The Phenomenology of Living: The foresight of the Coming

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THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF LIVING

The Foresight of the Coming

Kerem Duymus

2021

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The Original Name: The Phenomenology of Living The Foresight of the Coming Author: Kerem Duymus

Redactor: Esra K. Erol

Editor: Theo Agathangelou

Tyche Press: Μπελογιάννη 8, Τριανδρία, ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗΣ

All rights belong to the author.

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CONTENT

Acknowledgment………………………………………………………………. 4 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………… 5 The First Lecture: “What is Life?” …………………………….……….. 7 The Second Lecture: Temporality …………………………….….……. 47 The Third Lecture: Foresight of the Coming ………………….…….85 Quotations ............................................................................ 106

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This text has occurred after a serial of meetings, lectures, and speeches. The first draft of it was delivered as a speech to a very small special group in Istanbul in April 2017. The second expanded draft was presented at a private meeting in Vienna in December 2017. The latest version of the text was shared as a part of long philosophy lecture series in Dusseldorf in August 2018. In 2019, I have begun to rewrite the text in a book format with the help and motivation of my colleague and also my old friend Esra K. Erol. Finally, the book appeared in early 2020 after three years of very intense debate. These discussions gave me the chance to deepen the argumentations and examples. Thus, it may be said that the book came to the birth by containing the possible questions and critiques, and more importantly, it gained his strong ─and maybe to some extent provocative─ voice which has been approved by the time rather than the truthfulness of its ideas.

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INTRODUCTION

When F. Schlegel wrote in 1798, “über keinen Gegenstand philosophi[e]ren sie seltner als über die Philosophie” [No thing is philosophized about more rarely than philosophy], it was understood that Schlegel criticizes the fact that mostly the question about what philosophy is hasn’t been asked; but in fact, even Schegel was knowing very well that this question has already been asked many times and there are already several answers. In this regard, here what Schlegel pointed out is actually not about needing to add a new definition to the question concerning philosophy, more like, he tries to emphasize the necessity of finding the meaning of philosophy; namely, he criticized that we comprehend philosophy regarding making philosophy ─as if it’s a kind of methodology─, however, what should we do is that we must apprehend philosophy within the making philosophy. That is why Schlegel didn’t interest in the question of “what is philosophy”, but the question of “what is the meaning of the philosophy.” This small difference was so important for him because he always strived to demonstrate that philosophy is not a thing that has been produced but has been occurred. In this regard, it cannot be understood within the definition in a frame of the logical categories, it should be inquired in the genealogy of all existence. So, Schlegel called this new kind of investigation regarding philosophy as the philosophy of life ─or in the more recent literature it called as life-

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philosophy─; shortly, what philosophy is can be grasped in the question of what life is. Life and philosophy are not the opposite components for each other, we do not comprehend life by using philosophy; more like, we apprehend philosophy in the meaning of life. Because actually what we understood is always lifephilosophy before we divided them as life and philosophy in an abstract way. In this respect, life-philosophy is not to combine life and philosophy but to see the point that they cannot be separated. Then, there is a very promised new way to understand all these compelling questions. But of course, now we should ask, what is life-philosophy?

Kerem Duymus Bayreuth, May 2020

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The First Lecture:

“What is Life?”

The topic of this lecture is based on basic themes that I have been working on for some time now. The first one is the life-philosophy ─not philosophy of life─, the second one is the foresight of the coming ─not seeing the future─. We will look into the “foresight of the coming” in the following weeks, and then we will scrutinize our life-world (lebenswelt) as the lifephilosophy (lebensphilosophie). But of course, I have to underline that these approaches actually have no link between them but they seem like they are nested fragments of each other. And you will see, even though we talk about them in different chapters, they will connect to each other.

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In this regard, I would like to begin by asking the main question about life before talking about the life-philosophy: “What is life?”. (Of course, at this point, I should expose that why I’m beginning with this question. I won’t claim that this is a basic point or the first position for the philosophy or a general philosophical interrogation; it seems to me, maybe, there is a much more primary question to initiate. The importance of this question I think springs up from two main lines: the first, the question has an everyday usage. I wouldn’t say everyone should ask this question, but in some moments of our personal lives, we find ourselves saying “what is life”; the question catches us in the flow of life. The second, the question is more honest and reflexive than the other questions; because every kind of question that contains the knowledge of epistemological inquiry or an ontological investigation, commences by presuming that we are living beings, we are already alive. But they almost never indicate the actual assumption, whereas the question “what is life” directly begins with the general assumption of containing the survey about every kind of knowledge and being; it is that reflexivity, in this regard, is much more explicit, and involves a modesty. Strictly, the question could remain empty if the epistemological and ontological topics are not included in it; however, if it is reduced to these spheres, then it would remain definitely untouchable.) Undoubtedly, it seems like a very supererogatory question at first; because, as you might guess, one can live without asking that question. Even if some people, especially

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philosophers, asked this question in the past, but most of the people weren’t interest in it, and maybe all these people still can live better than the philosophers. Actually, even if sometimes it is really hard to accept, for us, this is really possible. The life is a concept that, no one can find a true answer about it; some of them don’t know and can’t explain how it is working, nevertheless they are able to live it like they grasped how it’s working. Moreover, when they want to tell their successes stories, their thoughts and disclosing look worse than the philosophers’. As if there is an answer that cannot be spoken. In that case, asking the question of “what is life?” actually brings along another question: “What is the benefit of asking this question?”. If you are able to live without asking what is life and if sometimes it can be the best way for that, then, why should we ask this question? Is this an important question or a question we will discuss forever? Interestingly, many philosophical thoughts begin with a quick answer that has been given to this question and they never look back at it again. Besides, almost every philosopher has an answer to that issue: “The life is a flow”, “the life is a gift from God” or “the life is a kind of death” etc. So, is life really all these? As you can see, if we talk about the question of “what is life?”, then we have to reach a true answer, because if we wouldn’t able to attain a true answer, then the question of “what is the benefit of asking this question?” would eliminate our question. In this aspect, even if our question looks like a kind of

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definitional affair, it has to be much more than that; because this definition which we must present has to be true. I think you can see the chain of all these connections. If once we ask the question of “what is life?”, until we give a true answer for that, it cannot be the main question and it canalizes us to other problems. But the trouble is that these other questions are only able to give an answer if there is a true answer to the question “what is life?”. So, here, the point is not only talking about life, but the point is also to find the right way to give a true answer. That means we cannot say simply “the life is ...”, we must say something fulfilling in such right way, so the answer must be true for the life. For instance, someone came and said, “life is everything”; so, is this an answer that we can accept? When we say, “okay that’s right, that’s what life is”, do we really find the answer? If we would have really found the right answer, someone could not come and say: “No no, life is nothing”. But we see that on the question about life, there is almost an eternal answering loop throughout the history of humanity and we can still continue to respond, how does that happen then? Is there any right answer? I suppose that there is no right answer yet because if there was, it must have eliminated the possibility of our answering. If we can still give some answers, that means there is still no right answer. Of course, at this point, probably you would like to know whether I will mention any scientific method or a kind of a logical system to give an answer to this question. But first of all,

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here, the matter is about the definition of life, and all these scientific or logical approaches can only give us a method to explain life, whether the answer is correct, it passes beyond them. So, let’s look at, for example, why is the answer of “life is everything” is not true? The reason for that is very simple, if it was really true, we could not say that “no, life is nothing”. In that case, the person who says, “life is everything” must justify his thought by eliminating the possibility that anyone says “the life is nothing”, and finally now, all these scientific and logical opinions begin here. So how will we do that? Firstly, maybe we can use a kind of pure logical method, which in here I’m giving reference to Tarski’s Concept of Truth. According to his thought, we can say, for instance, “life is everything if it is everything”1. At first glance, which we can see this is totally a tautology, it seems like a logical answer because it eliminates all other possible answers; but also, it reveals trouble here. So, Quine addresses the problem like this: “Though the satisfaction predicate is well explained even within the formal language by the recursion, it does not get reduced to the prior notation of that language. Satisfaction, and truth along with it, retain the status that truth already enjoyed under the disquotation account: clear intelligibility without full eliminability”.2 Actually, Tarski’s approach furnishes a very true logical structure, however, the problem is that this assertion actually only can give a postponement for the answer, and in this manner, it seems that it eliminates other possible answers, but actually it

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just generates a temporal vicious circle for that. I mean, it binds the answer to a condition, but also this condition is to give the true answer; and at this point, when we ask whether this answer is true, it produces a repetition which submits an infinite process: -

What is life?

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Life is everything if it is everything.

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Then, is it everything?

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If it is, yes.

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So, is it?

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If it is, yes

(and infinite repetition which we never reach an answer, emerges.) And, as we can see, through this temporal vicious circle, it can disqualify other possible answers, but in the end, it cannot give any answer for us. So, at that rate, secondly, maybe we can use the scientific method for our question, which I will give reference to Popper in here. According to his approach, even if we cannot furnish any absolute answer like “the life is ...”, we are able to give an answer which it can be true, binding to its falsifiability; and actually, that means we should add a “because” to our claim. In this regard, the first part of the sentence of our answer should be a kind of assumption, which means it has falsifiability, and the second part

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of our sentence should be proof throughout the usage of “because”, and thus, we eliminate other possible answers by attaching “because”.3 For instance, we can say that: “the life is everything [assumption], because we cannot speak about whatever is out of the everything [proof]”; then, in this case, to say that “the life is nothing” is absurd. And actually, it looks much more developmental method than the other, because in this thought, no one can say only “the life is …”; they have to add a “because” and then have to initiate to explain. So, it is indeed consistent; because there are always other possibilities of answering the question, and we have to disqualify them. Thus, it seems that we can do it; we can submit a falsifiable assumption ─which if our assertion wouldn’t be falsifiable, then we had to return to again Tarski’s vicious circle─, and then we can demonstrate a proof for our assumption; but how can we prove whether our proof is true? At this point, we need proof for our proof. So, I’m going to attach another “because”: “The life is everything [assumption], because we cannot speak on those what are out of the everything [proof for assumption], because the language is relevant to the things [proof for proof].” But, why is the language relevant to things? In that case, you might notice, the issue finally becomes an infinite process; in the dialog, every “because” that has been given about the question of “what is life”, forms an infinite extending chain. And this chain never culminates. The answer

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for the question of “what is life” cannot be completed, there is always a “because” that has to be attached, there is always a proof that needs another proof which has to prove that proof. Namely, we cannot attain an answer for that question, we could only do infinite speculations about what life is. So, the predicament about giving the true answer, stays the same even though we’ve used different methods. And the question we asked at the inception is still unanswered. Then, what should, and will we do? Will we strive to find a new method to give an answer ─because, here, we can see that, in the history of humanity, if there was an answer for that question, then now we wouldn’t have been able to give different answers for that, but we still keep going to give a lot of answers─, or will we accept that there is no answer? For instance, when we said, “answers that have been given in all these thoughts about the life, are not true due to the methodological problems; so then, the question of “what is life” is unanswered”, can we admit that as an answer? I mean, can we say, “it cannot obtain any answer on the investigation of the life because of the question of “what is life” is unanswered”? Admittedly, we can say that; but if we say that “the life is unknown” or “there isn’t any answer” or “the question of “what life is” cannot be answered”, then we should also add a “because” in order to prove it. In other words, the answer of “there is no answer” is still an assumption that needs proof.

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As we might see, here, we come across a very interesting occasion. Because the reason which doesn’t allow us to give an answer, also doesn’t permit us to say, “there is no answer”. This is actually what Davidson called the Paradox of Irrationality. About this matter, he says that: “... explanations explain by rationalizing... [and] for the irrational is not merely the nonrational, which lies outside the ambit of the rational; irrationality is a failure within the house of reason.”4 And that means every kind of irrationality that we can call it as a kind of unexplainable in our inquiry, belongs to the rationality; I mean the sentence of “there is no answer” [unexplainable/irrational] is also an answer [rational], but on the other hand, this answer is totally illogical [irrational] because of it says that there is no answer; I mean there is an answer which says that I’m not an answer [paradox]. So, in this case, as a result, we are not able to say that “that’s the answer!” ─because the transaction of the eliminating other possible answers expands to the infinity, which is an expected result if we consider that there are almost infinite numbers of possible different answers─; however, also we cannot say that “there is no answer!” ─because this is paradoxical─. And this paradox of “there is no answer” also creates a general paradox about the question, because when you can’t find any answer for a question instead of saying “there is no answer”; and if you also can’t say that because of its paradox, then now, you have a general paradox concerning the answering the question.

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Then, at this point, will we accept our defeat about questioning life? Will we say that there is no answer which includes this one as well? Will we say there is an insurmountable paradox in here? Will we stop at this point? Undoubtedly, for most philosophical books this is a sufficient result; the question about life ─and we can say that all these kinds of questions, because as we can see, the problem arises from the relation between the answer and the question─ gives us a totally paradoxical and inconclusive situation about the answering. But I won't leave the investigation at this point; and my justification for that is: If we are encountering a paradox or inconclusive situation on a question, that means we are asking the question in a wrong way. Because I think, there is not only a paradox concerning the answering the question, but also to say that the question is paradoxical, is paradoxical (I know it looks like it is beginning to go off the rail, but I will try to sum them all up). When we examined the question about life, we couldn’t find any kind of answer, more like, we saw that every kind of answer looks paradoxical; but in the end, if we say that there is just paradox, that means there is no possibility to answer this question because a paradox closes all doors for us. You cannot go out from the paradox; it incarcerates you eternally. But if we are able to say that there is a paradox, which that means there is a reflection; I mean if you can say that there is a paradox relevant

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to the question of life, then, I draw the following conclusion: You had gone out from the paradox, and you looked at it from the outside and said that there is a paradox, which this is entirely due to the functioning of the language. But if there is a paradox concerning this question, then where does the possibility of this reflection come from? Because real paradox is unspeakable. Or if there is a different kind of possibility for that, then why we attain a paradox in our investigation? (Of course, at this point, you can say that: “Then, are all paradoxes which we argued about them in the different scientific or philosophical fields, are meaningless?” If we can say “there is a paradox”, that means the situation about this affair cannot be paradoxical, because if it would be, then we wouldn’t be able to say it is paradoxical; due to the fact that there wouldn’t be a remaining possibility to say anything about the paradox; because we could only say “there is a paradox” with the power of the possibility of an answer. So, here, what looks like a paradox, in fact, is that we define it as a paradox. I mean, if we say that “x=2 but also x=3”, of course, the case about the “x” looks like a paradox, but there is no paradox for the “x”, because it is just our concept; what seems like a paradox, emerges from our definition. In other words, if there was a real paradox for the “x”, then we wouldn’t be able to say that “x=2 and not more”, which this definition entirely abolishes every kind of a possible paradox. As you can see, to answer the question or to furnish a definition is not only forbidding every kind of answer, but it also forbids every kind of paradox)

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In fact, our two paradoxes, I mean the paradox about the question of life, and the paradox of indicating this paradox, interestingly arise as soon as we ask the question; because I think, this is a kind of a turning point. Firstly, if we are able to ask the question of “what is life” then there must be no answer ─which that means there must be also no answer to “there is no answer”, in other words, there must be a paradox─; because if there was an answer ─or what is totally unexplained─, we wouldn’t be able to ask this question ─because once we asked the question than eternal answers flow, namely the indication of a truthful answer is the impossibility to ask a question about it.─. So, the possibility of asking the question actually comes from the paradox of answering. But secondly, again, if we can ask the question, that means we cannot reach the paradox about it, because the consequence of asking the question disqualifies the possibility of the paradox of answering. At this point, maybe you may ponder that we attain a paradox again; because the possibility of asking the question springs up from the paradox of answering, but also the consequence of asking the question entirely eliminates this paradox. But if the possibility of question emerges from this paradox, then how does it abolish it? I would say, there is not any paradox about that; rather, this is eventually our crucial successful result which we are able to attain. Because, as you can see, actually there are two different dimensions concerning asking the question. The first dimension

