The Polish Delegation in the European Parliament: Stability and Cohesion (Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations) 3031282701, 9783031282706

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CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The Polish Delegation in the European Parliament Stability and Cohesion Edited by Krzysztof Zuba

Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations Series Editors

Michal Onderco Erasmus University Rotterdam Rotterdam, The Netherlands Monika Sus Center for International Security Hertie School Wroclaw, Poland

CEEPIR, the foundational book series of the Central and East European International Studies Association (CEEISA), is an interdisciplinary forum for scholarship that straddles traditional and novel approaches, advancing cutting-edge scholarship in global international relations. The series invites proposals in the spirit of epistemological and methodological pluralism and in a range of traditional and innovative formats: research monographs, edited collections, textbooks and Pivots which aim at succinct and timely scholarly interventions. The editorial focus is twofold: (1) The CEEISA book series retains its long-standing objective to sustain and showcase excellent research in and on Central and Eastern Europe. We are interested in innovative scholarly perspectives on contemporary social and political transformations in the region, in how knowledge is produced about such transformations, and in how Central and Eastern Europe interacts with the wider European and global contexts. We are interested in advancing the scholarly discussion between Central and Eastern Europe and the discipline more broadly. In cooperation with CEEISA, we maintain a subseries of works which received distinction of excellence by the Association (e.g. the best doctoral dissertation, the best paper at the CEEISA convention, the best thematic panel). (2) We seek in particular outstanding empirical work which advances conceptual and methodological innovation in International Relations theory, European Studies and International Political Sociology, particularly when related to Central and Eastern Europe. We welcome novel research techniques and approaches that explore diverse sites and engage diverse challenges of contemporary world politics. As a devoted team dedicated to excellence and timeliness in the editorial and peer review process, we rely on the support of Palgrave Macmillan, and liaise with the Journal of International Relations and Development to develop a platform for scholars who can reinvigorate existing research in global international relations. For a correct copy of the proposal form, please contact Isobel Cowper-­Coles, Editor for International Studies, at isobel.cowpercoles@ palgrave.com

Krzysztof Zuba Editor

The Polish Delegation in the European Parliament Stability and Cohesion

Editor Krzysztof Zuba Institute of Political Science and Administration University of Opole Opole, Poland

ISSN 2947-7980     ISSN 2947-7999 (electronic) Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations ISBN 978-3-031-28270-6    ISBN 978-3-031-28271-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28271-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

1 Introduction:  National Delegations Between Europeanization and Nationalization  1 Krzysztof Zuba Part I Determinants of Stability and Cohesion  15 2 Social  and Electoral Determinants 17 Robert Geisler 3 Selection and Election 35 Anna Pacześniak 4 Career Paths 55 Krzysztof Zuba Part II Stability of the Delegation  77 5 Electoral Stability 79 Błażej Choroś

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Contents

6 Membership Stability101 Marta Witkowska and Krzysztof Zuba 7 Group Switching119 Krzysztof Zuba Part III Cohesion of the Delegation 143 8 Ideological-Programmatic Cohesion145 Aleksandra Trzcielińska-Polus 9 Voting Cohesion169 Michał Niebylski 10 Parliamentary  Questions as an Example of Operational Cohesion191 Kamil Weber 11 Impact  of Eurosceptics on the Stability and Cohesion213 Anna Pacześniak and Natasza Styczyńska 12 Conclusion:  A Bridgehead of National Politics at the European Level237 Krzysztof Zuba Index249

Notes on Contributors

Błażej Choroś  is an assistant professor in the Department of European Studies at the University of Opole, Poland, and a member of the Team Europe—external expert group working for the European Commission. His main research areas are European Parliament and political communication. He is a member of a research team working on the project “Determinants of Stability and Cohesion of the Polish Delegation to the European Parliament” funded by the National Science Center, Poland. Choroś is Visiting Professor of European and Global Studies at Kobe College (Japan). His relevant teaching experience includes European integration and political system of the EU. Robert Geisler  holds Habilitation in Sociology. He is Associate Professor of Management and Public Policy at the Institute of Political Science and Administration, University of Opole, Poland. Over the last few years, he has been involved in many research projects regarding entrepreneurship, innovations, organizational culture, and the corporate social responsibility model. Michał Niebylski  is an assistant professor and employee at the Institute of Political Science and Administration, University of Opole, Poland. He works in the Department of European Studies. His academic activity so far has focused on European issues, in particular elections to the European Parliament and the ideological dimension of the behaviour of political parties.

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Anna  Pacześniak is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wrocław, Poland, and a lecturer at the Free University of Brussels (2011–2018), Belgium. Her research interests include the Europeanization of political parties and civil society, political parties in Poland, and electoral defeats. She is the author of over 140 academic articles and chapters on Europeanization of political parties, organization and internal life of Polish parties, European parties, the political system of the European Union, and functioning of women in politics. Natasza Styczyńska  is an assistant professor at the Institute of European Studies, Jagiellonian University (JU), Kraków, Poland. Her academic interests include party politics, nationalism, populism, and Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans. She leads the JU team in Horizon Europe REGROUP “Rebuilding Governance and Resilience out of the Pandemic” research project and is a director of studies of Una Europa Joint BA in European Studies at Jagiellonian University. Aleksandra  Trzcielińska-Polus holds PhD and Habilitation in Humanities in the field of political science. Trzcielińska-Polus is an expert in German affairs. She is an associate professor and head of the Department of International Relations at the Institute of Political Science and Administration, University of Opole, Poland. Trzcielińska-Polus’ main research areas are German-Polish relations in the past and at present, German foreign policy, and migration in the modern world. She is the author of about 200 publications. Kamil  Weber  holds a PhD in Political Science. His academic interests include international relations and European integration. He is the author of about 30 publications. Marta  Witkowska  holds PhD and Habilitation in Humanities in the field of political science. She is an associate professor at the University of Warsaw, Poland. She is the author of over 100 academic articles and chapters on the political system of the European Union; political participation in the European Union; decision-making mechanisms in the EU; European political parties; lobbying in the EU; EU law and the process of its application in the Member States; EU policies and institutions. Witkowska is an European Commission’s expert in Poland and member of Team Europe (since 2009). She is the editor-in-chief of the scientific journal Przegla ̨d Europejski. Her research interests include political parties and civil society, EU policies, and EU law.

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Krzysztof Zuba  is Professor of Political Science, head of the Department of European Studies in the Institute of Political Science and Administration, the University of Opole. His areas of research include: European integration, politics in Poland, and religion and politics. His work has been published in a number of peer reviewed journals such as Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Religion, State and Society, Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, Journal of Political Power, Polish Political Yearbook, Europe-Asia Studies, Polish Sociological Review, German Politics, European Politics and Society, and East European Politics and Societies and Cultures. He is the author and editor of eight books (in Polish).

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 2.2 Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2

Fig. 4.1

Fig. 4.2

Support for the EU among Poles (2004–2021). (Source: the author’s own work based on CBOS data for 1994–2020) The voter turnout in EP elections and support for EU integration. (Source: the author’s own work based on CBOS and official electoral data) The percentage of women and men among Polish MEPs elected in the years 2004–2019 (inaugural sessions of the EP). (Source: The data of the National Electoral Commission) The percentage of re-elections to the PE in the Polish political parties in the years 2009–2019. (Source: The author’s own work based on the data from the National Electoral Commission) The average age of Polish MEPs compared to that for the whole EP. (Source: The author’s own work based on EP data and The youngest MEPs, European Parliamentary Research Service, https://epthinktank.eu/2014/05/09/the_ youngest_meps/ (access: 20.04.2022); European Parliament: Facts and Figures, European Parliament, Briefing, November 2014; Members of the European Parliament, 2019–2024, At a Glance Infographic, European Parliament, 2019) The career paths of members of the Polish delegation based on the duration of holding a seat in the EP (%). (Source: the author’s own work based on official EP data)

24 26 40

49

60 62

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List of Figures

Fig. 4.3

Fig. 4.4 Fig. 5.1 Fig. 5.2 Fig. 5.3 Fig. 6.1

Fig. 7.1 Fig. 7.2

Fig. 7.3

Fig. 8.1

MEPs and their positions held before winning a seat in the EP*: the Polish delegation vis-à-vis the other countries’ delegations* The data for the first eight terms of the EP; the data do not add up to 100% as individual MEPs held several positions. (Source: The author’s own work based on the data of the PE, the Sejm, the National Electoral Commission (and others); Beauvallet-Haddad, Michon, Lepaux, Monicolle (2016, p. 113)) 65 The scale of switching between the EP and governing bodies in Poland. (Source: Author’s own calculation based on the EP and Sejm data) 70 The effective number of parties in Sejm and EP elections. (Source: The author’s own calculations based on official electoral data) 87 The percentage of seats won in Sejm and EP elections by the main political parties. (Source: The author’s own calculations based on official electoral data) 89 Electoral volatility in Sejm and EP elections. (Source: Bértoa (2022), Emanuele et al. (2019) 91 Percentage of Polish MEPs seeking re-election and being re-elected. (Source: The author’s own work based on the data from the National Electoral Commission, https://pkw.gov. pl/wybory-­i-­referenda/wybory-­do-­parlamentu-­europejskiego (accessed: 15.03.2020). Net—the ratio of re-elected MEPs to those seeking re-election; Gross—the ratio of re-elected MEPs to all MEPs of the previous term) 111 A typological diagram of switches 123 Percentage of group switchers (in relation to the total number of MEPs)—the Polish delegation against the background of Central and Eastern Europe and the EU. (The data concerns the first eight parliamentary terms (1978–2019), and for the countries that joined the European Communities/EU at later stages—from their first EP elections to 2019) 124 Percentage of group switchers in the EP: the Polish delegation in comparison with those of the CEE countries and the entire EU (dynamic value). (Source: The authors’ own calculations based on EP data) 125 The ideological-programmatic distance between the parties of the Polish delegation with respect to identity (2001–2019). (Source: The author’s own work based on: (Volkens et al., 2021))150

  List of Figures 

Fig. 8.2

Fig. 8.3

Fig. 8.4

Fig. 10.1

Fig. 10.2

Fig. 10.3

Fig. 10.4

Fig. 10.5

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The ideological-programmatic distance between the parties of the Polish delegation with respect to economy (2001–2019). (Source: The author’s own work based on: (Volkens et al., 2021))153 The ideological-programmatic distance between the parties of the Polish delegation with respect to international affairs (2001–2019). (Source: The author’s own work based on: (Volkens et al., 2021)) 156 The ideological-programmatic cohesion (polarization) of the Polish delegation in the EP during its successive terms. (Dates refer to the years of national elections and the publication of electoral manifestos. The dates of the EP elections to which the analysis refers are provided in brackets. A higher value of the index corresponds to greater polarization within the delegation and, therefore, lower cohesion, and vice versa: the lower the index, the higher the ideological-­programmatic cohesion of the delegation. Source: The author’s own work based on: (Volkens et al., 2021)) 160 Themes of questions submitted by Polish MEPs during the 6th and 8th terms of the EP. (Source: The author’s own calculations based on the EP official data (https://www. europarl.europa.eu/meps))202 Structure of questions submitted in the 6th and 8th EP by PiS MEPs. (Source: The author’s own calculations based on the EP official data (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ meps))204 Structure of questions submitted by PO MEPs during the 6th and 8th terms of the EP. (Source: The author’s own calculations based on the EP official data (https://www. europarl.europa.eu/meps))205 Structure of questions submitted by SLD-UP MEPs during the 6th and 8th terms of the EP. (Source: The author’s own calculations based on the EP official data (https://www. europarl.europa.eu/meps))207 Structure of Polish MEPs’ parliamentary questions compared to that of questions submitted by MEPs representing France, the UK and Germany. (Source: The author’s own calculations based on the EP official data (https://www.europarl.europa. eu/meps))208

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 2.3 Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 6.3 Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 7.3 Table 7.4 Table 7.5 Table 9.1 Table 9.2

Poles’ trust in the EP compared to trust in the Sejm between 2002 and 2018 25 The voter turnout in the EP elections held in the CEE countries in the years 2004–2019 28 PO and PiS voters and their opinions on Poland’s integration with the EU 31 The numbers of committees/groups represented in both the Sejm and the national delegation in the EP (exclusive of independents)83 The electoral volatility index for Sejm and EP elections 93 WTS—the Polish delegation in comparison with the CEE countries and all EU countries: descriptive statistics 105 BTS—the Polish delegation in comparison with the CEE countries and all EU countries: descriptive statistics 107 SO—the Polish delegation in comparison with the CEE countries and all EU countries: descriptive statistics 113 Inter-group switches of Polish MEPs 126 Individual within-term switches of the Polish MEPs 128 Party within-term switches of Polish MEPs 130 Party between-terms switches of Polish MEPs 133 Individual between-terms switches of Polish MEPs 136 The voting cohesion of the Polish national delegation in the EP (2009–2019) 178 The cohesion of votes in the Sejm of the Republic of Poland (2011–2019)179

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List of Tables

Table 10.1 Table 11.1 Table 11.2

Summary of the data on questions submitted by 15 Polish MEPs (broken down by national party) The types of Euroscepticism of the Polish political parties represented in the EP between 2004 and 2019 EP group switches of Polish Eurosceptics and nonEurosceptics in the years 2004–2019

201 218 226

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: National Delegations Between Europeanization and Nationalization Krzysztof Zuba

A National Delegation: What Is It? As a subject matter of academic research, national delegations in the European Parliament (EP) have so far attracted only a trace of interest. This may be considered to be due to their lack of relevance, but a number of more convincing justifications for this can also be indicated. The essence of the problem with the question ‘Do national delegations matter?’ is well illustrated by a phenomenon related to its status. The category of ‘national delegation’ does not have any formal, legal or even organizational character in the EP. One can speak of national delegations (or more precisely: delegations of national parliaments) with reference to the situation up to 1979. At that time, representatives to the Parliamentary Assembly and then the European Parliament were delegated by national parliaments from among their MPs (Kreppel, 2004: 54; Rittberger, 2005: 103–105). The introduction of universal suffrage for EP elections in 1979

K. Zuba (*) Institute of Political Science and Administration, University of Opole, Opole, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 K. Zuba (ed.), The Polish Delegation in the European Parliament, Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28271-3_1

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fundamentally changed this situation. From that point onwards, MEPs became ‘representatives of the peoples of the states brought together in the Community’ and ceased to be delegates of both their parliaments and their states. The Lisbon Treaty (2007) strengthened the representative, supranational nature of the EP, which ‘shall be composed of representatives of the Union’s citizens’. Nevertheless, the category of ‘national delegation’ continued to be used in scholarly contexts to describe all MEPs hailing from a given Member State (Scarrow, 1997; Katz, 1999; Verzichelli & Edinger, 2005; Daniel, 2015), which is probably due to the lack of another more appropriate term. A national party delegation (NPD) is a separate category referring to representatives of one national party within political groups in the EP, often also abbreviated as ‘national delegations’. The status of NPDs has been sanctioned in the internal rules of political groups, while their importance has been confirmed by academic research (Kreppel, 2004; Ripoll Servent, 2018). Thus, despite the fact that national delegations formally do not exist in the EP, their analysis on scientific grounds makes it possible to explain at least some of the phenomena and processes taking place in the EP. Although in the first year of the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community (1952) it had not yet been decided whether its organization was to be based on national or ideological groups, in the following years the creation of transnational institutions was seen as an indicator of the success of European integration, which determined the introduction of the second model (Hix et al., 2014: 22). Therefore, the processes of Europeanization of the Common Assembly and EP embodied in the form of transnational political groups were being consistently supported and, at the same time, the opposing manifestations of nationalization embodied in national delegations were being thwarted. This led to the aforementioned de-institutionalization of the latter. All these measures aimed at eliminating the national legitimacy of MEPs were inherent in the very idea of the EP as a body representing Europeans as a whole. They provided institutional support for the processes of socialization and Europeanization whose objective was to form a supranational political elite, autonomous from the partisan influences of national politics. Successive general elections to the EP seemed to confirm such an evolution. One of the main markers of the growing autonomy of the Euro-elite was the fact that political life in the EP took place mainly within political groups (Westlake, 1994; Edinger & Fiers, 2007).

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Parliamentary assemblies consisting of national delegations are characteristic of strictly international organizations. Meanwhile, already the reports by Pierre-Henri Teitgen of 1954 and Alain Poher of 1955 indicated that the Common Assembly should be shaped in the likeness of parliaments of nation states (De Feo, 2015: 22). This, in turn, necessitated the diminution of the importance of national delegations. The initial adoption of the formula in which the EP is a collection of delegations of national parliaments representing them par excellence was considered a temporary arrangement. At the same time, a number of measures were taken to weaken or even exclude national delegations as the subjects of politics conducted in the EP. Carried out in 1962, the change of the institution’s name from European Parliamentary Assembly to European Parliament did not change the delegative character of this body of the Communities, but was an attempt to disguise it. It was only with the general elections to the EP in 1979 that this character was transformed effectively. The consequence of this approach and subsequent actions was that national delegations were consciously given no formal legal status. Such a status was gained by individual MEPs (due to the adoption of the free mandate formula), parliamentary committees and political groups. Another element of this process was the systematic reduction of dual-­ mandates until they were completely abolished. The existence of this mandate formula went against the general principles of the EP as a representative body and at the same time was a remnant of its delegative character (Herman & Lodge, 1978: 141). The reinforcement of the supranational character of political groups was at the same time a form of dilution of the national character of particular Member States’ delegations. Before 2003, accession of MEPs coming from at least two Member States had been required to set up a political group in the EP (Rules of Procedure 2003). In 2004, this threshold was raised to 1/4 (Rules of Procedure 2004) and in 2009 to 1/5 of the total number of Member States. It should be remembered that the period of these changes saw a significant enlargement of the EU: first with the addition of 10 Central, Eastern and Southern European countries (2004) and then additionally with Bulgaria, Romania (2007) and Croatia (2013). This further ‘denationalized’ political groups in the EP. It is therefore legitimate to argue that the national delegation is a relic of the initial stage of development of the European Parliament, which has been removed as an organizational and formal-legal category, but has

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persisted as a social and political phenomenon. This state of affairs should be attributed to two main conditions that limited the impact of Europeanization, simultaneously maintaining the importance of national factors. Firstly, cultural conditions caused the continuing omnipotence of national identity and the associated lack of a European demos. Secondly, institutional conditions determined the status of EP elections as ‘a set of different national elections rather than as coordinated Europe-wide campaigns’ (Corbett et al., 2007: 29; Farrell & Scully, 2007).

Europeanization Versus Nationalization The post-war process of European unification was marked by two dominant processes: Europeanization and nationalization. For the first decades, the former clearly prevailed, carrying with it the illusion that the process of Europeanization was unidirectional and irreversibly heading towards an ‘ever closer union’. In this context, it is significant that, academically, Europeanization became a key analytical category only in the 1990s (Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003), when tendencies towards nationalization and even symptoms of de-Europeanization were becoming apparent on an unprecedented scale. The adoption of the Maastricht Treaty was followed by an accumulation of phenomena that undermined the paradigm of Europeanization as a process without an alternative. The emergence of Euroscepticism as a socially and politically mass phenomenon provided evidence of the vitality of nationalizing tendencies. However, this did not undermine the overall trends. It was Europeanization that proved to be the best response to the collapse of the Cold War order in Europe. The EU expanded into more countries (1995, 2004, 2007, 2013) and European integration deepened in more political and economic areas (Ladrech, 1999). From the perspective of the entire process of European integration, alternating waves of Europeanization and nationalization have become increasingly visible. The last, and at the same time the most radical, manifestation of the nationalization backlash is related to de-Europeanization processes in CEE states (Hungary, Poland) and the UK’s exit from the EU. Brexit can be seen as the most shocking manifestation of such tendencies, as the British challenged not only the implemented model, scope and pace of European integration, but integration itself (Auer, 2017: 48). The UK is at the same time an example demonstrating the role of a national delegation in the EP as a litmus test of both Europeanization and nationalization. The UK delegation had been at the

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vanguard of the creation of a British Euro-elite since the first general EP elections (Westlake, 1994). The opening of the EP electoral system to smaller groupings (which was a manifestation of its Europeanization) paved the way for the arrival of Eurosceptics, who were steadily increasing their presence within the British delegation and eventually dominated it in the twenty-first century. Poland started on the road to a Common Europe almost at the same time as the European Union was born, and with it a new phase of integration in which the processes of Europeanization and nationalization were becoming increasingly balanced. Its relatively short history as an EU Member State can be seen as an illustration of the processes that have gradually emerged over decades in united Europe. The initial euphoria of the 1990s gave way to ‘business as usual’, while tendencies towards nationalization intensified in the middle of the 2010s (Zuba, 2021). What could be observed in Poland and the other CEE countries was the coupling of the processes of Europeanization and nationalization with the processes of democratization and de-democratization. Although this correlation is neither direct nor yet empirically confirmed, it can be seen in both the structure of the Polish delegation in the EP and the behavioural patterns of its members. At the core of the project constituting the basis of this book was the conviction that national delegations in the EP embody, in an almost ‘laboratory’ manner, the interaction of the two processes under discussion, as both competing and complementary tendencies. The focus on Poland as a case study is primarily driven by the interests of the research team members. At the same time, they are intended as a starting point for an analysis of national delegations of other Member States, comparative studies and generalizing syntheses. The central element to understanding the essence of national delegations in the EP is an answer to the question formulated more than two decades ago by Richard R. Katz (1999: 23) about whether the legitimization of the EP takes place at the European level or the national level. Although the election of MEPs by universal suffrage indicates the first model, the fundamentally national character of EP elections implies the dominance of the other. Formulated only one year after the first EP elections, the thesis of their second-order status (Reif & Schmitt, 1980) was confirmed in subsequent elections (van der Eijk & Franklin, 1996), providing one of the key pieces of evidence for the persistence of national determinants. In light of this and other concepts, EP elections are an echo

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of national elections rather than a bridge between citizens and EU authorities. A key element of this picture is the absence of a European demos. Despite 70 years of integration, the EU is a patchwork of nations as opposed to a community of citizens aware of their identity (Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009). Therefore, unlike elections to national parliaments, elections to the EP do not reflect the collective will of EU citizens, but primarily the particularistic will of its peoples, additionally, with little focus on European issues (Weiler, 1999: 10; Schmidt, 2006: 22; Gehring, 2000: 98). Thus, there are many indications that the Europeanization of the EP is not proceeding as dynamically as originally envisaged. National delegations are not so much a cause as a manifestation of this state of affairs. Through them, values, interests and patterns of behaviour are transferred from the national to the European level. The end of the permissive consensus and the systematic rise of social and partisan Euroscepticism in EU Member States have brought about a new form of nationalization. Paradoxically, European integration gained its rightful position during EP elections thanks to its critics. One can refer to an oxymoron-like paradox: Euroscepticism simultaneously constitutes a manifestation of both Europeanization and nationalization. On the one hand, Eurosceptics are a product of Europeanization, while on the other hand, they advocate and factually circulate national or nationalist content (Harmsen & Spiering, 2004; Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008). For decades, national delegations were considered a relic in the supranational structure that the EP, and through it the EU as a whole, was increasingly becoming. However, their role is not unequivocally negative. Through the selection and election of candidates for MEPs (essentially national in character), they remained a transmission belt through which national policies were conveyed to the European level. However, this was not a problem as long as European integration was not significantly challenged at the level of Member States. The strengthening of nationalization tendencies makes national delegations not only an unwanted channel of transferring them to the European level, but also a safety valve for channelling anti-European attitudes into the framework of parliamentary debates at the European level. The project concerning the Polish national delegation was based on the conviction that, like other national delegations, it embodies the interaction and interpenetration of the two processes of Europeanization and nationalization. We adopted the categories of cohesion and stability as a

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plane of analysis, which allowed us to place the considerations undertaken here within a specific conceptual framework and to move away from a descriptive narrative formula. The literature on the subject does not dispute the fact that the main gate-keepers in relation to the formation of the composition, diversity and identity of every delegation in the EP are national political parties. This analysis refers to the perspective of Europeanization proposed by Robert Ladrech (1999, 2002). He identified five main manifestations of the Europeanization of political parties. All these aspects are directly or indirectly reflected in the particular sections of our book. From the point of view of its objectives, the dimension related to ‘relations beyond the national party system’, taking into account party activity at the transnational level, is the most relevant and useful (Ladrech, 2002: 399). The issue of nationalization as a counter-trend to Europeanization has not received an equally broad and consistent treatment. With regard to trends in the public opinion, this concept has been operationalized by Oskar Niedermayer (1995: 57). It should be emphasized, however, that analyses devoted to the Europeanization of political parties—most often implicitly—provide a conceptual grid and general theoretical resources necessary when analysing nationalization. This is because nationalization is a process opposite to the process of Europeanization. Thus, manifestations of the undoing, negation or questioning of Europeanization and its effects can be equated with nationalization (see: Jurado & Navarrete, 2021).

Cohesion and Stability: A Conceptual Grid Cohesion, which, in the analyses to date, is almost entirely confined to voting in the EP (and usually examined in relation to political groups), has been redefined by us as a degree to which a group (a national delegation) is homogeneous, which depends on both internal and external factors, and manifests itself in behaviours, declarations and political activities. A broadening of this category becomes necessary as it leads to an unwarranted transfer of the conclusions of an analysis of votes to the entirety of phenomena occurring in the EP (Scully et al., 2012: 678). The approach to cohesion represented in this book is derived from the general concept of political cohesion. An element fundamental to the cohesion of any group is identity, being a much more enduring and stronger integrating factor than institutional ties. Even ‘weak subjective identity’ surpasses the relevance of objective group membership in this regard

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(Huddy, 2013: 744). Thus, as long as national identity prevails over European identity, national delegations will remain an important element of the EP political landscape. As already mentioned, research on cohesion in the EP has so far been dominated by studies of voting cohesion. This has led to the narrowing of not only the research area but also the concept of cohesion itself, equated with the homogeneity of MEPs’ votes. In the approach represented in this book, we regard the cohesion of the national delegation as not only the convergence of the behaviours of Polish MEPs revealed in their declarations, decisions, actions and patterns of behaviour. The point of reference for the evaluation of the thus-understood cohesion of the Polish delegation is, on the one hand, other national delegations and, on the other hand, cohesion at the level of Poland’s national politics. Such an approach is determined by the essence of a national delegation, which, unlike a political group in the EP, belongs to two political orders: national and European. Hence, we assume that cohesion may manifest itself both horizontally (cohesion within a delegation; cohesion between delegations) and vertically (cohesion between a delegation and a party system at the national level). The cohesion of a national delegation gains another dimension when it is a direct emanation of a national party system. If we add to this the fact that national party systems are generally polarized as a consequence of democratic competition, the transfer of this polarization to the European level determines the lack of cohesion of delegations at the EP level. At the same time, it demonstrates the cohesion of delegations in relation to their respective national political scenes. This aspect is revealed in almost all the studies presented in this volume: from socio-political divisions, through recruitment patterns, electoral stability, ideological and programmatic identity, to voting cohesion and the influence of Eurosceptic parties. Stability is understood as a political, demographical and compositional variability of a national delegation. Taking this dimension into account is important, as both national delegations and the EP as a whole are subject to dynamic changes over time. An analysis of a particular state of the Polish delegation in the EP is possible by either limiting one’s focus to a specific period (e.g. election, parliamentary term) or referring to synthetic indexes and generalizations. Both of these approaches are represented in this book, but they need to be complemented by an analysis of changes and trends that illustrate how much the Polish delegation has changed in terms of its composition, qualities and character from the first elections of 2004

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to the most recent ones of 2019. Although they represent only a section of the EP’s evolution, these 15 years make it possible to show the very significant differences occurring during the three EP terms under analysis.

The Structure of the Book Taking into account the two dimensions of cohesion and stability as an analytical axis determined the adopted structure of the book. The book has been divided into three parts: (1) determinants of cohesion and stability, (2) manifestations of cohesion and (3) manifestations of stability. It should be emphasized, however, that this division is analytical in nature, as in reality, the two dimensions (cohesion and stability) intermingle. This relationship is not direct, hence the decision to approach them separately. It can be shown that each of the presented aspects of stability can potentially be analysed through the prism of cohesion between the Polish party system and the Polish delegation in the EP. Similarly, each of the analyses devoted to cohesion evolving over time can potentially be diagnosed on the basis of the category of stability. In the individual chapters of the book, their authors have adopted one of the three analytical planes, focusing for the sake of clarity of the argument on the dominant aspects: the determinants of the phenomena, the stability of the Polish delegation or its cohesion. The first part takes into account the aspects that are not directly linked to the categories of stability and cohesion of the Polish delegation. However, the issues analysed here constitute a set of key determinants of both phenomena. This part includes three chapters whose authors analyse the social and electoral determinants of the creation of the Polish national delegation in the EP (the chapter by Robert Geisler), the creation of the composition of the Polish delegation in the party selection process and during elections (Anna Pacześniak) and the career paths of Polish MEPs (Krzysztof Zuba). This part focuses primarily on the national level, clearly showing that this is where the Polish delegation is ‘born’ in personal, ideological and electoral terms. Only the third chapter of this part goes beyond the national setting, as its objective is to define the position of an MEP mandate in the structure of the overall careers of the members of the Polish delegation. The chapter by Robert Geisler aims to demonstrate the social foundations determining the personal composition and political structure of the Polish delegation. Given that EP elections are organized at the national

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level, the analysis of the voting behaviours of Poles constitutes the basis of the analysis in this chapter. The extent to which EP elections are nationalized may be institutionally decreased or increased by means of adopted selection and election systems (Jurado & Navarrete, 2021). These two elements constitute a set of factors that most strongly and directly determine the national character of EP elections in Poland. Anna Pacześniak (chapter ‘Selection and Election’) aims to establish to what extent the selection models adopted in Poland, the shape of the electoral system and the electoral practice determine the stability and cohesion of the Polish delegation. With regard to the assumptions adopted by the author, it is important to determine to what extent these two levels of shaping the composition of the Polish delegation in the EP are influenced, respectively, by national and European politics. In other words, the author poses the question of whether selection and election are more conducive to nationalization or Europeanization of the Polish delegation. Previous research on MEPs’ career paths shows that there are multiple MEP career models, even within a single national delegation. However, dominant patterns can be demonstrated for individual delegations. The purpose of the chapter by Krzysztof Zuba is to determine whether, in the case of the Polish delegation in the EP, it is possible to indicate a specific dominant career model. A positive answer to this research question makes it possible to diagnose which specific model it is: an MEP mandate as an ‘interlude’ in the career of a national politician, a form of political retirement or the main element of an MEP’s political CV (professional model). The second part of the book, devoted to the stability of the Polish delegation, includes three chapters on the following topics: electoral stability (Błażej Choroś), membership stability (Marta Witkowska and Krzysztof Zuba) and group switching (Krzysztof Zuba). An analysis of electoral stability has been carried out in two dimensions: structural stability and stability of inter-party competition. Błażej Choroś thus refers to an approach to cohesion that we have termed vertical. Based on selected indexes of party systems, he undertakes to determine the congruence of Poland’s party system with the structure of the Polish delegation in the EP. However, his main objective remains the determination of changes occurring over time, that is, over the course of the four successive EP elections and the corresponding preceding Sejm elections. The research scheme designed in this way provides a basis for drawing conclusions

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regarding the stability of the Polish delegation in comparison to the Polish party system. Unlike in the case of electoral stability, neither membership stability nor group switching of the Polish delegation has such a direct coupling with the national party system. Therefore, the chapters devoted to these issues refer to secondary relationships, based on similar or identical patterns of behaviour, characteristic of the national party scene and the Polish delegation in the EP. Marta Witkowska and Krzysztof Zuba undertake to determine the stability of the Polish delegation in terms of two categories: changes occurring within the Polish delegation during EP terms and changes occurring between EP terms. In both cases, the collected data have been contrasted with the data for other CEE countries and the EP as a whole. This has allowed for not only an evaluation of these results, but also an identification of the specifics of the Polish delegation, which provides an important clue to conclusions about their national origins. While membership stability shows changes within the Polish delegation, group switching—analysed in the chapter by Krzysztof Zuba—shows changes in the affiliation of MEPs and parties to political groups within the EP. The dynamics of these changes directly determines the nature of relations with the Polish delegation’s immediate external environment in the EP, and by way of a feedback loop also influences relations within the delegation. What becomes important is not only the scale and directions of movement of MEPs between groups in the EP, but also the reasons why MEPs and their parties decide to change their group affiliation. The last part devoted to the cohesion of the Polish delegation consists of four chapters: ‘Ideological-Programmatic Cohesion’ (Aleksandra Trzcielińska-Polus), ‘Voting Cohesion’ (Michał Niebylski), ‘Parliamentary Questions as an Example of Operational Cohesion’ (Kamil Weber) and ‘Impact of Eurosceptics on the Stability and Cohesion’ (Anna Pacześniak and Natasza Styczyńska). In the first of these chapters, the author analyses the ideological and programmatic positions of the political parties forming the Polish delegation and determines the distances among them. This makes it possible to examine cohesion in three dimensions: partisan, ideological-programmatic and temporal (with respect to the four successive EP elections). The chapter by Michał Niebylski focuses on the voting cohesion of the Polish delegation. The author does not question the primacy of political groups as the basic forum for pursuing agreement on voting issues. At the same time, he indicates doubts as to the absolute nature of such a position.

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Simon Hix is of the opinion that it is ‘national party policies that are the strongest predictors of voting behaviour in the EP’ (Hix, 2002: 691). The findings reported in this chapter support this position. Niebylski additionally asks in relation to what voting cohesion within delegations should be determined. If we compare it to the cohesion of political groups in the EP, every delegation, including the Polish one, will turn out to lack cohesion. However, if we compare it to the cohesion of the votes of the same parties represented in the EP and the national parliament, then we find that the cohesion of the Polish delegation is surprisingly high. The concept of operational cohesion has been at the heart of the chapter on parliamentary questions (Kamil Weber). It has been reasonable to assume that in the case of this tool of parliamentary scrutiny, which does not carry as much weight as votes, MEPs would be more inclined to reveal their national preferences. In other words, one could assume that parliamentary questions would reveal a cohesion conditioned not by agreements, but by a sense of common interests and cultural patterns of behaviour. Verification of this assumption is the main purpose of this chapter. Written by Anna Pacześniak and Natasza Styczyńska, the last chapter of this book is devoted to the influence of Eurosceptic political parties on the cohesion and stability of the Polish delegation. This chapter not coincidentally concludes the book. This is because Eurosceptics represent the most visible and articulate force aiming to stop or reverse Europeanization, while at the same time promoting national values. This gives credence to the assumption, verified by the authors, that Eurosceptics are a significant source of incohesion and instability in the Polish delegation.

References Auer, S. (2017). Brexit, Sovereignty and the End of an Ever Closer Union. In W. Outhwaite (Ed.), Brexit. Sociological Responses (pp. 41–56). Anthem Press. Checkel, J. T., & Katzenstein, P. J. (Eds.). (2009). European Identity. Cambridge University Press. Corbett, R., Jacobs, F., & Shackleton, M. (2007). The European Parliament (7th ed.). John Harper. Daniel, W. T. (2015). Career Behaviour and the European Parliament. All Roads Lead to Brussels? Oxford University Press. De Feo, A. (2015). A History of Budgetary Powers and Politics in the EU: The Role of the European Parliament. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EUI.

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Edinger, M., & Fiers, S. (2007). The European Parliament and the Making of a Supranational Elite. Paper for presentation at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshop, Workshop 23 ‘The European Parliament and the Making of a Supranational Elite’, Helsinki, May 7–12. Farrell, D., & Scully, R. (2007). Representing Europe’s Citizens? Electoral Institutions and the Failure of Parliamentary Representation. Oxford University Press. Featherstone, K., & Radaelli, C. M. (Eds.). (2003). The Politics of Europeanization. Oxford University Press. Gehring, M.  W. (2000). Europe’s Second Constitution. Crisis, Courts and Community. Oxford University Press. Harmsen, R., & Spiering, M. (Eds.). (2004). Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration. Rodopi. Herman, V., & Lodge, J. (1978). The European Parliament and the European Community. The Macmillan Press Ltd. Hix, S. (2002). Parliamentary Behavior with Two Principals: Preferences, Parties, and Voting in the European Parliament. American Journal of Political Science, 46(3), 688–698. Hix, S., Noury, A. G., & Roland, G. (2014). Democratic Politics in the European Parliament. Cambridge University Press. Huddy, H. (2013). From Group Identity to Political Cohesion and Commitment. In L. Huddy, D. O. Sears, & J. S. Levy (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (2nd ed., pp. 737–773). Oxford University Press. Jurado, I., & Navarrete, R. M. (2021). The Europeanization of National Elections. The Role of Country Characteristics in Shaping EU Issue Voting. Electoral Studies, 71, 1–10. Katz, R. S. (1999). Representation, the Locus of Democratic Legitimation and the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union. In R. S. Katz & B. Wessels (Eds.), The European Parliament, the National Parliaments, and European Integration (pp. 21–44). Oxford University Press. Kreppel, A. (2004). The European Parliament and Supranational Party System. A Study in Institutional Development. Cambridge University Press. Ladrech, R. (1999). Political Parties and the Problem of Legitimacy in the European Union. In T.  Banchoff & M.  P. Smith (Eds.), Legitimacy and the European Union: The Contested Polity (pp. 93–112). Routledge. Ladrech, R. (2002). The Europeanization and Political Parties. Party Politics, 8(4), 389–403. Niedermayer, O. (1995). Trends and Contrasts. In O. Niedermayer & R. Sinnott (Eds.), Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance (pp. 53–73). Oxford University Press.

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Reif, K., & Schmitt, H. (1980). Nine Second-Order National Elections: A Conceptual Framework or the Analysis of European Election Results. European Journal of Political Research, 8(1), 3–44. Ripoll Servent, A. (2018). The European Parliament. Palgrave Macmillan. Rittberger, B. (2005). Building Europe’s Parliament. Oxford University Press. Scarrow, S. E. (1997). Political Career Paths and the European Parliament. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22(2), 253–263. Schmidt, V. (2006). Democracy in Europe. The EU and national Polities. Oxford University Press. Scully, R., Hix, S., & Farrell, D. M. (2012). National or European Parliamentarians? Evidence from a New Survey of the Members of the European Parliament. Journal of Common Market Studies, 50(4), 670–683. Szczerbiak, A., & Taggart, P. (Eds.). (2008). Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism (Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives) (Vol. 2). Oxford University Press. van der Eijk, C., & Franklin, M. (1996). Choosing Europe? University of Michigan Press. Verzichelli, L. & Edinger, M. (2005). A critical juncture? The 2004 European elections and the making of a supranational elite. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 11(2), 254–274. Weiler, J. H. H. (1999). The Constitution of Europe—Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor? And Other Essays on European Integration. Cambridge University Press. Westlake, M. (1994). Britain’s Emerging Euro-elite? The British in the Directly-­ elected European Parliament, 1979–1992. Aldershot. Zuba, K. (2021). From the Poster Boy of Europeanization to the Sick Man of Europe: Thirty Years (1990–2019) of Poland’s European Policy. European Politics and Society, 22(3), 394–409.

PART I

Determinants of Stability and Cohesion

CHAPTER 2

Social and Electoral Determinants Robert Geisler

Introduction Held since 1979, general elections to the European Parliament (EP) have been a subject of research interest for political scientists as well as sociologists. Voter turnout, the political orientation of candidates, electoral campaigns, the behaviour of the electorate and the relation of EP elections to elections at the national level are topics frequently addressed by various researchers (Berezin & Diez-Medrano, 2008; Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007; Gabel & Anderson, 2002; Birch & Lodge 2014; Niedermayer & Sinnot, 1998; Rittberger, 2005). This chapter will focus on the area of research related to the social (and simultaneously cultural) and electoral determinants of EP elections in Poland. This means that the phenomenon of these elections will be analysed against the background of broader socio-economic and cultural processes taking place in Poland during the first two decades of the twenty-first century. It is assumed that these processes are not events in their own right, but constitute integral elements of a sequence of political events (similarly to other categories of elections),

R. Geisler (*) University of Opole, Opole, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 K. Zuba (ed.), The Polish Delegation in the European Parliament, Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28271-3_2

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socio-economic events (such as the reactions of citizens to various economic or social phenomena) and, finally, cultural events (e.g. declared or fostered values of a particular society). The theoretical assumptions of the chapter refer to two disciplines: political science, more specifically European studies and political sociology. In the first area, reference is made to the theoretical framework of EP elections. Since 1980, the approach proposed by Reif and Schmitt (1980) and explaining primarily voter turnout, but also the whole mechanism of EP elections as second-order elections compared to national parliamentary or presidential elections, has been dominant. This nature of EP elections manifests itself, among other things, in a lower turnout, different motives of voters, increased activity of smaller political parties or, finally, more frequent defeats of ruling parties (Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Binzer Hobolt & Wittrock, 2011). The second-order character of this type of elections results, among other things, from the deficit of democracy at the level of the European Union (EU), which is highlighted by political scientists as one of the important factors in the integration of the Union itself. This aspect indicates the lack of a well-developed demos, that is, a European society with a strong sense of common identity, and voters’ scepticism of the impact of their votes on politics at the EU level. The EP’s 40 years of existence have not translated into EU citizens’ awareness of its real role and powers within the Union, or indeed of its ability to design individual policies. This is undoubtedly part of the wider phenomenon of the lack of legitimization of the EU order (Gabel & Anderson, 2002; Schmitter, 2000; Rittberger, 2005). In the context of the sociology of politics, public opinion, citizens’ values and the fragmentation of society are important factors at the centre of analyses. Public opinion is most often defined as the view of the majority of people on a particular topic. In other words, it is a set of a given community’s dominant attitudes towards and beliefs about public issues important to that community at a particular time (Philips Davison, 1968). Values are abstract categories important to people or entire communities that are formed over time and result from collectively significant historical events during which a ‘collective character’ or collective identity is created (Barker, 2003). From the point of view of this chapter, the important issue is the consistency of opinions and values, which means that citizens of a certain country express relatively the same or similar opinions on selected political, economic or social issues over a longer period of time. In other words,

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citizens are characterized by the constancy of social opinions as well as perceived values/beliefs, despite the various external factors that influence such opinions and beliefs. Secondly, consistency means that citizens have a fixed set of views that may be different from those of citizens of another country, which then determines their differentia speciffica. This is somewhat natural, since values as abstract categories constituting parts of culture are shaped over a longer period of time and, as a result, are more permanent. The permanence of values influences institutions established in a particular society (Keating et  al., 2003). Social fragmentation is an issue belonging to analyses of social structure or social stratification (Giddens, 1998; Bodnár, 2001). Since the beginning of sociology, that is, the nineteenth century, it has been dominated by the division into social classes and social strata. The end of the twentieth century brought the concept of the ‘death of social classes’, which resulted, among other things, from the homogenization of societies as a result of their massification, the impact of mass and popular culture, and the reduction of social differentiation in the economic (equalization of income) or cultural (unification of cultural preferences) dimensions. The concept of social fragmentation shows the possibility of analysing a society through the prism of its different fragments, that is, groups living in different social and physical environments of the same community or society. This chapter consists of four parts. The first part presents the methodological aspects of the author’s own research determining the results of the research presented in this chapter. The second part comprises analyses of the support for EU membership and EU institutions in the period after Poland’s accession to the European Union in 2004. The third part discusses the electoral dimension of EP elections in the period 2004–2019, and the last part constitutes an analysis of the EP elections held in 2019, regarded as an exceptional time compared to previous years.

Data and Method The analysis of the social basis of citizens’ activity during EP elections was primarily based on qualitative and quantitative data on voter turnout, the results of opinion polls, the diversity of values among citizens and the social fragmentation of Poles. The research used a triangulation of quantitative and qualitative methods. With regard to the quantitative research methods, the existing data were used, comprising the results of the European Parliament elections

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and the results of the national, presidential and local government elections held in the years 2004–2019. In addition, the results of surveys conducted by the Centre for Public Opinion Research (CBOS) in the years 2004–2019 and by the European Social Survey (ESS) in the years 2006–20181 were used. Based on the collected and aggregated survey results, statistical analyses were carried out using the Pearson coefficient and an analysis of the medium-term rate of change using chained indices. The Pearson coefficient is a coefficient indicating the level of linear dependence between random variables. The analysis of the medium-term rate of change using chain indices was chosen to analyse the dynamics of change in Poles’ opinions on and attitudes towards the EP compared to those relating to their national parliament. The medium-term rate of change belongs to the dynamics index and indicates how values change on average from one period to another. An analysis of the results of surveys conducted by the EES in 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014 and 2018 shows the possibility of examining changes in the particular values occurring in the respective years.2 All analyses were carried out using the desk research method, which consists in analysing existing sources and publicly available data, their processing and formulating conclusions (Babbie, 2001). In the analysis of the case of Poland, the research method of comparing the ‘new members’ to the countries of the so-called ‘old Union’ was rejected, although some comparative results, such as voter turnout, will appear in this chapter.

1  ESS is a broad research project based on the methodology of survey research carried out in most European countries since 1981, using a standardized survey questionnaire containing a series of questions relating to citizens’ key attitudes, opinions and values (EES, Data Portal). 2  Using chain indices, the rate of change can be calculated by dividing the value of a given period by the value of the previous period and then, to calculate the rate of change, by multiplying all the values and obtaining the fifth root of the product. In the next step, one is subtracted from the obtained result and the final result of the difference should be given in the form of a percentage. If the result is close to 0, it means that the individual values in the periods under examination differed little from each other, which allows for the conclusion the a given index is relatively consistent. Negative values show us the medium-term rate of decline, that is, how much the values fall on average over the period studied.

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Support for EU Membership When analysing the socio-cultural issues of the EP elections, it is worth pointing out several issues. Firstly, it should be borne in mind that for many years the EU (Europe) had appeared in the consciousness of Poles as a dream that eventually came true in 2004. For the generation of people who actively participated in the political system transformation in the 1990s, Poland’s accession to the EU was a natural consequence of the system change processes, and in practical or pragmatic terms, it represented the use of the historical opportunity for change that had occurred in 1989. At this point, it is worth quoting the results of surveys conducted by the CBOS in the years 1992–2019, which clearly indicate a high level of acceptance for the idea of Poland’s being a member of the EU. Since May 2004, the percentage of supporters of European integration has never been lower than 60% to 65%. Such positive opinions were formulated and consolidated due to the emergence of a number of new opportunities accompanying the country’s accession to the EU, such as: a) migration to EU countries, b) free movement of goods and services, c) inflow of EU funds (including, above all, funds from the European Social Fund and the European Regional Development Fund). The possibility of migration to particular EU countries (not all of them in 2004 due to restrictions imposed by some countries on their labour markets) resulted in a massive outflow of particularly young people to the UK and Ireland. In 2007, the number of Poles temporarily residing abroad was 2.27 million. This migration mostly resulted in permanent settlement, with continued financial support provided by emigrants to their families remaining in Poland (Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski, 2008). The free flow of goods and services caused an increase in the number of foreign capital investment projects in Poland and the intensification of activity by Polish enterprises on international markets. Between 2004 and 2007, there was a second wave of these types of investments (the first had taken place between 1995 and 2000) to reach a record level of USD 828 billion in 2007 (Czerniak & Baluth, 2010). Moreover, as Wojciechowski and Lubacha-Sember (2014) point out, between 2000 and 2012, the cumulative value of Polish investments increased 40-fold to EUR 44 billion, 78% of which was located in EU countries. As a result of such processes, many enterprises focused on cooperation with businesses coming from various EU countries, whether as exporters or subcontractors. Measurable advantages in the form of profits and jobs in foreign companies establishing

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their branches in Poland must have influenced the increase in the number of Poles’ positive opinions about European integration. Since 2007, Poland has also become an active beneficiary of European funds, which ensured an expansion of Poland’s infrastructure and significant assistance for businesses, local government institutions, as well as the central government administration. These funds provided an opportunity to reduce the gap between Poland and the developed countries of the EU, which was noticed by ordinary citizens. Just basic data show that in the years 2007–2013, support was provided to 30,703 enterprises and 247 business environment institutions. Thanks to this, approximately 400,000 new jobs were created, 1400 academic organizations and 1900 laboratories received financing, 3600 technologies were implemented, 12,000  km of motorways were built, 1500  km of railway lines were modernized, nearly 3000 units of municipal transport rolling stock were purchased, 500 waste water treatment plants were built, 7000 km of water supply systems were constructed, and all this for a total of EUR 67 billion from the EU budget, EUR 11 billion from national public funds and approximately EUR 6 billion from private entities. As a result, the quality of life increased, the labour market developed and Europeanness became an element of everyday life. For Europeans, such issues became much more important than their civic rights, including participation in elections. As a result of the processes mentioned above, a certain permanence of Poles’ attitudes towards the EU was established over the course of almost 20 years. On the one hand, significant enthusiasm, which emerged with the accession to the EU in 2004, continues to be maintained in consequence of citizen-voters being constantly aware of changes taking place in their immediate environment. Furthermore, many Poles, from children in schools to adults using libraries, concert halls, museums, infrastructure such as roads, public buildings, universities, motorways or local roads, became beneficiaries of European funds. This was also the experience of the social group most distrustful of Poland’s membership in the EU, that is, farmers, who started to receive direct agricultural subsidies. As a result of the changes brought about by EU funding, the European logo started to appear everywhere, which undoubtedly increased people’s awareness of the use of European funds and, above all, the Union’s enormous role in Poland’s civilizational leap into the twenty-first century. As much as 87% of Poles surveyed by Eurobarometer in 2018 were of the opinion that Poland benefited from EU membership. The arguments in favour of EU membership that were selected the most frequently included its

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contribution to the country’s economic growth (46%), employment opportunities throughout the EU (42%) and improvement in the standard of living of Polish citizens (36%). Already the first EP elections of 2004 revealed a low level of interest in the matters of European politics. As Aleks Szczerbak pointed out, at that time there was a lack of a social campaign informing people about the role of elections, European democracy, the mechanisms of European politics or the European institutions in general. Moreover, European issues were not always addressed in the election campaign, during which almost all election committees focused primarily on national issues. The only factor common to almost all candidates and different committees was the emphasis on the European, or international, character of the candidates, that is, their educational background, knowledge of foreign languages and international experience. Interest in European matters is linked to the image of and trust in the EP. Eurobarometer surveys from 2018 showed that 42% of Poles trusted the EP, the same number of respondents declared a neutral attitude towards the institution, and only 13% of them expressed negative opinions about it. This assessment was better than the average for all member states, which was 32% of positive opinions, 42% of neutral ones and 21% of negative ones. There are more positive opinions of EU institutions in Poland than in other member states, which corresponds with the aforementioned support for the EU. As the ESS shows, in 2006, only 5% of respondents described their confidence in the EP by means of 10 points on an 11-point scale (which indicated a high level of confidence). In this respect, the particularly visible element is the discrepancy between the aforementioned everyday life and experience of Europeanness and the attitude towards this European institution. The surveyed level of trust in the EP took the form of a normal distribution, with slight deviations in 2014, when the percentage of negative ratings was higher and the percentage of positive ratings was lower than in other years. It was an assessment of the work of the EP in the years 2010–2014. It can be explained by the intensified activity of the Law and Justice party (PiS), a principally Eurosceptic grouping, after the so-called Smolensk air disaster, and the increasing criticism of the then ruling Civic Platform party (PO), perceived as a pro-European grouping. In the scope of the analysis, the Pearson correlation coefficient was applied to trust in the EP as well as the national parliament. The value of the coefficient was 0.607607, which indicates a strong correlation. In other words, the respondents declaring trust in the national parliament

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were simultaneously characterized by trust in the EP.  Overall, the two forms of trust in legislative institutions are convergent, which is more indicative of the attitudes of people more knowledgeable about state and supra-state political institutions, as well as citizenship issues. Interesting data are provided by the calculation of the correlation coefficient for supporters of European integration and positive ratings for the EP and vice versa, that is, for opponents of integration and weak or no trust in European institutions.3 In the former case, the Pearson coefficient equalled −0.38, which shows a weak negative correlation, and in the latter case it was −0.04, indicating practically no correlation. There is no reason to conclude that the number of negative opinions of the EP increases in parallel with the number of opponents of integration. Also, acceptance of the EP’s activities decreases slightly as the number of supporters of integration increases. It is worth pointing out the use of another index, that is, the medium-­ term rate of change, which shows how values change on average from period to period. Analysing the results of the European Values Survey conducted in the years 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014 and 2018, it can be seen that trust in the national parliament was characterized by a high rate of change in the case of positive assessments in each period, while trust in the 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Supporters

Opponents

Undecided

Fig. 2.1  Support for the EU among Poles (2004–2021). (Source: the author’s own work based on CBOS data for 1994–2020) 3  The data in Figure  2.1 concerning support for the EU among Poles and the data in Table 2.1 concerning trust in the EP.

