The Philosophy of Authentic Leadership 3031296494, 9783031296499

Citation preview

Spencer Shaw

The Philosophy of Authentic Leadership

The Philosophy of Authentic Leadership

Spencer Shaw

The Philosophy of Authentic Leadership

Spencer Shaw Leadership and Negotiation Copenhagen Business School Copenhagen, Denmark

ISBN 978-3-031-29649-9    ISBN 978-3-031-29650-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29650-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to thank Christopher Wilby at Springer for all his constructive suggestions to bring this work to fruition. My interest in leadership grew out of my passion for philosophy. I first applied philosophical concepts to the image in film consciousness and representation and moved on to the unlikely combination of business and ethics. Early interest began with Professor Frank Henriksen’s sociological work at Copenhagen University. This developed through research and teaching at the University of Southern California under the auspices of Professors Marsha Kinder and Peggy Kamuf’s insightful seminars on Derrida. At the Annenberg School of Communication, work on the media and aesthetics owed much to Professor Daniel Dayan’s erudition. Research in postmodernism was completed at Warwick University with Professors Keith Ansell-Pearson and inspiring discussions with Professor Eric Alliez. Various routes in leadership and life-story narration emerged from lively discussions with Professor David Boje in Copenhagen. Finally, this work is dedicated to the memory of dear friend and mentor, Professor Robert S. Wistrich.

v

Contents

1

Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    1 The Search for Authenticity ��������������������������������������������������������������������     1

2

Autonomy��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   17 Self-Determination����������������������������������������������������������������������������������    17 Transactional Leadership ������������������������������������������������������������������������    29

3

Recognising Authenticity ������������������������������������������������������������������������   35 Authentic Reservations����������������������������������������������������������������������������    40 Relational Authenticity����������������������������������������������������������������������������    45 Levinas and the Care for Others��������������������������������������������������������������    46

4

Philosophies of Interest����������������������������������������������������������������������������   53 Nietzsche: Creative Overman������������������������������������������������������������������    56 Sartre: Existential Authenticity����������������������������������������������������������������    64 Heidegger’s Authenticity ������������������������������������������������������������������������    76

5

Ethics��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   91 Ethical Business ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    91 Foucault and Care������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    99 Well-being������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   105 Spirit and Joy ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   111

6

Leadership and Followership������������������������������������������������������������������  121 Empathy ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   121 Altruism and Ethics����������������������������������������������������������������������������������   130

7

Authenticity as Life-Story ����������������������������������������������������������������������  137 Life-Stories����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   137

8

 The Narrative Turn and Multiple Selves ����������������������������������������������  151 Forming Identity��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   151

vii

viii

9

Contents

Creativity��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  167 Creative Issues ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   167 Creative Traits and Virtues����������������������������������������������������������������������   176

10 Cosmopolitan Spirit ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  187 Cosmopolitanism ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   188 Authentic Enrichment������������������������������������������������������������������������������   203 Bibliography ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  215 Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  231

Chapter 1

Introduction

The Search for Authenticity Business gurus who look to explain just how change and innovation fit into the corporate credo have begun to use philosophical insights for their reorganisation and visions, albeit, steeped in esoteric, academic jargon. This may account for why the relationship between business leaders and philosophy at first sight makes for strange bedfellows. The one, practically oriented, speaks of management techniques, stakeholder rights, organisations, leadership styles and profit margins. Commercial and materialistic, it puts ambition and success on a pedestal. The other, theoretical, ethical, linguistic, asks questions of right and wrong, explores foundations and ponders over what in heavens name we are doing here in the first place. Though apparently indifferent to commercial intrigue, philosophy has nonetheless begun to make distinct inroads into the frenzied market place, and crucially into those areas which are its very lifeblood: creativity, innovation, change and authenticity. Those days when philosophers looked down on business activities as mercenary are over. Philosophy touches business on the micro level; individual activity, practical conduct, the mentor as guru, philosophical adviser, and on the macro level; ideologically, strategically, politically and spiritually. It acts as an independent vector of wisdom: Philosophy, after all, is the quest for knowledge about the most fundamental principles of reality. Its highest loyalty being to the cause of truth, it does not unhesitatingly render itself the servant of other forces that in any way threaten the fulfilment of its objective…All the current discussion about corporate social responsibility, stakeholders, sustainability, shared value, living wages, and ethical consumption, draws upon the deposit of wisdom bequeathed to us by the great philosophers of the past.1

1  George Bragues (2018). “Theorists and Philosophers on Business Ethics”, in The Routledge Companion to Business Ethics. Eugene Heath, Byron Kaldis, Alexei Marcoux. Routledge: Abingdon: Oxon and New York. 23–37, p. 23.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Shaw, The Philosophy of Authentic Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29650-5_1

1

2

1 Introduction

There is no suggestion that philosophy simply replaces practical business solutions. But what is added is something different: an impetus to engender mental courage, psychological strength which facilitates the ability to think otherwise, and moving laterally rather than in a straight line to adopt razor sharp critical faculties. The psychological transformation that is needed to convert a leader from an intransigent, defensive automaton into a flexible, fluid and versatile influence in a successful system is profound. Just as profound as the advice needed to correct a malfunctioning family or the personal care needed to prepare an individual for a life-changing moment. The problem in making personal changes to one’s personality or ways of conducting business is that those who have lived through proven successes are stubbornly reluctant to give up their well-trodden, familiar paths  – paths they may mistakenly, though understandably, feel safe and secure with. This is natural and this is why there is a need for all the outside help that has become popular today. The consultant, the coach and the mentor are needed to inject the necessary psychological motivation and fresh behavioural patterns to meet changing conditions. But when successful, the results are transformative and the gains substantial. There are no slick panaceas or quick fixes. Solutions lie in the process itself, the dialogues, meetings, interactions, interrogations and exchange of ideas, all of which take time and careful preparation. In a world where most individuals are determined to follow their own personal interest, it is well to explore the nature of leadership not solely in terms of personal subjectivity but from a social perspective. There is pressure to do so considering the way toxic leadership, so rife in the world today, overcomes leaders who view the world from their own egocentric vantage point. The salience of leader influence is also hard to pinpoint. If we use the philosophy of positivism, based on empirical observations and scientific findings, the intention is to maximise predictability and control. To achieve this there is abstraction and removal from the chance and haphazardness of daily life in order to appear as neutral and objective as possible. This may be a commendable pursuit but the question is whether it can fruitfully be applied to human behaviour as well as it can, purportedly, to the sciences. In the humanities, isolation of studied matter and pristine conditions for observation can never be achieved. The complexity of daily exchanges between employees and the demands of project policy and strategy make definitive statements about hard core decision directions elusive. However, leader influence still leaves its traces putting it on a par with ideology; both provide an undercurrent of values, beliefs and understanding, setting the tone, by example, in an unstated but pervasive manner. With the potential for such a wide range of influence, leadership roles need careful evaluation particularly from a moral point of view ‘leadership is distinctive because of its range… moral failures have an impact on the lives of a larger number and/or variety of people…more than when they do not hold leadership positions. Because of this, leadership is morality and immorality magnified.’2 The model of authentic

 Joanne B.  Ciulla (2005) “The State of Leadership Ethics and the Work that Lies Before Us”. Business Ethics: A European Review 14 (4): 323–335, p. 329. 2

The Search for Authenticity

3

leadership is formed to bring coherence and integrity to this very polarising tendency. Authenticity begins as aspiration, a process which intends self-improvement, self-transcendence and self-realisation. Philosophy helps us grasp the meaning of these terms, puts them in context and reminds us that to understand authentic leadership we have to recognise different interpretations of being, identity and morality. The philosophical roots of authenticity go deep, stretching back to Aristotle and Plato, the eighteenth century Romantic movement, Renee Descartes’ Cartesianism, and more recently the existentialism of Heidegger and Sartre. Likewise, postmodernist thinkers focus on the divide between reason as liberation and reason as instrumental management as it has filtered through contemporary thought. Even though there has been distorted criticism of postmodernism as the death of reason or a loosely formed movement overly negative and fundamentally relative, its contribution to authenticity is profound. Arguments are firmly situated within the critical traditions of constructive analysis and as such fruitfully uncover injustice and covert controls. Typically, the postmodern frame of mind explores the need to cope with ambiguity and indeterminacy within an authentic context. Especially valuable is the insight that most popular explanations and interpretations have a scientific claim to validity based on a grand narrative which legitimises corresponding epistemology. Applied to leadership, this suggests leaders act as the mouthpiece or avatar for such narratives thereby legitimizing their actions. A political leader in the West would legitimize the furtherance of democracy and capitalism and find those who oppose their principles to be the enemy. Or, corporation leaders might support pursuing profit within the grand narrative of capitalism and uphold policies against adopting social or ecological improvement if they cut into profits or inhibit industrial development. According to this argument, leaders are the protectors of dehumanising systems which deprioritise values in the name of profit and accumulation: ‘The decision makers… allocate our lives for the growth of power. In matters of social justice and of scientific truth alike, the legitimation of that power is based on its optimizing the system’s performance–efficiency.’3 The focus on autonomy and the individual pursuit of authenticity is a critique of the leader as representative of the grand narrative. The need to balance deep pluralism with unified democracy presents a plethora of strategic challenges which strain the authentic pursuits of caring and justice. Considering authenticity is founded on the nurturing and development of character, the variety of identity differences in a pluralistic society means the task is fraught with obstacles. The problem of pluralism combines ‘basic liberal commitments with both democratic rule and an acceptance of deep differences at the level of values, worldviews, and identities.’4 At best, the task is to proffer mutual respect to all as ‘equal morally reasoning agents.’5  Jean-François Lyotard (1979/1984). The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (trans.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. xxiv. 4  Howard H.  Schweber (2011). Democracy and Authenticity. New  York. Cambridge University Press. p. 1. 5  Ibid. p. 20. 3

4

1 Introduction

In pragmatic terms, authentic leaders build an empathic bridge with their adherents. There is not only an attraction, a pulse which connects shared vision and values, but also practical understanding that their interests, in whatever area they cover, will be taken care of by those in power. Nonetheless, many political scientists are sceptical; they have little confidence that leaders from their privileged position will indeed make the world a better place for us to live in. The subterfuge, concessions and cow tailing needed to make it to the top in the first place are reason enough for cynicism but there are also inequitable economic systems which produce painful and long-lasting polarisations in society. In other words, the emergence of authentic leadership cannot be assumed or taken for granted. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri compellingly ask, ‘where have all the leaders gone?’6 They rue the lack of caring leadership and point to the gap in the agendas and diverse worldviews held by leaders and followers respectively. Traditionally, leaders have seen the need to strategize far into the future and come up with well-­ rehearsed plans to compete with or defeat any form of opposition which may threaten their power of influence. Political leaders are more concerned with defeating the opposition provided by other parties than the well-being of the electorate. Followers, on the other hand, arrange their forces and influence on ground level, energize civic society, and deal with the specific problem at hand, concerned more with short-term activities. Hardt and Negri compare the relationship of the leader and follower to the mythical centaur: The centaur, half human and half beast, is emblematic of the union of the leaders and the led. The upper human half designates the strategic capacities and thus intelligence, knowledge of the social whole, understanding of the general interest, and ability to articulate comprehensive, long-term plans. The lower half instead needs only knowledge of its immediate surroundings to accomplish its tactical efforts.7

For real change to transpire the multitude must contest the form of domination leaders bring. They can investigate the means of their own subjugation and by doing so take on their own leader role and achieve autonomy. They can pursue authenticity by bearing in mind leaders cannot simply speak in the name of others to the detriment of allowing individual self-determination. Personal struggle and change is the precondition for creatively improving the human condition. To achieve this, the mindset of the multitude and followers must be understood on a grass root level. Leadership is inverted, shifting long-term strategy to the collective multitude’s short-term tactical leadership. It is even possible to envisage social movements as leaderless, collectives can cooperate without a figurehead to create internal momentum for change. All this can be accepted up to a point but it does not go unnoticed that individual pioneers, such as Steve Biko, Nelson Mandela or Martin Luther King Jr., are notable for the deep seated changes they have personally brought about.

 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2017). Assembly. New  York: Oxford University Press. pp. 3–14. 7  Ibid. p. 15. 6

The Search for Authenticity

5

Furthermore, whenever there is political or social turmoil, movements of all kinds unerringly turn to leaders to overturn systems and react to crises. Even within the democratic, liberal traditions of freedom and individual rights there is an inevitable focus on leadership to guide the social process and facilitate the path through communal complexity. There are always complications, as Max Weber explains the course to be followed for leaders in pursuit of the good is not without ambiguity. Once leaders acknowledge they are intimately in contact with historically important events how can they do justice to the power that accompanies it?8 Ethics and politics can harmonize but as far as political leadership goes there is an important, unique supplement to normal activity which detracts from applying an absolute ethic: the exercise of power may legitimately be backed up by violence. Indeed, the use of violence to eliminate the spread of evil or protect democracy may be the only available recourse. With a given end in mind pursuing that end may be taken to be sacrosanct, an ethic of ultimate ends where ‘the ethically good purpose ‘justifies’ the ethically dangerous’, where ethics is in fact exploited.9 Intention and corresponding conviction count over all else in achieving the end result. But pursuing what, to all intents and purposes, appears to be the good may be an excuse for all kinds of excess in order to achieve it. Better to deal with individual actions which require a duty of justification, an ethic of responsibility which considers particularised consequences. The problem is that political acts may rely on violence and within violence diabolic forces lurk, so any leader involved in politics as a vocation has to acknowledge ethical paradoxes and all the risks which contravene the apparently good. A sense of proportion is required in which the passionate devotion to effectuating a particular cause or policy is combined with an inner distance which allows the faculty of reason to come into play, implying the authentic leader should be able to combine passion with detachment. In this respect Aristotle’s description of virtue ethics helps us define what the good character is and guides the authentic leader when judging between personal standards and objective commitments. It is important to understand how leader agency becomes possible as an autonomous act in light of its potential to be hamstrung by social forces. When pursued to its fullest the existential capacity to make self-determined choices carries accountability with it and the inescapable duty to pursue the general good and human rights. Responsibility involves transparency and requirement to explain and justify courses of action. Any form of authenticity undertaken by leaders must stand the test of responsibility and accountability. This is a two pronged demand where leader decisions come under moral scrutiny as well as the quality of character behind the act. Evaluating leadership behaviour is hampered by the fact that efficiency and instrumentality are often taken as the yardsticks by which to measure results rather than strength of character, ‘the way that we judge a leader’s success is through

 Max Weber (1919/1968). “Politics as a Vocation”, in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. (trans.) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Oxford University Press, 77–128. 9  Ibid. p. 121. 8

6

1 Introduction

profit-based measurements. Whenever we focus on financial success as the primary measurement, it may be to the long-term detriment of a leader’s personal integrity, and the institution’s well-being.’10 There are fundamentally two strands necessary to the formation of authenticity which may appear incompatible, though we will see there are also cross-currents at work. The first strand is to admit the existence of an essence of the self, embedded in an individual from birth. We can immediately relate this to the Great Man theory of leadership inspired by Carlyle where the proposition is that one is born a leader because of innate traits. Crisis situations or political turning points will draw out these traits and authenticity in this case means the natural inclination to implement one’s divinely-given role as a leader of destiny. On the other hand, as well as repelling inauthenticity or alienation and accepting the necessary effort needed to become one’s true self, diligence is also paid to the importance of social construction, specifically culture, language and tradition. Isolating these tendencies leads to opposing perspectives but what the philosophy of leadership helps us understand is that authenticity is an evolving, holistic process which moves through self-discovery and self-determination to a more advanced condition of relational duty and an ethic of responsibility. Thus, a far broader remit is at play which includes the self as socially and historically constituted with the implication that identity is not fixed but is rather a work in progress, one which negotiates social connections within relevant communities. For leaders, this is particularly apposite to constituents, associates, and those who are directly affected by leadership strategy and policies. In order to achieve this, the role of self-consciousness is a pivotal pre-condition, discovering and unfolding a system of knowledge directly sourced from the self. However, the conceit is that from such a subjective system of knowledge all else can be deduced and authenticity will naturally follow as an inevitable outcome. However, it is debatable whether the authentic self lies as a repository within individuals waiting to be excavated. It may well be that rather than poised latency, authenticity is a condition not yet born, an achievement to be gained only through diverse personal and social activities which comprise an ideal of selfhood. Either way, an effort of will is called for, one which begins with the existential demand to make personal choices, not least of all, choosing oneself as an authentic agent. As such, authentic leadership clearly expresses the need to recognise autonomy as a permanent attachment to socially directed influences. Society does not merely control what is permissible to the individual; it also stimulates individual desires in the first place as a socio/cultural product. Autonomy and the pursuit of self-interest merely comprise an inward looking, isolated shell if the duty owed to others is ignored. Consequently, the way forward is to accept that positive freedom and relational authenticity slot smoothly into a democratic forum where authentic leaders

 Rita Gardiner (2015). Gender, Authenticity and Leadership: Thinking with Arendt. Basingstoke; Palgrave Macmillan, p. 16. 10

The Search for Authenticity

7

reject subordination of followers and instead encourage power equality and the right for all marginal groups to be heard. For this reason, authentic leadership has to explore the precise context in which key concepts such as freedom and justice are to be understood. The need is to examine social ascriptions, not to ask ‘who am I?’ but ‘who are we?’ Far from discovering a true self in isolation from society, we can only be ourselves and relate to ourselves through embeddedness in communities and background horizons of meaning…as dialogical beings we ask existential questions about who we are, about the meaning and value of our lives, because it is up to us to discover and create those meanings through dialogue and reflection…We need to understand ourselves in terms of shared identities and associations that give meaning and significance to our lives.11

Authentic leadership, then, is not just the expression of personal autonomy as an expression of inner core desires but even more a social enterprise relating to others and solidifying connections through trust and integrity. The implication is that the goods and ideals which are deemed desirable to pursue as an authentic leader need not be transcendently inscribed but can be considered a joint enterprise combining personal desire with social affordance. ‘We affirm our meanings as goods, because they make the best sense of our lives…they connect me to my significant others, to my projects, to my self.’12 The degree of awareness and introspection may vary but the challenge to erect an edifice of internal standards is a crucial first step. Progression is perceived whereby relationships to others and positive other-directed motives have a transcendent impact by moving away from self-interest to focus on intersubjective values such as trust, honesty, gratitude and general benevolence. When espoused, these commendable qualities are assumed to be internalized by followers where follower self-­ concepts are also transformed as they perceive the leader to be an authentic role-model. Inclusive transparency and affinity prevail between parties ‘characterized by positive and open exchanges…and complementary goals that reflect deeply held and overlapping values.’ Authentic leadership theorists specifically analyse key dispositions which reflect these values.13 Exchanges and shared values highlight the fact that practical transactions are indelibly combined with moral considerations especially in organizations where a balance must be established between personal credo and dictates of company policy. The sense of self is a complex concept held up as a standard-bearer for authentic discourse: ‘The times of evolving change require leaders with a stable philosophy of the self, as well as of others in the organization and community.’14 Without the  Allison Weir (2009) “Who are we? Modern identities between Taylor and Foucault.” Philosophy & Social Criticism 35(5): 533–553, p. 538, 543. 12  Ibid. p. 545. 13  Bruce J. Avolio, William L. Gardner. (2005) “Authentic Leadership Development: Getting to the root of positive forms of leadership.” The Leadership Quarterly 16(3): 315–338, p. 327. 14  Milorad M. Novicevic. Michael G. Harvey. M. Ronald Buckley. Jo Ann Brown-Radford. Randy Evans. (2006) “Authentic Leadership: A Historical Perspective.” Journal of Leadership and Organizational Studies 13 (1): 64–76, p. 65. 11

8

1 Introduction

idea of a stable but multifaceted self it is difficult to configure authentic leadership development as it sets out to unfurl personal beliefs, values and motives. From the outset, the goal is to attain self-consciousness and take on the task of being self-­ critical, ‘training one’s capability of distancing oneself critically from one’s own desires, dispositions, and identifications seems to be an important prerequisite of being able to reflect critically about one’s role in society and about the validity of shared values and social and political orders (and borders).’15 Once criticality is taken on board with an intimation of what the genuine sense of self comprises, it must then be communicated. Authenticity best bears fruit when it is conspicuous, emergent from a silent, tacit state to be clearly articulated in behaviour and speech, especially with the narration of personal life-stories. In this respect, the leader’s life-story is core to authentic leadership expressing as it does an individual’s effort to describe a coherent identity which draws from past experience, present concerns, and future aspiration. In sum, the authentic project is broadly based emanating from core desires which reach out to the community at large and in the process draws on intrinsic and extrinsic influences to clearly formulate and communicate desired identity. ‘What is vital, significant, can exist for us only through articulation…To fail to articulate what goods structure our choices and decisions is in large measure to surrender our freedom and responsibility for being the type of person we wish to be.’16 Articulation helps differentiate between desires, it points the self as well as others towards the higher goods that orient life. With life-stories, as projected identity, leader evaluations constantly inform others as to the nature of character and priorities in terms of values and beliefs. The communicative act, however, should not depict dispositions which are set in stone. Authenticity is not a naïve, revealing-all of the self but rather a strategic unfolding of the self, including different facets of the self to accommodate particular demands of circumstance, ‘authenticity requires judgment as to what is appropriate within the context of a specific set of role responsibilities. Building lasting relationships that are capable of accommodating change requires recognition of the fact that individuals do not always have to fulfil the same role.’17 Not all decisions reveal character, most decisions are routine but those which are called for as part of important policies or during moments of crisis reflect back on the character of the action-taking agent. At these times, higher level choices are infused with moral import, awareness that deciding to move in a particular direction conveys a particularised lifestyle replete with concomitant virtues and higher goods. There is clear progression from insight into and control over basic desires to second-­ order volitions which culminate in putting moral flesh on the bones of rational evaluation.  Katharina Bauer (2017). “To be or Not to be Authentic. In Defence of Authenticity as an Ethical Ideal.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20(3): 567–580, p. 579. 16  Brian J.  Braman (2008). Meaning and Authenticity. Toronto. Buffalo. London. University of Toronto Press. p. 40. 17  Mollie Painter-Moreland, (2008) Business Ethics as Practice. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. p. 214. 15

The Search for Authenticity

9

It is this level of communication which directly relates to authenticity as a sign that the leader has embarked on a journey of filtering desires and choosing worthy ends which command respect and admiration. Embarking on this journey denotes that authenticity is being taken seriously. The attitude revealed in these cases is not merely one of self-discovery but rather self-creation, an identity profile which develops over time in relation to experience in the lifeworld. The self that is created is one that approximates a personal ideal, an ideal which is not fixed but open to remodelling according to circumstance. The authentic quest is to attain a high degree of moral capital, one of integrity, mutual respect, and the freedom to develop personal opinion while recognising the constituency of others. When leaders appeal to followers in an authentic fashion they are delineating a set of beliefs, convictions and prioritised values. They are transparently communicating what it is they are willing to be accountable for. As Charles Taylor puts it: To know who I am is a species of knowing where I stand. My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose. In other words, it is the horizon within which I am capable of taking a stand.18

By articulating, authentic leaders become better versed in choosing between which desires or values they are inclined to follow. Such articulation helps solidify identity but also helps compose a figure which potentially carries the weight of a role model. When formulating self-narratives leaders can make coherence out of disjointed or haphazard experience and create an identity which has the important function of approximating the leader’s pattern of life. Leaders who create an authentic image differ from charismatic leaders who also build a bond of attraction with followers. Both maximise articulation but charismatic leaders indulge in persuasive rhetoric to win over allegiance and convince others of their vision. They maintain a distance from followers, appeal to large groups and according to Max Weber are at best divinely inspired and at worst excessively narcissistic.19 Authentic leaders, on the other hand, minimise distance, build trust and familiarity through individualised interest. They present the unvarnished truth in response to questions about decisions, being available for explanation, clarification and accountability. There is, however, similarity between authentic and charismatic leadership as far as role-modelling is concerned. A strong personal narrative influences followers in different ways depending on the nature and content of the projected self-image. Nietzsche has already alluded to what we recognise as exemplars which is not a copy-cat way of behaving, something which would contradict Nietzsche’s insistence on autonomy, but rather a way to re-consider the self in light of those worthy

 Charles Taylor (1989) Sources of the Self: The making of the modern identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 27. 19  Max Weber (1947). Theory of Social and Economic Organization. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (trans.). Free Press. 18

10

1 Introduction

of admiration, those who reinforce rather than constrict independence, ‘your educators can be only your liberators.’20 An exemplarist moral theory would be one in which admirable people connect up with those who find them admirable, where an exemplar is a ‘paradigmatically good person.’21 The admirable character traits displayed by virtuous people with the potential for being admired is increased by behaviour, attitude and interaction resulting from life-story narration. Most moral insights come from stories but it is the special virtue of the philosopher to organize those insights. Moral theory is rooted here in character and personal narratives which are at the very least ‘morally revealing.’22 The ability of authentic leaders to engender admiration brings with it inspiration in the Latin sense of inspiration ‘to breathe into’ the presence of another, from one who acts as exemplar. The connection between leader and follower is further cemented through transparency and open accountability. The ability to respond as a reaction to requests fosters a state of preparedness and demands willingness to rationalise and justify intention. In the process of making the case for decisions, authentic leaders will authenticate them, validate sources, and justify original propositions. This is not a discussion of leaders being forced to carry out policies as an instrument of ideological movement, or effectuating acts impelled by unconscious, deep-seated forces. Rather, there is an assumption of rationality, control, self-knowledge, and time for evaluation which opens the door for accountability. By holding the leader to account, reasons for actions are elicited, justification is sought on the basis that leaders are autonomous, responsible actors able to communicate and share their motives and intentions.23 The call for justification and subsequent accountability suggests that rationalization is indelibly infused with moral choices and adoption of ethical positions. Leaders behaving self-indulgently may not be acting immorally but from the vantage point of authentic leadership the demand for a high degree of transparency and honesty is essential to its discourse. As well as being autonomous and self-­ determining, rationally critical leaders are responsible for their actions, ‘there is no higher authority justifying morality than reason itself…morality is not autonomous from reason, but…it is autonomous thanks to reason.’24 For Rainer Forst, Practical reason is vindicating reason in intersubjective contexts…actors are in a practical sense ‘autonomous’ self-determining beings when they act consciously and with justification. As such they are responsible for their actions: they can be questioned with regard to

 Friedrich Nietzsche. (1876/1997) “Schopenhauer as Educator” in Untimely Meditations. Daniel Breazeale (ed.), R. J. Hollingdale (trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 125–194, p. 129. 21  Linda Zagzebski (2010). “Exemplarist Virtue Theory”. Metaphilosophy. 41 (1–2): 41–57, p. 54. 22  Ibid. p. 52. 23  Angela M. Smith (2015) “Responsibility as Answerability”. Inquiry 58:2: 99–126, p. 113. 24  Fernando Suarez Muller. (2013) “Justifying the right to justification: An analysis of Rainer Forst’s constructivist theory of justice.” Philosophy and Social Criticism 39 (10) 1049–1068, p. 1053. 20

The Search for Authenticity

11

the reasons on the basis of which they acted. As responsible persons they are responding persons, and we expect of them that they have considered their reasons for action and can justify them.25

In the extensive philosophical analysis of the true-self, emphasis on the ethical component of authentic leadership has not garnered the attention it deserves. Possessing a strong, determining moral compass is the deciding factor over whether authenticity can genuinely transform the leadership landscape, but it involves a complex balancing act between being true to self-motivation and meeting the demand to enhance the common good. Compromises are acceptable in a heated political or business climate so long as they are founded on a genuine moral driving force based on justification: ‘compromises are forgivable, even acceptable…where the compromiser is visibly, ably and consistently committed to particular goals and principles. Tactical retreats and digressions are legitimate if they are clearly for the sake of such larger ends.’26 Taking shortcuts or focusing on ends to the detriment of means is unacceptable where humane values and justice are concerned. The effort to be resolute, however, does not occur automatically; it calls for an attitude of care and refined sensibility. Leader decisions are context dependent fuelled by a web of interlaced circumstance while simultaneously coloured by the pull of transcendent moral norms. The relevance of moral norms and their particularised application surfaces with leaders who act as justifying beings, performing in a social ‘space of reasons.’27 In this space of reason justification is offered in open debate and invited criticism. There is no suggestion that responsibility is shunted to other groups or institutions to take on but rather it is up to leaders themselves to debate in this space of reason. People are seen to be endowed with a right to justification of norms ‘that affect them in morally relevant ways.’28 (ibid) Institutions and collectives can be held responsible but in terms of authenticity there is an autonomous foundation based on intentionality and imputation of authorship. Evidently, institutions cannot be cross-examined or asked for justification as is possible with individuals even though there are legislative rules and regulation which can be imposed and subsequently examined. At best, justification takes place in debate and discussion as an ‘inter-subjective process of vindicating oneself, of justifying oneself to someone in a position to demand justification and evaluate the reasons…’.29 The result of equitable intersubjective dialogue is to engender transparency and responsibility. Existentialism, in particular, emphasises that when an individual acts autonomously as basis for authenticity there must be freedom from domination by  Rainer Forst (2002). Contexts of justice: political philosophy beyond liberalism and communitarianism. Los Angeles and London, Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 256. 26  John Kane (2001). The Politics of Moral Capital. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 21. 27  Rainer Forst (2011). “The Ground of Critique: On the concept of human dignity in social orders of justification.” Philosophy and Social Criticism 37 (9): 965–976, p. 966. 28  Ibid. 29  Eva Buddeberg and Achim Hecker (2018). “Justification Incorporated: a Discursive Approach to Corporate Responsibility.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 21 (3): 465–475, p. 469. 25

12

1 Introduction

others, this is what allows for self-determination and free-flowing exchanges. Resistance against forces of domination is reinforced by reciprocal speech, argumentative interaction as the free exchange of ideas carried out in an atmosphere of respect and dignity. An authentic leader would not abnegate responsibility at all these levels since part of the transparency requirement is to admit ownership of action, monitoring of basic desires, and acceptance of the need to stand up and be counted, redolent of leadership surgency. There is an inherent requirement that leaders be accountable based on an expectation that they meet the range of virtues which authenticity encompasses. They are placed in a position of having to morally respond and if this call for response is ignored, or deflected, at the very least it results in adherents being resentful and ultimately withdrawing their allegiance. Leader autonomy includes respecting the dignity of others and their autonomy as independent thinkers with an unconditional right to hear justification; as Kant insists, the need is to accord dignity by recognising others as ends in themselves: ‘Act so that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same time as end and never merely as means.’30 Kant connects the question of which actions are morally justifiable with a procedure that tests their universalizability such that no moral person can merely be a means to someone else’s end. Authentic moral justifications must be open to other perspectives, admit that whatever truth one believes in is still open to debate and questioning, even to the point of revision. Any reason being offered has to be understood, justified, and shared by all, ‘to act with dignity means being able to justify oneself to others…to treat others in ways that violate their dignity means regarding them as lacking any justification authority.’31 This means that as authentic leaders are personally, intimately and performatively involved in acts of decision-making they must be cognisant of the way they affect the freedom and behavioural options of others. Moral construction works in tandem with political construction to ensure basic rights are contextualised into a particularised, political context, thereby guaranteeing ‘the protection of personality, political participation, and material security.’32 Associated with this ethical task, leadership is characterised by individuals who show integrity and honesty worthy of trust and loyalty. Inauthentic leaders lack integrity, failing in both character and policy. Integrity ensures the persistent demand for accountability, an attribute which is concerned with finding and appeasing the true self and in the process empathically reaching out to others, ‘we can say that integrity is the compassionate and receptive work of making the self whole and enduringly happy through critically and assiduously separating who we truly are

 Immanuel Kant. (1785/2002). Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Allen W.  Wood (trans. and ed.). New Haven and London: Yale University Press. [4:429f.] pp. 46–47. 31  Forst, “The Ground of Critique: On the concept of human dignity in social orders of justification”, p. 969. 32  Ibid. 30

The Search for Authenticity

13

from the false ego.’33 This intent applies to all authentic pursuits in combining decisions which attempt to resolve the maelstrom of conflicting interests with the personal struggle to become a better human being. The prime ideal of becoming a better human being, and with it becoming the right leader for the task, is to manifest the good by acting virtuously. For some philosophers, such as Charles Taylor, virtue ethics is a broad concept which comes to represent this entire authentic project: I have been speaking of the good…or sometimes the strong good, meaning whatever is picked out as incomparably higher in qualitative distinction. It can be some action, or motive, or style of life, which is seen as qualitatively superior. ‘Good’ is used here in a highly general sense, designating anything considered valuable, worthy, admirable, or whatever kind or category.’34

In sum, the message is that moral enterprise is at the heart of authentic leadership, albeit in different forms. Hannah Arendt makes clear that the first phase of authenticity is not to be at odds with oneself but to feel at ease within one’s skin.35 Individuals who experience personal conflict, who evade being true to themselves and live in self-denial, or lack self-awareness, will accordingly fail to achieve authenticity. Once leaders believe they are transparently reflecting their true self, discipline morphs into self-confidence and the feeling of well-being. However, the self-revealed may not be beneficent even though this is an assumption made by most positive psychologists. Authentic leadership theorists optimistically believe leadership roles will be filled by those who start with a sense of right and wrong, an extant moral reasoning which can be developed. But for this to be realised there must be a seed of moral reasoning to develop in the first place. In other words, we have to assume the presence of innate ethical sensibility to distinguish right from wrong. This is not guaranteed but the closest we come to it is in an individual’s own conscience. Where conscience was once a direct line to the divine it is now the direct voice of the authentic self: ‘Conscience is actualized in the thinking process, where I realize that I am related to myself in an intimate way…my relationship to myself is…dependence on myself as a silent partner… My conscience limits what I can do based on what I am willing to live with.’36 Once one is comfortable with oneself, reconciling the two-in-one, or the I and the Me, the authentic pursuit can begin as a moral journey: ‘the conscience…is a by-product of thinking (insofar as in thinking we become aware of ourselves as a two-in-one and hence the need to be able to live with ourselves).’37 Reflective judgment works with conscience as a form of judgment which does not rely on pre-determined categories against which a  Daryl Koehn (2005). “Integrity as Business Asset.” Journal of Business Ethics 58 (1/3): 125–136, p. 132. 34  Charles Taylor (1989). Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, p. 92. 35  Hannah Arendt (1971/1978). Life of the Mind. Mary McCarthy (ed.) San Diego: New  York: London: Harcourt Brace. 36  Serena Parekh (2008). “Conscience, Morality and Judgment: An inquiry into the subjective basis of human rights.” Philosophy & Social Criticism 34 (1–2): 177–195, p. 184. 37  Ibid. p. 187. 33

14

1 Introduction

decision or judgment is evaluated. The situation and context is perceived for what it is rather than coloured by, or slotted into, formulaic categories. Though this is particularised judgment it still carries universal application through the notion of common sense that is shared by all, suggesting that all those who employ common sense should come to the same conclusion. The assumption is that through reflection and judgment a leader’s conscience can establish moral norms without recourse to an extrinsic or transcendental source. Based on conscience, as soon as an individual leader makes a decision his or her humanity comes into play as a thoughtful, judging, imagining human who cannot help but relate to others, and through conscience is able to universalize the particular. Conscience works through imagination and empathy thereby relating self to the affective care and interest of others: ‘Judgment, then, does not depend only upon my own experiences or perceptions, but on the way I am able to imagine things from the point of view of others. Imagination allows us to ‘think in place of everybody else’ in order that we can develop examples that help us in our judgment…’.38 As Arendt points out, in the banality of evil the hope in war time is that human beings can innately tell right from wrong, Even when all they have to guide them is their own judgment, which, moreover, happens to be completely at odds with what they must regard as the unanimous opinion of all those around them…Those few who still were able to tell right from wrong went really only by their own judgments, and they did so freely; there were no rules to be abided by, under which the particular cases with which they were confronted could be subsumed.39

These comments cannot be distinguished from thinking since it is thought that relates the I to the Me, the only question being what form thought takes, either inner contemplation or the catalyst form of being expressed and carried out in action (vita activa). Thinking is the soundless internal dialogue which cements the self between the I and Me; there is always a return to self. Conscience as the guardian of this union reminds us that we have to live with ourselves no-matter-what: I must will to live with myself, reconciled with myself and the acts I have done, which define me, who I am, who I aspire to be, as opposed to living against myself. The famous bottom line, in short, is that if I choose to commit murder, I condemn myself to living in the company of a murderer for the rest of my life.40

Arendt emphasises the latter position of ‘vita activa’ which helps us to place conscience in the active setting of the lifeworld. Her focus on thinking as a guide to practical activity rather than abstracted theory applies to all, implying that it is not concerned with elitist notions propagated by, for example, the Great Man theory of leadership or elite, charismatic figures. Thinking, as the conveyor of conscience and morality, is an ‘exercise from every sane person, no matter how erudite or ignorant,  Ibid. p. 188.  Hannah Arendt (1965). Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York: Viking Press, pp. 294–295. 40  Arne Johan Vetlesen (2001) “Hannah Arendt on Conscience and Evil.” Philosophy & Social Criticism 27 (5): 1–33, p. 10. 38 39

The Search for Authenticity

15

intelligent or stupid he may happen to be.’41 To be fully alive and cognisant of what is needed to make insightful decisions leaders should think in the productive manner Arendt describes, not as mindless routine but with thoughtful actualisation and beneficence: To think and to be fully alive are the same, and this implies that thinking must always begin afresh; it is an activity that accompanies living and is concerned with such concepts as justice, happiness, virtue…thought’s quest is a kind of desirous love, the objects of thought can only be lovable things – beauty, wisdom, justice, and so on.42

The idea that thinking as opposed to thoughtlessness aids to discard evil is a position reflected in the positive psychology of authentic leader theorists. It is this that provides the foundation for relational authenticity whereby leaders working within an intersubjective setting insist on their concern for others and the general good. Moral judgment ‘often reflects a tension between one’s personal norms of responsibility and the collective norms of moral conformity’43 and authenticity grapples with this tension on several fronts. The cognitive and affective sides of being coalesce to guide perception of the world and the way individuals are either attracted to or repulsed by relationships with others. Sentiment colours reaction in a way which reason does not. Where reason allows for distance and systems which direct thought and logic, emotion brings a natural affinity and closely relates to the authentic expression of the self. Emotions are perceptions of significance and work together with thoughtfulness bringing value and moral weight to authentic decision-making in the lifeworld.

 Arendt, Life of the Mind, p. 13.  Ibid. pp. 178, 179. 43  Novicevic et al., “Authentic Leadership: A Historical Perspective.”, p. 67. 41 42

Chapter 2

Autonomy

Abstract  Autonomy is a challenge to leadership. It is based on self-determination and development of strong character. Strong leaders are admired in the world of business and politics but the personal ability to develop strength of character to make important decisions must be in harmony with the demands of society and the general good. Even within the democratic, liberal traditions of freedom and individual rights there is an inevitable focus on leadership to guide the social process and facilitate the path through communal complexity. The history of authenticity goes back to the Greeks, Aristotle and Plato, to Descartes, the liberalism of John Stuart Mill, and to existentialism, especially Heidegger and Sartre. Since the days of Carlyle and the Great Man Theory of leadership, the leader is considered to be someone born with a great gift to lead, a figure of destiny. The closest one comes to autonomy in leadership is the general concept of transactional leadership. There are basic characteristics of transactional leadership which directly relate to the notion of autonomy and its political expression in both liberalism and capitalism. But if there is a tendency for leadership and power to race ahead of the good of the people then the character of the leader must come under scrutiny. Authentic leadership is the best way to monitor this threat, the most important way to ensure the coherence and integrity of leadership. From this perspective, the drive to autonomy, which is the personal development of character, must be seen in terms of intersubjectivity, accountability, and responsibility if leadership is to be genuinely authentic. Keywords  Autonomy · Self-determination · Self-awareness · Transactional leadership · Liberalism · Authenticity · Responsibility · Accountability · Great man theory · Intersubjectivity · Moral reasoning

Self-Determination Like all leadership discussions, when we explore leadership we are not only focusing on the leader but everything in connection with leader-ship. This means taking into account followers, situation and context within a wide array of socio/cultural © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Shaw, The Philosophy of Authentic Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29650-5_2

17

18

2 Autonomy

conditions. Autonomy embraces this all-inclusive context on two levels. On one level, the personal relates to factors in the development and formation of subject identity, both of leader and follower alike. On a wider level, there is a need to place subject identity and personal expression within the prevailing social and political climate. Both autonomy and authenticity focus on the nature of identity. But identifying identity is not that simple. Is the inner core of self at all retrievable? Can the flow of basic, first-order desires be understandably expressed? Is the nature of identity formed around a constant and consistent figuration or is it too elusive to be meaningfully grasped? Under the influence of Descartes, there is a strong rationalist influence in considering these questions. It is argued the individual mind is private and its machinations are directly knowable only to the self via self-consciousness and introspection.1 Taylor points out the determination of the self to express and direct this inner core in an autonomous way means taking ownership of it. By making human essence one’s own we can engender individual empowerment against outside elements: Thus where Aristotelean philosophy saw the growth and development of man and the realization of human form as a tending towards order and equilibrium constantly threatened by disorder and disharmony, the expressivist view sees this development more as the manifestation of an inner power striving to realize and maintain its own shape against those the surrounding world might impose.2

The Age of Enlightenment has been considered the age of autonomy par excellence. Under the influence of the Enlightenment, reason is linked to the systemization of rational instrumentality, the ability to follow what is needed to achieve results and reject extraneous desires: ‘Autonomy refers to the actor’s accountability in his or her choosing a course of action, regardless of the grounds and type of rationality that inspire his or her choice’.3 Michel Foucault also notes that when Kant describes the Age of Enlightenment in terms of a departure from previous epochs a higher stage of development and maturity is achieved, which fits perfectly with it representing independence from outside coercion: ‘Kant indicates…Enlightenment is a process that releases us from the status of ‘immaturity’…by immaturity he means a certain state of our will that makes us accept someone else’s authority to lead us in areas where the use of reason is called for’.4 So, with maturity we have autonomy and the ability to take initiative into one’s own hand. For instrumentality, achieving one’s goals, both means and ends are carefully evaluated, rationally based, and purposively calculated. For Kant, this also applies to morality where autonomy reconciles acts with reason, strictly following the moral law. To explain this, Kant explores the difference between reflective

 Rene Descartes (1644/2009). Principles of Philosophy. John Veitch (trans.). SMK Books.  Charles Taylor (1975). Hegel. Cambridge University Press. p. 15. 3  Alessandro Ferrara (1998). Reflective Authenticity. Routledge. p. 5. 4  Michael Foucault (1984). “What is Enlightenment?” in P. Rabinow (ed.) The Foucault Reader. New York: Pantheon Books. 32–50, p. 37. 1 2

Self-Determination

19

judgement and determinant judgment in his ‘Critique of Judgment’. In terms of moral principles, autonomy follows a rigid, independently self-commanded adherence to moral laws, in keeping with determinant judgement.5 For Kant, determinant judgment applies particulars to universals, the particular is an instance of the given law and particulars come ready affixed to universals. As we find in commerce, work arrangement systems are usually in place and it is the workers role to apply specific projects to them. For determinant judgment, the fact that the rule is given means that the faculty of judgment has only to execute or apply an a priori rule whose source is understanding. In its restricted form, ‘autonomy as self-control is…a function of conforming to what is right and resisting what is wrong, where the rights and wrongs have been pre-established as part of the system of obligations’.6 For reflective judgment, by contrast, ‘the givenness of the particular has an exclusively empirical meaning. It is only experience that can provide a posteriori the specific case—and this is also all reflective judgment can count on (for only the particular is given to it)’.7 This means reflective judgment looks first to the particular and empirical world, while determinant judgment stands back, works under universal transcendental laws and, to a degree, lacks attention to historical and social factors. Kant identifies this with the will as something which lies beyond the particularities of the empirical world. Above all, there is the sense of independence we associate with autonomy and its self-imposed principles of rigour. Kant’s notion of autonomy regarding morality which breaks free from the shackles of external authority is complex. There is a strong sense of affirming the independent use of reason, but we also find a transcendental notion of reason that inheres within individuals as a rational constant. This means reason legislates for us, even over us, though we still continue to claim that the individual defines it as self-legislation. The expression of autonomy is the ability to attain self-control over tendencies which could be deemed immoral or lacking in virtue. If we will something, it is to act in accordance with the way we have self-legislated. The dilemma is one which revolves around a duty to follow one’s own way and take choices contra another duty to follow a universal dictum which limits our choices. We need to decide whether Kant sees the will as inherently autonomous or whether it follows an objective principle which makes it so.8 If it is inherently autonomous, the self will execute self-willing in practice and make choices in its own particular way. But if rational determination is the deciding factor it will lead to following the universal law, or categorical imperative, which means treating others  Immanuel Kant (1790/1987). Critique of Judgment. Werner S. Pluhar (trans.). Hackett Publishing Company. 6  Heesoon Bai (1999). “Autonomy Reconsidered: A Proposal to Abandon the Language of SelfAnd Other-Control And to Adopt the Language of ‘Attunement’”, in Steve Tozer (ed.). (1998) Philosophy of Education. Urbana: Illinois. 95–101. p. 97. 7  Angelica Nuzzo (2013). “Reflective Judgment, Determinative Judgment, and the Problems of Particularity.” Washington University Jurisprudence Review 6 (1): 7–25, p. 11. 8  Paul Formosa (2013). “Kant’s Conception of Personal Autonomy.” Journal of Social Philosophy 44. (3): 193–212. 5

20

2 Autonomy

as an end rather than a means, and the pursuit of human dignity. Put another way, personal autonomy has to do with pursuing the good, which is our own happiness or self-love. It has to do with satisfying desires and is also reliant on external achievement as a source of satisfaction. Moral autonomy is self-contained and not reliant on external factors. If we deduct all extraneous influence on willing, which includes non-rational or impulsive behaviour, we are left with an absolute sense of rational willing as described by Kant’s moral autonomy. For Kant, we are inherently autonomous beings and turning to others or outside source for moral legislation is to contravene autonomy: If the will seeks the law that is to determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of its aims for its own giving of universal law…heteronomy always results. The will in that case does not give itself the law, instead the object, by means of its relation to the will, gives the law to it…I ought to act in such or such a way even though I have not willed anything else.9

There is an interesting distinction between autonomy of the will as an inherent attribute, and willing autonomously, which suggests executing what the will wills as a separate act, or an ideal state to be achieved: ‘Autonomy of the will is a property of the will of every reasoning being, autonomous willing is an ideal achieved only by those rational beings who actually succeed in governing themselves in accordance with the principle of autonomy’.10 The determining ground here as a sense of self-­ governing is attached to a course of action considered in terms of what is good for the self, or personal autonomy. General values, such as dignity of self and others, will be self-legislated but the execution of actions is empirically based and it is here that judgments between good and bad arise. In general terms: The ideal of personal autonomy…holds the free choice of goals and relations as an essential ingredient of individual well-being. The ruling idea behind the ideal of personal autonomy is that people should make their own lives. The autonomous person is (part) author of his own life. The ideal of personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their lives.11

Leadership theory argues strongly for the individually developed self-concept as an important source for understanding leader autonomy and decision-making. But we also find that the critique of this position, which amounts to a critique of subjectivity, is an important source for postmodern leadership theory. The dilemma concerning both autonomy and authenticity is whether leadership needs a stringent inner core if it is to be meaningfully pursued, or whether a multifaceted, dispersed identity configuration serves as a convincing surrogate. The inner self, with its effort to build single inner coherence, is a security-seeking comfort zone which is challenged from various fronts, especially those which argue the need for divergent possible

 Immanuel Kant (1999). Practical Philosophy. Mary J.  Gregor. (trans and ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 89. 10  Formosa, “Kant’s Conception of Personal Autonomy” p. 195. 11  Robert S. Taylor (2005). “Kant’s Personal Autonomy.” Political Theory 33 (5): 602–628, p. 605. C/f. Joseph Raz (1986). The Morality of Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 369. 9

Self-Determination

21

selves and multiple perspectives.12 The challenge does not necessarily mean the coherent inner core evaporates. The various life challenges of modern society do not have to bring an abnegation of agency or fading inner cogency. Some are convinced that the various self-reflexive procedures involved in understanding and constructing the self are adequate to insure a sense of continuity in the face of the challenge from dispersion and multiple selves: ‘The very reflexive capacities of the self allow it to transcend former conceptualizations of the self, without serious threat to one’s core being’.13 An added bulwark against the threat to autonomy is the act of self-determination. Self-determination is the desire to do the deciding rather than be decided for.14 In fact, autonomy is an aspect of authenticity when it incorporates the notion of self-­ determining freedom, based on the same sense of independence and cultivation of an intimate contact with oneself. Self-determining freedom ‘is the idea that I am free when I decide for myself what concerns me, rather than being shaped by external influences’.15 This is the exercise of freedom which resists outside influence and fixates on making personal decisions through self-verifying rationality. The notion of self-determination lies at the core of autonomous leadership as well as authenticity, where it takes many forms. It is especially relevant as it impacts not only organizational leadership relations but also political leaders and leaders of industry. The key step in achieving self-determination begins with the competence and capacity for self-reflection.16 Competence to access self is rationally made with insight into motivation, which allows for reflective decision-making. Moreover, if after reflection some traits are felt to negatively impact behaviour an individual is confidently expected to be able to parry or overturn them, otherwise there is no autonomy. Resistance to outside coercion means one feels able to ‘reflect upon and embrace (or reject or revise) conceptions of value for themselves…having a basic interest in pursuing their own conceptions of what is valuable and doing so from the inside’.17 This attitude results in decisions being truly one’s own, undertaken by one’s own volition, what Isaiah Berlin describes as positive liberty: I wish to be an instrument of my own, not other men’s acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object…deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them.18

 Susan Harter (2012). The Construction of the Self. New York: Guilford Press.  Ibid. p. 8. (my emphasis) 14  Gerald Dworkin (1988). The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 15  Charles Taylor (1991). The Ethics of Authenticity. Cambridge: Mass: Harvard University Press. p. 27. 16  John Christman. (2005) “Autonomy, Self-Knowledge and Liberal Legitimacy” in John Christman and Joel Anderson (eds.). Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism. Cambridge University Press. 330–358. 17  Ibid. p. 340. 18  Isaiah Berlin (1969). Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford University Press. p. 131. 12 13

22

2 Autonomy

Naturally enough, the freedom to follow one’s own path by dint of self-­determination can be frustrated by external factors; collective deception, restricted liberty or lack of information. However, even if the freedom to pursue personal goals is impaired, the fact that self-determination is psychologically based means it is independent enough to lean on the will and motivations which help to overcome external restrictions. In normal circumstances, we pursue self-determination because we believe what we think counts, and we see ourselves to be a continuous or constant being capable of initiating a processes which sustains our autonomy. If one can be self-­determining, then the core self can be an independent decision-maker, an agentic centre for planning and setting processes in action. As Gerald Dworkin insists, this is based on a capacity to critically reflect upon and change basic desires in light of ‘higher order preferences and values’.19 The process is phased. The will to do something, though expressing basic, first-order desires is not coextensive with them. It involves more than intention; it is characterised by transferring intention into action and it is through pragmatically applied second-order desires that we come to recognise an individual’s personality.20 This means the mark of autonomy lies in the act of questioning and wrestling with the degree to which we are willing to follow basic desires and instincts. Such first-order desires are core desires but they are not determining in autonomy. One may acknowledge that there are feelings and inclinations to react in a certain way but still experience a feeling of being unhappy about them. There follows the desire to change them. In a similar argument to Kant’s debate between autonomy of the will and willing autonomy, Dworkin points to second-order desire as ‘the capacity to raise the question of whether I will identify with or reject the reasons for which I now act’.21 The outcome is an act of evaluation, desires will be hierarchically ordered into preferences as a form of second-order prioritising. On this argument, autonomy amounts to the ability to prioritise, assert preference over inner and outer pressures: ‘the autonomous are those who reflect upon their initial desires and undertake a process of deliberation that leads to the rational choosing of some over others’.22 For any leader, the transition from the substrate of personality, its emotional and dispositional make-up, to successful implementation of second-order desires and effectiveness in the lifeworld is one which involves all manner of action control. There is a strong cognitive role to consciously shape the self and its lifeworld. An interlacing process forms where experience is framed by interpretive schemas adopted by leaders to ensure influence, using a variety of strategies to maximise the effect of projects in society and the business world. Leaders will need to fit into the structure of the workforce they represent and the interests of the people they lead.  Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, p. 20.  Harry G. Frankfurt (1971). “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”. The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1): 5–20. 21  Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, p. 15. 22  Peter Nelsen (2010). “Oppression, Autonomy and the Impossibility of the Inner Citadel.” Studies in Philosophy and Education 29 (4): 333–349, p. 336. 19 20

Self-Determination

23

Self-awareness and accompanying reflection are initially attention states which direct conscious awareness to self. In appraising feelings and behaviours there is no initial questioning about the veracity of self-perception. This comes later as behaviour and events are contextualised into the kind of person one feels one is and especially how others respond socially to the personality being projected. The effort of perspectival insight is not designed to correlate findings with any pre-determined model of desirable attributes. It is simply an exercise to discover and attempt to understand the self as it relates to personal emotion, motives and desires. In this respect, reflection and self-monitoring play an important role in establishing autonomy and implementing goals: ‘Self-monitoring refers to one’s ability to monitor and adjust expressive behaviour, self-presentation, and non-verbal displays of affect in response to social cues’.23 Reflection stands testimony to the fact individuals do not want to be passive observers of their life. On this basis, one discerns a reflective cycle which includes delaying judgments until feelings and reactions have been fully assimilated, bringing moral evaluations to the table, drawing on experience to put the present situation in perspective and using empathy to understand the presence of others. All these processes aid reflection on what can be learnt from the present situation as a guide to future dealings.24 The implication is that, ideally, leaders will be open to self-change, use reflection as a key source to action and welcome constructive criticism. The reflective leader, as an autonomous individual, will channel first-order desires, critically process information, use inductive and deductive reasoning, ask probing questions and extend the frame of thinking by using creative solutions. Introspection is a common description of the reflective act, though it should be remembered introspection is not identical to sense-perception. We do not have empirical experience of desires in the same way as we have sensations of objects in the outside world. Looking at oneself introspectively is not the same action as perceiving a real-world object; the inner sense of self is of a different nature.25 In being reflectively aware of the ‘object’ self, the self carries out various egocentric strategies similar to the way leaders tend to justify their position. The self, in a grandiose sense, is seen as the mid-point of events, certainly more causally dominant than an indifferent observer. The self is the fulcrum for organizing knowledge and inserts its egocentric presence into the turn of events. The motive is to ensure the stability or status quo of extant cognitive categories and once in place it is this that is felt to correspond to self-identity. When acts are deemed autonomous they correspond to being expressions of oneself in ways that are consistent with inner  Lillian T. Eby, Jailzer Cader, Carrie L. Noble (2003). “Why Do High Self-Monitors Emerge as Leaders in Small Groups? A Comparative Analysis of the Behaviours of High Versus Low Self-­ Monitors.” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 33 (7):1457–1479, p. 1458. 24  Süleyman Davut Göker and Kıvanç Bozkuş (2017). “Reflective Leadership: Learning to Manage and Lead Human Organizations” in Aida Alvinius (ed.) Contemporary Leadership Challenges. Intech Publishing, 27–46, p. 42. 25  Sydney Shoemaker (1994). “Self-Knowledge and ‘Inner Sense’.” Lecture I: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2): 249–269. 23

24

2 Autonomy

thoughts and feelings.26 The conservative bias at work struggles to incorporate novelty into the already established cognitive system because cohesion combined with familiarity is both reassuring and controlling. The initial conceit, that an inner self can be both discovered and directed, is in keeping with most modernist tenets in which the metaphor of the machine, with ‘networks of associations’, neutral perception registers, and pervasive rationality suggest a true self can be excavated and moulded into a trustworthy ‘well-designed’ personality.27 The inner core of self was strongly supported by the Romantics who argued that there are two selves to identity; the observing introspective self and the core observed object self; the ‘I’ and the ‘me’. Gilbert Ryle explains that introspection is non-sensuous inner-perception and as such considered to be a more direct and superior form of knowledge than normal perception.28 The object of consciousness, the ‘ghost in the machine’ is direct, self-intimating, and cannot be delusory. As an inheritance from the Enlightenment, and the protestant ethic of conscience, the mind is ‘lit’ or reflectively lights itself. Introspection has a more intentional connotation than general awareness since it is deliberatively attentive, a conscious turning-­ towards the self. Beliefs and desires, constitutive of consciousness, are taken to be autonomous if they can be translated by rational deliberation. At the same time, Ryle has serious reservations concerning introspection and the way it supposedly supports the belief we can monitor at will intentions and subsequent actions. For Ryle, there is no consciousness of experience in the sense of it being lit or self-luminous as if events take place ‘in the mind’. Ryle’s objections point to the fact that one cannot be an ‘I’ and a ‘me’ at the same time. Desires cannot be known in that way. If, for example, we are angry we cannot at the same time dispassionately grasp what we are doing; desires are all-consuming. The conclusion is that to judge one’s autonomy one cannot look at one’s own mind to check if one is expressing self-made attributes. Ryle rejects targeting the inner light of the mind and the potential infallibility of one’s own personal mental state claims. Rather, the suggestion is that, in a more limited way, judging autonomy is to observe if one is acting independently, compared to those who are being deceived or living under different forms of external restrictions. Whether we completely agree with Ryle’s view of mental activity or not, it is still useful to take his lead. Leaders cannot simply adopt autonomy automatically, insulated in a problem-free environment as a way of building up self-confidence or don an appropriate mantle of authoritative role-playing. The claim that cognitive skills can be applied to any subject matter, irrespective of content, is redolent of Cartesian thought and empiricism which works well for scientific thinking where the emphasis is always on explaining reasons, defending positions and judging the value of evidence. These factors may contribute to

 Susan Harter (2002). “Authenticity” in C.R.  Snyder and Shane J.  Lopez. (eds.) Handbook of Positive Psychology. Oxford University: 382–394. 27  Ibid. p. 383. 28  Gilbert Ryle (1949/2000). The Concept of Mind. Penguin Books. 26

Self-Determination

25

reflective thinking and reinforce the conviction that, even if not absolute, some form of objectivity can be reached. There are degrees of reflection and personal insight but as long as there is effort and will to reflect in a significant way then the autonomous act can be understood as one which is relatively self-determining and independent: Someone is self-determining when she acts for the sake of what matters to her, what she deeply cares about, and, in that sense who she ‘is’…Even a self who is at all minimally self-reflective has crossed a threshold…self-reflection is self-determining when it (partly) shapes behaviour that mirrors a person’s deeper concerns that she has reflectively reaffirmed.29

Ultimately, there is the struggle over how to manage and interpret levels of desire which determine autonomy; whether one remains a slave to one’s passions or whether, using reason and self-determinism, one wills to redirect them. Albert Bandura concludes: ‘Self-regulation is a multifaceted phenomenon operating through a number of subsidiary cognitive processes, including self-monitoring, standard setting, evaluative judgment, self-appraisal, and affective self-reaction’.30 The self is depicted as a causal agent who can materialise purpose and goals combined with self-efficacy or a belief in personal effectiveness. For Bandura’s social cognitive theory, the self-efficacy mechanism is pivotal for autonomy and decision-­ making. This will only be possible with a high degree of self-knowledge which supports self-regulatory control and results in self-determined behaviour. There is a return to initial desires and a process of prioritising major drivers. On this account, a reflective leader will undertake rational choosing of motives and beliefs and a litany of preferences to guide actions. Marylin Friedman concludes autonomy is the support needed for personal resilience, personal autonomy can be a particularly inspirational ideal for those who in the course of living their lives, must cope with the all-too-familiar human wrongs of abuse, exploitation, domination, and oppression.31 However, even with the intimacy assumed by introspection and self-determination there is a need to encompass a broader canvas. Reflection is a vital component of a leader’s daily life but one also promoted by the culture of an organization which influences policy decisions. A more rounded, inclusive approach is called for which draws into its orbit the unpredictability of local interactions and various learning components which can be included as a form of problem- solving geared for a wider community: Reflective leaders regard learning as a lifelong process…They regularly tend to step out of their routine and accustomed settings to think, explore and learn…a reflective learning community, in which reflection is an ideal way of support and learning, should be created by reflective leaders. In such a community, you provide a safe environment for self-­ expression, identify objectives, give feedback and stimulate self-observation. In defining

 Marylin Friedman (2003). Autonomy, Gender, Politics. Oxford University Press. pp. 6, 7.  Albert Bandura (1991). “Social Cognitive Theory of Self-Regulation.” Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes 50. (2): 248–287, p. 282. 31  Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics, p. 6. 29 30

26

2 Autonomy the strengths of the individuals, you offer other people optional approaches to be successful in their work.32

Equally, reflective leadership should downplay predetermined solutions or any tool-­ based approach to leadership with pre-given instructions and recommendations in favour of recognising that decision-making is an eventfully unique and non-­ transferable activity. Clearly, within the bounds of self-governing and self-­concepts, it is not possible to be autonomous in the sense of disregarding outside influences from environment as well as ignoring ethical duties. It is questionable that decisionmaking emanates solely from self-determining processes as this omits the influence of social forces and relationships. The argument is based on an opposition between the impenetrable, individualistic, ‘inner citadel’ of autonomous choice, which is quick to resist all forms of external coercion, and the more socially grounded position which opposes ‘pathologizing relational values’ and eliminating community influence.33 The point being that social class, gender and ethnicity inevitably have a decisive influence on the formation of identity and if this is obfuscated there is need for a penetrating critical exposé. On a more subtle level, Charles Taylor points to the core problem of all autonomously centred theories. All choices of preference which are subjectively valued are nonetheless carried out against a background of horizons, a background of intelligibility. A stand must be taken as to whether choices made are simply personal taste, which is really only of interest to each individual, or whether they carry the weight of ethical normative significance, which is more relevant to the wider reach of leadership activities: ‘The agent seeking significance in life, trying to define him-or herself meaningfully, has to exist in a horizon of important questions…To shut out demands emanating beyond the self is precisely to suppress the conditions of significance, and hence to court trivialization’.34 The wider discussion, then, centres on how fixed personal traits and dispositions should be understood within the context of social and group pressure.35 To a degree, reflective leadership is dependent on the social context and it being conducive to the free expression of autonomous decision-making. Social theorists hold there is no such thing as the pre-social or the purely biological individual. They aver that the understanding of autonomy must take into consideration individual minds within a socially structured field. The values and beliefs at the core of personal identity derive from social structures of a different ilk. Society is the testing ground for action as both a restraining influence, which makes sure there are checks on behaviour, and an environment which helps form self-categorization. In some groups, theory argues an aggregate is produced which holistically shapes individuals, resulting in a collective approach where members, to all intents, are interchangeable.

 Göker and Bozkuş, “The Reflective Leader”, pp. 31, 34.  Nelsen, “Oppression, Autonomy and the Impossibility of the Inner Citadel.” pp. 334, 335. 34  Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, p. 40. 35  Michael A.  Hogg (2001) “A Social Identity Theory of Leadership.” Personality and Social Psychology Review 5 (3): 184–200. 32 33

Self-Determination

27

A negative consequence of this conclusion is crowd or mob mentality where group norms ‘encourage ordinary people to behave in a cruel and abusive way’.36 This tendency is by no means inevitable, other group formations display a ‘more restless and dynamic nature of group behaviour’ where blending of member characteristics or extreme assimilation is minimised.37 The extent of influence may depend on whether groups are high or low status, rich or poor, and the cultural norms of collectivism or individualism. It will also be reflected in the values of the group which can either encourage assimilation or foster individualism. While the formation of an individual’s self-concept may be heavily indebted to social interaction this by no means has to result in absolute group allegiance where the collective takes over to absorb the individual mindset. Autonomy is still maintained in an intersubjective world where meaning is shared and socially constructed. Phenomenologists point out that understanding phenomenological reality involves the sharing of interpretation and the interactive checking and affirmation of the lifeworld with others without there being any threat to independence. There are views which assume that critical reflection automatically facilitates autonomy mainly because it motivates an agent’s action. As long as one believes self-appraisal is not bound by pre-formed structures but is open to introspection and reflexive judgment then potentially constraining pressures can be counteracted. However, there are forces abroad which impact and potentially frustrate the pursuit of self-determining freedom. The problem is beliefs may be the result of circumstances unknown to agents, emanating ‘behind their back’, such as ideological influence or institutional thinking.38 Even with the requisite wherewithal to offset indoctrinating forces which may threaten or obfuscate autonomy, the problem is confounded by the fact that it is the self-same subject who must reflectively do the judging. This hinders the creation of a balanced perspective to judge whether beliefs are ideologically implanted or the result of invidious subterfuge from a tainted source. It is, therefore, relevant to ask whether preferences made by individuals who believe they are autonomous are in fact defective, indicating a state of non-­ autonomy.39 That is to say, one may feel free to choose preferences in one’s hierarchy of desires but a critical approach would question the status of these formations in the first place. To what extent are leader’s concepts of preferences non-­autonomous because they have been undermined by false consciousness? This is a reminder that participants in the leader-follower arrangement should be sufficiently aware to recognise that forces of socialization are in place. No one escapes ideology and prevalent discourse, and everyone is a product of social relationships. For some, this is the most important aspect of autonomy and demands navigating a route between externally and internally directed autonomy no matter how imperceptibly invasive it may  Matthew J. Hornsey (2006). “Ingroup Critics and Their Influence on Groups” in Tom Postmes and Jolanda Jetten (eds.) Individuality and the Group. Sage Publications.74–92, p. 74. 37  Ibid. p. 87. 38  Nelsen, “Oppression, Autonomy and the Impossibility of the Inner Citadel.” p. 344. 39  David Weberman (1997). “Liberal Democracy, Autonomy, and Ideology Critique.” Social Theory and Practice 23 (2): 205–233. 36

28

2 Autonomy

be: ‘autonomy is a condition of persons constituted, in large part, by the external, social relations people find themselves in … we can say that autonomy requires control over one’s external situation, a viable range of options for choice, and the absence of severe constraint’.40 Marina Oshana takes the realisation of self to be part of this situated embodiment, putting forward a realist account of subjectivity, ‘I am of the view that there is no “self of selves,” no essential core in light of which a self might be demarcated …We can learn quite a bit about what the self is and what the idea of selfhood represents by pinpointing the work that the self is expected to do’.41 The message of delineating what the self is supposed to do is one that acknowledges the ‘deeply embedded, interpersonally constructed, and historically situated nature of the self’.42 Relationships of work or politics do not take place in a vacuum and cannot be disembedded. In the act of pursuing autonomy one must be free to act according to what one stands for, in addition to doing what is really desired and taking ownership of one’s own actions. However, in taking on ownership the pull of responsibility on different levels comes into play, responsibility to others and to the self in pursuance of autonomy.43 The conclusion is that autonomy is reliant on an attitude of mind, one which assumes responsibility and answerability for one’s actions. The attitude is one which asserts the authority to speak through an acceptance of ‘self-authorization’, a demand that each accepts answerability for exercising authority. This is to say, autonomous leaders hold themselves accountable for their actions and decisions, an approach which leads to later authentic arguments which acknowledge surgency must be combined with transparency and integrity. The processes of autonomy, reflected-upon identity and self-determination do not start from scratch but come with degrees of socio/cultural imprinting. We can assume the presence of socialization may be liberalizing or constraining but as long as personal identity can be pursued through degrees of self-determination and self-authorization autonomy will always be in place.