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implies only the possibility of asking, which we are able to say that it is the potential of the speech; on the other hand, the second dimension actually denotes the consequence of asking, which we can accept that it is the act of the speech. In other words, the first part is about before asking, and the second part is about after asking. And, in fact, it seems like a paradox; because when we ask, this temporal distinction cannot be noticed at the moment, that’s why I understood it as a kind of a turning point; because there is a point which we cannot take the derivative of. And the reason for that is so simple; there is no temporal relation due to this instant situation which is kind of a singular point. Thus, actually, there is no paradox, because paradox doesn’t arise from a relation between these dimensions, essentially this paradox is about asking the question in a way that it’s kind of instant without any temporal weight. So, in this case, what does this result mean which a temporal relation has been involved in? As you can see, we encounter a very radical situation, because this manifests a consequence that says the act of asking the question affects the answer; before asking the question, there must be a paradox for the answer, but after asking the question, there cannot be a paradox ─but also there cannot be any answer─ for the question anymore. Incontestably, this is hard to comprehend. However, this is still not a big deal, considering the main issue in the result. As we can see, there is a bigger problem in there; we can easily

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understand the first dimension of the result, there must be a paradox for the answer in order to reach the possibility of asking the question; but if we regard the second dimension, we still cannot give any answer or we still cannot say “there is no answer”, but also now, we cannot say “the question is paradoxical”. Then, what remains? What happens in there? In this situation ─for the second dimension─, there must be a paradox due to the inception condition of functioning of the language, but on the other hand, the act of asking the question doesn’t allow any kind of a paradox, which in this case, seems like a paradox of the paradox. But what does this mean it’s the paradox of the paradox? Indeed, it cannot be a paradox for us, because, if we can say that there is a paradox, in fact, there is no paradox; so, what then? I accept that it looks more complicated, but at this point, finally, there is a different kind of possibility in order to reveal the issue. The paradox closes all doors for us, and it confines us to its closeness; the paradox of paradox closes all doors for the paradox, and it confines it to our closeness; which is that’s why our act of asking the question affects the answer because the paradox of the question has entirely been incarcerated to us. So, we commence to figure out so many mysteries in the issue. Before the act of asking the question we have entirely incarcerated to the paradox of answering, it affects our possibility of asking, but after the act of asking the question, now this paradox of the question, is incarcerated to us, and we affect its

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functioning, and as we can see, this relation of the confinement to each other is interlocked; because these two dimensions cannot be considered separately; the pre-speaking also belongs to the speech, because we can conceive the possibilities [pre-speaking] only when they have been a consequence [speech] ─which that’s why we still cannot give any answer because every analyze concerning the first dimension is still valid for the second dimension─. And also, now, we can comprehend that why we couldn’t grasp what happens in the second dimension. Because, although there is a relation of incarcerating to each other, the question of “what is life” still presumes a kind of reciprocal relation. In other words, again, the predicament doesn’t emerge from the correlation between them, the trouble is the question of “what is life”. Because we see that there must be a different kind of possibility, but the question of “what is life” cannot indicate it because of trying to see a reciprocal relation in there; in fact, for the reciprocal relation, there is no noticeable affair in the relation of confining to each other. In other words, we should find a new way of asking that will be appropriate to the relation of the limitation to each other. Therefore, I think, we are attaining the main core of the beginning of the life-philosophy, because philosophers who ask, “what is life”, call the answer for that question as a philosophy of life. That means, they are discussing the philosophy of life, and arguing what the philosophy of life means for the receiving

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end, the life as an object which stands on the opposite side for us (I mean, it is what Germans call as Gegenstand). In other words, the problem is “of”, in the “philosophy of life”. Here, philosophy and life are separate; life is a thing, a Gegenstand (because there is an “of”) for the philosophy. But is life really an object which stands on the opposite side? Do we really stand on the opposite of it? Can we really leave it and look at it? In a conclusion, if the case concerning the asking and the answering has to be a relation of the incarceration to each other, then how life could stand on the opposite side for us? In the history of philosophy, very few people discussed this issue; but some of them who I especially would like to mention, of course, there are others, really argued this question very differently and seriously. They had seen the predicament in here and they indicated that we must understand this question differently. So, they said also, concerning the philosophy of the life, (in German is die Philosophie des Lebens) it is useless to grasp the life ─because there is an approach based on the reciprocal relation─, we must scrutinize the life-philosophy (Lebensphilosophie) ─not a reciprocal but a correlation of that which the elements of the issue cannot be separate─. Okay, but what does the life-philosophy mean, and how can it give a new way of asking to comprehend life? In this case, first of all, I would like to draw attention to Cassirer; so, I’m quoting directly: “Comprehending of life is not simply the pure external encirclement of a completed, self-

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existent form which that the life is compressed within”. Undoubtedly, Cassirer says what is the philosophy of life here, and he demonstrates what is the wrong part on the question of “what is life”. And Cassirer continues: “Comprehending life is that unfolding itself in its own form”.5 So, what does it mean? In here, I would like to add another quotation from Memişoğlu: “A life that is consumed and spent in order to be expanded in a form. Not an economical life, but a life that saves its form as its arche [root] and nomos [law].”6 As we can see, both philosophers tackle the issue in the same way but from different directions. Because they entirely agree that life cannot be conceived as a kind of self-existed form which stands on the outside ─namely, as an object for the philosophy─ or a kind of economical relation ─namely, the idea of considering the life entirely within the body, thus the life becomes a trade matter because of the identical relationship with the body and its objectivity─ due to the fact that all these approaches are based on a reciprocal relation, but also they offer a quite interesting manner to explain the issue. According to Cassirer, life unfolds itself in its own form to us, but the question of how we can ensure that, is still a bit uncertain; according to Memişoğlu, if we save the life in order to use it in our life form ─not the body but the life form, then we should ask what is different between these, but for now, that question belongs to another work which I will return again to that prob for especially that question─, then it can unfold its root and

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its law in its own form to us. I think Memişoğlu’s thought, especially in two points, is so important; firstly, he engages between the life form and, roots and law of the life; and also he emphasizes interaction between “I” as a life form and “life”, as saving the other, which in fact, that means just to live; because to save the life form and to employ the life for that, is just to live without any another approach, concept or thought. In this regard, for Memişoğlu, the way of filling the blank of uncertainty, which springs up from Cassirer’s thought, is just to live, which I believe this is not wrong, but on the other hand, there is still a lot of missing pieces for us. For instance, how can we be sure that the life can unfold itself in its own form to us? As we can see, living is a kind of the beginning point ─beyond every kind of epistemological and ontological assumption─ for us, not a result. In addition, if we consider these two approaches with our examination, we can see that they actually attempt to reverse the limitation to each other, to a kind of a relationship that unfolds into each other. Because here, the real discovery is the relation of the confinement to each other, gives us a possible link of unfolding into each other. For instance, in the German language, there is an original sample for that situation: the word “auseinanderfallen”. This word comes from “fallen”, one of the meanings of this word is “confine” as well; and some meanings of the “auseinanderfallen” are “fall apart” and “unfold”. Because what we would like to grasp, could only unfold itself in its own form; otherwise we cannot be sure whether it unfolds itself to us or not.

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Maybe at this point, it can be helpful to look at a quotation from Pfänder: “Every life is centered, every life form has its own life, and this life is something incessantly moving. We do not mean that life flows through such a life form as a stream that comes from outside and passes through the parts of the life form; the life joins entirely in the life form and does not go beyond this.”7 As we can see, Pfänder engages with the life form and the life; because, for him, the life is neither a kind of transcendental flow nor an object, which stands on the opposite side, it entirely nests in the life form ─the life is flowing towards me, and I'm flowing towards it─. And, on the other side, according to Pfänder, here, the concept of “form” indicates a kind of border ─but I would not like to mean that there is a strict limit for that, or this border points out what is related to our mortality─. Rather, it occurs from the impossibility of the absolute and the limits; it is concerning the characteristic of attitudes and acts, because itself of living is a behavioral feature as against the rigid structure of absolute whole (namely, any kind of truth about the life) or certain pieces, which is divided with an eternal part (namely, every kind of approach which strives to submit some valid answer by admitting there is no general answer for the life)─, that means there are some answers that are limited to something. So, in this regard, it is given a possibility that it can unfold itself by that there is incarceration; owing to the fact that the life presents itself as a kind of a life form.

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At this point, also Pfänder’s approach strives to reverse Memişoğlu’s thought about the life (saves its own form as its root and its law); because, as we could see in his quotation, the life has a kind of incessantly moving ─which we saw the same situation as “an act of asking” before─, and in this regard, there cannot be any root or law for the life in there, because all these concepts give reference to the non-temporal ─which that means motionless─ relation. But on the other hand, we need something to understand what life can unfold itself in its own form to us does mean. So, what is the temporal connection ─otherwise we can’t escape from the reciprocal relation─ in here then? I think, there is a brilliant discovery here that is revealed by Pfänder; so I’m quoting directly: “In any case, man is a life form, and, certain aims ─as a life form─ are essentially and unconditionally life aims for him... Man has life-aims coercively.”8 (Of course, at this point, you could say that what about other life forms, or why we talk about only man, not an animal or a plant or different persons. But I will investigate that issue ─I mean the issue of how someone or something can have a life form, what is being alive─ on another work.) As we can see, Pfänder finds a perfect way to grasp the temporal connection concerning the life unfolding itself in its own form; the aims ─also immediately we can notice that there is not a singular “aim”─. When life unfolds itself in its own form to us, our aims and the life-aims properly are nesting into each other owing to the fact that we are a life form. (But here, especially in this debate concerning the aims of life, we should not forget Parfit’s

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warnings: “We should not assume that Life or Nature has any end or purpose. [And] even if Life or Nature did have some end or aim, this fact would not imply that we should also have this aim. Perhaps we ought to have some aim if this aim were given to us by a good God... But Nature has, as Nietzsche called, magnificent indifference to good or evil.”9 Here, Parfit is entirely right about the dangers of this issue; because as we can see, our aims and life-aims can only come together by a temporal ─when the life unfolds itself...─ correspondence ─...properly interlocked...─; which that means, there cannot be any epistemological or biological ─and ontological─ proof or root for this compatibility ─namely, we cannot say what life-aim or our aim is─. But, on the other hand, if we carefully pursue the topic, we can see that, this suitability can be possible ─and rendered actual─ by a way which Pfänder uncovered but couldn’t escape from the mistake Parfit underlined.) I know, I talked about so many things and have given so many quotations, but now, I will sum them all up. First of all, Cassirer said that if life unfolds itself in its own form to us, we can comprehend the life; after that Memişoğlu emphasized that this own form of life is a kind of the life form, and we need ─firstly─ to live to save this form so that it can unfurl itself to us, as its essential meaning; and finally Pfänder attached that the life can unfold itself in its own form to us because it is entirely incarcerated in our life form; and in this occasion, if only way to understand the life is that the life unfurls itself to us, and if this is possible owing to the fact that we are a life form, which the

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reason for that is the life form and the life are entirely incarcerate to each other, they flow through each other, then what I live for is, ─I mean my aim(s)─, can actually have the life-aim(s) of what life is ─because as Memişoğlu indicated, the life unfolds itself as its essential meaning, and in the temporal connection, it is its aim─. In other words, if life unfurls itself to me, that means what I live for is what life is. (I envision that this is a weird idea; especially at the last stage, of course, you can ask, why did we add this “aims” thought into the discussion. Because if there is a relation of unfolding to each other between our life form and the life, why didn’t we just say that what my life is what life is? Of course, we can say that ─maybe sometimes it can be even accurate, however, the life would be reduced entirely to my life─, but it doesn’t matter, because the problem of the question of “what is life” was the lack of the temporal connection, which that was its characteristic of reciprocal relation ─in other words, in this time, we have to ask “what is my life”, which that utterly furnishes to reference the reciprocal relation as such the question of “what is life”─ . So, here, the point is to find a temporal connection between my life form and life so that, we can find a new way to ask the question about life. And as Pfänder discovered, the life form and the life can be unfolded within each other temporally, only if they have the same aims.) As we can see, the motto of “what I live for can be what life is”, in fact, is not an answer for the question of “what is life”.

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Here, we still can’t know what life is, but on the other hand, now, we have a temporal question for that. In any case, we have a totally new perspective for the inquiry. I mean, all analyzes in our investigation concerning the question of “what is life”, of course still valid for the question of “what I live for”. Again, we cannot say that “what I live for is ...”; all predicament concerning the answering and the paradoxes, still stay in here, so what happens then? At this point, the question of “what I live for” gives us a new kind of possibility, which we came across in our survey about the paradoxes, but we couldn’t find out where this possibility came from (if you can remember, in the act of asking we still couldn’t submit any answer and also couldn’t say “there is no answer”, which means there is a paradox; but on the other hand, also we couldn’t say that “there is a paradox” due to the paradox of the paradox; then where does the possibility of being able to continue to ask comes?). Thus, the point which the question of “what I live for” indicates, belonging to a temporal connection in order to find an answer (I mean, for instance, if you could know the future, then you would grasp the answer for this question; whereas for the question of “what is life”, even if you can know the future, it doesn’t matter for the issue ─I will return to this topic later─). But on the other hand, of course, you are able to claim that all topics now look like an individual issue, and isn’t that kind of egocentric? It would have been true if we have given an

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answer for the question of “what I live for” ─or we have tackled it as the question of “what is my life”─. But as you can see, in fact, the answer to the question of “what I live for”, still depends on that whether life unfolds itself to us or not. So then, what is the possibility which is ensured by the temporal connection that has emerged through the question of “what I live for”? And also, we still can’t know how we can ensure unfolding of the life itself to us; now we still presume it by employing the possibility of it, but at some point, also we have to figure out this problem, but for now, I will focus on to our topic. So then, at this stage, I would like to return again to the analytical approaches; because the investigation which was in the thoughts of the life-philosophy, has given us a new kind of a way of asking; but now, again we must attempt to attain the answer relevant to the question. Of course, we cannot follow the same line which we used for the question of “what is life”, because now, we have a different kind of question, and there must be a different kind of way of answering. Admittedly, this stage is not easier than the previous one; however, there are some philosophers who grasp the problem and solve it genially. Because there are some different kinds of possibilities for this new question, unlike answering the question of “what is life” based on the reciprocal relation which has entirely sunk into the paradoxes and impossibilities.