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Table 2.1  Poles’ trust in the EP compared to trust in the Sejm between 2002 and 2018 Scale 2002

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

2006

2010

2014

2018

Medium-term rate of change ‘Trust in EP and the national parliament’

EP

Sejm EP

Sejm EP

EP

Sejm Sejm

EP

Sejm

EP

Sejm

7.1 4.1 6.3 8.5 11.7 28.3 11.2 10.3 7.4 3.2 2

11.5 8.8 13.6 17.5 13.5 20.4 5.8 4.8 3.1 0.3 0.8

22.1 12.3 16.8 15.7 10.1 15 3 2.3 1.5 0.5 0.8

8.5 3.9 7.2 9.6 11.6 24.2 11.5 11.2 8.4 2.6 1.1

14.6 6.5 10.7 12.5 10.9 21.2 8.7 7.6 4.5 1.4 1.4

14.6 8.6 12.4 10.9 11.3 21.4 7 6.6 4.6 1.2 1.2

20.9 13.8 15.5 14.4 8.7 15.3 4.7 3.2 2.3 0.4 0.8

4.6 −1.2 3.4 3.1 −0.2 −3.8 0.7 2.1 3.2 −5.1 −13.9

6.1 −7.3 −5.8 −8.1 −5.2 1 10.7 12.2 9.8 47 15

6.5 3.3 6.8 12 11.5 24.5 12.4 10.5 7.5 3.1 2.1

6.6 5.6 7.2 9.4 12.2 22.3 12.3 10.1 10.1 2.6 1.4

11.6 10.3 15.4 16.3 12.1 17.4 6.6 5.2 2.8 1.7 0.5

Source: ESS 2002–2018 /1 indicates no trust at all and 11 indicates total trust/

EP remained unchanged or changed very slightly in most assessments. In other words, Poles are characterized in this respect by the relative constancy of assessments of and opinions on the role of the EP. The analysis of the temporal dynamics in 2014 shows an increase in the proportion of negative opinions of Poles on the EP, as well as greater criticism of the EU itself among Eurosceptic parties. It was during the period of the campaign before the 2015 elections to the Sejm and the Senate that Eurosceptic arguments appeared in the political manifestos of the PiS and KORWIN parties. The Eurosceptic parties began to intensify their negative rhetoric, and the PiS, as the ruling and officially pro-European party, moved towards Eurosceptic positions in public discourse, which was clearly reflected in the statements of its leaders. Although the PiS won the parliamentary elections in 2015 and 2019, the percentage of Poles supporting EU membership remained high, which is undoubtedly a hard-­to-­ explain paradox of Polish society. Such a situation can be explained by the fact that Poles remain convinced of the benefits of EU membership at the

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100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

EP Elections

2012

2014

2016

2018

2020

Supporters of integratio

Fig. 2.2  The voter turnout in EP elections and support for EU integration. (Source: the author’s own work based on CBOS and official electoral data)

micro level, that is, at the level of everyday life (such as working abroad, family, tourism). This is irrespective of the intensification of the Eurosceptic discourse of Eurosceptic parties. Such discourse concerns the macro-­ structural perspective and concerns such issues as alleged corruption in European institutions or the dominant role of Germany in the EU and its negative role in policy-making. Looking for interpretations among the social and cultural determinants of EP elections, one should pay particular attention to several phenomena. Firstly, although the voter turnout in EP elections was on an upward trend, as shown in Fig. 2.2, there was also an increase in positive views of European integration in subsequent years. In a public opinion survey conducted by the CBOS in 2020, the knowledge of the European Parliament, the European Commission and the European Court of Justice was declared, respectively, by 30% (up from 23% in 2003), 27% (also up from 23% in 2003) and 26% of respondents. In contrast, little knowledge of the European Parliament, the European Commission and the European Court of Justice was declared, respectively, by 63%, 66% (both up from 54% to 55%) and 64% of respondents. These results show that people’s awareness of European institutions is rather superficial and concerns only the name or existence of a given institution rather than a particular scope of its activity or responsibility. The

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knowledge of EU institutions depends primarily on the degree of interest in politics. The more respondents follow political events, the greater knowledge of these institutions they declare. Education is another criterion that differentiates the level of knowledge of EU institutions. The higher the level of education, the greater the knowledge of these institutions. In 2020, the EP received the rating of ‘good’ from 61% of respondents, compared to 57% in 2003, and the rating of ‘bad’ from 19% of respondents, compared to 7% almost 20 years earlier. The rating depended primarily on the political orientation of respondents. Those declaring leftist or centrist political views (85%), that is, the supporters of the Left, Civic Coalition and Polish People’s Party, rate the EP as well as other EU institutions (the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union) the highest. The supporters of the PiS and the Confederation are characterized by divided views (CBOS, 2020). Summing up the above analyses, one can state that since Poland’s accession to the European Union, Poles have relatively positively assessed the institution of the EU itself and accepted the benefits resulting from the accession. This support corresponds to the superficial knowledge of the EU itself and its institutions. The majority of Poles admit having little knowledge of the functioning of EU structures. A significant area of knowledge is correlated with interest in politics. Social fragmentation shows that only in areas where the degree of interest in politics is higher does the level of knowledge of the EU itself as well as the EP increase.

EP Elections Held in Poland in the Years 2004–2019 The EP elections under analysis took place in Poland between 2004 and 2019. Held every five years, the first election was organized on 13 June 2004, a few weeks after Poland had been formally admitted to the EU on 1 May 2004. The 2004 EP elections were the first conducted in the enlarged EU on an unprecedented scale, with 785 MEPs elected in 25 countries. The previous election in 1999 was held in 15 countries, where 626 MEPs were elected. In the 2004 elections, 343,657,800 citizens of the Member States were eligible to vote. However, the voter turnout in the first European elections in Poland was 20.87%, one of the lowest among the member states. In the neighbouring CEE countries, the

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turnout was much higher, with 38% in Hungary and 28% in the Czech Republic, but lower in Slovakia (close to 17%). It is worth attempting to formulate some conclusions concerning electoral conditions. Firstly, the 2004 EP elections turned out to be an event of little interest to Poles. A little over a month after the grand celebration of Poland’s accession to the EU and despite the positive attitude towards the EU expressed in public opinion polls (in May 2004, acceptance for the EU was recorded at the level of 71% of polled respondents), Poland turned out to be a country with one of the lowest rates of voter turnout (Table 2.2) and thus the legitimization of its national delegation. The subsequent elections show a similar level of turnout, which only confirms the correctness of the then-prevailing thesis of the second-order status of EP elections, despite the fact that in other CEE countries the result was much higher. Despite the general acceptance of Poland’s integration with the EU, there was a lack of understanding of the mechanisms of European politics and a lack of knowledge of this institution. The voter turnout of approximately 20-something per cent definitely weakens the strength of the legitimization of the European Union itself among Poles as well as the legitimization of Poland’s national delegation to the EU. The turnout in the first three elections shows a rather weak mandate for the Polish delegation. Its members become representatives of only a few million committed citizens. In view of the above, the question can be raised about other types of factors determining the low participation of Polish citizens in the subsequent EP held in the years 2009 and 2014, and the relatively high turnout in the 2019 elections. The subsequent elections of 2009 and 2014 reveal similar attitudes, that is, the low turnout of 24% and 23%, respectively. On the one hand, its explanation may be the thesis that EP elections are of lesser Table 2.2  The voter turnout in the EP elections held in the CEE countries in the years 2004–2019

Poland Czech Republic Slovakia Hungary Median for CEE

2004

2009

2014

2019

20.87 28.3 16.97 38.5 28.02

24.53 28.22 19.64 36.31 27.94

23.83 18.2 13.05 28.97 28.97

45.68 28.72 22.74 43.36 33.53

Source: https://europarl.europa.eu‘election-­results-­2019

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importance than presidential or parliamentary elections. This may be confirmed by the considerable difference between the numbers of voters participating in the aforementioned national elections and EP elections. Approximately 50% of those eligible to vote participate in presidential elections, while this ratio for parliamentary elections ranges from around 40% in 2005 to 61% in 2019. Even in local government elections (which are also regarded as of secondary importance), the turnout was higher, ranging from 45% in 2006 to 54% in 2018. The number of voters participating in the second round of local government elections is usually 8% lower than in the first round. The results of elections to national institutions show a relatively higher level of legitimization than in the case of EP elections. In presidential elections held from 2005 to 2020, the turnout was 47% to 64% in the first round and 50% to 68% in the second round. The results of EP elections were characterized by a similar, although slightly lower, turnout (40%–61%). In local government elections, the turnout was 35% to 64%. Against this background, one can clearly formulate the thesis that presidential and national parliamentary elections are characterized by the highest degree of interest among Poles. Big political issues and the presence of prominent political personalities determine electoral activity. Local government elections do not enjoy such popularity, although they have a significant impact on the daily lives of citizens. Despite citizens’ frequent contacts with local government units and offices, they are perceived as ‘relatively foreign’. Consequently, local government elections do not attract as much interest as elections held at the national level. The lack of behavioural patterns also occurs in EP elections, which results, among other things, from the rather limited knowledge of, and trust in, the EU itself. EP elections show with increased force that European politics is defined as the activity of politicians distant from the country and the EU as a bureaucratic institution. In Poland, successive elections reveal a further lack of a sense of European democracy, a failure on the part of European elites to build an EU demos, and voters themselves treat elections as of secondary importance, without any direct impact on their situation. It can be hypothesized that there was a conviction among Poles regarding the positive assessment of European integration, which determined the acceptance of the Union as a supra-national organization, and the conviction that, regardless of the results of EP elections, Poland would receive aid funds due to it, which would be spent in accordance with EU programmes and contribute to improving the quality of life as a result. In other words, the benefits of membership would be independent of who sits in the EP and what support they enjoy.

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The Exceptional Year 2019 In 2019, political scientists and sociologists had to deal with the following question: Why was there an exception in the elections of this year where voter turnout in Poland was significantly higher despite there being no change in the definition of trust in the EP or other indices such as increased interest in European politics, increased knowledge of European institutions or belief in the impact of the European Parliament’s decisions on everyday life of Poles? The turnout in the latest EP elections was 45%, which gave greater legitimization (compared to previous elections) to the Polish delegation. Firstly, the EP elections took place in the period of the so-called tribal struggle, as Zbigniew Zagała (2021) referred to the phenomenon of the social and political conflict ongoing in Poland between two factions of society, that is, the electorates of the PiS and the PO/KO, since 2010. According to the author of Narracja o polityce, the fight between the two social groups referred to as ‘tribes’ broke out in the period 2004–2005, after Poland’s accession to the EU and the beginning of the breakdown of cooperation between the PO and PiS. The division of society concerns many aspects of life, such as the attitude towards the EU, but also other criteria, such as the sovereignty of the state in the twenty-first century, the relationship between the state and the Catholic Church, abortion, or the attitude towards tradition. After the so-called Smolensk air disaster, the division was becoming increasingly antagonistic, dividing Poland and Poles into so-called Poland of liberalism and Poland of solidarity, which continues to be the crucial division in the political discourse. From the point of view of the theses of this chapter, the important fact is that, despite the dominant role of criticism of the EU in the political platform of the PiS in 2005 and subsequently in 2015, as well as the negation of the foundations of the European values in Poland, Poles’ overall assessment of their country’s integration, as reflected in public opinion surveys conducted by the CBOS, did not change much. Nevertheless, the victory of the PiS in the 2015 parliamentary elections and its representative in the presidential elections, as well as the polarization of public opinion on the two key programmes/ideologies/worldviews contributed to the mobilization of both electorates. It is worth mentioning that in 2019, Poland held both EP elections (on 26 May) and national parliamentary elections (on 13 October). Thus, the EP elections were used as a means of intensifying the activity of the electorates centred around different values and different interpretations of the social world,

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Table 2.3  PO and PiS voters and their opinions on Poland’s integration with the EU Pairs of opposing statements

Acceptance of statements in the electorates (%)

Poland should strive for the closest possible integration within the European Union Poland should strive to remain as independent as possible within the European Union

PO PiS PO PiS

2007

2009

2011

51 42 29 36

61 30 18 48

57 33 24 47

2016 2019 66 27 17 49

72 26 9 50

Source: Zagała (2021: 80)

including the world of values. Therefore, the mobilization of the electorates resulted in a higher voter turnout than it ever had before. Based on Zagała (2021) and CBOS surveys from recent years, the supporters of the PiS and the PO are characterized by different attitudes towards, and opinions on, the EU, as well as what is considered to be European values. In 2019, every other member of the PiS electorate indicated Poland’s independence from the EU as a characteristic feature of the state; in the case of the PO, this opinion was shared by 10% of its electorate. Conversely, 72% of PO voters vis-à-vis 25% of PiS voters emphasized the necessity of Poland’s strong integration with the EU. In the case of both indexes, there is a clear upward trend, that is, both electorates are becoming polarized and the percentages of people declaring opposite opinions on the role of the EU and the Polish state in the EU are growing (Table 2.3). The CBOS survey results shown above indicate the persistence and consistency of values according to the criterion of social fragmentation, that is, the division of society into (1) two tribes or (2) two electorates, that is, communities differing with respect to age, education, place of residence (rural vs. urban) or region (Grabowska, Pankowski, Badora, Zagała, 2021). As a result of the aforementioned processes, there was record turnout of Polish voters in the 2019 EP elections.

Conclusions Elections to the EP held in Poland between 2004 and 2019 can be described as a political event of clearly secondary importance. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that the increase in voter turnout in 2019 was

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not fostered by any special European democracy-building programmes aimed at increasing the legitimization of MEPs or improving the sense of European democracy, which may only be an exception in the electoral determinants of the legitimization of the Polish delegation to the EP. It resulted only from the dynamics of current political and social events in Poland, particularly the division of Polish society, and the coincidence of national and European parliamentary elections in the same year. The significant increase in voter turnout was the result of the ongoing political struggle between the two polarized political groups. The axis of the division between them was determined by different definitions of the European Union itself, European integration, or the relations between the EU and its member states. However, there is no doubt that the level of support for the EU itself remains at the same, relatively high, level and has not changed for years. Among the social and cultural determinants of all elections, one should mention the significant benefits that Poles have gained and continue to gain on a daily basis in the form of opportunities to migrate to other EU countries, to cooperate with European business enterprises or to enjoy a higher quality of life thanks to EU funds received in the years 2007–2013 and 2014–2020. All this took place independent of the results of EP elections, and the lack of knowledge of European institutions or the lack of belief in translating votes cast in elections into decisions made by the EP did not interfere with everyday life of Poles within the European structures. The next EP elections to be held in 2024 will provide a good opportunity for further comparative research, and current national politics will certainly constitute a useful point of reference for further assessments.

References Babbie, E. (2001). The Practice of Social Science. Wadsworth/Thompson Learning. Barker, C. (2003). Cultural Studies. Theory and Practice. SAGE Publications. Berezin, M., & Diez-Medrano, J. (2008). Distance Matters: Place, Political Legitimacy and Popular Support for European Integration. Comparative European Politics, 6(2), 1–32. Binzer Hobolt, S., & Wittrock, J. (2011). The Second-Order Election Model Revisited: An Experimental Test of Vote Choices in European Parliament Elections. Electoral Studies, 30(1), 29–40. Birch S., & Lodge G. (2015). Voter Engagement, Electoral Inequality and First Time Compulsory Voting. “Political Quarterly”, 86(3), pp 385–392.

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Bodnár, J. (2001). On, Urban and Social. Critical. Perspectives on Urban Redevelopment, 6, 173–193. CBOS. (2020). Postrzeganie Unii Europejskiej i jej instytucji. Komunikat z badań. No. 32/2020. Czerniak, A., & Baluth, J. (2010). Co przyniosły inwestycje zagraniczne. Wpływ na gospodarkę Polski w ostatnim ćwierćwieczu. Polityka Insight. Eichenberg, R.  C., & Dalton, R.  J. (2007). Post-Maastricht Blues: The Transformation of Citizens Support for European Integration. Acta Politica, 42(2-3), 128–152. Gabel, M. J., & Anderson, C. J. (2002). The Structure of Citizen Attitudes and the European Political Space. Comparative Political Studies, 35(8), 893–913. Giddens, A. (1998). Socjologia. Wydawnictwo Zysk i S-ka. Grabowska-Lusińska, I., & Okólski, M. (2008). Migracje z Polski po 1 maja 2004 roku: jej intensywnos ́ć i kierunki geograficzne oraz alokacja migrantów na rynkach pracy krajów Unii Europejskiej. Seria Prace Migracyjne no. 33/91. Centrum Badań nad Migracjami. Keating, M., Loughlin, J., & Deschouwer, K. (2003). Culture, Institutions and Economic Development. A Study of Eight Europeans Regions. Edward Elgar. McLaren, L. (2006). Identity, Interest and Attitudes to European Integration. Palgrave Macmillan. Moro, G. (2012). Citizens in Europe. Civic Activism and the Community Democratic Experiment. Springer. Niedermayer, O., & Sinnot, R. (Eds.). (1998). Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance. Oxford University Press. Philips Davison, W. (1968). Public Opinion. Introduction. In D. L. Sills (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (Vol. 13). The Macmillan Company and the Free Press. Reif, K., & Schmitt, H. (1980). Nine Second-Order National Elections—A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Elections Results. European Journal of Political Research, 8(1), 3–44. Rittberger, B. (2005). Building Europe’s Parliament. Oxford University Press. Schmitter, P. (2000). How to Democratize the European Union ... And Why Bother. Rowman & Littlefield. Wojciechowski, L., & Lubacha-Sember, J. (2014). Uwarunkowania przepływu polskich bezpośrednich inwestycji zagranicznych do krajów Unii Europejskiej: model grawitacyjny z wykorzystaniem danych panelowych. Ekonomia Międzynarodowa, 7, 136–149. Zagała, Z. (2021). Narracje o polityce w podzielonym społeczeństwie—na przykładzie wyborców Platformy Obywatelskiej i Prawa i Sprawiedliwosci. ́ Uniwersytet Śla ̨ski.

CHAPTER 3

Selection and Election Anna Paczes'niak

Introduction The process of selecting candidates for Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) has an indirect impact on the personal and political stability and cohesion of each national delegation in the European Parliament (the EP). In contrast, this stability and cohesion are impacted directly by the results of elections to the EP. In all Member States of the European Union (the EU), winning a party nomination is a necessary condition to run for a seat on the EP (Norris & Lovenduski, 1995; Norris, 1997, 1999; Pruysers et  al., 2017). Although there is no uniform EU electoral system, a common feature of all national EP electoral systems is their proportionality (Pacześniak, 2017: 23). This feature strengthens the position of national political parties as gatekeepers controlling the paths leading to Brussels and Strasbourg. This is because with a proportional

The text presents the results of research funded under National Science Centre grant no. 2016/23/B/HS5/03750. A. Pacześniak (*) University of Wrocław, Wrocław, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 K. Zuba (ed.), The Polish Delegation in the European Parliament, Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28271-3_3

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voting system, especially in the version with closed electoral lists, political parties’ decisions on the selection of candidates and their inclusion in lists strongly guide voters’ decisions (Wojtasik, 2013). There is rich academic literature on the differences in the status of national and European parliamentary elections that refers to the publication by Karlheinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt (1980) and their terming of EP elections as second-order. One of the peculiarities of this type of voting is that winning an election does not translate into gaining power. Voters are aware of this, which is one of the factors contributing to a lower turnout than in national elections. In Poland, especially in the first three EP elections, the turnout was not only lower than in the elections to the Sejm and the Senate, but also significantly different from the EU average: in the years 2004, 2009 and 2014, it was 20.9%, 24.53% and 23.83%, respectively.1 Nevertheless, the low interest in EP elections and their lower stakes compared to national parliamentary elections do not mean that they are of little importance from the perspective of Polish parties. Their primary purpose is to appoint representatives of Polish citizens in the EU by way of direct universal suffrage, but the process of selecting candidates is also a tool for each political party to manage its organisation and personnel resources. Since the United Kingdom left the EU, Poland has filled 52 seats in the EP.2 The parties that put forward their electoral lists want the highest possible percentage of this number to go to the candidates they have nominated. Although the inter-party competition for seats in the EP is less fierce than that for seats in the Sejm or the Senate, its outcome is sometimes regarded as an indicator of a party’s position on the national political scene, a barometer of the current social mood, a harbinger of the outcome of subsequent electoral battles at the national level and, last but not least, a marketing element of future election campaigns. Party recruitment and electoral list-making criteria operate in a specific legal, institutional and political context (Cross, 2008; Di Donato, 2021); they also result from the genesis and organisational culture of a group (Frech, 2018), or the political career model adopted in a given country or 1  Only in the 2019 elections did almost twice as many voters go to the polls as five years earlier, with the turnout reaching 45.68%. 2  Previously, on the basis of the Treaty of Nice, Poland was entitled to 54 seats and this is how many deputies the Polish representation in the EP had after the elections in 2004. The 2009 elections took place after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, so the number of Polish MEPs was reduced to 50. After another adjustment, under the Lisbon Treaty, Polish citizens elected 51 MEPs in both 2014 and 2019.

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political party (Daniel, 2015). The Polish voting system, which favours the largest political parties in EP elections, influences not only the selection process and election results, but also parties’ decisions on possible electoral coalitions. An example of such a tactical alliance resulting from the political effects of the electoral law was close cooperation and a joint campaign of parties belonging to four different political groups in the EP before the 2019 elections. This coalition comprised the European People’s Party (the Civic Platform (PO) and the Polish People’s Party (PSL)), the Party of European Socialists (the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)), the European Green Party (Greens (Zieloni)) and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party (the Modern (Nowoczesna)). The decision to create the lists of the European Coalition influenced the candidates’ selection process, which not only had to take into account internal party regulations, but also became a subject of inter-party negotiations among the leaders of individual groups. The objective of this chapter is to analyse the selection of candidates for MEPs, its impact on candidate (re)election and the stability of the Polish representation in the EP. The first part of the chapter focuses on the analysis of the institutional context of the intra-party candidates’ selection process. This is followed by a review of the formal regulations on the recruitment, selection and approval of MEP candidates applied in selected Polish political parties. The subject of the last part is the political context of European elections that influenced the preparation of candidate lists by Polish political parties and the final outcome of elections.

Data and Research Design The structure and purpose of this chapter determined the adopted methodology. As an analysis of the candidates’ selection process should take into account the formal and legal conditions of EP elections, as well as their political context, we carried out our research on the basis of diverse sources and research methods. A legal analysis, that is, a review of national electoral legislation and party statutes, was complemented by desk research of already existing data on election results collected by the National Electoral Commission. The chapter comprises a qualitative analysis of data obtained in semi-­ structured interviews with Polish MEPs elected between 2004 and 2019 from the lists of the following parties: the Law and Justice, the Civic Platform of the Republic of Poland, the Polish People’s Party and the

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Democratic Left Alliance. The political parties were chosen according to the research objective, that is, the identification of relations between the intra-party selection of candidates and the membership stability of the Polish representation in the EP. Parliamentarians were chosen as respondents for two reasons: firstly, they are usually very familiar with the functioning of their political formations, and secondly, researchers typically find them to be somewhat more approachable as interlocutors compared to representatives of party headquarters or leadership. Anyone conducting research among party elites faces barriers, as politicians open and willing to cooperate with scholars are in short supply, particularly in younger democracies such as Poland. The inclusion of MEPs was therefore dictated by convenience in selecting the research sample. Interviews were conducted from August to October 2020, in numbers sufficient to achieve theoretical saturation. All quotations are drawn from these interviews, which were anonymised. They are marked with the abbreviations of the respective parties and numbers assigned to each interview. For instance, the third interviewee from the Polish People’s Party (PSL) is marked as ‘PSL_3’.

The Legal and Institutional Context of the Selection of Candidates for MEPs In the process of selecting candidates to sit in the EP, as in any general election, political parties must take into account national electoral regulations and the law governing the functioning of political parties. More than four decades after the first direct elections to the EP, they continue to be held on the basis of Member States’ voting systems rather than according to a uniform EU law. The European Union has only developed the common electoral principles of directness, universality and, since 1999, proportionality. The lack of uniform EP election rules means that the regulations adopted in individual Member States differ, among other things, in the type of electoral lists (open and closed lists), the electoral threshold, the formula for converting votes into seats, the scope of the voter’s rights in the act of voting, the existence or absence of compulsory voting, in addition to special regulations on the drawing up of electoral lists such as mandatory gender quotas (Oelbermann & Pukelsheim, 2015: 93). Differences also relate to the size of constituencies, the rules of financing election campaigns, restrictions on the length of a campaign, facilities

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for voters such as postal voting, proxy voting or internet voting (Nogaj & Popatcheva, 2015; Trzaskowski & Popielawska, 2013). In Poland, the legal aspects of organising EP elections are governed by the Electoral Code, which was adopted by the Sejm in the form of its act on 5 January 2011. In 2004 and 2009, EP elections were held in accordance with the European Parliament Election Law (Act on the European Parliament Election Law of 23 January 2004). Among the entities entitled to establish election committees, the Act lists political parties and coalitions of parties. Since the first European elections in which Polish citizens participated, the country has been divided into 13 single-member constituencies. The constituencies are much larger than in elections to the Sejm and the Senate. Voting takes place according to a proportional system in which votes cast for individual lists are converted into seats nationwide according to the d’Hondt formula. This means that neither political parties nor voters know before going to the polls how many MEPs will be elected in each constituency, as the number of seats to be filled in a given constituency depends on voter turnout. Once the number of seats allocated to each election committee is established, it is distributed among particular lists using the Hare-Niemeyer largest remainder method. Only those election committees receiving at least 5% of the valid votes nationwide are included in the distribution of seats in the EP. The Polish electoral regulations are moderately proportional and significantly advantageous or large parties. The effective electoral threshold is much higher than the statutory one of 5%, which quite effectively blocks smaller political groupings from obtaining representation and influences their decisions on candidate selection. In Poland, there is no compulsion to vote, and participation in elections is regarded as a civic privilege, not an obligation. Each voter has one vote, which they cast for a particular candidate and not for an entire electoral list. Seats are allocated to politicians in the order of the number of votes received, which is the formula of open lists. The places on a list assigned to candidates by election committees does not, therefore, determine their chances of being elected to the EP, but in practice it is of great importance: a place at the top of a list makes it much easier to gain support of voters and, consequently, to win a seat in the EP. In the first two European elections held in 2004 and 2009, the statutory gender quotas, which were introduced in the Electoral Code in 2011, had not applied. Thus, in the case of EP elections, they applied for the first time in 2014. According to the law, only a list on which at least 35%

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120% 100% 80% 60%

85%

78%

76%

22%

24%

2009

2014

65%

40% 20% 0%

15% 2004

women

35% 2019

men

Fig. 3.1  The percentage of women and men among Polish MEPs elected in the years 2004–2019 (inaugural sessions of the EP). (Source: The data of the National Electoral Commission)

candidates represent one gender can be registered in an election. Figure 3.1 shows that the introduction of the quota mechanism alone was not a sufficient solution to equalise opportunities for women and men in terms of political representation. Compared to 2009, when the Polish delegation was elected according to regulations that did not address the issue of gender quotas, the increase in the percentage of women among MEPs elected in 2014 was rather small. This is because the Electoral Code does not contain any requirements for the placement of candidates of both genders in specific places on electoral lists, nor does it provide for the so-called zipper mechanism, that is, alternating the placement of women and men on lists.3 In 2014, political parties achieved the statutory requirement of having both genders on electoral lists, more often putting women within places closer to the bottom of a list than men, so this did not translate into a significant change in the gender mix of the Polish representation in the EP. A noticeable increase in the number of women elected to the EP did not occur until the next elections in 2019, which can be interpreted as an 3  Among the parties that introduced their representatives to the EP in 2019, such a mechanism was voluntarily applied by Robert Biedroń’s Spring.

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effect of the deferred adjustment of parties’ candidate selection processes to the spirit of the law set forth in the Electoral Code. When compiling European electoral lists, political parties must take into account quantitative limitations: the Electoral Code specifies that the number of MEP candidates per list cannot be fewer than 5 and more than 10. With 13 constituencies, this means that a committee that has registered electoral lists all over Poland will recruit between 65 and 130 candidates to its lists. Theoretically, a party’s room for manoeuvre in selecting candidates is also limited by the provision according to which an MEP cannot simultaneously be a member of the Council of Ministers, Secretary of State, MP or senator. In practice, however, MPs and senators, secretaries and undersecretaries of state, as well as ministers run for seats in EP elections, as they are recognisable politicians who increase the chances of the whole election committee to succeed. After EP elections, a decision is made whether, if such officials win, they give up their national career and take up a seat in the EP or the seat is taken by the candidate on the electoral list with the second-best number of votes.

Party Regulations on the Selection of MEP Candidates In all Member States, political parties develop their own formal and informal rules for the selection of candidates for MEPs that, apart from statutory regulations, take into account specific conditions characteristic of a given party, such as the level of internal party democracy, degree of centralisation of decision-making processes, tradition and organisational culture, position of the leader, current status of the party (governing party vs. opposition party), support expressed in public opinion surveys and strength of political competitors. The situation is no different in Poland. From 2004 to 2019, over 50 Polish political parties put forward candidates in EP elections, and each party adopted its own rules for building electoral lists (Pacześniak, 2021: 73). These rules tended to be similar or the same as those applied during the selection of candidates in elections to the Sejm, which confirms the conclusions of various comparative studies conducted in all EU Member States. In the 2014 EP elections, more than 80% of parties applied the same candidate selection rules as in national parliamentary elections (Pilet et al., 2015: 21).

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The data of the National Electoral Commission (PKW) show that in 2004, nationwide lists were registered (individually or in coalition) by 23 party election committees and a dozen more put up their candidates only in some constituencies. In 2009, there were already 26 committees that registered lists in all constituencies, and three additional ones put up lists in only one constituency. In 2014, only 15 entities registered nationwide electoral lists, while 7 more managed to do so in selected constituencies. In 2019, the number of election committees that registered nationwide lists again exceeded 20, with an additional 4 fielding their candidates in only a few constituencies. Due to such a large number of parties appointing candidates for the EP between 2004 and 2019, the principles of candidate selection were analysed only in those groupings that had their representation in all EP terms starting from 2004, that is, the Civic Platform, Law and Justice, the Polish People’s Party and the Democratic Left Alliance. Examining the relationship between the intra-party selection of candidates and the membership stability of the Polish delegation in the EP between 2004 and 2019 by analysing the selection process also in those parties that did not succeed in sending their representatives to the EP would not fulfil the established research objective (cf. Peszyński, 2015: 32). The diversity of parties’ processes of selecting MEP candidates mainly concerns the composition of the selectorate entitled to recommend candidates and the level of centralisation in drawing up electoral lists (Pacześniak, 2019: 217). None of the four groupings analysed here adopted a solution based on mechanisms of direct democracy that would allow all party members to put forward proposals for candidates to sit in the EP. However, in none of them is the nomination of candidates for MEPs the personal prerogative of the party leader, although the Law and Justice (PiS) is close to such a solution. The party’s statute stipulates that lists of candidates for the EP are submitted by the party chairperson and approved by the Political Committee. Observing the decision-making practices of the PiS and the extent of its chairperson’s real power (Pacześniak & Wincławska, 2018), one can assume that it is not possible to select an MEP candidate without the party leader’s approval. The entity recommending candidates in the four parties under analysis is most often the national executive body, that is, a rather small and elite body. In this context, the PSL constitutes an exception. In that party, candidates are appointed by local electoral conventions, which is the most inclusive solution. As a rule, Polish political parties are characterised by not only a narrow selectorate entitled to

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put forward candidates, but also a high level of centralisation of decision-­ making processes. Although the regulations of the statutes of the PO, PiS and PSL provide for the expression of opinions by representatives of field structures at the stage of recommending candidates to the EP, the approval of electoral lists and introduction of possible corrections is controlled by central executive bodies either collegially (in the PO by the National Board, following a motion of the chairperson, in the PSL by the Supreme Executive Committee) or individually (in PiS by the party leader). Subjecting the MEP candidate selection process to the centralised control of a small number of party bodies results from the genesis and organisation of Polish political parties. The structures of most of them are dominated by the party elite (party in central office) and the parliamentary elite (party in public office), which—often in a personal union—set the directions of party politics. The selection of candidates running in general elections on a party ticket is an important part of such politics. Ewa Nalewajko, who studied the structures of Polish political parties a decade and a half ago, observed that party headquarters needed local branches almost exclusively as structures responsible for periodic mobilisation of the electorate and running of local election campaign offices (Nalewajko, 2006: 239). In most of the parties under analysis, this continues to be the case (Jacuński et al., 2021: 131–149). An exception is once again the PSL, which is characterised by not only the most extensive field structures at the levels of communes, districts and provinces, but also a high degree of democratisation of internal party decision-making processes and a collegial model of party leadership and management, which is reflected in the small range of exclusive authority granted to the party chairperson. This is also reflected in the process of selecting candidates for the EP. At the beginning, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) also had strong and well-developed structures, which, like the PSL, had ‘inherited’ the organisational model from its communist predecessor the Polish United Workers’ Party. Also in this grouping, the emphasis is put on the collegial model of management, and the party chairperson is not a separate and autonomous body. Over time, however, the party’s field structures were becoming weaker and weaker, which was accompanied by an exodus of members. In order to stem this, a mixed (membership-representative) method of electing the party chairperson was introduced, which strengthened the leader’s legitimacy while weakening the importance of local structures. Still, the drawing up of electoral lists, where the recruitment

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and selection of candidates is a central part, is formally the responsibility of collegiate bodies.4 When the Civic Platform was founded in 2001, electoral lists for parliamentary elections were to be drawn up by conventions consisting of electors elected in all constituencies by those who had signed a declaration of support for the new party. At conventions, electors from among themselves nominated candidates who were then approved by party leaders. By the time of the first EP elections in 2004, the selection process had evolved to give party field branches the power to appoint delegates to electoral conventions that nominate candidates for electoral lists. The approval of candidates for the EP is the prerogative of the collegiate body (the National Council), but in practice, the party chairperson was the author of reshuffles on electoral lists. Founded in the same year as the PO, PiS approached the building of field structures in a methodical way. Their creation proceeded under the strict control of the party leadership and was aimed at establishing a centralised, bureaucratically managed and hierarchically controlled organisation. This ‘perfectly controlled system’ (Nalewajko, 2006: 220) was intended to serve the party headquarters in the successful struggle for power. In PiS, the most important decisions, including those concerning the nomination of candidates for MEPs, are taken by the top management headed by the president. Formally, representatives of field structures elected as delegates to party conventions participate in the process of nominating candidates, but in practice, it is the party president who determines the contents of electoral lists. The analysis of the rules adhered to by Polish political parties in the selection of candidates to the EP shows great reserve and distrust with which they approach the trends observed in many European parties that opt for more participatory regulations (Hazan & Rahat, 2010) described in the literature on the subject as ‘open’, ‘democratic’, ‘inclusive’ and even ‘anti-establishment’ (Cordero & Coller, 2018: 5). The top leadership of Polish political groupings regards the candidate selection process as their own prerogative that they are rather reluctant to share with others.

4  In October 2021, the process of unification of the SLD and Spring was completed; its consequence was the establishment of the New Left party. SLD continues to be the formal acronym of the New Left, as it has not been changed by the court (status as at the end of March 2022).

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The Political Context of the Selection of Candidates to the EP Regardless of the formal regulations on the recruitment and selection of candidates for MEPs, each political party, when drawing up its electoral lists, takes into account the current political context: their popularity among voters and the strength of political competitors as reflected in public opinion polls. The selection of candidates when a party is balancing on the electoral threshold differs from that carried out when a party enjoys stable support indicating a chance to win seats in all constituencies. Let us start with two of the four parties under analysis that did not have a polling-based guarantee of reaching the electoral threshold in the EP elections held in the years 2004–2019, that is, the SLD and the PSL. Still at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the SLD was celebrating political triumphs: in 2000, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, who is associated with the left, was elected president for the second time; in 2001, the party under the leadership of Leszek Miller won the parliamentary elections and in 2002, it achieved the best result in the elections to provincial assemblies. Even in 2003, there were many indications that the first Polish elections to the EP would be a success for the left. However, the numerous scandals in which SLD representatives were implicated (with the so-called Rywin affair at the forefront) led to a gradual erosion of support, an exodus of members and a crisis in the government ending with the resignation of the prime minister (Kowalski, 2018: 122). Under these circumstances, the result of the left in the EP elections could not be good. One SLD MEP elected in 2004 described this context in an individual in-depth interview: It was the decline of the SLD government, the coalition with the PSL had fallen apart and Marek Belka had just formed his technical cabinet. The party’s ratings were so low that they were looking for candidates who would guarantee the required result without much promotion, because there was no time for that. When you are at the bottom, almost at the electoral threshold, because forecasts showed that SLD couldn’t get more than four or even three percent (…), you look for popular persons. Every party looks for popular candidates, but if the party has good ratings, voters often vote for the party’s emblem, not for particular people. If—as in the case of the then SLD—polls show a low support for your party, you simply look for recognisable candidates. (SLD_1)

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According to another SLD MEP, all parties, regardless of their level of support, care about recruiting politicians who are likely to be elected. However, ‘if a political grouping is to count, its candidates should play in the European or even world league. It is about people who know what it means to be a leader, who can rise above national interests and represent European interests’ (SLD_2). The PSL is another party that has never been certain of winning seats in the EP because, as one of the party’s MEPs admitted: there is no denying that for a good few years there has always been the problem of not being able to cross the electoral threshold. We have to put forward candidates who win votes, as we don’t have such a comfortable situation in which we could be sure to win 15, 20 or 25 per cent of votes. Therefore, the party leadership is not guided by its sympathies or antipathies towards particular candidates, but it assesses in a highly rational way who of these candidates is able to win the highest number of votes for the list. In the case of the PSL, a nomination certainly is not a reward for anything. (PSL_3)

Another MEP representing the PSL, who has run for a seat in the EP three times, pointed out during the interview that what their party took into consideration when selecting candidates was not only the popularity of a given politician, but also their preparation to work in the supranational body: It is a process of searching for such persons who would fit the profile of a candidate for the European Parliament. The most frequent candidates were current members of the national parliament, current local government activists, from both the provincial and district levels, as well as academics and people whose professional profile met the criterion of being interested in European politics. There was a conviction that the point is not for someone to be a linguist, but for them to know the subject matter due to their education and life experience. (PSL_2)

Another interviewee from the same party added that the PSL had always had more stringent criteria for the selection of candidates for the European Parliament than for those running for seats in the Sejm: The main difference is that there are far fewer candidates for the European Parliament than for the Sejm. Therefore, this selection for the European

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Parliament is, as it were, more detailed, more rigorous. Above all, it is based on a candidate’s experience and knowledge, their previous professional career. Moreover, one of the criteria is the candidate’s position in the party, whether they are a member of some decision-making body or fulfil some functions in the party. (PSL_3)

The process of selecting candidates looks different in the PO and the PiS. Both parties have easily crossed the 5% electoral threshold since the first EP elections. One of the MEPs representing the PO stated that before the 2004 elections: there were no competitions for candidates, there was no need to demonstrate knowledge of languages or EU topics. Priority and the best chance of winning a seat were given to those who had been observers in the EP, and the others were nominated a bit randomly. (PO_1)

The fact that, thanks to its well-established electoral position, the PO can also take into account factors other than the popularity and recognisability of a politician when nominating candidates for the EP was referred to by another interviewee who ran for the EP on the recommendation of the PO in 2014: What was analysed first of all was the possibility of a particular candidate’s winning the election, but also their substantive preparation, knowledge of foreign languages. Without this knowledge it is impossible to work in an international environment. In the PO, attention is also paid to include on the lists as many women as possible, women prepared to work in the EP. (PO_2)

The Law and Justice party seems to take other factors into account when selecting candidates. According to a PiS MEP sitting in the EP from 2009 to 2014, who also observed the selection of candidates in subsequent elections from the inside: The most important criterion in the recruitment process was loyalty. The party president always had the final say. Competences, not to mention language skills, were only the second or third most important criterion. Of the then [during the 2009–2014 term—A.P.] fifteen MEPs belonging to the PiS, the majority did not speak English. Experience was also not taken into account, most of them were new MEPs. (PiS_1)

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This opinion about the low level of re-election in the ranks of the PiS is reflected in the statistics: almost 2/3 of the party’s representation in the EP changes every five years.

Re-election as the Exception or the Standard? The prerequisite for the membership stability of a national delegation in the EP is a high level of re-election (more on this in the chapter ‘Membership stability’). The lowest level of re-election in the Polish delegation was recorded in 2009, when it was just 35.3%. The highest proportion of re-elected Polish MEPs was seen five years later, when almost half of the MEPs won their seat for the second or third time. In 2019, the ratio of experienced MEPs to débutantes was back to what it had been a decade earlier, at 36.5% of re-elected MEPs to 63.5% of first-timers. Demonstrating the relationship between candidate selection and membership stability of the Polish delegation in the EP requires a comparative analysis of the level of re-election in the particular political parties that won seats in the EP in the elections held in 2004, 2009, 2014 and 2019. These parties are the PO, PiS, SLD and PSL. The remaining political groupings that put forward their electoral lists in the years 2004–2019 either failed to cross the electoral threshold or managed to do so only once. While it would be theoretically possible for new parties to place existing MEPs previously running for other parties on their electoral lists, this was the case for neither the New Right Congress in 2014 nor Robert Biedroń’s Spring in 2019.5 Figure  3.2 compiles the data on MEP re-­ election broken down by political party. The most stable level of re-election has so far been observed in the PiS. It amounts on average to 35%. In the PO, the average level of re-­ election is 44%. The party had the fewest re-elected MEPs in 2009, and the most in 2014. In the SLD and PSL, the average of the three elections exceeds 50%, but in the case of both groupings, the differences between particular terms of office are very large. This is due to, firstly, the smaller size of the representations of both parties, which means that a change of just one MEP results in a large percentage fluctuation with respect to the whole party. Secondly, in 2019, the decision to jointly field electoral lists 5  In the Polish delegation, however, there were cases of re-election of MEPs who changed their party colours between elections. These were J. Saryusz-Wolski, J. Wojciechowski and R. Czarnecki.

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90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

PO

PiS 2009

SLD 2014

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PSL

2019

Fig. 3.2  The percentage of re-elections to the PE in the Polish political parties in the years 2009–2019. (Source: The author’s own work based on the data from the National Electoral Commission)

as part of the European Coalition consisting of, among other groupings, the PO, SLD and PSL, resulted in the need to adapt party plans to the arrangements made with the other partners. In the case of the SLD, it was connected with the allocation of attractive places on the electoral lists of the European Coalition to recognisable left-wing politicians (former prime ministers Leszek Miller, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz and Marek Belka), who, however, were debuting as MEPs and by gaining seats in the EP significantly lowered the level of stability of the SLD’s representation. The only party to have drafted an official document regarding the rules applicable to running for re-election is the PiS. Adopted in September 2009, it is still in force and applies to both national and European parliamentarians. In the case of MEPs, account is taken of their substantive work, attendance at sittings of the EP and its committees, observance of voting and attendance discipline during voting at sittings of the EP and its committees, payment of membership fees, maintenance of parliamentary offices in places designated by the PiS Political Committee, public speeches, particularly in the media, in accordance with the party’s platform, standing for election exclusively from the PiS election committee or a committee indicated or approved by the party’s Political Council, joining the PiS Team in the EP fraction after the elections, and remaining in the Group throughout the EP term and maintaining its membership. MEPs are subject to double scrutiny, exercised on the one hand by their party colleagues in the EP, and on the other hand by PiS national

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parliamentarians. The PiS Parliamentary Club, which brings together MPs and senators, is tasked with monitoring their MEPs’ media statements, while the PiS Team in the EP monitors their behaviour in Strasbourg and Brussels and records ‘all positive effects of the work of a given parliamentarian as well as all cases of breaching the rules’ in a document called the Parliamentarian’s Sheet. The PiS MEP distanced themselves from these official rules, claiming that considerations of merit and work discipline in the EP have no bearing on the party’s decision to re-recommend a politician wishing to seek re-election: What an MEP does in the European Parliament has zero influence on their re-election. I repeat: zero. It’s a question of whether or not they are put on the list, and whether or not they are elected, because voters have absolutely no interest in their activities. The worst MEPs get the first places on the lists and are elected every five years because they are loyal. And voters—and this applies to MEPs from all parties—do not distinguish between an MEP who works hard and one who pretends to work. Polish society receives information about the most active MEPs, but it is completely uninterested in them. (PiS_1)

In a similar vein, a PO MEP who sat in the EP between 2004 and 2009 spoke about chances for re-election: As long as the incumbent MEP was not eminently tarnished, the party agreed to their re-election. If nothing strange happened there, it was almost automatic. Competences were of absolutely no importance. Distinguishing oneself in the EP was OK, but it didn’t help in anything, because there was no perception of Europe in Poland. (PO_1)

MEPs from other groupings stress that not all of them who want to continue working in the EP are offered to be nominated again, but they usually admit that it is easier for MEPs to apply for re-election: It is always the party’s decision, although a lot depends on the MEP themselves. If internal surveys show that they have a lot of support in the region, then their position is rather secure, because it is known that they act as an electoral locomotive that will pull the whole list. If they worked poorly in the region, people don’t know their name or what they look like because they disappeared for five years, then there is practically no chance that the

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party will offer them to run again. For the party, it’s the result that counts, that’s the most important thing. The more MEPs a given party, a given list introduces into the EP, the more powerful it will be. And this is what every party cares about. But there were cases when a very popular, recognisable, hard-working MEP did not get such a proposal to run for the seat again, because the seat was prepared for someone else. (SLD_1)

According to MEPs from the PSL, a party which stands out for the high level of re-election of the current MEPs, the decision-making bodies appreciate the work done so far when deciding on nomination for re-election: In the Polish People’s Party, both social and professional capital that a person possesses is very much appreciated. This is a matter of both following a certain professional and political path and some social capital earned along the way, which is, of course, measured by the number of votes won in particular election campaigns. It depends on the politician how they will spend these five years in the European Parliament, because if someone is a complete loafer, no one will put them forward as a candidate in five years’ time. (PSL_3)

Conclusions Polish legislation does not limit the number of terms that an MEP sits in the EP, which allows for the multiple re-elections of MEPs and the building of between-term membership stability of the EP. However, the analysis described above shows that this does not mean that the Polish groupings favour primarily experienced MEPs. Even if candidates are officially required to speak foreign languages, have political experience and knowledge of issues discussed at the EU level, other factors such as loyalty to the party or the need to reshuffle top party representatives play a greater role during the selection of candidates. The calculation of electoral chances of the whole political grouping and individual candidates plays a considerable role. The parties with an established political position, for which crossing the real electoral threshold is not a problem, have more room for manoeuvre when selecting candidates and drawing up electoral lists. In the realities of Polish politics, however, it does not mean that with respect to EP elections the parties fill attractive places on electoral lists with names of less known politicians whom they would like to promote. A seat in the EP is regarded rather as a ‘challenge cup’ for a party’s distinguished members

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who return to national politics after one or two terms in the EP to make room for the next candidates. Such replacements decrease the membership stability of the Polish delegation in the EP. In the case of parties with lower electoral support, the level of ‘risk’ in the candidate selection process is smaller, and candidates that are experienced and recognisable, often current MEPs, are the most likely to win their party’s nomination. These inter-party differences balance out to such an extent that the aggregated re-election rate of Polish MEPs is almost exactly 40%. Thus, the candidate selection process and the result of elections allow parties to achieve two seemingly contradictory goals: maintaining relative membership stability of the Polish delegation and the resulting professionalisation of MEPs, as well as ensuring intra-party circulation of elites.

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Norris, P. (1999). Recruitment into the European Parliament. In R.  S. Katz & B.  Wessels (Eds.), The European Parliament, the National Parliaments, and European Integration (pp. 86–102). Oxford University Press. Norris, P., & Lovenduski, J. (1995). Political Recruitment: Gender, Race, and Class in the British Parliament. Cambridge University Press. Oelbermann, K.-F., & Pukelsheim, F. (2015). European Elections 2014: From Voters to Representatives, in Twenty-eight Ways. European Electoral Studies, 10(2), 91–124. Pacześniak, A. (2017). Ujednolicenie unijnej ordynacji wyborczej—mrzonka czy realny projekt na przyszłość? Studia Wyborcze, 23, 7–23. Pacześniak, A. (2019). Selekcja kandydatów na posłów do PE.  In K.  Zuba & B. Choroś (Eds.), Parlament Europejski w strukturze instytucjonalnej i politycznej Unii Europejskiej (pp. 215–228). Opole. Pacześniak, A. (2021). Proces selekcji kandydatów na posłów do Parlamentu Europejskiego a stabilność personalna polskiej delegacji. Przegla ̨d Europejski, 2, 71–86. Pacześniak, A., & Wincławska, M. (2018). Leadership in Polish Political Parties. e-Politicon, 28, 92–114. Peszyński, W. (2015). Strategie personalne w wyborach do Parlamentu Europejskiego 2014. Próba oceny efektywności polskich partii. Studia Wyborcze, 19, 31–51. Pilet, J.-B., Van Haute, E., & Kelbel, C. (2015). Candidate Selection Procedures for the European Elections. Directorate General for Internal Policies, European Parliament, Brussels. Pruysers, S., Cross, W., Gauja, A., & Rahat, G. (2017). Candidate Selection Rules and Democratic Outcomes: The Impact of Parties on Women’s Representation. In S.  E. Scarrow, P.  D. Webb, & T.  Poguntke (Eds.), Organizing Political Parties. Representation, Participation, and Power (pp.  208–233). Oxford University Press. Reif, K., & Schmitt, H. (1980). Nine Second-order National Elections—A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results. European Journal of Political Research, 8(1), 3–44. The Act on the European Parliament Election Law of 23 January 2004, Journal of Laws, 2004 no. 25 item 219. The Election Law Act of 5 January 2011, Journal of Laws, 2020.1319. Trzaskowski, R., & Popielawska, J. (2013). How European Are the European Elections? The European Parliament’s Long Struggle for a Direct and Universal Suffrage Conducted According to a Uniform Electoral Procedure. In E. Kużelewska & D. Kloza (Eds.), Elections to the European Parliament as a Challenge for Democracy (European Integration and Democracy Series 2) (pp. 27–42). Warszawa-Białystok. Wojtasik, W. (2013). Wyborcza selekcja elit politycznych w Polsce. Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne, 38, 153–171.

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Used Interviews PiS_1—Interview Conducted on 01.09.2020. PO_1—Interview Conducted on 26.08.2020. PO_2—Interview Conducted on 30.10.2020. PSL_1—Interview Conducted on 22.09.2020. PSL_2—Interview Conducted on 15.10.2020. PSL_3—Interview Conducted on 22.10.2020. SLD_1—Interview Conducted on 26.08.2020. SLD_2—Interview Conducted on 26.09.2020.

CHAPTER 4

Career Paths Krzysztof Zuba

Introduction The category of ‘career path’ can be viewed collectively or individually, exactly like any other phenomena such as recruitment, voting, activity in committees or affiliation to political groups. The collective approach, which is adopted in this chapter, means focusing on specific patterns of behaviour of a whole group (national delegation) rather than the behaviour of individual MEPs. Hence, the main objective of this analysis is to identify the dominant model or models of the political career paths of the members of the entire Polish delegation. This requires a generalisation within which individual behaviours will be synthesised into more generalised constructs. Simultaneously, it should be stated that the existence of a single career pattern for the entire delegation is not obvious. This is evidenced by previous studies showing that for some delegations, a clear The text presents the results of research funded under National Science Centre grant no. 2016/23/B/HS5/03750. K. Zuba (*) Institute of Political Science and Administration, University of Opole, Opole, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 K. Zuba (ed.), The Polish Delegation in the European Parliament, Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28271-3_4

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EP career pattern can be discerned, while for others, this is difficult or even impossible. Therefore, the outlined objective of the analysis should be formulated more cautiously as an attempt to determine whether a specific model of MEPs’ career paths can be delineated within the Polish delegation and, if so, to which category within the identified career path models it can be assigned. The status of a pioneering work focusing on the aspect of career paths of MEPs was acquired by the analysis of Susan E. Scarrow (1997). Based on a review of the first three terms of the EP (1979–1994), her findings showed that different career models existed within individual delegations. Only in a few cases (Germany, United Kingdom), however, could clear patterns be observed. They were described by the author as a professional model of an MEP’s career, based on the shaping of a group of politicians for whom a career in the EP was a goal in itself (Scarrow, 1997). The direction established by this research was followed by Richard Whitaker (2014), who focused on the characteristic features of age and seniority of MEPs as determinants of career paths. Meanwhile, the work of William Daniel (2015) should be considered as the most comprehensive attempt to analyse political careers of MEPs. Daniel concluded that although MEPs pursuing different career paths could be found in individual national delegations, a dominant model could be observed in most delegations. Of the factors analysed that could potentially determine the propensity of MEPs to take a particular path, he singled out the organisational form of the state. While MEPs representing federal states tended to treat their seats on the EP as a separate and autonomous career form, MEPs from unitary states tended to ‘jump’ from the national level to the European one and vice versa (Daniel, 2015, pp. 6, 25). The theme of the differences observed among national delegations in the EP in terms of connections between the national and European levels of politics was also analysed by Stefano Brahiroli (2008). For his research, he selected 12 delegations during the EP’s 5th and 6th terms. In the case of seven delegations, he found a clear link between loyalty within a party delegation in the EP and a subsequent career at the national level. This allowed him to conclude that party loyalty at the EP level increased the chances for re-election or, alternatively, the extension of a political career at the national or local level (Brahiroli, 2008, p. 12). A related theme was explored by Stephen A. Meserve et al. (2009). They found that MEPs’ calculations related to subsequent career paths at the national level fostered disloyalty to their political groups within the EP, especially in the

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case of votes on increasing the powers of the EP and other European transnational institutions (Meserve et al., 2009, p. 1030). Complementing S. Scarrow’s earlier division into long-term and short-­ term careers, Robert van Geffen (2016) included two additional short-­ term career models of MEPs: former national politicians and one-off MEPs. In the first category, he included those ‘MEPs who have already had a political career at the national level but are not close to retirement’. He wrote that this type of mandate was a reward granted by a party to those politicians who were not interested in a longer career in the EP. On the other hand, one-off MEPs are those who, with no previous political experience, seat in the EP for one term or even less (van Geffen, 2016, p. 1018).

