The Perspective of Resurrection: A Trinitarian Christology 9783161601095, 9783161601101

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Religion in Philosophy and Theology Editors

Helen De Cruz (St. Louis, MO) · Asle Eikrem (Oslo) Thomas Rentsch (Dresden) · Hartmut von Sass (Berlin) Heiko Schulz (Frankfurt a. M.) · Judith Wolfe (St Andrews)

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Petr Gallus

The Perspective of Resurrection A Trinitarian Christology

Mohr Siebeck

Petr Gallus, born 1979; studied protestant theology in Prague, Marburg, and Tübingen; 2005 PhD; 2005 − 2006 assistant professor at Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg; 2006 − 2016 vicar and pastor; since 2016 assistant professor at Charles University, Prague; 2021 habilitation (in progress).

ISBN 978-3-16-160109-5 / eISBN 978-3-16-160110-1 DOI 10.1628/978-3-16-160110-1 ISSN 1616-346X / eISSN 2568-7425 (Religion in Philosophy and Theology) Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliographie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de.

© 2021 by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, Germany. www.mohrsiebeck.com This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form (beyond that permitted by copyright law) without the publisher’s written permission. This applies particularly to reproductions, translations and storage and processing in electronic systems. The book printed by Laupp & Göbel in Gomaringen on non-aging paper and bound by Buchbinderei Nädele in Nehren. Printed in Germany.

Preface In 1993, John Hick stated that there is an “intense flurry” of christological discussions on the significance of Jesus Christ. 1 Ten years later, Markus Buntfuß notices in his habilitation lecture on Christology that there had been over 500 books on Christology in the last ten years. 2 In recent years, the situation has been noticeably different. While there is a lively christological discussion in catholic theology, the protestant production counts only a few items. Therefore, I hope to fill a certain gap with this study. From my perspective of a continental protestant theologian, I try to present my own conception of Christology in its whole extent and in an intense discussion with different theological traditions of old as well as from today. Among my main discussion partners are traditional and liberal protestant theologians, catholic theologians of various directions, and also the eastern orthodox tradition. Although I am following up many important ideas from the riches of the theological tradition with thankfulness and profit, in the end, I try to elaborate an original outline of a contemporary Christology, which could stand the challenge of the current postmodern situation. The following study is thus primarily V\VWHPDWLFDO, not historical or biblical. I try to identify the important pieces of biblical and historical theological tradition and rearrange it. In addition to some original ideas and new accents, I reimagine some traditional accents in order to put together a new picture, which critically deals with the tradition in a way that keeps and maintains the fundaments of Christian faith and, at the same time, provides a reasonable theological stance for our current time. This may result into a critique from both sides: for the rather conservative ones, it may be too little conservative and traditional; for the rather liberal ones, it may be still too conservative and traditional and too little progressive. Every time I took into my hands the next book on Christology that I have not read yet, I realized, how much I am still at the beginning. Nevertheless, I hope to contribute at least a little to the discussion, being continually aware

1 J. HICK, 7KH 0HWDSKRU RI *RG ,QFDUQDWH (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993), 1. 2 M. BUNTFUß , “Verlust der Mitte oder Neuzentrierung? Neuere Wege in der Christologie”, 1=67K46 (2004), 348.

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and awaiting the legitimate critique of what I have omitted and not mentioned.3 I cannot name all to whom I would like to express my gratitude and thankfulness for inspiring and critical questions and remarks on my thoughts. Substitutionally for all, I want to thank: my students and colleagues in Prague, esp. to those from the graduates-seminar in philosophy led by Prof. Dr. Lenka Karfíková; Prof. Dr. Malte D. Krüger and his students in Marburg, to whom I could repeatedly present my ideas; the publishing house Mohr Siebeck, in particular Tobias Stäbler and Matthias Spitzner, for editorial assistance and publishing my text as a nice book; Dr. Raymond E. Perrier, who did the proofreading – without him, my text would be far from being an English text. What is left, is my “Czenglish”.4 And last but not least, I want to thank Prof. Dr. Ingolf U. Dalferth, dr.h.c., who helped me in many respects – my thanks to him concern not only the possibility of publishing this study in the RPT-Series, but they go beyond what he himself may guess. This text is a result of the grant project Nr. 18-00355S “Humanity of God as God’s Accommodation to the World” provided by the Czech Science Foundation (GAČR).

Prague, in March 2021

Petr Gallus

3 What I did not manage to read anymore, was, in the first place, the newest handbook of Christology by H. ASSEL, (OHPHQWDUH&KULVWRORJLH, 3 vols (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2020). 4 If not quoted from an English source, all translations into English are mine.

Table of Contents  Preface ......................................................................................................... V List of Abbreviations ............................................................................... XIII

Part One Chapter 1: Christology as the Centre of Theology .......................... 3  &KULVWRORJ\DVWKH%DVHIRUWKH7ZRIROG)RFXVRI7KHRORJ\ ....................... 3 1.1. Divinity and Humanity ...................................................................... 3 1.2. Liberal Theology: An Opposite Conception? ..................................... 4 1.3. Jesus Christ as the Self-Revelation of God ........................................ 9  7KH0HWKRGRORJLFDO%DFNJURXQGV ............................................................ 19 2.1. The Postmodern Situation: Diagnostic Rationality within Plural Perspectives..................................................................................... 19 2.2. Semiotics ......................................................................................... 24 2.3. Internal Realism .............................................................................. 28

Chapter 2: The Object of Christology .............................................. 36  7KHµ4XHVWV¶IRUWKH+LVWRULFDO-HVXV ....................................................... 37  7KH6HDUFKIRUWKH+LVWRULFDO-HVXVIURP7RGD\¶V3HUVSHFWLYH ................ 53  &KULVWXVSUDHVHQV..................................................................................... 60

Chapter 3: The Field of Christology: The Chalcedonian Frame ..................................................................... 65

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 7KH&UHHGRI&KDOFHGRQDQG,WV3UREOHPV ............................................... 65 1.1. The Definition ................................................................................. 67 1.2. The Problems of the Definition........................................................ 78  7KH6WUXJJOHZLWK&KDOFHGRQLQWKH+LVWRU\RI7KRXJKW ........................... 89

2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2.4. 2.5. 2.6. 2.7. 2.8.

Communicatio idiomatum ............................................................... 89 Enhypostasis.................................................................................... 99 John of Damascus .......................................................................... 111 The Western Medieval Christology ............................................... 116 Martin Luther ................................................................................ 118 The Protestant Orthodoxy .............................................................. 129 Kenoticism .................................................................................... 137 Schleiermacher and His Critique of the Traditional Dogma ........... 142

 :KDWWR'R:LWK&KDOFHGRQ7RGD\" ...................................................... 154

Chapter 4: The Perspective of Christology: The Resurrection .................................................................................. 166  7KH5RXWHRI&KULVWRORJ\7KHUHDQG%DFN$JDLQ................................... 166 1.1. Resurrection as the Starting Point .................................................. 166 1.2. The Fundament for the Speech of Resurrection ............................. 169 1.3. There and Back Again ................................................................... 175  7ULQLW\DVWKH1HFHVVDU\%DFNJURXQG ..................................................... 177 2.1. The Importance of the Trinitarian Approach .................................. 177 2.2. The Challenges of a Consistent Trinitarian Speech of God ............ 180

Part Two Chapter 5: Divine Preexistence: The Accommodation .............. 185  7KH,PPXWDEOH*RGRIWKH7KHRORJLFDO7UDGLWLRQ ................................... 186  7KH&KULVWRORJLFDO&RPSOLFDWLRQ ........................................................... 188  7KH3UREOHP........................................................................................... 190



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 7KH'\QDPLF6SDFHZLWKLQWKH'LYLQH,PPXWDELOLW\ ............................... 192  7KH$FFRPPRGDWLRQDVWKH)XQGDPHQWDO2QWRORJLFDODQG5HJXODWRU\ 7HUP .................................................................................................... 203

Chapter 6: The Incarnation ................................................................ 216  $FFRPPRGDWLRQLQ3URFHVV$Q$WWHPSWZLWKWKHHQK\SRVWDVLVRU1HZ :LQHLQWR2OG:LQHVNLQV ...................................................................... 217  9HUHKRPR .............................................................................................. 226 2.1. Person and Personality within One’s Identity ................................ 226 2.2. Identity and Name ......................................................................... 231 2.3. Imago Dei...................................................................................... 234  7KH,GHQWLW\RI-HVXV&KULVW .................................................................... 239

Chapter 7: The Death of Jesus Christ ............................................. 250  ,GHQWLW\DQG'HDWK.................................................................................. 250 1.1. The Conception of Immortal Soul and Its Critique ........................ 251 1.1.1. The Conception................................................................... 251 1.1.2. Application to Christology .................................................. 255 1.1.3. The Critique of the Conception of Immortal Soul ............... 256 1.2. Total Death.................................................................................... 259 1.2.1. The Conception................................................................... 259 1.2.2. Death of Jesus Christ as Human Death................................ 265 1.2.3. Critique of the Total-Death Theory ..................................... 266  'HDWKRI-HVXV&KULVW±'HDWKRI*RG .................................................... 269 2.1. The Cross of Jesus Christ .............................................................. 269 2.2. Death of God? ............................................................................... 272 2.2.1. The Old Church .................................................................. 273 2.2.2. Martin Luther...................................................................... 276 2.2.3. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel .......................................... 277 2.2.4. Karl Rahner ........................................................................ 287 2.2.5. Eberhard Jüngel .................................................................. 287 2.2.6. Jürgen Moltmann ................................................................ 290

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 'HDWKRI-HVXV&KULVWDV'HDWKLQ*RG ................................................... 294 3.1. The Trinitarian Consequences of the Death of Jesus Christ ........... 294 3.2. The Ontological Relocation of Death............................................. 297

Chapter 8: Salvation: The Cross as Vicarious and Representative Sacrifice? ........................................................... 299  6RWHULRORJ\DQG,WV&XUUHQW&KDOOHQJHV.................................................. 299  $WRQLQJ6DFULILFH.................................................................................... 301  9LFDULRXV5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ ....................................................................... 305 3.1. Exclusivity and Inclusivity ............................................................ 305 3.2. Some Traditional Solutions............................................................ 308 3.3. Problems of Traditional Solutions ................................................. 313 3.3.1. Problems of Traditional Exclusive Aspects ......................... 314 3.3.2. Problems of Traditional Inclusive Aspects .......................... 314 3.3.3. Further Problems of the Conception of Vicarious Representation .................................................................... 315  7ULQLWDULDQ7UDQVIRUPDWLRQRIWKH7UDGLWLRQDO&KULVWRPRQLVP ............... 321 4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 4.4.

The Christological Key Point: Bearing of Fate .............................. 321 Christological Grounding of Salvation........................................... 328 Pneumatological Communication of Salvation .............................. 332 Trinitarian Soteriology of History.................................................. 336

Chapter 9: The Resurrection ............................................................. 338  7KH+HUPHQHXWLFVRI5HVXUUHFWLRQ ......................................................... 338

1.1. Three Hermeneutical Questions ..................................................... 338 1.2. The Fundamental Hermeneutical Structure .................................... 343  7KH+LVWRULFLW\RI5HVXUUHFWLRQ .............................................................. 345  %RGLO\5HVXUUHFWLRQ7KH(PSW\7RPE ................................................... 354  :KDW:DVWKH5HVXUUHFWLRQRI-HVXV&KULVW" .......................................... 360



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 $VFHQVLRQDQGWKH(QULFKHG*RG............................................................ 366  &RPPRQ5HVXUUHFWLRQDQGWKH/DVW-XGJHPHQW ...................................... 368 6.1. Common Resurrection ................................................................... 368 6.2. The Last Judgement ....................................................................... 369

Chapter 10: God, Time, and Eternity.............................................. 372  (WHUQLW\DQG7LPH................................................................................... 372 1.1. The Traditional Conception: God above Time ............................... 373 1.2. Alternative Conceptions: God in Time........................................... 378  7ULQLW\7KH2QWRORJ\RIWKH(WHUQLW\7LPH5HODWLRQ .............................. 383

Chapter 11: Christology in Postmodern Plurality ........................ 394  2QWKH:D\WRZDUG3RVWSOXUDOLVW+XPLOLW\ ............................................. 394 1.1. Christianity among Other Religions............................................... 395 1.1.1. Pluralism............................................................................. 396 1.1.2. Inclusivism ......................................................................... 409 1.1.3. Exclusivism ........................................................................ 414 1.2. The Particularity and Universality of the Christian Claim .............. 416  'LDORJXHRI3DUWLFXODU3HUVSHFWLYHV"..................................................... 418  $FFRPPRGDWLQJ3UDFWLFH........................................................................ 420

Bibliography ............................................................................................. 425

Index of Names ......................................................................................... 453 Index of Subjects ....................................................................................... 459

List of Abbreviations AAS ACO BHTh BSLK BThSt Cath(M) DBWE DH DoMo FC SD HThK AT HUTh KD KGA LPhR LThK MJTh NZSTh(R) QD PG PL RGG RPP RPT SJT STh TBT ThLZ ThWNT TRE

Acta apostolicae sedis Acta conciliorum oecumenicorum Beiträge zur Historischen Theologie (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck) Bekenntnisschriften der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche Biblisch-Theologische Studien &DWKROLFD (Münster: Aschendorf-Verlag) Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works [English] &RPSHQGLXP RI &UHHGV 'HILQLWLRQV DQG 'HFODUDWLRQV RQ 0DWWHUV RI )DLWK DQG0RUDOV, ed. H. DENZINGER and P. HÜNERMANN Dogmatik in der Moderne (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck) Formula concordiae, Solida declaratio Herders Theologischer Kommentar zum Alten Testament (Freiburg: Herder) Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck) K. BARTH, 'LHNLUFKOLFKH'RJPDWLN, 14 vols, Zürich: TVZ, 1932–1967 F.D.E. SCHLEIERMACHER, .ULWLVFKH *HVDPWDXVJDEH, 18 vols, Berlin: De Gruyter, 1972– G.W.F. HEGEL, /HFWXUHVRQWKH3KLORVRSK\RI5HOLJLRQ, 3 vols /H[LNRQIU7KHRORJLHXQG.LUFKH, 11 vols, 3rd ed., ed. W. KASPER, Freiburg: Herder, 1993–2001 0DUEXUJHU-DKUEXFK7KHRORJLH (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt) 1HXH =HLWVFKULIW IU 6\VWHPDWLVFKH 7KHRORJLH XQG 5HOLJLRQVSKLORVRSKLH  (Berlin: De Gruyter) 4XDHVWLRQHV'LVSXWDWDH (Freiburg: Herder) 3DWURORJLDHFXUVXVFRPSOHWXV6HULHVJUDHFD, 166 vols., ed. J.P. MIGNE, Paris, 1857–1866 3DWURORJLDH ODWLQDH FXUVXV FRPSOHWXV, 221 vols., ed. J.P. MIGNE, Paris, 1844–1864 5HOLJLRQLQ*HVFKLFKWHXQG*HJHQZDUW, 9 vols, 4th ed., ed. H.D. BETZ et al., Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998–2005 5HOLJLRQ LQ 3DVW DQG 3UHVHQW, 14 vols, ed. H.D. BETZ et al., Leuven: Brill, 2006–2013 Religion in Philosophy and Theology (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck) 6FRWWLVK-RXUQDORI7KHRORJ\ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) THOMAS OF AQUIN, 6XPPDWKHRORJLDH, 4 vols Theologische Bibliothek Töpelmann (Berlin: De Gruyter) 7KHRORJLVFKH/LWHUDWXU]HLWXQJ (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt) 7KHRORJLVFKHV :|UWHUEXFK ]XP 1HXHQ 7HVWDPHQW, 10 vols, ed. G. KITTEL, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1933–1979 7KHRORJLVFKH 5HDOHQ]\NORSlGLH, 36 vols, ed. G. MÜLLER et al., Berlin: De Gruyter, 1993–2006

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$EEUHYLDWLRQV Vigiliae Christianae Supplementa (Leiden: Brill) Veröffentlichungen der Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft für Theologie “Weimarer Ausgabe”: ' 0DUWLQ /XWKHUV :HUNH .ULWLVFKH *HVDPWDXVJDEH, 121 vols, Weimar 1883–2009 Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck) =HLWVFKULIWIU7KHRORJLHXQG.LUFKH (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck)

Part One

  Chapter 1

Christology as the Centre of Theology 1. Christology as the Base for the Twofold Focus of Theology &KULVWRORJ\DVWKH%DVHIRU7KHRORJ\

 'LYLQLW\DQG+XPDQLW\ Theology is the rational and critical reflection of the Christian speech of God, which tries, at the same time, to think it out to the end.1 The Christian speech of God is an expression of the Christian life of faith. Faith understands itself as a life FRUDP 'HR, in a world where God is present and active. Christian faith counts on God because, in its self-understanding, faith can only emerge when God meets human. This presupposes that God and human FDQ meet. Moreover, in the search for to what extent God and human can meet, at least from the perspective of Christian faith, it comes to the fundamental and grounding insight that God and human GLG already meet in a decisive way. The fundamental and unique point of intersection between divine and human for Christian faith and, hence, also for theological reflection is the person of Jesus Christ. In him, following the intuition of the traditional Chalcedonian Christology, true divinity meets true humanity, unconfused and undivided at the same time. In him, in his person, God did not only PHHW human, but, as the tradition states, God ZDV this human. This is the basic fact and notion for 1 Theology in my view is, therefore, not only the “grammar of the Christian life of faith” (cf. I.U. DALFERTH, -HQVHLWVYRQ0\WKRVXQG/RJRV'LHFKULVWRORJLVFKH7UDQVIRU PDWLRQ GHU 7KHRORJLH, QD 142 [Freiburg: Herder, 1993], 216–313; IDEM, &UXFLILHG DQG 5HVXUUHFWHG5HVWUXFWXULQJWKH*UDPPDURI&KULVWRORJ\, trans. J. BENETT [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2015], xxi; H.-P. GROSSHANS, 7KHRORJLVFKHU5HDOLVPXV(LQVSUDFKSKL ORVRSKLVFKHU%HLWUDJ]XHLQHUWKHRORJLVFKHQ6SUDFKOHKUH, HUTh 34 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996], 233), but it tries also to critically formulate the contents of faith in their ontological relation to reality. Thus far, theology as a function of faith itself presupposes that faith has an internal rationality based on an analogical structure of reality. It is this internal rationality of faith, which theology tries to disclose and reconstruct critically. This means that this reconstruction can get into a tension with the actual praxis of faith. Theology, therefore, can (and should) serve as its critical, although theoretical, pendant. It can (and should) permanently accompany faith because theology as the critical and rational reflection of faith lies on another level than the lived faith. Concerning the relationship of theology and faith cf. P. GALLUS, “Theologie – eine Glaubenswissenschaft?”, in 'LH5ROOHGHU 7KHRORJLHLQ8QLYHUVLWlW*HVHOOVFKDIWXQG.LUFKH, VWGTh 36, ed. J. SCHRÖTER (Leipzig: EVA, 2012), 55–67.

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the Christian faith as well as for the Christian theology and, at the same time, a point, which needs further explanation and consideration. This is exactly what I intend to do in the following text. Regarding the theological structure this implies that Christology as the theological reflection of the person of Jesus Christ lies on the point of intersection between the doctrine of God and of anthropology. Hence, it has from the very beginning a twofold focus: God and human. And, moreover, both in mutual relation. Which means, considering the factual unity of the person of Jesus Christ, that both divinity and humanity have to be thought in a mutually SRVLWLYH relation.2 With this setting, Christology has to fulfill two fundamental goals: First, it should show how to think of WKHSHUVRQRI-HVXV&KULVWDQGRIKLVLPSDFW and effect (the tradition called this the “person and work of Jesus Christ”, or Christology and soteriology). I will try to maintain that if the divinity of Jesus Christ himself and the outreach and effect of his salvation should not be diminished, this cannot be done without trinitarian background. The result should then be a WULQLWDULDQ&KULVWRORJ\. At the same time, I will argue that the most appropriate starting point and leading perspective for this goal is WKH SHUVSHFWLYHRIUHVXUUHFWLRQ, which binds together Christology and soteriology as well as the divinity and humanity of Jesus Christ. And second, because the person of Jesus Christ stands for the fundamental point of intersection between divinity and humanity, this christological concept could become a WKHRORJLFDOIRXQGDWLRQIRUDOOGLYLQHKXPDQUHODWLRQV as they emerge in the perspective of the first (creation) or the third article (just ification, church, Christian life). In other words, such trinitarian Christology could prove to be an appropriate foundation for a pneumatological anthropology in the wider context of the doctrine of creation.3 This twofold goal with all its presuppositions, consequences and context is the main objective to be elaborated in detail and argued for in this study.  /LEHUDO7KHRORJ\$Q2SSRVLWH&RQFHSWLRQ" In my view, Christology due to the unique unity of divinity and humanity is the very FHQWUHRIWKHRORJ\, just as the confession of Jesus Christ is the very core of the Christian faith. With this thesis, hence, I start with the centre and 2

I.e., not diminishing or even excluding one another, as it was the case often in the history of Christology. See below, Ch. 3. 3 A second volume following this study should be therefore a pneumatological anthropology where I intend to develop more the particular thesis that all acting of God in the world proceeds always according to its christological foundation. God enters the created categories in whose he remains unconfused and from whose he remains undivided and in this way, he can employ his full divinity with full respect to the creation and its finite forms.

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in the centre of theology. Therefore, some clarifications of my fundamental presuppositions and of principal decisions are necessary. For to start theologically with Christology is no self-evident step; it needs some justification. Of course, there are alternative ways. One could develop the whole theology from the perspective of the first article as theology of creation (or even solely from a theistic point of view following classical theism), or from the perspective of the third article following God’s presence in the world in the Spirit. The most opposite alternative to trinitarian concepts though – at least as it is traditionally put and although being differentiated into a variety of conceptions – was and is OLEHUDOWKHRORJ\. Here, the subject of theology is not God and human speech about God but the human and one’s religion. In the modern history of protestant theology, these two positions – the trinitarian and the liberal – traditionally mark two almost opposite attitudes to theology. Within the history of theological tradition, they both focus on different source-times as the most important measure for all theology. While the trinitarian and revelational theology sees the most important source in the biblical scriptures and in some fundamental texts and theological decisions of the old church as a genuine expressions of the fundaments of Christian faith, which are, then, critically reflected as the measure for everything else, the liberal tradition recurs back to the Enlightenment, its critique of religion and its anthropological turn, which is, then, the measure for the whole Christian tradition including biblical texts and traditional theological interpretations.4 And indeed, in particular concepts and in some particular accents, both traditions are in opposition to each other. Of course, there are many other possibilities for the foundation of theology; and there are also concepts which try to unite the above-mentioned and partly opposite ways of doing theology. Many catholic theologians follow the transcendental starting point of Karl Rahner and, developing it further, they try to show in a kind of philosophical prolegomena, that human in his freedom, in a hidden way, asks the question of God, which is then explicitly answered by the revelation.5 On the protestant side, :ROIKDUW3DQQHQEHUJ came up with a conception, which presupposes that humans are per definitionem religious, God-related beings and God is necessary 4 Cf. radically CH. DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPHGHU &KULVWRORJLH (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013), Vorwort (without pagination): “The European Enlightenment and its reception in Protestant theology have dissolved the traditional old-church Christology.” In this perspective, the traditional Christology is considered for “großkirchliche Einheitsphantasien” (A. VON SCHELIHA, “Kyniker, Prophet, Revolutionär oder Sohn Gottes? Die ‘dritte Runde’ der Frage nach dem historischen Jesus und ihre christologische Bedeutung”, =174 [1999], 29), or for “a historically unlikely illusion“ (DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 30). 5 Cf. K. RAHNER, )RXQGDWLRQV RI &KULVWLDQ )DLWK, trans. W.V. DYCH (New York: Crossroad, 1998), 31–41; TH. PRÖPPER, 7KHRORJLVFKH $QWKURSRORJLH, vol. I (Freiburg: Herder, 2012), 488–564; cf. also below. Ch. 3.3. On the protestant side cf. in his specific way P. TILLICH, 6\VWHPDWLF7KHRORJ\, 3 vols. (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1951–1963), vol.I, 62, and vol. II, 13.

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for a right human self-understanding. And therefore, God has to prove himself within the process of history as God, as the ultimate truth. Since the history is not over yet, human claims for truth – including the Christian one – can only be particular. Then, “the testing of the [Christian] claim must take the form of a systematic reconstruction of Christian teaching from its starting point in the historical revelation of God which it asserts”, namely “that the God of the Bible will prove himself to be the one God of all people, or has already shown himself to be this one God in Jesus Christ”. Accordingly, in his methodological procedure, Pannenberg switches the view “from the phenomenology of the experiences of revelation which are richly attested in the religious world to the theme of the revelation of the deity of the God of Israel as the one God of all people”, takes this perspective on the scientific level as a hypothesis and tests its plausibility. 6 The problem of these otherwise highly appreciated approaches is that their alleged pretheological analysis of human freedom or religiosity is in fact led by a hidden Christian understanding of the general term of religion where basic human phenomena are interpreted as leading to the question or reality of the Christian God. The whole method is hence a hidden SHWLWLR SULQFLSLL. Moreover, the concept of religion proves to be rather a western construct than a universal concept, which could include all ‘religions’ and ‘religiosity’. 7

Nevertheless, the discussion and the self-reflection within theology go on. Could the liberal theology be defined as “grasping of a transcendent dimension of reality, incited from without”,8 then both these attitudes and traditions, 6

W. PANNENBERG, 6\VWHPDWLF7KHRORJ\, vol. 1, trans. G.W. BROMILEY (London/New York: T&T Clark, 2004), 196; IDEM, 7KHRORJ\ DQG WKH 3KLORVRSK\ RI 6FLHQFH, trans. F. MCDONAGH (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976). Cf. also P. GALLUS, “Mluvit o Bohu v sekulární společnosti podle Wolfharta Pannenberga [How to Speak about God in a Secular Society According to Wolfhart Pannenberg]” in 3URPČQ\ PDU[LVWLFNRNĜHVĢDQVNpKR GLDORJXYýHVNRVORYHQVNX [7UDQVIRUPDWLRQVRIWKH0DU[LVW&KULVWLDQ'LDORJXHLQ&]HFKR VORYDNLD], ed. I. LANDA and J. MERVART (Praha: Filosofia, 2017), 275–296. 7 Cf. G.A. LINDBECK, 7KH1DWXUHRI'RFWULQH5HOLJLRQDQG7KHRORJ\LQD3RVWOLEHUDO $JH, 25th ed. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009), 26: Regarding the presupposed notion “that there is an inner experience of God common to all human beings and all religions”, it is to say: “There can be no experiential core because […] the experiences that religions evoke and mold are as varied as the interpretive schemes they embody. Adherents of different religions do not diversely thematize the same experience; rather they have different experiences.” Cf. P.F. KNITTER, ,QWURGXFLQJ 7KHRORJLHV RI 5HOLJLRQV (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2002), 178–190; and below, Ch. 11. Cf. also the plastic and colorful reproduction of different religious experiences, practices and rituals, which determine the pa rticular everyday life of different religious traditions in N. MACGREGOR, /LYLQJ ZLWK WKH *RGV2Q%HOLHIVDQG3HRSOHV (London: Allen Lane, 2018). 8 J. LAUSTER, “Liberale Theologie”, 1=67K550 (2007), 295. Unfortunately further on, Lauster conceives religion in a very narrow individualistic sense, located “only subjectively in the human conscience” (297) which is obviously the (only) point of immediacy of the Absolute. But any religious expression, which is always a human work, can never reach to what founds it (ILQLWXPQRQFDSD[LQILQLWL) so that the theology remains nothing more than ³GRFWDLJQRUDQWLD” (298). Here, theology cannot know what it is related to because every self-expression of a religious individual is insufficient. Theology mutates into anthropology or into a theory of culture because transcendence is paradoxically too far and always abstract and cannot come closer (LQILQLWXPQRQFDSD[ILQLWL).

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trinitarian theology and liberal theology, could be conceived complementary, as two possible theological ways with different focuses. If the objective of theology is a reality incited from without and somehow experienced by humans, then it is possible or even necessary to raise not only one but rather WZR TXHVWLRQV: on one hand the question of this “from without”, on the other the question of the human experience of it. Both these questions are legitimate and it is not possible to reduce theology only to one of them because they both need one another: it is impossible to grasp an external point without an internal reception and it is analogically impossible to speak about a reception if it would not come from an external source.9 For this insight that liberal theology would need a bit more of christological foundation and trinitarian theology in the opposite a bit more of dealing with religious experience and the earthly Jesus, 6FKOHLHUPDFKHU DQG KLV &KULVWRORJ\ could be an interesting example, which, at the same time, brings important questions for the position of Christology within the whole of theology. It is well known that Schleiermacher conceives the Christian dogmatics as “accounts of the Christian religious affections set forth in speech”10. The main objective of his theology is therefore the piety, that is “a modification of Feeling, or of immediate self-consciousness”,11 which is, at the same time, the place of immediate God-consciousness. 12 Theology is hence an account of the contents of a pious conscience. Schleiermacher tries to maintain this principle in his Christology as well when he states that Christology expresses “all propositions concerning Christ which are immediate expressions of our Christian self-consciousness”.13 Yet, in fact, his Christology is divided tradi9 Cf. W. KASPER, -HVXV WKH &KULVW (London: T&T Clark, 2011), 11–12. And lately D. EVERS, “Combinatory Christology”, +76 7KHRORJLHVH 6WXGLHV  7KHRORJLFDO 6WXGLHV 72 (2016), 2: “Traditionally, there has been a fundamental divide between liberal or expressivist, and conservative or doctrinal Christologies. This debate has reached a kind of stalemate situation: either Jesus is nothing but a human being, a prophet, a teacher, a role model as believer or religious individual, or Jesus Christ is understood as a supernatural divinehuman being, the son of God walking on earth. I still think that this difference between liberal and doctrinal Christology is valid, but I am even more convinced that we have to transform this disjunction into a distinction between different aspects of Christology that have to be held together. If we are able to see Christology as an interrelation of different perspectives on Jesus Christ which are not mutually exclusive, this might allow for the diversification into Christologies that differ in foci but can become positively related.” 10 F.D.E. SCHLEIERMACHER, 7KH &KULVWLDQ )DLWK, 2nd ed. 1830/31 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2016), § 15, Thesis, 76. 11 Ibid., § 3, Thesis, 5. 12 Ibid., § 4, Thesis, 12. 13 Ibid., § 91.2, 372. Cf. also ibid., § 29.3, 125: “[N]othing concerning Him can be set up as real doctrine unless it is connected with His redeeming causality and can be traced to the original impression made by His existence. Whatever falls outside these limits either must have its proper place elsewhere or can make good its position only in virtue of some

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tionally into two parts about the person of Christ and about his work.14 In the first part, Schleiermacher treats the person of the Redeemer not as a content of human self-conscience but as an external reality, a historical fact, which causes the Christian faith and the believing conscience.15 “There is no doubt that, for Schleiermacher, the person of Jesus is not a content of conscience.” 16 In this view, Schleiermacher’s Christology is indeed “the great disturbing element” in his doctrine, not allowing it to be a circle with one focus, but Christology, being a second focus, forces his system to be rather “an ellipse with two foci”.17 The interesting question would be how this notion of the external source of human faith should affect the foundation and the structure of such theology, i.e., what would it mean if Schleiermacher himself would take more seriously his starting point as expressed in the thesis of § 11: “Christianity is a monotheistic faith, belonging to the teleological type of religion, and is essentially distinguished from other such faiths by the fact that in it everything is related to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth.”18

more distant relationship to be demonstrated in a special way.” In his program, Schleiermacher wants obviously to conceive Christology mainly in its soteriological dimension. In his factual procedure, however, provoked by the tradition he criticizes, he deals a lot with the ontology of Christ’s person. Concerning the danger of reducing Christology only to soteriology cf. below, Ch. 3.2.4., fn. 246. 14 Ibid., § 92.2, 376. 15 Ibid., § 14.1, 68. 16 R. SLENCZKA, *HVFKLFKWOLFKNHLWXQG 3HUVRQVHLQ-HVX &KULVWL6WXGLHQ]XUFKULVWROR JLVFKHQ 3UREOHPDWLN GHU KLVWRULVFKHQ -HVXVIUDJH (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967), 210, cf. 209–211. Similarly D. LANGE, +LVWRULVFKHU-HVXVRGHUP\WKLVFKHU&KULVWXV (Gütersloh: Mohn, 1975), 141: “[T]he central position of the doctrine of Christ in The Christian Faith is identical not with the position of the exalted one but with the position of the earthly, historical [geschichtlich] Jesus”. Or R. NIEBUHR, 6FKOHLHUPDFKHU RQ &KULVW DQG 5HOLJLRQ D 1HZ ,QWURGXFWLRQ (New York: Scribner, 1964), 212 and 220: “[T]he redeemer is the historical person”, therefore the Christian faith and Christology as well are “dependent upon historical fact”. 17 K. BARTH, 3URWHVWDQW 7KHRORJ\ LQ WKH 1LQHWHHQWK &HQWXU\, 2nd ed. (Valley Forge: Judson Press, 1976), 431–432. Ibid., 464, Barth adds: “[T]he ellipse tends to become a circle, so that its two foci have the tendency to coincide in one centre-point. But at the same time it is unlikely that this centre-point will lie mid-way between the two foci, since the power of attraction of the first focus is from the outset much stronger than that of the second, and since the second, once the circle has been achieved, might perhaps have vanished altogether, having succumbed entirely to the first.” Cf. also NIEBUHR, 6FKOHLHUPDFKHU, 212, who, therefore, calls Schleiermacher’s concept not “Christo-centric” but “Christomorphic”. This – already traditional – critique of Schleiermacher mentions also M. REDEKER, 6FKOHLHUPDFKHU /LIH DQG 7KRXJKW, trans. J. WELLHAUSER (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1973), 151. Against it J. MARIÑA, “Schleiermacher’s Christology Revisited. A Reply to his Critics”, 6-7 49 (1996), 177–200. 18 SCHLEIERMACHER, 7KH&KULVWLDQ)DLWK, § 11, Thesis, 52. Therefore, for Schleiermacher, Christian faith is always christological. However, he refrains from any proof of this

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And indeed, in the Second Letter to Lücke, Schleiermacher considers very seriously the possibility that in the second edition, he would start his Christian Faith with the second part, i.e., with Christology: “Would it not, therefore, have been most natural and orderly for me to begin from this point and to view everything from this perspective, especially since I have so definitely asserted that Christians have their complete consciousness of God only as it is produced in them through Christ? […] In short, the entire doctrine would have been treated as it is now, but in reverse order.”19

It is obvious, anyway, that Schleiermacher knew about the centrality of Christology, although there were other theological centers and foci, which were stronger in the end – in the structure as well as in the material explication.20 Famous is his wish to arrange his dogmatics so “that at every point the reader would be made aware that the verse John 1:14 is the basic text for all dogmatics, just as it should be for the conduct of the ministry as a whole”.21  -HVXV&KULVWDVWKH6HOI5HYHODWLRQRI*RG Although the stress on the historicity of the person of Jesus Christ can look disturbingly in Schleiermacher, it is no wonder in the traditional view. Christology traditionally plays a key role for the question of the external reality and of the external source and foundation of Christian faith. It is the fundamental answer of the Christian tradition to the question of from where the faith comes and where is it anchored.22 The external anchor and foundation of fact appealing simply to the presupposition “that every Christian, before he enters at all upon inquiries of this kind, has already the inward certainty that his religion cannot take any other form than this” (ibid., § 11.5, 60). According to his “Second Letter to Lücke”, in IDEM, 2QWKH *ODXEHQVOHKUH 7ZR /HWWHUV WR 'U /FNH, trans. J. DUKE and F. FIORENZA (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981), 55 (= SCHLEIERMACHER, .ULWLVFKH *HVDPWDXVJDEH, Abt. I/10, ed. H.-J. BIRKNER [Berlin: De Gruyter, 1990], 338), “every Christian” refers to “every mature Christian who came to clarity”, not to the young people for whom the form of catechism with another set up is appropriate. 19 SCHLEIERMACHER, 2QWKH*ODXEHQVOHKUH, 55–56 (= .*$ I/10, 338). 20 Cf. ibid., 68–69 (= .*$ I/10, 358–359). The centrality of Christology in Schleiermacher’s dogmatics stresses also M. SCHRÖDER, 'LH NULWLVFKH ,GHQWLWlW GHV QHX]HWOLFKHQ &KULVWHQWXPV 6FKOHLHUPDFKHUV :HVHQVEHVWLPPXQJ GHU FKULVWOLFKHQ 5HOLJLRQ, BHTh 96 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996), 55–56, but he refuses Barth’s critique of Schleiermacher. 21 SCHLEIERMACHER, 2Q WKH *ODXEHQVOHKUH, 59 (= .*$ I/10, 343). Cf. H. FISCHER, )ULHGULFK'DQLHO(UQVW6FKOHLHUPDFKHU (München: C.H. Beck, 2001), 117. 22 This answer is, however, based also already on faith, it is an answer from within. And there is no other standpoint possible. “There is no way to escape this common argument for turning away from Christian realism to religious idealism”, as EVERS, “Combinatory Christology”, 8, rightly states. It is so because the Christian faith is not a belief among other beliefs of the human life, “but an organizing and orientating principle” of the whole Christian conduct. One who believes cannot answer but from within of his or her faith.

