The Philosophical Roots of the Ecological Crisis : Descartes and the Modern Worldview [1 ed.] 9781527512993, 9781527503434

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The Philosophical Roots of the Ecological Crisis

The Philosophical Roots of the Ecological Crisis: Descartes and the Modern Worldview By

Joshtrom Isaac Kureethadam

The Philosophical Roots of the Ecological Crisis: Descartes and the Modern Worldview By Joshtrom Isaac Kureethadam This book first published 2017 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2017 by Joshtrom Isaac Kureethadam All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-5275-0343-7 ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-0343-4

The time is coming when the struggle for dominion over the earth will be carried on. It will be carried on in the name of fundamental philosophical doctrines. —Friedrich Nietzsche

We cannot solve a problem with the same mind-set that created it in the first place. —Albert Einstein

CONTENTS

Preface ......................................................................................................... x Abbreviations ............................................................................................ xii Acknowledgements .................................................................................. xiii Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 Diagnosing the Root Causes of the Ecological Crisis Chapter I ...................................................................................................... 9 The Philosophical Roots of the Ecological Crisis 1. The Anthropogenic Character of the Contemporary Ecological Crisis 2. Resistance in Looking for the Causes of the Ecological Crisis 3. Going Beyond the Apparent Causes 4. Past Attempts to Trace the Deeper Roots of the Crisis 5. The Roots of the Ecological Crisis as ‘Philosophical’ Chapter II ................................................................................................... 47 Modernity as the Humus of the Philosophical Roots of the Ecological Crisis 1. The Alleged Roots of the Ecological Crisis in Gnosticism and Greek Philosophy 2. Christianity and the Supposed Depreciation of the Natural World 3. Modernity as the Humus for the Philosophical Roots of the Ecological Crisis 4. Bacon as a Possible Accoucheur of Modernity 5. The Singular Contribution of Descartes towards the Creation of the Modern Weltbild

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Contents

Chapter III ................................................................................................. 85 Descartes’ Unique Contribution towards the Modern Weltbild 1. The Metamorphosis of Natural Philosophy into the Modern Mechanistic Science 2. The Epistemological-Metaphysical Project of Descartes 3. Descartes’ New Epistemological Foundations 4. Cartesian Epistemological Revolution and Its Ecological Implications 5. Descartes’ New Metaphysical Foundations 6. Some Ecological Implications of Cartesian Metaphysics 7. The Cartesian Modern Weltbild and the Philosophical Roots of the Ecological Crisis Chapter IV ............................................................................................... 124 Cartesian Ego, Modern Anthropocentrism, and the Ecological Crisis 1. The Absolute Centrality of the Self in Modernity 2. The Cogito and the Birth of the Modern Subject 3. The Reduction and Exaltation of the Self as Res Cogitans 4. Modern Anthropocentrism and the Roots of the Ecological Crisis 5. A Philosophical Debate on Anthropocentrism 6. Biocentrism as an Alternative to Anthropocentrism 7. A Relational Perspective as the Only Viable Alternative Chapter V ................................................................................................ 163 The Modern Mechanistic Worldview and the Ecological Crisis 1. Descartes’ Substitution of Aristotelian Hylomorphism with Mechanism 2. Knowledge of the Physical World: A New Epistemology for a New Physics 3. Clear and Distinct Perception and the Geometrization of the Physical World 4. The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Mechanistic Physics 5. The Ontological Reduction of the Physical World to Res Extensa 6. A Reductive View of the Natural World 7. The Mechanistic Weltbild and the Roots of the Ecological Crisis

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Chapter VI ............................................................................................... 205 The Modern Mechanistic Physiology and the World of the Bête-Machines 1. Descartes Unique Contribution towards the Modern Mechanistic Physiology 2. The Mechanistic Explanatory Scheme in Physiology 3. From Mechanistic Description to Ontological Mechanism 4. The Elimination of Teleology from the Natural World 5. Ecological Implications of the Cartesian Mechanistic Physiology: Animals as Bête-Machines Chapter VII .............................................................................................. 248 Cartesian Metaphysical Dualism and the Human-Nature Divide 1. The Uniqueness of Cartesian Dualism 2. The Epistemic Route to the Human-Nature Divide 3. The Metaphysical Dualism between the res cogitans and the res extensa 4. Critique of the Cartesian Epistemological Dualistic Divide 5. Critique of the Cartesian Metaphysical Dualism 6. Cartesian Dualism and the Bifurcation of Nature 7. Holism as an Alternative Paradigm to Cartesian Dualism Chapter VIII ............................................................................................ 292 The Enduring Modern Weltbild and the Contemporary Ecological Crisis 1. The Long Shadow of Descartes over Modern Philosophy and Beyond 2. Modern Science, Technology, and the Taming of Nature 3. Modern Economy and the Exploitation of Nature 4. Modern Politics and Educational Curricula for the Conquest of the Natural World 5. The Enduring of the Modern Worldview and the Deterioration of Our Common Planetary Home Conclusion ............................................................................................... 331 New Wineskins for a New Worldview Bibliography ............................................................................................ 341 Index ........................................................................................................ 382

PREFACE

While attempts to search for the deeper roots of the ecological crisis began nearly fifty years ago with Lynn White’s celebrated essay, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis” (published in Science, 1967), the project has remained largely uncompleted to date. The fact that the crisis has only got worse in the meantime is a clear indication that we have not yet managed to diagnose and treat the real root causes of the problem. I believe that in order to overcome the contemporary ecological crisis, we need to unearth, in the first place, our fundamental beliefs and attitudes towards the physical world—the conglomerate of which constitutes a certain Weltbild—that have led to a voraciously exploitative and ruthlessly destructive relationship with nature. It is precisely the scope of the present book. I have taught courses in Ecology for post-graduate students for several years. I am of the opinion that environmental philosophy so far has restricted its domain mostly to environmental ethics, often cogitating on nuanced issues like the intrinsic worth of non-human species, the rights of animals, etc. Environmental philosophers have not yet sufficiently grappled with foundational questions like the metaphysical grounds underpinning our distorted relationship with the natural world, as evident in the current ecological crisis. In the light of my own research and teaching, I am convinced that an important task of environmental philosophy is to trace the deeper conceptual roots of humanity’s disharmonious relationship with the surrounding natural world. The present book is the humble result of an explorative journey over many years to unearth the latent philosophical roots of the contemporary ecological crisis. I am indebted to several persons who have nurtured and sustained me in this process. I remember with profound gratitude Luis Caruana who was an attentive guide while he was at the Gregorian University in Rome and later at Heythrop College of the University of London, Fiona Ellis who acted as my tutor while I was a Research Scholar working on this project at the University of Oxford, Paul Gilbert who offered some constructively critical perspectives on the research project which have improved the quality of the final outcome, Gerard J. Hughes, former Master of Campion Hall, University of Oxford, my own colleagues in the Faculty of Philosophy of the Salesian University in Rome, particularly

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Mauro Mantovani and Scaria Thuruthiyil, and last but not least, my own students over the years with whom several questions in this book were discussed and at times passionately debated. I am deeply grateful to Liz Walmsley who meticulously proofread the entire manuscript and offered valuable corrections. I also thank Annabel Clarkson who corrected some chapters of the earlier drafts, and Banzelão Julio Teixeira for his attentive reading of the manuscript. I am also grateful to John Dickson and Vincent Castilino for their timely assistance. I sincerely thank Cambridge Scholars Publishing for the excellent collaboration that I have received from them in getting this volume ready for publication. The state of our planetary home appears to be increasingly deteriorating. However, the silver lining in the clouds is that there has been a steady growth of ecological consciousness over recent years. Many people are increasingly aware of the grave challenge facing our common home and are disquieted about it, and want humanity to chart a way out of the crisis. I believe that an important step in this journey will be the accurate diagnosis of the root causes of the malaise. It is only after having understood the real and root causes of the contemporary ecological predicament that we can think of proposing ways and means to overcome it. This is what I have sought to do in this book. I hope that the book will appeal not only to academic philosophers and students of environmental disciplines, but also to all those concerned about the precarious state of our common home: environmental activists and grassroots movements, educationists and study-groups, religious leaders and faith communities, and many others. I praise and thank God for enkindling a great zeal to care for our common home (cf. Jn 2:17) in the hearts of so many people around the globe. I dedicate this book to everyone engaged in protecting and preserving our common planetary home for ourselves, for the rest of the biotic community, and for future generations.

ABBREVIATIONS

AT

Oeuvres de Descartes, eds. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery. 13 vols. Paris: CNRS/J. Vrin, 1964-74.

CSM

The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, tr. & ed. John Cottingham - Robert Stoothoff - Dugald Murdoch. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

CSMK

The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, tr. & ed. John Cottingham - Robert Stoothoff - Dugald Murdoch Anthony Kenny. 3 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Discourse

Discourse on the Method

Meditations

Meditations on First Philosophy

Principles

Principles of Philosophy

Passions

The Passions of the Soul

Rules

Rules for the Direction of the Mind

The World

The World or Treatise on Light

EFA

Ecological Footprint Analysis

IPCC

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

PETM

Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

All translations from non-English sources are my own, unless indicated otherwise.

INTRODUCTION DIAGNOSING THE ROOT CAUSES OF THE ECOLOGICAL CRISIS

The contemporary ecological crisis points to the precarious state of Earth, our planetary home. The talk about the ecological crisis is, in fact, spurred by a profound concern for the alarming situation of our common home. It is evident in the etymological origin of the very term “ecology”, derived from two Greek words: oikos and logos, meaning “home” and “discourse” respectively. The ecological crisis is about our very home. It is not a mere environmental issue, or even a host of them, as it is often presented in the media and in academic discussions. The crisis is about the real threat to the survival and flourishing of life, including human life, on Earth, our common home. For the first time in human history, the very home that sustains and hosts myriad forms of life, including human life, appears to be on the verge of a possible collapse. We live in a rather ironical situation. Today, we know much more about the contemporary ecological crisis than at any other time. There is no shortage of warnings about the precarious situation of our common planetary home. Report after report from the scientific community indicate in no uncertain terms that the state of our home planet is only deteriorating year after year, that many of the natural processes that sustain life on Earth are on the verge of a near collapse and that our common home is in danger. Some of the world’s most prestigious scientific bodies and leading academic institutions are on the frontline when it comes to the study of manifestations of the ecological crisis like climate change, biodiversity loss, pollution, desertification and resource depletion, to name a few. There is no dearth of proposals when it comes also to the possible solutions to the crisis which range from technological feats like geoengineering to political proposals like cap-and-trade. At the same time, the crisis is decidedly getting worse, and looms large as a real threat to the future of Earth as an abode for humanity and other forms of life. In fact, what is at stake is not just the survival of many forms of life but the very future of human civilization.

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Introduction

At this juncture it is important to pause and ask as to why we find ourselves in such a paradoxical, outright schizophrenic situation with regard to the precarious state of our common planetary home. We know that our common home is in real peril, yet we are nowhere when it comes to responding to the crisis which only gets increasingly worse. One very plausible reason is that we have not yet devoted sufficient time and energy to “diagnosing” the deeper root causes of the problem. We have not attempted to do what any well-trained doctor would do while attending to a patient with a grave illness. Before trying to treat the patient, any physician will seek to find out the underlying causes of the illness. It is only after a proper and thorough diagnosis has been carried out that real and effective treatment can begin. Otherwise, one will only be responding to the apparent symptoms of the disease. In fact, the malaise can only get worse, if the deeper underlying causes are not addressed in the first place. Faced with the contemporary ecological crisis, we stand in need of a real “diagnosis” of the underlying causes of the malaise. We need to ask ourselves some fundamental questions regarding the deeper causes of the crisis. How did we get here? Why do we pull down the very pillars of our common home? Why are we despoiling the very nest that shelters us? It is only after having rightly diagnosed and understood the real and root causes of the contemporary ecological predicament that we can think of proposing ways and means to overcome the very crisis. The importance of diagnosing the deeper underlying root causes of a problem is only ancient and received wisdom. This was what Gautama Buddha, the Enlightened One, did thousands of years ago when faced with the universal problem of human suffering. Buddha’s path to enlightenment unfolded in four important stages which led him to the discovery of the corresponding four Noble Truths. Confronted with the predicament of human misery, Buddha sought, first of all, to understand what suffering really is. This led him to the first noble truth about human existence and suffering. Then followed a very important step, probably the most important of the entire process. It consisted in finding the deep and underlying root causes of the problem of suffering. Thus he arrived at the second noble truth about the causes of human suffering. The third and fourth noble truths concerning the elimination of suffering and the concrete way to achieve it, namely, the Ashtanga-marga (the eight-fold path), were possible only after the deeper root causes of the problem of suffering had rightly been identified. In the face of the contemporary ecological crisis, we appear not to have given sufficient importance to (or even skipped altogether) the second phase of diagnosing the deeper roots of the problem. We have sought to

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understand and respond to the crisis. As we mentioned earlier, there is no dearth of studies which seek to describe the crisis as well as offer possible solutions to it. What has not taken place however, is a radical diagnosis of the deeper and underlying causes of the ecological crisis. In the meantime, we carry on responding to the mere symptoms of the problem, while the crisis itself is only getting worse. At this critical juncture of unprecedented threats to the sustainability of our common planetary home, we need to pause and reflect in order to diagnose the real causes of our current ecological predicament. It is a fundamental step, a sine qua non, if we are to overcome the crisis. It is precisely the journey that awaits us in this book. In the coming chapters, we shall seek to diagnose some of the underlying philosophical root causes of the contemporary ecological crisis. Of course, we are embarking on a very ambitious journey ridden with perils, blind alleys, and false leads. First of all, it may appear naïve on our part to presume that there exist direct and clear-cut causes for the complex and multi-faceted ecological predicament. The causes are indeed legion and they are hardly ever obvious! So we can only begin by advancing credible hypotheses—as physicians, scientists and others do while trying to arrive at the underlying causes of a malaise or unknown phenomena. The main hypothesis we advance in the present book is that the humus, where some of the underlying and most important philosophical root causes of the ecological crisis originate is the Weltbild of Modernity—the historical epoch which ushered a radical shift in the human perception and treatment of the natural world with detrimental consequences for the latter. We sharpen the hypothesis further by narrowing down the area of the humus for the conceptual roots of the ecological malaise more precisely in the philosophy of René Descartes, the father of modern philosophy, whose thought contributed significantly to the creation of the modern worldview. We shall now sketch out in a few strokes, the journey that lies ahead of us in the verification of the hypothesis regarding the underlying philosophical root causes of the contemporary ecological crisis in the worldview of Modernity, shaped largely by thinkers like Descartes. The first chapter will argue that the conceptual root causes of the contemporary ecological crisis are significantly philosophical. We will begin with a reflection on the anthropogenic character of the present ecological crisis, namely, that the crisis is caused by human activities. It is precisely for the human-induced origin of the crisis that we search for the deeper causes of the malaise in the distorted human-nature relationship. We will then go on to evidence how some of the factors often touted as the causes of the contemporary ecological crisis—like the indiscriminate

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Introduction

application of science and technology or the phenomenal explosion of human population—are only the apparent and not the real causes of the problem. The real causes need to be searched at a much deeper level, namely at the conceptual level of ideas that have moulded human attitudes towards the physical world and guided human treatment of nature. It needs to be admitted that there have been some attempts in this regard in the past. One may recall here the classical essay of Lynn White Jr. who sought to identify the roots of the contemporary ecological crisis in Christian theology, and especially in the biblical command to dominate over creatures found in the first chapter of the book of Genesis. Others have sought to trace the roots of the crisis in monotheistic beliefs and their attendant theological concepts of a transcendental God, with detrimental effects on the physical world considered as inferior and without intrinsic worth. Such proposals however, do not stand the razor of critical scrutiny as we will go on to evidence. The real roots of the ecological crisis are “philosophical”, as they emerge from a certain vision of the physical world and of humanity’s relationship with it. In the second chapter, we will seek to find out where exactly the deeper philosophical roots of the ecological crisis originate. We argue that the conceptual roots of the ecological crisis can be traced to Modernity rather than any other era of human history. Attempts to indict Greek philosophy or early and Medieval Christian spirituality for the contemporary ecological woes appear to be hollow on closer examination. Instead, Modernity reveals itself as a unique period that witnessed a radical transformation of humanity’s understanding of itself, the human perception of the physical world, and especially humanity’s relationship with the physical world. Such a worldview radically changed human-nature relationship, to the detriment of the latter. While it is possible to identify Modernity as the humus for the philosophical roots of the contemporary ecological crisis, there remains a knotty problem. The difficulty is to ascertain which modern thinker has contributed most to the creation of the modern Weltbild and the transformation of human-nature relationship in terms of dominion and exploitation. Carolyn Merchant, for example, has suggested that Francis Bacon, the father of modern experimental science, contributed most to a distorted human-nature relationship in the wake of Modernity. Others have suggested that the roots of the ecological crisis are to be sought in the modern mechanistic scientific method ushered in by Galileo, Gassendi and Newton. While the modern worldview was put in place by the collective efforts of many such stalwarts of Modernity, the contribution of René Descartes, universally acclaimed as the father of modern philosophy, appears singular in this regard.

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The third chapter will examine the unique contribution of Descartes in the creation of the modern worldview, especially from the philosophical point of view. Descartes sought to renew philosophy radically, providing it with altogether new foundations. The Cartesian approach has been both epistemological—in terms of a new theory of knowledge, as well as metaphysical—in terms of a new conception of the ens of beings. It is such a profound overhauling of the traditional philosophical categories of knowing and of the very nature of reality that makes Descartes stand out unique, head and shoulders above, among the accoucheurs of Modernity. The significant contribution of Descartes in the moulding of the modern worldview was acknowledged by a philosopher like Martin Heidegger in his incisive critique of Modernity in Sein und Zeit and in later writings. Other critics of Modernity like Hans Jonas and Maurice Merleau-Ponty have also pointed out Descartes’ singular contribution in the creation of the modern worldview and its attendant ecological implications. The principal elements of the modern Weltbild in terms of the emergence of the Archimedean modern Subject, the conception of the physical world, including animate beings, as reduced to pure extended matter, and the thorough dualistic divide between humans and the rest of the physical world trace their origin in Cartesian philosophy. The core of the present project is precisely to make explicit how the triple foundations of the Modern worldview—in terms of an exaggerated anthropocentrism, a mechanistic conception of the natural world, and the metaphysical dualism between humanity and the rest of the physical world—can all be largely traced back to the Cartesian thought with direct ecological consequences. This will be the programme undertaken from chapters four to seven. In chapter four, we will examine the link between modern anthropocentrism and the current ecological crisis. The turn to the Subject which becomes the Archimedean centre of reality takes place in Modernity and precisely with the emergence of the Cartesian ego, the res cogitans. Descartes brings about such a radical revolution through a clever epistemologicalmetaphysical strategy. From the epistemological perspective, Descartes proposes a new theory of knowledge in which certainty is arrived at in terms of the clear and distinct perception from the part of the subject, who represents physical reality according to its own categories. From the metaphysical perspective, Descartes reduces the identity of the human subject in terms of rationality alone, conceived as diametrically opposed to, and as superior to the physical world, the res extensa. Modern anthropocentrism thus begins with Descartes, with direct and evident ecological consequences. We will also discuss how biocentrism, the

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Introduction

alternative proposed against anthropocentrism by deep ecologists and others, is not a viable choice. In chapters five and six, we will deal with the modern mechanistic worldview ushered in by Descartes and other protagonists of Modernity. In chapter five, we will examine Descartes’ unique contribution towards the mechanistic understanding of the physical world which dethroned and replaced the Aristotelian-Scholastic hylomorphic conception of matter. Descartes’ strategy was to argue that physical entities have mechanistic properties alone which render the physical world purely inert, extended matter, and bereft of any element of teleology whatsoever. The Cartesian and modern mechanistic conception of the inanimate physical world, while possessing great heuristic value and pragmatic success, ultimately led to the creation of a one-dimensional perception of the natural world. We will go on to argue how such a reductive view of the natural world has contributed significantly to an instrumental and disenchanted conception of the physical world in terms of utility alone, and reduced to a mere storehouse of resources for human consumption. Modernity came up not only with a mechanistic physics but also with a mechanistic physiology, wherein the animal world also comes to be subsumed under the category of the res extensa. In chapter six, we will examine Descartes’ original contribution towards the mechanization not only of the inanimate world but also of the animate world. Within the Cartesian system, all non-human entities ultimately get reduced to mechanistic beings that exhibit machine-like properties alone, while all rational and intellectual properties are possessed solely by humans, who alone are the res cogitans. Modern mechanistic physiology is best evident in the infamous Cartesian doctrine of the bête-machines which has conspicuously manifest ecological implications. In chapter seven, we discuss the most important heritage of Cartesian thought in the creation of the modern Weltbild, namely his metaphysical dualism. In philosophical circles, Cartesian dualism is often reduced to anthropological dualism, namely, the question of the union of body and soul. But it is important to remember that Cartesian dualism is much deeper and is ultimately metaphysical in character. It is an ontological dualism in which all reality is divided into the two inseparable segments of the res cogitans and the res extensa—the human beings and the rest of the physical world—conceived in terms of diametric opposition and exclusion. On account of such a dualistic divide, humanity and the physical world stand in total separation within the Cartesian and largely modern worldview. Some of the most significant roots of the contemporary ecological crisis can be traced precisely within the humus of the

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metaphysical dualism introduced by Descartes at the dawn of Modernity. It is such an ontological divide between humans and the rest of the physical world, shorn of any element of continuity and relationship whatsoever between them, that has sanctioned the domination and exploitation of the natural world at the hands of humans, as the latter came to be considered as totally separate from and hierarchically superior to nature. In chapter eight, the very last of the book, we will seek to further verify the hypothesis advanced, namely, that the contemporary ecological crisis is intricately linked to the modern and Cartesian Weltbild. We do this by examining how the modern worldview, considered as the humus for the deeper philosophical roots of the current ecological crisis, endures to our present day, and continues to contribute to the distorted human-nature relationship and spoliation of the natural world. We continue to relate to and treat the physical world within the modern and Cartesian philosophical framework, in spite of the emergence of contemporary physics and postmodern philosophical categories. The long shadow of the modern philosophical Weltbild continues to serve as the foundation and the encompassing horizon of much of contemporary philosophical thought, science and technology, neo-liberal economy and political and educational institutions. This situation also explains why the domination and exploitation of the natural world has only been intensified in the recent decades with the “globalization” of the western modern worldview around the globe. Since the deeper conceptual roots of the contemporary ecological crisis lie within such an ideological paradigm, it is evident that the very crisis will not be overcome without a conscious attempt to surpass the underlying worldview inherited from Modernity. We will conclude therefore arguing for a new philosophical worldview that can provide a new orientation to human living in our common planetary home which appears to be on the verge of a possible collapse. We have briefly sketched out the intellectual journey awaiting us in this book that seeks to trace the deeper philosophical roots of the contemporary ecological crisis in Modernity and in Cartesian thought. We will be helped in this journey by the insights of some of the major thinkers who have sought to offer incisive critiques of Modernity and of the ecological impact of the Cartesian philosophical system on the natural world. We will refer especially to the philosophical critique from the part of Martin Heidegger towards Modernity and to Cartesian philosophy, in particular. We will also occasionally make mention of other critics of Modernity and Descartes like Hans Jonas, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Alfred

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Introduction

North Whitehead, Charles Taylor and others. We will also avail ourselves of the contributions from the various schools of eco-philosophy like deep ecology, ecofeminism and social ecology that are openly critical of Modernity and the Cartesian philosophical heritage in the context of the contemporary ecological crisis. But above all, we will undertake a direct and in-depth analysis of the major writings of Descartes, the father of modern philosophy, who has contributed more than anyone else towards the creation of the modern Weltbild, and indirectly also towards the moulding of human-nature relationship ever since.

CHAPTER I THE PHILOSOPHICAL ROOTS OF THE ECOLOGICAL CRISIS

Introduction What stands out about the contemporary ecological crisis is its conspicuously “anthropogenic” character. The crisis is caused by the humans themselves. So we will begin our opening chapter by considering to what extent the contemporary ecological crisis can be attributed to human activities. It is precisely the anthropogenic origin of the contemporary ecological crisis which motivates the search for the deeper causes of the malaise in the distorted human-nature relationship. If the crisis is caused by human activities, and is rather recent in origin, it is important to ask what are the factors that lead humanity to engage in an antagonistic relationship with the natural world. The thesis advanced in this book, namely, that the root causes of the contemporary ecological crisis are largely philosophical in nature, and can be traced largely in the modern Weltbild, makes sense only against such a background. The first three chapters of the book will frame the boundaries of our discussion in this regard. In the first chapter, we will argue that the deeper causes of the ecological crisis are ultimately philosophical. In the second chapter, we will demonstrate how these root causes can be found in Modernity rather than in any other epoch of human history. In the third chapter, we will evidence the unique contribution of Descartes towards the creation of the modern worldview that is the humus for the philosophical roots of the ecological crisis. Our claim in the first chapter regarding the philosophical root causes of the contemporary ecological crisis needs to be proved against some initial objections. A first obstacle to overcome is a certain resistance to get to the deeper and underlying root causes of the problem. Some authors like Robert Kirkman have argued that the ecological crisis is merely endemic to human nature and that humanity needs to take it in its stride. There are others who dismiss any attempt to look for the root causes of the problem and argue that science and technology will eventually solve the problem.

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Chapter I

We will demonstrate how both these assumptions are rather unfounded and why it is important to search for the deeper causes of the ecological malaise. In order to get to the real root causes of the contemporary ecological crisis, it is also important to go beyond some of the apparent causes, often touted as the real causes of the current environmental degradation. We will discuss here the argument from Paul Ehrlich and others that the population explosion of the recent decades is the main driver of the current ecological crisis. Others tend to lay the blame for the crisis on modern science and technology. They argue that the ecological crisis results from the indiscriminate use and application of science and technology for the exploitation of the natural world. We will briefly discuss these positions and will show that these are only the apparent and not the real causes of the problem. The latter need to be plumbed much deeper, namely, at the conceptual level of ideas that have created and moulded human attitudes towards the natural world and have eventually led to an exploitative relationship with it. There have been attempts in the past to trace the deeper conceptual roots of the contemporary ecological crisis. The most well-known proposal in this regard was advanced by Lynn White Jr. way back in 1967. White sought to trace the historical roots of the ecological crisis within the JudeoChristian tradition. His thesis was centred around the particular verse in the book of Genesis on the theme of domination (Gen 1:28) which he argued served as a licence and motivation for Christians to exploit the natural world. We will demonstrate how White’s argument, which led to much discussion in Christian theological circles, crumbles under critical scrutiny. The same fate also awaits similar claims that seek to identify the causes of the ecological crisis within the monotheistic religious traditions with their insistence on the transcendence of God and their alleged concomitant depreciation and negation of the intrinsic worth of the natural world. We will conclude the chapter by arguing how the real root causes of the contemporary ecological crisis are clearly “philosophical”. Such roots are basically ideological or conceptual, as they emerge from a certain vision of reality, a certain Weltanschauung of humanity’s understanding of themselves, of the physical world, and above all, of the relationship between humanity and the natural world.

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1. The Anthropogenic Character of the Contemporary Ecological Crisis The project to look for the philosophical roots of the current ecological crisis is based on the fundamental assumption that the crisis is anthropogenic in origin, and that behind human activities that have brought about the ecological predicament, it is possible to identify some deeply antagonistic human attitudes in the perception and treatment of the natural world. However, this starting point regarding the anthropogenic character of the ecological crisis is itself strongly contested in environmental scepticism. So it is important to deal with this crucial objection before embarking on the very project. Environmental scepticism raises serious objections regarding both the existence of the ecological crisis and of its causes.1 Scepticism regarding 1 Environmental scepticism has kept pace with the spread of ecological consciousness in the last few decades. Such scepticism is reflected clearly in the reluctance of mainstream economics and politics, to date, to come to grips adequately with the ecological crisis. Some of the notable works in environmental scepticism include: Julian Simon, The Ultimate Resource (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981); Robert Jastrow – William Nierenberg – Frederick Seitz, Global Warming: What Does the Science Tell Us? (Washington, D.C.: George C. Marshall Institute, 1989); Julian Simon – Norman Myers, Scarcity or Abundance?: A Debate on the Environment (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1994); Ronald Bailey, Eco-Scam: The False Prophets of Ecological Apocalypse (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993); Gregg Easterbrook, A Moment on the Earth: The Coming Age of Environmental Optimism (New York: Viking, 1995); Bjørn Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Michael Crichton, State of Fear (New York: HarperCollins, 2004); J.E. de Steiguer, The Origins of Modern Environmental Thought (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 2006); James Inhofe, The Greatest Hoax: How the Global Warming Conspiracy Threatens Your Future (Washington, DC: WND Books, 2012); Jone Fone, Climate Change: Natural or Manmade? (London: Stacey International, 2013), etc. For a good and extensive critique of environmental scepticism see: James Hoggan – Richard Littlemore, Climate Cover-Up: The Crusade to Deny Global Warming (Vancouver: Greystone Books, 2009); Wendy Wagner – Thomas O. McGarity, Bending Science: How Special Interests Corrupt Public Health Research (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2010); Clive Hamilton, Requiem for a Species: Why We Resist the Truth about Climate Change (London –Washington: Earthscan, 2010); Naomi Oreskes – Erik Conway, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming (New York – Berlin – London: Bloomsbury Press, 2010); James Lawrence Powell, The Inquisition of Climate Science (New York, NY: Columbia

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the existence of the ecological crisis is hard to sustain in our day as the multiple manifestations of the crisis have become too conspicuously evident. Today, hardly anyone doubts the existence of the ecological crisis. Instead, environmental scepticism regarding the causes of the contemporary ecological crisis lingers on despite mounting scientific evidence to the contrary. It is important to respond to this brand of scepticism which argues that the real causes of the crisis are attributable to natural factors rather than to human activities, before we can begin the enquiry about the causes of the crisis in human attitudes and behaviour. We shall limit ourselves to making evident how two of the most conspicuous manifestations of the ecological crisis, namely, climate change and species extinction are caused by human activities. It is in the area of climate change that the anthropogenic origin of the contemporary ecological crisis is most contested. A rather widespread argument advanced by climate sceptics is that it is unwarranted to toll bells of alarm regarding the present state of the earth because the planet has itself gone through numerous natural variations of climate during its geological history stretching into millions and millions of years. According to the sceptics, the claim that recent climate change is caused by humaninduced carbon emission is an exaggeration on the part of the scientific community.2 According to the sceptics when it comes to climate change, natural variability and possible solar influence are more significant than the human induced greenhouse gas emission.3 Accordingly, the environmental sceptics claim that the alarm about the ecological crisis is not only overstated but also misplaced, because it is part of the natural cycles of the life of the planet and has nothing to do with human activities. It is also argued that seen from the millennial geological perspective, the so-called ecological crisis is no crisis at all because the earth has remarkably coped

University Press, 2011); Andrew J. Hoffman, “Climate Science as Culture War,” Stanford Social Innovation Review 10 (2012), 30-37; Riley E. Dunlap, “Climate Change Skepticism and Denial: An Introduction,” American Behavioural Scientist 57 (2013), 691-98. 2 Cf. Tim Ball, The Deliberate Corruption of Climate Science (Mount Vernon: Stairway Press, 2014), 7; Richard S. Lindzen, “Global Warming, Models and Language,” in Climate Change: The Facts, ed. Alan Moran (New Hampshire: Stockade Books, 2015), 38; Robert M. Carter, “The Scientific Context,” in Climate Change: The Facts, ed. Alan Moran (New Hampshire: Stockade Books, 2015), 6782. 3 Nigel Lawson, “Cool It: An Essay on Climate Change” in Climate Change: The Facts, ed. Alan Moran (New Hampshire: Stockade Books, 2015), 100.

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with such challenges in the past, and the planet is bound to display equal resilience in the future too. Such a contention about the causes of climate change—which can be called the lay man’s version of environmental scepticism because one comes across it often in casual discussions and in popular media—appears to be rather well embedded in the public psyche. This line of thinking, however, reveals itself to be too simplistic when critically examined. The weakness of this argument lies mainly in its consideration of the time scale and intensity of climatic changes. It is true that Earth has gone through periods of global warming in the past. But the most recent global warming episode, similar to what our planetary home is bound to incur in the near future if no precautionary measures are adopted by the global community, dates back to millions of years ago when humans were not around. The anatomically modern humans, the Homo sapiens sapiens, emerged nearly 195,000 years ago4, and the Holocene epoch during which our current civilizations rose began just around 12,000 years ago.5 The arrival and flourishing of modern humans in our planetary home is indeed very recent when compared to the long geological history of the earth. In fact, the last time that our home planet experienced a similar rise in the global average temperatures as could occur in the current century without mitigation efforts, was a period named by scientists as the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM) which occurred as far back as 55 million years ago when a massive amount of carbon in the form of methane—about 4.5 trillion tons—entered the atmosphere, causing temperatures to shoot up by 5C (9F).6 The big difference is that while the previous episode was caused by natural factors and stretched over a period of 10,000 years, today human activities are releasing greenhouse gases 30 times faster than the rate of emissions that triggered a period of extreme global warming in the Earth’s past, capable of achieving the same effect in just 300 years.7 Besides, one needs to remember that it took 100,000 years after the PETM for carbon dioxide levels in the air and water to return to normal,8 with disastrous 4

See Paul Mellars, “Why Did Modern Human Populations Disperse from Africa ca. 60,000 Years Ago? A New Model,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 103 (2006), 9381. 5 See Brian Fagan, The Long Summer: How Climate Changed Civilization (New York: Basic Books, 2004). 6 Cf. James C. Zachos et al., “Rapid Acidification of the Ocean during the PaleoceneEocene Thermal Maximum,” Science 308 (2005), 1611-14. 7 Ibid., 1614. 8 Ibid., 1611.

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consequences for the species that swamped the waters and the land, a situation which presents a very bleak picture of the challenges facing humanity today. There exists a strong, credible and substantial body of evidence, based on multiple lines of research, documenting that Earth is warming precisely due to increased greenhouse gas emissions from human activities. Measurements show a rise close to 0.8°C in the average surface air temperature of Earth over the last century with greater increase in the recent decades. At the same time, the common conclusion of a wide range of studies conducted over the past years is that the observed climate changes cannot be explained by natural factors alone. The perceived changes can be explained only by having recourse to a substantial anthropogenic influence in terms of human activities.9 Today there exists a nearly unanimous consensus in the scientific community about the anthropogenic effect on climate change.10 The periodical Assessment Reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reveal a progressive trend in this regard. The first definitive statement that humans are responsible for climate change is to be found in the Second Assessment Report of IPCC published in 1995. The Report concluded that the balance of evidence suggests “a discernible 9

H. Le Treut et al, “Historical Overview of Climate Change” in Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, eds. S. Solomon et al. (Cambridge – New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 103; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, eds. T.F. Stocker et al. (Cambridge – New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 12. See also Charles Fletcher, Climate Change: What the Science Tells Us (Danvers: John Wiley and Son, 2013), 7; Kevin E. Trenberth - John T. Fasullo, “Earth’s Energy Imbalance,” Journal of Climate 27 (2014), 3144. 10 See John Cook et al, “Consensus on Consensus: A Synthesis of Consensus Estimates on Human-caused Global Warming,” Environmental Research Letters 11 (2016), 048002; Naomi Oreskes, “The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change: How do we know We’re not Wrong?” in Climate Change: What it means for Us, Our Children, and Grandchildren, eds. Joseph F. C. Dimento - Pamela Doughman (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014), 105-148; John Cook et al., “Quantifying the Consensus on Anthropogenic Global Warming in the Scientific Literature,” Environmental Research Letters 8 (2013), 024024; Naomi Oreskes, “Beyond the Ivory Tower: The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change,” Science 306 (2004), 1686; National Academy of Sciences Committee on the Science of Climate Change, Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2001), 3.

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human influence” on the earth’s climate. In the Third Assessment Report of 2001, the IPCC pointed to the human fingerprint of climate change stating that there is strong evidence that most of the warming observed is attributable to human activities. According to the Report “detection and attribution studies consistently find evidence for an anthropogenic signal in the climate record.”11 These positions were reiterated in the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC of 2007, which provided multiple lines of evidence that human-induced climate change is indeed happening. The 2007 Report showed a jump with regard to certitude that changes are down to human activities—from >66% of the 2001 Report to >90%.12 According to this Report, human activities are responsible for about 13 times as much of the warming as changes in the Sun’s output. The most recent Fifth Assessment Report from the IPCC awards the highest margin of certainty to the human-induced factor of climate change, i.e., >95%. We may quote from the Summary for Policy Makers which was released in September 2013. Human influence has been detected in warming of the atmosphere and the ocean, in changes in the global water cycle, in reductions of snow and ice, in global mean sea level rise, and in changes in some climate extremes. This evidence for human influence has grown since the Fourth Assessment Report. It is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century.13

The anthropogenic character of climate change was reiterated in the statements of some of the world’s premier scientific academies recently. The Royal Society—the oldest scientific academy in continuous existence—concluded its 2010 document Climate Change: A Summary of the Science by affirming that “there is strong evidence that changes in greenhouse gas concentrations due to human activity are the dominant cause of the global warming that has taken place over the last half 11

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report. A Contribution of Working Groups I, II, and III to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, eds. R.T. Watson et al. (Cambridge – New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 5. The italics are mine. See also p. 51. 12 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Group I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, eds. R. K. Pachauri – A. Reisinger (Geneva: IPCC, 2007), 38-41. 13 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis, 12.

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century.”14 The document is explicit when it states: “Various lines of evidence point strongly to human activity being the main reason for the recent increase [of CO2 concentrations in atmosphere], mainly due to the burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil, gas) with smaller contributions from landuse changes and cement manufacture.”15 The ground-breaking document of the US National Academies of Sciences in 2010, entitled Advancing the Science of Climate Change states: “there is a strong, credible body of evidence, based on multiple lines of research, documenting that climate is changing and that these changes are in large part caused by human activities.”16 The 2014 joint report by the Royal Society and the United States National Academy of Sciences reaffirms the scientific consensus that recent climate change is largely caused by human activities.17 Human responsibility for the current ecological crisis is equally evident when it comes to the problem of the mass extinction of species. Environmental sceptics often claim that the current wave of extinctions is only the normal turnover in the history of life. The underlying argument here is that life on Earth has experienced myriad of extinction events over billions of years, and it will continue to thrive, irrespective of the current extinction spasms, offering new opportunities for new better-adapted species.18 However, the naked truth is that the current rates of species extinction exceed those of the historical past by several orders of magnitude and is bound to accelerate. It is estimated that the normal background rates of extinction is roughly 0.1-1.0 extinctions per million species per year.19 But, as per the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment “over the past few hundred years, humans have increased species extinction rates by as much as 1,000 times the background rates that were typical over Earth’s history.”20 According to the same report the current extinction rate is up to one thousand times higher than the fossil record when it comes to

14

The Royal Society, Climate Change: A Summary of the Science (September 2010), n. 57. 15 Ibid., n. 25. 16 The National Academy of Sciences, Advancing the Science of Climate Change, 1. See also pp. 3 and 20ff. 17 National Academy of Sciences – The Royal Society, Climate Change: Evidences and Causes. An Overview from the Royal Society and the US National Academy of Sciences (February 2014), 5. 18 See Michael J. Novacek, “Engaging the Public in Biodiversity Issues,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105 (2008), 11752. 19 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Biodiversity Synthesis (Washington: World Resources Institute, 2005), 21. 20 Ibid., 3.

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birds, mammals and amphibians.21 In fact, scientists fear that extinction rates will increase to the order of 1,000 to 10,000 times background rates over the coming decades.22 Scientists believe that a sixth mass extinction spasm is upon the Earth,23 and predict that 15-37 per cent of regional endemic species could be committed to extinction as early as 2050.24 The unique feature about the sixth mass extinction of species is that it is anthropogenic in origin. As the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment points out, although biodiversity and ecosystem services experience change due to natural causes, current change is dominated by anthropogenic drivers.25 According to the Harvard conservation biologist Edward O. Wilson, human-caused species extinction has accelerated from approximately 1,000 species per year in the 1970s to more than 10,000 species per year at present and is bound to increase with the temperatures rising.26 The anthropogenic fingerprints behind the current mass extinction of species emerge with greater clarity when one examines the principal causes that are directly or indirectly triggering the decimation of species. According to the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, the most important direct drivers of biodiversity loss are: habitat conversion (such as land use changes, physical modifications of rivers or water withdrawal from rivers, loss of coral reefs and damage to sea floors due to trawling), climate change, overexploitation of natural resources, pollution of land, air and water and introduction of alien species and exotic organisms into native ecosystems.27 Virtually all the factors leading to the accelerating loss of 21

Ibid., 4. Ibid., 43. See also Henrique M. Pereira et al., “Scenarios for Global Biodiversity in the 21st Century,” Science 330 (2010), 1497. 23 John C. Avise – Stephen P. Hubbell – Francisco J. Ayala, “In the Light of Evolution II: Biodiversity and Extinction,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105 (2008), 11453; David B. Wake – Vance T. Vredenburg, “Are We in the Midst of the Sixth Mass Extinction? A View from the World of Amphibians,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105 (2008), 11466-67; United Nations Environment Programme, Global Environment Outlook GEO4: Environment for Development (Nairobi: UNEP, 2007), 162. 24 Chris D. Thomas et al., “Extinction Risk from Climate Change,” Nature 427 (2004), 145-48. 25 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Biodiversity Synthesis, 8. 26 Cf. Edward O. Wilson, The Diversity of Life (London – New York: Penguin Books, 1994), 268. See also Edward O. Wilson, The Creation: An Appeal to Save Life on Earth (New York – London: W.W. Norton, 2006), 79. 27 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Biodiversity Synthesis, vi, 8. See also Global Footprint Network, 2010 and Beyond: Rising to the Biodiversity Challenge. The Living Planet Index 2008 (Gland: WWF, 2008), 2. 22

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biodiversity have to do with human activities. Human activities are indeed altering the geographic distributions of many taxa around the world and are associated directly or indirectly with nearly every aspect of the current extinction spasm.28 We have begun to co-opt resources from, further displace, and cause extinctions of species with whom we have been coexisting for 10,000 years.29 Anthropogenic changes to the Earth’s climate, land, oceans and biosphere are now significant and so rapid that it may be time to speak of a new geological epoch defined by the action of humans.30 The human imprint on our planetary home has become so large that it rivals some of the great forces of nature in its impact on the functioning of the Earth system. The dramatic transformation of the home planet on account of human activities in recent times has led many scientists to claim that our home planet is now being forcefully ushered into a new geological epoch altogether. The term proposed to evidence this quantitative shift in the relationship between humans and the rest of the natural world is “Anthropocene”, namely, “the age of the humans”. It was proposed by Paul J. Crutzen nearly a decade ago, though the concept that humans are capable of altering geological processes is more than a century old.31

28 Wake – Vredenburg, “Are We in the Midst of the Sixth Mass Extinction?,” 11472; D. Jablonski, “Extinction and the Spatial Dynamics of Biodiversity,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105 (2008), 11528-35. 29 Anthony Barnosky, “Megafauna Biomass Tradeoff as a Driver of Quaternary and Future Extinctions,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105 (2008), 11546. 30 Jan Zalasiewicz et al., “The Anthropocene: A New Epoch of Geological Time?,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 369 (2011), 835-841. This is the opening article of a Theme Issue that the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A dedicated to the discussion of the question of the new geological epoch of the Anthropocene. It may be recalled that in 2008, the Stratigraphy Commission of the Geological Society of London decided, by a large majority, that there was merit in considering the possible formalization of this term. See also Philip L. Gibbard - Michael J. C. Walker, “The term ‘Anthropocene’ in the Context of formal Geological Classification” in A stratigraphic Basis for the Anthropocene, eds. Colin Waters et al. (London: Geological Society, 2013), doi 10.1144/SP395.1. 31 See P.J. Crutzen – E. F. Stoermer, “The Anthropocene,” Global Change Newsletter 41 (2000), 17-18; P. J. Crutzen, “Geology of Mankind: the Anthropocene,” Nature 415 (2002), 23. On the antecedents of the anthropocene concept see Will Steffen et al., “The Anthropocene: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 369 (2011), 84345.

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The term 'Anthropocene' suggests that the Earth is now moving out of the current geological epoch of the Holocene, and that human activity is largely responsible for this exit, rendering humankind a global geological force in its own right.32 It was the Holocene epoch of the past twelve thousand years, along with its stable climate, that ultimately made human civilization possible. In the early part of the Holocene as the planet moved out of the most recent Ice Age, the global temperature rose and stabilized around 11,000 years ago, and the sea level stabilized around 8,000 years ago. Global temperatures and sea level then reached a marked plateau where they have, until very recently, remained. This extraordinary period of climate stability (though modulated by a millennial-scale global temperature oscillation of around 1°C amplitude), the longest in at least the past 400,000 years, was a significant factor in the development of human civilization.33 Human societies in the Holocene epoch, up to the era of modern Industrialization, have had only local and transitory impacts on our home planet, well within the bounds of the natural variability of the Earth’s natural systems. Instead, it appears that the situation has changed radically since the 1800s, coinciding with the onset of the modern Industrial era. The process of industrialization during the last two centuries has seen the enormous expansion in the use of fossil fuels; first coal and then oil and gas as well, and the transition to a high-energy society, especially in the industrialized nations. It is significant that between 1800 and 2000 the human population grew more than six-fold, the global economy about 50-fold, and energy use about 40-fold.34 Thus began a new era of intensified and ever-mounting human influence upon the Earth system, a new geological epoch that has been informally termed as the Anthropocene. The new geological epoch of the Anthropocene is stratigraphically evident in several physical, geo-chemical, biotic, and climatic imprints left on Earth’s natural systems. Physically, humans have caused a dramatic increase in erosion and the denudation of the continents, both directly, through agriculture and construction, and indirectly, by damning most major rivers. The human transformation of Earth’s ecosystems has already irreversibly altered the terrestrial biosphere at levels sufficient to leave an unambiguous geological record. The imprint of the burgeoning human 32

Steffen et al., “The Anthropocene,” 843. Jan Zalasiewicz et al., “Are We Now Living in the Anthropocene?,” GSA Today 18 (2008), 4-5. 34 Will Steffen et al., “The Anthropocene: Are Humans Now Overwhelming the Great Forces of Nature,” Ambio: A Journal of the Human Environment 36 (2007), 616. 33

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enterprise on the Earth system is unmistakable. Human activities are indeed affecting the structure and functioning of the Earth System as a whole (as opposed to local and regional-scale environmental issues), making it possible to speak of “a geological age of our own making.”35 We have entered into a distinctive phase of profound changes in our relationship with the rest of the physical world. Indeed, most people still don’t realize that humanity has become a truly global force, interfering in a very real and direct way in many of the planet’s natural cycles. For example, human activity puts ten times as much oil into the oceans as comes from natural seepage; has multiplied the natural flow of cadmium into the atmosphere eightfold; has doubled the rate of nitrogen fixation, and is responsible for about half the concentration of methane (a potent greenhouse gas) and nearly a third of the carbon dioxide (also a greenhouse gas) in the atmosphere today – all added since the industrial revolution, most notably in the pasthalf-century.36

The alleged transition of our home planet from the Holocene to the Anthropocene is a clear statement that humankind has become a powerful force in Earth’s evolution.37 It would not be an exaggeration to say that the ultimate drivers of the Anthropocene, “if they continue unabated through this century, may well threaten the viability of contemporary civilization and perhaps even the future existence of Homo sapiens.”38 Today, as the 2012 Planet Under Pressure Conference noted, “humans have become a prime driver of change at the planetary level, significantly altering Earth’s biological, chemical and physical processes. There is increasing evidence that humans are driving the Earth system towards dangerous thresholds or tipping points.”39 The fingerprints that human 35

A. Revkin, Global Warming: Understanding the Forecast (New York: American Museum of Natural History – Environmental Defense Fund – Abbeville Press, 1992), 55. See also Steffen et al., “The Anthropocene,” 618. 36 Paul Ehrlich – Anne Ehrlich, Betrayal of Science and Reason: How AntiEnvironmental Rhetoric Threatens Our Future (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998), 14. 37 David Archer, The Long Thaw: How Humans Are Changing the Next 100,000 Years of Earth’s Climate (Princeton – Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), 64. See also Gaia Vince, Adventures in the Anthropocene: A Journey to the Heart of the Planet We Made (Washington: Milkweed Editions, 2014); Roy Scranton, Learning to Die in the Anthropocene: Reflection on the End of a Civilization (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2015). 38 Steffen et al., “The Anthropocene,” 862. 39 International Conference Planet Under Pressure, Rio+20 Policy Brief (London, 26-29 March 2012), 1.

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activities have left on our common home of life are conspicuously evident in a diverse range of records in land, ocean and atmosphere for which empirical evidence is on the increase. According to Michael S. Northcott: (T)here is not a stretch of ocean and very few areas of forest which do not show signs of the industrial and commercial transformation of the earth into a materials bank for human exploitation. The extent of human interference and disruption of natural systems can be measured three miles above the North Pole in the loss of protective ozone, and one mile deep in the rift valleys of the ocean floor in the polluted sediments which trickle down from the waste products of modern consumerism.40

As Lynn White wrote in 1967 in his epoch-making article: “surely no creature other than man has ever managed to foul its nest in such short order.”41 As the contemporary ecological crisis is caused by human activities, and is rather recent in origin, it is natural to ask what are the factors that have led to an antagonistic relationship between humanity and the natural world, leading to the ruthless dominion and wanton exploitation of the latter from the part of human beings. This is precisely the reason for which we need to discover the deeper underlying causes of the contemporary ecological crisis. But there is an initial resistance to overcome here as we go on to discuss below.

2. Resistance in Looking for the Causes of the Ecological Crisis Having established that the contemporary ecological crisis is human-made, our next task is to evidence the need to unearth the root causes of such a malaise in order to overcome the very crisis. It is not an easy task. There appears to be subtle and widespread resistance in getting down to the exploration of the deeper causes of the crisis. Such an eschewal finds manifold expressions. We will sum them up here in the form of a double temptation, which we go on to discuss below. We will then argue that it is necessary to plumb deeper in order to arrive at the philosophical roots of the current ecological crisis.

40

Michael S. Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 32-33. 41 Lynn White, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,” Science 155 (1967), 1204.

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The first temptation in the face of the ecological crisis is to consign oneself to a spirit of resignation and consequently abdicate from the task of looking for its deeper causes. Those who succumb to this temptation share the rather widespread opinion that the ecological crisis is a normal phenomenon that humanity just needs to learn to cope with. Such is the position of the philosopher Robert Kirkman, for example, who dismisses environmental problems as being “endemic” to human nature. According to Kirkman, “the [ecological] crisis is an ever-present (if sometimes latent) potential within the human condition; it is an unavoidable and perhaps even indispensable part of human life on Earth. Environmental problems are, in a word, endemic.”42 The underlying assumption here is that humanity needs to resign itself to such a fate since the abuse and exploitation of nature appear to be inextricably tied to the human condition. Such a stance not only disallows any serious reflection on the ecological crisis, but also paralyses committed action to tackle the very crisis. However, for Kirkman’s claim to hold, it needs to fulfil at least two conditions. First of all, if the ecological crisis is endemic to being human, then such a crisis should have accompanied humanity throughout, or at least during a significant period of human history. Secondly, the mistreatment of nature must show itself to be a universal phenomenon, and common to the majority of human cultures in different geographical areas of the world, since it is, after all, tailored into being human. We argue instead, that the roots of the contemporary ecological crisis (which is itself rather recent in origin) can be traced back to a precise period in human history, namely that of Modernity. It is true that generations of humans have always depended on nature to meet their basic needs—as do all other forms of life on the planet—first as huntergatherers and later through agriculture and other modes of sustenance. Here, Earth comes to be seen as a mother that provides for its off-spring with whom humanity and other forms of life co-exist in a symbiotic relationship of dependence. Such a perception of the physical world, vestiges of which can still be found among many indigenous populations around the globe, cannot have led to the ecological crisis of current proportions. Further, an antagonistic relationship with nature coupled with the will to conquer it as its “lords and masters”—the Cartesian dream which eventually became a major project of modern science and technology—is not shared by all humans. One can find an array of counter testimonies in this regard, be it in the native wisdom of numerous 42 Robert Kirkman, Skeptical Environmentalism: The Limits of Philosophy and Science (Bloomington – Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2002), 153.

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indigenous cultures which have for centuries lived in harmony with nature, or be it in the recent widespread movements of ecological activism around the globe for the care and protection of our common home. So the thesis that humans cannot exist apart from harming the environment and exploiting it ruthlessly falls apart. In our insistence on plumbing for the deeper causes of the ecological crisis we also argue against those who promote what can be branded as a mode of wishful thinking, namely, that technological efforts alone can resolve the present day crisis. This is the second assumption that we need to combat, namely, that the ecological crisis can be resolved by churning out technological solutions for it and that it is superfluous to search for its deeper and underlying causes. It is a widely held belief among the general public that science and technology will succeed, in the not too distant future, in resolving the ecological crisis. In the face of the current environmental degradation, the exponents of technological solutions advance a wide array of proposals which range from fanciful to pragmatic. We go on to examine some of them with a view to exposing the hollowness of the claim that technological fixes can resolve the current ecological crisis. The most audacious of the technological solutions to the ecological crisis is the popular dream of the “space colonies”.43 The message here is simple yet highly attractive to the technology-savvy contemporary society and consists in the assurance that overcoming the ecological crisis is a facile task. As and when the Earth turns uninhabitable on account of the over exploitation of its resources and other problems, it is claimed that humanity can swap Earth for a nearby planet like Mars or emigrate to other inhabitable planets in distant star systems and galaxies, or even build up large space stations where life can blissfully carry on. Such a way of thinking which is rather well-ingrained among the general public, is nurtured by the unconscious faith that technology will see humanity through any crisis whatsoever, including the crisis of our planetary home. The unscripted credo of such a faith is that we can carry on with our life as usual: exploiting our home planet’s natural resources, polluting its atmosphere and running down its ecosystems; and as and when the 43 For a critical view of this trend see Jerry Mander, “Leaving the Earth: Space Colonies, Disney, and EPCOT” in Deep Ecology for the Twenty-first Century, ed. George Sessions (Boston – London: Shambhala, 1995), 311-319; Jerry Mander, In the Absence of the Sacred: The Failure of Technology and the Survival of the Indian Nations (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1991); R.S. Deese, “The Artifact of Nature: ‘Spaceship Earth’ and the Dawn of Global Environmentalism,” Endeavour (2009), doi: 10.1016/j.endeavour.2009.05.002.

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ecological crisis will have spun out of hand, we can pack up, leave Earth, and migrate elsewhere. Such a way of thinking ultimately springs from a profound ignorance of and a lack of appreciation for the uniqueness of Earth as a home for life, made possible by an infinite series of intricate and complex mechanisms and processes that have evolved and been perfected over billions of years, which ultimately rendered this planet habitable. In the Solar System itself, Earth is a sort of “Goldilocks” planet, in the right position and with the right global temperature—a balmy 14.5°C average global temperate, as opposed to its immediate neighbours Venus, which has a searing surface temperature of 460 degrees Celsius, or Mars with a freezing average temperature of -50 degrees Celsius which can descend to a bone chilling 120°C when the Sun goes down, as almost no warmth is retained.44 Besides, there are so many other planetary conditions that together make Earth hospitable for life, indeed a concomitance of myriad of factors.45 Life itself has evolved through complex processes over millions and millions of years, before humans themselves emerged, and eventually occupied the entire planetary home.46 Earth is indeed a unique home for life in the infinitely vast universe. Today after decades of space exploration, this awareness has only deepened. We are still to come across any planet in the galactic expanses that can rival the blue-green jewel Earth that is the home of humanity, along with millions of other life forms. The sheer complexities, and not insignificantly the exorbitant costs of managing life conditions in human economic terms, even in a very tiny land area, were best evidenced in the famous and short-lived Biosphere 2 experiment in the Arizona desert, which has long been abandoned.47 Those who remain indifferent to the crisis facing our home planet, fancying an easy and quick escape to distant planets, appear also to be naïve about primary facts like the immensity of the universe and the 44 See Fred Pearce, The Last Generation: How Nature Will Take Her Revenge for Climate Change (London: Eden Project Books, 2006), 163-64; Mark Maslin, Global Warming: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 6; Robert Henson, The Rough Guide to Climate Change (London: Rough Guides, 2006), 23; Michael S. Northcott, A Moral Climate: The Ethics of Global Warming (London: DLT – Christian Aid, 2007), 22-23. 45 See Joshtrom Isaac Kureethadam, Creation in Crisis: Science, Ethics, Theology (New York: Orbis Books, 2014), 22-23. 46 See in this regard also Wilson, The Creation: An Appeal to Save Life on Earth, 26ff. 47 See in this regard A. Alling et al., Life Under Glass: The Inside Story of Biosphere 2 (Tucson, AZ: Synergetic Press, 1993).

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distances involved on the one hand, and the rudimentary stage of space travel on the other. Here one needs to distinguish between the realms of science fiction and reality. It is true that astronomers are continuously on the lookout for potentially habitable planets—called exoplanets— positioned in the right distance from their mother stars and with an adequate mass to hold their own atmospheres.48 It is part of the noble and insatiable human quest to know and explore the physical universe which has accompanied humanity right from the dawn of civilization. However, given that the search for exoplanets is in preliminary stages, it is important to avoid unnecessary hype. Two observations are in order here. First of all, with our present day space technology, even to reach the most hypothetical “twin Earths” – in which the presence of clouds, land, and sea are purely speculative49—we will need thousands and thousands of years, in fact, light years in astronomical parlance. Apart from such immense distances, there is also the question of the enormous costs. Space travel today is possible only for trained astronauts as part of multi-million dollar research projects or for rich millionaires who opt for a jolly ride paying with their personal fortunes. In this sense, the logic of continuing to despoil our common home, with the hope of migration to hypothetic distant habitable planets or to future space colonies, is also a direct affront to the multitudes of poor, of whom nearly a billion are still below the poverty line and who are precisely the ones who are the most affected by the contemporary ecological crisis. We may well one day, in the distant future, reach for the stars, and migrate elsewhere.50 But the contemporary ecological crisis is imminent, and in some aspects has already caught up with us. 48

For a vivid account in this regard see Michael Lemonick, Mirror Earth: The Search for Our Planet’s Twin (New York: Walker, 2012). For an update on exoplanets see Alexandra Witze, “The Exoplanet Files,” Nature 527 (2015), 28889; Jeff Hecht, “The Truth about Exoplanets,” Nature 530 (2016), 272-74. For a recent discovery of exoplanets see Michaël Gillon, et al. “Seven Temperate Terrestrial Planets around the Nearby Ultracool Dwarf Star TRAPPIST-1,” Nature 542 (2017), 456-60; Ignas A.G. Snellen, “Earth’s Seven Sisters,” Nature 542 (2017), 421-23. 49 Richard A. Kerr, “Kepler Snags Super-Earth-Size-Planet Squarely in a Habitable Zone,” Science 340 (2013), 262. 50 A deeper philosophical reflection will reveal that such dreams to flee from the earth, mask a fundamental lack of ‘at-homeness’ of the contemporary human person. Val Plumwood perspicaciously remarks: “Space colonisation is an extreme example of a rationalist project that misunderstands our nature as earth beings. … When we have learnt the true nature of our being as earth-dependent and have learnt both to cherish the earth and to go beyond it without damage, it may be time for us to try to leave for the stars – but not before.” Val Plumwood, Environmental

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Apart from such proposals bordering on fiction, it needs to be acknowledged that technology all too often comes to be touted as the panacea for all ecological problems, both at the macro and micro levels. Technological solutions are increasingly being seen as capable of surmounting our current ecological predicament. In the meantime, in spite of optimistic predictions from those who advocate technological solutions, the ecological crisis as evidenced by climate change, ozone depletion, species extinction, just to cite a few, appears to wax rather than wane. Report after report from the scientific community indicate how the contemporary ecological crisis is only getting worse.51 We do admit that technology can be a powerful tool in the care and protection of our ravaged planet. However, to stop here and eschew the task of tracing the deeper roots of the ecological crisis can conceal several risks. First of all, it would mean remaining at the superficial level and focusing our attention only on the symptoms of the pathology rather than on the deeper causes of it. What technological solutions amount to are, more often than not, palliative measures that relieve or soothe the symptoms of the disorder without really effecting a cure. Some of these remedies that help to tide over some individual environmental hazards in the short term can themselves contribute to aggravating the problem in the long term. Secondly, technological approaches do not get to the root causes of the problem in itself. But a malaise like the ecological crisis cannot be treated and overcome unless and until its deeper causes, and not just its manifest symptoms, are identified and dealt with. Finally, technology itself can never get around the limitations imposed on it by nature. Ultimately, it is dependent on the ecosystem from start to finish. So it would be a utopia to think that technological and related approaches alone can resolve the present day ecological crisis.

Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason (London – New York: Routledge, 2002), 240. 51 Some of the world’s most prestigious scientific academies have also issued authoritative reports on the ecological crisis, and climate change, in particular, in recent years. See in this regard, The National Academy of Sciences, Advancing the Science of Climate Change (Washington, D.C: The National Academies Press, 2010); The Royal Society, Climate Change: A Summary of the Science (September 2010); Institut de France, Académie des sciences, Le changement climatique (October 2010). See also the joint report by the Royal Society and the United States National Academy of Sciences: Climate Change: Evidences and Causes. An Overview from the Royal Society and the US National Academy of Sciences (February 2014).

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So neither an attitude of passive resignation in the face of the ecological crisis held by those who link it inextricably to the human condition, nor the naïve optimism of those who champion technological solutions, hold much promise in effectively overcoming the ecological predicament. Instead, what is needed is a serious effort to unearth the underlying roots of the ecological crisis, as the first step in any strategy to tide over crisis. Any serious effort to deal with the ecological crisis needs to begin with a real diagnosis of the deep-rooted causes of the malaise. In other words, if we are to overcome the ecological crisis we need, in the first place, to diagnose its true and real causes.

3. Going Beyond the Apparent Causes Having argued so far that the current ecological crisis is a human-made one of which it is imperative to look for the deeper underlying causes, it is important to strike a note of caution. On the way to get to the real root causes of the contemporary ecological crisis, there is a mirage to be avoided. The mirage consists in some of the apparent causes masking themselves as the real causes of the crisis. These apparent causes which often come to be touted, especially in public discussions, as having contributed to the ecological crisis, are legion. We shall limit ourselves to discussing only a couple of them here, namely, the population explosion of the last few decades and the indiscriminate use of science and technology. The phenomenal growth of world population is often placed in the dock as having contributed significantly to the contemporary ecological crisis and as its real cause. The proposal was first advanced by Paul Ehrlich of the Stanford University in 1968, and reiterated in later publications.52 It is an argument that appears to have found good public resonance. In fact, population growth tops the list of proposed causes in discussions about the ecological crisis in newspaper columns, television debates and even in academic circles. It needs to be admitted that the increase in human population in the last few decades has been phenomenal. It took hundreds of years for human species to reach a population level of 10 million, only 10,000 years ago. This number grew to 100 million people about 2,000 years ago. It took all of human history for our common human family to reach a population of one billion by 1800. In 1950 we were just around 2.5 billion people on Earth. In fact, in 52

Paul Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (New York: Sierra Club-Ballentine Books, 1968). See also Paul Ehrlich, The Population Explosion (New York – London: Simon & Schuster, 1990).

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the last century alone the world’s population quadrupled to six billion. We are now nearly 7.5 billion strong and human population is expected to peak around 10 billion strong by mid-century.53 It is true that an ever expanding population stretches the carrying capacity of the earth and puts pressures on its limited resources and lifesustaining ecosystems. For several decades many people considered rising population, almost entirely in poor and developing countries, to be the main challenge for the carrying capacity of the earth. Now we realize that it matters only to the extent of people’s consumption of natural resources. The concept of “ecological footprint” can shed some light on this point.54 As the noted American scientist Jared Diamond points out, “the average rates at which people consume resources like oil and metals, and produce waste like plastics and greenhouse gases, are about 32 times higher in North America, Western Europe, Japan and Australia than they are in the developing world.”55 According to Diamond, the estimated one billion rich people who live in developed countries have a relative per capita consumption rate of 32 while the rest of the world’s population have per capita consumption rates below 32, mostly down toward 1. It is thus obvious that the real threat to the carrying capacity of the earth is not sheer population numbers in themselves but rather the per capita consumption of key natural resources which, in fact, varies hugely around the world.56 There exist huge disparities in the consumption of natural resources across the globe which reveal scandalous differences in the ecological footprint of individuals and communities. We may cite from the 2012 Living Planet 53

Population Reference Bureau, 2016 World Population Data Sheet (Washington: PRB, 2016). 54 “Ecological footprints measure a population’s demands on nature in a single metric area of global biocapacity. By comparing humanity’s ecological footprint with the Earth’s available biological capacity, ecological footprint analysis (EFA) suggests whether or not our use of crop lands, forest lands, pasture lands, fisheries, built space, and energy lands can be sustained.” Jason Venetoulis – John Talberth, Ecological Footprint of Nations: 2005 Update (Oakland, CA: Redefining Progress, 2005), 2. The EFA was pioneered by William Rees and Mathis Wackernagel in Our Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact on the Earth (Philadelphia, PA: New Society Publishers, 1996) and has been perfected over the years. 55 Jared Diamond, “What’s Your Consumption Factor?” in The New York Times (2 January 2008). 56 Cf. Paul Harrison – Fred Pearce, AAAS Atlas of Population and Environment (Berkeley, LA – London: University of California Press, 2001), 43. See also Gary Gardner – Erik Assadourian – Radhika Sarin, “The State of Consumption Today” in The World Watch Institute, State of the World 2004: The Consumption Society (New York – London: W.W. Norton, 2004), 17.

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Report some examples of the discrepancy in the ecological footprint of citizens around the globe. If all of humanity lived like an average Indonesian, for example, only twothirds of the planet’s biocapacity would be used; if everyone lived like an average Argentinian, humanity would demand more than half an additional planet; and if everyone lived like an average resident of the USA, a total of four Earths would be required to regenerate humanity’s annual demand on nature.57

The huge disparities in the consumption of Earth’s natural resources and the deleterious pressure it places on our common home are often lost sight of or wilfully glossed over, in the misguided discussion on population increase as the sole or main culprit for the depletion of natural resources, and for the contemporary ecological crisis in general. The population growth does have an impact on our home planet with its finite resources. However, it is not such a decisive factor and pales in the face of consumption inequalities. So the real problem is not so much population but rather the unsustainable and overconsumption of our planet’s natural resources by the rich minority. As Robert Bailey notes, “the Malthusian instinct to blame resource pressures on growing numbers of poor people misses the point, because people living in poverty contribute little to world demand. Skewed power relations and unequal consumption patterns are the real problem.”58 It is the excessive demands on the part of the rich populations on Earth’s natural resources and on its common atmosphere, and not population growth in itself, which are the fundamental driver of the contemporary ecological crisis. The case is driven home even more strikingly when we examine the question of climate change. The greenhouse gas emissions contributing to climate change are measured in terms of per capita carbon footprint. According to the 2007 Human Development Report, if every person living in the developing world had the same carbon footprint as the average for high income countries, we would require the atmospheres of six planets. With a global per capita carbon footprint at Australian levels, we would need seven planets, and with the per capita footprint of Canada and the United States we would require the

57

Global Footprint Network et al, Living Planet Report 2012: Biodiversity, Biocapacity and Better Choices (Gland: WWF, 2012), 43. 58 Robert Bailey et al., Growing a Better Future: Food Justice in a ResourceConstrained World (Oxford: Oxfam International, 2011), 14.

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atmospheres of nine planets!59 As the 2011 World Population Report from the United Nations Population Fund points out: “an extra child born today in the United States, would, down the generations, produce an eventual carbon footprint seven times that of an extra child in China; 55 times that of an Indian child or 86 times that of a Nigerian child.”60 According to the report, in the case of climate change, the world’s richest half billion people—about 7 percent of the global population—are responsible for about 50 percent of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions. Meanwhile, the poorest 50 percent are responsible for just 7 percent of emissions.61 The expected growth of the world population by an extra two billion people would raise the share of emissions contributed by the poor world from 7 percent to 11 percent.62 It is estimated that slowing population growth could provide 16 - 29 percent of the emissions reductions considered to be necessary by 2050 to avoid dangerous climate change.63 But the remaining 71-84 percent of emissions—more than two-thirds—needs to come from reducing consumption and other strategies. Significantly, a UN Report concludes that “even if zero population growth were achieved, that would barely touch the climate problem—where we would need to cut emissions by 50 80 percent by mid-century.”64 While it is true that the per capita consumption of natural resources and carbon emissions are rising in developing countries, they are still nowhere close to the rates of the world’s one billion rich elite. In the face of existing income inequalities, it is an inescapable conclusion that overconsumption by the rich few is the key problem, rather than overpopulation of the many poor.

59

United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2007/2008. Facing Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World (New York: Macmillan, 2007), 48. 60 United Nations Population Fund, State of World Population 2011: People and Possibilities in a World of 7 Billion (New York: UNFPA, 2011), 94. The Report draws the conclusion from a study by statisticians at the Oregon State University led by Paul Murtaugh. 61 United Nations Population Fund, State of World Population 2011, 94. The calculations were provided by Stephen Pacala, Director of the Princeton Environment Institute. 62 See Fred Pearce, “Consumption Dwarfs Population as Main Environmental Threat” in Yale University: Environment 360 (13 April 2009). 63 Brian C. O’Neill et al., “Global Demographic Trends and Future Carbon Emissions,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107 (2010), 1752126. 64 United Nations Population Fund, State of World Population 2011, 96.

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Evidently, population rise in itself cannot be the real cause of the contemporary ecological crisis. The examination of the mechanisms of the ecological footprint and carbon footprint of the world’s citizens reveals how a small proportion of the world’s people consume the majority of the world’s resources and produce most of the pollution. The deeper causes of the ecological causes therefore are to be sought not within population statistics, but rather within human attitudes underlying present modes of development and consumption; roots of which lie elsewhere. It is precisely these roots which we seek to discover and make explicit in the coming chapters. Another common apparent cause proposed as an underlying cause of the contemporary ecological crisis is the indiscriminate use of modern science and technology. As some have argued, a certain form of technological and industrial development has itself contributed significantly to the environmental crisis.65 As David Toolan recognizes, “modern science and technology are part of a modernizing movement whose dominant motive, from the very start in the seventeenth century, has been exploitative.”66 The biologist René Dubos adds: “What is really peculiar to the modern world is the belief that scientific knowledge can be used at will by man to master and exploit nature for his own ends.”67 The mastery and conquest of nature is concretely achieved by means of science and technology.68 It is evident that recourse to modern technology has facilitated the large-scale extraction and depletion of natural resources. In fact, without modern technology the current massive exploitation of Earth’s resources and ecosystems would simply not be possible. The extraction of huge oil reserves and now shale gas through the infamous “fracking” technology; the excessive haul of fish through the use of hightech modern trawls which have led to most of the world’s oceans being overfished; the deforestation of wide swaths of tropical forests through machine sows, just to cite a few examples, are all clear instances where modern science and technology appear to have greatly assisted human conquest of the earth and its natural resources. The general tendency to lay the blame for the contemporary ecological crisis on modern science and technology appears to make sense in this regard. 65

See Wim Zweers, Participating with Nature: Outline for an Ecologization of Our World View (Utrecht: International Books, 2000), 143. 66 David Toolan, At Home in the Cosmos (New York: Orbis Books, 2001), 46. 67 René Dubos, The Dreams of Reason (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 16. 68 See in this regard William Leiss, The Domination of Nature (Montreal – London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994), 101ff.

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A deeper reflection, however, reveals that the link between modern science and technology and the contemporary ecological crisis is much more nuanced. The problem cannot be technology in itself, which can also be used for better understanding and for resolving the very ecological crisis. It is enough to remember in this regard the state of the art assistance provided by modern technology to assess the current state of our home planet and the health of the planet’s ecosystems. We may recall in this context the periodical assessments of the global temperature rise on land, sea and air carried out by the meteorological stations; round the clock air pollution checks in the major metropolitan cities; the accurate measurements of the sea-level rise from satellites; the streamlined satellite monitoring of deforestation around the globe, etc. In fact, technology can be used both to devastate our planetary home and to protect it. So the role of technology in causing the ecological crisis is ambiguous in itself. Even with regard to cases where technology becomes an ally in ecological devastation, what need to be sought and unearthed are the very human attitudes that have led to the employment of science and technology in such a manner as to devastate Earth, our common home. The critique of Heidegger and other thinkers about modern technology to which we will be referring in later chapters can provide some useful insights in this regard.69 What is important is to go beyond modern science and technology which come to be used as means to exploit the earth, to the very underlying conceptual root causes that lead to such an approach towards our planetary home in the first place. Here we need to trace the very roots of the modern mechanistic science and associated technology. These are the deeper root causes of the contemporary ecological crisis which need to be explored and made evident. Otherwise, we will once again be responding only to the symptoms and not to the real underlying causes of the contemporary ecological crisis. These deeper causes need to be plumbed much deeper, namely, at the conceptual level of ideas that have created and moulded human attitudes towards the natural world and led to a disharmonious human-nature relationship. It is to the search for these underlying root causes that we now turn.

69

For Heidegger’s critique of the dominance of modern technology see: Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1977); Michael Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity (Bloomington – Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990); Dale Allen Wilkerson, “The Root of Heidegger’s Concern for the Earth at the Consummation of Metaphysics: The Nietzsche Lectures,” Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 1 (2005), 27-34.

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4. Past Attempts to Trace the Deeper Roots of the Crisis Fortunately, ever since the awareness about the ecological crisis exploded nearly half-a-century ago, there have also been attempts to get to the deeper roots of the problem. We shall discuss some of them here and offer a critical evaluation of them. Our ultimate aim is to evidence the shortcomings of these proposals on account of which we argue that it is necessary to plumb still deeper to get to the philosophical roots of the contemporary ecological crisis. A very serious proposal regarding the conceptual origins of the ecological crisis was proposed by Lynn White Jr. in 1967 in a well-known article entitled the “Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis” published in the prestigious journal Science.70 White suggested that Christianity bore a huge burden of responsibility for the ecological crisis due to a theology supposedly hostile towards the natural order. According to him, it is in “the orthodox Christian arrogance toward nature” that the ideological source of the ecological crisis can be found.71 The argument of White rests on two pillars. First, he affirms that the relation homo-natura constitutes the fundamental opposition in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Second, he maintains that this opposition, which favours the human at the expense of the rest of nature, is the foundation upon which Western science and technology grew.72

Lynn White based his critique of Judeo-Christian tradition on the Priestly account of creation found in the first chapter of the book of Genesis, and more precisely on Gen 1: 28 that speaks of the dominion granted to humans to subdue the earth and to rule over every living creature. White’s argument was that Christianity “illicitly placed humans in a cosmologically privileged position, one in which we were seen as created fundamentally separate from and superior to the rest of the natural world.”73 According to White’s interpretation, in the book of Genesis nature exists only to serve human needs, a belief which according to him 70

Lynn White Jr., “The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis,” Science 155 (1967), 1203-7. 71 Ibid., 1207. 72 Vítor Westhelle, “The Weeping Mask: Ecological Crisis and the View of Nature,” Word & World 11 (1991), 141. 73 Ben A. Minteer – Robert E. Manning, “An Appraisal of the Critique of Anthropocentrism and Three Lesser Known Themes in Lynn White’s ‘The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis’,” Organization and Environment 18 (2005), 163.

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made Christianity “the most anthropocentric religion the world has ever seen.”74 White’s provocative argument about the Judeo-Christian tradition’s responsibility for the ecological crisis elicited an enthusiastic response from many, including the environmentalists,75 while there was a wide array of critiques from other quarters, not least from some theologians and biblical scholars themselves. We shall now dwell on some of these critiques which have challenged White’s direct and tight linkage of Christianity and the ecological predicament. We shall evidence how White’s thesis of tracing the historical roots of the ecological crisis to the Christian tradition, and to the concept of domination in the Book of Genesis, in particular, is beset with major hurdles. First of all, Lynn White’s conclusion that Judeo-Christian people have despoiled the earth more than anyone else is hard to sustain. White maintained, for example, that “Christianity, in absolute contrast to ancient paganism and Asia’s religions (except, perhaps, Zoroastrianism), not only established a dualism of man and nature but also insisted that it is God’s will that man exploits nature for his proper end.”76 This allowed Christians to “exploit nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural objects,”77 in contrast to the attitude of ancient peoples for whom “every tree, every spring, every stream, every hill had its own genius loci, its guardian spirit.”78 So White concluded that “Christianity bears a huge burden of guilt”79 for the ecological crisis. However, such a position is indeed difficult to sustain. Lewis Moncrief has argued against the “monocausal” reading of the origins of the ecological crisis and pointed out that there were other factors at play in environmental destruction beyond the Judeo-Christian tradition.80 John Passmore noted, for example, how the devastation of nature continues to take place even in geographical zones where non-Christian religious traditions that have always considered

74

White, “The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis,” 1205. See in this regard I.L. McHarg, Design with Nature (Garden City, N.Y.: Natural History Press, 1969); D. Ehrenfeld, The Arrogance of Humanism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); R.F. Nash, The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989). 76 White, “The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis,” 1205. 77 Ibid., 1205. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid., 1206. 80 See Lewis B. Moncrief, “The Cultural Basis of Our Environmental Crisis,” Science 170 (1970), 508-12. 75

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nature as sacred still wield much influence.81 According to him, “the power of the Western outlook, with no Genesis to lend its support, is nowhere more manifest than in Osaka or Nagoya.”82 As the ChineseAmerican geographer Yi-Fu Tuan has observed, the ecological situation in several Eastern countries, despite their different religious traditions, was every bit as destructive as in the West.83 In more recent times, countries like China or India, where Christian presence and ethos are insignificant, have also witnessed much ecological destruction. The above critique places an important question mark on the very “religious” roots of the ecological crisis which is the quintessence of White’s argument. The distinguished Oxford historian Keith Thomas has sought to evidence how Lynn White and his supporters overrated the extent to which human actions were motivated by religious factors. Keith argued that “disenchantment” with the physical world had to do more with economic reasons than with theological motives.84 White’s neglect and overlooking of economic and socio-political factors in his historical analysis of the roots of the ecological crisis have been similarly criticized by other scholars over the years.85 Secondly, coming to Christianity in particular, some of White’s affirmations run into difficulties. For example, White maintains that it is the core essence of Christian dogma that “nature has no reason for existence save to serve man.”86 A more thorough exegesis of the biblical passage cited by White can substantially weaken such a claim. It is true that the biblical verse of Genesis (1:28) to which White refers contains words like “subdue” the Earth and to “rule” over the fish, birds, and animals, of which the original Hebrew words kabash and raddah express superiority in the strongest terms.87 R.J. Raja notes in this regard: 81

John Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (London: Duckworth, 1974), 26-27. 82 Ibid., 26. 83 Yi-Fu Tuan, “Discrepancies between Environmental Attitude and Behaviour: Examples from Europe and China,” Canadian Geographer 12 (1968), 176-91; Idem, “Our Treatment of the Environment in Ideal and Actuality,” American Scientist (May-June 1970), 246-49. 84 See Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England, 1500-1800 (London: Penguin Books, 1984). 85 See M. Marangudakis, “The Medieval Roots of Our Environmental Crisis,” Environmental Ethics 23 (2001), 243-60; Elspeth Whitney, “Lynn White, Ecotheology, and History,” Environmental Ethics 15 (1993), 151-69. 86 White, “The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis,” 1207. 87 See Loren Wilkinson (ed.), Earthkeeping: Christian Stewardship of Natural Resources (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1980), 209.

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Chapter I The word "subdue", Kabas in Hebrew, means to tread down, to press, to rape (Est. 7:19), to reduce someone to the status of a slave (Neh. 5:5; 2 Chr. 28:10) or to bring nations under subjugation (2Sam. 8:11) ... Similarly, "dominion", whose Hebrew root is radahi, means to rule, to dominate, to exercise power. It is variously used in the context of crushing the grapes in a wine press (Joel 4:13), or of imposing punishment on someone (Lam. 1:13) of suppression, oppression, (Lev. 25:53; Is. 14:6).88

At the same time a number of biblical scholars have pointed out, in the light also of other biblical passages, that terms like dominion and subdue need not have such strong connotations.89 According to James Barr, the verb rada—“have dominion”—is not a particularly strong expression and was used to refer to Solomon’s peaceful rule; kabash, “subdue”, refers simply to the “working” or “tilling” of the ground in the Yahwist account of creation.90 In this regard, Lloyd Steffen emphasizes the need for a contextual interpretation of the word rada (dominion). While the term can mean “to tread down”, what the word really means in the Genesis context is “the ideal of just and peaceful governance.”91 Thus dominion in the opening chapter of Genesis is not a “domination” concept. A contextual reinterpretation of the meaning of the term dominion in the early chapters of the Book of Genesis clearly reveals a less aggressive and a more ecologically benevolent understanding.92 Thirdly, it is also important to remember here that the Book of Genesis has more than one doctrine of human relationship with nature, including 88 R.J. Raja, Eco-Spirituality (Bangalore: NBCLC, 1997), 3. Wilhelm Fudpucker also suggests that the biblical injunction “subdue” the earth should be translated with its full force, “to tread down,” “to conquer,” “to trample,” etc. See Wilhelm Fudpucker, “Through Christian Technology to Technological Christianity” in Theology and Technology: Essays in Christian Analysis and Exegesis, eds. Carl Mitcham - Jim Grote, (New York: University Press of America, 1984), 53-69. See also John Black, The Dominion of Man (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1970), 37; Hans Wolff, Anthropology of the Old Testament (London: SCM, 1974), 226-27. 89 See in this regard Peter Harrison, “Subduing the Earth: Genesis 1, Early Modern Science, and the Exploitation of Nature,” The Journal of Religion 79 (1999), 88. 90 James Barr, “The Ecological Controversy and the Old Testament,” Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 55 (1972), 22. 91 Lloyd H. Steffen, “In Defense of Dominion,” Environmental Ethics 14 (1992), 63-80. For similar analyses see also: Robin Attfield, The Ethics of Environmental Concern (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 27-32; Claus Westerman, Creation (London: SPCK, 1974), 52 and 82; Susan Bratton, “Christian Ecotheology and the Old Testament,” Environmental Ethics 6 (1984), 195-209. 92 See Steffen, “In Defense of Dominion,” 63-80.

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the view to be stewards of creation. Whereas the passage that White cites (Gen. 1:28) belongs to the Priestly Tradition, from 2: 4b of Genesis, one comes across the Yahwist Tradition which offers a different account of creation where the command given to Adam is to “till” (abad) and “keep” (shamar) the garden of Eden.93 Here Adam is commissioned to be a gardener with the responsibility to tend and preserve the garden.94 John Passmore, and in a more emphatic way Robin Attfield, have sought to evidence how the stewardship tradition—which positioned humans in the more humble role of caretaker of God’s creation, rather than as omnipotent masters of the physical world—is strongly present in the Bible.95 The diversity in the conception and praxis of human-nature relationship is greater when one considers the biblical tradition as a whole.96 In fact, the Bible does not present a single perspective on the question of human relationship with the natural world. Instead, as Ian G. Barbour has shown, “there are diverse strands in the Bible” when it comes to human-nature relationship.97 Robin Attfield has pointed out that the idea that everything exists to serve humanity, is not the position of the Old Testament, as evident in a range of key biblical passages. According to him, there is “much more evidence than is usually acknowledged for … beneficent Christian attitudes to the environment and to nonhuman nature.”98 David Livingstone insists on the need to pay more attention to the many voices in the post-biblical Western Christian tradition that speak in clear, appreciative tones about nature.99 Keith Thomas also points out 93 For a critique of Lynn White for having conflated the Priestly and Yahwist creation narratives see Richard H. Hiers, “Ecology, Biblical Theology, and Methodology: Biblical Perspectives on the Environment,” Zygon 19 (1984), 43-53, especially p. 45; J. Baird Callicott, “Genesis Revisited: Musings on the Lynn White, Jr. Debate,” Environmental History Review 14 (1990), 65-90. 94 See Wilkinson, Earthkeeping: Christian Stewardship of Natural Resources, 209. 95 Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature; Robin Attfield, “Christian Attitudes to Nature,” Journal of the History of Ideas 44 (1983), 369-86. For a comparative appraisal of the approaches of Passmore and Attfield see Minteer –Manning, “An Appraisal of the Critique of Anthropocentrism and Three Lesser Known Themes in Lynn White’s ‘The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis’,” 165. 96 See Clarence J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture in Western Thought from Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1967), 152. 97 See Ian Barbour (ed.), Western Man and Environmental Ethics: Attitudes toward Nature and Technology (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1973), 6. 98 Attfield, “Christian Attitudes to Nature,” 369. 99 See David N. Livingstone, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis: A Reassessment,” Fides et Historia 26 (1994), 38-55.

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how in the Biblical tradition “side by side with the emphasis on man’s right to exploit the inferior species went a distinctive doctrine of human stewardship and responsibility for God’s creatures.”100 As Peter Harrison points out, “despot” and “steward” turn out to be twin aspects of a single role, rather than opposing traditions.101 Further, as Gabriel Fackre reminds us, the book of Genesis clearly teaches a “stewardship over the Earth before a higher claimant.” Human beings are “called to tend the Earth in responsibility to its Creator.”102 Against White it can be plausibly argued in fact, that “Christian doctrine sought to restrain man’s earthly ambitions by holding him accountable for his conduct to a higher authority.”103 Accordingly, the concept of dominion is to be understood within the overarching theme of stewardship of creation entrusted to humanity which runs throughout the biblical tradition. It is significant to recall in this context that Lynn White himself came to remark that the most common complaint regarding his thesis was that he had ignored the fact that human dominion granted by God was intended to make human beings stewards of his creation rather than its despoilers.104 Fourthly, White’s attempt to trace the roots of the ecological crisis to the Book of Genesis common to all Christians, and implicate Christian tradition as a whole in this regard, is fraught with serious difficulties. The same critique also applies to those who in the wake of White’s article sought to link the ecological crisis directly to Christian attitudes towards nature.105 An Eastern Christian perspective clearly reveals how any effort to lay the blame for the ecological crisis on the triumph of the Christian world view is not only simplistic and reductionist but also inadequate and incorrect.106 The Eastern Christian orthodoxy, following in the tradition of the Cappadocian theologians like Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of 100

Thomas, Man and the Natural World, 24. Harrison, “Subduing the Earth,” 87. 102 Gabriel Fackre, “Ecology and Theology” in Western Man and Environmental Ethics: Attitudes toward Nature and Technology, ed. Ian Barbour (Reading, MA.: Addison-Wesley, 1973), 122. 103 Leiss, The Domination of Nature, 34. 104 Lynn White, Jr., “Continuing the Conversation” in Western Man and Environmental Ethics: Attitudes toward Nature and Technology, ed. Ian Barbour (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1973), 60. Cited by Harrison, “Subduing the Earth, 89. 105 See in this regard Jackson Lee Ice, “The Ecological Crisis,” Religion in Life 44 (1975), 203-11; Arnold Toynbee, “The Genesis of Pollution,” Horizon 15 (1973), 4-9. 106 See Issa J. Khalil, “The Ecological Crisis: An Eastern Christian Perspective,” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 22 (1987), 197. 101

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Nazianzus, has always conceived the human being as integrally sharing in both the worlds of matter and spirit.107 Matter does not receive a low status within Eastern Christian theology for the centrality of the mystery of Incarnation in Eastern teaching, meditation, and worship. The celebrated passage from St John of Damascus, a venerated theologian of the Eastern orthodoxy, pronounced in the context of the Iconoclastic controversy, conveys this truth best. Writes the Damascene: I do not worship matter but I worship the Creator of matter, who for my sake became material and deigned to dwell in matter, who through matter effected my salvation. I will not cease from worshipping the matter through which my salvation has been effected.108

For St John of Damascus, “everything on Earth is a picture of God,” for matter is the bearer of the divine.109 Early Christianity in fact, believed that the material world is intrinsically good since it is created by God who is Good. “For all beings—no matter how humble—not only are created by God, but reflect Him. Thus all nature … reflects its Creator and His goodness.”110 It is thus very difficult to attribute the roots of the contemporary ecological crisis to the Christian tradition, which had its most significant doctrinal development in the East, namely, in the first eight centuries of the Ecumenical Councils. Fifthly, White’s attempt to lay greater blame on Latin Christianity by proposing that it has played a more direct role in bringing about the modern scientific and technological progress and thus indirectly the ecological crisis, is also difficult to defend. This is so because the Latin Christian heritage itself contains important and diverse strands of profound harmony with nature and has an impressive array of models like the Benedictine care for the earth111—followed throughout the millennia-long Christian monastic tradition; the Franciscan fellowship with creation; the

107

Ibid., 199-200. John of Damascus, On Icons, 1:16 (P.G. xciv, 1245 A.) 109 Ibid., 1:11; 1:16. 110 Khalil, “The Ecological Crisis,” 203. 111 See in this regard Kenneth Ewart Boulding, Meaning of the Twentieth Century: The Great Transition (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 6; Robert Faricy, Wind and Sea Obey Him (London: SCM Press, 1982), 75; Rudolph Bahro, Building the Green Movement (London: GMP, 1986), 90; Stephen R.L. Clark, How to Think about the Earth: Philosophical and Theological Models of Ecology (London: Mowbray, 1993), 10. 108

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eco-harmony of the medieval peasantry, etc.112 Nor does White’s argument that the desacralisation of nature begins with Christian missionaries hold.113 One may also posit a rejoinder as to why it took so many centuries after the foundation of Christianity for these effects to manifest themselves. K.M. Matthew rebuts White on this when he affirms: “There is no justification in associating the environmental crisis with the missionaries’ enterprise, since the former did not surface for at least 15 centuries after the latter began. It is more correct to associate the environmental crisis with the dechristianization of the West.”114 In conclusion, White’s argument about the “religious” roots of the ecological crisis which he traces down to the Christian tradition is beset with enormous difficulties. The rather detailed critical evaluation of the thesis of Lynn White can also be applied to similar proposals that have sought to identify the roots of the crisis in monotheistic faiths. Arnold Toynbee has stated for example, that “some of the major maladies of the present-day world, in particular the recklessly extravagant consumption of nature’s irreplaceable treasures, and the pollution of those of them that man has not already devoured—can be traced back to a religious cause, and that this cause is the rise of monotheism.”115 Toynbee identifies the concept of a transcendental God introduced by monotheistic faiths to have supplanted and done away with the pre-monotheistic vision of nature as diffused with divinities. When the “Greco-Roman world was converted to Christianity, the divinity was drained out of nature and was concentrated in a single, transcendent God.”116 To Toynbee, the “disturbing and startling truth is that monotheism … removed the age-old restraint that was once placed on man’s greed by his awe. Man’s greedy impulse to exploit nature used to be held in check by his pious worship of nature.”117 Humans began to take unlimited liberties with nature and exploit it, because they began to think of her, in monotheistic terms, as unsacrosanct “raw material”.118 Jackson 112

See Sean McDonagh, The Greening of the Church (New York: Orbis Books, 1990), 170-74; Jame Schaefer, Theological Foundations for Environmental Ethics: Reconstructing Patristic and Medieval Concepts (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009). 113 White, “The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis,” 1205-06. 114 K.M. Mathew, "The Good News in the Ecological Age," Vidyajyoti Journal of Theological Reflection 63 (1999), 138-39. 115 Toynbee, “The Genesis of Pollution,” 7. See also Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Man and Nature: The Spiritual Crisis of Modern Man (London – Boston: Unwin, 1990), 5. 116 Toynbee, “The Genesis of Pollution,” 7. 117 Ibid. 118 Khalil, “The Ecological Crisis,” 194.

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Lee Ice, building on Toynbee’s thesis, claims that with the eventual dominance of monotheism over pantheism, a “radical bifurcation finally triumphed, and all Earth’s creatures, places and things were ultimately desacralized,”119 leading to the contemporary ecological crisis. Hans Jonas too recognizes that the Hebrew monotheism led to “a certain degradation of the world”.120 The argument that monotheism is the cause of the ecological imbalance falls apart, if we were to examine the link between the natural world and faith in the major monotheistic religions like Judaism, Christianity and Islam. We have already examined such a link in Christianity and Judaism, at least partially, in our critique of Lynn White’s thesis above. So it may be helpful here to examine briefly the case of Islam, the strictest of all monotheistic faiths. The consensus view among Muslim scholars is that Islam never advocated the destruction of the natural world in its millennial history.121 Even in the early Middle Ages, during the zenith of the Arabic-Islamic culture which it inspired—when scientific knowledge was developed to a high degree with no historical precedence up to then—Muslims did not develop the technology to exploit and menace the physical world.122 Nor did they do that in modern times, until the Western sweep of industrialization overtook the Arab countries along with the arrival of cheap petroleum.. It is thus difficult to attribute the cause of the ecological crisis to the triumph of monotheism which occurred millennia ago, either in the case of Judaism and Christianity or in that of Islam. On the contrary, the significant contribution of the Abrahamic faiths, both in their scriptural and doctrinal repertoire and their millennia-long praxis, for ecological restoration is increasingly being recognized today.123 As Issa J. Khalil rightly points out, the ecological crisis has its roots not in acknowledging God’s absolute sovereignty as in

119

Ice, “The Ecological Crisis,” 204. Hans Jonas, Philosophical Essays: From Ancient Creed to Technological Man (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1974), 29. See also Nathalie Frogneux, Hans Jonas ou la vie dans le monde (Bruxelles: Éditions DeBoeck Université, 2001), 119. 121 See in this regard Ibrahim Abdul-Matin, Green Deen: What Islam Teaches about Protecting the Planet (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2010). As the author reminds Islam considers the entire Earth as a mosque and everything in it as sacred. See Ibid., 1-3. 122 Khalil, “The Ecological Crisis,” 197. 123 See in this regard Natan Levy – David Shreeve – Harfiyah Abdel Haleem, Sharing Eden: Green Teachings from Jews, Christians and Muslims (Markfield, Leicestershire: Kube Publishing Ltd., 2012). 120

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monotheism but rather in human beings’ rejection of any sovereignty whatsoever over oneself, be it the sovereignty of God or of nature.124 Our critical evaluation and refutation of the alleged religious roots of the ecological crisis necessitates that the deeper conceptual roots of the problem be sought elsewhere. The causes of the contemporary ecological crisis are much deeper and more complex. We might claim that the real roots of the ecological crisis are “philosophical” as they emerge from a certain vision of reality, from a particular Weltanschauung, encompassing humanity’s understanding of itself, of the physical world, and above all, the human-nature relationship. Such an overarching view of humanity’s perception of itself in relation to the natural world is ultimately provided by philosophy, as we shall go on to argue.

