The Political Economy of Human Rights in Armenia: Authoritarianism and Democracy in a Former Soviet Republic 9780755692736, 9781848858114

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List of Maps and Tables

Map 1 Map 2 Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 5.1 Table 5.2

Armenia in Its Historical Setting Soviet Armenia, 1920‒1991, and the Republic of Armenia since 1991 Public Preferences for Political Office, 2006-2007 Public Opinion Regarding Institutions Armenia: Freedom of Press, 2002–2010 Religion and Government Policy in Armenia Corruption Perception Index in Comparative Perspective, 1999–2010 Economic Growth in Post-Soviet Armenia, 1991–2009

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PREFACE

On September 23, 1991, the floor of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Armenia erupted in euphoric applause when the republic was declared ankakh petutyun (independent state). The proclamation on independence adopted by the Supreme Council of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic a year earlier, on August 23, 1990, stressed ―the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the generally recognized norms of international law,‖ and declared, under Section 9, that the Republic of Armenia guarantees freedom of expression and conscience, separation of powers, equality among political parties, and depoliticization of the military and agencies of law enforcement. On September 21, 1991, Armenian citizens by a referendum approved independence from the Soviet Union. Nearly two decades have passed since then, and the post-Soviet government has yet to demonstrate its ability to promote internationally acceptable standards for the protection of human rights. This book contributes to the rapidly growing literature on human rights, authoritarianism, and democracy in the post-Soviet republics. With the exception of a handful of studies, works on human rights rarely include more than a pedestrian reference to the Republic of Armenia. The present volume examines the human rights situation in post-Soviet Armenia within the framework of historical legacies and political culture, the role of political institutions, and policy decisions by the top leadership. The Armenian case demonstrates the need to consider all three components in an interdisciplinary approach for an accurate elucidation of the clash between sovereignty and state-building, on the one hand, and democratization and promotion of human rights, on the other. Authoritarian rule inherited from the Soviet regime has persisted in Armenia and is further reinforced by a statist political culture and a highly oligarchic system at the expense of political, civil, social, and economic rights. The Armenian Constitution and international human rights law place certain legal and moral obligations on the state to adhere to established standards in its exercise of power. Compliance with such standards represents the most fundamental precondition for the political legitimacy of government institutions and leadership. The overall human vii

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rights performance of a government indicates the extent to which the nation‖s policymakers and elite can institute procedural and substantive democracy. The international community and international norms and standards can potentially exert a favorable influence on the Armenian government‖s human rights performance. So can the Armenian diasporan communities, yet they appear too preoccupied with promoting democracy and human rights in Turkey, while ignoring the problems in Armenia. With the exception of some passing references to the role of the diaspora, however, this study does not discuss the subject. This book represents a continuation of my exploration into Armenian history, the first volume of which appeared as The History of Armenia: From the Origins to the Present (Palgrave 2007). Inevitably, some of the arguments presented in that volume reappear in the present study, although the focus here is on human rights. The transliteration employed throughout this volume is based on Eastern Armenian phonetics but without diacritical marks. References to sources that use technical transliteration and diacritical marks appear in their original form. Foreign words are italicized only at first mention. By way of acknowledgement, the inclusion of references in the notes and the bibliography signifies more than the conventional practice of attribution; it also expresses my appreciation for their contributions to the study of authoritarianism, democracy, and human rights. Special thanks to Dennis Papazian (Professor Emeritus, University of Michigan, Dearborn) and Maureen S. Hiebert (Professor, University of Calgary) for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of the manuscript. Sections from Chapter 3 were presented at the annual conference of the Midwest Political Science Association April 3‒6, 2008, Chicago, Illinois. Thanks to Stephen Manning (Professor, University of Detroit Mercy) for his corrections and thoughtful comments on the paper. Of course, I alone am responsible for any errors found in facts and interpretations in this study. I am particularly grateful to Rasna Dhillon and Tomasz Hoskins at I.B.Tauris for their interest in the project, encouragement, patience, and assistance in navigating the book through the publication process. Special thanks to Saveria Upcraft and Robyn Angley for their skillful editing of the manuscript. The maps reprinted in this volume were produced by Robert H. Hewsen (Professor Emeritus, Rowan University) and appear in the two volumes of The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times (New York: St. Martin‖s Press, 1997), edited by Richard G. Hovannisian (Professor Emeritus, UCLA). Special thanks to both for their kind permission. I am pleased to have this opportunity to thank my colleagues and the

PREFACE

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staff in the Department of History at Boston University for their warm collegiality, without which the task of writing this book would have been far more difficult. Thanks also to the staff at the Mugar Memorial Library of Boston University and at the Widener Library of Harvard University for their prompt attention to my requests. My brother, Zareh, has been a source of inspiration and has always encouraged me to challenge conventional wisdoms. No words can convey my thanks to my wife, Arpi. I am deeply appreciative of her patience during the two years I intensely worked on this book along with many other projects. Simon Payaslian Boston, Massachusetts

1 An Overview

The collapse of the Soviet Union after 70 years of rule in Armenia offered new opportunities for the development of a democratic political system and for improvements in human rights. This study examines the extent to which post-Soviet Armenia – its political culture, political institutions and leadership, constitutional framework, and civil society – has accomplished the task of transition from the authoritarian regime inherited from the Communist system to a more democratically oriented society. Elucidation of this question requires a long-term historical perspective and close attention to several tightly interconnected causal factors, including historical legacies and political culture, newly established political institutions, and decisions by political leaders concerning policy and politics. A combination of these promotes or impedes democratization in the process of consolidation power and maintenance of the status quo.1 First, the historical legacies, stretching from the deep roots of Armenian political culture to the more recent Soviet experience, 2 are considered. Political culture represents the broad underlying cultural conditions that shape the habits of thought, the habits of governance, and the habits of civic engagement in transformations taking place at various levels and spheres of society. The concept of political culture became the focus of much scholarly attention in the 1950s and 1960s as a unit of analysis and as an independent variable in political analysis. After receding into the background briefly, the concept reemerged in the 1980s and especially in the 1990s as scholars grappled with economic development and the prospects for democracy in Latin America, Africa, East Asia, and the former Soviet bloc. The growing literature on the political cultures of the former communist societies has already made a rich contribution to our understanding of the relationship between historical legacies and democratization in the post-Soviet transitions. There is, however, no systematic and comprehensive analysis of Armenian political culture. The present study does not attempt to close that gap in the literature but integrates the variable into the analysis of the

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human rights situation in the current republic. The impact of political culture on a country‖s trajectory toward democratization or authoritarianism has been the subject of extensive scholarly debate. Robert Tucker, stressing the significance of political culture, has noted that ―if man is the culturebearing and culturecreating animal, then the idea of culture must play a central role in every one of the disciplines dealing with man – psychology, history, and the several social sciences.‖3 Others reject such a view as too deterministic, and instead propose the rational choice model and its derivatives as carrying a more robust explanatory valence. Robert Dahl is partly correct in his observation that ―The exact nature of the relationship among socioeconomic modernization, democratization, and the creation of a democratic culture, is almost as puzzling as it was a quarter century ago.‖4 Scholars disagree on the specific combination of independent variables and the causal direction of the connection between democratic political culture and institutions. Most would agree that a strong civic culture imbued with state and public tolerance toward minority groups, trust in political institutions, and interpersonal trust represent some of the essential tangible and intangible ingredients in the formation of democracy. 5 Yet, recent research has challenged the premise that a democratically inclined political culture must precede the development of democratic institutions. Instead, there has been a growing literature indicating that effective democratic institutions are necessary to foster a democratic political culture. While the question regarding the nature and direction of the causal relationship between culture and democracy – whether political culture shapes or is shaped by political institutions and political leadership – no longer represents a pressing issue for the more advanced democracies, in the former Soviet republics and the ex-communist countries of eastern Europe this question gives rise to debates on fundamental cultural values, beliefs, and attitudes. 6 Nevertheless, there is sufficient literature to support the view that, as an independent variable, political culture is an inextricable component of both elite and mass political behavior. As Oliver Woshinsky has noted, ―Politics is not some arcane ritual divorced from the life of society. It is intertwined in the most integral way with all other social activity. Political activity cannot be considered apart from society as a whole, any more than blood can be considered apart from the body in which it circulates.‖7 In the eloquent words of S. Frederick Starr in reference to the historical legacies of the post-Soviet states, ―history, then, is the dowry borne by leaders and citizens of these new states as they leave the Soviet family and set up housekeeping on their own.‖8 Yet, clearly, historical legacies and political culture alone cannot

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explain the success or failure of democratization, economic development, and human rights performance. Following Karl Popper, it is necessary to avoid the deterministic historicism found in the works of Karl Marx, Arnold Toynbee, and others whose theoretical frameworks rested on assumptions of unilinearity in development and modernization.9 Rather, structural aspects of political economy and the role and nature of human agency must also be considered. An analysis of a government‖s human rights performance requires integration of these approaches. Policymaking institutions that fail to implement policies promotive of virtuous cycles fail to do so partly because office holders lack the political will and the necessary resources. Prolonged failure may lead to the solidification of vicious cycles and to the permanence of structural violence. Governments in a number of former Soviet republics failed to accord priority to matters of economic equality while they pursued economic liberalization and privatization. As a result, particularly in the case of Armenia, which inherited a society devastated by the 1988 earthquake and the 1988–94 war in Nagorno-Karabagh (the Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan), the government failed to institute policies that could reverse the vicious cycle. As Starr has noted, ―On a day-to-day basis,‖ the impact of historical legacies is ―overshadowed by urgent issues of the moment. Pressing economic issues, like the need for economic reform, stable currencies, and access to international credit markets, provide more immediate stimuli to foreign and domestic policies than does the legacy of the past.‖10 In their valuable study on the post-communist transition in central and eastern Europe, Jon Elster and his associates delineate ―the chain of causation‖ in the systemic cycle ―from original conditions to political and economic “transformation actors,” and from actors to a new and more or less consolidated and institutionalized social order.‖ Four closely related ―institutional components‖ emerge: ―constitution-building, the formation of political institutions, the privatization and marketization of the economy, and the new institutional forms that emerge in the field of social security, poor relief, and social services.‖11 These themes assumed a central place in debates on democratization in the twentieth century. On democracy Two general types of democracy are employed in this study as the analytic framework with respect to Armenia: procedural democracy and substantive democracy. Procedural democracy refers to the ability of citizens to choose, through free and fair elections, those in authority of power who determine policies. Democracy construed as process, according to the classic definition by Joseph Schumpeter, ―is that institu-

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tional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people‖s vote.‖12 A central ingredient in procedural democracy, therefore, is that policymakers ascend to office of authority through elections by citizens rather than through hereditary succession, wealth, armed forces, or other non-democratic methods. 13 Civil and political rights and liberties enable citizens ―to make free choices,‖14 and the source of political legitimacy resides in the community of citizens, who expect those elected to office to represent their individual and collective interests. Procedural democracy is a necessary but not a sufficient precondition for substantive democracy. A society is not likely to develop democratic institutions without free and fair elections by its citizens; however, elections alone, even if they result in the removal of officeholders from power, cannot produce desirable and needed policy outcomes. Procedural democracy must lead to substantive democracy, whereby the laws and policies instituted by policymakers serve the interests of the commonweal at large. Substantive democracy requires general representation but also entails responsiveness to public demands by the policymaking institutions and a consistent congruence between public opinion and enacted policy between elections. On certain policy issues policymakers may have legitimate cause to disagree with public preferences, but repeated disregard concerning public demands indicates a lack of substantive democracy.15 Further, while procedural democracy requires fair and impartial rules and processes that facilitate meaningful participation in the electoral system, substantive democracy requires open public spheres, public accountability between elections, and accessible channels for political activity and influence by individual citizens and civil society organizations in setting the policy agenda and in expressing their values in the process of policy formulation and implementation. Whether a society possesses substantive democracy is ultimately determined by the ability and willingness of its policymaking bodies – the executive offices, the legislative chambers, and the judiciary – to promote the general well-being of citizens and to protect human rights in the areas of political and civil liberties; social, economic, and cultural rights; and the rights of women, children, refugees, homosexuals, minority religious groups, and other potentially vulnerable groups. By safeguarding substantive democracy, policymakers secure sustainable development, reduce poverty and unemployment levels, and provide adequate programs in social welfare and education. The significance of substantive democracy is highlighted effectively by the capabilities approach advanced by economist Amartya Sen and philosopher Martha Nussbaum. Sen, in cooperation with Mahbub ul Haq and others, formulated the conceptualization of the Human Devel-

AN OVERVIEW

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opment Report and the Human Development Index (HDI) used by the United Nations. Sen has argued that ―public policy to foster human capabilities and substantive freedoms in general can work through the promotion of ... (1) political freedoms, (2) economic facilities, (3) social opportunities, (4) transparency guarantees, and (5) protective security.‖16 Economic indicators alone, Sen argues, fail to capture the constitutive elements of development and democracy. The promotion of the individual‖s capabilities and substantive freedoms is essential for the development of a society whose members, each as an independent ―agency,‖ can enjoy both procedural and substantive democracy in pursuit of his or her interests toward the realization of his or her aspirations. 17 Nussbaum distinguishes between ―basic capabilities‖ and ―internal capabilities,‖ the former referring to physical and emotional capacities (e.g. speech, love, reasoning), while the latter refer to functional capacities (e.g. exercise of religious freedom) that can develop based on the extent to which the ―surrounding environment‖ proves conducive to the development and maturation of such capabilities. She also adds a third type of capabilities, ―combined capabilities,‖ consisting of ―internal capabilities combined with suitable external conditions for the exercise of the function.‖18 Substantive democracy, therefore, requires an ability on the part of the legal, political, and economic system to expand the capabilities of each member of society so that he or she can enjoy political, civil, social, cultural, and economic rights and freedoms. The failure to achieve these objectives – whether in the form of restrictions imposed on freedom of religion and speech by an authoritarian regime, or in the form of patriarchal, andocentric traditions and customs perpetuating gender inequality – lead to what Sen refers to as ―capabilities deprivation.‖ Historically, the experiences of Western democracies since the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries have demonstrated that substantive democracy does not develop by simple reliance on voting. Rather, the institutionalization of a stable, substantive democracy have necessitated a democratically inclined political culture, government responsiveness, a certain degree of checks on the powers of political and economic elites, economic development, and a legal structure promotive of civil society and of engagement in the public sphere by competing interest groups, policy entrepreneurs, and ordinary citizens alike. Neither procedural nor substantive democracy, however, may be assumed to remain permanent and irreversible, as the French experience of cycles of democratization and dictatorial rule showed after the revolution that overthrew Louis XVI in January 1793. As one observer has put it, ―some democratic glitter does not mean one has struck gold.‖19

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Political leadership, institutions, and legitimacy If political legitimacy through elections and predicated upon public trust represents a key ingredient in systemic stability in democratic societies, a distinction must nevertheless be made in the theoretical framework between political leadership, political institutions, and political legitimacy.20 In a functioning democracy, elections confer authority, and hence political legitimacy, to govern society. Under authoritarian rule, however, elections provide merely the veneer of legitimacy for political leaders whose exercise of authority is motivated by power, money, and in general by interests removed from the citizenry. Authoritarian regimes or, in the words of Andreas Schedler, ―electoral authoritarian‖ regimes often permit elections as symbolic avenues for public participation. 21 Several factors may militate against democratization and the institutionalization of human rights values and norms. First, social historians and sociologists agree that certain political cultures lack democratic proclivities and therefore impede the institutionalization of democratic practices. Second, as economic development encourages the emergence of a politically active middle class with higher levels of literacy and education, economic underdevelopment and the persistence of high levels of poverty hinder the development of democratic institutions. Third, the absence of a history of ―natural‖ progression from agrarian society to industrialization limits the development of the type of policymaking institutions that are capable of addressing, through political compromises and cooperation, the pressing problems associated with urbanization, infrastructural development, and financial and market fluctuations. And fourth, a closed elite structure insulates, through patronage and sheer coercion, the principal decision makers from public influences. Oligarchic patronage suffocates policy entrepreneurs and civil society, preventing citizens from gaining access to networks of power. In the absence of institutional mechanisms for the routinization of conflict management, tensions explode in violent ruptures as citizens attempt to capture illegitimately the public space denied them through constitutionally legitimate channels. Recurring violence ultimately undermines the legitimacy of political leaders and elites, who for their part respond with force to preserve their status and power. Political legitimacy constitutes a central component in the institutionalization of democratic practices. In traditional societies, Max Weber writes, political authority derives legitimacy from ―the sanctity of timehonored rules and powers‖ based on personal loyalty rather than impersonal rules and duties of administration. 22 Tradition and habits of subjecthood, rather than social contract, legitimize political authority.

AN OVERVIEW

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Finally, the institutional framework within which political power and the authority of decision making are exercised, as captured by ―new institutionalism,‖23 places the role of political institutions and human agency in the context of historical development. 24 An elucidation of the political economy of human rights and democratic transition therefore necessitates an integrative approach, taking into consideration the social, economic, and political environments and their impact on policy. It remains to be seen whether in the less developed post-Soviet states, such as Armenia, a normative balance can be secured between demands for democratization and the authoritarian proclivities of the political leaders and oligarchic elites (discussed in Chapter 5). Constitutional rights, in order to be effective, must be respected by elites. As Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel have noted, ―Law-abiding elite behavior, or “elite integrity” … distinguishes effective democracy from formal democracy. Hence the measure of effective democracy combines formal democracy (freedom rights) and elite integrity.‖25 Elite integrity refers to behavior that does not deviate from the law, and political and economic institutions and policymaking bureaucracies that are not corrupt. For an effective democracy to emerge, political and economic elites must act according to a belief in the efficacy of rights rather than bribes. 26 Elites represent closely intertwined reticulations of political and economic interests, of individuals or groups of individuals who control vast resources through formal and informal means. Oligarchic networks of power and rampant corruption permeating governmental institutions, which in turn show little regard toward individual human rights, clearly indicate the absence of democracy. Such elites, writes Charles Tilly, ―find democratization costly‖ and ―fare better in undemocratic regimes.‖27 Political culture, democratization, and economic development Particularly significant for this study is the relationship between political culture, democratization, and economic development, a central concern in the social sciences. According to a number of intellectuals (e.g. Karl Marx, Daniel Bell, Ronald Inglehart, and W.E. Baker) who from diverse perspectives consider economy as the primary causal force, economic development leads to class polarization, higher educational levels, greater personal autonomy, greater gender equality, and higher levels of political participation. 28 Others, however (e.g. Max Weber, Lawrence E. Harrison, Samuel P. Huntington, and David C. McClelland), consider culture as the causal force that fuels or hinders economic transformation and democratic development. This view posits a direct relationship

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between a country‖s political culture and its political system and holds that the psychological and cultural dispositions manifested in shared values determine the extent and character of a society‖s political economy and its economic and political development in terms of democratization, equality, justice, or lack thereof. 29 Accordingly, in the words of President Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, ―culture is destiny.‖30 In the economic model, political culture is a product of economic development and related sociological changes (i.e. political culture is a dependent variable), whereas in the second model political culture is an autonomous factor or the independent variable. A nation‖s political culture may, at the macro level, endorse either democratic or authoritarian oriented political socialization, behavior, and institutions, but in turn may be shaped by the physical environment or climatic factors. According to one study, ―societies in more demanding thermal climates endorsed survival values over self-expression values if they were relatively poor (e.g. Armenia and Moldova) but selfexpression values over survival values if they were relatively affluent (e.g. Canada and Sweden).‖31 In addition to climatic conditions, and closely related to the development of political culture, the economic nature of agrarian societies historically has determined the nature of political leadership and political structure. Karl Wittfogel has argued that ―hydraulic societies‖ such as ancient Egypt and China were led by despotic rulers because they required ―collective irrigation‖ systems to control large rivers, in turn necessitating a highly centralized political authority. 32 By contrast, Inglehart and Welzel note, ―rainfall agriculture‖ in late medieval western Europe encouraged the development of ―family farms with property rights and broadly based market access, giving people more autonomy in their daily activities.‖33 ―Not accidentally,‖ they write, ―the philosophy of humanism, the idea of human rights, and early modern version of limited democracy emerged in these areas.‖34 Traditional societies, especially those characterized by economic and physical insecurities, stress economic and physical security and the imperative of ―social conformity rather than individualistic striving, support deference to authority, and high levels of national pride and a nationalistic outlook.‖35 Foreigners, cultural diversity, and social change threaten people; insecurity fuels intolerance toward ―gays and other outgroups, insistence on traditional gender roles, and an authoritarian political outlook.‖36 In the case of Armenia, historically geographic location has played a crucial role in cultural and economic development since ancient times, in the nineteenth century when Armenian lands were divided between the Ottoman and Russian empires, and in the current post-Soviet republic where the nation‖s cultural and economic development has be-

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come, to use Ricardo Hausmann‖s words, ―prisoner of geography.‖37 In this respect, two general questions are relevant for the purposes of this study. The first pertains to the specific conditions necessary for the development of a political culture (values, mores) conducive to the cultivation of democratically oriented institutions and practices. The second is whether, once such institutions are in place, political culture and civic and social practices play a role in sustaining their stability. 38 Political sociologists have identified certain mores – e.g. modes of thought and behavior, interpersonal trust – considered culturally significant for the emergence of a stable society and democracy. 39 A political system reflects its citizens‖ political culture and in turn instills in them certain values and ―emotional content‖ which strengthen their trust in and relationship with existing institutions, laws, and traditions. Ultimately, that system must satisfy ―the psychological necessities of its citizens.‖40 Due to their Soviet heritage, the levels of interpersonal trust and of public trust in political institutions found in societies of the former Soviet bloc are quite low in comparison with more democratic societies; the Stalinist legacy, the networks of spies that permeated the entire system, and the imposition of foreign rule created a culture of mutual suspicion.41 In such societies which exhibit significantly lower levels of interpersonal trust and trust in political institutions and electoral processes, democratic practices and institutions are not likely to flourish. Further, mere expressions of opinion favorable to democracy, as experienced in post-Soviet Armenia, do not necessarily indicate a democratically oriented political culture. This has become a particularly significant problem, as ―lip service to democracy has become almost universal, with over 90 per cent of the publics of most countries giving favorable ratings.‖42 Political leaders‖ superficial homage to democratic values and principles creates the illusion of democratization in the transition from the Soviet system, and such declarations initially raised public expectations regarding the advantages of liberalization and democratization. Since the middle of the 1990s, however, hopelessness has dominated public perceptions of politics and the economy in Armenia. From the perspective of historical legacies, the political culture of a society determines the ―operational code‖ or political behavior of its elite. A nation‖s political culture, its norms and values, are reflected in the processes of decision making by its elite, the attitudes of elites and the general public, the nature of citizen-state relations, and the quality of citizencitizen interactions.43 A democratically inclined political culture demonstrates ―deeply rooted orientations of tolerance, trust, and participation.‖ Effective democracy, Inglehart and Welzel write, ―emerges from a broader process of human development, in which economic development

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tends to promote rising self-expression values that in turn tend to fuel effective democracy. In conclusion, effective democratic institutions are a consequence rather than a precondition of a democratic mass culture.‖44 Emphasizing the significance of political culture, Woshinsky maintains that in a given society the nature of elite response to conflict reflects that society‖s political culture. Possible responses include negotiation, repression, war, or denial, and the type of response will, over time, determine the character of the political system as pluralistic, authoritarian, anarchic, or parochial.45 Woshinsky identifies four types of societies: culturally homogeneous with an active citizenry; culturally homogeneous with a passive citizenry; culturally heterogeneous with an active citizenry; and culturally heterogeneous with a passive citizenry. In a culturally homogeneous society the degree of citizen agreement on basic values and citizen activism are relatively high, and the political system is characterized by pluralism and participation, which results in what Robert Dahl has referred to as ―polyarchy.‖ In a culturally homogeneous society where the degree of citizen agreement on basic values is high but citizen activism is low, the political system is characterized by oligarchic rule. In culturally heterogeneous societies where there is little agreement on basic values and the citizenry is active, the political system is characterized by fragmentation and instability. In a culturally heterogeneous society where the citizenry is passive and parochial, the political system is characterized by ―imperialist rule.‖46 The degree of cultural homogeneity and the level of citizen activism constitute key attributes of a political system. Citizens in more open and democratic societies can be highly active in community and national affairs and voice their beliefs and values. Citizens in authoritarian societies, in contrast, tend to be disfranchised and alienated and remain cynical, passive, and even fatalistic toward politics. 47 The typologies presented by Woshinsky are not mutually exclusive. While he considers collectivist cultures as separate from parochial cultures, the Armenian case suggests a closer association between the two. A collectivist culture is characterized by fear of disagreement and a preference for repression of dissident voices and nonconformist behavior; the structure of government preserves durable authoritarian stability interrupted only by sudden bursts of turbulence. A parochial culture embodies ethnocentrism and fear and hatred toward other (sub)groups; a highly centralized elite in command of the state arrogates to itself the power to decide on vital issues of power and patronage, while delegating decisions on routine matters to functionaries and loyal groups. This parochial culture sustains a structure of government consisting of an oligarchic circle of elites, where conflicts between elites and with opposition groups are often ―resolved by intrigue or low levels of violence

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(e.g. assassination),‖48 and where a high level of cynicism regarding politics also reflects a low level of trust toward political leadership. In his classic book Polyarchy, Dahl identifies a number of variables that shape culture. These include the class system, the level of wealth, the beliefs of political activists, the variety of distinct, antagonistic subcultures, historical developments (including whether a given society is independent or controlled by a foreign power), key historical events, and the timing of mass political participation. A society that is highly divided between the wealthy few and the poor masses is likely to produce intense tensions and mutual distrust between the two classes, which prevent the development of ―social comity‖ and stability. The level of national wealth and its just distribution across a large sector of society are closely correlated with democratization and democratic stability. ―The higher the socioeconomic level of a country, the more likely it is to have a competitive political regime,‖ Dahl notes.49 He asserts that the history of a given people, its achievements and failures over several centuries, are critical in the shaping of democratic or authoritarian political culture, in determining whether a political system emerges from its historical processes as an open or a closed society. The ―congruence thesis‖ holds that the stability of a political system requires consistency between the structures of authority and ―the people‖s prevailing authority beliefs.‖50 Accordingly, democratic regimes emerge where democratic beliefs and values prevail among citizens. As noted above, one essential element is whether a nation has experienced substantially long periods of independence or subjugation to foreign domination. A people lacking in national sovereignty cannot spontaneously acquire the values, customs, habits, and rituals of democratic practices, such as tolerance toward opposition leaders or groups. In Woshinsky‖s words, ―Citizens used to enforced obedience don‖t gain practice in the give-and-take methods of resolving conflict that are central to polyarchal politics.‖51 A nation living under foreign rule produces ―feelings of fear and servitude that are wholly incompatible with the participationist ethos of a polyarchy.‖52 It develops a political culture of servitude characterized by a profound sense of ―alienation and distrust‖; people in such a culture struggle to ―maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; [they] assume that all others will do likewise.‖53 Edmund Burke maintained that democratic values and standards promotive of individual rights could only emerge under ―a government rooted in a nation‖s history‖ and could be protected by its ―longstanding traditions and practices.‖54 People not versed in traditions of democratic habits are not likely to develop free and fair electoral procedures, democratic institutions, and customs of compromises among opposition groups.

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The lack of such traditions impedes the development of a certain degree of functional civility between the ruling government and the opposition and heightens the susceptibility of leadership succession to political machinations and violence. Stable democratic leadership succession is predicated upon legitimate rules of competition that are sustained through reciprocal civility on the part of the ruling party and its competitors. Ian Shapiro presents normative and explanatory, aggregative and deliberative theories of democracy. The aggregative conceptualization of democracy as advanced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau‖s Social Contract stresses the general public will as an expression of collective endeavor where competition and ―the right rules to govern the contest‖ form the essence of majoritarian principles of governance. On the other hand, theorists employing the Aristotelian approach to deliberative democracy hold ―a transformative view of human beings‖ and explore how deliberation may influence preferences with respect to community priorities. In this case, ―the general will has to be manufactured, not just discovered.‖55 Deliberative theorists encourage public deliberation in hopes of formulating policies in the interest of the commonweal. Contending that both deliberative and aggregative theorists exaggerate the role and significance of the notion of the common good, Shapiro proposes a conceptualization of democracy whereby the formal management of authority relations curtails ―the illegitimate exercise of power.‖ Referring to Niccolò Machiavelli, Shapiro defines the common good as a collective interest in ―avoiding domination share,‖ encompassing institutions of command to elicit obedience, but also, in the wider scheme of political economy, to determine national agendas, to delineate policy options, and to control resources essential in basic human needs.56 All societies are inherently hierarchical in their structures of power, although clearly some hierarchies of power command greater legitimacy than others. It is the ability of a society to minimize the illegitimate employment of force that prevents absolutist rule. The failure to check such hierarchies generally leads to, or, as in the case of post-Soviet Armenia, is a symptom of the absence of a viable, strong civil society and the lack of public spaces to cultivate the political efficacy of citizenry. 57 The Armenian case Armenians lived as a subject people for centuries under Ottoman, Persian, and Russian rule and subsequently under the Soviet regime. A democratically oriented political culture, values, beliefs, and attitudes regarding constitutional governance, along with constitutionally based patterns of individual and collective behavior all were absent, or at best

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underdeveloped, in Armenian society. 58 The authoritarianism, industrialization, and secularization experienced under the Soviet system failed to change the deeply rooted traditional values, worldviews, and mores characteristic of agrarian societies. Upon independence, the political leadership in Armenia worked feverishly to import Western constitutional designs. Accordingly, the government of Levon Ter-Petrosyan invited a host of legal and academic experts to develop the country‖s constitution and legal infrastructure. In so doing, the elite sought to legitimate its exercise of power 59 through a post-Soviet political culture that at least in appearances would emulate a democracy. Yet, the post-Soviet Armenian political landscape has been impervious to what Weber called ―legal authority‖ – that is, a legitimate authority predicated upon rationally adopted and implemented impersonal rules that are equally observed by ruler and ruled. In postSoviet Armenia, instead, the powers and prerogatives of personal rule dominate the processes of formulation and implementation of rules and laws. Such a political culture is highly conducive to personalistic leadership rather than an authority structure whereby formal rules and pro cedures govern the processes of legislation and implementation of rules through democratically oriented institutions. Public opinion surveys confirm the hypothesis that the traditional understanding of authority has persisted in Armenia, and the public holds a low estimation of the three policymaking institutions. The executive, legislative, and judicial branches are not considered as formal entities separate from the powers held by the president, the legislators within his party, and the judges serving on the bench. In a democratic system, the legislature is considered the principal policymaking body because it is the most representative institution among the three branches of government. This has not been the experience in the case of the Armenian parliament (Azgayin Zhoghov, National Assembly); rather, the ruling party views the minority parties in the assembly as obstacles to further consolidation of power. The dominant political party is in fact an inextricable component that sustains the structures of ―superpresidentialism.‖60 Further, most political parties have not functioned as parties but rather, in the words of Nora Dudwick, as ―hierarchical networks of relatives, friends, and acquaintances loyal to charismatic or powerful individuals.‖61 In such a system, democratic change of government through free and fair elections is not possible, and, more emphatically, any change in the incumbent leadership-party configuration of power also constitutes a radical, nearly revolutionary, change. For in personal authoritarian rule, the leader represents the ultimate authority in government and society, the singular power beyond the scope and

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reach of the constitution, the law, and juridical agencies. 62 The oligarchic nature of the exercise of political and economic power would require close attention to the extent to which patronage and financial considerations structure public discourses and spaces. The project of democracy, which was to have been founded upon civil, political, social, and economic rights, did not materialize in Armenia and a number of other former Soviet republics in part because their authoritarian and statist political cultures, deeply rooted in primordial habits of thought and customs impeded the development of democratic institutions. Political culture, however, provides only the foundations of the system; in addition to undemocratic political culture, the transition to the post-Soviet space was also shaped by individual political leaders whose own personal ambitions and authoritarian tendencies undermined or even destroyed the public energy, expectations, and aspirations invested in the prospect of a democratic society. What James Gibson has stated regarding the difficulties in Russia and Ukraine is equally applicable to Armenia: The primary ―threats to democratic consolidation,‖ he notes, ―lie in the authoritarian propensities of many Russian and Ukrainian leaders, the intolerance of the mass publics, the explosion of crime and social anomie, and the rise of neofascist political candidates and organizations.‖63 Democratization would require the dissolution of the oligarchic networks and the reconfiguration of state-citizens power relations so as to facilitate integration of excluded groups and to engender greater institutional accessibility and accountability. 64 By way of transition from the Soviet system, the former republics, including Armenia, relied heavily and exclusively on Western models in efforts to strengthen their juridical sovereignty, as they emulated the constitutional and market principles found in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and to a lesser extent Germany. Such an approach appeared quite prevalent particularly in Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, which could not survive without injections of Western capital and technology and without access to international financial institutions. Yet, regardless of whether it is an Anglo-American model or a Rhine model of political economy imported by the former Soviet republics, they were hardly in a position to adopt liberal market and civil institutional frameworks found in the West. Industrialization, urbanization, and market conditions and practices evolved in Europe over centuries, as did the legal infrastructures and the social, political, and economic institutions that developed gradually with the transformations brought about by the Industrial Revolution.65 Nevertheless, the political rhetoric emanating from Erevan, Tbilisi, Baku, Moscow, and other capitals masked their failure to establish legal, economic, and political

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institutions along the lines of Western models. In the aftermath of independence in 1991, such rhetoric may have sounded convincing, as they reflected public aspirations for national sovereignty and expectations for greater freedom from the authoritarian system inherited from the decrepit Soviet regime. By the end of the 1990s, rhetorical gestures alone no longer satisfied the population, and some republics, including Armenia, appeared to have evolved into a post-Soviet ―Potemkin village‖ or, in the words of Charles King in reference to the neighboring Georgia, a ―Potemkin democracy.‖66 In these societies, the state and entrepreneurs alike, for the sake of their own interests, presented to the outside world in fairly sophisticated ways the facade of modernization, Western capitalism, and democratization. In practice, however, they maintained authoritarian rule; their political cultures lacked a tradition of self-government and the necessary ingredients to institute principles of democratic governance, and as a result failed to promote and protect human rights. In the case of Armenia, the political leadership relied on Soviet practices of repression and intolerance toward opposition groups, leading to gross human rights violations. The political culture of authoritarianism inherited from the Soviet regime and the environment of oligarchic rule it created left the ordinary citizen at the mercy of oppressive institutions with few incentives to change their behavior. Citizen behavior oscillated between, on the one hand, muted anger combined with passive acceptance of existing conditions, and, on the other, public criticisms and demonstrations of outright violent hostility toward the political leadership. The record after nearly 20 years of sovereignty suggests that the problems are systemic, rooted in political culture and legal practices inherited from the past (e.g. the Soviet Union, tsarist Russia), 67 in the nature of the newly created post-Soviet institutions, and in the quality and character of the political leaders and their practices. The ―transitional‖ state has shown unmistakably authoritarian proclivities, which by 2010 appear to sustain and further deepen the authoritarian state. Indeed, in his 2002 article, Thomas Carothers suggested that the ―transitional paradigm‖ had lost its relevance. The transition model assumed that countries which oust dictatorial regimes inevitably embrace democratization, that elections deepen democracy, that ―economic level, political history, institutional legacies, ethnic make-up, sociocultural traditions‖ do not exert sufficient influence as to shape ―the outcome of the transition process.‖68 Yet, Carothers contends, certain patterns have emerged that negate the assumptions undergirding the transition paradigm, as some former communist societies have leaned toward democracy and others (Armenia among them) toward authoritarian rule.

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The post-Soviet Armenian state has become authoritarian in part because Armenian political history and sociocultural traditions have never experienced the historical, transformative democratization processes that occurred in the West. The autocratic tsarist Russian and subsequently Soviet authoritarian rule permitted no public spheres for opposition political parties, and civil society remained weak. The post-Soviet political leadership had never experienced democratic governance, and the policies they have generated in the executive, legislative, and judicial bodies, overburdened by patronage and corruption, have lacked moral and material incentives to accord due consideration to matters pertaining to the public good. It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that the poor human rights record in Armenia since 1991 is the product of a political culture with an underdeveloped or undeveloped ―spirit of democracy,‖69 an authoritarian political leadership that is determined to hold on to power, and an oligarchic elite structure that is at best indif ferent to the social and economic consequences of decisions and behavior by the powerful and privileged. These underlying conditions leave little political space for a viable, dynamic civil society and in fact subvert democracy. Human rights theoretical frameworks The emergence of international human rights standards is closely related to the history of modernization. The transformation of societies, initially primarily in the West, from the pre-capitalist, pre-industrial social order to their modern successor progressively was accompanied by secularization, industrialization, and urbanization. Beginning roughly in the middle of the fifteenth century, the European Renaissance, the European conquest of the Americas, the Protestant Reformation, the scientific revolution, and the Enlightenment challenged medieval customs and cultures and undermined the feudal political and socioeconomic structures. The American War of Independence and the French Revolution, on the one hand, and the Industrial Revolution, on the other hand, signaled the advent of modernization, the ―first wave‖ of democratization, and the ―first generation‖ of human rights. While political authority became centralized and increasingly exercised through administrative bureaucratic structure, modernization led to cultural secularization in the West, influenced not only by material socioeconomic factors but also by the philosophical contributions by John Locke (1632–1704), Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78), and Voltaire (1694–1778), and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), and other philosophes to a new conceptualization of man and

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individual identity, society and culture, authority and power, morality, political economy, and justice. Human beings would be liberated from the irrationality of superstitions and religious doctrines as inherited from the theological configurations of normative constructions of culture and identity. Society and culture, in turn, would be freed from the burdens of dogmas and canons imposed by the Church that for long had hindered man‖s emotional and intellectual maturation to its full potential. The political economy of power and of justice came to rest on the moral force of the social contract as envisioned by Rousseau, Kant, and Locke. These revolutionary ideas undergirding the transformation of Western society from feudalism to modernization culminated in the development of the constitutional principles of the Rights of Man as predicated upon liberty, equality, and fraternity, which came to serve as the foundations for the structurally republican and ideologically democratic modern state.70 Among other key elements contributing to modernization and democratization was the proliferation of printing, which underscores the close relationship between material and cultural development. Eugene Rice, Benedict Anderson, Karl Deutsch, among others, have noted that the advent of technological modernization and printing and the resultant spread of publications had enormous consequences for Europe. 71 Printing, writes Rice, ―turned intellectual work as a whole into a cooperative instead of a solitary human activity,‖ ―enlarged the amount of intellectual effort applied to individual problems,‖ and facilitated the acquisition of knowledge as ―the greater standardization of print [made] learning to read easier.‖ 72 The advent of printing thus advanced new scholarship and research and encouraged reading by an ever-widening circle of readers, thereby facilitating the exchange of ideas and public dialogue through ―cooperative critical examination and the repetition of experiments.‖73 This widening of public dialogue is of paramount importance for the development of a democratic political culture, as such dialogue also facilitates what Jürgen Habermas has referred to as ―the structural transformation of the public sphere.‖ 74 In the Armenian experience, the proliferation of printed material contributed to the strengthening of national identity and to the further solidification of transnational unity in the demands for democratic reforms in the Ottoman and Russian empires and ultimately for national independence. 75 This complex process experienced in the West also created the model for statehood, which inspired peoples across the globe, who for centuries had been subjugated to imperial rule in its various manifestations, be it in the British, French, Ottoman, or Russian Empire. As a result, for the colonized peoples, the concepts of liberty and rights came to be closely associated with sovereignty, 76 as their political consciousness was awak-

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ened to their collective aspirations to self-determination. Sovereign statehood, the power to self-rule, represented the only means to secure the autochthonous and autonomous institutionalization of human rights. Modernization came to be directly connected with westernization, but this transformative experience underscored the fundamental differences between the West and the colonial peoples with respect to their political cultures, historical experiences, and the socioeconomic contexts of modernization. Throughout the nineteenth century, and certainly by the early twentieth century, Western political culture had become a secular, constitutional culture whereby political authority granted certain rights to the individual, with widening spheres of civil and political rights and liberties both as an individual and as a citizen. Since the Second World War when human rights issues were placed on the international agenda, two general and divergent approaches to the study of human rights and development have emerged. Philosophers, legal scholars, and political activists have concentrated their energies on human rights and advocated political and legal reforms in accordance with international legal, moral, and ethical standards. On the other hand, policymakers, social scientists, and economists have focused on political and economic development and modernization with greater attention to financial arrangements, institutional and structural frameworks of statebuilding, and social and economic progress. 77 Disagreements notwithstanding, these two divergent approaches to human rights have emerged in the context of nation-building, state-building, and democratization. The study presented in this book combines both of these approaches but also integrates a third perspective – namely, basic human needs – to offer a more holistic analysis of human rights in Armenia. As Tony Evans has noted, developments in the sphere of international human rights since the Second World War led to an ―optimism offered by the formal regime,‖ while persistent violations of human rights resulted in pessimism. Evans identifies three approaches to discourses pertaining to human rights: philosophical, legal, and political. The philosophical discourses express foundationalist truths and morally just norms undergirding human aspirations as predicated upon natural rights, selfevidence, theories of justice, and human needs. The legal discourses are based on international human rights law, particularly as developed in the second half of the twentieth century under the United Nations.78 The legal debates involve a wide range of issues, for example, whether international human rights law is universally applicable in all societies and the extent to which the achieved or potential transnationalization of human rights law can ―resolve the contradictions between the cosmopolitan claims of human rights and the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and

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domestic jurisdiction, upon which the tradition of international law is built.‖79 Political discourses ―contextualize the prevailing values expressed in law and philosophy‖ as they are ―concerned with questions of power and interest associated with the dominant conception of human rights.‖80 While seen by their critics as ideologically driven, the political discourses stress power relations and interests as integral components of international and national political economy. The failure to consider the political economy of human rights and the various aspects of policymaking involved in the promotion or obstruction of morally just human rights practices renders both the philosophical and the legal discourses nugatory. Clearly, international human rights law, referring to both standard-setting treaties and customary norms, cannot address all issues pertaining to government performance, as from a policy perspective human rights compete with other values and interests.81 With respect to the political economy of human rights, the ideology of the post-Soviet political leadership and economic elite has stressed ―market discipline,‖ a leading principle in political economy, which advocates limited state intervention in the nation‖s economic affairs, free market policies through privatization, price liberalization, and deregulation to encourage economic development and growth. 82 Market discipline considers human rights ―a set of negative rights associated with liberty, security, and property, which offer a moral and normative foundation for justifying actions within the current global political economy.‖83 Neoliberals see the relationship between human rights and the free market as mutually complementary. A free market environment, they assert, is a necessary condition for the development of human rights. Expanding networks of commerce and communication in the age of globalization will in the long run enhance government transparency and will improve conditions for civil liberties and political rights, as societies seek the full benefits of commercial freedoms.84 Conservatives agree on the significance of the free market and its close association with market opportunities and inclusion of property rights as human rights, but in sharp contrast to neoliberals, they place a greater premium on demands of national sovereignty and security rather than on civil liberties and political freedoms. In sum, both neoliberals and conservatives agree on the advantages of the free market, the former with the expectation that at least political and civil liberties will improve, while conservatives reject or at least hold reservations regarding the ability of non-Western societies to democratize and improve their human rights situation. In sum, adherence to human rights standards on the part of governments requires their voluntary compliance with international human rights law. Yet, whether a government endorses and enforces human

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rights standards may depend on several factors, from the most general level of historical circumstances and political culture, to the intermediate level of institutional capacities, bureaucratic politics, and constitutional structures, to the most specific level of individual ideological predilections and personal motivations as reflected in policy decisions. Modernization theory The modernization theory, which appeared in the social sciences in the early years of the Cold War in the aftermath of the Second World War, was built upon the Enlightenment perspective that technological advances facilitate economic development and cultural transformations. According to this theory, industrialization and economic development, considered the prerequisites of modernization, entail cultural change and human progress in general, with attendant expectations for the institutionalization of free democratic institutions that promote and protect civil and political rights and liberties. 85 Human progress involves fundamental changes in material existence and in cultural and moral values and beliefs. As societies industrialize, their traditional values are replaced by ―modern values,‖ which lead to the ―convergence of values‖ across advanced societies, 86 while economically less developed societies retain their traditional institutions of authority and traditionally agrarian cultural traits, customs, and habits. The modernization theory maintains that modern institutions serve as mechanisms to facilitate adaptation to various political, social, and economic conditions. This theory underscores the role of religious leaders, entrepreneurs, and the intelligentsia as mobilizers and representatives of civil society. Such actors are assumed to serve as formal and informal links between the community and ruling parties and governmental institutions, while providing the institutional mechanisms for conflict management, political legitimacy, and stability. Other scholars stress the ―persistence of traditional values despite economic and political changes.‖87 Among the principal theories of ethnicity and nationalism, for instance, primordialists hold that ethnic identity is deeply rooted in a nation‖s collective history, culture, traditions, myths, and institutions. This complex anthropopsychological matrix constitutes the overall framework of ―basic group identity,‖88 a nation‖s ―state of mind,‖89 its customs, manners, and mores, or in the words of Alexis de Tocqueville, ―habits of the heart … the whole moral and intellectual condition of a people.‖90 Significantly, these cultural properties also comprise the philosophical and cultural foundations of modern nationalism and the nation-state.91 Nationalism solidifies boundaries at different levels: the nation-state in relation to its external environment in foreign

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affairs; the state in relation to civil society; the state and the dominant culture in relation to ethnic, religious, or other minority communities. Relatively strong nationalist pulses among the public contribute to the augmentation of authoritarian qualities of the state and its citizens. Cultural traditions exercise a lasting influence on a society‖s perception of the world and its worldview. ―History matters,‖ Inglehart and Welzel assert, and ―a society‖s prevailing value orientations reflect an interaction between the driving forces of modernization and the retarding influence of tradition.‖92 The Industrial Revolution was as much an economic phenomenon as it was a cultural phenomenon, as Britain and western Europe transformed, at times with spectacular alacrity and brilliant energy, from traditional, agricultural values, customs, and mores to the secular; from the aristocratic mainsprings of power and authority to the contractarian, rational, secular sources of authority. In this process, modernization and secularization brought about a transformation in culture from ―survival values to self-expression values,‖ which widened the distance between the ruler and the ruled and in so doing gave rise to further demands for self-expression values, economic development, and increases in liberties and choice. A democratic society permits wider liberties and freedoms of expression and self-realization in part because its political culture is inclined to accord greater respect to such values, which also give shape to an ―increasingly people-centered‖ society in the process of economic modernization and political development. This view is supported by empirical analyses that indicate a causal relationship between the presence of democratic political culture (independent variable) and the development of democratic institutions (dependent variable). 93 The ramifications of this finding for post-Soviet Armenia are ominous. It suggests that in a society such as Armenia, which lacks a democratic tradition and a human rights culture, democracy cannot instantaneously be developed and human rights values cannot be cultivated simply by creating a democratic constitution. Democratization and its corollary human rights cultural values develop and mature in the longue durée of political, economic, and cultural historical experiences. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to economic stagnation in Armenia, a substantial drop in the standard of living, and the virtual destruction of existing socioeconomic and political structures, heightening the sense of an increased threat to existential security. As a result, concern over matters of survival and a general sense of insecurity resulted in ―a regression toward traditional values and survival values.‖94 The younger generation has embraced outward signs of cultural modernization (encouraged largely by business interests), but there has been a general cultural reversal on a broader scale. The gains made in such areas as gender equality during the

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Soviet period have been reversed as traditional Armenian patriarchal values superseded the more egalitarian norms adopted under Soviet rule. Cross-cultural analyses indicate that 99 per cent of the people in lowincome societies believe that men are better political leaders than women, while only a small percentage concur with this view in wealthier advanced societies. The Armenian case demonstrates the former. The reversion to traditional views pertains to values, beliefs, and attitudes encompassing personal and family honor and shame, interpersonal trust, trust in and respect for institutions beyond the family, to tolerance toward religious and cultural minorities and toward alternative views and lifestyles (e.g. homosexuals), political efficacy and civic engagement, and so forth. Inglehart and Welzel find that ―Eastern ex-communist societies rank much lower than other societies on the syndrome of trust, tolerance, subjective well-being, civic activism, and self-expression.‖ The traumatic crises caused by the turbulence of the disruption in their social, economic, and political topography rendered life ―insecure and unpredictable‖; as a result, people in these poorer societies place a greater emphasis on survival values than those in societies with higher incomes.95 Marxist theories The official Soviet ideology of Marxism underscored class conflict between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between those who possessed no resources other than their physical labor and those who controlled the means of production. Marxism rejected the assumption, propounded by classical liberalism or capitalism, that politics and economics operated in two distinct spaces – one demarcated for state policy and the other for the market. Class conflict aimed to destroy existing political structures and the authority represented by the closely intertwined relations between the state and the capitalist classes, as the former controlled and extracted resources from society and protected the privileges of the latter.96 This theory asserts that at the international level, European colonization and imperialism created a global political economy that Western interests dominated through monopolies of various shades and hue. In the early twentieth century, Vladimir I. Lenin maintained that the worldwide competition for raw materials, coupled with the fact that monopolistic enterprises (e.g. cartels) were concentrated in a few hands, inevitably produced what he referred to as the ―highest stage of capitalism,‖ characterized by international military conflicts and struggles for spheres of influence. In the second half of the twentieth century, the dependencia theory, based on Marxist-Leninist structural thought and largely focusing on the experiences of Latin American economies, emerged as an influential

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school of thought in the works of Raoul Prebisch, Andre Gunder Frank, and others. According to this theory, the wide socioeconomic gaps between the advanced societies of the North (the ―core‖) and the less developed and poorer nations in the South (the ―periphery‖) were explained by the fact that during the long historical process of modernization and industrialization the wealthy societies exploited the developing countries and extracted their natural resources. The inequalities created in power and financial relations between the core and the periphery left the latter with a host of social, economic, and political difficulties in the twentieth century.97 The ideological conflicts between the two major powers, the capitalist United States and the communist Soviet Union, during the Cold War (i.e. 1945‒91) exacerbated the challenges confronting the less developed societies in the Third World – Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Further, the global system, dominated by the advanced countries, did not provide an opportunity for rapid economic development. By the time the former colonies gained independence, the advanced societies of Europe and the United States had solidified their supremacy over the major international organizations and international law. The less developed nations in Africa and Asia were therefore compelled to operate within the capitalist system after decolonization. As they sought rapid modernization, they found themselves under intense social and economic strains and many of them under authoritarian rule. Similar to the dependencia theory, Immanuel Wallerstein‖s worldsystem approach postulates that the major European and capitalist powers have ruled the modern world economic system since the sixteenth century. The evolution of the world system from agricultural to industrialized societies created technologically highly complex networks of trade, finance, and production facilities dominated by major capitalist powers. The world economic system, with its structural complexities, has remained inherently capitalist uninterrupted since the sixteenth century.98 According to Marx, a market-oriented conceptualization of human rights determines the value of rights according to the calculus of liberal exchange between free will and selfishness, equality and gain, property and community. Market discipline places a premium on profit as the ―supreme human value,‖ whereby human beings are valued in proportion to the value of the property they own, their financial contributions to sustain the political elite, and the extent of their engagement in commerce.99 Implications for the post-Soviet republics From a theoretical standpoint, the modernization theory was not applicable to the Armenian case as the country was a constituent republic of the Soviet Union from 1921 to 1991 and therefore could not participate in

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the Western-driven international capitalist development. The Western advanced societies could not exercise sufficient influence in the Soviet economy to encourage modernization. 100 Nor has globalization as yet exercised a significant, modernizing influence on the cultures and traditions of a number of former Soviet republics, particularly the poorer ones such as Armenia. While the Soviet experience may have facilitated to some degree the transformation to secularization because of the Communist ideology, that process did not include socioeconomic modernization and democratization on a par with the advanced societies. This is not to say that the Soviet Union failed at modernization but rather that the content and quality of its modernization could not compete with those found in the advanced societies. The socioeconomic and cultural modernization the Soviet system had introduced in its constituent republics experienced a reversal in the poorer republics after independence, hardening their authoritarian and virulently nationalist proclivities. In the poorer former Soviet republics, as in the case of Armenia, the post-independence governments have rationalized their failures in the social, political, and economic spheres as ―natural‖ difficulties encountered in the ―transitional stage,‖ all the while relying on laissez faire principles and according priority to privatization and price liberalization for the sake of accruing financial gains to individuals within the circles of the ruling oligarchy. Political leaders therefore acknowledge the ―high transition costs‖ – in the form of restrictions on civil and political liberties, unemployment, inflation, and poverty – as ―an acceptable price to be borne stoically in the name of future generations.‖101 Moreover, they view demands for democratization, particularly during elections, as potentially undermining economic growth. This position is reinforced in times of economic crisis, which, combined with the existing lack of democratic institutions, leads to the consolidation of authoritarianism, or what Davies has referred to as ―market preserving authoritarianism.‖102 The collapse of the Soviet Union legitimized the Western capitalist ideology in the eyes of political leaders and many in the public in the former republics. An ideological consensus emerged among leaders affirming the necessity of emulating the Western capitalist model; however, they exploited this opportunity and, employing the rhetoric of Western capitalism, also legitimized their authoritarian rule, with profound ramifications for human rights and democratization. Three generations of human rights First generation The modern concept of human rights emerged as an expression of uni-

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versal values with deep historical roots in ancient civilizations. The evolution of rights paralleled or reflected prevailing political, social, economic, and cultural conditions and the development of various strands in the history of philosophy. Since the Enlightenment, three generations of human rights have emerged. Universal moral values and ethics, prescribed as duties, are enshrined in ancient moral codes of conduct and the religious texts of Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The earliest compilation of the law codes of Hammurabi (reign 1796–50 BC) of ancient Babylon, the Ten Commandments of the Hebrew Bible, The Analects of Confucius (551–479 BC), the Arthashastra and Neetishastra of Kautilya (Chanakya, 350–283 BC), and the philosophical treatises of Plato (427–347 BC), Aristotle (384–22 BC), Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BC), and Epictectus of Hierapolis (55–135), among others, sought to identify the principles of truth, justice, virtue, freedom, rights, and laws for the benefit of the commonweal, the polis of Athens, the civitas of Rome, or the cosmopolite of the Stoics. 103 Well into the fifteenth century, the major empires of the east and the west – India, China, Byzantium, and the Muslim world – operated in a world system characterized largely by economic and military parities. Beginning in the sixteenth century, however, the global balance of forces tilted in favor of the West. The scientific revolution, the emergence of mercantilism and the modern nation-state, expansion across the Atlantic and Indian oceans, and the rise of the middle class, transoceanic merchants, and commercial entrepreneurs, all contributed to the rapid economic development in and the ascendance of the West in relation to other regions.104 The fundamental transformations unfolding in economic and social life across the West exercised a profound impact on philosophies of political economy, on religious thought, and on thoughts concerning the same issues that had preoccupied the ancient philosophers – justice, freedom, virtue, power, laws, and rights. Explorations of the New World and exploitation of its natural resources beginning in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries led to the accumulation of unprecedented wealth and power for the emerging new empires. The Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries challenged the authority of the Catholic Church. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 concluded the Thirty Years‖ War (1618–48) and facilitated the emergence of the modern nation-state. The Glorious Revolution of 1688, following the Habeas Corpus Act a decade earlier (1679), introduced the English Bill of Rights, which, with its ideological roots in the Magna Carta of 1215, challenged the monopoly of power exercised by the monarchy and guaranteed protections from excessive fines and torture. Beginning in

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1776, the American War of Independence produced the Declaration of Independence and subsequently the Bill of Rights as the first ten amendments of the Constitution. The French Revolution proclaimed the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789).105 These revolutionary movements and human rights declarations reflected the views expressed in the philosophical treatises of Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Voltaire, and Kant, among others. Their works espoused political rights and civil liberties, which served as the philosophical précis for the revolutions in the eighteenth century. Referred to as the ―first generation‖ of human rights, these centered on the principles of laissez-faire capitalism and represented the foundational values upon which the modernization theory rested. On one side, it stressed individual rather than collective rights and postulated a negative formulation of rights: the individual possessed the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and cruel or inhuman punishment and to be free from government actions that might abridge one‖s physical security, privacy, or ownership of private property. On the other side, first generation rights also embodied positive rights, as they placed legal and moral obligations on the government to create laws that guarantee the right to vote, freedom of thought, freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, the right to a fair and impartial trial. 106 The conceptualization of human rights as universal values clashes directly with the principle of national sovereignty. In general, two schools of thought represented the tensions seemingly inherent between human rights and sovereignty, a tension that reflects the historical reality that the development of modern democracy was closely related to the emergence of the nation-state and nationalism in the aftermath of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The modern realist school of politics, whose theoretical foundations date at least as far back as Jean Bodin (1530‒96), Thomas Hobbes (1588‒1679), and Emer de Vattel (1714‒67), focuses on the ―statist logic‖ undergirding territorial sovereignty and maintains that national sovereignty reigns paramount in the hierarchy of priorities in domestic and global politics.107 This ―statist logic‖ has created profound tensions between prescriptive political or geopolitical principles of national sovereignty and normative ascriptions propounding human rights values. On the domestic front, governments assign priority to internal security and employ police forces to maintain law and order, only secondarily (if at all) affording due consideration to human rights concerns as a guiding principle for policy. This statist view comports with the principle of sovereignty in international politics where, according to realists, the hostile environment compels reliance on military power, rather than moralism and idealism, for national security. 108

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Contrary to the realist school, moralists and proponents of human rights contend that human beings and societies are endowed with moral, ethical, and compassionate values promotive of internal and international stability. According to this school of thought, peoples and nations habitually cooperate, perceived or actual human and structural deficiencies notwithstanding. Democracy and human rights values represent the moral foundation of public law and order. It behooves the state to create a legal structure and implement principled practices that promote democracy, human rights, and human dignity (rather than routine reliance on force) as the basis for both internal stability and international order. 109 Second generation Social movements inspired by the French Revolution soon became radicalized, as Napoleon‖s territorial expansion gave rise to nationalism across the European continent. The Revolution and the execution of Louis XVI, however, also led to a conservative reaction on the part of ruling elites at a time when debates concerning political rights and civil liberties gave rise to heightened expectations. Grievances against tyrannical rule, however, and widespread social injustice could not be mollified by the mere enfranchisement of landowners and emerging middle classes. Industrialization and urbanization, the influx of farmers to the cities in large number, and the inability of governments to accommodate such major transformations resulted in demands for social, economic, and cultural rights that became closely associated with socialism. Referred to as ―second generation‖ rights, these human rights emerged in the nineteenth century as a reaction to slavery, exploitation of workers in factories, unsafe and unsanitary working and living conditions, ruthless child and women labor practices, and the absence of social welfare and social security programs. The Enlightenment, from the perspective of Karl Marx and other socialists, had failed to address the fundamental problems of a capitalist economy. Some socialists such as Louis Blanc (1811–82) called for reforms, while the more radical, such as Louis-Auguste Blanqui (1805– 81), exhorted their compatriots to rebel against the existing order. 110 Demands for social and economic rights emerged as an expression of the Marxist-socialist revolutions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Socialists contended that the capitalist laissez-faire philosophy of political economy legitimized the exploitation of workers, and capitalist economic development undermined or rendered irrelevant the benefits promised in guarantee of free elections and other first generation rights. Accordingly, various social movements called upon governments in industrialized societies in the West to assume broader responsibilities in

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regulating and providing services than originally conceived under first generation rights. 111 To liberal reformers and radicals alike, the social ills and economic inequalities generated by industrialization and urbanization necessitated state intervention to promote and protect the rights of workers, women, and children. Among reformers, American President Franklin D. Roosevelt‖s New Deal in response to the Great Depression and his apotheosis of ―four freedoms‖ (freedom of speech and expression, freedom to worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear) in his annual address to the US Congress on January 6, 1941, were manifestations of the extent to which such values had gained prominence. By the end of the Second World War, the magnitude of the horrors of the Holocaust and the extent of human catastrophe in general had become quite clear.112 Eleanor Roosevelt led the campaign for the adoption of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and served as the first chair of the UN Human Rights Commission. Speaking at a UN Assembly in Paris on September 28, 1948, she referred to the Declaration as the international ―Bill of Rights‖ of all mankind.113 Only respect for human dignity, in law and in practice, could ensure the realization of the principles of liberté, égalité, fraternité.114 Third generation The collapse of the traditional empires (Ottoman, Russian) during the First World War and the decline of the Western empires by the end of the Second World War enabled nationalist, anti-colonial movements in the Third World to press for self-determination. 115 They considered Western imperialism as a form of international domination and exploitation closely paralleling the political and economic conditions suf fered by laborers and the poor in the West. The third generation human rights focused on solidarity rights. 116 Particularly significant in the context of the 1960s and 1970s (by which time nearly all former colonial peoples had gained independence from their respective imperial rulers) were aspirations among social activist groups as well as some political leaders for international solidarity against Western domination and, as the Non-Alignment Movement demonstrated, against the domination by the United States and the Soviet Union. Advocating self-determination and liberation from Western hegemonic rule, anti-colonial movements criticized the modern capitalist world system, as being led by the political and economic elites in Britain, France, and the United States and as imposing their military and economic power and laws on, and impeding economic development in, Third World countries. 117

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The third generation of human rights, first enunciated in the Declaration of Algiers (1978),118 primarily emphasized the right to economic development, the rights of indigenous people, the right to ecological integrity, the right to peace, and the right to a nuclear-free world. Solidarity rights underscored the need to empower the individual through collectivities in order to enable him or her to influence decisions taken by national and local leaders that would affect their lives. 119 In the past two decades, unprecedented changes in telecommunication technologies have underscored the need for a fourth generation of human rights referring to the rights of access to information and telecommunications. The basic human needs perspective Fundamental to the above generations of human rights is the basic human needs perspective, which asserts that the economic right to adequate and sustainable standards of living is a fundamental value to uphold human dignity. Food, water, clothing, and shelter, regardless of international human rights instruments and national constitutions, represent essential needs for physical survival, without which all other rights and privileges purportedly enjoyed by citizens are meaningless. The basic human needs approach to human rights underscores the essential elements of the hierarchy of five fundamental needs developed by Abraham Maslow. These consist of physical needs (e.g. breathing, food, water); physical and personal security, including employment and financial security; social needs in terms of love, belongingness, friendship, and family; self-esteem needs such as dignity, respect toward and from others, recognition, and acknowledgement of achievements; and self-actualization, whereby the person reaches his or her full potential in the realization of aspired areas of competence.120 The basic human needs approach thus highlights the significance of substantive democracy and the need for policies promotive of second and third generation of human rights. 121 As Aristotle observed in the fourth century BC, as humans form social and political communities, their main object is to attain individual and collective fulfillment, eudaimonia (happiness), as the supreme good, for the viability of the polis, the commonweal. 122 This reference to the hierarchy of needs model is not to suggest that human beings must secure satisfaction for their physical needs before they can attain individual fulfillment and happiness. This normative theory of the hierarchy of needs has been questioned by some scholars who consider such hierarchies as ―dangerous because [they limit] the range of possibilities that should be opened by any good theory of needs.‖123 Johan Galtung has argued that elites, ―under the guise of humanitar-

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ianism,‖ would propagate the idea of the hierarchy of needs to keep people at the bottom focused on first-level needs with the hope that they will proceed to the next level of needs. 124 Further, the realization of individual human needs, though essential, is often also subordinated to the realization of societal values and needs according to institutional cultures and elite proclivities. 125 The emphasis here is placed on the contention that where a society lacks the means to satisfy the basic human needs of a large proportion of its citizenry, such a society is not likely to develop democratic institutions and policies even if it registers a significant rate of economic growth. 126 The relevance of the satisfaction of basic needs to discussions on democracy and human rights should be obvious. The normative thesis that poverty reduction and improvement in the quality of life for the less fortunate is necessary in a just society represents a universal value and, according to Rawls, 127 a moral principle of first order, which is upheld by all religions and humanistically inclined philosophers. The scholarship on the relationship between basic human needs and economic development has produced mixed results. Some studies have found that greater emphasis on needs such as equality burdens the system and impedes economic development. 128 Others have concluded that there is no correlation between the two, suggesting that policies geared toward the eradication of poverty do not hinder economic growth, nor does economic growth in and of itself eradicate poverty. 129 Still others maintain that rather than rely on state welfare programs, individuals seek resources from family and social networks; such resources include money, employment, and where necessary training and retraining. In some societies, including Armenia, family networks provide emotional and economic support to individual members. Yet, it is amply clear that family networks are not an adequate substitute for decent public programs; poor families cannot generate sufficient resources to address persistent problems of poverty, homelessness, and shortages in social and medical services. The Armenian case further demonstrates that family remittances from abroad and even a relatively large and wealthy diaspora cannot be relied upon to deal with socioeconomic problems. The classification of human rights into separate categories may be construed by some as an endorsement of a hierarchy of values. In practical terms, however, these generations of rights are indivisible, interdependent,130 and mutually reinforcing. 131 Clearly, as noted above, the free exercise of the right to vote (procedural or formal democracy) may be irrelevant when a society is mired in high poverty and unemployment levels, financial crisis, corruption, and so forth, and the policymaking institutions fail to rectify the situation (indicating a lack of substantive or effective democracy). The classification here, however,

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represents the chronological sequencing of the saliency that a specific set of rights gained at a certain time in the West and not necessarily their inherent value in relation to each other. As such, the unfolding of the generations of rights reflects the historical evolution of human rights standards: the first generation emerging in the eighteenth century with the American and French revolutions; the second generation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a result of industrialization and urbanization; the third generation in the twentieth century in the context of decolonization and the Cold War; and, if it should come to pass, a fourth generation in response to the proliferation and globalization of telecommunication technologies, access to which is essential for improved standards of living. International human rights standards The development of these generations of rights in international law demonstrates the ―normative power‖ of human rights 132 and of international law in general. The UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants, and especially the Helsinki Accords (1975) created a public space for human rights discourse in the Soviet Union, encouraged the development of an embryonic civil society in the form of fledgling human rights organizations known as Helsinki Groups in reference to the Helsinki Final Act, and led to demands for the institutionalization of human rights principles against state infringements.133 Increasingly, dissident groups rejected the discrepancies between the professed egalitarian ideology of the Soviet state and the Communist Party and the actual practices of authoritarian rule. Interpretations of this progress in human rights standards vary on several grounds. Cultural relativists challenge the notion that the international human rights instruments established under the United Nations necessarily confirm the universality of human rights standards. Nationalists reject the supremacy of international human rights law over municipal law. National sovereignty, they argue, is the most sacred principle of the nation-state and of international relations and therefore all international organizations and laws are of inferior status relative to matters of domestic sovereignty and security. 134 Indeed, the main argument advanced in this book is that responsibility for the protection and promotion of human rights ultimately rests with the state, but that the state has a moral and legal obligation to implement constitutional guarantees for human rights in compliance with international human rights law, a point similarly stressed in Fernando Tesón‖s explication of the ―Kantian thesis.‖135 Success or failure in this area, in the final analysis, depends on

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the normative propensities and political culture of a government, the character of its policymaking institutions, and the character of its leadership. Since the late 1800s and especially after the First and Second World Wars, substantial efforts have been made to devise international institutions that would cultivate and protect human rights and related values. At the global level, they included the League of Nations after the First World War and the United Nations after the Second World War. 136 At the regional level, they included, for example, the Convention Relative to the Rights of Aliens (1902), the Convention on Political Asylum (1933), the American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man (1948), and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which initially lacked the force of law when it was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, has since become an integral part of customary law, imposing legally binding obligations upon states. The Universal Declaration guarantees the protection and promotion of civil and political freedoms as well as economic, social, and cultural rights. 137 As Isfahan Merali and Valerie Oosterveld have correctly noted, although the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which the UN General Assembly adopted in 1966, created ―two distinct categories [of rights] … with distinct levels of justiciability and requirements for realization,‖138 subsequent international human rights conventions ―have rejected a division of hierarchy of rights, giving equal importance‖ to both categories of rights. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), a legally binding international treaty and considered women‖s Bill of Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, for example, have provided for a more integrated system of rights, coupled with regional treaties such as the European Social Charter and the African Charter on Human and Peoples‖ Rights. The International Court, in its judgment in the Barcelona Traction case (1970), stressed obligations erga omnes concerning international law and rules protecting basic human rights. 139 In practice, these efforts have produced mixed results. The inscription of signatures by national leaders on human rights treaties and declarations has not necessarily led to adherence to standards established by such instruments, and the enforcement of human rights conventions has posed a serious challenge in the ―anarchical society‖ of the community of nation-states.140 Yet, by the end of the twentieth century, human rights values had attained international status,141 and the creation of international organizations to promote and protect human rights achieved a degree of ―symmetry‖142 between human rights objectives and state obligations.143

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Human rights as charismatic values 144 The principles of liberté, egalité, and fraternité represent a special set of human rights values that can be characterized as ―charismatic values‖ (using the concept of charismatic adopted from Max Weber).145 Values play a central role in the maintenance of a political system, bind people together, and shape public policy. Social institutions facilitate, albeit incrementally, 146 the realization of shared values and respond to value-demands by ―affecting the reserves of support‖ that policymaking agencies ―accumulate or accrue to the “legitimacy account”‖147 of the political system, its institutions, and leaders. The effective promotion and protection of human rights, as commonly shared values, confers legitimacy upon state agencies. As charismatic authority contributes to the development of legitimate institutions, so do charismatic values enhance the legitimacy of a nation‖s social, political, and economic order – a particularly daunting task for postSoviet Armenia in the process of state-building, considering the economic crisis and human catastrophe experienced during and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As with the characteristics of Weber‖s ―charismatic leader,‖ charismatic values are a double-edged sword: human rights impart accumulative integrative effects, but the failure to engender systemic ―routinization‖ of the promotion and protection of human rights may prove fatal to legitimacy. It may be hypothesized that human rights values and the related legal institutions have ―a charismatic element [also] in the negative sense that persistent and striking lack of success in justifying their worthiness may be sufficient … to undermine their prestige‖ and legitimacy.148 Human rights values and their functional organizations, once institutionalized, perform what Talcott Parsons calls ―functionally important activities‖149 – that is, associative and integrative functions150 in promoting and protecting human rights. According to Max Weber, associative relationships are based on the ―rationally motivated adjustment of interests or a rationally motivated agreement‖ as well as on ―absolute values.‖ Undergirding ―voluntary associations‖ is a set of binding elements (e.g. political culture, law) that collectively enhance the integrative capabilities of political institutions, on the one hand, and the congruence between government and the governed, on the other. Ingredients necessary for the development of viable associative relationships include certain ―common qualities,‖ a ―common situation,‖ and a ―common mode of behavior,‖151 entailing a certain degree of cultural homogeneity and value consensus, the institutionalization of which represents the necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition for the attainment of human rights and democratic legitimacy. The state engages interest groups, voluntary associations, and civil society in general in the public spheres of political economy (following Easton‖s

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dictum) in the ―authoritative allocation of values.‖152 Following the basic needs approach to human rights, the ―authoritative allocation of values‖ implies that the state, in its role as the principal agency with the power to allocate values, is expected to serve the associative function of resource allocation as required for the satisfaction of values and needs.153 The effective promotion and protection of human rights reflects and encourages associative values among citizens, who evaluate the political legitimacy of governing institutions and individuals and therefore determine (adopting Albert Hirschman‖s words) whether to maintain their ―loyalty,‖ to express their ―voice,‖ or else to ―exit.‖154 In traditional societies such as Armenia, citizens expect the Constitution, the political institutions and bureaucracies, and authorities at all levels of government to fortify human rights as constituent ingredients of the deeply held values of family honor and shame. In theory, an authoritarian system based on oligarchic networks of patronage may be able to sustain such values as family honor at least for certain groups in society. In practice, systemic corruption and failure to protect civil, political, social, and economic rights, as in the case of Armenia, ineluctably diminishes the legitimacy of the system: It does not permit public ―voice,‖ cannot enjoy public ―loyalty,‖ and therefore is likely to witness citizens ―exit.‖ Emigration by as many as 1 million people since the early 1990s represents a profound legitimacy deficit further exacerbated by structural deficiencies in civil society and political economy. 155 Armenian political culture, religion, and statehood Writing in the middle of the nineteenth century, Stepanos Nazarian, a prominent advocate for an Armenian Enlightenment, commented that national cultural revival and political development required ―the vessel of citizenship‖ – i.e. citizenship in a sovereign democratic system.156 The absence of Armenian statehood impeded institutional developments and practices in public administration that could have been conducive to the modernization of political culture. The difficulties confronted by postSoviet Armenia, however, are not limited to matters of modernization and enlightenment per se. Lucian Pye stresses the significant role of ―traumatized political culture‖ in determining whether a society can democratize. His analysis of the difficulties facing China and Russia after decades of totalitarian rule is equally relevant to the situation in Armenia. He writes: There has been a dramatic breakdown in the norms essential for any form of civil society. It is no exaggeration to say that a moral vacuum exists in both countries. Moreover, the level of trust critical

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for constructive impersonal relationships, which was never particularly high in either Russia or China, has now largely evaporated. Lives have become more private as people turn inward to look after their individual interests, focusing on family ties and personal friendships. The level of social capital is shockingly low and hence there is little potential for creating effective civil societies. The erosion of collective values has undermined the foundations of legitimacy of the governments and consequently corruption abounds.157 In the case of Armenia, the traumatized political culture is not only the result of Soviet totalitarianism but also the result of the Genocide during the First World War, with serious ramifications for domestic and foreign policies.158 Within the overall context of general Armenian political culture, there are two additional subcultures: First, a clan system of oligarchic rule, with a traditional culture and pre-modern values; and second, a bureaucratic culture that has existed the advent of Russian domination in the Caucasus during the early part of the nineteenth century. The first subculture is a product of the centrality of the family and close circles of familial relations. The family, as a functional unit, represents one of the principal agencies of political socialization and resocialization in Armenia. Further, as a normative construct, the family provides the most basic support system for the individual as well as the basis for identity in the wider community, where honor and shame, image and reputation, loyalty and patronage determine the individual‖s pathways to success or failure. A positive public image of one‖s family is essential, as it determines his or her status in the community. Armenians project an image of themselves as ―hard-working and industrious people‖ and consider poverty, as manifested in ―a poorly furnished home or meager hospitality,‖ an indication of ―a lack of moral and social worth.‖159 On the positive side, the family serves as a safety net; on the negative side, it creates a culture of governance based on kinship rather than the rule of law and a culture of suspicion toward outgroups, with deleterious consequences for the development of civil society and civic order. The statist and authoritarian political culture becomes an extension of the rigidly patriarchical rule in the family. While the clan system constitutes a major element of Armenia‖s inherited historical legacy, the bureaucratic culture is a relatively more modern phenomenon developed first under Russian and subsequently (and more emphatically) under the bureaucratic communism of the Soviet regime. Its implications are that the individual has learned to maintain a pragmatic relationship with the agencies of the state but with

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certain expectations from the political leaders in matters of social welfare and other services. Although Armenian clan culture occasionally clashes with bureaucratic culture in competing loyalties, the cumulative impact of both can weigh heavily on the individual, restricting individual initiative and personal rights, while simultaneously expecting the individual to accede to group priorities and decisions. The existence of a nation‖s own sovereign government is a necessary condition for the development and institutionalization of modern, constitutionally based political and legal practices. 160 Constitutional law is the foundational law of the modern nation-state and governs its institutional arrangements and the conduct of its political leaders. While the moral foundations of human rights have deep roots in religious values,161 as expressed in ecclesiastical encyclicals and church canons, modernization and secularization in the West beginning in the seventeenth century transformed canon law into constitutional law. 162 In the absence of Armenian governmental institutions after the collapse of the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia in 1375, Armenians, as subject peoples, lacked opportunities to translate their philosophy of rights into policy and practice. Armenian canon law therefore remained confined to religious observances within their own communities, without a transformation into the constitution and constitutional law of a sovereign nation-state. The effectiveness of constitutional law, however, requires a political culture that is conducive to a constitutional order in rule-making and rule-following.163 Unlike canon law, constitutional law is a secular construction, although its philosophical and theoretical origins clearly are deeply rooted in theology. Well into the early part of the twentieth century, in the absence of Armenian statehood, Armenian political culture was shaped by canon law as the Church (in conjunction with the family) functioned as the primary institution governing the internal workings of the Armenian communities in the Ottoman, Persian, and Russian empires. Although (as discussed in Chapter 2) various church documents advanced human rights values, it would be a distortion of history to consider Armenian Church canon laws as formulations of democratic principles and ―constitutions‖ in the modern sense.164 Prior to their transformation to secularization beginning in the seventeenth century, the systems of the Christian West, like Armenia, were based on canon law. In Western societies, canon law and religion served as the philosophical foundations for the development of constitutional culture and law within the context of sovereign statehood, which also experienced secularization during the Enlightenment.165 Armenian culture, however, did not experience similar transformations until the twentieth century. In the absence of an Armenian government, the

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Church maintained a virtual monopoly over education and culture, and the hegemonic culture it sustained impeded the development of intellectual independence, creativity, scientific thought, and experimentations in philosophy, which in turn prevented the development of cultural values favorable to freedom of thought and tolerance toward contending worldviews. The preeminent status of the Church in society was buttressed by the traditional role of the family. The Armenian rhetoric of religion and of religiosity, which had emerged as a reflection of the feudal structure, remained unchanged for centuries in the Armenian heartland and ―habits of the heart.‖ To be sure, this view is not shared by many Armenian historians. Manuk Abeghyan noted that as a result of Armenia‖s cultural revival under the Bagratunis, by the first half of the eleventh century Armenian political culture had experienced a significant transformation toward secularization, whereby the centrality of theological thought and its influence on political philosophy began to recede. 166 This transformative process, he maintained, continued under the Cilician kingdom after the disintegration of the Bagratuni monarchy. 167 Nevertheless, the point to stress here is that by the fifteenth century, when the West began to experience a cultural shift in its theories of individual rights, the Armenian people had no sovereign state to institute similar changes. In the meantime, Western societies were developing a constitutional – i.e. contractarian – conceptualization of government, whereby the power to rule became vested in authority through a rational construction of political legitimacy in the management of political and economic affairs.168 Armenian communities in the Ottoman and Russian empires, however, did not experience a similar evolution toward contractarian governance, with the exception of the Armenian National Constitution (Sahmanadrutiun) of 1863, which created a National Assembly in Constantinople comprised of clergymen and laymen. 169 While this document reflected the philosophy of the European Enlightenment, the realities of Armenian social, political, and economic environment within the Ottoman Empire, in addition to the various latent and manifest structural constrains imposed by the traditional values and institutions, could not translate Enlightenment values into the modernization of Armenian political culture. Instead, Armenian community affairs continued to be regulated by Church-sanctioned canon law and rooted in feudal historical and theological legacies and practices that sustained the system. The Armenian Church, led by the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Holy Mother See at Echmiadzin in Russian Armenia, proved too conservative to accommodate major transformations in line with those unfolding in Europe, and the fact that both leading institutions were

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located in traditional empires, one led by the theocratic sultanate, the other by tsardom, rendered the Armenian Church less amenable to changes. Yet, social and economic rights, human dignity, and justice, all have deep religious foundations. The Christian ideal of respect toward the inherent dignity of humans as a fundamental moral principle necessitates certain ecological conditions, which at minimum sustain one‖s dignity. From a religious perspective, the eradication of poverty and hunger constitutes a duty toward the fulfillment of God‖s divine love for humans as well as one‖s love for God and others. 170 In the words of Jeffrie Murphy, ―the liberal theory of rights requires a doctrine of human dignity, preciousness and sacredness that cannot be utterly detached from a belief in God or at least from a world view that would be properly called religious in some metaphysically profound sense.‖171 Samuel Huntington has noted the correlation between Western Christianity and modern democracy: 39 out of the 46 democratic countries were predominantly Catholic or Protestant, and the 39 democratic societies constituted ―57 per cent of a total of sixty-eight countries that were predominantly Western Christian.‖ On the other hand, 7 (12 per cent) of 58 countries with ―other predominant religions were democratic.‖172 Christian values notwithstanding, the Armenian Apostolic Church in Armenia and across the diaspora has remained silent concerning the ubiquitous problems in virtually all spheres of human rights violations in the country, be it in the areas of political rights and civil liberties, social and economic rights, the rights of women and children, or the rights of refugees, while poverty, corruption, and various other ills threaten the social and moral fabric of society. As a result, unlike the active role played by the Catholic Church in Poland against Communist rule173 or the involvement of Catholic priests in the liberation theology movement against dictatorial regimes in Latin America, the Armenian Church in Soviet Armenia and in the current republic has failed to engage in the pressing human rights issues of the day.174 In fact, the observation made by James Richardson regarding the Russian Orthodox Church equally applies to the Armenian Church: While the Russian Orthodox Church ―was strongly in favor of more religious freedom as communism was toppling, it turned out that the religious freedom promoted by the ROC was organizational only (not individual) and to be limited as much as possible to the ROC itself.‖175 It would be a mere truism to state that the differences in Armenian and European experiences were profound. In Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, R.H. Tawney argues that the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were a pivotal period in European history. Prior to 1500, he writes, ―the typical

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economic systems are those of the Schoolman; the typical popular teaching is that of the sermon …; the typical appeal in difficult cases of conscience is to the Bible, the Fathers, the canon law and its interpreters; the typical controversy is carried on in terms of morality and religion as regularly and inevitably as two centuries later it is conducted in terms of economic expediency.‖176 Two centuries later, there emerged ―a new world of economic [and] political thought‖ and ―the claim of religion, at best a shadowy claim, to maintain rules of good conscience in economic affairs finally vanished.‖177 In the process of secularization, various social functions that had ―matured within the Church, and long identified with it, are transferred to the State, which in turn is idolized as the dispenser of prosperity and the guardian of civilization.‖178 Modern foundations of human rights The sacredness of human beings need not be exclusively derived from a theological, religious ―source of the normativity‖ (i.e. ―the source of the ―should‖‖).179 Ronald Dworkin asserts that ―for some of us,‖ that sacredness ―is a matter of religious faith; for others, of secular but deep philo sophical belief.‖180 Dworkin maintains that ―there is a secular as well as a religious interpretation of the idea that human life is sacred.‖181 Human rights values, as universal values, transcend the geographical boundaries defined by nation-states. The original development of modern human rights, which began in the West, does not negate the universality of such rights. Rather, in the long, historical evolution of the world, the Western political, cultural, intellectual, and economic environment proved more conducive to expressions of certain values that were not in and of themselves exclusively European or Western. Each and every human being, as the International Bill of Rights and associated documents came to explicitly declare or implicitly assume in the second half of the twentieth century, possesses inviolable ―inherent dignity‖ as a member of the ―human family‖ and is ―born free and equal in dignity and rights.‖182 As Bhikhu Parekh has stated, ―the view that the individual is conceptually and ontologically prior to society and can in principle be conceptualized and defined independently of society, which we shall call individualism, lies at the heart of liberal thought and shapes its political, legal, moral, economic, methodological, epistemological and other aspects.‖183 These human rights represent the normative force of cultural values expressed in law and morality over the centuries, but they were articulated beginning in the sixteenth century and gained codification in their modern manifestations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, most emphatically since the Second World War.

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The thesis of this book The experiences of the scientific revolution, the Enlightenment, the political revolutions in the United States, France, and Latin America, and the Industrial Revolution, were clearly Western experiences, but the values espoused in these events transformed the West and were universally valid and applicable. The fundamental difference between Western intellectuals and Armenian intellectuals was that philosophes and their successors writing in the West operated in an environment that facilitated, or did not obstruct, the dissemination of publications on such matters. Criticisms of Western cultural imperialism – that international human rights standards are in fact European or Western constructs imposed on other cultures around the world – are no doubt valid. That imperial experience, however, confirms the point made here: that the West represented the initiator role, while the others were recipient or ―importer‖184 cultures. The Armenian experience is the quintessential example of an importer or recipient, rather than an initiator, culture,185 buttressed by the ―xenophilic‖ proclivities of Armenian intellectuals regarding Western cultures, philosophy, technology, and particularly the Enlightenment.186 This does not negate the view that the European empires exercised an enormous influence as mission civilisatrice, but the purpose of the analysis presented here is not to attribute cultural or moral superiority to Western societies. Rather, the point to be emphasized is that given the deeply entrenched traditional and oppressive, even tyrannical social, cultural, and economic conditions under which some peoples (e.g. Armenians) lived well into the modern age, they failed to develop the institutional and cultural bases for liberal politics (or ―open society,‖ in the words of Karl Popper). The recipient cultures therefore could not emulate in toto Western experiences. While in the West, theories of society, rights, and justice had by the nineteenth century elevated the individual above the priorities of state and church, Armenians in the Ottoman and Russian empires failed to promote radical departures from tradition. In Europe, the development of human rights in relation to the abolition of slavery occurred at a time when industrialization had spread at a rapid pace and continued virtually unhindered, save for brief periods of recession and economic slowdown. Over time, however, Western societies developed civil institutions alongside their market institutions, laws, and customs. In the Russian Empire, however, industrialization did not press forward until the late nineteenth century, under Tsar Alexander III and his successor Nicholas II. Ronald Suny has argued that ―with the Russian occupation a historical process began which rent the fabric of traditional Georgian and Armenian society and produced

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both new opportunities and loyalties for some and persistent, if ultimately futile, resistance to centralized bureaucratic rule by others.‖187 For most of Armenian history since the Middle Ages, circumstances have required cultural adaptation to foreign rule rather than selfgovernment. The culture of the collectivity rather than the individual‖s well-being has been paramount as a key characteristic, with deleterious ramifications for those who dare to place the needs of the individual self above those of the community. Such a culture lacks a tradition of individual autonomy. Moreover, Armenian culture has developed in an inhospitable geographic terrain and climate, necessitating the primacy of physical survival. A premium is placed therefore on physical survival rather than justice. Further, Armenian culture espouses an essentially pessimistic worldview; Armenians are inclined to think in terms of conspiracies – i.e. organized life is a conspiracy against nature, and government and organized institutional settings are conspiracies against the chaotic world.188 What Woshinsky has observed regarding Russian political culture is equally applicable to Armenians. He writes: The Russians‖ sense of differentness produced … defensiveness. Especially in ruling circles and among the educated, Russian difference was historically accompanied by a deep-seated fear of inferiority. The upper classes traditionally worried that their country was backward or second-rate. This nagging worry undercut the normal psychological desire of any people to be proud of their heritage. What resulted was a classic behavior: a passive-aggressive reaction. Russian policymakers over the centuries belligerently asserted their superiority, while trying desperately to hide (even … to themselves) any societal shortcomings. 189 Woshinsky also points to the ―Potemkin village‖ syndrome, named after Grigory Potemkin, the famed prime minister of Catherine the Great. This refers to the tendency to ―set up glossy, false fronts before ramshackle huts to produce a glorified image of picturesque villages peopled by wealthy, industrious peasants.‖190 The current Armenian republic displays an entire panoply of the symbols of Western liberalism, democratization, and market economy. Its constitution, its leaders‖ political rhetoric, the imitative articulation of Western capitalist argot by the elite – all are put to use to demarcate the ideological boundaries between the current republic and its communist, Stalinist past. In doing so, the elite and the public alike seek to demonstrate the nation‖s advances in modernization, when, in fact, Armenian political culture remains steeped in the traditional habits of the Armenian heart, pre-modern political psychology, and con-

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servative customs and mores. 191 Armenia did not experience a ―cultural climate‖ of an Enlightenment – that is, ―a world in which the philosophes acted, from which they noisily rebelled and quietly drew many of their ideas, and on which they attempted to impose their program.‖192 Although the West served as a model for most of the nation‖s intellectuals in the nineteenth century, Armenian political culture was (and remains) an essentially eastern or ―quasi-oriental‖ culture. The West, these intellectuals believed, had unlocked the mysteries to successful economic, political, and cultural modernization, which, in turn, guaranteed democratization and civil and political rights and liberties. Despite their admiration for the West, Armenians in the Ottoman and Russian empires were influenced by the dominant cultures of their respective ―homelands.‖ By the 1880s, patrimonial rule under Russian tsardom had been transformed into the bureaucratic-police regime, which was further solidified under Tsar Nicholas II and particularly under the Bolshevik regime.193 As a result, Armenian subjects of the tsarist regime lacked any experience of democratic governance except through the political discourses of the ideology of liberation and self-determination.194 The short-lived first Republic of Armenia represented the culmination of the struggle to liberate the nation from foreign rule, but that government was too overwhelmed with crises to institutionalize democratic practices.195 In the post-Soviet republic, the absence of a democratic culture has been demonstrated by the authoritarian tendencies of the political leadership and executive agencies, by the lack of both an active legislature and an impartial judiciary, and by the absence of effective opposition political parties and civil society. These environmental factors in Armenian political culture, on the one hand, and the structural, systemic factors of governance and political leadership, on the other, have had profound ramifications for democratization and human rights since independence from Soviet rule in 1991 (the subjects covered in Chapters 3–6 in this book). Whether Armenian society can reverse the current vicious cycles and chart out pathways to virtuous cycles of democratization and development with respect for human rights and human dignity is a question that will be touched upon briefly in the concluding chapter. The present study stresses the necessity of an integrated approach to political, civil, social, and economic rights, as well as the rights of refugees. For the sake of analytical coherence, however, this book will address each category of rights in a separate chapter. Methodologically, this study employs a three-dimensional approach based on analyses commonly found in the literature in the fields of history, political culture, political economy, political science, sociology, econom-

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ics, and international human rights law. The first dimension consists of historical legacies and political culture. The second dimension consists of policymaking institutions. The third dimension examines policies generated by government leaders and agencies. 196 There is also a fourth component – namely, international human rights law – which runs throughout the chapters. The latter is particularly necessary in evaluating the human rights situation in a given country as it provides concrete conceptualizations of every category of human rights as articulated through international conventions. Instead of relying on abstract notions of human rights, this analysis measures human rights conditions in Armenia against a set of universally accepted standards. The three approaches, combined with international human rights standards, provide the necessary analytical tools to elucidate the causal relationships within a broader historical perspective than commonly found in human rights case studies. As a matter of political strategy, as Martha Nussbaum has correctly suggested, such an approach may also generate fruitful public dialogue concerning the nation‖s compliance with international human rights standards, a capabilities freedom best exercised by NGOs, women‖s groups, and other agencies in civil society.197 A caveat to the present study, however, is that a greater weight is accorded to policy implementation, outputs, and outcomes – that is, the government‖s human rights performance – than to policy formulation. Summary of three approaches: historical legacies, modern institutions, and policy decisions Jon Elster and his associates identify three key variables as constitutive of an explanatory model in studies on post-communist transitional societies: legacies, institutions, and decisions. This section relies heavily on their discussion of these variables. The notion of legacies constitutes the central variable in the structuralist model of politics. Historical legacies determine the present results of an authoritarian or democratic system based on the values inherited from the distant past. Beverly Crawford and Arend Lijphart maintain that ―Legacies approaches explain postcommunist transformation as a function of social, cultural and institutional structures created under Leninist regimes and Soviet domination in Eastern Europe that persist in the present period.‖ According to this approach, ―the past casts a long shadow on the present.‖198 The political, social, economic, and cultural environments in the postSoviet republics are determined by conditions inherited not only from the Soviet system but also from pre-Soviet times. An accurate assessment of

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the human rights situation in Armenia since 1991 requires an understanding of the history of political institutions and the administrative structures, the history of industrialization, and the role of the elites and the extent to which they dominate Armenian society. Such historical legacies determine future developments and are reinforced by the inherited values, beliefs, and attitudes regarding politics and community (i.e. political culture). According to the legacies or structuralist conceptualization of history and polity, then, the distant past governs the post-Soviet transformation, which can only be effected gradually, incrementally over a long period of time by the decisions of policymakers and by ―institutional innovations.‖199 The second, institutionalist approach examines the role of institutions, which, this view holds, adapt to existing political and economic conditions. Institutions are not amorphous entities materializing by chance from the ―mist of the past.‖ They are the creation of human agency: people devise rules and procedures governing their routine operation to secure specific policy outcomes, all the while preventing undesirable results. The power of institutions derives from existing conditions of institutional culture, systemic order, and stability. This approach therefore underscores the significance of the relative power of policymakers and citizens, political parties and civil society, and the procedures, rules, and guiding principles that legitimize institutional behavior and priorities. 200 Unlike the liberal modernization theory, which posited a close and positive relationship between capitalist modernization and democratic development, and unlike the Marxist and dependencia theories, which stressed economic factors, comparative approaches developed under the rubric of ―new institutionalism‖ 201 have proved particularly fruitful in this regard. ―New institutionalism‖ has placed the role of current political institutions and human agency in the context of historical development and the social and economic environment of political systems. In their study on the political economy of democratic transition, Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman note that ―it is a mistake to relegate the economic and political realms to separate spheres of analysis; economic conditions and policy, as well as the nature of political institutions, shape the prospects for democracy.‖202 Guillermo O‖Donnell and Philippe Schmitter assert, without underestimating the significance of structural variables, that ―unexpected events (fortuna), insufficient information, hurried and audacious choices … [and] the talents of specific individuals (virtù),‖ among other factors, determine policy. 203 The third approach focuses specifically on the decisions and policies generated by institutions. The least deterministic of the three models, the decisions approach emphasizes the motivations of and policy choices by policymakers. Policymakers have access to various sources of knowledge

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and domestic and international advice, including legal scholars, historians, political scientists, economists, and others with various degrees of expertise in economic modernization, democratization, human rights, and so forth. Thus, policy choices are believed to be ―a matter of rationality,‖ with ―clear guidelines as to what is to be done and what is to be avoided.‖204 While each of the three approaches elucidates certain aspects of modernization, democratization, and government human rights practices, each also has certain shortcomings. A difficulty in the first model is that it is overly deterministic, attributing to historical legacies the power to affect policy outcomes with little, if any, ―intentional causation‖ from the individuals and institutions involved. Unlike the legacies approach, the less deterministic institutional model focuses on organizational procedures but pays insufficient attention to the historical context of policies. The third approach focuses on decision making but excludes structural and environmental factors; equally important, it assumes that absolute rationality is applied with mechanical consistency. The extensive literature on the psychology and dynamics of group decision making indicates that an assumption of a high degree of rationality is not warranted. Elster, Offe, and Preuss correctly note that it is difficult for scholars to integrate the three approaches, in part because they carry with them the perspectives and predilections of a specific discipline. Historians generally focus on the impact of inherited legacies and structures as developed over the longue durée. Institutionalists, usually sociologists and political economists, search for explanatory variables as they assess the impact of rules and procedures that govern the behavior and interactions of policymakers. Economists and political scientists examine variables involving decision choices, the extent to which decisions are arrived at through rational means, and the nature and reach of power that decision makers exercise in determining policy choices. 205 The present study employs a ―synthetic‖ analytical framework whereby it integrates all three explanatory variables in order to account for ―backward linkages‖ (that is, historical legacies and political culture) and ―forward linkages‖ (that is, institutional settings, rules, and decisions). In so doing, the study underscores the complex nature of mutual influences among structures, institutions, and decisions. Such an approach is particularly necessary in studying the human rights situation in Armenia, as the success or failure of policymaking elites and institutions in promoting democratization and human rights is influenced, in a broad sense, by the legacies of not only Armenia‖s communist past but also its precommunist history over the longue durée. Chapter 2 presents a historical perspective and devotes close atten-

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tion to Armenian political culture and the legacies of a complex set of interconnected factors, including the influence of Christianity, the absence of Armenian statehood for centuries, and the impact of Ottoman and Russian rule as both empires approached the twentieth century. Chapter 3 examines Armenia‖s policymaking institutions and the extent to which they promote democratization and protect human rights. The legacy of Russian and subsequently Soviet authoritarian political culture and imperial rule has shaped and continues to influence Armenian government institutions.206 Brief attention is also paid to the Armenian Apostolic Church and the extent to which it is engaged in improving the human rights environment in the country. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 focus on a specific set of policy outcomes that reflect choices and decisions made by policymaking institutions – civil and political rights and liberties, social and economic rights, and the rights of refugees and internally displaced persons. Any assessment of the existing political system in Armenia and its success or failure in the area of democratization and human rights must acknowledge the absence of comparable data regarding the nation‖s preSoviet and post-Soviet performance. This shortcoming cannot be overcome because of historical circumstances. The brief existence of the government of the first republic from 1918 to 1920 does not offer sufficient data for a meaningful comparative analysis with Soviet Armenia and the post-Soviet republic. Instead, the present analysis first juxtaposes the history of Armenia and the evolution of international human rights standards, and subsequently examines the extent to which the current republic meets those standards in fulfilling its obligations under international law. Despite monumental accomplishments in international human rights law, no international legal system, in and of itself, can address the social, political, and economic ills of a given society. The sovereignty of the modern nation-state has created a wide chasm between international law and politics. While international human rights law has established standards and state obligations, these values and formal arrangements must compete with less than benign political, economic, and cultural realities at the national level. Political practices in a large number of countries, Armenia among them, routinely violate such standards. The political aspects of poor human rights performance in post-Soviet Armenia are further exacerbated by an unstable economic and social situation, the oligarchic networks, and rampant corruption.