Data and Methods In addition to analysing the duration of an MEP’s mandate, determining their overall career trajectory requires information on the course of their prior and subsequent career. Such a research model is more or less consistently applied by all researchers dealing with political career paths, which by no means indicates that what they have at their disposal are well-­ established analytical schemes and methods. On the contrary, individual researchers define their objectives differently, focus on different aspects of MEPs’ careers and use different methods, which consequently leads them to different—although usually complementary—conclusions. The present analysis employs the method of triangulation, that is, combining many specific methods so that they complement and validate each other (Henn et al., 2006, pp. 19–22; Crano & Brewer, 2002, p. 10). At a detailed level, where possible, I use research methods and techniques analogous to those employed by the authors who have previously addressed the issue of MEPs’ career paths. The purpose of the triangulation method is to utilise the findings of other researchers and also to obtain a plane of comparison and points of reference for the findings concerning the career paths of the MEPs in the Polish delegation. If the findings of the individual parts lead to the same conclusions, the triangulation method allows for the strengthening of the significance of such findings as well as the reliability of the reached conclusions. This chapter consists of five parts, which together form a coherent analytical model. In the first part, I focus on analysing MEPs’ age and seniority as indicators that define a career model. This element is built on the

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conceptual framework and methodology used by Whitaker (2014), who assumed that there were two main career path models for MEPs: a career secondary to one in national politics and an autonomous career. The decrease in the average age of MEPs as well as in the percentage of senior MEPs demonstrates that we deal with the process of PE careers becoming more and more autonomous. The second part examines the seniority MEPs’ (MEP) seniority as a determinant of career paths, referring to the conceptual and analytical framework proposed by Scarrow (1997), Whitaker (2014) and van Geffen (2016). The third part focuses on MEPs’ earlier socio-political activity in the period before winning a seat in the EP. Such an analysis allows for verifying the findings of William Daniel, who distinguished three career models: (1) an MEP’s mandate as a form of political retirement, (2) an MEP’s mandate as a springboard for a career in national politics, (3) an MEP’s mandate as an end in itself (Daniel, 2015, p.  6). In the fourth part, I analyse MEPs’ socio-political activity after the period of service in the EP. It will make it possible to determine whether MEPs’ careers help or hinder their subsequent careers in national politics. The last part of the chapter focuses on the directions and scale of switches between European and national politics, primarily between the Polish Sejm or Senate and the European Parliament, an issue that does not appear in research conducted by any other authors. Based on the model of the secondary importance of EP elections and simultaneously the primary importance of national parliamentary elections, developed by Karlheiz Reif and Hermann Schmitt (1980, p. 19), it should be acknowledged that: a) if the scale of switches from the EP to the Sejm and the Senate is greater than it is in the opposite direction, we can speak of a model in which politicians seek opportunities to enhance their status and scope of powers (policy-­seeking); b) if the scale of switches from the Sejm and the Senate to the EP is greater than it is in the opposite direction, we can speak of other extra-­political motivations of MPs related mainly to the attractiveness of an MEP’s mandate (office-seeking). Based on the existing conditions of a political (interviews with MEPs; Migalski, 2014, p. 167) and academic (Daniel, 2015) character, it becomes reasonable to formulate the following hypothesis: Within the Polish delegation to the EP, a career path model dominates that makes an MEP’s mandate an element of secondary importance vis-à-vis a career in national politics.

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Career paths were examined by analysing the biographs of all MEPs. The database was comprised of the resources of the European Parliament1; the data of the Sejm, the Council of Ministers, the MEPs’ websites; the press (the archives of the largest Polish dailies Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita); the archival data of local government bodies. From these data, information on the previous and subsequent careers of the MEPs was extracted. Regardless of the number of terms they sat in the EP, each MEP was coded once.

The Age Structure as a Determinant of Career Paths The age structure of MEPs, as well as trends in changes in it, provides an important indication of the dominant career path model. Whitaker highlighted the (visible, albeit not significant) decline in the average age of MEPs between the 1st term (52 years) and the 7th term (49 years) of the EP.2 On this basis, he concluded that with successive terms, MEPs started their careers earlier in life, which, in his view, indicated that it ceased to be an adjunct to a career in national politics (2014, p. 1517). Similar conclusions cannot be drawn from the analysis of the Polish delegation, where the average age of MEPs in the period 2004–2019 (53 years) was higher than that for the EP as a whole (50 years). If we take into account that the average age of MPs in the comparable period (2001–2019) was 48, it becomes clear that such a high average age of Polish MEPs does not result from patterns shaped at the level of national politics. More significantly, between the 6th and 9th terms, the average age of Polish MEPs increased from 50 to 57. At the same time, the average age of all MEPs was stable; it increased marginally from 49 to 50 years (Fig. 4.1). An additional indicator linking the age structure to career paths is the percentage of senior MEPs. It can be assumed, which Whitaker did, that the higher number of senior MEPs (he adopted the threshold of 65 years) within a delegation argues for considering an MEP’s mandate as the culmination of a political career, a kind of political retirement. It should be borne in mind, however, that differences in this regard among delegations—as in the case of the average age—may be due to different 1  On the basis of the biographs compiled for Members of the 9th European Parliament (and thus also for those who had sat in the EP earlier but were re-elected to the 9th EP). 2  According to the EP statistical service, the average for the 1st EP term was lower at 50.4 years.

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58 56 54 52 50 48 46

1st

2nd

3rd

4th EP

5th

6th

7th

8th

9th

Polish delegation

Fig. 4.1  The average age of Polish MEPs compared to that for the whole EP. (Source: The author’s own work based on EP data and The youngest MEPs, European Parliamentary Research Service, https://epthinktank.eu/2014/05/09/ the_youngest_meps/ (access: 20.04.2022); European Parliament: Facts and Figures, European Parliament, Briefing, November 2014; Members of the European Parliament, 2019–2024, At a Glance Infographic, European Parliament, 2019)

patterns of political careers in different countries. In some of them, a high proportion of seniors may be a natural phenomenon. In order to verify this in relation to members of the Polish delegation, I compared the percentage of senior MEPs in the composition of the Polish delegation with the analogous data for the Sejm in a similar period (2005–2019). In the 1st EP term, the percentage of MEPs aged 65 and over was 10%. Thirty  years later (2009), it dropped to 4% (Whitaker, 2014, p.  1517). These latter figures are somewhat questionable, especially in view of the fact that for the 8th EP term, other authors report a figure of 11% of MEPs aged over 64 (Cappelle et al., 2015, p. 22).3 To be on the safe side, let us adopt this higher value, which, however, means that the percentage of all senior MEPs is not declining, as Whitaker writes, but remains stable. The corresponding value for the 2004–2019 period for the Polish delegation is almost 20%, which is almost twice the average for the EP as a whole. Only the Estonian and Slovenian delegations showed a higher percentage of seniors, but it should be stressed that these are small delegations (6 and 3  The authors estimate the percentage of MEPs aged over 64 in the Polish delegation at 17.3%. I corrected this figure on the basis of my own calculations to 19.6%. In contrast, Beauvallet-Haddad, Michon, Lepaux, and Monicolle (2016, p. 111) estimate the total number of MEPs aged 65 and more for all EP terms at 12.5%

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8 MEPs respectively), which means that every single change in their case significantly alters the parameters. At the same time, that is, from the 5th term to the 8th term of the Sejm (2005–2019), the percentage of MPs aged 65 and more was only 4%. Thus, the difference between the Polish delegation in the EP and the composition of the Polish Sejm is radical, which proves that such a high percentage of senior MEPs within the Polish delegation cannot be explained by the patterns prevailing in Polish politics. Taking into account the age structure and the emerging trends in the average age, it can be concluded that in the case of Poland, an MEP’s mandate is regarded as a continuation of a career in national politics rather than an autonomous career path.

The Length of Holding a Seat in the EP Scarrow (1997) focused on the seniority of MEPs as a determinant of the career path model. She used a simple division of MEPs into ‘long-termers’ and ‘short-termers’, dividing the possible maximum duration of sitting in the EP in half. She also assumed that the higher the percentage of long-­ termers, the more professional the career path model. When short-termers dominate within a national delegation, this indicates that a MEP mandate is only a complement to a national career. As Scarrow analysed only the first three terms of the EP, she regarded as long-termers those MEPs who had held seats in the EP for at least 1.5 terms (7  years), and as short-­ termers those who had held their mandates for a shorter period. For the purposes of this chapter, I decided to slightly expand this model. I defined long-termers as those Polish MEPs who had served at least three terms, and short-termers as those who had served only one term. In the new category of mid-termers, I included the remaining MEPs, that is those who had served more than one term but fewer than three.4 Again, new MEPs elected in 2019 for the 9th term of the EP were excluded from the calculation, as it was impossible to predict how much seniority they would have in the future. The breakdown into the three distinguished categories is shown in Fig. 4.2. The calculations comprise 122 Polish MEPs sitting in the EP during its 6th, 7th and 8th terms. As shown in Fig. 4.2, the vast majority of members of the Polish delegation held their mandate for only one term or part 4  These are not only MEPs who served two terms, but also those who served one whole term and a part of the following term.

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10

20

30 Long-termers

40

50 Mid-termers

60

70

80

90

100

Short-termers

Fig. 4.2  The career paths of members of the Polish delegation based on the duration of holding a seat in the EP (%). (Source: the author’s own work based on official EP data)

of a term. Compared to the figures reported by Whitaker for the first six terms of the EP as a whole (60%), there is a clear over-representation of short-termers in the Polish delegation: they constitute as many as 66% of all Polish MEPs to date. This is an indication that for the vast majority of them, a career in the EP is a short-term episode rather than a mainstream career. Only slightly more than 17% of members of the Polish delegation can be considered professional MEPs for whom the EP is either a target career model or at least a long-term stage in their overall career. Analysing the seniority of Polish MEPs, one should also refer to the two categories proposed by van Geffen (2016, p. 1018) and distinguished within the category of short-termers: ‘one-off’ MEPs, previously not involved in politics, and former politicians. The status of ‘one-off’ MEPs, neither previously nor subsequently connected to politics, can be attributed to 9% of members of the Polish delegation, while the status of short-­ termers can be attributed to 57% of Polish MEPs. According to van Graffen, the size of the latter group is particularly significant, as it is related to the specific recognition of an MEP’s career as a political reward and at the same time as an ‘interlude’ in a national political career. It should also be borne in mind that a career path is a complex construct within which almost no MEP has full control over its course, and most of them become objects rather than subjects of the political mechanisms that elevate them to the EP or slam its doors in their face. Political parties remain doorkeepers (see Chap. 3), and it is their leadership that has the final say on whose name is put on an EP electoral list and whose name will be put on the list high enough to give the candidate a chance to win

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a seat in the EP. Another external determinant, largely independent of the will and activity of MEPs, is electoral support for the list on which the candidate stands for election. Hence, the ‘ephemerality’ of an MEP’s career is in some cases due to the ephemeral nature of the success of certain political parties in EP elections. In Poland, such a situation could be observed in the case of five parties (Freedom Union; Social Democracy of Poland, League of Polish Families, Self-Defence, Congress of the New Right) that managed to generate support allowing them to introduce their representatives to the EP in just one election. This factor accounts for over 1/3 of all short-term careers of Polish MEPs. The same can be said of MEPs who, as a result of an intra-party conflict, left the ranks of the party that potentially could offer them a chance to prolong their careers in the EP. If they returned to the bosom of the mother party—as in the case of the MEPs belonging to United Poland—then they reactivated their chances for a continued career in the EP. In the other cases, which comprise about 5% of MEPs’ short-term careers, a switching to a party with less potential had the effect of burying their chances for re-election. The case of Ryszard Czarnecki was an exceptionally opposite situation, where an MEP representing a party that would probably disappear from the EP (Self-Defence) moved to a party that offered him a chance to remain in the EP for another term (Law and Justice, PiS). Another element determining the length of an MEP’s career is their will to continue it. Chapter 6 presents detailed data on both re-election and the percentage of MEPs who decided to run for a seat in the EP for another term. These data show that almost 67% of MEPs actively confirmed their intention to prolong their political careers and participated in subsequent elections.5 If we focus on short-term careers only, from within this group of MEPs, more than half (53%) unsuccessfully sought re-­ election to the EP, some even twice. According to the nomenclature and typology adopted by Daniel (2015), these are MEPs oriented towards a longer career in the EP, but for reasons beyond their control or partly beyond their control, they did not obtain re-election. In this group, Daniel also included those who did not run for re-election but had the intention to do so. Such a situation took place, for example, in the 2009 elections, 5  W. Daniel refers to the declarative formula for an MEP to confirm their will to continue the political career. Hence, besides those running for election, he also includes MEPs who, although they did not ultimately seek re-election, had declared that they wanted to run (Daniel, 2015, p. 25).

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when the authorities of PiS deleted Marcin Libicki from the list of the party’s candidates for MEPs (Wybranowski, 2009). However, it is not possible to determine the actual scale of this phenomenon, as a large proportion of MPs resign ‘of their own free will’ when they cannot hope for a good place on an electoral list. All in all, the conditions taken into account here prove that such a clear domination of short-lived careers within the Polish delegation is due to not so much MEPs’ lack of interest in continuing their career paths in the European Parliament as their inability to do so. This state of affairs should first and foremost be blamed on the characteristic features of the Polish party system, and more specifically, on the dominant recruitment model which is hierarchical (often obsequious), based on the domination of tactical goals over strategic ones. This factor should also be taken into account when analysing and assessing long-term careers. This is a small group, as the most professional career path can be attributed to just over 17% of the Polish delegation’s members. In this group, only six MEPs (3.8% of the total) can demonstrate success in all four EP elections to date. While some general features of the career paths of members of the Polish MEP delegation can be confirmed based on seniority, it is the political party that primarily determines the model of these paths. Potential differences in this respect can be verified based on data concerning the following two parties: PO (60 MEPs) and PiS (51 MEPs). The number of MEPs from the other parties is so small that it makes it impossible to draw any responsible conclusions. Juxtaposing the data for both parties shows that the division into the three designated career categories, that is, long-­ termers, mid-termers and short-termers, follows a similar pattern with regard to the representation of both parties in the EP over the three parliamentary terms under analysis. The differences are slight, with the short-­ term career model dominating in both parties, but more clearly in PiS (66%) than in PO (62%). Jarosław Kaczyński’s party has more short-lived career paths and significantly fewer long-lived ones (12%) than PO (21%). Overall, however, the differences are not large, which may prove that there are unifying factors at the national level for career paths, these being institutional, cultural and political patterns similar for most parties, regardless of the fundamental ideological and structural differences among them.

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A Career Before the European Parliament One would like to say that, with regard to the Polish delegation, the strong representation of prominent politicians is already noticeable at first sight. Figure  4.3 shows the percentage of MEPs who previously held a public office at the national or local level. This time my calculations include the Members of the 9th European Parliament because, with regard to them, we also know ‘where they are coming from’, although they are not taken into consideration in the analysis of post-PE careers as we do not know ‘where they are going to’. The largest part of this group is former parliamentarians, most notably MPs (Fig. 4.3). The over-representation of MPs is clear, although to some extent understandable given that the Polish Sejm is more than four times the size of the Senate. However, it is also apparent in relative comparisons. Limiting the calculations to the simple ratio of the number of MEPs who previously sat in the Polish Parliament to the constitutional number of MPs (460) and the same ratio for former senators (100), we obtain 19.8% and 13% respectively. The difference is not dramatic, but evident. Willy Beauvallet-Haddad et  al. (2016, p.  112) made a similar breakdown of MEPs, taking into account their political past. However, their estimates should be treated with caution. Since the authors took the 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Parliamentarians

Ministers Poland

Local politicians CEE

No political position

EU (15)

Fig. 4.3  MEPs and their positions held before winning a seat in the EP*: the Polish delegation vis-à-vis the other countries’ delegations* The data for the first eight terms of the EP; the data do not add up to 100% as individual MEPs held several positions. (Source: The author’s own work based on the data of the PE, the Sejm, the National Electoral Commission (and others); Beauvallet-Haddad, Michon, Lepaux, Monicolle (2016, p. 113))

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trouble to check the past of MEPs from all Member States, in many cases their data are incorrect, Polish MEPs being a case in point. These reservations are necessary in order to treat the data presented below (Fig. 4.3) as indicative only. The conclusions drawn from the data presented in Fig. 4.3 are worth commenting on in those cases where the greatest disparities between Polish delegation and the delegations of the comparative states become apparent: 1. The dominance of former parliamentarians is also characteristic of the delegations representing Poland and all other states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), which at the same time clearly distinguishes them from the delegations of Western and Southern European countries; 2. The percentage of former ministers within the Polish delegation is roughly halfway between those of the Western European countries and the CEE countries. It should be emphasised that these figures also include former secretaries and undersecretaries of state and former ministers in the Chancellery of the President of Poland; 3. The Polish delegation is underrepresented by the category of former local politicians. In this respect, it clearly diverges from the CEE countries as a whole and sharply diverges from the Western European countries. What generally draws attention in relation to the earlier stage of the career path of Polish MEPs is the dominance of former parliamentarians. In this context, it is worth remembering the main theses of the work by Karlheiz Reif and Hermann Schmitt (1980, p. 19), who considered EP and local government elections as of secondary importance, in contrast to national parliamentary elections (regarded as of primary importance). According to this logic, the Sejm, the Senate and other organs of state authorities should constitute the main goal of political ambitions, while local government institutions and the EP should be a stage on the way to them. This logic is confirmed by the career paths of MEPs from the Western European countries (Fig.  4.3). This may indicate that in the Polish delegation, MEPs’ career paths have been built into the structure of party career paths more strongly than in other delegations, which indicates that an MEP’s mandate is a form of reward or political retirement.

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These findings are fully in line with the conclusions reached by András Bíró-Nagy, who, examining the career paths of MEPs from the CEE countries, concluded that ‘Central European MEPs are more strongly linked to national politics than the MEPs of the EU-15, and they are even more embedded in their countries of origin than the MEPs of the first directly elected EP were in 1979’ (Bíró-Nagy, 2019).

A Career After the European Parliament In order to determine which of these planes of interpretation is more justified, it is necessary to complement the findings concerning the career paths of members of the Polish delegation leading them to the EP with findings on their subsequent careers after the expiry of their mandates as MEPs. From the analysis concerning ‘post-EP activity’, it was necessary to exclude those MEPs whose careers comprised 1 EP term or 2 EP terms and were still in progress. [?] This is because it is difficult to determine into which category they should be classified. The situation is different for MEPs who have sat in the EP for three and more terms, because they can be classified as representing the (third) model of professional MEPs. The exclusion also comprised two MEPs who died or were killed during a parliamentary term (Filip Adwent †2005; Bronisław Geremek †2008). The model in which a seat in the EP is a form of political retirement can be assigned based on the age of an MP. This issue has already been analysed. Following Whitaker, I recognise as seniors those MEPs who won their mandate at the age of 65 and over. The average for the Polish delegation is 20%, which is almost twice as high as the European average. Using a slightly different method of calculation, instead of an average for each term, I will establish the percentage of MEPs who were 60 and over at the time of winning a seat in the EP for the first time. The aim is to avoid a situation where an MEP starting their career in the EP at the age of 40 (the sixth term), holding a seat for three consecutive terms and winning it again in the ninth term is regarded as a ‘political retiree’. Therefore, what is taken into account is only the age of an MEP at the beginning of their presence in the EP. About 10% of all MEPs winning a mandate for the first time were 65 or older. If this threshold is lowered to 60 years, a quarter of the Polish delegation meets this criterion. It should be stressed that this is not an assessment of MEPs’ efficiency, diligence or competence. It is merely an assumption that starting the career of an MEP at the age of 65,

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or even five years earlier, makes it the culmination of an overall political career rather than one of its stages. And this is what Daniel meant by singling out the model of an MEP’s mandate as political retirement. The second model is ‘an MEP’s mandate as a springboard for a career in national politics’. Distinguishing this category requires tracing former MEPs’ subsequent careers. For this purpose, three categories will be identified: (1) promotion; (2) return to an equivalent position; (3) demotion. Thus, if the ranking of the positions or offices held after the expiry of an MEP’s mandate is clearly higher than that of the positions or offices held before winning a seat in the EP, this model can be considered to be the case. From the total pool of data, we can only classify 75 MEPs, or 59% of the total sample, to these categories. This is because it is not possible to take into account MEPs who still held seats in the EP during its 9th term; died while holding a mandate; withdrew from political life after the expiry of their mandate. The last of these categories is the most questionable because the end of a political career often results from the lack of other options. Some MEPs in this group probably fall into the third category, as leaving politics reflects a decline in their status. However, it is impossible to determine how numerous this group is, and it would be absurd to assume that the end of a political career always means a decline in ranking. In order to be able to estimate the different categories of post-PE careers, it was necessary to adopt a certain (necessarily conventional) hierarchy of positions: a non-parliamentary politician, local government politician, member of the national parliament (MP, senator), secretary of state, minister, prime minister, president. If a politician holds a lower-ranking position before winning an MEP’s mandate and a higher-ranking position after leaving the EP, this is classified as a promotion. If a career goes the other way, it is classified as a demotion. If the positions held by a politician before and after the period of sitting in the EP are the same or equivalent, the status quo is maintained. We can speak of a promotion in the case of 11% of the Polish MEPs; 24% of them experienced a demotion and 23% maintained their status quo. These data show that a career as an MEP does not entail great threats to the course of a political career, as in 33% of cases, it allows one to return to national politics under previous or better conditions. However, for 24% of the Polish MEPs, returning to national politics meant a decline in their political status. These data cannot be fully interpreted based on a qualitative analysis, while a quantitative analysis becomes unavailable due to the limited number of available cases. However, taking into account the

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previous findings, this should be considered as another indication to assume that the dominant career model of MEPs is to treat a mandate as the culmination of a career in national politics. Most of the cases where a decline in ranking can be observed in the post-EP period concern two categories of MEPs. The first category comprises MEPs representing parties that have lost prominence in national politics and, consequently, are incapable of offering attractive positions to former MEPs. The other one includes senior MEPs for whom a political demotion after the expiry of their mandate is due to the natural cycle of leaving politics. The data on MEPs who could count on being promoted or maintaining the previous status quo after their career in the EP should also be looked at in the context of previous findings. These are mostly short-termers for whom a seat in the EP is only an interlude in their careers in national politics.

Attractiveness of an MEP’s Mandate in the Structure of a Career Path The final element of this analysis is determining the scale of mutual switches between the EP and prominent positions in national politics. Such positions include the offices of president, ministers, secretaries and undersecretaries of state, members of parliament and senators. If the scale of switches is clearly greater in one direction (in favour of national politics, at the expense of the EP, or in favour of the EP, at the expense of positions in national politics), it will make it possible to draw certain conclusions concerning the attractiveness of an MEP’s mandate in relation to positions in national politics. In this context, a switch will be understood as the phenomenon of leaving one position to take up another. Therefore, it will not be a switch if a politician holds a position in national politics, loses it and after some time wins a seat in the EP. Similarly, it will not be a switch if an MEP is not re-­ elected and later takes up an important office in national politics. Figure 4.4 shows the huge disproportion between the inflow to and outflow from the EP when considering switches between the EP and the organs of state power. Between the years of 2004–2019, there were 84 cases in which the representatives of state authorities in Poland abandoned their offices to take up an MEP’s mandate. They were the most often a member of the Sejm (63 cases6), less often a senator (11 cases) or a 6

 Ten other MEPs simultaneously held positions in the government.

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Switches to EP

Switches from EP -20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Fig. 4.4  The scale of switching between the EP and governing bodies in Poland. (Source: Author’s own calculation based on the EP and Sejm data)

member of the government (deputy prime minister, minister, secretary of state) (10 cases). On the other hand, there were only 10 cases of abandoning a seat in the EP in favour of an attractive position in national politics. There was only one case of exchanging an EP seat for a parliamentary seat (Wojciech Wierzejski in 2005). The remaining cases involved taking up the office of President of the Republic of Poland (Andrzej Duda), the office of minister (six cases) and the position of secretary of state at the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland (two cases). The above data allow for comparing an MEP’s mandate with public positions in Poland in terms of their attractiveness. They show that a mandate of an MEP is definitely more desirable than a mandate of a member of the Sejm or the Senate. The disproportion in terms of switches between the EP and the Polish Parliament is just glaring. A comparison between the attractiveness of an MEP’s mandate and a position in the government looks slightly different. As it has already been mentioned, so far in the Polish delegation to the EP there have been ten cases of leaving a governmental office for a seat in the EP and eight cases of giving up an MEP’s mandate in order to take up the office of minister or secretary of state (in the government or in the President’s Chancellery). The difference is not great, but it clearly indicates the greater attractiveness of an MEP’s mandate. It is not so clear, however, if we pay attention to the time when the switches representing both categories took place. On average, decisions to give up an MEP’s mandate in favour of a position in the government were taken 2.6 years before the end of an EP term. On the other hand, decisions to abandon a ministerial post in favour of an MEP’s mandate were taken half a year before the end of a term of the Sejm (and thus of a given

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government). Therefore, it can be concluded that a governmental position becomes more attractive than a mandate of an MEP, provided that the perspective of its holding is at least as long as the time remaining until the end of an EP term. If we compare the two parties with the numerous representations in the EP, that is, PiS and PO, which can boast of exactly the same number of MEP mandate holders (48) during the 6th to 9th terms of the EP, clear differences emerge. Switches from national politics to the EP are particularly frequent in the case of PiS. As many as 37 MPs representing PiS (77%) took up an MEP’s mandate after vacating a position in national politics. In the case of PO, it was 21 MEPs, or 44% of the total. This proves that although one can speak of a general model with regard to the whole Polish delegation, significant differences can be observed within it. If we consider the second-order status of the EP to be equivalent to the lower significance of MEPs in politics, then, from the point of view of Polish politicians, it is difficult to regard the move to Brussels in terms of promotion. Becoming an MEP means a rapid ‘disappearance’ from national politics and a radical decrease in exposure in the media and in public perception. The latter is clearly visible in the monthly reports of the Centre for Public Opinion Research (CBOS). Examining the level of trust in leading politicians in May 2019, the CBOS (2019a) listed five politicians who had won seats in the EP.  Six months later (CBOS, 2019b), only one person from this group was included in the list; a year after the elections (CBOS, 2020), none of them was recognised as enjoying the trust of the public. These findings should be seen as a strong argument in favour of the Polish delegation’s being dominated by the career path model under which an MEP’s mandate is a political party’s reward for its activist’s achievements at the national level. The attractiveness of MEPs’ salaries becomes crucial within this system. In the 6th term, a MEP’s salary was set at the level of a salary received by a member of the parliament in an MEP’s home country. In accordance with the EP’s decision, preceded by an opinion of an expert group established in 2000, in 2009 the remuneration of all MEPs was equalised at the level of 38.5% of the basic salary of a judge of the European Court of Justice (DUUE 2005). From the point of view of Polish MEPs, this radically increased the financial attractiveness of an MEP’s mandate, more than compensating for the inconvenience of the remoteness of the workplace (PSL_2; Migalski, 2014, p. 167). It is worthwhile at this point to cite Daniel’s research, which indicates an ambiguous effect of the attractiveness of an MEP’s salary on the

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attractiveness of an MEP’s mandate (Daniel, 2015, p. 51). Daniel points out that an assessment of the changes in MEPs’ remuneration system depends on the standard of living in their country of origin: the poorer the country, the greater the attractiveness of an MEP’s career caused by the changes introduced in 2009. Daniel eventually concludes that the impact of the increase in the salaries of MEPs representing Poland and other ‘poorer countries’ on the overall attractiveness of an MEP’s mandate is significant (Daniel, 2015, p. 144). From the perspective of a Polish politician, the lucrativeness of an MEP’s mandate is determined by not only a very high salary, but also a system of allowances and additional payments, for example, for office maintenance or pension security. All in all, as former MEP Marek Migalski put it, ‘these are really powerful sums (roughly ten times greater than those available to an MP in the Sejm of the Republic of Poland)’ (Migalski, 2014, p. 42).

Conclusions The findings of the next part of the analysis provide grounds for a positive verification of the hypothesis according to which the Polish delegation to the EP is dominated by the career model in which an MEP’s mandate is an element of secondary importance in comparison to a career in national politics. All the partial conclusions indicate that the model in which an MEP’s mandate is regarded as an add-on to a career in national politics is clearly dominant within the Polish delegation. The first part proves that an MEP’s mandate is to some extent a form of political retirement. Referring to the most elaborate theoretical framework proposed by Daniel, it can be concluded that the Polish delegation is closest to the model in which an MEP’s mandate is treated as a kind of political retirement. The second part, in which MEPs’ seniority constitutes the basis for formulating conclusions, is complementary to these findings. It considers the model of a short-lived career as the opposite of a professional career, autonomous from a career in national politics. Inspired by Scarrow’s proposal, I have shown that among the three distinguished categories, shorttermers constitute the largest group among Polish MEPs. Also van Geffen’s proposal according to which a seat in the EP is a reward for political activity at the national level supports my conclusions and perfectly harmonises with the dominant pattern of career paths within the Polish delegation.

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The third part shows the structure of positions held by Polish MEPs before taking up their mandates. The dominant group within the Polish delegation is former parliamentarians (62%), and within this group, there are more former MPs than Senators. This category clearly distinguishes the Polish delegation from the delegations of Western European countries, but the situation in the delegations of other Central and Eastern European countries is similar. There are relatively few former ministers within the Polish delegation, which is particularly visible in comparison with the other CEE countries. On the other hand, however, there are far fewer former ministers within the EP delegations of the Western European countries. The most underrepresented category within the Polish delegation is former local government officials. There are far fewer of them than in the delegations of the other CEE countries and radically fewer than in the delegations of the Western European countries. One can conclude from this that an MEP’s mandate is perceived in Polish politics as very attractive and, at the same time, available primarily to politicians with an established position at the national level. Thus, this is another indication that, with respect to career paths, a seat in the EP is perceived as a reward or political retirement. The last element of the analysis, which focuses on the scale of switches between positions in Polish national politics and the EP, shows a huge disproportion in this respect. The number of those abandoning parliamentary and governmental positions in favour of an MEP’s mandate is radically higher (84 cases) than those abandoning an MEP’s mandate in favour of political positions and offices in Poland (10). This demonstrates that a seat in the EP is more attractive than a position in national politics. This is particularly true of seats in the Sejm, and less so of positions in the government. It is difficult to find many arguments justifying this state of affairs. One, however, is undeniable—the difference in salaries between national politicians and MEPs. This is further proof that an MEP’s mandate is often treated instrumentally as a lucrative position offering a high salary, a system of allowances, subsidies for office maintenance and retirement security. * * * In summarising and synthesising all the elements of the analysis, it should be stated that they form a coherent picture of career paths of Polish MEPs. These careers are of secondary importance vis-à-vis careers in national

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politics and to a large extent are compatible with the logic of party politics according to which an MEP’s mandate is an attractive reward or comfortable political retirement.

References Beauvallet-Haddad, W., Michon, S., Lepaux, V., & Monicolle, C. (2016). The Changing Composition of the European Parliament: MEPs from 1979 to 2014. French Politics, 14(1), 101–125. Bíró-Nagy, A. (2019). The Career Paths of Central European MEPs. Political Experience and Career Ambitions in the European Parliament. Romanian Journal of Political Science, 19(1), 87–115. Brahiroli, S. (2008). Home Sweet Home: Assessing the Weight and the Effectiveness of National Parties’ Interference on MEPs’ Everyday Activity. SEI Working Paper, no. 1008. Cappelle, L., Pittoors, G., & Van Hecke, S. (2015, June). Seniors in the 2014 European Parliament Elections: Turnout, Voting Intentions and Representation. Wilfred Martens Centre for European Studies. Policy Brief. CBOS. (2019a). Zaufanie do polityków w maju, Komunikat z badań, no. 78/2019. CBOS. (2019b). Zaufanie do polityków w grudniu, Komunikat z badań, no. 162/2019. CBOS. (2020). Zaufanie do polityków na przełomie maja i czerwca, Komunikat z badań, no. 69/2020. Crano, W. D., & Brewer, M. B. (2002). Principles and Methods of Social Research (2nd ed.). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Daniel, W.  T. (2015). Career Behaviour and the European Parliament. Oxford University Press. Henn, M., Weinstein, M., & Foard, N. (2006). A Short Introduction to Social Research. SAGE Publications. Members of the European Parliament. (2019). European Parliament. Accessed May 20, 2020, from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ ATAG/2019/637976/EPRS_ATA(2019)637976_EN.pdf Meserve, S. A., Pemstein, D., & Bernhard, W. T. (2009). Political Ambition and Legislative Behavior in the European Parliament. The Journal of Politics, 71(3), 1015–1032. Migalski, M. (2014). Parlament ANTYeuropejski. The Facto. Reif, K., & Schmitt, H. (1980). Nine Second-Order National Elections—A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results. European Journal of Political Research, 8(1), 3–44. Scarrow, S.  E. (1997). Political Career Paths and the European Parliament. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22(2), 253–263.

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van Geffen, R. (2016). Impact of Career Paths on MEPs’ Activities. Journal of Common Market Studies, 54(4), 1017–1032. Whitaker, R. (2014). Tenure, Turnover and Careers in the European Parliament: MEPs as Policy-Seekers. Journal of European Public Policy, 21(10), 1509–1527. Wybranowski, W. (2009). PiS skreśliło Libickiego. Rzeczpospolita, 3(04), 2009.

PART II

Stability of the Delegation

CHAPTER 5

Electoral Stability Błazej Choroś

Introduction Research on the party system at the European level most often focuses on its transnational dimension, making political groups or European parties the object of analysis (Hix & Lord, 1997; Schmitt & Thomassen, 1999; Kreppel, 2001). The influence of national parties on European policymaking has also been highlighted in the literature on the subject (Gaffney, 1996; Ladrech, 1999; Berends, 2000; Hix et al., 2007, p. 314), but the assessment of this influence is no longer unambiguous. On the one hand, national political parties play a key role at the level of recruitment and selection of candidates for EP elections and in the process of political handling and supervision of ‘their own MEPs’. On the other hand, the predominant view among researchers of the phenomenon is that national parties are more of a barrier than a factor in the development of the The text presents the results of research funded under National Science Centre grant no. 2016/23/B/HS5/03750.

B. Choroś (*) University of Opole, Opole, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 K. Zuba (ed.), The Polish Delegation in the European Parliament, Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28271-3_5

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European party system and thus in the formation of a full representative democracy at the European level (Schmidt, 2006, p. 273). In connection with such a diagnosis, there are no calls for the abolition of national party systems, but rather for the strengthening of the autonomy of European parties and their affiliated political groups in the EP (Hix, 2008, p. 113). The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the electoral stability of the Polish national delegation in the EP and its determinants. The main axis of the analysis is the determination to what extent the stability of the Polish delegation is correlated with the national party system. Such an analysis will contribute to a fuller understanding of both the Polish delegation and the specific mechanisms of the unique party system operating in the European Union (Kostowska-Ga ̨stoł, 2013, p. 311). In research on political stability, two general approaches can be distinguished. In the first approach, stability is perceived in relation to some model, set of rules or state of the structure. Such a model establishes a contractual framework for what is regarded as a state of its stability and, by extension, a state of its destabilization (Ake, 1975, p. 274). In this sense, stability is seen as one of the indexes of the level of institutionalization of the system (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995, p. 4). In analyses of national parliaments, a clear relationship can be seen between the stability of a parliamentary representation and the stability of the relevant political system. Indeed, the instability of a given party present in the parliament will not only negatively affect its ability to perform legislative functions but may also translate into the instability of the current government. In the second sense, we can speak of policy stability. In research on the relationship between the number of parties in a government coalition and public policy stability (Colomer, 2012, p. 236), policy stability is defined as the volatility of the government’s ‘ideology’, that is, its position on selected programmatic issues based on particular partisan electoral agendas. In the case of the EP, with its lack of direct correlation between the election outcome and the composition of the European Commission and the Council of the European Union, as well as its pragmatic system of variable coalitions (Hix et al., 2005), such a relationship is of a completely different and much weaker character. The notion of stability will in this case be more strongly linked to the category of institutionalization related to the EU party system (Hix & Lord, 1997, p. 162). The main timeline along which measurements were carried out is that of subsequent elections. It is particular elections that constitute the main points of reference for detailed studies of structural stability, stability of inter-party rivalry and systemic

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conditions arising from electoral legislation; therefore, the category of electoral stability seems appropriate to use.

Data and Research Design Research on the EU party system refers to measurement tools used in the analysis of national systems (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Hix & Lord, 1997; Gwiazda, 2009). Thus, it seems legitimate to adopt them for the purposes of this analysis. In this case, the scope of the analysis will include the results of EP elections held in Poland, treated analogously to those of national elections. It is worth noting that in the case of the indexes relating to the parliamentary level (seats in the EP or the Sejm), the point of reference may be both committees running in the elections and groups of such committees divided according to their affiliation to political groups in the EP. The scope of the analysis results directly from the principles adopted for the whole book. The subject of the analysis is Poland’s delegation in the European Parliament from the first elections after Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004 until 2019. In the case of national elections, the subsequent elections to the Sejm preceding the respective EP elections (2001–2019) were taken into account. The analysis of the determinants of the electoral stability of the Polish delegation in the EP is based on the assumption of the existence of a relationship between the dynamics of stability at the national level and the dynamics of stability at the European level. The existence of such a relationship is indicated by previous research on European Parliament (EP) elections, and more specifically their second-order status and the conditioning of electoral decisions by considerations based on national politics (Hix & Lord, 1997, p. 88). The conclusions of this analysis will indicate the level of cohesion between the electoral stability of a parliamentary delegation at the national level and the electoral stability of Polish national delegation in the EP. The analysis will be conducted on the three main planes of structural stability, stability of inter-party rivalry and systemic conditions. Structural stability refers to the national delegation in the EP as a product of a specific party and electoral system, that is, the number of parties winning seats out of all those running, the translation of votes won into seats, the fragmentation of the party system and the power relations among parties. Structural stability was measured using three tools: an

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analysis of the dynamics of the number of participants in the party system, the index of the effective number of parties (ENP) (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979) and the party power index (Blondel, 1968). In order to better compare the variability of these indexes over time and to compare them at the European and national levels, their coefficient of variation was used. The stability of inter-party rivalry refers to the ideological identity of party system participants and its relations over time to party preferences. In the case of the members of a national delegation in the EP, ideological identity is strongly linked to the ideological positions of political groups in the EP (Kreppel, 2001, p. 751). Change over time in party preferences, on the other hand, is measured by the volatility index indicating the stability of the distribution of party preferences (Mair, 2005, p.  12) and its coefficient of variation. Systemic determinants, or differences in legislation applicable to national and European elections, will also significantly affect the indexes mentioned above. These will be analysed in terms of the system of constituencies, the rules for converting votes into seats, the electoral threshold and the types of electoral lists.

Structural Stability The first point to consider when analysing the stability of a given system is the dynamics of the number of its participants. As Table 5.1 shows, in the case of EP elections held in Poland, the number of committees winning seats varied from eight in 2004 to three in 2019. In contrast, in terms of the number of political groups to which Polish members of the European Parliament (MEPs) belonged during the constituent session, with the exception of the first EP election in 2004, seats were won exclusively by representatives of three political families: the Christian Democrats, the Socialists and the Eurosceptic Conservatives (UEN and subsequently ECR). Some MEPs remained unaffiliated during the constituent session. In 2004, this was the case for all six Self-defence MEPs, and in 2014, four MEPs representing the New Right Congress. The 2004 elections were exceptional in terms of the dispersion of votes among election committees. Eight election committees won seats, and during the constituent session Polish MEPs belonged to as many as five political groups in the EP. MEPs from the Civic Platform (PO) and the Polish People’s Party (PSL) joined the ranks of the European People’s Party (EPP). MEPs representing the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), the

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Table 5.1  The numbers of committees/groups represented in both the Sejm and the national delegation in the EP (exclusive of independents) 2001 2004 2005 2007 2009 2011 2014 2015 2019 Committees with seats in the Sejm Committees with seats in the EP divided by EP political group membership Election committees with seats in the EP Political groups with seats in the EP ENPs PE ENPv PE ENPs Sejm ENPv Sejm Percentage of seats won by EPP + socialists + ECR

7

7

5

6

6

6

–a

4

3

3

3

3

3.6 4.5 80%

8

4

5

3

5

3

3

3

6.13 7.52

2.75 3.40

3.34 4.41

63%

4.25 2.82 3 5.86 3.32 3.74 80% 100% 100% 91% 92%

2.21 2.77 2.75 2.76 4.45 3.41 85% 100% EP 97% Sejm

ENPs Effective Number of Parties (seats), ENPv Effective Number of Parties (votes) Poland had not been a Member State yet

a

Social Democracy of Poland (SdPl) and the Labour Union (UP) joined the ranks of the Socialists. MEPs belonging to the Law and Justice party (PiS) selected the Union for Europe of Nations (UEN) as their political group. MEP mandates were also won by representatives of the Freedom Union (UW) and the League of Polish Families (LPR), who joined the ranks of the Liberals (ALDE) and the Independence and Democracy group, respectively, while MEPs belonging to the Self-defence remained unaffiliated at the beginning of the term. In the 2009 elections, seats were won by representatives of the election committees established by the PO, PiS, PSL and SLD-UP.  They joined three EP political groups, in accordance with the pattern mentioned above. MEPs from the PO and PSL became part of the EPP group, the SLD-UP coalition became part of the Socialists and Democrats (which had changed its name during the course of the term), and MEPs representing the PiS joined the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, which had been established after the split of the UEN group. The same pattern was followed in 2014, when seats in the EP were also won by

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members of the election committee of the New Right Congress, who, however, did not affiliate themselves with any political group at the beginning of the term. In the 2019 elections, MEP mandates were won by representatives of three election committees, who joined three political groups functioning in the EP. Besides the PiS, whose MEPs once again joined the ECR group, seats were also won by representatives of the Spring, which had run in the EP elections for the first time. Its members joined the Socialists. The S & D group was also joined by a few MEPs running from the broad electoral list put forward by the European Coalition, which had been established by the PO and the PSL, the liberal Modern party (M), as well as the left-wing SLD and the Green party. The other MEPs elected from this list accessed the EPP group. For Sejm elections, the number of committees winning seats in the lower house ranged from five (the 2007 elections) to seven (the elections held in 2001 and 2005). If the committees running in national elections are divided according to their affiliation to EP factions, the number of entities operating within the system is very similar: four entities in the 2005 elections and three entities in all subsequent ones. The obvious cohesion between the European and national levels is also confirmed by the percentage of seats won by the parties belonging to the political groups constituting the core of the Polish delegation in the EP: the EPL, Socialists and Conservatives. In EP elections, these parties won 63% (2004), 100% (2009), 92% (2014) and 100% (2019) of seats, respectively, while in Sejm elections—80% (2001), 80% (2005), 100% (2007), 91% (2011), 85% (2015) and 97% (2019) of seats, respectively. Visible on the national political scene since 2007, the dominance of the parties belonging to the aforementioned European political families is reflected in the composition of the Polish delegation in the EP. It is also worth looking at the parties that won seats in EP elections only incidentally and those that won seats in the Sejm, but were unable to establish themselves in the EP. The first group includes the Union of Freedom, the Self-Defence and the League of Polish Families, all of which managed to win MEP mandates in the 2004 elections only, and the Congress of New Right (KNP) under the leadership of Janusz Korwin-Mikke, which managed to introduce its representatives to the EP in 2014. After the 2007 elections, the UW, Self-Defence and LPR lost significance on the national political scene. The UW, which had transformed itself into the Democratic Party,

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won only three seats in the Sejm after an election campaign run by the Left and Democrats coalition dominated by the SLD, while the Self-Defence and the LPR did not succeed in crossing the electoral threshold. In the subsequent EP elections held in 2009, the parties that in the previous elections had won 40% of the seats in the Polish delegation did not win a single mandate. The marginalization of these groupings was highlighted by the fact that only the Self-defence had run under its own banner. The Democratic Party had put its candidates on the broad Centre-Left electoral list, the LPR completely disappeared from the political scene, and its former MEPs tried unsuccessfully to win seats from the list of Libertas, an ephemeral pan- and Eurosceptic party, which in the 2009 elections managed to establish and register EP election committees in 14 EU Member States. In the 2014 elections, the New Right Congress won a few seats in the EP, but the party factually disintegrated the following year. The second group comprises the Palikot Movement, established by Janusz Palikot, a scandal-loving former member of the then ruling party (PO), who had won a seat in the Sejm in the 2011 elections, the anti-­ system Kukiz’15 party and the Modern party of Ryszard Petru, which both entered the Sejm after the 2015 elections. Your Movement (formerly the Palikot Movement) and Kukiz’15 are considered typical examples of ‘entrepreneurial parties’ in the Polish party system (Kostowska-Ga ̨stoł & Sobolewska-Myślik, 2019, p.  97). Both groupings were formed shortly before national elections and achieved relative success, winning 8.7% (the Palikot Movement in 2011) and 9.13% (Kukiz’15  in October 2015) of seats in the national parliament. In the European elections following the respective national elections, both parties failed to cross the electoral threshold, receiving 3.58% (Your Movement in 2014) and 3.69% (Kukiz’15 in May 2019) of votes. The defeat in the European elections caused a gradual disintegration of Your Movement. Before the 2015 Sejm elections, it joined a broad left-wing coalition, which, however, failed to cross the electoral threshold. A similar process occurred in the case of Kukiz’15, which was abandoned by some MPs after the party’s defeat in the EP elections. Before the 2019 parliamentary elections, the grouping had decided to run under the banner of the Polish People’s Party. Kukiz’15 candidates won six seats in the elections, but the grouping itself largely lost its subjectivity and its presence in the Sejm was reduced to a parliamentary circle of just four MPs. The fortunes of the Modern party were somewhat different. It entered the 2019 European elections in the main opposition bloc, which was the

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consequence of running on joint lists together with the PO in the 2018 local elections. In conclusion, it can be noted that the dynamics of events on the national political scene had a visible impact on the Polish delegation in the European Parliament. With strong positions in that scene, the relevant parties always won seats in the EP elections, which cannot be said about smaller, often ephemeral groupings, which only occasionally managed to win a seat or two in the EP. The MPs representing the PO, PiS, PSL and SLD, who held 90.6% of the seats in the Sejm between 2004 and 2019, controlled 88.75% of the seats allocated to the Polish delegation in the EP during the same period. At the same time, the fate of the Palikot Movement and Kukiz’15 after their defeats in the European elections shows that there is an analogous, although undoubtedly weaker, mechanism of influence operating in the opposite direction. These considerations omit two groupings: the Spring, which won seats in the EP elections held in May 2019 but merged with the Democratic Left Alliance before the parliamentary elections of the same year, and Confederation, which was established only in 2019. Although these groupings, unlike those analysed above, have not been marginalized on the national political scene, their short periods of existence make it impossible to draw conclusions based on their electoral results. Fragmentation The number of parties winning seats is an important but insufficient measure for describing a party system. From the national perspective, the fragmentation of the party system is very important. It affects a number of elements of the political system, including stability understood as the stability of the executive branch (Taylor & Herman, 1971, p. 37). The most widely used measure of electoral system fragmentation is the index called the effective number of parties (ENP) proposed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). For the purposes of this chapter, the values of the index were compared in both the parliamentary dimension (based on the number of seats won) and the electoral dimension (based on the number of votes won). As Fig. 5.1 shows, with the exception of the 2004 EP elections, the ENP values are very similar at both the parliamentary (ENPs) and electoral (ENPv) levels with respect to elections to both the Sejm and the EP.

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This significant difference, visible during Poland’s first elections to the EP, can be explained by the fact that eight election committees won seats, including the Eurosceptic groupings of the LPR and the Self-defence. In the 2004 EP elections, the LPR won 15.92% of votes, twice as much as in the Sejm elections held in 2001 (7.87% of votes) and 2005 (7.97% of votes). The result of the Self-defence in the 2004 EP elections was 10.78% of the popular vote. These successes were largely conditioned by two factors. Firstly, the pre-accession campaign, which gave high exposure to Eurosceptic views. Secondly, the very short period that elapsed between Poland’s accession to the EU and the first EP elections, which did not allow for the verification of the concerns about and benefits of EU membership (Zuba, 2015, p. 27). It seems that for these reasons it is possible to treat the 2004 elections as a special case and look at the relationship between fragmentation at the national and European levels, first including them in the analysis and then excluding them from it. The preliminary conclusions drawn from Fig.  5.1 are confirmed by comparing the average value and the coefficient of variation (V) for the effective number of parties at the national and European levels. With the 2004 elections excluded, the average ENPs is 2.76 for the European level and 3.19 for the national level, with V of 20.43% and 20.6% respectively. In contrast, the average ENPv is 3.52 for the European level and 4.21 for the national level, with V of 23.46% and 25.29% respectively. These values indicate a slightly higher ENP on average at the national level and almost identical variability. It can therefore be concluded that there is a high level of cohesion in the stability of the fragmentation of the party system at both the national and European levels.

Fig. 5.1  The effective number of parties in Sejm and EP elections. (Source: The author’s own calculations based on official electoral data)

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If the 2004 elections are taken into account, the average ENPs is 3.6 and ENPv 4.5, while the coefficient of variation increases to 48.34% and 46.58% respectively. Thus, the average values of ENP remain similar, while the difference in variation is already significant at almost 30% (at the parliamentary level). The incidental nature of the high level of fragmentation in the 2004 EP elections together with the small number of measuring points (only four elections) indicates the apparent nature of this variation due to the characteristics of the measuring tool, which, with a small number of measuring points, is sensitive to significant deviations. Power Relations The structural description of the party system at the national level and of the Polish delegation in the European Parliament is complemented by an analysis of the power relations of individual groupings, including the dominance of the largest ones. An analysis of the percentage of seats won by the parties present in the Polish delegation in the EP over the entire period under analysis in elections to the Sejm and the EP (Fig. 5.2) shows very strongly similar patterns at the national and European levels. Only in the case of the SLD are two clear anomalies visible: a very strong decline after the 2001 Sejm elections and a deviation in the 2015 Sejm elections, in which the SLD-led electoral coalition marginally failed to cross the 8% electoral threshold (obtaining 7.55% of the popular vote). It should also be noted that in the 2019 EP elections, the PO, SLD and PSL ran on a single electoral list. Therefore, this analysis takes into account the number of seats won by representatives of these parties being members of a single election committee. For the individual elections, Blondel’s power index, which measures the percentage of seats of the two largest groupings, that is, their level of dominance for the Polish delegation in the EP, equals: 46% (2004), 80% (2009), 75% (2014) and 78% (2019), while at national level it is 61% (2001), 63% (2005), 81% (2007), 79% (2011), 81% (2015) and 80% (2019), respectively. These figures show the growing dominance of the two largest groupings at both the European and national levels. This process started with the 2007 elections and was reflected in the 2009 European elections. The average value of Blondel’s power index for the national and European levels is very similar, at 74% and 70%, respectively. However,

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89

Fig. 5.2  The percentage of seats won in Sejm and EP elections by the main political parties. (Source: The author’s own calculations based on official electoral data)

there is a noticeable difference in the dispersion of this parameter with V of 22.7% for the European level and 12.7% for the national level. However, as in the case of fragmentation, there is justification for the argument about the exceptional nature of the first EP elections, in which the high scores of the Eurosceptic parties apparently flattened the election results and thus caused a somewhat artificial (because based on only four measurement points) increase in the coefficient of variation. In summary, it can be concluded that, in terms of power relations, a high level of cohesion between the national and European levels can be observed. The coefficient of variation for both levels does not exceed 10%, which indicates a relatively low dispersion and, consequently, high stability of the system. Furthermore, started in the 2007 national elections, the observed increasing dominance of the two largest groupings was reflected in subsequent EP elections, which allows one to conclude that this characteristic of the Polish delegation in the EP is conditioned by its value at the national level.

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Stability of Inter-Party Rivalry From the point of view of the stability of inter-party rivalry, two issues seem to be worth special attention: the ideological identity of system participants and changes in its relations over time with party preferences. As existing research shows (Kreppel, 2001, p. 357; Bressanelli, 2012, p. 751), a given party’s political group membership in the EP is strongly related to its party ideological positions. On the other hand, measuring electoral volatility will make it possible to illustrate the variability of party preferences over time. Linking these two categories will therefore show a picture of the stability of inter-party rivalry in EP elections in relation to national elections. Referring to ideological identity as measured by political group affiliation, it should be noted that during the four EP elections held in Poland, seats in each election were won by representatives of only three political families present in the EP, that is, the EPP, the Socialists and the Eurosceptic ECR. Incidentally, Polish MEPs also appeared in the groups of liberals (6th term), as well as nationalists and Eurosceptics: Independence and Democracy (6th term), Europe of Freedom and Democracy (7th term), Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy, Europe of Nations and Freedom (8th term). The groups of the European People’s Party (EPP), Socialists and Liberals are among the oldest and largest groups in the European Parliament and have existed since the first term of the EP.  It should be noted, however, that the Liberal group has not only changed its name several times—since the EP’s ninth term it has been called Renew Europe and earlier the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe— but its ideological profile has also undergone significant alterations (Choroś, 2021, p. 141). The Eurosceptic Conservative group emerged somewhat later, in 1973. It initially took the name of European Progressive Democrats but underwent numerous transformations due to electoral instability as a result of the lack of support in at least one strong national party. It first changed into the European Democratic Alliance (1984) and then the EUN (1999), which, in turn, in 2009 split into the ECR (bringing together British Conservative and PiS MEPs) and the Eurosceptic Europe of Freedom and Democracy. The basing of the EUN and then the ECR on British and Polish MEPs gave this group electoral stability and a significant position in the EP; during the 8th term (2014–2019), it was even the third force in the EP, marginally ahead of the Liberals.