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faith, the fundamental external reality for faith is grasped nowhere else than in Jesus Christ as the UHYHODWLRQRI*RG.23 Revelation cannot be understood as revelation of something, of some doctrines, of some fundamental contents of faith or of some holy words or texts, in which one would be required to believe in, as liberal theology rightly and often points out. 24 Faith is not based on accepting something as true but on a new perspective, on a newly understood reality as reality FRUDP 'HR. Revelation happens when God reveals himself in the conditions of the world as God and humans understand such moments as revelations of God. This means that in the epistemological respect, revelation is basically not a new reality but rather a new perspective and a new dimension of reality, which can be understood not only as it seems to be at first sight but also with more complexity when it is seen from a dif23

Cf. W. PANNENBERG, “Einführung”, in 2IIHQEDUXQJDOV*HVFKLFKWH, ed. IDEM (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1961), 8, where Pannenberg states a theological consensus already in the 1960s that “revelation is essentially the self-revelation of God”. Similarly IDEM, -HVXV ± *RG DQG 0DQ, trans. L.L. WIKLINS and D.A. PRIEBE (London: SCM Press, 1996), 127. I.U. DALFERTH, “Introduction: Understanding Revelation”, in 5HYHOD WLRQ, Claremont Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, Conference 2012, ed. I.U. DALFERTH and M.CH. RODGERS (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 20–25, shows in detail that this statement – developed originally in Hegel’s philosophy and later in a different way in K. Barth’s theology as “the two most accomplished types of understanding the idea of God’s self-revelation to this day” (ibid., 24) – is still valid, although we live today in a shifted postmodern paradigm of irreducible plurality of particular approaches (cf. below in this chapter, subch. 2). Cf. also DALFERTH, &UXFLILHG DQG 5HVXUUHFWHG, 172–176; CH. SCHWÖBEL, “Particularity, Universality, and the Religions. Toward a Christian Theology of Religions”, in &KULVWLDQ8QLTXHQHVV5HFRQVLGHUHG7KH0\WKRID3OXUDOLVWLF7KHRORJ\ RI5HOLJLRQV, ed. G. D’COSTA (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1990), 34. 24 However, mostly in order to destroy the traditional concept of revelation entirely. This tendency starts already with H.S. REIMARUS, “Zweites Fragment: Unmöglichkeit einer Offenbarung, die alle Menschen auf eine gegründete Art glauben können”, in G.E. LESSING,:HUNHXQG%ULHIH, vol. 8, ed. A. SCHILSON (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker-Verlag, 1989), 189; it is being mentioned by the liberals often in connection with Luther’s attack on ILGHVKLVWRULFD (cf. M. LUTHER, “Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen”, in :$ 7 [Weimar: Herrmann Bohlaus Nachfolger, 1897], 29; W. HERRMANN, 'HU 9HUNHKU GHV &KULVWHQ PLW *RWW LP $QVFKOXVV DQ /XWKHU GDUJHVWHOOW, 7th ed. [Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1921], 87). Today cf. e.g. DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 216 and 193: “Christology based on the theology of revelation as a special dogmatic doctrine is dissolved.” A middle position defends P. SCHMIDT-LEUKEL, *RWW RKQH *UHQ]HQ (LQH FKULVWOLFKH XQG SOXUDOLV WLVFKH 7KHRORJLH GHU 5HOLJLRQHQ (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2005), 212–226, who stresses as well that revelation is not an acceptance of some instructions or informations but rather a matter of communication. In his conception, revelation as the selfrevelation of God plays a central role (more to his position see below, Ch. 11.1). In the exact opposite to the claim of protestant liberal theology, catholic theology sees itself to be based on revealed truths, which are defined in dogmas, cf. C.V. POSPÍŠIL, -Håtã]1D]DUHWD 3iQD6SDVLWHO >-HVXVRI1D]DUHWK/RUGDQG6DYLRXU@, 2nd ed. (Praha: Krystal, 2002), 30– 35.

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ferent perspective. Revelation opens a new dimension of reality and with it a new and surprising perspective and meaning of things. It happens through an otherwise “normal” reality, in which – and this is the important point – God reveals God-Self not as something else but as God. Revelation is therefore always revelation VXEFRQWUDULR. It is “the experiential process in which he [God] allows us to experience himself as he is, both in, with, and as part of what is other than himself, with the result that we are able to perceive and recognize God in truth as we reflect on this experiential process.” 25

It brings a new understanding of reality and with it a clarifying differentiation because the basic semiotic DV-GLIIHUHQFH remains valid: what is understood is a different thing from how it is understood. Neither side of the process of revelation and of our experiencing and interpretation of revelation can be absent or reduced to the other. This means, at the same time, that revelation is always revelation for somebody. On the human side, this new understanding provokes faith, which is fundamentally an “experience with the experience” within this new and more complex perspective FRUDP'HR.26 Faith is therefore not a condition for recognition of something as a revelation of God. On the contrary, faith itself is EDVHG on this new perspective opened from outside. Theologically speaking from the internal perspective of faith, the understanding of God as God is mediated also by God-Self.27

25

DALFERTH, &UXFLILHGDQG5HVXUUHFWHG, 174; cf. ibid., 176, where Dalferth, following an important point of Hegel, points out the necessary interconnection of God and our thinking of God: “God is only truly conceptualized when the structure of the idea of God is determined by the reality through which, according to the Christian faith, God has revealed not just one of his specific realities but his essence, which defines all his realities.” 26 Faith is “Erfahrung mit der Erfahrung (experience with experience)”. This phrase comes from G. EBELING, :RUWXQG*ODXEH, vol.III (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1975), 22, and was also used and made known by E. JÜNGEL, “Drei Vorbemerkungen”, in IDEM, 8Q WHUZHJV]XU6DFKH (München: Kaiser, 1972), 8. 27 ‘God is recognized by God’ says since Hegel an old premise of theology of revelation (cf. G.W.F. HEGEL, 9RUOHVXQJHQ EHU GLH 3KLORVRSKLH GHU 5HOLJLRQ, vol. 3, ed. W. JAESCHKE [Hamburg: Meiner, 1995], 177–178, fn.; BARTH, &KXUFK 'RJPDWLFV II/1, 179; TILLICH, 6\VWHPDWLF7KHRORJ\II, 14. In Hegel and Barth, this premise has a christological point). However, this sentence needs to be corrected in a sensitive semiotic way in order not to sideline humans and their understanding (which is a common problem in both Hegel and Barth). Faith confesses its foundation by God-Self, but not in the sense that God would arrange or even force the understanding. An understanding is always a contingent process, always a little surprising, which arises from actually given possibilities. God in his Spirit takes part in this contingent process providing opportunities for human understanding but not forcing or making humans understand. Cf. I.U. DALFERTH, (YDQJHOLVFKH7KHRORJLHDOV ,QWHUSUHWDWLRQVSUD[LV (Leipzig: EVA 2004), 77–113; P. GALLUS, “Orientující teologie”, in IDEM and P. MACEK, 7HRORJLHMDNRYČGD (Brno: CDK, 2007), 56–67; P. GALLUS, “Was ist

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Already the first witnesses and many after them until today recognized in Jesus Christ God-Self; they understood and understand him thus as the VHOI UHYHODWLRQ RI *RG. Self-revelation means, on its basic level, as Pannenberg puts it, “that the Revealer and what is revealed are identical. God is as much the subject, the author of his self-revelation, as he is its content. Thus to speak of a self-revelation of God in the Christ event means that the Christ event, that Jesus, belongs to the essence of God hi mself.”28

Then, God cannot be understood without or apart from Christ. On the contrary, “[i]f God is revealed through Jesus Christ, then who or what God is becomes defined only by the Christ event. Then Jesus belongs to the definition of God and thus to his divinity, to his essence. The essence of God is not accessible at all without Jesus Christ.” 29

Therefore, according to semiotic distinctions, the central sentence should be put this way: Christian faith interprets the human Jesus Christ as a person, in which reveals himself as ‘God’; because for what we mean with (as the intended reality) we have no other signs and terms than ‘God’ (as our term). We can never have (as any other thing in itself), we can have only ‘God’ as referent to . Yet, if it is who reveals KLPVHOI in the human Jesus, i.e., who reveals himself in the wholly human categories as who he is – as , then, when searching where to ground our interpretation of , we are directed to the experience and interpretation of the human Jesus Christ. Therefore, presupposed with the Christian faith that it is who reveals himself in Jesus Christ, it is ‘God’ what we experience in Jesus Christ. When we thus want to speak about , the only door leads through the experience and interpretation of Jesus Christ. His person is the necessary and normative bound between and ‘God’. At the same time, obviously, the difference between , Jesus Christ, and ‘God’ remains valid and must not be forgotten. It must be rather thoroughly theologically elaborated. This fundamental notion of the Christian faith is the fundamental justification of the central position of Christology also within theology.30 And it simultaneously requires a trinitarian background. der Mensch?”, in -DKUH5HIRUPDWLRQLQGHU6ORZDNHL, ed. M. NICÁK and M. TAMCKE (Berlin: LIT Verlag), 239–256. 28 PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 129. 29 Ibid., 130. 30 Cf. ibid., 19. Therefore, DALFERTH, -HQVHLWV YRQ 0\WKRV XQG /RJRV, 3, stresses the necessary christological character of all theology: “If Christian theology wants to keep a distinct voice in the contemporary process of pluralization in culture and religion and not only to contribute to the general religious hum, it has to stress its own characteristic. That is &KULVWRORJ\. Christology is more than a part of theology: Christian theology is Christology. […] Insofar everything what Christian theology treats has christological foundations.”

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At the same time, this is the principal point of difference to all theologies, which take the confession of Jesus Christ rather metaphorically and which, therefore, do not conceive Jesus as the self-revelation of God but rather as an image or picture of God, which is to be transcended, in the end, toward God-Self. These theologies, as it is the case with the modern liberal theology, instead of being founded on the very concrete profession of Jesus Christ as true God and true human, they are rather grounded on the anthropological presupposition of a general human religiosity without being able or willing to think revelation at all, or only in a conditioned way. The question for liberal theology in this context would thus be, whether liberal theology can think God, the Absolute or the Unconditioned as being able to enter really into the world, or whether God, although all reality is conceived panentheistically as in God, remains in fact so far away (e.g. as the “horizon” of human life) that we as humans do not have and cannot achieve anything more than relative pictures (where Jesus himself is one of such) 31 or symbols,32 which need to be transcended at last if one would like to come closer to God. Then, the final result and the final possible theological achievement seems to be a sort of a negative theology. 33 Simply said: is there besides the human attempts to come closer to God also – and if, then much more importantly – the other direction: God’s coming into the world and human forms DV*RG?34 For the most extreme, yet, at the same time, nicely clear liberal position stands $YRQ +DUQDFNwith his famous thesis that “[t]he Gospel, as Jesus proclaimed it, has to do with the Father only and not with the Son“.35 Here, Jesus is not the Son of God: “The sentence Cf. programmatically also W. PANNENBERG, “Christologie und Theologie”, in IDEM, *UXQGIUDJHQV\VWHPDWLVFKHU7KHRORJLH*HVDPPHOWH$XIVlW]H, vol. 2 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980), 129–145; further cf. e.g. N. PITTENGER , 7KH :RUG ,QFDUQDWH $6WXG\ RI WKH 'RFWULQH RI WKH 3HUVRQ RI &KULVW (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), 284; F. WAGNER, “Christologie als exemplarische Theorie des Selbstbewußtseins”, in IDEM, :DVLVW7KHRORJLH"6WXGLHQ]XLKUHP%HJULIIXQG7KHPDLQGHU1HX]HLW (Gütersloh: G. Mohn, 1989), 329–333; J. MOLTMANN, 7KH&UXFLILHG*RG, trans. R.A. WILSON and J. BOWDEN (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 7; J. MACQUARRIE, -HVXV&KULVWLQ0RGHUQ 7KRXJKW (London: SCM Press, 1990), 3. 31 Cf. the philosophical background in the late J.G. Fichte, 1DFKJHODVVHQH:HUNH, vol. II, ed. I.H. FICHTE (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1962), 335 and 365; and a current German protestant concept in M.D. KRÜGER, 'DV DQGHUH %LOG &KULVWL (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017), 489–514. 32 P. TILLICH, 6\VWHPDWLF 7KHRORJ\ I, 132–137, 235–241; cf. P. GALLUS, 'HU 0HQVFK ]ZLVFKHQ +LPPHO XQG (UGH 'HU *ODXEHQVEHJULII EHL 3 7LOOLFK XQG . %DUWK (Leipzig: EVA, 2007), 82–90, 139–149, 212–214. 33 Thought out to the end, however, negative theology destroys itself, as I.U. DALFERTH, 'LH:LUNOLFKNHLWGHV0|JOLFKHQ (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 517, pointedly notices: if God is radical different than everything we can think, then we cannot think God at all. Then, “negative theology becomes a negation of theology” and, in fact, “the end of theology”. 34 Cf. EVERS, “Combinatory Christology”, 8: “[L]iberal accounts have difficulties to express the basic Christian belief that God is effectively present in, with and under the formations of creation, including objectified reality.” 35 A. VON HARNACK, :KDW LV &KULVWLDQLW\", trans. T.B. SAUNDERS (digital ed. 2006), 95. To Harnack’s Christology, cf. also CH. AXT-PISCALAR, “Adolf von Harnack’s Christology”, in -HVXV&KULVW7RGD\6WXGLHVRI&KULVWRORJ\LQ9DULRXV&RQWH[WV, ed. S.G. HALL (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2009), TBT 146, 159–177. Axt-Piscalar tries to interpret

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‘I am the Son of God’ was not inserted in the Gospel by Jesus himself, and to put that sentence there side by side with the others is to make an addition to the Gospel.“36 Rather, Jesus is the unique “personal realization” of the divine Gospel – not of God or divinity! – “in as pure form as it can appear on earth”, which still shines through the message of his disciples.37 In Harnack, no Christology is actually needed. 38 Jesus is fully human, not divine,39 and therefore only an ideal example to be followed. Christian religion in its original form as witnessed by the Gospels concentrates on the teachings of Jesus, not on his person. Hence, it is theological Christology, starting already with Paul and resulting into an “acute Hellenisation” of the Gospel,40 which is the biggest enemy of the Gospel: “If redemption is to be traced to Christ’s person and work, everything would seem to depend upon a right understanding of this person together with what he accomplished. The formation of a correct theory of and about Christ threatens to assume the position of chief importance, and to pervert the majesty and simplicity of the Gospel.”41

Harnack in a more orthodox way. Therefore, she weakens some of his radical theses (i.e., theses regarding Christology and Trinity in the first place, cf. ibid., 169–174) and blurs some fundamental differentiations (ibid., 170–171, where she tries to interpret Harnack’s Jesus as God in person, whereas Jesus in Harnack is rather “the personal embodiment of the Gospel, not of God”, as rightly sees EVERS, “Combinatory Christology”, 6). Nevertheless, Axt-Piscalar points rightly out that Harnack’s criticism of Christology and formation of dogma in the old church, led by falsely determined soteriological interest (AXTPISCALAR, “Adolf von Harnack’s Christology”, 166) does not mean that he would reject the importance of the person of Jesus and dogma as such. As an example, the so-called $S RVWROLNXPVWUHLW in 1870s in Germany can be mentioned, where Harnack did not want to reject the Creed as such but “he argued for the formulation of an up-to-date confession” (ibid., 163, footnote 8; cf. also R. LEONHARDT, “Die Bedeutung von Bekenntnissen in Theologie und Kirche zwischen Anspruch der Tradition und aktuellen Herausforderungen, in 'LH5HGHYRQ-HVXV&KULVWXVDOV*ODXEHQVDXVVDJH, ed. J. HERZER et al. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2018], 74–82). 36 HARNACK, :KDWLV&KULVWLDQLW\", 96. 37 Ibid. 38 He writes the word “Christology” only in the quotation marks, cf. ibid., 94. 39 Ibid., 84. 40 Ibid., 134. This thesis about the hellenization of the Gospel is one of Harnack’s most famous and therefore also most controversial. Cf. A. GRILLMEIER, “Christus licet uobis inuitis deus. Ein Beitrag zur Diskussion über die Hellenisierung der christlichen Botschaft”, in IDEM, )UDJPHQWH]XU&KULVWRORJLH6WXGLHQ]XPDOWNLUFKOLFKHQ&KULVWXVELOG, ed. TH. HAINTHALER (Freiburg: Herder, 1997), 81–111. Both positions of Harnack and Grillmeier are corrected as oversimplified by CH. MARKSCHIES, +HOOHQLVLHUXQJGHV&KULV WHQWXPV, ThLZF 25 (Leipzig: EVA, 2012); IDEM, “‘Hellenisierung des Christentums’? – die ersten Konzilien”, in 'LH$QIlQJHGHV&KULVWHQWXPV, ed. F.W. GRAF and K. WIEGANDT (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2009), 397–436. 41 HARNACK, :KDWLV&KULVWLDQLW\", 120. Hence, the whole history of dogma is actually a history of “decline” from the original simple Gospel (cf. K.-J. KUSCHEL, %RUQ%HIRUH$OO 7LPH" 7KH 'LVSXWH RYHU &KULVW¶V 2ULJLQ, trans. J. BOWDEN [London: SCM Press, 1992], 56–57).

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In the liberal theology, Jesus plays therefore still an important role, yet not as the Son of God but rather as the “exemplary character of a God-devoted life”.42 With this conception, liberal theologians often refer to Schleiermacher, but in Schleiermacher, Jesus is more than the best example to be followed and the only mediator of God-consciousness (cf. above in this chapter, subch. 1.2.1). According to Schleiermacher, the power of Godconsciousness in Jesus is so strong that “to ascribe to Christ an absolutely powerful Godconsciousness, and to attribute to Him an existence of God in Him, are exactly the same thing”. Therefore, we can posit “this perfect indwelling of the Supreme Being as his peculiar being and His inmost self”. 43 Schleiermacher seems, therefore, to count on Jesus’ divinity much more than the liberal tradition, which arose from him and refers to him as one of its important sources.44 Another extreme position within liberal theology is represented by theologians who try to conceive Christology radically as a form of subjectivity theory. Such a concept was presented in a programmatic way by )DON:DJQHU. Standing firmly in the Enlightenment tradition of Kant (with his differentiation of the “good principle” and its “personification” 45), Hegel (with his conception of the objective Spirit as the community46) and Strauss (with his idea of the divinity bound not only to one individual but to the whole mankind 47), Wagner in his earlier phase tries to establish Christology as an “exemplary theory of the self-consciousness”.48 Christology is for him rather an “argumentation figure”, a general speculative theory of self-explanation of the self-consciousness.49 The person of Jesus Christ fits into this theory because he is, following the idealistic tradition, a “unity of the particular and general self-consciousness”.50 Wagner tries here to reinterpret the traditional 42

U. BARTH, “Hermeneutik der Evangelien als Prolegomena zur Christologie”, in =ZLVFKHQ KLVWRULVFKHP -HVXV XQG GRJPDWLVFKHP &KULVWXV, ed. CH. DANZ and M. MURRMANN-KAHL, DoMo 1 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 303. 43 SCHLEIERMACHER, 7KH &KULVWLDQ )DLWK, § 94.2, 387 and 388. Cf. the liberal complaint of C.-D. OSTHÖVENER, “Dogmatik II: Materiale Entfaltung der ‘Glaubenslehre’”, in 6FKOHLHUPDFKHU+DQGEXFK, ed. M. OHST (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017), 366: “The fact that he, nevertheless, finds his way to the formulation ‘that the God-consciousness dwelling in him [sc. in Christ] was God’s true being in him’ does not make the evaluation of his Christology any easier.” (Osthövener quotes here F.D.E. SCHLEIERMACHER, 'HU FKULVW OLFKH*ODXEH ±, KGA I/7.2 [Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 1980], § 116, 27.) 44 Radical liberals, however, criticize Schleiermacher that that his decision to go a middle way between preservation and abandoning of the traditional dogma is “half-hearted”, cf. B. DAHLKE, “Die Christologie in Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre”, &DWKROLFD 70 (2016), 290. 45 Cf. below, Ch. 2.1, footnote 26. 46 Cf. G.W.F. HEGEL, 3KlQRPHQRORJLHGHV*HLVWHV (Hamburg: Meiner, 1988), 498, 511. 47 Cf. below, footnote 113. 48 WAGNER, “Christologie als exemplarische Theorie”, 309–342. Cf. also Wagner’s Lectures on Christology from 1989/90, F. WAGNER, “Vorlesung über Christologie (Wintersemester 1989/90 in Wien)”, in =ZLVFKHQ KLVWRULVFKHP -HVXV XQG GRJPDWLVFKHP &KULVWXV, ed. CH. DANZ and M. MURRMANN-KAHL, DoMo 1 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 309–401. 49 WAGNER, “Christologie als exemplarische Theorie”, 309–310: “Christology represents nothing else than an encoded expression of the fact of self-consciousness” (ibid., 310). 50 Ibid., 314.

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two-natures Christology as a meta-theory in abstract theoretical terms of self-consciousness and present this pattern, with a high ambition, also as a general and universal philosophical model.51 To achieve this, according to Wagner, it is necessary (following Reimarus, Strauss and Baur52) to remove the secondary and particular Christian images produced by the church and to liberate the general self-consciousness from all historical bounds. It is necessary to go beyond history and beyond all church production to the Unproduced.53 The Unproduced in this form is still a human idea, but it is only thinkable in a “reversal of the religious consciousness”: as a self-production of the Unproduced in a human production. In theological terms: It is only thinkable as the self-revelation of God in human terms. Translated into Christology: In Jesus Christ, the general self-consciousness becomes particular.54 And exactly this becoming, the constitution of the unity of the exemplary self-consciousness of Jesus Christ is the point of interest for Wagner. Therefore, he refuses to start with incarnation and with the traditional two-natures doctrine, because the constituted unity is already presupposed there.55 Instead, he seeks the point of God’s internal self-differentiation and the point of the constitution of the God-man-unity in Jesus Christ (i.e., he seeks in fact a kind of theogony). However, he does not do it in an ontological way but in terms of (or more sharply: in the reduction to) self-consciousness. From this perspective, Wagner reinterprets the classical christological tradition, asking the triple question of how the general self-consciousness develops within the particular, how the particular self-consciousness develops within the general, and how these two processes can create a unity.56 At the end of his treatise, he turns back to his initial question and widens the christological focus to the human self-consciousness in general: according to Wagner, it came out that in the search for a self-explanation, the self-consciousness cannot refer only to itself but it needs to refer to its ground. A finite self-consciousness needs the general self-consciousness for its explanation. The interest of the self-consciousness in itself is, in the end, grounded in its foundation in God.57 In his later period, Wagner abandoned his earlier attempt of a theory of the Absolute and became much more critical toward the traditional theology as well as toward his own earlier work. He attacked the traditional concept of God’s sovereignty, denied the idea of incarnation as an “imaginary play (vorstellungshafte Spielerei)”, and a “fairy-tale imagina-

51

Ibid. Ibid., 320. 53 Ibid., 321. 54 Ibid., 329. Cf. WAGNER, “Vorlesung über Christologie”, 342–343. This reversal pointing to the divine self-revelation is obviously the central point of Wagner’s theory of the Absolute: “The human knowledge of God and the human term of God is to be transposed into the self-term of God, and the human qualification of God into the selfqualification of God. This theo-logical turn of Christology is to be made in order that the christological subject does not remain dependent on the facticity of the recognition and production of the community. The transformation of the knowledge of God, as it is implied in the way of Jesus, matches therefore the reformulation of the ontological proof of God: the human term of God is to be understood from the self-qualification of God.” 55 Ibid., 330, 333. 56 Ibid., 333–341. In this context, he can surprisingly appreciate e.g. the Chalcedonian distinction or the Christology of K. Barth (ibid., 334). 57 Ibid., 341–342. 52

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tion (märchenhafte Vorstellungsart)” 58 and interpreted the God-human relation within his (clearly Hegelian) concept of the “revolutioning of the idea of God” as a symmetrical one: God needs human for his being God so that the originally asymmetrical relation turns out to be symmetrical. God-as-God – i.e., God in his superiority – dies and human remains “as the only power of his worldly existence”. 59 The whole process results into a picture of symmetrical human relations, i.e., into a social ethical concept, in which the real human freedom can be constituted and where any absolute instances are not acceptable any more.60 For religion, this means – and this is Wagner’s most radical point – the “detheologizing of religion”, going hand in hand with “de-dogmatizing, de-substantializing, de-supranaturalizing and de-mythologization of the traditional Christian concepts”. 61 Similarly, &KULVWLDQ'DQ]criticizes heavily the traditional two-natures Christology and, following and even radicalizing the christological conception of F. Wagner, he interprets the Christology as a mere instrument for a self-enlightenment of a finite individual freedom. 62 “Theological Christology has the sole function of a self-description of faith and of its historical integration. Therefore, systematic theological Christology is to be understood as a necessary expression of the self-understanding of the Christian religion about itself.”63 For Danz, God is identified with the process of self-enlightenment of one’s self: “The knowledge of God is the self-knowledge and the self-knowledge is the knowledge of God.”64 Hence, the human self-understanding as such “has throughout a soteriological dimension”.65 In this outcome, he meets 1RWJHU6OHQF]ND, who takes all christological statements only as statements on the level of language, which do not express anything about the objects of such speech but solely about the speaking subject. Christological statements are objectifications of human internal experiences. “The specifically Christian ‘speech of Christ’ turns out to be a moment of the Christian’s speech of himself.”66 58 F. WAGNER, 0HWDPRUSKRVHQ GHV PRGHUQHQ 3URWHVWDQWLVPXV (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 162. 59 Ibid., 163. 60 Ibid., 166. 61 Ibid., 165. 62 DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 193. 63 Ibid., 9, cf. 193–240. Similarly IDEM and M. MURRMANN-KAHL, “Der Problemhorizont der Christologie in der Moderne”, in =ZLVFKHQKLVWRULVFKHP-HVXVXQGGRJPDWLVFKHP &KULVWXV, ed. CH. DANZ and M. MURRMANN-KAHL, DoMo 1 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 1: Christology becomes “a description of the actual individual process of faith and of its inner structure”. The same states F. WITTEKIND, “Christologie im 20. Jahrhundert”, ibid., 7–45. I will deal with this position more in detail below in Ch. 2.1. 64 DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 216. 65 Ibid., 220. Then, faith is directly identified with revelation. And because “the subjective and the objective moment in the term of revelation originate simultaneously (gleichursprünglich) with faith”, God (but only as the mere thought of God) originates with faith as well (ibid., 211–212). 66 N. SLENCZKA, “Problemgeschichte der Christologie”, in 0DUEXUJHU-DKUEXFK7KHRO RJLH;;,,,: &KULVWRORJLH, ed. E. GRÄB-SCHMIDT, MThSt 131 (Leipzig: EVA, 2011), 60. Cf. also IDEM, “Die Christologie als Reflex des frommen Selbstbewusstseins”, in -HVXV &KULVWXV, ed. J. SCHRÖTER, Themen der Theologie 9 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 181–241. It seems to be no coincidence that in Christology, Slenczka shows some sympathies for Arius (ibid., 192–196).

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In these conceptions, Jesus Christ is only an image or an expression and projection of faith67 and, hence, Christology is reduced to anthropology or to a kind of a self-therapeutic process of the faith toward a better self-understanding or toward a “successful human selfrelationship”.68 All processes, which the traditional Christology describes as coming from H[WUD PH (knowledge of God, God-consciousness, atonement, salvation, redemption and even the reference to the historical person of Jesus Christ himself 69) are, in the end, processes within one’s individual consciousness, within one’s self-enlightenment (i.e., selfconsciousness, self-atonement, self-salvation, self-redemption).70 Either way, this means that Christology as such (if not the whole theology itself) is off the table.71 What remains, is individual religious anthropology.

Christology, or a principal theological decision, whether positive or negative about the VWDWXVRI&KULVWRORJ\, defines thus the grammar of the whole of theology. It is the approach to Christology, which decides about the shape of the particular theological concept and within of it about the position of God, of humans, of the world, and of their mutual relations. 72 Without Christology in the strong sense, which takes Jesus Christ as true human and true God, the liberal approach would be the most fitting, seeking to explain human religiosity from an anthropological perspective. Yet, if in Jesus Christ is God-Self, then Christology turns the table; then, Christology becomes the foundation of theology and structures its grammar. Then, there is no alternative to it.

67

For a believer, then, Jesus Christ is “das Andere seiner selbst” (SLENCZKA, “Problemgeschichte der Christologie”, 108). But exactly as such, and that is the problem, he is no real other, he is only one’s projection. Herein, the principal weak point of any theory of subjectivity comes clearly out: the inability to provide a possible space for a real otherness. Cf. DALFERTH, 'LH:LUNOLFKNHLWGHV0|JOLFKHQ, 425. 68 SLENCZKA, “Problemgeschichte der Christologie”, 99. 69 Cf. DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 192: Christology can move forward only “if the christological reflection is unburdened of all reconnections to the empirical history of the man from Nazareth”. Similarly F. WITTEKIND, “Christologie im Kontext der systematischen Theologie religiöser Rede”, in 'RJPDWLVFKH &KULVWRORJLH LQ GHU 0RGHUQH, ed. CH. DANZ and G. ESSEN (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 2019), 290. 70 Therefore, EVERS, “Combinatory Christology”, 6, calls this approach “from within a first-person perspective”, which lacks the ability to “give enough credit to what the reformers called the dimension of ‘H[WUDQRV’” (ibid., 8). 71 Either sublated in a left-Hegelian or even Straussian way into pneumatology (M. MURRMANN-KAHL, “Die universale Bedeutung der Person Jesu”, in 'RJPDWLVFKH &KULV WRORJLHLQGHU0RGHUQH, ed. CH. DANZ and G. ESSEN [Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 2019], 195–196), or totally abandoned (WITTEKIND, “Christologie im Kontext”, 290, where he states explicitly that the aim is “a modern religion without Christology”). 72 Cf. R.J. WOŹNIAK, “The Christological Prism. Christology as Methodical Principle”, in 7KH 2[IRUG +DQGERRN RI &KULVWRORJ\, ed. F.A. MURPHY (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2015), 527.

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2. The Methodological Backgrounds 2. The Methodological Backgrounds

On the level of scientific methodology, this central position of Christology with its claim for truth – a claim, which is based on the Christian faith – remains disputable until its eschatological confirmation, which is, however, also a theological presupposition that is a part of this theological perspective itself and, therefore, stands under the same reservation of disputability. 73 In my opinion, this hypothetical scientific status of theology and the above-mentioned double focus of theology – the external reality of God in Jesus Christ and the human religious understanding and experiencing of this reality – can be maintained the best on the background of WKH VHPLRWLFFRQ FHSWLRQRIKXPDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJFRPPXQLFDWLRQDQGUHODWLRQWRWKHH[WHUQDO UHDOLW\.74 Altogether, my starting point against this backdrop with Christology as the centre has two important consequences for the general principles of theological work as understood in this study, both of which are marks of current postmodern times with its stress on necessary SDUWLFXODULW\ of every perspective and, hence, on the unavoidable SOXUDOLW\ of perspectives: GLDJQRVWLF UDWLRQDOLW\ and LQWHUQDOUHDOLVP. These consequences are based on the principal insight into the semiotic fundaments of human understanding and communication.  7KH3RVWPRGHUQ6LWXDWLRQ'LDJQRVWLF5DWLRQDOLW\ZLWKLQ3OXUDO 3HUVSHFWLYHV Contrary to the modern view that presupposed the unity of everything and tried thus to bring all plurality to an original unity (in a kind of a metanarrative, whether in the transcendent absolute subject or in the transcendental human subject) and which tried, on the theoretical level, to search for ultimate justification that, however, proved impossible,75 the postmodern para73 This was an important emphasis of W. Pannenberg, which I share. Regarding the scientific status, PANNENBERG, 6\VWHPDWLF 7KHRORJ\ 1, 56 (cf. 48–61), conceived therefore the whole adventure of systematic theology as a hypothesis. Cf. also IDEM, 7KHRORJ\DQG WKH3KLORVRSK\RI6FLHQFH. 74 For a deeper introduction into semiotics, as founded by Ch.S. Peirce (cf. IDEM, “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities”, in 7KH &ROOHFWHG 3DSHUV RI &KDUOHV 6DQGHUV 3HLUFH, vol. V, ed. CH. HARTSHORNE and P. WEISS [Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1931– 1935], 5.264–5.316) see e.g. U. ECO, $ 7KHRU\ RI 6HPLRWLFV (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1976); IDEM, =HLFKHQ (LQIKUXQJ LQ HLQHQ %HJULII XQG VHLQH *HVFKLFKWH, trans. G. MEMMERT (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977). For the theological use of semiotics cf. DALFERTH, (YDQJHOLVFKH7KHRORJLHDOV,QWHUSUHWDWLRQVSUD[LV; GALLUS, “Orientující teologie”. 75 Cf. DALFERTH, 'LH :LUNOLFKNHLW GHV 0|JOLFKHQ, 336–430. Nevertheless, as LINDBECK, 7KH1DWXUHRI'RFWULQH, 28, states, “[t]he old theories may still hold perfectly well in their primary areas of application”, i.e., in systems or unities, which yet turned out

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digm76 focuses on the individual within his or her particular world and, hence, starts with the irreducible plurality and particularity of each perspective. 77 “There is no such thing as a bird’s-eye view of postmodernity because there is no such thing as a bird’s-eye view of anything. We can never rise above – or transcend – the location where we are standing in order to see all the other locations. We are always looking at other places from VRPH SODFH. Therefore, bird’s-eye views are – excuse the pun – for the birds. We are hmans. That means we are place-bound. That is what our ‘modern’ world seems to have forgotten. And the forgetfulness is rooted in the powerful influence that the

in the postmodern paradigm as particular unities. For the big picture, however, holds, what D. TRACY, 2Q 1DPLQJ WKH 3UHVHQW *RG +HUPHQHXWLFV DQG &KXUFK (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1994), 10–11, asserts: “[N]one of the models of modern self and the present time of modernity can any longer suffice: neither the purely autonomous self of the Enlightenment, nor the expresionist self of the Romantics, nor the anxious self of the existentialists, nor the transcendental self of the transcendental philosophies and theologies of consciousness. All such models are inadequate: for all are too deeply related to the embattled and self deluding self of modernity.” 76 Regarding the paradigm of postmodernity cf. TRACY, 2Q 1DPLQJ, 3–24; S. COAKLEY, *RG6H[XDOLW\DQGWKH6HOI$Q(VVD\µ2QWKH7ULQLW\¶ (Cambridge UP, 2013), 31; R. HAIGHT, -HVXV 6\PERO RI *RG (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1999), 330–334; Z. BAUMAN, 3RVWPRGHUQLW\ DQG ,WV 'LVFRQWHQWV (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997). J.-F. LYOTARD, in his classical text 7KH3RVWPRGHUQ&RQGLWLRQ$5HSRUWRQ.QRZOHGJH (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979), 10, referring to Wittgenstein’s language games, puts well the difference of the postmodern pragmatics compared to the modern search for the ultimate reason (in the 19 th century in the way of verification, in the 20 th century in the way of falsification, ibid., 24): The rules of a particular language game “do not carry within themselves their own legitimation, but are the object of a contract, explicit or not, between players (which is not to say that the players invent the rules)”. The “demand for legitimation” is even a symptom “of cultural imperialism” (ibid., 27). This notion is employed theologically in the cultural-linguistic conception of religion and theology in LINDBECK, 7KH 1DWXUH RI 'RFWULQH, 18–27. In the sociology of religion, reacting on the secularization debate, cf. S.N. EISENSTADT, “Multiple Modernities”, 'DHGDOXV 129/1 (2000), 1–29. 77 Cf. DALFERTH, 'LH :LUNOLFKNHLWGHV 0|JOLFKHQ, 337–338, and IDEM, “Introduction: Understanding Revelation”, 24, where he characterizes the postmodern paradigm in the terms of “particularity”, “plurality”, “differences”, “diversity” and “depth or mystery” (originally all terms italicized). Cf. also GROSSHANS, 7KHRORJLVFKHU 5HDOLVPXV, V–VI, who names also the fundamental problem of postmodernity: “To the markers of ‘postmodernity’ belongs the recognition of SOXUDOLW\: there is no longer RQH reality, which could be understood through RQH reason, but both the term of reality as well as the term of reason are to be thought of LQDSOXUDOZD\. However, if we give up a unified term of reality and a unified term of reason so that they cannot be presupposed in cognition, research, and communication anymore, the term of reality itself seems to be questioned. Something real cannot be claimed as objectively given: therefore the reality is understood as an invention, proposition or construction of humans.”