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So, at this point, I would like to talk about Leibniz. And actually, Leibniz lived hundreds of years ago than the philosophers who were mentioned in our investigation. But his link with this topic is not directly about his thoughts about life; which I won’t examine Leibniz’s approach about life. But there is a great connection between the question of “what I live for” and Leibniz’s logic studies which have been published after his death. In fact, Leibniz doesn’t follow the line we inquire with thoughts of the life-philosophy. But he encounters the same troubles in his manuscript of logic studies, and he discovers a marvelous solution. Leibniz interests a very basic question; is it possible to provide that a process is valid? I mean, for instance, how can I provide the validity of my personal propositions concerning life such as 2+2=4? (But here, the point is not to reduce every kind of problem to a certain arithmetic formula; on the contrary, even the formula of 2+2=4 has a symbolic structure which could be able to furnish the much more explicit possibility to attain the formal logic that the true answer could spring up from there, according to Leibniz). Of course, as you can notice, in this point, Leibniz asks the question differently; because he is not interested in whether that is it possible to prove the truth of the process or not. Because, for him, the affair concerning the proving of the truth of a process, is a formal problem which we presume that there is a kind of transcendental logical determinism; whereas we can talk about this formalism only by some tools: “It is obvious that if we could find characters or signs suited for expressing all

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our thoughts as clearly and as exactly as arithmetic expresses numbers or geometry expresses lines, we could do in all matters insofar as they are subject to reasoning, all that we can do in arithmetic and geometry.”10 The importance of this quotation is, while Leibniz was believing a formal rationalism, he can’t reject that the power of the formalism can be possible only by the clearness and exactness of the arithmetical symbols. In other words, the deep characteristic of symbols create the possibility of formal rationalism. For instance, “2” and “+” and “=” and “4” are actually symbols. So, if we would like to prove that “2+2=4”, we can never tackle them as only pure connection between numbers as formally, without their symbolic meanings. Because the formal correlation can only be possible thanks to them being unfurled within these symbols of numbers and signs; (however for Leibniz formal correlation is already there, but we can reach it by the symbolic tools11; but I am not interested in this predicament at Leibniz’s consideration ─which this trouble entirely belongs to the same basement with the idea of Kant’s philosophy: “if there is a phenomenon then there must be a noumenon in12”; all these are same rationalistic faults that presuming all universe has to function and be as logical─, because my special focusing is; how Leibniz engages between this symbolic structure and formal correlation) or in other words, we cannot talk about formal correlations in mathematics without the number and sign symbols. And as you can see, actually this is the similar result which we reached in our examination before; the matter about

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the paradox of the paradox, which it means there should be a relation between incarcerating to each other and, asking the question and the answer. Here, we cannot consider the symbols and the formal relations separately like the asking the question and the answer. So then, what is the new one? Firstly, a quotation from Leibniz: “If I can conceive all propositions as terms, and assumption as categoricals... this promises wonderful ease in my symbolism... Thus we have discovered how absolute and hypothetical truths have same laws and are contained in the same general theorems... because whatever is said of a term which contains a term could also be said for a proposition from another proposition that follows”13; and Cassirer interprets that “[In Leibniz’s thought] the hesitant situation can be abolished only by the fact that the property which sought through a true deductive proof and the notification of the general method is necessarily closed in this mode of production and proves that it is located within this mode of production”.14 This is a very hard sentence to understand at the first glance, but also a remarkable one. According to Cassirer’s comment on Leibniz, what provides the validity of the answer is that what will be said about the question should necessarily be closed in the act of giving the answer. In other words, I should retain the act of giving the answer itself in such a way that all possible answers should be closed in it. As you can see, we wouldn't be able to use this approach for the question of “what is life”, because, in that question, there is no temporal intermediary, which means we cannot talk about any kind of act of giving the answer; for it, there must be only a kind of the answer. In other words, “... what it will be said about

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the question...” is absurd for the question of “what is life”, because there is no future, no “will be”, no act. But for the question of “what I live for”, the issue has been brought directly to the act of living, which means there must be a temporal intermediary; here the question of “what I live for” can be answered in this motion, in this act ─in this temporal connection─. Thus, it is possible that there can be a kind of future, or “will be”, owing to the fact that I have a motion, an act; and if I can implement the approach of Leibniz for our inquiry, then it is possible that I can attain some answers. Because, at this point, the idea is that if you are able to culminate all those what will be talked about the question of “what I live for” during giving the answer, then, you could grasp the answer that is totally valid. So, in other words, Goodman discloses this approach by saying this: “While confirmation is indeed a relation between evidence and hypotheses, this does not mean that our definition of this relation must refer to nothing other than such evidence and hypotheses. The fact is that whenever we set about determining the validity of a given projection from a given base, we have and we use a good deal of other relevant knowledge... Whether these [projections], were valid or not remained in the question; but they some were made and how they turned out is legitimately available information.”15 So, of course, as you can see, the answer which has culminated in the act of giving the answer ─what Goodman calls as projection─ cannot be the truth but also can be entirely true. I

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mean, there is an answer which can be totally true but not the truth, or we can say that it is entirely valid, but it cannot be proved (maybe at this point, you can consider the issue as similar to the pragmatistic view; but the difference is that the pragmatistic view gives some answer for the question and it doesn’t regard whether they are truth, which this is totally incoherent, whereas our approach still doesn’t allow us to give some answer for due to the same problem about the truth, but it attempts to give a different way in order to tackle the question. In other words, pragmaticism interests the validity of the answers in a way that we can never be sure whether they are valid, but our approach scrutinizes whether the answers which have not been given yet, will be valid); because if the answer would become a truth ─or if we would give some answers that we presume they are valid─, then we would go back to the paradoxes at the inception; but on the other hand, if we can close all those what it will be said about the question of “what I live for”, in our act of giving the answer, the answer which we would conceive, will be entirely true and valid. In that case, it is possible that there is a distinction between the truth and the true ─without any pragmatistic approach─. However, what does it mean to retain the act of giving the answer? Because it sounds conceptual but also it looks like there is a mystery about how it operates. So then, I would like to read a quotation from Cassirer: “... in a basic and fundamental time conscious system; what happens in the future, may be now ‘made before time’.”16 Here, Cassirer emphasizes that if you have a

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time-conscious system ─that means if you establish a temporal connection concerning your case─, then it is possible that some answers about the question, can be given in the present time. But, first of all, we should ask what it means that some answer may be ‘made before time’; because we always tackle the answer as a kind of information form, but here, we see that, the answer is also something that may be. In other words, as Cassirer indicated, in the temporal intermediary, we can live some answers without knowing them yet, they can be “made before time”. (Maybe best sample to comprehend the importance of this issue is to regard Kierkegaard’s famous sentence concerning the predicament of living: “It is utterly accurate what the philosophy declare: Life can only be understood backward; but first of all you are forgetting the previous propose: It must be lived forward.”17 Whereas, that paradox is entirely certain by means of the Cassirer’s solving: The meaning of life can already also be lived.) Thus, we may notice that the act of giving the answer, has the possibility of living the answer before we know it, which it springs up from what it will or can be said for the issue will have culminated within an answer which can be known. (Actually, this is a situation we face almost every day in different ways; most of the time, we call it coincidence, in ancient times it was called fortune. For instance, Dio Chrysostom tells a story in his discourses concerning fortune: “What happened to Apelles the painter because of Fortune deserves recounting. As the story goes, he was painting a horse... Although the picture

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had everything true to life, it was lacking a color wherewith to depict froth such as there would be when blood and saliva have mixed intermingling... So, then, Apelles didn’t know how to represent the froth of a horse-wearing action. But as he was more and more perplexed, finally in a fit of desperation he hurled his sponge at the painting, striking it near the bit. But the sponge, containing many colors, when taken together, resembled bloody froth, fitted its color to the painting.”18 As we can see, the answer about how a froth can be painted, was entirely closed in the sponge strike and the paint in a perfect way. While Apelles hurling his sponge, he lived the answer of how he is able to draw a froth ─he didn’t know that─, and when the answer culminated within that the paint of the froth completed, eventually he could get the paint of the froth ─which this answer could only be valid until Apelles knows it─.) So, then, we can say that to retain the act of giving an answer is to strive to have the possibility of living an answer, which will culminate within a single answer that has a possibility to being known. (On this point, of course, you can ask: What is the difference between the expectation and the act of giving an answer then? Because in this situation the act of giving an answer seems like a kind of an expectation, if it is, then why do we need this new definition? But there is a strictly important distinction between these; because, in the expectation, it interests with an issue. When we expect something, it doesn’t mean that we are

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waiting for that; because an expectation is never about something, it’s about tending. We don’t say “I expect an apple”, it is always about an act; “I expect to see an apple”, “I expect to eat an apple” etc. In other words, when we expect things, that means, first of all, we tend to do something, actually, we don’t wait; or if we say in Blanchot’s words: “L'attente n'attend rien” [awating doesn’t wait].19 In this case, I think, also Vaihinger’s approach of as if (Als Ob) looks like adequate for this affair; according to him, there is a triple stage, firstly we posit a nonexisting situation ─for instance, we presume that there is an apple─, after that we infer a consequence from this hypothetical situation ─if there is an apple, then I’m able to eat it─, and finally we formulate an equation for that ─I expect to eat it─;20 in another aspect, even if the apple doesn’t exist yet, at the end we form an equation, a plan, an expectation as if it exists. In this context, what we call an expectation is acting as if there is something which we don’t know about its existence ─which means, we live the answer we don’t know yet (or ever)─. And the concept of the act of giving the answer attends to the game here. Because the act of giving the answer doesn’t want to give some answer and after that doesn’t expect their validity, no; it keeps itself in the tending acting and focusing to formulate a broad equation, thus, so many different possible answers can realize itself in this realm. In this regard, the act of giving the answer is to exercise circumspection towards what’s coming ─to lie to a realm of the possible answers will be able to come─, which that means, to present a kind of openness for the

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possibilities which will be able to come. So, as you can see, in fact, every expectation already is within the act of giving the answer and the act of giving the answer expects something every time; but it doesn’t focus on what it expects, more like, it posits a very large scale for its actions, and thus, it focuses to the coming rather than to stare what is coming.) I think, you can see very well, in the valid occasion, the reasons and the results are entirely interlocked to each other, which that submits a possibility for the answer. So then, finally we can understand all the missing pieces of our investigation. What I lived for, could entirely be closed within a present time situation so that it can be understood, only if it is unfurled at the present time as a result of that it was what I lived for. And here, only if the life unfurls itself to me, what I lived for can have the possibility of that which can be concluded I’m living it at the present time ─because my life-aims can be realized only by the aims of life, what I lived for can be known only if life actualizes it. And life actualizes what I lived for only if it is what life is─. In this regard, if or when the life unfolds itself to me, it can be knowable what I lived for thanks to what I live for became what life is ─which, in fact, this was Pfänder’s discovery─, if when the life unfolds itself to me, what I lived for can be concluded at the present time, namely what I lived for, which has culminated within the situation that my present time becomes its result, is what the life is during this period. But it can be only during this period, because when I’m living what I live for, it cannot be sure

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that whether I’m living for it; because it is still not concluded as a result. And this is the reason why in the act of asking the question of “what is life”, although we couldn’t give any answer ─which that means there must be a paradox─, we also couldn’t say there is a paradox for the answer. Because even though we can’t know the answer, we could live it, which means there must be a paradox ─because we can know the answer only it concluded in a situation that our present time is its result, namely, when we know it, it is not our life aim anymore─ but also there cannot be a paradox ─because we are able to live an answer, which that means there are some answers─. I think we must clarify a little more the topic in order to see how it can resolve all predicaments in our inquiry. We said that there must be a paradox for the answer so that it creates the possibility of asking, but after asking the question, now there cannot be any paradox due to the fact that this situation is a consequence of what has been revealed by a different kind of possibility. Now, we know that this possibility comes from the fact that we are motivated to ask the question thanks to we already lived some answers for this question ─that’s why while the possibility of asking the question is arising from the impossibility of a truthful answer, our motivation to ask the question thanks to we lived some answers regarding it, breaks this impossibility and strives to attempt an answer. In this way

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the presence of this motivation occurs as a result of the existence of some true answers that lived─. This is an important point because you are able to ponder why we are motivated to ask the question owing to the fact that already we lived the answer. Cassirer explains this situation like this: “A sentence function aims at a specific meaning, but cannot yet carry out the meaning: it does not give any answer in exact and perfect quality, it only determines the orientation of the problem precisely... Just as that, the knowledge can only be seen in the concept, research cannot begin until certain target lines are established..”21 We can begin to ask thanks to that there are some lines for the answer, if there wasn’t any answer which that the question will tend to it, then the act of asking wouldn’t begin because there would be no possibility to act ─because every act is possible with tending to some direction─. In other words, every question begins with an expectation, a motivation ─otherwise, we wouldn’t have asked it─, and every expectation means that we already tend to some answers in accordance with our previous answers that lived. Cassirer says: “Our living is a carrier of a meaning as sensorial living, and it always serves this meaning”.22 And this is also why we can give the answers which don’t matter whether they are true or not; because every question can be asked with tending to some answers thanks to previous answers that lived; so, if there is a tending, it has so many possible ─which cannot be reduced to one condition or to impossibility─ different directions [answers] for that. Namely,

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our previous answers that lived provide the motivation to ask the question, but they don’t ensure to reach any true answers. In other words, we can get the possibility of asking the question, because of we cannot give any truthful answer [paradox], but we can begin to ask, whereby we can give the answer which doesn’t matter whether it is true or not [paradox of the paradox]. (I mean, if there wouldn't be any possibility of giving the answer which doesn't matter whether it is true or not, then we wouldn't have motivation in order to ask for this matter. Or we can say in this manner: We are able to get the possibility of asking the question because of we cannot give a truthful answer; and we are able to begin to ask the question by the expectation that we already lived some answers.) In this case, if there was not a paradox for the answer, we had no possibility for asking the question ─in other words, we couldn’t have asked the question─, but even if we had a possibility to ask if we weren’t living any answer for that question ─or our question wouldn’t have tended to any answer─ then we wouldn’t have asked the question. I think, at this point, finally we can understand the result of the topic; because, if the answer you live for, would never culminate within an answer at the present time, then you could never comprehend what life is ─namely, you can’t find any answer─; but although an answer is closed within the act of giving the answer, this answer is valid only for a finished period of your life ─namely, you can’t employ this answer─; but also

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that means, you can be sure that if there is a possibility in order to find any answer, then there must be an answer and you live it, which it has been contained by your act of answering that makes it possible to find the answer ─because as Schlegel’s marvelous words demonstrates: “the relation of the philosophy with the life is always a result”23─. (Here, maybe you noticed a little detail between giving the answer and finding the answer. We perpetually talked about giving the answer, but at the last stage, we transformed it to find the answer, here, the distinction is that giving the answer arouses from the impossibility of a truthful answer, however finding the answer arises within the possibility of some answers that lived. Thus, as Schlegel expressed, the possibility of finding an answer comes from the consequence of living that answer; in this reason, when we find some answers, we can be sure that we lived them. Cassirer implies a familiar issue as such: “Then, we say that we recognize somethings when we already established a synthetic unity in the multiplicity of the experience of life.”24 But what is difference between the answer that given and the answer that found? The answers that found don’t need any proof for us. Because our presence at the present time is revealed as the result of these answers. While the answers that giving are desperately urging us to provide proof, the answers that found make us indifferent any attempt to ensure proof.) Nevertheless, to live what life is ─namely to find some answers─, as we can see, doesn’t commit to any essential meaning and importance, even if you are living what life is, you

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can live totally a wretched life ─one can find that what he/she lived for was just for nothing─. But that doesn’t mean all these things are simply what life brings or all these are your fault. Because to live what life is, means that your aims and the lifeaims are entirely nested into each other. In other words, all these things can spring up from the temporal intermediary between “I” as a life form and the life; everything comes from this temporality ─as you can see, not the time yet─. So then, if we cannot give [─as information─] any answer that could be called truth for the question of “what is life”; but also, if there is [─as to be─] some entirely true and valid answers for some finished periods of our life (which, to understand this compelling relation, it can be followed a very unique line from Plessner toward Pothast and Kozljanic. Plessner manifests that: “The positional-character, namely positionalness (Positionalität), of the life-form encircles the intuition [in which our perception occurs].”25 And Pothast suggest an important concept for that: Living reasonableness (lebendige Vernünftigkeit). So, he states that: “The living reasonableness... is the reasonableness of the living persons who essentially attend to their feeling organism as orientation- and knowledgeauthority.”26 And Kozljanic deepens the concept of living reasonableness by presenting the concept of life-experiencereason (Lebenserfahrungsvernunft); so, he explains that: “Living reasonableness is an experience-reason, a life-experience-reason. it is familiar and important for us in the form of life-experience, life-prudence, and life-wisdom. It is the base on which every

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knowing rises up.”27); and if we can grasp them owing to the fact that they have been closed within our act of giving an answer provided the possibility to the life unfolding itself to us, but when we comprehend these answers, we cannot be sure their validity no longer; and if to live these answers ─I mean, when what we live for is what the life is─ doesn’t promise any crucial significance ─which that’s why some people are able to live much better lives, although didn’t ask the question of “what is life”─; then remains only one question: “What is the point of asking this question?” Because, indeed, after all these investigations, it seems like there is no benefit of asking the question, which is totally true for the first step. But to ask the question of “what is life” manifests us to the main issue about life, it actually is the temporality ─because everything emerges from it─. So then, that means, the investigation about life is not finished yet; now we have to ask what temporality means in this case. The question of “what is life” demonstrates to us there is no essential meaning or importance for what life is; more like, what life is depends on the temporal connection, in order to unfurl itself to us, which that means, even the life obeys the temporal intermediary. In this regard, we come to an important conclusion, the issue that there is no essential significance about what life is and it doesn’t matter. Because, here, the unleashing power is the temporality. And this affair says, if you can understand and employ the temporality, it already doesn’t matter

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that there is no crucial significance about the life, besides, there is a temporal possibility which springs up from this lack of essential meaning; in other words, there is a possibility of ensuring that the life unfolds itself for us rather than it unfolds itself to us. So, then what does temporality, which takes us beyond the question about life, mean?