2 The History of Armenia and the Evolution of International Human Rights

This volume uses a three-dimensional perspective to analyze the extent to which democratic principles and human rights values have been institutionalized in Armenia since independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. The prospects for democracy and government human rights performance in accordance with international standards and norms are largely determined by historical legacies, emerging political institutions, and the policies produced through decision-making processes. The theoretical framework presented in Chapter 1 noted the significance of historical legacies that nations inherit from the past. The explanatory model employed identifies political culture as a key independent variable, and this chapter proposes a causal relationship between historical legacy and the post-Soviet authoritarian system in Armenia. Political culture by itself, however, is meaningless without due consideration of the historical context in which it operates, a particularly significant point in the Armenian case given the absence of Armenian sovereignty for centuries. This chapter surveys Armenian historical legacies in general outline and briefly juxtaposes Armenian history with the evolution of international human rights standards. The next four chapters demonstrate that the newly consolidated political order, while maintaining a constitutional framework, has nevertheless failed to institutionalize democratization and human rights policies. Armenian philosophy of law and jurisprudence developed in the environment of feudalism but amid various political and religious dif ficulties. Thus, rather than a unilinear progression, the process involved phases of advancement and decline, recovery and reverses. Prior to the collapse of the last Armenian monarchy in historic Armenia in the eleventh century, these cycles were caused by internal divisions and

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invasions by the Byzantine, Persian, Arab, and Seljuk empires. Thereafter, for nearly a millennium until 1918, Armenians across the former Bagratuni lands lacked their own government and entered the modern age as a subject people under the Ottoman Empire in the western lands and under the Persian Empire and subsequently the Russian Empire in the east.1 The absence of an Armenian state impeded the further development of the Armenian legal system.2 When in 1918 an Armenian government was revived, neither the domestic nor the international environment proved conducive for political stability and least of all for the institutionalization of a modern democratic system. The republic of 1918 collapsed in late 1920 when the Bolshevik army captured Erevan, and the Sovietization of Armenia further delayed democratization and liberalization. Prior to the founding of the first republic, Armenian conceptualizations of human rights rested on the nationalist discourse of modern statehood. The nationalist conceptualization of human rights embraced ideologies of national liberation and self-determination.3 The re-emergence of Armenian statehood, however, necessitated a reconceptualization of human rights, a transformation which the collapse of the first republic after a brief period of sovereignty failed to achieve. By 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, Armenia embarked on independence without prior democratic traditions and lagged behind in the evolution of international human rights law and standards. Historical legacies Armenians consider themselves among the most ancient of nations and the first Christian nation. Christianity was adopted in Armenia as the state religion in the early fourth century and the Armenian alphabet in the fifth, two events that marked the origins of Armenian national identity and culture as understood today. The Mother See of the Armenian Apostolic Church, centered at Echmiadzin, is led by the catholicos, the supreme patriarch. Having replaced polytheism, Christianity introduced a new value system, 4 although certain pagan traditions and rites have persisted into the twenty-first century. Notable Armenian historicalcultural legacies include the close relationship between the Armenian Church and Armenian culture; 5 a rigidly hierarchical social order and clan relations (under the dynastic nakharar or hereditary nobility, which corresponds to the oligarchic system in the current post-Soviet republic) and the centrality of the family; a culture heavily influenced by foreign conquerors – e.g. the Ottoman, Persian, Russian, and Soviet empires – and the struggle for autonomy or independence from foreign rule;6 the absence of a historical opportunity to reform and modernize their own

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political system and political culture; and the contradictory forces, on the one hand, of historical rootedness in an ancient homeland, and on the other, of a tendency to rely on outside powers to address domestic problems or else to emigrate when confronted by external threats, territorial partitions, internal political upheavals, and seemingly insurmountable economic crises. In addition, the overarching ingredient in Armenian political culture for centuries, but most emphatically since the Genocide, has also included the self-perception of a ―tragic nation‖ and the attendant impulse to persevere, as frequently expressed in rhetorics of ―cultural grandeur [and] of antiquity.‖7 As Vahakn Dadrian has noted, rhetoric replete with hyperboles by political and community leaders compensates for the national history of subjecthood, victimhood, powerlessness, and inferiority in the community of nations. 8 In the post-Soviet republic, the rhetoric of national survival has afforded little opportunity for voices demanding improvements in the human rights performance of the government across a range of issues, including political, civil, social, and economic rights, women‖s rights, the rights of children, and the rights of refugees. A comprehensive discussion of Armenian political culture is not possible here, but certain characteristics and issues are worth emphasizing. Religion and language In addition to the conversion to Christianity, the invention of the Armenian alphabet represented a pivotal development in the course of Armenian history. While the alphabet contributed to the formation of a cohesive national identity, it also insulated the Armenian Church hierarchy from the social, economic, and philosophical advances taking place in other parts of the world and contributed to church leaders remaining too intellectually rigid to tolerate ideological and theoretical experimentation.9 The Church, with the support of the state, consolidated near absolute control over cultural and educational institutions, thereby imposing a hegemonic, ―totalizing discourse,‖10 through which national history, collective culture, and individual identity came to be discerned. Armenian philosophical treatises served as establishing the foundational theses for the conceptualization of a Christian worldview, as propagated by the works of the earliest authors (e.g. Agatangeghos, Eznik Koghbatsi, Eghishe, Koriun, Pavstos Puzand, Movses Khorenatsi, Ghazar Parbetsi), all of whom shaped Armenian political and legal thought.11 Christianity provided one of the earliest theological conceptualizations of human rights as understood in the modern context. Christianity sought to strengthen the ties between the individual and the community through egalitarian principles of universal fraternity. The conversion to

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Christianity introduced major reforms in regulating familial relations and marriage, but the new religion did not change the androcentric, patriarchal customs and norms. Nevertheless, human rights values are said to be part of Armenian history, extending as far back as the fourth century. The Council of Ashtishat (365), Hakob Manandyan writes, led to the establishment of a number of humanitarian, charitable offices to care for the poor and the disabled. 12 The Council of Shahapivan (444) approved several resolutions regarding the responsibilities of the higher clergy and the family. The canon of Shahapivan, believed to be the first Armenian ecclesiastical ―constitution‖13 and the first codification of Armenian family law, reaffirmed the legitimacy of patriarchal dominance at home by granting the husband the right to exercise control over his wife.14 The canon of Shahapivan granted azats (small landowners and vassals of the nobility nakharars) protection from corporal punishment but imposed financial penalties. 15 Soon after the adoption of Christianity, the judicial system that emerged in historic Armenia consisted of secular and religious courts. Judges to the secular courts were highly educated and active members of their communities, and they were appointed by the nobility, while the king served as the supreme judge. The jurisdiction of the avag or senior judges included cases involving the nobility and individuals and families of higher social status, while cases heard by the lower courts involving azats and peasants. 16 The process consisted of the court of first instance followed by appeals at the appellate court. Similarly, the religious courts consisted of three levels of jurisdiction. The highest court at the catholicosal level consisted of a council of bishops and other priests, dealt with doctrinal issues, especially in relations with sister churches and other religious leaders. The second, bishopric level heard cases pertaining to the dioceses. The court of first instance heard cases involving marriage, theft, and so forth, in the local communities. Court administrators and bureaucracies were susceptible to bribery and other forms of influence by the wealthy.17 Movses Khorenatsi, the father of Armenian historiography (patmahayr), who is believed to have lived in the fifth century or as late as the seventh century, criticized the judges as ―inhuman, false, deceitful, venal, ignorant of the law, volatile, [and] contentious.‖18 Sources of Armenian law included ecclesiastical law, as derived from the Old and New Testaments, as well as church customs, directives, decisions adopted at ecclesiastical conclaves, and decisions made by the higher clergy. The ecclesiastical councils of Ashtishat, Shahapivan, Artashat (449), Dvin (645, 719), Pardav (768 or 771), and Sis (1243), in addition to directives by religious leaders, contributed to the development of Armenian law.19 These ecclesiastical councils instituted various laws of citizen-

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ship, criminal codes, laws for financial and market transactions, and family law, as found in a number of compilations of codes – e.g. a book of codes entitled Avrenk haghtogh tagavorats kristoneits (Laws of the Victorious Christian Kings), referring to the emperors Constantine the Great (306‒37), Theodosius II (408‒50), and Leo I (454‒74);20 and Kanonagirk Hayots (Armenian Book of Canons; Corpus juris canonici) compiled by Catholicos Hovhannes III Odznetsi (717‒28), which combined both secular and religious law. According to Avrenk haghtogh tagavorats, rights and responsibilities were designated according to age and social status. A person could attain the right to full citizenship at the age of 25, although the monarch, princes, nakharars, azats, and church leaders and the clergy in general enjoyed these rights. Armenian women‖s individual freedoms and participation in society beyond the family were restricted. Further, Avrenk haghtogh tagavorats provided to landowners full rights and guarantees for protection with respect to their properties in matters of ownership of mobile and immobile goods, finances, commercial relations, as well as the punishment and sale of servants. 21 In criminal law, Kanonagirk Hayots, Avrenk haghtogh tagavorats, and the codes issued by ecclesiastical councils enumerated criminal acts and their corresponding punishment. Murder was punishable by the death penalty. Treasonous acts, such as spying and sedition, constituted crimes against the state, and the king had the authority to sentence not only the individual culprit to death but also his or her entire family and to confiscate their properties. In relatively minor cases of theft and bribery, the criminal would lose comparable goods, and in the case of a more serious crime of thievery, his life. Heresy, witchcraft, and conversion to another religion or continuation of pagan traditions constituted crimes against the Church. Adultery was considered a violation of family pride and honor. Unsurprisingly, the extent and nature of punishment was often based on one‖s socioeconomic status in society. The Shahapivan code, for instance, permitted an azat thief to purchase exemption from corporal punishment. Other forms of punishment, according to Kanonagirk Hayots and Avrenk haghtogh tagavorats, included excommunication, defrocking, exile, termination of career, and pecuniary compensation. Punishment in some cases could be extreme, including the death penalty, hanging, blinding, and other forms of physical mutilation. 22 A number of documents advocated fairly progressive reforms in Armenian Church practices and society. Article 3 of the Shahapivan code, for instance, considered men and women equal before the law.23 In addition, certain reforms, such as the promulgation of a new inheritance law under the Byzantine emperor Justinian I (r. 527‒65) which required equality between sons and daughters, 24 perhaps could have brought

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about fundamental transformations in Armenian political culture and law. The Arab invasions, however, retarded further social and legal developments. Armenia remained under Arab rule from about 640 until the late 880s, when the Armenian Bagratuni dynasty emerged as the new kingdom. Islamic law classified Armenians among the protected ―People of the Book‖ and non-believers (that is, non-Muslims), thereby relegating them to an inferior status in matters of law, government, and social relations.25 While some church leaders, among them Hovhannes III Odznetsi, maintained good relations with the Muslim conquerors and secured freedom of worship, they also intensified persecution of Chalcedonians (adherents of the Council of Chalcedon, 451) and Paulicians and sought to prevent conversions to Islam. Responding to what he considered cultural and religious turbulence brought about by foreign invaders, on the one hand, and the absence of reverence toward the Church and church doctrine among the clergy and the public, one the other, Odznetsi summoned the Council of Dvin (719), which under his auspices formulated Kanonagirk Hayots, reaffirming Christian values and establishing religious and secular standards in law and justice. 26 The hostility toward the Paulicians and later toward the Tondrakian movement is illustrative of the intolerant character of the Church. 27 The Tondrakians, named after the district of Tondrak near Lake Van, attracted the lower classes and opposed the rigid and elite-oriented feudal Armenian Church hierarchy. 28 Foreshadowing the Protestant Reformation in Europe, the Tondrakians criticized the Armenian Church as too rigidly structured and too materialist in orientation and pressed for reforms. They preferred to elect their own priests independent of the Armenian Church hierarchy and stressed individual free will and egalitarianism, principles which they believed more accurately represented the authentic principles and practices of Christianity. 29 Like their predecessors the Paulicians, the Tondrakians elicited the ire of the Church and government. Grigor Narekatsi (950‒1003), Grigor Magistros Pahlavuni (990‒1058), and Aristakes Lastiverttsi (ca. 1000‒70s), among others, wrote disparagingly about the movement.30 Cultural revival After the re-emergence of Armenian government under the Bagratuni dynasty, the land experienced enormous construction, reconstruction, and cultural revival. Cities such as Van, Ani, and Dvin represented virtually autonomous centers of commercial and political power.31 Territorial divisions notwithstanding, the Bagratuni monarch and the lesser kings held absolute authority over their respective dominions.32 The Bagratuni king-

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dom, the last Armenian government in historic Armenia, became mired in power struggles and, weakened economically and militarily, fell against the invading Seljuk and Byzantine forces in the eleventh century. 33 By the late twelfth century, a new Armenian government was established by King Levon I (r. 1198‒1219) in Cilicia, situated on the northeastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea. Cilicia developed into an economically dynamic and prosperous society, and its commercial and diplomatic ties with the major trading centers in the West complemented the domestic advances in the sciences, theology, and philosophy. Among the renowned philosophers and writers of this period were Catholicos Nerses Shnorhali (the Gracious, 1102‒73); his nephew Grigor Tgha (ca. 1130‒93); Nerses Lambronatsi (Nerses of Lambron, 1153‒98); Hetum Patmich (Historian) of Korikos (thirteenth century); and the chronicler Smbat the Constable (1208‒76), the brother of King Hetum I. 34 The socioeconomic structure and culture of Armenian Cilicia closely resembled the feudal institutions and traditions found in Greater Armenia but with greater Byzanto-European cultural influences. Cilician society, a rigidly hierarchical system, consisted of feudal aristocratic lords and barons, in addition to a growing number of merchant capitalists among the higher strata of the social order, while rural and city dwellers represented the lower sectors. Among the principal landholders was the Armenian Church, which exerted a considerable influence. 35 Because of its geographical position, Cilicia‖s international trade ties developed primarily through its port cities and contributed to an expanding economy and to the development of a fairly advanced legal system.36 Two parallel judicial structures, one secular and the other ecclesiastical, governed Cilician society. The royal court represented the apex of the secular system and served as the ultimate arbiter, with vast jurisdiction regarding cases involving capital punishment, taxation, international trade, and finances, and criminal cases involving citizens of foreign countries. The court of princes dealt with disputes between princes, barons, and the principal feudal lords, while also performing appellate functions with respect to decisions by the lower courts. The lower courts exercised jurisdiction over cases concerning private property, debt and amortization of debt, primogeniture, adoption, dowry, marriage, and divorce. National economic development and growth in bilateral commercial ties led in the late thirteenth century to the establishment of the bail courts (bailia regis) to hear cases between foreign merchants and local citizens.37 The structure of the religious court paralleled its secular counterpart. The catholicos seated at Sis represented the apex of the hierarchy, followed by the bishopric courts. The archbishop of Sis exercised jurisdic-

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tion over civil and criminal law, particularly in cases involving citizens and foreigners. The religious court held jurisdiction over cases involving the clergy, disputes between Christian and non-Christian citizens, and offenses (meghk; sin) committed against church canons and religious doctrines in general. 38 In certain legal areas, such as marriage, the religious courts shared responsibilities with their secular counterparts. The Cilician legal structure was shaped by Armenian secular and religious traditions as well as various Middle Eastern, Roman, and Byzantine legal traditions and jurisprudence. The sources of law in Cilician Armenia included, for example, Assyrian law, the Latin Assizes of Antioch, Roman law, Byzantine law, royal decrees issued by Armenian kings, international treaties, church canons and decisions by church councils (e.g. the Sis Council of 1243), official proclamations (kondak) by the catholicos, as well as the legal opinions and works of major jurist-philosophers, including Nerses Shnorhali, Davit Alavkavordi, and Mkhitar Gosh. 39 In his Tught Endhanrakan (General Epistle), Nerses Shnorhali advocated ethical and moral values and principles that anticipated modern human rights standards. Stressing equality, he urged the nobility and political and religious leaders to treat their subjects and followers with a sense of justice, not to impose heavy taxes, and not to deprive the needy and disabled of equal access to just decisions in matters of law, family, and economy.40 Davit Alavkavordi (Davit Gandzaketsi or David of Ganjak, 1070/80‒ 1140/1) contributed to the development of Armenian legal philosophy, court procedure, and civil and criminal law in the Middle Ages and is believed to have pioneered the codification of Armenian laws. His kanonner (canons) dealt with issues ranging from the role of the Church in conflict resolution between family members to the requirements of daily hygiene. His sources of law included the Old and New Testaments, Armenian canonical law, and customary law. 41 He emphasized free will and the existence of good as derived from God. The source of evil, according to him, is neither God nor nature, but rather man himself, who possesses free will and, accordingly, is free to engage in good and evil acts. According to Alavkavordi, equality and justice are inextricably related. He strongly criticized the feudal socioeconomic order in medieval Armenia as highly unequal and unjust. The feudal lord and business owner, he argued, must be held accountable for the physical hardship borne by his serf and worker, and he must guard his charges against ill fortune.42 In criminal law, punishment must correspond to the crime. Legal philosopher Mkhitar Gosh (1130s or 1140s‒1213), born in the city of Ganjak (Ganja), is reputed as the most influential intellectual among his contemporaries for his contribution to the development of

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Armenian legal philosophy. In his Datastangirk (Lawcode), written in 1184, Mkhitar Gosh offered a comprehensive catalogue of legal precepts concerning nearly every aspect of society for the purpose of codification of Armenian law. This was necessary, he believed, because Armenians lacked a written code, as a result of which they relied on the laws of foreign authorities. The regulation of human behavior and habits, according to Mkhitar Gosh, also necessitated a written code, as ―mankind [is] overcome by evil.‖43 With respect to litigants and court proceedings, he stressed the equality of men as free individuals created by God, but, he argued, women could not be permitted to serve as witnesses in courts except as ―servants of witnesses‖ – ―because of their easy impulsiveness,‖ women ―were to be mistrusted.‖44 Mkhitar Gosh also recommended the formation of a judicial system based on a council of trained jurists but also noted the difficulty of finding such specialists.45 Armenian criminal law in the Middle Ages under the Cilician kingdom was not dissimilar to European legal principles in matters pertaining to government and legitimacy, protection for church interests, property rights, marriage and familial relations, and the rights of individuals. Offenses to the state and the Church and to property and family were considered crimes, punishable to the full extent of the law, although juvenile delinquency below the age of ten was exempt. Deviation from the church canons constituted offenses as meghk (sin). The severity of the punishment, according to Mkhitar Gosh, for example, would correspond to the seriousness of the crime; however, in practice punishments, ranging from the death penalty to imprisonment and monetary compensation, were executed with little regard to such principles. The purpose of punishment was deterrence, revenge, and retaliation.46 The legal and philosophical treatises by writers such as Mkhitar Gosh reflected the Armenian patriarchal culture and customary practices. In the sphere of marriage law, for instance, law and custom restricted women‖s rights in public life, for they were viewed as too capricious in temperament and judgment. 47 The patriarchal traditional values privileged men in power relations over women as manifested, inter alia, in the belief that, according to Mkhitar Gosh, women inherently possessed half the value of men and that the husband must be older than his wife so as to control her effectively. Mkhitar Gosh criticized domestic violence; however, he asserted, the victimized woman possessed no right to leave her husband. Divorce was rarely accepted, and women could resort to it only under the extraordinary circumstance that her husband severed his ties with the Christian faith and community. 48 Well into the latter half of the thirteenth century, the Cilician kingdom enjoyed a vibrant cultural life as home to extraordinarily productive

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religious and cultural institutions (e.g. the scriptoria in Sis, Hromkla, and Anazarba). Prominent ecclesiastical and cultural leaders developed ties with their counterparts in the West and translated their works into Armenian. Grigor II Vkayaser (1065‒1105), for instance, translated works from the Greek Orthodox Church, and Nerses Lambronatsi translated Latin ecclesiastical rites and civil codes. Translations of secular and religious works contributed greatly to the development of Armenian philosophy and jurisprudence in the Cilician kingdom.49 By 1300, the Cilician monarchy began to show signs of severe strain in matters of internal and external politics. Leadership instability and the escalation of Mamluk-Turkoman hostilities led to the collapse of the Cilician kingdom in 1375.50 The historical and cultural significance of the fall of the Cilician kingdom cannot be over-emphasized. Its accomplishments in the area of culture, commerce, and jurisprudence subsequently remained virtually dormant. Rather than further develop Armenian political culture and keep pace with the major transformations in other parts of the world, Armenians in Cilicia and across the historic lands eventually became subject to foreign rule. In the meantime, the feudal structures in the West had started to collapse, replaced by the highly centralized and bureaucratized institutions of the modern nation-state. Centuries without sovereign statehood After the fall of the Cilician kingdom, Armenians in Cilicia and historic lands witnessed the ―dark ages‖ between the late fourteenth century and the eighteenth century. This period in world history proved crucial, profoundly transforming local, national, and global political economy. In the former Bagratuni lands in the east the Armenian dark ages had begun in the eleventh century when the kigdom fell to the invading Seljuks. While Europe experienced philosophical revolutions and rapid developments in science and technology, the Armenian homeland was overrun by invaders.51 The Ottomans eventually consolidated power over most of historical Armenia, while Persians controlled the lands in the east.52 Among the principal institutions, the Armenian Church alone survived, albeit under foreign domination. The Catholicosate was reinstituted at Echmiadzin in 1441 but remained dormant through most of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople emerged as the administrative center of the Armenian millet (ethnoreligious community) in the Ottoman Empire, although the Catholicosate of Cilicia at Sis and the Patriarchate of Jerusalem were active as well.53 In the absence of a government, however, the Armenian people, ruled by foreign powers, no longer possessed their own political leaders

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and policymaking institutions, and therefore could no longer develop legal philosophy or a judicial system. Further, as the Armenian ecclesiastical centers could not feel confident regarding their status and jurisdictions, leadership succession and institutional insecurities bred jealousies and hostilities between the catholicosal seats and personal machinations in an environment of chronic corruption.54 Such behavior was not new. In his Tught Endhanrakan, Nerses Shnorhali criticized corruption in the church. While many among the clergy were poor prior to joining the church, he wrote, ―in the monasteries, they became lords of many inheritances and rich in estates; and not only are they not in need of essentials, but they are filled with excess. In the world they were weary in soul and with labor, but here, they have grown fat, so much at ease and free of care.‖55 In the absence of an Armenian government, the role and character of the clergy proved particularly significant for the communities. The survival of the Church enabled communities to maintain their culture, but the Church also stifled efforts to introduce modernization and secularization as its interpretation of Armenian political culture relied on religious identity. In addition, the administrative structure of the church itself remained internally rigid and oppressive toward the very communities it served. The local or village priest possessed little knowledge beyond the bounds of the village and church doctrine. To be sure, the disintegration of the Armenian government did not result in total cultural destruction. Dickran Kouymjian has demonstrated the decline and erratic fluctuations that characterized manuscript production in the turbulent years of invasions from the east from the thirteenth century to the middle of the sixteenth century. Beginning in the 1550s, Armenian manuscript production increased sharply as a result of the proliferation of printing. 56 Thus, cultural creative works continued and even increased in quantity despite the absence of statehood; however, such production could not contribute to the development of philosophical, social, economic, and political cultural practicalities of Armenian governmental institutions. The Armenian dark ages did not come to a close until the late eighteenth century with the revival of Armenian literary life and the emergence of nationalist ideologies. In the meantime, Armenian cultural evolution took place amid the historical realities of conquest and cultural destruction. In his analysis of Armenian modernization in terms of material transformations, an approach common in the social sciences, Kouymjian maintains that Armenians entered the modern age in the middle of the seventeenth century, as urbanization, expansion of commerce, and industrialization brought to an end ―the pre-industrial, selfsufficient, and rural economies of the Middle Ages.‖ Armenians ex-

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perienced an evolutionary process similar to that of Western societies: ―Armenian royalty had been abolished; the feudal nobility (the nakharar system) had withered away; the source of patronage had passed from the nobility and high-ranking clergy to merchants‖ (the khoja class).57 Boghos Levon Zekiyan, on the other hand, characterizing Armenian modernization primarily as a cultural transformation, places the period in the second half of the nineteenth century,58 when Armenians in the Ottoman and Russian empires witnessed the zartonk (awakening), a period of exceptionally brilliant cultural development that was heavily influenced by Western cultural and philosophical currents. As Armenian intellectuals traveled in growing numbers to Europe for education, they returned with hopes of importing the Enlightenment to their homeland. Also, intellectuals and entrepreneurs in various diasporan communities in Europe, India, and other parts of the world contributed from the outside to the development of Armenian culture and cultural institutions in the homeland.59 It is worth stressing that the Armenian zartonk and modernization in general were confined primarily to political and economic elites and the intelligentsia in major urban centers (e.g. Constantinople, Tiflis/ Tbilisi), while most Armenians resided in provincial agricultural settings where attendant parochial cultures lacked similar experiences. Despite the cultural revival, as Armenians entered the modern age the absence of an Armenian state meant that they were subject peoples under foreign rule and therefore Armenian political culture lagged behind in matters of self-governance. As a result, Armenian society lacked the opportunity to keep pace with the social, economic, and political transformations taking place in the West, where modern human rights discourses originated. The emergence of modern international human rights The experiences of Western modernization diverged considerably from the evolution of Armenian history. It is worth stressing that the analysis presented here is predicated upon the view that the Western origin of the modern conceptualization of human rights does not negate the universality of such rights. At the same time, however, at the risk of appearing Eurocentric, it should be emphasized that the Western political, cultural, and economic environment, more than other parts of the world, clearly proved more conducive to expressions of certain values, although these values were not necessarily inherently or exclusively European or Western. As demonstrated earlier, there were numerous councils in Armenian history that debated various issues touching on what are referred to today as human rights values. As Charles Tilly has noted with respect to

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democracy, however, ―On all inhabited continents, councils of lineage heads occasionally met to make momentous collective decisions in rough equality for millennia before glimmers of democracy appeared in Europe. If, under the heading of democracy, all we are looking for is negotiated consent to collective decisions, democracy extends back into the mists of history.‖60 Tilly further maintains that certain religious sects in the West developed democratic practices and customs inside their congregations, whereby general equality existed among members, shared responsibilities and practical collective decision making in the conduct of parish affairs. Such communities formed the ―nuclei for reformist movements,‖ which eventually solidified democratic values and traditions. 61 On the other hand, the Armenian Church in the Ottoman Empire, for instance, lacked such experiences and therefore remained, even after the adoption of the National Constitution (1863), a rigidly hierarchical institution with little opportunity for fundamental reforms. Modernization as experienced in the West consisted of material properties and ideational schemata. A comprehensive narrative concerning the history of the Western philosophy of human rights is not possible here. What is underscored is the historical reality that while Armenians lacked their own governmental institutions and became subjects of foreign conquerors, the West experienced fundamental scientific and cultural changes that gradually led to the emergence of democracy. The origins of modern political philosophy and political culture in Western civilization are found in the scientific revolution of the sixteenth century, which unleashed various philosophical currents that transformed Western thought. The heliocentric paradigm advanced by Polish astronomer Nicolaus Copernicus (1473‒1543) and the Italian astronomer Galileo Galilei (1564‒ 1642) challenged the Ptolemaic theory of the universe, and began to undermine the traditional theocentric conceptualization of the universe and society with enormous ramifications for the authority of church and state.62 In the meantime, the Reformation (1517‒1550s) led by the German theologian Martin Luther (1483‒1546) and French theologian John Calvin (1509‒64) ushered in a new era of opposition to the Roman Catholic Church. The political implications of such changes quickly became obvious. The clash between science and religion also represented a divide between monarchical authority and its subjects, for the removal of a divine right to rule from the traditional calculus of king-subject relationship called into question the political legitimacy of the monarch. The ideational schemata of the Western tradition rested upon a set of values protective of the well-being of the individual and promotive of his or her social and economic progress in an increasingly complex environment. Philosophers, legal scholars, and political activists concentrated

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their energies on human rights and advocated political and legal reforms. Human rights values in the modern sense found expression in the works of philosophers from Thomas Aquinas (1225‒74) to Hugo Grotius (1583‒ 1645), Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Mary Wollstonecraft (1759‒97), and Kant, among others.63 Despite the ―logic of Westphalia,‖64 in reference to the Peace of Westphalia (1648) which gave rise to the nation-state, political philosophers such as Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, and Locke attacked repressive governments and advocated the protection of citizens‖ natural (i.e. human) ―inalienable‖ rights against the consolidation of unbridled power in the hands of absolutist rulers. The Petition of Rights of 1628 and the adoption of the English Bill of Rights after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, all signaled the advent of a new age of ―natural law,‖ which particularly emphasized various legal aspects of authority and obligations. Modern human rights standards emerged as a result of the English revolution in 1688 and the Bill of Rights, the War of Independence in 1776 in the United States and the adoption of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and the French Revolution of 1789 and its Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. Henceforth, the ruler and the ruled would assume duties as well as rights, violations of which would constitute a breach of the ―social contract.‖ The material component of Western modernization included scientific and technological breakthroughs that propelled societies toward industrialization. The advent of the Industrial Revolution transformed the nature of economic activity from merchant capitalism to industrial capitalism, and the latter, in turn, encouraged development of new technologies of production and the emergence of new markets at home and abroad.65 Factories attracted thousands from rural areas in search of new opportunities. Industrialization, urbanization, an emerging middle class, and labor movements compelled governments to accommodate profound changes in society and to expand the franchise for wider public participation in the political process. In Britain, for example, the government instituted the Factory Acts to regulate working conditions and women and child labor in factories. The Reform Act of 1832 and the Chartist movements sought to increase the proportion of citizens who were eligible to vote. Britain and most other Western societies eventually transitioned from agricultural to industrial economies, in the process strengthening their democratic institutions and practices. Such fundamental transformations in Western societies ushered in political philosophies that placed a premium on public participation as the bases for political legitimacy. A government‖s political legitimacy rested on its ability to reform its institutions so as to accommodate

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societal changes. Where the ruling monarchy failed to address political and economic crises and to institute the necessary reforms in a timely fashion, as in the case of France under Louis XVI, radical ideologies often inspired revolutionary movements. The following section examines the extent to which these historical trends in the formation of modern values and political economy have been relevant to Armenian political culture. Armenian cultural reawakening and modernization The Armenian communities did not experience the Enlightenment until the nineteenth century due to the traditionally oriented cultural, social, and political system under their imperial Ottoman and Persian masters as well as to similar limitations within Armenian institutions and social order. Educational institutions and academies, such as the Mkhitarist Order, named after its founder Mkhitar Sebastatsi (1676‒1749) and first established in Venice (1717), led the cultural reawakening, the zartonk, mentioned earlier. Armenian schools were quite parochial in their orientation but increasingly contributed to the cultural reawakening in the nineteenth century. By then, however, more than three centuries had passed without the existence of any significant political and cultural institutions independent of the Church, which, after the Treaty of Amasia (1555), was governed by the dictates of Ottoman rule in the west and Persian rule in the east. The Qajar dynasty replaced the Safavids and governed Iran from 1779 to 1925, including Persian Armenia from 1795 to 1828.66 By then, the Russian Empire had gained considerable influence in the Caucasus and finally replaced Persian supremacy in 1828. In Persian Armenia, which under Safavid rule encompassed the area stretching from Erevan to Nakhijevan and Karabagh, Shah Abbas I (1587‒1629) and Shah Safi (1629‒42) encouraged commercial relations with the outside world; the resulting economic growth gave rise to wealthy and influential Armenian merchant families.67 In Ottoman Armenia, the expansion of economy and commerce, coupled with political stability, contributed to the emergence of a new class of merchants and set the foundations for the Armenian amira (business barons) class and the esnafs (guilds).68 The Armenian Church, including Echmiadzin, also benefited from its close ties, primarily through patronage, with leaders of trade and finance. Although Armenians lacked autonomous governance, the close ties between the Church and the wealthy classes resembled the old symbiotic relationship between the Church and the nakharar houses centuries earlier. Commercial expansion and economic reconstruction in both Otto-

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man and Persian Armenia encouraged cultural revival, as evinced by the development of scriptoria, monasteries, and other centers of Armenian cultural institutions. 69 Commercial relations with Europe, Persia, and China influenced Armenian art. In fact, the printing of Armenian books not only revealed the close ties between finance and culture for merchant markets but also the significance of the political environment which permitted such cultural development. The earliest Armenian books were published beyond the boundaries of historic Armenia – in Venice (1511 or 1512), Constantinople (1567), Rome (1586), Lvov (1616), New Julfa (1638 or 1641), Livorno (1644), Amsterdam (1658) – because neither the political and economic conditions nor the institutional capabilities of the Holy See at Echmiadzin allowed such an enterprise. 70 The first printing press and paper mill in Armenia were established at Echmiadzin in 1771 and 1776, respectively, under the auspices of Catholicos Simeon I Erevantsi (1763‒80), a highly capable leader who introduced major improvements in the organization of the Church and contributed significantly to cultural development, but unsurprisingly always according to the interests of the Catholicosate. The typeset was designed by a goldsmith and financed by Grigor Mikayelian Chakikian, a Julfan Armenian merchant in Madras. 71 The establishment of the printing press at Echmiadzin also served to counter the Armenian Catholic publications by the Mkhitarists in Venice. The Catholicosate at Echmiadzin viewed the distribution of Catholic publications as a direct challenge to its authority and jurisdiction. For instance, Catholicos Simeon I Erevantsi referred to Father Hakob Chamchian‖s Oratsuyts or Calendar (1758) as Tyunatsuyts or Catalogue of Poisons. 72 Regardless of location, however, the publications, with rare exceptions, were primarily religious in content. Increasing patronage from wealthy merchant classes gradually, if not entirely, freed printing from church control and signalled the advent of Armenian modernity. 73 Among the influential publications envisioning modern Armenian statehood appeared in the second half of the eighteenth century – Movses Baghramian‖s 74 Nor tetrak vor kochi hordorak (New Pamphlet of Exhortations) published in 1772 and Hakob Shahamirian‖s Vorogayt parats (Snare of Glory) and Tetrak vor kochi nshavak (Pamphlet of Aims) published in Madras in 1773 and 1783, respectively. Their primary objective was to advocate the liberation of Armenia from Muslim Ottoman and Persian rule. Under Ottoman and Persian rule, the civil and criminal legal system was based on Islamic law, administered by Muslim judges and courts, in cooperation with local Armenian clergy. The practice of Armenian law, which continued to be influenced by custom, church canon, and the Datastangirk of Mkhitar Gosh, remained confined to the realm of familial relations

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and matters internal to the church and community with little change since medieval times.75 The Madras publications sought to modernize Armenian political and legal thought. Influenced by the European Enlightenment, Nor tetrak and Vorogayt parats urge the Armenian youth to study the history and geography of the Armenian lands, the nature of sovereignty and governance, the perils of monarchy and foreign rule. 76 Baghramian contended that Armenian youth must be enlightened regarding Armenian history in order for them to believe in the cause of the liberation of the homeland. Assessing the causes of the failure of Armenian monarchies, Nor tetrak points to the despotic nature of Armenian leadership, the arrogance of individual kings, and the prevalence of ignorance, divisiveness, laziness, and indifference among Armenians. 77 The construction of nationhood and statehood demanded a cultural revival and armed struggle against foreign rule, Nor tetrak concludes. Reiterating the criticism expressed in Nor tetrak regarding the failures of Armenian governments historically, Vorogayt parats and Tetrak vor kochi nshavak elaborate the principles of democratic governance and the constitutional framework required for such a political system. 78 As a first step, Vorogayt parats maintains, Armenians must educate themselves for the advancement of national culture. Second, they must be prepared to fight for liberation from foreign rule, as witnessed, Vorogayt parats notes, among the British subjects in the thirteen colonies under the military command of George Washington. 79 National liberation and individual freedom, the treatise averred, are the most precious moral elements among human values. Sovereignty, once attained, must be based on law, and law and order are prerequisite ingredients for a successful polity. Vorogayt parats, comprised of 521 articles, proposes a modern constitution for the envisioned Armenian state encompassing Ottoman Armenia (including Cilicia) and Persian Armenia. It advocates a parliamentary form of government, whereby citizens elect representatives to the Armenian House (parliament). The citizenry thus constitute the source of legitimate authority. Nevertheless, Vorogayt parats proposes a statist, mercantilist political economy not dissimilar to the European practices at the time. With respect to the Armenian Church and religion, Vorogayt parats, deeply imbued with nationalism and religious ardor, places a premium on Armenianness and faithfulness to the Armenian Apostolic Church as legal requirements for election to, and to secure employment from, the Armenian House (Articles 204, 205). National identity is infused with religious identity throughout the treatise, and both identities are complemented by deference to the Church and conformity to Church doctrine. Although the document maintains structural separation between church

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and state (Articles. 155, 156), Article 233 guarantees the Catholicosate at Echmiadzin a seat in the parliament. Article 4 protects its status as the supreme religious authority in the land; however, Article 397 asserts that any reforms in public administration proposed by the Church must be made through the parliament. Article 11 encourages the nation to contribute generously to the Church treasury. 80 Vorogayt parats is tolerant toward other religions but vehemently opposes Armenian conversion from Christianity to another faith. The constitution guarantees freedom of speech and of thought (Article 500), freedom of religion (Article 5), and property rights for native and immigrant non-Christians (Articles 10, 128) so long as they obey the laws and pay taxes. All local and foreign religious communities, including Muslims and Jews, are endowed with the right to practice their religions and customs and are vested with the authority to administer their own civil courts, except in criminal cases and those involving the death penalty (Article 370). Article 6, however, states that any Armenian accepting other faith must be subject to the death penalty and his property transferred to his Christian children.81 The proposed constitution guarantees equality between men and women both in matters of individual freedom and compensation for labor (Article 3). Women and girls possess the right to appear in public without wearing a headscarf (Article 182), but they should not enter a male‖s abode in the absence of his wife unless accompanied by other guests (Article 183). Sons and daughters acquire their inheritance at the age of twenty-one (Article 188); however, sons are to be granted twothird of the inheritance, while daughters acquire one-third (Article 130). The constitution does not provide protection against domestic violence; Article 381 permits the husband to beat his wife, up to twelve lashes but without causing injury to her. Women of ill repute must not be allowed to join polite company among reputable women (Article 383).82 Vorogayt parats proposes social and economic rights and the freedom of movement. Under Articles 157 and 158, the parliament is obligated to provide housing for children born out of wedlock and to educate them in separate boys and girls schools until they reach the age of twelve. Similarly, the parliament has the obligation to care for the poor, the elderly, and the handicapped in case they are childless (Article 161), and to provide free medical services for the poor and the infirm (Article 162). In addition, the parliament is required to provide twelve loaves of bread daily to couples with twelve children (Article 206). Articles 367 and 368 grant all residents, except criminals and in times of war, the right to emigrate. The state generates revenues to provide for national security and to finance social services through a detailed schedule of taxation as

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regulated by the parliament (Articles 399‒459, 519).83 With respect to criminal law, Vorogayt parats advocates a moral responsibility on the part of the government to institute a fair system of criminal justice, including jurors selected for each case (Articles 506, 507), whereby the rights of both criminal and victim are protected (Articles 142‒151). Prison conditions are expected to be sanitary (Articles 148, 150) and criminals held in separately designated prison quarters as determined by the nature of the committed crime (Article 149). The death penalty is justified in a number of cases, including homicide (Articles 464, 468), rape (Article 465), theft involving goods worth more than 100 silver coins (Article 466), and minting coinage without government permission (Article 473). Public officials involved in corruption are to be removed from office and never permitted to hold a similar post (Articles 97, 169, 170). 84 Vorogayt parats urges Armenians to educate themselves regarding the Enlightenment values and expresses the sentiments of the emerging bourgeois classes who were determined to tame the powers of the aristocratic class through political socialization and liberalization in a system of parliamentary democracy. 85 Yet, the treatise is cognizant of the fact that having lived under foreign rule for centuries, Armenians lacked the experienced civil and military leadership necessary for the construction of a modern state. Accordingly, Article 510 states that in case individuals cannot be found among native Armenians with certain expertise – e.g. military leaders, architects, and engineers – agreements must be sought with other nations to recruit from among their experts for appointment in the Armenian government. 86 The search must be conducted first in neighboring Georgia, and in case of failure to locate trained individuals there, then in Russia, followed by Germany. The priority accorded to Georgia reflected the close relationship between the Shahamirians and Catholicos Simeon I Erevantsi, who, in efforts to strengthen his position in relation to contenders for the Catholicosal throne, opted for an alliance with the Georgian King Erekle II. 87 To be sure, publications such as Nor tetrak and Vorogayt parats were not unique in Armenian history in advocating humanitarian laws for the benefit of the community and national liberation from foreign rule. The ecclesiastical Council of Ashtishat in 354 and Nerses Shnorhali, Mkhitar Gosh, and Constable Smbat centuries later had urged Armenian citizens and monarchs alike to be cognizant of the needs of the poor, the sick, the elderly, and orphans, and they had stressed the imperatives of socio economic equality and of education for national advancement. 88 However, Nor tetrak and Vorogayt parats in and of themselves did not constitute Armenian modernization; 89 they merely expressed certain normative

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principles advanced by Western Enlightenment philosophers but without enjoying the relatively more open social, economic, cultural, and political environment found in the West. Nor could these two publications have any relevance to the practice of governance in the late eighteenth century in the absence of a sovereign Armenian government. As noted earlier, modernization is the product of long-term transformations from rural economy to urbanization and industrialization, secularization, the abolition of the feudal structures, bureaucratization, the emergence of merchant and middle classes, and the proliferation of mass culture. The modernization process was also shaped by and in turn shaped citizenstate relations. The political economy and political culture of the Persian and the Ottoman empires did not facilitate a transition to modernization corresponding to the European experience. In the Caucasus, Armenians, mostly peasants, inhabited towns and villages and lived in a virtually feudal society, under layers of authority from within the Armenian community and the Persian political, economic, and legal system. The land legally belonged to the Qajar shah, who distributed it to the sardars (provincial governors) through patronage. In practice, Qajar rule favored those with close ties to government officials and gained the support of the administrators of the khanate. 90 Khanate bureaucracies administered the imperial offices, including the collection of taxes, keeping the peace, and the maintenance of transportation infrastructures. In addition to the agricultural economy, small manufacturing enterprises began to appear in the early part of the nineteenth century in cities and towns, especially in Erevan. In the khanate of Erevan, about 5 per cent of the population was engaged in the industrial sector.91 Under Qajar law, the Armenian Church at Echmiadzin held jurisdiction over the villages and lands in the vicinity, including waqf (endowment) lands, and its institutions were exempt from taxation. 92 The Armenian Church managed the affairs of the community and relied on canonical law and customary law, including Mkhitar Gosh‖s Datastanagirk.93 In practice, however, the Persian sardar served as the final arbiter in the administration of religious authority, particularly in matters of taxation and property claims, although at least in one case concerning a property in Vagharshapat the Catholicosate secured a favorable decision at the sharia court against a Persian official. 94 The authorities of the khanate exploited the power of taxation to punish and to reward, and exorbitant taxation remained a fundamental problem of the Qajar state, inextricably intertwined with vicious cycles of economic decline and repression. 95 In the court system, plaintiffs and defendants could easily use bribery to influence judicial decisions regardless of evidence

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presented at court, as informal means permitted the courts broad discretion in rendering decisions according to personal favoritism and financial gains.96 As the famed writer Khachatur Abovian put it, (in loose translation) the Armenian, living under the command of the sardar, was ―forced to do whatever he or she was told. There was no court, no law … they abducted daughters and sons, forced them to convert to Islam, and often executed them by decapitation. … Neither his house belonged to him, nor his land, nor his personal effects.‖97 As Russian engagement in the Caucasus accelerated, and the Persian and Russian empires competed to control the Catholicosate as the center of Armenian religious, cultural, and political life, Persian suspicions concerning Armenian intentions deepened and intensified repressive and discriminatory policies. 98 In fact, upon learning of the newly established printing house by the Shahamirians in Madras, Catholicos Simeon I Erevantsi insisted that the publisher submit the manuscripts to the Catholicosate for approval prior to publication so as not to exacerbate local tensions. Shahamir Shahamirian agreed and dispatched copies of the introductions to Nor tetrak and Vorogayt parats to the catholicos. 99 Prior to its collapse, the Qajar government had bolstered its despotic rule in hopes of reversing the process of decline. Faced with economic and political difficulties, Armenians in growing numbers emigrated.100 By the time Persian rule dissolved in Eastern Armenia under Russian engagement, the Armenian people had been subjected to an intensely repressive regime, which in turn had led to the equally intense urgency to secure political and military support from outside powers for liberation.101 The integration of Persian Armenian lands into the Russian Empire transferred the former Qajar state properties to the Russian state. The introduction of Russian administration, however, did not lead to immediate removal of Muslim bureaucrats and institutions, nor did it result in lower taxes on peasants. General economic improvement was slow to come. Further, growing pressures for Russification caused disillusionment toward the Russians, for whose arrival Armenian political activists and ecclesiastical leaders had petitioned for so many years. 102 While Armenians petitioned the Russian government for liberation from Muslim rule, the geopolitical objectives of Peter the Great (r. 1689‒ 1725) in the Caucasus aimed at solidifying pro-Russian sentiments against Ottomans and Persians. Armenian fortunes in relations with the successors of Peter the Great oscillated between Russian support, as during the reign of Empress Anna (r. 1730‒40), and disengagement and even hostility, as under Empress Elizabeth (r. 1741‒62).103 Catherine the Great (r. 1762‒96) accelerated Russian expansion across the Black Sea and the Balkans. The Russo-Turkish war of 1768‒74 led to the defeat of

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the Ottomans, and under the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji (Küçük Kaynarca) (July 1774) Russia gained a number of geostrategic areas in the Crimea and along the shores of the Black Sea, navigation rights in Ottoman waters, and the right to intervene in Ottoman affairs on behalf of Christians.104 To secure their loyalty for purposes of commerce and geopolitics, Catherine the Great also granted Armenians land and privileges to encourage their migration to her dominion, particularly in New Nakhijevan and Grigoriopol, in addition to Tiflis, Moscow, and Saint Petersburg. Armenians enjoyed religious freedom, operated Armenian printing presses in Saint Petersburg (1781), New Nakhijevan (1790), and Astrakhan (1796), and managed their internal community affairs.105 Catherine the Great promoted herself as an enlightened monarch but her ―pragmatic‖ approach to leadership demanded political stability and the unity of a vast empire. She emphasized the modernization of education and culture but also demonstrated an absolutist determination to control the administration of government. 106 In introducing the ―Great Instruction‖ (Velikii Nakaz, 1766), she intended to fundamentally transform the government according to principles propounded by the Enlightenment. Regarding the use of punishment, Articles 96 and 123 of the Nakaz, borrowing from Cesare Beccaria‖s treatise On Crimes and Punishments (1764), provided, respectively, that ―All Punishments, by which the human Body might be maimed, ought to be abolished‖ and that ―The Usage of Torture is contrary to all the Dictates of Nature and Reason; even Mankind cries out against it.‖107 The implementation of such reforms, however, required responsive and accountable bureaucracies. Catherine the Great and the Legislative Commission she convened, however, ―bore a demonstrative, sham character, clearly illustrating the aspirations of “enlightened absolutism,” without changing anything in the social or political structure. … By creating this representative organ, Catherine intended to strengthen her position on the throne.‖108 Uprisings in the Urals (1763‒64) and the Pugachev Revolt (1773‒74) underscored the failure of the tsarist government to translate Enlightenment philosophy into policy 109 and revealed the enormous ―chasm between French philosophy and Russian reality.‖110 Major economic changes unfolding during the reign of Alexander I (1801‒25) required the tsar to serve not as an ―iron-will‖ autocrat but as a manager within a framework of constitutional monarchy and just governance, as variously proposed by the conservative Count Mikhail Speransky (1772‒1839) and the Decembrists Nikita Muravyev (1796‒ 1843) and Pavel Pestel (1793‒1826). Speransky‖s reforms failed partly because neither the monarchy nor the nobility had intentions to depart from the familiar terrains of tradition and partly because Speransky

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imitated Western constitutional designs that proved far removed from the Russian political and administrative landscape. More moderate than Pestel, Muravyev proposed a presidential system, which similarly failed to win political support. Although radical on issues concerning the political economy of serfs and democratization, Pestel vehemently rejected independence for the nationalities in the Caucasus, who, he argued, lacked sufficient experience in self-government.111 Russian consolidation of imperial power in the Caucasus was an extension of the absolutist rule in Saint Petersburg. The tsarist government rejected proposals for an independent Armenian state, as in the case of Archbishop Hovsep Arghutian‖s plan for a Russian-supported monarchy at Vagharshapat.112 In September 1801, Alexander I annexed Georgia and territories in northern Armenia, and in the aftermath of the Russo-Persian war (1804‒13), Russia also captured Gyumri and Erevan. Under the Treaty of Gulistan (1813) 113 and finally under the Treaty of Turkmanchay (1828) 114 Russia during the reign of Nicholas I established control over all of eastern Armenia. 115 Tsar Nicholas I (1825‒55), who never recovered from the trauma of the Decembrist revolt, demanded absolute loyalty. He viewed his leadership as ordained by divine rule, and the principles of ―Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality,‖ as formulated by Minister of Public Instruction Sergey S. Uvarov in 1833, underscored the core aims of his monarchy.116 Orthodoxy provided the ideological foundations and justification for the Divinely guided and hence purportedly unshakeable ties between the tsar and his subjects. Autocracy, which had been institutionalized at least since the era of Peter the Great, rested on militarism and bureaucratization117 (including the newly-created Third Department for the administration of censorship), 118 relying on formal as well as extrajuridical, ad hoc measures to govern his empire. The principle of Nationality (narodnost), which stressed Russian uniqueness and superiority in contradistinction to Europe, sought to universalize tsar-subject relations with respect to culture and geopolitics beyond Russia proper. The practical implications of this ideological trilogy were all too obvious to opposition forces in Russian and non-Russian lands.119 Under Nicholas I, the Russian empire experienced rapid economic developments and ever so reluctantly promulgated various reforms during the tenure of Uvarov to advance Russian Enlightenment programs in culture and education. 120 In urban centers, the intelligentsia and the expanding working and middle classes could no longer be kept under strict control, as the proliferation of pockets of capitalistic industrialization and related economic changes transformed Russian society, necessitating greater economic liberalization and political decentraliza-

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tion.121 The tsarist government appeared to consider a certain degree of autonomy for its Armenian subjects by creating, in March 1828, the Armenian oblast (province), which encompassed the khanates of Erevan and Nakhijevan as well the region of Ordubagh. 122 The administration of these areas included a number of prominent Armenian figures, among them Catholicos Nerses V Ashtaraketsi. 123 Yet, in March 1836, Nicholas I instituted the Polozhenie (Decree) in order to consolidate power over the Armenian Church and in 1840 dissolved the Armenian oblast, incorporating the areas into the province of Georgia. His edict of 1840 demanded that Russian be the official language for public administration in the Caucasus and that Russians hold all administrative posts. The Polozhenie restricted the activities of the Church in political matters and required that the Catholicosate at Echmiadzin declare its allegiance to the tsarist government and conduct its affairs according to Russian laws and regulations. The Polozhenie made the teaching of the Russian language and the history of the empire obligatory in Armenian seminaries and imposed censorship on local publications. With respect to the election of the catholicos, the government required that Armenians submit the names of two candidates to the tsar for his ultimate vote. In return, it granted certain cultural rights to Armenians residing in the Russian Empire and certain privileges to the Church, including freedom of worship, tax exemption, and local autonomy under the primacy of Echmiadzin. The Polozhenie placed a premium on the supremacy of the Church and in doing so further strengthened the position of Church as the center of Armenian culture and education. Armenian communities, headed by the Church, could establish new educational and religious institutions, as in Erevan.124 The presence of the Russian imperial administration in the Caucasus also buttressed the conservative orientation of the Armenian Church.125 Under the guise of imposing uniform standards on ecclesiastical education, the Church closed certain schools considered too liberal, as Abovian‖s school in Tiflis and Gabriel Patkanian‖s institute in Nor Nakhijevan in 1839 and 1845, respectively.126 In June 1849, the tsarist government formed the province of Erevan, encompassing the districts of Erevan, Nakhijevan, Aleksandropol, Ordubagh, and Nor (New) Bayazit. The court of the Erevan province served as an appellate court, with authority to review decisions by lower district courts and courts of first instance, a system which was further enhanced during the second half of the nineteenth century. A detailed discussion of the Russian imperial judicial system established in the Caucasus is beyond the scope of this book; suffice it to note that while it integrated the disparate regions in eastern Armenia into the Russian Empire and

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gave the local Armenian population a more unified identity than had been possible under Persian rule, the system nevertheless imposed a foreign power and therefore did not provide Armenians the opportunity to develop their own modern laws and customs and their own modern institutions of governance. The economy across the Caucasus generally remained pre-capitalist. The social and economic conditions in Russian Armenia were miserable when the Polozhenie was introduced in 1836, and most of the inhabitants in the region, especially the peasants and recent migrants from Ottoman Armenia, saw no improvement in their lot. 127 It was not until the 1880s and 1890s that social and economic changes began to appear. Armenians under the Russian administration developed a great sense of common identity, largely as a result of the growing number of the intelligentsia and the advent of print culture, which in turn had been the product of the emergence of the bourgeois, capitalist classes, the expansion of commerce, and the weakening of traditional semi-feudal relations. Changes in the economic structure notwithstanding, the Russian Empire, including Russian Armenia, remained a ―backward‖ society by European standards. While Armenians benefited from Russian culture and economy, as well as access to European intellectual movements, they remained a subject people, suffering official discrimination and the lack of equal opportunities in various aspects of life. 128 In fact, in comparison with their Turkic and Muslim neighbors, most Armenians found themselves in the same economically poor condition as they had been under Persian rule. Armenians had constituted a small minority among the feudal landowning elites in the former khanate of Erevan, and by the end of the nineteenth century, the situation had not improved: feudal and major landowners numbered 43,020 Muslims and 8,511 Armenians.129 Low levels of public literacy and the small number of students with opportunities for a university education could not create a ―cultural climate‖ conducive to an Enlightenment in the European sense. In the 1850s, for example, there were no more than 20 or 30 people with a college education in Russian Armenia, and the number of local Armenian scientists in the natural and social sciences did not exceed 100 individuals. There was hardly any market for books, as nearly 90 per cent of the population was either illiterate or semi-literate.130 There was little movement toward democratization, and corruption had so permeated all levels of government and sectors of society as to render nugatory any efforts to institute accountability based on principles of representative governance. The shortcomings of Russian imperial rule eventually would lead the emerging Armenian intellectual classes to the revolutionary movements opposed to the tsarist regime. 131 In the final

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analysis, historian Aleksandr Presniakov referred to the reign of Nicholas I as The Apogee of Autocracy.132 Tsar Alexander II (1855‒81), the ―Liberator,‖ introduced extensive legal and institutional reforms, but the autocratic proclivities inherited from his predecessors continued to dictate imperial rule and order. However, responding to the defeat in the Crimean War (1853‒56), the tsarist government ushered in a period of fundamental transformations from the semi-feudal, agricultural economy to a capitalist industrial economy.133 Reforms were introduced in four areas: the abolition of serfdom in 1861, the institution of the zemstvos (local assemblies) in 1864, the judicial reforms in 1864, and local government reforms in 1870. W.E. Mosse has identified two policies that accelerated the process of modernization: ―The liberation of the serfs increased the available force of mobile free labour. The construction of railways stimulated the growth of Russian industry. Together with a great expansion of banking and credit facilities, these developments laid the foundations of an “Industrial Revolution”.‖134 Under the Great Reforms, serfdom was abolished in Russia in 1861, in Tiflis province in 1864, and in the region of Erevan in 1870. 135 The emancipation of more than 20 million serfs undermined the social and economic power of the landowning nobility and enabled the wealthier peasants to gain financially, which occurred at the expense of both the nobility and the poorer peasants. Further, the proliferation of industrialization and the development of banking and commerce networks created a significant capitalist entrepreneur class. 136 The judicial reforms in 1864 sought to create a modern legal system and an integrated court system across the empire, replacing the traditional courts inherited from the age of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great. The reform also introduced a jury system, equality before the court of law, public hearings, and the professionalization of legal advocacy.137 The reform sought above all to inculcate a legal culture in citizens, to teach respect for the law, and to eradicate corruption. Public trust in the courts and the impartial administration of justice would contribute to the development of civil society, the advocates of the judicial reform averred.138 The judicial reforms were introduced in the Caucasus in the late 1860s and the early 1870s but remained subject to imperial geopolitical considerations in the region. If such reforms were difficult to institutionalize in Russia, particularly among the working classes and the peasants, they were near impossible in Russian Armenia largely because the local population had neither a legal culture, sufficient educated and bourgeois classes, nor a professional class trained in legal practice. 139 Instead, local traditions prevailed and customary practices persisted. A legal culture not only required the institutionalization of a modern

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independent court system and an end to the arbitrary rule of the despot and the police, but it also required a sufficiently knowledgeable citizenry, public advocacy for the protection of political rights and civil liberties, freedom of the press and of expression, ―rational codification of national law‖ and the routinization and ―regularity of judicial procedures.‖140 Not all reforms promulgated in Russia were immediately implemented in Russian Armenia, as the tsarist government, considering the local subjects as mere buffers against Persian and Ottoman encroachment, did not recognize the Armenians as requiring equal treatment as Russians. The zemstvos, one of the first experiments in Russian democracy, were not introduced in most non-Russian territories, including Armenia, and its institutionalization remained subject to heated controversies between Armenians and their Russian overseers. 141 Despite the difficulties, the tsarist administration established a new court system in the Caucasus, centered in Tiflis, along with regulations concerning civil and criminal proceedings enunciated in the reform of 1864. Reflecting these fundamental changes, by the end of the nineteenth century three general intellectual currents had emerged in Russian Armenia and Ottoman Armenia. The first group consisted of conservatives from the Armenian Apostolic Church and the wealthy merchant classes in the Ottoman and Russian empires. These elites viewed modernization as a threat to their social, economic, and political status in society and rejected demands for reforms which could potentially lead to structural alterations in Armenian communities. Conservatives stressed the importance of traditional institutions in strengthening communities and in revitalizing centuries-old traditions and culture. 142 They maintained that injustices and inequalities could not be rectified through unlawful, revolutionary methods. Radical reforms, if unchecked, might lead to disastrous consequences, they cautioned. 143 The second, more liberal group was comprised of the emerging Armenian bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, influenced by various intellectual movements in Europe and Russia. Liberals advocated the transformation of Armenian culture along the lines of the European Enlightenment and therefore demanded the removal of institutions and practices associated with the feudal system in order to establish instead a political system predicated upon democratic principles of representation and electoral participation. Although such a view clashed directly against the tsarist policies of integrating the Caucasus into the imperial domain, the liberals nevertheless undeterred fought for a voice in the political process in the hopes of establishing legal and administrative structural arrangements that would be conducive to procedural and substantive democracy. 144 Some Armenian observers stressed the necessity of promoting and safe-

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guarding the economic independence of the individual entrepreneur in an environment of free trade. They emphasized the significance of private property as a precondition for economic development but also for the full material and social development of the individual. They argued therefore that education must serve the purpose of developing what Max Weber referred to as ―the entrepreneurial spirit.‖ The third group, the radicals, severely criticized conservatives who rejected socialism and radicalism as a possible means to develop and strengthen Armenia‖s political economy and to create modern institutions. They were closely aligned ideologically with Russian, Ottoman, and European revolutionary movements and advocated armed revolution against the Russian and Ottoman political systems but also against the traditional Armenian institutions (e.g. the Church), structures of power, and customary practices. 145 The tsarist reform programs contributed greatly to the Armenian enlightenment in the nineteenth century, as prominent Armenian intellectuals received their Western oriented education in a number of universities in the empire ‒ e.g. Dorpat, Kazan, Kiev, Saint Petersburg, and Moscow.146 They sought to revive Armenian national culture and identity and to that end launched numerous publications – e.g. the conservative newspaper Kovkas (Caucasus, 1846–47) by the Nersisian Jemaran or Academy in Tiflis; the liberal-moderate journal Krunk Hayots ashkharhi (Crane of the Armenian World, 1860‒63) edited by Markos Aghabekian in Tiflis; the radical Ararat (1850‒51), founded in Tiflis by Gabriel Patkanian; and the radical, secular, anti-clerical Hyusisapayl (Northern Light, 1858‒64) established by Stepanos Nazarian (1812–79) in cooperation with Mikayel Nalbandian (1829‒66) in Moscow.147 These papers and journals debated issues concerning religion, secularization, tradition, modernization, citizenship, statehood, and empire. Unlike European experiences of the Enlightenment and modernization that required the construction of new ideological edifices on more stable cultural foundations, the re-formation of Armenian national identity necessitated the far more onerous task of the construction or reconstruction of a community identity, language, and culture in an envisioned enlightened but yet-to-be-formed Armenian sovereign state.148 By the late nineteenth century, the intellectual struggle to redefine and reformulate that national identity had shaped the modern Armenian worldview, philosophical ideals, and political ideologies. With respect to the socioeconomic situation, Russian statistics in 1917 showed that Armenians in Transcaucasia numbered around 1,783,000, or 22 per cent of the entire population; they constituted 60 per cent of residents in Erevan province, 33 per cent in Elisavetpol, and 28 per cent in Tiflis.149 Most Armenians and their non-Armenian neighbors worked

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on the land, while a relatively small number became engaged in the expanding commercial relations and in various crafts and industries. At the closing days of the nineteenth century, hereditary nobles in the Caucasus numbered 171,000; personal nobles 54,000; and merchants 18,500. Of that number, Armenians constituted 5.46 per cent of the hereditary nobles in the Caucasus, 8.65 per cent of personal nobles, and 32.34 per cent of merchants. 150 The advent of industrialization in Russia and across the region in the late nineteenth century began to create opportunities for economic development and modernization but also led to widespread economic inequalities and dislocation. 151 The advances in culture and the shortcomings in economy could not alter the reality that the Armenian experience clearly lacked the strong institutional, political, legal, and cultural bases necessary for sustainable national development commonly found among the attributes of the modern nation-state. Stepanos Nazarian observed in the middle of the nineteenth century that under the ―current circumstances, the Armenians have only two spiritual vessels – language and religion. The vessel of citizenship . . . no longer exists because both Armenians and foreigners destroyed it.‖152 The absence of an Armenian nation-state rendered Armenian identity vulnerable to foreign subversion and even to extinction, a process already set in motion in Western Armenia. Conditions were worse for Armenians in the Ottoman Empire than in the Russian Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century. Ottoman economic and military decline led to economic hardship and political uncertainty in the eastern provinces, which in turn caused a rapidly growing number of Armenians, who were considered secondclass citizens within the Muslim legal framework, to migrate westward to Constantinople and farther west to Europe. In the meantime, the Ottoman government intensified repressive measures to prevent further imperial decline, thereby effectively nullifying the reforms introduced since the 1830s. The Tanzimat (reorganization) reforms promulgated under by Sultan Abdul Mejid (r. 1839‒61) had promised equality before the law for Muslim and non-Muslim subjects, security of property and of life, elimination of arbitrary taxation, and modernization of the legal and administrative institutions. 153 The Sublime Porte in 1863 had issued an imperial iradé (decree) ratifying the Armenian National Constitution. 154 Similarly, the Ottoman Constitution of 1876, adopted by Sultan AbdulHamid II (r. 1876‒1909), provided for a democratic political system predicated upon wider public participation in the political process and guarantees for various civil and political freedoms. Ultimately, however, neither the reforms nor the constitution proved sufficiently effective to establish a democratic system in the Ottoman Empire. The sultan sus-

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pended the constitution, and the Ottoman despotic institutional traditions and abusive bureaucracies failed to implement civil and administrative reforms. The increasingly oppressive political environment, coupled with economic stagnation, stimulated anti-government activities by various groups, among them young Armenian intellectuals trained in European universities. Some Armenians also organized self-defense societies for protection against chronic atrocities.155 The zartonk generation advocated a modern Armenian nation based on a secular culture and Enlightenment values, a society liberated from foreign rule but also from its own superstitions and medieval traditions, an educated society operating independently of the Church and its restrictive doctrines and customs. By the 1860s, Ronald Suny writes, ―a secular and secularizing generation of Armenian intellectuals may be said to have appeared. … Clearly there was a growing interest in western ideas, for a concerted challenge to the traditional leadership of church and community, and for a clearer identification of Armenians as a nationality.‖156 Writing to Mkrtich Khrimian in 1858 (Patriarch of Constantinople, 1869‒73, and later Catholicos of All Armenians at Echmiadzin, 1892‒ 1907), the renowned Armenian novelist Raffi (Hakob Melik-Hakobian) and a staunch advocate of enlightenment and national liberation, commented on the difficulties experienced by Armenians in accepting modernity. He referred to the perennial clash between the old forces of tradition and the new forces of modernization and argued that historically in the Armenian case the former seem always to have won. He noted that in comparison with the European experience, Armenians were far advanced in talent and energy prior to the age of revolutionary scientific advances and Enlightenment, but in the end failed to achieve significant advances. Raffi pondered in his letter: How does one explain the European success in developing from relative backwardness into enlightenment and the Armenian degeneration from enlightenment into backwardness and the loss of Armenian statehood? There may be many explanations, he noted, but the responsibility for the Armenian decline rested primarily on the shoulders of the Armenian Church hierarchy and the clergy, who work in the isolation of monasteries and whose indifference to the fundamental changes taking place weakened the Armenian communities. Armenia lost its august kings, Raffi continued, after the conversion to Christianity, and thereafter the preservation and protection of the nation depended on the leadership of the Church. Yet, Raffi added echoing the complaint recorded by Nerses Shnorhali centuries earlier, jealousy and self-aggrandizement weakened Armenian institutions. Further, while Europeans expended enormous resources to build educational institutions and printing houses, the Armenian Church

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sought to forestall such cultural developments, fearing that a younger and educated generation would challenge the authority of the clergy. 157 By the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, several key characteristics of Armenian culture prevailed. The Armenian family remained patriarchal, with traditional divisions of labor between the public and domestic spheres demarcated by gender. The patriarchal system was led by the eldest male, who directed family affairs and finances, while his wife managed work inside the house. Armenian cultural values reflected patriarchal traditions and customs, and the ―principle of the superiority of the elder and of the male‖ governed the hierarchy of relations between men and women.158 All members of the family were expected to obey the patriarch and to protect the family‖s property and honor, although men enjoyed greater liberties than women. ―The ideal Armenian woman,‖ writes Mary Matossian, ―was chaste, restrained, and passive. She cared for her household and obeyed her husband and elders without protest.‖159 Maintaining the unity of the family, particularly in relations with the outside world, was deemed a matter of honor and shame and prestige. ―In relations with outsiders,‖ she adds, ―the members of the family tended to be suspicious and hostile. Strangers were generally distrusted, but the stranger who was a guest in the house was shown every courtesy.‖160 Armenian intellectuals, profoundly affected by European Enlightenment values, attempted to challenge this traditional patriarchal culture. At this stage in Armenian history, however, the raging debates among conservatives and enlightened intellectuals on such matters were overshadowed by nationalist discourses on the right to national liberation and the duties of patriotism. Nationalist conceptualization of human rights The development of a liberal human rights discourse and the concurrent process of modernization took place in Europe within the historical context of the emergence of modern nationalism. 161 Modern Armenian nationalism first emerged in the early nineteenth century in the form of a cultural reawakening. The founding of the Mkhitarist Order represented one of the first steps toward the revival of Armenian culture through the publication of Armenian classical literature (e.g. the works of Koriun, Eghishe, Grigor Narekatsi, and Nerses Shnorhali). 162 The movement for cultural reawakening was eventually led by a new generation of intellectuals, some of whom received training in European universities. They were heavily influenced by the Enlightenment and a wide range of French, German, Italian, and Russian philosophies of culture, language, history, and political economy.163 The Armenian intelligentsia reconstructed

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national identity and integrated Western principles and values of liberation, nation-building, and state-building.164 Accordingly, they advocated democratic reforms within Ottoman and Russian as well as Armenian institutions and society, particularly the Armenian Church and the elite structure led by the amira class. They were highly critical of the conservative orientation of the Armenian Church, which, they contended, had for centuries dominated Armenian arts and letters and as a result impeded a national enlightenment and modernization. This was all the more troubling, they argued, given the conservative, repressive nature of the Ottoman political system, which further strengthened ―the traditionalist proclivities of the Armenian Church, society, and customs.‖165 A handful of highly influential educational institutions served as the springboard for the Armenian enlightenment in the nineteenth century. Among them were the Lazarian Academy (or Jemaran) in Moscow, established in 1815; the Nersisian College in Tiflis, founded in 1830; and the Gevorgian Jemaran at Echmiadzin, founded in 1874. Other educational institutions appeared throughout Ottoman Armenia and Russian Armenia. While primarily conservative institutions, many of their faculty and students nevertheless propagated philosophies of the Enlightenment and promoted cultural literacy and national liberation. 166 The repressive governments of Sultan Abdul Hamid II and Tsar Alexander III (r. 1881–94), coupled with European diplomacy of deception regarding the treaties of San Stefano and Berlin, transformed public expression of Armenian nationalism from cultural reawakening to armed revolutionary movement (e.g. Protectors of the Fatherland in Erzerum in 1881). In the 1880s, organized political parties emerged espousing nationalist ideologies and revolutionary strategies: the Armenakan Party in 1885 in Van, the Social Democrat Hnchakian Party in 1887 in Geneva, and the Hay Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsutiun (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) in 1890 in Tiflis. 167 An important factor that contributed to this transition, as Ronald Suny has noted, was ―the absence of a “bourgeois” nationalism,‖ which led to ―a radical nationalism of the intelligentsia.‖168 Unlike in western Europe where political parties emerged as agencies of electoral competition, 169 Armenian parties in the Ottoman and Russian empires, reformists and revolutionaries alike, represented a subject people. The Dashnaktsutiun, for instance, gained political experience under the Young Turk movement in the coalition against Sultan Abdul Hamid II but possessed little to no practical experience as a ruling party in the Ottoman Empire. Although the first Republic of Armenia finally provided an opportunity for party alignments and realignments in governing a sovereign Armenian state, that period proved too brief to instill in Armenian political culture the

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practice of democratically oriented inter- and intra-party coalitions and compromises. By the late nineteenth century, the Ottoman government had grown too tyrannical to effectuate any meaningful reforms, and, beginning in 1894, implemented wholesale massacres of Armenians, which claimed more than 100,000 Armenian lives by the time the bloodshed stopped in 1896. The Young Turk revolution of 1908 reinstituted the 1876 Constitution and promised to bring about political and economic liberalization, a representative government, free elections, freedom of religion, and equality. In 1913, however, an extremist nationalist leadership established a dictatorial regime under the Ittihad ve Terakki Jemiyeti (Committee of Union and Progress, CUP) and ruled the empire until the end of the First World War. The Ittihadist regime launched a policy of genocide against the Armenian population soon after it entered the First World War; by the conclusion of that war, the government had employed death marches and mass murder to remove nearly the entire Armenian population from their historic homeland, policies that culminated in the annihilation of about 1.5 million Armenians. 170 By then, conditions in Russian Armenia had deteriorated as well. Beginning in 1881, after the assassination of Alexander II by the Narodnaya Volya (People‖s Will) revolutionary movement and the subsequent ascension of Tsar Alexander III to the throne, the reforms promulgated by the assassinated tsar were reversed. As Alexander III consolidated his power, the judicial system lost the little independence it had secured from the monarchy since the early 1870s. 171 He launched ―Russification‖ (obrusenie) policies to solidify cultural assimilation and further institutionalize Russian administration in the Caucasus. 172 His government imprisoned Armenian intellectuals, enforced tighter censorship on publications, and imposed Russian control over local schools. 173 Taking his father‖s policy one step farther, in July 1903, Nicholas II (r. 1894–1917) confiscated the properties of the Armenian Church, which ignited anti-tsarist hostilities. Catholicos Khrimian at Echmiadzin rejected the confiscation order outright.174 During the first Russian Revolution of 1905–07, demonstrations, labor strikes, and violence spread throughout the Russian Empire, including the Caucasus – for example, in the cities of Lori and Alexandrapol (Gyumri).175 Armenians demanded freedom from tyrannical and arbitrary rule, physical security and guarantees for ―equality before the law, freedom of speech, press, and assembly, distribution of land to the landless, elimination of compulsory and uncompensated labor, and establishment of conditions favorable to unrestricted national cultural progress.‖176 Armenians in the Russian Empire considered these values inextricably linked with

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their nationalist aspirations for self-determination and liberation, particularly concerning their compatriots in Ottoman Armenia. 177 Under Russian Prime Minister Piotr Arkadievich Stolypin (1906–11), in what became known as the ―Stolypin reaction,‖ the tsarist regime grew less tolerant toward disturbances of the public peace and threats to public security.178 Stolypin, a conservative nationalist, sought to eradicate revolutionary organizations and attacked real and imagined Armenian revolutionaries and community leaders, arresting hundreds of individuals between 1908 and 1912. Evincing little respect or patience for parliamentary methods, Stolypin also convinced the tsar to dissolve the First Duma, which had given rise to much expectation among the subjects of the tsar, including Armenians. In addition, deeply suspicious of the nationalities in the empire, Stolypin not only demanded absolute loyalty to Russia and the monarchy but also Russification of their local cultural and educational institutions. 179 The domestic tensions were exacerbated by the First World War, and Nicholas II, the last Romanov tsar, abdicated the throne on March 15, 1917, allowing the Provisional Government to assume the reins of power. Armenians welcomed the March Revolution with expectations for democratization and economic modernization. 180 Local soviets and workers‖ councils were established in anticipation of the formation of a representative government with the requisite institutional mechanisms for expansive participatory democracy.181 The Catholicosate at Echmiadzin hoped to convince the Provisional Government to repeal the tsarist rules and regulations imposed by the Polozhenie of 1836, but it did not gain institutional autonomy until the establishment of the Republic of Armenia in May 1918. 182 Despite the shortcomings of the Provisional Government, the Armenian leadership continued to press for democratization. In this interlude of expectations and optimism, Catholicos Gevorg V issued an encyclical in April 1917 directing the Armenian leadership and communities to respect women‖s rights to participate in the political affairs of the nation, to vote, and to be elected to public offices. Women‖s active engagement in the public sphere, Gevorg V maintained, represented an essential component for national progress. Significantly, he contended that while the Armenian Church had for centuries acknowledged the equality between men and women, ―foreign cultural influences had led to a transmutation of Armenian culture, thereby undermining the relationship between the church and the community.‖183 When the Republic of Armenia was proclaimed a sovereign state in May 1918, Armenians for the first time since 1375 embarked upon the difficult task of state- and nation-building in the midst of political chaos. These efforts were mired in intense internal discord, economic depres-

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sion, and ethnoterritorial conflicts. 184 Armenians did not possess governmental institutions productive of long-term political stability or the infrastructural base for modern economic development. The republic did not survive long enough to devise a constitution but instead relied on a series of laws adopted by the unicameral assembly. Russian influence persisted in the political and legal institutions of the newly created government. The leaders of the new government, headed by the Dashnaktsutiun, considered two options concerning the new legal system: 1) to revive the court system as introduced under the Judicial Reform of 1864, which of course would have entailed reliance on the Russian imperial legal structure, or 2) to create, as a sovereign state, a new system based on Armenian culture and customs. The government opted for the former, since the dire political and economic situation hardly afforded the luxury of time and resources necessary for the creation of a new system.185 On June 12, 1918, the government adopted a law establishing a jury system on the lines of the 1864 reforms, and on January 26, 1919, the law of parliamentary elections. The newly created political and judicial institutions could not function effectively under what were certainly inauspicious circumstances. Crises, such as the Bolshevik uprising in Alexandrapol in May 1920 and tensions with neighboring countries, continued unabated, and the government gravitated toward authoritarian rule under the ―Bureau Government,‖ which suspended the independent status of the courts. 186 The republic collapsed under Turkish and Bolshevik invasions late in 1920, and the Bolsheviks soon consolidated power after the brief uprising in February 1921 to reinstate the government of the republic failed. Armenia remained under Soviet rule for the next 70 years. The republic, unlike the Baltic states, had not experienced modern democratization, and Sovietization ended any such possibilities. The Soviet regime brought a stable political system, but it failed to modernize Armenian political culture. During the Soviet period, as in the tsarist era, political rights and civil liberties, political representation, private property, and civil society, all remained severely restricted. Yet, the Soviet federal structure sus tained the historical bonds between national identity and territory based largely on the principle of national territory, which institutionalized ―national bureaucracies‖ within the overarching bureaucratic authoritarianism of the Soviet Empire. 187 The new government, led by Aleksandr Miasnikyan, imposed dictatorial rule and formally entered into an ostensibly ―federal‖ structure with the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic in September 1921. Except with the brief experimentation under Lenin‖s New Economic Policy (NEP), Moscow retained absolute authority over the

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conduct of foreign and national security policies, the formulation of the budget and implementation of economic policies, administration of transportation and communication networks and of the legal system, and the direction of all policies with respect to natural resources, education, health, labor, and the mass media. The Communist Party of Armenia was engaged in the establishment of a new socialist system, which required the nationalization of the economy, including finance, transportation, utilities, and heavy industrial sectors.188 Primarily an agricultural economy, Armenia possessed few infrastructural bases for industrial development. Approximately 65,000 people lived in the city of Erevan in the middle of 1920s, and between 80 to 90 per cent of the population continued to reside in the rural areas. Urban workers constituted no more than 13 per cent of the population. While representing no more than 1 per cent of the population in Armenia, the Communist Party Sovietized all aspects of community life, including the church. The principal agents imposing Communist power were the Red Army, the Armenian Cheka, the local police, and the Komsomol (the Communist Youth Union), all of which showed little tolerance for deviations from Communist ideology and rule. 189 Beginning in the late 1920s (that is, after Lenin‖s death in 1924), Joseph Stalin, determined to consolidate power, demanded absolute ―orthodoxy‖ in the implementation of his own political and economic objectives and propagated a cult of personality as he launched rapid industrialization and collectivization campaigns. The Communist Party in Moscow and in Erevan forced Armenian leaders who were critical of his policies to step down, followed by arrests and exile to Siberia. 190 Party loyalists were placed in key positions within its own organizational networks and bureaucratic hierarchies and ―liquidated‖ those who opposed the regime. For example, the Communist Armenian leader Aghasi Khanjyan, initially a Stalinist loyalist but who later challenged the party line, became a victim of the purges in the 1930s. 191 With respect to the economy, by the 1940s, the state collectives had gained absolute control of the national urban and peasant economies. Within a decade, industrial workers constituted 31.2 per cent of the population, and industrial production increased eight-fold as nearly a hundred industrial enterprises were built. Industrial output rose from 23 per cent of GNP in 1923 to 78 per cent in 1940.192 In the meantime, the transition to Soviet, Stalinist industrialization caused enormous human suffering on the part of Soviet citizens.193 The drive to manufacture Soviet unity relied on virulently oppressive policies to impose Russification and Sovietization. The Kremlin considered the national identities prevalent in the constituent republics as a

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threat to the Soviet Union and expected the ―New Soviet Man‖ to transcend national identity and to embrace Soviet values as a sign of patriotism and loyalty. 194 Instead, as Ernest Gellner has put it most aptly, ―Far from creating a new social man, one freed from egotistic greed, commodity fetishism and competitiveness, which had been the Marxist hope, the system created isolated, amoral, cynical individualists-withoutopportunity, skilled at double-talk and trimming within the system, but incapable of effective enterprise.‖195 Stalin formulated the principle of ―national in form, socialist in content,‖ as the monopoly exercised by the Communist Party rested upon the brutal suppression of ―national‖ voices.196 Nor did the Armenian Church remain free from repression. Marxist philosophy considered religion as a construct of bourgeois ideology to legitimize capitalist domination and exploitation. All religious freedoms were officially suspended. During the late 1920s and 1930s, especially at the height of the Stalinist purges, Armenian Communist Party leaders (including Haykaz Kostanyan, Aghasi Khanjyan, and Hayk Amatuni) exiled several priests to Siberia and converted churches into theaters, clubs, and warehouses.197 Kostanyan, Khanjyan, and Amatuni were murdered during the purges – Khanjyan in 1936, Amatuni in 1937, and Kostanyan in 1938. Catholicos Khoren I Muradbekyan died in April 1938 under suspicious circumstances. Although the Soviet government kept the pontifical seat at Echmiadzin open, it directly controlled the internal and external affairs of the Church, including catholicosal succession. Gevorg VI Chorekjyan, elected Catholicos of All Armenians at Echmiadzin in 1945, cooperated with the Communist regime, and, in return for Armenian contributions to the war effort during the Second World War, the government permitted the reopening of the Gevorgian Jemaran (Academy) in 1948. 198 Although the Second World War proved detrimental to the economy of Soviet Armenia, the post-war economic recovery led to industrial growth.199 By 1953, when Stalin died, an industrial base and a seemingly viable economic infrastructure had developed in the republic. The Stalinist regime, however, had left behind the legacy of a traumatized national political culture and a political system dominated by the secret police and the Communist Party elite with little regard for citizens‖ well-being. At the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, Stalin‖s successor, Nikita Khrushchev, condemned the state terror practiced under Stalin and presented a new agenda for the improvement of political and economic conditions. Yet, despite his reputation as a reformer and his promises of de-Stalinization, the Soviet military reaction to the Hungarian rebellion later in 1956 demonstrated the wide chasm between Khrushchev‖s rhetoric and policies.200

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Communist totalitarian rule notwithstanding, by the early 1960s Soviet Armenia had developed into an urbanized and industrial economy. Industrial production grew an average of 9.9 per cent annually, by the middle of the 1970s registering more than 330 times greater production than prior to the Bolshevik Revolution. 201 Whereas in the preceding decade nearly 50 per cent of the labor force worked in agriculture, by the 1970s that figure had dropped to around 20 per cent. The republic registered unprecedented accomplishments in education, culture, and health services. It boasted a literacy rate of about 98 per cent and 13 institutions of higher education with 57,900 students, as well as 1,371 schools with 592,000 students.202 Yet, the advances in these areas of society and economy did not lead to a consumer economy, a failure further exacerbated by the fact that the public grew more familiar with the accomplishments in Western societies. Further, the advances made in the 1960s failed to introduce fundamental changes in the realm of politics and public administration. The habitual abuse of political power by party leaders and apparatchiks complemented the lack of an open, consumer economy, along with a host of problems: the prevalence of corruption and the informal economy; administrative incompetence, mismanagement, and wastefulness; chronic failures of construction projects because of insufficient funds or administrative indifference; the inferior quality of workmanship; the absence of proper maintenance practices; and environmental degradation.203 The catastrophic consequences of the earthquake in December 1988 served as a somber symbol of Soviet failures. Under the monopoly of the Communist Party, the political system failed to effectuate the necessary changes even if the top leadership, as under Khrushchev, sought reforms to improve procedures and standards. For example, Soviet citizens demanded the implementation of the right to recall (otzyv)204 officials in the local soviets, to remove from office those who failed to fulfill their obligations to constituents. This right, though granted in the Soviet constitutions since 1918 and adopted by the Supreme Soviet of Armenia in 1959, was rarely used as a mechanism for democratic expression; instead, it was abused by party leaders to replace officials who were not sufficiently loyal to the party. 205 As a form of ―modernization,‖ Armenian women particularly benefited from the liberalizing effects of educational and employment opportunities,206 as the Soviet government sought to remove obstacles in traditions and customs that would hinder the modernization of the family structure. The Soviets also encouraged women, based on the quota system, to hold political office; as a result, by 1990 women constituted 30 per cent of the 260-member Armenian Supreme Soviet. Only a few women, however,

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gained membership in the central Politburo in Moscow, Ekaterina Furtseva (1957–61) being the most famous. Ultimately, local Armenian culture and customs resisted the fundamental changes required by Soviet laws pertaining to gender matters. While the Soviet system theoretically enabled Armenian women to fuse the responsibilities of employment and motherhood, in fact women continued to shoulder a disproportionately large share of the responsibilities in household labor. Overall, conditions were far from satisfactory, as the republic lagged behind Western living standards. For example, the Soviet regime never succeeded in eliminating shortages in water supply – particularly the supply of hot water, a problem that persisted after Armenia‖s independence in 1991.207 By the mid-1980s, economic stagnation, political repression, and leadership instability in Moscow unleashed reformist movements in which secessionist movements lurked just beneath the surface.208 By then, nationalism and the demand for human rights had emerged as powerful forces across the Soviet bloc. Not unlike Armenian demands for democratization and independence from Ottoman and Russian rule a century earlier, expressions of nationalism in the Soviet Union were combined inextricably with civil and political freedoms. There was, however, a fundamental difference in the latter case: whereas in the nineteenth century Armenians lacked autochthonous policymaking institutions and bureaucratic structures, in the late twentieth century they possessed such institutions, which could be mobilized for secession from the ruling empire. In fact, the local Armenian political institutions, while sustaining Armenian national consciousness as distinct culture, 209 served as instruments of what Gregory Gleason has referred to ―bureaucratic nationalism.‖210 If Khrushchev and his successor, Leonid Brezhnev, tolerated deviations from the party, political rights and civil liberties had no place in Soviet authoritarian rule, although by the early 1960s the post-Stalinist environment afforded an opening of public spaces for discourses on individual and national rights and identity. The Armenian intelligentsia revived issues related to the Armenian language, culture, religion, and territories on the national agenda in Moscow and Erevan. Soviet efforts had failed to mold Armenian culture into the New Soviet Man. 211 Nationalist revival, human rights, and the Helsinki effect 212 Resurgent nationalism Challenges to the oppressive Soviet-backed Communist rule in eastern Europe had already appeared in opposition movements in the 1950s in

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Hungary and Poland, in Czechoslovakia under the Dubček government in the ―Prague Spring‖ of 1968, and in Poland in the Solidarity movement of the 1980s. These movements culminated in the precipitous collapse of the Communist regimes in the Eastern bloc, symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. As in the Eastern bloc and the other Soviet republics, human rights and nationalist movements in Soviet Armenia marched entwined with intense (even if not always visible) synchronicity, for, contrary to claims that national identity had ―forever disappeared‖ (i spar veratsel e), national consciousness, culture, art, and literature had survived against Russianism and Sovietization.213 Individual and collective national sense of relative deprivation 214 in comparison to the political, economic, and technological advances found in the West, very similar to situation in the Ottoman and Russian empires in the nineteenth century, further aggravated opposition sentiments against the Communist Party. Beginning in the early 1960s, human rights values, as expressions of individual rights and national liberation, served to galvanize the opposition against the Soviet regime. Formed as underground movements, human rights and nationalist movements made their first appearances in the early 1960s. The Union of Armenian Youth, established in 1963, was among the leading groups that organized the masses in Erevan on April 24, 1965, in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Genocide; many of the protestors clashed with the police.215 In response, the Kremlin removed the Armenian Communist Party leader Yakov Zarobyan from power. His successor, Anton Kochinyan, promising to check nationalist sentiments in the future, nevertheless permitted the construction of the Genocide Monument at Tsitsernakaberd in 1967 and, perhaps most surprisingly, the memorial complex dedicated to the Battle of Sardarapat (May 1918), when Armenian troops defended the final fragment of Armenian territory against the advancing Ottoman army. 216 Certain political or cultural concessions to the individual Union republics notwithstanding, Moscow was hardly prepared to allow venturesome endeavors to challenge its fundamental values and priorities (e.g. as demonstrated by the Brezhnev Doctrine in the brutal reaction to the reformist movement in Czechoslovakia in 1968).217 Yet, although the Soviet government appeared to maintain its authoritarian system, it nevertheless failed to uproot underground nationalist movements. More organized efforts against Soviet rule in the Armenian republic and revival of territorial issues commenced in 1966‒67, when a number of intellectuals founded the anti-Communist National Unity Party (NUP; Azgayin Miatsyal Kusaktsutyun). Among the leading organizers were the artist Haykazun Khachatryan and students Stepan Zatikyan and Shahen Harutyunyan. The party samizdat newspaper Paros (Beacon) advocated

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liberation from Russian rule and the reunification of the historic Armenian lands of Western Armenia, Nakhijevan, and Karabagh.218 The Kremlin responded by arresting and even executing some of the activists. In 1974, Karen Demirchyan emerged as the Communist Party leader in Erevan, with a mandate to address local economic problems, to eradicate corruption, and to check nationalism. 219 The three NUP leaders were arrested in 1968, and Paruyr Hayrikyan, a student at the Erevan Polythechnical Institute, emerged as the party‖s new leader. He was arrested in 1969 and imprisoned in a labor camp until 1973, when he returned to Armenia only to be arrested again in February 1974. He remained in a labor camp for the next ten years. While serving out their camp sentence, Hayrikyan and fellow NUP activists revised the party program. They removed the anti-Communist language found in their original statement and, although retaining the objective of liberating historic Armenia, their reformist approach placed a premium on the independence of Soviet Armenia. Rather than advocating armed rebellion, the revised party program proposed secession within the legal parameters of the Soviet Constitution of 1936, which under Article 17 guaranteed each republic the right to secede from the Soviet Union (reaffirmed under Article 72 of the 1977 Constitution). Accordingly, the NUP, considering itself a pan-Armenian movement, proposed a national referendum under international supervision. To that end, Hayrikiyan led a hunger strike in August 1974 appealing to UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim ―for the creation of an international commission to investigate Soviet crimes against the people of Armenia.‖220 In 1987, Hayrikyan created the National Self-Determination Union (NSDU), which emerged as a political party in post-Soviet Armenia. 221 Some dissident activists resorted to direct action for immediate results. In January 1974, Razmik Zohrapyan, a member of the NUP, burned Lenin‖s picture in Lenin Square (now Republic Square) in protest of Soviet totalitarian rule. That year, several NUP members were arrested. In January 1977, the group set off a bomb in the Moscow Pervomaiskaia metro station, killing seven people and wounding 37.222 According to a KGB document, the prominent dissident leader Andrei Sakharov accused the government of orchestrating the entire affair in order to portray prodemocracy activists as no more than violent terrorists. 223 The Soviet secret service reportedly foiled plans by the same group for another explosion at Moscow‖s Kursk railroad station in October. The government executed three Armenians (Stepan Zatikyan, Hakob Stepanyan, and Zaven Paghtasaryan) accused of the bombing and the attempted attack in October. In February 1980, the New Armenian Resistance bombed the Soviet Office of Information in Paris in retaliation. 224

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Could independence from Soviet rule bring about a more democratic government – one predicated upon principles of representation and promoting civil and political, social and economic rights? Could an independent Armenia establish a viable procedural and substantive democracy enshrined in a new constitution and in accordance with international human rights standards? Like Hayrikiyan, many of the political leaders shaping post-Soviet politics in Armenia had participated in the independence movement as dissident intellectual-activists. Having achieved independence from Soviet rule, they were confronted with the challenge of leading and managing a democracy in practice, an experience they never possessed. The authoritarian Soviet political culture did not permit democratic practices, and the Soviet system, beyond its routine symbolic gestures, failed to integrate international human rights standards. International human rights The international human rights regime as developed after the Second World War emerged in the context of the Cold War and divided Europe between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. The emphasis placed on human rights (e.g. freedom of speech, movement, and the press) by Western governments within the European Community (EC) heightened the saliency of international human rights, even if only for propaganda purposes for public opinion at home and in the Soviet bloc. For example, the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome in 1950, 225 outlined a normative framework and established legal obligations for the states in the European Community, further strengthened by the European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. The report issued by the European Community foreign ministers at the Luxembourg meeting in October 1970 incorporated human rights principles into their foreign policy cooperation and coordination. The report asserted that ―a united Europe should be based on a common heritage of respect for the liberty and rights of man and bring together democratic States with freely elected parliaments.‖226 Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union and Communist leaders in the Eastern bloc rejected such declarations as mere expressions of Western arrogance. The political ramifications of such declarations for the Soviet Union became apparent soon after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. The negotiations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe culminated in the Helsinki Final Act, which was signed on August 1, 1975, by 35 European countries, the United States, and Canada.227 By the time the Belgrade Conference met (October 4, 1977–

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March 8, 1978) to verify the Helsinki Accords, grassroots human rights movements within the Soviet Union had gained considerable ground, compelling the Soviet and Western delegates to openly discuss human rights conditions in the Soviet bloc. In the well-rehearsed fashion of Cold War diplomacy, the United States and the Soviet Union exploited the Belgrade Conference for their own ideological purposes, but the international attention brought to Soviet human rights activists at such a forum represented a major victory for the Helsinki groups.228 Nonetheless, Communist leaders vehemently opposed such endeavors to further human rights and viewed declarations by EC foreign ministers as an infringement on national sovereignty.229 The Kremlin viewed these developments with great alarm and redoubled its efforts – ranging from house searches to house arrests, psychiatric confinement, incarceration, and exile in a labor camp – to eradicate pro-democracy movements.230 Among the leading dissidents were the physicist and activist Andrei Sakharov and the novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn; the latter‖s greatest work, The Gulag Archipelago, brought gross human rights violations in the Soviet Union to international attention.231 The Soviet dissident movement galvanized its ideological forces around human rights and expressed its opposition to the government through various demonstrations in addition to their underground samizdat (self-publishing) and tamizdat (published abroad) publications. 232 In 1974, Human rights activists designated October 30 as the Day of the Soviet Political Prisoner, while the physicist Valery Chalidze and his close associates, most notably the mathematician Valentin Turchin and the physicist Andrei Tverdokhlebov, established the first Amnesty International chapter in the Soviet Union. 233 KGB chief Yuri V. Andropov, Soviet ambassador in Hungary during the 1956 revolt, reported in November 30, 1974, that a few days earlier ―the Committee for State Security conducted a search of the apartment of A.N. Tverdokhlebov.‖ The document added that Tverdokhlebov, together with Sakharov and Chalidze, had founded the ―so-called‖ Human Rights Committee, which played ―an important role in unifying hostile elements‖ for activities against the Soviet Union. 234 The arrest, in December 1974, of Sergei Kovalev (Sergey Kovalyov), biophysicist and a member of the Initiative Group, further strengthened inter-republic ties in the area of human rights. The announcement of Kovalev‖s sentence to seven years in camp elicited the indignation of human rights activists and non-activists alike, who signed a letter decrying repressive Soviet rule. Among the 179 signatories were Armenians, Jews, Georgians, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians.235 Moscow sought to insulate the country from the rapid advances made in international human rights. The Helsinki Watch Groups, however, countered that isolation from the outside world.236

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In the meantime, on April 1, 1977, the Armenian Helsinki Watch Group was established under the leadership of Eduard Harutyunyan, an economist; Samvel Osyan, a student at the Polythechnical Institute; and Robert Nazaryan, a physicist. The group also included Shahen Harutyunyan of the NUP. The Armenian Helsinki Watch Group espoused the objectives of the Helsinki Final Act but also demanded independent representation for Armenia at the United Nations. Further, it reiterated the key principles of the NUP program, namely the reunification of Karabagh and Nakhijevan with Soviet Armenia and the institutionalization of the primacy of the Armenian language. 237 In several reports, the Armenian Helsinki Watch Group presented the egregious human rights violations perpetrated under the Soviet regime. In a report dated April 1, 1977, the group informed the Belgrade Conference about the deplorable conditions of political prisoners, the suppression of national culture and language, and the censorship of books and their removal from libraries ―because their authors emigrated from the Soviet Union.‖238 Robert Nazaryan and Shahen Harutyunyan subsequently were arrested on December 22, 1977, the former sentenced to a five-year and the latter to a three-year prison term in labor camp. Their arrests and the failure of the group‖s leadership to attract national and international attention, including the support of diasporan Armenians, led to the eventual dissolution of the Armenian Helsinki Watch Group. Ludmilla Alexeyeva states that the interrogations of the three men accused of bombing the Moscow subway in January 1977 indicated that the government ―tried to link the National Unification [Unity] Party and the Armenian Helsinki Watch Group with the metro explosion.‖239 The organizational life of the Armenian Helsinki Watch Group came to an end after the arrest of its leader Eduard Harutyunyan in July 1979. In a statement to the court during his trial, Eduard Harutyunyan criticized the Brezhnev regime and ―demanded the release of all prisoners of conscience. He was happy … to be a defender of human rights and be sent to prison because he struggled against the dirty deeds of the Soviet leaders.‖ He was initially sentenced to a two-and-a-half-year incarceration in labor camp and later to an additional three-year term.240 Soviet repression kept the nationalist and human rights movements underground well into the 1980s. That decade witnessed the reintensification of the Cold War under the administration of Ronald Reagan in the United States and the government of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom. Their rhetoric of democratization and liberalization, famously captured in Reagan‖s speech at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin on June 12, 1987, when he urged Gorbachev to ―tear down this wall,‖ undoubtedly heartened human rights and nationalist activists in

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Armenia as they did others across the Soviet bloc. 241 During their trials in Erevan in March 1981, five members of an underground movement asserted their determination to bring about the secession of Armenia from the Soviet Union. They requested permission to dispatch a letter to Reagan, first to wish him rapid recovery from the assassination attempt at his life and second to urge him to remain ―true to his promises.‖242 Soviet repressive rule continued in the 1980s, but gradually it also became clear that arrests and imprisonment had failed to silence human rights and nationalist activists. By the time Mikhail Gorbachev emerged as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, some Soviet dissidents, most notably Andrei A. Amalrik (1938–80), author of the famed book Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?, had predicted the imminent disintegration of the empire. 243 Upon assuming power, Gorbachev and his close advisers, in hopes of invigorating the Soviet economy, proposed restructuring (perestroika), which along with openness (glasnost) ineluctably gave rise to a host of questions concerning the Soviet Marxist ideology that underpinned the Soviet political and economic system and its legitimacy. 244 The contradictions inherent in democratization, on the one hand, and in maintaining the monopoly exercised by the Communist Party, on the other, soon surfaced. High levels of literacy and education and increasing vocal demands for democratization (including the application of human rights standards commonly found in Western societies) placed enormous pressures on the Communist Party leaders in Moscow and in the republics. Nevertheless, economic stagnation and political paralysis prevented Gorbachev‖s regime from crafting a more viable system. The events unfolding rapidly across the Soviet bloc revealed that the existing institutions could not accommodate transformations of such magnitude and were further complicated by secessionist movements in the republics.245 In Soviet Armenia, Moscow‖s inadequate responses to the earthquake in 1988, which claimed at least 25,000 lives, only served to amplify and confirm perceptions of the ineptitude of the Communist leadership and to galvanize the opposition forces. A combination of factors – including the Stalinist legacy, mismanagement, corruption, and Moscow‖s inability to rectify the situation – rent the system beyond repair.246 Human rights and national independence The year 1988 proved to be a watershed year in the fate and fortunes of Soviet Armenia. Although Armenians were not prepared for independence, beginning in the spring of 1988, the Karabagh Committee in

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Erevan (including Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Vazgen Manukyan, Ashot Manucharyan, and other intellectuals and activists) and the Krunk (Crane) Committee in Stepanakert (headed by Robert Kocharyan and others) led the popular movement for the reunification of Nagorno-Karabagh with Armenia and for greater autonomy from Moscow.247 Yet, as in the case of the republic in May 1918, Armenia was hardly prepared for independence, and, as late as November 1990, leaders such as Vazgen Manukyan referred to their desire for a ―semi-indendent status.‖248 In December 1988, the Communist leaders in Moscow and Erevan reacted to this rapidly escalating movement by declaring martial law and arresting the members of the Karabagh Committee. Faced with mass demonstrations, the Kremlin offered certain concessions, including the release of the Karabagh Committee activists. The latter in turn organized the Armenian National Movement (ANM; Hayots Hamazgayin Sharzhum) and continued their opposition to Communist rule. The demonstrations continued in Karabagh and Armenia, and on December 1, 1989, the Armenian Supreme Soviet in Erevan declared the reunification of Karabagh, followed by the nullification of Article VI of the Soviet Constitution. The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic was renamed the Republic of Armenia. 249 Meanwhile, the Soviet government repealed Articles 70 and 190 of the Criminal Code, which were routinely used to sentence political dissidents and were a major symbol of authoritarianism. 250 As Rein Müllerson, a former member of the UN Human Rights Committee and Deputy Foreign Minister of Estonia, has observed, the challenges posed by the very process of repealing these articles and efforts to reassert Communist control in its aftermath demonstrated the positive impact of glasnost but also the difficult road to democratization and improvements in human rights. 251 Beginning early in 1990, systemic paralysis, combined with the resurgence of nationalism across the Soviet Union, appeared too intractable to be remedied through normal channels of bureaucracy and legislation. In Erevan, Suren Harutyunyan, Communist Party chief in Armenia since 1988, resigned in April 1990, unable to accommodate the conflicting demands for political stability and Soviet unity, on the one hand, and fundamental democratic restructuring and a favorable resolution of the Karabagh conflict, on the other. The parliamentary elections of that year further weakened the Communist Party‖s hold on the reins of power, as a coalition led by the ANM emerged as the majority headed by Ter-Petrosyan as president of the Armenian Supreme Soviet. The electoral success of the opposition encouraged greater political participation by the various anti-Soviet groups. Under Ter-Petrosyan, the Supreme Soviet of Armenia declared the supremacy of Armenian law

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over Soviet laws and Erevan‖s intention to secede from the Union. It also began to introduce political and economic liberalization reforms. 252 By the end of 1990, more than one in four among the Soviet population considered the disintegration of the Soviet Union inevitable. 253 Soon after the Communist hard-liners attempted a coup in August 1991 against Gorbachev, the Armenian Supreme Soviet approved a public referendum on the republic‖s independence to be held in September 1991. An overwhelming majority of voters favored independence, and the following month Ter-Petrosyan was elected the first president of the newly independent republic, marking the end of seven decades of Soviet rule in Armenia.254 The Belovezh Accords and subsequently the Alma Ata Protocols, signed by a number of the Soviet republics in December 1991, established the Commonwealth of Independent States and confirmed the sovereign status of the former republics. On December 26, 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union formally declared the Soviet Union dissolved and nullified the 1922 treaty that had formed the legal basis for the Soviet Union. Despite the war in Karabagh and the earthquake in December 1988, the transition proceeded in an atmosphere of relative stability and without a major revolutionary bloodshed, and this stability contributed to the rapid consolidation of power under the new leadership. Clearly, the political, economic, and cultural impact of the Soviet regime on Armenia persisted after the fall of the Communist Party. The newly independent government under Ter-Petrosyan launched various policies to facilitate the transition to a market economy, but the statist, monopolistic system survived, as did the etatist, authoritarian political culture. Armenia‖s political leadership and its bureaucracies, despite the adoption of an ostensibly democratic constitution, continued to function according to well-rehearsed practices of Soviet rule. Robert Tucker has noted that Soviet structures and ways of thinking survived into the post-Soviet republics. The former elite structure dissolved ―into various executive, representative, public, economic, and commercial structures, in which many representatives of the former middle-range nomenklatura … advanced to higher status.‖ The military conflicts and nationalist hostilities, he adds, ―rendered leadership for reform a moot matter in the three Transcaucasian republics.‖255 Despite the severity of the economic hardship in the early years after independence, Armenian ethnic homogeneity further enabled the government to avoid violent internal conflicts, and the cessation of combat hostilities in Karabagh after the armistice in 1994 permitted a ―breathing space‖ to focus on domestic matters.256

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The evolution of international human rights law Chapter 1 noted that since the Western Enlightenment, while historic Armenia was under Persian and subsequently Russian rule in the east and Ottoman rule in the west, three generations of international human rights emerged. Armenians were not among the beneficiaries of this evolution of rights, except through importation as philosophical and literary movements with the aspirations of a subject people, and remained outside the purview of developments in the West. Even after the Second World War, when international human rights law became institutionalized through the UN Charter and a host of international human rights conventions, the Armenian ―state‖ existed as a constituent republic within the Soviet Union, with none of the juridical privileges enjoyed by sovereign nation-states. Some of the key international human rights instruments developed under the UN Charter are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1954) 257 and the Protocol of 1967, 258 the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1954),259 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976),260 the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1976),261 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 1981),262 the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1987), 263 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1999). 264 As the dates of these conventions indicate, Armenia was not an independent state when these were adopted and entered into force (with the exception of the Convention on the Rights of the Child), and therefore lacked representation in preparatory debates and discussions. To be sure, the point stressed here is not necessarily the absence of public debate regarding these conventions but the fact that the policymakers in Erevan and the domestic political and legal institutions they represented lacked, until 1991, the opportunity to exercise the authority of incorporation of international norms and standards into domestic law and policymaking processes. This is also the case pertaining to regional human rights regimes, most significantly for Armenia the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953). 265 The UN Charter, in conjunction with various standard-setting conventions, has established binding legal obligations (erga omnes) protective of human rights. The UN Charter, as the supreme legal document in international law, ―the constitution of the world,‖ and the ―highest instrument in the international hierarchy of international and domestic docu-

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ments,‖ affirms the fundamental human rights of the individual, whose legal rights it recognizes as part of positive international law independent of the state. A state‖s failure or refusal to conform to internationally required conduct constitutes a breach of international obligations. Further, the International Bill of Human Rights – comprised of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights – has acquired the ―binding character‖266 of international law. No international human rights instrument has more genuinely reflected the ―conscience of humanity‖ than the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted on December 10, 1948, by the UN General Assembly. While the Declaration is not a treaty and therefore not legally binding, it has commanded moral authority as the expression of humanity‖s universal aspirations for human dignity. Louis Henkin states: ―The Declaration established the human rights idea as the ideology of our times. It is the holy writ to which all pay homage, even if sometimes the homage of hypocrisy. Eschewing – in its quest for universality – explicit reliance on divine inspiration or on natural rights, the Declaration provided the idea of human rights with a universally acceptable foundation, a supreme principle, that of human dignity.‖267 The Declaration constitutes an authoritative interpretation of the UN Charter and enumeration of universal human rights. As such, it is a fundamental component of international customary law, binding on all states, members and non-members alike.268 In addition to the Universal Declaration, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 269 are mutually complementary. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that parties, in accordance with the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration, recognize ―the inherent dignity‖ and the ―equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family‖ as the foundations of ―freedom, justice and peace in the world.‖ Similarly, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights declares that state parties assume the obligation to promote ―freedom from fear and want,‖ which ―can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights.‖ Further solidifying the international legitimacy of human rights for purposes of effective implementation by state parties, the UN Development Program has identified ―seven freedoms,‖ in large part encapsulating the three generations of rights, as necessary conditions for a decent

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standard of living with human dignity. These include: 1. freedom from discrimination – by gender, race, ethnicity, national origin or religion; 2. freedom from fear (of threats to personal security), torture, arbitrary arrest and other violent acts; 3. freedom of thought and speech and to participate in decision making and form association; 4. freedom from want – to enjoy a decent standard of living; 5. freedom from injustice and violations of the rule of law; 6. freedom to develop and realize one‖s human potential; and 7. freedom for decent work – without exploitation. 270 In an earlier study, the present author stated that what mattered between elections was ―the extent to which procedural democracy could facilitate the development of substantive democracy. Issues pertaining to women‖s rights may prove to be the litmus test for the degree of democratization Armenian social and political institutions can promote.‖271 At the global level, the decades of the 1980s and 1990s had witnessed no significant improvement in women‖s living and working conditions and human rights. 272 Poverty, discrimination, wars, and economic difficulties have had a devastating impact on the family. According to one estimate, 80 per cent of the world‖s 20 million refugees are women and children uprooted because of famine or conflicts. 273 Yet, in addition to the UN Charter and the International Bill of Human Rights, a number of key conventions and declarations adopted by the UN General Assembly, such as the Convention on the Political Rights of Women and CEDAW, have aimed at protecting women‖s rights and improving their living conditions. Governments have assumed the legal and moral obligation to protect women against human rights violations. Since issues such as division of labor, equality, peace, and security have been traditionally defined by men in male-dominated institutions, one of the consequences has been the perpetuation of ―male supremacy and the subjugation of women.‖274 Armenian women have made enormous contributions to the general well-being of society, yet little scholarly attention has been paid to their miserable conditions. Summary This chapter has identified key elements in the divergent paths of cultural development experienced by the West and by Armenians in the

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Ottoman, Persian, and Russian empires. Can the Armenian experience in the new era of independence create a synthesis within Armenian political culture by combining sovereignty and international standards regarding respect for personal and political freedoms, civil liberties, and social and economic rights? The mode of the emergence of Armenian nationalism, as Ronald Suny has noted, reflected Karl Deutsch‖s communication theory of nationalism. Deutsch maintained that nationalism developed in the nineteenth century within the context of, and closely related to, technological, economic, and social transformations. The proliferation of newspapers and of schools, the construction of railroad and telegraph networks, military conscription, mass migration to urban centers, and urbanization in general, all intensified modern social communication, which in turn contributed to the development of nationalism. 275 The Armenian intelligentsia perceived themselves as agents of enlightenment and modernization, secularization, and democratization. To them, Western Europe represented a source of inspiration with respect to modernization, national sovereignty, and human rights. Armenians‖ experiences as a subject people contributed to a blurring of the contours of modernization and nationalism, as demands for individual liberties necessarily required independence from foreign rule. When all is said and done regarding Armenian political culture, two essential points remain consistent throughout: That Armenian political culture emerged in the twentieth century rigidly statist and highly authoritarian, but also accustomed to cultural adaptation to foreign rule at home and abroad. The post-Soviet republic will be the first ever in modern times since 1375 to demonstrate whether Armenian political culture can evolve into a self-governing democratic system. Armenian canon law, developed through ecclesiastical councils over centuries, as Gagik Harutyunyan, President of the Constitutional Court of Armenia since 1996, has pointed out, may be said to have developed a supranational, transnational law as the Church hierarchy across the communities in foreign lands functioned as a representative institution for internal cohesion and administration. 276 The Armenian Apostolic Church, however, never functioned as a modern sovereign state, and its authority relied heavily on the wishes and whims of the ruling governments in Armenian land. Nor did the Armenian Church experience fundamental transformations internally; it remained a conservative institution favoring the status quo under the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire, and the Soviet Empire. Only in rare exceptions did it challenge the ruling regime, and when it did, its motivation was often national liberation

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rather than democratization per se. Writing in the early 1980s (that is, before the collapse of the Soviet Union), Jivan Tabibian maintained that Armenian political culture has failed to modernize and that it is in a period of disorder where the old system is clearly breaking down and there is absolutely no clearly defined modernization setting in. Instead of being an orderly transformation from traditional to modern political structures, Armenian society is essentially going from traditional to entropic, disorderly, fragmented, uncoalescing, shaped but unformed patterns. 277 Tabibian wrote his article within the context of the Armenian diasporan experience and the Cold War, but his arguments remain valid with respect to both post-Soviet Armenia and the post-Cold War diaspora. Tabibian correctly noted that the Armenian experience of modernization lacked structural conflicts between challenges of modernization and statehood because of the absence of an Armenian state. Therefore, unlike the French and other European cases, where the ruler and the ruled encountered structural conflicts as part of their overall cultural, institutional, and constitutional modernization, there was no similar correlation between modernization and statehood in the Armenian experience.278 The development of Armenian constitutional culture was retarded by historical disruptions, which prevented continuity in all spheres of Armenian political life and legal traditions that had developed prior to the collapse of the Bagratuni government in historic Armenia in the eleventh century and the Cilician government in the fourteenth century.279 As a result, Armenians did not experience structural modernization until the establishment of the short-lived republic in 1918 but more profoundly under Soviet rule. These structural changes, particularly under the Soviet regime, rested upon secular political authority but provided no opportunity for the development of cultural modernization along the lines of liberal democratization. Consequently, as the new post-Soviet leadership launched the task of dismantling the Communist system, the various groups competing for power were ill prepared for participation in politics and were therefore marginalized. Individual citizens remained confused and disoriented with respect to the emerging system, which, as in the other former Soviet bloc countries, in the words of Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss in reference to central and eastern Europe, bred ―a widespread disaffection, alienation, and cynicism concerning elites and their politics of change.‖280

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At a time when such aspirations as independence and democratization could fuel the national imagination, no one could have expected that the dictates of independence and sovereignty would clash head on with, rather than complement, the imperatives of democratization. The nation lacked the historical experiences necessary for a deeper appreciation of such forces, which, under certain social conditions and cultural environments, could, if mismanaged, prove incongruous, incompatible, and potentially detrimental to the very citizens whose aspirations national independence purportedly fulfills. As in the Ottoman and Russian empires in the nineteenth century, most Armenians viewed national independence and sovereignty as the ultimate solution to the failure of the old regimes to institutionalize reforms for democratization. Demands for human rights alone, however, could not serve as a sufficient force for independence. As Ihor Kamenetsky has noted, modernization in the Soviet Union encouraged forces of both human rights and nationalism. In fact, the latter proved sufficiently powerful to undermine the entire system of Soviet hegemonic rule from the Eastern bloc to the Soviet republics. 281 Nationalism proved to be an extremely powerful force in Armenia. As Peter Rutland has pointed out, ―nationalism both promoted and distorted the emergence of democratic institutions. The national question distorted the development of democracy because it pushed other issues off the political agenda, and strengthened the power of the presidency at the expense of the parliament and political parties.‖ 282 Having replaced the old authoritarian system, the new post-Soviet leaders in Armenia, operating in an authoritarian political culture and in an environment of transi tion first mired in war and then in persistent poverty and corruption, rather than promote democracy and human rights, themselves became the architects of an authoritarian regime.