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By contrast, it is difficult to speak of sustainable functioning in the case of far-right and nationalist groups. For obvious reasons, they have found it difficult to establish a multinational political group characterized by the ability to function on a relatively permanent basis. Some continuity can be observed in the case of the Eurosceptic group called Independence and Democracy (6th term), which later evolved into Europe of Freedom and Democracy (7th and 8th terms). In 2015, the Europe of Nations and Freedom group was established, which, after the 2019 elections, was replaced by the Identity and Democracy group based mainly on MEPs from the French National Unity, the Italian League and the German Alternative for Germany. As Peter Mair notes, electoral volatility is an important index showing the stability of the distribution of party preferences over time (Mair, 2005:12). It indicates the extent to which the party system is open to new entrants and thus its stability. Electoral volatility is measured by analysing data from contiguous elections (Pedersen, 1979, p. 4), which means that in the case of the Polish EP elections we have only three measurements. In the case of EP elections, a clear stabilization of the electorate’s party preferences is visible (Fig. 5.3). After the 2009 elections, which brought major changes with regard to those held in 2004 (no representation of the LPR, the Freedom Union, the SDPL and the Self-defence), the

Fig. 5.3  Electoral volatility in Sejm and EP elections. (Source: Bértoa (2022), Emanuele et al. (2019)

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fluctuations in electoral preferences were diminishing. It is true that there was a reshuffling of support among the parties that regularly win seats— the PO basically swaps places with the PiS in terms of the percentage of votes won—but support for the PSL and the Left remained more or less at a similar level. Admittedly, there were new parties entering the EP, such as Janusz Korwin-Mikke’s New Right in 2014 and Robert Biedroń’s Spring in 2019, but both of them enjoyed the support of from 6% to 7% of voters. Compared to the 2009 elections, when the parties that had won almost 40% in the previous elections did not enter the EP, the level of electoral volatility was therefore visibly lower. A similar trend in electoral volatility was also evident in the case of Sejm elections. The elections held in 2001 and 2005 were characterized by an electoral volatility index similar to that for the 2004 and 2009 EP elections. In those elections, a major reshuffle of the political scene took place. In the 2001 elections, over 41% of the popular vote was won by the SLD, a half more than in the previous election. The winner of the 1997 elections, the Solidarity Electoral Action disintegrated and did not take part in the next election. In 2001, the PO, PiS, LPR and Self-defence won seats in the Sejm for the first time. Together, these parties gathered 40.25% of the vote. Although no new parties entered the Sejm after the 2005 elections, significant changes occurred in support for the existing parliamentary groupings. A drop in support for the Left by almost 30 percentage points and a significant increase in support for the PiS and the PO resulted in the value of the electoral volatility index similar to that for the previous Sejm elections (Fig. 5.3.). The 2007 and 2011 elections increased the dominance of the PO and the PIS, with the LPR and the Self-defence disappearing from the political scene. Although a new grouping (Palikot Movement) entered the Sejm in 2011, the relative stabilization of the balance of power among the remaining groupings caused the electoral volatility index to more than double in comparison to that of the previous election. A noticeable change in this parameter occurred in the next elections held in 2015, mainly due to the break-up of the Palikot Movement following its defeat in the 2014 EP elections and the emergence of new players such as the Modern, Kukiz’15, KORWiN and Together parties, which together garnered 24.79% of the vote. However, this shift did not herald significant changes in voter preferences to occur in the next elections. Consolidation within the Civic Coalition (mainly the PO and the Modern party) and the PSL (running together with Kukiz’15), as well as the formation of the Confederation

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Table 5.2  The electoral volatility index for Sejm and EP elections

Sejm elections EP elections

2001 2004 2005 2007 2009

2011 2014 2015 2019 SD

35.2

7.7

34 –

23.7 40.05

29.7 19.3

V

7.4 12.59 54.86% 16.5 12.86 50.84%

Source: The author’s own calculations based on (Casal Bértoa, 2022)

(from the merger of the KORWiN and the National Movement) brought about little change in electoral preferences. The similar level of electoral volatility in EP elections compared to that in Sejm elections is confirmed by the similar coefficient of variation (V) for both types of elections (Table 5.2). Therefore, it can be concluded that the levels of stability of political preferences in EP and Sejm elections are similar and follow the trend set by the latter.

Systemic Determinants—The Impact of the Electoral Legislation on the Composition of the National Delegation Presented above, the indexes related to the party system, such as the number of system participants and the power relations among them, fragmentation or volatility, are influenced by a range of factors. This analysis focuses on the most important of these, that is, the systemic determinants resulting from the content of the electoral legislation. While the rules for the operation of political parties are common across the country, the electoral law for national and European elections has a diversified structure, which may condition the strategies of political parties as well as the composition of the delegation and its stability. The key elements of the electoral law include the division of the country into constituencies, the rules for converting votes into seats, the existence of the electoral threshold and the types of electoral lists. Constituency magnitude is the quotient of the number of seats available and the number of constituencies among which they will be distributed. The greater the number of seats per constituency, the greater the chances of smaller parties to win seats and the lower the premium for large parties (Taagepera, 2007, p.  23). The larger size of constituencies promotes greater proportionality in the electoral system.

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Poland’s law regulating elections to the EP provides for a two-stage mechanism for the allocation of seats. Its direct effect is that, unlike in elections to the Sejm, individual constituencies are not allocated a number of seats determined in advance. Although the electoral code (2011) states that ‘For the purpose of elections to the European Parliament, constituencies shall be established’ (Art. 340), in practice we deal with regional lists, obligatory for each committee. Although each committee issues separate lists in each constituency, the votes cast in each constituency for a given list are added up and distributed at the national level (Art. 358), while constituencies do not have concrete numbers of seats allocated to them. If one takes into account that the constituencies for EP elections are not geographically the same as those for Sejm elections and are much larger (13 constituencies for EP elections, 41 constituencies for Sejm elections), it is obvious that such a disproportion will affect the patterns of competition among candidates and the candidate selection mechanisms. The consequence of the ‘two-stage’ process of seat allocation adopted in the electoral law is the two-stage conversion of votes into seats, and in fact the two-stage process of identifying which candidates will receive seats. In EP elections, this system will generally generate results similar to those of Sejm elections, as the main rule for counting votes is based on the d’Hondt method. In Sejm elections, the rule is applied at the level of individual constituencies, while in EP elections it is applied at the first stage of seat allocation—to allocate seats to individual electoral lists based on the number of votes obtained in the whole country. The system used in EP elections to allocate seats to particular candidates in a list is based on the Hare-Niemeyer proportional method, that is, the percentage of votes cast for the list and won by individual candidates. In summary, although in the context of inter-party rivalry this system works analogously to elections to the Sejm (d’Hondt), it will translate into patterns of intra-list rivalry, if only by favouring candidates from larger urban centres or with a high level of recognition. The third element strongly linked to the nature of the electoral system is the application of an electoral threshold. With respect to EP elections, a Council Decision of 2002 allows for an electoral threshold of no more than 5% of the votes cast (Art. 3). This threshold level has been adopted by as many as 10 Member States, including Poland. At the same time, it is the same threshold as in Sejm elections, with the reservation that, unlike in Sejm elections, EP elections do not provide for a higher 8% threshold for electoral coalitions. The arrangement of constituencies for EP

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elections in Poland means that, from the point of view of the distribution of seats among individual lists, the whole country is a de facto single constituency. Therefore, despite a relatively small number of seats, the effective electoral threshold is not significantly higher, which is the case in some Member States. In summary, the design and impact of the electoral threshold in EP elections are similar to that used in Sejm elections. While the size of constituencies, the rules for translating votes into seats or electoral thresholds directly affect the outcome of elections, the form of an electoral list used relates more to the relationship between the voter and the MP and the relationship between the MP and their party (Nohlen, 2004, p. 92). From the voter’s point of view, the form of a particular list will translate into the level of freedom of choice. Using this criterion, two main types of lists can be distinguished—closed and preferential (Emanuele, 2014, p. 39). In Poland, preferential lists are used in both EP and Sejm elections. The voter has one vote, which they cast for a particular candidate on the party list. Therefore, it can be seen that despite the seemingly large differences between the legal regulations applicable to EP and Sejm elections, from the point of view of inter-party rivalry, they are very much similar. The rule for the translation of votes into seats is the same and based on the d’Hondt method, the solutions concerning the electoral threshold are similar, and preferential lists are used for both national and European elections. The impact of the systemic conditions on electoral stability at the European level can therefore be expected to be consistent with that at the national level.

Conclusions The analysis conducted in this chapter shows similar levels of structural stability and stability of inter-party rivalry for the national delegation in the EP and the political representation in the Sejm. The regulations adopted in the electoral legislation for both types of elections are also very similar. With the exception of the 2004 elections, the percentage of seats won by the main parties was very similar at both the national and European levels, and the dynamics of events on the national scene visibly influenced the composition of the delegation in the EP. The PO, PiS, PSL and SLD won more than 90% of the seats in the Sejm and almost 89% in the

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European Parliament during the period under analysis. Although a slightly higher effective number of parties was visible on average at the European level, its variability was almost identical, which indicates a similar level of stability in the fragmentation of the party system at the national and European levels. Also in the case of the examined power relations, a high level of cohesion between the two levels can be observed. The low coefficient of variation is a sign of a high stability of the system. Initiated in the 2007 national elections, the increasing dominance of the two largest groupings was reflected in the subsequent EP elections, which is consistent with the thesis of the determinant character of the national factors. The ideological landscape of the actors active on the European scene is identical to that of the actors active on the national scene. The analysis of electoral volatility also shows that the values of stability of political preferences in EP elections and Sejm elections are similar and follow the trend set by national elections. The conducted analyses justify the thesis that the dynamics of electoral stability of the Polish delegation in the European Parliament has a very similar character to such stability at the national level. Taking into account the observed chronological relations between the examined factors and the assumption of the dependence of electoral decisions on the factors of national politics (Hix, 2002, p.  698), one can speak of not only a high level of cohesion between stability at the European and national levels, but also the determinant character of the national factors. It is also worth noting that the high level of political polarization in Poland, coupled with the d’Hondt method adopted in the electoral code, causes political parties to adopt electoral strategies that may somewhat distort the picture emerging from the analysis of the party system indexes. The rule for translating votes into seats, which is favourable to the largest committees, particularly when more votes are ‘wasted’ in consequence of a given committee’s failure to cross the electoral threshold, has resulted in a tendency to cluster around the largest political camp. Opposition groupings enter into electoral alliances to increase their chances of defeating the United Right camp. This phenomenon was already apparent in the 2018 local elections, when the Civic Coalition (KO) was established, and became strongly evident in the 2019 EP and Senate elections. In the EP elections, a joint list under the banner of the European Coalition was put forward by the PO, PSL and SLD. In the majoritarian elections to the Senate, the KO, PSL and SLD ensured that their candidates would not

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compete against each other in the same constituencies. In the elections to the Sejm, however, these groupings ran under separate lists. The measurement tools commonly used in the analysis of party systems (including in this chapter) do not take such electoral strategies fully into account, indicating differences between the national and European levels slightly greater than they are in reality.

References Ake, C. (1975). A Definition of Political Stability. Comparative Politics, 7(2), 271–283. Berends, G. (2000). National Political Parties and European Integration: Mapping Functional Loss. Politics, 20(1), 11–17. Bértoa, C.  F. (2022). Database on WHO GOVERNS in Europe and beyond. PSGo. Retrieved July 14, 2021, from whogoverns.eu Blondel, J. (1968). Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 1(2), 180–203. Bressanelli, E. (2012). National Parties and Group Membership in the European Parliament: Ideology or Pragmatism? Journal of European Public Policy, 19(5), 737–754. Choroś, B. (2021). Porozumienie Liberałów i Demokratów na rzecz Europy, czyli gdzie dwóch się bije. In A. Pacześniak & B. Rydliński (Eds.), Europejskie partie polityczne. Dyskurs programowy w Unii Europejskiej (pp.  139–171). Wydawnictwo Sejmowe. Colomer, J. M. (2012). The More Parties, the Greater Policy Stability. European Political Science, 11, 229–243. Emanuele, V. (2014). Proportional Representation with Variable- Geometry: Here Is How to vote in the 28 Member States. In L. De Sio, V. Emanuele, & N. Maggini (Eds.), The European Parliament Elections of 2014 (pp. 38–42). CISE. Emanuele, V., Angelucci, D., Marino, B., Puleo, L., & Vegetti, F. (2019). Dataset of Electoral Volatility in the European Parliament Elections Since 1979. Italian Center for Electoral Studies. Retrieved June 25, 2021, from https://doi. org/10.7802/1905 Gaffney, J. (Ed.). (1996). Political Parties and the European Union. Routledge. Gwiazda, A. (2009). Poland's Quasi-Institutionalized Party System: The Importance of Elites and Institutions. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 10(3), 350–376. Hix, S. (2002). Parliamentary Behavior with Two Principals: Preferences, Parties, and Voting in the European Parliament. American Journal of Political Science, 46(3), 688–698.

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Hix, S. (2008). What’s Wrong With the European Union and How to Fix It. Polity Press. Hix, S., & Lord, C. (1997). Political Parties in The European Union. Red Globe Press. Hix, S., Noury, A., & Roland, G. (2005). Power to the Parties: Cohesion and Competition in the European Parliament, 1979–2001. British Journal of Political Science, 35(02), 209–234. Hix, S., Noury, A. G., & Roland, G. (2007). Democratic Politics in the European Parliament. Cambridge University Press. Kostowska-Ga ̨stoł, B. (2013). Zagadnienie istnienia europejskiego systemu partyjnego—rozwazania terminologiczne. Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej, 7, 311–327. Kostowska-Ga ̨stoł, B., & Sobolewska-Myślik, K. (2019). Do Entrepreneurial Parties Make any Difference for Polish Politics? The case of the Palikot Movement and Kukiz’15. Athenaeum. Polish Political Science Studies, 63(3), 92–116. Kreppel, A. (2001). The European Parliament and Supranational Party System. Cambridge University Press. Laakso, M., & Taagepera, R. (1979). “Effective” Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe. Comparative Political Studies, 12(1), 3–27. Ladrech, R. (1999). Political Parties and the Problem of Legitimacy in the European Union. In T.  Banchoff & M.  P. Smith (Eds.), Legitimacy and the European Union: The Contested Polity (pp. 93–112). Routledge. Mainwaring, S., & Scully, T.  R. (1995). Introduction. Party Systems in Latin America. In S.  Mainwaring & T.  R. Scully (Eds.), Building Democratic Institutions (pp. 1–36). Stanford University Press. Mair, P. (2005). Democracy Beyond Parties. UC Irvine: Center for the Study of Democracy. Retrieved June 20, 2021, from https://escholarship.org/uc/ item/3vs886v9 Nohlen, D. (2004). Prawo wyborcze i system partyjny. Scholar. Pedersen, M. (1979). The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility. European Journal of Political Research, 7, 1–26. Schmidt, V. (2006). Democracy in Europe. In The EU and National Polities. Oxford University Press. Schmitt, H., & Thomassen, J. (1999). Distinctiveness and Cohesion of Parties. In H. Schmitt & J. Thomassen (Eds.), Political representation and legitimacy in the European Union (pp. 111–128). Oxford University Press. Taagepera, R. (2007). Predicting Party Sizes. In The Logic of Simple Electoral Systems. Oxford University Press.

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Taylor, M., & Herman, V. M. (1971). Party systems and Government Stability. The American Political Science Review, 65(1), 28–37. The Electoral Code. (2011). The Electoral Code Act of 5 January 2011. Journal of Laws, 2011(21), item 112. Zuba, K. (2015). Rywalizacja międzypartyjna i wewna ̨trzpartyjna w kampanii referendum europejskiego w Wielkiej Brytanii z 2016 roku. Politeja, 1(46), 23–44.

CHAPTER 6

Membership Stability Marta Witkowska and Krzysztof Zuba

Introduction The stability of the personal composition is a key determinant of the effectiveness and functionality of any organization, including particularly democratic systems. The EU’s political system is a unique phenomenon, which fundamentally hinders any comparison, also in terms of the stability of political elites. On a scale of political systems, it locates itself ‘somewhere between’ an international organization and a federation (Hix, 2005; Witkowska, 2015). In principle, the EU is closest to a confederation, but even this position is sometimes questioned due to the fact that nowadays,

The text presents the results of research funded under National Science Centre grant no. 2016/23/B/HS5/03750.

M. Witkowska University of Warsaw, Warszawa, Poland e-mail: [email protected] K. Zuba (*) Institute of Political Science and Administration, University of Opole, Opole, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 K. Zuba (ed.), The Polish Delegation in the European Parliament, Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28271-3_6

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this model of organization does not exist in any other form outside the EU (if it is assumed that the EU is a confederation). Thus, it can only be confronted with theoretical models. The European Parliament is not only the EU’s largest ‘hub of elites’ but, more significantly, it also remains the only EU body shaped by a process of democratic representation. The ideals of a united Europe have been pursued by the European Parliament since the first general elections held in 1979. From election to election, the transnational character of the EP as an elite representing the whole of Europeans and constituting a negation of national particularisms was emphasized more and more boldly—often enthusiastically. The 40 years of work of the democratic EP has essentially confirmed these opinions—MEPs have proved to be the vanguard pursuing the transnational objectives of the Union. With all this said, the electoral model is still in place, and, above all, the consciousness of societies glued to the state and the nation have not allowed MEPs to emancipate themselves from the determinants of national politics. The issue of membership stability has been reflected in a number of publications, usually devoted to the EP as a whole. It has to be said, however, that the lack of uniform methodological, definitional, typological and even terminological categories makes it difficult to compare and synthesize the results of such research. Findings concerning the membership stability of national delegations are generally regarded as being of marginal importance. However, most authors dealing with this issue emphasize two aspects. Firstly, they indicate very large differences in stability among national delegations. Secondly, it is acknowledged that, to a fundamental extent, it is national politics factors that condition the membership stability of the EP, rather than supranational factors. It is impossible to negate the role of the latter, of which Europeanization, socialization, institutionalization and professionalization of the EP are attributed particular importance (Marrel & Payre, 2006, p. 119). However, it is national factors such as the organization of the state (Daniel & Metzger, 2018, p. 98; Marzi & Verzichelli, 2021), the system for electing MEPs (Wilson, Ringe, & van Thomme, 2016, p. 15), the dominant career models (Scarrow, 1997, p. 256; Beauvallet-Haddad et al., 2016, pp. 103–104) or the position in the party hierarchy (Whitaker, 2014, pp. 1521–1522) that have a dominant impact on the membership stability of national delegations and, indirectly, the EP as a whole. As already stated, few studies have been devoted to the membership stability of national delegations. They include works on the re-election of German MEPs (Frech, 2016), the reasons for their resignation during an

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EP term (Rütters, 2014), as well as the career paths of Danish (Kjaer, 2015), French (Kauppi, 1996) and British (Westlake, 1994) MEPs.

Conceptual Framework, Data and Methodology The main data resource underpinning this analysis is the profiles of Polish MEPs available on the EP website.1 Cross-checking these data with other collections and compilations relating to the composition of the EPs confirms their reliability and completeness. For the quantitative analysis, data from the three terms in which the Polish delegation was represented, that is, the sixth (2004–2009), seventh (2009–2014) and eighth (2014–2019) terms, were selected. The qualitative analysis additionally included Polish observers in the fifth EP, but this category was clearly separated from the category of full MEPs. There were three reasons for this: the observers had not come from elections, and they had not taken active part in the work of the EP and had performed their functions for 15  months only (from 23 April 2003 to 19 July 2004). Although with Poland’s accession to the EU on 1 May 2004 they gained the status of full MEPs, it was only 2.5 months before the end of the fifth term of the EP. Membership stability is defined as the level of changes in the composition of the Polish delegation during an EP term and between EP terms. Simultaneously, two sub-categories are distinguished: static and dynamic. The former is measured by synthetic indexes for all MEPs in the period 2004–2019, the latter by the dynamics of changes in stability observed from term to term. Pilot studies focused on other Member States’ delegations show that the two types of stability are not convergent. A given national delegation may be characterized by high static stability and at the same time low dynamic stability, or vice versa. For analytical purposes, three categories of membership stability are introduced: within-term stability (WTS), between-terms stability (BTS) and overall stability (OS). Each of these categories is captured in both static and dynamic dimensions. Therefore, in total, there are three categories and six sub-categories of stability. All three categories were reflected in previous research on membership stability, but have been given different names, determined by means of different indexes and measures, and were generally not combined with each other. 1  The research comprises a review of individual profiles of all MEPs (from the 5th term to the 9th term) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/directory/.

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WTS was defined as all changes in the personal composition of a national delegation that take place during an EP term, that is, between elections. A term of the EP lasts for five years and, under the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage of 20 September 1976, begins with the first session of the newly elected Parliament and lasts until the first session of the next Parliament (Act, 1976). Thus, any change involving the resignation of an MEP or their death and entailing the nomination of another representative will affect the value of WTS. WTS can be measured by means of either the percentage of MEPs vacating their seats before the end of their term or the percentage of MEPs who serve a full term. In order to make the collected data compatible with BTS, the second method of determining the level of WTS, that is, the percentage of full-term MEPs, was adopted for the analysis. BTS is defined as the total changes in the composition of a national delegation between successive EP terms. The measure of BTS is the percentage of MEPs in a given term who have also held seats in the previous Parliaments (the percentage of re-elected MEPs). Within BTS, three sub-­ categories can be distinguished: • re-electees—MEPs who have sat in the successive Parliaments; • returnees—MEPs who have been re-elected to the EP, but after a break of one or more terms; • successors—MEPs who entered the EP to fill a vacated seat (Verzichelli & Edinger, 2005). Overall stability (OS) is defined as all changes within a national delegation both during and between the terms of the EP. OS represents a kind of synthesis of the other two categories, that is, WTS and BTS. However, it is not a simple synthesis of the two, as the value of OS is determined by the average duration of holding a seat in the EP by MEPs representing particular national delegations or MEPs as a whole (cf. Beauvallet-Haddad et al., 2016, p. 106; Marzi & Verzichelli, 2021).

Within-Term Stability Vacating elective public offices before the expiry of the term of office can be observed in all legislatures, although the scale of the phenomenon varies considerably. Such events are usually caused by personal or political

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circumstances. Examples of the former include retirement, death, illness preventing the person to continue in office or any other accident resulting in a decision to resign as MEP. It can be assumed that such events ‘have no nationality’ and should therefore determine the occurrence of vacancies in all delegations to the same or similar extent. The situation is different in the case of political circumstances, as there are many factors determining differences among national delegations and, consequently, the scale of the phenomenon varies greatly. The legal solutions adopted in Poland before the 2004 EP elections, and then repeated in the Electoral Code of 2011, provide for two forms of vacating a seat in the EP: expiry or loss of an MEP’s mandate. The former is related to the death of an MEP or their resignation from the EP, while the latter can be the consequence of losing the right to stand in elections, holding a position or office that cannot be held simultaneously with an MEP mandate on the election day, being elected to the Sejm or the Senate or having the results of an election invalidated (The Act of 23 January 2004; the Act of 5 January 2011). Table 6.1 shows the static and dynamic values of the WTS of the Polish delegation. As mentioned earlier, the static value is defined by the percentage of MEPs (each term counted separately) who have sat in the EP for a full term. In order to be able to responsibly assess the value of both indexes, for comparative purposes, the values for the Polish delegation were compared with the overall data for the 10 Central and Eastern Table 6.1  WTS—the Polish delegation in comparison with the CEE countries and all EU countries: descriptive statistics

% of full-term MEPs Max (%) Min (%) Amplitude (percentage points) Average Mean value of difference between terms (percentage points) Standard deviation

Static WTS Poland (2004–2019) 87.74 Dynamic WTS 94.12 87.04 7.08 89.80 6.48 3.09

CEE (2004–2019) 88.13

EU (1979–2019) 86.24

90.24 86.8 3.44 88.75 2.23

90.24 81.80 8.44 85.99 2.64

1.44

2.44

Source: The authors’ own work based on: Directory, European Parliament (terms 1–9), https://www. europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/directory

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European (CEE) countries that joined the EU in 2004 or later, as well as with data for the EU as a whole. The Polish delegation is characterized by a relatively high level of WTS compared to the average for the CEE countries, and even compared to the average for all EU countries. However, these differences are small: in the former case, the difference is 0.39 percentage point, in the latter—1.5 points (Table 6.1). The second part of Table  6.1 shows the dynamic values of WTS.  It should be noted that Poland’s and the other CEE countries’ relatively short period of membership in the EU, which translates into three terms of the EP taken into account in the analysis, does not allow for drawing too far-reaching conclusions, especially in terms of trends. The Polish delegation is characterized by lower dynamic stability compared to both control groups. This is most clearly demonstrated by the standard deviation and mean values of differences between the EP terms. A more detailed picture regarding the nature and determinants of the WTS of the Polish delegation is provided by a qualitative analysis. Over the course of the EP’s three terms, 16 seats were vacated: seven in the 6th term, three in the 7th term and six in the 8th term. Of these, only two cases of vacating a seat were due to personal reasons. Both of them involved the death of an MEP. In 2005, Filip Adwent, a member of the League of Polish Families (LPR), died as a result of injuries sustained in a car accident, and in 2008, Bronisław Geremek, a member of the Freedom Union (UW), died in a car accident. An isolated case was Janusz Korwin-Mikke’s voluntary resignation from the 8th EP, which took place at the beginning of March 2018. The remaining (13) situations in which MEPs left the Parliament were related to taking up another position, of which only two cases involved jobs in the EU structures. Both cases involved taking up the post of commissioner within the European Commission. In 2010, Janusz Lewandowski (Civic Platform, PO) was appointed Commissioner for Budget and Financial Programming, while in 2016, Janusz Wojciechowski (Law and Justice, PiS) took up the post of auditor at the European Court of Auditors. In summary, in most of the analysed situations, the main reason for resigning as MEP was to take up a position in national politics—this concerned 11 cases and accounted for 68.75% of all situations of vacating a seat in the EP. The most common (seven cases) were governmental positions (minister or secretary of state), with individual cases of assuming the office of president (2015, Andrzej Duda), secretary of state in the President’s Chancellery (2007, Michał Kamiński), member of the Sejm (2004, Wojciech Wierzejski) or city mayor (2018, Bogdan Wenta).

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Between-Terms Stability As already indicated, the percentage of re-elected MEPs is used as a measure of BTS. In this respect, the value of the Polish delegation’s index is close to that calculated for the EU as a whole, but at the same time clearly lower than the value calculated for the 10 CEE countries that joined the EU in 2004 and the subsequent EU enlargements. It should be emphasized again that for both the CEE countries and the EU as a whole, these are not averaged data for the particular delegations, but aggregate data for all MEPs in the particular PE terms. Taking both categories into account makes it possible to consider the ratio of re-elected Polish MEPs as relatively low. Although the value of this index for the Polish delegation is similar to that for the EU as a whole, it is worth emphasizing that the latter covers the aggregated period from 1979 to 2019 (Table 6.2). The Polish delegation stands out in comparison to the EU as a whole and especially in comparison to the CEE countries with a high percentage of returned MEPs: 4.29% of the entire delegation as compared to 3.61% for the EU and 1.88% for CEE (Table 6.2). Similarly to the case of the low re-elected rate, this may also demonstrate the low level of professionalization of the Polish delegation. In countries where an MEP’s mandate is regarded as a serious commitment, the possibility of returning to the EP Table 6.2  BTS—the Polish delegation in comparison with the CEE countries and all EU countries: descriptive statistics

% of re-elected MEPs % of returned MEPs Max (%) Min (%) Amplitude (percentage points) Average Mean value of difference between terms (percentage points) Standard deviation

Static BTS Poland (2004–2019) 39.26 4.29 Dynamic BTS 36.54 42.11 5.57 38.18 4.40 2.28

CEE (2004–2019) 43.43 1.88

EU (1979–2019) 39.41 3.61

45.58 39.61 5.97 43.52 3.09

50.00 38.32 11.68 45.13 3.28

2.77

3.42

Source: The authors’ own work based on: Directory, European Parliament (terms 1–9), https://www. europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/directory

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after a period of absence is restricted by the standards of a political culture. Failure to win a mandate, whether as a consequence of the poor electoral performance of the candidate or their party as a whole, is a form of a vote of no confidence for the losing MEP. In consolidated democracies, parties have to take this into account and bet on winning politicians in subsequent elections, while replacing those with the worst results with new candidates. This is how a healthy elites circulation system operates (Higley & Pakulski, 2012). These conclusions imply the existence of a recruitment system disregarding the will of voters when former MEPs return to the EP relatively often, Poland being a case in point. The data collected by Varieties of Democracy seem to confirm the above assumption: the Polish system of appointing candidates for elections has been categorized by experts as one of the most centralized in Europe (Coppedge et al., 2021). The relatively high level of returned MEPs may also indicate that they alternate their political career in the EP with a career at the national level or, occasionally, in other European institutions. Such a career model is also indicative of a low level of professionalization. With respect to the dynamic category, the Polish delegation—similarly to all delegations from the CEE countries—is characterized by a high level of BTS. In the most aggregate way, this is shown by the low value of the standard deviation: in the case of the Polish delegation, its value is 2.28, in the case of the EEC delegations—2.77, and 3.42 for the EP as a whole. It is revealed in more detail when comparing the average values of the difference between EP terms: for the Polish delegation it is 4.40, for the EEC delegations—3.09, 3.28 for the entire EP. A comparison of the values for the Polish delegation with the data for all MEPs and MEPs representing the EEC countries shows that these differences are not significant. Again, it is important to emphasize the fact that only data concerning the three EP terms were used in the calculations for Poland and the other CEE countries. Therefore, the most reasonable point of reference for the Polish delegation is the delegations of its CEE neighbours. From this perspective, the differences are significant. Each successive EP election takes place in a specific and unique arrangement of factors, which, among other things, determines changes in the rates of re-elections. As previously mentioned, few researchers question the dominance of national factors over European ones in terms of membership stability, including BTS. This is primarily due to the fact that all key elements of candidate selection, election campaigns and elections themselves take place at the level of Member States (Lodge, 2005, p. 5; de

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Vries & Hobolt, 2016, p.  124). In such circumstances, fundamental importance should be attributed to the stability of a national party system. One of its elements is the alternation of power. Without going into the details of the other determinants at this stage, it is worth noting that if the same party again obtains the best result in EP elections, then this translates into a higher BTS level of the entire national delegation. In such a situation, the party with the largest number of its members within the delegation relies on its team of MEPs in the process of selecting candidates, and voters legitimize this in the course of elections. This was the case in the 2004 elections in the UK or in the 2004 and 2014 elections in Germany. As far as the Polish delegation is concerned, this mechanism became apparent in the 2014 elections, when the Civic Platform (PO) obtained the best results, repeating its success from 2009. Although the PO’s advantage over the Law and Justice party (PiS) decreased significantly compared to the 2004 elections, what was more significant was that there was no sharp alternation of seats. For both the PO (which lost 6 seats) and the PiS (which gained 4 seats), the bulk of their MEPs remained the same. To illustrate the impact of alternation on the dynamic of BTS, let us imagine a situation in which in the 2014 elections, the PO loses to PiS by the same margin by which it won in 2009. In such circumstances in 2014, the PO would have lost 10 seats and PiS would have gained 10 seats. This would have meant potentially 20 new MEPs in the Polish delegation. Let us compare this to the actual results of the 2014 elections, where only 10 new MEPs joined the Polish delegation due to the change in the balance of power between the PO and the PiS. This shows the strength of the alternation factor, but at the same time it should be stated that this is a very general factor whose significance can be strengthened by going to a more detailed level of analysis. The whole journey of the MEP from one EP to another can be divided into three stages: • the MEP’s decision to run again for the seat in the EP, • obtaining a place on the list of candidates selected by their party, • getting re-elected in the course of PE elections. The first stage can be ignored, as it is impossible to ascertain the true intentions of incumbent MEPs to run or not to run for a seat in the next elections. William T. Daniel estimated the total number of MEPs willing to obtain re-election at 49.3% in the 1994 elections and 59.42% in the 2014 elections (Daniel, 2015, p. 37). According to the estimates by Peter

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Rütters (2014, p. 793), ‘an MEP’s own free will’ constituted the reason for not running for re-election for as many as 54% German MEPs. However, the above figures are based on two questionable assumptions: • each MEP who declares that they do not want to run for re-election actually does not want to; • each MEP who is a candidate in EP elections actually wants to become an MEP. Regarding the first assumption, an MEP’s official decision not to run for re-election is often a manifestation of a realistic assessment of the lack of chances for being selected by their party, obtaining a good position on the list or receiving a sufficient number of votes in elections. Thus, what we have here is a genuine desire to seek re-election and an official declaration of unwillingness to do so. Few politicians can afford to openly admit that they would like to retain their MEP status but have no chance of being re-elected. With regard to the latter assumption, Daniel assumed that every MEP who runs for re-election has ambitions to sit in the EP. However, this is not consistent with reality. It is possible to indicate a number of situations in which an MEP runs from an ‘unelectable’ place on a list in order to garner votes for their own party. This is particularly true of closed lists, where running from a farther place does not give a candidate the chance of re-election. In the case of EP elections in Poland, potentially every position on a list offers a chance of election, but realistically a position at the bottom of a list makes it illusory. At the selection stage, it is political parties that fulfil the function of ‘gatekeepers’. When running for re-election, the MEP must obtain the approval of their own party. Out of the entire Polish delegation, about 2/3 of the MEPs ran for re-election. This means that 1/3 of them were unwilling or unable to stand for re-election. At the election stage, the role of ‘gatekeepers’ is played by voters, whose decisions are guided by support for particular parties and/or for candidates put on their respective lists. According to Fig.  6.1, only slightly more than 1/3 of outgoing Polish MEPs get re-elected at a subsequent election (the gross value). A more meaningful figure is obtained if the number of re-elected MEPs is compared to the (net) number of candidates running for election, in which case we obtain a figure of 55.65% of those running for election who got re-elected. This figure shows that it is much easier for incumbent MEPs to obtain a party nomination than electoral support.

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120 100 80 60 40 20 0

Total MEPs

Seeking re-election Gross

Re-elected

Net

Fig. 6.1  Percentage of Polish MEPs seeking re-election and being re-elected. (Source: The author’s own work based on the data from the National Electoral Commission, https://pkw.gov.pl/wybory-­i-­referenda/wybory-­do-­parlamentu-­ europejskiego (accessed: 15.03.2020). Net—the ratio of re-elected MEPs to those seeking re-election; Gross—the ratio of re-elected MEPs to all MEPs of the previous term)

At this point, it is worth devoting some attention to the category of ‘observers’. As previously mentioned, they are not included in the overall data, because of both their lack of electoral legitimacy and the absence of most MEP attributes. The observer status did, however, provide an opportunity for delegations from the new Member States to gain some experience within the EP, and this attribute—as indicated in the introduction—is an important justification for research on membership stability. Although formally sanctioned only in 1991 with the addition of representatives from the eastern Länder (former East Germany) to the German delegation, the institution of observers had already been known in practice since the accession of Spain and Portugal. In the case of these two countries, the delegates of the respective national parliaments were given the full status of MEPs, but only until the next general EP elections. Formally, they were not observers but ‘temporary MEPs’. In total, the status of temporary MEPs and observers concerned 10 countries.2 Before the Polish delegates obtained the status of full MEPs after the 2004 elections, 54 Polish observers had participated in the work 2  With regard to Germany, not all members of its delegation had the status of observers, but only those who represented the eastern Länder, formerly constituting the communist German Democratic Republic.

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of the EP in the year 2003 and 2004. They had been delegated by the Polish parliament: 42 by the Sejm and 11 by the Senate. The LPR initially refused to participate in the delegation, justifying this by the lack of appropriate legal regulations. The three LPR parliamentarians joined the Polish delegation only at the end of June 2003, after the referendum on Poland’s membership in the EU. The observers appointed by the Sejm were mainly recruited from the Committee for European Affairs, while those appointed by the Senate were members of the Committee for Foreign Affairs and European Affairs (Borkowski & Grzyb, 2004, p. 108). After the first general elections to the EP, the percentage of MEPs who had previously held the status of observers was 19.67% for the Polish delegation. It was the lowest in the group of the countries that started their tenure in the EP with temporary MEPs or observers. For comparison, the corresponding figure for Spain was 63.33%, Portugal—61.54%; Sweden—50%, Austria—42.86%, Hungary—38.46 and Romania—31.82%. Thus, during the 6th term of the EP, only one in five MEPs in the Polish delegation could demonstrate any experience in EP work (Members of the European Parliament…).

Overall Stability A separate analysis of the two categories of membership stability, that is, WTS and BTS, is justified by the different natures of the two phenomena, the different factors determining them, as well as the different consequences they entail. With all this in mind, it is natural to pursue the development of a synthetic index that takes into account the entirety of changes in the membership stability of the Polish delegation. Synthesizing both categories of membership stability within a single index causes the risk that those factors that influence only one category will be artificially transferred to the other. It is also possible to imagine a situation in which a specific factor conditions one type of stability positively and the other negatively. In such circumstances, the influence of this factor will be reduced in the generalized index. Let us illustrate this with a (fictional) example. Let us assume that young age positively conditions WTS, as young MEPs are much less likely to swap their mandate for an alternative political career path. Let us also assume that young age negatively conditions the chance of re-election (BTS). Another assumption is that, in both cases, the effect of the age factor is statistically significant and has the same, but reverse value. In such a situation, it may turn out that in a generalized index such

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as parliamentary tenure (OS), the age factor will not emerge at all, or will emerge at a statistically insignificant level. This does not change the fact that the development of such a generalized index makes it possible to show the complexity of the influence of both categories (WTS and BTS) on changes in the composition of a delegation, as well as to determine stability in the form of a single albeit internally differentiated index. This is the perennial dilemma of any generalization. As already stated, there are no fully acceptable models within the existing membership stability research. Of the existing proposals, the most generalized category is tenure, that is, the duration of an MEP’s sitting in the EP.  The value of this index is influenced by both WTS and BTS. Table 6.3 shows jointly the static and dynamic values of both these stability categories, as well as the average tenure of Polish MEPs. For the purposes of comparison, similarly to the earlier parts of the analysis, analogous values for the EU as a whole and for CEE are provided. It should be noted that the value of tenure expressed in months does not allow for fully responsible comparisons of OS with WTS and BTS; only relative comparisons can be made.

Table 6.3  SO—the Polish delegation in comparison with the CEE countries and all EU countries: descriptive statistics Poland CEE EU EC (2004–2019) (2004–2019) (1979–2019) (1979–1994) Average length of tenure (months) Max (%) Min (%) Amplitude (percentage points) Average Mean value of difference between terms (percentage points) Standard deviation

Static SO 73.33

67.7

82.18

68.29

Dynamic SO 89.56 87.38 53.11 44.97 34.45 42.41 73.33 67.99 18.23 21.21

94.64 47.79 46.85 80.52 18.74

85.27 47.79 37.48 67.46 10.36

15.32

14.33

15.36

17.51

Source: The authors’ own work based on: Directory, European Parliament (terms 1–9), https://www. europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/directory

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The value of OS for the entire EU is to a considerable extent determined by the length of individual countries’ presence in the EP. For example, MEPs from the group of the founding countries such as Germany, France or Italy have had longer tenure—some of them have held their seats in the EP for seven or even eight terms, which translates into approximately 420–480 months in the EP. The most experienced MEPs from the CEE countries could only manage three terms, that is, a tenure of 180 months. The average tenure of Polish MEPs was longer than that of MEPs representing the other CEE countries as a whole by almost half a year. This is a clear difference. As already stated, the value of OS is dominantly influenced by the value of BTS. This also applies to the CEE countries. In their case, however, the impact of BTS on the value of OS was reinforced by the fact that three full terms of the EP (within which changes in BTS occurred) and only two elections (those held in 2009 and 2014, within which BTS changes occurred) were taken into account. In Table 6.3, the dynamic value of OS for the Polish delegation is compared with the corresponding values for the CEE delegations and the EU as a whole. The data for the EU are complemented with OS values for the first three terms of the EP.  This research procedure is in line with the method of analogy. Using analogy, it is possible to compare the data for Poland, CEE and the EU for the adopted period. While the values of dynamic SO for the years 2004–2019 are significantly higher for the EU as a whole (1979–2019) in comparison with the values of SO for both the Polish delegation and CEE, the trajectories of changes in SO are similar when comparing CEE and the Polish delegation with the first three terms for the European Communities (1979–1994). Irrespective of the fact that the categories of membership stability are fundamentally different, in all three cases national factors are decisive. In the case of BTS, it is at the national level that career paths alternative to the EP mandate emerge the most often (see Chap. 4). National factors are equally decisive in determining BTS. It is on the national political scene (and not the European one) that the selection of candidates and the actual act of voting itself take place. This determines which parties will win seats in the EP and, in the case of open lists, which candidates from the same list will become MEPs. The replacement of MEPs in the processes of recruitment and election is of a systemic nature. WTS is fundamentally conditioned by personal factors related to political ambitions, the pursued career path, as well as unforeseeable circumstances such as illness or death. In the case of BTS, the decision to end or continue an MEP’s career is the results

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of decisions taken by the MEP themselves, their party and voters. Thus, while WTS is conditioned primarily by ambition factors, BTS is influenced primarily by factors related to the nature of national political scenes. In all but unforeseeable circumstances, entrenched patterns of behaviour characteristic of national political systems play an important role. In some delegations, an MEP mandate is regarded as a ‘full-fledged’ model of a parliamentary career; for other delegations, it can be a ‘waiting room’ on the way to positions in national politics or a reward for political retirees (Westlake, 1994, p. 12; Scarrow, 1997, p. 254; Daniel, 2015, p. 11). The issues in relation to Poland are discussed in detail in the chapter on career paths.

Conclusions The performed analysis of the stability of the Polish delegation proves that it is overwhelmingly conditioned by politics at the national level. This applies to WTS, BTS and OS. The Polish delegation is characterized by a relatively high degree of stability, particularly evident in the value of OS. It should be noted, however, that the main determinant is the value of WTS, and not that of BTS. While about 14% of the EP’s entire membership is replaced as a result of changes taking place during the term of the EP, and about 10% in the case of the Polish delegation, about 60% is replaced as a result of changes occurring between two consecutive terms. This value is similar for the EP as a whole and for the Polish delegation (Table 6.2). This shows how changes occurring in BTS have a considerably greater impact on the stability of national delegations than WTS. The scale of these differences is four times greater for the EU as a whole and as much as six times greater for the Polish delegation. The high value of WTS may be indicative of the implementation in Poland of a career path of a professional MEP, focused on their parliamentary duties and not treating the mandate as an interlude in their career in national politics. However, such an interpretation cannot be convincingly confirmed. The model of a professional MEP career is confirmed the best in relation to the delegations characterized by high levels of WTS and BTS. One might suspect, as MEPs themselves indicate, that a high level of WTS is conditioned by the financial attractiveness attached to an MEP’s mandate. The low value of BTS suggests that parties try to distribute this benefit over a larger number of activists, although it should be stressed that in the case of Poland, the relatively high turnover during elections is also determined by the dynamics of the Polish political scene.

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One can conclude from this that while Polish MEPs themselves consistently ‘hold on’ to their seats, political parties and voters ‘hold on’ to their MEPs much less consistently. The high values of both indexes could be a sign of the professionalization of the MEP function. The high value of only WTS implies the high attractiveness of the MEP mandate in Poland, as does the high percentage of MEPs running for re-election.

References Act. (1976). Act Concerning the Election of the Representatives of the Assembly by Direct Universal Suffrage. (1976, October 8). Official Journal of the European Communities, 19(L 278). Beauvallet-Haddad, W., Michon, S., Lepaux, V., & Monicolle, C. (2016). The Changing Composition of the European Parliament: MEPs from 1979 to 2014. French Politics, 14(1), 101–125. Borkowski, J. & Grzyb, A. (2004). The Role of Observers in the European Parliament in the Process of Institutionalization of Poland’s Membership in the EU. Yearbook of Polish European Studies, 8, 103–121. Coppedge, M., et  al. (2021). ‘V-Dem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset v11.1’ Varieties of Democracy Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds21 Daniel, W. T. (2015). Career Behaviour and the European Parliament. All Roads Lead to Brussels? Oxford University Press. Daniel, W. T., & Metzger, S. K. (2018). Within Or Between Jobs? Determinants of Membership Volatility in the European Parliament, 1979–2014. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 24(1), 90–108. de Vries, C. E., & Hobolt, S. B. (2016). EU Issue Voting in National and European Parliamentary Elections. In B. van der Wouter & C.  H. de Vreese (Eds.), [Un]intended Consequences of European Parliamentary Elections (pp. 101–124). Oxford University Press. Frech, E. (2016). Re-Selecting Members of the European Parliament. Candidate Selection, Party Goals, and Re-Election Probabilities. Springer, VR. Higley, J., & Pakulski, J. (2012). Pareto’s Theory of Elite Cycles: A Reconsideration and Application. In J. V. Femia & A. J. Marshall (Eds.), Vilfredo Pareto Beyond Disciplinary Boundaries (pp. 111–130). Ashagate. Hix, S. (2005). The Political System of the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan. Kauppi, N. (1996). European Institutions and French Political Careers. Scandinavian Political Studies, 19(1), 1–24. Kjaer, U. (2015). National Mandates as Stepping Stones to Europe – the Danish Experience In M. Edinger, & S. Jahr (Eds.), Political Careers in Europe. Career Patterns in Multi-Level Systems (pp. 159–178), Nomos.

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Lodge, J. (2005). Euro-Elections 2004  – A Defining Point in European Integration? In J. Lodge (Ed.), The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament (pp. 3–7). Palgrave – Macmillan. Marrel, G., & Payre, R. (2006). Des Carrieres au Palement longévité des Eurodéputés et Institutionnalisation de l’arène parlamentaire. L’Harmattan, 18(1), 69–104. Members of the European Parliament, European Parliament. Retrieved May 20, 2020, from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/home Rütters, P. (2014). ‘Verbleib’ von in Deutschland gewählen Europa-Abgeordneten. Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 4, 783–803. Scarrow, S.  E. (1997). Political Career Path and the European Parliament. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22(2), 253–263. The Act on the European Parliament Election Law of 23 January 2004. (2004). Journal of Laws, 25: item 219. The Election Law Act of 5 January 2011. (2011). Journal of Laws, 21: item 112. Verzichelli, L., & Edinger, M. (2005). A Critical Juncture? The 2004 European Elections and the Making of a Supranational Elite. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 11(2), 254–274. Westlake, M. (1994). Britain’s Emerging Euro-Elite? The British in the Directly-­ Elected European Parliament, 1979–1992. Dartmouth. Whitaker, R. (2014). Tenure, Turnover and Careers in the European Parliament: MEPs as Policy-Seekers. Journal of European Public Policy, 21(10), 1509–1527. Wilson, S. L., Ringe, N., & van Thomme, J. (2016). Policy leadership and reelection in the European Parliament. Journal of European Public Policy, 23(8), 1158–1179. Witkowska, M. (2015). The State of Democracy in the European Union in Scenarios: Federation, Empire and Europe à la carte. Przegla ̨d Europejski, 4, 92–108.

CHAPTER 7

Group Switching Krzysztof Zuba

Introduction Switches of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) among political groups in the European Parliament (EP) are an inherent part of parliamentary practice, as are switches of parliamentarians among parties in national legislatures. Approximately 10% of MEPs of all terms to date have changed their group affiliation in the EP at least once (Evans & Vink, 2012, p. 103; Hix & Noury, 2018). Data for national parliaments vary widely, ranging from minimum values of 1% (Germany, Austria) to over 30% (Brazil, Italy) (Heller & Mershon, 2009, p. 11). The Polish Sejm is characterised by a relatively high switching rate. During the first nine terms (1991–2015), more than 14% of MPs changed their party affiliation (Fijałkowski, 2022).

The text presents the results of research funded under National Science Centre grant no. 2016/23/B/HS5/03750

K. Zuba (*) Institute of Political Science and Administration, University of Opole, Opole, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 K. Zuba (ed.), The Polish Delegation in the European Parliament, Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28271-3_7

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The fundamental differences between national parliaments and the EP, which are discussed in the methodological section, also determine the limited possibilities of utilising the results of research on national legislatures for the purposes of analyses focused on the EP.  The main difference is already reflected in the terminology. While at the national level we deal with switching among parties present in the parliament (parliamentary party switching), in the EP, we deal with switching among political groups (EP group switching), which bring together representatives of national parties according to ideological and political criteria. Thus, switching in the EP can involve either individual MEPs (as in national parliaments) or entire national political parties, whereas in national parliaments, only MPs can be the subject of a switch. In the case of multi-party parliamentary clubs, a situation in which one party leaves the club resembles a situation that may take place in the EP.1 Nevertheless, such a change of club affiliation is also regarded as a switch of MPs. This is due to the fact that the subjectivity of a party in the national parliament is precisely equated with having its own parliamentary club or circle. If a party does not have its own club or circle, it is not formally represented in the parliament, although it does have its own MPs. The goal of this chapter is to determine the essence, scale and conditions of changes in the affiliation of Polish parties and individual MEPs to political groups in the EP. From this perspective, it should be emphasised that the existing research on group switching in the EP focuses on MEPs as a group, which allows the use of statistical methods. The value of such a perspective is unquestionable. At the same time, the results of such studies cannot be directly used to describe a specific national delegation. Most of the analyses to date emphasise that the key factors influencing the scale of switching should be sought at the level of Member States. All of them also indicate very large differences that exist among national delegations in this regard (Evans & Vink, 2012, p. 110). A slightly different approach to the issue is represented by Gail MacElroy and Kenneth Benoit (2009, p.  168, 2010), who ignore the impact of differences among national delegations, stressing the crucial importance of ideological compatibility between national parties and political groups in the EP.  It is worth noting, however, that this is an isolated position. In her earlier, independent work, MacElroy attributed significant importance to the 1  We have seen such a situation, for example, when MPs of the Alliance left the Law and Justice Parliamentary Club in August 2021.

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group size among potential factors. She noted a trend of more frequent switching from smaller to larger groups. What also turned out to be statistically significant was parliamentary seniority and positions held in a group and PE committees (MacElroy, 2009, p. 221). These are the benefits that MEPs and the parties they represent can gain from joining a particular group; therefore, they should be considered as determinants generated at the national level. Ana Maria Evans came to similar conclusions based on interviews with former Portuguese MEPs and EP officials. She showed that an important factor causing national political parties to switch their affiliation was their intention to maximise the political benefits of sitting in the EP. Such activities are an element of parties’ strategies at not only the European but also the national levels. When choosing an EP group, national political parties are willing to disregard their ideological alignment with groups as long as choosing a less ideologically coherent group provides them with greater political gains (Evans, 2009). Both perspectives seem to be combined by Simon Hix and Abdul Noury (2018). Their findings focus on analysing two potential determinants of group switching: a group’s political strength (switching from smaller and less influential groups to larger and more influential ones) and ideological proximity. The first factor proved to be of particular importance, but the other also proved to be relevant.

Theoretical and Methodological Background The choice of a case study as a research method is determined by the character of the entire book, that is, focusing on the individual case of the Polish delegation. At this point, it is worth emphasising the advantages of this method in the context of group switching research and, at the same time, pointing out its limitations. A case study makes it possible to highlight a number of elements that escape quantitative analyses, which dominate in research on group switching in the EP. The main advantage of this method is that it allows for a detailed presentation of the context and circumstances in which MEPs change their affiliation with political groups in the EP. The picture of group switching that we have thanks to generalised quantitative analyses shows huge differences among national delegations in terms of the scale of the phenomenon. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the causes of these differences should be sought primarily at the level of individual national delegations. A case study makes it possible to complement quantitative research with detailed data on the

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circumstances, reasons and effects of a change of affiliation of each individual Member. The chapter is based on data concerning the organisational status of the European Parliament. They make it possible to accurately determine changes in MEPs’ affiliation with political groups, as well as their affiliation with national parties. This makes it possible to analyse 172 cases, which are not the same as the number of MEPs in the Polish delegation. In accordance with the methodology used in research on group switching, a ‘case’ is considered to be each individual MEP in a particular parliamentary term. Thus, if a particular MEP has held a mandate for three terms, they will be counted as three ‘cases’. This analysis does not include observers delegated to the EP of the fifth term. The decisive reason was their status, precisely that of observers, which deprived them of the right to actively participate in the work of the EP. The second reason was the fact that observers had not been elected in a general election. They had been appointed by the Sejm at the request of parliamentary clubs (Borkowski & Grzyb, 2004, p.  108). Out of 50 Polish observers, none changed their affiliation with a political group. In order to illustrate how this factor affects the overall data, it suffices to state that the inclusion of observers causes the percentage of switchers among all Polish MEPs to decrease from 19.30% to 14.93%. As the research to date shows, an important factor determining the course of an analysis and its results is the adopted typology of the phenomenon under examination. In the research conducted so far, switches are divided with respect to the subject of a switch (group and individual switches) and the time when a switch takes place (within- and between-­ term switches). Pilot research conducted on a group of four countries (Germany, France, Great Britain and Poland) determined a change in one of these criteria. The quantitative division (collective versus individual) was replaced by a qualitative division according to the criterion of the initiator (party versus individual). This makes it possible to divide switches into institutional and individual. The former concern changes in group membership within the EP, which are initiated and carried out in accordance with the will and decision of the parent party of Members. The latter are the consequence of Members’ rebellion against the parent party and are most often associated with leaving its ranks. The determination of this new division is justified and at the same time fundamental, as it provides information on the general causes of switching (conflicts within a party) and their effects (weakening of one party and strengthening of

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another in the PE). Such knowledge was not provided by the division based on the quantitative criteria. The cross-application of these two typological criteria makes it possible to distinguish four sub-categories of group switching (Fig.  7.1). Thus, each case of switching can be classified into one of the four sub-categories. This scheme will be used as the main plane of analysis. It will be preceded by a presentation of findings on the overall scale of the phenomenon with respect to the number of switchers, that is, MEPs who have changed their political group affiliation in the EP.

Individual MEPs Party

Initiator of switching

Period of switching During EP term

Between EP terms

Individual

Individual

within-term

between-terms

switching

switching

(IWS)

(IBS)

Party within-term

Party

switching

between-terms switching

(PWS)

(PBS)

Fig. 7.1  A typological diagram of switches

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Scale of the Phenomenon Since 2004, Poles have participated in four elections to the EP, which accounts for three full parliamentary terms covered by the study. These terms witnessed 40 switches in which 34 Polish MEPs were involved. It is easy to calculate that 28 MEPs changed their group membership once, while six MEPs changed it twice. General data on the scale of switching within the Polish delegation in comparison to the group switching of all MEPs from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe2 and to the EP as a whole is presented in Fig. 7.2. Figure 7.1 shows the scale of individual switches within the Polish delegation that took place between the sixth and the eighth terms of the EP. The comparison shows that, in the case of the Polish delegation, the scope of group switching is twice as big as the scopes of the comparative categories. It is worth noting that the level of switching recorded for the Polish Sejm is also one of the highest in Europe and is clearly higher than in most other countries. This implies that the reasons for such high switching rates within the Polish delegation should be sought in the characteristics of the national party system and the previously developed national patterns of behaviour. A national delegation in the EP is a more 25 20 15 10 5 0 Poland

CEE countries Poland

CEE countries

EU EU

Fig. 7.2  Percentage of group switchers (in relation to the total number of MEPs)—the Polish delegation against the background of Central and Eastern Europe and the EU. (The data concerns the first eight parliamentary terms (1978–2019), and for the countries that joined the European Communities/EU at later stages—from their first EP elections to 2019) 2  I use the notion of Central and Eastern Europe conventionally, equating it with the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007.