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The Second Lecture:

Temporality

Last week, we finished our investigation concerning the question of “what is life” with the concept of temporality; and we asked ourselves what temporality means. As you might have noticed, there was a little detail about asking the question, because we especially avoided the question of “what is temporality”, which wasn't an absolute necessary preference. I mean, of course, also we can ask the question in this manner; but this approach enforces us to describe it with a certain method. If we ask the question of “what is temporality”, firstly we would have to define it, and then demonstrate the links between other topics. In other words, we have to build a structure that is based on the essential significance of temporality, which in this case, it is our definition about it. But, after we observed that there is no crucial significance even for what life is, in the question about life, let alone with assuming and admitting that there is an essential meaning for the temporality?

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On the other hand, as expected, we should grasp the temporality in some way, because even if we are skeptical about its essential meaning, we cannot deny its affective position concerning life and, probably, with other topics ─of course, we can use the question of “what is temporality” in order to attain same meaning, but I would like to demonstrate a more efficient approach for it─. In this regard, actually, I would like to see how it binds to the other issues which we consider; for instance, what is the relation between the temporality and the time which are alluded directly? But, also in this point, I prefer to avoid the question of “what is time” with same reason; however, we can find a kind of connection between our life and time, a kind of question which concerns both of them, and thus, I’m able to observe how the temporality settles in this affair. And, in this context, I assert this question: “What would happen if you woke up in a world that didn’t have a tomorrow? (The question might seem irrelevant to the topic. But here, the point isn’t what the question asks, it is more like, how we understand this question; which also manifests what we conceive about time, and how we place ourselves in this matter.) Now, what kind of an answer can be given to this question? Undoubtedly, the question is a little uncertain; there is a world that doesn’t have tomorrow, and we woke up in there, so what will happen and what will we do? First of all, probably we think a kind of catastrophe about this issue; we woke up a

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morning, and on TV, we see that a meteor was coming towards the earth, and everyone will die in 24 hours. Yeah, it is possible to woke up to such morning, I mean, this can be an answer to our question; the question of how it would be to wake up to a world with no tomorrow. But the question is not utterly about a catastrophe, for instance, it can be a personal thing. You woke up one morning, and your doctor says you will die in three months, so that’s the last day for you. In that case, that is not a catastrophe, but also a kind of end. Usually, we have a tendency for the first opinion, however, we don’t deny the other possibility either. Furthermore, here, another stimulating result is, we encounter a kind of an end for our answers; because the question says there is a world that we won’t be able to attain tomorrow, but we strive to ponder this proposition with a kind of information about the end of the world. Otherwise, how can we say that the world won’t attain tomorrow? Actually, this is the kind of situation in which we find ourselves in a predicament. How can we envision annihilation? If we are able to consider it, then it hasn’t happened yet; and when it happens, we can’t think about it anymore. In other words, we infer it from our induction, which the same trouble is also valid for so many issues. For instance, we can oppose both answers concerning the question: Someone can say first; “an annihilation cannot be perceived, so then even though a kind of catastrophe will happen, we can never experience it; in other

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words, for us, there won’t be any end”, and someone else can say; “even if you die, it doesn’t mean the world will disappear. After you die, there will be a world still”. As you can see, here, in fact, there is a priority problem; which one is the first, the time which we dwell within it ─namely the time experience─ or the time which has been established in our perception faculty ─namely to experience the time─? Because if the first one is the time that we dwell within it, then if we die, nothing happens to the world; but if the first one is the time which has been established in our perception faculty, then, an end can never happen because we can’t experience it. We know this is a very old debate between different philosophy schools; but on the other hand, we can see that actually, this trouble is concerning the induction. Because we can say that “it is the first one” for the way of the induction which employs by using the second one. For instance, if we scrutinize Hume’s famous assertion, he says: “For when by any clear experiment we have discovered the causes or effects of any phenomenon, we immediately extend our observation to every phenomenon of the same kind, without waiting for that constant repetition, from which the first idea of this relation is derived... [However] Anything may produce any thing”28, and that means, we can say that “the time which that we dwell within it, is the first one” only by inferring from our time perception and experience. On the other hand, if we look at Goodman’s approach, he says: “The original difficulty about

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induction arises from the recognition that anything may follow upon anything... [And] we have so far neither any answer nor any promising clue to an answer to the question what distinguishes lawlike or confirmable hypotheses from accidental or nonconfirmable ones... [because] our definition[s] makes no distinction whatsoever between valid and invalid inductive inference”29 ─as we can remember, the validity can be possible by temporal intermediary─, so according to this opinion, we can say that “the time which has been established in our perception faculty, is the first one” only already by inhabiting within the time. In this case, actually, both answers about the question are utterly suspicious, then how can we answer this question? On this point, I offer to regard these two citations deeply. Because as we can notice, there is also an important connection between each other. Hume supports his idea with the motto of “anything may produce anything”, which means every discourse about the future is groundless because we talk about it from the present time with our past experience. And Goodman supports his opinion with the motto of “anything may follow upon anything”, which means, every discourse about the past is unfounded because we talk about it from the present time with our concepts which we cannot be sure of their validity without a temporal intermediary. In other words, not only discussion concerning that the opinion of time but also the assumption of that there is a past and future time, is uncertain (of course this uncertainty is not a

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disclosing for the past and the future. Even if we must begin to inquire with the present time, we have to explain these topics. But now, I will focus on our investigation line). Because we can only consider the past and future time toward from the present time, if we look at the question again, we can see that actually, the question says nothing about the past and the future. We woke up in a world, which means we don’t know what happened before; and we know that the world won’t be able to reach tomorrow, but already the concept of tomorrow implies what hasn't been reached. In other words, what we call tomorrow, is already unattainable ─because we always live today─. In this regard, the question can be tackled in a way that it already indicates to our everyday life. I think it doesn’t need any fiction for the question because we already live in a present time that we woke up inside, and which won’t be able to reach tomorrow. (Or we can remind here the Klages’ famous sentence: “Vergangenheit und Zukunft sind nicht... Immer ist es das Jetzt...”30 [past and future are nothing... This is always the Now...] And I think the importance of this sentence is not only the saying there is just Now, but also not saying there is no past or future. Moreover, the idea is, there is past and future, but they are just nothing, because, in fact, all these are just Now. But I’m going to return to this issue later.) But this situation still doesn’t explain what the present time is; because even if we say that we can only talk about today, namely the present time, also there is a compelling problem.

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Firstly, if we say that we can only talk about the present time, then where does the possibility of this reflection come from? If we say that there is nothing beyond the present time, then where is the realm that enables reflection which we need to understand the present time with? (That means it cannot be a kind of solid whole). Secondly, even if we need a sphere that stands out of the present time, then how can we be there out of it? If there is nothing beyond the present time, no past or future, how can we go out? (That means it cannot be considered as separate pieces). In this case, the present time looks like both a giant, an endless moment which we cannot be there out of it, and a pieced instant which thus we can reflect on it by means of engagement between different pieces by us. But admittedly, the hardest point is, these two dimensions don’t only seem unlogic, also they are impossible together, because they demolish their possibility of each other, in other words, their presence is impossible. This is because, we cannot accept this common current opinion which says that the present time has so many pieces as chronological, but we can perceive it as a whole, no ─this is impossible─... So then, how will we figure out this trouble? On this point, I would like to mention Fink, which, in fact, he is a thinker who studied ontological topics. But especially in his magnum opus, when he attains the summit point of the investigation of the being, he came across with the same problem as us. According to him, when we inquire the topic till the final point, we see that our world ─which he understands this concept as a combination

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of the present time and the perspective─, must contain the beings ─as pieces─ and the Being ─as a whole─. But on the other hand, this is impossible, which Fink says for this situation “utopia”. Because for him, if we can talk about the presence of the world, we have to find where this possibility comes from. Here, Fink indicates, if we need a reflection to get a possibility of talking about the Being, then we need to go beyond it, and that means there must be a nothingness. But now, the problem is where the nothingness locates, because if it can be in a place, then it cannot be a nothingness. So that means, it must be in a no-place; but at this time, we need everything ─which it is in all-place─ to get the possibility of saying there is a no-place ─for nothingness─. So, in this aspect, Fink sees a huge reflection in here, so I’m quoting directly: “The World [as all-place of everything] is a utopia; [because] at the same time it is no-place of nothingness”31. This is really a brilliant idea because while he strives to complete the reflection in order to get the possibility of the presence of the world, he sees that there is a huge reflection not only between the being and the nothingness; but also between the all-place and the no-place, which means the nothingness is transcendent for being ─because it’s beyond of it─ which locates in a no-place, it is immanent in being which locates in an allplace, thus they make each other impossible, and the presence appears on this impossibility. In this regard, in fact, the present time illustrates a very original possibility; because at this point, we encounter a result:

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[then] what it must be beyond of it, is within it. But of course, on the other hand, we cannot say that this presence is the presence of the being in a special way (like Hegel or Heidegger); because here, the possibility belongs to the presence due to uniting the being and the nothingness and impossibility of which existing the being or the nothingness. So, actually, the possibility of the presence comes from the impossibility of the being ─and of course also the impossibility of the nothingness─; because their reflection never eventuates (which this is not an ontological or epistemological inference, but about the possible condition of the presence. In other words, when Sartre described the man as “the being by whom the nothingness comes into the world”32, it was entirely right, concerning the ─only─ paradox; but in fact, this is about the possible condition of the presence ─(not only but also) of man─ rather than a crisis of fundamental existence of humans as he mentioned), thus, their possibility never comes ─as long as we experience it─; but a possibility enables this reflection of impossibility (in fact, that means, the presence doesn’t rise over this reflection between being and nothingness; moreover, the possibility of the presence makes the reflection of the impossibility of the being and nothingness possible, otherwise, it cannot be possible either). According to Fink, the meaning of this possibility is presence of the world; but indeed, this concept ─I mean the concept of the world─ says nothing to us; it has no function and meaning, it is just a definition that is produced. Because now, even if there is a possibility for the presence, this is not about a

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pure presence ─because it is just a depiction─. The same problem concerning the holistic and pieces feature is still valid ─in other words, we cannot simply say that “there is only presence” or “this is a presence of ...”, here what has the possibility of presence must be also solving this problem─; but additionally, now we have a new course for that. In here, the presence belongs to what it must be beyond of it, is within it. (To sum up, the huge reflection of the possibility of the presence does not only make being and nothingness impossible but also doesn’t allow with same reason to every kind of pieced character ─like the presence of ...─ and a holistic feature ─like the pure presence─, which that’s the connecting point between Fink’s philosophy and our inquiry.) At this stage, if we return to our investigation about the present time, we see those two kinds of moments ─chronological and perceiving─ cannot be presence. Because both need each other to define themselves and they cannot let the possibility of each other. Then how is present time possible, which in this way also the presence can be possible? Or is the presence make the present time possible? In fact, here, as we can see, the relation between the presence and the present time has the same problem as well. In this regard, there is a kind of an eternal chain for a possible meaning. Then we have to find an answer which not only provides, for example, the meaning of the present time and the presence, but also furnishes us the meaning of the relation between them

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by figuring out this paradoxical connection for each other. I admit that this is a compelling task, but on the other hand, we have a hint for it, which we inferred from Fink’s thought. In this case, in fact, our new question about all these troubles must be this: What is it which has a feature that what it must be beyond of it is within it? Because as we saw, this condition enables every kind of possibility, and also demonstrates every kind of impossibility; because the main element of the question is so inclusive, I mean, every kind of issue concerning uniqueness and multiplicity, being and nothingness, transcendent and immanent, priority and secondary, etc., belongs to this sphere. In this regard, actually, the only thing we have to do is to find what has to be beyond of which has a feature to be within it, and this feature defines it at the same time. Because only that can give us the meaning of all these. So, in this point, I would like to give reference to Cassirer for this difficult and interesting question, because he doesn’t only comprehend this problem, also sees the way out from this trouble. And he says: “[In here], we must find a re-found [form] which it never repeats in the same way. Thus, we can get an inclusive frame by engaging from the different affairs without rejecting their unique features”33, in this regard, “[what we can do is] not to give a true solution to the problem, but to find its exact equation”34 To be honest, even if Cassirer manifests the way that we should follow, the difficulty still lies in deep (what does this

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equation mean? How does it work?); and here, the supporting perspective comes from Schelling’s philosophy: “Representation of the absolute with absolute indifference of the universal and the particular within the particular is possible only symbolically”.35 (Also, Paul Bishop ingeniously demonstrates similar ideas in Goethe's poems, and follows the line from Goethe to Cassirer, in this context. So, he says that: “[for Cassirer] it cannot be thought the "I" without the "Reality", the "Psyche" without "World", the "inside" without "outside", because as Goethe said: "Nothing is inside, nothing is outside; because what's inside that's outside". Moreover, neither the ego without the world nor the world without the ego is tangible. Then what is experience? According to Cassirer, the answers to such questions lie beyond the pure cognitive function, namely the concept of the symbol and the symbolic.”36) And Cassirer draws a conclusion from this conceptual perspective ─because Schelling investigates the concept of symbolic in the philosophy of art─ such general vitalist approach: “[This comprehending form] lives within a special image-world, which the given empirical things aren't simply reflected,... and it manages own symbolic layout where the mind unfolds itself”.37 (Here, also I would like to underline that in the German language there is also another word for the meaning of the symbol: Sinnbild. This is really stimulating affair because this word emerges “sinn” [meaning] and “bild” [image]; in another perspective, the symbol is a meaning of the image, which is utterly adequate for the connection Cassirer notifies.

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What is symbolic dwell in an image-world, because it is the meaning of these images.) This is, I think, a remarkably simple and also entirely magnificent solution. Because according to Cassirer with reference to Schelling, the symbolic is a sign function that calls the meaning in a very special way; a symbolic stand for something ─it points out something─ as a whole, but it doesn’t indicate what it is, in here the meaning occurs in order to substitute what it is, as particular; moreover, the meaning can substitute it whereby the symbol stands for it. Because a symbol may be possible with meaning, but it can never be reduced to one ultimate meaning; in addition, the transaction of inferring the meaning as symbolic can never end, because every ending, means that there are no other meanings, in other words, all these meanings are this symbol, namely, that means again reducing it in meaning, the meaning of “it is all these”. And thus, validity or trueness of the meaning concerning with the symbolic oscillates between two impossible poles, which Bradley manifests this situation such: “If there is any difference between what it means and what it stands for, then trueness is clearly not realized. But, if there is no such difference, then trueness has ceased to exist”38 (I think, in this point, we can remember the relevant chapter about the life; because in there, we said that we always live for somethings, but when we live these at the present time, now we can’t be sure that we live for these anymore; which, as you know, this situation arose by a way

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of the temporal intermediary, and now, we can see that, why temporal intermediary realizes such a process ─when there was a difference we cannot be sure about trueness due to the symbolic, and when there was no any difference, now we cannot say anything about trueness because, there is no any possibility of reflection in order to can say that, in other words there is no any symbolic meaning which can be inferred─). So, as you can see, the concept of symbolic solves many of our problems about the issue (Because as Schelling and Cassirer denoted, the main feature of the presence ─and also itself of the presence─ can be understood by the concept of symbolic. And maybe we can delineate that in this simple way, the presence is already symbolic). For symbolic, what it must beyond of it is within it. Because every meaning comes from a sphere which the symbolic doesn’t reveal it but it contains, and defer the ultimate meaning about the symbolic; (But, as we can notice, here, the main circumstance is that the meaning could be tackled as belonging to the symbolic; namely, we can consider it on only symbolic meaning, otherwise, again the same problem would appear about the statement of the meaning and also symbolic. In this respect, the decisive feature of symbolic arises according to that, in fact, it belongs to the meaning, and actually, what we call as the “meaning” has always to be symbolic meaning) which means, in fact, we cannot say anything about the presence of symbolic ─or pure meaning─, more likely the issue is that the symbolic is the characteristic of that the meaning can be possible (which may be best disclosing this characteristic is