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historical period of the Enlightenment has played on all of Western thought throughout the modern period.”78

On the other hand, no particular perspective stands alone and isolated. With all inevitable particularity of our perspectives, we still live in one shared world and are preformatted by the society we live in and by its structures. A particular perspective, therefore, cannot exist but in the encounter and clash with other perspectives, in a communicative process of subsequent mutual influence, correction and clarification in order to find mutual understanding and mutually shared perspective. Unity is, then, not something from which we come already and always but something we need to search for and create through mutual understanding and communication. 79 Yet this also implies, at the same time, that unity is a plural and partial phenomenon: what we can achieve from our particular perspectives, are always plural unities, on different levels, to different extents, and with other different particular positions. Thus, no more from the universal to the individual (or from the individual as a case of the universal) but, on the contrary, from the individual with all its specifics and irrevocable differences to the other, from the concrete and particular phenomena and then as far as it might go leads the way of thinking in the postmodern times; through mutual correction and clarification in the quest for mutual understanding, yet still being aware of the particularity of one’s own perspective. With respect to the disputability of all theological claims on the scientific level and to this plurality of perspectives and without any possibility of a justifiable claim of ultimate truth or ultimate perspective, what remains is one’s own particular perspective and certain pragmatics. One must VWDUW ZLWK KLV RZQ SRVLWLRQ and must try to develop it in order to make that position interesting for the others, clear in argumentation, critical in reflection of one’s own presuppositions, rationally reconstructable, and therefore plausible. 3ODXVLELOLW\, and not necessary reasons, is the highest goal that a theory or an explanation can achieve.80

78

KNITTER, ,QWURGXFLQJ, 173–174, cf. 173–178. Cf. COAKLEY, *RG, 16: Applied to theology this means that theology “must be a form of intellectual investigation in which a VHFXODU, universalist rationality may find itself significantly challenged – whether criticized, expanded, transformed, or even at points rejected. In other words, an Enlightenment-style appeal to a shared universal ‘reason’ can no longer provide an uncontentious basis for the adjudication of competing theological claims.” 80 Cf. DALFERTH, 'LH :LUNOLFKNHLW GHV 0|JOLFKHQ, 429. To this conclusion came also the reflection of the historical work within the quest for the historical Jesus, cf. below Ch. 2.1, and G. THEISSEN und D. WINTER, 7KH 4XHVW IRU WKH 3ODXVLEOH -HVXV, trans. M.E. BORING (Lousiville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002). 79

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That the postmodern paradigm has its severe ULVNV is known from its beginnings.81 The most severe danger is often seen in the fact that the postmodern paradigm seems to justify simply any particular perspective because there are no more shared values and criterias for differentiating the legitimate perspectives from the illegitimate ones. As if now anybody could claim anything (or even would have a right to do it). 82 And it is a fact that the irreducible, unavoidable and also often chaotic plurality of perspectives provides space not only for rational discussion but in the exact opposite for ideology, manipulation, and lie. Our mutual communication can become – and becomes indeed, every day – an instrument of power and control over the others because the space, in which it exists, is far from being neutral. Against the justification of a vast arbitrariness aims the tendency to emphasize that QR SDUWLFXODUSHUVSHFWLYHVWDQGVDORQH. We are already always placed in a common world, in a process of communication. Any particular perspective cannot exist only as a particular perspective but in a clash with other particular perspectives. Therefore, although in an imaginary beginning all perspectives are equal, it is necessary in the communication process to argue, clarify, and correct the particular perspectives. In this process, some perspectives will prove more valid, convincing, plausible or powerful than others, some will prove as legitimate and some as illegitimate. Every particular perspective is a part of a bigger whole, of a society, of a culture and there are already always some shared criteria, rules or norms (laws, moral, habits, patterns of rationality), which allow one to judge and sort particular perspectives. These criterias, however, are not external and absolute but they are outcomes and subjects of mutual discussion as well.83 Therefore, there is another important point to be stressed: no one with his or her pa rticular perspective starts from a zero point. Every perspective LVDOUHDG\DOZD\VSRVLWLRQHG in a particular context, which has a history where some perspectives are already more established and reasonable, while some others, on the contrary, are refused as inacceptable. 84 It still holds that the reasons for judging particular perspectives should be a matter of continuous critical reinvestigation. However, it is not possible to hold that, in a first step, any perspective is as acceptable as any other. There have been historical experiences and a rguments, there have been judgments passed regarding other perspectives. This development cannot be ignored, although it cannot be simply and uncritically accepted either. To81 Actually, it was the new social problems (as e.g. the computerization of human life, the influence of capital and technology on truth), which was the very reason for the diagnose of a paradigm-shift; cf. LYOTARD, 7KH 3RVWPRGHUQ &RQGLWLRQ, 1–9, 41–53. Open questions, with which the postmodern paradigm has to deal, names TRACY, 2Q 1DPLQJ, 18. Regarding religions and their problems in the postmodern (or in his terms: postliberal) world cf. also LINDBECK, 7KH1DWXUHRI'RFWULQH, 118–120. 82 This impression intensifies the open and often wild space of the internet and of the social networks in particular, which is the primary field for fake news, presented sometimes as “alternative facts”. These unstructured informations without any norms, limits and criterias are one of the biggest problems of today’s societies. 83 Cf. GALLUS, 3UDYGDXQLYHU]LWDDDNDGHPLFNpVYRERG\ [7UXWK8QLYHUVLW\DQG$FD GHPLF)UHHGRP] (Praha: Slon, 2020), 64–69. 84 In this sense reminds very fittingly TRACY, 2Q1DPLQJ, 20, that also the conception of postmodernity and postmodern paradigm is a western particular conception remaining thus “too self-centered and narrow”. That is the curse of any particular perspective. The only possibility is to know about it, speak appropriately and treat the others in their otherness appropriately.

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day, this context cannot be skipped when trying to establish a new perspective. It must be done in a critical discussion with the historical developments so far. It is not true that anything goes or that any perspective should have the right to be defended. There are perspectives, which are not viable, and for good reasons. And there are perspectives, which are preferred, for good reasons – although these reasons in both cases must be reconsidered and confirmed again and again. Nevertheless, they cannot be ignored.

This is also very important due to the fact – which is in accord with the semiotic background of my concept and with the position of internal realism, as I will show below – that every one of our understandings and conceptions of reality has necessarily a FRQVWUXFWLYHGLPHQVLRQ. Our perception, understanding and thinking is always a creative and contingent mixture of outer inputs, of what can be considered for a fact, and of our constructive phantasy and imagination. No interpretation, no theory, therefore, is a mere description. In every interpretation, there is an unavoidable element of constructivity. 85 Therefore, no interpretation can want to be more than a plausible theory constructed on what can be considered for facts and plausible arguments.86 Considering the plurality, contigency and constructivity of all our understanding and conceptions, the most important instrument within this frame is, therefore, the diagnosis, the GLDJQRVWLFWKLQNLQJ.87 A diagnosis critically processes the starting principles, axioms and facts – which themselves are mostly 85 Cf. HABERMAS, 7UXWKDQG-XVWLILFDWLRQ, trans. B. FULTNER (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 32: every knowledge is an “interpenetration of constituting activity and experience”, cf. also ibid., 26: in every knowledge, “the passive moment of experiencing practical failure or success is intertwined with the DFWLYH[orig.: NRQVWUXNWLY] moment of projecting, interpreting, and justifying”. The problem of constructivity arose clearly in the search for an appropriate method within the quest for historical Jesus. Cf. below, Ch. 2.1, and J. RÜSEN, “Faktizität und Fiktionalität der Geschichte – was ist Wirklichkeit im historischen Denken?”, in .RQVWUXNWLRQYRQ:LUNOLFKNHLW, ed. J. SCHRÖTER and A. EDDELBÜTTEL, TBT 127 (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2004), 19–32; CH. LANDMESSER, “Der gegenwärtige Jesus. Moderne Jesusbilder und die Christologie des Neuen Testaments”, .HU\JPD XQG 'RJPD56 (2010), 119–120. 86 Cf. J. SCHRÖTER, “Von der Historizität der Evangelien. Ein Beitrag zur gegenwärtigen Diskussion um den historischen Jesus”, in 'HUKLVWRULVFKH-HVXV7HQGHQ]HQXQG3HU VSHNWLYHQ GHU JHJHQZlUWLJHQ )RUVFKXQJ, ed. J. SCHRÖTER und R. BRUCKER (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2002), 206–207, who says the same analogically in the view on the historical Jesus: “The result is a historical construction with the claim to be plausible under the current conditions of knowledge.” 87 Cf. LINDBECK, 7KH 1DWXUH RI 'RFWULQH, 117: “In short, intelligibility comes from skill, not theory, and credibility comes from good performance, not adherence to independently formulated criteria. In this perspective, the reasonableness of a religion is largely a function of its assimilative powers, of its ability to provide an intelligible interpretation of its own terms of the varied situations and realities adherents encounter.” Regarding diagnostic thinking cf. GALLUS, “Was ist der Mensch?”, 246–247; IDEM, 3UDYGD, 69–74; G. SAUTER, =XJlQJH ]XU 'RJPDWLN (OHPHQWH WKHRORJLVFKHU 8UWHLOVELOGXQJ (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1998), 356–357.

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an outcome of certain interpretations or perspectives – it considers the relevant phenomena and their particular interpretations and tries to give an appropriate, fitting, and current interpretation for the actual situation (or, in other words: a plausible theory or explanation) and tries to offer, hence, a useful orientation or a leading perspective for thinking and life (as actually every good medical diagnose does).88 A diagnosis is, therefore, not speculation; on the contrary, it needs to know some fundamental facts or convictions and their existing interpretations and then, it needs to bring rational arguments for its claims. It is right though, at the same time, that a diagnosis also has to involve imagination and speculation into the process of creating new interpretations.89 However, it has to do so, at least within a scientific methodology, while also using rational arguments or diagnostic skills.90 (Afterall, the paradigm shift from the modernity to postmodernity is based exactly on the better diagnostic power of the postmodern paradigm – and is, hence, at the same time itself disputable, i.e., a subject of further discussion.) Overall, in order to bring it to a short expression, what I try to maintain with these considerations is the already known notion that, methodically speaking, theology should proceed by DEGXFWLRQ.91

 6HPLRWLFV The diagnostic thinking aims to provide a plausible and useful explanation of experienced facts, phenomena and their interpretations. It is a logical result of the basic anthropological insight that human life is a permanent sequence of 88

Concerning the orientation in thinking and life cf. DALFERTH, 'LH :LUNOLFKNHLW GHV 0|JOLFKHQ, 34–46. 89 Thinking as a process, which proceeds always in signs (cf. below), is therefore very often thinking in metaphors or “image-thinking”, as I.U. Dalferth puts it for the theological thinking referring to A. Farrer and J. McIntyre. Cf. I.U. DALFERTH, “In Bildern denken. Die Sprache der Glaubenserfahrung”, (YDQJHOLVFKH .RPPHQWDUH 30 (1997), 165. Cf. also IDEM, “Mit Bildern leben: Theologische und religionsphilosophische Perspektiven”, in 'LH 8QYHUPHLGOLFKNHLWGHU%LOGHU, ed. G. VON GRAEVENITZ et al. (Tübingen: Narr, 2001), 77– 102. 90 The criteria of rationality are themselves a part of such an emerging critical discourse. In correspondence with what was said above, neither rationality is a universal and univocal term but rationalities exist also in plural only. However, this notion does not lead to the complete abandoning of rationality and argumentation and to their replacement by a purely individual and subjective emotionality, which in a manipulative way refuses argumentation as an aggression disturbing one’s own privacy, as it is sometimes falsely claimed. 91 Cf. U. ECO, =HLFKHQ, 132–135; IDEM, $7KHRU\RI6HPLRWLFV, 131–133; IDEM, 6HPLRW LFV DQG WKH 3KLORVRSK\ RI /DQJXDJH (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1984), 39–43; GALLUS, 3UDYGD, 69–74. Again, this concurs among others with the results of the historical Jesus quest, cf. D.C. ALLISON, JR., &RQVWUXFWLQJ -HVXV 0HPRU\ ,PDJLQDWLRQ DQG +LVWRU\ (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2010), 22.

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interpretations of signs. Human is an DQLPDO VHPHLRWLFRQ. We perceive the world in signs and we communicate and think in signs while we interpret the signs with other signs. 92 This interpretation happens on the theoretical as well as on the practical level, we understand the world somehow in our thinking and we live according to it. There is no preinterpretative point, there never was a point where we could decide to start to interpret the world. 93 We communicate already always and cannot decide, whether we will or will not communicate. We can only decide how we will or will not communicate, because we have already always understood something somehow. It means, at the same time, that we have, from the very beginning, each one’s own perspective from which we understand and communicate. This perspective is fundamentally influenced by the culture we live in, providing us with some basic structures of our understanding of the world, mainly with the language we speak, which gives us the most important shared signs for understanding, thinking, and communication: the words and terms. And, simultaneously, in this way it preformats our understanding of the world. In this mutual intersection of our individuality and our sociality, everyone understands and speaks from a unique perspective and searches understanding with the perspectives of others within and with the help of these shared and common structures.

92 According to PEIRCE, &3 2.228, a sign has this structure: “A sign, or UHSUHVHQWDPHQ, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity.” If, then, we relate to the reality always through signs, because “all thought is in si gns” (&3 5.253) and, hence, all our communication happens in signs, this given definition of sign has far-reaching consequences: First, if we relate to the reality in signs, the reality has for us always the as-structure. Therefore, the first important difference to be made is the semiotic difference between our signs for reality and the intended reality we try to signify with our signs. Second, if we relate to reality, we pragmatically presuppose, there is something like objective reality (this presupposition uses to be confirmed mostly when our practice fails, in negative experiences, when we realize that the reality is different than we thought, cf. PEIRCE, &3 5.311; HABERMAS, 7UXWK DQG -XVWLILFDWLRQ, 12; GALLUS, 3UDYGD, 31–40 and 48–55). Therefore, the second important difference to be made is the pragmatic and ontological difference between our conceptions of reality and the reality itself, which we, however, can never have apart from signs and our conceptions of it. Third, every thought is bound to a certain perspective of a certain human, to a certain understanding in a particular situation. Plurality of perspectives is therefore inevitable. And, finally, a sign expresses something in some respect, i.e., we can never grasp the whole reality but only a certain part or structure of it. Therefore, plural descriptions and significations are also inevitable. This means, at the same time that plural and parallel claims for truth are possible without the necessity to exclude one another (cf. more in detail at the end of this chapter). 93 This is the problem of all transcendental foundations of philosophy or theology, which propose human freedom as a condition of possibility of human free will and, hence, a neutral point before all willing, deciding and acting. Here, modern catholic theologians often meet with protestant liberal theologians, cf. DALFERTH, 'LH:LUNOLFKNHLWGHV0|JOL FKHQ, 343–344, there also further literature.

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Therefore, there is no neutral position above all perspectives or an absolute perspective possible and no particular perspective can claim such position. As such, Christian faith (being in itself plural and internally differentiated) is, therefore, one perspective among other different perspectives with similar claims. Theology should know it and be aware of the fact that theology itself cannot claim such elevated position either. The PHWKRGLFDOPHWDOHYHO of rational reflection, from which theology speaks, does not mean a PHWD SHUVSHFWLYH above different religious perspectives and faiths. Theology also speaks always from a particular perspective and if it wants to be Christian theology, it should speak knowingly from the perspective of Christian faith. Nevertheless, it is not the task of theology just to reconstruct and defend what faith believes. First, Christian faith itself is a plural phenomenon, which hopes to be related in all cases to the one and only God but which is very different in its expressions and descriptions of this relation. Theology, based exactly on this differentiation between significations and their referent(s), has therefore to decide critically, which form of faith and which significations it takes as its starting point. Second, faith cannot prescribe anything to theology; it cannot set any limits to the theology, which theology would not itself accept. Theology is a function of faith, it should speak from perspective the perspective of faith, but this does delimit neither the field of theology nor its internal structure. Such limitation would mean that theology would have to stay on the same level as faith and within limits set by faith. This is the danger of a too narrow concept of theology, which sees theology only as a function of the church. 94 Although the Christian faith is never a matter of an individual only but is principally shared and has its genesis always in a community of faith, the internal perspective of Christian faith is wider than a perspe ctive of a particular church and has to be reflected on more levels: next to the church level is always, on one hand, the perspective of the individual believer and his or hers life of faith and, on the other hand, there is the methodically and critically reflected perspective of academic theology. Theology is thus not only rational repetition and reconstruction of faith, it does not stand on the same level as faith. Theology is rather a specific combination or rather integration of two perspectives, of the internal perspective 94

This narrow concept of theology as a church theology only represents in the first place K. Barth. In his view, theology is only the “reflection on the &UHGR that has already been spoken and affirmed”. “And just because the beginning and the end are already given in faith, and because all that has to be settled regarding the LQWHOOLJHUH that we are seeking is the gap between these two extremes, this LQWHOOLJHUH is a soluble problem and theology a feasible task” (K. BARTH, $QVHOP)LGHV4XDHUHQV,QWHOOHFWXP$QVHOP¶V3URRIRIWKH([ LVWHQFHRI*RGLQWKH&RQWH[WRI+LV7KHRORJLFDO6FKHPH [London: SCM, 1985], 27, 25. Cf. also IDEM, &KXUFK'RJPDWLFV I/1, 1. Similarly G. SAUTER, =XJlQJH]XU'RJPDWLN. Cf. my critique of this approach and a more detailed explanation of the different levels of theology in GALLUS, “Theologie – eine Glaubenswissenschaft?”).

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of faith and of the external perspective of philosophical reason, which are, however, not considered as opposites one would have to choose from or one would have to mediate between but which are both integrated into a (third) theological perspective based on the perspective of faith. 95 The fundamental difference of the internal and external perspective is here understood as a WKH RORJLFDO dilemma, thus once again as an internal theological differentiation. 96 It still keeps the basic perspective of Christian faith, yet within a much more complex structure, which, at the same time, provides for theology the necessary distance from the level of faith and hence allows theology to be really a self-standing critical reflection of faith. Yet still, a necessary part of the theological speech and critical reflection of faith has to be, simultaneously, the discussion of what defines the Christian faith, what are its fundamental points. As any theologian of this time can experience in the discussion with other similar thinkers who consider the mselves to be Christian theologians, neither in this point can theology get beyond a plurality of possible perspectives, claims, and concepts.97 Its task is, therefore, to choose critically, to differentiate, and to present a reasonable diagnose of what is Christian and how it should be theologically thought of in 95

This is the irritating point in the view of liberal theology, which works only with the first two perspectives and is convinced that the perspective of reason is more universal than the perspective of faith and requires, therefore, that the “contents of faith” have to be translated “into the contents of reason” (J. ROHLS, “Sprachanalyse und Theologie”, 7KHRO RJLVFKH 5XQGVFKDX 55 (1990), 216–217; cf. P. GALLUS, “Verschiedene Wege, ähnliche Resultate? Barth-Rezeption bei Ingolf U. Dalferth”, in 8PVWULWWHQHV (UEH /HVDUWHQ GHU 7KHRORJLH.DUO%DUWKV, ed. M. GOCKEL, A. PANGRITZ and U. SALLANDT [Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2020], 250–252). However, the liberal view with its presupposition of one transcendental reason underestimates the factual plurality of rationalities and reasons. 96 In this view, the threefold structure of the theological perspective is so complex that “it cannot be escalated anymore, but only repeated and varied again and again, every time in new ways”, as I.U. Dalferth showed dealing with the theological method and structure in the late Karl Barth: I.U. DALFERTH, “Theologischer Realismus und realistische Theologie bei Karl Barth”, (YDQJHOLVFKH7KHRORJLH46 (1986), 421. This article of Dalferth is not only a contribution to the critical reflection of K. Barth’s theology but has a much higher importance for the thinking about principles of theology in general. Cf. GALLUS, “Verschiedene Wege”. 97 This is a principal difference to the catholic view, which is based on the “authentic interpretation of the word of God” (POSPÍŠIL, -Håtã]1D]DUHWD, 27) and of the Tradition as “the bearer of the revealed truth” (ibid., 28) through the Magisterium, which alone defines what is Christian and what should be – in the form of a legitimate theological pluralism – presented further on to different recipients (ibid., 35). Hence, the official catholic approach is, in the end, founded in one superior perspective with the authority of revealed truth, cf. TH.G. WEINANDY, “The Doctrinal Significance of the Councils of Nicaea, Ephesus, and Chalcedon”, in 7KH 2[IRUG +DQGERRNRI &KULVWRORJ\, ed. F.A. MURPHY (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 563–564; G. NARCISSE, “What makes a Christology Catholic?”, ibid., 582–595.

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the context of today’s world and its relevant rationalities. As any such diagnose and perspective, every theological concept is a contribution to the continuous debate. This would be also the best outcome and fulfilled goal of a theological conception: to remain disputable, worth of dispute and therefore somehow useful.

 ,QWHUQDO5HDOLVP With this view, I share Putnam’s position of internal realism, which, in my opinion, is a very tenable position in the postmodern paradigm.98 Hilary Putnam has shown in the problem of brains in a vat, what I tried to substantiate above: that no one can get beyond the perspectivity of all human understanding and thinking. 99 No tenable meta-perspective or God’s-eye view or the ultimate legitimation is possible. On the contrary, everyone speaks from a certain perspective shaped by the conceptual scheme of the society one lives in and this conceptual scheme preformats both the signs and the “objects”: “‘Objects’ do not exist independently of conceptual schemes. :Hcut up the world into objects when we introduce one or another scheme of description. Since the objects DQG the signs are alike LQWHUQDO to the scheme of description, it is possible to say what matches what.”100

98 H. PUTNAM, 5HDVRQ 7UXWK DQG +LVWRU\ (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981), 52. In IDEM, 7KH0DQ\)DFHVRI5HDOLVP (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1987, 17, Putnam calls his position also “internalism” or “pragmatic realism”, which should be able to maintain a “common sense realism”. In the German philosophy, J. HABERMAS, 7UXWK DQG -XVWLILFD WLRQ, 22, came with a similar concept of “weak naturalism” with explicit reference to and in discussion with Putnam (cf. ibid., 8, 34, 213–235). Concerning both Putnam’s and Habermas’ positions cf. also M. MOXTER, “Wie stark ist der ‘schwache’ Realismus?”, in .RQ VWUXNWLRQHQ YRQ :LUNOLFKNHLW, ed. J. SCHRÖTER and A. EDDELBÜTTEL (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2004), 119–133, and GALLUS, 3UDYGD, 40–55. In the British theology, a similar position holds M. MCCORD ADAMS, &KULVWDQG+RUURUV7KH&RKHUHQFHRI&KULVWRORJ\ (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006), 10–13. I agree with her methodical approach, which she calls a “sceptical realism” (ibid., 10), but not with her proposal to solve christological questions with “a return to metaphysics” (ibid., 81). 99 PUTNAM, 5HDVRQ, 1–21. Cf. A.F. KOCH, +HUPHQHXWLVFKHU 5HDOLVPXV (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 1–9, who points already to Descates’ Meditations and his dream argument. 100 PUTNAM, 5HDVRQ, 52. Cf. in regard of religious speech similarly LINDBECK, 7KH1D WXUHRI'RFWULQH, 21: “A comprehensive scheme or story used to structure all dimensions of existence is not primarily a set of propositions to be believed, but is rather the medium in which one moves, a set of skills that one employs in living one’s life. […] Thus while a religion’s truth claims are often of the utmost importance to it (as in the case of Christianity), it is, nevertheless, the conceptual vocabulary and the syntax or inner logic which determine the kinds of truth claims the religion can make.”

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No neutral objectivity is therefore possible, or rather: a kind of intersubjective objectivity in the form of coherence of understandings is possible only within the given scheme or system, only LQWHUQDOO\.101 This means for theology that it may speak from a particular position because it PXVW speak always from a particular position, but theology needs to do it knowingly and in a critical reflection of this position. To claim a metaperspective would mean to pretend something theology can never achieve because no one can jump over one’s own shadow, and it would mean to raise a claim, which necessarily would have to prove as false and, after all, even arrogant. But at the same time, this perspectivity does not imply that we have to remain closed in our insufficient perspectives and resign from our attempts at a proper description of the external reality, from mutual communication about it and hence from the struggle for truth. This position stresses not only the internality of every perspective, but it is at the same time internal UHDOLVP.102 In this realistic impetus, it is pragmatically presupposed that the reality as we perceive it is the external reality, although it is perceived always internally. 103 It is important to keep the main distinction between the signification and the signified, between the sign and the intended thing, on both the semiotic and the ontological level, although we do not have the intended thing apart from our signs and significations. 104 We can never have the external reality in an101

Putnam defines thus the truth as “some sort of (idealized) rational acceptability” (PUTNAM, 5HDVRQ 7UXWK DQG +LVWRU\, 49) or “ultimate goodness of fit” (ibid., 64, orig. italicized). Cf. LYOTARD, 7KH3RVWPRGHUQ&RQGLWLRQ, 29, who focused on the science and its legitimation: “It is recognized that the conditions of truth, in other words, the rules of the game of science, are immanent in that game, that they can only be established within the bonds of a debate that is already scientific in nature, and that there is no other proof that the rules are good than the consensus extended to them by the experts.” 102 Cf. GALLUS, 3UDYGD, 17–55; GROSSHANS, 7KHRORJLVFKHU5HDOLVPXV, 104–163. 103 M.D. KRÜGER, “Die Realismus-Debatte und die Hermeneutische Theologie”, in M. GABRIEL and M.D. KRÜGER, :DV LVW :LUNOLFKNHLW" (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2018), 26, calls the position of the internal realism “a relatively plausible solution”, but 32–33, he expresses his hesitation: “Isn’t the internal realism only a wish? After all, I owe the prop osition ‘In my understanding, I relate to something real which does not merge into this understanding’ to my understanding again, resp. it is accessible to me only through my understanding. Therefore: How can our understanding limit itself in a way that has not crossed this border already?” It is the point of internal realism that to this internal VHPLRWLF intern-extern differentiation it adds this intern-extern differentiation once again as an RQWR ORJLFDO differentiation with the pragmatic presupposition that we relate to an external reality, although we are not able to relate to it outside of our internal perspective (cf. I.U. DALFERTH, ([LVWHQ] *RWWHV XQG FKULVWOLFKHU *ODXEH 6NL]]HQ ]X HLQHU HVFKDWRORJLVFKHQ 2QWRORJLH[München: Chr. Kaiser, 1984], 34; MOXTER, “Wie stark ist der ‘schwache’ Realismus?”, 122). 104 Nicely apostrophizes it U. ECO, 7KH 0\VWHULRXV )ODPH RI 4XHHQ /RDQD, trans. G. BROCK (Orlando: Harcourt 2005), 419–420, referring to Putnam’s brains in a vat: “That is

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other way than always in plural perspectives of individual understanding. :H UHODWHWRH[WHUQDOUHDOLW\EXWDOZD\VLQDQLQWHUQDOZD\.105 Within the given scheme, there exists thus a kind of intersubjective ‘objectivity’, although it will never be a real objective objectivity: what we consider objective, at least in our daily praxis and orientation, is based on intersubje ctive agreement arrived at through communication and the struggle for truth. (There is thus no space and reason for the other extreme either, i.e., for the conviction that every subjective opinion has its own private truth and that, hence, no common objectivity is possible. This would lead to a complete individualization and privatization of truth and would be, in fact, the end of all communication.) The same is valid for theology: theology has also to do with an external reality; it is hence not only a theory of religious conscience, religious imagination, individual piousness or morality. On the contrary: it was always Christology, which stood for the relation of faith and theology to the external reality. The person of Jesus Christ is the realistic anchor of both faith and theology, although from the particular testimonies and facts about him we can never get some objective picture of him. 106 It is the task of Christology to propose a critical, complex, and compact current understanding and conception of his – traditionally speaking – person and work in wider context. Despite all perspectivity, Christology should therefore have the ambition to propose an RQ WRORJLFDO &KULVWRORJ\, of course while being aware of its own perspective and, hence, of a certain particularity of every such attempt.107 Nevertheless,

how we do it in normal life, too: we could suppose we have been deceived by some evil genius, but in order to be able to move forward we behave as if everything we see is real. If we let ourselves go, if we doubt that a world exists around us, we will stop acting, and within the illusion produced by the evil genius we will fall down the stairs or die of hunger.” 105 Cf. in this respect the conception of “New Realism” or “ontological pluralism” by M. Gabriel, which pays respect to the postmodern plurality of perspectives and “fields of sense” and conceives reality not as a metaphysical category but rather as an epistemological category, as a “furnishing function” for a certain space of objects (M. GABRIEL, in IDEM and M.D. KRÜGER, :DV LVW :LUNOLFKNHLW", 76–77, 97; generally cf. M. GABRIEL, )LHOGVRI6HQVHD1HZ5HDOLVW2QWRORJ\, [Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2015]). Cf. also the “hermeneutical realism” of A.F. Koch (KOCH, +HUPHQHXWLVFKHU5HDOLVPXV). 106 See also below, Ch. 2.1. 107 With “ontological Christology”, I mean here, therefore, something different from catholic theology in its use of this term where it stands for the doctrine of the person of Jesus Christ next to the doctrine of his work (cf. POSPÍŠIL, -Håtã]1D]DUHWD, 18–19). I do not use it as a specific term but rather as an indication of the intended outreach of Christology. My stress does not lie that much on the question :KR is this person, but on the question who LV he. With this stress, I see myself in harmony with W. KASPER, “Christologie von unten? Kritik und Neuansatz gegenwärtiger Christologie”, in IDEM, -HVXVGHU&KULVWXV

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this is exactly, what in my view should theology have the courage to do: to provide a reasonable conception of the reality FRUDP'HR, to say, how things are and why, although from a certain perspective. In christological terms: Christology should say, who LV this Jesus Christ in whom the Christians believe. D. Bonhoeffer asked his famous question, which uses sometimes to be taken as the fundamental christological question: “[W]ho is Christ actually for us today?” 108 To me, this question is too narrow. Christology deals neither only with Jesus Christ today, nor with Jesus Christ for us, but with his whole person, with its past, present, and future. It is not possible to do this than from a certain perspective (I or we) and in a certain time (today). But the answer has to go beyond the sole actual meaning. That is the provocative point of Christology from a particular perspective with a universal claim.

In this respect, there is one important differentiation, which has to be made now: the differentiation between a universal claim and an absolute claim. 109 An DEVROXWHFODLP would mean that one particular perspective poses itself as a unifying meta-perspective above other perspectives exclusively as the only true perspective. As already said above, such claim is illegitimate, false, and arrogant because it disrespects the plurality of perspectives and the particularity of one’s own perspective.110 Nevertheless, even in the situation of irreducible plurality of perspectives, it is possible to raise from a particular perspective a XQLYHUVDOFODLP. That is exactly what Christian faith does: it claims that (Leipzig: St. Benno, 1981), 410, and with DALFERTH, -HQVHLWV, 312–313, who sees an “eschatological ontology” as the ultimate task of theology, which has its centre in Christology. 108 D. BONHOEFFER, /HWWHUVDQG3DSHUVIURP3ULVRQ, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, vol. 8, trans. I. BEST, L.E. DAHILL, R. KRAUSS and N. LUKENS (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2010), 362; cf. e.g. J. MACQUARRIE, -HVXV &KULVW LQ 0RGHUQ 7KRXJKW (London: SCM Press, 1990), 337; or J. MOLTMANN, 7KH :D\ RI -HVXV &KULVW, trans. M. KOHL (London: SCM Press, 1990), 64. 109 Cf. DALFERTH, “Theologischer Realismus”, 414. 110 This shows J.-F. LYOTARD at the very end of his short essay “What is Postmodernism?”, in IDEM, 7KH3RVWPRGHUQ&RQGLWLRQ, trans. R. DURANT (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979), 81–82, with a clear antireligious sting: “Finally, it must be clear that it is our business not to supply reality but to invent allusions to the conceivable which cannot be presented. And it is not to be expected that this task will effect the last reconciliation between language games (which, under the name of faculties, Kant knew to be separated by a chasm), and that only the transcendental illusion (that of Hegel) can hope to totalize them into a real unity. But Kant also knew that the price to pay for such an illusion is terror. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have given us as much terror as we can take. We have paid a high enough price for the nostalgia of the whole and one, for the reconciliation of the concept and the sensible, of the transparent and the communicable experience. Under the general demand for slackening and for appeasement, we can hear the mutterings of the desire for a return of terror, for the realization of the fantasy to seize reality. The answer is: Let us wage a war on totality; let us be witnesses to the unpresentable; let us activate the differences and save the honor of the name.”

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the salvation in Christ is valid for the whole creation. Such claim is legitimate, but it means at the same time that there can be (and indeed are) more universal claims from different perspectives next to each other. In the case of an absolute claim, there is no possibility of any plurality. Universal claims can exist at once, together, parallel in plural.111 From an external view, the religious claims are often interpreted as absolute. I do not say that there are not any absolute religious claims (also from the internal perspective of religions). What I try to say is that they are not defensible, at least not theologically. What can be theologically defended as legitimate is only a universal claim. If thus a religion wants to propose a claim concerning the totality of humans (or even of the whole universe) in a theologically defensible way, it has to propose it as a universal claim, not as an absolute one. Therefore, it is necessary for theology to explain the difference between absolute and universal claim and to propose at least the claim of the Christian faith as universal, not as absolute. Afterall, the certainty of this claim is not based on an absolute experience or evidence but it is the certainty of faith and thus a certainty of hope. Faith cannot guarantee the ultimate truth of itself and of its own perspective, only God can. The universal claim of Christian faith (and of Christian theology) remains, therefore, under the reservation of the eschatological justification.

Christian faith and theology with its christologically anchored universal claim is thus a part of a plural and diversified world where different universal claims exist, meet, and compete with each other. In this plurality, the christological foundation seems often to be actually a disadvantage. The person of Jesus Christ seems to be too particular, too narrow and too exclusive for a foundation of a universal claim. The image of God in Jesus Christ is unpleasantly concrete: a Jew, a man who was born and died 2000 years ago. This particular historical fact as the foundation of Christian universality as the so called “scandal of particularity” provoked and irritated minds ever since. A nice example is the famous dictum of D.F. Strauss, standing at the bottom of liberal theology, 112 that the divine idea and an individual cannot be unified: “This is indeed not the mode in which Idea realizes itself; it is not wont to lavish all its fullness on one exemplar.”113 Going in a similar direction in the 20th century, John Hick, within his religious pluralism, denied the divine and therefore salvific exclusivity of Jesus Christ as well: the man Jesus was only

111

Against KNITTER, ,QWURGXFLQJ, 176, who states (yet, maybe, only using different terms) that in the postmodern paradigm, “particularity cancels out the universality”. Particularity cancels out absoluteness, not universality. Cf. LINDBECK, 7KH1DWXUHRI'RFWULQH, 35: “[D]ifferent religions and/or philosophies may have incommensurable notions of truth, of experience, and of categorial adequacy”. As incommensurable, the can exist and do exist next to each other. Cf. below, Ch. 11. 112 Cf. the position of A. von Harnack above, subch. 1.3, and of some other liberal theologians below, Ch. 2.1. 113 D.F. STRAUSS, 7KH/LIHRI-HVXV&ULWLFDOO\([DPLQHG, ed. P. C. HODGSON, trans. G. ELIOT (Philadelphia: Fortress Press 1972), 779.

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secondarily divinized114 and the traditional speech about Messiah and Son of God is to be understood rather as mythological or metaphorical than as ontological.115 It would be, after all, much more viable – while still being “fully committed to Jesus” – to go a more “theocentric” way, especially in the encounter with other religious universal claims, as the catholic theologian P.F. Knitter states.116 Or the exact opposite: as I already sketched above, some liberal theologians conceive the Christology as a religious instrument for selfenlightenment of one’s religious subjectivity: Christology (and the image of Jesus) is a necessary step to a clear religious self-relation, it “explicates the reflexive structure of transparency in the self-relation of a human”.117 Overall, in the current plural situation, it seems to be wiser, more strategical, and more universal to speak generally about God or Divinity, or about human religiousness, and about a common structure of religion rather than concretely about Jesus Christ. There are, as shown, several strategies, how to weaken or sideline Christology in order to be more universal and more open to other universal claims. 118 But this direction once taken, it blurs the specific profile of Christian theology and tends to be abstract and far away from the 114 “And so his Jewish followers hailed him as their Messiah, and this somewhat mysterious title developed in its significance within the mixed Jewish-Gentile church ultimately to the point of deification” (J. HICK, “Jesus and the World Religions”, in 7KH0\WKRI*RG ,QFDUQDWH, ed. J. HICK [London: SCM Press, 1977], 173). For a more detailed debate of this position and of the whole controversy around Hick’s position, cf. DALFERTH, &UXFLILHG DQG5HVXUUHFWHG, 1–37. Hick’s position plays apparently – for the Anglican theology in the first place – the same role and brings the same irritations as liberal theology for the traditional Protestants and Catholics on the continent, and this irritation lasts since then still, cf. B. HEBBLETHWAITE, 7KH,QFDUQDWLRQ&ROOHFWHG(VVD\VLQ&KULVWRORJ\ (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987), vii, who counts Hick among “non-incarnational” christologies, which are a “much more serious threat” for Christian faith than different forms of atheism. Or cf. MCCORD ADAMS, &KULVW DQG +RUURUV, who deals with Hick throughout of her book. For more to Hick’s position cf. below, Ch. 11.1. 115 HICK, “Jesus and the World Religions”, 183–184; IDEM, 7KH 0HWDSKRU RI *RG ,Q FDUQDWH &KULVWRORJ\ LQ D 3OXUDOLVWLF $JH (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993), to the scandal of particularity esp. 154–155; cf. critically against this – basically old liberal – approach already R. BULTMANN, “Die Christologie des Neuen Testaments”, in IDEM, *ODXEHQ XQG 9HUVWHKHQ, vol. 1 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1933), 245–267, stressing against a purely historically naïve approach to the New Testament the perspective of faith based on Christ’s cross and resurrection. 116 P.F. KNITTER, 1R2WKHU1DPH"$&ULWLFDO6XUYH\RI&KULVWLDQ$WWLWXGHVWRZDUGWKH :RUOG 5HOLJLRQV (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1985), xiii–xiv. For Knitter, Jesus has a “universal relevance” and “significance” (ibid., 203), but still, the old rule is valid “deus semper major” (ibid., 202), so that “God has not been confined to Jesus” (ibid., 204). 117 DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 238. 118 It would be an interesting question for another study, to what extent are all these strategies paradoxically latently led by the conviction of the superiority of the Christian religion (or at least of the Christian theological perspective). Cf. below, Ch. 11.1.

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concrete praxis of faith. It yields the particular perspective with the hope there would be some more universal perspective. However, there is nothing but particular perspectives. To weaken Christology, for what reason or strategy ever, means to weaken the Christianity of theology. In the postmodern plural paradigm, there is no other option than to elaborate – in a purifying and correcting clash with other perspectives – fairly, and as plausibly as possible, one’s particular position with all that belongs to it.119 Therefore, even if the objection would be right that Christology and Christian theology founded on Christology is too particular, there are still no other relevant perspectives to be elaborated but only particular ones (cf. also below, Ch. 11). That is exactly, what I intend with this book. I will try to explicate and substantiate my conception of ontological Christology from the perspective of Christian faith in a critical reflection of it, and in discussion with the tradition and its interpretations, in order to provide a plausible contemporary concept, which, as I hope, will prove itself useful for the orientation RI faith, for the orientation DERXW Christian faith and for some IXUWKHUWKHRORJLFDODQGSKLOR VRSKLFDOGHEDWH. Within the above outlined tension between a universal claim and a particular perspective, there is one more important and ambitioned point, which is substantial in my view of theology. If a theological text should contribute something for a further debate, it has to be understandable. And if it should contribute something not only for the orientation of faith but also for the orientation about Christian faith, or: not only for the church and its theol ogy but also for the academic and scientific world, it has to be understandable somehow generally. The ambition of this study – and it should be, in my view, the ambition of all theology – is to be generally understandable for anyone who knows the given language (English in this case) and can follow rational argumentation. There are no other admissible conditions for understanding. This applies also for a theological text, which is written from the perspective of Christian faith. Despite this fact, Christian faith of the potential reader cannot be a condition for understanding and studying theology. If this would be the case, then theology would have its justification only inside the church walls and would have a meaning only within the community of believers, because no one else could understand it. This would imply, at the same time, that Christian faith provides some special abilities or higher (or at least different) kind of knowledge and argumentation, which is impossible to follow and to understand without faith. If the Christian speech, and with it also the theological speech of God, would be a wholly separate language game, then, church would have to become unavoidably a ghetto and theology some kind of a GLVFLSOLQDDUFDQL. But the claim of Christian faith and theology was from the beginning just the opposite one: to express and explicate ZLWKLQWKHFRPPRQODQJXDJH the new experience resulting from the Easter message. And, in case of theology, to do this within the standards of scientific rationality and argumentation, and, hence, in a wholly understandable way. Yet still, my 119

Cf. V.-M. KÄRKKÄINEN, &KULVWDQG5HFRQFLOLDWLRQ (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans, 2013), who – inspired by Ph. Clayton’s thesis that in philosophy and religion, we need a “new integration” within the plurality of traditions (PH. CLAYTON, $GYHQWXUHVLQWKH6SLULW *RG :RUOG 'LYLQH $FWLRQ [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008], 260) – proposes a postmodern Christology in the context of world religions.