 Marina A. L. Oshana (1998). “Personal Autonomy and Society” Journal of Social Philosophy 29 (1): 81–102. pp. 81, 98. 41  Marina A. L. Oshana (2013). “Self-identity and Moral Agency.” in Michael Kühler and Nadia Jelinek (eds.) Autonomy and the Self. Philosophical Studies 118. Springer Dordrecht. 231–252. p. 233. 42  Christman, “Autonomy, Self-Knowledge and Liberal Legitimacy.” p. 333. 43  Paul Benson (2005). “Taking Ownership: Authority and Voice in Autonomous Agency”, in Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism. John Christman and Joel Anderson (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 101–126. 40

Transactional Leadership

29

Transactional Leadership The closest we come to the direct application of autonomy in leadership models is via the general concept of transactional leadership. The line of argument to be followed here is that there are basic characteristics of transactional leadership which directly relate to the notion of autonomy and its political expression in both liberalism and capitalism. Transactional leadership is based on various forms of legal and economic contracts.44 It denotes independence and single-mindedness based on give and take with a focus on the exchange of resources. Leaders monitor follower performance and take corrective action only if standards are not met. As a mutual exchange exercise, transactional leaders with knowledge and resources give followers something they want in exchange for something leaders want.45 Leaders clarify how followers will be rewarded for their efforts. The relationship is one of mutual respect and confidence that the parties can fulfil their tasks without interceding in their areas of expertise. Leadership focuses on motivating followers and smoothing the path to effectively accomplishing the task. The object is to increase ‘personal pay-offs to subordinates for work-goal attainment and make the path to these pay-offs easier to travel by clarifying it, reducing roadblocks and pitfalls, and increasing the opportunities for personal satisfaction en route’.46 Competitiveness is encouraged and there is no intervention or micro-­management of employees so long as contracts are fulfilled and the overall status quo is maintained. Leaders will only intervene if there is imbalance or laissez-faire conditions are threatened. The interactive relationship is reciprocally materialistic, money for work, votes for political favour, and loyalty for security. These transactions are the most common form of business dealings between leaders and followers, typical of groups, legislatures and parties. The point is that such leaders recognise and acknowledge the self-interest of those they work with, as well their own self-­interest. Even though hierarchical roles may be maintained, the transactional mindset rejects extrinsic coercion and favours the autonomy of self-efficacy and self-direction. On a rudimentary level, then, the relationship between follower, in-groups and leaders can be seen in purely economic, contractual, even mercenary terms. Each autonomous party searches for the satisfaction of materialistically based needs. This form of leadership does not bind leader and follower together, other than contractually, based on an overview of rational and measured evaluation. To achieve the best results there must be a loosening of predictable acts determined by pre-given social roles in favour of autonomous competency which objectively accepts practical

 Bruce J.  Avolio and Bernard M.  Bass (1988). “Transformational Leadership, Charisma and Beyond.” in Emerging Leadership Vistas. James Gerald Hunt, B. R. Baliga, H. P. Dachler, Chester A. Schriesheim. (eds.) Lexington Books. 29–49. 45  Karl W. Kuhnert and Philip Lewis (1987). “Transactional and Transformational Leadership: A Constructive/Developmental Analysis.” Academy of Management Review 12 (4): 648–657. 46  Robert J. House (1971). “A Path-Goal Theory of Leader Effectiveness.” Administrative Science Quarterly 16 (3): 321–339. p. 324. 44

30

2 Autonomy

decisions. Mutual support, promises, expectations, obligations and rewards all come into play. Whatever the case, the autonomy of both leader and follower is respected and when the transaction is completed the relationship may well end. In terms of identity there is an enduring belief that leaders and followers are self-determining and rational. In the transactional process, autonomy is especially associated with freedom; freedom to act, freedom for the self and freedom in relating to others. Autonomy is blatantly diminished if there are signs of blandly following a leader’s wishes, or adhering to the will of the majority, even with democratic intent. The pursuit of autonomy places onus on the individual to accept responsibility and insists on personal competence. One of the irritants autonomous thinking reacts against is the condescending attitude of paternalism. Followers who defend their autonomy may object to the claim that leaders ‘know what is best for them’ simply because they are designated leaders. Paternalism is seen as an interference with another person’s liberty on the basis that someone else acts in the interest of another. For some, this is tantamount to coercion. In politics, the paternalistic line is a thin one, since in the interests of public security and safety leaders may be privy to confidential information which cannot be disseminated. This will encourage them to act paternalistically on behalf of their citizens and possibly make decisions which are offensive to the public. Such actions are undertaken for the safety of a community and apply to what John Stuart Mill explores in the public sphere. They should not, however, result in a fundamental change of attitude which flows into the private sphere or usurps the ability to self-develop autonomy: A person whose desires and impulses are his own—are the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture—is said to have a character…But society has now fairly got the better of individuality; and the danger which threatens human nature is not the excess, but the deficiency, of personal impulses and preferences.47

In the private sphere, the moral power of followers and their autonomous ability to make judgements should be tolerated, even encouraged. If there is paternalism and infringement of autonomy it means the freedom to make one’s personal judgement and exercise priorities have been substituted by the judgement of another. As this often takes place when authorities make decisions, an appropriate basis for measuring the transgression of boundaries is whether decisions have crossed over into the private realm of an individual’s expression of personal norms and morality. Several theorists have linked capitalism with liberal principles, notably the free-market capitalism of Milton Friedman48 and work on the furtherment of liberty through market forces in Friedrich Hayek’s version of capitalism.49 It is argued government leaders have a role to play in ensuring the market forces of laissez-faire economics and

 John Stuart Mill (1859/2001) On Liberty. Batoche Books. pp. 56, 57.  Milton Friedman (1962). Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. 49  Friedrich von Hayek (1948). Individualism and the Economic Order. London: University of Chicago Press. 47 48

Transactional Leadership

31

accepting measures to ensure economic liberty with liberal principles, defending freedom of expression and association. As Samuel Freeman puts it: ‘The enforcement of a scheme of private economic rights and liberties within a system of free competitive markets designed to achieve conditions of economic efficiency in both the allocation and the distribution of income and wealth is, as I understand it, the most fundamental feature of capitalism’.50 The position is one which protects individual rights, some of them inalienable, and protects economic efficiency and equal opportunity. Liberalism includes diversity of freedoms which cover equal opportunities to compete for positions, partaking in free competitive markets and receiving government support should there be a breakdown.51 For the high liberal tradition, which includes Mill and Rawls, the free development of individuality is essential for well-being and this would accommodate autonomy and transactional leadership. Every aspect of free exchange is to be supported, ‘economic contracts between strangers are to be regarded as if they were on a par with such private relations—both are forms of voluntary cooperation and, as such, freedom of contract should be given the same degree of protection as freedom of religious associations or of personal or intimate associative relations between friends’.52 Through economic arrangements, individuality can be achieved even though the economy of transactions is not for Mill a liberal right. Mill claims laissez-faire economy is insufficient without institutional help to ensure rational autonomy, individual growth and the realization of moral powers. Though markets play a major part in distribution of income and wealth, he insists institutions must play a part to support all members of society: ‘There never was more necessity for surrounding individual independence of thought, speech and conduct, with the most powerful defences, in order to maintain that originality of mind and individuality of character, which are the only source of any real progress’.53 Transactional leadership is close to personal autonomy as it is the pursuit of one’s personal good but there is a wider case to be made that moral autonomy and social responsibility are also present. Using Kant’s explanation of autonomy we can decide the extent to which transactional leadership involves moral obligation or whether it is purely personal and devoid of ethical content. For some leadership theorists, objective descriptions of transactions seem to obviate forms of moral content and hold them in abeyance until transformational and ethical leadership are appended. For example, many apologists for transformational leadership have an irreverent approach to the transactional position. It is suggested transactional leadership is either subordinate to other forms of leadership or can be used as a complement to other forms. The intention is to show that leader-follower relationships  Samuel Freeman (2011). “Capitalism in the Classical and High Liberal Traditions.” Social Philosophy & Policy Foundation 28 (2):19–55. p. 22. 51  Ibid. p. 26. 52  Ibid. p. 45. 53  John Stuart Mill (1848/2006). Principles of Political Economy, Book V. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. chap. 11, sec. 3, p. 940. 50

32

2 Autonomy

should go further than merely meeting contractual obligation and rather be concerned with actual personal needs, psychological connections, non-economic desires, mentoring and role-modelling. It is argued that leaders can impact followers’ self-development both as individuals and as part of a collective. In the former sense individual values are encouraged to forge out values and beliefs which then go on to constitute personal identity. For Avolio and Bass, transactional leadership ‘only captures a portion of the leader-subordinate relationship. Often its effectiveness is marginal. It can also be counterproductive’.54 These comments reflect the way leadership theory moves away from transactional autonomy to transformative heteronomy. The implication is that left to their own devices followers will flounder or pursue venal self-interest, so there is a need for outside influence to steer the relationship in the right direction. For example, leaders will attempt to ‘convert’ followers to their vision to the point of considerable sacrifice. They will also attempt to influence higher order wants and desires rather than leave them open to autonomous, personal reflection. Leaders will ‘instil pride, faith and respect, stimulate learning experiences and provide ideas for rethinking the old way’.55 Where transformational leadership can aspire to motivate followers to pursue transcendental goals, ‘transactional leadership is a prescription for mediocracy’.56 None of the transformative acts are in themselves negative. Indeed, combined with intellectual stimulation and the encouragement of self-­ confidence to cooperatively participate in policy debate the transformative model offers an attractive, total package. Yet, in undermining the significant contribution the transactional model has for autonomy the transformative approach deflects attention from its own deficiencies. Gary Yukl picks up on this deficit sensing in its most extreme form a bias in transformational leadership to heroic conceptions of leadership. Followers are motivated to transcend their self-interest for the sake of the organization. In the name of building up secure relationships, concerns for organizational processes and the best use of technology fail to receive sufficient attention.57 In short, autonomy takes second place to an over-dependency on heteronomy: Effective performance by an individual, group, or organization is assumed to depend on leadership by an individual with the skills to find the right path and motivate others to take it. In most versions of transformational leadership theory, it is a basic postulate that an effective leader will influence followers to make self-sacrifices and exert exceptional effort. Influence is unidirectional, and it flows from the leader to the follower.58

 Avolio and Bass. “Transformational Leadership, Charisma and Beyond.” p. 30.  Ibid. p. 34. 56  Bernard M.  Bass (1990). “From Transactional to Transformational Leadership: Learning to Share the Vision.” Organizational Dynamics 18 (3): 19–31, p. 20. 57   Gary Yukl (1999). “An Evaluation of Conceptual Weaknesses in Transformational and Charismatic Leadership Theories.” The Leadership Quarterly 10 (2): 285–305, p. 286. 58  Ibid. p. 292. 54 55

Transactional Leadership

33

The encouragement of personal identification with transformative or charismatic leadership results in strong follower dependence resulting in the lack of follower initiative. Such influence over follower attitudes and motivation stymies personal autonomy. Unlike transformational leadership, transactional leadership speaks the language of autonomy in that it is concerned with the conditions under which autonomy can flourish. The application of Kant’s three components of the categorical imperative encourages business leaders to focus on providing meaningful work for employees and high-quality product for customers. Norman Bowie argues that through capitalist enterprise and work provision, self-respect is encouraged, something which is foundational for autonomy and independence.59 As a form of autonomy for both leader and follower, transactional leadership is not a leadership panacea. But it is a misrepresentation to suggest that it lacks moral content and misunderstood when removed from its socio/political setting. Bowie places that setting firmly in the capitalist orbit. It is not surprising that prior to making provisos and reservations about the theory, most transformative apologists affirm that transactional leadership is the most common form of leadership. It is not hard to understand why this is the case. As Bowie suggests, it is because it is intrinsic to the capitalist/liberal philosophy. Kant’s second categorical formulation, which is concerned with the respect for all people and treating them as ends rather than means provides a theory of moral obligation in personal market transactions: ‘At a minimum, labour cannot be treated as a commodity like land, money and machines. All persons in a market transaction must be treated with respect’.60 Here, within the transaction, is mutual respect without any effort to manipulate psychological attitudes. Impartiality is the watchword. Transactional leadership is seen to increase performance when combined with contingent rewards and reduce job role uncertainty. It creates work, which engenders dignity and self-respect: ‘Economic actions are allegedly actions voluntarily entered into. If both parties recognize that economic transactions are agreements between rational responsible adults, and act accordingly, the transactions will pass the respect-for-persons test’.61 Respect for people results in personal dignity based on the human capacity for reason and autonomy. For Kant, from autonomy and rationality we naturally achieve moral agency. It is clear that if transactional leaders respect this approach, moral agency is not absent as some transformational critics suggest but is rather insistently present in what is a classical, capitalist arrangement. In Bowie’s reading of Kant we can conclude that business ethics is not a paradox but rather a comfortable fit. What we find with the autonomous, transactional approach is faith in human ingenuity and respect for personal integrity to get the job done and to consistently pursue acts of moral agency. This activity cannot be subject to the approval of outside influence, mentors or guides who set up principles for

 Norman E. Bowie (1998). “A Kantian Theory of Capitalism.” Business Ethics Quarterly. Special Issue: Ruffin Series. (1): 37–60. 60  Ibid. p. 38. 61  Ibid. p. 40. 59

34

2 Autonomy

judgement or behavioural paradigms. This would be a return to the classical leadership model which makes followers subordinate to leaders. It could be critiqued that this position is overly universal, where norms are a priori, inalienable and binding, and cultural contexts ignored.62 However, Bowie’s position is not reliant on a universal ethical straightjacket or one which disclaims non-universalists principles, or entirely ignores local and particular traditions. Nor does it search for the essence of capitalism. Capitalism is a movement which is malleable, elusive; adept at co-opting difference with chameleon-like qualities which nullify talk of essence. The application of Kant’s philosophy to capitalism and transactional leadership rather illumines the status of individualism and autonomy as a self-defining exercise, one which furthers responsibility and dignity within the capitalist, leader-follower relationship. It does this by insisting on equality of position, and a somewhat naïve faith in the inherent achievability of desirable moral agency. Management-by-exception allows this up to a point but it needs support from social consensus which rejects coercion and sustains individualism and the value-free norms of liberal/capitalist ideology. At best, autonomous and transactional leadership denote an emancipatory relationship, one which is based on the equality of leader and follower, whereby both parties follow an independent style of conduct. Nonetheless, if one strictly adheres to autonomy in the context of a liberal society without agreement, the political and social foundation appears brittle. Liberalism has ‘long been accused of being excessively individualistic in its politics’63 and this casts doubt on whether the legitimate pursuits and values of all citizens can be met: ‘Where there is no fixed and stable set of fully just political principles, the question as to what it means in practice to act as an autonomous, competent citizen who aims to foster the common good of all citizens has no definitive answer’.64 In other words, we can accept the importance of transactional leadership as an expression of autonomy but there is an inbuilt danger that the efforts of self-determination and individuals deciding on their own welfare remain self-serving and socially impotent. There is a need to broaden the concept when considering the pitfalls of both capitalism and liberalism and this is where the full significance of authentic leadership takes centre stage.

 Andrew C.  Wicks (1998). “How Kantian a Theory of Kantian Capitalism?” Business Ethics Quarterly. Special Issue: Ruffin Series. (1): 61–73. 63  Benson, “Taking Ownership: Authority and Voice in Autonomous Agency.” p. 118. 64  Bert van den Brink (2005). “Liberalism without Agreement: Political Autonomy and Agonistic Citizenship.” in Christman and Anderson, Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism, 245–271, p. 260. 62

Chapter 3

Recognising Authenticity

Abstract  Authenticity expands the pursuit of autonomy in the search for a genuine, inner self which can form the basis for authentic responsibility. Charles Taylor, in particular, traces the history of authenticity back to the Romantics and the need to get in touch with one’s inner self. Whereas autonomy is instrumental and single-­ minded, authenticity has a wider appeal to ethical values and moral responsibility. To be authentic is not to copy others but to be in direct contact with one’s inner self and to honestly express those inner characteristics. Finding the true self of authenticity requires considerable introspection and reflection. Leadership traits emerge, such as self-esteem and surgency but should not be taken over by hubris or self-­ interest. The ultimate test for how successful authentic leadership will be is if it is relational, the degree to which well-defined attributes are expressed in deeds which can be considered humane and morally desirable. Relational authenticity takes effort to develop, and calls for an appreciation of gender, ethnicity and race. The strongest advocate for relationality is Emmanuel Levinas, who argues that the Other should get preference over the self because there are indisputable obligations owed to others. A genuine form of altruism means care for others, sustaining ideas of justice for individuals as well as society at large. Keywords  True self · Inner core · Hubris · Moral exaggeration · Self-interest · Charles Taylor · Relational authenticity · Levinas · Altruism · Justice The shift from autonomous competence to authenticity takes place on many levels and still depends on the acceptance of the possibility for the expression of an inner, genuine self. But there is a far broader canvas to fill than the limited area of transactions and reserving a space for autonomy. Authenticity incorporates the autonomous character of self-determination but its reach is greater and the route from autonomy to authenticity is indirect, incorporating the need to consider several leadership characteristics. It begins by reassessing the autonomous insistence on self-control. The rational bias of autonomy is self-authorization via reason and this involves laying aside emotional content as well as lessening external, social and relational influence in order to reinforce independence. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Shaw, The Philosophy of Authentic Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29650-5_3

35

36

3  Recognising Authenticity

Charles Taylor explains that while authenticity owes much to Descartes’ disengaged rationality and pure mind, it also evolves from Romanticism.1 The Romantics tried to unravel the unconscious mind and the influence upon it of events which ultimately make up inner self, a being with inner depth. The understanding of the interaction between the subconscious mind and experience becomes the source for self-concepts. The form of inner self is not taken for granted as a given but rather as a work-in-progress, and this makes it amenable to the various procedures the self can take for improvement and development. In other words, the basis for the self-­ concept mechanism is the movement of becoming rather than the ontology of being. The Romantic era linked ethical judgement derived from intuition of what is right or wrong with the faculty of individual conscience. Morality comes from an inner voice. But as the expression of authenticity developed over time a change occurred whereby authenticity was relative, and its ideals watered down. The inner voice persisted but its connection to moral sense was displaced. It is precisely this crucial drift and the effort required to restore moral sense which puts the relationship between autonomy and authenticity into relief. The conflict between autonomy and authenticity plays out when there is self-serving concern to be free to make choices and disregard, or downplay, other important values. Sidelining these values and focusing on autonomous choice-making means demoting important aspects of moral and affective life, such as emotional concerns, the role of embodiment, and the recognition of difference. Extending authenticity to leadership requires a questioning of taken for granted components of autonomy, especially the ontological status of the self and the claim of being meaningfully able to come in contact with the kernel of identity. Is it at all possible to have an authentic relation to a genuine self? A first move to resolving this quandary is to question the exploration of first-order desire and autonomy. We have considered the vying of volition between first and second order desire and the way autonomy opts for control. Though authenticity acknowledges second-order constraint, it has a closer affiliation to first-order desires. Rather than mould them, there is an effort to positively channel the purity of desire more directly into the lifeworld. Authenticity incorporates categories deemed beyond autonomous, rational instrumentality. Whereas autonomy inhabits a pellucid world of instrumentality and single-mindedness, authenticity has a richer agenda striving to incorporate self-­ legislation, probing ethical values, and accepting moral responsibility. In an attempt to reveal authentic personality, a greater emphasis is placed on tradition and affectivity compared to the more instrumental characterisation of autonomy. Basic to authenticity, or authentic subjectivity, is that everyone has the potential, in fact a duty, to bring out what is best within them. Highly relevant for leadership is the compatibility of authenticity with creativity. One aspect of authenticity is its originality in the sense of not being a copy. Undeniably this is a core feature of artworks where uniqueness and originality is expected, one in which a fresh vision of some kind is expressed. An authentic, true self directly expressive of an inner

 Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity.

1

3  Recognising Authenticity

37

core fits this mould. As an act of individuality artists directly relate to who they are by an authentic connection to their self in much the same way as authentic leaders express the honesty of their intent: ‘Based on its characteristics, authentic leadership should be suitable for stimulating creativity and innovation.’, it especially has an impact on ‘individual creativity and on strengthening the positive relationship between creativity and on team innovation.’2 As a quality of leadership, authenticity requires a way of recognising and working with the genuine self. The assumption is that degrees of self-awareness can lead individuals to recognise the nature of their true self and direct it intentionally. It assumes that with self-awareness individuals acknowledge personal tendencies which can be categorised, formulated and applied to a diversity of situations. This resonates well with leadership theories which concentrate on categorising and collating individual traits in an effort to explore identity in terms of universal dispositions, idiosyncratic singularities, natural talents and acquired skills. For authenticity, self-awareness through reflection is not a destination point but an emerging process where one continually comes to understand one’s own talents, strengths, sense of purpose, capabilities, core values, beliefs and desires. As with autonomy, self-­ reflection provides the ability to tap into the authentic core self and reflective thinking helps support this in a way which is more outwardly directed to the lifeworld and the social realm. In order to explore the notion of authenticity in greater detail it is necessary to clearly grasp the phenomenological distinction between the natural self and the thinking self. Instincts and first-order desires are foundational and some would argue, notwithstanding autonomous efforts, outside the personal ambit of control. More accessible and malleable are the social cognitive components, such as self-­ esteem and self-knowledge. The different traits leaders show in different contexts may be considered components of one identity but may also appear to others as a radical change of personality. In fact, functional flexibility is a desirable sign of versatility, it ‘involves having confidence in one’s ability to call into play multiple, perhaps contradictory, self-aspects’ and ‘reflects the complexities of social life and people’s ability to adjust to them in dealing with life situations.’3 This echoes Stephen Zaccaro who posits the importance of using multiple traits which comprise constellations, ‘leader traits are not to be considered in isolation but rather as integrated constellations of attributes that influence leadership performance.’4 To meet leadership challenges and the need to adapt to changing situations a wide range of dispositional attributes and cognitive capacities are  Matej Cerne. Marko Jaklic. Miha Skerlavaj (2013). Authentic leadership, creativity, and innovation: A multilevel perspective. Leadership 9 (1): 63–85, pp. 64, 79. 3  Michael H. Kernis (2003). “Towards a Conceptualization of Optimal Self-Esteem.” Psychological Inquiry 14 (1): 1–26, p. 17 C/f. Delroy. L. Paulhus and Carol Lynn Martin (1988). “Functional Flexibility: A New Conceptualization of Interpersonal Flexibility.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 55 (1): 88–101. 4  Stephen J. Zaccaro (2007). “Trait-Based Perspectives of Leadership.” American Psychologist 62 (1): 6–16, p. 8. 2

38

3  Recognising Authenticity

needed, such as ‘cognitive complexity, cognitive flexibility, metacognitive skills, social intelligence, emotional intelligence, adaptability, openness, and tolerance for ambiguity.’5 The authentic, true self will normally encompass many traits which are available for use in different situations utilising different combinations of these attributes. It can be agreed that for leadership considerable self-esteem is needed to function successfully. The result of developed self-esteem is an assured sense of surgency which instills confidence in associates and followers. Self-esteem is part of how one sees oneself in terms of worthiness, likeability and respectfulness. The degrees of self-esteem may negatively or positively impact authentic relationships. Extremely high self-esteem can easily tip over into self-serving bias or act as a diversion from carrying out beneficial, productive activities. At the same time, over-­ confidence creates an unrealistic view of what is practically possible and distorts self-evaluation of personal abilities. It frustrates the processing of the knowledge that can be gained from experience, a linchpin for change and flexibility. On the other hand, too little self-esteem generally has a negative effect on decision-making. It results in harping on personal failures and may lead to apathy and inertia. To act according to optimal self-esteem means to reflect one’s values and preferences. It displays the confidence to withstand social rebuttal, which at one time or another everyone experiences. In sum, optimal self-esteem functions without the need for continuous validation or for external acceptance, approval or praise. Without self-­ esteem it is unlikely leaders will display surgency and accept the mantle of responsibility. Optimal self-esteem is part of the positive psychological state approach to authenticity and ties in well with authentic leadership prescriptions. In their summary of authentic leadership development, Luthans and Avolio argue the case for positive leadership on the socio/political level and for all types of organizations. They rue the present state-of-affairs where positive leadership is under-­ researched by leaders as well as being ignored by positive psychologists.6 Authentic leadership is described in terms of confluence, a meeting of transformational leadership and positive organizational behaviour. In furthering positive psychological capacities, the belief is that greater self-awareness and self-regulation on the part of both leader and follower can be strengthened. Positive psychology plays a comprehensive role in the application of authentic leadership both for individual leaders and group followers. The debate and subsequent recommendations have been forcefully adopted by leadership theorists who argue that the raised standard of conduct in terms of honesty and transparency should produce a much needed paradigm shift in the way leaders influence business and society. Authentic leader apologists argue leaders have no need for coercion or rhetorical mind-control but can serve up their cultivated persona as a role model for others to emulate whereby ‘authentic values,  Ibid. pp. 9–10.  Fred Luthans and Bruce Avolio (2003). “Authentic Leadership Development,” in Kim S Cameron, Jane E.  Dutton, Robert E.  Quinn (eds.). Positive Organizational Scholarship. Berret- Koehler Publishers, Inc. 241–258. 5 6

3  Recognising Authenticity

39

beliefs and behaviours serve to model the development of associates’ to become leaders themselves.7 These values and dispositions are positive, both in the sense of showing resilience and hope, and in the positivistic sense of being subject to description, evaluation and measurement. Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi support this view arguing that psychologists should reassess priorities to move away from focusing on the side of autonomy when it emphasises self-interest, aggressiveness and territoriality.8 In preference to this, attention should shift to positive psychology as a science and empirical study which ‘take as its primary task the understanding of what makes life worth living.’9 This increases the spread of positive psychology into social and cultural areas. As well as being relevant to individual leaders and followers, it also impacts group behaviour, civic virtues, institutions, ‘tolerance, and work ethics’.10 Through all of these facets positive psychology recommends authentic happiness procedures designed to cultivate fundamental strengths and virtues which can be applied to family and work in everyday life. According to Seligman, authentic happiness can be achieved through pursuing pleasure, especially in the form of long term positive emotions, being practically absorbed or engaged in activities and, finally, finding meaning in one’s life by aspiring to a higher, transcendent experience.11 Authentic happiness is reliant on subjective, sincere, personal evaluations. There is an autonomous residue at work where well-being can be considered a retreat from the judgment of others. The emphasis is on an ‘internal locus of evaluation’ in later years which is ‘seen by life span developmentalists to give the person a sense of freedom from the norms governing everyday life.’12 In authentic leadership theory, happiness has been more finely differentiated as ‘positive psychological capital, including the psychological states of efficacy, hope, optimism, and resiliency.’13 These positive emotions have also been extended to follower attitudes and the way they can be influenced by a leader acting as a positive role model.

 Ibid. p. 243.  Martin E. P. Seligman and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (2000) “Positive Psychology: an introduction.” American Psychologist 55 (1): 5–14. 9  Ibid. p. 13. 10  Julia Vassilieva (2016). Narrative Psychology. London: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 164. 11  Martin E. P. Seligman (2002). Authentic Happiness. New York: Free Press. 12  Carol D.  Ryff (1989). “Happiness Is everything, or is it? Explorations on the Meaning of Psychological Well-Being.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57 (6): 1069–1081, p. 1071. 13  Bruce J. Avolio and Ketan H. Mhatre (2012). “Advances in Theory and Research on Authentic Leadership” in Gretchen M.  Spreitzer and Kim S.  Cameron (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Positive Organizational Scholarship. Oxford University Press. 773–783. p. 776. 7 8

40

3  Recognising Authenticity

Authentic Reservations The argument is that authentic leaders genuinely desire to serve others through their position of authority; they are interested in empowering people they lead to make a difference, guided as much by the heart, passion, and compassion as they are by the mind. In addition to the transformative focus on relationships and the influence of mentoring, authentic leadership claims to set standards for ethics and justice. From this description, it is evident support for authentic leadership is far-ranging. However, because authentic leadership covers a wide area of activity which is supported by disciplines such as psychology and sociology, reservations inevitably arise. For example, most empirical validation has been carried out in the context of Western cultures, resulting in a limited horizon of interest so that the ‘impact of gender, ethnicity and race on authentic leadership’ has not been of primary concern.14 In addition, authentic leadership is highly eclectic which, in itself, is productive, however, there is tension between the personal search for the authentic self and the actual personality projected to others. It may be deemed that one’s authentic self is inappropriate for a particular situation or group of people. Just as charismatic leadership is dependent on community and reception, so with authenticity there is reliance on how others interpret and view one’s claim to be authentic and whether there is a situational fit. What must be taken into consideration is not only the personal conviction that the core self is genuinely being tapped but, in addition, the impression that it is being adequately and accurately communicated. Do others believe they are witnessing a genuine self, or do they believe, perhaps, they are being manipulated in duplicitous manner? How do other people view the presentation of self? It is understood that various versions of identity need to be juggled depending on situation. In order to be liked or accepted by a workforce, leaders need to have an appeal which may or may not be based on authenticity. David Collinson explores the variety of identities individuals attempt to project on to others: Rarely, if ever, do we experience a singular or unitary sense of self. There also appears to be an almost unlimited number of possible sources of identity. Human beings seem able to construct coexisting identities from many different aspects of our lives (e.g. one’s body, ethnicity, religion, possessions, family status, gender, age, class, occupation, nationality, sexuality, language, political beliefs, clothing, etc.).15

It is often the case in the business world that leaders and associates are encouraged to align their intended authentic self with organizational expectations. Practically built into culture, organizations encourage and confer identities on their workforce, producing pressure which may result in anxiety and deep-seated insecurity. As a result, various survival practices come into play as a counterforce defence resulting in a process of identity negotiation and adjustment. This may constitute a state of  Ibid. p. 782.  David L. Collinson (2003). “Identities and Insecurities: Selves at Work.” Organization 10 (3): 527–547, p. 534. 14 15

Authentic Reservations

41

destabilization where everything is up for grabs, from normal ways of behaving to demands placed on feelings and aspirations: ‘What was once considered private, namely the workers’ thoughts, feelings, and emotions, now routinely serve as fodder for organizational and managerial interventions.’16 The implication is that leaders may project authenticity as a strategic manoeuvre, a self-conscious spinning of the self as an attempt to coalesce various fragments of life-story into an attractive package, one which will appeal to follower groups. In return, followers may feel the need to ‘craft a fake self’ in the workplace to protect or secure an authentic self in private.17 In order to rework and conflate the apparent dichotomy between genuine and artificial selves, Tracy and Trethewey suggest a crystal image which serves to represent an all-inclusive multifaceted self.18 No one area of life is prioritised but each region reflects off the other, changing shape according to prevailing discourses and freeing individuals to follow activities in a natural, self-determining manner which is not tied to the determinants of an inner core. There are, then, both personal and environmental tensions involved in finding an authentic self and its appropriate representation. This has led Nyberg and Sveningsson to conclude there are fundamental difficulties with the notion of authentic leadership.19 They repeat the suspicion that relying on others for judgment and positive responses encourages leaders to design a more acceptable public face as a cynical compromise. From this perspective, any crystal image designed to project an authentic self is a mere amalgam to placate social expectation. An underlying tendency of the authentic critique is to question both the possibility of accessing a true self and, if discoverable, question whether it is ethical by nature. The conceit is that the ability to act authentically assumes one knows one’s true preferences and values, that one can act in accordance with them, and genuinely communicate them to others. In other words, there needs to be relational transparency, a degree of certainty which may be difficult to attain: Whether there is a ‘true self’ is highly questionable. Arguably, people struggle to reach some form of a positive and coherent idea of who they are, but these efforts do not necessarily mirror or reach a true self-core. It is quite difficult to construct a true self in a socially varying, relational and dynamic workplace – an imperfect world – that calls for a variety of different roles and acts that do not necessarily overlap any notion of true self.20

Even if the notion of a true, coherent self does materialise it may result in personal feelings of frustration or even resistance. Nyberg and Sveningsson give the example of managers who see themselves as authentic, ‘natural born leaders’ but find it  Sarah J. Tracy and Angela Trethewey (2005). “Fracturing the Real-Self↔Fake-Self Dichotomy: Moving Toward “Crystallized” Organizational Discourses and Identities.” Communication Theory 15 (2): 168–195, p. 172. 17  Ibid. p. 182. 18  Ibid. p. 186. 19  Daniel Nyberg and Stefan Sveningsson (2014). “Paradoxes of Authentic Leadership. Leader Identity Struggles.” Leadership 10 (4): 437–455. 20  Ibid. p. 440. 16

42

3  Recognising Authenticity

difficult to put this leader-centric trait into effect. They see their authentic, overly assertive approach as being too bossy and dogmatic for employees to feel comfortable. The result is alienation and awkward contact in local interactions, a form of identity stress. This necessitates a mellower, more socially acceptable approach which leaders ensconce within an amenable persona. Leaders can draw on different models or stereotypes to artificially configure their identity. Adopting different persona may target a variety of archetypes which leaders feel followers can more easily relate to. At best, these recognisable archetypical figures, such as the hero or peacemaker, are convenient ways to communicate compassion, courage and support but at worst only serve to frustrate and distance pathways to a genuine relationship by hiding behind an appealing mask.21 Other critiques of leadership authenticity take exception to the way it is linked to leader authority and the transformative influence within organizations. For example, in their model of classic authentic leadership, Gardner et al. examine the influence of authentic leaders on followers in an organization. They emphasise that ‘by modelling authentic values and behaviour, and actively encouraging follower self-­ development, authentic leaders can foster the process of self-discovery among followers.’22 They go on to analyse the degree to which adherence and influence will depend on follower self-clarity and the extent to which leader and follower values and goals coincide. Yet, this can all too easily result in unwholesome identification. Authentic leadership encourages role-modelling because there is an inbuilt belief that, being authentic, leaders attain desirable values and moral probity deserving respect and emulation. However, inauthentic followers who have weak self-clarity may over-identify with leaders to the extent they take on board leader values, a move which contradicts the authentic quest for self-determined values. In order to avoid or pre-empt this tendency Gardner et al. suggest part of the authentic leadership task is to encourage followers not to identify with individual leaders but with groups, or organizational values as a whole. In this way, they internalize the mission of the collective. The argument is that the process of internalizing core organizational and group values will lead to the desirable ‘high levels of self-clarity and autonomy that accompany authenticity.’23 However, these recommendations produce an uncertain outcome, pressurising followers on all sides. Authentic leaders may manipulate their authenticity to communicate a pristine, transparent inner core self which, if we are to follow the positive psychology supporters, will inhere optimism and the moral high ground. There may be an attempt to transfer these values organizationally and inculcate them into employee behaviour. This is reinforced when so-called authentic leaders become identified with their organizations to the extent their own autonomy evaporates. As for followers, they end up subordinate and objectified, their subjectivity subsumed  Brian Dale (2017). Archetypes: Unmasking Your True Self. Balboa Press.  William L. Gardner. Bruce J. Avolio, Fred Luthans, Douglas R. May, Fred Walumbwa (2005). “‘Can you see the real me?’ A self-based model of authentic leader and follower development.” The Leadership Quarterly 16 (3): 343–372. p. 359. 23  Ibid. p. 360. 21 22

Authentic Reservations

43

into the service of the collective which now includes both leader and organizational values. The relationship is not one of leader/follower, but of collective ‘domination and potential destruction of the follower.’24 Rather than authenticity, it is the inauthentic face of identity that surfaces. In general, the collective organizational self is left without positive agency or freedom of thought. Moreover, there is the insistent but unfounded argument that morality and the authentic leadership movement of psychology and organizational behaviour go hand in hand: ‘Proponents of this movement ultimately desire to train and develop leaders who will proactively foster positive environments and conduct business in an ethical, socially responsible manner… authentic theorists appear to assume that the true selves that authentic leaders discover through trigger events is an ethical self.’25 However, analysis of the relationship between moral reasoning and its expression through moral action fails to establish any direct correlation with authentic leadership: The absence of a direct relationship between moral reasoning and moral action through leaders’ authentic behaviour might explain why some leaders who are generally well adept at moral reasoning still engage in counterproductive or unethical behaviour (e.g., bullying, lying) irrespective of how authentic they perceive themselves to be or other people think they are…it is the gap between leaders’ moral reasoning and moral action which has led to numerous corporate scandals, and it remains unaddressed.26

Everyone can be self-serving, or Machiavellian. Moral behaviour is defined as being morally responsible because of the impact of choices and actions on others. What is not clear is how this is related to being true to one’s inner core beliefs which may be anything but morally inclined. The philosopher, Schopenhauer, was adamant that being in touch with one’s core was to be in touch with an agitated blind-urge. In essence, the human driving force, the will, ‘impels individual egos to be selfish’.27 For Schopenhauer, reflection and rationalization can be put into practice to analyse our internal restlessness but their impact is feeble. The self-interested, acquisitive will is hell bent on controlling those who are subordinate. Even though there is a saving grace, that we are all in the same mess and need each other to survive, Schopenhauer’s account is markedly at odds with the classic authentic position which refers to the same core but from a totally different perspective: ‘Authentic leaders also draw upon their core values and principles to determine what is believed to fall on the “thin white line” of what’s right versus off the line, regarding what’s

 Jackie Ford and Nancy Harding (2011). “The Impossibility of the ‘true self’ of authentic leadership.” Leadership 7 (4): 463–479. p. 474. 25  Cecily D.  Cooper, Terri A.  Scandura, Chester A.  Schriesheim (2005). “Looking forward but learning from our past: Potential challenges to developing authentic leadership theory and authentic leaders.” The Leadership Quarterly 16 (3): 475–493, pp. 477, 486. 26  Sen Sendjaya, Andre Pekerti, Charmine Hartel, Giles Hirst, Ivan Butarbutar. (2016). “Are Authentic Leaders Always Moral? The Role of Machiavellianism in the Relationship Between Authentic Leadership and Morality.” Journal of Business Ethics 133 (1): 125–139, p. 135. 27  Nathan W. Harter (1997). “The Shop Floor Schopenhauer: Hope for a Theory-X Supervisor.” Journal of Management Education 21 (1): 87–96, p. 89. 24

44

3  Recognising Authenticity

wrong…By reflecting on their own selves and others, such leaders think with greater depth about moral issues.’28 The sense of inner-self is thought to possess an innate sensibility concerning what is right or correct behaviour: ‘The individual integrates all…facets of experience and comes to an inner sense of what is right for him or her. This sense is trustworthy; it is not necessary to depend on outside authorities to say what is right.’29 Built into the process of reflection is the conceit that both ethics and personal values can be foraged and screened to become the fulcrum of authenticity, an internal compass to deal with morally grey situations. Sendjaya et al. go further and provide an example whereby unethical means support a moral end, thereby muddying the waters of authentic ethics. Mother Teresa won the Nobel Peace Prize for her authentic, moral courage working to alleviate the plight of the very poorest in the world. In carrying out her charitable work, she received donations and help from embezzler and convicted felon, Charles Keating. Following Keating’s conviction, she refused to return the money and wrote a letter on behalf of Keating to the judge pleading for leniency. Mother Theresa’s aim was to help the poor, even though the means to achieve it was supported by an unethical source. The conclusion is that one can follow ethically dubious action while at the same time be true to oneself. ‘At the point when Mother Teresa used morally ambiguous means to justify the noble cause of helping the less fortunate (i.e., behaving in a Machiavellian manner) she exemplified authentic yet Machiavellian behaviour.’30 Alvesson and Sveningsson claim authentic leader apologists unrealistically and pompously argue authentic leaders are akin to saints, prophets, martyrs and moral giants who devote themselves to creating a better world, while inauthentic leaders are not leaders at all, but individuals bent on self-interest and personal aggrandisement.31 As for the constructive influence of role-modelling, they argue it is more likely to involve dependency rather than personal growth, and copycat gesturing rather than genuine self-awareness. When the advice offered is to ‘be yourself’ and independently ignore social custom it sends a message which is naïve and a sign of ‘kitchen philosophical platitudes’.32 The conclusion is that if the classic format of the authentic leader model is followed leadership power is intensified: ‘A morally exaggerated view of the leader is likely to…further reinforce the employee dependencies, submissions and asymmetrical relations traditionally found in organizations…It accords with a general desire for comforting leadership and the desire for those in charge to be moral peak performers with full insight into themselves.33  Douglas R. May. Timothy D. Hodges. Adrian Y. L. Chan. Bruce J. Avolio (2003). “Developing the Moral Component of Authentic Leadership.” Organizational Dynamics 32(3): 247–260, pp. 252, 253. 29  Kernis, “Toward a Conceptualization of Optimal Self-Esteem.” p. 15. 30  Sendjaya, Pekerti, Hartel, Hirst, Butarbutar. “Are Authentic Leaders Always Moral?” p. 136. 31  Mats Alvesson and Stefan Sveningsson (2013). “Authentic Leadership Critically Reviewed.” in Donna Ladkin and Chellie Spiller. Authentic Leadership Clashes, Convergences and Coalescences. Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 39–54. 32  Ibid. p. 47. 33  Ibid. pp. 45, 52. 28

Relational Authenticity

45

These reservations warrant serious consideration. But care is needed when the notion of authenticity is deconstructed in this way. The basic tenets of authenticity, the genuine and honest pursuance of self-determined identity and the extent to which this core self can be related to interpersonal relationships, comes under threat and risks attenuation. Authenticity becomes something it originally set out to oppose; meeting the expectation and requirements of others and trying to passively fit in with the exigencies of circumstance and situation. This was not the authentic project supported by autonomy nor is it the position argued by existential authenticity. Most of the above criticisms depict leadership more in terms of the one-sided charisma and transformational models. Nonetheless, the critique is well-taken. There are difficulties accessing inner core desire and effectively channelling it in the right direction. No one is claiming that the road to authenticity is without hurdles to overcome or is an easy exercise in identity modelling. Without clarifying the existential, social and ethical dimensions the pursuit of authenticity appears threadbare when in fact it is the most comprehensive leadership model of all.

Relational Authenticity In as much as authenticity relates to self-development and transparency this comprises only an aspect of authentic life. Nor is there anything essentially good in a personal life story unless that life story depicts a virtuous person. It could just as easily convey ruthlessness and competitive spirit which may be desirable business qualities but may not contribute to well-being or solve the regular scandals which occur in the world of commerce. Equally, from an ethical perspective, being true to oneself only qualifies as authentic if that inner self does indeed possess virtuous qualities to do good. All authentic leadership theorists argue innate moral reasoning is a strong component but self-constituted values, and first level desires, have to be coupled with deeds, activating incipient moral rationale to where leadership decisions can take effect. The psychology theorist, Lawrence Kohlberg, has described the moral process as one which locks the ability to reason into developmental stages which do not directly parallel the desire to do good.34 The stages comprise three levels of cognitive moral development, the pre-conventional, the conventional and the post-­ conventional which trace movement from egoistic hedonism to social conformity and, finally, the internalization of universal ethical principles. Kohlberg’s cognitive model of moral ability is not based on innate dispositions or an inner core but is rather personal construction that develops throughout life and, if put into practice, results in absolute respect for fairness and justice during its later stage. Kohlberg is

 Lawrence Kohlberg (1971). Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education. Harvard University. 34

46

3  Recognising Authenticity

clear that the process is to move away from introspection and rationalization to relational activity: Moral judgments (or moral equilibrium) involve two related processes or conditions absent in the logical domain. First, moral judgments involve role-taking, taking the point of view of others conceived as subjects and coordinating those points of view, whereas logic involves only coordinating points of view upon objects. Second, equilibrated moral judgments involve principles of justice or fairness…structures are “natural,” not in the sense of being innate, but in the sense of being the sequential results of processing moral experience.35

This perceived pattern of alignment can be described as behavioural integrity; the coupling of an agent’s words with an agent’s deeds. It relates to a perceived fit between what the agent claims to be ethically and its application to actual events. In simple terms, it is what followers look for in leaders, a ‘follow-through on expressed commitments’36 whereby followers make a judgment based on their perception of what leaders say and the consistency of what they do to uphold their promise. This is important for building trust between leader and follower and can mutually benefit each party if word-deed alignment is present. If this is lacking, if there is misalignment, it easily results in moral outrage.

Levinas and the Care for Others For relational authenticity to be taken seriously it must first be recognised that self-­ interest is not necessarily a selfish pursuit. The reaction of others brings to the fore the dialectic between self-interest and promoting the care for others. Indeed, there is an unlikely but natural relationship between what is potentially a conflict of interest; pursuing self-interest as tantamount to pursuing the interest of others: Self-interest motivates us to find ways to be useful to our fellow human beings. It encourages us to be attentive to their wants. It impels us to treat others with courtesy and consideration. It induces us to work to earn their trust so that they will have the confidence to engage in further mutually advantageous exchanges with us.37

Self-interest, then, depends on the cooperation of others and coupled with altruism helps create a more decent society. Rather than mere motivation to be useful to others, genuine altruism is about prioritising care for the other, the alter-self. Altruism is a normative principle not merely a motive for action. Emmanuel Levinas, the most radical and insightful philosopher of altruism, argues altruism is inconceivable

 Lawrence Kohlberg (1973). “The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral Judgment.” Journal of Philosophy 70 (18): 630–646, pp. 633, 634. 36  Tony Simons (2002). “Behavioural Integrity: The perceived alignment between managers’ words and deeds as a research focus.” Organization Science 13 (1): 18–35, p. 19. 37  Ian Maitland (2002). “The Hunan Face of Self-Interest.” Journal of Business Ethics 38 (1–2): 3–17, p. 8. 35

Levinas and the Care for Others

47

without self-interest, since the care for self is perquisite for the care for others.38 Encouraging self-interests of others is an altruistic expression of a joint enterprise. For example, in negotiations leaders who aspire to achieve a win-win situation will attempt to further the self-interest of others to overcome deadlock, achieve an integrative solution, and transform solitary self-interest into a mutual area of satisfaction, abundance and growth for all parties.39 To meet this requirement authentic leadership is redefined away from only being true to oneself to a state of being true to self-in-relationship: while the self is an important reference point for assessing authenticity, it is not the only, and possibly not the most important reference point for AL. Authenticity is not just a question of ‘being true to self’, but also of being true to ‘self-in-relationship’ as well as to ‘self and world’.40

Levinas argues that there is no totality or basic models which can be used to dictate ethical behaviour. He rejects abstract theories, the systems of bureaucracy, or even aspects of Husserl’s intentionality. Authentic identity cannot be claimed prior to the relationship to other. Subjectivity is a self-in-movement between the ‘I’ and the other. To be authentic to this identity is not to respond to an inner core or set of first-­ order desires but rather to express responsiveness to self-in-movement to the other, movement which is both a response and a responsibility. Responsibility, which is the key move from owning oneself to interacting with others, is infinite, a given outside of reason and deliberation, a dedication which precedes dedication to self.41 Responsibility dates from an immemorial past and no rational system or totality of principles can accommodate it. For Levinas, totality is associated with power and control, orderliness and systems, whereas infinity relates to the quality of life, freedom and creativity. There is infinite excess, especially in language and dialogue which keeps the interactive process perpetually open and as a constant process of search. Active saying calls for responsibility.42 Levinas couches his argument of allegiance to the other in terms of the ‘face’ and that allegiance is absolute. Any appeal to the other is to ‘posit oneself as responsible’ as it seeks obligations, judgments and responses from another. The other is like an awakening of the self from cocooned slumber, a dis-location of the self-same, amounting to transcendence. The subject escapes from anonymity to ‘rid itself of itself’ and move away from the autonomy of self-relationship.43 The subject is  Emmanuel Levinas (1991/1998) Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other. Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav (trans.) Columbia University Press. 39  Roger Fisher. William Ury, Bruce Patton (1991). Getting to Yes. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 40  Puck M. Algera, Marjolein Lips-Wiersma (2012). “Radical Authentic Leadership: Co-creating the conditions under which all members of the organization can be authentic.” The Leadership Quarterly 23 (1): 118–131, p. 119. 41  Emmanuel Levinas (1947/1987). Time and The Other. Richard A.  Cohen (trans.) Duquesne University Press. 42  Emmanuel Levinas (1961/1969). Totality and Infinity. Alphonso Lingis (trans.) Duquesne University Press. 43  Richard Cohen, “Introduction”, in Levinas, Time and The Other, 1–27, pp. 5, 6. 38

48

3  Recognising Authenticity

ecstatically projected out of self into the world and this is characterised as salvation. For Levinas, the relation between self and the other predates subjectivity and creates an uncontainable, excess transcendence. For leaders to be authentic in this circumstance is to recognise the ethical dimension of otherness, where the individual begins with autonomy but comes to take up a position whereby the other counts more than the self. Again, responsibility is of the essence: ‘The ‘I’ is responsible not only to know the other or to share an understanding of the world which the other also shares, but is responsible to respond to the very alterity of the other.’44 In an attempt to apply Levinas’ insight into relationship to the other, Samuel Mansell picks up on the infinity of the ethical demand and how this impacts leaders and managers in business organizations.45 The gist of the argument is that pre-­ formed rules and regulations, or any form of rigid structure, limits ethical conduct by contravening the absolute responsibility for the other and impedes authenticity. Autonomy and egoistic self-interest belong to the closure that is totality. One cannot know what responsibility entails nor constrain it through regulations because life situations are infinitely varied. To be authentic, then, is to show self-responsibility, to be transparent and transpose inner core values to the lifeworld. To be relationally authentic is to show responsibility in the interaction between self and other by recognising indisputable obligations. Business leaders may not recognise this, showing inauthentic behaviour by acting narcissistically or single-mindedly pursuing economic goals to the detriment of business ethics and corporate social responsibility.46 Levinas reminds us that the danger of reflexively constituting the sense of self-identity artificially encrusts the self, whereas from an ethical standpoint subjectivity and identity ‘comes to us from the outside in the assignation of responsibility for my neighbour’. For Levinas, it is a question of ‘coring out’ the self from encrustation to affirm uniqueness, not merely based on self-construction but also through responsibility for others.47 His comments circumvent aspects of the rational argument in that they precede the workings of reason. The bureaucratic excuse, ‘I was only following orders’, may raise its ugly head. It is a clear denial of personal responsibility and relates to what Levinas describes as totality; being subject to the system, regulations, and knowing one’s place; a feeble and dangerous excuse. There has to be authenticity in relationships which Levinas insists cannot be present when blindly obeying others. Levinas’ recognition of the other is not based on the power of the other over an individual or on kowtowing to another’s wishes as in the bureaucratic model of power. The danger is that the bureaucratic system defends the totality or pervasiveness of rational systems and in  Ibid. p. 18.  Samuel Mansell (2008). “Proximity and Rationalisation: The Limits of a Levinasian Ethics in the Context of Corporate Governance and Regulation.” Journal of Business Ethics 83 (3): 565–577. 46  John Roberts (2003). “The Manufacture of Corporate Social Responsibility: Constructing Corporate Sensibility.” Organization 10 (2): 249–265. 47  Ibid. pp.  252, 253. C/f. Emmanuel Levinas (1974/1991). Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. Alphonso Lingis (trans.) Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. p. 100. 44 45

Levinas and the Care for Others

49

doing so disconnects individuals from moral responsibility. All become subject to predefined organization and all are judged according to the same, nameless, statistical quest. Failure to be authentic results in hiding behind the system, which allows leaders to use it as an excuse for neglecting moral obligations. This is highlighted by the ‘multitude of ethical controversies that have enveloped business in recent years, such as the accounting scandals of Enron and World Com, the use of ‘sweatshop labour’ by Nike, and the orientation of business towards the problem of environmental sustainability.’48 Relational authenticity, conversely, indicates openness, the infinity of ethical conduct based on the absolute recognition of another who cannot be subsumed under deductive generalisation but is connected in the flow of time by open dialogue, interactivity, and mutual respect. The inescapable obligation to the other cannot be reserved only for those one comes face-to-face with, or those with whom one is familiar. Leader actions are not reserved for the few who come in close proximity but for all. The other (autrui) is supplemented by the others (autre), which Levinas describes as the third party.49 The wider implication of the third party brings in the notion of justice and the need to explore more fully which ‘other’ is being addressed. The face, even if not taken literally, has a sense of proximity. But leaders have a wider appeal than this and must come to terms with the notion of justice as fairness for all in equality. With justice comes a wider orbit than the interpersonal, it brings with it institutions and community. The approach of a distant Other complicates and contradicts matters by introducing a third party who also demands my infinite obligation on top of the singular other. Even though infinite responsibility is interpersonal, wider systemisation and justice for all cannot be ignored by any authentic leader: Justice is necessary, that is, comparison, coexistence, contemporaneousness, assembling, order, thematization, the visibility of faces, and thus intentionality and the intellect, and in intentionality and the intellect, the intelligibility of a system, and thence also a co-presence on an equal footing as before a court of justice.50

Levinas’ account of justice is in places ambivalent; sometimes it coincides with ethics, sometimes not. There is tension between the particularity of the other and the universality of others in community and this produces potential incompatibility between ethics and justice. Levinas recognises this: ‘Levinas customarily reserved the word ‘justice’ for the relation to the third party. However, occasionally…Levinas used justice as a synonym for what he elsewhere called ethics.’51 In fact, Levinas encapsulates the one in the other, including all others in the Other: ‘In reality the

 Mansell, “Proximity and Rationalisation” p. 569.  Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 212. 50  Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 157. C/f. Pat J. Gehrke (2010). “Being for the Other-to-the-Other: Justice and Communication in Levinasian Ethics.” The Review of Communication 10 (1): 5–19, p. 14. 51  Robert Berasconi (1997). “Justice without Ethics?” In Responsibilities of Deconstruction. J. Dronsfield and N. Midgley. (eds.) Warwick Journal of Philosophy (Summer): 58–67. 48 49

50

3  Recognising Authenticity

relation with the Other is never uniquely the relation with the Other: the third party is always already represented in the Other; in the very apparition of the Other the third party already looks at me.’52 There are some who take exception to the way Levinas describes the status of the other interpreting it in a way that places initiative on the other’s action first and foremost, thereby completely dissipating the primacy of agency and with it leader initiatives. Paul Ricoeur, for example, describes Levinas’ philosophy as resting ‘on the initiative of the other in the intersubjective relation. In reality, this initiative establishes no relation at all, to the extent that the other represents absolute exteriority with respect to an ego defined by the condition of separation. The other, in this sense, absolves himself of any relation.’53 Ricoeur is right to recognise the significance of ‘face’ as more of an epiphany than a physical presence but his admonition is that onus comes from the other, as an injunction which makes the subject purely a passive ‘I’. For Ricoeur, the equality of the give and take of friendship is somehow put out of balance. However, agency must still involve responsibility, indeed this is substantially recognised by Levinas: ‘[I]n substitution my being that belongs to me and not to another is undone, and it is through this substitution that I am not another but me…There is no ipseity common to me and the others; ‘me’ is the exclusion from this possibility of comparison…’54 It is clear then that for Levinas the ‘I’ still retains the status of being irreplaceable. Not being concerned with the self in no way means the self is lost. For a leader, this means there is no passivity but responsible agency, a need to actively respond to the call of others. There is no subordination or absolute sacrifice to the other because the leader should actively contribute: ‘We need to be there to help the others (since undue sacrifice of self would militate against fulfilling our responsibility for the others)…(Levinas) also wants to allow justice for ourselves to limit the sacrifice of ourselves.’55 To cement this view, it is also important to perceive exchanges between self and other in an open way divested of ideological contamination. What the meeting of faces produces is not intimacy, clandestine exchanges, or absolute sacrifice but rather created events, happenings which are emergent from language and the chrysalis sayings of dialogue. Levinas is a fine source of relational authenticity as he emphasises relationality emanates from the depth of relational responsibility with universal application: ‘The third party looks at me in the eyes of the Other – language is justice…the epiphany of the face qua face opens humanity. The poor one, the stranger, presents himself as an equal.’56 In other words, the garrison that is ego is self-penetrated by an act of reversion to return to the founding openness of life, to the clearing that Heidegger describes, and  Ibid. p. 61.  Paul Ricoeur (1992). Oneself as Another. Kathleen Blamey (trans.) University of Chicago Press. pp. 188–89. 54  Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 127. 55  M.  Jamie Ferreira (2001). “Total Altruism in Levinas’ Ethics of the Welcome.” Journal of Religious Ethics 29 (3): 443–470, pp. 458, 467. 56  Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 213. 52 53

Levinas and the Care for Others

51

the essential ipseity which everyone is a part of. In much leader ego-rhetoric we come to expect cliché and stereotypical banality, indicative of political party politics or pre-determined organizational visions. A leader’s apparent scripted rhetoric all too easily results in public disillusionment and cynicism. Levinas finds problems with rhetoric’s specific nature of propaganda and flattery-diplomacy which he finds corrupts the freedom to pursue authentic relationships. Only through veritable conversation and discourse will face to face dialogue create justice to overcome rhetorical spin. It will respect the calling of other without influencing it with too much distortion or coercion which would be to subject it to a personal agenda. Rhetoric can be negative and dehumanizing but equally serve to be open to response and the call of humanity. Supplication involves openness and recognition. It is to listen rather than merely hear, which means actively listening to the other to show respect, interest and interaction. There needs supplication to show there is openness to the other as alterity. It also requires a communicative environment for such listening to occur where change, response and responsible authenticity can occur. This is a time and space ‘designed to solicit the other’s disruptive call.’57 Rather than assimilation of the same, the task of discourse is critical, something of an endless task, ‘the face is recovered bit by bit, little by little, in the continuous revelation of a dialogue that includes…a rhetoric that seeks and a rhetoric that reveals.’58 In this way, leaders can expose cultural bigotry or misdirected stereotypes and respect the marginalised without seeking to appropriate them. This approach can never completely recompense or correct the loss from distorting ideology and corrupting values since there is no one truth waiting to be unveiled. Nor will it solve the tension between social justice and ethical intersubjectivity. But Levinas’ foundational work has a major bearing on the nature of leader characteristics in relation to virtue, authenticity, and responsibility.

 Jeffrey W. Murray. “The face in dialogue: Emmanuel Levinas and rhetorics of disruption and supplication.” Southern Journal of Communication 68 (3): 250–266, pp. 260, 262. 58  Ibid. p. 261. 57

Chapter 4

Philosophies of Interest

Abstract  In general, the major philosophers have had a big influence on the notion of authenticity. Slavoj Žižek, argues for a ‘master’ leader to simplify the complexity of the multitude and make the definitive decision to bring about change. And Machiavelli has offered models of pragmatic solutions for the market place, including the need for strong leadership to bring about change and succeed in competition. Nietzsche’s overman has been incorporated by business guru Charles Handy to describe leadership and different kinds of business organizations. Nietzsche criticises both democracy and destructive leadership in arguing for his own form of authenticity, which is based on creativity and a primitive energy that can be activated under different cultural and historical contexts. Jean-Paul Sartre takes up some of Nietzsche’s ideas on creativity in his existentialism. Existential authenticity turns to autonomy in the belief that bowing to the collective will for acceptable ethical norms creates problems. Sartre worries that the basic version of authentic leadership oversimplifies the complexity of behaviour and consequently reworks notion of a true, inner self which is foundational for authenticity theory. In addition to Sartre, the philosophy of Heidegger is an important reference point. Heidegger describes aspects of authentic behaviour as a calling, or a form of conscience which is tantamount to being made aware of the inadequacy of inauthenticity, and the fact that there is so much more to life than blindly following the masses. Even though Heidegger’s philosophy offers rich notions of agency and creative authenticity his contribution to ethics is besmeared by his relationship to fascism. Keywords  Žižek · Charles Handy · Machiavelli · Nietzsche · Overman · Servant leadership · Sartre · Existentialism · Heidegger · Dasein · Fascism Philosophers help provide a perspective for the many components which comprise authentic leadership. Some philosophical models resonate with leadership studies while others are more tangential. Just as philosophy comes up with different theories utilising specific terminology and focusing on different aspects of the human condition, so leadership draws on a wide variety of influences which differ according to context. The problem is to be open-minded, understand and absorb the breadth © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Shaw, The Philosophy of Authentic Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29650-5_4

53

54

4  Philosophies of Interest

of influence leaders need to acquire, and struggle against the natural resistance to see things from someone else’s point of view. The tendency is ‘to cling on to our own preferred views and to dismiss theories that do not conform to our own operating premises, and hence to avoid sustained critical questioning of our own assumptions is widespread in the human sciences.’1 We need to accept that the true task of philosophical inquiry is only achieved by confronting different viewpoints just as leaders must come to terms with confrontational decisions from other policy makers. What is most regrettable is that more care has not been taken to fully comprehend and analyse what philosophers actually claim in their work: To have Marx or Heidegger summarized in a couple of sentences for the purposes of grounding forms of organization analysis in the respected pantheon of philosophical thought does little more than invite the normalization of an orthodoxy. Who is in a position to judge the accuracy or felicity of their readings of Marx and Heidegger…?2

Even Burrell and Morgan’s canonical text of organization studies which examines philosophies of different organizational models3 has been criticised for reifying and separating underlying paradigms as being incommensurable rather than admitting the acceptance of the complex interrelationships we have today. Philosophy helps focus on how leaders need to adapt and accommodate changing patterns in society; even more, it gives predictive signals as to where leadership needs to go in light of advances in communication through changing technological complexity and concomitant challenges posed to sustaining a humane core of behaviour. Postmodern thinkers have been co-opted by leadership and organization studies but not always with the diligence to overcome superficiality, ‘philosophy is often brought into the world of organization and management studies as a kind of ornament, for example in the form of an isolated quote in which allegedly profound witticisms are discovered.’4 In philosophy, logic apparently prevails but it has to deal with a complex, messy world: ‘It is not just that the actual world is too complex and varied to be modelled by systems of formal logic, although this may in fact be the case. It is that our reality, human reality  – incidentally the only one we have even if we inevitably misjudge its limits – is so often caught up in stupidity, opaqueness, ambiguity and sheer wrongness.’5 Even in light of complexity and the postmodern critique of subjectivity philosophers such as, Slavoj Žižek, refuse to efface the role of leaders. Žižek has argued the  Haridimos Tsoukas and Robert Chia (2011). “Introduction: why philosophy matters to organization theory.” Research in the Sociology of Organizations: Philosophy and Organization Theory 32: 1–21, p. 4. 2  Damian O’Doherty (2007). “Organization: recovering philosophy” in Campbell Jones and Rene ten Bos (eds.) Philosophy and Organization. Routledge. 21–38. p. 33. 3  Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgan (1979). Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis. Heinemann Educational Books. 4  Campbell Jones and Rene ten Bos (2007). “Introduction” in Jones and ten Bos, Philosophy and Organization. 1–20, p. 11. 5  Rocco Gangle (2013). François Laruelle’s Philosophies of Difference. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, p. 3. 1

4  Philosophies of Interest

55

left could well do with a leftist Thatcher to transform the attitudes of the political elite. A ‘master’ leader is required to simplify the complexity of the multitude and make the definitive decision to bring about change: ‘It is for the experts to present the situation in its complexity, and it is for the Master to simplify it into a point of decision.’6 The claim is that the voice of the mass does not always carry focused democratic ideals, egalitarian rights, or freedom for the marginalised. It may take a visionary or authoritarian leader to carry out those beliefs in the face of opposition and misunderstanding: ‘There are moments of intense collective participation where local communities debate and decide… taking things into their own hands, with no leader guiding them. But such states don’t last…’7 The critique is one which focuses on the pervasive passivity of the multitude and under these conditions the leader as enabler can awaken individuals from their dogmatic slumber. Leaders are able to inculcate self-belief to movement members and discourage them from being overly keen to abdicate decision-making to others who make policy on their behalf, policies which may not even be in their interest. Žižek recognises centralised leadership can swing both ways, either to enlightenment or corruption. Today’s pragmatic approach to philosophy cuts much deeper than merely bedecking avarice with a coat of respectability. It reaches the very core of the human condition. It emanates from the realisation that the market place, consumer behaviour, and the role of technology collectively belong to a reality which is not fixed or objectifiable; one that is hardly amenable to slick quantification. Though this insight may send shivers through the spines of economic analysts and doe-eyed futurists, it is the only way to understand the consistently changing, increasingly cosmopolitan lifestyle of a public best described as fickle and unpredictable. Each emergent group in society manifests new lifestyles, attitudes and mental states that need translation into commercial language. Business corporations could scarcely survive on the assumption of behavioural consistency and when shifts or deviations from previous norms arise, as they inevitably do, the aspiring business analyst must combine authentic leadership principles of intuition and empathy with deliberate calculation. Respected business gurus have had no compunction about borrowing from the pantheon of classic philosophers. Renaissance figures like Machiavelli have shed their shady repute to offer models of pragmatic solutions for the market place. ‘The Prince’, for example, has acted as a handy business manual for justifying everything from management strategy and organization to business psychology.8 The inspiration to market philosophy as a justification for both action and credo stretches even further back to the Greeks and embraces the present day insistence on breaking down barriers in the name of eclecticism. Charles Handy borrows directly from the

 Slavoj Žižek (2013), “The Simple Courage of Decision: a leftist tribute to Thatcher.” New Statesman. 17th April. p. 1. 7  Ibid. p. 4. 8  Niccolò Machiavelli (1517/1979). The Prince in The Portable Machiavelli. Peter Bondanella and Mark Musa. (trans and ed.) Penguin. 77–166. 6

56

4  Philosophies of Interest

philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche to incorporate his views on organizational management and leadership; views which help us contextualise authentic leadership.9

Nietzsche: Creative Overman Nietzsche’s work on ancient myths presents two basic oppositional approaches; the Apolline based on reason, order and appearance, and the Dionysian which inspires the iconoclastic, chaotic and emotional.10 In his work, Handy recognises these classifications acknowledging that though theoretically distinct in practical terms they can act as a mutually supporting complement. Handy classifies four distinct management cultures that exist within all organizations; Zeus, Apollo, Athena and Dionysus. These different cultures serve to describe the variety of business organisations and range from the well-proportioned, conservative, Apolline culture that draws on past traditions to bolster an organization, to the more existential, individual culture of Dionysus that tolerates individualists over corporate identity. There may be a clash of organizational cultures but leaders can gainfully refer to such categories and establish an appropriate balance between them. Handy’s reliance on Nietzsche’s ideas is not surprising since Nietzsche filters through all aspects of modern day leadership even if his influence may falsely be classified under the banner of leader-centric theorists. Since Nietzsche wrote ‘the world has been a madhouse for too long’11 the twentieth century has witnessed even greater horrifying acts of genocides, concentration camps, racial and ethnic cleansing and routine hostilities; the message being that the need for a humane, authentic and ethical approach is even greater today. So-called destructive leadership creates a toxic atmosphere of inauthenticity by ‘encouraging followers to pursue destructive goals and using destructive methods of influence with followers.’12 Nietzsche recognises these dangerous tendencies through his analysis of force and as a result produces his own version of authenticity. He recognises leaders should not be allowed to dominate or control in an unrestricted manner: Whoever can command, whoever is a ‘master’ by nature, whoever appears violent in deed and gesture – what is he going to care about contracts! Such beings cannot be reckoned with, they come like fate, without cause, reason, consideration or pretext, they appear just

 Charles B. Handy (1995). Gods of Management, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  Friedrich Nietzsche (1872/1993). The Birth of Tragedy. Shaun Whiteside (trans.) Penguin Classics. 11  Friedrich Nietzsche (1887/2006). On the Genealogy of Morality. Keith Ansell-Pearson (ed.). Carol Diethe. (trans). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 64. 12  Dina V. Krasikova, Stephen G. Green, James M. LeBreton (2013). “Destructive Leadership: A Theoretical Review, Integration, and Future Research Agenda.” Journal of Management 39 (5): 1308–1338, pp. 1310–1311. 9

10

Nietzsche: Creative Overman

57

like lightning appears, too terrible, sudden, convincing and ‘other’ even to be hated … where they appear, soon something new arises, a structure of domination ….13

If destructive power is to be avoided instincts need to be mastered and attuned to achieve the autonomous self-mastery and self-determination we associate with authenticity. Jacob Golomb shows how Nietzsche argues that force is a primitive energy that can be activated under different cultural and historical contexts. It is this transition of force into action which characterises the move to power.14 In order to meet the pursuit of freedom through the force of will, instinctual force has to be attuned through the role of sublimation, thereby controlling brute force and making it palatable. Power is culturally valuable, an outward expression carried through in activity whereas force is primal, latent and inherent. For qualitative power there can be no preservative stasis of energy, on the contrary, there can only be growth and expansion. The distinction between force and power is crucial to any understanding of power and its relationship to leader authority: it speaks of self-overcoming and as such presents a strong argument for authenticity and the pursuit of a kind of leadership best described as a vital care for the future of humanity. Nietzsche is a radical thinker, in particular his notion of the overman is beyond anything recognized as human before, undoing notions of a stable identity and any form of objective systems of morality. He especially has no time for the crowd, or horde. For Nietzsche, the horde suffocates and inhibits the individualistic expressions of the overman and pursuit of authenticity. The crowd is a reflection of society in general, though individuals believe themselves to be free and spontaneous they are in fact mesmerised to give up all personal autonomy. Power may lie in numbers but Nietzsche’s position is that group mentality expresses an insipid, passive attitude; the voice of the crowd is one of mediocrity and collective pressure: Who speaks? My answer taken not from metaphysics but from animal psychology: the herd instinct speaks… it will allow value to the individual only from the point of view of the whole, for the sake of the whole, it hates those who detach themselves – it turns the hatred of all individuals against them.15

When the herd instinct holds sway, the community swamps individual worth and the possibility to achieve authenticity by way of self-overcoming and qualitative self-­ development. For Nietzsche, many of the contemporary movements he objected to were simply accepted by a clueless public. Nietzsche’s antipathy to extant thinking is reflected in his aversion to slave mentality, the opposite to what he considers to be authenticity. Slave mentality, encapsulated within Christian doctrine, rejects the here-and-now to elevate transcendent reality, a condition he considers to be

 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, pp. 58, 59.  Jacob Golomb (2002). “How to De-Nazify Nietzsche’s Philosophical Anthropology” in Jacob Golomb and Robert S. Wistrich (eds.). Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism? On the Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy. Princeton University Press, 19–46. 15  Friedrich Nietzsche (1901/1968). The Will To Power. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (trans.). Vintage Books. p. 157. 13 14

58

4  Philosophies of Interest

life-­negating. The morality of tradition is exhaustive and exhausting, depleting autonomy and creativity. Where Nietzsche favours the now of immediacy, religious thought postpones rewards until later. The genealogical story of repression is not irreversible but can be overcome by the positive power of imagination, self-­ overcoming, and aesthetic creativity. Nietzsche’s critique of democracy is unrelenting but in the pursuance of searching for the will to power and freedom, new leadership is required to overturn the old order with the aid of philosophical wisdom: ‘where do we need to reach with our hopes? – Towards new philosophers…to put an end to the gruesome rule of chance and nonsense that has passed for history… a new type of philosopher and commander will be needed for this someday…The image of such leaders hovers before our eyes.’16 History itself has no inbuilt direction, only the act of interpretation by discerning agency detects patterns of movement, or provides understandable narratives from which to excavate portals of creativity. Nietzsche’s opposition to positing an objective moral credo to help evaluate the good from the evil, together with his discussion of nobility and cruelty, disturb commentators who read in his work dire ethical and political consequences.17 Such reservation has resulted in Nietzsche being linked to inauthentic leadership, such as fascism and National Socialism. Nietzsche was embraced by the Nazis when Hitler visited his archives at Weimar. If one perversely ignores the evil intent of ‘great leaders’ then the last century with Mussolini, Hitler, Stalin, Mao and Pol Pot, all of whom certainly made historical difference, were political giants, beyond good and evil, and free of all moral constraints.18 One has to ask, then, if there is not something in Nietzsche’s philosophy with its uninhibited cultivation of heroic individualism and the will to power which favours the fascist ethos. Even if his work went largely unread by those who claimed to support him, the spirit of his thoughts no doubt permeated twentieth century totalitarian movements. In fascism, the leader embodies the will of the people who are part of a non-egalitarian system, a system which welcomes war. As Walter Laquer points out, fascist inauthenticity always means the interest of the state takes precedence over the right of the individual: State power was to be based on leadership, and the legitimacy of leadership was provided by the fact that the people followed the leader…the leader embodied the will of the people, and fascism was the true democracy…power should be in the hands of a leader, and a new nobility born from blood and soil.19

 Friedrich Nietzsche (1886/2002). Beyond Good and Evil. Judith Norman (trans.) Rolf-Peter Horstmann. Judith Norman (eds.). Cambridge University Press, p. 91. 17  Alexander Nehamas (1999). “Nietzsche and Hitler”. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 37. (Supplement 1): 1–17. p. 8. 18  Jacob Golomb and Robert S. Wistrich (2002), “Introduction” in Golomb and Wistrich, Nietzsche Godfather of Fascism? 1–18, p. 3. 19  Walter Z. Laqueur (1996). Fascism. Oxford University Press. p. 25. 16

Nietzsche: Creative Overman

59

This credo rejects local concerns and the expression of active interest groups: ‘The relationship between the strong leader and the people is based on myths…such as the will to power and the voice of the blood, and the irrational.’20 Leaders support mythmaking and artistic incursions into daily life, not in terms of a provocative, avant-garde movement but as a way of aesthetically buttressing social integration, family values, and love of the nation. Rule by committee is a possibility but not decisive. In general, all fascist movements prioritise the personality of the leader as an institution and symbol. Fascists saw Nietzsche as a kindred spirit with his attempt to create the ‘new man’ and reject prevailing conditions by whatever means at one’s disposal. Yet, for all his bellicose rhetoric and token elitism, Nietzsche’s intent is to be understood in a way directly opposed to fascism and as a clear progenitor of authentic discourse. The fact that he drew fascist following has been rejected in later years, especially by postmodernists, as an aberration which was not to his choosing, but for which he carries blame for not doing enough to reject such association. Nietzsche accepts the risk of misinterpretation, willing to take its chances and consequences, even tolerate views which contradict those he holds in the name of pursuing his own mission, which is to encourage individual autonomy and pursue the creative life: ‘He was aware, then, of the risk and yet he preferred the risk because of what it entailed; that is the responsibility of each self, each reader, to create himself, to make of himself the individual of whom Nietzsche spoke.’21 Nietzsche displays gifted foresight concerning the darkening horizon of dictatorship rather than any prescriptive endorsement of violence, predicting the dangers of a spiritual vacuum which easily culminates in totalitarianism. The point for Nietzsche is that conflict is healthy; we must destroy in order to create. Seen in this light, the apotheosis of the fascist state contradicts everything Nietzsche stands for. Nietzsche responds vehemently to notions of authoritarian leadership: ‘The ones who set traps for the many and call them ‘state’ are annihilators, they hang a sword and a hundred cravings over them…the state lies in all the tongues of good and evil, and whatever it may tell you, it lies – and whatever it has, it has stolen.’22 The state is meant to lay the ground for individual expression and preserve individual integrity but it rarely does. For Nietzsche, the individual, the singular, or the particular will always transcend social or collective institutions. Individuals are part of the blind force of the will to power. Conflict and struggle against the hegemony of prevalent ideologies herald a new species of man. This new stage in evolution comprises new attitudes and morality and is based on a special kind of authenticity. It is important for authentic leadership to understand the nature of Nietzsche’s superior leader and the way leaders are able to influence followers. Nietzsche denigrates anything previously defined as worthy of hero-worship. When hero-worship  Ibid. p. 96.  Berel Lang (2002.) “Misinterpretation as the Author’s Responsibility”, in Golomb and Wistrich, Nietzsche Godfather of Fascism? 47–65, p. 62. 22  Friedrich Nietzsche (1883/2006) Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Adrian Del Caro. (trans.) Adrian Del Caro. Robert Pippin (eds.) Cambridge University Press, p. 34. 20 21

60

4  Philosophies of Interest

is expressed as blind admiration it directly shirks personal responsibility and ignores self-determination: ‘Hero worship…is interpreted by Nietzsche as a strategy for evading an inwardly felt demand for self-transformation through the cultivation of ethically impotent forms of admiration.’23 Nietzsche rejects a hero leader who controls, monitors and usurps follower decision-making powers. Even the notion of born to lead or the innate trait of leadership is questioned: [T]he activity of the genius seems in no way fundamentally different from the inventor of machines…the master of tactics…Every activity of man is amazingly complicated, not only that of the genius: but none is a ‘miracle’…Do not talk about giftedness, inborn talents! One can name great men of all kinds who were very little gifted.24

In other words, so-called genius comprises application, hard work, specialised knowledge, the ability to juxtapose disparate elements, and evidence of social insight. These are all qualities which can be developed and which we associate with authentic intelligence rather than charismatic genius. This is especially understandable as Nietzsche is adamantly opposed to the superior person being seen as divinely gifted. Nietzsche’s form of individualism is expressed through autonomy and self-­ determination, characteristics of the master mentality over the slave mentality. As a result, the overman must be allowed full freedom and encouragement to act and think otherwise. The fact is that Nietzsche’s great man is a refreshing exploration of individualism as the creation of something new, and a rejection of the deferential acceptance of hackneyed truths. Nietzsche’s philosophy is nothing less than a complete reformulation of truth and the notion of being human; for this reason alone his language is extreme. His will to power is a psychological tuning into the vitality of life in an effort to transform reactive forces into positive, personal creativity. As leader, the superior man does not use force from a central agency, be it the state or organizations. Nor does it cajole, or coerce followers to act in a certain way under a regulatory regimen. Rather, power is an energy driver to achieve self-­ mastery over the constraining instincts which deaden humanity. Central authority has a role but it is not one that focuses on retention of power and privilege but one which nurtures and encourages the quest for personal authenticity. The relevance for authentic leadership is to understand how the superior leader and overman exert their authority and what the basis is for their ability to influence followers. William Connolly points out the potential universality of the overman disposition, reminding us that it infuses all who come into contact with its energy and transformational consequence. The argument takes issue with the notion that the overman is a class apart from which great leaders should be exclusively chosen. In understanding the overman as an elitist leader seeking mastery over the present to encourage the yet-to-come, Connolly rejects the ideal of the gifted outsider; there should not be two spiritual types:

 James Conant (2001). “Nietzsche’s Perfectionism: A Reading of Schopenhauer as Educator”, in Nietzsche’s Postmoralism. Richard Schacht (ed.). Cambridge University Press. 181–257. p. 209. 24  Friedrich Nietzsche (1878/1996). Human, All Too Human. R. J. Hollingdale. (trans.) Cambridge University Press. p. 86. 23

Nietzsche: Creative Overman

61

If there is anything in the type to be admired, the ideal must be dismantled as a distinct caste of solitary individuals and folded into the political fabric of late-modern society. The Overman now falls apart as a set of distinctive dispositions concentrated in a particular caste or type, and its spiritual qualities migrate to a set of dispositions that may compete for presence in any self.25