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or less faithful copy of a national party system (see Chap. 4). A similar relationship can be observed in the case of other delegations as well. With regard to Germany, switches are rare both at the national level and within the EP delegation. On the other hand, the high level of switching in the French National Assembly and in the Italian Chamber of Deputies corresponds to the high level of switching among MEPs from these countries. Nevertheless, such a relationship is not universal. An interesting case is that of the British delegation, where the low level of switching in the EP’s first terms reflected the situation in the House of Commons at that time. Slowly, however—helped by the change in the voting system for EP elections—the two systems, the British national system and the European one, were becoming more and more distant from each other. The number of switches in the House of Commons remained low, while within the UK delegation in the EP, it increased dynamically in the few terms before the UK left the EU. The dynamic pattern of switching occurring within the Polish delegation (Fig. 7.3) shows them in a different light. The main influence on the scale of switching shown in Fig. 7.1 was exerted by the situation in the sixth term of the EP.  That period witnessed a record number of group switchers. As many as 18 MEPs changed their political group affiliation during that term, which accounted for almost 30% of the Polish delegation. The data for all MEPs from the CEE countries, as well as for the entire EU, show much greater stability in terms of switching that took place

35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

1st

2nd

3rd Poland

4th

5th CEE

6th

7th

8th

EC/EU

Fig. 7.3  Percentage of group switchers in the EP: the Polish delegation in comparison with those of the CEE countries and the entire EU (dynamic value). (Source: The authors’ own calculations based on EP data)

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during the sixth, seventh and eighth terms of the EP. While in the sixth term, the percentage of switchers in the Polish delegation was almost three times higher than that of the delegations from the other CEE countries, during the eighth term both values were already identical (8.75%). Thus, the trajectory of changes in the scale of switching within the Polish delegation diverges significantly from the overall values. For comparison, Fig. 7.2 shows changes in the percentage of switchers calculated for those delegations that were also present in the EP during its earlier terms (1–5). This is to eliminate the potential effect of institutionalisation and professionalisation, which can be assumed to have influenced the lower level of switching in subsequent terms. It is particularly worth comparing the first three terms (1–3) for all Member States and terms 6–8 for Poland and the CEE countries. The data do not indicate any clearly visible trend in switching during the first few parliamentary terms. Moving on to the application of the model adopted in the theoretical part, we should remember that two typological criteria have made it possible to divide switches into within- and between-term, as well as into party and individual. It should also be noted that these categories refer not to MEPs who changed their political group affiliation, but to individual acts of changing affiliation. In other words, it is not about group switchers, but about group switches. Combining the two typologies, four possible arrangements can be distinguished relating to the circumstances in which each switching took place (Fig. 7.1). By superimposing the data for the Polish delegation on the adopted model, it is possible to determine the scale of switching within each of the established sub-categories (Table 7.1). The most important general conclusions to emerge from these data is that the most switches take place during a parliamentary term. Out of a total of 40 switches, as many as 34 took place during a term of the EP. Only six of the remaining cases involved a change of an MEP’s group affiliation that took place between parliamentary terms. Analysing the switching of Table 7.1 Inter-group switches of Polish MEPs

Category of group switches Individual within-term (IWS) Party within-term (PWS) Party between-terms (PBS) Individual between-term (IBT) Total

Number of switches 27 7 5 1 40

Source: The author’s own work based on EP data

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MEPs in the Polish delegation according to the criterion of the initiator (party/individual), we can also see a large disproportion, although not as glaring as in the case of the criterion of the term. There were 28 individual switches and 12 party ones. More detailed conclusions concerning the particular categories of switching will be possible after a qualitative analysis, which will show the circumstances in which all 40 switches of members of the Polish delegation were made.

Qualitative Analysis Following the previous findings, a qualitative analysis will cover switching divided into four sub-categories, starting with the most numerous one (IWS) and ending with the category comprising just one case (IBT). Individual Within-Term Switches There was a total of 27 individual within-term switch cases in the Polish delegation between 2004 and 2009  (Table 7.2). Without considering each of these cases separately, let us draw attention to two general features of these switches that provide an indication of their causes. The first feature is related to the distribution of individual switches over time and the other to the clear convergence between individual group switches in the EP and switches between national parties. The vast majority of individual switches took place during the sixth term of the EP, which was the first one in which the Polish delegation, elected in the 2004 EP elections, enjoyed the full rights of MEPs. During this term, 18 out of a total of 27 individual switches took place. In the next two terms, we observe a sharp downward trend in the number of individual switches: in the seventh term there were five, and in the eighth term only four switches. This may be an indication that a factor favouring individual switches in the Polish delegation was the lack of role models and the consequent misjudgement of the effects of changing group affiliation on switchers. Lacking experience, Polish MEPs of the sixth term may have tended to overestimate their ‘personal’ political capital, assuming that it would allow them to get re-elected from another list in the next election. This conclusion is supported by a significant number of individual switchers who sought re-election in the subsequent EP elections. In 2009, ten such MEPs ran for re-election, and only three of them were successful (PKW, 2009a). This was a valuable, albeit painful, experience

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Table 7.2  Individual within-term switches of the Polish MEPs MEP Bogdan Golik

Term (year)

6th (2004) Wiesław S. Kuc 6th (2004) 6th (2006) Zbigniew Kuźmiuk 6th (2005) Janusz 6th Wojciechowski (2005) Zdzisław Podkański 6th (2005) Sylwester Chruszcz 6th (2005) 6th (2008) Paweł Piskorski 6th (2006) 6th (2006) Andrzej 6th T. Zapałowski (2006) Mariusz 6th M. Grabowski (2006) Bogdan Pęk 6th (2006) Mirosław Piotrowski 6th (2006) Bogusław Rogalski 6th (2006) Ryszard Czarnecki 6th (2006) Bernard 6th Wojciechowski (2007) Marek Czarnecki 6th (2008) Tadeusz Cymański 7th (2011) Jacek Kurski 7th (2011)

Parent party

Change of party

From group

To groupa

Self-­ Defence Self-­ Defence Self-­ Defence PSL

Non-affiliated Non-­ affiliated – Non-­ affiliated – PES

PES

Piast

EPP-ED

UEN

PSL

Piast

EPP-ED

UEN

PSL

Piast

EPP-ED

UEN

LPR

NP

Ind/Dem

NP

–

PO

SD

Non-­ affiliated EPP-ED

Non-­ affiliated UEN

PO

SD

LPR

NP

Non-­ affiliated Ind/Dem

LPR

FP

Ind/Dem

UEN

LPR

FN

Ind/Dem

UEN

LPR

Non-affiliated Ind/Dem

UEN

LPR

FP

Ind/Dem

UEN

Self-­ Defence LPR

PiS

UEN

PES UEN

Non-­ affiliated ALDE UEN

Self-­ Defence PiS

Piast

Non-­ affiliated Non-­ affiliated UEN

SolPol

ECR

EFD

PiS

SolPol

ECR

EFD

–

Ind/Dem ALDE

(continued)

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Table 7.2 (continued) MEP Jacek Włosowicz

Term (year)

7th (2011) Zbigniew Ziobro 7th (2011) Artur Zasada 7th (2014) Robert Iwaszkiewicz 8th (2014) Jacek 8th Saryusz-Wolski (2017) 8th (2019) Kazimierz 8th Ujazdowski (2018)

Parent party

Change of party

From group

To groupa

PiS

SolPol

ECR

EFD

PiS

SolPol

ECR

EFD

PO

Pol. Razem

EPP

ECR

KNP

KORWIN

EFD

–

Non-­ affiliated ECR

PO Non-­ affiliated PiS

Non-­ affiliated Non-affiliated EPP Non-­ affiliated Non-affiliated ECR

Non-­ affiliated

Source: The author’s own work based on EP data a Any change in an MEP’s organisational status, including leaving a group and becoming a non-affiliated MEP, is considered a switch, as is joining a group by a non-affiliated MEP

showing that leaving the group against the will of the party makes reelection to the EP for the next term rather difficult. It can be assumed that the gaining of experience was also collective and institutional in nature: political parties have developed strict recruitment criteria under which loyalty is a significant attribute of a candidate for a seat in the EP. It remains an open question to what extent these actions of party authorities and the individual experience of switchers during the sixth term of the EP were reinforced by the changes in the remuneration of MEPs that entered into force at the beginning of the seventh term in 2009. The obvious conclusion is that an MEP’s switching groups against the wishes of their parent party is a consequence of some conflict and should therefore involve a simultaneous change of party affiliation. This issue was highlighted by Ana M. Evans and Maarten P. Vink. However, they tested this relationship independently of any category of switching within the EP. This blurred the picture because, in the case of PWS and PBS switches, such events are rather coincidences. Nevertheless, Evans and Vinkus established that a change in national party affiliation was much more frequent

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in the case of MEPs who simultaneously changed their group in the EP than for MPs who remained in their EP political group. In the former case, inter-party switches constituted 36.8% of group switches, while in the latter one (MEPs who did not leave their group, but changed national party affiliation), the number amounted to only 8.6%. Of the 28 individual switches of Polish MEPs, 21 were linked to changing or leaving the home national party. It should be stressed that the scale of ‘double switches’ may in fact have been greater, as the methodology adopted in this chapter understates these values. Indeed, in several cases, there is no direct transition from one political group to another. Sometimes—and this was the case for the three Polish MEPs—leaving one group and joining another was separated by a period during which the MEP remained unaffiliated. Thus, the sequence: leaving group A—being a non-affiliated MEP—and joining group B is coded as two separate switches, whereas the situation in which an MEP remains non-affiliated is most often temporary and related to ‘searching for a new place’ and conducting necessary negotiations prior to joining a new group. In the data, however, this manifests itself as two inter-group switches accompanied by one inter-party switch. Either way, the convergence in group and party switching is evident, indicating that the vast majority of individual switches are associated with conflict within a political party, and most often group switching is a direct result of such conflict. Party Within-Term Switches The second category of switching distinguished in this analysis is party within-term switches (PWS). In the case of the Polish delegation, there were three such switches involving a total of seven MEPs (Table  7.3). What is worth noting is the relatively low number of MEPs that can be Table 7.3  Party within-term switches of Polish MEPs Party

EP term (year)

Group before transfer

Group after transfer

LPR Self-­ defence KNP

6th (2005) 6th (2006)

IND/DEM non-affiliated

NA UEN

2 3

8th (2015)

non-affiliated

ENF

2

Source: The author’s own work based on EP data

Number of MEPs

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included in this category. In the case of PWS, it is reasonable to assume that these switches will include, if not all members of a given party, then at least the vast majority of them. In order to explain why this is not the case for the Polish delegation, it is necessary to refer to the findings concerning individual within-term switches. They show that the majority of switches within the Polish delegation took place under conflictual circumstances, as a result of which some MEPs left both their national party and their political group in the EP.  This explains why the authorities of these parties, when deciding to change their group in the EP, could only influence the decisions of the remaining members of their parties. In 2005, only two MEPs from the League of Polish Families (LPR—Liga Polskich Rodzin), following the instructions of the party authorities (hence: party switching), changed their political group in the EP, while the other eight MEPs did not comply with these instructions. A similar situation, although on a smaller scale, took place in the sixth parliamentary term in the case of MEPs representing Self-Defence and in the eighth term in the case of MEPs representing the Congress of the New Right (KNP— Kongres Nowej Prawicy) under the leadership of Janusz Korwin-Mikke. In both cases, the party authorities’ order to switch groups in the EP was obeyed by only half of the MEPs: three out of the six Self-Defence members and two out of the four KNP members. Paying attention to the circumstances of the occurring conflicts and the consequent switches is necessary to explain their genesis, and especially to determine whether they had a European or a national context. Such an analysis allows for a diagnosis of the two major causes of institutional within-term switches taking place among MEPs representing Polish political parties: • leaving the group due to internal conflict: LPR in 2005; • changing political group affiliation with the intention of increasing political gains: Self-Defence in 2006 and KNP in 2015. As a result of the 2004 elections, the LPR introduced ten members into the EP, but seven of them soon left the party structures. In this situation, only the remaining three MEPs (Maciej Giertych, Sylwester Chruszcz, Bernard Wojciechowski) complied with the party’s decision to leave the Independence/Democracy (IND/DEM) group. The reason for the LPR leaving the IND/DEM Group in 2005 was a conflict caused by the style in which the party was managed. It should be emphasised that the conflict

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involved the entire party, and the situation in the LPR delegation in the EP was an emanation of what was happening in the party in Poland. The party leader, Roman Giertych, was accused by an influential group of activists of an authoritarian way of leading the LPR. His opponents included, among others, six MEPs. They contributed to the dismissal of Maciej Giertych (privately the father of the LPR leader) from the position of vice-chairman of the group. Thus, Giertych and two3 members loyal to the LPR party authorities remained a minority and eventually decided to leave the Independence/Democracy group (Koziełło, 2015, p. 199). In the cases of the Self-Defence and the KNP, we do not deal with switching in the strict sense, although the commonly accepted classification criteria dictate that they should be treated as such. Both the Self-­ Defence and the KNP did not so much change their political group as they decide to join it with some delay, maintaining their unaffiliated status immediately after the elections. Moreover, in the case of the KNP, it was not a matter of joining a group, but of participating in the establishment of a new one. In both cases, the change in the organisational status of MEPs was neither a cause nor a consequence of any conflict within the party. Both parties were radical in their views: the Self-Defence was perceived as populist and the KNP as Eurosceptic. This significantly limited their potential for joining any coalition of parties, and therefore their chances to find an ideologically close group in the EP. Both were also present in the EP for the first (and only) time and lacked extensive contacts with parties from other Member States. Eventually the Self-Defence opted for the Union for Europe of Nations (UEN), while the KNP joined the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) group (Woźnicki, 2015). After the 2004 EP elections, the Self-Defence, as a new populist party, found itself politically isolated. Its leaders considered building a new group in cooperation with populist groups from other countries or joining the UEN (Olszewski, 2006, p. 63). Both scenarios were not feasible. A new group that was to be built on the basis of the EU Democracy agreement did not come into being because only three parties of the agreement had delegations in the EP, and they failed to enlarge their group by attracting parties from other countries. The Self-Defence’s admission to the UEN was initially opposed by the Law and Justice party, whose representatives had been observers in the group since 2003, and full members since 2004. 3  Originally there were three of them, but in December 2008 Bernard Wojciechowski also left the party (WBS, 2005).

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After the elections to the Sejm in 2005, the two parties came closer at the national level, which resulted in the establishment of a parliamentary and subsequently a government coalition. This also ultimately paved the way for the Self-Defence to join the UEN.  This is another example of how much politics at the national level determines alliances developed in the EP. In the case of the KNP, on the other hand, the conflict within the party was related to an internal struggle for leadership. During a party convention held in January 2015, the incumbent chairman Janusz Korwin-Mikke was replaced by Michał Marusik. The fact that both the old chairman and the new one were MEPs was not related to this intra-party ‘coup’, although one of the officially announced reasons was that Korwin-Mikke had too many duties (Majewski et al., 2015). The KNP representation in the EP divided into two groups supporting, respectively, the old chairman and the new one. The first group was represented by Robert Iwaszkiewicz, and the other by Stanisław Żółtek. In June 2015, the new chairman Marusik and Żółtek joined the ENF group. Korwin-Mikke maintained his status as an unaffiliated MEP, as did (after his resignation in March 2018) his successor Dobromir Sośnierz. Iwaszkiewicz joined the EFDD group in October 2014. In January 2015, the establishment of the new KORWiN party was announced, with J. Korwin-Mikke as its president and Robert Iwaszkiewicz, an MEP loyal to him, among its members (Szacki, 2015). Party Between-Terms Switches Another of the distinguished categories of switching referred to as party between-terms switches (PBS) concerns the situation when a party changes its affiliation to a group after successive EP elections. In the case of the Polish delegation, such a situation occurred only once. The Law and Justice party, which had belonged to the UEN during the sixth and seventh terms of the European Parliament, joined the newly established European Conservatives and Reformists group (EKR) after the EP elections held in 2009 (Table 7.4). Table 7.4  Party between-terms switches of Polish MEPs Party EP term (year) Group before switching Group after switching Number of MEPs PiS

7th (2009)

UEN

Source: The author’s own work based on EP data

ECR

5

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Originally, before the 2004 EP elections, the PiS had planned to join the European People’s Party (EPP) group. This was at a time when, at the national level, the PiS closely cooperated with the Civic Platform (PO— Platforma Obywatelska), and both parties announced their intention to establish a government coalition after the 2005 national parliamentary elections. Their joint presence in the EPP would be a natural transfer of cooperation from the national to the European level (Kujawski, 2018, p. 426). Four observers representing the PiS, as well as five from the PO and five from the Polish People’s Party (PSL—Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe), became affiliated to the EPP in April 2003. The party leader Jarosław Kaczyński announced that after the 2004 elections, the PiS would declare its intention of joining the EPP (Kaczyński, 2003). Nevertheless, he eventually concluded that the differences between the respective platforms of the PiS and the EPP were too profound, particularly with respect to the issue of an EU constitution. It should be stressed, however, that this decision coincided with the termination of cooperation with the PO and the beginning of a gradually intensifying conflict between the two parties at the national level. In December 2003, the PiS transferred its observers from the EPP to the UEN4 (KID, 2003). It is reasonable to recognise that it was the conflict escalating at the national level between the PO and the PiS that prompted this decision. For the PiS, the UEN was a second-­ choice group, but the need to distance itself from the PO proved to be the prevailing factor. This is further evidence of the supremacy of national factors in switching within the EP. The weakness of the UEN was its marginal character, which was mainly due to the lack of any major parties, especially from Western Europe, in its ranks. Therefore, when a project to form a new conservative political group in the EP appeared, the PiS joined the negotiations on its establishment from the very beginning. The idea originated with the British Conservatives (CP—Conservative Party) back in 2005. The growing influence of its Eurosceptic wing meant that the CP was increasingly distancing itself from the federalist parties with which it had co-founded the Europe People’s Party—European Democrats (EPP-ED). At the end of March 2006, William Hague, then Shadow Foreign Minister, came to Warsaw to discuss the matter of creating a new EP group with the PiS authorities (Pawlicki, 2006). The PiS supported the idea, as the UEN had 4  This switch is not included in the analysis, as it concerned the 5th term of the EP when Poland was still represented by observers and did not have regular MEPs.

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a reputation of radicals with support of any serious mainstream parties. However, the creation of such a group during the sixth term of the EP was paradoxically opposed by MEPs from the CP (Pszczółkowska, 2006). The impasse was broken by the inclusion of a promise to create a new group in the CP’s platform before the 2009 EP elections. After the elections, the promise was fulfilled. Apart from the CP and the PiS, the ECR group was joined by the Czech Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and several smaller right-wing parties (Bale et al., 2010, p. 88). All 15 MEPs representing the PiS joined the ECR.  The UEN, the PiS’s previous group in the EP, disintegrated. It is worth noting the problematic nature of the PBS category. After the 2009 elections, the PiS had 15 MEPs, of whom only 5 were classified as switchers. If the switching had taken place during the sixth parliamentary term, then all seven MEPs representing the PiS would have been classified as switchers. If it had occurred during the seventh term, then all 15 PiS MEPs would have been deemed to be switchers. The fact that the change in the PiS’s group affiliation occurred between terms means that the status of switcher can only be attributed to those MEPs who had held their mandate in the previous term and had been members of the UEN. It should therefore be pointed out once again that it was a single switch involving 15 MEPs, and not 15 individual switches. Bringing this switch down to the number of MEPs who participated in it is dictated by the necessity to maintain a plane of comparison with individual switches. The main reason for the change in group affiliation in the case of the PiS’s switching from the UEN to the ECR was the desire to maximise political gains as perceived from the perspective of the whole party. At the national level, this allowed PiS to change its image as a party deprived of important partners at the international level. Thus, also in this case, what we deal with is the domination of national factors in arriving at the decision to switch to another EP group. Furthermore, the ideological and political character of this change can be questioned. The only thing that PiS on the one side and CP and ODS on the other shared was a critical stance on European integration. They differed considerably in their opinions on economics, the role of the state or religion. Nevertheless, the alliance with the CP and the foundation of a new, relatively strong group gave PiS a much-desired exit from its isolation in the EP.

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Individual Between-Terms Switches Within the Polish delegation, only one individual between-terms switch (IBS) occurred. This this was the case of MEP Mirosław Piotrowski, who—as a non-affiliated MEP—belonged to the UEN during the sixth term and joined the ECR in the next one (Table 7.5). This situation is worth analysing because of its uniqueness. Nominally, the IBS category indicates that a situation has arisen where an MEP who was a member of one group until the end of a term becomes a member of another group from the very beginning of a new term. What is important here is the ‘individual’ nature of the switching, which means that it cannot be linked to a decision made by such an MEP’s own party. The case of Mirosław Piotrowski is ambiguous, which further highlights the uniqueness of this type of switching. Piotrowski was elected to the sixth EP. Representing the LPR, he and the other representatives of the party joined the IND/DEM group. During the course of the term in December 2006, he left the LPR almost immediately changing his group affiliation to the UEN.  In doing so, he found himself in one group with the PiS MEPs, but remained non-affiliated with respect to national parties. In the subsequent elections to the European Parliament in 2009, he ran for a seat on the EP from the first position in the Lublin constituency, maintaining his non-party status (PKW, 2009b). He retained this status5 after the elections, although it is worth pointing out that his profile on the EP website identifies him as a representative of the PiS. Nominally, therefore, this change in group affiliation was the result of Piotrowski’s personal decision. However, joining the UEN, he became a type of a ‘non-affiliated member of the PiS’. He also started to comply with all decisions made by the party’s authorities with regard to PiS MEPs. One of such decisions concerned withdrawal from the UEN and participation in the Table 7.5  Individual between-terms switches of Polish MEPs MEP

Term (year) Parent party

Mirosław Piotrowski 7th (2009)

Change of party from group to group

Non-affiliated PiS

UEN

ECR

Source: The author’s own work based on EP data

5  He also ran for a seat on the EP as a non-affiliated candidate on the PiS list in the 2014 elections.

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establishment of the new ECR group at the beginning of the seventh parliamentary term. The conclusion from these findings can be summarised in the statement that an individual change of a group between parliamentary terms is subject to such restrictions that, although possible, is extremely unlikely.

Conclusion When it comes to intergroup switching in the EP, the case of the Polish delegation allows for the diagnosis of a number of situations which are rather superficially treated in quantitative research and, consequently, misinterpreted. The first and main conclusion from the analysis of switching within the Polish delegation is related to the categorisation of the phenomenon under discussion. The detailed analysis shows that using a general category of intergroup switching, especially when examining the causes and consequences of this phenomenon, becomes analytically unjustified. The particular categories determined by the divisions of switches into individual and party as well as within-term and between-terms comprise circumstances and factors that may be potentially different. In the case of quantitative data, this can result in individual factors neutralising each other. A case in point is one of the threads in the analysis performed by Ana Maria Evans and Maarten P.  Vink and concerning connections between party and group switching. Their analysis shows that less than 40% of all inter-­ group switches in the EP are linked to a simultaneous change of a national party. Looking at the particular categories in relation to the Polish delegation and focusing on PWS and PBS, we can see that such convergence is equal or close to 0. This is so because it is logical that while a party can change its group affiliation in the EP, it cannot at the same time ‘exit itself’ by changing a party. Even if a party that switches to another group changes its own name, this will be—as in the case of an EP group changing its name—its own continuation and not a switch. However, if we focus on individual switches (especially IWS), then the examined convergence for the Polish delegation is 75%. The Polish case cannot be generalised, but it is a sufficient basis for formulating a hypothesis that should be statistically verified in relation to the EP as a whole. The case of the Polish delegation also makes it clear to what extent the reasons for group switching are determined by the context of national politics, and this context—which is a cliché—fundamentally differs from

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one delegation to another. The example of Poland, whose parties had to adjust to the already existing political structure of the EP, shows how important inter-party rivalries and alliances at the national level are in this regard. Poland’s accession to the EU coincided with a new arrangement of the Polish political scene in consequence of the 2001 parliamentary elections (Szczerbiak, 2002). Since then, Poland’s party system has been increasingly structured by the deepening conflict between the PO and the PiS. The accession of individual parties to groups in the EP, as well as subsequent switches, cannot be ‘statistically’ explained. For this, it is necessary to understand the specifics of national politics and to realise its importance in shaping alliances at the European level. Without abandoning further references to general research, attention should be drawn to the most characteristic feature of switching within the Polish delegation, namely the dominance of individual switches over party switches. The percentage of individual switches within the Polish delegation (70%) far exceeds the percentage of MEPs changing groups in the EP as a result of decisions made by party authorities (party switches). In this respect, the data for the Polish delegation differ markedly from those for the EU as a whole, where individual switches constitute a distinct minority (32.18%). The figures for the other CEE delegations (exclusive of the Polish one) are also lower, accounting for 52.2% of all switches. This implies that the reasons for the higher level of group switches made by the delegations of the CEE countries, including the Polish delegation in particular, lie in the insufficient institutionalisation of their party systems— hence the major role of personal conflicts underlying individual switches. At this point, the reservation made in the methodological part should be strongly emphasised. Namely, the adoption of the initiator as one of the criteria of division should result in the acknowledgement that a change of a party’s affiliation to an EP group is always individual regardless of how many MEPs a given party has. Thus, the case of the switch that took place after the 2009 elections (when the PiS left the UEN and co-founded the ECR) was an individual switch made by the PiS, and not five switches of MEPs belonging to the PiS. The adopted methodology slightly blurs this important fact because, for comparative purposes, the indicator is the number of MEPs who change their affiliation, which allows for determining the impact of individual switches on the balance of power in the EP. However, it should be remembered how deceptive such calculations are, especially when it comes to the PBS, as the case of PiS very clearly shows a switch to a new group is preceded by elections, which bring two

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levels of verification of MEPs: selection and election. As a result, a party first ‘selects’ its own candidates for MEPs, and then voters decide which party and which candidates will represent them in the EP. Consequently, only re-elected MEPs can take part in a between-terms switch, which quantitative data do not show. New MEPs are regarded as being ‘switchless’, which implies that they have not changed their group affiliation. It would, however, be more accurate to say that their group affiliation has been ‘neither changed nor not changed’ . The conducted analysis of the Polish delegation allows yet another conclusion to be drawn. It should be regarded as a kind of postscript to the discussion of how the results of quantitative analyses differ from the findings based on in-depth case studies. MacElroy and Benoit (2010) pointed out that the pursuit of ideological alignment between a national party and a political group in the EP is one of the main factors in parties’ decisions to change their affiliation with a group in the EP. Attempting to determine the ideological and political compatibility of parties with particular political groups in the EP, the authors adopted the expert survey conducted in 2004 as a basis for their research. There were four Polish parties among those under analysis: the PiS, PO, PSL and Labour Union. MacElroy and Benoit found that the PSL was the most ideologically aligned with the EPP and the PiS with the UEN. The PO was found to be the party whose ideological alignment with the EPP was low. The findings formulated in this chapter show how reality has diverged from the conclusions mentioned earlier. In the case of the Polish delegation to the EP, the parties considered to be the most ideologically and politically aligned with their groups changed their group affiliation in subsequent years or were affected by switching. At the same time, the party classified as ideologically mismatched with its group remained within its chosen group, experiencing very few switches. In this context, the juxtaposition of the PiS and the PO is particularly striking. It is worth mentioning that the PSL, ranked by MacElroy and Benoit as one of the five parties, most ideologically aligned with its group in the entire EU and underwent a severe crisis relating to its membership in the EPP during the sixth term of the EP. It is impossible to question the importance of ideological alignment as a factor determining the decision to belong to a political group and a possible change of this affiliation. However, the experience of Polish political parties shows that in some cases, this factor may be of secondary significance.

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References Bale, T., Hanley, S., & Szczerbiak, A. (2010). May Contain Nuts’? The Reality Behind the Rhetoric Surrounding the British Conservatives. New Group in the European Parliament, The Political Quarterly, 81(1), 85–98. Borkowski, J., & Grzyb, A. (2004). The Role of Observers in the European Parliament in the Process of Institutionalization of Poland’s Membership in the EU. Yearbook of Polish European Studies, 8, 103–121. Evans, A. M. (2009). Bringing Back a larger Pie from Brussels: The Adjustment of National Party Strategy through Party Switching in the European parliament. CIES e-Working Paper, no. 63. Evans, A. M., & Vink, M. P. (2012). Measuring Group Switching in the European Parliament: Methodology, Data and Trends (1979–2009). Análise Social, 47(2), 92–112. Fijałkowski, M. (2022). Transfery personalne w Sejmie III RP, typescript of doctoral thesis, Opole University. Heller, W. B., & Mershon, C. (2009). Introduction: Legislative Party Switching, Parties, and Party Systems. In W.  B. Heller & C.  Mershon (Eds.), Political Parties and Legislative Switching (pp. 3–28). Palgrave Macmillan. Hix, S., & Noury, A. (2018). Power Versus Ideology: Political Group Switching in the European Parliament. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 44, 4. Kaczyński, J. (2003). ‘Wywiad z prezesem Prawa i Sprawiedliwość’ Przegla ̨d Europejski, July 10. KID. (2003). ‘PiS przesuwa się na prawo w Parlamencie Europejskim: doła ̨czył do Unii na rzecz Europy Narodów’, Gazeta Wyborcza, December 22. Koziełło, T. (2015). Elita polityczna Ligi Polskich Rodzin (2001–2007). Studia Politicae Silesiensis, 15, 190–206. Kujawski, J. (2018). Niezrealizowana koalicja PO-PiS w świetle wybranych pub́ likacji prasowych. Swiat Idei i Polityki, 16, 424–451. MacElroy, G. (2009). Intra-party Politics at the Trans-national Level: Party Switching in the European Parliament. In D.  Giannetti & K.  Benoit (Eds.), Intra-party Politics and Coalition Governments (pp. 205–226). Routledge. MacElroy, G., & Benoit, K. (2009). Party Group Switching in the European Parliament. In W.  B. Heller & C.  Mershon (Eds.), Political Parties and Legislative Party Switching (pp. 147–172). Palgrave Macmillan. MacElroy, G., & Benoit, K. (2010). Party Policy and Group Affiliation in the European Parliament. British Journal of Political Science, 40(2), 377–398. Majewski, P., Malinowski, P., & Pieńkowski, M. (2015). Korwin-Mikke nie jest już prezesem Kongresu Nowej Prawicy. Rzeczpospolita, January 5. Olszewski, E. (2006). ‘Partie polityczne i społeczeństwo w wyborach do Parlamentu Europejskiego 2004 roku’, Athenaeum. Political Science, 14–15, 59–76.

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Pawlicki, J. (2006). Fiasko PiS w Europarlamencie. Gazeta Wyborcza, July 12. PKW. (2009a). Komitet wyborczy, Wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego zarza ̨dzone na dzień 7 czerwca 2009, Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza. Retrieved November 15, 2021, from https://pe2009.pkw.gov.pl/PUE/PL/ KOMITETY/k110.htm PKW. (2009b). Lista kandydatów komitetu zarejestrowana w okręgu nr 8, Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza. Retrieved November 24, 2021, from https:// pe2009.pkw.gov.pl/PUE/PL/KOMITETY/k93_8.htm PSL_2 – Interview Conducted on 15.10.2020. Pszczółkowska, D. (2006). Jak torysi kusza ̨ PiS. Gazeta Wyborcza, February 2. Szacki, W. (2015). Janusz Korwin-Mikke zakłada nowa ̨ partię. Jak długo przetrwa?. Polityka, January 22. Szczerbiak, A. (2002). Poland’s Unexpected Political Earthquake: The September 2001 Parliamentary Election. Journal of Communist and Transition Politics, 17(3), 41–76. WBS. (2005). Kłopoty LPR w Europarlamencie. Gazeta Wyborcza, December 18. Woźnicki, Ł. (2015). Powstaje Europa Narodów i Wolności – skrajnie prawicowa frakcja w PE. Polak ma zostać wiceszefem. Gazeta Wyborcza, June 16.

PART III

Cohesion of the Delegation

CHAPTER 8

Ideological-Programmatic Cohesion Aleksandra Trzcielińska-Polus

Introduction The ideological-programmatic sphere remains a key element of political parties’ identities, relationships with the electorate and competition with other parties. This is regardless of the fact that this sphere has been undergoing significant transformations in recent decades, with parties becoming more vote-seeking and office-seeking rather than programme-seeking (Pedersen, 2012; Katz & Mair, 2018, p. 49). Ideological and programmatic issues as a field of rivalry in the European Parliament (EP) have received extensive exposure in the literature on the subject. Almost all publications, however, focus on the ideological-­ programmatic cohesion of litical groups (less often Euro-parties). Within this strand of research, a scholarly dispute has arisen as to whether the

The text presents the results of research funded under National Science Centre grant no. 2016/23/B/HS5/03750

A. Trzcielińska-Polus (*) University of Opole, Opole, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 K. Zuba (ed.), The Polish Delegation in the European Parliament, Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28271-3_8

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behaviours of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are determined more by the ideological factor or national affiliation. With the alternative formulated in this way, most research indicates that the primary factor is the ideological divide, institutionalized by the existence of political groups in the EP (Noury, 2002, p. 36). Nevertheless, there is a growing view that the alternative presented is false. This position results from the rather obvious observation that the ideological identity of political groups in the EP is a derivative of the ideological profile of the national parties that constitute them (McElroy & Benoit, 2007, p. 19). Moreover, if one compares political groups and national parties in terms of their influence on MEPs’ actions (including voting), the influence of the latter appears to be undeniably more significant (Hix et  al., 2007, p. 134). While, as already stated, research on the ideological-programmatic cohesion of political groups makes up a sizeable body of publications, research on the cohesion of national delegations has so far not been undertaken. This is fully understandable if one notes once again the complete lack of interest in national delegations as an object of scientific analysis. The aim of this chapter is to define ideological-programmatic cohesion understood as a neutral index. This last reservation is necessary because the use of the term ‘cohesion’ implies the assumption that a national delegation can be ideologically and programmatically cohesive. Such an assumption would be downright absurd, given that the characteristic feature of a national party system, of which a delegation is an emanation, is the political diversity inherent in the essence of democratic competition. Cohesion is therefore understood as a scale between total homogeneity and total diversity (lack of cohesion). The aforementioned objective of the analysis can be structured into the following main research questions: 1. How can the cohesion of the Polish delegation be described from the perspective of the ideological-programmatic differences among the parties that make it up? 2.  Which ideological-programmatic components have the strongest impact on increasing or decreasing the cohesion of the Polish delegation? 3. To what extent has the ideological-programmatic evolution of the parties forming the Polish delegation affected its cohesion?

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Data and Method The analysis of the ideological-programmatic cohesion of the Polish delegation in the EP presented in this chapter is based on the programmes of the parties that were represented in its composition between 2004 and 2019. Its basis is the party manifestos developed before the parliamentary elections to the Sejm and Senate, preceding the EP elections. The programmes of the Polish parties in EP elections do not allow for an equally systematic analysis, especially for a qualitative one. They reflect the secondary status of these elections, as European issues are not their major element and remain rather an echo of programmes created for the purposes of national elections. Some parties do not even bother to prepare separate programmes for the EP elections and limit themselves to drawing up specific copies or even ‘abstracts’ of programmes prepared for national elections, or use a programme of a particular Europarty, complementing it with elements of the national context. Thus, if only the programmes presented in the EP elections are used, it becomes impossible to identify the whole range of the Polish political parties’ positions on issues of key importance for MEPs’ activity (Słodkowska, 2015; Słodkowska & Dołbakowska, 2005). For this reason, paradoxically, the programmes of the Polish parties in the EP elections were treated as a secondary source that complemented the findings based on their respective national programmes. Consequently, the basic sources for the analysis comprised the programmes of the Polish parties published during the subsequent national elections preceding the respective EP elections. Most of them were presented in the form of official publications (Słodkowska, 2002; Słodkowska & Dołbakowska, 2011; Słodkowska & Dołbakowska, 2013), while others were obtained from party sources or the websites of individual parties. All parties that had seats in the EP were selected for the analysis, excluding those that had emerged as a result of splits during an EP term. The parties were divided into two groups. The core of the analysis was the programmes of those parties whose representatives had been present in the Polish delegation in all three (6th, 7th and 8th) terms of the EP. Those which had been present in the EP during only one term (no party had had representatives in only two terms) were treated superficially and excluded from the quantitative analysis. The analysis was based on Manifesto Project methodology and data (Volkens et al., 2021). Within the domains included in that project, 12 programmatic categories were identified and divided into three components: worldview, economy and foreign policy. This

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makes it possible to identify ideological-programmatic cohesion/polarization among the parties of the Polish delegation. The analysis was conducted in two dimensions. The more extensive and covering three sections of the chapter, the first dimension shows the ideological-­programmatic cohesion among the parties of the Polish delegation as manifested in the three dimensions of identity, economy and foreign policy. This makes it possible to reflect, firstly, which parties weakened and which parties strengthened the cohesion of the delegation, and, secondly, in which ideological-programmatic dimensions the Polish delegation showed the strongest and in which the weakest cohesion. The last part of the analysis focuses on determining the dynamics of the index of cohesion of the Polish delegation, which is an average of the indexes for the subsequent elections. The ideological-programmatic distance calculated on the basis of the Manifesto Project Database was used as a measure of the cohesion of the Polish delegation. The greater the distance between parties, the lower the cohesion and vice versa. The distance was calculated for each possible pair of parties represented in the EP during the subsequent three terms. The values obtained in this way were summed up and averaged (both for the individual ideological-programmatic dimensions and for each EP term). The purpose of such a procedure was not only to generalize the data, but also to limit the impact of inaccuracies present in the programmes of the Polish parties. This is because, as the analysis of the Polish political programmes examined within the framework of the Manifesto Project shows, they contain a number of distortions, concealed facts, inaccuracies and sometimes manipulations characteristic of the language of politics (Cześnik, 2011; Woźniak, 2017). The use of the Manifesto Project indexes, which quantify the content of the programmes and enable their quantitative analysis, allows for their confrontation with the researcher’s often subjective assessments formulated in the course of the qualitative analysis. Nevertheless, it is the qualitative analysis that makes up for the weaknesses of the arbitrary method of coding the content of the programmes and the lack of the contextualization of the selected indexes.

Cohesion with Respect to Identity The category of identity is the constitutive foundation of any community, and the national community in particular (Burke & Stets, 2009, p. 34). It is a key element of the ‘social software’, usually taking the form of an

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axiological and emotive resource. Hence, it is so difficult to modify its character; it is generally impossible to do so through a process of rational discourse, even when its elements are in conflict with the interests of community members or the community as a whole. This also means that the characteristic features of identity significantly condition the political behaviours of community members (Anderson, 2010, p. 97). This applies to both voters and their political representatives institutionalized in the form of political parties. The process of European integration poses one of the fundamental challenges to national identity, especially when identity is defined in traditional terms as an indivisible value. Already this element, that is, defining national identity and European identity as competing or complementary values, is at the heart of a political dispute in the EU member states, a dispute that is not less heated in the states that are candidates for EU membership or aspire to this status (Robyn, 2005, p. 22). No one expected that a uniform European identity based on shared values and content would emerge in the process of European integration. However, it was assumed that the divisions prevailing at the national level would not be directly transferred to the European level. The same expectations were formulated for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). It was hoped that in the course of the processes of Europeanization and socialization, reinforced by material and political gains, the CEE states would accept the principles fundamental to the European identity, irrespective of differences in their approach to its constituent elements (Schimmelfennig, 2007, p. 32). The components of identity analysed in this chapter (decentralization/ centralization; national way of life: positive/negative; traditional morality: positive/negative, multiculturalism: positive/negative) allow for the positioning of the parties represented in the Polish EP delegation in the political space and in relation to each other. Their mutual arrangement provides an overall picture of the cohesion of the Polish delegation in terms of identity (Fig. 8.1). The averaged identity cohesion index of the Polish delegation was 2.936. The main element weakening the cohesion of the delegation was the programme of the Law and Justice party (PiS), whose distance from the other parties exceeds the average for the entire delegation the most. Only two radical parties, present in the EP for one term only, showed a greater distance from the other parties in the Polish delegation: they were the League of Polish Families (LPR) in the 6th EP term and the New

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0

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1.5

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KO-PSL Left-PSL Left-PO PiS-PSL Average KO-PiS Left-PiS

Fig. 8.1  The ideological-programmatic distance between the parties of the Polish delegation with respect to identity (2001–2019). (Source: The author’s own work based on: (Volkens et al., 2021))

Right (NP) in the 8th EP term. As already mentioned, due to the formulated methodological assumptions, these groupings were not included in the overall analysis. The main axis of ideological divisions weakening the cohesion of the Polish delegation were two issues: attitudes towards the form of state organization (centralization/decentralization) and attitudes towards the values associated with the traditional national lifestyle. The Polish delegation can be the most generally characterized as an asymmetric multilateral system. Within this system, moderate polarization occurs among the centre-­left parties and clear polarization between PiS and the other parties. With regard to identity issues, the most progressive party was the left-­ wing Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), which promoted the pursuit of an efficient and functional state respecting democratic principles and protecting civil rights (LiD, 2007, p. 9). It strongly advocated the separation of the state from the Church and the secular character of the state (Lewica, 2019, p. 15). It attached importance to the formation of a knowledge-­ based society resistant to xenophobia and intolerance (SLD, 2001, p. 2). It also advocated respecting the rights of minorities, including support for the culture and languages of national minorities, which demonstrated its perception of the national community as a civic body (LiD, 2007, p. 9, 70). Close to the sphere of identity defined in this way was the Civic Platform (PO), which also advocated the building of a liberal modern state

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respecting its citizens’ freedom of opinion, human rights and basic civil liberties. The party emphasized the necessity of developing a civic formula of a community open to people with different political views and using culture and education as elements with the strongest impact on the shaping of a sense of identity (PO, 2015, p. 37). It expressed support for liberal values, freedom and respect for the autonomy of the individual. The Polish People’s Party (PSL) was positioned more to the right. Political alliances brought this party’s programme closer to those of PO and SLD, while its electoral base was closer to that of PiS. This also determined the evolution of the party’s programme. While at the beginning of the twentyfirst century its distance from PiS was rather moderate, subsequent elections brought an increase in programmatic differences between the two parties. Simultaneously, PSL was moving closer and closer to the vision of identity represented by PO and SLD. The PSL’s first election programmes (2001, 2005) contain slogans calling for the protection of Christian values as an element of the foundations of human subjectivity and national culture (PSL, 2001, p.  5). However, in the subsequent programmes, this aspect was no longer so prominent. PSL called for the fostering of patriotism, the protection of culture, language and national heritage, as well as the strengthening of national ties (PSL, 2007, p. 12). While the 2001 election programme of PiS treated the issues of identity rather superficially (Klepka, 2008, p. 154), the programmes drawn up for the subsequent elections brought a vision of an increasingly centralized state and an ethnically defined national community (PiS, 2009, p. 7; PiS, 2019, p. 12). However, in the context of the value of solidarity, the party’s 2019 programme contained also a very vague declaration of respect for the diversity of the people who make up the society (PiS, 2019, p. 9). An analysis of the content of programmes from the perspective of the identity component fully affirms the political dividing lines formed at the national level and then transferred to the EP. Importantly, it is not only programmatic declarations but also the political practice shaped at the national level that indicate the sources of the lack of cohesion within the Polish delegation. During the 6th and 7th terms of the EP, polarization among the parties represented in the Polish delegation was conditioned by several dividing lines, among which the left-right axis was the dominant one. According to this division, PiS was clearly different from the left-wing SLD-UP, but its distance to the centrist PO and PSL was much smaller. This was also reflected in the relatively large distance between PO and

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SLD-UP. It should be noted that during this period, PO tried to define itself as a centre-right party. This arrangement was further broadened by the programmatic dilemmas of PSL, which positioned itself ideologically between PiS and PO. It was therefore a multicentric arrangement. The situation changed in the next EP term, after the 2014 elections. They were preceded by a deepening conflict first between PiS and PO, and then between PiS and the other Polish parties present in the EP. This conflict slowly developed into a bipolar arrangement, with increasing cohesion among PO, PSL and SLD, as well as intensifying polarization between these parties and PiS. This conflict reached its apogee in the 2019 elections, in which the centre-left parties ran with a common programme and under the common banner of the European Coalition (KO, 2019).

Cohesion with Respect to Economy A modern and efficient economy as a goal and setting directions to achieve this goal are immanent elements of political party programmes, especially before elections. An economic policy understood as a set of actions and projects undertaken by the state is in fact one of the basic determinants of the survival and development of states and societies. The specific nature of the Polish political scene makes the economy a key factor in the division of the political scene, which, however, does not coincide with the left-­ right divide. The European Union (EU) constitutes a single uniform market comprising the economies of the 27 Member States. The end result of the integration process is to be a full economic union, including the financial and fiscal dimensions. Common economic policies pursued by the EU are intended to support the efforts of the Member States to counteract crises and ensure economic growth, as well as to help strengthen the social dimension of the economy and increase its internal and external competitiveness. According to Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union, the EU ‘shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress’ (TUE, 2016). These goals are served by financial assistance mechanisms, that is, transfers of funds from the EU budget, whose importance and relevance become particularly evident in such circumstances as the 2008 crisis, the SARS-­ CoV-­2 pandemic and the process of combating the effects of lockdowns,

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as well as Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the consequent problems with the supply of energy commodities. However, it is in the economic sphere that disputes and rivalries emerge when national interests turn out to be contradictory. This is because the individual Member States have different development conditions, specific economic systems and different economic strategies (Schmidt, 1995, p. 1077). This is also reflected in the programmes of individual parties, which advocate different ways to ensure economic growth. MEPs representing such parties carry over the divisions and differences in positions taken at the national level to the European Parliament. Thus, an economic policy is the resultant of the action of numerous vectors. This analysis examines the following components of the economic dimension of politics: free market economy versus corporatism/mixed economy; incentives versus Keynesian demand management; protectionism (both positive and negative); welfare state expansion versus welfare state limitation. If one refers to the average value of the ideological-programmatic distance separating the parties put together in pairs, the cohesion of the Polish delegation in the economic sphere (Fig.  8.2) was only slightly higher than in the worldview sphere (Fig. 8.1). This indicates significant differences among the parties in this dimension and, overall, a significant polarization of the Polish delegation. The ideological distance between PO and PSL as well as between PO and PiS has the greatest impact on the low value of this averaged cohesion 0

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Left-PiS Left-PO Average PiS-PSL Left-PSL PO-PiS PO-PSL

Fig. 8.2  The ideological-programmatic distance between the parties of the Polish delegation with respect to economy (2001–2019). (Source: The author’s own work based on: (Volkens et al., 2021))

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index. In particular, the differences shown between PO and PSL may come as a surprise, as both parties remained in a government coalition in the years 2007–2015. However, this result was mainly influenced by programmatic differences that had emerged before the 2004 elections, when both parties had remained in opposition to each other. At that time PO advocated a liberal model of the economy (PO, 2001, pp. 3–5; PO, 2005, pp. 100–108), while PSL was in favour of a strongly interventionist one. During the period of their coalition governments (2007–2015), the differences between the two parties concerning economic issues were significantly reduced, but not eliminated. PO emphasized the need to maintain economic growth and pro-development investments (PO, 2007, pp. 23–30, 40–45). However, PSL—due to the preferences of its electorate—did not renounce interventionist rhetoric in its programmatic declarations and the statements by its leaders (PSL, 2001, pp. 2–5). Although a member of the coalition government, PSL had little influence on the economy, which allowed it to hold on to its pro-­socialist declarations. During this period, the two main opposition parties—PiS and SLD— advocated an increase in social benefits and state interventionism (SLD, 2011, p. 15). The highest programmatic cohesion in the field of economy could be observed between PiS and SLD. This was due to the fact that, on economic issues, both parties presented very similar ideas of an active state with an extensive social programme. However, the ideological sources of such demands were different: while SLD referred to the principles of social democracy and equalization of opportunities in various spheres of life (SLD-UP, 2001, pp. 3–4, 10; LiD, 2007, pp. 33–38), PiS advocated the ideas of national solidarity (PiS, 2001, pp. 15–16; PiS, 2005, pp. 55–56). From 2005 onwards, when PiS took power in Poland, subsequently establishing a government coalition with the populists from the Self-Defence and LPR, centralist and redistributive tendencies deepened in its ideological and programmatic offer (PiS, 2019, pp.  54–64). In the following years—both during the period of remaining in opposition (2007–2015) and after returning to the helm of the state (in 2015)—the strands of economic nationalism (protection of Polish interests) were further strengthened in the PiS programme (PiS, 2007, pp. 20–31). This formed the basis for the forging of the key political division into so-called Poland of liberalism and Poland of solidarity. In this dispute, the dominant roles were

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played by PO and PiS, with the other parties reduced to mere supernumeraries. Paradoxically, ahead of the 2019 elections, the existing programmatic differences within the Polish delegation were flattened considerably. Virtually all political groupings called for increased public spending on health care, an increase in the minimum wage, the introduction of tax allowances, assistance for pensioners, people with disabilities and families and children, which showed their awareness of the role of pro-social policies (KO, 2019, pp.  61–63; Lewica, 2019, p.  13, 19; PSL, 2019, pp.  19–21). Among the opposition parties, it became a common belief that this was the only way to effectively compete with PiS, which had based its rule on abundant cash benefits targeted at the poorest social groups. Public social welfare programmes were used as tools of politics (PiS, 2019, pp. 54–64).

Cohesion with Respect to International Affairs Foreign policy, understood as a state’s outwardly directed activity aimed at the defence and pursuit of its interests, is considered an attribute of each state’s sovereignty and international subjectivity. Hence, some EU Member States shy away from establishing a strong cooperation mechanism with regard to common foreign and security policy, fearing a loss of sovereignty. The main task of foreign policy is the effective pursuit of national interests through international relations with other states. Foreign policy also plays an extremely important role in creating the image of a state beyond its borders. The international environment is subject to dynamic change, which is particularly evident in the twenty-first century. This situation resulting in changes in the perception of Poland’s place and role in the international arena can also be seen in the programmes of particular political parties. An international component is an immanent part of each party’s programme. The following indexes were selected for a comparative analysis of the programmatic principles of the Polish political parties with respect to international relations and Poland’s foreign policy: foreign special relationships: positive versus foreign special relationships: negative; internationalism: positive versus internationalism: negative; European Community: positive versus European Community: negative; Russia/USSR/CIS: positive versus Russia/USSR/CIS: negative.

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According to Comparative Manifesto Data, it is relations with Russia that are reflected the weakest in the Polish parties’ programmes, hence, for most elections, this category was coded ‘0’. The parties’ programmes addressed most extensively relations with the EU. In the context of the Polish delegation in the EP, this deserves special emphasis. It means that the members of the Polish delegation in the EP already at the stage of running for the MEP mandate have a specific view on European integration, shaped by their respective ideological and political circles. This dominance of the European component is all the more significant at the level of the European Parliament. Hence, most researchers acknowledge that attitudes towards integration are a distinct factor determining the position of national parties in the EP political space (Hix & Lord, 1997; McElroy & Benoit, 2011). Referring to the average value defining the measured distance (Fig. 8.3), one should note that the level of cohesion of the Polish delegation with regard to foreign policy issues is significantly higher than in the case of the aspects of worldview and economy. This reflects a certain paradigm of foreign policy as a sphere of a state’s activity. The good of the state dictates that in the sphere of foreign affairs, political actors should seek consensus while limiting existing conflicts. Unlike in the case of other issues that constitute the domain of domestic politics, conflicts about foreign policy are constrained by the interests of the entire national community and state. An examination of the agendas of the successive governments shows 0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1.4

PiS-PSL Left-PO PO-PSL Average Left-PSL PO-PiS Left-PiS

Fig. 8.3  The ideological-programmatic distance between the parties of the Polish delegation with respect to international affairs (2001–2019). (Source: The author’s own work based on: (Volkens et al., 2021))

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that such a consensus had existed in Poland until EU accession. It was subsequently being challenged, first by populist parties (Self-Defence, LPR) and then by PiS. The other main groupings of the Polish political scene maintained the foreign policy consensus (Zuba, 2021, p. 405). The data included in Fig. 8.3 fully confirm this state of affairs. PiS appears as the main member of the Polish delegation that weakens its cohesion on foreign policy issues. This, in turn, dictates that the aforementioned high cohesion in this regard should be considered relative, as not all groupings accept the foreign policy consensus underpinned by Poland’s EU membership. The key issue determining the level of cohesion of the programmes of the parties making up the Polish delegation was European integration. Other issues such as bilateral relations were most often derivatives of this general dispute. This also applied to relations with the USA, which, especially from the perspective of right-wing parties (PiS, LPR, Congress of the New Right—KNP), were formulated as an alternative to European integration. The exception to this was the attitude towards Russia, but this issue had gained some prominence only before the 2004 elections. The importance of the European issue was further reinforced by a temporal factor: the apogee of the disputes over EU membership occurred in the period before the accession and therefore the first EP elections to be held in Poland. This makes it possible to distinguish two main periods: a period of a multicentric system (2001–2007) and a period of a bipolar system (2007–2019). In the former system, the different parties located themselves in different positions across the foreign policy spectrum, from radical Eurosceptics (Self-Defence, LPR), through moderate critics of integration (Eurorealists: PSL, PiS), to more (SLD) or less (PO) declared adherents of integration with the EU. After the elections to the Sejm in 2009, this arrangement was gradually evolving towards a two-block system within which the parties were divided into pro-European (PO, SLD, PSL) and Eurosceptic (KNP, PiS). SLD’s attitude towards EU membership was not only unequivocally pro-European but also the most consistent; each successive election confirmed that European integration was the foundation of the party’s programme concerning foreign policy issues (SLD, 2001, p. 20; LiD, 2007, pp. 62–68; SLD, 2011). PO had a similar programme, with the difference that in the run-up to the 2005 elections, preparing itself for a (would-be) coalition with PiS, the party toned down the Euroenthusiastic content in its programme and declarations (PO, 2001, p. 31, 37; PO, 2005, p. 23).