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claim was that theology, if it wants to remain theology, has no other option than to speak from the perspective of Christian faith. The point is that the claim of general understandability and the necessary perspectivity of theology do not exclude one another. Because the Christian faith and theology think and speak in the common terms and in the common la nguage, their perspective has to be understandable even if one does not share it existentially for oneself. The theological perspective, i.e., the perspective of Christian faith, can be in the theological work (i.e., in the theoretical reflection, not in the religious praxis, where existentially shared faith is legitimately presupposed) accepted only as a hypothesis, only in the mode of: ‘Given that the premises of Christian faith are true, what follows from it?’ One can hypothetically accept the perspective of another in order to understand and discuss one’s argumentation from this perspective – this is what we do quite often in our mutual communication and argumentation. We are able to understand and debate positions, which we do not share. This is all that is necessary and sufficient to understand and study theology. Therefore, the ambition and claim of this text is also to be generally understandable in order to contribute something to a further discussion inside and outside the church as well as inside and outside of theology. 120

120 Cf. to the internally differentiated structure of the relation of faith, theology, church, and university GALLUS, “Theologie – eine Glaubenswissenschaft?”. And also DALFERTH, 5DGLFDO 7KHRORJ\ $Q (VVD\ RQ )DLWKDQG 7KHRORJ\ LQWKH 7ZHQW\)LUVW &HQWXU\ (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2016), 240: “One does not need to have faith in order to follow the thinking of theology. One must, however, at least as a thought experiment, follow along with faith’s radical change of orientation in order to see what the thinking of theology consists of.“ 

 Chapter 2

The Object of Christology Who is actually the object of Christology? This seems to be a simple question: well, Jesus Christ, for sure. In general, the person of Jesus is the indisputable starting point of Christian faith and Christian theology, but even – in general and only in general. 1 The answers to the more specific question of ‘Who is this Jesus Christ and where do we know it from?’ differ radically. The history of Christology in the modern age is actually a long debate trying to find an appropriate answer that is raised by this question. Until the Enlightenment, the accepted answer of the long developing Christian theological tradition was based on the Chalcedonian two-natures Christology: Jesus Christ is the incarnated Son of God. The stress laid on the incarnation of the divine Logos and on the two natures of Jesus Christ with their appropriations and with their clear subordination. It was the person of the divine Logos, who was the leading principle (WRKHJHPRQLNRQ). Therefore, the person of Jesus Christ in this traditional view had a rather divine character, which was important for its fundamental soteriological function. 2 In the Enlightenment, in context with the development of the historicalcritical method and its use for the reading of biblical texts, the question that arose was not of the so-called “dogmatic Christ” anymore, who has been now considered to be only a dogmatic and metaphysical construct, but rather of the “historical Jesus”, driven ahead mainly by liberal theology. Not the Jesus Christ of the church tradition but the “real” Jesus of Nazareth, his life and his self-understanding was now set as the main focus of any possible Christology. In this conception, the historical notion became a presupposition for every theology: “Whether Christ was more than a human being is a problem. That

1 This is beyond a doubt also in the radical liberal theology. Cf. e.g. DANZ, *UXQG SUREOHPH, 2: “For Christianity, the relation to the historical person of Jesus of Nazareth is constitutive. Without the relation to him, there is no Christianity.” Cf. also WAGNER, “Christologie als exemplarische Theorie”, 315; or even G. LÜDEMANN and A. ÖZEN, :KDW 5HDOO\ +DSSHQHG WR -HVXV $ +LVWRULFDO $SSURDFK WR WKH 5HVXUUHFWLRQ, trans. J. Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1995), 1, who point not only to the person of Jesus but directly to his resurrection: “The resurrection of Jesus is the central point of the Christian religion.” 2 For the beginnings and the development of the Chalcedonian christological tradition cf. below, Ch. 3.

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he was a true human being – if he was a human being at all – and that he never ceased to be a human being is not in dispute.” 3

1. The ‘Quests’ for the Historical Jesus4 1. The ‘Quests’ for the Historical Jesus

It was H.S. Reimarus, who came first with the strictly historical perspective on Jesus and his life. He considered the evangelists as “historians who have reported the most important things that Jesus said as well as did”.5 Therefore, the four Gospels are a reliable source from which should be derived what Jesus said and preached6 – in contrary to the writings of the apostles who were not historians but teachers who “consequently present their own views”.7 Therefore, Reimarus wants to – and this is his fundamental methodical presupposition – “separate completely what the apostles say in their own writings from that which Jesus himself actually said and taught”,8 because mixing up these two sets of writings considered Reimarus for the “common error of Christians”.9 With these presuppositions, Reimarus had given the principal setting for all following quests for the historical Jesus: 1) The quest for his3

G.E. LESSING, “The religion of Christ” (1780), in /HVVLQJ 3KLORVRSKLFDO DQG 7KHR ORJLFDO:ULWLQJV, ed. H. NISBET (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005), 178. 4 A good and short overview can be found in LANDMESSER, “Der gegenwärtige Jesus”, 96–120, whom I here loosely follow. More literature can be found in J. FREY, “Der historische Jesus und der Christus der Evangelien”, in 'HU KLVWRULVFKH -HVXV 7HQGHQ]HQ XQG 3HUVSHNWLYHQ GHU JHJHQZlUWLJHQ )RUVFKXQJ, ed. J. SCHRÖTER und R. BRUCKER (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2002), 273–336. For an exhausting amount of literature and a presentation of the whole topic present see the +DQGERRN IRU WKH 6WXG\ RI WKH +LVWRULFDO -HVXV, 4 vols, ed. T. HOLMÉN and S.E. PORTER (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2011); cf. here C. BROWN, “The Quest for the Unhistorical Jesus and the Quest for the Historical Jesus”, ibid., vol. 1, 855–886. Cf. also G. THEISSEN and A. MERZ, 7KH+LVWRULFDO-HVXV$&RP SUHKHQVLYH *XLGH, trans. J. BOWDEN (London: SCM Press, 1998), 1–16, who divide the whole era not into three Quests, as it is usually done in a simple manner but in more detail into five phases. Further also DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 13–41. 5 H.S. REIMARUS, )UDJPHQWV, ed. CH.H. TALABERT, trans. R.S. FRASER (Philadelphia: Fortress Press 1970), 64. 6 Ibid., 64–65. 7 Ibid., 64. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid., 71. In this sense, but 130 years later, A. von Harnack, with reference to W. Wrede, differentiated a “twofold Gospel in the New Testament” (A. VON HARNACK, “Das doppelte Evangelium im Neuen Testament [1910]”, in IDEM, $GROIYRQ+DUQDFNDOV=HLW JHQRVVH5HGHQXQG6FKULIWHQDXVGHQ-DKUHQGHV.DLVHUUHLFKVXQGGHU:HLPDUHU5HSX E OLN, vol. 1, Der Theologe und Historiker, ed. K. NOWAK [Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 1996], 181–182): the ‘first Gospel’ is the Gospel proclaimed by Jesus, the ‘second Gospel’ is the apostolic Easter proclamation about Jesus as the crucified and resurrected Son of God.

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torical Jesus concentrates predominantly on the Gospels. 2) The Gospels are approached in the expectance to be the history or biography of Jesus. 3) The other New Testament writings – although in fact older than the Gospels – are considered to be the prejudiced church tradition and are, therefore, not taken seriously in account. 4) Reimarus understood Jesus’ life fully within the margins of judaism, which was “a determination that should have a lasting effect”.10 It took a long time to critically and reasonably cross and redefine these margins. The following research doubted quite quickly the second presupposition of Reimarus: the Gospels are not a neutral history but they are written in a certain perspective with a certain aim. David Friedrich Strauss, in his influential 7KH/LIHRI-HVXV, read the narratives of the Gospels as Christian myths, as an ideological, i.e., in the end, a non-historical, fictional11 treatment of the universal and timeless “original Christian ideas, which are embodied in a narrative” and produced by the community of believers.12 William Wrede proved, then, that the evangelists were led by the concept of messianic secrecy, so that the Gospels cannot be treated as neutral history. 13 They have a “tendentious character”, which does not allow distinguishing the neutral history of Jesus from the after-Easter image of Christ. 14 The “naïvely historicizing” approach to the texts of the New Testament was hence no longer tenable. 15 The most famous critique of it presented already in 1892 Martin Kähler in his lecture 7KH 6R&DOOHG +LVWRULFDO -HVXV DQG WKH +LVWRULF %LEOLFDO &KULVW.16 Against the liberal differentiation of historical Jesus and dogmatic Christ, Kähler refers to the “real Christ of faith and history”, where “this real Christ is the Christ who is preached”.17 The quest for the historical Jesus trying to get beyond the texts of the Gospels is for Kähler a “blind alley”,18 because

10

LANDMESSER, “Der gegenwärtige Jesus”, 97. D.F. STRAUSS, 7KH/LIHRI-HVXV&ULWLFDOO\([DPLQHG, 87. 12 D.F. STRAUSS, 'DV/HEHQ-HVXNULWLVFKEHDUEHLWHW (Tübingen: C.F. Osiander, 1835), vol.I, 75: “geschichtartige Einkleidungen urchristlicher Ideen”. 13 W. WREDE, 7KH 0HVVLDQLF 6HFUHW, trans. J.C.G. GREIG (Cambridge and London: James Clarke, 1971). Cf. LANDMESSER, “Der gegenwärtige Jesus”, 99. 14 THEISSEN and MERZ, 7KH+LVWRULFDO-HVXV, 6. 15 LANDMESSER, “Der gegenwärtige Jesus”, 100. 16 M. KÄHLER, 7KH6R&DOOHG+LVWRULFDO-HVXVDQGWKH+LVWRULF%LEOLFDO&KULVW, trans. C.E. BRAATEN (Philadelphia: Fortress Press 1964). 17 Ibid., 57 and 66 (originally italicized). 18 Ibid., 46. 11

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“we do not possess any sources for a ‘Life of Jesus’ which a historian can accept as reliable and adequate. I repeat: we have no sources for a biography of Jesus of Nazareth which measure up to the standards of contemporary historical science.”19

The origin of Christian faith and confession is not based on historical facts but on “the crucified, risen, and living Lord”.20 Kähler tries also to overcome the reduction of the concentration only on the Gospels and the division b etween the allegedly reliable Gospels and the allogene Epistles: Jesus Christ is “the Christ of apostolic preaching, of the ZKROH New Testament”.21 This Christ is also “the originator of the biblical picture of the Christ”, so that we cannot separate biblical texts and Christ or filter him out from the texts.22 The fact that the biblical texts are written from the perspective of Easter faith and are prejudiced in this sense, Kähler obviously evaluates differently than the liberal tradition: it is not a problem, which needs to be overcome; it is rather the fundamental perspective of all Christian theology. 23 The end of the so-called ‘First Quest for the historical Jesus’ marked Albert Schweitzer, who declared that all attempts to find the historical Jesus behind the biblical texts are failed: “There is nothing more negative than the result of the critical study of the Life of Jesus. The Jesus of Nazareth who came forward publicly as the Messiah, who preached the ethic of the kingdom of God, who founded the kingdom of heaven upon earth, and died to give his work its final consecration, never existed. He is a figure designed by rationalism, endowed with life by liberalism, and clothed by modern theology in a historical garb.”24

The liberal lives of Jesus were unmasked as projections of our presence into a picture of Jesus as an ideal ethical personality, depending on the preferences of the authors.25 However, within this period of the liberal First Quest, a new theological category was established, which will play an important role further on. It was I. Kant as the first, who con19

Ibid., 48. The result of a search for a historical Jesus is then, according to Kähler, a wide plurality of hiddenly dogmatic pictures of Jesus, in which their authors “blithely compose epics and dramas without being aware that this is what they are doing”, so that “the image of Jesus is being refracted through the spirit of these gentlemen themselves” (ibid., 57). 20 Ibid., 64. 21 Ibid., 65, cf. 86. 22 Ibid., 87 (originally italicized) and 86. 23 Kähler holds a position exactly opposite to Reimarus – we have to read the New Testament from the epistles to the Gospels: “Thus, our faith in the Savior is awakened and sustained by the brief a concise apostolic proclamation of the crucified and risen Lord. But we are helped toward a believing communion with our Savior by the disciples’ recollection of Jesus, a recollection which was imprinted on them in faith” (ibid., 96–97). 24 A. SCHWEITZER, 7KH 4XHVW IRU WKH +LVWRULFDO -HVXV, ed. J. BOWDEN, trans. W. MONTGOMERY et al. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000), 478. 25 Cf. THEISSEN und MERZ, 7KH+LVWRULFDO-HVXV, 5–6.

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ceived Jesus as “the personified idea of the good principle”,26 who differentiated the historical personality of Jesus as a bearer of a certain principle from this timeless principle. This made possible to focus not only on a historical person but on the timeless principle in the first place. A similar thought is found in Schleiermacher, for whom Jesus was a particular historical personality fulfilled with a divine principle.27 D.F. Strauss, then, radicalized this thought and split the eternal principle (the idea) wholly from the particular historical person, because – according to his famous thesis – the idea and an individual never can be united.28 For many, this went too far. However, even Strauss himself knew that the idea needs particular historical expressions. On the other hand, the identification of the timeless principle with the historical person of Jesus (like in traditional dogmatics), together with the increasing notion of impossibility to reconstruct the historical personality of Jesus, stressed the danger that the person of the Redeemer remains locked behind the “ugly broad ditch of history” (Lessing). Therefore, an instance was needed, which would not split but in the contrary bind together the particular historical person of Jesus, the divine principle and also us. For this function, the term of WKHSLFWXUH was fitting. More precisely: the picture of Jesus’ inner life or of his character as it is preserved in the biblical scriptures. 29 This term was also easy to unite with the historic-critical approach to the Gospels as prejudiced testimonies, which gain, again, a very important role. Beginning with Schleiermacher’s speech of “total impression” of the Redeemer, 30 the “picture of Jesus” became a formula, which expressed the new “christological program”. 31 “The picture of Christ”, of his inner life,32 of his personality became from now on the main focus of Christology:33 Not anymore the life of Jesus, not Jesus himself, but the affecting spiritual picture of Jesus in the Scriptures was now the connection between the believers and the historical Jesus and the topic of Christology. Whomever seeks, what the apostles once experienced, that God “acts with us as with them”, “will find, what he seeks, in the Christ whom shows the New Testament”. When we put aside everything, “what does not seem to be an undoubted thing”, there remains, what cannot “be removed by any doubt. It is the picture of the inner life of

26

I. KANT, 5HOLJLRQ ZLWKLQ WKH /LPLWV RI 5HDVRQ $ORQH, trans. E. WOOD and G. DI GIOVANNI, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998), 79. Cf. EVERS, “Combinatory Christology”, 6. 27 SCHLEIERMACHER, 7KH&KULVWLDQ)DLWK, § 93.4, 384. 28 Cf. above, Ch. 1.2.3, at footnote 113. 29 Cf. R. SLENCZKA, *HVFKLFKWOLFKNHLW XQG 3HUVRQVHLQ, 84, who reminded already in 1967 that this term deserves much more attention than it had, because it is much more central than the term of ‘life’ of Jesus. 30 SCHLEIERMACHER, 7KH&KULVWLDQ)DLWK, §10, Postscript, 50. 31 DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 130. 32 So W. HERRMANN, “Der geschichtliche Christus, der Grund unseres Glaubens”, in IDEM, 6FKULIWHQ]XU*UXQGOHJXQJGHU7KHRORJLH, vol. 1, ed. P. FISCHER-APPELT (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1966), 173. Cf. IDEM, “Die christologischen Arbeiten der neuesten Zeit”, 7K/=1(1876), 116–119; DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 133–136. 33 And not only of the liberal theology, as we could see in Kähler, who used this term as well, cf. above. Cf. also R. SLENCZKA, *HVFKLFKWOLFKNHLW XQG 3HUVRQVHLQ, 84–91, who shows the origin of this idea in A. Neander, who “maintained the conception that the SLF WXUH of the self-revelation of Christ has further effect in the Gospels and refers also back to the individual historical person” (ibid., 85).

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Jesus”.34 The historical person of Jesus did not vanish in the history, because Jesus himself was the cause of the biblical picture. Yet, at the same time, the historical Jesus ceased to be of highest importance. The theological task was not anymore a conception of the person of Jesus (historical or dogmatic). The focus of Christology shifted to the biblical picture, which preserved through the times the most important instance: the living impression of Jesus’ God-consciousness. In this way, Jesus Christ was in fact reduced to a picture and faith (or religion) analogically and in consequence of it to individual morality. 35 At the same time, the term of the biblical picture of Jesus offered a broad space for different interpretations and was used not only in liberal theology. 36 It is found since then across the times e.g. in Schleiermacher, W. Herrmann, M. Kähler, P. Tillich, M. Moxter, M.D. Krüger or Ch. Danz.37 It apparently promises a middle position between a suspicious objectivity (be it the inaccessible objectivity of the historical Jesus or the alleged objectivity of the dogmatic Christ) and an arbitrary subjectivity. 38 As it will turn out later though, if used as the central christological category, it entails also compromises in the divinity of Jesus.39

After the end of the First Quest, there was for some time a “telling silence” (the so-called “1R 4XHVW”), represented mainly by the position of R. Bultmann, which was close to the one of Kähler: “It is therefore illegitimate to go behind the kerygma, using it as a ‘source’, in order to r econstruct a ‘historical Jesus’ with his ‘messianic consciousness’, his ‘inner life’ or his ‘heroism’. That would be merely ‘Christ after the flesh’, who is no longer. It is not the historical Jesus, but Jesus Christ, the Christ, preached, who is the Lord.”40

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HERRMANN, “Der geschichtliche Christus”, 172–173. Paradoxically, it is this biblical picture of Christ that Herrmann calls ‘the historical Christ’. Cf. R. SLENCZKA, *HVFKLFKW OLFKNHLWXQG3HUVRQVHLQ, 88: “The Scripture is the bearer of this picture. In this way, a general term of Christ is replaced by the ‘picture’ in its illustrativity (Anschaulichkeit) and by the historical person in its causality (Ursächlichkeit).” 35 The aim of the effect of the biblical picture of Christ was an inner religious exper ience, which should at the end lead to a better morality. Cf. DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 133: “The historical Christ represents a successful realization of morality in the world and this singular success establishes at the same time in the believers the trust in their own moral duty.” 36 U. Barth, “Hermeneutik der Evangelien”, 302, notices with a slight irony that with the term of the picture were in the history bound often weird and terrible interpretations and associations (“Gräuslichstes und Verschrobenstes”). 37 For a short sketch of the last three theological positions cf. below. 38 M. MOXTER, “Szenische Anthropologie – Eine Skizze”, in 0-7K;;,; $QWKURSROR JLH, ed. E. GRÄB-SCHMIDT and R. PREUL, MThSt 131 (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2017), 63, speaks about a “intertwinning of the external and the internal, of a predefined image and a receiving, appropriating response”. 39 Cf. below in this chapter. 40 R. BULTMANN, “The historical Jesus and the Theology of Paul”, in IDEM, )DLWKDQG 8QGHUVWDQGLQJ, vol. I, ed. R.W. FUNK, trans. L.P. SMITH (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 241.

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There is no possibility to go beyond the “kerygma” as it is told in the biblical scriptures, which are written from the perspective of Easter faith and, hence, they “speak categorically differently than a speech of the historical Jesus could”.41 It is actually quite a paradox in this respect that Bultmann comes very close to Strauss, only with the opposite signature: where Strauss saw the truth of the myth, the idea, Bultmann sees the kerygma.42 It is the principal perspective what matters here. For Bultmann, it is not an external perspective of a historian but an internal perspective of faith, as the famous first sentence of his 7KHRORJ\RIWKH1HZ7HVWDPHQWV says: “7KHPHVVDJHRI-HVXV is a presupposition for the theology of the New Testament rather than a part of that theology itself.”43 Therefore, the only point of the historical Jesus that Bultmann is interested in is the bare fact of his existence (“Dass” des Gekommenseins Jesu).44 The so-called 6HFRQG4XHVW was started in 1953 by E. Käsemann’s lecture 7KH 3UREOHPRI WKH +LVWRULFDO -HVXV.45 Although Käsemann, belonging himself to the Bultmann-school, considers the quest for the historical Jesus a “genuine liberal question”, he stresses also the importance of the historical approach to the Gospels in order to show their authenticity and reliability and to overcome the “separation, or even antithesis”, suggested by the liberal theology, between “kerygma and tradition”.46 In order to find what in the Gospels could be considered a “critically ensured minimum”47 of genuine acts or words of the historical Jesus, Käsemann introduces his “criterion of difference”: authentic Jesus is to be found when we filter off everything which is derived from Judaism on one side and from the early Christianity on the other.48 Within this frame, this “New Quest” found an intense echo. 49 This perspective, however, “necessarily led to seeing Jesus in contrast to Judaism” and, as time went on, it was considered more and more one-sided.50 It was thus inevitable that a reaction came – the so-called 7KLUG4XHVW for the 41

LANDMESSER, “Der gegenwärtige Jesus”, 102. THEISSEN und MERZ, 7KH+LVWRULFDO-HVXV, 7. 43 R. BULTMANN, 7KHRORJ\RIWKH1HZ7HVWDPHQW, trans. K. GROBEL (Waco: Baylor UP, 2007), 3. 44 R. BULTMANN, “Das Verhältnis der urchristlichen Christusbotschaft zum historischen Jesus”, in IDEM, ([HJHWLFD $XIVlW]H ]XU (UIRUVFKXQJ GHV 1HXHQ 7HVWDPHQWV, ed. E. DINKLER (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1967), 449–450. 45 E. KÄSEMANN, “The Problem of the Historical Jesus”, in IDEM¸ (VVD\VRQ1HZ7HV WDPHQW7KHPHV, trans. W.J. MONTAGUE (Chatham: SCM Press, 1964), 15–47. 46 Ibid., 17. 47 THEISSEN and MERZ, 7KH+LVWRULFDO-HVXV, 7. 48 KÄSEMANN, “The Problem of the Historical Jesus”, 37. 49 Cf. THEISSEN und MERZ, 7KH+LVWRULFDO-HVXV, 8, who give an overview of different answers to the question, in what lies the criterion of difference. 50 Ibid. Cf. DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 25, who declares this phase for a “dogmatic construction of the historical Jesus”. 42

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historical Jesus, which tries to see the person of Jesus in the exact opposite perspective: within the context of Judaism of his time. 51 On one side, there has been the -HVXV6HPLQDU in Santa Rosa, California, founded by R. Funk and J.D. Crossan, which, by voting scholars, tries to find out in the Gospels “what he really said”.52 On the other hand, a huge amount of different Jesusbooks have been published, each one seeing Jesus differently involved in the Jewish background of his times. 53 The main criterion of this Quest – may be the most important outcome of the whole development – seems to be, in the end, the “criterion of plausibility: what is plausible in the Jewish context and makes the rise of Christianity understandable may be historical”.54 Hand in hand with this research go also important PHWKRGLFDO TXHVWLRQV regarding the possibilities of historical research and historical reconstructions. From the current point of view, it is obvious that we have history always in the form of historical reconstruction, i.e., of particular constructions of history in the perspective of current time, based on the interpretation of historical sources.55 Although there is a presupposed objective history, which, in the end, has “‘constructed’ its constructors who are ‘thrown’ into it with 51 An important role played the new text-findings in Qumran and Nag Hammadi, which offer a better insight into the times then. The sources for the quest for historical Jesus were, however, enriched only by extra-canonical scriptures concerning the Jewish milieu and not directly the person of Jesus. The development of the research has shown that this fact led not so much to a deeper understanding of Jesus but rather to a wider plurality of possible interpretation-frames. Cf. J. SCHRÖTER, -HVXVXQGGLH$QIlQJHGHU&KULVWRORJLH0HWKRGL VFKH XQG H[HJHWLVFKH 6WXGLHQ ]X GHQ 8UVSUQJHQ GHV FKULVWOLFKHQ *ODXEHQV, BThSt 47 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 2001), 8–14. 52 Quoted in LANDMESSER, “Der gegenwärtige Jesus”, 104, with the fitting remark: “The majority replaces the argument” (ibid., 105). THEISSEN und MERZ, 7KH +LVWRULFDO -HVXV, 11, speak about Jesus with “more Californian than Galilean local colouring”. J.D. CROSSAN, “Context and Text in Historical Jesus Methodology”, in +DQGERRNIRUWKH6WXG\ RI WKH +LVWRULFDO -HVXV, vol. 1, ed. T. HOLMÉN and S.E. PORTER (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2011), 159, however, is convinced: “History is the past reconstructed interactively by the present through argued evidence in public discourse.” A detailed debate with the Jesus Seminar leads L.T. JOHNSON, 7KH5HDO-HVXV7KH0LVJXLGHG4XHVWIRUWKH+LVWRULFDO-H VXVDQGWKH7UXWKRIWKH7UDGLWLRQDO*RVSHOV (New York: HarperCollins 1996). 53 Cf. illustrative selections in LANDMESSER, “Der gegenwärtige Jesus”, 105–112; THEISSEN und MERZ, 7KH+LVWRULFDO-HVXV, 8–12; DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 30–41. 54 THEISSEN und MERZ, 7KH+LVWRULFDO-HVXV, 11. Critically to it and to all possible criterias in the quest for the historical Jesus ALLISON, &RQVWUXFWLQJ-HVXV, 10. 55 Cf. RÜSEN, “Fiktionalität und Faktizität”, 23, who speaks about the “imaginative power of the historical thinking”. J. SCHRÖTER, “Von der Historizität der Evangelien”, 167, says it more precisely: “The aim of the historical research is, therefore, not the UHFRQ VWUXFWLRQRIWKHSDVW but rather WKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIKLVWRU\” The constructivity of historical research is a common notion today. SCHRÖTER, ibid., 168, calls it “an important characteristic of the newest Jesus-research”. Cf. also LANDMESSER, “Der gegenwärtige Jesus”, 119; THEISSEN und MERZ, 7KH+LVWRULFDO-HVXV, 13.

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their lives”,56 we can have it only in the form of reconstructions from a particular point of view, from which we with imaginative power put together pieces of interpretations and create a picture of continuity. 57 Our constructions of history are therefore “fictions of the factual”. 58 This does not mean, however, that our interpretation of history would be absolutely deliberate. It is true that we can never reconstruct a definite picture of history. Every historical reconstruction is a construction and, therefore, always “necessarily selective, driven by interests and thus in principle revisable, partially even falsifiable”.59 The interpretation of the sources can never be unambiguous. But there is a negative limit, the so-called “power of veto of the sources”, which cannot say, which interpretation is correct, but that can say, which interpretation is – in respect to the sources – incorrect.60 56

RÜSEN, “Fiktionalität und Faktizität”, 28. Exactly for this reason, i.e., that his story of Jesus is a reconstruction DSRVWHULRUL, reproves HICK, “Jesus and the World Religions”, 176, the Gospel of John, cf. also D.-M. GRUBE, 2VWHUQDOV3DUDGLJPHQZHFKVHO(LQHZLVVHQVFKDIWOLFKH8QWHUVXFKXQJ]XU(QWVWH KXQJGHV&KULVWHQWXPVXQGGHUHQ.RQVHTXHQ]HQIUGLH&KULVWRORJLH (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012), 138. It is hence a kind of a Reimarian argument applied already within the Gospels against the (supposedly) youngest of them. In this context, the Gospel of John is indeed a remarkable entity within the debate. In a certain sense, the whole quest could be also read and interpreted from the perspective of how individual scholars work with this Gospel. Already M. KÄHLER, 7KH VRFDOOHG +LVWRULFDO -HVXV, 82–83, pointed to the specific position of John. For him, John is “an obvious link between the Synoptics and the Epistles”. Therefore, he criticizes the strict concentration on the Synoptics only. If we search the historical Jesus in the Gospels, then, through John we have a direct link to the Epistles so that there is no reason to put the Gospels in the liberal way against the Epistles. Thus, if someone concentrates only on the Synoptics (like Harnack or Danz), then one should bring convincing reasons, why should John have a different status within the Gospels themselves (cf. ibid., 84, footnote 19). 58 SCHRÖTER, -HVXVXQGGLH$QIlQJH, 33: “Fiktionen des Faktischen”. Cf. J.D.G. DUNN, -HVXV 5HPHPEHUHG, Christianity in the Making, vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans, 2003), 102–103, who makes a fundamental semiotic distinction between “event, data and facts”: events are irretrievably gone, available are the data, “which came down through history” and which are interpreted as facts. Facts, therefore, are “always an LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ of the data”. 59 J. SCHRÖTER, “Die aktuelle Diskussion über den historischen Jesus und ihre Bedeutung für die Christologie”, in =ZLVFKHQ KLVWRULVFKHP -HVXV XQG GRJPDWLVFKHP &KULVWXV, ed. CH. DANZ and M. MURRMANN-KAHL, DoMo 1 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 83. 60 This is a term of R. KOSELLECK, )XWXUHV3DVWRQWKH6HPDQWLFVRI+LVWRULFDO7LPH, trans. K. TRIBE (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 155: “In principle, a source can never tell us what we ought to say. It does not prevent us from making statements that we should not make. The sources have the power of veto. They forbid us to venture or admit interpretations that can be shown on the basis of a source to be false or unreliable. […] Sources pr otect us from error, but they never tell us what we should say.” This is basically the same point, which makes U. ECO, 7KH /LPLWV RI ,QWHUSUHWDWLRQ (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 57

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In other terms, this insight into the inevitable constructivity of the histor ical work is a way how to deal today with the old problem of Lessings ‘ugly broad ditch of history’. “In this remarkable theological discipline in which we are engaged, no one so far has won that could be called the ‘Broad Jump over Lessing’s Ditch’.”61 And no one can win, because the point is not anymore how to jump over it, but rather how to move and go on in it. We have already always jumped into it and right here we have to move: within the “historical relativity and preliminary knowledge”. 62 This methodical result has of course an impact on theology and on Christology and the question of the historical Jesus in particular. In the Third Quest (and in fact, although unknowingly, also in the First), it has led to an irreducible and almost endless plurality of pictures of Jesus. Right at the point where the historical research expected to finally have a clarity came a wide diversity.63 “The simple and rather devastating fact has been that Gospels researchers and questers of the historical Jesus have failed to produce agreed results. Scholars do not seem to be able to agree on much beyond a few basic facts and generalisations; on specific texts and issues there has been no consensus.”64

However, this plurality of outcomes does not result from the fact that different scholars work with different material, but “from the assumptions about the historical plausibilities that are presupposed in each case”.65 Not primarily facts, not their interpretation but already the preunderstanding of each scholar is the source of the diversity of the pictures. J. Schröter brings this to an im-

1994), 41, facing the problem of the so-called free “drift of interpretation”: “But, even though the interpreters cannot decide which interpretation is the privileged one, they can agree on the fact that certain interpretations are not contextually legitimated.” 61 G. THEISSEN und D. WINTER, 7KH4XHVWIRUWKH3ODXVLEOH-HVXV7KH4XHVWLRQRI&UL WHULD, trans. M.E. BORING (Lousiville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002), 229. 62 SCHRÖTER, -HVXVXQGGLH$QIlQJH, 18. 63 LANDMESSER, “Der gegenwärtige Jesus”, 118, points out: “This creates the illusion that a more precise and less modified picture of Jesus could be achieved by subtracting the religious, more precisely the christological interpretation. The opposite is the case, as a lready the incalculable variety of the modern pictures of Jesus shows.” G. WENZ, &KULVWXV, Studium Systematische Theologie 5 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2011), 114, calls the picture of Jesus, which results from the Third Quest, “multi-facetted” and even “disparate”. Facing this situation, M. BUNTFUß , “Verlust der Mitte oder Neuzentrierung? Neuere Wege in der Christologie”, 1=67K46 (2004), 349, speaks about a “twofold christological estrangement”: the “dogmatic estrangement from Christ the God-human” and the “historical estrangement from the earthly Jesus”. 64 DUNN, -HVXV 5HPHPEHUHG, 97. According to Dunn, after “the flight from dogma” (ibid., 25) therefore, there was the other flight, “the flight from history” (ibid., 67). 65 J. SCHRÖTER, -HVXV RI 1D]DUHWK -HZ IURP *DOLOHH 6DYLRU RI WKH :RUOG, trans. W. COPPINS and B.S. POUNDS (Waco: Baylor UP, 2014), 16.

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portant conclusion: “Therefore, the question of who Jesus ZDV cannot be separated from the question of who he LV today.”66 In this respect, a plurality of different portrayals of Jesus is inevitable. Every historical work as a view of history from a current standpoint remains “changeable, fallible, and incomplete”. This is also the reason why the “historical research can never ground the Christian faith let alone prove its co rrectness”.67 On the other hand, the sources still provide some historical data which can serve as a good foundation for a reasonable picture of Jesus, “if not in every detail, then at least in important facets”. 68 In this perspective, the biblical sources gain much more importance and reliance again. For liberal theology, the most important result of all the search for the historical Jesus, who, in fact, could be the only founding point for a theological Christology, is the notion that we cannot penetrate beyond the biblical texts to the historical person of Jesus. The hi storical, earthly Jesus is gone. All we have are biblical texts and their picture of Jesus. And again, we cannot have this picture in another way than in the plurality of our interpretations of it, in the plurality of our own pictures, constructed from an always particular here and now. Hence, Christology should be dealing with the importance of these pictures and our pre-understandings. Christology is possible only in the form of different Christologies, which are, in the end, self-expressions of one’s own convictions and faith.69 In the liberal tradition today there are two possible ways of how to process this notion. a) The more traditional approach emphasizes more the authenticity of the Gospels and of their picture of Jesus.70 This biblical picture is the medium, in which the people of today can meet Jesus. Jesus lives in the biblical pictures, they have affective and effective power on human consciousness and spirituality and mirror the vividness of Jesus’ personality. 71 66

Ibid., 10, and identically 247. Or, in other words, the “historical Jesus” cannot be separated from the Christ of faith, cf. B. DAHLKE, “Die bleibende Bedeutung der historischen Jesusfrage. Überlegungen zur Unterscheidung zwischen dem -HVXVGHU *HVFKLFKWH und dem &KULVWXV GHV *ODXEHQV”, in 'RJPDWLVFKH &KULVWRORJLH LQ GHU 0RGHUQH, ed. CH. DANZ and G. ESSEN (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 2019), 111–131. 67 SCHRÖTER, -HVXVRI1D]DUHWK, 17. 68 Ibid. We can “trace the contours of his activity” (ibid., 15). 69 Cf. CH. DANZ, “Neue Erscheinungen zur Christologie”, 7KHRORJLVFKH5XQGVFKDX81 (2016), 234: “After the old-protestant doctrinal term of Christology, which itself was constructed in most different ways, was abandoned in the Enlightenment, there are christological reflections only in the form of very diverse Christologies, which cannot be subsumed under one common denominator. This concerns also the object of these Christologies.” Cf. also EVERS, “Combinatory Christology”, 7, and his view of liberal Christology: “From its very start this type of Christology is nothing but the unfolding of the meaning of Christ for us, though not with reference to objective processes and matters of fact, but with reference to our God-consciousness, whose emergence links us to Jesus Christ.” 70 Which is a common point in the latest New Testament studies, cf. SCHRÖTER, “Von der Historizität der Evangelien”, 164–188. 71 Cf. U. BARTH, “Hermeneutik der Evangelien”, 301–303 and 277, where Barth marks the methodical starting point of the liberal approach: “I think that the unity of Godconsciousness and self-consciousness, attributed to Jesus, can be – if at all – seen only in the pious contemplation (Betrachtung) of his historical life.” And VON SCHELIHA, “Kyni-

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The first approach refers very often to the Christology of 3DXO7LOOLFK, although he himself was not a liberal theologian. Nevertheless, his picture-Christology goes very much in the direction of the liberal Christology and has been therefore positively received by many liberal theologians. Tillich refers to the biblical texts, which depict “Jesus as the Christ”. Tillich purposely does not speak simply about ‘Jesus Christ’ but rather about ‘Jesus as the Christ’ because he differentiates between Jesus and Christ in order to put both these terms into a dynamic relation: “[H]e is the Christ as the one who sacrifices what is merely ‘Jesus’ in him. The decisive trait in his picture is the continuous self-surrender of Jesus who is Jesus to Jesus who is the Christ.” In this picture, Jesus as the Christ is “the medium of final revelation”, the ultimate and perfect symbol, which is able to transcend itself at the same time: while Jesus as the bearer of the final revelation “overcomes its own finite conditions by sacrificing them, and itself with them”, he “becomes completely transparent to the mystery he reveals”.72 This self-surrender was fulfilled on the cross, where Jesus sacrificed his “historical existence”, so that the cross became “the final manifestation of his transparency” of the Divine. 73 Not in his life, rather in the moment of his death, i.e., in the moment of the total self-surrender of his humanity as the highest transparency for God was Jesus the ideal picture of God, was Jesus the Christ. This picture of Jesus as the Christ is preserved in the biblical scriptures and – here, Tillich is a faithful pupil of his teacher Kähler 74 – it is precisely this picture, which is the foundation of Christian faith: “The foundation of Christian belief is the biblical picture of Christ, not the historical Jesus.” 75 And the biblical picture of Christ bears still this power: “The concrete biblical material is not guaranteed by faith in respect to empirical factuality; but it is guaranteed as an adequate expression of the transforming power of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. […] And it can be shown that, in all periods of the history of the church, it was this picture which created both the church and the Christian, and not a hypothetical description of what may lie behind the biblical picture. But the picture has this cr eative power, because the power of the New Being is expressed in and through it.” 76 Because of the power of this picture, Tillich speaks about “DQDORJLD LPDJLQLV” between the biblical picture of Christ and his historical personality. This analogy is the final pin on ker”, 29: “Christology […] uses the religious power of the pictures of Jesus a s they are available in the multitude of possibilities to interpret his relationship with God.” The immediate encounter with the impression of Jesus’ personality as the foundation of the Christian faith is also to find already in STRAUSS, 7KH/LIHRI-HVXV, 86, who states, that one of the sources of the Christian myth is “that particular impression which was left by the personal character, actions, and fate of Jesus […] in the minds of his people”. And also in HARNACK, :KDWLV&KULVWLDQLW\", 23: The Gospels “describe to us the impression which he made upon his disciples, and which they transmitted”. 7KHLPSUHVVLRQRI-HVXV¶SHUVRQDOLW\ in his followers and later in the biblical scriptures (i.e., ‘the picture’) can be, hence, considered for a basic “christological” figure of the liberal theology. In how far stands this tendency close to the notion of Droysen that the goal of the historical work is to understand the “moral powers” acting in history? Cf. SCHRÖTER, -HVXVXQGGLH$QIlQJH, 27. 72 TILLICH, 6\VWHPDWLF7KHRORJ\I, 133. Regarding Tillich’s Christology and its critique cf. GALLUS, 'HU0HQVFK]ZLVFKHQ+LPPHOXQG(UGH, 139–149. 73 TILLICH, 6\VWHPDWLF7KHRORJ\ I, 134. 74 Cf. KÄHLER, 7KHVRFDOOHG+LVWRULFDO-HVXV, 72–97. 75 P. TILLICH, 2Q WKH %RXQGDU\ $Q $XWRELRJUDSKLFDO 6NHWFK (New York: Scribner’s, 1966), 50. 76 TILLICH, 7KH6\VWHPDWLF7KHRORJ\II, 115.

