patricians, landlords, military commanders, government officials, bureaucrats, burghers, guild masters and small direct producers. However, in contrast to the case of the proletariat, capitalists in Iran emerged not just from one or two sources but from many. Specifically, they were born from merchants and usurers in the earlier phases of the transition, and from landlords, military commanders, and civilian state officials and bureaucrats in the later phases. The transformation of these various actors into capitalist varied over time and at different speed and difficulty. The class also passed through several phases of development, acquiring in the process differing goals, aspirations, function, strength, consciousness and organization. For

244

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

example, it evolved from a nationalist and religious bourgeoisie into a dependent and secular bourgeoisie. Capital, as the material basis of the capitalist class, also originated in various sources and has gone through several stages of development. Usurer capital, merchant capital, oil rent, foreign loans, public funds (created through taxation, public debt and credit, deficit spending and inflation), war booty and expropriated property of the petty producers were all among sources of capital. However, there were two sources that provided the bulk of capital in Iran: merchant and usurer money in the earlier phases of the transition and oil rent after the 1940s. Moreover, capital has also gone through several phases of development, evolving from simple capitalist cooperation (1800–80) to capitalist manufacturing (1880–1950) and then to capitalist modern factory. As capital developed, it revolutionized not only its own factors, institutions and conditions, but also the form and content of almost all related social spheres including ideology and politics. The origins of Iranian workers, capitalists and capital had negative consequences for healthy capitalist development. Yet, what actually delayed that process were the abusive powers and practices of the feudal state and imperialism. First, the traditional craft industries were destroyed by the abusive practices of the feudal state and foreign competition and the craftsmen joined the propertyless proletariat; second, the shift to cash crop production and growing foreign trade impeded development of the productive forces in agriculture as the peasants were destroyed by unfair tax exactions; third, the big merchants allied themselves with the feudal lords and foreign traders as they made large investments in cash crop production and real estate; fourth, the development of mining and general conditions of production (infrastructure) were held back by the competing foreign powers; and fifth, the feudal state and imperial powers acted in a predatory manner towards the emerging national bourgeoisie. With agriculture and guilds destroyed, merchants incorporated in the world economy, investments going to cash crops and real estate, and the state and imperial powers acting as obstacles to the development of capitalist manufacturing, conditions for Iran’s underdevelopment, dependency, and modern dictatorship (as distinct from the traditional absolutism) were established. Another important set of specificities was related to the political and ideological superstructures. The role of the state is often a function of its type and form. It is safe to assert that the Iranian state was feudal in earlier phases of the transition and capitalist in the later phases. Feudal or

EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS

245

capitalist, the Iranian state was not developmentalist but rather obstructionist at first and then equivocal towards the end of the transition period. The forms these state types assumed were monarchical – absolute monarchy in the earlier phases of the transition and dictatorial monarchy in the later phases. Thus, the state in the earlier phases can be identified as an obstructionist feudal absolute monarchy and in the later phases as an equivocal capitalist dictatorial monarchy. This is not to say that the state did not represent the interests of other social forces in the transitional period or that it made no effort to develop the nation. The Iranian state, as has been shown, intervened in every aspect of the country’s life, including the private sphere of individuals, and its dominance on the nation was total, absolute and arbitrary. No law to follow and no countervailing force to respond to, the feudal state was not restricted in the extent of its interventions in the important areas of struggle among interest groups, the economy, the ideological contests and foreign affairs. However, the degree of the state’s effectiveness directly depended on the magnitude of its repressive strength. Indeed, that force varied during different phases of the transition. The Iranian state was stronger in the early phases of the transition than it was in the later phases. The state was particularly weak during the manufacturing period (1880– 1926) due to intensification of the class struggle and the conflict among the ruling elite. The feudal court and lords, who ruled with an iron hand before the Constitutional Revolution, had to share power with the growing bourgeoisie after the revolution. However, due to the historical weakness of the Iranian capitalist class, the feudal lords maintained their hegemonic position within the ruling class. Consequently, the bourgeoisie was unable to use state power to further its aims, among which was the development of capitalist manufacturing. The state always plays a central role in the class struggle in the transition period, often supporting the passing interest groups, as in Iran, but also siding with the emerging classes, as in Europe. In Iran, the state not only supported the feudal lords until it became impossible to sustain them in the 1960s, but also reinforced the imperialist domination of the country, although at times it also hindered that domination. Besides, in the struggle among social classes, the state invariably sided with the upper class demanding ‘economic growth’, and neglected ‘political development’ demanded by the emerging middle class and ‘social justice’ demanded by the poor and the working people. This lopsided approach to national development has survived the transitional period. It is no wonder that

246

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

demands for democracy and provision of basic needs remain high on the national agenda. In the public policy arena, the fight over the priorities of the state is one of the marked characteristics of the period between 1906 and 1926. The state was inclined towards a minimal and controlled reform largely focused on its administrative apparatuses. The feudal lords favoured a refeudalization (reactionary) policy and hindered every effort to industrialize the economy. The foreign forces also supported the feudal magnates and held back programmes for the development of manufacturing in Iran. The preservation of the status quo was their main goal. Thus, the transitional state became the arena of a fierce struggle among the emerging bourgeoisie, feudal magnets and imperial powers. The state was also the subject of pressure from the below in a revolutionary environment that was developing towards the end of the nineteenth century. These struggles made the arbitrary state weak, dependent and dictatorial as well as equivocal towards capitalist development. Significantly, to create a centralized administration and a national market (which were increasingly demanded by the rising bourgeoisie), the feudal state came into conflict with its very base of power, namely the feudal magnets. Thus, in the earlier phases of the transition (before 1890), the feudal state allied itself with the urban forces against the local feudal magnates. However, by the first phase of the capitalist manufacturing period (1890–1926), the emerging bourgeoisie, with its liberal slogans, had become a real threat to the absolutist role of the feudal monarchs. Subsequently, the feudal state turned its back on the urban classes, including the bourgeoisie, and became allied with the feudal lords and the imperialist forces. The fight between the state and the urban classes during the first two decades of the twentieth century was a consequence of this shift and the new alliance. In an effort to contain the threat of the progressive forces, the state allied itself with foreign powers. This above all increased the state’s military link with the external forces. This ‘military dependency’ in turn resulted in ‘financial dependency’ and later to a ‘cash crisis’ as the state’s need for cash increased. The cash crisis was also the result of the growing monetization of the economy, the corruption of state officials, increasing usurpation of state revenues by local governors and the extravagance of the court and the feudal lords. The ruin of the state’s revenue base, most notably the peasants and craft industries, exacerbated the cash crisis. Thus, financial dependency was inevitable for otherwise the state would have collapsed. The loan-concession link between the state and the foreign forces

EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS

247

was the main channel through which financial dependency developed and grew. Oil later replaced loan-concessions as the chief link in the chain of financial dependence. The Iranian state also intervened in the ideological struggles of the transitional period, a tradition that remains even today when the state and ideology are two sides of the same coin. The ideological struggles were waged in contests among social classes, over economic priorities, apropos state administration and regarding relations with foreign powers. The underlying economic motivation of the ideological struggles was clearly demonstrated by the fierce struggle between the emerging bourgeois liberal ideology and the passing feudal religious ideology in the mid- to later years of the transition. The socialist proletarian ideology also played a major role in the ideological struggle waged in later years of the transition period. Nationalism also played a key role but, like liberalism and socialism, it failed to sustain its national vigour. They all lost to fundamentalism and nativism, both of which promoted absolutism and dictatorship. This result was obtained largely because of a dominant obsolete political culture. The transition from feudalism to capitalism was most powerfully influenced by the near unique Iranian political culture. Although numerous traits defined (and some continued to define) this culture, several features were particularly problematic for the transition. Iran was a largely arid geography that needed communal work to provide water. This communal work over time led to absolutist politics. One key consequence was a deep suspicion of community, which in turn led to crass but illiberal individualism, selfishness and disunity. Meanwhile, as one of the early empire builders, Iran became entangled in many imperial wars and nomadic invasions. A loser in most of these conflicts, Iran developed a victimized personality that sought justice from hidden sources or comfort from inner selves. Coexisting with power, domestic or foreign, also became a serious challenge. Thus, Iranians became simultaneously combatant and subservient towards power. It is no wonder that Iranian history and society is characterized by frequent political disorder and instability. These interruptions, coupled with the religious tradition in Iran, led to the development of a deeply ideological culture that mistrusted the material and practical life while promoting supernatural and idealist existence. The ideological Iran then became distrustful of others who were often viewed as enemies rather than (say) competitors. Respect for diversity also became problematic, leading to the lack of tolerance and compromise. Violence then became the preferred means

248

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

of settling disputes even in non-political matters. It was within this political culture of absolutism, individualism, disunity, wars, defeats, victimization, combativeness, passivity, ideology, animosity and instability that the transition from pseudo-feudalism to proto-capitalism took place in Iran. It is then no wonder that within this problematic political culture and in the context of foreign interventions, the results obtained should be so dramatically unfavourable, indeed dreadful for Iran’s national development. The transition period was also characterized by the unique character of social classes in Iran and their struggles for a better life. Specifically, social classes existed in terms of ‘class-in-itself’, with clear economic and social stratifications, but they hardly developed into ‘class-for-itself’, conscious of their interests and power. Notwithstanding this serious defect, social classes did engage in continuous battles with their abusers. There is no doubt that peasant revolts broke out and that all of them were defeated. However, the battles of urban classes (largely the petty bourgeoisie and the working people under the leadership of the nationalist merchant elements and the social democratic forces) were fiercer and more frequent. They too were at many occasions defeated but they also won critical fights as in the cases of the Tobacco Movement and the Constitutional Revolution. However, even these ‘successes’ did not produce sustainable positive outcomes as they led to political chaos, which were only ended after the ‘defeated status quo’ triumphantly returned. Many factors led to these defeats and among them a few were most critical. They included (1) the over-exploitation of the working people and their organizational and leadership disabilities; (2) the lack of unity between the rural and urban struggling classes; (3) the highly oppressive and exploitative political and military structure of the feudal state; and (4) the anti-democratic interventions of foreign powers, Great Britain and Russia in particular. These defeats were also caused by the obsolete Iranian political culture within which political opposition was considered an enemy and class coalition became impossible. While the toiling classes were hardly predisposed to this culture, the so-called politicians and intellectuals, the middle-class revolutionaries in particular, who often led these movements, were the true bearer of this obsolete political culture. Indeed, this leadership was no less responsible for the defeats than the feudal state and its imperialist cohorts. The failure of peasant revolts and urban struggles against the antidevelopment camp of the feudal state, imperial powers and dependent propertied classes was a major cause of the origins and subsequent development of underdevelopment and dependency relations between Iran

EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS

249

and the capitalist world economy. Every defeat for the people was a victory for the so-called dependent merchant bourgeoisie as it used the opportunity to strengthen its economic, political, ideological and military ties with the foreign traders and powers. Indeed, the more the producing people were defeated, the less it became possible to spur domestic production, and the more Iran became entangled in an ‘unequal exchange’ based on an exploitative international division of labour that had assigned Iran the task of producing raw material. Meanwhile, the faster the dependent merchant bourgeoisie grew, the more it became dependent on foreign capital for the reproduction of its parasitic existence, and the more it also shifted capital to agricultural raw material and real estate. Perhaps the most significant of all the historical specificities that have characterized the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Iran are those associated with the presence and role of foreign forces. During the transition period, Iran was both militarily invaded and economically penetrated by the forces of imperialism. Thus, the political and economic domination of Iran was initially and primarily effected through the use of force and other violent means, even though the country never became a colony as such. Specifically, in the earlier phases of the transition, the foreign interventions were more violent than they were in the later phases (except for the periods of the two world wars) but the degree of the foreign domination over Iran was much less in the beginning of the transition period than towards its end. Indeed, the colonial practices of the imperial powers, based on military–political subjugation, were gradually replaced with their neo-colonial practices based on economic exploitation. Yet, the instruments of penetration and domination and the mechanisms through which they were carried out were mixed in different phases of the transition. The major means of penetration and domination of Iran by the imperialist forces in the earlier phases of the transition (up to the 1920s) included militarism, trade, treaties, concessions, ‘subsidies’, diplomatic and military missions, consular offices, trading houses and companies, capitulation, cash crop and raw materials production, local alliances, corruption (bribery and theft), loans and advances, and orientalism and freemasonry. Oil rent and economic planning became the dominant means and mechanisms of domination in the later phases (1920s–1950s). The alliance with local forces, the courtiers, feudal lords and dependent bourgeoisie was the major channel through which the imperial forces defeated the struggles of the progressive and nationalist forces for development as they established their domination over Iran.

250

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

It seems safe to assert that the principal interests of the external forces in Iran were driven by procurement of cheap raw materials, markets for consumer goods and markets for finance capital in the earlier phases (up to the 1920s), and oil rent and market dedicated to produce consumption items in the later phases. However, their interest in markets for consumer goods and cheap labour remained unchanged. Meanwhile, the internal economy also largely followed the changes in demand from the external traders. Thus, the Iranian economy conformed to the changing international division of labour, playing its peripheral role as a raw material producer, a market for foreign manufactured goods and a source of cheap labour. These economic interests notwithstanding, the imperial powers in Iran shifted attention towards political and strategic matters after the 1917 socialist revolution in Russia. The 1919 ‘Protectorate Agreement’ that Britain tried to impose on Iran is a prime example of this shift in imperial interest in Iran. While the alliance between the external forces and the internal reaction was strong, it also often was contradictory. Indeed, the interests of the allied forces did not always coincide. For example, the alliance reinforced feudalism (in select regions) and commercial capitalism in the early to mid-phases of the transition (up to the 1950s) as it held back the development of industrial capitalism. This approach meant strengthening the political position of feudal lords and merchants while weakening the political position of local manufacturers and industrialists. In later phases (after the 1950s), feudalism was gradually destroyed and many of the feudal lords were transformed into merchants and some into industrial capitalists (their land was exchanged for public factories). The merchants were also transformed into various factions of the dependent bourgeoisie but only a small number became industrialists. For a long time, the external forces blocked the development of industrial capitalism in Iran, and when in the 1960s they allowed for its limited development, they managed to ‘disarticulate’ Iran’s industrialization by firmly linking it to their own industrial needs. For example, the West did not wish Iran to build a steel mill plant (or any major industries producing capital goods) while it helped Iran build assembly plants producing consumer goods (the so-called import-substitution industrialization). As oil became a growing source of foreign exchange towards the later phases of the transition, assembly production of consumer durables expanded while productive capacities for capital goods production or non-oil exports (export-promotion industrialization) remained minimal. Given this imperial policy, which was carried in alliance with the internal reactionary forces, it is no wonder that the Iranian economy became underdeveloped and dependent.

EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS

251

Despite the needs of the imperial powers for domestic alliances, their rivalry made it often difficult for them to honour the particular form of alliances they had established with various factions of the internal reactionary forces. A particular class or class fraction, and at times the entire country, had to be often sacrificed after a compromise had been reached among the rival imperial powers. The territorial dismembering of Iran by Russia in the nineteenth century is a case in point when Britain and France pulled back support for Iran after they had settled disputes with Russia. Even when the contradictions among the external forces were acute and antagonistic, they often preferred to abuse Iran rather than fight among themselves. On occasions when such a diversion was not possible and they had to fight wars in Iran’s vicinity, they did not mind dragging Iran into the conflict as well. Indeed, a neutral Iran became a war theatre for the First World War and the Second World War, and it sustained colossal human and material losses during the wars. The external forces also had enemies in Iran. These were the masses of the toiling people and their nationalist and socialist allies. The contradictions between these forces and the external forces and their internal allies remained a major source of instability in the transitional period. These contradictions on many occasions became antagonistic and were expressed in open political and ideological struggles that often ended in the defeat of the nationalist and progressive forces. It is these defeats and the subsequent policies pursued by the state and its external allies as well as the other anti-development or even destructive practices of the foreign powers and traders that made Iran an underdeveloped and dependent peripheral capitalist country within the world capitalist economy. Only after the oil revenue significantly increased in the last phases of the transition to capitalism that Iran became a developing and dependent semi-peripheral capitalist economy. It is worth noting that while imperialism was essentially a regressive force in Iran, it also played a ‘progressive’ role as it was the source of democratic ideas and awakened Iranians to their dire plight. Last but not least are the specificities associated with the presence and the role of socialism during the transition in Iran. Socialist ideology (Bolshevism in particular) became a source of inspiration for young Iranian revolutionaries towards the latter phases of the manufacturing period. Yet its role in combating the religious ideology of feudalism, the liberal ideology of the bourgeoisie and the nationalist ideology of patriotic Iranians in the transitional period was by no means insignificant. Socialism idealized and politicized Iranian nascent intelligentsia and contributed to the people’s

252

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

awakening, thus preparing the ideological and organizational basis for fiercer anti-imperialist struggles in Iran. Socialist forces also participated in the political and economic struggles of the Iranian masses. Because all these struggles were defeated, socialist forces were never in a position to economically or politically affect the transition to any significant degree. The meagre economic effects of socialism were mixed and indirect, and they only materialized towards the very end of the manufacturing period. On the one hand, trade relations between the socialist nations and Iranian government enlarged the public sector of the economy and accelerated the rate of capital accumulation. This was largely a positive development for an economy in transition. On the other hand, these trade relations strengthened the state and legitimized its campaign against the indigenous progressive forces; socialism, as an international ideology, was indeed anti-nationalist and contrary to individual freedom. This strengthening of the state and weakening of the nationalism and individualism was largely a negative development for a political system in transition. However, the most negative effect of socialism had to do with the fact that Iran was located next to the first socialist nation. Under the pretext of the ‘Soviet threat’, the Western powers intensified their anti-democratic efforts in Iran, preparing the basis for the failure of the anti-absolutist and anti-imperialist struggles. Therefore, while socialism accelerated the destruction of feudalism in Iran, it also weakened Iranian nationalism and nascent liberalism, thus contributing to the nation’s dependent and dictatorial development within the capitalist world economy. From the foregoing analysis and the case study, it may be argued that underdevelopment and dependency relations are historically produced outcomes of a particular form of exploitative interaction between the internal and external forces during that historically specific transitional period. They are outcomes of relations within a given political economy and between a militarily, politically, ideologically and economically dominant nation and a nation whose entire social life is dominated. In Iran, underdevelopment, dependency and dictatorship have been the outcomes of the transition from pseudo-feudalism to proto-capitalism precisely because the country’s natural course of advancements in agriculture, commerce and industry (in that order) was altered by the colonial-imperial powers and the feudal state after they defeated the progressive forces fighting for a more productive and democratic capitalism. Specifically, under the dependency situation, the economic growth or development of the dominated country is conditioned upon the growth and

EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS

253

development of the dominant country (a colonial or imperial power). A change in the economic position of the dominant country may delay or accelerate the economic position of the dominated country depending on the specific circumstances. That is why dependency includes the concept of ‘underdevelopment’ but is not equivalent to it. Thus, a dependent country may well be an economically developed and politically democratic society. While a dominant economy may trickle down a ‘spread effect’ (positive impact) to the dominated economy, it is often the ‘backwash effect’ (the negative impact) that is transmitted. The important point to recognize is that no matter how economically and politically developed a particular country may be, it nevertheless remains dependent insofar as it is dominated by a colonial or an imperial power and its well-being is, in the final analysis, conditioned by circumstances outside its domain and control. It must be noted that dependency relations are not necessarily unidirectional as at time asymmetrical interdependencies can also develop. These relations of domination and dependency are not imposed overnight. In the case of Iran, they were the product of a long history. However, they could not have taken root had the internal forces of reaction not facilitated the process. The alliance of the internal reaction and the external forces on the basis of their shared interests was the fundamental condition for the formation of dependency relations, underdevelopment and dictatorship. The alliance made the defeat of the progressive forces possible. Each defeat, in turn, was a step towards further dependency, underdevelopment and dictatorship. It is in this sense that dependency relations are historically produced, reproduced, developed and maintained. These relations arose from the transition period during which the effective intervention of the external forces began. After they were produced, they underwent constant change and were reproduced through various mechanisms. These mechanisms of domination and dependency (as distinct from the forms of domination) have also been historically and geographically conditioned. It is for this reason that the socioeconomic, political and ideological contents of various dependency relations across nations have differed radically. In summary, the political economy framework has helped this study to underscore the indissoluble unity of the general and the specific levels of analysis, and to direct attention to the unity of theory and practice. In particular, the general levels of analysis are basically theoretical, whereas the specific level of analysis deals with historical practices. In this way, the methodology also articulates the unity of the transition process by allowing for an investigation and explication of dependency, underdevelopment and

254

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

dictatorship (as opposed to absolutism) as inseparable elements of a single transformation. The political economy approach also helps establish the links between external and internal forces and the fact that they united to obstruct development and democratic change. At the general level of analysis, the theoretical basis for the exposition of the transition at the practical level is laid down. Yet underdevelopment, dependency and dictatorship are inseparable from this applied level since they are the product of the practices of the internal and external forces as well as their interactions.

ENDNOTES

Chapter 1 Introduction 1

2 3 4 5 6 7

As examples of travel accounts on Iran, see James Fraser (a British spy), A Journey through Persia; A Second Journey through Persia; Narrative of a Journey to Khorassan; Travels and Adventures in the Persian Provinces on the Southern Banks of the Caspian Sea; and Historical and Descriptive Account of Persia. Also see Prince Alexis Soltykoff, Mosafarat Beh Iran (Travel to Iran), Persian translation by Mohsen Saba; C.A. De Bode, Travels in Luristan and Arabistan; R. Binning, A Journal of Two Years’ Travel in Persia, 2 Vols; C.M. MacGregor, Narrative of a Journey Through the Persian Province of Khorassan, 2 Vols; W. Brittlebank, Persia During the Famine; de Morgan, Safar Nameh-e de Morqan (Travel Accounts of de Morgan), Persian translation by G. Qa’emmaqami; A.V.W. Jackson, Persia: Past and Present; and S.K. Nweeya, Persia, the Land of the Magi. Also consult the works of Malcolm, Markham, Rawlinson, Sykes, Browne, Curzon, Shuster, Kinneir and Lorimer cited in the bibliography. See, e.g., C. Issawi, The Economic History of Iran, pp. 17–19. K. Marx, Capital, pp. 305–17. Also see A. Brewer, A Guide to Marx’s Capital, for a simple explanation of these periods. Ibid., pp. 318–47. Ibid., p. 359. For a representation of this view, see Homa Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran, pp. 27–71; quotes from pp. 46 and 58. This is the ‘standard’ position of the left forces in Iran. For examples, see the works of B. Jazani, M. Saudagar, E. Tabari, and B. Mo’meni, cited in the bibliography.

Chapter 2 Pre-capitalist Social Formations 1 2 3

A. Vali, Pre-Capitalist Iran: A Theoretical History, p. 228. See S.A. Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam; and S.A. Arjomand (ed.), Authority and Political Culture in Shi’ism. A. Bausani, The Persians, p. 139.

256 4 5 6

7

8 9 10 11 12

13

14 15 16 17 18 19 20

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

N.V. Pigoulevskaya, et al., Tarikh. Vol. 2, p. 507. For the opposite view, see R. Savory, ‘Notes on the Safavid State’, p. 97, and ‘The Safavid State and Policy’, p. 180. See V. Minorsky (translator and commentator), Tadhkirat Al-Muluk, p. 21. Chardin reports that the condition of peasants around Esfahan was far better than those in France. It must be remembered that Chardin’s observation was made after Shah Abbas I’s reforms. Moreover, the peasants around Esfahan, the capital, were not representative of peasants in Iran. See Minorsky, Tadhkirat, p. 23. For example, according to the treaty of 1612, Iran was to regain its western silkgrowing territories in exchange for the payment of 59,000 kilogrammes per year of raw silk to the Ottoman Empire. See N.V. Pigoulevskaya, et al., Tarikh, Vol. 2, p. 547. Ibid., p. 638. Sykes, A History of Persia, Vol. 2, p. 192. This is why the Armenian merchants of Julfa (near Esfahan) were so rich and powerful. Some of them had acquired as much as about 60,000–200,000 toumans of wealth. Pigoulevskaya, et al., Tarikh, Vol. 2, p. 577. The yearly production of raw silk during the reign of Shah Abbas I was about 2,750 tons of which about 125 tons was used in Iran and the rest was exported. See ibid., pp. 567–68. The army was modernized by the technical assistance from two English brothers, Antony and Robert Sherly (1598). The permanent standing army was formed for the first time. The size of the army is estimated between 90 and 120,000 strong men. See V. Minorsky, Tadhkirat, pp. 30–36 for details. See J.R. Perry, ‘Forced Migration in Iran During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, pp. 205–8. This same policy was also followed by Nader Shah. Esfahan, which in the sixteenth century had about 80,000 people, is reported to have had about 600,000 people by the seventeenth century. See N.V. Pigoulevskaya, et al., Tarikh, Vol. 2, p. 554. The shortage of labour was due to the mass flight of the peasants to neighbouring states – India in particular – in reaction to the rapacious tax system. It must also be remembered that in the previous periods, the Iranian peasants had been either massacred or died of starvation. V. Minorsky, Tadhkirat, pp. 14, 21. Some of the taxes had increased five-fold. Pigoulevskaya, et al., Tarikh, Vol. 2, p. 542. N.V. Pigoulevskaya, et al., Tarikh, Vol. 2, pp. 607–8. For example, the revenue of Bandar Abbas customs under Shah Abbas I was about 2,444 toumans per year, while by the end of the seventeenth century it was about 910–1,100 toumans. Ibid., p. 610. On all the above developments, see L.Z. Ashrafian and M.R. Arownova, Daulat-e Nader Shah [Nader Shah’s Government], chs 3 and 4. Ibid., p. 640. The city of Khoi which previously paid about 3,000 toumans per year now had to pay 100,000 toumans. On this great revolution, see M. Paiandeh, Qiam-e Qarib Shah-e Gilani (Rebellion of Qarib Shah-e Gilani).

