The Place of the Categories of Being in Aristotle's Philosophy

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THE PLACE OF THE CATEGORIES OF BEING IN ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY

Uitgegeven met steun van het Thijmgenootschap en het Prins Bernhard Fonds

THE PLACE OF

THEiATEGORIES OF BEING .. IN ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY

PROE FSCHRI F T ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor in de letteren en wijsbegeerte aan de Rijks- Universiteit te Utrecht, op gezag van de Rector Magnificus Dr J. Severijn, Hoogleraar in de Faculteit der Godgeleerdheid, volgens besluit van de Senaat der Universiteit tegen de bedenkingen van de Faculteit der Letteren en Wijsbegeerte te verdedigen op Vrijdag 28 Maart 1952, des namiddags te 3 uur door LAM BERT US MARIE DE RIJ K h\ Geboren te Hilversum

TE ASSEN BIJ VAN GORCUM & COMP. N.V. (G.A.HAK & DR H.J. PRAKKE)

I

PROMOTOR: PROF. DR C.

J. DE VOGEL

Uxori Parenti bus

De voltooiing van dit proefschrift biedt mij de gelegenheid, U, hooggeleerde Mevrouw de Vogel, hooggeachte Promotor, mijn erken­ telijkheid uit te spreken voor de steun die Gij mij in velerlei opzicht heht,geboden. De aandacht en belangstelling die Gij aan dit werk heht gewijd, zijn, evenals Uw talrijke raadgevingen, voor mij van grote waarde geweest. Gedurende bijna vijf jaar heh ik als Uw assistent met U mogen samenwerken. Dit nauwe contact is zonder twijfel van he­ slissende hetekenis geweest voor mijn wetenschappelijke vorming. Ik stel er hoge prijs op U vanaf deze plaats te danken voor het zeer vele dat Gij in deze jaren voor mij hebt gedaan. Prof. Dr W. J. Verdenius en Prof. Dr E. W. Beth zijn zo welwillend geweest het gehele manuscript door te lezen. Ik hen hun dankhaar voor hun vele opmerkingen en suggesties, die voor mij aanleiding zijn geweest op menige plaats mijn mening te herzien of mijn hedoeling te verduidelijken. Het Thijmgenootschap te N ijmegen en het Prins Bernhard Fonds te Amsterdam hetuig ik mijn welgemeende dank voor de subsidie die zij mij hehhen toegekend. Zij hehhen door deze hijdrage de financiele lasten van deze puhlicatie aanzienlijk verlicht. Het is mij een voorrecht mijn oprechte dank uit te spreken aan allen, met name de Hoogleraren der Litteraire Faculteit, die tot mijn academische vorming hehhen hijgedragen.

BIBLIOGRAPHY The following list is meant only to facilitate reference and does not aim at completeness. The quotations used in this study are self-evident. ALEX:_ANDER APHRODISIENSIS: In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck, (Commentaria Graeca vol. I), Berolini 1891. 0. APELT: Die Kategorieenlehre des Aristoteles, in Beitrage zur Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie, Leipzig 1891, 101--216. ARISTOTELES: Categoriae et Liber de lnterpretatione, recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit L. Minio-Paluello, Oxonii 1949. Prior and Posterior Analjrtics, a revised text with introduction and commentary by W. D. Ross, Oxford 1949. Metaphysics, a revised text with introduction and commentary by W. D. Ross, 2 vols, Oxford 2 1948. Topica cum libro de sophisticis elenchis, e schedis loannis Strache edidit M. Wallies, Lipsiae 1923. The works of Aristotle translated into English under the editor­ ship of W. D. Ross, 10 vols, Oxford 1908ff. H. BoNITZ: Ober die Kategorien des Aristoteles, in Sitzungsberichte der kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschqften, Phil.-Hist. Classe X (1853), Wien 1853, 591-645. Commentarius in Metaphysica Aristotelis, Bonnae 1848. Index Aristotelicus, (the fifth volume of Aristotelis Opera ed. Acad. Reg. Boruss.), Berolini 1870. I. M. BocHENSKI O.P.: Elementa Logicae Graecae, Roma 1937. Ancient formal Logic, Amsterdam 1951. CH. A. BRANDIS: Scholia in Aristotelem collegit Ch. A. Brandis, edidit Academia Borussica, Berolini 1836, (quoted as Arist. Scholia). CAJETANUS: In De Ente et Essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis Commentaria, ed. Marietti, Taurini 1934. G. CALOGERO: J Fondamenti della logica aristotelica, Firenze 1927. I primord1 della logica antica, in Annali della R. Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa (Lettere, Storia e Filosofia, Serie II, vol. IV, Fasc. 11), Bologna 1935, 121-138. J. DOPP: Lerons de la logiqueformelle vol. I, Louvain 1950. I