This affirms that all of humanity can be raised to the level of the superior man and ultimately the overman, not just the select few. The point is to integrate overman’s dispositions into humanity rather than separate it as an ideal. As long as the overman is removed from the political ferment, ensconced in a space on the edge of social life, both political impact and influence over others become questionable. At the outset, Nietzsche describes superior leaders as living on the periphery, away from the horde, but this can hardly match the complexity of contemporary society. Today, there are many outsiders, immigrants, disenfranchised, and nomadic figures populating the landscape. Furthermore, living a withdrawn life, especially for neoteric leaders, is untenable in a world of dwindling privacy, increasing surveillance, and networks which augment ‘the intensive entanglement of everyone with everyone else.’26 The result is there is no real, or even fictive space for the overman to inhabit so rather than circumscribe the ideal future, the overman leader and the superior leader collapse into each other to become ‘a struggle within and between selves’, all of which can be translated into a workable political engagement with institutionalized practices.27 Bearing this in mind, Connolly argues for a way to combine the dual tendencies in Nietzsche’s thought between liberal democratic pluralism and aristocratic authoritarianism. Nietzsche’s aversion to democracy hones in on his conviction that it limits independence and encourages resentment, tendencies which democratic apologists would vehemently deny. For Nietzsche, individuals resent being dependent on others or having to be grateful for what is theirs by right. Any form of inadequacy or lack of opportunity is blamed on other people or outside forces. Moreover, institutions reinforce expected modes of behaviour, frowning on deviant behaviour which increases the gap between the bureaucratic defenders of the status quo and those who protest for greater self-control and fairness in their lives. Connolly’s definition of domestic disciplining is exactly what Nietzsche points to as the calculated smothering of initiative and the frustration of authentic achievement. Connolly suggests that rather than reject democracy outright a form of ‘agonistic democracy’ would help cultivate counteracting tendencies and open a space for constructive, critical upheaval. While releasing democratic tenets of freedom, this would also challenge settled identities, inauthentic inertia, and structural injustices: ‘Agonistic democracy…furnishes the best political medium through which to incorporate strife into interdependence and care into strife’.28 Destiny is achieved  William E. Connolly (2002). Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox. University of Minnesota Press. pp.186–87 (my emphasis). 26  Ibid. p. 188. 27  Ibid. p. 189. 28  Ibid. p. 193. 25

62

4  Philosophies of Interest

through a process of self-monitoring and awareness, not by discovering what is already-there but by filling an existential void with meaningful pursuits. As precursor to change, Nietzsche would claim that the task of leadership is to transform the poor who carry resentment, the rich who are protective and resistant, and political parties which focus on safeguarding their own status and power. But to do this democracy must enter a new transformative phase which encourages autonomy, authenticity and open debate. For Nietzsche, there is no idealised overman, or perfected character which subordinates others: ‘The last thing I would promise would be to ‘improve’ humanity. I won’t be setting up any new idols; let the old ones learn what it means to have feet of clay… Knocking over idols… that is more my style.’29 This confirms that the overman is not an authentic ideal one reaches out to but rather an indication of a life-style, a way of life which is always becoming and self-transcending. Moreover, the way to achieve this lifestyle cannot be ordained in advance because like Nietzsche’s version of democracy and pursuit of authenticity, it is a process in the making. Nietzsche’s persistent claim is that humanity needs to be energized and propelled into a state of becoming. The means an authentic leader adopts to influence others is in terms of observation, inspiration and promoting personal re-evaluation. In this respect, there are marked similarities between the authentic leadership model and Nietzsche’s suggestions on role-modelling and inspiration. For example, in ‘mirror reading’ the implication is that individuals strive for authenticity by reading in leader actions and words a reflection of who they are, thereby aspiring to similar values. The use of the mirror analogy is instructive and must be contrasted with mere mirror reflection: (H)e is used to subordinating himself in front of anything that wants to be known, without any other pleasure than that of knowing, of ‘mirroring forth’. He waits until something comes along and then spreads himself gently towards it…He has so thoroughly become a passageway and reflection of strange shapes and events, that whatever is left in him of a “person” strikes him as accidental, often arbitrary, and still more often as disruptive.30

It is clear for Nietzsche that the possibilities for learning from mirroring do not come by way of copying or objectivity but rather through another kind of mirroring; reading of leader behaviour through interpretation rather than mimicry. For example, the hermeneutic approach considers the reader and writer, or performer and audience, to be in a mutually dependent relationship, one where the receiver constructs as much as the producer. The written word, or particular act, is always open to receiver interpretation and this will vary from one person to another. Perspectival perception is idiosyncratic and avoids definitive resolution where one voice or one truth prevails. The expressions of the superior man as leader thus appear provocative, inducing proactive initiative, leaving an open inlet for creative interpretation

 Friedrich Nietzsche (1888/2005). The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols. Judith Norman (trans.) Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman (eds.) Cambridge University Press, p. 71. 30  Friedrich Nietzsche (1886/2002). Beyond Good and Evil. Judith Norman. Rolf-Peter Horstmann. (trans.) Judith Norman (eds.). Cambridge University Press, p. 98. 29

Nietzsche: Creative Overman

63

which can be life-transforming. We see this most clearly in Nietzsche’s aphoristic style of writing which allows readers to self-reflexively explore their own directions: ‘Mirror writing is Nietzsche’s deliberate effort to make the reader realize that whatever meanings the reader gleans from the writing are a reflection of her or his values…he wants to encourage others to envision a higher humanity.’31 As with most of his work, this is not intended to be dogmatic but rather to leave enough space for others to draw their own conclusions in keeping with the relativism of individual perspectives: ‘When your gaze has become strong enough to see to the bottom of the dark well of your nature and your knowledge, perhaps you will also behold in its mirror the distant constellations of future cultures.’32 The ‘mirroring of future cultures’ is a wide notion which embraces several levels. The key focus is leadership by example, or ‘exemplarisch’. Leadership-by-example picks up on the mirror effect whereby transformation of selfhood takes place by seeing oneself in others as part of authentic development. The initial phase of Nietzsche’s superior leadership may have imitative aspects, but the exemplary phase is more profound. Rather than copying leaders according to pre-fixed rules and dictated procedures, leadership-by-example infuses others with the spirit of genius, talent and originality by association and osmosis. The requirement is to emulate by example in a non-­ imitative fashion. This means behaviours and abilities are not mere versions of leader attributes but a genuine personal transformation derived from a leader’s educative role: The exemplariness of an exemplar consists in its perspicuous realization of some possibility that, in its perfected form, is clearly recognizable as an excellence – an excellence to which other members of the genus can attain…it is the role of an exemplar to provide in this way a concrete representation of how one should live and to what one should aspire.33

This is the attitude communicated to other members of the genus. As Nietzsche puts it: “One repays a teacher badly if one always remains a pupil only…Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves; and only when you have all denied me will I return to you.’34 Nietzsche can be interpreted as furthering the interests of a genus, or specimen group, in this case privileged individuals or elitists who differentiate themselves as being superior by virtue of their group traits. But the preferred interpretation is to use exemplars to denote individuals who excel as members within the genus. Thus, we are not comparing one group with another but the standard of excellence of those within the same group. The point is that being an exemplar signifies the ability to play an educative role in the lives of others through emulation rather than imitation, as in authentic leadership. The implication is that followers become associates,

 Linda L.  Williams (2001). Nietzsche’s Mirror. Rowman Littlefield Publishers. p.  109. (my emphasis). 32  Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human. p. 135. 33  Conant, “Nietzsche’s Perfectionism”, p. 195. 34  Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 59. 31

64

4  Philosophies of Interest

attaining a higher self without being mired in subordinate positions allotted by organizational structure. The mirror affect is endorsed by the exemplary leader as ‘someone in whom each of us could discover his or her own deferred possibilities.’35 In conjuring up the notion of exemplar Nietzsche appeals to a more highly evolved self. The motivation to retrieve a higher self is the self-induced pang of conscience which accompanies all efforts to be a virtuous character. When the enlightened sparks of possibility and change are recognised, failure to pursue their path results in personal unease, like a nagging flint demanding to be lit: ‘Nietzschean impersonal shame is an emotion that one strives to engender in oneself so as to overcome (or avoid) a false sense of virtue…the exposure of counterfeit self-respect…our loss of self-respect becomes palpable to us’.36 Once the first phase of great leader development is overcome, the influence of overman and Dionysius comes into its own as the force of transformation. Exemplars, therefore, are those individuals who elicit or trigger the experience of impersonal shame when the pursuit of one’s higher, creative self fails to occur. The ultimate goal of Zarathustra is to give up leader authority after effectuating exemplary behaviour in others and welcoming them into the genus: ‘It dawned on me: let Zarathustra speak not to the people, but instead to companions! Zarathustra should not become the shepherd and dog of a herd!…Fellow creators the creative one seeks, who will write new values on new tablets.’37

Sartre: Existential Authenticity Most leadership models look for common characteristics or behavioural patterns detected in leaders who appear successful and effective. Trait theory, for example, provides many attributes and dispositions recommended for leaders to cultivate, or which organizations and institutions promote through teaching programmes. Once defined these traits become objectively desirable and a key to success: ‘The assumption behind this approach is that, once these competencies or behaviours are identified, the individual can be measured along each dimension and can estimate their relative strengths and development needs.’38 This is to say, the isolation of core competencies sets up a transferable formula upon which leadership behaviour can be based. Existentialism opposes this isolation of core competencies but still acknowledges aspects of trait theory: ‘the existential notion of authenticity embodies certain

 Conant, “Nietzsche’s Perfectionism”, p. 214.  Ibid. p. 205. 37  Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 14. 38  John Lawler (2005). “The Essence of Leadership? Existentialism and Leadership.” Leadership 1 (2): 215–231. p. 220. 35 36

Sartre: Existential Authenticity

65

ideal character traits – such as courage, integrity, clear-sightedness, steadfastness, responsibility and communal solidarity’ all of which are components of regular trait theory.39 Its main focus is a more flexible, contextual approach which acknowledges how crucial authenticity is to activity and moral rectitude but admits it needs specific contexts to be fully appreciated.40 Existential authenticity turns to autonomy in the belief that bowing to the collective will for acceptable ethical norms creates problems for the existential position of following personal volition and self-determination. Reference to past history and core characteristics are accepted but re-worked in order to facilitate a forward-­ looking perspective and future projection. An existential approach would reject the charismatic, transformational effort because it is too coercive and managerial. In like manner, transcendence and deontology are considered an oversimplified distortion of how to manage the particularity of ethically challenged situations. In its critique of the positive psychology approach, existential authenticity recognises the importance of positive traits such as optimism and perseverance but objects to using them as referential markers against which behaviour can be judged, in other words, using them abstractly. Abstraction assumes qualities can be divorced from their context and defined objectively by similarity: ‘What does cheerfulness mean, for example, in such concrete contexts as pitching a baseball, performing surgery, or deciding to go to war? Merely celebrating this abstraction does not help us know what it means or whether it is even relevant to the particulars of our lives.’41 The trait approach breaks down character into separate parts or facets which may not necessarily coalesce. Ultimately, it comes down to behaviour in specific circumstances and the holistic coupling of subjectivity and objectivity which is found in relational ontology: There is something profoundly disturbing in the description of a man as ‘a good father and a good husband, a conscientious citizen, highly cultivated, philanthropic, and in addition an anti-Semite.’ The presence of anti-Semitism changes the meaning of every other facet of this man’s life-story, and this remains true even as we highlight abstract character traits that a conventional moralist might consider positive (e.g., conscientiousness).42

For Sartre, we cannot break down which traits are needed to deal with situations nor can one be identified with specific traits as allotted to selfhood. The ‘pour-soi’ is always what it is not, a nothing, a pursued-pursuing, always a relation to the in-­ itself, but never an in-itself.43 The concern is the basic version of authentic leadership oversimplifies the complexity of behaviour and misreads the way  Ibid. p. 225.   John Lawler and Ian Ashman (2012). “Theorizing leadership Authenticity: A Sartrean Perspective.” Leadership 8 (4): 327–344. 41  Brent D.  Slife and Frank C.  Richardson (2008). “Problematic Ontological Underpinnings of Positive Psychology.” Theory & Psychology 18. (5): 699–723. p. 716. 42  Steven W. Quackenbush. Alanah K. Lockwood. Travis G. Cyr (2016). “And yet your duty is to hope: The Positive Psychology of Jean-Paul Sartre.” Theory & Psychology 26 (3): 360–376, p. 370. 43  Jean-Paul Sartre (1943/1956). Being and Nothingness. Hazel E.  Barnes. (trans.) New  York: Philosophical Library. p. 362. 39 40

66

4  Philosophies of Interest

decisions-in-the-world are made.44 Sartre’s existentialism suggests a radical ­reworking of the notion of a true, inner self, which is foundational for authenticity theory. For Sartre, authenticity is the lack we must strive to negate. A struggle to achieve what is not yet present because the self is always a becoming which is never complete presence in the present of time, only in the presence of embodiment. When Sartre rejects the notion of inner self he does so because the self cannot be objectified as being separate from the outside world; as an object-self we are always positioned with the object world and reliant on the gaze of the other. Arguing against the Cartesian position, Sartre rejects the self as a completed entity or homunculus ensconced in a privately removed sphere. Rather, ‘following the strand of thinking from Kierkegaard to Nietzsche onwards, our self is something we are becoming but never reach.’45 The inner core is rejected in favour of immanent being-in-the-world, without possibility for either excusing action due to unconscious desires or supplication to a transcendent power. Sartre insists existential choices always have to be made: ‘I am condemned to be wholly responsible for myself…a being which is compelled to decide the meaning of being’46 and this completely resonates with a leader’s decision-making process as an authentic expression of leader individuality, where there is both freedom and responsibility for action taken for self and others. If true authenticity is a work in progress, how can being true to oneself ever make sense if it always affixed to a central reference point? ‘Is it meaningful to talk of something being ‘authentic’ when that thing is still in the process of becoming? In other words, can we envisage a living human as being ‘authentic’ when that person has the capacity to change and to redefine her/his self constantly?47 The implication is that identifying with a concrete identity, role or function is to deny the human condition its potential for existential authenticity, or the expression and practice of freedom. Rather than insist that a person’s character comprises fixed objective values which are aspirational and quantifiable, we need to assume the self is a personal project at work, an exercise in pragmatism which needs absolute latitude to take shape without dependence on previous determinations. Sartre thus removes himself from positive psychology which underpins most of the early work on authentic leadership. He does so by his singular approach to reflection and the will. Rather than positivity, authentic freedom is characterised by anxiety and nothingness, ‘freedom is strictly identified with nihilation…nihilation is lack of being…but since desire…is identical with lack of being…freedom can arise as the project-for-itself…freedom is existence, and in it existence precedes essence.’48 Sartre would not accept a leader’s personal account as definitive self-­ narration to explain authentic identity but would search for the experience of an

 Lawler and Ashman, “Theorizing leadership Authenticity.” p. 328.  Ibid. p. 329. 46  Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 556. 47  Lawler and Ashman, “Theorizing leadership Authenticity.” p. 332. 48  Sartre, “Being and Nothingness”, pp. 567, 568. 44 45

Sartre: Existential Authenticity

67

open journey. In being pure spontaneity, constantly projecting outwards, the transcendental sphere is a sphere of absolute existence, ‘pure spontaneities which are never objects and which determine their own existence.’49 Contrary to common sense, for Sartre the ego is not the owner of consciousness but rather its object, which means that the spontaneity of consciousness will not be objectified and cannot come from the ‘I’. When the ego reflects or introspects, as traditional authenticity models prefer, it cannot grasp life’s spontaneity but only its pale modification in the form of passive objectification. This makes the act of expression foundational where the self-in-action is pre-ontological freedom. Sartre’s state of consciousness relates strongly to Husserl’s interpretation of how consciousness relates to the lifeworld. In applying the existential version of authenticity the focus is on intentionality, which for Husserl is a key phenomenological theme.50 Intentionality denotes the immediate consciousness of the world as a unified stream, and it explains how Sartre experiences the world as an unbroken, holistic unity of one consciousness, always the subject-consciousness to object, the noesis to noema. Intentionality is an act of cognition directed towards a state of affairs. A state of affairs cannot self-present its lack, but in a particular state of mind, or mode of authentic freedom, lack becomes apparent to the observer as an objective evaluation of a situation. Sartre calls this interpretive reason, where reason becomes the catalyst for the projection of self toward its possibilities for being, making subjectivity an outward interaction and fusion with a situated state of affairs. Now this state of affairs may be tangible, fluid or imaginatively non-existent. The important thing is that consciousness is always conscious of something. This allows Sartre to focus on being-in-the world and the reality-relating act itself. Lack is not evidently apparent, as it is not-yet-present, but in similar fashion to Husserl’s epoché and the bracketing of objectivity, there must be a conscious act of what Sartre terms a ‘pure wrenching away’ to make its potential evident to consciousness.51 This painful, anxiety-ridden foundational act makes it possible to experience the lack in the form of a non-existent ideal state of affairs, or a genuine possibility for action, including reorienting the past, which will then comprise an added motivation. The effort to ‘wrench away’ from self is burdensome because inauthenticity has a strong attraction in that there is a natural propensity to equate the (emptiness) of self with the facticity of life, all that is non-self. Facticity is the in-itself which is the already-given condition of life which all are tempted to fall in with, the completed components of culture and society which draw in individuals lulling their desire to choose. The onus of existential authenticity is heavy and the effort to transcend facticity considerable. There are constant choices to be made for self and others which produce what existentialists recognise as the ‘age of anxiety’: a freedom-responsibility  Jean-Paul Sartre (1994). The Transcendence of the Ego. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick. (trans.) Hill and Wang. New York, p. 96. 50  Edmund Husserl (1913/1962). Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. W. R. Boyce Gibson (trans.) Collier Press. 51  Sartre, “Being and Nothingness” p. 436. 49

68

4  Philosophies of Interest

dilemma. Anxiety is present in all of us and naturally occurs in the human condition when we are challenged by forces we find difficult to control. Followers may feel anxiety when given the existential freedom to choose their own actions rather than follow by rote the directives of higher authority. Equally, leaders may feel anguish in letting go the reins of control when they relinquish power by delegation or giving direct empowerment to followers. But the scenario is not all bleak. Some consider that the anxiety associated with existentialism takes on a positive role. Rather than recoil from the burden of responsibility and the unknown, anxiety serves as an uncomfortable but genuine lever for change. Indeed, the anxiety connected to existentialism revolves around dealing with the present as a catalyst to the future and the desire to bring one’s expectations into reality. Creativity is the driving force, as Nietzsche has already explained. For Rollo May ‘this is the characteristic of all creative endeavour…the capacity to deal with the ‘possible’…this capacity…is the condition both for anxiety and for creativity. The two are bound together…anxiety is the shadow of intellect and it is the milieu in which creativity occurs.’52 This positive slant to the existential condition is redolent of Sartre’s later, more positive approach to the demands freedom imposes. In this one respect, Sartre’s later work complements rather than opposes reliance on the positive psychology of authentic leadership. There is a return to Aristotle where practical wisdom, phronesis, is communally placed, even though the ability to experience communality has been autonomously set in motion. Sartre recognises the importance of the past but not as a straightjacket which defines and delimits our possibilities. The past cannot be denied but while it is recognised as contributing to the present because of it having been experienced in actuality it should be readily discarded if it interferes with the forward thrust of freedom. Relating this to authentic leadership and decision-­ making means leaders will still not rely on any fixed armoury of characteristics which determine how to act, but on openness, the path of which has been paved by negation and lack. The choices leaders make are in accord with the character they have chosen and combining the objective state of affairs with personal motivation. The causes and so-called facts of a situation are always susceptible to the perspective of the consciousness which intends them. Leaders are self-motivated by their projects which when translated become the incentive to act. This is a return to the common-sense position that individuals perceive from a particular position, they ask questions from that position which reflect the ends they are individually pursuing. Interpretation is based on personal motivation and as a hermeneutic of action ‘the world gives counsel only if one questions it, and one can question it only for a well-determined end.’53 Sartre’s work follows the humanist approach of personal understanding rather than the scientific pursuit of positivism. Situations can be analysed ad infinitum, objectively rationalised on many levels of causality but if questioning is emergent from the flow of consciousness it is not

 Rollo May (1950/1979). The Meaning of Anxiety. New York: Washington Square Press. p. 353.  Kevin T. Jackson (2005). “Towards Authenticity: A Sartrean Perspective on Business Ethics.” Journal of Business Ethics 58 (4): 307–325, p. 310. 52 53

Sartre: Existential Authenticity

69

ego-­bound from a personal straightjacket. When perspectives surface they only do so as part of an event; concrete, practical situations which call for an answer. For Sartre, the holistic inclusivity of self and object becomes projection into the future. It takes shape through dynamic consciousness and the interplay of positive and negative force which unfolds in time. The authentic individual expresses the freedom to perpetually choose and in choosing the object-correlate of consciousness mirrors those choices back as feasible courses of action. In keeping with Sartre’s non-universal, fluid, relative approach: The virtues and character strengths recognized as good at one point in time may be revealed as ethically problematic or even deficient as the individual’s life-story continues to unfold. Qualities that once defined my essence (e.g., humility) can become obstacles to self-realization.54

The implication is an individual leader would need the strength of conviction to reject personal preferences which have worked at one particular career period in favour of accepting a different set of values, or being able to change on the fly if necessary. Without this, the demand for authentic self-realization cannot be sustained: ‘Authenticity…leads to renouncing every project of being courageous (cowardly), noble (vile), etc., …Authenticity reveals that the only meaningful project is that of doing (not that of being). The one meaningful project is that of acting on a concrete situation and modifying it in some way.’55 The difficulty in grasping the message of existentialism is that, on the one hand, the familiar core of subjectivity is placed in doubt, denied as a source point, negated and substituted by being-in-the-world. At the same time, however, subjectivity does not disappear in the mist. On the contrary, it seems to take on an even stronger role as the guardian of moral sensibility. For all talk of negation, there is a strident positive side to Sartre’s authenticity. It relates to moral conviction which begins with a leader’s authentic drive to freedom, creativity, and choosing to choose. In relating to this outward thrust, Sartre calls for a general way of being-in-the-world to deal with what Heidegger calls ‘throwness’: Man is nothing else but that which he makes himself. That is the first principle of existentialism…existentialism…puts every man in possession of himself as he is and places the entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders.’56 With positioned subjectivity in the lifeworld, leaders encompass the added responsibility for others as social duty: We will freedom for freedom’s sake, and in and through particular circumstances. And in thus willing freedom, we discover that it depends entirely on the freedom of others, and that the freedom of others depends on our own…as soon as there is commitment, I am obliged to will the liberty of others at the same time as mine.57  Quackenbush and Lockwood, “And yet your duty is to hope: The positive psychology of Jean-­ Paul Sartre”, p. 364. 55  Jean-Paul Sartre (1983/1992). Notebooks for an Ethics. David Pellauer (trans.) University of Chicago Press. 56  Jean-Paul Sartre (1948/1989). Existentialism and Humanism. Philip Mairet (trans.) Methuen London. pp. 28, 29. 57  Ibid. pp. 51, 52. 54

70

4  Philosophies of Interest

There are questions which can be posed to Sartre’s authenticity, not least of which is, if being authentic means choosing freedom are we not also free to choose activities that deny the freedom of others? This is the critique levelled against his notion of subjectivity which is not the usual, centred ego pursuing extraneous moral norms. Morally this is an important objection, one that lies squarely in the ethical subjectivist corner. But Sartre has an expanded version of authenticity, one which moves into relational authenticity where there is dependence on, and respect for, the freedom of others, and especially a responsibility for the other’s freedom without which self-­ freedom has no meaning. Ultimately this is to accept that identity construction moves away from introspection to self-awareness which ‘requires understanding the intersubjective constitution of the self.’58 There are also traces of virtue ethics in the guise of courage and trustworthiness which, in the last resort, are existential demands for a character to follow through if the challenge of freedom is to be accepted. These virtues accompany decisions because the existential state is one that calls for courage and responsibility in acts which are tentative, exploratory and adventurous. But the mode in which these virtues are accepted still depends on an existential-throwness base rather than any categorised norm. They will be shaped by the way the conscious self treats and adapts movement in the lifeworld, always as an exercise in the freedom to choose. Sartre would argue that if we overcome inauthenticity and the appropriation of self we naturally promote the freedom of others. This becomes clearer in his later work where a strong social dimension is added to authenticity.59 Sartre’s explanation of authenticity concurs with our previous description of autonomy, as self-­ reflective, self-determination which transitions into relational authenticity and freedom. For leadership, when Sartre discusses personal responsibility it is not only an individual duty to self but a duty owing to all. Contrary to criticisms which accuse existentialism of being amoral, Sartre’s freedom project is a concern for fellow human beings and society in general. This translates as moral commitment to serve the community at large ‘where individual autonomy and well-being preserve a moral focus to advance human welfare.’60 Sartre’s authenticity makes for openness and flexibility in constructing one’s own, self-made moral reality. Moral responsibility is personally adopted but takes on meaning as liability only when fully accepted by others. In other words, when a leader acts responsibly, in the existential sense, authenticity is forthcoming when it has been approved by other’s judgment. It is the judgment of other’s which go on to form a leader’s role and this can only occur through manifest action: The meaning of an action is defined socially, intersubjectively, not simply through the intention of an agent…a liability requires admitting that the way others see my action is

 Storm T. Heter, (2006). Sartre’s Ethics of Engagement: Authenticity and Civic Virtue. Continuum International Publishing, p. 88. (my emphasis). 59  Thomas C. Anderson (2002). “Beyond Sartre’s Ethics of Authenticity.” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 33 (2): 138–154. 60  Slife and Richardson, “Problematic Ontological Underpinnings of Positive Psychology.” p. 708. 58

Sartre: Existential Authenticity

71

co-constitutive of the meaning of the action. Intention is insufficient. Just as the meaning of a text is socially negotiated, action in general is socially negotiated.61

We have the important gesture of shifting autonomy to the social plane by conversion to authenticity as a response to bad faith. It instils into authenticity the need to maximise the freedom of others. Leaders, sometimes knowingly, other times through ignorance, may represent bad faith in their analysis of situations which otherwise demand the open-mindedness of freedom: Racism is just one example of a secondary bad faith project. Sexism and classism are other ways of being in the world that attempt to degrade in bad faith the humanity of the other. Importantly, in limiting another’s freedom one reveals one’s fundamental attitude towards oneself, others and the world. Thus in all forms of racism there is a free project aimed at limiting the humanity of a particular race; in all forms of sexism there is a free project aimed at limiting the humanity of women; in all forms of classism there is a free project aimed at limiting the humanity of the underclass and the working poor.62

Sartre compellingly describes being the object of the gaze of others as dehumanizing. By extension, this consciousness is applied to groups and classes as a way to perpetuate marginalisation. When the self-other dualism holds sway individuals enforce their egos against anyone who is different. Social control can be considered the literal control of social roles. The cloak that bedecks individuals is their role-­ play of status or as part of an entrenched social hierarchy. Sartre intends to divest this protective coat and lay bare the pursuit of genuine freedom as involved, active, organic praxis. Leaders act inauthentically when they hide behind role playing or the conditioned mindset of class and race which result in myopic perspectives. Their bad faith is to superficially impress others and worst of all deceive themselves. Role-playing, adopting ready-made identities and predetermined behavioural patterns, are inauthentic acts which apply equally to leaders and followers. The necessary change of attitude comes with lowering the search for ego entrenchment as a form of us against them and following pure reflection, pre-­ cognitive consciousness as active, constructive intentionality in the lifeworld. This means being open to difference and welcoming diversity. This is crucial for Sartre’s description of the human condition and reflects back on the authentic leader’s process of decision-making. Sartre would not accept that the leader-follower relationship is either a dualism which admits coercion and undue influence or a fused collective closer to social identity leadership. Rather, there is no pre-formed relationship of any kind. As existentialism insists that life is consciousness being self-­ created from nothingness, any leader activity occurs in the midst of things, involved, participatory in a vibrant environmental surround. Rather than express incipient potentiality, it is an open page as to what is included in interaction, an interaction that takes place between separate entities having to carve out a multidirectional landscape upon which freedom and equality can be pursued. Before this can occur, the necessary conversion to relational authenticity must be in place.

61 62

 Heter, Sartre’s Ethics of Engagement, p. 90.  Gail Evelyn Linsenbard (2010). Starting with Sartre. Bloomsbury Publishing. p. 65.

72

4  Philosophies of Interest

As Thomas Anderson notes, Sartre argues the case for a modified attitude to his early work in which authentic love is ‘the decision to treat others as ends and join with them in assisting them to achieve their freely chosen projects.’63 This modification is a conversion where authenticity is realised through a mutual exchange of freedom, the common acceptance of another’s freedom which fends off the threatening notion of an objectified gaze based on a polarised dualism. After conversion there is mutual enrichment and recognition. The encouragement of the other’s freedom has affinity with democratic leadership, a close companion to authentic leadership. Democratic leadership has wide connotations including governance, decision-making, opportunity for open debate and ethical considerations. In particular: A crucial feature of democratic leadership is its oppositional character…the challenges of diminishing alienation and combatting the dominance of instrumental rationality embedded in hierarchy and exchange relationships…everyone, by virtue of their human status, should play a part in democratic agency, at times as a singular leader; more often through concertive agency which generates an additional dynamic through working together.64

This reflects Sartre’s ‘Critique of Dialectical Reason’ where he condemns centralized, leader authority as well as institutionalized structures. His dialectical ethics, the play between freedom and the facticity that delimits freedom, focuses on historical conditions and is highly political. It especially emphasises the effectiveness of interaction between individualism and group activity: The group defines and produces itself not only as an instrument, but also as a mode of existence; it posits itself for itself – in the strict determination of its transcendent task…it produces man as a free common individual, and confers new birth on the Other: thus the group is both the most effective means of controlling the surrounding materiality in the context of scarcity and the absolute end as pure freedom liberating men from alterity.65

Sartre comes to believe that authenticity and engagement are best supported in democratic, social groups. Groups are easily formed out of simple common interests where their seriality is a loose collection of atomized individuals. Individuals may have a common interest but in serial groups they come under the control of systems, institutions and general procedures which stymy their initiative and encourage inauthenticity. Authenticity only comes on the scene with a more humanised form of seriality which Sartre terms ‘groups-in-fusion’. This is a group that forms when individuals come together because they feel threatened or directly challenged and pull together for succour. There is a genuine democratisation of authority in groups-­ in-­fusion. Rather than a mere collection of individuals who group together with a similar or common interest but in no way relate authentically to each other, groups-­ in-­ fusion do have authentic significance and implications for freedom and

 Anderson, “Beyond Sartre’s Ethics of Authenticity” p. 141.  Philip A. Woods (2004). “Democratic leadership: drawing distinctions with distributed leadership.” International Journal of Leadership in Education 7 (1): 3–26, p. 12. 65  Jean-Paul Sartre (1960/2004). Critique of Dialectical Reason Vol. 1. Alan Sheridan-Smith (trans.). New York: Verso. p. 673. 63 64

Sartre: Existential Authenticity

73

leadership. The authentic concern for the freedom of others becomes a factor since there is a bond of common intent that permeates the groups, and at various moments a regulating third party embodies and mediates this mutual interest. There are no role assignments, as would be the case if there were, for example, commanders and infantry. Hence there is no hierarchical command/obedience structure. It remains true that the collective action of the group has direction. But rather than a distinct authority to command this direction, it is communicated through “regulatory third parties.” Every individual in a group-infusion is a regulatory third party and “regulates” the direction of the group in such a way that everyone has an equal role and equal responsibility.66

The turn to the need for political change is, in part, a response to the aporia we find in Sartre’s early analysis of authenticity. That is, the drive to spontaneity and creativity as authentic life contra the reflected need to achieve authenticity which, at root, contradicts spontaneity. In this light, democratic leadership is the preferred course, significant as an emergent phase of pragmatic decision-making through group-fusion: ‘The kind of power that makes mutual governance possible, is precisely, one that emerges from the relationality of a mutually functioning body of people. Here, power does not lie in the individual beings but in their mutual interaction; hence democratic power is found in the relationships themselves.’67 For Sartre, the ills and inequalities of society, seen existentially, have been carved out by individuals failing to be authentic, failing to choose the right course of action. Intersubjectivity and especially group influence can make a defining difference to social inadequacy as long as it is filtered through clarified reflection and responsibility. It is in coming-together where coordinated strength can achieve what cannot be achieved in isolation. There is reciprocity and mutual recognition crystallised by common concern. Thus, each group member has the alternating function of spontaneously relating to another unit while also co-ordinating in a broader fashion towards a unified goal. It is in this latter capacity an individual can be said to be acting as leader. Everyone is a possible ‘regulatory third’, or a transient leader. Leadership can help unify and identify groups but it is a revolving, temporary form of leadership based on mutual recognition which is not subdued by hierarchies and divisions between the rank and status of members. In the group-in-fusion, ‘each individual’s spontaneous action spontaneously inspires, reinforces, and directs the actions of others. As such, each individual of the group-in-fusion is a leader.’68 This tenuous form of leadership does not work in the classic authoritarian mode of orders being given and accepted but rather as a means of integration, expression and activity of each and every equal, democratic participant. Sartre explains the revolving form of ­leadership  Damon Boria (2013). “Sartre on Moral and Political Authority” in Benedict O’Donohoe (ed.) Severely Seeking Sartre. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 112–132, p. 122. 67  Heesoon Bai (2001). “Cultivating Democratic Citizenship: Towards Intersubjectivity.” In William Hare and John P. Portelli (eds), Philosophy and Education: Introductory Readings, revised Third Edition. Calgary: Detselig Enterprises, Ltd. 307–320, p. 308. 68  Gavin Rae (2011). “Sartre, Group Formations, and Practical Freedom: The Other in the Critique of Dialectical Reason.” Comparative and Continental Philosophy 3 (2): 183–206, p. 193. 66

74

4  Philosophies of Interest

has a mediating role: ‘From a structural point of view, the third party is the human mediation through which the multiplicity of epicentres and ends (identical and separate) organises itself directly, as determined by a synthetic objective.’69 The regulatory third party leader emerges out of circumstance, the project of the group, or perhaps as self-selected to comprise a communicating link between those in relationships and a third party newcomer who becomes part of the group. The leader of group cooperation is a democratic leader who crystallises and concentrates on the intention of the group while insisting the individual authenticity of each member is still to be retained. Under revolving leadership, the group is a force of unity carried on by everyone everywhere, not as a finished product but as a labile group of choice-makers. Once goals are achieved, or external threats parried, the raison d’etre of the group may dissipate, potentially making it redundant. However, social concerns and the journey for freedoms never disappear, even if a particular goal has been achieved. Potentially the group, albeit in a different form, will have a subsequent, positive role to play. The danger for Sartre is that in attempting to concretise the group, or extend its longevity, it loses its dynamic interplay to become entrenched as an institutionalised, over-structured, rule-governed entity which blocks the path to authenticity. In light of this, Sartre proposes the group-in-fusion makes a promise, or a ‘pledge’ that the group can be reconstituted, not so much as a spontaneous reaction to an imminent threat but as a body which can choose causes and reinforce reciprocal support for others who pursue authenticity, ‘contrary to the members of the group-­ in-­fusion, members of the organized group are free to choose the end towards which their group activity is directed.’70 With this in mind, the pledge is not a written, official vision but an understanding that mutual support will be proffered in the future when and where it is needed: I give my pledge to all the third parties, as forming the group of which I am a member, and it is the group which enables everyone to guarantee the statute of permanence to everyone…Thus my pledge to the third party receives at its source a dimension of community; it comes to touch everyone directly and through all.71

In such cases, one can assume leadership has a further role to play. Emergent leaders, any constituent member, can shape the group themselves, self-determine its activity or praxis and act proactively rather than reactively. It behoves the regulatory third party to oversee the necessary reconvening of the group, a function which any member can adopt at any time without pressurising others to pick up the cudgel. Indeed, once groups-in fusion have proven to be a success, its more organised successor is guaranteed and the pledge is its affirmation. Projected aims now come to vie with facticity and reification while, at the same time, support the move to freedom.

 Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason Vol. 1, p. 367.  Rae, “Sartre, Group Formations, and Practical Freedom” p. 197. 71  Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason Vol. 1, pp. 421, 422. 69 70

Sartre: Existential Authenticity

75

In sum, organised groups both constitute and are constituted by authenticity. It is clear from Sartre’s analysis of organisation  – the differentiated function of each member and their internal and external relationships – that his work is foundational for later models of democratic and dispersed leadership. As an egalitarian credo tending to social equality, intrusive control fed into the leader-follower relationship would be considered bad faith, inauthentic and self-deception. There is no denying the effort needed to achieve conversion and authenticity but such conversion to relational authenticity and a fluid form of leadership is a positive completion of Sartre’s earlier, ontological position. Existentialism argues the need to nurture an open mind in that it rejects ideologies with fixed goals and inflexible principles. Even as it prioritises personal autonomy and individual freedom to create a future, it insists disparate perspectives need to be respected within an awareness of the social setting. Leaders relate to groups-in fusion and communities of followers who expect their interests to be voiced and defended. This is an appropriate thought system for leader-follower interaction as well as inspiring innovation and practicality over abstract essence. Leaders should welcome approaches and strategic tools to deal with unpredictable events in business and politics, making full use of a philosophy which in particular tells us something about taking charge of the future and ‘coping with an indeterminate field of untried possibilities.’72 This is not to discard the past, just as life-story identities incorporate a coherent flow of time past, present and future so authenticity demands fidelity to the past, even while it existentially acknowledges openness to future possibilities. A desired balance is necessary which ‘threads the needle’73 avoiding the danger of sticking to an essential, reactive core competence while admitting there must be structure attached to proactive indeterminacy and novelty. Confronting the future as a form of scenario-planning, presenting all-­ manner of divergent scenarios, show anxiety is not to be feared. Authentic courage does not shy away from what is undecidable and indeterminate.74 By adopting existential attitudes leaders venture resolutely into the present age of uncertainty and volatility by accepting responsibility for others, and the conviction that personal autonomy carries with it sufficient passion to overcome iniquity and inequality: ‘Man is nothing else but what he purposes, he exists only in so far as he realises himself…nothing else but the sum of his actions…Man makes himself; he is not found ready-made; he makes himself by the choice of his morality.’75

72  James Ogilvy (2003). “What Sartre Can Teach Business Strategists.” Strategy  +  Business 33 (Winter): 38–47, p. 43. 73  Ibid. p. 47. 74  Ibid. p. 42. 75  Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, pp. 41, 50.

76

4  Philosophies of Interest

Heidegger’s Authenticity In addition to Sartre, the philosophy of Heidegger is an important reference point for the authentic leadership approach. Isolating authenticity is a key focus in Heidegger’s work. Freedom is not authentic if it is merely a negative space without restraint but is rather characterised by positive freedom to realize the need to do something with our lives as a journey in progress. Heidegger explores Dasein, his term for the individual entity who is born and ‘thrown’ into a pre-existing world. Throwness is us being who we are, the emergence into life of a particular person at a particular time. We have no choice in this matter, and we are also totally unique, experiencing only one place in the throwness of being. History makes us; this is our past throwness. But as with Sartre we are always moving to a future in the stream of time; this is projection. Heidegger sees the main preoccupation for understanding this predicament as a concern with the inevitability of death. The challenge is to recognise that discomfort is a necessary corollary to the authentic lifestyle, it is a fate we have to endure or as Sartre would put it, we are condemned forever to be free. For existentialists, the realisation and acceptance of death is very much linked to how we accept life. Indeed, part of acting in an authentic way depends on facing the inevitability of death and its impact on future intent. The states of throwness and normal reaction to death serve as an incomparable illustration of the way Dasein lives in a state of inauthenticity: ‘Our everyday falling evasion in the face of death, is an inauthentic being-towards-death.’76 Death is the wholly other of Dasein, the possibility of impossibility, which is what Dasein is not. Only by accepting this otherness of Death and resisting the temptation to see death as something that happens to someone else can authenticity be realised. As one unfolds one’s being towards the about-to-be, one can ‘anticipate’ death rather than ‘expect’ it, which is Heidegger’s healthy term, or constructive take on its inevitability: ‘Anticipation turns out to be the possibility of understanding one’s ownmost and uttermost potentiality-for-being  – that is to say, the possibility of authentic existence.’77 Anticipation, unlike inauthentic Being-towards death, does not evade the fact that death cannot be outstripped. Using the same notion as Sartre of ‘wrenching away’ from the inauthentic everyday of life, owning oneself must be wrenched away from false consciousness. Similar to Sartre, Dasein becomes a being which owns its innermost self as a taking responsibility for choosing one’s life and acceptance of its negation in death. For most philosophers who discuss authenticity, there are struggles to overcome barriers and parry all forms of alienation to uncover the genuine self, with the assumption that there is a genuine self to uncover. This is questioned by Heidegger who sees the self as an unfinished project which can neither be totalised nor perceived from any transcendent perspective.  Martin Heidegger (1927/1962). Being and Time. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (trans.) Blackwell Publishers. p. 303. 77  Ibid. p. 307. 76

Heidegger’s Authenticity

77

The being that is Dasein draws from Being, which is the world context of life determining the characteristics of Dasein. This process is taken on by Dasein as an ongoing project using the edifice of certain inbuilt structures which have come to mould individuals. These structures are not personal dispositions but the pre-­ existing frames we are born into. Heidegger’s fore-having and fore-sights, or degrees of prejudice, are the inevitable pre-judgments all are likely to make as a result of history and culture. The point is that we always inherit these perceptual frames as they form our inbuilt bias to understanding. On this basis, part of the effort to perceive authenticity is to genuinely experience the flow of time and reject the meaningless drift of the aimless, mindless generality of what Heidegger calls ‘Das Man’. When authenticity dawns, individuals reject the Das Man mentality and perceive the superficiality of the everyday. For Heidegger, inauthentic life is flight into the everyday, avoiding having to think about the finiteness of life by shrouding existence in routine and security. The routine everydayness of life tranquilises people and pacifies those who should instead be taking up existential challenges. Being faced with authenticity is no comforting solace rather it engenders a distinct feeling of anxiety that cannot be avoided. Consequently, anxiety should be accepted and once it has there is a sense of liberation, a release from acquiescing to the faceless conforming crowd. The voice of conscience is a nagging presence, pitting authenticity against Dasein’s own misrecognition. The call of conscience beckons away from the idle talk of the public to the silence of the existential potential-for-Being, anxiety and all. Dasein seems to desire listening to the ‘calling’ but it is a call which cannot be turned on and off at will because it is ambiguous: ‘The call comes from me and yet from beyond me’ and it is obscure, more an act of faith which occurs ‘against our expectations and even against our will.’78 Thus, having conscience is tantamount to being made aware of the inadequacy of inauthenticity and the fact that there is so much more to life than acquiescence. The result of achieving authenticity will be to carry out more profound decisions than in the inauthentic mode. Leader decision-making can be loosened from inherited throwness to a state where one chooses to choose while still bearing in mind the inauthentic. The state of being ‘fallen’ is the world of actuality, comprising the prevalent language we use to think, and the cultural traditions we naturally inherit. In other words, though authenticity can be set in motion from the tacit call of conscience there is still abiding dependence on the world shared with others; the inauthentic is still in a dependent state and relationship with the authentic. The difference is that with authenticity there is a change from aligning with the influence of others to individualized living as a being-towards-death. Crucially, the world remains the same but perspective changes when authentic resoluteness sees the world anew. As Heidegger puts it: The world which is ready-to-hand does not become another one ‘in its content’, nor does the circle of Others get exchanged for a new one; but both one’s Being towards the

78

 Ibid. p. 320.

78

4  Philosophies of Interest r­ eady-­to-­hand …and one’s solicitous Being with Others, are now given a definite character in terms of their ownmost potentiality-for-Being their-Selves.79

For leadership, it is clearly important to understand how Heidegger’s move to the authentic from inauthenticity impacts working with others. We are not merely describing personal traits or isolated individuals vying with existential angst but how, and under what circumstances, equitable decisions can be taken by an authentic, responsible leader. The first step to understand this is via Heidegger’s key notion of care. With the notion of care we begin to move away from Heidegger’s more autonomous first phase to the relational authenticity we also find with Sartre’s conversion. The call of conscience lays the pathway to care. In conscience, Dasein calls itself and manifests itself as the call of care. As Stephen Mulhall points out, the ancient myth of Cura is the founding impetus for care as Dasein’s worldly embodiment, and the way Dasein is shaped throughout its existence. Heidegger emphasises that Dasein is conditioned to care in the sense that it is ‘fated to a self and to a world of other selves and objects about which one cannot choose not to be concerned’.80 From this we begin to fathom the depth of Heidegger’s analysis in that we are now concerned not only with the personal effort to achieve autonomy and struggle to break inhibiting social forces but also with the need to recognise the world lived in as one which is shared by all: the ‘mitsein’. The individual who finds authenticity lives in the moment and shows care, which indicates that in reaching authenticity a particular way-of-being has been chosen. Leadership theorists have explored the struggle to attain authenticity especially regarding Heidegger’s notions of care, resoluteness, and dwelling. In the familiar leadership understanding of care, the caring leader may engender or indeed encourage a sense of dependency in followers. This is reinforced by levels of identification and psychological projection which seeks out caring interaction. Individual autonomy, as a component of authenticity, establishes an independent self which needs no outside help, an attitude much admired by those who believe in the self-made individual. On the other hand, in a social context, an ethics of care admits that everyone at one time or another is dependent on the care of others. Indeed, it is ontologically the case that we share and exchange dependency and caring with others as a principle of life. This relates to the ‘care-driven concepts of justice’ and the collective will to reflect such social driven attitudes.81 On this basis, caring leadership would be relationally dependent, a two-way street where leader and follower, carer and cared-for, mutually benefit even though they may consider themselves to be autonomous individuals. The Heideggerian perspective on authenticity and care incorporates several leadership perspectives, and Tomkins and Simpson’s study of care is one of the few to incorporate Heidegger’s notions into a leadership model. They substitute the carer

 Ibid. p. 344.  Stephen Mulhall (1996). Heidegger and Being and Time. Routledge, p. 112. 81  Nel Noddings (2010). The Maternal Factor: Two Paths to Morality. University of California Press, p. 59. 79 80

Heidegger’s Authenticity

79

for the leader, so that showing care comes from an initiator taking over responsibility for a problem, or from a more nurturing carer who points out options and directions which the cared-for can follow.82 The former, more forceful intervention, corresponds to Heidegger’s description of ‘leaping-in’ and takes the form of taking control. It relates to the everydayness of following others and clearly results in dependency. Leaping-in is taken to be the normal and expected form of leadership as an expression of leader authority dominating the decision process. Such behaviour tends to inhibit democratic input and fails to explore wider, contextual possibilities. It ‘interprets every challenge as a call for decisiveness over flexibility, certainty over ambiguity, control over complexity.’83 Less intrusive and closer to the understanding of authenticity is Heidegger’s concept of ‘leaping-ahead’, which ‘pertains essentially to authentic care – that is, to the existence of the other…it helps the Other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it.’84 This makes leaping-ahead more autonomous, respecting the ability of followers to make their own decisions and pursue the opening of personal and social horizons with opportunities offered by portals to future development. A more familiar description would categorise it as delegated responsibility or recognising the usefulness of empowerment. The suggestion is that leaping-­ahead is more conducive to a visionary, creative form of decision-making, one which looks to the future. This highlights the fact that Heidegger sees care in temporal terms as part of the past acquisition of knowledge, integrated with the facticity of the already-established givenness of the present, with a view to the projected future: ‘At the core of Dasein’s Being is care, which is made possible in existence as fundamentally temporal, or involving time…the meaning of Being, Heidegger hopes to show, is time.’85 Tomkins and Simpson compare Heidegger’s description of care closely to transformational leadership. However, their description of transformational leadership is highly problematic. It asserts the problems of transformational leadership can be seen as ‘an overemphasis on an aspirational future over a concrete present; on intimation over instruction; and on the celebration of non-resolution over the possibility of resolving at least some things.’86 But transformational leadership is by no means this diffuse and, in fact, revolves around relationships of nurturing and role-­ modelling which have a lot to offer authenticity. Nor is Tomkins and Simpson’s comparison of leaping-in and transactional leadership helpful. They claim it leaves ‘the care-recipient with too little space for manoeuvre.’87 But, on the contrary, transactional leadership is essentially autonomous; it delegates personal responsibility

 Leah Tomkins and Peter Simpson (2015). “Caring Leadership: A Heideggerian Perspective.” Organization Studies 36 (8): 1013–1031. 83  Ibid. p. 1019. 84  Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 159. 85  J. Jeremy Wisnewski (2012). Heidegger: An Introduction. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. P. 89. 86  Tomkins and Simpson, “Caring Leadership: A Heideggerian Perspective” p. 1020. 87  Ibid. 82

80

4  Philosophies of Interest

and offers sufficient ‘space’ to get the job done before any intervention is considered. They do, however, recognise what Heidegger argues to be the most important consideration, the personal idea of care; the ‘ethic of care as the attempt to master oneself, transform and give shape to one’s life.’88 The controversial move with all studies of authenticity comes in the transition from personal self-care to the care for others, ‘taking hold of oneself and one’s life is a project of self-awareness and self-control in which self-care is intimately related to care for others.’89 Jeremy Wisnewski makes the same point and explains it in terms of transparency. The apparent individualism of this thought moves from considering self as hollow, or self-translucent, and leads to community and reciprocity, much in keeping with Heidegger’s focus on light (lichtung): ‘Heidegger claims that one Dasein can be concerned about another Dasein in a way that allows him to become transparent to himself…In our caring for others authentically, we can somehow make authenticity possible for the person for whom we care.’90 This way of thinking belongs more to the early work of Heidegger and raises the question as to how the ‘somehow’ materialises, whether such transference is at all possible without closer dependency on Being. The intent is to aid others shift to authenticity by ‘leaping ahead of the other’ – not to act for the other or take over another’s initiative but to ‘help the other to become transparent to himself in his care and become free for it.’91 This is an act that leaders can adopt by aiding Dasein see the ineptitude of inauthenticity, a move which Heidegger probes deeply in his later work. Rather than be individualistic, ‘resoluteness pushes it (Dasein) into solicitous Being with others…when Dasein is resolute it can become the conscience of others.’92 Usefully, what Tomkins and Simpson do is to shift the notion of care closer to relational authenticity. The notion of care recognises that being involved in the event of decision-making can be a tense affair in which one cannot avoid conflict or the ambiguity inherent in complexity. Care does not mean nurturing for Heidegger but more a sensitive awareness to the surrounding force of being and respect for the complexity of situations: ‘The Heideggerian caring leader cannot be nice (or at least, not always), since niceness would be a denial of complexity and multiplicity – a ‘dumbing down’ into the ways of ‘the They’. In a Heideggerian world, compassion, kindness and niceness are neither necessary nor sufficient for care.’93 The other notion Heidegger explores which has had leadership appeal is ‘dwelling’, a cornerstone for what Donna Ladkin sees as the importance of ethics; situational context and receptivity to others.94 In a similar fashion to care, dwelling is  Ibid. p. 1021.  Michel Foucault (1986). The Care of the Self: The history of sexuality 3. Robert Hurley (trans.) New York: Pantheon Books. 90  Wisnewski, Heidegger: An Introduction, p. 128. 91  Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 159. 92  Ibid. p. 344. (my emphasis). 93  Tomkins and Simpson, “Caring Leadership: A Heideggerian Perspective” p. 1023. 94  Donna Ladkin (2006). “When Deontology and Utilitarianism Aren’t Enough: How Heidegger’s Notion of “Dwelling” Might Help Organisational Leaders Resolve Ethical Issues.” Journal of 88 89

Heidegger’s Authenticity

81

grounded in the continuum of time as a presence in Being. The move is a distinct shift away from leader traits and leader-centric decision-making. Recognition is paid to ‘letting things be’ and in terms of virtue ethics, an openness and humility which calls for ‘knowing one’s place’.95 This relates to the ‘turning’ where controlling will is given up in favour of release, an act of open-state waiting. In Heidegger’s, The Question Concerning Technology, Dasein must become the shepherd of being, the one who waits for the presence of Being.96 This process of waiting is hindered by the all pervasive influence of technology and the mindset it elicits. For Heidegger, the order of technology is the bane of modern life but at the same time technology is how Being emerges. This dual sense of technology is described from two separate sides. On the negative side, we come to know technology in its familiar form as an instrumental and controlling organizational system which pervades our lives. Its positive side, however, is one which comes to be known through its ‘essence’. It is the essence of technology which brings with it the (part) unveiling of Being so that the change into authenticity now comes solely from Being itself (ereignis) not Dasein: ‘For Being has no equal whatever. It is not brought about by anything else…Being brings itself to pass into its epoch.’97 There is still care but now the emphasis is on allowing Being to disclose itself through Dasein. A certain state of self is demanded which is self-effacing and a return to the condition of transparency which is able to imbibe otherness and true Being. Ladkin suggests the openness required involves the leader paying attention to overzealous judgments and habits of jumping to conclusions. Better to remain open, be inquisitive, and especially be meditative ‘to build the capacity to stay with the other in a way which enables him or her to really perceive the meanings behind the surface appearance of difficult situations.’98 Ladkin describes Heidegger’s notion of dwelling as ‘a particular quality of engagement. It connotes lingering, paying attention in an unhurried way …openness…affecting a place…which reflects the self while sympathetically representing the particularities of the space itself.’99 The route to linger in dwelling is to reintroduce transparency, allow light into the opening by effacing ego concerns and allow oneself to be fully present: ‘In the most practical sense, to really “stay with” another, we must let go of our own interpretations, analyses, and most importantly, our judgments, in order to be fully available.’100 Staying with others involves allowing them to air their viewpoint and maintain their own authenticity. Any leader acting in this way is considerate and benign. In

Business Ethics 65 (1): 87–98. 95  Ibid. p. 97. 96  Martin Heidegger (1977). The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. William Lovitt (trans.) Harper & Row, p. 42. 97  Ibid. p. 44. 98  Ladkin, “When Deontology and Utilitarianism Aren’t Enough”, p. 93. 99  Ibid. p. 92. 100  Ibid. p. 93.

82

4  Philosophies of Interest

sum, leaders in dwelling would be characterised as receptive, patiently exploring the event, respecting other’s views and introducing personal experiences. The point is to be open to the present flow of the matter-at-hand and create a space for action to emerge. Power is relaxed, authority positions are not haughtily defended and a degree of self-effacement is in order. To understand dwelling it is necessary to return to Heidegger’s analysis of thinking to the way thought takes hold, in particular applied to the mindset of leaders when making decisions and their attitude to associates. Heidegger argues for dwelling as a counter reaction to calculative thought which is ‘nothing more than a manipulation of operational concepts, representational models, and models of thinking’.101 Better to focus on the here and now, the moment of concern in which we dwell, ‘dwell on what lies close and meditate on what is closest; upon that which concerns us, each one of us, here and now; here, on this patch of home ground; now, in the present hour of history.’102 The attraction to think about what the moment presents is contrary to pre-formed strategies leaders normally come prepared with and their routinized hyperbole. Leaders need to await the thinking that comes…Experience reveals understanding in the context of place, time, body, mood, other people, weather, politics, stock markets and happenings…it is one thing to say ‘this is how to lead’. It is quite another thing to ‘be’ a leader, living the experience through crisis, celebration or everyday mundane.103

As described by Heidegger’s later work, dwelling is characterised as lingering, letting-­things-be in order that Being and the Earth can come into the light. Dwelling is very much a preservation of the antinomies of life, the mortals and the gods, earth and the world, ‘to preserve the fourfold, to save the earth, to await the divinities, to escort mortals  – this fourfold preserving is the simple nature, the presencing of dwelling.’104 To dwell is an exercise in disclosure and the mastery of waiting. At best, this reflective, aware state is also one of thinking in the correct way, to be inquiring and meditative: ‘Calculative thinking may someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking. What great danger then might move upon us?…Then man would have denied and thrown away his own special nature – that he is a meditative being.’105 We have here at least one way in which Heidegger’s position can positively contribute to leadership models, enabling them to be increasingly open and sensitive to situations as a recognition of being-somewhere and evaluating significance. Leaders should be able to apply their dispositions in multiple ways, from the most rationally   Elizabeth Smythe and Andrew Norton (2007). “Thinking as Leadership/Leadership as Thinking.” Leadership 3(1): 65–90, p.  67. C/f. Martin Heidegger (2001) Zollikon Seminars. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, p. 107. 102  Martin Heidegger (1966). Discourse on Thinking. John M.  Anderson and E.  Hans Freund (trans.) Memorial Address. New York: Harper & Row. p. 47. 103  Smythe and Norton, “Thinking as Leadership/Leadership as Thinking.” p. 68. 104  Martin Heidegger (1971). Poetry, Language and Thought. Albert Hofstadter (trans.) New York: Harper & Row, pp. 158, 159. 105  Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking. p. 56. 101

Heidegger’s Authenticity

83

astute to the intuitively emotional, all of which maximise the chance that the mystery and ambiguity of a situation will find full freedom of expression and be given due respect to come to light. The notions of dwelling and building resonate with Heidegger’s insistence that the truth of things will emerge if we have the openness of mind to let Being presence itself. What infuses us with action and true thinking is what Dasein receives as thought-provoking: ‘Everything thought-provoking gives us to think. But it always gives that gift just so far as the thought-provoking matter already is intrinsically what must be thought about.’106 On the one hand, this is a conservative stance, one in which building and dwelling co-join to allow Dasein to move from being rootless to being rooted in the world. In this case, thinking will lead leaders to accept ‘the call of leadership… the calling that captures the ear, the thinking, and the soul of a leader.’107 On the other hand, exploring notions of dwelling and care form the important background for understanding how complexity opens the potential for dynamic creativity. In the deeper reaches of Heidegger’s philosophy there are rich notions of agency and ontology to be mined and explored. However, in order to fully evaluate Heidegger’s contribution to authentic leadership it is important to question the role ethics plays in Heidegger’s work, considering it is an intrinsic component of authentic leadership. It should be remembered Heidegger never claimed to focus on ethics. His endorsement of Nazism in 1933 and his claim that ethics is not his concern present problems some would claim to be insurmountable: ‘Heidegger…has often been accused not only of failing to develop an ethical theory, but of failing to say anything that might clarify the relationship between his ontological thought and ethics.’108 Others, however, beg to differ. Joanna Hodge acknowledges that ethics should be recognised in Heidegger’s work even though it is not directly taken aboard: ‘I claim that the question of ethics is the definitive, if unstated problem of his thinking.’109 As a yardstick for determining how we should behave, ethics refers to ethos which is the area in which a person lives, a return to Heidegger’s exploration of dwelling as the essence of being-in-the-world. This relates to behaviour and praxis, essentially a way to overcome pre-judgements by meeting and responding to the singularity of particular situations. As a practice, ethics is not the focus of Heidegger but a road through which ontology can be understood, it presumes an overall, desirable way of life which corresponds to achieving authenticity. It relates to the necessary concern needed to cope with the finitude of life and its multifaceted condition. Heidegger’s peculiar stance centres on the fact that we are not merely discussing duty or responsibility of one individual to another but a different kind of  Martin Heidegger (1968). “What Calls for Thinking?” in David Farrell Krell (ed.) Martin Heidegger. (1927/1964) Basic writings. Expanded Edition. HarperCollins Publishers, 369–391, p. 370. 107  Smythe and Norton, “Thinking as Leadership/Leadership as Thinking” pp. 76, 83. 108  Charles Guignon (2012). “Becoming a person: Hermeneutic phenomenology’s contribution.” New Ideas in Psychology 30: (1): 97–106. p. 105. 109  Joanna Hodge (1995). Heidegger and Ethics. Routledge. p. 1. 106

84

4  Philosophies of Interest

relationship – one in which Dasein relates to Being – a relationship of the known to the unknown, the mystery of otherness. Hodge suggests an appropriate way to characterise Heidegger’s approach to ethics is to make it a ‘question of human flourishing.’110 In this way, ethical questioning questions what it is to be human, how flourishing can be encouraged, and how the hurdles which prevent the turn to authenticity can be overcome. In a similar way to Nietzsche, Heidegger does not turn to the majority to discover appropriate ways to make sensible, ethical judgment. The majority threatens descent to the crowd or mob mentality. Das Man is no reference point for doing the right thing or being authentic. Heidegger’s morality is based on understanding the meaning of man, and how the being of Dasein relates to Being, or as he conceptualises it, the ontological difference. Ethics does not deal with the moral measure of a person’s behaviour or attitude. The way to acting ethically is already in place as we are thrown into existence through traditional heritage and institutions; it is, therefore, pre-reflective, already part of the experienced lifeworld. As such, onus is exerted onto the individual Dasein to aspire to personal authenticity as a way to make and constitute the self, including ethical behaviour. As Taylor points out, ‘moral philosophy has tended to focus on what is right to do rather than on what it is good to be, on defining the content of obligation rather than the nature of the good life.’111 For Heidegger, the nature of the good life is the pursuit of authenticity as the bridge which scans the ontological difference. Crossing this bridge is a sensed pursuit based on the feeling that who the person is must be considered inseparable from a deep sense of who the person should be.112 At the same time, Dasein becomes a kind of guardian of Being who, once having seen the light in the clearing, can further spread its influence, Man is rather “thrown” from Being itself into the truth of Being, so that ek-sisting in this fashion he might guard the truth of Being…Man does not decide whether and how beings appear…man as ek-sisting has to guard the truth of Being. Man is the shepherd of Being.113

On this criteria, designating actions which are moral or immoral carries no weight in comparison to the activity of letting-Being-be, which occurs in the ‘ethos’ or dwelling of life. Consequently, for morality to take force it does so through the emergence of Being and dwelling, in keeping with the destiny of history and the nation state: Moral precepts cannot be binding for human beings unless they are issued by Being itself (das Sein), that is, by a transcendent non-entity or agent that is both concealed in human

 Ibid. p. 12.  Taylor, Sources of the Self: The making of the modern identity, p. 3. 112  Charles Guignon (2013). In Search of Authenticity. The Humanistic Psychologist 41 (3): 204–208. 113  Martin Heidegger (1946). “Letter on Humanism” in Krell, (1977) Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, HarperCollins Publishers, 217–265, p. 234. 110 111

Heidegger’s Authenticity

85

history and sends (schickt) to us humans the historical epochs that are our destiny (Geschick) and constitute history (Geschichte).114

For Heidegger, moral values neither emerge from subjective evaluation or the pure abstraction of universal rules, but to be in accord with authenticity they are derived from the world of Dasein, from the relationship of beings to Being: ‘If the name ‘ethics’, is in keeping with the basic meaning of the word ethos… that ‘ethics’ ponders the abode of man… that thinking which thinks the truth of Being as the primordial element of man…is in itself the original ethics.’115 Aspects of politics, modern technology, and pressures from the conformity of the age create what Heidegger describes as Gestell, a way of promoting the unethical and inauthentic. This prevents beings from truly manifesting, hindering them from coming into the light by lulling them into the belief that this is the only reality. To participate in moral decisions the emptiness at the heart of Dasein must be cultivated into a search for authenticity, the move away from the inauthentic to the recognition of finitude, anxiety, goundlessness, and acceptance that ‘moral situations are often complex and ambiguous, where outcomes are uncertain, where goods conflict with each other, where a balance of differing interests is hard to gauge.’116 This is the authentic challenge, not to access a final state or be part of a secure status quo, but to adopt a mindset which is open to the call of Being in all its mystery and uncertainty. Ethics and its authentic counterpart are an exercise in unconcealment. With this comes an attitude of openness and respect for others which we recognise from relational authenticity. Put otherwise, authenticity and ethics signal the counter reaction to a false condition: Heidegger asserts that politics’ realm is that of beings as a whole, and ethics, its essential counter-essence, is that dwelling within the political whole which resists the totalizing determination of politics and responds to being as that space in which singularity can occur and thus subvert the totality.117

Unless insight and resoluteness are present there can be no ethics. Ethics will not be subsumed to politics but will be a response to it. These observations are well-taken and from a phenomenological position a major contribution to Husserl’s findings. Heidegger’s insights are particularly relevant to the discussion of creativity and authenticity. Authentic leaders can display their flexibility as agents who express the Earth-World dialectic, where World is stable and familiar and Earth allows for endless possibility and profusion. Leaders would not be taken merely as products of their time or expressive of their authority, though cultural-historical heritage cannot be ignored. But authentic leaders will take the autonomous task outlined by Heidegger as Dasein, a state of ‘self-interpreting, and as the being that takes a stand  Herman, Philipse, (1999). “Heidegger and Ethics.” Inquiry 42 (3–4) 439–474, p. 440.  Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism”, p. 258. 116  Lawrence J.  Hatab (1995). “Ethics and Finitude: Heideggerian Contributions to Moral Philosophy.” International Philosophical Quarterly 35 (4): 403–417, p. 411. 117  Michael Lewis (2005) Heidegger and the Place of Ethics. London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic Publishing, pp. 4–5. 114 115

86

4  Philosophies of Interest

on its own being…situated in a rich context, filled with meaning and possibilities, but not grounded in an underlying ontology.’118 The implication is that leaders can draw on the ‘ungrounded enabling conditions’ that World generates from Earth to create possibilities for the future.119 These markers for creativity and the pursuit of authenticity are significant; why then is Sartre to be preferred as a source for authentic leadership’s perspective? There are many troubling implications for authentic leadership in Heidegger’s thinking which cannot be ignored. To begin with, to remain with Ladkin’s application of dwelling hardly seems to differ from other forms of leadership not based on Heidegger’s thoughts. Pondering dilemmas, searching for covert meaning, caring with others, or finding peace in the openness of Being, can be undertaken without relying on existential sensibility as support. Even if this advice is useful, or a necessary departure from charismatic leadership, do we need Heidegger’s concepts to understand this? If we do not, then for this analysis Heidegger’s notions are redundant. In fact, Ladkin herself points out some of these ideas are similar to established models which are not reliant on Heidegger. One can cite, for example, William Pollard’s ‘The Leader Who Serves: Will the leader please stand? Not the full-time Christian worker, but the full-time servant. Not the theologian, but the lover of people. Not the preacher, but the listener. Not the teacher, but the learner. Not the administrator, but the initiator. Not the successful businessman, but the steward. Not the taker, but the giver.120

Or, more pertinent Robert Greenleaf’s, servant leader: [I]f one is servant, either leader or follower, one is always searching, listening, expecting that a better wheel for these times is in the making…A new moral principle is emerging which holds that the only authority deserving one’s allegiance is that which is freely and knowingly granted by the led to the leader.121

The position of tolerance and lingering to allow Being its opening to the light is close to the mindset we associate with servant leadership. The suggestion is that Heidegger deepens leadership approaches but in effect offers suggestions which can just as easily emanate from other sources than his phenomenological work. In perusing servant leadership, Greenleaf employs similar terminology, albeit in a more colloquial form. He claims great leaders are first servants; they are in a relationship and serve the needs of others. They see the world ‘as it is’, and relate to each other not forcefully but in a creatively, supportive manner. Servant leaders in modern society will come to fight injustice and become positive ‘builders’ of a better society to dwell in. In an existential way, servant leaders should not seek destruction to bring about improvement but explore the present and dwell in its space to explore its potential attributes.  Stephen C.  Yanchar (2018). “Agency, World, and the Ontological Ground of Possibility.” Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 38 (1): 1–14, p. 6. 119  Ibid. p. 9. 120  C. William Pollard (1994). The Leader Who Serves. Pollard Papers. Minneapolis, MN. 1–10, p. 3. 121  Robert K. Greenleaf (1977). Servant Leadership. New York: Paulist Press, p. 20. 118

Heidegger’s Authenticity

87

The difficulty here is that taken on face value the impression is one of relinquishing control which, if sustained, would be unable to carry out what Heidegger considers to be the much needed total overhaul of everydayness for authenticity to be achieved. The role of being would be difficult to fix in terms of this static description, especially as he insists authenticity is to be pursued on different levels: the physical ‘umwelt’, the public ‘mitwelt’, the social ‘eigenwelt’ and the spiritual ‘uberwelt’. In each of these areas leadership needs a different, radical face, one which is underscored by an effort to create change, extend limit points, and work through initial anxiety. But even more troubling are the implications connected to Heidegger’s description of courage and resoluteness. One may question the role of resoluteness as a way of extracting decisions of the moment, making them resolute or decisive. The role of decisions is an indelible component of the existential position, taken as an ungrounded expression of the independent act of the human will. Such affinity and sensitivity to the moment of decision is highly desirable but there are also pitfalls. These are apparent if we include Carl Schmitt’s decisionism, strongly condemned by Richard Wolin. Wolin notes that Schmitt’s decisionism ‘abrogates conditions of ‘legitimacy’ or ‘political normalcy’…and thereby establishes the preconditions for political dictatorship…an absolute decision created out of nothingness…this decisionism is essentially dictatorship, not legitimacy.’122 Wolin concludes this arbitrary position is endorsed by Heidegger’s move away from ‘the quasi-solipsistic, individualist basis for decision’ that one finds in Being and Time to be replaced by a ‘collectivist’ orientation in which the ‘national community’ forms the basis for decisions.123 Consequently, from what seems to be a well-intentioned move to relational authenticity turns out to be a link to fascism and Heidegger’s version of heroic leadership. In 1933, following Hitler’s lead, Heidegger encouraged the populace to exit the League of Nations. Fascism had the cultural appeal he sought in that it promoted a common ethnic origin and the communal spirit of the people. More than any other, the fascist leader embodies the state and followers must work through that. For Heidegger the arrival of Hitler as Chancellor was ‘the greatness and glory of a new era’ and ‘The Fuhrer himself and he alone is the present and future German reality and its law’.124 Heidegger adopts Nietzsche’s arguments, though with different intent, to praise the virtue of militarism and advocates the struggle of life to find the ‘correct’ path. For all the sense of autonomy and voluntarism, it is fate and destiny that seem to hold sway, all of which counteracts the autonomy of authenticity Heidegger has initially argued in favour of. As Wolin points out, there are several parallel and  Richard Wolin (2016). The Politics of Being. Columbia University Press, p. 30. C/f. Carl Schmitt (1922/1985). Political Theology. George Schwab (trans.) M.I.T. Press, pp. 66–67. 123  Wolin, The Politics of Being, p. 32. 124  Martin Heidegger (1966) “Only a God Can Save Us”: The Spiegel interview with Martin Heidegger: May. 1976: 193–219, William J. Richardson (trans.) in Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker (1981), Thomas Sheehan (ed.). Precedent Publishing. 45–67. 122

88

4  Philosophies of Interest

countervailing currents at play here: The fate of individual autonomy, the destiny of the people, and the repetition of the past. Heidegger discusses destiny in terms of repetition but it is not carried out as the mere copying of tradition or the bland acceptance of fate. The basis for making choices for both leaders and followers is muddied by contradictory forces and this plays out on how leaders are chosen or come to prominence: ‘To repeat an authentic possibility derived from the past means that ‘Dasein may choose its hero.’125 With this insight we come to the major objection to the way leadership studies have over-utilised Heidegger’s compelling notions of dwelling and care. Rather than a form of servant leadership, which we have noted, Heidegger’s work is closer to charismatic and heroic leadership as conveyors of destiny fulfilment. It takes the role of the hero to remind us that in order to emerge from the state of fallenness and confusion we need to re-establish truths which were the glue which once created unity: ‘In heeding the summons of the hero, people once again perceive the spirit at work in their culture and can eliminate those traditions which are inimicable to that spirit.’126 Authenticity takes place within a historical community in which the enduring ideals which once belonged to Germany’s heritage can be retrieved while at the same time acknowledging that tradition is alive and changes with historical circumstance. In this respect heroes ‘breathe life into cultural symbols…World-historical heroes give new symbolic expression to the collective unconscious.’127 These thoughts have consequences for dwelling. Dwelling is not merely concerned with allowing the essence of situations a breathing space to inhabit. Dwelling is the spatial practice of being-in-place, always contextualised in society and culture, and with strong roots in primordial nature it invitingly conjures up menacing connotations: ‘In Heidegger’s world, in his day, the idea of a culture being rooted in earth carried with it ideas of racial purity.’128 Additionally, Heidegger’s dwelling joins places and spaces in a tight relationship, one which embodies one’s ‘spiritual’ identity and therefore the pursuit of authenticity: ‘Heidegger considered dwelling and building as spatial practices, and saw them as implicated in and formed by culture, so that they lacked authenticity if they became disconnected – particularly if they lost touch with the primordial.’129 Everything connected with place is bound to the possibility for a clearing and for Being to presence itself. It is the rooted origin as the home of being. As related to destiny and fate, dwelling is where the Volk (the people) are the national community in the pursuance of like-minded authenticity, rather than a collection of mobile, autonomous individuals. But the transition takes on a foreboding turn when the previous uncanny calling of conscience as a mythical story and

 Wolin, The Politics of Being, p. 63.  Michael E. Zimmerman (1981). Eclipse of the Self. Ohio University Press. p. 85. 127  Ibid. p. 86. 128  Andrew Ballantyne (2000). “In a Dark Wood: Dwelling as Social Practice.” Theory: Arq 4 (4): 349–355, p. 351. 129  Ibid. p. 354. 125 126

Heidegger’s Authenticity

89

Teutonic quest incorporates the leader. The hero, or semi-god, comes down to everyday life with the gift of insight and an obligation to pass it on and enlighten the people. The clue that we are not describing authentic leadership but instead the charismatic/heroic figure begins with the fact that the gift may only be temporary: ‘In actual human life, however, the treasure must be won again and again. Insight does not remain forever, but must be renewed.’130 Rather than authentic leadership, this sense of a disappearing gift which results in ineffectuality and loss of follower loyalty is precisely the way Max Weber discusses the ephemeral and fragile foundation of charismatic leadership. Heidegger inter-relates the charismatic leader and the heroic figure, the leader atop of the totalitarian hierarchy which brings national unity through struggle and militarism. In this sense, Hitler was the embodiment of Heidegger’s particular, deviant form of authenticity. Wolin concludes that the National Socialist movement of the 1930s was not based so much on principles or intellectual ideas but on the special qualities of the leader. The movement ‘is not so much ideological, but existential, rooted in the authenticity of the Fuhrer as an individual, historically existent Dasein.’131 Heidegger considers the need to act decisively to be paramount, and it does so when Germany, in the form of Hitler, rewrites politics by carving out its own existential future. Individual Dasein has transmogrified into the individual Being of the nation and created a self-made destiny fulfilling the need for resoluteness. Being, which has come to predominate after the ‘turn’ in Heidegger’s work, is now more clearly apparent in life’s clearing through the avatar of the heroic few. Those who are not called, or who live in the everyday of inauthenticity, ‘reel about within the orbit of their caprice and lack of understanding…they are donkeys…Being remains concealed to them…Being is not easily available for everyone at the same price…the true is not for everyone but only for the strong.’132 There is a sense, at least in the historically opportune time in which Heidegger writes, that leaders are authentic while the led still live in the concealed world of Being as inauthentic. For leadership, where decision-making is pivotal and the context within which ethical considerations predominate, Heidegger develops a theory which defends the sovereignty of Hitler’s will’ and his ability to lead. Following this, Heidegger believes only decisions carry authority, and demotes ethical discussion. Furthermore, ‘Heideggerian Being never issues moral precepts. As a consequence Heidegger’s heteronomous doctrine exterminates ethics by investing a transcendent non-entity (Being) with a moral monopoly, but without specifying moral rules so authorized.’133 Authenticity is no longer about self-determination but is now a mission to inculcate inauthentic followers. Consequently, placed somewhere between beings and

 Zimmerman, Eclipse of the Self, p. 89.  Wolin, The Politics of Being, p. 106. 132  Martin Heidegger (1935/2000). An Introduction to Metaphysics. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (trans.) Yale University Press. pp. 141, 142. 133  Philipse, “Heidegger and Ethics,” p. 440. 130 131

90

4  Philosophies of Interest

Being, Dasein can attain authenticity by following in the footsteps of the historically destined, heroic few. The individual takes up a role-model from his or her historical past and strives to emulate it in all he or she does. The authentic person ‘chooses its hero’ and is ‘free for the struggle of loyally following in the footsteps’ of the Dasein that has come before…retrieving possibilities of action from the communal history it now encounters as a shared destiny.’134 There is an absolute requirement to absorb living tradition in a way which respects what has been but insists on recognising its presence in the now of time, drawn from communal history to become a shared destiny. History has shown that Heidegger’s thoughts are a combatant to the philosophical problems of metaphysics but bearing in mind his reservations on ethics, adopting his views directly are inappropriate for a wide array of leadership situations. When the full impact of Heidegger’s system is given pragmatic expression its political consequences have proven to be dire. Rather than support servant, transformational or distributed leadership it veers over into the heroic/charismatic model which needs no support from Heidegger. In sum, both care and dwelling are remarkable descriptions of what it is ‘to be’. However, their relevance for leadership must be bounded by the philosophical system they represent. If care simply means allegiance to others and empathic sharing it would characterise important authentic qualities which have been widely explored in many other leadership models with no mention of Heidegger. But Heidegger’s notion of care is specific to his overall philosophy of human beings relation to Being, and what he describes as the relation of World to Earth. Care is essentially the state of being in the world and can just as easily include distasteful, offensive attitudes, as they are also the worldly part of the already-given limitations of facticity, anxiety and falling.