ENDNOTES

257

Chapter 3 Population, Urbanization and Infrastructure 1

2 3

4 5

6

7

8 9 10 11 12

The periods of decline were approximately: 1840–67 (see Table 3.1); 1871–3, the famine years (not shown in Table 3.1); 1884–8 (see Table 3.1) and 1891–7 (see Table 3.1). The periods of recovery were approximately: 1868–71 (implicit in Table 3.1), 1874–84 (implicit in Table 3.1), 1889–92 (see Table 3.1) and after 1898–1900 (see Table 3.1). As an example of views on the declining population of Iran, particularly for the later years of the period under investigation, see League of Nations, Commission of Inquiry into the Production of Opium in Persia, p. 34. See Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, Vol. 2, p. 493; C. Issawi, The Economic History of Iran: 1800–1914, p.33; and J. Bharier, Economic Development in Iran: 1900–1970., pp. 3–4. Schindler’s estimate extended to 1884, Curzon’s to 1891, Bharier’s to 1900 and Sobotsinskii’s to 1913. C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 20. H. Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran 1926–1979, pp. 29–30. Aside from cholera, Katouzian also mentions territorial losses in the early years of the nineteenth century as another factor responsible for the population decline in the first half of the century. These territorial losses, mainly to Russia, cost Iran, besides the fertile lands of the Caucasian provinces, about one million lives. By taking 1812 as the first year and 1884 as the last year of the first period for calculating the period’s average annual rate of growth I have, to some extent, eliminated the cyclical influences upon population change. The population estimate given for 1812 does not include the population of the territories lost to Russia under the Treaty of Golestan, though the treaty was signed in 1813 and the population estimate for the year 1884 takes into account a series of cholera outbreaks that ravaged Iran between the mid-1830s and the mid-1860s. In this way I have arrived at a more accurate estimate of secular population changes for the period. View expressed by Dr J.E. Polak (a physician living in Iran for a long time) in his ‘Report on Persia’ in 1873, quoted in Curzon, Persia, Vol. 2, p. 492. On the effect of the government oppression on population decline in Iran, see Malcolm, The History of Persia, Vol. 2, p. 372. H. Busse, History of Persia Under Qajar Rule, a translation of H. Fasai’s Farsnama-ye Naseri, p. 135. V. Chirol, The Middle Eastern Question, p. 97. See D. Behnam, Consequences Economiques de la Croissance Demographique, ch. 3. The 1836 plague in the Khorasan region was the main reason for the postponement of the conquest of Herat at that time. See H. Busse, History of Persia, p. 251. Quoted in Issawi, The Economic History, p. 22. Also consult W. Brittlebank, Persia During the Famine. F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Ejtema´i Va Siasi Va Eqtesadi Dar Asar-e Montasher Nashodeh-e Dauran-e Qajar (The Social and Political and Economic Thoughts in the Unpublished Works of the Qajar Period), p. 241.

258 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

21 22 23 24 25 26 27

28 29 30

31 32 33 34 35

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Issawi, The Economic History, p. 21. Quoted in Issawi, The Economic History, p. 21. See here for statistics on the number of deaths in Gilan, Khorasan and Tehran. P. Sykes, A History of Persia, Vol. 2. p. 512. See also pp. 487 and 515. J. M. Balfour, Recent Happenings in Persia, p. 23. See also Issawi, The Economic History, p. 373. J. Shahri, Tehran-e Qadim (The Old Tehran), pp. 75–6. ‘Persian Gulf’, UK Parliament, Accounts and Papers, 1873–8, 1880, p. 73. See L.I. Miroshnikov, Iran in the First World War, and also P. Sykes, A History of Persia, Vol. 2, pp. 487, 515. On price increases, see J. Shahri, Tehran-e Qadim, pp. 75–6. J. Shahri, Tehran-e Qadim, pp. 75–6. In the ‘hunger revolt’ of winter 1866–7, the poor inhabitants of Shiraz cried, ‘Hossam os-Saltana [the governor of the Fars province] is the cause of the high prices of bread ... He must leave the town.’ See H. Busse, History of Persia, p. 357. F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Eitema`i, p. 295. Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 2, p. 496. T.E.G. Gordon, Persia Revisited, p. 9. Z.Z. Abdullaev, Promyshlennost, pp. 183–92. Ibid. See also P. Sykes, A History of Persia, Vol. 2, p. 392. Z.Z. Abdullaev, Promyshlennost, pp. 183–92; C. Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 50–2. The term ‘ashaier’ denoting transhumant pastoralists is used interchangeably with the term ‘il’, the latter referring to ashaieri confederacies under an often hereditary leadership of ilkhani or khan, usually along sub-ethnic lines. Ils have played important political and military role in Iran. Issawi, on the basis of Thomson’s figures, suggests a very low level of urbanization in the first half of the nineteenth century. See C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 26. See C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 34. There were about 78 of them in 1900. See J. Bharier, ‘The Growth of Towns’, p. 336. C. Issawi, The Economic, pp. 26–7. There had occurred occasional upsurges in the urbanization of particular cities (e.g. Tabriz which became a ‘great emporia’ in the 1840s–1860s) due mainly to a shift in the foreign trade routes. I have tried not to dwell on these sources of cyclical urban fluctuations. See also C. Issawi, ‘Urbanization and Economic Development’, in Ira Lapidus (ed.), Middle Eastern Cities. See Abbott, ‘Report on Trade for 1841’, 31 December 1841, UK Public Record Office, Foreign Office Series, 60/92. C. Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 100, 110. See P. Sykes, Persia, Vol. 2, p. 533, and C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 153. An abstract of the concessions are given in C.R. Markham, History of Persia, pp. 542–3. Ibid.

ENDNOTES

36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

259

T. Ricks, ‘Background to the Iranian Revolution’, p. 19. P. Avery, Modern Iran, p. 84. Also quoted in T. Ricks, ‘Background’, pp. 19–20. T. Ricks, ‘Background’, p. 19. For an excellent account of the Reuter and Falkenhagen Concessions and the Anglo-Russia rivalry see F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, ch. 2. C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 156; on railways, see also Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, pp. 613–39. B.G. Marton, German-Persian Diplomatic Relations, pp. 179–97. xlii. C. Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 200–2. C. Jazairi, La crise economique mondiale et ses repercussions en Iran, p. 121. Hon. G.N. Curzon, ‘The Karun River and the Commercial Geography of Southwest Persia’, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society, NS 12, 1890, p. 527. G. Curzon, ‘The Karun River and the Commercial Geography of Southern Persia’, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society. NS 12, 1890, p. 527.

Chapter 4 Economic Forces and Transformations 1

2

3

4 5

6 7

I am not arguing that quantitative growth, particularly an increase in the size of the population, is by itself a sign of socioeconomic progress. It must also be kept in mind that I am primarily concerned with the transitional economy. Moreover, I myself do not know of any developed nation whose population did not, in absolute terms, increase in the course of its development. See C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 211. See also H. Katouzian, The Political Economy, pp. 43–4. According to Katouzian, the increased land taxes may have been the consequence of higher tax rates towards the end of the century: p. 33. Yet, his own estimates of the agricultural output show a steady increase at least until about 1890. It may well be possible that a part of the increase in the output of agriculture was due to improved productivity. J. Bharier, Economic, pp. 13 and 151. Three hundred thousand krans royalty drawn from turquoise mines constituted about 40 per cent of government’s total revenue from leases, rents and royalties of about 15 thousand pounds sterling in 1900. See Sir A. Houtum-Schindler, ‘Persia,’ pp. 621–2. On the methods of mining, see H.E. Wulff, The Traditional Crafts of Persia, pp. 14–18. For Abbott’s report, see C. Issawi, p. 283. Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 2, p. 513. See also C. Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 282–4. See F. Adamiyat, Amir Kabir va Iran, pp. 227–30. In 1925, besides many ‘primitive devices’, at least one ‘modern water-raising contrivance’ was observed: ‘a crude-oil pump which raised the waters of the Karoun to irrigate an area of several thousand hectares’. See League of Nations, Production of Opium in Persia, p. 22. H. Busse, History of Persia, p. 278. ‘Boxwood’, wrote Issawi, ‘had been exported to Russia and England (through Russia) as at least as early as the 1870s, and shipments to England alone were worth about 30,000 sterlings.’ C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 212.

260 8

9 10 11 12

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

24 25 26 27

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

See C. Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 255–6, 361, who quotes several authors. See also F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914, p. 207. In 1910, because of the abusive practices of Liazonov, ‘the Persians organized a boycott of Liazonov’s enterprise’, but failed to change anything. Ibid., p. 569. ‘Report on Bushire,’ UK Parliament, Accounts and Papers, 1880, 73, p. 55. See also J. Malcolm, History of Persia, Vol. 2, p. 379. J. Bharier, Economic, p. 94. A.C. Millspaugh, The Financial and Economic Situation of Persia, p. 36. The cheaper the raw materials, the smaller the share of constant capital, the greater the rate of profit. If P is made to represent the rate of profit, S the surplus value, C the constant capital, and V the variable capital, then P ¼ S/CþV. The smaller the value of C, assuming V and S constant (or S increases and V decreases) the greater is the value of P. Consult K. Marx, Capital, Vol. III, pp. 105–14. Regarding the purchase of the commodities from the Iranian peasantry, the imperialist forces were facing difficulties in so far as the exchange relations had not yet firmly developed. Thus, the introduction of market relations became an essential task and objective of the imperialist forces in Iran, particularly in the early years of the nineteenth century. See the chapter on imperialism in this book for detail. C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 258. Mirza Abul Hassan Khan to Castlereagh, 9 January 1820, and Ouseley to Planta, 23 November 1829, UK Public Record Office, Foreign Office Series, 60/19. N.A. Kuznetsova, ‘Materially’, in C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 286. F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Ejtema´i, p. 270, and C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 267. Manouchehr Setoudeh (ed.), Joqrafia-ve Esfahan (Esfahan’s Geography), pp. 103–4. F. Abdullaev, Gousheh-i Az Tarikh-e Iran (A Part of Iranian History), p. 180. The Reports of the Select Committee Appointed by the Court of Directors, pp. 113–20, in C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 88. See also C. Markham, History of Persia, p. 366. For the early 1800s, see J. Malcolm, History of Persia. Vol. 2, p. 380. A. de Gobineau, Trois Ans en Asie, pp. 400–4. See F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Ejtema´i, pp. 242–3. Manouchehr Setoudeh, Joqrafia-ve Esfahan, pp. 100–5, in C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 281. See F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Ejtema´i, p. 294. See pp. 138–9 for the case of a crystal trader who accumulated some money and founded a ‘glass factory’ and a ‘crystal workshop’ and began producing ‘water pipes and tumblers and saucers and plates and sugar-bowls’, but because the qualities of the products, compared to foreign competition, were not good went bankrupt for ‘500,000’ toumans. Ibid., p. 270. See C. Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 135–6. Z.Z. Abdullaev, Promyshlennost, pp. 116–0, in C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 298. Ibid.

ENDNOTES

28 29

30 31 32

33 34 35 36

37 38 39

40 41 42

261

Kerman City, where carpet-making became ‘the single major activity ... had the best wool in Persia and trained craftsmen (ex-shawl weavers) to weave carpets’. Ibid., p. 29. This change in the policy of imperialism was due to the changes in its production structure, the new world monetary situation, and the necessity of introducing some sort of change in the production structure of the undeveloped nations due to a host of internal problems. See A.O. Hirschman, A Bias for Hope, pp. 85–123. Report by Consul-General Jones, ‘Tabriz’, UK Parliament, Accounts and Papers, 1873, pp. 364–71. The Reports of the Selected Committee Appointed by the Court of Directors, pp. 113–20. Examples of arbitrary practices of the state include the case of a samovar maker encouraged by Amir Kabir to set up a workshop. He was blinded because he did not repay the borrowed money immediately after Amir was deposed. See F. Adamiyat, Amir Kabir, pp. 22–3. On the enslavement of skilled labourers by feudal lords and the state, see C. Meredith, ‘Early Qajar Administration: An Analysis of Its Development and Function’, p. 73. Amin ol-Zarb, the biggest industrialistcum-banker-cum-merchant of Iran was frequently ransomed by the shah. See C. Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 47–8. See also J. Malcolm, History of Persia, Vol. 2, p. 378: ‘If an individual exhibits superior skill as a manufacturer, his labor is liable to be seized by the monarch, or by the provincial despot.’ Z.Z. Abdullaev, Promyshlennost, pp. 37–40, C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 45. Habl ol-Matin. Calcutta, 18 May 1906. Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, pp. 167–8. As early as 1849, some of the Iranian merchants with international dealings had specialized as is evident from the following quotation: ‘Persian houses of Constantinople and Tabriz deal exclusively in cotton textiles.’ R. Godel, in C. Issawi, The Economic, p. 101. Z.Z. Abdullaev, Promyshlennost, pp. 39–42, in C. Issawi, pp. 47–8. Ibid., pp. 39–41, in C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 46. Similarly, ‘the trading house of Toumaniants, along with import and export business and farming, was engaged in large banking operations’. Ibid., pp. 41–7, in C. Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 43–6. In 1900, Sykes studied a village which was owned by a merchant. P. Sykes, A History. Vol. 2, pp. 388–90. J. Bharier, Economic, p. 171. Rouh ol-Qodos, 6 November 1907. P. Sykes, A History of Persia, Vol. 2, p. 484. To give an example of robbery by state officials, Sykes wrote as late as 1917 that the governor-general of Esfahan was in league with the robbers in the neighbourhood. He made a double profit by letting out the various routes to them in return for a daily payment, and by taking a percentage on the sale of the looted goods!’ Ibid., p. 519. General Sykes himself was an agent of British imperialism which sucked ‘the lifeblood of Persia’ no less than its ruling classes. It is, therefore, ironic for him to write that ‘the Persian grandees, who are the governing class are not only merciless in their exactions but care little for the welfare of their country’, while at the same time remaining completely silent

262

43

44

45 46 47 48 49 50

51 52 53 54

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

about the oppression suffered by the Iranians at the hands of the British ruling classes – himself included. Ibid., p. 384. See the 1872 degree of Mirza Hosein Khan Sepahsalar, the grand vizier, in H. Busse, History of Persia, pp. 375–6. On the corrupt character of the Iranian ruling classes during the period, there is, e.g. the case of Ain od-Dauleh, the prime minister between 1903 and 1906, who sold the office of the foreign ministry for 80,000 toumans. See E. Ra´in, Faramoushkhaneh. Vol. 1, pp. 450–1. The same person had arranged to forcefully receive about 1,000 toumans per day as a ‘gift’ from the butchers and bakers of Tehran. See E. Ra´in, ibid., Vol. 2, p. 243. Another vizier, as early as 1809, was made to pay 150,000 toumans to the king as compensation for large-scale corruption (a case of confiscation). He paid it out of his personal fortune. See H. Busse, History of Persia, p. 132. On the effect of oppression on agriculture and the peasantry, see N.R. Keddie, Historical Obstacles, pp. 4–5, and ‘Report on Bushire,’ UK Parliament, Accounts and Papers, 1880, pp. 250–5. N. Keddie, Historical Obstacles, p. 6; A. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant, pp. 176–7, 143; and A. Bausani, p. 176. Toyoul-holders (assignees of land revenues) were among the most oppressive of the landlords. ‘Everything in Persia depends on whether a village is brought into direct intercourse with the government or not. In the retired valleys, where grasping khans do not penetrate, fertility and contentment reign, but if the shah or the governor of a province cannot pay inferior officers they give them a village or villages [as tuyul] to do their worst with and woe to the village thus given – nobody therein call anything his own.’ See J.T. Bent ‘Village Life in Persia’, p. 366. H. Keddie, Historical Obstacles, p. 4. P. Sykes, Report on the Agriculture of Khorasan. Aftabneshins are also called Khoshneshins. See E.J. Hooglund, ‘The Khushnishins in the Population of Iran’, pp. 229–45. P. Sykes, Report on the Agriculture of Khorasan. ‘Report on Bushire’, UK Parliament, Accounts and Papers, 1880, 73, pp. 250–5. Ibid. Ibid. To get some sense of the extent of oppression, it is interesting to note that the price of land requiring 2,000 pounds of grain seed was about ‘100 to 600 krans’ in the same region (Kazeroun) and the moveable property of a bat did not exceed 250 krans, including 50 krans work of implements and 200 krans of furniture. Moreover, the annual expenses of a ra`iyat cultivator with a wife and two children in the same region was about 100 krans. Ibid. Ibid. In the case of water, ‘the water owner’, if he is a ra`iyat ‘pays three-fifths of his share to government’; if a non-ra`iyat, ‘he pays only half’. Z.Z. Abdullaev, Promyshlennost p. 22, C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 210. ‘Report on Bushire,’ UK Parliament, Accounts and Papers, 1880, 73, pp. 254–5. Subsequently, I will use the term ra`iyat to mean the landless ra`iyat; already towards the end of the nineteenth century almost all ra`iyats were landless and the term in its new meaning was socially accepted. As for landowners, they could be feudal lords (arbab) holding private lands (molk), the state holding crown lands (khaleseh) and state lands (divani), the toyoul-holder holding toyoul lands (conditional assignment

ENDNOTES

55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

71 72

73

74 75 76 77

263

of land revenue), or the religious authorities or institutions holding religious endowments (vaqf) or private (molk) lands. Soyorqal lands were insignificant. See Chapter 2 for definitions and explanations. A.I. Demin, Selskoe, pp. 44–50, in C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 223. A.I. Demin, Selskoe, pp. 44–50, in C. Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 221–2. K.E. Abbott, ‘Report on Journey to Caspian’, 29 June 1844, UK Public Record Office, Foreign Office Series 60/328. Abbott to Thomson, 5 April 1870, UK Public Records Office, Foreign Office Series 60/328. F. Lafont and H.L. Rabino, L’industrie Sericole en Perse, pp. 28–30. Importers themselves borrowed the money from ‘the banks which charge[d] a fairly high rate of interest’. Ibid. F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Ejtema´i, pp. 214–5. F. Lafont and H.L. Rabino, L’industrie, pp. 28–30. Ibid., p. 44. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 28–30. See N. Keddie, Historical Obstacles. P. Sykes, Vol. 2, p. 540, and the preceding pages. H. Busse, History of Persia, p. 376. See, e.g. K. Afshin, Naft Va Khouzestan (Oil and Khouzestan). H.A. Ruznetsova, ‘Materially’, in C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 285. There were also two categories of unfree handicraftsmen: (1) those who were attached to the court of the shah or the house of a khan, receiving subsistence in return for labour he rendered; and (2) those who were employed by the military workshops or arsenals and had also to render forced labour for public projects. They were not free but if they rendered labour they would have been paid in cash or in kind. Ibid., C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 289. In the 1850s Gobineau also wrote that the handicraftsmen worked for the merchants. See A. de Gobineau, Trois Ans en Asie, pp. 392–404. Ibid., C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 289. As early as 1833, J. Fraser had written about ‘the high rate of wages’ and from 1840 on how wage rates for skilled and unskilled labourers had been established. See J. Fraser, Historical and Descriptive, p. 204. Z.Z. Abdullaev, Promyshlennost, pp. 115–22. Abdullaev is considering the case of carpet manufacturing. This was true about other production processes as well, e.g. leather production and opium workshops. See, e.g. L.A. Sobotsinskii, Persiya, pp. 228–9. H. W. Maclean, ‘Report’, UK Parliament, Accounts and Papers, 1904, 95. See also Z.Z. Abdullaev, Promyshlennost, pp. 115–22, and V.S. Glukhoded, Problemy, p. 41. H.W. Maclean, ‘Report,’ p. 95. Ibid. L.A. Sobotsinskii, Persiya, pp. 228–9, C. Issawi, The Economic, p. 259.

264 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89

90 91 92 93 94 95 96

97 98 99 100 101 102 103

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Z.Z. Abdullaev, Promyshlennost, pp. 115–22, C. Issawi, The Economic, p. 298. A. De Gobineau, Trois, pp. 392–404. In 1845 a Haji is said to have had ‘a fortune of about seven crores’. See E. Ashtiani, Mirza Taqi Khan-e Amir Kabir, p. 195. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Z.Z. Abdullaev, Promyshlennost, pp. 32–42, in C. Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 42–6. M. Atrpet, Mamed-Ali-Shakh, p. 141. H. Busse, History of Persia, p. 132. Quoted in E. Ra´in. Faramoushkhaneh, Vol. I, pp. 448–9. The money actually paid out was 80,000 toumans. Ibid., pp. 450–1. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 243. For other examples of similar type see ibid., p. 68, and H. Busse, History of Persia, p. 195. E. Ashtiani, Mirza Taqi Khan-e Amir Kabir, p. 193. A. Lambton, Landlord, p. 209. According to Lambton, this concentration was due to the fact that ‘in the course of time the function of the provincial governor, the provincial military commander, the tax collector, the tax farmer, and the man to whom the land assignment was made tended to be combined in one person. This led to the emergence of large landed properties, virtually independent of the central government.’ See A. Lambton, ‘Rural Development and Land Reform in Iran’, Symposium on Rural Development, pp. 112–15. While this is true, it is not the whole story. M. Atrpet, Mamed-Ali-Shakh, p. 141. Z.Z. Abdullaev, Promyshlennost, pp. 32–34, in C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 43. D. Wilber, Iran, p. 69. P. Sykes, A History of Persia, Vol. 2, p. 433. K.E. Abbott, ‘Report on Journey to Caspian’, 29 June 1844, in UK Public Record Office, Foreign Office Series 60/108. F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Ejtema´i, p. 248. C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 208, on ‘compulsory purchase’ and ‘confiscation’ see J. Bharier, Economic, p. 11, and on ‘confiscation or annexation in times of famine by decrees’ see A. Bausani, The Persians, p. 174. See also A. Lambton, Landlord, pp. 153–4, for more detail. C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 221, A. Lambton, Landlords, pp. 154–5, N. Keddie, Historical Obstacles, p. 6. E. Ra´in, Anjomanha-ye Serri, p. 24. A. Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashrouteh, 1, pp. 52, 148. ‘Report on Bushire,’ UK Parliament, Accounts and Papers, 1880, 73, pp. 250–5. See also F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Ejtema´i. p. 383. Quoted in C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 210. Z.Z. Abdullaev, Promyshlennost, pp. 32–3, in C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 43. M. Atrpet Mamed-Ali-Shakh, pp. 138–40.

ENDNOTES

104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124

125 126 127 128

129

265

N. Keddie, Historical Obstacles, pp. 5–7. Ibid., p. 5. J. Bharier, Economic, pp. 34–5. Ibid., p. 171. Ibid. Z.Z. Abdullaev, Promyshlennost, pp. 116–20, in C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 298. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 125–60, in C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 261. J. Bharier, Economic, p. 171. The First World War brought ‘windfall gains’ for the wealthy, but was disastrous for the country and the lower classes. Z.Z. Abdullaev, Promyshlennost, pp. 183–92, in C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 49. Ibid., in C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 50. A. Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashrouteh, 1, pp. 336, 355; H. Busse, History of Persia, pp. 171, 356–7, 236–7; E.G. Browne, Persian Revolution, p. 118; J. Shahri, Tehran, pp. 9–10. T.E. Gordon, Persia Revisited, p. 9. Z.Z. Abdullaev, Promyshlennost, pp. 183–92, in C. Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 50–2. Ibid. P. Sykes, A History of Persia, Vol. 2, p. 392. A. Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashrouteh, Vol. l, p. 193. Z.Z. Abdullaev, Promyshlennost, pp. 183-192, in C. Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 51–2. Ibid. A. de Gobineau, Trois, pp. 392–404. H. Katouzian, The Political Economy, p. 34. For my discussion on the currency I am greatly indebted to H. Katouzian who generously allowed me to quote him when needed. On the currency question, see also S. Bakhash, Iran, pp. 270–2, and Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, pp. 471–3, 511–13. Data from H. Katouzian, The Political Economy, p. 34. Ibid. Souchart to Freycient, France, Ministere des Affairs Etrangeres, Correspondence Commerciale, Tehran, Vol. 3, 14 July1885. See also F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Ejtema´i, pp. 282–79. See also S. Bakhash, Iran, pp. 272, 280. H. Katouzian, The Political Economy, pp. 34–7. According to Katouzian, the price of silver between 1848 and 1867 was rising relative to gold due to American and Australian gold flooding the world market. Thereafter, after a relative price was established at 1:16 in 1867 the price of silver began to decline due to its increased production. By the end of the century the decline amounted to about 100 per cent. C. Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 130–2.