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which hangs this whole christological conception: through this analogy, through this kind of an imprint, Jesus as the Christ himself is present in the picture. 77 Lately, 0DOWH'.UJHU proposed a theological concept based on the term of the picture (Bild) and the fundamental human ability of imagination (Bildvermögen, innere Bildlichkeit, Einbildungskraft), which as such has an inborn religious dimension.78 The term of the picture or image secures the main goal of the protestant theology, which should “prevent the unconditional dimension of the religion from any objectification”.79 The picture stands for the permanent dynamics because in the reference to its object, a picture is precisely QRW what it is a picture of.80 In the middle of this theology stands Jesus Christ, conceived in a way that is very close to Tillich: the Christian faith sees Jesus Christ as a picture of God, as a depiction of the Unconditional. “Jesus as the picture of God refers to the fact that God as the unconditioned dimension of life is not accessible without a picture and, at the same time, manifests himself even in this picture of Jesus only indirectly.”81 With Easter, with the resurrection, Jesus “became definitely the picture of God”, an “unobjective object”, which “interrupted the physical world” and which is accessible only in faith, because on the cross, Jesus fulfilled the nature of a picture: in his self-negation he literally “crossed” himself in his humanity (and hence in his objectiveness) in order to point not to himself, but rather to the one whom he depicted, to Godself.82 As such, the role and effect of Jesus is that he “guides other people into the horizon of the Unconditional” and “opens the rel igious dimension of humans”. 83 After Easter, no personal encounter with Jesus is possible anymore. “Rather, the after-Easter Jesus encounters in the canonical scriptures of the Bible.”84 The biblical scriptures are the “follower” of the Easter manifestations of Jesus. 85 The biblical picture of Jesus effects, then, “an imaginative inner impressing of the picture of Christ (Einbildung des Bildes Christi)” in a human, “which is again understood as an imaginative self-impressing of God”.86 The biblical picture of Christ is the deciding element, which has the power to provoke inner human imagination that understands this biblical picture as a picture – and ultimately: as a revelation of God. This figure with its tendency to the immediacy of the encounter with the living picture of Jesus, present in the liberal tradition almost from the beginning, is surprising, especially

77

Ibid. M.D. KRÜGER, 'DVDQGHUH%LOG&KULVWL6SlWPRGHUQHU3URWHVWDQWLVPXVDOVNULWLVFKH %LOGUHOLJLRQ (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017), 538. Cf. my review of his book in &RPPXQ LR9LDWRUXPLIX(2017/1), 122–125. 79 KRÜGER, 'DVDQGHUH%LOG, 522. 80 Ibid., 453. 81 Ibid., 529. 82 Ibid., 504–505. The resurrected Christ has no existence outside of the faith: the Christian faith “is the anthropological realization of this christological being in the manifestation” (ibid., 522). 83 Ibid., 507 and 510. 84 Ibid., 505. 85 Ibid., 506. 86 Ibid., 521. The religion as a “plausible human imaginative inner impressing (plausible Einbildung des Menschen)” is based on the human “imaginative impressing of the picture of Christ as it is passed on in the New Testament”, “in which then again the imaginative self-impressing of God happens” (ibid., 539). 78

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in this tradition, which emphasizes rationality, historicity, and critical knowledge. 87 It was Albert Schweitzer, who said it explicitly in the context of the negative result of his book on historical Jesus: “Our relationship to Jesus is ultimately of a mystical kind. […] Our religion, in so far as it proves to be specifically Christian, it therefore not so much a Jesus-cult as a Jesus-mysticism.”88 It seems that the whole liberal search for the historical Jesus is motivated by the search for an immediate experience of the vividness of Jesus’ personality, of his “inner life”, which is according to the paradigmatic conception of W. Herrmann “the very characteristic of the Christian religion”.89 On this point, Schleiermacher can be rightly called the father of the liberal theology. In his conception, the whole of Christian faith and theology stems also from a mystical inner experience of Christ’s redeeming activity: “Now such a presentation of the redeeming a ctivity of Christ, as has been given here, which exhibits it as the establishment of a new life 87 With the tendency to the immediate encounter with the inner personality of Jesus, the liberal recourse to the picture of Jesus in the Scriptures contains a kind of a mystical el ement, although it was originally meant as a way, how to separate the historical person of Jesus from the Gospels and make it an object of objective historical research, cf. R. SLENCZKA, *HVFKLFKWOLFKNHLWXQG3HUVRQVHLQ, 90. 88 SCHWEITZER, 7KH4XHVWRIWKH+LVWRULFDO-HVXV, 486. 89 Cf. HERRMANN, 'HU9HUNHKUGHV&KULVWHQPLW*RWW, 63. In Herrmann, the very core of all religion is exactly this immediate experience of God’s effecting of the human soul (ibid., 16). It has to be mediated by other people and their testimony, but once found, this mediation is no more needed and the power of the inner life of Jesus is present immediately (ibid., 57–58). This immediate experience transcends, then, the question of the historicity of Jesus’ person (ibid., 59), because the power of the picture of the personal life of Jesus is unique and beyond compare with any other person in the history in the “solidity of religious conviction”, in the “clarity of the moral judgement”, and in the “purity and power of the will” (ibid., 67). – A similar conception is found in Harnack (cf. to him above, Ch. 1.1.3), who also insists on religious experience and on the immediacy of the soul to God, mediated by Jesus as the personified Gospel (cf. HARNACK, :KDWLV&KULVWLDQLW\", 44: the kingdom of God is “the inner link with God” and “the most important experience that a man can have”). However, AXT-PISCALAR, “Adolf von Harnack’s Christology”, 163, tries to argue against the notion that Harnack’s theology is based on a mystical element. She points to the important fact that for Harnack religion does not mean a negation of the world but has a clear positive function in shaping and forming the culture and community. Nevertheless, Axt-Piscalar does not sufficiently differentiate between the individual foundation and the practical outcomes of religion in Harnack. These two dimensions are different: inwardly, in the immediacy of the soul with God, individual religion is grounded on this mystical element. Outwardly, it has practical effects. – Similar tones are found in J.M. ROBINSON, .HU\JPD XQG KLVWRULVFKHU -HVXV (Stuttgart: Zwingli, 2 nd ed. 1967), 114–116, who states that the kerygma leads to an “existential encounter” with the whole historical person of Jesus. On the other hand, this illustrates a certain closeness of the liberal theol ogy to the existential interpretation. This applies also for DUNN, -HVXV 5HPHPEHUHG, 893, who at the very end of his opus says: “In short, WKURXJKWKH-HVXVWUDGLWLRQWKHZRXOGEH GLVFLSOH VWLOO KHDUV DQG HQFRXQWHUV -HVXV as he talked and debated, shared the tablefellowship and healed. In hearing the Jesus tradition read from pulpit or stage, in sacred space or neighbour’s sitting room, we sit with the earliest disciple and church groups […]. Through that tradition it is still possible for anyone to encounter the Jesus from whom Christianity stems, the remembered Jesus.”

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common to Him and us (original in Him, in us new and derived), is usually called by those who have not had the experience, ‘mystical.’ This expression is so extremely vague that it seems better to avoid it. But if we are willing to keep so close to its original use as to understand by it what belongs to the circle of doctrines which only a few share, but for others are a mystery, then we may accept it. Provided that we recognize that no one can be r eceived into this circle arbitrarily, because doctrines are only expressions of inward experiences – whoever has these experiences ipso facto belongs to the circle; whoever has not, cannot come in at all.”90 The problem is that the fixation on the term of the picture pushes God actually in an inaccessible distance God himself cannot surpass so that God cannot be really present in the world. God can touch the world only in pictures, which are, however, always necessarily fragmentary and relative. God remains absolutely transcendent and far, only a tangent to the world, too big and too perfect to enter the particular and imperfect world, so that the world becomes for God an unsurpassable limit. 91 With this fact, liberal theology misses the fundamental notion of the Christian faith that God comes not only LQ particular human pictures, but has come in a unique way DV a human being in Jesus Christ. b) The more radical liberal approach emphasizes the notion that it is RQO\SLFWXUHV, we have, i.e., either the constructions of the second generation of the early Christians (the Gospels), or RXU current constructions,92 without any possibility to return back to the “real Jesus”, who still “vanishes […] in his own times”.93 For these authors, this is the main result of the Third Quest and they intensively demand that systematic Christology should accept this result as the basis of its own thinking. 94 The (First and) Third Quest, seen as the finally sincere historical critique, allegedly proved that the Second Quest and with it the whole dogmatic church-Christology was nothing else than a construction of the picture of Jesus, in this case, however, a strictly dogmatic one, which is, therefore, prejudiced and should be abandoned. 95 The historical search for Jesus has to have not only a fundamental “corrective function” for the “constructions of systematic Christology”,96 moreover: the “Jesus of history, as the historical research can reconstruct him” should be “the starting 90

SCHLEIERMACHER, 7KH&KULVWLDQ)DLWK, § 100.3, 428–429. The question here, therefore, is not the one of M. Luther: How can I find a merciful God?, but rather: How can I find God at all? 92 Cf. DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 32. IDEM, “Der Jesus der Exegeten und der Christus der Dogmatiker. Die Bedeutung der neueren Jesusforschung für die systematisch-theologische Christologie”, 1=67K51 (2009), 201. 93 DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 40–41. LANDMESSER, “Der gegenwärtige Jesus”, 118, makes exactly this point to an objection against the modern question of historical Jesus: “The modern question of the historical Jesus strips to a large extent from the Jesus of the Gospels his christological interpretation, moves him away from his contexts of literature and theology, transposes him in a past, which vanishes in a distance to the present, which ca nnot be overcome.” 94 Cf. VON SCHELIHA, “Kyniker”, 22: “One has the impression: The gong for the ‘third round’ hasn’t rang yet for the systematic theology.” 95 DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 30. Cf. F. WITTEKIND, “Christologie im 20. Jahrhundert”, in =ZLVFKHQ KLVWRULVFKHP -HVXV XQG GRJPDWLVFKHP &KULVWXV, ed. CH. DANZ and M. MURRMANN-KAHL, DoMo 1 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 41: It was a “(self)misunderstanding of the ‘second round of the quest for the historical Jesus’ to read the dogmatic constructions as claims for historical knowledge”. 96 DANZ, “Der Jesus der Exegeten”, 201. 91

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point of Christology”,97 because it has also “a constructive function” for theology and faith.98 Danz takes the criteria of historical work from E. Troeltsch: historical criticism, probability, analogy and correlation. 99 The point is, then, that in this setting, there cannot occur anything really new in the history, which a historian could acknowledge as really historical and not only mythological or phantastic. Therefore, any claim of singular events such as Jesus’ divinity, incarnation of the Son of God or his resurrection is unacceptable. This only historical, i.e., immanent framework dictates then for theology and faith what is possible to think and to believe and what is not. Under these conditions, this picture of Jesus remains: Jesus was a “Jew from Galilee” and it was later that his Jewish followers, who, in order to deal with his death, “gave him after his death a meaning, which led to the rise of a new religion”. 100 Jesus himself obtained then a divine status.101 Even though in this radically liberal approach there is a clear knowledge that Christology is an “intertwining of fact and interpretation”, what remains is only the interpretation in form of the self-reflexivity of the self-consciousness.102 The “problem of historism in Christology” is solved with the escape into the self-consciousness: Christology does not relate to some historical realities but works with the current pictures of Jesus in order to contribute to the self-enlightenment of the religious individual. 103 Subsequently, everyone can choose and find their own picture of Jesus because there is not and cannot be any uni-

97

DANZ, “Neue Erscheinungen zur Christologie”, 234. DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 208. 99 Cf. Ibid., 195. 100 Ibid., 42–43, 51–52, referring to G. THEISSEN, 7KH5HOLJLRQRIWKH(DUOLHVW&KXUFK HV&UHDWLQJD6\PEROLF:RUOG, trans. J. BOWDEN (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1999), 41– 60. The problem is, a new religion, which should survive more than three or four gener ations, cannot begin only by a new symbolical interpretation in surmounting the experienced cognitive dissonance through the fundamentals of faith (cf. ibid., 43). P. POKORNÝ, 7KH*HQHVLVRI&KULVWRORJ\)RXQGDWLRQVIRUD7KHRORJ\RIWKH1HZ7HVWDPHQW, trans. M. LEFÉBURE (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1987), 109–156, showed in a convincing way that in the beginning of the new perspective on Jesus there must have been an external “impulse”. Cf. also below, Ch. 4.1.2 and 9.1–2. 101 Definitely in the Gospel of John, according to DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 54. Cf. also the position of J. Hick, below, Ch. 11.1. 102 Cf. ibid., 204. Danz struggles here in the first place with the position of J. Schröter but he cannot do justice to him because he underestimates what can be considered as historical facts, as well as he underestimates the Easter tradition, which belongs to history as well and cannot be simply filtered off as Danz does it. Cf. DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 38–41, 205–208. IDEM, “Neuere Erscheinungen zur Christologie”, 250. In opposition to it cf. SCHRÖTER, -HVXVRI1D]DUHWK, 14: “Therefore, a fundamental skepticism toward a picture of Jesus constructed with the help of historical criticism goes too far.” 103 DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 9, 193, 209–222. Faith “describes itself”, its contents do not exist independently of it (ibid., 203–204). Precisely WITTEKIND, “Christologie im 20. Jahrhundert”, 23: “This means that the function of the reference to the historical Jesus changes. He is not anymore the historical foundation of faith but the picture of the historicity of faith.” And ibid., 40: The alleged final point of Christology is not that “the reality of the historical Jesus is recognized and appropriated, but that the picture of Jesus is the function of the self-expression (Selbstdarstellung) of faith”. 98

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fied picture of Jesus.104 What remains, is an endless plurality of pictures going to the edge of arbitrariness. With this “anything goes”, these modern authors come paradoxically remarkably close to the danger of the postmodern paradigm. 105 Faith, in this concept, is thus solely the transparency of the self-reflection with the help of some religious images. That means a huge reduction of the whole theology to anthropological questions, and, moreover, merely to epistemological questions, from which these concepts often cannot proceed any further.106 The fundamental question (now from the perspective of the theory and critique of ideology) for a liberal theology of this shape is, therefore: why should one need such faith and religion, what does it actually bring? If the goal is to achieve self-transparency and self-enlightenment, why should one go necessarily the religious way? 107 How is an “inflationary functionalism” of religion to be avoided? 108 Nourished from the idealist critique of religion in the 19 th century, this theological conception says the same in the end, what people living under totalitarian regimes hear about religion: that it is only an internal, rather psychological need. 109 The next obvious and logical step then would be to abandon religion as obsolete. 110 A theology, which uses mostly the prefix “self-”, leads, in fact, unavoidably to an inner self-destruction.111 104

Therefore, this conception of Christology denies Christology as a Christology of a person (Personchristologie), DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 212–213. There are only pictures and images: “Jesus becomes the image – though in many cases surely rather a projection screen – for what we consider to be true religiosity, true faith, and authentic existence” (EVERS, “Combinatory Christology”, 7). 105 Cf. GRUBE, 2VWHUQ DOV 3DUDGLJPHQZHFKVHO, 162; and also CH. TIETZ, “Jesus von Nazareth in neueren Christologien”, =HLWVFKULIWIU'LDOHNWLVFKH7KHRORJLH62/31(2/2015), 90–108. 106 N. SLENCZKA speaks in this respect from an “escape from the ORFL of material dogmatics” (N. SLENCZKA, “Flucht aus den dogmatischen Loci”, ]HLW]HLFKHQ8/2013, 46; cf. D. EVERS, “Neuere Tendenzen in der deutschsprachigen evangelischen Dogmatik”, 7K/=140 [2015/1], 3). The ideal of these liberal conceptions, that is to say, is to abstain from all contents to faith conceived as pure certainty, thus – again – to some kind of mystical immediacy (cf. DALFERTH, 'LH :LUNOLFKNHLW GHV 0|JOLFKHQ, 341, refering to R. Barth, cf. R. BARTH, $EVROXWH :DKUKHLW XQG HQGOLFKHV :DKUKHLWVEHZX‰WVHLQ 'DV 9HUKlOWQLV YRQ ORJLVFKHP XQG WKHRORJLVFKHP :DKUKHLWVEHJULII ± 7KRPDV YRQ $TXLQ .DQW )LFKWH XQG )UHJH, RPT 13 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004]). 107 Cf. WITTEKIND, “Christologie im 20. Jahrhundert”, 41–42: “Christology expresses therefore that religion refers only to itself and the religious symbolic does not have any other object than the religion as the religious interpretation of the self.” What for religion then? 108 WAGNER, 0HWDPRUSKRVHQ, 165, obviously knew about this danger. 109 Cf. EVERS, “Combinatory Christology”, 7: “However – as can be studied in the criticism of religion from the 19 th century to today – Jesus can also become the symbol of what in a repressive religious perspective human beings should be, but what autonomous and self-determined individuals do not want to be, a repressive ideal of heteronomy.” On the contrary, confirming, in fact, that liberal theology and liberal Marxism do not stand far away from each other, M. MACHOVEC in his book -HVXV IU $WKHLVWHQ (Stuttgart: Kreuz, 1975), tries to interconnect marxism and “the Jesus thing”, which are allegedly mutually necessary, if neither of them should degenerate into ideology. 110 It is therefore only consistent, when WITTEKIND, “Christologie im 20. Jahrhundert”, 42, asks the question: “Is the consequence of this critique that Christianity has to get along

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2. The Search for the Historical Jesus from Today’s Perspective 2. The Search for the Historical Jesus Today

From the current point of view, the development of the method and the evaluation of the sources have brought some criticism towards the methodical setting of the Third Quest and also some new positions, which try to implement the important achievements of the research so far. In the current view of the Third Quest, it is obvious that it still holds the original conviction that the search for the historical Jesus has to process on a strictly historical basis. The main orientation of the Third Quest is therefore from the beginning anti-dogmatic, anti-theological and “DQWLFKULVWRORJLFDO” in particular. Theological treatises on Jesus are under the suspicion that they may “falsify the picture of Jesus and make it subservient to certain theological interests”.112 In contrary to it, the presupposition is leading that the historical approach can get to the historical core without such premises. Repeating the old starting point of Reimarus, it comes, in fact, again to the contraposition of the ‘historical Jesus’ and the ‘Christ of faith’, which are again set against each other. 113 The historical Jesus has to be found “in the opposition to the propositions of faith”,114 somewhere behind the “sources, which were reforged by Christians”.115 The new methodological insights into the historical research have, however, questioned such approach and “revealed the episwithout Christology in the future?” KRÜGER, 'DVDQGHUH %LOG &KULVWL, 488 and 538–539, states openly that the human God-consciousness is a projection, but against the Feuerbachian critique of religion he tries to save its relevance with the argument that it is a necessary projection because it roots in the fundamental and inborn human ability of imagination. However, if God is a projection, and be it a necessary one, whose function is, in the end, “the self-understanding of a human life” (ibid., 540) and the “counterfactual selfacceptance and freedom” (ibid., 537), one has to ask, whether this whole religious agenda was not in fact a needless “GpWRXU” one “could probably have spared” (S. FREUD, &LYLOL]D WLRQ DQG ,WV 'LVFRQWHQWV, trans. J. STRACHEY [New York/London: W.W. Norton, 1961], 35). 111 Cf. TRACY, 2Q 1DPLQJ, 16: “That self-grounding, self-present modern subject is dead: killed by its own pretensions to grounding all reality in itself.” And also I.U. DALFERTH, “Gott mit uns”, in 'HQNZUGLJHV*HKHLPQLV.%HLWUlJH]XU*RWWHVOHKUH )6IU (-QJHO]XP*HEXUWVWDJ, ed. IDEM and J. FISCHER, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 73: “The ‘anthropological turn’ of the modern Christology is an ‘anthropologization’ of salvation, consistently thought out to the end – a definition of the essence and life of humans without any relation to God” (originally partly italicized). 112 SCHRÖTER, “Die aktuelle Diskussion”, 68. 113 Ibid. Cf. DAHLKE, “Die bleibende Bedeutung der historischen Jesusfrage”. 114 SCHRÖTER, “Die aktuelle Diskussion”, 75. Schröter notices about this approach, which originates already from Reimarus: “This position has been held in the historiccritical research since that time again and again.” (Ibid.) 115 Ibid., 76.

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temological deficits at the beginnings of the Third Quest”.116 The history is to be (re)constructed not against the context of the sources but rather through it or even within it. Moreover: “The origin of Christianity is to be explained from Jesus’ acting,” not against it.117 Regarding the sources, the Third Quest criticized the Second for its narrow orientation only on the synoptic Gospels and sought to balance this onesidedness through the wider historical FRQWH[WRIWKH-HZLVKZRUOG, supported by the new discoveries. Hereby, the Third Quest was obviously fascinated and its main question was clearly influenced in a fundamental way by it: the Third Quest searches for the historical Jesus exclusively in the Jewish context.118 Since this time, it is taken as a commonly shared fact in the historical Jesus research that Jesus has to be understood on the backdrop of Judaism of his time.119 What remains fully aside though, is the rest of the New Testament, as if WKLV context would not be plausible at all. Since Reimarus, the opinion had been held that the Easter perspective, as contained in the apostolic texts of the New Testament, is a foreign dogmatic construction; that between the teaching of Jesus (or Jesus himself) and the interpretation in the epistles is only discontinuity; that these are two different worlds without any connection. 120 M. Hengel showed – in a polemic with A. von Harnack, who, actually fully in the intention of Reimarus, considered Paul for the founder of the speculative objective Christology of a divine human and, hence, of a ‘second Gospel’121 – that the origins of Christology lie already before Paul, in the two decades after Jesus’ death. 122 Here, Hengel again reminds us what already Kähler and Bultmann each in his way did: that for the biblical texts, even for the epistles, which are older than Gospels, the basic perspective on Jesus is the Easter perspective. Therefore, this perspec-

116

Ibid. SCHRÖTER, -HVXVXQGGLH$QIlQJH, 60. 118 Cf. SCHRÖTER, “Die aktuelle Diskussion”, 82. 119 SCHRÖTER, -HVXV RI 1D]DUHWK, 9. To the relation of Christology and Judaism cf., from his specific position, CH. DANZ, “Jesus, der Jude aus Galiläa und der christliche Erlöser. Anmerkungen zur Funktion der dogmatischen Christologie im christlich-jüdischen Diskurs”, in 'RJPDWLVFKH&KULVWRORJLHLQGHU0RGHUQH, ed. IDEM and G. ESSEN (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 2019), 303–318. With the impact of the Jewish context of the earthly Jesus intensified through the horrible experience of World War II deals 6WUHLWIDOO&KULV WRORJLH9HUJHZLVVHUXQJHQQDFKGHU6KRDK, ed. H. HOPING and J.-H. TÜCK, QD 214 (Freiburg: Herder, 2005). 120 With the epistles being rather a church phantasy of an objective divine human. Cf. above to Reimarus, and also VON SCHELIHA, “Kyniker”, 29. 121 Cf. above, Ch. 1.1.3, at footnote 35 and HARNACK, “Das doppelte Evangelium”. 122 M. HENGEL, “The Son of God”, in IDEM 7KH &URVV RI WKH 6RQ RI *RG, trans. J. BOWDEN (London: SCM Press, 1976), 2. Cf. also SCHRÖTER, -HVXVXQGGLH$QIlQJH, 60. POKORNÝ, 7KH*HQHVLV, 39, 70, 95, 147, and below in this chapter. 117

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tive should be taken in account at least as a possible perspective and it should be tested also historically, in how far is this perspective plausible. The point is not, as the liberal theology often puts it, that the Easter pe rspective would have to be the only one, the only correct one. 123 From today’s point of view, no one denies, that there were and are many perspectives on Jesus possible.124 The Easter perspective is one of them and it is the basic perspective for the Christian faith as it is depicted in the biblical texts. Asking for Jesus, theology should therefore take this perspective honestly into account. J.D.G. Dunn puts it precisely: “[I]t has become clear that to abstract faith from the historical task is to proceed unhistorically. For the first faith of those called by Jesus is itself part of the historical data to be considered.”125 Or as P. Pokorný states clearly: “The earthly Jesus is part of the Easter kerygma.”126 However, it is to say vice versa that the perspective of faith needs the correction of the historical research in order not to become a vast speculation:127 “[H]istorical Jesus research does not make a judgment about the truth of the Christian faith either. Instead, it provides the foundation for compr ehending its emergence.”128 The research has shown that the biblical texts, taken as testimonies written from this perspective, can provide also some historically authentic information.129 Hence, without taking this perspective into account the historical research risks to cease its critical historicity, and theology risks to get outside

123 Cf. VON SCHELIHA, “Kyniker”, 29; MURRMANN-KAHL und DANZ, “Problemhorizont”, 6; DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 189. 124 Cf. SCHRÖTER, -HVXVXQGGLH$QIlQJH, 178: “The christological development in the area of the Jesus tradition could have taken place with a different weighting than is often assumed.” 125 DUNN, -HVXV5HPHPEHUHG, 327; similarly JOHNSON, 7KH5HDO-HVXV, 143–146. 126 POKORNÝ, 7KH*HQHVLV, 62. 127 SCHRÖTER, “Die aktuelle Diskussion”, 86. IDEM, “Von der Historizität der Evangelien”, 165, who refers to THEISSEN und MERZ, 7KH+LVWRULFDO-HVXV, 23–33, 98–115 and their analysis of the arguments of the historical scepticism. The important result is that there is no reason to put the Easter perspective of the Gospels against the character of Gospels as historical sources. Cf. also POKORNÝ, 7KH*HQHVLV, 14. 128 SCHRÖTER, -HVXVRI1D]DUHWK, 7. 129 SCHRÖTER, “Von der Historizität der Evangelien”, 164, calls this “a turn within the Jesus research”. On the trust to the historical reliability of the Gospels based his book about Jesus J. Ratzinger (pope Benedict XVI), cf. J. RATZINGER, -HVXVRI1D]DUHWK, trans. A.J. WALKER (New York: Doubleday, 2008), 13: “I trust the Gospels. Of course, I take for granted everything that the Council and modern exegesis tell us about literary genres, about authorial intention, and about the fact that the Gospels were written in the context, and speak within the living milieu, of communities. I have tried, to the best of my ability, to incorporate all of this, and yet I wanted to try to portray the Jesus of the Gospels as the real, ‘historical’ Jesus in the strict sense of the word.” The book ignited a broad debate, for literature cf. DAHLKE, “Die bleibende Bedeutung der historischen Jesusfrage”, 118–119.

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of the perspective of the Christian faith (from which it shall speak) and, hence, to stop being Christian theology. 130 Finally, this approach is represented also in the quest for the historical J esus by some recent positions, which try to integrate the achievements of the research so far: among others, the Easter perspective of the Gospels, the context of the New Testament and Judaism, and the constructivity of the historical work. 131 What we have in the biblical sources, are remembrances of the first Christians, narratives, and some basic ideas trying to rationally process the experiences and remembrances. Therefore authors like J.D.G. Dunn 132, J. Schröter133 or D.C. Allison134 work with WKH PHPRU\ as “the mediating element between past and present”.135 From these memories (and other historical sources), we can construct our picture of Jesus as a plausible picture, based also on some particular “facts” or particular memories, which we have regarding the person of Jesus. 136 This does not mean, as the First Quest for the historical Jesus thought, to go beyond the sources to the real historical person of Jesus but rather to present a “conception grounded on the weighing of plausibilities, which as an abstraction from the sources always moves LQIURQW of the sources”.137 The Jesus we can reconstruct is, therefore, “the Jesus UH PHPEHUHG and PDGHSUHVHQW from a specific perspective at the beginning of the twenty-first century”. 138 130

Cf. LANDMESSER, “Der gegenwärtige Jesus”, 114–115. Cf. DUNN, -HVXV 5HPHPEHUHG, 65, who names the achievements of the research more in detail. 132 DUNN, -HVXV 5HPHPEHUHG. Dunn’s conception is based on the “immediate” and “lasting impact” or “impression” (ibid., 882 and 892), which the historical Jesus had on his disciples, whose remembrances we have now in the New Testament texts. With this, Dunn stands actually close to the liberal conception of the living picture of Jesus preserved in the NT (cf. above, Ch. 2.1). 133 SCHRÖTER, -HVXVRI1D]DUHWK. 134 ALLISON, &RQVWUXFWLQJ-HVXV. 135 LANDMESSER, “Der gegenwärtige Jesus”, 111. 136 Or, as ALLISON, &RQVWUXFWLQJ-HVXV, 460, does it: “Instead of attempting to authenticate individual item after individual item, I have preferred, for the most part, to identify larger patterns across the sources and then to seek for the best explanation”. 137 SCHRÖTER, -HVXVRI1D]DUHWK, 17. 138 Ibid., 9. Therefore, S. MCKNIGHT in his review of Allison’s work calls the Third Quest to be over: “Allison’s book brings the quest for the historical Jesus to a new deadend. We can’t do what we thought we were going to do. The Third Quest is, at least for me, officially over” (quoted in ALLISON, &RQVWUXFWLQJ-HVXV, 461, footnote 88). However, Allison himself denies that there would be different periods or quests for the historical Jesus (ibid., 461). – Concerning the periodization, M. WELKER, *RGWKH5HYHDOHG&KULVWRO RJ\ (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans, 2013), 87–94, tries to introduce a “fourth quest” by elevating the quest for the historical Jesus to a multi-level multicontextuality in order to avoid all risks of the previous quests and at the same time to preserve their complex concerns (ibid., 93). For a Fourth Quest within the search for the historical Jesus argues also E. 131

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According to J. Schröter, there is no possibility to get in the biblical scriptures beyond the plurality of after-Easter rememberances and perspectives on Jesus.139 This does not mean, however, that the question of the historical Jesus would be obsolete or that theology would have to start just so with the Easter perspective, take it or leave it. It was the Easter faith in the first place, who had a preeminent interest in the question of the historical, or may be on this point rather: the earthly Jesus.140 The Easter perspective expresses the faith in the crucified and resurrected one. Therefore, LWLVWKH(DVWHUIDLWKLW VHOIZKRLVLQWHUHVWHGLQWKHKLVWRU\LQWKHILUVWSODFH.141 Then, is it also possible to find and discern within this perspective some moments or elements of earlier traditions, which were integrated into this perspective. The Easter perspective marks hence no total discontinuity, there is “no ‘Easter-ditch’, that would set” the “pre-Easter Jesus and his post-Easter interpretation” “against each other”.142 It is not the beginning of a wholly new and different perspective and teaching, as Reimarus put it. It is of maximal imBAASLAND, “Fourth Quest? What Did Jesus Really Want?”, in +DQGERRNIRUWKH6WXG\RI WKH+LVWRULFDO-HVXV, vol.1, ed. T. HOLMÉN and S.E. PORTER (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2011), 31–56. Cf. also G. WENZ, “The Last Quest. Zum christologischen Problem der Frage nach dem historischen Jesus”, in 'RJPDWLVFKH&KULVWRORJLHLQGHU0RGHUQH, ed. CH. DANZ and G. ESSEN (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 2019), 153–178. 139 J. SCHRÖTER, “Der erinnerte Jesus als Begründer des Christentums? Bemerkungen zu James D.G. Dunns Ansatz in der Jesusforschung”, =17 20 (2007/2), 51, 53. The 20th volume of ZNT as whole is dedicated to the “remembered Jesus (Der erinnerte Jesus)”. Cf. also POKORNÝ, 7KH*HQHVLV, 95–96. 140 Cf. SCHRÖTER, -HVXVRI1D]DUHWK, 9; LANDMESSER, “Der gegenwärtige Jesus”, 119: “In the perspective of faith, the ‘historical Jesus’ is already always present, these are not aspects of the Christian approach to the reality and to the world, which would exclude one another.” 141 Cf. E. JÜNGEL, *RGDVWKH0\VWHU\RIWKH:RUOG2QWKH)RXQGDWLRQRIWKH7KHRORJ\ RIWKH&UXFLILHG2QHLQWKH'LVSXWHEHWZHHQ7KHLVPDQG$WKHLVP, trans. D.L. GUDER (London [et al.]: Bloomsbury T and T Clark, 2014), 349, footnote 17, who stresses the connection of the Easter faith with the question of the historical Jesus and vice versa the connection of the fact of the historical Jesus with the existence of Easter faith: “[O]ne can ask relevantly about the historical Jesus only when faith in Jesus Christ has been acknowledged as at least a IDFWXDO result of the fact that Jesus the man did exist on earth. But then it is already a statement made by faith to say that faith in Jesus Christ is the UHOHYDQWresult of the man Jesus’ having been on earth, and anything but a misunderstanding. There is no historical mediation between the two.” Cf. also IDEM, 3DXOXVXQG-HVXV, 6th ed., HUTh 2 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1986), 279–284; IDEM, “The Dogmatic Significance of the Question of the Historical Jesus”, in IDEM, 7KHRORJLFDO (VVD\V, vol. II, trans. A. NEUFELDT-FAST and J.B. WEBSTER (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 82–119; POKORNÝ, 7KH*HQHVLV, 130; KRÜGER, 'DVDQGHUH%LOG&KULVWL, 506. 142 SCHRÖTER, -HVXVRI1D]DUHWK, 201, cf. ibid., 202: “It would therefore be a misapprehension to want to set off the ‘real’ Jesus against the Jesus LQWHUSUHWHG with the help of the Easter experiences.”