134

 Guignon, “Becoming a person: Hermeneutic phenomenology’s contribution”, p. 104.

Chapter 5

Ethics

Abstract  Ethical leadership has been widely influenced by both ancient and modern philosophy. Ethics is closely aligned with business, especially when faced by the capitalist credo for profit-making and laissez-faire economy. Evaluating returns and profit rather than acting out of authentic motivation may well signal narcissism driven by narcissistic efforts of self-promotion and leadership self-interest. To counteract this, authentic leadership is partnered with virtue ethics, which acts to introduce ethical considerations into leadership decisions. The best proponent of virtue ethics is Aristotle. Even though Aristotle has concerns about profit for profit’s sake, he acknowledges that wealth can be used to create abundance for all and philanthropically benefit others. The most important virtues include, phronesis (practical wisdom), benevolence and prudence, all of which encourage eudaimonia which is a life-style of being true to one’s self in authentic fashion. An implication of virtue ethics is its argument for role-modelling, witnessed by the influence of great leaders such as Ghandi, or Mandela, and proposed by the transformational leadership model, where followers readily emulate leaders. Michel Foucault, influenced by Aristotle, argues moral responsibility for the other is part of an inner authentic core and has to be acquired by way of a self-disciplined, personal project. In fact, the postmodern thinkers, such as Derrida, Levinas and Foucault, are all concerned with virtuous activities such as justice, personal responsibility, and communitarian freedom. Keywords  Ethics · Narcissism · Transformational leadership · Role-modelling · Foucault · Derrida · Levinas · Aristotle · Well-being · Eudaimonia

Ethical Business Ethical decision-making is supported by a strong philosophical foundation. In her survey of ethical leadership after the millennium, Joanne Ciulla notes a wide interdisciplinary spectrum covering the seminal works of ancient and modern moral philosophers from both the West and East, from Aristotle to postmodernism. There © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Shaw, The Philosophy of Authentic Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29650-5_5

91

92

5 Ethics

is, however, an uneasy tension between philosophical advice and leaders who pursue power for power’s sake: Moral leaders have to be super-Kantians who put duty over inclination. History is littered with leaders who serve the interests of themselves, their families, clan, cronies, ethnic or religious groups, over the needs of, or to the detriment of, the rest of their constituents. Such leaders are unethical but they are also not doing their job.1

The path is difficult, complicated by the pursuit of profit maximization when prescribed rules or normative imperatives are passively followed, or profit is itself the deciding factor for gifts or hospitality. Evaluating returns and profit rather than acting out of authentic motivation may well signal narcissism driven by narcissistic efforts of self-promotion which obscure the promotion of the common good. As a way of life narcissism knows no limits, it is an endless pursuit which is never satisfied, a pursuit which can easily drag close associates down on its coat-tail.2 In sum, the accusation is that business leaders tend to prioritise self-interest over moral restraint, focus on economic ties over social relationships, individualism over collective goals, competition over voluntary cooperation, and generally favour materialistic values. With ethics at a price as the ruling credo, it is not surprising that genuine ethical pursuit is problematic within corporations which subtly achieve compliance through loyalty demands, conformity, and projecting superficial, exterior images. Leaders who themselves are preoccupied with inauthentic self-aggrandisement will transfer this mentality to the workforce and downplay genuine responsibility for others. In an atmosphere of routine and inbuilt hierarchical dominance the existential need for personal judgment evaporates, dulling human responsiveness, and minimizing the decision-makers own initiative. Ian Maitland describes the apparent disconnect between the norm of avarice, the exploitation the market place encourages, and the community of interest which enhances the personal sense of social responsibility. Maitland insists the division between self-interest and the greater public good can, however, be broached by virtue ethics where it essentially links self-interest to the larger interests of the group.3 Authentic leadership, when partnered by virtue ethics, acts to counteract the prevailing notion that indulging in cut-throat competition admits strategies which lack personal integrity. The question for business leadership is whether in acting to further self-interest one can at the same time follow authenticity and further the general good. The virtues of personal life, if well-rooted, need to flow into the business world which has its own demands, expectations, and role-play which may clash with any personal sense of what is right. In other words, virtues relevant in one

 Joanne B.  Ciulla (2005). “The State of Leadership Ethics and the Work that Lies Before Us.” Business Ethics: A European Review 14 (4): 323–335. p. 327. 2  John Roberts (2001). “Corporate Governance and the Ethics of Narcissus.” Business Ethics Quarterly 11 (1): 109–27. 3  Ian Maitland (2002). “The Hunan Face of Self-Interest.” Journal of Business Ethics 38 (1–2): 3–17. 1

Ethical Business

93

context may be difficult to apply in another. This is not to say virtues disappear, only that for weaker characters they may submerge beneath the weight of avarice. Psychological, perspectival frames are always present within prevailing discourse and the more rigid the frame the more limited is sensemaking and the more difficult it is to switch to other frames with more generous perspectives. These limited frames which have blind spots curtailing the depth of decision-making may be consciously adopted as an easy solution. They are also assimilated unconsciously resulting in a form of ‘ethical blindness’ a condition whereby the ethical dimension of a decision is simply invisible to the leader.4 Ethical blindness is the result of several forces, reinforced by an increasingly rigid perspectival frame which resists the need to deal with ethical dilemmas inherent in any situation. If the frame is too narrow, say corporative or economic, it may eliminate wider moral implications which reach out to the broader, socio/cultural good. Within a narrow, rigid frame with limited viewpoint any sense of relational authenticity risks falling by the wayside. In order to counteract these negative tendencies a process of recognition needs to be in place, a process that begins with basic awareness for interpreting information ethically and the understanding that the moral character of leadership does not depend upon organizations, authority or institutional hierarchy. For example, the much vaunted need for leaders in business and politics to present a viable vision for others to be attached to is considered par for the leadership course. Visions provide practical goals for followers, unify actions, and importantly, initiate inspirational potential. There is also possibility to recognise authenticity. A leader ‘has a broader sense of what is possible and therefore a broader sense of moral obligation…Leadership is morality and immorality magnified. Every ethical or unethical thing that a leader does can have a ripple effect.’5 This makes the vision of the future, which is a core leadership tool, not a simple functional goal but a significant signal for others to evaluate the degree to which leaders prioritise ethical considerations. Equality of relationships and mutual respect count more than the power of position. Even without going deeper into an analysis of the virtuous character, it is evident that authenticity and morality go hand in hand when authentic, personal, moral convictions are aligned with ‘the moral demands of organizational leadership’ and situational demands do not entail the sacrifice of personal moral codes.6 Because of its wide appeal, the morality of authentic leadership is one of the most useful to counteract narcissism and succeed in a world of complexity and dehumanizing technological systems. For most leaders, ethical questions come to the surface when conflict arises, when decisions have to be made which present dilemmas of choice with potentially  Guido Palazzo. Franciska Krings. Ulrich Hoffrage (2012). “Ethical Blindness.” Journal of Business Ethics 109 (3): 323–338, p. 324. 5  Ciulla, “The State of Leadership Ethics and the Work that Lies Before Us.” p. 325, 329. 6  Milorad M Novicevic, Michael Harvey, M.  Ronald Buckley, Jo Ann Brown-Radford Randy Evans (2006). “Authentic Leadership: A Historical Perspective.” Journal of Leadership and Organizational Studies 13 (1) 64–76, pp. 70, 72. 4

94

5 Ethics

good or bad consequences. Aristotle is the guiding figure here. He insists moral character is visible in that it is detectable by followers through performance rather than based on assumption, conjecture, or psychological attribution. Moreover, these actions need to be observed in context over a prolonged period. This aids understanding behaviour as a distinct pattern of action over time rather than evidenced as an isolated event. An authentic leader following ethical principles will need to show consistent traits of integrity, honesty and worthiness through visible actions which followers can identify with. Leaders will need to proactively put ethics at the forefront of their leadership agenda as authenticity must accompany decisions and be seen to be virtuous. Finally, leaders will need to transparently communicate that the basis for their decision-making is one which takes into consideration ethical values, with an awareness of consequences for both individuals and society at large. Virtues, as with all traits, are consistent patterns of behaviour rather than transitory reactions. Virtue ethics is concerned both with personal happiness and the pursuit of the just society, thereby covering the wide spectrum of authentic leadership requirements from autonomy to relational authenticity to ethical considerations. Aristotle insists that virtue ethics has a strong rational basis comparable to autonomous leadership: ‘We are able to act from reason rather than mere instinct, feeling or desire, and we are able to shape our emotions and desires so that they are aligned with reason. A virtuous person has practical wisdom (phronesis), which is an intellectual virtue that involves reasoning well about how to live and act virtuously.’7 Leaders use reason to socially interact based on the autonomous exercise of self-­ knowledge and self-regulation. Aristotle’s description of phronesis and prudence shows they belong to the rational part of the soul. A person with prudence or practical wisdom is an expert in deliberating for the purpose of living well, with the ability to identify moral virtue in any given situation: Prudence acts as an umbrella virtue which helps to negate the potential clash of different virtues: ‘it is not possible to be good in the true sense of the word without prudence, or to be prudent without moral goodness…the possession of the single virtue of prudence will carry with it the possession of them all.’8 The wide-ranging application of prudence has a moral dimension which is relevant to social activity and participation in the political community, even though communal life is more conflict-ridden than Aristotle suggests. Leaders need to examine their thought processes, to act self-reflexively and deliberate on their course of action by weighing up the benefits of options and, in particular, the moral quality of their conclusions. Applying virtue ethics means they relate authentic inner core desire to the desire to do what is good and noble. A thorough examination of motives, situation and context is required which demands more than lining up pros and cons of an issue but also includes searching for motivation as to why an argument is compelling. By concentrating on character, ‘virtue ethics focuses on the

 Liezl van Zyl (2018). Virtue Ethics. Routledge. p. 14.   Aristotle (350. B.C.E./2004). The Nicomachean Ethics. J.A.K.  Thomson (trans.) Penguin Classics, p. 166. 7 8

Ethical Business

95

conformity between right thinking and desire.’9 Authenticity requires there should be no conflict between what one wants to do and what one actually does. This means that good intentions are manifest in activity so followers can look up to fellow workers or leaders because their virtuous behaviour is transparent; they genuinely practice what they preach. The assumption is the virtues Aristotle explores will not clash with each other; the doctrine of the unity of the virtues insists this is the case but to achieve this it is necessary to find the golden mean and balance various diverging behaviours. It has been pointed out that establishing a balance between virtues corresponds to organizations which perpetuate the status quo, those who are unwilling to rock the boat in favour of equilibrium. This makes the argument a conservative one for organizations as Robert Solomon admits: Notoriously missing in Aristotle…is any reformist impulse, any attempt to view his community and culture as possibly not only imperfect but deeply flawed…one of the most obvious discoveries of any empirically minded or practical virtue ethics is that there is often a conflict of virtues.10

For Solomon, a pathway needs to be found to sort out the potential conflict of virtues by focusing on overriding traits without ignoring those which become more prominent in another context. In fact, this is resolved by understanding that virtues such as courage or temperance are consistent and omnipresent but the goods aimed for are immanent to the situation and will vary accordingly, thereby introducing a creative edge rather than falling back on routine. One such guide through the maze of virtues is the leader as role-model. Role-­ modelling plays a part in developing and encouraging the adoption of character virtues. This is the case even though from the outset to follow another’s example seems a distinct move away from the autonomous, personal determination of uncovering one’s inner core. Role-modelling occurs in different forms, from seeing an individual act in a compassionate way in person to news reports of altruistic acts or historical records of great leaders such as Ghandi, or Mandela. Followers can benefit from looking up to leaders as role models as a way to self-develop and transition from subordinate to superordinate. Leaders encourage and motivate followers to accept this responsibility and for different leadership models do more than they might have believed possible by appealing to followers’ sense of self-worth and commitment: Transformational leaders behave in ways that allow them to serve as role models for their followers. The leaders are admired, respected and trusted. Followers identify with the leaders and want to emulate them; leaders are endowed by their followers as having extraordinary capabilities, persistence and determination.11  Daryl Koen (1995). “A Role for Virtue Ethics in the Analysis of Business Practice.” Business Ethics Quarterly 5 (3): 533–539, pp. 535, 536. 10  Robert C.  Solomon (1993). Ethics and Excellence. Cooperation and Integrity in Business. Oxford University Press. p. 259. (my emphasis). 11  Bernard M. Bass and Ronald E. Riggio (2006). Transformational Leadership. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. p. 6. 9

96

5 Ethics

Though commendable, this view may be considered a tad naïve, indeed it has been critiqued from many fronts, including situationists who deny innate character virtues as well as by existentialists. However, some transformational leaders and those who follow virtue ethics, and the effectiveness of sage influence, argue authenticity can still benefit from role-modelling: If I am…unclear what a virtuous agent would do in the circumstances I find myself, the obvious thing to do is to go and ask one…it gives a straightforward explanation of an important aspect of our moral life, namely the fact that we do not always act as ‘autonomous’, utterly self-determining agents, but quite often seek moral guidance from people we think are morally better than ourselves.12

Cultivating leader authenticity incorporates a dual intent; nurturing and exploring personal identity and the ethical pursuit of a moral duty owed to others. Bearing this in mind, it is helpful if leaders possess an inclusive ethical ideology, a personal ethic as an integrated system of values and beliefs. Whether leaders stick to transcendent rules as idealistically principled or they choose to be more expedient rogue characters, the moral leader can mark decision-making issues as morally intense. This amounts to a proactive manner of pinpointing the importance of values to associates and followers, encouraging them to likewise acknowledge the importance of adhering to a moral compass. In any organization the values of that organization must be clarified to employees through discussion and clear communication.13 This does not come of itself as there must be determined efforts to forefront ethical concerns so that followers do not assume the leader is ethically neutral or even indifferent. As leaders of an organization are on a more familiar footing with employees than distant political leaders their role-modelling capability is powerful, aiding them to encourage authentic traits such as honesty, trustworthiness, and integrity. The reach of an authentic and responsible organizational leader includes all relevant stakeholders. This does not necessarily characterise the self-determining aspect of authenticity but is does underline its relational component in organizations as one which is concerned with nurturing others to hold similar values. These values grow and develop within a particular environment among a particular set of relationships and interpersonal competences. A form of authentic ‘perspectivism’ is at work whereby leaders evaluate the particular context within an organization and navigate ‘the complex typography of an organization’s various functional units and system of relations.’14 The way is cleared for individual initiatives at a local, decision-making level and creates an open environment for the furtherment of associations within organizations and wider communities. Aristotle’s comments on the virtues resonate within the business community where both leaders and employees can exercise their virtues and personal

 Rosalind Hursthouse (1999). On Virtue Ethics. Oxford. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 35.  Michael E.  Brown. Linda K.  Treviño (2006). “Ethical leadership: A Review and Future Directions”. The Leadership Quarterly 17 (6): 595–616. 14  Mollie Painter-Morland (2008) Business Ethics as Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 215. 12 13

Ethical Business

97

excellence. Employing moral management means leaders will look beyond selfinterest and work for decisions that incorporate the collective good. For example, the organizational activity of research and development approximates the contemplative life Aristotle recommends. Dedicated research involves thinking rationally and deeply; at one with the object of contemplation, a pure activity designed to improve conditions which does not immediately result in commercially successful products but initiates a thoughtful process.15 It is commercially astute as well as personally commendable to recognise business is reliant on virtues such as trust and honesty to make contracts work and promote respectable and responsible networks, ‘the virtues on which one prides oneself in one’s ‘personal’ life are essentially the same as those essential to good business.’16 For Aristotle moral virtues regulate desires and emotions: prudence helps make good decisions, self-control regulates sensual impulses, courage takes reasonable risks, generosity avoids an excessive attachment to money, and agreeable sociability draws in colleagues and customers. Insofar as a virtue does not refer to a specific deed but rather to a habit, all of these traits come together to form an admirable character, someone for whom doing the right thing in light of the circumstances at hand comes as second nature. As a result, Aristotle’s contribution to business ethics consists, not in providing a criterion to evaluate particular acts, but in putting the focus on the sort of people we wish to see working in the economy. Authenticity is characterised by a leader who seeks justice, an important virtue for Aristotle sadly lacking among business leaders. Justice means transacting fairly with others to give them what they justly deserve. The need for justice figures clearly whenever top executives are condemned for looting publicly traded corporations, falsifying accounts to investors, trading on insider information, or just plain making too much money. Justice is the issue, too, whenever corporations are encouraged to hire more women and minorities, let whistle-blowers press their case without threat of sanctions, stay away from countries with poor human rights records, or refrain from hiring cheap labour in the Third World.17

Justice centres on the fitting allocation of external goods, what people subjectively value in general such as, ‘life, bodily integrity, freedom, money, property, sex, offices, power and status.’18 All should be treated fairly; one party should not take advantage of another to the detriment of their well-being. On a business level, rewards are not only to be allocated to those who make a profit but also to those who show virtuous conduct. But Solomon also recognises that the display of virtuous conduct, such as trust, loyalty, courage and empathy, is complicated in a business environment where leaders of organizations need to draw on other dispositions: ‘there are those virtues that seem peculiar (though not unique) to business, such as

 George Bragues (2006). “Seek the Good Life, not Money: The Aristotelian Approach to Business Ethics.” Journal of Business Ethics 67 (4): 341–357, p. 354. 16  Ian Maitland (1997). “Virtuous Markets.” Business Ethics Quarterly 7 (1): 17–31, p. 23. 17  Bragues, “Seek the Good Life, not Money”, p. 349. 18  Ibid. 15

98

5 Ethics

being shrewd and ruthless and “tough,” which may well be vices in other aspects of life.’19 Aristotle makes the same point about friendship, arguing it would differ in a social as opposed to business or organizational setting. Power structures vary according to the nature of dependency in the relationship and what one party can offer the other: Those whose friendship is based on goodness are eager to benefit each other (since this is an essential feature of goodness and friendliness); and where there is this sort of rivalry there is no occasion for complaints or quarrels…But utilitarian friendship does give rise to complaints, because since each associates with the other for his own benefit, they are always wanting the better of the bargain…and the benefactor can never supply as much as the recipient demands.20

In the end, tensions can be resolved. The competitive spirit, even with self-­interested pretensions, still constitutes a virtuous mix of self-control, honesty, sympathy and fairness. Basically, interests in life are interconnected. For example, ‘what is generally referred to as private or personal consumption is nonetheless affected in its essence – that is, in the satisfaction or utility it yields – by consumption of the same goods or services by others; and in that specific sense it can be said to contain a social element.’21 There is mutual dependency between the individual and the collective, just as leaders and followers rely on the mutual support of each other. Accepting community values allows for a healthy pursuit of competition in a spirit of goodness and eudaimonia, a conclusion now finally accepted by the institutionalisation of corporate social responsibility: ‘Leaders in both business and civil society have focused too much on the friction between them and not enough on the points of intersection. The mutual dependence of corporations and society implies that both business decisions and social policies must follow the principle of shared value.’22 Even though Aristotle criticises acquisition of money for its own sake, and excessive preoccupation with making profit, as long as a business corporation is in harmony with that of the state and political priorities, he argues benefits still accrue. Indeed, Aristotle acknowledges that wealth can be used to create abundance for all and philanthropically benefit others: According to Aristotle’s logic, the state permits the creation of business organizations and assigns to them a particular function…Aristotle would not condemn a business for making a profit if this is one of the purposes given to it by the state and society. Aristotle’s argument rests on the notion that all professions, even business, have an appropriate end…Thus it is permissible for business to seek profit as it is merely fulfilling its proper function, just as the medical profession seeks cures for illness.23

 Solomon, Robert C. (1992). “Corporate Roles, Personal Virtues: An Aristotelean Approach to Business Ethics.” Business Ethics Quarterly 2 (3) 317–339, p. 330. 20  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, p. 224. 21  Fred Hirsch (1978). Social Limits to Growth. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 3. 22  Michael E. Porter and Mark R. Kramer (2006). “Strategy and Society.” Harvard Business Review (12): 77–92, p. 84. 23  Denis Collins (1987). “Aristotle and Business.” Journal of Business Ethics 6 (7): 567–572, p. 570. 19

Foucault and Care

99

This form of leadership should ensure that followers seek to work with a ‘moral manager’ by accepting both the role of a business leader and the person behind the role. Leaders need to bring ethical questions to the forefront and reinforce the conviction that ethics is an important part of organizational life to the point of admonishing those who act unethically: ‘Moral managers recognize the importance of proactively putting ethics at the forefront of their leadership agenda…The moral manager consistently rewards ethical conduct and disciplines unethical conduct at all levels in the organization, and these actions serve to uphold the standards and rules.’24 Characteristics of virtue ethics are also applicable to a corporation’s character. This includes past history of the organization and the corporate culture which evolves over the years to permeate the work place. It is the combination of personal virtue with organizational culture which cements the possibility for successfully integrating an ethical business policy. Virtue ethics stresses that people become what they are within a community or market place and as such the environment within which activity occurs takes on spiritual-material vibrancy. Business corporations which are morally sensitive work within these parameters searching for collective goals to realise company vision while at the same time carving a space for individual virtue to flourish. Integrity counts and people come before profit. Trustworthiness carried over time is indicative of lasting business relationships and this means self-interest is combined with a shared commitment for the benefit of all in partnership.

Foucault and Care In its focus on specific acts and their purpose, Aristotle’s virtue ethics is similar to aspects of postmodern ethics which insists that whether an act is deemed moral or not depends on the relative context rather than it being affixed to extraneous, absolute principles. In a similar fashion to virtue ethics, postmodernism emphasises context and strategy not universally valid rules. Any attempt to rid situations of their moral ambiguity is bound to fail; solutions can only be worked out by dispositions which have been cultivated through lengthy experience:25 ‘No logically coherent ethical code can ‘fit’ the essentially ambivalent condition of morality.’ Pre-ordained systems and rules are no match for ‘the moral self, constituted by responsibility’ and ‘to moral self-conscience.’26 Just as for Aristotle the pursuit of the good takes priority over all else so for the postmodern thinker the moral responsibility for the other is part of the inner authentic core as ‘a starting point rather than a product of  Linda Klebe Trevino. Laura Pincus Hartman. Michael Brown (2000). “Moral Person and Moral Manager: How Executives Develop a Reputation for Ethical Leadership.” California Management Review. 42 (4): 128–142, pp. 133, 136. 25  Zygmunt Bauman (1993). Postmodern Ethics. Oxford. U.K Cambridge. U.S.A. p. 10. 26  Ibid. p. 11. 24

100

5 Ethics

society.’27 Rather than espouse the viewpoint that postmodernism harbours an excessive concern with nihilism, its leading proponents, such as Derrida, Levinas and Foucault, are deeply concerned with virtuous activities such as ‘justice, personal responsibility, and communitarian freedom.’28 Admittedly, a degree of caution is needed when virtue ethics is compared to postmodernism which has widely different roots. For one thing, the outright desirability of Aristotelean virtue may be considered too sanguine, with an over-­emphasis on depicting positive virtues in business, society and politics where no such clear correspondences exist. Solomon is keen to emphasise the care and concern, even spiritual sensibility we find in all communities of interest, but one should not completely abandon postmodern suspicion: ‘It is one thing to claim that business practices can and should be ‘spiritualised’…care, concern and a shared understanding of the world are hallmarks of Aristotelian communities, but so are disorder, conflict and betrayal.’29 Critical thought is active and experimental, dealing with the exploration and questioning of prevailing limitations: ‘Leaders need to be obsessed with limits so that they can learn how to extend those that need extending and also negotiate those that need respecting.’30 As a key postmodern philosopher, Michel Foucault embraces difference and critique with a specific stylization of morality, a style that initially seems to be sceptical about self-determining authenticity but in fact effectively nurtures authenticity, virtue and integrity. In the context of leader authenticity and its virtuous appendage, one can discern an overlap in Foucault’s exploration of moral agency between the demands of virtue ethics and the social and cultural critiques of surveillance and control. Foucault is clear that it is insufficient to work on character from a transcendent vantage point or be ensconced in a hermetically protected cocoon of self-­ indulgence. In his later works, he outlines the creativity of the self, much as authenticity is a project which constitutes moral agency. Philosophy is a way of life where the subject embarks on a regimen of self-­ discipline and repetitions, not dissimilar to the leadership traits of perseverance and self-efficacy. Even though we cannot escape prevailing discourses which Foucault shows to replace centred subjectivity, there is still room within discourse for personal growth and self-enhancement undertaken by individual effort, ‘the kind of relationship you ought to have with yourself, rapport a soi, which I call ethics, and which determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions.’31  Ibid. p. 13.  Andrew Gustafson (2000). “Making Sense of Postmodern Business Ethics.” Business Ethics Quarterly 10 (3): 645–658, p. 649. 29  Campbell Jones. Martin Parker. Rene ten Bos (2005). For Business Ethics. Abingdon Oxon: Routledge. pp. 60, 61. 30  Ibid. p. 76. 31  Michel Foucault (1983/1997). “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress” in Paul Rabinow (ed.) Michel Foucault. Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth. The Essential Works of Foucault. 1954–1984. Vol. 1. Robert Hurley and Others (trans.) New Press. 253–280, p. 263. 27 28

Foucault and Care

101

Foucault explains that the Greek approach to virtue and moral life was overturned by Cartesian philosophy. The Greeks recognised the need to adopt procedures for ethical conversion to occur, techniques such as purification and contemplation of the soul had to be practiced. With the modern change, however, self-discipline was replaced by extraneous disciplining in the form of institutions designed to protect and look after the populace. This brings about a productive, well-adjusted citizenry but one which is also prone to be managed and controlled. The ethical component of care particularly surfaces in Foucault’s later work in which he combines the virtuous character with his agonistic, critical approach. Rather than turn away from subjectivity, Foucault admits the development of authentic character must come first via the ethical effort; one cannot care for others before one cares for self. He explains I don’t think we can say that the Greek who cares for himself must first care for others. To my mind, this view only came later. Care for others should not be put before the care for oneself. The care of the self is ethically prior in that the relationship with oneself is ontologically prior.32

Foucault’s position regarding ethics already has close correspondence to the authentic quest. Leaders mould life-stories into intended identities, making pragmatic decisions which are actively involved with context and environment together with the moral compass of the agent: Moral action involves a relationship with the reality in which it is carried out, and a relationship with the self. The latter is not simply “self-awareness” but self-formation as an “ethical subject,” a process in which the individual delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice, defines his position relative to the precept he will follow, and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal. And this requires him to act upon himself, to monitor, test, improve, and transform himself.33

This cannot be taken to mean subjectivity embarks on a solely isolated exercise of self-transformation. Authenticity always ends up relational, more phenomenological than Cartesian. There is always an objective correlate to activity and, in the case of Foucault, the correlate is one of difference, crucial if the differences in outlook are to be recognised, appreciated and respected. In sum, Foucault’s later work puts the ethical formation of subjectivity in perspective. But it is not a purely introspective pursuit of identity split off from the political arena. The personal, spiritual quest nurtures through agonism, resisting constraint by a force of free will. As is consistent in all Foucault’s analyses, the subject is very much woven into the social fabric, but as an ethical being there is now focus on the extensive interrelationships of networks and relays which comprise modern living, activities which produce their own ethical norms. These

 Michel Foucault (1984/1997). “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom.” P.  Aranov and D.  McGrath (trans.) in Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault. Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth, 281–301, p. 287. 33  Michel Foucault (1984/1985). The Use of Pleasure. The History of Sexuality. Vol.2. Robert Hurley (trans.) Pantheon Books. p. 28. 32

102

5 Ethics

interactional relays work up from localised business, to domestic governmentality, to culminate in international and cosmopolitan affairs. Viewed in this way, cosmopolitanism is the pinnacle of ethical engagement. Judith Butler recognises ‘virtue is not only a way of complying with or conforming to pre-established norms. It is, more radically, a more critical relation to those norms, one which, for Foucault, takes shape as a specific stylization of morality.’34 From the outset, Foucault emphasises the critical method and with it recognition of difference. For leaders, this entails acknowledgment of those who live on the margins and the need to explore inclusivity, ‘there is something about being on the borders of ethical conversations that provides valuable insight into the assumptions operating within the moral core of a given community or society.’35 Foucault describes his philosophy as ‘a form of care, a concern to transform oneself and the way one sees…as a kind of exercise – an askesis.’36 The significance of care was rooted in ‘askesis’, the early Greek form of an exercise in thinking; the training and practice of self-development. When combined with ‘parrhesia’, which is authentic frankness to openly speak one’s mind, we find a veritable foundation for speaking one’s mind with courage and resisting whatever powers there are to obfuscate truth. In other words, people are galvanized to awaken from their indifferent state and embark on a path of authenticity which begins with reflection and moves to self-­ transformation and the determination to make one’s voice heard. Ultimately, moulding the self becomes an aesthetic act, one which corresponds to personal and leadership ethics. For example, a king would need to justify himself ‘because I am the king, and because as somebody who commands others, who rules others, I have to show that I am able to rule myself.’37 If rulers want to rule others there are no universal principles but there is a chosen aesthetics of existence which produces an awareness of personal obligations needed to be accepted as leader. The normal procedures leaders have to see themselves introspectively and reflexively are admittedly difficult for Foucault as his work has effectively hollowed out any inner core of identity; more than most he has contributed to the postmodern argument for the death of the subject. However, on closer scrutiny, it is clear his objections mostly concern subjectivity as an essence and what he regards to be the false dualism between the subject-self probing the object-self. Due to Foucault’s aversion to routinely accepted dualisms, the self is best understood as ‘both that which does the caring, and the object of that same care.’38 Caring and the self are not separate substances but are so interwoven as to comprise shared immanence, the

 Judith Butler (2004). “What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue,” in The Judith Butler Reader. Sara Salih (ed.), Malden: Blackwell. 302–322. p. 308. 35  Paul T. Harper (2008). “Business Ethics Beyond the Moral Imagination: a response to Richard Rorty.” in Issues in Business Ethics 24 Springer Science. 57–79, pp. 60, 62. 36  Edward F.  McGushin (2007). Foucault’s Askesis. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press. p. xiii. 37  Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics” p. 354. 38  Daniel Smith (2015). “Foucault on Ethics and Subjectivity.” Foucault Studies 19: 135–150, p. 141. 34

Foucault and Care

103

one aspect creating the other, both inherently interrelated. Ethics is essentially this process of self-care-formation where a certain mode of being serves as a moral goal: Not simply ‘self-awareness but self-formation as an ethical subject’. A process in which the individual delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice, defines his position relative to the precept he will follow, and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal and this requires him to act upon himself, to monitor, test, improve, and transform himself.39

On this reading, Foucault is clearly more concerned with character than subjectivity and this allows for an elaboration of ethics which brings with it the cultivation of a particular aesthetic style of behaviour. Instead of inhabiting one role the form of life counts for everything. That is to say, an ethics of concern is wholly all-consuming, its dedication seeps through the pores of each individual. Foucault suggests that one can resist or ultimately work with any discourse which is constraining and controlling and still ensure the necessary self-transformation to form personal care. In taking care of the self as an aesthetic of existence there is no free-floating self-­ indulgence but rather a particular form of relationality, an artistic relation of movement and activity where the producer creates the work of art and the work of art also progressively creates the producer. The work and creator are inseparable, a Janus faced identity where the subject is only its activity, judged according to action rather than substance, which allows us to think this relationship in an immanent rather than transcendent way. There may seem to be subject-object fusion, but it cannot be claimed the subject disappears in activity for the simple reason that immanence of relationality is always accompanied by the extrinsic social context of others and this engages and emboldens the activity of self-care. In the flow of life, the effort to act ethically is all-encompassing. It does not differentiate aspects of character or gestures of acting ethically in one situation and not in another so, in this respect, Foucault’s ethics correlates to the intended consistency sought after in the development of virtue ethics. According to Aristotle, reason works through an individual’s natural ability to develop in maturity, creating a well-­ wrought, practically developed virtuous character which was not present from the outset. The authentic leader, who directly relates to the life force, creates and responds to the flow of life and situations that arise. Most importantly, Foucault’s description of the immanence of care and self is in accord with the directness sought by authenticity, the oneness of activity with self-expression as moral probity. Ethical behaviour leads to authenticity when it is open to the flux of change within which ‘I’ and ‘me’ are one, in a constant, immanent relationship. Neil Levy draws a similar conclusion; Foucault’s aesthetics of existence ‘bears a striking resemblance to the virtue ethics that has become prominent in Anglo-­ American moral philosophy.’40 Care for the self is ethical and subsequently leads to care for others. But the traits which are deemed desirable do not emanate from a priori reasoning or transcendent norms rather, in keeping with Foucault’s historical 39 40

 Smith, “Foucault on Ethics and Subjectivity.” pp. 146, 147.  Neil Levy (2004). “Foucault as Virtue Ethicist.” Foucault Studies 1: 20–31, p. 20.

104

5 Ethics

sensibility, they reflect what is considered by the prevailing culture to be virtuous, social practices according to an ‘inculcated interest in being a certain kind of person’, in keeping with a way of life which is currently ‘socially endorsed’.41 This is a shift in emphasis away from the authenticity mantra of an ‘I’ being true to an inner core to an active immanence of life and the concomitant traits needed to support it. As Foucault explains in, Hermeneutics of the Subject (1970), individuals must build up ‘true discourses’ which further the ability to act in the appropriate, effective way. These discourses become part of who we are and they are learnt from others, from reflection, through texts and through a life of experience. Truth is garnered by teaching, reading and assimilation; it is not the discovery of a truth hidden deep within oneself but rather an inviting appropriation. The exercise of truth necessitates effective listening, personal writing, and habitual self-reflection. The point is that Foucault stays with his emphasis of developing character. He adds that a form of shadow-subjectivity is constituted as it draws on knowledge and insight available from myriad sources of wisdom which lie outside the self: ‘The object, rather, is to arm the subject with a truth it did not know, one that did not reside in it; what is wanted is to make this learned, memorized truth, progressively put into practice, a quasi-subject that reigns supreme in us.’42 Both virtue ethics and postmodernism accept the struggle to achieve askesis and parrhesia. There will always be difficulty in gaining authenticity and moral responsibility as they are active processes which can potentially be frustrated by unsympathetic people or difficult circumstances. When Aristotle argues that virtues are not just simplified traits ‘but more the fulfilment of a task and the realisation of specific capabilities or possibilities’,43 he is also suggesting they are most realisable in an atmosphere of friendship, in a genuine relationship of caring within a community. When leaders are faced with adversity, as often occurs in the competitive market place, conditions are less conducive to the friendship Aristotle insists is vital to a proper social setting within a related community. This suggests the task of relying on virtue ethics as a measure of behaviour and decision-making is in itself challenging; choosing which virtues are applicable to particular situations may be unclear. But what makes virtue ethics as explored by Foucault and Aristotle particularly relevant to leadership is its practical use, a way of coming to decisions through strength of character and by the application of practical wisdom. Prudence works with moral goodness as a way to combine means and ends, getting desirable results while incorporating virtuous means. The genuine hope is that the malaise of deficient ethical leadership can be overcome by expanding the volume of a ‘shared moral universe.’44 This is supported by the pragmatic

 Ibid. pp. 27, 28.  Michel Foucault (1970/2000) “The Hermeneutics of the Subject.” Graham Burchell (trans.) in Michel Foucault. Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth. 93–106, p. 102. (my emphasis). 43  Jones, Parker, ten Bos, For Business Ethics. p. 64. 44  Harper, “Business Ethics Beyond the Moral Imagination.” p. 78. 41 42

Well-being

105

point of view which co-opts moral imagination to expand the human propensity to search out relationships, both near and far, and increase abundance for all. If we accept Foucault’s position of the individual always being formed and informed by prevailing discourses, and the insistence that freedom coincides with ethical care for the self, then the task of leadership is to grasp these countervailing currents of influence which may produce ambiguity and tension but also significant insights. As leaders navigate through such force fields, Foucault’s analysis of virtue ethics is a standard bearer of freedom, an appropriate support to rise above extant, threatening power practices. At best, ethical self-care reverses the worst of subjectification to realise an emancipatory state of self-knowledge. Foucault recommends that concrete, meticulous attention be paid to activity in local interactions and their structure of power distribution: The analysis of power relations is an extremely complex area…When an individual or social group succeeds in blocking a field of power relations…one is faced by with what may be called a state of domination…liberation paves the way for new power relationships, which must be controlled by practices of freedom…for what is ethics, if not the practice of freedom, the conscious practice of freedom?45

In sum, moral allegiance is not based on rules or edicts but on an inherent, pre-­ ontological freedom to be there for others. This allegiance refuses to bow to extraneous authority, indeed, postmodernism is anti-authoritarian. True responsibility arises where there is no fall back plan to rely on indelible rules but is activated in a space where there is genuine freedom to choose. Leaders, in the role of moral managers, will have endured the training of askesis to develop prudence, and the ability to evaluate ethical dilemmas in their appropriate context.

Well-being Well-being is most associated with Aristotle, in particular the notion of eudaimonia, which is life led to its fullest potential. According to Aristotle, there need not be an escape to another worldly state of existence but an authentic way to deal with the materiality of life putting a particular form of consciousness into practice. The pursuit of virtues such as truth, beauty or goodness are authentic aspects of the real self which constitute an individual’s self-actualization and must be included in any definition of what it is to be an authentic human being. Pursuing values such as truth, beauty and justice make professions such as leadership ‘not functionally autonomous but rather to be a carrier of, an instrument of, or an incarnation of ultimate values.’46

 Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom.” pp. 283, 284.  Abraham H.  Maslow (1967). “A Theory of Metamotivation: The Biological Rooting of the Value-Life.” Journal of Humanistic Psychology 7 (2): 93–127, p. 101. 45 46

106

5 Ethics

Well-being is satisfied by meeting various psychological needs including autonomy, trait enhancement, and successful relatedness to others. It also encompasses those activities which are in accord with one’s personal values and psychological needs. The pursuits are not just about gratification but are good for individuals ‘in the sense that they build people’s capacity to fulfil their potential.’47 Those who pursue these values reject myopic self-interest or the hedonism of self-­ aggrandisement and prioritize inherently meaningful endeavours. Humanity has to take part in a project, in the dual sense of having to fulfil a particular way of acting and as future projected telos to meet intended goals: Within that teleological scheme there is a fundamental contrast between man-as-he-­ happens-to-be and man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential nature. Ethics is the science which is to enable men to understand how they make the transition from the former state to the latter. Ethics therefore in this view presupposes some account of potentiality and act, some account of the essence of man as a rational animal and above all some account of the human telos.48

When authentic leaders are virtuous agents they flourish, experiencing a sense of well-being through self-concern as well as general humanitarian caring which can also be recognised through moral altruism. Eudaimonia, then, is being true to one’s self in text book, authentic fashion. Leaders are virtuous when their life activities are congruent with their deeply held values…when people are eudaimonically motivated they are fully engaged both in their own self-actualization and in using their virtues, talents and skills in the service of the greater good. That is, authentic leaders are interested not only in being all that they can be but also in making a difference.49

The conviction of authentic leadership is that it will always result in a positive and sanguine attitude which transmits feelings of optimism, enthusiasm and self-­ confidence. The psychological qualities which accompany the pairing of self-­ determination with morality are all positive; engendering states of hope and resilience to achieve a positive outcome.50 The positive moral perspective is an inherent quality for developing authentic leadership as it follows a pathway that begins with inner core desire, autonomy, self-scrutiny and expands into virtue ethics. This carves a move away from an introspective way of life which may be confined to more private pursuits to one which is existentially relational with social consequences. Of the several models with different perspectives on what the notion of the good is, none are without their problems. As an agent-relative approach, deontology looks at the motives for carrying out an action, showing good will, fully developing

 Michael F. Steger. Todd B. Kashdan. Shigehiro Oishi. (2008) “Being good by doing good: Daily eudaimonic activity and well-being.” Journal of Research in Personality 42 (1): 22–42, p. 24. 48  Alasdair Macintyre (1984). After Virtue. University of Notre Dame Press, p. 52. 49  Boas Shamir and Galit Eilam (2005). “What’s your story? A life-stories approach to authentic leadership development.” The Leadership Quarterly 16 (3): 395–417, p. 397. 50  William L.  Gardner. John R.  Schermerhorn Jr. (2004). “Performance Gains Through Positive Organizational Behaviour and Authentic Leadership.” Organizational Dynamics 33 (3): 270–281. 47

Well-being

107

personal moral capacities, and acting in accord with one’s moral duty with respect to the duty to others, ‘the Kantian emphasis on the moral autonomy of the individual as an ultimate normative principle prevents moral agents from exercising any form of coercion… .’51 Inviolable moral laws mean decisions should be taken to meet standard criteria with regards to respect for individuals and fairness of procedures. But duty for duty sake, acting in strict accordance to moral duty, can be restrictive, as illustrated by Kant’s insistence that it is wrong to lie even to prevent a murder, or the duty against stealing even if such an act were committed to steal a loaf of bread to save one’s child from starving. Utilitarianism, on the other hand, offers a teleological approach which seeks the greatest pleasure or good and least pain for the greatest number. It is an impartial moral view which de-emphasises personal character to focus on consequences rather than intentions. However, based on the democratic principle of the voice of the majority, its notion of the greatest good for the greatest number presents problems of evaluation for any authentic leader. Can the amount of goodness be measured? Where do individual rights fit in? Can quality be quantified and how do we calculate the notion of material growth? Is the greatest good based on profit, survival or efficiency and where does justice fit in?52 Hedonism is based on the utilitarian principle of pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain whereas eudaimonia is fulfilment, intensity and genuine belief that one is being true to oneself. Leaders who express eudaimonic well-being seek pleasure rationally, choose options to maximise the experience, and live intensely in the moment: ‘eudaimonia occurs when one is fully engaged in an activity and existing as one’s true self. Therefore, eudaimonic engagement assumes introspective reflection upon one’s values and reasoned choices for engagement in specific activities, and not only hedonic motivation.’53 Under Utilitarianism, individual freedoms do not come under scrutiny but are buried within collective well-being and this gives social planners opportunity to garner the unquestioning support of the underprivileged in the name of utility. Those who are marginalised or in minority may underestimate their lack of freedom, fail to analyse their situation, and consequently agree to justify a status quo which is in fact impeding their own development.54 At first sight, then, this approach is not in accord with authentic leadership which focuses on individual freedom and self-determination. Nonetheless, authentic leaders can still work with utilitarianism as it is inaccurate to claim utilitarianism is inherently about self-interest. In fact, its developed  George Gotsis and Zoi Kortezi (2008). “Philosophical Foundations of Workplace Spirituality: A Critical Approach.” Journal of Business Ethics 78 (4): 575–600, p. 588. 52  James Agarwal. David Cruise Malloy (2000). “The Role of Existentialism in Ethical Business Decision-Making.” Business Ethics: A European Review 9 (3): 143–154, p. 144. 53  Remus Ilies, Frederick P. Morgeson, Jennifer D. Nahrgung, (2005). “Authentic leadership and eudaemonic well-being: Understanding leader-follower outcomes.” The Leadership Quarterly 16 (3) 373–394. p. 375. 54  Cecile Renouard (2011). “Corporate Social Responsibility, Utilitarianism, and the Capabilities Approach.” Journal of Business Ethics 98(1): 85–97. 51

108

5 Ethics

version has a clear social aim to maximize global well-being: ‘internal resources exist within the utilitarian tradition which counter the simplistic conception of the homo economicus maximiser of his utility and defend the social finality of the economic activity.’55 In a position closer to authentic leadership’s relationality, John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian ethics emphasises the possibility to harmonize a defiant dualism by asserting individuals can combine autonomy with interdependence to achieve social goals: ‘Mill fights against a utilitarian conception centred on the maximization of individual pleasures…The idea is to orient the individual desire toward the care of others, so that the search for personal happiness and the quest for the other’s good merge.’56 Authentic leaders have the advantage of combining various components from different ethical models, holistically including virtue ethics. They acknowledge that ethics considers higher questions of values, including the definition of what the good life entails, the practice of ethics as applied to specific areas, such as the environment or medicine, and personal ethics which works with postmodern relativism. Personal ethics relates well to authenticity’s drive to fully develop and combine all aspects of life as a way to include commitments, relationships and resources as an integrated moral experience. The incorporation of philosophy with authentic leadership recognises the importance of personally navigating and integrating all facets of life in the promotion of well-being, mediated through areas such as medical ethics, feminist issues and indigenous rights. Indeed, philosophical reflection is a pragmatic necessity, ‘without philosophical reflection and analysis of the quality of life and society as we design and implement development policies and practices, we are not accomplishing authentic development, but carrying out careless anti-development.’57 The conclusion is that the idea of well-being needs to be unpacked as it covers a multitude of states. Being true to oneself is akin to feeling that action is as it should be and for leaders this corresponds to the willingness, surgency, and resolution taken in accepting authority in the first place. Such willingness corresponds to Aristotle’s notion of ‘daimon’, one’s authentic nature, the inner force to act in the right way, a person’s true, authentic self. It is expressed through examination which should realise one’s innate, character potential. The need to achieve self-realization is a progressive exercise which needs constant refuelling by partaking in activities which offer genuine challenges. The implication is leaders benefit from challenges since once a certain level of skill has been achieved the risk is complacency sets in and hinders growth. Authentic life accords value. For virtue ethics, the pursuit of authenticity is a good in itself and intrinsic to this is the achievement of well-being. When inner feeling corresponds to outer behaviour it effectuates mental well-­ being and has an important influence on both follower well-being and the leaders’  Ibid. p. 86.  Ibid. p. 89. 57  Lori Keleher (2019). “Why Development Needs Philosophy”, in Agency and Democracy in Development Ethics. Lori Keleher and Stacy J.  Kosko (eds.) Cambridge University Press, 25–48, p. 38. 55 56

Well-being

109

own efficacy. ‘Being truly authentic helps leaders to maintain their mental well-­ being and thus safeguards their work environment against ill effects’ and ‘is likely to result in positive contagion among followers.’58 We can describe both affective states and cognitive evaluations as subjective well-being, whereas objective well-­ being looks to more ‘objective indicators of well-being and success, such as education and achievement’.59 Personal desire obviously plays a part but if that desire were to include self-harm or negativity it would not contribute to the social good or personal well-being, so objective standards are an aid in guiding evaluations. Welfare comes under the banner of developmental ethics which prioritises well-­ being over profit, ruling ideologies, or efficiency imperatives.60 In making economic decisions policy makers consider which economic activities promote general well-­ being and opportunities to pursue what is valued. Interest in well-being is a prime authentic leadership policy concern with a perspective which transcends matters of gross domestic products, income and consumerism: Well-being has been equated with (or rather, reduced to) preference fulfilment. The most prominent way to measure these choices is by looking at consumption and the means to it, i.e. income. However, people who have significant income may be well-off but may still lack well-being, because they are deprived in other dimensions of life, e.g. by disability or social discrimination.61

This supports the point that well-being, apart from expressing subjective desire, focuses on values which are objectively formed such as health care, education opportunities, and the ability to freely form social relationships. In relational authenticity, self-development mediates autonomous self-determination and the social capability approach. The connection to capability discourse is especially relevant for authentic leadership as it relates leader initiatives to maximizing opportunities individuals have for the development of well-being in the prevailing social climate and political community. Capability discourse questions and explores how to achieve well-being, pursue knowledge, engage in meaningful work, and obtain the freedom to enjoy what is valued in life. Within the context of democracy, this is in keeping with authentic leadership’s mission to open the portals for others to achieve authenticity in their own way, and learn for themselves what goals are personally best to maximize their conception of the good.

 Matthias Weiss, Stefan Razinskas, Julia Backmann, Martin Hoegl (2018) “Authentic leadership and leaders’ mental well-being: An experience sampling study.” The Leadership Quarterly 29(2): 309–321, p. 318. 59  Stephen M. Schueller and Martin E.P. Seligman (2009). “Pursuit of pleasure, engagement, and meaning: Relationships to subjective and objective measures of well-being.” The Journal of Positive Psychology 5 (4): 253–263, p. 253. 60  Denis Goulet (1995). “Development Ethics: A New Discipline.” International Journal of Social Economics 24 (11): 1160–1171, p. 1169. C/f. Severine Deneulin (2013). “Ethics and Development: An Introduction from the Perspective of the Capability Approach.” Geography Compass 7 (3): 217–227, p. 218. 61  Rebecca Gutwald (2018). “Well-Being” in Jay Drydyk and Lori Keleher (eds.). The Routledge Handbook of Development Ethics. London: Routledge, 55–67, p. 56. 58

110

5 Ethics

By embracing a pluralistic approach to ethics and justice, authentic leaders address the challenge to maximize freedom of opportunity and promote well-being. Injustice lies in denying opportunities and requires leaders to deal with particularised problems and eliminate occurrences of opportunity bias. This is a position which has been closely analysed by Amartya Sen.62 When Sen argues that democracy is a universal value we can conclude that ethical decisions based on democratic openness aim to overcome the natural, localised bias of self-interested parties with their limited perspectives. It is possible for objective value judgments to be productively established from local positions, gainsaying parochial myopia.63 For Sen, a universal value does not entail that everyone consents to it; this would be a vastly over-ambitious claim and basis for claiming democracy is an impractical exercise. The argument to be considered by authentic leaders is rather that anyone in a particular, localised position would after critical scrutiny, objective assessment, and impartial judgment come to the same conclusion, thereby creating a consensual decision which is valuable and worthy of respect.64 As Martha Nussbaum points out, objective standards can be listed in which the main capabilities and opportunities perpetuate primary goods and human rights. These comprise a plurality of life activities which cater for different types of love and care, a life of dignity and well-being. For Nussbaum, we can construct a normative conception of social justice with potential for gender issues. Key capabilities include being able to live with and show concern for other human beings, control over one’s environment to include the political and material, and ‘being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others.’65 Authentic leadership acknowledges and encourages such degrees of openness and freedoms. This includes the capability to be part of different communicating networks and the ability to communicate in a free democratic context, one which combines liberal atomism with communitarian collectivism. As such we see how authentic leadership encourages others to pursue their own story and achieve their own authenticity without the intrusion or imposition from the more direct charismatic or transformational leadership models. Autonomy and interdependence are in harmony so that personal development is constituted as a two-way process which achieves collectively more than any one single voice. Other parameters of human capabilities and the chance to pursue opportunities and well-being are based on philosophical accounts of what is worthwhile. Whether standards are fixed according to a specific common good such as justice, or a personal good such as fulfilling one’s potential, the listing of what constitutes well-­ being will shift and be redefined according to changing political, social and  Amartya Sen (2009). The Idea of Justice. London: Allen Lane.  Elizabeth Anderson (2003). Sen, Ethics, and Democracy. Feminist Economics 9 (2–3): 239–261, p. 240. 64  Amartya Sen (1999). “Democracy as a Universal Value”. Journal of Democracy 10 (3): 3–17, p. 12. C/f. Anderson p. 241. 65  Martha C. Nussbaum (2003) “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice”. Feminist Economics 9 (2–3): 33–59, p. 42. 62 63

Spirit and Joy

111

environmental conditions. Authentic leaders will be aware of these conditions and what steps are needed to maximize choices within those ethically worthy areas: ‘Perception of the context is key…Given the specific context, what is the best decision so that the good of myself and of the relationships I am part of can be enhanced?’66 Environmental ethics, for example, impacts everyone, involving an understanding of the moral relations that occur between human beings and their natural environment. Authentic leadership explores the responsibilities connected to this relationship on two levels. The anthropocentric duty owed to other human beings because of their moral value, and the concomitant enhancement of their well-being to live in an environment which is sustainable, conserves resources, and ensures the well-being of future generations.67 Secondly, wider biocentric ethics which applies to life itself and the duty owed to natural objects and non-humans. As Aristotle asserted, every living thing has a good of its own, a function to fulfil and a potential to actualize. The position is that all have a right to be defended, with interests protected and suffering alleviated, including animals.68 Such considerations will determine what kind of decisions must be taken and how broad the perspective should be. In order to fully appreciate these considerations it is fitting to return to the core of authenticity which is its wholeness, the development of a well-rounded character which transcends the defence of particular roles or enactment of stereotypical behaviour to become a virtuous individual within the context of interpersonal relationships, both near and far.

Spirit and Joy The joy of authentic leadership ties in with theorists who directly relate authenticity to positive developmental psychology and the positive organizational lifestyle. It promotes positive emotions, self-confidence, hope, and goal-fulfilment for psychological and social well-being. The feeling is one described by leadership theory as intense involvement, an ability to be ‘intensively alive…related to peak experiences of interest, motivation and joy…’69 When leaders experience joyful intensity it is a contagious state which positively influences all those who come into contact.

 Severin Deneulin (2013). “Recovering Nussbaum’s Aristotelian roots.” International Journal of Social Economics 40 (7): 624–632, p. 628. 67  Joseph R.  Desjardines (2001). Environmental Ethics. Boston. MA: Wadsworth Publishing Company. 68  Peter Singer (1990) Animal Liberation. New York, N.Y. Random House. 69  Ilies et  al., “Authentic leadership and eudaemonic well-being: Understanding leader-follower outcomes.” pp. 374, 375. 66

112

5 Ethics

Joy is the great delight and happiness caused by something good. Joy creates the urge to explore, be playful, gather information and generally expand authenticity.70 As such, it is to be taken within a practical and ethical context. To en-joy someone or something is to join with, en-joy the moment, to partake in joyous life. Psychological research suggests that the positive feeling of joy intensifies a sense of benevolence towards others and increases creativity, imagination, and connection. Joy is a virtue involving knowing, feeling and doing what is ultimately good or what matters most…a visceral experience that activates and enables people to pursue life-giving and transformative endeavours. The positive feelings…actually allow human brain circuitry to be more open to others and to new ideas.71

Like most important characteristics linked to authenticity, joy has an inner and outer face. Joy’s transformational and extended reach indicates an affinity with Aristotle’s notion of eudaemonia concerned with well-being and worthiness of human life. For Aristotle, ‘the Aristotelian doctrine of virtue points out that it is not only necessary to do the right things, but to do them with the right dispositions and joy.’72 Virtues in themselves are pleasant to live by, they produce joy under the motivation to seek good actions and ‘establish an emotional and desiderative balance in the human being that allows him to perform the best actions in a natural way.’73 This is accompanied by the joy which accrues from such a lifestyle, essentially an inner pleasure based on the contemplation of the noble life, desirable because it suggests a grounded person, in harmony, at one with self-development and pursuit of authenticity. So, joy is especially an expression of that which is designated as good, in this case pursuing the good that is a virtuous life. For leaders to develop and thrive does not mean they need to deepen authority or influential clout but rather work with, and through, changing situational challenges by displaying the versatility to recalibrate perspectives in a joyful manner, ‘joy is a virtue that involves recurring patterns of positive emotions…Joy both shapes and is shaped by experiences and behaviours that are aligned with one’s sense of what should be.’74 Just as the only teacher is a joyful teacher, so the only leader is a joyful leader. With a joyful, positive mindset in place, there should never be a decision impasse. Joyfulness calls for free thought emblazoned with positivity and the acuity to discern diversity. More than any other, Spinoza’s ideas about a free human being can aptly be applied to leaders. His description of joy helps explain the drive to leader  Barbara L. Frederickson (2003). “Positive Emotions and Upward Spirals in Organizations.” in Kim S. Cameron, Jane. E. Dutton and Robert E. Quinn (eds.) Positive Organizational Scholarship. Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc., 163–175. 71  Pamela Ebstyne King. Frederic Defoy (2020) “Joy as a Virtue: The Means and Ends of Joy.” Journal of Psychology and Theology 48 (3): 1–31. p. 19. 72  Manuel Maria Cruz Ortiz De Landazuri (2014). “Virtue Without Pleasure? Aristotle and the Joy of a Noble Life.” Acta Philosophica 23 (1): 89–100, p. 92. 73  Ibid. p. 93. 74  King and Defoy, “Joy as a Virtue” p. 10. 70

Spirit and Joy

113

authenticity. According to Spinoza, ‘a “free” leader is never the slave of his (her) passions and instincts. Although a “free” human being searches for the perfection of everybody, he (she) is searching for his (her) own perfection as an end. A “free” human being wishes the perfection of the other’s existence as a means to get his (her) own.’75 Spinoza expresses his ideas on passion and emotion through joy, ‘by joy I shall understand the passion by which the mind passes to a greater perfection…If a person has done anything which he imagines will affect others with joy, he also will be affected with joy.’76 Rather than focus on accountability, or an ethics based on what a person deserves within a divine, moral universe, Spinoza’s ethics is an ethic of joy, ‘about how to live joyously and lovingly.’77 This is based on the ability to fulfil life through empowerment. The process is one of increasing the good rather than the bad as a sign of promoting health rather than illness. This is a clinical approach to what could be considered philosophical egoism, but it is not selfish in a reductive sense. It proposes joy as signalling the enhancement of the self; the experience of joy is an increase in goodness as well as a marked increase in power. There are certain objective norms to measure this as a sign of authentic behaviour: the intelligent care of oneself, tenacity or authentic perseverance, nobility as the application of knowledge to help others in friendship, and authentic benevolence. These are ways to empower the self, in other words to make a difference, while at the same time empower others; ‘in the Ethics Spinoza argues that tenacity and nobility are essential elements of an empowered way of life…he argues that the freedom to philosophize and the freedom to communicate with others are essential elements of a political system that empowers people.’78 The struggle to self-improve is a constant for Spinoza to push the envelope of authentic self-determinism as a mark of moral virtue. When Spinoza recognises leadership relates to joy, and nobility opposes all forms of coercion, he is taking issue with disempowering, controlling political systems which thrive on fear and ignorance.79 Spinoza recognises affectivity as a force-field; encounters which either deplete the self, with sadness, or enhance it with joy. Like most emotions, joy is informative, a source of knowledge that interprets the world, it has cognitive content and impacts well-being. The mind and body are as one, striving through positive action to well-being: ‘When we encounter a body that agrees with our nature, one whose relation compounds with ours, we may say that its power is added to ours; the passions that affect us are those of joy, and our power of acting is increased or

 Michel Dion (2012). “Are Ethical Theories Relevant for Ethical Leadership?” Leadership & Organization Development Journal 33 (1): 4–24, p. 10. 76  Benedict de Spinoza. Ethics (1677/2001). W. H. White and A. H. Stirling (trans.) Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Ltd. III. Prop. 11, III. Prop. 30, pp. 108, 121. 77  Andrew Youpa (2020). The Ethics of Joy. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 2. 78  Ibid. p. 169. 79  Ibid. p. 170. 75

114

5 Ethics

enhanced.’80 This is not to say joy always comes easily. There are challenges and struggle which leaders face before it can be fully experienced, ‘suffering may be a mechanism that promotes joy, and not only in religious contexts. In this sense, suffering is not the source of joy, but a vehicle through which joy may arrive.’81 For Spinoza, active joy is a positive barometer, an increase in capacity which feeds off of the encounter of bodies, ideas, and material. In this context, affectivity and joy carry a pivotal role, the logic of emotion which aids in our evaluative prowess: ‘we are not born possessing knowledge about ourselves, our context, God or Nature. This knowledge must be gained through experience, by processes of trial and error, with only the passions of joy and sadness to indicate what may aid us or what may harm us.’82 Spinoza admits joyful and sad emotions are not always reliable guides to action since the same thing can be at one time a cause of joy, and at another time, a cause of sadness. As he puts it, one and the same person is ‘affected in different ways towards the same object, and so far is changeable and inconstant.’83 The point is that forces expand the bodies of concern rather than allowing one or other to be dominant. The more one tests behavior and reactions the easier it becomes to gravitate to joy so that through trial and error and the reaction of others, strategic ideas take shape for future dealing. The process of education and learning, like the pursuit of authenticity, are also considered joyful and productive. Joyful energy is shared by all on a common ground of open exchange, mutual benefit, and shared interests. All comes down to the encounters of bodies on each other, bodies which are not mere individual, corporeal appendages to subjective consciousness but include non-human materiality and the generation of ideas received from the life force. Limitation and diminution is sadness while growth and abundance is the power of change, transformation, and truthfulness that creates a life for tomorrow. The way for leaders not to be overwhelmed by the weight of complex events is to indulge in positive relations, to actively express power which frees the self into fluid, interdependent activities while still retaining the sense of ethical authenticity. This wide interconnectivity includes empirical emphasis on the materiality of existence and the general physics of bodies; embodiment filled with desires, sadness and aversions. Judgment is crucial since decisions can work both ways with the same cure; food may be nutritious and healthy for some but the same food may be toxic and destructive for others. As adequate joy reaches out to expand its force actively, an extensive, relational capacity is pursued which denotes the sociability and community of authentic leadership: ‘We are concerned, not with a relation of

 Gilles Deleuze (1970/1988). Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. Robert Hurley (trans.) City Lights Publishers, pp. 27–28. 81  Elizabeth J. Krumrei-Mancuso (2020). “Reflections on the Science of Joy: Current Challenges and Future Directions.” The Journal of Positive Psychology 15 (1): 58–62, p. 61. 82  Moira Gatens. Genevieve Lloyd (1999). Collective Imaginings. Spinoza, Past and Present. Routledge. p. 103. 83  Spinoza, Ethics, IV. Prop. 33, p. 184. 80

Spirit and Joy

115

point to counterpoint, nor with the selection of a world, but with a symphony of Nature, the composition of a world that is increasingly wide and intense.’84 This is the same movement we find in authentic leadership’s search for a balanced, harmonious life related to justice and fairness in a widely interconnected web of force fields. Joy is not a possession but a speed which circulates; it is not reliant on subjective interpretation but needs the immersion of agents in the joyous flow of object and circumstance as they mark actuality. For Spinoza, harmony is where different speeds and affects of individual bodies begin to resonate or chime in a symphony of associations. It is velocities which ultimately determine whether an authentic leader’s decision turns out to be parochial or expansively in touch with posthuman inclusivity. When something is deemed important and joy engendered, there is the similar connection we find with affectivity; a soulful experience of the life force that penetrates to the core. As a powerful emotion, it is uplifting and sustaining in the face of external pressures. The political life in which leadership decisions are made does not have to be based on the premise of confrontation or belief that morality is incidental to the political process. On the contrary, empathy and care, with joy and happiness, have a key role in shaping how peace rather than conflict directs social relations and encourages ethical authenticity. Rather than something that is formally instituted by the law and authority, as in the liberal model, peace is conceived as intrinsic to life, ecology and survival, part of being healthy, mutually enabling, and socially comfortable. The positivity of authentic leadership is a beacon for ethical decisions but it penetrates further than the advice we are used to, such as listening to followers, being transparent, and showing empathy. More than this, it strives to connect with something deeper – the immanence of the human condition, spirituality, an entity in tune with the flow of the temporal continuum and spatial dispersion. Life satisfaction and happiness are now key components to measure the quality of life, implying that spirituality should be an addition to the triple bottom line, ‘even in a world of rampant materialism, of feeling less, of unhappiness, even in communities beset by trauma, what is clear is that the spiritual is becoming part of a new world paradigm of what is real, what is important.’85 The first requirement is to understand that authentic leadership avoids the dangers of spiritual management when it includes inculcation of belief systems, messianic undertones, or new age hyperbole, that ‘uneasy mix of the 1960’s counter-culture, humanistic psychology, system theories, nineteenth century spiritual movements, ancient eastern philosophical mysticism… .’86 This is not to detract from the religious connection to spirituality but history teaches us this can be  Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 126.   Sohail Inayatullah (2005) “Spirituality as the Fourth Bottom Line?” Futures 37 (6): 573–579, p. 578. 86  Dennis Tourish and Ashly Pinnington. (2002) “Transformational Leadership corporate cultism and the spirituality paradigm: An unholy trinity in the workplace?” Human Relations 55 (2): 147–172, p.165. 84 85

116

5 Ethics

conflict-­ridden and divisive whereas the argument for authenticity is that it is unifying and holistic. Authentic leadership embraces spirituality as a happy, joyful experience. Taken from a wider perspective, joy relates to the holistic state of spirituality. This gives individuals a sense of meaning for their life and reinforces altruistic care in keeping with relational authenticity. What is relevant for leadership is the secular aspect of spirituality which engenders health, energy, joy and enthusiasm. Where the religious connection to spirituality may appear dogmatic and institutionalised, the authentic connection is much broader; with virtue ethics it is personal, life-enhancing and socially involved.87 In terms of organizations and the workplace, ‘all the principle components of workplace spirituality – transcendence, connectedness, completeness and joy – could be properly integrated in a virtue ethics framework.’88 Even more than this, the result of spirituality in the workplace is judged to be materially advantageous by increasing productivity and cooperation.89 In terms of institutional and organizational leadership, the authentic character, by dint of personal vision and life-history narration, creates a climate of morality and spiritual well-being for the self which is impressive enough for associates to emulate. Spiritual feelings bring union and harmony with others, intensifying an authentic leader’s interrelationship with followers. When emotions and feelings are ‘spiritualised’ they become authentic, a direct expression of the inner core, ‘spiritualizing the passions requires that one’s emotions be rendered ‘true’, that is, integrated with the beliefs and values that help constitute a person’s sense of self, both as an individual and in relation to others. It is an emotionally creative process in service of the self.’90 The eudemonic – objective framework discussed in virtue ethics affords a fitting model for the spiritual side of authentic leadership. Spirituality is a key component of eudemonic well-being, encouraging personal growth and development through interaction in the lifeworld. At root, spirituality is the search for the meaning of life, a crossing between inner desire, motivation, and an effort to understand interconnectedness with the world at large. Philosophically, the moral character of leadership can be explored in spiritual terms drawn from the traditions of the moral sage and social prophet where spirit is taken as the authentic core. Though this could be understood in an otherworldly sense, for authentic leadership it means the psychic connection which engenders compassion and attachment. There is a spiritual connection to nature and the

 Kenneth I. Pargament and Annette Mahoney (2021) “Spirituality: The Search for the Sacred” in C.  R. Snyder, Shane J.  Lopez, Lisa M.  Edwards, and Susana C.  Marques (Eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Positive Psychology (3rd Edition) Oxford. New  York: Oxford University Press, 878–891. 88  Gotsis and Kortezi, “Philosophical Foundations of Workplace Spirituality”, p. 593. 89   Joshua Frye, Lorraine G.  Kisselburgh, and David Butts (2007) “Embracing Spiritual Followership”. Communication Studies 58 (3): 243–260. 90  James R. Averill (2009) “Emotional Creativity: Toward ‘Spritualizing the Passions’” in Shane J.  Lopez and C.R.  Snyder. The Oxford Handbook of Positive Psychology. Oxford. New  York: Oxford University Press, 249–258, p. 255. 87

Spirit and Joy

117

community, an all-inclusive approach corresponding to intellectual and moral virtues, ‘sustainability implies a holistic view of human needs that includes the social, spiritual, intellectual, and cultural dimensions of human experience.’91 The leadership channel for spiritual influence is the sage. The work of Plato’s ‘Apology’ describes the influence of the sage who acts as a role model for followers. Living a moral life, in this case what Socrates would wish for his sons after his death, means they ‘should not care for money or anything else more than they care for virtue.’92 The sage relentlessly pursues truth and virtue. The Socratic love of wisdom is conveyed through Platonic dialogues; a constant questioning which appears like a tutorial, or method of mentoring. The sage is identified with the superior person who explores and cultivates virtue through community and acts as a font of wisdom to be emulated. Trustworthiness is considered to be a trait of the virtuous character and by extension can serve as a lodestar for the business community. Whether visionary or ascetic, the sage and prophet have also widely been perceived as agents of change, as well as people to be emulated and as leaders of others, not followers. To be sure, moral leadership is not to be confused with occupying official positions of authority. In fact, the sage and prophet often held no official office and inveighed against the moral corruption of the principalities and powers.93

Spirituality experiences reality at a deeper level over and above the mundane or commercial life. Plato’s philosopher king and the Western Confucian tradition indicate the moral sage embodies wisdom and virtue with a presence sufficient enough to generate the changes authenticity calls for. It is only the artificial separation between ethics and spirituality of late modern culture which hinders this. This observation reminds us that in spite of unpopularity, and unlike other leadership models, authentic leadership has always aimed to integrate spirituality, well-being and ethical values into one package. In keeping with many eastern philosophies, the spiritual side of authentic leadership is one of integrity, interdependence, and justice, it ‘cherishes the same basic values such as humanity, righteousness, deep love and faithfulness’ and ‘holds in great esteem the integrity of the individual and social harmony.’94 Leaders who are not in touch with their inner core are empty subjects. When faced with extraneous fixation to the detriment of inner well-being an effort of imagination and creativity is called for, new eyes and new minds are requisite to turn energy into a new, transcendent way of living. With the authentic emphasis on self-determination spirituality brings with it transcendence over and above immediate experience to a higher reality. At first, responsible decision-making is linked to  Imre Lazar (2004) “Spirituality and Human Ecosystems” in Laszlo Zsolnai. Spirituality and Ethics in Management. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 87–96, p. 88. 92  Plato (339 BC/2000). The Apology of Socrates. G. M. A. Grube (trans.) in Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy. From Thales to Aristotle. Hackett Publishing Company. 112–130: 41 E. 93  Bernard M. Bass and Paul Steidlmeier (1999). “Ethics, Character, and Authentic Transformational Leadership Behaviour.” The Leadership Quarterly 10 (2): 181–217, p. 193. 94  Nada Korac-Kakabadse, Alexander Kouzmin, Andrew Kakabadse (2002). “Spirituality and Leadership Praxis.” Journal of Managerial Psychology 17 (3): 165–182, p. 168. 91

118

5 Ethics

the practice of spirituality in the form of what Heidegger describes as authentic being, letting-things-be, allowing the reality of people and things to speak.95 For efficacy, however, the aspect of letting-things-be is supplemented by a proactive process of self-transcendence which marks the authentic leader as one who can struggle through conflict, grow in wisdom, and achieve cosmic perspective: ‘The move toward greater and greater self-transcendence may be viewed as the driving force of developmental theories of human growth, the criterion for authentic human needs, and the antecedent for authentic relationship…only the fundamental option for self-transcendence leads to moral leadership.’96 This process of development and self-improvement influences followers as they internalize values based on leader behaviour and utterances. The conclusion from this broader perspective is that ‘the real measure of authentic leadership…is changed lives in terms of a transformation to the universal values and the subsequent attitudes and behaviour that reflect them.’97 In this way, the authentic leader is indeed in touch with an inner core but it is not the psychological core of inherited dispositions but the core of enfoldment, being involved in the unthought of thought yet to come. In empathetically relating to other bodies there is reciprocity combined with the force of auto-affection and relation to oneself. The individual leader’s universe grows joyously, exponentially, feeding off and feeding into nonhuman and natural abundance. In terms of political decisions affectivity revolves around a multitude of inclusive contributions which produce unexpected results. The task is to be discerning and show sensitivity to those encounters which further positivity and create change. Enlightenment and education fuel self-enhancement and the concomitant increase of personal power. In other words, the vista of authentic leadership stretches to incorporate concerns of well-being and the spiritual in terms of environmental concerns; Gaian vitalism, the balance of the planet, and human rights. Ultimately, for authentic leadership the benefit of spirituality is its enticing appeal. The varied facets of personality needed by leaders to cope with diverse situations becomes a unity of difference, one which allows flexibility to be combined with consistent virtue. For both leaders and followers, possible selves and role requirements surface in the everyday presentation of the self. But rather than this resulting in fragmentation and insipid dispersion, the experiences of diverse encounters are drawn together by a spiritual thread which ties together plurality of meaning

 Johan Verstraeten (2014). “Spirituality as Source Inspired, Authentic and Innovative Leadership” in Patrick Nullens, Jack Barentsen (eds.). Leadership, Innovation and Spirituality. Peeters: Leuven-Paris-Walpole, Ma. 81–98. 96  Michael R. Carey (1992). “Transformational Leadership and the Fundamental Option for Self-­ Transcendence.” The Leadership Quarterly 3 (3): 217–236, p. 227. 97  Louis W.  Fry and J.  Lee Whittington (2005) “In Search of Authenticity. Spiritual Leadership Theory as a Source for Future Theory, Research, and Practice on Authentic Leadership” (in William L. Gardner, Bruce J. Avolio, Fred O. Walumbwa Eds.) Authentic Leadership Theory and Practice: Origins, Effects and Development. Monographs in Leadership and Management Vol. 3, Netherlands, U.S.A., U.K.: Elsevier. 183–200, p. 197. 95

Spirit and Joy

119

with spiritual sustenance.98 In other words, spirituality is an holistic force, an intertwining helix which plugs into the wider horizon of life’s vitality. The living systems of vitalism do not only adjust or adapt to correlated milieus but through processes of self-modification productively create new structures. There is a vibrant, spiritual impulse which reverberates through the interdependency of everything, a transcendent reality which authentic leadership helps articulate, particularise, and at best, reinforce.