266 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155

156

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

P. Sykes, A History of Persia, Vol. 2, p. 477. See also S. Bakhash, Iran, pp. 270–9. J. Rabino, ‘Banking in Persia’. See also F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Ejtema´i, pp. 279–82. F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Ejtema´i, pp. 279–82. J. Bharier, Economic, p. 18. J. Fraser, Historical, p. 204. See also J. Malcolm, History of Persia, Vol. 2, p. 372. C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 341. E.B. Eastwick, 4 April 1861, in C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 342. H. Busse, History of Persia, p. 356. Ibid., p. 376. ‘Rasht’, UK Parliament, Accounts and Papers, 1898, 97. ‘Tabriz’, ibid., 1897, p. 92. E. Lorini, La Persia economica, p. 392. M. Jamalzadeh, Gani-e Shaian, p. 185. M. Atrpet, Mamed-Ali-Shakh, pp. 138–40. Z.Z. Abdullaev, Promyshlennost, p. 32, C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 43. See also H. Busse, History of Persia, p. 357. E. Ra`in, Anjomanha-ye, p. 84. Data from H. Katouzian, The Political Economy, p. 33. J. Fraser, Historical, p. 204. ‘Report on the Silk Trade of Ghilan’, 5 May 1842, UK Public Record Office, Foreign Office Series, 60/90. ‘Stevens to Sheil, February 26, 1851, Tabriz’, UK Public Record Office, Foreign Office Series, 60/166. ‘Gilan’, UK Parliament, Accounts and Papers, 1871, 61. ‘Report on Persia’, UK Parliament, Accounts and Papers, 1867–8, 69, pp. 250–5; Markham in 1874 characterized the extent of taxation as ‘cruel oppression’, History of Persia, p. 367. F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Ejtema´i, p. 266. Ibid., p. 97. Quoted in C. Issawi. The Economic History, p. 210. General Sir T.E.G. Gordon, Persia Revisited, p. 31. In 1891 Curzon had also noted that compared to 1848, the country showed a ‘marked advance in many of the resources of civilization, culture, comfort, and security’. Persia, Vol. 1, pp. 406–7. J. Bharier, Economic Development in Iran, p. 7. Yet the backward character of the country can be judged by the fact that in 1900, GNP amounted to about 3–5 billion krans (70 million pounds sterling). For the same years, Bharier gives an average life expectancy of about 30 years and an illiteracy rate of 95 per cent. Ibid., pp. 3, 5, 7, respectively. By 1913, per capita income had risen to about $9.

ENDNOTES

267

Chapter 5 Political System and Public Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6

7 8

9

10 11 12

13

14

J. Malcolm, History of Persia, 2, pp. 303, 306. See also Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, p. 433. Ibid. See also Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, p. 391; and P. Sykes, A History of Persia, Vol. 2, p. 381. Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, pp. 391, 435. Ibid., p. 433. On limits to the monarch’s power, see ibid., pp. 434–6. Quoted in S. Bakhash, Iran, p. 163. I am excluding a discussion of the court, harem, etc. In so far as they affect the general ideas expressed in this book, they are included in the discussions of the king and the courtiers whose socioeconomic, political and ideological roles I have outlined and will further discuss in this and the following chapter. For an example of the costs associated with these institutions, see S. Bakhash, Iran, pp. 262–3. Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. l, p. 391. On madakhel and pishkesh, see ibid., pp. 438–44. Watson had this to say about madakhel: Madakhel ‘signifies all that one can acquire by receiving bribes, by swindling and extortion, and by all other irregular means’. It is madakhel ‘and not salary which every Persian official is anxious to secure. A post which has only a good salary attached to it, and which affords no good opportunities [madakhel] is looked upon by Persians as being but a poor possession’. R.G. Watson, History of Persia, p. 372. ‘In 1894, the Shah pocketed the 110,000 toumans (23,000 pounds sterling) that Nizam os-Saltaneh had paid for the governorship of Fars and then turned around and sold the same governorship to Rokn od-Dowleh, securing a second fee’. See S. Bakhash, Iran, p. 264. Hon. G.N. Curzon. Persia, Vol. l, p. 446. S. Bakhash, Iran, p. 447. Towards the end of his rule, Naser od-Din Shah was earning 100,000 pounds sterling a year from the sale of governorships and 25,000 pounds sterling from the farmer of the mint. His prime minister, Amin os-Soltan, was earning 70–100,000 pounds sterling from the customs, the mint, the sale of offices and other sources. See S. Bakhash, Iran, p. 280. ‘The method of collection’, wrote F. Stolze and F.C. Andreas in their Die Handelsverhaltnisse Persiens in 1885, ‘is as follows. The subgovernors (zabit) have to deliver in installments to their respective superiors on each occasion a higher sum than is entered on the tax-roll (kitabchah). They, in their turn, receive the taxes from the different head of districts (kalantars), and these from the village magistrates; the collector at each stage paying in more than is due’. Quoted in Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, pp. 439–40. Sir Lewis Pelly, Report on the Tribes around the Shores of the Persian Gulf, quoted in Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, p. 443. The insecurity of office further intensified the oppression of the peasants: ‘A governor’ wrote Amin od-Dauleh, ‘who mounts the saddle by paying pishkesh (gift money) and who has no hope of permanence or stability does bis business at the first opportunity. Since he has paid

268

15

16 17 18

19 20 21 22 23

24 25 26 27 28 29 30

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

pishkesh he cannot be called to account for cruelty and oppression.’ In Khaterat. p. 124. See also enclosure in Lascelles to Rosebery, No. 3, Tehran, 13 January 1893, OF 60/542. See E. Ra`in, Anjomanha-ye Serri, pp. 30–6; A. Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashrouteh-e Iran. 1, p. 27; and S. Bakhash, Iran, pp. 262–4. According to Bakhash, ‘to raise money, the Shah [Naser od-Din] sold titles, medals, military rank, and other honors’. He even ‘signed away life pensions’. Ibid., p. 263. On the sale of army rank and promotion, see also ibid., p. 174. High officials were constantly required to make large cash gifts to the cash-needy shah. ‘Many high officials were thus in the curious position of being at once very wealthy and also heavily in debt’. S. Bakhash, Iran, p. 281. Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, p. 449. Ibid., p. 450. On the bureaucracy in the late Qajar period, see A.R. Sheikholeslami, ‘The Patrimonial Structure of Iranian Bureaucracy in the Late Nineteenth Century’, pp. 199–258. F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Eitema`i, p. 271. The same critic went on to complain that ‘one makes 150,000 toumans as salaries a year [through farming practice], has a yearly expenditure of 3 or 4 thousand toumans, and puts the rest in a ‘‘bank or invests in land and or buys light and pot and galloon and furniture [i.e. luxuries]’’. But the other cannot even pay for the expenses of his wife and children’. For this reason, the critic claimed ‘the servant class of Divan sells his salaries for 4,000 and 5,000 and 6,000 [toumans a year] in the beginning of the year’. Ibid. Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, p. 451. See also A. Lambton, ‘Persian Society under Qajar’, p. 134. Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, p. 451. J. Malcolm, History of Persia, Vol. 2, p. 456. Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, p. 425. Lascelles to Rosebery, No. 44 (58), Tehran, 12 February 1894, OF 539/66. For examples of the corrupt practices of Naser od-Din Shah, see S. Bakhash, Iran, pp. 261–2. On the corrupt character of the shah’s oldest son, Zell os-Soltan, see ibid., p. 108. Moshir od-Dauleh, the prime minister from 1871 to 1873, said of Zell os-Soltan that ‘he has excessive love for amassing wealth [and] will leave no one property or goods [if sent to Fars as governor]. The subjects will be rendered destitute and government taxes will not reach the treasury’. Ibid., p. 108. P. Sykes, A History of Persia, Vol. 2, p. 484. K. Marx, ‘The British Rule in India’, in K. Marx and F. Engels, On Colonialism, p. 37. J. Malcolm, History of Persia, Vol. 2, pp. 335–43. Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 2, pp. 470–86. A.C. Millspaugh, The Financial and Economic Situation of Persia 1926, pp. 28–33. Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 2, p. 471. Ibid., pp. 473–4. ‘Nothing can be so welcome to a Persian governor as a street-row, a blood-feud, a murder, or a quarrel within his jurisdiction. Down come his officers on the delinquents and from their pockets out comes the fine’. Ibid.

ENDNOTES

31

32 33

34 35 36 37 38 39

40 41

269

According to Curzon, in 1889 the peasants and ils were paying up to 1 kran per sheep, up to 10 krans per cow and [10] krans per ass. As an example of ‘extortion’ Curzon wrote: ‘Each district and subsection is charged annually with a sum of 25–50 krans for a copy of the Shah’s Diary of His First Journey to Europe [in 1873].’ Likewise, Curzon wrote that ‘similarity, a favourite horse of the shah having died, when he passed through Burujird many years ago, the district was fined in order to provide a substitute; which fine has been collected ever since by the local governor.’ Ibid., p. 473. Ibid., pp. 475–6. Curzon states the following statistics for pishkesh: Year

Estimator

Amounts in fixed prices (toumans)

1800 1809 1870 1888/9

Frasor Malcolm Kinner Curzon

600–720,000 1,200,000 (includes 600,000 extraordinary pishkesh) 943,000 35,800

The decline is due to; (1) depreciation of the Iranian currency; (2) shift to other more effective means of exactions: and (3) the decline of living standards for the peasantry. See ibid., p. 478, and J. Malcolm, History of Persia, Vol. 2, pp. 341–3. S. Bakhash, Iran, pp. 264, 280. Ibid., p. 261. Ibid., p. 262. M.H.K. E´temad os-Saltaneh, Rouznameh-e Khaterat, p. 247. Ibid., p. 555. S. Bakhash, Iran, p. 263. Some statistics may help shed light on the size of the court expenses. Thomson reported the shah’s private expenditures in 1867–8 to be about 500,000 toumans. In 1888–9 Curzon put the figure at 800,000 toumans including allowances to princes of royal houses. For 1910/11 Jaza`eri put the figure at about 674,947 toumans and finally Millspaugh gave a figure of about 384,772 toumans for 1922/3. See Thomson to Alison, ‘Report on Persia,’ UK Parliament, Accounts and Papers. 1867–8, 19; Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 2, p. 483; S. Jaza´eri, Qavanin-e Maliyeh, pp. 65–9, 79–81; and A.C. Millspaugh, The Financial and Economic, p. 32. The percentage share of court expenditures in the total expenditure of the years 1867–8, 1888–9, 1910–11 and 1922–3 was respectively 13.33, 18.94, 4.62 and 1.51 per cent. The extravagance of the court in the 1890s is evident from the large figure for the year 1888–9. S. Bakhash, Iran, p. 269. The army expenditure for 1867–8 is reported at 1,750,000 toumans; for 1888–9 at 1,810,000 toumans; for 1910–11 at 3,732,447 toumans; and for 1922–3 at 9,842,342 toumans. Figure for 1867 from Thomson to Alison, ‘Report on Persia,’ UK Parliament, Accounts and Papers. 1867–8, 19. The figures for 1888–9 from Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 2, p. 482 (includes navy); for 1910–1 from

270

42 43 44 45 46

47 48

49

50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

S. Jaza´eri, Oavanin-e Maliveh. pp. 65–9, 79–81; and for 1922–3 from A.C. Millspaugh, The Financial and Economic, p. 32. S. Bakhash, Iran, p. 276. See also pp. 277–8. Ibid., p. 275. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 279. According to S. Bakhash, the Ministry of Pension distributed a sum of about 500,000 toumans (100,000 pounds sterling) a year among the olama, religious students, private individuals, court favourites and the like. Ibid., p. 278. In 1867–8, Thomson reported 250,000 toumans as ‘pension’ going to ‘priesthood and syed’ while in 1888–9 Curzon’s figures under ‘pensions’ amounted to 1 million toumans, excluding payments to ‘priesthood, clergy’ included in a different figure. In 1922–3 under ‘pensions’, Millspaugh gave a figure 4,569,189 [toumans]. From this scattered data, it appears that, despite the attempts of the constitutionalists in the First Majles (1906) to reduce pensions, they nevertheless increased. See Thomson to Alison, ‘Report on Persia,’ UK Parliament, Accounts and Papers, 1867–8, 19; Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 2, p. 483; and A.C. Millspaugh, The Financial and Economic, p. 33. The percentage share of ‘pensions’ in the total expenditure for the corresponding years, as given in Table 5.4, was as follows: 6.67 per cent (for 1867–8), 23.68 per cent (for 1888–9) and 17.91 per cent (for 1922–3). We cannot neglect to note that from 1888–9 to 1922–3 the share of ‘pension’ in the total expenditure of the state grew tremendously, a major factor contributing to the deficit. Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, p. 391. Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, p. 460. Already in 1848–51 and 1871–3, attempts were made to extend the civil courts and limit the Shar´ courts. These attempts failed due to strong opposition from the olama. See H. Algar, Religion, pp. 130–2, 169–82, and the next chapter. Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, p. 460. A similar attempt had already been made by Amir Kabir, which increased the hostility of the mollas and the measure was abandoned. See H. Algar, Religion, pp. 133–5. See also A. Amanat, Pivot of the Universe. Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, pp. 460–1. Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, pp. 461–2, 281. See A. Amanat, Pivot of the Universe. For the laws promulgated between 1906 and 1909, see E.G. Browne, Persian Revolution, pp. 355–400. See also W.M. Shuster, The Strangling of Persia, pp. 291–312. A. Banani, The Modernization of Iran, p. 69. S. Jaza´eri, Qavanin-e Maliyeh, pp. 79–81, in C. Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 368–70. W.M. Shuster, The Strangling of Persia pp. 310–12. A. Banani, The Modernization of Iran, p. 69. S. Jaza´eri, Oavanin-e Maliyeh, pp. 79–81, in C. Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 368–70.

ENDNOTES

58 59 60 61

62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79

80

81 82

271

A. Banani, The Modernization of Iran, p. 70. J. Malcolm, History of Persia, Vol. 2, p. 355. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 355–60. According to Lambton, ‘The dividing line between’ khans of ils and military officers ‘was not clearly marked; and that between the civil and military officials was also fluid. The provincial governors usually commanded the military forces [of their respective provinces]’. See A. Lambton, ‘Persian Society under the Qajars’, p. 131. Quotes are all taken from ibid., pp. 356–7. Quotes are all taken from ibid., pp. 358–9. See also Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, p. 579. Quotes are all taken from ibid., p. 356. See C. Meredith, ‘Early Qajar Administration: An Analysis of Its Development and Function’, p. 17. S. Bakhash, Iran, p. 99. Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, p. 576. Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, pp. 577–8. See also E. Ashtiani, Mirza Taqi Khan-e Amir Kabir, p. 215. Ibid., pp. 582–3, and E. Ashtiani, Mirza Taqi Khan, pp. 218–19. Ibid., p. 580. J. Piggot, Persia, p. 238. H. Rawlinson, England and Russia in the East, pp. 30–1. S. Bakhash, Iran, p. 99. A. Lambton, ‘Persia: The Breakdown of Society’, p. 453. A.R. Sheikholeslami, ‘The Patrimonial’, p. 216. S. Bakhash, Iran, pp. 99–100. On the dissatisfaction of the shah with the army, see ibid., p. 101. S. Bakhash, Iran, p. 100. Ibid., p. 101. Also see Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1; and A. Amanat, Pivot of the Universe. J. Piggot, Persia, pp. 238–40. A Persian, writing in 1870–1, expressed similar views about the army and pointed out that the army suffered from these malpractices, despite the 3.5 crore toumans that had been spent on it. See F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Eitema´i, p. 439. J. Piggot, Persia, p. 237, quoting from Colonel Sheil’s article in the appendix to his wife’s work, Glimpses of Life and Manners in Persia. A similar view of the Persian soldier is given by Curzon in p. 579 of his Persia, Vol. 1, where he wrote: ‘The English officers found the men [soldiers] docile and intelligent; but the Persian officers, as the greatest rascals in the world.’ See also ibid., pp. 610–11 for the views of H. Rawlinson, C. MacGregor, and other ‘English officers’ expressing similar views. Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, p. 588. Ibid., pp. 605–6.

272 83 84

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96

97 98

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Ibid., pp. 601–2. In 1809, Malcolm reported the annual military pay of an artillery soldier at 10 toumans plus rations and some clothing, and the annual pay of an artillery officer between 40 and 500 toumans per annum. Curzon’s figures are 14 toumans plus rations and 500 (colonel) to 1,200 (first class sertip) toumans plus rations, respectively. If the debasement of the kran and inflation are taken into account (see Chapter 4), it appears that the pay of the soldiers had declined while that of the officers had shown little, if any, improvement. See J. Malcolm, History of Persia, p. 358. Also see Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, pp. 599–600. Ibid., pp. 579, 605. Ibid., pp. 602–3. See also S. Bakhash, Iran, pp. 276–8. S. Bakhash, Iran, p. 276. Ibid., p. 277. Ibid, Ibid. For an account of the Cossack brigade, see F. Kazemzadeh, ‘The Origin and Early Development of the Persian Cossack Brigade’, pp. 342–53. W. M. Shuster, The Strangling of Persia, p. 98. J.D. Rudolph, ‘Armed Forces’, in Iran: A Country Study, p. 390. Ibid. Ibid. A.C. Millspaugh, The Financial and Economic, p. 1. The final section of the Supplementary Fundamental Laws of October 1907 concerned the army. The Law was to determine the manner in which troops were recruited, the duties and rights of the military, and matters pertaining to promotion. Moreover, military expenditures were made subject to the approval of the Assembly. See Browne, Persian Revolution, p. 384. J.D. Rudolph, ‘Armed Forces’, p. 391. J.D. Rudolph, ‘Armed Forces’, p. 390.

Chapter 6 Civil Society and Ideological Encounters 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

See S.A. Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam; and S.A. Arjomand (ed.), Authority and Political Culture in Shi’ism. Ibid. M. Fischer, Iran, p. 38. Ibid., p. 41. Ibid., p. 42. Ibid., p. 33. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 32–3, 108. See also A.R. Arasteh, Education and Social Awakening in Iran, 1850–1968, pp. 69–70, 27.

ENDNOTES

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

273

A.R. Arasteh, Education, p. 27. H. Mahboubi Ardakani, Tarikh-e Mo`ssesat-e Tammadoni-ye Jadid Dar Iran (History of Modern Civil Institutions in Iran), Vol. 1, pp. 141–87. Ibid., pp. 189–95. Ibid., p. 29. See also Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, p. 494. A.R. Arasteh, Education, pp. 28–9. Ibid., pp. 311–20. Ibid., pp. 29–31. See also E.G. Browne. The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia, pp. 157–66. A.R. Arasteh, Education, p. 31. M. Fischer, Iran, p. 58. See also A.R. Arasteh, Education, pp. 34–5. Fischer mistakenly gives 1900 as the date of the opening of the College of Agriculture. J. Bharier, Economic, p. 38. A. Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashrouteh, Vol. 1, p. 21. See also E. Ra´in, Anjomanha-ye Serri, p. 25. M. Fischer, Iran, p. 33. A.R. Arasteh, Education, p. 69. E. Ra`in, Anjomanha-ye Serri, p. 25. A. Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashrouteh, Vol. 1, p. 21. E. Ra`in, Anjomanha-ye Serri, p. 25. Ibid., p. 26. Quoted in A.R. Arasteh, Education, p. 71. E.G. Browne, Persian Revolution, pp. 374–5. These laws and others concerning education are reproduced in A.R. Arasteh, Education, pp. 222–36. Ibid., p. 74. Ibid., p. 89. Bharier puts the number of ‘high schools’ at 86. As against this overestimated figure, Bharier’s figure for the primary schools is grossly underestimated. See J. Bharier, Economic, p. 38. A.R. Arasteh, Education, p. 87, quoting Mehdi qoli Khan-e Hedayat (Mokhberi os-Saltaneh), Khaterat Va Khatarat (Memoirs and Dangers), pp. 149–50. A.R. Arasteh, Education, p. 40. E.G. Browne, Press an Poetry of Persia, p. 8. G. Kohan, Tarikh-e Sansour Par Matbou`at-e Iran (History of Censorship in the Iranian press), pp. 18–19. E.G. Browne, Press and Poetry of Persia, pp. 11–12. Ibid., pp. 12–13. Ibid., p. 13. A. Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashrouteh, Vol. 1, p. 42. E.G. Browne, Press and Poetry of Persia, pp. 17–18. Ibid.

274 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63

64 65 66 67 68 69 70

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

E.G. Browne, Persian Revolution, p. 243. E.G. Browne, Press and Poetry of Persia, p. 14. Ibid., pp. 15–16. H. Busse, History of Persia, pp. 117–18. J. Malcolm, History of Persia, Vol. 2, p. 360. F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Eitema´i, pp. 32–40. On the relation between Amir Kabir and the olama, see H. Algar, Religion and State in Iran, pp. 131–6. H. Algar, Religion, p. 130; A. Eqbal Ashtiani, Mirza Taqi Khan, pp. 318–23. S. Bakhash, Iran, p. 84. Ibid., pp. 4, 77, 91–2. See also F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Ejtema´i, pp. 189–220. S. Bakhash, Iran, p. 92, quoting Amin od-Dauleh, Khaterat-e Siasi p. 21, and others. On Malkom, his works, organization, and views, consult H. Algar, Mirza Malkum Khan, Religion, pp. 185–93; F. Noura`i, ‘An Analysis of Malkam Xan’s Economic Ideas’, in Tahqiqat-e Eqtesadi, pp. 114–22; and E. Ra´in, Faramoushkhaneh. pp. 487–567. F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Eitema´i, p. 61. E. Ra´in, Faramoushkhaneh, 1, pp. 529–31. S. Bakhash, Iran, p. 17. Ibid., p. 19. E. Ra´in. Anjomanha-ye Serri, pp. 172–3. E. Ra´in, Faramoushkhaneh, 1, pp. 529–31. S. Bakhash, Iran, p. 22. It is also speculated that the letter had not been written by Mirza Ya´qoub as he himself denied to have done so, but by the supporters of Nouri, the former prime minister, who was attempting a return to power. See ibid. F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Ejtema´i, p. 97. Ibid., p. 98. Ibid., pp. 120–4. In the government of Hosein Khan-e Moshir od-Dauleh, he was appointed Minister of Justice, and despite his fatiguing efforts, he was not able to bring about any significant change in the judiciary system due to the pressure from the conservative mollas. See S. Bakhash, Iran, pp. 87–9. F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Ejtema´i, pp. 446, 417, 447. S. Bakhash, Iran, pp. 34–7, 79. Ibid., pp. 102–3. H. Algar, Religion, pp. 174–7. See also S. Bakhash, Iran, pp. 115–20. F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Ejtema´i, pp. 101–14. Ibid., pp. 118–19. Examples are Ketabcheh-e Madakhel Va Makharej (The Booklet of Earnings and Expenditures) in 1876 and the translation of Sismondi’s Political Economy and the Philosophy of Government in 1882. See ibid., pp. 223–48.

ENDNOTES

71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96

275

Ibid., pp. 136–44. Ibid., pp. 144–54. Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, p. 428. F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Ejtema´i, pp. 300–71. On reforms between 1875 and 1900, see B.N. Tandon, ‘Administrative Reorganization in Iran: 1875–1900’, in Indo-Iranica, Vol. 40, No. 3, Sept. 1962. Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, 1, pp. 424–5. S. Bakhash, Iran, p. 310. Ibid., p. 314. Quoted in ibid., p. 315. E.G. Browne, Persian Revolution, p. 36. S. Bakhash, Iran, p. 172. See also E. Ra´in, Faramoushkhaneh, Vol. 2, pp. 168–9. S. Bakhash, Iran, p. 320. Ibid., p. 321. E. Ra´in, Faramoushkhaneh, Vol. 1, p. 585. See pp. 583–600 for a complete explanation of the ‘principle of adamiyat’. Ibid., pp. 600–2. Ibid., pp. 611–13. E.G. Browne, Persian Revolution, pp. 27–8. S. Bakhash, Iran, p. 344. Ibid., pp. 347–51. See ibid., pp. 314, 344–5, 349, 353. See also A. Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashrouteh, 1, pp. 47, 74. F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Ejtema´i, p. 270. Ibid., p. 260. E. Tabari, Jame`eh-e Iran Dar Daureh-e Reza Shah, p. 126. E. Tabari, Barkhi Barrasiha, pp. 394–406. F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Eitema`i, p. 163. In 1920 the eight ministries included interior, foreign affairs, public works, commerce and agriculture, education, endowments and fine arts, justice, war, post and telegraph, and finance. H. Makki, Koudeta-ye 1299, pp. 421–2.