K. VON FRITZ: Der Ursprung der aristotelischen Kategorieenlehre, in

Archiv fiir Geschichte der Philosophie 40 (1931) 449-496. J. GEYSER: Die Erkenntnistheorie des Aristoteles, Munster i. W. 1917. J. GREDT O .S. B. : Elementa philosophiae aristotelico-thomisticae, 2 vols,

Friburgi Brisgoviae 1937. 0. HAMELIN: Le systeme d' Aristote, Paris 2 1931. N. HARTMANN: Aristoteles und das Problem des Begriffs, in Abhandlungen der Preuszischen Akademie der Wissenschefi:en 1939, Phil.-Hist. Klasse Nr. 5. M. HEIDEGGER: Sein und Zeit, Erste Halfte, Tiibingen 6 1949. W. JAEGER: Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik, Berlin, 1912. Aristoteles, Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung, Berlin 1923. Aristotle, Fundamentals '?f the history of his development, Oxford 21948, translated with the author's corrections and additions by R. Robinson. E. KAPP: Greek Foundations cf traditional Lo9ic, New York 1942. J. M. LE BLOND: Lo9ique et methode chez Aristote, Etude sur la recherche des principes dans la physique aristotelicienne, Paris 1939. J. LUKASIEWICZ: Aristotle's Syllo9istic from the standpoint cf modern formal lo9ic, Oxford 1951. W. LUTHER: ,, Wahrheit" und ,, Lii9e" im altesten Griechentum, Boma Bez. Leipzig 1935. H. MAIER: Die Syllo9istik des Aristoteles, 2 vols, Tiibingen 1896-1900. A. MANSION: Introduction la Physique aristotelicienne, Louvain-Paris 2 1945. S. MANSION: Le ju9ement d'existence chez Aristote, Louvain-Paris 1946. H. MuTSCHMANN: Divisiones quae vul90 dicuntur Aristoteleae, Teubner, Leipzig 1907. E. J. NELSON, The relation cf Logic to Metaphysics, in Philosophical Review 58 (1949), 1-11. J. OWENS C.ss.R.: The doctrine cf Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. A study in the Greek back9round cf Mediaeval Thought, Toronto 1951. L. DE RAEYMAEKER: Philosophie de 1' Etre, Louvain 1946. H. RICKERT: Die Logik des Pradikats und das Problem der Ontologie, in

a

Sitzun9sberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschefi:en, Phil.­ Hist. Klasse XXI 1, 15-236. L. M. DE RIJK: The authenticity cf Aristotle's Cate9ories, in Mnemosyne

1951, 129-159.

II

W. D. Ross: Aristotle, London 51949. see also s.v. Aristoteles. SISTER M. SCHEU O.S.F.: The cate9ories of Bein9 in Aristotle and S. Thomas, diss. Washington, 1944. H. SCHOLZ: Die mathematische Lo9ik und die Metaphysik, in Philosophi­ sches Jahrbuch der Gorres9esellschcift 51 (1938), 257-291. L. S. STEBBING: A modern introduction to Lo9ic, London 21933. THOMAS AQUINAS: In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria ed. Cathala (Marietti), Taurini 1915. ppusculum de modalibus ed. I. M. Boche�ski, in An9elicum 17

(1940), 183-200.

A. TRENDELENBURG: De Aristotelis cate9oriis prolusio academica, Bero­ lini 1833. Geschichte der Kate9orienlehre, Berlin 1846. UBERWEG-PRACHTER: Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie des Alter­ tums, Berlin 11 1920. H. VEATCH: Formalism and/or intentionality in Lo9ic, in Philosophy and Phenomenolo9ical Research XI ( 1951), 348-365. C. J. DE VoGEL: Greek Philosophy, A collection of texts selected and supplied with some notes and explanations, vol. I Thales to Plato, Leiden 1950. A. M. DE Vos: Het ,,Eidos" als ,,eerste substantie" in de Metaphysica van Aristoteles, in Tijdschrift voor Philosophie 4 (1942), 57-102. La ,,vraie substance" d' apres la Metaphysique d' Aristote", in Pro­ ceedin9s of the Tenth International Con9ress of Philosophy, Amsterdam 1949, Fasc. II, 1094-1096. P. WILPERT: Zurn aristotelischen Wahrheitsbe9rdf, in Philosophisches Jahr­ buch der Gorres9esellscheft 53 (1940), 3-16. E. ZELLER: Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer 9eschichtlichen Entwick­ lun9 dar9estellt, I[ 2, Aristoteles und die alten Peripatetiker, Leipzig 3

1879.