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what Cassirer calls as symbolic conciseness (symbolische Prägnanz)39. Because for the meaning, there is neither raw data (for Cassirer, sensation) nor pure logic (for Cassirer, perception), more like, in this situation we observe dynamic symbolic conciseness for the meaning); Or we can express with other words like; there is only the presence of meaning, and it is entirely symbolic. (Here you can ask what “meaning” is? Blumenberg would have named it as “life-world” (Lebenswelt) as togetherness of our life form and life, but I will explain that later.) (Here, we are able to exhibit that although every kind of ontological ─and of course epistemological─ debate, also what we call as being or object ─the idea or knowledge─, is entirely concerning the meaning in this manner. For instance, Cassirer says: “... how that which we call the object is to be understood not in the manner of a fixed and rigid substantive form but as a functional form. At the same time, it can be seen how the richness of being originally unfolds out of the richness of meaning, and how the manifold character of the significations of being does not stand in contradiction to the demand for the unity of being; rather, it is just the proper fulfillment of this demand that is exhibited.”40 Or we can look at Bradley’s thought: “The idea in judgment is ─always─ the meaning; it is not ever the occasional imagery, and still less can it be the whole psychical event”41) I can imagine that the issue about the meaning and the symbolic looks a bit complex because we always consider these

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as two separate fields, and also you can ask that what is the relation between this symbolic meaning and our investigation topic because the inquiry line has expanded so much. So, we tried to understand the present time and its two main affairs which have both a holistic and particular character; and when we noticed that we looked at the topic from the perspective of presence ─because there was the same problem─ we saw that there must be a different kind of presence for that. Thus, we have arrived that only meaning, which is entirely symbolic, can be present here; because only it carries out these two features. But, of course, still, we cannot understand very well how it fulfills these as vital. I mean, conceptually, it looks sufficient but the vitalist link of the matter, which Cassirer indicates, is still a bit uncertain. So, I think, in this point, the best way to understand the first part of this situation ─I mean, the feature of the holistic character─ is to scrutinize Vaihinger’s approach; because in this point, Vaihinger manifests that every transaction begins with fiction, and its holistic character: “[Fictions] always have as their primary object the formation of those particular apperceptions that are of a final and definitive character; and only such constructs are formed as can be shown to correspond to some kind of reality”.42 In fact, Vaihinger employed this approach just to explain the knowledge systems, but as we can see, the issue which Vaihinger notices, is not only about knowledge systems, but also

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it is about all of our experience about life. (For instance, when Husserl depicted such that “the perception as the possibility of which occurs the absolute composition of the continuity of the shading, is the experience which set the unite of flow”43, he was right about that. But for him, the reason for that is concerning the past time related constitution; thus, he says that this feature of perception is its absolute givenness; whereas, as Vaihinger mentioned, this matter is about the future time, because the point is to exercise circumspection in order to start to act of experience ─because as we can see in the Husserl’s quotation, there, the main characteristic of the perception is concerning the possibility of the holism, not directly itself of it─.) And the point which I especially underline is the possibility of the holistic character of this fiction; because it indicates an important affair. Our living ─which Vaihinger calls reality─ can be possible due to that it can correspond a possibility of the holistic fiction ─perception─, because every fiction ─perception─ can be possible toward from an already finished and certain assumption ─intentionality of the experience (because as we remember, every act has a tendency)─ which hasn’t been actualized yet (but its validity is still ambiguous); in other words, we can live only being already we live for something, the process can begin only with a fiction which has presented itself within a possibility of the holistic character which occurs by positing a certain something. And here, Bradley again indicates a very important affair about that: “[Even if] we cannot imagine how in detail its outline is filled up. But to say that it unites certain general characters

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within the living system of one undivided apprehension, is within our power”.44 In other words, the symbolic meaning which we mention isn’t only a kind of literature ─or metaphysical─ things, it is also about living. As Cassirer accentuated, and as Bradley stated, we infer these symbols from beings that we live (as the act of the experience) ─and we explain to live by means of these─, because these demonstrate to us how we can get the possibility of experiencing the life as a whole. In this regard, we can see that the present time and its symbolic layout come from vitalism of the temporality. And here, Klages discloses this relation very well, he indicates, we cannot experience the time as purely, it is always about to live, we can experience it whereby it keeps us alive. But also, he uncovers an entirely decisive issue about the means of the relation with the future time. So according to Klages: “... the vital time that comes into play does not mean a measurable distance of the now from the later, but the source of what we call the objectifying future”45 (As we can notice, what we accentuated by Vahinger’s approach, was concerning the possibility of the holistic character of the symbolic present time; but we didn’t explain how this possibility can be actual. And here, a crucial point which Klages exposed, directly link to this issue. Fiction ─and perception─ presumes the possibility of the holistic character concerning itself; but what fulfills or renders actual that, is the relation of the objectifying future. Besides, here, we can also regard Heidegger:

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“...The present springs up from the future in the original ecstatic unit of temporalizing of temporality.”46 But in Heidegger’s philosophy, the problem is, the future is placed out of the present, it is understood within the horizon of the present; in this reason, in his delineating, the future is thought together with the nothingness of existence, whereas, as Klages expressed, it is about also everythingness of vital.) At this point, we come to very important conclusions; firstly, now we can understand why we can talk about life only by the phenomenology of living. Because here, the symbolic present time is neither about a time which lies out of us, nor about only our process of mind; moreover, it is the experience act which we can understand the time and our mental process. In other words, we can begin to understand from our symbolic present time, which is the phenomenology of living. Secondly, as Bradley and Klages implied, this symbolic character gives us a comprehension of vital time, and that means, we can experience the time as a vital time by our symbolic present time due to that the symbolic has a holistic character which arises with the objectifying of future. And this is what Jung calls the meaningpregnant symbol (Bedeutungsschwangere des Symbols)47, namely, the symbolic character of the present time gives birth to the future; thus, symbolic present time demonstrates a holistic character, because everything that is coming, could only come from it ─that means, it is the objectifying the future─. In other words, symbolic present time has a holistic character because it carries the “future” inside. (Of course, when we say it in this

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way, you can ask that is this concept of future time really appropriate for its meanings. Actually no, because here, as you can see, there is no place for the future time, more likely it can be enabled by the motion within the present time. In this respect, I will prefer here Husserl’s concept of “coming” (kommenden) instead of this concept; because for Husserl, what we call future, is actually can be understood from an alive motion, in other words, what we call the future is actually the coming.48) But, in this point, we also regard the second part of our investigation ─I mean, the feature of the pieced character─, which there is also utterly opposite direction, and here, we can see the relation about these meanings which spring up towards from their symbolic characters ─thus as related the concept of fiction and perception─. In this regard, I will offer to look at Derrida, which he says that every meaning ─which according to Derrida, concerning the meaning entirely belongs to the significance of symbolic meaning─ can occur its deficiency, every meaning emerge by deferring the ultimate judgment on the fiction where it came from it, because of it is also a sign function due to its symbolic character: “The sign would then be deferred presence... the circulation of signs defers the moment when we could meet the same thing, take possession of it, consume it or spend it, touch, see it, have the intuition present”.49 And that’s why, even if we always live for something, we can’t know what it is; because the meaning always defer an ultimate or a valid answer about it, and when it states it, then it is not valid anymore ─because as we can remember, Bradley said if there is no

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difference, then the trueness can’t exist anymore─. In other words, this function of the sign manifests how we experience life as a continuous ongoing non-completed process. However, in this point, you can notice a weird affair concerning this approach; because even if Derrida is right, there is a big question about the issue: What happens when we possess something, touch something, see or spend something? As you can remember, we saw that we can only talk about the presence of meaning in our inquiry, then what kind of relations are all of these? (If we will conceive the meaning as a relevant sign function, and thus ─for instance─ while every kind of speech act was attending to this sphere, then what will it mean the experience which includes in language process? Also, if these experiences are contained in the sign function, then what will the subject for the signification process be? What is the relation between the meaning and the experience while there can be only the presence of the meaning?) I think this is the peak point of the topic; because even if we can follow the issue until here by using the significance of the symbolic character of meaning, now we come across an entirely different problem that cannot be solved by this approach. Because Derrida delineates the matter in an accurate way and also, he cannot explain the link. Admittedly, as concerning the sing function, Derrida is right; because every kind of sign, can be possible by deferring the ultimate judgment about its connection, but the problem is

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that Derrida tackles the ultimate judgment as a kind of present time which is related to the action; according to him, for instance, a sign function points out something concerning making something, and the ultimate judgment is here making it. But if there isn’t anything other than the presence of the meaning, then also making something is kind of a meaning relation ─I mean the meaning of the experience of making it─. In this respect, also every kind of present time experience ─like seeing, eating, hearing, touching, making, etc.─ is about the meaning, which means all these also postpone the ultimate judgment about that; (I mean, a sign function cannot defer the ultimate judgment concerning making something, as a kind of act, in there, also the meaning of the experience of making something defers the ultimate judgment; the act as the meaning defers it ─the act itself is not deferred─.) but then, what happens? (In other word, Derrida, such as Hegel ─because he confused epistemological inferences as if those are a kind of ontological facts─, intermixes the possibility of the knowledge and the knowledge of the possibility. For him, as a sign function, the speech always begins with a promise, but it can never be kept, is just renewed by the act; in this regard, according to Derrida, “La langue parle d'elle-même” [the language speaks for itself].50 Whereas here, the impossibility doesn’t belong to keeping the promise, it belongs to the guarantee of which keeping the promise. Because if a promise cannot be kept, then the motto of “the language speaks for itself” would have been impossible ─the promise of the language speaking for itself, can never be

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kept, so it cannot be valid─. As we can see, in Derrida’s thought, the act as a kind of absolute what it cannot be named keeps speaking alive. But ─for instance─ as Schlegel indicated, “all incomprehension is ─also─ relative... [because] there must be a connection of some secret brotherhood among words”.51 In other words, the act which seems like it cannot be named [─incomprehension─], in included in the language ─as what it defers the ultimate judgment, as such other meanings [─relative─]─, not only as a kind of performativity but also as a kind of promise which it can be actual [─secret brotherhood─].) As you can see, Derrida’s fault is that he considers the sign function as a kind of language which is related to ontological tradition; but as Cassirer emphasizes, it is utterly vital, which means, every kind of experience is also symbolic ─as a sign function─. But at this point, we must ask then, what is postponed? Here, I offer to scrutinize especially two philosophers; Ülken and ─with Cassirer’s link─ Klages. Because they haven’t only figured out the trouble in a very unusual way but also, they have signified important connections. So firstly, Ülken ponders this problem of the meaning as a kind of relation between knowing the meaning and living the meaning, and he says that: “If we want to know, then we will have forgotten whatever we have lived; if we want to live or to continue living, then we will have forgotten what we have known”.52 In this regard, according to Ülken, we can begin to know the meaning by forgetting to live

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it, and we can begin to live the meaning by forgetting to know it; but in any case, we know the meaning by deferring we have forgotten to live it, we live the meaning by deferring we have forgotten to know it. In other words, in fact, in a sign function process what is deferred is oblivion. But at this point, of course, the concept of oblivion seems so implicit ─looks so subjective─. Because we always tend to think the forgetting as a kind of mental process, which also contains this meaning; but if we stay in this sphere in order to understand the oblivion, that means, what Ülken emphasized hasn’t been grasped enough for our inquiry. However, also Ülken doesn’t explain this concept very well, he just notices its importance which has to be linked to the main concepts. In this regard, I would like to look at Cassirer’s anthropological observations, because when Cassirer investigates the mythical understanding, he underlines a very special point concerning a process which people perform and experience it, and this topic is directly connected to the concept of oblivion in an unexpected way; so I’m reading directly: “... A magical rite gives us a clear and concrete impression of the true sense of ‘sympathetic magic’, and of its social and religion function. The men who celebrate such a festivity, who perform their magical dances, are fused with each other and fused with all things in nature. They are not isolated; their joy is felt by the whole of nature and shared by their ancestors. Space and time have vanished...”53

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In crazy, magical dances, people’s ego utterly melts and thus, it fuses [“sym”-pathetic] with all nature and things. But what does this experience mean? Although these performances and their effects seem supernatural [magical], the reason for these cannot disclose by what they are; rather, the pattern of this process is familiar with a transaction of forgetting. Because, when we forget something, it totally dissolves and mixes with all other things; it doesn’t disappear, but also it is not in there, more like, it pervades in all. And in a celebrating dance, the ego of people actually is entirely forgotten in all; it doesn’t abolish, but also it doesn’t appear, it just forgets itself within everything (it’s like what Blanchot said: “... when I forget, I already feel closer to you. But with nearness which does not near... As if it was the last place for every encounter... Everything is in everything.”54). And, as what it was expressed, the concept of oblivion is much more than being related with just a kind of sign function; here, it connects to a deep mystery and exposes it within a vital process. In this perspective, in addition, the decisive affair of this sample is to demonstrate to us that there is not only just to forget something but also forget itself; in other words, oblivion isn’t concerning only a mental process, because also itself of the mind dwells in the nest of oblivion; otherwise, how can we get the possibility of experiencing the Cosmos as a whole? Or if we say with Chrétien’s words: “The unforgettable is not what we perpetually grasp and what cannot withdraw from memory, but what does not cease to grasp us and from which we cannot withdraw.”55

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(I’m able to envision how the relationship seems still a bit ambiguous, also maybe looks irrelevant. But anyway, this issue, undoubtedly, deserves much more deeply inquiry, which also has the key role ─in with different comprehensive─ for some philosophers like Nietzsche, Klages, or Deleuze. For instance, in Nietzsche’s thought, Dionysos who is the god of wine and ecstasy is not only the main character for his grasping, it’s also unavoidable as the togetherness of reciprocity: “And Dionysos [said]: If you will love yourself, you should hate yourself first. I’m your labyrinth”56; or in Klages’ philosophy the description of the concept of the cellular-microcosmic (zellarmikrokosmiche) man ─which it has so decisive meaning as concerning Eros by means of Dionysos for him─ is, “he sees within him the colors of plants and animals, or he sees columns, screens... He celebrates his festival in the purple vaults of his soul”57; lastly in Deleuze’s approach the concept of delirium (délire) has entirely familiar meaning: “...these two poles are found to coexist in every case of delirium, and fragments of schizoid revolutionary investment coincide with investment blocks of paranoiac reactionary. The oscillation between the two poles is a constituent aspect of the delirium”58. Here, we can see all the main points about the issue; for instance, the oblivion, in fact, uncovers an impossible situation which springs up from a kind of a reciprocal relationship as such not demolish but also not in there, etc.; and also, even if this situation looks like impossible, actually, it can’t be avoided. But as we notice, the root of all these concepts and thoughts ─which was mentioned

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by Nietzsche, Klages, and Deleuze─ doesn’t come from any kind of existential, mystic, or incomprehensible area; it is just concerning the oblivion and its characteristic, and that’s why we cannot expect any guarantee of the positive condition from these approaches even if these philosophers assume that. Because the oblivion is essentially committing nothing. But at this point, you can ask that then what is the motivation of all these philosophers. I think the marvelous glossing for that is Robert J. Kozljanic's analysis about the relation between dance and becoming-child. And for him, if the human is never cut off from his life-sources, and never let the out-of-the-line dancing go away, then he will be able to keep his "becoming-child", which that means he will be in his safe house of childhood, in his homeland. In dance, the human dwells in the homeland of childhood.59 So even if this situation doesn't promise something about the future, furnishes a very strong and attractant feeling, which that’s why this concept is about ecstasy and oblivion, and that’s why this concept doesn’t relate to any existential, mystic or incomprehensible sphere because oblivion is ─if we say with Kozljanic’s concept─ just basic-ethos (Basisethos)60 in which we feel ourselves in the homeland of the childhood.) So, as you can see, the thought of oblivion strictly gains a vital meaning by means of the link which is penetrated to Cassirer’s observation. But also, here we are able to accentuate Palágyi, which his philosophy is concerning the crucial detail of the connection between the oblivion and the ecstatic experience. For example, when Palágyi expressed, “only the non-alive is