5. The Roots of the Ecological Crisis as “Philosophical” An important clue regarding the “philosophical” roots of the contemporary ecological crisis was provided by Lynn White himself in his 1967 article which we have analysed above. We have been critical of White’s efforts to indict the biblical tradition and Christian theology as the source of the historical and conceptual roots of the ecological crisis. At the same time it needs to be acknowledged that White’s essay can blaze a trail in looking for the deeper ideological roots of the ecological crisis. In his seminal article, White did propose some valuable pointers to the philosophical roots of our current ecological predicament. Unfortunately, these have been overlooked during the last five decades of debate around the Christian roots of the ecological crisis in White’s essay. However, as Ben A. Minteer and Robert E. Manning have pointed out, there is more in White’s influential article than the environmentalist critique of Christianity.125 It also provides some key insights regarding the philosophical or ideological roots of our current ecological predicament. While Lynn White’s assumptions regarding the “Christian” roots of the ecological crisis have been refuted by subsequent research, “his larger point—that is, that we need to examine the underlying values and philosophical worldviews that motivate human activity in nature as revealed in our cultural and environmental history—remains as significant now as it was

124

Khalil, “The Ecological Crisis,” 208. See in this regard also Minteer –Manning, “An Appraisal of the Critique of Anthropocentrism and Three Lesser Known Themes in Lynn White’s ‘The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis’,” 165.

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in 1967.”126 Some of White’s basic intuitions have been profound and ground-breaking in this regard. White affirms, for example: Unless we think about fundamentals, our specific measures may produce new backlashes more serious than those they are designed to remedy. As a beginning we should try to clarify our thinking by looking, in some historical depth, at the presuppositions that underlie modern technology and science.127 What people do about their ecology depends on what they think about themselves in relation to things around them. Human ecology is deeply conditioned by beliefs about our nature and destiny.128 What we do about ecology depends on our ideas of the man-nature relationship.129

Lynn White’s essay thus provides some valuable clues in looking out for the conceptual roots of the contemporary ecological crisis. Such is “ultimately the most valuable and the most enduring legacy of White’s essay.”130 According to White, the way we treat the physical world ultimately depends on the way we think about ourselves in our relation to it, namely, on our ideas of human-nature relationship. It is in this vein that J. Baird Callicott argues that “the agenda for a future environmental philosophy” was set by Lynn White’s 1967 article.131 In another article, a decade later, White continued to insist that it is important to reflect on the value structures that underlie one’s perception of the world.132 He notes: The artifacts of a society, including its political, social and economic patterns, are shaped primarily by what the mass of individuals in that society believe, at the sub-verbal level, about who they are, about their

126

Ibid., 172. White, “The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis,” 1204. 128 Ibid., 1205. 129 Ibid., 1206. 130 Minteer –Manning, “An Appraisal of the Critique of Anthropocentrism and Three Lesser Known Themes in Lynn White’s ‘The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis’,” 173. 131 J.Baird Callicott, “Environmental Philosophy is Environmental Activism: The Most Radical and Effective Kind” in Environmental Philosophy and Environmental Activism, eds. D.E. Marietta – L.E. Embree (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995), 31. 132 See Lynn White, “Continuing the Conversation,” 55-64. 127

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In fact, every philosophy has as its core a certain vision of the world and of reality, of which it is the expression.134 One may also recall here a very pertinent remark from Alfred North Whitehead: “The mentality of an epoch springs from the view of the world.”135 The root causes of the ecological malaise ultimately stem from the particular way of perceiving the physical world and of relating to it. The crisis has to do with a certain worldview which was born and nurtured within a precise philosophical humus that was instrumental in effecting a profound change in the human relationship with nature, subjugating the latter to wanton exploitation and abuse. For this reason, the roots of the current ecological crisis are significantly also philosophical, as the very malaise appears to have resulted from a particular vision of life and of the physical world. As Peter Marshall points out, “what is wrong is nothing less than the way we see and act in the world.”136 What lay behind human actions that have brought about the ecological crisis are in fact underlying attitudes towards nature that ultimately lead to an exploitative treatment of it. “The aggression towards nature is not only the result of the paradigm of development ushered in by science and technology, but is more radically, the fruit of a mentality and of a culture that have deeper roots of an ideological nature.”137 The abusive treatment of nature is ultimately based on a certain view of the natural world (Weltbild) and consequent models of development which are proving to be harmful both for humanity and our common planetary home. The deeper roots of the contemporary ecological crisis are thus basically ideological or conceptual as they emerge from a certain vision of reality, a certain Weltanschauung of humanity’s understanding of itself, of the physical world, and above all the relationship between humanity and the natural world. It has been precisely such a distorted worldview that conferred absolute centrality on the human subject, depreciated the physical world as inferior, and conceived relationship between humanity 133

Ibid., 57. Henri Gouhier, La pensée métaphysique de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1978), 9. 135 Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1938), 7. 136 Peter Marshall, Nature’s Web: An Exploration of Ecological Thinking (London – New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 5. 137 Antonio Simula, In pace con il creato: chiesa cattolica ed ecologia (Padua: Messaggero, 2001), 18. 134

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and the rest of the physical world in antagonistic terms which contributed significantly to the contemporary ecological crisis. For this, the ecological crisis may be said to result from a metaphysical crisis, a crisis of our vision (dar‫܈‬ana)138 of reality—of a philosophical Weltanschauung wherein nature came to be viewed depreciatively and in purely quantitative terms, and as fundamentally alien on account of a radical dualism between the human being and the physical world. As Hans Jonas has pointed out with great insight: “a change in the vision of nature, that is, of the cosmic environment of man, is at the bottom of that metaphysical situation which has given rise to modern existentialism and to its nihilistic implications.”139 The underlying root causes of the contemporary ecological crisis are therefore ultimately ideological in nature. In other words, they are philosophical. What we need to do therefore is to lay bare the deep-seated and latent philosophical roots of the contemporary ecological crisis, by sketching out the very vision of the physical world that served as foundation for the human attitude towards nature in the modern era and thereafter. These latent conceptual roots, which are underlying and deep running, need to be traced and exposed with arduous labour. As Arran Gare writes, these underlying beliefs must be made conscious and considered in the first place, if we are ultimately to overcome the ecological crisis.140 We have no hesitation in qualifying such a task as eminently philosophical, as philosophy, by its very nature, seeks to arrive at the ultimate causes of the phenomena under study. These very philosophical roots could, in the end, prove to be the Ariadne’s thread that could lead one out of the labyrinth of causes generally proposed. Our attempt to discover the philosophical roots of the ecological crisis is also anchored in a deeper conviction that we will not be able to solve the problem unless we are willing to change our basic perception of the natural world and our fundamental attitudes towards it. If the very crisis has been brought about by a vision of nature and of physical reality, the crisis will not be overcome unless we come to detect such an underlying vision and its drawbacks and apply philosophical correctives to it. 138 It is significant that in Sanskrit philosophy is termed as darsana, meaning precisely ‘vision of reality’. 139 Hans Jonas, “Gnosticism and Modern Nichilism,” Social Research 19 (1952), 431-32. 140 See Arran Gare, “Philosophical Anthropology, Ethics and Political Philosophy in an Age of Impending Catastrophe,” Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 5/2 (2009), 265.

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In our effort to look for the deeper philosophical roots of the ecological crisis, we commit ourselves to a project which was outlined already in the nascent stage of the ecological movement but unfortunately remains uncompleted to date. As we pointed out above, Lynn White’s article on the historical roots of the ecological crisis published in 1967, was precisely an attempt to trace the underlying worldview of the present day ecological crisis, which he sought to work back to the Judeo-Christian tradition. Even though the claims made by Lynn White in this essay were inaccurate, as we have sought to evidence previously, the underlying insight of White proved to be a profound one, in as much as he set the programme for future eco-philosophy in terms of a two-stage agenda. It consisted in identifying the worldview that contributed to bring about the ecological crisis in the first place, and in spelling out, subsequently, the worldview necessary to overcome the very crisis. Much water has flowed under the bridge of environmental thought and activism since then, in terms of robust environmental movements, emergence of various schools of environmental thought, strategies for sustainable development, etc. But the original project of tracing the deeper roots of the ecological crisis, it appears, has remained largely unfinished. In recent years, there has been a resurfacing of the basic concern to get to the deeper causes of the ecological crisis, and a call to return to this original project of ecological philosophy is echoed in recent literature. In this sense J. Baird Callicott reinterprets the programme of eco-philosophy as follows: First, identify and criticize those aspects of our inherited worldview that have led us to a dysfunctional relationship with the natural environment; and second, identify and articulate a new worldview, pragmatically validated—a worldview, that is, that will enable us to live sustainably and symbiotically with nonhuman natural entities and nature as a whole.141

In order to overcome the contemporary ecological crisis, we need to unearth, in the first place, the very set of beliefs and attitudes towards the physical world—the conglomerate of which constitutes a certain Weltbild—that have led to a voraciously exploitative and ruthlessly destructive relationship with nature. It is in this vein that the deeper roots of the current ecological crisis are ultimately philosophical.

141

J. Baird Callicott, “After the Industrial Paradigm, What?” in Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999), 301-2.

CHAPTER II MODERNITY AS THE HUMUS OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL ROOTS OF THE ECOLOGICAL CRISIS

Introduction We concluded the last chapter with the claim that the deeper roots of the contemporary ecological crisis are eminently philosophical, i.e., conceptual or ideological. In the present chapter, our task is to identify the precise humus where the philosophical roots of the ecological crisis originate. We will begin with a quick survey and evaluation of some of the proposals that have sought to trace the conceptual roots of the ecological crisis in ancient philosophical schools or in early and medieval Christianity. Such proposals, however, fail to stand the test of critical scrutiny. We will therefore go on to argue that the conceptual roots of the ecological crisis are to be found much closer to us in Modernity rather than in any other period of human history. Modernity reveals itself as a unique era in which there occurred a radical change in human-nature relationship, and obviously to the detriment of the latter. While it is possible to identify Modernity as the humus of the philosophical roots of the contemporary ecological crisis, there remains the knotty problem of ascertaining which modern thinker contributed most to the creation of the modern Weltbild and to the distorted human-nature relationship in terms of dominion and exploitation. Some have proposed that the conceptual roots of the ecological crisis can be traced to the thought of Francis Bacon, the father of experimental science, who appears to have contributed significantly to the modern scientific project of the conquest and mastery of nature. The proposal, however, does not appear sufficiently convincing, as it is difficult to find direct and ample evidence for the radical transformation of human attitudes towards the natural world in the writings of Bacon. Some others have suggested that the roots of the ecological crisis are to be sought in the mechanistic science ushered in by Galileo at the dawn of Modernity and championed by Newton. While the

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mechanistic approach did contribute to a reductive view of the physical world, the contribution of Galileo and Newton and others does not appear to have been entirely decisive in the moulding of the modern worldview in terms of conceptual categories. Besides, a mono-causal interpretation of the birth and emergence of the modern worldview is fraught with difficulties. The parturition of Modernity was a rather complex process, brought about by an intertwining of several concomitant factors, which were largely instrumental in ushering in radical changes in humanity’s perception of itself, of the surrounding natural world, and of the relationship between the two. The conceptual foundations of the encompassing modern Weltbild in terms of a radically altered understanding of the human subject, the physical world, and human-nature relationship could only have been provided by an overarching philosophical system. Here the contribution of René Descartes, the father of modern philosophy, looms large. Significantly, most of the constitutive elements of the modern Weltbild in terms of the emergence of the Archimedean modern Subject, the reduction of the physical world to pure extended matter, and above all, a dualistic divide between humanity and the natural world, can all be traced largely to Cartesian philosophy. The unique contribution of Descartes in the creation and moulding of the modern worldview has been acknowledged by eminent critics of Modernity like Martin Heidegger and Hans Jonas, among others. It is along these lines that one might argue that the modern Weltbild, which is also largely Cartesian, is the humus of the distorted human-nature relationship with obvious ecological consequences. We now proceed to a detailed discussion of the main arguments of the chapter that we have briefly outlined above.

1. The Alleged Roots of the Ecological Crisis in Gnosticism and Greek Philosophy There have already been isolated proposals to trace the conceptual roots of the contemporary ecological crisis in ancient religious systems like Gnosticism or in ancient philosophical schools like Platonism and NeoPlatonism. It is important to examine some of these claims and critically evaluate them, before going on to discuss our main thesis regarding Modernity as the precise humus for the philosophical roots of the ecological crisis. The writings of Hans Jonas on ecological questions, and more specifically his efforts to find parallels between nihilistic tendencies in ancient Gnosticism and modern Existentialism, are interpreted at times as

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an attempt to retrace the roots of the contemporary ecological crisis to ancient Gnosticism.1 It is true that Jonas does speak of a sort of parallelism between Modernity and the historical period of the Gnostic doctrines. He writes: “to presume an analogy through a historical distance so wide is less surprising than it seems a first, if we think that, in more than one aspect, the Greek-Roman world of the first centuries shows parallels with the modern.”2 According to Jonas, “something in Gnosticism knocks at the door of our Being and of our twentieth-century Being in particular.”3 Jonas points out how the “spiritual denudation” of the natural world at the hands of modern physical sciences has something in common with the Gnostic contempt for nature.4 Jonas’ studies on ancient Gnosticism are considered monumental.5 He sought to evidence in the Gnostic thought the elements of a world denying “acosmism” and radical dualism which devalued the physical world.6 According to Jonas, ancient Gnosticism advocated a radical cosmological and anthropological dualism between humanity and the physical world; between the transcendent God and the cosmos, and within the human being, between body and soul. Gnosticism conceived the human being as a spark of the transcendent Divine, in being a spirit (pneuma) which is imprisoned within the body and the material world. As Jonas explains, for 1

See in this regard Hans Jonas, “Gnosticism and Modern Nihilism,” Social Research 19 (1952), 430-52. 2 Hans Jonas, Gnosi e spirito tardoantico, trans. C. Bonaldi (Milan: Bompiani, 2010), 1090-91. 3 Hans Jonas, “A Retrospective View” in Proceedings of the International Colloquium on Gnosticism, Sponsored by Royal Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities, Stockholm, August 20-25, 1973, eds. Geo Widengren - David Hellhom (Stockholm: Almqvist och Wiksell International, 1977), 13. 4 Jonas, “Gnosticism and Modern Nihilism,” 449. 5 See in this regard Hans Jonas, Der Begriff der Gnosis. Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung der Dotkor-würde der Hohen Philosophischen Fakultät der PhilippsUniversität zu Marburg (Göttingen: Hubert & Co., 1930); Gnosis und spätantiker Geist. Teil 1: Die mythologische Gnosis (Göttingen:Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1934); Gnosis und spätantiker Geist. Teil 2/I: Von der Mythologie zur mystischen Philosophie (Göttingen:Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1954). See also B. Aland (ed.), Gnosis: Festschrift für Hans Jonas (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978). 6 See in this regard Hans Jonas, Philosophical Essays: From Ancient Creed to Technological Man (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1974); The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology (New York: Harper & Row, 1966); The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age, trans. H. Jonas with the collaboration of D. Herr (Chicago London: Chicago University Press, 1984).

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the Gnostics, “the soul, psyche, is part of the natural order, created by the demiurge to envelop the foreign pneuma.”7 The human subjectivity that shares the divine nature was considered radically different from the terrestrial world.8 Against the classical Greek conception of the physical world as cosmos, namely, ordered world, the Gnostics considered the world as a theatre of chaotic forces. In stark opposition to other philosophical currents, in which all lower levels of being, right down to the material world, successively emanate from the higher ones, there is a sort of “tragic discontinuity”,9 when it comes to the Gnostic conception of the natural world. For the Gnostics, the material world arises as a result of a primordial error and ignorance, a tragic “cosmogonic fall.”10 The following remark about the Gnostics from one of the early Fathers of the Church, Irenaeus of Lyons, underlines the radically negative conception of the physical world in Valentinian cosmogony. Irenaeus writes in the Adversus haereses: “… they [Gnostics] declare that material substance had its beginning in ignorance and grief, fear and bewilderment.”11 Closely linked to the fallen state of the natural world was the Gnostic belief of “an absolute rift between man and that in which he finds himself lodged: the world.”12 Consequently, the Gnostic thinkers promoted a depreciative view of the natural world considered alien to human beings. The Gnostic sense of feeling extraneous to the physical world is best summed up in the concept of the Entweltliching. According to M. Waldstein, “Gnostic Entweltlichung is a radical and revolutionary attitude of anticosmism; it is an attitude which negates, ultimately, all definite

7

Jonas, “Gnosticism and Modern Nihilism,” 444. See Nathalie Frogneux, Hans Jonas ou la vie dans le monde (Bruxelles: Éditions DeBoeck Université, 2001), 105-6. 9 A term used by Barbara Aland. See “Gnosis und Philosophie” in Proceedings of the International Colloquium on Gnosticism, 73. 10 A term used by Ragnhild B. Finnestad in “The Cosmogonic Fall in Evangelium Veritatis,” Temenos 7 (1971), 38-49. The text of the Evangelium Veritatis is preserved in Nag Hammadi codices I.3 and XII.2. See in this regard also Aleksey Kamenskikh, “The Tragedy of Cosmogonic Objectivation in the Valentinian Gnosis and Russian Philosophy,” Forum Philosophicum 18 (2013), 211ff. 11 Irenaeus of Lyons, Adversus haereses, 1.1.3.11-13. Cited from Against Heresies, trans. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson in The Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. I, The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Maryr and Irenaeus, ed. Alexander Roberts James Donaldson - A. Cleverland Coxe (New York: Cosimo, 2007), 318. 12 Jonas, “Gnosticism and Modern Nihilism,” 435. 8

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ordered being and all definite moral norms.”13 The Gnostics naturally held a very pessimistic view of the natural world and considered it as an obstacle in the way of humans working out their salvation through gnosis (knowledge). The Gnostic knowledge was precisely the path to liberate the human being from bondage to the cosmos. Hans Jonas writes: Becoming aware of itself, the self also discovers that it is not really its own, but is rather the involuntary executor of cosmic designs. Knowledge, gnosis, may liberate man from this servitude; but since the cosmos is contrary to life and to spirit, the saving knowledge cannot aim at integration into the cosmic whole and at compliance with its laws. For the Gnostics … man’s alienation from the world is to be deepened and brought to a head, for the extrication of the inner self which only thus can gain itself.14

The pessimistic view of the physical world promoted by ancient Gnosticism could thus be interpreted as a fertile terrain for antagonistic human attitudes towards nature and thus for the ideological roots of the ecological crisis. A couple of observations are in order here. First of all, the Gnostic philosophies and religions need to be understood in a strictly soteriological context. The awareness of human alienation from the natural world had the ultimate aim of goading one to work for one’s own redemption. As Carolyn Merchant points out, “the religious goal of Gnosticism was otherworldly salvation through knowledge.”15 Jonas himself writes: “For the Gnostics, contrary to the Stoics, man’s alienation is not to be overcome, but is to be deepened and pushed to the extreme for the sake of the self’s redemption.”16 The gnosis was precisely a means for an intellectual and sacramental return to the Transcendental Self of which one is a spark. The goal of human life according to the Gnostics was God and the Gnostic worldview was essentially theocentric and never anthropocentric as it is in Modernity. As Jonas has himself pointed out, it is only in Modernity that

13 M. Waldstein, “Hans Jonas’ Construct ‘Gnosticism’: Analysis and Critique,” Journal of Early Studies 8 (2000), 345. 14 Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion: The Message of the Alien God and the Beginnings of Christianity (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958, 2001), 329. 15 Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980), 17. 16 Jonas, “Gnosticism and Modern Nihilism,” 438.

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humans will becomes the sole and exclusive source of all values (nomos).17 Secondly, the physical world which was depreciated by the Gnostics was a reality that humans had to flee from rather than to be engaged with. The basic preoccupation of the Gnostics was to not be contaminated by the physical world. Accordingly, the Gnostics promoted a sort of indifference to the physical world, the so-called gnostic “acosmism”, but not attitudes of direct exploitation and abuse of the natural world. The perception of nature as absolutely indifferent to human concerns will take place only in Modernity, as Jonas himself notes. On account of this, he considers modern nihilism to be infinitely more radical than the Gnostic contempt for the natural world. We quote him: There is no overlooking one cardinal difference between the Gnostic and existentialist dualism: Gnostic man is thrown into an antagonistic, antidivine, and therefore anti-human nature, modern man into an indifferent one. And only the latter case represents the absolute vacuum, the really bottomless pit. … This makes modern nihilism infinitely more radical and more desperate than Gnostic nihilism ever could be, for all its panic and terror of the world and its defiant contempt of its laws. That nature does not care, one way or the other, is the true abyss.18

According to Jonas, the mathematical and scientific physical universe of Modernity is absolutely indifferent to human existence, final causes and teleology. The modern cosmos is reduced to its materialistic and mechanistic character only.19 As he points out, “modernity extends nihilism to the whole of ontology, while the Gnostics proclaimed their nihilistic belief solely in their ethical denial of an actively evil universe, and with the aim of returning to their eternal home.”20 In fact, the radical ontological separation (and not just cosmic as in Gnosticism) between humanity and the physical world, and the metaphysical devaluation of the natural world as totally inert and inanimate matter, devoid of any element of interiority and teleology, will take place only in Modernity. As Hans Jonas points out, the division in philosophy between philosophical anthropology and 17

See Hans Jonas, Sull’orlo dell’abisso. Conversazioni sul rapporto tra uomo e natura, ed. Paolo Becchi (Turin: Einaudi, 2000), 21. 18 Jonas, “Gnosticism and Modern Nihilism,” 450-51. 19 See Jonas, “Gnosticism and Modern Nihilism,” 431-32. See also Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo, “Hans Jonas’ ‘Gnosticisim and Modern Nihilism’, and Ludwig von Bertalanffy,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 38 (2012), 293. 20 Tibaldeo, “Hans Jonas’ ‘Gnosticisim and Modern Nihilism’, and Ludwig von Bertalanffy,” 293.

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natural philosophy is something specifically “modern”.21 On account of this Jonas is oriented to trace the conceptual roots of the ecological crisis in Modernity rather than in ancient Gnosticism. He writes: The beginnings of the crisis reach back into the seventeenth century, where the spiritual situation of modern man takes shape. … nature is nothing but res extensa—body, matter, external magnitude. … that which makes man superior to all nature, his unique distinction, mind, no longer results in a higher integration of his being into the totality of being, but on the contrary marks the unbridgeable gulf between himself and the rest of existence.22

It becomes thus very difficult to link the contemporary ecological crisis to the world-denying mentality of ancient Gnostic systems, which it needs to be remembered were also circumspect only to elitist groups and limited regions and were never really mass movements. Besides, as we pointed out in the previous chapter in our critique of Lynn White’s proposal of linking the ecological crisis to Bible and early Christianity, there is a huge gulf of many centuries between the Gnostic schools of the first three centuries of the Christian era and the ecological predicament which is rather recent in origin. Thus while it is possible to trace some significant similarities between ancient and modern nihilism, as Hans Jonas has done, it would be unwarranted to establish a direct link between them. It also needs to be acknowledged that the parallelism that Hans Jonas sought to highlight was between Gnosticism and modern Existentialism as represented by Nietzsche, Sartre and especially Heidegger, and not strictly with Modernity as such.23 The critique of the attempts to trace the conceptual roots of the ecological crisis to ancient Gnosticism can also serve as a useful deterrent to those who try to trace the roots of the ecological crisis to classical Greek thought.24 It is difficult to trace the conceptual root causes of the ecological crisis in Greek philosophy for several reasons. First of all, the early Greek thinkers had an essentially positive view of the natural world. They considered the physical world as an ordered (cosmos) rather than a 21

See Jonas, Philosophical Essays, 29. Jonas, “Gnosticism and Modern Nihilism,” 430-31. 23 See D.J. Levy, Hans Jonas: The Integrity of Thinking (Columbia – London: University of Missouri Press, 2002), 25. See also Jonas, “Gnosticism and Modern Nihilism,” 441. 24 See in this regard J.B. Callicott, In Defense of the Land Ethic (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 181-82. For a good overview in this regard see Gilbert F. LaFrenier, The Decline of Nature: Environmental History and the Western Worldview (Palo Alto, LA: Academia Press, 2008), 83-88. 22

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chaotic (chaos) reality. In fact, Greek philosophy was born precisely from the original sense of wonder (thaumazein) in the contemplation of the natural world. As Plato writes, such a sense of wonder at natural phenomena is the very sign of a philosopher (philosophou touto to pathos, to thaumazein), and all philosophy is born and has its roots in such wonder.25 Aristotle also writes in his Metaphysics that it was a sense of wonder before the phenomena of the natural world that led the earliest philosophers—the Pre-Socratic thinkers—to philosophize. We quote him: For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize; they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater matters, e.g. about the phenomena of the moon and those of the sun and the stars, and about the genesis of the universe.26

A second reason for which it is not possible to trace the philosophical roots of the ecological crisis in early Greece is that Greek thought was far from being dualistic when it comes to the relationship between humanity and the natural world. An observation of R.G. Collingwood is pertinent here. Collingwood notes how, far from defining reason or logos as opposed to nature, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle studied a mind or nous that “was always first and foremost mind in nature.”27 As Nathalie Frogneux points out, Plato and Aristotle proposed a relationship of continuity, rather than rupture, between humanity and the physical universe. While celestial bodies are considered superior to earthly bodies, the latter also comprises human beings. For the classical thought, the human soul is well “in and of the world”, it occupies a precise place in the scale of other beings and living things.28 As evidenced by Vittorio Hösle, for the Greeks the physis was the totality of being in movement, including humans. It would have never occurred to the Greeks to place the human being against the physis of which he/she was considered as a constitutive part.29 According to Hösle, such a contrast is possible only with the 25 Plato, Theatetus, 155d 2ff. On the concept of thaumazein in Plato see also Symposium, Phaedrus and Phaedo. 26 Aristotle, Metaphysics, A 2, 982b 11ff. James Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), II, 1554. 27 R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature (Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), 6. 28 Frogneux, Hans Jonas ou la vie dans le monde, 107. 29 See Vittorio Hösle, Filosofia della crisi ecologica (Torino: Einaudi, 1992), 47; Id., “Les fondements culturels et historiques de la crise écologique,” Laval théologique et philosophique 63 (2007), 390.

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concept of nature in Modernity, introduced by Descartes whose dualistic counter-position between the res cogitans and the res extensa constitutes the basis of the modern science of nature.30 Platonist dualism in general, and the apparent Platonist depreciation of the present world which is only a copy of the ideal world of ideas, is at times put forward as an argument regarding the plausible origin of the conceptual root causes of the ecological crisis in ancient Greek philosophy.31 However, it needs to be remembered that Platonism does not consider the world as inert and inanimate as in the modern mechanistic thought. Plato spoke of the world as organic and animate and possessing a soul, the anima mundi.32 For Plato as for all the Greeks, the soul was a general causal agent responsible for life as a whole.33 As Vittorio Possenti writes, “the ancients saw matter not as res extensa but as res vitalis, so to speak. Though they possessed very few and shaky notions of biology, their culture was biological, vitalistic, organicist.”34 Plato saw the whole cosmos as a living being endowed with perfection and beauty. In the Timaeus, Plato’s work in cosmology, there is room for a certain finality and goodness of the natural world.35 Any effort to link the contemporary ecological crisis to the alleged devaluation of the natural world in Neo-Platonism is also bound to reap little success. Neo-Platonism was a complex system which proposed various levels of reality which all emanate from the one immaterial and indescribable reality called the One (to hen), the Good (ta kalon). The Mind or Intellect (nous) is the second level of reality, while the lowest level is matter. The apparent depreciation of matter in Neo-Platonism could be suspected of harbouring a certain contempt for the natural world. However, it is difficult to trace in Neo-Platonist the conceptual roots of the ecological crisis. It is true that Plotinus, the founder of Neo-Platonism, advocated the complete and absolute transcendence of the truly real over the empirical 30

Hösle, Filosofia della crisi ecologica, 47. See in this regard Albert Gore, Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992), 249. For an analysis and a defense of Plato in this regard see Huey-li Li, “Platonic Cosmology: A Terrestrial Pedagogy,” Philosophy of Education 8 (2004), 130-38. 32 See Timaeus, 49e-50a, 52a. 33 Thomas Steele Hall (tr. & ed.), René Descartes. Treatise of Man (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 37, footnote 64 34 Vittorio Possenti, “Nature, Life, and Teleology,” The Review of Metaphysics 56 (2002), 39. 35 See in this regard Timaeus, 30b-d. 31

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world which consequently came to be depreciated. It is even said that he was ashamed of possessing a body. At the same time, it needs to be acknowledged that Plotinus is no dualist in the same sense as sects like the Gnostics and was himself a great opponent of Gnosticism. In contrast, Plotinus admired the beauty and splendour of the world. For a long time the conventional wisdom was that the Neo-Platonists were so focused on other-worldly metaphysics that they neglected any serious study of the sensible world. Such a prejudice is generally based on the tenet that NeoPlatonism, following Platonism, perceived the natural world as only a shadowy image of the upper, ideal world. However, precisely because the Neo-Platonists saw the sensible world as an image of the intelligible world, they devoted much time and energy to understanding the inner workings of the natural world, developing a proper natural philosophy in the bargain. Thus we find Neo-Platonist writings on embryology, physiology, meteorology, astronomy, and much else.36 Neo-Platonism was not altogether averse to the physical world, for the observation and study of which it actively promoted disciplines like mathematics.37 In conclusion, the Platonist and the Neo-Platonist outlook towards the natural world was not entirely negative as is at times simplistically presupposed. The not altogether negative outlook of Neo-Platonism towards the natural world is vouched for by the great Christian philosopher, Augustine of Hippo. Augustine credited Neo-Platonist philosophy as having helped him to make the transition from dualistic Manichaeism to Christianity. As a Manichee, Augustine believed in the tussle between the great forces of good and evil, just as the Gnostics did. As a Neo-Platonist and later as a Christian, Augustine held evil to be only a privation of good and not as an absolute reality in itself counter-posited to good. Attempts to trace the conceptual roots of the ecological crisis to ancient religious systems like Gnosticism or to ancient Greek philosophy, especially to Platonist and Neo-Platonist dualism, are bound to yield little success, as we have sought to evidence above. We shall now proceed to examine briefly the contention that the ideological roots of the ecological crisis can be traced in the early Christian spirituality and medieval theology.

36 See in this regard the important volume: James Wilbering – Christoph Horn (eds.), Neoplatonism and the Philosophy of Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 37 See Roberto Maiocchi, Storia della scienza in occidente (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1995), 137.

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2. Christianity and the Supposed Depreciation of the Natural World It is at times claimed that early Christianity promoted a world-denying spirituality that was instrumental in the depreciation and in the consequent abuse and exploitation of the natural world. One may recall here the critique of Matthew Fox who blames the “Augustinian fall-redemption theology” in particular, for an openly antagonistic approach to the natural world.38 However, an attentive reading of the writings of some of the early Christian Fathers of the Church, including Augustine, reveals how early Christianity held a noble and lofty view of the natural world. The early Christian vision of the natural world was positive, often in direct opposition to that of the Gnostic, the Manichean, and similar currents which offered a pessimistic view of the material world. Early Christianity considered the natural world as the primary revelation (epiphany) of God. “Nothing is a vacuum in the face of God,” wrote Irenaeus of Lyons in the second century; “everything is a sign of God.”39 Some of the early Fathers of the Church, like John Chrysostom, spoke of the two Books of God: the Book of Works and the Book of Words; the book of the creatures and the book of the scriptures. The book of Works was considered God’s first and primordial revelation, which was not substituted or cancelled by the second book of Words. Instead, they advocated that the two books needed to be read together to have a complete understanding of God. As John Scotus Eriugena, theologian and Neoplatonist philosopher says: “Christ wears ‘two shoes’ in the world: Scripture and nature. Both are necessary to understand the Lord, and at no stage can creation be seen as a separation of things from God.”40 The 38 See Matthew Fox, Original Blessing (Santa Fe, N.M.: Bear, 1983), 10-11. See also Matthew Fox, The Coming of the Cosmic Christ: The Healing of Mother Earth and the Birth of a Global Renaissance (New York – London: Harper & Row, 1988), 31-32. 39 Irenaeus of Lyons, Adversus Haereses, IV, 21. 40 J. Matthew Sleeth, “Teachings on Creation through the Ages” in The Green Bible (London: Harper Collins, 2008), 101. See also John Scotus of Eriugena, Periphyseon (PL 122, col. 723D) where Eriugena compares creatura and scriptura as the two vestments of Christ at his Transfiguration. See in this context also Donald F. Duclow, “Nature as Speech and Book in John Scotus Eriugena,” Mediaevalia 3 (1977), 131-40. On the importance of reading together both the books about God—creation and the Bible, see also Edward Brown, Our Father’s World: Mobilizing the Church to Care for Creation (South Hadley, MA: Doorlight Publications, 2006), 98.

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perception of the physical world as the self-revelation of God was deeply rooted in the early Christian theology. The following words of St. Augustine are very clear in this regard: Some people, in order to discover God, read books. But there is a great book: the very appearance of created things. Look above you! Look below you! Read it. God, whom you want to discover, never wrote that book with ink. Instead, He set before your eyes the things that He had made. Can you ask for a louder voice than that?41

St Augustine insisted on how the contemplation of God is arrived through contemplation of the order of the created world. He also attributed to the liberal arts an ethical and religious value for their capacity to lead the mind to the contemplation of the supreme Truth.42 Augustine, in fact, held geometry and music in high esteem and acknowledged that the temporal could serve the eternal by supplying knowledge about nature. And in his own works, Augustine displayed a sophisticated knowledge of Greek natural philosophy.43 According to David C. Lindberg, a great historian of science, the attitude of early Christian scholars to the physical world was much more nuanced and sophisticated than direct opposition to the scientific study and observation of it as it is at times suggested.44 In early Christian thought, it was assumed that the natural world and living things contained a spiritual and moral teaching, beyond their capacity to satisfy human physical needs. One may recall in this regard a classical work of antiquity, the Physiologus, a work on animals, plants, and stones, produced in Alexandria between the second and fifth centuries.45 The Physiologus expounded the moral and theological significance of numerous natural objects. The fables contained in this book, which later in the Middle Ages was to enjoy a popularity second 41

Augustine, De Civitate Dei, Book 16. Maiocchi, Storia della scienza in occidente, 140-41. See also William Cecil Dampier, A History of Science and Its Relations with Philosophy and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 63-65. 43 David C. Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science: The European Scientific Tradition in Philosophical, Religious, and Institutional Context, Prehistory to A.D. 1450 (Chicago – London: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 150. 44 For a critical view in this regard see David C. Lindberg, “Early Christian Attitudes toward Nature” in Science and Religion: A Historical Introduction, ed. Gary B. Ferngren (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2002), 47-56. 45 See in this regard Peter Harrison, “Subduing the Earth: Genesis 1, Early Modern Science, and the Exploitation of Nature,” The Journal of Religion 79 (1999), 9192. 42

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only to the Bible itself, helped to create “a rich symbolic world in which natural objects came to be invested with profound and mystical meanings.”46 The positive vision of the natural world and the profound belief of created realities as symbols of God, as vestigia Dei, was most clearly expressed in the doctrine of icons in Orthodox thought and spirituality. In Orthodox theology, an “icon” is something that reveals the eternal dimension of everything. Significantly, in Orthodox theology, “it is not just humanity that is likened to an icon. The entire world is an icon, a door, a window, a point of entry, opening up to a new reality. Everything in this world is a sign, a seed.”47 In the Orthodox tradition, creation itself was likened to an icon, in the same way as the human person is created in the image [or icon] and likeness of God (Gen 1:26). According to the seventh century Eastern theologian John of Damascus, “the whole earth is a living icon of the face of God.”48 The Damascene advocated a very positive vision of matter and of the natural world founded ultimately on the principle of God’s incarnation. He wrote: “I worship the Creator of matter who became matter for my sake … Because of this I salute all remaining matter with reverence.”49 In conclusion, while extolling the virtue of asceticism and a certain detachment from mundane affairs, early Christianity was in no way worlddenying. Its positive vision of the natural world could not have led to ruthlessly exploitative attitudes towards the physical world which emerged only in the modern period as we shall be arguing shortly. In a similar way, any attempt to implicate the medieval Christian communities in the creation of antagonistic attitudes towards nature, through the application of the Genesis command to dominate and exploit the natural world (Gen 1:28), is also not bound to reap much success. Here one may recall the claim of Lynn White, already discussed at length in the previous chapter, to identify the precise source of such roots within JudeoChristian biblical tradition and in medieval Christianity. However, as Peter Harrison notes, “for the first fifteen hundred years of the Christian era there is little in the history of interpretation of Genesis to support White’s major contentions. Patristic and medieval accounts of human dominion are 46

See in this regard Ibid., 92. John Chryssavgis, “Introduction” in Cosmic Grace Humble Prayer: The Ecological Vision of the Green Patriarch Bartholomew, ed. John Chryssavgis (Grand Rapids, MI – Cambridge, UK: William B. Eerdmans, 2009), 24. 48 John of Damascus (675-749), Treatise. 49 St John of Damascus, On the Divine Images, I, 16. See also Myroslaw Tataryn, “The Eastern Tradition and the Cosmos,” Sobornost 11 (1989), 49. 47

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not primarily concerned with the exploitation of the natural world.”50 In the Middle Ages, the Genesis text that appears to grant humans dominion over nature “touched only secondarily on conquering the natural order.”51 The medieval worldview was essentially “organic”, with human communities existing in remarkable harmony with the physical world around them. The classical example in this regard is offered by the sustainable life-styles led by some of the medieval monastic communities. The pious spiritual works performed by these religious communities were invariably accompanied by efforts to modify the natural world through agriculture and husbandry and the transformation of woods and swamps into fields and pastures. Yet, as Peter Harrison notes, “this was not an engagement with the natural world in order to assert dominion or reap material gain; neither was it informed by a callous disregard for the earth.” It is difficult to find in the Middle Ages “the explicit articulation of an attitude of indifference to, or hostility toward, nature.”52 As Alexandre Koyré has pointed out with great insight, the medieval man, as against his modern counterpart, sought to contemplate the natural world rather than dominate it. Koyré writes: “Modern man seeks the domination of nature, whereas medieval or ancient man attempted above all its contemplation.”53 We only have to remember, as William J. Mills has argued, “the intricately and lovingly observed animals and plants decorating cathedrals and the margins of illuminated manuscripts, to realize that the stereotype of the Middle Ages as essentially distrustful of nature will simply not match its reality.”54 Medieval Christianity’s perception of the natural world was largely optimistic as it developed further the early Christian tradition of looking at the physical world as God’s book of works and a visible manifestation of the super-eminently bountiful Creator. For Hugh of St. Victor (10961141), “the whole visible world is like a book written by the finger of

50

Harrison, “Subduing the Earth,” 90. Jeremy Cohen, “Be Fertile and Increase, Fill the Earth and Master It”: The Ancient and Medieval Career of a Biblical Text (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 313. 52 Harrison, “Subduing the Earth,” 94, 95. 53 Alexandre Koyré, Mathematics and Measurement: Essays in Scientific Revolution (London: Chapman and Hall, 1968), 16. See also Alexandre Koyré, Newtonian Studies (London: Chapman and Hall, 1965), 5-7. 54 William J. Mills, “Metaphorical Vision: Changes in Western Attitudes to the Environment,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 72/2 (1982), 238-39. 51

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God.”55 Medieval saints like Francis of Assisi saw God’s goodness and beauty mirrored in His creation. For the poverello of Assisi, every flower, every bird spoke to him of the Creator, of God. His biographer Bonaventure noted that Francis began his spiritual quest with a contemplation of the world and all its fullness and that it was his wonder at the splendour of creation that directed him to God.56 In his own treatise, The Soul’s Journey to God, Bonaventure begins with a similar contemplation of the world and all the creatures within it: “Whoever is not enlightened by such a splendour of created things is blind,” he writes, “for every creature is by its nature a kind of effigy and likeness of the eternal wisdom.”57 According to Bonaventure, as “the one stream of light breaks up into different colours as it flows through a stained-glass window, so the Creator is reflected in the different creatures we see around us. Each and every creature reflects a different aspect of the Creator.”58 The Franciscan theologian therefore spoke of the physical universe as “a book reflecting, representing and describing its Maker, the Trinity.”59 All the creatures of the sense world lead the mind of the contemplative and wise man to the eternal God. For these creatures are shadows, echoes and pictures of that first, most powerful, most wise and most perfect Principle, of that eternal Source, Light and Fullness, of that efficient, exemplary and ordering Art. They are vestiges, representations, spectacles proposed to us and signs divinely given so that we can see God.60

As symbols of God, created realities were seen as vestigia Dei, signs and traces of God’s presence in creation within the medieval Christian world view and cosmology. For the medieval society, “every living form of plant, bird or animal, the sun, moon and stars, the waters and the mountains, were seen as signs of things sacred (signa rei sacrae), expressions of a divine cosmology, symbols linking the visible and the

55

Hugh of St. Victor, De Tribus Diebus, 4 (PL 176.814B). The translation is from Gabriel Josopovici, The Book of God: A Response to the Bible (New Haven London: Yale University press, 1988), 29. 56 Ian Bradley, God is Green: Ecology for Christians (New York – London: Doubleday, 1990), 98. 57 Bonaventure, The Soul’s Journey to God (London: SPCK, 1978), 77. 58 Bonaventure, Hexameron XIII, 14. 59 Bonaventure, Breviloquium II, 11-12. 60 Bonaventure, The Soul’s Journey into God, trans. Ewart Cousins (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), 75-76.

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invisible, earth and heaven.”61 For the medieval mystic, Meister Eckhart, “every creature is a book about God,” and “so full of God is every creature.”62 The exuberance of creation represented for the medieval man the infinite fecundity of God. It was a point masterfully brought home by the thirteenth century medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas who argued that the diversity of the extraordinary array of creatures on Earth reveals the richness of the nature of God. For God brought many things into being in order that his goodness might be communicated to creatures and represented in them; and because this goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, God produced many and diverse creatures, so that what was wanting to one in the representation of divine goodness might be supplied by another. For goodness which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and diverse. Hence the whole universe together participates in the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it better than any single creature whatever.63

The medieval perception of the natural world was overwhelmingly positive, and prior to Modernity, Christians considered themselves as stewards of creation rather than as its despots because they believed that ultimately “the Earth belongs to the Lord” (Psalm 24:1). Against such a background it is difficult to propose that the deeper conceptual root causes of the ecological crisis lay in early biblical tradition, or in early and medieval Christian worldview and spirituality. These roots are much closer to us in Modernity as we now go on to argue.

3. Modernity as the Humus for the Philosophical Roots of the Ecological Crisis In tracing the precise humus of the conceptual roots of the contemporary ecological crisis, the article of Lynn White—which we have discussed at length in the previous chapter—offers an unexpected clue. White appears to have hit the nail on the head in linking the roots of the ecological crisis to the development and application of modern science and technology— which he rightly claims originated in the West and continues to be Western 61

Philip Sherrard, The Rape of Man and Nature: An Enquiry into the Origins and Consequences of Modern Science (Suffolk: Golgonooza Press, 1987), 64. 62 Meister Eckhart, Sermons. 63 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1.47.2. Cited from Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Cosimo Books, 2007), 246. See also the Summa Contra Gentiles 2.45.2.

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in outlook—and has led to the pillage of nature in recent centuries.64 However, as Peter Harrison notes with great acumen, White goes off at a tangent “in locating that effect earlier than the seventeenth century.”65 White’s criticism of anthropocentrism as having contributed to the contemporary ecological crisis merits respect,66 even though White was wrong in branding the Judeo-Christian tradition as “the most anthropocentric religion the world has seen.” The anthropocentric roots with which the ecological crisis comes to be strongly associated are to be traced not to Christianity or to Christian dogma, as claimed by Lynn White,67 but to Modernity. We may quote Seyyed Hossein Nasr in this regard: Medieval European man was always aware that only God was absolute and that he was relative. Even if he did not often heed the call of certain of his saints and sages such as St Francis, to appreciate the salvific beauty of the natural order, he never dreamt of turning himself and especially his earthly existence into something absolute. …The absolutization of the human state is a heritage of the European Renaissance whose deadly consequences are being manifested only today.68

The acclaimed historian of ecology, Donald Worster makes a very accurate observation in this regard: As a fellow historian, I share White’s ambition to dig deeply into the past to illuminate the present. But it seems to me that we don’t have to look so far back as the Book of Genesis, nor do we have to indict the entire Christian heritage for our situation. We have a much shorter and distinctly modern cultural history to understand and fix.69 64

Lynn White, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,” Science 155 (1967), 1204. Harrison, “Subduing the Earth,” 102. 66 In fact, the critique of anthropocentrism in ecological thought post-dates Lynn White and is indebted at least partially to him. See in this regard J.B. Callicott, In Defense of the Land Ethic (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989); E. Katz, Nature as Subject: Human Obligation and Natural Community (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997); H. Rolston III, Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988); P.W. Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986). 67 White, “The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis,” 1205. 68 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Man and Nature: The Spiritual Crisis of Modern Man (London – Boston: Unwin, 1990), 6 69 Donald Worster, The Wealth of Nature: Environmental History and the Ecological Imagination (New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 208. The italics as in the original. 65

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The roots of the ecological crisis are much nearer to us and are to be sought in the immediate worldview of Modernity, which is the humus for the birth of modern science and technology. “Whatever evidence there may be of human impact on the natural landscape during the Middle Ages, only in the early modern period do we encounter the explicit connection between the exploitation of nature and the Genesis creation narratives.”70 Clarence Glacken notes that it is in the seventeenth century that there begins a unique formulation in Western thought, where the idea of human dominion over the Earth, becomes sharper and more explicit.71 It is only in the seventeenth century that the Genesis text comes to be read in terms of domination and conquest by the practitioners of the new sciences, leading philosophical luminaries of the epoch, the advocates of colonization, the agents of agriculture and husbandry, and others, often explicitly seeking to legitimize their domineering attitudes towards nature, and at times even towards indigenous cultures, by appealing to the text of Genesis (cfr. Gen 1:28).72 For example, Francis Bacon, who first set out the method of the empirical sciences, saw in the hitherto unprecedented means offered by science and industry as a way to regain the dominion over the natural world conferred on humanity by God in Genesis and which humanity had forfeited as a result of the Fall.73 For man by the fall fell at the same time from this state of innocency and from his dominion over creation. Both of these losses however can even in this life be in some part repaired; the former by religion and faith, the latter by arts and sciences. For creation was not by the curse made altogether and forever a rebel, but … is now by various labours … at length and in some measure subdued to the supplying of man with bread; that is to the uses of human life.74

It is significant that Thomas Sprat, the first historian of the Royal Society—which largely adopted the Baconian programme of dominion over nature, stated as one of the group’s objectives a re-establishment of

70

Harrison, “Subduing the Earth,” 108. See Clarence Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture in Western Thought from Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 494-95. 72 Harrison, “Subduing the Earth,” 96. 73 See Harrison, “Subduing the Earth,” 98; Merchant, The Death of Nature, 170. 74 Francis Bacon, Novum Organum II, 52, in Works, 14 vols., ed. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis - Douglas Denon Heath (London: Longman, 1857-74), vol. IV, 247-48. 71

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“Dominion over Things.”75 In an address to the same august body, Joseph Glanvill announced that the new philosophy championed by Bacon and others at the dawn of Modernity had provided “ways of captivating Nature, and making her subserve our purposes and designments”, leading to the restoration of “the Empire of Man over Nature.”76 It is evident that the early modern thinkers were trying to reread the Genesis text, for the first time, in the exclusive sense of ruthless domination over the natural world. Such dominion over the natural world was to be established through a regaining of the knowledge once possessed by Adam in Eden, prior to the Fall and by literally tilling the actual garden of the current natural world. The emergence of the Protestant work ethic, which contributed much to the development of modern agriculture and industry, was also based on such literal readings of the Genesis text.77 In this vein, Richard Neve wrote that tilling the land was “the most Ancient, most Noble, and most Useful of all the Practical Sciences” a science without which the Earth would quickly degenerate into a wilderness.78 Early modern thinkers found in the reinterpretation of the Genesis creation narratives the sanction not only for dominion over the natural world but also for justifications of property ownership and colonization. In the defence of private property in his Second Treatise of Government, John Locke explicitly cites the Genesis creation account. According to Locke inasmuch as “God and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth, i.e. improve it for the benefit of life … he that in obedience to this command of God, subdued, tilled, and sowed any part of, thereby annexed to it something that was his property.”79 Some early modern authors went to the extent of justifying overseas plantations and the colonization of indigenous peoples basing themselves explicitly on the Genesis command. Richard Eburne stated in A Plaine Path-way to Plantations that colonization was to be justified on account of “God’s express commandment to Adam, Genesis 1.28 that he should fill the earth, and subdue it.”80 In a similar vein, George Walker reasoned that those parts of the world “which are not 75

Thomas Sprat, History of the Royal Society (London, 1667), 62. Joseph Glanvill, Scepsis Scientifica (London, 1665), sig. b3v. 77 See Harrison, “Subduing the Earth,” 99-100. 78 Richard Neve (T. Snow, pseudonym), Apopiroscipy (London, 1702), 3. 79 John Locke, Two Treatises, in Works, 10th ed., 10 vols. (London, 1801), V: 354, 356, 362. 80 Richard Eburne, A Plaine Path-Way to Plantation (London, 1624), sig. B2v, pp. 16-18 (emphasis in original). See also Christopher Hill, The English Bible and the Seventeenth-Century Revolution (Ringword: Penguin, 1994), 136. Cited by Harrison, “Subduing the Earth,” 101. 76

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replenished with men able to subdue the Earth and till it,” are open to those who instead could properly exploit them.81 Peter Harrison concludes in this regard: “Developing conceptions of private property, along with commercial incentives for colonization, thus played their role in the modern conquest of nature, and these factors too, found their ideological justification in seventeenth and eighteenth century readings of Genesis.”82 Jürgen Moltmann rightly notes that exploitative attitudes towards nature are to be found not in the image of God of the Scriptures, but in the “image of God of the modern human person”.83 Fred Dallmayr pinpoints the problem accurately when he concludes: “the roots of the problem reach … as far as back as the onset of Western modernity and its attendant separation of ‘man’ and ‘nature’.”84 The origin of the exploitative attitudes towards the physical world is clearly modern. David Toolan, for example, writes: Our real environmental problems start not with Abraham and Moses but with the new scientific consciousness of the seventeenth century. Classical Newtonian science … has given rise to the philosophy of what Alfred North Whitehead called “scientific materialism,” the idea that all reality, including mental reality, is finally reducible to meaningless matter in motion. When nature is conceived in this way, in effect as a machine, it can have no moral standing. And hence can make no moral claim upon us. Our serious environmental problems really begin here.85

An exploitative attitude on the part of humans towards the natural world begins only in Modernity, and precisely with the adoption of the central metaphor of the natural world as a machine. In stark contrast to the medieval and Renaissance societies, Modernity ushers in an attitude towards the natural world in terms of control and exploitation, as pointed out by William J. Wills.

81

George Walker, The History of the Creation (London, 1641), 193 (emphasis in original). Cited by Harrison, “Subduing the Earth,” 101. 82 Harrison, “Subduing the Earth,” 101. 83 Jürgen Moltmann, “La crisi ecologica: pace con la natura?” in Questione ecologica e coscienza cristiana, eds. Adriano Caprioli – Luciano Vaccaro (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1988), 140. The italics are mine. 84 Fred Dallmayr, Return to Nature? An Ecological Counterhistory (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2011), 1. 85 David Toolan, At Home in the Cosmos (New York: Orbis Books, 2001), 42. The reference to Whitehead in the citation refers to Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Macmillan, 1926), 25-26.

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… during the medieval and Renaissance periods … for these societies, control was not their primary demand upon the environment. This attitude ceases with the adoption of the machine as the central metaphor. Since that time, during what we call the “modern” period, nature has been deprived of its aura of the divine and has become merely an instrument available for our use and exploitation.86

From the beginning, the most profound longing of Modernity has been to fashion a world that is the product of human choice.87 To use Machiavelli’s metaphor, the moderns wished to “conquer Fortuna.”88 According to Vlad Muresan, “the ecological crisis is undeniably the product of Western civilisation, particularly of the modern ameliorative task, now projected on a planetary scale.”89 William Leiss also notes how “humanity’s entitlement to mastery over nature is a subterranean theme that runs throughout the collective consciousness of the modern era.”90 So it is “not in the least contemplative Christianity to be held responsible for the ecological crisis, but, indeed, Faustian Modernity.”91 Seyyed Hossein Nasr sums up well the need to look out for the real causes of the crisis in Modernity, avoiding false leads that seem to point to the roots of the ecological crisis being in earlier periods of human history. He writes: Modern man, faced with the unprecedented crisis of his own making which now threatens the life of the whole planet, still refuses to see where the real causes of the problem lie. He turns his gaze to the Book of Genesis and the rest of the Bible as the source of the crisis rather than looking upon the gradual de-sacralization of the cosmos which took place in the West and especially the rationalism and humanism of the Renaissance which made possible the Scientific Revolution and the creation of a science whose function, according to Francis Bacon, one of its leading proponents, was to gain power over nature, dominate her and force her to reveal her secrets not for the glory of God but for the sake of gaining worldly power and wealth.92 86

Mills, “Metaphorical Vision,” 248. Gregory Bruce Smith, “Heidegger, Technology and Postmodernity,” The Social Sciences Journal 28 (1991), 369. 88 See Nicollo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harvey Mansfield (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 98-101. 89 Vlad Muresan, “The Faustian Western Spirit and the Ecological Crisis,” Studia Europaea 57 (2012), 149. 90 William Leiss, The Domination of Nature (Montreal – London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994), xviii. 91 Muresan, “The Faustian Western Spirit and the Ecological Crisis,” 149. 92 Nasr, Man and Nature, 6. 87

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Modernity was indeed a unique epoch that witnessed a psychic shift in the human-nature relationship, often in terms of antagonistic opposition and ruthless exploitation. “The ‘death of nature,’ which saw the replacement of the Aristotelian vitalism with a mechanical world view; the collapse of the “symbolist mentality” of the Middle Ages and the radical contraction of sacramentalism, which resulted in a denial of the transcendental significance of the things of nature”93 takes place only in Modernity. With Modernity there was indeed a radical shift of worldview, a real change of “paradigm”—a concept popularized by Thomas Kuhn, in human-nature relationship.94 Donald Worster rightly points out that the deeper roots of the contemporary ecological crisis are not to be found in singular scientific discoveries or technological advances but in the emergence of modern culture as a whole. We quote him: I believe the most important roots lie not in any particular technology of production or health care—the advent of medical inoculations, for example, or better plows and crops, or the steam engine, or the coal industry, all of which were outcomes more than causes—but rather in modern culture itself, in its world-view that has swept aside much of the older religious outlook. … I see this world-view—“post-Axial” we might call it—taking over Western Europe in the seventeenth and especially the eighteenth century A.D., after a long spawning period, and manifesting itself in many so-called “revolutions,” including the Scientific, the Industrial, the Capitalist, all of which were only surface manifestations of a more fundamental change of thought.95

As Martin Heidegger points out with great insight “the new age” (Der Neuzeit) of Modernity is radically different from all previous epochs in having produced a Weltbild (world picture) for the first time and precisely for the conquest of the world. … never could there have been before, namely, a medieval and an ancient world picture. The world picture does not change from an earlier medieval one into a modern one, but rather the fact that the world becomes picture at all is what distinguishes the essence of the modern age [der Neuzeit].96

93

Harrison, “Subduing the Earth,” 96. On the concept of ‘paradigm shift’ see Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962). 95 Worster, The Wealth of Nature, 209-10. 96 Martin Heidegger, “The Age of World Picture” in Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 130. 94

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The fundamental event of the modern age is the conquest of the world as picture. The world “picture” [Bild] now means the structured image [Gebild] that is the creature of man’s producing which represents and sets before. In such producing, man contends for the position in which he can be that particular being who gives the measure and draws up the guidelines for everything that is.97

It is from within such a reductive conception of the physical world from the part of the absolute central position of the human being in Modernity that the abuse and exploitation of the natural world ultimately springs. As Bagoes Wiryomartono points out “the changes and crises in our environment are unavoidable consequences of the modern way we think of reality.”98 According to him, “global environmental crises are inescapable as the consequences of modernity.”99 The role of philosophical thought in the creation of such attitudes at the dawn of Modernity has been significant. These are fundamental attitudes that have been greatly influential in moulding the human perception and treatment of the physical world. Therefore it is in the philosophical worldview of Modernity that the deeper root causes of the contemporary ecological crisis need to be looked for. In other words, the precise humus where the roots of the ecological crisis originate (which are eminently philosophical) are to be sought at the dawn of Modernity rather than in any other historical period.

4. Bacon as a Possible Accoucheur of Modernity While it is possible to identity Modernity as the humus of the philosophical roots of the contemporary ecological crisis, in terms of the new Weltbild it helped to create, there remains a knotty problem regarding which of the accoucheurs of Modernity contributed most to the parturition of the modern worldview, and thereby indirectly to the emergence of the philosophical roots of the ecological crisis. It is to this conundrum that we now turn our attention. The thought of Francis Bacon, the father of experimental science, is often put forward as having provided the launch pad for the modern

97

Ibid., 134. Bagoes Wiryomartono, “Rethinking Modernity and the Question of Future Development,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 26 (2012), 665. 99 Wiryomartono, “Rethinking Modernity and the question of future development,” 663. 98

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scientific project of the conquest and mastery of nature.100 Bacon was convinced “that if men wanted to achieve anything new in the world, it was of no use attempting to reach it on any ancient method—they must realise that new practices and policies would be necessary.”101 In short, he held that real scientific progress required renewal of the very foundations of science. We read in the New Organum, Bacon’s principal contribution to natural philosophy. It is idle to expect any great advancement in science from the superinducing and engrafting of new things upon old. We must begin anew from the very foundations, unless we would revolve forever in a circle with mean and contemptible progress.102

Bacon took over and strengthened the great Renaissance redirection of interest toward the natural world. His contribution was not so much in providing new knowledge of nature but rather in inspiring a new method of gaining such knowledge.103 Vestigia filo regenda sunt: our steps must be guided by a clue, like Ariadne’s thread, Bacon claimed, by a method preventing us from losing our way in the labyrinth of the universe.104 The inductive method championed by Bacon awarded a prominent place for empirical and organized research based on the systematic collection of observations concerning the phenomena studied. Bacon’s greatest merit probably lies in having laid down a grandiose vision for organized scientific research, a sort of a research establishment for science and technology – called Solomon’s House or the “College of the Six Days’ Works” outlined in his New Atlantis.105 The various more or less official scientific associations which arose in England in the course of the seventeenth century: the meetings at Gresham College, the group of Haak which regularly met in Oxford, and above all the Royal Society, chartered in 1662 and which amalgamated the other groups, owed their 100

Hans Jonas, for example, attributes the current ecological catastrophe to the “excessive success” of the Baconian ideal of power over nature through scientific technology. See Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, 140-1. 101 Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science 1300 - 1800, rev. ed. (New York – London: The Free Press, 1965), 113. 102 The quotation is from the English translation. Francis Bacon, The New Organon, ed. Fulton H. Anderson (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill; New York: Macmillan, 1960), xxxi. 103 E.J. Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture (Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), 398. 104 Francis Bacon, Instauratio magna. Praefatio. Works I, 129, 157. 105 See Francis Bacon, Works III (London, 1879), 199-266.

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existence to some extent to the new experimental philosophy that was cultivated with Bacon’s conceptions as a guiding principle. The founders of the Royal Society explicitly acknowledged their indebtedness to Bacon as having inspired its creation.106 The institute was actually regarded as a realization of the ideal of organized scientific co-operation Bacon outlined in the New Atlantis.107 Its foundation also provided a formal institutional basis for Bacon’s programme for the conquest of nature through the promotion of experimental knowledge.108 At the heart of Bacon’s scientific reform programme was the production of practical and useful knowledge of nature.109 Bacon carried forward the Renaissance ideal of practical knowledge championed by people like Leonardo da Vinci and others which saw in the technological know-how an ally for the improvement of human life, “for the benefit and use of life” (ad meritum et usus vitae) as he put it.110 For Bacon, the ultimate end of science was a practical one, namely, the improvement of 106

See Thomas Sprat, The History of the Royal-Society of London, for the Improving of Natural Knowledge (London, 1667), 144. See also Leiss, The Domination of Nature, 46; Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture, 402-3; Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science 1300 - 1800, 113. William Leiss notes that in the fifty years following Bacon’s death educational reformers influenced by the New Atlantis began organizing technical schools to promote instruction in the mechanical arts. See Leiss, The Domination of Nature, 46. 107 E.J. Dijksterhuis describes how Bacon visualised organized scientific research to take place, which is worth quoting here. “A team of co-operating scholars, who were to find a centre in the House of Solomon, were to divide the work as follows: some were to be sent to foreign countries to gather information about what was being done there and to collect books, others were to study these books, and others again were to report on what had come to light in the mechanical and in the liberal arts. One team was to be charged with the performance of experiments, another with the recording of their results in the lists referred to above, which in turn were to be studied by another team with a view to drawing practical conclusions for science and for practical life for them. A third set of three teams was to devise and perform fresh experiments, and finally was to formulate the most general axioms and aphorisms, in which man’s supreme knowledge about nature might be summed up.” Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture, 402. 108 Thomas Wirth, “‘So Many Things for His Profit and for His Pleasure’: British and Colonial Naturalists Respond to an Enlightenment Creed. 1727-1777,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 131/2 (2007), 130. 109 Stephen Gaukroger, Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 14. 110 Francis Bacon, The Works of Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam, Viscount St. Alban and Lord High Chancellor of England, collected and edited by James Spedding - Robert Leslie Ellis - Douglas Denon Heath (London: 1857), vol. I, 132.

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the living standard, relief, and—if possible—abolition of distress, anxiety, and grief. The new science that he championed aimed to harness the power of nature to ameliorate the human situation.111 The theme of domination of nature appears to be a main element of the Baconian scientific programme. As Stephen Gaukroger notes, Bacon saw “the pursuit of natural philosophy neither in terms of knowledge for its own sake, nor in terms of particular useful ends, but in terms of the restoration of human dominion over nature.”112 Bacon lay particular emphasis on mechanical arts in which natural materials come to be transformed: agriculture, chemistry, dyeing, cookery, brewing, manufacture of glass, enamel, sugar, gunpowder, fireworks, paper, and the like, and also those activities which call for manual skill or the use of mechanical tools, such as weaving, carpentry, architecture, and the manufacture of clocks and mills.113 The exercise of the mechanical arts, according to Bacon, calls for subjecting nature to trials and vexations rather than allowing it to run its own course. For like as a man’s disposition is never well known or proved till he be crossed, nor Proteus ever changed shapes till he was straitened and held fast, so nature exhibits herself more clearly under the trials and vexations of art than when left to herself.114

According to Richard H. Kennington, Bacon’s programme was to offer a practical goal to philosophy through the idea of the mastery of nature.115 In this vein, William Leiss notes that “Bacon’s great achievement was to formulate the concept of human mastery over nature much more clearly than had been done previously and to assign it a prominent place among men’s concerns.”116 As we have seen earlier, Bacon wedded the concept of mastery over nature with Christianity, through a reinterpretation of the 111

Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture, 401; Wirth, “‘So Many Things for His Profit and for His Pleasure’,” 130; Richard H. Kennington, On Modern Origins: Essays in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Pamela Kraus - Frank Hunt (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004), 17-32. 112 Gaukroger, Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy, 78. 113 See Francis Bacon, Parasceve ad Historiam Naturalem et Experimentalem V. in Works, vol. I, 399. 114 Francis Bacon, “De Dignitate,” in Works, vol. IV, 263; Francis Bacon, De Augmentis Scientiarum II, c. 2. in Works, vol. I, 500. 115 See in this regard Kennington, On Modern Origins, especially chapter 1: “Bacon’s Reform of Nature,” 1-15. 116 Leiss, The Domination of Nature, 48.

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Genesis texts on human domination over the natural world. According to him, the ideal of the new natural philosophy was to “let the human race recover that right over nature which belongs to it by divine bequest.”117 The natural philosophy championed by Bacon encompassed two related operations, “the one searching into the bowels of nature, the other shaping nature as on an anvil.”118 Bacon realized that mechanical inventions do not “merely exert a gentle guidance over nature’s course; they have the power to conquer and subdue her, to shake her to her foundations.”119 Scientific knowledge and mechanical arts were the weapons within the Baconian vision to gain mastery over the natural world. Carolyn Merchant, and some other eco-feminists, have argued that the conceptual roots of the ecological crisis can be largely traced to the thought of Francis Bacon along the lines of mastery over nature championed in his natural philosophy.120 According to Merchant, Bacon offered “a total programme advocating the control of nature for human benefit” and “fashioned a new ethic sanctioning the exploitation of nature.”121 With characteristic eco-feminist sensibility Merchant notes that “his description of nature and his metaphorical style were instrumental in his transformation of the earth as a nurturing mother and womb of life into a source of secrets to be extracted for economic advance.”122 Merchant 117

The New Organon, in The Works of Francis Bacon, vol. IV, 115. The Advancement of Learning (translation of De Augmentis Scientiarum), IV, 343. 119 Description of the Intellectual Globe, V, 506. See Leiss, The Domination of Nature, 58. 120 See Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980), 164-90; Carolyn Merchant, “The Scientific Revolution and the Death of Nature,” Isis 97 (2006), 513-33. See also Sandra Harding, “The Norms of Social Inquiry and Masculine Experience,” PSA 1980: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 2 (1980), 305-24; Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); Sandra Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Evelyn Fox Keller, “Baconian Science: A Hermaphroditic Birth,” Philosophical Forum 11 (1980), 299-308; Fox Keller, “Feminism and Science,” Signs 7 (1982), 589-602; Fox Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985) which includes the essay “Baconian Science: The Arts of Mastery and Obedience.” For a good overview in this regard see Brian Vickers, “Francis Bacon, Feminist Historiography, and the Domination of Nature,” Journal of the History of Ideas 69/1 (2008), 117-18. 121 Merchant, The Death of Nature, 164. 122 Ibid., 165. 118

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claims that the Baconian counsel to dominate nature through mechanical arts bears very close parallels to and is inspired by the “interrogations of the witch trials and the mechanical devices used to torture witches.”123 She also takes exception to the apparently sexually explicit language used by Bacon in The Masculine Birth of Time: “I am come in very truth leading to you nature with all her children to bind her to your service and make her your slave” and to Bacon’s exhortation to be “searchers and spies of nature” to discover her plots and secrets.124 According to Merchant the new experimental method proposed by Bacon and his denotation of nature by the female gender has led to the degradation and exploitation of the natural world. This method, so readily applicable when nature is denoted by the female gender, degraded and made possible the exploitation of the natural environment. As woman’s womb had symbolically yielded to the forceps, so nature’s womb harboured secrets that through technology could be wrested from her grasp for use in the improvement of the human condition.125

Merchant sees in the bold sexual imagery used by Bacon, for example, his claim that “by art and the hand of man,” nature can be “forced out of her natural state and squeezed and moulded,”126 as the ultimate source of the modern experimental method which was put into use to dominate nature for human benefit. Here, in bold sexual imagery, is the key feature of the modern experimental method—constraint of nature in the laboratory, dissection by hand and mind, and the penetration of hidden secrets—language still used today in praising a scientist’s “hard facts,” “penetrating mind,” or the “thrust of his argument.” The constraints against penetration in Natura’s lament over her torn garments of modesty have been turned into sanctions in language that legitimates the exploitation and “rape” of nature for human good.127

123

Ibid., 168. “The Masculine Birth of Time,” ed. and trans. Benjamin Farrington, in The Philosophy of Francis Bacon (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1964), 62; “The Great Instauration,” Works, vol. IV, 20; “De Dignitate,” in Works, vol. IV, 287, 294; Merchant, The Death of Nature, 169. 125 Merchant, The Death of Nature, 169. 126 Bacon, “The Great Instauration,” in Works, vol. IV, 29. Merchant, The Death of Nature, 171. 127 Merchant, The Death of Nature, 171. 124

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Merchant concludes that “the new image of nature as a female to be controlled and dissected through experiment legitimated the exploitation of natural resources” and that “the new mechanical order and its associated values of power and control would mandate the death of nature.”128 The indictment of Bacon on the part of Merchant received enthusiastic endorsement from some other eco-feminists.129 According to Katharine Park, Merchant offers a “pointed and in my view generally accurate analysis of Francis Bacon’s description of the search for natural knowledge in terms of a physically coercive relationship between male inquirer and female nature, expressed in metaphors of marital discipline, inquisition and rape.”130 On the other hand, the indictment of Bacon on the part of Merchant for having inspired the exploitation and degradation of the natural world at the dawn of Modernity has received several effective rebuttals from historians of science and others.131 We shall offer a rapid survey of the main criticisms advanced by them in order to make explicit how it is difficult to trace the conceptual root causes of the contemporary ecological crisis—the larger programme of the present book—to the natural philosophy promoted by Bacon at the dawn of Modernity. First of all, the defenders of Bacon point out how the feminists’ indictment was not based on a detailed and dispassionate analysis of his 128

Ibid., 189, 190. One may also recall in this regard the “Focus” symposium organized by the History of Science Society’s Women’s Caucus on the occasion of 25 years of publication of Carolyn Merchant’s work. The proceedings of the symposium were published in Isis, the journal of the History of Science Society. See Isis 97 (2006), 483-533. See in particular Katharine Park, “Women, Gender, and Utopia, The Death of Nature and the Historiography of Early Modern Science,” Isis 97 (2006), 487-504. 130 Park, “Women, Gender, and Utopia, The Death of Nature and the Historiography of Early Modern Science,” 408. 131 See Noretta Kroetge, “Methodology, Ideology, and Feminist Critiques of Science,” PSA 1980: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 2 (1980), 436-59, at 351-56; Alan Soble, “In Defense of Bacon,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 25 (1995), 192-215; quoted from revised version, “In Defense of Bacon,” in A House Built on Sand: Exposing Postmodern Myths about Science, ed. Noretta Kroetge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 195-215; Peter Pesic, “Wrestling with Proteus: Francis Bacon and the ‘Torture’ of Nature,” Isis 90 (1999), 81-94; Perez Zagorin, Francis Bacon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 121-23; Lothar Schäfer, “Bacon’s Project: Should It be Given up?,” Man and World 26 (1993), 303-17. For an overview see Vickers, “Francis Bacon, Feminist Historiography, and the Domination of Nature,” 118ff. 129

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programme for the reform of natural philosophy, but on a hostile interpretation of a few metaphors. Alan Soble mounts a harsh critique of Merchant and others by comparing the quotations used by them with the original texts. He faults them with having indulged in selective quotation, omitting key elements which defined the author’s original meaning, and thus drawing false conclusions from the passages quoted.132 Brian Vickers points out how most of these examples are taken from a tiny section of his extensive output stretching over nearly forty years, merely a single chapter of his De augmentis scientiarum of 1623 (Book 2, chapter 2), and is not representative of the entire corpus of Bacon’s writings.133 When it comes to metaphors, the indictment of Bacon on account of his reference to Nature as “she” is highly problematic. As Vickers notes, “he could hardly have done otherwise, since in Latin natura is a feminine noun, a gender it retains in modern European languages, both Romance and Germanic ... there is no necessary correlation between grammatical gender and sex.”134 It is not a convincing argument on the identification of woman with nature to indict Bacon’s natural philosophy to have indulged in the torture and rape of the natural world. Noretta Kroetge rejoins, “although Nature is always feminine, so were all institutions, such as the Church, the State, etc. Were these also to be dominated, exploited and raped?”135 Secondly, coming to singular metaphors and terms, Merchant’s indictment of Bacon on the supposed analogy between the “inquisition” of nature and the “torture chamber” is difficult to sustain.136 With regard to the torture of nature, Merchant quotes from a translation of the Novum Organum that renders the English phrase “the vexations of art” in French as “la torture des arts [mécaniques]”.137 However, as Peter Pesic has demonstrated, in the Latin text Bacon carefully used the much milder term “vexatio” rather than “tortura”.138 The term vexatio might be translated as frustration or provocation, a state in no way comparable to torture. Merchant ignores Pesic’s careful demonstration that “vexation” is a relatively mild word.139 In a similar way, Merchant’s insistence that the 132

Soble, “In Defense of Bacon,” 199-201, 203-6. Vickers, “Francis Bacon, Feminist Historiography, and the Domination of Nature,” 122. 134 Ibid. 135 Kroetge, “Methodology, Ideology, and Feminist Critiques of Science,” 353-54. 136 Merchant, The Death of Nature, 169. 137 Merchant, “The Scientific Revolution and the Death of Nature,” 529. 138 See Pesic, “Wrestling with Proteus,” 88-90. 139 Vickers, “Francis Bacon, Feminist Historiography, and the Domination of Nature,” 132. 133

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verb “straiten” used by Bacon meant “to tighten a knot, cord, or bonds”, and her attempt to make a link with the “torture chamber” that she presumes behind such metaphors is hard to sustain. The word in seventeenth century lexicons also had less violent connotations such as to restrain, contract, confine in or force into a narrow space, etc. Merchant’s interpretation of Bacon’s use of the myth of Proteus in this context is misleading. As Vickers points out “Bacon uses the fable to describe the persistence needed in natural philosophy to follow through an experimental inquiry until a phenomenon in nature is fully understood,” and not as “an analogy to the torture chamber.”140 In light of the above considerations, Merchant’s claim that Bacon’s new scientific method “treats nature as a female to be tortured through mechanical inventions, (and) strongly suggests the interrogations of the witch trials and the mechanical devices used to torture witches”141 is hard to sustain. While Merchant herself admits that “Bacon did not advocate the practice of torture or use of the rack on human beings,” she falls back on his metaphors, since “He nevertheless used imagery drawn from torture in his writings …”142 However, to indict Bacon merely on the basis of metaphors, ignoring their contextual functions and heuristic or persuasive purposes, is not a convincing argument. The same difficulty also surfaces with regard to Merchant’s critique of the sexual imagery of metaphors like “entering and penetrating” found in Bacon’s writings. It is a harmless metaphor in itself in the context of scientific research as expressed in Bacon’s Novum Organum. We may quote the relevant passage here: The discoveries which have hitherto been made in the sciences are such as lie close to vulgar notions, scarcely beneath the surface. In order to penetrate into the inner and further recesses of nature, it is necessary that both notions and axioms be derived from things by a more sure and guarded way; and that a method of intellectual operation be introduced altogether better and more certain.143

As Vickers rightly points out, “it is only by giving the words ‘entering and penetrating’ an obviously sexual and anatomical cast that Merchant can drag Bacon into guilt by association with whatever disgusting practices were used by the persecutors of so-called witches.” In fact, “the

140

Ibid., 133. Merchant, The Death of Nature, 168. 142 Merchant, “The Scientific Revolution and the Death of Nature,” 523-24. 143 Francis Bacon, The Works of Francis Bacon, vol. IV, 49-50. 141

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whole of Merchant’s association of Bacon with witch trials collapses once we realize that it derived from her misinterpreting this metaphor.”144 Thirdly, the greatest difficulty in tracing the conceptual roots of the exploitation of the natural world and distorted human-nature relationship in the natural philosophy of Bacon originates from those texts of the Baconian corpus where the philosopher speaks of nature with great respect and humility. As the eminent historian E.J. Dijksterhuis has pointed out, the first prerequisite of the method for gaining knowledge of nature within Baconian philosophy is a good deal of humility and respect.145 We may recall here what Bacon writes in the Preface to the Instauratio magna: The first prerequisite for this, however, is the humilatio of the intellect: it has to attain to humility and meekness towards nature; it is sheer arrogance to pretend to find the truth in the cells of the human brain; we must allow things to speak for themselves. If ever we are to enter the Kingdom of Man, which is to be founded on natural science, we shall have to satisfy the same condition as that made for entrance into the Kingdom of Heaven: to become like children towards nature, receptive, open to what she has to tell us.146

Bacon constantly insisted that Natura non nisi parendo vincitur, namely, that nature in order to be commanded must be obeyed.147 He visualized the human researcher and experimenter as the servant and interpreter of the natural world rather than its oppressor. He writes: Man, being the servant and interpreter of Nature, can do and understand so much and so much only as he has observed in fact or in thought of the course of Nature.148

Merchant’s allegation that Bacon envisaged nature “stripped of activity and rendered passive”149 is best countered with Bacon’s own words.

144

Vickers, “Francis Bacon, Feminist Historiography, and the Domination of Nature,” 131. 145 See Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture, 398-99. 146 Francis Bacon, Instauratio magna. Praefatio in Francis Bacon, The Works of Francis Bacon, Vol. I, 133, 179. 147 Ibid., 157, 222. 148 Bacon, Novum Organum, Aphorisms Concerning the Interpretation of Nature and the Kingdom of Man. Book I, I. See in this regard also Paolo Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), 18. 149 Carolyn Merchant, “The Scientific Revolution and the Death of Nature,” 514.

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Towards the effecting of works, all that man can do is to put together or put asunder natural bodies. The rest is done by nature working within.150

These and other passages from Bacon’s own writings effectively challenge the indictment of the philosopher on the part of eco-feminists and others who have sought to establish a direct link between his natural philosophy and the domination of nature. While Bacon, with other accoucheurs of Modernity like Descartes, Gassendi, Galileo and Newton, collectively contributed to the parturition of Modernity, his own singular contribution has not been decisive. While he exerted enormous influence in the area of organized scientific research in the years to come, especially in England, Bacon’s contribution to the emergence of modern science and to the creation of the modern Weltbild should not be exaggerated. Here is a passage from E.J. Dijksterhuis, a great historian of science, which appears to be rather drastic but can be of help in putting Bacon’s influence on Modernity in perspective. … if Bacon with all his writings were to be removed from history, not a single scientific concept, not a single scientific result would be lost. His criticism of Aristotle, on the other hand, is not much more than the echo of what had already been heard throughout the sixteenth century, and further loses a good deal of its fundamental value when it is realized how greatly the critic himself was still entangled in peripatetic modes of thinking. Besides, in the form in which he expounded it, his method of scientific research was never really applied either by himself or by anyone else and consequently it never produced any result. The only things left to tip the scales in Bacon’s favour are thus the framing of projects and the exercise of influence.151

Thus while Bacon’s natural philosophy contributed to the naissance of modern science, especially through his innovative ideas on scientific method and organized research, his contribution to modern science as a whole should not be overstated. It would also be impossible, for the same reason, to trace in his natural philosophy the conceptual roots of the exploitation and degradation of the natural world. The leads for directly linking Bacon with the concept of mastery of the natural world in terms of an antagonistic human relationship with it, are scarce, if not ambiguous, to say the least.

150

Bacon, Novum Organum, Aphorisms Concerning the Interpretation of Nature and the Kingdom of Man. Book I, IV. 151 Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture, 397.

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The conceptual roots of the distorted human-nature relationship and of the contemporary ecological crisis which are to be found at the dawn of Modernity, as we have demonstrated previously, could have only been provided by a new and overarching philosophical system. The emergence of the modern Weltbild and modern science required altogether new philosophical foundations. While ancient and medieval natural philosophy was based mostly on the overarching philosophical system of Aristotle, Modernity required a new Aristotle. In the post-Renaissance period there were many who were dissatisfied with the reigning Aristotelian and Scholastic natural philosophy, among them stalwarts like Bacon, Galileo, Gassendi, and others. They shared in common a profound dissatisfaction and deep-seated antagonism towards Aristotelian and Scholastic natural philosophy. But none were able to offer a new and rival philosophical system capable of dethroning and displacing the reigning Aristotelian and Scholastic one. The only philosopher who succeeded in this regard was René Descartes who offered an entirely new and overarching philosophical system which eventually replaced the Scholastic philosophy of the epoch. So we shall now go on to examine the singular contribution of Descartes in the moulding of the modern worldview.

5. The Singular Contribution of Descartes towards the Creation of the Modern Weltbild The parturition of Modernity was a complex process and cannot be attributed to sole factors like the Baconian scientific project, or even the mechanistic science ushered in by Galileo at the dawn of Modernity and championed by Newton. In fact, a mono-causal interpretation of the birth and emergence of the modern worldview is fraught with difficulties. The epochal changes in the human-nature relationship in the wake of Modernity could not have been brought about by single and isolated factors. The modern Weltbild emerged on account of an intertwining of several concomitant factors which ushered in radical changes in humanity’s perception of itself, of the surrounding natural world and the relationship between the two. Such a profound transformation of the entire Weltanschauung—vision of reality—could only have been provided by an overarching philosophical system. Here the role of René Descartes, universally acclaimed as the father of modern philosophy, in the creation of the modern Weltbild and in the human conception of and attitudes towards the natural world, appears unique. Significantly, most of the constitutive elements of the modern worldview in terms of the emergence of the Archimedean modern Subject,

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the understanding of the physical world as reduced to pure extended matter, and above all, a conception of the relationship between humanity and the natural world in categories of a dualistic divide, can all be largely traced back to Cartesian philosophy. It is along these lines that one might argue that the modern Weltbild, which is also largely Cartesian, is the humus of the distorted human-nature relationship with obvious ecological consequences. This is what we shall attempt to do in the coming chapters. We will show how Cartesian philosophy played a significant role in the formation of the modern Weltbild that served as the background of modern science,152 and contributed to the transformation of human attitudes towards nature; attitudes within which some of the principal conceptual roots of the current ecological crisis can be unearthed. Here we shall limit ourselves to expounding our choice of Descartes as representative of Modernity, in preference to Galileo Galilei or Isaac Newton or others who reaped more success than Descartes as far as the practical success of their scientific programmes were concerned.153 So why Descartes, after all? Descartes’ unique contribution towards the creation of the modern worldview lies in having provided its underlying philosophical foundations. As Gary Steiner notes, while “Bacon had anticipated the prospect of employing scientific knowledge to conquer nature, it was Descartes who managed “to develop the systematic conception of physical laws” which “will grant human beings the systematic control over nature that for Bacon had to remain a vague dream.”154 Descartes appears to have been the initiator of the modern idea of the laws of nature.155 In fact, Descartes is to 152

It is important to recall here that the separation of philosophy and science has been a later modern development. A distinction between the two would have been anachronistic for Descartes. See Daniel Garber, Descartes Embodied: Reading Cartesian Philosophy through Cartesian Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 9-10. During the 16th and 17th centuries, as it was earlier in the ancient and Middle Ages, natural philosophy covered much of what comes to be termed today as science. 153 Daniel Garber points out how Descartes was not the only thinker of the period to adhere to the mechanistic philosophy. There was a host of others like Galileo, Mersenne, Gassendi, Hobbes, Roberval, and Beeckman, then later Boyle, Locke, and many others. See Garber, Descartes Embodied, 2. 154 Gary Steiner, “The Epistemic Status of Medicine in Descartes,” International Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2011), 61. For a very good evaluation of the Baconian heritage in Descartes, see Elodie Cassan (ed.), Bacon et Descartes. Genèses de la modernité philosophique (Lyon: ENS éditions, 2014). 155 See in this regard Eric Watkins (ed.), The Divine Order, the Human Order, and the Order of Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

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be credited with having provided the philosophical underpinnings of modern science, not so much in having traced the exact physical contours of the natural world as with Galileo or Newton, but in having provided the overall philosophical background for the same. The originality of Descartes consists precisely in having provided new philosophical foundations for the mechanistic Weltbild of Modernity, the bedrock of modern science. As John Cottingham admonishes, “Descartes should be thought of not so much as being one of the inaugurators of a ‘scientific revolution’, but as having helped to establish the foundations for the very enterprise that was later to become known as ‘science’.”156 Descartes is to be seen as having supplied ideological underpinnings for the activities of modern scientists,157 in terms of both the epistemological understanding of the physical world and the ontological conception of the physical world as res extensa, namely, as inert and pliable matter. The contribution of Cartesian ontology and theory of knowledge in this regard is pivotal. Cottingham writes: Descartes is still rightly called the father of modern philosophy, not in the sense that our present-day belief systems lamely follow the Cartesian model, but in the richer and more interesting sense that, without Descartes’ philosophy, the very shape of the problems with which we still wrestle, about knowledge and science, subjectivity and reality, matter and consciousness, would have been profoundly different.158

Descartes represents not just modern philosophy but modern world and culture. Peter A. Schouls affirms: “In a sense, Descartes is the father not just of modern philosophy but, in important respects, of modern culture— of modern Western culture and later, through export of its ideas, of much of modern world and culture.”159 Descartes provided a world-picture, a Weltbild, an over-arching philosophical system which rivalled the Aristotelian and Scholastic ones and eventually displaced them. We may quote Dijksterhuis in this regard: 156 John Cottingham, Descartes (Oxford- Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1986), 3. On the “scientific” character of the foundational project of Descartes see also Joseph Almog, Cogito? Descartes and Thinking the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 13. 157 Mark Glouberman, “Certainty, the cogito, and Cartesian Dualism,” Studia Leibnitiana 22 (1990), 124. 158 John Cottingham (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 2-3. 159 Peter A. Schouls, Descartes and the Possibility of Science (Ithaca – London: Cornell University Press, 2000), 3.

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Cartesian physics primarily derives its importance for the historical development of science from the fact that here, for the first time since the assault on the Aristotelian system had begun, a system for the interpretation of nature was presented which equalled that of Aristotle in universality. Compared with Descartes, Galileo, who had confined himself to a searching investigation of a small number of special fundamental phenomena and had rejected and evaded as premature any questions about their inner nature, had worked in a fragmentary way (which Descartes accordingly charged to him as a defect). But the self-confident mathematical philosopher … considered himself capable … of constructing a worldpicture that was fundamentally complete.160

Descartes’ ambition, in fact, was to replace the Aristotelian view of the physical world with his new mechanistic conception of nature. As Desmond M. Clarke notes: “His objective was not a modest one: it was nothing less than constructing a new system of philosophy that would replace the scholastic style of philosophy almost universally taught at colleges and universities in Europe.”161 Daniel Garber rightly insists that Descartes’ philosophy must be seen as part of this larger programme. Descartes’ thought must be understood in the context of the attempt to reject Aristotelian physics, and replace it with a different kind of physics, one grounded in a mechanistic conception of nature. … One must understand Descartes’ philosophy as a part of this larger program to replace the Aristotelian philosophy with a new and better alternative.162

Here Descartes becomes a second Aristotle. Just as the classical natural philosophy was based on the solid foundations of Aristotelian epistemology and metaphysics, Descartes intuited that the new natural philosophy would require equally new philosophical foundations, which he sought to provide in terms of a new theory of knowledge of physical bodies and a new ontological conception of the physical world. Thus Descartes’ role as the philosopher who provided the conceptual foundations for the modern Weltbild is unique. As we shall be arguing in the coming chapters, some of the most important conceptual root causes of the contemporary ecological crisis can be traced precisely to the humus of the modern and largely Cartesian worldview. As Heidegger has masterfully evidenced, Descartes provided a worldview whose primary characteristics are the absolute primacy of the 160

Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture, 408-9. Desmond M. Clarke, “Introduction” in Meditations and Other Metaphysical Writings, trans. Desmond M. Clarke (London: Penguin Books, 2000), xvii. 162 Garber, Descartes Embodied, 1-2. 161

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Archimedean human subject who becomes the canon and measuring rod for every other entity, the ontological reduction of the natural world only to a storehouse of resources which is constantly available (placed in-front Gestell) for manipulation by the dominating self, the levelling of the essence of truth to empirically measurable exactitude, and, above all, the drastic counter-position between the humans and the rest of the natural world.163 In this way, according to Heidegger, the distinctively modern relation to Reality is set in motion by Descartes, wherein—in the age of the world picture—everything is reduced to an object from the part of the subject.164 In the coming chapter, we shall go on to examine in detail how the Cartesian philosophical system provided the conceptual foundations for the Weltbild of Modernity in terms of new epistemological and metaphysical foundations and a new natural philosophy. It is within such a new worldview which offered a radically new understanding of the human subject, of the surrounding natural world and of the relationship between the two, that some of the main philosophical roots of the contemporary ecological crisis can be traced, as we will argue in the successive chapters.

163

See Vittorio Possenti, “Techne: dai greci ai moderni e ritorno,” Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scholastica 81 (1989), 298. We will dwell on individual passages from Heidegger later in the coming chapters. 164 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 126-31. See also Smith, “Heidegger, Technology and Postmodernity,” 373.

CHAPTER III DESCARTES’ UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS THE MODERN WELTBILD

Introduction Our main thesis in this book is that some of the important conceptual roots of the contemporary ecological crisis can be largely traced to the modern Weltbild. In this chapter, we shall present and evaluate Descartes’ unique contribution to the creation of the modern worldview that eventually became the humus of some of the significant philosophical roots of the ecological crisis. Descartes’ contribution to the formation of the modern Weltbild has been unique. Descartes was instrumental, along with other pioneers of Modernity, in the radical metamorphosis of natural philosophy into modern mechanistic science. While Galileo before him and Newton after him reaped greater practical success with regard to mechanistic physics, the contribution of Descartes has been significant in displacing the reigning Aristotelian-Scholastic natural philosophy with a new and grandiose alternative system. The importance of Cartesian physics for the historical development of science lies precisely in the fact that he provided a “system” for the interpretation of nature which rivalled that of Aristotle in universality.1 Descartes thus contributed to creating the very philosophical framework for modern mechanistic science and the modern Weltbild in general. While Galileo, Newton, Gassendi and many others contributed to the emergence of the modern mechanistic science, the uniqueness of Descartes consists in having provided the conceptual bedrock on which the very modern scientific edifice came to be built. Descartes, in fact, helped in the overhauling of the very foundations of philosophy in terms of new epistemological and metaphysical categories, a revolution so sweeping 1

E.J. Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture (Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), 408.

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that it led to the “modern” turn of the entire Western philosophical tradition. So we will examine the extent and the import of the epistemological-metaphysical revolution of Descartes which merited him the appellative of the father of modern philosophy. It is such a revolution which distinguishes Descartes from other pioneers of Modernity who in spite of their remarkable originality and importance, did not arrive at providing radically new conceptual foundations altogether. Descartes alone succeeded in offering totally new epistemological and metaphysical foundations for the modern Weltbid. The epistemological-metaphysical revolution of Descartes consisted first of all, in a new theory of knowledge, whereby knowledge becomes entirely and solely representation from the part of the subject. Further, in the understanding of material objects, Descartes depreciated the role of the senses in the knowledge of the physical world which is known solely in terms of clear and distinct perception offered by reason alone. His insistence on the understanding of the physical world in terms of extension alone ultimately led to the geometrization of the natural world in the sole categories of quantity and movement. At the same time, Descartes also initiated a metaphysical revolution in terms of a radical transformation of the very ens of things. The conception of the knowing subject solely as the res cogitans, the physical world as the sole res extensa, and the ontological dualistic divide between the two res were the pillars of Cartesian metaphysics, the prima philosophia, as he called it. In providing altogether new epistemological and metaphysical foundations, Descartes contributed more than anyone else to the emergence of the modern Weltbild, the bedrock on which modern science eventually came to be erected. It was a worldview that transformed in a totally unprecedented manner humanity’s understanding of itself and its place in the natural world. Such a worldview has been precisely the fertile humus from which some of the principal conceptual roots of the current ecological crisis appear to have originated. We shall now examine in detail Descartes’ original contribution in the moulding of the modern Weltbild along the lines we have succinctly sketched out above.

1. The Metamorphosis of Natural Philosophy into the Modern Mechanistic Science In articulating the contribution of Descartes towards the creation of the modern Weltbild, we shall begin with some considerations on the singular influence of Descartes in the metamorphosis of the traditional natural

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philosophy into the modern mechanistic science. In the standard account of the history of science, it is generally assumed that modern science begins with Galileo and has Newton as its central protagonist, with only marginal contributions to its development from Descartes and others.2 An attentive reading of Descartes’ writings can offer some significant clues regarding the unique contribution of Descartes in the genesis of modern science by bringing about the travailed transition from the AristotelianScholastic natural philosophy to the modern mechanistic science. Natural philosophy not only lies at the core of Descartes’ thought,3 but also undergoes a radical transformation with him, along with other protagonists of Modernity like Bacon, Galileo and others. It is this reformed natural philosophy that became the cradle of the natural sciences, as we know them today.4 It will be rewarding therefore to map out the way trodden by Descartes in shaping modern natural philosophy and contributing thereby to the parturition of scientific enterprise. Descartes was engaged with natural philosophy all his life, a keen interest for which can be traced back to his early formative years. At La Flèche, his Jesuit masters initiated him, among other disciplines, into the body of knowledge regarding nature inherited from medieval times.5 Here he was taught not only scholastic philosophy but also mathematics, which

2

For a critique of this account while arguing for a greater recognition of the decisive role of Descartes in the scientific revolution see Ladislav Kvasz, “The Mathematisation of Nature and Cartesian Physics,” Philosophia Naturalis 40 (2003), 157-82; Roger Ariew, “The Mathematization of Nature in Descartes and the First Cartesians” in The Language of Nature: Reassessing the Mathematization of Natural Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century, eds. Geoffrey Gorham et al, (Minneapolis - London: University of Minnesota Press, 2016) 112–133. On Cartesian thought as helping to lay the foundations of modern science see also Carl Friedrich Freiherr Von Weizsäcker, Descartes und die neuzeitliche Naturwissenschaft (Hambrug: Selbstverlag der Universität Hamburg, 1958). 3 See Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes’ System of Natural Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1. 4 It is curious to note that at the Bodleian Library—Oxford University’s principal research library, natural sciences continued to be placed under the section of natural philosophy for a long time. This is probably an indication of how natural philosophy had been the cradle of natural sciences and of scientific enterprise in general. The entrance to the Library is via the Schools Quadrangle, with the title of “Schola Naturalis Philosophiae” adorning one of the four doorways. 5 Cf. Étienne Gilson, Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien (Paris: J. Vrin, 1930), 143.