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portance that Easter bring a new perspective, but a new perspective on what was there also already before, a new perspective on the continuous life-story of Jesus. A new perspective, which can be understood better in the light of the earthly Jesus, of his life and of his teaching. In this new Easter perspective, there is a IXQGDPHQWDOFRQWLQXLW\: the resurrected Jesus is the crucified Jesus. It is the continuation of his story, of the same person, of the same life. And also the interpretation from this new Easter perspective is based “on e xperiences that have gone forth from his earthly activity”. 143 The Easter perspective would not be possible without the activity of the earthly Jesus, although Easter brings something radically new, a wholly new experience with this previous experience. For the followers of Jesus, the Easter experiences would not be comprehensible without a foundation in the life of the earthly Jesus.144 As I stated above, although the Easter perspective became dominant, there were other perspectives and traditions, which can be still reconstructed from the biblical texts, although they had been reshaped from the Easter perspective. J. Schröter shows that from the very beginning, there was a Galilean interpretation of Jesus (the so-called Q source), wholly independent of Paul, which emphasized the importance of the earthly Jesus and his acting; this was later an important point for the continuity between the earthly and the resurrected Jesus.145 This tradition was oriented on Jesus’ announcement of the coming of the Kingdom of God and on the title of the ‘Son of man’. Mark integrated later this tradition into his conception with the titles of Jesus as Christ and Son of God who will return, however not as N\ULRV, as the Pauline tradition put it, but as the Son of man.146 There was hence a self-standing Galilean tradition with its own accents. With respect to the differences and different accents of the traditions, the important point is: both traditions the Galilean (Q and Mark) and the (pre-Pauline) tradition of Jerusalem do not mark different lines of development, which would stand unmediated next to each other or even against each other but build a certain “coherence”. They both represent with different accents the notion that in Jesus came the Kingdom of God. With their int egration into the Easter perspective, this notion and their specific accents were not blurred

143

Ibid., 201. Ibid., 202. Cf. ibid., 246: “Rather, there are multiple connections that lead from the activity of the earthly Jesus to the emergence of the Christian faith.” Cf. also ALLISON, &RQVWUXFWLQJ-HVXV, 25–26. 145 SCHRÖTER, -HVXVXQGGLH$QIlQJH, 60–61. POKORNÝ, 7KH*HQHVLV, 89, regarding the plurality of old sources and conceptions, points to the fact that the Q source is the only old tradition “in which both the title Messiah […] and the resurrection kerygma are missing”. It is therefore no wonder that, already from this point of view, the liberal search for the historical Jesus focused from its very beginnings on the synoptic Gospels. But it is to say, at the same time, that the Q source was “soon brought into relationship with the resurrection message”, thus “it cannot serve as a basis for the reconstruction of an alternative Christology” (ibid., 94–95, cf. 105–109 stressing the plurality of traditions and layers). 146 SCHRÖTER, -HVXVXQGGLH$QIlQJH, 217–218, 222. 144

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or lost but remained preserved. The point is, therefore, not to find the only tradition and perspective but to find and preserve a “SOXUDOLW\ZLWKLQDFRKHUHQFH”.147

Regarding the question of the beginnings of Christology, it is to say that there is a remarkable FRQWLQXLW\ between the earthly Jesus and the Easter perspective. The beginnings of Christology are firmly rooted in the acts of the earthly Jesus, who already during his life “bound the happening of the reign of God to his own person”, 148 so that church Christology with its emphasis on the christological titles (Messiah, Son of God) is to be understood not as a co nstruction from the Easter perspective but rather as an integral dimension already of the acting of the earthly Jesus and his message of the early coming of the Kingdom of God. 149 Schröter speaks about this continuity as “a development from an ‘implicit’ Christology with its basis in Jesus himself to a post-Easter H[SOLFLW Christology”.150 This point is one of the most irritating for liberal theology, which tries to prove intensively that the development from the historical Jesus to the church Christology was not necessary and only possible but merely contingent – and was proven in the Enlightenment to be false.151 But the point is not to present the Easter perspective as the only possible interpretation of the earthly Jesus and his life. Rather, the Easter perspective proves to be a plausible and – not the only, but still one – possible perspective and interpretation of the meaning of earthly Jesus and of his life. And from the internal perspective of Christian faith, this continuity is beyond a doubt. To disprove the Easter perspective, the liberal theology would not have to attack the necessity or contingency of the Easter interpretation of Jesus’ life but the plausibility of this perspective. The Easter perspective does not say that it is the only possible interpretation of the life of Jesus. However, it is convinced that it is a very plausible one. To refute it would mean not to show that there is no necessary continuity between the

147

Ibid., 217–219, quotation 219. Cf. with a similar result the study of F. BOVON, “The First Christologies: Exaltation and Incarnation Or, From Easter to Christmas”, in -HVXV &KULVW7RGD\6WXGLHVRI&KULVWRORJ\LQ9DULRXV&RQWH[WV, ed. S.G. HALL, TBT 146 (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2009), 27–43. And also POKORNÝ, 7KH*HQHVLV, 13 and 88: “It is true that there were various Christological conceptions; but we have seen that in the ol dest stage accessible to us they were already too closely knit together for us today to consider them as competing alternatives.” 148 SCHRÖTER, -HVXVXQGGLH$QIlQJH, 221. Cf. POKORNÝ, 7KH*HQHVLV, 45–55. 149 SCHRÖTER, -HVXVXQGGLH$QIlQJH, 223. 150 Ibid., 215. To implicit and explicit Christology cf. THEISSEN and MERZ, 7KH+LVWRU LFDO-HVXV, 523–563. 151 Cf. DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 185–189. His position concerning a possible continuity from the earthly Jesus towards the Easter interpretation of his life and resurrection is clear and remains inline with the position of Reimarus and Strauss: “The retracing of the early Christian kerygma to a particular historical figure is supposed to counter the suspicion that the after-Easter Christology is a myth and thus a projection of the congregation” (ibid., 187). For a critique of this position see also GRUBE, 2VWHUQDOV3DUDGLJPHQZHFKVHO160– 163.

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earthly Jesus and the Easter interpretation of his life, but rather to show that there FDQQRW EHDQ\ continuity at all.152

In summary: theology does not deny the plurality of possible approaches to Jesus or the plurality of possible pictures of him. 153 Nevertheless, it purposely chooses the Easter perspective as the perspective of its own interpretation, also because this perspective proved very early that it can integrate many other christological emphases.154 7KH(DVWHUSHUVSHFWLYHEHFRPHVWKHIXQGDPHQ WDOKHUPHQHXWLFDOSHUVSHFWLYH in the interpretation of the person of Jesus and, from here on, the whole of reality. Christology, then, is the consistent reflection on this perspective, which it tries to think to the end. It is not the only tothe-end-thinking of the only possible perspective but rather an attempt to think this perspective to the end in a consistent and plausible way.

3. &KULVWXVSUDHVHQV 3. Christus praesens

Who, then, is the object of Christology? Obviously, it is not the historical Jesus but it is not the earthly Jesus either. The object of Christology, if Christology should remain a theological discipline, cannot be a result of historical research. I intended to show above, in the discussion with the historical questions and with the help of the results of current research that the theological focusing on the person of Jesus Christ has to take in account the Easter perspective as the main framework for the interpretation of Jesus, as the fundamental hermeneutical perspective of Christology. It is the Easter perspective, which is the fundamental perspective of the New Testament (and of the church tradition) and of Christian faith. 155 And Christian faith does not relate 152

This was an important question in the discussion with R. Bultmann, who reduced the importance of the historical Jesus only to the mere fact of his historical existence (his “Daß”, cf. BULTMANN, “Das Verhältnis“, 449–450), which was in his opinion the only condition for the existence of the Christian proclamation. Everything else regarding the history of Jesus “does not matter” (ibid., 469), because “the Christ of the kerygma is not a historical figure which could be in any continuity with the historical Jesus” (ibid., 448; cf. WENZ, &KULVWXV, 108). 153 This is also the point of the summarizing study of DAHLKE, “Die bleibende Bedeutung der historischen Jesusfrage”, 111–131. 154 Cf. POKORNÝ, 7KH*HQHVLV, 147: “[T]he resurrection Christology had already made progress in wider circles before Paul, since it was able to integrate the other expressions of the Easter faith”. 155 Cf. LANDMESSER, “Der gegenwärtige Jesus”, 116: “In an essential point, however – in the Archimedes’ point, so to speak – the New Testament texts meet in their speech about Jesus. They talk about Jesus in the way they do only because of the event that decisively shapes their view of the story of Jesus and the message of Jesus: because of the encounter with the risen Christ. This is exactly the perspective of the believers, which is also the determining perspective already of the New Testament texts.” Cf. also KRÜGER, 'DVDQGHUH

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to Jesus Christ as to a mere historical person. Christian faith, as a vivid relation to Jesus Christ, relates to him DVSUHVHQW. “If there is to be an unambiguous starting-point at all theology has to take seriously that faith is essentially faith LQ&KULVW, i.e., a direct personal relation to the present Christ. But then, logically, for faith to exist Christ must be risen, alive and present.” 156 Therefore, the object of Christology, as I conceive it, is the &KULVWXVSUDH VHQV, the present Jesus Christ.157 Which is a theological statement – an abbreviation, actually – that needs to be more specified. First, the Easter perspective, as the fundamental hermeneutical perspective, points to the the crucified DQG resurrected one. The person of Jesus Christ in this perspective can be therefore reduced neither only to the historical or earthly Jesus, nor to the risen Christ apart from his earthly life, nor to the eternal Logos, who for a certain time became human. Neither is he a personal embodiment of an eternal divine principle (Kant, Schleiermacher) or of an idea (Strauss) or of the Gospel (Harnack), as some former approaches tried to put it. Jesus Christ as &KULVWXVSUDHVHQV stands for the person of Jesus Christ, in whom the Easter faith recognized God himself within full humanity. With this understanding of Jesus Christ, “God is already involved” 158 – this is the new and turning point in the Easter perspective. In Jesus was God himself, in Jesus Christ we have to do with God-Self. The human Jesus of Nazareth was and is the self-revelation of God. This is the only reason why faith relates to Jesus and believes in him. If God would not be in him, faith in him would be a mistake and a blasphemy. Against all negative and liberal theologies which try to overcome any necessary concreteness, particularity and objectification of the human speech of God in order to preserve God in his untouched absoluteness, from the christological point of view is to say: not GHXVVHPSHUPDLRU, not GHXVGHILQLULQHT XLW, not a negative statement, which should clearly delimit all human attempts of grasping the divine, but o` lo,goj sa.rx evge,neto, exactly this positive statement based not on the human attempt to grasp God from below but on the believed divine motion from above, is the starting point of all Christology and theology. “The sentence ‘deus definiri nequit’ is […] christologically unac-

%LOG &KULVWL, 506 and 507: The Easter is “the basic date of the Christian faith”. “To be a Christian means to stand in the efficacy of what happened at the Easter.” Similarly, WENZ, &KULVWXV, 29: “Easter is the constitutive ground of Christianity and Christology.” 156 I.U. DALFERTH, 7KHRORJ\DQG3KLORVRSK\ (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 126. 157 Cf. DALFERTH, &UXFLILHGDQG5HVXUUHFWHG, 24. And also CH. SCHWÖBEL, “‘Wer sagt denn ihr, dass ich sei?’ (Mt 16,15). Eine systematisch-theologische Skizze zur Lehre von der Person Christi”, in 0DUEXUJHU -DKUEXFK 7KHRORJLH ;;,,, &KULVWRORJLH, ed. E. GRÄBSCHMIDT und R. PREUL (Leipzig: EVA, 2011), 41–58, starting with the perspective of the Christian worship. The same stresses MOLTMANN, 7KH:D\RI-HVXV&KULVW, 42. 158 DALFERTH, &UXFLILHGDQG5HVXUUHFWHG, 23. Cf. WENZ, &KULVWXV, 46.

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ceptable.”159 Jesus Christ is the self-definition of God, without ceasing anything of his true humanity. Christology, therefore, must be a Christology of his person and his work in their unity. Considering all unavoidable perspectivity of one’s own standpoint within the perspective of Christian faith, Christology can and must bring more than an impressive picture or metaphor for a possible self-identification or self-enlightenment. It can and must give an answer to the question who this Jesus Christ is and what does it mean for us. Christology can and must develop a christological ontology. Secondly, however, in order not to make the same mistake of immediacy as the liberal theology does it, this presence is not immediate, nor is it to find LPPHGLDWHO\ on a certain place like in the biblical picture of Christ (as Kähler and Herrmann both in their own way stated) or in the proclamation of “the church as the bearer of the kerygma” (as Bultmann conceived it)160 but this presence is PHGLDWHG, and mediated in a twofold way: First, mediated through the Spirit, because the presence of Jesus Christ is not a bodily presence. On the contrary, his presence in the Spirit is based on his bodily absence. No direct encounter with the person of Jesus Christ, no encounter with Jesus Christ without the Spirit is possible. &KULVWXVSUDHVHQV cannot be therefore thought of than in trinitarian terms. The notion of Jesus Christ as the self-revelation of God is mediated by the Spirit who constitutes Christian faith as faith in Jesus Christ as the self-revelation of God. In this respect, the term of &KULVWXV SUDH VHQV is DQ DEEUHYLDWLRQ RI D PXFK PRUH FRPSOH[ ± EHFDXVH WULQLWDULDQ ± VWUXFWXUH. Christian faith is not the result of an immediate, somehow mystical encounter with the risen Jesus, with the effect or vividness of his biblical picture or with the immediate effect of the church proclamation; it is an encounter with the living Christ, who is present through and in the Spirit and who opens a new understanding of God, world and oneself. However, this refusal of any christological immediacy does not mean only a shift to a pneumatological immediacy, which would inevitably tend or even end in religious enthusiasm. Therefore second, and at the same time, also WKH SUHVHQFHRIWKH6SLULWLVDPHGLDWHGSUHVHQFH. In relation to his creation, there are no special ways or channels for God’s communication with the world. God relates to the world always with, in, and through created forms (as are e.g. the biblical texts or the church proclamation and many other forms of human communication – here, they have their legitimate place). The funda159

E. JÜNGEL, “Das Verhältnis von ‘ökonomischer’ und ‘immanenter’ Trinität”, in IDEM, (QVSUHFKXQJHQ*RWW±:DKUKHLW±0HQVFK7KHRORJLVFKH(U|UWHUXQJHQ (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1980), 267–268. Cf. WOŹNIAK, “The Christological Prism”, 526: “The Kantian critical question ZKDWFDQZHNQRZ" has in theology a radically Christological character.” 160 BULTMANN, “Das Verhältnis der urchristlichen Christusbotschaft”, 468–469, in a Hegelian manner, almost identifies the church with the Spirit and, hence, with the living Christ.

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mental base for this statement is nothing else than Christology in the terms of incarnation, of God’s coming into the world as a true human without ceasing to be God. In this fundamental point, &KULVWRORJ\ LV WKH YHU\ EDVH IRU DOO SQHXPDWRORJLFDOFRPPXQLFDWLRQ. The presence of the living Christ manifests itself therefore always as the presence of the Spirit within the created forms, in which God makes God-Self communicable and understandable. 161 This is valid also for the primary instances of encounter with the living Jesus Christ: for the Christian proclamation of faith and for the eucharist. And since understanding is a plural phenomenon, the presence of the Spirit opens a wide space for a plurality of understandings and formulations of the person of Jesus Christ. But this plurality of understandings is to be differentiated from what is understood: all Christian understandings of Jesus Christ should relate and refer to the crucified and resurrected one, who is now pr esent in the Spirit.162 If Jesus Christ is understood in the Easter perspective now as &KULVWXV SUDHVHQV, there is, on one side, the trinitarian context necessary. This means, when talking about &KULVWXVSUDHVHQV, God is already always in play, as stated above. But then, ‘Christ as &KULVWXVSUDHVHQV’ means Christ present WRXV. We also are involved. Christology is thus not (and has never been) a mere theoretical speculation about the person of Jesus Christ, of his divinity and humanity. The aim was never just to construct a theoretically consistent conception. The deepest interest of Christology from its early beginning was soteriological. The task of Christology, which has as its object the present Jesus Christ, is thus to elaborate not only the person of Jesus on the backdrop of the Trinity but also and primarily KLVPHDQLQJDQGLPSRUWDQFHIRUXV. It is the soteriological interest, from which all the important christological and ontological questions arise.163 At the end of Chapter 1.2.2 I stated that a firm part of the theological reflection is the debate about what defines the Christian faith (from which perspective the theology should speak) and what are its fundamental points. 164 161

I will develop more these pneumatological implications for the God-human communication in the following volume on pneumatological anthropology. 162 Cf. DALFERTH, &UXFLILHGDQG5HVXUUHFWHG, 28: The important thing is that “the wide range of Christian confessions” and theological concepts has still the identical referent. “The very consistency of this theme helps to integrate the varied and diverse content of the confessions.” 163 Cf. ibid., 26–30. This, however, does not mean that Christology could be reduced only to soteriology, cf. below, Ch. 3.2.5, fn. 246. 164 Or, said with LINDBECK, 7KH1DWXUHRI'RFWULQH, 82, who differentiates between the formulations of the doctrines and rules or paradigms they want to establish: what are the fundamental rules, which the grammar of faith tries to express (through its doctrinal statements in the first place), and then – and this is the specifically theological task – which grammar results from these rules. This theologically developed grammar does not neces-

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Implicitly, within what I have said about the object of Christology, I have now responded this question from my perspective: Christian faith is defined from the Easter perspective as its fundamental hermeneutical perspective as faith in Jesus Christ, the crucified and resurrected one. 165 “Christian faith stands or falls with the confession that Jesus has been raised by God – and Christian theology stands or falls with the clear and careful conceptual exposition of this confession.”166 Christian faith is thus that faith, which recognizes, that in Jesus Christ acted God-Self. This can be expressed differently, as already the first biblical confessions do: “Jesus Christ is Lord” (Phil 2:11). “This man was the son of God” (Mk 15:39). Or: “This is the Christ” (John 7:41). There are many more ways possible. But all these and similar expressions should point to the fundamental eschatological reality of the crucified and resurrected Jesus Christ.167

sarily have to match the grammar of faith. Then, theology with its developed grammar can be a critical pendant to the grammar of lived faith, if they both, however, relate to the same fundamental rules. 165 LANDMESSER, “Der gegenwärtige Christus”, 115, refers to his “christological criterion of preference” (in L. in italics) and names four aspects of the christologically shaped Christian faith: the incarnation, the teaching and the acting of Jesus, the death of Jesus and his resurrection. In my view, the Easter perspective (the death and resurrection of Jesus) is enough to name the specifics of Christian faith. The life of Jesus is the necessary presupposition, which, however, gets in the light of the Easter a new meaning. And the incarnation is a “secondary interpretament of the resurrection confession” (DALFERTH, &UXFLILHG DQG5HVXUUHFWHG, 31). 166 DALFERTH, &UXFLILHG DQG 5HVXUUHFWHG, 31 (partly in italics). Cf. also W. KASPER, -HVXV WKH &KULVW, trans. V. GREEN (London: Burns and Oates, 1976), 15: “The assertion ‘Jesus is the Christ’ is the basic statement of Christian belief, and Christology is no more than the conscientious elucidation of that proposition.” And also SCHLEIERMACHER, 7KH &KULVWLDQ)DLWK, § 91.1, 371: “The consciousness of one who in no degree relates the potency of the God-consciousness which he finds in himself to Jesus is not Christian at all.” 167 Cf. the presupposition of an identical consciousness of all at the beginning in SCHLEIERMACHER, 7KH &KULVWLDQ )DLWK, § 95.1, 389. Clearly DALFERTH, (YDQJHOLVFKH 7KHRORJLH DOV ,QWHUSUHWDWLRQVSUD[LV, 100 (going in the same direction as LINDBECK, 7KH 1DWXUH RI 'RFWULQH, 82, with his differentiation of principal rules and their particular formulations): “Therefore, the Gospel has a pragmatic identity but no semantical identity.”

 Chapter 3

The Field of Christology: The Chalcedonian Frame 1. The Creed of Chalcedon and Its Problems 1. The Creed of Chalcedon and Its Problems

After the Council in Nicea 325 dealt with and answered the basic questions of Christ’s divinity and the Trinity and after the Nicene Creed (with its extension of the pneumatological article in Constantinople I, 381) was subsequently acknowledged as WKH only Creed,1 the theological debate went on to include the fundamental christological question, how are divinity and humanity related in the person of Jesus Christ. With this question, the christological focus shifted massively to the incarnation and WKH LQFDUQDWLRQ SHUVSHFWLYH EH FDPHGRPLQDWLQJLQFKULVWRORJLFDOWKLQNLQJ.2 Although from a detailed perspective on the particular development of christological thought, it might not have seemed to be a fundamental decision and formulation, the Chalcedonian Definition of Faith set the margins for both future christological work and its critique. 3 This definition, therefore,

1

By the Canon 7 at the Council of Ephesus 431, quoted in $FWVRIWKH&RXQFLORI&KDO FHGRQ, vol. 1, Session I, Nr. 943, trans. and ed. R. PRICE and M. GADDIS, Translated Texts for Historians 45 (Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 2005), 323. Cf. D.M. GWYNN, “The Council of Chalcedon and the Definition of Christian Tradition”, in &KDOFHGRQ LQ &RQWH[W, ed. R. PRICE and M. WHITBY (Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 2009), 7–26. However, this decision, which was for the future very influential, was made by the presiding Cyril of Alexandria in a very wilful way legitimizing with this his own theology against Nestorius, cf. K. BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV GHU 'RJPHQJHVFKLFKWH, vol. 2,1 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1991), 51. 2 Cf. MOLTMANN, 7KH:D\RI-HVXV&KULVW, 49. 3 Cf. GRILLMEIER, &KULVW LQ WKH &KULVWLDQ 7UDGLWLRQ, vol. I, trans. J. BOWDEN et al. (London: Mowbray, 1965), 549: “The Fathers were probably not conscious of the significance of their decision as it is expressed in the following sentences, and of what it was to mean for future generations of theologians.” From a rather historical perspective, the current discussion stresses primarily the continuity of the Definition with the previous and following development, cf. GWYNN, “The Council of Chalcedon”, 23; B.E. DALEY, SJ, “Unpacking the Chalcedonian Formula: From Studied Ambiguity to Saving Mystery”, 7KH 7RPLVW 80 (2016), 165–189; K. ANATOLIOS, “The Soteriological Grammar of Conciliar Christology”, 7KH7RPLVW78 (2014), 165–188. However, PRICE and GADDIS, “General Introduction”, in $FWV RI WKH &RXQFLO RI &KDOFHGRQ, vol. I, ed. EIDEM, Translated Texts for Historians 45 (Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 2005), 71, footnote 234, seem to underestimate

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still marks “the playground, on which the Christological reflection operates”,4 although it has been heavily criticized in the times of its origin and again since the Enlightenment up to today. Both the Creeds of Nicea (Trinity) and Chalcedon (Christology) are still the most fundamental theological decisions of Christianity. 5 The leading question of this chapter is quite simple: Should we try to keep Chalcedonian categories or at least their intentions, or should we, e.g. with liberal theology, abandon this doctrine as insufficient and strive to overcome it? One could, in the end, avoid an answer pointing to the mystery: “The question of how divinity and humanity were united in Christ can presumably not be answered in a satisfactory way by any theologian.”6 Nevertheless, one should at least try it: “But patristic theology was never satisfied with such a situation. It continually made new efforts to transcend the embarrassment of concrete imperfections in its understanding of that which had been laid hold of in faith. Only the one who attempts it may greet the difficulties that emerge on a new level as a sign of the profound mystery of Jesus’ reality, which despite the most penetrating understanding can never be so ultimately resolved that there would remain no reason for further questioning.“ 7

The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to elaborate on the Chalcedonian frame of Christology and to sketch the development of the most important points, concepts, and critiques of it. If we want to keep the legitimate intentions of the Chalcedonian Christology, we need – and that is the thesis of this chapter – to go ZLWK &KDOFHGRQ EH\RQG &KDOFHGRQ. Therefore, I will show how the substance-thinking that starts with the perspective of incarnation leads inevitably into aporias. This result thus forces a change in perspective to the perspective of resurrection, which, then, with some necessary critical adaptations, helps to maintain the substantial intentions of the margins set by the

the importance of the council too much saying that “it cannot be said that the council itself marked any advance in Christological understanding; nor did it claim so”. 4 DALFERTH, “Gott für uns”, 57. Similarly PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 292; E. JÜNGEL, “Humanity in Correspondence to God. Remarks on the Image of God as a Basic Concept in Theological Anthropology”, in IDEM, 7KHRORJLFDO (VVD\V, trans. J. WEBSTER (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 132; CH. SCHWÖBEL, “Christology and Trinitarian Thought”, in 7ULQLWDULDQ 7KHRORJ\ 7RGD\, ed. IDEM (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 143. And, of course, Chalcedon as WKH christological frame is firmly held in the catholic as well as in the Eastern-orthodox theology. 5 Cf. DALFERTH, -HQVHLWVYRQ0\WKRVXQG/RJRV, 95. 6 B. LOHSE, $6KRUW+LVWRU\RI&KULVWLDQ'RFWULQH (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), 90. 7 PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 303 (partly my own translation).

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Chalcedonian definition: the unity of the person of Jesus Christ while preserving the distinction between his divinity and humanity.8  7KH'HILQLWLRQ The backgrounds and the content of the Chalcedonian Definition from 22 nd October 451 are well known. 9 Furthermore, the interest of this study is systematical, not primarily historical. I will, therefore, stress only some points important for the further discussion. My interest lies not in the particular thinkers and in the development of their thought but rather in the arguments and in their development. The Chalcedonian definition – respectively the last part, commonly quoted as the definition itself – is a careful and cautious compilation of sentences, phrases, and terms from other texts. Thus, not the particular formulations but their combination is new and opens new spaces for new interpretations. The traditional description of the Creed speaks about balancing between two rivalrous schools in $OH[DQGULDDQG$QWLRFK. Although it may be too generalizing to speak about two schools,10 the tendencies in the christological thinking between the Antiochenes, represent8 The first version of this chapter was published as P. GALLUS, “The Importance of the Chalcedonian Distinction”, &RPPXQLR9LDWRUXP LXI (2019/3), 256–288. 9 Cf. primarily the classics: A. GRILLMEIER, -HVXV &KULVWXV LP *ODXEHQGHU .LUFKH, 5 vols (1–2/4) (Freiburg: Herder, 1990/2004–2006) = &KULVW LQ WKH &KULVWLDQ 7UDGLWLRQ, 5 vols (1–2/4), from the 1 st German edition trans. J. BOWDEN et al. (London: Mowbray, 1965–1996). Concerning Chalcedon esp. A. GRILLMEIER, -HVXV &KULVWXV LP *ODXEHQ GHU .LUFKH, vol. 1 of the last German edition (Freiburg: Herder, 1990/2004), 751–775, and vol. 2/1. Further: 'DV .RQ]LO YRQ &KDONHGRQ, vols I–III, ed. A. GRILLMEIER and H. BACHT (Würzburg: Echter, 1951–1954); P.-TH. CAMELOT, (SKHVXVXQG&KDOFHGRQ (Mainz: Matthias Grünewald, 1963), 87–271; J. MEYENDORFF, &KULVW LQ (DVWHUQ &KULVWLDQ 7KRXJKW (New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1969); &KDONHGRQ*HVFKLFKWHXQG$NWXDOLWlW 6WXGLHQ]XU5H]HSWLRQGHUFKULVWRORJLVFKHQ)RUPHOYRQ&KDONHGRQ, ed. J. VAN OORT and J. ROLDANUS (Leuven: Peeters, 1998); &KDOFHGRQLQ&RQWH[W, ed. R. PRICE and M. WHITBY (Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 2009); B.E. DALEY, *RG9LVLEOH3DWULVWLF&KULVWRORJ\5HFRQ VLGHUHG (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2018), 1–10; K.-H. UTHEMANN, “Zur Rezeption des Tomus Leonis in und nach Chalkedon”, in IDEM, &KULVWXV.RVPRV'LDWULEH7KHPHQGHUIUKHQ .LUFKHDOV%HLWUlJH]XHLQHUKLVWRULVFKHQ7KHRORJLH (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2005), 1–36. A very sober and differentiated picture of history and theology with short and bright formulations provides BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV. – The text of the Creed see in &RPSHQGLXP RI &UHHGV 'HILQLWLRQV DQG 'HFODUDWLRQV RQ 0DWWHUV RI )DLWK DQG 0RUDOV, ed. H. DENZINGER and P. HÜNERMANN, 43rd ed. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2012), Nr. 300– 303; or in $FWVRIWKH&RXQFLORI&KDOFHGRQ II, Nr. 30–34, 201–205. For the genesis of the Creed in detail cf. A. DE HALLEUX, “La définition christologique à Chalcédoine”, 5HYXH WKHRORJLTXHGH/RXYDLQ7 (1976), 3–23, 155–170; A. GRILLMEIER, -HVXV&KULVWXV1, 753– 759; I.O. DE URBINA, “Das Glaubenssymbol von Chalkedon”, in 'DV .RQ]LO YRQ &KDONHGRQ I, 389–418; $FWVRIWKH&RXQFLORI&KDOFHGRQII, 183–205. 10 Cf. P.L. GAVRILYUK, 7KH6XIIHULQJRIWKH,PSDVVLEOH*RG7KH'LDOHFWLFRI3DWULVWLF 7KRXJKW (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004), 137–139; B.E. DALEY, “Antioch and Alexandria.

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ed by Nestorius, Theodor of Mopsuestia and Theodoret of Cyrus, and the Alexandrians, represented by Cyril in the first place but following other important theologians like Apollinaris of Laodicea or Athanasius, are quite clear and different: whereas the Antiochenes stressed more the duality of the natures of Jesus Christ, the Alexandrines emphasized more the unity of the person rooted in the K\SRVWDVLV of Logos.11 Both schools used different terms for the same phenomena, which made a mutual understanding only worse. 12 Moreover, on both lines of thought were known extreme positions that were condemned as heretical: on one side stands splitting the person of Jesus Christ into two (allegedly Nestorius, who was condemned in Ephesus 431, but who, in fact, held rather the position of the later Formula of Reunion 43313). On the other side stands the conception of the personal unity at the cost of the humanity (Apollinaris, condemned in Constantinople 381) or of the difference between divinity and humanity, resulting into a mixture of natures (Eutyches, condemned in Chalcedon 451). Both “schools” could find a certain mutual compromise in the )RUPXOD RI 5HXQLRQ IURP (written probably by Theodoret), which played an important role for Chalcedon in both the found compromise and the unsolved problems (and can be thus called the “predecessor of Chalcedon”).14 However, the important proponents of this peaceful compromise died shortly after: John of Antioch in 442, Cyril in 444, Proclus of Constantinople in 446. Alive was Theodoret of Cyrus. “Tensions began to rise again.” 15 As a third element next to these Eastern two, which played a major role in Chalcedon, came the West through pope Leo and his Tomus ad Flavianum.16

Since the council in Ephesus 431 and its factual end in the Formula of Reunion 433, the theology of Cyril of Alexandria was widely considered for the measure of orthodoxy.17 Also the Chalcedonian Definition itself was prepared Christology as Reflection on God’s Presence in History”, in 7KH 2[IRUG +DQGERRN RI &KULVWRORJ\, ed. F.A. MURPHY (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2015), 121–138. Literature to Antioch and Alexandria see in A.M. RITTER, “Dogma und Lehre in der Alten Kirche”, in C. ANDRESEN et al., 'LH FKULVWOLFKHQ /HKUHQWZLFNOXQJHQ ELV ]XP (QGH GHV 6SlWPLWWHODOWHUV, ed. A.M. RITTER (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 239. 11 Nicely BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 63: “Against the dyophysitism of Nestorius, which fluoresced heretically, [in the theology of Cyril] was put an ecclesiastically domesticated form of monophysitism.” 12 Cf. the case of Nestorius and Cyril, GRILLMEIER, -HVXV&KULVWXV1, 715–716. 13 Cf. the observation of BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 62: “In short, no matter how the Christology of Nestorius was intended to be orthodox, its structure had to appear questionable in the moment that it left the secure inner space of the Antiochene scholarship and entered the dangerous soundboard of the dogmatic discussions of the church.” 14 Cf. '+ 271–273; BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 52, 82–84; GRILLMEIER, &KULVW 1, 497– 501. 15 DALEY, “Unpacking the Chalcedonian Formula”, 167. 16 The differentiated position of Leo within the Western context tries to maintain BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 86–114; to the similarities and specifics of all three positions cf. ibid., 99–100. 17 However, as BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 134, substantiates, there is an important difference between Cyril of the Ephesine Council (cf. his Third Letter to Nestorius with its 12 Anathematisms in J.A. MCGUCKIN, 6W&\ULORI$OH[DQGULD7KH&KULVWRORJLFDO&RQWURYHU V\,WV+LVWRU\7KHRORJ\DQG7H[WV [Leiden et al.: E.J. Brill, 1994], 266–275) and between

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by a committee of mostly Cyrilline theologians. By now, it can be considered a broad consensus in the research that the intention of the whole Creed was PHDQW LQ WKH &\ULOOLQH OLQHKRZHYHU ZLWKRXW XVLQJ WKH FKDUDFWHULVWLF &\ULO OLQHWHUPLQRORJ\.18 An important role played, nonetheless, the position of Rome, represented by the pope Leo I in his 7RPXVDG)ODYLDQXP from 449.19 With the consistent distinguishing between the natures, Leo was close to the Antiochene position. Maybe therefore, the official acceptation of the Tomus at the council did not go as smoothly as the texts of Cyril, since “Cyril was the test for christological orthodoxy, and Cyril alone”. 20 Nevertheless, after some objections, Tomus was accepted also as orthodox with the concluding statement: “Leo and Cyril taught the same.”21 The final definition had thus to find a balance between these positions. It does it in a very cautious way: not only in what it contains but also in what it omits. Next to the missing controversial Cyrilline PLDSK\VLV-formula it is striking that the introduction of the definition refers to Cyril’s Laetentur-letter and to his Second letter to Nestorius but QRW to his Third letter to Nestorius with the 12 anathematisms, which was accepted as normative in Ephesus 431.22 To satisfy the Roman delegates, the definition replaces the Cyrilline conception of the person of Jesus Christ “from two natures” with the formulation “acknowledged in two natures”, which is more in line with Leo. Tomus also is directly quoted but only in one sentence: “the distinctive character of each nature being preserved and coming together into one person and one hypostaCyril after the Formula of Reunion (cf. Cyril’s so-called “Laetentur”-Letter to John of Antioch, in ibid., 343–348). The question, ZKLFK&\ULO is to be taken as the norm, played an important role for the further development, cf. BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 153–161, 182. 18 Cf. R. PRICE, “The Council of Chalcedon: A Narrative”, in &KDOFHGRQLQ&RQWH[W, ed. R. PRICE and M. WHITBY (Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 2009), 81; UTHEMANN, “Zur Rezeption des Tomus Leonis”, 1. 19 $FWVRIWKH&RXQFLORI&KDOFHGRQ, Session II, Nr. 22, 14–24. 20 P.T.R. GRAY, 7KH 'HIHQVH RI &KDOFHGRQ LQ WKH (DVW ± (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979), 9. 21 $FWVRIWKH&RXQFLORI&KDOFHGRQ, Session II, Nr. 23, 24. Tomus was accepted by the Council together with Cyril’s Laetentur-letter and with his Second letter to Nestorius as sunodikai. evpistolai, (“conciliar letters”, $FWVRIWKH&RXQFLORI&KDOFHGRQ, Session V, Nr. 34, 203; ACO II,1,2 129,11–16; UTHEMANN, “Zur Rezeption des Tomus Leonis”, 11). For the objections against Tomus cf. UTHEMANN, “Zur Rezeption des Tomus Leonis”, 12–24 and $FWVRIWKH&RXQFLORI&KDOFHGRQ, Session II, Nr. 24–34, 25–27. 22 Cf.$FWVRIWKH&RXQFLORI&KDOFHGRQ, Session V, Nr. 34, 203 (ACO II,1,2, 129,10); UTHEMANN, “Zur Rezeption des Tomus Leonis”, 10–11; BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 117– 118. All three “conciliar letters” (two letters of Cyril and the Tome of Leo) were read in the second session together with Nicaenum and Constantinopolitanum ($FWRIWKH&RXQFLO RI&KDOFHGRQ, Session II, Nr. 11–22, 12–24).

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sis”.23 Otherwise, the majority of quoted or alluded texts comes from Cyril; however, an important role for the final text played the Formula of Reunion from 433 with its respect for the Antiochene accents. Thus, the Chalcedonian definition is a respectable piece of theological work. In his classical study, A. de Halleux pointed to Basil of Seleucia as the leading head and hand of the definition and this opinion holds since then as a consensus in the discussion.24 In this way, the definition opened space for different interpretations. It is very probable that the authors of the definition “must have given a Cyrillian inte rpretation to what they approved, even if the Definition had to contain phrases that would satisfy the Roman delegates”, 25 but at the same time, because it does not use the characteristic Cyrilline terminology, the definition in its moderate formulation makes different readings possible. Whereas the latest studies argue plausibly for a moderate Cyrilline interpretation of Chalcedon (which would then stand in a continuous line between Ephesus 431, and Constantinople II 553, pushing, however, the Formula of Reunion from 433 with its Antiochene emphases to the background),26 the traditional western interpretation considered Leo’s Tomus as the dominating voice and thus read the Creed through this optics. 27 Both these interpretations 23

Cf.$FWVRIWKH&RXQFLORI&KDOFHGRQ, Session II, 17 and 204. Cf. DE HALLEUX, “La définition christologique”, 158–160; GRILLMEIER, -HVXV &KULVWXV, 757–758; UTHEMANN, “Zur Rezeption des Tomus Leonis”, 12. 25 PRICE, “The Council of Chalcedon”, 81; cf. RITTER, “Dogma und Lehre”, 271: “Everything seems to point to the fact that the formulation of the christological formula of Chalcedon in its final shape took as much as possible the side of Cyril and as less as abs olutely necessary (in order to avoid an open split) the side of Leo.” 26 Cf. MEYENDORFF, &KULVW; PRICE, “The Council of Chalcedon”; GRAY, 7KH 'HIHQVH RI &KDOFHGRQ, 16. One-sidedly Cyrilline are PRICE and GADDIS, “General introduction”, 67–68 (the Tome was only “a contribution to rhetoric rather than theology”, ibid., 67, footnote 227); WEINANDY, “The Doctrinal Significance”, 560 (Chalcedon “must be read through the eyes of Cyril”), or MCGUCKIN, 6W&\ULORI$OH[DQGULD, 240, who tries to read Chalcedon “apart from the Leonine Tome, which has too often been taken as its exegetical commentary, but rather should be taken out of the interpretative picture since the Chalc edonian symbol was more in the manner of a corrective of Leo than a substantiation of him.” The strong tendency to read the Chalcedonian definition in an only Cyrilline way leads, however, often to an inappropriate interpretation of Chalcedon from the backward – and, hence, anachronistic – perspective of Constantinople II (553), where the Cyrilline theology, however elaborated and corrected by the neo-Chalcedonians, clearly won. Cf. this tendency e.g. in R. NORRIS JR., “Chalcedon Revisited: A Historical and Theological Reflection”, in 1HZ3HUVSHFWLYHVRQ+LVWRULFDO7KHRORJ\(VVD\VLQ0HPRU\RI-RKQ0H\HQ GRUII, ed. B. NASSIF (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 140–158; PRICE and GADDIS, “General introduction”, 70–71; ANATOLIOS, “The Soteriological Grammar”. 27 Cf. J. PELIKAN, 7KH&KULVWLDQ7UDGLWLRQ7KH(PHUJHQFHRIWKH&DWKROLF7UDGLWLRQ ± (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 264; KASPER, -HVXV WKH &KULVW, 224–225; LOHSE, 6KRUW +LVWRU\, 93: “In the Chalcedonenian creed the West gave its answer to the East.” F. LOOFS, /HLWIDGHQ]XP6WXGLXPGHU'RJPHQJHVFKLFKWH, 7th 24

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argue from the FRQWH[W of the Creed. The definition itself contains rather balanced, symmetrical formulations, which can be read from both sides, depending on the theological context one puts it in. This combined or mixed character of the definition is precisely summarized by K.-H. Uthemann: “[T]he Definitio fidei of Chalcedon is to be understood in its intention as a reception of Christology of Cyril of Alexandria based on the Union of 433, however, with an unambi g-

ed. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1968), 246: “Just as in Nicea and in Chalcedon, the West pressed its orthodoxy.” In the view of CAMELOT, (SKHVXVXQG &KDOFHGRQ, 87–271, Constantinople II, and even Chalcedon itself, lack the clarity of Leo’s Tome. The genuine follow-up of the Chalcedonian definition was thus Constantinople III (680–81, ibid., 227). The perspective of Constantinople III is leading also in the clearly western interpretation of Chalcedon in H. HOPING (LQIKUXQJ LQ GLH &KULVWRORJLH, 3rd ed. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2014), 110–122. On the contrary, from a liberal position, E. MÜHLENBERG, “Das Dogma von Chalkedon: Ängste und Überzeugungen”, in &KDONHGRQ *HVFKLFKWH XQG $NWXDOLWlW 6WXGLHQ ]XU 5H]HSWLRQ GHU FKULVWRORJLVFKHQ )RUPHO YRQ &KDONHGRQ, ed. J. VAN OORT and J. ROLDANUS (Leuven: Peeters, 1998), 1–23, attacks harshly on one side the western contribution to Chalcedon as wrong theology (ibid., 14) and above all mere politics (ibid., 13) and on the other side the interpretation of christological dogmatic development by A. Grillmeier. Paradoxically, he favors the theology of Cyril (who, in his view, however, lost at Chalcedon, ibid., 21–22), just as Grillmeier also does (cf. GRILLMEIER, -HVXV &KULVWXV , 679), although with different reasons. With his position, Mühlenberg follows the classical but today already overcome interpretation of Chalcedon by A. VON HARNACK, /HKUEXFK GHU 'RJPHQJHVFKLFKWH II (Freiburg i.B.: J.C.B. Mohr, 1887), 369–376, that at the council, “everything was led by the commissars of the Caesar” (ibid., 370) and, with this political support in the background, the main theological influence had – against the Cyrilline conviction of the majority of the gathered bishops – the Pope with his Tome. Concerning the position of Leo at the council cf. BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 56–57, 130; D. WYRWA, “Drei Etappen der Rezeptionsgeschichte des Konzils von Chalkedon im Westen”, in &KDONHGRQ*HVFKLFKWHXQG$NWXDOLWlW6WXGLHQ]XU5H]HS WLRQGHUFKULVWRORJLVFKHQ)RUPHOYRQ&KDONHGRQ, ed. J. VAN OORT and J. ROLDANUS (Leuven: Peeters, 1998), 147–148. Although Harnack sees the whole proceedings mainly through the optics of politics, it is an indisputable truth that the political pressure of the caesar played a key role: BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 57, speaks of a “massive pressure of the caesar” who forced the Cyrilline-thinking East to make “an ecumenical christological decision with explicit respect to the position of Rome” (cf. also ibid., 115–124; DALEY, “Unpacking the Chalcedonian Formula”, 169). BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 130, then summarizes: “Outwards, i.e., regarding the rejection of heresies from both sides, are both Leo and Cyril equal bearers of the Chalcedonian definition; however, regarding the internal christological part, the Leonine (or the Leonine-Antiochene) position is clearly dominant, the Cyrilline in the contrary is since 433 dogmatically reduced and also clearly recessive. In this i ncogruence, imposed on the Council, between the claim and the reality lies the menetekel of the Chalcedonian dogma and with it, at the same time, the dangerous igniter of the christological conflicts after Chalcedon.” The recessiveness of Cyrilline theology is rather disputable, but the incogruence between the claim of the Creed and the reality of theology and church in that historical moment hits the target.