3 Political Rights under Authoritarian Rule

Democracy is not only about the organizational framework of elections. It is about electoral conduct and culture.1

In the early 1990s, observers expressed hope that after decades of authoritarian rule under the Soviet regime, the former constituent republics would establish democratic systems predicated upon principles of good governance and human rights. Independence from Moscow raised expectations regarding promised improvements in human rights and the economy, and as newly recognized sovereign states, the postSoviet governments assumed certain legal responsibilities subject to international standards. 2 Nearly two decades later, however, various social-political structural deficiencies, buttressed by leaders‖ authoritarian propensities, have created a nefarious environment where persisting abuses of political and civil rights and corruption at all levels of government have left the citizens with blighted hopes. Charles Fairbanks commented in 2001 that authoritarianism and corruption caused ―disillusionment‖ among the public.3 In a similar vein, Marc Morjé Howard observed that ―when compared to the idealistic hopes of 1989–1991, the current political, economic, and social realities have fallen short.‖4 As Zbigniew Brzezinski has correctly noted, ―a country cannot just adopt a parliamentary system and make it work without the necessary cultural and historical underpinnings.‖5 Societies do not ―generally design institutions ex nihilo; they redesign existing institutions along the lines suggested by such metaphors as rebuilding a ship at sea. … [P]ositive reform occurs when it changes so as better to reflect affected interests, particularly basic interests.‖6 The Soviet regime certainly had not provided the republics with opportunities or experiences for democracy

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building. The least effective in this respect was the Soviet court system. The judicial system, an indispensable institution for the effective functioning of democracy and protection of human rights, must (following Montesquieu) maintain itself as a separate agency of decision making in order to perform its tasks as an impartial arbiter in matters of policy and rights. Under the doctrine of ―socialist legality,‖ the Soviet judiciary possessed limited powers beyond the purview of the dictates of the Communist Party and failed to develop independent authority relative to the executive and legislative bodies. The principle of judicial review, which grants authority to the courts to determine the constitutionality of laws adopted by the legislative and executive branches, never developed in the Soviet system. An equally fundamental problem in the transitional process was the reality that the Soviet legal system rested upon an ideology that sustained authoritarian rule at the expense of cultivating a constitutional culture and a strong civil society. The emerging political leaders in Armenia and a number of other former Soviet republics therefore relied on Soviet authoritarian institutional practices and experiences as they charted the course of postSoviet independence. 7 This process underscores the clash between sovereignty and human rights values in the post-Soviet Republic of Armenia, as political and economic leaders 8 stressed and continue to stress the priorities of state-building rather than the promotion and protection of human rights. Further, the collapse of the Soviet Union provided emerging leaders the opportunity to reconstruct the postSoviet state according to their political cultures (values, belief systems) but also the opportunity to extract material resources from society. Where state-building occurred in congruence with democratic values and mores, as in the Baltic states, societies commenced the task of democracy-building with relative facility;9 however, societies, as in the case of Armenia, without democratic traditions proved excessively vulnerable to the opportunistic extraction of resources by the same leaders who had challenged the legitimacy of the Soviet leadership on grounds of exploitation and corruption. In the case of post-Soviet Armenia and in the broader context of Armenian history, this was all the more ironic, as many of the political leaders were intellectuals (e.g. Levon Ter-Petrosyan). As shown in Chapter 2, Armenian intellectuals in the Ottoman and Russian empires advocated human rights and national independence from tyrannical rule, and intellectuals led the human rights movement in Soviet Armenia. Yet, after centuries of advocacy and struggle for national liberation from foreign rule, once in power as leaders of a sovereign state, the intellectuals‖ government, led by Ter-Petrosyan, proved to be as authoritarian as the Soviet rulers they

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replaced – despite the rhetoric of democracy and of liberalism, despite the post-Soviet Constitution, and despite the legal and moral obligations assumed in accordance with established international human rights law and standards, the very ingredients that had fueled the human rights movements in the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s. International human rights law and protections against authoritarian rule International human rights law provides concrete guarantees for the protection of civil and political rights, and in recent years the right to democracy has also emerged, reaffirming the ―power of democratic legitimacy.‖10 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights emphasize the close relationship between democracy and human rights. The Preamble to the Universal Declaration states: ―Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law.‖ In a similar vein, Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees the right (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors. Governments habitually profess support for and formally commit to domestic and international human rights standards for political purposes and for international prestige, although their practices more often than not reveal proclivities at variance with such norms and standards. 11 By definition, democratic systems possess institutional arrangements that accord guarantees for meaningful political participation in community affairs and a certain degree of respect for political freedoms and individual rights. In such societies, legitimate governance rests – at least in theory – upon the legal and moral foundations of law and human rights with protections for the right of equality before the law, respect for the integrity of the person, freedom of speech, freedom of association, and protections from physical and mental harm. The democratic state deploys police and security forces only in extreme cases of violence and disorder but rarely for the personal financial benefits or political

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expediencies of those in positions of leadership. In the twentieth century, democracies have also offered various degrees of protections and guarantees in the economic, social, and cultural spheres.12 By contrast, authoritarian states are characterized by the conflation of the state and the ruling political party, along with, in close oligarchic partnership, the economic elite. Under the authoritarian state, the top leadership and executive agencies routinely resort to coercive measures, engineer extensive centralization of executive power, manipulate policymaking processes and electoral procedures, and finally exercise effective controls over budget and patronage through the extractive and distributive authority of the state and through civic community networks under their control. The oligarchic structure sustained by authoritarian leadership may be, according to Edward Shils, traditional oligarchies or modernizing oligarchies. 13 Despite their character and ideological orientation, oligarchies erode, in progressive order, the legitimacy of the political leadership, political institutions, and finally the entire po litical system. Considering the failure of some systems to democratize since the 1970s and that of a number of the former Soviet republics since 1991, the literature has identified a variety of authoritarian systems. Cases that fail to meet the standards of developed democracies are referred to as ―illiberal democracies,‖14 ―delegative democracies,‖15 ―clientelist democracies,‖16 ―pseudo-democracies,‖17 and such. In some cases the label ―hybrid regimes‖ is employed in reference to democracies in progress, which are said to consist of semi-democratic or semi-authoritarian practices in the ―gray zone‖ between inherited Soviet authoritarianism and the putatively democratic system under construction. 18 Such ―democracies‖ of inferior quality are in essence authoritarian regimes and suffer from fundamental shortcomings even if they demonstrate certain procedural features present in developed, functioning democracies. Routinely scheduled elections are the most common aspect of such systems, but in illiberal ―democracies‖ neither the incumbent leadership nor the power structures permit meaningful civic engagement; and, most commonly, the political elite is apprehensive concerning the potential power of citizen to change the leadership through free elections. As well, while authoritarian regimes permit elections, they inherently lack the substantive elements of democracy – e.g. civil, political, social, and economic rights. In a word, authoritarian tendencies obtain despite claims to the contrary. One form of authoritarianism that has emerged in the past three decades or so may be best characterized as ―electoral authoritarianism.‖19 Elections in this case require massive propaganda campaigns and the

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mobilization of the entire panoply of patronage and accouterments of power to ensure the permanent status of the ruling political and eco nomic elite with, where interests converge, the continuity of the incumbent leadership. Such ostensibly competitive elections have been held in a number of the former Soviet republics, including Armenia, in part as an inherited legacy of Soviet authoritarian methods. 20 The Soviet regime in theory promoted human rights principles, but in reality showed little tolerance toward the actual practice of democracy and independent, autonomous civic engagement. The Soviet political economy encouraged advances in industrialization, urbanization, education, and secularization, but it rejected calls for political liberalization and ―individualistic values and attitudes, such as … open-mindedness for the diversity and plurality of values, attitudes, and life-styles, the appreciation of competition, individual performance‖ and related ―orientations supportive of pluralist, liberal, and democratic concept of civil society.‖21 Instead, the Soviet state exercised power in all aspects of policy but also as ―a means of control of potential enemies, that is, predominantly an instrument of discipline and repression.‖22 Writing in 1984, Wayne DiFranceisco and Zvi Gitelman maintained that ―most Soviet people do not think they can make or even influence policy and are not even interested in doing so.‖23 Instead, Soviet citizens attempted to influence policy implementation rather than policy formulation largely because they could not realistically expect to exercise any meaningful impact on the policymaking institutions dominated by the Communist Party. Theodore Friedgut, whose study was published in 1979, noted ―a distinct lack of the dimension of citizen initiative. We find chronic recurrence of formal activity devoid of content.‖ Citizen participation had been limited to procedural aspects without rectifying ―the subject element so prominent in Soviet political culture.‖ He added that ―conformity rather than initiative still guides the Soviet citizen,‖ while public administration ―preserves its primacy through control of both the form and content of the participatory structures of the community.‖24 Political participation by the Soviet citizen may potentially increase in influence, but that would necessitate ―a basic change of political values in the Communist Party leadership. Such changes are as yet nowhere visible.‖25 In order to function effectively as a democracy, a regime requires a political elite and administrative agencies that demonstrate a strong commitment to democratic principles.26 Chapter 1 discussed the four categories of societies identified by Oliver Woshinsky, which greatly enhance our understanding of political systems (culturally homogeneous with an active citizenry; culturally homogeneous with a passive citizenry; culturally heterogeneous with an active

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citizenry; and culturally heterogeneous with a passive citizenry). The Armenian case clearly belongs to the first two groups, characterized as culturally homogeneous; however, the distinction is blurred with respect to passive and active citizenship, for while the Armenian citizenry is passive in general, it is also easily mobilized by elites in a populist fashion for specific political objectives, particularly during elections. In fact, the Armenian experience suggests the hypothesis that the government has gravitated towards authoritarian rule, on the one hand, because a passive citizenry has allowed it, and, on the other hand, because insecure elites tend to rely on repressive measures during times of mass mobilization (e.g. elections) to check aggressive tendencies. Cultural homogeneity in the Armenian context means that a large proportion of the citizenry act and think alike in various aspects of society and politics. Passivity not only denotes the absence of meaningful organization independent of the ruling elites but also the absence of significant engagement in politics for a number of reasons, including fear of government retaliation. Of Armenia‖s nearly 3 million people, 97.9 per cent are ethnically Armenian; more than 90 per cent are affiliated with the Armenian Apostolic Church; 99 per cent are literate, and 96 per cent use Armenian as their primary language. 27 According to a public opinion survey in 2007, no more than 16 per cent agreed that people in Armenia could express their political views freely and without fear, while 31 per cent believed that the majority of the public feared retaliation, 28 per cent believed many were afraid, and 23 per cent believed some were afraid.28 Citizens consider overt criticism of officials as too dangerous and, equally important, as fruitless.29 As a result, the political system that emerges in such a political culture is generally characterized by collectivist and authoritarian propensities. In a 1980 paper, Edward Keenan observed that the ―genetic structure of political culture‖30 of a people shapes their political institutions, norms, behavior, and system in general. Applying his analysis, it may be argued that Armenian political culture, and culture in general, holds a primarily pessimistic and fatalistic worldview and is inclined to think in terms of conspiracies – that is, organized life is a conspiracy against nature, and government and organized institutional settings are conspiracies against the chaotic world. 31 In such a political culture, support for democracy as expressed in public opinion surveys does not necessarily suggest a willingness to participate in democratic processes. Nor do expressions of individual ―support for democracy‖ necessarily translate to the actual ―presence of democratic institutions.‖ As one study has noted, ―Since the collapse of Communism, democracy has attained a positive image in virtually every country in the world. But these favor-

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able opinions are often superficial, and unless they are accompanied by more deeply rooted tolerance, trust, and participation, the chances are poor that effective democracy will be present at the societal level.‖32 Geography of human rights During the nearly two decades of post-Soviet independence, a visible pattern has emerged in the human rights records of the 15 former Soviet republics. They may be separated into three categories of ―Free,‖ ―Partly Free,‖ and ―Not Free,‖ as developed by Freedom House. The first group consists of the three Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia), which quickly made the transition to democracy. The second category includes Russia, Ukraine, and the Caucasian republics of Armenia and Georgia, where the governments have been authoritarian, the human rights situation in Armenia worsening in recent years, while it has improved somewhat in Georgia. Having established some aspects of procedural democracy (e.g. elections), the political and economic leadership nevertheless impose restrictions on or neglect political and economic rights to the detriment of the citizenry. The third category includes countries that have thus far failed to institutionalize procedural and substantive democracy. The former Soviet republics in this group are the Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Belarus. 33 Appendix I presents the relative conditions of political rights and civil liberties in the fifteen former Soviet republics as reported by Freedom House. Among the European republics, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have consistently registered the best human rights performance since 1991. The general cultural orientation of each group has enormous ramifications for the human rights situation in individual countries, whether they embrace democratization or authoritarianism, whether laws and customs promote civil liberties and tolerance, whether social and economic policies promote fair and just distribution of resources, and the extent to which the rights of ―vulnerable groups‖ (women, children, refugees) are protected. Ghia Nodia contends that ―feeling culturally close to the West will tilt a country toward political democracy.‖34 A period of two decades certainly does not provide the analyst with sufficient points of observation to arrive at definitive conclusions regarding the validity of Nodia‖s hypothesis, although his statement is clearly true in the case of the Baltic states. Nodia‖s contention, however, misses the mark regarding Armenia, even if Armenians ―feel culturally close to the West.‖ Armenia had registered some progress in the area of human rights and democratization immediately after

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independence but reverted to Soviet-style authoritarianism not long thereafter, certainly after 1993. At the center of human rights difficulties and challenges confronted in democratization by Armenian leaders rests the fact that neither the legal culture nor the political culture of Armenia considers municipal and international legal obligations as necessarily relevant to habits in daily life and to practices in national political economy. 35 Even if some sectors of the public aspire to integrate international legal principles and norms into the national institutions, the political elites have shown little respect for international human rights principles and standards, although, as Ian Shapiro has asserted, ―authoritarian rulers seldom reject democracy outright.‖36 As a result, since 1991 the Armenian political system has produced the procedural prerequisites for a ―formal democracy‖ but it has failed to institutionalize ―effective democracy,‖ whereby political and civil rights and liberties as well as socioeconomic rights are routinely practiced and protected. The regime has come under growing public pressure to democratize, but such outward expressions have been largely intermittent, occurring mostly in an organized fashion by opposition groups, particularly in times of elections. The public, oscillating between universal human rights values and democratic principles, on one side, and inherited authoritarian political culture and traditional values, on the other, exhibits a low level of trust in the government and even lower levels of tolerance, as determined mainly by ―survival values‖ rather than ―self-expression values.‖ As Inglehart and Welzel have argued, selfexpression values are ―primarily shaped by socioeconomic development.‖37 ―Self-expression values make people more supportive of individual liberties and human rights‖ and are promotive of ―procivic‖ values.38 Armenian political culture developed no tradition of individual rights autonomous of the family, the community, and the state. The family unit persisted as a closed entity, and the community required individual sacrifices for the preservation of the collective, thereby relegating the individual‖s well-being, needs, and demands to secondary concern. Instead, a premium was placed on physical survival rather than on matters of rights and justice. This strengthened the clan system and oligarchic rule with their attendant traditional feudal or semi-feudal culture and values, which have not experienced any fundamental changes from the pre-modern to the modern and to the present. A further layer was added by the deepening of the bureaucratic culture since the nineteenth century, first under the Russian Empire and subsequently under the Soviet Empire. This bureaucratic culture restricted individual initiative and individual rights, while demanding and expecting the individual to accede to state and party priorities and de-

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cisions.39 Further, while the Soviet nationalization of industries and the collectivization of the agricultural sector were in theory expected to eliminate the traditional, conservative, backward vestiges of local Armenian political economy and culture,40 these experiences instead fortified an Armenian political culture characterized by habits of subjecthood, habits of secrecy, of conspiratorial mind, of pessimism, and of fatalism. Armenian political culture thus remained adapted to foreign rule rather than enhance self-government, with an emphasis on collective survival values rather than just governance for the benefits of the individual citizen, rather than freedoms of press and of opinion, civic engagement, and citizen initiatives. Since independence in 1991, the political system in Armenia has failed to embrace democratic, liberal principles except as they appear in formal documents such as the republic‖s Constitution and in public statements by government officials. Political and economic elites, operating in their oligarchic arrangements, have safeguarded policymaking institutions and processes from citizens while insulating themselves from public accountability and obligations. As such, the political leadership fails to provide the public the institutional mechanisms for effective democracy. The Armenian citizen, therefore, has not experienced a transition from being a mere ―participant subject,‖41 as witnessed under the Soviet regime, to an active and autonomous participant in the political processes and community affairs as required of substantive democracy. Indeed, the concept of democratization as applied to Armenia is a misnomer; instead, ―regime transformation‖ characterized thus far by ―incomplete democracy‖ being more applicable. 42 William Mishler and Richard Rose note that ―the idealist approach‖ to democratization and human rights ―cannot capture the realities facing citizens in new democracies or in transitional regimes moving from an undemocratic past to an uncertain future.‖43 The democratization of Armenian political culture and the institutionalization of human rights would require not only a ―transitional phase‖ but several generations and decades of resocialization to transform the system from authoritarianism to democracy, both in terms of conduct and culture. In post-Soviet Armenia, certain efforts have been made by various civic groups and educational institutions to develop a constitutional culture and a culture of human rights. Under the Soviet regime no human rights courses were offered in schools and institutions of higher learning, and it was not until 1997 that the subject was first taught at Erevan State University.44 The Armenian Young Lawyers‖ Association (AYLA) at the same university was established in 1995 as an NGO,45 and the Armenian Human Rights School (AHRS) was founded in 1996 under the

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auspices of the Armenian Constitutional Right-Protective Centre (ACRPC) NGO.46 These developments are too recent to enable citizens in Armenia to exercise what Tilly has referred to as ―extensive citizenship,‖47 given the Soviet legacy. The current political environment, however, differs qualitatively from the Soviet context in that while in the Soviet regime local human rights groups focused on secession and independence, since 1991 such groups have been required to develop the organizational wherewithal and habits to engage in civic discourses and structural negotiations. Given the authoritarian nature of the political system, Armenian citizens have not been able to participate in a more inclusive democratization, where leaders and opposition groups debate national issues, negotiate and compromise, and compete in elections in reciprocal civility. This absence of inclusiveness in the political process may be explained in part by the fact that a large proportion of the citizens lack the financial resources to compel the state to engage in bargaining with them. 48 The authoritarian system that appeared by the middle of the 1990s, one analyst has noted, emerged because of the nature of the transition from the Soviet regime to a market economy.49 Gellner writes that ―the old nomenklatura turned into chauvinists or opportunist-capitalists with impressive and horrifying speed.‖50 The post-Soviet political leadership and institutions in Armenia emerged amidst the national crises caused by the war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabagh beginning in 1988, which lasted until the ceasefire in 1994, and by the earthquake in December 1988. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was in part caused by but also further intensified the ultranationalist propensities of the republics, which hindered the institutionalization of political practices and policy processes favorable to democratization. In the case of Armenia, the earthquake and the war necessitated the rapid mobilization of human and material resources, which, combined with the high degree of cultural homogeneity and the disinclination (in the name of national solidarity) to challenge the leadership in time of war, 51 heightened the vulnerability of the existing fragile political institutions to the consolidation of authoritarian rule under Levon Ter-Petrosyan. The shift to authoritarianism was not necessarily inevitable. During and soon after independence, the Armenian political leadership, headed by Ter-Petrosyan, came to power with enormous ―moral capital‖ – an indispensable ingredient in establishing the legitimacy of an emerging state.52 Elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Armenia in 1990, he was elected as the first president of the post-Soviet republic in 1991. On August 10, 1990, days before the Armenian

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Supreme Soviet issued its proclamation on independence on August 23, Ter-Petrosyan, presenting the ANM‖s platform, stated that the transformative processes witnessed in the country signaled ―major political developments,‖ including: 1. Independent national statehood based on a sovereign economic program; 2. A government of law based on the norms established by international law; and 3. A democratic system anchored in universal values and human rights.53 Ter-Petrosyan identified a number of pressing problems, including the crisis in Karabagh, the destruction caused by the earthquake, the influx of thousands of refugees, and the economic depression. The state‖s ability to address such challenges required stability, without which, he asserted, ―it is impossible to realize any economic, political, or national programs; it is impossible to sign international agreements, it is impos sible to introduce foreign capital.‖ In the absence of stability the government ―does not enjoy the confidence of the people.‖54 The Armenian National Movement emerged as the ruling party under Ter-Petrosyan and facilitated the consolidation of power, which within a couple of years after independence exhibited proclivities of authoritarian personal rule, a type of regime commonly found in postindependence African states. Step by step, the Ter-Petrosyan government marginalized and silenced opposition voices in the name of national security, and, by the time fighting in Karabagh had stopped, he had amassed considerable powers as the executive and head of state. The process of the consolidation of authoritarian rule continued under Robert Kocharyan and Serge Sargsyan. The accumulation of executive power in the process of state-building occurred at the expense of the other two principal branches of government, the parliament and the judiciary, neither of which has thus far gained sufficient powers to perform its constitutional functions effectively. Thus, the mode of transition from Soviet rule to independence contributed to the continuation of the authoritarian system inherited from Soviet rule.55 The process of gaining independence proved relatively stable, without the prolonged revolutionary upheavals witnessed in the decolonization of some African and Asian countries. However, the emerging political leadership in the post-Soviet space lacked significant experience and skills in governance in general56 and, more importantly, in democratic governance. Further, as the leadership cadre consolidated

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power, it routinely ignored, or at best treated as a minor concern, the formal rules and procedures of government, relying instead on informal networks of oligarchic clientelism and patronage to strengthen its position. The system that developed in the process of transition and statebuilding, therefore, not only maintained the practices of corruption as inherited from the Soviet regime, but corruption merged political and economic power into authoritarian rule. The symbiotic relationship between the political and economic elites has proved a powerful impediment to democratization and has undermined the constitutionally mandated institutions and procedures of democracy. Nora Dudwick has noted that ―While many ordinary citizens were plunged into poverty‖ in the process of transition, ―Soviet-era political elites‖ used ―connections and access to resources to maintain and improve their positio ns, while entrenched government-mafia networks profited from privatization and opportunities for war-profiteering.‖57 The extent to which a government can claim broad political legitimacy depends on the extent to which its leaders behave in ―democracysustaining ways.‖58 As noted earlier, ―backward linkages‖ mediate between the historical legacies and contemporary policymaking institutions, which then influence the ―inherited structures‖ of the state. 59 The TerPetrosyan government implemented economic liberalization with great speed but failed in the area of political liberalization, a problem underscoring the considerable challenges faced in establishing a market economy in congruence with human rights and democratic values. These challenges find their sources in the failure of Armenian political culture to internalize the ―spirit of democracy‖60 but also in the fact that ―the precipitously and coercively imposed industrialization did not go along with cultural and political modernization.‖61 As Elster and his colleagues have stated most aptly regarding Bulgaria and Slovakia, ―the properties of the Soviet communist regime served as a congenial host which allowed the endurance of many forms of traditional domination characteristic of agrarian societies.‖62 Between the 1960s and 1980s, scholarly debates concerning institutional stability revolved around the issue of whether a presidential or a parliamentary system is more conducive to democratic stability. Since the 1990s, the extant literature on the subject indicates that the central issue is not whether a system is one or the other but rather what the defining characteristics of the principal institutions are. Key determining factors, as Ian Shapiro has noted, appear to be ―a substantial presence of the presidential party in the assembly, favorable conditions for coalition politics, and centralized executive authority.‖63 Centralized authority, however, may be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, a

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strong leadership is necessary to curb the political and economic power exercised by oligarchs and similar autonomous centers of extrajuridical entities. Such an approach would facilitate ―the equalization of access‖64 to political institutions for marginalized groups and forge greater openness for public participation in the political process. On the other hand, a strong leadership, if unchecked, as has been the case in Armenia, also further enhances the power resources and capacity of the state and reinforces the authoritarian propensities. The Armenian Constitution provides for a multi-party system based on the Gaullist mixture 65 of presidential-parliamentary systems. Yet, contrary to Constitution, the predominance of the president as the executive has been clearly established, while the dominance of his political party in the National Assembly, whether under the Ter-Petrosyan government or its successors, has facilitated the consolidation and institutionalization of an authoritarian regime. As a result, within years after independence, certainly by 1995, the Ter-Petrosyan government lost credibility and public confidence, a problem faced by the government to this date. Ter-Petrosyan and the leadership he brought to power, despite the initial moral capital they enjoyed, failed to cultivate public trust in the policymaking institutions, an essential factor to overcome the Soviet legacy of general distrust toward the state and party organizations. Economic depression and corruption only exacerbated the crisis of legitimacy. 66 The precipitous regression to authoritarian rule ultimately undermined the development of a legitimate order based on principles of law, justice, and human rights. Despite their ―illegitimate exercise of power,‖67 however, the political leadership and oligarchs under President Ter-Petrosyan and his successors continued to claim that their policies aim to lead the transition to democracy. The Constitution also guarantees the applicability of international human rights standards to domestic law, and in some cases the supremacy of international human rights law over municipal law. Article 3 of the Armenian Constitution, as amended in 2005, guarantees ―the protection of fundamental human and civil rights in conformity with the principles and norms of the international law.‖ 68 Article 6 confirms that, upon ratification, international treaties become ―a constituent part of the legal system‖ of the republic, and ―if a ratified international treaty stipulates norms‖ other than those established in the laws of the republic, ―the norms of the treaty shall prevail.‖ These constitutional provisions affirm the juridical reach of international human rights law; however, neither the political nor the economic environment has proved conducive to the institutionalization of human rights as guaranteed by the Constitution.

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Perilous Sovereignty Five phases The evolution of human rights practices in Armenia may be divided into five phases according to the presidential elections held since 1991. Although Armenia experienced some advances in the area of political rights and civil liberties by 1993, 69 each new phase, with minor variations, propelled the country farther away from the ideals of democratic governance envisioned during its struggle for independence from Soviet rule. The first phase extended from 1991 to the middle of 1994, when the political leadership under Ter-Petrosyan and society at large appeared determined to establish a democratic system. Initially, Armenia lacked a formal constitution, the proclamation on independence (issued on August 23, 1990) serving instead as the legal and moral foundation for formulating a new governmental system, together with the laws on the presidency, the parliament, and on property. Because of the difficult economic situation in the country, the parliament and the judiciary remained largely ineffective in matters of policy, leaving most authority and responsibilities of government in the hands of the president. 70 The next phase, from the second half of 1994 to early 1998, witnessed a fundamental shift toward authoritarian rule under TerPetrosyan, despite the adoption of the new Constitution in 1995. This phase lasted until his forced resignation in February 1998. The third phase, representing Robert Kocharyan‖s first term, extended from 1998 until the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2003. This phase included Armenia‖s accession to the Council of Europe in 2001, and Armenia appeared, to a certain – albeit small – degree, to be reorienting toward democratization, with an attendant improvement in overall human rights performance. The elections of 2003, however, were so tainted by fraudulent practices, voter intimidation, and other violations of law that the government lost what limited political legitimacy it had gained based on its initial promises for political and economic improvements in the aftermath of Ter-Petrosyan‖s resignation. Kocharyan and his Republican Party (Hayastani Hanrapetakan Kusaktsutyun) remained in power from 2003 through 2008 and maintained the authoritarian leadership inherited from his predecessor. This was the fourth phase. The fifth phase was opened by the highly contested elections of February 2008, which brought to power Kocharyan‖s hand-picked successor, Serge Sargsyan, along with the continued dominance of the Republican Party. The 2008 elections were marked by violence and bloodshed. Police brutality immediately after the elections was indicative

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of the long process of deterioration in the human rights situation after independence (see Appendix I).71 State capacity, buttressed by the military and the Soviet KGB-style internal security apparatus, 72 had developed ―farther and faster than democratization,‖ reversing the trajectory of the regime from its initial brief course toward democracy to one of authoritarian rule. 73 These conflicts underscored the susceptibility of the Armenian political system to loss of government legitimacy but also to elite fragmentation, as evidenced by the escalation of tensions and clash between former President Ter-Petrosyan and the Kocharyan-Sargsyan bloc. The presidential election occasioned an existential conflict, accompanied by egregious human rights violations. In fact, every election, perhaps with the exception of the first in 1991, has violated principles of electoral integrity and democratic governance. After nearly two decades of independence, Armenian sovereignty had failed to institutionalize procedural democracy. Since independence, the governing elites in Armenia have emphasized state sovereignty rather than the promotion and protection of individual rights and liberties. A combination of factors – including the continuity of repressive Soviet-era practices, political and economic insecurity, and the Karabagh war – has impeded the nation‖s transition to democracy even when the public has pressed for greater respect for human rights. General neglect, indifference, and the lack of accountability have further widened the chasm between the principles expressed in the Constitution and the daily practices of governance. The republic adopted its first post-Soviet Constitution in 1995 and ratified a new constitution with amendments in 2005. In addition to its obligations under the Constitution, the government is a signatory to a host of international human rights conventions, but its attitude towards such matters has been consistently undemocratic, despite changes in individual leaders. As argued earlier, this persisting poor human rights performance reflects systemic deficiencies stemming largely from a lack of democratic political culture and traditions. Moreover, from an institutionalist perspective, the dominance of the presidency and the executive agencies over the full spectrum of the policy process, and hence the absence of an active parliament and an impartial judiciary to address the challenges of state-building, have prevented the opposition political parties and NGOs, and the public in general, from meaningful participation in routine policymaking processes. As M. Steven Fish has pointed out, the solidification of ―super-presidentialism‖ proved to be the greatest obstacle to ―the consolidation of democratic gains.‖ 74 With the exception of some minor improvements, the republic has failed thus far to maintain a healthy balance between the imperatives of state-building, on the one

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hand, and commitment to political and civil rights, on the other. The primacy of state-building has been motivated by several factors, with continued reliance on nationalism. The new post-Soviet political elite, most of whom had called for secession from the Soviet Union, have continued to rely on nationalism and nationalistic rhetoric to sustain their legitimacy. As Vojin Dimitrijevic warned immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the threat of rampant nationalism in the former Soviet republics posed a serious threat to human rights. 75 The government of Armenia, in its single-minded pursuit of personal authoritarian rule and building a modern state and liberal economy, in the process of consolidating independence, and similar to the decolonization experienced in African societies in the 1950s and 1960s,76 collided with citizens‖ political rights and civil liberties. At a minimum, the institutionalization of democratic practices and norms requires respect for individual human rights, free and fair elections, transparent institutions, and freedom of the press and assembly. Since independence, however, the republic has experienced gross violations of civil, political, and economic rights, and has failed repeatedly to ameliorate the situation. The situation in Armenia corresponds with Neil MacFarlane‖s description of a number of other former Soviet republics: They lack ―receptivity to the principle of the rule of law‖ and manifest ―the absence of any historically rooted tradition of institutionalized civil society, democratic governance, and judicial independence.‖77 The authoritarian presidency The executive branch Upon independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the president held extensive powers that at the time could have been counterbalanced neither by the parliament nor by the judiciary, which, as noted by Freedom House, has been ―characterized by widespread violations of due process.‖78 While leaders such as Levon Ter-Petrosyan appeared to favor democratically oriented governance at the time they pressed for sovereignty between 1988 and 1991, independence, once attained, revealed personalities possessing authoritarian proclivities not unlike the Communist leaders they had forced out. The political leadership that consolidated power during the process of gaining independence shaped the political institutions of the republic. 79 The process of post-Soviet state-building rested upon the monopolistic tendencies of the emerging political economy and the structural bases of authoritarian rule established in the formative stages of sovereign governance. As each successive president

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consolidated power, the executive policy institutions were solidified under his control at the exclusion of all others. The presidency and the executive agencies, including the military and the internal security apparatus, have dominated the government institutions and marginalized the parliament and the judiciary. Several factors contributed to the solidification of power in the executive office. The president held vast privileges, including the power to appoint and dismiss the prime minister, cabinet ministers, the Prosecutor General, the governors of the marzes (provinces), and the mayor of Erevan.80 The president possessed the authority to adjourn the National Assembly and to call new elections, with the exception of the last six months of his tenure in office. In addition, the war in Karabagh and related geopolitical and economic difficulties enabled the president, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, to further strengthen his hold on policymaking institutions. Moreover, the president could mobilize vast resources through his political party and patronage networks. The proper delimitation of presidential power became a major issue on the national agenda as the nation debated the new post-Soviet constitution to be adopted in 1995. President Ter-Petrosyan insisted on a maximalist formula, whereby the executive would retain the powers already vested in the office. The opposition, included Dashnaktsutiun, the Communist Party, the National Democratic Union, 81 and the Union of National Self-Determination, demanded a more balanced system to enhance the prerogatives of the legislature for a greater role in the policymaking process than had been possible since 1991. Ter-Petrosyan, for his part, stressed political stability, maintaining that under the existing arrangements his government had avoided armed conflicts at home while registering economic improvements since 1994. The proposed constitution, he argued, would sustain a stable political system. Contrary to the concerns voiced by the opposition regarding the power of the presidency, Ter-Petrosyan argued that the new constitution would create an inherently weaker executive office, as it would enable the National Assembly to override a presidential veto or demand the government‖s resignation by a simple majority rather than the two-thirds vote required during the pre-constitution period. Moreover, under the proposed constitution, the president could not dissolve the National Assembly within a year of parliamentary elections or ―during the last six months of a president‖s term‖ in office.82 As the nation prepared for the referendum on the new constitution in July 1995, the Ter-Petrosyan government launched the first volley of its campaign to control the national debate concerning the new constitution. In a highly ill-advised move, on December 28, 1994, in a televised

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speech, Ter-Petrosyan accused the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Hay Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsutiun), one of the leading opposition parties, of terrorist and espionage activities, drug-smuggling, and assassinations.83 Although ARF members of parliament remained in office, the government arrested more than 20 party members and suspended the party and its affiliated newspapers and cultural organizations. In its ruling in January 1995, the Supreme Court upheld the government‖s actions against the Dashnaktsutiun. In April 1995, however, the European Union adopted a resolution criticizing Ter-Petrosyan‖s measures as an ―attack on the basic principles of democracy.‖84 Undeterred by such condemnation, government harassment continued unabated after the elections in 1995. These and similar authoritarian methods were employed in a politically charged environment caused by war in Karabagh, severe economic difficulties, and several assassinations of highly visible government officials (e.g. the former head of the KGB in Armenia). These authoritarian trends did not augur well for the opposition groups that sought to use the new constitution to push for more democratically oriented institutions. If they believed that a constitutional framework predicated upon democratic principles would create a legal and cultural environment conducive to democratic behavior in a civil society, they were to be sorely disappointed. On April 13, 1995, the Constitutional Commission of the Supreme Council approved the draft of a referendum supporting Ter-Petrosyan‖s maximalist position, and it was presented to the voters on July 5.85 The tensions engendered in this ―uncivil‖ society permeated the entire political system beyond the debate over the nature of the constitution soon to be adopted. The conflict led to mass demonstrations and escalated into violence as the elections of July 1995 approached. The clash between the government and the opposition reflected the ever-widening chasm between the ruler and the ruled. The opposition protested the exclusivist restrictions imposed by the Central Election Commission (CEC) on parties and candidates and accused the Ter-Petrosyan government of manipulating the electoral process. Under the law, the president nominated the chair of the Central Election Commission, while parliament nominated the other members, granting the incumbent president considerable power over the results of the elections. On June 21, 1995, just days before the scheduled elections, the government reacted with brutal force, beating demonstrators, and security forces even firing shots at them. As the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe reported soon after the elections, ―the July 5 election took place in an atmosphere of deepening polarization in Armenia between the

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authorities and the opposition, while the Western press voiced concerns about setbacks in Armenia‖s democratization.‖86 The Constitution, thus adopted in a national referendum, retained most of the executive powers proposed by Ter-Petrosyan: the authority to dissolve the National Assembly and to call special elections, with the exception of ―during the last six months of his or her term‖ (Article 55, para. 3); and the power to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and cabinet ministers (Article 55, para. 4), the Prosecutor General (Article 55, para. 9), the governors of the marzes (Article 107), and the mayor of Erevan (Article 108). 87 During the first fifteen years of sovereignty, the president and the executive agencies serving him enjoyed vast powers as they imposed authoritarian rule on the republic. Efforts to silence the opposition failed, however, and the latter persisted in its demands for certain amendments with more effective checks and balances. The amended Constitution, adopted in 2005, introduced some modifications favorable to human rights but retained most of the executive powers established in the Constitution of 1995. With respect to the National Assembly, for example, Article 74.1 of the 2005 Constitution grants the president the power to dissolve the parliament but has omitted the provision that he can do so except ―during the last six months of his or her term.‖ Instead, the amended Constitution provides that the president ―shall dissolve the National Assembly‖ if the latter fails to approve the government‖s program ―two times in succession within two months‖ (Article 74.1), in addition to failure to vote ―within three months‖ on issues deemed urgent by the government, failure to convene ―for more than three months,‖ and failure ―for three months to adopt a resolution on issues under debate‖ (Article 74.1, paras. a‒c). Such amendments have not diminished the powers of the president, and both the parliament and the judiciary continue to function as institutions of secondary order, with little independence from the executive. The legislative branch Notwithstanding the impressive constitutional powers vested in the National Assembly and the numerous laws adopted concerning human rights, the institution has oscillated between loyalty to the president and paralysis as a result of sheer inertia and internal factional divisions. It has lacked the power to serve as a counterbalancing force relative to the president and thus failed to serve as an effective check on executive authority. Moreover, although the electoral system is based on a mixture of proportional and majoritarian principles, it has failed to translate these principles into meaningful public representation. 88 The nearly

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closed system of oligarchic power diminishes the incentives that electoral competition is expected to generate for responsive government. The transition from the Constitution of 1995 to the amended Constitution of 2005 raised expectations that certain provisions concerning the powers of the National Assembly could strengthen human rights and democratization. The Constitution of 1995 granted parliament, inter alia, the power to adopt the state budget (Article 76), to ratify international treaties and to declare war (Article 81, paras. 2‒3) as recommended by the president, and to pass a vote of no confidence in the government (Article 84). The Constitution of 2005 repeats the same provisions with some modifications. Two significant amendments are worth noting here. One reflects domestic and international demands to combat corruption. Article 65 of the 1995 Constitution stated: ―A Deputy may not hold any other public office, nor engage in any other paid occupation, except for scientific, educational, and creative work.‖ Article 65 of the 2005 Constitution asserts: ―A Deputy may not be engaged in entrepreneurial activities, hold an office in state and local self-government bodies or in commercial organizations, as well as engage in any other paid occupation, except for scientific, educational, and creative work.‖ The explicit prohibition of engagement in ―entrepreneurial activities‖ by members of parliament is a first step to combat corrupt practices in the long run, although thus far no improvements have appeared to any appreciable extent. The second and more fundamental change appears in the creation of the Office of the Human Rights Defender (or Ombudsman). An institutional innovation potentially strengthening human rights was the establishment in April 1998 of the human rights commission within the office of the president. The Constitution of 1995 did not contain a provision for the establishment of this office, but the amended Constitution of 2005 guarantees, under Article 18, that ―everyone shall be entitled to have the support of the Human Rights Defender for the protection of his/her rights and freedoms.‖ The National Assembly appoints the Ombudsman for six years (Article 83.1). He or she must be a ―person held in high esteem by the public.‖ Article 83.1 guarantees the independence of the office and grants the Defender the same level of immunity as provided for deputies in the National Assembly. Kocharyan appointed Paruyr Hayrikyan, a distinguished political activist and leader of the opposition Union of National Self-Determination, as director of the commission in 1998. Hayrikyan served until the middle of 2002, when he resigned in order to compete in the 2003 presidential elections. 89 The office transformed into the Human Rights Defender by an act of the National Assembly on October 21, 2003.

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Although the office has never possessed binding legal authority, it has brought cases of unjust and illegal practices by government bodies (―ranging from apartment allocations to police behavior‖) to the attention of policymakers for review. The primary objective of the Human Rights Defender is the protection against human rights violations at different levels of government. In pursuance of its mission, the Ombudsman seeks to ―raise the country‖s level of legal and juridical protection of the people;‖ to ―facilitate and contribute to the improvement of legislation related to human rights and fundamental freedoms,‖ and to ―bring Armenian legislation in line with the norms and standards of international law. ‖ Kocharyan appointed Larisa Alaverdyan as the Human Rights Defender in February 2004, and the office commenced its activities two months later.90 In February 2006, the National Assembly voted for Armen Harutyunyan as the Defender for a six-year term.91 While this clearly represented significant progress toward heightening the political saliency of human rights considerations in the country, the Council of Europe and human rights organizations expressed doubts that the office could in fact remain independent from government authorities. Soon after its establishment, the Human Rights Ombudsman met with local human rights groups, but the office, it was reported, ―suffered from internal disorganization and a perceived lack of independence from the Government during its first year of operation.‖92 It remains to be seen whether it can contribute significantly to a political environment more favorable to human rights. Despite public skepticism concerning its role, the office of the Ombudsman nevertheless may potentially serve the important function of a facilitator between citizens and government authorities, a function particularly valuable considering the lack of independent judiciary and the absence of institutional mechanisms for the effective representation of citizens in the judiciary. 93 Such improvements in the Constitution of 2005 notwithstanding, a fundamental, systemic problem persists with respect to human rights in general and gender equality in matters of political rights and representation in particular. Armenia‖s oligarchical system is also patriarchal, androcentric by tradition. Women have a limited role in government and politics in general. Article 14.1 of the Constitution (as amended in 2005) affirms protection against discrimination based on gender, and in doing so it upholds the norms established under the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, which entered into force on July 7, 1954, and to which Armenia became a party in 2008. 94 The 1954 Convention provides for equal participation of men and women in governance; Article 2 states that ―women shall be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies, established by national law, on equal terms with men,

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without any discrimination.‖95 Further, Article 2(a) of CEDAW, signed by Armenia on June 9, 1993, directs governments ―To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle.‖96 In practice, the National Assembly and the government in general have failed to meet the standards established in the nation‖s Constitution and in international human rights law. Ter-Petrosyan appointed Karine Danielyan (1991–94) as Minister of Nature and Environment Protection,97 the highest-ranking woman in his government. Hasmik Poghosyan has served as Minister of Culture since 2007 and Hranush Hakopyan as Minister of Diaspora since 2008. A number of women also held mayoral offices and a small number held seats the National Assembly. Since the institutionalization of the marzes in 1996, women have chaired no more than 2 per cent of Armenia‖s 859 village councils. ―No woman has been appointed governor or deputy governor or as head of a municipality.‖ 98 In 1990, women held 30 per cent of the seats in the parliament, but that figure dropped to 12 (6.0 per cent) out of 190 seats in the parliamentary elections of 1995, 4 seats (3.1 per cent) of the 131 seats in the elections of 1999;99 and 6 seats (4.6 per cent) out of 131 in 2003. While women constitute about 51.7 per cent of the population, prior to the elections in 2007, 7 (5.3 per cent) of the 131 deputies in the National Assembly were women, constituting, as one reporter put it, ―the most under-represented in the world.‖100 The quota law, adopted in 2007 in preparation for the parliamentary elections in May of that year, required that women constitute 15 per cent of ―a party‖s list for the proportional election and hold every tenth position on party lists.‖101 Nevertheless, 12 women were elected to the National Assembly in the election of May 2007, constituting 9.2 per cent of the 131 seats. 102 In April 2004, the Kocharyan government adopted the ―National Action Plan 2004-2010 on Improving the Status of Women and Enhancing Their Role in Society,‖ which aimed at promoting equality between men and women as a fundamental step toward building democracy. In view of the limited number of women candidates in the parliamentary elections of 2003, the OSCE/ODIHR recommended that the government reform its electoral laws so as to ―increase the participation of women in the electoral process and especially to improve the representation of women as candidates and in parliament.‖103 The lack of public support for women in leadership roles and political office is considered a manifestation of culture and additional quota laws may be necessary to facilitate the election of women into such

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offices. The same holds true in the case of the judiciary as well, where no more than 22 per cent of judges are women.104 Public opinion surveys conducted in 2006 and 2007 yielded the results shown in Table 3.1. Table 3.1 Public Preferences for Political Office, 2006-2007 Question: ―All other things being equal, would you vote for . . .‖ Men October 2007 July 2007 March 2007 November 2006 August 2006 May 2006

(%) 73 65 58 61 64 61

Women (%) 5 7 8 7 6 7

Does not matter (%) 20 27 32 31 28 29

No answer (%) 2 1 2 1 1 3

SOURCE: IRI, USAID, Baltic Surveys/The Gallup Organization, ASA, Armenian National Study, October 2007, p. 29.

The judicial branch The existing judicial culture inherited from the Soviet Union fundamentally embodies the belief that the court is merely ―a rubber stamp for the prosecutor and not a defender of citizens‖ rights.‖ Equally important, having inherited the ―Soviet mentality,‖ the courts view their role as an agency of punishment instead of justice and protectors of human rights.105 In the broader context of the political system, whereas scholars in Western democracies debate the extent of the judiciary‖s vulnerability to pressures of majoritarian politics, 106 in the case of Armenia there is no empirical evidence to suggest that electoral participation and majoritarian politics exert any influence on the judiciary. Further, while some analysts and policymakers in democratic societies believe that the courts tend to ―impose results on recalcitrant legislatures,‖107 the courts in Armenia have not exhibited the level of active engagement that could be construed as imposing decisions on the parliament. Recommendations that courts promote electoral and legislative competition in order to promote parliamentary responsiveness to marginalized voices are valid in societies that have effectively instituted procedural democracy even if they cannot routinely produce substantively democratic policies.108 This section focuses primarily on the extent to which the courts in Armenia function as independent agencies to protect

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human rights. The Constitution of 1995 granted the president extensive powers concerning the courts. While certain improvements have been introduced in the court system since the adoption of the Constitution of 2005, several factors, including presidential powers and corruption, continue to undermine the role and legitimacy of the judiciary. The absence of a constitutional culture unsurprisingly has had enormous ramifications for the post-Soviet judicial system in Armenia. Similar to the National Assembly and the political parties (discussed below), the courts have operated from a position of weakness relative to the president, whose powers, as noted above, were further strengthened under the Constitution of 1995, the guarantees for judicial independence under Article 97 notwithstanding. Article 55 of the 1995 Constitution granted vast powers to the president with respect to the court system. The president appointed and could remove from office the Prosecutor General ―upon recommendation of the Prime Minister‖ (Article 55, para. 9). The president appointed, could remove from office, and could order the arrest of the members of the Constitutional Court (Article 55, para. 10). The president appointed and could remove the judges of the Court of Appeals and the lower courts (Article 55, para. 11). The president, as the ―guarantor of the independence of the judicial bodies,‖ presided over the Judicial Council (Article 94, para. 1), while the Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General served as vice presidents of the Council (Article 94, para. 2). The president appointed the 14 members of the Council of Justice, which included nine judges, two legal scholars, and three prosecutors (Article 94, para. 3). The Council of Justice in turn recommended the judges serving in the courts of first instance and the courts of appeal and candidates for posts in the administration of justice for the president‖s approval (Article 95, paras. 1‒4). The president, as a member of the Council of Justice, also had the authority to review judges at all levels. Article 96 granted permanent tenure to judges and members of the Constitutional Court until the age of 65 and 70 respectively. The power to appoint and dismiss judges clearly granted the president extraordinary influence, which in turn undermined the moral status of the entire judicial system. The Constitutional Court did not begin to function until 1996, and the Court of Cassation until 1998. The independence of the judiciary from political pressures and economic incentives to ensure impartiality in decisions is essential for the proper functioning of democracy. According to Christopher Larkins, the institutionalization of the rule of law (or the ―submission of the state to law‖) helps the new democratic state achieve two impor-

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tant goals: (1) the realization of a clear break with the past, and (2) the development of a constitutional culture which teaches state actors that the legal bounds of the system cannot be transgressed for the achievement of partisan political gains. 109 Moreover, the courts, most emphatically the Constitutional Court, are the institutional mechanisms essential for the incorporation of international norms and standards into the nation‖s laws and practices. Their role is particularly and all too obviously central in this respect, as Article 6 of the Constitution affirms that international treaties, upon ratification by the National Assembly, are a ―constituent part‖ of the republic‖s legal system and that norms stipulated by a ratified international treaty prevail. The judiciary possesses the authority to uphold international and constitutional standards, and, with sufficient credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it can also require the effective formulation and adoption of human rights laws by the National Assembly and the execution of such laws by the president and the executive agencies.110 The revised judicial system stipulated by the Constitution as amended in 2005 and the Judicial Code adopted by the National Assembly in 2007 in theory made the courts less vulnerable to presidential intervention. 111 Article 97 of the 2005 Constitution guarantees judicial independence. Whereas under Article 94 of the 1995 Constitution the president appointed the members of the Council of Justice, Article 94 of the 2005 Constitution provides that its nine judges be elected by secret ballot by the General Assembly of Judges of the republic. 112 The president and parliament may each appoint two legal scholars. In addition, while the 1995 Constitution granted the president the power to preside over the Council (Article 94), the Constitution of 2005 reserves that power to the Chair of the Court of Cassation ―without the right to vote‖ (Article 94.1).113 Further, the Judicial Code, under Chapter 2: Principles of the Functioning of the Judiciary, requires that judges remain ―autonomous‖ and not be politicized (Articles 9‒11).114 While the president has retained the power to appoint and dismiss judges, Article 55(11) of the 2005 Constitution requires that he do so ―upon the recommendation of the Council of Justice.‖ The Court of Cassation is the highest court and can potentially contribute to the development of a legal system based on common law whereby its judgments establish precedent. It is followed by the Civil Court of Appeal and the Criminal Court of Appeal, the three specialized courts (an Administrative Court, Civil Courts, and Criminal Courts), and courts of general jurisdiction (which under the Constitution of 1995 were referred to as the courts of first instance).115 Cases may be appealed

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from the courts of general jurisdiction, the Administrative Court, the Civil Courts, and the Criminal Courts of first instance to the courts of appeal (the second-level court) and finally to the highest level, the Court of Cassation (Article 92). The Constitutional Court, which held a more limited jurisdiction under the Constitution of 1995 compared to its role under the revised Constitution, consists of nine members (instead of 14); the president appoints four members of the Constitutional Court (Article 55, para. 10), while the parliament appoints five members (Article 83, para. 1). In case the parliament fails to appoint the president of the Constitutional Court, the president of the republic appoints him or her. Article 96 of the 2005 Constitution grants permanent tenure to judges and members of the Constitutional Court until the age of 65 (rather than the age of 70 provided for the latter under the 1995 Constitution). The Constitutional Court possesses the power of judicial review (Article 100, para. 1), that is, it determines the constitutionality of laws passed by the parliament, approves international agreements, and decides on legal questions related to elections. A serious deficiency in the legal system under the 1995 Constitution was that the Constitutional Court lacked jurisdiction over matters pertaining to human rights. Article 101 (para. 8) of the Constitution of 2005, however, rectified that defect by granting the Constitutional Court the authority to consider cases filed by the Human Rights Defender. The Constitutional Court received more than one thousand petitions and accepted about 4.5 per cent of them. 116 Significantly, under the current law, decisions by the European Court of Human Rights are legally binding and establish precedent for Armenian courts. 117 The importance of this point cannot be overemphasized considering that since 2002 the European Court of Human Rights has received hundreds of applications from Armenia, decided on twenty cases, and only one ruling supported the government‖s position.118 The smooth functioning of such a system and the effective implementation of decisions may bring about major improvements in the Armenian judiciary, although this is difficult to evaluate at this stage in early 2011. Furthermore, several improvements have been promulgated in the administration of courts in recent years. These include judicial training in various aspects of the law and judicial conduct, such as the courses offered on ethics at the Judicial School beginning in 2007. Since January 2008, judicial candidates have been required by law to attend the Judicial School for continuing legal education. In addition, the courts have received a larger share of the state budget since 2005, particularly for purposes of renovation to meet international standards, a process supported by the Judicial Reform Project of the World Bank. ―Judicial

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salaries,‖ however, remain ―among the lowest in the former Soviet Union,‖ contributing to, or providing ―a justification for, corruption,‖ as reported by the Rule of Law Initiative of the American Bar Association. 119 The courts have yet to demonstrate effectiveness in protecting human rights. Although the Constitution of 2005 and the Judicial Code in theory create a more balanced system of presidential and judicial authority, thus far there is little indication that the latter can function as an independent, counterbalancing force to check presidential powers. Despite the improved Constitution and the Judicial Code, in practice the president continues to exercise vast powers formally and informally through decisions involving promotion of judges and ultimately through his power to dismiss them despite their guaranteed tenure.120 The courts continue to lack independence from the executive branch and the oligarchic networks, and, rather than serve as impartial arbiters of law and constitution, remain an integral part of corruption. Systemic corruption is discussed in some detail in Chapter 5; suffice it to note here that despite several important anti-corruption laws promulgated in recent years, corruption has persisted unabated. According to opinion surveys in August 2006, 30.5 per cent of respondents believed that corruption had increased since 2002, while 33.5 per cent thought it had significantly increased. 121 In 2007, 62.9 per cent of those surveyed believed that the level of corruption increased since 2004, although 22.9 per cent saw no change.122 Regarding the judiciary, Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer reported that about 40 per cent of those surveyed in 2010 believed that the judiciary was the most corrupt institution, followed by state civil service bureaucracies (31 per cent), and the police (20 per cent).123 In one survey, 51.9 per cent considered the Constitutional Court corrupt or very corrupt; 64.2 per cent, the Court of Cassation; 66.4 per cent, courts of appeal; and 69.4 per cent, courts of first instance.124 These findings raise serious questions concerning the public legitimacy of the judiciary. In official circles the nation‖s court system is said to be in a ―transitional phase‖ and therefore in need of time and patience for further development. Critics, however, consider such views as a mere justification for the unwillingness on the part of the political and economic elite to reform the judicial system (and, in fact, the entire political system). For reasons discussed above, the executive has been least willing to institute effective reforms. The failure of political parties Political parties serve as mediating institutions between the citizenry and government and therefore have several essential functions. In democratic

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systems, political parties perform a ―brokerage function,‖125 whereby party organizations, as instruments of interest articulation and aggregation, 126 facilitate the formulation of the national agenda, the transmission of public or group opinion to policymaking institutions, and the translation of values, attitudes, and opinions into public policy. 127 In democracies, the performance of such functions by political parties may be coterminous with interest group activities in a relatively open environment of civil society and civic engagement. Authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, rely almost exclusively on a single party (or a coalition dominated by the ruling party) whose primary function is to serve as instrument of state control over society. This does not preclude the role of the party as a mechanism for interest articulation and interest aggregation, but the procedures and substance of such processes are dictated by the imperatives of the security of the state and of the ruling political and economic elites.128 Rather than encourage what Anna Grzymala-Busse refers to as ―robust competition‖129 among post-communist parties, the post-Soviet authoritarian states have employed their respective ruling political parties to extract resources and to restrict the public space for civil society, with deleterious ramifications for the political, civil, social, and economic rights of their citizenry. The absence of freedom for party competition under the one-party regime of decades of Communist rule had impeded the development of independent parties, and the disintegration of that system gave rise to numerous self-proclaimed parties, initially numbering more than 70 in Armenia, as people seized the opportunity to energize political activism. The emerging political parties were hardly prepared to perform the functions of party organizations assumed in democratic theory. Armenia lacked independent political parties as found in the Western democracies. In their stead there emerged ―blocs or coalitions of relatively small groups lacking in strong organizational structures and mass membership.‖130 Although at first Armenia appeared to have become a multiparty system, and on the surface it is, most of the earlier parties lacked organizational wherewithal and a tradition of democratic practices and instead behaviorally functioned as ―interest groups‖ or as tusovkas (i.e. ―the Russian youth phenomenon of the informal group of friends who frequently gather to talk, smoke, and drink coffee‖).131 In the post-Soviet system, most political parties, with the exception of the ruling party and the diasporan parties, lacked (and continue to lack) sufficient financial resources to strengthen their mass base. 132 The emerging political parties, organizationally weak and displaying a bewildering array of ideologies, were led by powerful individuals, a small number of whom successfully rallied sufficient political support to create personal authoritarian leadership. A

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key weakness has been that the citizenry distrusted party organizations because the latter represented the painful experiences and memories associated with the Communist Party.133 According to public opinion surveys in May 2006 and March 2007, when seventy-four parties were registered,134 respectively 59 per cent and 65 per cent of the respondents considered individual party leaders more important than the political parties in determining how to vote at the ballot box. No more than 33 per cent viewed the party organizations as significant.135 That the ruling party would serve as a mechanism for the imposition of authoritarian rule became apparent not long after independence. In the early 1990s, the Ministry of Justice granted political parties permission to register without any restrictions.136 The leading ANM party, however, which had exhibited clear ―radical-democratic‖ tendencies in the late 1980s prior to independence, quickly transformed into a ―conservative‖137 party under President Levon Ter-Petrosyan. Indeed, as political parties prepared for the parliamentary elections in 1995, the government banned nine political parties from the electoral process, enabling the ANM further to consolidate power. 138 Whereas prior to the elections in 1995 an estimated 40 political parties had registered, that figure dropped to 13 parties/blocs that ―emerged and/or survived the election registration process to contest the 40 seats allocated for proportional voting.‖ 139 While opposition parties have raised public consciousness with respect to alternative approaches to agenda-building and policies, they have yet to exert sufficient influence to introduce fundamental changes in policy and governance, a failure stemming in part from chronic internal discord and instability. For example, the resignation of Artur Baghdasaryan as Speaker of the National Assembly in May 2006 led to the collapse of the three-party coalition supporting the Kocharyan government, as Baghdasaryan‖s party, Orinats Erkir (Country of Law; Rule of Law), joined the opposition. This party further weakened when some of its key members with other parties formed an ―Entrepreneur‖ faction in parliament.‖140 The Justice Alliance bloc, which briefly represented the most significant opposition in the National Assembly, did not survive, allowing its parties to field their candidates separately.141 By 2007, the weakness of opposition parties in Armenia reflected, and contributed to the slide toward, the authoritarian nature of the regime at the expense of opposition participation in policymaking processes, which in the process also contributed to the decline of leadership legitimacy. In one case, the Kocharyan government, in preparation for the parliamentary elections in May 2007, had secretly taped a conversation between Baghdasaryan and an official in the British Embassy in Armenia during their meeting at the Marco Polo restaurant in Erevan in

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February 2007. The transcripts of the conversation revealed that Baghdasaryan reportedly wished to bring to the attention of the European Union the ruling government‖s efforts to rig the elections, a process already in progress as the government restricted ―opposition access to the electronic media and intimidating and bribing voters.‖ Kocharyan accused Baghdasaryan of ―committing high treason‖ against national security. Furthermore, Emil Danielyan reported that ―The scandal has also cast a fresh spotlight on the role of the National Security Service (NSS), the Armenian successor to the KGB, in political processes in the country.‖ Armenian law prohibits wiretapping, making ―the whole affair … a serious cause for concern for local commentators, human rights activists and probably Yerevan-based Western diplomats.‖142 Commenting on the scandal, the opposition newspaper, Zhamanak (Time), observed that the event was not surprising but represented another step in undermining the constitutional guarantees for the individual‖s human rights. No one, the paper warned, could feel secure that his or her private conversations remained private. ―Nobody can now be sure that there are no “bugs” planted in their apartment, that their phone conversations are not wiretapped, that their every step is not watched.‖143 ―Politics is zero-sum, ruthless, and sometimes murderous,‖ Fairbanks has noted. ―It is therefore understandable that people should see their rulers as selfish, unpatriotic exploiters.‖144 The Economist Intelligence Unit‖s index of democracy, which ranks Armenia among ―hybrid regimes,‖ predicted that the parliamentary elections in May 2007 would be ―highly flawed, tipping the country into an outright authoritarian regime.‖145 Public opinion surveys in July 2007 indicated that 68 per cent of the respondents did not consider the 2007 elections ―fair and free,‖ compared to 19 per cent who did.146 The ramifications of weak opposition parties for human rights are obvious. As ineffective mediating institutions, they cannot mobilize and transmit aggregate demands for rights and liberties. Where political parties fail to provide institutional mechanisms for meaningful participation in policymaking at different levels of government, the existing power structures go unchallenged. This represents a particularly daunting problem, as most of the earlier political parties failed to achieve the degree of institutionalization necessary for organizational durability. Rather, they were transitory groupings, subject to emerging patronage structures and the ideological predilections of their individual leaders. Institutionalization requires that political parties transcend their individual members‖ proclivities and survive beyond the lifetime of their leaders;147 however, most of the new political parties disappeared after their leaders withdrew from the political arena. The ANM, for example,

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had dominated the political arena from 1991 to 1998 and survived as a major party as long as its leader, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, held the presidency. The leading opposition parties – including the Dashnaktsutiun, the National Democratic Union, and the Communist Party – while enjoying considerable popularity, nevertheless failed to gain sufficient electoral strength to challenge him. The Ter-Petrosyan government (like many of the other former Soviet republics) had initially banned the Communist Party, but the latter was permitted to register in 1992 during the brief phase of democratization. After his return to the political arena in 2008, Ter-Petrosyan formed the Armenian National Congress (founded in August 2008). Further, an authoritarian presidency and weak opposition parties have widened the gap between the center (Erevan) and the periphery (the marzes). While some local representation based on political party organizations has been established,148 the authoritarian propensities of the regime have concentrated power in the capital with little open political space in other cities and rural areas. Although local communities have held elections, the president has arrogated to himself the right to interfere in elections.149 Given the concentration of power in personal authoritarian rulership since 1992, the process of privatizing rural land and urban industries created vast opportunities for corruption and cronyism, further insulating political authorities from public pressures for accountability, democratization, and improvements in human rights practices. Some parties are led by powerful businessmen (e.g. the Prosperous Armenia Party founded in 2006) and may not survive a leadership succession. Finally, the amended Constitution may have weakened the degree of control exercised by the president on electoral rules and procedures. This may have enabled the Heritage Party, founded by former foreign minister Raffi Hovannisian, to win seven parliamentary seats in 2007. Additional elections, however, are necessary to determine if that is in fact the case. Yet, parties have been prevented from channeling public energies into the political process. The task to demand government accountability and protection for human rights will ultimately remain at the hands of NGOs, although despite their numbers they are too weak to influence policy. The absence of a strong civil society Even under the best of circumstances, public pressure cannot effectuate changes favorable for democratization exclusively through the ballot box and political parties. In addition to fair elections and strong political parties, a vibrant civil society is an essential component of a democratic

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political system that engenders substantive democracy and possesses capabilities promotive of welfare, equality, and justice. Civil society occupies the public sphere through the mediation of voluntary organizations operating independently of the state.150 Nicos Mouzelis has identified three key ingredients necessary in a strong civil society: the institutionalization of a legal structure or system – ―rule-of-law conditions‖ – that guarantees citizens effective protection from ―state arbitrariness‖; interest groups that operate independently of the state and that are sufficiently strong and active to check ―eventual abuses of power by those who control the means of administration and coercion‖; and an openly competitive ―balanced pluralism‖ whereby the impartial system prevents one group from imposing its preponderance upon others. 151 Ultimately, the principal function of civil society is to moderate the Machiavellian proclivities of the state. An active civil society, embodying a constitutional culture and predicated upon a commitment to democratic legitimacy, is necessary for the consolidation of democratic institutions and the routinization of decisions and practices by political leaders and bureaucratic functionaries that adhere to the rule of law.152 Civil society also requires an informed public engaged in meaningful political participation through multiple venues of mediating institutions – i.e. interest groups that represent various sectors of society. Yet, public engagement in post-Soviet Armenia has thus far remained confined to political parties, and the influence wielded by public pressure upon politics has been determined by the mobilization capacity of individual party leaders. As a result, the demands voiced by the public have been largely limited to the personal desires of party leaders and their ephemeral political gains. The Armenian public, which had no experience in the free, open expression of values and convictions under the Soviet regime, lacks confidence in the efficacy of civil society. This skepticism, however, reflects problems beyond matters pertaining to civil society. It reflects a general lack of self-confidence at both the personal and collective levels to act effectively in the public sphere to influence public policy, undoubtedly a byproduct in Armenian political culture as inherited from centuries of subjecthood under foreign rule. Under the tsarist and communist regimes, responsibilities for decisions and policy rested in the government halls of Saint Petersburg and Moscow, respectively, and were beyond Armenian control and initiative. The failure of the first Republic of 1918 in the midst of genocide, war, and bloodshed resulted in what Lucian Pye has referred to as a ―traumatized political culture,‖ virtually paralyzing Armenians. Independence in 1991 may have commenced a process of building national confidence, but the financial meltdown in time of war exacer-

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bated the lack of confidence in personal and public initiative – except when mobilized by a political leader. As Nora Dudwick has observed, ―The endemic distrust so common in postcommunist regimes facilitates the continuing atomization and fragmentation of social and civic life. Distrust, combined with harsh economic conditions and competition for funding, sponsors, equipment, and so forth, discourages the sharing of resources or even information.‖153 Civil society in post-Soviet Armenia, she notes, represents the ―Potemkin village‖ of ―civic organizations.‖154 Hundreds of NGOs in Armenia 155 (more than 500 in Erevan alone) represent various groups and issues – e.g. human rights, economic and cultural development, children, gender, refugees, health, and sports. Many are recipients of international aid. The Syunik Branch of the Center for Protection of Human Rights after Sakharov reportedly received $48,300 from 2000 to 2004 for projects benefiting refugees; UNHR contributed $34,700 of that amount; the US Agency for International Development (USAID) World Learning NGO Strengthening Program (WL NSP), $14,000; and the OSCE Erevan office, $600.156 Yet, according to a survey in 2007, only 1 per cent of the population claimed membership in a nongovernmental organization and 11 per cent in a political party; 88 per cent reported no membership in any organization. 157 The same survey revealed significant results concerning public attitudes toward the principal public institutions and the media. The survey conducted in October 2007 indicated that political parties enjoy the least public approval, while the church enjoys the highest (see Table 3.2). In late 2010, Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan reportedly complained that the highest level of corruption is found in the health industry. 158 That after years of Marxist atheism the Armenian Church enjoys the highest degree of public approval among the domestic public institutions mentioned in the survey clearly indicates the level of deeply held veneration toward it. Accordingly, as Dudwick has also stressed, the Church, ―as an autonomous, wealthy institution,‖ can potentially and significantly contribute to the formation and development of civil society in Armenia. 159 Yet, the Church has failed to play an active role both in the public sphere of civil society in general and in the area of human rights in particular. It certainly has failed to provide the public a social and political fortification against the authoritarian propensities of the government. As discussed in the previous chapters, the Armenian Church, led by the Catholicosate at Echmiadzin, has historically represented a conservative agent in society. Its authority and functions were severely curtailed under the Soviet regime, and, in sharp contrast to the Catholic Church in Poland, 160 for example, the Armenian Church failed to play a leading role in anti-Soviet movements in the 1980s. Unlike the assem-

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Table 3.2 Public Opinion Regarding Institutions Question: ―What is your opinion about the work of each of these institutions?‖ Institution

Church Army Armenian media Educational system President‖s office Central bank Government (ministries)* Police Armenian Parliament Political parties

Favorable Opinion (%)

Unfavorable Opinion (%)

No Opinion (%)

81 79 63 60 49 41 39 39 38 35

17 18 34 37 46 51 56 59 59 62

2 3 3 3 5 8 4 2 3 3

SOURCE: IRI, USAID, Baltic Surveys/The Gallup Organization, ASA, Armenian National Study, October 2007, p. 47. *Note: Total 99 per cent.

blies of bishops in the 1970s in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Philippines, and Spain, which, after decades of silence, openly rejected authoritarian rule and demanded social justice and respect for human rights and human dignity, 161 the Armenian Church at Echmiadzin has demonstrated no such proclivities. As in tsarist Russia in the nineteenth century and under the Soviet regime, the Catholicosate at Echmiadzin, with rare exceptions, has functioned and continues to function ―as servant of the state,‖ in the words of Richard Pipes in reference to the Russian Orthodox Church. 162 The Armenian Church has maintained a pro-status quo orientation since independence in 1991, during the Ter-Petrosyan government and its successors. In fact, at a time of severely intensifying authoritarian rule under Ter-Petrosyan, Catholicos Karekin I Sarkissian at Echmiadzin (1995‒99),163 who succeeded Catholicos Vazgen I Baljian (1955‒94) with Ter-Petrosyan‖s direct support, in his enthronement sermon (on April 9, 1995) delivered an encomium to the regime: ―Armenia has been liberated from seventy years of totalitarian rule, and today a benevolent, democratic regime prevails in our fatherland.‖ He emphasized a renewal of faith in the Church and the need ―to comprehend the value of a homeland and a national state.‖164 His sole mention of human rights was in reference to the self-determination of Karabagh, evoking the nineteenthcentury conceptualization of ―human rights‖ as Armenian national libera-

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tion from foreign rule. 165 In 1995, however, Armenia was a sovereign state and the nation‖s political leadership had tilted toward authoritarian rule; the Church could potentially contribute to the development of public sphere for civil society engagement and human rights. What Jon Elster and associates state regarding the churches in Bulgaria and Slovakia applies equally to the Armenian Church: ―Given the hierarchical and authoritarian character of both Catholic Churches, particularly the Orthodox, they were no potential candidates for the conceivable task to serve as an antidote against pervasive statism or at least as an embryonic countervailing constituent of an autonomous civil society.‖166 A strong civil society also requires a ―constitutional culture,‖ whereby participation in public affairs is regulated by habits of civic engagement and civility. Further, a constitutional culture in turn requires a modern, secular tradition of legal philosophy. Experience since 1991, however, suggests that Armenian political culture has not attained a modern ―constitutional culture,‖ even if it may have eliminated its feudal canonic culture under Soviet rule. This point was made clear at the conference on ―Christianity and Law,‖ held in Erevan in October 2000. President of the Constitutional Court Gagik Harutyunyan noted in his opening remarks and paper that for the contemporary individual Christianity and law are mutually complementary, and their synchronization rests upon the recognition and respect they grant to the individual‖s natural and inalienable rights, which the state must protect.167 Catholicos Garegin II Nersesyan (1999‒pres.) of Echmiadzin similarly stressed that Christian values are closely associated with respect for the law and responsibility with related obligations. 168 The conference papers, however, contained no discussion of Armenian legal philosophy in the age of the modern nation-state. The impact of Mkhitar Gosh on Armenian legal tradition was stressed in the context of canon law, and in passing mentioned Shahamirian‖s Vorogayt parats.169 That no names were mentioned as Armenian philosophers of law worthy of note since the Middle Ages may be indicative of the underdeveloped character of a ―legal consciousness‖ and a constitutional culture in Armenian political culture in matters of governance as well as the absence of a modern Armenian philosophy of law and rights appropriate for the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Lacking an autochthonous modern political philosophy in such matters, except as inherited from Russia and subsequently the Soviet authoritarian system, the current republic has adopted a Western legal system which is not particularly suitable to local conditions. In fact, the discrepancy between Armenian political rhetoric and reality may be best characterized as the ―Potemkin village‖ syndrome. In the context of this book, this refers to the cultural tendency to present to the outside world

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the facade of democratization (e.g. elections), while being fully cognizant of the lack of any principles and practices of democratic governance premised on human rights values for the benefit of the citizenry. To borrow an apt phrase from Jessica Allina-Pisano, the current Republic of Armenia represents a ―post-Soviet Potemkin village‖170 of sorts, most emphatically in the discrepancies between the republic‖s Constitution and its leaders‖ actual political behavior. As a UN Human Development Report has observed, ―having obtained all the visible attributes of a state, newly independent countries often lack the historical and institutional traditions of a stable functioning state, i.e. the intricate political, eco nomic, and psychological complex that is frequently called “the spirit of statehood”.‖171 Willy Brandt, Chancellor of West Germany from 1969 to 1974, has commented that ―the mere existence of a written constitution is no guarantee of constitutionality.‖172 The Armenian government has permitted domestic and international human rights NGOs to operate freely in the country, and its administrative offices have in general cooperated with them. However, the combined problems of authoritarian leadership, political mischief and malversation, chronic corruption, and economic hardship have resulted in widespread indifference, hopelessness, and cynicism among the public regarding political institutions. Various opinion surveys in the past ten years have indicated that citizens mistrust the government and exert little influence on policy. A public opinion survey conducted in Armenia in 2003 indicated a general dissatisfaction with the human rights performance of the government. Human rights violations affected every facet of society, and the vulnerability of citizens to ―bureaucratic tyranny‖ hindered the development of civil society. 173 An individual‖s physical and economic security depends largely on his or her socioeconomic status. Invariably, the legal system in Armenia operates according to the dictates of political elites, a situation buttressed by the ―legal illiteracy of the population.‖ The report comments that ―the law of force has replaced the force of the law in society. The population has lost the feeling of security in a whole range of vitally important spheres.‖174 On matters of human rights violations, more than 70 per cent of those polled indicated that when they have experienced a human rights violation they either have taken no action to remedy the violation or have discussed matters with friends and relatives. Moreover, the report concludes, ―according to the scheme well mastered in Soviet times, the law-enforcing bodies, courts and office of public prosecutor continue to intensely protect the interests of the state from society, instead of starting to protect the law from any encroachments on it and on the legal rights of the citizens.‖ 175 Another survey in early 2007 found that most Armenians expressed dissatisfac-

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tion with the lack of democracy. 176 More recently, a survey by the Institute for Political and Sociological Consulting in March and June 2010 – that is, two years after the election crisis in February-March 2008 – indicated that 67.1 per cent and 58.1 per cent, respectively in March and June, did not believe that the government protected human rights.177 Most Armenians, however, have lost confidence in the government and have resigned themselves to passivity, a condition reinforced by a political culture inherited from the Soviet era when all open political activity was seen as a threat to the state and citizens. Hopelessness, passivity, and dissatisfaction may prove quite destabilizing in the absence of a viable ideology undergirding civil society and civic culture. The post-Soviet ideological void is filled not by a belief in democracy but in nationalism. The political leadership has relied on the rhetoric of nationalism to strengthen its claims to legitimate authority in statebuilding and to consolidate sovereignty; similarly, marginalized groups have exploited nationalist sentiments to mobilize the downtrodden and discontented against the state and other groups. In both cases, human rights issues have been either ignored or exploited for political aims. Parliamentary and presidential elections provide the only opportunity for involvement in the political process, but these events have been characterized by electoral fraud, human rights violations, violence, and police brutality, as demonstrated by the ―state of emergency‖ declared on March 1, 2008, when clashes between protestors and security forces deployed in the capital led to the death of eight civilians and two security officers, while over 130 individuals (including 57 police) were wounded. Elections, whether presidential or parliamentary, national or local, have held little meaning with respect to democratic principles and practices; political legitimacy has been diminished rather than enhanced by elections as accompanied as they have been by fraudulent practices and violations of human rights, mass demonstrations and riots. Elections under authoritarian rule Modern Armenian political experience has lacked a tradition of competitive electoral succession and has been shaped by the monopoly imposed by the Communist Party for seven decades of Soviet rule. Traditional theories of democracy stress the indispensability of free and fair elections as a stable mechanism to change government leaders. Politics as an arena for meaningful electoral competition, as stressed by Joseph Schumpeter, assumes open public spheres for the expression of values and interests. Ultimately, electoral competition becomes meaningful if it serves as the basis for the legitimate exercise of power in such areas as the right to

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―participate in agenda setting and to operate as a “loyal” opposition.‖178 While elections in Armenia have provided the public the rare opportunity to participate in the political process, neither parliamentary nor presidential elections have met international standards. The political leaders‖ failure to institutionalize legitimate elections free of corruption and intimidation has rendered the entire electoral process suspect to domestic and international observers alike. Procedural deficiencies experienced as a result of recurring fraudulent behavior by officials and followers in elections have profoundly diminished government credibility to such an extent that citizens no longer consider elections a viable mechanism for meaningful participation in the political process. As a result, the elections thus far have proved fruitless as a legitimate means to change government leaders, as they have brought the severity of political polarization into sharp relief, with deleterious consequences for human rights. Incumbent presidents have resorted to harassment, intimidation, and police forces to control the electoral process in order to secure a ―plebiscitary victory‖ against opposition parties. 179 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, in Democracy and Disagreement, maintain that institutional mechanisms for deliberation may effectively minimize disagreement but that such an arrangement must be predicated upon the principle of reciprocity and ―mutual respect.‖ Disagreements in public discourse, if not absolutely resolved, nevertheless ―help citizens treat one another with mutual respect as they deal with disagreements.‖180 In the case of Armenia, however, the political culture has failed to create a political environment conducive to ―mutual respect‖ in addressing contentious issues, nor have the political leaders been successful in institutionalizing policies and procedures promotive of mutual respect in the public space. Quite the contrary – Armenia has experienced two situations that resembled military coups: the first in February 1998 when Ter-Petrosyan was removed from office by the then Prime Minister Robert Kocharyan with the support of the military, and the second in early March 2008, when mass opposition took to the streets following the presidential elections in February, and the government declared a state of emergency and called in the military to maintain law and order. The problem of leadership succession, an extremely volatile process in the Soviet system, has persisted in the current Armenian system, each election occasioning further harm to the Armenian body politic. Thus, rather than cultivate rules of political engagement through consensus, mutual distrust between the Armenian public and the government and among the political parties has frequently led to resort to force. In the absence of mutual respect, disagreement has impeded democratization.

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The Ter-Petrosyan government The period from 1991 to the middle of 1994 was one of war but also one of hope and expectations. During these years, Armenian society experienced severe shortages of basic human needs (food, water, electricity) because of the Karabagh war and the economic blockade imposed by Turkey in alliance with Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, the nation appeared determined to establish a democratic system. Initially, Armenia relied on the law on the presidency (1990) and the law on parliament (1991) rather than a formal constitution. 181 The economic crisis and the war rendered the parliament ineffective in matters of policy, leaving most of the authority and responsibilities of government in the hands of the president. Perhaps it should have been obvious at the time that the leadership possessed all the ingredients necessary for authoritarian rule, but the war blurred the line between the imperatives of national security and the drive by the president and state bureaucracies for political control. These factors had enormous ramifications for human rights practices in Armenia.182 By February 1998, when Ter-Petrosyan resigned from power, an authoritarian regime had emerged instead of the democracy anticipated in the euphoric days of independence. The initial phase of the transition from Soviet rule to independence proved extremely traumatic for Armenia. The collapse of the Soviet system caused the republic‖s economy to decline by an estimated 60 per cent, leading to a severe depression by 1993.183 The inability of the new government to address the crisis exacerbated political tensions, which gradually diminished public support for the political leadership. Leadership instability contributed to the political crisis, as several former political allies of Ter-Petrosyan either defected or were removed from office, including Prime Minister and Defense Minister Vazgen Manukyan who resigned in July 1992. Shifting loyalties among the political elite fueled growing intolerance in the Ter-Petrosyan regime toward the opposition, particularly as demonstrations became increasingly frequent.184 The parliamentary elections on July 5, 1995, served as the first test of the extent to which citizens could exercise their right to vote and enjoy meaningful participation in the political process. The elections would also indicate whether the country had made a successful transition from the Soviet tradition of largely symbolic elections. Moreover, the nation was called to vote on a referendum for the adoption of the new constitution. The suspension of the Dashnaktsutiun party in the preceding year and the fact that the government prevented several opposition parties and candidates from registering did not augur well for the elections. Thus, as the election date approached, the political landscape had become

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highly polarized. Opposition groups held demonstrations on June 21, 1995, protesting the restrictions imposed by the Central Election Commission (CEC) on parties and candidates disqualified for the elections, and the police reacted with force. The president and his allies in the National Assembly tightly controlled the CEC, which virtually facilitated the victory of the ruling coalition. Comprised of parties and individuals affiliated with the ANM and loyal to Ter-Petrosyan, the government bloc secured 80 per cent of the seats in the legislature.185 At the invitation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an estimated 185 foreign election monitors observed the 1995 elections. They included the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the European Parliament, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The Warsaw-based OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) coordinated its monitoring activities with the United Nations.186 In its annual report, Human Rights Watch commented: ―The Armenian government blatantly reneged on its commitments to democracy, making 1995 the worst year for human rights in Armenia since independence.‖187 The Christian Science Monitor reported that ―violent methods‖ were used ―to gain control over the election commissions‖ and that opposition parties were concerned that the draft constitution would create ―a super-presidency, unfettered by either the parliament or an independent judiciary.‖188 It may be argued that the deficiencies in the electoral process and the various violations that occurred were due largely to inexperience on the part of those implementing the election rules, as the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly observer delegation noted in its assessment of August 3. Such a view certainly carried a degree of validity from the perspective of 1995, merely four years after gaining independence from the Soviet regime. International observers, while pointing to procedural problems (e.g. rigging, verification, and counting of votes), granted the government the benefit of the doubt by considering the electoral process ―generally free, but not fair.‖ International monitors concluded that the elections of July 1995 involved government ―intimidation‖ of opposition party candidates and ―threats to withdraw their candidacy.‖ In some cases, as in the town of Masis, soldiers and local authorities intervened directly to disperse meetings on elections; clashes and fights ensued.189 That the elections also included a referendum on the new constitution heightened the government‖s aggressive efforts to control the entire affair across the country in order to ensure the adoption of the new progovernment constitution. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) found irregularities in voting practices. The European

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Institute for the Media found that state-owned media networks exclusively presented the position of the Ter-Petrosyan government favoring the new constitution rather than ―explaining that voters had a choice.‖ At the same time, government officials ―distributed some 150,000 copies of the constitution with a sample ballot inside that had the NO vote crossed out. The CEC also produced thousands of posters exhorting voters to adopt the constitution.‖190 After the votes were cast on election day, the CEC reported that 55.6 per cent of the country‖s eligible voters had participated in the referendum, 68 per cent voting in favor of, and 28.7 per cent against, the adoption of the new constitution. 191 The fraudulent practices and other violations of electoral law and national and international standards did not remain confined to the elections of 1995. Several elections later, the political system and the election processes had further deteriorated rather than improved, and the persistence of routine violations of human rights indicated that the fundamental difficulty was no longer ―inexperience,‖ but rather the institutionalization of experienced authoritarian governance. The first parliamentary elections in post-Soviet Armenia and the national referendum on the new constitution created an opportunity for thousands of citizens and several political parties to participate and compete in the political process. The intense debates and mass rallies generated by the various issues would appear to be a manifestation of a healthy democratic system and a legal environment conducive to free and fair electoral processes. Yet, as shown above, nothing could have been farther from the truth. The adoption of the new constitution further strengthened the powers of the president and enhanced the political fortunes of his party. The elections in 1995 clearly demonstrated that Armenia had not achieved democracy as human rights violations in the civil and political spheres remained a serious problem. One report commented in the aftermath of the elections: ―In the prevailing atmosphere of mutual demonization, there appears to be a total absence in Armenia‖s political class of trust or willingness to give the other side the benefit of the doubt on any issue of policy or politics.‖192 Could Ter-Petrosyan and his followers in the political leadership be sufficiently motivated to press for democratization and improved human rights practices? The presidential elections held on September 22, 1996, were similarly characterized by severe crises. In addition to the rules and regulations adopted by the CEC, in 1996 the government passed two laws, the Law on the Election of the President and the Law on the Election of Local SelfGoverning Bodies, which aimed to enhance the transparency of the legal procedures governing the electoral process. Formally, these laws improved the electoral process, but they were not implemented effectively.193

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The principal contenders for the presidency in the 1996 elections were Ter-Petrosyan and former Prime Minister Vazgen Manukyan (of the National Democratic Union). Observers agree that given Manukyan‖s popularity, he could have won a fair and free election. As in the 1995 parliamentary elections, however, Ter-Petrosyan exerted considerable influence and expended enormous government resources to monopolize media coverage and to control public debate. 194 In general, incumbency affords certain advantages over opponents in terms of campaign finances and public visibility. The European Institute for the Media, which monitored media coverage of the elections, reported that from August 23 to September 17, 1996, Ter-Petrosyan received 1050 minutes of editorial coverage on State TV‖s Channel 1; Vazgen Manukyan, 65 minutes; Ashot Manucharyan, 48 minutes; and Sergei Badalyan, 37.5 minutes. 195 The government also refused to lift the ban on the Dashnaktsutiun, effectively eliminating the party from the election. On election day, international monitors observed numerous irregularities, ranging from ballot stuffing to intimidation. In some cases, in an obvious breach of voting practices, military officers instructed troops to vote for Ter-Petrosyan; this phenomenon was witnessed in 40 per cent of the polling stations where the military voted.196 An OSCE report found the election process in the country ―encouraging,‖ as about 53 per cent of polling stations visited conducted procedures according to the law. This suggested, however, that in 47 per cent of the polling stations ―serious breaches in ballot security‖ were observed and that ―in some cases the law was flagrantly disregarded.‖197 Under severe pressure at home and from the diasporan communities, Ter-Petrosyan felt compelled to resort to further dictatorial steps to weaken the opposition.198 As tensions escalated, he declared a state of emergency and relied on military tanks, the security agencies, and paramilitary groups within the Erkrapah (Protectors of the Homeland, created by veterans of the Karabagh war) to assert control. Members of opposition parties were forced out of polling stations, and an estimated 250 persons were arrested.199 Although Ter-Petrosyan‖s reelection in 1996 was tarnished by irregularities and serious breaches of law, he was officially declared as president with 51.75 per cent of votes; Vazgen Manukyan received 41.29 per cent of votes, and Sergei Badalyan, 6.34 per cent.200 Yet, the president and his regime failed to regain public confidence and political legitimacy. The severe human rights violations prior to, during, and after the elections indicated that Armenia was far from establishing a democratic society. As one analyst has noted: After the election, each side accused the other in apocalyptic lan-

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guage of behaving as ―traitors to the nation‖ or as ―state criminals,‖ the opposition labeled the president‖s electoral victory a coup d‖état, while the minister of the interior compared the post-election violence to an ―attempted putsch,‖ and Ter-Petrossian characterized it as a ―fascist‖ coup by ―mentally ill people.‖201 In its annual report on human rights in Armenia, the US State Department commented that ―The Government‖s manipulation of the presidential election continued to restrict the Constitutional ability of citizens to change their government peacefully.‖202 Ter-Petrosyan resigned from office in February 1998 because of conflicts within the ANM as a large number of party members resigned, especially in protest of his reconciliatory policy on Karabagh. Robert Kocharyan, prime minister and president of Karabagh prior to his appointment as prime minister of Armenia by Ter-Petrosyan in 1997, became independent Armenia‖s second president after the extraordinary elections in March 1998. Kocharyan won the election in a runoff against former Communist Party leader Karen Demirchyan, but the process, as with previous elections under his predecessor, was marred by various violations of electoral law and human rights. The OSCE found the presidential elections of 1998 seriously flawed. Ballot-box stuffing, the activities of several unauthorized people in polling stations, and other fraudulent measures and proceedings by national and local officials inflated the number of votes favoring Kocharyan. 203 After a decade of independence, the political leadership in Armenia came under severe criticism for having failed to establish a democratic government. Public disillusionment with the existing system led to apathy among the voters, the critics charged, and the political system, contrary to official declarations favoring democratization, discouraged and even prevented participation in the elections and in the political process. Under such circumstances, the nation‖s Constitution at best represents a simulacrum of aspirational declarations, for it certainly has not served as a legally binding and morally viable repository of democratic governance, of rights and liberties. 204 The Kocharyan government Ter-Petrosyan‖s resignation raised public expectations that the era of authoritarianism and economic crises would soon end. Within a year, however, the continuation of the authoritarian trends inherited from the previous government underscored the systemic nature of authoritarianism. The extensive control the Ter-Petrosyan government had exercised

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over media coverage during elections had led ODIHR to recommend in a number of reports improvements in electoral and broadcasting laws, rules governing electoral procedures at the polling stations, and rules regulating media coverage of candidates and parties during election campaigns.205 In response, the National Assembly adopted amendments to the Electoral Code in 2002 and approved the Law on Freedom of Information in 2003, both of which promised better electoral practices than had been possible previously. At face value they appeared to contribute to the institutionalization of fair and free elections, to transparency and accountability, and hence to the strengthening of democracy. Yet, as with other areas of ―democratic‖ governance, these laws failed to effectuate any changes in government practices as the authorities simply chose not to comply with them. 206 Such democratically oriented reforms notwithstanding, the elections held during the tenure of the Kocharyan government consistently fell short of international standards and the democratic principles enshrined in the country‖s Constitution. The period between 1998 and 2001 proved particularly violent, as Kocharyan, despite his ―success‖ at the ballot box, lacked a solid party base to consolidate power immediately upon entering office. The turbulent situation created by the transition from Ter-Petrosyan to Kocharyan and the weak party base of the new leadership created a brief window of opportunity for the opposition People‖s Party to enter into an alliance with Kocharyan‖s Republican Party to form the Unity Bloc and to secure a victory in the parliamentary elections of May 1999. The Unity Bloc, which proposed broader government engagement in social protection programs, consisted of the Republican Party headed by the politically powerful Defense Minister Vazgen Sargisyan and the People‖s Party led by former Communist Party leader Karen Demirchyan.207 Sargisyan became prime minister and Demirchyan the speaker of the National Assembly. This reconfiguration of power further weakened the opposition parties in the parliament but also indicated a willingness on the part of Kocharyan to form a more inclusive coalition government. This process of potential realignments came to an abrupt halt in October 1999, when five gunmen assassinated several prominent politicians in the National Assembly, including Vazgen Sargisyan and Karen Demirchyan. Kocharyan responded to the political crisis at first by appointing, on November 3, 1999, Aram Sargisyan as prime minister to succeed his older brother, the murdered Prime Minister Vazgen Sargisyan. If Kocharyan expected the inexperienced Aram Sargisyan to serve his president loyally, he was soon disabused of such notions. While the crisis enabled Kocharyan further to solidify his position, Aram Sargisyan began to

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demonstrate unanticipated political skill and emerged as a forceful rival of Kocharyan. In response, in May 2000, Kocharyan dismissed Prime Minister Aram Sargisyan and Defense Minister Vagharshak Harutyunyan because they had engaged in ―political intrigues.‖ Kocharyan appointed head of the Republican Party Andranik Margaryan as prime minister, and his advisor, Serge Sargsyan, as defense minister. 208 The trial of the five gunmen and eight others charged with complicity commenced in February 2001, and the crisis seemed behind him as Kocharyan further consolidated power. The political environment, however, had grown extremely hostile and polarized. In September and October 2001, thousands of people, led by former Prime Minister Aram Sargisyan and his newly created Republic Party, held protest rallies calling for Kocharyan‖s resignation. Claiming that Kocharyan had sabotaged the investigations into the assassinations in the parliament, they attempted to impeach him in 2002 but failed.209 The presidential (February 15 and March 5) and parliamentary (May 25) elections of 2003 were marred with various irregularities ‒ e.g. extensive use of state resources to support the campaigns of the incumbents, reliance on election commissions loyal to Kocharyan and his allies, irregularities in vote counting, and ballot box stuffing.210 The presidential election in 2003 was a contest between Kocharyan and Karen Demirchyan‖s son, Stepan Demirchyan. In the first round held on February 15, Kocharyan won by 49.5 per cent, requiring a runoff against Demirchyan. Rejecting the results of February 15 as highly manipulated, by some estimates as many as 100,000 opposition demonstrators took to the streets in protest. The police and military responded with force, detaining several hundred persons and opposition leaders, and prohibiting rallies. Subsequently, the police arrested several supporters of opposition candidates, and by March 5, 2003, when the runoff elections were held, nearly 200 people were arrested for taking part in opposition rallies not approved by local authorities. A number of opposition candidates submitted legal complaints to the Constitutional Court, and while the latter agreed that the elections were flawed it found no constitutional basis to alter the election results. Unable to find recourse through legal means, the opposition parties organized mass demonstrations in some cities from March to May demanding a ―referendum on the mandate of the President.‖ During one such demonstration with the participation of more than 10,000 supporters before the gates of the National Assembly on April 12 and 13, the police again reacted with brutal force to disperse the crowd. Commenting on the intensification of the government use of illegal methods to control the opposition, one observer stated succinctly: ―A police state is being rebuilt in Armenia.‖ 211

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Nor were parliamentary elections in May 2003 (which also included a referendum on amendments to the nation‖s Constitution) and the rerun elections on June 14-15 free of irregularities, fraudulent tactics, and the use of force. The OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission reported that the third parliamentary elections since independence ―fell short of international standards for democratic elections.‖ 212 Nevertheless, certain improvements over the 2003 presidential election were evident. Local authorities paid closer attention to the validity of ballots, and observers and voters alike were more willing to submit formal complaints. In a similar vein, the courts, particularly the Constitutional Court, which had thus far aligned itself closely with the president, demonstrated a certain degree of independence concerning inconsistencies and flaws in decisions by electoral commissions.213 The parliamentary elections of 2003 were the first since the country joined the Council of Europe in January 2001. In June 2004, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), upon reviewing the human rights situation in Armenia, concluded that while the government had improved conditions, there remained three areas in need of fundamental reforms: the Constitution, the judiciary, and election laws.214 Other international observers concurred. Whereas in its annual report for 2001 Freedom House had stated that ―Armenians can change their government democratically,‖ its report for 2003 recounted the electoral crises witnessed in the presidential and parliamentary elections and concluded that ―Armenians cannot change their government democratically.‖215 The State Department reported in 2005 that while Armenia witnessed ―some improvements‖ in certain areas of human rights, the government‖s performance ―remained poor.‖ The 2005 report enumerated several persistent human rights problems that required further improvements, including the ―abridged rights of citizens to change their government,‖ in addition to police brutality and impunity, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and limited press freedom. On November 27, 2005, amidst protests by thousands of opposition supporters and calls for Kocharyan‖s resignation, a national referendum, which international observers found procedurally quite defective, approved a number of constitutional amendments. These amendments purportedly intended to make the political system more democratic, to institute effective parliamentary checks on executive powers, and to enhance the independence of the judicial branch. Although arbitrary arrests by the police and security forces were not common in 2005, during and immediately after the constitutional referendum in November the police attacked and arrested some 50 followers of opposition groups. 216 The US Department of State‖s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2006

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echoed its criticism from the previous year: ―The government‖s human rights record remained poor, and serious problems remained. Citizens were not able freely to change their government; authorities beat pretrial detainees; and the national security service and the national police force acted with impunity.‖217 International observers expected the parliamentary elections, to be held on May 12, 2007, to meet international standards and praised the electoral reforms introduced in recent years. As the nation prepared for the elections, Prime Minister Andranik Margaryan, leader of the ruling Republican Party, died on March 25. Minister of Defense Serge Sargsyan assumed the party leadership on March 26, and Kocharyan subsequently appointed him as the new prime minister.218 In late March 2007, the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR issued a Joint Opinion on the amendments to the Electoral Code as adopted in December 2006. The Joint Opinion welcomed the reforms in the electoral process, which included enhanced training for election commission members and the removal, in the final draft of the electoral code, of a provision from the initial draft of Article 38 of the Electoral Code that had reinstituted the power of appointing bodies to recall members of election commissions. 219 The power of recall had been revoked in 2002 in an effort to render the appointment and conduct of commission members less vulnerable to political pressures, and its reinstitution would have strengthened the power of the incumbent president and the ruling party. In addition, under Article 23 of the amended Code, proxies were granted the authority to be ―physically present next to commission members during voting day procedures and to observe their activities without disrupting their work.‖ Paragraph 61 of Article 27 also allowed proxies to comment on and to make ―suggestions to the commission chairperson upon which the chairperson is now required to act.‖220 The Joint Opinion underscored a number of problems. The power of the president to appoint members of the electoral commission ―remains unclear‖ despite previous requests for clarification, the Joint Opinion stated,221 as does the procedures concerning the composition of the CEC, a point emphasized in the Final Opinion issued in October 2005 by the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR.222 These and similar reports stressed the necessity of implementing in good faith the electoral reforms that existed on paper.223 Similarly, a pre-election report by the OSCE/ ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission observed that the Election Code, as amended in 2005, 2006, and 2007, had established ―a solid foundation for the conduct of democratic elections‖ but required ―political will and good-faith implementation‖ in order to meet OSCE standards. 224 The Mission identified several potential obstacles to successful elections, in-