98

 Frye et al. “Embracing Spiritual Followership” p. 247.

Chapter 6

Leadership and Followership

Abstract  An important way for leaders to relate to followers is via empathy. It shows sensitivity to followers, pays attention to their needs, listens carefully to their requests, and establishes an intimacy of relationship which is hard to substitute by any other means. The positive psychology movement which underpins authentic leadership promotes the influence empathy has as part of leadership authenticity. Empathy is often linked to emotional intelligence, combining reason with emotional insight. Husserl argues we never lose the distance between self and others, and therefore prefers to describe the experience as an analogy of comparing self to other, a position supported by Wilhelm Dilthey’s concept of Nachbilden, which reconstructs the others’ psychic life through inference. Aron Gurwitsch describes this widening of perceptual experience in his notion of fields of consciousness. For Schopenhauer, the guiding sentiment which cements ethical bonds is compassion, where empathy is aligned with sympathy. Martha Nussbaum takes these thoughts on board, arguing for adopting the perspective of another, and the possible compassion it brings about to help cement an ethical core. Empathy may be easier for leaders with those they are familiar with, the problem is that present day leaders are constantly faced by the unfamiliar; strangers in the sense of marginalised groups and foreign cultures. As a result leaders are required to nurture authenticity towards lowering the outer shell of egoism, and partaking in the affective resonance of another by entering into the flow of their life, no matter what their background or how distant they are. Keywords  Empathy · Positive psychology · Analogy · Gurwitsch · Husserl · Merleau-Ponty · Dilthey · Affective resonance · Nussbaum

Empathy Empathy may be the key way to express relational authenticity and exercise responsibility to the other. This has always been considered a fundamental, personal characteristic of transformational and authentic leadership. It shows sensitivity to © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Shaw, The Philosophy of Authentic Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29650-5_6

121

122

6  Leadership and Followership

followers, pays attention to their needs, listens carefully to their requests, and establishes an intimacy of relationship which is hard to substitute by any other means. The positive psychology movement attached to authentic leadership includes empathy related qualities in its recommended litany of leader attributes. An authentic leader-follower relationship comprises processes of identification, positive modelling, emotional contagion, supporting self-determination, and positive social exchanges.1 This facilitates understanding the reactions of followers, confirming that leader and follower are on the same page, and serves as a wake-up call if there is relational discrepancy. The positive psychology movement which underpins authentic leadership promotes the influence empathy has as part of leadership authenticity. This means leader initiative is not the only criteria for creating empathic connection. Followers, too, have the need to be empathic suggesting empathy is a basic psychological need. Heinz Kohut considers empathy to be a common human faculty of perception: ‘The empathic understanding of the experience of other human beings is as basic an endowment as his vision, hearing, touch, taste and smell…and psychoanalysis can deal with the obstacles that stand in the way of empathic comprehension…’2 And Michael Slotte insists ‘moral right and wrong can be distinguished by determining whether actions express or exhibit fully developed human empathic caring, or whether they exhibit an absence or a deficiency of such caring.’3 According to Slotte: When I empathise with a caring or benevolent agent, I register and reflect in myself the empathic warm concern that they are feeling towards others. That empathic registering of what the agent is feeling as acting as he or she acts towards others is what I think approval is. Approval is the empathic reflection of the warm empathic concern an agent shows towards others.4

Minimally, empathy is taken to be a natural ability to share an affective state with others. Where empathy is specifically mentioned it is often linked to emotional intelligence: ‘Of all the dimensions of emotional intelligence, empathy is the most easily recognised…empathy means thoughtfully considering employees’ feelings along with other factors - in the process of making intelligent decisions’.5 The ability to read others and be sensitive to their needs is only one aspect of empathy. The basic conceit is that empathy involves not only appreciating or sympathising with another’s mental state or emotional make-up but actually being in the same state. The fact that empathy has a wide orbit of interpretation, ranging from sensitivity to others to absorbing their emotional state gives leaders a degree of personal flexibility, particularly in dealing with local interaction. Leaders may need to share

 Bruce J. Avolio. William L. Gardner (2005). “Authentic Leadership Development: Getting to the root of positive forms of leadership.” The Leadership Quarterly 16. (3): 315–338, p. 326. 2  Heinz Kohut (1977/2009). The Restoration of the Self. The University of Chicago Press. p. 144. 3  Michael Slote (2004). “Moral Sentimentalism”. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1): 3–13, p. 7. 4  Ibid. p. 8. 5  Daniel Goleman (2004). “What Makes a Leader?” Harvard Business Review 82 (1): 82–91, p. 89. 1

Empathy

123

mental states to fully understand where others are ‘coming from’ but equally they may require a modicum of distance to evaluate the other’s mental state in order to act with a clear mind. Taken in a wider perspective, empathy may be one of the most important antidotes against excessive narcissism and manipulative leader behaviour which encourage unethical business practices. Being emotionally intelligent implies the possibility of an empathic experience and with it an authentic mode of access to the inner reaches of intersubjectivity: ‘Empathy and compassion connect us with others through the shared language of feelings and experience, one heart to the next, beneath the words, beneath the posturing and gestures.’6 The result is that other people lower their natural resistance and are more willing to open up, feel safe enough to tell their stories, and reveal their motivation without fear of criticism or retribution. In this compassionate frame of mind leaders are best able to reach their followers and followers most willing to confide their wishes. As a result, empathy has practical application so that during times of conflict arising from being faced with opposition empathic understanding overcomes negativity to maximise the creation of a positive, unified force.7 However, little within leadership literature analyses in detail what empathy involves or the degree to which it is achievable. This is the case even though for many it is not only achievable but would figure high on the ladder of leadership traits as a key to successful relationships: Empathy, the natural capacity to share, understand and respond with care to the affective states of others, plays a crucial role in much of human social interaction from birth to the end of life. Empathy is thought to have a key role in motivating prosocial behaviour, inhibiting aggression, and providing the affective and motivational bases for moral development.8

Philosophically, the problem is how to know other mental states than one’s own if we start from the subjective ego. In other words, if we are going to empathise, what is it exactly we are empathising with? And if we can empathise is it direct or indirect interaction? There is a belief we can know other minds based on simulation where we use our mind as a model to understand or read the mind of others. This can be taken as a form of inner imitation, a way to understand both action and emotion9 Perception is a main inroad to empathic experience and phenomenologists have offered a comprehensive analysis of both direct and indirect perception as a way to understand the mental state and behaviour of others. Husserl frequently turns to empathy in his analysis of perception. He is clearly against conflating the self’s unique constitutionality with the being of another, preferring to speak in terms of analogy:

 Robert K. Cooper and Ayman Sawaf (1997) Executive EQ. Orion Business Books. p. 51.  Ibid. p. 112. 8  Jean Decety (2012). “Why is empathy important?” in Jean Decety (ed.) Empathy: From Bench to Bedside. MIT Press. p. vii. 9  Dan Zahavi and Soren Overgaard (2012) “Empathy without Isomorphism: A Phenomenological Account.” in Decety, Empathy: From Bench to Bedside, 3–20. 6 7

124

6  Leadership and Followership

In a certain way…I also experience the other’s lived experiences…To that extent, what we have here is thus experience, perception…It is characteristic of empathy that it refers to an originary Body-spirit-consciousness but one I cannot myself accomplish originarily, I who am not the other and who only function, in regard to him, as a comprehending analogon.10

Theodore Lipps, the most notable analyst of empathy, sees it as the prime way we get to know and relate to others, as an act of projecting one’s own experience onto another.11 Lipps’ ideas, which work out from the aesthetic experience, argue emotions are transposed into object forms or artifacts which originally cannot possess human qualities. However, once they are subjectively experienced, emotions surface and are read into the work as objective properties, and then re-experienced by the observer as a source of enjoyment. In human relationships, too, we recognise the expression of another, naturally enough as we share human characteristics, and this creates an ‘instinct of empathy’12 which is imitated and then re-projected. This has much to do with mimicking and mirroring others, just as we glean from body language communication where postures and gestures are mirrored by communicating partners. The emotional experience from one to the other takes place through an act of imitation. In the same way as laughter can be infectious, so there is a similar process of emotional contagion. This analysis of emotional contagion is relevant but not identical to empathic experience. We can recognise that for genuine sharing to take place there must be reciprocity; immersion in the same emotion. But even with a deeply shared experience, which for Lipps is to feel the same emotion as the other person, phenomenologically identical feelings cannot take place, there is no fusion: ‘If I empathize with your sadness, I have a sense of what it is like for you to be sad without being sad myself; I lack first-personal access to the sadness in question.’13 The importance of this lies in the fact that the arena of concern is action and behaviour. Emotional states are not passively experienced or impersonally observed. In order to react to them, they are to be seen as expressions which have a bodily and behavioural appearance which plays out in leader-follower relationships. The question arises whether emotions and the mental states of others can only be empathically understood if the observer has personally experienced the same emotion. Do leaders have to go through similar experiences and emotions to understand those who are followers? Most probably not, since the resonance of interaction will filter through the empathizer. Empathy can be based on déjà vu, experiences with which one has a feeling of familiarity but also vu jade, experiencing something new which breaks the appeal to the past and acts as a learning process beyond the previously known. For Husserl, the Other is ‘intentionally constituted in me in the form   Edmund Husserl (1913/2000). Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Richard Rojcewicz. Andre Schuwer (trans). Netherlands: Springer Publishers. p. 208. 11  Dan Zahavi (2017). “Phenomenology, Empathy, and Mindreading” in Heidi L.  Maibom (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy. Routledge. 33–43. 12  Zahavi and Overgaard, “Empathy without Isomorphism”, p. 5. 13  Zahavi, “Phenomenology, Empathy, and Mindreading”, p. 38. 10

Empathy

125

of a presence’, but the Other is also ‘otherness’ and is never totally present, or always outside me.14 Husserl points out ‘if what belongs to the others own essence were directly accessible, it would be merely a moment of my own essence, and ultimately he himself and I myself would be the same…A certain mediacy of intentionality must be present.’15 The sense of openness and reaching out to others we discern in relational authenticity also corresponds to empathic openness as a sharing of mental states. As sharing is a two-way process both leader and follower need this to be present. If empathy is an experience of direct sharing and mutual understanding of mental states it will be characterised by an intuitive flow, not unlike that described in leader authenticity as ‘flow experience’ which both leader and follower can enjoy.16 With openness and relational authenticity, mental state disclosures, either cognitive or emotional, can result in mutual intimacy, a closer leader-follower bond and, in particular, a deepening of trust. In the wider reaches of relational authenticity, relational identification takes place which calls on shared interest rather than the self-interest of autonomy: When mixed with the other attributes of authentic leadership, empathy may serve as a springboard to strengthen relationship outcomes of authentic leadership. The use of empathy relates to relational transparency, a core attribute of the authentic leader…Followers described leaders as gleaning information through empathetic conversations that influenced the leaders to balance people with the results in business.17

Even without intense bonding everyone has the ability to glean the life of the mind of others because overt behaviour reflects the emotional state of all. Phenomenology suggests the tacit can be brought to visible presence to become a concrete factor in social exchange. There are also physical and neurological connections made between the empathic parties based on perceptual acuity. One can investigate the application of energy and matter to visual awareness, ‘the nature of visual awareness and the neural correlates of consciousness based on a holistic approach to the outside world.’18 This would encapsulate embodiment, levels of visual awareness, and the existence of micro-consciousnesses which would be factors for the communication of authentic leadership. The empathic route need neither be mystical nor overly complex. People are sensitive to micro movements of the face and generally adept at empathetic

 Wolfgang Walter Fuchs (1976). Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Presence. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 15  Edmund Husserl (1929/1973). Cartesian Meditations. Dorion Cairns. (trans.) The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, p. 109. 16  Remus Ilies. Frederick P. Morgeson. Jennifer D. Nahrgung (2005). “Authentic leadership and eudaemonic well-being: Understanding leader-follower outcomes.” The Leadership Quarterly 16 (3): 373–394, p. 377. 17  Patricia. C. Bravo (2018). “Empathy as a Vehicle to Authentic Leadership in Latin America: A Practitioner Perspective” in Dorianne Cotter-Lockard (ed.) Authentic Leadership and Followership: International Perspectives. Palgrave: Macmillan. 59–80, pp. 64, 72. 18  W.  Alexander Escobar (2013). “Quantized Visual Awareness.” Frontiers in Psychology 4 (November): 1–11, p. 1. 14

126

6  Leadership and Followership

understanding through body language. The key point is that physical gesture is the tip of an iceberg, not divorced from thought and emotion but physically linked to their working. The outer and inner are inseparably fused in the communicative act of expression. The expression of true self as channeled through bodily actions, because it has empathic links, may well reveal weakness as well as strength but this only increases the impression of authenticity. The body is not only the field in which perceptive powers are localised but also part of the created field exercised and expressed by others. Bodily expression allows for a natural, almost naked vision of the self which penetrates to the root, overcoming more self-conscious ordering processes. Indeed, it is the leader’s body, and the way he or she uses it to express ‘true self’ which is the seemingly invisible mechanism through which authenticity is conveyed to others.’19 These views directly emanate from Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. He frequently refers to gestalt theory to support his argument for contextual understanding and situational relevance: When Gestalt theory informs us that a figure on a background is the simplest sense-given available to us we reply that this is not a contingent characteristic of factual perception…It is the very definition of the phenomenon of perception, that without which a phenomenon cannot be said to be perception at all. The perceptual ‘something’ is always in the middle of something else; it always forms part of a ‘field’.20

We learn that the body is not a mere container or a simple marker of presence. Unlike other objects in the world, the human sensibility of a sentient body has a particular relationship to other bodies; that of reversibility. This means as we touch something else we are at the same time touched by it, as we perceive another we are also perceived by the other. The cornerstone of empathy coincides with this interchange between being subject and object, one which obfuscates dichotomies and meshes oppositions into ‘flesh’ as an opening to the world of others.21 Merleau-­ Ponty’s notion of flesh describes the way intersubjectivity and reversibility operates in this opening. Hidden aspects are discerned and become apparent under certain conditions, forces which are detectable only by the traces they leave. Such tacit forces are historically, socially and culturally determined. Empathic connection binds with specific feelings but even more so overall impressions. For Merleau-­ Ponty what is of concern is the constantly fluctuating field of perception with dependency on particular situation and circumstance. This form of direct empathy as a way of inferring mental states from action means perceptual experience is accompanied by core mechanisms which enhance neural links between perceivers. For example, the ‘perception action model’ proposes that the brains of someone executing an action (or experiencing an affect) and  Donna Ladkin, Steven Taylor (2010). “Enacting the ‘true self’; towards a theory of embodied authentic leadership.” The Leadership Quarterly 21 (1): 64–74, p. 65. 20  Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962). The Phenomenology of Perception. Colin Smith (trans.) Routledge & Kegan Paul. p. 4. 21  Fred Evans and Leonard Lawlor (2000). “The Value of Flesh: Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy and the Modernism/Postmodernism Debate” in Fred Evans and Leonard Lawler (eds.) Chiasms. Merleau-Ponty’s Notion of Flesh. State University of New York Press. 19

Empathy

127

an observer of that action utilize similar neural routines.22 There are degrees of empathy between the subjective emphasis of emotional response, and empathy based on perspective taking oriented to the other. Or in terms of tacit, emotional contagion: It happens extremely quickly and is typically below the threshold of awareness, so in standard cases, we end up “catching” another’s emotion without realizing it. The main processes involved are facial, vocal, and postural mimicry and the activation and afferent feedback triggered by mimicry. All of these processes are automatic and involuntary.23

Emotional contagion is not indispensable to empathy but when it occurs the result is a strong response. The physiological connection is through mirror neurons which ‘allow us to match the perceived behavioural characteristics with the inner features of our concepts because the perception of these behavioural characteristics activates the appropriate mirror neurons.’24 The basis for the breadth of empathy, its readable reach, can be explained with the help of Aron Gurwitsch’s notion of fields of consciousness, which encompasses body sense, tacit peripheral awareness and environmental conditions. Gurwitsch was a devotee of Husserl and his phenomenological notion of the field of consciousness is an explicit investigation of the fringes that accompany perceptual experience. His theory that there is always a theme or focus of attention in a field of consciousness fits well into the focussed concentration needed for empathic experience. The reaction to the other is set on an exploratory path which incorporates in relational proximity an intimacy of personal knowledge, and tacit awareness of surrounding penumbra. The breadth of focus, what is attended to and reciprocally shared, varies in quality and extent: Every topic or theme is surrounded by fringes, a halo of relations, references, and pointings of which we have only an inarticulate and vague awareness…In passing to such items, the transition is smooth and continuous; we have the feeling that our thought moves in a right direction. Our thought moves along lines traced out by the very fringes escorting and surrounding the theme.25

This understanding that the field of consciousness embraces the totality of co-­ present data is intensified by the social context which forms the background for leader-follower relationships; a pre-existing, deeper knowledge of surrounding conditions creates a zone of familiarity, an environment which makes behaviour more readable and openly accessible. Gurwitsch extends the neural correlates of focal consciousness to neural correlates of peripheral consciousness.26 His holistic

 Jean Decety (2006) “Human Empathy”, Japanese Journal of Neuropsychology 22, 11–33.   Amy Coplan (2011). “Will the Real Empathy Please Stand Up? A Case for Narrow Conceptualization.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (S1): 40–65. p. 45. 24  Karsten R. Stueber (2006). Rediscovering Empathy. MIT Press. p. 137. 25  Aron Gurwitsch (2010). The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901–1973). Vol. 3. The Field of Consciousness. Richard M. Zaner and Lester Embree (eds.) Springer: Dordrecht. 301–365, p. 302. 26  Jeff Yoshimi. David W. Vinson (2015). “Extending Gurwitsch’s field theory of consciousness.” Consciousness and Cognition 34: 104–123. p. 105. 22 23

128

6  Leadership and Followership

approach, coupled with gestalt configurations, impact what is sensed empathically and reinforces the ability to pick up verbal and physical cues. Neuron connectors may be influenced by how predictions or anticipation of reactions are fulfilled or frustrated, as is the case of jarring when a particular emotion is felt but then contradicted by bodily expression. A successful reading of another’s mindset will need to absorb both the overriding emotion and these aforementioned peripheral factors which in turn indicate behaviour. These shadow perceptions are, what Husserl calls, ‘adumbrations’ which give rise to a sense of future unfolding: Peripheral items which are highly predictively relevant to the theme are experienced as a kind of sense of what’s coming next, i.e., what Husserl and Gurwitsch called “adumbrations” or “protentions”. When adumbrations materialize as expected, experience unfolds in a smooth way. When they fail to materialize as expected, a disruption is experienced.27

A unified perspective may be empathically transferred as a core affective theme supported by its shadowed, peripheral units. This inclusivity encourages the move from direct empathy, the direct connection of neurobiological causes, to ‘re-­enactive empathy’ where our deliberative capacities re-enact the more comprehensive thought processes of the other person. This is a broader canvas where the possibility of re-experiencing the other’s emotion and action incorporates the empathiser’s own life experience. In this context, hermeneutics offers a path to widen empathic reach. The close alignment of hermeneutics to phenomenology indicates that levels of interpretation can provide the necessary vista which direct empathy lacks. If the measure for understanding is too restricted the relation of mental state to action remains abstruse and intended meaning is lost. But with the help of hermeneutics we learn to understand the meaning behind an outer expression. This requires acknowledging historical context; the historical movement everyone is part of which creates a degree of like-minded thought. In order to judge an act it is always necessary to place it within a socio-cultural context. Once this is accepted, it is apparent contemporaneous people share customs, values, and behaviours which will differ from era to era. It is important to realise that extending empathy in this way, as a combinatory exercise of emotion and understanding, creates increased horizons for leadership to work with. Wilhelm Dilthey directly addresses this point, consolidating the various levels of intersubjectivity raised by empathy with hermeneutic perspectives. In the ‘Rise of Hermeneutics’, Dilthey raises the empathy question of how it is possible to know another’s thought when the existence of other people is given us at first only from the outside through their gestures and actions. This is further extended to the act of interpretation and the challenge of entering into the mindset of authors and artists from a different era. Dilthey is concerned with trying to breach the veneer of overt emotion, gesture and textuality to penetrate through to a meaningful, underlying identity. For Dilthey, this can be accomplished spiritually and historically: 27

 Ibid. p. 117.

Empathy

129

Inasmuch as the exegete tentatively projects his own sense of life into another historical milieu, he is able within that perspective, to strengthen and emphasize certain spiritual processes in himself and to minimize others, thus making possible within himself a re-­ experiencing of an alien form of life.28

His conclusion is similar to Husserl’s, one cannot submerge fully into the same emotion but must rather employ re-enactive empathy, a secondary-level experience which combines personal history with the quality of the other’s feeling: Dilthey reinforces his argument by stating that understanding involves reconstructing (Nachbilden) others’ psychic life through an inference of analogy…From the at first disparate sensory evidence available to us, we recreate the unity, vitality and individuality of others’ experiences by both ‘investing our own life experience’ and critically comparing our manner of expressing this experience with the others’ symbolic framework.29

Edith Stein’s further exploration of Husserl’s notion of empathy also has leadership relevance. By insisting empathy is a non-primordial experience, we are more likely to pursue the story of the other inasmuch as narration is an important authentic mediator. This facilitates empathy in being a broad–based exploratory pursuit, one that takes a marked interest in the immanence of another. Stein insists empathy is complex and not purely based on direct perception which is more limited and only provides mere knowledge, ‘perception has its object before it in embodied givenness; empathy does not.’30 In the empathic experience, we are drawn or led by the presence of the other on a journey of discovery: ‘we are not merely directed towards the other in her embodied presence, but we enact a more active envisaging of the other’s world-directed experiential life, bringing it to mind ‘as if’ we were its subject, in a manner more similar to memory, expectation, or imagination than to perception.’31 This is a far more comprehensive, contextual and communal experience. The approach to extending the empathic experience beyond face to face proximity to the imaginative, empathic leap to the story behind the mental state complicates the experience even as it enriches it. It is feasible that the back-story behind another perspective can be imaginatively complemented. However, the role of imagination cannot be to freely indulge in wild conjecture. It rather presupposes an already-existing symbiosis between empathiser and target which offers a framework for mutual understanding, one which helps avoid inappropriate projection. The emotion of another is coloured by the singular circumstance of an individual who has the same recognizable dispositions as everyone else but at the same time is unique to the individual’s life story.  Wilhelm Dilthey (1900/1972). “The Rise of Hermeneutics.” Frederic Jameson (trans.) New Literary History 3 (2): 229–244. p. 243. 29  Austin Harrington (2001). “Dilthey, Empathy and Verstehen.” European Journal of Social Theory 4 (3): 311–329. p. 319. 30  Edith Stein (1917/1970). On the Problem of Empathy. Waltraut Stein (trans.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, p. 19. 31  James Jardine. Thomas Szanto.(2017) “Empathy in the Phenomenological Tradition” in Heidi L. Maibom (Ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy, 86–97, p. 92. 28

130

6  Leadership and Followership

One distinct argument claims that for any broadening to take place familiarity or similarity between the parties is favoured, preferably as part of the same in-group, in other words for empathizer and target to possess similar shared values. But hermeneutics assures us that leaders do not have to have led the same kind of life as their followers or draw on identical feelings to empathise. It suggests that psychological and physical signs engender wider horizons relating to story, environment, and heritage which can imaginatively and insightfully be excavated and concretised. Authentic leaders can search for emotions and concomitant reactions to infer an understanding of another’s inner self aided by the objective spirit of community and culture.

Altruism and Ethics The universal, ethical bond is a passionate commitment by all. This concurs with the discussion on authentic leadership and the inner drive which becomes an ethical norm to manifest self authentically in the lifeworld. To achieve this, the same herd mentality Nietzsche derides must be confronted and defeated. Furthermore, in terms of Kierkegaard’s tripartite modes of existence, the aesthetic, ethical and spiritual, the spiritual perfectly coincides with leaders who would make decisions empathically ‘characterized by altruistic love, hope and faith. Altruistic love is defined as a sense of wholeness, harmony and ‘well-being’ based on selflessness and thoughtfulness towards oneself and others.’32 The process is to move to the highest form of sensibility, making decisions with a spiritual content aimed to promote positive, social development. There is world interconnectedness: ‘Leadership with spiritual grounding assumes and requires a complete change in the mindset, amongst other things, leading to mechanical solutions being perceived and understood in terms of an organic worldview.’33 On this track, decisions will be spontaneous and original engendering passionate individuality while fulfilling ethical needs. Empathic experience may well engender an automatic response to consider ethical prerequisites, a form of moral intuition ‘defined as the sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective valence (good-bad, like-dislike), without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion.’34 Moral judgments, then, are frequently based on immediate perception and empathic experience of others without conscious reflection. Nonetheless, reasoning has a part to play in empathic reaction as an intuition may present several conflicting  Vivi M. L. Storsletten and Ove D. Jakobsen (2015). “Development of Leadership Theory in the Perspective of Kierkegaard’s Philosophy.” Journal of Business Ethics 128 (2): 337–349, 341. 33  Ibid. p. 342. 34  Jonathan Haidt (2001). “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral judgment.” Psychological Review 108 (4): 814–834, p. 818. 32

Altruism and Ethics

131

paths to follow according to changing circumstance. In such cases, rational judgment may subsequently be included to relate to original reactions, working together with moral intuition to break an impasse and create a ‘feel right ethic.’35 For Schopenhauer, the accompanying, guiding sentiment which cements this ethical bond is compassion, where empathy is aligned with sympathy. The empathic perspective of seeing and sharing another’s mental state is accompanied by compassion rather than rules or Kantian duty which decides whether an act is morally acceptable or not: ‘Boundless compassion for all living beings is the firmest and surest guarantee of pure moral conduct, and needs no casuistry.’36 Schopenhauer considers empathy to be a more intimate confluence of emotion and identification, ‘the entire difference between me and everyone else, which is the very basis of my egoism, is eliminated, to a certain extent at least…the difference between him and me is now no longer absolute.’37 Schopenhauer’s analysis lies somewhere between those who discuss empathy in terms of the sustained distinction between self and other, and those who feel the intimacy of empathy highlights fused simultaneity of minds. For Schopenhauer, the empathizer enters into the feelings of another in compassion; the experienced feelings are not imported but still reside with the other. For leader and followers this means that concerns can be appreciated by the leader without leaders themselves being overcome by similar feelings of say, anguish or frustration, though they will come to share the others’ concern. Where necessary, leaders can export optimism and security to fill a necessary need. In fact, compassion is more likely to occur the greater the gap in emotions between empathizer and target. It is true that sympathy is most associated with negative pain or loss rather than the sharing of pleasure but the point is that it is still a coming-together, a communion of beings: ‘For indeed our sympathy rests on an identification with them’.38 This is humanity in a nutshell - the care for others as the love of self is identified with the love and concern for others. For Schopenhauer, leaders whose lives are motivated by egoism or malice, which Schopenhauer would identify with toxic leadership, are unable to alter their detestable direction. This is because he is convinced the feeling of compassion for humanity is innate and does not suddenly occur through experience. The ability to empathise and show compassion is ‘something which is inborn, unchangeable, and incapable of further explanation’.39 This unconscious, pre-rational ability knows the thing-in-itself and serves as a basis for moral action; the quasi-mystical intuition of the oneness of all things. The suffering of others is ultimately identical with oneself, a common sharing of reality that moves people to act morally through empathic sharing as part of the same shared will. Moral realists exclude emotion, moral

 Ibid. p. 829.  Arthur Schopenhauer (1840/1995). On The Basis of Morality. E.F.J.  Payne (trans.) Berghahn Books, p. 172. 37  Ibid. pp. 143–144 38  Ibid. p. 147. 39  Ibid. p. 197. 35 36

132

6  Leadership and Followership

s­ entimentalists include it. Emotions make us; they motivate us to do the right thing. What follows from this is a leap of judgement. Various levels of perception coated with affectivity are not only relevant to the leader-follower relationship in terms of communication and immediate understanding but also because of the ethical bond that is created: ‘Empathy-related processes are thought to motivate prosocial behaviour (e.g., sharing, comforting, and helping) and caring for others, to inhibit aggression, and to provide the foundation for care based morality.’40 Endemic to business and social life in general, the concern is whether empathic experience and emotional sharing carries the same weight as other moral theories when related to justice and respect for the rights of others. Some theories such as utilitarianism or deontology proffer moral conflicts can be resolved by applying universal justice principles and rationalising the solution. In these cases, empathy is not the main concern. Indeed, moralists who insist on an impartial perspective to ensure equality for natural rights and justice may question whether empathy’s close emotional contact engenders impartiality; they argue sharing similar emotions may negatively hinder forming the wider perspective necessary for moral judgment. Empathizing with those we are close to, a natural inclination with friends or those we continually work with, can lead to preferential treatment and risks ignoring others who need moral support. However, when it comes to leadership and decision-­ making, the natural proclivity for favouring family or friends may be mollified by today’s high-profile publicity, monitoring those who are suspected of cronyism. In fact, judged in their best light, transformational and authentic leadership co-opt empathic and sympathetic traits to move away from bias and ethnocentricity to a more geocentric mindset. The critique that empathy establishes a sense of intimacy with others without discerning whether the shared sentiments emanate from morally respectful people is similar to the charismatic critique where power over followers becomes toxic. However, charisma has a larger armoury, utilising propaganda, charm, and powerful rhetoric within a bounded community of followers which need pay no attention to morality. Empathy, however, already possesses a sense of moral decency. The notion of empathy would never be used to describe a relation to the emotional and cognitive platform of someone who performs evil acts. Rather than empathise with a wrong-doer we would situate our reaction to corrupt deeds from the outside as a concerned, critical observer, but not as an empathiser. The implication is that in experiencing empathy and sympathy a moral standard is already in place, one which embodies care and feeling for another person.41 There is, then, a pre-existing moral component which is foundational when considering the interest of others. To a degree, this goes towards prioritising the other and brings in the important perspective of altruism. One of the sources of altruism is empathic concern, essentially feeling distressed or sad for the plight of the  Jean Decety and Jason M.  Cowell (2014). “The Complex Relation Between Morality and Empathy.” Trends in Cognitive Science 18 (7): 337–339. 41  Tamar Schapiro (2011). “Empathy as a moral concept: Comments on John Deigh’s ‘Empathy, Justice, and Jurisprudence.’” The Southern Journal of Philosophy. 49 (S1): 91–98, p. 93. 40

Altruism and Ethics

133

other(s).42 Acts of altruism are based on compassion, tenderness and sympathy where benevolent attempts to improve the lot of another are prioritised. The link to authentic leadership is reinforced by altruistic endeavour and the way positive psychology is concerned with pro-social behaviour. It may be that benefitting others is a practical requirement, an organizational need or a contingently useful act called for at a particular time. Genuine altruistic help, however, seeks no external rewards or benefits as it is carried out solely from a heart-felt sense of moral responsibility and benevolence.43 This involves a genuine need to make a carefully focused, broadly-contextualised moral judgments which are dependent on situation rather than fixed principles. For example, an empathic anger response may alternate between the plight of the victim and the plight of the culprit resulting in different reactions: One may feel anger at the culprit because one sympathizes with the victim, because one empathizes with the victim and feels oneself vicariously attacked or a combination of the two…(but) empathic anger may shift from one target to another. Thus if one discovers the victim had previously harmed the culprit, one’s empathic distress for the victim may decrease, and one may begin to empathize with the culprit.44

For Nussbaum, taking the perspective of another and the possible compassion which results, creates an ‘ethical core to work with…a promising imaginative basis for the extension or evening of concern.’45 There is no general consensus how wide this level of concern reaches or the degree of empathic imagining. Normally, empathy-­ induced altruistic-motivation will be strongest where particular, prototypical members of a follower group are targeted and seen to be in need. Emphasis is placed on the more intimate relationship leaders have with their close followers and this is in keeping with social-identity theory. Leaders act in the interest of others for a variety of motives. There may be legal compulsion, a duty to act, or an altruistic goal to further the interests of followers and associates. However, when empathy is related to an extended, wider sense of caring for humanity in keeping with authentic leadership, it calls for re-examining the debate concerning familiarity and strangeness. Leaders inexorably relate to their own community of followers, in organizations or political parties and this familiarity with a common plight or set of interests creates shared problems often requiring ‘transnational solutions.’46 To create the right mindset, leaders can suggest different strategies, for example, Nussbaum focuses on the arts and literature to intensify empathic understanding. Alternatively, compassion meditation can be pursued which increases empathic concern ‘beyond its  Martin L.  Hoffman (1981). “Is Altruism Part of Human Nature?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 40 (1): 121–137, p. 135. 43  Bruce Maxwell (2008). Professional Ethics Education. Studies in Compassionate Empathy. Springer. 44  Martin L. Hoffman (1989). “Empathic Emotions and Justice in Society.” Social Justice Research. 3 (4): 283–311, p. 289. 45  Martha Nussbaum (2001) Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of the Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 414. 46  Ibid. p. 421. 42

134

6  Leadership and Followership

n­ ormal bounds…thereby producing a more sensitive behavioural response to the target’s needs’47 which widens altruistic motivation to include all sentient beings. Promoting universal welfare should not be considered an over-ambitious ideal or futile exercise. In fact, it corresponds to the credo of the authentic-ethical model of leadership whereby leaders can alleviate suffering and meet the needs of their constituents. At the same time, it facilitates the authentic demand to empathize with inner feelings and determine whether actions are genuinely driven by moral concerns which qualify them to be judged as authentic in the first place. The key expansion of the range of empathy includes moving outside the bystander model, or affective perception, and exploring the possibilities for when physical presence is not required. Leaders then show empathy via the affects evoked by represented events.48 The result is a shift of emphasis whereby greater demand is placed on a cognitively extended bystander position in which imagination, in particular moral imagination, plays a greater role in bringing about moral response and detecting situations of moral salience: [W]hen abstract moral issues like stealing come to mind, they may operate as stimuli that prime the representation of victims and thus transform the abstract issue into an empathy-­ relevant one. Empathy may in this way contribute to moral judgment as well as to moral behaviour…If one empathizes with society's least advantaged people and imagines the consequences of different distributive systems for them, one may advocate distributive systems based on the principle of need, or equality.49

The drive from empathy to altruistic-motivation has interesting implications. At first sight it centres on the closeness and affective interaction of self and other, or leader and follower, depending on circumstance and the perceptual scope of the situation. Even though the presence of familiarity as a means to smooth affective contact undoubtedly eases the path to shared sensibility, present day leaders are constantly faced by strangers in the sense of marginalised groups and alien cultures. Here the soothing balm of familiarity offers no relief: The stranger is doubled in that it is always similar and dissimilar in a play of unsettling ambivalence. It is because it is like us and yet not like us at all, hovering between the knowable and unknowable, that it strikes us as uncanny…As Other, it is so unexpected and transcendent that it eludes our knowledge.50

When there is encounter with the stranger, poesis, in the sense of reaching out beyond, can set the stage for sharing empathically: ‘Poetic phenomenology must pay attention to the moment of phronesis—the assessment of the hostility or  C. Daniel Batson (2017). “The Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis: What and So What?” in Emma M. Seppälä, Emiliana Simon-Thomas, Stephanie L. Brown, Monica C. Worline, C. Daryl Cameron and James R. Doty (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Compassion Science. Oxford University Press. 27–40, p. 36. 48  Hoffman, “Empathic Emotions and Justice in Society” p. 293. 49  Ibid. pp. 293, 297. 50  Richard Kearney and Kascha Semonovitch (2011). “At the Threshold: Foreigners, Strangers, Others” in Phenomenologies of the Stranger: Between Hostility and Hospitality. Richard Kearney and Kascha Semonovitch (eds.) Fordham University Press. 3–29, p.5. 47

Altruism and Ethics

135

friendship of the one at the doorway or frontier, the double-edged root of the term hostis, connoting both ally and adversary.51 On one hand, the act of host is isomorphic with direct empathy as close encounter but as poesis it reaches out to explore wider systems or even the unknown and build furrows to unchartered territory. For leaders, it is vital to draw on this and nurture the ability to transport into different cultural contexts and accommodate the unfamiliar. If all this were to occur in pristine fashion, respect for the unfamiliar and difference would result in a satisfying, respectful relationship with others. However, the possibilities and potential released by the direct exposure empathy offers is rarely utilised. The reason for this is an offshoot of autonomy and the capitalist ethic where self-identity, the pursuit of abundance, and the rule of reason predominate. In terms of existence, Heidegger also points to the tendency to conglomerate sameness and seek ‘Das Man’ as universal similarity. When empathy is locked into the already-­ given it limits the freedom to acknowledge those we deal with as intrinsically singular, or interestingly different. If leaders are to glean the full empathic experience of strangeness when dealing with an unfamiliar other, they need to indulge in a structure of switching from the imposition of self-affectivity into an experience which is the non-possessive recognition of the other qua other.52 By doing this we move from the ethnocentric to a possibility of interlaced, far-reaching, dispersed networks of meaning, where things or people are subject to transformation: [A]n object of experience becomes the site of an event of reversal and transformation in which not only is the subject implicated in an unexpected way, but the world, or a part of it, is poised for restructuration, and for the proliferation of new chains of possibility.53

Empathic experience, then, either supports prevailing structuration and ideology or it offers the potential to think otherwise about identity and transcendence, experience which reinforces the effort for an altruistic attitude: Empathy…gives us a sense of difference, a sense that there are other ways of being in the world…it allows us to see how we have denied the singularity of those we now recognise and it allows us to see how we have committed violence to them in order to sustain the unity of our own identities…This acknowledgment of our violence to others allows us, or forces us, to acknowledge how all of our identity claims and all of our cultural and political settlements have come about as a result of acts of violence against Difference.54

The point about this insight is that difference is recognised in a deep manner which penetrates to the foundation of postmodern thought. Difference is prior to identity, it is an aspect of movement and change and cannot therefore be discerned from a given empathic feeling or insight. Empathy is about emotion and affectivity but also affective power which can attract and repulse. Extant force is a move away from representational thinking bound to sensation to a more abstract level of being. This  Ibid. p. 20.  Anthony M. Clohesy (2013). Politics of Empathy. Routledge, p. 4. 53  David Wood (2011). “Things at the Edge of the World” in Kearney and Semonovitch, Phenomenologies of the Stranger, 67–79, p. 68. 54  Clohesy, Politics of Empathy, pp. 3, 4. 51 52

136

6  Leadership and Followership

level of being is paradoxically not-yet, it is process in becoming. When we tie things down to the known we assume they constitute a graspable and fixable identity, a tendency pursued to protect self-identity and the solace of personal containment. But recognizing the other as fluid, ungraspable and unassimilable takes the courage to lower defences and allow being exposed to the outside. It is here empathy plays its part. Indeed, empathic experience cannot occur without lowering the shell of egoism and partaking in the affective resonance of another by entering into the flow of their life. This experience encourages personal awakening from the stupor of non-committed conformity while encouraging proactive gestures of trust and curiosity in the behaviour of others. It also serves as a reminder of our shared destiny, at the very least encouraging productive intersubjectivity and at best, producing life-­ changing, epiphanic moments. The efficacy of empathy is at its most potent when recognising this state of difference.

Chapter 7

Authenticity as Life-Story

Abstract  Life-stories are a key form of communication between leaders and followers. Stories have always had a function to move others in a particular direction both on a rational and emotional level. Creating the personal life-story is an exercise in image-making which decides what sort of person one wants to be, and how one wants to be recognised by others. For Jerome Bruner, storytelling and its conceptualizations are recipes for structuring experience, and it is impossible to separate a life as led from a life as told. Stories about the self may not be accurate, events may be fabricated. In this respect, Paul Ricoeur’s phenomenological hermeneutics insists there is always a rudimentary propensity to relate life-stories and they often coalesce truth and fiction to create a relative interpretation of life experience. Life-story is always tied to social contact which includes others and, in the case of authentic leadership, the close relationship of followers. In creating a life-story certain events stand out, others are left by the wayside. Turning points, or crucibles, are noteworthy because it is these events individuals feel have made a conspicuous difference to their life. Stories can relate tales and anecdotes of courage and sacrifice which illumine all the virtues and those leader traits needed for authenticity An excellent example of life-story leadership in politics is the 1988 convention for the American presidency, when Jesse Jackson came up against Michael Dukakis. Jackson’s rhetorical skills encompassed both the emotional appeal we come to expect from great rhetoricians within a story-frame which directly targeted an enchanted audience. Keywords  Story-telling · Life-history · Jerome Bruner · Self-concepts · Autobiographical memory · Paul Ricoeur · Crucibles · Jesse Jackson · Image-making

Life-Stories A related approach to authenticity and its appreciation of individuality, self-­ determination and the incontrovertible dependency on the reaction of other people is the life-story model of narrative identity. This is one of the most potent strategies © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Shaw, The Philosophy of Authentic Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29650-5_7

137

138

7  Authenticity as Life-Story

for shuffling personality aspects to retain coherent agency over action and desire, an attribute which leaders do well to benefit from. Stories have always had a function to move others in a particular direction both on a rational and emotive level. They create emotional openings and, as such, any leader-follower situation will affect and move others as part of a co-constructed encounter. Although we have pointed to problems with Heidegger’s position, the noted apologists for his work, Charles Guignon, explains how the existential/hermeneutic position explains humans as events in dynamic movement. Heidegger’s description of the human being leads to a critique of the natural science position: Instead (it) characterizes a human being as an “event” or “life-story” unfolding between birth and death…A person, on this account, is an individual who can assess her primary desires in the light of “higher” or “second-order” motivations concerning what sort of person she wants to be. As a participant in a social context, she is indebted to the historical tradition of a community for her possibilities of self-interpretation and self-evaluation.1

Understanding the event or life-story of the human being as an exercise in deciding what sort of person one wants to be is a lifelong mission. The event as life-story is one of the most effective means of decoding, reflecting and formulating authenticity within a social context and historical tradition. Stories bear a tight relationship to identity and as such may be the most privileged site for identity analysis where the aim is to weave life’s temporal experience into an accessible and understandable narrative.2 Authentic leaders need to be narratively intelligent leaders: ‘A narratively intelligent leader will support and challenge others to become more aware of the narratives in which they dwell and to develop the capacity to shape more efficacious narratives.’3 A sense of ‘us’ is created to share vision and common goals. Jerome Bruner argues, the way we think about life, the narrative mode of thought and the expression through forms of narrative discourse, are inextricably coupled: ‘Our experience of human affairs comes to take the form of the narratives we use in telling about them.’4 The narration of life-story comprises a complex which includes personal traits, innate and nurtured individual dispositions, together with motivations and incentives which are the driving force behind our chosen life tasks. In communicating identity by describing the sense of self, the past of what has been and the existential project of choosing the future are normally combined Furthermore, for Bruner, the dynamic of collating and recounting life-story through cognitive and linguistic processes cannot avoid partaking in the influence of prevailing culture and mores:

 Charles Guignon (2012). “Becoming a person: Hermeneutic phenomenology’s contribution.” New Ideas in Psychology 30 (1) 97–106, p. 97. 2  Michael Bamberg (2011). “Who am I? Narration and Its Contribution to Self and Identity.” Theory & Psychology 21(1): 3–24. 3  Greg Morgan (2019) Reworking Leadership with Narrative Intelligence. Emerald Publishing Limited, p. 5. 4  Jerome Bruner (1991). “The Narrative Construction of Reality.” Critical Inquiry 18 (1): 1–21. p. 5. 1

Life-Stories

139

The culturally shaped cognitive and linguistic processes that guide the self-telling of life narratives achieve the power to structure perceptual experience, to organize memory, segment and purpose-build the very ‘events’ of life. In the end, we become the autobiographical narratives by which we tell about our lives.5

Bruner insists life-stories are an integral part of personality psychology. Narratives introduce a sense of sameness over difference and continuity over change. In the mature adult, this phase creates an overarching, integrated perspective of who one was, who one is, and where one intends to go. In general, Bruner argues that narrative serves to bring coherence to diverse conflicts and alleviates the task of social negotiation. As part of this development, the self is the center of narrative gravity, a position which becomes more nuanced as age progresses. The story of a leader’s journey can be construed to show that adopting the mantle of authority was not an isolated, ad hoc decision but rather tied to a consistent identity ambition linked to earlier phases in the leader’s life. This could be conveyed by the literary linguistic method of prolepsis, such as ‘if I had known then what I know now’, or ‘what I did 10 years ago would stand me in good stead later.’ Stories can account for things or justify actions in the present based on a reading of the past or an intended future. For Bruner, the mode of storytelling and its conceptualization ‘become recipes for structuring experience itself, for laying down routes into memory…a life as led is inseparable from a life as told.’6 Storytelling is a structured process where the self is split between the ‘I’ as the transcendent narrator/author and the constructed ‘me’ as the object correlate of the narrator. This is a linear developmental model where individuals pass through set, invariable stages of development, even though some phases may overlap or appear concurrently. In essence, the ‘I’ embarks on a lifelong process ‘to enhance the me, to make it bigger, stronger and more excellent. The I also seeks to make the me consistent, understandable and predictable.’7 Taking up Bruner’s observation that culture and society impact personal views of identity, Dan McAdams shows how political and religious values colour the content of life narratives: Politically conservative Christian adults tended to construct life narratives that feature scenes of self-discipline…a strict father morality, expressing strong fears regarding personal turmoil and societal breakdown. By contrast, politically liberal Christian adults tended to feature life-story scenes of self-exploration…a nurturant-caregiver morality, expressing strong fears regarding inner emptiness.8

Similarly, Seymour Epstein points out we can agree that self-concept, as formed through life-stories, approximates the search for authenticity as it is applied to identity in a broad sense which includes both the personal and social:

 Jerome Bruner (2004). “Life as Narrative.” Social Research 71 (3): 691–710. p. 694.  Ibid. p. 708. 7  Dan P. McAdams (2013). “The Psychological Self as Actor, Agent, and Author.” Perspectives on Psychological Science 8 (3): 272–295, p. 290. 8  Ibid. C/f. George Lakoff, (2002). Moral Politics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 5 6

140

7  Authenticity as Life-Story

The self as an object of knowledge…consisting of whatever the individual views as belonging to himself. This includes a material self, a social self, and a spiritual self. The material self is an extended self which contains, in addition to the individual’s own body, his family and possessions. The social self includes the views others hold of the individual. The spiritual self includes the individual’s emotions and desires.9

For Epstein, individuals construct self-concepts about themselves as experiencing human beings to come to terms with a world they must interact with. Self-concepts comprise the stories that are formed to communicate with others, psychologically prioritising the desire to optimize pleasure and bolster self-esteem. But these concepts are built upon shaky foundations because of the conundrums produced by the complexity of life: What is it that consists of concepts that are hierarchically organized and internally consistent; that assimilates knowledge, yet, itself, is an object of knowledge; that is dynamic, but must maintain a degree of stability; that is unified and differentiated at the same time; that is necessary for solving problems in the real world; and that is subject to sudden collapse, producing total disorganization when this occurs?10

Some voice more faith in the resilience of stories because the events are tied to facts in a way which can be verified and substantiated. It helps when evidence is available and can be supported by the testimony of others where external events may have a degree of factual support in the form of other people’s testimony or official records. But there is a difference between chronicling occurrences as a simple listing of atomistic, sequential events and embracing storytelling to signal one’s moral compass in the world, ‘the virtues of narrative (is) our best and most compelling tool for searching out meaning in a conflicted and contradictory world.’11 Notwithstanding this, the standing of events in a life-story is open to conjecture since even acts of verification or substantiated testimony may be on shaky ground. Hayden White points to the problem of uncovering the ‘whole’ truth of an occurrence, not only because there may be a lack of corroboration but because there are so many sources and viewpoints to consider. For White, the seemingly factual recounting of historical events can be as fictional as a novel: ‘there has been a reluctance to consider historical narratives as what they most manifestly are: verbal fictions, the contents of which are as much invented as found and the forms of which have more in common with their counterparts in literature than they have with those in the sciences.’12 The task of the historian, like a leader’s narrative, is to make sense of isolated events which in their unprocessed form may make no sense. The downside to this is that this combination of actions in the outside world with the phenomenological  Seymour Epstein (1973). “The Self-Concept Revised: Or a Theory of a Theory.” American Psychologist 28 (5): 404–416, p. 405. 10  Ibid. p. 407. 11  William Cronon (1992). “A Place for Stories: Nature, History, and Narrative.” The Journal of American History 78 (4):1347–1376, p. 1374. 12  Hayden V.  White (1978). “The Historical Text as Literary Artifact.” in Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism. John Hopkins University Press. 81–99, p. 82. 9

Life-Stories

141

consciousness of the inner world of the subject makes the truth of the narrative difficult to judge empirically. The upside, especially important for leadership, is that the choices made in terms of the formative process of narrative identity will serve as critical indicators of motivation and clearly suggest which values the leader deems it important to live by. It is likely that follower trust will be based on these putative storied-values leaders attempt to portray. The fact is personal narratives as opposed to historically-based events may not be based on ‘truths’ but depend on the standard of presentation. They depict personal rather than objective reality, one which reflects the psychological forces internal to the narrator. For this reason, life-story rather than life-history may be preferable to suggest that the events narrated are subject to embellishment or simply fabricated to fashion a convincing, desirable life style. In his interpretive work, Paul Ricoeur shows that truth and fiction coalesce as the basic communication medium. The course over which events are recounted and the narrative that constructs them fuse to create a relative interpretation of life experience. Through metaphors of reality, a poetic narrative function replaces the directly referential, and this adds to the attraction of the story. Ricoeur’s phenomenological hermeneutics insists there already is a rudimentary propensity to relate life-stories: Are we not inclined to see in a given sequence of the episodes of our lives (as yet) untold stories, stories that demand to be told, stories that offer anchorage points for narrative?…It is the quest for this personal identity that assures the continuity between the potential or inchoate story and the actual story we assume responsibility for…We tell stories because in the last analysis human lives need and merit being narrated.13

This affirms that even with ontological difficulties authentic leadership depends on reflective judgement to understand the self through personal narration. Reflective judgement is a key element in the process of creating life-stories because it is required to form a cohesive account out of the myriad events and detours that make up an individual’s life experience. Identity is a story created, told, revised and retold throughout life because life is constant experience and open to change. Simply put, the formation of personal life histories creates and expresses one’s identity as a dynamic process in constant flux. The leader-follower relationship is forged through an ascending order of intimacy, beginning from observations of general demeanour, to participating in the business activity of transactional leadership and culminating in a closer, personal bond encouraged by the exchange of life-stories, more amenable to authentic leadership. McAdams sees the life-story model of identity to be one of unification as it is common to all, leader and follower alike. Life unfolds as narrative, reconstructing the past and imagining the future just as literary narrative incorporates synchrony, time shifts, plots, characters and themes. The overall theme of one’s life can be described in literary or epic terms, for example; acting in a heroic way, finding redemption by transforming negative experience into positive meaning, showing sensitivity to the suffering of others, pursuing prosocial goals for the future,

 Paul Ricoeur (1984). Time and Narrative. Vol. 1. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (trans.). The University of Chicago Press. pp. 74, 75. 13

142

7  Authenticity as Life-Story

overcoming difficulties to achieve great success, or changing the course of one’s life under the influence of mentor figures.14 Followers understand these accounts and use the material for judging leader authenticity and ethical values. Individuals draw on objective events to help form their identity and weave these events around their ideographic talents and motivation. There is selection, interpretation and recounting in one form or another. Causal links will be made where there may not have been any. The transmuting of chance events into fate will be common. The narrative exercise of emplotment intertwines character and plot lending self-­ constancy to an individual’s identity as it works through temporal phases of an implied beginning, middle, and end. When we compare life-story and narrative structure there is a sense of constancy where emplotment irons out inconsistencies in a persuasive way allowing for the mapping of a variety of themes which come to differentiate individuals. The authentic model of leadership naturally turns to life-­ stories as it is a central strategy for communicating personality: Authentic leadership invokes the traditional mind/body dichotomy of Cartesian dualism to produce an order in which a mindful identity, created retrospectively through a highly crafted life-story, is the primary maker of meaning…the search for authenticity through narrative is, in fact a search for unity. Within authentic leadership the search for unity is variously described as that between thought and action.15

The difficulty with authentic leadership is coming to terms with how a leader’s behaviour needs to be consistent with one’s core values and beliefs if the leader is to literally put on show via life-story his or her authentic behaviour. The philosophical conceit at work is that the certainty of self-concepts is achieved through the acuity of determined self-awareness. This process of reflection reveals a self which is consistent and admissible in diverse and varied situations. For leaders, the aim is to find a suitable fit between a subjectively discovered self and an idealized form of what it takes to be an authentic leader. The next step is how to communicate this concordance. The narrated life-story lies at the heart of this pragmatic exercise designed to ease the challenge of interaction and dissipate lingering contradictions. Stories act as the sounding-board from which life lessons can be learnt by the narrator in an ongoing process of forming self-concepts. They are also the sounding-­ board for associates and followers to judge whether the impressions and images created in the social field carry genuine substance. The activity of recognising events as important markers in one’s life, even turning points, shows an undeniable reliance on the influence of what takes place in the social world. Any form of self-construction has to turn outwards; it cannot rely on self-satisfying egoism but must recognise the individual journey in an environment influenced by natural forces and social actors. Life-story is always tied to social contact which includes others and, in the case of authentic leadership, the close

 Dan P.  McAdams (2015). “Narrating the Generative Life.” Psychological Science 26 (4): 475–483. 15  Jan Shaw (2010). “Papering the Cracks with Discourse: The Narrative Identity of the Authentic Leader.” Leadership 6 (1): 89–108, pp. 90, 92. 14

Life-Stories

143

relationship of followers. The leader’s ability to form identity through narrative coherence reinforces a positive attitude to life, not necessarily mastery over life’s vicissitudes but at least a conviction that there is a pattern to be discerned. The cognitive ability to form continuity and the belief meaningful connections can be made reinforces a personal, positive outlook, one which fits well into the positive psychology of authentic leadership. It also makes for a convenient fit between self-concepts and actual behaviour which can be a manageable and controllable exercise as opposed to existential authenticity which is tantamount to being thrown into the vagaries and chaos of a complex world. To a great degree, life-story narratives draw on a phenomenological structure, utilising a specific kind of autobiographical memory. This entails both the recounting of events or episodes combined with the personal feelings and attitudes which accompanied them when they originally occurred. Whether the original feeling can be recaptured, re-imagined in pristine manner, or whether over the years the associated feeling has changed will depend on perceptual awareness and introspective acuity. The process is rarely one dimensional. It is more likely to be one that melds linearity, chronological order and spatial fixity with the complexity of time disjuncture; memory, recollection, the just-past, and movement into the future. Eugene Minkowski, for example, in his phenomenological analysis of split-self schizophrenia examines lived-time by considering time in relation to different mental states, the influence of memory, and Bergson’s élan vital. Recollected events need to be understood with their own horizon of experience as they transition to the dynamic future of becoming, ‘it is not only that we feel a general progression, in us as well as outside us, but rather a unique rhythm common to us and to ambient becoming… ’16 Because the present is horizonal, dynamic, and vital reaching into the past-future through spheres of indeterminacy, this gives the life-story creator a wide orbit to explore. Within this exercise certain events stand out over the routine. Turning points or crucibles are noteworthy because it is these events individuals feel have made a conspicuous difference to their life. For example, after interviewing more than 40 top leaders in business and the public sector over three years, Bennis and Thomas state, ‘we were surprised to find that all of them - young and old-were able to point to intense, often traumatic, always unplanned experiences that had transformed them and had become the sources of their distinctive leadership abilities.’17 Epiphanies, shocks, surprises, violent episodes, even strong reactions to prejudice or racism can catalyse change because they are thought-provoking, out-of-the-­ ordinary experiences which jolt the system. Crucibles were once the vessels medieval alchemists used to try and convert base metals into gold. As an experience, they are moments in time which engender deep self-reflection, forcing leaders to question their identity and potentially bring about personal conversion. Turning  Eugene Minkowski (1933/1970). Lived Time: Psychological and Psychopathological Studies. Nancy Metzel (trans.) Northwestern University Press, p. 69. 17  Warren G. Bennis and Robert J. Thomas (2002). “Crucibles of Leadership.” Harvard Business Review 80 (9): 39–45, p. 40. 16

144

7  Authenticity as Life-Story

points work with embedded traits; they will be combined with the temporal changes in life by directing nuclear episodes into personally directed life-stories. For leaders, in particular, life-stories not only recount how they became leaders but also offer justification for doing so; they answer the questions ‘how have I become a leader? and why have I become a leader? In other words, in constructing their life-stories leaders explain and justify their present self, which includes their leadership role and motivations.’18 One such motivation is illustrated through ‘stories of victory over enemies or debilitating circumstances (where) they attest to the existence in the leader of many qualities that are considered necessary for leadership—strong will, self-confidence, proactivity, ability to take on big challenges and cope with difficulties, independence, and toughness.’19 By narrating a life-story, leaders have a frame of reference for action and decision-­making which will express personal conviction and clarity of values. It also provides a personal template for making sense of reality and giving it meaning. In return, life-story is the most convenient and accessible platform for followers to judge a leader’s personality. It offers an inviting means to communicate authenticity rather than simply presenting an inventory of stated beliefs. In this respect, a key difference should be noted when the trustworthiness and honesty of a life-story is judged. As the life-story approximates the aesthetic production of literature or drama in content and construction, one may think it susceptible to the same criteria for interpretation. Eric Hirsch examines the various possibilities for valid interpretation, pointing out that one can re-animate author intent to offset the free play of interpretation at a later date.20 But the intentional fallacy, and new criticism in particular, prioritise texts and banish author intent. Whereas the life of the artist behind an artistic creation may or may not be relatable or even relevant to the finished work of art, the leader’s genuine character and personal information comprise the whole point of the life-story exercise. Story and authentic identity go hand in hand. Accepting this, crucibles may not always be immediately apparent. Events that are turning points may need evaluation and excavation to be extracted from one’s life-continuum after the event, before realisation dawns that they did indeed possess life-transforming consequences. In the 1988 convention for the American presidency, Jesse Jackson came up against Michael Dukakis. What was most noticeable in the key speech he gave was its story-telling; the personal background and turning points in his life which Jackson claimed made him what he became. At the convention Jackson made constant references to important cultural and historical episodes which illustrated his passion for embracing the American dream. From the outset, Jackson described his life story as closely aligned to Dr. King and martyrdom, as well as the self-sacrifice associated with Abraham Lincoln: ‘Jackson’s identification with King was not

 Boas Shamir and Galit Eilam (2005). “What’s Your Story? A Life-stories Approach to Authentic Leadership Development.” The Leadership Quarterly 16 (3): 395–417, p. 403. 19  Ibid. p. 404. 20  Eric Donald Hirsch Jr. (1967). Validity in Interpretation. Yale University Press. 18

Life-Stories

145

accidental but was a result of a deliberate campaign – Jackson put his portraits next to King’s, affected King’s speech cadence, and anointed himself in King’s blood, at least symbolically.’21 His rhetorical skills encompassed both the emotional appeal we come to expect from great rhetoricians with a story frame which directly targeted an enchanted audience. All elements of a powerful life-story are present. As a live event directly speaking to the crowd gathered around him, and an awareness of the media coverage, there is intense use of tone and musicality of voice to target the message to the media and cheering crowd. The content of Jackson’s speech adds gravitas, referring to history, culture and tradition to elevate it in stature. Jackson claimed his ideas and convictions were built on ‘the shoulders of others’, great democratic presidents, civil rights heroes such as Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King Jr. who merit respect as role-models to be emulated. Above all Jackson tried to ‘transcend the limits of the black identity and to become a national leader…to try and crystalize a broader and more inclusive identity’, what he called a rainbow coalition.22 Jackson’s life story is full of metaphors; lions and lambs working together, hawks and doves sharing the same world, and most notably the shared, collective identity reflected in a quilt metaphor: America is not a blanket woven from one thread, one colour, one cloth. When I was a child growing up in Greensville, S.C., and grandmother could not afford a blanket she didn’t complain and we did not freeze. Instead, she took pieces of cloth  – patches, wool, silk, gabardine, crockersack on the patches – barely good enough to wipe off your shoes with. But they didn’t stay that way very long. With sturdy hands and strong cord, she sewed them into a quilt, a thing of beauty, power and culture. Now, democrats, we must build such a quilt.23

The use of metaphor reinforced a shared collective identity between Jackson’s life-­ story and the various groups he addressed. At all times Jackson was willing to insert the struggles of his personal life-story into his political strategy: You don’t understand my situation. I understand. You see me on TV. But you don’t know the me, that makes me, me. They wonder, why does Jesse run, because they see me running for the White House. They don’t see the house I’m running from. I have story…I was born to a teenage mother who was born to a teenage mother. I know abandonment and people being mean to you and saying you’re nothing and nobody…I wasn’t born with a silver spoon in my mouth. I had a shovel programmed for my hand.24

The narrative core here is a disadvantaged background and this constituted Jackson’s appeal and the events around which he pinpoints his narrative ascendency to becoming a national figure. However, the idea that one can strive in a somewhat idealistic  Boas Shamir, Michael B.  Arthur, Robert J.  House (1994). “The Rhetoric of Charismatic Leadership: A Theoretical Extension, A Case Study, and Implications for Research.” The Leadership Quarterly 5 (1): 25–42, p. 37. C/f. Ernest. R. House (1988). Jesse Jackson and the Politics of Charisma. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, p. 120. 22  Ibid. p. 32. 23  Ibid. p. 33. 24  Ibid. p. 35. 21

146

7  Authenticity as Life-Story

way for the collective good does not always sit well with individual voters and their pursuit of self-interest. Jackson vacillated between his specific appeal to marginal minorities and the attempt to bring the whole nation under one banner. This attempt to offer an all-inclusive panacea left the electorate uncertain as to the character they were identifying with and may have explained the victory of his opponent, the bland but more focused, pragmatic candidacy of Dukakis. Another example, described by Abraham Zaleznik, relates to Dwight Eisenhower. After World War 1, Eisenhower, a young army officer, felt unsatisfied with his career. He asked to be transferred to General Fox Connor in Panama but was turned down. Shortly after, Eisenhower was heart-broken when his first-born son died. The army later recanted and agreed to transfer Eisenhower. He finally met with General Connor and as a result of being mentored by him developed a similar father-son relationship to the one he had lost. The experience of being mentored and his subsequent command at Fort Leavenworth transformed his life and led to the self-belief necessary to reach the highest office in the land.25 This illustrates how one sees oneself and the way intended future goals will influence which events are chosen in life to be designated turning points. As this is a complex juggling exercise between choosing and evaluating past events and the need to decide the complexion of identity which most suits present needs, identity formation needs to be carefully managed and navigated. Narrative serves this purpose well, with the potential for alternating points-of-view, shifting narrator positions, and the revealing or disclosure of significant events. Not only do life-stories communicate the randomness of life but in keeping with authenticity also contain moral content. Alasdair Macintyre has no doubt about the moral imputation of life-stories: Mythology, in its original sense, is at the heart of things…And so too of course is that moral tradition from heroic society to its medieval heirs according to which the telling of stories has a key part in educating us into the virtues…all attempts to elucidate the notion of personal identity independently of and in isolation from the notions of narrative, intelligibility and accountability are bound to fail. As all such attempts have.26

The core of the narrative quest is the constant and continuous formulation and reformulation of life’s purpose and this embraces perspectives on what the good life can or should be. This is a quest intrinsic to individual life but also to the human condition in general, thus making it both personally ethical and socially moral. Rather than reflect transcendent ethical values, life-stories can articulate ethical values from within, ‘as a vector of an autopoietic unfolding of life encompassing the very logic of narrative development.’27 All of which grounds the ethical within the narrative process rather than in relation to external norms. As an activity, the good is itself a notion of quest and the questioning of what is the good can be explored and

 Abraham Zaleznik (1977). “Managers and Leaders. Are they different?” Harvard Business Review. May – Jun: 67–78, p. 76. 26  Alasdair MacIntyre (1984). After Virtue. University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 216, 218. 27  Julia Vassilieva (2016). Narrative Psychology. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 181. 25

Life-Stories

147

suggested through character in one’s life-story. Such an exploration makes the life-­ story a virtuous pursuit. When stories are extended to the social field, as they inevitably are, moral considerations follow. The question then becomes; not what is my story but what is our story? Drawing on Aristotle’s notions of muthos, imaginary stories, plot and mimesis, the representation of action always teaches something. One might object that the mix of fact and fiction in narration detracts from its moral impact in the absence of objectivity. On the other hand, its aesthetic component through characterisation, turning points, and temporal unfolding allows for thought experiments which present new ways to evaluate character and ethical behaviour. Ricoeur rejects any claims that literary narrative loses ethical determinations: The thought experiments we conduct in the great laboratory of the imaginary are also explorations in the realm of good and evil. Transvaluing, even devaluing, is still evaluating. Moral judgement has not been abolished; it is rather itself subjected to the imaginative variations proper to fiction…In narrativizing the aim of the true life, narrative identity gives it the recognizable features of characters loved or respected.28

Ricoeur insists that this meld of fact and fiction, where personal accounts may be the result of fictional spinning, has moral imputation. Actions are first neutrally ascribed to an agent but then explicitly given moral significance. Life-stories which configure these events and acts invite ‘accusation, excuse, acquittal, blame or praise’, in short moral appraisal in terms of the ‘good’ or the ‘just’.29 Appraisal is apposite here since onus shifts from self-judgement to evaluation from the outside input of another. In leadership terms, this is to work with follower and social approbation. This does not necessarily entail empathy from either party, something which is certainly present in virtue ethics. It does, however, involve interaction. Just as fictional narrative is a process of communication which includes writer, formal text and reader response, so life-story is a forum for exchange, the demonstration of text, self-portraiture, commitment, and tentative visions, all of which are offered up for interpretation, moral appraisal and mutual participation. Stories can relate tales and anecdotes of courage and sacrifice which illumine various virtuous acts. These can be worked on, extended and deepened by acts of imagination, or artistic poiesis which, inherent to the life-story, is a function of both revelation and transformation. For Ricoeur, it is the poetic imagination which fixes, coheres and travels through the different horizons of past, present and future.30 In this travel and excursion into potentially alien territory or reconfigured persona, the self’s construction of story finds a world already replete with stories and it is these which act as fodder for further embellishment. The fact that narrative imagination plays a part in life-stories helps complete them but also destabilises them. Narrative  Paul Ricoeur (1992). Oneself as Another. Kathleen Blamey (trans.) University of Chicago Press, pp. 164, 166. 29  Paul Ricoeur (1991). “Narrative Identity”, in On Paul Ricoeur. Narrative and Interpretation David Wood (ed.). Routledge. p.191. 30  Richard Kearney (1996). “Narrative Imagination”, in Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics of Action Richard Kearney (ed.) Sage Publications: 173–190, p. 181. 28

148

7  Authenticity as Life-Story

imagination creates narrative fluidity: ‘The recognition that self-identity presupposes narrative imagination requires…the corollary recognition that narrative identity is something which perpetually makes and unmakes itself.’31 The message is that if narrative imagination is given a free pass it can overstep the boundaries of probity. The countervailing force needed to reinstate ethics is the judgment of others and the realisation that life-story is not a whimsical or irresponsible exercise but a form of communication that rests on other shoulders, reliant on empathy and the anticipated reaction of followers. Ricoeur insists authenticity has the personal imprint of virtuous behaviour, an ethical notion of self-constancy which genuinely expresses trust and integrity: Self-constancy is for each person that manner of conducting himself or herself so that others can count on that person. Because someone is counting on me, I am accountable for my actions before another. The term ‘responsibility’ unites both meanings: ‘counting on’ and ‘being accountable for.32

If the leadership life-story route to identity is to be instructive and constructive it must be evaluated against the many models which can be utilised. Philosophy has fully explored the various models of narrative construction delineating an array of approaches from the traditional, representational form of an Aristotelean linear model to structuralism’s analysis of story, hermeneutic phenomenology, and the postmodern, anti-positivist, counter-narrative. In postmodern understanding, narratives are not neutrally proposed but are communicated as a part of power structures which determine both their sending and reception. The tension between presenting a life-story which is stable and the obvious need for change and flexibility is a challenging predicament, one which is difficult to surmount. Leader stereotypes abound, with admiration given to leaders who show strength in accord with the popular discourse of leadership, which asserts formulaic models to be followed. This is predominantly egocentric, self-determined, and a-priori based. Leaders, usually already in some position of authority, portray themselves through their life-stories as being worthy of the role and experienced in controlling and ordering a workforce. Consequently, the life-story then becomes ‘a construct designed to serve a particular purpose…one must construct oneself within existing frameworks of characterizations and narratives of leadership…The uniqueness of the one must give way to the universal in order to be recognizable.’33 Truth is not an objectively given touchstone but the result of procedures of production. Accordingly, power structures would seem to tilt in favour of the effective prominence of leader’s life-stories over that of followers. Postmodern narratologists show how individual narratives contain hegemonic storylines which ‘may reinforce prevailing stories and marginalize and suppress other voices.’34  Ibid. p. 183.  Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, p. 165. 33  Shaw, “Papering the Cracks with Discourse”, p. 101. 34  Ann L. Cunliffe, John T. Luhman and David M. Boje (2004). “Narrative Temporality: Implications for Organizational Research.” Organization Studies 25 (2): 261–286. P. 264. 31 32

Life-Stories

149

It can be argued that organizations predetermine employee roles, nowhere more salient than in rigid bureaucracy and tightly managed structures. This means narratives within such structures may be self-serving, ironing out discontinuities and filling in gaps for one’s own benefit. In a study of the Disney organization, David Boje discusses the way the collective story of Disney dominates individual efforts to express individuality and nullifies the opportunity to present counter-stories, which means deviance from the hegemonic norm is co-opted: Complicity arises when organizations (and subcultures) channel ambiguity, inconsistencies, dissensus, and differences outside their boundaries. This control over interpretive ambiguity is often manipulated to support the interests of management…Disney’s dialogues have become complicit in this way because Walt’s dominant interpretation of meaning is something that Disney people still find difficult to challenge…In the discipline of the storytelling organization, this system is reified and stands outside of the people who do the storytelling work…Walt’s official story and singular worldview dominate, socialize, and marginalize others’ experience.35

The critical function in postmodernism also questions such narrative. Foucault’s genealogical approach to narratives ‘strips away the veils that cover narrative practices’ in that they can ‘show how they have been mere discursive constructs of historical contingency.’36 The creation of anti-narratives is a contributory critical factor in challenging conditions suppressing authentic identity and the potential to form meaningful life-stories. With critique ingrained, anti-narrative helps question organizational power structures which manipulate race, class and gender by circumventing superficial categories intended to define those who fit in as insiders and marginalise all the rest as outsiders. Postmodern narrative emphasises the task is to read and unravel narratives as a reflexive undoing of their significance in an attempt to show how subjects search for recognition. Most importantly, attention is drawn to the teller, thereby fracturing group anonymity of a collective workforce and allowing individuals to surface in their uniqueness. At best, an affective bond is encouraged, an embodied moment of recognition between story-tellers. With such connection, divergent stories can be democratically offered without need for power subterfuge or covert strategies. Resistance to the controlling discourse emanates from organized pockets of intransigence: ‘Within every organization there is an uncolonised terrain, a terrain which is not and cannot be managed.’37 On the positive side, participating in the life-story of fellow members means an uplifting experience of sharing an emotional tone with the opportunity to become a

 David M.  Boje (1995). “Stories of the Storytelling Organization: A Postmodern Analysis of Disney as ‘Tamara-Land’.” The Academy of Management Journal 38 (4): 997–1035, pp. 1029, 1031. 36  Maria Tamboukou (2008). “A Foucauldian Approach to Narratives.” in Doing Narrative Research. Molly Andrews. Corinne Squire and Maria Tamboukou (eds.). Sage Publications, 88–107, p. 104. 37  Yiannis Gabriel (1995). “The Unmanaged Organization: Stories, Fantasies and Subjectivity.” Organization Studies16 (3): 477–501, p. 478. 35

150

7  Authenticity as Life-Story

‘fellow traveller’ by expanding and enriching its ‘disengaged, wish-fulfilling character’.38 Life-stories have a pivotal role to play in arguing for a middle ground between conformity and rebellion, and emotion over reason. Naturally, facts are incorporated into stories but more important is the spirit and theme of the narrative which can reveal far more than dry information. This has already been suggested by Walter Benjamin in his short essay, ‘The Storyteller’.39 Benjamin ‘is not concerned with facts-as-information but with facts-as-experience. The response invited by a story is then not to challenge ‘the facts’ but to engage with its meaning…it disengages the narrative from the fact in a similar way that a psychoanalytic approach to dreams disengages the text of a dream from the day’s residues.’40 One can dissect, explore and look for clues and signs within a story which reveal, at least, ‘its’ truth. By becoming a fellow-traveller one can also match stories, find similarities, and share an emotional roller coaster. By looking at the formal character of communicated life-stories as well as its particularised content both its critical and performative aspects come into play. When leaders welcome the stories of others as a guide to their self-image, or a platform for complaints presented in a palatable way, it smooths over the jagged edges of grievances without diluting their significance.