Chapter 7 Foreign Trade, Interventions and Policy 1

In this chapter and elsewhere in this book, the terms ‘imperialism’ and ‘colonialism’ are being used interchangeably regardless of the structural differences between them. This ignorance of the distinction between imperialism and colonialism is justified on the grounds that my interest in them is limited to the role they came to play in shaping the events during the period under investigation. Neither their origin and development per se, nor their structure (either socio-economic, political or ideological) falls within the realm of this study.

276

2 3

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

I must remind the reader that my characterization of Russia as ‘imperialist’ or ‘colonialist’ is essentially conventional in that the country never actually became a colonial or an imperial power in the same sense as, for example, Britain. The best way to characterize Russia of that time is perhaps to call it expansionist. On orientalism, see E. Said, Orientalism. On freemasonization of the Iranian ruling class by Britain, France, the US, etc., see E. Ra´in, Faramoushkhaneh. To what extent this was a useful tool can be gleaned from the fact that a freemason was an internationalist who had to obey the Grand Mason and submit to strict secrecy. Moreover, being an internationalist, a freemason could not have been a patriot or a nationalist. Since he was obedient, he could not also have been an independent thinker. B. Jazani, Capitalism and Revolution in Iran, p. 2. F. Abdullaev, Gousheh-i Az Tarikh-e Iran, p. 28. M. Atkin, Russia and Iran 1780–1828, p. 3. F. Abdullaev, Gousheh-i Az Tarikh-e Iran, p. 28, and Hon G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 2, p. 532. Hon G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 2, p. 532. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 532–3. Ibid., p. 532. Ibid., p. 533. The text of the queen’s letter is given in C.R. Markham, History of Persia, pp. 529–30. Shah Tahmasb’s farman is given in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Vol. 1, pp. 6–7. Hon G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 2, p. 534. See J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy, Vol. 1, p. 1. Hon G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 2, p. 535. Shah Abbas’s farman is given in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy, pp. 15–16. P. Sykes, A History of Persia, Vol. 2, p. 192. Shah Safi’s farman is given in Hurewitz, Diplomacy, Vol. 1, pp. 18–20. British penetration through the Persian Gulf began in 1581 with the formation of the Turkish and Levant Company. The company aimed at competing with the Portuguese over the Persian raw silk trade. Its main project was, however, to penetrate into India. See Hon G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 2, p. 545. P. Sykes, A History of Persia, Vol. 2, p. 189. F. Abdullaev, Gousheh-i Az Tarikh-e Iran, p. 33. M. Atkin, Russia and Iran, p. 4. F. Abdullaev, Gousheh-i Az Tarikh-e Iran, pp. 34–5. The text of the agreement is given in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy, Vol. 1, pp. 42–5. Hon G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 2, p. 551. The text of the agreement is given in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy, Vol. 1, pp. 52–4, and in C.R. Markham, History of Persia, pp. 530–2. C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 12.

ENDNOTES

28

29 30

31 32 33 34

35 36 37

38 39 40 41

277

Hon G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 2, p. 544. These figures relate to the final years of Nader Shah’s reign during which trade between Iran and Europe sharply declined mainly because of the refusal of Nader to comply fully with concessions and the capitulatory rights given to the Europeans by the Safavids (who ruled Iran from 1499 to 1736). The English sales in Persia of ‘woollen manufactures’ alone are reported at about 554,687 pounds sterling, i.e. 3.18 times more than the sale made by all of Europe in 1743–6. Ibid., p. 552. F. Abdullaev, Gousheh-i Az Tarikh-e Iran, p. 39. The first in a series of extraterritorial privileges extended to Europeans were those granted by Shah Abbas in 1600, followed by additional privileges granted to the Netherlands in 1623 by the same shah. Six years later his successor, Shah Safi, granted capitulations to England (1629). The last in this series of capitulations seems to have been granted by Shah Soltan Hosein to France in 1708. Only the Netherlands seems to have granted the Persian merchants extraterritorial rights in return. Nader Shah (1736–47) refused to go along with the full execution of these capitulatory schemes, the result of which was a decline in trade between Iran and European nations (see footnote 28 above) with the exception of Russia, whose trade with Iran increased. The farmans are given in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy, Vol. 1, pp. 15–21 and 32–8. See also ‘A Note on the Abolition of Extraterritoriality in Persia’, pp. 557–65. See also, W. Foster, England Quest of Eastern Trade, chs 30–1; A.T. Wilson, The Persian Gulf, chs 9–11; and J Chardin, Travels in Persia, pp. 59–62, 277–87. P. Sykes, A History of Persia, Vol. 2, p. 293. F. Abdullaev, Gousheh-i Az Tarikh-e Iran, p. 49. P. Sykes, A History of Persia, Vol. 2, p. 293. For this and subsequent developments leading to the first series of wars between Iran and Russia in 1803–12, as well as for a discussion of the Treaty of Golestan and subsequent developments leading up to the Treaty of Torkmanchai and the role of the British and French in these developments, see Ishtiaq Ahmad, AngloIranian Relations, 1905–19, pp. 4–13, and M. Atkin, Russia and Iran 1780–1828. The Golestan Treaty is given in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy, Vol. 1, pp. 84–6. P. Sykes, A History of Persia, Vol. 2, p. 299. However, it must be emphasized that Britain was not seeking a takeover of Afghanistan by Iran as was proven in the subsequent developments that we shall shortly see. The basic premises of British foreign policy in the Middle East throughout the whole of the nineteenth century was the preservation of the status quo. See L.E. Frechtling, ‘The Reuter Concession in Persia’, pp. 518–33. The texts of the treaties are given in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy, Vol. 1, pp. 68–71, and C.R. Markham, History of Persia, pp. 532–3. The text of the treaty is given in ibid., pp. 77–8. H. Busse, History of Persia, p. 126. Wright also wrote: ‘Jones brought an array of gifts rivaling in variety and value those of Malcolm in 1800’. D. Wright, The English, p. 6. E. Ra´in, Faramoushkhaneh, Vol. 1, p. 16. I have retranslated the statement from the Persian source as I had no access to the original source. Therefore, it is possible that

278

42

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53

54 55

56 57 58 59 60

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

the original statement differs somewhat from the one given here. On freemasonry, see footnote 3 above. Ibid. Again, I have retranslated the statement directly from the Persian source. Therefore, it is possible that the original statement is somewhat different. The Hindustan Institution of Endowments had apparently been organized by the English in the Baghdad consulate to assist the tollabs (students of the Shi’ite scriptural schools). The money was also distributed among the olama and other religious authorities. However, not all religious authorities accepted this indirect bribery from the British. D. Wright, The English Among the Persians, p. 7. E. Ra´in, Faramoushkhaneh, Vol. 1, pp. 326–7,329; H. Busse, History of Persia, p. 137; and D. Wright, The English, p. 7 (footnote). H. Busse, History of Persia, p. 139. See also E. Ra´in, Faramoushkhaneh, Vol. 1, pp. 323–5. H. Busse, History of Persia, p. 139. The ‘subsidies’ were to be spent under the strict supervision of the British. E. Ra´in, Faramoushkhaneh, Vol. 1, pp. 23–8. The text of the treaty is given in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy, Vol. 1, pp. 86–8. See also P. Sykes, A History of Persia, Vol. 2, pp. 309–10. Calculated using the figures in pounds sterling and New Persian Rupees given in C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 91. Data from ibid., pp. 90–1. M. Entner, Russo-Persian Commercial Relations, p. 8. The text of the Treaty of Erzurum is given in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy, Vol. 1, pp. 90–2. H. Busse, History of Persia, pp. 127–8, and 174–6. According to Farsnameh: ‘In addition to the ordinary expenditure for the army, the Shah assigned the sum of 300,000 touman[s] to be spent on the Holy War’ during the second period of wars between Iran and Russia. Ibid., p. 174. According to H. Nateq, the fatva for the Holy War in the first period of wars between Iran and Russia was written by the English Joseph Khan and the vizier of Azerbaijan. See H. Nateq, ‘Rauhaniyat Va Azadiha-ye Demokratik’ (The Clergy and the Democratic Freedoms), p. 8. The texts of treaties are given in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy, Vol. 1, pp. 96–102. The governor, Farmanfarma, was the son of the shah. After the death of Mohammad Shah, another of the shah’s sons, Farmanfarma, spent over 800,000 toumans in order to ensure his succession. He was still unsuccessful. See E. Ashtiani, Mirza Taqi Khan, pp. 177–8, 186. P. Sykes, A History of Persia, Vol. 2, p. 321. Quoted in Ishtiaq Ahmad, Anglo-Iranian Relations, p. 13, quoting C.U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, pp. 132–3, Document No. XXVIII. H. Busse, History of Persia, pp. 232, 235. Ishtiaq Ahmad, Anglo-Iranian Relations, p. 14. E. Ra´in, Faramoushkhaneh, Vol. 1, pp. 355–6.

ENDNOTES

61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

71 72

73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81

82

279

H. Busse, History of Persia, pp. 253–61, and Ishtiaq Ahmad, Anglo-Iranian Relations, pp. 14–17. The text of the treaty is given in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy, Vol. 1, pp. 123–4. Ellis to V. Palmerston, 16 January 1836, and 1 September 1836, in UK Public Record Office, FO, 539/3. E. Ashtiani, Mirza Taqi Khan, pp. 300–3. Ibid., pp. 303–5. Ibid., pp. 106, 318–3. E. Ra´in, Faramoushkhaneh, Vol. 1, p. 425. The text of the undertaking is given in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy, Vol. 1, pp. 141–3. The text of the Treaty of Paris is given in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy, Vol. 1, pp. 161–3. In about 1849–50, Abbott wrote that ‘the manufacture of cotton goods is carried to a great extent, and affords occupation to many of the inhabitants of the town [Esfahan] and surrounding village.’ K.E. Abbott, ‘Notes on the Trade Manufactures and Production of Various Cities and Countries of Persia’, UK Public Record Office, FO 60/165. Also now available in Abbas Amanat (ed.), Cities & Trade: Consul Abbott on the Economy and Society of Iran, pp. 74–209. C. Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 245–6. Hon G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, p. 367. On the statistics for other years, see C.R. Markham, History of Persia, p. 366; F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Ejtema´i, p. 280; and J. Bharier, Economic, p. 11. On price of silk, see C. Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 237–8; and on export consult Hon G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 2, p. 544. C. Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 238–40. Ibid., pp. 241–244. I. Berezin, Puteshestvie, in C. Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 105–8. Abbott to Aberdeen, 30 September 1840, UK Public Record Office, FO 60/107, in C. Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 111–12. See C. Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 258–9. Ibid., p. 259: ‘Dispatch by Bonham, 28 June 1844’, FO 60/107. See C. Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 258–9. Ibid. In 1864, a Persian critic wrote that most of the Persian merchants have gone out of business and ‘the remaining five or six’ had no choice but to become ‘the agent of foreign merchants’, and that ‘all of the Iranian necessities come from abroad’. See F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Ejtema´i, pp. 276–777. To give an example of how tariff rate discriminated against the Persian merchants, I quote Stevens, a British resident of Tabriz in about 1851: ‘The European importing [into Tabriz] a load of sugar [e.g.] of a value of 10 toumans–pays his 5 percent [ad valorem tariff] once for all and may re-export it to Tehran [or anywhere else]. The Persian pays for the [same] load ... 14 percent and if he re-exports to Tehran, is charged [at] Rahdarlik ... Meeana, Zengan, Kazveen and Tehran.’ See ‘Stevens to Sheil, 25 February 1851, ‘Tabriz’, UK Public Record Office, FO 60/166.

280 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108

109 110 111

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

An abstract of the concessions are given in C.R. Markham, History of Persia, pp. 542–3. Ibid. T. Ricks, ‘Background to the Iranian Revolution’, p. 19. P. Avery, Modem Iran, p. 84. Also quoted in T. Ricks, ‘Background’, pp. 19–20. T. Ricks, ‘Background’, p. 19. Hon G.N. Curzon, Persia, l, p. 480. Ibid., p. 480–1. An abstract of the text of the concession is given in C.R. Markham, History of Persia, pp. 544–9. E. Ra´in, Faramoushkhaneh, Vol. 1, p. 427. According to Bakhash, Reuter had ‘purchased the favorable responses’ of the Persian officials. See S. Bakhash, Iran, p. 113. See. H. Algar, Religion, pp. 174–5; S. Bakhash, Iran, pp. 116–17; and L.E. Frechtling, ‘The Reuter Concession in Persia’, pp. 518–33. For an account of the concession see Sir H. Rawlinson, England and Russia in the East, pp. 122–8. For an excellent account of the Reuter and Falkenhagen Concessions and the Anglo-Russia rivalry see F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, ch. 2. Hon G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, pp. 475–7. J. Rabino to Colonel Picot, Confidential, Tehran, 14 May 1898, quoted in F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, p. 317. Z.Z. Abdullaev, quoted in C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 46. C. Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 358–9. Ibid., p. 346. F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, p. 317, quoting Rabino. M. Entner, Russo-Persian Commercial Relations, p. 41, and Sykes, History of Persia, Vol. 2, p. 375. C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 346. M. Entner, Russo-Persian, pp. 42–4. On some of the activities of the Bank, see C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 360. N. Keddie, Religion and Rebellion in Iran. The text of the concession is given in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy, Vol. 1, pp. 205–6. E.G. Browne, Persian Revolution, p. 47. C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 339. For the list of the concessions, see C. Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 358–60. The text of the concession is given in S. K. Ghosh, The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, pp. 279–83. On the bribe paid by D’Arcy to secure the concession, see E. Ra´in, Faramoushkhaneh, p. 450. For the text of the agreement of the British Treasury and Admiralty with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 20 May 1914, see J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy, Vol. l, pp. 278–81. B.V. Ananich, ‘Rossiya’. Kent, Oil and Empire, p. 209. On oil in Iran, consult the following sources: S. K. Ghosh. Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute; M. Kent, Oil and Empire; N. Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy; F. Fesharaki,

ENDNOTES

112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120

121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140

281

Development of the Iranian Oil Industry; L.P. Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil; B. Shwadran, Oil and the Great Powers; and M.K. Fateh, Paniah Sal Naft-e Iran. F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, pp. 308, 314. Kazemzadeh provides one of the best accounts so far of the power politics behind the loans. C. Hardinge to Salisbury, No. 140, Tehran, 23 October 1897, FO 60/61 and FO 65/1549. Hardinge to Salisbury, Telegram, No. 35, Tehran, 2 March 1898, in F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, p. 315. Ibid. Ibid., p. 315. Ibid., p. 309. Ibid., p. 318. Ibid., p. 223. The amount of the first loan was 22.5 million rubles or about 2.25 million pounds sterling paid at 5 per cent interest per year. The debt service was, therefore, about 112,500 pounds sterling a year. The customs revenue of Persia for 1901, however, amounted to 438,095 pounds sterling. See Table 7.2. F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, p. 325. On the first loan see also P. Sykes, A History of Persia, Vol. 2, p. 375; and E. Ra´in, Anjomanha-ye Serri, pp. 27–8. F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, p. 325. Durand to Salisbury, No. 58, Gulahek, 21 August 1899. Quoted in F. Kazemzadeh, p. 324. F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, p. 331. P. Sykes, A History of Persia. 2, p. 376. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 362–7. F. Kazemzadehu, Russia and Britain, pp. 331–5. P. Sykes, A History of Persia, 2, pp. 377–8. F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, pp. 376, 383–4. Sykes, A History of Persia, Vol. 2, p. 376. See, e.g. F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, pp. 306, 309, 319, 374, and 383. L.E. Frechtling, ‘The Reuter Concession in Persia’, pp. 518–33. Quoted in E. Ra´in, Faramoushkhaneh, Vol. 1, p. 23. P. Sykes, Persia, Vol. 2, p. 379. See also W.R. Ward, ‘British Policy in Persia’. L.E. Frechtling, ‘The Reuter Concession’, pp. 518–33. Ibid. On the rivalry between Russia and Britain, see H.J. Whigham, The Persian, pp. 332–424. F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, p. 345. On the view of ‘active imperialists,’ see Hon. G.N. Curzon, ‘Analysis of British Policy and Interests in Persia and the Persian Gulf’, in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy, pp. 219–49. P. Sykes, A History of Persia, p. 380. E.G. Browne, Persian Revolution, pp. 246–7.

282 141 142 143 144

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

For a critical study of the convention, see Ishtiaq Ahmad, Anglo-Iranian Relations, ch. 6. H. Nicolson, Curzon, the Last Phase, pp. 121–2. See also B. Shwadran, The Middle East, pp. 27–33, for an analysis of the Agreements. See also H. Filmer, The Pageant of Persia, pp. 338–43. The texts of the agreements are given in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy, Vol. 2, pp. 64–6. The text of the treaty is given in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy, Vol. 2, pp. 90–4.

Chapter 8 Class Alliances and Political Struggles 1 2 3 4 5 6

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

M. Bayat, Mysticism and Dissent: Socioreligious Thought in Qajar Iran; and M. Bayat, Iran’s First Revolution. P. Sykes, A History of Persia, Vol. 2, pp. 293–4. H. Busse, History of Persia, p. 99. Ibid., p. 158. F. Abdullaev, Gousheh-i Az Tarikh-e Iran, p. 186, quoting K.A. Smiranov, ‘Iran’, p. 24. H. Busse, History of Persia, p. 114. This version of events is found in the first volume of Farsnama. A different version is found in the second volume of Farsnama. The second version suggests that the problem had only to do with the refusal of the upper classes to adhere to the uniform dress code ordered by the vizier. The form of struggle reported under the second version is also rather doubtful. It runs as follows: ‘about 250 people of Fars . . . took off their clothes, except headgear and shoes, and put on a cloak. Then they marched in procession to the palace and burst into the government building with great clamor. Then they all dropped the cloaks from their shoulders.’ See ibid., p. 116. Ibid., p. 149. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 161–3. Ibid., p. 209. Ibid., p. 213. Ibid. Ibid., p. 214. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 215. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 216. Ibid., p. 236. Ibid.

ENDNOTES

22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

40 41 42

43

44 45 46 47 48

283

Ibid. Ibid., pp. 236–7. Ibid., p. 237. Ibid., p. 238. Ibid., p. 241. Ibid., p. 253. Ibid., pp. 263–4. Ibid., p. 264. Ibid., pp. 265–6. Ibid., pp. 266–7. See C. Issawi, The Economic History, pp. 258–9. Ibid., p. 259: ‘Dispatch by Bonham, 28 June 1844’, FO 60/107. H. Busse, History of Persia, pp. 283–4. Ibid., pp. 286–7. Ibid., p. 287. E. Ashtiani, Mirza Taqi Khan, pp. 125, 128–9. On Salar’s rebellion, see E. Ashtiani, Mirza Taqi Khan, pp. 115–40. E.G. Browne, ‘The Babis of Persia 1,’ p. 485. See also, A. Amanat, Resurrection and Renewal: The Making of the Babi Movement in Iran, 1844–1850: D. MacEoin, The Sources for Early Babi Doctrine and History: A Survey; and P. Smith, The Babi and Baha´i Religions: From Messianic Shı´ism to a World Religion. E.G. Browne (ed. and trans.), A Traveller’s Narrative, p. 2; Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, p. 497; and J.M. Upton, The History of Modern Iran, p. 10. On the Shaikhiyeh School see E.G. Browne, ‘The Babis of Persia, 2’, pp. 888–92, and E. Tabari, Foroupashi, pp. 62–7. E.G. Browne, ‘Babis of Persia, 1’, p. 521. See also, A. Amanat, Resurrection and Renewal: The Making of the Babi Movement in Iran. 1844–1850; D. MacEoin, The Sources for Early Babi Doctrine and History: A Survey; and P. Smith, The Babi and Baha´i Religions: From Messianic Shı´ism to a World Religion. E.G. Browne, Traveller, p. 11. According to Traveller, he was ‘released’, but in Browne’s view he ‘escaped.’ See E.G. Browne, ‘Babis of Persia, 1’, p. 521. See also, A. Amanat, Resurrection and Renewal: The Making of the Babi Movement in Iran. 1844–1850: D. MacEoin, The Sources for Early Babi Doctrine and History: A Survey; and P. Smith, The Babi and Baha´i Religions: From Messianic Shı´ism to a World Religion. E. Tabari, Barkhi Barrasiha, p. 391. Ibid., p. 390. According to Traveller, however, no more than 313 people had gathered in the fort, of whom only 110 were prepared for war. E.G. Browne, Traveller, p. 39. E. Tabari, Barkhi Barrasiha, p. 390. Ibid. The author of Farsnama refers to the Nairiz insurrection as ‘Babi Disturbances’ and refers to the followers of Saiied Yahya as ‘evil doers’. See H. Busse, History of Persia, pp. 290–4.

284 49

50 51 52 53 54

55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

According to Browne, Suleiman Khan ‘was led to the place of execution with lighted candles inserted in wounds to his flesh, and who nevertheless continued to give expression to the liveliest joy at his approaching martyrdom, and to recite verses of poetry’. See ‘The Babis of Persia, 1’, p. 525. About Qorrat ol-Ain, a Babi woman, the author of Traveller had this to say. ‘She had a brain full of tumultuous ideas and thoughts vehement and restless. In short, in elocution she was the calamity of the age, and in ratiocination the trouble of the world.’ Ibid., p. 31. Her heroism is also acknowledged and praised by Curzon, Tabari, and Browne, among others. She is also known by the names Tahereh and Zarrintaj. E.G. Browne (ed. and trans.), The New History, pp. xix–xx. E.G. Browne, Traveller, p. xxi. See E.G. Browne, ‘The Babis of Persia 1’, p. 490; Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, p. 500; A. Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashrouteh, Vol. 1, pp. 289–91,416–19, and 422; and E. Ra´in, Anjomanha-ye Serri, pp. 36–40. See B. Mo´meni, Iran Par Astaneh-e Enqelab-e Mashroutiyat, and E. Tabari, Barkhi Barrassiha. E.G. Browne, Persian Revolution, p. xvi. On the Babi Movement, consult – in addition to the works noted above – the following sources: H. Algar, Religion and State, pp. 137–151; S.K. Nweeya, Persia, The Land of the Magi, pp. 226–59; Lady Sheil, Glimpses of Life, chs 11, 28; J.A. de Gobineau, Religions et Philosophies, Chs. VII–X; R.G. Watson, History of Persia, chs 11,13; Mirza Kazim Beg, Journal Asiatique, 1866. See also sources given in Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia, Vol. 1, p. 497, and in E.G. Browne, ‘The Babis of Persia, 1 and 2’, pp. 506, 865–87. H.L. Rabino, Gilan, p. 552. The quotes are retranslated from the Persian. F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Ejtema´i, p. 184. H. Busse, History of Persia, pp. 340 and 343. F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq. Afkar-e Ejtema´i, p. 186. E. Ra´in, Faramoushkhaneh, p. 526. Ibid., pp. 526–7. F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Ejtema´i. p. 186. H. Busse, A History of Persia, pp. 250–251. Ibid., p. 356. Ibid. Ibid., p. 357. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 357–8. H.L. Rabino, Gilan, p. 553. F. Adamiyat and H. Nateq, Afkar-e Ejtema´i, p. 184. The quotes that follow are taken from pp. 184–5. See, e.g. H. Algar, Religion and State, pp. 129–130, 172; N. Keddie, Religion, pp. 79, 84, 90, 98, 115, 116–17; and F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, pp. 309–11. The anti-innovative character of the olama seems to be one of Algar’s central theses in his Religion and State. See, e.g. pp. 122 and 181.

ENDNOTES

72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84

85 86

87 88

89

285

See F. Kazemi and E. Abrahamian, ‘The Nonrevolutionary Peasantry of Modem Iran’. S. Bakhash, Iran, pp. 115–16, 119–120, and H. Algar, Religion and State, p. 177. Sir Henry Rawlinson, England and Russia, pp. 133–44, and N. Keddie, Religion, pp. 6–7. S. Bakhash, Iran, pp. 141–2, 145–6, 151. A.R. Sheikholeslami, ‘The Patrimonial’, p. 211 and footnote 42, p. 245. He quotes E´temad os-Saltaneh’s Tarikh-e Montazem-e Naseri, Vol. 3 (supplementary), pp. 5–52, and Zell os-Soltan’s Sargozasht-e Mas´oudi, pp. 296–7. H. Algar, Religion and State, pp. 181–2. Ibid., p. 182. Algar quotes E.G. Browne, A Year Amongst the Persians, p. 98. Ibid., p. 182. Algar quotes D.A. Khan Mo´aiier ol-Mamalek, Yaddashtha-yi az Zendegani-ye Khosousi-ye Naser od-Din Shah, pp. 180–1. S. Bakhash, Iran, pp. 291–2. J. Rabino, ‘Banking in Persia’, in C. Issawi, The Economic History, p. 356. For these and other causes see S. Bakhash, Iran, p. 241; N. Keddie, Religion, ch. 1; F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, ch. 4; and E.G. Browne, Persian Revolution, Ch. 2, 650. See M. Bayat, Iran’s First Revolution. On the role of olama, see Shireen Hunter, Islam; M. Bayat, Iran’s First Revolution; S. Bakhsh, Iran. M. Bahar, Miraskhar-e Este`mar, p. 516, quoting Feuvrier’s diary, and F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, p. 248. ‘To go through with the concession’, the shah, his grand vizier, Amin os-Soltan, and a number of ‘princes and high officials’ were further ‘bribed’. See ibid., p. 251. FO 65/1394, Wolff to Salisbury, No. 271, Very Secret and Confidential, 3 September 1890. F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, p. 251, quoting Butzov to the Minister of Foreign Affairs [Qavam od-Dauleh], No. 40, 29 Moharram 1308 (14 September 1890), Enclosure No. 3 in Wolff to Salisbury, No. 286, Very Secret, Gulahek, 23 September 1890. The French Minister in Tehran seemed to have been in agreement with Butzov’s assertion that the tobacco monopoly was probably in violation of the Persian treaties, which guaranteed freedom of commerce, evident from his dispatch of 17 September 1890. See N. Keddie, Religion, p. 44, quoting A.E. Perse, 1890, No. 28, 17 September. For the translation of Akhtar’s article (11 November 1890, No. 13 of the 17th year), see E.G. Browne, Persian Revolution, pp. 46–9. On ‘the ties of the liberals to the Russians in this period’, see Akhtar, 12 January 1891. A section of the article relating to the Tobacco Concession, printed in this issue of Akhtar, is translated and printed in N. Keddie, Religion, pp. 45, 49. The Akhtar article charged that the Regie was greatly disadvantageous to the Persian cultivators, merchants, and exporters and showed that compared to the Ottoman Regie, the Persian Regie was very unsatisfactory, particularly because the former enjoyed no export monopoly. N. Keddie, Religion, p. 45.