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cluding equal access to media, the failure of the government to punish officials engaged in violations of electoral procedures, the failure to punish those involved in human rights violations in the 2003 elections, and the lack of public confidence in the electoral process. Problems encountered in the previous elections persisted, and the parliamentary elections in May 2007 were also marred by fraudulent practices, intimidation, and other human rights violations. Twenty-two parties and one bloc participated in the elections. The Republican Party maintained its dominant position, winning 65 out of the 131 seats in the National Assembly, followed by the Prosperous Armenia Party (25), the Dashnaktsutiun (16), the People‖s Deputy Group (10), Orinats Erkir (8), and the Heritage Party (7). 225 The election led to a governing coalition comprised of the Republican Party, the Dashnaktsutiun, and the Prosperous Armenia Party. In its assessment of the elections, the OSCE/ODIHR commented that the amended Election Code, as supplemented by related laws, such as the Law on Political Parties, represented a marked improvement over the 2003 elections and that the CEC and the Territorial Election Commissions (TECs) had complied with the rules and regulations, enhancing the transparency of the proceedings. Procedural improvements notwithstanding, certain undemocratic practices persisted. Among these, the Final Report issued by the OSCE/ODIHR noted, the practice of vote buying, whereby a political party or a candidate promised goods or services in exchange for votes, allegations of pressure by employers instructing employees to vote for a certain candidate at the threat of loss of employment, and the continued influence of media coverage by powerful political and business groups, which hindered freedom of expression and limited diversity of opinions.226 While there appeared to be greater media coverage of opposition parties and candidates, the government and the coalition parties ‒ the Republican Party, the Prosperous Armenia Party, and the Dashnaktsutiun ‒ received the most frequent and favorable television coverage.227 The elections suffered from a number of key procedural deficiencies. Inadequate and inaccurate reporting of political party campaign finances represented a serious flaw, although Article 7.3 of the Constitution provides that ―parties shall ensure the openness of their financial activities.‖ Moreover, in clear violation of the Constitutional guarantees for freedom of speech and assembly (Articles 27-29), the authorities in Erevan prohibited demonstrations in Liberty Square, a decision challenged in court by the ―Alternative‖ civic NGO. The court, however, supported the city government.228 In March and April 2007, the Heritage Party submitted formal requests to three advertising agencies for billboard space, but these

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were rejected, as were requests by the Orinats Erkir Party.229 In addition, the amendments adopted in February 2007 required that elections be held ―only in the territory of the Republic of Armenia‖ and that those holding dual citizenship could vote only if registered as residents of the republic. Finally, the number of women candidates in the May 2007 elections was rather low. Of the 119 majoritarian candidates no more than five were women, and only twelve women were elected to parliament based on the proportional lists. As an OSCE/ODIHR report noted following the elections, ―the present majoritarian system does not seem conducive for women‖s representation in parliament.‖ The report also stressed the necessity of maintaining a clear distinction between political party activities and the role and function of government officials as policymakers, a principle explicitly addressed in the Copenhagen Document of 1990.230 The opposition parties, among them Orinats Erkir, the New Times Party, the Republic Party, and the Impeachment Bloc, challenged the election procedures as highly irregular and flawed with numerous violations of the Electoral Code and the results as unacceptable. Responding to these complaints, the Constitutional Court, the sole arbiter of such complaints, in a ruling on June 10, 2007, upheld the final decision by the CEC, thus confirming the elections results. The Constitutional Court, however, did point out several deficiencies in the electoral law governing campaign financing and related activities. In a positive move, the government charged a number of people with criminal acts involving violations of electoral laws. In Armavir, a person was accused of bribery, as was a candidate proxy in Hrazdan, the latter sentenced to one year in prison. On June 5, nine members of a precinct, also in Armavir marz, were tried on charges of falsifying election results, and the chairman of the PEC was sentenced to 18 months in prison. 231 The enforcement of electoral laws may deter some criminal activities during campaigns and elections and may even enhance public confidence in the electoral process in the future. The presidential election of February 2008, however, demonstrated that criminal activities could not be deterred so easily. The violence witnessed in the aftermath of the election certainly could not inspire much public confidence. Deplorable violations of human rights have undermined the credibility of elections and the legitimacy of the political system. According to a study conducted in 2007, more than two-thirds of those surveyed considered the parliamentary elections held in May 2007 to be neither free nor fair, and 60 per cent believed that the presidential elections in February 2008 would be equally undemocratic. 232 Surveys in July and October 2007 indicated that, respectively, 60 per cent and 53 per cent of

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the respondents did not believe that the government was effectively ―implementing anti-fraud measures for the presidential election.‖233 In a similar vein, an OSCE/ODIHR report issued in December 2007 commented that despite the electoral reforms since the parliamentary elections of May 2007, there was a general lack of confidence in the electoral system. ―Cosmetic‖ reforms, 234 aimed at placating international observers, could not contribute to the development of democratic institutions and practices. The report underscored several problems prior to the election, including opaque campaign financing, vote buying, unequal access to the media and unbalanced coverage of parties and candidates, and the distribution of counterfeit passports. The authorities assured international observers that they had addressed the difficulties in vote counting and tabulation experienced in previous elections. 235 The Sargsyan government The presidential election of February 19, 2008, the fifth since independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, served as an indication of the extent to which Armenia had consolidated a democratic system after nearly two decades. Events unfolding in Erevan revealed that the nation had not yet established a democracy. The political chaos and crisis caused by the presidential election attested to the urgent need for improvements in the electoral system. Perhaps more directly to the point, they also indicated that Armenian political culture requires a fundamental transformation whereby elections may take place without the deplorable excesses of inter-party and inter-personal hostilities. Nine candidates were registered for the presidential campaign, but Prime Minister and head of the ruling Republican Party Serge Sargsyan and former President Levon Ter-Petrosyan emerged as the two principal contenders, the latter with the support of fifteen ―non-parliamentary political parties.‖236 The CEC declared Sargsyan the winner with 52.82 per cent of votes, followed by Ter-Petrosyan with 21.51 per cent. Although international election monitors confirmed that the election of 2008 ―mostly‖ met international standards, there were serious shortcomings similar to those observed in previous elections. Kocharyan and Sargsyan clearly influenced media coverage of candidates during the campaign, and the CEC and the National Council for Television and Radio (NCTR) failed to guarantee impartiality as required by law. During the election, international monitors witnessed fraud, a lack of transparency, and ineffective appeals procedures, among other violations of the Electoral Code. 237 Kocharyan and Sargsyan abused their position of power and expended state resources to mobilize government em-

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ployees and other sectors in society in support of the Republican Party. As the Final Report issued by the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission stated, such methods ―blurred the separation of party and State, challenged equal campaign opportunities, and raised concern that citizens could face retribution for their electoral choices.‖238 The highly contentious nature of the entire campaign led to violence in the streets. On February 20 and 21, 2008, thousands of demonstrators filled the streets in central Erevan protesting what they considered ―widespread electoral fraud.‖ Ter-Petrosyan‖s supporters demanded that the official winner, Sargsyan, step down.239 Kocharyan responded with force; he declared a state of emergency and ordered the military onto the streets of Erevan, imposed censorship, and prohibited public assemblies. On March 1, clashes between opposition supporters and security forces led to the arrest of over 100 people and to the death of eight individuals. Human Rights Watch reported a few days after the elections that ―according to victim testimonies taken by Human Rights Watch, assailants beat and threatened opposition party activists, domestic observers, and journalists who attempted to document election fraud at polling stations during the presidential vote.‖240 Holly Cartner, Europe and Central Asia Director at Human Rights Watch, urged the Armenian government to ―ensure that no harm is done to peaceful demonstrators. … Armenia claims to be a democratic country, and that means allowing people to exercise their right to freedom of assembly.‖241 Referring to the political crisis surrounding the election in 2008, Freedom House reported that ―Armenia is not an electoral democracy‖ and that the country‖s ―political rights rating declined from 5 to 6‖ as a result of several factors, including the inability of opposition groups to freely compete and the violent means employed by the authorities to disperse the protesters.242 According to the Armenian Helsinki Association, there were ―at least four cases of torture of opposition supporters in custody in 2009 related to investigation into the March 1 events.‖243 ―Disputes and violence‖ have become ―a fixture in Armenian elections,‖ read a Human Rights Watch report. 244 International responses Given the weakness of civil society and the low levels of public trust in the political institutions and the judiciary, international pressure – e.g. by international organizations such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and European Court of Human Rights and by the Armenian diasporan communities – may prove the only recourse to improve the situation with respect to political rights in the country. Interviews conducted in Armenia by the Rule of Law Initiative of the American Bar

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Association indicated an overall lack of public confidence in the judicial system, particularly the Court of Cassation.245 A number of decisions by the European Court of Human Rights suggest that perhaps in the long run such external pressure may compel the government in Erevan to adhere to international human rights standards. In November 2007, reviewing the case of Arsham Galstyan and others who were arrested and detained for several days for their participation in demonstrations and in the aftermath of the presidential elections in February 2003, the European Court found the Armenian government in violation of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, including the right to freedom of assembly as guaranteed under Article 11, the ―right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their defense‖ under Article 6 (sections 1 and 3b), and the right to appeal in criminal cases as provided under Article 2 of Protocol 2. The European Court emphasized that ―in no circumstances should penalties be applied for mere participation in a rally which has not been prohibited.‖246 Similarly, in December 2008 and October 2009, the European Court ruled on a number of grounds that the Armenian government had violated the European Convention on Human Rights with respect to the detention of three members of opposition groups. 247 The violations included Article 3, pertaining to the prohibition against inhuman or degrading treatment; Article 6, related to the right to a fair trial; and Article 2 of Protocol 7, concerning the right to appeal. The defendants were held ―in cramped and unsanitary detention cells without bedding and with restricted access to toilet facilities.‖248 Despite such decisions, however, enforcement of court rulings remains problematic, especially when government officials and interests are involved and in part because of corruption as private interests often influence enforcement.249 Moreover, in response to the post-election crisis in March 2008, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a US foreign assistance agency established by Congress in 2004, withdrew $64 million of its support from the initial agreement of March 2006 to allocate $235.6 million targeted at reducing rural poverty. At first, the MCC had suspended the entire amount because of Erevan‖s failure to perform according to the ―eligibility criteria‖ on civil rights. 250 ―This hold on funding,‖ a press release by the MCC Board of Directors stated, ―is a result of actions by the government of Armenia that are inconsistent with MCC principles promoting democratic governance.‖ Immediately after the March events, CEO John Danilovich in a letter to Kocharyan warned that such government actions as witnessed during the crisis ―could have negative effects on the country‖s eligibility for MCC funding.‖251

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Also in response to the post-election crisis, PACE adopted several resolutions expressing its concern over the government‖s reaction to the protestors.252 In its report of April 15, 2008, the Committee on the Honoring of Obligations and Commitments by member states of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee) commented: While the outbreak of public resentment in Armenia, following the Presidential election of 19 February 2008 and culminating in the tragic events of 1 March 2008, may have been unexpected, the Monitoring Committee considers that the underlying causes of the crisis are deeply rooted in the failure of the key institutions of the state, including the parliament and courts, to perform their functions in full compliance with democratic standards and the principles of the rule of law and the protection of human rights.253 The report identified several factors that hindered the development of democratic institutions and practices in Armenia. First, the National Assembly has failed to function as a legitimate ―forum for political debate and compromise between the different political forces.‖ As a result, opposition parties, excluded from ―the decision-making process‖ and therefore unable to exercise their right to meaningful participation in the ―governance of the country,‖ resort to street actions. Second, fraudulent practices in elections have diminished public trust in the electoral process and election results. The ―lack of impartiality‖ and transparency in the administration of elections have the cumulative result of diminishing the legitimacy of the political system. Third, the judicial system has failed to secure independence from political interference and therefore has failed ―to inspire the public‖s trust as impartial arbiters.‖ Fourth, the fact that some protestors have been arrested and remained in detention without any evidence of crimes but simply because they disputed the election results indicates that their arrests were politically motivated. The report stressed that ―this is unacceptable in a Council of Europe member state and cannot be tolerated by the Assembly.‖ The report further pointed out that the degree of government control exercised over media networks through state regulatory agencies has created a legal and political environment conducive to monopolistic tendencies, ―further exacerbat[ing] the lack of public trust in the political system.‖254 Although in reaction to the crisis a number of top officials were removed from their posts, the government failed to charge them with violations pertaining to the use of excessive force. Internal inquiries were opened for 200 cases and continue to this day, but only four police

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officers were charged for excessive use of force by the end of 2009. In June 2009, President Sargsyan terminated an investigation into the 2008 event by a task force that included members of opposition groups. Also in June 2009, he granted amnesty to approximately 50 citizens who had been prosecuted for their participation in the violence, but around 17 supporters of the opposition parties remained in prison. In the meantime, a parliamentary commission, consisting mostly of members of the president‖s Republican Party, having completed its investigation into the violence in March and in September 2009, concluded that while the police did use excessive force, their actions were nevertheless ―largely legitimate and proportionate.‖255 The elections for the Erevan city council on May 31, 2009, were the first test since the crisis of March 2008 with respect to such a trans formation in the ―old mentality.‖ These were the first elections held for the city council in Erevan. Article 108 of the Constitution (as amended in 2005) granted the capital the legal status of a ―community‖ and provided for ―either direct or indirect elections‖ of the city council and the mayor. This represented a significant departure from the status of a province under Article 108 of the 1995 Constitution, which vested the government with the power to appoint the mayor. There were fears that, as in previous elections, as the elections would be marred by corruption, illegal activities, and violence. The Council of Europe‖s Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, which dispatched a delegation to monitor the election, expressed ―deep concern‖ regarding such problems and requested to meet with several leading officials. Given the apparent ―deficiencies in the conduct of the vote,‖ the nation ―should change attitude and behavior so that the practical conduct of elections, as well as the democratic culture of the country, could further improve in the future.‖ 256 In Erevan, the Council of Europe mission, led by Nigel Mermagen, met with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Territorial Development Armen Gevorgyan and with Chair of the CEC Garegin Azaryan to discuss the electoral procedures.257 The delegation also met with former President Ter-Petrosyan and political parties which had fielded candidates for the election. The delegation and their hosts reportedly emphasized the necessity for elections ―to offer a real choice for voters‖ as well as the need for impartial presentation of issues and candidates by the media, and participation of women in elections.258 On election day, voters, candidates, and journalists encountered the very problems raised by the Congress mission. According to the Council of Europe‖s Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, while the Erevan city elections in general adhered to international standards and demonstrated significant improvements from previous elections, various ir-

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regularities and intimidations took place during the campaign leading to the elections. Human Rights Watch reported that ―unidentified persons‖ threatened several local party representatives and domestic observers and ―attacked opposition journalists‖ Tatev Mesropyan of Hayq, Marine Kharatyan of Zhamanak, and Gohar Veziryan of the Chorrord Ishkhanutyun (Fourth Estate). The journalists were banned from the polling stations. 259 In one instance, the local authorities serving the electoral commission refused to permit Arshaluys Hakobyan, a monitor for the Armenian Helsinki Association, to observe the process at polling station in the capital‖s Malatia-Sebastia district. On June 5, 2009, within days after Hakobyan filed a formal complaint with the Special Investigation Department of the Office of the Prosecutor General concerning the episode, the police arrested him on charges of ―resisting authority.‖260 During his trial, Hakobyan testified that he was beaten while in custody at the police station in the Kentron district. The authorities failed to investigate his accusations, but on October 16, 2009, the court decided to release him on bail after four months of pre-trial detention. On February 5, 2010, the court acquitted his case on account of insufficient evidence against him.261 In a joint press release, several international and local human rights organizations, among them the South Caucasus Network of Human Rights Defenders, welcomed the acquittal of his case but urged the authorities to conduct a thorough investigation into the charges of police brutality.262 Summary The Armenian case illustrates the deteriorating situation of political rights in the post-Soviet space. In its annual report for 1993, the US State Department noted that there were no political prisoners in Armenia. By 2010, however, the human rights situation had radically changed, as demonstrated by the election crisis in 2008, which brought President Serge Sargsyan to power. The political leadership since 1991 has depicted the poor state of democratization in the country as a ―transitional‖ phase, implying that conditions will improve at the end of the process. In an address in October 2009, Sargsyan stated: We are sure that in states of young democracy one of the key tasks of state power and civic society is the constitutionalization of social life. This, first of all, assumes transformation of constitutional values into comprehended property of each citizen. In this case, the responsibility of the legislative body is very important. Firstly, the fundamental constitutional values shall guarantee implemen-

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tation by the means of the laws. This assumes the performance of a programmed, perspective legislative politics. For overcoming the old mentality and formation of the civic society, the new generation shall be educated and brought in a corresponding way. 263 At the 37th Congress of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH, Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l‖Homme), held in Erevan on April 6–10, 2010, FIDH President Souhayr Belhassen urged the Armenian government to release all political prisoners from jails and to launch an investigation into the crisis surrounding the elections in February 2008. Artak Kirakosyan, representative of FIDH‖s Armenian member-organization, Civil Society Institute, stressed the necessity of releasing ―all political prisoners and holding to account those responsible‖ for the deaths on March 1 if the parties hoped to establish a just system in Armenia.264 Yet, investigations into the postelection violence have not been completed, and many cases remain unresolved.265 ―Like Janus,‖ Nora Dudwick commented in the mid-1990s, ―Armenia presents one face to the international community, another to its own citizens.‖266 The government has joined the international community and signed numerous international treaties and human rights conventions; however, Dudwick added, ―The face the Armenian state presents to its own citizens is less benign.‖267 A political culture inherited from seven decades of Soviet authoritarian rule, a general lack of public confidence in matters of human rights and democracy, and an overall distrust toward politics, political leaders, and political institutions – all have bred cynicism and exacerbated existing cultural propensities of fatalism. The constitutional framework in principle guarantees the rights and privileges one expects to find in democratic societies in accordance with international human rights standards. In practice, however, the government‖s human rights record since independence from the Soviet Union has not met international standards. Comparing the political situation in the post-Soviet republic with Hakob Shahamirian‖s aspirations expressed in Vorogayt parats in the 1770s, Malik Telunts has observed that while the latter stressed the legitimate rule of law as a precondition to viable democratic governance, the political reality since 1991 is that Armenia suffers under the oppressive law of illegitimate governance. 268 The closed political space in the Soviet regime did not permit the exercise of political freedoms. The current republic has created the civic space to develop a democratic system. The parliamentary elections scheduled for 2012 will offer the next opportunity to assess any appreciable improvements in procedure and conduct.

4 Respect for Civil Liberties and the Integrity of the Person

The preceding chapter focused primarily on political rights and underscored the fact that the Armenian government, after the brief initial phase of democratization between 1991 and 1993, rapidly gravitated toward authoritarian rule. This chapter examines the extent to which the authorities have promoted and protected civil liberties and the integrity of the person as guaranteed under the Constitution. It is worth reiterating that the apparent distinction here between political rights and civil liberties is largely for purposes of analytical coherence, as such a clear delineation is not possible in actual practice. Civil rights encompass both negative and positive rights. The former refer to individual freedoms from extrajudicial killing; freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention; freedom from torture and other cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment; and freedom from arbitrary intrusion into one‖s privacy. Positive rights consist of freedom of speech and the press, freedom of peaceful assembly and association, freedom of religion, the right to justice and fair public trial, the protection of property rights, and equality before the law. Civil rights are closely related to political, social, and economic rights, including the right to political participation in the exercise of power either as a voter or as member in a body possessing political authority, and including social and economic rights that allow for ―a modicum of economic welfare and security‖ and the right to civilized standards of livelihood. 1 These rights have been enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and numerous international standard-setting instruments, with guarantees for additional liberties such as freedom of movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation. 2 Philosophical treatises on civil liberties and the integrity of the person emphasize the imperative of the protection of the individual from various forms of violations of human dignity. An early reference in

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national law to the protection of the physical integrity of the person appears in the Magna Carta of 1215, which states that: No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.3 John Stuart Mill (1806–73) in his most celebrated work On Liberty maintained that a ―civilized community‖ possesses the moral authority to exercise control over a member of society only ―to prevent harm to others.‖4 Otherwise, Mill averred, ―over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign,‖ and ―his independence is, of right, absolute.‖ This principle of individual sovereignty, according to Mill, incorporates certain general properties of rights and liberties, including the freedom of thought and opinion, the freedom of choice with respect to personal pursuits and plans, and the freedom to join others in common endeavor. 5 Stepanos Nazarian, founder of the Hyusisapayl journal and a contemporary of Mill, expressed similar views. In his ―Kaghakayin enkerutyan armatakan nyutere‖ (―The Fundamental Elements of Political Association‖), Nazarian stated: ―Collective obligations must simultaneously [support] individual rights – internal freedom, equality and human individuality – and external autonomy that does not incite hatred. ...‖ Further, ―Humanity will never require the individual to retract his own values. ... Where individual character ends, so ends life.‖6 These freedoms in modern human rights discourse constitute the essence of ―natural‖ rights, as encapsulated in the first (that is, civil and political rights) set of rights in the evolution of the three generations of international rights since the eighteenth century. International human rights conventions protect the civil rights and personal integrity of the individual, while numerous provisions in conventions also extend protections to group or collective rights as well. 7 Whether one approaches these and associated rights from the Hobbesian, Lockean, Marxist, neoliberal, or other philosophical and ideological perspectives, the general consensus regarding the moral validity and legal force of universal civil rights had gained prominence by the time the Armenian republic began to grapple with the institutionalization of international human rights standards in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. These standards, as Louis Henkin has argued, center on the ―supreme principle‖ of human dignity.8

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The Constitution of the republic and international human rights law Chapter 2 of the Armenian Constitution (2005), entitled ―Fundamental Human and Civil Rights and Freedoms,‖ enumerates in more than thirty articles civil, political, social, economic, and cultural rights and freedoms guaranteed to citizens. Article 14, for example, states that ―Human dignity shall be respected and protected by the state as an inviolable foundation of human rights and freedoms.‖ Article 16 provides that ―Everyone shall have a right to liberty and security. A person can be deprived of or restricted in his/her liberty by the procedure defined by law.‖ Article 17 asserts, ―No one shall be subjected to torture, as well as to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Arrested, detained or incarcerated persons shall be entitled to human treatment and respect of dignity.‖ While these rights were guaranteed under the Constitution of 1995, the Constitution of 2005 differs in fundamental aspects, indicating (at least in theory) a certain degree of improvement. Article 38 of the 1995 Constitution provided that ―Everyone is entitled to defend his or her rights and freedoms by all means not otherwise prescribed by law. Everyone is entitled to defend in court the rights and freedoms engraved in the Constitution and the laws.‖ Article 39 states: Everyone is entitled to restore any rights which may have been violated, as well as to a public hearing by an independent and impartial court, under the equal protection of the law and fulfilling all the demands of justice, to clear himself or herself of any accusations. Article 18 of the 2005 Constitution similarly guarantees the right to ―effective legal remedies‖ but also provides further guarantees not found in the 1995 Constitution. It states: Everyone shall be entitled to have the support of the Human Rights‖ Defender for the protection of his/her rights and freedoms on the grounds and in conformity with the procedure prescribed by law. Everyone shall in conformity with the international treaties of the Republic of Armenia be entitled to apply to the international institutions protecting human rights and freedoms with a request to protect his/her rights and freedoms. Article 18 therefore explicitly establishes the legal basis for the indi-

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vidual‖s right to access to the Human Rights Defender and international bodies for remedial action. Most observers agree, however, that the wide disparity between the civil liberties guaranteed under the Constitution and the reality undermines the credibility of the entire legal system.9 Further, while in general Armenia has not been plagued by political killings, political prisoners in large numbers, or routine political disappearances, mass arrests after the Armenian presidential elections of February 2008 raised serious questions whether the authorities would resort to such measures more frequently in the future. International human rights conventions impose upon governments the legal and moral obligation to respect the fundamental human rights of individuals. 10 International human rights law – as developed under the UN Charter and the International Bill of Human Rights – has acquired the status and binding character of international law. 11 The original provisions stipulated in the UN Charter required greater specificity, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and a host of other standard-setting instruments have provided the necessary enforcement guidelines and procedures. These instruments of human rights propose to advance a just world order, predicated upon non-derogable human rights obligations by sovereign states.12 Accordingly, they define the individual (first-generation rights) and in recent years collectivities (third-generation rights) as the principal beneficiaries of international protections for civil liberties, political rights, and social, economic, and cultural rights, as well as solidarity rights. With respect to the individual, as Professor Hersch Lauterpacht argued more than five decades ago, the international human rights instruments have transformed ―the status and stature‖ of the individual ―from an object of international compassion into a subject of international rights.‖13 The UN Charter, as the supreme legal document in international law, ―the constitution of the world‖ and the ―highest instrument in the international hierarchy of international and domestic documents,‖14 affirms the fundamental human rights of the individual, whose legal rights it recognizes as part of international law independent of the state.15 A state‖s failure or refusal to conform to this international standard constitutes a breach of such international obligations. 16 According to the International Bill of Human Rights, the principle of the integrity of the person establishes certain protections for the individual.17 The Universal Declaration18 affirms ―the inherent dignity‖ and ―the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family,‖ and it further asserts that under the UN Charter the international community has expressed its ―faith in fundamental human rights, in the

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dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women‖ and has ―determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.‖ The Universal Declaration provides that ―all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights‖ (Article 1); that ―no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment‖ (Article 5); and that ―no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile‖ (Article 9). According to Article 8, ―Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.‖ The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 19 (ICCPR) confirms that its signatories, in accordance with the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration, recognize ―the inherent dignity‖ and ―the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family‖ as ―the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.‖ The ICCPR reiterates protections against various violations; for instance, Articles 7 and 9 guarantee, respectively, protection from torture and arbitrary arrest. The ICCPR, however, also contains a derogation clause (Article 4[1]), acknowledging the authority of the state to employ extraordinary, but not extra-legal, measures during ―public emergency which threatens the life of the nation.‖ These emergency measures must be consistent with ―other obligations under international law.‖ Although the right to derogation as reserved to the state is assumed to be temporary, the political difficulties entailed in derogation and the possibility of exploitation of such provisions by political leaders for the ostensible purpose of national security are quite obvious. 20 Nevertheless, the ICCPR includes nonderogation provisions (Article 4[2]) with respect to the individual‖s ―inherent right to life‖ (Article 6), prohibition against torture (Article 7), and prohibition against slavery and servitude (Article 8[1,2]), among others. The ICCPR also provides protection for the right to privacy (Article 17); the right to freedom of opinion, expression, and access to informatio n (Article 19[1,2]); and the right to peaceful assembly (Article 21). The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 21 adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1975, reasserts ―the inherent dignity‖ of the individual. Article 2 confirms the principle of non-derogation: ―1) Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction; 2) No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.‖ Similarly, at the regional level, Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights

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provides that ―everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.‖22 The UN agencies, especially the Commission on Human Rights, possess the competence to investigate specific government violations, although the absence of effective machinery, as well as domestic procedural obstacles, make efforts to address complaints extremely difficult. The development of moral and legal standards, however, provides mechanisms beyond strict reliance on the applicability of the law. Heightened public awareness, combined with the involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the United Nations, and regional fact-finding agencies, can exert sufficient moral power to rectify poor human rights practices. In addition, domestic courts successfully have invoked international human rights conventions and the Universal Declaration with increasing frequency.23 Effective enforcement of civil and political rights, as with international human rights law in general, has proved challenging in large part because of the principle of state sovereignty. 24 Thus, while international human rights law guarantees respect for the integrity of the person, the extensive record of human rights violations by authoritarian governments underscores the discrepancy between standards and guarantees, on the one hand, and the realities of state practices in the absence of enforcement mechanisms, on the other. The effective functioning of international human rights instruments and adherence to standards require a degree of receptivity and compliance that can only be achieved by democratic societies, where, as postulated by the congruence thesis, a positive correlation exists between democratically inclined political culture and the systemic, institutionalized promotion and protection of human rights. The practice of judicial independence and the principle of judicial review, commonly found in democracies but absent in authoritarian regimes, facilitate the incorporation of international human rights standards into national law. The judicial disposition to integrate international and national law is indicative of a highly advanced and sophisticated legal culture that routinely confirms democratic legitimacy. 25 Authoritarian and dictatorial regimes, in contrast, lack viable domestic mechanisms and politically independent ―competent national tribunals‖ for the protection of individual rights against state violations, as stipulated in Article 8 of the Universal Declaration. As a result, citizens are compelled, after exhausting domestic avenues for just resolution, to petition competent international agencies (e.g. the European Court of Human Rights). Yet, authoritarian governments, taking recourse in the principle of national sovereignty, rarely comply with judgments delivered by such bodies. Consequently, the citizen fails to secure the protections guaranteed for his or her human rights under international law.

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Armenia became a member of the UN Charter in 1992 and since then has adopted most of the international human rights conventions – e.g. ICCPR in June 1993, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in July 1993, and the Protocol in September 2006.26 However, as discussed earlier, it has yet to institutionalize principles and practices congruent with international human rights standards. Various forms of human rights violations persist, ranging from surveillance and censorship to torture and other forms of police brutality, particularly toward political opposition groups. It was noted in the preceding chapter that upon independence, Armenia appeared to be progressing toward democratization and economic liberalization under President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, despite the authoritarian political culture inherited from the past, and despite the war in Karabagh and the economic crises. The government evinced respect for freedom of the press and of assembly, along with freedom of speech and of cultural and religious expressions, and permitted wide latitude in civil society engagement.27 The consolidation of authoritarian rule beginning in 1994, however, reversed the gains made in human rights. Although by the time of his resignation in February 1998, there were 70 registered political parties and more than 1,700 NGOs, they had exercised little positive impact on government institutions. Corruption, indifference to public interests, and prevalent authoritarian and autocratic practices in the state bureaucracies (the result of both low salaries and the absence of a democratic political culture) stifled, and continue to stifle, civic engagement in the public sphere. 28 The nation‖s legal structure, including its civil and criminal codes, was inherited from the Soviet regime, which in practice not only meant the lack of a democratic legal, constitutional culture but also the absence of a judicial system operating independently of the power and patronage of the executive branch. In fact, as noted in Chapter 3, Armenia did not adopt its post-Soviet Constitution until 1995, by which time the Ter-Petrosyan government had clearly, if imperceptibly at first, gravitated toward authoritarianism, as it hoped to address internal political problems through cooptation if possible, coercion if necessary. Armenia and basic civil liberties Freedom of assembly In theory, freedom of assembly, association, and religion are guaranteed by Armenia‖s Constitution. Article 29 of the Constitution provides that ―everyone shall have the right to freedom of peaceful and unarmed

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assembly.‖ Similarly, Article 11(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights states that ―Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.‖ In a recent report, the Human Rights Defender affirms that ―The right to peaceful assembly is a fundamental human right. In the modern era, especially, it constitutes not only an integral element of the constitutional legal status of the person in democratic states, but also a benchmark of democratization.‖29 The post-Soviet republic inherited the Soviet laws concerning mass gatherings, which were not nullified until April 2004, when the National Assembly passed the Law on Conducting Meetings, Gatherings, Rallies, and Demonstrations. Unlike the Soviet regime, which tolerated no demonstrations against the government, the Armenian government, according to the Constitution and laws, in theory permits freedom of assembly and association. In practice, however, it has imposed certain, and in times of elections severe, limitations on the public activities of opposition political parties and groups. In the absence of an effective civil society, recourse to mass demonstrations and similar activities (short of an outright revolution) represent the only avenues for public expression of demands and grievances. Many of the human rights violations involve arbitrary arrests of members or followers of political opposition groups, as discussed in Chapter 3. The Ter-Petrosyan government, following Soviet practices, resorted to authoritarian measures to limit freedom of assembly. While initially people expected the Kocharyan government to undo the damages caused by his predecessor in this area, which it did to some extent (as in the case of Dashnaktsutiun), it soon became apparent that his government also could not tolerate opposition groups. For instance, in March and April 2004, the government rejected petitions by opposition political parties to hold rallies in Erevan and other cities. Although several small rallies took place without government interference, mass demonstrations by an estimated 7,000 protesters in Erevan on April 12 and 13 led to government retaliation. The police reacted with brutal force, using ―flash grenades, water cannon, and batons,‖ to disperse a crowd in front of the National Assembly, several of whom were taken to hospital for treatment. Among those attacked were journalists reporting on the protest rallies. Within days, police arrested and interrogated 115 individuals related to the demonstrations. 30 Responding to these demonstrations, the National Assembly adopted in April 2004 a set of new laws regulating demonstrations. In effect since June 2004, the new laws terminated ―the requirement to obtain a government permit to organize rallies and demonstrations.‖ In-

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stead, organizers were merely required to give the government advance notice; however, a police permit is required to hold demonstrations in front of government buildings, monuments, and locations where another public event is being held. The revised laws required that demonstrations be held at designated areas if organized without permit; otherwise, the police were granted authority to disperse demonstrations if they ―encourage violence and the overthrow of the government.‖31 The requirement to obtain a permit has since served as the government‖s primary means of controlling public activities by opposition groups, and in practice the frequent reliance on this law for that purpose may be considered a violation of citizens‖ constitutional rights – a point stressed by opposition parties.32 In 2009, for example, opposition groups submitted 84 applications to hold political rallies and demonstrations, but only 28 were approved.33 Such restrictions, opposition groups have argued, make it particularly difficult to organize large meetings.34 Freedom of the press The fall of the Soviet regime was expected to eradicate from the Armenian body politic the ubiquitous censorship imposed on newspapers, literary works, and other forms of public expression. This was accomplished to some extent upon independence as initially the authorities showed a healthy degree of respect for freedom of the press and of peaceful assembly and association. As in other areas of human rights, however, government attitudes toward print and electronic media grew authoritarian. The principal instrument of control over the media has been the legal requirement that all print and electronic media register with the Justice Ministry, a power exploited by the authorities at different levels of government, who grant registration to reward loyal supporters and deny it to punish opposition groups and journalists critical of the government. The government has not imposed limits on access to the internet, but journalists and reporters have learned to exercise self-censorship. Yet, as a signatory to the principal instruments of international human rights, the Armenian government is obligated to guarantee ―the right to freedom of opinion and expression,‖ as enshrined, for example, under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.35 The Constitution of Armenia incorporates the stipulations found in the Universal Declaration and the ICCPR. Article 27 of the 2005 Constitution provides for freedom of the press and of expression and guarantees the right to establish independent electronic media for ―informational, cultural and entertaining programs.‖ Article 19, however, imposes

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certain restrictions regarding civil and criminal trials; the public and the press ―may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order, national security, protection of the private life of the participants, or if the administration of justice so requires.‖ The Ter-Petrosyan government continued Soviet-era practices of state-ownership of press and electronic media but eventually permitted privatization of the state-owned printing houses while maintaining certain regulatory restrictions on their operation. Indeed, in the first several years after independence, government ownership and control of electronic media broadcasting, combined with government interference, prevented full independence by nascent media organizations. The situation was further exacerbated by shortages in supplies and electricity.36 By 1993, the government had approved the registration of more than 250 media organizations, and privatization encouraged further proliferation of press organizations. According to the Yerevan Press Club, by 1996, there were 440 registered media outlets, comprised of 294 newspapers, 59 magazines, 53 television programs, 16 radio programs, and 18 news agencies. However, no more than 100 remained in operation consistently,37 and by the end of Ter-Petrosyan‖s first term, government policy toward the press had degenerated into authoritarian knee-jerk reactions to opposition opinions. Within two years (1995–96), the government suspended or rejected the renewal of between 300 and 400 media licenses, allowing no more than 10 per cent of Armenia‖s licensed mass media to continue operation. 38 By 2000, there were eight major newspapers in Armenia, three television channels, and several radio stations, Armenian Public Radio being the most significant. A decade later, most news outlets are privately owned, although a large number of them continue to be associated through patronage with various political factions or economic interests. Formerly, the government operated two newspapers, Hayastani Hanrapetutyun (daily) and Respublica Armenia (weekly), both founded in 1990 by the parliament.39 These newspapers were revamped in 2000 and emerged in February 2001 as a joint-stock company, with the President‖s Office, the National Assembly, the Armenian government, and the Department of Information each holding a 25 per cent share. 40 Although the post-Soviet state, unlike its Communist predecessor, does not impose a specific ideology on the media, it has devised various forms of control and manipulation. As a Freedom House report noted, ―This contemporary form of censorship is achieved through a mix of stateenabled oligarchic control, broadcast monopolies of presidential “families,” judicial persecution and subtle and overt forms of intimidation.‖41 The report maintains that the Commonwealth of Independent

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States (CIS) has reverted to the Soviet practice of censorship and repression and has emerged as one of the most dangerous areas for journalists. The report contends that the differences in historical experiences between the democratic or democratizing societies and the former Soviet republics may offer at least a partial explanation for the character of state responses to the press. While the former had a long tradition of freedom of the press, the CIS countries have inherited the legacy of Soviet rule. Also, the reorientation to authoritarian measures regarding the press is not driven by an ideological doctrine but rather by the security imperatives of political and economic elites who are determined to forestall public scrutiny of corrupt practices and public expressions of discontent. The fact that 12 of the former Soviet republics have been classified as ―Not Free‖ by Freedom House (see Appendix I) indicates the extent of control exercised by these governments despite constitutional protections for freedom of the press and expression.42 Table 4.1 captures the decline in the freedom of press in Armenia. Table 4.1 Armenia: Freedom of Press, 2002–2010 Year Rank Rating Status

2002 — 46–60 PF

2004 135 64 NF

2006 137 64 NF

2008 144 66 NF

2010 146 66 NF

SOURCE: Freedom House, Annual Survey of Press Freedom (2002–2010). Rated on a total score from 0 (best) to 100 (worst). PF = partly free; NF = not free.

Constitutional guarantees for freedom of the press notwithstanding, the government‖s tolerance level for public expressions of rights diminishes considerably as elections approach. To date, the government has consistently attempted to exert a considerable influence on media networks during campaigns, in some cases employing severe measures to silence criticism by the opposition. Formal and informal limits have circumscribed journalistic investigations and reporting, especially on issues related to corruption and national security. During the war in Karabagh in the early 1990s, the government was reported to have provided all editors of the mass media ―with a list of forbidden subjects,‖ mostly concerning national security matters such as military recruitment and weapons technology.43 Further, many private media organizations currently are not independent but are owned by, or are closely associated with, businesses and the government. Journalists, complaining about growing restrictions on freedom of the press but fearful of retaliation,

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have reverted to the well-rehearsed habits of self-censorship learned under Soviet rule. 44 Yet, despite the political difficulties, non-governmental media networks have adamantly pursued public spheres for freedom of the press and tested the limits on public expression. Among such groups are the Armenian Union of Journalists, which has continued its activities from the Soviet period; the Yerevan Press Club, which was created in 1995; and the Mass Media Association of Armenia, which was established in 1997. For example, since its establishment, the Yerevan Press Club has sought to create a forum for non-governmental voices. The Club‖s mission statement stresses its goal to ―support and development of independent and professional media, seeking to help strengthen democratic institutions and establish civil society in Armenia.‖ Along with promotion of the freedom of the press and access to information, the Club also emphasizes lobbying the government for improvements in laws related to the media. Further, the Club aims at cultivating ―professional ethics by journalists‖ and the development of their ―professional skills.‖45 The Club has been openly critical of the government‖s efforts to suppress their activities, especially in periods prior to elections. Commenting on the general situation confronted by media agencies and Armenian society in general, the Club stated that: The social status of journalists is lowered, there is practically no system for their social and legal protection. None of the state or social services has been seriously concerned with the problem of about 100 staff members of publications shut down in December 1994. The cases of assaults on journalists and editors taken place in 1993‒1995 have not provoked an adequate reaction in the society and state structures. None of those cases has been properly investigated and disclosed by the legal bodies.46 To the difficult political environment in which media networks had to operate were added further challenges in the dire economic condition the country suffered during the 1990s when newspapers faced declining subscriptions and dwindling funds. Most newspapers and electronic media have voiced concerns with respect to human rights violations, including civil, political, social, and economic rights. According to one study, during the months of February and March 2002, Armenian Public TV and Armenian Public Radio devoted 321 and 413 stories, respectively, to human rights issues. During the same period, the newspaper Hayots Ashkhar (Armenian World) contained 289 articles related to human rights, followed by Aravot (Morning) and Azg

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(Nation), with 247 articles each.47 Both electronic and print media frequently covered human rights issues, including social and economic problems and the abolition of capital punishment, and they regularly referred to the Commission on Human Rights within the executive office and international organizations such as Amnesty International. While the attitude of the government toward international organizations (including human rights NGOs) has been positive and cooperative, such organizations have not effectively reached a large sector of the public. Although a considerable proportion (78.7 per cent of those surveyed, according to a 2002 study) believe that their personal rights are violated frequently or sometimes, according to the same survey, a large majority of the public lack familiarity with their constitutional rights and with rights provided under international human rights conventions. Mass illiteracy concerning human rights, the study noted, enables the politicians and bureaucrats to exploit the powers of their office and position at the expense of the ordinary citizen. Combating human rights illiteracy would require freedom of the press, effective educational initiatives, and grassroots campaigns, although to a significant proportion of the citizenry that has lost hope such efforts may seem futile. 48 Not dissimilar to the inherited Soviet system, the state ultimately dominates the mass media. According to a survey published in 2003, 61 per cent of citizens in Armenia receive their information regarding human rights primarily from the state-controlled mass media.49 A mere 3 per cent rely on foreign mass media. It would be safe to assume that the public in Armenia lacks sufficient information concerning human rights, as the state-owned media do not devote sufficient attention to such issues. The state-run public television station, Public TV of Armenia, routinely received directions from the Kocharyan government in matters of politics and avoided any negative coverage of the administration. 50 The primary legal instrument employed by the government to silence opposition media networks has been its rejection or revocation of press and broadcasting applications and licenses, though it sometimes applies more direct methods. For instance, in November 1993, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs banned correspondents representing three opposition media outlets from attending official press briefings.51 Then, in 1996, the government suspended Azg (Nation), a newspaper published by the diasporan Ramkavar Party, whose offices, along with many others, were ―ransacked, and editors and journalists were beaten.‖52 In revoking the paper‖s registration, the Ministry of Justice also ―reconstituted its board,‖ which subsequently began to publish reports favorable to the government. Reaction to such heavy-handed methods of silencing opposition opinions was immediate, as journalists and the public took to the streets in protest

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of the government‖s action. To its credit, a court upheld the rights of the ―original board of directors.‖53 In another case, also in 1996, a court suspended the newspaper Lragir for three months, purportedly over concerns regarding foreign policy. Some articles appearing in the paper had supported the annexation of territory in southern Georgia that borders Armenia,54 an issue which the Ter-Petrosyan refused to place on the national agenda. After Ter-Petrosyan‖s resignation, public expectations that conditions in the area of freedoms of the press would improve did not materialize. The Kocharyan government at times showed little tolerance for public criticism and placed enormous pressure on newspapers publishing antigovernment reports. Journalists from independent and opposition media have become targets of physical attacks by authorities at all levels of government and associated elite entities. There are no indications as of this writing in early 2011 that the Sargsyan government will exercise greater respect toward press freedoms. Thus far, journalists have found it difficult to protect themselves against state violence. Neither the parliament nor the judiciary has shown sufficient determination to ameliorate the situation. While government hostility toward journalists has been on the rise in recent years, in general the actual ties between government authorities and those assaulting journalists have been difficult to prove largely because those in charge of investigating the cases are themselves antagonistic toward the media. A number of cases demonstrate the highly politicized nature of statemedia relations, with serious ramifications concerning the credibility of the entire judicial system. One extremely contentious case has received wide public attention with contradictory accounts and is worth discussing briefly. Reputed as the first journalist prosecuted for libel in postSoviet Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, editor of the daily Oragir55 and its successor Haykakan zhamanak (Armenian Times), an affiliate of the Nor Ughi (New Path) opposition party led by former Minister of Education Ashot Bleyan, ran articles in early 1999 condemning corruption in the private sector and the government, including the Ministry of Interior and National Security. Some of the parties involved, including the trading company Mika-Armenia and former Minister of Interior Serge Sargsyan, filed suit against Pashinyan for libel. Both Sargsyan and Mika-Armenia won their case in court in March and April 1999, respectively. The court ordered Pashinyan to pay a fine of 13.5 million dram ($25,000) and to retract his accusations. Pashinyan refused to comply with court orders, and in June the court, charging him with contempt of court, ordered the properties of Oragir confiscated and its bank accounts frozen. Pashinyan was sentenced to one year in prison. 56

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Many journalists organized rallies in support of Pashinyan,57 and in September 1999, in a letter addressed to President Kocharyan, Ann Cooper, Executive Director of the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), an international NGO based in New York, commented that her organization was ―deeply disturbed by the criminal prosecution‖ of Pashinyan and by the government‖s effort to silence Orgair. The letter added that ―Applying criminal penalties for defamation is a clear violation of international conventions on free expression, to which, we respectfully remind Your Excellency, Armenia is a signatory.‖ Cooper advised Kocharyan to exercise his power to repeal Pashinyan‖s prison sentence as well as to repeal ―all Armenian laws that criminalize free expression.‖58 Government authorities continued to harass Pashinyan, however. In late October 2007, when Pashinyan, along with chief editor of Chorrord Ishkhanutyun Shogher Matevosyan, took part in a mass anti-government demonstration, the authorities filed criminal charges against both for participation in mass riots and ―violence against a representative of the authorities.‖59 The following year, Pashinyan, active in Ter-Petrosyan‖s campaign headquarters for the presidential elections, organized opposition rallies. In the aftermath of the election violence in March, when Kocharyan declared a state of emergency, Pashinyan went into hiding. In April, several media and civil society organizations submitted a letter to the General Prosecutor Aghvan Hovsepyan, protesting the government persecution of Pashinyan on politically motivated charges. In early July 2009, Pashinyan voluntarily surrendered to the authorities.60 Court hearings commenced in October at the Shengavit court of general jurisdiction in Erevan, and in January 2010, the Kentron and Nork-Marash court, finding Pashinyan guilty of participating in mass riots, sentenced him to prison for seven years. 61 Upon his appeal, the Criminal Court of Appeal in March reduced the sentence to four years, but Pashinyan‖s lawyer submitted the case to the Court of Cassation, which upheld the judgment by the court of appeal.62 Pashinyan was held at Kosh prison, where he reportedly was attacked and beaten on November 11, which led to his subsequent transfer to the high-security Artik prison. The office of the Human Rights Defender requested further information from the prison administration, and in a letter dated November 26, 2010, Head of Prison Administration Hayk Harutyunyan responded that Pashinyan was transferred to an isolation area not as a form of punishment but because the latter had requested a more secure cell for his own physical safety. The letter, however, contradicts itself by noting that Pashinyan had violated prison rules, and the prison administration therefore decided to relocate him to a secure cell.63 On November 30, Pashinyan was transferred to Artik prison.64

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In the meantime, in a rare effort on the part of the diasporan communities concerning human rights in Armenia, a petition campaign was organized in Canada and the United States urging government authorities in Erevan to ensure Pashinyan‖s physical security.65 In Armenia, a number of organizations (e.g. the Writers Union of Armenia and the Union of Theater Workers) submitted similar appeals to the government.66 On December 2, 2010, CPJ issued a statement reiterating the concerns expressed in Ann Cooper‖s letter more than a decade ago. Nina Ogniavona, CPJ Europe and Central Asia Program Coordinator, urged the government ―to conduct an independent investigation,‖ to ensure his safety, and ―to improve his prison conditions.‖67 In a similar case, in December 1999, the Russian-language paper Novoye Vremya (New Times) in Erevan published an article accusing the late Prime Minister Vazgen Sargisyan of corruption. In its annual report on human rights for 1999, the US Department of State states that the editor of the paper reportedly received a threatening telephone call purporting to be from the Yerkrapah Union, a socio/political faction of veterans of the Nagorno-Karabagh war founded by [Vazgen] Sargsyan. The caller warned the editor that if his paper continued to ―insult‖ the slain Prime Minister, his house would be burned. On December 31, a fire characterized by media reports as arson damaged the Yerevan offices of the Russian newspaper. 68 The case of the A1 Plus (A1 +) television station has been particularly frustrating for advocates of human rights. In April 2002, the government suspended the broadcasting license for the independent television station in retaliation for its criticism of the Kocharyan government; the station subsequently lost its broadcasting frequency. Critics charged that the ruling leadership sought to control media networks in preparation for presidential and parliamentary elections in 2003. Thousands of protesters participated in weekly demonstrations calling for the reopening of the station and for Kocharyan‖s resignation. An appeal by A1 Plus in June 2002 failed. Since then, the station has submitted numerous applications to reopen, but to no avail,69 although the company maintains its internet production, which regularly posts reports and videos critical of the government. In June 2008, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg ruled that the ban imposed on A1 Plus was in violation of Article 10 (concerning freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights.70 Although in its ruling the European Court did not require the Armenian government to reverse its policy and permit

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A1 Plus to resume its broadcast transmission, the Court did fine the Armenian government 30,000 euros.71 Government reaction to criticism has not been limited to withholding or suspension of applications. Hostility towards journalists persists to this day, and authorities have not refrained from using brute force. Examples abound. In August 2002, several men, reportedly hired by the mayor of Abovyan, attacked the founder and the director of the local television station ―in retaliation for critical reports aired by the station.‖72 In October 2002, Mark Grigoryan, a journalist and civic activist who was preparing a report on the parliamentary shootings in October 1999, was the target of a grenade attack in Erevan and suffered severe injuries. During opposition demonstrations in April 2004, a number of journalists were assaulted. Some cases demonstrate a growing willingness on the part of the lower courts to issue rulings that may potentially enable them to secure greater independence from political and economic elites. In June 2004, two men were found guilty of the attack and were penalized with a fine of 100,000 dram ($188). In August of that year, a journalist was attacked while photographing the ―luxury villa owned by a Member of Parliament,‖ apparently preparing a report on corruption. In October, a court sentenced a man found guilty of the attack to 6 months in prison. 73 The litany of assaults on journalists goes on. In August 2008, ―an unknown assailant‖ attacked and severely injured Hrach Melkumian, acting head of the Erevan office of RFE/RL. 74 In November 2008, ―an unknown assailant‖ attacked Edit Baghdasaryan, editor of the online Hetq news journal and chair of the Investigative Journalists‖ Association; Baghdasaryan was ―hospitalized with [a] concussion.‖75 In April 2009, unidentified individuals attacked Argishti Kvirikyan, editor of Armenia Today, an online news service; the editor was ―hospitalized with severe injuries.‖ Similarly, in May 2009, unidentified men attacked Nver Mnatsakanyan, anchorman of Shant TV. In February 2010, Gagik Margaryan, a police officer at the Erebuni district police department in Erevan, attacked photojournalist Gagik Shamshyan, who was employed by a number of opposition newspapers and photographed Margaryan, in front of the Prosecutor General‖s office. 76 The assault was captured by a security camera on the building and the images were made public within days.77 These and similar attacks have not been fully investigated; as a result, Miklos Haraszti, OSCE representative on press freedom, ―urged the authorities to swiftly investigate the attacks.‖78 Policymakers have repeatedly promised to reform the law on the media and broadcasting in accordance with international standards. In October 2000, the National Assembly adopted a new legislation, which

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Kocharyan signed into law, revising the regulations in keeping with changes advocated by human rights and media organizations. The latter continued to express concern, however, regarding certain provisions retained from earlier regulations that could be utilized by government agencies to exercise control over the media.79 The National Assembly eventually adopted amendments to the media laws in April 2009, which promised ―greater transparency regarding approval for broadcasting licenses.‖ The revised law, however, failed to rectify certain structural shortcomings, such as the power of the president to appoint members of the licensing agency, the Council for Public Television and Radio.80 The government generally has not intervened in the operations of foreign media networks. In July 2007, however, apparently in preparation for the approaching elections in February 2008, the government refused to extend the contract for broadcasting the Armenian service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), which is funded by the US Congress. The US Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) commented: The potential end of our very fruitful relationship with Public Radio has no economic or other legitimate justification. … Armenians go to the polls in eight months to choose their next president, and therefore it is particularly important that RFE/RL‖s broadcasts, which are widely respected for their accuracy, objectivity and timeliness, reach the largest possible audience.81 Since taking office in March 2008, the Sargsyan government has continued its predecessors‖ approach toward the media, although the latter have come under greater pressure. In its report on the press in 2009, the Committee to Protect Journalists noted that the state television station, H1, operates under the direct supervision of the Council on Public Television and Radio. Accordingly, H1 airs programs presenting the voice of the government, which has ―sought to suppress critical debate‖ concerning the election crisis in 2008 and the economic crisis in 2009. 82 Respect for the integrity of the person In addition to the freedom of assembly and freedom of the press, respect for the integrity of the person and protection of his or her physical security are of paramount importance for a viable civil society and democracy. These rights are guaranteed by international human rights conventions and the Constitution of Armenia. Under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Armenian government has assumed the legal and moral responsibility to

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protect its citizens against human rights violations in this area, and the Constitution of the republic explicitly prohibits such practices and provides specific protections. Chapter II of the Armenian Constitution, entitled ―Fundamental human and civil rights and freedoms,‖ enumerates the various protections granted to the individual (Articles 14–48). Article 17 of the Constitution (as amended in 2005) affirms that ―No one shall be subjected to torture, as well as to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Arrested, detained or incarcerated persons shall be entitled to humane treatment and respect of dignity.‖ Further, on June 14, 1994, the National Assembly approved the ―Act concerning victims of repression‖ under the Soviet regime (e.g. illegal convictions, political convictions, and deportations), thereby granting certain privileges to citizens subjected to such measures in the Soviet period.83 Despite such constitutional and legal protections, however, the republic has thus far failed to eliminate violations in the area of arbitrary arrests and detention, as Soviet-era criminal justice and inherited practices have persisted. Although these types of violations occur with greatest regularity in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, similar practices have been reported in Armenia. The police ignore laws and detain citizens regardless of constitutional and legal guarantees for protection against such violations. That human rights principles pertaining to the integrity of the person can be undermined at will for political or personal reasons became apparent not long after independence. Policymaking institutions have failed to remedy the situation to this day. To a limited extent, the office of the Human Rights Defender (Ombudsman) has been able to persuade some policymakers to evaluate and reassess specific problems, such as improving prison conditions and eradicating physical abuses in the military.84 Chapter 3 discussed various forms of violations of political rights since 1991. The following sections focus on police brutality, physical abuse in the military, the death penalty, and freedom of religion. Police brutality and torture Chapter II of the Constitution provides guarantees in all spheres of human rights. Article 14 states: ―Human dignity shall be respected and protected by the state as an inviolable foundation of human rights and freedoms.‖85 As noted above, Article 17 guarantees protection from torture. Yet, arbitrary arrests, police brutality, and torture have remained a chronic problem. Although under the law a suspect has the right to an attorney and the police are required to notify family members, in practice the authorities often restrict or ignore such rights. The Criminal Code provides for bail, but the courts often order detention rather than grant

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requests for bail. 86 Police brutality may be attributable to the lack of professionalization, repressive institutional culture, and political motivations. Whatever its source, police brutality in prisons has caused numerous deaths since 1991. Violent acts on the part of government authorities not only create hostilities between citizens and the state, thereby undermining the legitimacy of governing institutions, but they also destroy families and communities. Vagharsh Ovanyan died while in official custody in 1993,87 and the same year police officers in the district of Spandaryansky tortured Rudik Vardanyan to death.88 Although in 1993 seven police officers were charged with the use of excessive force, 89 such condemnations have failed to exercise a lasting positive effect on the agencies of repression and torture. According to Human Rights Watch, police in the Kamo district detained Romik Grigoryan without a warrant on May 8, 1995, and he was tortured to death the following day. 90 Conditions did not improve under the Kocharyan government. According to the Prosecutor General‖s office, 54 deaths occurred in 1999 as a result of beating and torture while in custody, but officials failed to investigate accusations. These included Edward Vardanyan, who died in March of that year allegedly as the result of suicide; Stepan Gevorgyan and Oleg Arishin, who died in April 1999; and Arsen Stepanyan and Artush Ghazaryan, who died in July and September, respecttively. Yet, no charges were filed against the perpetrators of the crimes, although the International Helsinki Foundation petitioned the government in October 1999 to investigate the cases. By the end of the year, the government closed the cases of Stepan Gevorgyan and Arsen Stepanyan because of lack of sufficient evidence. 91 In its annual report for 1999, the US Department of State commented that the human rights performance of the Armenian government remained poor. There were extrajudicial killings, the security forces arbitrarily arrested people without warrant and routinely subjected detainees under their control to physical harm, and civilians and government officials became targets of assassination. 92 Well into the middle of the 1990s, Armenian citizens possessed no legal protections of privacy other than those provided under the International Covenant.93 The period was considered one of transition, and accordingly Article 116(14) of the 1995 Constitution provided that the procedures employed in searches and arrests remain in effect until they conform to the Constitution. The post-Soviet Civil Code and Criminal Procedure Code entered into force in January 1999. According to the Criminal Code, the authorities may detain a suspect for a maximum of 12 months. The length of time a detainee could be held without being charged was revised from 72 to 96 hours. No significant improvements

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have appeared in these matters thus far, although Kocharyan appointed a commission in June 1998 for the purpose of reforming the constitution and enhancing the judiciary‖s independence as well as granting wider authorities to protect human rights. Dissatisfied with the commission‖s work, in July Kocharyan reconstituted it with specific instructions to review the constitutional provisions regarding the judicial system.94 The Gulyan and Khalafyan cases In May 2007, Levon Gulyan, arrested in connection to the death of Stephan Vardanyan, died in police custody at the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Erevan. According to police, Gulyan, in an attempt to flee, dove to his death from the second-floor of the police building during interrogation at the Directorate General of Criminal Investigations concerning a shooting outside his ―Pantok‖ restaurant. Gulyan‖s family and human rights NGOs accused the police of torturing Gulyan and then forcing him out of the window.95 Investigation by the Prosecutor General‖s office supported ―the police version of the incident.‖ In June 2008, an Erevan court supported the Gulyan family‖s plea to reopen the case, but the Office of the Prosecutor General‖s Special Investigative Service (SIS) conducted its own investigation in April 2009 and concluded that the incident lacked sufficient ―evidence of police torture.‖96 The court of first instance declared the case closed. The Gulyan family appealed the decision, but on February 5, 2010, the Criminal Court of Appeal rejected their appeal.97 Khalafyan‖s case attracted considerable international attention. Vahan Khalafyan died in police custody on April 13, 2010, at the police station in Charentsavan, a town approximately 25 miles north of Erevan. The police claimed that Khalafyan ―stabbed himself to death‖ during questioning.98 Khalafyan and three others had been arrested on charges of stealing clothing worth $3,500, and, according to a police report, they had ―confessed to the crime.‖ Soon after an interrogation session, the report asserted, Khalafyan, who, according to the report, suffered from a mental disorder, ―suddenly took a “kitchen knife” from a police officer‖s drawer and fatally wounded himself in the stomach.‖ Khalafyan was pronounced dead at the Charentsavan Medical Center. Khalafyan‖s family rejected this explanation and maintained that he must have been tortured to death. Haykakan zhamanak reported that ―forensic experts found two deep cuts on the dead man‖s stomach and injuries in other parts of his body,‖ but that there were no signs of stabbing on his shirt. ―If we believe the police theory,‖ Khalafyan took out the knife, then bared his belly and stabbed himself,‖ commented Haykakan zhamanak. ―What is more, he did that twice and kept the belly bare in the

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process.‖ ―It‖s not hard to tell just how credible such a scenario is,‖ the paper concluded. Artur Sakunts, head of the Helsinki Citizens‖ Assembly (HCA) Vanadzor office, accused the police of brutality and called for the chief of police Alik Sargsyan resignation for the misrepresentation of the facts.99 The latter a few days later at a news conference, claimed that his subordinates had misinformed him and apologized for having misled the public. ―Armenian police in rare apology over torture,‖ read a report by Azatutyun radiokayan.100 It is worth noting that the Soviet legal system permitted a loose definition of ―mental illness,‖ which allowed authorities to commit individuals to psychiatric institutes. Reformulating the language inherited from the Soviet regime, a law adopted in 2004 made decisions regarding forcible detention and commitment to such institutes subject to evaluation by a panel of psychiatrists and contingent upon court review.101 By 2010, physical abuse at the hands of the police had become a common violation of human rights in the process of integoration, 102 and local and international human rights organizations continue to express serious concern over the brutal force exercised to extract confessions. 103 In late April 2010, Human Rights Watch, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), the Civil Society Institute (CSI), the Armenian Helsinki Committee, and the Foundation against the Violation of Law expressed in the strongest terms their criticism and condemnation of police brutality and the attempt to conceal the truth from Khalafyan‖s family and the community. In a letter addressed to Prosecutor General Aghvan G. Hovsepyan, Holly Cartner, Executive Director at Europe and Central Asia Division of Human Rights Watch, referred with ―profound concern‖ to Khalafyan‖s death and urged Hovsepyan to conduct a thorough investigation of the circumstances surrounding his death. Cartner added that Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which Armenia has ratified, obligates the government ―to provide a complete and plausible explanation for and account of any death in custody, based on a thorough and independent investigation.‖ Further, the letter warned, ―failure to carry out such an investigation and to pursue any appropriate prosecutions of those responsible would bring Armenia in violation of its obligations under the ECHR.‖104 The SIS, perhaps in response to international and domestic pressure, finally completed its investigation in April 2010. The investigations led to arrests within the Charentsavan department of criminal investigations unit charges of negligence and coercion to obtain confession. 105 Under Article 309 of the Criminal Code concerning abuse of official position with severe consequences, sentences may range from six to ten years of imprisonment.106 The courts, however, as one report has noted, have not

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been ―sympathetic to claims of human rights violations.‖ Rather, having inherited the ―Soviet mentality,‖ they see their role as an agency of punishment instead of justice and protectors of human rights. 107 Prison conditions The number of deaths in prisons because of police brutality and harsh conditions has increased over the years. By late 1997, 14 prisoners had died because of ―harsh conditions.‖108 In 2001, 27 deaths in custody were reported, 18 of which took place in prison, while nine died during probation after having completed their sentences. Several other deaths also occurred in prison but these were reportedly ―due to disease.‖109 Prison conditions have been particularly appalling. Despite its authoritarian nature, the government since independence has maintained good relations with domestic and international human rights organizations, and the Ministry of Interior, as required by international standards, has generally permitted the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access to its detention facilities as well as local prison headquarters to visit prisoners. The ICRC also visits POWs from the war in Karabagh. 110 In June 2004, the Ministry of Justice permitted monitors from the Civil Society Monitoring Board (CSMB) to inspect prisons, but in 2005 they were denied access to detention facilities. There are limits to the extent to which human rights organizations can have access to detention (especially pre-trial detention) facilities. Local police often refuse access to detention cells, where most abuses tend to occur.111 In June 2005, the CSMB released a report underscoring a number of serious problems in prisons, including physical abuse, total neglect of hygiene and medical needs, and refusal to permit visitors. Adolescents in juvenile detention centers seldom received education. Prison conditions are characterized as ―harsh and life-threatening.‖112 Prisoners live in heavily crowded quarters, lack adequate food and medical supplies, and are exposed to various diseases. Upon visiting one such facility in Gyumri in October 2000, the Human Rights Commission of Armenia found the conditions ―shocking‖; the prison was ―filthy, cold, and in poor repair,‖ and the personnel were ―indifferent to the welfare of the prisoners.‖ Also, the prisoners possessed little privacy; prison staff regularly intercepted their mail, including complaints mailed to the Commission.113 Efforts by NGOs to improve prison conditions have produced some – albeit too limited – positive results. The National League for Democratic Reforms (NLDR), whose expressed mission is the promotion of democratic reforms and protection of human rights in Armenia, reportedly received $4,840 in April 2002 from the London-based Penal Reform International (PRI) to improve prison conditions in Erevan and Gyumri,

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specifically to guarantee prisoners daylight and clean air. PRI also contributed $5,118 to help employ convicts on a poultry farm created in the Abovian branch of the NGO ―Support to Convicts,‖ where prisoners could work for improved food quality for themselves in the prisons. The NLDR received $5,100 in November 2002 from OSCE/ODIHR to monitor the conditions of prisoners in the Erevan Prison and the central clinic and $18,585 in February 2003 from the Open Society Institute Assistance Foundation (OSI AF) for the creation of a rehabilitation center in Erevan to offer legal and economic consultancy. The organization also presented recommendations to the Ministry of Justice on international standards.114 Police brutality and politics Police brutality tends to become prevalent particularly in election times when the public is mobilized by opposition political groups. During the presidential elections of 1996, for instance, which became engulfed in severe crises, the government could not silence opposition protests, and as tensions mounted in the streets of Erevan, the Ter-Petrosyan government dispatched military tanks and the police to suppress the demonstrations. The appropriate use of force to maintain law and order is an essential function of government. Yet, the disproportionate use of force against members of opposition parties and unarmed civilians, especially when they are exercising their legal right during elections to voice their rejection of politicians and oligarchs in power, violates both the Constitution of the republic and a host of international human rights conventions. Brutality in detention cells certainly cannot be justified on grounds of maintaining law and order. According to Amnesty International, the authorities detained more than 100 people during the 1996 election demonstrations, many of whom were beaten while in detention.115 Aramazd Zakaryan, a member of parliament representing the opposition National Self-Determination Union, was arrested and beaten ―with fists and batons.‖116 Upon detention at the police station, he was again beaten by the police. He was transferred to hospital two days later ―with a fractured skull, a broken rib and facial lacerations.‖117 The Special Rapporteur of the UN Economic and Social Council‖s Commission on Human Rights reported a number of cases involving allegations of police brutality during post-election protest demonstrations in September 1996. These included, for example, the case of Ruben Akopyan, a member of the National Assembly and representing the Dashnaktsutiun party banned at the time, who was reportedly attacked on September 25 at the parliament building, ―kicked and beaten unconscious with gun butts.‖ In addition, troops raided the offices of the op-

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position National Self-Determination Union and severely beat – with gun butts and boots – several party members, including NSDU President Garine Stepanyan and staff members Ina Konstanyan, Sophia Neshanyan, and Anahid Garabedyan.118 Reporter Gagik Mkrtchyan of Golos Armenii (Voice of Armenia), the opposition Russian-language newspaper, and David Varanyan of the opposition National Democratic Union were arrested on September 26, detained at the 6th Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and severely beaten.119 Court trials in political cases have been directed by the government in power, whether under Ter-Petrosyan, Kocharyan, or Sargsyan, and victims of police brutality in such cases have not received a fair hearing. By all accounts, the trial of the 31 members of the Dashnaktsutiun party, including one of its leading figures, Vahan Hovannesyan, failed to meet international standards. A number of them reported that they had been severely beaten, as had some members of their families, to force confession. Artavazt Manukyan, who was among those arrested when the Dashnaktsutiun party was suspended in December 1994, died in prison hospital from pneumonia in May 1995, although his lawyer had requested medical treatment weeks prior to his death. 120 Cases involving police brutality toward members of opposition groups are nearly always highly visible on account of the publicity accorded by their respective organizations. Police brutality toward ordinary citizens, in contrast, has not attained visibility, although it can with sufficient media attention. Nonetheless, citizens become victims of police brutality without legal protection or due process. These, however, are non-political cases. There are also cases in which the culprits and causes are not clearly identified and remain subject to public speculation. Such cases involve current and former political figures and officeholders whose arrest, torture, or death at the hands of the police or internal security agents may be linked to political calculations or personal machinations involving corrupt practices in one form or another. In May 1999, former Minister of Education Ashot Bleyan was arrested on corruption charges for the misappropriation of funds earmarked for textbooks. Bleyan, however, continued to insist on his innocence and maintained that the accusations were politically motivated fabrications.121 In August 1999, Bleyan‖s lawyer complained that officials inside the Ministry of Internal Affairs beat the former minister while he was in pre-trial detention. After months in detention, Bleyan‖s appeal to drop the case was denied in July 2000, but the Presidential Human Rights Commission advised that his incarceration take place ―under more humane conditions.‖122 The court sentenced Bleyan to eight years in prison. In addition to police brutality, assassinations of political figures,

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regardless whether or not they were actually motivated by political objectives, raise deep suspicions among the public concerning the authorities in power, although as in most such cases the perpetrators are not always identified. In early 2001, in Erevan, unknown individuals shot execution-style Deputy Chief of Public Affairs of the Customs Department Arthur Mnatsakanyan. In September 2001, a grenade explosion killed Gagik Poghosyan, advisor to the Prime Minister and ex-Minister of State Revenues. That same month, in a case that received wide media attention, political activist Poghos Poghosyan of the opposition Dashnaktsutiun party was murdered in the restroom of a restaurant in Erevan by one of President Kocharyan‖s bodyguards, Harutyun Aghamalyan. In a public announcement, Kocharyan promised an impartial investigation, and the Procurator General‖s office revealed that the injuries sustained by Poghosyan were ―consistent with torture.‖123 Aghamalyan was convicted on manslaughter charges in November.124 This and similar court decisions, though infrequent thus far, nevertheless suggest that the judicial system has developed a certain threshold with respect to political crimes, which can further strengthen the courts to meet international standards. Given the authoritarian nature of the political leadership, it should come as no surprise that human rights activists have come under attack as well. In late March 2004, four unidentified assailants attacked Mikael Danielyan, head of the Helsinki Association of Armenia and a vocal critic of the government. On April 5, 2004, the World Movement for Democracy (WMD) issued an alert, urging its supporters to submit petitions to Larisa Alaverdyan, the Human Rights Ombudsman at the time, to investigate Danielyan‖s case. WMD also urged them to write a letter to Prosecutor General Aghvan Hovsepyan regarding Danielyan‖s case as well as the case of the journalist Mark Grigoryan.125 Danielyan, who was hospitalized, believed that his criticism of the Armenian authorities in an interview with an Azerbaijani newspaper provoked the attack, as his comments were considered treasonous. Danielyan reported the incident to the Human Rights Ombudsman, and although the prosecutor‖s office began an investigation, Danielyan reportedly ―refused to cooperate with the investigation.‖126 On May 21, 2008, Tigran Urikhanyan, former head of the Progressive Party of Armenia (PPA), which has maintained close ties with the Sargsyan government, shot Danielyan with a ―pneumatic gun‖127 after an altercation, causing serious injuries. The investigations into the incident concluded that both Urikhanyan and Danielyan were innocent, and in August 2009 the court therefore dismissed the case. International responses Many victims of unlawful detention, police brutality, and other forms of

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human rights abuses lack confidence in the Armenian courts and seek justice through international human rights regimes, especially the European Court of Human Rights. International observers have published numerous reports criticizing the Armenian government for its failure to institute proceedings for fair trial in criminal cases and to eradicate police brutality. The annual reports by the US Department of State have repeatedly stated that citizens are victims of police beatings during arrest and interrogation, but most cases ―go unreported because of fear of retribution.‖ Also, courts routinely dismiss accusations of police torture claims.128 In a joint declaration, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), CSI, the Foundation against the Violation of Law, and the Armenian Helsinki Committee stated that ―Our organisations are deeply concerned by the seemingly pervasive culture of impunity for crimes committed by or under the responsibility of law enforcement bodies in Armenia.‖129 They called on the Armenian authorities to fully comply with the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, the European Convention on the Prevention of Torture, and a host of related human rights instruments, which impose specific legal obligations on governments and to which Armenia is a party.130 The European Court of Human Rights in a number of cases has urged the Armenian government to improve its court procedures and legal practices in compliance with the ECHR. As noted above, the European Court of Human Rights has heard 20 cases from Armenia and only in one case supported the government‖s position. The case of Misha Harutyunyan, a soldier, involved his arrest on murder charges and confession obtained through torture. In December 1999, Judge Lernik Atanyan of the Syunik Regional Court of first instance, justifying the use of torture to obtain evidence, sentenced him to thirteen year‖s imprisonment, and after appeals for further investigation, in June 2002 the same court sentenced him to ten year‖s imprisonment (counting the two years since his detention in April 1999). The Avan and Nor Nork District Court of Erevan in October 2002 found the interrogating police officer guilty of abuse of power, and Harutyunyan appealed his case to reopen the investigation on account of unfair trial. The Armenian courts at different levels, including the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court, rejected his case, and as a result Harutyunyan appealed to the European Court of Human Rights, which in June 2007 found the government in violation of Article 6(1) (concerning the right to a fair trial) of the European Convention.131 The Council of Justice reprimanded Atanyan and ordered a 25 per cent reduction in his salary for a year. Harutyunyan‖s lawyer, Hayk Alumyan, commented that the punishment meted out

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against Atanyan represented an effort on the part of the Council of Justice to ―single out the weakest and most vulnerable‖ among the judges involved in the case and to punish Atanyan for views ―they basically all co-sponsored.‖ ―This disciplinary punishment,‖ Alumyan noted, ―is a mere formality designed to create the impression that our government actively pursues and punishes those who break the law.‖132 In onother case, Erevan police in April 2004 arrested a woman for her participation in a political demonstration. The Erevan and NorkMarash court of first instance sentenced her to detention for three days. Rather than appeal her case to a court of appeals, she petitioned the local OSCE office, stating that resort to international offices was her only hope, as she found no reason to appeal her case within the local court system because Armenia lacked justice and because the courts served the interests of the president. 133 The military services After independence, the military services in Armenia continued to experience egregious violations of human rights inherited from the Soviet period. The hazing of conscripts and abuses related to training persisted despite official pledges to terminate such practices. 134 In one case, in 1995, a sergeant reportedly beat a soldier and stabbed him with a knife. The soldier, Hmayak Oganesyan, received no immediate medical attention, and when finally taken to a military hospital he was subjected to further violence. His fellow soldiers threatened to ―blow [him] up on a mine‖ if he complained.135 Similarly, in August 1998, a soldier who had been absent without leave was beaten severely and died from his injuries. In 1999, the US Department of State reported around 120 deaths caused by mistreatment and training-related abuses in the military services; that figure for the year 2000 was between 16 and 20 non-combat deaths per month. In 2001, 92 military men died because of ill-treatment and accidents, and 62 such deaths were reported in 2002. Local human rights groups reported 30 hazing cases in 2003. Physical abuse of soldiers has remained a serious problem in the military services. More recently, government reports indicate that, from January to November 2008, 69 deaths occurred in the army, 25 of them as a result of illness. These also included nine killings, three of which may have been by enemy fire, and eight suicides. A detailed discussion of specific cases would require a lengthy study, but the following is an example of soldiers victimized by their cohorts. Gegham Sergoyan died at the military base in Stepanakert in April 2007. He is believed to have been shot by his platoon commander Lieutenant Henrikh Grigoryan re-

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portedly because Sergoyan was ―without shoes and his uniform hat.‖136 Another account points to an equally grim scenario: Sergoyan was laughing while watching television when Grigoryan entered the room; suspecting derision and disrespect, Grigoryan shot him in the head point blank from a distance of less than six inches. 137 Physical abuse, including hazing, is believed to have caused suicides as well. Military officials and the Ministry of Defense rarely release details concerning such cases, ostensibly because of national security considerations, as the state of war with Azerbaijan technically continues. 138 In July 2000, several families of soldiers who had been wounded or killed while in training demonstrated before the presidential palace for several days and were able to gain an audience with the staff to submit their grievances. 139 In June 2008, relatives of soldiers who had died while on duty drafted a declaration complaining that official investigations into the deaths of their loved ones had been flawed or even intentionally distorted. The statement accused the government of ―systematically … destroying or tampering with evidence in order to disguise homicides as accidents, suicides, or the results of sniper attacks.‖ 140 The abolition of the death penalty Considering the Stalinist legacy of chronic state violence against the citizenry, the abolition of the death penalty in post-Soviet Armenia bears an enormous cultural significance as a step toward democratic legitimacy. Under the Ter-Petrosyan government, the war in NagornoKarabagh served as justification for retaining the practice, and the death penalty was not abolished until 2003 after a tortuous process and under intense international pressure. In a draft of the nation‖s criminal code approved in April 1997, the National Assembly aimed to abolish the death penalty, but the move was soon shelved, although the nation‖s representatives at the United Nations communicated to the UN Human Rights Committee the government‖s intention to implement the new code beginning in January 1999. 141 An estimated 13 people had been sentenced to death by 1995, and between 1997 and 1999, that figure increased from 25 to 31. Perhaps largely because Ter-Petrosyan opposed the death penalty, no executions were reported, yet ―no death sentences were commuted.‖142 The government had not passed the new criminal code into law by the time when the assassinations in the National Assembly took place in October 1999, placing the issue of death penalty on the national agenda. The five gunmen were charged with terrorism and premeditated murder, and both crimes were punishable by death.143 Kocharyan

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assured the public that the gunmen would receive a fair trial. Amnesty International urged him to ―exercise his constitutional authority and commute to imprisonment all pending death sentences, as well as any future ones passed prior to abolition, in line with parliament‖s intention to remove the death penalty from the statute book.‖144 Amnesty International reported three death sentences in 2001; an estimated 31 men remained under death sentence by the end of the year. 145 Membership in the Council of Europe may have proved critical in this issue. Armenia joined the Council of Europe on January 25, 2001, and assumed a number of legal obligations to be implemented at home. Upon accession Armenia signed the European Convention on Human Rights and Protocol No. 6 of the Convention (regarding the death penalty), with the requirement that the government ratify both within a year of accession. There were international concerns that by the end of 2001 the Armenian government had not ratified them, but it finally did so on April 26, 2002.146 Within a year of accession, Armenia was obligated to ratify the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and to pass a new criminal code (drafted in 1997) to abolish the death penalty. On several occasions, the Council of Europe nearly suspended Armenia because of the government‖s failure to abolish the death penalty. In the aftermath of the assassinations in the parliament, both the public and policymakers strongly favored enforcing the death penalty. The Council of Europe threatened to revoke Armenia‖s membership if the defendants were executed.147 In September 2002, in a strongly worded letter the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) called upon the Armenian government to abolish the death penalty and issued an ultimatum: the Armenian parliamentary delegation would be suspended if Erevan refused to abolish the death penalty by June 2003. 148 In May 2003, the legislature passed a revised criminal code, which included provisions for the abolition of the death penalty in peacetime, although the bill retained the right to practice execution in the case of the 1999 assassins in the National Assembly. The Kocharyan government vacillated between abolition of the death penalty for all crimes and its retention for specific (e.g. wartime) crimes. In July 2003, Kocharyan commuted all death sentences to lifetime imprisonment. 149 The current Constitution, under Article 15, protects citizens from the death penalty. Of particular relevance in this regard is the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 150 which the government of Armenia had not signed as of 2010. The abolition of the death penalty may be considered a turning point

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in the process of the de-Sovietization of Armenian political culture. It conveyed the symbolic significance of terminating in law the Bolshevik legacy of state violence and atrocities, ending the culture of the Gulag. Combined with the economic liberalization policies introduced soon after independence in 1991 and therefore the eradication of the political and economic monopoly exercised by the Communist Party, such structural reforms may in the long run lead to the institutionalization of democratization and improved human rights performance, engendering both procedural and substantive democracy. In 1998, however, a report by the UN Development Program warned that if the Armenian government fails to introduce laws and policies promotive of democratic practices, ―the new authorities will move along the same path taken by the former regime, which will result in even more pernicious consequences for the country.‖151 The structural and cultural challenges confronting the republic at this stage may prove too onerous to afford transformations from long and short historical legacies with the projected degree of facility and alacrity. Freedom of movement Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of movement, the right to leave and to return to the country. This comports with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which under Article 12 provides that ―Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence;‖ and ―Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.‖ Article 12 does stipulate certain limitations on this freedom, as necessary for purposes of national security, stability, ―public health or morals.‖ The Armenian government in general imposes no restrictions on movement within the country or travel abroad, except in times of political crises and for political purposes. For instance, restrictions on movement have been imposed during opposition rallies in the capital. In April 2004, the police prohibited vehicles from entering the capital to prevent the opposition from participating in protest demonstrations. 152 Citizens requesting passports to travel abroad are required to produce invitation from individuals or organizations in their desired destination. The government generally refuses to grant passports to individuals in possession of national security secrets and to those whose relatives have legal, ―financial claims against them.‖ Although for a number of years after independence the Office of Visas and Registration, inherited from the Soviet system, prevented emigration in large numbers, the Armenian

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government since the early 1990s has not erected any obstacles to prevent emigration. Consequently, immediately after independence, Armenia‖s Greek and Jewish minorities left the country in increasing numbers.153 Civil liberties associated with the freedom of movement within the country, foreign travel, and emigration appear to have experienced the highest level of improvement since Soviet times. Thus, Freedom House has reported that, unlike Soviet restrictions on internal and foreign travel, there are currently few or no such restrictions in the republic. Emigration in large numbers, however, particularly in the 1990s, reflects the country‖s hopelessly poor social and economic conditions. The Armenian Church and human rights Although residing in a predominantly Christian country, where more than 90 per cent of the population belongs to the Armenian Apostolic Church, minority communities (for example, Russians, Jews, Kurds, Yezidis, Georgians, Greeks, and Assyrians) have not experienced severe government or official discriminations. While in the aftermath of independence the government adopted no laws for the protection of ethnic and religious minorities, the law on languages (adopted in 1992) has provided protection for minorities‖ cultural rights and the right to learn and publish in their mother tongue. Minorities were also granted the right to use their language in court during trials, although most members of these communities speak Armenian. 154 With respect to religion, however, a wide gap appears between the right to freedom of religion as provided under the Constitution, on the one hand, and government legislation and public reaction, on the other. Article 26 of the Constitution (2005) guarantees freedom of religion and of thought and conscience. The Constitution echoes the right to freedom of religion provided in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights affirms that ―Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion,‖ including freedom to adopt a religion and ―to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.‖ Further, ―No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.‖ Likewise, according to Article 18(3), a government may not proscribe freedom of religion except under such circumstances as require the protection of ―public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.‖ In practice, the situation has been far less favorable than the Con-

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stitution promises and more complicated than official rhetoric suggests. The 1991 law on religion provides for separation of church and state. While the Constitution of 1995 made no reference to the church, Article 8.1 of the 2005 Constitution first reaffirms the principle of separation of church and state as promulgated under the 1991 law; however, the same article also stresses ―the exclusive historical mission of the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church as a national church, in the spiritual life, development of the national culture and preservation of the national identity of the people of Armenia.‖ Nevertheless, Article 8.1 guarantees ―Freedom of activities for all religious organizations in accordance with the law.‖ The Armenian Apostolic Church, however, traditionally considered the ―national‖ Church, enjoys special privileges according to custom and law and, similar to its reaction to the Paulicians and Tondrakians centuries before, has opposed activities of ―foreign religions‖ in Armenia.155 Given the predominant status enjoyed by the Armenian Apostolic Church, a number of cultural and legal limitations are placed on the religious freedom of those not affiliated with it. Since 1991, religious organizations have been legally required to register with the State Council on Religious Affairs. A presidential decree on December 22, 1991, further enhanced the privileged position of the Armenian Church by authorizing the Council on Religious Affairs with extensive powers to scrutinize the activities of registered religious groups and to prohibit foreign missionaries from activities that fail to comply with the laws of the country.156 Table 4.2 shows the level of government support for the Armenian Church and the level of tolerance toward other religions. The public is generally suspicious toward those who embrace ―foreign religions,‖ often showing extreme hostility concerning their activities. This has been particularly the case regarding the Jehovah‖s Witnesses, in part because its members refuse to serve in the military but also because the group is seen as serving the political objectives of foreign interests. As a result, its proselytizing activities are perceived as a threat to Armenian culture and national security.157 Violence toward such groups tends to erupt unpredictably. In April 1995, a paramilitary squad of 25 men attacked and ―arrested‖ nine members of the Jehovah‖s Witnesses, Hare Krishna, and other religious groups, detained them in a military prison for two weeks, and beat 19 of the Hare Krishna followers. 158 Since the middle of the 1990s, government policy has tended more forcefully to oppose non-traditional religious groups and has been more restrictive toward foreign groups. In 1996, the parliament adopted a new set of requirements regarding religion, raising from 50 to 200 adults the minimum threshold for registration (i.e. legal recognition) of religious organizations and requiring prior approval from the Council on Religious

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Table 4.2 Religion and Government Policy in Armenia

Government Regulation of Religion Government Favoritism of Religion Social Regulation of Religion Religious Persecution a b

low is less regulation low is less favoritism

Index 7.2 8.1 9.3 4.0 c d

Rating 0-10a 0-10b 0-10c 0-10d

low is less regulation high is more persecution

SOURCE: The Association of Religion Data Archives, 2006.

Affairs for public activities, travel outside the country, importation of religious literature in large volumes, and invitations of foreign guests to Armenia. Under the law, organizations whose registration requests have been rejected by the government are also denied ownership of their own broadcasting programs and publication of newspapers. 159 Although legally the Council on Religious Affairs may prohibit missionary activities by foreign or non-Apostolic denominations, it has generally refrained from taking drastic measures against them. Further, most legal requirements have not been or are only rarely enforced in practice, and registered and unregistered groups have had little difficulty traveling and importing religious literature in limited numbers. The absence of due diligence in these matters, however, may be attributable to the lack of sufficient resources rather than to religious tolerance.160 In recent years, the Council has begun to impose certain restrictions on the rights of ―foreign‖ faiths. Human rights reports have indicated that registered groups generally were able to re-register annually as required by law, but the Hare Krishnas failed to re-register because their membership in 1998 fell below the required minimum 50 members.161 The Council rejected registration by Jehovah‖s Witnesses, prohibiting its ―illegal proselytism.‖ Additionally, the Council maintained that activities by Jehovah‖s Witnesses caused ―tensions‖ within the community.162 Other groups also have been targeted, among them the Baptist Union of Armenia, the Erevan Baptist Church, and the Seventhday Adventist Church. 163 Cultural intolerance only partly explains such restrictions on religious freedom. One of the principal concerns, at least from the government‖s perspective, is military service. Membership in a foreign religious organization such as the Jehovah‖s Witnesses may secure a potential draftee the status of a conscientious objector, thereby granting exemption from

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military service. Several members of Jehovah‖s Witnesses have been imprisoned in recent years on charges of draft evasion or desertion. In 1999, 11 followers of the Jehovah‖s Witnesses were in prison;164 in 2000, 41 members;165 and in 2001, the total number held in prison was 27, although by the end of the year 14 remained in prison.166 As in other areas of human rights, the government has assumed the legal responsibility to protect religious freedoms, and this is closely related to the rights of conscientious objectors and laws on military conscription. Enjoying a privileged status in society, the Armenian Church has preferred to maintain amicable relations with the state and therefore to remain silent on human rights violations. In October 2000, at a conference on Christianity and law dedicated to the 1700th anniversary of Armenia‖s conversion to Christianity, which was co-sponsored by the government and the Catholicosate of the Armenian Church, President of the Constitutional Court Gagik Harutyunyan in his opening remarks stressed the close historical ties between Armenian culture and Christianity. Catholicos Garegin II of Echmiadzin encouraged the government and citizens of the republic, ―having overcome the hopeless times of repression and atheism,‖ to redouble their efforts for national reconstruction and to strengthen relations between the government and the Church. For his part, Kocharyan emphasized the significance of Christian culture in Armenian history and noted that modern society requires integration of the nation‖s historical legacy and its unique characteristics with individual dignity and inalienable rights and liberties, the promotion of which, he added, also requires close cooperation between the government and the Church.167 Such laudatory declarations notwithstanding, with the exception of cursory allusions by Bishop Eznik Petrosyan to judges and corruption, unsurprisingly none of the papers voiced criticism of the human rights situation in the country.168 This conference was followed in early 2001, also in celebration of the 1700th anniversary, by an agreement between the government and the Armenian Apostolic Church further formalizing the latter‖s privileged status.169 The government extended additional privileges to the Armenian Church under the Law on Relations of the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian Church, adopted in 2007. The law grants certain rights to the Church but without ensuring equal privileges to other religious groups. Under the law, the Armenian Church possesses the authority to maintain ―permanent representatives in hospitals, orphanages, boarding schools, military units, and all places of detention.‖ In contrast, the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations allows other religious organizations similar presence in such institutions on demand basis.170

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Such symbiotic state-church relations, complemented by oligarchic networks in the cultural context of intolerance toward non-Armenian and non-traditional groups cannot help but convince most citizens that the governmental institutions ill-prepared to serve as impartial arbiters. The inability to secure just resolution through the legal system has led many to seek justice in international forums, such as the European Court of Human Rights. Membership in the Council of Europe may contribute to improvements in this area as well. Within three years of accession, Armenia was obligated to adopt a new law on conscription to permit alternative military service, while granting amnesty to conscientious objectors in prison at the time. By late 2001, Amnesty International reported that Armenia had failed to fulfill its commitments.171 Days after Armenia joined the Council of Europe in January 2001, the government sentenced Karen Yegoyan, a member of Jehovah‖s Witnesses, to prison for two years for declining to serve in the military.172 Nevertheless, in June 2001, in an apparent effort to comply with international obligations, Kocharyan granted amnesty to 40 members of Jehovah‖s Witnesses who were detained on charges of draft evasion. In September 2001, the court of first instance in Armavir acquitted Levon Margaryan, an active member of Jehovah‖s Witnesses, of charges of ―enticing minors into attending religious meetings of an unregistered religion, and influencing members to refuse their civic duties.‖ The Prosecutor‖s office appealed the case to a higher court. 173 These changes, however, elicited a sharp reaction from the Catholicosate of the Armenian Church at Echmiadzin. In October 2004, when the State Registrar permitted the Jehovah‖s Witnesses to register as a legal organization,174 the Church responded by demanding that the government rescind their registration. The authorities, however, refused to reverse the decision. As part of its reform of laws on religious communities, the government in August 2002 formed a new religious council comprised of representatives of the Armenian Apostolic, Catholic, and Protestant churches but without representatives from non-traditional or ―foreign‖ denominations. Seemingly charting a new course in its policy on religion, in September 2002 the Ministry of Education directed secondary schools to display the national flag along with the portraits of President Kocharyan and Catholicos Garegin II of the Armenian Church at Echmiadzin.175 Thereafter, the government pursued contradictory policies, oscillating between greater freedoms for minority religions, on the one hand, and imposition of stricter controls, on the other. In June 2004, the government instituted a law on Alternative Military Service providing conscientious objectors exemption from military service.176 Yet, the police continued to

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arrest followers of the Jehovah‖s Witnesses for their refusal to serve in the military. In 2009, Jehovah‖s Witnesses News reported that 66 members between the ages of 18 and 24, who refused to obey military orders because of their religious convictions, were jailed in the Erebuni penitentiary, and 12 others were held at the Artik penitentiary. 177 In June 2010, 76 members remained in prison on charges of draft evasion. 178 The European Court of Human Rights in several cases has ruled against the government of Armenia, except in one case. Vahan Bayatyan requested exemption from military service as a conscientious objector and a permission to perform alternative civilian service. The government, however, responded by initiating criminal proceedings against him in October 2002. After appeals to the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal and subsequently to the Court of Cassation, the case of Bayatyan v. Armenia eventually reached the European Court of Human Rights. In 2009, the European Court ruled that the Armenian government had not violated Article 9 (concerning religious freedom) of the European Convention on Human Rights. 179 Of the 20 decisions involving applications from Armenia, in this case alone did the European Court of Human Rights find no violations by the Armenian government. 180 Ani Sarkissian contends that the close relationship between Armenian identity and membership in the Church ―contributes to an atmosphere of intolerance toward ethnic and religious minorities and inhibits the development of pluralism. This underdevelopment of a democratic culture therefore leads to weak opposition movements and delayed democratic consolidation.‖ Further, she asserts, ―cultural and societal closed-mindedness inhibits the development of a democratic political culture, which has thus stalled the country‖s democratic transition.‖181 Similarly, Jonathan Fox argues that ―the extent to which a state government supports religious exclusivity influences that state‖s human rights record.‖ He maintains that ―state religious exclusivity‖ (i.e. ―state support for some religions or one religion over others‖) is closely related to poor human rights performance.182 The role of the church and of religion extends beyond the question of tolerance toward minority religions. As discussed earlier, the Armenian Church is inherently patriarchal and therefore inimical to fundamental changes in tradition and culture. Issues pertaining to the rights of women pose a particular challenge to the position of the Church because of its emphasis on the family as the foundation for Armenian life and community. Any alteration in the traditional status of women is considered an unwelcome mutation in national (and essentially androcentric) values. Yet, many Armenians consider the Church an important religious and cultural institution. The capabilities approach advanced by

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Martha Nussbaum offers a more nuanced perspective than the simple negation of religion on account of its conservative orientation. She stresses the ―intrinsic value of religious capabilities,‖ and stresses that ―The liberty of religious belief, membership, and activity is among the central human capabilities.‖183 She notes, however, that secularist feminists view religion as ―irredeemably patriarchal, and a powerful ally of women‖s oppression throughout the ages.‖184 For the secularist feminist, the basic human rights of equality and dignity supersede any religious principles that fail to respect the personal integrity of women. Traditionalist feminists, on the other hand, Nussbaum writes, insist on the preservation of traditional religious values and practices as the fount of moral principles of human existence. Nussbaum contends that such views cannot be rejected outright, for religion can serve as a powerful source for justice, identity, and empowerment. Unlike secular feminists who advocate women‖s rights and capabilities by securing guarantees for protection against various forms of discrimination and abuse, traditional feminists advocate the preservation of values that have historically caused enormous suffering for women at both the familial and societal levels.185 Clearly, in its determined support for traditional values, the Armenian Church has failed to utter any criticism of gender-related human rights problems. Further, the Armenian Church has failed to utter any criticism of government human rights violations. As a result, the Church may serve as a source for identity, but it has not served as a source for justice and empowerment. Summary The Armenian Constitution in principle has established guarantees for human rights and privileges one expects to find in democratic societies and in accordance with international human rights standards. In practice, however, the government‖s human rights record since independence has worsened. While the human rights situation improved briefly after 1991, the gains secured have been reversed since 1994. In fact, as the human rights performance of the Armenian government deteriorated, Steven Fish has argued, ―the agent of degradation in every instance‖ was President Ter-Petrosyan,186 who had solidified his authority in the constitutional framework between 1991 and 1995 and whose power continued to expand considerably under the Constitution of 1995. In certain areas of civil rights, particularly in matters related to prison condition and police brutality, the government has altogether failed to register improvements. The Constitution prohibits brutality and torture, but most cases are not

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reported and consequently the perpetrators are not punished. Impunity remains a problem, and the authorities rarely investigate abuses by the police and national security agencies, unless pressured by NGOs or international bodies, such as the European Court of Human Rights. The prevalence of police brutality toward opposition groups and of torture in prisons – as well as similar practices in the military – have continued unabated since 1991. Police brutality, torture, and related human rights violations (to secure confessions) have undermined the legitimacy of the government and of the political leadership. The lack of an established tradition of police training for professionalization has certainly contributed to police violence, further exacerbated by systemic corruption and non-accountability, which, as shown in Table 3.2, has led to low levels of public approval of the police. As of this writing, conditions have not improved, although in certain cases the government has held some police officers accountable and investigated accusations of brutality. Civil rights and respect for the integrity of the person are closely related to democracy and constitutional culture. Democratic practices and rules of the game reflect the extent to which a society can respect human rights. The post-election violence of February-March 2008 confirmed the lack of democratic tradition and culture in Armenia but also the fact that the political establishment thus far has been unable or unwilling to institutionalize a system of consistent, democratic governance and normalcy. It goes without saying that political corruption and recurring election crises undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the government. At present, the political legitimacy of the Armenian government seems to have eroded beyond repair. The post-Soviet state suffers from various limitations, including the ability of political and economic elite to control the media, the absence of a tradition of tolerance for legitimate opposition voices, and the lack of tolerance toward minority religions. Whether opportunities for democratization will improve in the near future is highly debatable. Fundamental cultural and structural changes are necessary to improve the government‖s performance in the areas of civil liberties and respect for the integrity of the person.

5 Social and Economic Rights

Human rights and human development share a common vision and a common purpose — to secure, for every human being, freedom, well-being, and dignity.1

Legacies from Soviet rule, including the obsolete political and economic institutions of the Communist system and corruption, impeded the transition to liberal, democratic political economy in most of the newly independent states. Upon the collapse of the centralized Soviet economy, the new political leaders introduced liberalization policies to fill the resulting economic and ideological vacuum. Marxism had been discarded but, in the words of Ernest Gellner, ―without any clear or single alternative in sight.‖2 The post-Soviet states, now facing enormous challenges at home, were also confronted with the task of catching up with Western economic and technological advantages. Democratization required institutional arrangements and a legal environment conducive to the development of civil society and open political participation, free and fair elections, and freedom of the press.3 Economic liberalization necessitated open and free market relations and the de-Sovietization of the cumbersome state and party monopolies on production and trade. As many observers have noted since 1991, high public expectations regarding the potential benefits of independence from the decrepit Soviet regime could only be realized in a small number of states. In the Baltic states, the post-Soviet governments launched market liberalization policies with relative ease, as they reverted to their pre-Soviet, European customs and practices.4 In contrast, the historical legacy of comparatively lower levels of economic development obstructed the process of transition to viable market economies in the Central Asian countries (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan), Moldova, Belarus, and the Caucasian republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan,

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and Georgia.5 The economic collapse in Armenia after independence led to the loss of industrial capacity, with deleterious consequences for the nation‖s social welfare system and standard of living.6 These conditions impeded the development of an adequate market base in Armenia, and many of the former Communist Party leaders and apparatchiks who had enjoyed extensive social and economic privileges either joined or were replaced by the emerging power configurations of clans and oligarchs.7 Economic development and democracy According to a study by Adam Przeworski and his associates, economic development exercises a considerable impact on democratic stability. While richer economies tend to secure the sustainability of democratic systems, poorer economies heighten the vulnerability of democratic states to instability. Thus, the higher a country‖s level of per capita income, the greater the sustainability of its democratic system. An economically poor democracy can become stable and survive if the government is able to promote economic growth and development while avoiding economic crises.8 Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel note that ―a society‖s level of economic development is a much better predictor of democratization than its economic growth rate.‖9 Further, they argue, socioeconomic analyses must be ―supplemented by taking the society‖s historical heritage into account.‖10 Socioeconomic underdevelopment, inadequate levels of education, and the absence of advanced industrial and telecommunications technologies limit choices and cause material shortcomings and physical hardship for people.11 As Samuel Huntington has stressed, ―poverty is a principal and probably the principal obstacle to democratic development.‖12 High levels of poverty impede the development of civil society and democratically oriented political culture and institutions. Finally, where a society lacks a viable welfare services, familial relations and group bonds and obligations fill the policy void to serve as social insurance; however, such relations also impose cultural and social restrictions on the individual‖s options and choices.13 It should come as no surprise that Armenia, faced with such difficulties, has failed to make a transition to democracy and economic development. These studies consider economic development as the independent variable and democracy or democratization as the dependent variable. Some scholars have maintained that the relationship between the two variables may be a mere correlation rather than causation, although, as Anna Grzymala-Busse has demonstrated, ―the development of markets and democracies are very closely correlated.‖14 Yet, it is also valid to inquire whether democratization leads to economic growth and, if so,

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whether it contributes to the just distribution of resources across different sectors of society. 15 Ian Shapiro has argued that there is little empirical evidence to demonstrate causal relationship between the expansion of political enfranchisement and the redistribution of resources from the wealthy to the lower classes.16 Such debates notwithstanding, the long historical evolution of democracies in economically advanced societies indicates, as noted above, that an economically poor and undeveloped society cannot develop procedural or substantive democracy. As a result, human rights – whether in the realm of political and civil liberties, or social and economic rights – suffer in clear violation of national constitutions and international human rights law. Although international human rights conventions have heightened the saliency of various issues concerning the exercise of governmental power over citizens, there persists, as Isfahan Merali and Valerie Oosterveld have observed, ―a lack of political will to devote needed resources and implement infrastructural change in order to protect and advance‖ human rights. National and international human rights documents cannot in and of themselves fulfill aspirations. The human rights values they express must first be ―humanized‖ and then implemented, they write. ―This means recognizing that, without progress in the realization of economic, social, and cultural rights, an ancient language is lost, families struggle in slums, communities go hungry, women‖s bodies are exploited, children wait days in clinic doorsteps. Both bodies and spirits die.‖17 Social and economic rights, from the perspective of ―basic human needs‖18 and as ―charismatic values‖ (as discussed in Chapter 1), represent the fundamental issues of economic development and modernization, and under international law the Armenian government is obligated, as a signatory to international human rights conventions, to implement policies in accordance with human rights principles and to remedy social and economic problems such as poverty, homelessness, the exploitation of children, domestic violence, human trafficking, and corruption in its various forms.19 The poor are landless wage laborers, who cannot afford healthcare services or education for their children and generally are not likely to marry their sons and daughters into a family with better means. International human rights law requires that the government alleviate the worst circumstances by guaranteeing certain minimum standards of decent livelihood. The failure to do so constitutes a breach of international law and human rights standards, principles, and values. 20 Article 55 of the UN Charter affirms that the United Nations shall promote, inter alia, higher standards of living and address social and economic problems.21 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights upholds the universality of social and economic rights. The International Covenant

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on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 22 one of the principal legally binding instruments in international human rights, provides: The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent (Article 11). In the post-Soviet societies, striking a healthy balance between growth-centric and welfare-centric policies has been particularly challenging given the economic difficulties inherited from the Communist system. Nevertheless, as one observer has noted, ―the measure of a society is the way it treats its poor.‖23 Where the most fundamental basic needs (for instance, food) of a person cannot be met, ―when hunger is strong, the social ties, let alone morality, are weak.‖24 In assessing the human rights performance of Armenia in these regards, it is necessary to take into consideration the national need for economic growth but also the individual citizen‖s demands concerning his or her personal welfare as integral, mutually complementary components of national economic development. The economic well being of the individual is a necessary if not a sufficient condition for national economic growth.25 The analysis presented in this study supports the argument advanced by other scholars that efforts to eliminate poverty do not necessarily impede national economic development and progress. Clearly, Armenia‖s basic needs performance has been lower than expected when the nation secured its independence from the Soviet Union. The emerging economy lacked the infrastructural base required for financial growth and stability, a situation further exacerbated by the humanitarian disasters inherited from Soviet failures to address the crises created by the earthquake in 1988 – which devastated 40 per cent of the country‖s territory – and the military conflict in Nagorno-Karabagh.26 Under the Soviet system, Armenia experienced rapid urbanization beginning in the early 1960s as an increasing number of people migrated from small rural towns and villages to Erevan, placing considerable pressure on public administration. Yet, the Soviet republic also benefited from the interdependent web of planned manufacturing and trade complexes, contributing to its economic development. The dissolution of these manufacturing networks in 1991 rendered the new republic vulnerable to internal and external economic pressures, as demonstrated by

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the economic blockade imposed by Turkey and Azerbaijan. 27 Under the authoritarian post-Soviet order, political and economic elites have relied on control of coercive measures and utilized their resources (e.g. authority of office, patronage, land, employment opportunities) to retain power. While a substantial portion of the privatization process took place under Ter-Petrosyan, the Kocharyan government and the parliament continued to privatize state-owned enterprises even when it had become clear that such a policy had not served the public interest well. In June 2001, the National Assembly adopted a new privatization program for the remaining state-owned enterprises.28 The much-heralded laissez-faire capitalist ideology led in practice to the rapid privatization of state properties, which created vast opportunities for the accumulation of wealth by oligarchic networks, which, in turn, served as the basis for the consolidation of political power by the political and economic elite. Social and economic rights and development The social and economic conditions in Armenia raise a host of questions concerning the government‖s adherence to international human rights standards. As noted in Chapter 2, in 2000 the UN Development Program (UNDP) identified ―seven freedoms‖ necessary for a decent living and human dignity – freedom from discrimination, freedom from fear, freedom of thought and speech, freedom from want, freedom from injustice, freedom to develop, and freedom for decent work. 29 The UN Millennium Declaration, adopted in September 2000, reaffirmed the human rights principles and values found in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Declaration stressed that ―we will spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty,‖ a point reiterated by The Millennium Development Goals Report in 2008.30 The United Nations‖ objectives to bring about a more peaceful and secure world and to promote and protect human rights cannot be realized without due recognition, on the part of individual governments, of the need to develop public programs for equitable economic development. Developing economies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America already had considerable experience with the challenges of political democratization and economic development by the time the former Soviet republics gained independence. Lessons drawn from the even longer historical transformations of the advanced societies underscore the mutual – if at times painful – complementarities between human rights and human development.31 Despite variations in the economic evolution of societies from the agricultural to the industrial and to the post-industrial age, the

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overarching conclusion to be drawn from their experiences remains that, as a UN report has asserted, ―human development is essential for realizing human rights, and human rights are essential for full human development.‖32 The Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1986, further solidified the legal and moral nexus between human rights and human development.33 Mary Robinson, former UN Commissioner for Human Rights (1997–2002), has noted that ―The recognition of a “right” to health or education, arising out of treaties and other international commitments, implies corresponding legal obligations of national governments as well as of the international community. As a consequence of that recognition, those who are poor and marginalized are empowered, and their participation rendered effective.‖34 Such social and economic rights have assumed particular legal and moral significance since the middle of the twentieth century. 35 Numerous international conventions underscore the obligations assumed by state parties to respect and implement the international human rights instruments developed since the adoption of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In 1966, the UN General Assembly adopted the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which, together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Charter, affirms the universal moral and legal legitimacy of social and economic rights with guarantees for equal protection of men and women, children, and the elderly. In 1968, the World Conference on Human Rights declared that ―the achievement of lasting progress in the implementation of human rights is dependent upon sound and effective national and international policies of economic and social development.‖36 The economic and social right to development was further confirmed by the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1977. 37 In a similar vein, CEDAW holds that ―the full and complete development of a country, the welfare of the world and the cause of peace require the maximum participation of women on equal terms with men in all fields.‖38 In addition to the principle of equality, CEDAW also provides under Article 3 for the ―full development‖ of women in political, social, economic, and cultural affairs, with guarantees for their ―exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.‖ Part III of CEDAW (Articles 10–14) also provides for guarantees to the same educational and employment opportunities as men and for equal access to health and financial services in urban and rural areas. The conventions and declarations discussed above confirmed the normative principles and values enunciated in numerous universal and regional conventions, including, for example, the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), the American Convention on Human Rights

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(1969), and the African Charter on Human and Peoples‖ Rights (1981). The Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Commonwealth of Independent States, signed in Minsk by many of the former Soviet republics on May 26, 1995, represents a potentially significant step in the development of a regional human rights system in the post-Soviet space.39 However, after a decade since its entry into force on August 11, 1998, the CIS Convention has not been elevated to the status of the European, American, and African conventions. The UN World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993 and the UN World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen in 1995 represented watershed events in the development of international human rights standards. 40 The conferences expressed the collective, universal aspirations of the international community for the encouragement of political democratization and social and economic progress. Indeed, convening not long after the Cold War had ended, the conferences promised to steer the world political economy, freed from decades of ideological rivalry, to concentrate its energies on the promotion and protection of human rights. The fact that the heads of state from the 15 post-Soviet republics (including President Ter-Petrosyan) participated as representatives of sovereign governments enhanced the moral legitimacy of the conferences and raised expectations that the former Soviet states would adhere to the declarations issued by the two conferences. These two declarations, supplementing a host of existing international human rights conventions, place legal and moral obligations on state parties to promote and protect the human rights of their citizens in nearly all spheres of society. The Vienna Declaration and Program of Action reaffirms: all human rights derive from the dignity and worth inherent in the human person, and that the human person is the central subject of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and consequently should be the principal beneficiary and should participate actively in the realization of these rights and freedoms…41 The Copenhagen declaration proposes to end poverty, unemployment, and social disintegration. Juan O. Somavia, Chile‖s ambassador to the United Nations and Chairman of the Preparatory Committee of the Copenhagen Summit, commented that economically disadvantaged countries needed new plans to achieve these objectives. 42 The Summit stressed the imperatives of social and economic rights and placed particular emphasis on women‖s rights. Among its declared Commitments are,

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for example, that governments ensure ―adequate economic and social protection during unemployment, ill health, maternity, child rearing, widowhood, disability and old age‖ (Commitment 2[d]) and that governments develop a legal environment conducive to employment opportunities for women, including ―the protection of their position in the labour market and the promotion of equal treatment of women and men, in particular with respect to pay‖ (Commitment 3[g]).43 Several leaders attending the Copenhagen Summit expressed the urgent need to address social and economic problems worldwide. In his speech, President Fidel Ramos of the Philippines described ―poverty as another tyranny, … a tyranny against which we must wage the moral equivalent of war.‖44 The rhetorical ornamentation attending such pronouncements notwithstanding, the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action and subsequently the Declaration of Commitments adopted by the Copenhagen Summit establish legal and moral obligations for state parties to implement policies for the protection and promotion of social and economic rights. The global attention paid to human development as a human right by public and private international organizations has undoubtedly contributed to certain global achievements, although the international community continues to suffer from severe inequities and various other injustices. Access to safe water rose from 13 per cent to 71 per cent between 1970 and 1999. Malnutrition decreased from 20 per cent of the world‖s population in 1990–92 to 17 per cent in 2000–04. In the least developed countries, the figures were 38 per cent and 35 per cent, respectively, and in the countries defined as ―medium human development‖ by the UN Development Program, malnutrition declined from 20 per cent to 16 per cent for the same years. The adult literacy rate worldwide increased from 76.4 per cent in the 1985–94 decade to 82.4 per cent in the following decade.45 Despite such accomplishments, however, serious problems remain. In 1999, nearly 150 million workers were unemployed worldwide. Approximately 30 per cent of women were subjected to domestic violence across the globe in 2007, and nearly 1.2 million women and girls have fallen victim to trafficking. An estimated 90 million children drop out of primary school, and 100 million children work or live on the street annually.46 Since independence in 1991, post-Soviet Armenia may be best characterized as economically undeveloped and accordingly grouped among the predominantly poorer societies – suffering from gross inequities and the various social and economic ills of high levels of unemployment and poverty, truncated human rights for women and children, domestic violence, human trafficking, and corruption in general.