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perceived, only the life is felt”61, in fact, he references to those ideas, “ecstatic experiences (Gemütsbewegungen) find their source in the vegetative life-process and [thus] they are closely related to digestive-processes”62. In other words, although we can’t perceive life as a whole, we can feel it whereby the emotions as ecstatic experiences are closely relative with the process of digestion of all Cosmos as such the plants which diffuses everywhere; but even if it happens, we still can’t perceive it. And thus, we connect to Derrida after a long investigation chain again; but now, we can see that, in a sign function what it is deferred is not a kind of act or experience ─because all these also are entirely meanings─, but the oblivion or the forgetting in the experience ─because here, there is the forgetting of the meaning─. So then, we can say that, here, concerning a sign function, even if the ultimate judgment is always about the unforgettable ─like truth─, what is ultimate can be ─only─ experienced ─and only─ by the emotions (if we remember Palágyi), and substantially, thus, it is totally oblivion. Or again, if we say Chrétien’s words: “Only the immemorial is properly unforgettable.”63 At this point, we can also reach a very crucial point by means of what Chrétien declared, which admittedly, this is another important dimension of oblivion, I mean, the topic about the memory related with the forgetting. But of course, now, we cannot simply expound the memory as concerning the mind

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─again─, because still all results that we have obtained in our inquiry about the oblivion, are valid; in other words, we have to comprehend the memory as vital, which I think, this is the connection that finally could be linked to our investigation about the feature of the meaning as a sign function and the pieced characteristic of the symbolic present time. For this complex binding, I propose to regard with Ricoeur's comprehensive work, which in his grasping there are two main ideas: Here, the first one is that, “[particularly as concerning the history] time experience and narrative are constituent poles [as necessary reciprocity]”64; and the second one is that, “neither we can say the importance of the narrative establishes a mastering subject for all meaning... nor we can say the mystery of time which cannot be reduced within the limits of narrative, means that there is an absolute obscurantism... more likely, [the history] is about to arouse the exigency to think more and to speak differently”65; and this main structure, in fact, can be transformed as the past time ─history─ with the forgetting ─time experience─ and the memory ─narrative─ (which Ricoeur doesn’t make this transformation, but all relations and structure are perfectly suitable his approach). So then, we can infer two decisive lines from there. Firstly, we can see the link between the oblivion ─which gives the meaning of forgetting and memory together─ and the past time; because the “past time” can be possible only by the oblivion. Those what we talk about within the past time actually

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belong to the oblivion. (Or, we can say in this way, all essential meanings of the past time totally belong to the features of the character of oblivion. Concerning those that happen in the past time, we cannot say that it didn’t happen anything but also, we cannot show what happens there; more likely, we presume those by arousing ─by remembering─ them at the present time. In other words, there is no past time, but oblivion.) Of course, here, our all-over analyzes about the past time ─especially as you remember those what have been uncovered by Goodman─ are still valid, but the concept of oblivion makes bypass to all these; because it doesn’t relate any kind of ontological or epistemological assumption, it just a phenomenon within the act of experience which belongs to the symbolic present time. Secondly, what Ricoeur underlined in an ambiguous way like to think more and to say differently, as we can notice, is not directly about the past time ─the history─ but about the attitude concerning it. Although this is Ricoeur's wish related attitude, I see there is a kind of characteristic feature about past time ─the history─; more likely, I think, eventually this is the pick point which we can connect the pieced character of the symbolic present time. Here, Ricoeur states a perpetual relation related with the history ─the past time─, but I offer that this perpetual relation isn’t related with history, moreover it is the feature of oblivion that belongs to what we call the past time ─the history─. I can imagine, the connection between approaches seems uncertain, the reason for that is about the boundary of Ricoeur's philosophy; because, literally, Ricoeur notices the link between

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the concepts, but doesn’t ask the reason for the consequences which he obtained. In this regard, I would like to emphasize another thinker concerning this compelling affair, and here, the explanation of issue comes from Klages’ thought, and his simple but also the ingenious solution is the concept of rhythm; so then, I quote: “the rhythm [like most enthralling melody] makes the blood stir and numbs the consciousness... [and] the similarity of experience that underlies the conception of temporal and spatial rhythms is a ‘primal phenomenon’ suitable for the estimation of equality as well as inequality”.66 For Klages, the concept of rhythm numbs the consciousness ─which we forget to know what we live for─, and stirs the blood ─which we forget what we know─; and in this regard, he connects the concept of oblivion to the concept of rhythm as totally vitalist meaning. However, here, the main point is about the feature of rhythm; firstly, we see its link with the concept of oblivion, but the leading issue is its correlation with the perpetually feature of oblivion as related to the past time. So, in this point, when Klages disclosed the issue which links to the concept of oblivion, with the concept of rhythm, he also indicates that the rhythm as a kind of primal phenomenon manifests us the correlation of two different situations; measurement and motion: “every measurement begins and ends, but wave motion is unborderly, it comes and goes without any beginning or ending... and every kind of measurement is just a

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limiting part of the motion, but also we can delineate the motion only like this”.67 This is a really important point because, in this way, the concept of rhythm doesn’t disclose the only concept of oblivion but also it connects oblivion to the temporal link ─and in this respect, to the feature of the pieced character of symbolic present time─. And as we remember, we were investigating the pieced characteristic of the present time by regarding its symbolic meaning, and now we can comprehend the issue from a much more general point of view. As Klages notify, the pieced characteristic of the present time which we consider as a chronological feature is utterly about rhythm, and that also signifies the motion as adequate with all these meaning chains. Because a rhythm is firstly a measurement, but it also manifests the motion as a predecessor for it. In other words, we define the clock ticks as one second and this rhythm gives us the motion perception, but here, the indication of the flow of time is not simply movement but the continuity of the rhythm which will be a motion until it will culminate as repeating. (Here Klages perfectly discloses the special position of the rhythm within the motion by distinguishing between the concepts of rhythm and -clock- tick (Rhythmus und Takt): "What rhythmic is expresses itself and appear [as] the life, on the other hand, the tick forces rhythmic life-puls-beat (Lebenspulsschlag) into a particular law of Geist."68 In other words, the tick alone is not a rhythm, because there is no context within the motion. There is no continuity in these ticks, there are just identical copies; and these identical copies cannot have any idea about

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their continuity, the tick alone lacks the motion. It doesn't repeat, just copies the sameness; eternal identical and motionless copies ─like other products of the logical mind, because every tick is just a measurement─. Whereas in the continuity there are always differences, which in this way it can be said that there is a continuity, there is a motion. So as Klages profoundly indicated, the rhythm is not just a repeat or tick, but also the continuity of this repeat by repeating.) Because every movement emerges in rhythm ─otherwise we can’t percept it as a motion─ (which we call this relation as velocity and displacement), and every rhythm repeats by the movement ─otherwise there can’t be a rhythm─ (which we call this relation as velocity and acceleration), thus, we can say that rhythm is a repeating movement (because the integral ─acceleration─ of a function ─motion─ that can be derived ─displacement─ at each point, can be taken), and here I draw this conclusion: motion is what makes rhythm repeat itself with repeating in it. This last part concerning rhythm and movement, in fact, needs a bit of explanation, which is the case of the concept of oblivion and coming to attach. Because as you can see, actually we cannot talk about a kind of pure rhythm or motion, there are always basic conditions in order to state them; and these conditions entirely connect the main feature of the oblivion and coming. Oblivion is not simply a rhythm but continuity ─or repeating─ of it; and coming is not simply a motion but the movement of the rhythm which will culminate as repeating.

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In this regard, finally, we can reach quite original results concerning the symbolic present time; because as you remember, in fact, we tried to uncover two different dimensions about the feature of the present time as symbolic meaning, and we saw that, what we call future time, as coming and what we call past time, as oblivion are characteristic features of the present time as symbolic. There is neither future nor past time, or any huge holistic moment or eternal instant which proceeds as chronological. There is only concerning the act of experience, as about living, symbolic present time which links to each other the coming and the oblivion. But of course, we can ask what is that connection between the coming and the oblivion? Actually, the answer for that lies in the correlation between the concept of rhythm and movement, which this relation, actually, directly springs up from the connection between the concept of coming and oblivion. Because we can talk about rhythm and motion by means of the oblivion and the coming; in other words, what we call rhythm is possible as being within oblivion, and what we call movement is possible as being within coming. Thus, the link between the rhythm and the movement gives us a disclosure concerning the concept of oblivion and coming. And this point is the flow of time, because the rhythm and the motion together bring the flow of time, and ─as we remember─ that was the continuity of the rhythm which will be a motion until it will culminate as repeating. But the question is

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that how ─or when─ can there be a continuity of the rhythm which will be a motion until it culminates as repeating? Or we can ask in a much more basic and simple way, how ─or when─ can we say that there is a rhythm which will be a motion until it culminates as repeating? If we ponder this question with the concept of oblivion and coming, we come across such condition; there can be a rhythm that will be a motion until it culminates as repeating, only if ─without any kind of epistemological, ontological, or logical reference─ there is a seeing the coming in oblivion. Seeing the coming in oblivion links the oblivion and the coming to each other, it enables symbolic present time ─as becoming─. Or in Schlegel’s marvelous words: “[With the seeing coming] the possibility of memorizing [namely oblivion] spring up from the unity of the finite and the infinite by the concept of becoming [namely symbolic present time]. With this conception, the difference between the finite and the infinite is destroyed, and this makes the possible not only the memorizing but also to be ready for epiphany [namely coming]”69 (Here, maybe, I’m able to give a reference concerning this topic ─I mean concerning epiphany─ in the way of Chrétien and Ovidius. Chrétien accentuates a story from the Bible in order to understand a similar problem which we try to grasp, it is the episode of “Jacob wrestling with the Angel ─or with the God to some comments─”. According to the narrative, Jacob encounters a man while he is going back to Canaan in his journey, and man

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doesn’t allow for Jacob to pass from there but also, he doesn’t say anything, thus they start wrestling, and they wrestle until sunrise. In the end, Jacob is given the name “Israel” and blessed, while the man refuses to give his own name. Then Jacob calls the name of this place “Penuel”, which means “face of God”. For Chrétien, this wrestling seems familiar with the situation of our living; because we wrestle with life like Jacob. And in this point, Chrétien signifies an important issue related to the silence and the word, he says: “These hands ─which belong to those who wrestle with each other─ silently vibrating in the proximity of the word ─the name of Israel─”70. But, I think, here, the crucial affair lies between the concept of vibrating and proximity rather than silence and speech, which in this respect here, all relations look totally same with our concepts: vibrating – oblivion, proximity – coming, rhythm – speech, movement – silence. And as we can notice, the connection has been established in a different way, here, the silence (movement) is concerning with the vibrating (oblivion) and the word (rhythm) is concerning with the proximity (coming); which demonstrates these concepts have totally nested each other in a point, which can be understood by it. This point is “Penuel”, “face of ─silence─ God” such as an Ovidius’ poem: “... dum loquor, hore fugit... et tacita vultu scire futura licet... si quaeret quid agam, spe noctis vivere dices...” [While I’m speaking, time flows... a silence face can know the future... if she asks how I am, say that I live in hope of night]71. The vibrating silence in the proximity

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of speech would be able to know the “future”, thus it can be lived in hope of night...) So then, after this long investigation line concerning temporality, we reach an entirely decisive but also ambiguous point. Because if seeing the coming in oblivion establishes the symbolic present time ─namely the temporality─, which this intermediary has a crucial position about the question of what is life, and we wanted to understand it because of the possibility of employing it; then what does it mean seeing the coming in oblivion? Or, if it is possible, then how can I see the coming in oblivion? Also, even if this question seems like a kind of new interrogation topic, it is rather about those what we saw in previous inquiries as a possibility; thus, it entirely belongs to those investigations with its basic meaning. However, eventually, it is the only thing that can give an undertaking concerning all other questions about life and temporality; and more importantly, it is able to make that because of the meaning which arises from the temporality as an intermediary to grasp the life. So then, I will attempt to sum all these up next week; but it won’t be a kind of final section for this work; because, as you will see, in fact, our last lecture won’t be about the beyond of our all questions or won’t have the last word. Rather, it will demonstrate to us the meaning of the possibility which we already saw at the beginning. In other words, it will give us a kind

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of new perspective to comprehend the reason why we are able to ask the question of what life is; and this aspect will be much more than a simple approach; more like, it will unveil the quite new relation with the life, which we already live in that way.

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The Third Lecture:

Foresight of the Coming

We have asked earlier the question: “How can I see the coming in oblivion?”, and this possibility ─I mean, the possibility of a question which could be asked─ had come from the feature of the symbolic present time ─namely the temporality as vital time─. Because the only way of which the symbolic present time that has some characteristics which connect to those what we call as the future and past time, enables its ingrained components as conclusive, can be ensured by the grasping of seeing coming as oblivion. Even if that conclusion seems radical or weird, I think, this is not a kind of discovery unveiled by me; but rather, maybe, that can be a manner of engaging to comprehend this result. I mean, if it was necessary to demonstrate an instance for that, here, we can point out a late period of Schelling’s philosophy; which is also a kind of furnishing a sample concerning the issue, because Schelling does not only denote the idea of seeing the coming but also he implies its basic meanings and main features.

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So then, I would like to begin with a quote from Schelling: “There is no wisdom (Weisheit) for a man when there is none in the objective course of things. The first presupposition of philosophy as the pursuit of wisdom is, therefore, that in the object, that is being, in the world itself, there is wisdom. I ask for wisdom, which means: I demand with wisdom, foresight [─the coming─] (Voraussicht) and freedom which occupies the being. Philosophy sets in, not as it happens, but at the beginning with wisdom, with foresight [─the coming─], and thus with freedom, before the arising of the being.”72 Here, I would like to underline especially two points, which are about seeing the coming as well as these indicate a quite implicit affair. The first point is, admittedly, concerning the wisdom of the being; this expression sounds like an entirely metaphysical fact, but as Schelling detected, rather, it is about a kind of assumption for the philosophy. However, I admit that this point needs elaboration ─but I’m going to focus that on the following parts─. And here, the second point concerns the foresight of the coming (Voruassicht) ─which in fact, the word of Voraussicht should be translated as “foresight”, but I would like to emphasize a special affair here. Also, you can ask that why is it not the concept of seeing the coming but foresight of the coming? And this is the second point of my special expression which will be uncovered in the subsequent parts─, which are related to the concept of wisdom and freedom.

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Now, if we stare at the second issue, we can see that the concept of wisdom needs the concept of the foresight of the coming (Voraussicht), and freedom, which is also Schelling’s description concerning the epistemological structure. In other words, Schelling places the foresight of the coming on the basis of every kind of knowledge. And I think, this is an utterly marvelous statement about what we’ve already uncovered in our previous inquiry on the question of what life is. Because in there, as we remembered, the answer ─and as Schelling has mentioned, not only answering but answering wisely because of the concept of wisdom─ cannot be related to any kind of truth, but it is true; which means, now as we can see, the wisely answer is always about the foresight of the coming. But in addition, there is another crucial point about the foresight of the coming, which is why I perpetually accentuate the concept of Voraussicht concerning the concept of the foresight of the coming. Here, I would like to scrutinize another decisive topic about this issue; because I think, what Schelling has remarked about the base of every kind of epistemological affair, is only the first dimension concerning the foresight of the coming. I mean, when Schelling was saying that the foresight of the coming is the base of the knowledge, he was right; however, the issue about the foresight of the coming, isn’t only about the knowledge or epistemology, but also wisdom, or wisely knowledge, and there is a huge difference even if Schelling hasn’t manifested in his notes.