 Ibid. p. 481.  Walter Benjamin (1936/1992). Harry Zohn (trans.) Hannah Arendt (ed.) “The Storyteller” in Illuminations. Fontana Press. 83–107. 40  Gabriel, “The Unmanaged Organization” pp. 480–481. 38 39

Chapter 8

The Narrative Turn and Multiple Selves

Abstract  The postmodern approach argues traditional narratives too easily become part of the power structures which determine both their sending and reception. This suspicion of life-stories considers them a construct designed to justify power, the dominance of leadership over followers, and a way to marginalise voices of protest. Moreover, Galen Strawson doubts that identity can rely on the narrative act to form a competent persona. Life-stories need elements of discontinuity, disjuncture, and non-linearity. There are also psychoanalytic reservations. Jacques Lacan objects to the closure and linearity of classical narrative as an illusion which camouflages insatiable driving forces of life which can never be satisfied. However, critique that a unified narrative frame fails to pay due diligence to life’s unexpected divergences is exactly what postmodern narrative addresses. The postmodern approach sees opportunities to enrich life-story experience with creative explorations of how life-­ story communication can be a practical, reflexive, enjoyable process. It employs unconventional time forms, aporias, and disruptions to allude to prevailing systems of dominance. This is not to eliminate traditional narrative forms, indeed, narrative intelligence helps to choose which form is the most effective version for conveying authenticity in a particular situation. As Judith Butler puts it, life-story is an emergent process which allows narratives to be part of an interactive performance. Story-­ telling takes on different perspectives as related by multiple selves, in different situations, in localised situations. This calls for smaller, mini-narratives which focus on localised events and utterances between leader, follower and associates. Keywords  Postmodern narrative · Strawson · Sartre · Non-linearity · Lacan · Narrative intelligence · Performance · Judith Butler · Mini-narratives

Forming Identity It should not be assumed all theorists agree life-story narration is the key to identity formation and its effective communication to others. The fact is life-stories can be construed as a premeditated strategy to achieve personal ends and this arouses © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Shaw, The Philosophy of Authentic Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29650-5_8

151

152

8  The Narrative Turn and Multiple Selves

suspicion. Moreover, various critiques have been levelled against the efficacy of life-­story narration. Crispin Sartwell finds traditional narrative depicts the eclipse of freedom as the sign-world takes over, everyone knuckles under to the regime of signs. The individual subject is liquidated within roles as it splits itself in a kind of narrative regime: ‘By making narrative into a transcendental category, one short-­ circuits the possibility of zones of resistance…One feature of a narrative mode of life is that it divides the self into speaker and listener, master and slave.’1 Galen Strawson questions whether identity can best be formed through the temporal configuration of classical narration, doubting that identity is reliant on the narrative act to form a competent persona. He also questions the ethical import of storytelling which equates life-story with the ethical life as a way of fulfilling the demands to become a virtuous character.2 For Strawson, there are many non-narrative ways to form identity and communicate this to others. One objection raised is that temporal experience is unrealistically ironed out to remove the creases of disjuncture and non-linearity when a more authentic picture would be to include discontinuities in different phases of an individual’s life. The preference would be to describe a non-coherent unity or an episodic personality in existentialist fashion whereby past and future are not rejected but revolve around the present in an intricate web which contributes to a zero point of perception. The point is that consciousness is existentially related to self-­presence, and the certainty of self-immanence has immediate resonance with the now of time. In addition, there is a sense that if one follows the contours of a created life-story one lives life according to a prefabricated model. A leader who projects identity through life-story accounts will lead life, make decisions, and project personality guided by the storied world. This may give a meaningful structure to decision-­ making and ease communicating with fellow associates but the danger for Strawson is that one is most concerned with following premises within the narrated frame. This can become burdensome, a restriction imposed by a unified construction on life which limits freedom of thought and movement by failing to pay due diligence to emergence and sudden divergences. Such criticism threatens to make the traditional storied frame redundant, ‘the narrative tendency to look for story or narrative coherence in one’s life is, in general, a gross hindrance to self-understanding…the more you recall, retell, narrate yourself, the further you risk moving away from accurate self-understanding, from the truth of your being.’3 Strawson concludes citing short-story writer, V.S. Pritchett: ‘We live beyond any tale that we happen to enact.’4 Similar narrative reservations can be found in the works of Sartre. For Sartre, to project a life totality as a unified identity is meaningless. Authenticity can only be lived as it is taken, not based on a model horizon. Through the character of Antoine Roquentin in his novel, ‘Nausea’

 Crispin Sartwell (2000). End of Story. Albany: US. SUNY Press. pp. 47, 56.  Galen Strawson (2004). “Against Narrativity.” Ratio. 17 (4): 428–452. 3  Ibid. p. 447. 4  Ibid. p. 450. C/f. V.S. Pritchett (1979) The Myth Makers. Random House. p. 47. 1 2

Forming Identity

153

(1938), Sartre argues that though human life can be presented in the form of narrative, there is nothing good about doing so as it is a falsification.5 Early in ‘Nausea’, Roquentin voices the view: everything changes when you tell people about life; it’s a change no one notices: the proof is that people talk about true stories. As if there could possibly be true stories…I wanted the moments of my life to follow and order themselves like those of a life remembered. You might as well try and catch time by the tail.6

MacIntyre considers Sartre’s position to be a prime example of anti-narrative thinking: ‘Sartre makes Antoine Roquentin argue not just…that narrative is very different from life, but that to present human life in the form of a narrative is always to falsify it’.7 There are also psychoanalytic reservations. As Jacques Lacan’s emphasis on language and words explains, the classical form of narrative encourages comprehension through linear connections of events and recognisable characterisation. It usually has teleology and closure. Lacan describes this as an imaginary condition. The condition of wholeness and satisfaction is an illusion designed to cover over perpetual, unconscious, insatiable driving forces which insist on an essential lack of subjectivity. The imaginary casts doubt upon the independent, autonomous nature of identity construction since part of self-construction is so influenced by the symbolic and external forces.8 Life-stories can be considered ephemeral on a personal level because they are always trying to placate a desire which can never be satisfied, an unfillable lack. There is no guarantee of definitive meaning. The disruption of the imaginary is acknowledged as a stop-gap in the futile pursuit of wholeness. All of the above may contain elements of truth; there may well be a tendency for narratives to overpower subjects like normalizing machines which dampen the ability to experience the fullness of the moment. However, this cannot be taken as an outright rejection of narration per se but more specifically a critique of the limitations of traditional narrative. From a Lacanian perspective, the difficulties in establishing clear identity through storytelling does not lead to deadlock but a form of pleasure, ‘in the sense that we come closest to feeling intensely alive, to an experience of who we are as subjects and to being at our most creative and powerful….’9 In other words, the struggle to overcome fragmentation encourages autonomous scrutiny and exploration of how life-story identity can be a workable, enjoyable process without necessarily solving the illusions created by the imaginary.  Jean-Paul Sartre (1938/1964) Nausea. Robert Lloyd Alexander (trans.) New  York: New Directions. 6  Sartre, Nausea, pp.  39–40. C/f. Ben Roth (2015). “How Sartre, Philosopher, Misreads Sartre, Novelist: Nausea and the Adventures of the Narrative Self.” in Narrative, Philosophy and Life. Boston Studies in Philosophy, Religion and Public Life 2. Allen Speight (ed.) Springer Dordrecht 81–102, p. 82. 7  Alasdair MacIntyre (1984). After Virtue. University of Notre Dame Press, p. 214. 8  Jacques Lacan. (1988) The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II: The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis 1954–1955. New York, NY: Norton. 9  Michaela Driver (2009). “Struggling with Lack: A Lacanian Perspective on Organizational Identity”. Organization Studies 30 (1): 55–72, p. 56. 5

154

8  The Narrative Turn and Multiple Selves

Furthermore, Sartre’s phenomenologically oriented emphasis on existence, with sensations which sustain the vividness of the moment, is ripe for narrative inclusion though not in terms of traditional, narrative closure. Rather, his descriptions favour unconventional time forms, aporias, and the desire to disrupt prevailing systems of dominance. What is being argued here is not condemnation of life-story ­significance in formulating identity but the form of narrative that is used to enact it. Indeed, Sartre’s stance should not necessarily be taken to be identical to the views voiced by his characters but seem to be more of a disquisition and examination of pertinent issues.10 Consequently, it is important to broaden the narrative scope and include the narrative turn of postmodernism, which injects fresh form into life-story, not to exclude traditional forms but allow for the best of narrative options to come into play. Narrative forms retain their pragmatic efficacy for projecting identity and allowing others the opportunity to judge leadership ethos; story-telling is upheld as something to be lived by. It still provides the prospective stance of conjecture suggesting how self-narrative will come to unfold and what others can expect from leaders in the future. Life-stories are still accepted as ways of constituting the self. However, the cohesive, well rounded life-story appears inadequate to deal with postmodern suspicion of dominant discourse, technological instrumentality, and endless consumerism. There is outright rejection of life-story placed in the lifeworld which serve personal agenda designed to impress or meet stereotypical formulae. The requirement is to make contextual judgment decide what form of story is appropriate. Narrative intelligence helps to choose between traditional or postmodern forms and find the most effective version for evaluating and shaping fragments of a life, Our storied space does not mirror a world ‘out there’. Instead it comprises a ‘space’ of location, time and thoughts, existing between the words we utter…Rather than our storied space being some static, temporal or physical space that exits externally to us and that we somehow tap into, our consciousness creates it and emerges into it as we make sense of the ever-­ unfolding present.11

The mediation of life-story is essentially a coming-together of minds, a possible joy ride of excavation, a messy, magical mystery tour of space and time. On the one hand, narrators employ foreshadowing, predicted events of the future which act as an omen to development with ineluctable outcomes. No doubt this is a highly effective way of drawing and leading followers into the tellers intended progress of life, but it also restricts imaginative forays and follower input. Sideshadowing, on the other hand, which casts sidelong shadows of possibilities, encourages multiple choices, openness, and conditional state of affairs; what might-be, or could have been. In general, performances are encouraged to express a questioning, searching,

 Roth, “How Sartre, Philosopher, Misreads Sartre, Novelist.” pp. 82, 83.  Greg Morgan (2019) Rewriting Leadership with Narrative Intelligence. Emerald Publishing Limited, p. 48. 10 11

Forming Identity

155

and exploratory identity.12 This particularly lends itself to the dialogic mode of presentation, where identity is constitutive, formed from the cross-currents of dialogue and interaction. Each interaction and diverse utterances reflect local situations and spatial contexts as particularised by individual identities. As Bakhtin puts it, languages of heteroglossia ‘whatever the principle underlying them and making each unique, are specific points of view on the world, forms for conceptualizing the world in words, specific world views, each characterised by its own objects, meanings and values.’13 Bakhtin’s open narrative and stories support multiple ‘I’ positions. His description of the polyphonic novel is ‘a novel where different voices, often of a markedly different character and representing a multiplicity of relatively independent worlds, interact to create a self-narrative.’14 As an example, the polyphonic novels of Dostoevsky convey a plurality of consciousness with a corresponding plurality of worlds. The dialogical self is a ‘multiplicity of relatively autonomous ‘I’ positions in an imaginal landscape.’15 Several voices are present within one person in a network arrangement in mutual dialogue without any one voice dominant: ‘The metaphor of the polyphonic novel implies that there are more than one ‘I’ positions and that each position represents a voice telling its own story in terms of an organized system of valuations.’16 The message to be taken from narrative critique and application of postmodernist thought to life-story is there needs to be an adjustment to identity analysis. This is to acknowledge that radically different selves appear which cannot be contained or incorporated into classical narrative. As a result versatility in performance of story is needed to stamp individual personality in the common world. For Hannah Arendt, the common world is replete with the common interests of groups or organizations. It is characterised by diversity and sameness, a shared world of separate perspectives, being-seen and being-heard by others as performances which express the freedom to create within localised interaction. In the common world, personal stories overwrite, resist, even nullify already given stories which are imposed on ideologically positioned subjects. Rather than roles being subsumed to prevailing discourse they enter into a freer, unstable state of becoming, with the flexibility of transient identities and possible selves.17 Life-story presentation expands and adapts an amorphous self which matches local identification to build rapport with others: ‘Individuals changed their personality and character traits according to the groups they felt they belonged to, such as fellow workers, optimists or pessimists, and even according to the appearance of

 Gary Saul Morson (1994). Narrative Freedom: The Shadows of Time. Yale University Press.  Mikhail. M.  Bakhtin (1975/2008). The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays Michael Holquist (ed.) Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (trans.) University of Texas Press, pp. 291–292. 14  Hubert J. M. Hermans. Trlx I. Rljks. Hany J. G. Kempen (1993). “Imaginal Dialogues in the Self: Theory and Method.” Journal of Personality 61 (2): 207–236, p. 208. 15  Ibid. p. 215. 16  Ibid. p. 220. 17  Hannah Arendt (1958). The Human Condition. University of Chicago Press. 12 13

156

8  The Narrative Turn and Multiple Selves

others, where the behaviour of others was enough to inspire self-change.’18 The narrative turn of postmodernism promotes life-stories with an edge, a way of supporting the suspicion of absolute truths and neatly defined identities in favour of resistance and multiplicity. Each story can be taken on its own terms as an ­individualised vision irrespective of transcendental truth content. By only utilising authenticity’s positive psychology and ignoring the angst of existentialism there is a risk of eliding tensions in materiality and embodiment which can richly occupy the storied world of existential action. Life-stories now accept complexity as experienced in flux and constant change, utilising presentation which includes incoherence, discontinuity, simultaneity, ellipses, openness and ambiguity. Although ambiguity is confusing and irresolute, ‘theorists find it casts doubt on common claims that powerful stories are simple and concrete with a necessary coherence to impart a convincing identity. Instead, stories may be powerful insofar as they seem to hang together while pointing in quite different normative directions.’19 The show of continuity and coherence in classical narrative is replaced by poststructural positions which readily accept the divergent and unexpected. In the latter case, indiscernibility is the watchword, accompanied by qualitative shifts, multiplicity and change, making narrative a key component in the ‘process of transformation…and thus makes possible the use of narrative as a means and a tool of psychological change and development.’20 Eric Eisenberg’s finds that ambiguity, especially in organizations, can further interpersonal relationships. Elements of uncertainty are no hindrance for others to share. The inability to establish completion or definitive meaning leaves interpretation open to all parties, implying that an ambiguous life-story encourages involvement, interaction, and the cultivation of creative ideas.21 Those who argue in favour of multiple and possible selves argue it is a boon to personality development and should readily be conveyed through life-stories: ‘To suggest that there is a single self to which one can be true, or an authentic self that one can know is to deny the rich network of potential that surrounds individuals and that is important in identifying and descriptive of them’22 The ability to form possible selves and imbibe multifarious influences invites variegated life-stories and labile identities. The more focus placed on alternative self-views the greater confidence an individual will have that the self can be channeled to meet extant conditions. For leaders, it communicates to followers a sense of transparency and flexibility which widens their appeal. It is unlikely that others believe a totally other 18  Kenneth Gergen (1996). “The Healthy, Happy Human Being Wears Many Masks.” The Fontana Postmodernism Reader. Walter Truett Anderson (ed.). Fontana Press. 132–146, p. 137. 19  Francesca Polletta, Pang Ching Bobby Chen, Beth Gharrity Gardner and Alice Motes. (2011). “The Sociology of Storytelling.” Annual Review of Sociology 37: 109–130, p. 122. 20  Julia Vassilieva (2016). Narrative Psychology, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 121. 21  Eric Eisenberg (2006). Strategic Ambiguities. Essays on Communication, Organization and Identity. Sage Publications. 22  Hazel Markus and Paula Nurius (1986). “Possible Selves” American Psychologist 41 (9): 954–969, p. 965.

Forming Identity

157

character has come on the scene; the notion of a continuous self will not disappear. But such stories provide the latitude to support an array of emergent profiles needed to cope with a fickle and demanding public. In phenomenological terms, Alfred Schutz insists that multiplicity is an integral part of life and that multiple realities naturally demand multiple perspectives. This is to be regarded in a positive vein creating a liberating effect on authenticity: ‘There are many realities each with their own characterizations, expectations and expected ways of behaving.’23 The world we come into comprises the stock of all experience into which we are born. Life-stories maintain the lived flow of inner-time consciousness rather than piecemeal events. Multiple realities may diminish the homunculus of autonomy but they still retain a sense of inner flow. Realities experienced by possible selves are believed in at the time otherwise they turn out unconvincing and ineffective. Schutz explains each story of the self is part of reality for the duration it is experienced, this includes fictional stories which should not be interpreted through the lens of everyday life but nonetheless contain important insight. The point is that leaders will want to communicate a particular identity, at a particular time, in a particular situation. This is an ongoing process of formation, interaction and signalling. The self is conceptualised ‘in terms of a dynamic multiplicity of relatively autonomous I-positions…The I fluctuates among different and even opposed positions, and has the capacity imaginatively to endow each position with a voice so that dialogical relations between positions can be established.’24 As different voices, these characters exchange information about their respective self, resulting in a complex, narratively structured identity. Hubert Hermans concludes that both self and culture are dynamic systems in a field of tension between unity and multiplicity. The different views on the effect of multiple selves encompass the larger, postmodern discussion that has taken place on subjectivity and the frail basis for autonomous agency. On the positive side, the real self becomes a pliable concept as it navigates life through media influence, and speed of the contemporary, commercial world. On the negative side, however, the impression is that the various roles individuals must adopt to function in the social dispersion of the modern world is itself a sign of identity dissolution. The prevalence of consumption activity, and concomitant varieties of self-construction needed to cope, result in an addictive reliance on materialism and image-making. The result is an abundant production of possible selves, so instead of being content within one self and its inner core there is a neurotic desire to keep up with fleeting and illusionary demands to produce multiple substitutions. It is unclear whether multiple selves as opposed to a solid single identity is more desirable or effective as communication material but there is no denying the dispersion of self has many advantages; it more smoothly adapts to social challenges,  Alfred Schutz (1962/1990). Collected Papers 1. The Problem of Social Reality. Maurice Natanson (ed.). Kluwer Academic Publishers, p. 230. 24  Hubert J.M. Hermans (2001) “The Dialogical Self: Toward a Theory of Personal and Cultural Positioning.” Culture and Psychology 7 (3): 243–281. p. 248. 23

158

8  The Narrative Turn and Multiple Selves

singular forms of relationships, and the thrill of newly opened vistas. What Kenneth Gergen describes as the populating of the self, the acquisition of multiple and disparate potentials for being, is an enrichment rather than diminution of life experience. His view on the versatile, multiple self is one of ‘guarded but excited optimism.’25 Possible selves are a projected way of filling in the discrepancies between the kind of person one is, and the kind of person one wants to be, or feels one should be. It plays on the duality of is and ought which makes multiple selves an appealing concept. Possible selves provide direction for decision-making and help direct individuals away from options they think themselves unsuited for: ‘As long as a person is aware of the reality he or she buys into…I would argue that this awareness provides a sense of freedom (I am forgoing a different reality) and responsibility (it is my reality) that promotes authenticity.’26 In accepting the broad repertoire of possible selves which explore ‘enduring goals, aspirations, motives, fears and threats’27 there is still a challenge to uphold authenticity’s need for accountability. If, as some postmodernists claim, there is only difference and lack of self how can this be related to the ethical requirements of authentic leadership? Taking multiple selves at face value, a promise made by an individual five years ago would be irrelevant if claimed years later that it was made by a wholly other self. There would be no accountability. As representations of the self may be different in the past or reconfigured in the future, they may appear detached from the present self. With no one single self but only multiplicity, which of the selves does authenticity then refer to? The authentic response to this would be that the moral component of authenticity takes place ‘in time’, both in the sense of the opportune moment as well as being in the present of action. As a project in time, authenticity is an achievement in the present rather than a past where it was still being formed. In other words, presence in the present counts as something belonging to the emergent self, whoever and whichever of the selves may be current. In this way, moral accountability can never be flippantly ignored; it is always permanently affixed to self, a self which is judged to materialise in the immediate performance of expression. Put another way, there is always accountability, and for Macintyre this is above all due to being able to locate the self in its unique singularity as spatio-temporal embodiment. The fact that reconfiguration leads to another version of the self is not a sign of contingent confusion but indicative of an essential narrative understanding: various selves are manifested through narratives because all subjects are part of an authentic quest: the quest for multifaceted well-being, which includes moral probity. This quest is articulated from the collection of personal self-conceptualizations which are inherently moral, directed at the inseparable union between society and authentic individuals. The roles everyone plays in different areas of the lifeworld

 Kenneth J. Gergen (2000) The Saturated Self. Basic Books, pp. x–xi.  Michael H. Kernis (2003). “Towards a Conceptualization of Optimal Self-Esteem.” Psychological Inquiry 14 (1): 1–26, p. 15. 27  Markus and Nurius, “Possible Selves” p. 954. 25 26

Forming Identity

159

naturally demand different skills and dispositions, and the life-stories which relate to these roles stretch out as antennae to a complex network of moral duties: We all approach our own circumstances as bearers of a particular social identity. I am someone’s son or daughter, someone else’s cousin or uncle; 1 am a citizen of this or that city, a member of this or that guild or profession; I belong to this clan, that tribe, this nation. Hence what is good for me has to be the good for one who inhabits these roles. As such, I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point. This is in part what gives my life its own moral particularity.28

Stories are essentially constructed for a purpose, not only to transmit a sense of authentic identity but to be performed to fit a particular circumstance: It is now commonly acknowledged that the construction of identity, gender, and social reality more generally have a performative dimension…We can perform narratives in the sense of playing certain roles in different social situations, aiming at a certain narrative sequence.29

The performance of life-stories simplifies what is complex, embellishes experience into a pleasing or admirable picture of self-identity and, for leaders, serves as an appealing way of getting followers to accept an authentic, proffered vision. The wide variety of narrative types is testament to the fact that leaders and followers alike construct identity in the face of dominant discourses and defer stereotypical formulae. Rather than perpetuating self-sealed stories with reluctance to change, performative acts of recognizing the stories of all relevant actors produce an openly receptive, shared narrative community. This is polyphony, competing narrative voices and stories told within many relational contexts. The upshot is shared meaning ‘maintained through enacted narratives: rhetorical strategies, responsive dialogue, and oral and written speech genres.’30 Within multiple discursive fields, stories can be taken independently, or as intermingling discourses on a platform which enables authentic leadership to find expression in a dynamic, performative environment. The focus is on the social construction of identity and the strategies leaders use to increase their repertoire for effectuating a successful relationship with followers. Evidently, the formation of life-stories does not arise without accompanying baggage in the form of dominant discourses or conflicting life-stories from other parties. It is essential, therefore, to maintain the capacity to create alternative narratives for all those involved. The use of traditional narrative messaging carries out the task of projecting a preoccupation with order and security, a natural enough tendency, but this can be self-defeating. The more order is protected the less prepared one is for change. As Sartre and other existentialists maintain, anxiety and uncertainty cannot be dismissed and this is precisely what postmodern narratives take into account. Inevitably, leadership development concerns itself with all manner of  Alasdair MacIntyre (1984). After Virtue. University of Notre Dame Press, p. 220.  Hanna Meretoja (2018) The Ethics of Storytelling. Oxford University Press, p. 72. 30  Ann L. Cunliffe, John T. Luhman and David M. Boje (2004). “Narrative Temporality: Implications for Organizational Research.” Organization Studies 25 (2): 261–286, p. 278. 28 29

160

8  The Narrative Turn and Multiple Selves

multiple discursive fields which potentially offer conflicting life-stories and extraneous pressures to surprise and contradict the leader’s own. The narrative turn helps recognize the importance of flexibility, the use of a playful, testing, polyphronic dialogue to cope with ‘multiple, gendered selves in workplace relations, characterized by ambiguity, paradox and power relations.’31 Throughout activities within narrative communities there is no authoritarian posing, nor leader imposition of the will to power. There are rather messages, explorations, and stories which act as a catalyst for a shared community, part of Arendt’s common ground. It allows followers to contribute as much as leaders to future directions and projects, bringing out latent wishes which may previously have been subdued. Conversely, leaders need to recognise the kind of stories fellow workers believe they can be a part of. Reliance on performative story-telling in the moment weakens Strawson’s argument that narrative increases the likelihood of failing to appreciate the vitality of living in the ‘now’ and shuts off the multitude of sensations which mark life’s transformative potential. Instead, the immediacy of performance through dialogue and body alleviates these concerns. Performance covers a wide spectrum of activity with implications for life-­stories. Judith Butler argues subjectivity is the result of a process of social recognition with emphasis placed on activity; performing life-story is one such activity which draws from others interpretations and reactions, it is this which goes on to produce a subjective standpoint: Giving an account thus takes a narrative form, which not only depends upon the ability to relay a set of sequential events with plausible transitions but also draws upon narrative voice and authority, being directed toward an audience with the aim of persuasion.32

It is true that the experiencing of live, social performance by others, such as those who are members of an organization, is initially and unavoidably coloured by norms and prevailing discourse: ‘Subjectivity is effectively the outcome of a process of social organization through which certain performative acts come to be recognized as viable subject positions, while others are disavowed.’33 Nonetheless, performativity survives to overcome generality and speak for the individual as it communicates identity through a live process of exchange, embodied moments of reaction, and recognition of each other’s life-story: ‘In the very performativity of subjectivity lies our capacity to reflexively undo its constraining effects, opening up the possibility of reinstating alternative performances that potentially challenge subjective normativity.’34  Carroll, Brigid and Levy, Lester (2010). “Leadership Development as Identity Construction.” Management Communication Quarterly 24 (2): 211–231, p. 226. C/f. David L. Collinson. (2003). “Identities and Insecurities: Selves at Work.” Organization 10 (3): 527–547, p. 534. 32  Judith Butler (2005). Giving an Account of Oneself. New York: Fordham University Press, p. 12. C/f. Kathleen Riach. Nick Rumens. Melissa Tyler (2016). “Towards a Butlerian Methodology: Undoing Organizational Performativity through Anti-narrative Research.” Human Relations 69 (11): 2069–2089, p. 2076. 33  Riach et al., “Towards a Butlerian Methodology”, p. 2074. 34  Ibid. p. 2075. 31

Forming Identity

161

The performance of life-story reverts back to literary roots and with it connection to the aesthetic experience. Foucault has already insisted life is held to be a personal work of art, ‘from the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art…we should relate the kind of relation one has to oneself to a creative activity.’35 With components which include dramatic turning points and imposing imagery, life-stories are open to the same aesthetic evaluation as applied to any artistic experience. This means considering the resonance created between storyteller and recipients in an aesthetic field environment. There is intense exchange through aesthetic consciousness which takes place in the communion of minds aesthetically sharing a common experience. The link between dialogue exchange and its mediation through life-story is affect. Narration is not the dry exchange of information and data but a storied world of drama and imagination based on truth, half-truths, and sometimes fantasy. The extent of its influence will depend on the credible ethos and emotional pathos of the presenter: Social and organizational life emerges in our moment-to-moment, relationally responsive, talk-entwined activities, specifically, in oral encounters and reciprocal speech…narratives take place in many discursive times and contexts in which we improvise, respond, draw on past narratives, and create new ones.36

Storytellers take on the social masks individuals feel appropriate to fit into their ongoing construction of self, others and society. The more aesthetically crafted the story, the more likely it will be considered authentic as its impression can move an audience. As an experience which is pursued for its own pleasurable sake connections are deepened to maximise empathy and mutual understanding.37 In sum, powerful, aesthetic stories are especially effective because they communicate and persuade on both rational and emotional levels in an aesthetic of ‘felt meaning.’38 The performative domain of interrelationships manifests identity as a mode of responding to and cajoling others. Multiple selves and the fracture of universal types help convey leader singularity by rooting it in the materiality of embodied experience. The outcome is a proliferation of perspectives, multiple, juxtaposed viewpoints which call for a more nuanced approach to life-stories. This is supported by the positioning of the ‘smaller stories’ of everyday life: We need to shift away from talk of lives as wholes to a consideration of our grasp of the narrative contours of particular moments. Only in exceptional circumstances (near-death

 Michel Foucault (1983/1997) “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of a Work in Progress” in Paul Rabinow (ed.) Robert Hurley and others (trans.) Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984. The New Press, 253–280, p. 262. 36  Cunliffe et al., “Narrative Temporality: Implications for Organizational Research.” p. 264. 37  Steven S. Taylor. Dalmar Fisher and Ronald L. Dufresne (2002). “The Aesthetics of Management Storytelling. A Key to Organizational Learning.” Management Learning 33 (3): 313–330, p. 316. 38  Ibid. p. 315. 35

162

8  The Narrative Turn and Multiple Selves

experiences, the writing of autobiography, truly off-putting self-indulgence) do most of us probably cast an eye over the shape of our entire lives.39

In localised experience, the performance of mini-narratives or small-stories becomes as significant for authenticity as the more comprehensive life-story or grand narrative. Rather than sweeping vistas of lifelong ambitions and well-rounded, wholesome personalities, the focus is on local forms of dialogues and utterances between leader, follower and associates. Michael Bamberg borrows from the structural, linguistic distinction between paradigm and syntagm in his small stories description. The big story and grand narratives place identity in a world of values, custom and ideologically prescribed roles. But small stories are locally occasioned syntagms; embodied performances which occupy everyday life extrapolated from paradigms. These mini-narratives are an alternative approach to big story narrative research that takes narratives-in-interaction, the way stories surface in everyday conversation (small stories), as the locus where identities are continuously practiced and tested out. This approach allows us to explore self at the level of the talked-about and at the level of tellership in the here-and-now of a story-telling situation.40

The context-sensitive experience makes story telling instrumental in establishing situational identity when life events come-into-being. Small stories may seem inchoate and incidental when compared to the more commonly understood traditional narrative. However, in keeping with the postmodern narrative turn emphasis is not placed on the stories representational plot valued by classical form, nor totally assimilated and absorbed into a broader, ideological landscape. Rather, they are fragmented, functional and performative, a genuine contribution to interactivity and leader-follower exchange.41 Small stories provide a forum to air those unresolved life events which cannot be assimilated into broader narratives by grounding story in the practicalities of life experiences within the sense of lived time. They have a wide appeal and cover a broad canvass of interest. The activity is one of interfacing narrative, a form of narrative transaction where narrative communication is firmly planted within the complex of language, behaviour and interrelationship: ‘Almost any verbal utterance will be laced with more or less minimal narratives, ranging from fragmentary reports and abortive anecdotes to those more distinctly framed and conventionally marked tellings that we are inclined to call ‘tales’ or ‘stories’.’42 The spontaneity of making meaning, and awareness of narrative performance in context, result in the expression of many different voices,

 Roth “How Sartre, Philosopher, Misreads Sartre, Novelist” pp. 96–97.  Michael Bamberg (2011). “Who am I? Narration and its Contribution to Self and Identity.” Theory & Psychology 21(1): 3–24, p. 15. 41  Michael Bamberg and Alexandra Georgakopoulou (2008). “Small stories as a new perspective in narrative and identity analysis.” Text & Talk 28 (3): 377–396, p. 382. 42  Barbara Harrison Smith (1980). “Narrative Versions. Narrative Theories.” Critical Inquiry 7 (1): 213–236, p. 232. 39 40

Forming Identity

163

encouraging the singularity and uniqueness of individuals marked by freedom of expression often lacking in more planned, elaborate forms. As expressed through the contingent demands of situated dialogues, small stories channel the fragmented self and plethora of role-playing. Montaigne describes how he views this mosaic of identity: We are all framed of flaps and patches, and of so shapeless and diverse contexture, that every piece, and every moment plays its part. And there is as much difference found between us and ourselves, as there is between ourselves and others.43

This underlines the shift from an autonomous production of self-certainty and relative completion to stories which are fragmented, polyvocal, and immersed in the heat of the present. There is reliance on the presence of others, a multitude of spectator and storyteller to comprise an interactive community. With situated stories there is a form of cross-fertilization, narrative creation which is reciprocally co-­ created with the help of the other. The existential gaze of the other affirms the self, not objectifying it by causing Sartrean alarm but affirming it and completing it via the weave of narrative participation. This fits well with the notion of authenticity as co-produced narration where there is constant creation through freely entered intersubjective opinion and debate built upon a foundation of autonomy. The difference between traditional narrative and the mini-story is its dynamic unfolding. Considered from an aesthetic viewpoint, the author may well know the final end point or denouement of the narration, at least if it is formally constructed. The story-in-action, however, emphasises dependence on circumstance, spontaneity, improvisation, and co-production all of which escape predictability. An isolated gesture, comment or reaction, no matter how small, may be significant enough to change the texture and essence of the performance. Localised interaction demotes the auteur authority of the composer to allow for fluctuation and spontaneous contribution from many other parties. Thought and judgment come together as co-­ produced but never completed, always vitalised and unpacked by multiplicity and diverse accounts which realise myriad facets of being. With this bond of shared and co-produced experience inevitably arise ethical ramifications. The power of judgment rests on a potential agreement with others, and the thinking process which is active in judging something is not like the thought process of pure reasoning, a dialogue between me and myself…It needs the special presence of others ‘in whose place’ it must think, whose perspectives it must take into consideration, and without whom it never has the opportunity to operate at all.44

Dependency on the action and reaction of others for completion echoes Arendt’s notion of the daimon. This is an argument that identity formation takes place in the social arena where it is the other who ratifies identity through dialogue, story and embodiment. No matter the effort, authentic leaders will be unable to escape the daimon or limit the power of disclosure others possess. Arendt helps us make the  M. de. Montaigne (1603). The Essays: Or morall, politike and millitarie discourses. J. Florio (trans.) London. Blount. 196–197, C/f. Hermans, “The Dialogical Self”, p. 276. 44  Hannah Arendt (1977). The Crisis of Culture, in Between Past and Future. Penguin. pp. 220, 221. 43

164

8  The Narrative Turn and Multiple Selves

case that authentic leadership cannot be sustained if there is division between inner and outer selves. Rather, immanence allows the daimon to accompany every person throughout life, a force most apparent only to others: The ‘who’, which appears so clearly and unmistakably to others, remains hidden from the person himself, like the daimon in Greek religion which accompanies each man throughout his life, always looking over his shoulder from behind and thus visible only to those he encounters.45

The richness through reciprocal exchange, live debate, and voice of the other become the authentic scene, the place in which life-story is a half-way house between aspiration to artistic creation, a substantial work in its own right to be appreciated and evaluated, and a transient dwelling which reconfigures according to exigency and circumstance. Life-stories create common ground as a conduit, a sphere of exploration comprising the familiar and the strange, the challenge of adventure and the venture of chance. They employ the familiar patterning of narrative only to particularize it and transform it into a unique, personal experience which leads to individual leader and follower goal-orientations. As life-stories are expounded, so morality is explained, and acts justified to others within moral discourse and performative expression. Narrativity is unquestionably a key activity in developing a full account of authenticity and what one morally supports. If identity and life-story fail to gel, the feeling of unease may well be due to questionable ethical roots. For both leader and follower, for turning points to result in self-transformation, conscience examination and self-appraisal are in order. To achieve a broader personal vision, social and cultural constraints will need to be re-examined in a state of openness, transparency, even vulnerability. Jason Hill reminds us that to sustain any notion of multiple self or democratic interaction in performing narratives, it is necessary to discard the mould of external imprinting from pre-given ethnic and racial stereotypes and with the help of moral imagination strive towards a state of self-­ transformative becoming.46 Only then can the horizons produced by imaginative consciousness come into play. The implication is that life-story narration is an exercise in personal liberation by opposing racial or ethnic dictates which only calcifies change. If autonomy and self-legislation is elided, leaders in particular will not grow, they will remain static, intransigent, dangerously acquiescent and compliantly acceptant of the status quo: A static standpoint is the posture of a self that convinces itself of its developmental completion, including its moral completion. This self refuses any type of modification, amplification, or meaningful metamorphosis in the face of unfamiliar experiences.47

Leadership life-stories invite possible selves and fresh perspectives when circumstances arise which call for changing life schemes and concomitant stories to  Arendt, The Human Condition, pp. 179–180.  Jason. D. Hill (2011). Becoming a Cosmopolitan: What it Means to be a Human Being in the New Millennium. Rowman and Littlefield Inc. 47  Ibid. p. 21. 45 46

Forming Identity

165

express this. In the postmodern era the various questions posed to the narrative act lead to an acceptance of variety and ambiguity. This confirms authentic leaders have to hone their ability to cope with situation complexity and hybrid groupings of followers and associates. It puts into perspective the latitude existing within narrative to explore a variety of identities and possible selves by exposing the fluid, multi-­ dimensional character of the modern self.

Chapter 9

Creativity

Abstract  There is a parallel to be drawn between the authentic road to self-­ development which evolves into social interaction with others, and creativity as it moves from personal expression to the distribution of novel ideas. Authentic leadership encourages a creative ambiance in which followers feel independently strong enough to challenge existing standards and dare to come up with unconventional ideas. Authentic leaders encourage positive emotions and build the self-confidence to take risks and pursue novel paths. As Daniel Goleman explains, creativity calls for emotional intelligence to be situationally versatile while drawing on the need for divergent, lateral thinking. Creativity is a search for the authentic, just as artistic creation is not a copy but a new creation. There is also a dark side to creativity which may even be pathological or criminal. Robert Sternberg notes the world is paying for the dark side through global warming, ozone layer depletion, terrorism, and uneven income distribution. In a positive vein, however, creativity shows the courage to think unconventionally, as Abraham Maslow points out, creativity is at the core of authentic, self-actualization, recognised as a perpetual drive to personal betterment. Martin Buber looks to cultural creativity which results in social transformation and serves as an antidote against routine stagnation. While, in the commercial world, authentic leaders work with corporate social responsibility to come up with creative ideas to sustain the planet, and at the same time be profitable and attractive to investors. Keywords  Creativity · Emotional intelligence · Daniel Goleman · Divergence · Lateral thinking · Creative dark-side · Sternberg · Abraham Maslow · Self-­ improvement · Martin Buber · Originality · Corporate social responsibility

Creative Issues There is a clear parallel to be drawn between the authentic road to self-development which evolves into social interaction with others, and creativity as it moves from personal expression to the distribution of novel ideas. That is to say, individual © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Shaw, The Philosophy of Authentic Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29650-5_9

167

168

9 Creativity

creativity at some point loses ownership of its creation when those ideas are received and assimilated by others. This means leaders need to consider group dynamics and historical settings to recognise the relevance of actors who are integrating and assimilating novel ideas as they are socially and culturally disseminated: Choosing, supporting, interpreting and refining ideas are as important as “having” an idea. Indeed, on close examination, distinctions between field roles and the “creator” role begin to disappear. People we have traditionally called “creators” may be more usefully conceived as “producers”.1

In the context of organizations, leaders are individually creative and adopt an attitude of encouragement to make workforce and departments creatively aware and innovatively active. Creativity is typically regarded as a key to leadership development: Creativity is the primary source of the leader’s ability to envision inspiring futures, to adapt to change, and to devise new paradigms to replace outdated old models. Leaders think laterally, express passion, initiate change, and encourage diversity…when new challenges arise we need individuals who can invent new approaches to resolving these challenges. We need men and women who can see patterns and create a context that leads to foresight.2

The apparent contradictory notion of organized creativity, pigeon-holing what should otherwise be a free-flowing exercise, can rather be integrated into co-­ operative, brainstorming and innovative activities. Leadership works well collectively in tandem with others instead of focusing solely on individuality as the unique source for the creative act. Indeed, it can use the resources of diverse communities, social organisations and institutions to contribute towards a new state of affairs. If egocentric talent is overly relied upon it threatens to impoverish the eclectic reach of creativity by sidestepping ‘activity between domains’ and ‘the challenge of interdisciplinary or cross-cultural exchanges’3 all of which result in advantageous, productive, hybrid forms. The reaction to a leader or group of initiators who propose novel ideas obviously differs according to who the recipients are, nonetheless, leaders always play a positive role not through personal pressure but by establishing a favourable environment within which creative ventures can flourish.4 In keeping with the fact that authentic leadership is not based on power or hierarchy, the flatter organizational structure still requires leader and managerial guidance over team activity and the continuing support to provide a rich, creative climate. Nurturing the talents of followers from being submissive to being proactive is prerequisite for effective leadership.

 Michael Hanchett Hanson (2015). “The Ideology of Creativity and Challenges of Participation.” Europe’s Journal of Psychology 11(3): 369–378, p. 372. 2  Robert J. Allio (2005) “Leadership development teaching versus learning” Management Decision 43 (7/8): 1071–1077, 1073. 3  Rob Pope (2005). Creativity: Theory, History, Practice. Routledge. p. 68. 4  Michael D.  Mumford. Ginamarie M.  Scott. Blain Gaddis, Jill M.  Strange (2002). “Leading Creative People: Orchestrating expertise and relationships.” The Leadership Quarterly 13 (6):705–750, p. 707. 1

Creative Issues

169

Authentic leadership is well-suited to nurture employee personal strength not by inculcating ideas but by promoting strength of character, embodying trust, confidence, and motivational energy. By reducing the emotional threat of failure, a creative ambiance is encouraged in which followers feel independently strong enough to challenge existing standards and dare to come up with unconventional ideas.5 The structure of work environment is designed to liberate rather than constrain and human resource practices, such as rewards, availability of resources, and leader feedback should all be maximised. Leadership initiatives play a key role in furthering interpersonal and social relations by creating the context in which the realm of ideas and theoretical speculation can flourish. Rather than establish fixed entities with fixed relationships to each other we find the very notion of fixity to be illusory. Creativity is pure desire. Any acceptance of business hierarchy based on invariable structure cannot give free play to the inestimable potential of each company member. Until now the problem has been one of deep structure whereby restriction has been built into the system. Fear and a sense of defeatism characterise unwieldy and old-fashioned structures. Blind obedience to impersonal power leads to trepidation, blockage, hesitation and reluctance to take on responsibility. All of this shrouds the notion of progress in a suffocating mist, for no genuine progress can be made until business is recognised as the organic mindset of those who work within it; an interrelated matrix of communicative exchanges which lead to exploration and novelty. Creativity cannot be an exception but has to accompany routine action, improvisation cannot be an optional extra but has to permeate rule-governed behaviour, and divergent thinking cannot be deemed a threat but rather a welcome addition to systemic planning. Dynamic activity circulates within an organisational setting which itself comprises a microcosmic social community. Authentic leaders are well aware that the inner working of an organization is never removed from its social context, cultural contribution, or political effect. Creative products always see the light of day within contexts of language, networks and conventions so that a whole series of ramifications transcend the workplace to filter through to society at large. Once a created product has reached its market or selection field, it is deemed acceptable and appropriate by those in the know: Novelty and appropriateness are judged by people who are experts in that creative domain: the field. If the field decides that the product meets these criteria, the product enters the domain, where it’s preserved and disseminated to other members of the field. Works that are rejected by the field don’t enter the domain, and are often forgotten and destroyed.6

Two aspects are particularly noteworthy; openness related to the virtues as a defining character ability to be responsive to the other, whether it be cognitive, emotional

 Armenio Rego. Filipa Sousa. Carla Marques. Miguel Pina e Cunha (2012). “Authentic leadership promoting employees’ psychological capital and creativity.” Journal of Business Research 65 (3): 429–437, p. 431. 6  R.  Keith Sawyer (2012). Explaining Creativity: The Science of Human Innovation. Oxford University Press, p. 214. 5

170

9 Creativity

or material, and distributed thinking, the essence of partaking in every phase of the creative process as it spreads throughout a communicative chain within communities of interest. Consideration of the distribution of the creative process moves its study from inception of being ‘located inside the head, to conceptualising creative action, extending the psychological into the social and material world.’7 This ensures that authentic leaders, either through their own creative activities or acting as stewards for the creative activities of others, relate creative expressions to the relevant cultural context and social good. Creativity impacts all who come in contact with it. Authentic transparency will signal to followers the degree of toleration they can expect if they embark on creative endeavours, ‘openness and full disclosure that is characteristic for authentic relations characterized by high levels of relational transparency enables the employees to better estimate the degree to which the leaders show support for innovation.’8 Essentially, the positivity identified with authentic leadership encourages self and others to pursue innovative targets. The conclusion to be drawn is that creative actions emerge from the rich contributions that different perspectives of seniority, status and authority can offer and also from the ability to co-ordinate and integrate these diverse perspectives to arrive at fresh insight.9 The much overlooked dynamic within organizations between leader and followers is a blueprint for the general abundance that can be accrued from interdependency between dedicated, creative agents. Each contribution is of value because it affords creative potential from different perspectives. In other words, the creative decisions made by authentic leaders benefit from multi-­ perspectival input; it aids fellow workers understand the rationale behind decisions as they contribute to the process and consequently improves self-esteem and sense of empowerment. The high point of organizational activity is genuine interaction and interdependence where leaders, associates, and followers experientially coalesce to partake in and evaluate the creative product. Creativity is the engine for cultural change and waits on social approbation to determine degrees of integration and possibility to bring about beneficial results, ‘the community stagnates without the impulse of the individual. The impulse dies away without the sympathy of the community.’10 Encouraged by the distribution of creativity and the diverse, unpredictable perspectives it engenders, new ideas emerge within culture as inherently inviting, tantalising challenges: Instead of thoughts of concrete things patiently following one another in a beaten track of habitual suggestion we have the most abrupt cross-cuts and transitions from one idea to  Vlad Petre Glaveanu (2014). Distributed Creativity: Thinking Outside the Box of the Creative Individual. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer Cham, p. 81. 8  Matej Cerne, Marko Jaklic, Miha Skerlavaj (2013). “Authentic leadership, creativity, and innovation: A multilevel perspective.” Leadership 9 (1): 63–85, p. 67. 9  Vlad Petre Glaveanu (2015). “Creativity as a Sociocultural Act.” The Journal of Creative Behavior 49 (3): 165–180. 10  William James (1880). Great men, Great thoughts, and the Environment. The Atlantic Monthly 46 (276) October: 441–459. p. 448. 7

Creative Issues

171

another, the most rarefied abstractions and discriminations, the most unheard-of combinations of elements, the subtlest associations of analogy; in a word, we seem suddenly introduced into a seething cauldron of ideas, where everything is fizzling and bobbing about in a state of bewildering activity… .11

Dilemmas are essentially situated problems in daily activity which call for decisions and creative suggestions over widely distributed domains. This wide distribution over which the creative process unfolds inevitably impacts actors and agents from socially varied positions who will be shaken out of their comfort zone. When creative action takes hold there is difference rather than uniformity, encounters which embody opposition rather than consent: ‘Creative action and its social distribution…are facilitated by this confrontation with otherness.’12 Even more so, at root, social otherness is not extrinsically emplaced but is already a psychological attribute of agency, the social is not an on off switch that one can operate at will. The human mind itself is social and this means that the difference in social distance and perspective…exists within as well as outside the person. In this sense, the creative actor is at once embodying other voices that contribute, in their polyphony, to the shaping of creative action.13

This call to action by the ever-present ‘other’ reinforces the notion that pre-formed ideas and predetermined positions work less effectively than does immersion in the busy activity of everydayness which calls for immediate response. Creative acts and the changes they engender tend to defy norms of the general public, the prevailing spirit of the times, or the security offered by personally entrenched habits. This means the scale of impact can be large or small: ‘Minor creativity is what an individual displays in his daily life as he goes beyond what he has done before…Major creativity comprises willingness to defy the crowd and to defy oneself.’14 To the degree that novel pathways evolve from existing possibilities at hand in organizations, they emanate from the work culture. There are many factors that enhance creativity in the workplace; especially noteworthy is emotional intelligence. By overcoming or defying norms, positive emotions, reliant on passion and zeal, aid in broadening the available mix of choices founded on rational planning. The process is one of emotional contagion, where a leader’s emotions filter through to follower reactions to create positive, affective states, ‘positive emotions experienced by authentic leaders will spread and reverberate through social contagion processes to positively foster the emotional and cognitive development of other organizational members.’15 In general, authentic leader-follower relationships owe

 Ibid. p. 456.  Glaveanu, Distributed Creativity, p. 44. 13  Ibid. 14  Robert J.  Sternberg (2018). “The Triangle of Creativity” in Robert J.  Sternberg and James C.  Kaufman (eds.) The Nature of Human Creativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 318–334, pp. 325, 326. 15  Bruce J. Avolio and William L. Gardner (2005). “Authentic Leadership Development: Getting to the Root of Positive Forms of Leadership.” The Leadership Quarterly 16(3): 315–338, p. 326. 11 12

172

9 Creativity

much to the emotional support required for leaders to succeed in implementing policy and convincing followers of the need for their creative initiatives. Authentic leaders encourage positive emotions and positive thinking which figure in various phases of the creative process. In order to respond to the emotions of others and build rapport it is necessary to possess a workable knowledge of how emotions function within specific creative phases such as in the early flights of imagination where the need for self-belief and enthusiasm is so important. A prime connection between authentic leadership and emotion occurs with emotional intelligence. Though intelligence does not exactly correspond to creativity, its coupling with the emotions has much to offer authentic leaders. In general, emotion and intelligence, as with understanding and imagination, draws our attention to the many philosophical dualisms including self-other and mind-body, suggesting polar opposites can be mutually supportive rather than divisive. Daniel Goleman has no doubt about our reliance on emotional guidance and the interaction between reason and emotion.16 However, all too often in decision-­ making the automatic, gut instinct expressive of emotions is considered too reckless. The fear is that intent is lost because spontaneous emotions cloud judgment. The corrective introduced is the cool, sober presence of reason. Logic is used to reflect, introspect, analyse and control. Descartes’ Cartesian dualism makes this clear; the human condition is composed of physical bodies and immaterial minds. Yet, emotional intelligence resolves these apparently contrasting forms of judgement to propose integration; it meets the complex requirement of being situationally versatile while drawing on the need for divergent, lateral thinking: The increased flexibility deriving from emotional intelligence may also contribute to effective leadership…enabling them to respond to multiple issues simultaneously. Flexible thinking arising out of emotional intelligence facilitates seeing connections among divergent information, and thus may help leaders see how issues are interrelated.17

Rather than be a slave to passion and succumb to its excesses emotional intelligence takes what is best from intuitive feeling and sculpts it to meet specific, situational conditions. Just as creativity benefits from being well-prepared, having expertise in a specific domain, and allowing for periods of idea gestation, so emotions benefit from self-knowledge, monitoring self-reactions, heeding acceptance or rejection from others, and reflecting on one’s own reaction to emotionally significant events. In other words, emotions are not mere automatic responses which are hard to control, just as the act of creation is not just a light bulb moment. In both cases a comprehensive process is set in motion. Emotional relationships arise in the multi-phased creative act and are a constant addition to political and financial commitments. Positive behaviour, which authentic leadership prioritises, ‘suggests that creativity may be particularly susceptible to affective influence, mainly because positive affect leads to the sort of cognitive  Daniel Goleman (1995). Emotional Intelligence. Bloomsbury Publishing, p. 8.  Jennifer M.  George (2000). “Emotions and Leadership: The role of emotional intelligence.” Human Relations 53 (8): 1027–1055, p. 1044. 16 17

Creative Issues

173

variation that stimulates creativity.’18 Authentic leadership’s virtues of openness, benevolence and transparency contribute to creative action promoting follower’s affective bonds and individual creativity in positive work environments. Emotions arise spontaneously but are also accompanied by subsequent responses and consequences which in turn invite moral judgments, ‘emotions always involve thought of an object combined with thought of the object’s salience or importance; in that sense they always involve appraisal or evaluation.’19 A leader’s emotional intelligence can allay the potential conflict in organizations between the need for controlled predictability and the disequilibrium brought about by emotionally charged, creative detours. Positive organizational behaviour associated with authentic leadership has much to do with the emotional competence to foster self-authenticity and the follow-on effect of engendering enough confidence in associates to be unorthodox and creatively daring. The ability to foster creativity is strengthened by emotional intelligence because of the emotional swings involved in the highs of successful creation or the lows of its failure. Within the environment of creativity, emotionally intelligent leaders use their appraisal of moods ‘to awaken creativity in their followers through affect timing and affect balance.’ Those with negative emotions may well have them transformed and profitably channelled ‘in the direction of problem recognition and creative problem solving rather than in a gradual withdrawal from the workplace.’20 The spark that sets creativity in motion relates to the authentic expression of core self and has close affinity with artistic creation. In the personal search for identity, as well as the artist’s aesthetic creation, the authentic article is sought rather than a copy which all too easily cuts off vitality from original source and curtails the possibility for genuine expression. As Taylor points out, self-discovery and artistic creation are closely aligned: ‘Artistic creation becomes the paradigm mode in which people can come to self-definition…become ourselves by expressing what we’re about…what we express is not an imitation of the pre-existing but a new creation.’21 Out of self-creation a sense of wholeness and intrinsic satisfaction arises which is comparable to the satisfaction derived from art, beauty in particular. Artistic creation is expressive on many different levels just as individual identity formulates itself in different environments, within different communities, and under varied circumstances to manifest life-stories in action. The experience of creativity like the experience of a work of art elicits reactions which range from interest to curiosity to awe. Expressed ideas may well appear fictive or unconventional but this is their fascination and attraction, like works of fiction creative action allows for imaginative flights of fantasy in which other people find suspense and vicarious pleasure.  Teresa M. Amabile. Sigal G. Barsade. Jennifer S. Mueller. Barry M. Straw (2005). “Affect and Creativity at Work.” Administrative Science Quarterly 50 (3): 367–403, p. 369. 19  Martha C. Nussbaum (2001) Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. Cambridge University Press. p. 23. 20  Jing Zhou and Jennifer M. George (2003). “Awakening Employee Creativity: The role of leader emotional intelligence.” The Leadership Quarterly 14 (4–5): 545–568, p. 556. 21  Charles Taylor (1991) The Ethics of Authenticity. Harvard University Press. p. 62. 18

174

9 Creativity

Followers and associates in the workplace become the positive recipients of an authentic leader’s creative activities. They process creative works in an organizational environment in the same manner as they would fictive artworks employing not only rational feasibility and judgment but mind sets which mentally transform, explore, elaborate, construct and thematise experience and events.22 Such forms of mental agility contribute towards reinforcing the creative potential and individual creative process of both leader and follower. Authentic leaders express autonomy by filling in their own personal life-gaps to express who they are; an exercise which draws from what pre-exists to create something newly formed from extant material. Similarly, works of art in film and literature are always filled in and broadened by reader/audience reaction and imaginative concretisations which re-experience the work. The process validates the psychology of creativity which includes the contribution of others in creative activity making for a productive, interdependent, aesthetic relationship between leader and associates. This deeper understanding confirms that creativity works within myriad domains and is indicative of both the out-of-the-ordinary occurrence designated as exceptional and those changes that naturally occur in everyday life experience. The influence of authentic leadership and creativity is not one which needs to focus on atypical moments promising radical upheaval but suffices to be creative as a more mundane exercise pursuing the novel as part of transactional life. In other words, creativity emanates from the ontological condition of movement and flux which pervades reality not as an exception but as the rule. With roots within the persistent, latent disruption present in all established order there is never stasis or inertia in life but always change and turbulence boiling under the surface: [C]reativity reflects the successful harnessing of an ever-present disordering tendency immanent in established orders and making it work towards our productive gain…Creativity is that which flits between order and disorder, between certainty and uncertainty, and between organization and disorganization.23

Bearing in mind that creative opportunities arise at the interstice between order and disorder a high level of sensitivity is called for to judge the appropriateness of time and place for incorporating creative acts into the socio/cultural fabric. It is clear, however, that those who succeed in reading the signs of the time may use their insight for positive or negative purposes. The fact is that fascination with creative activity and its potentially radical strategies can blind innovators to negative repercussions or even pave the way for intentional malfeasance. There is a latent dark side to creativity. In encouraging creativity, leaders may well deviate from routine, reject norms, and oppose social mores resulting in anti-social, pathologic or even criminal acts: ‘Acts of terrorism, as well as fraud, theft, and deceit, bring into focus the fact that creativity is by no means limited to the production of useful or effective

 Noel Carroll (2014). The Creative Audience. 62–82, p. 80.  Robert Chia (2020) “A Process-philosophical approach to researching creativity-in-practice.” in Viktor Dörfler and Marc Stierand (eds.) Handbook of Research Methods on Creativity. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 126–135, p. 126. 22 23

Creative Issues

175

novelty for universally positive purposes.’24 Robert Mclaren, borrowing from Plato’s comments on the need for artistic integrity, admits, ‘if we are to be honest in our quest for understanding creativity, we cannot evade acknowledging that, like all human endeavours, it too has its dark and even, to use Plato’s word, its daemonic side.’25 The dark-side of creativity takes many forms from harming the environment, producing innovative but dangerous products, and ‘creatively’ planning genocide. The world is paying for the dark side of creativity through global warming, ozone layer depletion, terrorism and uneven income distribution. Technology aids mankind’s progress but also creates doomsday scenarios. Nuclear power helps the energy crisis but also creates nuclear weapons; medical advances in curing illness also create the possibility for germ warfare. As for leadership, whole populations may regard their charismatic leader as someone who rescues their nation from poverty and humiliation, while other nations consider the uncompromising attitude of charismatic demagogues to be a threat to world peace. In the business world, creativity is routinely co-opted and assimilated into predictable standards of profit: ‘creativity…in the conventional view is seen merely as a production of value, it is controlled by an economic sphere and an expected economic output…When creativity is economized, it is homogenized and robbed of the very possibility to produce the absolute new.’26 Behaviour associated with creativity may denote acting in gung-ho fashion, dispelling convention in the pursuit of difference, casting aside moral strictures and restraint in the name of adventurous forays into the unknown, there is ‘a pervasive stereotype that people who are creative tend to be less ethical. It is thought that creative people, such as entrepreneurs, ‘tend to bend the rules’ and are likely to challenge established industry norms, morals and laws…This reputation…may be based on the perception that they will do almost anything to succeed.’27 Robert Sternberg searches for an antidote to such hubris and misuse of creativity: ‘If creativity and intelligence both can lead to so much harm, is there some other construct that one would wish creative and/or intelligent people to possess that might deter them from using their abilities in destructive ways?’28 Sternberg suggests the authentic virtue of wisdom acts as an ideal bulwark against the potential

 David H.  Cropley (2010). “The Dark Side of Creativity: A Differentiated Model” in David H.  Cropley. Arthur J.  Cropley. James C.  Kaufman. Mark A.  Runco (eds.) The Dark Side of Creativity. Cambridge University Press. 360–374, p. 371. 25  Robert B. McLaren (1993). “The Dark Side of Creativity.” Creativity Research Journal, 6 (1–2): 137–44, p. 137. 26  Sarah Louise Muhr, (2010). “Ethical interruption and the creative process: A reflection on the new.” Culture and Organization 16 (1) 73–86, p. 83. 27  Paul E. Bierly III, Robert W. Kolodinsky, Brian J. Charette (2009). “Understanding the Complex Relationship Between Creativity and Ethical Ideologies.” Journal of Business Ethics 86 (1): 101–112, p. 101. 28  Robert J.  Sternberg. (2010). “The Dark Side to Creativity and How to Combat it.” in David H. Cropley et al. The Dark Side of Creativity, 316–328, pp. 318, 327. 24

176

9 Creativity

apocalyptic extremes of creativity. We need to ‘temper creativity with common sense and wisdom.’29 As our analysis has shown, this is precisely the strength of authenticity. Authentic leaders recognise ethical consequences arise when ideas are generated and the free flow of thought risks transgressing ethical boundaries. Indeed, of all the available ‘constructs’ or buffers against the dark side, authentic leadership offers the most trustworthy model to reconcile creativity and ethical sensibility by dint of its multi-perspectival, eclectic scope, refusal to place personal interest above others, and practical wisdom.

Creative Traits and Virtues Being in touch with one’s authentic self is already creative. The creative urge does not emanate from outside but is a potential within all as part of self-determination and creative identity. The activity of excavating dispositions and unfurling core desire takes creative imagination, originality, and an artistic-style effort of self-­ definition. The composition needed to form life-stories is an essential part of the personal creative drive, an effort not dependent on the influence of others but on the autonomous, soul-searching enterprise to realise singularity from the virtual. Creativity enters the authentic pursuit in development of character and formulation of life-story. Seen as a process of connected phases, creativity expresses the flow and disappearance of self within the creative act, a shifting reappraisal of previous experiences which allows for the construction of stimulating self-determined pathways. The creative self combines innately determined traits with intensity derived from life experience stretched over time; changes and challenges which effectuate confidence and self-efficacy. With a high degree of introspection and self-knowledge comes self-confidence and courage to break out of conventional moulds. This relates creativity as a trait to the five factor model and traits such as extraversion and openness. Openness to experience is at the core of the creative personality just as it is to authenticity; it accepts the challenges offered from diverse activities and different domains. Without self-belief and confidence in one’s personal creative skills there can be no creative action but there are also reality checks in place calling for humility to acknowledge failures and perseverance to combat hurdles along the way. The aim is to sustain creative confidence ‘the natural ability to come up with new ideas and the courage to try them out…Creativity is something you practice, not just a talent you’re born with.’30 Authentic leaders welcome new experiences which encourage a wide range of emotions, mental agility, and the courage to think otherwise.  Robert J.  Sternberg (2018) “The Triangle of Creativity” in Robert J.  Sternberg and James C. Kaufman (eds.) The Nature of Human Creativity. Cambridge University Press. 318–334, p. 330. 30  Tom Kelley and David Kelley (2012) “Reclaim Your Creative Confidence.” The Harvard Business Review 90 (12): 115–118, p. 116. 29

Creative Traits and Virtues

177

The creative process cries out for a flexible, pragmatic approach, especially in times of turbulence where novel solutions are called for. The temptation to accept compromise is rejected in as much as compromise is the acceptance of equilibrium between already-known constants. Creativity is rather to venture into the unknown and challenge rules. Pursuing predetermined rules and kowtowing to authority do not sit well with authentic leaders in their quest for creative decisions which employ empathy, insight, and an awareness of wide-ranging social perspectives. The oppositional nature of divergent thinking stands up against ruling regimes of behaviour and entrenched ideas which stubbornly refuse critique. It takes courage to persevere with oppositional ideas when faced with obdurate, antagonistic parties bent on defending their own interests. Politically, a form of agonism is in place which grows within landscapes of differentiation and ambiguity inherent in the life force. The best recourse to establish creative solutions is through debate, open argument, and healthy disagreement: In practice, creating agonistic spaces requires thinking differently about the context in which decisions are made… Reciprocity requires, at the very least, an engagement with disagreement and conflict rather than avoidance and fearfulness…Recognizing the undecidability of the terrain in which decisions are taken in an agonistic space provides opportunities for alternative, possibly innovative or even radical solutions to emerge.31

The intensity of deep-seated motivation in contact with inner core desire and the unconscious realm solidifies the authentic drive to break free from routine and reach out for universal change. As an authentic disposition, creative desire is not merely about what is produced but about the frame of mind that accompanies production and decision-making. This is particularly relevant for leaders as their social skills and inter-relational, social intelligence are their prime authentic attributes. As Abraham Maslow points out, creativity is at the core of self-actualization because there is never an end point to the process, only perpetual drive to personal betterment. Self-actualizing ‘creativity stresses first the personality rather than its achievements, considering these achievements to be epi-phenomena…It stresses characterological qualities like boldness, courage, freedom, spontaneity, perspicuity, integrity, self-acceptance.’32 By taking Maslow’s description a stage further we are led into the community analysis of philosopher, Martin Buber. The socio/political arena is particularly relevant to authentic leaders as this is where the impact of their activities has wide-­ reaching consequences. Buber ‘considered community to be the basic social framework supporting human creativity…and emphasized a fundamental reality: humans live and create within communities and each community membership brings with it a distinctive set of resources and practices, a specific knowledge and

 Sophie Bond (2011). “Negotiating a ‘democratic ethos’: moving beyond the agonistic – communicative divide.” Planning Theory 10 (2) 161–186, p. 179. 32  Abraham Maslow (1968). Toward a Psychology of Being. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, p. 145. C/f. Ruth Richards (2010) “Everyday Creativity” in James C. Kaufmam. Robert J. Sternberg (eds.) The Cambridge Handbook of Creativity. Cambridge University Press.189–214. 31

178

9 Creativity

identity.’33 Authentic leaders recognise creativity serves as a key way to humanize communities and ensure healthy and productive forms of interrelationship. According to Shmuel Eisenstadt, this view was shared by Buber who felt cultural creativity together with social authenticity results in social transformation and serves as an antidote against routine stagnation.34 Creativity sustains Buber’s description of ‘I-Thou’ relationship as a fresh, vital dynamic essentially placed within culture and fuelled by the power of innovation. Authentic leaders ensure that dialogue transpires in communicative openness with ‘a strong commitment to direct interpersonal relations, transcending and cutting across more institutionalized and formalized frameworks’, where relations are directed to ‘the transcendental, to the sphere of ultimate values.’35 Some forms of dialogue and rhetoric may be used to control others and signify leader domination over follower. Open dialogues, on the other hand, are the foundation for varying levels of interrelationship, be they profane and temporal or spiritual and ethical. Whatever the context may be, open dialogue is the glue which holds society together and sustains cultural creativity. Leaders ensure the sparks which fire spontaneity in social relationships and expressions of cultural creativity are not dampened by state domination but instead allow for frameworks of common discourse to be developed. Open dialogues pave the way for open systems, the constitutive role of interaction, where diversity and creative experimentation is encouraged still within an organizational setting. Creativity relies on divergent thought to meet the challenge of being receptive to the strange, unpredictable, alien and unfamiliar. Divergent thought has its source in the distribution and extension of cognition and the phenomenon of emergence. Those situations and events which materialise from diverse, lower level activities cannot be predicted and have characteristics which did not previously exist when they originated. When different perspectives and interests emanating from widely spaced locations intersect emergence ensues: Despite always being located in the here-and-now context, humans are often aware of other spaces and times. Spaces beyond the immediate zone of perception are real for us and can motivate action. Thus, within any particular situation, human beings can be motivated by the perspectives of others. Moreover, recalled pasts and imagined futures are woven into our perception of immediately present situations such that we can act not on the basis of what is, but on the basis of what might be, or even, what might happen if we don’t act a certain way.36

 Vlad-Petre Glaveanu (2010) “Principles for a Cultural Psychology of Creativity.” Culture & Psychology 16 (2): 147–163, p. 160. 34  Martin Buber (1992). Martin Buber: On Intersubjectivity and Cultural Creativity: Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (ed.) University of Chicago Press. 35  Ibid. p. 11. 36  Martin J. Martin and A. Gillespie (2010) “A neo-Meadian approach to human agency: Relating the social and the psychological in the ontogenesis of perspective-coordinating persons.” Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science 44 (3): 252–272. p. 256. 33

Creative Traits and Virtues

179

These dispersed and distributed perspectives also include self-perspective, an example of the George Mead argument for the distantiation of the ‘I–Me’ relation, where ‘creators are simultaneously audiences of the creations of others and they are also the first audiences of their own creativity.’37 By emphasising perspectival positions and concomitant social dynamics we get a deeper, metaphysical understanding of creativity as a free-flowing intuitive force field which results in ‘alternative possibilities, alternative pasts and futures and alternative social perspectives.’38 In the search for originality, the imaginative use of experience and the ability to synthesise diverse perspectives for problem-solving result in perspectives which create sparks of insight. In the process of thinking through a problem there is a “kaleidoscope flash” of alternative possibilities…it is not only the ability to think through a situation in terms of various perspectives, but also the ability to integrate and coordinate them such that new relevancies emerge.39

The upshot is that divergent directions of thought and dimensions can be explored with an open, tolerant mindset which welcomes paradoxes and contradictions because they offer opportunities for unconventional development. Particularly in times of turmoil, moral dilemmas raise important questions for leaders to answer. Such times require leaders with the ability to establish values in an organization and relate them to the community at large. The notion of moral creativity directly appeals to authentic leader tenets of an internalized moral perspective, relational transparency, and social commitment. In other words, the drive to creativity and change are the same authentic requirements of being in touch with one’s personal moral compass and taking responsibility for the consequences of decisions on others. The divergent approach to creatively with its multiple solutions fits with the argument that ‘authentic leaders exhibit a higher moral capacity to judge dilemmas from different angles and are able to take into consideration different stakeholder needs.’40 Any consequence of leader decision-making in today’s world requires the ability to think-into a system and wherever the instrumentality of system thinking is rigidly imposed the safeguard of ethics serves as an invaluable corrective. Scientists need not exclude working from a moral conscience which considers the social implications of their research. Corporate Social Responsibility is at its most successful when corporations come up with ideas to sustain the planet which are also profitable and attract investors. In terms of process ethics, there is no ultimate principle for ordering or ranking moral dilemmas to find the right thing to do. However, specialised knowledge in the particular domain one is acting in helps in the same way as being familiar with general moral theories helps find which ones are appropriate for specific moral judgments. Both creativity and authenticity have  Vlad Petre Glaveanu (2015). “Creativity as a Sociocultural Act.” The Journal of Creative Behavior 49 (3): 165–180, p. 171. 38  Ibid. p. 170. 39  Martin and Gillespie, “A neo-Meadian approach to human agency”, p. 257. 40  Douglas R. May. Timothy D. Hodges. Adrian Y. L. Chan. Bruce J. Avolio (2003). “Developing the Moral Component of Authentic Leadership.” Organizational Dynamics 32 (3): 247–60, p. 248. 37

180

9 Creativity

distinctly positive ethical components. The creative urge is driven both by emotion and the intellect where emotion has an intrinsic moral value. A feeling accompanying an act need not merely carry with it instrumental value but may also carry intrinsic moral value, a moral judgment which would commonly be shared by others as an overall sense of decency.41 As a facet of authentic leadership, creativity requires consideration of all virtues, personal motivation and character: ‘Creativity is a virtue only if part of what is praiseworthy and admirable concerns excellence of character.’42 Like authenticity, creativity is a positive, ingrained disposition of character carried out for its own sake with intrinsic worth, ‘being intrinsically motivated makes a person far more likely to be creative.’43 As Aristotle emphasises, the virtuous character pursuit is a process, a life which unfolds with desirable values rather than an exercise to achieve an end condition no matter what. Likewise for creativity, it is not possible to escape from the activity itself by extrapolating an end state of completion, or a style which is not part of immanent value since if one takes the means to an end one has to know the end. But if a process of making something is creative, then one cannot know the end; for if one knows the end, one has already been creative.44

Authentic leaders express virtues consistently and profoundly to the exclusion of acting out of deference or seeking permission or praise from outside sources. They ignore extrinsic motivation in search of genuine and personal expression of originality: A deep-seated intrinsic motivation is a disposition that explains why, other things being equal, the virtuously honest person will reliably tell the truth or why someone will be creative across a range of situations even in the face of variance in extrinsic reasons.45

As with authenticity, creativity takes courage to pursue one’s own, self-determined path even in the face of general rebuke or cynicism. Expressing one’s own ideas by listening to oneself is an expression of authenticity but the virtue of courage is required to actively and positively apply self-expression to the everyday social world as a genuine commitment, ‘emptiness within corresponds to an apathy without, and apathy adds up, in the long run, to cowardice….Courage…is the foundation that underlies and gives reality to all other virtues and personal values.’46 Creative courage potentially produces fresh forms and patterns into being, extending even to changes within society. Bravery and courage do not ‘shrink from  Rosalind Hursthouse. (1999) On Virtue Ethics. Oxford University Press. p. 108.  Matthew Kieran (2014) “Creativity as a Virtue of Character” in Elliot Samuel Paul and Scott Barry Kaufman (eds.) The Philosophy of Creativity: New Essays. Oxford University Press. 125–146, p. 128. 43  Berys Gaut (2010) “The Philosophy of Creativity”. Philosophy Compass 5 (12): 1034–1046, p. 1036. 44  Ibid. p. 1041. 45  Kieran, “Creativity as a Virtue of Character”, p. 140. 46  Rollo May (1975) The Courage to Create. W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., p. 13. 41 42