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The post-Soviet oligarchist logic and human rights The oligarchic system in post-Soviet Armenia emerged early in the process of de-Sovietization when the Ter-Petrosyan government launched its privatization policies. In some cases, former Communist Party officials and factory managers within the nomenklatura structure appropriated state properties as their own with no legal pretence or a legal process. In other instances, state factories that were marked for exemption from privatization became easy targets for plunder; various machinery and tools were sold as scrap metal. The entire privatization process became a vehicle for some officials and members of their families and clans to acquire, at minimum cost and for personal profit, former Soviet state properties. Within a short period (1991–92), for instance, nearly 70 per cent of state-owned apartments were privatized, as were the kolkhoz (collective farms) and sovkhoz (state farms) lands. 47 Privatization contributed to the consolidation of the oligarchic system, 48 which now came to rest entirely on systemic corruption, not dissimilar to the one inherited from the Soviet regime. The uncivil culture of corruption was also inherited from Soviet Marxism. Managers, writes Gellner, ―who dribbled their way between the threat of punishment for failing to fulfil the plan, and punishment for violating legality (which was the only way to fulfil the plan), could hardly develop a work ethic. They developed a mafioso intrigue ethic, which they carried on into the post-Communist world, where they learnt to speak laissez-faire rather than Marxese.‖49 International human rights law draws a direct relationship between corruption and human rights. 50 The United Nations Convention against Corruption, the most significant instrument to date in this area, emphasizes in its Preamble ―the seriousness of problems and threats posed by corruption to the stability and security of societies, undermining the institutions and values of democracy, ethical values and justice and jeopardizing sustainable development and the rule of law.‖51 The Convention, ratified by Armenia in 2007, 52 seeks ―to promote integrity, accountability and proper management of public affairs and public property‖ (Article 1[c]). Armenian acceptance of this Convention notwithstanding, corruption remains a serious problem in the republic. 53 In an environment of corruption and oligarchic rule, the propensity on the part of governments and citizens in the post-Soviet republics to disregard legal obligations incurred under both municipal and international human rights law as binding further weakens the enforceability of the law. Legal failure has represented one of the principal challenges confronting post-Soviet societies as the heirs of a political and economic

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culture lacking a tradition of democratic governance. Further, unequal distribution of resources in return ―fosters perceptions of widespread corruption and correspondingly habituates norms of corruption as “the way things are done”.‖54 Inequality breeds jealousy and resentment. A social environment pathologically strained by the real or perceived absence of legitimate rules of state and market norms, encumbered by largely authoritarian ―super-presidentialism,‖ is hardly conducive to the effective implementation of legally binding international conventions. 55 Two closely related issues are worth emphasizing here. It may be argued that the system of super-presidentialism is itself in part responsible for the government‖s failure to implement economic rights, as it inherently lacks the institutional mechanisms to accommodate public demands (i.e. demands from below). Also, the political system is predicated upon elitism, which, being exclusionary, relies on a closed circle of policymakers and their supporters in large capital enterprises for economic and financial stability and therefore lacks the political will to implement the necessary economic reforms. The combination of authoritarian and elitist political and economic structures, to borrow Jean Drèze‖s words regarding India, ―perpetuates the deprivations‖ and ―disempowers‖ people by preventing them from meaningful participation in the political system, which can in turn potentially affect government policy in matters of social and economic rights. 56 In the final analysis, the oligarchic system buttressed by authoritarian regime fuels public perception of a system mired in rampant corruption, which in turn generates a vicious cycle, as observed by Stephen Morris and Joseph Klesner regarding Mexico, whereby the more widespread the perception of the political institutions as corrupt, the greater the public propensity to be engaged in corrupt practices.57 The Armenian political system is too exclusionary for ordinary citizens to exercise influence on the policymaking process. The symbiotic relationship between political and economic elites and the various subgroupings sustained by them permit little access to policy institutions. During the tenure of the Ter-Petrosyan government between 1991 and 1998, the heads of the nation‖s leading enterprises had close ties with the government and the ruling political party, the Armenian National Movement (ANM). Policymakers operated within the oligarchic system, where members of the National Assembly served as both legislators and lobbyists representing their own economic interests. 58 Christoph Stefes notes, for instance, that President Ter-Petrosyan‖s brother, Telman TerPetrosyan, ―allegedly dominated the construction and other industrial sectors.‖ Former Minister of Interior and mayor of Erevan Vano Siradeghyan and Minister of Defense Vazgen Sargisyan held virtual monopolies over the trade of food and oil products, while officials in

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other ministries accumulated enormous wealth ―through embezzlement schemes involving humanitarian aid.‖59 In June 1999, criminal investigations by the Prosecutor General enumerated ten counts of indictment against Siradeghyan; among the charges were the murder in 1993 of Hambardzum Ghandilyan, director of railroads, and of Hovannes Sukiasyan, executive committee chairman of the Ashtarak district. Siradeghyan was also charged with the attempted murder of Vladimir Grigoryan, chief of the Prosecutor General‖s department of investigation. In a related case, the court also heard the case of Armen Ter Sahakyan, leader of an armed gang whose members, mostly former employees of the Ministry of Interior, were part of a ―hit squad‖ acting on orders from Siradeghyan. The charges included the murders of several officials since 1991, in addition to ―extortion, robbery, and illegal possession of weapons.‖60 The investigation of the Siradeghyan case was concluded in August 2000, and the court found ten members of his gang guilty and sentenced Ter Sahakyan and Alik Grigoryan to death, while the other six were sentenced to four to 11 years in prison. The court also heard criminal charges against 11 members of a group led by former Deputy Minister of Interior and commander of internal forces Vahan Harutyunyan. The court found all 11 guilty of ―murder, attempted murder, abuse of power, and complicity in murder‖; six were sentenced to terms of six to 15 years in prison; the other five were granted amnesty by the parliament in 1997 and 1998.61 Murders of equally prominent government officials were believed to have been related to organized crime. In December 1998, Deputy Minister of Defense Vahram Khorkhoruni was found dead, as was Deputy Minister of Interior and National Security and Chief of Internal Troops Artsrun Margaryan two months later, in early February 1999. While some crimes have been investigated, the verdicts and official reports have lacked credibility, and public suspicions about the cases have persisted. In one particularly unconvincing court ruling, the highly publicized case of the murder of Prosecutor General Henrik Khachatryan in August 1998 was officially declared ―homicide and suicide‖!62 Stefes further adds that Ter-Petrosyan‖s ouster in 1998 prompted the influx of a new group of ―clans and oligarchs.‖ Both Kocharyan and his successor, President Serge Sargsyan, who had transferred their networks from Karabagh to Erevan, established their own oligarchic networks. Sargsyan and his brother, Aleksandr Sargsyan, leading figures in the ruling Republican Party, have dominated ―the gas and fuel market and are the main exporters of scrap metal.‖ Other influential members of the oligarchy are Gagik Tsarukyan, Hrant Vardanyan, and Mikhail Baghdasarov. Tsarukyan is believed to the wealthiest and most famous

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member of the ruling oligarchy. He established the ―Multi Group‖ conglomerate in 1995, which encompasses the production and distribution of a wide range of goods (e.g. cement, furniture, gas). 63 Founder and current chief of the Prosperous Armenia Party (Bargavaj Hayastan Kusaktsutyun, BHK), Tsarukyan and other 24 BHK members were elected to the parliament in 2007. Vardanyan, a member of the ARF party, is the president of the conglomerate Grand Holding corporation. 64 In January 2009, President Serge Sargsyan awarded Vardanyan with the honorary title of ―Meritorious Economic Servant,‖ praising him for his entrepreneurial initiatives and contributions to the nation‖s economic development, for generating jobs, and for his humanitarian support for poor children.65 Baghdasarov is the owner of Mika Ltd., one of the largest oil importers, the Armenian Savings Bank, and Armenia‖s airline company Armavia (established in December 1996).66 The causes and the extent to which corruption and the informal economy prove advantageous or detrimental to national economies has been the subject of intense scholarly debate.67 In poor societies, patronage in government employment and bribery in the informal sector permit access to greater resources than otherwise available to people barely eking out a livelihood. Matthew Cleary and Susan Stokes suggest that the political culture of skepticism sustains successful democracies. It is inevitable, they contend, that ―poverty and inequality tempt political parties to deploy a strategy of clientelism‖ and engage in vote trading through ―tightly enmeshed in personal networks‖ of friends and clients. 68 However, the negative consequences of corruption far outweigh such gains. Tax evasion limits the financial resources available for budgets at different levels of government and threatens the very survival of social programs. Corruption drains economic resources and as a result impedes sustainable and equitable growth. As Fairbanks has pointed out, appropriation by private interests of ―state assets disguised as “privatization” has feudalized the state.‖69 Corruption undermines the functions of government and poses a serious threat to the legitimacy of the political system. Political theorists since Aristotle have stressed that trust is one of the most essential ingredients in democracy. A democratic regime cannot function effectively unless its citizens believe that their governmental institutions, if not necessarily all politicians, have the general public good in mind and promote the common interest. Yet, clearly, as Robert Putnam has correctly noted, ―modern society is replete with opportunities for free-riding and opportunism. Democracy does not require that citizens be selfless saints, but in many modest ways it does assume that most of us much of the time will resist the temptation to cheat.‖70 Patron-client networks first emerged under Levon Ter-Petrosyan and

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were further consolidated under his successor, Robert Kocharyan. In the process, the patron-client system marginalized citizens and rendered their participation in the political process nugatory. Transparency International (TI) has consistently ranked Armenia among the 25 most corrupt countries in the world. Armenia (along with Bolivia) was ranked as 80th on TI‖s Corruption Perceptions Index in 1999 and 88th out of 158 countries in 2005. On a scale of 10 (least corrupt) to 1 (most corrupt), Armenia scored 2.5 and 2.9 for the same years, joining such countries as Ecuador (2.4) and Russia (2.4).71 Corruption permeated nearly all spheres of economy and government institutions, including the police and the court system.72 Although some improvement was recorded in 2007, corruption has remained a serious problem, as its Corruption Perception Index score increased to 3.0, but it began to decline the following year (see Table 5.1).73 Public opinion surveys have indicated that corruption, along with the failing economy, represents the most pressing problem in Armenia. According to a 2003 opinion survey, the public did not believe that the authorities were genuinely interested in combating corruption. Another survey in 2004 indicated that a large proportion of the public agreed that Table 5.1 Corruption Perception Index in Comparative Perspective, 1999–2010 Country Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Estonia Georgia Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Latvia Lithuania Moldova Russia Tajikstan Turkmenistan Ukraine Uzbekistan

CPI score 99 2.5 1.7 3.4 5.7 2.3 2.3 2.2 3.4 3.8 2.6 2.4 – – 2.6 1.8

00 2.5 1.5 4.1 5.7 – 3.0 3.0 3.4 4.1 2.6 2.1 – – 1.5 2.4

01 – 2.0 – 5.6 – 2.7 – 3.4 4.8 3.1 2.3 – – 2.1 2.7

02 – 2.0 4.8 5.6 2.4 2.3 – 3.7 4.8 2.1 2.7 – – 2.4 2.9

03 3.0 1.8 2.4 5.5 1.8 2.4 2.1 3.8 4.7 2.4 2.7 1.8 – 2.3 2.4

04 3.1 1.9 3.3 6.0 2.0 2.2 2.2 4.0 4.6 2.3 2.8 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.3

05 2.9 2.2 2.6 6.4 2.3 2.6 2.3 4.2 4.8 2.9 2.4 2.1 1.8 2.6 2.2

06 2.9 2.4 2.1 6.7 2.8 2.6 2.2 4.8 4.8 3.2 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.8 2.1

07 3.0 2.1 2.1 6.5 3.4 2.1 2.1 4.8 4.8 2.8 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.7 1.7

08 2.9 1.9 2.0 6.6 3.9 2.2 1.8 5.0 4.6 2.9 2.1 2.0 1.8 2.5 1.8

09 2.7 2.3 2.4 6.6 4.1 2.7 1.9 4.5 4.9 3.3 2.2 2.0 1.8 2.2 1.7

10 2.6 2.4 2.5 6.5 3.8 2.9 2.0 4.3 5.0 2.9 2.1 2.1 1.6 2.4 1.6

SOURCE: Transparency International, Annual Report [various years]. CPI scores are on a scale of 1 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt). www.transparency.org.

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corruption permeated across ―all spheres and at all levels‖ of government.74 The informal or ―shadow‖ economy constituted between 30 and 55 per cent of the nation‖s GDP, unrecorded in government accounting and shielded from taxation – a serious impediment to economic development. In certain sectors (e.g. retail), that figure could be as high as 80 per cent.75 Under Ter-Petrosyan, the first post-independence government made no effort to address corruption. His successor, Robert Kocharyan, had opportunities to establish anti-corruption programs but failed to implement them. After the parliamentary elections of 1999, Prime Minster Vazgen Sargisyan stated in the National Assembly that his government would ―overcome the economic and social crises in the country‖ and would ―fight against corruption at all levels of civil service.‖76 In September 2000, the World Bank approved more than $12 million for a program aimed at improving judicial independence and accountability, and in May 2001 it pledged $300,000 for anti-corruption projects. 77 In June 2001, the parliament adopted a law obligating officials in the executive and judicial branches to disclose their income. 78 In May 2003, the Kocharyan government also signed the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, and in November 2003 the government introduced the Anti-Corruption Strategy and Implementation Action Plan, which aimed to eliminate corruption in nearly all sectors. In January 2004, Armenia became a member of the Group of States Against Corruption, the monitoring agency of the Council of Europe. The National Assembly ratified the Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption in January 2005 and the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption in January 2006. 79 In 2006, the government reported that 69 public officials had been charged with various crimes related to corruption and 16 of them were convicted. Also, the mayor‖s office in Erevan created a public information center, as required by municipal law and by the UN Convention against Corruption. 80 Becoming a signatory to international conventions to eliminate corruption serves to integrate Armenia into the globalized networks of the international political economy and to enhance its public image at home and in multilateral forums. In June 2006, addressing the inaugural session of the UN Human Rights Council, Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian stressed the close relationship between economic development and human rights. He emphasized that ―it is only when the preconditions for a full and free life of dignity are in place, only then are markets powerful engines of development, only then is critical infrastructure sustainable, and only then individuals stand up to demand and protect individual and collective human rights.‖81 In fact, however, continued failure to imple-

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ment in good faith the obligations assumed under international human rights conventions diminishes the credibility of the nation‖s political leaders. The legal obligations assumed by the Armenian government to counter corruption may eventually serve as a catalyst to transform the nation‖s political culture and economy. Yet, the anti-corruption laws, one report comments, ―have remained on paper, or used solely against the opposition.‖ ―Corruption has deep roots in Armenian society,‖ the report adds, ―and political resolve will not arise without pressure from the public.‖82 Thus far, the force of the adopted laws has remained confined to selective enforcement against a handful high-ranking officials,83 opposition parties and personal opponents of leading officials in bureaucracies.84 Economic development and human rights If the dissolution of Communist rule was expected to remove the constraints of monopolistic structures and lead to closer integration with and great benefits from the world markets, these expectations have not been realized in Armenia. Instead, the collapse of the Soviet system resulted in an economic depression that spanned the first five years of independence, with profound ramifications for its citizens in subsequent years. Transitions from closed, Soviet-style command economies to market economies did benefit those countries (e.g. Latvia) that were culturally closer to western Europe prior to Sovietization. In other countries, however, as in Armenia, the transition has led to gross inequalities between rich and poor, between cities and rural regions,85 with little benefit from international economic relations, except through bilateral and multilateral assistance. Unlike in neighboring Azerbaijan, Armenia possesses no significant natural resources that could stimulate rapid economic development, and as a result the economy has suffered enormously. Only since 2005 has it experienced some level of improvement (see Table 5.2). Armenia has faced the challenging task of avoiding the political and Table 5.2 Economic Growth in Post-Soviet Armenia, 1991–2009 Real GDP Per Capita (ppp) (US$) 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 4,610 2,040 2,208 1,960 2,215 2,650 3,671 4,945 5,693 5,208* SOURCE: UN Development Program, Human Development Report [various years], hdr.undp.org. *Constant 2008 US$ppp.

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economic tribulations witnessed in developing countries since the 1950s, while pressing forward to become an active participant in the world political economy along with advanced countries. The nation has registered successes in some economic and cultural areas, but the difficulties encountered since 1991 have overshadowed the nation‖s accomplishments. The figure for the adult literacy rate in the republic was well above 95 per cent for decades. Between 1993–95 and 2002–04, malnutrition in Armenia decreased from 52 per cent of the population to 24 per cent. 86 Yet, the apparent improvements notwithstanding, the figure of 24 per cent regarding malnutrition remains quite alarming. The economy suffered disastrous setbacks during the waning years of the Soviet Union and the first years of independence, as indicated by the following figures: 1) The earthquake on December 7, 1988, displaced more than 400,000 people in need of urgent assistance of every kind; 2) The war in NagornoKarabagh caused the influx of about 360,000 refugees fleeing Azerbaijan; and the Azerbaijani bombing of the border regions within Armenia during the war forced the evacuation of 72,000 people. Thus, within a period of six years (1988–94), the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Armenia reached an overwhelming total of 832,000 people living in deplorable conditions. 87 The nation‖s economy declined by 42 per cent in 1992 and by an additional 8.8 per cent in 1993. 88 Industrial output fell by 69.2 per cent compared to the levels of 1990, construction by 32.3 per cent, and services by 12.1 per cent. Only the agricultural sector registered an increase at 13.7 per cent. 89 Annual gross domestic product (GDP) data showed a rapid growth in the 1990s, an average of 6 per cent between 1994 and 1998 and 7.7 per cent during the period of 1998 and 2002. However, despite this seemingly rapidly growing economy, income levels dropped by more than 50 per cent, perhaps as much as by 70 per cent, from Soviet levels. 90 The data indicated aggregate growth but hid the highly unequal distribution of wealth and income. The economic blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey since the Karabagh war contributed to the desperate conditions in an economy that had not only been rendered volatile but also extremely vulnerable to the vicissitudes of events beyond its borders, such as the political upheavals in Georgia between 1992 and 1994, which interrupted gas deliveries to Armenia.91 The government‖s response to the problem of poverty and inequality has remained perfunctory at best. Contrary to the modernization theory, privatization and structural adjustment policies widened the gap between rich and poor, a disparity that was further exacerbated by low income levels and high levels of unemployment in the absence of viable minimum economic safety standards and adequately funded social pro-

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grams. Armenia‖s economic difficulties have been exacerbated by the country‖s primitive infrastructure and limited access to markets and credit. The shortage of serviceable roads makes transportation difficult, in some cases, as in the village of Tatev, leaving the residents in total isolation. The current construction of the cable car from the village of Halidzor to Tatev over the Vorotan River Gorge is expected to encourage tourism in hopes of injecting capital into the local economy. In the absence of sufficient domestic capital, the nation has grown dependent on foreign investments (as in real estate by diasporan Armenians), family remittances from the diaspora, and international aid. Approximately 21 per cent of households have received some share of their income from remittances, which by 2009 represented 55 per cent of income for recipient households.92 Further, the UN Development Program, for instance, contributed $51 million to Armenia for the period from 1993 to 2009. Despite extensive international support from various international organizations and the diaspora, the country has failed to develop a robust economy that could eliminate structural inequalities, reduce poverty, and improve its social and economic programs in accordance with international human rights standards. A central problem in structural inequality has been the gap between the levels of economic development in the cities and the rural regions. Economic policy since independence has concentrated heavily on development in Erevan and has neglected a host of social and economic problems in the rural regions. In the agricultural sector, the kolkhoz (collective farms) economies had collapsed with the Soviet system, and the new government was slow in instituting programs for agricultural development, with the exception of seed allocation and other programs financed with the aid of international agencies. Agricultural employment, which represents about 25.4 per cent of the nation‖s GDP,93 accounted for about 15 per cent of total employment in Soviet Armenia in 1991, but that figure increased to 43–46 per cent in the 1990s, women constituting 50 per cent of labor in agriculture.94 No more than 20 per cent of the arable land is utilized,95 and approximately 40 per cent of farmers do not have access to irrigation. 96 About 75 per cent of landowners hold title to their private land, but landownership in the rural areas has placed most landowning families at a disadvantage. Most private land in the rural areas, where about 36 per cent of the population resides, consist of small plots that cannot generate sufficient quantities of agricultural produce to sustain families either through sale in the market or for personal consumption. 97 Many farmers originally held posts in other sectors of economy but converted to the agricultural sector in response to the post-independence economic

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crisis and land privatization. Consequently, they lack technical skills such as land cultivation, animal husbandry, and agricultural production and management. These conditions are made worse by insufficient access, since 1991, to ―the information, instruments and institutions needed to efficiently operate a market-oriented rural economy, particularly in terms of input supply, technical and mechanical services.‖98 Adherring to laissez-faire economic liberalism, the Ter-Petrosyan government introduced no coherent or comprehensive regulatory policies regarding the agricultural sector. It was not until 1996 that the government turned its attention to agricultural economy, in large part because of the prompting and support of international organizations, other governments, and the diaspora. The Kocharyan government adopted a more proactive stance toward agricultural matters, but the structural challenges persisted. Thus, the local agricultural economies suffer from various problems, including inadequate advanced research and technology and the lack of proper levels of quality control and processing, all of which discourage farmers from acquiring skills to become ―proactive entrepreneurs.‖99 The Food and Agriculture Organization, a specialized agency of the United Nations, encouraged policymakers in Erevan to pay closer attention to difficulties in this sector.100 In October 2004, Minister of Finance and Economy Vardan Khachatryan signed an agreement with Henning Pedersen, head of the Armenia office of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD),101 another specialized UN agency, to implement programs promoting infrastructural investment and poverty reduction in the rural areas. This project, totaling more than $20 million, sought to improve the income and welfare of communities in rural and mountainous areas. The IFAD agreed to extend credit in the amount of $15.5 million in highly concessional loans, while the OPEC Fund promised to finance the remaining balance of $5 million. The project aimed at bolstering private enterprises and related services as well as assisting in the infrastructural development, particularly in the regions of Aragatsotn, Gegharkunik, Kotayk, Lori, Shirak, Syunik, and Vayots Dzor.102 This was not the first program implemented in Armenia by the IFAD. In April 1995, the Executive Board of the IFAD approved a loan for $8 million for the Irrigation Rehabilitation Project for a period of about five years. In December 1997, the Board approved another highly concessional loan in the amount of $15.5 million for the North-West Agricultural Services Project which focused on agricultural development in the regions of Aragatsotn, Lori, and Shirak. The government and the IFAD agreed on another Agricultural Services Project, for which the Executive Board in April 2001 approved $15.5 million. 103 Unlike these earlier programs,

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which focused primarily on agricultural development, the 2004 program was, in Pedersen‖s words, ―profit-oriented‖ and sought to develop small and medium-scale businesses.104 Subsequently, the government also adopted the Agricultural Sustainable Development Strategy in 2006.105 With respect to social welfare programs, the government, specifically the Office of Social Services, which maintains agencies throughout the country, has implemented a limited number social programs. The Paros (Beacon) system is one such program. Introduced on August 1, 1994, and funded by USAID through the Fund for Armenia Relief, this program, premised upon the principle of sustaining the Armenian family structure, aimed to develop a poverty ranking system to assess the socioeconomic situation of households for the purpose of distributing financial assistance.106 Upon introduction, 540,000 households (60 per cent of the families in the republic) applied for the program, and by the middle of 1996, the Paros system was serving 750,000 (85 per cent) families.107 The program continued to serve 230,000 families (27 per cent), with a monthly benefit of about $13.00. The program also included a small electricity allowance, which in 1999 assisted 70,000 families. 108 Another program has been the ―single-family benefit,‖ which began to be implemented in early 1999. Soon after its introduction, 430,000 families submitted applications for eligibility. By November 1999, about 217,545 families across the country were permitted to register for benefits. Under this program each eligible household received 3,500 drams ($7.00) per month, and family members who were not in the workforce (e.g. pensioners unable to work, the handicapped, and children under 16) received 1,300 drams ($2.50) each. 109 Far greater efforts are necessary on the part of the government and the private sector to ameliorate the situation. The government has had to balance social and welfare policies with other sectors of state-building, including the military. Although military expenditures in Armenia have dropped from 4.1 per cent of GDP in 1995 to 2.7 per cent in 2005, the decrease has not resulted in improvements in public social programs. 110 Further, the government‖s macroeconomic programs and structural reforms, including price liberalization, led to severe hyperinflation. Prices rose by more than 13 times between 1991 and 1994. Although by 1996 inflation appeared to have stabilized at 18.5 per cent, prices continued to increase thereafter. 111 A UN report observed in June 1995: The blockade imposed by Azerbaijan has contributed to the difficult conditions resulting in widespread malnutrition, higher mortality rates, low birth weights, homelessness, and increased medical and psychological problems. According to the World Bank, more

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than 90 per cent of the population lives below the international poverty line [of $1 per capita per day]. The minimum monthly wage in Armenia will buy half a pound of butter.112 According to the World Health Organization, the nation‖s mortality rate increased from 5.7 per 1,000 in 1986 to 8.3 in 2007. The population growth rate plummeted from 18.3 to 4.1 per 1,000 for the same years. 113 In a 2003 report, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) commented that the 1991–93 period ―left deep scars in the psychological and historical memory of the part of population that stayed in the country.‖ 114 By the time Ter-Petrosyan resigned in 1998, the expected advantages of market economy and political liberalization had not materialized for a large proportion of the population, as the national economy remained confined within an oligarchic structure and mired in corruption.115 In the meantime, falling budget revenues resulted in severe shortages in public social programs,116 with no adequate safety nets for the poor and unemployed. Inequality and poverty The rapidly deteriorating economic situation caused by a sharp decline in the republic‖s industrial capability, combined with the turbulence and insecurities generated by the fall of the Soviet economy, the war in Nagorno-Karabagh, and the earthquake, led to a profound financial crisis, unemployment, and poverty. Prolonged poverty has deleterious consequences for health. Insufficient income renders basic human needs such as decent housing, heat, water, electricity, and health services inaccessible and limits choices. Poverty contributes to various forms of physical illness and psychological disorder.117 Between 1988 and 1993, the nation‖s industrial output fell by nearly 64 per cent; the gross domestic product (GDP) by almost 50 per cent; and energy production by 60 per cent. As the post-Soviet government introduced economic liberalization, incrementally privatizing various sectors, the industrial sector remained far below full capacity, causing high unemployment rates and gross inequalities in income. The nation‖s real gross domestic product (GDP, ppp) dropped from $4,610 per capita in 1991 to $1,960 per capita in 1997, 118 and, as shown in Table 5.2, it did not surpass the 1991 levels until 2005. The United Nations‖ Human Development Index (HDI) values reflect these minor improvements. Armenia‖s HDI value had dropped from about 0.74 in 1990–91 to 0.70 in 1995, but it recovered to the 1991 level in 2000 and rose to 0.78 in 2005.119 Inequality in general and income inequality in particular has remained quite high; in fact, Armenia has ranked among countries with the highest

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levels of inequality in the world.120 In the late 1990s, the richest 12 per cent of the population in Armenia received 50 per cent of the total national income, while the poorest 55 per cent of the population received no more than 16 per cent.121 By 2005, the highest 10 per cent of the population accounted for more than 41 per cent of all household incomes; the share of the lowest 10 per cent was 1.6 per cent. The middle class constituted no more than 25 per cent of the population. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet system, inequality in Armenia was considerably less severe than it came to be after independence. In Soviet Armenia, the Gini coefficient (a statistical method to measure inequality) for income per capita was 0.27 in the period 1987–90 compared to 0.59 in 1996–99. Such extreme disparities in income may pose a serious threat to the political system, and this figure was the highest among the former Soviet republics, followed by the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan (0.47). As one analyst has observed, income inequality in Armenia ―increased by 136 per cent or more‖ between 1989 and the late 1990s.122 In recent years, the level of income inequality improved (i.e. the gap was narrowed), decreasing from the high levels of 0.59 in the late 1990s to 0.39 in 2008.123 The economic improvement recorded since 2005 has not enabled the government to address the problem of poverty, particularly some of the disparities the urban and rural economies. An IFAD report in 2003 commented that ―poverty in Armenia is geographically widespread, deeprooted, and severe.‖ 124 A study on poverty at the household level in 1993–94, the first of its kind in Armenia, found that at least 28 per cent of the households (urban and rural) were poor, with 31 per cent in cities and 25 per cent in rural areas living in poverty. 125 A 1996 survey by the Ministry of Statistics (currently the National Statistical Service) indicated that 55 per cent of the population considered themselves poor, 28 per cent very poor, and more than 10 per cent extremely poor. 126 In 1999, the first year of the Kocharyan government, 53.7 per cent were poor, of whom 25.4 per cent were very poor. 127 By 2005, the number of people in poverty had dropped to 29.8 per cent, 4.6 per cent being very poor, and the number of poor decreased further to 26.5 per cent and 4.1 per cent respectively in 2006. 128 According to a 2009 report, about 30 per cent of the population continued to live below the poverty line.129 A World Bank report cautioned that the international financial crisis since 2008 could increase the number of people below the poverty line by 172,000 in the 2009‒10 period, to a total of an estimated 906,000 people. About 297,000 people would be classified as extremely poor. As the economic situation worsens, the report warned, the gains recorded in reducing poverty levels during the last several years would be reversed.130 Poverty figures, of course, are a source of controversy. For example,

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in the region of Shirak in Armenia, an extremely poor area, official statistics of the Poverty Reduction Program in May 2008 indicated that about 42.5 per cent of the population lived below the poverty line. In 2005, that figure was 75 per cent, so the authorities boasted that they had reduced poverty by 50 per cent in three years. However, as one reporter has commented, the reality was quite different. ―During this period people have continued to move out of the region with their families in tow. Additionally, work plants and jobs … haven‖t been created [while] the prices of basic goods have skyrocketed. Given these conditions it thus remains a mystery how poverty, of its own accord, is being overcome.‖ 131 Further, notwithstanding the gains made in Shirak, the government concentrated its energies primarily in Erevan, while other regions remained ―in much the same miserable condition as a decade earlier.‖ 132 Despite some of the discrepancies in poverty figures, it is apparent that the economy has witnessed a certain degree of improvement. The severely high levels of inequality experienced under the Ter-Petrosyan government appeared to have been addressed. As noted above, the Gini coefficient prior to his resignation had reached 0.59; a decade later, that figure had declined to 0.39, indicating a certain degree of improvement in the overall economic situation, although this figure does not imply improvements in all aspects of society. Improvements registered since 1999 have enabled a large proportion of those in the category of ―very poor‖ to advance to the level of ―poor.‖ 133 This reduction in extreme poverty is partially attributable to policy changes under the Kocharyan government. In January 1999, the government adopted a family assistance program that provided between 8,000 and 10,000 drams ($20.00) to approximately 200,000 households, reaching nearly 25 per cent of all families registered as poor.134 Thus, only in recent years has the government instituted some financial support for the needy and the unemployed. Unfortunately, neither policy adjustment nor economic growth has proven sufficient to eliminate the underlying causes of poverty. In 1996, the poverty line was 10,527 drams ($24.20) per month (per capita expenditure) for poverty and 6,612 drams ($15.20) for extreme poverty.135 More recent statistical reports define ―poor‖ as a person with 25,188 drams ($81.00) or less to spend per month ($2.70 or less per day), and ―extremely poor,‖ 17,232 drams ($55.00) or less to spend per month ($1.8 or less per day).136 In November 1998, Armenia introduced the policy of a minimum guaranteed income for families below the poverty line, whereby each would receive about 3,000 drams ($7.0) per month in addition to 1,300 ($3.0) drams per person. Despite the symbolic significance of the policy, such income was not sufficient to support a family or a person.137 In 2003, the minimum wage was set at $9.00 (5,000 drams)

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per person ($36.00 or 20,000 drams per family of four) each month; that figure increased to $24.00 (13,000 drams) per person in 2004. In October 2010, Minister of Labor and Social Security Artur Grigoryan announced that the minimum monthly wage had increased by 2,500 drams ($7.00), from 30,000 drams ($83.00) to 32,500 drams ($90.00).138 Guaranteed minimum or employment with low wage levels, however, has been inadequate for basic needs and for a decent standard of living. Employment has not necessarily led to improved standards of living, as about 17 per cent of the employed remained in the category of ―extremely poor‖ in 2009.139 While the economy registered improvements beginning in 2005, salaries remained extremely low, about $25.00 per month, leaving more than 50 per cent of the population below the poverty line.140 Unemployment High unemployment levels have plagued the Armenian economy since independence, remaining the highest among the former Soviet republics. During the first years after independence, economic depression and privatization of industries led to the elimination of 645,000 industrial and related jobs, while the privatization of agricultural land (according to one estimate, more than 80 per cent by 1996) resulted in an increase in employment in the agricultural sector but which degenerated into subsistence economy.141 For years, even a decade after independence, more than 25 per cent of the potential work force of 1.2 million remained unemployed, although official data have generally placed that figure at about 8 or 9 per cent. According to official data, the unemployment rate in 1999 was 10 per cent, but the actual figure may have been at least 30 per cent. 142 Comparable estimates for the years 2001–03 have suggested a figure of between 35 and 45 per cent, even as high as 50 per cent.143 A World Bank study reported in 2010 that despite the overall economic improvements, one-third of the nation‖s labor force were unemployed.144 Structural deficiencies were exacerbated by the nation-wide recession, the economic blockade in place since the Karabagh war, regional geopolitical instability, and global economic stagnation. By 1999, Armenia had made significant progress in its transition to a market economy, as nearly all formerly state-owned agricultural land had been privatized along with medium-sized and small businesses. The pace of economic development began to accelerate in 2000, and per capita GDP (ppp) increased from $2,220 in 1999 to $4,190 in 2004. 145 The government also launched the Poverty Eradication Program in 2006 and introduced a form of unemployment funds, allocating about 1 per cent of its budget to finance unemployment benefits. 146

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The economic liberalization policies pursued by the government since 1991 and the oligarchic system have not permitted the development of effective labor unions to represent the employed and the unemployed. The Law on Employment, adopted in 1992, guarantees the right to form and to join unions as well as the right to strike. These rights were reaffirmed in the Constitution of 2005. Article 28 of the Constitution (Article 25 of the 1995 Constitution) guarantees the freedom of association and the right to form and join unions. Article 28 also provides for restrictions, ―in a manner prescribed by law,‖ on the right to association for employees in the military, national security, police, and prosecutor‖s office, as well as judges (including the Constitutional Court). Article 32 guarantees employees the right to strike ―for the protection of their economic, social and employment interests.‖ It also provides for fair wages as defined by the minimum wage. Further, Article 32 guarantees safe working conditions. The labor unions in Armenia came to operate under the inauspicious international environment of post-Fordist globalized information and telecommunications networks and production. Global market forces of privatization and deregulation predicated on the neoliberal model have led to rising levels of socioeconomic inequality and to a widespread sense of financial insecurity. Although entrepreneurs reap enormous profits from neo-Taylorist functional specialization in small post-Fordist production facilities, that very system marginalizes the role of labor unions in the political process, both as mobilizers of votes and as agents of lobbying. As Karl Polanyi has noted, ―To allow the market mechanism to be the sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of their purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society.‖147 The Council of Europe‖s Social Cohesion Development Division has maintained that ―classic‖ approaches to macroeconomic management and institutional reforms offer no meaningful solutions to the socioeconomic crises in Armenia. According to the Social Cohesion Development Division, Armenia must combat poverty through ―decentralized collaboration‖ among the national ―government, along with local authorities, trade union representatives, entrepreneurs and NGOs.‖148 Armenia is party to the Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize (ILO Convention 87)149 and the Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively (ILO Convention 98).150 The nation‖s Constitution and labor laws, including the 1992 law on employment, guarantee the right to collective bargaining, but the labor unions have been extremely weak and largely inactive. 151 According to the Con-

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federation of Labor Unions, there were 25 labor unions in Armenia, with a total membership of about 290,000. Because of high unemployment and the dismal economy, however, the existing organizations have been extremely ineffective in representing the labor force and as a result have failed to exert any influence. In April 2005, the Employment Service Agency assumed from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs the primary responsibilities for the implementation of workers‖ rights and occupational health and safety standards. These and similar changes in administrative leadership at the ministerial level were expected to strengthen the enforcement of labor laws,152 but no tangible improvements in the implementation of the labor code have appeared thus far. Emigration and brain drain The seemingly insurmountable social and economic problems have led to public loss of confidence in the government. 153 In theory, universal suffrage provides the poor and the marginalized a legal mechanism to express grievances, but in reality, as discussed in the previous chapters, public awareness that the elections are repeatedly fixed diminishes the legitimacy of the process. Manifest inequalities in power and privilege amplify the sense of relative deprivation among those mired in abject poverty and intensify their envy and resentment toward the wealthier classes, particularly as newly constructed houses and residential buildings (e.g. Northern Avenue in Erevan) remain virtually inaccessible to a large majority of the population. Ideologically, the leadership since 1991 has justified systemic inequalities as an inevitable component of laissez-faire capitalism and privatization, stressing individual responsibility for one‖s failure to advance in society. The ideology and principles of laissez-faire market and oligarchic, authoritarian rule have left the Armenian people, long past the euphoria for embracing capitalism experienced in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, with little hope for the future and feel estranged from the system. They compensate for their disengagement from the political process by sporadic involvement in national and local elections, often mobilized by party leaders for immediate political gains.154 Under such conditions of apathy and hopelessness, individuals in poor societies choose to remain loyal to the political system, to mobilize for political participation to reform the system, to rebel against the sys tem, or to leave the system altogether. In the words of Albert Hirschman, as noted in Chapter 1, people may choose ―the voice option‖ or ―the exit option.‖ The former refers to attempts to change the undesirable system. If citizens are confident that articulation of interests will produce positive results, they are likely to participate in the political process. This may take

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the form of the expression of grievances and demands, voting, or outright opposition to the political leadership. In contrast, citizens may choose the exit option in cases where the existing institutional mechanisms do not accommodate expression of values and chronically fail to respond to their minimum satisfaction. The legitimacy of the leadership and institutions is diminished, and citizens withdraw their support. This diminution of political legitimacy, often coupled with severe economic hardship, results in what Hirschman has referred to as ―exit.‖155 Exit encompasses withdrawal from participation in the political process because of alienation and apathy but also, as in the case of Armenia, the physical exit from society (i.e. emigration).156 Indeed, Armenians in large numbers, perhaps as many as 1 million, have emigrated since the early 1990s in hopes of finding better economic opportunities abroad. A survey in 1994 found that 70 per cent of the population would prefer to emigrate before the winter, when conditions were expected to be harsher than during the winter of 1992–93. The winter of 1992–93 witnessed ―the highest level of emigration‖ in the 1990s157 and a considerable increase in the number of deaths among newly born infants and the elderly, as well as in the number of suicides and cases of mental illness. A 1999 survey of natives and refugees found that from 5 to 10 per cent of respondents were determined to leave Armenia within the next year, while 20 per cent indicated that they ―seriously‖ considered emigrating.158 The public outlook regarding social and economic conditions in the country had not improved after a decade. In a 2004 opinion poll, 78 per cent of experts and 65.5 per cent of the public surveyed agreed that the nation‖s youth were unlikely to ―see their future in Armenia.‖159 By 2009, between 15 and 20 per cent (perhaps as high as 25 per cent) of the population had emigrated since independence,160 with nearly 75 per cent of that group departing to Russia, the other former Soviet republics, or the West. 161 Labor migrants have constituted an estimated 30 per cent of emigrants, women accounting for 42 per cent. 162 A Gallup poll published in August 2010 reported that 44 per cent of those surveyed in Armenia would be willing to migrate for temporary employment; 39 per cent would like to study abroad, and 39 per cent would prefer to emigrate permanently. 163 While emigration from Armenia has been relatively easy, immigration into other countries has not, leading many to resort to seeking asylum rather than normal channels of immigration. From 1990 to 1999, a total of 45,810 Armenians sought asylum in 17 European countries; major destinations included Germany (26,270 asylees), the Netherlands (4,590), and Belgium (4,540). The largest increase in asylum seekers was from 1,140 in 1992 to 8,000 in 1993. Subsequently, the numbers increased

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from 4,040 in 1994 to 8,570 in 1999. 164 According to a report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 6,226 Armenian citizens sought asylum in advanced societies in 2009, an increase by 43 per cent from 4,361 in 2008, totaling 10,587 for the two years.165 Emigration in turn led to brain drain, as the mass exodus has included the professional classes (doctors, scientists), resulting in shortages in the very skills necessary to reinvigorate the economy. 166 According to Radik Martirosyan, president of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), the National Academy employed more than 7,000 people in 1990, 60 per cent of whom were scientists. By 2009, that figure had dropped by 50 per cent to about 3,500, although he reportedly has hinted that dismissal from employment may also have contributed to this decline. Martirosyan predicted that the brain drain would continue in the future. 167 According to a 2006 public opinion study by the Caucasus Research Resource Center, 31.2 per cent of those surveyed in Armenia believed their economic condition had worsened in the past three years. No more than 19.5 per cent of those surveyed believed that the economic situation would improve in the next three years. 168 Persistent economic hardship is likely to lead to more negative assessments of the economy, as well as to deeper public hopelessness, frustration, and cynicism – problems exacerbated by the political crises experienced in 2008. Also, a survey by the Armenian Sociological Association in July 2007 indicated that 54 per cent of the 1,200 people randomly interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with the Kocharyan government. About 35 per cent identified high unemployment, the failure to resolve the Karabagh conflict, and corruption as the most pressing problems. ―Rising consumer prices, controversial privatization deals,‖ and a general ―lack of attention to the people‖ were mentioned as other significant government failures.169 From the government‖s perspective, emigration may appear the lesser evil, as the poor and discontented depart rather than mobilize against the regime. As such, emigration serves as a ―safety valve,‖ enabling the authorities to maintain stability without necessarily rectifying the existing conditions by radical reforms. For the country as a whole, however, emigration leads to the loss of significant human and material resources (e.g. brain drain) and to general apathy and hopelessness, further impeding economic development and growth.170 The availability of ―the exit alternative,‖ Hirschman writes, can ―tend to atrophy the development of the art of voice.‖171 Though improved since the miserable years of 1991–94, the existing social and economic conditions in Armenia, like its human rights situation in general, remain deplorable, with serious shortages in housing and basic necessities for daily subsistence, including grain, gas, oil, electricity, and even water supplies. Despite government programs to improve the

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housing situation, which benefited an estimated 16,000 households during the period 2000–06, the demand for housing has not subsided; according to an IMF report in 2008, nearly 43,000 households remained in need of housing, with 26,000 of them homeless.172 Emigration remains an attractive option as many parents fail to support their families financially, which leads to various social problems. Young women and children have been particularly vulnerable as they lack the resources and skills to earn a living. Children in large numbers have become economic orphans, living and begging in the streets. Such conditions certainly are not conducive to the development of civil society and to improvements in human rights practices. Women and human rights Normative postulates concerning women‖s rights in the context of civil society expect that the extent to which the government protects women‖s rights positively correlates with the degree of democratization that its social and political institutions promote. 173 Although the Ter-Petrosyan government and its successors have stressed the important role women play in the family and the community, government policy has failed to improve their social and economic situation. Instead, despite the international human rights conventions, women have remained vulnerable to the extreme consequences of poverty and unemployment, of androcentric traditions and habits of behavior, ranging from receiving lower wages than their male co-workers, domestic violence, and human trafficking and prostitution. Armenia has ratified the ILO Convention on Equal Remuneration (1951), the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1952), and the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women (1957).174 Armenia adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1993 and the Optional Protocol in 2006.175 CEDAW was further buttressed by the Vienna Declaration of 1993, which reconfirmed that ―women‖s human rights are an indivisible and integral part of universal human rights.‖176 Article 5(a) of CEDAW requires that states take necessary steps To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women. The values expressed in such international human rights conventions

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pertaining to women directly clash with the nation‖s traditions and customs. It was noted earlier that traditionally, the ideal Armenian woman married at a young age, represented chastity and submissiveness both at home and in the public sphere, and therefore limited her daily activiities to matters of family welfare.177 Officials regularly refer to women‖s ―natural roles,‖ 178 which traditionally have entailed ―fulfilling‖ household responsibilities as wives, mothers, and daughters-in-law. International human rights conventions such as CEDAW challenge these cultural prescriptions by emphasizing gender equality and just relations at home and in the community. ―The family, justly constituted, would be the real school of the virtues of freedom,‖ commented John Stuart Mill in The Subjection of Women.179 Soviet ideology stressed egalitarian values, and the rapid spread of industrialization enabled women to attain certain political and economic rights associated with modern society. Their social status, however, whether at home or at work, did not experience significant improvements in Armenia because of inherited traditional, patriarchal values and customs. Contrary to the principle of gender equality, women in general received lower wages than their male counterparts, while at home about 75 per cent of family responsibilities fell to women. 180 Since independence, as in most former Soviet bloc countries, many of the accomplishments secured under Communist rule for women in the area of social, economic, and political rights were reversed with the recrudescence of patriarchal, androcentric values and attitudes toward women, along with a determined effort on the part of the emerging elite to articulate a nationalist ideology.181 The collapse of the Soviet economy and the subsequent spread of poverty led to economic dislocation and disruption of normal family life and heightened the vulnerability of women to various pressures to sacrifice their education and to find employment away from their families.182 As in most traditional societies, family honor and shame place enormous pressures on women in terms of personal choices and style. In December 2009, at a conference organized by the Student Council of Erevan State University and the Armenian Apostolic Church Youth Union, Narek Baghdasaryan of the Erevan State Medical University reportedly expressed surprise that the virginity of girls ―is a subject for fetishism in our society.‖ He added: ―Come to our clinics and see how many girls come to restore the hymen.‖183 As noted in Chapter 3, Armenian women have also experienced cultural restrictions in the realm of politics.184 As with the proliferation of institutionally and financially weak political groupings in the post-Soviet space, so did the collapse of the Soviet regime lead to the proliferation of

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weak women‖s organizations. As a result, they have failed to make their voices heard. While the post-Soviet Constitution and the Family Code theoretically guarantee gender equality, in practice they have failed to protect women‖s rights. 185 In 1997, the International Women‖s Rights Action Watch commented in a report that the post-Soviet Armenian government had ―done nothing to overcome the stereotypical understanding of women‖s role and place in society.‖186 Efforts by local organizations to promote women‖s rights are often seen by many as a threat to Armenian traditions and values, while related international conventions are considered foreign conspiracies to undermine Armenian society by weakening the family. 187 Yet, Armenian society is clearly a ―maledominated society,‖ where women at home raise the family and perform the household chores, while in the workplace, ―they are generally not afforded the opportunities for training and advancement given to men.‖188 Women and employment Soviet employment laws prohibited discrimination against women in the workplace and official labor unions provided at least the prerequisite institutional bases for the protection of women‖s rights in employment. The post-Soviet Constitution and labor laws of Armenia also prohibit discriminatory practices in employment. Women legally enjoy equal rights with men in all areas of social, political, and economic activities, including educational and employment opportunities. In practice, however, patriarchal values and norms limit women‖s options and opportunities in employment. To be sure, the government has promulgated certain laws that guarantee equality in economic activities, protection against discrimination, and safe working conditions. Most of the existing laws, however, have been rendered meaningless for reasons mentioned above and as a result of the economic conditions. Article 35 of the Armenian Constitution (2005) prohibits dismissal because of pregnancy and guarantees the ―right to paid maternity leave and parental leave following the birth or adoption of a child.‖ The 1992 Law on Employment prohibits discrimination in the workplace and guarantees ―just wages.‖ The 1992 law also stipulates the right to organization and collective bargaining; however, the decline – if not disappearance – of labor unions in Armenia has rendered women vulnerable to various forms of exploitation. The Law on Individual Entrepreneur, adopted in April 2001, guarantees men and women equal access to and freedoms in market activities,189 and as part of its program to eradicate poverty the government has repeatedly promised financial support for women entrepreneurs in the small business sector. Yet, the

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government has failed to implement such policies in part because of economic difficulties and in part because of lack of political will. 190 While more women receive higher and postgraduate education than men, they are usually offered menial, labor-intensive jobs with few opportunities for professional advancement. Women are regularly subjected to various forms of discrimination and sexual harassment in and outside the workplace. Women in rural areas are particularly vulnerable to severer forms of discrimination and abuses in harsher social and economic conditions, but the government generally has remained indifferent toward them. 191Labor laws in Armenia permit workers to refuse tasks in the workplace that are deemed dangerous to their health and safety. Such legal protections, however, are rarely effective, as women in need of employment rarely challenge their employers. This is particularly true in the informal sectors, where women have been most active but where legal protections are totally neglected. Despite legal guarantees for equality in the workplace, in 2005 women‖s wages were 63 per cent of what men earned in Armenia. 192 The social-political system perpetuates gender-based ―categorical inequalities,‖193 privileging (especially wealthier) men over women, whereby men control the resources necessary for women‖s financial security and professional advancement. In cases where economic deprivation compel husbands to emigrate to Russia and other parts of the world, their wives are forced to be engaged in barter economy and trade to eke out a meager living. Many resort to begging and prostitution to supplement family income, even when the husband is at home. Financial difficulties at home create tensions between husband and wife, and in a society where women generally hold an inferior status they also often become the target of men‖s anger and frustrations.194 Domestic violence Discrimination against and exploitation of women in the areas of employment and politics in Armenia (as discussed in Chapter 3) have their parallels in the domestic sphere as well, domestic violence representing the most extreme form. There has emerged in recent years a general consensus among legal scholars that domestic violence constitutes a violation of international human rights law, and failure on the part of state parties to protect women against such behavior signifies a breach of a number of key international human rights conventions and declarations.195 At the international level, domestic violence gained in public saliency beginning in the 1970s as scholars and NGO activists drew attention to the close relationship between economic development and women‖s rights and

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made efforts to make international human rights law ―gender conscious.‖196 The UN Declaration of International Women‖s Year in 1975 and the UN Decade for Women (1975‒85), in addition to the World Conferences on Women held in Mexico (1975), Copenhagen (1980), Nairobi (1985), and Beijing (1995), placed domestic violence on the international agenda. The declarations adopted at Copenhagen and at subsequent conferences regarding violence against women were further affirmed by Resolution 14 adopted by the UN Economic and Social Council in May 1984 and Resolution 40/36 passed by the UN General Assembly in November 1985.197 The 1989 UN report on Violence against Women in the Family stressed protection against violence ―within the family‖ in the framework of international human rights law.198 Thus, as Bonita Meyersfeld has argued, while the most prominent conventions upholding women‖s rights, CEDAW, does not explicitly address domestic violence,199 several international declarations and conventions, in conjunction with CEDAW, have emphasized the protection of women against violence as an obligation under international human rights law. In 1992, the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in its general recommendations observed that ―Gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women‖s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men,‖ and that discrimination in the form of violence against women also constitutes a violence against human rights.200 Paragraph 9 states that discrimination under the Convention is not restricted to action by or on behalf of Governments. … For example, under article 2(e) the Convention calls on States parties to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise. Under general international law and specific human rights covenants, States may also be responsible for private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence, and for providing compensation. The Optional Protocol to CEDAW granted the DECAW Committee the authority to accept communications ―by or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals‖ concerning violations of CEDAW.201 The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (DEVAW) sought to correct the omission of reference to domestic violence in CEDAW.202 Further, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted at the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in September 1995;203 the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and

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Degrading Treatment or Punishment; and Resolution 45 adopted by the UN Commission on Human Rights in March 1994, which incorporates women‖s rights into the UN human rights regime and women‖s protection against violence 204 – all obligate governments to take measures to protect women against violence. DEVAW and the Beijing Platform for Action affirmed that ―violence against women constitutes a violation of the rights and fundamental freedoms of women and impairs or nullifies their enjoyment of those rights and freedoms.‖205 With respect to government responsibility, Article 4 of DEVAW urges states to ―condemn violence against women‖ and not to ―invoke any custom, tradition or religious consideration to avoid their obligations‖ to eradicate violence against women. DEVAW further encourages states to develop policies and ―all appropriate means‖ to fight against violence against women, including government budgetary allocations for such purposes, as well as educational programs ―to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women and to eliminate prejudices, customary practices and all other practices based on the idea of the inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes and on stereotyped roles for men and women.‖206 Further, UN General Assembly Resolution 58/147 declares violence against women and girls in the private sphere a human rights violation. The resolution underscores ―that domestic violence is one of the most common and least visible forms of violence against women and that its consequences affect many areas of the lives of victims,‖ and ―that domestic violence is of public concern and requires States to take serious action to protect victims and prevent domestic violence.‖207 Accordingly, the resolution strengthens the relationship between international human rights law and state obligations to guarantee prevention and protection against domestic violence.208 Finally, although not directly addressing domestic violence, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees the ―right not to be subjected to torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment‖ (Article 7). In the final analysis, whether one accepts or rejects these conventions and declarations as evidence of international human rights law – in the form of treaty or customary law – and therefore as legal obligations to protect women against domestic violence, the reality remains that, as Amitai Etzioni has argued, ―the normativity of human rights is self-evident.‖209 As such, protection of women against violence, as protection of human rights in general, is a matter of human values and dignity, and government failure to protect women against ―systemic intimate violence‖210 constitutes a breach of international human rights law, norms, and standards. Legal and policy failures on the part of the Armenian government are

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not limited to matters pertaining to the public sphere, as drawing distinctions between the public and domestic spheres is not credibly sustainable under international human rights law. The international human rights conventions and declarations extend protection to public and private rights. As Andrew Clapham has pointed out, ―The public/private distinction can quickly become a weapon utilized in order to deny or claim jurisdiction: the police might refuse to intervene in an incident of domestic violence because it is essentially a “private affair”.‖211 The Armenian government‖s failure to hold the perpetrators of domestic violence responsible for their crime represents a symptom of government complicity. 212 Domestic violence never emerged on the national agenda in postSoviet Armenia as an item of sufficient political valence. In the new environment, transitional justice, 213 which in the Armenian context promised democratization and equitable economic liberalization, was expected to further enhance women‖s status in society. In fact, women‖s participation in civil society did increase through the proliferation of NGOs in the 1990s. While women reportedly constituted 80 per cent of NGO leaders and more than 80 per cent of NGO members,214 they in general remained passive and even resigned to powerlessness at home and in politics confronted with conservative cultural habits and customs.215 Armenian women who participated at the Beijing conference on women in 1995 did provide an opportunity to raise awareness of such issues,216 as demonstrated by the grievances expressed by women NGOs at a conference in Erevan in May 1996. 217 Yet, increased public awareness has not been translated into greater protections for women. The National Assembly has appeared quite willing to ratify international conventions related to women‖s rights, but the authorities thus far have failed to create institutional mechanisms to remedy the situation. Government failure to take preventative and protective measures against domestic violence at best indicates the absence of institutional mechanisms for the development of civil society. 218 Yet, obviously, government failure in this area entails more than the mere absence of a strong civil society. Construed as ―familial terror,‖ domestic violence constitutes, in the words of Celina Romany, ―an egregious form of … an infringement of the core and basic notions of civility and citizenship. Violence assaults life, dignity, and personal integrity.‖219 In Armenian society, as dominated as it is by notions of family honor and social shame, and where one does not ―air dirty laundry in public,‖220 domestic violence, a taboo subject in public discourse, has proven particularly difficult to address and has received little attention from policymakers and the police. The latter fail to investigate spousal abuse, rape, and other violations of women‖s rights. Authorities tend to minimize

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the problem and underreport or disregard abuses; as a result, official statistics are far from reflecting the reality. 221 Police in general discourage women from making complaints against abusive husbands, and abusers are rarely removed from their homes or jailed. ―The overwhelming response of the legal system to domestic violence is to urge women to reconcile with their abusers.‖222 Thomas and Beasley have noted that ―the widespread failure by states to prosecute such violence and to fulfill their international obligations to guarantee women equal protection of the law has gone largely undenounced.‖223 While the problem is widespread, women in the rural regions are particularly vulnerable as they have few economic opportunities for financial independence and even less recourse to protection from physical abuse from their husbands, relatives, and others. The recent case of Zaruhi Petrosyan, who was murdered by her husband Yanis Sarkisov in October 2010, and reportedly had been repeatedly subjected to physical violence by her mother-in-law,224 demonstrates a fundamental cultural problem in Armenian society. Physical violence against women (and children) is common, and Armenian society lacks the necessary support system for rescue and rehabilitation. As Armine Ishkanian has pointed out, government officials and the public severely criticized the international anti-domestic violence campaigns in 2002–04, especially the establishment of shelters and hot-lines, as ―artificially imported and imposed‖ by foreign donor organizations. 225 A study in 2000 found that officials, including those within the legal system, denied in their interviews that such a problem existed or considered it a private matter to be resolved by family members and therefore beyond the reach of the legal system. 226 Another study conducted in 2001 by the Women‖s Rights Center in Erevan revealed that 45 per cent of those surveyed confirmed that they had been victims of psychological abuse, and 25 per cent had been victims of physical violence. 227 According to one study, more than 30 per cent of all murders between 1988 and 1998 occurred within the family; 81 per cent of murders were committed by men, and in 35 per cent of all cases the victims were wives or girlfriends.228 In response to such difficulties, several NGOs in Armenia have been mobilized to improve conditions for women.229 Yet, as a member of an organization supporting a women‖s shelter has commented, there was a general ―lack of interest in the shelter,‖ which reflected ―structural, socioeconomic and cultural factors.‖ Fieldwork research by the Akunk Center for Ethnosociological Studies found that 57.3 per cent of the respondents attributed domestic violence to ―difficult socioeconomic conditions‖ and 25.6 per cent to ―cramped living conditions.‖230

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Human trafficking In addition to issues concerning domestic violence, several international conventions address matters pertaining to human trafficking. Armenia is a party to the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (1949), the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,231 the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,232 and related conventions, including the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 233 Article 6 of CEDAW states that governments ―shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women.‖ As noted earlier, despite the commitments made by Armenia, the lack of political will, on the one hand, and the social and economic conditions, on the other, have impeded the eradication of corruption, extreme poverty, and destitution, which have exercised a particularly deleterious impact on women and children. In the absence of well-paying jobs, women in increasing numbers have resorted to prostitution to support their families. 234 Armenia has no laws prohibiting prostitution, although operating a brothel is illegal. In 2003, the government adopted a new Criminal Code regarding trafficking in persons and, under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, established the Interagency Commission to Address Issues Related to Human Trafficking. The commission, consisting of representatives from law enforcement agencies and a number of ministries, coordinates its activities with NGOs. In the summer of 2003, the commission also prepared a draft National Plan of Action and Concept Paper on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and invited international organizations to comment.235 In 2005, the Prosecutor General and UNDP signed a Memorandum of Understanding to foster cooperation between Armenia and the UNDP project, ―Anti-Trafficking Program: Capacity Building Support and Victims Assistance,‖ with the aim of further strengthening the National Plan of Action. 236 The criminal law adopted in 2003 criminalized human trafficking, which at the time of the adoption of the law was punishable by fines of 6.5 million dram ($12,200), ―correctional labor‖ for two years, or imprisonment for eight years in certain cases. Nevertheless, human trafficking to and from Armenia persists, as the government remains indifferent toward the problem while many officials at different levels of government are themselves engaged in trafficking. In 2002, investigations by the pro-

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secutor‖s office revealed organized criminal activities by a small number of police and airport employees in Erevan who reportedly prepared forged documents for purposes of trafficking to the United Arab Emirates.237 Though the problem persists, several NGOs have become active in this area, and in recent years authorities at different levels have paid closer attention. NGOs have complained that while the authorities had convicted a number of officials and individuals in trafficking, the Kocharyan government had failed to implement the anti-corruption strategy introduced in 2003. Nevertheless, the conviction and sentencing by a local court in 2005 of an Uzbek citizen to five years in prison, along with a handful of similar cases in recent years, may signal a gradual improvement in enforcement of the law and international human rights standards.238 Power and bribery, however, continue to undermine the authority of the law. Armenia has been a destination country for prostitutes trafficked from Ukraine and Uzbekistan.239 According to a study by the International Organization of Migration, in 2001 Armenia was a source for trafficking women and youth (mostly from Erevan, Gyumri, and Vanadzor) to Germany, Greece, Russia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and other parts of the world. While the Armenian government estimated that the number of women and children involved was around 300 for that year, local NGOs and international organizations believe the actual figures were much higher. The local NGO Hope and Help has estimated that between 5,000 and 6,000 prostitutes work in Armenia, about 1,500 of them in Erevan,240 but the subterranean nature of the problem precludes the collection of reliable data. Women trafficked from Armenia are engaged in various jobs. Many Armenian women from Erevan, Vanadzor, and other parts of the country seeking a livelihood in Turkey, for example, are employed in home cleaning services, as home care attendants, and in the commerce sector (especially if they are fluent in Russian), earning, depending on luck and skills, from $200 per month to more than $1,000. The less fortunate are employed in sex trafficking, especially in coastal towns frequented by vacationers, as in Antalya and Trebizond, Turkey. These women and girls generally come from economically vulnerable sectors of society and lack skills and employment opportunities. The absence of adequate social welfare programs compels them to sacrifice their bodies for a loaf of bread, their personal integrity for income. Yet, authorities reportedly often claim that many trafficked women are prostitutes and therefore voluntarily travel to their destination even if without fully comprehending the consequences for their safety.241

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The Kocharyan government encouraged bilateral agreements with countries that have served as destinations for trafficking 242 and allocated more resources to public education programs and training of state personnel to combat human trafficking. Armenia received $133,985 in US economic assistance to combat trafficking in fiscal year 2007. 243 The media, with international financial support, also covered the topic of human trafficking with greater frequency, and cooperation between officials and journalists increased beginning in 2003. The International Organization of Migration and a number of local Armenian NGOs (e.g. Hope and Help) in 2003 assisted a handful of Uzbek victims of trafficking in Armenia to be repatriated to Uzbekistan. To raise public awareness of the problem, the United Nations, along with several organizations (e.g. the Armenian Red Cross) and the government, coordinated a number of activities, such as a showing of the film Lilya 4ever at the Moscow Movie Theater, the American University of Armenia, and in the towns of Gyumri and Noyemberyan. The National Security Service, in cooperation with its foreign counterparts (e.g. in Georgia and the United Arab Emirates) investigated cases of corruption and trafficking. Several highly publicized arrests were made between 2002 and 2007; among the arrested were border guards, police officers, and airport employees. In July 2006, the parliament passed new legislation designed to combat international and internal human trafficking, and as mentioned above, the courts may become more active in this area.244 The profound and long-term implications of the social and economic hardships endured by women, and families in general, are obvious, even if complex.245 In the turbulent context of poverty, prostitution, domestic violence, human trafficking, and rampant corruption, children become the most vulnerable group in a society that is experiencing a form of economic development that is wrought with uncertainties. In the absence of effective social and economic safety nets, they are left with little opportunity and hope for a better life than their parents. In fact, for some children, their very lives appear to be at stake. Children and human rights The extensive literature delineating the preconditions for democracy stresses the necessity of adequate health, nutrition, physical safety, and education for children. Globally, an estimated 200 million children between the ages of 5 and 14 are engaged in some form of labor, 10 million of whom are involved in various illegal industries. Such experiences not only cause physical and mental pain at a young age but may

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also severely harm their health for the rest of their lives. For nations in need of rapid economic development, as in the case of the former Soviet republics, failure to reduce poverty and child labor and to eliminate associated illicit activities often incurs deleterious consequences on society. Notwithstanding the complexities involved in identifying the causes and consequences of exploitation and deprivation, the international community has arrived at a general consensus regarding the necessity of specific policies to protect children against abuse within the family and schools and against hazardous and harmful activities. Children have been especially vulnerable to the economic stagnation experienced since 1991. Efforts to recover from the Soviet legacy and the economic difficulties faced in the transitional phase are undermined by the loss of healthy and educated younger generations whose talents and skills are essential for economic growth and modernization. 246 It was precisely to preserve new generations that the Geneva Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted in 1924 under the auspices of the League of Nations, and since the Second World War the UN General Assembly and its associated agencies (e.g. International Labor Organization) and other multilateral organizations have adopted a number of key international human rights instruments to provide for the legal protection for children against poverty and abuse. These include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959), the ILO Convention on Minimum Wage (Convention No. 138, 1973), the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,247 and the ILO Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor (Convention No. 182, 1999). 248 Most human rights scholars stress the significance of these documents, especially the Convention on the Rights of the Child, as legally binding in accordance with the standards established under international law. 249 Not long after independence, the Armenian government adopted many of the international conventions pertaining to the rights of children. The fundamental problems, however, persist in the area of implementation of the policies and programs promised according to international law. In June 1992, Armenia acceded to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,250 and in recent years the parliament ratified several international conventions, including the CRC Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography and the Optional Protocol on Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (2005),251 the ILO Convention 182 relating to Child Labor (2005), and the Hague Convention on Inter-Country Adoption (2006). Article 32 of the 1999 Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that:

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States Parties recognize the right of the child to be protected from economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child‖s education, or to be harmful to the child‖s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development. The Armenian Constitution (2005) emphasizes the central role of the family in society (Article 35) and its provisions related to children echo international conventions. In May 1996, the National Assembly adopted the Law Concerning the Rights of the Child and since then has adopted or amended a number of domestic laws (eg, the Family Code, the Labor Code, and the Criminal Code) for the protection of children from exploitation, abuse, and trafficking, thereby reaffirming the UN Convention on the Rights of Children and other instruments of international law. The Law Concerning the Rights of the Child enumerates the rights of children, inter alia, to ―appropriate living conditions necessary for its comprehensive physical, mental and spiritual growth‖ (Article 8); protection of health (Article 7) and against violence (Article 9); the right to education (Article 11); and the right to a labor contract at the age of 16 (Article 19).252 A number of articles affirm the state‖s responsibility to provide the necessary support for services and care in case the child‖s immediate family or other relatives lack the resources to fulfill their obligations. Under Article 9, for instance, The state and its corresponding bodies provide protection to the child from any violation, exploitation, inveigling in criminal activities including the use, production or trade of drugs, beggary, prostitution, gambling, and other violations of the Child‖s Rights and legal interests. While the Law Concerning the Rights of the Child seemingly reinforces the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, in actual practice, the government has failed to address the problems identified in Article 9, along with a range of issues, particularly in the areas of education, child labor, and health standards. Children constitute about 26.5 per cent of the population in Armenia, and according to 2008 data, 26 per cent of them were classified as poor, 3 per cent of whom living in extreme poverty.253 While the overall figures for 2008 appeared to represent a marked improvement since the early 2000s, when 38 per cent of children were in poverty, the problems of a poor education system, child labor, physical abuse, and inadequate health services persist, among other social ills associated with poverty.254 That children remain

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highly vulnerable to poverty in the absence of sufficient government support was demonstrated by the impact of the global financial crisis. In 2009, according to UNICEF/Armenia, 38.1 per cent of children were ―poor‖ and 4.5 per cent ―extremely poor,‖ an increase in the child poverty rate to the level in the early 2000s. In Shirak marz, 50 per cent of children were poor, while in Lori marz 9 per cent were extremely poor, the highest level in the country.255 Children and education Armenians are said to place a premium on education, and Article 39 of the Constitution guarantees the right to education and mandates free secondary education to children in state schools. Although children‖s education is legally free, parents are expected to pay school personnel in order to have their children admitted to classes and earn passing grades. Since independence, many children could not attend school because their parents could not afford adequate clothing for them. In many cases, particularly in the rural areas, families needed their children‖s help to work on the land. Economic difficulties so strained family incomes that some parents could not – and cannot to this day – afford to purchase school supplies and the required textbooks. 256 Further, most families in Armenia cannot afford to send their children to universities. Matriculation at institutions of higher learning is highly competitive and very expensive. Given the fact that upper grade students generally lack sufficient preparation for university entrance, parents who can afford it hire private tutors, which may require studies of about 30–35 hours per week costing from 200,000 dram ($550) to as much as 500,000 dram ($1,380) annually. 257 More than a decade after independence, the educational system at all levels had remained in a state of crisis. Teachers and university professors continued to offer private tutoring to subsidize their low salaries and took bribes in exchange for awarding passing grades. 258 In an attempt to improve processes and practices in educational institutions and to eliminate corrupt practices, the Bologna Process, signed in 1999 at the University of Bologna and to which Armenia became a signatory in 2005, sought to develop international standards in the area of higher education in Europe.259 In 2004, Armenia became a signatory of the Lisbon Convention concerning international recognition of educational qualifications.260 The Bologna Declaration and the Lisbon Convention sought to develop a system of internationally comparable evaluation of educational qualification to facilitate processing, transfer, and integration. The Armenian government in 2005 created the National

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Information Center for Academic Recognition and Mobility (NICARM) to encourage the country‖s integration into the European as well as global educational and employment services and markets. 261 The government also increased its budgetary allocation for education in the fiscal year of 2005–06, particularly to increase teachers‖ salaries. 262 Most educational institutions lack the basic tools for instruction and operate in poor condition, with meager resources for teachers and maintenance. Although in the years of deepest economic depression, from 1991 to 1995, the Ter-Petrosyan government introduced measures to protect larger families (four children or more) from the crisis, it lacked resources to improve the deplorable conditions for the poorest children and families.263 For example, Dudwick writes, ―the school in Khoznavar had lost most of the glass from its windows (now covered with plastic) and part of a wall. Schools were cold and barren, without equipment or decoration; electricity and water functioned sporadically.‖264 Hundreds of schools were destroyed in the earthquake zone.265 Education serves more than the utilitarian function of transmission of knowledge and preparation for a career. Educational institutions function, along with the family, as one of the principal agents of political socialization and as vehicles for elite recruitment. 266 However, in postSoviet countries such as Armenia, they also represent one of the principal mechanisms for developing the cultural foundations for democratization. This is particularly important considering the conservative role of the family as the fulcrum of Armenian traditional values and considering the structural ascriptive inequalities imposed on the individual, especially on women. In a society where the political culture lacks democratic traditions, improvement in human rights practices both by the government and citizenry alike necessitates a liberal educational system with more universalist perspectives than was possible under the Soviet regime. As Murray Hunt has commented in the context of human rights education in Britain, ―the individual is more than the mere bearer of negative rights against the state but [is] a participative individual taking an active part in the political realm and accepting the responsibility to respect the rights of others in the community.‖267 Lesley McEvoy and Laura Lundy add that ―if individuals are to “buy into” such a [democratic] culture there is clearly a need for an additional element in the construction of a human rights culture: education. Educational approaches in this context must go beyond merely informing individuals about their rights to persuading individuals and society in general of the intrinsic value of human rights per se.‖268 Student drop outs and absenteeism have become serious problems in Armenia. A 2003 study reported that 84.3 per cent of pupils were able to

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complete their schooling through the age of 14, but 36.7 per cent continued through the age of 16. Schools in the rural regions were extremely poor, where daily survival remained a primary concern for most families. Families in poverty tend to deny that their children work to earn a living, but interviews with school principals indicated that, in the late 1990s between 15 and 50 per cent of children worked while attending school.269 A report in 2004 confirmed what has been common knowledge – namely, that the ―culture of corruption‖ persists from elementary schools to universities, and that in the process wealthier students survive its tenacious hold on institutions of learning, while the poor drop out. 270 Child labor and abuses Systemic shortcomings in education from early childhood, on the one hand, and limited governmental support for urgently needed health and welfare programs for children, on the other, have in the long run contributed to high levels of unemployment, child poverty, and widespread criminal activities as youth grow dependent on illegal means to support themselves and family members. 271 As a measure to protect children, the Armenian parliament in May 1996 passed the Law on the Rights of the Child in accordance with the UN Convention. More recently, it also adopted the Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor. 272 In December 2008, the National Assembly held its ―first ever parliamentary hearings on child protection.‖ At the hearings, Hovik Abrahamyan, Chair of the National Assembly, stressed the significance of protecting children‖s rights for a better society as well as for national security. For her turn, Laylee Moshiri-Gilani, UNICEF representative in Erevan, emphasized the role the National Assembly can play to ―challenge attitudes and beliefs that treat violence against children as inevitable and harmless.‖ While improvements were noted (e.g. child mortality rate, school enrollment, introduction of laws concerning children), several ―systemic gaps‖ were also pointed out, including the lack of political will in general, the lack of institutional mechanisms for the effective implementation and monitoring of existing laws, and inadequate budgetary allocations for related programs. 273 Article 32 of the Armenian Constitution (2005) provides that children below the age of 16 cannot be employed full time. The article also prohibits compulsory employment. Yet, the challenges confronted by children and families in poverty persist. A local NGO estimated in 2002 that there were about 900 homeless children in Armenia. The Ministry of Social Welfare reported in 2003 that 130 children remained home-

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less in Erevan.274 According to the NGO Orran (Haven): There are more than 14,000 children who do not attend school in the Republic of Armenia because their families are unable to meet the basic costs of their education. Social vulnerability and economic deprivation in families have also contributed to an increase in the number of unaccompanied children and children living and working on the streets. Some of these children have resorted to begging, others to selling flowers, and some to simply picking food out of the garbage. This problem is becoming more serious every year.275 The human rights problem of ―street children‖ is a result of a combination of factors, most prominently the country‖s acute economic difficulties, the government‖s unwillingness to expend resources for the marginalized, and the inability of the limited number of existing orphanages to accommodate them.276 Street children are considered ―among the most vulnerable groups for trafficking.‖277 Significantly, Armenia has yet to sign the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse.278 According to Article 19 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, states are obligated to protect children from all forms of violence and to provide support to them. In January 2000, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child evaluated the measures taken by the Armenian government to enforce the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The committee commended the government for its adoption of the Convention as well as other international human rights commitments. It praised the government for the creation of the Human Rights Commission and the Gender Commission and for its efforts to establish an office of the human rights ombudsman. On the negative side, the committee found the authorities lacking in adequate awareness of the poor treatment and various physical and mental abuses suffered by children both at home and in school. The report stated: Notwithstanding protection under the Rights of the Child Act, the Committee expresses its concern at the ill-treatment of children, including sexual abuse, not only in schools and institutions, but also within the family. Limited access to complaints mechanisms and the insufficiency of rehabilitation measures for such children are also matters of concern to the Committee.279 The committee stressed the need to monitor inadequate living situations, to respond to complaints, and to ameliorate injurious conditions. It also

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urged the Armenian government and NGOs to work toward the development of civil society for the benefit of children and community at large. Children and health Article 38 of the Constitution guarantees basic healthcare services to all citizens. Free health services for children through age 8 are available but usually they are of poor quality due to insufficient government funds allocated to programs for children of early age.280 Generally, Armenia‖s medical services have deteriorated since 1991, and substandard medical facilities and services fail to provide much needed healthcare for children and families. Wealthier families and wealthier regions enjoy greater access to decent medical facilities and services and therefore access to superior medical care. The level of infant mortality rate is a case in point. In a recent study, Mihran Hakobyan and Levon Yepiskoposyan found that poorer regions of the country (e.g. Shirak) have been particularly vulnerable to high infant mortality rates. While the nation‖s overall infant mortality rate dropped by 24 per cent from 1992 through 2006, that decline was reversed, from 11.6 per 1,000 live births in 2004 to 13.9 in 2006. Also, they note, the decline in the 1992‒2006 period was in post-neonatal (from 28th day of life through the 365th day) infant mortality rate; however, neonatal mortality rate (the first 27 days of life) increased. The overall infant mortality rate in ―the lowest wealth quintile (41 per 1,000 live births)‖ was ―about three times higher than the rate in the highest (14 per 1,000 live births).‖ The neonatal mortality rate was 24 per 1,000 live births among poorer families and 14 per 1,000 live births among wealthier families. They add: ―Not a single case of post-neonatal death was registered in the highest wealth quintile, whereas in the lowest there were 17 cases per 1,000 live births.‖281 A country‖s infant mortality rate represents a comprehensive indication of its level of economic development. The rise in the neonatal mortality rate has been correlated in part with inequalities in wealth and education, coupled by the shortcoming in the Armenian health system. Hakobyan and Yepiskoposyan discovered an inverse correlation between mortality rates of newly born children and their mothers‖ level of education. The infant mortality rate among mothers with low levels of education was 43 per 1,000 live births, twice the number among mothers with university education (22 per 1,000 live births). The infant mortality rate in the post-neonatal category was 14 times higher among mothers with low education levels than those with university education (i.e. 20 and 2 per 1,000 live births, respectively). 282 Children with disabilities represent a more serious challenge not only

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because of insufficient state funding but also because of the cultural stigma attached to disabled persons, stereotypically, as socially inferior. According to UNICEF, 50 per cent of children with disabilities live in poverty and 17 per cent in extreme poverty, a significantly higher rate than other categories of children. 283 On September 22, 2010, the National Assembly ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.284 The Convention acknowledges that ―women and girls with disabilities are often at greater risk, both within and outside the home, of violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation.‖ The Convention stresses that ―children with disabilities should have full enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis with other children.‖285 Article 7 of the Convention obligates states to ―take all necessary measures to ensure the full enjoyment by children with disabilities of all human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis with other children.‖ Also, Article 8 requires that states ―combat stereotypes, prejudices and harmful practices relating to persons with disabilities, including those based on sex and age, in all areas of life.‖286 It remains to be seen whether the government can demonstrate the political will to implement this policy, although policy alone cannot serve as an antidote to such problems as children with disabilities, domestic violence, and human trafficking, given the cultural stereotypes. As discussed above, however, both the nation‖s Constitution and international human rights law place certain obligations on the Armenian government to institute policies and programs to meet basic human needs, to alleviate poverty, to ameliorate social and economic conditions, and to create a legal environment conducive to national but also individual social, economic, and cultural development. Human rights and happiness Aristotle‖s eudaimonia and Maslow‖s hierarchy of needs crowned by selfactualization and fulfillment of one‖s potential (see Chapter 1) require individual initiative but also a legal, institutional, and economic environment favorable to the well-being of the citizenry. The realization of social, economic, and cultural rights, respect for the integrity of the person, and the enjoyment of civil liberties and freedoms constitute foundational human values and the fundamental bases for democratic legitimacy. A growing body of literature on human rights has paid close attention to the relationship between human rights and individual and national happiness.287 Philosophers and activists, underscoring the utilitarian principle of maximization of happiness, have assigned a great responsibility to

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governments to institute laws and policies that promote conditions for happiness.288 In The Rights of Man, Thomas Paine asserted that ―whatever the form or Constitution of Government may be, it ought to have no other object than the general happiness.‖289 Scholarly research on the subject has focused on the concept of ―subjective well-being‖ (SWB), encompassing ―moods or feelings of joy,‖ satisfaction regarding one‖s position in life and society and relations with family and friends, participation in community affairs, employment, personal wealth, personal achievements, and the ―absence of depression, anxiety, and insecurity.‖290 Empirical research on the happiness of nations has demonstrated a positive correlation between economic deelopment and happiness. 291 Ronald Inglehart maintains that ―the transition from a society of scarcity to a society of security brings a dramatic increase in subjective well-being. But we find a threshold at which economic growth no longer seems to increase subjective well-being significantly.‖ At that point, Inglehart argues, survival needs are met and physical, existential security no longer presents a quotidian preoccupation.292 Instead, people emphasize improvements in quality of life and ―self-expression values‖ (e.g. cultural and intellectual development). An essential contributive factor to happiness is the ability to ―maximize free choice‖ and ―control over one‖s life.‖293 Concerning national level happiness in advanced industrial societies, Inglehart found that ―high levels of SWB are conducive to democracy, and democracy provides a wider range of free choice, which is conducive to SWB.‖294 Using data from the World Values Survey and European Values Study from 1981 to 2007, Inglehart and his associates confirmed the hypothesis that economic development is positively correlated with rising levels of SWB. Further, ―religion, tolerance of outgroups, and a society‖s level of democracy represent strong predictors of subsequent levels of SWB.‖ Their analysis yields, for the purposes of this study, a number of significant findings. Advanced industrial societies with higher incomes have attained considerably higher levels of happiness than poorer societies. Denmark is ranked as one of the highest (9–10 on a scale of 10 points) where 52 per cent of the people agreed that they were ―highly satisfied with their lives‖ and 45 per cent were ―very happy.‖ In sharp contrast, only 5 per cent in Armenia indicated that they were ―highly satisfied with their lives‖ and 6 per cent were ―very happy.‖295 A similar finding was reported by Angus Deaton using a Gallup World Poll. Deaton‖s analysis confirms that levels of life satisfaction are higher in wealthier societies scoring between 7.5 and 8.5 on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 represents ―the worst possible life‖ and 10 ―the best possible life.‖ Armenia is among the bottom 20 countries according to the level of life

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satisfaction, along with sub-Saharan African countries. Armenia is also among those countries with the lowest levels of health satisfaction. 296 Inglehart and Deaton agree that changes in societal expectations and economic conditions tend to exert a greater influence on satisfaction with life and happiness than general income levels. According to Deaton, ―it is changes in the expectation of life that seem to have an effect, no matter whether life expectancy is high or low.‖ Deaton notes that the extremely low levels of health satisfaction in the post-Soviet states reflect not so much the poor health of individuals as the ―decline in health among a population that was used to a better state of affairs.‖297 Inglehart and his associates explain the general dissatisfaction in the former Soviet republics as the result of the disintegration of their ―political, economic, and belief systems‖ and the result of a profound disillusionment in the face of the disintegration of national pride, myths, and self-perceptions. The collapse of the Soviet Union was a traumatic experience, although in the first year or so after independence the euphoria of national liberation concealed the malevolent aspects of that trauma. For Armenia, a host of political and economic crises contributed to the post-independence traumatic experience. Armenians had resented Soviet rule and welcomed independence. They expected independence to lead to democratization, and they aspired to emulate the standards of living found in Paris, Geneva, London, and Los Angeles. In sharp contrast to their expectations and aspirations, they found themselves slipping into economic depression and cultural stagnation and ruled by an authoritarian state. Summary There are obvious ramifications for human rights in societies where corruption in its various manifestations remains an obstacle to the development of civil society. The lack of democratic traditions and democratically oriented political culture and institutions impedes the effective implementation of international human rights standards and therefore hinders the emergence of a viable democratic system in Armenia. The assassinations in the National Assembly in October 1999 may be seen as symptomatic of the systemic restrictions on participatory politics and of the inability of functionally negligent policymaking institutions to rectify procedural deficiencies with dire consequences for substantive democracy and society.298 Vazgen Manukyan, who served as the first prime minister of post-Soviet Armenia, wrote in 1990: It is necessary to realize that only economic development makes

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social justice possible. ... We must create the conditions necessary so that people can get rich, and get rich by establishing work places for honest labor and private commercial and industrial concerns, and not by pillaging. It is the responsibility of the state to ensure that the poor are not too poor, that they have the means to have a decent life, and to ensure that the rich do not use their wealth to establish monopoly of power.299 Since 1991, the economic and political elites have erected a system of ―monopoly of power,‖ buttressed by traditional values and customs in Armenian political culture. The economic difficulties have persisted, as have acute economic disparities between the wealthier and poorer classes, between men and women, between Erevan and other cities and rural regions. The government‖s failure to combat poverty, domestic violence, and human trafficking constitutes a breach of a host of international human rights standards, most emphatically those established under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the Declaration on the Right to Development; the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor. As the UN Development Program has aptly observed: The state has the primary responsibility for ensuring that growth is pro-poor, pro-rights and sustainable – by implementing appropriate policies and ensuring that human rights commitments and goals are incorporated as objectives in economic policymaking. There is a need for open and transparent public debate – in politics, in the media – that presses for accountability in public policy decisions. 300 There is a general consensus that the rise in Armenia‖s GDP since 2004 indicates a significant improvement. While poverty figures have decreased compared to the levels of the 1990s, they remain too high to enhance the standard of living for a large segement of the population. Rapid economic growth tends to occur in less developed societies in their early stages of development.301 It remains to be seen whether in the case of Armenia such aggregate growth can be translated into overall improvements in the nation‖s standard of living, and whether such growth encourages democratization and an improved human rights environment.