286 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Ibid., p. 46. See pp. 45–6 for the content of the leaflet. Ibid., pp. 49 and 52. F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, p. 254. ‘Abstract of Confidential News’, FO 248/530. See also FO 539/60, Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 9 (25), 23 February 1891, Telegraph. According to Keddie, ‘cancellation was considered by the Shah as early as the first serious petitions and Russian pressures in March 1891’. See Religion, p. 52. F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, pp. 254–5. FO 60/522, Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 95(62), 10 March 1891. N. Keddie, Religion, p. 55. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 55–60, and S. Bakhash, Iran, pp. 316–17. N. Keddie, Religion, p. 56. Ibid., p. 65. H. Algar, Religion and State, p. 207. For the events in Shiraz and those surrounding the expulsion of Ali Akbar, see respectively E. Teimouri, Tahrim-e Tanbakoi, pp. 68–73; A.M. Molkara, Sharh-e Hal-e Abbas Mirza Molkara, pp. 115–6. H.Algar, Religion and State, p. 207. N. Keddie, Religion, p. 67. Ibid., p. 68. Ibid., p. 75, and F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, pp. 259–60. H.Algar, Religion and State, p. 209, quoting J.B. Feuvrier, Trois Ans a` la Cour de Perse. See also M. Bahar, Miraskhar, p. 517. A. Amin od-Dauleh, Khaterat-e Siasi, p. 152. See also Keddie, Religion, p. 80, quoting a telegram sent home by Kennedy, the British consul. A.M. Molkara, Sharh-e Hal, p. 115. N. Keddie, Religion, p. 81, and F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, p. 258. Quoted in N. Keddie, Religion, p. 80. Ibid. See also F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, p. 259. Quoted in F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, p. 259. N. Keddie, Religion, p. 83, quoting documents cited in L.V. Stroeva, ‘Bor´ba . . . ’, p. 168, and A.M. Molkara, Sharh-e Hal, p. 115. FO 60/553 Paton to Kennedy, 5 September 1891, enclosed in Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 207, Sept. 12, 1891. N. Keddie, Religion, p. 84. J.B. Feuvrier, Trois, pp. 272–4. E.G. Browne, Persian History, p. 19. For the complete English translation of the letter, see pp. 15–21. For the original text of the letter (in Arabic), see Nazem ol-Eslam Kermani, Tarikh-e Bidari, Vol. 1, pp. 88–96. E. Teimouri, Tahrim-e Tanbakou, pp. 92, 97, and J.B. Feuvrier, Trois, p. 314. For the English translation of the text of the ‘First Telegram’, see N. Keddie, Religion, p. 89, quoting A.E. Perse, 1891, enclosed in No. 64, 23 December 1891.

ENDNOTES

120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133

134 135 136 137 138 139

287

N. Keddie, Religion, pp. 90–1. Keddie denounces Aqa Najafi as ‘unscrupulous’. For a short list of his ‘vicious’ practices, the reader may consult E. Ra´in, Anjomanha-ye Serri, p. 37 and H. Algar, Religion and State, p. 220. See also footnote 143 below. N. Keddie, Religion, p. 91. Ibid., pp. 91–2, quoting L.V. Stroeva, ‘Bor´ba. . .,’ pp. 172–4, and A.E. Perse, 1891, No. 57, November 27. FO 60/553, Telegram from the Shah to the Saheb Divan, Confidential, 6 October 1891, enclosed in Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 227, 10 October 1891. FO 60/553, Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 228, 19 October 1891, Confidential, quoting private letter from Gen. MacLean, 10 October 1891. N. Keddie, Religion, p. 136. Ibid., p. 138. E.G. Browne, Persian Revolution, p. 52, and M. Bahar, Miraskhar, p. 518, quoting Feuvrier. N. Keddie, Religion, p. 137, quoting FO 60/525, Lascelles to Salisbury, No. 239, 22 November 1891. Ibid., p. 94. Ibid., p. 95, and M. Bahar, Miraskhar, p. 818, quoting Feuvrier. E.G. Browne, Persian Revolution, p. 22. The Persian text is reproduced in N.-E. Kermani, Tarikh-e Bidari, Vol. 1, pp. 19, 30. See H. Nateq, ‘Rauhaniyat va Azadiha-ye Demokratik’, p. 8, and N. Keddie, Religion, pp. 96–7. N. Keddie, Religion, pp. 79, 90, 98, quoting J.B. Feuvrier, Trois, p. 271; M. Malekzadeh, Tarikh-e Enqelab-e Mashroutiyat-e Iran, Vol. 1, p. 129; and A.M. Molkara, Sharh-e Hal, pp. 116, 119. See also, N.-E. Kermani, Tarikh-e Bidari, Vol. 1, p. 22; H. Nateq, ‘Rauhaniyat,’ Iranshahr, Vol. 4, No. 3, April 2, 1982, p. 8; H. Algar, Religion and State, p. 213; and Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, p. 309. In 1897, Picot, the British military attache´ wrote: ‘Seyid Abdullah [Behbahani], a Mushtahed who stood by this Legation at the time of the Regie, and with whom we are still on excellent terms, took the place of Haji Mirza Ashtiani, and at once sent me message, to ask the views and wishes of the Legation. From another source messages were conveyed to me that if Her Majesty’s Legation wished for disorder the Moollahs of Shuster would carry out our instructions to the letter.’ Memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel H. Picot, Military Attache´, 12 May 1897, FO 65/1547, quoted in F. Kazemzadeh, pp. 309–10. See also N. Keddie, Religion, p. 118. FO 60/553, Lascelles to Salisbury, No. 261, 22 December 1891. N. Keddie, Religion, p. 101. See also N.-E. Kermani. Tarikh-e Bidari, Vol. l, p. 49. N. Keddie, Religion, p. 102. E. Teimouri, Tahrim-e Tanbakou, pp. 150–167. See also N.-E. Kermani, Tarikh-e Bidari, pp. 19–22; M. Bahar, Miraskhar, pp. 520–521, quoting J.B. Feuvrier; and H. Algar, Religion and State, p. 214. A.E. Perse, 1892, No. 4, 8 January, postscript of 5 January. N. Keddie, Religion, p. 106.

288 140 141 142 143 144

145

146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

J.B. Feuvrier, Trois, quoted in M. Bahar, Miraskhar, p. 522. F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, p. 267. For the politics behind the loan Iran received from the Imperial Bank to pay off the Regie debt, see Chapter 7. A.E. Perse, 1892, No. 6, 31 January 1892. N. Keddie, Religion, p. 120. As I noted above, Ashtiani removed the ban on smoking before receiving authorization from Shirazi. The latter continued to insist that he had not yet authorized the lifting of the ban and that it remained in full force. Ashtiani, however, ignored Shirazi’s telegrams and letters to this effect and further cemented his ties with the government. Ashtiani’s letters to Shirazi and the shah were full of praise for both the shah and his grand vizier. In a letter to Shirazi, he also referred to the Imperial Bank and other European enterprises in Iran and suggested that ‘no allusion to their abolition should be made in the Mirza’s [Shirazi’s] correspondence.’ FO 60/554, Lascelles to Salisbury, No. 28, 11 February 1892, Secret and Confidential. For the text of the Ashtiani’s, Amin os-Soltan’s, Shirazi’s, and the shah’s letters to each other, see N.-E. Kermani, Tarikh-e Bidari, Vol. 1, pp. 22–46, and for the translation of some of Ashtiani’s letters to Shirazi, see N. Keddie, Religion, pp. 145–47. On the split between the olama, see ibid., pp. 114–18, and H. Algar, Religion and State, p. 219. H. Algar, Religion and State, pp. 219–20. Algar remarked that ‘Aqa Najafi came to an understanding with Zill us-Sultan similar to that reached by Amin us-Sultan and the olama of Tehran’. He then quoted Reece, the British consul in Esfahan (reported on 13 October 1893): ‘As far as my information goes, the Zil os-Sultan and Aqa Nedjefy have formed a sort of partnership and have affected a corner in wheat. The discontent has shown itself in the placing of placards on the walls of the bazaar and caravanserai doors, abusing Aqa Nedjefy and calling him a wheat merchant . . . he has now entirely become the servant of the prince.’ Report to Lascelles, contained in FO 60/543. See also M. Malekzadeh, Tarikh-e Mashroutiyat-e Iran (Tehran, 1327/1948–9), Vol. l, p. 166. Two weeks after the date of Reece’s letter, a ‘bread riot’ occurred in Esfahan. See H. Algar, Religion and State, p. 220. Decypher, Sir F. Lascelles, Tehran, No. 164, 9 November 1892, FO 60/533, and Lascelles to Rosebery, Tehran, No. 196, 21 December 1893, and enclosure, FO 60/532. Lascelles to Rosebery, No. 166 (92), Tehran, 9 November 1892, FO 539/59; and Decypher, Sir F. Lascelles, Tehran, Nos 33 and 35, 17 and 20 May 1893, FO 60/544. Ibid. Lascelles to Rosebery, Nos 167 and 168, both dated Tehran, November 7,1893, F.0.60/543. See also E. Ra´in, Anjomanha-ye Serri, p. 37. See note 143. S. Bakhash, Iran, p. 287, quoting sources cited in note 147 above. S. Bakhash, Iran, pp. 287–8, and H. Nateq, ‘Rauhaniyat,’ Iranshahr, Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 8. Durand to Salisbury, No. 70 (50), August 28, 1895, and enclosures, FO 539/70. See also H. Nateq, ‘Rauhaniyat’, Iranshahr, Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 5.

ENDNOTES

154 155 156 157 158 159

160

161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178

289

H. Nateq, ‘Rauhaniyat,’ and S. Bakhash, Iran, p. 288. On the lutis in Iran, see Lambton, Islamic Society in Persia (Oxford, 1954), pp. 18–19. See N. Keddie, Religion, p. 55. M.S. Ivanov, Enqelab-e Mashroutiyat, p. 4. Greene to Kimberley, No. 207(99), Very Confidential, Tehran, October 11, 1894, FO 539/68. The information relating to Mirza Reza Kermani reported here is taken from: l) the cross-examination of Mirza Reza printed in Sour-e Esrafil 5, 9, 10, July and August 1907, translated and printed in Browne, Persian Revolution, pp. 63–85; 2) Declarations of Mirza Reza, August 1896, also in Browne, ibid., pp. 85–93. For the original Persian texts, see Kermani, Tarikh-e Bidari, Vol. l, pp. 100–24. According to E. Ra´in, in the plot against the shah’s life, Asadabadi, Amin ol-Zarb, Malkom, Browne, Blunt (an English official), and Ottoman Sultan Abd ol-Hamid were all involved. See Faramoushkhaneh, p. 411 and Anjomanha-ye Serri, pp. 22–3. In E.G. Browne, Persian Revolution, p. 71. Ibid., p. 80. H. Algar, Religion and State, p. 219. F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, p. 306. On the rivalry among the members of the ruling class, see here pp. 302–11. A. Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashrouteh, Vol. 1, p. 140. M.S. Ivanov, Enqelab-e Mashroutiyat, p. 5. For the urban riots between 1900 and 1904 see ibid. E. Ra´in, Anjomanha-ye Serri, pp. 46–55. Times, August 21, 1903. A. Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashrouteh. See Kambakhsh, Nazari Be Jonbesh-e Kargari, pp. 13–26; and Asnad-e Jonbesh-e Kargari, Vol. 1, pp. 16–17. For the constitutions and by-laws of the Ejtema´iyoun-e Ammiyoun and Mojahedin, see ibid., pp. 37–54. E. Ra´in, Faramoushkhaneh, 2, pp. 175–7. Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 677–8. Ibid., pp. 646–7. Ibid., 2, p. 248; E. Ra´in, Anjomanha-ye Serri, pp. 177–8, and Kermani, Tarikh-e Bidari, Vol. 1, pp. 243–308. See this source for a description of the 12 meetings of the Anjoman. A. Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashrouteh, Vol. 1, pp. 67–76. The letters are given in ibid., pp. 84–95. Ibid., pp. 101–103. According to Browne, the basters in the Masjed included ‘mullas, rawza-khwans [religions orators], students, merchants, tradesmen, artisans, and people of yet humbler rank.’ Browne, Persian Revolution, pp. 118, 120. A. Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashrouteh, Vol. 1, p. 110. See also Browne, Persian Revolution, p. 119.

290 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

The text of the rescript is given in Browne, Persian Revolution, p. 353, and Sykes, A History of Persia, 2, p. 403. P. Sykes, A History of Persia, 2, p. 394. The text is given in Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashrouteh, Vol. 1, p. 120. See E.G. Browne, Persian Revolution, pp. 355–6. Ibid., p. 386. Ibid., p. 389. For the names, numbers, and the class composition of the deputies of the first Majles, see Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashrouteh, Vol. 1, p. 168. E. Ra´in, Faramoushkhaneh, 2, pp. 208–9. A. Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashrouteh, Vol. 1, pp. 224–6. The term Mashrou`eh seems to have been coined by the shah or those around him in the court. See ibid., p. 211. The text of the program is given in Asnad-e Jonbesh-e Kargari, p. 45–6. For a comparison of the Mojahedin’s program and that of the Ejtema´iyoun-e Ammiyoun see ibid., p. 39. The text of this latter program is given in pp. 40–41. Ibid., p. 16–17. M.S. Ivanov, Enqelab-e Mashroutiyat, pp. 7–8. Ibid., p. 7. A. Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashrouteh, 1. pp. 285–95, 415–23. Ibid., pp. 171–4, 238–41, 245–8. Ibid., pp. 319, 321. Ibid., p. 355. See also p. 330. On Amin os-Soltan’s death, see N. Keddie, ‘The Assassination of Amin os-Sultan.’ According to Browne, the assassination was a ‘turning point’ in the movement. See Persian Revolution, p. 151. M.S. Ivanov, Enqelab-e Mashroutiyat, p. 11. See R.A. McDaniel, The Shuster Mission, pp. 80–81; and Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, pp. 521–2. On the events leading to the coup and the measures taken by the counterrevolution and thereafter, see Kermani, Tarikh-e Bidari, Vol. 2, pp. 136–64; and Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashrouteh, 2, pp. 577–97. On these wars, see Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashrouteh, 2, pp. 577–906. On the uprisings of the revolutionaries in Rasht, see A. Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hiidah Saleh, Vol. 1, pp. 7–15. For the Bakhtiari’s revolt in Esfahan, see Ibid., pp. 1–7. M.S. Ivanov, Enqelab-e Mashroutiyat, p. 13. The events leading to the takeover of Tehran by the Bakhtiaries and the Rashti revolutionaries are given in Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hiidah Saleh, pp. 51–60; and Kermani, Tarikh-e Bidari, 2, pp. 444–508. On the war against the former Shah and other counter-revolutionaries in this period, see W.M. Shuster, The Strangling of Persia, Chs. 4 and 5. Ibid., Ch. 5.

ENDNOTES

206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221

222

223 224 225 226

291

On Yeprem Khan, see E. Ra´in, Yeprem Khan-e Sardar. M.S. Ivanov, Enqelab-e Mashroutivat, p. 14. The text of the ultimatums and the politics behind them are given in ibid., Chs. 6 and 7. See also R.A. McDaniel, The Shuster Mission, Ch. 9, and Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Saleh, Vol. 1, pp. 234–40. See Shuster, The Strangling of Persia, Ch. 8, and Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Saleh, Vol. 1, pp. 337–80. V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 26, p. 353, quoted in M.S. Ivanov, Tarikh-e Iran-e Novin, p. 26. See also Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 23 and Vol. 21, p. 340. M.S. Ivanov, Tarikh-e Mashroutiyat, p. 15. Ibid. A. Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Saleh, 2, pp. 634–45. For a description of these struggles, see ibid., pp. 647–70. M.S. Ivanov, Tarikh-e Mashroutiyat, p. 18. P. Sykes, A History of Persia, 2, p. 486. On Iran during the First World War consult the following works: D. Wright, The English Amongst the Persians, Ch. 12; Ishtiaq Ahmad, Anglo-Iranian Relations, Ch. 8; H. Filmer, The Pageant of Persia, Ch. 11; and Ivanov, Tarikh-e Novin-e Iran, pp. 25–29. Hosein Makki, Tarikh-e Bist Saleh, Vol. 1, p. 290. P. Sykes, A History of Persia, 2, pp. 481, 519. Hosein Makki, Tarikh-e Bist Saleh, Vol. 1, p. 290. According to Arasteh, quoting a Russian source: By 1917 skilled labour unions had appeared in Tehran, Rasht, Tabriz, and other cities. As a result of a fourteenday strike in 1918, skilled laborers in Tehran received more favorable treatment and their success encouraged workers in other cities. In 1920, a number of industrial workers went on strike and demanded certain union rights, including an eight-hour work day. In the same year, 15 unions participated in May Day demonstrations in Tehran. Since then it has become an annual event in Iran. In 1926, the unions combined to form a Central Council, which in 1925, was estimated to have a total membership of 30,000. See R. Arasteh, Man and Society in Iran, quoting U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Contemporary Iran [in Russian], Moscow, 1957. See also Ivanov, Tarikh-e Novin-e Iran, pp. 31, 55–6. On the jangal Movement consult the following works: E. Fakhra`i, Sardar-e Jangal and the sources therein; Ivanov, Tarikh-e Novin-e Iran, pp. 39–42; Y. Armajani, Iran, pp. 131–4; S. Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran, pp. 13–45; H. Makki, Tarikh-e Bist Saleh, 1; H. Filmer, The Pageant of Persia, Ch. 9; and G. Lenezowsk, Russia and the West in Iran, Ch. 3. The text of the Constitution is given in E. Fakhra`i, Sardar-e Jangal, pp. 56–9. Ibid., p. 51. A slogan of the Jangalis read: ‘Expulsion of the foreign forces – Establishment of security and eradication of injustice – Struggle against dictatorship and absolutism.’ Ibid. M.S. Ivanov, Tarikh-e Mashroutiyat, p. 19. See H. Makki, Tarikh-e Bist Saleh, Vol. 1, pp. 81, 500, and E. Fakhra`i, Sardar-e Jangal, p. 308.

292 227 228 229 230 231 232

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

On the coup and British involvement, see H. Makki, Tarikh-e Bist Saleh, 1, Chs. 1 and 2. The text of Rothestein’s and Mirza’s letters are given in E. Fakhra`i, Sardar-e Jangal, pp. 356–61. On the Khiabani movement, see Ivanov, Tarikh-e Novin-e Iran, pp. 36–9; H. Makki, Tarikh-e Bist Saleh; and Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Saleh, pp. 342–896. On Amir Mo`aiied’s uprising see H. Makki, Tarikh-e Bist Saleh, p. 1. On Pasian’s uprising see ibid.; Ali Azari, Qiam-e Kolonel Mohammad Taqi Khan-e Pesian Dar Khorasan; and Ivanov, Tarikh-e Novin-e Iran, pp. 49–52. M.S. Ivanov, Tarikh-e Novin-e Iran, p. 49.

Chapter 9 Empirical and Theoretical Conclusions 1 2 3 4

5 6

K. Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, part 4; The German Ideology, pp. 72–9; Poverty of Philosophy, pp. 119–21; F. Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England, pp. 42–8, 55. See also V.I. Lenin, Development of Capitalism in Russia, chs 5, 6, 7. ‘It is not the articles made’, wrote Marx, ‘but now they are made, and by what instruments that enables us to distinguish different economic epochs’. K. Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p. 180. Nicos Poulantzas distinguishes four levels of dislocation: structural, functional, ruptural and revolutionary. See his Political Power and Social Classes, pp. 155–6. In the ‘preface’ where Marx is interested in establishing the most general laws of social change and developments, the word ‘class’ is not even mentioned. See E. Hobsbawm, ‘Introduction’ in K. Marx and F. Engels, Pre-Capitalist Socioeconomic Formations, p. 11. The nature of the superstructure and its relation to the economic basis of the political economy during the transition is often indeterminate. See the debate between M. Dobb and P. Sweezy on the subject. This ‘coexistence’ of production modes has often created theoretical difficulties for a more accurate characterization of the specific political economy system in place. By way of example, consider the peasant who is also a seasonal worker. He is both a peasant and a worker. This case will ultimately resolve itself in favour of the emergent category, worker in this example. But does the existence of the ‘peasant– worker’ category entail there being no dominant mode of production during that period? The answer is probably not. First, an isolated phenomenon cannot represent a totality. Second, a category such as ‘peasant–worker’ should be seen as a peasant who is going through a quantitative change. To the degree that the process has not yet been completed, i.e. as far as a qualitative change has not yet transformed him into a worker (meaning a category free from all labour obligations and from all means of corruption), he will belong to the old formation and its corresponding mode of production. After qualitative change has taken place, the ‘worker’ will still not be a ‘pure’ category. He will still be a ‘worker–peasant’, in which case he will conform to the new mode. This process is involved in the transformation of all social phenomena. Take another example: the state in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. It will be either a feudal or a capitalist

ENDNOTES

7

8 9

293

state. In cases where state power is shared by the feudal lords and capitalists, the state is still going through a quantitative change. If the process has not yet completed itself, i.e. if qualitative change has not transformed it into a capitalist state, it will be a feudal state corresponding to the feudal mode, or even a capitalist mode, in which case the state will be in a relation of dislocation vis-a`-vis the economic structure. Such a state will eventually be transformed into a capitalist state corresponding to the capitalist mode of production. However, after the qualitative change has taken place, the state cannot present itself as a pure category. It will still be a shared one, which in this case will be a capitalist state corresponding to the capitalist mode of production, which has already acquired the position of dominance vis-a`-vis the feudal mode of production. Engels wrote that: ‘Our [Marx and he] conception of history is above all a guide to study, not a level for construction after the manner of the Hegelian. All history must be studies afresh; the conditions of existence of the different formations of society must be examined individually before the attempt is made to deduce from them the political, civil-law, aesthetic, philosophic, religious, etc., views corresponding to them.’ Engels to C. Schmidt, 5 August 1890, in K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, p. 679. For a good account of the Iranian historical geography, consult V. V. Barthold (C. E. Bosworth, ser. ed.), An Historical Geography of Iran. Marx and Engels – after a detailed discussion on the nature and consequences of the contradiction between the forces and relations of production – summed up their arguments in the following terms. Thus all collisions in history have their origin, according to our view, in the contradiction between the productive forces and the form of intercourse. Incidentally, to lead to collisions in a country, this contradiction need not necessarily have reached its extreme limit in this particular country. The competition with industrially more advanced countries, brought about by the expansion of international intercourse, is sufficient to produce a similar contradiction in countries with a backward industry. K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology, p. 89. Also see ibid., pp. 87–8. These latter points are important for an understanding of the present international division of labour and the origin of dependency relations between the developed and dependent nations, Iran included.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbott to Aberdeen. UK Public Record Office. FO 60/107 (30 September 1840). Abbott to Thomson. UK Public Record Office. FO 60/328 (5 May 1870). Abbott, K.E. UK Public Record Office. ‘Notes on the Trade, Manufacture, and Production of Various Cities and Countries of Persia’, FO 60/165. ––––––– ‘Report on Trade for 1841’, FO 60/92 (31 December 1841). ––––––– ‘Report on Journey to Caspian’, FO 60/108 (29 June 1844). ––––––– ‘Report on the Trade and Commerce of Tabreez for the Year 1866’, Accounts and Papers: vol. 29. Commercial Reports, Session 19: November 1867–31 July 1868. ZHC 1/3262 (Tabreez, 20 April 1867). Abdullaev, F. Gousheh-i Az Tarikh-e Iran [A Part of Iranian History], Q. Matin, translator. Tehran: Khorshidnau Press, 1971. Abdullaev, Z.Z. Promyshlennost i Zarozhedenie Rabochego Klassa Irana v Kontse XIX-Nachale XXVV. Baku: Izd-vo Akademiinauk Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR, 1963. Abrahamian, E. ‘The Crowd in the Persian Revolution’, Iranian Studies, 2:4 (Autumn 1969). ––––––– Iran Between the Two Revolutions. Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press, 1982. Abstract of Confidential News, FO 248/530. Adamiyat, F. Amir Kabir Va Iran [Amir Kabir and Iran]. Tehran, 1334 (1955). Adamiyat, F. and H. Nateq. Afkar-e Ejtema´i Va Siasi Va Eqtesadi Dar Asar-e Montasher Nashodeh-e Dauran-e Qajar [The Social and Political and Economic Thoughts in the Unpublished Works of the Qajar Period]. Tehran: Agah Press, 1356 (1977). Adams, R.M. ‘Agriculture and Urban Life in Early Southwestern Iran’, Iranian Studies, 2:2–3 (Spring–Summer, 1969). Afary, J. The Iranian Constitutional Revolution: Grassroots Democracy, Social Democracy, and the Origins of Feminism. NY: Columbia University Press, 1996. Afshin, K. Naft Va Khouzestan [Oil and Khouzestan]. Tehran, 1933. Aitchison, C.U. A Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries. Delhi, 1933. Algar, H. Religion and State in Iran 1785–1906. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. ––––––– Mirza Malkum Khan: A Study in the History of Iranian Modernism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