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was quite unusual for the times.6 However, the defining moment of Descartes’ career as a natural philosopher was his meeting with Isaac Beeckman in November of 1618 in the town of Breda.7 Descartes, then twenty-two years old, was instantly drawn into the new mechanistic and mathematical physics that Beeckman was trying to develop. The decade or so that followed the meeting with Beeckman turned out to be a very productive one for Descartes, during which he worked out his celebrated method and his geometry as evident in his Rules (1628). His correspondence from 1629 and 1630 bears testimony that already in those years he was engaged in working on the theory of motion, space and body, on optics and light, and sought to offer a mechanical explanation of the physical properties of bodies which he sought to extend also to anatomy. (AT I, 3, 23, 53ff, 71, 106-7, 109, 119-20, 127, 179) The work of this period culminated in The World, of which the first part Treatise on Light deals with physics proper, while the second part Treatise on Man deals with physiology. These works reveal clearly the general mechanistic framework of Descartes’ natural philosophy. Descartes abandoned the publication of The World in 1633, though a sketch of its physics will appear in Part V of the Discourse (1637).

6

Cf. Desmond M. Clarke, “Introduction” in Meditations and Other Metaphysical Writings, tr. Desmond M. Clarke (London: Penguin Books, 2000), xvi. At La Flèche Descartes came under the influence of Christopher Clavius, a renowned professor of mathematics. 7 Thanks to the discovery of the diary of Isaac Beeckman in 1905 [Journal tenu par Isaac Beeckman de 1604 à 1634, ed. C. De Waard, 4 vols., (La Haye, Nijhoff, 1939-1953)] much is known today about Descartes’ friendship with Beeckman whom he called his “awaker” and with whom he maintained a steady correspondence in the years immediately after their meeting. As for the details of Descartes’ relationship with Beeckman, see Gustave Cohen, Écrivains français en Hollande dans la première moitie du XVIIe siècle (Paris : Librairie ancienne Édouard Champion, 1920), 371 ff.; Gilson, Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien, 146-49; Klaas van Berkel, “Descartes’ Debt to Beeckman: Inspiration, Cooperation, Conflict” in Descartes’ Natural Philosophy, eds. Stephen Gaukroger - John Schuster - John Sutton (London – New York: Routledge, 2000), 46-59; Max Jammer, “The Program and Principles of Descartes’ Physics” in Descartes: il Metodo e i Saggi. Atti del convegno per il 350° anniversario della pubblicazione del Discours de la Méthode e degli Essais, eds. G. Belgioioso – G. Cinismo – P. Costabel – G. Papulli (Roma: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1990), 303; Richard Arthur, “Beeckman, Descartes and the Fore of Motion,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 45 (2007), 1-28; Klaas Van Berkel, Isaac Beckmann on Matter and Motion (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013).

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Once the manuscript of the Meditations was ready, Descartes felt that the time was ripe to author a treatise in natural philosophy which would be used as a textbook.8 In a letter to Mersenne on 11th November 1640, Descartes states: “My plan is to write a series of theses which will constitute a complete textbook of my philosophy.” (AT III, 233 / CSMK 156-157) Descartes began working on the Principles in 1641 and wanted to include in it, albeit in a more circumspect form, material from his suppressed treatise, The World. “My World”, he wrote to Constantijn Huygens on 31st January 1642, “would be out already, I think, were it not that I want to teach it to speak Latin first. I shall call it the Summa Philosophiae, to make it more welcome to the scholastics, who are now persecuting it and trying to smother it before its birth.” (AT III, 523 / CSMK, 210) The Principles of Philosophy 9 in its projected complete form, with the four parts of the work carrying the titles of The Principles of Human Knowledge, The Principles of Material Things, The Visible Universe, and The Earth and a further two parts originally planned on plants and animals, and man, which were never completed, presents the mature Cartesian system, a sort of his summa philosophica. The Principles, Descartes’ text book on natural philosophy wherein he synthesises his previous works in physics, testifies to the transition from the Aristotelian-Scholastic natural philosophy to the Cartesian one.10 The originality of Descartes’ natural philosophy comes to the fore when placed against the Aristotelian natural philosophy that had dominated the medieval and the early modern era. Despite the attack mounted against it by the Renaissance, Aristotelian-Scholastic natural philosophy held ground well into the seventeenth century and it was very

8

One needs to note the change in the redactional style from the first-person “I” of the Meditations to the more inclusive “we” / “it” of the Principles which clearly indicates Descartes’ conception of this work as a textbook for wider use. 9 The original Latin edition of the text under the title of Principia Philosophiae was published by Elzevir of Amsterdam in 1644. A French version of the work by the Abbé Claude Picot, a translation with significant divergences from the original and some of which were supposedly authorized by Descartes himself, was published by Le Gras of Paris in 1647. It is the original edition of 1644 which is considered as the authoritative text. On the link between Principles and Descartes’ earlier works, see also Gaukroger, Descartes’ System of Natural Philosophy, 7-27. 10 As Stephen Gaukroger notes, the Principles provides a systematic statement of Descartes’ natural philosophy and is a rewriting of The World on the basis of the metaphysical foundations provided in the Meditations. Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes: An Intellectual Biography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 364.

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much alive throughout Descartes’ life.11 It was this natural philosophy that Descartes studied at La Flèche, and what was still studied in most other schools in Europe in 1650 when Descartes met his death in Sweden.12 So in order to make explicit Descartes’ original contribution in natural philosophy, one needs to contrast the Cartesian natural philosophy with the Aristotelian-Scholastic one. Such a comparison lays bare significant elements of both continuity and rupture which we shall briefly go on to discuss. Descartes shows himself to be in continuity with the AristotelianScholastic tradition at least for two reasons. A first and apparently convincing factor that underlines Descartes’ continuity with the AristotelianScholastic tradition of natural philosophy is his choice of the textbook (summa) genre—a typically Scholastic medium—in order to expose his philosophical theses.13 (cf. AT III, 276 / CSMK, 167; AT III, 233 / CSMK 156-157; AT VII, 577 / CSM II, 389) As Descartes confided to Marine Mersenne in his letter dated 11th November 1640, he had in mind “tout un cours de ma philosophie en forme de theses”. (AT III, 233) Among the scholastic texts that Descartes picked up were the Summa Philosophiae Quadripartita of Eustache de Saint-Paul (1573-1640) and the Summa totius philosophiae of Charles d’Abra de Raconis (1580-1646). (cf. AT III, 232 / CSMK, 156) A second element of continuity with the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition is Descartes’ conception of natural philosophy as that which deals with all phenomena in nature. In the Preface to the French edition of the Principles Descartes claims: “I consider myself to have embarked on an explanation of the whole of philosophy in an orderly way.” (AT IXB, 16 / CSM I, 187) At the end of the third part of the Principles—the section that deals with the visible universe, Descartes states: “I think I have here given 11 See Anthony D. Lariviere, “Cartesian Method and the Aristotelian-Scholastic Method,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (2009), 463. 12 Cf. Daniel Garber, “Descartes’ Physics” in The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 286; William A. Wallace, “Traditional Natural Philosophy” in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, eds. Charles B. Schmitt et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 234-35; E.M. Curley, Descartes against the Skeptics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), 5-6; Charles B. Schmitt, “Towards a Reassessment of Renaissance Aristotelianism,” History of Science 11 (1973), 15993. 13 As Stephen Gaukroger notes: “there was a late Scholastic textbook tradition which offered a comprehensive treatment of philosophy, and the Principia was modelled on these textbooks.” Gaukroger, Descartes’ System of Natural Philosophy, 3.

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a satisfactory explanation of absolutely every phenomenon that we observe in the heavens above us.” (AT VIIIA, 202 / CSM I, 266) Again towards the end of the Principles, Descartes makes an astounding claim to this effect, namely, that “there is no phenomenon of nature which has been overlooked in this treatise.” (AT VIIIA, 323 / CSM II, 285) Such an apparently preposterous claim can be appreciated only if Descartes is placed within the scholastic tradition of natural philosophy. Such a wide range of focus and such a sweep of subject matter recall the panoramic range of topics typically treated in the philosophical manuals of the scholastic tradition.14 However, Cartesian natural philosophy also has important elements of discontinuity with the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition of natural philosophy. These elements in fact, appear to outweigh the apparent similarities cited above. Descartes’ pledge of loyalty to the Aristotelian-scholastic tradition of natural philosophy was in fact, only skin deep. His real intention in following the textbook manual tradition of the Scholastics was not so much to profess an avowal of the natural philosophy of the Schools but rather to ensure that his new brand of natural philosophy came to be taught in the schools and gained him more followers. For this he planned a comprehensive university textbook which would rival and, he hoped, eventually replace the traditional texts based on Aristotle. In this sense, Descartes’ text in natural philosophy, the Principles, camouflaged as it was in the summa vestige, is the Trojan Horse that Descartes introduces into the citadel of the Scholastic natural philosophy, whose new but hidden foundations ultimately destroyed the existing ones.15 Any affinity between his and these traditional texts was limited only to the style and in no way to the content. So while Descartes does aim to engage the Scholastic philosophy, to some extent on its own terms, he does so with a view to reform and transform Scholasticism into the Cartesian natural philosophy.16

14 Alan Gabbey, “The Principia Philosophiae as a Treatise in Natural Philosophy” in Descartes: Principia Philosophiae, eds. Jean-Robert Armogathe – Giulia Belgioioso (Naples: Vivarium, 1996), 517. 15 See in this regard a similar observation that Hiram Caton makes in the context of the Meditations. Cf. Hiram Caton, “Will and Reason in Descartes' Theory of Error,” The Journal of Philosophy 72/4 (1975), 98. 16 Cf. Gaukroger, Descartes’ System of Natural Philosophy, 31. Descartes touted his new natural philosophy as a corrective to the faults of the traditional one. See Lariviere, “Cartesian Method and the Aristotelian-Scholastic Method,” 463, 48184.

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At this point, Descartes’ deep divergences with the AristotelianScholastic tradition come to the fore. Descartes effects in fact, a rupture with the above tradition of natural philosophy by offering a radical critique of it. Such a rupture shows itself in several instances, some of which we shall enumerate below. First of all, there exists a fundamental structural difference between the scholastic manuals and the Cartesian texts. The scholastic manuals were generally divided into four parts, each of which dealt with the four sciences accepted within the scholastic tradition, namely, logic, ethics, physics and metaphysics.17 For example, the scholastic textbooks in natural philosophy like those of Eustachius and d’Abra de Raconis (texts referred to by Descartes himself) and that of Scipion Dupleix, dedicate a book each for every one of the above sciences.18 In stark contrast, Descartes limits himself to just two sciences in the Principles, his most important text in natural philosophy: metaphysics (the subject matter of the first part) and physics (which is the subject matter of the remaining three parts). What Descartes attempts to do here is to radically reform natural philosophy already at the structural level. A second difference has to do with the very order of these sciences within the natural philosophy of the time. While in the scholastic textbooks mentioned above metaphysics is placed at the end after logic, ethics and physics, Descartes effects a radical “renversement” (reversal) of the traditional order. He begins rather with metaphysics and it is only after the metaphysical foundations have been well established that physics is considered. In the Preface to the French edition of the Principles he offers a clear apology for this radical shift. The apology is contained in the celebrated metaphor of philosophy as a tree whose roots are metaphysics and whose trunk is physics. (cf. AT IX B, 14 / CSM II, 186) Descartes’ move in placing metaphysics before physics in natural philosophy is crucially important, as we shall see later. Besides the above differences in the structure and order of subjects treated, a third divergence of Descartes’ texts in natural philosophy with the Scholastic tradition of natural philosophy is to be found in his refusal to fall back at any time on the established authority of his predecessors in order to find support for his conclusions in natural philosophy. Descartes 17

See Laurence W.B. Brockliss, “Rapports de structure et de contenu entre les Principia et les cours de philosophie des collèges” in Descartes: Principia Philosophiae, eds. Jean-Robert Armogathe – Giulia Belgioioso (Naples: Vivarium, 1996), 495. 18 See in this regard the table of comparison presented in Gaukroger, Descartes’ System of Natural Philosophy, 54.

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does not depend on the authority of the ancients, usually Aristotle, or on the sacred scriptures, as in some scholastic manuals.19 Here Descartes clearly strikes new ground and becomes “modern”. Significantly even Gassendi—a contemporary of Descartes with equally staunch antiAristotelian stances in natural philosophy—rejects Aristotle but only to replace the latter with Epicurus in his own version of mechanistic physics. Descartes insists on the fact that the true philosopher is someone who rejects the opinions of his precursors. He was deeply convinced that the natural philosophy that he was developing was novel and differentiated itself from the natural philosophy of the scholastic manuals in vogue at that time, precisely because its conclusions were direct and self-evident and it did not hang on any other established authority. However, the absolute novelty to which Descartes stakes claim for his natural philosophy and his entire philosophical system vis-à-vis the Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy cannot be adequately explained in terms of these divergences alone. Such novelty was ultimately founded on some crucial epistemological and metaphysical moves on Descartes’ part, a fact only insufficiently, and hardly ever, recognized in its ensemble by most Cartesian commentators. The transition that Descartes effected from traditional natural philosophy to the modern mechanistic one was founded on some crucial epistemological and metaphysical moves. These fundamental departures contributed significantly to the redrawing of the map of natural philosophy after Descartes; helped in the birth of modern science, and above all, made possible the modern mechanistic Weltbild to which some of the significant roots of the current ecological crisis can be traced. It is to the epistemological-metaphysical revolution of Descartes that led to the parturition of modern science, and above all, to the formation of the modern Weltbild—the humus of some of the philosophical roots of the contemporary ecological crisis, that we turn our attention now.

2. The Epistemological-Metaphysical Project of Descartes The contribution of Descartes towards moulding the modern Weltbild has been unique in terms of the radical revision of the foundations of Western philosophy through a grandiose and original epistemological and metaphysical project. Descartes sought to offer entirely new foundations 19

Here it needs to be pointed out that when Descartes does refer to Aristotle in the final and fourth part of the Principles (AT IXB, 323 / CSM I, 286) or refers to the authority of the Church in the very last article (AT IXB, 329 / CSM I, 291) it is done for motives other than founding his doctrines on them.

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for philosophy both in terms of the knowing process and the reality (ens) of the known reality. It is therefore necessary to read Descartes from a bifocal epistemological and metaphysical perspective. While Cartesian texts have been read in the past either from a dominantly epistemological or metaphysical perspective,20 a bi-focal epistemological and metaphysical reading of them is important, if we are to grasp the total Cartesian project. In coupling together the epistemological and the metaphysical readings of Cartesian texts, we are faithful to Descartes’ own strategy of arriving at a new ontological conception of physical reality through a revolutionary epistemological theory of knowledge. A certain epistemologicalmetaphysical “circularity” could be said to lie at the very heart of Cartesian thought wherein it is possible to discern a “dialectic” link between the order of knowing (ordo cognoscendi) and that of being (ordo essendi). Descartes appears to have perceived such a dialectical link: “while he follows a metaphysical quest (the ordo essendi), he must proceed according to the evidence available to him (the ordo cognoscendi).”21 Here lies also Descartes’ greatness as an overarching thinker. Descartes realized that just as the Aristotelian-Scholastic worldview was built on its own theories of intellect and ontology, the new worldview that he wanted to inaugurate required similar and equally solid epistemological and metaphysical foundations. It is the epistemological-metaphysical programme that characterises the unique contribution of Descartes towards the birth of modern science. The joint epistemological and metaphysical approach was undertaken by Descartes precisely to serve his larger scientific project of replacing the then reigning Aristotelian-Scholastic physics with the novel one he was proposing. The originality of Descartes with regard to his contemporaries was precisely his genial insight and his insistence on coupling together the 20

Descartes is usually read from a perspective in which either the epistemological or the metaphysical interests dominate, though there are exceptions in this regard. Guarding ourselves against any hasty generalizations, it may be concluded that the epistemological perspective has been predominant in Anglo-American philosophy (due possibly to the influence of the analytical tradition of philosophy), while the Continental, especially the French scholars, tend to emphasize the metaphysical. It becomes clear when one examines, as a confirmatory test, the works on Descartes by two Cartesian scholars—Margaret Dauler Wilson, representing the AngloAmerican philosophical tradition and Jean-Luc Marion, representing the Continental one. The epistemological concerns tend to dominate Wilson’s works while the metaphysical concerns, rather conspicuously, characterise Marion’s output in Cartesian scholarship. 21 Frederick P. Van De Pitte, “Descartes’s Strategy for the Grounding of Physics in the Meditations,” Laval Théologique et Philosophique 53 (1997), 563.

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metaphysical and the epistemological. Descartes realized that he needed nothing less than a combined epistemological and metaphysical approach in order to usher in a new interpretation of the physical world, as part of his overall scientific project.22 It is precisely in having provided the philosophical (epistemological and metaphysical) foundational basis of the modern scientific worldview that Descartes differentiates himself from the other stalwarts of Modernity. It is true that prior to Descartes, Francis Bacon had anticipated the dream of modern science for the conquest of nature and for the amelioration of human life through the knowledge of the functioning of the physical world in terms of collective scientific enterprises.23 Galileo Galilei, who had championed the experimental method, certainly excelled Descartes in applying mathematical laws to physics, having postulated mathematics as the code to read the Book of Nature. However, it was Descartes alone who intuited that worldviews are changed through the revision of fundamental epistemological and metaphysical categories that precede physical 22 Attention to the underlying scientific project of Descartes which conditioned his philosophy has been mounting in recent Cartesian scholarship. See Stephen Gaukroger (ed.), Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980); Géraud Tournadre, L’orientation de la science cartésienne (Paris: J. Vrin, 1982); Desmond M. Clarke, Descartes’ Philosophy of Science (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982); Daniel Garber, Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Daniel Garber, Descartes Embodied: Reading Cartesian Philosophy through Cartesian Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Peter Schouls, Descartes and the Possibility of Science (Ithaca – London: Cornell University Press, 2000); Stephen Gaukroger – John Schuster – John Sutton (eds.), Descartes’ Natural Philosophy (London – New York: Routledge, 2000); William R. Shea, “La pensée scientifique de Descartes” in Letture Cartesiane, ed. Mariafranca Spallanzani (Bologna: CLUEB, 2003), 47-69; Ferdinand Alquié, Leçons sur Descartes: Science et métaphysique chez Descartes (Paris: La Table Ronde - La Petite Vermillon, 2005); Tom Sorell, “Scientia and the Sciences in Descartes” in Scientia in Early Modern Philosophy: Seventeenth Century Thinkers on Demonstrative Knowledge from Frist Principles, eds. Tom Sorell – G.A.J. Rogers – Jill Kraye (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), 71-82 ; Carlo Borghero, Les Cartésiens face à Newwon: Philosophie, science et religion dans la première moitié du XVIIIe siècle (Brepols: Turnhout, 2011); Adrian W. Moore, The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics: Making Sense of Things (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), especially chapter 1, “Descartes: Metaphysics in the Service of Science”, 25-43. 23 See, for example, Bacon’s plan for the “House of Solomon” to promote collective scientific enterprises which we have already discussed in the previous chapter.

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concepts and laws.24 Descartes realized, anticipating Newton to an extent, that “the method of science must be based on an ontological rather than on a merely phenomenal reduction, and on this ontological level, it must lead to a universal description of the laws of nature.”25 The scientific edifice, Descartes realized, needs to be erected on solid metaphysical foundations. In fact, Descartes chided Galileo for lacking a philosophy to base his science on, and in thus having “built without foundation.” We quote him directly: But it seems to me that he [Galileo] is greatly deficient in that he digresses continually and that he does not stop to explain fully any subject; this shows that he has not examined any in orderly fashion, and that he has sought for the reasons of some particular effects without having considered the first causes of nature, and that thus, he has built without foundation. (AT II, 380)26

Commenting on Descartes’ critique of Galileo for lacking ontological foundations to build his scientific enterprise on, Étienne Gilson writes: Galileo incarnated, in Descartes’ eyes, the man who errs in physics because he has no philosophy – meaning someone whose science is inexact because it thought to do without metaphysics … Galileo’s errors in physics have no other origin. In fact, to reproach Galileo, as does Descartes, for having ‘built without foundations,’ or for not knowing what weight is, lacking ‘the true principles of physics,’ is precisely to reproach him for not

24

On the difference between the contributions of Galileo and Descartes to the emergence of modern science see: William R. Shea, “The ‘Rational’ Descartes and the ‘Empirical’ Galileo” in The Reception of the Galilean Science of Motion in Seventeenth-Century Europe, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 239, ed. Carla Rita Palmerino - J.M.M.H. Thijssen (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004), 67-82. On the essential complementarity of Galileo and Descartes with regard to essential points of modern cosmology see Maurice Clavelin, “Galilée, Descartes, et la nouvelle vision du monde,” Galilaeana 9 (2012), 3-28. 25 Kvasz, “The Mathematisation of Nature and Cartesian Physics,” 161. 26 Descartes’ critique of Galileo is found his Letter to Mersenne of October 16th, 1638. The above extract of it is from Adam and Tannery. Unfortunately this letter is not translated in CSMK. I have followed the translation of this passage as found in Roger Ariew, “Descartes as Critic of Galileo’s Scientific Methodology,” Synthese 67 (1986), 81.

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having climbed down to the first definitions of matter by extension and movement which are also the ultimate conclusions of metaphysics.27

Descartes’ ultimate aim, as Jean-Dominique Robert insightfully notes, was to offer the nascent modern science a foundation (“donner à la science moderne naissante un fondement”).28 As John Cottingham points out, Descartes’ aim has not been so much as to propound a theory of the physical universe, as to establish the metaphysical and epistemological foundations for such a theory.29 Some of the main pillars of Modernity in general, and of modern science in particular, rise from these foundations. The mechanistic physics of Newton and other leading figures of Modernity has been possible because the ontological and epistemological foundations for a mechanistic worldview were already laid by Descartes. It is highly significant that Descartes was regarded already by his contemporaries as overturning the foundations of traditional philosophy and as inaugurating a new one. One may recall here the condemnation of the “new” philosophy in 1642 by the Senate of the University of Utrecht, where the lectures of Descartes’ disciple Henricus Regius had aroused the hostility of the authorities, especially of Gisbertus Voëtius, Descartes’ implacable adversary. The senate’s decree, quoted by Descartes himself in his letter to Father Pierre Dinet, ends as follows: “The professors reject this new philosophy … it is opposed to the traditional philosophy which universities throughout the world have hitherto taught on the best advice, and it undermines its foundations.” (AT VII, 592 / CSM II, 393)30 If the Principles of Philosophy evidences the transition from the Aristotelian-Scholastic natural philosophy to the Cartesian one, it is in the Meditations on First Philosophy31 that Descartes lays the epistemological 27

Gilson, Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien, 176-77. 28 Jean-Dominique Robert, “Descartes, créateur d’un nouveau style métaphysique: Rèflexions sur l’introduction du primat de la subjectivité en philosophie première,” Revue philosophique de Louvain 60 (1962), 369. See also note 2 where Robert enlists the support of eminent Cartesian scholars like M. Gouhier, L. Lévy-Bruhl and M. E. Gilson to argue that Descartes was a sage who constructed a metaphysis to offer foundation for the new science. Ibid., 370. 29 John Cottingham, Descartes (Oxford – Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1986), 81. 30 The italics are mine. The Letter to Father Dinet was printed at the end of the Seventh Set of Objections and Replies in the second (1642) edition of the Meditations. 31 The first edition of the Meditationes de prima philosophia was printed in Paris by the publication house of Michel Soly, with the ‘achevé d’imprimere’ dated 28th August 1641. A second edition of the Meditationes de prima philosophia was

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and metaphysical foundations of his entire philosophical system. The Meditations thus offers also the foundations for the modern mechanistic Weltbild. The Meditations contain, as per Descartes’ own (oft quoted) declaration in the letter to Mersenne, dated 28th January 1641, “all the foundations of my physics.” (AT III, 298 / CSMK, 173) So in order to unearth the epistemological-metaphysical project of Descartes and the foundational philosophical pillars of the modern Weltbild, we shall undertake a quick reading of the Meditations, commonly recognised as the masterpiece of the Cartesian corpus.32 Our epistemological and metaphysical readings of the text will seek to outline the Cartesian theory of knowledge and vision of reality respectively. The epistemological reading of the Meditations will trace the Cartesian route to certain knowledge, beginning with radical doubt and culminating in the discovery of the cogito, the first principle of certainty. This in turn makes possible a reconstruction of the physical world, from the dominating perspective of the subject, conceived in terms of geometrical properties and reduced to these alone. The parallel metaphysical reading of the text will highlight the originality of Cartesian ontology as prima philosophia, namely, in providing the metaphysical foundations of knowledge, and inversely the epistemic route to being. At brought out in Amsterdam by the editor-typographer Ludwick Elzevier in 1642. It is this second edition that is commonly recognised among scholars as the basic text of reference of the Meditations. This is the edition followed in the authoritative compilation of Descartes’ works by Charles Adam – Paul Tannery, Œuvres de Descartes (Paris: Cerf, 1897-1913). 32 Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (London: Penguin Books, 1978), 19. John Cottingham refers to the Meditations as “Descartes’ most celebrated philosophical work”. See CSM II, 1 and “Introduction” in The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1. Jean-Luc Marion and Jean-Marie Beyssade qualify the Meditations as the “maître livre qui domine la métaphysique moderne”. Jean-Luc Marion – Jean-Marie Beyssade (eds.), Descartes. Objecter et répondre. Actes du colloque « Objecter et répondre » organisé par le Centre d’études Cartésiennes à la Sorbonne et l’Ecole normale supérieure du 3 au 6 octobre 1992, à l’occasion du 350e anniversaire de la seconde édition des Meditationes (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1994), ix. Some of the stalwarts of modern western philosophical tradition have directly engaged with the Meditations, a work that Heidegger calls the fundamental text of modern philosophy. Kant turns to it in The Critique of Pure Reason; Hegel makes extensive use of it in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy and Husserl uses it both in The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Philosophy and evidently in the Cartesian Meditations. See in this regard Bernard Charles Flynn, “Descartes and the Ontology of Subjectivity,” Man and World 16 (1983), 4.

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the heart of Cartesian metaphysics lies a radical dualism between the two heterogeneous and diametrically opposed substances of res cogitans and res extensa, based on their respective essences of thought and extension. Such a substantial dualism, it may be argued, has contributed to the dichotomy between humans and the physical world with its attendant ecological consequences.

3. Descartes’ New Epistemological Foundations According to the Oxford philosopher Anthony Kenny, “the area of philosophy that underwent the most significant development in the early modern period was the philosophy of mind. It was due above all to the work of Descartes.”33 Descartes marks the beginning of modern thought precisely in having placed knowledge at the centre of philosophical concerns. Here Descartes’ revolution was ground breaking. “The main current of speculative inquiry from Descartes onward has been permeated by the conviction that investigation into the nature and possibility of knowledge forms a necessary preliminary to the successful attack upon other ultimate issues.”34 In fact, as Peter Markie observes, Descartes went on to define the central problem of epistemology for the next 300 years.35 The epistemological revolution of Descartes was itself part of a larger revolution regarding the conception of the knower in relation to the surrounding world. “The central place of epistemology in modern philosophy is no accident; it is a most natural corollary of something still more pervasive and significant, a conception of man himself, and especially of his relation to the world around him.”36 It is important to take note also of the close relation between Cartesian epistemology and Descartes’ overall scientific programme. Descartes thought of his epistemological project as a necessary preliminary to scientific investigation.37 One of the chief aims of the Meditations was to eliminate the common sense prejudices about the world, based on excessive dependence on the senses—which characterises the Aristotelian33

Anthony Kenny, The Rise of Modern Philosophy: A New History of Western Philosophy, vol. 3 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 212. 34 Edwin Arthur Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1932), 1-2. 35 See Peter Markie, “The Cogito and Its Importance” in The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 141. 36 Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science, 2. 37 Garber, Descartes Embodied, 223-24.

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Scholastic natural philosophy, according to Descartes—and replace them with a true picture of the way the world really is. The Meditations can thus be read as an epistemological preparation for science, a prelude to a larger scientific program. Descartes’ aim was not just the refutation of scepticism, but rather the provision of new “epistemological” foundations in view of a larger programme of offering scientific foundations, thereby ushering in a new conception of the physical world. Daniel Garber sums up well the Cartesian project in the Meditations: The Meditations are intended to give the epistemological foundations of the new science as much as its metaphysical foundations; the account of knowledge, of clear and distinct perception, imagination, and sensation that forms the backbone of the Meditations is, I claim, intended to undermine the epistemology that underlies Aristotelian physics, and lead directly to its replacement by a Cartesian conception of the way the world is.38

Descartes’ project to usher in a new vision of reality (worldview) is profoundly radical as it is anchored on a fundamental epistemological revision about the nature, sources and validity of human knowledge. The Cartesian epistemological project in the Meditations, which we will attempt to situate accurately within its wider historical context, can be seen as a journey from probable to certain knowledge, realized in the passage from radical doubt to the certainty of the cogito, by means of a new theory of knowledge that awards priority to the intellect over the senses. Such an epistemological journey engenders a purely geometrical understanding of the physical world—a new conception of matter and of the world at the service of the scientific project. We shall begin by examining the context within which rises Descartes’ epistemological project. Descartes’ epistemological project in the Meditations—which may be described as a journey from vraisemblable (probable) to certain knowledge—needs to be understood within the very historical context of intellectual trends that engendered such an enquiry. It is a context woven by several factors of which the three principal ones may be identified as the following: the dominating Aristotelian-Scholastic natural philosophy, a pervasive and lingering belief in occult science and knowledge, and a certain scepticism in academic circles regarding the possibility of

38

Ibid., 223. Italics as in the original. See also Daniel Garber, “Science and Certainty in Descartes” in Descartes: Critical and Interpretative Essays, ed. Michael Hooker (Baltimore – London: John Hopkins University Press, 1978), 114.

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knowledge, all of which made the quest for certain knowledge a difficult task. We shall briefly discuss each of these elements. The Aristotelian-Scholastic intellectual background of Descartes is undeniable and its influence on his philosophy conspicuous.39 Descartes had learned Aristotle as interpreted by the Scholastics already in his school days at La Flèche.40 Descartes, in fact, found himself in a historical niche that served as the transitional pivot from the medieval worldview dominated by the Aristotelian-Scholastic thought to the modern one. As John Cottingham points out, “the transition from the ‘medieval’ to the ‘modern’ world outlook was a lengthy, gradual and exceedingly complex affair; but if there can be said to be one generation that represents the 39

The classical works in this regard remain those of Étienne Gilson, Index scolastico-cartésien (Paris : F. Alcan, 1913); Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien (Paris : J. Vrin, 1930). Henry Gouhier in La Pensée métaphysique de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1978) traces the relation of Descartes to his scholastic predecessors. For some recent contributions on the Scholastic background of Cartesian philosophy see Roger Ariew “Descartes and Scholasticism: The Intellectual Background to Descartes’ Thought” in The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 58-90; Marleen Rozemond, Descartes’s Dualism (Cambridge, MA – London: Harvard University Press, 1998), 38-63; Jorge Secada, Cartesian Metaphysics: The Late Scholastic Origins of Modern Philosophy (Cambridge - New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Anthony D. Lariviere, “Cartesian Method and the Aristotelian-Scholastic Method,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17/3 (2009), 463-86; Andrew Pessin, “Divine Simplicity and Eternal Truths: Descartes and the Scholastics,” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 38 (2010), 69-105. 40 It needs to be remembered that “it was not the Aristotle of the thirteenth or fourteenth-century schools, but the Aristotle of the sixteenth century that students at La Flèche were exposed to.” Garber, Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics, 7. These were mainly the Coimbrian commentaries on Aristotle, Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis, a complete course on Aristotelian philosophy, assembled by the Jesuit Fathers of the College of Coimbra, and published in nine volumes between 1592 and 1607. Cf. Ibid., 6. Descartes came particularly under the influence of Francisco Suárez and other lesser figures as Jean-Luc Marion has pointed out. See in this regard Jean-Luc Marion, Théologie blanche de Descartes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1981). On the influence of Suárez on Descartes see also Ary D. Karofsky, “Suárez’s Influence on Descartes’s Theory of Eternal Truths,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 10 (2001), 241-62; José Pereira, Suárez. Between Scholasticism and Modernity (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2007); Marco Sgarbi (ed.), Francisco Suárez and his Legacy. The Impact of Suárezian Metaphysics and Epistemology on Modern Philosophy (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 2010); Benjamin Hill - Henrik Lagerlund (eds.), The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

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pivotal phase of that transition, it is the generation of Descartes and his contemporaries.”41 Descartes’ critique of Aristotelian-Scholasticism from the epistemological point of view was centred around its total failure, according to Descartes, in “explaining” phenomena.42 The Scholastics are “unaccustomed to distinguishing true reasons from probable” ones, he states in the Discourse (AT VI, 50/ CSM I, 136). Descartes, instead, claims to distinguish himself as one who set as his target the discovery of certain knowledge in the place of a probable one. A second element that constituted the historical context of Descartes was the general intellectual climate, in the wake of the dissatisfaction with the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition, in which knowledge was held to be occult, uncertain, and difficult to attain. In such an ambient, occult practices like magic, witchcraft and alchemy held sway wherein “the search for truth was seen as a laborious attempt to uncover occult powers and forces.”43 The sixteenth century, and to an extent even the seventeenth century, were far from being wholly emancipated from animistic and magical superstitions, and alongside mathematics, medicine, and physics, the pseudo-sciences flourished.44 Ernst Cassirer recalls how Renaissance philosophy of nature never succeeded in removing magic from its path.45 “Magic and astrology not only occupied an accredited position in the hinterland of philosophy during the Renaissance, but also entered from time to time into ‘purely philosophical’ contexts from which they have since been indignantly removed.”46 Renaissance natural philosophy, in spite of its quest for discovery and mastery of nature, was associated with an element of the secretum and an animist-organic view of nature which looked to teleology for the ultimate criterion of explanation and intelligibility.47 41

Cottingham, Descartes, 1. See Desmond M. Clarke, Descartes’ Theory of Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 3ff and especially chapter 1. 43 Cottingham, Descartes, 22. 44 Stanley Victor Keeling, Descartes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 46. “Thus, despite Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo, astronomy is still being applied to deciphering the issues of human destiny from the stars, chemistry to discovering the secret of transmuting metals into gold, while physics and physiography not infrequently lapse into a species of magic.” Ibid., 47. 45 Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy (New York – Evanston: Harper & Row, 1964), 147. 46 Charles B. Schmitt et al (eds.), The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 3. 47 Cf. Alfonso Ingegno, “The New Philosophy of Nature” in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, eds. Charles B. Schmitt et al (Cambridge: 42

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Such an intellectual atmosphere of the occult and mysterious did cast a spell on the intellectual trends of the time, from which even original minds like Bacon were unable to break loose. As Paolo Rossi has noted, Bacon himself, while trying to free the critical mind from the domination of magic, was caught up in its snares, seeing in magic a way to dominate nature.48 Descartes instead was determined to let natural philosophy free itself from the fetters of magical and animistic conceptions of nature.49 He crossed swords with the tendency to turn the quest for knowledge into a cult of mystery and occultism, and looked for certain knowledge in order to release the full potentiality of the sciences. From the start Descartes was convinced that the sciences need not be weighed down with such occult paraphernalia; true knowledge was open rather than hidden, simple rather than complex, clear and certain rather than murky and full of doubt. ‘The sciences are at present masked’ he wrote in an early notebook, ‘but if the masks were taken off they would be revealed in all their beauty’. (AT X, 215 / CSM I, 3)50

A third constitutive element of Descartes’ historical background was scepticism and its fierce challenge regarding the possibility of certain knowledge. Such a scepticism was, in fact, widespread. “There was a Cambridge University Press, 1988), 244-55. See also R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature (Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), 96. 48 Paolo Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science, tr. Sacha Rabinotich (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), 35. “According to Bacon, magic endeavours to dominate and to improve nature; and for this it should be imitated. Where it needs revising is in its claim to use one man’s inspiration instead of the organised efforts of the human race, and to make science serve individual ends rather than mankind.” Ibid., 32. 49 Descartes seems to have been exposed, though not in a sympathetic way, to the sixteenth-century preoccupation with magic, alchemy, and the occult, already during his formation years at La Flèche. Descartes knew about these ‘curious sciences’ as he refers to them in the Discourse. (cf. AT VI, 5 / CSM I, 113). See Etienne Gilson, René Descartes: Discours de la Méthode (Introduction et notes) (Paris: Vrin, 1970, 1999), 49. See also Gilson’s clarification in footnote 2. “On nommait alors sciences curieuses ce que nous nommons aujourd’hui sciences occultes: astrologie, chiromancie, magie, etc.” In the context of Descartes’ passage from magic to modern science see also Ettore Lojacono, Cartesio: dalla magia alla scienza (Saonara, Padua: Il Prato, 2010). 50 Cottingham, Descartes, 23. For William R. Shea, Descartes responds to this challenge in his Météores wherein natural phenomena are studied, themes traditionally left to natural magic. William R. Shea, “La science de Descartes,” Laval Théologique et Philosophique 53 (1997), 532.

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general recognition during the sixteenth century that the standards of evidence had to be relaxed, since complete assurance could not be found. So many semi- or quasi-sceptical views were presented, even in scholastic text-books, by people whom one would not usually classify as sceptics.”51 It was a general context of scepticism in which Descartes found himself which made any project for the discovery of certain knowledge look unattainable. The challenge of scepticism in Descartes’ days was intense due to the works of authors like Michele de Montaigne and Pierre Charron who studied the treasury of ancient scepticism and employed its arguments in formulating modern scepticism, with its radical interrogatives on the epistemological basis of certitude.52 Descartes had to encounter “the fashionable scepticism of the salons, which, on the precedent of the middle Academy’s scepticism, had insensitively transformed the delicate irony of Socrates into a veto on all certainty.”53 Descartes reacted to the sceptical currents in Renaissance thought, asserting certain knowledge to be possible. He realized that much was at stake here, namely, that he would not be able to carry out his philosophical and scientific project unless “certain” knowledge could be guaranteed. Here again Descartes distinguishes himself from his contemporaries like Mersenne and Gassendi who championed a modified and mitigated scepticism, having opted to contend themselves with limited certainty.54 Descartes instead sought and accepted as valid only certain knowledge. Descartes hailed from such a context of uncertain or probable (vraisemblable) knowledge, to the making of which the factors identified 51 Richard H. Popkin, “The Role of Scepticism in Modern Philosophy Reconsidered,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 31 (1993), 502-3. 52 Cf. Richard H. Popkin, “Theories of Knowledge” in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, eds. Charles B. Schmitt et al (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 679; Richard H. Popkin, “Scepticism and Modernity” in The Rise of Modern Philosophy, ed. Tom Sorell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 15. See also Gianni Paganini, Gianni Paganini, Le débat des Modernes sur le scepticisme: Montagine, Le Vayer, Campanella, Hobbes, Descartes, Bayle (Paris: Vrin, 2008); Jesús Navarro Reyes, “Scepticism, Stoicism and Subjectivity: Reappraising Montaigne’s Influence on Descartes,” Contrastes. Revista interdisciplinaria de filosofía 15 (2010), 243-60. 53 E. Booth, “An Epistemological Variation in Descartes and its Probable NeoStoic Origin,” Angelicum 60/4 (1983), 585. 54 Peter Dear, Mersenne and the Learning of the Schools (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); Lynn Sumida Joy, Gassendi, the Atomist: Advocate of History in an Age of Science (Cambridge – New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

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above significantly contributed. Descartes entered the epistemological arena to fight gallantly for the cause of certain knowledge. The Cartesian quest for certain knowledge is evident in the very first paragraph of the First Meditation. Some years ago I was struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had accepted as true in my childhood, and by the highly doubtful nature of the whole edifice that I had subsequently based on them. I realized that it was necessary, once in the course of my life, to demolish everything completely and start again right from the foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable and likely to last. (AT VII, 17 / CSM II, 12)55

The architectural metaphor of the “foundations” in this passage is a recurring image in Descartes.56 Associated with such a metaphor are the two moments of the demolition of old foundations and laying them anew, both of which form part of a single task that needs to be undertaken once in the course of life, semel in vita. The metaphor of the foundations with its two constitutive moments of deconstruction and reconstruction is an overture that anticipates the entire philosophical drama of the Meditations. We may identify the moment of deconstruction with radical doubt and the moment of reconstruction with the discovery of the cogito and the subsequent epistemological theory that comes to be built on it. We shall now briefly discuss these two stages that Descartes proposes in order to arrive at certain knowledge. Even though certainty is central to Descartes, the path to certainty for him begins with doubt.57 Radical doubt, as the expression of incertitude, “constitutes the veritable point of departure of the Cartesian meditation

55

The italics are mine. See also Recherche de la vérité, AT X, 509 / CSM II, 406-407. See in this regard Benoît Timmermans, “L’analyse cartésienne et la construction de l’ordre des raisons,” Revue philosophique de Louvain 94 (1996), 205. Geneviève Rodis-Lewis makes an interesting remark that the architectural metaphor probably dates back to Descartes’ days at La Flèche which itself was ‘encore en construction’ when he was a student there. Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, Le développement de la pensée de Descartes (Paris: Vrin, 1997), 119. On the house-building metaphor see also Vere Chappell (ed.), Descartes’ Meditations (Lanham – Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), xi-xii. 57 See James Hill, “Res Cogitans as Res Dubitans” in Essays on the Concept of Mind in Early-Modern Philosophy, eds. Petr Glombicek - James Hill (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2010), 29-44. 56

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towards the foundation of philosophy and of knowledge in general.”58 Descartes’ doubting is radical as he intends to demolish the existing foundations of knowledge, by attacking the very principles on which all that he formerly believed is based: “Once the foundations of a building are undermined, anything built on them collapses of its own accord; so I will go straight for the basic principles on which all my former beliefs rested.” (AT VII, 18 / CSM II, 12) In the Meditations, Descartes concretely presents a series of three sceptical doubts. The first is directed at the naïve belief that everything learned via the senses is worthy of belief. “Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true I have acquired either from the senses or through the senses. But from time to time I have found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once.” (AT 18 / CSM II, 12) Descartes therefore concludes that the “appeal to the senses” is not a sufficient foundation for claims to certainty. The second, the famous dream argument, is directed against the somewhat less naïve view that the senses are at least worthy of belief when dealing with middle-sized objects in our immediate vicinity. “A brilliant piece of reasoning! As if I were not a man who sleeps at night … How often, asleep at night, am I convinced of just such familiar events—that I am here in my dressing-gown, sitting by the fire—when in fact I am lying undressed in bed! … I see plainly that there are never any sure signs by which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep.” (AT VII, 19 / CSM II, 13) Even though the reliability of the senses in any given moment may be doubted, Descartes supposes that there are some general truths, not directly dependent on one’s present sensations. “This class appears to include corporeal nature in general, and its extension; the shape of extended things; the quantity, or size and number of these things.” (AT VII, 20 / CSM II, 14) Against them Descartes uses the doubt of the deceiving God argument. The possibility of the meditator going wrong even with respect to the simplest truths of mathematics pushes doubt to its extreme limits. At the end of the First Meditation in the recapitulation of the argument Descartes proposes the hypothesis of the meditator being deceived by a malicious demon. “I will suppose that … some malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning has employed all his energies in order to deceive me.” (AT VII, 22 / CSM II, 15) Here hyperbolical doubt is pushed to its furthest limits.

58

Michel Meyer, “The Problematical Interpretation of the Cogito: Is there a Distinctive Argumentative Structure in the Meditations?,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 50 (1996), 24.

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Descartes concludes the First Meditation in conceding doubt the temporary victory over all previous beliefs based on probable knowledge, admitting that “there is not one of my former beliefs about which a doubt may not properly be raised … So in future I must withhold my assent from these former beliefs just as carefully as I would from obvious falsehoods, if I want to discover any certainty.” (AT VII, 21-22 / CSM II, 14-15) Cartesian doubt, however, does not have a supreme value, and has only a pedagogical role. It has both a negative and a positive role. Its negative role is to weed out prejudices or preconceived opinions (cf. AT VII, 22 / CSM II, 15) in order to lay down a sure foundation for certain knowledge. In the Preface to the Reader of the Meditations, Descartes states regarding the sceptical argument of the First Meditation: “its greatest benefit lies in freeing us from all our preconceived opinions, and providing the easiest route by which the mind may be led away from the senses.” (AT VII, 12 / CSM II, 9) Descartes’ purpose of raising doubts was to eliminate all doubts and arrive at something secure and indubitable. In the Meditations, doubt has also a positive role, namely, that of vindicating reason and the possibility of knowledge. Descartes’ radical doubt is the mirror image of the definitive certainty at which he hopes to arrive. The germ of certainty is already latent in the seeds of doubt sown by Descartes. In this he also marks a radical break with the sceptical tradition. As Henri Gouhier observes, the sceptics doubt to doubt, but Descartes, on the other hand, doubts so as not to doubt any longer.59 Descartes’ quest for the foundation that is immune to doubt leads him to look for the Archimedean foothold, standing on which he can erect the new epistemological edifice. The discovery of the cogito turns out to be this Archimedean point of certainty for Descartes. We will dwell more on the centrality of the cogito for the Cartesian philosophical system, and modern philosophy in general, in the coming chapter. Instead we shall proceed now with the epistemological revolution of Descartes expounding the Cartesian theory of knowledge.

4. Cartesian epistemological revolution and its ecological implications Two fundamental characteristics of the knowing process according to Descartes are the primacy of the intellect and the consequent downgrading of the role of sense perception. These features of Descartes’ theory of knowledge have a significant bearing on the re-structuring of the physical 59

Gouhier, La pensée métaphysique de Descartes, 35.

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world in the Cartesian philosophical system, and also find an echo in the modern scientific perception and treatment of the natural world. A principal feature of Cartesian epistemology is the primacy awarded to the pure intellection over the senses and the imagination in the process of knowing. Such a claim regarding the primacy of the intellect in the knowing process is evident especially in the analogy of the wax in the Meditations where Descartes argues that its true nature is “perceived by the mind alone.” Descartes argues there that sense perception cannot do the job. (AT VII, 30 / CSM II, 20) It is the inspection of the mind alone (solius mentis inspectio) that reveals the nature of the wax. (AT VII, 31) The rejection of imagination also follows close on the heels of the disappointment with the senses. “I can grasp that the wax is capable of countless changes of this kind, yet I am unable to run through this immeasurable number of changes in my imagination, from which it follows that it is not the faculty of imagination that gives me my grasp of the wax as flexible and changeable.” (AT VII, 31 / CSM II, 20-21) It is the mind alone, working apart from the body-connected faculties of sensation and imagination, that allows the meditator to distinguish the wax from its external forms, and consider it as if naked, having removed its clothing (cf. AT VII, 32 / CSM II, 22). The exaltation of the pure intellect over the senses and imagination characterises in a certain way the epistemological revolution of Descartes in the Meditations. Later in the Meditations, in replying to Gassendi’s Objections, Descartes reinforces the point that pure understanding of both bodily and non-bodily things is realized without any bodily image. (AT VII, 387 / CSM II, 265) This is in perfect harmony with what Descartes claims in the Second Meditation with regard to the wax, that it cannot be perceived in strict sense by the senses or by the faculty of imagining, but only by the intellect. (AT VII, 34 / CSM II, 22) On the flip side of the exaltation of the intellect as superior, one can perceive a conscious downplaying of the role of senses in the process of knowing. This could be identified as the second feature of the Cartesian theory of knowledge in the Meditations. The all powerful doubt of the First Meditation seeks to provide a way for the mind to detach itself from the senses, as Descartes himself recognises in the Synopsis. In the First Meditation reasons are provided which give us possible grounds for doubt about all things, especially material things, so long as we have no foundations for the sciences other than those which we have had up till now. Although the usefulness of such extensive doubt is not apparent at first sight, its greatest benefit lies in freeing us from all our

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preconceived opinions, and providing the easiest route by which the mind may be led away from the senses. (AT VII, 12 / CSM II, 9)

The “detachment from the senses” is a radical and indispensable step for Descartes in his strategy of ushering in a new worldview through the development of a truer image of reality, in contrast to Aristotelian Scholasticism. From the first meditation to the sixth one where Descartes will redraw the picture of the physical world as having only mechanistic qualities, there is a steady attempt to dethrone the Aristotelian-Scholastic epistemology which considered sense perception as integral to the process of knowing. Descartes held all sense experience to be to some degree a confused and obscure perception of material things.60 At the beginning of the Third Meditation Descartes lays down as true only whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived by the mind and discredits all knowledge previously attained through the senses. “So I now seem to be able to lay it down as a general rule that whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true. … Yet I previously accepted as wholly certain and evident many things which I afterwards realized were doubtful. What were these? The earth, sky, stars and everything else that I apprehended with the senses.” (AT VII, 35 / CSM II, 24) Descartes’ fundamental claim is that knowledge of the truth about bodies pertains to “mind alone”, and not mind and body in conjunction. (AT VII, 82-83 / CSM II, 57) Only by accepting the view of the senses as thoroughly and systematically “deceptive” does one arrive at a stage to make advances in physics, “by replacing theories cast in terms of the old sensory, qualitative, ‘confused’ ideas of body with explanations formulated entirely in terms of the ‘distinct’, intellectual, Cartesian geometrical ones.”61 We may conclude with a reflection on the risk of reductionism inherent within the epistemological project of Descartes and some of its inherent ecological implications. The Cartesian theory of knowledge did catapult epistemology to the centre stage of philosophical discourse. The posterior philosophical tradition has acknowledged this in awarding him the title of the father of modern thought, in recognition of his permanent revision of Western philosophical outlook—to use Descartes’ own jargon—from the foundations. However, 60

Martha Bolton, “Confused and Obscure Ideas of Sense” in Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 389. 61 Margaret Dauler Wilson, “Descartes on Sense and ‘Resemblance’” in Reason, Will, and Sensation: Studies in Descartes’ Metaphysics, ed. John Cottingham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 213.

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Cartesian epistemology, revolutionary and ground breaking as it had been, seriously suffers from a sort of “epistemological reductionism”. We may synthesize this as a triple reduction—of the knowing process, of the knower and of the known—with articulate implications for the ecological discourse. First of all, the very Cartesian conception of the knowing process (cogitare) itself may be alleged to harbour a certain epistemological reductionism. For Descartes the knowing process comes to be reduced to a purely intellectual act with a marginal role for sense perception. The epistemological reading of the Meditations has laid bare a strong prejudice on the part of Descartes regarding the role of senses in the process of knowing, along with an exaltation of the intellect placed in diametrical opposition to the senses. The very conflict between sensation and intellection is resolved by letting the mind turn away progressively from the material to un-cover its true properties. As John Cottingham remarks, “it remains one of the remarkable paradoxes of Cartesian philosophy that in order to construct a reliable and informative account of the physical world we are urged first to turn away from it.”62 The Fifth Meditation in fact offers a science of nature that is in a sense a priori. The contextindependent concept of knowledge that Descartes proposes in the Meditations, especially when applied to physical bodies, could end up in an abstract vision of nature bereft of all traits of particularity and with little scope for any sort of empathy towards it. As Emily Grosholz remarks, Descartes has “bequeathed to Western philosophy an impoverished paradigm for epistemology, the isolated knower abstracted from the body, nature, and social traditions.”63 In the epistemological reading of the Meditations one may speak of a certain reduction of the knower (cogitans) too. In Descartes the human subject comes to be reduced to the res cogitans, the thinking thing. In the Preface to the Reader, Descartes explicitly states that he intends to reconfirm in the Meditations his position in the Discourse that thought alone belongs to the essence of the human mind. (AT VII, 8 / CSM II, 7) Descartes’ placing of the res cogitans at the centre of the knowing process as superior to the known object also ushered in a subject-centred conception of knowledge and vision of reality, denounced by ecophilosophers for its anthropocentric implications. In this way, it is the Cartesian ego that gives birth to the totally disincarnated and disembodied

62

Cottingham, Descartes, 149. Emily R. Grosholz, Cartesian Method and the Problem of Reduction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 147.

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rational self of Modernity cut off from the physical world, not rooted in it, and living with an illusion of absolute freedom from the material. The third, and probably the most significant from the point of view of the ecological discourse, is the Cartesian reduction of the known (cogitatum)—the physical reality—to mere res extensa. A strong prejudice against material reality runs through the Meditations, and the hardest blow of the Cartesian reductive epistemological programme is dealt to the material world. Within Cartesian thought the physical world, in fact, comes to be reduced to nothing but extended matter as in the famous analysis of the piece of wax in the Second Meditation. Descartes’ claim here is that the physical body is really known only through the grid of extension imposed on it by the mind, denuded totally from all sensible qualities. Descartes’ mental analysis of the piece of wax is a paradigmatic anticipation of the understanding, use and exploitation of nature that the environmental philosophers denounce as characteristic of modern industrial production. The reduction of the physical reality to the quantifiable (extensa) alone spells out major consequences in the human perception and attitude towards the physical world. We will take up these points for detailed discussion in the coming chapters.

5. Descartes’ New Metaphysical Foundations The originality of Descartes, in contrast to other intellectual giants of Modernity like Galileo and Newton, lies precisely in having intuited that metaphysical foundations lie at the heart of worldviews. As Descartes points out in the celebrated analogy in the Preface to the French edition of the Principles, if the whole of philosophy can be considered as a tree, its “roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences.” (AT IXB, 14 / CSM II, 186) Descartes was aware that metaphysics is the ultimate foundation of every philosophy. We may also recall in this regard a very profound observation from Martin Heidegger in Die Zeit des Weltbildes: “Metaphysics grounds an age, in that through a specific interpretation of what is and through a specific comprehension of truth it gives to that age the basis upon which it is essentially formed.”64 Later in the essay, Heidegger exemplifies this statement precisely with regard to the metaphysics of Descartes which according to him inaugurates the modern age. 64

Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, tr. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 115.

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The Cartesian metaphysical vision, along with the epistemological revolution that accompanied it, was greatly instrumental in moulding the modern “world-picture” (Weltbild) and consequently the human perception and treatment of nature. The modern dualistic and mechanistic worldview, to which we attempt to trace the principal root causes of the current ecological crisis, can be articulated only by concomitantly deciphering the underlying Cartesian metaphysical foundations on which it has been erected. As Henri Gouhier observes with regard to Cartesian metaphysics: “A study of his metaphysical thought should be able to trace its way back to the very worldview that this thought tries to translate into metaphysics.”65 In his insistence on providing metaphysical foundations for scientific enterprise Descartes is truly modern and even contemporary. We may recall here Descartes’ denigrating remark about Galileo as someone who constructed a system “without foundations”, that is to say, precisely without metaphysics (cf. AT II, 380). As Stanley Victor Keeling notes: “This is the point of Descartes’ contention that Galileo was misled in his physical conclusions ‘because he had no philosophy’: his science being inadmissible ‘because it supposes it possible to dispense with metaphysics’.”66 It is not an obsolete, scholastic trait of Descartes’ thought to have insisted on such metaphysical foundations as some Cartesian scholars have alleged.67 “On the contrary, this feature makes Descartes modern, as he proceeds in agreement with the practice of many contemporary scientists. The only difference is that Descartes is fully conscious of the metaphysics and explicitly states it, while modern science has a formal metaphysics, which is taken for granted and therefore perceived by nobody.”68 Today, we are increasingly aware that the modern sciences of nature and modern technology are all intimately linked to a precise mode of metaphysics.69 In contemporary philosophy of science, there appears to be a greater recognition of the foundational role of underlying metaphysical paradigms.

65

Gouhier, La pensée métaphysique de Descartes, 330. Keeling, Descartes, xvii, footnote 1. 67 See in this regard, Desmond Clarke, “Descartes’ Philosophy of Science and the Scientific Revolution” in The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 272-73. 68 Kvasz, “The Mathematisation of Nature and Cartesian Physics,” 162. 69 Vittorio Hösle, “Les fondements culturels et historiques de la crise écologique,” Laval théologique et philosophique 63 (2007), 388. See in this regard also Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science, 3; Gerd Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: The Classical Origins Descartes to Kant (Lanham – New York – London: University Press of America, 1988), v. 66

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We may quote here the noted physicist David Bohm who has the following to say about metaphysics as fundamental to scientific enquiry: Metaphysics is fundamental to every branch of science. Metaphysics is … something that pervades every field, that conditions each person’s thinking in varied and subtle ways, of which we are not conscious. Metaphysics is a set of assumptions about the general order and structures of existence.70

Our option to look for the underlying metaphysical presuppositions of Cartesian thought is also in keeping with a major preoccupation expressed in Lynn White’s important observation that “to adequately understand the environmental crisis, we must first dig up and critically evaluate the ideas of nature, human nature, and the proper relationship between people and nature embedded in our inherited worldview.”71 In this regard, we also agree with Charles Taylor’s remark that historical retrieval is important when we want to free ourselves from some “picture”, some forgotten and “unquestionable background assumption” that has become “the organizing principle for a wide range of the practices in which we think and act and deal with the world.”72 The task of disclosing the Cartesian metaphysical worldview and its underlying ontological assumptions becomes crucial then for the objective of the present work, namely, that of tracing the philosophical roots of the contemporary ecological crisis within the modern Weltbild. As we did with regard to tracing the epistemological foundations of the Cartesian system, it is the Meditations, the magnum opus of Descartes, that reveals also the metaphysical foundations of his thought. The Meditations can be considered as the gateway to Cartesian metaphysics. Martial Gueroult rightly claims that “all interpretation of Cartesian metaphysics must rest above all on … the Meditations.”73 70

David Bohm, “Further Remarks on Order” in Towards a Theoretical Biology 2: Sketches, ed. C.H. Waddington (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1969), 41ff. 71 Lynn White Jr., “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis” in Science 155 (1967), 1204. 72 See Charles Taylor, “Philosophy and its History” in Philosophy in History: Essays on the Historiography of Philosophy, eds. Richard Rorty - Jerome B. Schneewind - Quentin Skinner (Cambridge – New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 20-22. 73 Martial Gueroult, Descartes selon l’ordre des raisons (Paris: Aubier, 1953), vol. I, 23. In fact all the classical works on Cartesian metaphysics adopt the Meditations as the basic text. See Ferdinand Alquié, La découverte métaphysique de l’homme chez Descartes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950);

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In order to release the metaphysical potentials of the Cartesian texts, a certain “de-emphasis” of Cartesian epistemology is in order.74 It has been a paradox that “Descartes helped move epistemology to the centre of philosophy even when he himself thought it was only a mere prelude to a new metaphysics.”75 Margaret Wilson concludes her work on Descartes, a study concerned largely with the epistemological themes of Cartesian philosophy, recognising the priority of the metaphysical: “The error would be to suppose that epistemological issues take precedence, in Descartes’ philosophy, over a general metaphysical vision of reality, and commitments to a special conception of what the world is like and how it works.”76 The metaphysical reading of the Meditations in the present chapter is precisely an attempt to trace the Cartesian metaphysical vision of reality that serves both as a background and as a foundation for his overall system. Such a reading, while taking its cue from the epistemological one, seeks to go deeper in order to strike the metaphysical strata of the Cartesian texts. We shall begin with some considerations on the originality of Cartesian metaphysics as prima philosophia and the epochal revolution it signalled regarding the very essence of metaphysics. Cartesian metaphysics is not without its detractors. Blaise Pascal described it as “inutile et incertain”,77 while Jacques Maritain described Descartes as a “métaphysicien infidèle à la métaphysique”.78 It is

Gouhier, La pensée métaphysique de Descartes; Leslie J. Beck, The Metaphysics of Descartes : A Study of the Meditations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965); Wolfgang Röd, Descartes’ Erste Philosophie (Bonn: Bouvier, 1971); Jean-Marie Beyssade, La philosophie première de Descartes: le temps et la cohérence de la métaphysique (Paris: Flammarion, 1979). 74 Such is the claim of Jorge Secada in Cartesian Metaphysics, 3. John Cottingham explicitly mentions in the preface to his work on Descartes his intention of avoiding excessive stress on epistemological problems so as to avoid a possible distortion of Cartesian thought. Cottingham, Descartes, vii. 75 Secada, Cartesian Metaphysics, 48. Secada continues: “Our epistemological ‘Cartesian’ philosophy was not Descartes’ own. For him epistemology was at the service of metaphysics and ontology.” Ibid., 49. 76 Margaret Dauler Wilson, Descartes (London – New York: Routledge, 1978), 221. 77 Blaise Pascal, Œuvres complètes, ed. Louis Lafuma (Paris: Delmas, 1963), § 887/78. For an exhaustive discussion on the above comment of Pascal on Descartes, see Jean-Luc Marion, Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes: Constitution et limites de l’onto-théo-logie dans la pensée cartésienne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1986), 307-24. 78 “Descartes est un métaphysicien infidèle à la métaphysique, et qui se détourne volontairement vers les plaines, vers le vaste pays plat qu’arrose le fleuve

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appropriate to ask whether the Cartesian metaphysical enterprise in the Meditations really belongs to metaphysics.79 In response, it needs to be acknowledged that the metaphysics of the Meditations, however, is not of the traditional stamp. It is to be noted that the very term ‘metaphysics’ is rarely found in the Cartesian texts. One finds it for the first time in the letter to Mersenne of 15th April 1630, where it is not used as a substantive but as an adjective: “I think that I have found how to prove metaphysical truths in a manner which is more evident than the proofs of geometry.” (AT I, 144 / CSMK, 22) The term metaphysics appears just twice in the Discourse, used again as a simple adjective. (AT VI, 31, 38 / CSM I, 126, 130) These are important indications that point to the fact that the metaphysical texture of the Meditations is not of the usual run of the mill type and needs further exploration. The clue does not lie far away. It is revealed in the very title of the text. Descartes did not write Meditationes metaphysicae, but rather Meditationes de prima philosophia. Two letters to Mersenne, both bearing the same date of 11th November 1640, point to Descartes’ explicit intention to privilege the concept of “first philosophy” in the title of the Meditations. I have not put any title on it, but it seems to me that the most suitable would be René Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy because I do not confine my discussion to God and the soul, but deal in general with all the first things to be discovered by philosophizing. (AT III, 235 / CSMK, 157) I am finally sending you my work on metaphysics, which I have not yet put a title to, so that I can make you its godfather and leave the baptism to you. I think, as I wrote to you in my previous letter, that it could be called Meditationes de Prima Philosophia; for in the book I deal not just with God and the soul, but in general with all the first things that can be discovered by philosophizing in an orderly way.” (AT III, 238-239 / CSMK, 158)

The metaphysical originality of the Meditations consists in it being prima philosophia. According to Jean-Luc Marion, here Descartes effects nothing less than a Copernican revolution of the very concept of mathématique; un métaphysicien qui n’aime pas la vérité métaphysique.” Jacques Maritain, Le songe de Descartes (Paris: Éditions R.-A. Corrêa, 1932), 132. 79 For a historical review of this discussion see Vincent Carraud, “Descartes appartiene alla storia della metafisica?” in Descartes metafisico:Interpretazioni del Novecento, eds. Jean-Robert Armogathe – Giulia Belgioioso (Rome: Istituto Enciclopeida Italiana, 1994), 165-77.

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metaphysics: a sort of renversement dans l’essence de la métaphysique—a mutation of the very essence (and not only of the lexicon) of metaphysics and of its historical destiny.80 Descartes carves out in the process a sort of epistemological metaphysics, or rather, “a metaphysics of knowledge.”81 Marion notes that Descartes’ prima philosophia includes a discussion of knowledge foreign to any scholastic conception of the subject, including that of his scholastic contemporaries.82 In Cartesian metaphysics the focal points are not God and the soul, in spite of the claim to the contrary in the subtitle of the work, but the first things that can be known, namely the ego, of its cogitatio and of its indubitable existence. It can therefore be said that what Descartes achieves is not a destruction of metaphysics but rather a renversement and a reorientation of the same. According to Marion, Descartes then does belong “with full rights, to the history of metaphysics, in which he shares, and of which he radically guides the destiny.”83 Marion, in fact, does not hesitate to award Descartes a place of honour in the history of metaphysics, on a par with Aristotle and Kant.84 The originality of Cartesian metaphysics as first philosophy lies precisely in it being “dialectically” linked to epistemology, an argument that serves also to underline and vindicate the bi-focal (epistemological and metaphysical) reading of the Cartesian texts in the present work. Descartes lays the metaphysical foundations of knowledge, and inversely paves the epistemological route to being. In the first philosophy, one arrives at certain ontic primacies, but these are epistemically derived.85 Cartesian metaphysics stands out as first philosophy precisely on account of its “epistemological proctology”, which remains Descartes’ great originality. The Cartesian metaphysics places itself in radical contrast to the traditional priority of the ousia, and grants, in turn, priority to the ens cogitabile, in order to highlight in the process the order of knowledge. In other words, in Cartesian metaphysics, being comes to be

80

Marion, Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes, 3, 14. The expression is of Martin Heidegger. See Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 139. 82 See Jean-Luc Marion, Sur l’ontologie grise de Descartes, 2nd ed. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1981), 64, note 75. See also Garber, Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics, 60. 83 Marion, Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes, 372. See also Jean-Luc Marion, “Le paradigme cartésien de la métaphysique,” Laval Théologique et Philosophique 53 (1997), 787-88; Robert, “Descartes, créateur d’un nouveau style métaphysique,” 385. 84 See Marion, “Le paradigme cartésien de la métaphysique,” 789. 85 Cf. Marion, Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes, 71. 81

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placed under the yoke of knowing, of the cogitatio.86 The most radical difference introduced by Descartes in ontology, is his refusal to consider beings according to their genera entium, that is to say, according to the categories of the ens.87 For Descartes, metaphysics, as prima philosophia, has to begin with the first and primary experience of cogitatio, a primacy that will have a bearing on the question of being. It is monumentally important that Descartes became the first philosopher to have established thought (cogitatio) as the first principle of philosophy. Hegel, in fact, recognises the grandeur of Cartesian metaphysics and describes Descartes as the initiator (Anfänger) of modern philosophy, for having made thought the first principle of philosophy.88 The construction of a metaphysics as first philosophy by awarding primacy to the cogitatio spells three important consequences for Cartesian thought, and subsequently for modern philosophy. The first is the exaltation of the principle of ratio. The Meditations is in fact the “première formulation moderne du principe de raison.”89 In the new Cartesian ontology it is the subject (res cogitans) that defines the object (res extensa), that too in epistemological terms of the ratio. As in the prima philosophia the ontology strictly coincides with the epistemology, the latter taking on itself the task of defining being. Such a process is evident in the analogy of the wax in the Second Meditation, where the cogitatum comes to be defined solely and exclusively in terms of the clear and distinct categories of the mens, that is to say, as extension and as antonymous to the nature of the cogito. The second consequence of the primacy of the cogitatio in the prima philosophia will be the emergence of the ego, the Cartesian subject, 86

Cf. Ibid., 92. Jean-Luc Marion notes that here there is a reduction of ens to understanding alone: “L’ens se réduit donc à une seule de ses acceptions aristotéliciennes : être dans l’entendement. … La vérité ne se situe pas seulement, parmi d’autres sens de l’ens, dans l’entendement; elle résulte de l’entendement, comme seule instance déterminant l’être de l’étant.” Ibid., 84-85. 87 Cf. Marion, Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes, 82; Jean-Luc Marion, “L’ambivalence de la métaphysique cartésienne,” Études philosophiques 4 (1976), 444. 88 See Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, III, 2, I, A, I, in Jubiläum Ausgabe, 19, pp. 331, 335, and 345. Cited by Marion, Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes, 74. See in this regard also John Cottingham, Cartesian Reflections: Essays on Descartes’ Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), especially chapter 3 on Cartesian metaphysics and the emergence of modern philosophy. 89 Stanislas Breton, “Origine et principe de raison,” Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 52 (1974), 45.

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omnipresent and omnipotent in modern philosophy ever since. Here again ontic primacy is ascertained through the epistemic route. “According to the order of knowing, knowledge has an absolute priority, therefore the first being that knowledge knows will be the very being that exercises it, the ego, which thus necessarily precedes the knowledge and existence of God.”90 It needs to be clarified that it is not the ego that claims primacy over God, but the knowledge of the self that precedes the knowledge of God. The primacy of the ego thus ultimately comes from its thought, which thus characterises it. The fruit of the epistemological protology of the cogito in the prima philosophia will be the primacy of the subject, on account of which Descartes becomes the creator of a new metaphysical style.91 The third consequence of the Cartesian conception of metaphysics as first philosophy based on the primacy of the cogitatio is its claim to provide foundations for physical sciences. Jean-Marie Beyssade defines Cartesian metaphysics in this regard: “To establish with the first truths the very possibility of truth, the possibility of true and certain science, this is what Descartes calls metaphysics or first philosophy.”92 With Descartes, metaphysics becomes the science of the spirit, facilitating the preeminence of the science of mens over that of bodies.93 It is a science whose starting point is the subject, a subject that represents the physical reality outside of oneself as object. Accordingly, in Cartesian metaphysics, the physical thing and the world become reduced to a res repraesentata (cf. AT VII, 8 / CSM II, 7), as the physical world is one spelt out by the thinking subject.94 As Heidegger notes, “truth is first defined as the certainty of representing, in the metaphysics of Descartes.”95 Within the Cartesian prima philosophia, the hierarchy of sciences will no longer come to be ordered, as in the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition, according to their being, but in relation to the thinking ego.96 Descartes’ influence on modern metaphysics has been decisive and enduring. To quote Heidegger 90

Marion, “L’ambivalence de la métaphysique cartésienne,” 39. See Robert, “Descartes, créateur d’un nouveau style métaphysique,” 369-70. 92 Beyssade, La philosophie première de Descartes, vi. 93 Cf. Philippe Soual, “Res cogitans et res extensa dans les Méditations. Métaphysique et physique chez Descartes.” Revue de métaphysique et de morale 104 (1999), 231-60. 94 Cf. Daniel Garber, “Foreword” in Jean-Luc Marion, Cartesian Questions: Method and Metaphysics (Chicago – London: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), x. 95 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 127. 96 Cf. Marion, Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes, 98. 40. 91

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again, “the whole of modern metaphysics taken together, Nietzsche included, maintains itself within the interpretation of what is to be and of truth that was prepared by Descartes.”97

6. Some ecological implications of Cartesian metaphysics Each of the three consequences of the new metaphysical foundations of Descartes’ prima philosophia mentioned above has significantly contributed to the radical transformation of the philosophical landscape after Descartes, leading to the emergence of the modern Weltbild along with concrete ecological implications. We shall briefly mention here how the Cartesian prima philosophia offers a radically new understanding of the human self, of the physical world, and of the relationship between the two, all of which have some profound ecological consequences. First of all, the primacy and absolute centrality of the subject (res cogitans)—the Cartesian ego, which defines the object (res extensa) in terms of represented knowledge, eventually paved the way for the emergence of modern anthropocentrism. As Wiryomartono writes … despite its various meanings, modernity as a philosophical concept is inescapably Cartesian from its very foundation: the thinking ego. … Modernity finds its root and foundation of thinking in the Cartesian cogito, ergo sum. With Cartesian philosophy, transcendence is no longer the world as a purposeful totality of beings but, rather, the human mind as well as the consciousness of the thinking subject over everything in terms of objects.98

The modern Cartesian self, as Heidegger says, becomes the canon for every other entity. “Man becomes that being upon which all that is, is grounded as regards the manner of its Being and its truth.”99 Modern anthropocentrism thus begins with Descartes, a philosophical position which ecological thinkers have commonly cited as one of the important conceptual sources of the contemporary ecological crisis. They claim that anthropocentrism has led to the promotion of an attitude of domination, mastery and ruthless exploitation of the natural world. We will explore this question further in the coming chapter. Secondly, the representation of the object from the part of the dominating subject solely and exclusively in terms of extension has huge 97

Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 127. Bagoes Wiryomartono, “Rethinking Modernity and the Question of Future Development” in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 26 (2012), 664-65. 99 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 128. 98

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implications for the understanding of the physical world in Modernity. It is only with Modernity and more particularly with modern mechanistic physics that the natural world gets reduced to res extensa, inert and passive matter bereft of all concreteness and represented solely in geometrical categories. Within such a conception of the natural world, all natural physical entities, including living beings, come to be understood solely in mechanistic terms. For Descartes, all that exists outside the human being is devoid of subjectivity. In this regard, even plants and animals are for Descartes nothing other than simple machines totally devoid of interiority.100 The reductive Cartesian view of physical entities, both animate and inanimate, as sole res extensa has facilitated the wanton exploitation and degradation of the natural world since Modernity. The instrumental rationality of Modernity, as Charles Taylor has pointed out, proposes a reductive view of the natural world in terms of a storehouse of resources for human consumption.101 It is also in this sense that the Modern Weltbild becomes a fertile humus for some of the underlying root causes of the ecological crisis as we shall see in the later chapters. Thirdly, and above all, the Cartesian metaphysical conception of the res cogitans as antonymous to the res extensa and the ontological divide between them has led to human separation from the natural world. It is a metaphysical divide which has ontological foundations. Heidegger writes in Being and Time while offering an analysis of the Cartesian understanding of the world as res extensa: “In Descartes we find the most extreme tendency towards such an ontology of the ‘world’, with, indeed, a counterorientation towards the res-cogitans which does not coincide with Dasein either ontically or ontologically.”102 Cartesian dualism, in fact, wedges a gap between human beings and nature that has proved to be almost unbridgeable, as posterior philosophical tradition bears witness to. As Marjorie Grene affirms, “It is the real distinction and the concomitant double reduction of mind to thought and nature to machinery that have plagued our thinking. … Even God cannot weld together what clear and distinct thought has so sharply split asunder.”103 Such a radical counter position naturally becomes the fertile ground for the alienation of humans from the natural world. According to Hans Jonas, 100

Hösle, “Les fondements culturels et historiques de la crise écologique,” 395. See Charles Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 1991), 5. 102 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. John Macquarrie – Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), 95. 103 Grene, Descartes, 108. 101

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Cartesian separation and dualistic divide between the res cogitans and the res extensa furnishes the metaphysical map for a purely mechanical and quantitative picture of the natural world.104 Vittorio Hösle notes that Cartesian metaphysical dualism is at the heart of the current ravage of nature on the part of human beings.105 “The Cartesian doctrine of nature constitutes a key to understanding the exploitation that is actually done to nature. Considered as res extensa it comes to be radically placed against the res cogitans.”106 J. Baird Callicott too explicitly states that the “cornerstone for the Modern worldview is the divorce, decreed by Descartes himself, between the res extensa and the res cogitans.”107 It is easy to see how the modern Cartesian Weltbild becomes in this way the humus for some of the important roots of the contemporary ecological crisis. The three revolutions brought about by Descartes in the philosophical conception of the human self, of the physical world, and of the relationship between humanity and the natural world constitute the bedrock of the modern Weltbild. As we will see in the coming chapters, the modern Cartesian worldview becomes, precisely along these lines, an important source for some of the main conceptual roots of the contemporary ecological crisis.

7. The Cartesian Modern Weltbild as the Humus for the Philosophical Roots of the Ecological Crisis In our journey so far in this book, we have sought to establish that the roots of the contemporary ecological crisis are ultimately philosophical (chapter one), that these are to be found in Modernity rather than at any other human epoch (chapter two), and more precisely in the modern Cartesian Weltbild (chapter three). In the coming chapters, we will seek to explore in detail how the modern Cartesian mechanistic Weltbild concretely became an important humus for some the prominent conceptual roots of the contemporary ecological crisis. We will see how the absolute centrality of humans in modern anthropocentrism, an exclusively mechanistic 104

Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 72. 105 Hösle, “Les fondements culturels et historiques de la crise écologique,” 395. 106 Vittorio Hösle, Philosphie der ökologischen Krise (München: Beck, 1991), 54. 107 J. Baird Callicott, “Introduction: Compass Points in Environmental Philosophy” in Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999), 16. See in this regard also Vernon Pratt – Jane Howarth – Emily Brady, Environment and Philosophy (London – New York: Routledge, 2000), 9-11.

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conception of the physical world (including both the inanimate and animate beings), and a metaphysical dualism between humanity and the rest of the natural world become a fertile humus for the philosophical roots of the contemporary ecological crisis. We will realize this programme in the coming four chapters. Before embarking on this ambitious programme, a caveat may be in order regarding the methodology we adopt. A common tendency among those who have sought to link Descartes to the ecological crisis is to pick up isolated phrases in the Cartesian corpus and vilify Descartes as the villain of the ecological crisis. An oft quoted phrase of Descartes in this regard is the one culled from Part VI of the Discourse on the Method. “Through this philosophy we could know the power and action of fire, water, air, the stars, the heavens and all the other bodies in our environment … and thus make ourselves, as it were, the lords and masters of nature.”108 (AT VI, 62 / CSM I, 142-143) This passage may be interpreted as programmatic of Cartesian philosophical vision with regard to the mastery of nature,109 but is insufficient, in itself, to link Descartes to the ecological crisis. Moreover, the original context of this passage is one in which Descartes extols the virtues of the practical philosophy he proposes vis-à-vis the speculative philosophy of the Scholastics. Obviously such attempts to link Descartes to the ecological crisis are not destined to reap much reward, as they would not stand up to a serious scrutiny of texts. An examination of the hypothesis of linking Descartes and the present day ecological crisis needs to be done against the background of Descartes’ philosophy as a whole, rather than through the selective use of isolated phrases from his writings.110 This is what we intend to do in the coming chapters. While we will occasionally cite critics of Modernity and proponents of eco-philosophy, 108

Italics added. For a critique of these “five dramatic words” see Brian Easlea, Liberation and the Aims of Science: An Essay on Obstacles to the Building of a Beautiful World (London: Sussex University Press, 1973), 253-58; Rupert Sheldrake, The Rebirth of Nature: The Greening of Science and God (London: Century, 1990), 37-40. See also Richard Kennington, “Descartes and Mastery of Nature” in Organism, Medicine and Metaphysics, ed. Stuart F. Spicker (Dordrecht – Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1978), 201-23; David Pepper, Modern Environmentalism: An Introduction (London – New York: Routledge, 1999), 143-48. 110 One may remember here Descartes’ admonition in the Meditations in the Preface to the Reader: “Those who do not bother to grasp the proper order of my arguments and the connection between them, but merely try to carp at individual sentences, as is the fashion, will not get much benefit from reading this book.” (AT VII, 9-10 / CSM II, 8) 109

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our main focus will be on Cartesian texts themselves. We will attempt to trace the philosophical roots of the ecological crisis in the Cartesian modern Weltbild through a close scrutiny of Cartesian philosophy which in turn calls for an attentive study of some of the basic Cartesian texts. We will discuss in particular the Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes’ philosophical masterpiece which offers the epistemological and metaphysical foundations of his entire philosophical system; the Principles of Philosophy, Descartes’ most comprehensive text in natural philosophy, and the Treatise on Man which presents Descartes’ view of the animate world and his mechanistic physiology. Most of the earlier works of Descartes, including important ones like the Rules for the Direction of the Mind, The World, and the Discourse on the Method come to be either condensed or referred to in the Meditations and in the Principles, while two of the last works of Descartes – Description of the Human Body and The Passions of the Soul—are anticipated to some extent already in the Treatise on Man. We will be referring to these other works of Descartes when deemed necessary and helpful. We will also refer to the voluminous correspondence of Descartes, that runs into almost half of the canonical edition of his works and which is of unique philosophical interest.111 We now enter into the programme of tracing the philosophical roots of the contemporary ecological crisis in the three principal constituents of the Cartesian modern Weltbild: anthropocentrism, the mechanistic view of the natural world and the ontological divide between humanity and the natural world.

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In fact, no philosopher of comparable stature has left such a corpus of letters of such philosophical importance. See Anthony Kenny (tr.), Descartes: Philosophical Letters (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), ix.

CHAPTER IV CARTESIAN EGO, MODERN ANTHROPOCENTRISM, AND THE ECOLOGICAL CRISIS

Introduction In the overall project of tracing the philosophical roots of the contemporary ecological crisis within the humus of the modern Cartesian Weltbild, we will deal in the present chapter with modern anthropocentrism, one of the main pillars of the modern worldview, along with the mechanistic conception of the physical world, and the metaphysical dualism between humanity and the natural world. We will be concerned particularly with the ecological implications of modern anthropocentrism to which the Cartesian “egocentric” philosophy appears to have contributed significantly. One of the striking features of the modern Weltbild is the absolute centrality of the human subject which becomes the norm and measure of every other entity. The turn to the subject happens precisely in Modernity and with Descartes, as Heidegger has rightly pointed out, even though its qualification as the Copernican revolution in modern philosophy will only come to be thematized later by Immanuel Kant. We will therefore examine how the turn to the subject that becomes the Archimedean centre of reality takes place in Modernity, and more accurately with the emergence of the Cartesian ego, the res cogitans. Descartes brought about the subjective turn of modern philosophy through a double epistemological-metaphysical strategy. From the epistemological perspective, Descartes proposes a representational theory of knowledge in which certainty is arrived at in terms of clear and distinct perception from the part of the subject, who represents the physical reality according to its own categories. From the metaphysical perspective, Descartes understands the identity of the self as res cogitans, and defines the human being exclusively in terms of rationality and as diametrically opposed to and superior to the physical world, the res extensa. The primacy and absolute centrality of the subject

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(res cogitans) in modern philosophy was one of the important contributing factors for the emergence of modern anthropocentrism. Modern anthropocentrism is often placed in the dock by ecological thinkers, as having contributed significantly to the current ecological crisis. They allege that the absolute centrality of the modern subject has led to a thoroughly anthropocentric approach in the human perception and treatment of nature. Such an approach has led consequently to the promotion of an attitude of domination, mastery and ruthless exploitation of the natural world. As an alternative to anthropocentrism, some environmental philosophers have proposed biocentrism which, despite its popularity, is equally fraught with difficulties. We will conclude by arguing that in order to overcome the contemporary ecological crisis, we will need to go beyond the exaggerated anthropocentrism of Modernity as well as misplaced versions of biocentrism and opt instead for a relational perspective of the self, as inter-related to and inter-dependent on the natural world. We shall now examine in detail how Cartesian philosophy contributed to modern anthropocentrism and spell out also some of its salient ecological implications.

1. The Cartesian Ego and the Absolute Centrality of the Self in Modernity What characterizes Modernity is the emergence of the Archimedean subject and thereby the pre-eminence of the human self over the rest of reality. The philosophy of subjectivity begins with Modernity,1 which may be rightly termed as the “the era of subjectivity.”2 Probably no other critic of Modernity has contributed more to evidencing the radical shift that occurs in the auto-comprehension of the self in the modern age than Martin Heidegger. According to Heidegger, what happens in Modernity is the adoption of an entirely novel and unique stance towards Reality (Being) on the part of the humans. Heidegger sees the focal point for the beginning of the modern age in the totally unprecedented development of the human being becoming “subject”.3 In 1

Jean-Dominique Robert, “Descartes, créateur d’un nouveau style métaphysique: Réflexions sur l’introduction du primat de la subjectivité en philosophie première,” Revue philosophique de Louvain 60 (1962), 372 (note 4). 2 Joseph P. Fell, “Some Thoughts on the Modern Mind,” Journal of Speculative Philosophy 26/4 (2012), 590. 3 William Lovitt, “Introduction” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, tr. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), xxv-xxvi.

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the footsteps of Heidegger, it would be a fruitful exercise to contrast modern subjectivity with the Greek and medieval understandings of the self. As Heidegger recognises, the phenomenon of the “subject” is not itself entirely new. It was present already among the Greeks. However, for the Greeks, the subject, hypokeimenon, that-which-lies-before, meant the reality that confronted the human being in the power of its presence.4 For the Greeks, Reality was physis (Nature), which constantly opened itself and revealed itself to the humans. The vocation of humans was precisely to remain open to the revelation of Reality and to apprehend it receptively. “That which is, is that which arises and opens itself, which as what presences, comes upon man as the one who presences, i.e., comes upon the one who himself opens himself to what presences in that he apprehends it.”5 In Greek thought, the ground of Reality was outside humans and existed prior to them. For this reason, according to Heidegger, “all subjectivism is impossible in Greek sophism, for here man can never be subiectum.”6 It is so because Greek man is “the one who apprehends that which is, and this is why in the age of the Greeks the world cannot become picture.”7 According to Heidegger, anthropocentrism was impossible in medieval philosophy as well. For medieval thinkers, all that existed was conceived as ens creatum, the conscious creation of a creator-God who is the highest cause, the ground of all grounds. For the medievals, “to be in being means to belong within a specific rank of the order of what has been created” and “never does the Being of that which is consist here in the fact that it is brought before man as the objective, in the fact that it is placed in the realm of man’s knowing and of his having disposal, and that it is in being only in this way.”8 For the medievals or the Greeks it was impossible to have claimed that Reality exists “because man first looks at it.”9 Heidegger writes:

4 Martin Heidegger, “Séminaire tenu au Thor en septembre 1969 par le Professeur Martin Heidegger” (unpublished transcript), cited in Lovitt, “Introduction,” xxvi. 5 Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, tr. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 131. 6 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 147. 7 Ibid., 131. 8 Ibid., 130. 9 Gregory Bruce Smith, “Heidegger, Technology and Postmodernity,” The Social Sciences Journal 28 (1991), 372.

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That which is does not come into being at all through the fact that man first looks upon it, in the sense of a representing that has the character of subjective perception. Rather, man is the one who is looked upon by that which is; he is the one who is—in company with itself—gained toward presencing, by that which opens itself.10

It is only with Modernity that there takes place “man’s arrogation to himself of the role of subject.”11 Only in Modernity does the human being come to assume a dominant “position” from which a world-picture (Weltbild) is created. In fact, the event of world becoming picture from the part of the humans and the event of human being becoming a subject perfectly coincide. Now for the first time is there any such thing as a “position” of man. Man makes depend upon himself the way in which he must take his stand in relation to whatever is as the objective. There begins that way of being human which mans the realm of human capability as a domain given over to measuring and executing, for the purpose of gaining mastery over that which is as a whole. … That the world becomes picture is one and the same event with the event of man’s becoming subiectum in the midst of that which is.12

The distinctly modern relation to Reality or Being was set in motion by Descartes by introducing the primacy of subjectivity.13 “Modernity finds its root and foundation of thinking in the Cartesian cogito, ergo sum.”14 Heidegger takes pains to reveal that the modern Cartesian ego does not coincide with the subiectum of ancient Greek sophists like Protagoras.15 The modern subject could not have emerged before the modern era because prior to it the fundamentum absolutum inconcussum veritatis (self-supported, unshakable foundation of truth, in the sense of certainty) was recognized as coming from outside humans.16 It is only with Descartes at the dawn of Modernity that it is claimed that “if things are to 10

Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 131. Lovitt, “Introduction,” xxviii. 12 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 132. 13 See Robert, “Descartes, créateur d’un nouveau style métaphysique,” 371. For an important study of subjectivity in the thought of René Descartes, see Hiram Caton, The Origin of Subjectivity: An Essay on Descartes (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973). 14 Bagoes Wiryomartono, “Rethinking Modernity and the Question of Future Development,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 26 (2012), 665. 15 See Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 144-45. 16 Ibid., 148. 11

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become present in a reliable fashion, they must first be consciously set in place by man.”17 Descartes offers the source of such reliability, in the cogito, the absolute foundation. “What is this something certain that fashions and gives the foundation? The ego cogito (ergo) sum.”18 In this way Man founds and confirms himself as the authoritative measure for all standards of measure with which whatever can be accounted as certain— i.e., as true, i.e., as in being—is measured off and measured out (reckoned up). Freedom is new as the freedom of the subiectum. In the Meditationes de prima philosophia the freeing of man to the new freedom is brought onto its foundations, the subiectum.19

It is with Descartes that “man has become subiectum,”20 the absolute foundation (fundamentum absolutum) for the representation of reality. Modern anthropocentrism begins with Descartes. It is possible therefore to trace the roots of modern anthropocentrism to the Cartesian conception of the thinking subject as the unique source of value in the world. Wim Zweers links modern anthropocentrism to Cartesian philosophy in very explicit terms. We quote him: In this view, humans stand outside of, opposite to nature, they are essentially different from it and do not, in essence, belong to it. That is the core of mainstream Western philosophy since Descartes, who also gave exemplary expression to this in his distinction between ‘thinking being’ and ‘extended matter’. This opposition of humans and nature—one could also say: this thinking in terms of separation between culture and nature— provides on the one hand the foundation for the aforesaid view of nature and self view of humans, and on the other the justification for humans to treat nature exclusively according to their own wishes. This entire complex can be summarized as anthropocentrism, that is, the perspective in which everything revolves around humans because they are the only beings that have value in themselves, and all the other elements of reality only have value for the benefit of humans.21

Descartes laid the foundations of modern anthropocentrism by introducing the primacy of subjectivity through a complex epistemological17

Smith, “Heidegger, Technology and Postmodernity,” 373. Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 149. 19 Ibid., 151. 20 Ibid., 152. 21 Wim Zweers, Participating with Nature: Outline for an Ecologization of Our World View (Utrecht: International Books, 2000), 60-61. 18

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metaphysical strategy. At the epistemological level, Descartes proposes a representational theory of knowledge in which the cogitans of the ego is presented as the unique element of certainty and from the vantage point of which the rest of reality comes to be apprehended. On the metaphysical front, the very ens of the human self comes to be defined exclusively in terms of rationality as res cogitans which comes to be catapulted to a position of absolute centrality. We shall now evidence, in the light of Cartesian texts, the epistemological and metaphysical moves from the part of Descartes to establish the primacy of subjectivity and pave the way thereby for modern anthropocentrism.

2. The Cogito and the Birth of the Modern Subject Modern anthropocentrism finds its direct roots within the ego-centrism22 of the Cartesian epistemology. The ego-centric starting point is indisputably something original of the Cartesian epistemology. It is from Descartes that modern philosophers learn to begin their reconstruction of knowledge from the vantage point of the subject.23 As William Barrett notes, “a particular model of mind became embedded in Western culture at the very beginning of the Modern Age and has really persisted with us since.”24 As we saw in the previous chapter in our examination of the new epistemological foundations that Descartes offers to modern philosophy, the Cartesian quest was essentially for certain knowledge against uncertain or probable (vraisemblable) knowledge. Descartes was thoroughly dissatisfied with the Aristotelian-Scholasticism of his age which sought,

22

Egocentrism within Cartesian philosophy may be defined as the epistemological position that regards the subject as the absolute centre in the knowing process devaluing the role of the object in the process. Egocentrism is not to be equated with egoism which is concerned with moral choices and acts, though the latter could result from the former. 23 Our critique of the turn to the subject in Descartes and modern thought does not mean a blanket condemnation of this tendency. The emphasis on human subjectivity also has its merits evident in movements like humanism and in thinkers like Kierkegaard. What we contest is the extreme form of subjectcentredness in Modernity, wherein, to cite Martin Heidegger, “the objective, is swallowed up into the immanence of subjectivity.” See Martin Heidegger, “The Word of Nietzsche: ‘God is Dead’” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, tr. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 107. 24 William Barrett, Death of the Soul: from Descartes to the Computer (New York – London: Doubleday, 1986), 20.

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according to him, only to “explain” phenomena,25 and was unable “to distinguish true reasons from probable” ones as he states in the Discourse (AT VI, 50/ CSM I, 136). Descartes was also wary of the general intellectual climate of his time marked by an unbridled enthusiasm for occult knowledge and associated practices like magic, witchcraft and alchemy, as well as widespread scepticism and its fierce challenge regarding the possibility of certain knowledge. Descartes instead sought to establish human knowledge on “certain” foundations. The Cartesian quest for certainty is evident already in the First Meditation where Descartes proposes a series of sceptical doubts with the aim of identifying a solid foundation of certainty that no doubt can ever assail. Descartes’ concern in proposing such doubts is to let emerge the characteristic of “indubitability” as a condition for certainty, a concern already evident in the Discourse. (AT VI, 18 / CSM I, 120) Henri Gouhier remarks how for Descartes the sign of truth is the resistance to doubt.26 It is interesting that Descartes does not award the status of scientia (certain or perfect knowledge) to the atheist geometer’s otherwise certain knowledge, precisely on the ground that not all doors are closed to “dubitability” resulting from his denial of the existence of God.27 (see AT VII, 141 / CSM II, 101) Descartes’ quest for the foundation that is immune to doubt becomes so intense by the end of the doubting process that he will be satisfied with any bit of certainty whatsoever, which can become the Archimedean foothold for him, standing on which he can erect anew the epistemological edifice. He writes: “Archimedes used to demand just one firm and immovable point in order to shift the entire earth; so I too can hope for great things if I manage to find just one thing, however slight, that is certain and unshakeable.” (AT VII, 24 / CSM II, 16) The discovery of the cogito turns out to be this Archimedean point of certainty that Descartes was desperately searching for.28 The tortuous journey towards certainty unexpectedly stumbles upon what has been so very close to the meditator all the while. The very thinking (cogitare ) of 25

See Desmond M. Clarke, Descartes’ Theory of Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), chapter 1. 26 Henri Gouhier, La pensée métaphysique de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1978), 19, 23. 27 Cf. Keith DeRose, “Descartes, Epistemic Principles, Epistemic Circularity, and Scientia,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1992), 228. 28 “The Cogito is the rock on which Descartes’ epistemology is built.” Anthony Kenny, The Rise of Modern Philosophy: A New History of Western Philosophy, vol. 3 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 120.