6 The Rights of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

Upon independence from the Soviet Union, Armenia inherited the territorial boundaries drawn immediately after Sovietization. The consolidation of Soviet power in the 1920s institutionalized territorial nationality but also arrested inter-republic hostilities.1 Beginning in 1988, Armenians in Nagorno-Karabagh, the predominantly Armenian enclave within former Soviet Azerbaijan, pressed for independence or reunification with Armenia. The military conflict resulted in considerable human suffering and loss of life until a cease-fire took effect in 1994. The war, particularly in the early transitional phase from Soviet rule, could hardly create a favorable political environment for the protection and promotion of the human rights of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The magnitude of the economic and political difficulties involved in addressing the conditions of refugees and IDPs, combined with government indifference, eventually raised concerns regarding their social and economic well-being. On the one hand, the government of President Levon Ter-Petrosyan had become a signatory to international human rights and refugee conventions; on the other hand, his government preferred to rely on international assistance rather than shoulder the burden of accommodating refugee demands through the state budget. The policy vacuum created by such failure on the part of policymakers necessitated greater international engagement. Not until President Robert Kocharyan assumed power in 1998 did the government commence the task of addressing the refugee and IDP crises. This chapter examines the extent to which the Armenian government has fulfilled its obligations under international human rights and refugee law. Regardless of the causes that generated the crises, the government of Armenia has assumed legal obligations to comply with international human rights law. The war in Karabagh exacerbated the social and economic hardships caused by the underdeveloped nature of Armenia‖s

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economy, with enormous ramifications for human rights, as discussed in the preceding chapters.2 The presence of refugees and IDPs generally indicates systemic failure of sorts, whether as a result of internal political upheavals, international wars, natural catastrophes, or man-made disasters. Refugees often leave behind their homes and communities, their finances, careers, ―dignity and standing in society.‖3 In their resettled locations, particularly in the event of a prolonged stay, they routinely become vulnerable to human rights violations and therefore require protection for their physical security, civil liberties, and political rights, as well as various forms of assistance, including housing, healthcare, education, employment, and if possible the safe return to their communities of origin. The host government is legally and morally obligated to render such assistance to refugees and IDPs, as it is responsible for the safety and wellbeing of its citizens in general. Ethnic conflicts in many parts of the world suggest that governments, while insisting on national sovereignty, have failed to establish effective mechanisms for conflict resolution in domestic and international institutional arrangements. In fact, in many cases the formation of state itself has generated refugees. 4 One study has identified 57 ―serious and emerging ethnopolitical conflicts‖ in the 1990s.5 A number of observers have expressed concern that the current nature of the state system, predicated on the ―logic of Westphalia,‖ is ill-equipped to deal peacefully with such conflicts. Rodolfo Stavenhagen, for example, has argued that the logic of the nation-state system and the demands for national unity have had destructive consequences for ethnic and indigenous peoples. In the 1950s and 1960s, in Africa, for example, post-independence governments were primarily concerned with state-building within the administrative and territorial units they inherited from colonial rule; and in the process, they failed to create institutions reflective of their internal multicultural compositions. As a result, post-colonial multiethnic societies experienced violent rivalries, as in Rwanda, Somalia, and Nigeria. 6 The international system and its legal foundations perpetuate statist structures and biases. The current standard-setting international legal instruments related to the rights of ethnic minorities, indigenous and tribal peoples have hardly attempted to address the legal issues surrounding their collective rights. To counter the challenges posed by the principle of sovereignty and government indifference in this area, Roberta Cohen and Francis Deng have advocated that the concept of sovereignty be construed as state responsibility. A state can enjoy the powers and prerogatives of sovereignty if it complies with international law by the effective implementation of its responsibilities ―to provide protection and

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life-supporting assistance to its citizens. Failure to do so would cause it to forfeit traditional rights of sovereignty and legitimize the involvement of the international community.‖7 A number of international mechanisms provide for greater engagement by the international community in matters pertaining to refugees and IDPs: the UN Charter as well as the associated instruments for international human rights protection, as discussed in the preceding chapters; the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and its 1967 Protocol; and the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,8 among others. In recent years, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998) have also assumed significant authority regarding international involvement for the protection of IDPs. As noted in the previous chapters, most of these conventions establish specific restrictions, enshrined in derogation clauses, which permit governments to suspend their application (e.g. in time of war and domestic emergency).9 However, regardless of circumstance such derogation is not permissible with respect to the rights to the protection of life and physical security, protection from torture or degrading treatment, and protection from slavery.10 The international community has accepted the promotion and protection of refugee rights as a legitimate objective. Yet the universalization of human rights values notwithstanding, the United Nations failed to provide for specific protection of refugees‖ collective rights. Despite the fact that the UN Charter was created during the Second World War, the document nevertheless did not recognize refugees as legitimate beneficiaries of international legal standards. Specific international instruments – for example, the Hague Regulations (1907), the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 (Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War), and the Additional Protocols (I and II, 1977) – provide for the protection of civilians and the enforcement of rules of conduct in times of war. While these documents possess the authority of general rules and customary international law and are therefore binding on states, their principal object is the protection of noncombatant civilians in armed conflicts, and as such they do not directly apply to circumstances of internal political upheaval, natural or manmade disaster, and other humanitarian crises that generate refugees and IDPs. The emergence of the international refugee protection regime 11 Historically speaking, Armenians have experienced numerous phases of

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forced and voluntary migration, and their experience is considered one of the paradigmatic cases, along with those of Greeks and Jews, in the emergence of diasporan communities. 12 As in other areas of human rights, centuries of foreign rule prevented Armenia from developing permanent financial and legal infrastructures to assist migrants and refugees. The Armenian Apostolic Church played some role in this aspect, but it relied on ad hoc measures. In response to the massacres in 1894– 96 and particularly in the aftermath of the Genocide during the First World War, Armenian communities in the diaspora and the first Republic of Armenia organized special programs for refugees with assistance from the international community. In the process, the Armenian experience in the early part of the twentieth century contributed to the development of the international refugee regimes. The Armenian dispersion as a result of the Genocide coincided with the fundamental transformations taking place in international refugee law. Prior to the refugee crises generated by the First World War, responses to refugee problems were limited to philanthropic organizations with the infrequent support of governments. In 1921, the League of Nations developed an international law of refugees and created the High Commissioner for Refugees (headed by Fridtjof Nansen, the Norwegian scholar and statesman who created the Nansen Passport in 192213) in response to the exodus of about 1 million refugees fleeing Bolshevik rule in Russia between 1917 and 1922 and the forced removal of nearly the entire Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire. These refugee movements were followed by the forced population exchange between Turkey and Greece in 1923. 14 The abject conditions in which refugees found themselves were exacerbated by the initial unwillingness on the part of governments, especially in Europe, to accept refugees.15 Aid for refugees required sustainable solutions rather than charities, and Nansen proposed that the International Labor Organization (ILO), best equipped to render the necessary assistance, to establish programs for refugee employment and training. The ILO accepted the responsibility of assisting Russian and Armenian refugees as a ―temporary task to be terminated as soon as possible.‖16 The political influence and moral legitimacy of the League of Nations declined as it failed to resolve international military conflicts, particularly in Manchuria and Ethiopia. Nevertheless, a number of conventions signed under its auspices laid the foundations for the development of international refugee law. In the inter-war period, these included, for instance, the Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees (June 28, 1933) and the Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany (February 10, 1938). The High Com-

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mission for Refugees Coming from Germany and the Nansen Office were dissolved in December 1938 and replaced by the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees under the Protection of the League, which was headquartered in London. The economic crises suffered during the Great Depression in the 1930s had deleterious consequences for international migration in terms of both the pressures for migration generated by unemployment and the restrictive immigration policies introduced by governments as part of their overall protectionist measures.17 Since the Second World War, which caused the displacement of nearly 30 million people, 18 a substantial body of legally binding international conventions and declarations has developed under the UN system; this corpus imposes on states the obligation to protect refugees within their juridical sovereignty.19 Intensifying tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union and the advent of the Cold War shaped the authority and functions of the emerging international refugee regime even before the conclusion of the Second World War. Created by the Allied Powers, the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA), operated from late 1943 through 1947 and was succeeded by the International Refugee Organization (IRO), which was created in 1948 and dissolved in 1952. 20 On December 14, 1950, the UN General Assembly adopted, through Resolution 428(V), the Statute of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees. The United States, the principal provider of financial support for UNRRA, the IRO, and the High Commissioner for Refugees, demanded ideological alliance against Communism as a condition for economic aid. The Soviet bloc vehemently opposed US attempts to control international cooperation regarding refugees and refused to participate in subsequent international deliberations leading to the key document pertaining to refugees: the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed in Geneva in 1951.21 Despite the enormous challenges in the early years, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) began to assume greater responsibilities as a result of decolonization in Africa and Asia, which substantially augmented UN membership from the developing world. UNHCR came under growing criticism from different quarters. The emerging nations claimed that UNHCR represented a global system dominated by the West. Governments from advanced societies criticized UNHCR as too burdensome and detracting from national priorities. Nevertheless, by the time the Cold War ended, UNHCR had evolved into a ―prominent international organization with a global focus.‖22 Its annual budget for 2010 totaled $3 billion, compared to $300,000 in 1950. In 2010, it operated in 110 countries, with about 6,600 staff working across the world in international, regional, and local offices. Whereas in

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1951 it was faced with the task of assisting 1 million refugees, in early 2009 that figure had reached 10.5 million refugees as well as 26 million IDPs.23 In less than two decades since 1951, key standard-setting instruments of international human rights had been established, which instituted various obligations within the framework of political, civil, social, economic, and cultural rights. This expansive conceptualization of refugee rights reflected evolving understanding of the causes and consequences of their plight. Whereas in the early part of the twentieth century refugees were viewed exclusively as victims of military conflicts, by the early 1990s it was evident that ―non-military‖ causes – including political, social, economic, and ecological crises – also threatened domestic and international peace and security. 24 By the early years of the twenty-first century, the combination of conventions and resolutions by international bodies – the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Statute of UNHCR, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights – had established sufficient legal bases to obligate governments to devise and implement policies for the protection of refugees and IDPs. These documents as well as numerous other resolutions and conventions by international bodies have already become a part of international customary law and, as such, are legally binding on all states, 25 imposing non-derogable obligations to observe international standards. 26 In this context, the UN Charter provides general protections for human rights, as under Articles 55–56, wherein member states pledge to support the United Nations in promoting higher standards of living; ―solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems‖; and respect for fundamental human rights. Under its Statute adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1950 and under the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961), UNHCR is mandated to provide assistance to refugees rendered stateless and to secure their protection. UNHCR thus assumes the primary responsibility for organizing international assistance and protection for refugees worldwide and to serve, where possible, as a mechanism to ―facilitate the voluntary repatriation of such refugees, or their assimilation within new national communities.‖27 UNHCR identifies three possible ―durable solutions‖: voluntary repatriation to a refugee‖s country of origin; local integration in the host country of first refuge; or resettlement to a third country if it is impossible to return home or to remain in the host

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country.28 The third solution is the least employed; according to UNHCR, of the 10.5 million refugees, no more than 1 per cent have been resettled to a third country. It is the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol that constitute the primary instruments of international refugee law. The Preamble of the 1951 Convention expresses the aspiration to ensure the protection of the ―fundamental rights and freedoms‖ of refugees, urges international cooperation concerning matters of asylum, and encourages states to address the plight of refugees within their jurisdiction so as to avoid conflicts. After delineating, in Article 1, the definitional and legal parameters pertaining to the term ―refugees,‖ the Convention identifies the responsibilities of refugees (Article 2), their juridical status (Chapter II) and rights concerning employment (Chapter III), welfare (Chapter IV), and freedom of movement (Article 26). The Convention also obligates state parties to cooperate with UN agencies (Chapter VI). 29 The Refugee Convention places a premium on the principle of nonrefoulement (Article 33), a principle of international customary law that was first introduced in the Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees in 193330 and has acquired the status of jus cogens.31 Under Article 33, states are prohibited from compelling refugees within their jurisdiction to return to their country of origin if they might be subjected to physical harm or other forms of human rights violations. Signatory and non-signatory states alike assume legal and moral obligations concerning non-refoulement, as predicated upon non-derogable international refugee and human rights law. 32 Regional instruments also contributed to the development of international refugee law – e.g. the Refugee Convention (1969) of the Organization of African Unity (OAU; African Union since 2002), and the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (1984) within the Organization of American States.33 In June 2010, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a regional grouping of former Soviet states, reached an outline agreement on measures to take as a response to the refugee crisis in Kyrgyzstan, 34 a preliminary step that may potentially lead to a regional refugee organization. These instruments also sought to guarantee protections specifically to refugees who, fleeing mass violence and human rights violations, could not ―generate documented evidence of individual persecution as required by the 1951 Convention.‖35 A fundamental deficiency inherent in the 1951 Convention was the stipulation, stated in the General Provisions (Chapter I), that its application be limited to ―events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951‖ (Article 1, §A, para. 2). This Eurocentric conceptualization of refugees and refugee rights was challenged in the 1950s and 1960s as it

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ignored the vast number of refugees and internally displaced persons in other parts of the world. The United Nations initially established its ―good offices‖ in response to refugee problems in the developing world, but this mechanism served primarily as an advisory body whose monitoring and declarations lacked the force of law. 36 In order to rectify the principal shortcoming in the 1951 Convention, several governments in 1967 signed the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which confirmed the universal authority vested in the Statute of UNHCR and the universal applicability of the 1951 Convention. Since the 1990s, increasing attention has been paid to incongruities with respect to definitions and legal enforceability as emanating from the distinction made between refugees and IDPs. The 1951 Convention and its Protocol of 1967 impose legal obligations on states to adhere to specific humanitarian standards and grant the UN High Commissioner for Refugees the legal and moral authority to intercede in order to provide refugees the assistance necessary for the protection of their rights. The 1951 Convention, however, does not offer similar protections to IDPs. 37 To remedy the legal and institutional limitations in the international refugee regime, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were developed under the auspices of the United Nations, which aimed at establishing international norms and standards for the protection of IDPs as distinct from those for refugees. Francis Deng, a prominent international statesman and intellectual from Sudan, served as the first Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons from 1992 to 2004 and in that capacity was one of the principal architects of the Guiding Principles. 38 Although as of this writing the Guiding Principles are not legally binding, they nevertheless, in the words of the current Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Walter Kälin, have ―gained considerable authority.‖39 Similar to the instruments of international refugee law, the Guiding Principles, 40 submitted to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1998, are also derived from international human rights and humanitarian laws and seek to establish a ―normative framework‖ and international standards to guide UN agencies, governments, multilateral organizations, and NGOs engaged in matters pertaining to the protection and aid of internally displaced persons. 41 The Guiding Principles are perceived as directly challenging the principle of national sovereignty. Unlike the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the Guiding Principles provide protection for citizens within the jurisdiction of a state, which pose a different set of challenges than those generated by trans-border migration. Under the Guiding Prin-

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ciples, UNHCR, as anticipated by Article 9 of its Statute of 1950, assumes a greater role in monitoring IDP conditions. Where a government fails to adequately address the protracted hardships endured by IDPs, the international community, through the universally legitimate bodies and specialized agencies of the United Nations, may become engaged to assist the government in formulating durable solutions. Yet, some have criticized this expansive role and insisted that UNHCR limit its activities to international refugees rather than become mired in the domestic problems of nations. Many states initially rejected such an infringement on their prerogatives of sovereignty and proposed instead a functionally ―collaborative approach,‖ whereby several agencies would cooperate with the relevant ministries of the government concerned. Accordingly, a ―clustered‖ method developed, where specialized agencies assumed functionally specific roles: UNHCR in the area of physical protection, IDP camp management, and issues related to shelters; the World Food Program in the area of food; and UNICEF in the area of protection of children. 42 Unlike the reservations expressed by states regarding the viability of the Guiding Principles, international organizations supported their universal applicability, which eventually gained the confidence of government leaders. Within the UN framework, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), UNHCR, the World Food Program (WFP), UNICEF, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), among others, have accepted the Guiding Principles as an essential legal document. At the regional level, organizations such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) have expressed their support for the Guiding Principles. In addition, a host of NGOs have been active in the promotion and the dissemination of information regarding the Guiding Principles. 43 Finally, at the UN World Summit in New York in September 2005, attending government leaders accepted the Guiding Principles as ―an important international framework for the protection of internally displaced persons.‖44 No effort can be made here to explicate the Guiding Principles in their entirety, as such a study would require a separate volume. Some examples of the key principles suffice to illustrate the significant points found in the document. Comprised of 30 principles in five sections, the Guiding Principles extend to all persons the same physical security and legal rights and freedoms guaranteed under international and municipal law regardless of their legal status.45 Accordingly, states assume the obligation ―to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to internally

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displaced persons within their jurisdiction.‖ IDPs possess, regardless of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, or political views, ―the right to request and to receive protection and humanitarian assistance‖ from state authorities.46 IDPs are guaranteed a minimum standard of living with access to food and water, shelter and housing, clothing, medical services,47 the right to education,48 and the right to return, ―in safety and with dignity,‖ to their residence of origin. 49 Principle 29 emphasizes government obligations to enable IDPs ―to recover, to the extent possible, their property and possessions which they left behind‖ or else to assist them ―in obtaining appropriate compensation or another form of just reparation.‖50 Thus, a constellation of existing international standard-setting instruments, including the Guiding Principles, has established a viable international refugee regime which consists of related documents with key obligations, in addition to those pronounced in the UN Charter, the 1951 Refugee Convention, and the 1967 Protocol. The Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961) under Article 8(1) provides that a state party should not deprive a person of his or her nationality ―if such deprivation would render him stateless.‖ The Preamble of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights affirms the recognition secured under the UN Charter of the ―inherent dignity‖ and the ―inalienable rights of all members of the human family‖ as ―the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.‖ Article 11(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights confirms the standards established by the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration and provides the right to an adequate standard of living and to improvement in living conditions. Article 12(1) of ICESCR asserts the right to the ―highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.‖51 In addition, Article 5(a–f) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination enumerates guarantees for various rights in the civil, political, social, cultural, and eco nomic spheres.52 Further, Articles 7(a–c) and 11(1)(a–f) of CEDAW obligate state parties not only to remove discriminatory law and practices against women but also to guarantee political, civil, social, and economic rights.53 Also, Article 19(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child requires that state parties institute administrative and other measures for the protection of the child ―from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation.‖ Article 24 provides for the right of the child to enjoy ―the highest attainable standard of health.‖54 Finally, Article 3(1) of the Convention against Torture provides refugees with protection against refoulement.55

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In 2002, the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights adopted a resolution concerning international protection for refugees, stressing the importance of addressing the ―plight of refugees around the world‖ and calling upon governments to institute mechanisms to admit and host refugees.56 In a similar vein, a resolution regarding human rights and mass exodus adopted by the UN Commission on Human Rights on April 24, 2003, noted the magnitude of global humanitarian crisis as a result of mass displacements in different parts of the world. Referring to three reports by the Secretary-General concerning the protection of civilians in armed conflict, in addition to UN Security Council Resolution 1265 (September 17, 1999), Resolution 1296 (April 19, 2000), and the aide mémoire adopted on March 15, 2002, the Commission underscored the need for all relevant governmental and non-governmental bodies to cooperate and assist in remedying the absence of due protection for refugees and displaced persons ―until durable solutions are found,‖ while respecting the principle of non-refoulement.57 Despite the substantial advances registered in the development of international refugee law and human rights law, there continues to be little consensus at the national and local levels on the range of state obligations concerning refugees and IDPs. Further strengthening of the international refugee regime requires reconciliation of the variations in law and practice with an eye toward a politically feasible and financially sustainable degree of uniformity or ―harmonization.‖ Yet, policies pertaining to immigration, asylum, and refugees have generated heated political debates and deep ideological controversies. State parties to international conventions have variously interpreted their legal obligations for the protection of refugees and sometimes have neglected these obligations altogether. Armenia and the government responses to the refugee and IDP crises As noted earlier, Soviet Armenia could not pursue an independent foreign policy and therefore did not possess the rights and responsibilities exercised by sovereign states. As in other areas of international human rights law and practice, Armenian legal philosophy and institutional administrative experience, confined to the ideological and political limits set under Soviet rule, lagged behind more advanced Western and developing countries that had participated in the process of the formation of the international refugee law regime. By the time Armenia gained independence from the Soviet Union, it could merely hope to appear to imitate existing practices in other countries but without instituting sub-

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stantively viable social and economic programs for a large proportion of its population, including the refugees and IDPs. In the meantime, however, the magnitude of the human catastrophe created by the earthquake in 1988, the war with Azerbaijan, and the national economic meltdown compelled the newly established government and the public in general to rely on foreign aid. Accordingly, upon independence the Armenian government faced the necessity of launching rapid legal and institutional reforms in order to accelerate its adjustments to meet the standards expected of sovereign governments under pre-existing international conventions. The post-independence government, having consolidated its authoritarian rule, failed to implement policies in accordance with international refugee law, as in other areas of human rights law. Nearly a decade later, it had yet to institute effective policies in these areas. The Ter-Petrosyan government adopted the1951 Convention and the Protocol of 1967 in 1993. 58 Although the refugee crisis in the aftermath of the earthquake in 1988 received considerable attention at the international level, as late as 2000 a UN representative to Armenia complained about the ―paucity of research and analysis‖ concerning IDPs in the republic.59 Only in recent years, with the support of the international community, the Kocharyan government and subsequently the Sargsyan government have introduced policies favorable to refugees and IDPs. Two crises, the 1988 earthquake and the Karabagh war, created hundreds of thousands of refugees and IDPs in Armenia with detrimental ramifications for human rights. The 1988 earthquake centered at Spitak led to the displacement of an estimated 400,000 people. While most of them eventually returned to their communities in the earthquake zone, an estimated 30,000 settled in Erevan and the Ararat valley. Beginning in 1988, the violence against the Armenian communities in Azerbaijan during the early part of the war in former Soviet Azerbaijan (e.g. in Baku, Sumgait) caused Armenians to flee Azerbaijani territory but also elicited hostility against the ethnic Azeri population in Armenia. The government of Armenia retaliated to the pogroms in Azerbaijan by forcing ethnic Azeris to leave Armenia. As a result, nearly all ethnic Azeris, totaling approximately 185,000, were compelled to leave by dint of threats or overt violence. During the same period, between 265,000 and 330,000 Armenian refugees fled Azerbaijan to Armenia. By 1994, when cease-fire was declared, between 304,000 and 360,000 Armenians from Azerbaijan had become refugees in Armenia, most of whom continued to live in Armenia in 2003, while thousands emigrated to other CIS countries.60 Only a small proportion (2.4 per cent) of the Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan had resided in rural areas, while approximate-

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ly 81.3 per cent were from large urban centers. 61 In addition, according to the Armenian government, between 72,000 and 75,000 people were evacuated from the border regions of Tavush, Syunik, Vayots Dzor, Ararat, and Gegharkunik, as they came under attack by Azeri forces.62 An estimated 12,300 houses in the border regions were damaged during the war, 40 per cent of which were ruined beyond repair.63 About 132 of the total 170 settlements were destroyed along with their entire infrastructure (roads, communications, water supplies), leaving their institutions of education and health services totally devastated.64 Since the cease-fire in 1994, between 56,600 and 60,000 IDPs have returned to their towns and villages or emigrated to other countries, 65 but approximately 50,000 of them continued to live in refugee-like conditions as late as 2003. 66 In the region of Tavush, for example, of the 28,000 IDPs, 16,000 had returned to their communities by 2000. 67 The remainder of the total IDP population (estimated at approximately 8,400 IDPs by 2007, but perhaps as high as 12,000–15,000) continued to live in other regions of Armenia partly because they could not or chose not to return to their former communities because of economic difficulties, physical insecurity in areas that remain vulnerable to cross-border shooting and skirmishes along the border,68 and land mines. 69 There were refugees from other conflicts as well. Individuals fleeing to Armenia from conflicts in neighboring Georgia numbered 5,800 in 1993 and 5,000 in 1994.70 In 2002, about 12,000 Armenian refugees displaced by separatist wars in Chechnya and Abkhazia resided in Armenia.71 These refugees arrived in the midst of an existing economic and refugee crises.72 The influx of hundreds of Armenian refugees fleeing the war in Iraq, which began in 2003, further complicated the situation. Most have arrived virtually in abject poverty, with little or no means to sustain themselves, rendering them vulnerable in many ways. Refugees and IDPs are the most vulnerable groups to poverty in Armenia.73 Their poverty levels are significantly higher than the average local population, and their living conditions are characterized by residence in temporary shelters made of metal shipping containers (domiks in Russian), which have little or no household goods or other basic necessities, such as access to drinking water. Refugees and IDPs lack agricultural land and machinery, have not attained sufficient levels of education for meaningful participation in the economy, and have little access to employment opportunities. 74 Yet, for more than a decade their conditions received little attention from domestic governmental agencies, nongovernmental groups, or international organizations. The lack of public saliency, as some observers have pointed out, left the impression that Armenia‖s refugees and IDPs have been successfully absorbed into the

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local communities. However, government officials and domestic NGOs admit that the very opposite has been true. The plight of the refugees and IDPs has not been a national priority, and rather than facilitate their smooth integration into society, the government and NGOs in general have remained indifferent to the crisis. Refugees and IDPs have suffered severe hardships, including loss of family members, home, and community; high levels of unemployment and abject poverty; psychological trauma; and failure to function effectively in the local economy. Years of neglect on the part of the government in Erevan exacerbated these conditions.75 It was not until the resignation of President Ter-Petrosyan in 1998 and the change in top executive leadership that the government began, albeit all too slowly, to pay attention to the situation of refugees and IDPs. Government failure, particularly during the Ter-Petrosyan regime, may be attributed to the fact that for most of the first decade after independence it lacked sufficient resources to finance programs in this area, due to the country‖s dire economic situation. In addition, powerful business and private interests competed for budgetary consideration, precluding active engagement by the state in matters pertaining to the least influential subgroup among the poorest and most vulnerable segments of society.76 Even under ideal circumstances where the government could sustain contingency plans for war and economic depression, the multifaceted socioeconomic and geopolitical crises unfolding on the domestic and international fronts in Armenia could only overwhelm the overburdened policymaking institutions. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet regime, the government, in efforts to house refugees and to provide for their safety, converted numerous public facilities (schools, vacation resorts, dormitories) into shelters, while government agencies, individuals, and diaspora organizations mobilized food and clothing collection and organized distribution stations. 77 Upon independence, the war in Karabagh and the dire economic situation in Armenia impeded implementation of urgently needed social welfare programs for the thousands of refugees arriving from the war zones and for the IDPs in the earthquake areas. The newly established government ineluctably placed a premium on state-building, in the process pressing forward with economic liberalization which minimized state involvement in desperately needed social welfare programs not only for refugees but also for the general population. As a result, according to Thomas Greene, interviews in the republic indicated that native Armenians considered the refugees a ―burden.‖78 It is possible that native Armenians even resented the international aid refugees received. One analyst in Armenia claims that the refugees enjoyed certain economic

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advantages not available to the natives, and as a result, the refugees were reluctant to change their legal status as refugees. 79 Despite Armenia‖s accession to the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, well into the late 1990s the government had not promulgated laws providing for the legal status of refugees in accordance with that commitment. The government has respected and continues to respect the principle of first asylum, although for years the lack of a legal framework to that effect rendered official recognition of political asylum arbitrary.80 In the absence of state programs, refugees as well as many among the local population relied on international humanitarian assistance. The Armenian government since the Ter-Petrosyan administration in the early 1990s has cooperated with a host of international organizations and humanitarian NGOs providing relief assistance to refugees. Over the years, with various degrees of engagement and success, these have included UNHCR,81 Children/US funded by USAID from 1993 through 1998 (replaced by Mercy Corps International in April 1998), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross,82 the Norwegian Refugee Council, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) of Belgium, the German government, and Mission Armenia. The Vatican established a hospital in Ashotsk, and Norwegian health centers were founded in Spitak. MSF of Belgium initially offered psychological services for the survivors of the earthquake and soon expanded its operations to serve refugees from Azerbaijan.83 As Thomas Greene has noted, ―foreign assistance is all that … kept the people from starvation,‖ but it also ―brought with it a dependency mentality.‖84 Nevertheless, international organizations served thousands of refugee families, although their aid activities were not necessarily coordinated. By 2000, the volume of such assistance had begun to decline precipitously. In a similar vein, while the Armenian diasporan communities initially reacted to the earthquake with vast humanitarian relief assistance and although some organizations and individuals have continued their involvement, rampant corruption and the lack of significant improvements in the Armenian economy eventually discouraged many diaspora donors. In the early 1990s, the Ter-Petrosyan government adopted a number of key policies concerning refugees and IDPs, which were mandated through executive orders because the National Assembly had not adopted laws to safeguard the rights of refugees. 85 The Ter-Petrosyan government opened the Department of Refugees on November 5, 1991, which merged with other offices in September 1995 to become the Ministry of Social Security, Labor, Migration, and Refugee Issues. By late 1991, three years had passed since the first refugees fleeing Azerbaijan entered

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Armenia. As part of its mandate, the Department of Refugees, in cooperation with other governmental agencies and NGOs, issued identity cards for refugees and IDPs. 86 In 1991 and 1992, the government issued laws directing government bureaucracies, local communities, and hotels to provide temporary housing and essential supplies for IDPs in the earthquake zone and for refugees fleeing Azerbaijan and the bordering areas.87 In November 1995, a law concerning refugees encouraged them to obtain Armenian citizenship and promised not to impose restrictions in case they sought asylum and citizenship abroad. 88 Further, while these laws were designed exclusively for Armenian refugees and IDPs, the government also granted refugee and asylee status to noncitizens and respected their right of first asylum against refoulement, as in the case of a Sudanese refugee who received asylum ―based on fear of religious persecution‖ at home.89 Government efforts to aid refugees eventually concentrated mainly on the Paros program, which was established in 1994, and the distribution of humanitarian relief in cooperation with the World Food Program. 90 After this initial relatively active response to the refugee crisis, the government retreated from such efforts,91 preferring instead to rely on international assistance and diasporan support. In fact, for the 1994–2002 period, international assistance constituted 7 per cent of the nation‖s GDP.92 By 1995, as discussed earlier, the Ter-Petrosyan government had shifted to authoritarian rule and the oligarchic networks had solidified their hold on the economy – with serious ramifications for natives and refugees alike. Basic human needs and refugees Over the years, the UN Development Program has identified specific basic socioeconomic indicators for ―sustainable human development.‖ These include such variables as healthcare services, living conditions (e.g. housing, access to water), and literacy. Arriving in Armenia during a period of war and economic meltdown, the refugees found themselves in abject poverty. Nor were the regions designated by the Erevan government for their settlement favorable for rapid recovery and resumption of productive life. Kotayk, Tavush, Ararat, and Aragatsotn had been among the poorer areas during the Soviet era, and the post-Soviet government lacked the political will and resources to allocate urgently needed funds to alleviate the conditions created by the influx of thousands of refugees. 93 By 2003, Shirak and Lori marzes were added to the list of the poorest marzes. 94 In the late 1990s, about 34.6 per cent of refugee families were poor, 16.4 per cent of these being extremely poor.

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Among refugees settled in urban centers, 45.9 per cent were poor, while among those settled in rural areas, 42.9 per cent were poor. About 44 per cent of the non-settled refugees were poor, including 22.4 per cent extremely poor.95 A 2003 IMF report commented that ―refugees and internally displaced people represent one of the least protected and poorest layers‖ in Armenia.96 In the late 1990s, the Ministry of Social Security was responsible for identifying and evaluating poor families to determine the extent of state benefits each household would receive. Refugee families in urban centers represented 48.4 per cent of total recipients of state family benefits, compared to 33.9 per cent of refugee families in rural areas. Among the refugee population, 41.4 per cent of women and 37.2 per cent of men received state family benefits; 44.9 per cent of families with children received benefits compared to 41.1 per cent without children. 97 The available data also show that most programs have not been sufficiently funded or have not been implemented effectively. At least four areas can be identified where the Ter-Petrosyan and Kocharyan governments have failed to support the basic human needs of refugees and therefore have failed to fulfill their obligations under international human rights law. These areas are living conditions (housing, access to drinking water), health care, education, and employment. Living conditions The privatization of formerly state-owned land and houses soon after independence led to the private ownership of 80 per cent of the housing in Armenia by the late 1990s. Official statistics in the late 1990s indicated that 86 per cent of local families (including those in the earthquake zone) resided in private houses, as did 66 per cent of settled refugees. By contrast, 99 per cent of all non-settled refugee families lived in state-run public facilities, such as temporary shelters (usually metal shipping containers), hostels, and dormitories. 98 By 2009, their situation had improved somewhat, as most lived with relatives and friends or had settled in rented apartments; a small number had even purchased houses, although the banks in general rejected IDP applications for loans. 99 During the war, according to official figures, 320 miles of water pipes, 450 miles of irrigation water pipes, and 357 miles of road had been damaged in the border regions. Nearly 60 per cent of roads were deemed ruined, and 70 per cent of villages lacked irrigation water. Also in the border regions, 75 per cent of the IDP population continued to live in huts and temporary shelters in 2000, while mere 4 per cent had purchased a house. 100 Well into the late 1990s, the government in Erevan had offered little assistance to reconstruction efforts for IDPs

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who returned to border communities after 1994, leaving the burden mostly to local governments and individual returnees. 101 Neither the Ter-Petrosyan government nor its successors have been able to address the various problems associated with housing. By the late 1990s, an estimated 14,000 refugee families in Armenia, especially in the capital, lacked housing. In Erevan and its vicinity, about 10,800 refugee families resided in temporary shelters, while more than 1,960 ref ugee families in the regions remained without housing. In a 1999 study, the UN Development Program found that 1,183 refugees owned ―halfconstructed houses,‖ while 784 possessed ―no construction at all.‖102 The report predicted that given the slow pace of housing construction, the refugee housing problems could not be solved earlier than 25–30 years. With the passage of time, the report added, ―refugee families will form new families, [and] the solution to their housing problems will need even longer time.‖103 In May 2000, a delegation headed by Francis Deng, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, visited Armenian villages in the border regions. The Deng mission found that the government had largely ignored the IDP population. He commented that the government had intended to house IDPs in ―temporary shelters‖ (most of them iron crates) for two years; these shelters were initially designated for refugees from the earthquake zone. Yet in 2000, 12 years after the earthquake, people continued to live in shelters that, in the words of an official from the Minister for Regional Administration and Urban Planning, were ―falling to pieces.‖ 104 Kocharyan agreed that greater attention had to be paid to the ―forgotten people.‖ In June 2003, Deng reported to the CSCE that Erevan had failed to address the issue.105 Altogether, it was estimated in 2003 that people housed in temporary shelters (both from the earthquake zone and war refugees) accounted for 5.1 per cent of the entire population in Armenia. By 2015, the number of people in temporary shelters is expected to decrease to 1.5 or 1 per cent of the population, with projections that the problem can be solved by 2020.106 In addition to the housing crisis, numerous problems related to housing structures, availability of water, electricity, and heat, and accessibility of maintenance services, all represented serious human rights crises. As noted in Chapter 2, certain problems, such as daily shortages in water supply, had never been eliminated by the Soviet regime, and the first post-independence government lacked both the funds and expertise to modernize the country‖s decrepit infrastructure. In the late 1990s, 71 per cent of dwellings inhabited by the local population had indoor water taps, compared to 52 per cent of settled and non-settled refugee dwell-

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ings. A comparison between dwellings in rural and urban areas indicates the magnitude of the hardship experienced by refugees on a daily basis. About 70 per cent of the dwellings of refugees settled in rural villages lacked indoor water taps, with outdoor water sources available only at impracticable distances. Among dwellings inhabited by non-settled refugees in urban centers, 90 per cent lacked indoor water taps. 107 Two decades after independence, dilapidated infrastructure and persisting (and in some areas permanent) shortages in drinking and hot water supplies and accessibility detain people in miserable conditions. Adding insult to injury, in recent years the government, without prior notice or even consultation, has arbitrarily evicted many of the domik residents to different domik zones and sold the land to private construction companies to build private houses and buildings. 108 Although government programs have promised to address these issues, budgetary constraints and the long list of local residents waiting for state housing assistance have impeded further support for refugees as well as also for thousands of IDPs in areas affected by the earthquake. Under Act No. 203 the National Assembly, on July 27, 2001, adopted a program to address the housing situation in the earthquake zone and to assist 14,920 families in the Shirak, Lori, Aragatsotn, and Tavush marzes. Twenty years after the earthquake, however, an IMF report noted in 2008 that while the Kocharyan government‖s housing programs improved the situation for an estimated 16,000 households between 2000 and 2006, the government had failed to address the housing demands of nearly 43,000 families, many of whom remained in temporary shelters.109 However, in 2009, according to the Armenian Ministry of Urban Development, only 64 families were expected to receive government assistance for housing, 14 families in Tavush and Vayots Dzor marzes under the House Purchase Certificate (HPC) and 50 families in Erevan under the House Building Project. 110 Healthcare services The problems in housing are not confined to mere availability of buildings and accessibility of resources. They are also associated with serious health issues. The impact of poverty on health was mentioned above. Refugees in general have suffered worse conditions than the population. A 1999 health study found that among those surveyed 13 per cent were ―seriously sick‖ (that is, disabled or suffering from chronic diseases), of these around 55 per cent were refugees. 111 The study indicated that 76.3 per cent of the ―seriously sick‖ received no medical care, and 70 per cent of non-settled refugees had no access to state medical care.112 Significantly, although less than 1 per cent of those surveyed believed

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that medical facilities were physically inaccessible, the inability to afford healthcare kept nearly 82 per cent of both native and refugee populations from seeking medical services. These included about 96 per cent of non-settled refugees (the most vulnerable group), 87 per cent of settled refugees, 78 per cent of the local population, and 60 per cent of IDPs in the earthquake zone. In the case of the latter, as noted above, international humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of the earthquake led to the construction of several modern medical facilities which provided services gratis or for a nominal fee. 113 During the war, 62 medical facilities in the border regions were damaged, and government data indicated in 2000 that no more than 60 per cent of the villages in the border regions had medical facilities, while only 20 per cent of these operated with a sufficient number of staff. Such low figures, as one UN report observed, indicate ―a quality of medical examination and treatment considered to be well below standard.‖114 Education and employment As noted in the previous chapter, education is compulsory for children, but higher education since independence has been limited to wealthier families. In the late 1990s, the educational levels of the refugees in Armenia were low compared to those of the native population. Obstacles to education for refugees and IDPs have been far greater than for the local population, particularly for those residing in the border regions where many villages lack educational facilities. According to one estimate, 60 per cent of such facilities in the border regions required ―urgent renovation‖ in 2000, while 12 per cent required ―basic renovation‖ to render them serviceable. During most of the winter season, many schools remain unheated, their roofs leaking, their restrooms without water and without doors. During times of heavy rain, unpaved roads are ―washed out and become impassable.‖115 More than infrastructural renovations and construction are necessary, however, in order to revive educational and cultural life for refugees and IDPs. In the border regions, poor living conditions and lack of employment opportunities have discouraged potential teachers from moving to these areas. The dearth of supplies (textbooks, notebooks) hinders basic learning, let alone cultivation of creative thought. The mayor of a village commented that ―children are lost in such conditions.‖ He continued: ―in the 10 years since the war, not a single child from the village had gone on to higher education, whereas 8–10 children routinely had done so during the pre-war (and Soviet) period.‖116 Moreover, the dropout rate for post-primary students among the poor is high because rather than attend school, children work to increase the household

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income. In 2007, at least one child in 6 per cent of families worked, about 33 per cent of whom were below the legally established working age of 16. As many as 60 per cent attended school and worked, and 30 per cent discontinued their studies because of lack of sufficient funds as well as ―lack of interest.‖117 Lower levels of education among refugees may be partially explained by the precondition of poverty as a result of displacement and loss of income but also in part by the emigration of the more educated to other countries, a common pattern among both refugees and natives. During the early stages of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabagh (i.e. 1988–91), many refugees benefited from the Soviet educational system in place and resumed their education in their host communities.118 The policies of economic liberalization after independence, however, rendered access to education, especially at institutions of higher learning, far more difficult (if not virtually inaccessible) for refugees. In the late 1990s, it was estimated that students constituted 23 per cent of the local population compared to 16 per cent of the refugee population. Between 61 and 66 per cent of the local population, though literate, do not have higher education, compared to 72 per cent of settled refugees. In fact, in 1999, men with fewer than eight years of education accounted for as much as 41 per cent of the refugee population. 119 Commitment to years of education implies a certain degree of hope and expectation regarding future employment and financial security. As in the case of most native Armenians leaving the republic, however, financial hardship, uncertainties, and hopelessness compelled many refugees to move to other countries. Failure to secure a decent education compounded the existing social and economic difficulties and further limited employment opportunities. As a result of poor social and economic conditions, emigration among IDPs and refugees has been higher than among their local counterparts. 120 Limited employment opportunities and confinement to the rural economy increased the relative level of poverty among refugees, while the lack of familiarity with the local community, culture, and legal system further exacerbated their sense of despair. Poverty, inadequate housing, and the absence of basic social and economic goods and services contributed to the disintegration of family structures. In 1999, for example, it was estimated that more than 60 per cent of non-settled refugee women of active reproductive age were not married.121 A 1999 study reported that between 20 and 30 per cent of women refugees and earthquake zone IDPs either could not have children and start a family, or were ―condemned to take care of their children on their own‖ because their ―potential or actual husbands‖ were absent. 122

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Refugees of working age generally found fewer employment opportunities than their native counterparts. Settled and unsettled refugees found it difficult to compete with local Armenians on the job market, even though refugees pursued employment opportunities with greater intensity than their native compatriots. Among unemployed refugees, an estimated 70–80 per cent failed to find employment simply because they were refugees or IDPs, a difficulty caused both by inaccessibility to labor markets and parochial social-cultural biases among native Armenians. According to a UNDP study, in 1999, 27.8 per cent of native Armenians were unemployed, compared to 42.1 per cent of refugees. The study also noted that 35.8 per cent of native Armenians and 44.5 per cent of refugees had not been employed in the seven days prior to the interviews.123 More recently, official government statistics indicate that unemployment levels have remained particularly high in the border regions of Tavush (9 per cent) and Syunik (11.8 per cent) in 2009, compared to 6.3 per cent in Erevan. 124 Employment among refugee women was similarly problematic. As of early 2010, unemployment among refugee women was about 60 per cent, compared to 51 per cent native women. Women constitute 54 per cent of all refugees, with 50 per cent being elderly. Like most refugees from Azerbaijan, refugee women had resided primarily in urban centers prior to fleeing their communities; however, in Armenia they remained confined to agricultural work regardless of their skills and expertise. 125 Disparities between the careers many refugees held prior to their displacement from Soviet Azerbaijan and the skills needed to function in their new communities in Armenia have posed a particular challenge. A large proportion of the refugees arriving from Soviet Azerbaijan had been employed in blue-collar jobs or possessed training in various sectors of industry.126 During the conflict, the Ter-Petrosyan government compensated some Armenian IDPs (e.g. about 3,000 from the town of Artsvashen) and refugees fleeing Azerbaijan by settling them in houses (mostly in the rural areas) evacuated by Azeris who fled Armenia. 127 As a result, refugees residing in these houses were required to work in the agricultural sector or else either migrate to the cities, where they were not likely to secure employment, or move to another country. Thus, career experiences and expertise that refugees brought with them proved ineffectual for employment in the Armenian economy. Though resettled in rural areas, they possessed no agricultural land or machinery, farm animals, or production and marketing facilities. Refugees in general, but non-settled refugees in particular, lacked personal possessions upon which to rely to improve their socioeconomic conditions. Their situation was made worse by local conditions. In 2000, it was

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reported that nearly 40 per cent of the irrigated land in the border regions remained defunct because of labor shortages, the extent of damage sustained by irrigation systems, and the lack agricultural equipment and machinery.128 This was all the more ironic since, as noted previously, the agricultural sector alone had a greater increase in output than the other sectors, including industry, construction, or services. Finally, a major concern with respect to the human rights of refugees from Azerbaijan has been the forced recruitment of men into the Armenian military despite their legal exemption from military service. As refugees eventually acquired the rights of citizenship, including voting and property ownership, they also accepted the obligation (and native Armenians expected them) to serve in the military. 129 During the war and well into the late 1990s, however, the military relied on forcible conscription of able-bodied refugees to augment or sustain troop levels. As reported by the US State Department, in many instances, overzealous army personnel engaged in acts that clearly violated human rights and the privacy of families during army conscription drives. Refugee families, fearful of retaliation, chose to remain silent rather than complain. When families did not know or would not divulge the whereabouts of male members of military age, military recruiters often seized family members as hostages in order to force draft-evaders to surrender. They appeared at houses where draft-age men were reported to live and threatened or detained the occupants or inflicted material damage. They also seized draft-age men in public places, such as markets, theaters, and the subway. Further, there are credible reports that in times of army recruitment drives, the Armenian draft board frequently dispatched recruiters to Russia (e.g. Krasnodar Kray) to capture men of military age who had dodged the draft in Armenia. These practices did not become less frequent until 1998–99, after Kocharyan entered office. 130 Until 1998, the government had failed to deal effectively with the refugee crisis. Having lost their homes and, in many cases, family members in the war, a growing number of refugees and IDPs, both men and women, resorted to criminal endeavors to survive. The pressures of poverty and the loss of self-esteem exacerbated the existing problems of domestic violence, prostitution, human trafficking, and other social ills. Many workers, particularly men, left their families behind in hopes of better employment opportunities in other countries. A 1999 survey on public expectations found that refugees expressed greater pessimism than native Armenians regarding opportunities for employment and improvements in their financial situation in the near future (defined as the next three years). On a scale of 1 to 7, refugees‖ expectations registered 2.78 points, and natives‖ 3.24 points. 131 Both groups agreed that in 1999

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their households were in a considerably worse situation than in 1990–91 and 1995–96, and significantly, both groups were pessimistic (lower than 4 points) about the future. 132 A favorable turn in policy Signs of a positive changes policy began to appear with the advent of the Kocharyan government in 1998, as the new leadership began to consider policies to ameliorate the plight of refugees. This favorable turn under Kocharyan could have been the result of economic improvements relative to earlier years as the nation began to recover from the economic depression in the early 1990s and eventually adapted to constrains imposed by geopolitical realities (e.g. the blockade since 1993). Further, Kocharyan and his close circle of advisors from Karabagh identified closely with refugees from Azerbaijan and therefore showed a greater political will to assist them than the Ter-Petrosyan government. After its initial support, the latter had begun to consider the war refugees as a burden on Armenia‖s economy and the entire Karabagh affair as a constraint on foreign policy options. Finally, while the Kocharyan government consolidated power, international agencies were in the process of redoubling their efforts to address the growing global refugee problem and to assist individual governments to promulgate policies in accordance with international refugee laws and standards. Within a year after assuming office, the Kocharyan government introduced programs to cope with the refugee and IDP crises in the earthquake zone and the border regions. 133 After nearly a decade, as thousands of refugees and IDPs displaced by earthquake and war remained in refugee-like conditions, 134 the United Nations proposed efforts to improve their situation. In May 2000, Francis Deng led a delegation to Armenia, accompanied by Ambassador Karen Nazaryan, representative to the United Nations office in Geneva. During his short visit, Deng met with Kocharyan and other high-level officials as well as with representatives of NGOs and found them cooperative. He visited several villages in the district of Ijevan in the marz of Tavush, a region that covers 10 per cent of the Armenian territory135 with a 218-mile border with Azerbaijan. In his report, Deng praised the Department for Migration and Refugees (now the Migration Agency),136 the principal body responsible for IDPs, and the Armenian government in general for their expressions of support regarding the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 137 In order to promote and strengthen compliance with the Guiding Principles in the South Caucasus, three legal teams were created, one

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representing each country – Armenia (Lusine Hovhannisyan and Tatshat Stepanyan), Azerbaijan (Elkhan Asadov and Imran Veliyev), and Georgia (Giorgi Chkeidze and Konstantin Korkelia). They held their first regional workshop in Tbilisi, Georgia, on May 10–12, 2000, at the initiation of the Georgian Young Lawyers‖ Association (GYLA) under the auspices of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement.138 The workshop sought to explore the measures necessary for the development of institutional mechanisms in order to provide for the safe return of IDPs to their communities of origin and for their social and economic self-sufficiency. Participants at the workshop included high-ranking government officials and representatives of NGOs. Among the representatives of the Armenian government were Lialia Aslanyan, Deputy Head, Department of Migration and Refugees; Samvel Harutyunyan, Head of IDPs and Resettlement Issues Desk at the Department of Migration and Refugees; and Ashot Kocharyan, Advisor in the International Organizations Department and Head of Human Rights and Humanitarian Issues within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. NGO representatives included Karen Zadoyan of the Armenian Young Lawyers‖ Association (AYLA), Hranush Kharatyan of the Hazarashen Armenian Center for Anthropological Studies, Levon Nersisyan of the Sakharov Foundation, and Gevorg Poghosyan of the Armenian Sociological Association. Attending the workshop were also representatives from a host of international organizations, among them the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), to name a few. 139 The three legal teams met again in February 2001 under the chairmanship of Walter Kälin and in May 2001, followed by meetings in Erevan (October 2001), Tbilisi, and Baku (both in February 2002). The details of the meetings are beyond the scope of this chapter, but a brief summary of the meeting in Erevan is useful. The latter was organized on October 15, 2001, by OSCE/ODIHR, the Brookings InstitutionCUNY Project on Internal Displacement, and GYLA, under the cochairmanship of Walter Kälin and Vladimir Shkolnikov of OSCE/ ODIHR. Participants included the legal teams, government authorities, international organizations, and civil society NGOs. Lialia Aslanyan stressed the absence of a special law pertaining to IDPs in Armenia, although, she added, a commission had been preparing a government program to ameliorate substandard living conditions, especially in the border regions. She noted that despite the lack of a legal framework for

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IDPs, the Armenian government nevertheless ―always endeavors in its programs to create normal social and economic conditions for IDPs.‖ While the government supported the return of IDPs to their communities, Aslanyan maintained, it lacked sufficient resources to finance such programs and required international assistance. Tatshat Stepanyan added that not only was there a lack of a specific law concerning IDPs but that such a law was necessary in order to establish programs that protect their ―social and economic rights, as set forth in the Guiding Principles.‖140 The round tables organized in Erevan, Tbilisi, and Baku led to a comprehensive report on IDPs in the South Caucasus published by the American Society of International Law and the Brookings Institution in 2003.141 The report on Armenia, prepared by Lusine Hovhannisyan and Tatshat Stepanyan (legal experts from Armenia), approached the IDP problem ―from the perspective of the actual needs of the internally displaced‖ and sought to ―identify the areas where existing domestic law does not respond adequately to the protection and assistance needs of internally displaced persons as provided by the Guiding Principles.‖142 The Kocharyan government and the relevant bureaucracies responded favorably to these and similar initiatives with expectations for international financial support, as expressed by Liala Aslanyan, representative of the Armenian government at the Erevan meeting on October 15. For reasons mentioned above, Kocharyan and his advisors may have been genuinely interested in assisting the refugees. However, the efforts on the part of the Department for Migration and Refugees (DMR) seem to have been to secure funds from international agencies ostensibly to assist refugees and IDPs. The DMR cooperated with the International Organization for Migration within the latter‖s Capacity Building in Migration Program. Accordingly, they created working groups, comprised of Armenian government officials and international and local experts, to formulate policies regarding the refugee and IDP situation. These bodies published recommendations with respect to policy and administration. The DMR sought to facilitate, where possible, the return of the refugees and IDPs to their towns of origin, which necessitated the reconstruction of their home communities. In November 2000, the DMR adopted the Concept Paper of State Regulation of Migration of Population of the Republic of Armenia, specifying measures for the regulation of migration and for the amendment of existing laws, in addition to the need to ratify pertinent international conventions. The DMR subsequently proposed and the government adopted in December 2000 a Program of Action to that effect.143 This program was designed to accommodate approximately 67,000

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displaced people, comprised of 28,000 persons who had already returned to their communities in 1999 and 39,000 who were expected to return. To that end, the DMR proposed a more comprehensive plan involving the construction of new houses and reconstruction of those deemed habitable at ―minimum standards,‖ the construction and repair of roads, communications systems, water supplies, schools, and healthcare clinics, as well as the distribution of grants of land to compensate for the inaccessibility of areas contaminated by land mines until the completion of demining. 144 Further, the DMR program for the first six months would provide subsistence assistance to those returning; thereafter, the returnees would be expected to achieve a certain degree of selfsufficiency and financial stability through employment in the reconstruction projects and additional support for credit toward purchases of agricultural equipment.145 The entire program would cost about $81 million according to DMR estimates, which, DMR officials maintained, the government in Erevan was not in a position to allocate. Instead, the government would agree to fund the program as much as possible but full implementation of the projects would necessitate international aid. DMR officials indicated that the government would allocate about $15 million toward the project, with the expectation that the balance be financed by international donors. As the Deng mission was to discover, however, the DMR had failed to bring the project to the attention of policymakers in Erevan, the United Nations, and other international agencies, which, for their part, lacked sufficient knowledge concerning the conditions of displaced communities in the first place. In its report, the Deng mission underscored ―a clear disconnection between the plans of the DMR and the priorities of the Government as a whole.‖ The report stated: Literature on the situation as well as the preliminary meetings held by the mission delegation with government officials and international agencies in the capital had suggested that the needs of internally displaced persons were being satisfactorily addressed through general programmes for poverty alleviation. However, as the field visit made evident and as the Working Group survey has documented in greater detail, clearly this is not the case. Considerable needs of the internally displaced in the conflict areas are not being attended to, especially with regard to shelter, safe access to land, opportunities for self-sufficiency and access to health care and education. 146 As part of a plan of action, the Deng mission offered a number of recom-

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mendations for the effective formulation and development of the proposed project. It was first necessary to prepare a comprehensive survey of the conditions of IDPs in Armenia, their accurate number, locations, and needs, and whether they intended to return to their communities of origin. Second, the DMR would mobilize support among policymakers in the executive and legislative agencies, which in turn would require increasing the public saliency of the issues involved through various means – for example, publication of assessments of the IDP situation in the country. Finally, the government, upon formally adopting the DMR proposal, would seek to mobilize international support for the project and submit it to the United Nations and international bodies for review.147 Deng highlighted that this effort must be built on the realization that displacement considerably heightens one‖s vulnerability to poverty and that assistance policies must be formulated and the necessary resources mobilized accordingly. In addition, as the refugees return to their communities of origin, it would be necessary to devise a demining program to ensure their physical safety. Moreover, to the extent that it was possible in view of ongoing demining efforts, the returnees must have access to cultivable land for their self-sufficiency; if no such land could be allotted, the government would relieve them of land taxes. Finally, the report recommended the resolution of the conflict with Azerbaijan through both bilateral and multilateral avenues. 148 When in 2008 the Migration Agency (formerly DMR) finally announced its plan, the entire project had been considerably downsized. According to Agency Chief Gagik Yeganyan, the government had prepared a three-year program for the reconstruction of over 18,000 houses and the resettlement of more than 1,000 IDPs, at an estimated cost of $38 million. The government would present the proposed program to potential international donors and expected to commence negotiations soon. He stated that at least 2,000 IDPs were willing to return to their communities in the border regions. The government would grant each returning family about $700 as a ―one-time payment‖ toward the purchase of seeds and equipment. It would also pay $7,700 to ―families whose houses were completely destroyed by shelling,‖ which, Yeganyan stated, totaled 1,700 houses, and $1,500 to owners whose houses had been damaged during the war.149 On March 2, 2009, the United Nations and the government of Japan agreed to grant economic assistance totaling nearly $2.5 million for a program called ―Sustainable Livelihood for Socially Vulnerable Refugees, Internally Displaced and Local Families‖ in Armenia. The program would be funded through the UN Trust Fund for Human Security and implemented by a number of UN agencies, including UNHCR, the UN

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Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and UNICEF. A press release by the Japanese foreign ministry stated that ―due to rapidly increasing income inequalities and social uncertainties, socially vulnerable people including groups such as refugees and internally displaced people have been suffering from poverty and lack of access to social services in Armenia.‖150 The program aimed to alleviate these conditions through funds for the renovation of houses for vulnerable families, to urge aid recipients to become active in local civil society organizations, to provide training for entrepreneurship, to train staff for healthcare services, and to encourage the use of renewable energy. The return of IDPs to communities in the border regions affected by the war with Azerbaijan has proved a complicated process because of frequent landslides and areas of minefields, requiring a greater engagement on the part of the national government in Erevan than exercised thus far. In 2005, the Landmine Impact Survey examined 60 communities in five border marzes (Tavush, Ararat, Syunik, Vayots Dzor, and Gegharkunik). The number of victims from landmines totaled 394 (110 killed and 284 injured). The Landmine Impact Survey reported that 68,737 people were affected by landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in contaminated areas, totaling about 124.20 square miles. The report noted that ―while there is an overall understanding of the hazard among the population, the capacity to deal with the problem is very low.‖151 For most refugees, this has been particularly worrisome as many have received little detailed knowledge of the events transpiring in their communities since their evacuation and therefore lack knowledge as to the exact location of minefields. While minefields have posed a threat to communities, it is also the case that some of the residents in the border regions may eventually have to be evacuated because of the possible establishment of militarized buffer zones along the Armenia-Azerbaijan borders. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the boundaries between the two former Soviet republics were considered intra-state borders, and communities developed along these boundary lines. The collapse of the Soviet Union, however, necessitated the establishment of restricted militarized buffer zones which, depending on the terrain and strategic significance, ranged from 219 yards to 1.2 miles from the border. 152 In its 2003 report, the IMF recommended the introduction of policies that would encourage greater equality between refugees and the local population, at least in areas essential for refugees‖ economic survival and social development. The report stressed access to better housing and, with respect to poor refugees and local populations in rural areas, training in the skills of agricultural production, as a considerable

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proportion of rural refugees were urban residents in the former Soviet Azerbaijan.153 Women refugees, the report noted, have suffered the most and are left with ―insufficient (or no) representation in national, regional, or community bodies.‖ As a vulnerable group, refugees were in need of government social assistance programs in order to facilitate their social, cultural, and economic integration into local society. The Kocharyan government adopted a policy on December 14, 2000, to that effect, mandating the completion of construction of residential buildings, conversion of hostels (which thus far had served as temporary shelters) into residential housing, and purchase of apartments for refugees. The report expected that these programs would enable approximately 11,000 refugee families to settle in apartments and 1,500 seniors in boarding houses. Further, by 2004, the government would ―undertake measures to improve housing conditions for refugees residing in temporary shelters.‖154 In addition to such programs, the Kocharyan government emphasized the need to grant citizenship to Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan and the integration of refugees and IDPs into the local communities where they have resettled. Citizenship and integration The Ter-Petrosyan government had not considered refugees and IDPs as separate groups or de jure distinct from the native Armenian population. Nor did it have an effective mechanism to address refugee and IDP problems, but dealt with them on an ad hoc basis. The government eventually introduced specific policies for refugees and incorporated some IDPs into refugee programs, in addition to the Paros system.155 After the 1994 cease-fire, as it became clear that the refugees were not likely to return to their homes in Azerbaijan, the Armenian government placed greater emphasis on their eventual integration into local communities. Yet, the government was not prepared to allocate the necessary financial support. This situation created a dilemma for the government and refugees, which was further complicated by the question of citizenship and political participation. On the one hand, from the government‖s perspective, which placed a premium on state-building and privatization, both refugees and natives experienced similar socialeconomic difficulties with equal hardship and therefore refugees required no special treatment. 156 On the other hand, the underlying causes of refugees‖ economic privation were (and remain) far more complicated and the extent of deprivation, as discussed above, often far more severe than those suffered by the natives.

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While privatization at a time of economic depression and infrastructural collapse meant that small farmers (natives and refugees alike) had to fend for themselves with no social welfare safety nets for protection, the lack of citizenship rights for refugees necessitated an immediate response from policymakers. Most refugees felt excluded from the political process,157 and it was not until the 1996 law concerning naturalization and citizenship that specific provisions for the expeditious naturalization of refugees from Azerbaijan were introduced. According to this law, refugees of Armenian descent could become citizens after three years of residence in Armenia, a policy that the government began to implement in 1998 under the slogan ―One State-One People.‖158 Conditions for refugees did not begin to improve until 2000. A set of programs under the Kocharyan government were exclusively for ethnic Armenians arriving from the former Soviet republics and later from Iraq and aimed at integrating them into local host communities. In 1999, the National Assembly adopted the long-awaited refugee law, which enabled the government near the end of the year to create a new locallevel program enabling refugees to obtain citizenship. 159 The National Assembly subsequently reformed the 1999 refugee law in further compliance with the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its Protocol of 1967 and passed laws providing for political asylum and guarantees for the protection of refugees‖ rights. This law sought to assist refugees and IDPs who held Armenian citizenship for more than three years. A key provision under Article 3 states that those ―residing in housing, which belongs to the State Housing Resources shall be recognised as tenants of that housing, if other persons have no tenancy or other rights to these housing.‖ 160 In 1999, the State Department for Migration and Refugees was created to address migration issues, which in 2005, as part of general structural reforms, was relocated within the Ministry of Territorial Administration as Migration Agency. 161 Thus far, these efforts have produced mixed results, but the effective implementation of the policies in place could remedy one of the more serious difficulties confronted by refugees. Further efforts to improve the refugee situation took place in 1999. In a major step toward strengthening its power of judicial review, the Constitutional Court in October declared unconstitutional the Law on Local Self-Government and the Law on Refugees, as they ―prohibited refugees with permanent residence (propiska) in Armenia from participating in municipal elections.‖162 The Constitutional Court ruled that both laws also violated electoral laws, thereby affirming the right of refugees with permanent residence to vote in local elections. In December 2002, the National Assembly passed the Law on Trans-

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fer of Ownership Rights of Apartments Constructed for Refugees Forcibly Displaced from Azerbaijan in 1988–1992, which enabled refugees to own the apartments and houses they occupied. At the time of the adoption of the law, an estimated 3,200 refugee families were expected to obtain ownership of their place of residence. By 2003, some (albeit limited) degree of integration of Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan had been achieved, but social, economic, and cultural obstacles persisted. 163 Nevertheless, these reforms led to the institutionalization of procedures for refugees and asylum seekers. In 2006, the government approved 120 of the 646 petitions submitted for asylum; in 2007, 164 out of 266 refugee applicants; in 2008, 68 out of 190 applicants; and in 2009, 33 out of 66 applicants.164 Naturalization granted refugees the rights of citizenship as guaranteed under the Constitution of the republic. In addition to political and civil rights acquired as citizens, refugees began to gain access to social and health services and public education, the right to ownership of property, and the right to seek employment. At least initially, most refugees were reluctant to accept citizenship, ―fearing the loss of free housing, military service exemption, and other benefits accorded to refugees.‖165 For a growing number of refugees, however, citizenship enabled them to enjoy certain benefits, including, for example, possession of an Armenian passport, without which they could not legally travel abroad, and if they did travel illegally, they could not have the legal protection of the Armenian embassy. 166 Gradually, the number applying for citizenship increased. From 1995 to 1998, about 7,400 refugees became citizens; that figure increased to 8,000 in 1999, and to 15,600 in 2000.167 By early 2004, nearly 65,000 refugees from Azerbaijan were granted Armenian citizenship, and by the end of 2009 that figure had increased to 81,300. 168 These figures represented, in the words of a UNHCR report, ―the largest ever for a specific refugee group.‖ 169 Lloyd Dakin, then representative of UNHCR in Armenia, commented that ―[n]aturalization and local integration are not very often available as a durable solution for refugees worldwide. … But in Armenia it has been happening on a large scale for some time. This is an impressive achievement reflecting the government‖s generosity towards refugees, and it deserves recognition.‖ 170 Although the government was slow in responding to the needs of IDPs, nevertheless with assistance from international organizations it eventually introduced social programs to absorb IDPs effectively into their host communities, 171 including the program for ―Post-conflict Rehabilitation in Near-border Regions of Armenia‖; the ―Preliminary program to improve residential conditions for residents of near-border

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regions damaged by bombing‖; and the ―Comprehensive Development Program in Near-border Regions,‖ as promulgated under the Law of Armenia on the Adoption of the Comprehensive development program for these regions. The IMF report of 2003 recommended that these programs be ―complemented with sub-programs targeting cultural rehabilitation, including the restoration of cultural centers with the emphasis on library and information assets, and the restoration of community life.‖172 The Kocharyan government also created a temporary protection program for many of those who otherwise lacked refugee status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 protocol. An estimated 96 Iraqi Armenian refugees benefited from this program in 2004, and 50 in 2005.173 The Central Emergency Response Fund in 2007 allocated $300,000 earmarked for their winter needs. 174 The Sargsyan government continued the favorable attitude established within the presidential office regarding refugees and IDPs. In 2009, the government finalized a refugee program, which provided assistance for the resettlement of more than 625 households displaced as a result of the Karabagh war. This program, however, lacked sufficient funding and therefore could not effectuate its immediate implementation. 175 Corruption and burdensome bureaucratic procedures caused unnecessary delays in processing individual cases, a problem further exacerbated by shortages in housing and lack of sufficient social-economic programs. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, which allocated $1.94 million in 2009 and $3.82 million in 2010 to its program in Armenia, noted the ―gaps and obstacles‖ to legal and socioeconomic integration through urgently needed housing and social protection programs. 176 The effective integration of refugees into society, however, requires more than granting citizenship and participation in procedural democracy. Other factors contributing to or impeding socioeconomic, cultural, and psychological integration must also be considered.177 Poor standards of living indicate the absence of substantive democracy and the failure of the Armenian government to fulfill its obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The Kocharyan government cooperated with international agencies to introduce the reforms advanced under the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, and in doing so he laid the foundations for a sustainable refugee policy in accordance with international refugee law and human rights standards. Several more years of observation are necessary, however, for an accurate assessment of the durability of his policies. The Guiding Principles have contributed to the development of international human rights standards and promise greater attention to the plight of IDPs in

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Armenia and around the world, while serving as a practical guide for policymakers, international bodies, and NGOs. The moral and legal responsibility to implement policies effectively to address the nation‖s socioeconomic problems, however, rests with the government in Erevan. Summary As of this writing, Armenia is not among the list of ―Worst Places for Refugees‖ published annually by the World Refugee Survey. 178 Nevertheless, removed from their homes and familiar environments as a result of earthquake and war, refugees and IDPs in Armenia have been victims of profoundly traumatizing turmoil and disruptions in nearly every aspect of life, including health, housing, education, and employment, all of which have contributed to their protracted poverty. The general indifference shown under the Ter-Petrosyan government to such a largescale human catastrophe, state failure to allocate sufficient financial resources, and the failure of the agencies centered in Erevan to take an active role in rendering assistance to the refugees and IDPs, all prolonged their hardship in clear violation of the Armenian Constitution, international human rights law, and international refugee law. After its initial active response to the refugee crisis prior to and immediately after independence from the Soviet Union, the Ter-Petrosyan government, in part because of the economic depression and in part because of its authoritarian orientation and the oligarchic system, limited its engagement to ad hoc measures. Instead, it relied on international agencies and the diasporan communities for assistance. It was not until the Kocharyan government assumed power in 1998 that the much-needed policies were instituted, a change in policy direction from its predecessor encouraged by international organizations, led by the United Nations, as the latter began to pay greater attention to the global refugee and IDP crisis. International aid enabled the government to institute various programs in the area of housing, infrastructural development, demining, and so forth, to facilitate the return of IDPs to their communities of origin. These programs, coupled with efforts to integrate the refugees into the local communities, gradually commenced the task of removing many of the refugees and IDPs from the miserable conditions in the communities of temporary shelters. The IMF expects the number of people housed in temporary shelters to drop from about 5 per cent of the total population to 1 per cent by 2015 and the refugee problem to be solved entirely by 2020.179 The integration of refugees and IDPs into local communities necessitates various housing, health, educational, and employment programs, and a comprehensive strategy

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for economic development. Armenia has accepted legal obligations under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 and its 1967 Protocol, along with other key instruments of international human rights law. Unlike in the case of the formulation of the international conventions prior to 1991, when Armenia lacked sovereign statehood and therefore was excluded from such processes, it directly participated in the formulation of the Guiding Principles as a sovereign state, and, the difficulties inherent in the authoritarian and oligarchic system notwithstanding, the nation appears to have benefited from such participation, as the policymaking institutions adjusted their orientation to accommodate the needs and demands of the refugees and IDPs. This was possible in large part because of expectations for financial assistance from international organizations but also in part because such engagements do not require direct intervention on the part of the international organizations in matters of domestic political and civil rights. In his farewell speech to the United Nations in December 2006, former Secretary-General Kofi Annan emphasized ―the interconnectedness of the security of all people,‖ highlighting ―the global community‖s responsibility for everyone‖s welfare,‖ as well as ―respect for the rule of law‖ and the ―accountability of governments for their actions.‖180 In a similar vein, António Guterres, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in addressing the High Commissioner‖s Dialogue on Protection Challenges, commented in late 2008 that an estimated 10 million refugees from different parts of the world – such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Myanmar, Somalia and Sudan – have for more than five years been subjected to various forms of human rights violations. Guterres stressed the imperative of UN engagement in ―mediation, negotiation, the establishment of peacekeeping missions or the punishment of those who are found guilty of war crimes.‖ He further emphasized the necessity of spe cific measures to improve living conditions for ―long-term refugees‖ through decent standards of livelihood, effective education, and training. Yet, the international community, he notedy, has gradually lost interest in such matters, resources for basic services are soon exhausted, and ―education and health care stagnate and then deteriorate.‖181 Paul Hunt, UN Special Rapporteur on the right to the highest attainable standard of health, has stressed that ―because the right to health gives rise to entitlements and obligations, it demands effective mechanisms of accountability.‖182 Further, Hunt added, ―the combined effect of these three dimensions – standards, obligations and accountability – is the empowerment of vulnerable individuals and disadvantaged communities.‖183

Conclusion

The collapse of the Soviet Union revived democratic aspirations across the constituent republics and led some observers to believe that the end of Communist Party rule would usher in a new age of democratization. Others held a less sanguine view regarding these architectonic transformations. Indeed, those propagating an unduly optimistic conceptualization of ―transition‖ failed to account for reversals in the political fortunes of some of the newly independent states. The latter, including Armenia, had for decades existed under an oppressive Soviet regime that at best oscillated between totalitarianism and authoritarianism. They attained, therefore, little experience in the procedures and politics of liberal democratic governance. The post-Soviet republics, similar to the experiences in post-colonial Africa and Asia, instantaneously became too vulnerable to internal and external pressures to institute procedurally open mechanisms for procedurally and substantively democratic policies. The challenges of state-building afforded faint prospects for the effective institutionalization of public accountability and transparency. In the case of Armenia, in no policy area have these issues gained a higher degree of saliency than in human rights. The present study has examined the human rights situation in postSoviet Armenia. A high level of respect for human rights on the part of the government would indicate its adherence to democratic principles and the effective manifestation of both procedural and substantive democracy. A study of human rights in Armenia therefore is also an evaluation of its political system and the extent to which its principal policymaking institutions promote and protect human rights. It elucidates the nature of the relationships between these institutions and mediating agencies such as political parties, non-governmental organizations, and mass media, which, if effective, contribute to the institutionalization of public accountability. It assesses the extent to which the public is permitted routine opportunities for constitutionally guaranteed participation in the political process and for civic engagement in the public sphere. This study has utilized four approaches for purposes of analysis. The first three, derived from analyses commonly found in the existing litera-

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ture in the fields of history, political science, sociology, economics, and cultural studies, consist of historical legacies, policymaking institutions, and the policies generated by individual government leaders and agencies.1 A fourth component has been added – namely, international human rights law – as a set of universally accepted standards against which human rights conditions in the republic are assessed. Rather than rely on abstract notions of human rights, the analysis presented here benefits from concrete conceptualization of human rights as articulated in international declarations and conventions in the categories of political rights, civil liberties, social and economic rights, and refugee rights. These four approaches combined provide the necessary theoretical and empirical tools to elucidate causal relationships within a broader his torical perspective than commonly found in the literature on human rights case studies. One caveat in the present study, however, has been the greater weight accorded to policy implementation than to policy formulation. That is, in examining the Armenian government‖s human rights performance, this study has focused primarily on evaluating policy outputs and outcomes. Further research is necessary, therefore, for a more comprehensive assessment of the policy process in its entirety from policy formulation to implementation and evaluation. The principal argument presented in this study is that since gaining independence in 1991 the Armenian government has failed to meet the human rights standards established in both the Constitution of the republic and international human rights law. This failure is amply demonstrated in publications by various governments, international organizations, and NGOs. A plethora of sources cover, in explicit detail, the egregious violations of human rights by the Armenian government. The experiences of victims are significant in and of themselves to warrant detailed chronicles of their pain and suffering. But these violations assume further importance in analyses of the extent to which Armenia has achieved democratization since 1991, particularly the government‖s human rights performance relative to international standards. This volume offers the Armenian experience as a case study in postSoviet authoritarian rule. The Armenian republic pressed for democratization in the closing days of the Soviet Union, but after two decades of national sovereignty, the government has consolidated an authoritarian regime rather than a democratic one. The present study has advanced the argument that a deeper understanding of the authoritarian turn in Armenian politics and a substantive evaluation of the current political system require a sound appreciation of Armenian historical legacies and political culture. As John Hall has cogently argued, an accurate assessment of the rapidly changing post-Soviet landscape neces-

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sitates due consideration of the historical legacies inherited by the newly independent republics and the cultural, political, and economic environment in which they currently operate. 2 The challenges confronting post-Soviet Armenia with respect to democratization have proven exceptionally difficult to overcome since it was ruled not only by the Communist Party for seven decades but also by the Russian tsarist regime for more than a century before the Bolsheviks consolidated power in Erevan. Nor did Armenia have an opportunity to experiment with democratization prior to the Russian expansion into the Caucasus in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Armenians in the region had been under the Persian Empire for centuries prior to the advent of Russian imperial rule. In fact, the last independent Armenian government in the Caucasus collapsed in the eleventh century, nearly a millennium before the emergence of the first republic in 1918. Even the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia at the northeastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea did not survive into the modern age and fell victim to internal political machinations and foreign invasions in 1375. Thus, the current republic lacks historical experiences comparable to those that gave shape to the relatively more democratic political cultures and traditions of Europe over the centuries. Theorists debate the preconditions for the establishment and continuation of democracy, but there is a general consensus that liberalism and democracy are closely related and, more explicitly, that ―liberalism precedes democracy.‖3 Armenia represents a case where the historical trajectory omitted opportunities for liberalism to shape Armenian governance. This study has contended that Armenian political culture, shaped by the historical legacies of Russian and Ottoman rule, possesses little to no experience of liberalism. When Armenian liberal ideologies did emerge in the past, they did so in the first instance in the form of nationalism and national liberation in opposition to Ottoman, Persian, or Russian domination. As a result, in the absence of liberalism, it was found virtually impossible to develop democracy within the relatively short period (i.e. 1991‒2010). Political culture, as a unit of analysis and as an independent variable, constitutes an integral component of historical legacies, and the present volume has stressed its significance in exploring the entrenchment of authoritarianism and the prospects for democratization in Armenia. The political economy of a country reflects its citizens‖ deeply held beliefs and values and cultural norms – their ―habits of the heart.‖ Political culture is rooted in the history and collective consciousness of a people, comprising belief systems and patterns of political behavior and social attitudes, none of which changes instantaneously. 4

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This points to a contentious issue in the literature on the causal relationship between development and democracy. There are sufficient theoretical treatises and empirical analyses to support the contention, following Karl Marx, Max Weber, and others, that socioeconomic development (e.g. the emergence of specific politically significant classes or groups) introduces fundamental changes in political culture and mores, and some scholars have maintained that ―the basic values and beliefs of the publics of advanced societies differ dramatically from those found in less-developed societies.‖5 While, following Barrington Moore‖s analysis,6 one may argue that an Armenian bourgeois class did emerge in the nineteenth century, unlike the cases studied by Moore, the Armenian bourgeois class could not perform the same liberalizing functions with respect to an Armenian government (as the bourgeois classes did in Britain or France, for instance) simply because no Armenian government existed. The Armenian bourgeoisie instead was confronted with the demands and vagaries of foreign rule and failed to inspire and embed liberal values that would lead to the consolidation of homegrown democracy. Further, if modernization is seen as equivalent to Westernization, there is ample evidence to support the contention that historically Armenian political culture in Greater Armenia lacked opportunities to develop along Western lines. The Cilician kingdom farther west perhaps could have exercised a westernizing influence (and to a limited extent it did), but after its fall Armenians in the region and across historic Armenia remained subjects under their Ottoman, Persian, and Russian overlords, whose traditions, institutions, and customs proffered little opportunity for modernization and Westernization. In the meantime, the Western societies that were to emerge as liberal democracies by the twentieth century experienced – and the rulers and the ruled were required to adjust to – the positive and negative consequences of the Renaissance, the Reformation, the scientific revolution, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution, along with political revolutions (e.g. the French Revolution), all of which served as either piecemeal or revolutionary convulsions that dismantled feudal customs, cultures, and political and socioeconomic structures. These transformations engendered modernization, the ―first wave‖ of democratization, and the ―first generation‖ of human rights. Armenian culture, whether in the Ottoman, Persian, or Russian empire, remained a recipient or ―importer‖ culture of the Enlightenment values emanating from the West but without opportunities to shape institutions of modern sovereign statehood. Under different socio-cultural and economic conditions and ruled by a sovereign government of their own, the Armenian people perhaps could have developed their own democratic institutions. In parallel his-

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torical developments witnessed in the West, a sequence of transformative events – for example, a scientific revolution of their own, an Armenian Enlightenment, or a genuinely democratically oriented revolution – perhaps could have propelled Armenian society toward modernization in political culture and democratization in the commonweal by the twentieth century. Instead, however, Armenians were to remain for centuries subject peoples under foreign rulers, without such transformative experiences on their own terms. The Genocide during the First World War terminated what progress had been achieved during the preceding century, and the Sovietization of the first republic further solidified the authoritarian political culture experienced under the tsarist regime. By the time the Soviet regime fell and Armenians finally secured an opportunity to manage their own affairs, they had lagged behind in the political, economic, and technological advances taking place beyond the Iron Curtain. They indeed found themselves in a similar situation as experienced by a host of other juridically sovereign but economically less developed societies. Further, this study has stressed the significant role the Armenian Apostolic Church can potentially exercise in promoting democracy and protecting human rights. Thus far, however, it has failed in part because of historical legacies and in part because of its conservative character. For centuries, the Church, whether under the Catholicosate of Echmiadzin or the Patriarchate of Constantinople, enjoyed the privilege of close cooperation with the political and economic elites and therefore preferred the status quo. In most of the twentieth century, the Armenian Church at Echmiadzin, which, as a result of Soviet coercion and cooptation, had aligned itself with the political dictates of the Soviet regime, subsequently and in a similar fashion aligned itself with the postSoviet state. Consequently, even though the public maintains a high degree of loyalty to the Armenian Church, the latter has failed to play an active role in promoting and defending human rights in the current republic or to render even a minimal contribution to the public discourse on human rights. Given the significance of the Armenian Church and Christianity in Armenian history and culture, more active involvement by the Church may be essential to cultivate a democratic culture and an improved political environment favorable to human rights practices. It is worth reiterating the point that the contrast drawn between European achievements and Armenian underdevelopment is not meant to assign a cultural or moral superiority to the former and inferiority to the latter. The historical legacies of Western societies were shaped by social, economic, scientific, and religious forces that gradually gave rise to the Enlightenment and to liberalism, which in turn generated progres-

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sively louder demands for fundamental reforms in political institutions and for changes in social and economic policy. Liberalism and subsequent philosophies and intellectual movements were essential in propelling Western societies toward secularization and democratization. Meanwhile, as a small number of Western societies engaged in global empire-building and in the process, as mission civilisatrice, disseminated Western cultural values and imposed capitalist international legal standards, the older empires in the East, such as the Chinese, Mughal, Ottoman, and Persian empires, could not withstand international and domestic pressures and eventually either were subjugated or collapsed under the weight of domestic and international conflicts. Societies and communities across the globe, among them Armenians in the Ottoman, Persian, and Russian empires, remained deeply entrenched in their own traditional institutions, customs, and cultures, subject peoples living under oppressive, even tyrannical, social, cultural, and economic conditions well into the modern age. As a result, neither Armenians in Ottoman (Western) Armenia nor their compatriots in Persian and later Russian (Eastern) Armenia could develop the requisite institutional and cultural bases for liberal politics and democracy with cultural standards favorable to international law in general and human rights in particular. This book juxtaposes the history of Armenia with the evolution of international human rights standards, delineated in the literature as a progression of ―generations‖ of human rights. Derived from the values of the Enlightenment and their forceful articulation during the American War of Independence and the French Revolution, the first generation consists of civil liberties and political rights (liberté); the second generation includes social and economic rights (égalité); and the third generation refers to collective or solidarity rights (fraternité). This work has analyzed the Armenian government‖s performance in negative and positive rights, comprised of political rights, civil liberties, and social and economic rights, with particular attention to the rights of women, children, and refugees. Since the Second World War, several key international standardsetting instruments have affirmed the universality and legally binding character of these rights, most prominently the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In the case of the Soviet

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bloc countries, the Helsinki Accords, though not legally binding, nevertheless galvanized human rights movements across the Soviet empire. By the time Armenia became a sovereign state, most of these conventions and standards had been established, requiring considerable efforts on the part of policymakers in Erevan to incorporate them into the emerging legal framework. This study has argued that post-Soviet Armenia has failed to make the political, cultural, economic, and legal adjustments necessary for the task. Having failed to do so, and in the absence of democratic, constitutional political culture and institutions, it has opted for imitative behavior, ―importing‖ the symbols of democratization (e.g. elections, a constitution) but without the substance of democracy. The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia guarantees the rights and privileges one expects to find in democratic societies in accordance with international human rights standards. In practice, however, the government‖s human rights record since independence has not met international standards. The assessment of the human rights situation in Armenia since 1991 as presented in this study leads to the conclusion that the Ter-Petrosyan, Kocharyan, and Sargsyan administrations have performed poorly according to standards established by both the Constitution and international human rights law. In addition to identifying Armenian political culture as a contributing factor to the republic‖s dire human rights situation, this study has highlighted the clash between sovereignty and human rights values, as political and economic elites have stressed state-building at the expense of the promotion and protection of human rights. The traumatic nature of the transition from the Soviet regime to independence – the catastrophic consequences of the earthquake in December 1988, the war in Karabagh, the economic blockade imposed by Turkey and Azerbaijan, and the initial shock of the Soviet collapse and the economic crisis in general – no doubt contributed to the government‖s dismal performance. One of the most ardent advocates of individual rights in the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill, maintained that in the ―ancient commonwealths‖ the exercise of state power to restrict individual rights may have been deemed ―admissible in small republics surrounded by powerful enemies, in constant peril of being subverted by foreign attack or internal commotion, and to which even a short interval of relaxed energy and self-command might so easily be fatal, that they could not afford to wait for the salutary permanent effects of freedom.‖7 Seen in this light, the shift toward authoritarian rule under Ter-Petrosyan during the period from 1993 to 1994 may be explained from the perspective of national security, which is certainly a legitimate concern for any

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sovereign state. This shift to authoritarianism, however, also reflected the deeply entrenched authoritarian culture and practices inherited from the Soviet regime, now buttressed by the symbiotic state-oligarchic complex. Rather than seizing the opportunity to develop a democracy, the Ter-Petrosyan regime laid the foundation for authoritarian rule and in so doing also set a precedent for his successors, who continued to resort to repressive practices to quell their internal opposition. The war in Karabagh ceased in 1994, Ter-Petrosyan resigned in 1998, and the economy began to recover despite the continued blockade. Yet, authoritarian rule has prevailed as the established system of governance. The deplorable human rights situation did not improve after the transition to the Kocharyan government and in fact deteriorated rapidly, as demonstrated by the violence and bloodshed that followed the 2008 presidential election. By then, authoritarian rule and the resultant human rights violations had become a matter of routine behavior on the part of authorities at all levels of government. Numerous sources indicate that the government‖s poor human rights performance persists. Citizens cannot change the government through free and legitimate means of elections. Deaths and physical abuses in the military continue, as do police brutality, arbitrary arrests and detentions, government hostility toward the press, domestic violence in the family, and human trafficking across international borders, with little or no recourse for reforms. The human rights situation in Armenia is thus best understood in the context of the nation‖s overall political, cultural, social, and economic environment, which is dominated by a number of inextricably entwined factors: the oligarchic networks, consisting of symbiotic relations between political leaders and economic elites; the exercise of virtually unlimited powers on the part of the executive; party loyalty within the legislature toward the executive; the absence of an independent judiciary; weak opposition parties; the absence of a viable civil society and of political civility; and systemic corruption. Significantly, while economic indicators show a respectable level of recovery from the depression of the early 1990s, the principal or even the exclusive beneficiaries of economic growth and development have been the oligarchic networks. Poverty has remained a serious problem and has encouraged further corruption and criminal behavior, particularly involving the most vulnerable groups in society: women and children. The examination of the human rights situation of refugees and internally displaced persons is particularly illuminating. While the human rights performance of the government in the areas of political rights, civil liberties, and economic and social rights has been consistently

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dismal, the government‖s response to the problems of refugees and IDPs has seen some, albeit limited, improvement. The Ter-Petrosyan government, in part because of the war over Karabagh and the economic meltdown, and in part because of its authoritarian propensities in an environment dominated by oligarchic interests, neglected the refugee/ IDP issue after its initial engagement and relied instead on international support to ameliorate the situation. Government policy changed after the Kocharyan government entered office. Although requiring further research, several factors may have contributed to this change in policy. Kocharyan and his close circle of advisers hailed from Karabagh, which may have contributed to a sense of moral responsibility to address the crisis. Also, the early years of the Kocharyan government coincided with growing international attention by the United Nations and NGOs to the issue of refugees and IDPs on a global scale. The Kocharyan government, whether out of a consideration for human rights standards or a desire to secure foreign aid, closely cooperated with international organizations. Nevertheless, these efforts did not extend into other human rights areas. A democratic future? The current Armenian democratic experiment may yet succeed if the political leaders demonstrate the political will as well as the social and institutional capacity to construct a political system and culture premised on a belief in human rights. The reality on the ground, however, thus far has revealed propensities that fall short of the experiment‖s initial promise. Instead, the vicissitudes of fraudulent and even violent political succession, economic depression and insecurity, war and an overall sense of instability, all have fueled a vicious cycle of generalized suspicion and habits of distrust, particularly regarding Armenian governance. Further, in contradistinction with the more familiar habits of subjecthood to foreign rule – habits of apathy and passivity – the Armenian citizenry has shown patterns of aggressive participation when mobilized.8 As a form of compensation for their insecurities, 9 both the public and the political leadership have relied on networks of familial loyalty and trust, but with little loyalty to or trust in the general commonweal. Instead, they have routinely resorted to the rhetoric of ―transition‖ and democratization and of tradition and nationalism. The political leaders have advocated the ideology of Westernization and liberalism of a market economy. In the meantime, the political institutions have not advanced a constitutional, human rights culture. Such a cultural and ideological construction of ―Potemkin democracy‖ in postSoviet Armenia remains devoid of the most fundamental, rudimentary

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ingredients of procedural and substantive democracy in its practical aspects. One could argue that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Stalinist legacy provided a long-awaited opportunity to create a democratically oriented political system where citizens could expect decent human rights standards. From such an optimistic point of view, despite the historical, cultural, and structural constraints on democratization, Armenia may improve its human rights situation in the future, given sufficient international pressures for democratization, political and economic liberalization, and economic development. External incentives for improved human rights practices (as demonstrated in the case of refugee policies) and for the construction of democracy may include closer relations with diasporan communities, foreign direct investment, closer integration into the global political economy, and international assistance for various industrial and technological projects. Following this rather optimistic perspective, the predictive model developed by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel suggests several options regarding the future trajectory of human rights and democratization in Armenia. The socioeconomic development of a country, Inglehart and Welzel contend, serves as a fairly accurate predictor of the extent to which it can stimulate industrialization, which in turn augments the industrial work force. They argue that ―a relatively large industrial work force [tends] to bring a society closer to secular-rational values.‖ Further, ―a relatively large percentage of the work force in the service sector tends to [bring] societies closer to self-expression values.‖10 The relative improvement regarding refugee policy under international influence also suggests the question of whether the diaspora can contribute to future improvements in the human rights situation in the homeland. Although this issue requires a separate study, thus far the diaspora has failed in this area. Armenian diasporan communities can potentially exert a positive influence with respect to democratization in Armenia – similar to the pressures exerted by Soviet dissident émigrés through the Helsinki movement. The Kocharyan government‖s favorable response to international initiatives in the area of refugees and IDPs supports the view that international human rights conventions and NGOs can influence state policy. The creation of the office of the Human Rights Defender (Ombudsman) within the constitutional framework of the republic also serves as a positive step toward democratization. These improvements lend support to the argument, advanced in this volume, that reliance exclusively on historical legacies and political culture as independent variables cannot offer an accurate assessment of human rights performance and democratization. Policymaking institutions and

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policy decisions must also be considered. On the pessimistic side, however, the authoritarian nature of the republic‖s political institutions, the deeply entrenched interests of the political-economic elites, the pervasive corruption, and the undeveloped economy, all are likely to have profoundly detrimental consequences for the country. Armenia‖s high unemployment and poverty levels, coupled with the general indifference shown by the nation‖s political leaders toward the social and economic problems suffered by a large percentage of the public, are not conducive to democratization and would, in fact, impede significant improvements in human rights practices. Armenia is not likely to emerge as a democracy in the foreseeable future, nor is its human rights record likely to improve significantly. In the extreme case, the failure of the political system to rectify the human rights situation could bring about a right-wing military dictatorial regime. Nor does the human rights situation of women and children warrant an optimistic projections for the future, particularly if a positive correlation between the advancement of their rights and the development of democracy is considered. With respect to the human rights of women, for instance, John Stuart Mill observed in the nineteenth century that human experience has demonstrated that ―every step in improvement has been so invariably accompanied by a step made in raising the social position of women, that historians and philosophers have been led to adopt their elevation or debasement as on the whole the surest test and most correct measure of the civilization of a people or an age.‖ 11 The Armenian case clearly demonstrates a fundamental failure in this area, a challenge most poignantly brought to public attention both in Armenia and the diaspora by the physical abuse Zaruhi Petrosyan had reportedly suffered at the hands of her husband and mother-in-law and was finally murdered by her husband in October 2010. 12 It remains to be seen whether national and international calls for improvements in women‖s rights (particularly concerning trafficking and domestic vio lence) can exert sufficient influence to change public attitude and policy. Unlike the improvement in refugee policy, challenges confronting women involve more than policy; rather, they require fundamental transformations in culture and conduct. Although as of yet the Armenian government cannot be characterized as praetorian, its continued reliance on the security apparatus to suppress opposition supporters after elections or protests could lead to the praetorianization of Armenian politics, whereby the military intervenes frequently in politics and potentially ―dominates the political system.‖13 As Samuel Huntington has argued, political modernization generates political instability as well as praetorian order. 14 Elections marred

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by fraudulent practices, intimidation, physical attacks, and arrests, as witnessed during parliamentary, presidential, and local elections, have created an environment and psychology of insecurity and instability. Leaders who assume power under such circumstances cannot command the degree of political legitimacy necessary for democratization. Recurring conflicts – or ―anomies,‖ in Talcott Parsons‖ terminology – and the failure of the political leadership to manage them through democratic measures may lead to political instability 15 and eventually debilitate the political system. 16 The loss of political legitimacy on the part of the civilian leadership, on the one hand, and a growing sense of instability, on the other, may eventually lead to the emergence of a core military group that perceives itself as the guardian of the constitutional order. The full institutionalization of democracy and human rights standards, therefore, requires anomie-mitigating mechanisms. Free and fair elections serve as one such mechanism and do so as a necessary ingredient of procedural democracy. As this book has argued, however, procedural democracy is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the development of mature democracy. The implementation of policies that promote and protect human rights would signal the emergence of substantive democracy. Court decisions, arrived at independently of executive or other extraneous influences, would enhance the anomiemitigating functions of the judiciary and hence solidify a more democratically oriented political culture in congruence with emerging democratic institutions and practices. Effective democracy requires centuries of cultural development that create an environment conducive to democratic institutional arrangements and practices. The challenge for the construction of democracy, as Ian Shapiro has noted, ―is to devise mechanisms for structuring the power dimensions of human interaction so as to minimize domination, while limiting interference‖ in the individual‖s cultural, educational, economic, and social spheres. 17 Armenian political culture is likely to continue the Soviet tradition of demanding conformity on the part of the individual rather than stress individual autonomy. But, as Karl Popper cautioned in the 1960s, closed minds lead to a closed society. 18 The emphasis placed on the authoritarian propensities of Armenian political culture should not be construed in absolute, deterministic terms, for cultures do change; however, they do not change overnight. From the perspective of intergenerational change, it may be that the post-Soviet generations will guide Armenian society toward greater modernization of political economy and liberalization of political culture, and will embrace self-expression values. This would entail opening the public sphere for meaningful political participation through legiti-

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mate electoral processes, through viable civil society organizations, and through constitutional mechanisms respected equally by authorities in power and opposition groups in reciprocal civility. Charles Fairbanks, in his assessment of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, has noted that while they consider themselves European, ―they display the historic attraction of small peoples to universal principles. … Together with the ideological monopoly that democracy now has, these civilizational identities will over the long term pull‖ the country ―toward democratization.‖19 Activities by domestic and international human rights groups in the long run may contribute to improvements in the human rights situation in Armenia. As Richard Falk states: To advocate human rights is to inform people about their violation, to fortify morale of certain resistance efforts, to create ―space‖ for human rights concerns within and without the governmental apparatus, and to set in motion a positive transnational momentum on behalf of peace and justice in the world. 20 Perhaps a preliminary step toward democratization was taken in January 2001 when Armenia joined the Council of Europe as full member. 21 Both the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe have demonstrated considerable concern for the human rights situation in the former Soviet republics, and membership may encourage greater domestic and international support for democratization. Two decades have passed since Armenia gained independence, and its political leaders and governmental institutions have yet to demonstrate their ability to obtain the standards set by the Constitution of the republic and by international human rights law. Armenia‖s historical legacies inherited from both pre-Soviet and Soviet experiences do not inspire hope in such a fundamental transformation in the foreseeable future, the lack of socioeconomic development further retarding modernization, liberalization, secularization, and self-expression values. Undoubtedly, as with other societies, individual existential security represents first priority. People living in underdeveloped, substandard socioeconomic conditions, as found in Armenia, cannot emphasize objectives at variance with the imperatives of daily livelihood. Human rights values under such conditions become closely associated with pressing economic considerations rather than matters pertaining to civil and political rights and liberties. Yet, the political system and the oligarchical structure cannot accommodate demands to that effect, for the dominant elite is not likely, motivated by compassion alone, to introduce the

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democratic institutional mechanisms necessary for effective practices in human rights spheres. The failure to improve socioeconomic conditions indicates that post-Soviet Armenians are not likely to cultivate democratically oriented norms in the near future. Instead, disillusionment with post-Soviet ―democracy,‖ which has already caused frustration and resignation, may further entrench authoritarian tendencies. Nora Dudwick‖s conclusions regarding the ―disturbing trends‖ apparent in the political economy of post-Soviet Armenia in the early part of the 1990s remain equally valid to this day. The predominance of ―clientalistic relationships‖ rather than the presence of an active civil society; the rigidly stratified nature of society which in turn impedes educational and economic development; ―social anomie,‖ nationalism, and emigration leading to cultural ―homogenization‖ and ―provincialization‖; and restrictions on political freedoms and civil liberties 22 – all have, by 2011, led to the development of authoritarian rule rather than the democracy so eagerly expected at the time of independence. Gretchen Casper reminds us that ―the legacies of authoritarian rule are fragile democracies.‖23 Democratization in Armenia would entail the extremely difficult task of dissolving the oligarchic economic and political structures and reconfiguring state-citizen power relations. A vibrant civil society may facilitate the development of legitimate public spheres for active political participation and meaningful voice, especially by groups that are currently excluded. Taking these steps would promote greater institutional accessibility and accountability. In modern times, the first Armenian attempt at national sovereignty and democratic rule from 1918 to 1920 failed due to, on the one hand, the extremely severe domestic conditions generated by war and genocide, and, on the other, the combined forces of the Turkish Kemalist and Russian Bolshevik armies. Soviet rule for seven decades thereafter rested upon totalitarianism and authoritarianism. It remains to be seen whether postSoviet Armenia can disperse the long shadow of its turbulent past, eradicate its current authoritarian proclivities, and cultivate a sovereignty based on democratic legitimacy.

Appendix I Comparative measures of political rights and civil liberties in the former Soviet republics, 1992-2008

Country Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Estonia Georgia Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Latvia Lithuania Moldova Russia Tajikistan Turkmenistan Ukraine Uzbekistan

1992 PR / CL 4 3 PF 5 5 PF 4 3 PF 3 3 PF 4 5 PF 5 5 PF 4 2 PF 3 3 PF 2 3F 5 5 PF 3 4 PF 6 6 NF 7 6 NF 3 3 PF 6 6 NF

1994 PR / CL 3 4 PF 6 6 NF 4 4 PF 3 2F 5 5 PF 6 5 NF 4 3 PF 3 2F 1 3F 4 4 PF 3 4 PF 7 7 NF 7 7 NF 3 4 PF 7 7 NF

1996 1998 PR / CL PR / CL 5 4 PF 4 4 PF 6 5 NF 6 4 PF 6 6 NF 6 6 NF 1 2F 1 2F 4 4 PF 3 4 PF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 4 4P 5 5 PF 2 2F 1 2F 1 2F 1 2F 3 4 PF 2 4 PF 3 4 PF 4 4 PF 7 7 NF 6 6 NF 7 7 NF 7 7 NF 3 4 PF 3 4 PF 7 6 NF 7 6 NF

2000 PR / CL 4 4 PF 6 5 PF 6 6 NF 1 2F 4 4 PF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 1 2F 1 2F 2 4 PF 5 5 PF 6 6 NF 7 7 NF 4 4 PF 7 6 NF

2002 PR / CL 4 4 PF 6 5 PF 6 6 NF 1 2F 4 4 PF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 1 2F 1 2F 2 4 PF 5 5 PF 6 6 NF 7 7 NF 4 4 PF 7 6 NF

2004 PR / CL 5 4 PF 6 5 NF 7 6 NF 1 1F 3 4 PF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 1 2F 2 2F 3 4 PF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 7 7 NF 4 3 PF 7 6 NF

2006 2008 PR / CL PR / CL 5 4 PF 6 4 PF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 7 6 NF 7 6 NF 1 1F 1 1F 3 3 PF 4 4 PF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 5 4 PF 5 4 PF 1 1F 2 1F 1 1F 1 1F 3 4 PF 4 4 PF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 7 7 NF 7 7 NF 3 2F 3 2F 7 7 NF 7 7 NF

SOURCE: Freedom House, Freedom in the World: Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, various years. Each country is rated on a one-to-seven scale, where one is the most free and seven the least free in political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL). F = free; PF = partly free; NF = not free.

Notes

Chapter One 1

2

3

4

5 6

7 8

9 10 11 12 13

Elster, Jon, Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). On Soviet political culture, see White, Stephen, Political Culture and Soviet Politics (London: Macmillan, 1979); White, Stephen, ―The USSR: patterns of autocracy and industrialism,‖ in Archie Brown and Jack Gray (eds), Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979, 2nd ed.), pp. 25‒65. Tucker, Robert C., ―Culture, political culture, and communist society,‖ Political Science Quarterly 88:2 (1973), pp. 173‒90 (quote appears on p. 174). See also Tucker, Robert C., Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia: From Lenin to Gorbachev (New York: W.W. Norton, 1987). Dahl, Robert A., ―Development and democratic culture,‖ in Larry Jay Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu and Hung-mao Tien (eds), Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), pp. 34‒39. Rose, Richard, ―Postcommunism and the problem of trust,‖ Journal of Democracy 5:3 (1994), pp. 18‒30. Mishler, William and Richard Rose, ―Political support for incomplete democracies: realist vs. idealist theories and measures,‖ International Political Science Review 22:4 (2001), pp. 303‒20 (more specifically p. 306). See also Petrosyan, Rafik G., Datarane ev kaghakatsiakan datavarutyune arevelyan Hayastanum xix-xx darerum [The Court and Civil Procedure in Eastern Armenia in xix-xx Centuries] (Erevan: Erevan State University, 2001), pp. 32‒35. Woshinsky, Oliver H., Culture and Politics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), p. 5 (italics in original). Starr, S. Frederick, ―Introduction: the legacy of history in Russia and the new states of Eurasia,‖ in S. Frederick Starr (ed.), The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 4. Popper, Karl, The Poverty of Historicism (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961). Starr: ―Introduction,‖ p. 15. Elster, Offe and Preuss: Institutional Design, p. 3. Schumpeter, Joseph A., Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1942), p. 269. Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth

NOTES

14 15 16 17 18

19

20 21

22

23

24 25

26 27 28

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Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 5–9; Sandel, Michael J., ―The procedural republic and the unencumbered self,‖ Political Theory 12:1 (1984), pp. 81‒96. Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, ―Political culture and democracy: analyzing cross-level linkages,‖ Comparative Politics 36:1 (2003), p. 66. Jacobs, Lawrence R. and Robert Y. Shapiro, ―Studying substantive democracy,‖ PS: Political Science and Politics 27:1 (1994), pp. 9‒17. Sen, Amartya, Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor books, 2000), p. 10. Ibid., pp. 18‒19. Nussbaum, Martha C., Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 70‒85. See also Nussbaum, Martha C., ―Women‖s capabilities and social justice,‖ in Molyneux, Maxine and Shahra Razavi (eds), Gender, Justice, Development, and Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 45‒77. van Brabant, Koenraad, ―Civil society and substantive democracy: governance and the state of law in Belgium,‖ Development in Practice 8:4 (1998), pp. 407‒18 (quote appears on p. 408). Lipset, Seymour Martin, Political Man (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). Schedler, Andreas, ―The logic of electoral authoritarianism,‖ in Andreas Schedler (ed.), Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006), pp. 1‒23. Some scholars have characterized such authoritarian governments as ―hybrid regimes‖ or ―competitive authoritarianism.‖ See Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Diamond, Larry Jay, ―Thinking about hybrid regimes,‖ Journal of Democracy 13:2 (2002), pp. 21‒35. Weber, Max, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), Vol. 1, pp. 226‒27. March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen, ―The new institutionalism: organizational factors in political life,‖ American Political Science Review 78:3 (1984), pp. 734‒49. Haggard, Stephan and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 4. Inglehart and Welzel: ―Political culture and democracy,‖ p. 66. See also Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Inglehart and Welzel: ―Political culture and democracy,‖ pp. 66‒67. Tilly, Charles, Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 196. Inglehart, Ronald and W.E. Baker, ―Modernization, cultural change, and the persistence of traditional values,‖ American Sociological Review 65 (2000), pp. 19‒ 51; Bell, Daniel, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1976); Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, intro. Ernest Mandel, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Penguin Books, 1990‒2, 3 vols).

296 29

30 31 32

33 34

35 36 37

38 39

40

41 42 43 44 45 46 47

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA

Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); Harrison, Lawrence E. and Samuel P. Huntington (eds), Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress (New York: Basic Books, 2000); Hampden-Turner, C. and F. Trompenaars, The Seven Cultures of Capitalism (New York: Doubleday, 1993); McClelland, C.D., The Achieving Society (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1961); Weber, Max, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Scribner, [first published 1904] 1958). Zakaria, Fareed, ―Culture is destiny: an interview with Lee Kuan Yew,‖ Foreign Affairs 73:2 (1994), pp. 109‒26. van de Vliert, Evert, ―Climatoeconomic roots of survival versus self-expression cultures,‖ Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 38:2 (2007), p. 163. Wittfogel, Karl A., Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957); Inglehart and Welzel: Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p. 35. Inglehart and Welzel: Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p. 35. Ibid. See also Moore, Barrington, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968). Inglehart and Welzel: Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p. 52. Ibid. Hausmann, Ricardo, ―Prisoners of geography,‖ Foreign Policy 122 (2001), pp. 45‒ 53; Gallup, John, and Jeffrey Sachs, ―Location, location: geography and economic development,‖ Harvard International Review (Winter 1998/1999), pp. 56‒61. Inglehart and Welzel: ―Political culture and democracy.‖ Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963); Coleman (1990); Putnam, Robert D., with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Inglehart and Welzel: Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p. 71. Griffith, Ernest S., John Plamenatz and J. Roland Pennock, ―Cultural prerequisites to a successfully functioning democracy,‖ American Political Science Review 50:1 (1956), pp. 101‒37; Lipset, Seymour Martin, ―Some social requisites of democracy: economic development and political legitimacy,‖ American Political Science Review 53:1 (1959), pp. 69‒105. Dudwick, Nora, ―When the lights went out: poverty in Armenia,‖ in Dudwick, Gomart and Marc: When Things Fall Apart, p. 118. Inglehart and Welzel: ―Political culture and democracy,‖ p. 64. Almond and Verba: Civic Culture, p. 5. Inglehart and Welzel: ―Political culture and democracy,‖ p. 76. Woshinsky: Culture and Politics, p. 42. Ibid., pp. 48‒50, 51‒67. Ibid., pp. 44‒48.

NOTES 48 49 50

51 52 53 54

55 56 57 58

59

60

61

62 63

64 65

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Ibid., pp. 65‒66. Dahl, Robert A., Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 64. Welzel, Christian and Ronald F. Inglehart, ―Political culture, mass beliefs, and value change,‖ in Christian W. Haerpfer, Patrick Bernghagen, Ronald F. Inglehart and Christian Welzel (eds), Democratization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 134; see also Eckstein, Harry, A Theory of Stable Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966); Almond and Verba: Civic Culture. Woshinsky: Culture and Politics, p. 72. Ibid., pp. 72‒73. Ibid. Hunt, Lynn, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), p. 177. On the French, German, and American intellectual traditions in political culture, see Brint, Michael, A Genealogy of Political Culture (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991). Shapiro, Ian, The State of Democratic Theory (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 2‒3. Ibid., pp. 3‒4. Ishkanian, Armine, Democracy Building and Civil Society in Post-Soviet Armenia (London and New York: Routledge, 2008). See Libaridian, Gerard J. (ed.), Armenia at the Crossroads (Watertown, MA: Blue Crane, 1991), especially Ishkhanian, Rafayel, ―The law of excluding the third force,‖ pp. 9‒38, and Libaridian, Gerard J., ―Postscript: democracy, diaspora, and the national agenda,‖ pp. 157‒70. Suny, Ronald G., ―Elite transformation in late-Soviet and post-Soviet Transcaucasia, or what happens when the ruling class can‖t rule?‖ in Timothy J. Colton and Robert C. Tucker (eds), Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), p. 141. Fish, M. Steven, ―The dynamics of democratic erosion,‖ in Richard D. Anderson, Jr., et al. (eds), Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 54‒95; Markarov, Alexander, ―Macroinstitutional political structures and their development in Armenia,‖ Demokratizatsiya 14:2 (2006): pp. 159‒70. Dudwick, Nora, ―Political transformations in postcommunist Armenia: images and realities,‖ in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds), Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 84. Elster, Offe and Preuss: Institutional Design, p. 302. Gibson, James L., ―The resilience of mass support for democratic institutions and processes in the nascent Russian and Ukrainian democracies,‖ in Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.), Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), p. 53. Tilly: Democracy, pp. 74‒79; Dudwick: ―Political transformations‖; Ishkanian: Democracy Building. Gray, John, Enlightenment‖s Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age

298

66

67

68 69 70 71

72 73 74

75 76 77

78 79 80 81

82

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(London and New York: Routledge, 1995), Ch. 4, esp. pp. 58‒61. Allina-Pisano, Jessica, The Post-Soviet Potemkin Village: Politics and Property Rights in the Black Earth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); King, Charles, ―Potemkin democracy: four myths about post-Soviet Georgia,‖ National Interest 64 (2001), pp. 93‒104; Dudwick: ―Political transformations,‖ p. 102. Petrosyan: Datarane; Pivazyan, Harutyun, Datarani kazmakerpume ev zargatsume Sovetakan Hayastanum [The Formation and Development of the Court in Soviet Armenia] (Erevan: Mitk, 1966). Carothers, Thomas, ―The end of the transition paradigm,‖ Journal of Democracy 13:1 (2002), pp. 5‒21, esp. 6‒8. Diamond, Larry, The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the World (New York: Henry Holt, 2008). See, for example, Hunt: Inventing Human Rights; Herbert, Gary B., A Philosophical History of Rights (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2002). Rice, Eugene F. Jr., with Anthony Grafton, The Foundations of Early Modern Europe, 1460‒1559 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994, 2nd ed.); Deutsch, Karl W., Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1953); Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006, rev. ed.). See also Khachaturian: Cultivating Nationhood. Rice: Foundations, p. 8. Ibid. Habermas, Jürgen, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger, with Fredrick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989). Panossian, Razmik, The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 94‒97, 109‒21. Falk, Richard, Human Rights and State Sovereignty (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1981), pp. 53‒54. United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report 2000: Human Rights and Human Development (New York: UNDP, 2000), p. 2. See also Robinson, Mary, ―What rights can add to good development practice,‖ in Philip Alston and Mary Robinson (eds), Human Rights and Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 27. Evans, Tony, The Politics of Human Rights: A Global Perspective (London: Pluto Press, 2005, 2nd ed.), pp. 35‒38. Ibid., p. 38. Ibid., p. 39. Stammers, Neil, ―Human rights and power,‖ Political Studies 41:1 (1993), pp. 70‒ 82; Donnelly, Jack, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, 2nd ed.). Gill, Stephen, ―Globalisation, market civilisation, and disciplinary neoliberalism,‖ Millennium: Journal of International Studies 24:3 (1995), pp. 399‒423; see also Evans: Politics of Human Rights, pp. 43‒44. Evans: Politics of Human Rights, pp. 43‒44.