295

Amanat, A. ed. Cities & Trade: Consul Abbott on the Economy and Society of Iran. Oxford Oriental Monograph no. 5. Ithaca Press, 1983. ––––––– Resurrection and Renewal: The Making of the Babi Movement in Iran. 1844–1850. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989. ––––––– Pivot of the Universe: Naser al-Din Shah Qajar and the Iranian Monarchy, 1831–1896. London: I.B. Tauris, 1997. Amin od-Dauleh, A. Khan.Khaterat-e Siasi [Political Memoirs]. Tehran, 1341 (1962). Amirahmadi, H. ‘A theory of ethnic collective movement and its application to Iran,’ Ethnic and Racial Studies. vol. 10, no. 4, 1987, pp. 363–91. Amirahmadi, H. ‘Toward a Dynamic Theory of the State and Civil Society in Development Process’, Journal of Planning Education and Research. no. 16, 1996, pp. 15–25. ––––––– Revolution and Economic Transition: The Iranian Experience. NY: New York University Press, 1990. ––––––– Jame’h Siasi, Jame’h Madani va Touse’h Melli [Political Society, Civil Society and National Development]. Tehran: Entesharat Naghshva Negar, 1380 (2001). ––––––– Farhang Siasi va Tou’eh Melli [Political Culture and National Development]. www.iran-emrooz.net/index.php?/politic/print/28043. Ananich, B.V. ‘Rossiya i Kontsessiyad’Arsi’, Istoricheskie Zapiski. 66 (1960). Anderson, P. Lineages of the Absolutist State. London: Verso, 1979. Arasteh, A. R. Man and Society in Iran. Leiden: EJ Brill, 1964. ––––––– Education and Social Awakening in Iran 1850–1968. Leiden: EJ Brill, 1969. Arfa, General H. Under Five Shahs. London: John Murray, 1964. Arjomand, S. A. The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam. Publications of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, no. 17. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984. ––––––– ed. Authority and Political Culture in Shı`ism. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1988. Armajani, Y. Iran. N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972. Ashraf, A. ‘Historical Obstacles to the Development of a Bourgeoisie in Iran’, Iranian Studies, 2:2–3 (Spring–Summer, 1969). Ashrafian, L.Z. and M.R. Arownova. Daulat-e Nader Shah [Nader Shah’s Government], Hamid Amin, translator. Tehran: Shabgir Press, 2536 (1978). Asnad-e Jonbesh-e Kargari, Sosial Demokrasi Va Komonisti-ye Iran [Documents of Worker’s, Social-Democratic, and Communist Movements in Iran (1903–1963)], vol. 1. Florence, Italy: Mazdak Press, 2nd edn., 1974. Atabaki, T. Iran and the First World War: A Battleground of the Great Powers. London: I.B.Tauris, 2006. Atkin, M. Russia and Iran 1780–1828. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980. Atrpet, M. Mamed-Ali-Shakh. Aleksandropol, 1909, p. 141. Aubin, E. La Perse d’aujourd’hui. Paris, 1908. Avery, P. Modern Iran. London: E. Benn, 1965. Axworthy, M. The Sword of Persia: Nader Shah, from Tribal Warrior to Conquering Tyrant. London: I.B. Tauris, 2006. Azari, A. Qiam-e Kolonel Mohammad Taqi Khan-e Pesian Dar Khorasan [The Rebellion of Colonel Mohammad Taqi Khan-e Pesian in Khorasan]. Tehran: Tajaddod Press, 1950.

296

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Bahar, M. Miraskhar-e Este´mar [The Inheritor of Colonialism]. Tehran: Amir Kabir Press, 1357 (1978). Bahrami, A. Khaterat [Memoirs]. Tehran, 1344 (1965). Bakhash, S. Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy and Reform under the Qajars: 1858–1896. London: Ithaca Press, 1978. Balfour, J.M. Recent Happenings in Persia. London, 1922. Banani, A. The Modernization of Iran 1926–1941. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961. Barclay, G. to Sir Edward Grey. UK Public Record Office. ‘Annual Report on Persia for the Year 1911’, FO 881/10010 (Tehran, 28 January 1912). ––––––– UK Public Record Office. ‘Annual Report on Persia for the Year 1911’, FO 416/ 14 (Tehran, 28 January 1912). ––––––– UK Public Record Office. ‘Annual Report on Persia for the Year 1908’, FO 881/ 9656 (Tehran, 10 February 1910). ––––––– UK Public Record Office. ‘Annual Report on Persia for the Year 1909’, FO 416/ 111 (Tehran, 10 February 1911). ––––––– UK Public Record Office. ‘Annual Report on Persia for the Year 1910’, FO 416/ 14 (Tehran, 18 February 1911). ––––––– UK Public Record Office. ‘Annual Report on Persia for the Year 1910’, FO 881/ 9855 (Tehran, 18 February 1911). Baring. UK Public Record Office. ‘Report on Trade and Cultivation of Opium in Persia’, ZHC 1/4682 (23 September 1881). Barth, F. The Nomads of South Persia. Oslo: Oslo University Press, 1961. Bausani, A. The Persians, J.B. Bonne, translator. NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1971. Bayat, M. Mysticism and Dissent: Socioreligious Thought in Qajar Iran. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982. ––––––– Iran’s First Revolution. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. Becker, C.H. Islamstudien: von Werden und Wesen der Islamischem Welt. Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1967. Behnam, D. Consequences Economiques de la Croissance Demographique. Paris, 1957. Bemont, F. Les Villes de L’Iran. Paris, 1969. Bent, J.T. ‘Village Life in Persia’, The New Review. 1891. Berezin, I. Puteshestvie Do Severnoi Persii. Kazan, 1852. Bharier. J. Economic Development in Iran: 1900–1970. London: Oxford University Press, 1971. ––––––– ‘A Note on the Population of Iran, 1900–1966’, The Population of Iran, J.A. Momeni, ed. 1977. ––––––– ‘The Growth of Towns and Villages in Iran, 1900–1966’, The Population of Iran: A Selection of Readings, J.A. Momeni, ed., Honolulu and Shiraz: East-West Population Institute, East-West Center and Pahlavi Population Center, Pahlavi University, 1977. Bill, J.A. The Politics of Iran. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1972. Binning, R.A. Journal of Two Years’ Travel in Persia, 2 vols. London, 1857. Blau, E. O. Commerzielle Zustande Persiens. Berlin, 1858. Bosworth, C.E. ‘The Political and Dynastic History of the Iranian World (AD 1000–1217)’, The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 5, J.A. Boyle, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

297

Bosworth, C.E. Iran and Islam. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1971. Braidwood, R.J., B. Howe, and C.A. Reed. ‘The Iranian Prehistoric Project’, Science, 1322 (April–June, 1961). Brewer, A. A Guide to Marx’s Capital. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Brittlebank, W. Persia During the Famine. London, 1873. Browne, E.G. ‘The Babis of Persia. I. Sketch of their History and Personal Experience amongst Them’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. XXI [New Series] (July, 1889). ––––––– ‘The Babis of Persia. II. Their Literature and Doctrine’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society. vol. XXI [New Series] (October, 1889). ––––––– ed. and translator. A Traveller’s Narrative Written to Illustrate the Episode of the Bob. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1891. ––––––– ed. and translator. The New History. A Translation of Tarikh-e Jadid by Mirza Huseyn of Hamadan, composed in 1880, also containing Haji Mirza Jani’s History and Subh-e Ezel’s Narrative. Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1975 (reprint). Originally published by Cambridge University Press, 1893. ––––––– The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909. London: Cambridge University Press, 1910. ––––––– The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1914. ––––––– Materials for the Study of the Babi Religion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1918. ––––––– A Literary History of Persia, 4 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1924. ––––––– A Year Amongst the Persians. London, 1950. Buchanan, G. to Sir E. Grey. UK Public Record Office. ‘No. 273 and Enclosure in No. 273’, FO 881/10375 (St Petersburg, 15 May 1913). Bulliet, R.W. The Patricians of Nishapur: A Study in Medieval Islamic Social History. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. ––––––– The Camel and the Wheel. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975. ––––––– Islam: The View from the Edge. New York: Columbia University Press. 1994. Busse, H. translator. History of Persia under Qajar Rule (Translated from the Persian of Hasan-e Fasa´i’s Farsnama-ye Naseri [1882–1883]). NY: Columbia University Press, 1972. Cahen, C. ‘Tribes, Cities and Social Organization’, The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 4, R.N. Frye, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. Cameron, G.G. History of Early Iran. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936. Chardin, J. Travels in Persia. 1927 edn. Chehabi, H.E. and V. Martin eds. Iran’s Constitutional Revolution: Popular Politics, Cultural Transformations, and Transnational Connections. London: I.B.Tauris, 2010. Chirol, V. The Middle Eastern Question: Or Some Political Problems of Indian Defense. London: J. Murray, 1903. Christensen, A.E. L’Iran sous les Sassanides. Osnabruck: Otto Zeller, 1971. Clive, R.H. to Sir A. Chamberlain. UK Public Record Office. ‘Annual Report on Persia for the Year 1926’, FO 416/112 (Tehran, 26 January 1927). Collins, R. The Medes and Persians. NY: McGraw-Hill Book Company, undated. Cottam, R.W. Nationalism in Iran. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964. Curzon, Hon. G.N. ‘The Karun River and the Commercial Geography of Southwest Persia’, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society. 12, 1890.

298

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

––––––– Persia and the Persian Question, 2 vols. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1892. Daftary, F. The Isma´ilis: Their History and Doctrines. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992. De Bode, C.A. Travels in Luristan and Arabistan, 2 vols. London: J. Madden and Co., 1845. de Morgan. Safarnameh-e de Morgan [Travel Accounts of de Morgan]. Persian translation by G. Qa´em Maqami. Tehran, 1335 (1956). Debevoise, N.C. A Political History of Parthia. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938. Demin, A.I. Selskoe Khoziaistvo Sovremennogo Irana. Moscow, 1967. Diakonov A.M. Tarikh-e Ashkanian [History of the Parthians], K. Keshavarz, translator. Tehran, undated. Diakonov A.M. Tarikh-e Mad [History of the Medes], K. Keshavarz, translator, Tehran. ‘Dispatch by Bonham, 28 June 1844’, FO 60/107. Dickson, W.J. UK Public Record Office. ‘Memorandum on Commercial Relations between Persia and Great Britain and Communication with Persia’, FO 881/4224 (Foreign Office, 2 March 1880). ––––––– ‘Report on the Trade of Persia’, ZHC 1/4682 (Tehran, 30 August 1882). ––––––– ‘Report on the Trade of Persia’, ZHC 1/4489 (Tehran, 17 September 1883). ––––––– ‘Report on the Manufactures, Commerce, &c., of the Countries in which They Reside’, ZHC 1/4774 (Tehran, 31 October 1884). Douglas, J.A. to Sir W. Townley. UK Public Record Office. ‘Shiraz, Enclosure 1 in No. 63’ (25 February 1913) and (T.W. Holderness, Enclosure 2 in No. 63 (India Office, 8 April 1913). Drummond W.H. to the Marquis of Salisbury. UK Public Record Office. ‘Inclosure: Draft Convention’, FO 881/5618 (Tehran, 21 April 1888). Durkheim, E. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Carol Cosman, translator. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Duzdap Railway. UK Public Record Office. ‘Annual Report on Persia for the Year 1923’, FO 416/112. Dyson, R.H., Jr. ‘Problems in the Relative Chronology of Iran, 6000–2000 BC’, Chronologies in Old World Archaeology, R.W. Ehrich, ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954. E´temad os-Saltaneh, M.H.K. Tarikh-e Montezam-e Naseri [Naseri’s History], 3 vols. Tehran: Government Press, 1877–82. ––––––– Rouznameh-e Khaterat [Journal of Memoirs], Iraj Ashfar, ed. Tehran, 1345 (1967). East India Company. Three Reports of the Select Committee Appointed by the Court of Directors to Take into Consideration the Export Trade from Great Britain to the East Indies, China, Japari, and Persia. London: J.S. Jordan, 1793. Eastwick, E.B., UK Public Record Office. ‘Report by Mr Eastwick’, ZHC 1/2770 (Camp near Tehran, 5 July 1861). Eastwick, E.B. to Earl Russell. UK Public Record Office. ‘Report on the Trade of Khurasan’, ZHC 1/2855 (Tehran, 2 February 1863). Eaton, J. Political Economy. NY: International Publishers, 1977. Ellis to V. Palmerston. UK Public Record Office. FO 539/3 (16 January 1836 and 1 September 1836). Elwell-Sutton, L.P. Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics. London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1955.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

299

Engels, F. The Condition of the Working-Class in England. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973. English, P.W. City and Village in Iran: Settlement and Economy in the Kirman Basin. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966. Entner, M.L. Russo-Persian Commercial Relations, 1828–1914. Gainesville, Fla.: University of Florida Monographs, no. 28, Autumn 1965. Eqbal Ashtiani, A. Mirza Taqi Khan-e Amir Kabir, Iraj Afshar, ed. Tehran: Tous Press, 1355 (1976). Fakhra´i, E. Gilan Dar Jonbesh-e Mashroutiyat [Gilan During the Constitutional Movement]. Tehran: Sepehr Press, 1977. ––––––– Gilan Dar Jonbesh-e Mashroutiyat. Sardar-e Jangal, Mirza Kouchak Khan [Mirza Kouchak Khan, the Commander of Jungle]. Tehran: Javidan Press, 1357 (1978). Fateh, M.K. The Economic Position of Persia. London: P.S. King and Son, 1926. ––––––– Panjah Sal Naft-e Iran [Fifty Years of Iranian Oil]. Tehran: Chehr Press, 1956. Fatemi, N.S. Oil Diplomacy, Powderkeg in Iran. New York, Whittier Books, 1954. Fesharaki, F. Development of Iranian Oil Industry: International and Domestic Aspects. New York, Praeger, 1976. Feuvrier, J.B. Trois ans a` la Cour de Perse. Paris: Maloine, 1906. Filmer, H. The Pageant of Persia: a Record of Travel by Motor in Persia with an Account of its Ancient and Modern Ways. Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1936. Fisher, M. Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980. Foreign Office. UK Public Record Office. ‘Report for the Year 1885 on the Trade of the Persian Gulf’, Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and Finance. Persia. Annual Series: no. 29, ZHC 1/4965 (1886). ––––––– ‘Report for the Year 1886 on the Trade of the Province Fars’, Diplomatic and Consular Reports on the Trade and Finance. Persia, Annual Series: no. 166, ZHC 1/ 4965 (1887). ––––––– ‘Memorandum, handed to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Respecting Railway Construction in Persia’, FO 881/9364 (14 October 1908). ––––––– ‘Numbers 116 to 130’, FO 881/10375 (April 1913). Fortescue, L.S. to British Forces Headquarters, North Persia. UK Public Record Office. ‘Military Report on Tehran and Some Provinces of Northwest Persia, 1920’, FO 248/1300 (Tehran, February 1926). Fraser, J. A Journey through Persia. 1808–1809. London, 1812. ––––––– A Second Journey through Persia. London, 1818. ––––––– Narrative of a Journey to Khorassan. London, 1825. ––––––– Travels and Adventures in the Persian Provinces on the Southern Banks of the Caspian Sea. London, 1826. ––––––– Historical and Descriptive Accounts of Persia. New York, 1833. Frechtling, L.E. ‘The Reuter Concession in Persia’, Asiatic Review, 1938. Frye, R.N. Heritage of Persia. New York: The New American Library, 1963. ––––––– ed. Cambridge History of Iran. vol. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. Gafurov, B.G. and G.F. Kim. Lenin and National Liberation in the East. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978.

300

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Garthwaite, G. Khans and Shahs; A History of Bakhtiyari Tribe in Iran. London: I.B.Tauris, 2009. Ghirshman, R. Persia from the Origins to Alexander the Great. Thames and Hudson, 1964. ––––––– Iran. New York: Penguin Books, 1978. Ghosh, S.K. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute. Calcutta, India: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhayay, 1960. Gifford, J. The World of the Persians (texts by J.A. de Gobineau). London, 1971. Glukhoded, V.S. Problemy Ekonomicheskovo Razvitiva Irana. Moscow, 1968. Gobineau, A.C. de. Trois ans en Asie.Paris, 1859. ––––––– Religions et Philosophies dans L’Asie Centrale. Paris: Gallimard, 1933. Goldsmith, W.W. ‘The War on Development’, Monthly Review, March 1977. Gordon, T.E.G. Persia Revisited. London, 1896. Gramsci, A. Prison Notebooks, Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith, translators and eds. New York: International Publishers, 1978. Hallock, R.T. The Evidence of the Persepolis Tablets. Cambridge, Cambridge Middle East Center, 1971. Hardinge to Salisbury. FO 60/61, 65/1549 (no. 140, Teheran, 23 October 1897). Hardinge, A.H. UK Public Record Office. ‘The Persia (Regulations) Order in Council, 1901’, no. 1 of 1901, Prohibited Imports and Exports, King’s Regulation Under Article 3 (1), FO 881/7632 (Tehran, 26 August 1901). ––––––– ‘The Persia (Regulations) Order in Council, 1901’, no. 2 of 1901, Road Tax, King’s Regulation Under Article 3 (1), FO 881/7629 (Tehran, 28 November 1901). Helfgott, L.M. ‘Tribalism as a Socioeconomic Formation in Iranian History’, Iranian Studies. 10(1977): 36–61. Herbert to Mr Nicolson. UK Public Record Office. FO 881/5281 (Tehran, 7 June 1886). Herodotus. The Histories, Aubrey de Selincourt, translator. New York: Penguin Books, 1977. Hertslet, E. et al. Foreign Office. UK Public Record Office. ‘A review of the British Consular Reporters on Trade with Turkey in Europe, Turkey in Asia and Persia, from 1868 to 1877’, FO 881/3882 (30 April 1878). Herzfeld, E.E. Archaeological History of Iran. London: Oxford University Press, 1935 (published for the British Academy by H. Milford). Hirschman, A.O. A Bias for Hope. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971. Houtum-Schindler, Sir A. ‘Persia’, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1910 (11th edn). Hunter, T. Shireen, ed. Islam: Mediating Islam and Modernity. NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2009. Hurewitz, J.C. Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1956. Ishtiaq Ahmad, M.A. Anglo-Iranian Relations 1905–1919. Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1975. Issawi, C. ‘Urbanization and Economic Development’, Middle Eastern Cities, Ira Lapidus, ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. ––––––– The Economic History of Iran: 1800–1914. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971. Ivanov, M.S. Tarikh-e Novin-e Iran [The Modern History of Iran], Tizabi, translator. Tehran: Eslouj Press, 1963. ––––––– Enqelab-e Mashroutiyat-e Iran [The Iranian Constitutional Revolution], Izadi, translator. Undated.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

301

Izadi, S., ed. and translator. she Maqaleh Dar Bareh-e Bardegi [Three Articles on Slavery] [Articles by I.P. Petrashevsky and E.A. Belianov]. Place, date, and publisher unidentified. J.E.F. UK Public Record Office. ‘Memorandum to Persian Government Laws’, FO 371/1711 (27 November1912). Jackson, A.V.W. Persia: Past and Present. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1906. Jamalzadeh, M.A. Ganj-e Shaigan [The Worthy Treasure]. Berlin, 1335 (1915). Jaza´eri, S. La Crise Economique Mondiale et Ses Repercussions en Iran. Paris, 1938. ––––––– Qavanin-e Maliyeh [The Financial Laws]. Tehran, 1335 (1956). Jazani, B. Capitalism and Revolution in Iran. London: Zed Press, 1980. Johnson, G.A. Local Exchange and Early State Development in Southern Iran. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, 1973. Kambakhsh, A.-S. Nazari Beh Jonbesh-e Kargari Va Komonisti Dar Iran [A Short Survey on Workers’ and Communist Movement in Iran]. Stassfurt: Salzland, 1972 (a publication of the Tudeh Party of Iran). Kasravi, A. Tarikh-e Pansad Saleh-e Khouzestan [500 Years of Khouzestan’s History]. Tehran: Gam-e Paidar Press, 2536 (1978). ––––––– Tarikh-e Mashrouteh-e Iran [History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution], 2 vols. Tehran: Amir Kabir Press, 2537 (1979). ––––––– Tarikh-e Hijdah Saleh-e Azerbaijan [The Eighteen-Year History of Azerbaijan], 2 vols. Tehran: Amir Kabir Press, 2537 (1979). Katouzian, H. The Political Economy of Modern Iran 1926–1979. New York: New York University Press, 1981. ––––––– State and Society in Iran: The Eclipse of the Qajars and the Emergence of the Pahlavis. London: I.B.Tauris, 2000, 2006 (paperback edn). Kazemi, F. and E. Abrahamian. ‘The Nonrevolutionary Peasantry of Modern Iran’, Iranian Studies, vol. XI (1978). Kazemzadeh, F. ‘The Origin and Early Development of the Persian Cossack Brigade’, The American Slavic and East European Review, vol. XV, no. 3 (October 1956). ––––––– Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. Kazim Beg, M. ‘[On Babism]’, Journal Asiatique, 1866. Keddie, N. Historical Obstacles to Agrarian Change in Iran. Claremont, 1960. ––––––– Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891–1892. London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1966. ––––––– ‘The Assassination of the Amin os-Sultan (Atabak-e A´zam), 31 August 1907’, Iran and Islam, C.E. Bosworth, ed. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1971. ––––––– Qajar Iran and the Rise of Reza Khan, 1796–1926. London: I.B.Tauris, 1999. Kennedy to Salisbury. FO 60/553 (no. 227, 10 October 1891, and no. 228, 19 October 1891). Kent, M. Oil and Empire: British Policy and Mesopotamian Oil 1900–1926. London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 1976. Kermani, N.-E. Tarikh-e Bidari-ye Iranian [The History of the Iranian Social Awakening], 2 vols. Tehran: Agah Press, 1357 (1978). Khanji, M.A. Resaleh-i Dar Barrasi-ye Tarikh-e Mad Va Mansha´-e Nazariveh-e Diakonov [An Article in the Investigation of History of Mede and the Origin of Diakonov’s Theory]. Tehran: Nauzohour Press, 1358 (1979).