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the meditator that made doubting possible now paves the way for the first principle of certainty regarding the existence of one’s self. It is the dramatic paradox of the Meditations that the same mental process that pushed the meditator into the bottomless abyss of uncertainty can also lead him to the bedrock of unassailable certainty manifested in the intuition of the cogito. No: if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. (AT VII, 25 / CSM II, 17)

The argument of the cogito is central to Cartesian epistemology and philosophy in general as it appears in all of his major works. In the Meditations, the cogito is presented as a direct intuition, wherein the emphasis is on the cogito as thought. It is presented as a syllogistic argument in the Discourse (Part IV) and in the Principles (Part I, article 7), where the argument is “ego cogito, ergo sum”. In the Meditations, “What guarantees the certainty of ‘I exist’ is, Descartes suggests, a process of thought; the proposition ‘I exist’ is true whenever it is conceived in the mind.”29 Descartes clarifies the same in the Second Replies: “when we become aware that we are thinking things, this is a primary notion which is not derived by means of any syllogism.” (AT VII, 140 / CSM II, 100) To emphasise the intuitive link between thought and existence, John Cottingham insists that the correct English translation of cogito / je pense should employ the continuous present—“I am thinking”—rather than the simple present, “I think”.30 “For what makes me certain of my existence is not some static or timeless fact about me—that I am one who thinks; rather, it is the fact that I am at this moment engaged in thinking. And so long as I continue to be so engaged, my existence is guaranteed.”31 Descartes himself affirms in the Second Meditation: “I am, I exist—that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking.” (AT VII 27 / CSM II, 18) 29

John Cottingham, Descartes (Oxford – Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1986), 35-36. Ibid., 36. 31 Ibid. 30

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The possible influence of Augustine on Descartes regarding the cogito argument had been a matter of discussion ever since it was raised by Antoine Arnauld, the author of the Fourth Objections. Arnold writes: “The first thing that I find remarkable is that our distinguished author has laid down as the basis for his entire philosophy exactly the same principle as that laid down by St Augustine – a man of the sharpest intellect and a remarkable thinker.” (AT VII, 197 / CSM II, 139) Descartes denied any such influence.32 The close parallel between Augustine and Descartes on the insight of cogito continues to stir debate.33 However, it needs to be 32

Descartes confessed that he went to the library of Leiden to read for the first time Augustine’s De Trinitate in the light of the above objection (see Descartes’ Letter to Colvius of 14 November 1640 - AT VIII, 247-48 / CSMK, 159). The composition of the Meditations took place, in fact, prior to such a visit. It also needs to be recalled that the cogito as the first principle of philosophy is a conviction that Descartes carries over already from the Discourse. “And observing that this truth ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’ was so firm and sure that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics were incapable of shaking it, I decided that I could accept it without scruple as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking.” (AT VI, 32 / CSM I, 127) Here is Descartes’ own account of this visit and self-defence: “I am obliged to you for drawing my attention to the passage of St Augustine relevant to my I am thinking, therefore I exist. I went today to the library of this town to read it, and I do indeed find that he does use it to prove the certainty of our existence. He goes on to show that there is a certain likeness of the Trinity in us, in that we exist, we know that we exist, and we love the existence and the knowledge we have. I, on the other hand, use the argument to show that this I which is thinking is an immaterial substance with no bodily element. These are two very different things. In itself it is such a simple and natural thing to infer that one exists from the fact that one is doubting that it could have occurred to any writer. But I am very glad to find myself in agreement with St Augustine, if only to hush the little minds who have tried to find fault with the principle.” (AT III, 247-48 / CSMK, 159) 33 See in this regard Léon Blanchet, Les antecedents historiques du “je pense, donc je suis (Paris: Alcan, 1920); W. Weier, “Die introspektive Bewusstseinswahrnehmung beim hl. Augustinus und bei Descartes,” Franziskanische Studien 50 (1968), 23950; J.A. Mourant, “The Cogitos : Augustinian and Cartesian,” Augustinian Studies 10 (1979), 27-42; Gareth B. Matthews, Thought’s Ego in Augustine and Descartes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); M.-A. Vannier, “Les anticipations du cogito chez s. Augustin,” Revista augustiniana 38 (1997), 115-16, 665-79; Stephen Philip Menn, Descartes and Augustine Dialogue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Robert Crouse, “St. Augustine and Descartes as Fathers of Modernity” in Descartes and the Modern, eds. Neil G. Robertson – Gordon McOuat – Tom C. Vinci (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007), 1627; Jean-Luc Marion, “De Descartes à Augustin: un percours philosophique” (Entretian avec Michaël Foesel et Olivier Mongin), Esprit 7 (2009), 86-103;

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remembered that Descartes’ originality lies in making the cogito the foundation and cornerstone of his entire philosophical system, highlighting its unique identity as an epistemological first principle, whereas Augustine’s context was religious subjectivism. For Descartes, the cogito is the very first principle since one can affirm it before being certain of any other. Epistemologically, i.e., in the ordo cognoscendi, it precedes even the knowledge of God, and of the world. According to Descartes, to arrive at certainty the awareness of one’s thinking alone will suffice. “Ambulo, ergo sum”—to take Descartes’ own example—will not work. “The uncertainty that infects the premise ‘I walk’ would also infect the conclusion ‘I am’. Because thinking is the only activity of which I am certain, ‘cogito’ is the only acceptable premise for the argument.”34 Descartes does make a long list of activities that could come under the umbrella of the cogito. “But what then am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions.” (AT VII, 28 / CSM II, 19) But he is quick to raise a question: “This is a considerable list, if everything on it belongs to me. But does it?” (AT VII, 28 / CSM II, 19) He analyses the activities listed above one by one right up to sensory perceptions to conclude finally that each of them in the restricted sense of the term “is simply thinking.” (cf. AT VII, 28-29 / CSM II, 19) He clarifies it further in the Second Replies: “Thought. I use this term to include everything that is within us in such a way that we are immediately aware of it. Thus all the operations of the will, the intellect, the imagination, and the senses are thoughts.” (AT VII, 160 / CSM II, 113) Here there is in act a subtle “magnification” of thought itself, as the diverse modifications of the cogito get subsumed into just one single category. Anthony Kenny points out that French and Latin usage was never as wide as that found in Descartes, who was consciously extending the use of the words cogitare and penser.35

Marko J. Fuchs, Sum und cogito: Grundfiguren endlichen Selbstseins bei Augustinus und Descartes (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2009); David C. Bellusci, Amor Dei in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Amsterdam – New York: Rodopi B.V., 2013). 34 Kenneth R. Merrill, “Did Descartes Misunderstand the ‘Cogito’?,” Studia Cartesiana 1 (1979), 111. 35 See Anthony Kenny, Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1968), 68-69.

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The radically first-personal nature of the Cartesian project is very illuminating.36 The Cartesian quest for knowledge is a lonely one. The very physical setting of the first meditation is revealing in this regard—the quiet study with the meditator seated alone by the fire! Such a lonely quest for knowledge dates back to the early years of the Cartesian enquiry. Descartes himself narrates in the Discourse the precise moment and circumstance that ignited his quest for knowledge. It was in 1619 when on his way back from the coronation of the emperor he was detained by the severe winter to stay in a stove-heated room, where he was completely free to converse with himself about his own thoughts (cf. AT VI, 11 / CSM I, 116). John Cottingham concludes: “the notion of a solitary search for truth aptly describes the character of much of Descartes’ life; and in a deeper sense … it also signals the character of much of his philosophy.”37 For all its lonely character the cogito is also paradoxically the bridge to the external world! The external world’s existence comes to be asserted and its characteristics described only in relation to the self and one’s knowledge of the self. Only from the knowledge of self can one pass to the knowledge of the world. “The project, then, is to build the entire world from the thinking self. It is important here that it is not just the mind that is the foundation, but my mind.”38 Descartes attempts to construct a system of knowledge, moving “from the inside outwards”.39 Thus within Cartesian epistemology it is from the knowledge of the self that one passes on to the knowledge of external world, as the project is to build the entire world from the part of the thinking self. Descartes thus comes to award the central place to the subject in the new theory of knowledge that he sought to outline. It is the meditator himself who has to seek illumination, as the quest for knowledge is essentially a path of self-discovery. “He will make the thing his own and understand it just as perfectly as if he had discovered it for himself” (AT VII, 155 / CSM II, 110), affirms Descartes in the Reply to the Second Set of Objections. Descartes’ choice of the meditational genre in the Meditations was certainly intentional for the very project of placing the res cogitans at the centre of the epistemic process.40 36

Cf. Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (London: Penguin Books, 1978), 68. 37 Cottingham, Descartes, 19. 38 Ibid., 8. 39 Cf. John Cottingham, “Introduction” in John Cottingham (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 8. 40 See in this regard Joshtrom Isaac Kureethadam, “The ‘Meditational’ Genre of Descartes’ Meditations,” Forum Philosophicum 13 (2008), 51-68.

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Having found the unassailable certainty in the cogito, the same principle of the cogito ergo sum becomes for Descartes the absolute beginning of the knowing process.41 With his starting point of the cogito Descartes initiates the representational theory of knowledge in which reality outside is perceived and known from the vantage point of the subject and in the categories imposed on it by the subject. Descartes proposes a view of the world, as “represented” by the knowing subject. As Heidegger has pointed out “the fundamental event of the modern age” is the representation, “the conquest of the world as picture.”42 In fact, a picture of the world itself is possible only because the human being has emerged as the subject.43 Here Modernity clearly marks a watershed moment in relation to Greek and subsequent Western philosophical tradition. In distinction from Greek apprehending, modern representing, whose meaning the word repraesentatio first brings to its earliest expression, intends something quite different. Here to represent means to bring what is present at hand before oneself as something standing over against, to relate it to oneself, to the one representing it, and to force it back into this relationship to oneself as the normative realm. Wherever this happens, man “gets into the picture” in precedence over whatever is.44

In proposing the representational theory of knowledge, Descartes was radically different also with regard to the Scholastic tradition as noted by Louis Dupré. “The scholastic tradition contains extensive discussions of the species “through” which we know. Yet none of that implied a representational theory of the real.”45 In establishing the cogito as the absolute centre of the knowing process and within a representational theory of knowledge, Descartes awards the res cogitans, the thinking self, a place of absolute centrality never before conceded in the history of philosophy. With the arrival of the Cartesian cogito, “man found his self-certainty within himself.”46 Based on such an unassailable foundation of certainty “Man could represent reality to himself, that is, he could set it up over 41

See Fell, “Some Thoughts on the Modern Mind,” 590. Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 134. 43 See Ibid., 132. 44 Ibid., 131. See also Ibid., 143-47 where Heidegger explains in an appendix why all subjectivism is impossible in Greek philosophy. 45 Louis Dupré, “Alternatives to the Cogito,” Review of Metaphysics 40 (1987), 692. 46 Lovitt, “Introduction,” xxv. 42

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against himself, as it appeared to him, as an object of thought. In so doing, he felt assured at once of his own existence and of the existence of the reality thus conceived.”47 It is important to remember that it is not mere representation in subjective terms – a process which is inevitable to an extent as contemporary theories of hermeneutics have evidenced. Cartesian and modern representation is radical in the sense that it leaves no possibility for things to emerge as they are. … in the modern “Cartesian” scientific age man does not merely impose his own construction upon reality. He does indeed represent reality to himself, refusing to let things emerge as they are. He does forever catch reality up in a conceptual system and find that he must fix it thus before he can see it at all.48

In the modern Cartesian representation, as Heidegger has insightfully pointed out, the subject stands over the real, objectifying and mastering it. Representing is no longer the apprehending of that which presences … but is a lying hold and grasping of. … What presences does not hold sway, but rather assault rules. Representing is making-stand-over against, an objectifying that goes forward and masters.49

The mirror image of the absolute centrality of the Cartesian subject is the thorough objectification of the rest of reality as all physical entities are reduced to the status of mere representations. “Things become “real” or “actual” insofar as they are “objectified” by the cognizing subject.”50 In fact, the idea of truth in Cartesian epistemology is the “adequate representation of reality or world-picture, that is, the world conceived and grasped as a picture.”51 As Heidegger clarifies, “world picture, when understood essentially, does not mean a picture of the world but the world conceived and grasped as picture. What is, in its entirety, is now taken in such a way that it first is in being and only is in being to that extent that it is set up by man, who represents and sets forth.”52

47

Ibid. Ibid., xxviii. 49 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 150. 50 Michael E. Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, and Art (Bloomington – Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), 182. 51 Arran E. Gare, Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis (London – New York: Routledge, 1995), 52. 52 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 129-30. 48

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In representative objectification, the subject stands-over-against all that is real. “Every being, then, is either object or a subject or ‘sub-ject’ of a subject: in either case it is what it is only in reference to the self-conscious subject.”53 It is no more reality which imposes itself on the subject in the act of knowing which is always a subjective-objective process. Within Cartesian epistemology, as Vittorio Possenti points out, the evidence of certainty is no more provided by the fulgor entis seu objecti, but solely by the clear and distinct ideas provided by the mens of the cogitans.54 For Descartes, for something “to be” means for it to be the object of the selfcertain subject. Thus it is from the vantage position of the res cogitans that Descartes conceives the physical world as res extensa, knowable and reduced to the geometrical characteristics of extension alone revealed in pure intellection—as exemplified in Descartes’ analysis of the piece of wax in the Second Meditation. Since for Descartes, the real is only that which can be represented in terms that are as certain as the self-certainty of the subject’s own presence to itself, only extended objects, which can be measured mathematically, can be represented so precisely.55 The subject in representing the physical world reduces the world to a collection of calculable, controllable objects. The birth of modern science is thus closely associated with modern Cartesian representation.56 Heidegger has noted that the Cartesian objectifying representation is precisely the essence of modern science. “Entrapping representation, which secures everything in that objectness which is thus capable of being followed out, is the fundamental characteristic of the representing through which modern science corresponds to the real.”57 The rise of modern science is thus intrinsically linked to the transformation of the substance from hypokeimenon to the modern Cartesian subject.58 Vittorio Hösle notes how “behind the sciences … lies the modern subjectivity.”59 Hösle sees precisely a link between modern subjectivity and the plundering of 53

William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), 325. See also Bernard Charles Flynn, “Descartes and the Ontology of Subjectivity,” Man and World 16 (1983) 14, 19. 54 See Vittorio Possenti, “Techne: dai greci ai moderni e ritorno,” Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scholastica 81 (1989), 300. 55 Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity, 172. 56 See Gare, Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis, 52. 57 Martin Heidegger, “Science and Reflection” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, tr. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 168. 58 Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity, 182. 59 Vittorio Hösle, “Les fondements culturels et historiques de la crise écologique,” Laval théologique et philosophique 63/2 (2007), 405.

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the planet as in the contemporary ecological crisis. Hösle, in fact, corroborates our central thesis regarding the philosophical roots of the ecological crisis within the Cartesian philosophical system when he writes: This subjectivity, which rejects the idea that an absolute can be the foundation of reality (of a reality which includes oneself) and which has transformed all that surrounds oneself into a pure object, has now entered the final stage of its conquest, of which the final consequence will be the destruction of the planet, and along with it its own destruction.60

Descartes completes the project of guaranteeing the absolute centrality of the human self as subject through his metaphysics, by arriving to define the very ens of the self as thought and thought alone. It is to the Cartesian metaphysics of subjectivity that we turn our attention now.

3. The Reduction and Exaltation of the Self as Res Cogitans Descartes’ contribution to modern anthropocentrism through the epistemological path of arriving at the absolute centrality of the res cogitans in the knowing process is complemented by a correlated metaphysical strategy in which the very ens of the human being comes to be defined exclusively in terms of rationality and as diametrically opposed to and superior to the physical world, the res extensa. We shall now examine the metaphysical strategy employed by Descartes to catapult the ego to a position of absolute centrality. Within Cartesian philosophy the subject is catapulted to the centre in two deft moves. First of all, there is the metaphysical reduction of the self (ego) to thought alone, arriving thereby at the definition of the self as res cogitans. Here the reality of the self gets reduced to sole rationality, and rationality itself is further trimmed down to thinking or consciousness alone. For Descartes the human soul is exclusively the rational one (cf. AT III, 371 / CSMK, 182), whose nature is solely to think (AT I, 349-50 / CSMK, 53). Secondly, along with such reduction there is also a simultaneous exaltation of rationality within Cartesian thought—and subsequently within modern philosophy—as that which confers on human beings ontological superiority over the rest of creation, making them the centre of everything. We shall briefly dwell on these two moves from Descartes to establish the primacy of the subject in his metaphysics.

60

Ibid., 405-6.

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First of all, Cartesian metaphysis offers a definition of the human being exclusively in terms of rationality. In the Meditations, Descartes defines thought as the particular and exclusive characteristic that constitutes the self’s essence making it a res cogitans. Already in the Discourse, Descartes had come to the conclusion regarding the essence of the self as thought and its nature as immaterial. “I knew I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is simply to think, and which does not require any place, or depend on any material thing, in order to exist.” (AT VI, 33 / CSM I, 127) Descartes reiterates such a conclusion in the Preface to the Reader of the Meditations: I was aware of nothing at all that I knew belonged to my essence, except that I was a thinking thing, or a thing possessing within itself the faculty of thinking. I shall, however, show below how it follows from the fact that I am aware of nothing else belonging to my essence, that nothing else does in fact belong to it. (AT VII, 8 / CSM II, 7)

In the Second Meditation, after having traversed the excruciating path of doubt, Descartes finally arrives at discovering thought, and thought alone, as the essence of the self. Thinking? At last I have discovered it—thought; this alone is inseparable from me. I am, I exist—that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking. … I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that thinks; that is, I am a mind, or intelligence, or intellect, or reason – words whose meaning I have been ignorant of until now. But for all that I am a thing which is real and which truly exists. But what kind of a thing? As I have just said – a thinking thing. (AT VII, 27 / CSM II, 18)61

The Cartesian self exists as a thinking thing. From the self’s activity of cogitare, Descartes moves on to the definition of the thinking self as res cogitans, as the thinking substance.62 The question of cogitare is ultimately ontological, for what is at stake here is the choice between being and nothingness. It is thought, even though couched as doubt as in the early part of the Meditations, that leads the self to the certainty of the

61

Italics added. As John Cottingham notes “the word ‘only’ is taken as going with a ‘thing that thinks,’ and this interpretation is followed in the French version.” CSM II, 18, footnote 1. 62 See in this regard Pietro Faggiotto, “Nota sul passaggio cartesiano dal cogito alla res cogtians” in Cartesio e il destino della metafisica, ed. Luigi Ferdinando (Padua: Il Poligrafo, 2003), 87-92.

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truth of one’s own existence, saving it from the peril of nihilism.63 Henri Gouhier, for example, observes how the cogito is ultimately an insight against nihilism, for to think one needs to exist.64 The certainty of the Cartesian cogito itself “rests on the absolute correspondence of being and thought” as Bernard Charles Flynn has pointed out. My existence is absolutely certain each time that “I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it.” The cogito is that place where being and thought coincide, a place where to exist and to think that I exist is the same thing. … In the thinking subject there is an identity between the thought that I exist and the fact that I exist.65

In his peculiar conception of the self as res cogitans, Descartes comes to redraw the very figure of the human subject, in terms of thinking or intellection. By cogitatio Descartes means strictly and only pure intellection.66 Other cognitive faculties mentioned in the Second Meditation are in some way linked to senses and imagination, which in turn are connected to the physical states of the body, and therefore cannot be held to be strictly forming part of the res cogitans.67 The mind is an incorporeal substance, precisely on account of the fact that only pure intellection belongs to the essence of the mind, excluding sensation and imagination. Its purely intellectual activity, unlike the other mental states, does not involve mental states tied to states of the body.68 As Margaret Wilson concludes, “Descartes regarded his mind as essentially only intellect, and denied corporeal correlates of purely intellectual acts, capacities and powers. Bodily states are not merely not identical with mental states: they are not even relevant to a subclass of such events.”69 63

Philippe Soual. “Res cogitans et res extensa dans les Méditations. Métaphysique et physique chez Descartes.” Revue de métaphysique et de morale 104 (1999), 236. 64 See Gouhier, La pensée métaphysique de Descartes, 281-85. See also JeanMarie Beyssade, La philosphie première de Descartes: le temps et la cohérence de la métaphysique (Paris: Flammarion, 1979), 224. 65 Flynn, “Descartes and the Ontology of Subjectivity,” 10-11. 66 Cf. Marleen Rozemond, Descartes’s Dualism (Cambridge, MA – London: Harvard University Press, 1998), 56. See also the Letter to Mersenne of July 1641 (AT III, 395 / CSMK, 186). 67 Cf. Pamela A. Kraus, “Mens Humana: Res Cogitans and the Doctrine of Faculties in Descartes’ Meditationes,” International Studies in Philosophy 18 (1986), 1-4. 68 Cf. Rozemond, Descartes’s Dualism, 48ff. 69 Margaret Dauler Wilson, Descartes (London – New York: Routledge, 1978), 181. Margaret Wilson comes to be credited as almost the only author to have paid

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In his insistence on the immateriality of intellectual activity and in his conception of the soul as an incorporeal substance, Descartes appears to be close to Aquinas and other Scholastics. But unlike the AristotelianScholastics Descartes reduces the soul to be only the principle of thought.70 The Aristotelian-Scholastics, on the other hand, held the soul to be also the principle of nutrition, growth, locomotion, and sensation. Descartes was convinced that all these traditional operations of the soul could be very well accounted for mechanistically.71 John Cottingham reminds us that for Descartes “soul” and “mind” are synonymous. Both are merely convenient labels for res cogitans—that which thinks (AT VII, 487 / CSM II, 329).72 For Descartes the soul is identical with the mind, in its turn identical with the res cogitans since the essence of the mind consists in thinking. Descartes insists in particular that the essence of the soul consists in thought alone, emphasizing that thought constitutes the entire (tota) essence or nature of the soul (AT VII, 27 / CSM II, 18), excluding thereby other traditional functions of the soul. On the other hand, the Aristotelian-Scholastics held the mind to be the intellectual part of the soul, and not the whole soul.73 Edwin M. Curley notes how Descartes introduces the term mens as a synonym for “thinking thing” in the Second Meditation, and henceforth displaces with it the term anima.74 Descartes’ transformation of the conception of the soul only as the principle of thought, as res cogitans alone, in sharp contrast to the Scholastics, is reiterated in the Fifth Objections and Replies. Descartes responds to Gassendi who expressed bafflement over Descartes’ claim in sufficient attention to the question of the identity of res cogitans as pure intellection. See in this regard, Kraus, “Mens Humana: Res Cogitans and the Doctrine of Faculties in Descartes’ Meditationes,” 1-3; Marleen Rozemond, “The Role of the Intellect in Descartes’s Case for the Incorporeity of the Mind,” in Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes, ed. Stephen Voss (New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 97ff. 70 See in this regard also Dominik Perler, “What are the Faculties of the Soul? Descartes and His Scholastic Background” in Continuity and Innovation in Medieval and Modern Philosophy: Knowledge, Mind, and Language (British Academy Dawes Hicks Symposium on Philosophy, 2011), ed. John Marenbon (Oxford: The Oxford University Press, 2013), 9-38. 71 Rozemond, Descartes’s Dualism, 97-98. 72 Cottingham, Descartes, 111. 73 Cf. Rozemond, “The Role of the Intellect,” 109, footnote 2; Rozemond, Descartes’s Dualism, 39, 46. 74 See E. M. Curley, “Analysis in the Meditations: The Quest for Clear and Distinct Ideas” in Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 159.

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the Second Meditation that he is just a thinking thing (AT VII, 263 / CSM II, 183). Descartes responds: “The term must be understood to apply only to the principle in virtue of which we think; and to avoid ambiguity I have as far as possible used the term “mind” for this. For I consider the mind not as a part of the soul but as the thinking soul in its entirety.” (AT VII, 356 / CSM II, 246) Descartes rightly needs to be “credited with the primary philosophical formation of the nature of the modern mind” in terms of rationality alone.75 Descartes’ metaphysical understanding of the human self as a thinking thing (res cogitans) replaces the traditional Aristotelian conception of the human being as a “rational animal” with a definition of it in terms of rationality alone.76 It is such a reductive vision of the human being, at the expense of all other dimensions of the human person, that has been one of Descartes’ legacies to Modernity and successive thinkers. The Cartesian ego is only an abstract self, and not the concrete self with all its physical, sensuous, and emotional life.77 It is such a particular model of mind that “became embedded in Western culture at the very beginning of the Modern Age and has really persisted with us since.”78 Descartes not only defines the human self as res cogitans, i.e., as thought alone, but also exalts it in counter position to the objectivity of the res extensa and as ontologically superior.79 This is the second metaphysical move on the part of Descartes to establish the absolute primacy of the subject which we shall go on to discuss. Descartes’ definition of the human self in terms of rationality leads him to see the rest of the natural world as opposed to humans and as hierarchically inferior. The same element of rationality, unique to humans, becomes within Cartesian metaphysics the ground for ontological dualism: “just as the central feature of human identity comes to be seen as reason, (and reason itself construed oppositionally to nature and to other human

75

Fell, “Some Thoughts on the Modern Mind,” 589. See in this regard Enéias Forlin, “A concepção Cartesiana de sujeito: a alma e o animal racional” in Alexandre G. Tadeu de Soares (éd), Educação e Filosofia, v. 25, número especial: Descartes e o Grande Século (Uberlândia: Edufu, 2011), 135166. 77 William Barrett, Death of the Soul: From Descartes to the Computer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 18. 78 Ibid., 20. 79 On the metaphysical primacy of the cogito in Cartesian philosophy see also Georges J.D. Moyal, “La démonstration de la primauté métaphysique du cogito,” Dialogue 43 (2004), 67-81. 76

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features) the central feature of nature comes to be seen as its lack.”80 On account of the uniqueness stemming from rationality, Descartes considers the human being as entirely “different” from whatever is non-human. Conversely, Descartes holds the non-human reality which he subsumes under the category of the res extensa, as totally devoid of rationality and as such totally different from the humans. While the essence of the self is defined as thought, the essence of the material body is perceived by the intellect as diametrically the opposite, namely extension. Within Cartesian metaphysics, as explained in the Sixth Meditation, the properties of extension and of thought are mutually incompatible: an extended thing is a non-thinking thing, and a thinking thing is a non-extended thing (cf. AT VII, 78 / CSM II, 54). Such a dualistic divide naturally leads to an attitude of alienation and domination.81 Since humans alone possess subjectivity, they are considered as totally different and superior to the inert physical world of the res extensa. Paul W. Taylor, for example, notes that “anthropocentricity underlying the claim to human superiority runs throughout Cartesian dualism.”82 Within Cartesian metaphysics, given the absolute primacy of the res cogitans over the res extensa, the ego conquers for itself an unprecedented supremacy in the human vision of reality. In awarding such a primacy to the ego, Descartes is absolutely original with no remote or immediate historical predecessors. Jean-Luc Marion examines why Aristotle, despite highly valuing self-reflection, as does also Descartes, does not end up in a metaphysical interpretation of the ego. With characteristic insight, Marion pinpoints the reason for it in Aristotle’s concept of the category of “relation”. For Aristotle and later for the Scholastic tradition, the process of knowing involves a co-relation between the known and the knower. One’s knowledge of something is always in relation to and conditioned by the object known. For Aristotle, the thought does not constitute the ousia;

80

Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London – New York: Routledge, 1993), 104. 81 See in this regard Angela Taraborrelli, “Il Descartes di Hannah Arendt: alienazione del mondo e critico del soggetto” in Immagini filosofiche e interpretazioni storiografiche del cartesianesimo, eds. Carlo Borghero - Antonella Del Prete (Florence: Le Lettere, 2011), 307-34. 82 Paul W. Taylor, “The Ethics of Respect for Nature” in Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, eds. Michael E. Zimmerman et al. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), 79.

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on the contrary, it constitutes itself by the ousia that it deals with.83 Descartes, on the other hand, conceives the res cogitans, not so much in relation to the res extensa, but as diametrically opposite to it and accordingly in differentiating terms. The ego accomplishes its metaphysical function fully, not only in imposing itself as the being par excellence, but in determining from its mode of being, the mode of being of all beings.84 The cogito then becomes the criterion for all sciences, not as a truth among others, but as the way to the truth.85 We will take up for further discussion Descartes’ conception of the res cogitans in opposition to the res extensa in the seventh chapter while dealing with Cartesian dualism as a possible humus for the conceptual roots of the ecological crisis. Here it is sufficient to recognize how the very conception of the human self as superior and disconnected to the rest of the natural world within Cartesian metaphysics is bound to lead to domination, mastery and ruthless exploitation of the natural world. The emergence of the unique and preeminent “position of man” as the subject vis-à-vis the rest of reality at the dawn of Modernity appears to have contributed significantly to the emergence of modern anthropocentrism. As Heidegger notes, “Nietzsche’s doctrine which makes everything which is and how it is a ‘property and product of man’ merely carries out the furthest unfolding of Descartes’s doctrine, according to which all truth is grounded on the self-certainty of the human subject.”86 Descartes marks thereby the end of the reign of ontologies founded on Being and initiates a metaphysics centred around the concepts of the I, Me, Thought and the Subject.87 The unprecedented centrality and importance that Descartes confers on the human subject consequently leads to the depreciation of other dimensions of the real like God, society, and above all in our context, the natural world. Vittorio Hösle writes in this regard: In Descartes, in a certain sense, one can notice the culmination of the tendency, latent within human nature itself, to project subjectivity always further outside the world. With Descartes subjectivity manages to 83

Cf. Jean-Luc Marion, Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes: Constitution et limites de l’onto-théo-logie dans la pensée cartésienne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1986), 143ff. 84 Ibid., 214. 85 Cf. Michelle Beyssade, “The Cogito: Privileged Truth or Exemplary Truth?,” in Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes, ed. Stephen Voss (New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 38. 86 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, 2nd ed., vol. II, (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1961), 129/86. 87 Robert, “Descartes, créateur d’un nouveau style métaphysique” 376.

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absolutize itself in a way that has no equivalents in universal human history. The fact that subjectivity becomes the Archimedean point of the world leads to the necessary consequence of the devaluation of the other three spheres of being: God, nature, and the inter-subjective world.88

It is to the ecological implications of the exaltation of the cogito to a position of absolute centrality in modern anthropocentrism that we turn now.

4. Modern Anthropocentrism and the Roots of the Ecological Crisis The over-arching, dominant, and hierarchically superior position assumed by the human subject vis-à-vis the physical world within the Cartesian philosophical system is bound to have ecological repercussions. Such an exaggeratedly human-centred view of reality that emerged at the dawn of Modernity cannot but have led to a despotic attitude of domination and exploitation of nature. Anthropocentrism posits a misleading and hubristic gulf between human beings and other creatures. It ignores the human context which is necessarily circumspect by the wider creaturely character of all living entities, picturing human beings alone, suspended in a vacuum.89 Such isolation and exaltation of the humans from the rest of the biotic community has serious ecological consequences. For this reason, it is plausible to seek in modern anthropocentrism, to which the modern and Cartesian Weltbild contributed significantly as we have sought to evidence, some of the deeper philosophical roots of the contemporary ecological crisis. Within an anthropocentric perspective, human relationship with nature tends to become despotic and exploitative, since the latter is perceived exclusively in terms of human interests. Herein, nature is seen as only “peripherical” to human concerns, and as in no way contributing to what essentially constitutes the human being. Nature is only valuable in so far as human beings have a use for it.90 Anthropocentrism is ubiquitous in contemporary life and thinking. Leonardo Boff writes:

88

Vittorio Hösle, Philosphie der ökologischen Krise (München: Beck, 1991), 53. See David Clough, “Not a Not-Animal: The Vocation to be a Human Animal Creature,” Studies in Christian Ethics 26 (2013), 5. 90 Mark J. Smith, Ecologism: Towards Ecological Citizenship (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), 4. 89

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Chapter IV The imperial and anti-ecological anthropology at work in the contemporary dreams, projects, ideals, institutions, and values can be summed up in one word: anthropocentrism. The term means that everything throughout the fifteen-billion-year story exists solely for the human being, man and woman. Hence, everything culminates in the human being. Nothing has intrinsic value, nothing has otherness and meaning apart from the human being. All beings are at the disposal of human beings, to serve as their property and under their control, so that humans may attain their desires and projects. Human beings feel that they are above things rather than alongside and with things. They imagine themselves as an isolated single point, outside nature and above it.91

Some environmental philosophers, especially those in the fold of deep ecology, have sought to present anthropocentrism—the ideology according to which everything revolves around the humans who consider themselves as the absolute centre of all norms and values—as one of the root causes of the contemporary ecological crisis.92 Deep ecology holds the ecological crisis to be the outcome of the anthropocentric humanism that is central to the leading ideologies of Modernity.93 The critique of anthropocentrism in environmental philosophy has been refined to some extent due to the critique made of deep ecology’s own critique of anthropocentrism by eco-feminists and social ecologists. The eco-feminists point out that it has been more often “androcentrism” (male-centredness) rather than anthropocentrism which has caused the ecological crisis. The eco-feminists fault deep ecologists as speaking of “a gender-neutral ‘anthropocentrism’ as the root of the domination of nature, when in fact androcentrism is the real root.”94 The social ecologists claim 91

Leonardo Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor (New York: Orbis Books, 1997), 70. Italics as in the original. 92 See John Seed, “Beyond Anthropocentrism” in Thinking Like a Mountain: Towards a Council of All Beings, eds. John Seed et al. (Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1988), 35-40. See in this regard also Arne Naess, “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary,” Inquiry 16 (1973), 95-100; George Sessions, “Anthropocentrism and the Environmental Crisis,” Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 2 (1974), 71-81. Arne Naess criticises ‘shallow’ environmentalism, “which seeks only to reform certain socio-economic practices (e.g., curtailing industrial pollution) without altering modernity’s anthropocentric attitude, which is held to be largely responsible for the growing ecological crisis.” Michael E. Zimmerman, Contesting Earth’s Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity (Berkeley – London: University of California Press, 1994), 20. 93 Cf. Zimmerman, Contesting Earth’s Future, 1-2. 94 Michael E. Zimmerman, “Feminism, Deep Ecology, and Environmental Ethics,” Environmental Ethics 9 (1987), 37. In fact, several eco-feminists either imply that

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that the domination of weaker classes in society is linked with or even prior to the oppression of nature, and that the domination of nature is linked to the domination of humans.95 Murray Bookchin, the architect of social ecology, charges that deep ecology’s critique of anthropocentrism fails to see that it is not humankind in general, but rather specific social groups that are responsible for the poisoning and pillaging of nature.96 These critiques, however, do not remove the sting from deep ecology’s critique of anthropocentrism. Granting the validity of eco-feminists’ distinction between anthropocentrism and androcentrism, it needs to be admitted that, in the last instance, the problem is with “humancentredness” itself. As Thomas Berry affirms, the ecological crisis is “the consequence of a human-centred norm of reality and value.”97 As for the critique of social ecologists, while one cannot gloss over links between social hierarchy and the oppression of nature, it needs to be remembered that a socially egalitarian society does not always guarantee an ecologically benign society.98 Besides it would be naïve to claim that what is needed is to concentrate on interhuman egalitarian concerns for all to become ecologically well with the natural world. One may then conclude that anthropocentrism does remain a root problem which has contributed to the contemporary ecological crisis. It is precisely Descartes’ contribution to the emergence of modern anthropocentrism through the awarding of the res cogitans a position of absolute centrality that has been denounced by some environmental philosophers for its ecological implications. It is in Cartesian philosophy androcentrism is somehow prior to anthropocentrism or rather dogmatically assert that it is prior. For an overview of eco-feminist positions in this regard see Deborah Slicer, “Wrongs of Passage: Three Challenges to the Maturing of Ecofeminism” in Ecological Feminism, ed. Karen J. Warren (London – New York: Routledge, 1994), 30-32. 95 Cf. Murray Bookchin, Remaking Society (Montreal: Black Rose, 1989), 44; Joel Kovel, “The Marriage of Radical Ecologies” in Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, eds. Michael E. Zimmerman et al. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), 407. 96 Zimmerman, Contesting Earth’s Future, 152. 97 Thomas Berry, “The Viable Human” in Deep Ecology for the Twenty-first Century: Readings on the Philosophy and Practice of the New Environmentalism, ed. George Sessions (Boston – London: Shambhala, 1995), 9. 98 Warwick Fox, “The Deep Ecology – Ecofeminism Debate and Its Parallels” in Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, eds. Michael E. Zimmerman et al. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), 220. The wanton environmental destruction under socialist regimes goes towards confirming this observation.

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“that we have the beginning of subjectivism, where the subject is conceived or as the self-determining, as certain of itself, and as that which knows and places value on an objective world.”99 As Michael E. Zimmerman notes, it is with the subjectivistic turn initiated by Descartes at the dawn of Modernity that “humanity began to arrogate to itself the role of God, the grounding ground, the producer of all things.”100 The modern subject thus becomes the metron, the only measure and centre of all that exists. The Cartesian epistemology of subjective representation is closely linked to the concept of mastery over nature. Heidegger refers to the Cartesian “representation” (Vor-stellung) of physical objects and its link to the subject’s quest to master and dominate over the physical world. This has been Heidegger’s critique of Modernity in general, and of Descartes in particular, which Michael Zimmerman sums up well: Making itself the measure for all truth, reality, and value, the subject compels things to show themselves solely according to dictates of rationality: to be means to be a clear and distinct idea. … Objects are “representations,” in that for them to be, they must be re-presented, that is, re-positioned by the subject in accordance with its own standards.101

As Heidegger remarks, the fundamental characteristic of the modern age is the conquest of the world reduced to an image of the representative production. In this production the human being strives to secure that place in which it can be that being which becomes the rule and canon for every other being.102 The human quest for representation and subsequent mastery is most evident in modern technology, with its emphasis on quantification and calculation, and leading to control and mastery over nature. The risk of modern technology is precisely the representation of the physical world only as a world of objects available for human consumption. As Heidegger writes, “the world now appears as an object open to the attacks of calculative thought. … Nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry.”103 The notion of representation, as Heidegger has pointed out with great perspicacity, is redolent of domination. “Representing is making-standover-against, an objectifying that goes forward and masters. In this way 99

Gare, Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis, 52. Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity, 171. 101 Zimmerman, Contesting Earth’s Future, 111. 102 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 134. 103 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, tr. John M. Anderson - E. Hans Freund (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 50. 100

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representing drives everything together into the unity of that which is thus given the character of object. Representing is coagitatio.”104 The subject while representing the world reduces it to a collection of calculable, controllable objects, available for human manipulation at will.105 This mastery requires physical nature (including the human body) to be a purely mechanistic system, which one is capable of understanding through science. “The use of mathematics and the design of experiments are such as to reveal the world only insofar as it is controllable.”106 As Heidegger points out, “Modern science’s way of representing pursues and entraps nature as a calculable coherence of forces.”107 Once the subject becomes the Archimedean centre as in modern Cartesian anthropocentrism, the rest of physical reality comes to be seen as nothing but a gigantic reservoir of objects or raw materials destined for human consumption. Louis Dupré notes how “thought, when it takes its origin in the subject, inevitably adopts a controlling quality.”108 A line of thought oriented towards the possession and domination of nature inevitably leads to a voracious and exploitative attitude towards it. Environmental philosophers rightly point out that at the heart of ecological problems lie precisely these domineering and exploitative attitudes towards nature.109 Anthropocentrism, in fact, does lead to a despotic attitude towards nature. As all subjectivity and value is concentrated on the human self (res cogitans) alone, the rest of the physical world (res extensa)—both animate and inanimate—is perceived as only a collection of things or objects as “disposable” for the subject. In modern anthropocentrism, the physical world is seen to exist at the disposal of humans and as incapable of posing any limit whatsoever to the human quest for conquest and mastery. Any entity is seen as a mere object without any ontological bindings to be respected, and as merely available for the free manipulation of the subject.110 In Modernity everything arranges itself on the horizon of utility; the entire Earth itself becomes an object of human assault.

104

Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 150. Cf. Gare, Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis, 52. 106 Ibid., 53. 107 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 21. 108 Dupré, “Alternatives to the Cogito,” 715. 109 David Pepper, Modern Environmentalism: An Introduction (London – New York: Routledge, 1999), 10. 110 Possenti, “Techne: dai greci ai moderni,” 300. 105

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Chapter IV The whole field of vision has been wiped away. The whole of that which is as such, the sea, has been drunk up by man. For man has risen up into the I-ness of the ego cogito. Through this uprising, all that is, is transformed into object.111 … The world changes into an object. In this revolutionary objectifying of everything that is, the earth, that which first of all must be put at the disposal of representing and setting forth, moves into the midst of human positing and analysing. The earth itself can show itself only as the object of assault.112

The present state of our home planet as evidenced in the contemporary ecological crisis is a clear indication that humanity appears to have usurped for itself a disproportionate centrality imperilling its own and the survival of other forms of life on it. There appears to exist a solid connection between the anthropogenic nature of the current ecological crisis—an argument on which we reflected in the very first chapter of the book—and the insight that modern anthropocentrism is one of the root causes of the current ecological crisis.

5. A Philosophical Debate on Anthropocentrism Modern anthropocentrism is so ingrained in contemporary thinking and life-styles that it becomes difficult for many to accept any radical critique of it. For this reason, we shall conclude this chapter with a philosophical debate on anthropocentrism and its possible alternatives. We will, first of all, examine some of the main arguments that could be marshalled in defence of anthropocentrism and offer a rebuttal of them. We will then go on to consider biocentrism which some have proposed as an alternative to anthropocentrism and evidence how such a proposal is equally fraught with difficulties. We will finally argue in favour of a relational perspective in which the human self is perceived to exist as interrelated to and interdependent on the natural world rather than in total independence and opposition to it. We shall begin with some of the common arguments that are often tabled in favour of anthropocentrism. A first argument which is usually presented in defence of anthropocentrism is that it is simply inevitable, as any perspective on nature is always from the “human” viewpoint.113 In 111

Heidegger, “The Word of Nietzsche,” 107. Ibid., 100. 113 See for instance the argument of Michael Pollan who notes that “we know nature only through the screen of our metaphors; to see her plain is probably 112

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spite of the excesses and dangers fraught in anthropocentrism there is no alternative to it as any worldview is always a creation of the human subject (or subjects). As every worldview is necessarily a human creation, it is inevitable that humans place themselves at its centre and consequently are entitled to all privileges that accrue from such a centrality. A second argument in defence of anthropocentrism is that it defends the uniqueness of humans which is based on rationality. It is an undeniable fact that rationality is something original and unique to humans. Such uniqueness also entails that humans be recognized as having a certain ontological superiority over the rest of creation, justifying thereby a hierarchical division between human beings and all other animate and inanimate beings. Obviously a human being has more value than a fox in the forest, or a tropical exotic plant, or a mosquito that spreads malaria. It is perfectly justifiable then, it can be argued, to talk of human superiority within an anthropocentric view of reality. A third argument in defence of anthropocentrism is that this ideology has proved to be a great pragmatic success story in the wake of Modernity. The most eloquent testimony of its success is the significant progress that has been achieved in the field of science and technology which in turn has ameliorated human life on an unprecedented scale in areas ranging from health care to transportation and communication. Such progress is a vindication of the claim that the human beings are really at the centre, and nature is pliable and totally under human control. In other words, it could be argued that humans are the ones who call the shots at this stage of evolution of life, and it is so obvious that destiny has placed them in the centre. So what is the fuss about anthropocentrism? The first argument about the inevitability of anthropocentrism basically holds, because any human discourse is bound to be anthropocentric, as humans are the only ones who are involved in any discourse in the first place. But it needs to be remembered that what is called into question is an exaggerated form of anthropocentrism which leaves no room at all for the non-human realm and subjugates nature in a despotic manner. While human intervention in nature is inevitable and has always taken place, what is contested is that form of intervention which exceeds the carrying capacity of the Earth and can trigger the collapse of biosystems that support various forms of life, including human life. It is where modern impossible.” Michael Pollan, Second Nature: A Gardener’s Education (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1991), 191. On the inevitability of anthropocentrism see also Eric Katz, “Against the Inevitability of Anthropocentrism” in Beneath the Surface: Critical Essays in the Philosophy of Deep Ecology, eds. Eric Katz Andrew Light - David Rothenberg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 17-42.

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anthropocentrism finds itself in the dock with its pretensions to treat nature at will, reminiscent of Descartes’ moulding of the totally pliable wax. Such a position is certainly not defensible as we argue further. The second and third arguments in defence of anthropocentrism are more vulnerable. First of all, Descartes’ definition of the self as res cogitans and in terms of rationality can be called into question, because it does not take into account the complete human being who is also corporeal, not to speak of other dimensions of being human like affectivity, emotionality, etc. Though rationality does characterise what is unique to humans, a definition of the human being in terms of rationality alone does not cover the entire spectrum of what it means to be human. A definition of a being or entity is supposed to provide a concise yet sufficiently complete description of the object under study. Here the Cartesian definition of the human being in terms of thought alone flounders. It is important to recall here the Aristotelian definition of the human being as a “rational animal” which scores over the Cartesian one as it makes room for both rationality and for all that is associated with being animal, including corporeality and rootedness in nature. Within Aristotelian logic the definition of a species is generated by taking into account both the differentia and the genus. For example, the definition of human being is rational (the differentia) animal (the genus); the definition of triangle is three-sided (the differentia) plane figure (the genus). For Aristotle while the human being is unique and distinct in being rational, he or she shares at the same time animality with other living beings. Here the Cartesian metaphysical postulate of total discontinuity between humans and the natural world also collapses. John Cottingham writes in this regard: The Aristotelian definition of man as a rational animal acknowledges our physical nature while also stressing, quite rightly, our ability to think and reason. So to say that we are ‘thinking things’ is in a sense quite correct, provided we do not follow Descartes in making the further, illegitimate, move of saying that what does the thinking is something incorporeal – a pure, non-extended mind or soul. Rather what does the thinking is a person, and a person is, necessarily, something with a body.114

Besides, the Cartesian definition of rationality itself in terms of thought alone is highly reductive and restrictive, as the original meaning of nous was much wider than Cartesian cogitans. R.G. Collingwood points out that 114

John Cottingham, “Descartes’ Sixth Meditation: The External World, ‘Nature’ and Human Experience” in Descartes’ Meditations: Critical Essays, ed. Vere Chappell (Lanham – Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 222.

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“Greek natural science was based on the principle that the world of nature is saturated or permeated by mind.” 115 The faculty of rationality does make human beings unique and distinct. We do not contest Descartes on this. But to draw a conclusion of hierarchical superiority on account of rationality is fraught with risks already at the intra-human level. As the renowned historian Keith Thomas points out: “If the essence of humanity was defined as consisting in some specific quality, then it followed that any man who did not display that quality was subhuman, semi-animal.”116 In fact, when humanity comes to be identified with particular attributes such as rationality, it can consequently lead to the marginalisation of those humans considered to be lacking in them.117 A couple of examples could be useful here. It is enough to recall here how during the era of colonialism the superiority of the conquerors was often associated with being a more rational civilization while that of the conquered people was disparagingly dismissed as primitive and backward as they were considered closer to nature.118 Some of these prejudices still linger on in our rationality dominated culture, wherein indigenous people are considered inferior as they lack a higher use of rationality expressed in terms of a written form of language, abstract thinking, etc., and exhibit more readily and spontaneously the socalled animal passions, live closer to nature and adopt a frugal lifestyle. Another example of the danger fraught with basing hierarchical superiority on rationality is the job-division in economically advanced societies. Thus jobs which call for a higher level use of rational and mental powers are considered to be superior jobs (the so-called white-collar jobs, obviously better paid too), while manual jobs closer to nature and involving less use of reason, are considered comparatively as mean jobs (the so-called bluecollar jobs, underpaid in most cases). One could find multiple examples in this regard. 115

R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945), 3. Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800 (London: Penguin Books, 1984), 41. 117 Clough, “Not a Not-Animal,” 5. 118 Keith Thomas provides some vivid and chilling examples here. “In the colonies, slavery, with its markets, its brandings and its constant labour, was one of dealing with men thought to be beastlike. The Portuguese, reported an English traveller, marked slaves ‘as we do sheep, with a hot iron’, and at the slave market in Constantinople, Fynes Moryson saw the buyers taking their slaves indoors to inspect them naked, handling them ‘as we handle beasts, to know their fatness and strength.” Thomas, Man and the Natural World, 44. See Fynes Moryson, An Itinerary Containing His Ten Yeeres Travell through the Twelve Dominions (Glasgow: 1907-8), II, 95-96. 116

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What is important to recall here is that distinctness, uniqueness and difference, on account of rationality or other factors, need not necessarily entail hierarchical divisions in terms of superiority and inferiority. In the same way human uniqueness and distinctness vis-à-vis nature can very well be preserved without having recourse to a despotic perception and treatment of nature as inferior based on the criterion of human rationality. The third argument in defence of anthropocentrism is about human control over nature made possible through science and technology. But are humans really in control of nature? Humanity today seems to be awakening to the realization, after decades of false illusions regarding unlimited material progress and infinite economic growth, that nature is not totally pliable in human hands like the piece of wax in Descartes’ Second Meditation. The ecological crisis is itself the most telling proof of the hubris and arrogance of anthropocentrism in refusing to accept the limits imposed by nature. The alarming proportions of the crisis expose the false pretensions of human control over nature, as though humans were above and apart from it, and that nature can be subjugated at will to human interests. Rather, the impact of the ecological crisis on humanity points to how humans cannot survive unless they align themselves to the rhythm of the biospheric processes, and be willing to acknowledge their dependency on them.119 As Kyle Burchett writes, “from an ecological perspective, Homo sapiens is always part of its environment—i.e., its evolutionary success is fundamentally dependent on factors such as climate, resource availability, and so on.”120 Anthropocentrism places humans at the centre, as everything else, including non-human nature, is supposed to revolve around them. Here nature is pushed to the periphery whereas humans occupy the coveted central spot. But the biological fact of human dependence on natural processes mounts probably the most serious challenge to this form of exaggerated anthropocentrism. It is enough to recall here the geological history of the earth, which reminds us that the human beings are within nature rather than above or apart from it. The human domination and exploitation of the earth appears all the more repulsive when the human being is situated against the background of geological history. Life appeared on Earth nearly 3.8 billion years ago and modern Homo sapiens sapiens, our direct ancestors, emerged nearly 200,000 years ago. It means that we make up only 0.0054% of life’s history on Earth. If we were to 119

See in this regard Val Plumwood, Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason (London – New York: Routledge, 2002), 3. 120 Kyle Burchett, “Anthropocentrism and Nature: An Attempt at Reconciliation,” Teoria 34 (2014), 119.

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conceive the nearly five billion years of the geological history of the Earth as recorded in ten volumes of 500 pages each—as Richard H. Overman once proposed—so that each page records a million years, it would be only on page 499 of the tenth volume that humankind would appear. The last two words on the last page would suffice to recount our story from the rise of civilization six thousand years ago until the present.121 It is only when we reach the last letter of the last word on the last page of the last volume does humanity take to tearing down its own home. It is during this tiny fraction of geological chronos that the human being has sought to exploit the planet's resources to the extent of threatening the very future of human life as indicated by the present day ecological crisis.122 As the geological history of the planet reveals, life existed on the Earth much before humans appeared on the scene, and will carry on existing without them, subject to mutation of course, which however has been the hallmark of evolution right through. One wonders then how absolutely central humans are to the whole picture! It is more correct to say that humans belong to the earth rather than claim that the earth belongs to humans as modern anthropocentrism would have it. Humans depend on the biospheric processes and not vice-versa! Nature can continue to exist without humans but not human life and human civilization without nature! In fact, the alarming prospect of the ecological crisis looming on the planet is that life will carry on without the human component, unless humanity is willing to shed its exaggerated anthropocentric importance, and one might add, also the Cartesian and modern ego-centric worldview.

6. Biocentrism as an Alternative to Anthropocentrism In the wake of the realization that modern anthropocentrism—of which we have tried to trace some of the roots to Cartesian egocentrism—has played a significant role in causing the contemporary ecological crisis, some environmental philosophers have come forward with alternatives to it. The

121

See Richard H. Overman, “A Christological View of Nature,” Religious Education 66 (1971), 37; John B. Cobb, Sustainability: Economics, Ecology, and Justice (New York: Orbis Books, 1992), 119-20. 122 It is in this context that one needs to understand Thomas Berry’s remark which otherwise could sound highly misanthropic. Berry writes: "If there were a parliament of creatures, its first decision might well be to vote the humans out of the community, too deadly a presence to tolerate any further." Thomas Berry, The Dream of the Earth (San Fransisco: Sierra Club Books, 1988), 209.

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most popular by far has been deep ecology’s proposal of biocentrism. 123 It is to biocentrism that we turn now, trying to assess its validity as an alternative to anthropocentrism. Biocentrism is deep ecology’s response to a profound question raised in the context of modern anthropocentrism: whether the human being, while being the only measurer of things, is the only measure of things? Deep ecology, in embracing biocentrism, answers in the negative to this query. As Arne Naess states, “Man may be the measurer of all things in the sense that only a human being has a measuring rod, but what he measures he may find to be greater than himself and his survival.”124 The first of the eight planks of Arne Naess’s Deep Ecology Platform reads: “the well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent worth). These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes.”125 Commenting on this point Andrew McLaughlin writes: “Essentially, this is a rejection of anthropocentrism. … Accepting the idea that humans are not the only valuable part of nature is the watershed perception from which Deep Ecology flows.”126 The biocentric alternative of deep ecology is born out of the realization that the human community needs to move away from anthropocentrism.

123

Deep ecology has drawn also from movements within the philosophical tradition that arose as a reaction to anthropocentrism. Spinoza’s non-anthropocentric pantheistic metaphysics in which mind or the mental attribute, unlike Descartes, is found throughout nature, as well as the German Naturphilosophie tradition, are said to have inspired Arne Naess and other proponents of deep ecology. The Romantic Movement in literature, which arose as a reaction also to the mechanistic philosophy of Modernity, has also been considered a possible source for biocentric environmental thought by some deep ecologists. Cf. Del Ivan Janik, “Environmental Consciousness in Modern Literature: Four Representative Examples” in Deep Ecology for the Twenty-first Century: Readings on the Philosophy and Practice of the New Environmentalism, ed. George Sessions (Boston – London: Shambhala, 1995), 104-5. 124 Arne Naess, “A Defence of the Deep Ecology Movement,” Environmental Ethics 6 (1984), 270. Italics as in the original. 125 Arne Naess, “The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects” in Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, eds. Michael E. Zimmerman et al. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), 197. 126 Andrew McLaughlin, “The Heart of Deep Ecology” in Deep Ecology for the Twenty-first Century: Readings on the Philosophy and Practice of the New Environmentalism, ed. George Sessions (Boston – London: Shambhala, 1995), 86.

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The naïve assumption that the natural world exists solely to be possessed and used by humans for their unlimited advantage cannot be accepted. The earth belongs to itself and to all the component members of the community. The entire earth is a gorgeous celebration of existence in all its forms. Each living thing participates in the celebration as the proper fulfilment of its powers of expression.127

Biocentrism certainly has its merits. Biocentrism, as the very term implies, is concerned about the well-being of all forms of life on Earth. It does not consider humans to be the only valuable beings in nature. A central concept of biocentrism is biospherical egalitarianism, namely, that recognition of the right of all living entities to exist and flourish. It is concerned with the wellbeing of all forms of life on Earth by recognizing the intrinsic value and inherent worth of all living entities. It promotes a de-ontological ethics of respect, based not just on the instrumental value of nature, but also on valuing the telos in organisms.128 Biocentrism, however, is not without its difficulties. Its biggest drawback is that in reacting to anthropocentrism it swings the pendulum to the opposite extreme in the name of bio-egalitarianism. It has no way to account for human uniqueness. In biocentrism, human nature appears to be glossed over since the human being is considered just another leaf on the cosmic tree, coequal with birds and bacteria! It is a position which is untenable both theoretically and pragmatically. Theoretically because, as we argued previously, any worldview is ultimately from the human point of view as humans are the only ones who can have a viewpoint after all. As Victoria Davion argues, genuine biocentrism, which exhibits no bias in humanity’s favour, is ultimately untenable.129 So strict biocentrism, the viewpoint of all, is a logical contradiction. At the practical level too strict biocentrism is untenable. Humanity has always intervened in nature to satisfy basic human needs like nutrition, clothing and shelter, and other forms of self-preservation. In this process humans cannot but act out of a form of self-interest (which, however, need not be despotic).130 Otherwise one will not be allowed to exterminate a

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Berry, “The Viable Human,” 12. Cf. Holmes Rolston III, “Challenges to Environmental Ethics” in Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, eds. Michael E. Zimmerman et al. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), 143. 129 See Victoria Davion, “Itch Scratching, Patio Building, and Pesky Flies: Biocentric Individualism Revisited,” Environmental Ethics 28 (2006), 115-28. 130 As Mary Anne Warren writes, “anthropocentrism is inevitable in any moral theory that is relevant to human actions”. Mary Anne Warren, Moral Status: 128

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virus that causes a human disease, not to speak of more complex issues like experiments on animals to achieve breakthroughs in medicine. One might also add here the critique from proponents of social justice who question the wisdom in spending huge resources in the conservation of exotic species and conservation of wilderness, while neglecting the plight of the millions who live in abject poverty. It is true that Arne Naess and other proponents of deep ecology have refined their original positions calling for the respect of ecosystems rather than individual living entities. But the concept of bio-egalitarianism in biocentrism remains a big problem since it does not recognize and integrate the element of human difference and uniqueness. From the metaphysical point of view it could lead to an ontology of monism, wherein all entities are levelled down to a common and amorphous biosphere. In fact, the cult of life in biocentrism, as opposed to anthropocentrism, borders at times on misanthropy. The views of some deep ecologists in characterizing the human species as “a pernicious presence in the world of the living on a unique and universal scale,” given the deleterious influence of the humans on the planet,131 can be interpreted as a form of self-critique for humanity to mend its excessive anthropocentric ways. But bioegalitarianism taken to its logical conclusions poses serious problems. If all life is of worth to itself, whose point of view should be adopted when the worths of different manifestations of life are compared? The most radical answer is—nobody’s. Biocentrism in its extreme form requires that within the community of life all should be respected for what they are, and human beings should have no privileged position. Its logical conclusion is that since we have done more damage to the world than any other species, and are now its main predator, the web of life might be better off without us, or at least without so many of us.132

The views of certain deep ecologists on the ideal size of human population which is ecologically sustainable has contributed to biocentrism being branded as a form of environmental fascism. William Aiken, for example, takes the extremist position that from a biocentric point of view, given the unchecked growth of global population, “massive human diebacks would be good,” and that it would be desirable to

Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 43. 131 Berry, “The Viable Human,” 11. 132 John Habgood, The Concept of Nature (London: Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd., 2002), 72.

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eliminate 90 percent of the present population.133 Arne Naess himself, in the fifth point of the eight-point Deep Ecology Platform states: “The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantially smaller population. The flourishing of non-human life requires a smaller human population.”134 While commenting on a United Nations study of optimal human population, Naess asks: “are cultural diversity, development of the sciences and the arts, and of course the basic needs of humans not served by, let us say, 100 million?”135 As Christine J. Cuomo points out “Despite Naess’ apparent benevolent sensibilities, the writings and recommendations of a number of Deep Ecologists have sometimes verged on the inhumane, and others have put forth the view that phenomena such as the global AIDS epidemic and Third World famine are “necessary solutions” to the “population problem.”136 If one were to adopt an egalitarian biocentric axiology, as Kyle Burchett has pointed out, “one might be morally obligated to assist in expunging humanity from the Earth,” subscribing to the view of some environmentalists that Earth’s biotic communities would be better off if humans were not around.137 Here biocentrism runs into some very serious difficulties indeed. In conclusion, one might say that biocentrism does raise important questions regarding modern anthropocentrism, but could lead up a blind alley, if it ends up in obliterating altogether the uniqueness of the human dimension. Biocentrism does serve as an important corrective to anthropocentrism. But taken to its logical conclusions, biocentrism could ultimately turn out to be another form of reductionism, as reductive as anthropocentrism which it sought to substitute. In other words, it could lead to the substitution of one absolute paradigm with another, substituting the cult of the ego with the cult of amorphous life! 133

William Aiken, “Ethical Issues in Agriculture” in Earthbound: New Introductory Essays in Environmental Ethics, ed. Tom Regan (New York: Random House, 1984), 269. Cited in J. Baird Callicott, “The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic” in Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, eds. Michael E. Zimmerman et al. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), 125-26. 134 Naess, “The Deep Ecological Movement,” 197. 135 Arne Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 141. See also Arne Naess, “Holdninger til mennesker, dyr, og planter” [Attitudes to people, animals, and plants], Samtiden 94 (1985), 68-76. 136 Christine J. Cuomo, “Ecofeminism, Deep Ecology, and Human Population” in Ecological Feminism, ed. Karen J. Warren (London – New York: Routledge, 1994), 92. The controversial remark in question here appeared in the Earth First! Newsletter. See Ann Thropy, “Population and AIDS,” Earth First!, May 1 (1987), 32. 137 Burchett, “Anthropocentrism and Nature: An Attempt at Reconciliation,” 131.

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7. A Relational Perspective as the Only Viable Alternative .

Deep ecology’s concept of biocentrism, proposed as an alternative to anthropocentrism, cannot go all the way in effecting the transition required from the Cartesian ego-centrism to a holistic worldview in which human beings exist in harmony with the natural world. It is only a profoundly “relational” perspective, capable of respecting and integrating within it the uniqueness of both the humanum and of the natural world, that can truly bring about such a transition. Such a relational perspective will go beyond the Cartesian anthropocentrism of Modernity as well as misplaced versions of biocentrism, and opt instead for a relational perspective of the self, as inter-related to and inter-dependent on the natural world. It will place emphasis neither on the autonomy of humans nor on that of nature, but on the relationship between human beings and the natural world, within a perspective of inter-dependence rather than independence. As Hans Jonas points out, in the wake of the ecological crisis, the interests of humans and nature converge, as it is a question of survival for both.138 A relational perspective will not view the human being as a parasitic presence on the planet. Instead, it will consider the human as integrated within nature’s continuum. Thus even the human mind, that which makes the self a res cogitans within the Cartesian philosophy, cannot be considered as totally extraneous to and opposite to res extensa or physical reality. As social ecologists have pointed out, mind itself has its origin within the process of material evolution. At the same time one need not adopt the extreme position of reducing the mind or the spiritual exclusively to the material as it comes to be done in social ecology, the very thing that Descartes so valiantly sought to avoid. The upshot, however, is that an exclusively egocentric and anthropocentric perspective is not necessary to be able to safeguard the uniqueness of the self, as it can be guaranteed within a relational perspective. A relational perspective will also recognize the autonomous identity of nature, not reducing it to the parameters of the knowing self, as happens within modern anthropocentrism. A relational perspective is able to guarantee the relative autonomy and otherness of nature, respecting thereby its independence. As Bill McKibeen notes, “nature’s independence is its meaning; without it there is nothing but us.”139 Ecological thinkers urge that humanity be ready to recognize in nature its own goals and purposes and not just the 138

See Hans Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age (Chicago – London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 136-37. 139 Bill McKibben, The End of Nature (London: Viking, 1990), 54.

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anthropocentric ones of self-interest, and be willing to respect them. Val Plumwood claims that it is possible to have an alternative perception of nature in this regard. We can as humans indeed recognise ourselves in nature, and not only as we do when it has been colonised, commodified and domesticated, made into a mirror which reflects back only our own species’ images and our own needs. We can instead recognise in the myriad forms of nature other beings—earth others—whose needs, goals and purposes must, like our own, be acknowledged and respected.140

In the context of the contemporary ecological crisis, it is only a relational perspective that appears capable of steering humanity towards a harmonious co-existence with and in the natural world, avoiding the Scylla and Charybdis of anthropocentrism and biocentrism respectively. Within such a relational perspective the natural world will regain its primordial meaning as oikos (household), the primitive Greek domicile with its sacred hearth, bonding the earth to all aspects of human and social life. Within a relational perspective the earth is perceived as oikos, the natural habitat of human beings and the rest of the biotic community. Edgar Morin refers to the human vocation, in the context of the ecological crisis, to rediscover the earth as “homeland”, heimat, patria, as it is not so much the earth which belongs to humans but it is rather humans who belong to the earth.141 In order to overcome the contemporary ecological crisis, we need to overcome the Cartesian and modern anthropocentric perspective that considers humans as the measure of all things. Here we need to recover an authentic understanding of the human being in relation to the surrounding natural world. Such an insight is also the received wisdom of both East and West as pointed out by Michael S. Zimmerman, comparing Heideggerian philosophy with Buddhist teachings. Both Heidegger and Zen master would say that Western humanity’s technological will to power over nature arises from an inadequate understanding of what it means to be human. So long as we regard ourselves as ego-subjects who are the measure of all things, we will plunder the planet in an endless quest for security and control. Needed is a

140

Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 137. Cf. Edgar Morin – Anne Brigitte Kern, Terra-Patria (Milan: Raffaello Cortina Editore, 1994), 187, 190.

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Chapter IV shift from our present understanding of all things as objects whose value lies solely in what they can contribute to some human purpose.142

In the face of the contemporary ecological crisis, we stand in need of a radical redefinition of the human being as interrelated to and interdependent on the natural world along with its myriad forms of life.

142

Michael S. Zimmerman, “Heidegger and Heraclitus on Spiritual Practice,” Philosophy Today 27 (1983), 88. See also Greg Kennedy, An Ontology of Trash: The Disposable and Its Problematic Nature (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2007), 20.

CHAPTER V THE MODERN MECHANISTIC WORLDVIEW AND THE ECOLOGICAL CRISIS

Introduction In the previous chapter, we examined how modern anthropocentrism— towards the creation of which Cartesian ego-centric philosophy contributed significantly—is an important humus of the philosophical roots of the contemporary ecological crisis. In the next two chapters, we shall now go on to see how the modern and Cartesian mechanistic Weltbild is yet another significant source of the conceptual roots of the ecological crisis. We will discuss modern Cartesian mechanistic philosophy in two stages. In the present chapter, we will deal with the Cartesian mechanistic physics, while mechanistic physiology will be discussed in the next one. The modern mechanistic worldview had several important protagonists including Galileo, Gassendi, and Newton. Descartes’ contribution towards its creation has been significant—though not sufficiently acknowledged— in as much as he provided the very philosophical foundations for it. Cartesian philosophy contributed notably to dethroning and replacing the Aristotelian-Scholastic hylomorphic conception of matter that lay at the core of the traditional natural philosophy of the time. Here again the strategy employed by Descartes, as throughout his philosophical system, was epistemological and metaphysical. From the epistemological point of view, Descartes argued that certain knowledge of the material world is obtained in terms of the categories of quantity and measurement alone. He thus introduced mathematical physics as the science of the physical world. On the metaphysical front, Descartes’ strategy was to argue that physical entities have mechanistic properties alone, arriving thereby at a conception of the natural world exclusively in terms of inert and extended matter. The modern Cartesian mechanistic conception of the inanimate physical world, while possessing great heuristic value and empirical applicability, ultimately led to the creation of a one-dimensional perception of the physical world as res extensa, i.e., in terms of quantity alone. Such a

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reductive view of the natural world has consequently led to a disenchanted and instrumental conception of the physical world in terms of utility, reduced to a mere storehouse of resources for human consumption. It is for this reason that we argue that the modern Cartesian mechanistic Weltbild is an important humus of the conceptual roots of the contemporary ecological crisis. We shall now go on to examine in detail the unique contribution of Descartes to the creation of the modern mechanistic Weltbild. We will then dwell on some of the principal ecological implications of the mechanistic worldview.

1. Descartes’ Substitution of Aristotelian Hylomorphism with Mechanism The mechanization of the physical world, as E.J. Dijksterhuis has pointed out, characterizes in a conspicuous way Modernity and the Scientific Revolution.1 Obviously, such a process came to be realized over a long period involving a wide spectrum of thinkers ranging from Galileo to Newton and beyond, among whom Descartes holds a prominent place. Descartes, as Daniel Garber points out, was well known as a mechanist in the seventeenth century, a fact largely fallen into oblivion today.2 Descartes’ unique contribution in this regard consists of having provided new and important philosophical foundations for the mechanistic Weltbild of Modernity. Descartes made an original contribution in the overthrow of the Aristotelian-Scholastic explanatory apparatus built around the hylomorphic account of physical bodies and in its substitution with the exclusively mechanistic explanation. The transition that Descartes effected from the hylomorphic to the mechanistic explanatory apparatus was indeed a tectonic shift that changed for once and all the landscape of natural philosophy. Within scholastic scientia, the only way to explain natural phenomena was through hylomorphism, the view that all material objects are composites of matter and form. The natural philosopher’s task was to discover the forms that underlie the reality of any entity and its appearance manifest to the human 1

See E.J. Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961). See also Daniel B. Botkin, Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology for the Twenty-first Century (New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 101-5. 2 Cf. Daniel Garber, “Descartes’ Physics” in The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 286.

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perceiver in reliable sensations. Thus the scholastic scientia was directed towards acquiring knowledge of forms.3 Descartes was thoroughly disenchanted with the Aristotelian-Scholastic hylomorphic explanation of the physical world.4 His consistent attitude throughout his mature philosophy, as Desmond Clarke points out, was “to object to the explanatory framework to which many scholastic philosophers of the period appealed.”5 According to Descartes, the basic problem with the Scholastic explanations is that they are not genuinely explanatory. They were at best re-descriptions—in an esoteric language—of explananda rather than genuine explanations.6 Descartes disparages the AristotelianScholastic model of explanation as vacuous, circular and as only redescribing the phenomenon to be explained.7 In a letter to Huygens in March or April 1638, Descartes gives an example of a non-explanation: “lux est medium proportionale inter substantiam et accidents” (AT II, 51).8 Descartes’ critique of the Aristotelian-Scholastic model of explanation 3

Desmond M. Clarke, “Descartes’ Philosophy of Science and the Scientific Revolution” in The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 260. 4 Descartes’ critique of hylomorphism, which he eventually succeeded in demolishing, is fraught with some fundamental flaws. As Étienne Gilson has rightly pointed out the hylomorphic theory that Descartes came to know and criticise was an adulterated version of it. What Descartes argued against was a form of hylomorphism as he understood it, or rather mis-understood it, wherein the definitions of things are not based on the content of things in experience, but where rather the definitions of things in the thought determined the content of things. Étienne Gilson, Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien (Paris: J. Vrin, 1930), 162. 5 Desmond M. Clarke, Descartes’ Theory of Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 23. 6 Desmond M. Clarke, Descartes’ Philosophy of Science (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982), 118. 7 It suffices to recall here the celebrated parody of Molière, who borrowing the Cartesian critique makes a caricature of hylomorphism when he states, for example, that sleeping pills have their desired effect for a “dormitive power” in them. In Molière’s Le Malade imaginaire, Doctor Bachelierus tries to explain how opium makes one fall asleep by saying it has a “virtus dormitiva, cujus est natura sensus assoupire”. J.-B. P. de Molière Oeuvres complètes, ed. Georges Couton, 2 vols (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), II, 1173. See Clarke, Descartes’ Theory of Mind, 22; John Cottingham, Descartes (Oxford – Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1986), 7. 8 Commenting on this passage Desmond M. Clarke concludes that it “would be difficult to resist agreeing with him!” Clarke, Descartes’ Philosophy of Science, footnote 16. See also Clarke, “Descartes’ Philosophy of Science and the Scientific Revolution,” 265-66.

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can be summed up under the following charges, namely, its lack of clarity, its redundancy, and finally its sterility which, according to him, muted the progress of natural philosophy. We shall briefly discuss each of them. The most important of the charges that Descartes brings against the hylomorphic explanation of natural phenomena within the AristotelianScholastic natural philosophy is that it lacks clarity. John Cottingham notes that while Descartes shared the irritation voiced earlier by Galileo and later by Boyle about the vacuity and circularity of qualitative explanations in hylomorphism, his own principal reason for rejecting it was precisely the lack of clarity about them.9 [Descartes’] complaint against the invoking of qualities like ‘gravity’ or ‘heaviness’ has to do with the obscurity and indistinctness of such notions: we are unable to specify in any precise way exactly what we mean by them. As he puts it elsewhere: when we say we ‘perceive’ such qualities in objects ‘this is really just the same as saying we perceive something in the objects whose nature we do not know’ (AT VIIIA 34; CSM I, 218). It is a fundamental requirement for Descartes that all the terms used in philosophy and physics be transparently clear: they must reflect the clear and distinct perceptions of the mind when it is freed from the lumber of preconceived opinions, and guided only by careful rational reflection.10

In The World, Descartes rejects the scholastic explanatory qualities like heat, cold, etc., precisely because, according to him, “these qualities themselves seem to need explanation.” (AT XI, 26 / CSM I, 89) According to Descartes, to explain that terrestrial particles move downwards because they are composed of earthly matter is not really to explain anything but only to re-describe the phenomenon which itself needs to be explained. Descartes writes in the Preface to the French edition of the Principles: “Yet although experience shows us very clearly that the bodies we call “heavy” descend towards the centre of the earth, we do not for all that have any knowledge of the nature of what is called “gravity”, that is to say the cause or principle that makes bodies descend in this way.” (AT IXB, 78 / CSM I, 182-83) In one of the last articles in the fourth part of the Principles Descartes reiterates the charge of explanatory vagueness of the Aristotelian natural philosophy. This is much better than explaining matters by inventing all sorts of strange objects which have no resemblance to what is perceived by the senses . (AT VIIIA, 32425 / CSM I, 287)

In his critique of the Aristotelian-Scholastic hylomorphic explanatory apparatus, Descartes focuses especially on its use of what he considered qualitative notions like substantial forms. The concept of substantial forms was the cornerstone of the Scholastic edifice of natural philosophy. Descartes knew that it was sufficient to pull down this cornerstone to have the entire system crumbling to the ground.11 Descartes’ dissatisfaction with the Aristotelian substantial forms is evident throughout his writings. Speaking of the forms and qualities of the schools, Descartes characterizes them as chimeras (AT III, 212), philosophical beings unknown to him (AT II, 364, 367; AT III, 648-49), beings from which he shrinks (AT II, 74). He emphasises to his correspondents that the hylomorphic view of body derives from confusion and from the errors of youth (AT II, 212-13, AT III, 420, 435, 667-68), claims that his philosophy destroys that of Aristotle and the Scholastics (AT I, 602-3; AT III, 297-98, 470), and, indeed, boasts that it is easy to refute his opponents who hold on to such a theory (AT II, 384, AT III, 231-32).12 In the Principles, Descartes attempts to explain physical phenomena without recourse to substantial forms which, according to him, the scholastic philosophers supposed to inhere in things (AT VIIIA, 322 / CSM I, 285).13 11

Étienne Gilson, while referring to the conflict between Scholastic natural philosophy and the Cartesian one, notes with characteristic insight that the nodal point of difference was precisely the question of the substantial forms. See Gilson, Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien, 143-44. 12 See Daniel Garber, Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics (Chicago – London: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 104-5. The only case where Descartes accepts the substantial forms is in the case of the human soul as evident in his letter to Regius in January 1642 (cf. AT III, 503, 505 / CSMK, 207, 208). 13 For a pointed critique of Descartes’ understanding of substantial forms in Scholastic philosophy see Gilson, Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien, 162-63. Gilson points out that Descartes does not understand substantial forms as “abstractions” of the mind in the act of understanding. Instead he considers them to be real qualities inherent in physical objects. The Cartesian critique of the obscurity surrounding the substantial forms in the Principles follows from such a misunderstanding. In effect, the hylomorphism that Descartes tears down is a straw man that Descartes had himself made of it. In the version of hylomorphism that Descartes criticises, both substantial forms and prime matter are considered as substances; the former material and the latter immaterial. Gilson comments: “Rien d’étonnant que

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A second charge that Descartes brings against the AristotelianScholastic explanatory apparatus of hylomorphism is that its explanations are ultimately redundant. He considers them, in fact, to be useless for the purpose of explanation, as evident in his letter to Mersenne on 26th April 1643: “The philosophers posited these real qualities only because they did not think they could otherwise explain all the phenomena of nature; but I find on the contrary that these phenomena are much better explained without them.” (AT III, 649 / CSMK, 216) Descartes’ letter to Regius in January 1642 clearly makes evident the redundant and unnecessary character of hylomorphic explanations. Recalling an earlier work, he chides Regius: “Do you not remember that on page 164 of my Meteorology, I found them unnecessary in setting out my explanations? If you had taken this course, everybody in your audience would have rejected them as soon as they saw they were useless.” (AT III, 492 / CSMK, 205) The context of this remark was Regius’ troubles on the question of the rejection of substantial forms with Voëtius, the Rector of the University of Utrecht, where the former, who was a disciple of Descartes taught medicine. Descartes goes on to add: “We do not need them in order to explain the causes of natural things.” (AT III, 500 / CSMK, 207) Their redundant nature ultimately leads Descartes to reject them altogether. (AT III, 500 / CSMK, 207) For Descartes hylomorphic explanations are redundant for the very fact that the simple and direct mechanistic explanations are themselves sufficient to explain all natural phenomena. As an example, one may recall here how Descartes rules out the hylomorphic explanation in The World to describe what happens when fire burns a piece of wood. Descartes points out that a mechanistic explanation alone suffices in this case. When flame burns wood or some other similar material, we can see with the naked eye that it sets the minute parts of the wood in motion and separates them from one another, thus transforming the finer parts into fire, air and smoke, and leaving the coarser parts as ashes. Others may, if they wish, imagine the form of fire, the quality of heat, and the process of burning to be completely different things in the wood. For my part, I am afraid of mistakenly supposing there is anything more in the wood than what I see must necessarily be in it, and so I am content to limit my conception to the motion of its parts. … I consider that this power alone will be able to bring about all the same changes that we observe in the wood when it burns. (AT XI, 7 / CSM I, 83)

Descartes ait conçu pour un tel monstre plus que de l’indifférence, de l’horreur; mais on peut bien dire que c’est lui qui l’avait engendré.” Ibid., 163.

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A third charge that Descartes brings against the hylomorphic explanations is that they are sterile. It is enough to recall here Descartes’ letter to Voëtius in May 1643 regarding the hylomorphic categories: “They are quite useless, moreover, as long experience has shown to us; for no one has ever succeeded in deriving any practical benefit from ‘prime matter’, ‘substantial forms’, ‘occult qualities’, and the like.” (AT VIIIB, 26 / CSMK, 221) The element of sterility associated with the AristotelianScholastic natural philosophy is picked up for special criticism by Descartes in the Principles. In the Preface to the French edition of it, Descartes points out how it has not led to any real progress in natural philosophy: “Indeed the best way of proving the falsity of Aristotle’s principles is to point out that they have not enabled any progress to be made in all the many centuries in which they have been followed.” (AT IX B, 18 / CSM II, 189) Descartes’ critique of the Aristotelian-Scholastic concept of explanation and of substantial forms may be defined as a watershed in the history of ideas; that there was no going back to these concepts, at least in the explanation of material things, after the philosophical revolution that he championed.14 In this way, Descartes did make an important contribution to the ultimate demise of hylomorphism in the seventeenth century.15 Margaret Wilson writes: We know too that Cartesian physics—for all the embarrassments of its particular formulations and accounts—was in fact highly instrumental in ‘overthrowing the principles of Aristotle’—in establishing the concept of a universal science of matter that seeks to explain all phenomena in terms of basic quantifiable properties and simple laws governing change.16

Descartes’ contribution in the naissance of modern science lies precisely in his dethroning of the traditional Aristotelian-Scholastic natural philosophy through a critique of its hylomorphic explanatory account of natural phenomena to which his alternative proposal was the mechanistic one. We shall now go on to present the epistemological and metaphysical strategy that Descartes employed in order to establish the modern mechanistic Weltbild. We will base ourselves mainly in this chapter on the Principles of Philosophy, Descartes’ textbook of natural philosophy.

14

Cf. Clarke, Descartes’ Theory of Mind, 41. Garber, Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics, 116. 16 Margaret Dauler Wilson, Descartes (London – New York: Routledge, 1978), 3. Italics as in the original. 15

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2. Knowledge of the Physical World: A New Epistemology for a New Physics Descartes’ basic project in natural philosophy was to replace the reigning Aristotelian-Scholastic natural philosophy with his own new and better alternative of an exclusively mechanistic conception of nature. Descartes was aware that Aristotelian physics was deeply embedded in its own epistemology, both of which were embraced and popularized by the scholastic philosophers of his time. So, in order to usher in a new physics, Descartes begins by laying siege to the very epistemological foundations of the Aristotelian-Scholastic natural philosophy, with a view to demolishing them and erecting new ones in their place. The new Cartesian conception of the physical world, which would eventually contribute to the modern scientific Weltbild, builds itself accordingly on new epistemological foundations. Descartes’ revolution in physics begins inevitably with a revolution in epistemology.17 The epistemological project of Descartes was to lay new heuristic foundations for enquiry into the physical world, a project which can be spelt out as follows. First of all, Descartes moves away from the Aristotelian-Scholastic epistemology based on sense perception which he relegates as confused and childhood knowledge. He proposes instead a theory of knowledge in terms of pure intellection alone. Secondly, Descartes reduces the knowable and real attribute of physical bodies to metric extension alone revealed in clear and distinct perception. Such a pivotal move enables him to arrive at an exclusively mechanistic conception of the physical world. Descartes thus paves the way for a new theory of knowledge with regard to the physical world which we shall examine in detail now. The first part of Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy carries the title of “principles of human knowledge”. In beginning his treatise on natural philosophy with an examination of the principles of knowledge, Descartes intends to offer nothing short of new epistemological foundations for the edifice of certain knowledge (scientia) about the physical world that he intends to erect. The new Cartesian epistemological foundations were meant to substitute the existing ones of the Aristotelian-Scholastic natural philosophy. Of course, Descartes was not the only one struggling against the dominant 17

See in this regard also Daniel Garber , Descartes Embodied: Reading Cartesian Philosophy through Cartesian Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 234.

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Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy of the time. The disenchantment with Aristotelianism was widely shared.18 As Daniel Garber notes, in the Renaissance, there was not one single opposition to Aristotle and Aristotelianism, but a wide variety of quite different programmes.19 The group of thinkers who pitted themselves against the Aristotelian-Scholastic natural philosophy included Bacon, Galileo, Hobbes and many other lesser figures. To this list one can add various elements of Platonism, Hermeticism, the chemical philosophy of Paracelsus, and above all the revival of ancient atomism with Gassendi, a Descartes contemporary, at its head.20 But it was Descartes who was most articulate in his opposition to the Aristotelian-Scholastic natural philosophy, and grabbed the bull by the horns, one might say, by substituting its epistemological foundations with his own. In this Descartes was eminently original. Descartes alone intuited that the revolution in physics needed to be preceded by a revolution in epistemology and that too, at the deepest level of foundations. Here, as we have already pointed out earlier, Descartes stands out head and shoulders above other stalwarts of Modernity like Galileo and Bacon.21 It was an enormous task,22 which Descartes, however, felt confident to handle, as evident in a letter to Mersenne, dated 11th November 1640: “I do not think that the diversity of the opinions of the scholastics makes their philosophy 18 See in this regard Roger Ariew – John Cottingham – Tom Sorell (eds.), Descartes’ Meditations: Background Source Materials (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), xv. 19 See Daniel Garber, “Descartes’ Physics” in The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 324, note 2. 20 Cf. Garber, “Descartes’ Physics,” 287; Daniel Garber, Descartes Embodied: Reading Cartesian Philosophy through Cartesian Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 2. For an overview of Renaissance alternatives to Aristotelianism in natural philosophy, see, for example, Alfonso Ingegno, “The New Philosophy of Nature” in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, eds. Charles B. Schmitt et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 236-63. 21 We have compared Descartes to Galileo in this regard already in the third chapter. In attempting to provide solid theoretical epistemological foundations for his new brand of natural philosophy Descartes also superseded Francis Bacon who instead advocated the model of the natural philosopher purely as a practical man. See Stephen Gaukroger, Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 14-18, 104. 22 John Cottingham reminds us that “when Descartes challenged the Schoolmen he had to contend with a formidable philosophical system of considerable sophistication and power.” Cottingham, Descartes, 4.

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difficult to refute. It is easy to overrun the foundations on which they all agree, and once that has been done, all their disagreements over detail will seem them foolish.” (AT III, 232 / CSMK, 156) The foundational nature of Cartesian epistemology is evident already in the first paragraphs of the Meditations wherein Descartes seeks to demolish the existing foundations of knowledge and erect more trustworthy ones in their place. (AT VII, 17 / CSM II, 12) However, within the architectonic structure of the Principles—Descartes’ treatise in natural philosophy concerned about the study and description of the physical world—the collocation of a section on the principles of human knowledge right at the very beginning as foundation to the rest of the edifice is original. The fundamental claim that Descartes advances here is that a thorough and fool proof enquiry into the knowing process itself needs to precede all affirmations regarding one’s knowledge of the physical world. In fact, strictly keeping in with this project, the epistemological enterprise (the first part of the Principles) precedes and founds physics (the remaining three parts of the Principles). It is a position that Descartes appears to have acquired in his mature philosophical writings as Daniel Garber notes. In the mature writings [of Descartes] the epistemological investigation of the sources of knowledge has become integrated into the system as a whole as a prominent component of the foundations of all knowledge; no mere practical preliminary to methodical investigation, it is unambiguously a component of the first philosophy on which the rest of knowledge stands, and from which the rest of knowledge grows.23

In laying new epistemological foundations for the knowledge of the physical world, Descartes ultimately transforms the very concept of scientia.24 It may be remembered here how in the Rules Descartes defines scientia as “certain and evident cognition” (AT XI, 362) which is itself drawn from clear and evident first principles. Descartes claims in the Principles that the first principles that he has developed in this work are clear and self-evident and thus qualify themselves to be termed as scientia: The true principles, enabling one to reach the highest degree of wisdom which constitutes the supreme good of human life, are the principles which 23

Garber, Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics, 154. It is important to recognize that scientia here does not correspond exactly to the modern concept of science. “In the philosophical Latin of the seventeenth century, the primary meaning of scientia (from the Latin scire ‘to know’) is simply ‘knowledge’.” Cottingham, Descartes, 3.

24

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I have set down in this book. Just two reasons are enough to prove the point: the first is that the principles are very clear, and the second is that they enable all other things to be deduced from them. These are the only two conditions that such principles must meet. (AT IXB, 9 / CSM II, 183)

Descartes handpicks for critique the scientia taught in colleges and universities around that time precisely for the reason that their conclusions are not clear and evident. Such scientia was founded on the weak foundations of sense perception and lacked a precise definition of material entities which instead were seen to inhabit occult qualities of substantial forms and prime matter. Descartes was convinced that what stunted or even blocked a fruitful scientific enquiry into nature was the reigning Aristotelian-Scholastic natural philosophy erected on such brittle epistemological foundations and embarked on the task of demolishing them one by one in order to erect new ones in their place. We shall now go on to discuss the Cartesian assault on the epistemological foundations of the Aristotelian-Scholastic natural philosophy. The Cartesian epistemological revolution begins with a critique of knowledge based on the senses, the first of the epistemological foundations of the Aristotelian-Scholastic natural philosophy that Descartes intends to tear down. Descartes assails the dependence on sense perception with the familiar weapon of sceptical doubt, a tool perfected by use in earlier Cartesian works like the Discourse and the Meditations and re-employed in the Principles. Descartes wields the weapon of doubt against the senses in the very opening paragraph of the Principles. Since we began life as infants, and made various judgements concerning the things that can be perceived by the senses before we had the full use of our reason, there are many preconceived opinions that keep us from knowledge of the truth. It seems that the only way of freeing ourselves from these opinions is to make the effort, once in the course of our life, to doubt everything which we find to contain even the smallest suspicion of uncertainty. (AT VIIIA, 5 / CSM I, 193)

While the critique of sense knowledge is a thread running throughout the Cartesian texts, the novelty of such a critique in the Principles consists of associating it to the prejudices of childhood or infancy.25 The contrast between the stages of childhood and adulthood that Descartes sets up 25

Étienne Gilson was the first one to call attention to the use of childhood metaphor in Cartesian texts. See Gilson, Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien, 169ff. Henri Gouhier also discusses this theme in La pensée métaphysique de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1978), 45-51.

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evinces clearly the superiority of his own philosophical system as dealing with the “real” world as opposed to the fantasy world of childhood prejudices. While Descartes identifies the pre-scientific era of childhood to the sense-based Aristotelian-Scholastic natural philosophy, he claims that his philosophy built on the intellect rather than on the senses holds the promise of ushering in the scientific era.26 The text of the Principles is interspersed with references about how the prejudices of childhood imagination stand in stark contrast to the truths of physics when it continues to hold that the earth is flat and immobile (AT VIIIA, 36 / CSM I, 219; AT VIIIA, 91 / CSM I, 253), that it is at rest in its own heaven, but nonetheless it is carried along by it (AT VIIIA, 89 / CSM I, 252), that the absolute vacuum exists (AT VIIIA, 50 / CSM I, 230), that the stars are very small (AT VIIIA, 37 / CSM I, 220), and so on. Descartes notes that childhood prejudices persist and offer stiff resistance to be overcome even in adulthood. “For example, in our early childhood we imagined the stars as being very small; and although astronomical arguments now clearly show us that they are very large indeed, our preconceived opinion is still strong enough to make it very hard for us to imagine them differently from the way we did before.” (AT VIIIA, 36-37 / CSM I, 220) In article 71 of the first part of the Principles, Descartes arrives at the conclusion that “the chief cause of error arises from the preconceived opinions of childhood.” (AT VIIIA, 35 / CSM I, 218)27 According to Descartes, the basic problem with childhood sense knowledge is that it is confused cognition. “In our childhood the mind was so immersed in the body that although there was much that it perceived clearly, it never perceived anything distinctly.” (AT VIIIA, 23 / CSM I, 208) Towards the end of the first part of the Principles Descartes states that since “there is nothing whose true nature we perceive by the senses alone, it turns out that most people have nothing but confused perceptions throughout their entire lives. (AT VIIIA, 37 / CSM I, 220) The error of the Aristotelian-Scholastic natural philosophy consists, according to Descartes, in being built on sense knowledge associated with childhood and consequently in not being able to distinguish the apparent physical world of the senses from the real one. Étienne Gilson rightly notes that Descartes’ 26

See Francesca Bonicalzi, “Sensi, infanzia e il sapere del corpo” in Descartes: Principia Philosophiae, eds. Jean-Robert Armogathe – Giulia Belgioioso (Naples: Vivarium, 1996), 55. 27 According to Anthony Krupp, Descartes views infancy and childhood precisely as a physical impediment to the unphysical activity of thought. See Anthony Krupp, Reason’s Children: Childhood in Early Modern Philosophy (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2009), 33.

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contention against the Aristotelian-Scholastic natural philosophy is that it takes the universe of the infant to be the real universe.28 For Descartes, it is precisely such infantile knowledge of the physical world based on the senses that is the obstacle for true scientific knowledge. In order to explain how the sense based knowledge of infancy obstructs scientific knowledge Descartes asks Mesland in his letter of 2nd May 1644 to refer to the text of the Principles about to be published. The difficulty we have in learning the sciences, and in clearly setting before ourselves the ideas which are naturally known to us, arises from the false preconceptions of our childhood, and other causes of error, as I have tried to explain at length in the treatise I am having printed. (AT IV, 233 / CSMK, 233)

What is the way indicated by Descartes to get out from the confusion of sense knowledge in the slough of which is caught up the AristotelianScholastic natural philosophy? Here Descartes’ answer is categorical. For him, the only guarantee of freedom from error is to assent solely to what is perceived clearly and distinctly by the intellect, because as he affirms in the Principles “we never go wrong when we assent only to what we clearly and distinctly perceive.” (AT VIIIA, 21 / CSM I, 207) In article 30 of the first part of the Principles, after having plodded through various doubts, Descartes concludes: “It follows that everything that we clearly perceive is true; and this removes the doubts mentioned earlier.” (AT VIIIA, 16 / CSM I, 203) Such clear and distinct knowledge is obtained by the intellect alone. (cf. AT VIIIA, 42 / CSM I, 224) It is the light of reason alone that discloses the true principles of material bodies. (AT VIIIA, 80 / CSM I, 248) In other words, it is by basing oneself on the clear and distinct perception of the intellect that one can truly arrive at the true nature of objects and of the physical world as a whole.

3. Clear and Distinct Perception and the Geometrization of the Physical World After having dismissed the Aristotelian-Scholastic scientia based on sense knowledge which Descartes closely associates with childhood prejudices, Descartes erects a new foundation for knowledge of the physical world in terms of clear and distinct ideas—the only valid epistemological starting point for him. Descartes’ epistemological strategy is to demonstrate that 28 Gilson, Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien, 170.