NOTES 84

85 86 87

88

89

90 91

92 93 94 95 96 97

98

99 100 101 102

103

299

See Conley, Marshall and Daniel Livermore, ―Human rights, development, and democracy: the linkage between theory and practice,‖ Canadian Journal of Development Studies 17:4 (1996), pp. 19‒36. Inglehart and Baker: ―Modernization,‖ pp. 19‒51. Ibid., p. 20. Inglehart and Baker: ―Modernization,‖ p. 20. See also deMaggio, Paul, ―Culture and economy,‖ in Neil J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg (eds), The Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 27‒57. Isaacs, Harold R., ―Basic group identity: the idols of the tribe,‖ in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (eds), Ethnicity: Theory and Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 29‒52. Kohn, Hans, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1965), p. 9; Connor, Walker: ―Beyond reason: the nature of the ethnonational bond,‖ Ethnic and Racial Studies 16 (1993), pp. 376‒77. De Tocqueville, Alexis, Democracy in America (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1945), Vol. 1, p. 310. Smith, Anthony D., The Cultural Foundations of Nations: Hierarchy, Covenant and Republic (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008); Smith, Anthony D., The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); Connor: ―Beyond reason,‖ pp. 376‒77. Inglehart and Welzel: Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p. 5. Ibid., pp. 2‒5. Ibid., p. 38. Ibid., pp. 23, 111. See, for example, the famous Manifesto of the Communist Party, first published in 1848, by Marx and Engels. Sweezy, Paul, The Theory of Economic Development (London: Dennis Dobson, 1946); Hobson, J.A., Imperialism: A Study (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972); Higgott, Richard A., Political Development Theory: The Contemporary Debate (London: Croom Helm, 1983). Wallerstein, Immanuel, The Modern World System (New York: Academic Press, 1974–89, 3 vols); Wallerstein, Immanuel, The Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Wallerstein, Immanuel, ―Classformation in the capitalist world-economy,‖ Politics and Society 5:3 (1975) pp. 367‒ 75; Chilcote, Ronald, Theories of Comparative Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981). Marx, Karl, Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Evans: Politics of Human Rights, p. 44. Inglehart and Baker: ―Modernization,‖ p. 20. Evans: Politics of Human Rights, p. 79. Davies, Michael C., ―The price of rights: constitution and East Asian economic development,‖ Human Rights Quarterly 20:2 (1998), pp. 303‒37; Evans: Politics of Human Rights, p. 48. On authoritarianism in the Caucasus and the Central Asian republics, see Peimani, Hooman, Failed Transition, Bleak Future? (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), pp. 59‒85. Lauren, Paul Gordon, The Evolution of International Human Rights (Philadelphia:

300

104 105 106

107 108

109

110 111

112 113

114

115 116

117 118 119

120 121

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003, 2nd ed.), pp. 4‒10; Ishay, Micheline R., The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), pp. 18‒61. Lauren: Evolution, pp. 10‒20; Ishay: History of Human Rights, pp. 64‒66. Lauren: Evolution, pp. 13‒21. Weston, Burns H., ―Human rights,‖ in Richard Pierre Claude and Burns H. Weston (eds), Human Rights in the World Community: Issues and Action (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1989), p. 17; Lauren: Evolution, pp. 21‒28. Falk: Human Rights, pp. 35‒38; see also Tomuschat, Christian, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics among Nations (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1949); Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979). Falk: Human Rights; McDougal, Myres S., Harold D. Lasswell and Lung-chu Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order: The Basic Policies of an International Law of Human Dignity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); McDougal, Myres S., Studies in World Public Order (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960); Simmons, Beth A., Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Ishay: History of Human Rights, pp. 118‒72; Lauren: Evolution, pp. 37‒70. Weston: ―Human rights,‖ pp. 17‒18. Lauren: Evolution, pp. 135‒46. Ibid., pp. 199‒232. James, Michael, ―Soviet rights hit by Mrs. Roosevelt,‖ New York Times, 29 September 1948, p. A4. She also referred to the Declaration as the ―Bill of Human Rights.‖ See Roosevelt, Mrs. Franklin D., ―The promise of human rights,‖ Foreign Affairs 26:3 (1948), 470‒77. Ishay: History of Human Rights, p. 119. Lauren: Evolution, pp. 233‒70. Vasak, Karel, ―Pour une troisième génération des droits de l‖homme,‖ in Christophe Swinarski (ed.), Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), pp. 837‒39. See, for example, Rodney, Walter, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1982). Cassese, Antonio and Edmond Jouvé (eds), Pour un droit des peuples: essais sur la déclaration d‖Alger (Paris: Berger Levrault, 1978). Udombana, N. J., ―The third world and the right to development: agenda for the next millennium,‖ Human Rights Quarterly 22:3 (2000), pp. 753‒87; Snyder, Francis G., ―Law and development in the light of dependency theory,‖ Law & Society Review 14:3 (1980), pp. 723‒804; Wellman, Carl, ―Solidarity, the individual and human rights,‖ Human Rights Quarterly 22 (2000), pp. 639‒57; Weston: ―Human rights,‖ p. 18. Maslow, Abraham H., ―A theory of human motivation,‖ Psychological Review 50 (1943), pp. 370‒96. Davies, James Chowning, ―The existence of human needs,‖ in Roger A. Coate

NOTES

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131

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and Jerel A. Rosati (eds), The Power of Human Needs in World Society (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988), pp. 23‒33; Moon, Bruce E., The Political Economy of Basic Human Needs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Alston, Philip, ―International law and the right to food,‖ in Asbjørn Eide et al. (eds), Food as a Human Right (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1984), pp. 162‒74. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980). See also Franklin, Samuel S., The Psychology of Happiness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Galtung, Johan, ―The basic needs approach,‖ in Katrin Lederer (ed.), Human Needs: A Contribution to the Current Debate (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1980), pp. 55‒125. Ibid. Burton, John W., ―Human needs versus societal needs,‖ in Coate and Rosati: Power of Human Needs, pp. 34‒58 (specifically p. 42). Streeten, Paul, First Things First: Meeting Basic Human Needs in the Developing Countries (New York: World Bank, Oxford University Press, 1981). Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 1999, rev. ed.). Kuznets, Simon, Economic Change (New York: Morton, 1953); Kuznets, Simon, ―Quantitative aspects of the economic growth of nations,‖ Economic Development and Cultural Change 11:2 (1963), pp. 1‒80; Robinson, Sherman, ―A note on the U-hypothesis relating income inequality and economic development,‖ American Economic Review 66:3 (1976), pp. 437‒40. Moon: Political Economy, p. 8. Wellman: ―Solidarity‖; Resolution on Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means within the United Nations System for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted 16 December 1977, GA Res. 32/130, GAOR 32nd Sess., UN Doc. A/Res/32/130 (1977); Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted 4 December 1986, GA Res. 41/128, GAOR 41st Sess., UN Doc. A/Res/41/128 (1986), available at gopherV//gopher.un.org. Hereinafter, URLs were correct at time of publication. Alston, Philip and Mary Robinson, ―The challenges of ensuring the mutuality of human rights and development endeavours,‖ in Alston and Robinson: Human Rights and Development, pp. 1‒18. Evans: Politics of Human Rights, p. 40; Risse, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Meron, Theodor, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Meron, Theodor (ed.), Human Rights in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Sieghart, Paul, The International Law of Human Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983); Sohn, Luis and Thomas Buergenthal, International Protection of Human Rights (New York: Bobbs-Marrill, 1973). See, for example, McCorquodale, Robert and Richard Fairbrother, ―Globalization and human rights,‖ Human Rights Quarterly 21:3 (1999), pp. 735‒66;

302

135

136 137 138

139 140 141 142 143

144

145 146 147 148 149 150

151 152 153 154 155

156

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Langlois, Anthony J., The Politics of Justice and Human Rights: Southeast Asia and Universalist Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Tesón, Fernando R., A Philosophy of International Law (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), Ch. 1. Lauren: Evolution, Chs. 3–6. Donnelly, Jack, ―Human rights, democracy, and development,‖ Human Rights Quarterly 21:3 (1999), pp. 608–32. See Merali, Isfahan and Valerie Oosterveld (eds), ―Introduction,‖ in Giving Meaning to Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), p. 1. ICJ reports, 1970, as mentioned in Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 546. Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002, 3rd ed.). Forsythe, David P., The Internationalization of Human Rights (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1991). Sieghart: International Law of Human Rights. See the classic works by McDougal, Lasswell and Chen: Human Rights and World Public Orde; McDougal: Studies; McDougal, Myres S. and Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). The following section borrows heavily from Payaslian, Simon, ―The interAmerican human rights system: charismatic values and regional integration,‖ Journal of the Third World Spectrum 4:1 (1997), pp. 1‒36. Ibid. Falk, Richard, A Study of Future Worlds (New York: Free Press, 1975), pp. 72‒74. Almond, Gabriel and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: System, Process and Policy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978, 2nd ed.), p. 356. Weber, Max, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Free Press, 1946), pp. 382‒83. Parsons, Talcott, The Social System (New York: Free Press, 1951), p. 28. Ake, Claude, A Theory of Political Integration (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1967); Deutsch, Karl, The Nerves of Government (New York: Free Press, 1966); Almond and Powell: Comparative Politics. Weber: Theory, pp. 135‒36. Easton, David, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science (New York: Knopf, 1953). Galtung: ―The basic needs approach.‖ Hirschman, Albert O., Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). See Astourian, Stephan H., ―From Ter-Petrosian to Kocharian: Leadership Change in Armenia,‖ Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, Working Paper Series (2000‒01), p. 60. Nazarian, Stepanos, Vardapetaran kroni hasarakakan Hayakhosutyamb [Religious Instruction in the Armenian Vernacular] (Moscow: Lazarian Press, 1853), pp. 6‒7,

NOTES

157 158 159 160 161 162

163

164

165 166

167

168

169 170 171

303

quoted in Khachaturian, Lisa, Cultivating Nationhood in Imperial Russia: The Periodical Press and the Formation of a Modern Armenian Identity (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2009), p. 70. Pye, Lucian W., ―Traumatized political cultures: the after effects of totalitarianism in China and Russia,‖ Japanese Journal of Political Science 1:1 (2000), pp. 113‒28. See, for example, Hovannisian, Richard G. ―Historical memory and foreign relations: the Armenian perspective,‖ in Starr: Legacy of History, pp. 237‒76. Dudwick: ―When the lights went out,‖ p. 120. Petrosyan: Datarane, p. 18. Lerner, Natan, Religion, Beliefs, and International Human Rights (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2000). On secularization, see Gorski, Philip S., ―Historicizing the secularization debate: church, state, and society in late medieval and early modern Europe, ca. 1330 to 1700,‖ American Sociological Review 65:1 (2000), pp. 138‒67. Franklin, Daniel P. and Michael J. Baun (eds), Political Culture and Constitutionalism: A Comparative Approach (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995); see also Libaridian, Gerard J., The Challenge of Statehood (Watertown, MA: Blue Crane, 1999). Rafayel Hambardzumyan, for instance, refers to the Armenian monarchy in the early fourth century as the ―first Christian republic‖ because of the laws instituted upon its conversion to Christianity. Hambardzumyan, Rafayel, Vorogayt parats: akunknere, ayzhmeakanutyune ev arandznahatkutyunnere [Snare of Glory: Its Origins, Contemporaneity, and Characteristics] (Erevan: Nzhar, 1999), p. 5. For a similar criticism of Hambardzumyan, see Telunts, Malik M., Haykakan arajin sahmanadrutyune [The First Armenian Constitution] (Erevan: National Academy of Sciences, 2001), pp. 15‒16. Tierney, Brian, Religion Law and the Growth of Constitutional Thought, 1150‒1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Gorski: ―Historicizing.‖ Abeghyan, Manuk, Erker [Works] (Erevan: Armenian Academy of Sciences, 1966–86, 8 vols), Vol. 4, p. 17; Safaryan, G.H., ―Davit Alavkavordu iravakaghakakan hayatsknere‖ [―David Alavkavordi‖s legal-political views‖], Patmabanasirakan handes 4 (1988), pp. 113‒22. Sukiasyan, Aleksei G., Kilikiayi Haykakan petutyan ev iravunki patmutyun (xi-xiv darer) [History of the Cilician Armenian Government and Jurisprudence (xi-xiv centuries)] (Erevan: Erevan State University, 1978). Barker, Sir Ernest (ed.), Social Contract: Essays by Locke, Hume and Rousseau (London: Oxford University Press, 1952); see Barker‖s ―Introduction,‖ pp. vii‒ xliv; Boucher, David and Paul Kelly (eds), The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls (London: Routledge, 1994); see also McCormick, Peter J., Social Contract and Political Obligation: A Critique and Reappraisal (New York: Garland, 1987). Artinian, Vartan, The Armenian Constitutional System in the Ottoman Empire, 1839‒ 1863: A Study of Its Historical Development (Istanbul: s.n.). See, for example, Perry: Toward a Theory, pp. 7‒13. Murphy, Jeffrie, ―Afterword: constitutionalism, moral skepticism, and religious belief,‖ in Alan S. Rosenbaum (ed.), Constitutionalism: The Philosophical Dimension (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), p. 239.

304 172 173

174

175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184

185

186

187

188

189 190 191

192

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA

Huntington: Third Wave, p. 73. Richardson, James T., ―Religion, constitutional courts, and democracy in former communist countries,‖ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 603 (2006), pp. 129‒38. See, for example, Sahakyan, Vahe and Arthur Atanesyan, ―Democratization in Armenia: some trends of political culture and behavior,‖ Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 14:3 (2006), p. 354. Richardson: ―Religion.‖ Tawney, R.H., Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (New York: Mentor Books, 1953), p. 16. Ibid., p. 17. Ibid., p. 15. Perry: Toward a Theory, p. 18. Dworkin, Ronald M., ―Life is sacred. That‖s the easy part,‖ New York Times Magazine, 16 May 1993, p. 36. Dworkin, Ronald M., Life‖s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1993), p. 195. Preamble, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Parekh, Bhikhu, ―The cultural particularity of liberal democracy,‖ in David Held (ed.), Prospects for Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), p. 157. On the importation of Western values and institutions by modernizing intellectuals in different parts of the world, see Badie, Berrand, The Imported State: The Westernization of the Political Order, trans. Claudia Royal (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). On comparisons of the European Enlightenment and the Armenian experience, see Leo (Arakel Babakhanian), Erkeri zhoghovatsu [Collected Works], Vol. 3, Bk 2, pt. 2 (Erevan: Hayastan, 1973), pp. 430‒41; Zekiyan, Boghos Levon, The Armenian Way to Modernity (Venice, Italy: Supernova, 1997). Oshagan, Vahé, ―Modern Armenian literature and intellectual history from 1700 to 1915,‖ in Hovannisian: Armenian People, Vol. 2, p. 142; Panossian: Armenians, p. 99. Suny, Ronald Grigor, ―Russian rule and Caucasian society in the first half of the nineteenth century: the Georgian nobility and the Armenian bourgeoisie, 1801–1856,‖ Nationalities Papers 7:1 (1979), pp. 53‒78. Keenan, Edward L., ―Human rights in Soviet political culture,‖ in Kenneth W. Thompson (ed.), The Moral Imperatives of Human Rights: A World Survey (Lanham: University Press of America, 1980), pp. 69‒80. Woshinsky: Culture and Politics, p. 89. Tawney: Religion, p. 89. This study does not examine the cultural characteristics of the diasporan Armenian communities, although they potentially may have a role in advancing democratization in Armenia. On the Armenian diaspora, see Tabibian, Jivan, ―Modernization, political culture, and political economy in the diaspora,‖ Armenian Review 36:1 (1983), pp. 17‒25. Gay, Peter, The Enlightenment: The Rise of Modern Paganism (New York: W.W.

NOTES

193 194

195

196 197 198

199 200 201 202 203

204 205 206

305

Norton, 1977), p. x. Pipes, Richard, Russia under the Old Regime (London: Penguin Books, 1995, 2nd ed.). Libaridian, Gerard J., ―Revolution and liberation in the 1892 and 1907 programs of the Dashnaktsutiun,‖ in Ronald Grigor Suny (ed.), Transcaucasia, Nationalism, and Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996, rev. ed.), pp. 187‒98. See also Libaridian, Gerard J., ―The ideology of Armenian liberation: the development of Armenian political thought before the revolutionary movement (1639‒1885),‖ Ph.D. dissertation (Los Angeles: University of California, 1987). Hovannisian, Richard G., ―Parliamentary government as modernization in the Republic of Armenia,‖ Armenian Review 36:1 (1983), pp. 26‒33; Hovannisian, Richard G., The Republic of Armenia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971‒96, 4 vols); Somakian, Manoug J., Empires in Conflict: Armenia and the Great Powers, 1895‒1920 (London: I.B.Tauris, 1995). Jon Elster, Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Nussbaum: Women and Human Development, pp. 217‒18. Crawford, Beverly and Arend Lijphart, ―Explaining political and economic change in post-Communist Eastern Europe: old legacies, new institutions, hegemonic norms, and international pressures,‖ Comparative Political Studies 28:2 (1995), pp. 171‒99. Elster, Offe and Preuss: Institutional Design, p. 294. Ibid., pp. 293‒95. March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen, ―The new institutionalism: organizational factors in political life,‖ American Political Science Review 78:3 (1984), pp. 734–49. Haggard, Stephan and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 4. O‖Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusion about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 5. Elster, Offe and Preuss: Institutional Design, p. 295. Ibid. Dudwick: ―Political transformations,‖ pp. 72‒74.

Chapter Two 1

2

Hovannisian, Richard G. (ed.), The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, Vol. 1: The Dynastic Periods, and Vol. 2: Foreign Dominion to Statehood: The Fifteenth Century to the Twentieth Century (New York: St. Martin‖s Press, 1997); Bournoutian, George A., A Concise History of the Armenian People: From Ancient Times to the Present (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2006, 5th ed.); Payaslian, Simon, The History of Armenia: From the Origins to the Present (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Hovhannisyan, S.V., ―Iravunk ev datavarutyun‖ [―Law and jurisprudence‖], in Ts.P. Aghayan et al. (eds), Hay zhoghovrdi patmutyun [History of the Armenian People]

306

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5

6 7

8 9

10

11

12 13 14

15

16 17 18

19

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA

(Erevan: Armenian Academy of Sciences, 1968), Vol. 2, p. 480. See, for example, Panossian: Armenians, pp. 191‒92; Libaridian: ―The ideology of Armenian liberation.‖ Piotrovski, Boris B., ―Arvest, kron, gir, grakanutyun‖ [―Profession, religion, letters, literature‖], in Aghayan et al.: Hay zhoghovrdi patmutyun, Vol. 1, pp. 407‒ 13, 415‒19. Zekiyan, Boghos Levon, ―Christianity to modernity,‖ in Edmund Herzig and Marina Kurkchiyan (eds), The Armenians: Past and Present in the Making of National Identity (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 41‒64. Russell, James R., ―Early Armenian civilization,‖ in Herzig and Kurkchiyan: Armenians, pp. 23‒40 (specifically p. 25). Dadrian, Vahakn N., ―Nationalism in Soviet Armenia: a case study of ethnocentrism,‖ in George W. Simmonds (ed.), Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin (Detroit: University of Detroit Press, 1977), pp. 210‒13. Ibid., pp. 213‒14. Manandyan, Hakob A., Knnakan tesutyun Hay zhoghovrdi patmutyan [A Critical Analysis of the History of the Armenian People] (Erevan: Haypethrat, 1944‒60, 3 vols), Vol. 1, p. 246. Foucault, Michel, Le souci de soi (Paris: Gallimard, 1984), as discussed by Cameron, Averil, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 2‒3. Ter-Minasyan, A.G. and S.B. Harutyunyan, ―Grakanutyun ev patmagrutyun,‖ [Literature and historiography], in Aghayan et al.: Hay zhoghovrdi patmutyun, Vol. 2, pp. 445‒46; Arevshatyan, S.S., ―Pilisopayutyun‖ [―Philosophy‖], in Aghayan et al.: Hay zhoghovrdi patmutyun, Vol. 2, pp. 503‒30; Garsoïan, Nina, ―The Aršakuni Dynasty,‖ in Hovannisian: Armenian People, Vol. 1, pp. 63‒94. Manandyan, Hakob A., Erker [Works] (Erevan: Armenian Academy of Sciences, 1977‒78, 6 vols), Vol. 2, p. 164. Akinian, N. ―S. Sahaki veragrvats kanonnere‖ [The canons attributed to Saint Sahak], Handes amsorya 60 (1946), pp. 48‒70. Adoyan, ―Haykakan,‖ pp. 51‒52; Torosyan, Kh.A., ―Amusna-entanekan iravunk‖ [Marriage-family law], in Ts.P. Aghayan et al. (eds), Hay zhoghovrdi patmutyun [History of the Armenian People] (Erevan: Armenian Academy of Sciences, 1976), Vol. 3, p. 826. Manandyan, Hakob A., The Trade and Cities of Armenia in Relation to the Ancient World, 2nd rev. ed., trans. Nina G. Garsoïan (Lisbon: Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 1965), p. 71. Hovhannisyan: ―Iravunk ev datavarutyun,‖ pp. 498‒99. Ibid., pp. 500‒01. Khorenatsi, Movses, Patmutyun Hayots [History of the Armenians], trans. Robert W. Thomson, Moses Khorenats―i: History of the Armenians (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 353. Hakobyan, Vazgen, ed. and comp., ―Preface,‖ Kanonagirk Hayots [Armenian Book of

NOTES

20 21 22 23 24

25

26

27

28 29 30 31

32

33

34

307

Canons] (Erevan: Armenian Academy of Sciences, 1964, 1971, 2 vols), Vol. 1, pp. vii‒lviii, lix‒lxxix, and ―Introduction,‖ Vol. 2, pp. vii‒cxxii. See also Bozoyan, Ashot [Azat], ―Hayots kanonagrki dzevavorman skzbnakan pule‖ [―The early phase of the development of the Armenian book of law‖], in Kristoneutyun ev iravunk, pp. 85‒99; Harutyunyan, Gagik G., Sahmandrakan mshakuyt [Constitutional Culture] (Erevan: Nzhar, 2005), pp. 50‒57. Hovhannisyan: ―Iravunk ev datavarutyun,‖ pp. 481‒84. Ibid., pp. 487‒88. Ibid., pp. 496‒97. ―Kanonk Shahapivani,‖ in Hakobyan: Kanonagirk Hayots, Vol. 1, pp. 432‒34. Adonts, Nikohgayos, Armenia in the Period of Justinian: The Political Conditions Based on the Nakharar System, trans. Nina Garsoian (Lisbon: Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 1970), pp. 76, 80, 94; Garsoïan, Nina G., ―The Marzpanate,‖ in Hovannisian: Armenian People, Vol. 1, pp. 103‒04. Ter-Ghevondyan, Aram N., Arabakan amirayutiunnere Bagratuniats Hayastanum [The Arab Emirates in Bagratuni Armenia] (Erevan: Armenian Academy of Sciences, 1965), pp. 234‒38. Hakobyan: ―Preface,‖ pp. xiii‒xv; Ormanian, Maghakia, ―Hovhannes G. Odznetsi,‖ Azgapatum (first pr., Constantinople: V. and H. Nersesian, 1913‒27; repr., Antelias: Catholicosate of Cilicia, 2001, 3 vols), Vol. 1, cols. 558‒80; Harutyunyan: Sahmandrakan mshakuyt, pp. 372–73; Bournoutian: Concise History, pp. 70‒77. Garsoïan, Nina G., The Paulician Heresy (The Hague: Mouton, 1967); Garsoïan, Nina, ―The Independent Kingdoms of Medieval Armenia,‖ in Hovannisian: Armenian People, Vol. 1, pp. 173‒74; Melik-Pakhshyan, S.T., Pavlikyan sharzhume Hayastanum [The Paulician Movement in Armenia] (Erevan: Erevan State University, 1953); Nersessian, Vrej, The Tondrakian Movement (Allison Park, PA: Pickwick Publications, 1988). Garsoïan: Paulician Heresy; Garsoïan: ―Independent,‖ pp. 173–74. Arevshatyan, S.S., ―Pilisopayutyun‖ [―Philosophy‖], in Aghayan et al.: Hay zhoghovrdi patmutyun, Vol. 3, pp. 332‒33. Arevshatyan: ―Pilisopayutyun,‖ pp. 334‒36. Arakelyan, B.N., ―Kaghakneri nor verelke xii‒xiii darerum‖ [―The new development of cities in the twelfth–thirteenth centuries‖], in Aghayan et al.: Hay zhoghovrdi patmutyun, Vol. 3, pp. 558‒78. Ter-Ghevondyan, A.N., ―Bagratunyats takavorutyun petakan karke‖ [―The governmental structure of the Bagratuni kingdom‖], in Aghayan et al.: Hay zhoghovrdi patmutyun, Vol. 3, pp. 266‒67. Bournoutian: Concise History, pp. 81‒91; Babayan, L.H., ―Hyusisayin Hayastani azatagrume seljukyan tirapetutyunits‖ [―The liberation of northern Armenia from Seljuk rule‖], in Aghayan et al.: Hay zhoghovrdi patmutyun, Vol. 3, pp. 523‒ 40. See Hewsen, Robert H., ―Armenia Maritima: the historical geography of Cilicia,‖ and Bozoyan, Azat A., ―Armenian political revival in Cilicia,‖ in

308

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36

37 38 39

40

41

42 43

44 45

46

47 48

49

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Richard G. Hovannisian and Simon Payaslian (eds), Armenian Cilicia (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 2008), pp. 27‒65, 67‒78. Der Nersessian, Sirarpie, ―The Kingdom of Cilician Armenia,‖ in R.L. Wolff and H.W. Hazard (eds), Gen. ed. Kenneth M. Setton, A History of the Crusades, Vol. 2: The Later Crusades, 1189‒1311 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962), p. 651; Bornazyan, S.V., ―Kilikiayi Haykakan petutyan sotsialakan karutsvatske ev hoghatirutyan dzevere‖ [―The social structure of the Armenian government of Cilicia and the methods of landownership‖], in Aghayan et al.: Hay zhoghovrdi patmutyun, Vol. 3, pp. 715‒16. Bornazyan, S.V., ―Kilikiayi petakan karge‖ [―The organization of the Cilician government‖], in Aghayan et al.: Hay zhoghovrdi patmutyun, Vol. 3, pp. 742‒46; Sukiasyan, Kilikiayi, pp. 106‒13. Bornazyan: ―Kilikiayi petakan karge,‖ pp. 748‒49; Sukiasyan: Kilikiayi, pp. 178, 269–372. Sukiasyan: Kilikiayi, pp. 176‒77; Bornazyan: ―Kilikiayi petakan karge,‖ p. 748. Sukiasyan: Kilikiayi, pp. 181, 203, 206‒10. See, for example, on Mkhitar Gosh, Torosyan, Kh.A., ―Datavarutyune mijnadaryan Hayastanum‖ [―The court system in Armenia during the Middle Ages‖], Patma-banasirakan handes 3 (1966), pp. 39‒52. Shnorhali, Nerses, General Epistle, trans. and intro. Arakel Aljalian (New Rochelle, NY: St. Nersess Armenian Seminary, 1996); see also Harutyunyan: Sahmandrakan mshakuyt, pp. 90‒91. Safaryan: ―Davit Alavkavordu‖; Torosyan, Kh.A., ―Hay iravunki aghbyurnere‖ [―The sources of Armenian law‖], in Aghayan et al.: Hay zhoghovrdi patmutyun, Vol. 3, pp. 818–22. Safaryan: ―Davit,‖ pp. 113‒22. Mkhitar Gosh, The Lawcode [Datastanagirk´] of Mxit´ar Goš, trans. and comm. Robert W. Thomson (Amsterdam; Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 2000), Introduction by Thomson, pp. 20‒21. Ibid., p. 88. Harutyunyan: Sahmandrakan mshakuyt, pp. 92-93; see also Samuelyan, Khachik, Mkhitar Goshi Datastanagirkn u hin hayots kaghakatsiakan iravunke [The Book of Codes of Mkhitar Gosh and the Civil Law of Ancient Armenians] (Vienna: Mkhitarist Press, 1911). Tovmasyan, A.T., Hin ev mijnadaryan hay kreakan iravunk [Ancient and Medieval Armenian Criminal Law] (Erevan: Erevan State University, 1962); Torosyan, Kh.A., ―Kreakan iravunk‖ [―Criminal law‖], in Aghayan et al.: Hay zhoghovrdi patmutyun, Vol. 3, pp. 823‒24. Payaslian: History of Armenia, p. 63. Torosyan: ―Datavarutyune,‖ p. 47; S.G. Barkhudaryan, ―Hay knoj iravakan vichake mijin darerum‖ [―The Legal Situation of Armenian Women during the Middle Ages‖], Patma-banasirakan handes 2 (1966), pp. 34‒35; Torosyan: ―Amusnaentanekan iravunk,‖ p. 827; Payaslian: History of Armenia, p. 62. Bernard Coulie, ―Manuscripts and Libraries: Scriptorial Activity in Cilicia,‖ in Hovannisian and Payaslian, Armenian Cilicia, pp. 261‒74; Bozoyan: ―Armenian

NOTES

50 51 52

53 54 55 56

57

58

59 60 61 62

63

64 65

66

309

Political Revival in Cilicia,‖ p. 72; L.G. Khacheryan, ―Dprotsn u krtutyune‖ [―The School and Education‖], in Aghayan, Hay zhoghovrdi patmutyun, Vol. 3, pp. 789‒802; Payaslian: History of Armenia, p. 88. Bournoutian, Atamian Ani, ―Cilician Armenia,‖ in Hovannisian: Armenian People, Vol. 1, pp. 288‒90. Bournoutian: Concise History, pp. 107‒14. See ―Treaty of Peace and Frontiers: The Ottoman Empire and Persia,‖ 17 May 1639, in J.C. Hurewitz (comp. and ed.), The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record, Vol. 1: European Expansion, 1535‒1914 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1975, 2nd rev. ed.), pp. 25‒28. Kouymjian, Dickran, ―Armenia from the fall of the Cilician kingdom (1375) to the forced emigration under Shah Abbas (1604),‖ in Hovannisian: Armenian People, Vol. 2, pp. 18‒21, 25; Bournoutian, George A., ―Eastern Armenia from the seventeenth century to the Russian annexation,‖ in Hovannisian: Armenian People, Vol. 2, p. 81. Bournoutian: Concise History, pp. 113, 189‒90. Kouymjian: ―Armenia,‖ pp. 5‒6, 35‒40. Shnorhali: General Epistle, p. 30. Kouymjian, Dickran, ―Dated Armenian manuscripts as a statistical tool for Armenian history,‖ in Thomas J. Samuelian and Michael E. Stone (eds), Medieval Armenian Culture (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1984), pp. 425‒38. Kouymjian, Dickran, ―Response to ―modern Armenian culture‖: the distinguished lecture of Levon Zekiyan,‖ in Nicholas Awde (ed.), Armenian Perspectives (Richmond, Surrey, UK: Curzon, 1997), pp. 355‒61 (quote appears on p. 359). Zekiyan, Boghos Levon, ―Modern Armenian culture: some basic trends between continuity and change, specificity and universality,‖ in Awde: Armenian Perspectives, pp. 323‒54; see also comments by Kouymjian: ―Response,‖ p. 359. Khachaturian: Cultivating Nationhood. Tilly: Democracy, p. 29. Ibid., p. 30. See the classic study by Kuhn, Thomas, The Copernican Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957); see also Jacob, Margaret C., The Cultural Meaning of the Scientific Revolution (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993). Ishay, Micheline R., The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Hunt: Inventing Human Rights; Herbert: Philosophical History. Falk: Human Rights. Knox, Paul and John Agnew, The Geography of the World Economy (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1989), p. 131; Hobsbawm, Eric J., The Age of Revolution, 1789–1848 (New York: Mentor Book, 1962); Braudel, Fernand, Capitalism and Material life, 1400–1800 (New York: Harper and Row, 1967). Bournoutian, George A., The Khanate of Erevan under Qajar Rule, 1795‒1828 (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 1992); Bournoutian: ―Eastern Armenia,‖ p. 89; Grigoryan, V.R., ―Arevelyan Hayastane xviii dari 50‒70-akan tvakannerin‖ [―Eastern Armenia during the 50s‒70s of the eighteenth century‖], in

310

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68 69 70 71

72 73 74 75

76

77 78

79

80 81 82

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Aghayan et al.: Hay zhoghovrdi patmutyun, Vol. 4, p. 190. Bournoutian, George A. (trans. and comp.), Armenians and Russia, 1626‒1796: A Documentary Record (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2001), p. 375; Bournoutian, George A., A History of Qarabagh (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 1994), p. 17. Kouymjian: ―Armenia,‖ pp. 21‒28. Payaslian: History of Armenia, pp. 106‒07. Ormanian: ―Simeon I Erevantsi,‖ Azgapatum, Vol. 2, cols. 3098‒3120; Zekiyan: ―Modern Armenian culture,‖ pp. 328‒29. Ishkhanyan, Rafayel A., Hay girke, 1512‒1920 [The Armenian Book, 1512‒1920] (Erevan: Armenian Academy of Sciences, 1981); Pehlivanian, Meliné, ―Mesrop‖s heirs: the early Armenian book printers,‖ in Eva Hanebutt-Benz, Dagmar Glass, and Geoffrey Roper (eds), Middle Eastern Languages and the Print Revolution: A Crosscultural Encounter (Westhofen: WVA-Verlag Skulima, Gutenberg Museum Mainz, 2002), pp. 53‒92; Ormanian: ―Simeon I Erevantsi,‖ cols. 3019–3136, on the printing press, cols. 3098‒3120; Leo (Arakel Babakhanian), ―Hayots dpakrutyun‖ [―Armenian printing‖], in Erkeri zhoghovatsu [Collected Works] (Erevan: Hayastan, 1986), Vol. 5, pp. 123‒571. Ormanian: ―Simeon I Erevantsi,‖ cols. 3102‒06, 3122‒23. Zekiyan: ―Modern Armenian culture,‖ pp. 328‒29; Kouymjian: ―Response,‖ pp. 355‒61. Baghramian was a native of Karabagh, who had visited Moscow with Hovsep (Joseph) Emin and in Madras served as tutor for Shahamirian‖s children. Petrosyan, Rafik G., Datarane ev kaghakatsiakan datavarutyune arevelyan Hayastanum xix-xx darerum [The Court and Civil Procedure in Eastern Armenia in xix-xx Centuries] (Erevan: Erevan State University, 2001), pp. 35‒36; Samuelyan, Khachik, Hin hay iravunki patmutyune [The History of Ancient Armenian Law] (Erevan: Armfani Hratarakchutyun, 1939). Baghramian, Movses, Nor tetrak vor kochi hordorak [New Pamphlet Called Exhortation], translation from grabar (classical Armenian) with annotation, Khachatryan, P.M., Nor tetrak vor kochvum e hordorak (Erevan: Erevan State University, 1991); see also Oshagan: ―Modern Armenian literature,‖ pp. 145‒46; Harutyunyan: Sahmandrakan mshakuyt, pp. 96‒97; Bournoutian: Concise History, pp. 222–23; Bournoutian: Armenians and Russia, 1626‒1796, p. 392. Baghramian: Nor tetrak, Ch. 7, pp. 129‒51. For a similar summary of the articles in Vorogayt parats, see Telunts, Malik M., Haykakan arajin sahmanadrutyune [The First Armenian Constitution] (Erevan: National Academy of Sciences, 2001); on Nshavak, see pp. 95‒102. Shahamirian, Hakob, Vorogayt parats [Snare of Glory] (Tiflis: N. Aghanian, 1913), p. 138. A similar document, Astrakhani Hayots datastangirke [The Book of Laws of the Armenians of Astrakhan], was prepared in the 1740s. Shahamirian: Vorogayt parats, pp. 142, 145, 263, 277, 286, 363‒64. Ibid., pp. 143, 145, 253‒54, 343‒44, 395. Ibid., pp. 142, 254‒55, 271‒73, 354, 355.

NOTES 83 84 85

86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103

104 105 106

107

311

Ibid., pp. 264, 265, 277, 342‒43, 364‒81, 409‒12. Ibid., pp. 242, 259‒62, 268, 382‒83, 384, 397‒400. Grigoryan, V.R., ―Azadagrakan sharzhumnere Hayastanum xviii dari erkrord kesin‖ [―The liberation movements in Armenia during the second half of the eighteenth century‖], in Aghayan et al.: Hay zhoghovrdi patmutyun, Vol. 4, pp. 224‒26; Gregorian, Vartan, ―The impact of Russia on the Armenians and Armenia,‖ in Wayne S. Vucinich (ed.), Russia and Asia: Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian Peoples (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), pp. 167‒ 218 (specifically pp. 177‒78). Shahamirian: Vorogayt parats, pp. 401‒02. Bournoutian: Armenians and Russia, 1626‒1796, pp. 399‒400. Telunts: Haykakan arajin sahmanadrutyune, p. 34. Zekiyan: ―Modern Armenian culture,‖ pp. 328‒29. Bournoutian: Khanate of Erevan, pp. 95‒100, 125‒29. Diloyan, V.A., ―Arevelyan Hayastan‖ [―Eastern Armenia‖], in Aghayan et al.: Hay zhoghovrdi patmutyun, Vol. 5, pp. 24‒29, 32. Bournoutian: Khanate of Erevan, pp. 137‒39, 150‒51. Diloyan: ―Arevelyan Hayastan,‖ pp. 16‒17. Bournoutian: Khanate of Erevan, pp. 80‒81. Diloyan: ―Arevelyan Hayastan,‖ pp. 20‒22, 46‒56. Ibid., pp. 16‒17, 56. Abovian, Khachatur, Erkeri liakatar zhoghovatsu [Complete Collection of Works] (Erevan: Armenian Academy of Sciences, 1948, 10 vols), Vol. 3, p. 38. Bournoutian: Khanate of Erevan, pp. 71‒79, 81–83, 118‒19. Khachatryan, Poghos, ―Notes,‖ in Shahamirian: Vorogayt parats, pp. 244‒45. Diloyan: ―Arevelyan Hayastan,‖ pp. 24‒25. Hovhannisyan: ―Hayastani,‖ pp. 89‒90. Bournoutian: Khanate of Erevan, p. 148. Hovhannisyan, A.G., ―Hayastani azatagrman hartsi shrjadardze depi Rusastan‖ [―The re-orientation toward Russia in the cause of Armenia‖s liberation‖], in Aghayan et al.: Hay zhoghovrdi patmutyun, Vol. 4, pp. 138‒45; Seton-Watson, Hugh, The Russian Empire: 1801‒1917 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 60–61; Bournoutian: Armenians and Russia, 1626–1796, pp. 393‒94. Bournoutian: Concise History, pp. 235‒38. ―Treaty of Peace (Küçük Kaynarca): Russia and the Ottoman Empire,‖ 10/21 July 1774, in Hurewitz: Documentary Record, Vol. 1, pp. 92‒101. Gregorian: ―Impact of Russia,‖ pp. 172, 174; Bournoutian: Armenians and Russia, 1626‒1796, p. 381. De Madariaga, Isabel, Catherine the Great (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); Riasanovsky, Nicholas V., A History of Russia (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, 5th ed.), p. 258; MacKenzie, David and Michael W. Curran, A History of Russia, the Soviet Union, and Beyond (Belmont, CA: West/Wadsworth, 1999, 5th ed.), pp. 237‒38. ―Catherine instructs the legislative commission, 1767,‖ in Cracraft: Major

312

108 109

110

111

112

113 114 115

116

117 118 119 120 121

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Problems, pp. 200‒05; MacKenzie and Curran: History of Russia, p. 224. See also Beccaria, Cesare, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments (Boston: International Pocket Library, 1983; original in Italian, 1764). Istoriia SSSR (Moscow, 1967), vol. 3, pp. 428, 433, 435, 445‒47, excerpt in MacKenzie and Curran: History of Russia, p. 226. Ibid., p. 234; De Madariaga: Catherine, p. 63; Raeff, Marc, ―Pugachev‖s rebellion,‖ in Forster, Robert, and Jack P. Greene (eds), Preconditions of Revolution in Early Modern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 167‒200. Riasanovsky: History of Russia, pp. 260–61; see also Griffiths, David, ―Catherine II: the Republican empress,‖ Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 21 (1973), pp. 324‒44; ―Catherine‖s charter to the nobility, 1785,‖ in Cracraft: Major Problems, p. 207. Raeff, Marc, Michael Speransky: Statesman of Imperial Russia, 1772‒1839 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1957), p. 321; Seton-Watson: Russian Empire, pp. 104‒10, 187‒92. See Bournoutian: Armenians and Russia, 1626‒1796, Doc. 357 (1783), pp. 299‒ 303. See also Grigoryan, V.G. ―Hay-Rusakan haraberutyunnere xviii dari 8090-akan tvakannerin‖ [―Armenian-Russian relations during the 80s-90s of the 18th century‖], in Aghayan et al.: Hay zhoghovrdi patmutyun, Vol. 4, pp. 224‒26; Telunts: Haykakan arajin sahmanadrutyune, pp. 87–94. ―Treaty of Peace (Gulistan): Russia and Persia,‖ 30 September/12 October, 1813, in Hurewitz: Documentary Record, Vol. 1, pp. 197‒99. ―Treaties of Peace and Commerce (Turkmanchay): Persia and Russia,‖ 10/22, February 1828, in Hurewitz: Documentary Record, Vol. 1, pp. 231‒37. Bournoutian: ―Eastern Armenia,‖ pp. 100–01, 104‒05; Gregorian: ―Impact of Russia,‖ p. 178; Lynch, H.F.B., Armenia: Travels and Studies (Beirut: Khayats, 1965, 2 vols), Vol. 1, pp. 232‒33. Lincoln, W. Bruce, Nicholas I: Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russians (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1989), pp. 84‒85, 239‒41; MacKenzie and Curran: History of Russia, pp. 281‒82; Riasanovsky, Nicholas V., Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825‒1855 (Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959); Saunders, David, Russia in the Age of Reaction and Reform, 1801‒1881 (London: Longman, 1992), p. 155. Starr, Frederick S., Decentralization and Self-Government in Russia, 1830‒1870 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 9‒19. Monas, Sidney, The Third Section: Police and Society in Russia under Nicholas I (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961). Lincoln: Nicholas I, pp. 241–52; Riasanovsky: History of Russia, pp. 324‒25; MacKenzie and Curran: History of Russia, pp. 282‒83. Seton-Watson: Russian Empire, pp. 218‒26. Pomper, Philip, Russian Revolutionary Intelligentsia (New York: Crowell, 1970), p. 14; MacKenzie and Curran: History of Russia, pp. 271‒72; Riasanovsky: History of Russia, p. 343.

NOTES 122

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125

126 127 128 129 130

131 132 133

134 135 136 137

138

313

Diloyan: ―Arevelyan Hayastan,‖ pp. 13‒60; Diloyan, V.A. and V.H. Rshtuni, ―Arevelyan Hayastane Rusastani kazmum‖ [―Eastern Armenia in the Russian structure‖], in Aghayan et al: Hay zhoghovrdi patmutyun, Vol. 5, pp. 201‒43; Bournoutian: Concise History, pp. 281‒82. See, for example, Catholicos Nerses Ashtaraketsi‖s declaration, in Bournoutian, George A. (trans. and comp.), Russia and the Armenians of Transcaucasia, 1797‒1889: A Documentary Record (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 1998), Doc. 275, p. 258. For the text of the Polozhenie, see Bournoutian: Russia and the Armenians of Transcaucasia, 1797–1889, Doc. 363, pp. 350‒68; see also Bournoutian‖s commentary, pp. 453‒85; Bournoutian, George A., ―The Armenian Church and the political formation of eastern Armenia,‖ Armenian Review 36:3 (1983), pp. 7‒17; Diloyan and Rshtuni: ―Arevelyan Hayastane,‖ p. 213. See Werth, Paul, ―Imperial Russia and the Armenian Catholicos at Home and Abroad,‖ in Ieda Osamu and Uyama Tomohiko (eds), Reconstruction and Interaction of Slavic Eurasia and Its Neighboring Worlds (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2006), pp. 203‒35. Suny, Ronald Grigor, ―The formation of the Armenian patriotic intelligentsia in Russia: the first generations,‖ Armenian Review 36:3 (1983), pp. 18‒34. Diloyan and Rshtuni: ―Arevelyan Hayastane,‖ pp. 233‒34. Hovannisian, Richard G., ―Russian Armenia: A century of tsarist rule,‖ Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 19 (1971), pp. 31‒48. Gregorian: ―Impact of Russia,‖ pp. 181‒82. Eritsyan, Al., Pordz (Nov. 1879), p. 48, as discussed in Hovhannisyan, A.G., ―Arevelahay hasarakakan hosanknere‖ [―The eastern Armenian popular currents‖], in Aghayan et al.: Hay zhoghovrdi patmutyun, Vol. 5, p. 387. Hovannisian: ―Russian Armenia,‖ pp. 31‒32. Presniakov, A.E., Emperor Nicholas I of Russia: The Apogee of Autocracy, 1825‒1855, ed. and trans. Judith C. Zacek (Gulf Breeze, FL: AI Press, 1974). Zakharova, Larissa, ―Autocracy and the reforms of 1861‒1874 in Russia: Choosing paths of development,‖ in Eklof, Ben, John Bushnell and Larissa Zakharova (eds), Russia‖s Great Reforms, 1855–1881 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 19‒39; Lincoln, W. Bruce, The Great Reforms: Autocracy, Bureaucracy, and the Politics of Change in Imperial Russia (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1990), pp. 36‒60; Mosse, W.E., Alexander II and the Modernization of Russia (New York: Collier Books, 1958), p. 9. Mosse, Alexander II. Suny: ―Formation.‖ Mosse: Alexander II, p. 9; Riasanovsky: History of Russia, pp. 328, 341‒42, 345. Afanas‖ev, Alexander K., ―Jurors and jury trial in imperial Russia, 1866‒1885,‖ in Eklof, Bushnell and Zakharova: Russia‖s Great Reforms, pp. 214‒30; Wortman, Richard, The Development of a Russian Legal Consciousness (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 2; Petrosyan: Datarane, pp. 60-61. Neuberger, Joan, ―Popular legal cultures: The St. Petersburg mirovoi sud,‖ in

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148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155

156 157

158 159 160 161

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Eklof: Russia‖s Great Reforms, pp. 231‒46. Petrosyan: Datarane, p. 69. Jane Burbank, Russian Peasants Go to Court: Legal Culture in the Countryside, 19051917 (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp. 5‒6. Hovannisian, Richard G., Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 15, 73, 77. Hovhannisyan: ―Arevelahay hasarakakan hosanknere,‖ in Aghayan et al.: Hay zhoghovrdi patmutyun, Vol. 5, pp. 381‒83. Ibid., pp. 390‒91. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 381‒83. Khachaturian: Cultivating Nationhood, pp. 48‒53. Petrosyan, Hovhannes (comp.), Hay parberakan mamuli bibliografia, 1794‒1900 [Bibliography of Armenian Periodical Press, 1794‒1900] (Erevan: Petgrapalat, 1956, Vol. 1), pp. 132‒33, 137‒39, 228‒46, 260‒65. See also Suny, Ronald G., Looking toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 60‒62; Khachaturian: Cultivating Nationhood, Chs. 3‒4; Bournoutian: Concise History, pp. 285‒88. See Suny, Ronald Gregory, ―Eastern Armenians under tsarist rule,‖ in Hovannisian, Armenian People, Vol. 2, pp. 115‒17; Suny: ―Formation,‖ pp. 26‒28. Hovannisian: ―Russian Armenia,‖ pp. 37‒38. Ishkhanian, Bakhshi, Narodnosti Kavkaza (Petrograd: M.V. Popov, 1916), pp. 68‒114, as cited in Hovannisian: ―Russian Armenia,‖ p. 43. Suny: ―Eastern Armenians,‖ pp. 115‒17. Nazarian: Vardapetaran kroni, pp. 6‒7, quoted in Khachaturian: Cultivating Nationhood, p. 70. Barsoumian, Hagop, ―The Eastern question and the Tanzimat era,‖ in Hovannisian: Armenian People, Vol. 2, pp. 180‒82. Ormanian: Azgapatum, Vol. 3, col. 4068. Hovannisian, Richard G., ―The Armenian question in the Ottoman Empire, 1876‒1914,‖ in Hovannisian: Armenian People, Vol. 2, p. 203; Walker, Christopher J., Armenia: The Survival of a Nation (New York: St. Martin‖s Press, 1980), pp. 100‒02, 108‒17; Nalbandian, Louise, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 74‒78, 80‒85; Barsoumian: ―Eastern question,‖ pp. 199‒200. Suny: ―Formation,‖ pp. 29‒30. Raffi (Hakob [Mirzayan] Melik-Hakobian) to Mkrtich Khrimian, [May or June] 1858, in Raffi, Erkeri zhoghovatsu [Collected Works] (Erevan: Armenian Academy of Sciences, 1999), Vol. 12, pp. 154‒57. May K. Matossian, The Impact of Soviet Policies in Armenia (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1962), pp. 3‒4. Ibid., p. 11. Ibid., p. 6. Hunt: Inventing Human Rights, pp. 176‒77.

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Antabyan, P.P., ―Dprots ev mankavarzhutiun‖ [―School and education‖], in Aghayan et al.: Hay zhoghovrdi patmutyun, Vol. 4, pp. 437‒50; Bournoutian: Concise History, pp. 192‒94. Khachaturian: Cultivating Nationhood, Chs. 3‒4; see also Walicki, Andrzej, A History of Russian Thought from the Enlightenment to Marxism, trans. Hilda AndrewsRusiecka (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979). Suny: Looking toward Ararat, p. 21; Etmekjian, James, The French Influence on the Western Armenian Renaissance, 1843–1915 (New York: Twayne, 1964), p. 98. See also Mardin, Şerif, ―The influence of the French Revolution on the Ottoman Empire,‖ International Social Science Journal 119 (1989), pp. 17‒30. Payaslian: History of Armenia, p. 118. Ibid., pp. 118‒19. See Ter Minassian, Anaide, Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary Movement, 1887‒1912 (Cambridge, MA: Zoryan Institute, 1984), pp. 5‒6; Nalbandian: Armenian Revolutionary Movement, pp. 90‒178, passim; Nersisyan, M.G., Hay zhoghovrdi azatagrakan paykare Turkakan brnapetutyan dem, 1850‒1870 [The Armenian People‖s Struggle for Liberation against Turkish Tyrannical Rule, 1850‒1870] (Erevan: Armenian Academy of Sciences, 1955). Suny: Looking toward Ararat, p. 20. Caramani, Daniele, The Nationalization of Politics: The Formation of National Electorates and Party Systems in Western Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Dadrian, Vahakn N., The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1995); Payaslian: History of Armenia, pp. 123‒24, and Ch. 6. Petrosyan: Datarane, pp. 90‒91. Suny: ―Eastern Armenians,‖ pp. 128‒29; Matossian, Mary K., The Impact of Soviet Policies in Armenia (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1962), p. 19; Lynch: Armenia, Vol. 1, p. 459; Seton-Watson: Russian Empire, pp. 485‒505. Bournoutian: Russia and the Armenians of Transcaucasia, 1797‒1889, p. 469. Payaslian: History of Armenia, p. 121; Hovannisian: ―Russian Armenia,‖ pp. 40‒ 41; Hovannisian: Road to Independence, pp. 17‒21; Libaridian: ―Revolution and liberation,‖ pp. 194‒97. Ascher, Abraham, The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); Muradyan, Derenik A., Hayastane Rusakan arajin revolutsiayi tarinerin (1905‒1907) [Armenia during the Years of the First Russian Revolution (1905‒1907)] (Erevan: Armenian Academy of Sciences, 1964). Hovannisian: ―Russian Armenia,‖ p. 39. Hovannisian: Road to Independence, pp. 22‒23. Rogger, Hans, Russia in the Age of Modernization and Revolution, 1881‒1917 (London: Longman, 1983), p. 240; Riasanovsky: History of Russia, p. 429. Hovannisian: ―Russian Armenia,‖ pp. 37–38, 45; MacKenzie and Curran: History of Russia, p. 371; Riasanovsky: History of Russia, pp. 411–12. SetonWatson presents a more sympathetic view on Stolypin. Seton-Watson: Russian

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188

189 190

191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198

199 200

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Empire, p. 629; on nationalism, see Seton-Watson: Russian Empire, pp. 663‒70. Vratsian, Simon, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun [The Republic of Armenia] (Beirut: Mshak, 1958, 2nd pr.), p. 17. Hovannisian: Road to Independence, pp. 70‒71. Stepanyants: ―Hay arakelakan,‖ pp. 103‒05. Payaslian: History of Armenia, p. 146. Hovannisian: Republic of Armenia, 4 vols. Petrosyan: Datarane, pp. 110‒12. Harutyunyan: Sahmandrakan mshakuyt, pp. 119‒20; Bournoutian: Concise History, pp. 299‒315; Payaslian: History of Armenia, pp. 165‒170. Gleason, Gregory, Federalism and Nationalism: The Struggle for Republic Rights in the USSR (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 2‒5; Payaslian: History of Armenia, pp. 172‒75. Suny, Ronald Grigor, ―Soviet Armenia,‖ in Hovannisian: Armenian People, Vol. 2, pp. 348, 353; Matossian: Impact, Ch. 2, passim; Payaslian: History of Armenia, pp. 171‒73; Bournoutian: Concise History, pp. 318‒22. Matossian: Impact, pp. 37‒42, 53, 78‒95; Suny: ―Soviet Armenia,‖ pp. 351‒52, 355; Payaslian: History of Armenia, pp. 171‒75. Suny: ―Soviet Armenia,‖ pp. 358‒59; Feldman, D., ―Krestyanskaya Voyna‖ [Peasants‖ Wars], Rodina, 1989, No. 10, p. 57, cited in Rein Müllerson, International Law, Rights and Politics: Developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 166‒67n11; Payaslian: History of Armenia, pp. 175‒76. Suny: ―Soviet Armenia,‖ p. 362; Payaslian: History of Armenia, pp. 175‒76. Mirzakhanyan: ―Economic,‖ p. 198; Suny: ―Soviet Armenia,‖ p. 359. Payaslian: History of Armenia, p. 175. Ibid., p. 176. Gellner: Conditions of Liberty, p. 5. Dadrian: ―Nationalism,‖ pp. 205‒06. Matossian: Impact, p. 149. Ibid., pp. 149‒50, 161, 194‒95; Sarafian, Vahe, ―The Soviet and the Armenian Church,‖ Armenian Review 8:2 (1955), p. 97; Payaslian: History of Armenia, pp. 176‒80. Mirzakhanyan: ―Economic,‖ p. 198. Staar, Richard F., Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1982, 4th ed.), p. 137; Roskin, Michael G., The Rebirth of East Europe (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1994, 2nd ed.), p. 101; Smith, Hedrick, The New Russians (New York: Random House, 1990), pp. 8‒9, 14‒15; Payaslian: History of Armenia, pp. 182‒84. Suny: ―Soviet Armenia,‖ pp. 372‒73. Kurkchiyan, Marina, ―Society in transition,‖ in Herzig and Kurkchiyan: Armenians, pp. 216‒17. Supreme Soviet of Armenia (SSA), Haykakan SSR hingerord gumarman geraguyn Soveti nistere [The Fifth Conference of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian S[oviet] S[ocialist] R[epublic]], 3rd sess., 24‒25 March 1960 (Erevan: Presidium, Sup-

NOTES

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213

214 215 216 217 218

219 220 221 222 223

317

reme Soviet of Armenia, 1960), pp. 6‒7, 10‒32; Payaslian: History of Armenia, pp. 183‒84; Suny: ―Soviet Armenia,‖ p. 373. Hahn, Jeffrey W., Soviet Grassroots: Citizen Participation in Local Soviet Government (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 181. Hahn: Soviet Grassroots, pp. 182‒83; SSA: Haykakan SSR hingerord gumarman geraguyn Soveti nistere, pp. 157‒98. Matossian: Impact, pp. 63‒64. UNDP, Armenia, Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia, Mirzakhanyan, Astghik (ed.) (UNDP, Armenia, 1999), available at www.undp.am. Panossian: Armenians, pp. 376‒79; Gorbachev, Mikhail, Memoirs, trans. Georges Peronasky and Tatjana Varsavsky (New York: Doubleday, 1996), p. 168. Dadrian: ―Nationalism,‖ pp. 209‒16. Gleason: Federalism and Nationalism, pp. 81‒104, 112‒15. Payaslian: History of Armenia, pp. 184‒98. Kamenetsky, Ihor (ed.), Nationalism and Human Rights: Processes of Modernization in the USSR (Littleton, CO: Association for the Study of the Nationalities, Libraries Unlimited, 1977); Thomas, Daniel C., The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). Aghayan, Dz., ―Patmakan gitutyunnere 14rd mijazgayin konkgresu‖ [―The historical sciences at the 14th international congress‖], Sovetakan Hayastan, 8 January 1976, as cited in Dadrian: ―Nationalism,‖ pp. 209, 254n30. Dadrian: ―Nationalism,‖ pp. 212‒13. On relative deprivation, see Gurr, Ted Robert, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970). Suny, Ronald G., ―On the road to independence: cultural cohesion and ethnic revival in a multinational society,‖ in Suny: Transcaucasia, p. 392. Suny: ―Soviet Armenia,‖ pp. 376‒77. Staar: Communist Regimes, pp. 71‒72; Roskin, Rebirth of East Europe, pp. 118‒20. Chorbajian, Levon, Patrick Donabedian, and Claude Mutafian, The Caucasian Knot: The History and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabagh (London: Zed Books, 1994), pp. 145–46; Alexeyeva, Ludmilla, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights, trans. Carol Pearce and John Glad (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), pp. 13, 132‒24; Bournoutian: Concise History, p. 330; Panossian: Armenians, pp. 323‒25. See also Chorbajian, Levon (ed.), The Making of Nagorno-Karabagh: From Secession to Republic (New York: Palgrave, 2001). Suny: ―On the road to independence,‖ p. 379. Alexeyeva: Soviet Dissent, p. 126. Panossian: Armenians, pp. 325‒26. Alexeyeva mentions 44 wounded based on a report by Izvestyia, 8 February 1979. Alexeyeva: Soviet Dissent, p. 128. Andrei Sakharov KGB File, Andropov, Gromyko, and Rudenko to the Central Committee, A bomb in the Moscow subway and the expulsion of George Krimsky, 18 January 1977, reported by V.E. Galkin, Sector I of the of the CPSU General Affairs Department, #110-A, FSB [Federal Security Bureau], S.II. 2.5.48, Yale University, Annals of Communism, available at www.yale.edu; also in

318

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227

228 229

230 231 232

233

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Rubenstein, Joshua, and Alexander Gribanov (eds), The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), Doc. 121, pp. 221‒22. Suny: ―Soviet Armenia,‖ p. 377; New York Times, 3 February 1980, p. 29. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome, 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953. Report by the foreign ministers of the member states on the problems of political unification, 27 October 1970, Luxembourg, Bulletin of the European Communities 11 (1970), pp. 9‒14, Part I, para. 5. CSCE, Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe Final Act, signed at Helsinki, 1 August 1975. The Helsinki Conference addressed three areas or ―baskets‖: Basket I on security; Basket II on cooperation in economy, science, technology, and the environment; and Basket III on human rights and cultural exchange. Alexeyeva: Soviet Dissent, p. 344; Courtois, Stéphane et al., Le livre noir du communisme: crimes, terreurs et répression (Paris: Laffont, 1997); Thomas: Helsinki Effect. See Ferraris, Luigi Vittorio (ed.), Report on a Negotiation, Helsinki–Geneva–Helsinki, 1972‒1975, trans. Marie-Claire Barber (Geneva: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, 1979). Rubenstein, Joshua, Soviet Dissidents: Their Struggle for Human Rights (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985, 2nd rev. ed.), pp. 229–35. Alexeyeva: Soviet Dissent, pp. 319‒20; Thomas: Helsinki Effect, p. 65. Andrei Sakharov KGB File, Andropov to the Central Committee. The spread of samizdat, 21 December 1970, #3461-A; Vladimir Bukovsky Collection, B.6; enclosed: 2/10/71 ruling by the Secretariat of CC on Andropov‖s document; 1 l; signature of Politburo members on Andropov‖s report. Yale University, Annals of Communism, available at www.yale.edu; also in Rubenstein and Gribanov: KGB File of Andrei Sakharov, Doc. 19, pp. 107‒10; see also Alexeyeva: Soviet Dissent, pp. 12‒15. Alexeyeva: Soviet Dissent, pp. 319, 330; Chalidze, Valery, To Defend These Rights: Human Rights and the Soviet Union, trans. Guy Daniels (New York: Random House, 1974). See also Bilinsky, Yaroslav, ―Russian dissenters and the nationality question,‖ in Kamenetsky: Nationalism and Human Rights, p. 80; New Scientist 87 (10 July 1980), pp. 96–97. Andrei Sakharov KGB File, Andropov to the Central Committee; The search of Andrei Tverdokhlebov‖s apartment, 30 November 1974, #3384-A; RGASPI [Russian State Archive for Social and Political History; formerly Central Party Archive]#13, Collection 5, inventory 67, file 960; S.II.2.6.1.14, Yale University, Annals of Communism, available at www.yale.edu. Alexeyeva: Soviet Dissent, pp. 13, 124. Rubenstein: Soviet Dissidents, p. 330. Alexeyeva: Soviet Dissent, pp. 127, 339; Bournoutian: Concise History, p. 330. Alexeyeva: Soviet Dissent, p. 127. Ibid., pp. 128‒30. Ibid., pp. 130‒31. Manukian, Vazgen, ―It is time to jump off the train,‖ in Libaridian: Armenia at

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the Crossroads, p. 58. Alexeyeva: Soviet Dissent, pp. 131‒32. Amalrik, Andrei A., Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984? (New York: Harper and Row, 1970). Smith: New Russians, pp. 14‒15; Payaslian, Simon, ―From Perestroika to uncertainty: will Gorbachev‖s experiment survive forces pounding at Kremlin gates?‖ Armenian International Magazine (July 1990), pp. 42‒44; Bournoutian: Concise History, pp. 331‒36. Payaslian: ―From Perestroika,‖ pp. 42‒44. See, for example, Goldman, Marshall I., U.S.S.R. in Crisis: The Failure of an Economic System (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983); Brzezinski, Zbigniew, The Grand Failure (New York: Collier Books, 1990). Libaridian, Gerard J., Modern Armenia: People, Nation, State (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2004), p. 206; Ishkhanian: ―The law of excluding the third force,‖ pp. 9‒38. Manukian: ―It is time to jump off the train,‖ p. 70. Payaslian: History of Armenia, p. 193; Beissinger, Mark R, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 188‒90; Kurkchiyan, Marina, ―The Karabagh conflict: from Soviet past to post-Soviet uncertainty,‖ in Herzig and Kurkchiyan: Armenians, p. 155; Chorbajian: Caucasian Knot, pp. 155–56. Pravda, April 11, 1989, p. 1; Vedomosti Verhovnogo Sovieta RSFSR, 1989, No. 37, cited in Rein Müllerson, International Law, Rights and Politics: Developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 163 and note 5. Müllerson: International Law, p. 163. Payaslian, History of Armenia, p. 197; Beissinger: Nationalist Mobilization, p. 404; Masih, Joseph R. and Robert O. Krikorian, Armenia at the Crossroads (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999), pp. 11‒12; Libaridian: Modern Armenia, pp. 207‒8. See Tolz, Vera, The USSR in 1990: A Record of Events (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 807‒8. Libaridian: Modern Armenia, p. 208. Suny: ―Soviet Armenia,‖ pp. 383, 385‒86. Tucker, Robert C., ―Post-Soviet leadership and change,‖ in Colton and Tucker: Patterns, p. 10. Suny: ―Elite transformation,‖ pp. 146, 147. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 150, entered into force 22 April 1954. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 UNTS 267, entered into force 4 October 1967. Opened for signature 31 March 1953, 193 UNTS 135, entered into force 7 July 1954. UN GA Res. 2200A (XXI), 999 UNTS 171, 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976. UN GA Res. 2200A (XXI), 993 UNTS 3, 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against

320

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268 269

270 271 272 273 274

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Women, A/RES/34/180, 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, GA res. 39/46 [annex, 39 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, UN Doc. A/39/51 (1984)], entered into force 26 June 1987. UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, A/RES/44/25, UNTS 1577, 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1999. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome, 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953. Henkin, Louis et al., International Law: Cases and Materials (St. Paul, MN: West, 1993, 3rd ed.). Henkin, Louis, ―Human rights: ideology and aspiration, reality and prospect,‖ in Samantha Power and Graham Allison (eds), Realizing Human Rights: Moving from Inspiration to Impact (New York: St. Martin‖s Press, 2000), p. 11. Italics in original. Sohn, Luis, ―John A. Sibley lecture: the shaping of international law,‖ Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 8:1 (1978), pp. 18‒22. UN GA, A/RES/2200A (XXI), 993 UNTS 3, 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976; Brudner, Alan, ―The domestic enforcement of international covenants on human rights: a theoretical framework,‖ University of Toronto Law Journal 35 (1985), pp. 219‒54. UNDP: Human Development Report 2000. Payaslian: History of Armenia, pp. 216‒17. See, for example, Amnesty International, Women in the Front Line: Human Rights Violations against Women (New York: Amnesty International, 1991). Macklin, Audrey, ―Refugee women and the imperative of categories,‖ Human Rights Quarterly 17:2 (1995), p. 217. Clark, Belinda, ―The Vienna Convention reservation regime and the Convention on Discrimination against Women,‖ American Journal of International Law 85 (1991), pp. 142, 281. Deutsch: Nationalism and Social Communication; Suny: ―Formation,‖ p. 19. Harutyunyan: Sahmandrakan mshakuyt, pp. 72‒73. Tabibian, Jivan, ―Modernization, political culture, and political economy in the diaspora,‖ Armenian Review 36:1 (1983), pp. 17‒25 (quote appears on p. 19). Ibid. See also Ishkhanian: ―The law of excluding the third force,‖ pp. 9‒38. Harutyunyan: Sahmandrakan mshakuyt, p. 117. Elster, Offe and Preuss: Institutional Design, p. 14. Kamenetsky: Nationalism and Human Rights. Rutland, Peter, ―Democracy and nationalism in Armenia,‖ Europe-Asia Studies 46:5 (1994), pp. 839‒61 (quote appears on p. 839).

Chapter Three 1

Mermagen, Nigel (UK, ILDG), Council of Europe, Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, ―Congress mission welcomes first election of the Yerevan mayor and calls for a better democratic culture in Armenia,‖ 1 June 2009,

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11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

19

20

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available at https://wcd.coe.int. Donnelly, Jack, International Human Rights (Boulder: Westview, 1993), p. 133. Fairbanks, Charles H. Jr., ―Disillusionment in the Caucasus and Central Asia,‖ Journal of Democracy 12:4 (2001), pp. 49‒56. Howard, Marc Morjé, ―The weakness of postcommunist civil society,‖ Journal of Democracy 13:1 (2002), pp. 157‒69. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, ―The primacy of history and culture,‖ in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds), Democracy after Communism (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), p. 197. Shapiro: State of Democratic Theory, p. 54. On problems of transition to democracy, see, for example, Diamond and Plattner: Democracy after Communism; Bremmer, Ian and Ray Taras (eds), New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), esp. chapter on Armenia, Dudwick, Nora, ―Armenia: paradise regained or lost?‖ pp. 471‒504. On post-Soviet leadership, see Colton and Tucker: Patterns, in particular Suny: ―Elite transformation,‖ pp. 141‒67. Grzymala-Busse, Anna, Rebuilding Leviathan: Party Competition and State Exploitation in Post-Communist Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). UN Commission on Human Rights, Promotion of the Right to Democracy, Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/57, 57th meeting, 27 April 1999; Franck, Thomas M., ―The emerging right to democratic governance,‖ American Journal of International Law 86:1 (1992), pp. 46‒91. Falk: Human Rights, p. 33. Shapiro: State of Democratic Theory, pp. 19‒20. Shils, Edward, Political Development in the New States (The Hague: Mouton, 1960). Zakaria, Fareed, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003). O‖Donnell, Guillermo, ―Delegative democracy,‖ Journal of Democracy 5:1 (1994), pp. 55‒69. Kitschelt, Herbert, ―Linkages between citizens and politicians in democratic polities,‖ Comparative Political Studies 33:6 (2000), pp. 845‒79. Diamond, Larry, Juan Linz and Seymour M. Lipset (eds), Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experience with Democracy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995). Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Thomas Carothers, ―The end of the transition paradigm,‖ Journal of Democracy 13:1 (2002), pp. 5‒21. Schedler, Andreas, ―The logic of electoral authoritarianism,‖ in Andreas Schedler (ed.), Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006), pp. 1–23. See also Brownlee, Jason, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 25. Schedler, Andreas, Electoral Authoritarianism; Bunce, Valerie, Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss (eds), Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Postcom-

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munist World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Herron, Erik S., Elections and Democracy after Communism? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). Elster, Offe and Preuss: Institutional Design, p. 301. Ibid. DiFranceisco, Wayne and Zvi Gitelman, ―Soviet political culture and “covert participation” in policy implementation,‖ American Political Science Review 78:3 (1984), pp. 603‒21. Friedgut, Theodore H., Political Participation in the USSR (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 302. Ibid., p. 325. Huntington: Third Wave, pp. 36‒37. Republic of Armenia, National Statistical Service, 1 October 2008. International Republican Institute, Baltic Surveys, Gallup Organization, Armenian Sociological Association, ―Armenia National Study,‖ 27 October‒3 November 2007, with funding from the United States Agency for International Development. Woshinsky: Culture and Politics, pp. 56‒57. Keenan: ―Human rights,‖ pp. 69‒80 (the phrase ―genetic structure of political culture‖ appears on p. 71); see also Bozeman, Adda B., ―Law, human rights, and culture,‖ in Thompson: Moral Imperatives, pp. 25‒38. Keenan: ―Human Rights,‖ pp. 69‒80. Inglehart and Welzel: ―Political culture and democracy,‖ pp. 61‒79. See, for example, Fish, M. Steven, ―The dynamics of democratic erosion,‖ in Richard D. Anderson, Jr., et al. (eds), Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 54; Diamond: Spirit of Democracy, pp. 190‒207; Brzezinski: ―Primacy,‖ p. 194. Nodia, Ghia, ―The impact of nationalism,‖ in Diamond and Plattner: Democracy after Communism, pp. 204‒05. Kurkchiyan, Marina, ―The illegitimacy of law in post-Soviet societies,‖ and MacFarlane, S. Neil, ―Politics and the rule of law in the Commonwealth of Independent States,‖ in Denis J. Galligan and Marina Kurkchiyan (eds), Law and Informal Practices: The Post-Communist Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 25‒46, 61‒76. Shapiro: State of Democratic Theory, p. 1. Inglehart and Welzel: Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p. 156; see also Wejnert, Barbara, ―Diffusion, development, and democracy, 1800–1999,‖ American Sociological Review 70:1 (2005), pp. 53‒81; Burkhart, Ross E. and Michael S. Lewis-Beck, ―Comparative democracy: the economic development thesis,‖ American Political Science Review 88:4 (1994), pp. 903‒10; Halliwell, John, ―Empirical linkages between democracy and economic growth,‖ British Journal of Political Science 24:2 (1993), pp. 225‒48. Inglehart and Welzel: Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p. 143. Keenan: ―Human Rights,‖ pp. 69‒80. Lapidus, Gail Warshofsky, ―Gender and restructuring: the impact of perestroika and its aftermath on Soviet women,‖ in Valentine M. Moghadam (ed.),

NOTES

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52

53 54 55 56

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

66 67 68 69

323

Democratic Reform and the Position of Women in Transitional Economies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 137‒61. Almond and Verba: Civic Culture, p. 4. Mishler and Rose: ―Political support,‖ pp. 303‒20. Ibid., pp. 303‒04. Ayvazyan, Vardan, Mardu iravunkner [Human Rights] (Erevan: Tigran Mets, 2007, 2nd rev. ed.), pp. 10‒11. Armenian Young Lawyers Association (AYLA). www.ayla.am. Armenian Constitutional Right-Protective Centre (ACRPC). www.acrpc.am Tilly: Democracy, p. 36. Ibid., pp. 38‒39. Stefes, Christoph H., Understanding Post-Soviet Transitions: Corruption, Collusion and Clientelism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). Gellner: Conditions of Liberty, p. 5. Dudwick: ―Armenia,‖ p. 492; United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report, Armenia 1998: The Role of the State (UNDP Armenia: UNDP, 1998), p. 18. Libaridian, Gerard J., ―Introduction,‖ in Libaridian, Gerard J. (ed.), Armenia at the Crossroads (Watertown, MA: Blue Crane, 1991), pp. 1‒8. On moral capital, see Kane, John, The Politics of Moral Capital (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). See the text of the statement in Libaridian: Armenia at the Crossroads, pp. 96–105; the quote appears on page 96. Ibid., pp. 104‒05. See Stefes: Understanding. Hunter, Shireen T., The Transcaucasus in Transition: Nation-building and Conflict (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), pp. 180‒82. Dudwick: ―Armenia,‖ p. 490. Shapiro: State of Democratic Theory, p. 7. Elster, Offe and Preuss: Institutional Design, p. 303. Diamond: Spirit of Democracy. Elster, Offe and Preuss: Institutional Design, p. 305. Ibid. Shapiro: State of Democratic Theory, p. 86. Tilly: Democracy, p. 28. Khachatryan, Henrik M., Hayastani Hanrapetutyan arajin sahmanadrutyune [The First Constitution of the Republic of Armenia] (Erevan: National Academy of Sciences, 1997). Dudwick: ―Armenia,‖ p. 490. Shapiro: State of Democratic Theory, p. 1. The full text of the Constitution appears at www.parliament.am. AI, Report 1993; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 1992–1993: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (New York: Freedom House, 1993). Unless otherwise noted, all references to Freedom House, Freedom in the World,

324

70 71 72 73 74 75

76

77 78 79 80 81 82

83 84

85 86 87 88

89 90 91 92 93 94

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA

are to Freedom House‖s website, www.freedomhouse.org. US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993, available at www.state.gov. Hereinafter USDS: Country Reports for (year). ―Troubling news from the Caucasus,‖ Economist, 8 March 2008, pp. 60‒61; ―Protests continued,‖ Economist, 29 March 2008, pp. 66‒67. Danielyan, Emil, ―Armenian Security Services Suspected of Spying on Opposition Leader,‖ Eurasia Daily Monitor 4:85 (1 May 2007). Tilly: Democracy, p. 77. Fish: ―Dynamics of democratic erosion,‖ p. 54. Dimitrijevic, Vojin, The Insecurity of Human Rights after Communism: ―Factors and Difficulties‖ Affecting the Implementation of International Human Rights Standards in Times of Transition (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, 1993); Brzezinski, Zbigniew, ―Post-communist nationalism,‖ Foreign Affairs 68:5 (1989), pp. 1‒25. See, for example, Beissinger, Mark R. and Crawford Young (eds), Beyond State Crisis? Postcolonial Africa and Post-Soviet Eurasia in Comparative Perspective (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002); Zartman, I. William (ed.), Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995). MacFarlane: ―Politics and the rule of law,‖ p. 72. Freedom House: Freedom in the World, 2003. Colton and Tucker: Patterns, esp. Suny: ―Elite transformation,‖ pp. 141‒67. USDS: Country Reports for 1995. The National Democratic Union was led by Vazgen Manukyan, a former political ally of Ter-Petrosyan and member of the Karabagh Committee. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Armenia‖s Parliamentary Election and Constitutional Referendum, July 5, 1995, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1995), p. 6. Payaslian: History of Armenia, pp. 204‒05. Human Rights Watch, World Report 1996 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997). All references to the Human Rights Watch annual reports (HRW: World Report) are to the organization‖s website, www.hrw.org. CSCE: Armenia‖s Parliamentary Election (1995), p. 6. Ibid. USDS: Country Reports for 1995. Ayvazyan, Vardan, Mardu iravunkneri pashtpanutyan kazmakerbume Hayastani Hanrapetutyunum [The Formation of Human Rights Protection in the Republic of Armenia] (Erevan: Areg, 2000), pp. 130‒31. USDS: Country Reports for 2002. Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Armenia, ―History‖ and ―Missions and goals,‖ available at www.ombuds.am. Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Armenia, ―RA Human Rights Defender,‖ available at www.ombuds.am. USDS: Country Reports for 2004. Ayvazyan: Mardu iravunkneri pashtpanutyan kazmakerbume, pp. 131‒33. Armenia, Depository Notification, C.N.41.2008.TREATIES-1, 24 January

NOTES

95

96

97 98

99

100 101

102 103

104 105 106

107 108 109

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2008, http://untreaty.un.org/. The Convention on the Political Rights of Women, General Assembly resolution 640(VII), 20 December 1952, opened for signature on 31 March 1953, entered into force 7 July 1954, 193 UNTS 135. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, A/RES/34/180, Dec. 18, 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981. United Nations, Focus 2007: Towards Universal Participation and Implementation. A Comprehensive Legal Framework for Peace, Development and Human Rights (New York: United Nations, 2007), p. 23; USDS: Country Reports for 1993; Anjargolian, Sara, ―Armenia‖s women in transition,‖ in Christopher P.M. Waters (ed.), The State of Law in the South Caucasus (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 181‒95. Renamed Ministry of Nature Protection. See www.mnp.am. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Executive Board, Republic of Armenia: Country Strategic Opportunities Paper, Sess. 80, Agenda Item 10(a), EB 2003/80/R.19, Rome, 17‒18 December 2003, p. 5. Republic of Armenia, Ministry of Statistics, State Register and Analysis, Women and Men in Armenia (Erevan: Ministry of Statistics, 1999), pp. 48‒49; Dudwick, Nora, ―Out of the kitchen into the crossfire: women in independent Armenia,‖ in Mary Buckley (ed.), Post-Soviet Women: From the Baltic to Central Asia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 245. Itano, Nicole, ―Quota law puts more women in Armenia‖s election,‖ WeNews, 10 May 2007, available at www.womensenews.org. OSCE/ODIHR, ―Republic of Armenia: Parliamentary Elections, 12 May 2007,‖ Needs Assessment Mission Report, 30 January‒2 February 2007. Warsaw: OSCE, 15 February 2007. Inter-Parliamentary Union, Historical Archive of Parliamentary Election Results, available at www.ipu.org. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, ―Republic of Armenia, Parliamentary Elections, May 25, 2003: Final Report‖ (Warsaw: OSCE, 31 July 2003). American Bar Association, Rule of Law Initiative, Judicial Reform Index for Armenia, January 2008 (Washington, DC: ABA/ROLI, 2008, Vol. 3), p. 18. ABA/ROLI: Judicial Reform Index for Armenia, January 2008, Vol. 3, p. 25. See Dahl, Robert A., ―Decision-making in a democracy: the Supreme Court as a national policy-maker,‖ Journal of Public Law 6 (1957), pp. 279‒95. Ran Hirschl has pointed out that independent courts ―may be devices for limiting domestic political opposition to unpopular policies by taking them off the table.‖ Hirschl, Ran, ―The political origins of judicial empowerment through constitutionalization: lessons from four constitutional revolutions,‖ Law and Social Inquiry 25:1 (2000), pp. 91‒147. Shapiro: State of Democratic Theory, pp. 66‒67. Ibid., pp. 74‒76. Larkins, Christopher M., ―Judicial independence and democratization: a theoretical and conceptual analysis,‖ American Journal of Comparative Law 44:4 (1996), p. 606.

326 110 111 112 113 114 115

116 117 118

119 120 121 122

123

124 125 126 127 128

129

130 131 132 133

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Ayvazyan: Mardu iravunkneri pashtpanutyan kazmakerbume, p. 145. ABA/ROLI: Judicial Reform Index for Armenia, January 2008, Vol. 3, p. 7. Ibid., p. 1. Ibid., p. 15. See Republic of Armenia, Judicial Code, AL‒135, 7 April 2007, with various amendments, 28 November 2007‒28 October 2010. The Economic Court, which had jurisdiction over business disputes, was terminated in January 2008. ABA/ROLI: Judicial Reform Index for Armenia, January 2008, Vol. 3, p. 7. Ibid., pp. 21‒22. Ibid., pp. 1, 6. Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, Country Statistics, Armenia, 1 January 2009, www.echr.coe.int; see also Manoukyan, Lousine, ―A flow of decisions coming from the European Court,‖ Open Society Institute, Human Rights in Armenia, 24 March 2010, available at www.hra.am. ABA/ROLI: Judicial Reform Index for Armenia, January 2008, Vol. 3, pp. 2‒3, 13, italics in original; see also pp. 34‒36. Ibid., pp. 38–39; Ayvazyan: Mardu iravunkneri pashtpanutyan kazmakerbume, p. 147. ABA/ROLI: Judicial Reform Index for Armenia, January 2008, Vol. 3, pp. 49‒50. Center for Regional Development/Transparency International Armenia, Corruption Perception in Armenia 2007 (Erevan: Center for Regional Development/ Transparency International Armenia, 2007). TI Global Corruption Barometer, 2010. In a 2007 survey, 20.5 per cent of the respondents identified the educational system as the most corrupt, while 15.9 per cent the judiciary (including the prosecutor‖s office, courts, police), followed by the healthcare system (11.7 per cent). Center for Regional Development/ Transparency International Armenia, Corruption Perception in Armenia 2007 (Erevan: Center for Regional Development/Transparency International Armenia, 2007). ABA/ROLI: Judicial Reform Index for Armenia, January 2008, Vol. 3, p. 51. Lowell, A. Lawrence, Public Opinion and Popular Government (New York: Longmans, Green, 1913), p. 61. Almond and Powell: Comparative Politics, pp. 205‒31. Mayer, Lawrence C., Comparative Political Inquiry: A Methodological Survey (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1972), p. 216. For a similar argument regarding the Russian case, see Easter, Gerald M., Reconstructing the State: Personal Networks and Elite Identity in Soviet Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Grzymala-Busse: Rebuilding Leviathan, pp. 58–63; see also Kitschelt, Herbert, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radosław Markowski and Gébor Tóka, Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-party Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Tucker: ―Post-Soviet leadership,‖ p. 15. Dudwick: ―Political transformations,‖ p. 89. Ibid., p. 88. See, for example, Libaridian, Gerard, interview, Armenian International Magazine

NOTES

134

135

136 137 138 139

140

141 142 143 144 145 146

147 148

149

150

151

152

327

(April 1999), p. 46; see also Fairbanks: ―Disillusionment.‖ OSCE/ODIHR, ―Republic of Armenia: Parliamentary Elections, 12 May 2007,‖ Needs Assessment Mission Report, 30 January‒2 February 2007 (Warsaw: OSCE, Feb. 15, 2007). International Republican Institute, Baltic Surveys, Gallup Organization, Armenian Sociological Association, ―Armenia National Study,‖ 27 October‒3 November 2007, with funding from the United States Agency for International Development. USDS: Country Reports for 1993. For a useful discussion of these terms in the context of post-Soviet Russian politics, see Tucker: ―Post-Soviet leadership,‖ p. 15. Freedom House: Freedom in the World, 2002. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Armenia‖s Parliamentary Election and Constitutional Referendum, July 5, 1995, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1995, p. 8. OSCE/ODIHR, ―Republic of Armenia: Parliamentary Elections, 12 May 2007,‖ Needs Assessment Mission Report, 30 January‒2 February 2007 (Warsaw: OSCE, 15 February 2007). OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission, ―Republic of Armenia, Parliamentary Elections 2007,‖ Interim Report no. 1, 21‒28 March 2007. Danielyan, Emil, ―Armenian Security Services Suspected of Spying on Opposition Leader,‖ Eurasia Daily Monitor 4:85 (1 May 2007). Zhamanak [Time], April 26, 2007; quoted translation appears in Danielyan, ―Armenian Security Services.‖ Fairbanks: ―Disillusionment.‖ Laza Kekic, director, The Economist Intelligence Unit‖s Index of Democracy, The World in 2007, available at www.economist.com. International Republican Institute, Baltic Surveys, Gallup Organization, Armenian Sociological Association, ―Armenia National Study,‖ 1‒9 December 2007, with funding from USAID. Huntington: Political Order, p. 410. See, for example, US Agency for International Development, ―Armenia Local Government Project,‖ prepared by Samuel L. Coxson (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2003). Council of Europe, Combating Poverty and Access to Social Rights in the Countries of the South Caucasus: A Territorial Approach, Trends in Social Cohesion, no. 5 (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2003), pp. 40‒42. Keane, John, Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); Howard, Marc Morjé, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Mouzelis, Nicos, ―Modernity, late development, and civil society,‖ in John A. Hall (ed.), Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 227‒28. Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns

328

153 154 155 156 157

158

159 160

161 162 163 164

165 166 167

168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA

Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 7‒9. Dudwick: ―Political transformations,‖ p. 98. Ibid. Republic of Armenia, Ministry of Justice, Report on the Activities for 2008. Armenian Center for Protection of Human Rights after Sakharov, Syunik Branch, www.ngo.am, index. International Republican Institute, Baltic Surveys, Gallup Organization, Armenian Sociological Association, ―Armenia National Study,‖ 27 October‒3 November 2007, with funding from the United States Agency for International Development. Ionesyan, Karine, ―Health and costs: prices in medicine may be slashed amid increased government spending,‖ ArmeniaNow, 5 November 2010, available at www.armenianow.com. Dudwick: ―Political transformations,‖ p. 98. Walaszek, Zdzislawa, ―An open issue of legitimacy: the state and the Church in Poland,‖ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 483 (1986), pp. 118‒34. Huntington: Third Wave, pp. 80‒81. Pipes: Russia under the Old Regime, Ch. 9. Catholicos Karekin I Sarkissian had served as Catholicos of the Great House of Cilicia (Coadjutor, 1977‒83; Catholicos, 1983‒95) in Antelias, Lebanon. Sarkissian, Karekin I, ―The Enthronement Sermon of His Holiness Karekin I,‖ in Challenge to Renewal: Essays for a New Era in the Armenian Church, Christopher Hagop Zakian (ed.) (New York: St. Vartan Press, 1996), pp. 93‒99. Razmik Panossian records a similar statement by Karekin I reflecting nineteenth century nationalist discourse. See Panossian: Armenians, p. 353. Elster, Offe and Preuss: Institutional Design, pp. 297‒98. Harutyunyan, Gagik, ―Zhamanakakits anhati kristoneakan ev iravakan ashkharhembrnume‖ [The Christian and legal worldview of the contemporary individual], in The Mother See of Holy Echmiadzin and the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia, Kristoneutyun ev iravunk [Christianity and Law] (Erevan: Nzhar, 2001), pp. 74‒78. Ibid., pp. 5‒8. Serobyan, Pushkin, ―Hay arakelakan ekeghetsu iravakan vichake‖ [The legal status of the Armenian Apostolic Church], in ibid., pp. 130‒41. Allina-Pisano: Potemkin Village. UNDP: Human Development Report, Armenia 1998. Brandt, Willy, Arms and Hunger, trans. Anthea Bell (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1987), p. 196. Poghosyan, Gevorg (ed.), Situation with Human Rights in Countries of South Caucasus (Erevan: Armenian Sociological Association, 2003), pp. 19, 68. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 22, 68. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, ―Poll finds popular discontent in Armenia,‖ 31 August 2007. See www.Armenialiberty.org.

NOTES 177 178 179 180

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184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193

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329

Institute for Political and Sociological Consulting, Erevan, 2010. Shapiro: State of Democratic Theory, p. 57. Fish: ―Dynamics of democratic erosion,‖ pp. 70, 71. Gutmann, Amy and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1996), pp. 2‒12, 52‒53, 346. See also Ely, John Hart, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980). USDS: Country Reports for 1993. HRW: World Report 1994. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Executive Board, Republic of Armenia: Country Strategic Opportunities Paper, Sess. 80, Agenda Item 10(a), EB 2003/80/R.19, Rome, 17‒18 December 2003, p. vi. Levitsky and Way: Competitive Authoritarianism, pp. 208‒09; Astourian: ―From Ter-Petrosian to Kocharian.‖ USDS: Country Reports for 1995. CSCE: Armenia‖s Parliamentary Election, p. 11. HRW: World Report 1996. Sneider, Daniel, ―Democracy teeters in three ex-Soviet states,‖ Christian Science Monitor, 30 May 1995. CSCE: Armenia‖s Parliamentary Election, p. 13 Ibid. Ibid., p. 14. Ibid., p. 17. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ―Armenian Presidential Elections: Final Report,‖ 24 September 1996 (Warsaw: OSCE, 1996). OSCE/ODIHR, ―Preliminary Statement of the International Observers Armenian Presidential Elections,‖ 22 September 1996; OSCE: ―Final Report‖ (24 September 1996); Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, p. 210; Bremmer, Ian and Cory Welt, ―Armenia‖s New Autocrats,‖ Journal of Democracy 8:3 (1997), p. 88. OSCE: ―Preliminary Statement‖ (22 September 1996); OSCE: ―Final Report‖ (24 September 1996). OSCE: ―Preliminary Statement‖ (22 September 1996). OSCE: ―Final Report‖ (24 September 1996). See Payaslian: History of Armenia, pp. 204‒05. Human Rights Watch, Armenia: Democracy on Rocky Ground (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009), p. 9; Levitsky and Way: Competitive Authoritarianism, p. 210; Minasian, Liana, ―The role of the army in Armenia‖s politics,‖ Caucasus Reporting Service, no. 5, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 4 November 1999. USDS: Country Reports for 1999; OSCE, ―Final Report‖ (24 September 1996); Republic of Armenia, Central Electoral Commission. Dudwick: ―Political transformations,‖ pp. 104‒05. USDS: Country Reports for 1996. USDS: Country Reports for 1999 and 2000.

330 204 205 206 207 208 209 210

211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218

219

220 221 222

223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA

See, for example, Telunts, Malik M., Haykakan arajin sahmanadrutyune [The First Armenian Constitution] (Erevan: National Academy of Sciences, 2001), p. 77. OSCE/ODIHR, ―Armenian Presidential Elections, 24 September 1996: Final Report.‖ USDS: Country Reports for 2004. Freedom House: Freedom in the World, 2002. Ibid. Ibid.; Zakarian, Armen and Shakeh Avoyan, ―Impeachment Row Disrupts Armenian Parliament Session,‖ 10 June 2002, azatutyun.am. Ibid.; OSCE/ODIHR, ―Republic of Armenia, Parliamentary Elections, 25 May 2003: Final Report‖ (Warsaw: OSCE, 31 July 2003); OSCE/ODIHR, ―Republic of Armenia, Presidential Election, 15 February and 5 March 2003: Final Report‖ (Warsaw: OSCE, 28 April 2003); see also Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, p. 211. Danielyan, Emil, ―Armenia: A Dictator in the Making,‖ Transitions Online, 24 June 2004. www.tol.org. OSCE/ODIHR, ―Republic of Armenia, Parliamentary Elections, 25 May 2003: Final Report‖ (Warsaw: OSCE, 31 July 2003). OSCE/ODIHR: ―Parliamentary Elections: Final Report‖ (31 July 2003). Ibid. Freedom House: Freedom in the World, 2004. USDS: Country Reports for 2005. USDS: Country Reports for 2006. Ibid.; OSCE/ODIHR, ―Republic of Armenia: Parliamentary Elections, 12 May 2007: Final Report,‖ Election Observation Mission Report (Warsaw: OSCE, 10 September 2007). Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR, Final Joint Opinion on Amendments to the Electoral Code of the Republic of Armenia, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 70th plenary session (Venice, 16‒17 March 2007) CDL-AD(2007)013, available at www.osce.org. Ibid. Ibid. Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR, ―Final Joint Opinion on the Amendments to the Electoral Code of the Republic of Armenia,‖ CDL-AD(2005)027 (Strasbourg/Warsaw: Venice Commission and OSCE, 25 October 2005). Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR: Final Joint Opinion, 16‒17 March 2007. OSCE/ODIHR: ―Republic of Armenia: Parliamentary Elections, 12 May 2007,‖ Needs Assessment Mission Report. OSCE/ODIHR: ―Parliamentary Elections, 12 May 2007: Final Report.‖ Ibid. Ibid. OSCE/ODIHR: Election Observation Mission: ―Parliamentary Elections 2007.‖ OSCE/ODIHR: ―Parliamentary Elections, 12 May 2007: Final Report.‖ Ibid.

NOTES 231 232 233

234

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238 239 240

241 242 243 244 245 246

247

248 249 250

251 252

331

Ibid. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: ―Poll finds popular discontent.‖ International Republican Institute, Baltic Surveys, Gallup Organization, Armenian Sociological Association, ―Armenia National Study,‖ 27 October‒3 November 2007, with funding from USAID. OSCE/ODIHR, ―Republic of Armenia: Presidential Election, 19 February 2008,‖ Needs Assessment Mission Report, 4–5 December 2007 (Warsaw: OSCE, 13 December 2007). Ibid.; OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission, ―Presidential Election, 2008: Republic of Armenia,‖ Interim Report No. 1, 10‒26 January 2008. Ibid. OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Report, ―Republic of Armenia: Presidential Election, 19 February 2008: Final Report‖ (Warsaw: OSCE, 30 May 2008). Ibid. Ibid. Human Rights Watch, ―Armenia: violence at polling stations Mars elections: assailants target opposition activists, observers and journalists,‖ 22 February 2008, www.hrw.org. Ibid. Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2009. HRW: World Report 2010. HRW: Democracy on Rocky Ground, p. 9. ABA/ROLI: Judicial Reform Index for Armenia, January 2008, Vol. 3, p. 28. European Court of Human Rights, Galstyan v. Armenia, no. 26986/03, judgment, 15 November 2007; Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Supervision of the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Annual Report 2009, ―Freedom of Assembly and Association,‖ Galstyan and Other Similar Cases, 26986/03, judgment of 15 November 2007, final on 15 February 2008 (Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, April 2010), p. 170. See also Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome, 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953. European Court of Human Rights, Karapetyan v. Armenia, no. 22387/05, judgment, 27 October 2009; Kirakosyan v. Armenia, no. 31237/03, judgment, 2 December 2008; Mkhitaryan v. Armenia, no. 22390/05, judgment, 2 December 2008; Tadevosyan v. Armenia, no. 41698/04, judgment, 2 December 2008. HRW: World Report 2010. ABA/ROLI: Judicial Reform Index for Armenia, January 2008, Vol. 3, p. 32. Millennium Challenge Corporation, ―MCC Board of Directors meets to address U.S. government global development priorities: partial termination of assistance to Nicaragua announced hold on funding for Armenia to remain in force,‖ 10 June 2009, available at www.mcc.gov; HRW: World Report 2010. Millennium Challenge Corporation, ―Armenia and the Millennium Challenge Corporation,‖ available at www.mcc.gov. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1643, ―Imple-

332

253

254 255 256 257

258

259 260 261 262

263

264 265 266 267 268

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA

mentation by Armenia of Assembly Resolutions 1609 (2008) and 1620 (2008),‖ Assembly debate, 3rd Sitting, 27 January 2009. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Committee on the Honoring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee), Co-rapporteurs Georges Colombier (France) and John Prescott (UK), Report, ―The functioning of democratic institutions in Armenia,‖ Doc. 11579, 15 April 2008. Ibid. HRW: World Report 2010. Council of Europe, Congress of Local and Regional Authorities: ―Congress mission welcomes first election.‖ Council of Europe, Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, ―Congress delegation concerned about lawfulness of elections in Yerevan, Armenia,‖ 29 May 2009, available at https://wcd.coe.int. Council of Europe, Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, ―Congress begins its election observation mission in Armenia,‖ 28 May 2009, available at https://wcd.coe.int. HRW: World Report 2010. Ibid. Helsinki Association for Human Rights, available at www.hahr.am. See the South Caucasus Network of Human Rights Defenders, ―Joint press release – Armenia: acquittal of human rights defender Arshaluys Hakobian,‖ Paris-Geneva-Erevan, 16 February 2010, available at www.caucasusnetwork.org. Serge Sargsyan, Opening Address, in XIV Erevan International Conference, 1‒3 October 2009, Almanac 2009: Constitutional Justice in the Millennium (Erevan: Nzhar, 2009), pp. 21–22. FIDH, ―Human rights in Armenia: an appeal from the 37th FIDH Congress,‖ FIDH 37th Forum, 6 April 2010, available at www.fidh.org. A1Plus.am, 3 May 2010. Dudwick: ―Armenia,‖ p. 494. Ibid. Telunts: Haykakan arajin sahmanadrutyune, pp. 9‒10.

Chapter Four 1 2 3

4 5

Marshall, Thomas H., Class, Citizenship, and Social Development (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964), p. 78. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Articles 13, 18, 19, 20; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Articles 12, 19, 18, 20. Halsbury‖s Statutes, 3rd ed., p. 401, quoted in Paul Sieghart, The International Law of Human Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 131; see also Turner, Ralph V., Magna Carta (Harlow, UK: Pearson Longman, 2003). Mill, John Stuart, On Liberty and The Subjection of Women (London: Penguin Books, 2006 [1859, 1869]), p. 16. Ibid.

NOTES 6

7 8 9 10

11 12

13 14

15 16 17 18

19

20

21

333

Nazarian, Stepanos, ―Kaghakayin enkerutyan armatakan nyutere‖ (―The Fundamental Elements of Political Association‖), Hyusisapayl (April 1862), p. 190, quoted in Khachaturian: Cultivating Nationhood, p. 110. Brownlie: Principles of Public International Law, p. 153. Henkin: ―Human rights,‖ p. 11. See, for example, ABA/ROLI: Judicial Reform Index for Armenia, January 2008, Vol. 3, p. 24. See Martin, Francisco Forrest et al., International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Treaties, Cases, and Analysis (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Lauterpacht, Hersch, International Law and Human Rights (New York: Praeger, 1950); Sohn and Buergenthal: International Protection of Human Rights; Sohn: ―Sibley lecture,‖ pp. 18‒22; Sohn, Luis, ―The new international law: protection of the rights of individuals rather than states,‖ American University Law Review 32:1 (1982), pp. 1‒64; Buergenthal, Thomas, ―International human rights law and institutions,‖ Washington Law Review 63:1 (1988), pp. 1–19; Meron: Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms; Meron: Human Rights in International Law; Sieghart: International Law of Human Rights; Cassese, Antonio, Human Rights in a Changing World (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1990); Vasak, Karel (ed.), The International Dimensions of Human Rights (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982). Henkin et al.: International Law. Falk, Richard A., Samuel S. Kim and Sam H. Mandlovitz (eds), The United Nations and a Just World Order (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Buergenthal: ―International human rights law and institutions,‖ pp. 1‒19; Meron: Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms; Claude and Weston: Human Rights in the World Community; Farer, Tom J., ―The United Nations and human rights: more than a whimper,‖ Human Rights Quarterly 9:4 (1987), pp. 550‒86; Luard, Evan (ed.), The International Protection of Human Rights (New York: Praeger, 1967). Lauterpacht: International Law and Human Rights, p. 4. Sohn: ―New international law,‖ p. 13; see also Taubenfeld, Howard J. and Rita Falk Taubenfeld, ―Human rights and the emerging international constitution,‖ Hofstra Law Review 9:2 (1981), pp. 475‒514. Lauterpacht: International Law and Human Rights, p. 34. Brudner: ―Domestic enforcement of international covenants,‖ pp. 219‒54. For example, UDHR, Articles 5, 9, 12; ICCPR, Articles 7, 9, 17. The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10 December 1948. UNGA Res. 217A III, 3(1) UN GAOR Res. 71, UN Doc. A/811. United Nations, General Assembly, A/RES/2200A (XXI), 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, entered into force 23 March 1976; dates of accession appear at Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, http:// untreaty.un.org. Steiner, Henry J., Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 153‒54, 385‒88. United Nations, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or

334

22 23 24 25

26

27 28 29 30 31

32 33 34 35 36 37 38

39 40 41 42 43 44

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA

Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Committee Against Torture, Considera-tion of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 19 of the Conven-tion, CAT/C/24/Add.4/Rev.1, 17 January 1996. European Convention on Human Rights, Article 5. Brownlie: Principles, pp. 532‒33; Ramcharan, Bertrand G. (ed.), International Law and Fact-finding in the Field of Human Rights (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982). Manokha, Ivan, The Political Economy of Human Rights Enforcement (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). Benvenisti, Eyal ―Reclaiming democracy: the strategic uses of foreign and international law by national courts,‖ American Journal of International Law 102:2 (2008), pp. 241‒74; Franck: ―Emerging right,‖ pp. 46‒91. United Nations, General Assembly A/RES/39/46, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85, entered into force 28 June 1987. See also Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, General Assembly, A/RES/57/199, adopted 18 December 2002. Freedom House: Freedom in the World 1992‒1993, pp. 104‒06. UNDP: Human Development Report, Armenia 1998. Republic of Armenia, Human Rights Defender, Ad hoc Report on the Right to Peaceful Assembly in the Republic of Armenia (Erevan: Human Rights Defender, 2010), p. 3. UNDP: Human Development Report, Armenia 1998. Republic of Armenia, Human Rights Defender, Annual Report for 2004 (Erevan: Human Rights Defender, 2004), www.ombuds.am; USDS: Country Reports for 2004. Republic of Armenia, Human Rights Defender: Ad hoc Report on the Right to Peaceful Assembly in the Republic of Armenia. HRW: World Report 2010. Ibid. UN GA Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force 23 March 1976. USDS: Country Reports for 1993. Yerevan Press Club: ―Situation in Armenia.‖ Noyan Tapan news agency, as referred to in Freedom House, Freedom in the World 1996‒1997: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (New York: Freedom House, 1997), p. 130. USDS: Country Reports for 1999 and 2000. ―Armenia: changed status of two government newspapers (Hayastani Hanrapetutyun),‖ Yerevan Press Club, weekly newsletter, 27 January‒2 February 2001. Walker, Christopher, Muzzling the Media: The Return of Censorship in the Commonwealth of Independent States (Freedom House, June 2007), p. 1. Ibid. USDS: Country Reports for 1993 and 1999. Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), ―Attacks on the press 2009: Armenia‖ (New York: Committee to Protect Journalists, 2010), available at http://cpj.org/ 2010/02/attacks-on-the-press-2009-armenia.php; Freedom House, Freedom

NOTES

45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63

64 65 66 67 68 69 70

71 72

335

in the World 1994‒1995: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (New York: Freedom House, 1994), p. 112. See Yerevan Press Club, http://www.ypc.am. Ibid., ―Situation in Armenia,‖ available at www.ypc.am. Poghosyan: Situation with Human Rights, p. 43. Ibid., pp. 17, 18‒19, 21. Ibid., p. 9. USDS: Country Reports for 2004. USDS: Country Reports for 1993; Freedom House: Freedom in the World 1994‒ 1995, p. 112. CSCE: Armenia‖s Parliamentary Election. Freedom House: Freedom in the World 1996‒1997, p. 130. Ibid. Established in 1998, Oragir was shut down by the government the following year. Haykakan zhamanak, http://www.armtimes.com/about. USDS: Country Reports for 1999. USDS: Country Reports for 2000. Ann K. Cooper, Executive Director of the Committee to Protect Journalists, to President Kocharyan, 10 September 1999, available at www.cpj.org. USDS: Country Reports for 2007; Yerevan Press Club, weekly newsletter, March 7–13, 2008. Yerevan Press Club, weekly newsletter, 26 June‒2 July 2009. Ibid., 16‒22 October 2009, 14‒21 January 2010. Ibid., 5‒11 March 2010, 7‒13 May 2010. Republic of Armenia, Ministry of Justice, Head of Prison Administration Hayk Harutyunyan to Human Rights Defender Armen Harutyunyan, letter, no. E 40/7–3287, 26 November 2010, available at http://www.ombuds.am. CPJ, ―Armenian activist and editor attacked, placed in strict jail,‖ 2 December 2010, available at cpj.org. The text of the petition and accompanying signatures appear in Haykakan zhamanak, 30 November 2010, available at http://www.armtimes.com/19643. Yerevan Press Club, weekly newsletter, 26 November‒2 December 2010. CPJ: ―Armenian activist.‖ USDS: Country Reports for 1999. Freedom House: Freedom in the World, 2003; CPJ: ―Attacks on the press 2009: Armenia.‖ Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Supervision of the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Annual Report 2009, ―Broadcasting rights,‖ Meltex Ltd and Mesrop Movsesyan, 32283/04, judgment of 17 June 2008, final on 17 September 2008 (Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, April 2010), p. 167; A1+, ―A1+ has won,‖ interview with Mesrop Movsesyan, 2 April 2010, available at www.a1plus.am; see also HRW: World Report 2010. Freedom House: Freedom in the World, 2009. Freedom House: Freedom in the World, 2003.