302

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Khosravi, K. Jame´eh-e Dehqani Dar Iran [The Peasant Society in Iran]. Tehran: Piam Press, 1357 (1978). ––––––– Nezamha-ye Bahrehbardari Az Zamin Dar Iran: Az Sasanian Ta Saliouqian [The Systems of Land Exploitation in Iran: From Sassanids to Saljuqs]. Tehran, undated. Kinneir, J.M. Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire. London, 1813. Krusinski, J.T. The History of the Late Revolutions of Persia, 2 vols. New York: Amo Press, 1973. Kuznetsova, N.A. ‘Materialy K Kharakteristike Remeslennogo Proizvodstva V Iranskom Gorode XVIII-Nachala XIX Veka’, O Genezise Kapitalizma V Stranakh Vostoka (XV–XIX VV.). Moscow, 1962. Labat, R. ‘Elam and Western Persia, c. 1200–1000 BC’, The Cambridge Ancient History, vol. II Part 2, I.E.S. Edwards, etal., eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. ––––––– ‘Elamc. 1600–1200 BC’, The Cambridge Ancient History, vol. II, Part 2, I.E.S. Edwards, et al., eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. Lafont F. and H.L.. Rabino. L’industrie Sericole en Perse. Montpelier, 1910. Lamberg-Karlovsky, C.C. ‘The Earliest Communities of Iran’, Iranian Studies, 2:1 (Winter, 1969). Lambton, A. Landlord and Peasant in Iran. London: Oxford University Press, 1953. ––––––– Islamic Society in Persia. Oxford, 1954. ––––––– ‘Persian Society under the Qajars’, Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, vol. XLVIII (April, 1961). ––––––– ‘Rural Development and Land Reform in Iran’, Symposium on Rural Development. CENTO, 1963. ––––––– ‘The Evolution of the Iqta in Medieval Iran’, Iran, 5 (1967). ––––––– ‘The Internal Structure of the Saljuq Empire’, The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 5, J.A. Boyle, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968. ––––––– Cambridge History of Islam, vol. II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. ––––––– ‘Persia: The Breakdown of Society’, Cambridge History of Islam, vol. I P. Holt, A. Lambton and B. Lewis, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. ––––––– Qaajaar Persia: Eleven Studies. London: I.B.Tauris, 1987. Lascelles to Rosebery. FO 60/553 (no. 261, 22 December 1891), and FO 60/554 (no. 28, 11 February 1892). ––––––– FO 60/542 (no. 3, Teheran, 13 January 1893). ––––––– FO 539/66 (no. 44 (58), Teheran, 12 February 1894). Laurence, K. Diplomacy and Murder in Tehran: Alexander Griboyedov and Imperial Russia’s Mission to the Shah of Persia. London: I.B.Tauris, 2006. Law, E.F. Reports by Mr E.F. Law on Commercial Matters in Persia. FO 881/5728, 2 January 1889. Le Strange, G. The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1905. League of Nations. Commission of Inquiry into the Production of Opium in Persia. Geneva: League of Nations, 1926. Lenczowski, G. Russia and the West in Iran, 1918–1948: A Study in Big-Power Rivalry. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1949. Levine, L.D. ‘Prelude to Monarchy: Iran and the Neo-Assyrian Empire’, Iranian Civilization and Culture, Charles J. Adams, ed. Canada: McGill University, Institute of Islamic Studies, 1973.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

303

Lenin, V.I. Development of Capitalism in Russia. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977. Levy, R. The Social Structure in Islam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962. Litten, W. Persien. Berlin, 1920. Longrigg, S.H. Oil in the Middle East. London, 1963. Loraine to Chamberlain. FO 416/112 (no. 186), Tehran, 8 April 1926. Loraine to Curzon. FO 416/112 (no. 314), Tehran, 26 July 1923. Loraine, P. to Mr MacDonald. UK Public Record Office’. Annual Report on Persia for the year 1923’, FO 416/112 (Tehran, 4 May 1924). Loraine, P. to Sir A. Chamberlain. UK Public Record Office’. Annual Report on Persia for the year 1925’, FO 416/112 (Tehran, 8 April 1926). Loraine, P. to Sir Austen Chamberlain. UK Public Record Office’. Annual Report on Persia for the year 1924’, FO 416/112 Tehran, 22 May 1925). Loraine, P. to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. UK Public Record Office’. Annual Report on Persia for the Year 1922’, FO 416/112 (Tehran, 10 February 1923). Lorimer, J.G. Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf. Calcutta, 1915. Lorini, E. La Persia Economica. Rome, 1900. MacEoin, D. The Sources for Early Babi Doctrine and History: A Survey. Leiden and New York: EJ Brill, 1992. MacGregor, C.M. Narrative of a Journey through the Persian Province of Khorasan, 2 vols. London, 1879. Maclean, H.L. UK Public Record Office. ‘Memorandum on Persian Finances’, Enclosure in no. 295, ZHC 1/7889 (5 July 1913). Maclean, H.W., UK Public Record Office. ‘Report on the Condition and Prospects of British Trade in Persia’, ZHC 1/6773. Mahboubi Ardakani, H. Tarikh-e Mo´assesat-e Tammadoni-ye Jadid Dar Iran [History of Modern Civil Institutions in Iran], vol. 1. Tehran: Entesharat-e Daneshgah-e Tehran, 1354 (1976). Makki, H. Tarikh-e Bist Saleh-e Iran: Koudeta-ye 1299 [The 20-Year History of Iran: 1299 Coup de`tat], vol. I. Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1358 (1979). Malcolm, Sir J. The History of Persia, 2 vols. London: John Murray, 1829. ––––––– The Melville Papers. London, 1930. Malekzadeh, M. Tarikh-e Enqelab-e Mashroutiyat-e Iran [The History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution]. Tehran, 1327 (1948). Markham, C.R. History of Persia. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1894. Kraus Reprint, 1977. Marling, C.M. to Sir E. Grey. UK Public Record Office. ‘Annual Report on Persia for the Year 1907’, FO 881/9221 (Tehran, 28 January 1908). Martin, V. The Qajar Pact: Bargaining, Protest and the State in 19th Century Persia. London: I.B.Tauris, 2005. Marton, B.G. German-Persian Diplomatic Relations: 1873–1912. Netherlands: Mouton and Co., 1959. Marx, K. On Colonialism. NY: International Publishers, 1972. ––––––– The German Ideology, C.J. Arthur, ed. New York: International Publishers, 1974. ––––––– Capital, vols 1–3. NY: International Publishers, 1977. ––––––– Pre-Capitalist Socioeconomic Formations, introduction by E.J. Hobsbawm. New York: International Publishers, 1977.

304

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

––––––– F. Engels. Selected Works [of K. Marx and F. Engels]. Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1970. McDaniel, R.A. The Shuster Mission and the Persian Constitutional Revolution. Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1974. Mclean, H.W. UK Parliament, Accounts and Papers. ‘Report on the Condition and Prospects of British Trade on Persia’, 1904. Medvedev, A.I. Persiya Voenno-Statisticheskoye Obozrenie. St Petersburg, 1909. Memorandum by Mr W.J. Dickson on Commercial Relations between Persia and Great Britain and Communication with Persia. FO 881/4224, Foreign Office, 2 March 1880. Meredith, C. ‘Early Qajar Administration: An Analysis of Its Development and Function’, Iranian Studies (Spring–Summer, 1971). Middle Eastern Cities: A Symposium on Ancient, Islamic, and Contemporary Middle Eastern Urbanism. Lapidus, Ira M. ed., Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Military Report on Tehran and some Provinces of North-West Persia. FO 248/1300, Tehran, February, 1926. Millspaugh, A.C. The Financial and Economic Situation of Persia. New York, 1926. ––––––– Americans in Persia. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1946. Ministry of Labour. Statistical Survey of Major Industrial Plants of Iran. Tehran, 1947. Ministry of Mines. Industry and Mines Statistical Yearbook. Tehran, 1959. Minorsky, V., translator and commentator. Tadhkirat Al-Muluk: A Manual of Safavid Administrators. Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, Ltd., 1943. Mirfetrous, A. Hallai. Tehran: Kar Press, 1357 (1978). Miroshnikov, L.I. Iran in the First World War. Moscow: Oriental Literature Publishing House, 1963. Mo´aiier ol-Mamalek, D.A. Khan. Yaddashtha-yi Az Zendegani-ye Khosousi-ye Naser od-Din Shah [Notes from the Private Life of Naser od-Din Shah]. Tehran, undated. Mokhberos-Saltaneh-e Hedaiat, M.Q. Khaterat Va Khatarat [Memoirs and Dangers]. Tehran: Sherkat-e Chap-e Rangin, 1329 (1950). Molkara, A.M. Sharh-e Hal-e Abbas Mirza Molkara [An Account of Abbas Mirza Molkara’s Life]. Tehran, 1325 (1946–7). Mo´meni, B. Iran Dar Astaneh-e Enqelab-e Mashroutiyat [Iran on the Eve of the Constitutional Revolution]. Tehran, undated. Momeni, J.A. ed. The Population of Iran: A Selection of Readings. Honolulu and Shiraz: East-West Population Institute, East-West Center, and Pahlavi Population Center, Pahlavi University, 1977. Murray, C.A. to the Earl of Clarendon. UK Public Record Office. ‘Inclosure, Tabular Survey of the Strength and Condition of the Persian Army, with Notes and Observations’, FO 881/624 101183 (Camp at Lar, 18 August 1855). Nafisi, S. Tarikh-e Ejtema´i-ye Iran: Dar Dauran-e Pish Az Tarikh Va Aqaz-e Tarikh [The Social History of Iran in the Period of Pre-history and the Beginning of History]. Tehran: University of Tehran, Institute of Social Studies and Research, no. 13, 1342 (1963). ––––––– Tarikh-e Ejtema´i-ye Iran: Az Enqeraz-e Sasanian Ta Enqeraz-e Omavian [The Social History of Iran from the Decline of Sassanids to the Decline of Umayyads]. Tehran: University of Tehran, Institute Of Social Studies and Research, no. 15, 1342 (1963). ––––––– Tarikh-e Ejtema´i Va Eqtesadi-ye Iran Dar Qoroun-e Mo´aser [Political and Social History of Iran in the Contemporary Centuries]. Tehran: Boniad, 1965.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

305

Nateq, H. ‘Rauhaniyat Va Azadiha-ye Demokratik’ [‘The Clergy and the Democratic Freedoms’], Iranshahr, vol. 4, no. 3, 2 April 1982. Nicolson to the Earl of Iddesleigh. FO 881/5392 (no. 149), Tehran, 8 December 1886. ––––––– UK Public Record Office. ‘Inclosure: Report on the Internal State of Persia’, FO 881/5392 (Tehran, 8 December 1886). Nicolson to the Earl of Rosebery. FO 881/5250 (no. 47), Tehran, 2 April 1886. Nicolson, A. to the Earl of Rosebery. UK Public Record Office. ‘Inclosure 1: Mr A. Herbert to Mr Nicolson’, FO 881/5250 (Tehran, 2 April 1886). ––––––– UK Public Record Office. ‘Inclosure in No. 4: Report on the Present State of Persia and her Mineral Resources, &c.; with Appendix by Dr Baker on the Diseases and Climate of the North of Persia’, by A. Herbert, British Legation (Tehran, 7 May 1886) ZHC 1/4861 (Tehran, 10 May 1886). Nicolson, H. Curzon, the Last Phase. London, 1934. Nomani, F. ‘A Note on the Abolition of Extraterritoriality in Persia’, Asiatic Review (New Series), no. 23 (1927). ––––––– ‘The Origin and Development of Feudalism in Iran: 300–1600 AD (Part One)’, Tahqiqat-e Eqtesadi [Economic Research], 9:27–28. Tehran: University of Tehran, 1972. ––––––– ‘Notes on the Origins and Development of Extra-Economic Obligations of Peasants in Iran, 300–1600 AD’, Iranian Studies (Spring–Summer 1976). ––––––– ‘Notes on the Economic Obligations of Peasants in Iran, 300–1600 AD’, Iranian Studies, 10:1–2 (Winter–Spring, 1977). Noura´i, F.M. ‘An Analysis of Malkam Xan’s Economic Ideas’, Tahqiqat-e Eqtesadi. 8:22 (Spring, 1971). Nweeya, S.K. Persia, the Land of the Magi. Philadelphia, 1913. Olmstead, A.T. History of the Persian Empire. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. Paiandeh, M. Qiam-e Qarib Shah-e Gilani [The Rebellion of Qarib Shah-e Gilani]. Tehran: Sahar Press, 1357 (198). Parsons, T. Economy and Society: A Study in the Integration of Economic and Social Theory. London: Routledge, 2010. Paton to Kennedy. FO 60/553 (5 September 1891), enclosed in Kennedy to Salisbury, no. 207, 12 September 1891. Pelly, Sir L. Report on the Tribes around the Shore of the Persian Gulf. 1874. Perry, J.R. ‘Forced Migration in Iran during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, Iranian Studies, 8:4 (Autumn, 1975). Petrashevsky, I.P. Keshavarzi Va Monasebat-e Arzi Dar Iran-e Ahd-e Moqol [Agriculture and Land Relations in Iran of Mongol Period], 2 vols, Karim Keshavarz, translator. Tehran: University of Tehran, Institute of Social Studies and Research, nos 34–5, 1344 (1965). ––––––– ‘The Socio-Economic Condition of Iran under the Il-khans’, The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 5, J.A. Boyle, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968. ––––––– Eslam Dar Iran [Islam in Iran], K. Keshavarz, translator. Tehran: Piam Press, 1354 (1975). ––––––– Tarikh-e Nehzat-e Sar-beh-daran Dar Khorasan [History of Sar-beh-daran Movement in Khorasan], Karim Keshavarz, translator. Tehran, undated. Picot, H.P., Lieutenant Colonel, Military Attache´, H.B.M.’s Legation. UK Public Record Office. ‘Report on the Persian Army’, FO 881/7364 (Tehran, January 1900).

306

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Piggot, J. Persia: Ancient and Modern. London: Henry S. King and Co., 1874. Pigoulevskaya, N.V., A. Yakoubovsky, I.P. Petrashevsky, L.V. Stroeva, and A.U. Belenitsky. Tarikh-e Iran: Az Dauran-e Bastan Ta Paian-e Sadeh-e Hijdahom [History of Iran from the Ancient Time to the End of the Eighteenth Century], 2 vols, K. Keshavarz, translator. Tehran: University of Tehran, Institute of Social Studies and Research, nos 73, 74, 1349 (1970). Polak, J. Persien: Das Land und Seine Behwohner, 2 vols. Leipzig, 1865. Political Department. UK Public Record Office. ‘Memorandum as to Persian Government Loans’, FO 881/9733 (17 October 1910). Poulantzas, N. Political Power and Social Classes, T. O’Hagan, translator. London: Verso, 1978. Rabino, H.L. Gilan, Ja´far Khomamizadeh, translator. Tehran: Entesharat-e Boniad-e Farhang-e Iran, no. 119, 1978. Rabino, J. ‘Banking in Persia’, Journal of the Institute of Banking (13 January 1892). Ra´in, E. Yeprem Khan-e Sardar. Tehran: Javidan Press, 1976. ––––––– Anjomanha-ye Serri Dar Enqelab-e Mashroutiyat [The Secret Societies in the Constitutional Revolution]. Tehran: Javidan Press, 2535 (1977). ––––––– Faramoushkhaneh Va Framasoneri Dar Iran [Free Mason House and Free Masonry in Iran], 3 vols. Tehran: Amir Kabir Press, 1357 (1978). Rawlinson, G. The Seventh Great Oriental Monarchy. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1876. Rawlinson, H. England and Russia in the East. London, 1875. Ricks, T. ‘Background to the Iranian Revolution: Imperialism, Dictatorship, and Nationalism, 1872 to 1979.’ Iran: Essays on a Revolution in the Making, A. Jabbari and R. Olson, eds. Lexington, Kentucky: Mazda Publishers, 1981. Rodinson, M. Islam and Capitalism, B. Pearce, translator. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978. Rodinson, M. Muhammad, A. Carter, translator. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980. Rogers, R.M. A History of Ancient Persia. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1929. Rudolph, J.D. ‘Armed Forces’, Iran a Country Study, Area Handbook Series, R.F. Nyrop, ed. Washington, DC: American University, 1971. Saflnejad, J. Boneh. Tehran: Tous, 1354 (1975). Said, E. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books, 1978. Saudagar, M. Roshd-e Ravabet-e Sarmaiehdari Dar Iran (Marhaleh-e Enteqali), 1304–1340 [The Growth of Capitalist Relations in Iran (the Transition Period), 1925–1961]. Tehran: Pazand, undated. Savory, R. ‘The Safavid State and Policy’, Iranian Studies. 7(1974): 179–212. ––––––– Iran under the Safavids. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. ––––––– ‘Notes on the Safavid State’, Iranian Studies 1(1986): 96–103. Setoudeh, M. Joqrafia-ye Esfahan [Esfahan’s Geography]. Tehran, 1963. Shah, I. The Sufis. NY: Anchor Books, 1971. Shahri, J. Gousheh-i Az Tarikh-e Ejtema´i-ye Tehran-e Qadim [A Part of the Social History of the Old Tehran]. Tehran: Amir Kabir Press, 1357 (1978). Shaian, F. Seiri Dar Tarikh-e Iran-e Bastan [A Tour in the Ancient History of Iran]. Tehran: Raz Press, 2536 (1978). Shams Gilani, J. Khaterat [Memoirs]. Tehran, 1369 (1990).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

307

Sharvar, S. The Forgotten Schools: The Baha’is and Modern Education in Iran, 1899–1934. London: I.B.Tauris, 2009. Sheikholeslami, A.R. ‘The Patrimonial Structure of Iranian Bureaucracy in the Late Nineteenth Century’, Iranian Studies, 11(1978): 199–258. Sheil, M.L. Glimpses of Life and Manners in Persia. London, 1856. Shuster, W.M. The Strangling of Persia. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1912. Shwadran, B. The Middle East, Oil and the Great Power. NY: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1959. Smith, P. The Babi and Baha´i Religions: From Messianic Shı´ism to a World Religion. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Sobotsinskii, L.A. Persiya: Statistiko-ekonomicheskii Ocherk. St Petersburg, 1913. Soltykoff, Prince A. Mosaferat Beh Iran [Travel to Iran], Mohsen Saba, Persian translator. Tehran, 1336 (1957). Spooner, B. ‘Towards a Generic Model of Nomadism’, Anthropological Quarterly, 44 (July, 1971). ––––––– ‘City and River in Iran: Urbanization and Irrigation of the Iranian Plateau’, Iranian Studies, 7 (1974): 681–713. Stern, S.M. ‘Ya´qub the Coppersmith and Persian National Sentiment’, Iran and Islam, C.E. Bosworth, ed. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1971. Stevens to Sheil.UK Public Record Office. ‘Tabriz’, FO 60/166. Stolze, F. and F.C. Andreas. Die Handelsverhaltnisse Persiens, 1885. Sunderland, E. ‘Early Man in Iran’, The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 1, W.B. Fischer, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ––––––– ‘Pastoralism, Nomadism, and the Social Anthropology of Iran’, The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 1, W.B. Fisher, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968. Sykes, P. Report on the Agriculture of Khorasan. Calcutta, 1910. ––––––– A History of Persia, 2 vols. NY: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1969. Tabari, E. Barkhi Barrasiha Dar Bareh-e Jahanbiniha Va Jonbeshha-ye Ejtema´i Dar Iran [Some Investigations about Ideologies and Social Movements in Iran]. Place and Publisher unidentified, 1348 (1969). ––––––– Foroupashi-ye Nezam-e Sonnati Va Zaiesh-e Sarmayehdari Dar Iran Az, Aqaz-q Tamarkoz-e Qajar Ta Astaneh-e Enqelab-e Mashroutiyat [The Collapse of the Traditional System and the Rise of Capitalism in Iran from the Beginning of the Qajar Centralization to the Eve of the Constitutional Revolution]. Stockholm: Takmann, 1975. ––––––– Jame´eh-e Iran Dar Daureh-e Reza Shah [The Iranian Society during the Reign of Reza Shah]. Stockholm: Tudeh Publication Center, 1356 (1977). Tandon, B.N. ‘Administrative Reorganization in Iran: 1875–1900’, Indo-Iranica. 40:3 (September, 1962). Teimouri, E. Tahrim-e Tanbakou [The Tobacco Boycott]. Tehran, undated. Terray, E. Marxism and ‘Primitive’ Societies. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972. Thompson, K. ed. Readings From Emile Durkheim. London: Routledge, 2004. Thomson to Alison.UK Parliament, Accounts and Papers. ‘Report on Persia’, 1867–8. Thomson to Salisbury. FO 881/3821 (no. 161), Tehran, 20 September 1878. Thomson, R.F. UK Parliament, Accounts and Papers, ‘Report on Persia’, 1867–8, 19 and 69. Thomson, R.F., UK Public Record Office. ‘Report to Mr Alison’, ZHC 1/2929 (Tehran, 3 February 1864).

308

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Thomson, R.F. UK Public Record Office. ‘Report by Mr Thomson, Her Majesty’s Secretary of Legation, on the Population, Revenue, Military Force, and Trade of Persia’, ZHC 1/3263 (Tehran, 29 April 1868). Thomson, R.F. to the Marquis of Salisbury. UK Public Record Office. FO 881/3821 (Tehran, 20 September 1878). Thomson, W.M. Taylor to the Earl of Derby. UK Public Record Office. ‘Inclosure: Report by General Franchini on the Persian Army’, FO 881/3478 (Tehran, 25 February 1878). Townley, W. to Sir E. Grey. UK Public Record Office. Tehran, 16 March 1913, [N. Patrick Cowan, Enclosure in no. 37, Consul Cowan to Sir W. Townley, Tabriz, 24 February 1913], FO 881/10375. ––––––– UK Public Record Office. ‘Annual Report on Persia for the Year 1913’, FO 416/14 (Tehran, 18 February 1914). ––––––– FO 416/111 (no. 55), Tehran, 18 February 1914. ––––––– UK Public Record Office. ‘Annual Report on Persia for the Year 1912’, FO 416/14 (Tehran, 18 March 1913). UK Parliament. Accounts and Papers, ‘Report on Persia’, 1867–8. ––––––– Accounts and Papers, Report by the Consul General Jones, ‘Tabriz’, 1873. ––––––– Accounts and Papers, 1880, 73. ––––––– Accounts and Papers, ‘Report on Bushire’, 1880. ––––––– Accounts and Papers, ‘Rasht’, 1898. UK Public Record Office. ‘Manufactures and Commerce, &c.; China; Coal’, Accounts and Papers: vol. 30, Session: 19 November 1867–31 July 1868. ZHC 1/3263. ––––––– ‘Correspondence Respecting the Religious and Political Revival Among Mussulmans 1873–74’, FO 881/2621. ––––––– ‘Correspondence Respecting Trade in Arms in Persia, Muscat, &c. 1880–98’, Part 1, nos 230, 231 and 232. Inclosures 1–6. FO 881/7093. ––––––– ‘Persia considered as a Market for Austrian Goods’, FO 881/1127. ––––––– ‘Report for the Year 1898–99 on the Trade and Commerce of Khorassan’, Diplomatic and Consular Reports. Persia. Annual Series: no. 2386, ZHC 1/6352. ––––––– ‘Report for the Year 1899 on the Trade and Commerce of the Persian Gulf’, Diplomatic and Consular Reports. Persia. Annual Series: no. 2442, ZHC 1/6352. ––––––– ‘Report for the Year 1899–1900 on the Trade and Commerce of Khorassan’, Diplomatic and Consular Reports. Persia. Annual Series: no. 2533, ZHC 1/6352. ––––––– ‘Report for the Year 1900 on the Trade and Commerce of the Persian Gulf’, Diplomatic and Consular Reports. Persia. Annual Series: no. 2631, ZHC 1/6449 (presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty, June 1901). ––––––– ‘Report for the Year 1900 on the Trade of the Consular District of Resht’, Diplomatic and Consular Reports. Persia. Annual Series: no. 2648, ZHC 1/6449 (presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty, June 1901). ––––––– ‘Report for the Year 1900 on the Trade of Azerbaijan’, Diplomatic and Consular Reports. Persia. Annual Series: no. 2685, ZHC 1/6449 (presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty, August,1901). ––––––– ‘Report for the Year 1901 on the Trade and Commerce of the Persian Gulf’, Diplomatic and Consular Reports. Persia. Annual Series: no. 2803, ZHC 1/6567. ––––––– ‘Report for the Year 1901–02 on the Trade of Khorassan and Sistan’, Diplomatic and Consular Reports. Persia. Annual Series: no. 2921, ZHC 1/6567.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

309

––––––– ‘Report on the Silk Trade of Gilan’, FO 60/90. ––––––– FO 60/19. Upton, J.M. The History of Modern Iran: An Interpretation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. Vali, A. Pre-Capitalist Iran: A Theoretical History. New York: New York University Press, 1993. Vardasbi, A. Elal-e Kondi Va Napeivastegi-ye Takamol-e Jame´eh-e Fe´odali-ye Iran [The Reasons for the Slow Growth and the Discontinuity of the Feudal Society of Iran]. Tehran: Chapar Press, 2536 (1978). Vreeland, H.H. Iran. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1957. Walcher, H.A. In the Shadow of the King: Zill Al-Sultan and Isfahan under the Qajars. London: I.B.Tauris, 2008. Ward, W.R. ‘British Policy in Persia, 1858–1890’, The English Historical Review, vol. LXLX, no. 273 (October, 1954). Watson, R.G. A History of Persia. London, 1866. Weber, M. Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Richard Swedberg, ed. NY: W.W. Norton & Co Inc., 2009. Whigham, H.J. The Persian Problem. London: Isbister and Company, 1903. White, W. to the Marquis of Salisbury. UK Public Record Office. ’Reports by Mr E.F. Law on Commercial Matters in Persia’, Inclosure nos 1–7, FO 881/5728 (Constantinople, 8 December 1888). Wilber, D.N. Iran: Past and Present. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. Wilson, Sir A.T. The Persian Gulf. London: George and Unwin, Ltd., 1954. Wittfogel, K. Oriental Despotism. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963. Wolff to Salisbury. ‘Very Secret and Confidential’, FO 65/1394 (no. 271, 3 September 1890). Wright, D. The English among the Persian during the Qajar Period 1787–1926. London: Heinemann, 1977. Wright, H.T. and G.A. Johnson. ‘Population, Exchange, and Early State Formation in Southern Iran’, American Anthropologist, 77 (1975). Wulff, H.E. The Traditional Crafts of Persia. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966. Yaganegi, E. Recent Financial and Monetary History of Persia. NY, 1934. Zabih, S. The Communist Movement in Iran. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966. Zarrinkoub, A.-H. ‘The Arab Conquest of Iran and Its Aftermath’, The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 4, R.N. Frye, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. Zell os-Soltan (Soltan Mas´oud Mirza Qajar). Sargozasht-e Mas´oudi [Mas´oudi’s Biography]. Lithograph. Place and publisher unidentified, 1907. Ziba Kalam, S. Maa Chegouneh Maa Shodim: rishehyabi-ye elal-e Aghabmandeguidar Iran [How we became what we are: searching for the causes of Iranian backwardness]. Tehran: Entesharat Rouzaneh, 1374, 1375 (2nd edn). Zolotarev, A.M. ‘The Area and Population of Persia’, Proceedings of the Russian Geographical Society [Izvestiya Russ. Geogr. Obshest. XXIV], 1888. Zonis, M. The Political Elite of Iran. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.