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the only attribute of physical entities which can be known according to the parameters of clear and distinct perception is metric extension. This move is pivotal in as much it enables Descartes to arrive at an exclusively mechanistic conception of the physical world. We shall go on to discuss how Descartes goes about it. Descartes’ basic argument is that in order to arrive at the “real” physical world one needs to have, first of all, a clear and distinct conception of it. So the question to be put to Descartes at this stage is whether, apart from the intuition of the cogito, there exist any clear and evident truths regarding the physical world which can be obtained by pure intellect. Descartes thinks so and proposes mathematical truths to belong to this category. They qualify themselves for the very fact that “they are utterly clear to us.” (AT VIIIA, 17 / CSM I, 203). From an early age, Descartes was impressed and delighted with the clarity and certainty that he found in mathematics.29 Accordingly, he insisted that all genuine knowledge ought to be as clear and certain as mathematical knowledge.30 What ultimately founds the Cartesian quantitative mechanistic approach is his conviction that the only valid way for the knowledge and explanation of the physical world is mathematical, as nature is purely extension (res extensa).31 Descartes vindicates that not only is nature mathematical but that the human mind itself is structured to think

29 One may recall Descartes’ meeting with Isaac Beeckman in 1618 and the latter’s profound influence on him. See in this regard chapter 3, footnote 7. 30 Georges Dicker, Descartes: An Analytical and Historical Introduction (New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 7. “This became, for Descartes, the fundamental requirement of knowledge: it must be as certain as geometry or algebra. Only so would it be immune to the sceptics’ attacks.” Ibid. See in this regard also Daniel Stolarski, Die Mathematisierung des Geistes: Algebra, Analysis und die Schriftlichkeit mentaler Prozesse bei René Descartes (Wien: Münster Lit, 2009). 31 See in this regard Daniel Garber, “Descartes et la physique mathématique” in Descartes, ed. Jean-Luc Marion (Paris: Bayard/Calmann-Levy, 2007), 189-207. On the philosophical function of mathematics in the philosophy of Descartes see Frédèric de Buzon, La science cartésienne et son objet. Mathesis et phénomène (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2013). See also David Rabouin, Mathesis universalis. L’idée de «mathématique universelle» d’Aristote à Descartes (Paris: PUF, 2009). For a comparison between Bacon and Descartes on the role of mathematics in natural philosophy, see Philippe Boulier, “Conception mathèmatique de la nature et qualités sensibles chez Bacon et Descartes” in Bacon et Descartes. Genèses de la modernité philosophique, ed. Elodie Cassan (Lyon: ENS éditions, 2014), 69-85.

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mathematically.32 He is certain that the human mind’s mathematical code is also nature’s code. But how can one be sure that it is the code? Here the certainty comes from God’s code—a kind of supercode (surcodage) that really gets things going.33 As Marjorie Grene notes, it is Descartes who achieved the radical geometrization of nature, not in some passing comment or in a superficial way, “but in a fundamental projection of natural science as encoding the mathematical relations that show us, with such certainty as our finite minds can master, what nature is.”34 Descartes virtually identifies mathematics with natural science. “Natural science is mathematical in character not only in the wider sense that mathematics ministers to it, in whatever function this may be, but also in the much stricter sense that the human mind produces the knowledge of nature by its own efforts in the same way as it does mathematics.”35 As Richard H. Kennington notes, it is “Descartes who implants ‘mathematicism’ in the heart of philosophy and science.”36 It may be recalled that the Cartesian project to build his edifice of knowledge on mathematical foundations dates back very early to his famous dreams of 1619 in which mathematics is seen as the key to understanding the universe and finds echoes in the Cartesian epistemology of the Rules and Essays.37 Mathematical properties are, in fact, frequently cited by Descartes as paradigm cases of properties which the intellect can clearly and distinctly perceive (cf. AT VIIIA 33 / CSM I, 217). For Descartes, as John Cottingham notes, to restrict one’s judgement to the sphere of pure mathematics is a reliable strategy for avoiding error and offers a way forward in obtaining clear and distinct knowledge of the physical world. 32

Here there is a reduction of thought itself to mathematical thinking, rendering the rule of mathematics the standard of all thought. Cf. Louis Dupré, “Alternatives to the Cogito,” Review of Metaphysics 40 (1987), 693. 33 On the question of the supercode see the extensive footnote in Jean-Luc Marion, Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1981), 327. See also Marjorie Grene, Descartes (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1985), 84. 34 Grene, Descartes, 81-82. 35 Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture, 404. 36 Richard Kennington, “Descartes and Mastery of Nature” in Organism, Medicine and Metaphysics, ed. Stuart F. Spicker (Dordrecht – Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1978), 202. 37 Cf. Ettore Lojacono, “L’attitude scientifique de Descartes dans les Principia” in Descartes: Principia Philosophiae, eds. Jean-Robert Armogathe – Giulia Belgioioso (Naples: Vivarium, 1996), 426.

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According to Descartes clear and distinct perception reveals physical entities in their metric extension. In the Meditations, for example, Descartes restructures the world solely along the geometrical characteristics that the intellect perceives the material bodies to contain. It is through geometrical categories that Descartes seeks to reconstruct the physical world as against the common sense perception of it. Descartes also makes maximum use of the abstract nature of geometry to emphasise that the objects of the intellect are purely objects of abstraction with no direct relation to the world. The intellect in itself has no relation to the world as “the proper objects of the intellect are completely abstract entities and are free of images or ‘bodily representations’.”39 As the mathematical relationships among extended beings become central in Cartesian science, sensory and imaginative experience plays only an auxiliary role in our comprehension of the physical world.40 As Descartes observes in his Sixth Replies (AT VII, 440), in his new vision of the physical world, all of the sensible properties that bodies seem to have, all colour, sound, heaviness, and lightness are to be eliminated, leaving an abstract and a fully geometrized world behind. If in the Meditations Descartes uses the examination of the piece of wax through the categories of clear and distinct perception to conclude that all material bodies are nothing but extended stuff, the same function is carried out in the Principles by the Cartesian distinction between real qualities and sense qualities—better known in subsequent philosophical discussion as the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.41 38

Cottingham, Descartes, 65. Stephen Gaukroger, “The Nature of Abstract Reasoning: Philosophical Aspects of Descartes’ Work in Algebra” in The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 110. 40 John P. Carriero, “The Second Meditation and the Essence of the Mind” in Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 216. 41 The distinction between the primary and secondary qualities which dates back to antiquity is a commonplace of seventeenth century scientific discourse and finds explicit treatment in the writings of the empiricist philosopher, John Locke. See in 39

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The Cartesian distinction between primary and secondary qualities is in itself a correlate of the epistemological divide between the confused and indistinct knowledge of the senses and the clear and distinct perception of pure intellection. Jill Vance Buroker is right in remarking that “the doctrine of clear and distinct ideas was not developed independently of the view that sense experience is inherently confused. Rather, it is the other side of the same coin.”42 In fact, the contrast between the confused ideas of the sensations of colour, sound, taste and the clear ideas of size, shape and position and motion runs throughout Descartes’ writings. Such a contrast, what Descartes calls “the wide gap”, is clearly evident in the title of article 69 of the first part of the Principles: “We know size, shape and so forth in quite a different way from the way in which we know colours, pains and the like.” (AT VIIIA, 33 / CSM I, 217) Descartes then goes on to state: This will be especially clear if we consider the wide gap between our knowledge of those features of bodies which we clearly perceive, as stated earlier, and our knowledge of those features which must be referred to the senses, as I have just pointed out. To the former class the size of the bodies we see, their shape, motion, position, duration, number and so on … To the latter class belong the colour in a body, as well as pain, smell, taste and so on. It is true that when we see a body we are just as certain of its existence in virtue of its having a visible colour as we are in virtue of its having a visible shape; but our knowledge of what it is for the body to have a shape is much clearer than our knowledge of what it is for it to be coloured. (AT VIIIA, 33-34 / CSM I, 217-18)

Descartes’ basic contention is that the sense-based knowledge of physical bodies is inherently confused and does not ultimately merit the appellative of real knowledge which can be obtained only through the clear and distinct perception of the intellect. For Descartes, colours, odours, tastes, sounds, heat, and cold are different in kind from extension, shape, and motion. “Whereas the latter are clearly and distinctly perceivable, the former are inherently obscure and confused, and therefore

this regard John Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, II. 8. 8-26. For a discussion on this question see Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (London: Penguin Books, 1978), 236ff; Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate (Oxford - New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 42 Jill Vance Buroker, “Descartes on Sensible Qualities,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 29 (1991), 604-5.

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cannot play a role in causal explanations in physics.”43 Towards the end of the Principles in article 200 of part IV Descartes states: Who has ever doubted that bodies move and have various sizes and shapes, and that their various different motions correspond to these differences in size and shape; or who doubts that when bodies collide bigger bodies are divided into many smaller ones and change their shapes? … But the same cannot be said of the other characteristics like colour, sound and the rest, each of which is perceived not by several senses but by one alone; for the images of them which we have in our thought are always confused, and we do not know what they really are. (AT VIIIA, 323-24 / CSM I, 286)

Commenting on this passage Margaret Wilson writes that only “ideas of size, shape, position, and motion, which apply exclusively to body, together with a small number of other ideas (such as number and duration) that apply equally to mental and corporeal substance, thus constitute the total repertoire of ‘clear and distinct’ knowledge of bodies.”44 It is such an epistemological conviction that leads Descartes to conclude that the only knowledge possible about the physical world is about its quantitative extended characteristics alone and that sense qualities cannot be real properties of physical objects. Only the quantitative features of extension about the physical world are real in as much as they are measurable—i.e., they are encompassed by mathematics and can be understood in geometrical terms. As Edwin Arthur Burtt notes: “we find ourselves forced to view the real world as possessed of none but primary or mathematical characteristics, the secondary or unreal qualities being due to the deceitfulness of the senses.”45 The central thesis of Cartesian epistemology in the knowledge of the physical world is that the essence of material things “consists not in those qualitative features which we arrive at by sensory observation, but in their underlying geometrical structure—in the attribute of being extended in three dimensions.”46 The theory of knowledge that Descartes develops, 43 Buroker, “Descartes on Sensible Qualities,” 589. However, Descartes can be challenged for his position that sense qualities are not quantifiable. In fact, they are amenable to mathematical treatment and it is possible to measure the brightness of colours, the pitch of a sound, and the temperature of an object. See Ibid., 590. 44 Margaret Dauler Wilson, “Descartes on the Perception of Primary Qualities” in Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes, ed. Stephen Voss (New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 163. 45 Edwin Arthur Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1932), 108. 46 Cottingham, Descartes, 80.

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leads him to conclude that only geometrical properties can be ascribed to material bodies, letting emerge thereby a new scientific vision of the physical world. The Cartesian conception of matter is thus a purely geometrical one.47 In fact, the only valid and possible conception of the physical world that can emerge at the end of the Cartesian epistemological route is a mechanistic one. Such a claim has been a momentous passage that led to the mechanization of the physical world, and has been the bedrock of modern science and of the modern Weltbild. The order of the cosmos, gleaned at the dawn of Greek philosophy, came alive in the thought of Descartes, Galileo, Newton and others, as a tangible and intelligible code in understanding nature. However, there is a great shift here compared to Greek thought. With Descartes, science ends the search for the order of the world since it discovers the world of order.48 It has been the beginning of the “mechanization” of the world picture, which became the major paradigm of modern science. Descartes contributes to the creation of the modern mechanistic Weltbild not only epistemologically as we have seen so far, but also metaphysically by arriving at the ontological definition of all physical entities in mechanistic categories. The Cartesian mechanistic conception of the physical world is not only the result of a certain method of investigation, but is also the ontological commitment to how things really are. We shall now examine the Cartesian ontology of the physical world.

4. The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Mechanistic Physics Descartes breaks with the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition of natural philosophy by awarding a foundational role for metaphysics in natural philosophy. In the Summa of Eustache and in other treatises on natural philosophy of the period, metaphysics was placed after physics, in keeping with the Aristotelian method of moving from the sensible to the abstract. Instead Descartes, whose ambition it was to become a new Aristotle in natural philosophy, sets out to build the edifice of physics on metaphysical foundations.49 The great originality of Descartes, as Geneviève Rodis47

See Dicker, Descartes, 205. Cf. Pierre Guenancia, Lire Descartes (Paris: Gallimard, 2000), 53. 49 On the metaphysical foundations of Cartesian mechanistic physics see Antonio Moretto, “Fisica e metafisica: La fondazione della mecanica secondo Descartes” in Cartesio e il destino della metafisica, ed. Ferdinando Luigi Marcolungo (Padua: Il Poligrafo, 2003), 147-69; Geoffrey Gorham, “The Metaphysical Roots of Cartesian Physics: The Law of Rectilinear Motion,” Perspectives on Science 13 (2005), 43148

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Lewis recognises, consists in having proposed a mechanistic view based on a metaphysics.50 It is especially evident in the Principles, Descartes’ treatise on natural philosophy, where metaphysics is placed at the very beginning. Such a detour on Descartes’ part is motivated by some unique considerations which shed light on Descartes’ conception of philosophy in general, and of natural philosophy, in particular. We shall examine two of these motives in the discussion below. Firstly, Descartes’ strategy to build his physics on metaphysical foundations in the Principles is in keeping with his overall conception of philosophy itself. Michio Kobayashi points out that both metaphysics and physics are closely bonded in Cartesian philosophy and that it is indispensable that one examine this rapport in order to understand his philosophical system.51 “In none of his major works Descartes develops a metaphysics without relating it to his natural philosophy. For the rest, Descartes himself declares, on several occasions during his philosophical itinerary, that it is his metaphysics that constitutes the foundations of his physics.”52 The Cartesian quest to build a complete philosophical system that unites physics and metaphysics finds its most articulate expression in the Principles, which is veritably a summa of Descartes’ philosophical views. In this work, Descartes effects a sort of grand synthesis of his previous works in metaphysics (prima philosophia) and his essays in physics. In the Principles Descartes aims “to unite metaphysics and physics within a coherent manual,”53 permitting him to fulfil a promise that he had made to 51; Helen Hattab, “Convergence or divergence? Reconciling Descartes’ Physics with His Metaphysics,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 45 (2007), 49-78. 50 Cf. Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, L’anthropologie cartésienne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990), 88; Id., “De la métaphysique à la physique chez Descartes” in Descartes, ed. Jean-Luc Marion (Paris: Bayard/Calmann-Levy, 2007), 139-59. 51 Michio Kobayashi, La philosophie naturelle de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1993), 9. On the link between metaphysics and physics in Cartesian thought see also JeanMarie Beyssade, “Scientia perfectissima. Analyse et synthèse dans les Principia” in Descartes: Principia Philosophiae, eds. Jean-Robert Armogathe – Giulia Belgioioso (Naples: Vivarium, 1996), 6-8. 52 Kobayashi, La philosophie naturelle de Descartes, 9. For an excursus through Cartesian works on the theme of metaphysics as preceding physics and as offering philosophical foundations for physics see Marcelo Dascal, “On the Role of Metaphysics in Descartes’ Thought,” Man and World 4 (1971), 461-64. 53 Jean-Robert Armogathe, “Liminaire” in Descartes: Principia Philosophiae, eds. Jean-Robert Armogathe – Giulia Belgioioso (Naples: Vivarium, 1996), xxvi. See also Beyssade, “Scientia perfectissima,” 6.

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himself and others of writing a complete textbook on philosophy. (AT III, 233 / CSMK 156-157; (AT III, 276 / CSMK, 167) Jean-Marie Beyssade notes that the explicit renversement of the order of physics and metaphysics finds systematic articulation only in the Principles, and not in earlier works.54 The celebrated analogy contained in the Preface to the French edition of the Principles makes evident that such a synthesis between metaphysics and physics has finally been reached and that the traditional order of sciences has now decidedly been reversed. Descartes writes: The first part of philosophy is metaphysics, which contains the principles of knowledge, including the explanation of the principal attributes of God, the non-material nature of our souls and all the clear and distinct notions which are in us. The second part is physics, where, after discovering the true principles of material things, we examine the general composition of the entire universe and then, in particular, the nature of this earth and all the bodies which are most commonly found upon it, such as air, water, fire, magnetic ore and other minerals. … Thus the whole of philosophy is like a tree. The roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences, which may be reduced to three principles ones, namely medicine, mechanics and morals. (AT IXB, 14 / CSM II, 186)

A second reason for Descartes to place metaphysics before physics is his unique conception of natural philosophy. It needs to be remembered that Descartes’ intention in the Principles is to provide an ontological account of matter, rather than just a phenomenal description of it. Such an exercise, he was aware, required solid metaphysical foundations, and here lies the originality of Cartesian natural philosophy. It is by virtue of having erected his physics on metaphysical foundations that his natural philosophy is not simply one amongst many, “but the one uniquely suited to revealing the ultimate constituents and structure of the cosmos. That his natural philosophy is a metaphysically grounded one is a key part of Descartes’ project.”55 Accordingly, the metaphysics of the first part of the Principles is a legitimatory enterprise in natural philosophy. The Cartesian metaphysics, as Pierre Guenancia notes, is not only placed before physics, but is also in view of physics.56 The “renversement” of the traditional order of physics 54

Beyssade, “Scientia perfectissima,” 30-31. Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes’ System of Natural Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 3-4. 56 Guenancia, Lire Descartes, 127. Guenancia terms Cartesian metaphysics in this regard as “une métaphysique ‘utilitaire’.” Ibid. 55

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and metaphysics was therefore necessary as part of Descartes’ new conception of natural philosophy. Such a reversal becomes the trademark of Cartesian philosophy vis-à-vis both the Scholastic natural philosophers of the time and others like Galileo or Gassendi who offered rival systems. Within the Aristotelian-Scholastic natural philosophy, physics was always taught before metaphysics, following a didactic methodology of moving from the better known to the lesser one. Descartes in the Principles turns upside down this traditional order. While the Aristotelian physics is based on common sense, the Cartesian one requires metaphysical foundations. As mentioned earlier, it was precisely on the question of the metaphysical foundations that Descartes profoundly diverges also from Galileo, who according to him built without foundations. (AT II, 380 / CSMK, 124) Descartes jealously guarded his originality regarding the new order of metaphysics and physics. In fact, Descartes disowns the work of his onetime disciple Regius precisely for the reason that the latter tampered with such an order. “Because he … changed the order and denied certain truths of metaphysics on which the whole of physics must be based, I am obliged to disavow his work entirely.” (AT IXB, 19 / CSM I, 189) The fundamental metaphysical conclusion that Descartes arrives at in the Principles and which serves as a foundation for the Cartesian mechanistic physics, is that the essence of single material entities and of the physical world as a whole consists in nothing but quantitative extension. It is a central claim that underlies not only the Cartesian but also the modern mechanistic Weltbild. What is the metaphysical strategy adopted by Descartes to arrive at this conclusion? This is what we shall look into now. The metaphysical strategy adopted by Descartes to arrive at the ontological definition of the physical world in terms of extension alone may be termed as “essentialism”. It consists in defining the essence of an entity in terms of its principal attribute alone. It is this method that enables Descartes to define all substances under the mutually exclusive categories of res cogitans and res extensa, identifying their principal attributes in thought and extension respectively. The search for essence is central to Cartesian ontology. According to Descartes, knowledge of a thing’s nature is prior to knowledge of its existence. Such a claim finds expression in a maxim expressed already in the Meditations, that “according to the laws of true logic, we must never ask about the existence of anything until we first understand its essence.” (AT VII, 107-8 / CSMK II, 78) The essentialist approach of Descartes differs radically from the Scholastic tradition of his time. As Jorge Secada points out the “opposite claim that in the order of knowledge, existence is

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prior to essence was indeed one of the most widely and firmly established of Scholastic doctrines.”57 For this, the Scholastic metaphysics may be termed as “existentialist” in contrast to Descartes’ essentialist one. Descartes realizes the metaphysical doctrine of essentialism through the “one principal attribute” strategy. According to the rule of one principal attribute “for any given substance there is one and only one corresponding principal attribute, i.e., one and only one attribute that constitutes the nature or essence of that substance.”58 In other words, each (kind of) substance “has its attribute, which is single, and clearly and distinctly intelligible to a ‘pure and attentive mind’.”59 The Cartesian argument of one principal attribute is very clearly articulated in article 53 of the first part of the Principles. To each substance there belongs one principal attribute; in the case of mind, this is thought, and in the case of body it is extension. A substance may indeed be known through any attribute at all; but each substance has one principal property which constitutes its nature and essence, and to which all its other properties are referred. Thus extension in length, breadth and depth constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; and thought constitutes the nature of thinking substance. Everything else which can be attributed to body presupposes extension, and is merely a mode of an extended thing; and similarly, whatever we find in the mind is simply one of the various modes of thinking. (AT VIIIA, 25 / CSM I, 210)

Descartes’ concept of principal attribute can be better understood in terms of the Aristotelian substantial form, which he sought to replace. “Since Descartes eliminates prime matter from the hylomorphic conception of corporeal substance, the result in Aristotelian terms is that a substance just consists in a substantial form. In Descartes’ own terms the result is that the substance just consists in a principal attribute.”60 The Cartesian principal attribute, in fact, does inherit several notions of the Aristotelian-Scholastic substantial form, especially from authors like Aquinas and Suárez. While for them substantial forms constitute the natures of substances, for Descartes the principal attribute plays this role.

57 Jorge Secada, Cartesian Metaphysics: The Late Scholastic Origins of Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 7. 58 Blake D. Dutton, “Descartes’s Dualism and the One Principal Attribute Rule,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 11 (2003), 395-96. 59 Grene, Descartes, 99. 60 Marleen Rozemond, Descartes’s Dualism (Cambridge, MA – London: Harvard University Press, 1998), 11.

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Chapter V The substantial form of a hylomorphic substance is the principle or source of the properties, faculties, and activities of a substance, and it determines what kinds a substance can have, or, at least, those proper to certain kind of substance. For Descartes its principal attribute determines what kinds of modes belong to a substance. Aquinas and others held that the substantial form is what gives the substance its being, its actuality. It makes something a substance. For Descartes the principal attribute makes something a substance, a being in its own right, as opposed to a mode, which has being through something else.61

The route to the principal attribute is epistemological while the conclusion at which one arrives at the end of this argument is metaphysical. The route is epistemological in as much as it is the intellection, and intellection alone, that reveals the naked substance in its essentiality through the process of stripping it of all other supposed attributes and letting emerge in the process its principal attribute alone. One may recall here how Descartes arrives at comprehending the true nature of the piece of wax in the Second Meditation, discarding all its sensory qualities in order to reach its sole and principal attribute. The clear and distinct perception of the intellect serves precisely to know and identify the principal attribute of body as extension. Descartes argues that the corporeal substance needs to be conceived always in terms of quantity because otherwise, as he puts it, it is conceived in a confused manner. (AT VIIIA, 45 / CSM I, 226) The conclusion at which one arrives at the end of the principal attribute argument is metaphysical in as much as the doctrine reveals the “nature” of the entity under discussion. Thus, returning to the example of the piece of wax in the Meditations, it is important to note that for Descartes the piece of wax is not just something extended, flexible and changeable, but it is in fact, “essentially” extended, flexible and changeable.62 Its sole ontological nature consists in extension which being its principal attribute constitutes the reality of its substance. A citation from Jean-Luc Marion can shed light on this point. The principal attribute has another function which is resolutely ontic and not at all epistemological, namely, to constitute the substance. … Among the multiple modes, properties or attributes which are attributed to a substance and which make it known, one finds each time a singular one, that stands out as the principal attribute and whose character it is to ‘constitute’ the substance, i.e., to exist for itself, exactly as it is. The 61 62

Ibid., 11-12. Secada, Cartesian Metaphysics, 134.

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principal attribute then adds to its epistemological role a resolutely ontic character.63

Descartes’ strategy of defining the substance in terms of its principal attribute alone and the consequent reduction of the substance to this sole attribute has important consequences. The fall-out of the metaphysical doctrine of essentialism and associated principal attribute argument is the ontological reduction of the physical world to mere extension, the Cartesian res extensa. Descartes “identifies” the substance entirely with its principal attribute. For him a substance contains nothing over and above its principal attribute. He leaves no room for additional attributes to contribute to its nature and definition. Descartes thus arrives at defining the physical world as essentially and solely extension.

5. The Ontological Reduction of the Physical World to Sole Extension Descartes’ natural philosophy, as Daniel Garber notes, begins with his conception of body.64 One of the central pillars of Cartesian physics is Descartes’ metaphysical claim regarding extension as the essential or principal attribute of any corporeal substance and thus of all physical entities. In a way strictly parallel to the move of Descartes in the ontological reduction of the res cogitans to rationality alone, there is also concomitant reduction of the res extensa, the physical and natural world to extension alone. Already in the Meditations, Descartes defines each physical object and the physical world as a whole in terms of the sole category of extension. We may recall in this regard Descartes’ famous analysis of the piece of wax in the Meditations, which for Descartes represents all physical bodies and ultimately the physical world itself.65 The conclusion that Descartes arrives at is that the nature of the wax consists in sole extension which is “perceived by the mind alone.” (AT VII, 31 / CSM II, 21) It is a conclusion that is valid for wax in general (see AT VII, 31 / CSM II, 21) and ultimately for all physical objects in general. The physical matter reduced to sole extension, does not leave any room for sensible qualities like colours and odours, as evident in the Third Meditation. 63 Jean-Luc Marion, “A propos de Suárez et Descartes,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 50 (1996), 127. 64 Garber, “Descartes’ Physics,” 292. 65 On Descartes’ analysis of the piece of wax see also Patricia Limido-Heulot, Une histoire philosophique de la nature (Paris: Éditions Apogée, 2014), 30-35.

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Chapter V But as for all the rest, including light and colours, sounds, smells, tastes, heat and cold and the other tactile qualities, I think of them only in a very confused and obscure way, to the extent that I do not even know whether they are true or false, that is, whether the ideas I have of them are ideas of real things or of non-things. (AT VII, 43 / CSM II, 30)

The impoverishment of the physical world is all the more conspicuous in the Sixth Meditation where, as Henri Gouhier observes, Descartes restores to the world its ontological solidity, but without its colours and its perfumes.66 There is a subtle transition at work here, from the general conclusions about the nature of a body, to conclusions about which of the sensibly “perceived” properties of bodies have real correspondents in physical reality. “Descartes argues that only a subset of the properties that a body seems to sense to have are clearly and distinctly ‘perceived in’ it. This leaves him only a step from the Sixth Meditation conclusion that only geometrical properties can be ascribed to the physical world.”67 While for the Scholastics, as Descartes himself notes, the category of extension is only an accident (cf. AT VIIIA, 45 / CSM I, 227), for Descartes it is identical with the physical entity itself. Such a move from Descartes forms part of his programme of ontological austerity. Descartes drastically reduces the diversity of form-matter combinations of Aristotelian-Scholasticism when he decrees that in all of nature, matter has a single form or essence, namely extension.68 Descartes claims in the Principles that the nature of body consists simply in extension and not in qualities like weight, hardness, colour or the like: If we do this, we shall perceive that the nature of matter, or body considered in general, consists not in its being something which is hard or heavy or coloured, or which affects the senses in any way, but simply in its being something which is extended in length, breadth and depth. … weight, colour, and all other such qualities that are perceived by the senses as being in corporeal matter, can be removed from it, while the matter itself remains intact; it thus follows that its nature does not depend on any of these qualities. (AT VIIIA, 42 / CSMK II, 224)

66

Gouhier, La pensée métaphysique de Descartes, 269. Wilson, Descartes, 101. 68 Gary Hatfield, “First Philosophy and Natural Philosophy in Descartes” in Philosophy, Its History and Historiography, ed. A.J. Holland (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985), 151. 67

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“Descartes’ view,” as Daniel Garber notes, “is that bodies that exist in the world are extended things and extended things alone.”69 There is a clear example that Descartes provides in article 11 of the second part of the Principles which explicates Descartes’ reduction of matter to extension alone. In this passage, Descartes examines a stone, and in a manner reminiscent of what he does with the piece of wax in the Second Meditation, strips it of all sensible categories, till he arrives to define it solely and reductively in terms of extension in length, breadth and depth. Here is the passage: Suppose we attend to the idea we have of some body, for example a stone, and leave out everything we know to be non-essential to the nature of a body: we will first of all exclude hardness, since if the stone is melted or pulverized it will lose its hardness without thereby ceasing to be a body; next we will exclude colour, since we have often seen stones so transparent as to lack colour; next we will exclude heaviness, since although fire is extremely light it is still thought of as being corporeal; and finally we will exclude cold and heat and all other such qualities, either because they are not thought of as being in the stone, or because if they change, the stone is not on that account reckoned to have lost its bodily nature. After all this, we will see that nothing remains in the idea of the stone except that it is something extended in length, breadth and depth. (AT VIIIA, 46 / CSM I, 227)

What takes place here is the ontological reduction of the physical object under study and of the physical world as a whole to quantitative extension. Only after the logical elimination of all other attributes other than extension—which Descartes claims to be the principal and only essential one—and the consequent reduction of the ens to the minimal objectivity as per the categories of extension does Descartes allow the ens to exist. Here the material substance comes to be stripped of all its sensible qualities, considered as lacking ontological reality, and comes to be conceived in terms of quantitative features alone, i.e., in terms of the sole principal attribute of extension. The novelty and import of Descartes’ argument regarding material bodies consists in his insistence not just that bodies have geometrical properties, “but that they have geometrical properties alone, that is, that they lack all other properties.”70 From the reduction of the physical reality to sole extension, a mechanistic, geometrised view of the natural world naturally follows. From affirming that nature can and does lend itself to be considered under 69 70

Garber, Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics, 63. Garber, “Descartes’ Physics,” 297.

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the aspect of extension, Descartes slides into the assertion that material nature is essentially and solely extension.71 It is a clever strategy on Descartes’ part. He begins by reducing everything to simple natures of extension, shape and motion, to conclude that physical reality is constituted of mechanistic qualities alone, perceived through intellectual abstraction. Descartes, in fact, considered mechanics as the very order of nature impressed on it by God. (See his letter to Villebressieu in 1631 AT I, 213-14) As William R. Shea notes: “For Descartes, the material world, all the material world, is made up of cogs and wheels, of cranks and shafts. The component parts of Nature are bits and pieces of machinery, and machines, regardless of their size or complexity, have no end of their own.”72 The entire natural world itself thus comes to be construed as a single vast and interlocking machine—the machine of machines.73 Descartes thus makes a metaphysical advance in awarding ontological significance to the abstracted geometrical characteristics of matter. Gerd Buchdahl sketches out well such a transition: That which remains after abstraction takes on an additional ‘ontological’ significance. What the mind ‘considers in complete nakedness’ is not just an abstraction; on the contrary, it is what ‘really exists’, ‘properly speaking’. For Descartes argues that every other attribute of body presupposes extension; that all attributes are reducible to it. It is as though Descartes was passing from the contention that we are to study (and cannot but study) what is capable of order and measure, i.e. extension, to the assertion that matter or body is nothing but extension. Where earlier he had merely concentrated on the spatial and kinematical aspects of matter—as being the ones most ‘clearly and distinctly understood—he now reduces matter to these characteristics themselves!74

Behind the Cartesian mechanization of the physical world one might speak of an ontological mathematisation of nature. “Descartes’ contribution to the rise of modern science” is precisely “the replacement 71 Cf. Gerd Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: The Classical Origins - Descartes to Kant (Lanham – New York – London: University Press of America, 1988), 89-90. 72 William R. Shea, “The Environment and Changing Concepts of Nature” in Changing Concepts of Nature at the Turn of the Millennium. Proceedings of the Plenary Session of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences. 26-29 October 1998 (Vatican City: Pontificia Academia Scientiarum, 2000), 192. 73 William Barrett, Death of the Soul: From Descartes to the Computer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 6. 74 Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, 91.

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of the objects of the life-world by their mathematical representation— extended bodies.”75 The claim of Descartes—that mathematics constitutes the ontological structure of the physical world and provides its best explanation—has not been sufficiently evidenced by most commentators of Descartes, who limit themselves to pointing out that Descartes’ dependence on mathematics has not been as explicit as that of Galileo or Newton. John Cottingham, for example, observes that one is struck by the paucity of mathematical workings in Descartes’ physics. “Readers who approach Descartes’ scientific writings expecting anything detailed in the way of geometrical measurement, arithmetic calculation or algebraic formulae will be to a great extent disappointed.”76 However, to stop here—as many commentators of Descartes and historians of science do— is to miss Descartes’ basic contribution to the mathematisation of nature and thereby to the mechanization of the physical world.77 Descartes’ contribution to the mathematisation of nature stands out when placed in contrast to both the ancients and his contemporaries. It is evident when compared with Aristotle who in the Posterior Analytics precluded the use of mathematics in physical enquiry to explain natural phenomena, or with Galileo who only “mathematised” physical problems.78 Aristotle based his view on the argument that scientific explanations must be causal ones, i.e., based on the causes, and according to him mathematical abstractions are unable to provide causal explanations. The only role of mathematics is to provide descriptions of the phenomena.79 Galileo remains within the limits set by Aristotle when he restricts himself to offering mathematical descriptions of the studied phenomena. Descartes goes beyond Galileo and his contemporaries by moving from the mathematical idealization of the particular quantities—which is what Galileo does—to uncover mathematics as the ontological basis of the physical world as revealed in extension. Descartes argued that the 75

Ladislav Kvasz, “The Mathematisation of Nature and Cartesian Physics,” Philosophia Naturalis 40 (2003), 160. Italics as in the original. 76 Cottingham, Descartes, 88. 77 Anthony Kenny notes that even though it is Descartes’ philosophical works which are most read, “in his own time his reputation rested as much on his mathematical and scientific works.” Anthony Kenny, “Descartes to Kant” in The Oxford History of Western Philosophy, ed. Anthony Kenny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 117. 78 Stephen Gaukroger, “Descartes’ Project for a Mathematical Physics” in Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics, ed. Stephen Gaukroger (Sussex: Harvester Press – New Jersey: Barnes and Noble Books, 1980), 97-98. 79 Kvasz, “The Mathematisation of Nature and Cartesian Physics,” 168-69.

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mathematical form, i.e., extension, is the ontological basis or essence of nature. He held the ontological basis of the physical world to be mathematical. For Descartes, contrary to Galileo, “it is not only that the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics, but nature itself is embodied mathematics.”80 As Ladislav Kvasz rightly notes, Descartes thus passed from the Galilean idealization of the particular physical quantities to the idealization of the ontological foundation of the world.81 For Galileo mathematics was only a language suitable for the description of phenomena. It was Descartes who first arrived at the idea of a mathematical physics. … When Descartes says that everything can be reduced to extension and motion, it means that mathematics is the ontological foundation of reality. So geometry is not just a language suitable for the description of reality, as it was for Galileo. Reality itself is nothing else but mathematical bodies in motion.82

Descartes’ reduction of the physical world to mere extension was a momentous step and provided him with the “framework principles” of his natural philosophy.83 All that remains of the traditional cosmos is a conglomeration of impersonal and inert mechanistic laws that govern the physical world. “Descartes frees himself from the idea of the Cosmos. The world no longer has any unity; it is no more than a set of objects available for scientific research.”84 As Martial Gueroult observes, “this is the fundamental discovery of Descartes, that which inaugurates the modern science.”85

80

Ibid., 170. Cf. Ibid., 169. See also Nancy L. Maull, “Cartesian Optics and the Geometrization of Nature” in Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics, ed. Stephen Gaukroger (Sussex: Harvester Press – New Jersey: Barnes and Noble Books, 1980), 26. 82 Kvasz, “The Mathematisation of Nature and Cartesian Physics,” 166-67. Italics added. Descartes was probably the first to realise clearly the possibilities of algebraic language to move from the description of appearances to the description of the universal relations that constitute them. Ibid., 170. 83 See Hatfield, “First Philosophy and Natural Philosophy in Descartes,” 151. 84 Alain Touraine, Critique of Modernity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 45. 85 Martial Gueroult, “De la méthode prescrite par Descartes pour comprendre sa philosophie,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 44 (1962), 180. 81

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6. A Reductive View of the Natural World Descartes’ ambitious programme to replace the Aristotelian-Scholastic natural philosophy with a mechanistic one, by substituting the latter’s epistemological and metaphysical foundations with his own, is impressive in its sweep and audacity. The new Cartesian natural philosophy, he claimed, could explain all natural phenomena through the sole categories of extension and movement. Towards the end of his principal work in natural philosophy, the Principles, Descartes exuberates extraordinary confidence when he states: “there is no phenomenon in nature which has been overlooked in this treatise.” (AT VIIIA, 323 / CSM I, 285) The new mechanistic explanation impresses also for its capacity to offer a uniform account of wide ranging natural phenomena. One may recall here Descartes’ claim contained in a letter to Mersenne already in 1638 that the mechanistic model proposed by him to explain light in the Dioptrics, for example, is equally adequate for explaining photo-emanation from a star and from a glow-worm. (cf. AT II, 179-80) Descartes’ mechanistic programme in the study of the physical world contains some obvious merits, which to be fair to Descartes, need to be acknowledged. The positive contributions of the Cartesian mechanistic programme appear all the more striking when placed against the historical background where such a proposal was originally advanced. In comparison to the reigning Aristotelian-Scholastic natural philosophy, Descartes considered his own mechanistic explanation to be superior on several accounts. First of all, there was a certain epistemological clarity about it vis-à-vis the Scholastic explanations of physical entities in terms of prime matter and substantial forms, categories which defy empirical measurement. Secondly, there was a parsimonious employment of concepts utilised as all of the physical world within the Cartesian mechanistic system gets reduced to extended substances in motion. And finally, there was the element of descriptive universality thanks to the homogenization of physical matter based on the mathematisation of nature within the Cartesian system. The Cartesian mechanistic system proved to be a clear winner also versus the Renaissance conceptions of nature by exorcising the natural world of animism, of elements of the secretum, and of the magical aurora often bordering on the superstitious.86 A very important feature of the modern Cartesian mechanistic programme was the pragmatic success that it reaped. In the wake of the 86

See Ingegno, “The New Philosophy of Nature,” 244-45; Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy (New York – Evanston: Harper & Row, 1964), 147.

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Scientific Revolution the mechanistic physics conquered for itself the terrain of the scientific investigation of the physical world, and became the framework par excellence for the conquest of and mastery over nature. But lurking behind the apparently successful Cartesian and largely modern mechanistic Weltbild is a reductive and impoverished perception of the natural world. A serious problem with the mechanistic explanation is that it totally excludes all other levels of explanation of the physical world. Descartes makes a transition from the claim that all extended things are measurable, and thus mathematically intelligible, to the claim that the mechanistic mathematical approach is the only valid one to be employed in the knowledge of the physical world. This is a presupposition which has gone unchallenged ever since Descartes and has become part of the modern Weltbild which is also the foundation of modern science. The modern mechanistic worldview rules out in principle any explanation other than the quantitative one, since physical reality is by nature extended matter, res extensa. But is one constrained to accept as valid only the mechanistic understanding of nature? An example from ordinary life can light up the discussion here. Take, for example, a plot of land. It can give rise to a plurality of perceptions. A mechanistic scientist will be concerned about the size of the plot, the chemical composition of the soil, its topography, etc. An economist will come close to such a perception seeing the plot of land in terms of its monetary value as a piece of real estate. But these are not the only possible perceptions of land. A poet will see it in a very different way, as evoking sentiments of charm, beauty and empathy. An indigenous community will look at the same plot of land in an altogether different way, and see in their land a cradle of life, a repository of their traditions, and a symbol of their cultural identity. Now the trouble is that modern mechanistic science (along with modern economy) has accustomed most people to seeing land in a certain way. So a plot of land ultimately gets reduced to res extensa, its value measured as a commodity and in terms of economic utility, and considered interchangeable with any other piece of land. Such a perspective naturally enters into conflict with other perceptions of land like that of an indigenous community, for example. One could find multiple examples here. In fact, when dealing with certain realities like the beauty of a flower or of a sunset or the phenomenon of human love, mechanistic explanations fall too short indeed. Here the Cartesian epistemological postulate that the only kind of account that one can give of any corporeal entity is a mechanistic one proves grossly insufficient. The basic point that we want to make here is that the Cartesian mechanistic perception of the physical world, which has

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also become largely that of modern science, is only one among many ways of perceiving nature. The problem with the Cartesian mechanistic programme is that it leads to a homogenization of language about nature, as the physical world itself comes to be reduced to homogenous extension. Instead, as evident in the examples cited above, science is only one of the many possible languages of nature and the physical world, albeit a very important one. The mechanistic explanation does not exhaust the reality and meaning of nature. Scientific knowledge is in fact only one of the ways of “charting” reality and cannot claim monopoly over discourse about the physical world. Poetical, religious, mythical, philosophical, aesthetic and other forms of languages about nature do have their relative legitimacy in the perception and understanding of nature. There is a double epistemological reductionism to be overcome in Descartes: the reduction of all knowledge to scientific knowledge and the reduction of scientific knowledge to the mechanistic one alone. The mechanistic model proposed by Descartes and others at the dawn of Modernity, as an alternative to the reigning Aristotelian-Scholastic and the emerging Renaissance explanatory models, ends up being an exclusive model in the knowledge of the physical world. However, there is a problem when the mechanistic explanation is touted as the only possible and valid approach in the perception, knowledge and treatment of nature and of all physical phenomena. When the mechanistic model becomes absolute and exclusive—as happens with Descartes and other protagonists of mechanism—it cannot but end up in a reductive perception of the physical world. The modern Cartesian mechanistic philosophy presents a reductive view of the natural world as homogenous, inert, and unidimensional, as we go on to argue below. A first feature of the Cartesian conception of matter is its ontological homogeneity.87 Within Cartesian mechanistic perspective the physical world gets reduced to just homogenous matter—extension in length, breadth and depth. One may recall here Descartes’ claim at the end of the Principles that apart from sizes, shapes and motions, the entire physical world is nothing else (cf. AT VIIIA, 323 / CSM II, 285-86). Daniel Garber appears to have seen this point when he writes: “According to Descartes, all body is of the same nature; everything in the physical world is extended in substance, and its tendencies to behaviour are defined by the laws of motion”88 and that “for Descartes while there are an infinite number of ways that extended matter may subdivide into smaller parts, there is only 87 88

Kvasz, “The Mathematisation of Nature and Cartesian Physics,” 163. Garber, Descartes Embodied, 112.

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one kind of stuff in the physical world, and it all behaves in the same way, in accordance with geometry and the laws of motion.”89 Descartes writes in the Principles: The matter existing in the entire universe is thus one and the same, and it is always recognized as matter simply in virtue of its being extended. All the properties which we clearly perceive in it are reducible to its divisibility and consequent mobility in respect of its parts, and its resulting capacity to be affected in all the ways which we perceive as being derivable from the movement of the parts. (AT VIIIA, 52 / CSM I, 232)

Descartes adopted the homogenous conception of matter for some obvious merits of such a doctrine. The doctrine opened up a spectacular reduction in the number of special entities and properties—with which abounded the reigning Aristotelian-Scholastic physics—in order to explain physical reality.90 Descartes’ quest for explanatory simplicity in physics based on ontological reduction of the physical world to extension spells serious difficulties. G. Rodis-Lewis rightly notes how Descartes’ “reduction of the physical object to a three-dimensional, homogeneous, and undifferentiated space produces all the impasses of strict mechanism.”91 Cartesian mechanistic reductionism expressed in its homogenous conception of matter is blind to the rich multiplicity and profligate diversity of the physical world of everyday life. The “end of nature” thus begins with modern and Descartes’ reduction of the physical world to sole homogenous matter.92 A second feature of the Cartesian conception of matter is its inertness. For Descartes, all physical matter is not only homogenous in being extension alone, but also totally inert and passive. For a mechanist like Descartes, matter is ultimately reducible to parts which are totally inert and are in constant motion. Matter is inert in as much as it has no innate tendencies; all forces on it are applied from the external as per the laws of mechanism.93 The material body is described in Cartesian thought in the 89

Ibid., 230. See John Cottingham, A Descartes Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 11415. 91 Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, “From Metaphysics to Physics” in Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes, ed. Stephen Voss (New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 252. 92 See Bill McKibben, The End of Nature (New York – London: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1999) xv-xvi. 93 Here one may recall Erich Heintel’s critique of the Cartesian conception of nature as “onhe Innerlichkeit.” See Erich Heintel,“Tierseele und Organismusproblem im 90

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following terms that Gaukroger summarizes well: “It is completely regular and deterministic in its behaviour, it does not contain any of the “souls’ traditionally postulated to account for vital or other functions; it does not initiate activity but merely conserves a pre-given amount of activity; causation occurs only by means of physical contact, and so on.”94 With his mechanical philosophy, Descartes carries out the de-souling of the physical world making nature totally inanimate. An animate view of nature was common up to the 16th century, with animism and fertility cults having survived up to the Renaissance period.95 The AristotelianScholastic tradition held an en-souled view of the physical world in terms of sentient soul, animal soul, etc., while the spiritual soul was assigned only to humans.96 Descartes brought about a radical change to this scheme by reducing the human soul to the rational or cognitive soul alone, and in depriving the rest of the physical world of any element of subjectivity at all. Within Cartesian metaphysics, the traditional animal and vegetative capacities of the Aristotelian soul are all explained away in mechanistic terms alone. In short, within Cartesian metaphysics, nature, apart from humans, is without soul and life. Luc Ferry writes: Cartesian physics took to the task of eradicating the notion that the universe is a “great living being,” of doing away with the animism or “hylozoism” that still dominated scholastic thought. … The material world is without soul, without life, without even a force; it is entirely reduced to the dimensions of “extension” and motion. Thus no mysteries are inaccessible to human knowledge in this simple mechanism of objects that is the universe.97

Against the Cartesian conception of the natural world as totally inert, it needs to be remembered here that a certain dynamism is immanent to nature, as the very etymological meaning of the term infers. Nature is etymologically derived from natus, which refers to the process of birth. What emerges in the classical Aristotelian vision of nature is a dynamic rather than a static concept of nature. For Aristotle, the natural world was cartesianischen System,” Wiener Zeitschrift für Philosophie, Psychologie, Pädagogik 3 (1950), 73-120. 94 Gaukroger, Descartes’ System of Natural Philosophy, 70. 95 See in this regard Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980), 195. 96 Within the Aristotelian account even plants share to a minor degree in aspects of the psyche. See in this regard De Anima 413 a-b. 97 Luc Ferry, The New Ecological Order (Chicago – London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 21.

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essentially a living world. In his Metaphysics he declared the meaning of nature (phusis) to be the essence of things which have a source of movement in themselves.98 Within the Aristotelian philosophy of nature, matter is never inert, but is invested with a certain internal dynamism, as it is potency in constant actuation. In this view of the matter, things have internal causal powers inherent to them. Change in the case of living entities, for example, is governed internally by the causal principle of its inherent telos. Descartes abandons the Aristotelian scheme of change as the actus of potentia. For Descartes the only potentiality in nature is divisibility, which is itself, a potentia without an end, a non-teleological potentia.99 The offshoot of the Cartesian inanimate conception of nature has been precisely the blurring of the dynamic aspect of nature. It is important to recall here that the science of ecology itself has shed much light on the dynamic aspect of nature. Some clear indications in this regard have come from the study of food chains and energy circuits that exist within the biosphere. Within ecology, nature does not come to be looked upon any more, as in the Cartesian-Newtonian tradition as a great machine, but rather as a living organism. Herein, the Earth is itself perceived as a living organism, and as a living planet, rather than dead and inert matter. One of the most fertile ecological concepts in this regard has been the Gaia hypothesis of James Lovelock. Here, the planet Earth comes to be perceived as a unitary living organism, and as a self-regulating system.100 A third feature of the Cartesian and modern mechanistic philosophy is that it offers a one-dimensional view of the natural world. As Herbert Marcuse noted, Cartesian philosophy cleared “the road toward the 98

See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk 5, ch. 3, 1014b,16-17. See also R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature (Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), 82; Jürgen Mittelstrass, “Historical and Epistemological Aspects of the Concept of Nature” in Changing Concepts of Nature at the Turn of the Millennium. Proceedings of the Plenary Session of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences. 26-29 October 1998 (Vatican City: Pontificia Academia Scientiarum, 2000), 3. 99 See, Dennis Des Chene, “Descartes and Coimbra Natural Philosophy” in Descartes’ Natural Philosophy, eds. Stephen Gaukroger - John Schuster - John Sutton (London – New York: Routledge, 2000), 37. 100 James E. Lovelock, Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth (Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press, 1979). Lovelock’s basic argument is that Earth is not simply an “environment” for life, but is rather a living organism, a self-sustaining system, a system that modifies its surroundings so as to ensure its survival. It needs to be pointed out that the original intuition regarding the earth as an animate organism dates back to ancient times. One may recall here the concept of world soul (anima mundi) in Plato. See Timaeus, 49e-50a, 52a.

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establishment of a one-dimensional scientific universe.”101 Within the mechanistic approach only the quantitative features of the physical world come to be recognised while the qualitative ones are left out altogether. The perception of the physical world in terms of quantitative mathematical categories alone runs the risk of straight-jacketing nature to a single dimension alone. This is certainly a reductive conception of matter as “nothing more can be said about the essence of res extensa than that it instantiates geometrical forms. It is purely homogenous extendedness, and so it has no other essential qualities.”102 Such a reductive perception of the physical world in terms of extended matter alone is blind to the irreducible and prodigal complexity and diversity of nature. So the physical world that the Cartesian subject comes to know is not nature as it is but a highly filtered version of it in terms of geometrical features alone. It is reminiscent of Alfred North Whitehead’s remark regarding modern science’s approach to nature as “one-eyed reason deficient in its vision of depth.”103 When it is claimed that nature is all that is revealed in this way, namely, as exhibiting mechanistic properties alone, what remains is certainly an impoverished perception of nature. In fact, the Cartesian geometer’s mind, while claiming to perceive the “real” world, loses touch with the “concrete” world. As Daniel Garber notes, within the Cartesian mechanistic philosophy the sensual bodies are replaced by the lean, spare objects of geometry.104 Marjorie Grene writes of the Cartesian geometer’s flight from the concrete world. The geometer’s mind, turning against the ‘natural impulses’ of common sense, which had filled the world, obscurely and deceptively, with sights and sounds, bright colours and alluring songs and tempting fragrances, the geometer’s mind ‘knows’ instead, and conquers, a dead expanse of machine-like matter above which it stands in what Merleau-Ponty was to call a position of ‘survol’.105

101

Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (London – New York: Routledge, 1991), 156. 102 Emily R. Grosholz, Cartesian Method and the Problem of Reduction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 62. 103 Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926), 75. 104 Garber, Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics, 75. 105 Grene, Descartes, 190-191. Interestingly, Grene sees here the mutual sympathy between Descartes and the Port Royal theologian Arnauld who advocated a flight from the world. See Ibid., 169-92.

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A uni-dimensional mechanistic conception of nature amounts to bracketing out important areas of reality. As John Habgood observes, “a whole dimension of our human environment and experience has been bracketed out by the assumption that nature, as currently understood, is all there is.”106 Peter Simpson points out how “the abstract and artificial nature of scientific categories leaves much of the richness of the world of experience untouched, and it is a mistake to try, like Descartes, to absolutize them and extend them beyond their proper sphere.”107 Mechanistic thinking, while it has its own validity, is certainly not adequate to the full range of human experiences of nature, nor can it monopolize human perception and understanding of nature. The Cartesian and largely modern mechanistic approach towards the natural world—for all its validity from the scientific point of view—is hugely impoverishing, as it ends up in a uni-dimensional perception of the physical world in terms of quantity and motion alone. We shall now go on to make explicit some of its ecological implications.

7. The Mechanistic Weltbild and the Roots of the Ecological Crisis The modern and Cartesian view of the physical world solely in terms of mathematically measurable extended physical matter (res extensa) offers a reductive and impoverished view of the natural world as we have seen above. We shall now seek to evidence some of the attendant ecological consequences of the modern Cartesian Weltbild. What characterizes Modernity is a thorough disenchantment with the natural world.108 The eco-feminists describe it as a transition from looking at nature as our life-giving mother to looking at nature as dead and inert matter available for exploitation. Vandana Shiva writes: “The shift from Prakriti to ‘natural resource’, from Mater, to ‘matter’ was considered to be a progressive shift from superstition to rationality. But from the perspective of nature or women embedded in nature, the shift is regressive

106

John Habgood, The Concept of Nature (London: Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd., 2002), 51. 107 Peter Simpson, “The Nature and Origin of Ideas: The Controversy over Innate Ideas,” International Philosophical Quarterly 25 (1985), 30. 108 On the question of the disenchantment of nature in the wake of Enlightenment see Peter Marshall, Nature’s Web: An Exploration of Ecological Thinking (London – New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 214-221. See also Charles Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 1991), 94.

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and violent.”109 Carolyn Merchant, another eco-feminist notes: “In 1500 the parts of the cosmos were bound together as a living organism; by 1700 the dominant metaphor had become the machine.”110 According to Merchant “the removal of animistic, organic assumptions about the cosmos constituted the death of nature—the most far reaching effect of scientific revolution. Because nature was now viewed as a system of dead forces, the mechanical framework itself could legitimate the manipulation of nature.”111 The disenchantment with the natural world in the wake of Modernity has to do with an exclusively mechanistic conception of the physical world on the part of Descartes and other accoucheurs of the modern worldview. It is precisely the abstract vision of nature in terms of extension alone, presupposed within the Cartesian mechanistic approach, that leads one to view the world in terms of quantity and calculability, robbing the physical world of any element of marvel or beauty. In fact, the Cartesian res cogitans in perceiving the physical world as only res extensa can never be a homo aestheticus. Descartes repeatedly denies that the physical world, which within the Cartesian mechanistic programme is res extensa alone, can evoke any sentiment of wonder and empathy. Thus neither the macrocosm of the physical universe in the Principles nor the microcosm of the human body in the Treatise on Man evokes in Descartes any sentiment of wonder or marvel at all.112 The mechanistic worldview of Modernity, crystallised into the mechanistic canons of modern science, reduces knowing to scientific knowing and nature to mere matter with obvious ecological consequences. Wim Zweers writes: This is not only a turn to the subject, but especially a turn to a very specific kind of subject, namely a subject engaged in purely scientific knowing and technological control, where there is no place for aesthetic or spiritual (including religious) knowledge or experience of nature. Because of this turning, nature has disappeared as anything other and perhaps more than 109

Vandana Shiva, Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Survival in India (New Delhi: Kali for Women, 1988), 47. See also J. Baird Callicott - Roger Ames (eds.), Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought: Essays in Environmental Philosophy (New Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1991), 3 110 Merchant, The Death of Nature, 288. See also 111 Ibid., 193. 112 See Gouhier, La Pensée métaphysique de Descartes, 88-89; Annie BitbolHespériès, “Cartesian Physiology” in Descartes’ Natural Philosophy, eds. Stephen Gaukroger - John Schuster - John Sutton (London – New York: Routledge, 2000), 353-54.

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The mechanistic Weltbild and explanatory apparatus of Modernity has not only rendered obsolete but also eliminated in the process all other rival forms of perceiving and describing the natural world.114 The reductionism and exclusivity associated with the mechanistic explanation of the physical world do not leave any room for alternative and complimentary perspectives of the physical world like the aesthetic, symbolic or even religious and sacramental ones. Henri Gouhier speaks of the resultant Cartesian vision of nature as shorn of all symbolism.115 The inanimate conception of nature proposed by Descartes and other pioneers of Modernity contributed to some extent to the desacralization of the natural world. In fact, what is often taken as material world in the common parlance in the post-Cartesian period, is a neat abstraction, reached by failing to take account of other experiences of nature including the transcendent one.116 Against the mechanistic conception of nature as inanimate, it appears urgent today to recuperate the symbolic and transcendent dimensions of nature.117 In fact the multiple languages about nature like the religious, aesthetic and poetic, just to mention a few, contribute their precious mite in the human perception of and relationship with nature. The disenchantment of nature does not make room for other values in nature except the utilitarian one. Obviously, an ontological view of nature in terms of efficient causes alone cannot leave any room for contemplation of nature, but only for manipulation of it. As Hans Jonas notes, the new 113

Wim Zweers, Participating with Nature: Outline for an Ecologization of Our World View (Utrecht: International Books, 2000), 76. 114 See in this regard Louis Dupré’s critique of Modernity in Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture (New Haven – London: Yale University Press, 1993), 249. 115 Gouhier, La pensée métaphysique de Descartes, 88. See also Henri Gouhier, “Le refus du symbolisme dans l’humanisme cartésien,” Archivio di filosofia 2-3 (1958), 65-74. 116 Habgood, The Concept of Nature, 163. 117 It is significant to recall here that nature has always played, and continues to offer an element of symbolism and a pointer towards transcendence for many. There is a certain universality in the philosophical, religious and mystical traditions of humanity in perceiving the symbolic and transcendental dimensions of nature. Against the insights of these worldviews, the Cartesian and modern mechanistic perception of nature as dead and inert reveals itself to be bland and insufficient.

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mechanistic concept of nature contained the notion of manipulability at its theoretical core.118 The Cartesian, and to a great extent the modern, inert account of the physical world presents nature terra nullius, uninhabited by the mind, and ready for human annexation. Since no agency or ends or goals need to be recognized in nature, it is assumed that one can treat nature at will! Within an inert conception of the physical world, nature has no internal principle of agency or movement. Accordingly, within the Cartesian mechanistic paradigm, nature is seen as non-agentic, as passive, non-creative and inert, with action being imposed from without by an external force. Nature is thus mere stuff, mere matter.119 For Descartes, as Rupert Sheldrake points out, “all nature was inanimate, soulless, dead rather than alive.”120 The conception of nature as soul-less and mind-less is Descartes’ original contribution which lingers on to the present day. As Luc Ferry notes, “Nature is dead letter for us. Literally: it no longer speaks to us for we have long ceased—at least since Descartes—to attribute a soul to it.”121 The natural world thus gets reduced to the status of materials bank and human living space. Nature is “available”, for human expropriation and exploitation.122 Significantly, as William J. Mills has pointed out, it is precisely with the adoption of the machine metaphor to refer to the natural world in Modernity that an exploitative attitude towards the natural world emerged in the West.123 Within the Cartesian and modern mechanistic worldview, nature accordingly comes to be reduced to a “thing” at the disposal of the human being. The only intelligibility of the natural world is in terms of the mathematical rationality of measurability and calculability.124 Such a onedimensional disclosure of the natural world as raw material presents nature

118 See Hans Jonas, Philosophical Essays: From Ancient Creed to Technological Man (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974), 48. 119 Cf. Wim Zweers, Participating with Nature: Outline for an Ecologization of Our World View (Utrecht: International Books, 2000), 105. 120 Rupert Sheldrake, The Rebirth of Nature: The Greening of Science and God (London: Century, 1990), 37. 121 Ferry, The New Ecological Order, xvi. 122 Michael S. Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 63. 123 William J. Mills, “Metaphorical Vision: Changes in Western Attitudes to the Environment,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 72/2 (1982), 248. 124 See in this regard Nathalie Frogneux, Hans Jonas ou la vie dans le monde (Bruxelles: Éditions DeBoeck Université, 2001), 125.

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as something solely “plastic” ready for human use and manipulation.125 The uni-dimensional understanding of the physical world as homogenous res extensa is, in fact, what underlies the modern utilitarian conception of nature as nothing more than a heap of physical resources at the disposal of human consumption. As Martin Heidegger has pointed out, Modernity’s one-dimensional disclosure of beings in the age of machination (Machenschaft) turns the natural world as “standing-reserve” (Gestell), into merely a storehouse of resources at disposal for human consumption.126 “The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit.”127 Emblematic in this context is also Heidegger’s observation regarding the Rhine river turned into a powerhouse of energy by building a hydroelectric plant into it, reducing the river to a piece of equipment for the production of energy.128 Within the modern mechanistic worldview, entities come to be considered as mere resources for human use and consumption with their ontological value measured only in terms of utility.129 The modern mechanistic perspective, and the contemporary economic and industrial paradigm that has derived from it, continue to look at the natural world as a store house of resources, as mere commodities at the disposal of humanity. Such a reductive perception of the natural world consequently becomes a fertile terrain for some of the conceptual root causes of the contemporary ecological crisis, as evidenced by the abusive treatment of nature on the part of humanity today.

125

Michael E. Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, and Art (Bloomington – Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), xiii. 126 See Dale Allen Wilkerson, “The Root of Heidegger’s Concern for the Earth at the Consummation of Metaphysics: The Nietzsche Lectures,” Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 1 (2005), 29. On the concept of “standing-reserve” see Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, tr. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 23-24. 127 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 14. 128 See Ibid, 16. 129 According to Heidegger utility is the ultimate metaphysical value in the age of technology. See in this regard Hubert Dreyfuss, “Heidegger and the History of Equipment” in Heidegger: A Critical Reader, eds. Hubert Dreyfuss - Harrison Hall (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 182-84.

CHAPTER VI THE MODERN MECHANISTIC PHYSIOLOGY AND THE WORLD OF THE BÊTE-MACHINES

Introduction In this chapter, in continuity with the previous one, we shall deal with the mechanization of the animate world on the part of Descartes at the dawn of Modernity. We will begin with a discussion of Descartes’ unique contribution to the de-souling of the animate world, facilitating thereby the emergence of the modern mechanistic physiology. Descartes contributed to the mechanization not only of the inanimate world but also of the animate world. We will then make evident the new philosophical foundations—epistemological and metaphysical—offered by Descartes for the creation of the modern mechanistic physiology. From the epistemological perspective, we will highlight Descartes’ originality in proposing the mechanistic explanatory schema to describe all physiological phenomena. Descartes succeeds thereby in dispensing with the vegetative and the sensitive souls altogether and paves the way for the exclusively mechanistic interpretation in physiology. On the metaphysical front, Cartesian physiology is erected on the bedrock of a radical ontological dualism between body and soul, reduced respectively to their associated mechanistic and cognitive features. In the process, Descartes also succeeds in eliminating all elements of teleology from the animate world. In the reduction of animate beings to mere res extensa, the modern Cartesian physiology becomes a humus for some of the most important conceptual roots of the contemporary ecological crisis. It promotes, as in the case of the inanimate physical world, an instrumentalist approach and an exploitative attitude towards animals and the rest of the biotic community. We will briefly consider especially the notorious Cartesian doctrine of animals as automata (bête-machines) and seek to evidence its main ecological implications.

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1. Descartes Unique Contribution towards the Modern Mechanistic Physiology The mechanistic approach was the master stroke with which Descartes sought to raze to the ground both Aristotelian physics and physiology.1 If The World and the Principles sought to offer a mechanistic cosmology and physics in place of the animated cosmology and hylomorphic physics of Aristotle’s Physics, Descartes’ writings in physiology like the Treatise on Man sought to substitute the vitalistic physiology of De Anima with a thoroughly mechanistic one. Descartes’ systematic interest in anatomy and physiology dates back to his transfer to the Netherlands at the end of 1628. His correspondence of this period gives precious clues about his study of anatomy.2 In his letter to Mersenne of 18th December 1629, Descartes expressed his desire to begin studying anatomy. (AT I, 102) A year later, Descartes wrote to Mersenne again, on 15th April 1630: “I am now studying chemistry and anatomy simultaneously; every day I learn something that I cannot find in any book.” (AT I, 137 / CSMK, 21) Descartes’ interest and competence in anatomy is borne out by the numerous anatomical exercises that he undertook. Adrien Baillet, Descartes’ biographer testifies in this regard: “He taught himself in a much surer way by personally dissecting animals of different species; and he discovered directly many things more detailed than the ones that all these authors had reported in their books.”3 In a letter to Mersenne, on 20th February 1639, nearly a decade later, Descartes wrote: In fact I have taken into consideration not only what Vesalius and the others write about anatomy, but also many details unmentioned by them 1

For the wider historical context of Descartes’ reaction to Aristotelian biology see Walter Pagel, “The Reaction to Aristotle in 17th Century Biological Thought: Campanella, van Helmont, Glanvill, Carleton, Harvey, Glisson, Descartes” in Science, Medicine and History: Essays in Honour of Charles Singer, ed. W.A. Underwood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951), vol. I, 489-509. 2 Apart from his correspondence there is also the collection of Descartes’ unedited works that shed light on his study of anatomy. For a collection of such fragments dating back to different epochs from 1631 to 1648 see Pierre Mesnard, “L’esprit de la physiologie cartésienne,” Archives de philosophie 13 (1937), 190-91; Jacques Roger, Les sciences de la vie dans la pensée française du XVIIIe siècle: la génération des animaux de Descartes à l'encyclopédie. (Paris: A. Colin, 1971), 142-50. 3 Adrien Baillet, La vie de Monsieur Descartes (Paris: D. Horthemels, 1691), pt. 1, 196-97.

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that I have observed myself while dissecting various animals. I have spent much time on dissection during the last eleven years, and I doubt whether there is any doctor who has made such detailed observations as I. But I have found nothing whose formation seems inexplicable by natural causes. (AT II, 525 / CSMK, 134)4

Our basic text of reference in outlining Cartesian physiology is the Treatise on Man which was originally planned by Descartes to form the second part of The World, of which the first part was the Treatise on Light. The redaction of these drafts was carried out between 1629 and 1632.5 The World was nearly ready for publication in 1633, but Descartes abruptly abandoned his plans, for motives not fully certain.6 Descartes continued to work on the manuscripts of the Treatise on Man,7 almost into the mid1640s, carrying on alongside his extensive studies in anatomy.8 It was only posthumously, in 1662, that from the manuscripts that survived, an imperfect Latin translation of the Treatise on Man was published by Florentius Schuyl.9 The physiological project of the Treatise on Man is echoed at least in four other works of Descartes. The Discourse on the Method which appeared in 1637 contains a summary of the Treatise on Man, in its Part V 4

In another letter to Mersenne of 13th November 1639 Descartes recalls the winter of 1629 at Amsterdam in the Kalverstraat, i.e., the Street of Calves, during which he used to go nearly every day to a butcher’s, to watch him slaughter animals, and to bring along with him the parts of the animals that he wanted to anatomise at leisure. (AT II, 621) 5 Cf. CSM I, 79; Annie Bitbol-Hespériès, Le principe de vie chez Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1990), 26; Stephen Gaukroger, “Introduction,” in René Descartes. The World and Other Writings, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), xxxi. 6 Many attribute Descartes’ decision to the condemnation of Galileo in 1633 on the part of Roman Inquisition regarding his views on the motion of the Earth contained in his Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems. See Descartes’ own letters to Mersenne of November 1633 and of April 1634. (AT I, 270-272 / CSMK, 40-41; AT I, 285 / CSMK, 42-43) 7 We refer to this work as Treatise on Man rather than as Treatise of Man, holding the former to be a better rendering in English of the original title of the work in French, Traité de l’homme. Thomas Steele Hall, whose translation we follow, calls it Treatise of Man, while CSM refers to it as Treatise on Man. As this work is translated only in bits and pieces in the CSM (running into just 10 pages altogether) all our citations will be from Hall. 8 Gaukroger, “Introduction,” ix. 9 Renatus Des Cartes, De nomine figuris et latinitate donatus (Leyden, apud Franciscum Moyardum et Petrum Leffen, 1662).

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(AT VI, 40-60 / CSM I, 131-41). Descartes concludes the Principles of Philosophy, published in 1644, expressing his desire to complete it by two more sections on animals and the human being respectively, in order, as he puts it, “to complete our knowledge of material things.” “I would not add anything further to this fourth part of the Principles of Philosophy if, as I originally planned, I was going on to write two further parts—a fifth part on living things, i.e., animals and plants, and a sixth part on man.” (AT VIIIA, 315 / CSM I, 279) The Description of the Human Body, the unfinished treatise of Descartes on physiology and embryology dating from the winter of 1647/48, may be said to complete in a certain way the physiological project of the Treatise on Man.10 Finally, the Passions of the Soul, Descartes’ last philosophical work, published in 1649, goes on to summarize his mechanistic physiology as he explains human passions to Princess Elizabeth, while taking into account also the union between the body and soul. As the Treatise on Man was not published during Descartes’ life time and as his interest in anatomy and physiology accompanied him till the very end and found expression in these later works and in his letters, we shall be taking into account these sources, as well as Descartes’ prolific correspondence, in order to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of the physiological project of Descartes. The originality of the mechanistic physiological project of the Treatise on Man lies in the fact that it is carried out in conjunction with the mechanistic cosmology and general physics of The World and (later of the Principles), and applies the same explanatory principles to human physiology. His physiology is a piece with his programme in physics. Descartes’ intention is to base his cosmology and physiology on a physics “so universal that it could apply to animal functions and to man himself, as well as to inanimate objects—to the world as a whole and all it contains.”11 Descartes aims to explain both organic and inorganic matter by the same mechanical principle, considering the whole of the physical world, animate and inanimate as res extensa. So Descartes forges connections between cosmology, physics and physiology, placing them in the all-embracing mechanistic context. The sweep of Descartes’ thinking and vision in this regard was a match for the Stagirite master whose system of natural philosophy he aimed to replace.

10 In a letter to Princess Elizabeth of January 1648 Descartes talks of working on a manuscript offering “a description of the functions of the animal and of man.” (AT V, 112 / CSMK, 329) 11 I. Bernard Cohen, “Foreword” in René Descartes. Treatise of Man, tr. and ed. Thomas Steele Hall (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), xvi.

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Cartesian physiology was not altogether original, but rather built on an existing tradition. Annie Bitbol-Hespériès points out Descartes’ indebtedness in this regard to the great Renaissance masters of physiology.12 Descartes himself acknowledged his debt “to Andreas Vesalius and others” in his letter to Mersenne on 20th February 1639. (AT II, 525) Vesalius, who taught anatomy at Padua, published in 1543, the same year that Copernicus published his De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium, his treatise on physiology entitled De Humani Corporis Fabrica Libri Septem. In the Foreword of this book, intended to show the “fabric of the human body”, Vesalius called for a revitalization of the anatomical tradition, restoring the “lost knowledge of the human body” (emortuam humani corporis partium scientiam) as against the bookish teaching he himself received in Paris.13 The others mentioned in Descartes’ letter to Mersenne were in all probability Bauhin,14 and Fabricius of Aquapendente,15 stalwarts of the anatomical tradition of the time. Descartes’ years in Amsterdam, in fact, coincided with a renewal of anatomical studies, pursuing the way that was opened up by Vesalius.16 Descartes’ indebtedness to his predecessors in anatomy, however, ends here. Vesalius and others considered the human body as a microcosm and as a marvel of nature, themes that persisted in the medical treatises of the time, right up to Harvey and beyond, echoing the original AristotelianScholastic vitalistic tradition. Annie Bitbol-Hespériès sums up the spirit that reigned among the anatomists of the time, taking her cue from the Foreword of the aforementioned treatise of Vesalius. He [Vesalius] mentions the ‘charm’ of studying the organism which is ‘the most perfect among all the creatures’, and of examining with attention 12

Bitbol-Hespériès, Le principe de vie chez Descartes, 353ff. Cf. Andreas Vesalius, De Humani Corporis Fabrica (Basileae, Ex officina I. Oporini, 1543), Foreword. 14 Gaspard Bauhin’s most important anatomical work was Theatrum Anatomicum (Frankfurt am Main: Matthäus Becker, 1605). Descartes refers to the pineal gland in the Treatise on Man by using the letter ‘H’, imitating one of Bauhin’s anatomical plates in the Theatrum Anatomicum where the pineal gland or conarion is identified with the letter ‘H’. See Annie Bitbol-Hespériès, “Cartesian Physiology” in Descartes’ Natural Philosophy, eds. Stephen Gaukroger – John Schuster – John Sutton (London – New York: Routledge, 2000), 358. 15 Fabricius of Aquapendente taught anatomy at Padua for nearly half a century, where he had among his pupils Bauhin and Harvey. He was the founder of the famous permanent wooden anatomical theatre and wrote several treatises on anatomy. Cf. Bitbol-Hespériès, “Cartesian Physiology,” 358-62. 16 Bitbol-Hespériès, “Cartesian Physiology,” 354. 13

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Chapter VI what is ‘the refuge and the instrument of our immortal soul, that the Ancients, thanks to the remarkable correspondence with the world, had rightly named microcosm (microcosmus)’. These ideas, one dealing with the perfection of the human being that is shown in Vesalius’ book, the other associated with the definition of man as a microcosm and with the theme of Nature creating this noteworthy, remarkable work of art, will be of great importance in medical treatises after Vesalius, even in Harvey’s treatise on the movement of the heart and the blood.17

Descartes parted ways with the existing physiological tradition of his times by offering a totally mechanistic conception of the body, and rejecting analogies of the sort of microcosm to refer to the human body. The human body, for him, is no different from that of the animals, as bodies of all types belong to the realm of the res extensa, and obey the same natural mechanistic laws. Descartes offers a thorough and exclusive mechanistic explanation in physiology, exorcising from it any form or even residue of animistic or vitalistic tendencies. In the Treatise on Man the body is represented as a machine (AT XI, 120-21 / TM, 2-4), and there are references to it throughout the work as a machine whose functions can be explained in mechanistic terms. Descartes’ basic argument is that the machine “represents” the body and its functions rather than merely “resembling” it. Here lies Descartes’ originality in comparison with his predecessors who tried to understand human and animal bodies using the analogy of the machine and artefacts, having noted the close resemblance between the two. For Descartes the machine not just resembles the body, rather it “re-presents” it. The body does not merely appear to be a machine, but rather it is only a machine, as all its physiological functions can be described purely in mechanistic terms, just as earlier in The World he tried to describe physical laws in terms of the grand cosmic machine. The importance of Descartes for modern physiology18 and for the moulding of the modern Weltbild, through his mechanistic approach is huge. It is often forgotten that modern medicine was born, apart from the metric-experimental tradition, also out of the rational-philosophical tradition with Descartes as its most articulate and best-recognised early spokesman. There is no denial of the fact that most of the particulars of Cartesian physiology have been either proved wrong or eventually superseded in the course of time. But, paradoxically, while the particulars of Cartesian physiology have been surpassed, Descartes’ general premises, 17

Ibid., 353-54. See in this regard the masterly work of Vincent Aucant, La philosophie medicale de Descartes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2006).

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namely the rational and mechanistic explanation of physiological phenomena, and the rejection of teleology and non-local causes, have ultimately come to be the bedrock of modern physiology.19 There has been lack of recognition of the pivotal role played by Descartes in the fields of medicine and anatomy, and Cartesian physiology has been given only cursory treatment or dismissed outright, in spite of the many years of his working life spent on it.20 The medical sources used by Descartes were amazingly rich and diversified, although he studied medicine all by himself. He certainly knew ancient sources including Hippocrates, Galen, and the Coimbra commentaries on Aristotelian biology and medicine which were taught at La Flèche where he had his early education.21 According to Etienne Gilson, Descartes knew the Parva Naturalia of the Scholastics and Fernel’s treatises.22 The sources acknowledged by Descartes himself were the most recent ones: Vesalius, Bauhin and Fabricius, which were the same as Harvey’s reference books in anatomy and embryology.23 And, of course, Harvey himself is mentioned by Descartes. Such a rich repertoire of sources goes to testify that he was certainly no amateur in the medical field! Instead, as Annie Bitbol-Hespériès points out, he contributed to “the transformation of both the status of medical discourse and the place occupied by physiology and medicine in the field of knowledge.”24

19

Cf. Bitbol-Hespériès, Le principe de vie chez Descartes, 64; Dennis Des Chene, Spirits and Clocks: Machine and Organism in Descartes (Ithaca – London: Cornell University Press, 2001), 34; Thomas Steele Hall, “The Physiology of Descartes” in René Descartes. Treatise on Man, tr. and ed. Thomas Steele Hall (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), xxvi-xxvii. 20 Des Chene, Spirits and Clocks, 2; Bitbol-Hespériès, Le principe de vie chez Descartes, 22-23. 21 Cf. Gaukroger, “Introduction,” xxiii. See Bitbol-Hespériès, Le principe de vie chez Descartes, chapter 2, for an excellent presentation of Descartes’ medical sources. The author also provides indications regarding Descartes’ own references to them in his writings. 22 Étienne Gilson, “Descartes, Harvey et la scholastique,” in Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien (Paris: J. Vrin, 1930), 52. 23 Bitbol-Hespériès, “Cartesian Physiology,” 362. “The coherence of the Cartesian sources in science should be noted, because Descartes, in medicine as in physics, in L’Homme as well as in Le Monde, wanted to draw information from the most recent sources: from Copernicus to Galileo in physics, from Vesalius to Bauhin and Harvey in medicine.” Ibid., 353. 24 Ibid., 370.

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The huge influence of Descartes on medicine was acknowledged by some of the medical historians themselves.25 We may recall in this regard some of the letters that fully qualified physicians wrote to Descartes about medical problems. Descartes’ interlocutors included Plempius, Regius, and Vorstius, who taught medicine in the Low Countries, and Meyssonnier, a French physician.26 Of special interest is Descartes’ correspondence with Regius who was appointed professor of medicine at Utrecht in 1638. Regius even submitted to Descartes the medical theses he was formulating in order to have them defended by his students at Utrecht. Annie BitbolHespériès remarks: “Regius, a teacher of medicine, was behaving as though he was a student of Descartes, as can be seen from the letters he wrote to him, as well as from Descartes’ answers, from 24th May 1640 onwards, when Descartes pointed out the modifications that Regius should make to his theses.”27 Descartes never wrote a medical text but managed to create a school of medical thought.28 The great influence of Descartes on modern physiology is vouched for by the fact that in 1633 he was sought after by the University of Bologna to fill a vacant chair in theoretical medicine.29 One of the most important intellectual legacies of Descartes for posterity has been a mechanistic philosophy of biology. The philosopher of biology Ernst Mayr rightly notes that no one other than Descartes “contributed more to the spread of the mechanistic world picture.”30

25 See in this regard W.F. Bynum, “Psychiatry in Its Historical Context” in Handbook of Psychiatry, eds. M. Shepherd – O.L. Zangwill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 11-38; Thomas Steele Hall, A Biomedical Index to the Correspondence of René Descartes (Bethesda: National Library of Medicine, 1986); Gideon Manning, “Out on the Limb: The Place of Medicine in Descartes’ Philosophy,” Early Science and Medicine 12 (2007), 214-22. 26 Bitbol-Hespériès, “Cartesian Physiology,” 352. 27 Ibid., 374. See also Annie Bitbol-Hespériès, “Descartes et Regius, leur pensée médicale,” in Descartes et Regius, Autour de l’Explication de l’Esprit Humain, ed. Theo Verbeek (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993), 47-68. 28 See in this regard Géraldine Caps, Les ‘médecins cartésiens’. Héritage et diffusion de la représentation mécaniste du corps humain (1646-1696) (Hildesheim – Zürich - New-York: Georg Olms Verlag, 2010); Patricia Easton, “The Cartesian Doctor, François Bayle (1622-1709) on Psychosomatic Explanation,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 42 (2011) 203-9. 29 Gideon Manning, “Out on the Limb,” 214. 30 Ernst Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1982), 97. See also David R. Keller,

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Descartes’ original contribution to physiology, just as in physics, consists in having provided it with new philosophical foundations altogether. We shall now go on to make evident the new epistemological and metaphysical foundations of the Cartesian mechanistic physiology through an analysis of relevant Cartesian texts. In the epistemological reading of the texts, we will highlight Descartes’ originality in proposing the mechanistic explanatory schema to describe all physiological phenomena. The metaphysical reading of the Cartesian texts will evidence Descartes’ ontological reduction of all animate beings to sole res extensa, extended matter.

2. The Mechanistic Explanatory Scheme in Physiology Descartes initiated the revolution of physiology, by proposing an exclusively mechanistic explanatory schema to understand all living entities, a characteristic trait of modern biology ever since. We shall now examine in depth the epistemological strategy adopted by Descartes to promote the exclusively mechanistic explanation of all physiological phenomena. Our discussion of the question will trace the following trail. First of all, we will situate Descartes’ mechanistic explanation within his overall quest for certain knowledge, the latter being characteristic of his entire epistemological programme. Secondly, we will examine the Cartesian claim to provide mechanistic explanation for all major bodily functions, with special reference to the heat of the heart considered as the principle of life by Descartes. Descartes’ choice of the mechanistic explanatory schema came from his deep and prolonged dissatisfaction with the explanatory methodology of the Aristotelian-Scholastic natural philosophy, as we have already discussed in the previous chapter on Cartesian physics. In physiology, as in physics, against the Aristotelian-Scholastic approach, Descartes opted for mechanistic explanations which he realized was the only path to certain knowledge with regard to physical and physiological phenomena. Descartes considered the mechanistic explanation to be providing certain knowledge in physiology on the following grounds. First of all, on account of the epistemological clarity that it provided, while eliminating all occult forces and qualities from the explanation of physical and physiological phenomena. If the mechanistic explanation in The World and later in the Principles was supposed to exorcise all the occult forces from “Toward A Post-Mechanistic Philosophy of Nature,” Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment 16 (2009), 715.

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the cosmos at the macro level, it did the same in the Treatise on Man at the level of microcosm, the human body. Descartes achieved this by comparing both the cosmos and the body to a machine. The machine is, in fact, a paradigm of total epistemological clarity, and thereby of certainty, as it is open and without secrets.31 The adoption of the machine analogy was a clever strategy on Descartes’ part which paid him rich dividends. “The machine is visible, transparently articulated in a way that forms and faculties are not. It can be shown.”32 Within Descartes’ mechanistic physiological programme, physiological functions are, in fact, fully “explicable” in as much as they are demonstrable, and even “depictable”, as the many diagrams that appeared along with the Latin and French editions of the Treatise on Man testify.33 His introduction of the mechanistic approach in physiology brought along with it an amount of novelty, especially for the descriptive diagrams that accompanied the published texts. Dennis Des Chene brings to the fore Descartes’ originality, contrasting him with his predecessors: We are so used to back-and-forth reading of this sort that we hardly notice it. Yet the De Anima commentaries of Toletus, Suárez, and the rest are almost bereft of figures. Substantial forms and active powers, of course, do not beckon the engraver. But even when it would be appropriate, as in anatomical descriptions, the texts rarely include figures, nor are figures needed to understand them.34

A second reason for which Descartes considered the mechanistic explanation to provide certain knowledge, while at the same time scoring over the Aristotelian- Scholastic one, was its parsimonious character. Such parsimony characterises Descartes’ explanation of physiological phenomena in the Treatise on Man, and later in works like the Description of Body and the Passions of the Soul. The parsimonious mechanistic explanation enabled Descartes to liberate physiology from the wide range of Aristotelian substantial forms and the faculties and powers associated with the vegetative and sensitive souls. The strategy employed by Descartes here was to reduce the explanatory conceptual framework to a single and at the same time universal framework. As all inanimate and animate 31

Cf. Des Chene, Spirits and Clocks, 99-100. Des Chene contrasts the openness of the laboratory of virtuosi like Boyle with the occult chambers of the alchemist. Ibid., footnote 37. 32 Ibid., 73. 33 On the insertion of diagrams in the Latin and French editions of Treatise on Man, see Des Chene, Spirits and Clocks, 74. 34 Ibid., 74-75.

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nature, including the human body, comes to be brought under the purview of the same res extensa, Descartes claims that mechanistic explanations apply to them all universally. Descartes knew that “no epistemological frontier separated the part of physics that occupied itself with inorganic realities from that which occupied itself with organic realities.”35 Thirdly, an equally important reason for Descartes to adopt the mechanistic explanatory apparatus was the pragmatic motive. Descartes was convinced that the mechanistic approach in physiology could bear tangible fruits for medicine. We may quote from a later work in Cartesian physiology, the Description of the Human Body: There is no more fruitful exercise than attempting to know ourselves. The benefits we may expect from such knowledge not only relate to ethics, as many would initially suppose, but also have a special importance for medicine. I believe that we would have been able to find many very reliable rules, both for curing illness and for preventing it, and even for slowing down the ageing process, if only we had spent enough effort on getting to know the nature of our body, instead of attributing to the soul functions which depend solely on the body and on the disposition of its organs. (AT XI, 223-24 / CSM I, 314)

In conclusion, Descartes adopted the mechanistic approach in physiology, just as in physics, for its epistemological credentials over the reigning Aristotelian-Scholastic explanatory mould, and above all for its pragmatic appeal. We shall now go on to discuss Descartes’ basic claim, that all the functions of the body can be explained mechanically–something that was to alter the course of physiology ever since. It is true that mechanistic models as devices in physiological interpretation go right back to Aristotle.36 Descartes’ originality was to reduce the physiological phenomena under consideration to the mechanistic interpretation alone. In 35

Françoise Duchesneau, La physiologie des Lumières: Empirisme, modèles et théories (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), xiv. 36 Cf. Aristotle, De motu animalium, 701b1-4, wherein the movements of animals come to be compared with those of automatic puppets, or with the toy wagon. We cite the passage here. “The movements of animals may be compared with those of automatic puppets, which are set going on the occasion of a tiny movement (the strings are released, and the pegs strike against one another); or with the toy wagon (for the child mounts it and moves it straight forward, and yet it is moved in a circle owing to its wheels being of unequal diameter).” James Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), I, 1092.

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fact, all the physiological descriptions of the Treatise on Man are not only conspicuously mechanistic ones, but they are also exclusively so. By describing the human body as a machine, what Descartes claims is that the entire bodily structure and all its organic functions can be conceived in terms of the mechanistic explanation, just as he had done earlier with the physical world. Descartes paves the way for the mechanistic explanation of all physiological functions in the Treatise on Man in two stages. The first and the most important of these is his rejection of the role of vegetative and sensitive souls in causing bodily functions. Descartes staunchly rejected the Aristotelian and Galenic physiological faculties associated with bodily functions. This may be considered as the singular most revolutionary step in modern physiology, as it brought about the dispensability of the soul as causa vitae. The role played by Descartes in this revolution in physiology was nothing short of pivotal. Stephen Gaukroger highlights Descartes’ originality in this regard. The originality comes in the attempt to show how such a physiology can be modelled mechanistically. In particular, various functions had traditionally been ascribed to qualitatively different ‘souls’: digestion, movement of the blood, nutrition, growth, reproduction and respiration to the ‘vegetative soul’; perception, appetites and animal motion to the ‘sensitive soul’. Descartes sets out to show how we need postulate no souls at all for these organic processes, that all that is needed is the right kind of mechanical explanation.37

Thus in the Treatise on Man the digestion of food comes to be described as a physico-chemical action (AT XI, 121 / TM, 5-6) and the circulation of the blood is attributed to production of heat in the heart alone (AT XI, 123 / TM, 9-10). Also in his later works on physiology Descartes makes heat, and not the soul, the primary cause of physiological functions.38 He writes in Part V of the Discourse on the Method, which offers a summary of the Treatise on Man. I supposed too, that in the beginning God did not place in this body any rational soul or any other thing to serve as a vegetative or sensitive soul, but rather that he kindled in its heart one of those fires without light which I had already explained, and whose nature I understood to be no different from that of the fire which heats hay when it has been stored before it is 37

Gaukroger, “Introduction,” xxiii-xxiv. See Discourse of the Method (AT VI, 52-55), The Passions of the Soul (AT XI, 329-331). See also letters to Mersenne (AT III, 122) and Henry More (AT V, 267)

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dry, or which causes new wine to seethe when it is left to ferment from the crushed grapes. (AT VI, 46 / CSM I, 134)

Later in the Description of the Human Body Descartes reiterates his conviction that a body is only a machine which does not need a soul to move it, just as a clock does not require one. (cf. AT XI, 246) While comparing bodily organs to machines was not altogether new in physiology, what was new in Descartes’ approach was the determined and systematic effort to analyze all the vegetative and sensitive functions of the body in the manner in which machines had long been analyzed.39 The second step undertaken by Descartes, in order to pave the way for the exclusively mechanistic explanation of bodily functions, is to attack the notion of automation or self-movement, something that was traditionally held as the characteristic feature of animate entities in contrast to inanimate ones. Descartes shows that there is actually no difference, as automation in the case of the human body can be explained away, just as with regard to mechanical artefacts. According to Descartes, there is nothing more to physiological functions than similar mechanical processes taking place in other natural events. One may recall here how Descartes explains the physiological process of digestion. First, then, the food is digested in the stomach of this machine by the force of certain liquids which, gliding among the food particles, separate, shake, and heat them just as common water does the particles of quicklime, or acqua fortis those of metals. … And the food is ordinarily of such a nature that it can be broken down and heated quite of itself just as new hay is shut up in the barn before it is dry. (AT XI, 121 / TM, 5-7)

The stage is thus set for Descartes to explain mechanically, and exclusively in these terms, all the major physiological functions of the body. Once the way had been paved for mechanical explanation of bodily functions, especially with the disposal of the soul as causa vitae, Descartes’ claim to explain all physiological functions mechanically was only a logical consequence. In the very last paragraph of the Treatise on Man, Descartes enumerates the physiological functions performed by the machine of the body. The list is impressive which we reproduce below. I desire you to consider, further, that all the functions that I have attributed to this machine, such as [a] the digestion of food; [b] the beating of the

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Chapter VI heart and arteries; [c] the nourishment and growth of the members; [d] respiration; [e] waking and sleeping; [f] the reception by the external sense organs of light, sounds, smells, tastes, heat, and all other such qualities; [g] the imprinting of the ideas of these qualities in the organ of common sense and imagination; [h] the retention or imprint of these ideas in the memory; [i] the internal movements of the appetites and passions; and finally [j] the external movements of all the members that so properly follow both the actions of objects presented to the senses and the passions and impressions which are entailed in the memory. (AT XI, 202 / TM, 113)

It is significant that Descartes attempts to offer a mechanistic explanation not only of external senses, but also of internal ones. The internal senses for him include hunger and thirst, besides the traditional ones like common sense, imagination, memory, etc., all of which come to be explained exclusively in mechanistic terms. Even joy and sadness, and other emotional states like love and anger, it is claimed, can be mechanically explained. (AT XI, 165 / TM, 70)40 It would be worthwhile to examine Descartes’ mechanistic explanation of all physiological functions, but we shall limit ourselves to the study of just one of them, which is crucial in understanding Descartes’ mechanistic physiological theory. It is the movement of the heart, the heat of which is considered by Descartes as the principle of life. Descartes awards great importance to the question of the movement of the heart in his natural philosophy, both in his works and in his letters.41 He considers the movement of the heart as a privileged example, since he holds all other functions of the body to be dependent on this. Descartes refuses to explain the heart’s movement, calling upon a vis pulsifica in the heart, or as Harvey did, upon the expansive and contractive action of the heart itself, which according to Descartes cannot be accounted for.42 40

Of course, there is the notable exception of intellectual joy which belongs to the realm of res cogitans. In The Passions of the Soul Descartes distinguishes corporeally instigated joy from pure intellectual joy “that arises in the soul through an action of the soul alone.” (AT XI, 397 / CSM I, 361) 41 As Annie Bitbol-Hespériès notes, this is an aspect of Cartesian physiology that finds greater development in the works that appeared after the Treatise on Man. Bitbol-Hespériès, Le principe de vie chez Descartes, 55-56. See in this regard Discourse on the Method (AT VI, 46-55), Description of the Human Body (AT XI, 228-245, 253-254, 280-282) and The Passions of the Soul (AT XI, 333-334). See also Descartes’ letters to Plempius of 15th February and 23rd March 1638 (AT I, 521-536, 496-499 and AT II, 62-69, 52-54), to Mersenne of 9th February 1639 (AT II, 500-501) and to Beverwyck of 5th July 1643 (AT IV, 3-6). 42 Cf. Bitbol-Hespériès, “Cartesian Physiology,” 364.