Creative Traits and Virtues

181

threat’, they ‘speak up for what is right even if there is opposition’, and ‘act on conviction even if unpopular’.47 The more authentic process unfolds with increased self-determination and sensitivity, the more creative proclivity increases, ‘genuine creativity is characterised by an intensity of awareness, a heightened consciousness.’48 With heightened consciousness and self-exploration increased focus opens the portal for creativity to take hold. In keeping with the satisfaction and happiness derived from authenticity, creativity also promotes happiness and joy, ‘joy defined as the emotion that goes with heightened consciousness, the mood that accompanies the experience of actualising one’s own potentialities.’49 Popularly understood as ecstasy, the joyful experience is ex-stasis, to literally stand-out from, an intensity which binds the conscious and unconscious, the intellectual with the spiritual, the intrinsic core with extrinsic behaviour, the holistic expression of one’s total being. The question to be faced is the degree to which particular creative activities and results are morally appropriate within their social and cultural environment. Evidently, ethical considerations depend on the ethical stance of the creator who will determine appropriateness and moral probity. Creativity is about producing the not-yet, nascent thought which carries an inbuilt conviction that the activity and what it produces should be realised, otherwise the act would not be undertaken to begin with. The ‘should’ that is to be realised is, therefore, a moral assumption that can justifiably be questioned by authentic leaders whereby they evaluate the appropriateness of the act, and the extent it benefits the community and humanity at large. Evaluation will be impacted by the degree to which creators have embarked on their process by avoiding harmful methods and destructive intent, in other words, both means and ends are ethical factors when considering those who will most be affected by creative acts. This is where convergent thinking is applied. Whereas divergent thinking outside-the-box may result in conflict with existing norms, its complement, convergent thinking, identifies useful practical strategies, evaluates effectiveness of ideas and weighs up ethical consequences. Creativity is not all about divergent thinking. People must also use convergent thinking to evaluate and judge the appropriateness of their creative ideas…the creative process tends to involve holistic, global thinking that incorporates a variety of self-oriented and social factors in both moral and non-moral contexts.50

We have seen the importance of the virtue of wisdom to resist the misuse of creativity and possible toxic consequences. Sternberg provides further arguments for synthesising creativity and wisdom in the correct environment with a common good in mind:

 Nansoon Park. Christopher Peterson. Martin E. P. Seligman (2004). “Strengths of Character and Well-Being.” Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 23 (5): 603–619, p. 606. 48  May, The Courage to Create. p. 44. 49  Ibid. p. 45. 50  Long Wang and J.  Keith Murnighan (2015). “Ethics and Creativity” in Christina E.  Shalley, Michael A.  Hitt, and Jing Zhou (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Creativity, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship. Oxford University Press. 245–260, p. 252. 47

182

9 Creativity

Wisdom is in large part a decision to use one’s intelligence, creativity, and knowledge for a common good…wisdom involves not only skills in the use of these elements but also the disposition to use them for the common good…wisdom is always implemented in context, because the course of action that balances intrapersonal, interpersonal, and extrapersonal interests so as to achieve a common good can only be understood in the context in which the action takes place.51

Wise leaders inevitably recognise the risk of introducing novel ideas or radical decisions into the environment and expect uncertain reception. Consequently, they will analyse strategies of judgment and bear in mind there are differences of values and priorities in different environments. Authentic leaders take a measured approach to these challenges displaying their self-determined character, inner core desires and relational duties. The integration of emotional intelligence and wisdom results in authentic leaders applying moral creativity to virtually all domains of human activity. With moral creativity, the drive is to append something morally valuable to the different domains where decision-making and creative acts are carried out. There are many variables involved, such as ‘identifying, interpreting, and integrating the values relevant to the situation. It also involves pinpointing key issues, making relevant factual inquiries, responding to others’ views, imaginatively assessing options, and exercising good judgment.’52 By relating ethical considerations to an analysis of creativity we delve deeper into the personal challenge to take relational responsibility to its outer limits. Mark Johnson explores the role moral imagination plays in divergent thinking and concomitantly the way it reinforces efforts to evaluate benefits and pitfalls in the quest for self-knowledge. The imaginative component of moral understanding is the creative aspect of ethical behaviour. This incorporates the imaginative make up of our moral understanding with its ‘values, limitations, and blind spots.’53 When undertaken by leaders, creative decisions have similar variables to moral imagination; ambiguity, indeterminacy and multiplicity of meanings which need collating and formulating in actuality with the goal of reaching novel solutions. Creative acts, mould, shape, give form to, compose, harmonize, balance, disrupt, organize, re-form, construct, delineate, portray, and use other forms of imaginative making…this is exactly what we do in morality. We portray situations, delineate character, formulate problems, and mould events. When we act we engage in various forms of creative making.54

Moral creativity is not about coming up with new values or ethical norms, virtue ethics already provides the guidelines. It is rather about resolving dilemmas, integrating multiple ideals, weighing up moral choices in an existential, pragmatic manner to meet exigencies which are challenging by dint of their specificity: ‘There are  Robert J. Sternberg (2007) “System Model of Leadership: WICS.” American Psychologist 62 (1): 34–42, pp. 38, 40. 52  Mike W. Martin (2006) “Moral Creativity”. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 20 (1): 55–65, p. 58. 53  Mark Johnson (1993). Moral Imagination: implications of cognitive science for ethics. The University of Chicago Press, p. 187. 54  Ibid. p. 212. 51

Creative Traits and Virtues

183

no right or wrong choices or moral perspective, beyond the requirement to be authentic – that is to choose with complete awareness of one’s freedom to choose.’55 As for creative leadership, in keeping with authenticity there is no attempt to inculcate values or exert pressure on the independence of followers and associates. An approach to achieve desirable moral goals would be more a question of setting appropriate parameters, choosing talented people for a project, offering encouragement, being inspirational, and showing empathy and care, in other words, establishing the basis for activating an effective creative process. Those involved in any variety of creative activity will plan strategically how to realise ideas effectively. The cross-over of intelligence, emotion, openness and wisdom all involve correspondence between ethical decision-making and creative thinking skills which include problem definition, concept selection, conceptual combination, idea evaluation, and implementation planning. This leads Mumford et al. to conclude that creative thinking skills are positively related to ethical decision-making, and, in fact, creative thinking seemed to promote ethical decisions in multiple areas where scientists must make ethical decisions…creative thinking skills contribute to more effective application of ethical decision-making strategies that, in turn, contribute to better ethical decision-making.56

The act of creation means breaking down barriers and overcoming the fear of difference, especially as difference brings with it an ethical stance. There is no reason not to harmonize creativity and the ethical concern for others. In order to be creative and welcome both difference and otherness leaders ‘move beyond ontology, into the realm of ethics…the new can only be seen as truly new if it is perceived ethically as an effect of the opening up to the Other’57 This thought is above all the philosophical position of Levinas who is very much concerned with the transformation that takes place with relationships to others. On reflection, it is apparent that this transformation is authenticity writ large; character development as it assimilates virtue ethics and the good of others. For Levinas, one does not just come into the world as Dasein but one comes into the world as questioning via the face-to-face relation. Questions seek response, a social call back from the Other; one is summoned by the Other, and with summoning comes responsibility. The correlation of summoning and reply is echoed in Bergson’s notion of creative evolution. Consciousness freely and creatively reacts, continually responding to, and creating from, matter. Response is the reciprocity between agents and environment, a duality of co-existence between mind and matter, which calls for individual-social dialectic, ‘life must create a form for itself, suited to the circumstances which are made for it…Such adapting is not repeating,  Martin, “Moral Creativity”, p. 59.  Michael D.  Mumford. Ethan R.  Waples. Alison L.  Antes. Ryan P.  Brown. Shane Connelly. Stephen T.  Murphy. Lynn D.  Devenport (2010). “Creativity and Ethics: The Relationship of Creative and Ethical Problem-Solving.” Creativity Research Journal 22 (1): 74–89, p. 86, 87. 57  Sarah Louise Muhr (2010). “Ethical interruption and the creative process: A reflection on the new.” Culture and Organization 16 (1): 73–86, p. 74. 55 56

184

9 Creativity

but replying, – an entirely different thing…life, like conscious activity is invention, is unceasing creation.’58 As response, authentic leaders encourage change and pursue ‘utmost action’, a form of action which accepts the risk of innovation because forms of production cannot remain unchanged over time. Movement is transition from one phase to another and material products are just momentary fragments of dynamic emergence: ‘The product must eventually change and become different from itself because it cannot stop this process. Life and innovation have a need for ‘utmost action’ to continually change.’59 It is clear that there is no passive state of response, no passive-active correlation between self and others but only shared, supplementary growth. The discovery of otherness is a primal challenge to deconstruct identity and authentically self-­ determine, ‘discovery extracts the self from its ontological confinement and opens a deconstructionist phase of identity, leading the ego to overcome the cult of selfhood and to become porous to the other.’60 For Levinas, in being-faced by otherness the self is exposed, ethical encounters dislodge self-certainty and expose the core: ‘The passivity of the exposure responds to an assignation that identifies me as the unique one, not by reducing me to myself, but by stripping me of every identical quiddity, and thus of all form, all investiture… ’61 Questions also relate to being questionable, which is to be suspect or doubtful. An existential blandness is detected; one that Heidegger shows is rooted in inauthenticity and Das Man, the acceptances of adhering to pre-given social norms. Likewise, Donald Winnicott states, ‘it is only in being creative that the individual discovers the self.’62 The extant self may be a false self, inauthentic in terms of deficiency and lack of originality calling for creative input and imagination. This may involve new experiences or equally a retrieval of Winnicott’s focus on childhood where perceptual undifferentiation is the norm lost in adulthood as we sort out and categorise experiences by rejecting what is not useful or productive. Horizons become limited but the creative urge is able to engender results which restore undifferentiated vision. Creativity occurs in Winnicott’s potential space, a liminal experience well-suited for experimentation and discovery where the found self is worked upon to become the authentic self.  Henri Bergson (1911/1998). Creative Evolution. Arthur Mitchell (trans.) New  York: Dover Publications, pp. 23, 58. 59  Anthony O’Shea (2002). “The (R)evolution of New Product Innovation.” Organization 9 (1): 113–125, p. 121. 60  Maria Giuserrina Bruna and Yoann Bazin (2018). “Answering Levinas’ Call in Organization Studies”. European Management Review 15 (4): 577–588, p. 578. 61  Emmanuel Levinas (1974/1981). Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence. Alphonso. Lingis (trans.) Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, p. 49.C/f. Muhr, Ethical interruption and the creative process, p. 80. 62  Donald. W. Winnicott (1971). Playing and Reality, London: Tavistock Publications Ltd. p. 54. C/f. Nihan Kaya (2008) “Compelled to create: the courage to go beyond” in Lucy Huskinson (ed.), Dreaming the Myth Onwards: New Directions in Jungian therapy and Thought. Taylor & Francis Group, 21–30, p. 23. 58

Creative Traits and Virtues

185

For Levinas, the indifference of commonality and sameness carries with it the same inauthentic lifestyle which comprises power struggles and exclusion of respect for difference. Otherness throws down the gauntlet, challenges hermetically sealed personal worlds and invites creative input to bring about openness and solidarity. The role of creativity here is to take initiative and clear away the cobwebs of homogeneous sameness and come afresh to the world by way of questioning and self-­ problematization. Creative activity supported by desire and reason recognises the Other as infinite awakening. If there is an active proposition to be revealed it is one of benevolence, initiated by the creative urge to dispel the taken-for-granted sensibility of self-interest and allow creativity to build another world where altruism reigns. Before this can occur, prevailing discourse, ideological infrastructure, as well as embedded taken-for-­ granted power structures need questioning. There are various kairotic moments for discerning possibilities where creativity begins this questioning. One area is that of communication when ‘interruption’ takes place; the breakdown or splintering of norms, especially noticeable when communication exchange comes to an unsuccessful impasse. Such deadlocks, however, do not denote shutdown, on the contrary, they are wake-up calls to expose the weakness of collective representation and reluctance to stand face-to-face with the other. In the guise of communicative transformation cliché-ridden repetition is replaced by ethical involvement, ‘the limit of communication is precisely what gives rise to communication as an ethical event…interruption (has) a special ethical significance: as a point of exposure and vulnerability upon which the relation with the Other may undergo a profound transformation.’63 Transformation cannot be effectuated on its own but is set in motion by a state of doubt and uncertainty. The remedial process is the creative turn which instils originality and determination to make a difference. In sum, interruption offers the chance for enlightenment and revelation, an intrusive challenge to one’s neatly formed, comfortable world. Creativity is recognised as a self-generating process, activated by communication, with the promise to explore the darkness of what is strange or infinite and lay the foundation for otherness to emerge. In exploring this potentially bountiful landscape with the help of divergent, creative thought authentic leaders build an identity of openness and infinite modulation.

 Amit Penchevski (2005). By Way of Interruption: Levinas and the Ethics of Communication. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, pp. 67, 68. 63

Chapter 10

Cosmopolitan Spirit

Abstract  The romantic poet-philosopher, Novalis, argues the cosmopolitan mindset can be reached through creative imagination, an authentic experience based on peaceful state reforms and the unification of humanity without dependence on national borders. This means, in pursuing cosmopolitanism leaders apply their authentic virtues of empathy, loyalty and benevolence. Authentic leadership takes seriously the cosmopolitan goals of justice, hospitality, and notion of world citizenry. The full reality of the cosmopolitan, citizen of the world, is not yet with us but well-intentioned, authentic leaders can still explore the potential for such a state. Immanuel Kant clarifies the dichotomy between existence and promise, between nations involved in political and economic warfare contra a state of mutual support and friendship. Cosmopolitanism strives to further virtues such as openness encouraging empathy-at-a distance, and the transformation of leaders from bystander to helper. In his work, ‘Risk Society’, Ulrich Beck foregrounds people’s fears in the light of global pollution, warfare and poverty, which means the need for mutual aid is greater than ever. Jacques Derrida argues in true cosmopolitan fashion for free asylum cities to protect those who are persecuted, seeking openness as a new form of geo-political solidarity. Authentic leaders hold out the hand of hospitality, especially to the movement of diaspora, and the general migration of people. Transnational democracy, as described by John Dryzek, reinforces the cosmopolitan model to argue for the interplay of discourse with no need for centralised, government organizations. In this respect, authentic leaders become facilitators, stewards, and educators to followers and other leaders, to build a more humane, interrelated, cosmopolitan world. Keywords  Novalis · Humanity · Multi-perspectivism · World citizenry · Ulrich Beck · Risk society · Derrida · Free cities · Diaspora · John Dryzek · Facilitator · Cosmopolitan world

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Shaw, The Philosophy of Authentic Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29650-5_10

187

188

10  Cosmopolitan Spirit

Cosmopolitanism Charles Taylor reminds us of the two originating strands of authenticity which are instructive in understanding cosmopolitanism. One is represented by the Cartesian world view of disengaged rationality, which emphasises abstraction, political individualism, and self-determination. The other is the romantic vision, critical of rationality and atomism because it neglects social ties and community influence but far from extending to the apotheosis of the nation-state Hegel describes. As far as morality goes, rather than look at consequences and transcendent rewards and punishment as a guide to action, the romantic view suggests individuals have an inner sense, an intuitive feeling for what is right and wrong. The romantic poet-philosopher, Novalis, relates this strength to cosmopolitanism based on inner spiritual power which brings about genuine peace and a satisfactory way for individuals to relate to each other: ‘Only through inner religion, not through outward institutional reform, can unity be re-established’.1 Novalis insists individual, cosmopolitan mindset can be reached through creative imagination, an authentically experienced, perfected version of humanity. The new spiritual world leads to freedom, peaceful state reforms, and the unification of humanity without dependence on national borders. The romantic ideal of spiritual transcendence captures the cosmopolitan love of humanity. ‘The perfected human beings are citizens of the world, members of the organic whole of humanity’.2 While Novalis values the importance of the state, albeit in ideal form, the spiritual benefit of religion offers cosmopolitan sentiments which nation-states seem unable to comprehend in their determination to compete and engage in war with other states. With cynicism, however, there is also hope: It is impossible that worldly powers come into equilibrium by themselves; only a third element, that is worldly and supernatural at the same time, can achieve this task…there is the rapturous feeling of freedom, the unlimited expectations of a more potent sphere of action, the pleasure in what is new and young, the informal contact with all fellow citizens, the pride in human universality.3

It can be concluded from these early remarks that authentic leaders need not prioritise the nation-state when they are pursuing democratic rights and ideals of openness, respect and hospitality. Growth of the authentic universe takes its most definitive step forward as a worldly perspective when it reaches out beyond self-­ interest and parochial politics to become cosmopolitan. In terms of placement, there is reterritorialization and openness which precludes the entrenched defensive postures of nationalism, tribalism and ethnocentricity.  Pauline Kleingeld “Romantic Cosmopolitanism: Novalis’s Christianity or Europe.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (2): 269–284, p. 274. 2  Ibid. p. 284. 3  Novalis (1996). “Christianity or Europe. A Fragment” in The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics. Frederick C. Beiser (trans. and ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 59–79, p. 77. 1

Cosmopolitanism

189

Based on this description, neither authenticity nor cosmopolitanism can be equated with globalisation. The globalisation movement, somewhat counter-­ intuitively, includes closed space, interlocked organizations which accept exclusion, elite groups of countries which dominate developing countries for potential profitability, exploitation of cheap labour, and investment without concern for local welfare. If we include patriotic fervour which can tip over into realpolitik, the cosmopolitan outlook must be welcomed as a humanitarian counterforce to global policies. In pursuing cosmopolitanism leaders recognise that to be a member of the wide community of all humanity, authentic dispositions expressive of identity, empathy, loyalty and commitment inevitably extend beyond the nation-state: What is being asserted is that humans are in some fundamental sense members of a wider body as contrasted to the membership of a particular political community such as a city-­ state, nation-state or even an empire. All the latter are accidents of one’s birth or circumstance. That one is a global citizen points to a more fundamental fact about who one is, one’s being, for instance, a human being sharing the essential characteristics of humanity— for example, rationality—with all other human beings.4

In displaying a capacity for perspective-taking and the facility to comply with different social and cultural practices, authentic leader policy planning takes seriously the cosmopolitan goals of justice, hospitality, and notion of world citizenry: We should regard our deliberation as, first and foremost, deliberation about human problems of people in particular concrete situations, not problems growing out of a national identity that is altogether unlike that of others…We should work to make all human beings part of our community of dialogue and concern, base our political deliberations on that interlocking commonality…The life of the cosmopolitan, who puts right before country, and universal reason before the symbols of national belonging, need not be boring, flat or lacking in love.5

The limitations of globalisation with regard to income equality, border controls and conservative acceptance of arbitrary restrictions based on race, class or gender, mean there is an ‘unequal distribution of resources in capitalism and movements that attempt to reconfigure the people’.6 Conversely, fluid boundaries relating to cosmopolitan thinking counteract such democratic inadequacies. The alternative to the globalisation position is the minoritarian which refers to those people who are dominated or subordinate to those who systematically influence decision-making. Whereas the general will presupposes the aggregate voice of a stable, measured democratic grouping, minoritarian democracy ‘circumvents the boundary problem by rejecting the need for, or legitimacy of, territorial and civic borders’.7 The upshot is that the minoritarian voice resists assimilation by the nation, without preaching  Nigel Dower and John Williams (eds.) (2002) Global Citizenship: A Critical Introduction. New York and London: Taylor & Francis Group. p. 2. 5  Martha C. Nussbaum, (1994). “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism.” Boston Review XIX (5) 3–6. October/November, pp. 3, 4. 6  James A. Chamberlain (2017). “Minoritarian Democracy: The Democratic Case for No Borders.” Constellations 24 (2): 142–153, p. 147. 7  Ibid. p. 148. 4

190

10  Cosmopolitan Spirit

revolution it is nonetheless confrontational in the pursuit of establishing cosmopolitan values which defuse and diffuse the dictates of the overriding majority. There is no tailored identity to fit one nation, religion or ethnicity, though one may vocalize allegiance to one or the other. The point is that there is no reliance on the straightjacket of birth and background. Where globalization looks to work and business rights, and the variance between nation-states and transnationalism, cosmopolitanism has broader applications including a state of mind which questions universal truths, stereotypical identities, and control of movement. Leaders become a vital part of the social discourse which concerns itself with global matters, international justice and environmental issues. Global communication characterises the spread of public discourse to offer a wide level of analysis, outweighing the insularity of nation-state dictates. Cosmopolitical thinking is not merely concerned with geographical space but rather a way of life which relates to authentic character. Once this occurs the foundation is laid for the recognition of open debate where all can speak freely to make themselves heard if they wish. Where the citizen of the state possesses civic virtue the citizen of the universe, the Kosmopolite, lives a life of virtue guided by natural law. Cosmopolitan thinking is not guided by international precepts; inter-national is literally the relation of nations rather than individuals, with citizenship based on the nation-state. Cosmopolitanism is rather guided by an open form of discourse ethics; the ‘belief in the existence of a morality and an identity above the principles shaped by states’.8 In fact, when nation-states fail in their duty to provide security and reasonable living standards the recourse is to appeal to an improved model of citizenship: ‘When national citizenship fails to protect people’s civil, social and economic rights, their only resort is to hope for better conditions in their alternative capacity as world citizens’.9 The promotion of a universally shared experience of life denotes the wide reach of authentic leadership’s potential to express the burgeoning promise of conviviality, immaterial communities, and topological relationships of cooperation. But the full reality of the cosmopolitan, the citizen of the world, is not yet with us. Well-­ intentioned authentic leaders need, therefore, to fully explore what is realisable and what remains out of reach. Put another way, arguments concerning cosmopolitanism hover between what exists and what could exist. Kant clarifies the dichotomy between existence and promise, between nations who fight for aggrandisement, self-expression, and global warfare (political and economic), and a state of humanity which would further mutual support and friendship. For Kant, the rational cosmopolitan is true to humanity, a figure who transcends self-interest, an essential idea that everyone should act out in society: According to Kant: Wars, tense and unremitting military preparations, and the resultant distress which every state must eventually feel within itself: even in the midst of peace—these are the means by

 Derek Heater, (2000). “Does Cosmopolitan Thinking have a Future?” Review of International Studies 26 (5) 179–197, p. 181. 9  Ibid. p. 191. 8

Cosmopolitanism

191

which nature drives nations to make initially imperfect attempts but finally, after many devastations, upheavals and even complete inner exhaustion of their powers, to take the step which reason could have suggested to them even without so many sad experiences—that of abandoning a lawless state of savagery and entering a federation of peoples in which every state, even the smallest, could expect to derive its security and rights not from its own power or its own legal judgement, but solely from this great federation (Foedus Amphictyonum), from a united power and the law-governed decisions of a united will.10

For Kant, to will that we are rational cosmopolitans is to be in accord with nature, the life-force that deals with the actual to access the potential. Kant understands that the idea of right is ‘best suited to the identity of world citizens, not to that of citizens of a particular nation state, but that this insight was lost when the universalistic elements of right were swamped by the particularistic self-assertion of one nation against another’.11 Cosmopolitanism projects an admixture of language, dialects, creolization, hybrids and possibilities. It sides with laws of nature and freedom of the life-force to inform humanity that the way forward is based on natural, universal rights, rejecting war, self-interest, class domination and general aggression: No one can or ought to decide what the highest degree may be at which mankind may have to stop progressing, and hence how wide a gap may still of necessity remain between the idea and its execution. For this will depend on freedom, which can transcend any limit we care to impose.12

Stakes are high. Kant’s worldwide peace and universal hospitality set out to minimise disharmony and promote global concord. His insistence on cosmopolitan thinking as a precondition of perpetual peace means there can be no place for inhospitable conduct: [C]ontinents distant from each other can enter into peaceful mutual relations which may eventually be regulated by public laws, thus bringing the human race nearer and nearer to a cosmopolitan constitution. If we compare with this ultimate end the inhospitable conduct of the civilised states of our continent, especially the commercial states, the injustice which they display in visiting foreign countries and peoples (which in their case is the same as conquering them) seems appallingly great.13

When taken as interrelated entities, national decisions within the worldview each have a knock-on effect so that injustice in one quarter reverberates everywhere. Kant admits there is a natural predisposition for self-interest even for nations to wage war as they desire to expand or colonise. But his notion of nature has an enlightened effect; it unites nations under the concept of a cosmopolitan right to progress in the name of mutual self-interest and the spirit of commerce.

 Immanuel Kant (1784/1991) “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose.” H.  B. Nisbet (trans.) Hans Reiss (ed.) in Political Writings. Cambridge University Press. 41–53, p. 47. 11  Robert Fine (2011). “Cosmopolitanism and Natural Law: Rethinking Kant” in Maria Rovisco and Magdalena Nowicka (eds.). The Ashgate Research Companion to Cosmopolitanism. Routledge, 147–162, p. 148. 12  Kant, Political Writings, p. 191. 13  Ibid. p. 106. 10

192

10  Cosmopolitan Spirit

Ideals designed to elevate the values of humanity have an uphill struggle against extant, aggressive patriotism and self-interested divisive agendas. Contra Kant, it could be argued that ethical considerations are seen as parochial exercises of localised judgments where social allegiance is culturally specific and family, race and personal religions are prioritised. But clearly the wider implications for any citizen living in the modern world of interconnected networks, assemblages, information technology, and international commerce cannot be ignored. Placed within this orbit of diversity and multifarious relationships spread throughout the world all the salient characteristics of authentic leadership relating to courage and promotion of the common good rise to the surface: Today’s world is at a crossroads. Either it will leave behind the ancient impasses bred of privilege and of limited solidarities, or it will get bogged down in new patterns of violent servitudes. If the world is to succeed in its development efforts, it needs to discover, to promote, and to propose an ethics which takes full account of the requirements of authentic development.14

If negative evaluation persists it results in exclusion and becomes all the easier to ignore distant interests. At worst, toxic leaders devise policies to dehumanize the victimised with little or no conscience. There are always attempts to justify negative behaviour, ‘given people’s dextrous facility for justifying violent means, all kinds of inhumanities get clothed in moral wrappings. Voltaire put it well when he said, ‘those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities’.15 The basic self-interest view reinforces the self-interested nation-state view of prioritising insiders rather than outsiders. Self-interestedness also mitigates the chance of acting with courage when someone is in danger. Fear for personal safety obviously plays a part but it has been shown that over time bystanders to injustice who remain passive often lose vestiges of empathic distress and distance themselves from victims: ‘We cannot expect bystanders to sacrifice their lives for others’.16 Yet, there are notable exceptions which help indicate how hospitality is put into practice in extreme circumstances. Ervin Staub gives the example of rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe, who endangered their own lives to help others: In their families, they had learned to include groups other than their own in the realm of humanity—that is, in the moral realm. Moreover, once people begin to help others, they also begin to change. Through learning by doing, initial acts of helping can lead to a more positive evaluation of other people and concern about their welfare. This process both furthers moral inclusion and strengthens the motivation to help. It can also lead to a self-­ perception as the kind of person who will make the sacrifices needed to help others.17

 Denis Goulet (2006). Development Ethics at Work. Abingdon, Oxon. New York: Routledge. p. 4.  Cited in, Albert Bandura (1999). “Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities”. Personality and Social Psychology Review 3 (3): 193–209, p. 195. 16  Erwin Staub (2003). The Psychology of Good and Evil: Why Children, Adults, and Groups Help and Harm Others. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 318. 17  Ervin Staub (1990). “Moral Exclusion, Personal Goal Theory, and Extreme Destructiveness” Journal of Social Issues 46 (1): 47–64, p. 60. 14 15

Cosmopolitanism

193

The unfettered hospitality proposed by cosmopolitanism is indicative of humane consideration for others, no matter their race, religion or background. Tracey Dowdeswell provides another powerful example of Albanian rescuers, in this case Muslims, who rescued Jews during the holocaust. Albanian’s hospitality is part of their code of honour and moral egalitarianism, it exemplifies the way cosmopolitan principles can ‘span cultural, linguistic and religious divides’.18 Rescuers stand in front of their homes, doors open wide, sometimes with shoes strewn across the mat, welcoming all visitors. They hold out cups of tea, or lovingly display photographs of departed relatives, in this small and culturally homogenous, deeply religious and deeply cosmopolitan society, to express Kant’s ideal of the law of hospitality during the dark days of the Holocaust. Rescuers embodied Kant’s ideal of moral universalism—that all persons are ends in themselves and of equal worth—as well as reciprocity, Kant’s counsel that we think from the standpoint of everyone else…Rescuers also demonstrate the truth of what Kant argued in Perpetual Peace: that when political discourse is subordinate to morality, peace among peoples can be achieved.19

Authentic leaders who generate cosmopolitan spirit bring attention to the lack of intervention and empty posturing so common with international organizations, such as the United Nations. They do so by nurturing virtues such as phronesis and openness, encouraging empathy-at-a distance and make deliberate efforts to intensify moral concern for others, transforming leaders from bystander to helper. Practical wisdom is an emotional and intellectual virtue which encapsulates honesty, generosity and empathic concern for others. Introspection is needed for self-­determination and used to analyse why people turn against each other and how attentiveness to the plight of discriminated victims can be strengthened. Though it is understood that directly influencing the moral standing of other people is not part of the authentic remit, indirectly motivating moral standing as a virtuous role model can be significant, ‘agents with well-developed moral capacities are more likely to produce institutions and develop social practices that are just…enacting global responsibility at an individual level (which) include dispositions for empathy, respect, critical awareness, action, and knowledge…’.20 It is insufficient to stand idly by, show pity, and be kind to distant others who suffer. This is a form of ironic scepticism which sustains feelings at a distance, fuelled by the spectacle of media coverage which, in terms of post-humanitarian thinking, is a form of self-empowerment rather than involvement. The corporatisation of help and humanitarian policies have become a commercial industry in themselves, including marketing, branding and celebrity-driven campaigns intensified by the hype and distancing effect of modern, media hierarchies.21 Images of suffering

 Tracey Dowdeswell (2011). “Cosmopolitanism, Custom, and Complexity: Kant’s Cosmopolitan Norms in Action.” Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal 3 (3): 176–196. p. 182. 19  Ibid. p. 190. 20  Neta C. Crawford (2009). No Borders, No Bystanders: Developing Individual and Institutional Capacities for Global Moral Responsibility in Charles R. Beitz and Robert E. Goodin Global Basic Rights. Oxford University Press. 131–155, p. 139, 140. 21  Lilie Chouliaraki (2013). The Ironic Spectator. Cambridge: Polity Press. 18

194

10  Cosmopolitan Spirit

become part of what Baudrillard calls the ‘lowest common culture’,22 an aesthetic recycling which depersonalises, dehumanises and decontextualizes suffering. In the process, the locus of morality shifts away from personal responsibility to an objectified arena of concern. Ultimately, these campaigns are distancing, they result in the failure to associate the vulnerability of sufferers with injustice or recognise the way unequal distribution of income and goods impacts the quality of humanity across the globe. This is morality which ‘perpetuates the historical relationships of power between the West and the developing world, under the noble guise of cosmopolitan solidarity.’23 Solidarity becomes a practice of self-expression and self-gratification which radiates from a personally concerned centre rather than from the ‘public world’ ‘as a site where we both think about and imagine the other that promises to renew cosmopolitan solidarity, today’.24 In this world, authentic leadership can further an agonistic, humanitarian form of communication to engender cosmopolitan solidarity with no desire for reciprocation. This is a return to Levinas and acknowledgement that others cannot be assimilated or subordinated to arbitrary, personal values but must be recognised in their distinction and difference, with legitimate and just claims to be an equal part of the public realm. Authentic leaders express the true cosmopolitan sentiment by ‘problematizing human vulnerability as a question of global injustice, collective responsibility, and social change.’25 Cosmopolitanism cannot be absorbed by entrenched globalized behaviour as a way to manage the world, it rather suggests planetary conviviality. In its best light, it does not limit difference to any one model of citizenship but is an idea of polity utilising debate and negotiation which permeates the cosmos, not one particular nation. It seeks to relate to the Other in ways which have been pioneered by Derrida and Levinas. For leadership, rather than support the dualisms of world systems theories or world societies as they grapple with local-global conflicts, adopting the cosmopolitan outlook transcends aporia, it comes with practical suggestions on how to welcome and encourage transnational relations and their transformative influence on topography, topology and lived-time. [T]hreats to this cosmos—resource depletion, rising sea levels, global heating, desertification, species extinction, viral apocalypse, violent fundamentalisms, bio-weapons…impel us to free the polis from the nation-state and imagine a greater cosmos…If decisions are made in the name of national polities, such as recent decisions to put environmental policy on hold in the face of economic imperatives, or of the compromise of claims for rights to life and universal health care because of a need to sustain fiscal responsibility and corporate

 Jean Baudrillard (1990). Revenge of the Crystal. Paul Foss and Julian Pefanis (trans.) Pluto Press.  Lilie Chouliaraki. (2013). “Cosmopolitanism as Irony: A Critique of Post-humanitarianism” in Rosi Braidotti, Patrick Hanafin, Bolette B. Blaagaard. (eds.) After Cosmopolitanism. Routledge. pp. 77–96, p. 79. 24  Ibid. p. 90. 25  Ibid. p. 91. 22 23

Cosmopolitanism

195

structures, then what one appears to lose is not only the space of the cosmos but also a certain modality of the future.26

Cosmopolitanism ascends to the state of peace as nations have descended to the state of war. Ulrich Beck foregrounds people’s fears in the light of global pollution, warfare and poverty. Risk society brings communities together, opening the possibility for authentic leaders to support solidarity, joint-responsibilities and actions which transcend boundaries: [T]he everyday experience of cosmopolitan interdependence is not a mutual love affair. It arises in a climate of heightened global threats, which create an unavoidable pressure to co-operate. With the conceptualization and recognition of threats on a cosmopolitan scale, a shared space of responsibility and agency bridging all national frontiers and divides is created that can (though it need not) found political action among strangers in ways analogous to national politics.27

All of which means the need for such shared interests may be greater than ever. It sets leaders on an ethically bound, normative mission: ‘What cosmopolitanism is cannot ultimately be separated from what cosmopolitanism should be’.28 For one thing, global citizens articulate an all-inclusive transnational dialogue even though such a free-floating enterprise of discussion and debate may at first sight not carry the clout of national authority. A pragmatic approach to the cosmopolitan ideal of representative democracy would not reject abstract principles of justice as a fixed foundation for radically altering the world. It would, however, focus on what is practically feasible as a way authentic leaders can realistically influence the openness and generosity required for transnational democracy. The approach would be to positively address, in agonistic fashion, the problem of dehumanization in its various social and political guises. This does not necessarily meet the cosmopolitan drive to eliminate injustice but critiques pity as an ineffectual palliative which ignores the need to take practical steps to eliminate the true cause of suffering. Much discussion revolves around the application of ethical principles and responsible leadership in terms of deliberative democracy, which is a combination of public deliberation and discourse ethics. The rational pursuit of principles for ethical action attempts to incorporate local and global exchange which includes placating foreign cultures through rational discourse. Leaders, shareholders and stakeholders take part in discussions to find fair conflict resolutions and balanced decisions. A high degree of trust needs to be shown between relevant parties to assuage the problems of cultural heterogeneity and maximize the deliberative and discursive practices at the heart of authentic, responsible leadership. There is no world state nor may it be a desirable proposition. The United Nations is representative but its impotence on the world stage and inability to enforce rulings do not go unnoticed. Its history has been characterised by partisan voting patterns

 Claire Colebrook (2014). Death of the PostHuman. Open Humanities Press. p. 97.  Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider (2006). “Unpacking Cosmopolitanism for the Social Sciences: A Research Agenda.” The British Journal of Sociology 57 (1): 1–23. p. 12. 28  Ibid. p. 4. 26 27

196

10  Cosmopolitan Spirit

and pockmarked by a series of scandals which include ignoring genocides, corrupt foreign aid payments, and endemic corruption. Indeed, world institutions are anything but democratic; the IMF has a one-size-fits-all-approach with control over fiscal and monetary policies as well a history of chairmen who have been imprisoned. In light of this, authentic leaders have the responsibility to take it on themselves to personally edify followers and associates and articulate the positive face of cosmopolitanism which overrides policies of separatism and right-wing populism. It may well be that originally the European Economic Union was a kind of cosmopolitan vanguard not drawn up according to nation-state constitutionalism but with non-state authorised jurisdictions based on human rights, democracy and the rule of law.29 But the subsequent critique of the union and threats of withdrawal are based on business interests and worries over immigration rather than what the union genuinely represents; the peaceful cooperation between nations which have experienced centuries of bellicose conflict. European Union leaders rarely raise the philosophical and ethical issues emanating from cosmopolitanism in their debates on the need for union solidarity or take time to praise the moral importance of the ‘The European Court of Human Rights’. The scope of these institutions reminds us that the critique of global citizenry based on the non-existence of a global state misses the point of cosmopolitanism. To be a global citizen is to make a moral claim about the extent of moral obligations. These incorporate ‘obligations in principle towards people in any part of the world; for instance, to help alleviate poverty, work for international peace, support organisations trying to stop human rights violations, or play one’s part in reducing global warming’.30 It is then incumbent on authentic leaders to devise strategies and effective actions to achieve these desired changes, whether they be based on a long term vision or more immediate action. Cosmopolitan theory will be determined by the nature and extent of duties and rights these issues call for.31 For other thinkers who aver the importance of authenticity, applying the cosmopolitan mindset of benevolence and care is not so straightforward. Heidegger is a case in point. His position on the status of the nation-state contra cosmopolitanism begins with his analysis of dwelling, couched in general terms as the manner in which human beings inhabit earth. The essential nature of mankind is to dwell, to be protected in peace, preserved from harm and danger, a condition which encourages the expression of authenticity.32 Mankind needs to dwell, face up to anxiety, accept death and allow Being to infuse the being of beings. At first glance it seems that being at one with nature, communing with the fourfold elements of life, is not essentially the sole prerogative of where one is domiciled. Yet, the problem is that being-at-home for Heidegger seems to be something nearby rather than remote, a  Erik O. Eriksen, (2009) “The EU: A Cosmopolitan Vanguard”. Global Jurist 9 (1): 1–23.  Nigel Dower (2002). “Global Ethics and Global Citizenship” in Global Citizenship: A Critical Introduction, Dower and Williams, 146–158, p. 146. 31  Ibid. p. 155. 32  Martin Heidegger (1971). “Building, Dwelling, Thinking” in Poetry, Language, Thought. Albert Hofstadter. (trans.) New York: Harper & Row. 29 30

Cosmopolitanism

197

virtual omnipresent, an occasion to think and question: ‘The question of dwelling, along with the question of our own identity and belonging, first arises—can only arise—in and through the specific places in which we find ourselves…We thus begin in the singularity and specificity of place—of this place…’.33 Heidegger’s authenticity is not aligned with the cosmopolitanism associated with authentic leadership; it is rather ‘jargon’ which supports nostalgia and loyalty to the homeland.34 As David Harvey puts it, Heidegger’s reactionary position mitigates against cosmopolitanism, he rejects universality in favour of boundaries, the ‘will of the state’, arguing in favour of permanence, the ‘place-bound sense of geopolitics’, following a path of intense nationalism to ensure social and political security.35 Though Heidegger becomes disillusioned with the National Socialist party he still voices the love of homeland and yearning for place, the place of the Black Forest, the Swabian soil of home. This is coupled with an exclusionary anti-Semitic aversion to rootless foreigners in which Germany is the guardian of Being, ‘the German people are an ontologically and being-historically chosen people who are marked out by the history of being as the ones who pose, decide and renew the question of being. Heidegger is committed to a German-centric vision of being’.36 Moving away from jargon and dwelling that encompasses beings, the cosmopolitanism of authentic leadership is a far more constructive, active and pedagogical stance interposed between self, nation and global sensibility: If we educate citizens to see themselves primarily as citizens of a world community, as opposed to members of narrow, special, chosen, and exceptional communities, then these citizens would be less likely to engage in the rituals of blood that are so indispensable to patriotism…37

Derrida’s position is also antithetical to Heidegger’s, as illustrated by his advocacy of the case for ‘free cities’ which amounts to a critique of all physical and psychological constraints implied by the nation-state. These cities are intended to serve as asylums, a refuge for writers in danger of persecution. In the absence of nation-state protection, an overarching cosmopolitan approach takes responsibility to protect the democratic right of free speech. Derrida extends the original remit of setting up protection for authors to an all-encompassing ‘openness to a new form of

 Jeff Malpas (2014) “Rethinking Dwelling: Heidegger and the Question of Place.” Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology Newsletter 25 (1): 15–23, p. 22. 34  Theodor Adorno (1964/2003). The Jargon of Authenticity. Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will (trans.) London and New York: Routledge. 35  David Harvey (1989) The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change, p. 209. 36  Eric S. Nelson (2017): “National Socialism, Antisemitism, and the History of Being.” Heidegger Jahrbuch 11: 77–88, p. 95. C/f. Martin Heidegger (2016). “Ponderings” 11–VI: Black Notebooks 1931–1938. Richard Rojcewicz (tr.) Indiana University Press. 37  Eduardo Mendieta (2009) “From Imperial to Dialogical Cosmopolitanism” Ethics & Global Politics, 2(3): 241–258, p. 249. (my emphasis) 33

198

10  Cosmopolitan Spirit

geo-­political solidarity’.38 For Derrida this represents a direct challenge to the closure of nation-states, exposing them to ‘a new charter of hospitality’. Whether it be the foreigner in general, the immigrant, the exiled, the deported, the stateless, or the displaced person…we would ask these new cities of refuge to reorient the politics of the state…If the name and the identity of something like the city still has a meaning, could it, when dealing with the related questions of hospitality, and refuge, elevate itself above nation-states, or at least free itself from them, in order to become, to coin a phrase in a new and novel way, a free city.39

The cities represent Derrida’s vision to protect the oppressed, not as a political foe against the state, but in the spirit of cosmopolitanism as a haven for imaginative forays in a space of freedom. In the Cities of Asylum network, Derrida presents his vision for a democracy to come, the reorientation of the politics of the state to protect those in need, which include peoples of the diaspora, refugees, migrants and exiles. The cosmopolitical community and the role of foreigner are a particular focus of Derrida’s philosophy; his musings on the subject help us understand openness as authenticity’s extended reach and the dispositions which come into play. Descriptions of benevolence, hospitality, and moral sentiment appeal to the welfare of others and lay the groundwork for the global reach utilised by authentic leadership. The need to be hospitable may seem an innocuous, minimal requirement, somewhat commonplace for leader conduct but for Derrida the notion fully explores universal, ethical duties. It brings to the forefront a deep analysis of authentic leadership’s moral component; accepting responsibility to question institutions, isolate their inadequacies, target weak spots, and further the common good. All too often the earnestness needed for ethical responsibility is degraded by superficiality, power posing and hypocrisy. Derrida’s hospitality acts as a counterforce, taking issue with the predisposition to exclude people from one’s moral universe by devaluing them, rejecting them as outsiders, or justifying policies of dehumanization: Humans, like other organisms, tend to fear the strange…people often dislike, fear, and feel threatened by other people’s way of life, beliefs, and values that are substantially different from their own. These differences threaten people’s beliefs in the goodness of their own identity and group, and their comprehension of reality.40

Derrida explains the complexities by taking issue with the dualisms created by subjectivities which see the world in terms of near and far, familiar and strange, domestic and foreign, local and global, secure and dangerous. He insists deconstruction acknowledges these dualisms only to fracture them and open up what are arbitrarily erected but deeply entrenched polarisations. Derrida presents the law of absolute

38  Sean K. Kelly (2004) “Derrida’s Cities of Refuge: Toward a Non-Utopian Utopia” Contemporary Justice Reviews 7 (4): 421–439 p. 427. 39  Jacques Derrida (1997/2001). On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. Mark Dooley and Michael Hughes (trans.) Routledge. pp. 4, 9. 40  Ervin Staub (1990). “Moral Exclusion, Personal Goal Theory, and Extreme Destructiveness”. Journal of Social Issues 46 (1) 47–64, p. 52.

Cosmopolitanism

199

hospitality as a way to deconstruct such boundaries which delineate otherness. He notes the antinomy between the absolute purity of hospitality and its conditional limitations creates an imperative to carefully walk a tightrope between two opposing tendencies. On the one hand: ‘The law of absolute, pure, unconditional, hyperbolic hospitality, asks us to say “yes” to the newcomer…before any determination, before any prevention, before any identification—irrespective of being a stranger, an immigrant, a guest or an unexpected visitor’.41 On the other, faced with the acceptance of conditional laws which limit hospitality, openness is undermined and rights of entry denied, ensuring a foreigner remains a foreigner. The argument for authentic decision-making is based on hospitality, insisting this applies to nations as much as individuals. Hospitality is the core of ethics and it is incumbent on leaders to make it a priority. According to this line of thought, ethical behaviour does not emanate from an egoistic response or initiative. It just is; one is always-already subject to a primal calling of duty to the other, above all respecting their otherness. There is commitment, radical altruism in responding to the call which has to be answered. By philosophically taking up the existential condition of being-there, as a being situated some-where, the host can accept the other from an emplaced, home-base; indeed the other’s request to be accepted reinforces the ability of the host to display hospitality: ‘The foreigner, then, gives a place to the host from which the host can give to the foreigner; he becomes the taking place of giving and, ironically, becomes the host of the host’.42 There is outright acceptance of alterity and Derrida relates this concretely to place, not just location but also temporality, the time of an event taking-place: Hospitality gives and takes more than once in its own home. It gives, it offers, it holds out, but what it gives, offers, holds out, is the greeting which comprehends and makes or lets come into one’s home, folding the foreign other into the internal law of the host.43

In sum, ethics is hospitality, an active reaching out and responsive welcoming of the other. The idea of unconditional gift-giving means we do not get or expect something in return as an exchange. There is no instrumentality or calculation involved in giving even though the normal condition is to have such expectations, especially where the mutual exchanges of business leaders are concerned. But this understanding of the gift is unusual because once the gift is recognised as a gift it becomes, consciously or unconsciously, part of a giving circuit in which reciprocity is expected. For the gift to be a gift that keeps on giving unconditionally, it has to be part of the impossible realm of pure hospitality. Impossibility, however, is only a thought exercise, a socially constructed understanding that gradually dissipates through pragmatic activity, shared dependence, and the negotiated to and fro of active-reactive social intercourse.  Gerasimos Kakoliris (2015). “Jacques Derrida on the Ethics of Hospitality” in Elvis Imafidon (ed.) The Ethics of Subjectivity: Perspectives Since the Dawn of Modernity. Palgrave Macmillan 144–156, p. 146. 42  Kelly, “Derrida’s Cities of Refuge”, p. 430. 43  Jacques Derrida (2000). “Hospitality” Angelaki 5 (3): 3–18. p. 7. 41

200

10  Cosmopolitan Spirit

Derrida’s views on cosmopolitanism are readily applicable to the movement of diaspora. Diaspora is a communal phenomenon which incorporates displacement, uprootedness, and questions of group identity. Not all diaspora desire to return back to their original homeland, even the Jewish diaspora is split over the long term goal of return. The fact that some diasporic movements focus on returning home while others gladly settle in a newly found hostland tends to create a ‘double consciousness of belonging both here and there’.44 But apart from the potential political problems of becoming an underclass as newcomer, in its positive light cosmopolitan workers are vital entrepreneurs, innovators who benefit from their mobility, ‘for the new cosmopolitan worker, nationality is a garment to be donned or shed according to convenience. Income and class, as well as mobility, divide the cosmopolitan and the local’.45 A modern example of diaspora is the emergence of the transnational, world middle class which shares tastes and values, ‘despite ethnic, nationality and other differences, members of this class have far more in common with each other than with their fellow, poorer co-nationals or co-ethics…These global tribes are today’s quintessential cosmopolitans’.46 Along with this, come all the advantages of rejecting parochialism and being intimately involved in a worldwide network. Authentic leaders recognise the coexistence of different lifestyles without the creation of a single culture. They focus on the advantages accruing from an identity-­ in-­flux and the promising transformations brought about by transnational participation in hybrid groupings. For all the potential problems of assimilation and political agendas practiced by some nation-states to relegate refugees and diaspora to minority status, cosmopolitan thinking encourages difference as a positive addition to social life. A degree of homeland patriotism is accepted as a natural reaction from minorities who feel embattled but authentic leaders focus on initiating policies which encourage plurality and promoting internal networks among scattered diaspora. No doubt, adopting the plural perspectives cosmopolitanism requires is a difficult but still attainable goal. Drawing on stoic philosophy, Nussbaum sketches the target groups leaders need to embrace in the form of a series of concentric circles: The first one is drawn around the self; the next takes in one’s immediate family; then follows the extended family; then, in order, one’s neighbors or local group, one’s fellow city-­ dwellers, one’s fellow countrymen—and we can easily add to this list groupings based on ethnic, linguistic, historical, professional, gender and sexual identities. Outside all these circles is the largest one, that of humanity as a whole. Our task as citizens of the world will be to draw the circles somehow toward the center.47

 Vinay Dharwadker (2011) “Diaspora and Cosmopolitanism” in Maria Rovisco and Magdalena Nowicka (2011) (eds.). The Ashgate Research Companion to Cosmopolitanism. Routledge, 125–144, p. 131. 45  Nicholas Van Hear (1998). New Diasporas: The Mass Exodus, dispersal and Regrouping of Migrant Communities. London and New York: Taylor & Francis Group. p. 253. 46  Ibid. 47  Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism” p. 4. 44

Cosmopolitanism

201

Not all thinkers agree with this trajectory. Gertrude Himmelfarb believes cosmopolitanism underestimates nation and family ties: ‘Above all, what cosmopolitanism obscures, even denies, are the givens of life: parents, ancestors, family, race, religion, heritage, history, culture, tradition, community—and nationality. These are not ‘accidental’ attributes of the individual. They are essential attributes’.48 Attempts to refute Nussbaum’s analysis amount to a critique of the ability to stand neutral as a moral agent by divesting the self of all its inherent influences which comprise identity, even though Nussbaum would hardly argue that impartiality means moral agency is independent of all social influence. The point is that there are communitarian loyalties to those closest in neighbourhood, family and nation, and morality is understood to be socially contextualised: Some positions…reject the notion that morality must aspire to an impartialist world-view and argue instead that morality is ‘embedded’ in particular social, historical and affective commitments…the possible implications of these firmly anti-impartialist positions cannot be ignored.49

Consequently, the argument goes that anyone who is a ‘citizen of nowhere’ cannot be a competent moral agent; moral agents cannot be removed from the context of their role as citizen of the state and adherence to this position makes it difficult to support cosmopolitan ethics. According to this account, in pursuing authenticity, a leader cannot escape a community related identity and is assumed to be spatially bound and explicitly state-centric. However, as we have noted, self-determination and virtue ethics are not in this way territorially bound, there are multifarious community influences which transcend nation and patriotism in constitutive life-stories so that the national context or horizon will appear as only one symbolic-cultural boundary. Rather than one community vying for allegiance with another, the cosmopolitan identity is best understood as ‘the figure of a web of intersecting and overlapping morally relevant ties’,50 a form which accommodates the distant other in fluid inclusivity. This directly leads us back to authentic characteristics, dispositional as well as behavioural. It is noteworthy that community influences are not given directives with ready-made recipes for action; they rather serve as formative influences, nurseries where learning takes place through dialogue and deliberation in order to develop moral capacities and an incipient cosmopolitan mindset which may initially not be in place. John Dryzek puts it another way with reference to transnational networks which authentic leaders readily monitor. His thesis of transnational democracy beyond the cosmopolitan model is the interplay of discourse writ large with no need for institutionalised, centralised, government organizations. Communication directly concerned with cosmopolitan issues of mobility, ecology, environmental protection and

 Gertrude Himmelfarb (1996). “The Illusions of Cosmopolitanism”, in Joshua Cohen (ed.) For Love of Country? Martha C. Nussbaum. Boston, MA: Beacon Press Books. pp. 72–77, p. 77. 49  Toni Erskine (2002). “‘Citizen of Nowhere’ or ‘The Point Where Circles Intersect’? Impartialist and Embedded Cosmopolitanisms.” Review of International Studies 28 (3): 457–77, p. 459. 50  Ibid. p. 474. 48

202

10  Cosmopolitan Spirit

general welfare are dealt with through decentralised networks filtered through civil societies.51 Deliberation does not depend on national support but can be considered ‘in terms of the contestation of discourses and their component identities. Such a model of democracy is particularly conducive to international society, because unlike older models of democracy, it can downplay the problem of boundaries’.52 Transnational civil societies may vie with states or even international government organizations to form their own interlacing networks which are not structured institutions but allow for informal connections centring around common interests and joint, co-operative action. Dryzek arguments in favour of local interaction, communicative freedom, and deliberation present one of the options authentic leaders can draw from to democratise contemporary forms of globalization. They can look to an alternative liberal approach, which relies on a more ‘top-down’ model built upon ‘formal legal and political institutions’ which help safeguard individuals from the more deleterious effects of globalisation.53 Pragmatic cosmopolitanism, under the guidance of John Dewey’s pragmatic philosophy, can also be added to the political mix. This utilises the notion of problem-solving publics to deal with conflicts between territorially bound nation-state interests and the transnational issues raised by cosmopolitan concerns. Authentic leader contribution is to critically present the call for action from different groups by ensuring a democratic basis for deliberative exchanges: ‘Without leaders who can successfully construct, mobilise and sustain global or transnational constituencies, existing territorial boundaries will constitute the limits of democratic life’.54 Leaders recognise the significance of public power as a discursive medium which blends loose networks with authoritative political agencies, employing critical faculties, deliberation and feedback to establish transnational publics for those interested, including migrant and minority groupings. In short, authentic leaders have sufficient humility to respect the fact that there are shifts in the way decision-making is made away from hierarchical authority to a shared, distributive model of social cooperation. The leader is facilitator, steward and educator to other leaders as well as followers to build a more humane world. The ‘most challenging mode of leadership for global justice’ involves ‘engaging with and educating the vast majority of persons in privileged, affluent democracies, concerning global justice issues’.55

 John S. Dryzek (2000). Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations. Oxford University Press. 52  Ibid. p. 129. 53  Daniel Bray (2011). “Pragmatic cosmopolitanism and the role of leadership in transnational democracy” in Joe Hoover, Meera Sabaratnam, and Laust Schouenborg (eds.) Interrogating Democracy in World Politics. London and New York: Taylor & Francis Group. 166–190, p. 166. 54  Ibid. p. 176. 55  Thad Williamson and Douglas A. Hicks (2012). “Leadership toward Global Justice: Conceptual and Practical Challenges” in Douglas A. Hicks and Thad Williamson (eds.) Leadership and Global Justice. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 193–205, p. 199. 51

Authentic Enrichment

203

This is not a stronger version of democratic rights, just as cosmopolitanism is not an aggregate of all groups vying for preference. It is, essentially, constitutive of a new mindset, a fresh approach to concepts and language which raises the components of discourse to a higher level of inclusivity in the community of humankind. The result is to encourage unity of diversities, a mosaic of perspectives which sustains difference without wielding leadership imposition from above.56 The objective is to achieve mutual understanding where dialogue is tolerated within diverse forums, and identity is not a protective shield held up against the threat of those who do not ‘belong’, outsiders who set themselves apart from ‘us’.

Authentic Enrichment The cosmopolitan spirit is the ultimate component in pursuit of authenticity, providing vital leader insight into how to cope with the world order. The image of the cosmopolitan as a fancy-free, elitist, globe-trotting individual who refuses commitment is rejected in favour of someone who addresses deeply philosophical issues which deal with the human condition and peaceful survival on this planet. Concern with humanity and the creation of a cosmopolitan consciousness make the authentic leader a visionary thinker of the future; a future replete with worldly values which promote ecological concerns, mutual respect, justice, and the moral worth of each person. But this must be contextualised within the complexity of what the universalistic reach must manage; local differences, the impact of glocalization, and influence of national, political cultures. Authentic leaders recognise opinionated standpoints inherent in opposing worldviews. The exchange of customs and duties which are placed on the public stage can lead to tensions between different cultural groups and ruling hegemony if those customs are considered antithetical to the majority. For one worldview to dominate it must be assumed that it corresponds to a natural, truthful, objective reality, which it patently does not. Rather, the difference of worldviews has to be welcomed; conflicting viewpoints merit exploration as a bountiful source of knowledge and merit just consideration in a world which relativizes discourse and epistemology. At stake is whether leaders are representatives and promoters of the interests of social and political boundaries or whether they can, through concrete intervention, make leadership a sounding board for cosmopolitan issues concerned with gender, marginalised groups, outsider rights, and post-colonial, political responsibilities. Infinite obligation spills over situated boundaries and requires authentic leaders transform self-interest and autonomy into cosmopolitan thinking; a growth in awareness and generosity of spirit which acknowledges the gift of otherness as the road to abundance. In keeping with the fact that authenticity is a lifelong process,

 Leszek Koczanowicz (2010) “Cosmopolitanism and its Predicaments” Studies in Philosophy and Education 29 (2): 141–149. 56

204

10  Cosmopolitan Spirit

actively refining inner core desires and promoting well-being ensure there is always room for moral improvement. Such learnt capabilities can only benefit from cosmopolitanism. Though we are all rooted, even embedded within our own nation and abode, rootlessness does not negate the positive benefits of home security but reveals a newly found sense of belonging to a wider, global community with even greater benefits. Cosmopolitan values of conviviality and hospitality may not immediately carry the same weight as the organizational groupings social identity theory refers to, or Taylor’s ‘frameworks’ which define community as a web of dependences. Nonetheless, Taylor’s frameworks are based on strong evaluations; interpretations which encompass inherently higher goods and these are certainly common to both cosmopolitanism and nationhood. Frameworks do not disappear in relation to one’s personal moral compass: I want to defend the strong thesis that doing without frameworks is utterly impossible for us; otherwise put, that the horizons within which we live our lives and which make sense of them have to include these strong qualitative discriminations…living within such strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human agency.57

Though this communitarian approach flows against the tide of nomadic cosmopolitanism its hyper goods, such as universal care and equal respect for all, resonate with cosmopolitan values. Notwithstanding reservations concerned with stepping outside pre-given ethnic and religious communities, cosmopolitanism has its own essential constituents which include an admixture based on a highly critical perspective, a strong intersubjective dynamic, an enriched moral space, and legally supported democratic empowerment. These values are not incidental to daily activities; on the contrary, they are intrinsic to a positive, noetic mindset of lifeworld behaviour where differences are not crushed but praised. A useful approach to assist with the task of radically reappraising identity to suit Taylor’s reservations is the Foucauldian notion of problematization. Adopting a problematizing mindset ensures how an issue is to be dealt with, seeking efforts to categorise it as a scientific challenge, a political problem, a moral dilemma, or all of the above. This effort of characterisation determines the extent to which one understands apparent dualisms such as local and global, strange and familiar, hostile and friendly, domestic and foreign. The point of problematization is to establish criteria which make something an object of knowledge in the first place and the way in which discursive and non-­ discursive practices create values for what is acceptable or unacceptable. For example, individuals cannot be quantified as a number. Welcoming the other as anonymous, or providing ‘rational’ arguments for exclusion, contravene ethical respect due to individuals who must be recognised with a name and identity, respected for themselves not as an-other but someone of worth in recognition of the singularity of each, unique person. Values are the principles upon which authentic  Charles Taylor (1989). Sources of the Self: The making of the modern identity. Cambridge University Press, p. 27. 57

Authentic Enrichment

205

leaders base their behaviour and the promotion of mutual respect is one such value as it filters through networks of power, institutional mechanisms, and existing forms of knowledge. In his in-depth study of sexuality, Foucault uses examples to question prevailing norms, social assumptions and the irresistible process by which hegemonic beliefs come to be treated as innate human characteristics.58 The argument is that it is necessary to question political structures and those ethical forces which establish unquestioned value judgements and stereotypes. Foucault contextualises such questioning as problematization, a process to explore the status quo and the accepted axioms of fixed ideology. Problematization procedures seek to contextualise prejudices by dismantling the hold they have over society and put into relief the forces of encounter, practices, and interactive variables which sustain their production. These procedures call for authentic leader initiative, proactively entering the fray to carry out the necessary series of interventions. Where Kant expands friendship and hospitality to values which are based on sameness and what is universally shared, Foucault applies his own procedures to highlight the importance of difference. In adopting problematization as a practice authentic leaders isolate and locate conditions for asking probing questions, connecting cause and effect on proximal and distal events, and weighing the implications of separating the local from the global. Because of the wide disparity in lifestyle, language and culture, authentic leaders who problematize need to be adept at translating different origins. Problematizing raises the question of translatability, that is, how easy it is to live with, or simply make sense of, alien cultures, language and traditions which at the outset may appear very different from the experience of one’s own. The translation of the common good into authentic decision-making involves overcoming the double bind of promoting domestic, secure growth while at the same time practicing an ethics of hospitality which unconditionally welcomes outsiders as a natural law. The process begins with cosmopolitan internalisation of otherness which in its immanence situates translation right at the heart of cosmopolitan social theory. Cosmopolitanism, read as a form of cultural translation, views one’s own ethnicity and culture through the eyes of the other: [T]ranslation is more than interpretation and the transmission of meaning; it is also about the transformation of meaning and the creation of something new, for culture is never translated neutrally. The logic of translation is inherent in culture, which is not static or the expression of authorial meaning but is dynamic and transformative…Cultural translation is a process of mutations, transferences, innovations, appropriations, borrowings, re-­ combinations and substitution.59

This inevitably has consequences for authentic leadership by broadening perspective and proclivity to self-transformation. Part of authentic character build-up inevitably considers the degree of internalising the global other in order to appeal to  Michel Foucault(1976/1978) The History of Sexuality. Volume 1. Robert Hurley (trans.). New York: Pantheon Books. 59  Gerard Delanty (2009) The Cosmopolitan Imagination. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press p. 195. 58

206

10  Cosmopolitan Spirit

culturally different groups. Leaders will view both the universal idea of cosmopolitan rights as well as perspectives relevant to specific, migrant groups. The idea of internalisation of otherness promoted by critical cosmopolitanism directly connects to a way of thinking about cultural translation, critical evaluation, and relativizing extant identity. Every time something foreign is translated or interpreted new insights are incorporated. The more experience expands in social relations and the greater variety of exchanges as plurality of contacts, the greater the likelihood for appreciating the relative value of different cultures, surely a prime directive for authentic leadership. The authentic leader as translator is one who acknowledges benefits gained from interaction and reciprocal activities which are potentially life-changing. The logic of translation does not call for a direct re-presentation of what is but rather reformulation of intrinsic presuppositions, ‘translation of the Self and Other, local and global translations, and translations of the past and present…every translation is transformation of both subject and object’.60 Walter Benjamin finds in translation a quality of ‘translatability’ which can be extended to the cosmopolitan urge to understand and accommodate language, foreign cultures and their way of life. It is with the effort of transposition and unfolding what is alien or different that both the translator and the translated open up a heretofore unexpected horizon of experience. With the advent of translatability ‘a specific significance inherent in the original manifests itself’.61 Borrowing from Benjamin, the notion of cultural translation suggests that while all forms of culture are similar, by virtue of their signifying and symbolic activity, translation somehow cracks the edifice of independence and reveals its fragile self-­ sufficiency.62 The act of translation turns singularity inside-out, reveals it uniqueness while hiding its spirit in a way Benjamin describes an object’s aura which veils at the moment it reveals. Difference is already inherent in all cultures which are in constant, relational flux, reinforcing the fact that cosmopolitanism can easily cope with diverse cultures as they are already, fundamentally, decentred and cosmopolitan in essence. Cosmopolitan thinking spurs authentic leadership to intensify its pursuit of self-­ constitution and re-examine its potential for growth by consistently questioning established norms: ‘Cosmopolitan culture is one of self-problematization… and subject formation…in which codifications of Self and Other undergo transformation’.63 In the process, individuals grow as social entities, developing a cosmopolitan ethics which transcends borders. What Foucault describes as spiritual ethics is the movement of self-transfiguration, advancing the ability to find appropriate ethical solutions in relation to the distant Other and the world.  Ibid. pp. 197, 199.  Walter Banjamin (1923/1992). “The Task of the Translator” in Harry Zohn (trans.) Hannah Arendt (ed.) Illuminations. Fontana Press. 70–82, p. 71. 62  Homi Bhabha (1990). “The Third Space” in Jonathan Rutherford (ed.) Identity, Community, Culture, Difference. Lawrence & Wishart, 207–221, pp. 209–210. 63  Delanty, The Cosmopolitan Imagination, pp. 68, 70. 60 61

Authentic Enrichment

207

The result is a fresh way to consider what is liberating and what is constraining. Perspectives work through thoroughly applied questioning with particular reference to dwelling, home and nation. In a sense, authentic leaders are homeless because their vision far outweighs the demarcated political and legal axioms of liberal nationalism. The critical approach penetrates the veil of ideology, appellation of subjectivity, and various latent frameworks which influence thought in prevailing discourse. In meeting the challenges, authentic leaders become agents of self-­ transfiguration, refining and exploring openness, conviviality and virtuous wisdom. Problematizing is a journey of discovery. In the process, authenticity shifts from being a stable, identity configuration to an involved dynamic of multiple opportunities showcased by revitalised notions of democratic inclusion. As a work in progress, the pursuit of authenticity adopts problematization to liberate vision and, most importantly, realise the transformation of self. This leads Eduardo Mendieta to combine cosmopolitan self-transfiguration with authentic self-determination: ‘Universality, consequently must be rearticulated, defended, expanded, and made concrete. Cosmopolitanism must…entail a self-critique of one’s prejudices, as well as a confession and disclosure of one’s epistemic standpoint.’64 (my emphasis) Self-critique, relating to vices and virtues, results in a particular way of acting; a performance to others and a presentation to oneself. To deeply penetrate social issues a phenomenological approach is called for: stepping back, suspending judgment, perceptual exploration, and making decisions which incorporate the experience of others via an intelligent form of empathy. This condition is enhanced by new media technologies and social media which visualize and connect the dots to create a transnational, phenomenological consciousness by ‘thoughtfully imagining the world and its interconnected issues as well as the distant Other…To be kind to strangers requires an intelligent form of empathy and an informed moral outlook’.65 With the stranger no longer spaced at distance but intimately installed in one’s own backyard, narratively structured intersubjectivity must now be reworked to accommodate boundaryless perceptions and modes of consciousness which were previously excluded: Modern subjectivity is not only inscribed through a dualism between self and other, but also between here and there, via the spatialization of inclusion and exclusion, presence and absence, and the specification of what is ‘in-place’ and ‘out-of-place… space is far from a passive stage or container, but is radically open, constituted through perturbation, oscillation and movement…place is nothing if it is not in process.66

 Eduardo Mendieta (2014) “From Imperial to Dialogical Cosmopolitanism” in Matthias Lutz-­ Bachmann, Amos Nascimento, (eds.) Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Cosmopolitan Ideals: Essays on Critical Theory and Human Rights. Ashgate Publishing Ld., 119–138, p. 132. 65   Miriam Sobré-Denton and Nilanjana Bardhan (2013). Cultivating Cosmopolitanism for Intercultural Communication. Routledge, pp. 85, 86. 66  E. Jeffrey Popke (2003). “Poststructuralist ethics: subjectivity, responsibility and the space of community”. Progress in Human Geography 27 (3): 298–316, pp. 302, 309. 64

208

10  Cosmopolitan Spirit

No longer is one tied down to specific places but there are now possibilities to draw on dispersed sources toward a spatial imaginary grounded in intersubjectivity and responsibility. The expanded self that authentic leaders constitute combines the physical, mental and spiritual as a pragmatic source for decision-making, and an ethically qualified task which now includes cosmopolitan communities characterised by hospitality and the interchangeability of perspectives unlimited by space and time. Even more than uncovering genealogical roots and preconceived prejudice, problematizing cosmopolitan thinking is also an exercise in the re-evaluation of identity. It concerns the internal transformation of social and cultural phenomena through self-problematization, self-transcendence and pluralization. The combination of minority traditions and cultural diversity calls for interventions that promote multiple, intersubjective positions for dialogical relationships. At best, these relationships result in a cosmopolitan public sphere, a power free enterprise to ensure the free articulation of interests.67 There is recognition and respect for cultural background but also commitment to the requisite openness to multiple viewpoints. Rather than eliminate views of cultural homeland or ethnic concerns in an accommodating free zone, forums allow for heated debate around presentations of minority and migrant concerns, as well as a-political arguments for sustainability and ecology: ‘Public dialogue is here granted an autopoietic force…now values and value-perspectives cannot be introduced as pre-established, as already-known-to-­ be-true-or-right—they will have to be confirmed by the process’.68 As a process of manifestation and articulation, exchanges demand awareness, self-critique and ample distancing to be able to clarify where ‘one is coming from’, literally and psychologically. Authentic leaders endure this hermeneutic process of understanding as they formulate their life-stories, and present an appealing role model which they hope will inspire others to do likewise. A cosmopolitan, dialogical, perspective-taking eases intelligent empathic contact, jointly agreed upon evaluations, opposition to ethnocentric impositions, and asserts views on personal as well as the public good. It furthers a shared global fate by enacting ‘the basic hermeneutic potential to move in-between contexts, without aiming to reach as such, a detached level of abstraction’.69 The cosmopolitan outlook may not be the easiest to adopt but in the effort to merge what is conflicting horizons of custom, culture and language authentic identity gains traction. Life-stories are recomposed to include multiple attachments over varying distance. The more varied and diverse recognised interactions the greater the scope for self-determination and burgeoning authenticity:

 Hans-Herbert Kögler (2016) “Hermeneutic Cosmopolitanism, or: Toward a Cosmopolitan Public Sphere” in Maria Rovisco and Madalena Nowicka (eds.) The Ashgate Research Companion to Cosmopolitanism. Routledge, 225–242. 68  Ibid. p. 227. 69  Ibid. p. 239. 67

Authentic Enrichment

209

The only way in which individuals are constituted as persons is by learning to refer to themselves, from the perspective of an approving or encouraging other, as beings with certain positive traits and abilities. The scope of such traits—and hence the extent of one’s positive relation-to-self—increases with each new form of recognition that individuals are able to apply to themselves as subjects.70

The need for deepening self-knowledge combined with social approbation underscores the challenges for furthering cosmopolitan openness. Few of the issues cosmopolitanism confronts can be readily resolved. For example, Taylor’s appreciation of communitarianism would object to the implied ease of assimilation one associates with the universality of cosmopolitan values. For Taylor, values are certainly at the heart of identity supporting all virtuous pursuits. But considerable effort is needed to incorporate relevant cosmopolitan values over and above the frameworks which individuals think within; society, milieu, ethnicity and nation. For Taylor, reconsidering fundamental formulations and categorical shifts in authentic identity is an inherently radical manoeuvre. Sustaining the required level of openness is difficult because the wider import of cosmopolitan concerns appear distant in comparison to the everyday lifeworld, even if their implications cut far deeper. Furthermore, various factions in the decision-making process will hold to their conviction that their particular worldview should reign supreme. Figures of authority are indelibly part of individual, nation-states. Whether the conviction is self-imposed or part of an authoritative role, the belief is figures of authority are custodians of a particular set of worldview beliefs. The worldview has many guises; predominant ideology, prevailing discourse, paradigms, or ‘weltanschauung’. Any comprehensive leadership strategy will find it difficult to navigate different world cultures each with their worldview. It is equally difficult, in terms of complexity theory, to impose a worldview on systems which are self-generating, or large networks which invite dispersion rather than centralised authority. Notwithstanding the scepticism to somehow be situated outside of accepted discourse, an acceptance of diverse worldviews is the seed to transcend parochialism. The thinking behind compromise decisions concerning vying worldviews relies on philosophical notions of multiple realities and postmodernist views of ontology concerning whether reality is found or constructed. These approaches demand a new principle of leadership on a global scale observing the construction of reality made possible by the interaction of worldviews. These principles are relativist rather than absolute in ways described by postmodernists. All too often, personal world views are ethnocentric rather than geocentric. An unswerving belief in the sanctity of one’s own system of values can impede the ability to share and come together. This, in turn, means that meaningful dialogue on two levels of interaction, the local and the global, is frustrated. What should be a cosmopolitan negotiation designed to reconcile opposing views for mutual gain becomes a power struggle over ideological credo.

70

 Axel Honneth (1995) The Struggle for Recognition. Joel Anderson (trans.) Polity Press. p. 173.