III

INTRODUCTION The nature and origin of the Aristotelian doctrine of the categories has already come up for discussion frequently during the last hundred years. The principal and most pronounced 1 views on this problem are those of Trendelenburg, Bonitz and Apelt. T rendelenburg 2 attempted to explain the doctrine as a system of grammatical distinctions transferred to the domain of logic. He presumed that Aristotle, in framing the doctrine of the categories, started from grammatical distinctions: substantive (> oucr(a), adjective (> 1tocr6v and 1toL6v), relative comparative (> 1tp6� ·n), adverb (> 1tou and 1to-rs),verb (> xEfo&aL, EX.ELV, 1toLE°i:v and 1t&crx_Ew)3• Unfortu­ nately he was not able to furnish any shadow of argument in support of his theory, so that it has met only opposition. 4 Bonitz takes the doctrine of the categories to be a first, rough classification of beings. In his opinion -ro 6v indicates concrete nature (ens reale). He thinks that the main argument in support of his view is to be found in Top. I 9, 103 b 20ff. , where Aristotle, after having grouped the protaseis according to the four predicables, passes on to the ontolo9ical division of them according to the categories. 5 From this passage plainly appears, as is rightly argued by Bonitz, the ontolo9ical character of the categories. There are other places in the work of Aristotle where the categories serve to define the field for a scientific Jos. Geyser (Die Erkenntnistheorie des Aristoteles, 1 13- 1 18) briefly reports the theories of Trendelenburg, Bonitz, Prantl, Brentano, Zeller, and Maier. The last scholar gives (Die Syllo9istik des Aristoteles II 2, 288-326) an original synthesis of the former views. I shall deal with Maier's view later. Geyser holds that the categories are 'Begriffe' (op. cit., 1 19). He calls them 'nachschaffend' as opposed to those of Kant, which are 'erschaffend'. What exactly is Geyser's view of the Aristotelian categories, does not clearly emerge from his exposition (op. cit., 109-128). The ontological aspect of the categories is intentionally (see op. cit., 50) not taken into account by him. 2 De Aristotelis cate9oriis prolusio academica, passim, and Geschichte der Kate9orienlehre,

1

passim.

a Prolusio, 23. 4 A. Spengel, Miinchener Gelehrte Anzei9er 1845 and especially H. Bonitz, Uber die Kate9orien des Aristoteles, 59 1-595. Trendelenburg's theory is, for the greater part, an exaggeration of the admitted fact (see Le Blond, Lo9ique et methode chez Aristote, 308-326), that Aristotle, generally speaking, is guided in his metaphysical and logical analyses by the structure of his native tongue. 6 For the interpretation of this passage, see below, p. 76 f. 1

1

inquiry. According to Bonitz (Kategorien, 622) the original sense of the term XOC't'YJYOPL(X is not 'predicate' but 'Aussage' 6, so that the categories indicate the different manners of using the term -ro ov. 7 Apelt (Beitroge zur Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie, 105) thinks that Bonitz is wrong in rejecting together with the grammatical origin of the categories (as defended by Trendelenburg), also their deduction from the proposition and their relation to it. According to Apelt -ro 6v of the categories cannot mean concrete being (ens reale), for in that case it would be impossible to speak of np6c; -r� (relation), nor could there be any classification of 't'O µ� ov according to the categories (e.g. Metaph. 0 10, 1051 a 34; N 2, 1089 a 15 and 26). Apelt takes (op. cit., 107ff.) 't'O ov of the categories to be simply the copulative 'is' (&en�) of the proposition, which is, by itself, meaningless. He founds this view among other arguments on De lnterpr., 16 b 22ff., where Aristotle declares indeed that the copulative &crn is not significant of any fact. 8 Apelt borrows his main argument from Metaph. � 7, 1017 a 22ff. 9 To ov xoc&' ocu-r6 (i.e. the being of the categories) is explained by Apelt as the determination of being by itself, i.e. detached from the proposition (op. cit., 119).1 0 But if such is the meaning of the term xoc&' ocu't'6, we are inclined to ask for that of its counterpart in � 7, viz. 't'O ov xoc't':'t'Cl,

7tO't'

s\

,

YJ

\

,,

't'Cl

OUX. E O"'t' L

't'o cxAYJ &e: c; As:y6µs:vov :� �s:u3o c; ; \

~

't'OU't'O

I

yrtp

O"X.E7t't'EOV

".I I

I

't'L

/\Ey o µs:v .