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Descartes believes that if blood is expulsed during systole, namely, during the phase of contraction of the heart when it diminishes its volume, as Harvey held in his De Motu Cordis, there must be something in the heart itself that is the cause of its contraction. So Descartes explains the expulsion of the blood from the ventricles as a kind of natural phenomenon occurring in the blood itself, a process like ebullition, or fermentation, the result of the production of heat taking place in the heart. (cf. AT XI, 125) Descartes’ disagreement with Harvey and with the dominant physiological tradition of the time, is centred around his rejection of faculties to explain physiological functions. Descartes attributes the movement of the heart to the heat of the heart alone, which rarefies the circulating blood. He clearly states it in the Description of the Human Body. Now if we suppose that the heart moves in the way Harvey describes, we must imagine some faculty which causes this movement; yet the nature of this faculty is much harder to conceive of than whatever Harvey purports to explain by invoking it. What is more, we shall also have to suppose that there are additional faculties which change the qualities of the blood while it is in the heart. … For surely the best and swiftest way of preparing the blood that we can possibly imagine is that which is effected through the fire or heat—the strongest agent that we know of in nature. The heat rarefies the blood in the heart, separates the tiny parts of the blood one from the other, and divides them up and changes their shapes in all the ways we can imagine. So I am very surprised that although it has always been known that there is more heat in the blood than in the whole of the rest of the body, and that blood can be rarefied by heat, no one has so far noticed that it is the rarefaction of the blood, and this alone, that is the cause of the heart’s movement. (AT XI, 243-44 / CSM I, 318-19)

In his discussion of the concept of the heat of the heart Descartes is both deeply entrenched in the traditional physiology, as well as strikingly original. He shares the traditional medical view, held by Aristotle, Galen, and indeed by most medieval and Renaissance medical thinkers that the blood distributes an enlivening heat from the heart to the various parts of the body.43 But he differs from them on the cause of this heat. For the 43

Aristotle considered the source of the heat in sanguineous animals to be in the heart; in bloodless animals in an analogous organ. See Aristotle, De juventute, 469b3-4. Cf. Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle, I, 748. For the

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predecessors of Descartes, the heat was an instrument of the soul. For Descartes, instead, the heat by itself, without having to bring in the soul, is the sufficient cause of the physiological functions. His great originality consists in considering the heat of the heart as the principle of life, understood purely as a mechanical phenomenon, without needing to have recourse to any faculties of the soul. Descartes writes in the Description the Human Body: So I will say here that the heat in the heart is like the great spring or principle responsible for all the movements occurring in the machine. The veins are pipes which conduct the blood from all the parts of the body towards the heart, where it serves to fuel the heat there. … The arteries are yet another set of pipes through which the blood, which is heated and rarefied in the heart, passes from there into all the other parts of the body, bringing them heat and material to nourish them. (AT XI, 226-27 / CSM I, 315-16)

Descartes caused a major breakthrough in physiology by rejecting the interpretation which worked in terms of faculties previously used to characterise the functions of the body (the vegetative faculty dealing with the liver, the vital faculty dealing with the heart, etc.).44 Descartes tried to offer a mechanistic physiology disassociating the principles of life and soul, and identifying the former merely with the heat of the heart, against the Aristotelian vision where biology and psychology are intimately linked.45 In fact, as Annie Bitbol-Hespériès insightfully notes, the nub of Descartes’ controversy with Harvey is basically regarding the Aristotelian vitalistic conceptual framework of the latter, even when Descartes agrees with him on the experimental proofs of the circulation of blood.46 Against Harvey, Descartes consistently argues for a mechanistic framework in physiology. The mechanistic context of Cartesian physiology was also in sharp reaction to the pan-psychisms of Tommaso Campanella, Henry More and others of Renaissance naturalism.47

positions of Galen and the neo-Galenists of the Renaissance period, see Hall, René Descartes. Treatise of Man, 10, footnote 21. 44 Bitbol-Hespériès, “Cartesian Physiology,” 351. 45 Bitbol-Hespériès, Le principe de vie chez Descartes, 211; Jean-Marie Le Blond, Aristote, philosophe de la vie. Le livre premier du Traité sur les parties des animaux (Paris: Éditions Montaigne, 1945), 14-15. 46 Bitbol-Hespériès, “Cartesian Physiology,” 365, 369-70. 47 Bitbol-Hespériès, Le principe de vie chez Descartes, 211. Descartes criticises Campanella in his letter to Christian Huygens of March 1638 (AT II, 659 / CSMK,

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The epistemological revolution of Descartes in physiology was that the mechanistic explanation is sufficient to understand the phenomenon of life, in as much as fire and heat, like any other natural phenomena, can be explained mechanically. The epistemological barrier between the living and non-living thus comes to be abolished, as both are merely mechanical configurations of the same res extensa obeying natural laws. For Descartes, the principle of movement and of life are solely within the laws that govern all material bodies, which can be totally explained by mechanical principles (AT III, 213), on account of the disposition of its organs (AT XI, 120) without having recourse to any vegetative or sensitive soul (AT XI, 202). Descartes offers a totally mechanistic conception of the principle of life, which was indeed a ground-breaking advance in modern physiology. Des Chene writes: The science of life is henceforward to be, not the science of a special part of nature consisting in those things that live, and that therefore have souls, but an extension of physics. … The principle of life is no longer a form peculiar to living things: it is the heat of the heart, the same heat which is found in fire or rotting hay, and which consists in the violent motion of small particles. … Conversely, the human soul has nothing to do with the vital operations that in Aristotelian physiology are referred to the vegetative part of the soul. These belong instead to the body-machine.48

The mechanistic explanation, the exclusively valid one for Descartes, thus comes to be employed to describe and account for all physiological phenomena in the case of animate beings. Such an approach was itself founded on Descartes’ ontological conception of animate beings as sole res extensa, as we shall now go on to discuss.

3. From Mechanistic Description to Ontological Mechanism Descartes effects a transition from the epistemological to the metaphysical when he moves from the mechanistic description of physiological entities to their mechanistic ontological nature. Mechanism in Cartesian

90-91), while the panpsychic doctrines of Henry More are attacked in Descartes’ response to More of August 1649 (AT V, 404 / CSMK, 381-82). 48 Des Chene, Spirits and Clocks, 2-3.

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physiology is not only an explanatory method but also a substantive doctrine about bodies.49 Descartes completed the mechanization of the physical world with the mechanization of the animal soul, which was, in effect, done away with altogether.50 What ultimately founds such a move is Descartes’ ontological conception of animate beings as mere res extensa, and his refusal to recognize any animating principle in them. Dennis Des Chene writes: “Whether animals have souls is not a matter of whether their actions and those of automata could be exactly similar. It is a matter of what they are made of: for Descartes, they are made of res extensa, from which any quality or form like those in Aristotelian physiology is excluded.”51 Here Cartesian physiology is apiece with his physics. Accordingly, the human body and animals are not only described functionally in terms of a machine, but are constantly referred to as being nothing more than a machine in Descartes’ writings on physiology. Ultimately, it is Descartes’ conviction that the natural world is mechanistic for its very ontological nature that justifies his exclusive mechanistic explanation of all natural phenomena, both animate and inanimate. In fact, Descartes begins the Treatise on Man with the metaphysical presupposition about the human body as a machine: “I assume their body to be but a statue, an earthen machine” (AT XI, 120 / TM, 2), an assumption repeated at regular intervals throughout the treatise. Herein Cartesian metaphysics reveals its foundational character. Physiology, which Descartes understands merely as an extension of physics since the human body and nonhuman animate world obey the same mechanistic laws of general physics, is thus also built upon the very same metaphysical foundations.52 The biomachine ontology is itself an integral part of Descartes’ overall picture of the world, both animate and inanimate.53 In making evident the metaphysical foundation of Cartesian physiology, we will begin by demonstrating how Cartesian physiology is 49

Cf. Ibid., 14. Cf. Ernst Mayr, This is Biology: The Science of the Living World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 3-4. 51 Des Chene, Spirits and Clocks, 15, footnote 6. 52 According to Géraldine Caps, metaphysics “fonde la médecine philosophique de Descartes”. Géraldine Caps, “La place de la métaphysique dans la représentation mécaniste du corps selon Descartes et selon les ‘médecins cartésiens’,” in Nature et surnaturel. Philosophies de la nature et métaphysique aux XVI-XVIII siècles, eds. Vlad Alexandrescu - Robert Theis (Hildesheim - Zürich - New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 2010), 66. 53 Keller, “Toward A Post-Mechanistic Philosophy of Nature,” 717. 50

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built on the bedrock of a radical metaphysical dualism between body and soul. We will then proceed to make explicit the double reduction involved in such a dualism, namely, a reduction of mind to thought whose realm is the cognitive, and nature to machinery whose realm is the mechanistic. Cartesian physiology, just as in the case of Cartesian physics, is built on the bedrock of a metaphysical dualism wedged between the res cogitans and the res extensa, the two components into which Descartes divides all created entities.54 The question of the ontological separateness between the body and the soul is the foundation of Cartesian physiology. Within the dualistic framework of Cartesian philosophy, the soul is conceived as res cogitans, as thought, which is in no way connected to the corporeal, while the body is considered as res extensa, mechanistic extension, which is in no way connected to the incorporeal soul. The originality of the Cartesian conception of the human being in dualistic terms is most evident when contrasted against the views of Descartes’ predecessors. The Aristotelians and the Scholastics understood the soul and body as incomplete substances, and their union as bringing into existence a complete substance. For them “the incomplete substances are really distinct, but that is no bar to their joining to make a thing that is one in the strong sense, unum per se.”55 Descartes’ basic contention, something which sets him apart from his predecessors in physiology, is that the two components of body and soul mutually exclude each other. Descartes sees the error of ancient metaphysics as its inability to distinguish between what belongs to spiritual realities and what belongs to material realities, which he seeks to correct in his metaphysics (See Letter to Mersenne, 30th September 1640 – AT III, 192 / CSMK, 154).56 It is significant that Descartes divides all beings into just two realms which are themselves placed in sharp contrast to each other, whereas Aristotle spoke of different levels of perfection suggesting that the differences may be of degree. Aristotelian natural philosophy interpolated a series of forms, of increasing perfection, between prime matter and the immortal soul. Descartes’ natural philosophy has only two levels of perfection: extended substances, which are all on par, and the soul. … In Aristotelianism the domain of the living stretches from the lowly plant to the perfect being; in Cartesianism there

54

See Bitbol-Hespériès, Le principe de vie chez Descartes, 96. Des Chene, Spirits and Clocks, 140. 56 Cf. Henri Gouhier, La pensée métaphysique de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1978), 51. 55

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Whereas Aristotelian hylomorphism allows a graded hierarchy of living things with increasingly complex soul-functions, the Cartesian schema is strictly dualist. In this way the traditional soul-functions come to be allotted to either mind or matter.58 The ontological separateness between the body and the soul persists throughout the Treatise on Man. Descartes sometimes refers to the human body as though its rapport with the soul was extrinsic. “And this will permit the soul, when there will be one in this machine.” (AT XI, 184 / TM, 95) Close on the heels of the ontological separateness of the soul and body in Cartesian physiology, there is the thorny issue of their interaction. Consistent with his mechanistic approach Descartes seeks to explain such a connection in purely mechanistic terms. He does it by employing the concept of the “pineal gland”, which is described as the point of contact between the physiological and the cognitive, and “the principal seat of the soul” (Letter to Meyssonnier, 29th January 1640, AT III, 19 / CSMK, 143). The pineal gland comes in handy for Descartes to explain the interaction between the otherwise mutually exclusive substances of the body and the soul. The concept of the pineal gland as the point of interaction between the body and the soul did bring Descartes’ physiological views a certain respectability, as the pineal gland was an accepted term in the physiological universe of his time.59 However when the very concept was discarded later, the problem of interaction was back, and has remained to date as part of the Cartesian heritage of metaphysical dualism in anthropology. In fact, the difficulty of offering a satisfactory explanation of the interaction between the soul and the body persists throughout Descartes’ writings. Descartes does make an attempt to overcome this tension, especially in his later works. In the Discourse of the Method and in the 57

Des Chene, Spirits and Clocks, 3. Cecilia Wee, “Animal Sentience and Descartes’ Dualism: Exploring the Implications of Baker and Morris’s Views,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (2005), 615. 59 Descartes does not name the pineal gland in the Treatise on Man, wherein it is referred to as the “gland H, where the seat of imagination and common sense is” (AT XI, 177 / TM, 86), and at other times as “the principal seat of the soul” (Letter to Meyssonnier, 29th January 1640, AT III, 19 / CSMK, 143). But he does name it as “pineal gland” in his correspondence. See his letter to Meyssonnier, 29th January 1640 (AT III, 19-20), and to Mersenne, 1st April 1640 (AT III, 47-48). 58

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Sixth Meditation, the pilot analogy to explain the relationship between the soul and the body is explicitly rejected by Descartes as being unsatisfactory. (cf. AT VI, 59; AT VII, 71) In the Passions of the Soul, physiological states are admitted as being influenced by the states of the soul. But the problem persists and appears to be irresolvable, as it is part of the very metaphysical dualism of ontological separateness of the body and soul, which is the bedrock of his philosophy, physics and physiology.60 As his letter to Elizabeth of 28th June 1643 reveals, Descartes is at a loss when it comes to both defending the distinction between the body and the soul and their union. (cf. AT III, 693-94) John Cottingham sums up well the Cartesian problem with the status of the human being. His official dualistic ontology allows for only two kinds of substance, mind (res cogitans) and matter (res extensa), and the effect of this is to make a human being not an organic whole, but an uneasy amalgam of two incompatible elements—on the one hand, a pure incorporeal spirit and, on the other hand, the mechanical structure of the body, which is merely ‘a certain configuration of limbs and other accidents of this sort’ (AT VII, 14 / CSM II, 10). … For Descartes, the true self—‘this “I” by which I am what I am’ – is entirely distinct from the body (AT VI, 33 / CSM I, 127), and our biological nature as a certain species of animal is, if not denied, at least made extraneous to our essence as conscious beings.61

The ontological separateness of the body and the soul on which Cartesian physiology is founded takes the form of a double reduction of the mind to thought and body/nature to machinery. We shall now go on to reflect on this double reduction. We begin with the question of the reduction of the soul to thought. In the Treatise on Man, as in other works, Descartes understands the soul to account for only cognitive functions. It may be remembered that within Cartesian metaphysics thought constitutes the entire (tota) essence or nature of the soul. Descartes does not attribute to the soul any of the vital 60 On the irreducible tension throughout Cartesian thought on account of the mindbody dualism and the denigration of embodied experience see Gary Steiner, “The Epistemic Status of Medicine in Descartes,” International Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2011), 55-72. See also Stefan Ecks, “Welcome Home, Descartes!: Rethinking the Anthropology of the Body,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 52/1 (2009), 153-58; Andrew Nierenberg, “Failure to Integrate Brain and Mind (or Blaming Descartes to Understand a Very Modern Dilemma about Explanatory Models, Psychiatric Treatment, and Underfunding of Clinical Care and Research),” CNS spectrums 14 (2009), 599-600. 61 John Cottingham, A Descartes Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 74.

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functions that his predecessors did. The vital powers, once attributed to the vegetative and sensitive souls, are transferred by Descartes to the body. The crux of Descartes’ endeavour in the Treatise on Man and other works in physiology has been to eliminate the physiological role of the soul altogether and to limit it to the cognitive. It is important to place Descartes in his context with regard to this question. His view represents a reaction to a tradition which dated back to the Greeks, and which regarded the soul as both the motive cause of physiological function and the conscious agent of perception, volition and reason. His reduction of the soul to the cognitive alone therefore came as a radical revolution in the field of physiology, overturning positions held by masters like Plato and Aristotle and which influenced the discipline for centuries. The central contribution of Descartes to the development of physiology and medicine was the position he adopted with respect to man’s soul. Plato’s theory, we remember, envisioned two souls or parts of soul: rational and irrational, the latter having two parts, one passionate and the other appetitive-nutritional. Aristotle recognised four faculties of the single soul: nutritive (in all forms of life), sensitive (in all animals and in men), motive (in mobile animals and in man), and rational (in man alone). These ideas in various adaptations still dominated physiological thought at the time of Descartes. … the key to Descartes’ whole endeavour was his elimination of all soul faculties except the rational.62

In reaction to such theories of the soul, Descartes sought the elimination of the non-cognitive functions of the soul. He did retain the soul, but only as an agent of thought, with its seat in the brain. (cf. AT XI, 132 / TM, 22) Cartesian physiology is built on Descartes’ conviction that “there is nothing in us which we must attribute to our soul except our thoughts.” (The Passions of the Soul, XI, 342 / CSM I, 335) Descartes’ reduction of the soul to the cognitive alone is most explicit in his letter to Regius of May 1641: There is only one soul in human beings, the rational soul; for no actions can be reckoned human unless they depend on reason. The vegetative power and the power of moving the body, which are called the vegetative and sensory souls in plants and animals, exist also in human beings; but in the case of human beings they should not be called souls, because they are not the first principle of their actions, and they belong to a totally different genus from the rational soul. (AT III, 371/ CSMK, 182)

62

Hall, Treatise of Man, 113-114, footnote 158.

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Having reduced the soul to the cognitive functions alone, Descartes ultimately succeeds in removing the soul from physiology altogether, dispensing the soul as causa vitae. Cartesian physiology is concerned with the body, of which the soul is no more the form as in the Aristotelian Scholastic tradition. Whereas his contemporaries like Harvey or Borelli never relinquished the idea of the soul as a motive cause of vital action, Descartes promoted a soulless physiology which, however, finally survived. Thomas Steele Hall remarks about Cartesian physiology: Ultimately it [Cartesian physiology] prevailed. There could be no physiology, as we understand it, based on animistic theories of antiquity or on the new animisms that developed in the eighteenth century under the influence of such thinkers as Stahl, Whytt, and Sauvages de la Croix. … The soulless physiology practiced by some in the days of Descartes, and explicitly championed by him, was thus delayed, but eventually it was decisive.63

The soulless physiology was an important metaphysical constituent of Cartesian philosophy, on the basis of which he could refer to the human body as a mere machine. All the other non-human living entities also came to be considered by him to be merely automata, bête-machines, since he considered them to be soulless. From the reduction of the soul to the cognitive to the reduction of the body and nature to machinery was an inevitable concomitant to which we now turn. The reduction of the soul to thought within Cartesian metaphysical dualism finds its counterpart in the corresponding reduction of the body to machine. Descartes claims that every movement of the body that does not arise from volition “occurs in the same way as the movement of a watch is produced merely by the strength of its spring and the configuration of its wheels.” (AT XI, 342 / CSM I, 335)64 In the Treatise on Man, the body is called a machine, in as much as it is an assemblage or aggregate of distinct functional parts, linked together by their mutual action. As the human body is entirely material, and hence nothing but a particular modification of res extensa, Descartes holds that it should function with the same necessity of a clock. The movement of the heart, for example, “follows just as necessarily as the movement of a clock 63

Hall, Treatise of Man, 114, footnote 158. Stanley Victor Keeling notes that the simile of a watch to describe bodily functions became a stock illustration of this period, with Leibniz and Geulincx also having made use of it. Stanley Victor Keeling, Descartes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 152, footnote 2. 64

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follows from the force, position, and shape of its counter-weights and wheels.” (AT VI, 50 / CSM I, 136) Descartes is most explicit regarding the mechanistic character of bodily functions, dependent solely on the arrangement of organs and without having to call a soul into question, in the Description of the Human Body: It is true that we may find it hard to believe that the mere disposition of the bodily organs is sufficient to produce in us all the movements which are in no way determined by our thought. So I will now try to prove the point, and to give such a full account of the entire bodily machine that we will have no more reason to think that it is our soul which produces in it the movements which we know by experience are not controlled by our will than we have reason to think that there is a soul in a clock which makes it tell the time. (AT XI, 226 / CSM I, 315)

With the understanding of the human body as a machine Descartes eliminates the Aristotelian form from the nonhuman animate world. It is facilitated by Descartes’ homogenous conception of matter. The Cartesian matter lacks all qualities and forms which were typical of Aristotelian Scholasticism. The whole of the physiological world, just as with the physical world, is res extensa. David Keeling writes in this regard: The anatomy and physiology of Descartes’ natural philosophy is all in line with his celestial and terrestrial mechanics. The animated body or ‘machine’ is differentiated from inanimate matter in no essential respect, but simply in exhibiting greater complexity in the disposition and function of its parts and greater heterogeneity among its constituent corpuscles.65

From the Cartesian metaphysical point of view there is strictly no distinction between the animate and inanimate as they all come under the same physical laws and are res extensa ultimately. As Hans Jonas notes, “having rid ‘body’ in general of any relation to mind, and the science of body of any obligation to deal with the phenomena of mind, Descartes and the Cartesians could feel safe in treating the organism as just another instance of the res extensa.”66 Descartes, in fact, equates the animate beings with the inanimate ones, as the datum to be explained both with regard to animate and inanimate phenomena are only different modes of

65

Ibid., 156. Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology (Chicago – London: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), 56. 66

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the same matter.67 In modern mechanistic ontology, animate and inanimate beings are placed at the same level. Descartes provided important philosophical foundations for the mechanization of physiology at the dawn of Modernity by promoting an exclusively mechanistic explanation of all physiological phenomena and an ontologically mechanistic conception of all physiological entities. We shall now proceed to evaluate the influence of the Cartesian system on modern mechanistic physiology.

4. Cartesian Mechanistic Physiology and the Elimination of Teleology Descartes’ contribution to the emergence of modern physiology has some very conspicuous merits. There is no denying the fact that the Cartesian mechanistic explanatory mould in physiology, founded on the claim that there is nothing in living entities inexplicable by mechanistic laws, contributed significantly to experimental research in physiology and in particular to anatomy. Descartes needs to be credited for having revitalized the anatomical tradition in physiology. As Thomas Steele Hall writes: “Physiology also needed its Descartes. It needed the freedom he proclaimed from animistic, humoral, pneumatic, and ‘facultative’ working ideas and the relentless application of the materialistic and mechanistic ideas he espoused.”68 The rational mechanistic explanation, of which Descartes was among the major advocates, eventually turned out to be the bedrock of modern physiology and medical practice. There is a ring of irony about Descartes’ contribution in this regard. While a good number of the particulars of Descartes’ physiology have either been proved wrong or surpassed, the general mechanistic background that he so consistently promoted, has come to stay as the backdrop to modern physiology. The characteristics of the mechanistic explanation like its explanatory power and clarity, parsimony of concepts, descriptive universality, etc., proved to be exceptionally fecund in physiology, as the history of the discipline in the centuries after Descartes testifies. But the mechanistic explanation when applied in physiology, as in physics, has a shadowy side to it—its own mirror image of undesirable consequences. We shall now explore here this darker side of the Cartesian mechanistic physiology.

67 68

See Keeling, Descartes, 157. Hall, “Introduction,” xxx.

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The Cartesian approach in physiology may be identified as the biomechanics (body-machine) perspective in medicine which has increasingly come under critique for its reductive outlook. Today medical practitioners tend instead to opt rather for the more holistic psycho-somatic approach.69 A biting critique of Cartesian physiology in this regard was advanced by Antonio Damasio’s The Error of Descartes.70 But to be fair to Descartes it needs to be admitted that in his very last work The Passions of the Soul, a work curiously never mentioned by Damasio, he did try to move, at least partially, towards the psycho-somatic perspective. But such a corrective step on Descartes’ part was neither complete nor effective as the basic metaphysical vision of dualism, that conceives the body as mutually exclusive from the non-bodily, persists right through Cartesian writings. Besides, as Dennis Des Chene notes, “in the popular reception of his work, it is biomechanics that has come to be the ‘Cartesian’ manner in medicine.”71 The influence of Cartesian dualism has led to the woeful neglect of the mind by modern medicine and the deep-seated scepticism about the role of psychological and emotional factors in the onset and progress of disease as well as in its treatment.72 69

Today health care in most places integrates the services of therapists, counsellors, religious chaplains, etc. which is itself a recognition of the limits of the biomechanics approach in medicine. For a historical review of the contrast between reductionist medicine and holistic medicine see Christopher Lawrence – George Weisz, “Medical Holism: The Context” in Greater than the Parts: Holism in Biomedicine 1920-1950, eds., Christopher Lawrence – George Weisz (New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1ff. 70 Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994). Damasio’s book is not an exclusive critique of Descartes, as one might expect from the title of the work. Instead, most of the book is about neuroscience, and the critique of Descartes is mainly limited to the very last chapter. However, his critique is to the point when he writes: “This is Descartes’ error: the abyssal separation between body and mind, between the sizable, dimensioned, mechanically operated, infinitely divisible body stuff, on the one hand, and the unsizable, undimensioned, un-pushpullable, nondivisible mind stuff; the suggestion that reasoning, and moral judgement, and the suffering that comes from physical pain or emotional upheaval might exist separately from the body. Specifically: the separation of the most refined operations of mind from the structure and operation of a biological organism.” Ibid., 249-50. 71 Dennis Des Chene, “Life and Health in Cartesian Natural Philosophy” in Descartes’ Natural Philosophy, eds. Stephen Gaukroger – John Schuster – John Sutton (London – New York: Routledge, 2000), 724. 72 See in this regard P. Martin (ed.), The Sickening Mind (London: Flamingo, 1998); Steven Greer, “Healing the Mind/Body Split: Bringing the Patient Back Into Oncology,” Integrative Cancer Therapies 2 (2003), 6.

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Let us look critically at the very metaphor of the machine within the Cartesian mechanistic explanation, employed to understand the human body and its functions. It is true that the machine can resemble to an extent human and animal bodies and shed light on their functioning, but cannot represent them totally or exclusively, because the entity under consideration is not inanimate matter but a living organism. The machine metaphor thus exposes a gross insufficiency when explaining living realities like the human body and animals. The crux of the matter is that living entities are organisms rather than merely assembled artefacts. The mechanistic explanation, in fact, excludes the possibility of seeing the living entities as “organisms”. Hans Jonas, more than anyone else, has exposed the inability of the modern scientific and mechanistic thinking to comprehend the phenomenon of organic life.73 The claim of the mechanistic explanation, that the operation of the macro-phenomena can be explained solely by reference to the interactions of the micro-particles fails in the case of living organisms as it is unable to explain adequately phenomena like growth and generation. It is true that Descartes did try to account for the dynamism of motion and change in his mechanistic explanation in terms of corpuscular movement. However, the mechanistic explanation of the Treatise on Man does not, in fact, succeed in explaining some of the major physiological functions, like generation and growth, which receive only a passing and naïve treatment. (cf. AT XI, 128 / TM, 18) As Ernst Mayr observes, “after all, no machine has ever built itself, replicated itself, programmed itself, or been able to procure its own energy.”74 The exclusivity and consequent reductionism associated with the mechanistic model of explanation creates serious problems especially with regard to animate beings. The machine model, highly successful with regard to single physical entities and phenomena, breaks down when dealing with wholes as in the case of ecosystems and biotic community. In the case of an ecosystem, for example, the whole is not just the sum total of individual mechanisms, and whose emergent characteristics of totality cannot be adequately explained in terms of its parts alone. The problem with the mechanistic approach is that it offers only a static and clockwork picture of the physical world and cannot make sufficient room for any principle of animation, internal spontaneity, and purpose. As E.J. Dijksterhuis points out within modern mechanism, “there is not a single 73 See Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life; Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo, “Hans Jonas’ ‘Gnosticism and Modern Nihilism’, and Ludwig von Bertalanffy,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 38 (2012), 295; Nathalie Frogneux, Hans Jonas ou la vie dans le monde (Bruxelles: Éditions DeBoeck Université, 2001), 122. 74 Mayr, This is Biology, 4.

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difference between a running clockwork and a growing tree.”75 But when it comes to living entities and complex life systems like the ecosystems, the mechanistic approach proves itself to be grossly insufficient. The most important Cartesian legacy to physiology is the elimination of teleology altogether from the animate world. We shall go on to discuss briefly how Descartes brought about the abolition of teleological considerations in his mechanistic physiology, and also evidence some of its ecological implications. Teleology is a term which in its Greek etymological origin is associated with telos, meaning goal or end. A teleological vision of nature has characterised human perception of, and relationship with, nature right from the dawn of human thought, and within the Western tradition itself one can trace its roots back to the Greek thought. Aristotle, for example, noticed that natural processes are inherently directed towards goals, and need to be explained also by taking into account their final causes.76 Accordingly the ontological nature (phusis) of an entity may be said to be constituted also by its potentiality, as within the Aristotelian scheme the final causes are essential to the definition and description of natural entities. Descartes eschews teleology both in physics and in physiology, by opting for an exclusively mechanistic conception of physical and physiological phenomena. As Dennis Des Chene notes, for Descartes, “the book of nature, in short, tells us only how things are, or how they would be if such-and-such were the case; it tells us nothing of their perfections or aims, and in that sense nothing of how things ought to be.”77 Descartes’ elimination of teleology from physiology forms part of his overall programme to eliminate teleology from natural philosophy altogether. According to Alison Simmons, “one of Descartes’ hallmark contributions to natural philosophy is his denunciation of teleology.”78 Dennis Des Chene also highlights in Descartes “an unbending opposition to finality.”79 Descartes’ move to eliminate teleology was in keeping with the general tendency of Modernity to do away with any consideration of finality in the 75

E.J. Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 415. 76 See John Habgood, The Concept of Nature (London: Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd., 2002), 8. 77 Des Chene, “Life and Health in Cartesian Natural Philosophy,” 726. 78 Alison Simmons, “Sensible Ends: Latent Teleology in Descartes’ Account of Sensation,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (2001), 49. 79 Dennis Des Chene, Physiologia: Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 170.

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natural world.80 As Stephen Gaukroger remarks, “one of the principal tasks of a mechanist natural philosophy in the seventeenth century was the elimination of teleology.”81 By his insistence on the exclusive mechanistic approach, Descartes rules out any other cause as needed in the explanation of a physical and physiological entity other than the material and efficient ones. Thus he eliminates in a single move both the traditional Aristotelian formal and final causes. The formal cause is done away with, as the substantial forms are admitted only in the case of the composite human being. The final cause is considered as superfluous by Descartes, as a physical or physiological entity is fully explicable in terms of efficient cause alone. Descartes achieves the de-teleologization of the natural world by describing it solely in terms of efficient causes and eliminating, in the process, any reference to final ends. Descartes places himself in sharp discontinuity with the Aristotelian tradition which integrated the element of the telos in the understanding of both animate and inanimate beings. Descartes was convinced that what is important to know is not so much the “why” of the phenomena in question but precisely the “how” of it. So in place of the final causes Descartes wanted to place emphasis on the efficient causes. In this way, Descartes, along with other pioneers of the mechanistic tradition, dispensed with teleology altogether. Already in the Meditations, Descartes had placed explicit strictures against appeals to ends in natural philosophy (AT VII, 55 / CSM II, 39). In the Principles too, Descartes is concerned exclusively with the efficient causes and rules out categorically any reference to the final causes. Descartes rejects any appeal to the final causes in article 28 of the first part of the Principles: It is not the final but the efficient causes of created things that we must inquire into. 80 Regarding the heuristic infertility of teleological explanations in natural philosophy at the beginning of Modernity, one may recall Bacon’s celebrated gibe to the effect that teleology, like a virgin consecrated to God, produces no offspring—tanquam virgo Deo consacrata, nihil parit (De Dignitate & Augmentis Scientiarum Libri IX, iii, 5). See in this regard, R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 93 ff. One may also recall here Hans Jonas’ remark regarding “the inhospitality of nature to final causes” at the dawn of Modernity. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, 35. 81 Stephen Gaukroger, “The Resources of a Mechanist Physiology and the Problem of Goal-directed Processes” in Descartes’ Natural Philosophy, eds. Stephen Gaukroger - John Schuster - John Sutton (London – New York: Routledge, 2000), 383. See in this regard also Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, 33-34.

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Chapter VI When dealing with natural things we will, then, never derive any explanations from the purposes which God or nature may have had in view when creating them . For we should not be so arrogant as to suppose that we can share in God’s plans. We should, instead, consider him as the efficient cause of all things. (AT VIIIA, 15-16 / CSM I, 202)

Descartes’ negation of final causes is itself in keeping with his mechanistic metaphysics which proposed a dead and inert physical world, itself a grand machine (cf. (AT VIIIA 315 / CSM I, 279), ruling out thereby all elements of internal dynamism and inherent teleology. Moreover, in keeping with his mechanistic outlook Descartes presents a static vision of the physical universe, glossing over the phenomena of nonmechanical, i.e., biological, changes. Descartes writes in the Principles: “For there is no doubt that the world was created right from the start with all the perfection which it now has. The sun and earth and moon and stars thus existed in the beginning, and, what is more, the earth contained not just the seeds of plants but the plants themselves; and Adam and Eve were not born as babies but were created as fully grown people.” (AT VIIIA 99 / CSM II, 256) Descartes’ basic claim is that all physiological phenomena are mechanistically explicable in terms of internal organization alone, just as any machine. The machine itself is an effect of efficient causes, a result of the laws of mechanism.82 Descartes’ denial of teleology and goal-directedness in physiology is evident, for example, in his description of the development of the foetus, a physiological activity that is apparently goal-directed. Descartes, however, succeeds in offering a totally non-teleological account of this phenomenon availing himself of the resources of the mechanistic explanation. He argues that a foetus develops into an adult of a particular species, not because it is intrinsically directed so, but purely on account of the mechanistic processes taking place. For him, “it is the (mechanistically construable) chemical and mechanical processes that occur in the foetus that cause it to develop into an adult of a particular species, not the fact that it is going to develop into a member of a particular species that causes the particular chemical and mechanical processes to occur in the way they do.”83 In his physiology Descartes regards organic teleology to have the

82

Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, “Limitations of the Mechanical Model in the Cartesian Conception of the Organism” in Descartes: Critical and Interpretative Essays, ed. Michael Hooker (Baltimore – London: John Hopkins University Press, 1978), 161. 83 Ibid., 393.

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status of a result as opposed to a cause.84 Since he considers mechanistic explanation to be totally exclusive, Descartes cannot conceive of any other mode of explanation wherein both efficient and final causes are accommodated. Such an approach ultimately proves to be the Achilles’ heel of Descartes’ mechanistic approach in physics and physiology. Descartes ended up removing teleology altogether from nature, by erasing any element of internal agency in nature. Within Cartesian metaphysics, teleology can be admitted only in the case of the res cogitans who alone possesses consciousness. Thus teleology, according to Descartes, is limited to the human sphere alone. The marginalization of all teleology to humans alone and its exclusion from the natural world follows from the overarching Cartesian ontological dualistic between the res cogitans and the res extensa, between humanity and the natural world respectively. As Vittorio Possenti notes with great insight, it would appear a logical contradiction today. “If man and his consciousness, in which finality is undeniable, are a part of nature, how can one seriously maintain that final causes ought to be excluded from nature?”85 By employing an inert conception of both animate and inanimate physical realities Descartes eliminates any room for goal-directed activity which cannot be captured mechanistically.86 Descartes considers all physical entities—both animate and inanimate—only in terms of efficient causes alone, namely, in terms of their functionality. With the rejection of final causes, there is no room for value in nature. One may recall here “the distinction between fact and value that is often taken to be among the hallmarks, or the stigmata, of modern science.”87 With nature robbed of any element of finality within the mechanistic vision, there is nothing to guide human attitude towards nature, except values of instrumentality and utility. As Pierre Guenancia observes, the only finality tolerated in Cartesian metaphysics is the finality of the practical and utilitarian order.88 The coalescence between Descartes’ emphasis on the efficient causes at the expense of any sort of finality and modern technology’s emphasis on the efficient causes in terms of utility is more than striking.

84

Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, “Descartes and the Unity of the Human Being” in Descartes, ed. John Cottingham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 199. 85 Vittorio Possenti, “Nature, Life, and Teleology,” The Review of Metaphysics 56 (2002), 46. 86 Gaukroger, “The Resources of a Mechanist Physiology and the Problem of Goal-directed Processes,” 384. 87 Des Chene, “Life and Health in Cartesian Natural Philosophy,” 726. 88 Cf. Pierre Guenancia, Lire Descartes (Paris: Gallimard, 2000), 297.

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Once teleology is eliminated from the conception of nature and of natural entities, there remains no obligation to deal with them respecting their ends as in traditional natural philosophy. “By reducing plants and animals to insensate matter, mere conglomerates of atomic particles devoid of internal purpose or intelligence,” mechanistic philosophy removed all barriers to unrestrained economic exploitation.89 The value of the object comes to be determined in terms of the interests of the subject alone which opens the path for the human domination and subsequent exploitation of nature. We conclude with the words of Val Plumwood: For if something is conceived in these mechanistic terms, as lacking any of the qualities of autonomy and agency which are required for us to be able to accord respect to it as its own thing, it can be seen as merely our thing. If it lacks its own goals and direction, it can impose no constraints on our treatment of it; it can be seen as something utterly neutral on which humans can and even must impose their own goals, purposes and significance. It represents a teleological vacuum, into which human ends must enter. Thus a mechanistically conceived nature lies open to, indeed invites the imposition of human purposes and treatment as an instrument for the achievement of human satisfactions.90

5. Ecological Implications of the Cartesian Mechanistic Physiology: Animals as Bête-Machines In our study of Cartesian physics in the previous chapter, we sought to evidence how an exclusively mechanistic conception of physical phenomena leads to an impoverished view of nature. The mechanistic conception wreaks similar havoc when dealing with physiological entities. Descartes, in fact, equates the living phenomena with the non-living one, as both constitute the same res extensa, and are only modes of extension ultimately. For Descartes, not only billiard balls and rocks, but also human body, non-human animals, and plants are all nothing but mechanistic automata. Such a metaphysical conception raises serious problems and can lead to deprecation and exploitation of animals without any moral scruple, as in the case of Descartes’ doctrine of animals as bête-machines. We shall therefore conclude our discussion of modern mechanistic physiology and its possible ecological implications with a detailed discussion of Descartes’ 89

Donald Worster, Nature’s Economy: A History Ecological Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 40. 90 Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London – New York: Routledge, 1993), 110-11.

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notorious doctrine of animals as mere automata or bête-machines (animal machines). The doctrine of bête-machines is alluded to in the last paragraphs of Part V of the Discourse of the Method, wherein Descartes offers a summary of the Treatise on Man (AT VI, 55-60). Descartes’ correspondence also carries references to his doctrine of bête-machine. Writing to Henry More on 5th February, 1649, Descartes states: “Nature should produce its own automata, much more splendid than artificial ones. These natural automata are the animals.” (AT V, 277 / CSMK, 366) In a letter to the Marquess of Newcastle on 23rd November, 1646, Descartes writes: “I know that animals do many things better than we do, but this does not surprise me. It can even be used to prove they act naturally and mechanically, like a clock which tells the time better than our judgement does. Doubtless when the swallows come in spring, they operate like clocks.” (AT IV, 575 / CSMK, 304) The doctrine of bête-machine forms an integral part of Cartesian physiology, and has some clear ecological implications. We will discuss Descartes’ views of animals in three stages. We will first state the problem, as it had been perceived by Descartes’ own contemporaries, and has been re-evoked in our own times, especially by the animal rights activists. Secondly, we will offer a limited defence of Descartes by refuting some of the indefensible charges made against him. Finally, we will explore how Cartesian metaphysical dualism and its accompanying mechanistic conception of life provide a bedrock for the doctrine of animals as bête-machines and plausible maltreatment of animals. We hope to bring to the fore, through this discussion, the ecological implications of the Cartesian view of animals, and indirectly of the natural world as a whole. There is a wide range of views on Descartes’ doctrine of bête-machine. Already during Descartes’ lifetime Henry More represented the concerns of many of his contemporaries when he denounced Descartes’ view of animals as “murderous and cutthroat.” More wrote to Descartes on 11th December, 1648: “There is none of your opinions that my soul, gentle and tender as it is, shrinks from as much as that murderous and cutthroat view you maintain in the Discourse, that deprives the brutes of all life and sense.” (AT V, 243)91 The doctrine of bête-machine continued to be hotly debated after Descartes’ death between Cartesians and their opponents. The central points of these exchanges were questions like whether animals had 91

See Geneviève Rodis-Lewis (ed.), René Descartes. Correspondance avec Arnauld et Morus, Texte latin et traduction (Paris: J. Vrin, 1953), 104.

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sensations, whether they experienced pain, etc. Malebranche is said to have captured the essence of Descartes’ views of animals when he wrote: “They eat without pleasure, cry without pain, grow without knowing it; they desire nothing, fear nothing, know nothing.”92 There were, in fact, Cartesians who justified vivisection by claiming that animals did not feel pain.93 A controversial, and perhaps exaggerated, testimony of an eyewitness account of what Cartesian physiologists did to animals is provided by Nicolas Fontaine in his Mémoires: The (Cartesian) scientists administered beatings to dogs with perfect indifference, and made fun of those who pitied the creatures as if they felt pain. They said the animals were clocks; that the cries they emitted when struck were only the noise of a little spring that had been touched, but that the whole body was without feeling. They nailed the poor animals up on boards by their four paws to vivisect them to see the circulation of the blood which was a great subject of controversy.94

Some Cartesian scholars have also paid attention to Descartes’ doctrine of animals as non-sentient automata, and have been critical of it. Norman Kemp Smith denounces as “monstrous” Descartes’ thesis that animals “are themselves simply machines, mere automata, entirely lacking in conscious awareness of any kind, as incapable of experiencing the feelings of wellbeing or the reverse, hunger or thirst,”95 while Alexander Boyce Gibson describes it as a doctrine which “brutally violates the old kindly fellowship of living things.”96 The whole question has been posited anew with fresh vigour by the animal rights activists during the last few decades. The tendency among them has been to brand Descartes outright as the villain of the piece for his alleged views that animals merely behave “as if they feel pain when they 92 Geneviève Rodis-Lewis (ed.), Nicolas Malebranche, Œuvres complètes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1958-1970), II, 394. 93 Cf. Leonora Cohen Rosenfield, From Beast-Machine to Man-Machine: Animal Soul in French Letters from Descartes to La Mettrie (New York: Octagon, 1968), 45. 94 Nicolas Fontaine, Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire de Port-Royal (Utrecht: 1736). Cited in Rosenfield, From Beast-Machine to Man-Machine, 54. The historical authenticity of this testimony is not bereft of controversy. See Gordon Baker – Katherine J. Morris, Descartes’ Dualism (London – New York: Routledge, 2002), 95, footnote 89. 95 Norman Kemp Smith, New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes: Descartes as Pioneer (London: Macmillan, 1952), 135, 136. 96 Alexander Boyce Gibson, The Philosophy of Descartes (New York: Garland, 1987), 214.

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are, say, kicked or stabbed.”97 Stephen Clark terms Descartes’ views on animals an “irredeemably fatuous belief.”98 Tom Regan reiterates that Descartes considered animals to be “thoughtless brutes”. Animals, in his view, are ‘thoughtless brutes,’ automata, machines. Despite appearances to the contrary, they are not aware of anything, neither sights nor sounds, smells nor tastes, heat nor cold; they experience neither hunger nor thirst, fear nor rage, pleasure nor pain. Animals are, he observes at one point, like clocks: they are able to do some things better than we can, just as a clock can keep better time; but, like the clock, animals are not conscious.99

To be fair to Descartes it needs to be admitted that not all charges levelled against him regarding his doctrine of bête-machine are defensible. Some representations of Descartes’ doctrine of animals have been based on misinterpretations of his original views. Naturally, there have been voices raised in defence of Descartes. John Cottingham writes: “But if we look at what Descartes actually says about animals, it is by no means clear that he holds the monstrous view which all the commentators attribute to him. In fact, the traditional rubric ‘Descartes’s doctrine of the bêtemachine’ is vague and ambiguous.”100 Peter Harrison, too, comes to the defence of Descartes when he opines that “the view that Descartes was a brute to the brutes is, above all else, historically myopic.”101 Descartes’ views on animals require, therefore, a more careful examination. Greater perspicacity is called for in grasping both the historical context of Descartes’ pronouncements on animals, and what exactly he meant by the doctrine of bête-machine. Descartes’ negative comments on animals need to be seen, first of all, in their historical context. In his doctrine of bête-machine Descartes was basically positing a difference in kind between humans and animals, a difference which he believed was under threat from the likes of Montaigne

97

Tom Regan – Peter Singer (eds.), Animal Rights and Human Obligations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976), 4. 98 Stephen Clark, The Moral Status of Animals (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), 37. 99 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (London – New York: Routledge, 1983), 3. 100 John Cottingham, “Descartes’ Treatment of Animals” in Descartes, ed. John Cottingham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 225. 101 Peter Harrison, “Descartes on Animals,” Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1992), 227.

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and Charron.102 This historical context of the debate is evident in Descartes’ letter to the Marquess of Newcastle on 23rd November 1646. Descartes categorically states in this letter: “I cannot share the opinion of Montaigne and others who attribute understanding or thought to animals.” (AT IV, 573 / CSMK, 302) Descartes disagrees with the claims of Montaigne and Charron that the linguistic competence of animals is comparable to that of human beings. It needs to be conceded that, against Montaigne and the others like Charron, Descartes did have a point to make. He had, as Peter Harrison puts it, the temerity to point out that their justifications for attributing consciousness to animals were vacuous. On that he was not entirely wrong.103 Descartes’ comments on animals need to be seen also in the context of his theological concerns. He rejected that animals have souls at all, since he held rational souls to be immortal, something which he considered only humans to possess. Descartes writes in the Discourse: For after the error of those who deny God, … there is none that leads weak minds further from the straight path of virtue than that of imagining that the souls of beasts are of the same nature as ours, and hence that after this present life we have nothing to fear or to hope for, any more than flies and ants. But when we know how much the beasts differ from us, we understand much better the arguments which prove that our soul is of a nature entirely independent of the body, and consequently that it is not bound to die with it. (AT VI, 59 / CSM I, 141)

The consideration of Descartes’ historical context thus offers some important clarification regarding his views on animals. A careful examination of what exactly Descartes meant by his doctrine of bêtemachine could further help in overcoming some of the misconceptions regarding this question. Those who accuse Descartes of cruelty to animals often single out the alleged Cartesian view that animals cannot feel as the most horrendous part of Descartes’ view of animals.104 However, as Katherine Morris notes, this is clearly a misunderstanding which stems from the eliding of the crucial distinction between sentience and

102

Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) provides a rhetorical exposition of the superiority of animals to human beings in L'apologie de Raymond Sebond, and Pierre Charron (1541-1603) discusses the status of animals in Bk. 1, Ch. VIII of De la sagesse trois livres. See Desmond M. Clarke, Descartes’ Theory of Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 72. 103 Cf. Harrison, “Descartes on Animals,” 227. 104 See in this regard Smith, New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes, 135.

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rationality.105 Descartes does not reject animal sentience, he only claims to explain it exclusively in mechanistic terms without having to admit a sensitive or vegetative soul to account for it. In fact, animals for Descartes are sentient machines. In his letter to Henry More on 5th February 1649 Descartes states: For brevity’s sake I here omit the other reasons for denying thought to animals. Please note that I am speaking of thought, and not of life or sensation. I do not deny life to animals, since I regard it as consisting simply in the heat of the heart; and I do not deny sensation, in so far as it depends on a bodily organ. (AT V, 278 / CSMK, 366)

It is clear therefore that Descartes does not deny animal sensations. He only denied consciousness to animals, understood as “conscientia”, which for Descartes and his neo-Aristotelian contemporaries was the power of the rational soul to reflect on its thoughts. Descartes understood thought (cogitatio) in terms of coscientia, as a passage from the Principles testifies. “By the term ‘thought’ (cogitatio), I understand everything which we are aware (nobis consciis) of as happening within us, in so far as we have awareness (conscientia) of it.” (AT VIIIA, 7 / CSM I, 195) Descartes was not prepared to grant consciousness of this sort to animals. One may then conclude, against the common assumption of animal rights proponents, that Descartes held that animals could feel but not think. The clarifications offered above can help in placing Descartes’ views on animals in their historical context, and in refuting some of the charges made against him. This is as far as any defence of Descartes’ view of animals could get. The problem persists however that he did consistently speak of animals as bête-machines, a doctrine that leaves the door open for maltreatment of animals. Such a doctrine is also an integral part of his mechanistic physiology and is ultimately anchored in his metaphysical dualism. It is therefore ultimately to the metaphysical dualism of Descartes that one needs to turn, to trace the roots of Descartes’ doctrine of bêtemachine and draw out its implications.106

105

Cf. Katherine Morris, “Bête-machines” in Descartes’ Natural Philosophy, eds. Stephen Gaukroger – John Schuster – John Sutton (London – New York: Routledge, 2000), 402. Janice Thomas also demonstrates how Descartes does not deny all feeling and awareness to non-human animals. See Janice Thomas, “Does Descartes Deny Consciousness to Animals?,” Ratio 19 (2006), 336-63. 106 Katherine Morris too argues that the bête-machine doctrine was clearly a metaphysical rather than an empirical doctrine for Descartes. See Morris, “Bêtemachines,” 401.

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Descartes’ metaphysical dualism, along with his respective conceptions of the res extensa and the res cogitans, form the bedrock both of his mechanistic physiology, and of his doctrine of bête-machine. The doctrine of bête-machine fits well into Descartes’ metaphysical dualism wherein all entities are considered as belonging either to the realm of the res cogitans or res extensa. Descartes’ naming of the animals as automata was not simply a stylistic move in keeping with the Baroque spirit of the seventeenth century, with its automatons and elaborately contrived moving statues that adorned the royal fountains, as some authors tend to make it appear.107 Descartes was totally original in speaking of animals as bête-machines. While Baker and Morris are right in pointing out that Descartes was not the first one to consider animals as bête-machines,108 it needs to be remembered that he was the first to consider them “only” as machines! There is certainly a very big shift here. “The novelty was to combine the animal-machine with a new philosophy of nature, in which the actions of agents inferior to humans not only might but must be explained without reference to any ‘form’ but extension or to any qualities but the models of extension.”109 Descartes’ views of animals needs to be seen in the context of his ontological mechanistic conception of life. Within such a view the animals are nothing but mechanistic entities, pure modes of extension (res extensa).110 The conception of animals as mere res extensa facilitates, to say the least, practices like vivisection.111 In fact, Descartes himself provides, with least perturbation, examples of experiments on slicing the heart of a living dog or a rabbit. See, for example, the experiment that he suggests while discussing Harvey’s theory of the circulation of blood in the Description of the Human Body. “If you slice off the pointed end of the heart in a live dog, and insert a finger into one of the cavities, you will feel unmistakably that every time the heart gets shorter it presses the finger, 107

Cf. Baker – Morris, Descartes’ Dualism, 92-94. Gordon Baker and Katherine Morris warns of the danger of anachronism in attributing the bête-machine doctrine to Descartes, as living things were compared to machines already in antiquity, a practice which was popular also in the early modern period. Cf. Baker – Morris, Descartes’ Dualism, 94. See also Des Chene, Spirits and Clocks, 13, footnote 1; 97, footnote 32. 109 Des Chene, Spirits and Clocks, 13. 110 It is significant that Descartes avoids using the term “animal” which might evoke the idea of an “animating principle”, and prefers the more down-to-earth label bête (beast), or in Latin brutum (brute). 111 Louis Liard writes in this regard of Descartes: “Le premier peut-être, il pratique la vivisection et cherche les secrets de la vie, non sur le cadavre inerte, mais dans l’animal vivant.” Louis Liard, Descartes (Paris: Germer Baillière, 1882), 113. 108

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and every time it gets longer it stops pressing it.” (AT XI, 241 / CSM I, 317) A couple of paragraphs later Descartes suggests a similar experiment. “If you cut off the pointed end of the heart in a young rabbit which is still alive, you will be able to see by inspection that the cavities become slightly wider, and emit blood, when the heart hardens.” (AT XI, 243 / CSM I, 318) There is grist for environmental moral philosophers to discuss here which we do not wish to take up. Descartes succeeds in establishing that the animals are only “machines” not simply by virtue of them being nothing but modes of extension (res extensa), but also on account of the mutual exclusion of substances in his metaphysical dualism. Once the animals are recognised to be only modes of res extensa, it entails that they have no thought, which is the principal and exclusive attribute of the res cogitans. Cartesian dualism upholds as fundamental the exclusion of mental and physical properties in the same substance, the only exception to such a categorical division being the human composite. Accordingly, within Cartesian metaphysics, thought is an attribute of the thinking substance—res cogitans, of the rational soul alone. Thought becomes, in fact, for Descartes the dividing line between humans and animals as evident in his twin tests of language and action in the Discourse (AT VI, 56-59 / CSM I, 139-41).112 Descartes concludes that the inability of the animals to use a language shows that they have no reason at all. This shows not that the beasts have less reason than men, but that they have no reason at all. … It proves rather that they have no intelligence at all, and that it is nature which acts in them according to the dispositions of their organs. In the same way a clock, consisting only of wheels and springs, can count the hours and measure time more accurately than we can with all our wisdom.” (AT VI, 58-59 / CSM I, 140-41)

Thought, which is recalcitrant to mechanistic explanation, thus becomes the point of difference between humans and animals. In denying thought to animals Descartes feels entitled to deny souls to them altogether, and call them soulless automata (cf. Discourse, AT VI, 46; Response to the Fourth Objection to the Meditations, AT VII, 229-30; 112

It is Keith Gunderson who christens these tests as the Language Test and the Action Test. See Keith Gunderson, “Descartes, La Mettrie, Language and Machines,” Philosophy 39 (1964), 98. For an extensive study of these two tests and for a spirited defence of Descartes in this regard, see Gerald J. Massey – Deborah A. Boyle, “Descartes’ Tests for (Animal) Mind,” Philosophical Topics 27 (1999), 87-146.

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Passions, AT XI, 330-34; and letter to More, AT IV, 573). In a letter to Regius, Descartes claims that the powers of vegetation and of feeling in animals do not merit the designation “soul” in the sense that mind merits that designation in man, and adds that “this common view is based on ignorance of the fact that animals lack a mind.” (AT III, 370 / CSMK, 181) Descartes’ affirmation that animals have no rational soul or mind, a conclusion which he draws from his metaphysical dualism, is thus a crucial point in his conception of animals as bête-machines. John Cottingham admits that in this regard the monstrous thesis fits in neatly with Descartes’ dualism, with disastrous consequences. Since an animal is not a res cogitans, has no mind or soul, it follows that it must belong wholly in the extended divisible world of jostling Cartesian shapes. And this means that what we call (and évidemment, Descartes himself called) ‘animal hunger’ cannot be anything more than a set of internal muscle contractions leading to the jerking of certain limbs, or whatever.113

Descartes’ denial of souls to animals, on account of his metaphysical dualism, brings back the question of the experience of pain in animals. The problem is precisely that within the Cartesian mechanistic physiology pain is associated with the soul rather than with the body. “I do not explain the feeling of pain without reference to the soul,” wrote Descartes to Mersenne on 11th June, 1640, “for in my view pain exists only in the understanding.” (AT III, 85 / CSMK, 148) Descartes holds, consistent to his metaphysical dualism, that pain cannot be experienced by animals in the way that it can by a thinking, rational being. Animals cannot have states of mind like pain and joy which are characteristic of the soul.114 Obviously, pain is considered by Descartes as a sensation experienced by the mind alone. It is evident in the triple classification of sensations that Descartes makes in the Reply that he gives to the Sixth Set of Objections to his Meditations: 113

Cottingham, “Descartes’ Treatment of Animals,” 231. John Cottingham brings to the fore an apparent inconsistency in Cartesian metaphysics in Descartes’ use of the term laetitia animalis. (cf. Principles, Part IV, art. 190 – AT VIIIA, 317 / CSM I, 280-281). “Descartes clearly wants to say that the joy of dogs and cats is analysable into just such physiological events. But what he seems to forget is that, as a strict dualist, he should not be using the word ‘laetitia’ at all in this case. For a true dualist, if something is laetitia (an inescapably ‘mental’ predicate) it cannot be animalis (part of res extensa); and conversely, if it is animals, it cannot be laetitia.” Cottingham, “Descartes’ Treatment of Animals,” 233. 114

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We must distinguish three grades of sensory response. The first is limited to the immediate stimulation of the bodily organs by external objects; this can consist in nothing but the motion of the particles of the organs, and any change of shape and position resulting from this motion. The second grade comprises all the immediate effects produced in the mind as a result of its being united with a bodily organ which is affected in this way. Such effects include the perceptions of pain, pleasure, thirst, hunger, colours, sound, taste, smell, heat, cold and the like. … The third grade includes all the judgements about things outside us which we have been accustomed to make from our earliest years—judgements which are occasioned by the movements of these bodily organs. (AT VII, 436-437 / CSM II, 294-295)

In Descartes’ own classification pain belongs to the second set of sensations which are mental results associated with the mind. This line of thinking is reiterated in the Principles where Descartes describes pain as a prime example of those “confused perceptions” which must be referred to the substantial union of the mind with the body (cf. AT VIIIA, 23 / CSM I, 209), as in the Sixth Meditation. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that animals do not experience pain, as they do not possess a mind. To be fair to Descartes, it needs to be recognised that he maintained a certain agnosticism on this issue, as his candid admission made to More reveals: “But though I regard it as established that we cannot prove there is any thought in animals, I do not think that it can be proved that there is none, since the human mind does not reach into their hearts.” (AT V, 276 / CSMK, 365). There have been attempts to defend Descartes on these grounds.115 Some even argue that Descartes’ denial of minds to animals has only moral certainty, and not absolute certainty,116 though it is difficult to back such a claim with direct textual evidence. In the end, such bulwarks of defence are too frail, and will ultimately crumble under the sheer weight of their inconsistency with Descartes’ overarching metaphysical dualism on which he builds his mechanistic physiology, and of which the doctrine of bête-machine is an essential component. As Cecilia Wee has noted, there are “inherent difficulties in accommodating animal sentience within Descartes’ official dualist framework.”117 Descartes’ mechanistic explanation reveals itself to be most repellent when applied to living entities. In fact, “by the time of Descartes and the 115

The final conclusions of both the articles of John Cottingham and Peter Harrison, which have been cited extensively in this section, tend to move in this direction. 116 This is the line of argument adopted by Katherine Morris. See Morris, “Bêtemachines,” 409-14. 117 Wee, “Animal Sentience and Descartes’ Dualism,” 612.

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Scientific Revolution, animals (along with mountains, rivers, and trees) had lost their claim to a soul.”118 Within the Cartesian philosophical system, animals, and the rest of the animate kingdom, are defined as totally lacking subjectivity, as at the ontological level they are perceived as diametrically opposed to the res cogitans which alone is the seat of consciousness and of interiority. Such a stance provides the ontological, and to an extent even moral, legitimization for the treatment of animate beings on a par with the inanimate ones. Practices like vivisection fit in coherently within the Cartesian conception of living entities as automata (bête-machine), as animals are, at the ontological level, nothing but res extensa. “Since they have no rational soul, no self-conscious mind, they have, strictly speaking, no consciousness at all. Their reactions as such are purely mechanical reactions by which that disposition of organs, which is the animal, necessarily responds to stimuli.” (Letter to Newcastle - AT IV, 573)119 Vittorio Hösle remarks while offering a critique of Descartes: “if the animal is only a machine then to vivisect is no more disdaining than reassembling a clock.”120 The conclusion can be drawn that human cruelty to animals is justified ultimately by a mechanistic ontology like the Cartesian one where animals are nothing but res extensa, heaps of extended matter, organized like in a machine. As Luc Ferry concludes, within Cartesian metaphysical vision, “literally and figuratively, there is nothing prohibiting us today from continuing to torture “nonhuman beings,” since they are merely unimportant heaps of matter.”121 The soulless physiology of Descartes goes hand in glove with his conception of a soulless cosmos and an inanimate nature, with some pronounced ecological consequences. In its conception of animate beings as only machines, Cartesian thought exposes some of the deepest roots of the contemporary ecological crisis. Descartes’ doctrine of bête-machine is reflective, not only of his views of animals, but of the whole of the natural world. Such an ontological conception promotes, as in the case of the inanimate physical world, an instrumentalist approach and an exploitative attitude of domination towards animals and the rest of the biotic

118

Mayr, This is Biology, 1 Leslie J. Beck, The Metaphysics of Descartes: A Study of the Meditations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 268. This section of the letter has not been translated by CSMK. 120 Vittorio Hösle, Philosophie der ökologischen Krise (München: Beck, 1991), 54-55. 121 Luc Ferry, The New Ecological Order (Chicago – London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 44. 119

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community.122 With the loss of the traditional conception of living entities as organisms, and the whole of the natural world itself as a living organism, there are no more cultural or moral constraints in humanity’s exploitation of its home planet. The whole of the natural world, both animate and inanimate, reduced to res extensa, inert and passive matter, opens itself up for humanity’s voracious consumption and ruthless exploitation.

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As David R. Keller notes, “the biomachine ontology has had a profound effect on our conception of nonhuman organisms, exemplified, for instance, in the practice of factory farming.” Keller, “Toward A Post-Mechanistic Philosophy of Nature,” 718.

CHAPTER VII CARTESIAN METAPHYSICAL DUALISM AND THE HUMAN-NATURE DIVIDE

Introduction The most important legacy of Cartesian thought to the creation of the modern Weltbild is the dualistic divide between humanity and the rest of the natural world. Some of the most significant roots of the contemporary ecological crisis can be traced precisely within the humus of the metaphysical dualism introduced by Descartes, as recognized by eminent critics of Modernity like Hans Jonas. Cartesian dualism is not just anthropological dualism, to which it is often reduced in philosophical circles, namely, the controversial question of the union of body and soul, with the famous pineal gland as the hypothetical point of liaison. Cartesian dualism is much deeper and is essentially metaphysical in character. It is ultimately a worldview in which all reality is divided into the two inseparable segments of the res cogitans and the res extensa—the human beings and the rest of the physical world—conceived in terms of diametric opposition and exclusion. The human perception of the natural world since Modernity has been moulded by such a dualistic divide. Accordingly, humanity and the physical world stand in total separation and mutual opposition within the Cartesian and largely modern Weltbild. The ontological divide between humans and the rest of the physical world, rules out any element of continuity and relationship whatsoever between them. The Cartesian bifurcation of nature, as noted by Alfred North Whitehead, eventually sanctioned the domination and exploitation of the natural world at the hands of humans, as the latter came to be considered as totally separate from and as hierarchically superior to nature. The scope of the present chapter is to trace the contours of modern Cartesian dualism and to make explicit some of its ecological implications. We will begin by highlighting the uniqueness of Cartesian dualism which is metaphysical rather than anthropological. We will then trace the

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epistemological route followed by Descartes to arrive at metaphysical dualism. We will evaluate some of the counter arguments in defence of Cartesian dualism and seek to respond to them. We will conclude the chapter by evidencing some of the salient ecological consequences of the Cartesian and modern metaphysical divide between humanity and the rest of the natural world.

1. The Uniqueness of Cartesian Dualism Dualism in itself is no stranger to philosophy, of which the roots within the Western tradition can be traced right back to Plato.1 However, we consider Cartesian dualism to be original for two reasons. First of all, Cartesian dualism is profoundly metaphysical in character. Descartes does not have to posit a Platonic transcendental world as an exemplar of the present one, in order to place a wedge between the two. For Descartes, dualism is woven into the very ontological fabric of reality, as vouched by the substantial distinction between the res cogitans and the res extensa. Secondly, it is with Descartes that the dualistic tradition within Western philosophy reaches a level of extreme polarisation between the two constituents of mind and body and correspondingly between humanity and nature. As Hans Jonas has pointed out, human-nature divide follows from the metaphysical dualism between the res cogitans and the res extensa: “since ‘nature’ is entirely and exclusively the latter, i.e. external, while the former is in no sense ‘nature,’ that division provided the metaphysical charter for a purely mechanistic and quantitative picture of the natural world.”2 It is important to clarify right at the beginning that we are not concerned here primarily with anthropological dualism in Descartes, to which Cartesian dualism, erroneously though, often comes to be reduced in philosophical circles. The latter, which is itself an offshoot of the former, is the one which often comes to be discussed and debated almost exclusively among Cartesian scholars. Accordingly, the significance of Cartesian dualism is usually limited to the anthropological version of it 1

For a synthetic survey of dualism within Western thought see the study of Nathalie Frogneux on Hans Jonas where she dedicates a chapter to the “L’occident dualiste”. Nathalie Frogneux, Hans Jonas ou la vie dans le monde (Bruxelles: Éditions DeBoeck Université, 2001), 101-50. See also Vernon Pratt – Jane Howarth – Emily Brady, Environment and Philosophy (London – New York: Routledge, 2000), 40-46. 2 Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology (Chicago – London: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), 72.

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alone. John Cottingham writes, “By ‘Cartesian dualism’ is meant the thesis that man is a compound of two distinct substances—res cogitans, unextended thinking substance, or mind, and res extensa, extended corporeal substance, or body.”3 Cartesian dualism is problematic already at the anthropological level. Scholarship on Cartesian anthropological dualism can be divided into at least three main groups. First of all, there is the position of Jacques Maritain and other classical interpretations of Descartes which are critical of the dichotomous conception of body-soul relationship in Cartesian anthropology. One may recall Jacques Maritain’s classical charge of “angelism” in Cartesian anthropology. According to Maritain, “Cartesian dualism breaks man up into two complete substances, joined to one another no one knows how: on the one hand, the body which is only geometric extension; on the other, the soul which is only thought—an angel inhabiting a machine and directing it by means of the pineal gland.”4 On the other hand, there has been a steady stream of scholars who have taken up cudgels in defending Descartes’ conception of the body-mind union, for example, Gordon Baker and Katherine Morris.5 Baker and Morris argue that, despite the general consensus within Western philosophy, Descartes was not a proponent of dualism. They claim that direct textual evidence for a dualistic conception is not compelling in Descartes’ own writings.6 3

John Cottingham, Descartes (Oxford – Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1986), 119. J. Maritain, The Dream of Descartes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1944), 179. See in this regard also Stephen Voss, “Descartes: The End of Anthropology” in John Cottingham (ed.), Reason, Will, and Sensation: Studies in Descartes’ Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 274. 5 Gordon Baker – Katherine J. Morris, Descartes’ Dualism (London – New York: Routledge, 2002), especially chapter 3. On the difficulties that the position of Baker and Morris on Cartesian dualism runs into with regard to the question of animal sensation see Cecilia Wee, “Animal Sentience and Descartes’ Dualism: Exploring the Implications of Baker and Morris’s Views,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (2005), 611-26. 6 On the problem of the union of body and soul and the nature of the human being see also Salvatore Nicolosi, “Metafisica e antropologia in Cartesio, l’unità sostanizale del composto umano” in Cartesio e il destino della metafisica, ed. Ferdinando Luigi Marcolungo (Padua: Il Poligrafo, 2003), 53-74; Justin James Skirry, Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature (London – New York: Continuum, 2005); Lynn Margulis - Dorion Sagan - Ricardo Guerriero, “Descartes, Dualism, and Beyond” in Dazzle Gradually: Reflections on the Nature of Nature, eds. Lynn Margulis - Dorion Sagan (White River Junction: Chelsea Green Pub., 2007), 195-207; John Hawthorne, “Cartesian Dualism” in Persons: 4

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John Cottingham has proposed a third way of dealing with Cartesian mind-body union in terms of “trialism”—a term coined by him—to refer to the human composite, considering it as a hybrid union of body and soul and making space thereby for the reality of sensations.7 Cottingham observes that “the account of sensation and imagination which Descartes himself provides tends to put his official dualism under considerable pressure. Partly as a result of this, we often see the emergence, in Descartes’ writings on human psychology, of a grouping of not two but three notions—not a dualism, but what may be called a ‘trialism’.”8 Obviously, the point of contention here is clearly anthropological dualism as it is about the conception of the human person and more precisely the question of mind-body interaction. As evident from the quick survey we have presented above, the debate around Cartesian anthropological dualism appears to be far from being settled. We intend to decipher in Cartesian philosophy a deeper form of dualism, represented in the radical distinction between the two heterogeneous substances of res cogitans and res extensa. As Enrico Berti has pointed out, such a dualism is much deeper than what is habitually imputed to Descartes.9 It is the ontological dualism of the division of all created reality into the two opposing and mutually exclusive spheres of res cogitans (thinking substance) and res extensa (extended substance), that serves as the overarching framework of the whole of Cartesian thought and modern worldview. It is the dichotomy between matter and spirit that Descartes introduced into modern thought, and which found a fertile terrain in the nascent modern scientific project and of the Modern Weltbild. Descartes thus creates a wedge that cuts across the whole of created reality, between humanity and the rest of the physical world. The deeper metaphysical dualism is certainly the most important of Descartes’ philosophical heritage. In this dualistic division of reality, only the humans are considered as res cogitans since subjectivity is possessed

Human and Divine, eds. Peter Van Inwagen - Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), 87-98. 7 John Cottingham, “Cartesian Trialism” in Mind 94 (1985), 218-30. See also John Cottingham, Descartes (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 127-32. In fact, occasional, but in no way consistent references in this regard can be found in some passages of Descartes’ later writings, especially his letters to the princess Elizabeth. 8 Cottingham, Descartes, 127. For a critique of Cottingham’s views on Cartesian trialism see: Eugenio E. Zaldivar, “Descartes’ Theory of Substance: Why He was Not a Trialist,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (2011), 395-418. 9 See Enrico Berti, “Descartes: il metodo e il cogito” in Cartesio e il destino della metafisica, ed. Ferdinando Luigi Marcolungo (Padua: Il Poligrafo, 2003), 11-30.

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by the thinking humans alone, while the rest of animate and inanimate nature, including animals, is lumped under the category of res extensa. It is such a conceptual humus that becomes a significant source of the human alienation from nature leading to the contemporary ecological crisis. As John Rodman rightly points out, most philosophical discussion of Cartesian dualism in the past focused exclusively on mind/body separation, whereas the “real Cartesian revolution” consists in the sharp separation that it makes of humankind from the world.10 It is the trail that we shall be following in tracing the philosophical roots of the contemporary ecological crisis within the Cartesian and largely modern Weltbild. Descartes’ metaphysical dualism is closely linked to his epistemology. In arriving at his dualistic conclusions, Descartes is consistent in his overall methodology of treading the epistemological path in order to arrive at metaphysical truths. It is only after the process of understanding has prepared the terrain that Descartes moves on to draw metaphysical conclusions, well aware that the order of things can be known through the order of reason alone and subsequent to it. (cf. AT III, 266 / CSMK, 163) We shall now go on to examine the epistemological character of Cartesian dualism presupposed in the dichotomy between the knower and the known within the representational theory of knowledge initiated by Descartes.

2. The Epistemic Route to the Human-Nature Divide The metaphysical doctrine of the dualistic divide between the two substances of res cogitans and res extensa is ultimately grounded on the epistemological theory of clear and distinct understanding. Descartes claims that “the fact that I can clearly and distinctly understand one thing apart from another is enough to make me certain that the two things are distinct.” (AT VII, 78 / CSM II, 54) Writing to Regius in June 1642, Descartes is all the more explicit: “For the only criterion we have enabling us to know that one substance differs from another is that we understand one apart from the other.” (AT III, 567 / CSMK, 214) Descartes gives a clear hint of the epistemological path to his dualistic metaphysics already in the Synopsis of the Meditations. “The inference to be drawn from these results is that all the things that we clearly and distinctly conceive of as different substances (as we do in the case of mind and body) are in fact substances which are really distinct one from the other.” (AT VII, 13 / CSM II, 9) As Marjorie Grene rightly notes: “For Descartes, the separation of mind as intellect and body as extension is 10

John Rodman, “The Dolphin Papers,” North American Review 259 (1974), 23.

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luminously clear; the way of ideas as distinct from the way of judgment demands precisely that kind of self-reliant intellect, cut off entirely from the unthinking physical world.” 11 According to Descartes, the knowing process itself is thoroughly dualistic and thus provides the foundations for the absolute divide between the knowing subject and the known object. Within Cartesian epistemology, there is a stark accentuation of the subject-object dichotomy. It happens precisely on account of the representational theory of knowledge inaugurated by Descartes. All knowing for Descartes, it may be said, is an act of representation by the knower as per the canons of an Archimedean subjective rationality. Within Cartesian epistemology, the act of knowing gets reduced to an exercise of the pure intellect, with only a marginal role for the senses. As Descartes states in the Meditations, it is the inspection of the mind alone (solius mentis inspectio) that reveals the true nature of the wax (AT VII, 31 / CSM II, 21). In the Principles, Descartes claims that the dependence on the senses is a childhood prejudice which needs to be overcome as one enters into the threshold of intellectual adulthood (AT VIIIA, 5 / CSM II, 193). The epistemological revolution that Descartes wanted to realize was centred around the exaltation of the pure intellect over the senses, considering thereby the former as a superior source of knowledge.12 Thus for Descartes, knowing becomes predominantly an exercise of the res cogitans, as in the act of knowing the physical world the balance tilts grossly in favour of the subject. Étienne Gilson makes a profound observation when he notes that the Cartesian epistemological method prohibits that the existence of the external world be proved except in terms of the contents of one’s own thought.13 Here Descartes is original as he departs from the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition which conceived the process of knowing as involving a co-relation between the known and the knower. Within Cartesian epistemology it is not the object which 11

Marjorie Grene, Descartes (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1985), 20. Val Plumwood points out how Plato’s denial of the body foreshadows Descartes’ denial of senses. “In the early dialogues dependency on the body is flatly denied; the body is said to be ‘of no help in the attainment of wisdom’, and we are said to ‘make the nearest approach to knowledge when we have “the least possible intercourse with or communion with the body”’ (Phaedo 204). Plato thus foreshadows Descartes’ later denial of dependency on the senses and his treatment of the senses as sources of error, as well as other elements of Descartes’ later development of human/nature dualism in terms of mind/body dualism.” Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London – New York: Routledge, 1993), 91. 13 Étienne Gilson, René Descartes: Discours de la Méthode (Introduction et notes) (Paris: Vrin, 1970, 1999), 20. 12

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imposes itself on the subject, but rather the res extensa is always a res repraesentata. The process of subjective “representation” is a running thread throughout the Cartesian texts. In Cartesian thought, the epistemological protology of the cogito leads to the pre-eminence of the science of mens over that of bodies. This is so because within Cartesian epistemology, the truth of a physical entity is revealed not by the fulgor entis seu objecti, but by the certainty of the subjective conditions of clear and distinct perception. The physical world here is known as represented by the subject, and represented in terms of geometrical categories alone since the sole essence of any material object is geometrical extension. As Jean-Luc Marion notes, there is a reduction of the ens of the object known, as it comes to be represented only in terms of the abstraction of its essence, which is geometrical alone.14 This process is tellingly exemplified in Descartes’ famous analysis of the piece of wax in the Second Meditation in which the nature of the wax consists in sole extension which is “perceived by the mind alone.” (AT VII, 31 / CSM II, 21). The truth of the physical world, within Cartesian thought, thus becomes a “representation” of it from the part of the subject. It is a momentous step that marks the beginning of modern thought with marked implications for human knowledge of the physical world. Cartesian epistemology reveals a profound subject-object dichotomy which becomes the foundation for the metaphysical divide between humanity and the natural world. The process of subjective representation within Cartesian epistemology inevitably leads to a subject-object dichotomy and a corresponding human-nature divide. It happens for at least three reasons. First of all, keeping to the basic parameters of the Cartesian conception of the act of knowing, the intellect or rationality is considered as belonging to the realm of the essentially human, while the senses come to be associated with the realm of the material or the natural. Thus the diametrical opposition between the intellect and the senses leads to a corresponding divide between subject and object. David Pepper rightly notes in this regard: “We, as observers of nature (subjects) are separate from it, the object, so that we can be objective about it. Such dualism, as between mind and matter, sets the paradigm for understanding most of

14

See Jean-Luc Marion, Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes: Constitution et limites de l’onto-théo-logie dans la pensée cartésienne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1986), 84-85.

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Western culture.”15 The inevitable outcome of such a dualistic divide is the total separation between rational humans and irrational nature. Secondly, as we have evidenced above, within the process of subjective representation the object is conceived and represented in terms of the subject alone. The natural world has no independence or autonomy apart from the essence conferred on it by the subject who dominates over it in terms of power and control. Val Plumwood notes: It involves not just separation but hyper-separation, construing sharing and connection as a hindrance to knowledge, the object known as alien to the knower, and the knowledge relation as power. … In the Cartesian dream of power, the subject is set over against the object it knows, in a relation of alleged neutrality in practice modelled as power and control.16

Thirdly, within Cartesian epistemology the subject and object are poles apart with nothing to connect them. The subject is characterised exclusively by rationality (the res cogitans) while the physical object or the physical world is marked precisely by the lack of it, as it is purely extended material (the res extensa). All subjectivity is limited to the thinking humans alone, while the rest of the physical world, including all non-human living entities, is considered as just heaps of matter. Accordingly nature comes to be perceived as dead and inert matter, lacking freedom and spontaneity, which the mind alone possesses. Thus every non-human entity exists in so far as it is useful for human consumption, an unconscious assumption which is the bedrock of modern economy, for example. The Cartesian subject-object dichotomy not only leads to the humannature divide, but also conceives the latter as inferior and accordingly as pliable for manipulation at will. The dividing line here is clearly rationality. For Descartes rationality or any form of subjectivity is to be associated exclusively with humans, while both inanimate and animate nature is perceived as totally devoid of it. “Human/nature dualism … is a system of ideas that takes a radically separated reason to be the essential characteristic of humans and situates human life outside and above an inferiorised and manipulable nature.”17 The Cartesian subject as the sole 15 David Pepper, Modern Environmentalism: An Introduction (London – New York: Routledge, 1999), 246. Douglas C. Bowman also speaks of the “principle of separation” that operates in Western consciousness ever since Modernity. See Douglas C. Bowman, Beyond the Modern Mind: The Spiritual and Ethical Challenge of the Environmental Crisis (New York: The Pilgrim Press, 1990), 7. 16 Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 117. 17 Plumwood, Environmental Culture, 4.

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possessor of rationality tends to see all that is not res cogitans as res extensa and devoid of reason, and consequently as inferior. “Whatever is identified with nature and the realm of the physical is inferior to (“below”) whatever is identified with the “human” and the realm of the mental; or, conversely, the latter is superior to (“above”) the former.”18 It is precisely rationality which is absent in the natural world, as the res extensa is just inert and passive matter. The upshot is a deeply entrenched view of the genuine or ideal human self as not including features shared with nature, and as defined against or in opposition to the nonhuman realm, so that the human sphere and that of nature cannot significantly overlap. Nature is sharply divided off from the human, is alien and usually hostile and inferior. Furthermore, this kind of human self can only have certain kinds of accidental or contingent connections to the realm of nature.19

Herein nature loses any axiomatic value which is invested with the res cogitans alone. In short, the rationalist inspired accounts of the self and of nature may be said to be one of the root causes of the human alienation from and domination over nature. So it can be claimed that the Cartesian, and very much modern, subject-object dichotomy based on rationality has contributed significantly to causing the human-nature divide conceived in terms of a hierarchical superior-inferior relationship. Descartes, in this manner, provides the epistemological foundations for the “master narrative” which characterises the modern conception of nature, as diametrically opposite and consequently to be dominated and exploited. With the transformation of nature into res extensa, quantifiable and mathematical, the human rapport with nature undergoes a profound revolution. Nature becomes totally the other, and is sought to be brought under absolute human dominion by submitting it to human power. The project of Descartes thus becomes one of domination over the natural world. Descartes, in fact, will take to heart the Renaissance quest for mastery over the world through knowledge, an expression that Descartes originally found in P. Richeome’s 1621 volume, L’Immortalité 18 Karen J. Warren, “The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism” in Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, eds. Michael E. Zimmerman et al. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), 324. 19 Val Plumwood, “Nature, Self, and Gender: Feminism, Environmental Philosophy, and the Critique of Rationalism” in Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, eds. Michael E. Zimmerman et al. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), 292-93.

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de l’âme déclarée avec raisons naturelles (…) contre les athées et libertins.20 Richeome justifies the human appetite for knowledge in striking terms for Descartes: “L’homme doit connaître le monde pour le posséder”, an expression that will be re-echoed by Descartes himself in the celebrated expression of becoming “lords and masters of nature” in the Discourse on the Method. (AT VI, 62 / CSM I, 142-143) The Cartesian epistemology of representation is closely linked to the concept of mastery over nature. Here Étienne Gilson’s remark—while commenting on the phrase in the Discourse on becoming “lords and masters” of nature—that Descartes’ dream of the mastery of nature and its potential for human benevolence is an accidental and unintended consequence of his philosophy which Descartes came upon only after virtually all of his system was complete, is clearly a misinterpretation.21 Geneviève RodisLewis in fact interprets Descartes’ first dream as a temptation to possess or control the world through knowledge, alluding to the temptation in Genesis “to become gods” through knowledge, in the light of yet another passage from Descartes found in his letter to Pierre Hector Chanut on 1st February, 1647. (AT IV, 608) 22 The quest for knowledge of the natural phenomena in order to gain control over the natural word and thus to ameliorate human living conditions was something that Descartes shared with other pioneers of Modernity like Bacon. Carrying forward the Renaissance programme of the acquisition of practical knowledge for the improvement of human life, Bacon, like Leonardo da Vinci before him, saw in technical know-how a precious ally in this regard. Scientific knowledge in general, and mechanical arts in particular, aimed to harness the power of nature to fulfil human needs.23 The uniqueness of Descartes is that in going beyond the immediate practical benefits of the mastery of nature through knowledge he provided an explicit link between human rationality and domination of 20

See in this regard Rodis-Lewis, L’anthropologie cartésienne, 132 ff. See Étienne Gilson, Discours de la méthode, texte et commentaire (Paris: J. Vrin, 1962), 444. Richard Kennington accuses Gilson of having fathered such a misinterpretation on generations of Cartesian scholarship. See Kennington, “Descartes and Mastery of Nature,” 206; Richard H. Kennington, On Modern Origins: Essays in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Pamela Kraus - Frank Hunt (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004), 123-144. 22 Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, “L’alto e il basso e i sogni di Descartes” Rivista di Filosofia 80 (1989), 189-214; Rodis-Lewis, L’anthropologie cartésienne, 155 (footnote 14). 23 See Stephen Gaukroger, Francis Bacon and the Transformation of EarlyModern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 14. 21

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the natural world. The Cartesian and largely modern dominant rationality thus promoted an instrumental and utilitarian approach towards nature. Thus within the modern worldview humanity is the rational master while the natural world as a subordinate force is to be controlled through instrumental reason. The taming and manipulation of nature is ultimately possible on account of the superior element of rationality of which humans are the sole possessors. Fredric Jameson has noted how the misguided urge for power and domination over nature is a central motif of Modernity.24 The hierarchy based on rationality leads to domination over nature as well as to other forms of domination at the intra-human level. “Once the subject is established as the sole and unique pole of meaning and value, nature can no longer be conceived as anything but a gigantic reservoir of neutral objects, or raw materials destined for human consumption.”25 The colonization of nature, exorcised of any trait of rationality or subjectivity, is also accompanied by the colonization of primitive cultures, based on a dynamic of dualism based on hierarchy. Social ecologists have shown how it is not only nature—conceived as res extensa and lacking rationality altogether—but also other social groups, that come to be considered as outside the sphere of reason and as such deemed as “inferior”, that remain vulnerable to domination. The subject-object dichotomy in Cartesian epistemology leads to a relationship of diametrical opposition between the knower and the known, between the dominant human rationality and the homogenized and inert world of objects.26 This dichotomy based on rationality has contributed significantly to causing a corresponding human-nature divide in terms of a hierarchical superior-inferior relationship. It is manifested in the human quest for control and domination of both inanimate and animate nature with detrimental ecological consequences. The dualistic divide between the knower and the known in Cartesian epistemology is ultimately founded on the divide that exists already at the ontological level between the two substances of res cogitans and res extensa and divides the whole of created reality in two. It is to the substantial metaphysical dualism in Descartes that we turn now.

24

See Fredric Jameson, The Seeds of Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 25. 25 Luc Ferry, The New Ecological Order, tr. Carol Volk (Chicago – London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 48. 26 See in this regard Patricia Limido-Heulot, Une histoire philosophique de la nature (Paris: Éditions Apogée, 2014), 10.

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3. The Metaphysical Dualism between the res cogitans and the res extensa Cartesian dualism is original precisely on account of its metaphysical character. Even though a dualistic vision of reality may be traced right back to Plato in the Western philosophical tradition, it is only with Descartes that such a dualism comes to assume clear metaphysical contours. Unlike in Plato, there are not two worlds for Descartes. For him, dualism is woven into the very fabric of reality, as evidenced in the ontological distinction between the heterogeneous and mutually opposed substances of res cogitans and res extensa. As Geneviève Rodis-Lewis notes, “Descartes, in reducing the essence of the soul to the exercise of thought, and that of body to extension, accentuates the heterogeneity of the two substances much more radically than Platonic dualism.”27 Here it is important to consider Descartes’ understanding of substance in the Meditations. Descartes provides an informal definition of substance half-way through the Third Meditation as “a thing capable of existing independently” (AT VII, 44 / CSM II, 30). This definition is re-echoed in the Fourth Set of Replies: “the notion of substance is just this – that it can exist by itself, that is without the aid of any other substance.” (AT VII, 226 / CSM II, 159) Cartesian dualism is metaphysical precisely on account of the fact that the distinction between the res cogitans and the res extensa is a “substantial” one, leaving an unbridgeable gap between them.28 Descartes, in fact, closes all doors to minor versions of dualism, where mind and body may be considered as separate attributes, but as belonging to the one and same substance. One may recall here Aristotle’s understanding of substance, when he wrote that it is “a distinctive mark of substance, that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities.”29 Obviously the Aristotelian definition is not monistic and avoids the pitfalls of Cartesian dualism.

27 Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, L’anthropologie cartésienne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990), 39. See also Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, Le développement de la pensée de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1997), 154; “Le dualisme platonisant au début du XVIIe siècle et la révolution cartésienne,” Rivista di storia della filosofia 43 (1988), 677-96. 28 See Jean-Dominique Robert, “Descartes, créateur d’un nouveau style métaphysique: Rèflexions sur l’introduction du primat de la subjectivité en philosophie première,” Revue philosophique de Louvain 60 (1962), 387. 29 Aristotle, Categories, 17-18, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1981), 14.

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Cartesian dualism is adumbrated already in the very First Meditation, through the powerful means of doubt that casts suspicion on senses in the process of knowledge. Behind Descartes’ effort to drive a radical wedge between sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge, what is presupposed is the diametrical opposition between the body and the mind with which the senses and the intellect are respectively associated within Cartesian philosophy. In this sense the methodic doubt is not just an introduction to metaphysics, it already postulates a dualistic metaphysics.30 It is in the Sixth Meditation that Descartes argues for the real distinction of mind and body based upon the indivisibility of the mind and the divisibility of the body. The argument runs as follows: There is a great difference between the mind and the body, inasmuch as the body is by its very nature always divisible, while the mind is utterly indivisible. For when I consider the mind, or myself in so far as I am merely a thinking thing, I am unable to distinguish any parts within myself; I understand myself to be something quite single and complete. … By contrast, there is no corporeal or extended thing that I can think of which in my thought I cannot easily divide into parts; and this very fact makes me understand that it is divisible. This one argument would be enough to show me that the mind is completely different from the body, even if I did not already know as much from other considerations. (AT VII, 85-86 / CSM II, 59)

The logic of dualism and counter-positioning between the res cogitans and the res extensa, between the meditator and the external world, marks the underlying logic of the Meditations. Cartesian dualism, as Pierre Guenancia notes is “the expression of a rigorously (and without doubt exaggerated) ‘symmetric’ conception of things, wherein the properties of one type of things appear to be nothing else than the negation (or privation) of the properties of the other.”31 Descartes highlights the element of contrariety and appears to have opted for separation rather than union in his metaphysics and also in his physiology and ethics. As Descartes affirms in the Synopsis, “the natures of mind and body are not only different, but in some way opposite.” (AT VII, 13 / CSM II, 9-10) Descartes does not only see mind and body as distinct, he rather defines them in mutually exclusive terms. An exercise of explicatio terminorum brings to the fore clearly the contrariety and metaphysical cleavage between res cogitans and res extensa. In the Meditations, the term cogitans is present participle, and 30 31

Cf. Gouhier, La pensée métaphysique de Descartes, 321. Pierre Guenancia, Lire Descartes (Paris: Gallimard, 2000), 304.

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signals an activity, deriving from the verb cogitare. It is the ego that recollects itself in the act of cogitare. As Descartes affirms repeatedly, only cogitatio is the essence of the ego. In sharp contrast to the cogitans, the past participle extensa comes from the verb extender which signifies to tend or stretch towards the outside, the prefix ex marks the exteriority characteristic of material bodies. The past participle indicates clearly a state, the passive state of being nothing other than pure extension in length, breadth and depth, in spatial exteriority. Obviously then, cogitans and extensa are terms with diametrically opposed characteristics; the former active and recollected in one’s own interiority, the latter totally passive and turned towards the exterior.32 The Cartesian subject, while it conceives of itself in terms of interiority, immanent presence to oneself, thinks of the res extensa, in terms of exteriority, “hors de soi”, “everything else located outside me” (AT VII, 33 / CSM II, 22).33 Accordingly the world is that which is exterior and foreign to the subject. As Pierre Guenancia notes, the separation between the moi and the non-moi is, in fact, the cornerstone of the Cartesian metaphysics.34 The problem with the Cartesian understanding of the res extensa as material substance has its source in the difficulty of the extension of a concept elaborated originally for and by the ego. The Cartesian physical world of the res extensa is then a world represented by the cogitans and reduced to the parameters of the ego cogito.35 The metaphysical statute of the world is precisely to be an object or idea of the spirit, thought of as res extensa by the subject. As we have seen earlier, Descartes holds that the essence of a substance is ultimately determined by and consists in its principal attribute.36 According to the rule of one principal attribute “for any given substance there is one and only one corresponding principal attribute, i.e., one and only one attribute that constitutes the nature or essence of that substance.”37 The Cartesian argument of one principal attribute is very clearly articulated in article 53 of the first part of the Principles wherein Descartes states that “To each substance there belongs one principal 32

Soual, “Res cogitans et res extensa dans les Méditations,” 250-52. Cf. Ibid., 246-248. 34 Guenancia, Lire Descartes, 47. 35 Cf. Marion, Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes, 180-90. 36 See Blake D. Dutton, “Descartes’s Dualism and the One Principal Attribute Rule,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 11 (2003), 395-415; Marleen Rozemond, Descartes’s Dualism (Cambridge, MA – London: Harvard University Press, 1998), 19ff;. 37 Dutton, “Descartes’s Dualism and the One Principal Attribute Rule,” 395-96. 33

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attribute; in the case of mind, this is thought, and in the case of body it is extension.” In one of his last works, the Comments on a Certain Broadsheet, Descartes restates his originality in having proposed the principal attribute argument: “I am the first to have regarded thought as the principal attribute of an incorporeal substance, and extension as the principal attribute of a corporeal substance.” (AT VIIIB, 348 / CSM I, 297) Descartes conceives the two substances, the res cogitans and the res extensa, identified through their respective principal attributes of extension and thought, as “contrary” to each other. In Article 54 of the first part of the Principles Descartes states: “We can easily have two clear and distinct notions or ideas, one of created thinking substance, and the other of corporeal substance, provided we are careful to distinguish all the attributes of thought from the attributes of extension.” (AT VIIIA, 25 / CSM I, 211) The most explicit doctrine of the substantial dualism between self and the world in the Principles is found in article 48 of the first part. Descartes states there: “But I recognize only two ultimate classes of things: first, intellectual or thinking things, i.e. those which pertain to mind or thinking substance; and secondly, material things, i.e. those which pertain to extended substance or body.” (AT VIIIA, 23 / CSM I, 208) The distinction between thought and extension is a real one in as much as it is a substantial one. Here is where the metaphysical doctrine of essentialism, and in particular the principal attribute argument plays a very crucial role. The principal attribute argument recognizes only one attribute of each of the substances of mind and body, namely, thought and extension. Descartes holds each of these attributes to be not only unique to the substance under consideration but also as contrary to each other by their very nature. For example, mind is non-extended and body is non-thinking. Thus they are not only conceptually diverse but mutually exclusive as well. As Descartes identifies and equates the principal attribute with the substance in which it inheres, the contrariety of attributes cannot but lead to the contrariety of the substances themselves. It is such contrariety of substances that guarantees the real and substantial distinction between them. In responding to Regius’s claim that the attributes of thought and extension are different but not exclusive of one another, Descartes emphatically asserts their absolute and mutual contrariety.38 When the question concerns attributes, … there can be no greater opposition between them than the fact they are different; and when [Regius] acknowledges that the one attribute is different from the other,

38

See Dutton, “Descartes’s Dualism and the One Principal Attribute Rule,” 408.

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this is tantamount to saying that the one attribute is not the other; but ‘is’ and ‘is not’ are contraries. (AT VIIIB, 349 / CSMI I, 298).

The absolute contrary natures of res cogitans and res extensa are clearly evident in Descartes’ response to a query from Burman and shows how Descartes held fast to this view even in his later years. Descartes writes: You have a clear conception of corpore al substance, and you also have a clear conception of thinking substance as distinct from, and incompatible with, corporeal substance, just as corporeal substance is incompatible with thinking substance. In view of this, you would be going against your own powers of reasoning in the most absurd fashion if you said the two were one and the same substance. For you have a clear conception of them as two substances which not only do not entail one another but are actually incompatible. (AT V, 163 / CSMK, 345)

At the heart of Cartesian metaphysics lies a radical dualism between the two heterogeneous and diametrically opposed substances of res cogitans and res extensa, based on their respective essences of thought and extension. The contrariety between the two substances is established not only via the existence of their corresponding principal attributes but also by the corresponding negation of them. Thus res extensa is all that which does not possess thought or rationality, while res cogitans is all that which does not possess extension. Here a single element – the principal attribute – is exalted as unique and becomes the point of total division. In the human-nature divide, the dividing element is clearly rationality. Descartes creates an abyssal separation between humans and nature, as the former alone possess rationality and the latter is totally deprived of it. What is even more striking is that the Cartesian strategy employed in this regard is at the basis of each and every dualistic divide. Thus in the case of racism, casteism, classism, or any other dualistic separation, one element is exalted as unique to one group and a total separation is made from the “others” who do not possess this “unique” characteristic. In the context of the contemporary ecological crisis, it is sufficient for us here to take cognizance of how the Cartesian dualistic divide between res cogitans and res extensa has proved to be indeed lethal for the human-nature divide. The basic problem of Descartes may be identified as his emphasis on distinction than on unity, on separation rather than on relation. Descartes constantly privileges the logic of dualism and counter-positioning over that of unity and inter-relatedness of reality. Such a substantial dualism, we argue, has contributed to the dichotomy between humans and the physical world with its attendant ecological consequences. It may be

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remembered that in Cartesian thought such a distinction is substantial and therefore also metaphysical, as it is ingrained in the very constitution of reality. This radical counter position naturally becomes the fertile ground for the alienation of the modern mind from nature. Cartesian metaphysical dualism ultimately robs the human self of its earthly particularity. The shadow of the real, substantial distinction between res cogitans and res extensa falls squarely on the Cartesian self, depriving it of the ontological rootedness in the physical world. As Emily Grosholz notes, “even the pilgrim souls in Augustine and Dante, merely passing through on their way to transcendence, are not so thoroughly stripped of their earthly particularity.”39 Cartesian dualism, in fact, wedges a gap between human beings and the natural world that has proved to be almost unbridgeable, as posterior philosophical tradition bears witness to. As Marjorie Grene affirms, “It is the real distinction and the concomitant double reduction of mind to thought and nature to machinery that have plagued our thinking. … Even God cannot weld together what clear and distinct thought has so sharply split asunder.”40 A fundamental problem posited by the Cartesian metaphysics is precisely the question of the place of the human being in nature. Before going on to arrive at the ecological implications of Cartesian dualism, we shall critically evaluate some of Descartes’ arguments, epistemological as well as metaphysical, for establishing such a dualistic divide between humans and the rest of the physical world.