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At this point, also when we observe the issue about the foresight of the coming, we would see a simpler affair; the matter of knowing the coming. The concept of foresight of the coming is about backward knowledge inasmuch as it is about the beyond of knowledge, which is the wisdom in Schelling’s philosophy. But here, I would like to regard another remarkable philosopher, who is not well known: Feder. He investigates almost the same problems with scarcely the same lines, but he notices a perfect relation between these concepts. However, I think, Feder’s brilliant approach is to ask the question directly, and to reveal the issue by employing an abstruse connection: “How does man know the future? Naturally, no other means than the knowledge of the past, and the arriving darkness and clear judgment, that the same will come back under similar circumstances. Not every encounter becomes an experience. Without the existence of concepts in stock and the exercise of thought, the man gives too little attention to what is going on around and with him, does not comprehend the context of the effects and causes; to make comments and to create sweet memories where it might be; where he does, who is already prudence (Klugheit).”73 Here, Feder doesn’t only signify the basic meaning of the foresight of the coming, he also exposes a decisive link between the foresight of the coming and the wisdom. Because even if the wisdom should come from and by the foresight of the coming, there is not any wisely base for the foresight of the coming; rather, it is concerning prudence. And as Feder pointed out, the foresight of the coming as prudence doesn’t utterly separate from

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the wisdom –or namely, in Feder’s words, the knowledge of the past (and while Feder saying that we can attain to foresee the coming by the knowledge of the past, he is totally right; but here, we should add that, also the foresight of the coming emerges as the knowledge of the past. And that’s why Feder elaborates on the creating sweet memory; because it would have been convincing for us concerning whether we could foresee the coming or not.)–. In this aspect, concerning the concept of foresight the coming (Voraussicht), Feder establishes a distinction between the concept of prudence (Klugheit) and wisdom (Weisheit): “The general doctrine of prudence (Klugheit), however, can prescribe nothing more than the plan or the form of this deliberation, which constitutes the essence of caution (Vorsicht).”74 I think, eventually we are able to commence to grasp all these relations between words. Prudence (Klugheit) as the foresight of the coming (Voraussicht) is more about the caution (Vorsicht) than wisdom (Weisheit) ─which as we can see the word of “Weisheit” comes from the same root with the word of “wissen” [to know]─. Because the foresight of the coming (Voraussicht), in fact, comes from the caution (Vorsicht). But here, an important point still remains latent; the difference between the knowledge and the wisdom that come from the foresight of the coming; which I think, that affair also uncovers another main characteristic between the foresight of the coming (Voraussicht) and the caution (Vorsicht). So, in this

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sense, I will suggest looking at Cassirer again; because at this point, he expounds on the topic, and also indicates the issue about what Feder describes as inherent concerning how we can foresee the coming: “…The people learn to Ab-Sicht instead of watching to a purpose such they are enchanted, this Ab-Sicht establish to Voraus-Sicht; and it establishes the possibility of attempt that toward a purpose which it stands in spatial nothingness and temporal remoteness.”75 As we can see, here, Cassirer unveils two interesting points; first, as he implies, the basement of the foresight of the coming (Voraussicht) comes from, actually, a kind of intentional act of seeing the coming (Absicht) ─here “Sicht” means just “view”, but “Abischt” means “intention”─; which incontestably, the relation looks similar to the one with the concept of caution (Vorsicht), but of course, this similarity is still ambiguous. And secondly, as he establishes a distinction between the “Absicht” [intentional act of seeing the coming] and “Voraussicht” [foresight the coming], here, we can see the relation between the knowledge and wisdom, which is also, the explanation of the relation between the concept of seeing the coming and the foresight of the coming, springs up from there. Because every knowledge comes from the intention (Absicht) first ─as Cassirer expressed─, which means it can commit to nothing essentially but everything comes from that, and this is the concept of seeing the coming; but that possibility of knowledge, can uncover the possibility of prudence ─which

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contains the wisdom as well, but it is much more about than that─, strictly, the possibility of the foresight of the coming (Voraussicht), which is the only point that could commit as temporal. In this regard, we can see that seeing the coming means strives to live the coming ─namely, to live the meaning without knowing─, but it can give the possibility of the foresight of the coming ─namely to live wisely meaning by using to see the coming─. So then, we have two main questions concerning where the concept of the foresight of the coming sprung up from, in order to inquire. Firstly, how seeing the coming (Absicht) ─intention─ can establish the foresight of the coming (Voraussicht)? And secondly, what is the position of caution (Vorsicht) in all this? (I think, we conceived very well the relation between these German words, and now, I will use only English ones). Then, firstly, if we look at the meaning of establishing the foresight of the coming by seeing the coming, we can notice that, substantially, Cassirer demonstrates the way we should follow. As he denoted, the relationship is established as a kind of attempt to what stands in spatial nothingness and temporal remoteness; I think, this is one of the perfect descriptions concerning seeing the coming. For instance, I have interpreted this idea in my previous works like this: “Seeing the coming (geleceği görme) does not necessarily mean knowing what will happen in the future, but rather it is to live in a present time which the future will open itself.”76

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I think this expression is adequate in an equal manner to what Feder manifested and what Cassirer implied. Seeing the coming as related with what will happen in the future either can be portrayed as a kind of peculiar way of knowing or can be depicted as a kind of specific way of living; then maybe, it can be collected such phrase, seeing the coming means to be open for what will come, thus it can culminate there. Then, as we can see, there are two main dimensions for such a valid process: We should be open to what will come, and it should culminate there. Then, if we scrutinize the first dimension concerning the topic, in fact, we should understand what it means to be open to what it will come. Here, I will offer another profound but also latent philosopher, to comprehend this matter, Schuler. The important position of Schuler comes from his conceiving about what we inquired, in a special way and with useful concepts. So, his crucial approach is to engage between two simple but recondite concepts; open life and closed life. And he clarifies the bond between these two like this: “Signs of open life (geöffnete Leben) is feeling of fulfillment and saturation, are standstill of time... The closed life (geschlossene Leben) is work directed to the outside... This age is guided by the motive of working towards a future goal.”77 I hope, we can immediately comprehend the relation between Schuler’s concept of closed life and what Cassirer delineated concerning learning to see the coming. Because the first step is to learn the seeing coming, is to abandon to look at a

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single purpose in the future, which is utterly closed life; and Schuler’s depiction of open life, in this regard, directly gives reference to attempt a spatial nothingness and a temporal remoteness. But more importantly, he reveals three special points that are related to the main characteristic of open life: The feeling of fulfillment, saturation, and standstill time. Here, I would like to draw attention to the first part of these topics; because eventually, it connects us to the second question concerning seeing the coming ─what it will come, culminated within us when we are open to what it will come─. Because Schuler’s concept of open life is not only appropriate to the idea of being open, but it also contains an effort to explain how can what will come to culminate in that openness. And when we are engaged between concepts by Schuler, we can notice that we are also coming back to the Feder. Thus, the first part of Schuler’s expression talks about the feeling of fulfillment and saturation; which I think we can see the chain of meaning, as Feder says, from the one who creates sweet memory, is already prudent, to the concept of saturation, which all these lines emerge from the approach of to be open to what it will come. And we can see another significant line from Feder’s indications again, from the concept of caution (Vorsicht), to the concept of fulfillment, which that connection arises as to the idea of the culminating of what it will come within our openness. So, we reach our second question which we asked at the beginning ─the question of what the position of concept of

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caution is─, which in this point, finally we can understand all related links. We can reach the foresight of the coming only with the seeing coming, and it emerges only with an open life which contains the idea of being open ─saturation or being able to create sweet memory─ and the idea of caution ─fulfillment or the culmination of which what will come within our openness (or maybe we can express this dimension such way; to be cautious for the life opening itself to our openness. Because in this dimension, there is no necessity; even if we are entirely cautious for everything, if life doesn’t open itself, then what will come doesn’t open itself to us. However, even if life opens itself to us, if ─as Feder implied─ we could not be cautious for that, then again what will come doesn’t open itself. Thus, we can see that, the only thing we can do is to be cautious and hope; because their possibility is always there ineffaceably)─, and if we can employ this process as a kind of method, then we can reach the foresight of the coming by seeing the coming. Hence, we can say seeing the coming is that the life opens itself to us, but the foresight of the coming is that the life opens itself for us ─or also we can express like this: seeing the coming gives us what life is, but the foresight of the coming renders us a kind of god whom life devotees ─. That’s why in the seeing coming there is no essential commitment ─because it is just passive intention in the traditional meaning─; but in the foresight of the coming there is the possibility of temporal commitment ─because it is foresight─. And here, as we can see, the commitment doesn’t come from us or from life; but rather, it springs up the possibility

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of which be able to arrogate the temporal correspondence between us and life. (But the commitment of what? Of course, it cannot be simple happiness or development to the perfectness or an absolute saturation or much better World, etc. Here, commitment is that life serves us. Every kind of happiness, saturation, perfectness to be obtained if it is worth for that ─but who knows if all these are worth it or not? Indeed no one, but time─. Commitment doesn’t promise any specific matter; first of all, it promises itself). In this regard, to see the coming which will be culminated as the foresight of the coming, exhibits that there is ─not essentially but temporally─ a kind of prudence which occupies the life ─or in Schelling’s philosophy, occupies the being─, which means what Schelling mentioned, is not only a kind of assumption for the philosophy but rather, a kind of fact which we can see it as the past. In Schuler’s words: “The open life represents a harmonious whole, in which the individual limbs loop like gigantic chains of stars in the rhythmic dance around the central light. In the open life, there is no religion, because such life is the religious fact.”78 (If we would like to examine the details concerning that issue, it seems to me, we can find so many examples in different ways; but here, I’m going to quote one of the most famous, Goethe: “The life, which it is the highest one we receive from nature, is the rotating movement of the monad concerning itself... its main peculiarity remains for us and others as secret.”79 Life as

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a monad, which we sustain its experience but can’t understand it, is entirely a religious fact; we can’t reject it, but also we can’t describe or explain it; we necessarily presume it for our prudential act, because to be able to ask what is life, is a result of existing wisdom there. But it never means that there is inherent wisdom that can be grasped in a special way in life ─like the idea of Golden Age which is emphasized by romantics or any kind of mystic approach which claims there is a kind of immanent truth in life─, it has to always obey its hypothetical character ─which is why as Schuler expressed, there is no religion, but all of these are already religious─. Also, as Cassirer underlined, concerning the debate between the ratio and the myth, this main basement which presumes there is wisdom as such it is not an assumption ─according to Cassirer this is the myth─, “is rather the Urdummheit of man that is responsible for these absurdities and contradictions. Without this "primeval stupidity" there would be no myth.”80 In this regard, I think, best portraying for that issue comes from Chrétien, as he pointed out, all these relations, namely, the details concerning the basic characteristic of seeing coming, is about just listening to the life, as hospitality: “The first hospitality is nothing other than listening. It is the hospitality that we can grant to others, with our body and our soul, even out on the streets and on the roadside, when we would not be able to offer a roof, or warmth of food. And it is at any instant that this hospitality can be granted.”81 Thus, we can say that the specific features of the seeing coming are being able to grasp only by

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tackling a “silence of listening which promises speech”82 ─because “silence is never alone”83─.) So then, before passing to the second dimension of what Schuler stated, I would like to emphasize an important result that we got from our interrogation, which is about the methodological relation between the concept of seeing the coming and the concept of the foresight of the coming. I think that point is really dangerous as well as it is crucial; because when we talked about a kind of method concerning the foresight of the coming, that means there should be a kind of project for that. In this aspect, the importance is that even if the foresight of the coming needs a special temporal concurrence between life and us ─which means there cannot be any true method for that─, there is also the possibility of us being able to arrogate that ─which means there should be a peculiar method for that─. In other words, of course, there cannot be a certain formula to foresee the coming; however, there should be a basic schema to increase the possibility. (Because our guarantee of which to obtain the possibility of the foresight of the coming, comes together with the prohibition of which being able to employ it as unconditional, according to a certain formula. In other words, to foresee the coming perpetually and to foresee the coming not even once are equally impossible; there are only possibilities which will be able to increase or decrease.) Moreover, as we declared, this method has already been uncovered concerning seeing the coming: To be open and the

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culminating of what it will come within our openness. So, what we will strive to demonstrate is that to expose a much more explicit and practical way for that. In this context, here I would like to give reference to Wells ─another unexpected figure─. In his original works, Wells says: “We cannot estimate for accidents and accelerations and delays; but if only we throw our web of generalization wide enough, if only we spin our rope of induction strong enough, the final result of great man, his ultimate surviving consequences, will come within our net.”84 (But of course, in fact, we are able to estimate so many things in a lot of different and special ways, however, even if it doesn’t mean the estimation has a direct relation with seeing the coming, it is an elementary and inefficient form of that ─which the relation of the idea of seeing the coming with the scientific views is established from this position, and maybe, one day it will be possible that there can be a kind of scientific foresight of the coming if there can be a science as seeing the coming─. Because, as Feder indicated before, every kind of skill of estimation belongs to the prudence, as so little part of it.) And I have interpreted that in this way in my other previous work: “...as a wandering that has not lost hope of coming back, or as an awaiting for what it is unexpected...”85 Here, I would like to accentuate that these two approaches ─ what Wells’ has said and what I’ve remarked─ give us a general expression about how can we foresee the coming, they don’t cancel each other or carry each other to the beyond; but they serve to have the simple and practice view. Besides, maybe

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we can initiate such an inclusive phrase: We can foresee the coming if we throw our web of generalization wide enough in our waiting for the unexpected and spin our rope of induction strong enough in our wandering in which hope of coming back has not been lost. (In this point, maybe you are able to ponder that this complex description about how we can foresee the coming, seems like, kind of a project that have never been fulfilled in history, or is a dewey-eyed hope that will never be actualized ─or it looks like still totally ambiguous to understand and to render to actualize it─. But as Wells pointed out by referencing the concept of great man, which means it could be done in the past, there are so many examples that we can notice; besides, one of some thinkers such as Schlegel doesn’t only demonstrate these instances, but also give a much deeper and more practical way to foresee the coming. For example, Schlegel examines the French and English literature at his age, and he explains by using the samples how to be able to foresee the coming in the sphere of art. Thus, he submits two special concepts: Arabesque (Arabeske) and concatenation (Verkettung). According to him, “... our enjoyment was related to what we often feel when we look at the witticistic (witzigen) play-paintings called arabesque... [which] of course it is not high poetry, but... a very definite and essential form or expression of it... However, the arabesque is not a work of art but only... the romantic natural product of our time.”86 Because for Schlegel, the arabesque means ─not only as related literature form but also vital─ that one attends the concatenation

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which has its own self-creation ─by means of the special meaning which furnishes reference to the main characteristic of temporality or namely symbolic present time87─; in the concatenation, we add something and wait for the life, and then we attach another thing according to what life brought, here neither us nor life is a sovereign, the concatenation as the vital form of temporal correspondence generates an arabesque which able to serve for us; like, the branch finds its path and the root clutches to the soil, here, with Klages’ words, “[we] bind ourselves to and even alter the stream of power solely in the interests of life.”88) Now, I think the last missing piece concerns the vital meaning of the foresight of the coming, which the second dimension that we mentioned in Schuler’s quotation ─the standstill time features about the open life, namely concerning to bind to the foresight the coming─, gives us that connection which we were expecting. Here, the question is why the time becomes standstill when we foresee the coming? I’m able to envision this idea seems inherent in this way, because what does it mean that the time becomes standstill? In this aspect, I would like to peer to Feder again, because also he underlines the same topic, but entirely from the opposite side, which I will declare that, in fact, these counter poles establish a decisive meaning. So then, Feder’s quotation: “On the other hand, in the unwarranted sense of reason, man is more and more for the sake of the future. At last, the future will give him

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eternity.”89 So then, we can see that the vital meaning of seeing the coming emerges in an eternal standstill time experience, which, in fact, it is the basement of our vulgar time perception. In this view, when Heidegger says, “the vulgar time-conceiving has its natural right”90, that is entirely accurate; but the reason of that is not that ─as Heidegger declared─ it springs up from the temporality of decaying of Dasein; rather, because of seeing the coming which we can get the vulgar time perception as a result that we infer from it ─because the assumption of the decaying of Dasein also comes as a possibility from the seeing coming. Moreover, the idea of seeing the coming comes from the seeing the coming; or if we strictly say, seeing the coming can be told only by seeing the coming. So then, I hope, if I can achieve that, the view of seeing the coming will obtain its cogent─. (Or we can express with Cassirer’s words: “... The first separation carries the features of later separation; the later ones become to be bounded and dominated by him... eventually... the special character of life-feeling can be demonstrated in this first separation.”91) Incontestably, even if the vital meaning of seeing the coming submit a big retrospective view for us to grasp our previous investigation’s origin ─I mean, now, we can comprehend why does the main common idea concerning the time arise as a double character of present time such pieced instance [eternal] and the simple huge moment [standstill]─, that significance still seems like so ingrained. In other words, although the idea of seeing the coming gives us the main