INDEX

A Abbas, Shah I, 10, 12 Abbas Mirza 101, 102, 112, 118, 143, 147, 148, 183, 185, 186, 236 Absolutism, 78, 181, 196 Adalatkhanah, 214 ad valorem tariff, 86, 147, 152, 183, 233 Administrative state apparatus, 78 Afazel-e Mellat, 132 Akbar, Hajj Saiied Ali, 201 Akhoundzadeh, 124, 133 Akhtar (The Star, in Constantinople, 1875), 119 Amel, 126 Amin ol-Zarb, 42, 43, 47, 48, 58, 91, 115 Amirtouman, 89 Amniyeh, 107 Andaroun, 89, 207 Anjoman, 97, 98, 120, 134, 213, 216–222 Anjoman-e Eslamiyeh, 219 Anjoman-e Fotovvat, 219 Anjoman-e Hoqouq, 213 Anjoman-e Ma´aref, 115 Anjoman-e Makhfi, 134 Anjoman-e Makhfi-ye Awal, 213 Anjoman-e Nezarat, 97 Anjoman-e Okhowat, 213 Anjoman-e Tabriz, 218, 222 Anglo-Persian Agreements (1919), 172 Anglo-Russian Convention (1907), 171, 172

Anti-imperialist struggles, 196 Anti-Regie movement, 203, 205 Arbabi, 52 Army, 11, 12, 14, 52, 73, 82, 89, 91, 100–107, 111, 112, 116, 120, 123, 127, 135, 186, 228 Asadabadi, Saiied Jamal od-Din, 132, 199 Ashaier, 56, 104, 185, 197, 208 Ashrafis, 61 Azalis, 192 B Babi insurrection, 191, 192 Babi Movement, 189, 190, 192, 193, 236 Babis prosecution, 192 Babism, 192–193 Baha´, 191, 192 Baha´i, 192 Baha´ism, religion, 192 Baian (Bab), 191 Banque d’Escompte de Perse (Discount and Loan Bank), 161, 167 Barat, 83, 84, 91 Bast, 96, 214, 215 Biglarbegi, 11, 194 Bolouks, 79 Bourgeois democratic revolutions, 231 Bozorgan, 81 Bread riots, 181, 211, 213, 214, 236, 237

INDEX

Brilliant ring, Ashtiani, 206 British Capital Investment in Iran, 45, 170 Budget deficit, 82–92 C Capitalism, 232 Capitalist manufacturing, 3, 6, 16, 17, 20, 24, 26, 57, 58, 75, 107, 122, 137, 178, 234, 244–246 Cash crops, 22, 23, 36, 48, 53, 56, 58, 70, 137, 234, 244 Caspian Fisheries Concession, 163 Catherine, Czarina, 142 Civil courts (1907), 99 Civil society, 108 education and media, 109–122 ideological struggle, 122–135 reformers and reforms, 122–135 vs. political society, 108 Civil war, 187–189 Class struggle 1796–1890, 182–197 1891–1911, 197–226 1912–1926, 226–231 periodization, 181–182 Commercial Treaty, 144 Companies, trading houses and sarrafis, 47, 48 Composition of Government Revenues, 55, 85 Concessions, 28, 158, 160 Caspian Fisheries, 163 D’Arcy Oil, 163, 164, 167–169 Falkenhagen, 29, 30, 160, 171 Karoun and Imperial Bank, 199 Kerosene, 164 Khoshtaria, 164 Liazonov, 160 Lottery, 131, 160, 167 Pipeline, 168, 169, 171

311

Reuter, 29, 30, 128, 159, 160, 163, 171, 195 Road, 168, 169 Telegraph, 28, 158 Tobacco, 89, 92, 161, 163, 171, 197, 199, 200 Trade, 12 Consolidated debts and service charges (interest charges), 92, 94 Constitutional Revolution of 1906, 5, 54, 86, 96, 97, 115, 161 Corrupt ruling class, Iran, 157 Corruption, 79–82 Cossack Brigade, 60, 104–106, 221, 222, 272 Cotton famine, Europe, 156 Currency, 3, 51, 64–67, 70, 75, 89, 169, 197, 208 Debasement and Depreciation, 66 Curzon, G.N., 77, 81, 82, 96, 105 D D’Arcy Oil Concession, 163, 164, 167–169 Daftar, 83 Daftar-e estifa, 83, 105 Daftar-e Qanoun, 125 Darbar-e A´zam, 127, 129 Dar ol-Fonoun college, 102–104, 112–113, 120, 235 Dar osh-Shaura-ye Kobra (Upper Consultative House), 127, 129 Darvazeh Qazvin, 196 Darouqehs, 79 Dastour ol-amal, 83 Daulat, 126, 132 Daulat-e Haqq, 120 Debts and Service Charges, 94 Definitive Treaty, Articles 3 and 4 of, 148

312

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Dependency, 157–178, 246 Dialectical method, 238 Dictatorship, 6, 7, 32, 33, 75, 77, 181, 235, 236, 238, 240, 244, 247, 252–254 Discount and Loan Bank, 47, 135, 161, 167 Divan-e Qanoungozari, 127 Divan-e Tejarat, 127 Drought, 3, 22, 32 E East India Company, 139, 141, 144, 146 Economic base, 65 Economic developments primitive accumulation, 58–65 production relations, changes in, 49–58 productive forces, changes in, 33–49 Qajar period, four phases, 32–33 Economic reductionism, 4 Edareh, 125 Education and media administrative reforms, demand for, 113 Dar ol-Fonoun college, 112–113 explendid school, 115 Kaqaz-e Akhbar (The Paper of News), 118 literacy rates, 120–121 modern elementary school (1889), 115 newspapers, divisions of, 117–118 newspapers, specialization, 119 Rouznamehe Vaqaie`-e Ettefaqiyeh (The Newspaper of Current Events), 118 ruling ideology, religious educational institutions, 109

satirical papers, 120 schools and enrolment (1910–1925), 115, 117 scientific periodicals, Persia, 120 Shi’ism, religion, 109, 111 struggling forces, 110 study abroad program, 113–114 study program, schools, 115 Sunni centralism, assertion of, 110 Ejtema´at, 98 Ejtema´iyoun-e Ammiyoun party, 212 Electoral Law of 9 September (1906), 97 Epidemic and famine, 21, 45 Epochal transition, concept of, 1, 238 Eqta´, 11 Esfahani, Ali Khan-e, 184 Esma´il, Shah, 10 Estifa, 83 Ettehad-e Eslam (Unity of Islam), 228, 230 Exchange rates and parity, 69 Expansionism, 136, 140 Expenditures on private commercial and industrial real estates, 49 Expropriation of direct producers, 239 F Falkenhagen Concession, 29, 30, 160, 171 Famine, 19, 21–22, 24, 56, 127, 156, 194, 195, 208, 211, 220, 230 Faramoushkhaneh, 125, 126, 213 Farhang, 118 Farmanfarma, Hosein Ali Mirza, 183 Farmans, 77, 96, 139 Fars province, 183, 184 Farsnama, 184 Father of Public Education (Roshdiyeh), 115 Fatva, 205

313

INDEX

‘Fear of disorder,’ 91 Feda`is, 218, 221, 222, 224, 226 Feudalism, 8–15, 192 Finkenstein Treaty (1807), 101 Foreign debt, loans and advances, 92, 93 Foroughi, Mohammad Ali, 133 Fundamental Laws of 30 December (1909), 98 G Geographical specificities, 240 Georgian national liberation movement, 142 Government expenditures, selected years, 89, 90 revenues and expenditures, 86–88 revenues, composition of, 84, 85 institutions of, 78 Gross domestic fixed capital formation (GDFCF), 41, 44 Guilds, 13, 15, 40, 56, 57, 113, 215, 216, 241–244 Gwadur–Jask–Bandar Abbas lines, 28 H Hakems, 79 Handicraftsmen, 1, 2, 56, 63 Hasharat ol-Arz, 120 Hauzeh-e Khosousi, 218 Hauzeh-e Omoumi, 218 Hekmat, 119 Hezb-e Demokrat, 119 Historical specificities, 238, 240, 241, 249 Homayoun, Vazir, 211 Holy war (jehad), 201, 206 Hungry people’s rebellions, 211

I Ideological encounters, 108–135 Ideological state apparatus, 78, 108 Il, 100, 106 Ilbegis, 79 Ilkhani, 79, 185, 187 Imperial Bank of Persia, 161, 162, 166, 167 Imperialism, role of, 180 Imperialist domination, period of (1870–1926), 137 ‘concessions,’ 158–159 capitalism, 174 cash demand, ruling class, 157–158 consumption of imports, annual distribution, 174, 178 economy, deteriorating impact, 157, 158 foreign trade, distribution of, 174, 177 Iranian trade with Russia, 174, 175 mini-legations, telegraph offices, 159 percentage of foreign trade, 174, 176 Political and Military Agreement, 172 Imperialists’ penetration, Iranian feudal society, 136 ‘peaceful’ means, 137 Anglo-Persian War, 137 commercial relations, 138–139 Commercial Treaty, 144 economic effects of, 141, 150–152 grant of capitulation (extraterritoriality), England, 140 pecuniary indemnity, 147 Preliminary Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, 145 religious missionaries, agents, 137–138

314

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

treaty of friendship, 144 war and aggression, Russia, 137–138 Imperial Tobacco Corporation of Persia, 163 Imported capital goods, 41, 44 Import-substitution industrialization, 250 Inflation, 70–71 Infrastructure, 26–31 Iranian currency (Kran), debasement and depreciation, 65–70 J Jamee`h-e Adamiyat (pseudofreemasonic society), 212–213 Janbaz, 101 Jangal Movement, 228–229 Jangalis, 228–230 Jangalis, Mirza Kouchek Khan, 228 Jenkinson, Anthony, 139 Jolfa–Tabriz–Tehran telegraph lines, 28 Jones, Harford, 144 Judiciary system and laws, 94–99 K Kabir, Amir, 102, 103, 112, 123, 150, 189, 190–9 Kadkhodas, 79 Kalantars, 79, 208 Kaqaz-e Akhbar (The Paper of News), 118 Karoun and Imperial Bank concessions, 199 Kerosene concession, 164 Kermani, Mirza Reza, 209 Ketabcheh, 79 Ketabcheh-e Qeibi, 124 Khaf atbeha, 80

Khaleseh, 60–61 Khan, Ab ol-Hasan, 146 Khan, Ahsan ol-Lah, 229 Khan, Ali Naqi, 186 Khan, Ali Qoli, 182 Khan, Aqa Mohammad, 11, 142, 143, 182 Khan, Ehsan Ol-Lah, 229 Khan, Hosein Qoli, 182, 183 Khan, Isa, 193 Khan, Karim, 10, 14 Khan, Mirza Kouchek, 228 Khan, Mirza Malkom, 112, 119 Kharvar, 22, 61 Khaneqein-Tehran-Bushire telegraph lines, 28, 158 Kholasat ol-Havades (Summaries of Events), 118 Khoshneshins, 52, 87 Khoshtaria concession, 164 Komiteh-e Mojazat, 230 Komiteh-e Sattar Khan, 222 Kouchek, Mirza, 228 Kran, exchange rate and debasement, 68 L Legislative court, 127 Liazonov Concession, 160 Literacy rates, 121, 235 Loans and advances, 92, 93, 137, 138, 158, 164, 169, 170, 178, 249 Lottery concession, 131, 160, 167 M Maa Chegouneh Maa Shodim (Kalam), 5 Madakhel, 79, 81, 82, 105 Madrasa, 109, 111, 113, 198 Madraseh-e Elmiyeh, 116

315

INDEX

Madraseh-e Nezam, 116 Majles, 11, 54, 116, 119, 124, 130, 135, 216–218, 220–227, 229, 230 Majles-e Qanoungozari, 128 Majles-e Shaura, 129 Majles-e Shaura-e Melli, 134 Majles-e Shaura-ye Daulati (Governmental Consultative Assembly), 123, 124 Majles-e Shaura-ye Kobra-ye Melli, 132 Majles-e Tahqiq-e Divan-e Nezam, 103 Majles-e Tahqiq-e Mazalem, 130 Majles-e Tejarat, 130 Majles-e Vokala-ye Tojjar-e Iran, 130 Majma´, 132 Majma´-e Adamiyat (secret society), 132, 213 Majmou´eh-e Akhlaq, 120 Maklavani, Shirzad, 14 Maktab, 109, 111, 114, 198 Maktoubat-e Kamal od-Dauleh, 124 Malcolm, John, 76, 82, 100, 101 Maleks, 11 Maliyeh, 89 Markaz-e Qeibi, 212, 218 Mashrou`eh, 217, 220 Mashrou`teh, 217, 220 Maslahatkhaneh (The House of Consultation), 124 Mellat, 131, 132, 235 Melli, 131 Melliyat, 131 Merchant bourgeoisie, 5 Migration, 12, 13, 19, 22–25, 51, 62–64, 73 mass migration, 13, 19, 23, 51 migrants, 22–25, 63, 64 Military institutions, 100–107 Mining 34, 35, 42, 46, 112, 163, 178, 244 Mirza, Abbas, 101, 102, 183

Mirza, Ahmad, 223 Mirza, Kamran, 90, 91 Mirza, Kouchek Khan Jangalis, 228 Mirza, Mohammad, 148, 186 Mirza, Mohammad Reza, 184 Mirza, Nader, 182, 183 Mirza, Reza Kermani, 200, 209 Modern Industry, 344, 232, 240 Modern state, origins of, 10–15 Mohammad, Mirza Ali, 190 Mojahed, 202, 204, 205, 208, 211, 217–222, 224, 226 Mojahedin group, 212 Mojaheds, 202, 204, 208, 218, 220 Monarchy, institution of, 76–78 Mosavat, 119 Mostaufis, 81, 83 Mozare`eh system, 11, 52, 53 Musketeer force, 185, 187 N Nader Shah, 10, 12, 13 Na´eb ol-hokoumetes, 79 Naus, M., 213, 217 Nazm, 125 Neda-ye Vatan, 119 Nedjefy, Aqa, 208 New Customs Tariff, 169 New Electoral Law (1909), 216 Nezam, 106 Nezamiyeh, 110 Nomadic Population, 25, 26 O Obstructionism, 6 od-Dauleh, Ain, 212–215, 217 od-Dauleh, Amin, 59, 115, 129, 166, 200, 201, 211 od-Dauleh, Emad, 194, 195 od-Dauleh, Hosein Khan-e Moshir, 127

316

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

od-Dauleh, Moshir, 103, 113, 127, 128, 129, 160, 195, 230, 231 od-Dauleh, Mo`tamed, 191 od-Dauleh, Qavam, 193, 211 od-Dauleh, Sa`d, 204, 220 od-Dauleh, Salar, 224 od-Dauleh, Sarem, 194 od-Dauleh, Vosouq, 230 od-Din Shah, Mozaffar, 64, 77, 92, 97, 217 od-Din Shah, Naser, 77, 83, 96, 103, 112, 118, 123, 130, 133, 150, 189 od-Din-e Asadabadi, Jamal, 132 od-Dowleh, Amin, 130 od-Dowleh, Emad, 195 od-Dowleh, Malkom, 130 Oghli, Heidar Amou, 212, 218, 221, 229 Oil products, domestic consumption of, 164, 165 ol-Ain, Qorrat, 191, 192 ol-Din, Saiied Jamal, 209 ol-hokoumetes, Na´eb, 79 ol-Lah, Sheikh Fazl, 213, 217, 219 ol-Mamalek, Mo´aiier, 196 ol-Mamalek, Mostaufi, 77, 195 ol-Matin, Habl, 115, 119 ol-Molk, Dabir, 126–127 ol-Molk, Moshir, 183, 185 ol-Molk, Nasr, 214 ol-Molk, Qavam, 183, 185, 201, 208 ol-Molouk, Seif, 185 ol-Motakallemin, Malek, 211, 212, 222 One-party system, 10 Oppression, Iran, 71 Oqli, Heidar Amou, 212 Orf, 94–97, 99, 111, 123, 124, 191, 198 os-Saltana, Hosam, 194 os-Soltan, Amin, 90, 200, 205, 206, 212–214 os-Saltaneh, E´temad, 89

os-Saltaneh, Movaqqar, 211 os-Saltaneh, Sho`a`, 224 os-Soltan, Zell, 90, 208 Osoul-e edareh, 119 Osoul-e Elm-e Servat (Principles of Wealth Science), 133 Ostensibly Sufi, 184 ot-Tojjar, Malek, 200 Ottoman expansionism, 140 P Paris Treaty, 150 Peace treaty, Babis, 191 Peasants revolts, 219, 242, 248 misery, 2 Pelly, Lewis, 80 Periodization, 3, 137, 181 periods, 181 phases of transition, 3 Persian Bank Mining Rights Corporation, 34 Persian Council of State, 130 Pipeline concession, 168, 169, 171 Pishkesh, 51, 79, 86, 145 Political and Military Agreement, 172 Political Treaty, 144 Population growth, 16, 20 cholera outbreaks, series of, 20 demographic transition, theory of, 17 distribution, 24 estimates, 18–19 factors responsible for, 20–21 famine and epidemics, outbreaks of, 21 positive and negative influences, 23 rate of, 17 urban, 19 Pre-capitalist social formations Pre-harvest selling practice, peasantry, 61

317

INDEX

Preliminary Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, 145 Primitive accumulation, 58–65 consequence of, 63 pre-harvest selling practice, peasantry, 61 Pro-capitalist social formations, 8–15 Production relations, changes in capitalist manufacturing relations, 57–58 class relations, 50 class-for-itself, 50 class-in-itself, 50 commodity exchange relations, 54 goverment revenues, composition of, 54–55 groupings of people, Iran, 50 peasantry, plight of, 51 property relations, 52 putting-out system, 57 ra`iyat cultivator, 52 simple capitalist cooperation, 57 Productive forces, changes in agricultural output, 33–34 British capital investment, 45 carpet industry, 41 companies, formation of, 47 deforestation, 35 gross domestic fixed capital formation (GDFCF), 41, 44 gross national product, 33–34 imported capital goods, 41, 44 Iranian peasantry, 36 irrigation system, 35 land taxes, 33–34 looms and workshops, 37–39 manufacturing units, list of, 41–43 mining sector, changes, 34 outward-looking mining strategy, 35 private industrial buildings, expenditure, 48, 49 Russian capital investment, 41, 44

Pro-capitalist social formations, 8–15 Protectorate Agreement (1919), 250 Proto-capitalism, 15 Provinces, revenue of, 84 Pseudo-feudalism to proto-capitalism, 233–238 ‘politicized intellectuals,’ 235 civil society, 235 corrupt and oppressive feudal state, 234 Dar ol-Fonoun college, 235 Iranian nationalism, 236 political instability, 233, 237 transitional period, defined, 232 Public finance, 82–92 Public policy, 76–107 Q Qanat, 35 Qanoun, 131, 132 Qanoun-e Nezam, 129 Qanounnameh, 128 Qavam cabinet, 135, 208 Qazvini, Mirza Nabi Khan-e, 189 Qezelbash (Red Heads), 10 R Ra`iyat-e padeshah, 51 Ra`iyats, 11, 36, 51–54, 61, 64, 127 Reform islamism, 204 Reformers and reforms, 122–135 characteristics of, 122 Rent and Taxes rate rise, Iran, 71–73 Repressive state apparatus, 92, 94 Reuter Concession, 29, 30, 128, 159, 160, 163, 171, 195 Revenue of Provinces, 84 Revolutionary government, 229 Revolutionary period (1891–1911), 181 Reza Khan, 56, 106, 228, 229, 231

318

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN UNDER THE QAJARS

Rigid hierarchy, 79 Road concession, 168, 169 Rouznameh-e Elmi, 120 Rouznameh-e Elmiyeh-e Daulat-e Alliyeh-e Iran, 120 Rouznameh-e Mellati (Citizens’ Newspaper), 118 Rouznamehe Vaqaie`-e Ettefaqiyeh (Newspaper of Current Events), 118 Rural population, 25, 26 Russian capital investment in Iran, 44 S Safavid Dynasty (1501–1722), 9, 10 Salar rebellion, 191 Salar, Mohammad Hasan Khan-e, 190 Saltanat, 126 Sarrafis, 47 Sartip, 186 Senf, 56 Shabnameh, 119 Shah Abd ol-Azim, 30, 214, 221 Shah, Fath Ali, 182 Shah, Naser od-Din, 189 Shaqaqi, Sadeq Khan-e, 182 Shar´, 94–97, 99, 111, 132, 198, 218, 220 Shaura, 119, Sheikhiyeh school, 190 Sherly, Anthony, 139 Shi’ism, religion, 9, 10, 109, 111 Shi’ite-Sunni struggle, 11 Shirazi, Mirza Saleh-e, 112, 118 Siasat-e Modavvan (Khanan), 134 Silk trading, 12 Simple capitalist cooperation, 3–4 16-Point constitution, 212–213 Social democrats, 230 Socialist ideology, 251–252 Sonnats, 94 Soursat (irregular revenue), 84, 86

Soyorqal, 11 Status quo, preservation of, 198 Supplementary Fundamental Laws of 7 October (1907), 98 Supplementary Fundamental Laws of October 1907, 115 Supreme Majles, 11 T Tabriz movement, 201 Talesh people, 14 Tanzimat-e Hasaneh, 129 Tahmasb, Shah, 139 Tajaddod, 119 Tamaddon, 119 Tanzimat, 119 Taraqqi, 119 Tashakkoli, 230 Taxes, regular and irregular exactions, 28, 158 Telegraph concessions, 28, 158 Temporary Revolutionary Republic, 229 Theocracy, 10–15 Theory and practice, political economy, 238–254 ‘class-in-itself’, social classes, 248 ‘defeated status quo’, 248 backwash effect, 253 capital, stages of development, 244 cash crisis, 246 class struggle, 245 feudal magnets, 246 feudalism, reinforcing, 242 financial dependency, 246–247 fundamental principles, governing transition, 239 geographical specificities, 240 historical specificities, 241 industrialization, 242, 250 monarchical, types, 245

319

INDEX

oil rent and economic planning, 249 political and ideological superstructures, 244 primitive accumulation, 239, 240 proletariat, origin, 243 ‘Protectorate Agreement’ (1919), 250 refeudalization (reactionary) policy, 246 socialist ideology, 251–252 socialist proletarian ideology, 247 spread effect, 253 transition, theory of, 238 Tire bureaucracy, 79–82 Tobacco Concession, 89, 92, 161, 163, 171, 197, 199, 200 Tobacco Movement, 197–199, 207 Toyoul system, 11, 86, 125, 134, 217 Trade balance, 173–174 Trade concessions, 12 Trade deficits, 3, 33, 69, 146, 152, 154, 174, 234 Traditional tax structure, Qajar period, 86 Transitional period, 5, 6, 100, 232, 239, 240, 245, 247, 251, 252 Transportation, 26–28, 30, 31, 33, 45, 46, 64, 158, 173, 178, 179, 233, 243 Treasury Gendarmerie, 106 Treaty of Alliance (Finkenstein Treaty), 144 Treaty of Commerce, 149 Treaty of Golestan, 143 Treaty of Paris, 154 Treaty of Torkmanchai, 102, 146, 147 Trebizond Route, trade, 152–153

U Urban population, 19, 25, 26 Urbanization, 24–26 V Valis, 11, 79 Vaqf, 86, 198 Vaza´ef, 124 Vazir-e daftar, 83 Vazir Homayoun, 211 Volga–Caspian trade route, 11, 12, 138 W Wage rates, 73–75 Waterways, Karoun River, 30–31 Western historiographies, 5–6 World War I, 22, 27, 30, 56, 69, 116, 137, 172, 173, 182, 226, 228, 230, 237, 251 World War II, 251 Y Yearly value and percentage of foreign trade with Russia, 174 Year of famine, 194 Yek Kalemeh, 126, 200 Yourt, 11 Z Zanjani, Mirza Ali-e, 191 Zedd-e Tashakkoli, 230 Zalem, 51