4. Critique of the Cartesian Epistemological Dualistic Divide The problem with Cartesian epistemology is a perception in which rationality is seen as separating the human being totally from the rest of nature. But is it really so? We may raise some fundamental questions here regarding the legitimacy of such a conception of rationality as independent of nature and the dichotomies that result thereby. A first question to be raised is whether the subject-object dichotomy of the Cartesian conception of the knowing process can be sustained. Such a dichotomy, in fact, does not hold in the real act of knowing which is always a correlation involving the senses and the intellect within a unitary process. It is common knowledge that the epistemological subject-object 39 40

Grosholz, Cartesian Method and the Problem of Reduction, 142. Grene, Descartes, 108.

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hyper separation is considered to be untenable in contemporary physics in the wake of Quantum Mechanics. We may quote Werner Heisenberg in this regard: The old division of the world into objective processes in space and time and the mind in which these processes are mirrored—in other words, the Cartesian difference between res cogitans and res extensa—is no longer a suitable starting point for our understanding of modern science.41

As one of the environmental philosophers, J. Baird Callicott, reminds us, “in the worldview of the New Physics, the Cartesian distinction between the res extensa and res cogitans is blurred.”42 “In the subatomic realm the physical act of knowing, thus, in a sense, partially constitutes the objects of knowledge. At this level, the objective world becomes inseparably entangled with the subjective.”43 Contemporary physics, in fact, professes a relational perspective of knowing which takes into account both the poles of the subject and the object. Today, physics offers “a picture not of nature but of our relationship with nature.”44 For empirical information to be collected, in other words, energy must be exchanged between the observer and the observed. Light or other electromagnetic radiation, sound or other mechanical energy and the like must flow from the thing observed to the observer to be registered by our senses or by apparatuses—such as photographic plates, cloud chambers, or Geiger counters—that serve as sensory surrogates or extensions. Thus

41 Werner Heisenberg, The Physicist’s Conception of Nature (London: Hutchison, 1958), 29. 42 J. Baird Callicott, “Introduction: Compass Points in Environmental Philosophy” in Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999) 17. 43 J. Baird Callicott, “Just the Facts, Ma’am” in Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999), 83. 44 Wim Zweers, Participating with Nature: Outline for an Ecologization of Our World View (Utrecht: International Books, 2000), 111. For a short review of the epistemological challenges from subatomic physics in this regard see Pepper, Modern Environmentalism, 246-49. Instead from the field of relativity see David Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order (London – New York: Routledge, 1980), 13-14. See also Brigitte Falkenburg, Particle Metaphysics: A Critical Account of Subatomic Reality (Berlin – Heidelberg: Springer, 2007); Laura Ruetsche, Interpreting Quantum Theories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

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The more fundamental question, we believe, is whether one can consider rationality as constituting in exclusive terms the essence of being human, as Descartes tends to do. There is an implicit danger in the excessive emphasis placed on rationality to the detriment of other human faculties, and as extruded from nature. John Habgood issues a relevant warning in this regard: The power of reasoned objectivity may be our greatest gift as human beings, but to exalt it over every other human quality is a disaster, as the Romantics never tired of pointing out. Remove a sense of intimate relationship with the world of nature, remove feeling and instinct, remove an awareness of one’s own bodiliness and sexuality, and one is left with half a person—and a dangerous half at that. … To express such misgivings is not to denigrate reasoned objectivity. In many respects the world could do with more of it. But there are consequences to detaching it from its wider context in nature as a whole.46

It is true that rationality as self-consciousness is unique to the human being alone. But the difference with the rest of natural beings in the realm of consciousness is not as drastic a one as Descartes and other thinkers of the Enlightenment make it appear. Such a difference appears to be one of degree than of total separation. Besides, it needs to be remembered that rationality itself is a product of natural evolution. On account of this, human rationality cannot be considered as totally bereft of any rootedness in nature altogether. What is needed is to reintegrate reason with other aspects of human experience, including a sense of relationship with the nonhuman world.47 A precious support in this regard has been offered in contemporary philosophy of mind. John McDowell appears to have arrived at a precise diagnosis of the epistemological angle of this problem when he identifies the present impasse as arising from rationality being extruded from nature 45

J. Baird Callicott, “Rolston on Intrinsic Value” in Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999), 232. See also Peter Hay, A Companion to Environmental Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002), 121. 46 John Habgood, The Concept of Nature (London: Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd., 2002), 73-74. 47 Michael E. Zimmerman, Contesting Earth’s Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity (Berkeley – London: University of California Press, 1994), 271.

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altogether, and conceiving understanding as independent of sensibility. We quote him: [A] familiar modern conception of nature tends to extrude rationality from nature. The effect is that reason is separated from our animal nature, as if being rational placed us partly outside the animal kingdom. Specifically, the understanding is distanced from sensibility. And that is the source of our philosophical impasse. In order to escape it, we need to bring understanding and sensibility, reason and nature, back together.48

McDowell suggests that it is important to reconnect human rationality back to nature and to animality “which is what gives us our foothold in nature.”49 Rationality is part of human nature, which is, however, also animal nature. Thus it is the entire human being, along with rational and other faculties, who is rooted in nature. What is needed therefore is a “rediscovery” of reason as rooted in nature. The problem then is not so much bridging the gulf between subject and object, or thought and world, but more fundamentally as reconciling reason and nature. Nature is not then merely a mirror for humanity to discover its own image, evoking the critique of representation which we discussed earlier.50 McDowell’s critique of Richard Rorty appears to be highly pertinent: [T]he task I envisage is not the one that Rorty deconstructs, the reconciling of subject and object, or thought and world. My proposal is that we should try to reconcile reason and nature, and the point of doing that is to attain something Rorty himself aspires to, a frame of mind in which we would no longer seem to be faced with problems that call on philosophy to bring subject and object back together.51

As McDowell notes, self-awareness and awareness of the world are interdependent, and by situating self-consciousness in a wider context, it is possible to avoid Cartesian dualism.52 The human presence in the world is basically a bodily presence which involves one being there physically, in a context of relationship with the natural world. The new paradigm required

48

John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, MA – London: Harvard University Press, 1994), 108. 49 McDowell, Mind and World, 85, 91. 50 See in this regard also Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1979). 51 McDowell, Mind and World, 85-86. 52 Ibid., 102.

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therefore is a relational one, wherein the human being is not separated from nature but is rather inserted into it! A view of nature as sharply discontinuous or ontologically divided from the human sphere, leading to the human self-perception of being situated outside it, is not shared by all. Environmentalists often rightly point to indigenous cultures who have not inherited a dualistic and dominant perspective of the human-nature relationship. One may cite a couple of works in ethnography here. As Tim Ingold points out, non-Western and especially hunter-gatherer cultures “systematically reject the ontological dualism of that tradition of thought and science which—as a kind of shorthand—we call ‘Western,’ and of which the dichotomy between nature and culture is the prototypical instance. Signe Howell’s work on the Chewong people in Malaysia illustrates Ingold’s point. The Chewong, she writes, do not oppose a natural world with a cultural world, nor do they see oppositions between humans and animals, mind and emotion, or other dualisms common to Western thought. Thus they provide “an empirical counter-example” to the supposedly universal categories that we use to construct meaning and value.53

The denial of the dependence of the intellect on senses—associated with the material—within the Cartesian conception of the knowing process comes full circle in the denial of human dependence on nature. The path to overcoming the ecological crisis, which is itself the result of such a perception of nature as totally alien to the human condition, will consist among other measures in re-integrating once again rationality with and within nature. It calls for a new epistemology not based on a kind of reductive rationality and hyper-separation between the knowing subject and the known object, but emphasizing rather the relationship between them. There is also the widely held myth to be overcome, namely, that human freedom consists in domination over nature, overlooking the fundamental fact that humans are inevitably and always within the natural 53

Anna L. Peterson, Being Human: Ethics, Environment, and Our Place in the World (Berkeley, LA – London: University of California Press, 2001), 62. The references in the citation are to the following sources: Tim Ingold, “Hunting and Gathering as Ways of Perceiving the Environment” in Redefining Nature: Ecology, Culture, and Domestication, eds. Roy Ellen - Katsuyoshi Fukui (Oxford Washington: Berg, 1996), 117; Signe Howell, “Nature in Culture or Culture in Nature? Chewong Ideas of ‘Humans’ and Other Species” in Nature and Society: Anthropological Perspectives, eds. Philippe Descol - Gisli Palsson (London: Routledge, 1996), 128.

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world and essentially dependent on nature. The Cartesian and modern denial of dependency on nature and the master narrative of domination over that natural world and exploitation of it is bound to boomerang, as evident in the contemporary ecological crisis. Here is a quote from Val Plumwood: After much destruction, mastery will fail, because the master denies dependency on the sustaining other; he misunderstands the conditions of his own existence and lacks sensitivity to limits and to the ultimate points of earthian resistance. The master’s denial of dependency and his selfdeception with respect to the conditions of his own life carry grave dangers, which include, of course, self-destruction. Since he is set on a course of devouring the other who sustains him, the story must end either with the death of the other on whom he relies, and therefore with his own death, or with the abandonment of mastery, his failure and transformation.54

Cartesian dualism thus reveals itself to be unsustainable at the epistemological level. The same fate also awaits Descartes’ metaphysical dualism. We shall now critically evaluate Descartes’ reasons for wedging an ontological dualism between res cogitans and res extensa which ultimately ends up in the sharp human-nature divide, leading to the ecological crisis.

5. Critique of the Cartesian Metaphysical Dualism As we have seen earlier, the Cartesian philosophical system and the modern Weltbid that Descartes contributed to create are anchored on a radical and underlying metaphysical dualism. What are the reasons that led Descartes to wedge such a deep-rooted ontological division between the two substances of res cogitans and res extensa? They are many but we shall reduce them to two basic arguments which we shall now examine critically. First of all, Descartes appears keen to preserve the uniqueness of the human being who alone possesses rationality/thought and is accordingly defined as the res cogitans. Within Cartesian metaphysics, the element of rationality, unique to humans: the res cogitans, and of which the rest of the physical world, the res extensa is totally bereft, becomes the ground for ontological dualism. In short, the lynchpin here, as throughout Cartesian metaphysical dualism, is rationality—its possession or lack of it. Thought is also what differentiates humans from the animal kingdom, a difference 54

Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 195.

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which Descartes believed was under threat from the likes of Michel de Montaigne and Pierre Charron (cf. AT IV, 573 / CSMK, 302).55 Descartes considers human being as entirely “different” from whatever is nonhuman, as rationality is “unique” to human beings alone. We may term this argument as the “uniqueness-difference” argument. The second argument follows from the first. Here the res extensa—the rest of the non-human reality—is considered as totally “separate” from the res cogitans, on account of the radical difference that exists between them. Within Cartesian metaphysics, the properties of extension and of thought are mutually incompatible: an extended thing is a non-thinking thing, and a thinking thing is a non-extended thing. (cf. AT VII, 78 / CSM II, 54) Within such a scheme of things, the properties of one type of things appear to be nothing other than the negation (or privation) of the properties of the other.56 The drastic separation of humans from the natural world, it is assumed, entitles the domination of the latter on the part of the former. Herein humans, who alone possess subjectivity, are considered as superior to the inert physical world of the res extensa. This confers on humans the right to dominate over non-human reality, as evident in the oft-quoted Cartesian slogan to be “lords and masters of nature” in the Discourse on the Method (AT VI, 62 / CSM I, 142-143). Moreover, such domination itself comes to be justified as being required for basic human survival and for the amelioration of human conditions, a concern which Descartes and other pioneers of Modernity like Bacon had very much at heart.57 We term the second argument, which has also a pragmatic concern attached to it, as the “separation-domination” argument. Both these arguments, though apparently impressive, are fraught with difficulties at the ontological level, as we go on to argue below. 55

It is precisely on the human capacity to think that Descartes also hinges the argument of human immortality, which itself is employed to substantiate his dualistic claim. He states in the Discourse that the “soul is of a nature entirely independent of the body, and consequently that it is not bound to die with it.” (AT VI, 59 / CSM I, 141) However, as Leibniz noted, the Cartesian distinction between humans and animals on the pretext of immortality was an opinion into which the supporters of Cartesianism had foolishly rushed “because it seemed necessary either to ascribe immortal souls to beasts or to admit that the soul of man could be mortal.” Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, tr. and ed. Leroy E. Loemker, 2nd ed. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969), 588. Cited by Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800 (London: Penguin Books, 1984), 34. 56 Pierre Guenancia, Lire Descartes (Paris: Gallimard, 2000), 304. 57 See in this regard Peter A. Schouls, Descartes and the Possibility of Science (Ithaca – London: Cornell University Press, 2000), ix, 5-6.

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We will begin with Descartes’ “uniqueness-difference” argument. One needs to concede Descartes’ claim regarding human uniqueness on account of thought in the vestige of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness, along with the capacity for thought, is certainly something unique to human beings. In this, Descartes certainly had a point to make, which he drove home so powerfully as to have caused the turn to the subject in modern thought. But a serious problem arises when Descartes drives a clear-cut demarcation between the human and non-human world, claiming that the latter is totally deprived of any form of consciousness at all, in not being res cogitans. In fact, the problem with Cartesian dualism is not just a distinction between res cogitans and res extensa, but their mutually exclusive ontological status based on a total discontinuity between them. But is it really the case? Is the supposed chasm between the res cogitans and the res extensa really so unbridgeable as Descartes claims? We do not think so. First of all, the immateriality of mental operations— Descartes’ claim that the act of thinking does not require any place or depend on any material thing (e.g., requires no brain) (cf. Discourse Part IV – AT VI, 33 / CSM I, 127)—has come under serious doubt in the light of recent studies in philosophy of mind and neurophysiology.58 The divide that Descartes places between humans and animals on account of mental activities does not really hold. Ernst Mayr, a noted biologist, observes that mind and consciousness do not form a strict demarcation between humans and animals. The study of mind has long been thwarted by semantic confusion, which has tended to restrict the term to the mental activities of humans. Researchers in animal behaviour have now established that there is no categorical difference between the mental activities of certain animals (elephants, dogs, whales, primates, parrots) and those of humans. The same is true of consciousness, traces of which are found even among invertebrates and perhaps protozoans. Mind and consciousness do not form a demarcation between man and ‘the animals’.59

In the light of insights from contemporary biology, while one can admit degrees of difference between humans and the rest of the living entities, the Cartesian argument for a total and absolute divide between them on account of consciousness cannot hold ground. As Fritjof Capra points out, cognition, at its elementary level, is present in all levels of life, 58

Cf. Cottingham, “Cartesian Trialism,” 218. Ernst Mayr, This is Biology: The Science of the Living World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 240-41. 59

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in terms of self-organization of the individual organism in relation to the surrounding environment.60 Secondly, as we argued earlier in our critique of anthropocentrism, the mind itself is rooted in nature and has evolved in nature. As Wim Zweers notes: “Life is an island in an ocean of self-ordering, and consciousness is a very recent phenomenon, restricted to a small corner of that island. Without that ocean and without that island, consciousness would literally not even have been conceivable.”61 Human beings are, as noted by Ian G. Barbour, “products of evolution and parts of an interdependent natural order.”62 We are thoroughly embedded in nature ontologically. In making the opposite claim, namely of mind as totally separate from nature, Cartesian dualistic metaphysics is original within philosophical tradition, as historical hindsight will confirm. Far from defining reason or logos as opposed to nature, early Greek philosophers including Socrates, Plato and Aristotle studied a mind or nous that “was always first and foremost mind in nature.”63 The problem with Cartesian dualism is the radical elimination of mind-body overlap and continuity. “As mind and nature become substances utterly different in kind and mutually exclusive, the dualist division of realms is accomplished and the possibility of continuity is destroyed from both sides.”64 Thirdly, ontologically speaking, the self’s intuition of self-existence through thought (cogito) is inevitably about existence in-the-world, though Descartes glosses over it. Such an ontological relationship with the physical world is underlined by the human biological origin in nature and the continuous human dependence on natural resources; from the air one breathes to basic needs like food, clothing and shelter, not to speak of higher needs at every level of human culture and civilization. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, for example, recognizes the Cartesian subjectobject dualism to stand at the basis of much modern and contemporary thinking and culture. According to him, from the subject-object dualism stem other additional dualisms that are deemed to be central to human existence, for instance, body and soul, consciousness and world, culture and nature.

60 See Fritjof Capra, The Hidden Connections: A Science for Sustainable Living (London: Flamingo, 2003), 30. 61 Zweers, Participating with Nature, 109. 62 Ian G. Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science (London: SCM Press, 1990), 221. 63 R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature (Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), 6. 64 Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 115.

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Merleau-Ponty explains that the broad acceptance of these dualisms leads to a viewing of the subject, the soul, consciousness, and culture as primary, and an emphasizing of these supposedly primary aspects of human existence. One result of this emphasis, according to Merleau-Ponty, is that the human body, the world, nature, and other manifestations of the object that emerge in these subject-object dualisms are considered to be marginal. They are often perceived as objects that exist solely in order to serve the subject.65

Merleau-Ponty holds that the belief in a subject-object dualism is basically wrong, and argues in his Phenomenology of Perception that the subject-object dualisms that were accepted and promoted in the philosophical thinking of the past four centuries need to be discarded in favour of a more primal and accurate understanding of human existence as a way of Being-in-the-world.66 Dualism’s blind spot is precisely the denial of this fundamental human dependency on nature. We may take the fight against Descartes’ uniqueness-difference argument further by demolishing the Cartesian and largely modern claim of total difference between humans and animals. As Kay Anderson notes, the belief that human beings become human “to the extent that they move away from animal nature is stubbornly present in western cultural formations.”67 However, a certain clue indicating the opposite, namely human kinship with animals, is provided by human empathy in the face of animal suffering. Lest Cartesians brush aside such a consideration as based only on emotional grounds, founded evidently on the Cartesian conception of humans in terms of rationality alone, Descartes needs to be countered here at his own game. What is to be called into question here is the fundamental dualism between humans and animals within Cartesian philosophy based on the metaphysical dualism between res cogitans and res extensa. Descartes encouraged experiments on animals, including the practices of vivisection, based ultimately on his dualistic metaphysics within which animals came to be considered as diametrically opposite to res cogitans and as mere res extensa. But here the tables may be squarely 65

Haim Gordon – Shlomit Tamari, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception: A Basis for Sharing the Earth (Westport, Connecticut – London: Praeger, 2004), 3. 66 See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1962); Gordon – Tamari, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, 3. 67 Kay Anderson, “Mind over Matter? On Decentering the Human in Human Geography,” Cultural Geographies 21 (2014), 3.

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turned on Descartes. The underlying rationale for the practice of experiments on animals in medicine is precisely their fellowship with humans at the physiological level. As Peter Singer points out: “The researcher who makes rats choose between starvation and electric shocks to see if they develop ulcers (they do) does so because he knows that the rat has a nervous system very similar to man’s, and presumably feels an electric shock in a similar way.”68 So are those experiments involving animals, for example, to find out whether certain drugs induce states of depression. These drugs are first tried on animals since it is presumed that they will lead to similar results in humans. Here the supposed Cartesian logic of allowing vivisection of animals since they do not experience pain, given the dualistic divide between the humans and animals on the basis of the res cogitans – res extensa distinction, contradicts itself! In the face of the above considerations, the Cartesian metaphysical dualism of the res cogitans as diametrically opposed to the res extensa, and the parallel counter-positioning between humans and the rest of the biotic community, cannot really hold ground. The second Cartesian argument of “separation-domination” also presents serious difficulties which makes it unsustainable. The very Cartesian logic in creating such a separation between the res cogitans and res extensa, and in a parallel way between humans and the rest of the biotic community, can be disputed. The logic here is that the essence of the self is not to be found in what is shared with the rest of the non-human world, but rather in opposition to non-human nature. Val Plumwood writes: In this dualism, what is characteristically and authentically human is defined against or in opposition to what is taken to be natural, nature, or the physical or biological realm. … What is taken to be authentically and characteristically human, defining of the human, as well as the ideal for which humans should strive is not to be found in what is shared with the natural and animal (e.g., the body, sexuality, reproduction, emotionality, the senses, agency) but in what is thought to separate and distinguish them—especially reason and its offshoots. Hence humanity is defined not as part of nature (perhaps as a special part) but as separate from and in opposition to it. Thus the relation of humans to nature is treated as an oppositional and value dualism.69 68 Peter Singer, “Animal liberation” in Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, eds. Michael E. Zimmerman et al. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), 28. 69 Val Plumwood, “Nature, Self, and Gender: Feminism, Environmental Philosophy, and the Critique of Rationalism” in Environmental Philosophy: From Animal

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It is a logic where difference is exalted as separating humans entirely from the rest of the biotic community and any element of continuity is erased altogether. Here we reiterate what was argued earlier in the fourth chapter dealing with modern anthropocentrism, that the human being is not just a Cartesian res cogitans but rather an Aristotelian rational “animal”, which gives humanity also an essential and indispensable foothold in nature. There can be no room for total separation between res cogitans and res extensa, and between humans and the natural world, as there are also equally elements of continuity between them. While rationality makes humans a unique species, they belong at the same time to the genus of animals, which allows them to be tagged—as Aristotle did—as the so-called rational animals. On this ground, the logic of proceeding to absolute domination on account of the presumed total separation reveals itself to be unfounded. It needs to be remembered here that Cartesian dualism is not just dichotomy between two substances, but rather it presupposes a relationship of diametrical opposition between them, in which one of the constituents is considered as superior and the other relegated as inferior. Here Cartesian dualism resembles both ancient dualisms like the Platonian body-soul relationship, or the Gnostic divide between matter and spirit, as well as modern ones like racism, classism, casteism, etc. In all these forms of dualism, one of the constituents is held as superior to the other of the dualistic pair, often ending up in a process of domination and of exploitation of the latter by the former. Herein a particular difference is exalted above all the rest, and elements of continuity with the “other considered as separate” are totally lost sight of or consciously suppressed. The pragmatic argument attached to Cartesian dualism in terms of domination of and exploitation of nature does not hold either, because it can be argued that the domination over nature, in spite of the short term benefits it has accrued for humanity, has brought about the ecological crisis in the long term. Thus, an absolute dualism between humans and the rest of the non-human world is not only ontologically untenable but also functionally infeasible, and thoroughly damaging as well, as the current ecological crisis testifies. In conclusion, the problem with Cartesian dualism is that it falsely links human uniqueness with absolute difference between humans and the rest of the biotic community. In attempting to exalt human uniqueness in terms of rationality, it goes for overkill by making such a sweeping

Rights to Radical Ecology, eds. Michael E. Zimmerman et al. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), 292.

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difference. Cartesian dualism should not be seen as creating difference where none exists. What it tends to do is to capitalize on existing patterns of difference to the point of exasperating them, leaving no connection at all between them.70 It turns separation to hyper-separation, opening the doors thereby for ruthless domination and wanton exploitation of nature. It is to some of the ecological implications of Cartesian dualism that we turn now.

6. Cartesian Dualism and the Bifurcation of Nature Descartes’ metaphysical distinction between the two substances of res cogitans and res extensa is at the basis of human-nature divide. Martin Heidegger writes in Being and Time in this regard: “Descartes distinguishes the ‘ego cogito’ from the ‘res corporea’. This distinction will thereafter be determinative ontologically for the distinction between ‘Nature’ and ‘spirit’.”71 The Cartesian view of nature as sharply discontinuous and ontologically separated from the human sphere has contributed significantly to the Western concept of human identity as outside nature, and a conception of nature as including everything except humans. Nature has become —by definition— especially since Descartes,that which is situated outside of humans.72 Conversely, we have reached a situation wherein humans are considered human to the extent they move away from animal nature and the natural world.73 Descartes was, in fact, the one “who first made philosophically coherent the subject/object bifurcation that was to become an essential principle of both western philosophy and the scientific method.”74 Cartesian dualism helped to pave the way for modern physical science and sought to expel the mind from nature, setting the human subject over

70

Cf. Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 55. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. John Macquarrie - Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), 123. 72 Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 79. The illusion of hyperseparation from nature may also underlie some forms of wilderness conservation ideologies. For example, those who try to work to establish wild reserves, driving out from the land indigenous populations who have lived there for centuries in harmony with nature, labour under a misplaced hyper-separated understanding of human-nature relationship. 73 See Anderson, “Mind over Matter?,” 3-5. 74 Hay, A Companion to Environmental Thought, 123. 71

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nature regarded as object.75 Cartesian dualism ultimately led to the conception of the physical world as sole res extensa and as inhospitable to all final causes. We may cite Georges Dicker in this context: Descartes’ dualism is perhaps his most important doctrine, for it had sweeping and far-ranging implications. On the one hand, it helped to clear the way for modern physical science. … A battle was taking shape between the scholastic defenders of this traditional science and the proponents of the new science of Kepler and Galileo, which denied the relevance of final causes for explaining nature. Descartes’ dualism provided a powerful philosophical rationale for the newer conception, for one implication of Descartes’ dualism is that all final causes are expelled from the physical universe, or res extensa. The only place left for final causes is the mind, or res cogitans. Thus Descartes’ dualism helped prepare the way for modern physics, which does not explain nature by reference to purposes.76

What comes to be stressed in Cartesian dualism and in much of subsequent modern thought is the disconnectedness of human beings who alone possess subjectivity with the rest of the natural world which is diametrically opposite to humans in being only inert, extended matter and bereft of teleological ends. Cartesian dualism conceives humans and the natural world as diametrically opposite. It is a worldview wherein “mind and matter are defined as opposites: mind is thinking, while matter is unthinking; matter is extended (three-dimensional), while mind is unextended. Matter occupies spaces but doesn’t think, and a mind thinks but doesn’t occupy space.”77 In denying any element of teleology, dynamism and purposeful agency in the natural world, modern Cartesian dualism promotes a radically dualistic nihilism, as Hans Jonas has insightfully pointed out.78 We quote from Jonas: The disruption between man and total reality is at the bottom of nihilism. The illogicity of the rupture makes its fact no less real, or its seeming alternative more acceptable: the stare at isolated selfness, to which it 75

Joseph P. Fell, “Some Thoughts on the Modern Mind,” Journal of Speculative Philosophy 26/4 (2012), 590. 76 Georges Dicker, Descartes: An Analytical and Historical Introduction (New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 69-70. 77 Ibid., 69. 78 See Hans Jonas, “Gnosticism and Modern Nihilism,” Social Research 19 (1952), 451. See also Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo, “Hans Jonas’ ‘Gnosticism and Modern Nihilism’, and Ludwig von Bertalanffy,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 38 (2012), 294 and note 30.

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Cartesian dualism has contributed to cleaving an unbridgeable chasm between humanity and the rest of nature, emphasizing the radical discontinuity between human beings and the natural world. “The rift between ourselves and the cosmos,” notes William Barrett, is “one troubling legacy that the seventeenth century bequeathed to us.”80 Cartesian dualism reduces the natural world to the status of a mere object, a “bare, depopulated world of matter and motion: a wasteland.”81 Consequently, the natural world is reduced to terra nullis for human conquest and mastery. Evidently, it has also caused the wanton exploitation of the latter at the hands of the former. Nature became “a mere resource, utensil, or instrument for human and social benefit.”82 Naturally the perception of the human being as metaphysically and entirely different from the natural world promoted an antagonistic and exploitative attitude towards the natural world. It can thus rightly be claimed that the Cartesian dualism ultimately provides the ontology for the mastery of nature. Descartes’ dualistic metaphysics has much to commend it as the appropriate ontology for the mastery of nature. We may regard the heterogeneity of the subject and object, of mastering human ego and inert, objective nature, as requiring a ground in the diversity of thinking substance and extended substance.83

Alfred North Whitehead, decades ago, already anticipated the critique of environmental philosophy, when he identified Cartesian dualism to be

79

Jonas, “Gnosticism and Modern Nihilism,” 452. William Barrett, Death of the Soul: from Descartes to the Computer (New York – London: Doubleday, 1986), 11. 81 Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1934), 51. Cited by Charles Eisenstein, The Ascent of Humanity: Civilization and the Human Sense of Self (Berkeley, CA: Evolver Editions, 2013), 145. 82 Fred Dallmayr, Return to Nature? An Ecological Counterhistory (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2011), 1. 83 Richard Kennington, “Descartes and Mastery of Nature” in Organism, Medicine and Metaphysics, ed. Stuart F. Spicker (Dordrecht – Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1978), 215. 80

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the ultimate cause for the bifurcation of nature.84 It is such a radical bifurcation that also accounts, to a great extent, for the alienation of the human being from nature and the spoliation of the latter by humans. Wim Zweers writes: In this view, humans stand outside of, opposite to nature, they are essentially different from it and do not, in essence, belong to it. That is the core of mainstream Western philosophy since Descartes, who also gave exemplary expression to this in his distinction between ‘thinking being’ and ‘extended matter’. This opposition of humans and nature … provides on the one hand the foundation for the aforesaid view of nature and self view of humans, and on the other the justification for humans to treat nature exclusively according to their own wishes.85

Thus, it is in the falsely assumed discontinuity between the human and non-human realms that the deeper roots of the contemporary ecological crisis are found. “Industrialization and the instrumentalization of nature, justified by the fallacy of a human/nonhuman divide, flirts precariously with ecocide.”86 We are experiencing today, as pointed out by Ross Jackson, “the shadow side of a centuries-old worldview that separates Man from Nature. … Nature is something outside of us, having no intrinsic value, and is to be conquered.”87 John Habgood writes: “Those who regard themselves merely as detached observers, standing as it were outside nature or above it, are likely to think of it in purely instrumental terms, as a set of objects to be used, manipulated, and changed at will.”88 Such a cleavage itself is, ultimately, based on the metaphysical conclusion that “there are two quite different sorts of substances or orders of being in the world; for example, mind and body, humans and nature, such that humans are completely different from everything else in nature.”89 An exaggerated belief in the human autonomy from nature, introduced by Cartesian dualism and inherited by the Western philosophical tradition 84

See Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, Corrected Edition, ed. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: The Free Press, 1978), 288-89; The Concept of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930), vi. 85 Zweers, Participating with Nature, 60-61. 86 David R. Keller, “Toward A Post-Mechanistic Philosophy of Nature,” Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment 16 (2009), 123. 87 Ross Jackson, “A Gaian Worldview” in The Song of the Earth: A Synthesis of the Scientific and Spiritual Worldviews, eds. Maddy Harland – William Keepin (Hampshire: Permanent Publications, 2012), 26. 88 Habgood, The Concept of Nature, 73. 89 Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 70.

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and modern industrial paradigm, has contributed in a significant manner to human alienation from nature. As Val Plumwood notes, this leads to a view of humans as apart from or “outside of” nature, usually as masters or external controllers of it.90 As Wim Zweers points out: “the environmental crisis is very closely connected to the position that humankind has in modern times attributed to itself within the whole of reality, that is: separation between humans and nature as a necessary condition for the possibility of controlling nature, and reduction of nature to merely utility for humans.”91 Metaphysical dualism, therefore, may be said to be at the origin of the unprecedented colonization of nature in the wake of Modernity. In such a process, nature comes to be seen as inferior, and consequently oppressed and exploited, and as devoid of any value. Writing on the impasse with the march of modern rationality, Max Horkheimer remarks: “we have on the one hand the self, the absolute ego emptied of all substance except its attempt to transform everything in heaven and earth into means for its preservation, and on the other hand an empty nature degraded to mere material, mere stuff to be dominated.”92 Cartesian and modern metaphysical dualism is evidently the most significant source of the conceptual roots of the contemporary ecological crisis as it creates an unbridgeable divide between humanity and the rest of the natural world. Significantly, the scientific community recognized decades ago how the contemporary ecological crisis has to do with a dualistic worldview of total separation. We may quote from the 1969 UNESCO Conference document on the Biosphere. In recent centuries, however, the world has been increasingly dominated by a dualistic world-view in which the distinction between man and his environment has been particularly stressed. This view accepts as a virtual axiom that man’s foremost task consists in the progressive establishment of complete mastery over all of non-human nature. But, in recent times, man has tended to become so dominant on earth that he is now approaching a position where he constitutes one of the principal aspects of his own environment and in which environmental mastery would require the subjugation even of human nature by man.93 90

Plumwood, “Nature, Self, and Gender,” 291. Zweers, Participating with Nature, 72. 92 Max Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), 97. 93 Guy Gresford, “Qualitative and Quantitative Living Space Requirements,” in Final Report of the Intergovernmental Conference of Experts on the Scientific Basis for Rational Use and Conservation of the Resources of the Biosphere (UNESCO Document SC/MD/9, 1969), Annex IV, 1. 91

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The 1992 World Scientists’ Warning to Humanity, signed by 1,700 of Earth’s leading scientists, including 104 Nobel laureates, is even more direct in evidencing the disastrous collision course that humanity has embarked upon. Human beings and the natural world are on a collision course. Human activities inflict harsh and often irreversible damage on the environment and on critical resources. If not checked, many of our current practices put at serious risk the future that we wish for human society and the plant and animal kingdoms, and may so alter the living world that it will be unable to sustain life in the manner that we know.94

The threat of the ecological catastrophe provokes a radical critique of the modern idea that humans exist apart from nature.95 It also makes urgent the need for alternative ontologies that conceive humanity’s place in nature as one of harmonious co-habitation with the rest of the biotic community rather than in diametrical opposition to it.

7. Holism as an Alternative Paradigm to Cartesian Dualism The ecological philosophers have diagnosed precisely within Cartesian dualism the roots of human alienation from nature. They propose instead a metaphysical paradigm of holism, based on the inter-relatedness of reality. From the ecological perspective, the world is not seen as divided into mutually independent parts and mutually exclusive attributes: everything is seen as implicating, and being implicated in the identities of other things, reality being a relational system of shared, interpenetrating essences … each individual owes its nature to others in the network.96

Within an ecological vision the human being comes to be seen not in opposition to the physical reality, but as constitutively related to and as placed “within” the common natural habitat (oikos).

94 “The World Scientists’ Warning to Humanity” in Paul Ehrlich – Anne Ehrlich, Betrayal of Science and Reason: How Anti-Environmental Rhetoric Threatens Our Future (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998), 242. The italics are mine. For the text of the declaration and for an abridged list of the signatories see Ibid., 241-50. 95 Anderson, “Mind over Matter?,” 13. 96 Freya Mathews, “Ecological Philosophy,” in Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig (London: Routledge, 1998), III, 198.

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The paradigm of holism proposed in environmental thought can be considered as an alternative to the human-nature divide erected by Cartesian dualism at the dawn of Modernity. As Fred Dallmayr suggests, “the rigid divide between ‘man’ and nature must be cancelled in favour of wholeness or a more holistic relationship.”97 Within a holistic ecological paradigm, emphasis is laid on unity and relatedness rather than on dualism and separation. However, holism itself is not a monolithic concept.98 We will identify two strands of holism in environmental thought. The first version is the one which is proposed predominantly in deep ecology, where unity rather than the individual identity of beings comes to be accentuated, with overtones of monism. Herein, inter-connectedness implies that individuals exist or are significant only at the level of appearance, as individuality lacks ultimate ontological significance. The second is a relational model of holism which stresses interrelatedness and interdependence among beings. In this version of ecological holism, the natural world appears to be a community, in which individuals are internally related, in the manner of a family, but are nevertheless distinct.99 We begin with deep ecology’s concept of holism. In environmental thought, the earliest of responses to a dualistic conception of human-nature relationship was articulated by the proponents of deep ecology. For Arne Naess, the founder of deep ecology, shallow ecology characterises itself as a philosophical vision that does not view the human being as part of nature, but as outside and above it.100 Deep ecology, instead, speaks of the unitary and indistinguishable “Self” of which both nature and humans are part.101 Naess believes that the path to overcoming the ecological crisis is 97

Dallmayr, Return to Nature? An Ecological Counterhistory, 2. The term ‘holism’ eludes easy definition. The term itself was coined in 1926 by Jan Smuts. See Jan C. Smuts, Holism and Evolution (New York: Macmillan, 1926). See also Jozef Keulartz, The Struggle for Nature: A Critique of Radical Ecology (London – New York: Routledge, 1998), 130-35. Holism is, basically, the view that wholes are always more than just the sum of their parts, and that the wholes cannot be defined as a heap or collection of their parts. However, a concrete example can illumine such a distinction. Holistic medicine, for example, tends to look at the whole body and mind to explain an illness or malfunction of a single part. On the other hand, reductionist medicine tends to look at just the single part and repair it. See Pepper, Modern Environmentalism, 331. 99 Cf. Mathews, “Ecological Philosophy,” 199. 100 On the distinction between ‘deep’ and ‘shallow’ ecology see Arne Naess, “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary,” Inquiry 16 (1973), 95-100. 101 The “Self” here is closely linked to the of concept of Atman (the Sanskrit word for Absolute Self within Indian philosophy) within Eastern traditions, especially 98

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one of “Self-realization”.102 According to the theory of Self-realization, individuals can overcome their culturally acquired alienation from the natural world by recognizing the ultimate ontological seamlessness of reality, and by gradually identifying themselves with wider and wider circles of being, until their sense of self encompasses not only the personal ego, but family, community, bio-region, land, society at large and eventually the planet as a whole. Within the project of a larger Selfrealization, individuals will perceive their own interests as converging with those of the rest of life.103 The central pillar of deep ecology’s concept of holism is the indistinguishability thesis, according to which everything is really part of and indistinguishable from everything else. Deep ecology, in this sense, offers a new ontology which posits humanity as inseparable from nature.104 “Deep ecology does not separate humans from the natural environment, nor does it separate anything else from it.”105 Unlike in the Cartesian dualistic metaphysics, for deep ecologists there is no ontological divide between the human and the nonhuman realms, obliterating thereby any false dichotomy between the self and other. Within deep ecology, there is a total rejection of any form of dualism or bifurcation as the emphasis is entirely on the whole rather than the parts. For deep

Hinduism and Buddhism, which encompasses all life forms, including the individual selves (jivas). See Arne Naess, “The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects” in Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, eds. Michael E. Zimmerman et al. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), 209. In this context Naess also refers to Gandhi’s vision of advaita. See Arne Naess, “Self-Realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World” in Deep Ecology for the Twenty-first Century: Readings on the Philosophy and Practice of the New Environmentalism, ed. George Sessions (Boston – London: Shambhala, 1995), 232-34. However, it may be recalled that the concept of advaita (non-duality) finds collocation originally within a mystical and theological context, as in Sankara’s school of Advaita Vedanta. An uncritical transfer of such a mystical religious experience into human-nature relationship could smack of overtones of monism or of pantheism. For a critique of deep ecology’s ‘potpourri’ of Eastern mystical traditions see Murray Boockchin, The Philosophy of Social Ecology (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1990), 138-40. 102 Arne Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, tr. and ed. David Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 8-9. 103 Mathews, “Ecological Philosophy”, 199-200. 104 Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, 2. 105 Fritjof Capra, “Deep Ecology: A New Paradigm” in Deep Ecology for the Twenty-first Century: Readings on the Philosophy and Practice of the New Environmentalism, ed. George Sessions (Boston – London: Shambhala, 1995), 20.

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ecologists, “the humans are intimately a part of the natural environment: they and nature are one.”106 Deep ecology’s model of holism has occasionally come under critique as harbouring a version of ecofascism, in which individuals may be sacrificed for the good of the larger whole.107 At the same time it should be acknowledged that deep ecologists defend the inherent worth of individual organisms and the ecosystems of which they are a part.108 This paradigm of holism, however, suffers from serious drawbacks, and is beset with many hurdles. In reacting to the metaphysical paradigm of radical dualism, it appears to swing the pendulum to the opposite extreme, ending up in a sort of metaphysical monism, wherein there appears to be an obliteration of the self/nature distinction altogether. It promotes a sort of holistic self-merger, in its attempt to avoid any and every form of bifurcation. What remains at the end is a non-relational and atomistic Self or selves. Herein individual natural identities run the risk of losing their unique identity in the oceanic whole. From radical alienation from nature as in Cartesian dualism, one moves to a metaphysics of total unity with nature which obliterates distinctions altogether! Such a sweeping unity may not leave legitimate space for “difference” or diversity, which is also important within an ecological perspective. As Val Plumwood states, “we need to recognise not only our human continuity with the natural world but also its distinctness and independence from us and the distinctness of the needs of things in nature from ours.”109 According to Plumwood, “overcoming the dualist dynamic requires recognition of both continuity and difference; this means acknowledging the other as neither alien to and discontinuous from self nor assimilated to or an extension of self.”110 Deep ecology’s model of holism as in the indistinguishability thesis does not make sufficient room for the element of difference and independence. Deep ecology succumbs to the temptation that once the role of dualism in creating exaggerated separation is perceived, the resolution of such a dualism requires a merger and the elimination of the problematic boundary between the one and the other of the dualistic pair.111 This type of holism, in which all distinctions are obliterated altogether, cannot really work. 106 107

Pepper, Modern Environmentalism, 17. For a short review of these critiques see Pepper, Modern Environmentalism, 29-

30. 108

Zimmerman, Contesting Earth’s Future, 41. Plumwood, “Nature, Self, and Gender,” 295. 110 Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 6. 111 Cf. Ibid., 59. 109

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Thus deep ecology’s solution to removing this discontinuity by obliterating all division is far too powerful. In its over-generality it fails to provide a genuine basis for an environmental ethics of the kind sought, for the view of humans as metaphysically unified with the cosmic whole will be equally true whatever relation humans stand in with nature—the situation of exploitation of nature exemplifies such unity equally as well as a conserver situation and the human self is just as indistinguishable from the bulldozer and Coca-Cola bottle as the rocks or the rain forest. … once one has realized that one is indistinguishable from the rain forest, its needs would become one’s own. But there is nothing to guarantee this—one could equally well take one’s own needs for its.112

But holistic self-merger is not the only alternative to dualistic and egoistic accounts of the self enshrined within Cartesian thought and institutionalized in subsequent modern philosophy. “Relational” accounts of the unity between the various components of the biotic community, including humans, do exist. The relational model of holism highlights especially the elements of interrelatedness and interdependence that constitute reality. The presupposition underlying the human-nature dualism in Cartesian thought is one of “discontinuity” as opposed to relationship. In response to such a dualism, deep ecology came up with the paradigm of the holistic self-merger which, as discussed above, swings the pendulum to the other extreme, leaving no room at all for difference and individuality. Here the relational model of holism offers a more satisfactory alternative, in terms of the relational self who exists in relationships of interdependence with the rest of the biotic community. In fact, a key feature of the relational model of holism in ecology is the concept of interdependence. It means that not only are all entities within the web of nature interrelated, but that they are also interdependent. On account of it, no living entity, not even the human being, can consider itself as being outside the biosphere nor to be totally independent. The basic presupposition of the relational model of holism is that the natural world is fundamentally a web of relationships. But is it really so? In fact, it is not so obvious at first sight. What is apparent in the natural world is the fight for survival exemplified in the case of predation and ruthless competition between various forms of life. Such reservations, however, result from a superficial observation of the natural world. The science of ecology reveals the natural world to be a biotic community which is itself held together by a host of relationships. As Fritjof Capra writes: “No individual organism can exist in isolation. Animals depend on 112

Plumwood, “Nature, Self, and Gender,” 294-95.

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the photosynthesis of plants for their energy needs; plants depend on the carbon dioxide produced by animals, as well as on the nitrogen fixed by the bacteria at their roots; and together plants, animals and microorganisms regulate the entire biosphere and maintain the conditions conducive to life.”113 The biological interdependence of organisms is explicit in the case of the food chain composed of photosynthesizing plants, herbivores, carnivores and decomposers (microbes and fungi). Both competition and cooperation are thus to be understood within this overall relational context. Ecology is, by definition, the study of the relationships between organisms and environment, relationships which guarantee the equilibrium of nature and all living beings, including humans, collocated in nature.114 The first law of ecology, according to Barry Commoner, is that everything is connected to every other thing.115 A striking example of interdependence and interrelatedness of relational holism is provided by the concept of ecosystem.116 Ecosystem calls attention to the fact that individual organisms come into being and can survive only within a holistic environment consisting of a network of relationships. Eugene P. Odum, in his classical work, Fundamentals of Ecology, lays emphasis on the elements of interaction and interrelatedness within the ecosystem.117 Within an ecosystem, parts are seen as operationally inseparable from the whole.118 Herein, the nature of the part is, in fact, determined by its relationship to the whole. The noted biologist 113

Capra, The Hidden Connections, 5. Ernst Haeckel who is credited with the coining of the neologism “ecology” defined it as “the totality of the sciences of relationships of the organism with the ambient.” Ernst Haeckel, Generelle Morphologie der Organismen (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1866), vol. II, 286. On an interpretation of Haeckel’s work as a response to the dualism of classical science see Anna Bramwell, Ecology in the Twentieth Century: A History (London: Yale University Press, 1989), 43 ff. 115 Cf. Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle: Confronting the Environmental Crisis (London: Jonathan Cape, 1971), 33-39. 116 The term ecosystem was first proposed by the English plant ecologist Arthur George Tansley to refer to the whole system of associated organisms together with the physical factors of their environment. See Arthur George Tansley, “The Use and Abuse of Vegetational Concepts and Terms,” in Ecology 16 (1936), 204-307. For an authoritative survey on the concept of ecosystem in ecology during the past one hundred years see, Gene E. Likens, “Ecosystems: Energetics and Biogeochemistry” in A New Century of Biology, eds. John W. Kress – Gary W. Barrett (Washington – London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), 53-88. 117 See Eugene P. Odum, Fundamentals of Ecology (Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Company, 1971), 8. 118 Ibid., 9. 114

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Ernst Mayr defines ecosystem as “the interaction of the thousands of organisms from the largest trees to the smallest bacteria in the biota of a locality and what controls their presence, frequency, and interactions.”119 According to Gene E. Likens, “ecosystem ecology, with its holistic, comprehensive approach, offers a foundation for … providing solutions to currently widespread and rapidly developing environmental problems.”120 The concept of ecosystem reverses the ontological primacy of objects and the ontological subordination of relationships, characteristic of modern worldview and science. Here the emphasis is unambiguously on the whole rather than on parts, as ecological relationships determine the nature of organisms rather than the other way around. “A species has the particular characteristics that it has because those characteristics result from its adaptation to a niche in an ecosystem.”121 What counts here is not mere individuality. The species is also significant because it is a dynamic form of life maintained over time. Within the ecosystem, which is itself a community of life, “the fauna and flora, the species, have entwined destinies.”122 While the Cartesian, and largely modern scientific worldview, may be said to rest on a fundamental principle of dualism and separation, the alternative relational ecological worldviews are based, on the contrary, on a principle of interconnectedness. We conclude the discussion of the relational metaphysical paradigm in environmental thought by spelling out how it scores over the paradigm of modern Cartesian metaphysical dualism. In the wake of the ecological crisis to which, as we argue, the Cartesian dualism and the resultant human-nature divide has contributed significantly, the need is all the more pressing to adopt the more relational ontological paradigm both in theory and practice. We state below some reasons that could motivate such a choice. First of all, the relational metaphysical paradigm appears to be more true ontologically. As we have argued, Cartesian dualism and its human119 See Ernst Mayr, “Foreword” in A New Century of Biology, eds. John W. Kress – Gary W. Barrett (Washington – London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), ix. 120 Likens, “Ecosystems: Energetics and Biogeochemistry,” 79. 121 J. Baird Callicott, “The Metaphysical Implications of Ecology” in Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought: Essays in Environmental Philosophy, eds. J. Baird Callicott - Roger Ames (New Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1991), 60. Italics as in the original. 122 Holmes Rolston, “Challenges in Environmental Ethics” in The Environment in Question: Ethics and Global Issues, eds., David E. Cooper – Joy A. Palmer (London – New York: Routledge, 1992), 142.

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nature divide in terms of total discontinuity and hyper-separation does not stand ground ontologically. Instead, the relational paradigm is founded on a sound ontological basis, as the physical world is itself a web of relationships that sustains all living entities, including humans. Interdependence is, in fact, an ontological reality rather than just a functional choice. Thus, the relational metaphysical paradigm corresponds more faithfully to the ontologically given situation of human existence in-the-world, which is precisely the opposite of what Cartesian dualism claims in conceiving the human being to be above or apart from the physical world relegated as mere res extensa. Secondly, the relational metaphysical paradigm is able to accommodate both continuity (as against the Cartesian dualistic metaphysical paradigm) and difference (which comes to be glossed over in deep ecology’s concept of holism based on the principle of indistinguishability). The advantage with the relational perspective is that it recognizes both the elements of human dependence on and independence from nature. By the same token, one also recognizes nature’s dependence and independence. Thus, the response to modern Cartesian dualism is not a paradigm of monistic unity with nature, but rather a relational approach which alone can guarantee the identity of both nature and of the humanum, but within a wider perspective of interrelatedness and interdependence. Humans are thus part of nature but not reducible to it. A relational perspective can make room for human uniqueness without having to level down humans at the ontological level to all other entities in terms of bio-egalitarianism. At the same time, the relational ecological paradigm recognizes that humans depend upon other animal and plant species and upon the physical environment and its processes, within a reciprocal relationship. Thirdly, the relational metaphysical paradigm, in stark contrast to Cartesian dualism, appears to promote human kinship with nature, by showing that humans are related to the rest of nature biologically and culturally. At the biological level, “it was Charles Darwin who a century later obliterated the ontological divide between the human and non-human by suggesting that all organisms are the result of the same evolutionary process.”123 As Brennan R. Hill notes, “in order to be adequately concerned about the earth, it is necessary to see how we are related to the earth.”124 On the other hand, as Greta Gaard perspicaciously notes, “a failure to recognize connections can lead to violence, and a disconnected sense of self is most assuredly at the root of the current ecological 123

Keller, “Toward A Post-Mechanistic Philosophy of Nature,” 722. Brennan R. Hill, Christian Faith and the Environment: Making Vital Connections (New York: Orbis Books, 1998), 251.

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crisis.”125 Such a realization should motivate humans to make a transition from a “parasitic” relationship with the earth to one of “symbiotic” relationship. The concept of “self-in-relationship” requires that one lives in harmony with nature rather than in antagonism towards it, which is the presupposition for mastery over nature. Michael E. Zimmerman offers an apt critique of the paradigm of mastery over nature. The ecological crisis stems from the fact that modernity’s proponents have simply assumed that human emancipation and well-being can be achieved only by somehow “mastering” the natural world. Here, I join radical ecologists in arguing that this idea is both nonsensical and self-defeating, since humankind itself is not merely a historical being, but arises through, participates in, and depends on natural processes.126

In fact, the flurry of environmentally friendly technologies and initiatives in sustainable development at local and global levels in recent times is a clear indication that humanity need not live at loggerheads with nature, harping on the theme of mastery over nature. It shows that a more harmonious human insertion with nature is not only feasible but urgent and necessary. This shift in praxis underlines our basic argument that a relational ontological paradigm is more appropriate than the Cartesian dualistic one in the wake of the contemporary ecological crisis. A final argument in favour of the relational metaphysical paradigm as against the Cartesian dualistic one is that the former is more deeply rooted within humanity’s religious, philosophical and cultural traditions than the latter one.127 Within the western philosophical tradition itself, one may recall here the medieval view of the link between the microcosm and the macrocosm. Susan Bordo points out how medieval humans did not experience consciousness as somehow isolated and cut off from the larger world. On the whole, the people of the medieval times lived by the relational paradigm of the link between the macrocosm and the microcosm, and considered themselves as somehow linked to the whole cosmos. In their relation to their environment, the medieval person felt rather less like an

125

Greta Gaard, “Living Interconnections with Animals and Nature” in Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, Nature, ed. Greta Gaard (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 2. 126 Zimmerman, Contesting Earth’s Future, 7-8. 127 See in this regard Eliot Deutsch, “A Metaphysical Grounding for Nature Reverence: East-West,” Environmental Ethics 8 (1986), 293-99.

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island, and more like an embryo.128 Some of the Eastern religious traditions also offer rich conceptual sources in sketching out holistic ecological paradigms. The practice of non-violence (ahimsa) towards both fellow human beings and non-human beings in strands of major religions like Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism, is itself based on a deeper ontological realization of humanity’s kinship with the rest of the biotic community. The ontological concept of pratityasamutpada (paticcasamuppada in Pali) in Buddhism, meaning interdependent co-arising, is a singularly promising conceptual source for ecological holism. It is a concept which underlines the ontological interconnectedness and interdependency of all constituents of reality, as everything is related to everything else. Reality here is seen as nothing but a web of relationships, as beings exist only in interdependence.129 One may also recall here the concept of harmony with nature in the East Asian religions of Taoism and Confucianism. These traditions hold a relational understanding of human nature. While the Cartesian and subsequent modern Western thought assumes an ontological discontinuity between the self and nature, these worldviews begin with the assumption that one is constituted by one’s relationships, including one’s relationships with plants, animals, soils, and waters as well as with other human beings.130 One also finds equally popular versions of holistic ecological models in indigenous traditions, “peoples who have not developed the sophisticated philosophies of separation from nature that so characterise western thought.”131 As Val Plumwood notes, “the view of humans as outside of and alien to nature seems to be especially strongly a Western one, although not confined to the West. There are many other cultures which do not hold it, which stress what connects us to nature as

128

Susan Bordo, “The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought,” Signs 11 (1986), 442-43. 129 Cf. Raimundo Panikkar, “Colligite Fragmenta: For an Integration of Reality” in From Alienation to At-Oneness: Proceedings of the Theology Institute of Villanova, eds. F.A. Eigo - S.E. Fittipaldi (Villanova, PA: The Villanova University Press, 1977), 74; Francis H. Cook, “The Jewel Net of Indra” in Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought: Essays in Environmental Philosophy, eds. J. Baird Callicott - Roger Ames (New Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1991), 224-25. 130 Cf. J. Baird Callicott, Earth’s Insights: A Multicultural Survey of Ecological Ethics from the Mediterranean Basin to the Australian Outback (Berkeley, LA: University of California Press, 1994), 82. See also Peterson, Being Human, 13. 131 Hay, A Companion to Environmental Thought, 155.

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genuinely human virtues, which emphasize continuity and not dissimilarity.”132 The metaphysical paradigm of holism, characterised by the elements of interrelatedness and interdependence, appears to be slowly emerging as a credible and effective alternative ecological paradigm, in lieu of the modern Cartesian two-substance metaphysical dualism. While the latter appears to have contributed significantly to the ecological crisis, the former holds the promise of overcoming the same.

132

Plumwood, “Nature, Self, and Gender,” 291. See also Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 11-12.

CHAPTER VIII THE ENDURING MODERN WELTBILD AND THE CONTEMPORARY ECOLOGICAL CRISIS

Introduction The modern worldview as we have sought to evidence in the preceding chapters bears a clearly Cartesian imprint. In the formation of the modern Weltbild, Descartes appears to have contributed more than any other single thinker, as Martin Heidegger, for example, has recognized. The Cartesian heritage for Modernity is indeed colossal. In philosophy, it was Descartes who initiated the turn to the subject, catapulting the cogito to a position of absolute centrality in the human perception of reality. Its ontological correlate was the metaphysical dualism between the self, reduced to thought alone, and the rest of the created world, reduced to geometric extension. Descartes also laid the foundations for the modern mechanistic worldview in both physics and biology.1 In physics, Descartes contributed significantly to the rejection of the Aristotelian-Scholastic natural philosophy and provided the epistemological and metaphysical foundations for the new mechanistic science. In biology, the Cartesian mechanistic physiology was pivotally important in the disposal of the soul as causa vitae leading to the substitution of the Aristotelian vitalism with the mechanistic one. As Alick Bartholomew notes, the Cartesian Weltbild “still informs contemporary biology, biochemistry, physics and medicine— indeed our whole worldview.”2 The modern worldview, which is also significantly Cartesian, in terms of the self-understanding of the human in terms of absolute centrality; the perception of the natural world, both inanimate and animate, as res extensa 1

Rupert Sheldrake, The Rebirth of Nature: The Greening of Science and God (London: Century, 1990), 37. 2 Alick Bartholomew, The Story of Water: Source of Life (Edinburgh: Floris Books, 2010), 165.

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and merely as a storehouse of resources for human consumption, and humanity’s relationship with the natural world in terms of a radically dualistic divide, has endured to our present day. The Cartesian modern worldview, a major humus for the deeper philosophical roots of the current ecological crisis, continues to mould our present lives as well as our contemporary institutions. We continue to perceive and relate to the natural world mostly within the modern and Cartesian conceptual framework, in spite of the emergence of contemporary physics and postmodern philosophical categories. Our present day thinking and our modern institutions, ranging from science and economy to politics and educational curricula, are largely built on the bedrock of the enduring modern Cartesian worldview, which in turn contributes to the prolongation of the ecological crisis. In this last chapter, we shall go on to briefly survey how the Cartesian modern Weltbild continues to permeate our contemporary thought, life and institutions, with detrimental effects on our common planetary home. We will examine, first of all, the influence of Cartesian thought—in terms of anthropocentrism, mechanistic perception of the natural world, and metaphysical dualism—on the development of Western thought. The philosophical currents of idealism and rationalism on the one hand and materialism and empiricism on the other are both inspired by Descartes, with clear ecological implications. Modern science and technology also bear the imprint of the Cartesian representational thinking. The exclusively mechanistic understanding of physical entities proposed by modern science has led to a reductive view of the natural world in terms of utility alone, bereft of any element of teleology, and shorn of its capacity for symbolism. The Cartesian and modern conception of nature as mere inert matter and as a storehouse of resources for human consumption is most evident in modern economy, and particularly in the current neo-liberal economic models. The modern and largely Cartesian conception of the isolated self is clearly evident in modern political institutions wherein the self-interest of a selected human community triumphs over the rights of the wider community, in utter negligence of the interests of the wider human and biotic community. Further, the anthropocentric outlook of the Cartesian modern Weltbild and the dualistic divide between humans and the rest of the natural world forms the bedrock of much of contemporary educational curricula, as has been insightfully pointed out by prominent educationists like C.A. Bowers. We shall now go on to discuss at length how the Cartesian and modern worldview has endured in the fundamental areas mentioned above,

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contributing thereby to the perpetuation of the distorted human-nature relationship even in our present day.

1. The Long Shadow of Descartes over Modern Philosophy and Beyond Descartes has rightly been called the father of modern philosophy for the permanent mark that he has left on subsequent philosophical thinking. The modern Weltanschuung—philosophical vision of reality3— clearly bears the Cartesian imprint. Modern ontology or metaphysics, understood as the inquiry into the ultimate nature of being, is basically Cartesian for the unprecedented emphasis on the subjective conditions of experience. As Martin Heidegger states, “the whole of modern metaphysics taken together, Nietzsche included, maintains itself within the interpretation of what is to be and of truth that was prepared by Descartes.”4 Post-Cartesian thinkers, “in spite of all the claims to epoch-making originality,” have all remained basically “modern philosophers”.5 A quick review of the main currents of Western philosophy in the postCartesian epoch can reveal how they have been significantly influenced by the main contours of Cartesian thought in terms of the absolute centrality of the subject (ego), the mechanistic view of the physical world, and the dualistic divide between humanity and the rest of the natural world— which are also the pillars of the modern Weltbild as we have sought to evidence in the preceding chapters. Most of the major currents in modern Western philosophical thought, including rationalism and idealism on the one hand, and empiricism and materialism on the other, are indebted to Descartes. While Idealism and the related rationalistic currents spring from the Cartesian and modern subjectivity, modern Materialism and related empiricist and positivist schools of thought share the reductive perception of physical reality in terms of extended matter alone, the Cartesian res extensa. Modern anthropocentrism and the exclusively mechanistic conception of the natural world are correspondingly linked to these two main streams of thought in Western philosophy, with human-nature dualism as a shared characteristic among them. 3

Significantly in Sanskrit philosophy is referred to as dar‫܈‬ana (vision or view of reality), akin to the German Weltanschauung. 4 Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, tr. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 127. 5 Kenneth Dorter, “First Philosophy: Metaphysics or Epistemology?,” Dialogue (Canada) 11 (1972), 1.

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First of all, the so-called reflective turn of modern thought—what Immanuel Kant would later thematize as the Copernican revolution in philosophy—began with the Cartesian res cogitans. The advent of subjectivity is irreducible to pre-Cartesian philosophy.6 Descartes puts the modern concept of subjectivity squarely at the centre of philosophical reflection.7 As we have seen earlier, Descartes initiated the epistemological turn of modern philosophy by introducing subjectivity—the selfconsciousness of the Subject—as the sole basis and the uniquely valid point of reference in the act of knowing.8 With Descartes, self-awareness becomes an indispensable condition for object-awareness, and truth requires the prior reflective endorsement of the subject. Truth seems to be made dependent, at least in part, on subjectivity.9 It is true that Kant was the first one to set forth formally the epistemological theory that objects conform to the mind; “but the germ of that theory was developed by Descartes and is inseparable from his rationalistic position, a germ which was elaborated by Leibniz and Hume before being formalized by Kant.”10 As Klaus Brinkmann states: “It is the internal structure of this essentially Cartesian consciousness that becomes the focus of the later theories of self-consciousness as a fundamental epistemic and ontological principle in German idealism from Kant and Reinhold to Fichte and Hegel.”11 Kenneth Dorter summarizes well the Cartesian revolution in this regard and its enduring influence on subsequent philosophical thinking: Formerly, first philosophy was ontology or metaphysics, inquiry into the ultimate nature of being; in Descartes’ hands it becomes epistemology, inquiry into the human conditions for experience. The completeness of this revolution is attested by the universality with which subsequent philosophy has taken the ‘mental conditions of experience’, rather than the ‘things themselves’ as its starting point: empiricism, philosophies of mind, of language, of logic, idealism, phenomenology, etc.12 6 Bernard Charles Flynn, “Descartes and the Ontology of Subjectivity,” Man and World 16 (1983) 9. 7 Klaus Brinkmann, “Consciousness, Self-consciousness, and the Modern Self,” History of the Human Sciences 18 (2005), 29. 8 See in this regard Jean-Dominique Robert, “Descartes, créateur d’un nouveau style métaphysique: Réflexions sur l’introduction du primat de la subjectivité en philosophie première,” Revue philosophique de Louvain 60 (1962), 381, 385. 9 See Brinkmann, “Consciousness, Self-consciousness, and the Modern Self,” 2728, 38. 10 Dorter, “First Philosophy,” 7. 11 Brinkmann, “Consciousness, Self-consciousness, and the Modern Self,” 30. 12 Dorter, “First Philosophy,” 3-4.

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The modern self-consciousness is precisely Cartesian, namely, the disincarnate, disembodied self, the res cogitans, totally distinct from the surrounding physical world of the res extensa and also from other minds. In fact, the pseudo problem of Solipsism, i.e., the enigma of my relation to other minds, occurs only in Modernity! Modern idealism takes the res cogitans (the cogito) as the explanatory principle of the whole of reality, holding that the comprehension of the real takes place entirely within the consciousness of the subject.13 Accordingly, the primary reality is the selfconsciousness to which everything can be reduced in the ultimate analysis.14 Jorge Secada recognises Descartes to be the father of modern thought precisely on account of his atomist, and consequently alienating conception of the self. Descartes’s philosophy shaped the atomistic assumptions of modern reason, though he himself was neither a material nor a temporal atomist. His analysis of sensory experience into simple, discrete sensorial contents in the reflection on the wax in the Second Meditation marks a crucial departure from Scholastic holism and announces the reductionist programmes of modern empiricism, from Locke to the logical positivists. More significantly still, the Cartesian ego became the true atom, both social and natural, of modern metaphysics. Descartes’s conception of the self as a private, inner theatre, the pure realm of subjectivity, with the corresponding idealization of quality and quantification of natural reality, is a cornerstone of modern thinking.15

The modern and largely Cartesian concept of the subject as the sole source of meaning and value has persisted ever since. As Heidegger has pointed out with great insight, in Greek philosophy, the subject—the hypokeimenon—was the substance, the ultimate ground of the real, and could in no way be reduced to the human observer.16 Instead in Modernity, the Cartesian subject is “not simply one type of being among others; rather its advent installs a new epoch of Being, that is, an altered relationship between Being and beings – a new relation between a being and the

13 See Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 18. 14 See Nathalie Frogneux, Hans Jonas ou la vie dans le monde (Bruxelles: Éditions DeBoeck Université, 2001), 128-30. 15 Jorge Secada, Cartesian Metaphysics: The Late Scholastic Origins of Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 268. 16 See Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 147.

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horizon, or field, in which it can appear as a being.”17 According to Heidegger, it is only with Descartes that “Man becomes the relational centre of the entity as such.”18 Michael Zimmerman offers a masterful synthesis of Heidegger’s critique of Descartes in this regard. … For the Greeks, hypokeimenon meant “substance” in the sense of that which lies-forth as the ground which gathers the various aspects of an entity. Hypokeimenon was the “basis” or “substance” of things. Living substance meant that which “actualized” itself, in the sense of bringing itself forth into presence. … With the Cartesian “turn,” however, … humanity made itself into the “substance” of things: the self-certain subject, the grounding ground, the founding basis for all truth, reality, and value … In effect, modern man has absorbed into himself the “substance” of things, thereby reducing them to the status of mere representations. Things become “real” or “actual” insofar as they are “objectified” by the cognizing subject.19

In post-Cartesian Modernity, humanity thus becomes the efficient cause of everything objective. “Here, then, was the culmination of humanity’s drive to ‘make’ itself in the image of God, i.e., God understood as the providential Creator Who ‘dominates and calculates the whole of the entity’ as a ‘work’ which He has produced.”20 The triumph of modern productionist metaphysics occurs with Karl Marx, who proclaims: “Man is the only god for man”. According to Marx, man not only produces and reproduces himself, but he also creates the social world within which he lives.21 In the philosophy of Kant, the active positing role of subjectivity became explicit, as against a passive reception of the real. However, “the price exacted by this explicitation of the subjectness of the subject is an agnosticism concerning our knowledge of the ‘real,’ the thing-in-itself.”22 For Kant, the condition for the possibility of experience of all objects in 17

Flynn, “Descartes and the Ontology of Subjectivity,” 13. Flynn is presenting here Heidegger’s reading of Descartes. 18 Martin Heidegger, Holzwege, 5th ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1972), 81/128. 19 Michael E. Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, and Art (Bloomington – Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), 182. 20 Ibid., 182. Zimmerman quotes here from Heidegger’s Seminar on Parmenides (Winter Semester, 1942) in Gesamtausgabe 2, ed. Manfred S. Frings (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1982), 164. 21 Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity, 182. 22 Flynn, “Descartes and the Ontology of Subjectivity,” 21.

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general, no longer finds its origin in the thing-in-itself, but in the selfconstitution of the subject.23 The centrality of the subject is further absolutized in Hegel. Hegel would celebrate the turn to the subject on the part of Descartes as decisive for human thinking. According to Hegel, while hitherto philosophy has been like a ship sailing over the oceans, with Descartes, the ship has come at last into harbour with the conscious subject.24 Hegel, of course, goes farther than Descartes on human subjectivity. For Descartes, while the subject’s presence to itself is absolutely certain, the truth of its knowledge of objects is itself guaranteed by the veracity of God. Instead, for Hegel, the self is no longer the unmediated presence of the self to itself, but the presence of the Absolute Spirit itself mediated through the process of the dialectic. As Bernard Charles Flynn notes, “at the end of The Phenomenology of Spirit, what natural consciousness perceived as the other than itself, appears to us as the self in otherness.”25 In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel writes of Descartes’ cogito: “The thinking subject as the simple immediacy of being-at-home-with-me is the very same thing as what is called Being; and it is quite easy to perceive this identity.”26 The Cartesian modern Subject becomes the Absolute Spirit within Hegelian idealistic philosophy.27 The transformation of the human being into subiectum and the determination of beings as the represented and produced character of the objective, reaches its culmination in the Nietzschean Übermensch who is the essence of the Cartesian modern self.28 Heidegger writes: “The name ‘overman’ designates the essence of humanity, which, as modern humanity, is beginning to enter into the consummation belonging to the

23 Vittorio Hösle, “Les fondements culturels et historiques de la crise écologique,” Laval théologique et philosophique 63 (2007), 396. 24 See William Barrett, Death of the Soul: from Descartes to the Computer (New York – London: Doubleday, 1986), 16. 25 Flynn, “Descartes and the Ontology of Subjectivity,” 22. 26 G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy, tr. Elizabeth S. Haldane – Frances H. Simson (New York: The Humanities Press, 1967), vol. III, 229. 27 On Descartes’ influence on Hegel see also Mario Longo, “Metafisica del soggetto: Hegel interprete di Cartesio” in Cartesio e il destino della metafisica, ed. Ferdinando Luigi Marcolungo (Padua: Il Poligrafo, 2003), 171-86. 28 See Dale Allen Wilkerson, “The Root of Heidegger’s Concern for the Earth at the Consummation of Metaphysics: The Nietzsche Lectures” in Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 1 (2005), 32.

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essence of its age.”29 It is a situation where “everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct. … It seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself.”30 Nietzsche’s Wille zur Macht as the only possible form of subjectivity is a logical conclusion of the modern journey in subjectivity initiated by the Cartesian cogito.31 The Cartesian and modern conception of subjectivity has left an indelible mark on the development of Western philosophical thought. Even Heidegger, for all his critique of Descartes and Modernity, and his persistent endeavour to return to pre-traditional ontology, was not able to shake off the Cartesian heritage. Heidegger, in spite of the concern of interpreting phenomenology as meaning “to the things themselves”, begins Being and Time precisely with a discussion of the decisiveness of one’s initial epistemological position.32 The Dasein of early Heidegger is a clear shadow of the Cartesian res cogitans. As Roberto Morani points out, Heidegger bases himself on the cogito and finds there the prefiguration of the traits of Dasein.33 It is clear especially when Heidegger argues that meaning can occur only in relation to Dasein, Being “is” “only insofar as and as long as Dasein is”, which is not the case with entities.34 It is only after the famous Kehre (the turn) in his thought, that the (later) Heidegger would re-discover and defend the primacy of Being over the Dasein, marking thereby a complete turn-around of his thought. Significantly, the long shadow of the Cartesian subject reaches right up to post-modernism.35 The tendency for the dissipation and final destruction of the subject in post-modernism results ultimately from the over emphasis on subjectivity. It is the culmination, all be it in the negative, of the selfcentred and self-sufficient subject in modern philosophy from Descartes onwards. Joseph Fell writes: “It [post-modernism] restricts itself to the human subject’s thought and writing, understood as a ‘text’, and proceeds 29

Martin Heidegger, “The Word of Nietzsche: ‘God is Dead’” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, tr. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 96. 30 Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, tr. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 27. 31 See Roberto Morani, Soggetto e modernità: Hegel, Nietszche, Heidegger interpreti di Cartesio (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2007), 207. 32 See Dorter, “First Philosophy,” 4. 33 See Morani, Sogetto e modernita, 367. 34 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (London: SCM Press, 1962), 272. See in this regard Kenneth Dorter, “First Philosophy,” 12. 35 See in this regard Antonio Malo, Cartesio e la postmodernita (Rome: Armando, 2011).

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to deconstruct the text. This is the extremist case and consequence of the appeal to subjectivity: the demise of the subject itself.”36 It is the obliteration of the subject from the part of the very subject catapulted to the position of absolute centrality; what Jacques Bouveresse has called the “autophagous,” self-devouring tendency of post-modernism.37 Postmodernism is very much modern in this regard and in order to really overcome Modernity one needs to go beyond the Cartesian modern subject. We may recall in this context the admonition of Gregory Bruce Smith. To transcend modernity, to arrive at something genuinely post-modern, one would have to transcend the attitude that turns the world into our projection. We would have to quit the attitude that it is incumbent upon us to continuously create ourselves and the world de novo.38

The modern mind is thus specifically Cartesian which has not ceased to endure to our present day. As William Barrett points out, “a particular model of mind became embedded in Western culture at the very beginning of the Modern Age and has really persisted with us since.”39 Modern subjectivism as well as modern anthropocentrism, the origin of which can be traced with good measure to Cartesian philosophy, has characterized post-Cartesian thought ever since, and with obvious ecological implications as we have sought to evidence earlier in the book. Barrett writes: “Man’s arrogation of himself of the role of subject in philosophy” cannot but lead to the objectifying and consequent exploitation of nature.40 Secondly, and on the other hand, modern materialism and the associated mechanistic conception of the natural world has inherited significantly from the Cartesian mechanistic philosophy and particularly 36

Joseph P. Fell, “Some Thoughts on the Modern Mind,” Journal of Speculative Philosophy 26 (2012), 594. 37 See in this regard Jacques Bouveresse, Le philosophe chez les autophages (Paris: Les editions de minuit, 1984). For a critique of the post-modern deconstructionism see also Vincent Colapietro, Fateful Shapes of Human Freedom: John William Miller and the Crises of Modernity (Nashville : Vanderbilt University Press, 2003), 162-75. 38 Gregory Bruce Smith, “Heidegger, Technology and Postmodernity” in The Social Sciences Journal 28 (1991), 385. 39 William Barrett, Death of the Soul: From Descartes to the Computer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 20. 40 See William Lovitt, “Introduction” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, tr. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), xxviii-xxix.

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from his conception of the physical world as mere extended matter, the res extensa. The modern Cartesian mechanistic Weltbild has, in fact, been accentuated in the successive philosophical tradition of the West leading to a progressive depreciation of the natural world. A certain “nihilism” of the natural world has accompanied modern philosophy, science and technology throughout post-Cartesian Modernity. The deep depreciation of the very concept of nature and of the natural world is the extreme result of the Cartesian and modern solipsistic subjectivism.41 Significantly, it is only with Modernity that one comes to doubt for the first time the very existence of the physical world. Here the roots are evidently Cartesian. Already in paragraph eight of the First Meditation Descartes calls into question the very existence of the physical world. He points out there how the images in one’s dreams need not even correspond to anything real, that there need be no connection at all, not even the most tenuous one, between my perceptual experience and physical reality; for perhaps there is no physical world at all!42 Descartes was setting modern philosophical tradition on a perilous route that progressively depreciated the surrounding natural world, a trend in which some of the latent roots of the contemporary ecological crisis are easily recognizable. The ontological solidity of the very physical world is further eroded in the philosophy of Kant with his distinction between physical entities as they appear to the human subject (the phenomena) and things-inthemselves (the noumena). With Kant and later in idealistic philosophy, proofs have to be provided for the very existence of the material world. As Heidegger points out in his critique of Kant and Modernity, the “scandal of philosophy” is precisely that such proofs are asked for! We quote him: “The scandal of philosophy is not that this proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again.”43 Ironically, some strands of modern arm-chair philosophizing came to doubt the very existence of the physical world, the very world that includes and sustains all forms of life, including human life! One of the most important and disastrous legacies of the Cartesian and modern mechanistic Weltbild is the reduction of the natural world to the 41

See Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo, “Hans Jonas’ ‘Gnosticism and Modern Nihilism’, and Ludwig von Bertalanffy,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 38 (2012), 294. 42 Georges Dicker, Descartes: An Analytical and Historical Introduction (New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 21. 43 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, vol. II, 272-73. Cited by Frank Schalow, The Incarnality of Being: The Earth, Animals, and the Body in Heidegger’s Thought (New York: State University of New York Press, 2006), 118-19.

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one-dimensional disclosure of beings, which is constantly at the disposal of the value-positing agent. Modernity’s perception of the physical world is essentially one-dimensional, in terms of utility alone, and is incapable of looking at the natural world as a source of order for spiritual, environmental, cultural, and social life.44 As Bagoes Wiryomartono writes, “the selfconsciousness of modern society perceives the world as the sum of beings in terms of mere objects.”45 The nihilistic modern culture arose precisely from such a one-dimensional disclosure of entities.46 Descartes’ influence regarding the ontological depreciation of the natural world only in terms of use for humans, runs throughout the Western philosophical tradition. Significantly, such an outlook of instrumentalist ontology permeates the thought of the earlier Heidegger in Being and Time, while the later Heidegger is markedly different, as we have pointed out previously. The Dasein of the early Heidegger perceives the physical objects of the world only in the horizon of utility for human use.47 The ontological character of things are thus revealed as “equipments for human use” which manifest themselves as “readiness-to-hand” (Zuhandenheit), “manipulable in the broadest sense and at our disposal.”48 Heidegger reaffirms that the “kind of Being which belongs to these entities is readiness-to-hand. … Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined ontologico-categorically.”49 The “environing Nature” is thus “ready-to-hand” for the early Heidegger.50 The natural world as a limitless reservoir of raw material is the outlook which is prevalent to our times.51 The one-dimensional and ultimately nihilistic perception of the natural world as mere res extensa in Modernity reaches its fateful culmination in post-Modernity’s negation of permanence in nature, in its claim that everything is fluid and malleable, and in its quest to dissolve the natural world completely. Modernity’s anti-nature animus leads to post44

Bagoes Wiryomartono, “Rethinking Modernity and the Question of Future Development,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 26/4 (2012), 666. 45 Ibid., 667. 46 Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity, xix. 47 See in this regard Brett Buchanan, Onto-Ethologies: The Animal Environments of Uexküll, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze (New York: State University of New York Press, 2008), 5. 48 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), 98. 49 Ibid., 101. Italics as in the original. 50 Ibid. 51 See Patricia Limido-Heulot, Une histoire philosophique de la nature (Paris: Éditions Apogée, 2014), 7.

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modernism’s conception of the human being as world-less and bereft of any rootedness in the natural world.52 The disastrous results of postCartesian Modernity’s depreciative understanding of the natural world and the consequently hostile and exploitative treatment of it on the part of humanity are evident before our eyes in the form of the contemporary ecological crisis. Thirdly, apart from the excessive centrality of the human subject reflected in modern anthropocentrism, and the reductive mechanistic conception of the natural world as ready for human use, the third pillar of the Cartesian modern Weltbild, namely, the metaphysical dualistic divide between humanity and the natural world has permeated post-Cartesian Western philosophical tradition. The rationalist and empiricist philosophies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which closely examine the distinct operations of reasoning and sensing are the relatively independent successions of the ontological mind-matter antithesis of Descartes. They also mostly retain Descartes’ rejection of any coordination or necessary interrelation between them. The trajectory of modern philosophy is such a dualism which moves on the two independent tracks of reason and senses.53 Hans Jonas, for example, speaks of how the two monisms of idealism and materialism are the products of the disintegration of the last stage of Cartesian dualism.54 The surgical operation in which spirit and matter became totally separated within Cartesian ontological dualism dominated successive philosophical and scientific thought.55 We have explored in detail the ecological consequences of the Cartesian and modern ontological dualism earlier in the book, and especially how the “the rift between ourselves and the cosmos” is a “troubling legacy that the seventeenth century bequeathed to us.”56 In the context of the contemporary ecological crisis, our most urgent task is therefore “to include the reintegration of the human mind with the human body and the reintegration of both with the natural world.”57 An incisive critique of humanity’s domineering orientation towards nature, and the blindness of the interdependence of humans on the rest of 52

See Smith, “Heidegger, Technology and Postmodernity,” 384-86. See Fell, “Some Thoughts on the Modern Mind,” 592. 54 Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, 14. See also Frogneux, Hans Jonas ou la vie dans le monde, 127-28, 131. 55 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Man and Nature: The Spiritual Crisis of Modern Man (London – Boston: Unwin, 1990), 70. 56 Barrett, Death of the Soul, 11. 57 Fell, “Some Thoughts on the Modern Mind,” 591. 53

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natural world, based on the Cartesian metaphysical dualism, was proposed by none other than Nietzsche.58 Rejecting the categories by which humans have devalued the world, Netzsche argued: All the values by means of which we have tried so far to render the world estimable for ourselves and which then proved inapplicable and therefore devalued the world—all these values are, psychologically considered, the results of certain perspectives of utility, designed to maintain and increase human constructs of domination – and they have been falsely projected into the essence of things.59

We have sketched out in a few quick strokes how the modern worldview ushered in by Descartes in terms of the understanding of the self, the surrounding natural world, and the relationship between the two, has influenced most successive philosophical schools. As Anthony Kenny notes, Descartes’ “philosophical ideas remain—for better or worse— enormously influential to the present day.”60 However, the influence of the Cartesian and modern Weltbild is not limited to philosophy alone, but extends to other significant areas of contemporary life and culture like modern science, modern economy, modern politics, and even the modern educational curricula. It is to a rapid survey of the continuing sway of the modern Cartesian worldview on these important areas and their related detrimental impacts on our common planetary home that we turn in the coming sections.

2. Modern Science, Technology, and the Taming of Nature Modern science and technology is another important area where the Cartesian and modern Weltbild has left a permanent mark, aiding in the project of the conquest and mastery of nature. The metaphysical essence of modern science has its source largely within Cartesian philosophy as Martin Heidegger has insightfully pointed out. Descartes’ contribution consists not so much in having directly influenced the development of modern science and technology, but rather in terms of having provided the underlying metaphysical ground that serves as the foundation for science 58

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, tr. Walter Kaufmann (New York, Vintage Books, 1968), paragraph 556, pp. 301ff. 59 Ibid., paragraph 12B, pp. 13-14. Cited by Arran E. Gare, Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis (London – New York: Routledge, 1995), 88. 60 Anthony Kenny, The Rise of Modern Philosophy: A New History of Western Philosophy, vol. 3 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 39.

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as a modern phenomenon. According to Heidegger, “the entire essence of the modern age will have to let itself be apprehended from out of that ground.”61 Following such a lead, we shall briefly evidence below how far modern science and technology are indebted to the Cartesian philosophical heritage. We will make explicit how modern science basically follows the representational thinking of Modernity, a way of thinking that seeks to dominate entities rather than letting them reveal their manifold identities. The exclusively mechanistic understanding of physical entities proposed by modern science has resulted in a reductive view of the natural world in terms of utility alone. A disenchanted perception of the world conceived as totally opposite to humanity—as within the Cartesian and modern dualism—is largely at the basis of the concept of mastery over nature that characterises modern science and technology, with evident ecological consequences. For Heidegger, modern science is one of the most important manifestations of the Cartesian representational thinking, i.e., thinking which seeks to dominate entities rather than allowing them to disclose themselves.62 William Lovitt writes in his introduction to Heidegger’s The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays: [Modern] Science strikingly manifests the way in which modern man as subject represents reality. The modern scientist does not let things presence as they are in themselves. He arrests them, objectifies them, sets them over against himself, precisely by representing them to himself in a particular way. … specifically because man himself represents nature as of this character and then grasps and investigates it according to methods that, not surprisingly, fit perfectly the reality so conceived.63

In the modern scientific age the subject represents reality to itself, refusing to let things emerge as they are. The subject does forever catch reality up in a conceptual system and finds that he must fix it thus before he can see it at all.64 As Heidegger points out, the essence of modern science as “research” which involves the “objectification” of the physical world has its roots within the Cartesian representation. We quote him: We are reflecting on the essence of modern science in order that we may apprehend in it its metaphysical ground. What understanding of what is

61

See Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 117. Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity, 185. 63 Lovitt, “Introduction,” xxvi-xxvii. 64 Ibid., xxviii. 62

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Chapter VIII and what concept of truth provide the basis for the fact that science is being transformed into research? Knowing, as research, calls whatever is to account with regard to the way in which and the extent to which it lets itself be put at the disposal of representation. … Nature in being calculated in advance … become[s] the objects of a representing that explains. … Only that which becomes object in this way is—is considered to be being. We first arrive at science as research when and only when truth has been transformed into the certainty of representation. What it is to be is for the first time defined as the objectiveness of representing, and truth is first defined as the certainty of representing, in the metaphysics of Descartes.65

According to Heidegger “science as research is an absolutely necessary form of this establishing of [the Cartesian] self in the world; it is one of the pathways upon which the modern age rages toward fulfilment of its essence.”66 Further, it is on account of the subject’s capacity to represent the physical world in terms of quantity and movement (the only valid categories for knowledge of the physical world within the mechanistic philosophy promoted by Descartes and others), that modern science becomes “experimental”.67 The physical world is conceived by the modern subject solely in terms of mechanism, i.e. quantity and movement, and as a field of exploration and experimentation. So represented, nature becomes amenable to experiment. As Heidegger points out “neither medieval doctrina nor Greek episteme is science in the sense of research, for these it is never a question of experiment … To set up an experiment means to represent or conceive the conditions under which a specific series of motions can be made.”68 The experimental and technological orientation of modern science has reduced the natural world to manipulable objects. In fact, the use of mathematics and the design of experiments in modern science are such as to reveal the world only insofar as it is measurable and controllable: Modern science’s way of representing pursues and entraps nature as a calculable coherence of forces. Modern physics is not experimental because it applies apparatus to the questioning of nature. The reverse is true. Because physics, indeed already as pure theory, sets nature up to

65

Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 126-27. Ibid., 135. 67 Lovitt, “Introduction,” xxvii 68 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 121. 66

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exhibit itself as a coherence of forces calculable in advance, it orders its experiments precisely for the purpose of asking whether and how nature reports itself when set up in this way.69

The physical world represented by modern physics is only “nature as the object-area, whose objectness is first defined and determined through the refining that is characteristic of physics.”70 It is precisely on account of this that “the more exactly the ground plan of nature is projected, the more exact becomes the possibility of experiment.”71 Based on these considerations Heidegger claims that “the much-cited medieval Schoolman Roger Bacon can never be the forerunner of the modern experimental research scientist; rather he remains merely a successor of Aristotle.”72 The experimental tradition that so characterises modern science begins only with Descartes and his mechanistic philosophy. It is precisely for this reason that the Cartesian philosophical system becomes one of the solid metaphysical foundations of modern science. As we have seen earlier, within Cartesian metaphysics there takes place also an ontological reduction of the physical world, as the entire quantitative nature of physical matter gets subsumed into the principal attribute of extension alone and all matter collapses into homogeneity. The lingering legacy of the Cartesian concept of res extensa is precisely this conception of matter that present day natural sciences seem to have inherited from Descartes, wherein physical matter gets reduced to mere geometrical extension.73 Jorge Secada describes it as ontological reductionism. There is, thought apart, only one kind of substance in the universe. It is commonly expressed in the view that all that there is in reality is ultimately what physics speaks about, some qualitatively homogenous stuff. … ontological reductionism, originating in Descartes’s substitution of the

69 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 21. See also Gare, Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis, 53. 70 Martin Heidegger, “Science and Reflection” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, tr. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 173-74. 71 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 122. 72 Ibid. 73 See Jean-Marie Beyssade, La philosphie première de Descartes: le temps et la cohérence de la métaphysique (Paris: Flammarion, 1979), 47; Pierre Guenancia, Lire Descartes (Paris: Gallimard, 2000), 60-64.

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The mechanistic turn of modern science under the influence of Galileo, Descartes, Newton and others lets only mechanistic qualities emerge in the perception and description of the natural world. The modern cosmological conception of the physical universe as a field of masses and of inanimate forces that work according to the laws of inertia and quantitative distribution of extended matter is the heritage of modern mechanism, to which Descartes, among others significantly contributed. Descartes helped to reduce the rich diversity of the external physical world to the sole categories of quantity and movement apprehended by mathematical relations. With the metamorphosis of the natural world in quantifiable and mathematical res extensa, physics is elevated as the model for all natural sciences, forcing even a life-science like biology to cast itself in the mechanistic mould.75 In fact, “the reduction of biology to physics, and indeed the idea that all corporeal phenomena could be explained simply by reference to the movement of particles of a certain size and shape, is one of the central planks of Cartesian scientific method.”76 We may quote the words of the great historian of science E.J. Dijksterhuis on the wide-reaching influence of the Cartesian mechanism on modern science, and its implications. Cartesian physics is … mechanistic in character. This implies that it uses no explanatory principles other than the concepts employed in mechanics: geometric concepts such as shape, size, quantity, which are used by mechanics as a department of mathematics, and motion, which forms its specific subject. It recognizes as actually existing in nature only those things which can be described and explained by means of these concepts. It not only excludes all notions of animation, internal spontaneity, and purpose, but also denies all internal changes in the particles of mater, which it looks upon as the ultimate building blocks of perceptible bodies; it also banishes from physics all secondary qualities of matter, which it regards as states of consciousness.77

74

Secada, Cartesian Metaphysics, 247. Hösle, “Les fondements culturels et historiques de la crise écologique,” 396. 76 John Cottingham (ed.), Descartes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 5. Stanley Victor Keeling also thinks that Descartes reduces biology in its entirety to a mechanistic physics. See Stanley Victor Keeling, Descartes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 158. 77 E.J. Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture (Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), 414-15. 75

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The quest for the domination and mastery over the natural world in a totally unprecedented in manner in Modernity has its conceptual roots in the Cartesian subject that dominates over the natural world reduced to mere objects. When “man becomes subject, when from out of his consciousness he assumes dominion over everything outside himself,” he also “begins to take control over everything.”78 Modern people have been trained with science and technology to make them agents of the will to control, utilize, and improve natural entities.79 The modern scientist imposes the metaphysical conception of the physical world as quantity— the Cartesian res extensa—on the natural world and seeks to dominate it aided by the “boundless Will to Will” of Modernity.80 William Lovitt points out, drawing inspiration from Heidegger, how the natural world has been reduced to objects at the disposal of the dominating subject in Modernity. … when the modern subject represents and objectifies and, in objectifying, begins to take control over everything … things are not even regarded as objects, because their only important quality has become their readiness for use. Today all things are being swept together into a vast network in which their only meaning lies in their being available to serve some end.81

The drive to dominate and exploit the natural world is also facilitated by the fact that modern science, in strict adherence to the modern Weltbild that gave birth to it, continues to be dualistic. Modern science carries on the subject-object duality of modern mechanism, in spite of the blurring of such distinctions in contemporary physical theories like Quantum Mechanics and Relativity, and continues to perceive humanity as totally separate from the natural world. It is so even in modern life-sciences, even though “evolutionary biology offers abundant evidence of human continuity with other life-forms, while ecology and conservation biology recognize differences in the requirements and capacities of various nonhuman organisms that are distinct from those of human beings.”82 Such a dualistic conceptual divide naturally facilitates domination and exploitation of the non-human natural world without moral scruples. 78

Lovitt, “Introduction,” xxix. Wiryomartono, “Rethinking Modernity and the Question of Future Development,” 666. 80 See Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967), 99-100. 81 Lovitt, “Introduction,” xxix. 82 Ronnie Zoe Hawkins, “Ecofeminism and Nonhumans: Continuity, Difference, Dualism, and Domination,” Hypatia 13 (1998), 159. 79

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The problem with the modern scientific perception of the natural world is that it is essentially reductive as it is just one way of looking at it, though often idealized as the only valid perception of it. Heidegger writes in this regard: Nature, in its objectness for modern physical science, is only one way in which what presences—which from of old has been named physis— reveals itself … this objectness can never embrace the fullness of the coming to presence of nature. Scientific representation is never able to encompass the coming to presence of nature; for the objectness of nature is, antecedently, only one way in which nature exhibits itself.83

According to Heidegger, “the essence of modern technology starts man upon the way of that revealing through which the real everywhere, more or less distinctly, becomes standing-reserve.”84 Industrial modes of production made possible by modern technology compel entities to present themselves in a one-dimensional way, as standing-reserve for human consumption.85 Modern science and technology, founded on the Cartesian and modern mechanistic Weltbild, lead to a totally different perception of the natural world along with an unprecedented change in human relationship with the rest of the natural world. Heidegger writes: The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order appears differently than it did when to set in order still meant to take care of and to maintain. The work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In the sowing of the grain it places the seed in the keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its increase.86

Another significant influence of the Cartesian natural philosophy on Modernity and modern science in particular, is the disenchanted view of the natural world, bereft of any element of teleology, and shorn of its capacity for symbolism. Within the Cartesian and modern mechanistic framework, there is no room for inner projectiveness or inherent goals, and for immanent finality. Within Cartesian metaphysics teleology comes to be recognized only in the human composite, as in the case of the ends of 83

Heidegger, “Science and Reflection,” 174. Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 24. See in this regard also Mollie Painter-Morland - René ten Bos, “Should Environmental Concern Pay Off? A Heideggerian Perspective,” Organization Studies 37 (2016), 547-64. 85 Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity, 163. 86 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 15. 84

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sensations in the Sixth Meditation, on account of the presence of the conscious res cogitans. Consequently, teleology in the natural world is done away with altogether as only efficient causes come to be recognized. Within such a reductionistic understanding of science which seeks to explain all phenomena in terms of the behaviour of their most fundamental constituents alone, ultimately only efficient causes are acceptable.87 Heidegger writes: “The causa efficiens, but one among the four causes, sets the standard for all causality. This goes so far that we no longer even count the causa finalis, telic finality, as causality.”88 Hans Jonas has been highly critical of the modern scientific conception of the physical world as totally devoid of any element of teleology whatsoever and of the disenchanted conception of life in the postCartesian modern thought.89 We may recall in this context Descartes’ own remark in the Principles of Philosophy that he recognises no other difference between natural bodies and artefacts produced by skilful artisans other than one of size: that which takes place invisibly in the former, in the latter happens on so big scale that we can observe it. For the rest there is not a single difference between a running clockwork and a growing tree. (AT VIIIA, 326 / CSM I, 288) The reductive and disenchanted view of the natural world in Cartesian philosophy and modern science appears to have shorn nature of any element of symbolism and led to a pervasively secular and de-sacralized view of nature. It appears to have destroyed any vestiges of a contemplative perception of the natural world that still survived in many religious and cultural traditions. Seyyed Hossein Nasr speaks of how modern humans live in a de-sacralized world. The symbolic view of things is for the most part forgotten in the West and survives only among peoples of far away regions, while the majority of modern men live in a de-sacralized world of phenomena whose only meaning is either their quantitative relationships expressed in mathematical formulae that satisfy their scientific mind, or their material usefulness for man considered as a two legged animal with no destiny beyond his earthly existence. But for man as an immortal being they bear no direct message.90 87

John Habgood, The Concept of Nature (London: Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd., 2002), 9. 88 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 7. Heidegger carries on: “The four causes are the ways, all belonging at once to each other, of being responsible for something else.” Ibid. 89 Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, 9-10, 74. See Frogneux, Hans Jonas ou la vie dans le monde, 131. 90 Nasr, Man and Nature, 37.