210

10  Cosmopolitan Spirit

The key to resolve tensions is not to choose an either or scenario but settle ‘in-­ between’, whereby leadership is activated in the hiatus between systems, in the space between worldviews. Some are sceptical that dislocation to find relocation can ever be achieved, ‘there is no space between worldviews to get into…objectivity is objective only within some worldview…worldviews take up all the mindspace there is’.71 Nonetheless, authentic leaders in pursuit of productive intercultural communication and mutually supportive worldviews recognise an interconnecting space, between states and within a single, nation-state. It is not a question of choosing one location over another but rather following the codes appropriate to each belonging, which means cosmopolitans differentiate between cultural locations. Consequently, authentic leaders perpetuate cosmopolitan thinking by laying the foundation for a third space of community. Within this space, leaders draw on motivational sources which allow for intercultural ‘code switching’; the ability to switch back and forth between diverse ‘cultural knowledges and repertoires’.72 Dispositions of versatility and flexibility ensure respect for different lifestyles and cultural heritage with an ability to bring out the best of both homeland and hostland, switching easily between the two in a form of cultural ambidexterity.73 Hybridity, the combining of elements from two or more sources, can work successfully, but is not a definitive solution as it often results in creolization or cross-fertilization which lose vestiges of cultural uniqueness. Rather than being subject to an irreconcilable duality between feeling at home or suffering alienation, the cosmopolitan mindset avoids the pitfalls of assimilation and creolization which can leave individuals in no-man’s land, unable to come to terms with alien culture or lifestyles while nostalgically yearning for homeland. The ability to switch from one cultural and ethical code to another when it is desirable avoids the conflict of cultures by supporting and expressing the differential quality of both. The openness of hospitality relishes this space beyond the home, an invitation to share a generative space beyond possession or control. The form of third space allows cosmopolitanism to be played out in environments where communicative praxis can find ample expression. Of particular interest is the shift from individual personhood to interactive peoplehood as it forefronts the role of leadership and agency in what may well be an asymmetrical power relationship between locals and foreigners, or leaders and followers.74 As a form of neutral ground between cultures, third space is not dialectical syntheses which tends to closures but supports difference as repetition of the new, a dimension of social invention, ‘this third space displaces the histories that constitute it, and sets up new structures of authority, new

 Wilfred Drath (2001) The Deep Blue Sea: Rethinking the Source of Leadership. Jossey-Bass, p. 140, 141. 72  Ian Woodward and Zlatko Skrbis (2012). “Performing Cosmopolitanism” in Gerard Delanty (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Cosmopolitanism Studies, Routledge, 127–137, p. 128. 73  Dharwadker, “Diaspora and Cosmopolitanism”. 74  Sobré-Denton and Bardhan, Cultivating Cosmopolitanism for Intercultural Communication, p. 69. 71

Authentic Enrichment

211

political initiatives, which are inadequately understood through received wisdom’.75 As such, this invites the full potential creativity plays in an authentic leader’s repertoire, solidifying the role of facilitator in a new area of negotiated meaning and representation. The message is that one turns to the multiple layers of otherness within each individual which are not based on any handed-down recipe but which reveal myriad modalities. The alternative to the ties of nation-states interest lies with displacement which injects location into any-space-whatever. Cosmopolitanism recognises the fundamental mobility of the present world so that we are citizens of the entire world because we are no-where at home…no place is our home because our proper dwelling is yet to be constructed…Cosmopolitanism names the denaturalization of every dwelling place of the human being…If no abode is natural to us, all that remains is for us to construct it.76

The ability ‘for us to construct it’ invites authentic leaders to intervene in benign fashion in a self-appointed place of freedom, not to exert authority over others but to mobilise creative innovators who are enlightened cosmopolitans. Cosmopolitanism is not embodied in a supra-national identity but is characterised by growing self-­ reflexivity within existing identities and existing nations. Generative potentials of the third space soar above fixity allowing the full impact of the voice of others, engendering due dignity and respect to share what may be contradictory, alien perspectives. The third space is above all liberating, allowing leaders to inhabit handed-­ down customs and traditions of homeland while employing dispositions which allow for objectivity and unbiased judgments beyond restrictive frameworks. It is the space Derrida describes to find the intricate balance and desirable resolution between closeness and distance, inclusion and exclusion, hospitality and hostility. Derrida’s own conclusion is that no definitive solution can be found; there is never closure but always openness which insists on the ‘principled impossibility’ of a clearly defined, separated self and other. As Heidrun Friese puts it, a politics of hospitality grapples with these ambivalences not to dissipate them but to work with tensions which can be a productive source for personal and social re-evaluation: Hospitality signifies the deferment of definite belongings and evolves in a liminal space… it opens a space and forms of exchange that allow for encounter, yet does not extinguish the obligations that must be noticed and noted (Vermerken) for hospitality to come into being and to subsist…what is at stake is not only thinking of hospitality, but thinking as hospitality.77

Self-realization and identity development proceeds with each new form of recognition that individuals are able to apply to themselves as subjects. Self-transformation means someone you were not in the beginning, it is ‘the guiding goal of the

 Homi Bhabha, “The Third Space”, p. 211.  Mendieta, “From Imperial to Dialogical Cosmopolitanism”, pp. 122, 123. 77  Heidrun Friese (2004). “Spaces of Hospitality”. James Keye (trans.) Angelaki: journal of the theoretical humanities 9 (2): 67–79, p. 74. 75 76

212

10  Cosmopolitan Spirit

philosophical life’.78 Authentic leaders are willing to form diverse, new affiliations in the construct of identity, a process of becoming which is never finalised. Yet for authentic leaders the accumulation of values to form a world-oriented moral vision is not clear-cut. In order to morally thematise one’s life and live the self-created moral narrative one cannot live what may be the lies of one’s immediate culture and socialization but need recourse to Aristotelean rationality: The self in moral becoming ought to be provided with the intellectual skills that will enable it to realize that the set of so-called cultural criteria (appeals to traditions, traditional values, labels, mores, customs and categories of race and ethnicity, among others) that aim to evaluate its authenticity is linked to a bloated and false ontology that would impose its lies on others.79

If cosmopolitan ideals appear overly ambitious this is no bad thing as long as flights of imagination together with inspirational rhetoric are also grounded in the here and now. Openness is predominantly a pragmatic expression of hospitality and broadened horizons directly relatable to virtue ethics. In its updated version, contemporary virtue ethics has to accommodate pluralism and cosmopolitanism: ‘Accounts of virtue inevitably change over time along with the evolution of the traditions in which they are situated’.80 When openness is assimilated as leadership virtue it then has to be transmitted to followers and associates in a reciprocal manner, ‘learning requires teaching, feedback, modelling, and guidance from those who already exhibit the character strength’.81 Internalizing openness as habit means it cannot be switched on and off at will. Phronesis recognises that the diversity of issues emanating from migrants, diasporic communities, and minority interests offer no recourse to universally applicable rules when aiming for socially just decisions. On the contrary, what emerges from intellectual virtues, questioning and problematization is the discovery of alternative viewpoints and different discourses. Above all, ‘virtue ethics clarifies that openness to the other is much more than learning information and acquiring behavioural skills…The virtue of openness to the other is a transformative capacity that can help existing cultural and virtue traditions to remain vibrant, self-reflective, and open-ended’.82 Leaders are reminded to support beleaguered minorities when their ability to read social affordances brings discrimination to their attention. A practical approach is welcomed, one which recognises the immediacy of incorporating openness and justice. Authentic leaders draw on their developed sense of virtue ethics to read cultural changes and apply their practical wisdom to meet emergent social realities. This is achieved with the requisite clarity of mind, recognising practical strategies

 Jason. D. Hill (2011). Becoming a Cosmopolitan: What it Means to be a Human Being in the New Millennium. Rowman and Littlefield Inc., p. 80. 79  Ibid. p. 21. 80  Blaine J. Fowers and Barbara J. Davidov (2006). “The Virtue of Multiculturalism”. American Psychologist 61 (6): 581–594, p. 592. 81  Ibid. p. 586. 82  Ibid. p. 593. 78

Authentic Enrichment

213

for coalitional agency building, intercultural bridgeworks and commitment to postcolonial difference.83 For Rosi Braidotti, The yearning for sustainable futures can construct a liveable present. This is not a leap of faith, but an active transposition, a transformation at the in-depth level. A prophetic or visionary dimension is necessary in order to secure an affirmative hold over the cosmopolitan ideal, as the launching pad for sustainable becoming or qualitative transformations. The future is the virtual unfolding of the affirmative aspect of the present, which honours our obligations to the generations to come.84

Integrating the cosmopolitan mindset takes us part of the way to inhabit the as-yet unfulfilled potential to fully enrich authentic leadership. The required application of cosmopolitan thinking is a movement which embraces the diversity of structural relationality; a nomadic eco-philosophy of environmental and social interdependence that takes life as its main referent. The result unquestionably boosts social interrelationships and an outlook which adopts deep-seated, self-transformation with a strong sense of transversal, relational bonding. If not yet fully realised, the requisite cosmopolitan imagination is on the horizon: ‘Remember this: We be many and they be few. They need us more than we need them. Another world is not only possible, she is on her way. On a quiet day, I can hear her breathing’.85

 Sobré-Denton and Bardhan, Cultivating Cosmopolitanism for Intercultural Communication, p. 88.   Rosi Braidotti (2013). “Becoming-World” in Rosi Braidotti, Patrick Hanafin. Bolette B. Blaagaard. (eds.) After Cosmopolitanism. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 29–66, p. 58. 85  Arundhati Roy (2004) “Confronting Empire” in Eddie Yuen, George Katsiaficas and Daniel Burton-Rose (eds.) Confronting Capitalism: Dispatches from a Global Movement. New York: Soft Skull Press, 243–246, p. 246. 83 84

Bibliography

Adorno, T. W. (1964/2003). The jargon of authenticity (K. Tarnowski & F. Will, Trans.). Routledge. Agarwal, J., & Malloy, D.  C. (2000). The role of existentialism in ethical business decision-­ making. Business Ethics: A European Review, 9(3), 143–154. Algera, P. M., & Lips-Wiersma, M. (2012). Radical authentic leadership: Co-creating the conditions under which all members of the organization can be authentic. The Leadership Quarterly, 23(1), 118–131. Allio, R.  J. (2005). Leadership development teaching versus learning. Management Decision, 43(7/8), 1071–1077. Alvesson, M., & Sveningsson, S. (2013). Authentic leadership critically reviewed. In D. Ladkin & C. Spiller (Eds.), Authentic leadership clashes, convergences and coalescences (pp. 39–54). Edward Elgar Publishing. Amabile, T. M., Barsade, S. G., Mueller, J. S., & Straw, B. M. (2005). Affect and creativity at work. Administrative Science Quarterly, 50(3), 367–403. Anderson, T. C. (2002). Beyond Sartre’s ethics of authenticity. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 33(2), 138–154. Anderson, E. (2003). Sen, ethics, and democracy. Feminist Economics, 9(2–3), 239–261. Arendt, H. (1958). The human condition. University of Chicago Press. Arendt, H. (1965). Eichmann in Jerusalem. A report on the banality of evil. Viking Press. Arendt, H. (1971/1978). Life of the mind (M. McCarthy, Ed.). Harcourt Brace. Arendt, H. (1977). The crisis in culture. In Between past and future. Penguin Books. Arendt, H. (350. B.C.E./2004). The Nicomachean ethics (J.  A. K.  Thomson, Trans.). Penguin Classics. Averill, J.  R. (2009). Emotional creativity: Toward ‘spritualizing the passions’. In S.  J. Lopez & C. R. Snyder (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of positive psychology (pp. 249–258). Oxford University Press. Avolio, B.  J., & Bass, B.  M. (1988). Transformational leadership, charisma and beyond. In J.  G. Hunt, B.  R. Baliga, H.  P. Dachler, & C.  A. Schriesheim (Eds.), Emerging leadership vistas (pp. 29–49). Lexington Books. Avolio, B. J., & Gardner, W. L. (2005). Authentic leadership development: Getting to the root of positive forms of leadership. The Leadership Quarterly, 16(3), 315–338. Avolio, B. J., & Mhatre, K. H. (2012). Advances in theory and research on authentic leadership. In G. M. Spreitzer & K. S. Cameron (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of positive organizational scholarship (pp. 773–783). Oxford University Press.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Shaw, The Philosophy of Authentic Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29650-5

215

216

Bibliography

Bai, H. (1999). Autonomy reconsidered: A proposal to abandon the language of self-and other-­ control and to adopt the language of ‘attunement’. In S. Tozer (Ed.), Philosophy of education (pp. 95–101). Academy Publication. Bai, H. (2001). Cultivating democratic citizenship: Towards Intersubjectivity. In W.  Hare & J.  P. Portelli (Eds.), Philosophy and education: Introductory readings. Revised third edition (pp. 307–320). Detselig Enterprises, Ltd. Bakhtin, M. (1981). The dialogic imagination (C. Emerson & M. Holquist, Trans., & M. Holquist, Ed.). University of Texas Press. Ballantyne, A. (2000). In a dark wood: Dwelling as social practice. Theory: Arq, 4(4), 349–355. Bamberg, M. (2011). Who am I? Narration and its contribution to self and identity. Theory & Psychology, 21(1), 3–24. Bamberg, M., & Georgakopoulou, A. (2008). Small stories as a new perspective in narrative and identity analysis. Text & Talk, 28(3), 377–396. Bandura, A. (1991). Social cognitive theory of self-regulation. Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes, 50(2), 248–287. Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3(3), 193–209. Bass, B.  M. (1990). From transactional to transformational leadership: Learning to share the vision. Organizational Dynamics, 18(3), 19–31. Bass, B. M., & Riggio, R. E. (2006). Transformational leadership. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Bass, B. M., & Steidlmeier, P. (1999). Ethics, character, and authentic transformational leadership behaviour. The Leadership Quarterly, 10(2), 181–217. Batson, C.  D. (2017). The empathy-altruism hypothesis: What and so what? In E.  M. Seppälä, E. Simon-Thomas, S. L. Brown, M. C. Worline, C. Daryl Cameron, & J. R. Doty (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of compassion science (pp. 27–40). Oxford University Press. Bauman, Z. (1993). Postmodern ethics. Blackwell. Beck, U., & Sznaider, N. (2006). Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: A research agenda. The British Journal of Sociology, 57(1), 1–23. Benjamin, W. (1923/1992). The task of the translator. In Illuminations (H.  Zohn, Trans. & H. Arendt, Ed., pp. 70–82). Fontana Press. Benjamin, W. (1936). The storyteller. In H. Arendt (Ed.), Illuminations (pp. 83–107). Fontana Press. Bennis, W.  G., & Thomas, R.  J. (2002). Crucibles of leadership. Harvard Business Review, 80(9), 39–45. Benson, P. (2005). Taking ownership: Authority and voice in autonomous agency. In J. Christman & J. Anderson (Eds.), Autonomy and the challenges to liberalism (pp. 101–126). Cambridge University Press. Berasconi, R. (1911/1998). Creative evolution (A. Mitchell, Trans.). Dover Publications. Berasconi, R. (1997). Justice without ethics? In Responsibilities of deconstruction (J. Dronsfield & N. Midgley, Eds.). Warwick Journal of Philosophy (Summer), 58–67. Berlin, I. (1969). Four essays on liberty. Oxford University Press. Bhabha, H. (1990). The third space. In J. Rutherford (Ed.), Identity, community, culture, difference (pp. 207–221). Lawrence & Wishart. Bierly, P. E., III, Kolodinsky, R. W., & Charette, B. J. (2009). Understanding the complex relationship between creativity and ethical ideologies. Journal of Business Ethics, 86(1), 101–112. Boje, D. M. (1995). Stories of the storytelling organization: A postmodern analysis of Disney as ‘Tamara-Land’. The Academy of Management Journal, 38(4), 997–1035. Bond, S. (2011). Negotiating a ‘democratic ethos’: Moving beyond the agonistic – Communicative divide. Planning Theory, 10(2), 161–186. Boria, D. (2013). Sartre on moral and political authority. In B. O’Donohoe (Ed.), Severely seeking Sartre (pp. 112–132). Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Bowie, N. E. (1998). A Kantian theory of capitalism. Business Ethics Quarterly, 1, 37–60. Special Issue: Ruffin Series.

Bibliography

217

Bragues, G. (2006). Seek the good life, not money: The Aristotelian approach to business ethics. Journal of Business Ethics, 67(4), 341–357. Bragues, G. (2018). Theorists and philosophers on business ethics. In E.  Heath, B.  Kaldis, & A. Marcoux (Eds.), The routledge companion to business ethics (pp. 23–37). Routledge. Braidotti, R. (2013). Becoming-world. In R. Braidotti, P. Hanafin, & B. B. Blaagaard (Eds.), After cosmopolitanism (pp. 29–66). Routledge. Braidotti, R., Hanafin, P., & Blaagaard, B. B. (Eds.). (2013). After cosmopolitanism. Routledge. Braman, B. J. (2008). Meaning and authenticity. University of Toronto Press. Bravo, P. C. (2018). Empathy as a vehicle to authentic leadership in Latin America: A practitioner perspective. In D. Cotter-Lockard (Ed.), Authentic leadership and followership: International perspectives (pp. 59–80). Palgrave Macmillan. Bray, D. (2011). Pragmatic cosmopolitanism and the role of leadership in transnational democracy. In J.  Hoover, M.  Sabaratnam, & L.  Schouenborg (Eds.), Interrogating democracy in world politics (pp. 166–190). Taylor & Francis Group. Brown, M. E., & Treviño, L. K. (2006). Ethical leadership: A review and future directions. The Leadership Quarterly, 17(6), 595–616. Bruna, M.  G., & Bazin, Y. (2018). Answering Levinas’ call in organization studies. European Management Review, 15(4), 577–588. Bruner, J. (1991). The narrative construction of reality. Critical Inquiry, 18(1), 1–21. Bruner, J. (2004). Life as narrative. Social Research, 71(3), 691–710. Buber, M. (1992). Martin Buber: On intersubjectivity and cultural creativity (S.  N. Eisenstadt, Ed.). University of Chicago Press. Buddeberg, E., & Hecker, A. (2018). Justification incorporated: A discursive approach to corporate responsibility. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 21(3), 465–475. Burrell, G., & Morgan, G. (1979). Sociological paradigms and organizational analysis. Heinemann Educational Books. Butler, J. (2004). What is critique? An essay on Foucault’s virtue. In S. Salih (Ed.), The Judith Butler reader (pp. 302–322). Blackwell. Butler, J. (2005). Giving an account of oneself. Fordham University Press. Carey, M.  R. (1992). Transformational leadership and the fundamental option for self-­ transcendence. The Leadership Quarterly, 3(3), 217–236. Carroll, B., & Levy, L. (2010). Leadership development as identity construction. Management Communication Quarterly, 24(2), 211–231. Cerne, M., Jaklic, M., & Skerlavaj, M. (2013). Authentic leadership, creativity, and innovation: A multilevel perspective. Leadership, 9(1), 63–85. Chamberlain, J.  A. (2017). Minoritarian democracy: The democratic case for no borders. Constellations, 24(2), 142–153. Chia, R. (2020). A process-philosophical approach to researching creativity-in-practice. In V. Dörfler & M. Stierand (Eds.), Handbook of research methods on creativity (pp. 126–135). Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. Chouliaraki, L. (2013). Cosmopolitanism as irony: A critique of post-humanitarianism. In R. Braidotti, P. Hanafin, & B. B. Blaagaard (Eds.), After cosmopolitanism (pp. 162–198). Routledge. Christman, J. (2005). Autonomy, self-knowledge and liberal legitimacy. In J.  Christman & J.  Anderson (Eds.), Autonomy and the challenges to liberalism (pp.  330–358). Cambridge University Press. Ciulla, J. B. (2005). The state of leadership ethics and the work that lies before us. Business Ethics: A European Review, 14(4), 323–335. Clohesy, A. M. (2013). Politics of empathy. Routledge. Cohen, R. (1987). Introduction. In Time and the other (R.  Cohen, Trans., & E.  Levinas, Ed., pp. 1–27). Duquesne University Press. Cohen, R. (2014). Death of the PostHuman. Open Humanities Press. Collins, D. (1987). Aristotle and business. Journal of Business Ethics, 6(7), 567–572.

218

Bibliography

Collinson, D. L. (2003). Identities and insecurities: Selves at work. Organization, 10(3), 527–547. Conant, J. (2001). Nietzsche’s perfectionism: A reading of Schopenhauer as educator. In R. Schacht (Ed.), Nietzsche’s postmoralism (pp. 181–257). Cambridge University Press. Connolly, W.  E. (2002). Identity/difference: Democratic negotiations of political paradox. University of Minnesota Press. Cooper, R. K., & Sawaf, A. (1997). Executive EQ. Orion Business Books. Cooper, C. D., Scandura, T. A., & Schriesheim, C. A. (2005). Looking forward but learning from our past: Potential challenges to developing authentic leadership theory and authentic leaders. The Leadership Quarterly, 16(3), 475–493. Coplan, A. (2011). Will the real empathy please stand up? A case for a narrow conceptualization. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 49(S1), 40–65. Crawford, N. C. (2009). No borders, no bystanders: Developing individual and institutional capacities for global moral responsibility. In C. R. Beitz & R. E. Goodin (Eds.), Global basic rights (pp. 131–155). Oxford University Press. Cronon, W. (1992). A place for stories: Nature, history, and narrative. The Journal of American History, 78(4), 1347–1376. Cropley, D.  H. (2010). The dark side of creativity: A differentiated model. In D.  H. Cropley, A. J. Cropley, J. C. Kaufman, & M. A. Runco (Eds.), The dark side of creativity (pp. 360–374). Cambridge University Press. Cunliffe, A. L., Luhman, J. T., & Boje, D. M. (2004). Narrative temporality: Implications for organizational research. Organization Studies, 25(2), 261–286. Dale, B. (2017). Archetypes: Unmasking your true self. Balboa Press. de Landazuri, M. M. C. O. (2014). Virtue without pleasure? Aristotle and the joy of a noble life. Acta Philosophica, 23(1), 89–100. de Montaigne, M. (1603). The essays: Or morall, politike and millitarie discourses (J.  Florio, Trans.). Blount. de Spinoza, B. (1677/2001). Ethics (W.  H. White, & A.  H. Stirling, Trans.). Wordsworth Editions Ltd. Decety, J. (2006). Human empathy. Japanese Journal of Neuropsychology, 22, 11–33. Decety, J. (2012). Why is empathy important? In J. Decety (Ed.), Empathy: From bench to bedside. MIT Press. Decety, J., & Cowell, J. M. (2014). The complex relation between morality and empathy. Trends in Cognitive Science, 18(7), 337–339. Delanty, G. (1970/1988). Spinoza: Practical philosophy (R. Hurley, Trans.). City Lights Publishers. Delanty, G. (2009). The cosmopolitan imagination. Cambridge University Press. Deneulin, S. (2013a). Ethics and development: An introduction from the perspective of the capability approach. Geography Compass, 7(3), 217–227. Deneulin, S. (2013b). Recovering Nussbaum’s Aristotelian roots. International Journal of Social Economics, 40(7), 624–632. Derrida, J. (1997/2001). On cosmopolitanism and forgiveness (M. Dooley & M. Hughes, Trans.). Routledge. Derrida, J. (2000). Hospitality. Angelaki, 5(3), 3–18. Descartes, R. (1644/2009). Principles of philosophy (J. Veitch, Trans.). SMK Books. Desjardines, J. R. (2001). Environmental ethics. Wadsworth Publishing Company. Dharwadker, V. (2011). Diaspora and cosmopolitanism. In M. Rovisco & M. Nowicka (Eds.), The ashgate research companion to cosmopolitanism (pp. 125–144). Routledge. Dilthey, W. (1900/1972). The rise of hermeneutics (F.  Jameson, Trans.). New Literary History, 3(2), 229–244. Dion, M. (2012). Are ethical theories relevant for ethical leadership? Leadership & Organization Development Journal, 33(1), 4–24. Dowdeswell, T. (2011). Cosmopolitanism, custom, and complexity: Kant’s cosmopolitan norms in action. Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, 3(3), 176–196.

Bibliography

219

Dower, N., & Williams, J. (Eds.). (2002). Global citizenship: A critical introduction. Taylor & Francis Group. Drath, W. (2001). The deep Blue Sea: Rethinking the source of leadership. Jossey-Bass. Driver, M. (2009). Struggling with lack: A Lacanian perspective on organizational identity. Organization Studies, 30(1), 55–72. Dryzek, J. S. (2000). Deliberative democracy and beyond: Liberals, critics, contestations. Oxford University Press. Dworkin, G. (1988). The theory and practice of autonomy. Cambridge University Press. Eby, L. T., Cader, J., & Noble, C. L. (2003). Why do high self-monitors emerge as leaders in small groups? A comparative analysis of the Behaviours of high versus low self-monitors. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 33(7), 1457–1479. Eisenberg, E. (2006). Strategic ambiguities. Essays on communication, organization and identity. Sage. Epstein, S. (1973). The self-concept revised: Or a theory of a theory. American Psychologist, 28(5), 404–416. Eriksen, E. O. (2009). The EU: A cosmopolitan vanguard. Global Jurist, 9(1), 1–23. Erskine, T. (2002). ‘Citizen of nowhere’ or ‘the point where circles intersect’? Impartialist and embedded cosmopolitanisms. Review of International Studies, 28(3), 457–477. Escobar, W. A. (2013). Quantized visual awareness. Frontiers in Psychology, 4(November), 1–11. Evans, F., & Lawlor, L. (2000). The value of flesh: Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy and the modernism/postmodernism debate. In F. Evans & L. Lawler (Eds.), Chiasms. Merleau-Ponty’s notion of flesh. State University of New York Press. Ferrara, A. (1998). Reflective authenticity. Routledge. Ferreira, M.  J. (2001). Total altruism in Levinas’s ethics of the welcome. Journal of Religious Ethics, 29(3), 443–470. Fine, R. (2011). Cosmopolitanism and natural law: Rethinking Kant. In M. Rovisco & M. Nowicka (Eds.), The Ashgate research companion to cosmopolitanism (pp. 147–162). Routledge. Fisher, R., Ury, W., & Patton, B. (1991). Getting to yes. Penguin Books. Ford, J., & Harding, N. (2011). The impossibility of the ‘true self’ of authentic leadership. Leadership, 7(4), 463–479. Formosa, P. (2013). Kant’s conception of personal autonomy. Journal of Social Philosophy, 44(3), 193–212. Forst, R. (1983/1997). On the genealogy of ethics: An overview of a work in Progress. In P.  Rabinow (Ed.), Ethics, subjectivity and truth: Essential works of Foucault 1954–1984 (pp. 253–280). New Press. Forst, R. (1984a). What is enlightenment? In P. Rabinow (Ed.), The Foucault reader (pp. 32–50). Pantheon Books. Forst, R. (1984b). The ethics of the concern for self as a practice of freedom. In P. Rabinow (Ed.), Michel Foucault. Ethics, subjectivity and truth. The essential works of Foucault 1954–1984 (pp. 281–301). New Press. Forst, R. (2002). Contexts of justice: Political philosophy beyond liberalism and communitarianism. University of California Press. Forst, R. (2011). The ground of critique: On the concept of human dignity in social orders of justification. Philosophy and Social Criticism, 37(9), 965–976. Foucault, M. (1970/2000). The hermeneutics of the subject. In Michel Foucault. Ethics, subjectivity and truth. The essential works of Foucault. 1954–1984 (G. Burchell, Trans., & P. Rabinow, Ed., Vol. 1, pp. 93–106). Foucault, M. (1976/1978). The history of sexuality (R. Hurley, Trans.). Pantheon Books. Foucault, M. (1984/1985). The use of pleasure. The history of sexuality (R. Hurley, Trans., Vol. 2). Pantheon Books. Foucault, M. (1986). The care of the self: The history of sexuality 3 (R.  Hurley, Trans.). Pantheon Books.

220

Bibliography

Fowers, B. J., & Davidov, B. J. (2006). The virtue of multiculturalism. American Psychologist, 61(6), 581–594. Frankfurt, H. G. (1971). Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. The Journal of Philosophy, 68(1), 5–20. Frederickson, B. L. (2003). Positive emotions and upward spirals in organizations. In K. S. Cameron, J. E. Dutton, & R. E. Quinn (Eds.), Positive organizational scholarship (pp. 163–175). Berrett-­ Koehler Publishers, Inc. Freeman, S. (2011). Capitalism in the classical and high liberal traditions. Social Philosophy & Policy Foundation, 28(2), 19–55. Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and freedom. The University of Chicago Press. Friedman, M. (2003). Autonomy, gender, politics. Oxford University Press. Friese, H. (2004). Spaces of hospitality (J.  Keye, Trans.). Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, 9(2), 67–79. Fry, L. W., & Whittington, J. L. (2005). In search of authenticity. Spiritual leadership theory as a source for future theory, research, and practice on authentic leadership. In W. L. Gardner, B.  J. Avolio, & F.  O. Walumbwa (Eds.), Authentic leadership theory and practice: Origins, effects and development (Monographs in leadership and management) (Vol. 3, pp. 183–200). Elsevier. Frye, J., Kisselburgh, L. G., & Butts, D. (2007). Embracing spiritual followership. Communication Studies, 58(3), 243–260. Fuchs, W. W. (1976). Phenomenology and the metaphysics of presence. Martinus Nijhoff. Gabriel, Y. (1995). The unmanaged organization: Stories, fantasies and subjectivity. Organization Studies, 16(3), 477–501. Gangle, R. (2013). François Laruelle’s philosophies of difference. Edinburgh University Press. Gardiner, R. (2015). Gender, authenticity and leadership: Thinking with Arendt. Palgrave Macmillan. Gardner, W. L., & Schermerhorn, J. R., Jr. (2004). Performance gains through positive organizational behaviour and authentic leadership. Organizational Dynamics, 33(3), 270–281. Gardner, W. L., Avolio, B. J., Luthans, F., May, D. R., & Walumbwa, F. (2005). ‘Can you see the real me?’ A self-based model of authentic leader and follower development. The Leadership Quarterly, 16(3), 343–372. Gatens, M., & Lloyd, G. (1999). Collective imaginings. Spinoza, past and present. Routledge. Gaut, B. (2010). Philosophy of creativity. Philosophy Compass, 5(12), 1034–1046. Gehrke, P. J. (2010). Being for the other-to-the-other: Justice and communication in Levinasian ethics. The Review of Communication, 10(1), 5–19. George, J.  M. (2000). Emotions and leadership: The role of emotional intelligence. Human Relations, 53(8), 1027–1055. Gergen, K.  J. (1996). The healthy, happy human being wears many masks. In W.  T. Anderson (Ed.), The Fontana postmodernism reader (pp. 132–146). Fontana Press. Gergen, K. J. (2000). The saturated self. Basic Books. Glaveanu, V.-P. (2010). Principles for a cultural psychology of creativity. Culture & Psychology, 16(2), 147–163. Glaveanu, V. P. (2014). Distributed creativity: Thinking outside the box of the creative individual. Springer. Glaveanu, V. P. (2015). Creativity as a sociocultural act. The Journal of Creative Behavior, 49(3), 165–180. Göker, S. D., & Bozkuş, K. (2017). Reflective leadership: Learning to manage and Lead human organizations. In A. Alvinius (Ed.), Contemporary leadership challenges (pp. 27–46). Intech Publishing. Goleman, D. (1995). Emotional intelligence. Bloomsbury Publishing. Goleman, D. (2004). What makes a leader? Harvard Business Review, 82(1), 82–91.

Bibliography

221

Golomb, J. (2002). How to De-Nazify Nietzsche’s philosophical anthropology. In J. Golomb & R. S. Wistrich (Eds.), Nietzsche, godfather of fascism? On the uses and abuses of a philosophy (pp. 19–46). Princeton University Press. Gotsis, G., & Kortezi, Z. (2008). Philosophical foundations of workplace spirituality: A critical approach. Journal of Business Ethics, 78(4), 575–600. Goulet, D. (1995). Development ethics: A new discipline. International Journal of Social Economics, 24(11), 1160–1171. Goulet, D. (2006). Development ethics at work. Routledge. Greenleaf, R. K. (1977). Servant leadership. Paulist Press. Guignon, C. (2012). Becoming a person: Hermeneutic phenomenology’s contribution. New Ideas in Psychology, 30(1), 97–106. Guignon, C. (2013). In search of authenticity. The Humanistic Psychologist, 41(3), 204–208. Gurwitsch, A. (2010). The collected works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901–1973). Vol. 3. The field of consciousness (R. M. Zaner & L. Embree, Eds., pp. 301–365). Springer. Gustafson, A. (2000). Making sense of postmodern business ethics. Business Ethics Quarterly, 10(3), 645–658. Gutwald, R. (2018). Well-being. In J. Drydyk & L. Keleher (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of development ethics (pp. 55–67). Routledge. Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108(4), 814–834. Hall, S. (2003). Cultural identity and diaspora. In J. E. Braziel & A. Mannur (Eds.), Theorizing diaspora: A reader (pp. 233–246). Blackwell Publishing. Handy, C. B. (1995). Gods of management. Oxford University Press. Hanson, M. H. (2015). The ideology of creativity and challenges of participation. Europe’s Journal of Psychology, 11(3), 369–378. Hardt, M., & Negri, A. (2017). Assembly. Oxford University Press. Harper, P.  T. (2008). Business ethics beyond the moral imagination: A response to Richard Rorty. In G. Flynn (Ed.), Leadership and business ethics. Issues in business ethics (Vol. 25, pp. 57–79). Springer. Harrington, A. (2001). Dilthey, empathy and verstehen. European Journal of Social Theory, 4(3), 311–329. Harter, N. W. (1997). The shop floor Schopenhauer: Hope for a theory-X supervisor. Journal of Management Education, 21(1), 87–96. Harter, S. (2002). Authenticity. In C. R. Snyder & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), Handbook of positive psychology (pp. 382–394). Oxford University. Harter, S. (2012). The construction of the self. Guilford Press. Harvey, D. (1989). The condition of postmodernity: An enquiry into the origins of cultural change. Blackwell. Hatab, L.  J. (1995). Ethics and finitude: Heideggerian contributions to moral philosophy. International Philosophical Quarterly, 35(4), 403–417. Heater, D. (2000). Does cosmopolitan thinking have a future? Review of International Studies, 26(5), 179–197. Heidegger, M. (1927/1962). Being and time (J.  Macquarrie & E.  Robinson, Trans.). Blackwell Publishers. Heidegger, M. (1935/2000). An introduction to metaphysics (G.  Fried & R.  Polt, Trans.). Yale University Press. Heidegger, M. (1946). Letter on humanism. In D. F. Krell (Ed.), Martin Heidegger. (1927/1964) Basic writings. Expanded edition (pp. 217–265). HarperCollins Publishers. Heidegger, M. (1954). What calls for thinking? In D. F. Krell (Ed.), Martin Heidegger. (1927/1964) Basic writings. Expanded edition (pp. 369–391). HarperCollins Publishers. Heidegger, M. (1966a). Discourse on thinking (J.  M. Anderson & E.  Hans Freund, Trans., Memorial address). Harper & Row.

222

Bibliography

Heidegger, M. (1966b). “Only a god can save us”: The spiegel interview with Martin Heidegger (1976, May, pp. 193–219). In Heidegger: The man and the thinker (1981) (W. J. Richardson, Trans., & T. Sheehan, Ed., pp. 45–67). Precedent Publishing. Heidegger, M. (1971). Poetry, language, thought (A. Hofstadter, Trans.). Harper & Row. Heidegger, M. (1977). The question concerning technology and other essays (W. Lovitt, Trans.). Harper & Row. Heidegger, M. (2001). Zollikon seminars. Northwestern University Press. Heidegger, M. (2016). “Ponderings” 11-V1: Black Notebooks 1931–1938 (R. Rojcewicz, Trans.). Indiana University Press. Hermans, H. J. M. (2001). The dialogical self: Toward a theory of personal and cultural positioning. Culture and Psychology, 7(3), 243–281. Hermans, H. J. M., Rljks, T. I., & Kempen, H. J. G. (1993). Imaginal dialogues in the self: Theory and method. Journal of Personality, 61(2), 207–236. Heter, T.  S. (2006). Sartre’s ethics of engagement: Authenticity and civic virtue. Continuum International Publishing. Hill, J. D. (2011). Becoming a cosmopolitan: What it means to be a human being in the new millennium. Rowman and Littlefield Inc. Himmelfarb, G. (1996). The illusions of cosmopolitanism. In M. C. Nussbaum & J. Cohen (Eds.), For love of country? (pp. 72–77). Beacon Press. Hirsch, F. (1978). Social limits to growth. Harvard University Press. Hirsch, E. D., Jr. (1967). Validity in interpretation. Yale University Press. Hodge, J. (1995). Heidegger and ethics. Routledge. Hoffman, M.  L. (1981). Is altruism part of human nature? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40(1), 121–137. Hoffman, M. L. (1989). Empathic emotions and justice in society. Social Justice Research., 3(4), 283–311. Hogg, M.  A. (2001). A social identity theory of leadership. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5(3), 184–200. Honneth, A. (1995). The struggle for recognition (J. Anderson, Trans.). Polity Press. Hornsey, M. J. (2006). Ingroup critics and their influence on groups. In T. Postmes & J. Jetten (Eds.), Individuality and the group (pp. 74–92). Sage. House, R. J. (1971). A path-goal theory of leader effectiveness. Administrative Science Quarterly, 16(3), 321–339. House, E. R. (1988). Jesse Jackson and the politics of charisma. Westview Press. Hursthouse, R. (1999). On virtue ethics. Oxford University Press. Husserl, E. (1913/1989). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy (R. Rojcewicz & A. Schuwer, Trans.). Springer. Husserl, E. (1929/1973). Cartesian meditations (D. Cairns, Trans.). Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1931/1962). Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (W.  B. Gibson, Trans.). Collier Press. Ilies, R., Morgeson, F. P., & Nahrgung, J. D. (2005). Authentic leadership and eudaemonic well-­ being: Understanding leader-follower outcomes. The Leadership Quarterly, 16(3), 373–394. Inayatullah, S. (2005). Spirituality as the fourth bottom line? Futures, 37(6), 573–579. Jackson, K. T. (2005). Towards authenticity: A Sartrean perspective on business ethics. Journal of Business Ethics, 58(4), 307–325. James, W. (1880). Great men, great thoughts, and the environment. The Atlantic Monthly, 46(276), 441–459. Jardine, J., & Szanto, T. (2017). Empathy in the phenomenological tradition. In H. L. Maibom (Ed.), The Routledge handbook of philosophy of empathy (pp. 86–97). Routledge. Johnson, M. (1993). Moral imagination: Implications of cognitive science for ethics. University of Chicago Press. Jones, C., & ten Bos, R. (2007). Introduction. In C. Jones & R. ten Bos (Eds.), Philosophy and organization (pp. 1–20). Routledge.

Bibliography

223

Jones, C., Parker, M., & ten Bos, R. (2005). For business ethics. Routledge. Kakoliris, G. (2015). Jacques Derrida on the ethics of hospitality. In E. Imafidon (Ed.), The ethics of subjectivity: Perspectives since the dawn of modernity (pp. 144–156). Palgrave Macmillan. Kane, J. (2001). The politics of moral capital. Cambridge University Press. Kant, I. (1784/1991). Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose. In Political writings (H. B. Nisbet, Trans., & H. Reiss, Ed., pp. 41–53). Cambridge University Press. Kant, I. (1785/2002). Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals (A. W. Wood, Trans. & Ed.). Yale University Press. Kant, I. (1790/1987). Critique of judgment (W. S. Pluhar, Trans.). Hackett Publishing Company. Kant, I. (1999). Practical philosophy (M. J. Gregor, Trans. & Ed.). Cambridge University Press. Kaya, N. (2008). Compelled to create: The courage to go beyond. In L. Huskinson (Ed.), Dreaming the myth onwards: New directions in Jungian therapy and thought (pp.  21–30). Routledge/ Taylor & Francis Group. Kearney, R. (1996). Narrative imagination. In R. Kearney (Ed.), Paul Ricoeur: The hermeneutics of action (pp. 173–190). Sage. Kearney, R., & Semonovitch, K. (2011). At the threshold: Foreigners, strangers, others. In R. Kearney & K. Semonovitch (Eds.), Phenomenologies of the stranger: Between hostility and hospitality (pp. 3–29). Fordham University Press. Keleher, L. (2019). Why development needs philosophy. In L.  Kelleher & S.  J. Kosko (Eds.), Agency and democracy in development ethics (pp. 25–48). Cambridge University Press. Kelley, T., & Kelley, D. (2012). Reclaim your creative confidence. The Harvard Business Review, 90(12), 115–118. Kelly, S. K. (2004). Derrida’s cities of refuge: Toward a non-utopian utopia. Contemporary Justice Reviews, 7(4), 421–439. Kernis, M. H. (2003). Towards a conceptualization of optimal self-esteem. Psychological Inquiry, 14(1), 1–26. Kieran, M. (2014). Creativity as a virtue of character. In E. S. Paul & S. B. Kaufman (Eds.), The philosophy of creativity: New essays (pp. 125–146). Oxford University Press. King, P. E., & Defoy, F. (2020). Joy as a virtue: The means and ends of joy. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 48(3), 1–31. Koczanowicz, L. (2010). Cosmopolitanism and its predicaments. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 29(2), 141–149. Koehn, D. (2005). Integrity as business asset. Journal of Business Ethics, 58(1/3), 125–136. Koen, D. (1995). A role for virtue ethics in the analysis of business practice. Business Ethics Quarterly, 5(3), 533–539. Kögler, H.-H.  Hermeneutic cosmopolitanism, or: Toward a cosmopolitan public sphere. In M.  Rovisco & M.  Nowicka (Eds.), The Ashgate research companion to cosmopolitanism (pp. 225–242). Routledge. Kohlberg, L. (1971). Stages of moral development as a basis for moral education. Harvard University. Kohlberg, L. (1973). The claim to moral adequacy of a highest stage of moral judgment. Journal of Philosophy, 70(18), 630–646. Kohut, H. (1977/2009). The restoration of the self. The University of Chicago Press. Krasikova, D. V., Green, S. G., & LeBreton, J. M. (2013). Destructive leadership: A theoretical review, integration, and future research agenda. Journal of Management, 39(5), 1308–1338. Krumrei-Mancuso, E. J. (2020). Reflections on the science of joy: Current challenges and future directions. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 15(1), 58–62. Kuhnert, K. W., & Lewis, P. (1987). Transactional and transformational leadership: A constructive/ developmental analysis. Academy of Management Review, 12(4), 648–657. Lacan, J. (1988). The seminar of Jacques Lacan, book II: The ego in Freud’s theory and in the technique of psychoanalysis 1954–1955. Norton. Ladkin, D. (2006). When deontology and utilitarianism aren’t enough: How Heidegger’s notion of “dwelling” might help organisational leaders resolve ethical issues. Journal of Business Ethics, 65(1), 87–98.

224

Bibliography

Ladkin, D., & Taylor, S. (2010). Enacting the ‘true self’; towards a theory of embodied authentic leadership. The Leadership Quarterly, 21(1), 64–74. Lakoff, G. (2002). Moral politics. University of Chicago Press. Laqueur, W. Z. (1996). Fascism. Oxford University Press. Lawler, J. (2005). The essence of leadership? Existentialism and leadership. Leadership, 1(2), 215–231. Lawler, J., & Ashman, I. (2012). Theorizing leadership authenticity: A Sartrean perspective. Leadership, 8(4), 327–344. Lazar, I. (2004). Spirituality and human ecosystems. In L. Zsolnai (Ed.), Spirituality and ethics in management (pp. 87–96). Kluwer Academic Publishers. Levinas, E. (1947/1987). Time and the other (R. A. Cohen, Trans.). Duquesne University Press. Levinas, E. (1974a). Otherwise than being or beyond essence (A.  Lingis, Trans.). Duquesne University Press. Levinas, E. (1974b). Otherwise than being or beyond essence (A.  Lingis, Trans.). Kluwer Academic Publishers. Levinas, E. (1991/1998) Entre nous: On thinking-of-the-other (M. B. Smith & B. Harshav, Trans.). Columbia University Press. Levy, N. (2004). Foucault as virtue ethicist. Foucault Studies, 1, 20–31. Lewis, M. (2005). Heidegger and the place of ethics. Bloomsbury Academic Publishing. Linsenbard, G. E. (2010). Starting with Sartre. Bloomsbury Publishing. Luthans, F., & Avolio, B. (2003). Authentic leadership development. In K. S. Cameron, J. E. Dutton, & R.  E. Quinn (Eds.), Positive organizational scholarship (pp.  241–258). Berret-Koehler Publishers. Lyotard, J.-F. (1979/1984). The postmodern condition: A report on knowledge (G. Bennington & B. Massumi, Trans.). University of Minnesota Press. Machiavelli, N. (1517/1979). The Prince. In The Portable Machiavelli (P. Bondanella & M. Musa, Trans. & Ed., pp. 77–166). Penguin. Macintyre, A. (1984). After virtue. University of Notre Dame Press. Maitland, I. (1997). Virtuous markets. Business Ethics Quarterly, 7(1), 17–31. Maitland, I. (2002). The hunan face of self-interest. Journal of Business Ethics, 38(1–2), 3–17. Malpas, J. (2014). Rethinking dwelling: Heidegger and the question of place. Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology Newsletter, 25(1), 15–23. Mansell, S. (2008). Proximity and rationalisation: The limits of a levinasian ethics in the context of corporate governance and regulation. Journal of Business Ethics, 83(3), 565–577. Markus, H., & Nurius, P. (1986). Possible selves. American Psychologist, 41(9), 954–969. Martin, M. W. (2006). Moral creativity. International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 20(1), 55–65. Martin, J., & Gillespie, A. (2010). A neo-Meadian approach to human agency: Relating the social and the psychological in the ontogenesis of perspective-coordinating persons. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 44(3), 252–272. Maslow, A.  H. (1967). A theory of Metamotivation: The biological rooting of the value–life. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 7(2), 93–127. Maslow, A. (1968). Toward a psychology of being. Van Nostrand Reinhold. Maxwell, B. (2008). Professional ethics education (Studies in compassionate empathy). Springer. May, R. (1950/1979). The meaning of anxiety. Washington Square Press. May, R. (1975/1994). The courage to create. W.W. Norton & Company Inc. May, D. R., Hodges, T. D., Chan, A. Y. L., & Avolio, B. J. (2003). Developing the moral component of authentic leadership. Organizational Dynamics, 32(3), 247–260. McAdams, D.  P. (2013). The psychological self as actor, agent, and author. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8(3), 272–295. McAdams, D. P. (2015). Narrating the generative life. Psychological Science, 26(4), 475–483. McGushin, E. F. (2007). Foucault’s askesis. Northwestern University Press. McLaren, R. B. (1993). The dark side of creativity. Creativity Research Journal, 6(1–2), 137–144.

Bibliography

225

Mendieta, E. (2014). From imperial to dialogical cosmopolitanism. In M.  Lutz-Bachmann & A. Nascimento (Eds.), Human rights, human dignity, and cosmopolitan ideals: Essays on critical theory and human rights (pp. 119–138). Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Meretoja, H. (2018). The ethics of storytelling. Oxford University Press. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). The phenomenology of perception (C.  Smith, Trans.). Routledge & Kegan Paul. Mill, J. S. (1848/2006). Principles of political economy. Book V. Liberty Fund. Mill, J. S. (1859/2001). On liberty. Batoche Books. Minkowski, E. (1933/1970). Lived time: Psychological and psychopathological studies (N. Metzel, Trans.). Northwestern University. Morgan, G. (2019). Reworking leadership with narrative intelligence. Emerald Publishing Limited. Morson, G. S. (1994). Narrative freedom: The shadows of time. Yale University Press. Muhr, S. L. (2010). Ethical interruption and the creative process: A reflection on the new. Culture and Organization, 16(1), 73–86. Mulhall, S. (1996). Heidegger and being and time. Routledge. Mumford, M.  D., Scott, G.  M., Gaddis, B., & Strange, J.  M. (2002). Leading creative people: Orchestrating expertise and relationships. The Leadership Quarterly, 13(6), 705–750. Mumford, M.  D., Waples, E.  R., Antes, A.  L., Brown, R.  P., Connelly, S., Murphy, S.  T., & Devenport, L.  D. (2010). Creativity and ethics: The relationship of creative and ethical problem-­solving. Creativity Research Journal, 22(1), 74–89. Murray, J. W. The face in dialogue: Emmanuel Levinas and rhetorics of disruption and supplication. Southern Journal of Communication, 68(3), 250–266. Nehamas, A. (1999). Nietzsche and Hitler. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 37(Supplement 1), 1–17. Nelsen, P. (2010). Oppression, autonomy and the impossibility of the inner citadel. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 29(4), 333–349. Nelson, E.  S. (2017). National socialism, antisemitism, and the history of being. Heidegger Jahrbuch, 11, 77–88. Nietzsche, F. (1872/1993). The birth of tragedy (S. Whiteside, Trans.). Penguin Classics. Nietzsche, F. (1876/1997). Schopenhauer as educator. In Untimely meditations (R. J. Hollingdale, Trans., & D. Breazeale, Ed., pp. 125–194). Cambridge University Press. Nietzsche, F. (1878/1996). Human, all too human (R.  J. Hollingdale, Trans.). Cambridge University Press. Nietzsche, F. (1883/2006) Thus spoke Zarathustra (A.  Del Caro, Trans., & A.  Del Caro & R. Pippin, Eds.). Cambridge University Press. Nietzsche, F. (1886/2002). Beyond good and evil (J.  Norman, Trans., & R.-P.  Horstmann & J. Norman, Eds.). Cambridge University Press. Nietzsche, F. (1887/2006). On the genealogy of morality (C. Diethe, Trans., & K. Ansell-Pearson, Ed.). Cambridge University Press. Nietzsche, F. (1888/2005). The anti-Christ, ecce homo, twilight of the idols (J. Norman, Trans., & A. Ridley & J. Norman, Eds.). Cambridge University Press. Nietzsche, F. (1901/1968). The will to power (W.  Kaufmann & R.  J. Hollingdale, Trans.). Vintage Books. Noddings, N. (2010). The maternal factor: Two paths to morality. University of California Press. Novicevic, M. M., Harvey, M. G., Buckley, M. R., Evans, R., & Brown-Radford, J. A. (2006). Authentic leadership: A historical perspective. Journal of Leadership and Organizational Studies, 13(1), 64–76. Nussbaum, M. C. (1994). Patriotism and cosmopolitanism. Boston Review, XIX(5), 3–6. Nussbaum, M. (2001). Upheavals of thought: The intelligence of the emotions. Cambridge University Press. Nussbaum, M. C. (2003). Capabilities as fundamental entitlements: Sen and social justice. Feminist Economics, 9(2–3), 33–59.

226

Bibliography

Nuzzo, A. (2013). Reflective judgment, determinative judgment, and the problems of particularity. Washington University Jurisprudence Review, 6(1), 7–25. Nyberg, D., & Sveningsson, S. (2014). Paradoxes of authentic leadership. Leader identity struggles. Leadership, 10(4), 437–455. O’Doherty, D. (2007). Organization: Recovering philosophy. In C.  Jones & R. ten Bos (Eds.), Philosophy and organization (pp. 21–38). Routledge. O’Shea, A. (2002). The (R)evolution of new product innovation. Organization, 9(1), 113–125. Ogilvy, J. (2003). What Sartre can teach business strategists. Strategy + Business, 33(Winter), 38–47. Oshana, M.  A. L. (2013). Self-identity and moral agency. In M.  Kühler & N.  Jelinek (Eds.), Autonomy and the self (Philosophical studies) (Vol. 118, pp. 231–252). Springer. Painter-Moreland, M. (2008). Business ethics as practice. Cambridge University Press. Palazzo, G., Krings, F., & Hoffrage, U. (2012). Ethical blindness. Journal of Business Ethics, 109(3), 323–338. Parekh, S. (2008). Conscience, morality and judgment: An inquiry into the subjective basis of human rights. Philosophy & Social Criticism, 34(1–2), 177–195. Pargament, K. I., & Mahoney, A. (2021). Spirituality: The search for the sacred. In C. R. Snyder, S. J. Lopez, L. M. Edwards, & S. C. Marques (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of positive psychology (3rd ed., pp. 878–891). Oxford University Press. Park, N., Peterson, C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2004). Strengths of character and well-being. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 23(5), 603–619. Paulhus, D. L., & Martin, C. L. (1988). Functional flexibility: A new conceptualization of interpersonal flexibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55(1), 88–101. Penchevski, A. (2005). By way of interruption: Levinas and the ethics of communication. Duquesne University Press. Philipse, H. (1999). Heidegger and ethics. Inquiry, 42(3–4), 439–474. Plato. (339BC/2000). The apology of Socrates. In Readings in Ancient Greek philosophy. From Thales to Aristotle (G. M. A. Grube, Trans., pp. 112–130). Hackett Publishing Company. Pollard, C. W. (1994). The leader who serves (pp. 1–10). Pollard Papers. Polletta, F., Chen, P. C., Bobby, G., Gharrity, B., & Motes, A. (2011). The sociology of storytelling. Annual Review of Sociology, 37, 109–130. Pope, R. (2005). Creativity: Theory, history, practice. Routledge. Popke, E. J. (2003). Poststructuralist ethics: Subjectivity, responsibility and the space of community. Progress in Human Geography, 27(3), 298–316. Porter, M. E., & Kramer, M. R. (2006). Strategy and society. Harvard Business Review, 12, 77–92. Pritchett, V. S. (1979). The myth makers. Random House. Quackenbush, S. W., Lockwood, A. K., & Cyr, T. G. (2016). And yet your duty is to hope: The positive psychology of Jean-Paul Sartre. Theory & Psychology, 26(3), 360–376. Rae, G. (2011). Sartre, group formations, and practical freedom: The other in the critique of dialectical reason. Comparative and Continental Philosophy, 3(2), 183–206. Raz, J. (1986). The morality of freedom. Oxford University Press. Rego, A., Sousa, F., Marques, C., & e Cunha, M.  P. (2012). Authentic leadership promoting employees’ psychological capital and creativity. Journal of BusinessResearch, 65(3), 429–437. Renouard, C. (2011). Corporate social responsibility, utilitarianism, and the capabilities approach. Journal of Business Ethics, 98(1), 85–97. Riach, K., Rumens, N., & Tyler, M. (2016). Towards a Butlerian methodology: Undoing organizational performativity through anti-narrative research. Human Relations, 69(11), 2069–2089. Richards, R. (2010). Everyday creativity. In J.  C. Kaufmam & R.  J. Sternberg (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of creativity (pp. 189–214). Cambridge University Press. Ricoeur, P. (1991). Narrative identity. In D. Wood (Ed.), On Paul Ricoeur. Narrative and interpretation. Routledge. Ricoeur, P. (1992). Oneself as another (K. Blamey, Trans.). University of Chicago Press. Roberts, J. (2001). Corporate governance and the ethics of narcissus. Business Ethics Quarterly, 11(1), 109–127.

Bibliography

227

Roberts, J. (2003). The manufacture of corporate social responsibility: Constructing corporate sensibility. Organization, 10(2), 249–265. Roth, B. (2015). How Sartre, philosopher, misreads Sartre, novelist: Nausea and the adventures of the narrative self. In A. Speight (Ed.), Narrative, philosophy and life (Boston studies in philosophy, religion and public life) (Vol. 2, pp. 81–102). Springer. Rovisco, M., & Nowicka, M. (Eds.). (2011). The Ashgate research companion to cosmopolitanism. Routledge. Roy, A. (2004). Confronting empire. In E.  Yuen, G.  Katsiaficas, & D.  Burton-Rose (Eds.), Confronting capitalism: Dispatches from a global movement (pp. 243–246). Soft Skull Press. Ryff, C. D. (1989). Happiness is everything, or is it? Explorations on the meaning of psychological well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57(6), 1069–1081. Ryle, G. (1949/2000). The concept of mind. Penguin Books. Sartre, J.-P. (1936/1994). The transcendence of the ego (F.  Williams & R.  Kirkpatrick, Trans.). Hill and Wang. Sartre, J.-P. (1938/1964) Nausea (R. L. Alexander, Trans.). New Directions. Sartre, J.-P. (1943/1956). Being and nothingness (H. E. Barnes, Trans.). Philosophical Library. Sartre, J.-P. (1946/1948). Existentialism and humanism (P. Mairet, Trans.). Methuen & Co. Ltd. Sartre, J.-P. (1960/2004). Critique of dialectical reason (Vol. 1, A. Sheridan-Smith, Trans.). Verso. Sartre, J.-P. (1983/1992). Notebooks for an ethics (D. Pellauer, Trans.). University of Chicago Press. Sartwell, C. (2000). End of story. SUNY Press. Schapiro, T. (2011). Empathy as a moral concept: Comments on John Deigh’s “Empathy, justice, and jurisprudence”. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 49(S1), 91–98. Schmitt, C. (1922/1985). Political theology (G. Schwab, Trans.). M.I.T. Press. Schopenhauer, A. (1840/1995). On the basis of morality (E. F. J. Payne, Trans.). Berghahn Books. Schueller, S.  M., & Seligman, M.  E. P. (2009). Pursuit of pleasure, engagement, and meaning: Relationships to subjective and objective measures of well-being. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 5(4), 253–263. Schutz, A. (1962/1990). Collected papers I.  The problem of social reality (M.  Natanson, Ed.). Kluwer Academic Publishers. Schweber, H. H. (2011). Democracy and authenticity. Cambridge University Press. Seligman, M. E. P. (2002). Authentic happiness. Free Press. Seligman, M.  E. P., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2000). Positive psychology: An introduction. American Psychologist, 55(1), 5–14. Sen, A. (1999). Democracy as a universal value. Journal of Democracy, 10(3), 3–17. Sen, A. (2009). The idea of justice. Allen Lane. Sendjaya, S., Pekerti, A., Hartel, C., Hirst, G., & Butarbutar, I. (2016). Are authentic leaders always moral? The role of Machiavellianism in the relationship between authentic leadership and morality. Journal of Business Ethics, 133(1), 125–139. Shamir, B., & Eilam, G. (2005). What’s your story? A life-stories approach to authentic leadership development. The Leadership Quarterly, 16(3), 395–417. Shamir, B., Arthur, M.  B., & House, R.  J. (1994). The rhetoric of charismatic leadership: A theoretical extension, a case study, and implications for research. The Leadership Quarterly, 5(1), 25–42. Shaw, J. (2010). Papering the cracks with discourse: The narrative identity of the authentic leader. Leadership, 6(1), 89–108. Sheehan, T. (Ed.). (1981). Heidegger: The man and the thinker (pp. 45–67). Precedent Publishing. Shoemaker, S. (1994). Self-knowledge and ‘inner sense’. Lecture I: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54(2), 249–269. Silverstone, R. (2002). Regulation and the ethics of distance: Distance and the ethics of regulation. In R. Mansell, R. Samarajiva, & A. Mahan (Eds.), Networking knowledge for information societies: Institutions & interventions (pp. 279–285). Deft University Press. Simons, T. (2002). Behavioural integrity: The perceived alignment between managers’ words and deeds as a research focus. Organization Science, 13(1), 18–35.

228

Bibliography

Singer, P. (1990). Animal liberation. Random House. Slife, B. D., & Richardson, F. C. (2008). Problematic ontological underpinnings of positive psychology. Theory & Psychology, 18(5), 699–723. Slote, M. (2004). Moral sentimentalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 7(1), 3–13. Smith, B. H. (1980). Narrative versions. Narrative theories. Critical Inquiry, 7(1), 213–236. Smith, A. M. (2015a). Responsibility as answerability. Inquiry, 58(2), 99–126. Smith, D. (2015b). Foucault on ethics and subjectivity. Foucault Studies, 19, 135–150. Smythe, E., & Norton, A. (2007). Thinking as leadership/leadership as thinking. Leadership, 3(1), 65–90. Sobré-Denton, M., & Bardhan, N. (2013). Cultivating cosmopolitanism for intercultural communication. Routledge. Solomon, R. C. (1992). Corporate roles, personal virtues: An Aristotelean approach to business ethics. Business Ethics Quarterly, 2(3), 317–339. Solomon, R.  C. (1993). Ethics and excellence. Cooperation and integrity in business. Oxford University Press. Staub, E. (1990). Moral exclusion, personal goal theory, and extreme destructiveness. Journal of Social Issues, 46(1), 47–64. Staub, E. (2003). The psychology of good and evil: Why children, adults, and groups help and harm others. Cambridge University Press. Steger, M. F., Kashdan, T. B., & Oishi, S. (2008). Being good by doing good: Daily eudaimonic activity and well-being. Journal of Research in Personality, 42(1), 22–42. Stein, E. (1917/1970). On the problem of empathy (W. Stein, Trans.). Martinus Nijhoff. Sternberg, R. J. (2007). System model of leadership: WICS. American Psychologist, 62(1), 34–42. Sternberg, R. J. (2010). The dark side to creativity and how to combat it. In D. H. Cropley et al. (Eds.), The dark side of creativity (pp. 316–328). Cambridge University Press. Sternberg, R. J. (2018). The triangle of creativity. In R. J. Sternberg & J. C. Kaufman (Eds.), The nature of human creativity (pp. 318–334). Cambridge University Press. Storsletten, V. M. L., & Jakobsen, O. D. (2015). Development of leadership theory in the perspective of Kierkegaard’s philosophy. Journal of Business Ethics, 128(2), 337–349. Strawson, G. (2004). Against narrativity. Ratio, 17(4), 428–452. Stueber, K. R. (2006). Rediscovering empathy. MIT Press. Tamboukou, M. (2008). A Foucauldian approach to narratives. In M.  Andrews, C.  Squire, & M. Tamboukou (Eds.), Doing narrative research (pp. 88–107). Sage. Taylor, C. (1975). Hegel. Cambridge University Press. Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self: The making of the modern identity. Cambridge University Press. Taylor, C. (1991). The ethics of authenticity. Harvard University Press. Taylor, R. S. (2005). Kant’s personal autonomy. Political Theory, 33(5), 602–628. Taylor, S. S., Fisher, D., & Dufresne, R. L. (2002). The aesthetics of management storytelling. A key to organizational learning. Management Learning, 33(3), 313–330. Tomkins, L., & Simpson, P. (2015). Caring leadership: A Heideggerian perspective. Organization Studies, 36(8), 1013–1031. Tourish, D., & Pinnington, A. (2002). Transformational leadership, corporate cultism and the spirituality paradigm: An unholy trinity in the workplace? Human Relations, 55(2), 147–172. Tracy, S.  J., & Trethewey, A. (2005). Fracturing the real-self↔fake-self dichotomy: Moving toward “crystallized” organizational discourses and identities. Communication Theory, 15(2), 168–195. Trevino, L.  K., Hartman, L.  P., & Brown, M. (2000). Moral person and moral manager: How executives develop a reputation for ethical leadership. California Management Review, 42(4), 128–142. Trevino, L.  K., Hartman, L.  P., & Brown, M. (2011). Introduction: Why philosophy matters to organization theory. Research in the Sociology of Organizations: Philosophy and Organization Theory, 32, 1–21.

Bibliography

229

van den Brink, B. (2005). Liberalism without agreement: Political autonomy and agonistic citizenship. In J.  Christman & J.  Anderson (Eds.), Autonomy and the challenges to liberalism (pp. 245–271). Cambridge University Press. Van Hear, N. (1998). New diasporas. The mass exodus, dispersal and regrouping of migrant communities. Taylor & Francis Group. Van Zyl, L. (2019). Virtue ethics. Routledge. Vassilieva, J. (2016). Narrative psychology. Palgrave Macmillan. Verstraeten, J. (2014). Spirituality as source inspired, authentic and innovative leadership. In P. Nullens & J. Barentsen (Eds.), Leadership, innovation and spirituality (pp. 81–98). Leuven/ Paris/Walpole. Vetlesen, A.  J. (2001). Hannah Arendt on conscience and evil. Philosophy & Social Criticism, 27(5), 1–33. von Hayek, F. (1948). Individualism and the economic order. University of Chicago Press. Wang, L., & Murnighan, J. K. (2015). Ethics and creativity. In C. E. Shalley, M. A. Hitt, & J. Zhou (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of creativity, innovation, and entrepreneurship (pp.  245–260). Oxford University Press. Weber, M. (1919/1968). Politics as a vocation. In From Max Weber: Essays in sociology (H. H. Gerth & C. W. Mills, Trans., pp. 77–128). Oxford University Press. Weber, M. (1947). The theory of social and economic organization (A. M. Henderson & T. Parsons, Trans.). Free Press/Oxford University Press. Weberman, D. (1997). Liberal democracy, autonomy, and ideology critique. Social Theory and Practice, 23(2), 205–233. Weir, A. (2009). Who are we? Modern identities between Taylor and Foucault. Philosophy & Social Criticism, 35(5), 533–553. Weiss, M., Razinskas, S., Backmann, J., & Hoegl, M. (2018). Authentic leadership and leaders’ mental Well-being: An experience sampling study. The Leadership Quarterly, 29(2), 309–321. White, H. V. (1978). The historical text as literary artifact. In Tropics of discourse: Essays in cultural criticism (pp. 81–99). John Hopkins University Press. Wicks, A.  C. (1998). How Kantian a theory of Kantian capitalism? Business Ethics Quarterly, 1(Special Issue: Ruffin Series), 61–73. Williams, L. L. (2001). Nietzsche’s Mirror. Rowman Littlefield Publishers. Williamson, T., & Hicks, D. A. (2012). Leadership toward global justice: Conceptual and practical challenges. In D.  A. Hicks & T.  Williamson (Eds.), Leadership and global justice (pp. 193–205). Palgrave Macmillan. Winnicott, D. W. (1971). Playing and reality. Tavistock Publications Ltd. Wisnewski, J. J. (2012). Heidegger: An introduction. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Wolin, R. (2016). The politics of being. Columbia University Press. Wood, D. (2011). Things at the edge of the world. In R.  Kearney & K.  Semonovitch (Eds.), Phenomenologies of the stranger, between hostility and hospitality (pp.  67–79). Fordham University Press. Woods, P.  A. (2004). Democratic leadership: Drawing distinctions with distributed leadership. International Journal of Leadership in Education, 7(1), 3–26. Woodward, I., & Skrbis, Z. (2012). Performing cosmopolitanism. In G. Delanty (Ed.), Routledge handbook of cosmopolitanism studies (pp. 127–137). Routledge. Yanchar, S.  C. (2018). Agency, world, and the ontological ground of possibility. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 38(1), 1–14. Yoshimi, J., & Vinson, D.  W. (2015). Extending Gurwitsch’s field theory of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 34, 104–123. Youpa, A. (2020). The ethics of joy. Oxford University Press. Yukl, G. (1999). An evaluation of conceptual weaknesses in transformational and charismatic leadership theories. The Leadership Quarterly, 10(2), 285–305. Zaccaro, S. J. (2007). Trait-based perspectives of leadership. American Psychologist, 62(1), 6–16. Zagzebski, L. (2010). Exemplarist virtue theory. Metaphilosophy, 41(1–2), 41–57.

230

Bibliography

Zahavi, D. (2017). Phenomenology, empathy, and mindreading. In H.  L. Maibom (Ed.), The Routledge handbook of philosophy of empathy (pp. 33–43). Routledge. Zahavi, D., & Overgaard, S. (2012). Empathy without isomorphism: A phenomenological account. In J. Decety (Ed.), Empathy: From bench to bedside (pp. 3–20). MIT Press. Zaleznik, A. (1977). Managers and leaders: Are they different? Harvard Business Review, (May– June), 67–78. Zhou, J., & George, J. M. (2003). Awakening employee creativity: The role of leader emotional intelligence. The Leadership Quarterly, 14(4–5), 545–568. Zimmerman, M. E. (1981). Eclipse of the self. Ohio University Press. Žižek, S. (2013, April 17). The simple courage of decision: A leftist tribute to Thatcher. New Statesman.

Index

A Alvesson, M., 44 Anderson, T., 72 Anxiety, 40, 66–68, 75, 77, 85, 87, 90, 159, 196 Apolline, 56 Apology, 117 Arendt, H., 13–15, 155, 160, 163 Aristotle, 3, 5, 68, 91, 94–99, 103–105, 108, 111, 112, 147, 180 Askesis, 102, 104, 105 Avolio, B., 32, 38 B Bakhtin, M., 155 Bandura, A., 25 Bass, B., 32 Baudrillard, J., 194 Beck, U., 195 Benjamin, W., 150, 206 Bennis, W., 143 Bergson, H., 143, 183 Berlin, I., 21 Biko, S., 4 Boje, D., 149 Bowie, N., 33, 34 Braidotti, R., 213 Bruner, J., 138, 139 Buber, M., 177, 178 Burrel, G, 54 Butler, J., 102, 160

C Caring leader, 78, 80 Carlyle, T., 6 Cartesianism, 3 Categorical imperative, 19, 33 Ciulla, J., 91 Collinson, D., 40 Connolly, W., 60, 61 Connor, F., 146 Conscience, 13, 14, 24, 36, 64, 77, 78, 80, 88, 164, 179, 192 Corporate social responsibility, 1, 48, 98, 179 Critique of dialectical reason, 72 Csikszentmihalyi, M., 39 D Daimon, 108, 163, 164 Das Man, 77, 84, 135, 184 Deliberative democracy, 195 Democratic leadership, 72, 73 Derrida, J., 100, 194, 197–200, 211 Descartes, R., 3, 18, 36, 172 Dewey, J., 202 Diaspora, 198, 200 Dilthey, W., 128, 129 Dionysian, 56 Disney, 149 Dispersed leadership, 75 Dostoevsky, F., 155 Dowdeswell, T., 193 Dryzek, J., 201, 202

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Shaw, The Philosophy of Authentic Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29650-5

231

232 Dukakis, M., 144, 146 Dworkin, G., 22 E Eisenberg, E., 156 Eisenhower, D., 146 Eisenstadt, S., 178 Emotional contagion, 122, 124, 127, 171 Emotional intelligence, 38, 122, 171–173, 182 Enlightenment, 18, 24, 55, 118, 185 Epstein, S., 139, 140 Ethical blindness, 93 Eudaimonia, 98, 105–107 European Union, 196 Existentialism, 3, 11, 64, 66, 68–71, 75, 156 F Fascist leader, 87 Flow experience, 125 Forst, R., 10 Foucault, M., 18, 100–105, 149, 161, 205, 206 Free cities, 197, 198 Freeman, S., 31 Friedman, M., 25 Friese, H., 211 G Gardner, W., 42 Gergen, K., 158 Ghandi, 95 Goleman, D., 172 Golomb, J., 57 Great Man Theory, 6, 14 Greenleaf, R., 86 Guignon, C., 138 Gurwitsch, A., 127, 128 H Handy, C., 55, 56 Hardt, M., 4 Harvey, D., 197 Hayek, F., 30 Hegel, G., 188 Heidegger, M., 3, 50, 54, 69, 76–90, 118, 135, 138, 184, 196, 197 Hermans, H., 157 Hermeneutics, 62, 68, 104, 128, 130, 138, 141, 148, 208 Heteroglossia, 155 Hill, J., 164

Index Himmelfarb, G., 201 Hirsch, E., 144 Hitler, 58, 87, 89 Hodge, J., 83, 84 Husserl, E., 47, 67, 85, 123–125, 127–129 J Jackson, J., 144–146 Johnson, M., 182 Joy, 111–119, 154, 181 K Kant, I., 12, 18–20, 22, 31, 33, 34, 107, 190–193, 205 Kierkegaard, S., 66, 130 King, M.L. Jr., 4, 145 Kohlberg, L., 45 Kohut, H., 122 L Lacan, J., 153 Ladkin, D., 80, 81, 86 Laquer, W., 58 Levinas, E., 46–51, 100, 183–185, 194 Levy, N., 103 Liberalism, 29, 31, 34 Lipps, T., 124 Luthans, F., 38 M Machiavelli, N., 55 Macintyre, A., 146, 153, 158 Maitland, I., 92 Mandela, N., 4, 95 Mansell, S., 48 Maslow, A., 177 May, R., 68 McAdams, D., 139, 141 Mclaren, R., 175 Mead, G., 179 Mendieta, E., 207 Merleau-Ponty, M., 126 Mill, J.S., 30, 31, 108 Minkowski, E., 143 Mirror reading, 62 Montaigne, M. de, 163 Moral manager, 99, 105 Morgan, G., 54 Mulhall, S., 78 Mumford, M., 183

Index N Narcissism, 92, 93, 123 Negri, A., 4 Nietzsche, F., 9, 56–64, 66, 68, 84, 87, 130 Novalis, 188 Nussbaum, M., 110, 133, 200, 201 Nyberg, D., 41 O Oshana, M., 28 P Parks, R., 145 Parrhesia, 102, 104 Paternalism, 30 Phenomenologists, 27, 123 Phronesis, 68, 94, 134, 193, 212 Plato, 3, 117, 175 Pollard, W., 86 Positive leadership, 38 Positive psychology, 15, 38, 39, 42, 65, 66, 68, 122, 133, 143, 156 Postmodern, 3, 20, 54, 99, 100, 102, 108, 135, 148, 149, 154, 157, 159, 162, 165 Pragmatic cosmopolitanism, 202 The Prince, 55 Pritchett, V., 152 Problematization, 204, 205, 207, 212 Prudence, 94, 97, 104, 105 R Rational cosmopolitan, 190, 191 Rawls, J., 31 Reflective leadership, 26 Ricoeur, P., 50, 141, 147, 148 Risk society, 195 Role-modelling, 9, 32, 42, 44, 62, 79, 95, 96 Roquentin, A., 152, 153 Ryle, G., 24 S Sartre, J.-P., 3, 64–76, 78, 86, 152–154, 159 Sartwell, C., 152 Schmitt, C., 87 Schopenhauer, A., 43, 131 Schutz, A., 157 Seligman, M., 39 Sen, A., 110 Sendjaya, S., 44

233 Servant leadership, 86, 88 Simpson, P., 78–80 Slotte, M., 122 Social cognitive theory, 25 Solomon, R., 95, 97, 100 Spinoza, B., 112–115 Staub, E., 192 Stein, E., 129 Sternberg, R., 175, 181 Strawson, G., 152, 160 Sveningsson, S., 41, 44 T Taylor, C., 9, 13, 18, 26, 36, 84, 173, 188, 204, 209 Thomas, R., 72, 143 Tomkins, L., 78–80 Toxic leadership, 2, 131 Tracy, S., 41 Transactional leadership, 29–34, 79, 141 Transformational leadership, 31–33, 38, 79, 110 Transient leader, 73 Translation, 55, 205, 206 Transnational democracy, 195, 201 Trethewey, A., 41 U United Nations, 193, 195 Utilitarianism, 107, 132 V Voltaire, 192 W Weber, M., 5, 9, 89 Winnicott, D., 184 Wisnewski, J., 80 Wolin, R., 87, 89 Y Yukl, G., 32 Z Zaccaro, S., 37 Zaleznik, A., 146 Zarathustra, 64 Žižek, S., 54, 55