OU yap ◊La 't'O �µii c; ols:cr&cu CXAYJ &wc; m:: AEUXOV dvtXL d (jt) Asux.6c;, &Ma

�'

o UX

~ O 'L ' ETr.VClL ":I/\EUX.OV ' YJ' µE1.c;

'

't'O

O'E

cp&v-rs: c; 't'OU't'O CXAYJ &Euoµs:v. d 0� -ra \

µs:v

,

\

I

ClEL

,�1

\

cruyx.EL't'ClL

XClL

ClOUVCl't'Cl

oLcxLps:&�vrtL, -ra o' &d oL�P YJ 't'ClL xrtr. , �I

n_

~

\ �, , � I EVoEXE -

CloUVCl't'Cl O"UV't'E'l.TYJVClL, 't'Cl o

,

'

' E LVClL' E' O"'t' L 't'O cruyx.s:fo&rtL X.Cl!. �v dvrtL, 't'O oe: µ� dvrtL 't'O µ� cruyxs:fo&etL &Ma 't'ClL

":I '

't'ClVClV't'LCl,

7t/\E LC.U

';'

)

('t'O'

E LVClL ,

µe:v

'

7tEp L

';'

'

µs:v

~

OUV

'

't'Cl

I � ' c; EVosxoµs:vrt YJ ClU't"YJ YLYVE't'C/.L YJEUoYJ XCl!. CXAYJ&� c; o6�rt XCl!. o Myoc; o ,

�

6

I

'

,

'

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This (viz. ' being as truth' and ' non-being as falsity') depends , on the side of the objects, on their being combined or separated, so that he who thinks the separated to be separated and the combined to be combined has the truth, while he whose thought is in a state contrary to that of the ob­ jects is in error. This being so, when is what is called truth or falsity present and when it is not ? We must consider what we mean by these terms. It is not because we think truly that you are pale, that you are pale, but because you are pale we who say this have the truth. We start from two con­ ditions. (1) Some things are al­ ways combined and cannot be separated, and others are always separated and cannot be combi­ ned, while others are capable

Maier (op. cit . , I 6ff. ) even sees - wrongly - a contradiction within the Aristotelian concept of truth. P. Wilpert (Zurn aristotelischen Wahrheitsbegrdf, 3-1 6 ) , however, clearly shows that both aspects of the Aristotelian concept of truth do not contain any inconsistency and, moreover, occur already with Plato . 7 Prof. Ross ( Metaph. , II 2 7 5 ) thinks it rather absurd that the correlate �e:u8ot; is lacking in the case of &A7J-&e:; ev 't'OLt; &cruv-8-hOLt; : 'that which could not possibly be false could not without tautology, and therefore absurdity, be said to be true . ' Interpreting in such a way one cannot but charge Aristotle with ' much obscurity' . H. Joachim (Logical Studies, 2 5 ) rightly rejects this way of interpreting.

10

' '

'

CX.U't'Oc; , ' '\

(\_

XCXL

(

' �'

\

' '

e:voe:xe:'t'CX.L �\

,I,

O't'E

(\_

I �

'

µ e:v \

CX./\l) ve:ue:r.v o't'e: oe: 'f e:uoe:avcxr., 1te:p r. f

'' '\ '\ �' 't'(l. CXoUVCX.'t'CX. ,, '�, ' CXA/\Wc; EXELV OU ' ' ' ' ' ' CXA"Y)ve:c; �' '\ yr.yve:'t'cxr. O't'e: µe:v O't'e:' oe: \

oe:

(\_\

41e:uooc;, o/'-A' &d 't'CXU't'rl CXAl) &Y] XCX!. �EUOY).

either of combination or of sepa­ ration, (2) ' being' is ' being­ united-and-one' and ' non-being ' is ' not-being-united-but-many. ' This being so, regarding con­ tingent facts the same opinion or the same statement comes to be false and true, and it is possible for it to be now correct, now erroneous ; but concerning things that cannot be otherwise, opi­ nions are not now true and now false, but the same opinions are always true or always false.

The crux of the question here is : what does Aristotle mean by 't'