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According to Nasr, “nothing is more dangerous in the current ecological debate than that scientistic view of man and nature which cuts man from his spiritual roots and takes a desacralized nature for granted.”91 What remains then is the natural world reduced to a heap of resources for humans to conquer and exploit. As Heidegger notes, the failure to preserve an enchanted view of the natural world is the “crisis” of modern science and Modernity in general. Heidegger’s own lectures on Hölderlin in the latter part of his life could be seen as an attempt to disclose once again the power of nature, the ingathering physis which had been “disenchanted” by modern science.92 The influence of the Cartesian and modern Weltbild on modern science and technology is rather conspicuous as our quick survey above has sought to evidence. It is true that the purely mechanistic conception of the natural world did not go unchallenged during the nineteenth century, particularly in art and literature where the romantic movement sought to re-establish a more intimate bond with nature and the indwelling spirit within nature. One may recall in this context romantic poets like Novalis, Wordsworth and others.93 At the same time it needs to be acknowledged that the romantic attitude toward nature was more sentimental than intellectual, and did not really succeed in challenging the dominant mechanistic paradigm of Modernity. In fact, “whatever service the romantic movement rendered in re-discovering the medieval art of the beauty of virgin nature, it could not affect the current of science.”94 Cartesian mechanism appears to have become a permanent element of the modern scientific worldview and a sort of unconscious background of all later scientific thought up to the present day. Cartesian physics was rejected and superseded by Newton; Cartesian zoology was attacked and refuted by Henry More and others, but the encompassing Cartesian mechanistic worldview, the attempt to reduce all physical reality to pure quantity, the res extensa, with which one could then deal in a purely mathematical way, has become the background of modern science.95 Modern science and technology are even today largely the progenies of modern Cartesian mechanistic Weltbild. Accordingly, “the social responsibility of science is often framed in terms of prediction and

91

Ibid., 7. See Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity, 185. 93 See Nasr, Man and Nature, 72. 94 Ibid., 73. 95 See Ibid., 69. 92

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manipulation of nonhuman nature, and acolytes of the mechanical view exude confidence about the control of nature.”96 The contemporary ecological crisis ultimately reveals “a crisis of our whole ‘scientific and technological civilization’,”97 which is anchored on the bulwarks of the modern and largely Cartesian mechanistic Weltbild.

3. Modern Economy and the Exploitation of Nature The influence of the modern Cartesian mechanistic perception of nature is clearly evident in the case of modern economy, wherein the natural world is generally perceived as a “warehouse” of resources and as a “sink” that absorbs consumerist waste and industrial pollution. Significantly, the unprecedented scale of commodification and commercialization of nature begins only in Modernity. The overarching belief that guides modern economic capitalism is that physical objects are merely resources to be utilized for human consumption. Accordingly the natural world gets reduced to a heap of commodities, meticulously calculated in terms of their monetary value, to be used, stored, and bartered. David Toolan explains well the emergence of the mechanistic paradigm that facilitated the emergence of modern capitalism. The mechanistic paradigm … divorced human beings from nature and generated an attitude of neutrality toward the biophysical world that all too commonly translated into indifference, alienation, or open hostility (i.e., nature as something to be conquered). It was a mindset ideally suited to an emerging culture of industrial capitalism – what might be called economic materialism – which would proceed to exploit the natural world as if its resources were unlimited.98

Underlying such a perception and treatment of the natural world is largely the Cartesian and modern mechanistic Weltbild. When the natural world is represented in the sole categories of quantity and movement—the Cartesian res extensa, it consequently gets reduced to a storehouse of raw material available for human consumption. In having laid the metaphysical foundations for the modern mechanistic paradigm, Descartes has had a 96

David R. Keller, “Toward A Post-Mechanistic Philosophy of Nature,” Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment 16 (2009), 710. 97 Jürgen Moltmann, Creating a Just Future: The Politics of Peace and the Ethics of Creation in a Threatened World (London: SCM Press; Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1989), 52. 98 David Toolan, At Home in the Cosmos (New York: Orbis Books, 2001), 42.

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singular influence in the human perception of the natural world as pliable for human manipulation and consumption. As the renowned environmental historian Donald Worster notes, “In a way that no truly traditional Christian, believing in the sanctity of God’s creation, could share, Descartes looked on nature simply as raw material to be exploited by the human brain.”99 According to Worster, the echo of the Cartesian dream to become lords and masters of nature “resonates down through the centuries, promising an intellectual conquest of mind over matter that knows no bounds.”100 Within the Cartesian and largely modern mechanistic worldview, the natural world comes to be emptied of all values, except as resource for human manipulation, and is thus intimately connected to economic materialism. The physical world thus gets reduced to an empty, meaningless mass of atoms upon which humans can readily impose their meanings. “Nature takes on a single meaning, that of ‘resource’ or ‘raw material’ for human exploitation and use.”101 The natural world thus presents itself in a one-dimensional fashion, a world that is immediately at its disposal.102 Modern economy reflects the core tenet of Modernity that value is created by humans alone while the natural world is valueless in itself. Any natural entity thus has value only when and if it serves some direct human use. The value of the natural world ultimately becomes a quality that humans create through their labour out of the raw materials supplied by nature. Accordingly, nothing in the natural world has any intrinsic worth, but only an instrumental worth, measured by the extent of its usefulness for human needs.103 Significantly, Adam Smith, the father of modern economics, in The Wealth of Nations does not include as wealth “the air and water that sustain life, the process of photosynthesis in plants, the intricate food chains that we draw on for sustenance, the microorganisms that decompose rotting carcasses and return them to the soil.”104 Correspondingly, the enormous value of ecosystem services and biodiversity—so fundamental for the sustenance of life on Earth and for 99

Donald Worster, The Wealth of Nature: Environmental History and the Ecological Imagination (New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 212. 100 Ibid. 101 Toolan, At Home in the Cosmos, 43-44. 102 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 84. See also Wilkerson, “The Root of Heidegger’s Concern for the Earth at the Consummation of Metaphysics,” 33-34. 103 See Worster, The Wealth of Nature, 215-16. 104 Ibid., 216.

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the very existence of humanity and all human institutions, including economy—continues to be ignored or bypassed altogether even in present day economic systems.105 In neo-liberal economics, as Ross Jackson points out, “there is no room for ecological or social considerations. Nature is seen as a free resource to be exploited without restriction.”106 In modern capitalistic economy, nature is only a mere commodity and a store-house of resources assessed solely in terms of their monetary value. Non-human nature is seen herein only as a resource to be used, with the profit of the Corporation implying, more often than not, the deficit of the earth. Within the capitalistic economic system, there takes place a radical transformation of money into capital by the inversion of the traditional relation between commodity and money; i.e., money, instead of functioning as a universal mediation of value, becomes, as capital, a value in itself. “Consequently, nature loses its proper and independent dignity and the product extracted from it, defined by its use, establishes its value. The accumulation of such value determines the rhythm of progress.”107 Furthermore, relating to every physical entity only as a resource to be used, also promotes unending and wasteful consumption.108 The ravaging of the planet in modern economy does not even spare human beings and their bodies, seen like the rest of the natural world, as only resources for utility and profit. Basic for the triumph of capitalism is the understanding of labour as the individual or corporative appropriation of nature for the sake of further monetary accumulation. Accordingly, “the very nature that constitutes the body of the worker is treated in the same way and viewed as a means for the accumulation of value. Considerations of value always begin from the results of productive effort, and not from 105

One may recall in this regard the recent global initiative The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) under the auspices of the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity to draw attention to the economic benefits of biodiversity by monetary quantification of the growing cost of biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation. TEEB has published a number of volumes in recent years beginning with the influential report released in Bonn in 2008. See Pavan Sukhdev et al., The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity: An Interim Report (Bonn: European Communities, 2008). 106 Ross Jackson, “A Gaian Worldview” in The Song of the Earth: A Synthesis of the Scientific and Spiritual Worldviews, eds. Maddy Harland – William Keepin (Hampshire: Permanent Publications, 2012), 27. 107 Vítor Westhelle, “The Weeping Mask: Ecological Crisis and the View of Nature,” Word & World 11 (1991), 144. 108 Haim Gordon – Shlomit Tamari, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception: A Basis for Sharing the Earth (Westport, Connecticut – London: Praeger, 2004), 5.

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the organic relation of the human within nature.”109 Haim Gordon and Shlomit Tamari make a pointed critique of modern economic capitalism in this regard, inspired by Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Modernity: [C]apitalism is a regime founded upon the pursuit of greed and upon the continual exploitation of other human beings and of the riches of the earth. The ideal capitalist regards other human beings, and other living species, as mere objects or resources to be utilized for his or her own benefits. Other human beings or natural species will rarely be viewed as beings with whom the capitalist shares his or her being.110

The perception of the natural world merely as a storehouse of resources for conquest and exploitation was eventually carried by European colonialist powers to other parts of the world. As environmental historian Donald Worster points out, “this world-view was carried along in the minds of Europeans invading the New World, conquering and exploiting its riches.”111 In the regions colonized, prime lands were expropriated for plantations and cash crop monocultures, mines, and commercial farmlands, forcing peasants either into slavery or landless labouring or transfer on to marginal lands. It also brought about unprecedented ecological degradation.112 Today, the drive for capital accumulation and profit in modern economy coupled with the dream of Modernity to master the natural world turns material objects to nothing other than commodities for the satisfaction of ever-increasing needs of modern consumerism. Modern humans do not dwell at peace and in harmony with the natural world, their home. While the essence of dwelling is to cultivate the land and its resources as responsible members of the common household, modern humans are restlessly seeking fulfilment of their infinite and mostly artificial needs, in a never-ending orgy of self-gratification in the sense of

109 110

Westhelle, “The Weeping Mask,” 144. Gordon – Tamari, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, 4-

5. 111

Worster, The Wealth of Nature, 212. See in this regard also Alfred W. Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 112 See World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 29; Michael S. Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 29-30.

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narcissism.113 They live on a stream of consumptive addiction and of productive obsession toward infinity, towards the satisfaction of which the natural world needs to be increasingly dominated and exploited.114 As William Leiss writes in The Domination of Nature: Mastery over nature means the extraction of resources from the natural environment to turn them into commodities for the satisfaction of needs, without apparent limit and without any regard for the appropriateness of those needs or the means chosen to satisfy them, judged according to some criteria for a “truly human” existence. In short: to get what we want (or what we think we need in order to be happy) by transforming the planet into nothing but a supplier of our wants—an abundant, unlimited, neverending variety of goods.115

The mechanistic and quantitative Cartesian paradigm in the perception of nature continues to condition contemporary social values and thinking, as nations and societies come to be valued in terms of GNP, and development is seen in terms of capacity to exploit and utilize the resources of the earth. As Donald Worster notes, the most significant impact on the natural world in the wake of Modernity came from economic materialism.116 It is an encompassing worldview wherein an individual’s or a people’s success is best judged in terms of their worldly possessions and their economic productivity. We quote directly from Worster: I mean the view that improving one’s physical condition—i.e., achieving more comfort, more bodily pleasure, and especially a higher level of affluence – is the greatest good in life … In current parlance, I mean worshiping the god of GNP. All through earlier history there were individuals who lived by a materialistic standard, but we cannot find any whole culture where materialism defined the dominant system of values until we arrive at the modern age, which is emphatically, unabashedly materialist in its ultimate goals and daily strategies.117

113

See Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 170; Wiryomartono, “Rethinking Modernity and the Question of Future Development,” 670. 114 Wiryomartono, “Rethinking Modernity and the Question of Future Development,” 668. 115 William Leiss, The Domination of Nature (Montreal – London: McGillQueen’s University Press, 1994), xxv. 116 Worster, The Wealth of Nature, 210. 117 Ibid.

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Market economy, in fact, lives on the myth that non-living resources are abundant and that infinite growth is possible, which within a closed system like the earth is a contradiction. We may recall in this regard the “cornocupian” argument advanced by some of the environmental sceptics,118 mainly from the corporate world of economy and industry. According to the cornocupians, there are few intractable natural limits to growth, as the world can provide a practically limitless abundance of natural resources.119 One may also recall in this regard the infamous remark from Lawrence Summers, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury under President Clinton who stated: “There are no limits to the carrying capacity of the earth that are likely to bind at any time in the foreseeable future. The idea that we should put limits on growth because of some natural limit is a profound error.”120 What is even more detrimental is the stubborn and persistent refusal of modern and neo-liberal economies to recognize that humans are interrelated to and inter-dependent on the natural world for their very survival and sustenance. The modern homo economicus lives under the illusion of not being bound by or pretends ignorance of the limits of the natural world on which he or she is inevitably dependent. Here modern economy closely mirrors the Cartesian and modern dualistic divide between humanity and 118

See in this regard Julian Simon, The Ultimate Resource (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981); Julian Simon – Herman Kahn (eds.), The Resourceful Earth: A Response to Global 2000 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984); Bjørn Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). These authors, not surprisingly, have also sought to deny the very existence of the ecological crisis. Julian Simon argues that there is no statistical evidence for rapid loss of species and that the climate does not show signs of unusual and threatening changes. See Simon –Kahn (eds.), The Resourceful Earth, 23. See also the reassuring message of Bjørn Lomborg as recently as 2000 that “there is no ecological catastrophe looming around the corner to punish us.” Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist, 348. Lomborg’s claims are basically the same as those of the cornucopians, namely, that there is no depletion of natural resources and that the severity of the problems has been overstated, the phenomenon of global warming is not serious enough to warrant radical fossil fuel cutbacks, the feared extinction of species will only be marginal, the rate of deforestation—including that of Amazon forests—is not significant, and finally, that the environmental problems are getting smaller rather than bigger. Ibid., 4-33. 119 See the title of chapter 3 of Julian Simon’s controversial work The Ultimate Resource: “Can the Supply of Natural Resources really be infinite? Yes!” 120 Cited by Toolan, At Home in the Cosmos, 45. See in this regard also Clive Hamilton, Growth Fetish (London: Pluto, 2004).

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the rest of the natural world that negates any element of continuity as well as mutual dependence between them. Modern economy, in fact, does not acknowledge human dependence on natural systems, tempted by excessive, and misplaced confidence in human ingenuity.121 Here one may recall the critique of E.F. Schumacher that “it is inherent in the methodology of economics to ignore man’s dependence on the natural world.”122 Our current economic system operates on the false assumption that the earth’s environment is a subset of the human economy.123 However, the truth remains that every economy that humans have devised is dependent on the larger economy of the natural world. We ignore such a fundamental dependence at our own peril. We have not invented nature’s economy; we have inherited it through eons of evolution. We learn to take things out of it for our own use and circulate them for a while within our little economy, turning forests into houses and books before yielding them to rot and mildew. The human economy requires for its longterm success that its architects acknowledge their dependence on the greater economy of nature, preserving its health and respecting its benefits.124

While in industry and economics the dominant paradigm is that of constant growth—the credo of modern capitalist economy from Adam Smith onwards—within natural ecosystems there are limits which need to be respected, without which the system itself will collapse.125 One may recall here the insistence of the renowned economist Nicholas GeorgescuRoegen that the economic process is itself solidly anchored to a material basis which is subject to definite constraints.126 In this vein, one needs to be critical of popular concepts like progress, sustainable development, etc., 121

See for example, the following claim of Julian Simon: “In the end, copper and oil come out of our minds. That’s really where they are.” Reported in Julian Simon - Norman Myers, Scarcity or Abundance (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994), 100. 122 E.F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered (London: Abacus, 1974), 36. Italics as in the original. 123 Peter G. Brown – Geoffrey Garver, Right Relationship: Building a Whole Earth Economy (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2009), 8. 124 Worster, The Wealth of Nature, 217. 125 See Ernest Partridge, "Gefährlicher Optimismus," Natur und Kultur 2 (2001), 332. 126 See in this regard the critique of neo-classical economics founded on the mechanistic model by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, “The Entropy Law and the Economic Problem” in Valuing the Earth: Economics, Ecology, Ethics, eds. Herman E. Daly - Kenneth Townsend, (London: MIT Press, 1993), 75-88.

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when these are based on a metaphysical worldview that considers nature as a mere storehouse of resources.127 It is an evident and undeniable truth that the capitalist economy is the locomotive that guides the modern world.128 “Economics based on consumerism and obsession with growth has become, in effect, the modern world’s state-sponsored religion.”129 It is also equally evident that the current economic system, sustained by the quantitative modern industrial paradigm, becomes a contributing factor to the present day ecological crisis. The transformation “of the natural and human substance of society into commodities,” as Karl Polanyi had warned decades ago, “must disjoint man’s relationships and threaten his natural habitat with annihilation.”130 Economic activities are increasingly placing our common planetary home in peril as evident in the rise of toxic wastes, pollution, loss of biodiversity, ozone depletion, excessive carbon emissions and the resultant climate change, etc. Healing our planet requires nothing short of a radical change of the paradigm of modern economy and of the underlying modern and largely Cartesian Weltbild that perceives the natural world as inert raw material available for human consumption. We will need to rediscover our intimate relationship with the natural world that sustains us and the rest of the biotic community and learn anew to “manage our common home” as in the original etymology of the term economy. We need to shed our false identity as consumers of resources and rediscover our intimate connection with the natural world as dwellers in our common planetary home. As Karen K. Chen points out, healing our home planet will require reprioritizing some of our most basic values and beliefs: Contemporary society in the West stands at a crossroads, a pivotal moment in time. We have become a culture of individual consumers, our central purpose tied to the accumulation and production of material wealth. Isolated and disconnected, we have forgotten our intrinsic and inevitable need to live in relationship, to participate within the natural cycles that 127

See Vandana Shiva, “Recovering the Real Meaning of Sustainability” in The Environment in Question: Ethics and Global Issues, eds., David E. Cooper – Joy A. Palmer (London – New York: Routledge, 1992), 187-93. 128 See Hösle, “Les fondements culturels et historiques de la crise écologique,” 406. 129 Brown – Garver, Right Relationship, xvii. 130 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 42. Cited by Raymond A. Rogers, Nature and the Crisis of Modernity: A Critique of Contemporary Discourse on Managing the Earth (Montréal - New York: Black Rose Books, 1994), 18.

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nourish us. This mode of being has led to severe consequences that are undermining our ability to survive on this planet. In light of rising incidences of resource and energy depletion, rampant greenhouse gases, and environmental degradation, it is clear that healing our modern crisis will require reprioritizing our most basic values and beliefs.131

4. Modern Politics and Educational Curricula for the Conquest of the Natural World We have so far assessed the long shadow of the modern and Cartesian worldview over contemporary philosophy, modern science and technology, and modern economy. Significantly, the influence of the Cartesian modern Weltbild extends also to other areas of contemporary life and institutions like politics, and even to educational curricula. It is to some concise reflections in this regard that we turn our attention now. As part of the overall project in this book, namely, to trace the conceptual roots of the contemporary ecological crisis in the Cartesian and largely modern Weltbild, our ultimate aim is to evidence how the persistence of the Cartesian modern worldview contributes to the perpetuation of the contemporary ecological crisis. The concept of the autonomous “atomist” Cartesian self, catapulted to a position of absolute centrality in modern anthropocentrism, has largely shaped modern politics, from Hobbes to our present day. The ego-centric turn of Modernity inaugurated by Descartes has led to a conception of society as a collectivity of autonomous selves rather than an organic and mutually constitutive unity. “Individualism does not seem to have been known among peoples, but since the seventeenth century we have fostered the idea of the isolate, independent individual.”132 The independent, autonomous and, therefore, essentially non-social Cartesian subject characterises the modern ideology of the individual and society.133 As Bagoes Wiryomartono writes: “modern personality is a metaphysical construct of self-consciousness that possibly leads to social alienation because modern individualism is by nature nothing but a metaphysical

131

Karen K. Chen, “Our Saving Grace: A Relational Mode of Being,” Tikkun 27 (2012), 49. 132 Douglas C. Bowman, Beyond the Modern Mind: The Spiritual and Ethical Challenge of the Environmental Crisis (New York: The Pilgrim Press, 1990), 17. 133 See Christian Lalive d’Epinay, “Individualism and Solidarity Today: Twelve Theses,” Theory Culture Society 8 (1991), 58.

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withdrawal from the spiritual communion of the social world.”134 Every person in modern society is a totally autonomous entity, and consequently social cohesion and solidarity are reduced to a construct of totally independent subjects, a transaction between isolated selves. Since existence for the Cartesian subject is nothing but the consciousness of the subject that perceives all beings as objects, the Cartesian world is not anything but the extension of the self-consciousness of others in in terms of the totality of objects for a thinking thing as subject. Since then, the world as a transcendentally united system of beings has been taken over by the awareness of ego; therefore, collective solidarity and social cohesion become part of a transaction between an ego and another one.135

What stands out in post-Cartesian Modernity is the moral detachment of the individual from the social structures. It is ultimately so since “meaning and value, by modern standards, must come entirely from the individual subject. Structures are accepted only to the extent that the individual first sanctions them.”136 The Enlightenment idea of the society as a social contract between egoistic individuals, as well as utilitarianism, mainstream economic theory and psychology, have all drawn heavily from the ego-centric philosophy of Descartes and the associated mechanistic conception of the natural world.137 After Descartes, it took at least a century and a half before modern individualism would present its political charter in terms of a theory of human rights defined as inherent in the individual human condition independently of one’s social and historical context.138 But the groundwork of this eighteenth century political construction had been laid long before in the Cartesian and largely modern conception of the self.139 134

Wiryomartono, “Rethinking Modernity and the Question of Future Development,” 664. 135 Ibid., 664-65. 136 Louis Dupré, “Alternatives to the Cogito,” Review of Metaphysics 40 (1987), 712. Italics as in the original. 137 See in this regard Gare, Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis, 38. See also Henryk Grossman - Boris Hessen, “Descartes and the Social Origins of the Mechanistic Concept of the World,” Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 278 (2009), 157-229. 138 Dupré, “Alternatives to the Cogito,” 710. 139 Dupré points out how Francisco de Vitoria in the sixteenth century, and Hugo Grotius in the seventeenth, had attempted to erect principles of international law precisely on the theoretical basis of individual personhood that emerged in Modernity. See Dupré, “Alternatives to the Cogito,” 710.

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Modern political theories proposed by thinkers like Thomas Hobbes, a contemporary of Descartes, found a fertile terrain in the Cartesian modern anthropocentrism built around the myth of the atomic individual. In his major work in political theory entitled Leviathan (1651), Hobbes offered a vision of the civil society as composed of atomic individuals governed by a social contract. Hobbes shared with Descartes a mechanistic understanding of the physical world. The first part of the Leviathan, “Of Man”, characterizes humans as complex machines moved by appetites and aversions. Political society was seen as constructed upon a social contract between autonomous individuals for the promotion of self-interests.140 As Vítor Westhelle notes, starting with Hobbes, and extending through Leibniz to recent neopositivists, the individual has been the irreducible component of the social matrix. Collectivity, civil society, thus became reduced to a compound of contractual arrangements among individuals in the pursuit of their proper interests.141 With the emergence of modern society the concept of organic community, within which individuals find identity, disappeared. Society became more of a market place where competitive self-interests lead to competition for survival among individuals rather than an organic community where resources are commonly owned and shared. We live in a society which gives priority to the autonomous individual over the role of the community and where individuals and their personal happiness have come to be seen as absolute ends.142 Douglas C. Bowman speaks of the stranglehold of the modern myth of individualism on Western society: What power this myth has exerted in Western consciousness. It has made us fundamentally deny our deep, intrinsic sociality. The myth informs us that we are alone in the world and that social organization is just an agreement we reluctantly enter into in order to mitigate possible conflict of interest with other individuals. … The myth fosters privatism and deludes us into the “wishdream” of being totally independent one day like the cowboy hero.143

140

See Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980), 209-12; Arran Gare, “Philosophical Anthropology, Ethics and Political Philosophy in an Age of Impending Catastrophe,” Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 5 (2009), 266-67. 141 Westhelle, “The Weeping Mask,” 143. 142 See Brinkmann, “Consciousness, Self-consciousness, and the Modern Self,” 39; d’Epinay, “Individualism and Solidarity Today,” 62. 143 Bowman, Beyond the Modern Mind, 17.

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The ego-centric orientation of modern societies marks the triumph of the Cartesian and modern atomist self, bereft of interrelatedness with the wider human community and ultimately with the natural world. The gradual decontextualization of the human person from the wider cosmic and social network is ultimately linked with “Descartes’ theory of the isolated self as source of meaning and value.”144 Modern anthropocentrism ultimately “devolves into egoism and is thus reduced to spatiotemporal scales that are only relevant to individuals—typically, no more than a handful of generations.”145 Modern capitalist societies, as Max Weber has shown, are the most evident expressions of such agglomerations built around the atomist individuals in order to protect and promote short-term self-interests. In most modern political institutions, including democratic ones, the self-interest of a selected group of individuals or specific communities, triumph over the rights of the wider community, often backed by lobby groups in neo-liberal economic contexts, in utter negligence of the interests of the wider human and biotic community. Alasdair MacIntyre, a noted contemporary moral philosopher, has sought to expose the disastrous moral consequences that have resulted from the primacy of an autonomous, isolated subject, and proposes a program for a socially and historically more integrated ethical reconstruction.146 We live in an era of exacerbated individuality wherein political and economic institutions seldom feel bound by a sense of accountability to the wider social community. One of the worrying concerns about the manifestations of the contemporary ecological crisis like climate change— which is caused largely by the hugely disproportionate emissions of greenhouse gases on the part of the elite minority and of which the disproportionate victims are mostly the poorer nations and societies147—is precisely the lack of social responsibility towards the collective humanity. In fact, a communitarian political outlook for the protection of our common planetary home is still to emerge. Its emergence will be possible only if humanity is willing to abandon the anthropocentric and atomist worldview of Cartesian Modernity.

144

Dupré, “Alternatives to the Cogito,” 710. Kyle Burchett, “Anthropocentrism and Nature: An Attempt at Reconciliation,” Teoria 34 (2014), 135. 146 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1981). Cited by Dupré, “Alternatives to the Cogito,” 687. 147 See in this regard U. Thara Srinivasan et al., “The Debt of Nations and the Distribution of Ecological Impacts from Human Activities,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105 (2008), 1768-73. 145

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The influence of the Cartesian modern Weltbild also permeates other areas of life and society, apart from philosophy, science and technology, economics, and politics. The Cartesian and modern cultural parameters continue to be perpetuated, mostly in an unconscious way, even in education imparted to younger generations. As C.A. Bowers notes, “we are still, at the deepest level of our thought processes, Cartesian thinkers.” According to him “this can most easily be seen in the curriculum and the teaching styles that characterize the educational process from the early grades through graduate school.”148 So we shall briefly examine the influence of the Cartesian modern worldview in terms of anthropocentrism, a reductive and mechanistic conception of the natural world, and the dualistic divide between humans and the rest of the natural world, on contemporary education and present-day educational curricula. First of all, Cartesian and modern anthropocentrism subtly permeates educational curricula in most parts of the world.149 According to Bowers, the main cultural message propagated by the contemporary educational system is the western myth that accords human beings the status of independence and absolute centrality in relation to other forms of life within biotic communities. As Bowers points out, “In all public education students encounter in textbooks an image of the individual as an autonomous agent engaged in social and technological activities. The pronoun ‘you’ is ubiquitous from grade one through grade twelve.”150 The greater part of the school and university curricula continue to suggest somewhat disingenuously that human beings are the one and only point of reference for all that exists in the world.151 The autonomy of the thinking subject, free of cultural values and through its independence from the environment, is constituted as the very basis of education, rather than being seen as a possible deficiency. The Cartesian cogito is thus the basis of education.152

148

C.A. Bowers, Education, Cultural Myths and the Ecological Crisis: Toward Deep Changes (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993), 25. 149 C.A. Bowers provides an excellent review of how anthropocentrism subtly permeates educational curricula as in the case of school text-books. See Bowers, Education, Cultural Myths and the Ecological Crisis, 117-53. 150 Bowers, Education, Cultural Myths and the Ecological Crisis, 125. 151 See the evaluation of Bowers’ views in this regard on the part of Mauro Grün, “Gadamer and the Otherness of Nature: Elements for an Environmental Education,” Human Studies 28/2 (2005), 158. 152 Grün, “Gadamer and the Otherness of Nature,” 158.

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The problem with modern education is that the autonomy of the self is seen as the perfect ideal and is given a central role within the conceptual basis of the educational curriculum. Modern and contemporary forms of educational theories and praxis are largely centred around the atomistic and reductive concept of the self, inherited from Modernity. Mauro Grün writes in this regard: … most conceptual structures of curricula are based on Cartesian thought and on the philosophy of consciousness that it gives rise to in its conception of an autonomous subject. We might propose therefore that the history of modern education is the history of the construction of the project of the creation of the autonomous subject.153

Secondly, modern educational curricula continue to transmit the mechanistic conception of the natural world inherited from Modernity and indirectly subserve the instrumental rationality of modern industrial economy. In most textbooks, Earth is represented more as a source of natural resources for human consumption rather than a home that hosts and sustains humanity along with myriads of other forms of life. The educational curricula and system mostly continue to work within a Weltbild or framework of unlimited economic expansion based on the myth of the infinite plenitude of natural resources and people as consumers.154 Some of the top-notch centres of higher education continue to spawn engineers, technicians and managers who measure their career success in terms of increased economic output, even at the cost of the wellbeing of the planet, and profit margins, even when it means depletion of the life-sustaining resources of our home planet and our common ecosystems. As David W. Orr points out, the ecological crisis is not caused mainly by ignorant people, but by literate ones (people with BAs, BSs, LLBs, MBAs and PhDs), some of the best educated people in society.155 According to Orr, the main focus of current educational curricula appears only to prepare the students to compete in the world economy, as economic growth is presented as the highest goal.156 Such an outlook also promotes the mantra of technological mastery of the planet rather than the 153

Ibid., 157-58. See Bowers, Education, Cultural Myths and the Ecological Crisis, 3, 127-30. 155 David W. Orr, Earth in Mind: On Education, Environment and the Human Prospect (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1994), 7. Orr makes a thoughtful comparison, taking his cue from Elie Wiesel, between the ecological crisis and the Holocaust, of which the designers and perpetrators were the heirs of Kant and Goethe, widely thought to be the best educated people on earth. See Ibid., 7, 18-20. 156 Orr, Earth in Mind, 16. 154

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creed of sustainable living on Earth. Orr writes with reference to the American context. A second myth is that with enough knowledge and technology, we can, in the words of Scientific American (1989), ‘manage planet earth.’ Higher education has largely been shaped by the drive to extend human domination to its fullest. In this mission, human intelligence may have taken the wrong road. … But the complexity of earth and its life systems can never be safely managed. The ecology of the top inch of topsoil is still largely unknown as is its relationship to the larger systems of the biosphere. What might be managed, however, is us: human desires, economies, politics, and communities. … It makes far better sense to reshape ourselves to fit a finite planet than to attempt to reshape the planet to fit our infinite wants.157

Significantly, even programmes of “environmental” education in the educational curricula work within the Cartesian mechanistic outlook of the natural world and the dream of the technological mastery of the planet and its resources. The underlying assumption of most environmental education curricula is that a bit of recycling, organic farming, occasional use of renewable forms of energy, etc. is all that it takes to ward off the ecological crisis, without having to fundamentally question our current mind-set and radically alter profligate consumerist life styles. Thirdly, educational training imparted in schools and universities continue to promote a relationship of dualistic divide between humanity and the rest of the natural world. “The Cartesian view of rationality and the autonomous individual (both part of the foundations of modern consciousness)” helps “to maintain the sense of separation between man and nature.”158 The dualistic divide between humanity and the natural world in the wake of Modernity is rooted in the Cartesian epistemological separation of the self and object. In Cartesian epistemology the observer sees nature as if looking at a photograph. The world gets reduced to what is thought and objectified by the subject. The autonomous subject is thus someone outside of nature.159 Bowers points out how most textbooks perpetuate such a dualistic epistemology. The preposition “on” (“The Earth You Live on” in the chapter heading) expresses the form of relationship that is consistent with the verb to “see” as the way of knowing about relationships. This reference to vision, which 157

Ibid., 9. Bowers, Education, Cultural Myths and the Ecological Crisis, 3. 159 Grün, “Gadamer and the Otherness of Nature,” 158. 158

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The educational curricula thus further reinforce the modern and Cartesian worldview that humans are totally separate from the natural world and are not dependent on the biological web and ecosystems that sustain all life, including human life, on Earth. We are still to create a holistic educational curricula that can educate students to become responsible members of the wider human community and citizens of the biotic community. Today, we stand in need of educational endeavours that can “rectify the flaws of the dualistic, atomistic, and materialistic worldview deeply embedded in formal education in many modern societies.”161 In order to motivate our younger generations to care for our imperilled common planetary home, we need to move decisively beyond the modern and largely Cartesian Weltbild that continues to be at the basis of our educational institutions and curricula at large.

5. The Enduring of the Modern Worldview and the Deterioration of Our Common Planetary Home As we have sought to evidence above, the Cartesian and modern philosophical Weltbild, founded on the triple pillars of an exaggerated anthropocentrism, a mechanistic conception of the natural world, and the dualistic divide between humanity and the natural world, continues to serve as the encompassing horizon of much of contemporary life and thought. Descartes, the father of modern philosophy, was hugely influential in moulding the main currents of philosophical reflection after him, and has left an indelible imprint on contemporary institutions ranging from modern science and technology to economy and modern politics, and even educational curricula. The long reach of the Cartesian and modern worldview over contemporary life, thinking, and institutions can also help to explain the perpetuation and exacerbation of the contemporary ecological crisis in our own times. As David W. Orr points out, behind the 160

Bowers, Education, Cultural Myths and the Ecological Crisis, 126. Huey-li Li, “Platonic Cosmology: A Terrestrial Pedagogy,” Philosophy of Education 8 (2004), 130. See in this regard Noel Gough, “From Epistemology to Ecopolitics: Renewing a Paradigm for Curriculum,” Journal of Curriculum Studies 21 (1989), 225-41; Larry M. Gigliotti, “Environmental Education: What Went Wrong? What Can Be Done?” Journal of Environmental Education 22 (1990), 912.

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ecological crisis lies ultimately a defective worldview of how the natural world is perceived and related to. The disordering of ecological systems and of the great biogeochemical cycles of the earth reflects a prior disorder in the thought, perception, imagination, intellectual priorities, and loyalties inherent in the industrial mind. Ultimately, then, the ecological crisis concerns how we think and the institutions that purport to shape and refine the capacity to think.162

We have argued in this book that some of the most important conceptual roots of the contemporary ecological crisis are to be sought in the conceptual worldview of Modernity to which Cartesian philosophy, in terms of understanding of the human self, of the physical world, and of the relation between the two, appears to have contributed most. We have also seen how the overreaching influence of the underlying Cartesian modern worldview to the present day has some obvious and corresponding ecological consequences. The domination and exploitation of the natural world has only intensified in recent decades with the “globalization” of the western and modern Weltbild around the world. It is obvious therefore that in order to overcome our current ecological predicament, we stand in need of nothing short of a transformation of the Cartesian, and largely modern, conceptual paradigm. In order to rediscover our place in the natural world we will need to overcome the modern worldview. David R. Keller writes: In the Western, or Occidental, intellectual tradition, discourse on the human place in nature has been dominated by the ontology and axiology of Modernity. Constructing a new, more robust vocabulary for ecological discourse necessitates that we surmount the limitations and presuppositions of the Modern weltanschauung.163

To overcome the contemporary ecological crisis, one of the first things we will need to do is to evolve a worldview, a new Weltbild that transcends our hyper-separation from the natural world, radically recast some of our most important institutions, and consciously adopt more virtuous ways of living on our home planet. We conclude with the words of Ronnie Zoe Hawkins in this regard: Instead of insisting on maintaining our presently existing institutions at the expense of the rest of the living world, hyperseparating ourselves from that world and projecting our own constructions onto it, we can try opening 162 163

Orr, Earth in Mind, 2, 26-27. Keller, “Toward A Post-Mechanistic Philosophy of Nature,” 709.

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Chapter VIII ourselves to that world, apprehending the needs and capacities of nonhuman others as well as those of marginalized human others and reconstructing our social reality so as to accommodate them. … to embrace more virtuous ways of living on the planet, ways of living within ecosystems that recognize and respect both our continuity with and differences from their other inhabitants.164

164

Hawkins, “Ecofeminism and Nonhumans,” 189.

CONCLUSION NEW WINESKINS FOR A NEW WORLDVIEW

Sometime between 1881 and 1882, around the same time that he wrote “The Madman,” Friedrich Nietzsche left a note with a ring of prophecy. It read: “The time is coming when the struggle for dominion over the earth will be carried on. It will be carried on in the name of fundamental philosophical doctrines.”1 Our main task in this book has been precisely to trace and make explicit the philosophical root causes of the contemporary ecological crisis. We have sought to evidence how humanity’s distorted relationship with the natural world and its ruthless and unprecedented exploitation in the wake of Modernity, ultimately go back to fundamental philosophical doctrines about our understanding of ourselves, of the natural world, and of the link between the two. It may be a worthwhile exercise at this stage to cast a quick glance at the journey that we traversed so far, before making mention of the task that awaits us in the light of our analysis. Our point of departure was the conspicuously anthropogenic character of the contemporary ecological crisis. It was precisely the human-induced origin of the crisis that motivated our search for the deeper causes of the malaise in the disharmonious human-nature relationship. We argued that these root causes are ultimately “philosophical” in as much as they emerge from a certain conceptual paradigm regarding humanity’s perception of the natural world and its relationship with it. The hypothesis that we advanced was that the humus where some of the underlying philosophical root causes of the ecological crisis originate is the Weltbild of Modernity. Modernity was indeed a unique period that witnessed a radical transformation of humanity’s understanding of itself, the physical world, and, above all, of human-nature relationship. We sharpened the hypothesis further by arguing that it is in the philosophical system of René Descartes, 1

Significantly these words were cited by Martin Heidegger. See Martin Heidegger, “The Word of Nietzsche: ‘God is Dead’” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, tr. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 101. The italics are Heidegger’s.

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universally acclaimed as the father of modern philosophy, that some of the most significant conceptual sources of the modern Weltbild and the conflictual human-nature relationship can be found. The main chunk of the book was devoted to evidencing how the triple foundations of the Modern worldview—an exaggerated anthropocentrism, a mechanistic conception of the natural world, both inanimate and animate, and the metaphysical dualism between humanity and the rest of the physical world—can all be largely traced back to Cartesian thought, along with their attendant ecological consequences. We examined, first of all, how modern anthropocentrism – widely attributed as one of the significant conceptual sources of the ecological crisis in eco-philosophy today—began with the Cartesian ego, the res cogitans. It was precisely the turn to the Subject, catapulted to a position of absolute centrality in Cartesian epistemology, that made the human knower the Archimedean centre of reality in modern philosophy. From a metaphysical point of view, it was Descartes who offered the modern understanding of the subject as res cogitans, providing thereby a definition of the human being in terms of rationality alone. The knowledge of the physical world, the res extensa, consequently became a sort of representation from the part of the subject in the sole categories of quantity, conceived as diametrically opposed and superior to humanity. The absolute primacy of the subject in modern philosophy was one of the important contributing factors for the emergence of modern anthropocentrism. We concluded the chapter by examining the major ecological implications of modern anthropocentrism in the mastery and ruthless exploitation of the natural world. We were also critical of misplaced alternatives to anthropocentrism like biocentrism. We argued instead for a relational perspective of the self, as inter-related to and inter-dependent on the natural world. Secondly, we examined the modern Cartesian mechanistic perception of the natural world, yet another significant conceptual source of the roots of the ecological crisis. We dealt here with both Cartesian mechanistic physics and Cartesian mechanistic physiology and their ecological consequences. Descartes’ unique contribution to the mechanistic understanding of the physical world consists in having helped to dethrone and replace the Aristotelian-Scholastic hylomorphic conception of matter with a novel one. It is in having provided an alternative philosophical system that Descartes stands out from other pioneers of modern mechanism like Galileo, Gassendi, and Newton. From the epistemological point of view, Descartes argued that certain knowledge of the material world is obtained in mathematical categories of quantity and measurement alone. He thus

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facilitated the geometrization of the physical world. On the metaphysical front, Descartes’ strategy was to argue that physical entities have mechanistic properties alone, arriving thereby at a conception of the natural world exclusively in terms of inert and extended matter, bereft of any element of teleology whatsoever. The Cartesian and modern mechanistic conception of the inanimate physical world ultimately led to the creation of a one-dimensional perception of the natural world i.e., in terms of quantity alone. Such a reductive view of the natural world has contributed significantly to an instrumental and disenchanted conception of nature in terms of utility, and reduced it to a mere storehouse of resources for human consumption. Descartes facilitated the mechanization not only of the inanimate world but also of the animate world, a feat that makes him stand out among the stalwarts of Modernity. Within Cartesian mechanistic physiology, the animal world is subsumed under the category of the res extensa. From the epistemological perspective, Descartes’ originality consisted in having proposed the exclusively mechanistic explanatory schema to describe all physiological phenomena. Descartes succeeded thereby in dispensing with the vegetative and the sensitive souls altogether and paved the way for the de-souling of the animate world. On the metaphysical front, living entities ultimately got reduced to mechanistic entities that exhibit machine-like properties alone, while all rational and intellectual properties were attributed solely to humans, who alone are the res cogitans. In the process, Descartes also succeeded in eliminating all elements of teleology from the non-human animate world. Cartesian mechanistic physiology is best evident in the infamous doctrine of the bête-machine which has conspicuously manifest ecological implications. Thirdly, we examined the most important legacy of Cartesian thought in the creation of the modern Weltbild, namely, the dualistic divide between humanity and the rest of the natural world. We took pains to evidence how Cartesian dualism is not just anthropological dualism, to which it is often reduced in philosophical discussions, namely, the controversial question of the union of body and soul. Cartesian dualism is ultimately metaphysical, as all reality is divided into the two inseparable segments of the res cogitans and the res extensa—the human beings and the rest of the physical world—conceived in terms of diametric opposition. The ontological divide between humans and the rest of the physical world rules out any element of continuity and relationship whatsoever between them. The human perception of the natural world from Modernity onwards has been largely influenced by such a dualistic divide. Accordingly, humanity and the physical world stand in total separation and mutual

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opposition within the Cartesian and largely modern Weltbild. Some of the most significant roots of the contemporary ecological crisis can be traced precisely within the humus of the metaphysical dualism introduced by Descartes at the dawn of Modernity. The Cartesian bifurcation of nature, to use an expression of Alfred North Whitehead, ultimately sanctioned the domination and exploitation of natural world at the hands of humans, who considered themselves as totally separate from and as hierarchically superior to nature. In the very last chapter of the book, we sought to make explicit how the Cartesian modern Weltbild endures to our present day, and continues to contribute to the distorted human-nature relationship and the spoliation of the natural world. The Cartesian modern worldview continues to mould our present lives as well as our contemporary institutions. We continue to perceive and relate to the natural world mostly within the modern and Cartesian conceptual framework, in spite of the emergence of contemporary physics and post-modern philosophical categories. The influence of the modern Weltbild—especially in terms of anthropocentrism, mechanistic perception of the natural world, and metaphysical dualism— have significantly conditioned the evolution of Western thought. Our present day institutions, ranging from science and economy to politics and educational curricula, are all largely built on the bedrock of the enduring modern Cartesian worldview, which in turn contributes to perpetuate rather than resolve the ecological crisis. In fact, the domination and exploitation of the natural world has only intensified in recent decades with the “globalization” of the western and modern Weltbild around the globe. We have thus been able to trace some of the most significant philosophical roots of the contemporary ecological crisis within the modern Cartesian Weltbild, erected mainly on the triple foundations of an exaggerated anthropocentrism, an exclusively mechanistic conception of the physical world, and the metaphysical divide between humanity and the rest of the natural world. Our claim to have diagnosed the deeper conceptual root causes of the ecological crisis in Modernity, and in Cartesian philosophy in particular however, needs to be tagged with a precautionary caveat. The caveat is that it is not possible to relate Modernity and Cartesian thought with the current ecological crisis within the simple scheme of a direct cause and effect relationship. Apart from the historical distance of centuries, it also needs to be acknowledged that neither Descartes, nor other protagonists of Modernity could have foreseen such dire consequences. The project for the conquest and mastery of nature on the

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part of Descartes, Bacon and other stalwarts of Modernity was indeed motivated by benevolent intentions and was meant to ameliorate human living conditions. So, one might ask, is there a relationship between Cartesian thought and the current ecological crisis? Yes, we answer, provided such a relationship is traced at a deeper level of the conceptual or philosophical roots. As we have seen in the previous chapters, Cartesian thought has provided much of the warp and woof—epistemological and metaphysical conceptual foundations—of the modern Weltbild to which some of the deeper philosophical root causes of the current ecological crisis can be traced. Here Descartes’ own analogy of the tree of philosophy in the preface to the French edition of the Principles, to which we have referred earlier in the study, can be illuminating. In this passage, Descartes describes philosophy as a tree of which the roots are metaphysics (which contains the principles of knowledge), the trunk is physics, and the other sciences are the branches. (cf. AT IX B, 14 / CSM II, 186) It is highly significant that Descartes places metaphysics, first philosophy, at the level of roots, at the foundational level. Conversely, it is at the level of the root causes—which are philosophical as we have sustained throughout, i.e., fundamental metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions that have formed the modern Weltbild and moulded the human perception and treatment of nature—that it is possible to speak of the relationship between Cartesian philosophy and the current ecological crisis. What is important to recall here is that one is looking for “root’ causes”, and that these causes are acknowledged to be “philosophical”. The modern mechanistic Weltbild is not without its merits, as many who take cudgels to defend Descartes and Modernity are quick to point out. We do not deny this. Two very obvious merits of the Cartesian mechanistic philosophy are its heuristic fertility at the level of explanations and its pragmatic success. The heuristic fertility of the Cartesian natural philosophy did triumph over the Aristotelian-Scholastic one—associated with its hylomorphic explanatory apparatus which Descartes constantly denounced for its lack of clarity and its redundancy. The pragmatic success of the mechanistic philosophy and science is clearly evident in the onward march of the juggernaut of modern science, technology and economy. It is undeniable that modern mechanistic science has significantly ameliorated human living conditions. It is all the more remarkable that such progress has been brought about in a relatively short period of time. In fact, the short-term gains of modern mechanistic philosophy and science are there for everyone to see, making the pioneers of Modernity, like Descartes, appear clear winners.

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It is to this self-congratulatory feast of modern mechanistic philosophy and science that the spectre of the current ecological crisis has turned up as an uninvited guest, with a stark reminder that technological and economic progress has not only brought about evident benefits, but also incurred huge costs! The crisis is itself a clear and serious warning to humanity that such short term gains have, in the meantime, jeopardized the very habitability of the planet Earth. The ecological crisis is a sort of red light indicating the juggernaut of modern mechanistic science, (whose motor is, in turn, mechanistic philosophy and associated Weltbild), to arrest its triumphant march. The ecological crisis itself may be described as a long term effect in the chain of consequences of the mechanistic perception and treatment of the physical world—reduced to a warehouse of resources for human consumption. While the modern mechanistic framework finds support in the immediate causal network in terms of pragmatic success, the very causal network, at a deeper level and in the long term perspective, points to the inevitable and detrimental ecological crisis that has already begun to unfold. Today, our common planetary home is falling into ruin. The ecological crisis raises a serious question mark on the future of human civilization. Since the deeper conceptual roots of the contemporary ecological crisis lie within the modern Weltbild, as we have argued so far in the book, it is evident that the crisis cannot be overcome without a conscious attempt to surpass the underlying worldview inherited from Modernity. Carrying on with the Cartesian, and eminently modern worldview would entail placing in jeopardy the very capacity of the planet Earth to be a home for all. As philosopher David Ray Griffin puts it very clearly, “the continuation of modernity threatens the very survival of life on our planet.”2 Eppure, to quote Galileo, our world continues to move on with the modern Weltbild. Despite the historical distance, the Cartesian and modern mechanistic worldview continues to condition and mould to a large extent—consciously and unconsciously—the human perception of nature and its relationship with it. There is also a subtle and widespread resistance to break with such a paradigm, as in the case of the cornucopian argument of environmental scepticism in neo-liberal economy, to cite an example. The resistance to breaking with the Cartesian mechanistic paradigm of Modernity is understandable for the fact that it calls for a radical change of 2

David Ray Griffin (ed.), The Reenchantment of Science: Postmodern Proposals (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1988), xi.

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life-style which needs to accompany any new vision of reality. However, it is important to recall here that the current ecological crisis is not just lifestyle threatening—as it is for many of us today—but, it is also lifethreatening, for millions of our brothers and sisters who are already victims of the manifold manifestations of the ecological crisis. In the wake of the alarming proportions of the crisis, the abandonment of the modern worldview that continues to look at the earth as inert res extensa for exploitation, counter-posited in dualistic opposition and mercilessly submitted to the hubris and voracity of the all-conquering ego, in order to embrace with greater humility a new vision of reality which sees the earth as basically a home (oikos) to dwell in and to share with the rest of the biotic community, is not only an option but also a necessity. We need, as Charles Eisenstein writes, “a radical redefinition of what it is to be human, how we relate to one another, and how we relate to the world.”3 In order to overcome the ecological crisis, we will need nothing less than a rethinking of Modernity and its Weltbild. We need nothing short of a radical paradigm shift. The contemporary ecological crisis can be overcome only by going beyond the very same vision of reality which brought about the crisis in the first place. Technological solutions like increasingly mushrooming geo-engineering proposals and temporary stopgaps will be of no avail in the long run as they are themselves expressions of the underlying worldview to dominate and control our planetary home rather than dwell in a harmonious relationship with it. In a similar vein, neither the reigning neo-liberal economic model that does not accept the wider economy of the natural world that sustains all forms of life, including human life, nor contemporary political institutions mostly built around an autonomous conception of the individual and the vested self-interests of specific groups, hold any promise of overcoming the crisis facing our common home. As Vítor Westhelle cautions, the ecological crisis originated “in the midst of a social, economic, and political system that affirms a model of social organization and economic development to which the crisis is endemic.”4 We cannot expect a solution to the crisis “from those who historically represent the very attitude that lies at the root of the crisis.”5 As the crisis is not a mere side-effect that could be corrected with some minor adjustments, what is required is nothing short of a “reshaping of the 3

Charles Eisenstein, The Ascent of Humanity: Civilization and the Human Sense of Self (Berkeley, CA: Evolver Editions, 2013), xxi. 4 Vítor Westhelle, “The Weeping Mask: Ecological Crisis and the View of Nature,” Word & World 11 (1991), 143. 5 Westhelle, “The Weeping Mask,” 140.

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very cultural values that have oriented the present hegemonic civilizations of the world.”6 As the famous saying goes, commonly attributed to Albert Einstein, we cannot solve a problem with the same mind-set that created it in the first place. The contemporary ecological crisis which is anthropogenic in origin, i.e., caused by human activities, can be overcome only by a new human way of acting, guided by a new vision of reality. One reason why our current efforts to overcome the ecological crisis—mostly sincere and innovative in themselves—have not met with any success so far, is that they continue to be presented in the old wineskins of the reigning Cartesian modern Weltbild. The contemporary ecological crisis, the philosophical roots of which we have sought to trace to the Cartesian and modern Weltbild, calls for new wineskins, for nothing short of a totally new vision of reality. The need of the hour is a new conceptual paradigm, a new worldview, that can radically reorient human dwelling in our common planetary home which appears to be on the verge of a possible collapse. Providentially, times of crisis are frequently also times of birth. It is said that the original etymological meaning of the word crisis in Greek does not have the negative connotation it presently has in English and in other modern languages. It originally meant a propitious “opportunity” in the wake of a serious obstacle, to pause and look back at the journey so far, in order to give it a radically new direction.7 In this vein, the contemporary ecological crisis, with all its grim prospects, holds a beacon of hope for humanity to enter into a new kairos. The crisis itself can then truly become an opportunity to pause and reflect over the present course of our civilization in order to chart a new one.8 In articulating a new worldview of harmonious human existence on Earth in the present critical kairos of our history and civilization, philosophy has an indispensable role to play. Such a contribution is mainly two-fold. First of all, to look back and take stock of the defective conceptual paradigms that have contributed to our disharmonious relationship with the natural world in the past, as a first step to overcoming the crisis. It is the task that we have attended to in the present book. There is also a second, and even more important contribution that philosophy can 6

Ibid., 143. It is interesting to note that in the Chinese Tao Te Ching, the hexagram for ‘crisis’ is the same as opportunity. 8 Joshtrom Isaac Kureethadam, Creation in Crisis: Science, Ethics, Theology (New York: Orbis Books, 2014), 373. 7

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offer. It consists in facilitating the heralding of a new worldview, the parturition of a new way of perceiving and relating with the earth, rediscovering it once again as Terra—patria,9 as our “common home”.10 Alasdair MacIntyre concludes his important work on moral philosophy, After Virtue, calling for a new Benedict.11 Donald Worster, the noted environmental historian, in arguing for a full economy of nature that recognizes the intrinsic worth of all beings and the beauty and wonder of the cosmos, augurs the arrival of a new Adam Smith.12 I believe that what we need today, paradoxically, in the context of the contemporary ecological crisis, is a new Descartes. In order to create a new vision of reality, a new worldview which conceives the human self not as absolutely autonomous but as inter-dependent on and inter-related with the rest of the biotic community, a new conception of the natural world not as inert and disenchanted as in modern mechanism, but as animate and teleological with final ends and purposes to be respected, and a new relationship between humanity and the natural world, not in terms of antagonistic and dualistic counter-positioning, but in relational harmony and in terms of care and stewardship, we will need a new philosopher of the stature of Descartes. We will need the courage of Descartes who in his day created an altogether new and overarching conceptual synthesis which replaced the grand philosophical system of Aristotelian Scholasticism and provided the conceptual foundation for Modernity. To really enter into the post-modern era of harmonious relationship with the planetary home that hosts and sustains us, along with other forms of life, we need nothing short of a new and over-arching philosophical vision of reality. We are aware that radical changes in worldviews are the most difficult to bring about, but they are indispensable in this particular moment of history with our civilization on the verge of a possible collapse. We conclude with the wise and cautious words of an indigenous leader, Daniel R. Wildcat.

9

See in this regard Edgar Morin – Anne Brigitte Kern, Terra-Patria (Milan: Raffaello Cortina Editore, 1994). 10 Significantly Pope Francis’ landmark encyclical letter Laudato si’, issued in 2015, carries the subtitle: “on care for our common home”. 11 See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 265. 12 Donald Worster, The Wealth of Nature: Environmental History and the Ecological Imagination (New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 219.

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Conclusion The most difficult changes required are not those of a physical, material, or technological character, but changes in worldviews and the generally taken-for-granted values and beliefs that are embedded in modern, Western-influenced societies. In this respect, what humankind actually requires is a climate change—a cultural climate change, a change in our thinking and actions—if we are to have any reasonable expectation that we might mitigate what increasingly appears to be a period of dramatic planet and animal extinction.13

13 Daniel R. Wildcat, Red Alert! Saving the Planet with Indigenous Knowledge (Golden, Colorado: Fulcrum, 2009), 5.

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INDEX abad; 37 Académie des sciences; 26 actus; 198 Adam; 37; 65; 234 advaita; 283 Advaita Vedanta; 283 Advancing the Science of Climate Change; 16 Adversus haereses; 50 aesthetic; 195; 201; 202 affectivity; 152 ahimsa; 290 Aiken, William; 158 Aland, Barbara; 50 alchemist; 214 Amazon; 318 Amsterdam; 98; 207; 209 anatomy; 88; 206; 207; 208; 209; 211; 228; 229 Anderson, Kay; 273 androcentrism; 146; 147 anima; 55; 141 animals animal rights; 237; 238; 241 maltreatment of; 237; 241 animal sentience; 241 animality; 152; 267 animate world; 6; 123; 205; 222; 228; 232; 333 animation; 231; 308 animism; 193; 197 Anthropocene; 18; 19; 20 anthropocentrism; 5; 63; 119; 121; 123; 124; 125; 126; 128; 129; 138; 144; 145; 146; 147; 149; 150; 151; 152; 154; 155; 156; 157; 158; 159; 160; 161; 163; 272; 275; 293; 294; 300; 303; 321; 323; 324; 325; 328; 332; 334

Aquinas, Thomas; 62; 141; 185; 186 Aristotelians; 223; 308 Aristotle; 54; 79; 80; 83; 85; 91; 93; 101; 116; 143; 152; 167; 169; 171; 181; 191; 197; 206; 208; 215; 219; 223; 226; 232; 259; 272; 275; 307 De Anima; 197; 206; 214 Metaphysics; 54 Physics; 206 Arnauld, Antoine; 132; 199 artefacts, mechanical; 210; 217; 231; 311 Ashtanga-marga; 2 Atman; 282 atomism; 171; 284; 296; 308; 326; 328 atomist; 296; 321; 324 Attfield, Robin; 37 Augustine of Hippo; 56; 57; 58; 132; 133; 264 automata; 205; 222; 227; 236; 237; 238; 239; 242; 243; 246 automation; 217 axiology; 159; 329 Bacon, Francis; 4; 47; 64; 65; 67; 69; 70; 71; 72; 73; 74; 75; 76; 77; 78; 79; 80; 81; 87; 95; 103; 171; 257; 270; 335 De augmentis scientiarum; 76 House of Solomon, project of; 71; 95 Instauratio magna; 78 New Organum; 70 Novum Organum; 76 The Masculine Birth of Time; 74 Bacon, Roger; 307 bacteria; 157; 286; 287 Baillet, Adrien; 206 Baker, Gordon; 242; 250

The Philosophical Roots of the Ecological Crisis Barbour, Ian G.; 37; 272 Baroque; 242 Barr, James; 36 Barrett, William; 129; 278; 300 Bartholomew, Alick; 292 Bauhin, Gaspard; 209; 211 Beeckman, Isaac; 81; 88; 176 being-in-the-world; 273 Benedict, saint; 339 Berry, Thomas; 147; 155 Berti, Enrico; 251 bête-machines; 6; 205; 227; 236; 237; 241; 242; 244; 333 Beverwyck, Jan Van; 218 Beyssade, Jean-Marie; 118; 183 bifurcation of nature; 248; 279; 334 biocentrism; 5; 125; 150; 156; 157; 158; 159; 160; 161; 332 biochemistry; 292 biodiversity; 1; 17; 314; 315; 320 biodiversity loss; 1; 17; 315 bio-egalitarianism; 157; 158; 288 biogeochemical; 329 biology; 55; 206; 211; 212; 213; 220; 271; 292; 308; 309 biomachine; 222 bio-mechanics; 230 biosphere; 18; 19; 198; 285; 286; 327 Biosphere 2 experiment, Arizona; 24 biosystems; 151 biotic community; 145; 161; 205; 231; 247; 274; 275; 281; 285; 290; 293; 320; 324; 328; 337; 339 Bitbol-Hespériès, Annie; 209; 211; 212; 220 Bodleian Library, University of Oxford; 87 body divisibility of; 260 Boff, Leonardo; 145 Bohm, David; 113 Bonaventure; 61 The Soul’s Journey to God; 61

383

Bookchin, Murray; 147 Bordo, Susan; 289 Borelli, Giovanni Alfonso; 227 Bouveresse, Jacques; 300 Bowers, C.A.; 293; 325; 327 Bowman, Douglas C.; 323 Boyle, Robert; 81; 166; 214 brain; 78; 226; 271; 314 Breda; 88 Brinkmann, Klaus; 295 brutum; 242 Buchdahl, Gerd; 190 Buddha, Gautama; 2 Buddhism; 283; 290 Burchett, Kyle; 154; 159 Burman, Frans; 263 Buroker, Jill Vance; 179 calculability; 201; 203 Callicott, J. Baird; 43; 46; 121; 265 Campanella, Tommaso; 220 capital; 315 Capra, Fritjof; 271; 285 carbon dioxide; 13; 20; 30; 286 carbon footprint analysis; 29; 30; 31 carnivores; 286 Cartesian epistemology; 99; 108; 110; 114; 129; 131; 134; 136; 137; 148; 172; 177; 180; 253; 254; 255; 257; 258; 264; 327; 332 clear and distinct perception; 5; 86; 100; 124; 170; 175; 176; 178; 179; 186; 254 dependence on the senses; 99; 253 knowing process; 94; 107; 108; 110; 129; 135; 138; 172; 253; 264; 268 pure intellect; 108; 176; 253 subject-object dichotomy; 253; 254; 255; 256; 258; 264 Cartesian metaphysics; 86; 99; 112; 113; 114; 116; 118; 119; 138; 142; 143; 144; 183; 197; 222; 225; 235; 243; 244; 261; 263; 264; 269; 270; 307; 310

384 Cartesian physiology; 205; 207; 209; 210; 211; 215; 218; 220; 222; 223; 224; 225; 226; 227; 230; 237 circulation of blood; 220; 242 movement of the heart, explanation of; 210; 218; 219; 227 principle of life; 213; 218; 220; 221 cash crops; 316 Cassirer, Ernst; 102 causality efficient causes; 202; 233; 234; 235; 297; 311 final causes; 52; 232; 233; 234; 235; 277; 311 formal causes; 233 Chanut, Pierre Hector; 257 chaos; 54 Charles d’Abra de Raconis; 90; 92 Charron, Pierre; 104; 240; 270 Chen, Karen K.; 320 Chewong, tribe; 268 Christ; 57 Christianity Eastern Tradition; 38; 39 Christianity, as responsbile for the ecological crisis; 33; 34; 35; 39; 40; 41; 42; 47; 53; 57; 59; 60; 63; 67 chronos; 155 Clark, Stephen; 239 Clarke, Desmond; 165 Clarke, Desmond M.; 83 climate change; 1; 12; 13; 14; 15; 17; 26; 29; 30; 320; 324 carbon emissions; 30; 320; 324 cap-and-trade; 1 Climate Change: A Summary of the Science; 15 Coca-Cola; 285 cogitare; 110; 130; 133; 139; 261 cogitatio; 116; 117; 118; 140; 241; 261 cogitatum; 111; 117

Index cogito; 98; 100; 105; 107; 117; 118; 119; 127; 130; 131; 132; 133; 134; 135; 140; 142; 144; 145; 150; 176; 251; 254; 261; 272; 276; 292; 296; 298; 299; 325 cognition; 172; 174; 271 Coimbra; 101; 211 Coimbra commentaries; 211 Collingwood, R.G.; 54; 152 colonialism; 153; 316 Commoner, Barry; 286 Confucianism; 290 conscientia; 241 consumerism; 21; 316; 320; 327 Copernican revolution in philosophy; 295 Copernicus, Nicolaus; 102; 209; 211 cornocupian; 318 cosmos; 49; 50; 51; 52; 53; 55; 67; 181; 183; 192; 201; 214; 246; 278; 289; 303; 339 Cottingham, John; 82; 97; 101; 110; 131; 134; 139; 141; 152; 166; 177; 191; 225; 239; 244; 245; 250; 251 creation as vestigia Dei; 59, 61 desacralisation of; 40; 202 Priestly Tradition; 33; 37 Yahwist Tradition; 37 creation care Benedictine tradition; 39 Christian monastic tradition; 39 Franciscan tradition; 39 Medieval Christian tradition; 40 creatura; 57 Crutzen, Paul J.; 18 Cuomo, Christine J.; 159 Curley, Edwin M.; 141 da Vinci, Leonardo; 71; 257 Dallmayr, Fred; 66; 282 Damasio, Antonio; 230 Dante, Alighieri; 264 dar‫܈‬ana; 45, 294 Darwin, Charles; 288 David C. Lindberg; 58

The Philosophical Roots of the Ecological Crisis Davion, Victoria; 157 De Motu Cordis; 219 De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium; 209 deconstructionism; 300 Deep Ecology; 8; 146; 147; 156; 158; 282; 283; 285; 288 Deep Ecology indistinguishability thesis; 283; 284 Self-realization; 283 Deep Ecology Platform; 156; 159 deforestation; 31; 32 Des Chene, Dennis; 214; 221; 222; 230; 232 Descartes, works cited Comments on a Certain Broadsheet; 262 Description of the Human Body; 123; 208; 215; 217; 218; 219; 220; 228; 242 Dioptrics; 193 Discourse on the Method; 88; 102; 103; 110; 115; 122; 123; 130; 131; 132; 134; 139; 173; 207; 216; 218; 224; 237; 240; 243; 257; 270; 271 Meditations; 89; 91; 97; 98; 99; 100; 105; 106; 107; 108; 110; 111; 113; 114; 115; 117; 122; 123; 131; 132; 134; 139; 172; 173; 178; 184; 186; 187; 233; 243; 244; 252; 253; 259; 260; 346 Passions of the Soul; 208; 214; 225 Principles; 88; 89; 90; 91; 92; 93; 97; 111; 123; 131; 166; 167; 169; 170; 172; 173; 174; 175; 178; 179; 180; 182; 183; 184; 185; 188; 189; 193; 195; 196; 201; 206; 208; 213; 233; 234; 241; 244; 245; 253; 261; 262; 311; 335 Recherche de la vérité; 105 Rules; 88; 123; 172; 177

385

The Passions of the Soul; 123; 218; 226; 230 The World; 88; 89; 123; 166; 168; 206; 207; 208; 210; 213 Treatise on Light; 88; 207 Treatise on Man; 88; 123; 201; 206; 207; 208; 209; 210; 214; 216; 217; 218; 222; 224; 225; 226; 227; 231; 237 desertification; 1 de-souling; 197; 205; 333 Dicker, Georges; 277 digestion; 216; 217 Dijksterhuis, E.J.; 78; 79; 164; 231; 308 Dinet, Pierre; 97 doctrina; 306 Donaldson, James; 50 Dorter, Kenneth; 295 dualism; 6; 34; 45; 49; 52; 55; 56; 99; 120; 143; 144; 223; 225; 230; 243; 244; 248; 249; 250; 251; 252; 253; 254; 255; 258; 259; 260; 262; 263; 264; 267; 269; 271; 272; 273; 274; 275; 276; 277; 278; 279; 280; 281; 282; 283; 284; 285; 286; 287; 288; 294; 303; 305; 333 anthropological dualism; 6; 49; 248; 249; 250; 251; 333 metaphysical dualism; 5; 6; 7; 120; 121; 122; 123; 124; 223; 224; 225; 227; 237; 241; 242; 243; 244; 245; 248; 249; 251; 252; 258; 264; 269; 273; 274; 280; 283; 287; 288; 291; 292; 293; 304; 332; 333; 334 ontological dualism; 6; 142; 205; 251; 268; 269; 303 Platonic dualism; 259 substantial dualism; 99; 263 trialism; 251 Dubos, René; 31 Dupré, Louis; 135; 149; 322 Earth a Goldilocks planet; 24

386 a home for life; 24 carrying capacity of; 28; 151; 318 twin Earths (see also exoplanets); 25 ebullition; 219 Eburne, Richard; 65 Eckhart, Meister; 62 ecofascism; 284 ecofeminism; 8; 73; 75; 79; 146; 147; 200 ecological activism; 23 ecological crisis anthropogenic origin of; 3; 9; 11; 12; 14; 15; 17; 18; 150; 331; 338 Islam, link with; 41 medieval Christianity, as responsible for; 59; 61; 62 monotheistic traditions, link with; 40; 41; 42 technological solutions to; 23; 26; 27 ecological footprint; 31 ecological footprint analysis; 28; 29 economics; 11; 314; 319; 325 economy; 293; 315; 318; 319; 320; 321; 326; 328; 334; 335; 336; 337 exponential growth of; 19 modern; 194; 255; 293; 304; 313; 314; 315; 316; 318; 319; 320; 326 natural; 319; 339 neo-liberal; 7; 293; 315; 318; 324; 336; 337 economy, modern capitalism; 313; 315; 316 infinite growth, myth of; 318 ecosystem services; 17; 314 educational curricula; 293; 304; 321; 325; 326; 327; 328; 334 ego, Cartesian; 5; 110; 116; 117; 118; 119; 124; 127; 128; 129; 131; 138; 142; 143; 144; 150; 155; 159; 160; 161; 163; 261;

Index 276; 278; 280; 283; 294; 296; 321; 322; 324; 332; 337 Egocentrism; 129 Ehrlich, Paul; 10; 27 Einstein, Albert; 338 Eisenstein, Charles; 337 Elizabeth, Princess; 208; 225; 251 embryo; 290 Emily Grosholz; 110; 264 empiricism; 178; 293; 294; 295; 296; 303 ens cogitabile; 116 ens creatum; 126 environmental education; 327 environmental ethics; 285 environmental scepticism; 11; 12; 13; 318; 336 epiphany; 57 episteme; 306 essentialism; 184; 185; 187; 262 ethnography; 268 Eustache de Saint-Paul; 90; 181 Eve; 234 Existentialism; 48; 53 exoplanets; 25 experimentation; 306 explananda; 165 extension, geometrical; 254; 307 extension, metric; 170; 176; 178 extinction of species; 16; 17; 318 background rates of extinction; 16 sixth mass extinction; 17 Fabricius of Aquapendente; 209 Fackre, Gabriel; 38 factory farming; 247 Fell, Joseph; 299 fermentation; 219 Fernel, Jean; 211 Ferry, Luc; 197; 203; 246 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb; 295 Finnestad, Ragnhild B.; 50 Flynn, Bernard Charles; 140; 297; 298 foetus; 234 Fontaine, Nicolas; 238

The Philosophical Roots of the Ecological Crisis food chains; 198; 314 fossil fuels; 16; 19 Four Noble Truths; 2 Fox, Matthew; 57 Francis of Assisi; 61 Francis, Pope; 339 Francisco de Vitoria; 322 Frogneux, Nathalie; 54; 249 Fudpucker, Wilhelm; 36 fulgor entis seu objecti; 137; 254 fungi; 286 Gaard, Greta; 288 Gaia, hypothesis of; 20; 198 Galen; 211; 219; 220 Galileo, Galilei Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems; 207 Galileo, Galilei; 4; 47; 48; 79; 80; 81; 82; 83; 85; 87; 95; 96; 102; 111; 112; 163; 164; 166; 171; 181; 184; 191; 192; 207; 211; 277; 308; 332; 336 Garber, Daniel; 83; 100; 164; 171; 172; 187; 189; 195; 199 Gare, Arran; 45 Gassendi, Pierre; 4; 79; 80; 85; 93; 104; 108; 141; 163; 171; 184; 332 Gaukroger, Stephen; 72; 88; 216; 233 Gautama Buddha; 2 Genesis; 4; 10; 33; 34; 35; 36; 38; 59; 63; 64; 65; 67; 73; 257 genius loci; 34 geo-engineering; 1; 337 Geological Society of London; 18 geometrical categories; 120; 178; 254 geometrization; 86; 177; 333 geometrization of nature; 177 geometry; 58; 88; 115; 176; 178; 192; 196; 199 Georgescu-Roegen, Nicholas; 319 Geulincx, Arnold; 227 Gibson, Alexander Boyce; 238

387

Gilson, Étienne; 96; 97; 165; 167; 173; 174; 211; 253; 257 Glacken, Clarence; 64 Glanvill, Joseph; 65 global warming; 13; 15; 318 solar influence; 12 globalization; 7; 329; 334 Gnosticism; 48; 49; 51; 52; 53; 56 acosmism; 49; 52 Entweltliching, concept of; 50 gnosis, concept of; 51 GNP (Gross National Product); 317 goal-directed; 234; 235 God transcendence of; 10 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von; 326 Gordon, Haim; 316 Gouhier, Henri; 97; 101; 107; 112; 130; 140; 173; 188; 202 gravity; 166 greenhouse gas emission; 12 greenhouse gases; 13; 28; 321; 324 Gregory of Nazianzus; 39 Gregory of Nyssa; 38 Grene, Marjorie; 120; 177; 199; 252; 264 Gresham College; 70 Griffin, David Ray; 336 Grotius, Hugo; 322 Grün, Mauro; 326 Guenancia, Pierre; 183; 235; 260; 261 Gueroult, Martial; 113; 192 Gunderson, Keith; 243 Haak, group of; 70 Habgood, John; 200; 266; 279 habitat conversion; 17 Haeckel, Ernst; 286 Hall, Thomas Steele; 207; 227; 229 Harrison, Peter; 38; 59; 60; 63; 66; 239; 240; 245 Harvey, William; 209; 210; 211; 218; 219; 220; 227; 242 Hawkins, Ronnie Zoe; 329 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; 98; 117; 295; 298

388 Absolute Spirit; 298 Heidegger, Martin; 5; 7; 32; 48; 53; 68; 83; 84; 111; 118; 119; 120; 124; 125; 126; 127; 135; 136; 137; 144; 148; 149; 161; 204; 276; 292; 294; 296; 297; 298; 299; 301; 302; 304; 305; 306; 307; 309; 310; 311; 312; 331 Being and Time; 120; 276; 299; 302 Dasein; 120; 299; 302 Kehre; 299 Zuhandenheit; 302 heimat; 161 Heisenberg, Werner; 265 herbivores; 286 Hermeticism; 171 higher education; 326 Hill, Brennan R.; 288 Hinduism; 283; 290 Hippocrates; 211 Hobbes, Thomas; 81; 171; 321; 323 Leviathan; 323 social contract; 322; 323 Hölderlin, Friedrich; 312 holism; 281; 282; 283; 284; 285; 286; 288; 290; 291; 296 Holocene epoch; 13; 19; 20 homo aestheticus; 201 homo economicus; 318 Homo sapiens; 13; 20; 154 Homo sapiens sapiens; 13; 154 homogeneity; 307 homogenization; 193; 195 Horkheimer, Max; 280 Hösle, Vittorio; 54; 121; 137; 144; 246 Howell, Signe; 268 hubris; 154; 337 Hugh of St. Victor; 60 Human Development Report, 2007; 29 human uniqueness; 154; 157; 271; 275; 288

Index human-nature divide; 249; 254; 255; 256; 258; 263; 269; 276; 282; 287; 288 humanum; 160; 288 Hume, David; 295 hunter-gatherers; 22 Husserl, Edmund; 98 Huygens, Christian; 220 Huygens, Constantijn; 89; 165 hylomorphism; 6; 163; 164; 165; 166; 167; 168; 169; 185; 186; 206; 224; 332; 335 hylozoism; 197 hyper-separation; 255; 268; 276; 288; 329 hypokeimenon; 126; 137; 296; 297 Ice Age; 19 Idealism; 293; 294; 295; 296; 303 imagination; 100; 108; 133; 140; 174; 218; 224; 251; 329 immanent; 197; 261; 310 indigenous communities and cultures; 22; 23; 64; 65; 153; 194; 268; 276; 290 Individualism; 321 individuality; 282; 285; 287; 324 Industrial era; 19 Industrial Revolution; 20 Industrialization, modern; 19; 279 Ingold, Tim; 268 interdependence; 125; 160; 282; 285; 286; 288; 290; 291; 303; 318; 332; 339 interdependent; 150; 162; 267; 272; 285; 290 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; 14 Second Assessment Report; 14 Third Assessment Report; 15 Fourth Assessment Report; 15 Fifth Assessment Report; 15 interrelated; 150; 162; 285 interrelatedness; 125; 160; 282; 285; 286; 288; 291; 318; 324; 332; 339 invertebrates; 271

The Philosophical Roots of the Ecological Crisis Irenaeus of Lyons; 50; 57 Islam; 41 Jackson, Ross; 40; 279; 315 Jainism; 290 Jameson, Fredric; 258 jivas; 283 John Chrysostom; 57 John of Damascus; 39; 59 John Scotus Eriugena; 57 Jonas, Hans; 5; 7; 41; 45; 48; 49; 51; 52; 53; 120; 160; 202; 228; 231; 248; 249; 277; 303; 311 kabash; 35; 36 kairos; 338 Kant, Immanuel; 98; 116; 124; 295; 297; 301; 326 Keeling, David; 228 Keller, David R.; 247; 329 Kennington, Richard H.; 72; 177; 257 Kenny, Anthony; 99; 133; 304 Kepler, Johannes; 102; 277 Khalil, Issa J.; 41 Kierkegaard, Søren Aabye; 129 Kirkman, Robert; 9; 22 knowing process co-relation between the known and the knower; 143; 253 knowledge representational theory of; 124; 129; 135; 252; 253 Kobayashi, Michio; 182 Koyré, Alexandre; 60 Kroetge, Noretta; 76 Kuhn, Thomas; 68 Kvasz, Ladislav; 192 La Flèche; 87; 90; 101; 103; 105; 211 labour; 45; 314; 315 Laudato si’, encyclical letter; 339 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm; 227; 270; 295; 323 Leiden; 132 Leiss, William; 67; 72; 317 Lévy-Bruhl, L.; 97 Liard, Louis; 242

389

Likens, Gene E.; 287 Lindberg, David C.; 58 Livingstone, David; 37 lobby groups; 324 Locke, John; 65; 81; 178 logos; 1; 54; 272 Lomborg, Bjørn; 318 Lovelock, James; 198 Lovitt, William; 305; 309 MacIntyre, Alasdair; 324; 339 macrocosm; 201; 289 Malebranche, Nicolas; 238 Manichaeism; 56 manipulability; 203 Manning, Robert E.; 42 mantra; 326 Marcuse, Herbert; 198 Marion, Jean-Luc; 115; 116; 143; 186; 254 Maritain, Jacques; 114; 250 Markie, Peter; 99 Marquess of Newcastle; 237; 240 Mars, planet; 23; 24 Marshall, Peter; 44 Marx, Karl; 297 master narrative; 256; 269 mastery of nature; 47; 70; 72; 102; 122; 257; 278; 304; 334 Mater; 200 materialism; 52; 66; 229; 293; 294; 300; 303; 313; 314; 317; 328 mathematics; 56; 87; 95; 102; 106; 149; 176; 177; 180; 191; 192; 306; 308 matter, as inert; 196 matter, as homogenous; 195; 196 Matthew, K.M.; 40 Mayr, Ernst; 212; 231; 271; 287 McDowell, John; 266; 267 McKibeen, Bill; 160 McLaughlin, Andrew; 156 mechanical arts; 71; 72; 73; 74; 257 mechanistic conception of life; 237; 242

390 mechanistic conception of the physical world; 122; 124; 170; 176; 181; 201; 334 mechanistic cosmology; 206; 208 mechanistic physics; 6; 85; 93; 97; 120; 163; 181; 184; 194; 308; 332 mechanistic physiology; 6; 123; 163; 205; 208; 213; 220; 229; 232; 236; 241; 242; 244; 245; 292; 332; 333 mechanization of the physical world; 164; 181; 190; 222 mens; 117; 118; 137; 141; 254 Merchant, Carolyn; 4; 51; 73; 75; 76; 77; 78; 201 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice; 5; 7; 199; 272; 273; 316 Mersenne, Marin; 81; 89; 90; 98; 104; 115; 168; 171; 193; 206; 207; 209; 218; 223; 224; 244 methane; 13; 20 Meyssonnier, Lazare; 212; 224 microbes; 286 microcosm; 201; 209; 210; 214; 289 microorganisms; 314 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment; 16; 17 Mills, William J.; 60; 203 mind indivisibility of; 260 Minteer, Ben A.; 42 misanthropy; 158 modern industrial paradigm; 280; 320 modern mechanism; 231; 308; 309; 332; 339 modern science; 10; 22; 31; 32; 55; 62; 64; 79; 80; 81; 82; 86; 87; 93; 94; 95; 96; 97; 103; 112; 137; 169; 181; 190; 192; 194; 195; 199; 201; 235; 265; 293; 304; 305; 306; 307; 308; 309; 310; 311; 312; 321; 328; 335 modern technology; 31; 32; 43; 112; 148; 235; 310

Index Molière, J.-B. P. de; 165 Moltmann, Jürgen; 66 Moncrief, Lewis; 34 money; 315 monism; 158; 282; 283; 284 monotheistic religious traditions; 10 Montaigne, Michele de; 104; 239; 240; 270 Morani, Roberto; 299 More, Henry; 220; 221; 237; 241; 244; 245; 265; 312 Morin, Edgar; 161 Morris, Katherine; 240; 241; 242; 245; 250 Moryson, Fynes; 153 Muresan, Vlad; 67 Murtaugh, Paul; 30 mystical; 202 Naess, Arne; 146; 156; 158; 159; 282; 283 Nag Hammadi codices; 50 Nagoya; 35 narcissism; 317 Nasr, Seyyed Hossein; 63; 67; 311 natural philosophy; 53; 56; 58; 70; 72; 73; 75; 76; 77; 78; 79; 80; 81; 83; 84; 85; 87; 89; 90; 91; 92; 93; 97; 100; 102; 103; 123; 163; 164; 166; 167; 169; 170; 171; 172; 173; 174; 175; 176; 181; 182; 183; 187; 192; 193; 208; 213; 218; 223; 228; 232; 233; 236; 292; 310; 335 natural variability; 12; 19 natural world disenchanted perception of; 6; 35; 164; 165; 171; 200; 201; 202; 305; 310; 311; 312; 333; 339 nature contemplative view of; 311 colonization of; 258; 280 de-sacralized view of; 311 end of; 196

The Philosophical Roots of the Ecological Crisis one-dimensional perception of; 6; 163; 198; 199; 203; 204; 302; 310; 314; 333 Naturphilosophie; 156 natus; 197 Neo-Platonism; 48; 55; 56 neopositivists; 323 nervous system; 274 Netherlands; 206 neurophysiology; 271 neuroscience; 230 Neve, Richard; 65 Newton, Isaac; 4; 47; 48; 79; 80; 81; 82; 85; 87; 96; 97; 111; 163; 164; 181; 191; 308; 312; 332 niche; 101; 287 Nietzsche, Friedrich; 53; 119; 144; 294; 298; 299; 304; 331 Übermensch; 298 Wille zur Macht; 299 nihilism, modern; 52; 53; 140; 277; 301 nomos; 52 Northcott, Michael S.; 21 nous; 54; 55; 152; 272 Novalis (Georg Friedrich Philipp Freiherr von Hardenberg); 312 oceans; 18; 20; 31 Odum, Eugene P.; 286 oikos; 1; 161; 281; 337 ontological homogeneity; 195 ontological reduction; 84; 187; 189; 196; 213; 307 ontology, relational; 125; 150; 160; 161; 265; 268; 281; 282; 284; 285; 286; 287; 288; 289; 290; 297; 332; 339 ordo cognoscendi; 94; 133 ordo essendi; 94 organic farming; 327 organism; 17; 157; 231; 247; 284; 286; 287; 288; 309 Orr, David W.; 326; 327; 328 Osaka; 35 ousia; 116; 143 Overman, Richard H.; 155

391

ozone depletion; 26; 320 Pacala, Stephen; 30 Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM); 13 Paracelsus; 171 paradigm; 7; 44; 68; 110; 159; 177; 181; 203; 204; 214; 254; 267; 281; 282; 284; 285; 287; 288; 289; 291; 312; 313; 317; 319; 320; 329; 331; 336; 337; 338 Park, Katharine; 75 Parva Naturalia; 211 Pascal, Blaise; 114 Passmore, John; 34; 37 paticca-samuppada; 290 patria; 161; 339 penser; 133 Pepper, David; 254 person; 25; 29; 59; 66; 89; 113; 142; 152; 251; 266; 289; 322; 324 phenomenology; 295; 299 philosophizing, arm-chair; 301 philosophy of mind; 99; 266; 271 photosynthesis; 286; 314 photosynthesizing; 286 physics, Cartesian; 83; 85; 169; 187; 197; 213; 223; 236; 308; 312 physics, mathematical; 88; 163; 192 physics, subatomic; 265 Physiologus; 58 physis; 54; 126; 310; 312 pineal gland; 209; 224; 248; 250 Planet Under Pressure Conference; 20 Plato; 54; 55; 198; 226; 249; 253; 259; 272 anima mundi; 55; 198 Timaeus; 55 transcendental world; 249 Platonism; 48; 55; 56; 171 Plempius, Vopiscus Fortunatus; 212; 218 Plotinus; 55 Plumwood, Val; 25; 161; 236; 253; 255; 269; 274; 280; 284; 290 pneuma; 49; 50

392 poetic; 202 Polanyi, Karl; 320 polarisation; 249 politics; 11; 293; 304; 321; 325; 327; 328; 334 pollution; 1; 17; 31; 32; 40; 313; 320 population growth of; 19 population explosion; 10; 27 positivism; 294 Possenti, Vittorio; 55; 137; 235 Post-modernism; 7; 293; 299; 300; 302; 303; 334; 339 Prakriti; 200 pratityasamutpada; 290 prima philosophia; 86; 97; 98; 114; 115; 117; 118; 119; 128; 182 primary and secondary qualities; 178; 179 prime matter; 166; 167; 169; 173; 185; 193; 223 primitive cultures colonization of; 258 Princeton Environment Institute; 30 principal attribute; 184; 185; 186; 187; 189; 261; 262; 263; 307 privatism; 323 profit; 315; 316; 326 protozoans; 271 psyche; 50 psychology; 220; 251; 322 psycho-somatic; 230 Quantum Mechanics; 265; 309 rada; 36 raddah; 35 rain forest; 285 Raja, R.J.; 35 ratio; 117 rational animal; 142; 152 rationalism; 25; 67; 256; 293; 294; 295; 303 rationality; 5; 120; 124; 129; 138; 139; 142; 148; 151; 152; 153; 154; 187; 200; 203; 241; 253; 254; 255; 256; 257; 258; 263;

Index 264; 266; 267; 268; 269; 273; 275; 280; 326; 327; 332 rationality, dominant; 258 reason, instrumental; 258 recycling; 327 reductionism; 109; 110; 159; 195; 196; 202; 231; 307 Regan, Tom; 239 Regius, Henricus; 97; 167; 168; 184; 212; 226; 244; 252; 262 Reinhold, Karl Leonhard; 295 Relativity, theory of; 265; 309 religious traditions, Eastern; 290 Renaissance; 63; 66; 67; 70; 71; 80; 89; 102; 104; 171; 193; 195; 197; 209; 219; 220; 256; 257 renversement; 92; 116; 183 res cogitans; 5; 6; 55; 86; 99; 110; 117; 119; 120; 121; 124; 129; 134; 135; 137; 138; 139; 140; 141; 142; 143; 144; 147; 149; 152; 160; 184; 187; 201; 218; 223; 225; 235; 242; 243; 244; 246; 248; 249; 250; 251; 252; 253; 255; 256; 258; 259; 260; 262; 263; 264; 265; 266; 269; 270; 271; 273; 274; 275; 276; 277; 295; 296; 299; 311; 332; 333 res extensa; 5; 6; 53; 55; 82; 86; 99; 111; 117; 119; 120; 121; 124; 137; 138; 142; 143; 144; 149; 160; 163; 176; 184; 187; 194; 199; 200; 201; 204; 205; 208; 210; 213; 215; 221; 222; 223; 225; 227; 228; 235; 236; 242; 243; 244; 246; 247; 248; 249; 250; 251; 252; 254; 255; 256; 258; 259; 260; 261; 262; 263; 264; 265; 266; 269; 270; 271; 273; 274; 275; 276; 277; 288; 292; 294; 296; 301; 302; 307; 308; 309; 312; 313; 332; 333; 337 res repraesentata; 118; 254 res vitalis; 55

The Philosophical Roots of the Ecological Crisis Rhine; 204 Richeome, Louis; 256; 257 Robert, Jean-Dominique; 97 Roberts, Alexander; 50 Roberval, Gilles Personne de; 81 Rodis-Lewis, Geneviève; 182; 196; 257; 259 Rodman, John; 252 Romanticism; 312 Rossi, Paolo; 103 Royal Society; 15; 16; 64; 70 sacramental; 51; 202 Sartre, Jean-Paul; 53 Sauvages de la Croix, François Boissier de; 227 Scholastics; 91; 101; 122; 141; 167; 188; 211; 223 Schouls, Peter A.; 82 Schumacher, E.F.; 319 Schuyl, Florentius; 207 Science, journal; 33 scientia; 130; 164; 170; 172; 173; 175 scientific academies; 15; 26 Scientific American, journal; 327 Scientific Revolution; 67; 164; 194; 246 scire; 172 scriptura; 57 Secada, Jorge; 184; 296; 307 secretum; 102; 193 self-awareness; 267; 295 self-consciousness; 266; 267; 271; 295; 296; 302; 321; 322 self-in-relationship; 289 semel in vita; 105 sensation; 100; 108; 110; 140; 141; 241; 244; 250; 251 sense knowledge; 173; 174; 175; 260 sentience; 240; 245 shamar; 37 Shea, William R.; 190 Sheldrake, Rupert; 203 Shiva, Vandana; 200 Simmons, Alison; 232

393

Simon, Julian; 318; 319 Simpson, Peter; 200 Singer, Peter; 274 Smith, Adam; 314; 319; 339 The Wealth of Nations; 314 Smith, Gregory Bruce; 300 Smith, Norman Kemp; 238 Smuts, Jan C.; 282 Soble, Alan; 76 social ecology; 8; 146; 147; 160 Socrates; 54; 104; 272 Solar System; 24 Solipsism; 296; 301 solius mentis inspectio; 108; 253 soul as causa vitae; 216; 217; 227; 292 faculties of; 108; 140; 186; 214; 216; 219; 220; 226; 266; 267 rational; 216; 226; 241; 243; 244; 246 sensitive; 205; 214; 216; 217; 221; 226; 241; 333 vegetative; 197; 205; 214; 216; 217; 220; 221; 226; 241; 333 space colonies; 23; 25 space exploration; 24 space travel; 25 Spinoza, Baruch; 156 Sprat, Thomas; 64 Stahl, Georg Ernst; 227 Stanford University; 27 Stanley Victor Keeling; 112; 227; 308 Steffen, Lloyd; 36 Steiner, Gary; 81 Stoics; 51 Suárez, Francisco; 101; 185; 214 subiectum; 126; 127; 128; 298 subjectivity; 50; 82; 120; 125; 126; 127; 128; 129; 137; 138; 143; 144; 149; 197; 246; 251; 255; 258; 270; 277; 294; 295; 296; 297; 299 Archimedean modern Subject; 5; 48; 80

394 substantial forms; 166; 167; 168; 169; 173; 185; 193; 214; 233 Summers, Lawrence; 318 surcodage; 177 sustainable development; 46; 289; 319 symbolic; 59; 202; 311 symbolism; 202; 293; 310; 311 systole; 219 Tamari, Shlomit; 316 Tansley, Arthur George; 286 Tao Te Ching; 338 Taoism; 290 Taylor, Charles; 8; 113; 120 Taylor, Paul W.; 143 technicians; 326 teleology; 6; 52; 102; 198; 205; 211; 232; 233; 234; 235; 236; 277; 293; 310; 311; 333; 339 finality; 55; 232; 235; 310; 311 telos; 157; 198; 232; 233 terra nullis; 278 terra nullius; 203 thaumazein; 54 theology Orthodox; 59 Third World; 159 Thomas, Keith; 35; 37; 153 time scale; 13 tipping points; 20 Toletus, Francisco de; 214 Toolan, David; 31; 66; 313 tortura; 76 Toynbee, Arnold; 40; 41 transcendence; 55; 119; 202; 264 transcendental; 202 Transfiguration; 57 Tuan, Yi-Fu; 35 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity; 315 United Nations Population Fund; 30 United States National Academies of Sciences; 16 University of Bologna; 212 University of Utrecht; 97; 168 unum per se; 223

Index utilitarian; 6; 149; 164; 194; 202; 204; 235; 258; 280; 293; 302; 304; 305; 315; 333 utilitarianism; 322 value in nature; 235 Vesalius, Andreas; 206; 209; 210; 211 De Humani Corporis Fabrica Libri Septem; 209 vexatio; 76 Vickers, Brian; 76 vis pulsifica; 218 vitalism; 55; 68; 206; 209; 210; 220; 292 vivisection; 238; 242; 246; 273 Voëtius, Gisbertus; 97; 168; 169 Vorstius, Adolphus; 212 Waldstein, M.; 50 Walker, George; 65 waste; 21; 28; 313 Weber, Max; 324 Wee, Cecilia; 245 Weltanschauung; 10; 42; 44; 45; 80; 294 Weltbild; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 44; 46; 47; 48; 68; 69; 79; 80; 81; 82; 83; 84; 85; 86; 93; 98; 112; 113; 119; 120; 121; 123; 124; 127; 145; 163; 164; 169; 170; 181; 184; 194; 200; 202; 210; 248; 251; 252; 292; 293; 294; 301; 303; 304; 309; 310; 312; 313; 320; 321;325; 326; 328; 329; 331; 333; 334; 335; 336; 337; 338 Westhelle, Vítor; 323; 337 White, Lynn Jr.; 4; 10; 21; 33; 34; 35; 38; 40; 41; 42; 43; 46; 53; 59; 62; 63; 113 Whitehead, Alfred North; 8; 44; 66; 199; 248; 278; 334 Whytt, Robert; 227 Wiesel, Elie; 326 Wildcat, Daniel R.; 339 Wilson, Edward O.; 17

The Philosophical Roots of the Ecological Crisis Wilson, Margaret; 114; 140; 169; 180 Wiryomartono, Bagoes; 69; 302; 321 Wordsworth, William; 312 World Population Report, 2011; 30 World Scientists’ Warning to Humanity; 281 worldview; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 9; 44; 46; 48; 51; 60; 62; 64; 68; 69; 80; 81; 83; 84; 85; 86; 94; 95; 97; 100; 101; 109; 112; 113; 121; 124; 151; 155; 157; 160; 163;

395

164; 194; 201; 203; 248; 251; 258; 265; 277; 279; 280; 287; 292; 293; 304; 312; 314; 317; 320; 321; 324;325; 328; 329; 332; 334; 336; 337; 338; 339 Worster, Donald; 63; 68; 314; 316; 317; 339 Zen; 161 Zimmerman, Michael E.; 148; 161; 256; 289; 297 Zoroastrianism; 34 Zweers, Wim; 128; 201; 272; 279; 280