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In 2007, PO abandoned this tactical instrumentalization of the European issue, becoming the forerunner of pro-European forces (PO, 2007, pp. 74–80; PO, 2011, pp. 89–99). In the period before Poland’s accession to the EU, the PSL had belonged to the camp of soft Eurosceptics. However, with farmers as the party’s electoral base becoming the biggest beneficiaries of the country’s EU membership, PSL revised its position. Nevertheless, this was not a full transition to Euroenthusiastic positions. Similarly to economic aspects, the PSL remained a centre-right party in terms of its rhetoric, which was additionally conditioned by the search for a new identity based on the principles of Christian democracy. This was the origin of the party’s acceptance of integration based, however, on the category of the ‘Europe of Homelands’ (PSL, 2001, p. 3,7). The evolution of PiS’s programme was proceeding in the direction opposite to that of PSL. The party accepted EU membership but formulated a number of conditions for its continued support. Already before the 2004 EP elections, PiS described EU accession as a ‘big problem’ and an undertaking that was ‘the most important’, but simultaneously ‘the most controversial’ (PiS, 2001, p. 5). After Poland had become an EU Member State, PiS assumed the role of the main critic of integration. In its programmes preceding the EP elections in 2009 and 2014, it was not the EU that was indicated as the priority foreign policy direction, but NATO and cooperation with the USA. PiS perceived the strengthening of relations with the US and the CEE countries as an alternative to continued European integration (PiS, 2005; PiS, 2007, pp. 10, 29, 49–50). The 2019 elections were exceptional in all aspects, including that of foreign policy. The election campaign saw the consolidation of almost the entire opposition against the increasingly authoritarian rule of PiS. This increased both the cohesion of the opposition parties grouped in the European Coalition (KE: PO, The Greens, Modern, SLD and PSL) and the polarization between these parties and PiS. Consequently, after the 2019 elections, the cohesion of the Polish delegation decreased and its sources changed, as well. The conflict between PiS and the EC over democracy and European integration became the main factor weakening the cohesion of the Polish delegation. The Civic Coalition1 demanded an end to the ineffectiveness and passivity of PiS government on the EU forum, which had resulted in  It consisted of the following parties: PO, Civic Initiative, the Modern and the Greens.

1

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‘demoting Poland to the second league’, the rebuilding of cooperation with Germany and France, the strengthening and expansion of the US and NATO military presence on Polish territory (KO, 2019, p. 41, 47). PSL, which ran separately in the national elections, formulated a programme that corresponded like none of its previous ones to the pro-European demands of PO and SLD (PSL, 2019, p. 24). This was a consequence of creating a common programmatic line whose institutional superstructure was the establishment of the European Coalition in 2019. This unity was a response to the increasingly pronounced Eurosceptic course of PiS, whose government became embroiled in open conflict with the European institutions such as the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the EU and the European Parliament. The basis of this conflict was not only Eurosceptic rhetoric, but above all the undermining of the foundations of the rule of law. PiS sought an alternative to the ‘diktat of Brussels’, which resulted in a number of initiatives aimed at cooperation in Europe, for example, the Visegrad Group, the Three Seas Initiative, the Bucharest Format and Nordic-Baltic cooperation (PiS, 2019, p. 24).

Changes in the Cohesion of the Polish Delegation in the Years 2004–2019 The emerging dominance of catch-all parties in contemporary politics and the trends towards cartelization make a programme and ideology increasingly unstable elements of a party’s identity. Polish parties are also adjusting their programmes in response to the challenges of the socio-economic environment, seeking to increase their influence on the electorate and reconfiguring political alliances. In such a view, ideology and programme appear as not only a determinant of individual parties’ positions and actions in the EP but also a product of a specific political strategy and tactic. Most researchers share the view that such strategies and tactics are first shaped at the national level and subsequently adapted at the EP level. Figure 8.4 shows how the level of ideological-programmatic cohesion of the Polish delegation changed after the successive EP elections. It should be remembered that the analysis was based on the programmes of the parties making up the Polish delegation, prepared for the national elections preceding the respective EP elections. By averaging the indexes of the ideological-programmatic distance, a picture of the dynamically changing cohesion of the Polish delegation in the EP was created. Thus, it is

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2001 (2004)

2007 (2009)

2011 (2014)

2019

Fig. 8.4  The ideological-programmatic cohesion (polarization) of the Polish delegation in the EP during its successive terms. (Dates refer to the years of national elections and the publication of electoral manifestos. The dates of the EP elections to which the analysis refers are provided in brackets. A higher value of the index corresponds to greater polarization within the delegation and, therefore, lower cohesion, and vice versa: the lower the index, the higher the ideological-­ programmatic cohesion of the delegation. Source: The author’s own work based on: (Volkens et al., 2021))

possible to assess not only the cohesion itself but also the ideological-­ programmatic stability of the Polish delegation. The overall picture presented in Fig. 8.4 indicates very large differences between the cohesion of the Polish delegation in the period before the EP elections held in 2004 and the subsequent three EP terms. On the eve of the 2004 elections, the cohesion of the Polish delegation deviates most markedly from the average value (4.171). The observed trends are a result of changes in the number and character of the groupings making up the Polish delegation, their ideological-programmatic evolution and the patterns of inter-party rivalry. Before the 2004 elections, the level of inter-­ party conflicts was record high in the aftermath of a major reconstruction of the Polish party system. These changes were violent enough to merit the name of a political earthquake (Szczerbiak, 2002). As Radosław Markowski and Ben Stanley put it, ‘between 2001 and 2005, significant chaos and destabilization of the emerging structures of inter-party competition are visible’ (Markowski & Stanley, 2016, p. 27). Of the eight parties present in the EP after the 2004 elections, five were new groupings that had either emerged before the 2001 elections or gained the status of a relevant party for the first time then. It is not less important that the three

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other parties, which were able to demonstrate their institutional, ideological and programmatic continuity, were reduced to the role of supernumeraries in the EP. They held just 13 seats, which represented ¼ of the Polish delegation. From the point of view of the topic addressed in this chapter, taking these factors into consideration is of crucial importance, as it proves that the vast majority of the parties represented in the Polish delegation to the EP after the 2004 elections were only at the stage of shaping their ideological-programmatic character. Therefore, the situation during this period cannot constitute a benchmark for subsequent elections because, by all indications, it is an anomaly. This explains such a huge lack of ideological cohesion among the parties forming the Polish delegation in the run-up to the first EP elections. This anomaly determines not only the decline in the cohesion of the Polish delegation in the static dimension but also in the dynamic dimension. The value of the standard deviation for the four elections under examination is 3.272. If the data for the first period (before the 2004 elections) are excluded, the value of this measure for the three remaining elections is only 0.353. A significant factor negatively affecting the cohesion of the Polish delegation, especially in the first period, was the conflict over European issues. After the 2004 election, the Polish delegation included three Eurosceptic parties, with LPR being particularly radical (Zuba, 2009, p.  335). However, the presence of Eurosceptics does not fully explain such a low level of cohesion of the Polish delegation before the 2004 elections. If LPR2 were to be eliminated from the calculations, this would, admittedly, raise the value of the cohesion index by a third, but it would still remain a record-low level of cohesion for the Polish delegation over the entire period under analysis. This clearly indicates that the aforementioned radical changes taking place within the Polish party system during that period were the key factor contributing to such a low level of the cohesion of the Polish delegation before the 2004 elections. Hence, one cannot conclude that cohesion was high from the fact that a significant increase occurred in the value of ideological-programmatic cohesion in the subsequent elections. It will be possible to draw such a conclusion after a comprehensive comparative study, which exceeds the objectives of this chapter and the author’s capabilities. 2  Although the Self-Defence was a Eurosceptic party during that period, it completely ignored European issues in its programme.

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If an analysis is limited to the periods prior to the EP elections held in 2009, 2014 and 2019, it can be shown that there were significant changes in the cohesion of the Polish delegation during that time as well. Between the state prior to the 2009 elections and the state prior to the 2014 elections, the aggregate ideological distance within the Polish delegation increased by 45%, which indicates a clear decrease in the cohesion of the Polish delegation. A comparison of the respective situations preceding the 2014 and 2019 elections shows a decrease in the ideological-­programmatic distance (and therefore an increase in the cohesion of the Polish delegation) by 6%, which should be considered a small change. The highest level of cohesion was reached by the Polish delegation after the 2009 elections. The key factors in this were the relative quieting of disputes over European issues and the stabilization of the party system, that is, the same factors (but with opposite vectors) that conditioned the record low cohesion of the Polish delegation after the 2004 elections. As already mentioned, the subsequent EP elections held in 2014 brought intensified inter-party conflicts, which caused a decrease in cohesion. The increased cohesion of the Polish delegation after the 2019 elections was influenced by a qualitative change in inter-party rivalry. On the one hand, conflicts among the main opposition parties (KO, SLD and PSL) were being contained, the institutional emanation of which was their joint participation in the elections under the banner of the EC. On the other hand, there was a sharp polarization of positions between these groupings and the ruling PiS. The European context became an important axis of conflict and yet another element in the more general dispute over the rule of law and the condition of democracy in Poland.

Conclusion It is impossible to expect any national delegation in the EP to be completely cohesive in terms of ideology and political programme. As already stated, such a state of affairs would contradict the idea and practice of democratic representation reflecting different interests, value systems and competing political visions. In general, the structure of the Polish delegation reflects the structure of the political scene at the national level. However, as with the other delegations, the former is not a faithful copy of the latter (see Chap. 6). In this chapter, due to the weakness of the programmatic content of the Polish parties in EP elections, it was decided to base the analysis of the ideological-programmatic cohesion of the Polish

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delegation in the EP on the parties’ manifestos drawn up for the purposes of elections to the Sejm, which precede elections to the EP.  This fact should be taken into account in a summary of the main conclusions arising from the analysis, as not all issues included in the national parties’ programmes constitute a significant field of conflict or cooperation among the Polish parties represented in the EP. Based on the existing literature on the subject, including that concerning other delegations and the practices of the EP itself, it is possible to conclude that there are several important factors capable of changing the programmatic and ideological cohesion of the Polish delegation compared to the cohesion observed on the national political scene. In many Member States, the status of EP elections as second-order elections results in an overrepresentation of radical or ‘exotic’ groupings in the EP. This stems from the fact that voters are willing to ‘experiment’ in EP elections because their direct results do not include any change of government, including at the EU level. This phenomenon occurs with greater intensity if there are considerable differences between a given Member State’s respective systems of electing members of the European Parliament and the national parliament. This has significant consequences for ideological-programmatic cohesion. In the case of the Polish delegation, these differences are of a minor character. Indeed, there has not been a situation where, as a result of EP elections, the Polish delegation has included a party which has not previously or subsequently held seats in the Sejm. Nor has it happened, as in the case of other Member States, that any party has been radically overrepresented or underrepresented in the EP compared to the number of its members sitting in the Sejm. This argues in favour of the position that also with respect to the parties’ ideological-­ programmatic profiles, the structure of divisions inherent in the domestic political scene is reflected within the Polish delegation in the EP. The analysis presented in this chapter suggests that, within the Polish delegation, the most conflicting issues are those related to identity and understood as worldview aspects. Such issues concern the principles on which political parties build their relationships with the electorate. On the other hand, the greatest ideological-programmatic cohesion of the Polish delegation emerges in the case of foreign policy issues. As these conclusions were based on an analysis of political parties’ programmes prepared for the purposes of national parliamentary elections, they can be regarded as circumstantial. Nevertheless, the analysis of voting cohesion conducted

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in Chap. 9 fully confirms the conclusions, positively verifying the findings presented above. The change in the character of conflict and cooperation (and thus cohesion) observed in the structure of the Polish delegation from multilateral to bipolar is also a direct transfer of the deepening dualization of the Polish political scene (PiS versus PO). After 2015, this arrangement was based on a conflict over the essence of Polish democracy and the country’s presence in the EU, in which pro-democratic and pro-European parties positioned themselves opposite the increasingly authoritarian PiS. The last key conclusion from the analysis conducted in this chapter is related to the dynamics of the ideological-programmatic stability of the Polish delegation. What is particularly noteworthy is the record low cohesion in the period preceding the first EP elections held in Poland in 2004. In the subsequent elections, differences in the level of cohesion were noticeable, but no longer so profound. The main factor behind this state of affairs should be linked to the deep transformation of the Polish party system that took place after the 2001 elections. As a result, several large parties disappeared from the Sejm and new ones were formed in their place, immediately gaining the status of relevant parties. The situations before the elections held in 2004 and 2014 indicate the significant influence of Eurosceptic parties on the decline in the cohesion of the Polish delegation. This issue, however, will be analysed in depth in a separate chapter. It is only mentioned here as an important factor. Finally, it is impossible to ignore the impact of the European factor: Poland’s accession to the EU was not without any influence on the overall increase in the number of political conflicts. Subsequently, when most of the threats predicted by Eurosceptic and Eurorealist parties had not materialized, the European issue ceased to be so contentious. Its prominence rose again ahead of the 2019 EP elections, however, when it became a part of a broader geopolitical and civilizational dispute.

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& M.  Dołbakowska (Eds.), Wybory 2007. Partie i ich programy. Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN. Hix, S., & Lord, Ch. (1997). Political Parties in the European Union. Macmillan. Hix, S., Noury, A., & G., and Roland, G. (2007). Democratic Politics in the European Parliament. Cambridge University Press. Katz, R. S., & Mair, P. (2018). Democracy and the Cartelization of Political Parties. Oxford University Press. Klepka, R. (2008). Wizje państwa w programach wyborczych z 2005 r. Platformy Obywatelskiej oraz Prawa i Sprawiedliwości. Chorzowskie Studia Polityczne, 1, 153–168. KO. (2019). Twoja Polska. Program Koalicji Obywatelskiej, https://platforma. org/upload/document/86/attachments/121/KO%20Program.pdf. Lewica. (2019). Lewica KW Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej. Polska jutra. Główne postulaty Lewicy. Ła ̨czy nas przyszłość. LiD. (2007). Nowa Polityka, Nowa Nadzieja. Program Wyborczy Lewicy i Demokratów. Warszawa. Markowski, R., & Stanley, B. (2016). Rozłamy socjopolityczne w Polsce: iluzja czy rzeczywistość? Studia Socjologiczne, 4(223), 17–40. McElroy, G., & Benoit, K. (2007). Party Groups and Policy Positions in the European Parliament. Party Politics, 13(1), 5–28. McElroy, G., & Benoit, K. (2011). Policy Positioning in the European Parliament. European Union Politics, 13(1), 150–167. Noury, A. G. (2002). Ideology, Nationality and Euro-Parliamentarians. European Union Politics, 3(1), 33–58. Pedersen, H.  H. (2012). What Do Parties Want? Policy Versus Office. West European Politics, 35(4), 896–910. PO. (2001). Program Platformy Obywatelskiej., http://www.ciemnoczolowski. pl/index.php?menu=dokumenty&dokumenty=program_po PO. (2005). Państwo dla obywateli. Program rza ̨dzenia 2005–2009. Eds. J. Rokita, S. Kawalec. Warszawa. PO. (2007). Platforma Obywatelska. By żyło się lepiej. Wszystkim! Program Wyborczy Platformy Obywatelskiej. Warszawa. PO. (2011). Następny krok. Razem. Program wyborczy 2011, Platforma Obywatelska. Warszawa. PO. (2015). Polska przyszłości. Program Platformy Obywatelskiej RP. PiS. (2001). Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości., http://www.pisbytow.wik-­hw.pl/ program.htm PiS. (2005). IV Rzeczpospolita. Sprawiedliwość dla Wszystkich. Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości, Warszawa. PiS. (2007). Program PiS. Dbamy o Polskę. Dbamy o Polaków. Warszawa.

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CHAPTER 9

Voting Cohesion Michał Niebylski

Introduction The tone of political debate in the European Parliament (EP) is set by political groups. Their importance and impact on the dynamics of debates and legislative processes in the EP is correlated with not only their size but also their level of cohesion. The larger the group, the greater its impact on the EP legislative process in general. Furthermore, the greater the importance of the group, the higher its cohesion, as this translates into effectiveness in achieving political objectives (Faas et al., 2004). The category of cohesion refers to the ability of a political actor (most often a political group) to secure support for solutions put to the vote. A high degree of cohesion means that the course taken by the group enjoys broad approval among its members, resulting in a vote along factional lines. The operation of the political groups, most often based on the similarities with the national parties that make them up in terms of programme and ideology, influences the integration of their constituent groupings. The functioning of the groups in such an arrangement is intended to

M. Niebylski (*) University of Opole, Opole, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 K. Zuba (ed.), The Polish Delegation in the European Parliament, Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28271-3_9

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protect the legislative process in the EP from undue influence of national particularisms. Given the way in which the framework of political debate in the EP has been constructed and, more specifically, the role assigned to political groups in the context of organizing the activity of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), it is perhaps not surprising that research on voting cohesion within the EP has focused on groups and their ability to homogenize MEPs’ voting behaviours (Attiná, 2006; Kreppel & Tsebelis, 1999; Raunio, 1997; Thomassen et al., 2004). While the primacy of affiliation to political groups in terms of MEPs’ activity (including voting) cannot be questioned, the thesis of its supremacy is increasingly being challenged. The literature on the subject highlights the influence of other factors in the context of the arrangement of MEPs’ voting patterns (Cichi, 2013; Kang, 2019; Kluver & Spoon, 2015). It has been shown that the space to agree on voting positions on the EP forum is provided by national delegations. This claim seems paradoxical if one considers the fact that political rivalry at the European level has been arranged according to the criterion of ideology and that the main actors in the EP are transnational political groups. The conditions of the rivalry have been constructed in such a way as to cut off national factors from influencing decision-making processes at the European level. However, this claim does not reflect the thesis that national delegations are more cohesive in terms of voting than political groups. On the contrary, national delegations reflect the polarization of national political scenes (and the incohesion programmed into them) by transferring it to the EP level. It can therefore be said that political parties vote within groups not only because they share common values and interests but also because in doing so, they perpetuate divisions and conflicts with their national opponents located in other political groups. From this perspective, what for many years has not been the focus of academic exploration aimed at determining to what extent a given national delegation is cohesive in terms of voting in the EP gains full scientific justification nowadays and at the same time creates opportunities for exploring and understanding the complexity of the context of political competition in the EP.

Data and Research Design The aim of this chapter is to determine the cohesion of the Polish national delegation in votes held on the EP forum. Four main research questions have been formulated to achieve this objective: 1. Does the Polish national

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delegation in the EP constitute a space for agreeing on common voting positions? If so, to what extent? 2. In which thematic areas is the voting cohesion of the Polish delegation the highest? 3. What is the level of voting cohesion at the European level as compared to that at the national level? 4. What are the sources of voting cohesion within the Polish national delegation to the EP? It should be stressed that the category of ‘cohesion’ is treated in this chapter—as it is in the whole book—not as a valuing category but as a neutral index. Hence, potentially even a complete lack of cohesion would be referred to as ‘cohesion with a value of 0’. This caveat is important in order to dismiss the suggestion that the purpose of this chapter is to prove the cohesion of the Polish delegation’s votes. Two research hypotheses have been adopted as part of this chapter. The first hypothesis assumes that, with respect to issues of strategic importance to Poland, such as agriculture, the level of cohesion of the Polish delegation will be greater than in the case of issues of lesser significance. Agriculture is as important a subject area as it is sensitive, particularly for Polish MEPs. This is due to at least three things. Firstly, it is an important sector of the Polish economy. Against the background of the EU, the contribution of Poland’s agriculture to its gross domestic product is relatively high.1 Poland has one of the highest shares of the agricultural area in the total surface area of the country in Europe. Secondly, agriculture is a highly communitized area, which means that it is subject to EU policy regulations (under the Common Agricultural Policy). And thirdly, a specific feature of Polish agriculture is the fragmentation of farms (Poczta, 2013). This gives rise to certain political implications. Farmers are a large and relatively influential interest group in Poland. The interests of this group cannot be ignored by political parties. For this reason, in their efforts to gain or maintain power, they cannot afford to give up the support of the rural electorate. With the above rationale in mind, it is assumed that Polish MEPs will be more inclined to take a common position in EP votes on agriculture and the EU agricultural policy than in other thematic areas. In other words, the cohesion of the national delegation in such votes is expected to be higher than it is in other votes. The second hypothesis, on the other hand, assumes that the determinant of voting 1  The share of agriculture in GDP and employment in economically developed countries is 1.4%, while in Poland it is 3%. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Agriculture and the Food Economy in Poland, Warsaw 2019, p. 12.

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cohesion within the Polish delegation in the EP is ideological polarization at the national level. Thus, it is assumed that Polish MEPs will show a greater tendency to be consistent in their votes when ideological differences between parties at the national level are relatively small. Conversely, an increase in ideological polarization on the Polish political scene will lead to a decrease in the voting cohesion of the Polish delegation in the EP. The methodology of the research is based on a quantitative analysis of votes held in the EP.  The analysis comprised a total of 128 randomly selected votes held between 2009 and 2019, which corresponds to the 7th and 8th terms of the EP. The selection was based on systematic random sampling consisting in choosing elements of the general population distant from each other by a fixed value k, referred to as the sampling interval (in this research, k took the value of 6). The sampling frame was a database of EP votes constituting a resource of the VoteWatch Europe website. For the purposes of the quantitative analysis, three thematic categories of votes were distinguished: economic problems, international relations and worldview issues. The first category included the three thematic areas referred to in VoteWatch as agriculture, budget and employment and social affairs. The second category also included three areas, namely foreign and security policy, international trade and development. Finally, the two areas of civil liberties, justice and internal affairs, as well as gender equality were assigned to the third category. The smaller number of the areas assigned to the third category was due to the fact that the thematic division of votes in the VoteWatch database did not contain a sufficient number of areas that could be allocated to worldview issues. Sixteen votes were randomly selected for analysis from each of the eight areas, with eight votes held during the EP’s 7th term and eight votes held in the years 2014–2019. In addition, an analogous review of the Sejm’s votes was conducted in order to compare the cohesion of votes at the European and national levels. The only difference was that the Sejm’s votes on international trade and development were not included in the international area. Consequently, the review was carried out on a smaller sample of 112 votes held in the years 2011–2019 (the 7th and 8th terms of the Sejm). To calculate the cohesion index, as already indicated, the Hix index, otherwise known as the cohesion index, was used (Hix et  al., 2005). Admittedly, the Rice index (Rice, 1925) or its modifications (Born & Nevison, 1974) are often used in research on cohesion, but due to the weakness of this index consisting in its disregard of abstentions (Sokołowski, 2014), the calculation of cohesion was based on the approach proposed by

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Simon Hix, which provides for a voting model where a parliamentarian can take one of the three decisions: to vote in favour of a bill, to vote against it or to abstain from voting. The index of cohesion adopts the following formula:



1 max Yi ,N i ,Ai   Yi  N i  Ai    max Yi ,N i ,Ai  2 AI i  , Yi  N i  Ai



where Yi is the number of ‘yes’ votes cast by the group in a given vote, Ni is the number of ‘no’ votes and Ai is the number of abstaining votes (Hix et al., 2005, p. 215). The index takes values between 0 and 1, where 0 means no cohesion and 1 means maximum cohesion (all those taking part in a vote take the same position). It is assumed that the condition of voting cohesion in the Polish national delegation is fulfilled if the value of the index is higher than 0.700.

The Cohesion of Votes in the EP Research on cohesion in the EP leads to the conclusion that factional affiliation is the main determinant of MEPs’ voting behaviours. Research conducted by S. Hix, based on a quantitative analysis of votes, showed a high level of cohesion within political groups (Hix, 2001; Hix, 2002). Other studies covering the years 1989–1999 show that the level of voting cohesion within political groups has successively increased (Thomassen et al., 2004). Based on an analysis of votes held since the introduction of direct EP elections, an increase in the cohesion of political groups has been shown to be correlated with the expansion of the EP’s legislative powers (Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2005). The accession of ten new Central and Eastern European (CEE) member states and the subsequent accession of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia have generally not undermined the ability of political groups to moderate MEPs’ voting behaviours (Nissen, 2014; Voeten, 2009). While it is true that a tendency has been observed among MEPs from newly acceded countries to display higher levels of disloyalty to factions in the voting process (Lindstädt et al., 2012), political group cohesion still remains at a significantly higher level than the cohesion of national delegations. On the basis of an analysis of votes from the period of 1979–2014, it has been proven that even in such a sensitive area as the

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EU’s external relations, where attempts to safeguard the interests of member states can be a strong incentive for MEPs to vote according to national affiliation, factional voting patterns nevertheless emerge (Raunio & Wagner, 2020). In light of the literature on the subject, it is not in doubt that the dominant voting pattern in the EP is organized by political groups. However, in the research projects that empirically legitimized this finding, one can discern a tendency to adopt a different paradigm of politics at the EP level. What could be observed for several decades, especially since the introduction of general elections to the EP, was the direct or implicit acceptance of the thesis that an autonomous dimension of politics has emerged on the EP forum, showing a high degree of independence from the influence of national politics. In other words, as a result of the process of institutionalization, Europeanization and socialization, a political space has emerged in the EP, where loyalty to national parties or, more broadly, to nation states is being desubstantialized. It is being replaced by identification with supranational political groups and socio-political categories they represent at the European level. The category of national interest is to be displaced by the priorities of political groups’ programmes and the European identity of MEPs. The EP forum is not perceived as an extension of national political arenas, but is to be a fully separate arena of competition. Such assumptions lead to the general conclusion that the EP voting process is limitedly responsive to the influence of national factors. While the call for a further ‘communitization’ of MEPs’ behaviour in the EP is to be received with understanding and even acceptance, the thesis that the formative capacity of national factors to shape the voting patterns in the EP has been exhausted is increasingly questionable. Necessarily, a view of the EP voting process cannot be based solely on one model. A much broader perspective of the research on voting cohesion in the EP is needed in order to see and reveal the complexity of the process of coordinating voting positions in the EP. While the primacy of affiliation to political groups cannot be questioned, the thesis of its supremacy is increasingly being challenged. Within the EU, one can repeatedly see a pattern of voting if not directly according to the criterion of nationality, then influenced by national factors. This means that MEPs break from factional discipline and express a position in line with that of the majority of their national delegation when voting in the EP. In such situations, MEPs’ behaviours do not reflect the classic divisions that exist in the EP space (the left vs. the right; Euroenthusiasts vs. Eurosceptics).

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The determinant of these behaviours is the national interest understood as an objective perceived by different political circles as necessary to fulfil the essential needs of a given country. It should also be stressed that voting according to national interests is not the same as simply breaking factional discipline. The peculiarity of the first situation lies in the unanimity of the national delegation (or its majority), despite different factional affiliations. The second situation, on the other hand, does not necessarily fit into the pattern of voting according to national interests, if the position presented in the vote by the ‘deserting’ MEPs does not coincide with the choices of the other representatives of the national delegation. It may simply result from ideological differences between the party and the political group (Faas, 2003). The question of the role of national representations as a platform for agreeing voting positions in the EP has not been the subject of much academic research. The topic has certainly not attracted the attention of researchers to the same extent as political groups and their ability to organize MEPs’ activities in the context of voting. Nevertheless, several interesting research ventures can be found that have shed light on alternative voting patterns beyond the factional one. Analysing votes on EU trade, in particular trade agreements with third countries (such as South Korea, Peru and Colombia), Yoo-Duk Kang has found that political group affiliation is not the only factor determining voting patterns (Kang, 2019). An equally important role is played by the determinants of national politics, including an assessment of a country’s economic health. Lorenzo Cicchi’s research has shown that being guided by national interests in votes is unevenly distributed among MEPs. MEPs from countries with traditionally Eurosceptic attitudes (the Czech Republic, Sweden, the UK, Denmark) are more likely to vote along national lines, while MEPs from countries known for their drive to deepen European integration (e.g. Germany) show loyalty to political groups (Cichi, 2013). Other findings also suggest that breaking out of factional discipline is more likely to occur in thematic areas that are of prime importance to EU Member States (e.g. agriculture, environment and transport). Particularly in the area of the EU agricultural policy, a pattern of voting according to national interests emerges. According to the research carried out by Wojciech Słomczyński and Dariusz Stolicki, only in Malta and Croatia, this area was not under a strong influence of national interests on the EP voting process. Malta has the lowest percentage of arable land of all EU Member States and, for this reason, shows little interest in EU agricultural policy

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issues, while Croatia joined the EU structures already after the adoption of key reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (Słomczyński & Stolicki, 2015, p. 179). In the discussion on the determinants of voting in the EP, it is also worth referring to the results of the research conducted by Heike Klüver and Jae-Jae Spoon. They have proved that the political importance of an issue is a factor influencing the voting behaviours of MEPs. The more important an issue is to a national grouping, the more likely it is that the party’s representatives in the EP will vote contrary to the instructions of their political group if there are differences in positions between a given MEP’s political group and the national political environment. Conversely, the marginal importance of an issue from the national party’s point of view favours cohesion within the political group (Klüver and Spoon 2015). Based on the cited research results, several findings can be formulated. Firstly, party representatives in the EP may tend to be autonomous in the voting process vis-a-vis their political groups. Although dominant in the EP, the factional voting model does not have the potential to describe exhaustively all votes in the EP. Secondly, differences in the assessment of issues voted on in the EP can antagonize the relations between a national party and a political group. It is not uncommon, therefore, for MEPs to be faced with a loyalty dilemma: whether to be loyal to the group or to the political party at home. Thirdly, on issues considered fundamental to the interests of a given country, it is national representations that establish the space for agreeing voting positions. It is therefore necessary to check whether these findings remain valid with regard to the Polish national representation in the EP.

Voting Cohesion in the Polish Delegation The Polish national delegation consisted of 54 MEPs after the 2004 EP elections, 50 MEPs after the 2009 elections and 51 MEPs during the 8th term of the EP (2014–2019). Seats in the EP were held by representatives of many political groupings, ranging from the main political forces in Poland (Civic Platform, PO, and Law and Justice, PiS), through smaller groupings such as the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), the Polish People’s Party (PSL), to parties that enjoyed a modest number of seats and a relatively short presence in the EP (e.g. the Labour Union, Jarosław Gowin’s Poland Together, Zbigniew Ziobro’s United Poland (SP) or KORWIN). It may not come as a surprise that the multi-party and ideologically

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heterogeneous Polish delegation did not choose for itself a place in one political group, but became divided along ideological lines into smaller units, which entered different political groups within the EP. PO and PSL have belonged to the European People’s Party (EPP) since the beginning of their presence in the EP. PiS first joined the Union for Europe of the Nations and, after its dissolution in 2009, affiliated itself to the European Conservatives and Reformists. The left-wing parties (led by SLD) found an agreement with the European Socialists, operating since 2009 under the banner of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats. MEPs representing United Poland joined the Europe of Freedom and Democracy group, but, after the party’s defeat in the 2014 EP elections, its members had to vacate the seats in the EP. A small representation of the KORWIN party increased the membership of the not very influential but clearly Eurosceptic Europe of Nations and Freedom. A cursory analysis of the composition of the Polish delegation may lead to the conclusion that the diverse factional affiliations essentially rule out the possibility of reaching an agreement on the EP forum based on national factors. A quantitative examination of votes taken in the EP, however, shows that the matter is much more complex. On the basis of the 128 votes analysed, it was found that voting cohesion within the Polish national delegation was at a relatively high level of 0.707 (see Table 9.1). This means that on average almost ¾ of Polish MEPs voted in exactly the same way. It should be emphasized that the cohesion of voting at the EP level is much higher than it is at the national level. The conducted research shows that the voting cohesion index for the Sejm in the period 2011–2019 was 0.435 (see Table 9.2). Thus, while parties are generally not interested in sharing the positions of political opponents and even seek to exaggerate differences and provoke conflicts at the national level, they tend to exhibit more consensual behaviours at the European level. Thus, it can be seen that voting cohesion (or its lack) in the Sejm or the Senate is not automatically transferred to the EP. It is interesting to look at the dynamics of the voting cohesion index. In the period 2009–2014, its value for the Polish national delegation was 0.777. There was a decrease in the cohesion index in the next EP term by −0.141. The trends at the national level were different. During the rule of the PO-PSL coalition between 2011 and 2015, the cohesion of votes equalled 0.426. After the alternation of power in 2015 and the electoral victory of PiS (whose electoral list had also included members of United Poland and J. Gowin’s Agreement), it increased slightly to 0.443.

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Table 9.1  The voting cohesion of the Polish national delegation in the EP (2009–2019) Category

Thematic area

Voting cohesion (AI) 2009–2014

Voting cohesion (AI) 2014–2019

Voting cohesion (AI)

Economic issues Agriculture Budget Employment and social policy Average International Foreign and security relations policy International trade Development Average Worldview Civil liberties, justice matters and internal affairs Gender equality Average

0.906 0.781 0.674 0.787

0.653 0.873 0.675 0.733

0.780 0.827 0.675 0.760

0.886 0.905 0.856 0.882

0.806 0.817 0.493 0.706

0.846 0.861 0.675 0.794

0.757 0.569 0.663

0.555 0.381 0.468

0.656 0.475 0.566

Average voting cohesion (AI)

0.777

0.636

0.707

Source: The author’s own work based on the results of votes in the PE (the 7th and 8th terms)

Voting cohesion was also examined with respect to the three thematic categories of economic matters, international relations and worldview issues. The cohesion of voting on these categories was calculated separately for votes taken in the EP and the Sejm. Determining the cohesion of votes separately for each category and comparing the obtained results made it possible to establish that the level of voting cohesion showed a strong correlation with the subject matters of votes at the European level. On the other hand, at the national level, the differences in the results of votes on particular matters are minimal. In votes on economic issues and international relations, the cohesion of the Polish national delegation in the EP was unquestionable (almost 80% of Polish MEPs took the same position). In the case of worldview issues, it is not possible to speak of Polish MEPs succeeding in developing a common national position: the Hix index reached a value of 0.566, which means that on average only 56.6% of them took the same decisions in the voting process). As for votes in the Sejm, the index of cohesion ranged from 0.401 (for economic issues) to 0.451 (for worldview issues). The

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Table 9.2  The cohesion of votes in the Sejm of the Republic of Poland (2011–2019) Category

Thematic area

Voting cohesion (AI) 2011–2015

Voting cohesion (AI) 2015–2019

Voting cohesion (AI)

Economic issues Agriculture Budget Employment and social policy Average International Foreign and security relations policy International trade Development Average Worldview Civil liberties, justice matters and internal affairs Gender equality Average

0.332 0.286 0.393 0.337

0.585 0.323 0.489 0.465

0.459 0.305 0.441 0.401

0.421 – – 0.421

0.480 – – 0.480

0.451 – – 0.451

0.625 0.416 0.521

0.340 0.429 0.385

0.483 0.423 0.453

Average voting cohesion (AI)

0.426

0.443

0.435

Source: The author’s own work based on the results of votes in the Polish Sejm (the 7th and 8th terms)

cohesion of parliamentary votes on bills relating to international affairs took a value of 0.453. The obtained results should be regarded as surprising. Two questions in particular attract attention. The first question is why votes in the EP on worldview issues were characterized by such a low level of cohesion compared to the other two categories. The second question seems even more complex. Namely, why does cohesion (or its lack) in votes taken at the national level on economic and international issues disappear at the European level? With regard to the first question, it can be assumed that worldview issues, unlike economic and foreign policy ones, are not considered fundamental from the point of view of the vital interests of the state, and therefore it is difficult to build consensus around them within the Polish national delegation in the EP. Simplifying, one can say that meeting the needs of the Polish economy requires the involvement of Polish MEPs in the drafting of optimal EU legislation on development, agricultural and international trade policies, rather than in expressing opinions on values.

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Although this explanatory approach seems convincing, it is certainly difficult to consider that it can comprehensively clarify the issue. It is also possible to look at the problem at hand from another point of view. One may venture to claim that the only dimension with real potential for the ideological polarization of Polish political parties is that of worldviews and values, which essentially excludes the possibility of reaching a common position on the EP forum. Although it is difficult to consider economic matters and international relations as areas where inter-party relations do not become antagonized, the existing ideological differences among the groupings are not so serious as to paralyse consensus-­seeking initiatives among Polish MEPs. In the area of worldviews, on the other hand, two competing trends are noticeable in the Polish political discourse. One of them is Catholic traditionalism, championed by right-wing, nationalist and conservative political groups centred around parties such as PiS and SP. The other trend is secular progressivism. It is mainly represented by left-wing forces such as the New Left and Together, but also, in a less developed form, by PO and the Modern. These trends are characterized by fundamental differences when it comes to assessing the role and place of the Catholic Church in public life. They differ in their attitude to the scope of human freedoms, including the right to abortion. They also have different views on the rights of minorities, in particular sexual minorities. They also differ in their understanding of democracy and the rule of law. The assumption that it is only in terms of worldviews that political groupings become polarized at the national level is in clear contradiction with the results of votes in the Sejm. Indeed, if there was no diversification of positions among the parties with respect to economic and foreign policy issues, then voting cohesion would be much higher. On the other hand, as it has been established, the cohesion index remains low (0.401 and 0.451, respectively), which indicates that the parties evaluate proposed bills differently and apparently represent different visions of economic or international relations. At this point, it is legitimate to address the second question, namely why a low cohesion of votes on economic and international issues in the Polish parliament does not lead to an analogous level of cohesion (or its lack) in the EP. Potential for explaining this problem can be found in the thesis of the partial ostensibility of conflicts concerning economic and international matters. This thesis shows some relations to the theory of the de-ideologization of politics. It assumes that contemporary political markets are subject to a process of convergence in

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the areas of ideologies and party programmes. This means the exhaustion of ideological differences among relevant political actors. Under the conditions of globalization, the integration of financial systems, the liberalization of international trade, the mobility of capital and the increased interconnectedness of national economies, the space for offering financial and economic alternatives has been radically reduced (Andrews, 1994; Strange, 1996; Cerney, 1997; Garrett & Mitchell, 2001). As Suzenne Berger put it, ‘it does not matter whether an election is won by the left or the right; the constraints of the internationalized economy oblige both parties to follow the same monetary and fiscal policies, otherwise they will face a loss of national economic competitiveness and investments’ (Berger, 2000, p. 51). The homogenization of the political sphere means that political groupings, in order to maintain or strengthen their position in the political arena, resort to a strategy of emphasizing or even creating differences between themselves and their competitors. Such a solution makes it possible, on the one hand, to manifest a given party’s distinctiveness and strengthen bonds with its own electorate, and, on the other hand, to devalue principles adopted by rivals. Differences in stances on specific problems and issues can thus be an element of a political game or an instrument for pursuing set objectives. Although a number of different objections have been raised against the theory of de-ideologization (e.g. economic determinism, a one-way model of ideological development, depreciation of political factors) (Garrett, 1998; Haupt, 2010; Kitschelt et al., 1999), there is no doubt that the nature of inter-party interactions as well as the extent of political competition has changed over the last few decades (Katz & Mair, 1996; Schmitter, 2001). Applying these observations to the context of the Polish political reality, it must be said that there is no fundamental disagreement between the relevant political forces on socio-economic issues today. The parties present in the national parliament accept the principles of the free market, although they obviously argue about the role that the state should play in the economy. With respect to social aspects, there has been a reconfiguration of ideological principles within the parties over the recent years. Coming to power in 2015, PiS took over some elements of the left-wing agenda and, after the electoral victory, started to consistently pursue them, including the most famous and most widely commented electoral promise, that is, the Family 500 plus programme and other ideas (e.g. the thirteenth pension) (Niebylski, 2020). Competing groupings, including PO,

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once identified with liberal thinking about the economy, are not currently contesting PiS’s pro-social solutions, and even promise to maintain them if they come to power. It is, however, difficult to assess to what extent these are genuine promises on the part of PO, and to what extent they are a political game aimed at winning the elections, but it does show an emerging consensus with regard to the social solutions introduced by PiS. In the international dimension, the dominance of European and pro-Atlantic optics is noticeable in the Polish public discourse, although, of course, individual political circles differ in their assessment of the EU and approach European integration differently. PiS unequivocally opposes the strengthening of the competences of EU bodies and the communitization of further areas and policies, seeing this as a threat to national sovereignty, while PO, SLD and PSL are much more pro-European. It seems, therefore, that the actual level of differences among the parties concerning economic and foreign policy issues is much smaller than it appears from an analysis of parliamentary votes. This finding is further supported by the fact that the lack of cohesion in these areas at the national level does not preclude agreements on how to vote in the EP, which may suggest a partial ostensibility of differences in this regard. The situation is different, however, in the case of votes on worldview issues, which include not only the problem of gender equality but also such matters as the rule of law or the independence of the judiciary. Thus, these are the issues that, after 2015, gave rise to a conflict between the main political forces in Poland and, more importantly, the European Commission’s accusations of violating the rule of law, which consequently triggered proceedings against Poland before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The lack of cohesion in the case of worldview issues at the national level translated into the exclusion of this area from the space of agreeing common positions within the national delegation in the EP, which can be perceived as a confirmation of the authenticity of the differences among the parties. The analysis of the EP votes attempted to establish one more thing, namely the thematic area in which the Polish representation in the EP recorded the highest level of cohesion. The original assumption was that this would be an area related to agriculture and the agricultural policy. The veracity of this assumption was made plausible by the results of other research projects that had showed that, for all EU member states, it was agriculture that most strongly consolidated national delegations internally, which was reflected in the high value of the cohesion index in votes on agricultural issues (Słomczyński & Stolicki, 2015). Although the

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conducted analysis of votes confirmed that votes on the agricultural policy were indeed characterized by a high level of cohesion (0.778), in comparison with other thematic areas, this cohesion was not the highest. It turned out that votes on international trade constituted the closest reflection of the model of voting in accordance with national interests (cohesion of 0.861). This area is important from the point of view of seeking new development opportunities for the economies of member states, and the Polish economy is no exception. EU legislation within this area is aimed at improving the legal environment and creating conditions and incentives for the intensification of economic relations.

Sources of Cohesion (or Its Lack) in the Polish Delegation Various determinants influence the ability of national delegations to achieve cross-factional agreements in the EP forum. The conducted analysis, confronted with the findings of other authors, allowed for the identification of two leading explanatory trends. The first research trend emphasizes the importance of attitudes towards European integration as a determinant of the ability of national delegations to build common positions in EP votes (Cichi, 2013). Adopting a positive attitude towards European integration and perceiving the process through the prism of opportunities and benefits build the capital of trust in the standards and procedures in place at the EU level and, above all, foster adherence to agreements entered into at the level of political groups. A negative approach to European integration leads to a negation of the institutional order of the EU. Integration is perceived in terms of threats and dangers to nation states and their interests. Such an attitude limits the formation of a sense of loyalty to political groups. Instead, a high sense of attachment to national interests persists. This clearly reinforces the role of national delegations as a space for reaching cross-factional agreements in the voting process. However, in the case of the Polish national delegation, the approach presented earlier is of limited explanatory value. It is important to note the fact that the pro-European PO had the majority of EP seats in the 7th and 8th terms of the EP, with the Eurosceptic forces clearly strengthening their presence in the EP in the period of 2014–2019. PiS gained four more seats compared to the results of the 2009 elections, which gave it the

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same number of seats as PO. In addition, Janusz Korwin-Mikke’s New Right, after winning over 7% of votes in the European elections, gained a pass to the European Parliament (it won four seats). However, the greater number of Eurosceptic MEPs within the Polish delegation did not increase the delegation’s ability to influence the voting behaviours of its members. On the contrary, there was a decline in this respect compared to the 2009–2014 period. It seems that the main reason for the occurrence of the declining trends was the increase in the effective number of groupings making up the composition of the Polish delegation in the EP. During the 7th term of the EP, the Polish representation consisted of four groupings (PO, PiS, SLD, PSL). In the subsequent term, Polish MEPs came from not four, but five parties. Moreover, the significant concentration of seats in the hands of PO (the party had held half of all the seats allocated to the Polish delegation between 2009 and 2014), which was conducive to a high voting cohesion index, was replaced by a duopoly in which two groupings hostile to each other held the majority of the three quarters of all seats. In the second approach, the determinants of voting cohesion within national delegations include the potential impact of decisions taken in the EP on the interests of a given EU member state (Klüver & Spoon, 2015). The impact of decisions adopted at the EU level can manifest itself in four different ways. The first way is characterized by a low degree of positive, although hardly perceptible, impact on the Member State concerned. The characteristic feature of the second way is a high degree of positive influence, which makes it an important factor for the member state. The peculiarity of the third way is limited negative impact, with adverse but imperceptible consequences for the interests of the member state. And the last way can be described by considerable and clearly negative influence on the strategic interests of the member state, which is perceived by its political elites as a serious threat requiring urgent action. The potential impact of decisions taken at the EU level can stimulate the ability of the national delegation to take specific actions, that is, to support favourable solutions or to seek to block decisions that threaten state interests. The strongest impulse to align voting positions according to the criterion of nationality is an attempt to block solutions regarded as highly detrimental to a given member state as a whole or to a key branch of its national economy. Among the 128 EP votes under analysis, there were 19 votes (14.8%) in which the Polish representation presented a unanimous position (cohesion index of 1), including two cases in which all Polish MEPs opposed the

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proposals under consideration. Full voting cohesion within the Polish national delegation in the EP was achieved on 11 occasions in the context of votes relating to international relations, five of which concerned international trade (e.g. the EU’s partnership with Uzbekistan, the facilitation of trade with Moldova, or the reduction of customs duties on goods from Ukraine). In the economic area, unanimity was achieved on six occasions (in four cases concerning the agricultural policy). In terms of worldviews, Polish MEPs expressed a common position twice. In both cases, they voted on matters related to civil liberties, justice and internal affairs. Among the negative votes aimed at expressing opposition to the issues under consideration, one vote concerned the abolition of the milk quota system, which raised a number of concerns among Polish MEPs about how the adoption of the proposed solutions would affect the financial condition of the Polish dairy market. In another vote, they opposed the draft resolution of the European Parliament on EU–Russia trade relations after Russia’s accession to the WTO. Some interesting findings can be reached when the unanimous votes of Polish MEPs are placed on a timeline. It turns out that almost 95% of such votes took place in the period 2009–2014. Only once was a unanimous position reached during the EP’s 8th term. The approaches presented earlier do not provide a full and satisfactory explanation for why there is such a drastic difference. The discussion on the determinants of the voting cohesion (or its lack) of the Polish national delegation must therefore be extended by one more aspect. Namely, what should be taken into consideration is the degree of ideological polarization in the national parliamentary arena. Researchers generally define ideological polarization according to the approach proposed by Giovanni Sartori, who understood it as the distance on the ideological axis between the positions of parties taking extreme positions and meeting the criterion of relevance (Sartori, 2005). It is generally accepted that the higher the value of this index, the greater the intensity of a political conflict. Conversely, the lower its value, the greater the tendency of political actors to adopt conciliatory attitudes. Ideological polarization has far-reaching effects on the consistency of voting in the EP.  The lower the ideological polarization between political groups at the national level, the more likely it is that consensus will be reached in the voting process. On the other hand, if inter-party rivalries are highly polarized, then disputes spill over from the national level to the European level, which may derail the possibility of reaching an agreement within the national delegation.

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Various approaches and methods are used to measure polarization (e.g. Chapel Hill expert surveys), with the Manifesto Project Database (MPD) and the Right–Left Index (RILE) having the status of research standards used to determine a party’s position on the left-right axis. Using MPD data, it was found that in 2015, the index of ideological polarization in 2015 had increased by 1.41 points compared to the 2011 result. Meanwhile, four years later, it was already 42.8 points higher than in 2015. The main subject of the political dispute after 2015 was PiS’s attempts to push through controversial changes to both the constitutional and common judiciary systems (Pacholska & Ujma, 2020). The changes introduced by PiS were perceived by the opposition as an attack on the independence of the judiciary and an attempt to dismantle the pillars of democracy in Poland. On the one hand, the treatment of Jarosław Kaczyński’s party as an anti-democratic force and, on the other hand, PiS’s perception of its opponents as the ‘total opposition’ essentially ruled out any chance of consensus on the issues subject to voting. This seems to have been reflected at the European level as well, where not only the cohesion of votes in the EP but also generally the ability of the Polish national delegation to speak unanimously in defence of Polish interests decreased considerably.

Conclusion Despite the fact that political groups are the EP’s main actors organizing MEPs’ activity, the conducted research indicates that the ability of national delegations to shape their members’ voting behaviours should not be ignored. The voting cohesion of the Polish national delegation was 0.707. This is an average value calculated for the entire period under analysis (2009–2019). However, it should be noted that the veracity of this statement is particularly evident with respect to the 7th term of the EP, when voting cohesion within the Polish delegation was at the level of 0.777. The high cohesion of votes of Polish MEPs was due to the relatively low number of groupings making up the Polish national representation. The relatively high cohesion was also determined by the lower level of ideological polarization among the parties at the national level. The years 2014–2019 were a period in which the ability of the Polish delegation to reach unanimous positions on European matters weakened significantly. The voting cohesion index fell from 0.777 to 0.636. As it is assumed that high voting cohesion occurs when the threshold of 0.700 in the Hix index

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is exceeded, one has to conclude that in the years 2014–2019, the activity of the Polish delegation in the EP was characterized by the lack of cohesion in the voting process. Two factors contributed to the decline in the value of this index. Firstly, the number of the parties making up the Polish delegation increased from 4 to 5. Secondly, ideological polarization at the national level radically intensified after the electoral victory of PiS and the launch of a series of its controversial reforms, including, above all, attempts to introduce changes to the judiciary system in Poland. The initiatives undertaken by PiS exacerbated relations with other political circles and limited the possibility of achieving compromise-based and non-partisan solution. The conflict from the national level was transferred to the European one, which resulted in the destabilization of the Polish national delegation as a space for building political agreements in the EP. On the basis of the analyses presented earlier, it is possible to positively verify the first hypothesis, which assumes that ideological polarization at the national level is a determinant of voting cohesion within the Polish delegation in the EP. It is important to note the impact of strong ideological polarization at the national level on the increase of intra-factional cohesion in the EP. This observation reveals a new field for the interpretation of cohesion within political groups. Referring to the metaphor of gravity, one can say that the cohesion of political groups is the result of not only the mutual attraction of parties with similar ideological profiles and political programmes but also the process of repulsion among national political forces. This is exemplified by the situation in which PO, which is a member of the EPP, takes a certain position on a vote not only because it is the position of its political group, but also because its opponent on the Polish political scene, PiS, has taken the opposite position on a given issue. The unintended effect of the depreciation of the importance of the Polish national delegation as a space for agreeing voting positions was the strengthening of both the factional loyalty of Polish groupings and voting cohesion within political groups. Another finding is the negative verification of the second hypothesis, according to which the highest degree of consensus among Polish MEPs can be observed in the area of agriculture and the agricultural policy. While it is true that during the 7th term of the EP, the Polish delegation did indeed maintain the highest level of cohesion (0.906) among all thematic areas, there was a significant decrease in the cohesion of votes on agricultural issues during the subsequent term (0.653). It appeared that Polish

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MEPs had shown more cohesive views on international trade than the EU agricultural policy during the whole period of analysis (2009–2019). The final conclusion is that voting cohesion within the Polish national delegation in the EP shows a strong correlation with the subject matter of votes. Votes on economic and international issues were characterized by a significantly higher level of cohesion than votes on worldview and ideological issues. It should be stressed that, unlike economic and foreign policy matters, worldview issues are not regarded as fundamentally important for the interests of the state, and consequently, it is superfluous to attempt to build consensus on them among Polish MEPs. Another thing is that the worldview sphere is one where ideological differences among the Polish political parties are the greatest, which is another barrier preventing the development of a common position on votes.

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Garrett, G., & Mitchell, D. (2001). Globalization, Government Spending, and Taxation in the OECD. European Journal of Political Research, 39(2), 145–177. Haupt, A. B. (2010). Parties’ Responses to Economic Globalization: What Is Left for the Left and Right for the Right? Party Politics, 16(1), 5–27. Hix, S. (2001). Legislative Behaviour and Party Competition in the European Parliament: An Application of Nominate to the EU. Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(4), 663–688. Hix, S. (2002). Parliamentary Behavior with Two Principals: Legislator Preferences, Parties and Voting in the European Parliament. American Journal of Political Science, 46(3), 688–698. Hix, S., Noury, A. G., & Roland, G. (2005). Power to the Parties. Cohesion and Competition in the European Parliament, 1979–2001. British Journal of Political Science, 35(2), 209–234. Kang, Y.-D. (2019). European Affiliations Or National Interests? Analyses of Voting Patterns on Trade Policy in European Parliament. Baltic Journal of European Studies, 9(4), 19–48. Katz, R. S., & Mair, P. (1996). Cadre, Catch-All or Cartel? A Rejoinder. Party Politics, 2(4), 525–534. Kitschelt, H., Lange, P., Marks, G., & Stephens, J.  D. (1999). Conclusion: Convergence and Divergence in Advanced Capitalist Democracies. In H.  Kitschelt, P.  Lange, G.  Marks, & J.  D. Stephens (Eds.), Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (pp.  427–460). Cambridge University Press. Kluver, H., & Spoon, J. J. (2015). Bringing Salience Back in: Explaining Voting Defection in the European Parliament. Party Politics, 21(4), 553–564. Kreppel, A., & Tsebelis, G. (1999). Coalition Formation in the European Parliament. Comparative Political Studies, 32(8), 933–966. Lindstädt, R., Slapin, J. B., & Vander Wien, R. J. (2012). Adaptive Behaviour in the European Parliament: Learning to Balance Competing Demands. European Union Politics, 13(4), 465–486. Niebylski, M. (2020). The Issue of Ideological Changes in the Context of the Polish Political Parties - Theoretical Models and Their Exemplifications. Polish Political Science Yearbook, 4(49), 166–182. Nissen, C. (2014). Voting Behaviour in the European Parliament 2009–2014: Implications for EU and National Politics. DIIS Report, 2014, 11. Pacholska, A., & Ujma, M. (2020). Pięć lat zmian w polskim sądownictwie z perspektywy bezpieczeństwa prawnego, Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia de Securitate, 10(1), 132–158. Poczta, W. (Ed.). (2013). Gospodarstwa rolne w Polsce na tle gospodarstw Unii Europejskiej – wpływ WPR. Główny Urza ̨d Statystyczny. Raunio, T. (1997). The European Perspective: The Transnational Party Groups in the 1989–1994 European Parliament. Ashgate.