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uous differentiation of nature and K\SRVWDVLV, in which the Leonine part of the formula was built in.”28

Anyway, at least in one point, the definition brings a final clarification. Based on the presupposition of Christ’s full divinity and full humanity (YHUH'HXV± YHUH KRPR), considered both as natures (SK\VHLV), the Creed establishes the fundamental distinction of Christ’s two natures (SK\VHLV) and his person (K\ SRVWDVLV, SURVRSRQ). Until then, this distinction was made only by some theologians and not consistently.29 The Creed says clearly that the unity of the person lies on another level than the duality of the natures: the duality of the natures with their particular attributes “concurs” into the unity of the person.30 In this way, both accents can be preserved, the Alexandrine accent on the unity of the person as well as the Antiochene accent on the duality of the natures without falling each time to the other extreme, as if the unity of the person would exclude the duality of the natures and YLFHYHUVD.31 Stating the difference between person and natures on the one side and between the natures on the other side, the Creed fundamentally stresses the unity of the person of Jesus Christ, using the phrase “one and the same” three times and using “the same” next to it five more times. And it is precisely the question of the unity of the person, which is both at the same time the most important and the most problematic to think. In other words, the definition leaves the question open, how is WKHXQLW\RIWKHSHUVRQRI-HVXV&KULVW constituted. It makes it possible to access the person of Jesus Christ from two different perspectives: starting either from the unity of his person, or from the duality of his natures. It is this point where the biggest difference lies between Cyril on the one side and the West (with the Antiochians) on the other side. From this decision follows then the point of differing interpretations, which caused (and partly still cause) the biggest mutual irritations.

28 K.-H. UTHEMANN, “Definitionen und Paradigmen in der Rezeption des Dogmas von Chalkedon bis in die Zeit Kaiser Justinians”, in &KDONHGRQ *HVFKLFKWH XQG $NWXDOLWlW 6WXGLHQ]XU5H]HSWLRQGHUFKULVWRORJLVFKHQ)RUPHOYRQ&KDONHGRQ, ed. J. VAN OORT and J. ROLDANUS (Leuven: Peeters, 1998), 54, fn. 1. 29 Most important was again Cyril of Alexandria. However, at the same time, it was his terminological inconsistency and ambiguity, which caused some of the following misunderstandings, cf. GRILLMEIER, &KULVW 1, 473–483; N. RUSSELL, “‘Apostolic Man’ and ‘Luminary of the Church’: The Enduring Influence of Cyril of Alexandria”, in 7KH7KHROR J\ RI 6W &\ULO RI $OH[DQGULD $ &ULWLFDO $SSUHFLDWLRQ, ed. T.G. WEINANDY and D.A. KEATING (London/New York: T&T Clark, 2003), 237–257. 30 '+ 301: “swzome,nhj de. ma/llon th/j ivdio,thtoj e`kate,raj fu,sewj kai. eivj e]n pro,swpon kai. mi,an u`po.stasin suntrecou,shj.” 31 In fact, Chalcedon set “a new way of speaking” with this differentiation, cf. A. GRILLMEIER, “‘Piscatorie’ – ‘Aristotelice’”, in IDEM, 0LW LKP XQG LQ LKP (Freiburg: Herder, 1975), 291.

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In the general Cyrilline atmosphere and with the strong stress on the unity of the person, it is a paradox that the only explicit hint in the question of the constitution of the unity is the quotation of Tomus: the natures “coming together” to the unity, as if the unity was the result of this process of congruence. It is true that this is the only passage, where the Creed starts explicitly with the duality of the natures and aims then to the unity. 32 But the problem is that the opposite view – the concept of Logos as the KHJHPRQLNRQ in this whole process, who constitutes the unity in itself from the beginning so that the unity precedes (at least noetically) the difference between the natures – remains unmentioned. This concept is a logical result of the key formula of Cyril mi,a fu,sij tou/ qeou/ lo,gou/ sesarkwme,nh,33 but it was explicitly developed later.34 Nevertheless, in the Chalcedonian Creed itself this conception can only be tacitly presupposed from the general context and theological atmosphere of the council.35 The definition as such remains, therefore, RSHQWR ERWKUHDGLQJV, searching for balance and symmetry. 36 In this form, 32 At the same time, the Creed refuses the extreme Nestorian position which starts with two VHOIVWDQGLQJ natures of Christ before their unity with an anathema: “kai. tou. du,o me.n pro. th/j e`nw,sewj fu,seij tou/ kuri,ou muqeu,ontaj […] avnaqemati,zei” ('+ 300). 33 This important but in the Chalcedonian perspective rather confusing formula originates from Apollinaris of Laodicea. However, Cyril used it being firmly convinced that is stems from Athanasius and is therefore orthodox. At the same time, Cyril himself did not distinguish clearly enough between SK\VLVand K\SRVWDVLV, so that he can say with the same meaning also mi,a u`postasij tou/ qeou/ logou/ sesarkwme,nh, which would – at least in the Chalcedonian perspective – shift the meaning considerably towards Chalcedonian orthodoxy. Nevertheless, Cyril insisted on PLD SK\VLV, even when differentiating two natures following the Formula of Reunion (cf. his Second letter to Succensus, ep. 46, in MCGUCKIN, 6W&\ULORI$OH[DQGULD, 359–363). With all this, Cyril created rather a terminological chaos offering different interpretations and variations. G. ESSEN, 'LH )UHLKHLW -HVX 'HU QHXFKDONHGRQLVFKH (QK\SRVWDVLHEHJULII LP +RUL]RQW QHX]HLWOLFKHU 6XEMHNW XQG 3HUVRQHQSKLORVRSKLH (Regensburg: Pustet, 2001), 28, fn. 12, calls this insisting of Cyrill on his formula a fall back “to the pre-Cappadocian niveau”. Cf. also GRILLMEIER, &KULVW 1, 473–483; BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 68–73, 84–85. Fitting is the remark of Beyschlag that a radical monophysite interpretation of PLD SK\VLV, however, was in Chalcedon “ruled out once for all times” (ibid., 128–129). 34 Cf. GRILLMEIER, &KULVW 2/2, 455; BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 128–129, fn. 226, although the core of this concept stems already from Athanasius, cf. ibid., 65. 35 Cf. KASPER, -HVXVWKH&KULVW, 226, who, therefore, can read the definition one-sidedly in the western perspective: “The Chalcedon definition lies essentially within the framework of western Christology; there was no place for Cyril’s dynamic Christological idea of the hegemony of the /RJRV within the apparently symmetrical scheme of two natures which meet in one person.” ANATOLIOS, “The Soteriological Grammar”, holding the opposite interpretation, points to the formulation of the Creed “not as though he was parted or divided into two persons, but one and the same Son and only-begotten God, Word, Lord, Jesus Christ”, which should presuppose the hegemony of the Logos. The current common opinion expresses UTHEMANN, “Der Neuchalkedonismus als Vorbereitung des Monotheletismus”, in IDEM, &KULVWXV.RVPRV'LDWULEH (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2005), 215:

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“it represents something novel and original, what could be and was indeed interpreted in different ways, depending on the decision, whether the hypostasis was made the central term of this Christology, i.e., whether it was filled with a particular content (Cyrilline or Byzantine interpretation of Chalcedon), or not. In other words, whether K\SRVWDVLV was understood within the frame of Leo’s term SHUVRQD only as a purely formal defense of Trinity where Christ is SHUVRQD of the incarnated Logos and not some fourth subject of worship (so-called Leonine interpretation).”37

This search for balance is also obvious in another point. After long discussions, the definition accepted, in the end, the Leonine “in two natures” instead of the obviously originally proposed Cyrilline phrase “out of two natures”, mainly as a clear stance against Eutychianism. 38 At the same time, the definition does not simply say that Jesus Christ has two natures, but rather that the one Jesus Christ is “acknowledged” (gnwrizo,menon) in two natures. This is again a Cyrilline stress regarding the distinguishing of the natures, which can be done – according to Cyril, in order to avoid splitting Christ into two – only theoretically, as if retrospectively, only in a theoretical analysis. 39 On the other side, with the four famous negative adverbs, the definition stresses the duality of the natures in their distinctiveness (avsugcu,twj( avtre,ptwj, against Eutychianism) and inseparability (avdiaire,twj, avcwri,stwj, against Nestorianism) at the same time. The terms are all basically Cyrilline40 but were introduced to the council the first time by the Roman delegates in the context of the debate about the orthodoxy of Leo’s Tome and are used

“The 'HILQLWLR ILGHL of Chalcedon was open for two interpretations. It was born – this might be meanwhile a consensus within the research – from the Cyrilline spirit, without constituting Cyril’s christological language as a norm: the omission of the main Cyrilline formula was too obvious.” 36 Cf. UTHEMANN, “Der Neuchalkedonismus”, 213–221. 37 UTHEMANN, “Definitionen und Paradigmen”, 54, with reference to DE HALLEUX, “La définition christologique”, 155–170; cf. UTHEMANN, “Der Neuchalkedonismus”, 213–221. Based on Cyril’s Laetentur-letter where Cyril confirms the enduring difference of the natures within the unity, this Cyrilline point was integrated into the Chalcedonian definition and opened the space for the Leonine emphasis on two preserved natures, cf. IDEM, “Zur Rezeption des Tomus Leonis”, 11. 38 For the text variations cf. '+ 302. This was also the official reason and appreciation of the Tomus of Leo that it clearly refuses Eutychianism, cf. $FWVRIWKH&RXQFLORI&KDO FHGRQII, Nr. 34, 203. It was thus not meant by the council primarily against monophysitism, as the western optics often reads it. 39 Cf. GRAY, 7KH'HIHQVH, 14; MCGUCKIN, 6W&\ULORI$OH[DQGULD, 239, quoting Cyril’s First Letter to Succensus 7. But again, this stress was more elaborated later by the neoChalcedonians. 40 Two of them (avsugcu,twj( avtre,ptwj) from his First Letter to Succensus, cf. MCGUCKIN, 6W&\ULORI$OH[DQGULD, 239, added all together with the other two according to the demands of the Romans and of the Caesar by the committee under the influence of Basileus of Seleucia, cf. GRILLMEIER, -HVXV&KULVWXV1, 756.

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here apparently to satisfy the western and the Antiochene accents.41 In fact, the definition corrects hereby – paradoxically with his own terms – Cyril’s own one-sidedness and his monophysite tendencies and his lack of terminological concision.42 Moreover, systematically, this clear distinction brings a fundamental stress: In the one person of Jesus Christ – although conceived already in the Nicene Creed as “becoming flesh” (sarkwqe,nta) or “becoming human” (evnanqrwph,santa, '+ 125) – *RGUHPDLQV*RGDQGKXPDQUHPDLQVKXPDQ. There is no fusion or merging and no transformation or mutation of one of the natures into the other. Although God became human, divinity was not huma nized, and humanity was not divinized. Neither divinity nor humanity was transformed to the other nature or changed in its own character; full divinity and humanity remain preserved. God became human without ceasing to be God. And human Jesus was not transformed into a divine being that would cease its full humanity. This important notion, however, marks another point of further struggle and controversy. It concerns the interpretation of the term avtre,ptwj. Among the four adjectives, avtre,ptwj is in the theological discussion the term that receives the least analysis. While the other terms are clear in their opposition against Euthychianism and Nestorianism, avtre,ptwj was originally used against Euthyches, and, within the Chalcedonian context, it takes a stance against monophysitism (which is, as already said, a slight paradox, because the term originates from Cyril 43). It defends the immutability of the natures and tries to avoid the absorbance of the humanity by the divinity, as the Apollinarist PLDSK\VLV-formula tends to do, and also YLFHYHUVD it tries to prevent

41

Cf. DE URBINA, “Das Glaubenssymbol von Chalkedon”, 394 and 399. Cf. also $FWVRI WKH&RXQFLORI&KDOFHGRQII, 204, footnote 53. The editors add here their commentary saying quite one-sidedly: “Here again the emphasis is on unity rather than duality in Christ.” It is, however, obvious that the focus of the adjectives lies in the twoness of the natures and of their mutual relation than in the oneness of the person (which is rather the context here than the direct topic). 42 This is most obvious in the Chalcedonian anathema of all who “imagine one nature after the union” ('+ 300, $FWVRI WKH &RXQFLORI &KDOFHGRQ II, Nr. 34, 204). It is a clear stance against radical monophysitism (now in specifically Chalcedonian shaping of the terms), which makes the Cyrilline PLDSK\VLVIRUPXOD in fact impossible. Cyril’s insisting on the PLDSK\VLVIRUPXOD without any more precise differentiation between SK\VLV and K\SRVWDVLV is thus considered by many scholars to be his main weakness (cf. e.g. RUSSELL, “‘Apostolic Man’”, 239). Nevertheless, cf. Canon 8 of the Council of Constantinople II 553 ('+ 429), where the Cyrilline line won and the PLDSK\VLV formula emerges again, although corrected by the context. 43 Cf. CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA, Ep. 45 (First letter to Succensus), 3*77, 232B–C.

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the (rather theoretical) transformation of divinity into humanity (or even flesh) in the incarnation.44 In the context of the following interpretations of Chalcedon it becomes more and more clear that the main interest lies in the preservation of the immutability of the divine nature, which must remain untouched despite the incarnation and humanity of Jesus Christ. On the other hand, to preserve the hypostatic unity of the person of Jesus Christ, both natures cannot remain simply next to each other. There must be a unifying power, some unifying dynamic. This purpose secures the idea of WKHRVLV, i.e., the divinization of the human nature, in the later interpretation based on the concept of HQK\SRVWD VLV.45 If there has to be a true and full unity of divinity and humanity, at least one side has to change, or at least it has to adapt to the other. In the earlyChristian thinking, following up the Antiquity, God cannot change. Therefore, all necessary change will have to be done on the side of the human nature.46 However, with this scheme starts the long-lasting struggle for preserving the full humanity of Christ, which is herewith endangered, be it with its divinization or with its diminishing. Overall, the Chalcedonian Creed did not (and in respect to the Canon 7 of Council of Ephesus even could not) want to be anything else than a genuine interpretation of the “the Symbol”, of the Nicene Creed.47 And just as such, 44 Nevertheless, this position can be also found in the old theology, cf. DE URBINA, “Das Glaubenssymbol von Chalkedon”, 408, as well as in the 19 th century, where this way go the attempts with NHQRVLV, cf. below in this chapter, subchapter 2.7. De Urbina, however, interprets the term ἀτρέπτωj only in the relation to the divine nature in order to preserve its immutability and impassibility and to prevent any kenotic tendencies. 45 Cf. below, subch. 2.2. Here, the question arises, whether the strong stress on WKHRVLV does not collide with the Chalcedonian avtre,ptwj, i.e., whether the human nature does not change towards the divine on the cost of full humanity, which is thus in danger to be diminished. That is why WKHRVLV cannot be established as the normative soteriological model, as ANATOLIOS, “The Soteriological Grammar”, proposes. My proposal goes exactly in the opposite direction, cf. below, Ch. 6.1. 46 Cf. the alternative attempt of BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 96–114, who tries to interpret the western (Leonine) Christology in terms of “Christus humilis”, where both natures remain strictly preserved, yet divinity, in an opposite movement to WKHRVLV, adapts to humanity and this is the fundamental soteriological mediation: “Whereas the Christian East sees the mediator in the divine Logos […], in the West is it ‘homo Christus’, i.e., the human side of Jesus who steps into the center” (ibid., 96, fn. 168). “To secure salvation, the divine self-communication [Selbstmitteilung] can proceed in general only in the IRUP RI KXPDQ KXPLOLW\ of ‘homo assumptus’ and through it, i.e., under strict preservation of the boundary between the two natures” (ibid., 97). Beyschlag tries to interpret Leo with patripassian tones (i.e., in the line of Lutheran Christology with its stress on the real FRPPXQLFDWLRLGL RPDWXP, cf. below, subch. 2.5), which, however, Leo would never accept. 47 Cf. '+ 300; A. GRILLMEIER, “Das Verständnis der christologischen Formulierungen”, in IDEM, )UDJPHQWH]XU&KULVWRORJLH (Freiburg: Herder, 1997), 140. The factual and authoritative claim of the Chalcedonian council was, nevertheless, even greater as the

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the claim of the Chalcedonian definition was definitely RQWRORJLFDO: it wanted to present “the message of the truth”,48 i.e., who Jesus Christ ontologically is – although this claim is exactly the problem, which leads, in the end, to aporias of the two-natures doctrine.49 Anything less would not be in accordance with the self-understanding of the council and with the intensity of the whole early Christian trinitarian and christological debate. 50 This is to be respected one of Nicea: with around 370 bishops, Chalcedon was the biggest council until Vatican I (cf. PRICE, “Truth, Omission, and Fiction in the Acts”, in &KDOFHGRQ LQ &RQWH[W, ed. R. PRICE and M. WHITBY (Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 2009), 103; BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 115). And, at the same time, the acts of the council, which frankly note almost all discussions at the council including many disagreements and dissents, are “the longest single document that survives from the early Church” (PRICE, “Truth, Omission, and Fiction”, 105). The Chalcedonian Creed itself, however, is written in a doctrinal language, which made the reception of the Creed in the church more complicated since the very beginning. Cf. GRILLMEIER, )UDJPHQWH ]XU &KULVWRORJLH, 134–151, refering how the bishops complained to the Caesar Leo I. in &RGH[(QF\FOLXV from 458 that Chalcedon with its complicated terms “cannot be a basis for the baptismal catechesis” (ibid., 136). Cf. also IDEM, “‘Piscatorie’ – ‘Aristotelice’”, 283–300; and DALEY, “Unpacking the Chalcedonian Formula”, 181–182: The formula and its reception started in fact “a new style of theology, which had haltingly begun in the late-fourth-century controversies with the ‘Eunomian’ Arians over how to conceive of God as both radically one and irreducibly three – a style I would characterize as ‘scholastic’ or academic – [this new style] now almost completely replaced the more exegetical and homiletic forms of theological discourse that had predominated in earlier centuries. Whereas previously theological controversies had been conducted largely in oratorical style – in works shaped by the rhetorical canons of epideictic and forensic speech – Christological argument from the mid-fifth century on came to be couched almost exclusively in the style of the classroom, the scholastic disputation, the philosophical lecture. The exact definition of terms, the analysis of traditional formulas, the development of complex chains of argument in syllogisms and theses, formed an increasingly large part in the development of theological ideas. Technical concepts and stra tegies, drawn especially from the ideologically Neoplatonic commentators on the Hellenistic philosophical ‘scriptures’ of Plato and Aristotle, now came to play a decisive, if unacknowledged, role on all sides in reflection on the unity of the person of Christ. Learned monks and educated laypeople (often called scolastikoi,), rather than bishops, more and more dominated theological discussion.” 48 $FWV RI WKH &RXQFLO RI &KDOFHGRQ II, Nr. 31, 201; cf. BEYSCHLAG , *UXQGULVV, 131: “The Chalcedonian creed is normative in the first place as a dogmatic statement about being [Seinsaussage], i.e., it says, who (resp. what) Christ truly ‘is’.” 49 Cf. DALFERTH, &UXFLILHGDQG5HVXUUHFWHG, 142. 50 Cf. E. SCHLINK, “Die Christologie von Chalcedon im ökumenischen Gespräch”, in IDEM, 'HUNRPPHQGH &KULVWXVXQGGLHNLUFKOLFKHQ 7UDGLWLRQHQ (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961), 81 and 86: “[F]or the 19 th and 20th century, the tendency is characteristic to sideline the ontological utterances at all and to limit oneself only to the historical utterances. However, this would, in the end, mean to surrender the Chalcedonense complet ely.” “The historical and the ontological utterances in the Christology are not an Either-Or, they rather belong together.” Cf. also J.D. ZIZIOULAS, “On Being a Person. Towards an Ontology of Personhood”, in 3HUVRQV 'LYLQH DQG +XPDQ, ed. CH. SCHWÖBEL and C.E.

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also concerning the modern and postmodern discussions about the interpretation of the Creed, its status, and meaning. In the last decades, there were more attempts of a new way of reading the Creeds (or the Chalcedonian definition in particular) with a different degree of loosening the ontological commitment of the Creed itself: it was read only in the direction of a mythological metaphor,51 or as a paradigmatic, yet rather intuitive way of speaking, 52 or in the frame of the theory of rules as a fundamental grammar of faith, 53 or as criteria for any following christological theory, 54 or as an “‘apophatic’ document” marking the “horizon” of what is and is not possible to say about Jesus Christ,55 or in a very literal sense, or simply as a paradox, or even a riddle.56 Theoretically, it can be argued for any of these possibilities. From the current point of view, however, it might be obvious that a straight metaphysical reading is no longer tenable and that we need to understand the Creed and its meaning in a more differentiated way than as a direct metaphysical description. However, in doing so, one should not forget the original ontological claim of the Creed.57  7KH3UREOHPVRIWKH'HILQLWLRQ The basic problem was the simple fact that the natures are two. This problem concerned in the first place the theology of Cyril of Alexandria, as characterized by the PLDSK\VLVIRUPXOD, and hence all his followers including the majority at the council, but, as it will turn out, it played a major role also in the development later.58 Already Apollinaris knew that two wholes could not cre-

GUNTON (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 43, who, in his stressing of the ontological character of the Creed, however, reads Chalcedon from the perspective of Constantinople II. 51 HICK, “Jesus and the World Religions”. IDEM, 7KH 0HWDSKRU RI *RG ,QFDUQDWH &KULVWRORJ\ LQ D 3OXUDOLVWLF $JH (Westminster: John Knox Press, 1993), 45, reads the Chalcedonian Creed as a “philosophical artefact” with technical terminology, which, however, cannot be reasonably explicated “in any religiously acceptable way”. 52 NORRIS, “Chalcedon Revisited”. 53 LINDBECK, 7KH 1DWXUH RI 'RFWULQH, 59–97; DALFERTH, &UXFLILHG DQG 5HVXUUHFWHG, 137–153. 54 PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 292. 55 S. COAKLEY, “What Does Chalcedon Solve and What Does it Not? Some Reflections on the Status and Meaning of the Chalcedonian ‘Definition’”, in 7KH,QFDUQDWLRQ $Q ,Q WHUGLVFLSOLQDU\6\PSRVLXPRQWKH,QFDUQDWLRQRIWKH6RQRI*RG, ed. S.T. DAVIS et al. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004), 160–161. 56 For the last three possible readings cf. ibid., 155–159. 57 Cf. BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 131: “All processes, meanings and acts come from this ‘is’ of this person [i.e., what this person ontologically is], not vice versa. With all this, the christological dogma is in a steep opposition to all ‘functional’ and substitutional Christologies of today as well as to the changing flow of modern Jesus-impressions.” 58 Cf. PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 322.

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ate a unity. 59 The problem of the twoness of the natures within a proclaimed unity is, since then, the biggest problem of incarnation Christology at all. On the church level, the simple number of two caused the first big schism. For the “Cyrillian purists”, in fact more Cyrilline than Cyril himself, “any assertion of ‘two natures’ after the union was anathema”, so that “the Definition never had a hope of winning universal acceptance in the eastern provinces”.60 There arose a strong opposition of the so called “mono-“ or “miaphysites”.61 Intense discussions with these churches about Chalcedon took place in the past decades.62 These discussions contributed clearly to a better mutual understanding and understandings of the Chalcedonian Creed, where it turned out that the differences were mainly in the terminology, 63 so that “none of the parties claims, what the other fears”.64 It is obvious that the tendency in the debates is to accept the differences as legitimate alternatives with different focuses (the Orientals focus more on the unity of the person, the Romans more on the duality of the natures), which, however, lead to different views on Chalcedon and the history of dogma.65 The question is not, whether one should keep or abandon the Chalcedonian Creed, but how to understand and to interpret it. Chalcedon is still the common basis. As Wendebourg states: “[T]he christological controversy has been overcome, the Orthodox and the Orientals could unite on a common formulation of faith in the incarnated Logos and they

59 “Du,o te,leia e]n gene,sqai ouv du,natai“, quoted from ATHANASIUS, &RQWUD$SROOLQDUL XP, 1,2, in LOOFS, /HLWIDGHQ, 210. 60 PRICE, “The Council of Chalcedon”, 81. However, next to it, there were more reasons why these churches did not accept Chalcedon than only the two natures, cf. P. FARRINGTON, “The Oriental Orthodox Rejection of Chalcedon – An Introduction”, https://www.academia. edu/6905550/The_Oriental_Orthodox_Rejection_of_Chalcedon [accessed April 23, 2019], discussing the six anathemas of Dioscoros and showing their legitimity. Cf. also A. LOUTH, “Why Did the Syrians Reject the Council of Chalcedon?”, in &KDOFHGRQ LQ &RQWH[W, ed. R. PRICE and M. WHITBY (Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 2009), 107–116. 61 The terminology in this case is not unified. Some consider the name “monophysites”, who were labeled with it by their opponents, for a pejorative term, which should be avoi ded (PRICE and GADDIS, “General Introduction”, 74); others find the term “miaphysite” rather barbarian (LOUTH, “Why Did the Syrians Reject the Council of Chalcedon?”, 107). The simple term “non-Chalcedonian” is too wide because of the other outside wing of the whole controversy: the dyophysite non-Chalcedonian churches, which never accepted the condemnation of Nestorius (PRICE and GADDIS, “General Introduction”, 74). 62 A very good insight into the debates in the broad ecumenical scene, into the different understandings of Chalcedon and the following history of dogma offers D. WENDEBOURG, “Chalkedon in der ökumenischen Diskussion”, in &KDONHGRQ *HVFKLFKWH XQG $NWXDOLWlW 6WXGLHQ]XU5H]HSWLRQGHUFKULVWRORJLVFKHQ)RUPHOYRQ&KDONHGRQ, ed. J. VAN OORT and J. ROLDANUS (Leuven: Peeters, 1998), 190–223; and TH. HAINTHALER, “Christological Declarations with Oriental Churches”, in &KULVWLDQV6KDSLQJ,GHQWLW\IURPWKH5RPDQ(PSLUH WR%\]DQWLXP, ed. G.D. DUNN and W. MAYER, VChS 132 (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 426–453. 63 WENDEBOURG, “Chalkedon in der ökumenischen Diskussion”, 199. 64 Ibid., 201. 65 E.g. on Tomus Leonis or on the 5 th ecumenical council in Constantinople in particular; ibid., 207–217.

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acknowledge mutually the legitimacy of their traditional doctrines.”66 This result was possible also due to the above mentioned modern reading of the Creeds, which has brought, among other things, the crucial differentiation between the faith and its contingent formulations in the Creed, which are always only “relative approximations” to the substantial reality of the one Jesus Christ, 67 who is “unabridged and unremittingly” God and human.68 The biggest remaining and “barely soluble” problem is hence not the dogmatic content of the Creed. It is rather the authority of the Council. 69

Next to it, the two natures, conceived in Chalcedon rather symmetrically and on the same level, lead to an equivocation in the term of SK\VLV.70 This notion was the main critical point of Schleiermacher’s critique of the old dogma: it is not possible to use the same term “indifferently” for such different entities like divinity and humanity. 71 Another known problem is the fact that Chalcedon does specify neither the particular terms nor their mutual relations. 72 Moreover, it does not care about 66

Ibid., 218. Ibid., 203. 68 Ibid., 202. 69 Ibid. 70 POSPÍŠIL, -Håtã] 1D]DUHWD, 145–146, states, however that “the Chalcedonian definition definitely does not put the divine and human nature of Christ on the same level”, b ecause the participation of Jesus Christ on divinity is different from his participation on humanity and because “every our utterance about the living God is only analogical and this has to apply also for the Chalcedonian definition” (ibid., 146, footnote 209). Neither of these two arguments has any support in the Chalcedonian definition itself. It is, again, a backward reading of Chalcedon from the perspective of later development. 71 SCHLEIERMACHER, 7KH&KULVWLDQ)DLWK, § 96.1, 392. 72 COAKLEY, “What does Chalcedon solve”, 162–163, tries to summarize the questions, which remain open in Chalcedon – although at least some could be answered with respect to the context of the debate preceding Chalcedon or from the quite long but often overlooked Prooemium of the Creed’s famous definition: “Thus: (1) Chalcedon does not tell us in what the divine and human ‚natures‘ consist; (2) it does not tell us what K\SRVWDVLV means when applied to Christ; (3) it does not tell us how K\SRVWDVLV and SK\VHLV are related, or how the SK\VHLV relate to one another (the problem of the FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP); (4) it does not tell us how many wills Christ has; (5) it does not tell us that the K\SRVWDVLV is identical with the pre-existent Logos; (6) it does not tell us what happens to the SK\VHLV at Christ’s death and in his resurrection; (7) it does not tell us whether the meaning of K\SRV WDVLV in this christological context is different, or the same, from the meaning in the trinitarian context; (8) it does not tell us whether the risen Christ is male.” Similarly BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 121: “Concerning the points of conflict, the definition is rather silent than explicit: The Symbol says nothing about the relation between its first (fundamental) and the second (terminological) part of its declaration. It does not define any of its christological terms (fu,sij, u`po,stasij, pro,swpon). Moreover and primarily, the relation between the unity of Christ’s person and the duality of the natures (which was for all followers of Cyril the decisive question of the identity of divine person and divine nature) remains peculiarly blurred; this is a problem, which – in spite of the four exclusive adverbs between both natures (‘unconfused, unchanged, undivided, unseparated’) remains rather 67

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the previous and already codified use of them, which leads to contradictions between Christology and Trinity (e.g. in the case of K\SRVWDVLV, as I will show later).73 In general, the XVH RI WHUPV was the biggest problem of all the debates around Chalcedon, complicated by the fact that each party used its own terminology and, moreover, not always consistently, as it is the case in Cyril who, on one side, insisted on the use of his PLDSK\VLV-formula but, on the other side, could also use the term of K\SRVWDVLV instead of SK\VLV.74 The Chalcedonian formula is, hence, rather a mixture “without any adequate theology in the background”.75 And still, “[s]omewhere in that mix, the [Chalcedonian] statement suggests, lies orthodoxy.” 76 The terms used in the Creed went through a difficult process of reshaping during the first Christian centuries and actually never had a clearly univocal meaning.77 I will shortly sketch the development of the three most important of them until about the time of Chalcedon: 3K\VLV was defined by Apollinaris as auvtokinh,ton, i.e., a self-sufficient unity which is able to live as a whole (te,leion). Therefore, a SK\VLV is not the body itself but a living body, a body revived by soul or spirit. According to this notion, the question in the beginning was how to think the unity of d ivinity and humanity in Jesus Christ within one SK\VLV, as it was expressed in firmly standing than being solved. The understanding of the Chalcedonian formula was loaded with these aporias from the beginning and this situation was transposed mutatis mutandis also to the modern research of Chalcedon.” Ibid., 133, Beyschlag adds two more missing points: “any possibility to formulate WKHGLYLQLW\RIWKHKXPDQ-HVXV in his immanency” and the cross. HICK, 7KH0HWDSKRU, 48, repeatedly criticizes the solely negative and technical formulation of the Creed, which allegedly cannot have any reasonable religious meaning. According to him, ‘truly God and truly man’ remains thus a mere assertion. 73 Regarding the fact that Chalcedon is a “patchwork of terms and phrases” taken from different sources, DALEY, “Unpacking the Chalcedonian Formula”, 169–170, presumes that “[p]robably most of the more than five hundred bishops present would have been hard put to explain what ‘substance’ and ‘nature’ (universal reality) and ‘hypostasis’ and ‘prosopon’ (reality as individual and concrete) actually mean, when applied to Christ, and what the difference among them is.” 74 Cf. GRILLMEIER, &KULVW, 481; UTHEMANN, “Zur Rezeption des Tomus Leonis”, 9. 75 LOOFS, /HLWIDGHQ, 237. 76 DALEY, “Unpacking the Chalcedonian Formula”, 173. 77 All three major terms ‘SK\VLV, K\SRVWDVLV, SURVRSRQ’ were introduced into the christological debate by Apollinaris of Laodicea. Cf. GRILLMEIER, &KULVW1, 500 and 338 with a nice quotation from APOLLINARIS, 'HILGHHWLQFDUQDWLRQH 6, in which he equates all three following terms: „[H]e himself is RQH physis, RQH hypostasis, RQH power (evne,rgeia), RQH prosopon, wholly God and wholly human.“ For the Trinitarian use of these terms as the necessary background for christological thinking cf. G. GRESHAKE, 'HUGUHLHLQH*RWW, 3rd ed. (Freiburg: Herder, 1997), 74–171. – Another problem, which I do not follow in this study, was the search for an appropriate translation of the Greek terms into Latin, which caused further shifts in the understanding and was discussed far into the Middle ages.

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the PLDSK\VLVIRUPXOD by Apollinaris and later and primarily by Cyril of Alexandria.78 The latter specified the term SK\VLV as “an individual, existent substance” – i.e., as an efficient principle, which still needs a real basis for its real existence: a K\SRVWDVLV. Therefore, “Cyril can also use the expression K\ SRVWDVLV for the complete SK\VLV”.79 And to make it even more complicated: from the perspective of Trinitarian theology, as partly followed in the Chalcedonian creed itself, in Jesus Christ SK\VLV actually represents the divine and human RXVLD and, in some cases, both terms could be used SURPLVFXH.80 According to this usage, SK\VLV stands for the substance or unspecified material all people have in common (in other words, the K\OH without the PRUSKH). The shifts in the use of the term (at first a self-standing unit, then only an impersonal substance which needs a K\SRVWDVLV to be real, and later – as a necessary christological consequence – a synonym for RXVLD) contributed to a blurriness in its understanding. +\SRVWDVLV was a term firmly rooted in trinitarian theology, used since Cappadocian theology to refer to the divine persons:“+\SRVWDVLVis the RXVLD with the LGLRPDWD or the NRLQRQ together with the LGLRQ.”81 It is hence a stand-alone entity, which can be composed of more united parts. In the K\ SRVWDVLV, the SK\VLV or RXVLDbecomes a real, existent being, an “objective reality”. 82 +\SRVWDVLV in a ‘personal’ sense can, therefore, be considered for a kind of middle term between SK\VLV and SURVRSRQ: not only a mere substance

78

GRILLMEIER, &KULVW1, 474–475. This move became possible only at the price of diminishing of ‘humanity’ to the body only, i.e., without its living principle, which was always Logos. Therefore, Apollinaris was condemned by Chalcedon as a monophysite heretic ('+ 300). Cyril, however, believed that the formula originates from Athanasius and is hence clearly orthodox (Cyril had it from Letter to Jovian, which he believed to be written by Athanasius, yet the letter was from Apollinaris). Nevertheless, the Apollinarist danger of reducing the humanity of Christ remains latently hidden in Cyril all the time: “Cyril’s unusual popularity in the church and in dogmatics may be maintained also by the fact that his oscillating monophysitism can be interpreted in both ways in the church sense and in the heretical sense” (BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 76). 79 GRILLMEYER, &KULVW1, 481. 80 The Chalcedonian Creed itself ('+ 301) speaks of Christ as KRPRRXVLRVwith the Father and KRPRRXVLRV with us. These RXVLDL are thus nothing else than what is a few lines later called SK\VHLV concurring to one K\SRVWDVLV. Further cf. GRILLMEIER, &KULVW 2/2, 52– 61. 81 GRESHAKE, 'HUGUHLHLQH*RWW, 81. Cf. ESSEN, 'LH)UHLKHLW-HVX, 24–32, who points also to the roots of the Cappadocian distinction in the Stoic theory of individuation (ibid., 31, fn. 23); cf. also GRILLMEIER, &KULVW 1, 373, cf. IDEM, -HVXV &KULVWXV 1, 768; IDEM, &KULVW2/2, 278; and IDEM, “Piscatorie” – “Aristotelice”, 294–300. Also the difference between K\SRVWDVLV and RXVLD is already a result of a development; in the very beginning, they both meant the same (cf. GRESHAKE, 'HUGUHLHLQH*RWW, 81, footnote 95). 82 GRESHAKE, 'HUGUHLHLQH*RWW, 81.