336 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81

82 83

84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95

96 97 98 99 100

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA

USDS: Country Reports for 2004. Freedom House: Freedom in the World, 2003. HRW: World Report 2010. Azatutyun radiokayan (Freedom Radio Station), ―Armenian journalist attacker ―identified‖,‖ 26 March 2010, available at www.azatutyun.am. Ibid. Ibid. USDS: Country Reports for 2000. HRW: World Report 2010. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, ―Armenian public radio refuses to re-sign contract for RFE/RL programs,‖ 25 July 2007, www.Armenialiberty.org; Moscow News, ―Armenia blocks Radio Liberty broadcasts,‖ 26 July 2007, Erevan, AFP, http://mnweekly.rian.ru/cis. Committee to Protect Journalists: ―Attacks on the press 2009: Armenia‖. United Nations, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Committee Against Torture, Considera-tion of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 19 of the Con-vention, CAT/C/24/Add.4/Rev.1, 17 January 1996. USDS: Country Report for 1998 and 2001. The full text of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia appears at www.president.am. USDS: Country Reports for 2005. USDS: Country Reports for 1993. HRW: World Report 1996. USDS: Country Reports for 1993. HRW: World Report 1996. USDS: Country Reports for 1999 and 2000. USDS: Country Reports for 1999. USDS: Country Reports for 1993. USDS: Country Reports for 1999. Helsinki Association for Human Rights, 19 September 2007; the conclusions of the medical examiner‖s office concerning the causes of Gulyan‖s death appear in the Republic of Armenia, Ministry of Health, medical document, Scientific Business Center of form # 2060915, Erevan, as reported by Helsinki Association for Human Rights, ―Local post-mortem examination report of Levon Gulyan,‖ 12 December 2007, available at www.hahr.am; Human Rights Watch, ―Armenia: death in custody needs independent investigation,‖ 22 May 2007, available at www.hrw.org. Danielyan, Emil, ―Prosecutors probe another death in Armenian police custody,‖ Azatutyun radiokayan, 16 April 2010, available at www.azatutyun.am. http://lragir.am, 27 April 2010. Danielyan: ―Prosecutors probe.‖ Haykakan zhamanak, 22 April 2010, available at www.armtimes.com. Ibid., 17 April 2010, available at www.armtimes.com; Danielyan: ―Prosecutors probe‖; Stepanyan, Ruzanna, ―Armenian police in rare apology over torture,‖

NOTES

101 102 103 104

105

106

107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115

116

117 118 119 120 121

337

Azatutyun radiokayan, 30 April 2010, available at www.azatutyun.am. USDS: Country Reports for 2004. Azatutyun radiokayan is the Armenian service for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. See Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty at www.rferl.org. Danielyan: ―Prosecutors probe.‖ Holly Cartner, Executive Director, Europe and Central Asia Division, Human Rights Watch, to Aghvan G. Hovsepyan, Prosecutor General, Republic of Armenia, 21 April 2010, available at www.hrw.org. Haykakan zhamanak, 22 April 2010, available at www.armtimes.com/en/7337; www.tert.am, 27 April 2010; Stepanyan, Ruzanna, ―Arrested policeman charged with torture,‖ Azatutyun radiokayan, 29 April 2010, available at www.azatutyun.am; Abrahamyan, Gayane, ―Police department death: senior officer charged with negligence,‖ ArmeniaNow, 30 April 2010, available at www.armenianow.com; Ovanisyan, Lilit, ―Policemen suspected of involvement in the death of a 24-year-old youth arrested in Armenia,‖ Caucasian Knot, 28 April 2010, available at www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru. Stepanyan, Ruzanna, ―Charentsavani vostikanutyan kreakan hetakhuzutyan bazhanmunki pete meghadrvum e Vahan Khalafyani nkatmamb brnutyun gortsadrelu mej‖ [―Chief of the Criminal Investigations Unit of the Charentsavan Police Department is charged with the use of excessive force‖], Azatutyun radiokayan, 29 April 2010, available at www.azatutyun.am. ABA/ROLI: Judicial Reform Index for Armenia, January 2008, Vol. 3, p. 25. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 1997-1998: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (New York: Freedom House, 1998), p. 125. USDS: Country Reports for 2001. USDS: Country Reports for 1993, 1999, and 2000. USDS: Country Reports for 2005. USDS: Country Reports for 2000. Ibid. www.ngo.am, index. Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 1997 (New York: Amnesty International, 1998). Unless otherwise noted, all references to Amnesty International annual reports (hereafter AI: Report) are from AI‖s website, www. amnestyusa.org. UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), ―Question of the human rights of all persons subjected to any form of detention or imprisonment, in particular: torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,‖ Report of the Special Rapporteur, Nigel S. Rodley, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1997/38, E/CN.4/1998/ 38/Add.1, 24 December 1997. AI: Report 1997; UNCHR: ―Question of the human rights.‖ UNCHR: ―Question of the human rights.‖ Freedom House: Freedom in the World 1997–1998, p. 124. HRW: World Report 1996; AI: Report 1996. USDS: Country Reports for 2000.

338 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129

130 131

132 133

134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150

151 152 153

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA

USDS: Country Reports for 1999 and 2000. USDS: Country Reports for 2001. AI: Report 2000. World Movement for Democracy, 5 April 2004, www.wmd.org. USDS: Country Reports for 2004. HRW: World Report 2010. USDS: Country Reports for 2009. Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l‖Homme (FIDH), ―Death of a suspect at the Charentsavan Police Department,‖ Paris-Erevan, 27 April 2010, available at www.fidh.org. Ibid.; www.lragir.am, 27 April 2010; www.tert.am, 27 April 2010. European Court of Human Rights, Harutyunyan v. Armenia, no. 36549/03, judgment, 28 June 2007, Final, 28 September 2007; Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Supervision of the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Annual Report 2009, ―Unfair proceedings,‖ Harutyunyan, 36549/03, judgment, 28 June 2007, final, 28 September 2007 (Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, April 2010), p. 140. Petrosyan, Sara, ―They picked the “weakest” judge to punish,‖ Hetq online, 6 August 2007. Ishkhanyan, Vahan and Avetis Babajanyan, Hashvehardar: halatsank ev dimadrutyun [Reckoning: Persecution and Resistance] (Erevan: Azat Khoski Kentron, 2004), pp. 18‒19. AI, Report 2001. UNCHR: ―Question of the human rights‖; AI: Report 1997. Ibid. www.hayazg.com/forum/. USDS: Country Reports for 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2008. USDS: Country Reports for 1999 and 2000. USDS: Country Reports for 2008. AI: Report 1998, and Report 1999. AI: Report 1996, Report 1998, and Report 2000. AI: Report 2000. Ibid. AI: Report 2002. Council of Europe, Treaty Office, http://conventions.coe.int. Ibid. AI: Report 2001. AI, Report 2004. United Nations, General Assembly, Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, A/RES/44/128, adopted 15 December 1989, 1642 UNTS 414, entered into force 11 July 1992. UNDP: Human Development Report, Armenia 1998, p. 25. USDS: Country Reports for 2004. USDS: Country Reports for 1993.

NOTES 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163

164 165 166 167

168 169 170 171 172

173 174 175 176 177

178 179

339

Ibid. Law on Freedom of Conscience (1991, as amended in 1997). Presidential decree of 1993, which supplemented the 1991 law; USDS: Country Reports for 1999. USDS: Country Reports for 1993. USDS: Country Reports for 2004. HRW: World Report 1996; AI: Report 1996. USDS: Country Reports for 1999. Ibid. USDS: Country Reports for 2000. USDS: Country Reports for 1999. Hendon, David W. and James M. Kennedy, ―Notes on Church-State affairs: Armenia,‖ Journal of Church & State 37:3 (1995), p. 672, and ―Notes on ChurchState affairs: Armenia,‖ Journal of Church & State 37:4 (1995), p. 925; Hendon, David W. and David D. Allman, ―Notes on Church-State affairs: Armenia,‖ Journal of Church & State 40:3 (1998), p. 711. AI: Report 1999. USDS: Country Reports for 2000. AI: Report 2002. The Mother See of Holy Echmiadzin and the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia, Kristoneutyun ev iravunk [Christianity and Law] (Erevan: Nzhar, 2001), pp. 5‒10. Ibid., pp. 11‒13. ―Human rights without frontiers,‖ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 26 January 2001, available at www.hrwf.net. USDS: Report on International Religious Freedom, 2010. AI: Report 2002. ―Armenia: Council of Europe obligations “ignored” (Armenia Sentences Jehovah‖s Witness to Two Years‖ Imprisonment),‖ IPR Strategic Business Information Database, February, 2001, available at http://findarticles.com. USDS: Country Reports for 2001. USDS: Country Reports for 2004. Freedom House: Freedom in the World, 2003. USDS: Country Reports for 2004. Jehovah‖s Witnesses News, June 2009; see also European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), The Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs of the Council of Europe, The OSCE/ ODIHR Advisory Council on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 79th Plenary Session (Venice, 12–13 June 2009), CDL-AD(2009)036, Joint Opinion, no. 530/2009, Strasbourg, 23 June 2009, available at www.venice.coe.int. United States, Department of State, Report on International Religious Freedom, 2010, www.state.gov. Bayatyan v. Armenia (Application no. 23459/03), European Court of Human Rights, Third Section, Judgment, Strasbourg, 27 October 2009. The Court decided six votes to one, Judge Ann Power dissenting.

340 180 181 182 183 184 185 186

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA

European Court of Human Rights, Violation by Article and by Country, 1959‒2009. Sarkissian, Ani, ―Religion in postsoviet Armenia: pluralism and identity formation in transition,‖ Religion, State & Society 36:2 (2008), p. 164. Fox, Jonathan, ―State religious exclusivity and human rights,‖ Political Studies 56:4 (2008), pp. 928‒48. Nussbaum, Martha C., Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 179; italics in original. Ibid., p. 175. Ibid., pp. 178‒80, 186‒87. Fish: ―Dynamics of democratic erosion,‖ p. 68.

Chapter Five 1 2 3 4 5

6

7 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15

UNDP: Human Development Report 2000. Gellner: Conditions of Liberty. Madison, Gary Brent, The Political Economy of Civil Society and Human Rights (London; New York: Routledge, 1998). See, for example, Laar, Mart, ―Estonia‖s success story,‖ in Diamond and Plattner: Democracy after Communism, pp. 78–83. See, for example, Fish: ―Dynamics of democratic erosion,‖ p. 54; Brzezinski: ―Primacy,‖ p. 194; Rose, Richard, William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer, Democracy and Its Alternatives (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1998); Suny: ―Elite transformation‖; Herzig, Edmund, The New Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999); Cornell, Svante E., Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2001). For a useful summary of the consequences of the economic crisis in the aftermath of independence, see Gomart, Elizabeth, ―No way back: social exclusion among the poorest in Armenia,‖ in Nora Dudwick, Elizabeth Gomart and Alexandre Marc, with Kathleen Kuehnast (eds), When Things Fall Apart: Qualitative Studies of Poverty in the Former Soviet Union (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003), pp. 155‒211. Freedom House: Freedom in the World, 2003. Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950‒ 1990 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Inglehart and Welzel: Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p. 42. Ibid., p. 79. Ibid. Huntington: The Third Wave, p. 311. Inglehart and Welzel: Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p. 79. Grzymala-Busse: Rebuilding Leviathan, p. 18, Table 1.3, p. 19. UNDP: Human Development Report 2000; UNDP, Human Development Report, Armenia 1995 (Erevan: UNDP, 1995); UNDP, Human Development Report: Armenia,

NOTES

16 17 18 19 20

21 22 23 24 25

26 27 28 29 30

31

32 33

34 35

341

1996 (Erevan: UNDP, 1996). Shapiro: State of Democratic Theory, pp. 104‒05. See ―Introduction,‖ in Merali and Oosterveld: Giving Meaning, pp. 1‒2. Moon: Political Economy; Coate and Rosati: Power of Human Needs; Merali and Oosterveld: Giving Meaning. Freedom House: Freedom in the World, 2003. For classic statements on state responsibility, see Lauterpacht: International Law and Human Rights; Luard: International Protection of Human Rights; Sohn: ―New international law‖; Meron: Human Rights in International Law; Falk, Kim and Mandlovitz: United Nations and a Just World Order. UN Charter, signed 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, entered into force 24 October 1945. UN GA Res. 2200A (XXI), 993 UNTS 3, adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976. Moon: Political Economy, p. 7; Alston: ―International law and the right to food.‖ Davies: ―The existence of human needs,‖ p. 24. Galtung, Johan and Anders Helge Wirak, ―Human needs, human rights and the theories of development,‖ in Indicators of Social and Economic Change and Their Application, Reports and Papers in the Social Sciences No. 37 (Paris: UNESCO, 1977), pp. 7‒34; Galtung, Johan and Anders Helge Wirak, ―Human needs and human rights—a theoretical approach,‖ Bulletin of Peace Proposals 8:3 (1977), pp. 251–58; Moon: Political Economy, pp. 7–8. Republic of Armenia, Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, March 2001, available at www.imf.org/external/NP/prsp/2001/arm/01/INDEX.HTM. ―The aftermath,‖ Economist, 12 December 1992, pp. 59‒60. Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 2002. UNDP: Human Development Report 2000. UN General Assembly, Res. 55/2, Millennium Declaration, 8th plenary meeting, 8 September 2000, at www.un.org; UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), The Millennium Development Goals Report 2008 (New York: UN DESA, 2008). Lauren, Paul Gordon, The Evolution of International Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003, 2nd ed.); Donnelly: Universal Human Rights; Claude and Weston: Human Rights in the World Community. UNDP: Human Development Report 2000, p. 2. UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Right to Development, A/RES.41/ 128, 4 December 1986. See also Sen, Amartya, ―Human rights and development,‖ and Sengupta, Arjun, ―The human right to development,‖ in Bård A. Andreassen and Stephen P. Marks (eds), Development as a Human Right (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 1‒8, 9‒35; Alston and Robinson: ―Challenges,‖ pp. 1‒18. Robinson: ―What rights can add,‖ p. 39. Pogge, Thomas, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms (Cambridge: Polity, 2008, 2nd ed.); Pogge, Thomas (ed.), Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right (Paris: UNESCO; Oxford; New York: Oxford Univer-

342

36

37 38

39 40

41 42

43

44 45

46 47 48 49 50

51 52 53 54

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA

sity Press, 2007). See also Lauren: Evolution; Donnelly: Universal Human Rights; Claude and Weston: Human Rights in the World Community. The Proclamation of Tehran, para. 13, in Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, UN doc. A/CONF.32/41 (1968), cited in Alston and Robinson, ―Challenges,‖ p. 1. Alston and Robinson: ―Challenges,‖ p. 1. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, A/RES/34/180, 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981. See also Anjargolian: ―Armenia‖s women.‖ See text in Human Rights International Journal 17 (1996), p. 159. UN, World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, Austria, 14–25 June 1993, A/CONF.157.24, endorsed by the General Assembly, A/RES/48/121, 20 December 1993; UN, World Summit for Social Development, Copenhagen, Denmark, 6‒12 March 1995, A/CONF.166/9, www.un.org. UN, World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna (1993). Preparatory Committee for the World Summit for Social Development (2nd Sess.), Outcome of the World Summit for Social Development: Draft Declaration and Draft Programme of Action, A/Conf.166/PC/L.18, 31 August 1994; Nancy Seufert-Barr, ―The ABCs of a better life,‖ UN Chronicle, December 1994, pp. 43–54. ―Declaration and programme of action of the world summit for social development,‖ Report of the Main Committee, A/CONF.166/L.3; A/CONF.166/L.3/ Add.2, 6–12 March 1995. Associated Press, 12 March 1995. UNDP, Human Development Report 2007‒2008: Human Rights and Human Development (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, UNDP, 2007), Table 7, pp. 251‒54, and notes, p. 254. UNDP: Human Development Report 2000 and 2007–2008. Mirzakhanyan: ―Economic and social development,‖ pp. 201‒03; IFAD, Executive Board: Republic of Armenia, p. vi. Stefes: Understanding, pp. 94‒95. Gellner: Conditions of Liberty, p. 49. For useful analyses, see, for example, Rose-Ackerman, Susan, ―Political corruption and democracy,‖ Connecticut Journal of International Law 14:2 (1999), pp. 363‒78; Rajagopal, Balakrishnan, ―Corruption, legitimacy and human rights: the dialectic of the relationship,‖ Connecticut Journal of International Law 14:2 (1999), pp. 495‒507; Scheppele, Kim Lane, ―The inevitable corruption of transition,‖ Connecticut Journal of International Law 14:2 (1999), pp. 509‒32; Stephan, Paul B., ―Rationality and corruption in the post-socialist world,‖ Connecticut Journal of International Law 14:2 (1999), pp. 533‒49. UN Convention against Corruption, adoption by the General Assembly, Doc. A/RES/58/422, 31 October 2003, entered into force 14 December 2005. See UN: Focus 2007, p. 85. Stefes: Understanding. You, Jong-Sung and Sanjeev Khagram, ―A comparative study of inequality and corruption,‖ American Sociological Review 70:1 (2005), pp. 136‒57 (quote

NOTES

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56 57

58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67

68 69 70

71 72 73 74 75 76 77

343

appears on pp. 153‒54). Galligan, Denis J., ―Legal failure: law and social norms in post-Communist Europe,‖ in Galligan and Kurkchiyan: Law and Informal Practices, pp. 1‒24; Kurkchiyan: ―The illegitimacy of law‖; MacFarlane: ―Politics and the rule of law.‖ Drèze, Jean, ―Democracy and the right to food,‖ in Alston and Robinson: Human Rights and Development, p. 51. Morris, Stephen D. and Joseph L. Klesner, ―Corruption and trust: Theoretical considerations and evidence from Mexico,‖ Comparative Political Studies 43:10 (2010), pp. 1258‒85. Dudwick: ―Political transformations,‖ p. 100. Stefes: Understanding, pp. 97‒99; Bremmer, Ian and Cory Welt, ―Armenia‖s new autocrats,‖ Journal of Democracy 8:3 (1997), pp. 77‒91. USDS: Country Reports for 1999 and 2000. USDS: Country Reports for 2000. USDS: Country Reports for 1999. Italics added. See Prosperous Armenia Party (Bargavaj Hayastan Kusaktsutyun), ―Gagik Tsarukyan, Business,‖ available at www.bhk.am. Stefes: Understanding, pp. 97‒99; Bremmer and Welt: ―Armenia‖s new autocrats.‖ ―Hrant Vardanyan bestowed with ROA Economic ―Meritorious Servant‖ Award,‖ Hetq Online, 21 January 2009. Stefes: Understanding, pp. 97‒99; Armavia, ―About us: history,‖ http://u8.am/ index/view/id/18/lang/en. See, for example, Smith, Estellie (ed.), Perspectives on the Informal Economy (Lanham: University Press of America, 1990); Thomas, James J., Informal Economic Activity (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992); Treisman, Daniel, ―The causes of corruption: a cross-national study,‖ Journal of Public Economics 76:3 (2000), pp. 399‒457; Costa Tavares, Samia, ―Do rapid political and trade liberalizations increase corruption?‖ European Journal of Political Economy 23:4 (2007), pp. 1053‒76. Cleary, Matthew and Susan Stokes, Democracy and the Culture of Skepticism: Political Trust in Argentina and Mexico (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006), p. 10. Fairbanks: ―Disillusionment.‖ Putnam, with Leonardi and Nanetti: Making Democracy Work, p. 349; Putnam, Robert D., Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000). Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) (Berlin: Transparency International, 1999, 2005), www.transparency.org. Council of Europe, Groupe d‖états contre la corruption (GRECO), Evaluation Report on Armenia, 27th Plenary Meeting, Strasbourg, 6‒10 March 2006. Transparency International, www.transparency.org. USDS: Country Reports for 2005. USDS: Country Reports for 2004 and 2005. Armenian International Magazine (July 1999), p. 24. Bulghadaryan, Naira, Global Integrity Country Report, 2006: Armenia (Washington, DC: Global Integrity, 2007), p. 5, www.globalintegrity.org.

344 78 79 80

81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88

89

90 91

92 93 94 95 96 97

98 99 100 101

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Freedom House: Freedom in the World, 2002. Bulghadaryan: Global Integrity, p. 5; USDS: Country Reports for 2004. UN Convention against Corruption, Article 10(a). The text of the document appears at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC. See also USDS: Country Reports for 2006. Republic of Armenia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ―Oskanian addresses UN Human Rights Council,‖ 21 June 2006, at www.armeniaforeignministry.com. Bulghadaryan: Global Integrity, p. 4. ―Resignations of Yerevan mayor and justice minister do not mean that authorities have started “witch-hunt”,‖ ArmInfo, 10 December 2010 (Groong online). Bulghadaryan: Global Integrity, p. 4. Brzezinski: ―Primacy‖; Fairbanks: ―Disillusionment‖; Zartman: Collapsed States; Howard: ―Weakness‖; Beissinger and Young: Beyond State Crisis? UNDP: Human Development Report 2007‒2008, Table 7, pp. 251‒54, and notes, p. 254. International Monetary Fund, Republic of Armenia, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, IMF Country Report No. 03/362 (Washington, DC; Erevan, 2003). International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Executive Board, Republic of Armenia: Country Strategic Opportunities Paper, Sess. 80, Agenda Item 10(a), EB 2003/80/R.19, Rome, 17‒18 December 2003, p. vi. Griffin, Keith, ―Investment and structural change,‖ in Keith Griffin et al. (eds), Growth, Inequality and Poverty in Armenia, A Report on the Impact of Macroeconomic Policy on Poverty (Erevan: United Nations Office in Armenia, UNDP, 2002), p. 28. Griffin et al.: Growth. Greene, Thomas, ―Internal displacement in the North Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia,‖ in Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng (eds), The Forsaken People: Case Studies of the Internally Displaced (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), p. 276. World Bank, Armenia: Implications of the Global Economic Crisis for Poverty, Report No. 47770-AM, September 2009, p. 2. www.worldbank.org. World Resources Institute, 2006, http://earthtrends.wri.org/. UNDP: Human Development Report 2007‒2008, Table 21, p. 300; Country of Return Information Project (CRIP), Country Sheet, Armenia (February 2009), p. 46. Council of Europe: Combating Poverty, p. 40. IFAD, Executive Board: Republic of Armenia, p. vi. Barseghyan, Syuzanna, ―Zhoghovrdagrakan iravichake Hayastanum‖ [―The demographic situation in Armenia‖], in Hayastan: Nor razmavarutyan hramayakane [Armenia: The Imperative for a New Strategy] (Erevan: Armenian Center for National and International Studies, 2007), p. 180. IFAD, Executive Board: Republic of Armenia, p. vi. Ibid. UN Food and Agricultural Organization, ―Softening hard times in Armenia,‖ 15 December 2008. Armenia became a member of the IFAD in January 1993.

NOTES 102

103 104

105 106

107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117

118

119

120 121

122

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IFAD, ―Agreement on economic development of rural areas signed in Yerevan between Armenia & IFAD,‖ Arka News Agency, 28 October 2004, available at www.ifad.org/media/news/2004/281004.htm. IFAD: ―Agreement.‖ See also IFAD, Executive Board: Republic of Armenia. IFAD, ―Agreement on economic development of rural areas signed in Yerevan between Armenia & IFAD,‖ Arka News Agency, 28 October 2004, available at www.ifad.org/media/news/2004/281004.htm. Republic of Armenia, Agricultural Sustainable Development Strategy, 2006. Avagyan, Aram and Hovhannes Poghosyan, The Vocational Education and Training System in Armenia: Recent Changes, Challenges and Reform Needs, Working Report, Armenia 2000, European Training Foundation, National Observatory Network (Erevan: National Observatory of Armenia, 1999), p. 6; see also Gomart: ―No way back,‖ pp. 181–82, Appendix B, pp. 205–11. UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia, Ch. 6, available at www.undp.am/docs/publications/publicationsarchive/refugee/. Avagyan and Poghosyan: Vocational Education, p. 6. UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia, Ch. 6. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Military Expenditure Database, 1988–2006, available at www.sipri.org. IFAD, Executive Board: Republic of Armenia, p. vi. United Nations, International Human Rights Instruments, HRI/CORE/1/ Add.57, 30 June 1995. World Health Organization, ―Armenia: facts and figures,‖ WHO Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark, available at www.euro.who.int. IMF: Republic of Armenia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, p. 17. Kurkchiyan: ―Society in transition,‖ p. 227. Mirzakhanyan: ―Economic and social development,‖ pp. 201–03, 207. Tonoyan, Tamara, Poverty, Inequality and Health: A Case Study of Armenia, discussion paper series 124 (Göttingen, Germany: Department of Economics, University of Göttingen, 2005). Mirzakhanyan: ―Economic and social development,‖ p. 210; World Bank, World Development Indicators (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007); UNDP, Human Development Report 2006: Human Rights and Human Development (New York: United Nations, 2007). In 2004, per capita GDP (ppp) was about $40,000 in the United States and $33,000 in Switzerland. The HDI represents a measure of three aspects of development: (1) life expectancy; (2) adult literacy and school enrolment; and (3) standard of living as indicated by purchasing power parity (ppp) income. UNDP: Human Development Report 2007–2008, www.undp.org. IMF: Republic of Armenia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, p. 23. Kelly, Thomas and Armen Yeghiazarian, ―The transition to inequality,‖ in Griffin et al.: Growth, p. 115; Oxfam, Growth with Equity: Policy Choice for Poverty Reduction (Erevan, 2002). World Bank, Making Transition Work for Everyone: Poverty and Inequality in Europe and Central Asia, August 2000, Ch. 4, Table 4.1, p. 140; Tonoyan: Poverty,

346

123 124 125 126

127

128 129 130

131

132 133 134

135 136 137 138 139 140

141 142 143

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Inequality and Health. The Gini coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 represents perfect equality and 1 perfect inequality. Republic of Armenia, National Statistical Service, Social Snapshot and Poverty: Statistical-Analytical Report (Erevan: NSS, 2009). IFAD, Executive Board: Republic of Armenia, p. 4. UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia, Ch. 6. Armenian International Magazine (January 1996), p. 14; Halpin: ―Up the down escalator,‖ Armenian International Magazine (October 1992), pp. 14‒15, 20; Mirzakhanyan: ―Economic and social development,‖ pp. 201‒03, 207. Kelly, Thomas, ―The nature of poverty,‖ in Griffin et al.: Growth, Table 6.1, p. 95. An IMF study places the figures at 56.1 per cent of the population were poor, of whom 21.0 per cent were very poor. IMF: Republic of Armenia: Second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Table 2.5, p. 46. IMF: Republic of Armenia: Second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Table 2.5, p. 46. CRIP: Country Sheet, Armenia, p. 41. World Bank: Armenia: Implications. See also World Bank, ―UN, IFIs discuss with RoA Government ways to offset social impact of the crisis,‖ Joint press release by the UN, IMF, WB and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs of Armenia, Erevan, 14 April 2009. www.worldbank.org.am. Davtyan, Ararat, ―The region of Shirak is the poorest in Armenia despite what official statistics show,‖ 9 June 2008, Hetq online; USDS: Country Reports for 1999, 2003, 2004, and 2005. Mirzakhanyan: ―Economic and social development,‖ pp. 204‒05. IMF: Republic of Armenia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, pp. 19‒20. UNDP: Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia, Ch. 6. See also Republic of Armenia, Ministry of Statistics, ―Social panorama of Armenia and poverty‖ (1998); World Bank, ―Armenia confronting poverty issues,‖ Report No. 15693-AM (10 June 1996); World Bank, ―Improving social assistance in Armenia,‖ Report No. 19385-AM (8 June 1999). Republic of Armenia, National Statistical Service, Social Snapshot and Poverty in the Republic of Armenia (Erevan: NSS, 2001). UNICEF, ―Child poverty in Armenia,‖ factsheet (2010), available www.unicef.org/ armenia/Factsheet_Child_Poverty_in_Armenia.pdf. Council of Europe: Combating Poverty, pp. 27, 28. ―Minimum Monthly Wages Up in Armenia,‖ news.am, 7 October 2010, Armenian News Network/Groong (online). CRIP: Country Sheet, Armenia, p. 41. United Nations, Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), Specific Groups and Individuals: Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Francis Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/53, Addendum, ―Profiles in displacement: Armenia,‖ E/CN.4/2001/5/Add.3, 6 November 2000, p. 6. IMF: Republic of Armenia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, p. 16. UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia, Ch. 4. USDS: Country Reports for 2004 and 2005; Freedom House: Freedom in the World,

NOTES

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146 147 148 149

150

151 152 153

154 155 156 157 158 159

160 161

162 163

164 165

166

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2002. Hicks, Norman, Poverty Reduction Support Credits: Armenia Country Study, IEG Working Paper 2010/6 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010), p. 1. World Bank: World Development Indicators; UNDP: Human Development Report 2006. In 2004, per capita GDP (PPP) was about $40,000 in the United States and $33,000 in Switzerland. Council of Europe: Combating Poverty, pp. 34‒35. Polanyi, Karl, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1944), p. 73. Council of Europe: Combating Poverty, pp. 9, 11. Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, adopted by the General Conference of the ILO, UNTS 68, 9 July 1948, entered into force 4 July 1950. Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively, adopted by the General Conference of the ILO, UNTS 96, 1 July 1949, entered into force 18 July 1951. Freedom House: Freedom in the World, 2003. USDS: Country Reports for 1999 and 2006. Lenard, Patti Tamara, ―Trust your compatriots, but count your change: the roles of trust, mistrust and distrust in democracy,‖ Political Studies 56:2 (2008), pp. 312‒32. ―300 Republican members dismissed,‖ Lragir.am, 27 December 2010 (Groong online). Hirschman: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. See Astourian: ―From Ter-Petrosian to Kocharian.‖ UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia, p. 14. Ibid., Ch. 7. Lalayan, Gevorg (ed. and comp.), Hayastane pokhakerpvogh ashkharhum [Armenia in a Transforming World] (Erevan: Armenian Center for National and International Studies, 2006), Fig. 39, p. 529. UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia, Ch. 7; USDS: Country Reports for 2003. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR: 1999 Statistical Overview (Geneva: UNHCR, July 2000), Table VI.6, also available at www.unhcr.org. CRIP: Country Sheet, Armenia, p. 47. Neli Esipova and Julie Ray, ―70 Million in CIS Would Migrate Temporarily for Work, Study, Half as Many Desire to Migrate Permanently,‖ Gallup, Inc., August 4, 2010. UN High Commissioner for Refugees: Refugees and Others of Concern, Table VI.6. UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries 2009: Statistical Overview of Asylum Applications Lodged in Europe and Selected Non-European Countries (UNHCR, March 2010), Table 4, p. 16, available at www.unhcr.org. Armenian International Magazine (February 1996), p. 14. See also Noyan Tapan,

348

167 168

169 170 171 172 173

174 175 176 177

178

179 180 181

182 183 184 185 186 187

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18 February 2000, where it is estimated that about 600,000 people emigrated from Armenia during the decade, ANN/Groong (online). ―Brain drain from Armenia continues,‖ Panorama.am, 20 February 2009, ANN/Groong (online). Gutbrod, Hans, 2006 Data Initiative Survey for Georgia and the South Caucasus: Introduction, Results and Application (Eurasia Foundation, Caucasus Research Resource Centers, 2006). I thank Robyn Angley for bringing this study to my attention. RFE/RL: ―Poll finds popular discontent‖; USDS: Country Reports for 2006. ―Brain drain from Armenia continues,‖ Panorama.am. Hirschman: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, p. 43, italics in the original. IMF: Republic of Armenia: Second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, p. 291. Rao, Arati, ―Right in the home: feminist theoretical perspectives on international human rights,‖ National Law School Journal 1:5 (1993), pp. 62–81; Nussbaum, Martha C., ―Capabilities and human rights,‖ Fordham Law Review 66 (1997‒98), pp. 273‒300; Sen, Amartya, ―Gender inequality and theories of justice,‖ in Martha C. Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover (eds), Women, Culture, and Development (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 259‒73. United Nations: Focus 2007, p. 74. UN: Focus 2007, p. 85. UNDP: Human Development Report 2000, p. 117. Matossian: Impact, pp. 3, 11; Dudwick: ―Out of the kitchen,‖ pp. 235‒48; Lissyutkina, Larissa, ―Soviet women at the crossroads of perestroika,‖ in Nanette Funk and Magda Mueller (eds), Gender Politics and Post-Communism (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 274‒86. International Women‖s Rights Action Watch (IWRAW), Country Report: Armenia, submitted to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (Minneapolis, MN: International Women‖s Rights Action Watch, 1997), p. 3. Mill: On Liberty and The Subjection of Women, p. 180. Lapidus: ―Gender and restructuring,‖ pp. 143‒47. Moghadam, Valentine M., ―Introduction: gender dynamics of economics and political change: efficiency, equality, and women,‖ in Valentine M. Moghadam (ed.), Democratic Reform and the Position of Women in Transitional Economies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 1‒25. Dudwick: ―When the lights went out,‖ pp. 122–23. Erevan State University, Graduate Union, ―Husband is the head, wife is the body,‖ 4 December 2009, available at www.ysugu.am. Dudwick: ―Out of the kitchen,‖ pp. 235‒48; Lissyutkina: ―Soviet women,‖ pp. 274‒86. Republic of Armenia, National Assembly, Family Code, AL‒123, entry into force 19 April 2005. IWRAW: Country Report: Armenia, p. 3. Grigoryan, Geghetsik, Hayastani Hanrapetutyan orensdrutyune ev genderayin himnakhndirnere [The Legislation of the Republic of Armenia and Gender Issues] (Erevan: n.p., 2007).

NOTES 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195

196 197

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USDS: Country Reports for 1993. Republic of Armenia, National Assembly, Law on Individual Entrepreneur, AL‒167, adopted 3 April 2001. Grigoryan: Hayastani Hanrapetutyan orensdrutyune, pp. 68‒69. Ayvazyan: Mardu iravunkneri pashtpanutyan kazmakerbume, p. 72. World Resources Institute, 2006, http://earthtrends.wri.org/; USDS: Country Reports for 1999, 2003, and 2004. Tilly: Democracy, p. 111. Dudwick: ―When the lights went out,‖ pp. 127–53 passim. Meyersfeld, Bonita, Domestic Violence and International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), Ch. 1, pp. 1‒107; Cook, Rebecca J., ―Women‖s international human rights law: the way forward,‖ Human Rights Quarterly 19 (1993), pp. 230‒ 61; Thomas, Dorothy Q., and Michele E. Beasley, ―Domestic violence as a human rights issue,‖ Human Rights Quarterly 15:1 (1993), pp. 36‒62; see also Amnesty International: Women in the Front Line; Charlesworth, Hilary, Christine Chinkin and Shelley Wright, ―Feminist approaches to international law,‖ American Journal of International Law 85 (1991), pp. 622‒25. Cook: ―Women‖s international human rights law,‖ p. 238. Meyersfeld: Domestic Violence, pp. 18‒19. UN Economic and Social Council, Res. 14 (24 May 1984), UN Doc. ESC Res. 1984/14, ―Violence in the Family‖; UN General Assembly Res. 40/36 (29 November 1985), UN Doc. A/RES/ 40/36. Meyersfeld: Domestic Violence, p. 19. UN Center for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs, Violence against Women in the Family (1989), UN Doc. ST/CSDHA/2. Meyersfeld: Domestic Violence, p. 6. UN Division for the Advancement of Women, Department of Social and Economic Affairs (DESA), CEDAW, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 19, ―Violence against women,‖ para. 1, llth sess., 1992, available at www.un.org; Clapham, Andrew, Human Rights in the Private Sphere (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 100; Meyersfeld: Domestic Violence, pp. 20‒21, 34‒37. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, UN General Assembly, Res. 54/4, 15 October 1999, UN Doc. A/RES/54/4, entered into force 22 December 2000. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (DEVAW), UN General Assembly, Res. 48/104, 20 December 1993, UN Doc. A/RES/ 48/104. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 15 September 1995, UN Doc. A/Conf.177/20/Rev.1 (1995); UN Doc. A/Conf.177/20/Add.1 (1995). See also Meyersfeld: Domestic Violence, pp. 39‒41. ―Question of integrating the rights of women into the human rights mechanisms of the United Nations and the elimination of violence against women,‖ UNCHR Res. 45, 4 March 1994. DEVAW, preamble; United Nations, Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4‒15 September 1995 (New York: United Nations, 1996), Ch. 1,

350

206 207 208

209 210 211 212

213 214

215 216 217 218 219 220

221 222

223 224

225 226 227 228

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Res. 1, Annex II, Sect. D; see also United Nations, The World‖s Women 2005: Progress in Statistics (New York: United Nations, 2006). See DEVAW, Article 4(a‒q). UNGA, Res. 58/147, para. 1(b) and (d). UN General Assembly, Res. 58/147, Elimination of domestic violence against women, 19 February 2004, UN Doc. A/RES/58/14758/147. See also Meyersfeld: Domestic Violence, pp. 60‒62. Etzioni, Amitai, ―The normativity of human rights is self-evident,‖ Human Rights Quarterly 32:1 (2010), pp. 187‒97. Meyersfeld: Domestic Violence, Ch. 3, pp. 193‒251. Clapham: Human Rights, p. 137. Copelon, Rhonda, ―Intimate terror: understanding domestic violence as torture,‖ in Cook: Human Rights of Women, pp. 116‒52; Romany, Celina, ―State responsibility goes private: a feminist critique of the public/private distinction in international human rights law,‖ in Rebecca J. Cook (ed.), Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), pp. 96‒106. See Teitel, Ruti G., Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Democracy Today, 2002, p. 19, as cited by Ishkanian, Armine, Democracy Building and Civil Society in Post-Soviet Armenia (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 59. Grigoryan: Hayastani Hanrapetutyan orensdrutyune, pp. 81–82. Ishkanian: Democracy Building, p. 61. Ayvazyan: Mardu iravunkneri pashtpanutyan kazmakerbume, p. 62. Ishkanian: Democracy Building, Ch. 3. Romany: ―State responsibility,‖ p. 85. Budryte, Dovile, ―From ―dirty laundry‖ to a human rights concern? International norms and gender violence in Armenia and Lithuania,‖ in Dovile Budryte, Lisa M. Vaughn and Natalya T. Riegg (eds), Feminist Conversations: Women, Trauma and Empowerment in Post-transitional Societies (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2009), pp. 33‒50. USDS: Country Reports for 1999. Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, Domestic Violence in Armenia (Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, December 2000), p. 3, also available at www.mnadvocates.org. Thomas and Beasley: ―Domestic violence,‖ p. 48. Gender Informational Network of South Caucasus (GINSC), ―In Armenia, domestic violence claims a victim,‖ 12 October 2010, available at GINSC.NET; Avagyan, Sofya, ―Our silence ―killed‖ the 20-year-old girl,‖ Human Rights in Armenia, Civil Society Institute, 28 October 2010, available at www.hra.am. Ishkanian: Democracy Building, p. 63. Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights: Domestic Violence in Armenia; USDS: Country Reports for 1999. USDS: Country Reports for 2003 and 2004. See Arakelyan, Sergey Vaganovich, ―Ubistva v sfere semeino-bitovikh otno-

NOTES

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232

233

234

235 236 237 238 239

240

241 242 243

244 245 246

351

shenii i ikh preduprezhdeniye‖ [―Murder in the sphere of domestic relations and its prevention‖], Ph.D. dissertation (Erevan: Erevan State University, 1999), sections 1.1., 1.2, as cited in Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights: Domestic Violence in Armenia. Ritter, Laurence, ―Under pressure,‖ Armenian International Magazine (March 2002), pp. 29‒35. Ishkanian: Democracy Building, pp. 63, 72‒73. UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by the General Assembly, A/RES/55/25, 15 November 2000, entered into force 19 September 2003, Doc. A/55/383. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by the General Assembly, A/RES/ 55/25, 15 November 2000, entered into force 25 December 2003, Doc. A/55/383. Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by the General Assembly, 15 November 2000, A/RES/ 55/25, entry into force 28 January 2004, Doc. A/55/383. USDS, Trafficking in Persons Report, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, June 4, 2008; Dewey, Susan, Hollow Bodies: Institutional Responses to Sex Trafficking in Armenia, Bosnia, and India (Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2008). USDS: Country Reports for 2004; see also Dewey: Hollow Bodies. UNDP Armenia, ―UNDP Armenia and the Prosecutor General Join Efforts to Fight Trafficking in Human Beings,‖ press release, 14 June 2005. USDS: Country Reports for 2004; see also Dewey: Hollow Bodies. USDS: Country Reports for 2003, 2004, and 2005. Baghdasaryan, Edik, ―Notorious pimp changes name,‖ 15 January 2007, Hetq online; USDS: Country Reports for 2003 and 2004. In 2004, the general prosecutor‖s office estimated that ―at least 80 women were victims of trafficking‖ that year. See USDS: Country Reports for 2005. See, for example, Davtyan, Ararat, ―Court reduces sentences for trafficking convicts,‖ 22 October 2007, Hetq online. See also USDS: Country Reports for 2004 and 2005; USDS: Trafficking in Persons Report, 4 June 2008 [and various years]. Davtyan: ―Court reduces sentences‖; USDS: Country Reports for 2004 and 2005; USDS: Trafficking in Persons Report, 4 June 2008 [and various years]. USDS: Country Reports for 2004. US Department of Justice, Attorney General‖s Report to Congress on Assessment of the US Government Activities to Combat Trafficking in Persons, FY 2007, May 2008, Appendix D, p. 6. USDS: Country Reports for 2006. See Zakaryan, Varduhi, ―Gyumri‖s human trafficking victims,‖ 15 January 2007, Hetq online; USDS: Country Reports for 2003 and 2004. See UNICEF reports [various years]; Betcherman, Gordon, Jean Fares, Amy Luinstra and Robert Prouty, ―Child labor, education, and children‖s rights,‖ in Alston and Robinson: Human Rights and Development, pp. 173‒74.

352 247 248

249

250 251

252 253

254 255 256 257

258

259 260

261 262

263

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA

UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, A/RES/44/25, UNTS 1577, 20 November 1989, entry into force 2 September 1999. ILO Convention 182, Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor, adopted by the International Labor Conference, 87th Sess., 17 June 1999, entry into force 10 November 2000; USDS: Country Reports for 2004. See, for example, O‖Byrne, Darren J., Human Rights (Harlow, London, New York: Longman, 2003), p. 375; Betcherman, Fares, Luinstra and Prouty: ―Child labor,‖ p. 174. USDS: Country Reports for 1993; see also Ayvazyan: Mardu iravunkneri pashtpanutyan kazmakerbume, pp. 41‒56. UN General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in armed conflict, Doc. A/RES/54/ 263, 25 May 2000, entry into force 12 February 2002; Armenia signed the Optional Protocol on 24 September 2003 and ratified it on 30 September 2005. Republic of Armenia, National Assembly, Law Concerning the Rights of the Child, AL–59, adopted 29 May 1996. United Nations Children‖s Fund (UNICEF), Child Poverty in Armenia: Analysis of the 2008 Integrated Living Conditions Survey (UNICEF and University of York, October 2009), p. 3; UNICEF, ―Child poverty in Armenia,‖ factsheet (2010), available at www.unicef.org. UNICEF, Child Poverty in Armenia. UNICEF/Armenia, Media Center, ―UNICEF raises concerns over high child poverty rates in Armenia,‖ press release, 17 December 2010, www.unicef.org. Dudwick, ―When the lights went out,‖ pp. 143‒44; Ayvazyan: Mardu iravunkneri pashtpanutyan kazmakerbume, pp. 55‒56. Ibid., p. 54. According to one report, the monthly rate for a private tutor is about $160.00. Armenakyan, Nazik, ―Wrong books or wrong tests? Students complain that textbooks do not prepare them for entry exams,‖ ArmeniaNow reporter, 15 June 2010, ANN/Groong (online). See, for example, Karine Asatrian, ―Armenia: college bribery rife,‖ Institute for War and Peace Reporting, UK, 18 January 2007; see also Stefes: Understanding; Dudwick, ―When the lights went out,‖ pp. 144‒45. Bologna Declaration, 19 June 1999, Joint Declaration of the European Ministers of Education. The text appears at www.ond.vlaanderen.be. Council of Europe, Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education in the European Region, European Treaty Series/ No. 165, Lisbon, 11 April 1997, entry into force 1 February 1999, available at http://conventions.coe.int. CRIP: Country Sheet, Armenia, p. 47. UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of Reports: Concluding Observations, CRC/C/15/Add.119; UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Armenia, 30 January 2004; USDS: Country Reports for 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. USDS: Country Reports for 1993.

NOTES 264 265 266 267 268

269 270

271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279

280 281

282 283 284

353

Dudwick: ―When the lights went out,‖ p. 144. Ayvazyan: Mardu iravunkneri pashtpanutyan kazmakerbume, p. 55. Almond and Powell: Comparative Politics, pp. 124–26. Murray Hunt, ―The human rights act and legal culture: the judiciary and the legal profession,‖ Journal of Law and Society 26:1 (1999), pp. 86–102. McEvoy, Lesley and Laura Lundy, ―“In the small places”: education and human rights culture in conflict-affected societies,‖ in John Morison, Kiernan McEvoy and Gordon Anthony (eds), Judges, Transition, and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 496‒516 (quote appears on p. 499). UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia. UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of Reports: Concluding Observations, CRC/C/15/Add.119; UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Armenia, 30 January 2004; USDS: Country Reports for 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. USDS: Country Reports for 2003; Ayvazyan: Mardu iravunkneri pashtpanutyan kazmakerbume, p. 53. ILO Convention 182; USDS: Country Reports for 2004. UNICEF/Armenia, Media Center, ―National Assembly of Armenia holds first ever parliamentary hearings on child protection,‖ 9 December 2008. USDS: Country Reports for 2003. Orran was founded in Erevan in April 2000. See www.orran.am. USDS: Country Reports for 1999, and 2004. Interview with Hasmik Edilyan, Project Manager, ―Democracy Today‖ NGO, 4 December 2008, Erevan, quoted in CRIP: Country Sheet, Armenia, p. 26. Council of Europe, Treaty Office, http://conventions.coe.int. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Committee on the Rights of the Child, ―Consideration of reports submitted by states parties under Article 44 of the Convention: concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Armenia,‖ 23rd Sess., CRC/C/15/Add.119, 24 February 2000; see also Ayvazyan: Mardu iravunkneri pashtpanutyan kazmakerbume, pp. 41‒55. USDS: Country Reports for 1999, 2003, 2004, and 2005. Hakobyan, Mihran and Levon Yepiskoposyan, ―Infant mortality decline in Armenia: Why with uneven rates?‖ Economics and Human Biology 8 (2010), pp. 134‒37. See also Hakobyan, Mihran, Ararat Mkrtchyan and Levon Yepiskoposyan, ―Infant mortality in Armenia, 1992–2003,‖ Economics and Human Biology 4 (2006), 351‒58; Redmond, Gerry, ―Infant mortality in Armenia 1992‒ 2003: A comment,‖ Economics and Human Biology 5 (2007), pp. 350‒54; Hakobyan, Mihran, Ararat Mkrtchyan and Levon Yepiskoposyan, ―Reply to Redmond,‖ Economics and Human Biology 5 (2007), pp. 355‒56. Hakobyan and Yepiskoposyan: ―Infant mortality,‖ p. 135. UNICEF, Child Poverty in Armenia, p. 5. UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, A/RES/61/106, 13 December 2006, entry into force 3 May 2008, UN Doc. A/61/611. Armenia, Ratification, C.N.600.2010.TREATIES-23 (Depositary Notification).

354 285 286 287

288 289 290 291 292 293 294

295 296 297 298 299 300 301

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA

Ibid., Preamble(q), (r). Ibid., Article 7(1); Article 8(1b). Inglehart, Ronald, Roberto Fao, Christopher Peterson and Christian Welzel, ―Development, freedom and rising happiness,‖ Perspective on Psychological Science 3:4 (2008), pp. 264‒85; Ott, Jan C., ―Good governance and happiness in nations: technical quality precedes democracy and quality beats size,‖ Journal of Happiness Studies 11 (2010), pp. 353‒68; Deaton, Angus, ―Income, health, and well-being around the world: evidence from the Gallup World Poll,‖ Journal of Economic Perspectives 22:2 (2008), pp. 53‒72; Duncan, Grant, ―Should happinessmaximization be the goal of government?‖ Journal of Happiness Studies 11:2 (2010), pp. 163‒78. Duncan: ―Happiness-maximization,‖ p. 163. Paine, Thomas, ―The rights of man,‖ in Bruce Kucklick (ed.), Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 164. Argyle, Michael, The Psychology of Happiness (London: Routledge, 2001, 2nd ed.); Duncan: ―Happiness-maximization,‖ p. 166. Inglehart, Fao, Peterson and Welzel: ―Development,‖ p. 265. Inglehart, Ronald, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 64. Inglehart, Fao, Peterson and Welzel: ―Development,‖ pp. 265‒66. Inglehart and Welzel: Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy; Inglehart, Ronald, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). Inglehart, Fao, Peterson, and Welzel: ―Development,‖ p. 268. Deaton: ―Income, health, and well-being.‖ Ibid. MacFarlane: ―Politics and the rule of law,‖ p. 68. Manukian: ―It is time to jump off the train,‖ pp. 71‒72. UNDP: Human Development Report 2000, pp. 11‒12. Doorenspleet, Renske, ―The structural context of recent transitions to democracy,‖ European Journal of Political Research 43 (2004), pp. 309‒36; Doorenspleet, Renske, ―Reassessing the three waves of democratization,‖ World Politics 52 (2000), pp. 384‒406; Inglehart and Welzel: Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p. 42.

Chapter Six 1

2

Brubaker, Rogers, Nationalism Reframed: Nationalism and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Knippenberg, Hans, ―State formation and nation-building in the Netherlands and the Soviet Union: a historical comparison,‖ GeoJournal 40 (1996), pp. 249‒62. See also Nodia: ―The impact of nationalism,‖ pp. 201‒08; also in Journal of Democracy 12:4 (2001), pp. 27‒34. See Herzig: New Caucasus; Cornell: Small Nations. See also USDS: Country Reports for 1992 and 1993; Freedom House: Freedom in the World 1992‒1993, pp.

NOTES

3 4

5 6 7 8 9

10 11

12 13

14

15

16

355

92-93; HRW, World Report 1993 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993). O‖Byrne: Human Rights, p. 259. Zolberg, Aristide R., ―The formation of new states as a refugee-generating process,‖ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 467 (1983), pp. 24‒38. Gurr, Ted Robert and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 160‒65. Stavenhagen, Rodolfo, The Ethnic Question: Conflicts, Development, and Human Rights (Tokyo: United Nations Press, 1990), p. 37. Cohen, Roberta and Francis M. Deng, ―Introduction,‖ in Cohen and Deng: Forsaken People, p. 6. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome, 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953. ―The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child do not contain a derogation clause.‖ Hovhannisian, Lusine and Tatshat Stepanyan, ―Report on the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the law of the Republic of Armenia,‖ in Roberta Cohen, Walter Kälin and Erin Mooney (eds), The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the Law of the South Caucasus: Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan (Washington, DC: American Society of International Law, 2003), p. 250, note 7. Ibid., p. 179. Skran, Claudena M., Refugees in Inter-War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Hathaway, James C., The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Cohen, Robin, Global Diasporas (London: UCL Press, 1997). Fridtjof Nansen received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1938 for his humanitarian work in aiding refugees and the Nansen passports. See Holborn, Louise W., ―The League of Nations and the refugee problem,‖ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 203 (1939), pp. 124–35. League of Nations, High Commissioner for Refugees, Conférence pour les questions des réfugiés russes et arméniens, Rapport du Haut commissaire et rapport du représentant de la Belgique présentés au Conseil (Geneva: League of Nations, 1926); League of Nations, Council, Settlement of Armenian Refugees, 16 September 1926 (Geneva, League of Nations, 1926); League of Nations, Assembly, Fifth Committee, Armenian and Russian Refugee Problems, Report of the Fifth Committee to the Assembly, Presented by the German Delegate (Geneva: Imp. Kundig, 1926); see also Adams, Walter, ―Extent and nature of the world refugee problem,‖ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 203 (1939), pp. 26–36. Sjöberg, Tommie, The Powers and the Persecuted: The Refugee Problem and the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR), 1938-1947 (Lund, Sweden: Lund University Press, 1991). Holborn: ―League of Nations,‖ p. 130.

356 17

18

19 20

21

22

23 24 25 26

27 28 29 30

31

32 33

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA

Hathaway: Rights of Refugees; Skran: Refugees; Loescher, Gil, Alexander Betts and James Milner, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection into the Twenty-first Century (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 6–9. Kushner, Tony and Katharine Knox, Refugees in an Age of Genocide: Global, National, and Local Perspectives during the Twentieth Century (London: F. Cass, 1999), pp. 8–11. Hathaway: Rights of Refugees. Kushner and Knox: Refugees, pp. 8–11; Alborzi, M.R., Evaluating the Effectiveness of International Refugee Law: The Protection of Iraqi Refugees (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), pp. 160–65. UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (1951) [hereafter Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, entered into force 4 October 1967; Loescher, Betts and Milner: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, pp. 10–15. Loescher, Gil, The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Loescher, Betts and Milner: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, p. 1. UNHCR, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ―About us‖ and ―Figures at a glance,‖ available at www.unhcr.org. UNESCO, Non-Military Aspects of International Security (Paris: UNESCO, 1995); Loescher, Betts and Milner: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, p. 52. Lauterpacht: International Law and Human Rights; Sohn: ―New international law‖; Sohn: ―Sibley lecture,‖ pp. 1–25. Henkin et al.: International Law, p. 1007; Stavropoulou, Maria, ―Displacement and human rights: reflections on UN practice,‖ Human Rights Quarterly 20:3 (1998), pp. 515–54. UN GA, Statute of the Office, 1950. United Nations, High Commissioner for Refugees, ―What we do: durable solutions,‖ available at www.unhcr.org. UN General Assembly, Resolution 2198 (XXI) (1951). League of Nations, Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees, 159 LNTS 3663, 1933; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, United Nations, 2008, available at untreaty.un.org. Lauterpacht, Sir Elihu and Daniel Bethlehem, ―The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement: Opinion,‖ in Erika Feller, Volker Türk and Frances Nicholson (eds.), Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR‖s Global Consultations on International Protection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 87‒177. Türk, Volker and Frances Nicholson, ―Refugee protection in international law,‖ in Feller, Türk and Nicholson: Refugee Protection, pp. 3–45. Organization of African Unity, ―The organization of African Unity Convention governing specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa,‖ OAU Doc. CM/267/Rev. 1, 10 September 1969; United Nations High Commissioner

NOTES

34 35 36 37

38

39 40 41

42 43

44

45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56

57

357

for Refugees, The Cartagena Declaration of 1984 (Geneva: UNHCR, 1985). BBC News, Uzbek refugees flee Kyrgyzstan violence, 14 June 2010. Loescher, Betts and Milner: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, p. 29. Ibid., p. 28. Cohen and Deng: Forsaken People, p. 8; Cohen, Roberta and Francis M. Deng, Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998). In May 2007, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed Deng as the new Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide. UN Secretary-General, SG/A/1070, BIO/3877, Department of Public Information, 29 May 2007, www.un.org. Cohen, Kälin and Mooney: Guiding Principles, p. vii; the text of the Guiding Principles appears in Annex, pp. 155–71. See E/CN.4/1993/35 Annex; E/CN.4/1996/52/Add.2; and E/CN.4/1998/ 53/Add.1. Cohen, Kälin and Mooney: Guiding Principles, Introduction, para. 3; see also the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, ―The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,‖ The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, available at www.brookings.edu. Loescher, Betts and Milner: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, pp. 104–06, 108. Cohen, Roberta, Simon Bagshaw and Vladimir Shkolnikov, ―Background memorandum for the regional workshop on internal displacement in the South Caucasus,‖ Tbilisi, 10–12 May 2000. UN GA Res. 60/L.1, para. 132, UN Doc. A/60/L.1, 24 October 2005, available at unpan1.un.org; see also UN, the 2005 World Summit, high-level plenary meeting of the 60th session of the General Assembly, 14–16 September 2005, Documents, available at www.un.org/summit2005. Cohen, Kälin and Mooney: Guiding Principles, Principles 1 and 2. The text of the document is available at www.idpguidingprinciples.org. Ibid., Principle 3, para. 1 & 2; Principle 4, para. 1. Ibid., Principle 18. Ibid., Principle 23. Ibid., Principle 28, para. 1. Ibid., Principle 29, para. 2. UN GA Res. 2200A (XXI), 16 December 1966. UN 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 7 March 1966. CEDAW 1979. Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC 1989). UN General Assembly 1984; Optional Protocol 2002. United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ―International Protection for Refugees,‖ E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/2002/23, 14 August 2002. United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, ―Human Rights and Mass Exoduses,‖ E/CN.4/RES/2003/52, 24 April 2003.

358 58

59 60

61 62 63 64

65 66

67 68

69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA

UN High Commissioner for Refugees, States Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, UNHCR, 1 October 2008, available at www.unhcr.org. UNCHR, Specific Groups, p. 3. UNHCR, Populations of Concern to UNHCR: A Statistical Overview, 1994 (Geneva: UNHCR, 1995); UNHCR: Statistical Yearbook, 2002; UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia; USDS: Country Reports for 1999; Hovhannisian and Stepanyan: ―Report,‖ p. 176. See also Ayvazyan: Mardu iravunkneri pashtpanutyan kazmakerbume, pp. 80–81. The figure 239,250 appears in UNHCR: Statistical Yearbook, 2003. UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia, Ch. 1. Hovhannisian and Stepanyan: ―Report,‖ pp. 176–77. Thomas Greene gives 65,000 as a more accurate figure (Greene: ―Internal displacement,‖ p. 271). UNCHR: Specific Groups, p. 7. IMF: Republic of Armenia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, p. 70; USDS: Country Reports for 2007. The dispersed nature of the refugee and IDPs‖ households has made it difficult to generate accurate numbers, leading to some discrepancies in the figures presented by Armenian and international agencies. UNCHR: Specific Groups, p. 6. IMF: Republic of Armenia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, p. 70; USDS: Country Reports for 2007; UNCHR: Specific Groups, p. 6. CSCE, ―Internally displaced persons in the Caucasus region and southeastern Anatolia,‖ Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 108th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 June 2003 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003), p. 2; Lynch, Maureen, ibid., p. 120; World Refugee Survey 2003, Table 6, available at www.refugees.org. UNCHR: Specific Groups, p. 7. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Norwegian Refugee Council, Armenia: Need to Monitor Progress towards Durable Solutions, A profile of the internal displacement situation (23 February 2010), p. 8, available at www.internaldisplacement.org. IMF: Republic of Armenia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, p. 70; IDMC/NRC: Armenia: Need to Monitor, p. 7; USDS: Country Reports for 2007. UNHCR: Populations of Concern, 1994, Table 8. USDS: Country Reports for 2002. UNHCR: Statistical Yearbook, 2002. UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia, Tables 40 and 42, available at www.undp.am. IMF: Republic of Armenia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, p. 16, note 15. UNCHR: Specific Groups, pp. 9, 13. Greene: ―Internal displacement,‖ p. 279. UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia. Greene: ―Internal displacement,‖ p. 271. Ayvazyan: Mardu iravunkneri pashtpanutyan kazmakerbume, p. 87. USDS: Country Reports for 1998.

NOTES 81 82

83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119

359

USDS: Country Reports for 1996; Greene: ―Internal displacement,‖ p. 280. Forsythe, David P. and Barbara Ann J. Rieffer-Flanagan, The International Committee of the Red Cross: A Neutral Humanitarian Actor (London: Routledge, 2007); Greene: ―Internal displacement,‖ pp. 280–82. CRIP: Country Sheet, Armenia, p. 95. Greene: ―Internal displacement,‖ p. 276. USDS: Country Reports for 1994, 1995, and 1996. Greene: ―Internal displacement,‖ p. 280. Ayvazyan: Mardu iravunkneri pashtpanutyan kazmakerbume, p. 81. Ibid., p. 87. USDS: Country Reports for 1999. UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia, Chs. 1 and 6; UNCHR: Specific Groups, p. 10. Hovhannisian and Stepanyan: ―Report,‖ p. 177. IMF: Republic of Armenia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, p. 17. Ibid., Ch. 6. IFAD, Executive Board: Republic of Armenia, p. 4. UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia, Ch. 6, Tables 40, 42. IMF: Republic of Armenia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, p. 16, note 15. UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia, Ch. 6. Ibid. See also IMF: Republic of Armenia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, p. 28. IDMC/NRC: Armenia: Need to Monitor, p. 8. UNCHR: Specific Groups, pp. 7, 8. Ibid., p. 7. UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia, Ch. 5. Ibid. Ibid. CSCE: ―Internally displaced persons,‖ Maureen Lynch, Director of Research, Refugees International, pp. 9, 41. IMF: Republic of Armenia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, pp. 38, 291; CRIP: Country Sheet, Armenia, p. 31. Ibid., Ch. 6. IDMC/NRC: Armenia: Need to Monitor, p. 8. IMF: Republic of Armenia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, pp. 38, 291; CRIP: Country Sheet, Armenia, p. 31. CRIP: Country Sheet, Armenia, pp. 31–32. UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia, Ch. 5. Ibid., Ch. 5, Table 30. Ibid., Table 32. UNCHR: Specific Groups, p. 8. Ibid., pp. 8‒9. Ibid. IDMC/NRC: Armenia: Need to Monitor, p. 10. UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia, Ch. 5. Ibid.

360 120 121 122 123 124

125 126 127

128 129 130 131

132 133 134 135 136

137 138 139 140 141 142 143

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA

UNCHR: Specific Groups, p. 6. Ibid., p. 8. UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia, Fig. 4. Ibid., Tables 9 and 19, Fig. 14. IDMC/NRC: Armenia: Need to Monitor, p. 8. On Syunik, see Groenewold, George and Jeannette Schoorl, The Living Conditions of Refugees in Armenia: Millennium Development Indicators and Coping Behaviour: Country Report (The Hague: Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute, 2006). CRIP: Country Sheet, Armenia, p. 47. UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia. IDMC/NRC: Armenia: Need to Monitor, p. 7. See also report by the Norwegian Refugee Council, 1 March 2005; UNCHR: Specific Groups, p. 6. The Armenian government compensated, in the total amount of 70 million rubles (in 1989 value), the Azeris who moved from areas affected by the earthquake. UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia. UNCHR: Specific Groups, p. 8. Ayvazyan: Mardu iravunkneri pashtpanutyan kazmakerbume, p. 86. USDS: Country Reports for 1994, 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000. The study employed a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represented the belief that conditions ―will become much worse,‖ 4 represented the view that they ―will remain the same,‖ and 7 that conditions ―will become much better.‖ UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia, Ch. 7. Ibid. Cohen and Deng: Masses in Flight, p. 54. Greene: ―Internal displacement,‖ p. 271. UNCHR: Specific Groups, p. 6. The Department for Migration and Refugees (DMR), created in April 1999 as an independent body responsible to the prime minister, was initially within the Ministry of Social Security and Labor. In May 2005, the DMR was reorganized and merged into the Migration Agency (MA) under the Ministry of Territorial Administration. RA Government Res. 244, ―On establishment of Department of Migration and Refugees within the government of the Republic of Armenia,‖ 21 April 1999; RA Governmental Decree No. 633-N, 19 May 2005. The Charter of the Migration Agency, RA Governmental Decree No. 1898-U, 28 November 2002. See the website of the Migration Agency at www.dmr.am. See also Hovhannisian and Stepanyan: ―Report,‖ pp. 185, 251n22. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, E/CN/.4/1998/53/Add.2. Cohen, Bagshaw and Shkolnikov: ―Background‖; see also Cohen, Kälin and Mooney: Guiding Principles, p. vii. Cohen, Bagshaw and Shkolnikov: ―Background.‖ Round Table on ―Compliance of legislation of the Republic of Armenia with the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,‖ Report, Erevan, 15 October 2001. Cohen, Kälin and Mooney: Guiding Principles. Hovhannisian and Stepanyan: ―Report,‖ p. 175. Ibid., pp. 10, 185.

NOTES 144 145 146 147 148 149 150

151

152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160

161 162 163

164 165

166 167

361

UNCHR: Specific Groups, p. 11. See also International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), Landmine Monitor Report 2009: Armenia, available at www.the-monitor.org. UNCHR: Specific Groups, p. 11. Ibid., pp. 12, 13–14. Ibid., p. 12. See also Norwegian Refugee Council, ―Pilot IDP mapping survey in Armenia,‖ Forced Migration Review 17 (2003), p. 52. UNCHR: Specific Groups, pp. 14–16. Shoghikian, Hovannes, ―Armenia seeks donor aid for war-ravaged border regions,‖ Azatutyun radyokayan, 1 October 2008, available at www.azatutyun.am. Government of Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ―Assistance by the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security to the Project ―Sustainable Livelihood for Socially Vulnerable Refugees, Internally Displaced and Local Families‖ in Armenia,‖ press release, 2 March 2009, available at www.mofa.go.jp. UNDP, Landmine Impact Survey: The Republic of Armenia, 2005, p. 26, www. undp.am. See also ICBL: Landmine Monitor Report 2009; IDMC/NRC: Armenia: Need to Monitor, p. 8. UNDP and the Defense Ministry of Armenia initiated a three-year (2004–2007) project, signed on July 29, 2004. UNDP: Landmine Impact Survey, p. 73. IMF: Republic of Armenia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, p. 69. Ibid. Hovhannisian and Stepanyan: ―Report,‖ p. 182. UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia; Ayvazyan: Mardu iravunkneri pashtpanutyan kazmakerbume, pp. 86‒87. Dudwick, ―When the lights went out,‖ pp. 151‒52. USDS: Country Reports for 1999; UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia, Ch. 1. USDS: Country Reports for 1999. Republic of Armenia, ―On the Legal and Socio-Economic Guarantees for the Persons Who Had Been Forcibly Displaced from the Republic of Azerbaijan in 1988–1992 and Have Acquired the Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia,‖ AL-120, 27 December 2000. Ministry of Territorial Administration of Republic of Armenia Migration Agency, available at www.dmr.am. USDS: Country Reports for 1999. USDS: Country Reports for 2003; Emil Sahakyan (UNHCR Armenia), ―Ethnic Armenian refugees face challenge of integration,‖ 7 May 2003, United Nations, High Commissioner for Refugees, available at www.unhcr.org. USDS: Country Reports for 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2009. USDS: Country Reports for 1999; UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia; Ayvazyan: Mardu iravunkneri pashtpanutyan kazmakerbume, p. 87. From August through November, 6,473 refugees were granted citizenship. UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia. According to the country report published by the US Department of State for 2000, the total figure by the end of that year was 25,000. USDS: Country Reports for 2000. See also UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia.

362 168

169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180

181

182

183

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA

UNHCR, ―Some 65,000 refugees from Azerbaijan gain Armenian citizenship,‖ UNHCR, 6 February, available at www.unhcr.org; UNHCR: ―2010 regional operations.‖ UNHCR: ―Some 65,000 refugees.‖ Ibid. IMF: Republic of Armenia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper; USDS: Country Reports for 2007. IMF: Republic of Armenia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, p. 70. USDS: Country Reports for 2004 and 2005. UN General Assembly, GA/SHC/3904, Sixty-second General Assembly Third Committee, 41st & 42nd Meetings, 9 November 2007, available at www.un.org. USDS: Country Reports for 2007, 2008, and 2009. UNHCR: ―2010 regional operations.‖ UNDP, Armenia: Poverty of Vulnerable Groups in Armenia. World Refugee Survey. www.refugees.org. IMF Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General. Secretary-General‖s address at the Truman Presidential Museum and Library, December 2006, available at www.un.org. António Guterres, UNHCR, ―Enduring exile,‖ Address to the High Commissioner‖s Dialogue on Protection Challenges: Protracted Refugee Situations, Geneva, 11 December 2008, available at www.unhcr.org. Hunt, Paul, ―The human right to the highest attainable standard of health: new opportunities and challenges,‖ Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 100:7 (2006), p. 604. See also UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, ―Economic, social and cultural rights: the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health,‖ Fifty-ninth session, Item 10 of the provisional agenda, E/ CN.4/2003/58, 13 February 2003. Hunt: ―Human right,‖ p. 604.

Conclusion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Elster, Offe and Preuss: Institutional Design. Hall, John A., ―Consolidations of democracy,‖ in Held: Prospects for Democracy, pp. 271–90. Ibid., p. 277. Woshinsky: Culture and Politics, p. 41. Inglehart and Welzel: Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p. 1. Moore: Social Origins. Mill: On Liberty and The Subjection of Women, p. 19. Karakhanian, Aghavni, ―Political culture and democracy building: the case of Armenia,‖ in Ella Akerman (ed.), Political Culture Case Studies (Camberley, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2003), pp. 3–13 (specifically p. 7).

NOTES 9

10 11 12 13

14 15

16 17 18 19 20 21

22 23

363

Sahakyan, Vahe and Arthur Atanesyan, ―Democratization in Armenia: some trends of political culture and behavior,‖ Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of PostSoviet Democratization 14:3 (2006), pp. 347–54 (specifically p. 353). Inglehart and Welzel: Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p. 79. Mill: On Liberty and The Subjection of Women, p. 154. GINSC: ―In Armenia‖; Avagyan: ―Our silence.‖ Perlmutter, Amos, ―The praetorian state and the praetorian army,‖ Comparative Politics 1:3 (1969), pp. 382–404 (quote appears on p. 383). See also Huntington: Political Order, pp. 192–263; Falk: Human Rights, pp. 66–67, 86–87. Huntington: Political Order, pp. 32–39. Sigelman, Lee, ―Understanding political instability,‖ Comparative Political Studies 12:2 (1979), pp. 205–28; Tsurutani, Taketsugu, ―Stability and instability,‖ Journal of Politics 39 (1968), pp. 910–33. Parsons: Social System, p. 39; Almond and Powell: Comparative Politics, p. 5. Shapiro: State of Democratic Theory, p. 39. Popper, Karl, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966 [1945], 2 vols). Fairbanks: ―Disillusionment,‖ pp. 49–56. Falk: Human Rights, p. 3. RFE/RL Newsline, ―Armenia, Azerbaijan accepted into Council of Europe,‖ 26 January 2001, IPR Strategic Business Information Database, February 2001, available at findarticles.com. Dudwick: ―Political transformations,‖ pp. 102–03. Casper, Gretchen, Fragile Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995), p. 5.

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Index

Abbas I, 61 Abdul Hamid II, 75, 78 Abdul Mejid, 75 Abkhazia, 256 Abovian, Khachatur, 67, 70 Abrahamyan, Hovik, 237 Administrative Court, 124‒25 Africa/African, 1, 23, 110, 115, 199, 242, 245, 248, African Charter on Human and Peoples‖ Rights, 32, 201 Agatangeghos, 49 Agricultural Sustainable Development Strategy (2006), 213 Alexander I, 68‒69 Alexander II, 72, 79 Alexander III, 40, 78, 79 Alexeyeva, Ludmilla, 90 Alma Ata Protocols, 93 Amalrik, Andrei A., 91 Amatuni, Hayk, 83 American Bar Association, Rule of Law Initiative, 126, 150‒51 American Society of International Law, 269 American War of Independence, 16, 26, 284 Amnesty International, 89, 168, 179, 185, 190 Anderson, Benedict, 17 Andropov, Yuri V., 89 Anna (Empress of Russia), 67 Annan, Kofi, 278 Anti-Corruption Strategy and Implementation Action Plan, 208, 231 Aquinas, Thomas, 60

Aragatsotn, 212, 259, 262 Ararat, 74 Arghutian, Hovsep, 69 Aristakes Lastiverttsi, 52 Aristotle, 12, 25, 206, 240 Armavia, 206 Armenakan Party, 78 Armenian Church and human rights, 187‒93 Armenian Center for Protection of Human Rights after Sakharov, 132 Armenian Cheka, 82 Armenian Constitutional RightProtective Centre, 109 Armenian Genocide, 35, 49, 79, 86, 131, 247, 283, 292 Armenian Helsinki Association, 150, 154, 182 Armenian Helsinki Watch Group, 89‒90 Armenian House, 63 Armenian Human Rights Commission, 178, 180, 238 Armenian Human Rights School, 108‒09 Armenian National Constitution (Sahmanadrutiun) (1863), 37, 75 Armenian refugees from Iraq, 256, 274, 276 Armenian Savings Bank, 206 Armenian Sociological Association, 221 Armenian Supreme Soviet, 84, 92, 93, 109‒10 Armenian Young Lawyers‖ Association, 108, 268

406

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA

Asadov, Elkhan, 268 Ashtishat, Council of, 50, 65 Aslanyan, Liala, 268‒69 Avrenk haghtogh tagavorats kristoneits (Laws of the Victorious Christian Kings), 51 Azaryan, Garegin, 153 Azerbaijan, 106, 109, 138, 181, 184, 195, 199, 207, 209, 210, 213, 244, 255, 258‒59, 265‒68, 271‒75, 285, 292 Azgayin Miatsyal Kusaktsutyun (National Unity Party), 86, 130 Baghdasarov, Mikhail, 205‒06 Baghdasaryan, Artur, 128‒29 Baghdasaryan, Edit, 172, Baghdasaryan, Narek, 223 Baghramian, Movses, 62‒63 Bagratuni, dynasty/kingdom, 37, 48, 52, 56, 98 Baljian, Vazgen I, 133 Baltic states, 81, 101, 106, 195 Barcelona Traction case (1970), 32 Bargavaj Hayastan Kusaktsutyun (Prosperous Armenia Party), 147, 206 Beccaria, Cesare, 68 Beijing Conference on Women, 226‒28 Belgrade Conference, 88‒90 Belhassen, Souhayr, 155 Belovezh Accords, 93 Blanc, Louis, 27 Blanqui, Louis-Augaste, 27 Bodin, Jean, 26 Bologna Declaration, 235 Bolshevik rule, 42, 48, 81, 84, 186, 247, 281, 292 Brandenburg Gate, 90 Brandt, Willy, 135 Brezhnev Doctrine, 86 Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement, 268‒69 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 100

Burke, Edmund, 11 Byzantium/Byzantine Empire, 25, 47, 51, 53, 54 Calvin, John, 59 Capacity Building Support and Victims Assistance, 230 Capacity Building in Migration Program, 269 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (1984), 250 Cartner, Holly, 150, 177 Casper, Gretchen, 292 Catherine the Great, 41, 67, 68, 72, 134‒35 Catholics/Catholic Church, 25, 38, 59, 62, 132, 134, 190 Catholicosate at Echmiadzin, 48, 56, 62‒64, 66, 67, 70, 76, 80, 83, 132, 190, 283 Catholicosate of Cilicia, 53 Central Election Commission, 117, 139, 140, 144‒49, 153 Central Emergency Response Fund, 276 Chalidze, Valery, 89 Chamchian, Hakob, 62 Chartist movement, 60 China, 8, 25, 34, 35, 62 Chkeidze, Giorgi, 268 Chorekjyan, Gevorg VI, 83 Chorrord Ishkhanutyun (Fourth Estate), 154, 170 Cicero, Marcus Tullius, 25 Cilicia, kingdom, 36, 37, 53‒56, 98, 281, 282 Civil Court of Appeal, 124 Civil Society Institute, 155, 177 Clapham, Andrew, 228 Cohen, Roberta, 245 Cold War, 20, 23, 31, 88, 89, 90, 98, 201, 248 Collective Security Treaty Organization, 250 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 117, 261

INDEX

Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 226 Commonwealth of Independent States, 93, 139, 165‒66, 201 Communist Party, Armenia, 82, 83, 86, 87, 92, 93, 116, 130, 142, 143, 196, 203 Communist Party, Soviet Union, 31, 82‒84, 86, 91, 93, 101, 104, 128, 136, 186, 279, 281 Comprehensive Development Program in Near-border Regions, 276 Concept Paper of State Regulation of Migration of Population of the Republic of Armenia, 230, 269 Confederation of Labor Unions, 218‒19 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 88, 261 Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, 153‒54 Congress of the International Federation for Human Rights, 155, 177, 182 Constable Smbat, 53, 65 Constitution of 1995, 109, 113, 114, 118, 119, 123‒25, 153, 158, 162, 175, 187, 193, 218, 224 Constitution of 2005, 108, 112, 114, 118‒21, 123‒26, 135, 143, 145, 147, 153, 156, 158, 159, 162‒64, 166, 173, 174, 185, 186, 189, 192, 193, 218, 224, 234, 235, 237, 239, 240, 285, 291 Constitutional Commission of the Supreme Council, 117 Constitutional Court, 97, 123‒26, 134, 144, 145, 148, 182, 189, 218, 274 Convention against Corruption, 203, 208

407 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 94, 160, 162, 173, 182, 226, 253, 285 Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 230 Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize (ILO 87), 218 Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively (ILO 98), 218 Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor (ILO 182), 233, 237, 243 Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany, 247 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, 230 Convention on Political Asylum, 32 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 32, 94, 96, 121, 200, 222, 223, 226, 230, 253 Convention on Equal Remuneration (ILO 100), 222 Convention on Minimum Wage (ILO 138), 233 Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, 222 Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 94, 96, 120, 222 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 249, 253 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 32, 94, 233, 234, 238,

408

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA

243, 253, 285; Optional Protocols, 233 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 240 Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees (1933), 250, 292 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), 94, 246, 248‒50, 253, 276, 278; Protocol (1967), 94, 246, 249‒51, 253, 258, 274, 278 Convention Relative to the Rights of Aliens, 32 Copenhagen World Conference on Women, 226 Copenhagen Document of 1990, 148 Copenhagen Summit, 201, 202 Copernicus, Nicolaus, 59 Council of Europe, 113, 120, 139, 145, 150, 152, 153, 185, 190, 208, 291 Council of Europe, Civil Law Convention on Corruption, 208 Council of Europe, Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, 238 Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, 208 Council of Europe, Social Cohesion Development Division, 218 Council of Justice, 123, 124, 182‒83 Council/Code of Shahapivan (444), 50‒51 Court of Cassation, 123‒25, 128, 151, 170, 182, 191 Crawford, Beverly, 43 Criminal Code, 174, 175, 177, 230, 234 Criminal Court of Appeal, 124, 170, 176 Criminal Courts, 124

Czechoslovakia, 85‒86 Dadrian, Vahakn N., 49 Dahl, Robert A., 2, 10, 11 Dakin, Lloyd, 275 Danielyan, Emil, 129 Danielyan, Karine, 121 Danielyan, Mikael, 181 Danilovich, John, 151 Datastangirk (Lawcode), 54, 62, 66 Davit Alavkavordi, 54 Deaton, Angus, 241‒42 Decembrists, 68, 69 Declaration of Algiers (1978), 28‒29 Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man (1948), 32 Declaration of the Rights of the Child, 233 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (DEVAW), 226, 227 Declaration on the Right to Development, 200 Demirchyan, Karen, 87, 142, 143 Demirchyan, Stepan, 144 Deng, Francis, 245, 251, 261, 267, 270, 271 Department for Migration and Refugees, 268 Department of Refugees, 258‒59 Dependencia theory, 22, 23, 44 Deutsch, Karl, 17, 97 DiFranceisco, Wayne, 104 Dimitrijevic, Vojin, 115 Drèze, Jean, 237 Dubček, Alxander, 85 Dudwick, Nora, 13, 111, 132, 155, 236, 292 Dvin, Council of, 50, 52 Dworkin, Ronald, 44 Eghishe, 49, 77 Elster, Jon, 3, 43, 45, 98, 111, 134 Employment Service Agency, 219 Elizabeth (Empress of Russia), 67

INDEX

English Bill of Rights, 25, 60 Enlightenment, 16, 20, 25, 27, 34, 36‒37, 40, 42, 58, 61, 63, 65, 68, 69, 71, 73, 74, 76‒78, 93, 282‒84 Erekle II, 65 Erevan State Medical University, 223 Erevan State University, 108 Erevan State University, Student Council, 223 European Commission of Human Rights, 88 European Community, 88 European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 32, 88, 94, 151, 160, 163, 177, 185, 200, 246 European Court of Human Rights, 88, 125, 150, 151, 161, 171, 182, 190, 191, 194 European Institute for the Media, 141 European Parliament, 139 European Social Charter, 32 European Union, 117, 129 European Values Study, 241 Evans, Tony, 18 Eznik Koghbatsi, 49 Fairbanks, Charles, 100, 129, 206, 291 Family Code, 224, 234 First World War, 28, 32, 35, 79, 80, 247, 283 Fish, M. Steven, 114, 193 Food and Agriculture Organization, 212 Fourth Geneva Convention, 246 Frank, Andre Gunder, 23 Freedom House, 106, 115, 145, 150, 165, 166, 193 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 26, 60

409 French Revolution, 16, 26, 27, 60, 282, 284 Friedgut, Theodore, 104 Fund for Armenia Relief, 213 Furtseva, Ekaterina, 84‒85 Galileo Galilei, 59 Gallup poll, 122, 133, 220, 241 Galstyan, Arsham, 151 Galtung, Johan, 29 Gegharkunik, 212, 256, 272 Gellner, Ernest, 83, 109, 195, 203 Geneva Convention on the Rights of the Child, 233 Genocide Monument at Tsitsernakaberd, 86 Georgia, 15, 40, 65, 69, 70, 89, 106, 169, 186, 196, 207, 210, 232, 256, 268, 291, 293 Georgian Young Lawyers‖ Association, 268 Gevorgian Jemaran, 78, 83 Gevorgyan, Armen, 153 Ghazar Parbetsi, 49 Gibson, James, 14 Gitelman, Zvi, 104 Glorious Revolution, 25, 60 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 90, 91, 93 Great Instruction (Velikii Nakaz) (Catherine the Great), 68 Great Reforms (Alexander II), 72 Greece/Greeks, 186, 193, 231, 247 Greek Orthodox Church, 56 Greene, Thomas, 257‒58 Grigor II Vkayaser, 56 Grigor Magistros Pahlavuni, 52 Grigor Narekatsi, 52, 77 Grigor Tgha, 53 Grigoryan, Alik, 205 Grigoryan, Artur, 217 Grigoryan, Henrikh, 183‒84 Grigoryan, Mark, 172, 181 Grigoryan, Romik, 175 Grigoryan, Vladimir, 205 Grotius, Hugo, 60

410

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA

Group of States Against Corruption, 208 Grzymala-Busse, Anna, 127, 198 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 246, 251, 252, 253, 267, 269, 276, 278 Gulag Archipelago, 89 Guterres, António, 278 Gutmann, Amy, 137 Gyumri, 69, 79, 178, 231, 232 Habeas Corpus Act, 25 Habermas, Jürgen, 17 Haggard, Stephen, 44 Hague Convention on InterCountry Adoption, 233 Hague Regulations, 246 Hakobyan, Arshaluys, 154, 279 Hakobyan, Mihran, 239 Hall, John, 281 Hammurabi, 25 Harrison, Lawrence E., 7 Harutyunyan, Eduard, 90 Harutyunyan, Gagik, 97, 134, 189 Harutyunyan, Samvel, 268 Harutyunyan, Vagharshak, 144 Harutyunyan, Vahan, 205 Hausmann, Ricardo, 9 Hay Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsutiun (Armenian Revolutionary Federation), 78, 81, 116, 117, 130, 138, 141, 147, 163, 179, 180, 181, 206 Hayastani Hanrapetakan Kusaktsutyun (Republican Party), 113, 143, 144, 146, 147, 149, 150, 153, 205 Haykakan zhamanak (Armenian Times), 169 Hayots Hamazgayin Sharzhum (Armenian National Movement), 92, 110, 128‒30, 139, 142, 204 Hayrikyan, Paruyr, 87, 88, 119 Hazarashen Armenian Center for Anthropological Studies, 268

Helsinki Accords, 31, 88‒89, 285 Helsinki Final Act, 31, 88, 90 Helsinki Watch Groups, 89 Henkin, Louis, 95, 157 Heritage Party, 130, 147 Hetum I, 53 Hetum Patmich (Historian), 53 Hirschman, Albert, 34, 219‒21 Hobbes, Thomas, 26, 157 Hope and Help (NGO), 231, 232 House Building Project, 262 House Purchase Certificate, 262 Hovannisian, Raffi K., 130 Hovhannes III Odznetsi, 51, 52 Hovhannisyan, Lusine, 268, 269 Howard, Marc Morjé, 100 Human rights and happiness, 240‒42 Human rights as ―charismatic values,‖ 33‒34, 197 Human Rights Defender (Ombudsman), 119, 120, 125, 154, 158‒ 59, 163, 170, 174, 181, 288 Human Rights Watch, 139, 150, 154, 175, 177 Hungarian rebellion, 83, 85, 89 Hunt, Murray, 236, Hunt, Paul, 278 Huntington, Samuel P., 7, 38, 196, 290 International Fund for Agricultural Development, 212, 215 International Monetary Fund, 214, 222, 260, 262, 272, 276, 277 Industrial Revolution, 14, 16, 21, 40, 60, 282 Inglehart, Ronald, 7, 8, 9‒10, 21, 22, 107, 196, 241, 242, 288 Interagency Commission to Address Issues Related to Human Trafficking, 230 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 252 International Bill of Human Rights, 28, 39, 95, 96, 159

INDEX

International Committee of the Red Cross, 178, 252, 258, 268 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 32, 94, 95, 102, 159, 160, 164, 185, 186, 192, 227, 249, 253, 284 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 32, 94, 95, 198, 200, 243, 253, 276, 284‒85 International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 139‒40, International Labor Organization, 233, 247 International Organization for Migration, 232, 268, 269 International Refugee Organization, 248 International Women‖s Rights Action Watch, 224 Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 139 Irrigation Rehabilitation Project, 212 Ittihad ve Terakki Jemiyeti (Committee of Union and Progress, CUP), 79 Japan, foreign ministry, 271 Judicial Code, 124, 126 Judicial Council, 123, 124, 182‒83 Judicial Reform, Russian (1864), 81 Judicial Reform Project of the World Bank, 125‒26 Judicial School, 125 Justinian I, 51 Kälin, Walter, 251, 268 Kamenetsky, Ihor, 99 Kanonagirk Hayots (Armenian Book of Canons), 51‒52 Kant, Immanuel, 16, 17, 26, 31 Karabagh Committee, 91, 92 Kaufman, Robert, 44 Kautilya, 25

411 Kazakhstan, 106, 195, 207, 293 Keenan, Edward, 105 KGB, 87, 89, 114, 117, 129 Khachatryan, Haykazun, 86 Khachatryan, Henrik, 205 Khachatryan, Vardan, 212 Khanate of Erevan, 66, 70, 71 Khanjyan, Aghasi, 82, 83 Kharatyan, Hransuh, 268 Kharatyan, Marine, 154 Khorkhoruni, Vahram, 205 Khrimian, Mkrtich, 76, 79 Khrushchev, Nikita, 83, 84, 85 King, Charles, 15 Kirakosyan, Artak, 155 Kocharyan, Ashot, 268 Kocharyan, Robert, 92, 110, 113, 114, 119, 120, 128, 129, 137, 142‒49, 150, 151, 163, 168‒ 71, 173, 175, 176, 180, 181, 184‒85, 189, 190, 199, 205, 207, 208, 212, 215, 216, 221, 231, 232, 244, 255, 260‒62, 266, 267, 269, 273, 274, 276, 277, 286‒88 Kochinyan, Anton, 86 Komsomol (Communist Youth Union), 82 Koriun, 48, 77 Korkelia, Konstantin, 268 Kostanyan, Haykaz, 83 Kotayk, 212, 259 Kouymjian, Dickran, 57 Kovalev, Sergei (Kovalyov), 89 Kovkas (Caucasus), 74 Krunk (Crane) Committee, 91‒92 Krunk Hayots ashkharhi (Crane of the Armenian World), 74 Kyrgyzstan, 106, 195, 207, 215, 250 Landmine Impact Survey, 272 Latin America, 1, 22‒23, 38, 40, 199 Law Concerning the Rights of the Child, 234, 237

412

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA

Law on Employment, 218, 224 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, 190 Law on Freedom of Information, 143 Law on Individual Entrepreneur, 224 Law on Refugees, 274 Law on the Election of Local SelfGoverning Bodies, 140 Law on the Election of the President, 140 Law on Transfer of Ownership Rights of Apartments Constructed for Refugees Forcibly Displaced from Azerbaijan in 1988‒1992, 274‒75 Lazarian Academy, 78 League of Nations, 32, 233, 247, 248 League of Nations, High Commissioner for Refugees, 247, 248 Lee Kuan Yew, 8 Lenin, Vladimir I./Leninist, 22, 43, 81, 82, 87 Leo I, 51 Levon I, 53 Lijphart, Arend, 43 Lilya 4ever, 232 Lisbon Convention, 235 Locke, John, 16, 17, 26, 60, 157 Logic of Westphalia, 60, 245 Lori, 79, 212, 235, 259, 262 Louis XVI, 5, 27, 61 Lundy, Laura, 236 Luther, Martin, 59 Machiavelli, Niccolò, 12 Madras, 62‒63, 67 Magna Carta, 25, 157 Manandyan, Hakob, 50 Manucharyan, Ashot, 91, 141 Manukyan, Vazgen, 91, 92, 138, 141, 180, 242 Margaryan, Andranik, 144, 146

Margaryan, Artsrun, 205 Margaryan, Gagik, 172 Margaryan, Levon, 190 Martirosyan, Radik, 221 Marx, Karl/Marxism, 3, 7, 22, 23, 27, 44, 83, 91, 132, 157, 195, 203, 282 Maslow, Abraham, 29, 240 Massacres (1890s), 79, 247 Matossian, Mary K., 77 McEvoy, Lesley, 236 Médecins Sans Frontières (Belgium), 258 Merali, Isfahan, 32, 197 Mercy Corps International, 258 Mermagen, Nigel, 153 Mesropyan, Tatev, 154 Meyersfeld, Bonita, 226 Migration Agency, 267, 271, 274 Mikayelian Chakikian, Grigor, 62 Mill, John Stuart, 157, 223, 285, 289 Millennium Challenge Corporation, 151 Minister for Regional Administration and Urban Planning, 261 Ministry of Justice, 123 Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, 217, 219 Ministry of Social Security, 237‒38 Ministry of Social Security, Labor, Migration, and Refugee Issues, 259, 260 Ministry of Social Welfare, 237 Ministry of Territorial Administration as Migration Agency, 274 Mishler, William, 108 Mkhitar Gosh, 54‒55, 62, 65‒66, 134 Mkhitar Sebastatsi, 61 Mkhitarist Order, 61, 62, 77 Mkrtchyan, Gagik, 180 Moldova, 8, 106, 195, 207, 293 Montesquieu, Baron de, 16, 26, 60, 101 Moore, Barrington, 282

413

INDEX

Moshiri-Gilani, Laylee, 237 Mosse, W.E., 72 Mouzelis, Nicos, 131 Movses Khorenatsi, 49, 50 Müllerson, Rein, 92 Muradbekyan, Khoren I, 83 Muravyev, Nikita, 68, 69 Nagorno-Karabagh, 3, 61, 87, 91, 92, 93, 109, 110, 114, 116, 117, 132, 138, 141, 142, 162, 166, 171, 178, 184, 198, 205, 210, 214, 217, 221, 244, 255, 257, 264, 267, 276, 285‒87 Nalbandian, Mikayel, 74 Nansen, Fridtjof, 247 Nansen Passport, 247, 248 National Academy of Sciences, 221 National Action Plan (2004-2010), 121 National Council for Television and Radio, 149 National Democratic Union, 116, 130, 141, 180 National Information Center for Academic Recognition and Mobility, 235‒36 National Plan of Action and Concept Paper on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, 230 National Security Service, 129, 205, 232 National Self-Determination Union, 87, 116, 119, 179, 180 National Unity Party, 86‒87, 90 Nazarian, Stepanos, 34, 74, 75, 86, 157 Nazaryan, Karen, 267 Nazaryan, Robert, 90 Nerses V Ashtaraketsi, 70 Nerses Lambronatsi, 53, 56 Nerses Shnorhali, 53, 54, 57, 65, 76, 77 Nersesyan, Garegin II, 134, 189, 191

Nersisian Jemaran, 74, 78 Nersisyan, Levon, 268 ―New Soviet Man,‖ 82, 85 Nicholas I, 69‒72 Nicholas II, 40, 42, 79‒80 Nodia, Ghia, 106 Nor tetrak vor kochi hordorak (New Pamphlet of Exhortations), 62, 63, 65, 67 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 88 North-West Agricultural Services Project, 212 Norwegian Refugee Council, 258 Noyemberyan, 232 Nussbaum, Martha, 4, 5, 43, 192 O‖Donnell, Guillermo, 44 Offe, Claus, 45, 98 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 121, 139, 143, 145‒150, 179, 268 Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 268 Oosterveld, Valerie, 32, 197 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 121, 132, 139, 141‒43, 145‒50, 172, 179, 183, 268 Organization of African Unity, 250, 252 Orinats Erkir Party (Country of Law; Rule of Law), 128, 147, 148 Orran (Haven), 238 Oskanian, Vardan, 208 Ottoman Constitution (1876), 75 Ottoman Empire/Ottomans, 8, 12, 17, 28, 36, 37, 40, 42, 46, 48, 56‒59, 61‒63, 66‒68, 71, 73‒75, 78‒80, 85, 86, 94, 96, 97, 99, 101, 247, 281, 282, 284 Poghosyan, Gagik, 181 Poghosyan, Gevorg, 268 Poghosyan, Hasmik, 121

414

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA

Poghosyan, Poghos, 181 Paghtasaryan, Zaven, 87 Paine, Thomas, 241 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 139, 145, 152, 185 Paros (Beacon), newspaper, 86 Paros (social program), 213, 259, 273 Parsons, Talcott, 33, 290 Patkanian, Gabriel, 70, 74 Patriarchate of Constantinople, 37, 56, 76, 283 Patriarchate of Jerusalem, 56 Paulicians, 52, 187 Pavstos Puzand, 49 Pedersen, Henning, 212, 213 Persia/Persian Empire, 12, 36, 47, 48, 56, 61‒63, 66, 67, 69, 71, 73, 94, 96, 281, 282, 284 Pestel, Pavel, 68 Peter the Great, 67, 69, 72 Petrosyan, Eznik, 189 Petrosyan, Zaruhi, 229, 289 Pipes, Richard, 133 Plato, 25 Poghosyan, Gagik, 181 Poghosyan, Gevorg, 268 Poland, 38, 85‒86, 132 Polanyi, Karl, 218 Polozhenie, 70, 71, 80 Polyarchy, 10, 11 Popper, Karl, 3, 40, 290 Post-conflict Rehabilitation in Near-border Regions of Armenia, 275 ―Potemkin democracy,‖ 15, 288 Potemkin, Grigory, 41 ―Potemkin village,‖ 15, 41, 132, 134, 135 Poverty Eradication Program, 217 Poverty Reduction Program, 216 ―Prague Spring,‖ 86 Prebisch, Raoul, 23 Presniakov, Aleksandr, 71 Preuss, Ulrich K., 45, 98

Procedural democracy, 3, 4, 96, 106, 114, 122, 290 Prosecutor General, 118, 122, 123, 154, 170, 172, 175, 176, 177, 181, 190, 205, 218, 230 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 230 Provisional Government (Russian), 80 Przeworski, Adam, 196 Pugachev Revolt, 68 Putnam, Robert, 206 Pye, Lucian, 34, 131 Qajar Dynasty, 61, 66‒67 Raffi (Hakob Melik-Hakobian), 76 Rawls, John, 30 Reagan, Ronald, 90, 91 Red Army, 82 Reformation, 16, 25, 52, 59, 281 Refugee Convention of the Organization of African Unity, 250 Renaissance, 16, 282 Republic of Armenia (1918), 42, 46, 48, 78, 80‒81, 92, 98, 131, 281, 283 Republic Party, 144, 148 Rice, Eugene, 17 Robinson, Mary, 200 Romany, Celina, 229 Roosevelt, Eleanor, 28 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 28 Rose, Richard, 108 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 12, 16, 17, 26, 60 Russia/Russian Empire, 8, 12, 14, 15‒17, 28, 34‒38, 40‒42, 46, 48, 58, 61, 65‒75, 77‒81, 85, 86, 94, 96, 97, 99, 101, 106, 107, 127, 133, 134, 171, 180, 186, 207, 220, 225, 247, 256, 266, 281, 282, 284, 292, 293

INDEX

Russian Revolution (1905), 79 Russification, 67, 79, 80, 82 Russo-Persian war (1804–13), 69 Russo-Turkish war (1768–74), 67 Rutland, Peter, 99 Rwanda, 246 Safavids, 61 Safi, 61 Sakharov, Andrei, 87, 89, Sakharov Foundation, 268 Sargisyan, Aram, 143‒44 Sargisyan, Vazgen, 143, 171, 204, 208 Sargsyan, Aleksandr, 205 Sargsyan, Alik, 177 Sargsyan, Serge, 110, 113, 114, 144, 146, 149‒54, 169, 173, 180, 181, 205, 206, 255, 276, 285 Sargsyan, Tigran, 132 Sarkissian, Ani, 192 Sarkissian, Karekin I, 133 Schedler, Andreas, 6 Schmitter, Philippe, 44 Schumpeter, Joseph, 4, 136 Second World War, 18, 20, 28, 32, 39, 83, 88, 94, 233, 246, 248, 284 Sen, Amartya, 4‒5 Shahamirian, Hakob, 62, 67, 77, 134, 155 Shahamirian, Shahamir, 67 Shahamirians, 65 Shamshyan, Gagik, 172 Shapiro, Ian, 12, 107, 111, 197, 290 Shils, Edward, 103 Shirak, 212, 216, 235, 239, 259, 262 Shkolnikov, Vladimir, 268 Simeon I Erevantsi, 62, 65, 67 Siradeghyan, Vano, 204, 205 Social Democrat Hnchakian Party, 78 Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr, 89

415 Somalia, 245, 278 Somavia, Juan O., 201 South Caucasus Network of Human Rights Defenders, 154 Soviet Constitution of 1936, 87 Soviet Constitution of 1977, 87 Sovietization/de-Sovietization, 48, 81, 82, 86, 186, 195, 203, 209, 244, 283 Speransky, Mikhail, 79 Spitak, 255, 258 Stalin, Joseph/Stalinist, 9, 41, 82, 83, 85, 91, 184, 288 Starr, S. Frederick, 2, 3 State Department for Migration and Refugees, 274 Stavenhagen, Rodolfo, 245 Stefes, Christoph, 204, 205 Stepanyan, Arsen, 175 Stepanyan, Garine, 180 Stepanyan, Hakob, 87 Stepanyan, Tatshat, 268, 269 Stolypin, Piotr Arkadievich, 80 ―Subjective well-being‖ (SWB), 241 Substantive democracy, 3, 4, 5, 21, 29, 30, 73, 88, 96, 103, 106, 108, 122, 131, 186, 197, 242, 276, 279, 285, 288 Sumgait, 255 Suny, Ronald G., 40, 76, 78, 97 ―Super-presidentialism,‖ 13, 114, 139, 204 Surenyants, Gevorg V, 80 Sustainable Livelihood for Socially Vulnerable Refugees, Internally Displaced and Local Families, 271 Syunik, 132, 182, 212, 256, 265 Tabibian, Jivan, 97‒98 Tajikistan, 106, 174, 195, 215, 293 Tanzimat, 75 Tatev, 211 Tavush, 256, 259, 262, 265, 267, 272 Tawney, R.H., 38

416

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA

Tbilisi/Tiflis, 14, 58, 68, 70, 72‒74, 78, 268, 269 Telunts, Malik, 155 Ter Sahakyan, Armen, 205 Ter-Petrosyan, Levon, 13, 91‒93, 101, 109‒18, 121, 128, 130, 133, 137, 138‒42, 143, 149, 150, 153, 162, 163, 165, 169, 170, 179, 180, 184, 193, 199, 201, 203‒06, 208, 212, 214, 216, 222, 236, 244, 255, 257‒61, 265, 267, 273, 277, 285‒87 Ter-Petrosyan, Telman, 204 Tesón, Fernando, 31 Tetrak vor kochi nshavak (Pamphlet of Aims), 62, 63 Thatcher, Margaret, 90 Theodosius II, 51 Thompson, Dennis, 137 Tilly, Charles, 7, 58, 59, 109 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 20 Tondrakian movement, 52, 187 Toynbee, Arnold, 3 Transparency International, 126, 207 Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji (Küçük Kaynarca), 67‒68 Treaty of Turkmanchay, 69 Treaty of Westphalia, 25, 26 Tsarukyan, Gagik, 205 Tucker, Robert, 2, 93 Tught Endhanrakan (General Epistle), 54, 57 Turchin, Valentin, 89 Turkey, 138, 199, 210, 231, 247, 285 Turkmenistan, 106, 195, 207, 293 Tverdokhlebov, Andrei, 89 Twentieth Party Congress (Soviet Union), 83 Ukraine, 14, 106, 207, 231, 293 UN Charter, 31, 94‒96, 159, 160, 162, 197, 199, 200, 246, 249, 253, 284

UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, 238 UN Development Program, 186, 199, 202, 209, 211, 230, 243, 259, 261, 265 UN Economic and Social Council, 179, 226, 252 UN General Assembly, 32, 95, 96, 160, 200, 226, 227, 233, 249, 252 UN Commission on Human Rights, 28, 89, 161, 179, 200, 227, 251, 252 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 221, 248, 251, 276, 278 UN Human Rights Committee, 89, 92, 184 UN Human Rights Council, 208 UN Industrial Development Organization, 271‒72 UN Millennium Declaration, 199 UN Relief and Rehabilitation Agency, 248 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 254 UN Trust Fund for Human Security, 271 UN World Summit, Copenhagen (1995), 201 UN World Summit, New York (2005), 352 UNICEF, 235, 237, 240, 252, 272 United Arab Emirates, 231, 232 United Nations, 5, 18, 31, 32, 90, 139, 150, 161, 184, 197, 199, 201, 212, 214, 232, 246, 249, 251, 252, 267, 270, 271, 277, 278, 287 United States, 14, 23, 28, 40, 60, 88, 89, 90, 171, 248 United States Agency for International Development, 122, 132, 133, 213, 258 United States, Declaration of Independence, 26

417

INDEX

United States, Department of State, 142, 145‒46, 154, 171, 175, 182, 183, 266 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 28, 31, 32, 94, 95, 102, 156, 159‒61, 164, 186, 197, 199, 200, 233, 243, 249, 253, 284 Uzbekistan, 106, 174, 195, 207, 231, 232, 293 Vanadzor, 177, 231 Vardanyan, Edward, 175 Vardanyan, Hrant, 205‒06 Vardanyan, Stepan, 176 Vardanyan, Rudik, 175 Vatican, 258 Vattel, Emre de, 26 Vayots Dzor, 212, 256, 262, 272 Veliyev, Imran, 268 Venice Commission, 146 Veziryan, Gohar, 154 Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, 201, 202 Voltaire, 16, 26, 60 Vorogayt parats (Snare of Glory), 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 134, 155 Waldheim, Kurt, 87 Wallerstein, Immanuel, 23 Warsaw Pact, 88

Washington, George, 63 Weber, Max, 6, 7, 13, 33, 74, 282 Welzel, Christian, 7, 8, 9, 21, 22, 107, 176, 288 Wittfogel, Karl, 8 Wollstonecraft, Mary, 60 Women‖s Rights Center (Erevan), 229 World Bank, 125, 208, 213, 215, 217 World Conferences on Human Rights, 200, 201 World Food Program, 252, 259 World Health Organization, 214 World Refugee Survey, 277 World Values Survey, 241 Woshinsky, Oliver, 2, 10, 11, 41, 104, 123 Yeganyan, Gagik, 271 Yepiskoposyan, Levon, 239 Young Turks, 78, 79 Zadoyan, Karen, 268 Zarobyan, Yakov, 86 Zartonk (Awakening), 58, 61, 76 Zatikyan, Stepan, 86, 87 Zekiyan, Boghos Levon, 58 Zhamanak (Time), 129, 154 Zohrapyan, Razmik, 87