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Raunio, T., & Wagner, W. (2020). Party Politics Or (Supra-)National Interest? External Relations Votes in the European Parliament. Foreign Policy Analysis, 16(4), 547–564. Rice, S. A. (1925). The Behavior of Legislative Groups. A Method of Measurement. Political Science Quarterly, 40(1), 60–72. Sartori, G. (2005). Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis. ECPR Press. Schmitter, P. (2001). Parties Are Not What They Once Were. In L. Diamond & R.  Gunther (Eds.), Political Parties and Democracy (pp.  67–89). The John Hopkins University Press. Słomczyński, W., & Stolicki, D. (2015). Sługa dwóch panów: frakcyjne i narodowe przesłanki głosowania posłów w PE. In A. Kirpsza, P. Musiałek, & D. Stolicki (Eds.), Podsumowanie siódmej kadencji Parlamentu Europejskiego (2009–2014) (pp. 109–138). AT Wydawnictwo. Sokołowski, J. K. (2014). Spójność, zgodność i dyscyplina ugrupowań parlamentarnych: przegla ̨d aktualnych zagadnień badawczych. Politeja, 32(6), 45–62. Strange, S. (1996). The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. Cambridge University Press. Thomassen, J., Noury, A., & Voeten, E. (2004). Political Competition in the European Parliament: Evidence from Roll Call and Survey Analyses. In G.  Marks & M.  R. Steenbergen (Eds.), European Integration and Political Conflict (pp. 141–164). Cambridge University Press. Voeten, E. (2009). Enlargement and the ‘Normal’ European Parliament. In J. Thomassen (Ed.), The Legitimacy of the European Union After Enlargement (pp. 93–114). Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 10

Parliamentary Questions as an Example of Operational Cohesion Kamil Weber

Introduction Contemporary analyses of the activity of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) tend to focus on their participation in votes, work in committees and speeches made during debates. Questions as a manifestation of parliamentary activity, at the levels of both national legislatures and the European Parliament (EP), are considered a less significant form of parliamentary scrutiny. In fact, however, they not only illustrate the activity of parliamentarians, but are a manifestation of certain functions performed by MPs, both those enshrined in parliamentary rules of procedure and those performed informally (e.g. on behalf of lobbyists) (de Dios & Wiberg, 2011; Martin, 2011). In the context of the EP, the broadly The text presents the results of research funded under National Science Centre grant no. 2016/23/B/HS5/03750

K. Weber (*) Central Museum of Prisoners-of-War, Opole, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 K. Zuba (ed.), The Polish Delegation in the European Parliament, Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28271-3_10

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outlined normative basis of questions as a category of MEPs’ activity is noteworthy. It includes questions requiring oral answers and debate (Rule 136 of the Rules of Procedure of the EP), questions asked during monthly sessions (Rule 137 of the Rules of Procedure of the EP), as well as questions requiring the addressees to respond in writing (Rule 138 of the Rules of Procedure and Annex III). Regardless of the prominence of questions themselves compared to other tools of parliamentary scrutiny, their introduction into EP procedures, as well as their significant popularity among MEPs, clearly demonstrate the growth of the EP’s attributes as a parliamentary body (Roca et al., 2009, p. 209). A complementary element of a survey of parliamentary activity could also be an analysis of the contribution of individual MEPs to parliamentary debates in the form of speeches delivered in plenary sessions and written statements concerning debates (in accordance with Rule 204 and Rule 171(11) of the Rules of Procedure of the EP). The issue of parliamentary questions in the EP has so far received little attention in the literature, which probably reflects the prevailing view of their secondary importance in terms of parliamentary scrutiny. It is noteworthy that, although there are few publications on this topic, they all highlight the fact of the supremacy of national factors among the determinants of MEPs’ parliamentary question activity. From the perspective of the objective of this chapter, it is a key aspect that justifies undertaking research on the role of national delegations with regard to this parliamentary scrutiny tool at the European level. Sebastian Jäckle and Thomas Metz’s (2019) study on the cohesion of groups submitting oral questions during the 7th and 8th EP terms should be considered the most comprehensive work on parliamentary questions in the EP. According to their findings, group cohesion does not correlate with the cohesion of votes within groups, with Socialist and Democrats group being the least cohesive. Jäckle and Metz indicated belonging to a national delegation as one of the major determinants of the cohesion of a group formulating questions (2019, p. 106). In contrast, what emerges from the work of Christian B. Jansen, Sven-­ Oliver Proksch and Jonathan B. Slapin is a picture of parliamentary questions in the EP as a vehicle for competition between particular member states’ opposition and ruling parties, shifted from the national to the European level (Jansen et  al., 2013, p.  270). In an earlier publication, Proksch and Slapin went further in their claims by formulating the thesis that the EP arena is used by national opposition parties as a form of

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parliamentary scrutiny of their own governments (Proksch & Slapin, 2010, p. 70). The only work on parliamentary questions perceived from the perspective of national delegations is an analysis by Mihail Chiru and Valentina-­ Andreea Dimulescu. They focused their attention on Romanian MEPs sitting in the 7th European Parliament. Their study also revealed that, with respect to parliamentary questions, MEPs were primarily guided by a national perspective, including primarily the desire to secure re-election (Chiru & Dimulescu, 2011, p. 15). The issue of parliamentary questions submitted by Polish MEPs appears in a publication by Dariusz Stolicki, who analyses the cohesion of political groups in the 7th EP (Stolicki, 2015, p. 139). This analysis concerns parliamentary questions asked by Polish MEPs and requiring a written response (they are further referred to as written questions). Fulfilling mainly their scrutiny function, MEPs are entitled to submit such questions to the President of the European Council, the Council, the Commission or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. According to the Rules of Procedure, each MEP (as well as each parliamentary committee and group) may submit up to twenty questions over a period of three consecutive months. These are questions to which a written answer should be sent within six weeks after submission. Questions may be submitted by individual MEPs or by their groups. They should be of general interest, be no more than 200 words,1 and contain no more than three specific questions (Rules of Procedure of the EP).

Research Methodology and Assumptions MEPs are subject to many influences in the course of their mandate. This study aims to present the practices related to Polish MEPs’ activity in the area of submitting written parliamentary questions. In order to obtain an adequate scale of representativeness of this activity, the analysis covered the content of questions submitted by both Polish MEPs and—for the 1  In 2016, as a result of the adoption of a package of reforms aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the European Parliament’s work,—the number of questions requiring a written answer was reduced to three. Indeed, they had previously reached an excessive average level of approximately 60,000 questions per year (Socialist and democrats. eu, 2016), and as many as over 72,000 questions during the 7th EP term (Kirpsza, 2015, p. 465).

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purpose of comparison—MEPs representing Germany, the United Kingdom and France, that is, the countries with much longer membership in the EU. The structuring and operationalisation of this research was based on the following main research questions: • Can the predominance of specific thematic categories be attributed to questions formulated by Polish MEPs according to their party affiliation? • Are there any thematic similarities and domination of national, European, or universal issues in questions submitted by MEPs belonging to particular parties (PiS, PO and SLD-UP) and political groups in the EP (EPP, S & D and ECR)? • How significant were the differences between questions formulated by Polish MEPs and those submitted by MEPs from Germany, the United Kingdom, and France? What did these differences concern? In the search for answers to the aforementioned questions, the analysis focused on the content of questions obtained from the official EP websites (Parliamentary Questions, 2021) presenting the activity of individual MEPs. Direct interviews conducted with Polish MEPs by members of the team conducting research entitled Determinants of stability and coherence of the Polish representation in the European Parliament2 proved to be an important and valuable additional source of information, especially in terms of assessing the significance and function of parliamentary questions. Fifteen Polish MEPs sitting in the 8th EP (2014–2019) were randomly selected for the first analysis: five from each of the three parties (the main political forces in Poland) with the most representatives in the EP, that is, Law and Justice, (PiS), Civic Platform (PO) and Democratic Left Alliance—Labour Union (SLD-UP).3 The number of five MEPs from each party was determined by the need to maintain proportions in the research sample structure, and this is how many MEPs (four from SLD and one from UP) won seats in the EP on 2  The interviews were conducted with Eurodeputies representing the PO, PSL, PiS, SLD and New Right Congress. 3  Ryszard Legutko, Anna Fotyga, Beata Gosiewska, Bolesław Piecha, Karol Karski (PiS); Barbara Kudrycka, Dariusz Rosati, Janusz Lewandowski, Michał Boni, Tadeusz Zwiefka (PO); Lidia Geringer de Oedenberg, Adam Gierek, Bogusław Liberadzki, Krystyna Łybacka, Janusz Zemke (SLD-UP).

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behalf of SLD-UP.  MEPs from the three parties belonged to the three most numerous political groups in the EP, that is, European People’s Party (EPP), Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S & D) and European Conservatives and Reformists, Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (ECR). An additional condition for the selection of MEPs was the previous submission of at least ten parliamentary questions. The first stage of the analysis focused on the content of questions submitted by the aforementioned fifteen Polish MEPs of the 8th EP.  Each question was coded as concerning national issues (N), European issues (E) and global/universal issues (U). When it was difficult to clearly allocate a query to the three indicated categories, it was classified as belonging to a combined category, N/E, when a national issue was closely linked to the EU/Europe; E/U, when an EU/European matter was directly linked to global/universal issues. The second stage of the research was aimed at establishing how the distribution of questions submitted by MEPs during the 6th and 8th terms of the EP evolved in terms of specific thematic categories and what changes could be observed by comparing these two terms. The 6th EP was the first in which Poland was represented in this institution. The 8th EP, on the other hand, was the last which, at the time of the research, had ended and could be analysed in a comprehensive manner. The research took into account questions submitted by twelve randomly selected MEPs,4 using the same criteria as in the first stage. The method of analysis is analogous to that used to classify interpellations into the categories of national, European, universal, as well as N/E and E/U.  This time, however, it was decided to allocate questions to twelve separate thematic categories. These were established on the basis of a preliminary analysis aimed at identifying the most frequent topics of MEPs’ parliamentary questions. Thus, for the proper analysis, the following thematic categories were distinguished: 1. EU law (sectoral EU legal regulations and the functioning of EU institutions), 2. allocation of EU funds, 4  These were: the 6th EP—Hanna Foltyn-Kubicka, Marcin Libicki (PiS); Jacek Protasiewicz, Urszula Gacek (PO); Lidia Joanna Geringer de Oedenberg, Andrzej Jan Szejna (SLD-UP); the 8th EP—Bolesław Piecha, Ryszard Legutko (PiS); Tadeusz Zwiefka, Michał Boni (PO); Adam Gierek, Janusz Zemke (SLD-UP).

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3. relations with third countries (e.g. trade and political agreements with non-EU countries, recognition of documents), 4. human rights (mainly violations thereof), 5. ecology (protection of the atmosphere, water, flora and fauna, recycling), 6.  other common policies (including: economic policy excluding trade, banking, telecommunications, competition, transport, energy), 7.  social problems and risks (poverty, unemployment, addictions, public health, migration), 8. security and related threats (armed forces, other services, terrorism), 9. regional issues affecting member states, 10. historical politics, 11. trade and 12. agriculture and fisheries. An attempt was made to keep the categories as general as possible and thus to be able to include all submitted questions in a fairly broad thematic spectrum, without having to significantly multiply the number of thematic groups. On the other hand, however, it was important that the clarity of the division be not lost because of this. This was so because the research was intended to show the differences regarding which topics/problems in the submitted questions had been of key importance to MEPs, depending on their party affiliation. Each question was allocated to a specific thematic category based on content analysis. If a clear allocation was not possible, such a question was placed in up to two categories, for example: trade/agriculture and fisheries. In such cases, when counting the results, a score of 1 was added to the group of questions concerning the categories of trade, agriculture and fisheries. Consequently, the total sum of the percentages assigned to the twelve identified categories in relation to the analysed questions submitted by MEPs from particular parties is greater than 100% of the cases under analysis. This method of analysis shows, for each category, what percentage of the total questions concerned the themes that appeared very infrequently. In the third stage of the analysis, elements of comparative research were applied, which allowed for extending the methodological basis from a case study (Poland) to a cross case study. An additional twelve MEPs from

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France,5 Germany6 and the United Kingdom7 representing parties belonging to the same three political groups to which the Polish MEPs belonged were randomly selected for the purpose of the research. Their questions were also examined in terms of their content and allocated to the particular thematic categories. The material obtained in the course of all three stages of the research made it possible to select two criteria for the analysis of parliamentary questions: the theme of a question and the political party of the MEP asking the question. This, in turn, made it possible to structure this chapter into the following three parts: • an analysis of the content of the questions; • the political and ideological context of the questions, • a comparative analysis allowing for the placing of the questions of Polish MEPs in a broader (international) context, and at the same time for the verification of these questions’ universality or uniqueness.

Essence, Significance and Functions of Parliamentary Questions Written parliamentary questions are among the most popular forms of obtaining information. Simultaneously, they are the least visible and the least procedurally constrained activities of MEPs (Sorace, 2018, p.  13). Their analysis provides an alternative to roll-call voting surveys whose aim is to determine how a parliamentarian perceives their mandate and political role in the EP or to describe the cohesion of intra-fractional politics within a particular party group, and in relation to MEPs constituting a 5  Randomly selected French MEPs: the 6th EP—Jean-Pierre Audy, Véronique Mathieu (UMP); Anne Ferreira, Yannick Vaugrenard (PS); Carl Lang, Jean-Calude Martinez (FN); the 8th EP—Angélique Delahaye, Marc Jouland (UMP); Guillaume Balas, Sylvie Guillaume (PS); Bruno Gollnisch, Gilles Lebreton (FN). 6  Randomly selected German MEPs: the 6th EP—Markus Ferber (CSU), Elmar Brok, Klaus-Heiner Lehne (CDU); Heinz Kindermann, Ulrich Stockmann (SPD); Heide Rühle (Alliance90/Greens); the 8th EP—Daniel Caspary, Axel Voss (CDU); Dietmar Köster, Brigit Sippel (SPD); Reinhard Bütikofer, Rebecca Harms (Alliance90/Greens). 7   Randomly selected British MEPs: the 6th EP—Robert Atkins, Daniel Hannan (Conservative Party); Linda McAvan, Richard Howitt (Labour Party); Derek Roland Clark, Gerard Batten (UKIP); the 8th EP—Ashley Fox, Geoffrey Van Orden (Conservative Party); Seb Dance, Clare Moody (Labour Party); Steven Woolfe, David Coburn (UKIP).

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particular national delegation. Thus, it can also be used to measure and assess the spectrum of ideological cohesion within individual factions, political parties and national delegations. The starting assumption is that questions represent a more personalised form of parliamentary activity compared to votes and more clearly reflect MEPs’ perceptions of their political role in the EP. On the basis of the interviews conducted with Polish MEPs, six functions that could be attributed to parliamentary questions were distinguished. The essence and role of these functions can be expressed by defining them as: • initiative, • control, • information acquisition, • lobbying, • intervention and • self-promotion. Briefly characterising the specifics of each of the above functions, it should be stated that, firstly, questions allow MEPs to show individual initiative (activity) and confirm their political preferences (interviews: SLD_2, PiS_1, PSL_3). Secondly, they perform a control function vis-a-­ vis the executive branch, above all vis-a-vis the European Commission (Interview: PSL_2), which is most often their addressee and is obliged to respond to them in writing. Thirdly, they can be used as a source of acquiring information. Tapio Raunio even refers to parliamentary questions as a ‘two-way information channel’ between the European Parliament and the EU institutions (Raunio, 1996, p. 384). This is because they can be used to obtain various general (interview: PO_2) or detailed data, as well as to provide information on a particular problem to the relevant EU institution. Questions are used to transfer knowledge, to shape a desired image of a given problem and to propose possible solutions (interviews: PSL_1, PiS_1, PSL_3). MEPs’ questions can therefore be perceived, fourthly, as a form of demonstrating that they provide valuable services to their countries (Interviews: PO_1, PSL_1, PSL_2, PSL_3) or regions (interview: PSL_1) from which they were elected and promoting the interests or addressing the matters of their constituencies (interview: PSL_1). Fifthly, Polish MEPs indicated in the interviews that their questions also fulfilled the function of intervention (interviews: PSL_2, PiS_1); a particular

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question is submitted repeatedly if the European Commission does not take the steps requested by an MEP. Sixthly, this form of parliamentary activity allows MEPs to emphasise that they are fulfilling their obligations under the Rules of Procedure to represent the public interest of all member states and all EU citizens, as well as the supranational ideas of the EP, and indicate the pan-European or even global dimension of the issues raised in their questions. Indeed, they may submit questions relating to matters of countries other than their home country, thus giving expression to the idea of acting for the good of Europe as a whole and in the general interest of its citizens (Interview: SLD_2). In one of the interviews (SLD_1), the respondent stated that questions submitted by MEPs only served to boost the statistics of their activity on the EP forum. In that context, they also alleged that Eurosceptic MEPs performed a destructive function by flooding the European Commission with a large number of questions in an attempt to paralyse its functioning. Planning the research on the content of MEPs’ questions, the authors relied, among other things, on their interviews with the Polish MEPs and identified the following five determinants of the themes raised in questions: • the interests and problems of the country and constituency represented by an MEP (the interviewees regarded this determinant as the most important), • affiliation to particular national parties and, consequently, membership in a particular MEP faction, • an MEP’s individual interests and preferences influenced by their education, professional experience, worldview and value system, • membership in EP committees and • current (important) problems (e.g. disasters, emergencies, threats, etc.) whose solution requires coordinated international effort and action. Some publications on MEPs indicate the seniority and experience gained in the course of serving as an MEP among the factors influencing their attitudes and activity in the EP. This is because they determine practical knowledge and familiarity with the mechanisms of the EP and other EU bodies (Stolicki, 2015, pp.  140–141). In the case of parliamentary questions, however, this factor is not as important as it is in relation to other forms of parliamentary activity since questions and interpellations function similarly in the parliaments of all EU member states.

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In the context of the aforementioned determinants, the literature on the subject emphasises the particularly strong influence of national parties on the behaviour and activity of MEPs, including the questions they submit (Hix, 2001, p. 666). This is because they run for seats in the EP by trying to win votes on the national political scene. Thus, they have to take care of their image among voters in their home country (Hix, 2004, p. 203). EU rules prohibit political groups from donating funds to their members’ campaigns in EP elections. In Poland, this issue is regulated by national legislation on the rules of campaign financing in elections to the European Parliament (PKW, 2019). These rules result in MEPs’ dependence on their national parties (Meyerrose, 2017, p. 626). Their loyalty to the national party may also be influenced by factors such as the structure of the electoral system in a given country (Stolicki, 2015, p. 140; Faas, 2003, pp. 841–866) and the time remaining until the next election. The closer to the next electoral process, the higher the loyalty of MEPs to the national party and society of their home state (Lindstädt et  al., 2012, pp. 37–70).

Analysis of the Content of Questions Table 10.1 shows the results of the first stage of the research resulting from the classification of questions submitted by 15 MEPs from Poland, elected to the EP on behalf of PiS, PO and SLD—UP (EP, 2022). The data included in Table 10.1 show that the research sample comprised 463 questions. The vast majority of these (280, i.e. more than 60%) were questions on pan-European issues, in particular those related to the functioning of the EU. Over 12% of the questions (56) were strictly related to issues of concern to Poles, which MEPs wanted to raise with the European Commission or whose solution was expected to be achieved through the intervention of relevant EU bodies. In addition, approximately one tenth was questions in which the problems of the Polish state and nation were linked by MEPs directly to the functioning of the Union and were therefore included in the collective category (national problems linked to European problems). As can be seen from the aforementioned text, when these two categories are added together, it should be noted that during the eighth term of the EP, the proportion of questions in which both national problems and national/European problems were raised amounted to just over 22%, that is, more than one fifth of the total sample.

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Table 10.1  Summary of the data on questions submitted by 15 Polish MEPs (broken down by national party) Number of questions/% Number N of questions

E

U

N/E

E/U

N+N/E

PiS

240

PO

136

140 (58.33%) 78 (57.35%) 62 (71.26%) 280 (60.47%)

27 (11.25%) 6 (4.41%) 1 (1.15%) 34 (7.34%)

17 (7.08%) 22 (16.17%) 8 (9.19%) 47 (10.15%)

32 (13.33%) 10 (7.35%) 4 (4.60%) 46 (9.93%)

41 (17.08%) 42 (30.88%) 20 (22.99%) 103 (22.25%)

SLD-UP 87 Total

463

24 (10%) 20 (14.7%) 12 (13.79%) 56 (12.09%)

N—national issues; E—pan-European issues; U—global/universal issues; N/E—national issues closely linked to pan-European issues; E/U—European issues closely linked to global issues; N+N/E—national and national issues linked to pan-European issues together Source: The author’s own calculations based on the EP official data (https://www.europarl.europa. eu/meps)

Global issues raised in the questions under analysis were mainly related to climate change, the use of natural resources, poverty, human rights violations and international humanitarian aid. They accounted for 7.34% of the questions and, when combined with European themes, just under 10%. As can be seen from Table 10.1, Polish MEPs primarily intervened on matters related to European issues, thus expressing an understanding of their duties in accordance with the code of conduct that defines the guiding principles of MEPs’ work. The results obtained in the second stage of the research after allocating the questions submitted by the 12 Polish MEPs to the relevant thematic categories are presented in Fig. 10.1. A total of 394 questions submitted by Polish MEPs during the 6th and 8th terms of the European Parliament were analysed (Fig.  10.1). The analysis of the aggregate results for both parliamentary terms reveals that the largest number of questions submitted by Polish MEPs concerned the category of EU law and other common policies. This was followed by the categories of EU funds allocation, relations with third countries, ecology, human rights and regional issues. However, when comparing the two PE

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40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

Total 6. and 8. terms

6. term

8. term

Fig. 10.1  Themes of questions submitted by Polish MEPs during the 6th and 8th terms of the EP. (Source: The author’s own calculations based on the EP official data (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps))

terms with regard to the dominant thematic category of questions, that is, EU law, a significant decrease should be highlighted, as the percentage of such questions formulated by Polish MEPs was 36.05% in the 6th term and only 19.01% in the 2014–2019 term. A similar decrease (from 34.1% to 21.49%) occurred in the category of other common policies. A similar but weaker trend could also be noticed when comparing the number and percentage of questions concerning the allocation of EU funding (a drop from 18.37% to 14.88%). It can be assumed that this may have been influenced primarily by the fact that after joining the EU, a large proportion of Polish MEPs’ questions were firstly aimed at obtaining specific information on the functioning of EU institutions, and secondly, were of a demanding nature, as Poland, a new member state, was counting on greater support from EU funds to help it catch up with other older and better developed member states. The sixth term of the EP also included the onset of the global economic crisis, which may have heightened MEPs’ interest in financial issues. The opposite trend, that is, greater interest in a given theme as manifested in the number of parliamentary questions submitted during the 8th term in comparison to that in the 6th term, can be seen in the case of such thematic categories as human rights, trade, as well as agriculture and fisheries. Inferring from the number of questions

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concerning human rights (and, to a lesser extent, agriculture and fisheries), one may venture to conclude that, with the passage of time, Polish MEPs were treating the European Parliament less and less as a place for soliciting EU funds, and more and more as a forum for dealing with universal issues and problems of a pan-European nature.

Political Context of Parliamentary Questions In 2015, during the 8th term of the EP, there was a change of the government in Poland. The Civic Platform, which had been the main political force in the country for eight years (from 2007 to 2015), became the opposition. This party supports the development of European integration, including the strengthening of the European Commission as an institution that promotes the interests of smaller member states. The party’s MEPs are strongly in favour of Poland’s EU membership and have been part of the EPP faction of centre-right parties since 2004. The currently governing Law and Justice party, which had remained in opposition from 2007 to 2015 and in 2015 was the main founder of the so-called United Right camp, places a strong emphasis in its programmes on the need to strengthen national identity, declaring a commitment to national and Christian values. Its leaders indicate the need for Poland’s membership in the EU but oppose the ‘interference of Brussels’ in the internal affairs of the state. PiS advocates a model of a ‘Europe of nations’. PiS MEPs are members of the European Conservatives and Reformists faction. On the other hand, the opposition Democratic Left Alliance is a party advocating a dynamic and fair social policy aimed primarily at combating poverty. One of its key demands is the secular character of the state. Concerned about the state of the environment, it seeks to increase the share of renewable sources in the Polish energy sector. SLD’s priority is Poland’s deeper integration with the European Union; the party strongly supports all pro-­ European initiatives. MEPs elected from the party’s ranks are members of the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats. It was MEPs from SLD-UP that asked the most questions concerning national issues (N), and not, as one might expect, MEPs from PiS, a party that often presents itself as a defender of the national interest. Also, taking into account the aggregate category N+N/E, it was the representatives of the left-wing Polish party that submitted the largest number of such questions, and the advantage over the questions formulated by MEPs representing PiS in this category was a considerable 5.91%. Among the Polish

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party groups in the EP, SLD-UP also asked the highest percentage of questions on European issues (71.26%). On the other hand, it is somewhat surprising that MEPs belonging to PiS submitted the largest number of questions on universal/global issues. Prior to the research, it had been expected that such themes would be the domain of representatives of the left. However, MEPs representing SLD-UP formulated exceptionally few questions in this category (1.15%). For comparison, the equivalent percentage in the case of MEPs belonging to PiS was 11.25%. Analysing the results of the second stage of the research, that is, the one concerning specific thematic categories determined by the party membership of a given MEP, one can also notice certain regularities. Figure 10.2 shows the percentages of questions relating to particular thematic categories broken down by party groupings included in the analysis (cumulative data from both PE terms). Figure 10.2 presents the themes of questions submitted by MEPs representing PiS in the European Parliament. In the case of questions submitted by PiS MEPs, the largest number of questions concerned EU law and other common policies, a result analogous to that obtained by comparing the questions of all randomly selected representatives of Poland in the EP. Relations with third countries came next. It is interesting to note that PiS MEPs devoted quite a lot of attention to human rights and ecology. This was followed by social problems 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

Total 6. and 8. terms

6. term

8. term

Fig. 10.2  Structure of questions submitted in the 6th and 8th EP by PiS MEPs. (Source: The author’s own calculations based on the EP official data (https:// www.europarl.europa.eu/meps))

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and risks, which may correspond to the pro-social profile of this grouping’s programme. In the case of PiS MEPs, 2.41% of their questions concerned historical politics. This is not a significant figure, although among all the questions submitted by MEPs during the two PE terms under analysis, it was the highest rate in this category. Such a result may also correspond to the characteristic elements of PiS’s programme, as its politicians often refer to patriotic values and related historical events. Figure 10.2 shows that during the 6th term of the EP, the highest number of questions concerned other common policies, EU law and relations with third countries. During the 8th PE term, the largest decrease in the number of submitted questions occurred in the thematic categories of other common policies, ecology, and relations with third countries. Meanwhile, the number of questions relating to the allocation of EU funds and trade increased the most. Figure 10.3 shows the themes of questions submitted by MEPs representing PO. In the case of MEPs from PO, by far the largest number of questions (28.04%) concerned the collective category of other common policies. This was followed by EU law (20.56%), the allocation of EU funds and human rights (16.82% each) and regional issues (as much as 14.95%). The high percentage of questions concerning regional issues was related to the

35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

Total 6. and 8. terms

6. term

8. term

Fig. 10.3  Structure of questions submitted by PO MEPs during the 6th and 8th terms of the EP. (Source: The author’s own calculations based on the EP official data (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps))

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fact that representatives of this party had submitted many applications for the registration of local food products. By contrast, only 6.54% of questions formulated by PO MEPs focused on social issues and risks. One might assume that this party—often perceived as more pro-European and more modern in terms of programmes than PiS—would persuade their MEPs to submit more questions concerning ecology. But questions in this thematic range constituted just 9.34% of all questions formulated by PO MEPs, while for PiS representatives, it was 13.25%. As expected, a lower percentage of questions on historical politics was also characteristic of PO MEPs. For MEPs representing PiS, this figure was 2.41%, while for those belonging to PO, it was 0.93%. During the 6th term of the EP, PO MEPs submitted the most questions on the following themes: regional issues, other common policies, EU law, as well as agriculture and fisheries. During the 8th term, the distribution of questions (in terms of the percentage of each thematic category) was more even. The percentage of questions on other common policies was by far the highest. In comparison to the data concerning the 6th term, the largest decrease occurred in two categories: regional issues and agriculture and fisheries. On the other hand, the largest increase was in the categories of human rights and, to a lesser extent, EU funds allocation and ecology. Figure 10.4 presents the themes of questions submitted by MEPs from SLD-UP. The largest number of questions submitted by SLD-UP MEPs concerned EU law (35.9%) and other common policies (29.49%). The third most popular theme was the allocation of EU funds (21.79%), followed by regional issues (as much as 15.38%) and ecology (12.82%). It may come as a surprise that questions submitted by the members of a left-wing party rather infrequently concerned such themes as security and related threats (6.41%), as well as social problems and risks (6.41%) and human rights (just 3.85%). The results in these thematic categories differ from those obtained for questions formulated by MEPs representing other left-wing parties functioning in member states. The most questions submitted during the 6th EP term by SLD-UP MEPs concerned EU law, other common policies and EU funds allocation. By contrast, during the 8th term, the most popular themes were regional issues, ecology, other common policies and EU law. A comparison of the themes dominant in questions formulated by MEPs representing the PiS, PO and SLD-UP shows that PiS MEPs were

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50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

Total 6. and 8. terms

6. term

8. term

Fig. 10.4  Structure of questions submitted by SLD-UP MEPs during the 6th and 8th terms of the EP. (Source: The author’s own calculations based on the EP official data (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps))

interested the most in EU law and other common policies. Their third most popular themes were relations with third countries. Human rights and ecology also received a lot of attention from PiS representatives. Social problems and risk came next. As for PO MEPs, by far the largest number of questions concerned the category of other common policies. This was followed by EU law, EU funds allocation, human rights and regional issues. Similarly, SLD-UP MEPs submitted the most questions on the themes of EU law and other common policies. The subsequent most popular themes were EU funds allocation, regional issues and ecology.

Comparative Analysis As it has been mentioned in the section on research methodology, the third stage of the research comprised a comparative analysis of the themes of questions submitted by MEPs representing Poland (394 questions), Germany (260 questions), France (340 questions) and the United Kingdom (278 questions). The compared queries had been formulated by 12 MEPs representing each of the aforementioned member states and sitting in the EP during its 6th and 8th terms (Fig.  10.5). (The MEPs’ names and parties are detailed in footnotes 5–8).

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Agriculture and fisheries Trade Political history Regional issues Security Social problems and risks Other EU policies Ecology Human rights Relations with third countries Allocation of EU funds EU law 0

5

10 Germany

15

20 the UK

25 France

30

35

40

Poland

Fig. 10.5  Structure of Polish MEPs’ parliamentary questions compared to that of questions submitted by MEPs representing France, the UK and Germany. (Source: The author’s own calculations based on the EP official data (https:// www.europarl.europa.eu/meps))

Looking at the results obtained in the course of the comparative analysis of the themes of written questions formulated by MEPs representing the four selected member states, one may note that the category of EU law was the most popular with MEPs from the United Kingdom (39.23%). They were followed successively by MEPs from France (36.44%), Germany (30.33%) and lastly Poland (28.36%). Polish MEPs, on the other hand, submitted the most questions on the allocation of EU funds (16.79%), ahead of the representatives of the United Kingdom (13.59%), Germany (11.71%) and France (a mere 7.83%). In the category of relations with third countries, the questions formulated by MEPs from all four member states had a relatively similar percentage result, with the exception of those asked by the British, for which it was only 7.95%, a share almost twice as low compared to the others. German MEPs appeared to be the most interested in the thematic category of human rights. The percentage of their questions relating to this theme was as high as 19.82%, while for the other three countries, the figure was between 7.83% and 10.82%. Ecology did not appear very often in the interpellations of MEPs from the selected

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member states. The percentage of questions relating to this issue ranged from 11.57% for Polish MEPs to 7.69% for British ones. The low percentage (just 7.81%) for questions submitted by German MEPs may come as a surprise. Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that, among all German MEPs’ questions under analysis, it was questions formulated by the members of the Greens that were the most numerous in this category (15.55%). The low percentage of the entire German delegation’s questions relating to ecology was affected by the thematic distribution of questions submitted by MEPs representing the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). Only 0.88% of their interpellations concerned ecology, which was by far the lowest score among all party groups covered by the research. The second lowest result in this category (4.72%) was for questions from MEPs representing the British Conservative Party. The sixth thematic category concerned other common policies. By far the largest number of questions on this theme was submitted by Polish MEPs (28.36% vis-à-vis 9.61% for German MEPs). An interesting category from an analytical point of view is social problems and risks. French MEPs led the way with 16.26% of questions relating to these issues. They were followed by MEPs from the United Kingdom (12.31%) and Poland (8.21%). The fewest questions on social issues (2.7%) were submitted by MEPs representing Germany. It was also relatively rare for MEPs to submit questions on security issues. This theme was the most popular with the British (10.51%) and the least— with the French (2.11%). An interesting result came from the analysis of the percentage of questions in the category of regional issues. One could expect that, due to the federal structure of their state, it would be German MEPs that would submit the most questions concerning the matters of their respective Länder. However, questions submitted by German MEPs in this category had the lowest percentage—just 0.6%—while Polish MEPs submitted the most questions on this theme (10.82%). Very rarely did historical politics appear in MEPs’ interpellations. As expected, Polish MEPs submitted the highest number of such questions (1.49%). In the case of MEPs from Germany and France, it was 0.6%. Questions relating to the category of trade were submitted the most frequently by the French delegation, with a percentage of 17.47%. This was followed by questions from the British (10.26%) and Germans (7.21%). Poles were the least likely to ask about trade-related matters, with a percentage of only 3.73%. French MEPs also clearly dominated in the case of questions concerning agriculture and fisheries (18.67%). Polish MEPs submitted 7.46% of questions in this category, while German and British MEPs only 3.3% each.

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Conclusion The aforementioned analysis was based on a sample of randomly selected MEPs and their parliamentary questions, with particular emphasis on those submitted during the 8th EP term and, to a lesser extent, during the 6th term. The authors perceive the conducted research as a proposal for a certain approach to analysing the activity of MEPs. The results of the research may constitute a starting point for more extensive research. Due to the limited capacity to process the huge amount of data (the number of submitted questions), the obtained results should become the subject of analysis by more numerous research teams. Responding to the questions formulated in this chapter, one should note that among the issues concerning the functioning of the EU, including interpellations formulated by Polish MEPs from all three parties, the categories such as EU law, common policies and EU funds allocation dominated. However, the slight differences in the percentage of each category do not allow for identifying any clear dominance of a given thematic category in questions submitted by MEPs representing the particular parties. As far as the differences among the themes dominant in questions formulated by MEPs from the three older member states (Germany, France and the United Kingdom) are concerned, it should be noted that Polish MEPs were the most interested in issues related to EU funds allocation and other common policies. Simultaneously, they submitted the fewest questions in the thematic category of EU trade. Thus, one can formulate the thesis that parliamentary questions reflected national priorities. For a new member state such as Poland, the priority was financial resources. On the other hand, for older member states, which are nett contributors to the EU budget, the single market and EU trade were more important. In the course of the interviews conducted with Polish MEPs, they most often declared that their questions concerned matters related to Poland and the regions from which they had been selected. However, the conducted analyses of the questions submitted by the randomly selected MEPs show that it was not national but European issues (mainly those related to the functioning of the EU) that dominated. The problems of Poland and Poles in the context of EU membership constituted the substance of only about one fifth of the analysed questions submitted by Polish MEPs.

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References Chiru, M., & Dimulescu, V.-A. (2011). Tributes Experts: An Analysis of the Romanian MEPs’ Questions. CEU Political Science Journal, 6(1), 1–21. de Dios, M. S., & Wiberg, M. (2011). Questioning in European Parliaments. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 17(3), 354–367. EP. (2022). Members of the European Parliament. Retrieved October 16, 2021, from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps Faas, T. (2003). To Defect Or Not to Defect? National, Institutional and Party Group Pressures on MEPs and their Consequences for Party Group Cohesion in the European Parliament. European Journal of Political Research, 42(6), 841–866. Hix, S. (2001). Legislative Behaviour and Party Competition in the European Parliament. An Application of Nominate to the EU. Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(4), 663–688. Hix, S. (2004). Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior: Explaining Voting Defection in the European Parliament. World Politics, 56(2), 194–223. Jäckle, S., & Metz, T. (2019). Oral Questions in European Parliament: A Network Analysis. Statistics, Politics, and Policy, 10(2), 87–113. Jansen, C., Proksch, S.-O., & Slapin, J.  B. (2013). Parliamentary Questions, Oversight, and National Opposition Status in European Parliament. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 38(2), 259–282. Kirpsza, A. (2015). Analiza aktywności posłów do Parlamentu Europejskiego siódmej kadencji w zakresie frekwencji w głosowaniach, pytań parlamentarnych i przemówień plenarnych. In A.  Kirpsza, P.  Musiałek, & D.  Stolicki (Eds.), Podsumowanie siódmej kadencji Parlamentu Europejskiego (pp. 455–482). AT Wydawnictwo. Lindstädt, R., Slapin, J. B., & Van der Wielen, R. J. (2012). Adaptive Behaviour in the European Parliament: Learning to Balance Competing Demands. European Union Politics, 13(4), 465–486. Martin, S. (2011). Parliamentary Questions, the Behaviour of Legislators, and the Functions of Legislatures: An Introduction. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 17(3), 259–270. Meyerrose, A.  M. (2017). It Is All About Value: How Domestic Party Brands Influence Voting Patterns in the European Parliament. Governance. An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, 31(4), 625–642. Parliamentary Questions. (2021). European Parliament. Retrieved June 22, 2021, from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-­questions. html?tabType=wq PKW. (2019). Wyjaśnienia Państwowej Komisji Wyborczej dotycza ̨ce zasad finansowania kampanii wyborczej do PE przed wyborami w 2019 r. [Explanation of the State Electoral Commission on the Rules of Campaign Financing for the

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EP Elections Ahead of the 2019 Elections]. Retrieved April 26, 2022, from https://pkw.gov.pl/uploaded_files/1550846617_wyjasnienia_ws_finansowania_kampanii_wyborczej_wybory_do_PE.pdf Proksch, S.-O., & Slapin, J. B. (2010). Parliamentary Questions in the European Union. European Journal of Political Research, 50(1), 53–79. Raunio, T. (1996). Parliamentary Questions in the European Parliament: Representation, Information and Control. Journal of Legislative Studies, 2(4), 356–382. Roca, P., Rasmussen, A., & Ponzano, P. (2009). The European Parliament Asserts Its Power. In Y.  Mény (Ed.), Building Parliament: 50 Years of European Parliament History, 1958–2008 (pp. 135–226). European Parliament. Sorace, M. (2018). Legislative Participation in the EU: An Analysis of Questions, Speeches, Motions and Declarations in the 7th European Parliament. European Union Politics, 19(2), 299–320. Stolicki, D. (2015). Spójność grup politycznych w Parlamencie Europejskim siódmej kadencji. In A. Kirpsza, P. Musiałek, & D. Stolcki (Eds.), Podsumowanie siódmej kadencji Parlamentu Europejskiego (2009–2014) (pp.  139–162). AT Wydawnictwo.

A List

of the

Interviews Used in

the

Chapter

NRC_1 – interview conducted on 15.09.2020 PiS_1 – interview conducted on 01.09.2020 PO_1 – interview conducted on 26.08.2020 PO_2 – interview conducted on 30.10.2020 PSL_1 – interview conducted on 22.09.2020 PSL_2 – interview conducted on 15.10.2020 PSL_3 – interview conducted on 22.10.2020 SLD_1 – interview conducted on 26.08.2020 SLD_2 – interview conducted on 28.09.2020

CHAPTER 11

Impact of Eurosceptics on the Stability and Cohesion Anna Paczes'niak and Natasza Styczyńska

Introduction The post-war process of European unification was accompanied, on the one hand, by a citizens permissive consensus (García-Guitián, 2022) and, on the other hand, at least in some political circles, by scepticism towards progressive integration. However, it was only the enlargement of the Communities to include Denmark and the UK, as well as the appearance of Conservative and Communist Members of Parliament (MPs) that increased the political diversity of the European Parliament (EP) and the The text presents the results of research funded under National Science Centre grant no. 2016/23/B/HS5/03750. A. Pacześniak (*) University of Wrocław, Wrocław, Poland e-mail: [email protected] N. Styczyńska Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 K. Zuba (ed.), The Polish Delegation in the European Parliament, Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28271-3_11

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number of Eurosceptics. The most significant change began in 1979 with the first direct elections to the EP. European elections, not least because of their second order status (Reif & Schmitt, 1980), gave small parties and protest parties the chance to gain representation in the EP, which had previously been limited by the procedure under which national parliaments delegated their representatives to the EP. In subsequent years, fuel for criticism of the European integration process was provided by the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty transforming the Communities into the European Union (Franklin et al., 1994). It manifested itself in the results of the referendums held in Denmark and France (Franklin et al., 1995) and the bumpy course of the ratification process in the UK and Germany. For many years, Eurosceptics’ low quantitative and organizational potential condemned them to function on the margins of the EP. Politicians and parties critical of integration were regarded within the EU institutional system as a political fringe with limited capacities (Brack, 2013: 85). They were widely regarded as anti-system forces whose aim was not so much to correct integration policy principles, but to ‘turn the tables’ and change the rules of the European game. As the logic of the EU system rejects political conflict and is based on consensual pursuit of decision-­ making, Eurosceptics do not easily find themselves in such a setup. The marginalization of the importance of Eurosceptic Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in the EP was further exacerbated by the difficulties in establishing and maintaining a common political group. This was not due to a shortage of seats, as the electoral support given to politicians contesting the EU was sufficiently high for Eurosceptics to obtain representation that met the requirements for establishing a parliamentary group.1 Obstacles to the agreement necessary to establish a common political group were usually ideological and programmatic divergences, as well as the ambitions of the leaders resulting, for example, in the establishment of two Eurosceptic factions during the 2014–2019 term (Pacześniak, 2018: 48). Eurosceptic groups in the EP are programmatically incoherent and characterized by unstable membership, leading researchers to often ‘dismiss Euroscepticism from the analyses because they are not numerous, organised or integrated enough in the EP to really influence its deliberation’ (Brack, 2018: 398).

1  A minimum of 25 MEPs representing at least a quarter of the Member States is needed to form a parliamentary faction.

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The rising importance of Eurosceptics in the EP could be observed after the ‘Big Bang Enlargement’ of 2004, when representations of right-­ wing and populist parties from post-communist countries entered the European Parliament. Also in the case of Poland, Eurosceptics were very successful in the 2004 European elections. The parties opposing Poland’s accession to the EU in the pre-accession period, that is, the League of Polish Families (LPR) and the Self-Defence, obtained then the second and fourth best results, respectively, which together gave them almost 30% of the seats allocated to the Polish delegation. In the two subsequent EP elections held in 2009 and 2014, the electoral support given to Eurosceptic politicians in Poland declined, which coincided with an increase in public support for European integration (Zuba, 2015: 8–10). However, contrary to appearances, the share of Eurosceptic politicians in the Polish delegation to the EP, although describing themselves as Eurorealists, grew in each successive term to already constitute half of the delegation in 2019. The aim of this chapter is to examine the influence of Eurosceptics on the cohesion and stability of the Polish delegation in the three EP terms from 2004 to 2019. In order to conceptualize and operationalize the topic, as well as to justify the selection of political parties for analysis, the first part of the chapter presents the main strands of the academic debate on Euroscepticism. The second part identifies the place of Polish Eurosceptic parties in the national and supranational political landscape, which provides an indirect indication of the extent to which they influence the cohesion and stability of the national delegation in the EP. The next section analyses the indexes of the stability and cohesion of the Polish delegation in relation to Eurosceptic MPs. The chapter ends with a summary and conclusions.

Theoretical and Methodological Background Although researchers have been interested in Euroscepticism for three decades, the term remains fuzzy and there is no consensus on a single definition of it (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2003: 4). Due to the lack of precision required of scientific concepts, some researchers have stopped using the term (e.g. Flood & Usherwood, 2005: 3), while others have made attempts at definitional clarification, proposing original typologies of attitudes sceptical and critical of European integration processes. Among the best known is the typology of Paul Taggart and Alex Szczerbiak (2001), who distinguished between two varieties of Euroscepticism: hard and soft. Petr

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Kopecký and Cas Mudde (2002) questioned this division mainly due to the subjectivity of both categories. They proposed a broader typology of attitudes towards European integration, assuming that support for integration processes could be diffuse and specific. In their view, there are four model categories of attitudes towards European integration: Euroenthusiasm, Euroscepticism, Europragmatism and Eurorejectism. These and other attempts to categorize Euroscepticism (see also: Flood & Usherwood, 2005; Riishoj, 2007; Bertoncini & König, 2014) are mainly created based on national level data, as it is the research on Euroscepticism in individual European countries that has dominated analyses of the phenomenon. Less extensive is the literature analysing Eurosceptic politicians and parties in the EP. Researchers tend to focus on the roles that Eurosceptic MEPs play in the EP and on the coherence of individual Eurosceptic political groups in the EP (Brack, 2012, 2015, 2018; Fitzgibbon et al., 2016; Whitaker & Lynch, 2014; McDonnell & Werner, 2019; Ahrens et al., 2022), while there is a shortage of research on the impact of Eurosceptics on national delegations. For a long time, EU institutions were considered ‘bastions of Europhile and pro-integration actors’, but in the face of economic, refugee or Brexit crises, contestation of EU policies also strengthened within the EU (Brack & Costa, 2017: 372–373). Nowadays Eurosceptical political groups in the EP represent a significant part of the opposition, hence it can be argued that Euroscepticism has moved from the vestibule of politics to its salons (Kaniok & Kominkova, 2022). Importantly, Eurosceptics do not constitute a homogeneous ideological bloc, so in order to examine the activities of Polish Eurosceptics in the EP, it is necessary to apply a typology that emphasizes the multidimensional nature of this phenomenon and takes into account the specific features of the Polish delegation (e.g. the absence of left-wing Euroscepticism). Hence, in this chapter, we apply the typology proposed by Sofia Vasilopoulu (2011), as it reflects the multifaceted nature of Euroscepticism and focuses on the right-wing parties and their characteristic features. Looking at four aspects of EU integration, Vasilopoulu identifies three patterns of opposition to European integration and, therefore, three main models of Euroscepticism: rejecting, conditional and compromising. These are distinguished on the basis of parties’ positions with regard to: (1) the feeling of cultural, religious and historical bonds among the European people, (2) the wish and willingness for cooperation at the European multilateral level, (3) the EU institutional and policy status quo,

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and (4) the making of European polity (Vasilopoulu, 2011: 224). Rejecting Euroscepticism recognizes and accepts the existence of European cultural, historical and religious commonalities, but opposes the principle of multilateral cooperation within the EU, contests EU institutions and specific policies, and expresses firm resistance to the building of a European political community. The political goal of this faction of Eurosceptics is to leave the EU and restore full sovereignty and decision-making to nation states. Conditional Euroscepticism, on the other hand, describes an attitude of acceptance of the common heritage of European nations and approval of the principle of multilateral European cooperation, but expresses aversion to the current political practice and the prospect of building a European community because they threaten the sovereignty of nation states. Within the ranks of conditional Eurosceptics, it can be heard that cooperation within the EU has already gone too far and that there should be a return to intergovernmental cooperation. Meanwhile, compromising Eurosceptics acknowledge that some aspects of European integration are beneficial to nation states because they promote prosperity. Nevertheless, they oppose the federalization of the EU (Vasilopoulu, 2011: 232–233). An analysis of the content of party programmes and public statements by political party leaders shows that each of the Eurosceptic stances could be identified in the Polish delegation in the EP between 2004 and 2019: rejecting Euroscepticism was characteristic of the New Right Congress (KNP) between 2014 and 2019, conditional Euroscepticism was a quality of the League of Polish Families and the Self-Defence between 2004 and 2009, and compromising Euroscepticism could be used to describe United Poland (SP) between 2012 and 2014. An interesting case is that of the Law and Justice party (PiS), whose attitude towards the EU and European integration evolved over the three EP terms under analysis, from light criticism in the years 2004–2009 (which, however, was not strong enough to be regarded as Euroscepticism), through compromising Euroscepticism in 2009–2014, to conditional Euroscepticism after 2014 (Table 11.1). Besides an analysis of the content of party programmes and public statements of party leaders, an additional criterion for the selection of cases to be analysed in this chapter was the affiliation of the Polish parties to the EP political groups identifying themselves as Eurosceptic. During the sixth EP term (2004–2009), this was the Independence and Democracy (IND/DEM) group, which was joined by Polish MEPs from the LPR after the 2004 elections.

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Table 11.1  The types of Euroscepticism of the Polish political parties represented in the EP between 2004 and 2019 Aspects of European integration Model of opposition

Common cultural heritage of Europe

Principle of multilateral European cooperation

Practice of EU integration

Building a European political community

Rejection

In favour

Against

Against

Against

Conditionality In favour

In favour

Against

Against

Compromise

In favour

In favour

Against

In favour

Polish political parties

New Right Congress (2014–2019) League of Polish Families (2004–2009) Self-Defence (2004–2009) Law and Justice (2014–2019) Law and Justice (2009–2014) United Poland (2012–2014)

Source: Vasilopoulu (2011: 232–233) and the authors’ own findings based on an analysis of the programmes of the Polish political parties represented in the EP in the period 2004–2019

In the seventh EP (2009–2014), Eurosceptics gathered in the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) group. It consisted mostly of the parties belonging to the IND/DEM and Union for Europe of Nations (UEN) groups during the previous EP term. None of the four Polish parties that crossed the representation threshold after the 2009 elections initially joined the EFD group. However, a split in the Law and Justice (PiS) party took place during the EP’s seventh term, with four MEPs leaving the party to form a new United Poland (SP) grouping. In December 2011, the SP left the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group and joined the EFD group. Incidentally, the ECR group, which describes its attitude towards the EU as Eurorealist, is also categorized by researchers as ‘soft Eurosceptic’ on the basis of its lack of support for deeper

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integration and criticism of certain EU policies (Usherwood & Startin, 2013: 6; Whitaker & Lynch, 2014: 232; Brack & Startin, 2015: 240). In the EP’s eighth term (2014–2019), Eurosceptics established as many as two groups: Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD), which was largely a continuation of the EFD, with the UKIP as the numerically strongest political party, and in 2015 Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF), where Marine Le Pen’s French National Front had the largest representation. Both groups included MEPs from the Polish New Right Congress (KNP). The PiS did not change its affiliation and continued to form the core of the ECR group. Taking into account the aforementioned criteria, the impact on the stability and cohesion of the Polish delegation in the EP is analysed in relation to five Eurosceptic political parties: the LPR, Self-Defence, SP, KNP and PiS.