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disclosing of present time and temporality; the general process of that has stayed in the darkness. So, here, we can ask that question, how does seeing the coming fulfill to keep us alive and create the foresight of the coming in this process? Maybe, in this point, you think that the question seems unimportant or unnecessary, which, I can say that the answer which we will strive to attain, be able to say no more things what we already obtained; but I especially would like to underline that, because this question contains a general view for the possible questions and explanations. So then, here, I will offer to look at a special German concept again, the life-world (Lebenswelt). This German word is not only adequate to conceive the vulgar time perception within the life, but also it reflects an original meaning relation by means of the usage in the history of philosophy. In this regard, even if I will not regard its historical evolution, I would like to accentuate and focus on a contemporary thinker with his specific background. Blumenberg whom I would like to talk about distributes a quite peculiar significance on this concept by referencing Husserl’s thought. But in Husserl's philosophy, the meaning and the position in the series of the idea, of this concept is totally different and useless for our interrogation ─because Husserl always considers this concept related to the past─. Besides, Blumenberg’s thought, and approach employs a concept, I will claim that can be grasped perfectly with the idea

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of seeing coming, and thus, it gives us a more general and practical view. In this context, the connection in Blumenberg’s approach comes from a new concept, self-stabilization (Selbstsabilisierung) which furnishes reference to the present time by containing the relation between the past and the future time. Thus, his view, submits us an original aspect as well as it is vulgar: “This peculiarity of self-stabilization divides the lifeworld with each of the systems of world views and theories which have long since been dismissed, which every step of their self-assertion by refinement and differentiation of their means with the price of their susceptibility to the next refinement and differentiation of them to pay for any questions that have arisen.”92 Our everyday life experience, namely our life-world, springs up the origin of consequences of seeing the coming, namely the self-stabilization process which works according to refinement and differentiation steps within the relation between the past and the future. In this context, of course, there is no truth in our life-world which refers to a result that was inferred from it, or there isn’t any nothingness; rather the self-stabilization as a process, generates the possibility of the new one by its selfreferencialization, which is constituent as well as a differentiator; thus submits to our vulgar life-world. So, with Luhmann’s words: “The circularity is not eliminated. It is taken, unfolded, detautologized (enttautologisiert) in using. Without this

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fundamental self-reference (selbstbezug) all knowledge would collapse. Only with its help can an environmentally sensitive structure be erected that can acquire information from what science calls reality.”93 In other words, the life-worlds as a kind of selfstabilization gains its natural right by means of its selfreferencialization character, not because there is a true balance or a biological, physical, or philosophical basement. Especially, I would like to underline this point, because every kind of biological comprehension or physical view can be understood and actualize with that process. Namely, the seeing coming isn’t only a kind of mind training or a kind of the philosophical project; but also, emerges from a basic relationship that furnishes the validity of our life-worlds, and it infers a vital project to attend the foresight of the coming. (For instance, while Rignano saying, “now, the property, which we have hypothesized above in the specific potential elements, both germinal and somatic, and which constitutes the keystone of the epigenetic center hypothesis, constitutes by itself a real mnemonic faculty (facoltà mnemonica). We intend to say that property by which the substance constituting these specific potential elements, apt to give as discharge (scraica) a single appropriate specific nerve current, albeit that same and unique that this specific nervous current, where it acts as a charging current (corrente di carica), can in its turn form and lay down...”94 ─because as Luhmann implied, “repeating generates

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both forgetting and remembering”95─ and Semon followed and developed that idea like this: “The various elements of the energetic condition ─like morphological state, chemical, thermic, electrical, and other states─, together with the morphological state, determine the respective organic state of excitement; and the original excitations so generated are joined by mnemic (mnemischen) excitations, which, at that moment, are ecphorised (ekphoriert) in the organism... the morphogeneous excitations have acted engraphically (engraphisch) ─especially by repetition─ in each generation, and that the engrams (Engremme) have been transmitted to offspring...”96 it doesn’t mean that all these don’t related in our results concerning the seeing coming and its significance of the self-stabilization as the life-world, or our investigation gives reference to prove its perseusivity –this was what Rignano and Semon attempted do in their subsequent works–; but rather, all these observations concerning with what seems like biological facts, already sprung up from the vital meaning of seeing coming.) Lastly, I would like to summarize the vital meaning of seeing coming with Schuler’s poetic words: “[in the seeing coming] the life that is imbued with the essence of the world, must reflect the cosmos.”97 And, I would like to finish my speech, by saying something related to how does “to foresee the coming” seem: When we foresee the coming, we don’t become God, but Tyche, the god of fortune whom even God serves...

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Quotations

1

Alfred Tarski, “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages Logic”, In Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 152—278, p. 156 2 Willard Van Orman Quine, Pursuit of Truth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 87-88 3 Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (New York: Basic Books, 1962), p. 37 4 Donald Davidson, Problem of Rationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 169 5 Ernst Cassirer, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen - Dritter Teil: Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer Verlag, 1929), p. 220 6 Enis E. Memişoğlu, “From The Economics of Life to The Nomos of The Oikos”, Paper presented at Philosophy of Life Conference (Cardiff University, 2009), p. 1 7 Aleksandr Pfänder, Philosophie der Lebensziele, ed. Wolfgang Trillhaas (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Verlag, 1948), p. 29 8 Ibid, p. 28 9 Derek Parfit, On What Matters: Volume Two, ed. Samuel Scheffler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 597 10 G.W. Leibniz, “Preface to the General Science”, in Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, ed. Nicholas Jolley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 234 11 See ibid, p. 129 ff 12 See Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 239 13 G.W. Leibniz, Leibniz Logical Papers, trans. and ed. G.H.R. Parkinson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 85 14 Cassirer, Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis, p. 418 15 Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 84-85 16 Cassirer, Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis, p. 234

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17

Soren Kierkegaard, Soren Kierkegaards Skrifter: 18 - Journalerne EE FF GG HH JJ KK (Copenhagen: Gads Frolag, 2001), p. 194 18 Dio Chrysostom, Discourses 61-80, [Loeb Classical Library] trans. H. Lamar Crosby (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 37-39 19 See, Maurice Blanchot, L'attente l'oubli (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1962) 20 Hans Vaihinger, Die Philosophie des Als Ob (Leipzig: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1922), p. 586 21 Cassirer, Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis, p. 354-355 22 Ibid, p. 231 23 F. Schlegel, Philosophische Lehrjahre I, Fragmente zur Philosophie, Kritische Ausgabe Seiner Werke: Band 18 (Zürich: Thomas-Verlag, 1963), p. 563 24 Ernst Cassirer, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen - Zweiter Teil: Das mythische Denken (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer Verlag, 1925), p. 79 25 Helmuth Plessner, Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch: Einleitung in die philosophische Anthropologie (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1975), p. 131 26 Ulrich Pothast, Lebendige Vernünftigkeit: Zur Vorbereitung eines menschenangemessenen Konzepts (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1998), p. 31 27 Robert J. Kozljanic, “Zur Entstehung und Motivik lebensphilosophischen Denkens”, in IV. Jahrbuch für Lebensphilosophie: Lebensphilosophische Vordenker des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts, Hg. Robert J. Kozljanic (München: Albunea Verlag, 2008), pp. 9-34, p. 30 28 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Sellby-Bigge for Reprinted from the original edition (Oxford: Clerandon Press, 1960), p. 173174 29 Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, p. 80-82 30 Ludwig Klages, Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele (Bonn: Bouiver Verlag, 1981), p. 14 and p. 22 31 Eugen Fink, Alles und Nichts: Ein Umweg zur Philosophie (Dordrecht: Springer Verlag, 1959), p. 249 32 Jean-Paul Sartre, L'être et le néant: Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1943), p. 59 33 Ernst Cassirer, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen - Erster Teil: Die Sprache (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer Verlag, 1923), p. 16 34 Ernst Cassirer, Wesen und Wirkung des Symbolbegriffs (Darmstadt: Wissentschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1959), p. 229

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35

F.W.J. Schelling, Sämtlich Werke: Fünfter Band (1802-1803), Hg. K. F. A. Schelling (Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta’sche Verlag, 1856), p. 406 36 Paul Bishop, "Das Goethe’sche Symbol als Instrument der morphologischen Wandlung in Philosophie und Psychologie: Cassirer, Jung und Klages", in Morphologie und Moderne Goethes ›anschauliches Denken‹ in den Geistes- und Kulturwissenschaften seit 1800, Hg. Jonas Maatsch (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), pp. 157-176, p. 160 37 Cassirer, Die Sprache, p. 9 38 Francis H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality (London: George Allen & Uwin Ltd., 1916), p. 544 39 Ernst Cassirer, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen - Dritter Teil: Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer Verlag, 1929), p. 234235 40 Ernst Cassirer, “Das Symbolproblem und seine Stellung im System der Philosophie”, Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft 21 (Stuttgart: Enke Verlag, 1927), 191-208, p. 208 41 Francis H. Bradley, The Principles of Logic: Vol. l (London: Oxford University Press, 1928), p 10 42 Vaihinger, Die Philosophie des Als Ob, p. 15 43 Edmund Husserl, Einführung in Die Phänomenologie Der Erkenntnis (Vorlesungen 1909): Band VII, Hg. Elisabeth Schumann (Dordrecht: Springer Verlag, 2005), p. 187 44 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 183 45 Ludwig Klages, Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele, p. 596 46 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1967), p. 427 47 Carl Gustav Jung, Psychologische Typen: Gesammelte Werke; Bd. 6,Hg. v. Marianne Niehus-Jung, Lena Hurwitz-Eisner u. Franz Riklin (Zürich: Rascher Verlag, 1967) p. 520 48 Edmund Husserl, Die Lebenswelt: Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution: Band XXXIX, Hg. Rochus Sowa (Dordrecht: Springer Verlag, 2008), p. 576 49 Jacques Derrida, “la différance”, in Marges de la philosopie (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1972), p. 9 50 Jacques Derrida, Mémoires: pour Paul de Man (Paris: Éditions Galilée, 1988), p. 101 and 143

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51

Friedrich Schlegel, “Über die Unverständlichkeit”, Athenäum: Dritten Bandes; Zweite Stück (Berlin: Bei Heinrich Fröhlich, 1800), p. 337 52 Hilmi Z. Ülken, Varlık ve Oluş (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1968), p. 38 53 Ernst Cassirer, An Essay On Man (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), p. 125 54 See, Blanchot, L'attente l'oubli 55 Jean-Louis Chrétien, L'inoubliable et l'inespéré (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1991), p. 107 56 See Friedrich Nietszche, Dionysos-Dithyramben: Band 1; Textgenetische Edition der Vorstufen und Reinschriften, Hg. Wolfram Groddeck (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991) 57 Ludwig Klages, Rhythmen und Runen; Nachlass herausgegeben von ihm selbst (Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth Verlag, 1944), p. 305 58 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, L'Anti-Œdipe: Capitalisme et schizophrénie (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1972), p. 451 59 Robert J. Kozljanic, "Die Kunst, sein Leben zu tanzen: Über das exochoreische Ich und seine wilden Sprünge", in Ommasin allois: Festschrift für Professor Ioannis E. Theodoropoulos zum 65. Geburtstag, Hg. Vasileios E. Pantazis & Michael Stork (Essen: Oldib-Verlag, 2014), pp. 41-71, p. 67 60 Ibid, p. 54 61 Melchior Palágyi, Wahrnehmungslehre, Hg. Ludwig Klages (Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth Verlag, 1925), p. 98 62 Melchior Palágyi, Naturphilosophische Vorlesungen: über die Grundprobleme des Bewusstseins und des Lebens: Zweite [veränderte] Auflage (Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth Verlag, 1924), p. 222 63 Jean-Louis Chrétien, L'inoubliable et l'inespéré, (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1991), p. 91 64 Paul Ricoeur, Temps et récit: Tome II (Paris: Éditions de Seuil, 1984), p. 120 65 Paul Ricoeur, Temps et récit: Tome III (Paris: Éditions de Seuil, 1985), p. 392 66 Ludwig Klages, “Vom Wesen des Rhythmus: Auszug aus dem Vortrage”, Sudhoffs Archiv für Geschichte der Medizin und der Naturwissenschaften [Bd. 27, H. 3/4] (September 1934), pp. 223-228, p. 225-227 67 Ibid, p. 224 68 Ludwig Klages, Sämtlich Werke VI: Ausdruckskunde, (Bonn: Bouiver Verlag, 1966), p. 626

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Friedrich Schlegel, Die Entwicklung der Philosophie - Philosophische Vorlesungen: Band 3, Hg. C. J. H. Windischmann (Bonn: Bei Eduard Weber, 1846), p. 40 70 Jean-Louis Chrétien, Corps à corps: à l’écoute de l’oeuvre d’art (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1997), p. 7 ff 71 Ovidius, Amores/1.11 72 F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophie der Offenbarung ─ Sämtlich Werke: Zweite Abteilung, Dritter Band, Hg. K. F. A. Schelling (Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta’sche Verlag, 1858) , p. 203 73 J.G.H. Feder, Unterschungen Über den Menschlichen Willen: Erster Teil (Lemgo: Verlag der Meyerschesen Buchhandlung, 1779), p. 114 74 J.G.H. Feder, Unterschungen Über den Menschlichen Willen: Vierter Teil (Lemgo: Verlag der Meyerschesen Buchhandlung, 1793), p. 407 75 Ernst Cassirer, “Form Und Technik”, in Symbol, Technik, Sprache: Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1927–1933, Hg. Ernst Wolfgang Orth und John Michael Krois (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1985), 39–90, p. 62 76 See Kerem Duymuş, Yaşamın Olanak Refleksiyonu: Kendilik ve Başkalık 2 (İstanbul: Tanba Kitap, 2016), p. 211 77 Alfred Schuler, Fragmente und Vorträge aus dem Nachlass, Hg. Ludwig Klages, (Leipzig: Verlag Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1940), p. 273 78 Ibid, p. 162─163 79 J.W. Goethe, Maximen und Reflexionen ─ Shriften der Goethe─Gesellschaft: 21.Band, Hg. Max F. Hacker (Weimer: Verlag der Goethe─Gesellschaft, 1907), p. 76 80 Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of State (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1946), p. 4 81 Jean─Louis Chrétien, L’arche de la parole (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998), p. 13 82 See ibid, p. 64 83 See Chrétien, Corps à corps, p. 26 84 Herbert G. Wells, The Discovery of the Future (New York: B.W. Huebsch, 1913), p. 44 85 See Kerem Duymuş, Anlamın Refleksif Felsefesi: Kendilik ve Başkalık 1 (İstanbul: Tanba Kitap, 2015), p. 457

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Friedrich Schlegel, “Gespräch Über die Poesie”, Athenäum: Dritten Bandes; Erstes Stück (Berlin: Bei Heinrich Fröhlich, 1800), pp. 58─128, p. 115─117 and 126 87 Friedrich Schlegel, “Kritische Fragmente”, Lyceum der schönen Künste: Ersten Bandes; zweiter Teil (Berlin: Bei Johann Friedrich Unger, 1797), pp. 133─170, p. 159 88 Klages, Rhythmen und Runen, p. 293 89 Feder, Erster Teil, p. 115 90 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 436 91 Ernst Cassirer, Das mythische Denken, p. 91 92 Hans Blumenberg, Theorie der Lebenswelt, Hg. Manfred Sommer (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2010), p. 15─16 93 Niklas Luhmann, Soziale Systeme: Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1987), p. 649 94 Eugenio Rignano, La Memoria Biologica; saggi di una nuova concezione filosofica della vita (Bologna: Zanichelli editore, 1922), p. 94 95 Niklas Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1998), p. 580 96 Richard W. Semon, Die Mneme: Als Erhaltendes Prinzip Im Wechsel Des Organischen Geschehens (Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm Engelman, 1920), p. 243─245 97 Schuler, Fragmente und Vorträge, p. 162