The Positions and Programmes of the Eurosceptic Parties in the Polish EP Delegation All Polish Eurosceptic parties that crossed the electoral threshold and gained representation in the EP between 2004 and 2019 were situated on the right side of the political scene. Established in 2001, the League of Polish Families (LPR) was a nationalist party whose organizational and ideological core consisted of groupings representing the national-­ democratic and Catholic trends: the National Party, the National-­ Democratic Party and the All-Polish Youth (Jajecznik, 2006: 110). The party advocated a vision of a nation state pursuing policies dictated by Polish interests, and emphasized that the Roman Catholic religion was an important factor in the identity of Poles. Until the adoption of the Accession Treaty in a nationwide referendum in 2003 the LPR had unambiguously opposed Poland’s membership in the EU. Once the question of accession had been decided, the party advocated refraining from closer integration and limiting interference by EU bodies in Poland’s internal affairs. In the sixth term of the EP (2004–2009), MEPs representing the LPR opposed the adoption of the treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe, defended Christian values, which in their view were threatened by liberal and left-wing groupings. Before the 2009 EP elections, the LPR partnered with the Irish businessman Declan Ganley, who founded a branch of his pan-European movement, the Libertas Poland party. In the

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election campaign, the grouping called for the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty and support for the concept of a Europe of homelands. It also opposed ‘the excessive bureaucratization of the EU and the diktat of Brussels officials’. The Libertas Election Committee together with LPR politicians failed to exceed the electoral threshold, receiving only 1.14% of the popular vote. The Self-Defence grouping was established in 1992 as both a political party and trade union by Andrzej Lepper, who first came to prominence as a leader of radical farmers’ protests against debt foreclosures. During the period of accession negotiations, the Self-Defence presented totally Eurosceptic discourse, claiming that the negotiated conditions were against national interest and would put Poland into the position of a ‘third-rate Member State’ (Styczyńska, 2018: 109). It proposed to seal the borders, to restore high subsidies for production and to develop native production which was supposed to suffer from the accession to the EU. The Self-Defence criticized the EU mainly from the ideological (the nation as the highest good) and economic (negative system transformation) positions. In the party leader’s opinion, the integration processes were leading to the extermination of Poles and, in a short period of time, to the devastation of the economy in consequence of the purchase of agricultural land by foreigners (De Waele & Pacześniak, 2012). The United Poland (SP) is a right-wing party formed late in 2011 after four parliamentarians elected to the EP in 2009 had left the Law and Justice party. Ideologically, it belongs to the family of national-­conservative groupings and advocates economic solidarity, which it alludes to in its name. After 2015, the United Poland was the most vocal advocate and implementer of changes to the Polish justice administration system, which the European Commission assessed as contrary to the rule of law. The dispute between the Polish government and the EC further exacerbated the Eurosceptic rhetoric of SP politicians, who initially only distanced themselves from the building of a European political community, but accepted the practice of integration, which is why we have classified them as compromising Eurosceptics between 2012 and 2014. Over time, the party’s stance towards the EU came closer to rejecting Euroscepticism, which became evident in the EP during the 2019–2024 term, which, however, is not included in the scope of this analysis. Founded in 2011, the New Right Congress (KNP) is a conservative-­ liberal party. It managed to introduce its four-member representation to the EP for one term in 2014. The party advocated the overarching role of

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the Catholic Church in the social system, the protection of heteronormativity, universal privatization (with private property as the backbone of the entire system), a limited social role for the state, a free use of all stimulants, universal conscription for adult males and free trade (Chwedczuk-Szulc & Zaremba, 2015: 131–132). Its representatives in the EP criticized the EU for its leftist ideology, bureaucracy and strong interventionist measures towards the economies of Member States. They also demanded that European cooperation be reduced to a free trade zone and that the EU be abolished. The Law and Justice (PiS) party was founded in 2001 on the initiative of the brothers Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński. The party identifies itself as conservative and is described by political scientists as national-conservative (Hloušek & Kopècek, 2010: 85), Eurosceptic (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008; Brack & Startin, 2015; Styczyńska, 2018) or illiberal (Sadurski, 2019). On economic issues, since its inception PiS has proposed a social programme, while on worldview issues, it emphasizes identity aspects such as the role of tradition and Catholic religion. In the European context, the party is an advocate of limited integration in the political sphere, indicating a ‘Europe of Nations’ as the desired future direction for the EU. It strongly opposes the concept of a federal EU, criticizing European institutions as undemocratic and imposing their models on nation states without consulting citizens. The party also perceives the EU as dominated by Germany and technocrats (Balcer et al., 2016). According to the PiS, the EU should be thoroughly reformed and the competences of its institutions should be reduced (Styczyńska, 2018; Balcer et al., 2016). According to the ECR group in the EP, to which the PiS has belonged since its establishment, ‘the dangerous model of a centralized federal European state should be rejected in favour of a looser, confederal association of nation states’ (ECR, 2017). The party’s place in the political landscape is determined by not only its ideological and programmatic profile but also its function in the party system, one of the determinants of which is its participation in the exercise of power (a ruling or co-ruling party versus an opposition party). The Eurosceptic parties under analysis did not have a homogeneous political status. Before 2006, the LPR and the Self-Defence had been opposition parties deprived of the possibility of blocking those in power. Both during the 2001–2005 Sejm term, when a coalition of left-wing parties was in power, and after the 2005 parliamentary elections, when the PiS formed a minority one-party government, the LPR and the Self-Defence seemed to

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be at a considerable distance from the barrier of relevance understood as participation in governing the state. However, in May 2006, both Eurosceptic parties entered Jarosław Kaczyński’s coalition government as junior partners of the PiS. The coalition collapsed a year later, leading to early elections to the Sejm and Senate in autumn 2007, in which neither the LPR nor the Self-Defence crossed the electoral threshold. In the period 2012–2014, that is, in the second half of the PE’s seventh term, the United Poland (SP) was a party standing in opposition to the coalition government of the Civic Platform (PO) and the Polish People’s Party (PSL). After the 2015 parliamentary elections, the SP entered the coalition government of the United Right as a junior partner, but at that time, it had no representation in the EP, to which it returned in 2019, running on the PiS lists. Represented in the EP continuously since 2004, the Law and Justice (PiS) is the most relevant Polish Eurosceptic party. On the national stage, it has been one of the strongest parties of the last two decades, and its leader Jarosław Kaczyński has become an internationally recognizable politician, mainly due to his redirection of Poland’s foreign policy after taking power in 2015, and his conflict with the European Commission over the rule of law. Prior to this, the PiS had ruled Poland between 2005 and 2007, first on its own, based on a one-party minority government, and between 2006 and 2007 in a coalition government together with the LPR and the Self-Defence. After the PO’s victories in the 2007 and 2011 parliamentary elections, the PiS was the largest opposition party. It returned to power after winning the 2015 parliamentary elections and retained this position after the subsequent elections held in 2019. The New Right Congress (KNP) is the only Eurosceptic party that has never been involved in any form of government at the national level. The party was founded in 2011, which allowed it to run in the parliamentary elections in the autumn of the same year. Nevertheless, it failed to cross the electoral threshold and did not win any seats in the Sejm. In the 2014 EP elections, being an extra-parliamentary grouping, it received 7.15% of the popular vote, which secured the status of an MEP for four candidates representing the KNP. However, just one year later, in the Sejm elections, it received only 4852 votes (0.03% of all votes cast in the elections). The KNP thus never managed to cross the threshold of representation in the Polish parliament. The case of the KNP illustrates a wider trend of over-representation of Eurosceptic politicians in the EP, observed in the context of some Member

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States and their national delegations. There are two reasons for Eurosceptics’ greater chances of winning seats in the EP than in national parliaments. Firstly, in some countries, regulations applicable to EP elections differ significantly from those followed in national parliamentary elections, which is the subject matter of the chapter written by Błażej Choroś. This was or is the case, for example, in the UK and France. Secondly, EP elections are treated by voters as so-called second-order elections (Reif & Schmitt, 1980), which manifests itself, among other things, in a significantly lower turnout and greater opportunities for smaller and niche parties. Voters, whose political preferences are often split in national elections between the two largest parties or coalitions of parties, use EP elections to vote for a grouping they would never support in national parliamentary elections due to fear of wasting their votes (Norris & Karlheinz, 1997). In EP elections, there are fewer reasons to vote strategically: citizens feel they have more freedom and cast their votes in a more expressive and stress-free manner, knowing that their behaviour at the ballot box has no real consequences of changing party configurations and has very limited impact on who governs in the EU. Moreover, they often treat these elections as a way of expressing their dissatisfaction with the actions of the parties in power in their country, which means a relatively worse performance of the parties forming cabinets in Member States and better results for minority groupings, including Eurosceptics. In the EU political system, the division between opposition parties and ruling parties is not as obvious as in national systems. However, if one were to apply this imperfect distinction to describe the EP, Euroscepticism is interpreted by some scholars as a ‘deviant’ form of political opposition directed against the system and the polity (Brack, 2018). Polish MEPs have joined the ranks of those Eurosceptic groups in the EP that are considered right-wing or populist radical right. The most moderate and largest group is the ECR, while the ENF is considered the most radical Eurosceptic group. Nationalism and strong Euroscepticism accompanied by anti-immigration and social-conservative demands are what brings them together (McDonnell & Werner, 2019). At the same time, with the exception of the ECR, all of the aforementioned Eurosceptic groups have not influenced either the staffing of EU institutions or decision-making processes, have not been parts of political alliances, and their participation in the debate on the future of Europe has been visible, but has not resulted in proposals of any constructive solutions (Czerska-Shaw et al., 2022).

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The Non-obvious Influence of Eurosceptic Parties on the Stability and Cohesion of the Polish Delegation in the EP The stability of the Polish delegation in the EP is analysed in this book in the context of its personal and partisan composition, as well as the institutional affiliation of national parties to political groups in the EP, while cohesion is examined in terms of the homogeneity of the delegation at the programmatic level (programmatic cohesion), at the level of parliamentary votes and actions taken in the EP (e.g. joint cross-party declarations, resolutions and convergent positions in parliamentary debates). The characteristics of Eurosceptic parties, such as ephemerality, ideological-programmatic incoherence, distance from the ideas of supranational cooperation and consensual way of doing politics, provide grounds for the thesis that their presence in a national delegation generates a higher level of instability and a lack of cohesion. Let us verify this thesis with reference to the Polish delegation. The personal and partisan stability of a national delegation in the EP is significantly affected by the shape and dynamics of a national party system. The examples of Polish Eurosceptic parties from the years 2004–2019 prove that most of them can be categorized as so-called flash-parties (Art, 2011: 148) whose potential to survive on the political market proved to be low. During the period under analysis, all Polish Eurosceptic parties, with the exception of the PiS, won seats in the EP only once. The ineffective re-election of these groupings contributed to a decrease in both the partisan and personal stability of the Polish delegation. The aggregate re-election rate of Polish MEPs in the three elections held in 2009, 2014 and 2019 was less than 40%, not only due to the electoral defeats of Eurosceptic parties such as the LPR, Self-Defence, KNP and some pro-EU parties that failed to cross the electoral threshold, but also as a result of the relatively low re-election rate of PiS MEPs. Of all Polish parties with representation in each EP term, the PiS was characterized by the lowest personal stability. The re-election rate in this party averaged 35% of its MEPs, compared to 44% in the PO and over 50% in the SLD and PSL, as discussed in more detail in the chapter on selection by Anna Pacześniak. The Eurosceptic parties also decreased the institutional stability of the Polish delegation through an above-average number of inter-group transfers (for more on this topic, see the chapter by Krzysztof Zuba). Although

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between 2004 and 2009 as much as 37% of the composition of the entire delegation changed political groups, including a few MEPs who did it twice (Ćwiek-Karpowicz et al., 2007: 52), which is indicative of generally high institutional instability, it is worth noting that this stability was generated largely by two Eurosceptic parties: the LPR and Self-Defence. Of the ten MEPs belonging to the LPR, only one (!) remained in the party from whose list they had entered the EP until the end of the term. Changes in national party affiliations often entailed changes in the affiliations with political groups within the EP. Six MEPs who left the LPR moved to the Union for Europe of the Nations, two remained in the Independence and Democracy group, and one changed the status to a non-affiliated MEP.  Party colours and group affiliations were also changed by MEPs elected in 2004 from the Self-Defence list. They were all non-affiliated MEPs at the inaugural session of the EP in 2004, but during the course of the term, they were gradually leaving the ranks of the Self-Defence and joining mainly the UEN group, but also the Party of European Socialists (PES) and Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) groups. During the 7th term of the EP (2009–2014), the changes in group affiliations of some Polish MEPs were due to a split in the Eurosceptic PiS, which resulted in the formation of a new (also Eurosceptic) party, that is, the SP. Four MEPs elected in 2009 from the PiS list changed their political group in the EP, leaving the ECR group and joining the EFD group. In the 8th EP (2014–2019), all Eurosceptic MEPs from the KNP were initially non-affiliated. In October 2014, one of them joined the then only Eurosceptic group in the EP, that is, Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy. In January 2015, there was a change in the position of the KNP party chairperson and the MEPs (among them the outgoing and new party chairpersons) split into supporters of the old and new party leadership, which also translated into a choice of affiliation with particular political groups within the EP. The new KNP leadership decided to affiliate its MEPs with the newly formed Eurosceptic ENF group, and two MEPs complied with the decision. The other two MEPs, who had left the party after the decision to change the KNP chairperson and had established a new party (KORWIN), adopted different strategies at the EP level. One maintained their affiliation with the EFDD group, while the other remained unaffiliated and resigned their seat in the EP in 2018. Their successor was also a non-affiliated MEP until the end of the 8th term of the EP.

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Table 11.2  EP group switches of Polish Eurosceptics and non-Eurosceptics in the years 2004–2019 All MEPs 2004–2009 Eurosceptics Non-Eurosceptics 2009–2014 Eurosceptics Non-Eurosceptics 2014–2019 Eurosceptics Non-Eurosceptics Total (2004–2019) Eurosceptics Non-Eurosceptics

Switches

Switchers

16 38

18 5

14 4

15 36

10 1

10 1

23 28

4 2

4 1

54 102

32 8

28 6

Source: The authors’ own calculations

The cases of EP group switching during the three terms under analysis divided into Polish Eurosceptic and non-Eurosceptic parties are presented in Table 11.2. It clearly shows that although Eurosceptics were a minority in the Polish delegation in each of the three EP terms, they had the largest number of switchers who accounted for the majority of group switches. It seems that analysing the cohesion of a national delegation in the EP is much more difficult than examining its stability, especially in view of the fact that in the literature on the subject, the category of cohesion is usually applied to political groups in the EP. This is probably due to the fact that national delegations composed of representatives of different political parties are not expected to be uniform at the programmatic level or at the level of political behaviours (e.g. votes). While simply analysing the cohesion of collective actors does not indicate an expectation that it should be high, as we have mentioned several times in this book, the topic of the cohesion of national delegations in the EP has not been addressed by researchers. A high level of cohesion of a national delegation would contradict both the institutional logic of the EP, which is to minimize national particularisms, and the role of political parties, whose task is to articulate the interests of social groups rather than entire nations. On the face of it, it also seems obvious that Eurosceptic parties that question the practice and sometimes the idea of European integration, that is, position themselves as anti-systemic vis-a-vis the EU, will considerably reduce the

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cohesion of the delegations of which they are members. On the other hand, however, there are known cases of Eurosceptic parties’ participation in the forging of a cross-party consensus in both the EP and national parliaments. An initiative that was supposed to contribute to ensuring greater cohesion in the Polish delegation’s activities related to key issues of national interest was the establishment in 2004 of an informal institution called the Polish Club. It was supposed to be a platform of cooperation for all Polish MEPs regardless of party affiliation. Its functioning boiled down to monthly meetings of the heads of the Polish representations in political groups and ad hoc meetings of all Polish MEPs to coordinate action on issues of exceptional importance to Poland. Although this cross-party forum did not make decisions on voting positions binding for its members, MEPs sometimes managed to work out a common position, mainly on economic issues. Matters of an ideological nature were very rarely discussed, as reaching a consensus on such issues would have been difficult, if at all possible (Ćwiek-Karpowicz et al., 2007: 44). The Polish Club also served Polish MEPs to obtain information on the progress of legislative work in those committees where their party had no representatives. In the subsequent EP terms, this cooperation loosened, as it was increasingly hampered by political disputes in the national arena. Nonetheless, albeit irregular and less frequent than in the 2004–2009 term, meetings continued to be held and were also attended by Eurosceptics. Moreover, when the PiS won the parliamentary elections in Poland in 2015 and gained the status of a governing party, meetings of the Polish Club in the EP were often initiated by Eurosceptic PiS MEPs, mainly with the aim of persuading MEPs representing the national opposition to support the government’s policies at the supranational level. As far as the programmatic cohesion of the Polish national delegation in the EP is concerned, it was the Eurosceptic parties that contributed the most to its deterioration, which is analysed in our book by Aleksandra Trzcielińska-Polus. This can be seen in the three examined dimensions of identity, economy and foreign policy. A comparison of the programmatic documents of all parties represented in the EP shows that the lack of cohesion of the national delegation can be attributed primarily to the PiS, whose distance from the other groupings considerably exceeded the average for the entire delegation. Similar results were also observed for the LPR in the 6th EP term and the KNP in the 8th term.

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The heterogeneity of positions on worldview issues should not come as a surprise, as it is a bone of contention within not only national delegations but also political groups in the EP. Researchers who analysed groups in the EP found that the ability of Eurosceptic groups to form a coherent opposition depended on a political domain: it was higher in domains related to new political issues such as gender equality or non-­discrimination than in domains related to national interests or organized along a left-­ right axis (Börzel & Hartlapp, 2022). The programmatic cohesion of the Polish delegation in the economic dimension was slightly higher than in the dimension related to identity. The biggest differences occurred between the economic liberals from the PO and the advocates of state interventionism and social transfers representing the left and the PiS. It would therefore be difficult to conclude that it was the Euroscepticism of the latter group that caused a decrease in the cohesion of the delegation, as the interventionist position of the pro­EU left and the Eurosceptic PiS might just as well be used as a point of reference, in which case the economically liberal programmatic position of the PO could be interpreted as lowering the cohesion of the entire delegation. The highest level of the programmatic cohesion of the Polish delegation was evident in the dimension of foreign policy, although also in this case the Eurosceptic PiS was responsible for its lowering. A key factor in this dimension is the attitude of the PiS towards European integration different from those of the other parties represented in each EP term. Apart from the classic divisions into the right and the left described by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) or the social cleavage between Green-Alternative-­ Libertarian and Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist (GAL/TAN) (Hooghe et al., 2002), one may observe European integration becoming a new cleavage. In this vein, Euroscepticism is not a stand-alone phenomenon, but is rather part of a broader emerging cleavage between those favouring the federal model of the EU and those who are against it, claiming that the nation-state is the only way to preserve national identity and realize national interests. In this dimension, despite their support for individual EU policies such as the European Neighbourhood Policy, Enlargement Policy or Common Defence, for ideological reasons, Eurosceptic parties cannot present a joint position with pro-EU parties. In their attitude towards European integration and the advocated future shape of the EU, they are much closer to parties from other Member States and representing the same ideological family than to MEPs from

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the same national delegation, although representing ideological political opponents. Despite open criticism of the practice of European integration by Polish Eurosceptics and articulated disapproval of EU federalization, only a few MEPs (e.g. Janusz Korwin-Mikke) opted for EU-reject rhetoric. The study conducted by McDonnell and Werner (2019) demonstrates that the majority of Eurosceptic MEPs (no matter of their national affiliation) in the 8th term of the EP would abstain from total rejection of the EU and focus on voicing the urgent need for the EU reform, the main reason being the high public support towards the EU membership. In the past, both internal and external challenges to the EU, including the discussions on the deficit of democracy, migration and the economic crisis, constituted the basis for cooperation among right-wing Eurosceptics. Although they advocate similar solutions, cooperation within the family of right-wing parties is more evident at the supranational level (e.g. non-­ institutionalized party cooperation) or regional level than within European institutions such as the EP (Startin & Brack, 2017: 38). Traditionally, right-wing MEPs agree as to the need to curb immigration, criticize globalization and believe that the EU integration process has gone too far, giving EU institutions too many prerogatives and therefore posing a threat to national sovereignty. Interestingly, divergences between the positions of MEPs from the new and old Member States can be observed in the EP, with differences mainly concerning worldview issues (e.g. LGBTQI rights), migration and EU foreign policy (sanctions on Russia). It was the issue of attitudes towards European integration that determined the low programmatic cohesion of the Polish delegation. In the 6th term of the EP, conditional Eurosceptic parties (LPR and Self-Defence) had their representatives in the EP. Before 2004, they had advocated rejecting the prospect of EU membership in the accession referendum, and after the referendum went on to negate the EU’s activities and the benefits of accession. After their defeat in the 2007 parliamentary elections, Eurosceptic rhetoric was practically absent from the mainstream political discourse until the campaigns before the 2014 EP elections and the 2015 Sejm elections, when anti-establishment parties such as the KNP, National Movement and Kukiz’15 emerged on the Polish political scene (Styczyńska, 2018: 94). At the beginning, the PiS supported Poland’s membership in the EU, but shifted to Eurosceptic positions over time, criticizing the current shape of the EU, insufficient presence of Christian values, extensive bureaucracy and lack of solidarity. The party focuses on emphasizing the pragmatic dimension of integration, portraying the EU as a source of economic gain, while

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denying the EU’s right to influence Poland’s domestic policies. At the same time, the PiS continues to have a positive attitude towards the EU’s common defence and security policy, advocating the creation of a European army, which, especially in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, was one of very few cases of a common ground for agreement with the other Polish parties present in the EP. Another aspect of the cohesion of national delegations in the EP comprises political behaviours, specifically voting. In his chapter, Michał Niebylski conducted a quantitative analysis of votes held during two EP terms. It shows that voting cohesion within the Polish delegation was at a relatively high level of 0.707, meaning that on average almost three-fourth of Polish MEPs, inclusive of Eurosceptic ones, voted in exactly the same way. When one places the unanimous votes of Polish MEPs on a timeline, it turns out that almost 95% of such votes took place in the period 2009–2014, and only once did they manage to reach a common position during the EP’s 8th term (2014–2019). The average voting cohesion index fell from 0.777 in the years 2009–2014 to 0.636 in the 2014–2019 period. The level of cohesion in votes was linked to the subject matters of particular votes. Eurosceptics (the PiS and KNP) held 45% of the seats within the Polish delegation during the 2014–2019 term. This is almost completely in line with cohesion in votes on worldview issues (56.6% consensus level). Based on the programmes and declarations of the Eurosceptic parties, it is possible to conclude that their MEPs decreased the level of the Polish delegation’s cohesion in almost all votes on worldview and identity issues. However, their position was not so uncompromising on economic and international matters. It can be estimated that in half of the votes, Eurosceptics voted the same as the pro-European part of the Polish delegation. Sometimes Polish MEPs managed to cooperate in votes on the election of EP President. Although personal votes are secret, our IDIs with the then Polish MEPs showed that an example of a joint action of the Polish delegation was the vote for the Polish liberal Bronisław Geremek, who was running for the position of EP president. Geremek was not elected EP president, but five years later, Jerzy Buzek of the PO was successfully put forward for the same post by the European People’s Party (EPP). At that time, PiS MEPs did not break the agreement entered into by the political groups in the EP and, like the entire ECR group, voted in favour of Buzek’s candidacy.

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Conclusion While the EP forum is not a straightforward extension of national political arenas, the different perceptions of national interests in relations with supranational institutions, which would be a justification for a cross-party consensus when voting in the EP or when working on common positions, seem to be an effective block to achieving a high level of cohesion in national delegations. The case of the Polish delegation is unique in the sense that the polarization between the two largest parties present in the EP, that is, the PiS and PO, is extraordinarily high. In each successive term of the EP, this deep political conflict generated in the domestic arena affected more and more strongly the cohesion of the Polish delegation. During the period under examination, there were (and still are) issues on which Polish MEPs representing both pro-European and Eurosceptic parties were in agreement. This was especially true of the main foreign policy objectives for which Poland sought support at the EU level (e.g. the Eastern Partnership, sanctions against Russia, the enlargement policy). These issues are not controversial in the national arena, so at the level of the national delegation, they did not result in the lack of coherence either at the programmatic level or at the voting level. The landscape of value-­ based divisions is different. In such matters, the position of the Polish delegation is inconsistent, and issues related to minority rights, multicultural policy, secularization (and thus the role of religion in public life) or the rule of law become the main bone of contention. Politicians representing a particular party in the EP adopt different positions, vote differently from their political opponents in the same national delegation not only because they have a different view on a given issue but also because in this way they reproduce conflicts and political divisions from the national level at the supranational level. The cohesion of the Polish delegation in the EP was also being weakened by the different levels of Euroscepticism of individual Polish parties. Different shades of Euroscepticism are important not only because it is difficult to find a common denominator for the conditional, compromising and rejecting types of Euroscepticism but also because attitudes towards the idea of a united Europe and its practical implementation have been changing. Moreover, only the PiS has been present in the EP continuously since 2004; other Eurosceptic parties have held seats in the EP for one term only. Thus, in the period under analysis, we witness a complete rejection of the EU (KNP) and conditional Euroscepticism, which

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was represented by the League of Polish Families and United Poland. The strongest Eurosceptic party, the PiS has evolved from a position of compromising Euroscepticism to conditional Euroscepticism. This is significant because although none of the Eurosceptic groups in the EP was ideologically cohesive, the ECR was the biggest and the most influential one, and their rhetoric was also evolving. In the 8th term of the EP, the ECR accepted the radical right-wing parties such as the Danish People’s Party (DF), Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and the Finns Party (PS), even though they had previously been refused membership (McDonnell & Werner, 2019: 57–58). A similar trend can be observed in the PiS, whose rhetoric also became more radical not only in the national arena but also in the EP, which was not conducive to the cohesion of the Polish delegation. The material analysed in this book clearly demonstrates that Eurosceptics were decreasing the cohesion of the Polish delegation between 2004 and 2019, but this was not happening with the same force at all levels under examination. Cohesion is visible to a much greater extent when economic and international policy issues are analysed, while worldview and identity issues affect the deepest divide between Eurosceptics and the other members of the Polish delegation. The case of the Polish delegation in the EP confirms the trend observed by researchers that, besides immigration, European integration is the most divisive factor for political parties (Katsanidou & Lefkofridi, 2019).

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García-Guitián, E. (2022). ‘Citizens’ ‘Permissive Consensus’ in European Integration Scholarship: Theoretical Reflections on EU Politicisation and the Democratic Deficit Discourse. In T. Haapala & A. Oleart (Eds.), Tracing the Politicisation of the EU.  Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology. Palgrave Macmillan. Hloušek, V., & Kopècek, L. (2010). Origin, Ideology and Transformation of Political Parties. East-Central and Western Europe Compared. Ashgate Publishing. Hooghe, L., Marks, G., & Wilson, C. (2002). Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration? Comparative Political Studies, 35(8), 965–989. Jajecznik, K. (2006). Pozycja Ligi Polskich Rodzin w polskim systemie partyjnym w kontekście transformacji systemowej. Studia Politologiczne, 10, 107–134. Kaniok, P., & Kominkova, M. (2022). Hard and Soft Euroscepticism in the European Parliament. European Review, 30(1), 79–95. Katsanidou, A., & Lefkofridi, Z. (2019). Shifting Dynamics: Mapping the Divisions Between and Within Party Groups in the European Parliament Ahead of the 2019 Elections. Europpblog LSE London. Kopecký, P., & Mudde, C. (2002). The Two Sides of Euroscepticism. Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe. European Union Politics, 3(3), 297–326. Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (Eds.). (1967). Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Crossnational Perspectives. The Free Press. McDonnell, D., & Werner, A. (2019). An International Populism: The Radical Right in the European Parliament. Hurst. Norris, P., & Karlheinz, R. (1997). Second-order Elections. European Journal of Political Research, 31(1), 109–124. Pacześniak, A. (2018). Wybory do PE: wiatr w żagle eurosceptyków. Nowa Konfederacja, 10(101), 45–49. Reif, K., & Schmitt, H. (1980). Nine Second-order National Elections—A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results. European Journal of Political Research, 8(1), 3–44. Riishoj, S. (2007). Development of Parties and Party Systems in Central Europe (1989–2007). Politologiske Skrifter, Nro. 19, Syddansk Universitet. Sadurski, W. (2019). Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown. Oxford University Press. Startin, N., & Brack, N. (2017). To Cooperate or Not To Cooperate? The European Radical Right and Pan-European Cooperation. In J.  Fitzgibbon, B.  Leruth, & N.  Startin (Eds.), Euroscepticism as a Transnational and Pan-­ European Phenomenon (pp. 28–45). Routledge. Styczyńska, N. (2018). Więcej czy mniej Europy?: UE i integracja europejska w dyskursie polskich partii politycznych. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.

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CHAPTER 12

Conclusion: A Bridgehead of National Politics at the European Level Krzysztof Zuba

The question of whether Polish Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in the European Parliament are more ‘Polish’ or ‘European’ is not purely academic (Scully et al., 2012). Resolving this dilemma has not been the aim of this book, which does not change the fact that it determines answers to fundamental questions relating to the position, role and importance of the Polish national delegation in the European Parliament (EP). The findings made in our book refer only to Polish MEPs and the conditions of their activity in the EP. At the same time, as a case study, they have the character of pilot research aimed at responding to the demand for a broader consideration of the relations between a national political system and the activity of MEPs and the parties they represent. The findings of this book can be summarized in a few general and a number of specific conclusions. The latter will be significantly limited due to the fact that each chapter contains its own conclusions.

K. Zuba (*) Institute of Political Science and Administration, University of Opole, Opole, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 K. Zuba (ed.), The Polish Delegation in the European Parliament, Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28271-3_12

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The cohesion of the Polish delegation, understood as the level of homogeneity in terms of ideological, programmatic and political behaviours, should be considered in the context of what a national delegation is. This statement ceases to sound trivial if we realize that the main addressee of comparisons of national delegations to date has been political groups within the EP. While political groups—their cohesion and stability—are an institutional emanation of the process of Europeanization, national delegations are a relic of the impact of national factors (nationalization). While political groups are shaped on the basis of ideological and programmatic similarities among parties and MEPs belonging to them, delegations are a reflection of political diversity revealed during elections. This calls for extreme caution in drawing overly far-reaching conclusions about the progress of Europeanization and, at the same time, the regress of nationalization processes. National delegations are by their very nature incohesive, as are voters making up the total electorate choosing their representatives in EP elections. This is why we have proposed in this book a redefinition of cohesion, which should be referred in varying degrees to the cohesion of political groups as well as the national political scenes from which they emanate. It is slightly different with stability. Any change in electoral preferences at a national level and within a party system triggers changes within both national delegations and political groups. The difference, however, is that consequences for the composition of delegations are far greater, as the numbers of their members are relatively small. In the case of political groups, we observe much smaller consequences. The largest groups (European People’s Party, Socialists & Democrats) are formed by more parties than there are EU Member States (in 2019: European People’s Party (EPP)—46; Socialists and Democrats (S&D)—34). This also causes changes to occur in different directions and statistically balance each other out (Colomer, 2012). At the same time, although the changes that follow successive EP elections are large (in 2019, out of 195 all parties, 29 were new parties), they are unevenly distributed, as they mainly affect small and most often also radical groups. Thus, the consequences of national elections for large groups are relatively small, but significant for both small groups and national delegations. And in this case, therefore, it is justified to analyse the cohesion of a national delegation both horizontally—in relation to other national delegations and political groups—and vertically—in relation to changes occurring within national party systems.

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While it has been repeatedly emphasized in this book that ‘national delegation’ is an informal term that does not define the electoral legitimacy of MEPs, the analysis in our book shows that there is another aspect to the issue. The thesis of the second-order status of EP elections is widely acknowledged and accepted. Neither the level of voters’ interest in and knowledge of the EU nor the features of political debates make them par excellence European elections (Reif & Schmitt, 1980). In the view of some scholars, this provides grounds to question the representative nature of these elections (Farrell & Scully, 2007). In this context, the Polish case is not unique, but it provides another reason to ask the question whether national delegations really matter. The analyses of the social basis of EP elections in Poland (Robert Geisler), the process of selecting candidates by political parties (Anna Pacześniak) and the career paths of MEPs (Krzysztof Zuba) justify the somewhat provocative thesis that the mere fact of general EP elections has not fundamentally changed the delegative nature of the process of selecting and legitimizing Polish MEPs. Robert Geisler’s analysis shows how much the process of EP elections in Poland is determined by the national perspective. For the majority of voters, these are de facto another form of national elections and not European elections, besides being of much lesser importance. Although formulated almost a quarter of a century before Poland’s accession to the EU, the thesis advanced by Reif and Schmitt (1980) has been fully confirmed in the three EP elections held in Poland so far. The extent to which Poles ‘remain glued’ to the national realities when deciding on the composition of the Polish delegation in the EP is clearly evidenced by two aspects outlined by the author of the chapter: voter turnout and electoral affiliations. Voter turnout in EP elections in Poland is among the lowest in Europe. The 2019 EP elections brought a significant change here, as the turnout was 45.68%—almost double the average of the three previous elections. This would be a very optimistic symptom if it were not for the fact that this increase was not related to a greater interest in European issues, but only to an increase in the polarization of the national political scene. In terms of political affiliations, Poles also remain trapped in the logic of national politics. Hence the paradox that, in a country of Euro-­ enthusiasts, Eurosceptics won the 2019 EP elections. The nationalization of EP elections as well as the process of shaping the composition of the Polish delegation are further petrified by the candidate selection mechanisms (see the chapter by Anna Pacześniak). Polish political parties generally adjust such mechanisms to strategies developed at the

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national level. The significant differences among parties with regard to the candidate selection mechanisms stem from two factors. Firstly, they are the result of different perceptions of the role of MEPs and, more broadly, different visions of European integration. For a pro-European party, the selection of (at least some) candidates is a strategic investment in Europeanization. Eurosceptic parties are characterized by the instrumental treatment of the MEP mandate, where individual MEPs are elements of a party’s ‘cadre resources’. The other factor is related to the calculation of chances for crossing the electoral threshold and participating in the distribution of MEP mandates. Large parties can afford more freedom in terms of the preparation of their lists of candidates. For smaller parties, balancing on the edge of the electoral threshold, nominating ‘good candidates’ (whatever this means) may turn out to be a decisive factor in winning seats in the EP. These findings are confirmed by an analysis of the career paths of Polish MEPs. It shows that there is no single model in this respect within the Polish delegation. However, a dominant model can be identified. To a large extent, it is determined by political parties’ treatment of places on MEP candidate lists as a resource at their disposal. Due to the high financial attractiveness of the MEP mandate, parties use these places to reward or punish their functionaries. Although such an assessment applies more to Eurosceptic parties than pro-European ones, it appears that the dominant career model is to treat the MEP mandate as a supplement to a career on the national political scene. This general assessment is justified by comparing the career paths of Polish MEPs with the career models dominant in other delegations. In the Polish case, the dominant model is that of a short-lived career as the opposite of a professional career, autonomous from a career in national politics. The analytical distinction of the three categories of MEPs (short-termers, mid-termers, long-termers) shows the dominance of the first of these: short-termers account for as much as 66% of all Polish MEPs. Moreover, the largest group among Polish MEPs are former parliamentarians (62%), which clearly distinguishes the Polish delegation from other delegations, including those of CEE countries. What is also apparent is the huge disproportion in terms of transfers between positions in national politics and the EP.  While it has been possible to identify as many as 84 cases of national posts being abandoned in favour of the MEP mandate, there have been only ten Polish MEPs who have given up their seat in the EP and opted for a position in national politics. The reasons for this state of affairs can be seen in the factors that are

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universal for the EP as a whole and those that are specific to only some Member States. Among the former, in addition to the often mentioned second-order status of EP elections, the fact that national parties do not regard them as a ‘power game’ may be important. Hence the natural tendency to treat them instrumentally. Within the second category of factors, the financial attractiveness of the MEP mandate is particularly important, especially for candidates from poorer Member States such as Poland. This causes most Polish parties to show a tendency to treat MEP mandates as benefits that they can distribute among their members. A key feature of the Polish national delegation in the EP (and arguably not only the Polish one) is therefore that its cohesion is strongly determined by national political considerations. In terms of the partisan composition of the Polish delegation, it can be argued that it is a reflection of the national party system. According to Błazej Choroś’s analysis, although it is not a perfect reflection, in the Polish case, these similarities seem to be more significant than in the case of most other EU Member States. This is determined by the relatively large delegation (in the case of delegations consisting of a few persons, the mirroring effect is flattened), the similar systems of elections for the Sejm and the EP, and the low status of European issues in Polish politics (as a result of which such issues do not distinguish EP elections from national parliamentary elections). Equally strong similarities and the effect of the national political scene being reflected in the delegation are revealed in patterns of rivalry. Disputes, conflicts and alliances occurring at the national level determine the affiliation of Polish parties to political groups within the EP. The same can be said of the dividing lines between the parties of the Polish delegation. EP elections constitute a ‘transmission belt’ through which parties and rivalry patterns are transferred from the national to the European level. These elections are fundamentally national in character: they are organized by the same parties (supported by the same electorates) that focus on similar issues as in the case of Sejm elections. The aforementioned effect of ‘reflection’ is somewhat less evident in the case of the 2004 EP elections than in the case of the subsequent ones. There are many indications that the pioneering nature of these elections—the first ones in which Poles participated—is decisive here. This phenomenon is also evident in the analyses of the Polish delegation performed in the other chapters of this book. In 2004, political parties were just adjusting their political strategies to those still ‘exotic’ elections. The subsequent elections, moreover, showed that

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the development of new strategies was superfluous; parties generally limited themselves to copying strategies from national elections. If one can speak of clear differences between EP elections and Sejm elections, they become revealed when the former immediately precede the latter. In such circumstances, Euro-elections become a testing ground for the effectiveness of the adopted strategies. In the 2014 elections, the rightist parties ran separately, which limited their expected success. A year later, in the elections to the Sejm, the PiS, United Poland and Jarosław Gowin’s Poland Together ran as parts of a single election committee (PiS), which ensured their unequivocal victory. The democratic opposition, on the other hand, had a different experience in the 2019 EP elections. It decided to put forward a joint list of candidates under the banner of the European Coalition. This did not yield the expected results, as the coalition failed to break the supremacy of the PiS. In view of this, in the elections to the Sejm that took place a few months later, the parties making up the European Coalition ran separately for the Sejm, and in a coalition for the Senate. The next two chapters report findings showing somewhat differently the dependence of the stability of the Polish delegation on domestic political factors. In the case of membership stability (the chapter by Marta Witkowska and Krzysztof Zuba), the factors described in the first part of the book, in the chapter on career paths, come to the fore. It is the conditions resulting from the entanglement of MEPs’ careers with careers at the national level that determine changes in the composition of the Polish delegation. This is particularly true of changes occurring during the course of a parliamentary term (WTS). Objective reasons (death or illness of an MEP) have a marginal impact on the number of vacated seats. The predominant reasons for giving up the MEP mandate are due to the opening of an opportunity structure at the national level, for example, due to new political (especially ministerial) positions. The situation is slightly different with between-­ terms stability (BTS). At the level of political parties (selection), as in the case of within-term stability, the dominant career path model becomes the key factor. However, at the level of election, changes in the balance of power among parties play a major role. This applies to both a change in the number of parties within the Polish delegation after elections and the number of seats obtained by individual parties in the EP. In both cases, there are fluctuations in the number of old and new MEPs; the greater the fluctuations, the lower the level of the between-terms stability of the Polish delegation. Against the background of the comparative data, the

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Polish delegation shows relative stability (i.e. it does not differ significantly from the whole body of MEPs). Differences are revealed at the level of two separate categories of stability: in the case of WTS, the stability of the Polish delegation is higher, while in the case of BTS, it is lower. This can be explained by the already indicated relatively high financial attractiveness of the MEP mandate (which influences the higher value of WTS) and the related tendency to treat instrumentally the MEP mandate, as well as the higher circulation of politicians aspiring to seat in the EP (which favours the lower value of BTS). One can conclude from this that while Polish MEPs themselves consistently ‘hold on’ to their seats, political parties and voters ‘hold on’ to their MEPs much less consistently. Information on the stability, and indirectly also on the cohesion, of the Polish delegation can also be derived from the analysis of group switching. Almost one in five Polish MEPs (19.77%) changed their political group affiliation at least once. This is significantly higher than the average for MEPs from CEE countries (10.26%) and the EU as a whole (9.94%). The analysis of the circumstances of group switching has been based on four categories of the phenomenon: individual within-term (IWS), party within-term (PWS), party between-terms (PBS) and individual between-­ term (IBT). The first of these (IWS) has proved to be the most numerous, which says a lot about the dominant cause of group switching. They were most often the result of conflict between individual MEPs and their respective national parties’ authorities. Hence, a change of group affiliation in almost all cases was combined with a change or abandonment of the parent party. At the same time, these individual switches most often (18 out of 27 cases) took place during the 6th term of the EP (i.e. the first with the participation of the Polish delegation). In general, such switches did not benefit the MEPs making them (in the form of subsequent re-­election). Hence, we note only a few cases of IWS in the next two terms. The second and third most frequent forms of changing of a political group affiliation in the EPs were PWS and PBS, respectively. In both of categories, MEPs’ changes of group affiliations are initiated by the authorities of national parties. This was the case for a total of 4 parties and 12 MEPs. With only one case, the IBT category proved to be the rarest form of change of political group affiliation in the EP. This demonstrates that a single MEP has very limited chances of re-election when they are not supported by a strong party. The last four chapters focus on the cohesion of the Polish delegation in the EP. Again, as with the earlier chapters, it is important to emphasize

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that this is an analytical division, as the authors of these chapters also address issues of stability, albeit usually as an accompanying theme. The chapter by Aleksandra Trzcielińska-Polus shows both the scale and the determinants of the ideological and programmatic cohesion of the Polish delegation. The highest level of polarization in this respect was characteristic of inter-party relations during the EP’s 6th term (and the first term with the participation of the Polish delegation). To a considerable extent, this was a result of new relations being developed within the party system, which underwent a radical overhaul following the 2001 parliamentary elections. At the same time, the analysis carried out in this chapter reveals the fundamental differences in the influence of individual parties on the cohesion of the entire delegation. The most conflictive parties proved to be the nationalist and Eurosceptic groupings: the LPR and the PiS. The influence of the latter party was particularly strong in reducing the cohesion of the Polish delegation. The PiS was present in the EP in all terms after 2004 and was obtaining increasingly better results in subsequent elections. Moreover, the assumption of power in Poland by the PiS had a direct impact on the polarization of relations within the Polish delegation. Initially (the sixth and seventh terms of the EP), the arrangement within the delegation could be described as multilateral. The distances between particular parties were spread relatively evenly according to the left-right divide. Since the eighth term of the EP, this arrangement has been transforming into a two-block system. The increasingly authoritarian PiS unites the other parties against itself. The ideological and programmatic distances between the parties standing in opposition to the PiS are decreasing, while the distance between the PiS and its opponents is increasing. This process culminated in the 2019 EP elections, in which the democratic opposition went to the polls together as part of the European Coalition. The analysis performed by Trzcielińska-Polus also provides important findings on the issue of differences in the cohesion of the Polish delegation depending on the ideological and programmatic fields. Of the three such fields (identity, economy, foreign policy), the highest cohesion is found in the foreign policy field, slightly lower in the economic field, while identity proves to be the most disintegrating factor in the Polish delegation. This differentiation has been confirmed in the examination of voting cohesion (by Michał Niebylski). Using an analogous division of issues voted on in the EP, he has shown that the highest cohesion is revealed in the fields of foreign policy and economy, while votes on identity issues are

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the most incohesive in the Polish delegation. Moreover, the level of differences observed among Polish MEPs is clearly higher than for MPs of the same parties in votes taken in the Polish Sejm. This reveals an interesting phenomenon in which, at the level of voting in the EP, parties decrease their programmatic and ideological differences on foreign policy and economic issues, but increase them on worldview issues. The next chapter of the book, in which Kamil Weber has analysed parliamentary questions, aims to find out whether Polish MEPs, not bound by party discipline or under pressure from party authorities, are willing to show more cohesion than they do during votes. Another objective has been to establish whether national themes dominate the content of submitted questions. The analysis does not provide clear answers regarding the extent of differences among the parties of the Polish delegation. However, a clear difference emerges between the Polish delegation and the French, German and UK delegations, chosen for comparative purposes. This is a clear clue indicating that it is within the national delegation that the factors determining the topic of parliamentary questions are to be found. The last chapter of the book presents findings on the influence of Eurosceptics on the cohesion and stability of the Polish delegation. As the authors state, this influence is not unambiguous. In some fields it is clear, in others it is difficult to confirm. However, as they show, when such an influence does emerge, it is almost always of a nature that weakens the cohesion and stability of the Polish delegation. Such a negative impact is not only due to the criticism of European integration, which indicates that deeper differences in the understanding of democracy, as well as the roles of the state and the nation are at the root of it. * * * The Polish delegation is only one of 27 national delegations in the EP, accounting for 7.38% of all MEPs. The national diversity of the European Parliament, reflecting the diversity of the EU, is a challenge, but not a problem. The same is true of national delegations—their position and role remains a product of the impact of Europeanization and nationalization. Which of these processes prevails differs for individual delegations, parties and MEPs. Research shows that Polish MEPs perceive themselves as representing the national interest rather than the ‘Europe-wide interest’, while, for Eurodeputies as a whole, perceptions of these two roles are

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balanced (Hix et al., 2016). Similar conclusions emerge from the content of the interviews conducted with Polish MEPs for the purpose of this project. A few MEPs indicated that the two roles were complementary, but most of them put representing their own country first. This resonated most clearly in the statement of a right-wing MEP, who said that ‘the European Parliament is a tool used to look after one’s own interests’ (PiS_1). In a softer version, however, this position was also manifest in the statements of MEPs from other parties. This role of Polish MEPs is reflected in public opinion. In a February 2019 survey, 50% of respondents stated that an MEP’s mandate provided great opportunities to ‘promote Polish interests’. Simultaneously, 33% of respondents did not reject the statement that MEPs should represent Polish interests and acknowledged that they were in a position to do so effectively (CBOS, 2019). This shows how deeply the vision of the EP as a ‘game of national interests’ and of the Polish delegation as the representative of these interests is rooted in the consciousness of the general public and political elites. At the same time, this vision is neither entirely true nor desirable. Presented by the EP in May 2022, the proposals for a profound reform of the rules on EU elections aim to undermine the national character of EP elections (EP, 2022), potentially redefining the role and position of national delegations.

References CBOS. (2019). Opinie o pracy polskich europarlamentarzystów. Komunikat z badań, no. 34/2019. Colomer, J. M. (2012). The More Parties, the Greater Policy Stability. European Political Science, 11(2), 229–243. EP. (2022). MEPs Begin Revising Rules on EU Elections, Calling for Pan-­European Constituency, 3.05.2022. Retrieved 10 October, 2022, from https://www. europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-­r oom/20220429IPR28242/meps-­ begin-­revising-­rules-­on-­eu-­elections-­calling-­for-­pan-­european-­constituency Farrell, D., & Scully, R. (2007). Representing Europe’s Citizens? Electoral Institutions and the Failure of Parliamentary Representation. Oxford University Press. Hix, S., Farrell, D., Scully, R., Whitaker, R., & Zapryanova, G. (2016). EPRG MEP Survey Dataset: Combined Data 2016 Release. https://mepsurvey.eu/ data-­objects/data/ PiS_1—Interview Conducted on 01.09.2020.

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Reif, K., & Schmitt, H. (1980). Nine Second-Order National Elections: A Conceptual Framework or the Analysis of European Election Results. European Journal of Political Research, 8(1), 3–44. Scully, R., Hix, S., & Farrell, D. M. (2012). National or European Parliamentarians? Evidence from a New Survey of the Members of the European Parliament. Journal of Common Market Studies, 50(4), 670–683.

Index1

A Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), 83, 90, 225 Alternation of power, 109, 177 Attitudes towards the EP, 20 Attitudes towards the EU, 22 C Candidates for the EP, 42–44, 47 Career paths office-seeking, 58 policy-seeking, 58 post-PE careers, 65, 68 Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), 4, 5, 11, 27, 28, 66, 67, 73, 105–108, 113, 114, 124–126, 124n2, 138, 149, 158, 173, 240, 243 countries, 5, 11, 27, 28, 66, 67, 73, 106–108, 114, 125, 126, 138, 158, 240, 243

Centre for Public Opinion Research (CBOS), 20, 21, 24, 26, 27, 30, 31, 71, 246 Civic Platform (PO), 23, 30, 31, 37, 42–44, 47–50, 64, 71, 82–86, 88, 92, 95, 96, 106, 109, 134, 138, 139, 150–155, 157–159, 158n1, 164, 176, 177, 180–184, 187, 194, 194n2, 198, 200, 203, 205–207, 222, 224, 228, 231 Cohesion determinants of, 9, 96, 171, 173, 184, 185, 187, 192 ideological-programmatic, 11, 145–164 with respect to economy, 152–155 with respect to identity, 148–152 with respect to international affairs, 155–159

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 K. Zuba (ed.), The Polish Delegation in the European Parliament, Central and Eastern European Perspectives on International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28271-3

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Confederation party, 86 Congress of the New Right (KNP), 63, 84, 131–133, 157, 219, 220, 222, 224, 225, 227, 229–231 Constituencies, 38, 39, 41, 42, 44, 45, 82, 93–95, 97, 136, 198, 199 D Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), 37, 38, 42, 43, 44n4, 45, 46, 48, 49, 51, 82, 84–86, 88, 92, 95, 96, 150–152, 154, 157–159, 162, 176, 177, 182, 184, 194, 194n2, 198, 199, 203, 224 D’Hondt formula, 39 E Election to the EP electoral legislation, 37, 81, 93–95 electoral list, 36, 38–45, 48, 49, 51, 62, 64, 82, 84, 85, 88, 93–95, 177 re-election, 48–51, 48n5, 56, 63, 108, 110, 127, 129, 224 2004 election to the EP, 23, 27, 28, 31, 36n2, 39, 41, 42, 44, 48, 50, 82, 84, 86–88, 92, 95, 105, 111, 112, 127, 131, 132, 134, 158, 160, 161, 164, 176, 219, 241 2009 election to the EP, 28, 36n2, 39, 47, 48, 50, 71, 83–85, 88, 91, 92, 127, 133, 135, 158, 162, 172, 176, 183, 215, 218–220 2014 election to the EP, 28, 39, 41, 47, 48, 83–85, 88, 92, 136n5, 152, 158, 162, 177, 215, 220, 222, 229

2019 election to the EP, 19, 27, 28, 31, 37, 40–42, 48, 84, 88, 124, 164, 172, 219, 239, 242, 244 Electoral campaign(s), 17 Electoral support, 52, 63, 110, 214, 215 Electoral system of the EU, 35 of the Poland, 10 Eurobarometer, 22, 23 European Coalition, 37, 49, 84, 96, 152, 158, 159, 242, 244 European Commission, 26, 27, 80, 106, 159, 182, 198–200, 203, 220, 222 European democracy, 23, 29, 32 European funds, 22 European Green Party, 37 Europeanization, 1–12, 102, 149, 174, 238, 240, 245 Europeanness, 22, 23 European parties, 44, 79, 80 European Social Survey (ESS), 20, 20n1, 23 European Union (EU), 3–6, 18, 19, 21–32, 24n3, 35, 36, 38, 41, 47, 51, 67, 80, 81, 85, 87, 101–103, 105–107, 112–115, 124, 124n2, 125, 132, 134, 138, 139, 149, 152, 155–159, 163, 164, 171, 174–176, 179, 182–185, 188, 194, 195, 198–208, 210, 214–221, 223, 226, 228–231, 238, 239, 241, 243, 245, 246 European Values Survey (EVS), 24 Eurosceptics compromising Eurosceptics, 217, 220 conditional Euroscepticism, 217, 231, 232

 INDEX 

Euroscepticism, 4, 6, 214–218, 223, 228, 231, 232 Eurosceptic MEPs in the EP, 214 Eurosceptic parties, 8, 25, 26, 89, 161, 161n2, 164, 215, 219–232, 240 rejecting Euroscepticism, 217, 220 F Federal states, 56 Freedom Union party, 63 G Gatekeepers, 35, 110 Germany, 26, 56, 91, 109, 111n2, 114, 119, 122, 125, 159, 175, 194, 197, 207–210, 214, 221 I Ideological identity, 82, 90, 146 K Knowledge of EU institutions, 27 KORWIN party, 25, 92, 133, 176, 177, 225 L Law and Justice (PiS), 23, 25, 27, 30, 31, 37, 42–44, 47–50, 63, 64, 71, 83, 84, 86, 90, 92, 95, 106, 109, 132–136, 136n5, 138, 139, 149–155, 157–159, 162, 164, 176, 177, 180–184, 186, 187, 194, 194n2, 198, 200, 203–207, 217–222, 224, 225, 227–232, 242, 244, 246

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League of Polish Families (LPR), 63, 83–85, 87, 91, 92, 106, 112, 131, 132, 136, 149, 154, 157, 161, 215, 217, 219–222, 224, 225, 227, 229, 232, 244 Legitimization of the EU, 18, 28 Local government, 22, 29, 46, 59, 66, 68, 73 elections, 20, 29, 66 M Membership stability between-terms stability (BTS), 103, 104, 107–115, 242, 243 determinants of, 101, 102, 113 dynamic stability, 103, 106 overall stability (OS), 103, 104, 112–115 static stability, 103 within-term stability (WTS), 103–106, 112–116, 127, 242, 243 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) age structure of, 59 incumbent, 50, 109, 110 mandate, 57–59, 61, 66, 68–74, 105, 107, 115, 246 observers, 111, 112, 122 ‘one-off,’ 57, 62 resigning as, 106 returned, 107, 108 salaries, 71, 72 seniority, 61, 64, 72, 199 successor, 104, 133, 225 temporary, 111, 112 unaffiliated, 133 Migration, 21, 196, 229 The Modern (Nowoczesna), 37

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N National delegation, 1–12, 55, 56, 61, 80–83, 93–95, 102–105, 109, 115, 120, 121, 124, 146, 162, 170–171, 173–179, 182–188, 192, 193, 198, 215, 216, 223, 224, 226–231, 237–239, 241, 245, 246 National Electoral Commission (PKW), 37, 42, 127, 136, 200 National identity, 4, 8, 149, 203, 228 National interest, 46, 153, 155, 174, 175, 183, 203, 220, 227, 228, 231, 245, 246 Nationalization, 1–12, 238, 239, 245 National parliamentary elections, 29, 30, 36, 41, 58, 66, 134, 163, 223, 241 Electoral Code of 2011, 39, 94, 105 National parliaments, 1, 3, 6, 12, 20, 23, 24, 46, 68, 80, 85, 111, 119, 120, 163, 181, 214, 223, 227 parliamentary party switching, 120 National party delegation (NPD), 2 National politics, 2, 8, 32, 52, 58, 59, 61, 67–74, 81, 96, 102, 106, 115, 137, 138, 174, 175, 237–246 O Opinion polls, 19, 28, 45 Opponents of European integration, 216 P Parliamentary elections in 2015, 25, 222 in 2019, 19, 25, 27–31, 37, 40–42, 85, 88, 162, 164, 222, 238, 239, 242, 244

Participation, 22, 28, 39, 136, 162, 191, 221–223, 227, 243, 244 Party of European Socialists, 37 Pearson correlation, 23 Poland’s accession to the European Union, 19, 21, 27, 28, 30, 81, 87, 103, 138, 158, 164, 215, 239 The Polish Club, 227 Polish People’s Party (PSL), 27, 37, 38, 42, 43, 45, 46, 48, 49, 51, 82–86, 88, 92, 95, 96, 134, 139, 151–155, 157–159, 162, 176, 177, 182, 184, 222, 224 Political elites elites circulation, 108 European elites, 29 Political groups in the EP European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), 82–84, 90, 133, 177, 194, 195, 218, 221, 223, 225, 230, 232 European People’s Party (EPP), 37, 82–84, 90, 134, 139, 177, 194, 195, 230 Europe of Nations and Freedom, 90, 219, 223 Eurosceptical political groups, 216 political group affiliation, 90, 123, 125, 243 Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament, 84, 177, 194, 195 Political group switching individual between-term (IBT), 136–137, 243 individual within-term, 127–131, 137, 243 party between-terms (PBS), 129, 133–135, 137, 138, 243 party within-term (PWS), 129–133, 137, 243 Political parties

 INDEX 

effective number of parties (ENP), 82, 86–88, 96 fragmentation, 81, 86, 87, 93, 96 inter-party competition, 10, 36, 160 Manifesto Project, 147, 148 party manifesto, 147 party power index, 82 party recruitment, 36 Polish party system, 9, 11, 64, 85, 160, 161, 164 power relations, 81, 88, 93 Political system, 80, 86, 101, 115, 223, 237 transformation, 21 Professionalization, 52, 102, 107, 108, 116, 126 Public opinion, 7, 18, 26, 28, 30, 41, 45, 246 S Second-order elections, 18, 163, 223 Sejm, 10, 25, 36, 39, 41, 46, 58–61, 66, 69, 70, 72, 73, 81, 83–89, 91–97, 105, 106, 112, 122, 133, 147, 157, 163, 164, 172, 177–180, 221, 222, 229, 241, 242 Selection of the candidates, 6, 36–48, 51, 52, 79, 94, 108, 114 The Self-Defence, 63, 82–85, 87, 91, 92, 131–133, 154, 157, 161n2, 215, 217, 219–222, 224, 225, 229 Senate, 25, 36, 39, 58, 65, 66, 70, 96, 105, 112, 147, 177, 222, 242 Social Democracy of Poland (SdPl), 63, 83, 91

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Social fragmentation, 19, 27, 31 Socialization, 2, 102, 149, 174 Social structure, 19 Sovereignty, 30, 155, 182, 217, 229 Stability electoral, 8, 10, 11, 79–97 inter-party rivalry, 80–82, 90–93, 95 membership, 10, 11, 38, 42, 48, 51, 52, 101–116, 242 structural, 10, 80–89, 95 T Triangulation, 19, 57 Tribal struggle, 30 U Unitary states, 56 United Kingdom (UK), 4, 21, 36, 56, 109, 125, 175, 194, 207–210, 213, 214, 223, 245 The United Poland (SP), 176, 180, 218–220, 222, 225 V Voter turnout, 17–20, 26–28, 30–32, 39, 239 Voting cohesion cohesion index, 177, 182, 184, 186, 230 in the EP, 8, 12, 169–172, 174, 177, 178, 184–188, 230, 244 in the Sejm, 177, 179 sources of, 171