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but also not a personality. 83 But the christological use of this term, then, in the context of incarnation, shifted closer to anthropology, i.e., closer to the term of SURVRSRQ, so that K\SRVWDVLV and SURVRSRQ were later sometimes used interchangeably.84 A serious question arose: how could the divine K\SRVWDVLV of the Son become truly human and remain one K\SRVWDVLV at the same time? 85 The term K\SRVWDVLV lent itself more and more to equivocation. 86 In the Trinitarian use, it meant something different than it did in its christological or anthropological usages: whereas a K\SRVWDVLV of the Trinity is not a selfstanding personality (because this would lead directly to tritheism), in the 83

Cf. fundamentally GRILLMEIER, “Piscatorie” – “Aristotelice”, 297: “In der Aussage: Christus ‘eine Hypostase in zwei Naturen’ bedeutet ‘hypóstasis’ noch nicht das, was später als Hypostase (Person) definiert worden ist: ‘Einzelsubjekt in geistiger Natur’ (distinctum subsistens in natura intellectuali). ‘Subjekt’ ist noch nicht unter der Rücksicht seiner unmittelbaren Eigenständigkeit gesehen.“ Cf. IDEM, “Das Verständnis”, 147. 84 This was the case already in Cappadocian theology because the K\SRVWDVLV of a particular human is always understood to be a concrete individual with a face, recognizable in a concrete SURVRSRQ. Cf. GRILLMEIER, &KULVW 1, 374–375, who points out, that the Cappadocian concept of K\SRVWDVLV was actually too individualistic: “they remain fast in a realm which we may describe as individuality” (ibid., 375). In Christology, the heritage of Cappadocian theology became a complication because it does not comply with the trinitarian use of the terms: “in the WKHRORJLDone nature and three K\SRVWDVHVand in the RLNRQRPLD one K\SRVWDVLV(from the Trinity) in two natures” (GRILLMEIER, &KULVW 2/2, 278). 85 Cf. GRILLMEIER, -HVXV&KULVWXV1, 768. 86 Cf. already NESTORIUS, “Liber Heraclidis” B 342,3–7, quoted in A. GRILLMEIER, “Das Scandalum oecumenicum des Nestorius in kirchlich-dogmatischer und theologiegeschichtlicher Sicht”, in IDEM, 0LWLKPXQGLQLKP (Freiburg: Herder, 1975), 261–262: “Further alike the Trinity: there one essence (syr. ouvsi,a), three prosopa; however, three prosopa of one essence (ouvsi,a); here one prosopon of two essences (ouvsi,ai) and two essences (ouvsi,ai) of one prosopon.” Further cf. ESSEN, 'LH )UHLKHLW -HVX, 37–38, and again GRILLMEIER, &KULVW 2/2, 505, quoting a Severian author from the 6th century who even stresses this equivocation between WKHRORJLD and RLNRQRPLD: “There is agreement about the fact that K\SRVWDVLV and RXVLD, or SK\VLV, are not the same in the WKHRORJLD; in the RLNR QRPLD, in contrast, they are identical.” In opposition to the Severians, the neoChalcedonism tried to show the univocity of WKHRORJLD and RLNRQRPLD and thus of the trinitarian and christological terminology, cf. UTHEMANN, “Das anthropologische Modell”, 107, footnote 20. This problem remained unsolved for a long time, cf. SCHLEIERMACHER, 7KH &KULVWLDQ )DLWK, § 96.1, 395, who saw the problem precisely: “If now we carry over into the doctrine of the Trinity the explanations which are usually given of the word ‘Person’ in the doctrine of Christ – and there is sufficient reason for this, since it is asserted that Christ did not become a Person only through the union of the two natures, but the Son of God only took up human nature into His Person – then the three Persons must have an independent anterior existence in themselves; and if each Person is also a nature, we come almost inevitably to three divine natures for the three divine Persons in the one Divine Essence. If, on the other hand, the same word ‘Person’ means something different in the one doctrine from what it means in the other, so that in the Person of Christ we have still another Person in the other sense of the word, the confusion is just as great.”

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christological and anthropological use, the term shifted more and more toward exactly this meaning. 87 With the course of time, it was more and more obvious that the term of K\SRVWDVLV itself could not fulfill both functions, which Chalcedon attributed to it: to be the unifying level on one side, and to integrate two natures in their fullness and fully presereved difference. 88 The termSURVRSRQ went through remarkable shifts as well. Rejected after first attempts to use it within the Trinity to indicate a Trinitarian person b ecause of its common meaning as “face”, or even “mask” (a step which would have led to modalism), 89 this term stands for the individual specifics, SURSULH WDWHV, for the sum of individual differences which make any individual unique; it is the concrete and particular expression for individual personal substance (K\SRVWDVLV): Every K\SRVWDVLV has a SURVRSRQ.90 Both terms could be hence used synonymously, but at the same time, SURVRSRQ also opens the path – seen in a substantially longer run – in the direction of the Latin SHUVR QD and towards the modern term of personality. 91 Chalcedon puts this term 87

The current Eastern-orthodox theology remains often on the position of the Cappadocian theology, struggling then, however, with exactly this different meaning of person in the Trinity and in anthropology, cf. ZIZIOULAS, “On Being a Person”, 33–46; CH. SCHWÖBEL, “Introduction”, ibid., 18–19; ZIZIOULAS, %HLQJDV&RPPXQLRQ, 31–49. On the contrary, E. SCHILLEBEECKX, -HVXV $Q ([SHULPHQW LQ &KULVWRORJ\, trans. H. HOSKINS (London: Collins, 1979), 661, tries to identify the anthropological use of ‘person’ with the trinitarian use. Yet, this would, in the end, lead to a tritheistic conception of God. 88 Cf. ESSEN, 'LH )UHLKHLW -HVX, 48, who calls both these functions “the diacriticalindividuating function” and “the henotic function”. 89 Cf. GRESHAKE, 'HUGUHLHLQH*RWW, 80: 3URVRSRQ “never had the place in Greek philosophy that SHUVRQD had in the West. Instead, the equivalent for the Latin SHUVRQD in the East became stepwise the more ‘philosophical’ term K\SRVWDVLV.” Cf. also ZIZIOULAS, %H LQJDV&RPPXQLRQ, 31–36. 90 Cf., e.g., the use of SURVRSRQby Nestorius, GRILLMEIER, -HVXV&KULVWXV 1, 713: SURV RSRQ is the “carakth.r th/j u`posta,sewj”. At the same time, Nestorius can use both terms as synonyms, cf. ibid., 715. 91 Although the Greek SURVRSRQ would be interpreted in Latin with the much clearer SHUVRQD, e.g. as Tertullian did it (cf. GRILLMEIER, &KULVW, 126), “the long-lasting process of creating an explicit meaning and deepening” of the terms “proceeded in the East and the West independently of each other” (GRESHAKE, 'HUGUHLHLQH*RWW, 83). The West had for a long time no equivalent for K\SRVWDVLV – there was no translation for it, until the term “subsistentia” was implemented. In his influential Tomus, Leo used the Augustinian term of person (cf. UTHEMANN, “Zur Rezeption des Tomus Leonis”, 35 ). Yet also the term of SHU VRQD developed, cf. the famous definition of BOETHIUS, 'H FRQVRODWLRQH SKLORVRSKLDH V (cf. ESSEN, 'LH)UHLKHLW-HVX, 49–53), its later correction by Richard of St. Victor, and its further development in the Enlightenment (H. SCHMID, 'LH 'RJPDWLN GHU HYDQJHOLVFK OXWKHULVFKHQ.LUFKH, 7th ed. [Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1893], 214–215; GRESHAKE, 'HU GUHLHLQH*RWW, 101–171; DALFERTH, &UXFLILHGDQG5HVXUUHFWHG, 148–153; JÜNGEL, *RGDV WKH 0\VWHU\, 82–83; R. SPAEMANN, 3HUVRQV 7KH 'LIIHUHQFH %HWZHHQ µ6RPHRQH¶ DQG µ6RPHWKLQJ¶ [Oxford: Oxford UP, 2017], 21–33).

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right next to K\SRVWDVLV. On one hand, SURVRSRQ was the preferred term for the unity of the person of Jesus Christ in the Antiochene perspective. 92 However, in the Chalcedonian Creed, it is a quotation of Leo’s Tome: the Latin term SHUVRQD is translated into Greek with SURVRSRQ and added with the preferred Cyrilline term of K\SRVWDVLV next to it.93 The Antiochene SURVRSRQ as a translation of the Western SHUVRQD stands here thus without any mediation next to the Cyrilline K\SRVWDVLV. The question is, whether both of these terms can be understood here simply as synonyms, or if, after all, SURVRSRQ could be taken as a further specification of K\SRVWDVLV?94 With this question, I go knowingly beyond Chalcedon and its intention, but this will be an important point in my further work with the Chalcedonian formula. From this perspective, there is an interesting and important space between K\SRVWDVLV and SURV RSRQ, which could be christologically used to emphasize and develop more the humanity of Jesus Christ. 95 A respectable Eastern-orthodox perspective founded on the conception of the person in the Greek Fathers was presented by John D. Zizioulas.96 In his perspective, the crucial step was done within the trinitarian debate when the term of K\SRVWDVLV, meaning originally the same as RXVLD or SK\VLV, was established for ‘person’ in the theology of Cappadocian Fathers.97 Since then, K\SRVWDVLV is what makes the real personhood: it is the constitutive element of personal being and its fulfilment.98 However, in the trinitarian debates, K\SRVWDVLV was identified with the being of God, whence the only true person is God-Self, moreover: the Father. This is the anchor of RUWKRGR[SDWURFHQWULVP: the true hypostasis is the hypostasis of the Father who in his person is the principle of all divinity and of all true person-

92

Cf. GRILLMEIER, &KULVW1, 431–437 (Theodor of Mopsuestia) and 491 (Theodoret of Cyrus); BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 61. 93 Cf. $FWVRIWKH&RXQFLORI&KDOFHGRQ II, 17; for the original Latin text of Tomus Leonis and its Greek translation read at the Council cf. 3/ 54,763A/764A. The roots of this paratactic use of K\SRVWDVLVand SURVRSRQ lie in the Formula of Reunion from 433 and before it in Proclus of Constantinople, cf. UTHEMANN, “Zur Rezeption des Tomus Leonis”, 12. It occurs also in the Confession of Flavian’s “endemic” synod of 448, cf. BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 88–90. 94 GRESHAKE, 'HU GUHLHLQH *RWW, 80, footnote 90, points out that “in Chalcedon, the parataxis of prosopon and hypostasis was not a problem (cf. '+ 302); at the Second Council of Constantinople (553), on the contrary, the paratactic use of both terms was taught as obligatory (cf. '+ 421).” Yet still, the Council of 553 speaks about the use of this parataxis for the persons of the Trinity. Christologically, the important question remains, how can one K\SRVWDVLV or SURVRSRQ unite two natures? 95 Cf. below, subchapter 3 and Ch. 6. 96 ZIZIOULAS, %HLQJDV&RPPXQLRQ. His conception, too, works with the difference and tension between K\SRVWDVLV and SURVRSRQ. However, he does not trace their relation much in the development of the historical debate, but rather proposes his own theological conception. 97 Ibid., 36–37. 98 Ibid., 39, 47.

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hood. 99 “If God does not exist, the person does not exist.” 100 But when God the Father is the definition of personhood, then authentic person means “absolute ontological freedom”, free from all necessity, i.e., it must be uncreated.101 For humans, bound through their “biological hypostasis”, which subsists in them and constitutes them, their createdness is clearly a limitation so that they cannot “become a person in the same sense that God is one, that is, an authentic person”.102 This is possible only with a new hypostasis, with a new birth in the baptism, through which human existence gets an “ecclesial” or “sacramental or eucharistic hypostasis”, participates in the person of Christ, and becomes a divinized existence (WKHRVLV).103 This conception raises several questions. Within the Trinity, the patrocentric stress on the person of the Father as the constitutive element of divinity seems to cause an equivocation in the trinitarian use of “person”, which applies differently to the Father and differently to Son and Spirit as derived in both personhood and divinity from the Father.104 Moreover: if only the Father is God in the proper sense, who is the Son (and the Spirit)? – With the identification of the person of Christ with God-Son, there is a danger of another equivocation between the use of K\SRVWDVLVor “person” within the Trinity and in anthropology: the trinitarian persons are not three individuals.105 Zizioulas knows about it (while the source of this danger lies already in the Cappadocian Fathers106) and stresses, therefore, that person VXEVLVWV in the particular being and that the true mode of being is being in communion with other persons.107 – Nonetheless, this mode of proper being is possible only when the limits of createdness are transcended. Obviously, in Zizioulas’ conception humanity and divinity stand against each other: biological existence is incompatible with the ecclesial existence. Creation and createdness as such are understood in a negative way and should be transcended. However, is the VDU[ in the incarnation, then, taken seriously enough? – Zizioulas sees the solution in WKHRVLV, resp. in the christification of humans: baptism is “adoption of man by God, the identification of his hypostasis with the hypostasis of the Son of God”. 108 By taking biblical metaphors as ontological statements, Zizioulas blurs the distinction between Christ and other humans: believers become a second Christ and Christ thus the first of many. Moreover, the presence of God is identified with the church: “Thus the Church becomes Christ Himself in human existence, but also every member of

99

Ibid., 41. Ibid., 43. 101 Ibid. 102 Ibid., 44, 49. 103 Ibid., 49–50, 53, 59. 104 This saw precisely SCHILLEBEECKX, -HVXV, 667. 105 Cf. ZIZIOULAS, %HLQJDV&RPPXQLRQ, 54. 106 Cappadocian Fathers did not conceive the Trinity from a divine substance but rather from the three distinct persons, who were seen, however, in analogy with three human individuals trying to avoid both extremes: modalistic Sabellianism and tritheism, cf. BASILIUS M AGNUS, Ep. 38 and Ep. 263,6, both in 3*32, 325–340 and 883–884; *UHJRU\ RI 1\VVD 7KH 0LQRU 7UHDWLVHV RQ 7ULQLWDULDQ 7KHRORJ\ DQG $SROOLQDULVP, ed. V.H. DRECOLL and M. BERGHAUS (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2011); and later the simplifying summary in JOHN OF DAMASCUS, ([SRVLWLRILGHL 48 (III 4), in 'LH6FKULIWHQGHV-RKDQQHVYRQ 'DPDVNRV, vol.II, ed. B. KOTTER (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1973), 116,1–5. 107 This would go in the direction of my own proposal, cf. below. Ch. 6.2. 108 ZIZIOULAS, %HLQJDV&RPPXQLRQ, 56. 100

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the Church becomes Christ and Church.”109 The basic Chalcedonian distinction that God remains God and human remains human seems, hence, to be transgressed. In his conception, Zizioulas truly represents the theology of the Greek Fathers preserving both: their indisputable contribution as well as their problems, which remain unsolved.

It is obvious that the construal of all these terms in the time of Chalcedon was still in motion without any firm and universally acknowledged meaning – on the contrary, the terms were used and developed differently by different theologians, and Chalcedon contributed to this lack of clarity in some cases even more.110 The unresolved aspects of this terminology open a space for different interpretations, and sometimes, these very substantial metaphysical terms lead even to contradictions in their own meaning. This makes a coherent understanding much more complicated and, as the history of interpretation has shown, actually impossible and, in the end, aporetic. Already this situation shows that Chalcedon was not the closing of a debate, as the council fathers had wished,111 but rather the beginning of a new and long debate, which had to clarify the terms first, and the beginning of a search for an appropriate theological structure that would integrate Trinitarian and christological aspects in their complexity – which actually in the time of the early church never happened. Despite this unclearness, with the famous four negative adjectives in the first place, Chalcedon has set new, quite clear and very fundamental and influential margins. The whole following christology in its development until today can be, therefore, understood as a continuous struggle with Chalcedon and its meaning. As a new and influential beginning as well as a vote for a more differentiating theology and despite all the problems sketched above, Chalcedon set three main challenges for the Christology that would follow in its wake, all of which must be considered in terms of their particular complexity, on one side, and of their unity, on the other: a) 9HUHGHXV – Jesus Christ is to be thought of as the true God, the incarnated second person of the Trinity, the incarnated Son in his difference from the Father and Spirit and at the same time in divine unity with them. b) 9HUHKRPR – Jesus Christ is to be thought of, at the same time, as a true human possessing the fullness of humanity, as part of the human genus, not differing from other humans.

109

Ibid., 58. Cf. e.g. GRILLMEIER, -HVXV &KULVWXV 1, 702: e.g. Andrew of Samosata was able to write that SK\VLV = K\SRVWDVLV and K\SRVWDVLV = SURVRSRQ. A similar lack of clarity can be found in Nestorius who, compared to his big rival Cyril, and regarding the same things, uses the terms in another way, resp. uses other terms as Cyril does, which made the debate complicated the more, cf. ibid., 715–716. 111 Cf. GRILLMEIER, &KULVW2/1, 3. 110

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c) Unique XQLW\ – at the same time, Jesus Christ is to be thought of as being unique and special, in a unique, unrepeatable unity of both previously mentioned characteristics. Chalcedon expressed this point with the originally biblical notion that Jesus Christ was the only one without sin (cf. Hebr 4:15), and in this respect fundamentally different from all. 112 The FRPSOH[LW\ of the Chalcedonian task drives both reason and rationality to the edge because the person of Jesus Christ is obviously the point of intersection between God and man, universality and particularity, eternity and finitude.113 Nevertheless, it is a task theology cannot abandon: in the certitude about the thing that is to be expressed, i.e., the person of Jesus Christ in its soteriological meaning, theology has to search for appropriate ways to express it.114 The most fundamental reason why theology has struggled since Chalcedon with an appropriate understanding of the person of Jesus Christ has been neither a fondness for abstract theological speculation or some selfconfident plan to build a perfect theological system, but it is – from the very beginning – VRWHULRORJ\. With the person of Jesus Christ, salvation is at stake.115 At the same time, the question of the unity of Christ’s humanity and divinity, answered by Chalcedon in the terms of two natures in one person, concentrates the main theological IRFXV RQ WKH LQFDUQDWLRQ, which becomes the leading theological perspective. It is this perspective that leads in the end to the aporias of Chalcedonian Christology, as the history of interpretation of the Creed has shown. This is now to be elaborated more in detail.

112

Cf. DALFERTH, “Gott für uns”, 63–64; IDEM, &UXFLILHGDQG5HVXUUHFWHG, 133. Cf. also C. SCHÖNBORN, *RWW VDQGWH VHLQHQ 6RKQ &KULVWRORJLH, AMATECA, Lehrbücher zur katholischen Theologie VII(Paderborn: Bonifatius, 2002), 147; WEINANDY, “The Doctrinal Significance”, 549–550; IDEM, 'RHV*RG&KDQJH"7KH:RUG¶V%HFRPLQJLQWKH,QFDU QDWLRQ (Still River, MA: St. Bede’s Publications, 1985), 82, with reference to Thomas of Aquin. 113 Cf. PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 344: “It should be clear that we have here a degree of complexity in the matter to be expressed that brings us to the limit of what can be expressed at all and which, therefore, even in a systematically coherent succession of statements, can no longer be described with a sufficient degree of concreteness (i.e., in all its aspects).” 114 Cf. ibid., 303: “‘No trespassing’ signs against ‘betrayal of the mystery’ […] are of little help. […] True respect for the mystery can express itself, among other ways, just in the attempt to think it over” (partly my own translation, P.G.). 115 For the soteriological dimension and differences between East and West cf. below, subch. 2.4, and P. GALLUS, “Christologické kořeny konceptu svatosti [Christological Roots of the Concept of Holiness]”, 7HRORJLFNiUHIOH[H24 (2018/1), 19–29.

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2. The Struggle with Chalcedon in the History of Thought 2. The Struggle with Chalcedon in the History of Thought

Although right after Chalcedon there were repeated attempts to reject the Creed and turn back to far more popular and broadly deep rooted Cyrilline monophysitism, Chalcedon was established (also on the political level) as the official teaching of the church (dogma) and, hence, as the basis for any following Christology. 116 This fact, however (next to the first big church schism, as said above), immediately raised the question of an appropriate interpretation and woke up the need for a further theological clarification. B.E. Daley puts it shortly: “[T]he Chalcedonian definition itself can better be understood as a mid-fifth-century waystation, a brilliant but largely unsuccessful attempt to reconcile competing traditions of language and thinking about the person of Christ, than as a settlement, let alone as the climax, of patristic debates about Christ, or as itself an adequate foundation for lasting ec umenical agreement.”117

Two theological figures were important in the first place: regarding the duality of the natures, it was the (already pre-Chalcedonian) concept of FRPPXQL FDWLR LGLRPDWXP; regarding the unity of the person of Jesus Christ then the (neo-Chalcedonian) concept of HQK\SRVWDVLV.118 According to different accents of the two main parts of Christianity, the first was more important in the West, the second in the East. I will sketch both concepts and their problems and then I will follow their further development in some of the most important stations of the history of theology.  &RPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP Western theology stressed primarily the differentiation of the natures. In this respect, it stood close to the Eastern Antiochene position, but otherwise continued its development independently. The fundamental and until today most 116 Cf. GRILLMEIER, &KULVW2/1, 3–4; 'DV.RQ]LOYRQ&KDONHGRQII, ed. GRILLMEIER and BACHT; CAMELOT, (SKHVXVXQG&KDOFHGRQ, 198–221; WENDEBOURG, “Chalkedon in der ökumenischen Diskussion”; WYRWA, “Drei Etappen”; DALEY, “The Christology of Chalcedon”, in IDEM, *RG9LVLEOH, 10–27. Regarding the main players of the christological development so far, BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 134, summarizes the factual paradoxical outcome: “With respect to the alliance of 431, Nestorius had to remain dogmatically out, although, in fact, he was rehabilitated by the Chalcedonian two-natures doctrine. Cyril, in the contrary, was encompassed into the imperial-ecclesiatical Creed of Chalcedon, although the ‘whole Cyril’, i.e., Cyril of mi,a fu,sij and of the 12 Anathematisms, fits into it in no way.” 117 DALEY, “Unpacking the Chalcedonian Formula”, 179–180. Similarly ANATOLIOS, “The Soteriological Grammar”, 174: “The standard modern question, first posed by Ra hner, of ‘Chalcedon: End or Beginning,’ leaves out the more historically accurate option of ‘Middle.’” Anatolios uses this argument for favouring the perspective of Constantinople II. 118 Cf. BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 70.

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influential document of the Western position was the famous Tomus ad Flavianum of Pope Leo I,119 which partly influenced the Chalcedon Creed itself: against the Cyrilline miaphysite emphasis on unity and against the thinking from the unity towards the duality of the natures in an theoretical analysis (“evk du,o fu,sewn”), Leo insisted on the duality of the natures (“evn du,o fu,sesin”), which concur to the unity of the person, thinking thus from the duality towards the unity (or presupposing the unity only as a formal term).120 While in the Chalcedonian definition both these accents stand simply next to each other creating a momentary but untenable symmetrical balance, on the other hand, Leo does not seek any balance in this question. On the contrary, in his christological view, he goes far beyond what will be shortly accepted in Chalcedon, and sees both natures of Jesus Christ as self-acting substances. With full power, it is expressed in the sentence of the Tome known as “the horror to the Monophysites”: “For each form performs what is proper to it in communion with the other, the Word achieving what is the Word’s, while the body accomplishes what is the body’s.” 121 Both natures are self-standing and self-acting entities, which only subsequently seek their unity constituted in the mutual communication of both. “Therefore, the ‘distincte agere’ […] of both natures follows not – as one would expect – ‘alterius unitate’, but rather only ‘alterius communione’.”122 The strong stress on the duality within the unity raises quite acutely the question of the FRPPXQLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP. In fact, this theological figure has been used since the most ancient Christian times (avnti,dosij tw/n ivdiwma,twn) and has been more reflected since the Apollinarian controversy.123 It is in119 For the Christology of Leo I cf. GRILLMEIER, -HVXV &KULVWXV 1, 734–750; IDEM, &KULVW, , 115–194; MÜHLENBERG, “Das Dogma von Chalkedon”, 14–16. CAMELOT, (SKHVXV XQG &KDOFHGRQ, 167, representing the typical Western catholic view, favors the theology of Leo, seeing it as a corrective of both Eastern extremes, the Alexandrine reduction of only one nature and the Antiochene separation into two persons. However, the same tendency as in the Antiochene view can be found in Leo as well, cf. below, footnote 156. 120 Cf. UTHEMANN, “Der Neuchalkedonismus”, 219: “In Leo and in Chalcedon, whose definition accepted this idea of Leo in the sense that Cyril’s main formula has to be interpreted with respect to the term of SHUVRQD or K\SRVWDVLV, remains unsaid, how is SHUVRQD to be thought of so that the person binds the symmetry of the natures into a unity, unless one would be satisfied with the hint that due to the symmetry of the natures no fourth subject of worship is established, because the Logos, in the sense of a formal unity – XQLWDVSHUVRQDH – is the subject of both.” Cf. also IDEM, “Zur Rezeption des Tomus Leonis”, 35–36; IDEM, “Definitionen und Paradigmen”, 54; BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 90–94. 121 $FWV RI WKH &RXQFLO RI &KDOFHGRQ II, 19, cf. the Latin original: “Agit enim utraque forma cum alterius communione quod proprium est: Verbo scilicet operante quod Verbi est, et carne exsequente quod carnis est” ('+ 294). 122 BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 94. 123 Cf. PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 297; and B. GLEEDE, “Vermischt, ausgetauscht und kruzweis zugesprochen. Zur wechselvollen Geschichte der Idiome Christi in der alten

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tended to express, in an appropriate way, “how the divine and the human in Christ could be united without damage to the distinctiveness of each”.124 Due to the distinction of two SK\VHLV in one K\SRVWDVLV at the background of Cappadocian ontology (which itself was rooted in Stoic distinctions 125), it was clear that each nature has its own specific properties or attributes which – in order to create the real unity of the person – it should and can somehow share with the other.126 This was, on one hand, the explanation of the paradoxical statements concerning Jesus Christ, which began to emerge from the very beginning of Christian theology and even within the biblical scriptures themselves. Leo gives clear examples, which lean on the biblical and theological tradition: “the Son of man came down from heaven” (cf. John 3:13) or “the onlybegotten Son of God [was] crucified and buried” (cf. the Nicene or later the Apostolic Creed).127 It is, then, possible to make seemingly contrary assertions but still concerning the same person. It opens the problem of the so-called GLYLVLR YRFXP, of the attribution of different biblical statements concerning Jesus Christ in the unity of his divinity and humanity, of his words and his actions, which was a topic also in the debates around Chalcedon. Who is the subject of the particular statements? To whom are the statements to be attributed – both the high and the low statements to the person of Jesus Christ, or rather each statement should be attributed to the appropriate nature (high to the divinity and low to the humanity)? 128 And what about the biblical statements, in which divinity and Kirche“, in &UHDWRUHVW&UHDWXUD/XWKHUV &KULVWRORJLHDOV/HKUHYRQGHU,GLRPHQNRPPX QLNDWLRQ, ed. O. BAYER and B. GLEEDE, TBT 138 (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2007), 35–94, who brings a good overview of the development in the early church. In his opinion, avnti,dosij tw/n ivdiwma,twn is “the very SURSULXP of the Chalcedonian Christology” (ibid., 83). GRILLMEIER, &KULVW 1, 436–437, considers as the earnest beginning of the reflected use of FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP the time and work of Theodore of Mopsuestia. R. CROSS, “Perichoresis, Deification and Christological Predication in John of Damascus”, 0HGLDHYDO 6WXGLHV62 (2000), 70, calls the Latin term itself in the contrary “a Western medieval coinage”. 124 PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 296. 125 Cf. GRILLMEIER, &KULVW1, 372. 126 Leo in his Tomus speaks about “ivdio,thj e`kate,raj fu,sewj”. This phrase (originating from TERTULLIAN, “Adversus Praxeam” 27, cf. BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 93) was subsequently incorporated into Chalcedonense, cf. $FWVRIWKH&RXQFLORI&KDOFHGRQ II, Session II, Nr. 22, 17 (Tomus), and Session V, Nr. 34, 204 (Chalcedonense): “the distinctive character of each nature”. 127 $FWVRIWKH&RXQFLORI&KDOFHGRQII, 20–21. Cf. BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 93, fn. 162. 128 This was a traditional question, cf. BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 94, fn. 163: “Whereas the Christian East discusses, how can be both ascribed to the one christological subject”, Leo simply says with sheer easiness: “unum horum coruscat miraculis, aliud subcumbit injuriis […] unus idemque est”.

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humanity occur together (the so-called DFWLRQHVFRPPXQHV)? In this question, the Alexandrine and the Western (and the Antiochene) position differ. “We can speak about a Cyrilline and a Leonine interpretation, depending on what is stressed, if it is stressed that God-Logos, one K\SRVWDVLV of the Trinity becomes flesh, makes miracles and suffers, or if it is stressed that Christ, God and human in one person makes miracles in his divine nature and dies on the cross in his human nature”

and both these actions meet in the person. 129 However, Chalcedon did not bring a solution: “As it was shown already in the protest of the Illyrians and of the Palestinians in Chalcedon, which Leo tried to rebut with his so-called second Tomus, concerning the DFWLRQHV FRPPXQHV Chalcedon left something open. Depending on where the stress was laid – if on the remaining difference of the natures or on the hypostatic union of the natures – the Chalcedonian formula led to a different picture of Christ. Here, it is obvious that the reason for the difference lies, in the end, in each case in different soteriology.”130

For Leo, the soteriological point of the FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP was exactly the possibility of two contrary statements about one and the same person of Jesus Christ: we need someone who “would be able to die in respect of the one and would not be able to expire in respect of the other”.131 Yet this sentence of Leo’s, with his stress on separate actions of both natures, actually avoids the FRPPXQLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP by ascribing both parts of the sentence separately to both natures, which do not really communicate with each other but exist rather together next to each other in one presupposed person.132 129

UTHEMANN, “Zur Rezeption des Tomus Leonis”, 35–36. Cf. IDEM, “Der Neuchalkedonismus”, 215–216. This question knows already the Formula of Reunion (433), which mentions it as a still unsolved problem: “As for the evangelical and apostolic stat ements about the Lord, we recognize that theologians employ some indifferently in view of the unity of person but distinguish others in view of the duality of natures, applying t he God-befitting ones to Christ’s divinity and the humble ones to His humanity” (cf. '+ 273). 130 UTHEMANN, “Der Neuchalkedonismus”, 216. 131 $FWVRIWKH&RXQFLORI&KDOFHGRQ II, 17–18; “et mori posset ex uno, et mori non ex altero”, '+ 293. Similarly Cyril of Alexandria (cf. ANATOLIOS, “The Soteriological Grammar”, 171, who calls it in Cyril the “Cyrillian paradox”) or John of Damascus, cf. CROSS, “Perichoresis”, 106: “This strategy is a commonplace of orthodox Christology from Cyril of Alexandria and Leo onwards.” 132 The same case is the already above-mentioned follow-up of the famous “Agit enim”sentence, which ends also with a clear separation of actions of the particular natures: “the one shines with miracles, while the other has succumbed to outrages” ($FWVRIWKH&RXQFLO RI &KDOFHGRQ II, 19). The unity of humanity and divinity is simply presupposed with the biblical fact of Christ’s person, cf. BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 92. That this point leads, on the other hand, to logical incoherencies with two opposite sets of properties, points out in the 20th century, HICK, 7KH 0HWDSKRU, 102, who calls this “the incompatible-attributes problem”. Similarly I. LANDA, “Jednota dvou přirozeností. Hegel a ‘Symbolum Chalcedonense’ [The Unity of Two Natures. Hegel and the ‘Symbolum Chalcedonense’]”, )LORVRILFNiUHIOH[H 40 (2011), 27: “It seems that the propositions of the Symbolum Chal-

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(This indicates already the aporetic nature of the figure of FRPPXQLFDWLRLGL RPDWXP, as I will show later.) Yet still, the FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP should be an instrument for grasping and expressing the searched XQLW\ of these two natures, because they should not remain simply next to each other, although SHUGHILQLWLRQHP they are absolutely different or even opposite. Therefore, at the same time, the question arises, what kind of unity can be expressed with a paradoxical statement and how far can such unity reach. 133 Or, in other words: what does this “sharing” or “communication” of attributes actually mean? As was obvious already to Leo, the question of the unity of two natures becomes critical regarding the death of Jesus Christ on the cross. The Chalcedonian two natures in combination with the necessity of the FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP obviously raised in a fundamental way the question of the suffering of God in Jesus Christ and a certain theopaschitism seemed to be inevitable.134 The most courageous were the Scythian monks, who in 518/519 came with the formula “One of the Trinity was crucified”, which ascribes the suffering and death not only to the humanity of Jesus Christ, nor to his person but directly to the second person of the Trinity, to the eternal Son. 135 This formula became the matter of the so-called WKHRSDVFKLWLFFRQWURYHUV\ because it went exactly against the basic and firmly rooted presupposition that God is unchangeable and thus impassible (what is sometimes called the “apathy-axioma”). The divine apathy was fundamental and shared by all. From this axioma, then, it was only a small step to take exactly this point as the key differentiation between the natures. cedonense create a set of logically inconsistent assertions (or at least such a set can be drawn from it). Divine attributes are, that is to say, incompatible with the human ones: e.g. God is all-knowing but a human has only limited cognitive abilities etc. When we admit, Christ was ‘truly God and truly human’, we are forced to affirm the assertion that he was omnipotent, and at the same time, that he wasn’t.” Exactly this, however, was the case and strategy in the Antiochene theology, cf. e.g. THEODORET, “Erranistes”, 3*83, 147 (= 1L FHQH DQG 3RVW1LFHQH )DWKHUV II/III, 195): “But when we are discussing the Person we must then make what is proper to the natures common, and apply both sets of qualities to the Saviour, and call the same Being both God and Man, both Son of God and Son of Man.” 133 Cf. UTHEMANN, “Der Neuchalkedonismus”, 219: “Since the union as such is not considered, it is within the frame of a Leonine interpretation of Chalcedon not necessary to do in the theory of predication the step, which led to the neo-Chalcedonian theory of HQK\ SRVWDVLV.” Cf. below, subch. 2.2. 134 Cf. ELERT, 'HU$XVJDQJGHUDOWNLUFKOLFKHQ&KULVWRORJLH (Berlin: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1957), 123–124: “theopaschism” is probably originally a term of Nestorius used by him against Cyril and the monophysites. Cf. also below, Ch. 7.2.2.1. 135 Cf. LOOFS, /HLWIDGHQ, 241; W. ELERT, “Die Theopaschitische Formel”, 7KHRORJLVFKH /LWHUDWXU]HLWXQJ75(1950/4–5), 195–206. IDEM, 'HU$XVJDQJ, 121–124; GRESHAKE, 'HU GUHLHLQH *RWW, 342–343; GRILLMEIER, &KULVW2/2, 317–343; RITTER, “Dogma und Lehre”, 279; BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 151–152. Another variant of the formula says: “e[na th/j a`gi,aj tria,doj peponqe,nai sarki, ” (ibid., 151). This (in its origin already biblical [1Pt 4:1] and then Athanasian and Cyrilline) sarki, proved later to be the way out of the problem, cf. below, subchapter 2.2 and Ch. 7.2.2.1, and also ELERT, 'HU$XVJDQJ, 76–97.

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The most fundamental difference between divinity and humanity was the apathy of divinity and the passibility of humanity. 136 And this line could not be crossed.137 From the western point of view, theopaschitism was always considered rather a heresy because in its consequences, it was close to the Arian and tri-theistic thought.138 The Chalcedonian definition itself mentions the impassibility of the divine twice in the introduction as a crucial point holding strictly the divine apathy. It declares for a nonsense the opinion of those who are “fantasizing that the divine nature of the Only-begotten is passible”. Then, it praises the Tomus of Leo in his critique of Euthychianism, whose mixture of natures would lead to the passibility of divinity. 139 Leo himself, although fascinated by the possibility of FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP, which allowed him to claim Christ’s mortality and immortality at once, strictly differentiated between divine apathy and human suffering. On the one hand, he was able to write the paradoxical, as if theopaschitic sentence “the Son of God is said to have been crucified and buried”, but, on the other hand, right after that he hurries to add “when he endured these things not in the Godhead itself in which he is onlybegotten, coeternal and consubstantial with the Father, but in the weakness of his human nature”.140 With this differentiation, Leo assumes already the orthodox solution of the problem: suffering is to be limited to the human nature only. Otherwise, at least in the Alexandrine mia-physitic sense, the human passion and sufferings would have to be ascribed to the hypostasis of the Logos. This seemed to be the case in Cyril. In his Third letter to Nestorius, he refuses all conceptions of unity, which speak only about “juxtaposition” or “conjunction” and, stressing the Logos as the only subject of all Christ’s actions, he writes in the famous 12 th anathema, leaning on 1Pt 4:1: “the Word of God suffered in the flesh, was crucified in the flesh, and tasted death in the

136

Cf. ELERT, 'HU$XVJDQJ, 87 (concerning the Antiochians). This notion was very common and absolutely fundamental. Suffering and God were in an absolute opposition. A suffering God would lose his divinity. Especially for the Western tradition with its stress on the remaining difference of the natures, the “preservation of the transcedence of God” was crucial (UTHEMANN, “Der Neuchalkedonismus”, 218). Cf. PELIKAN, 7KH&KULVWLDQ7UDGLWLRQ, 231, 268; ELERT, 'HU$XVJDQJ, 72–73. But cf. also K. RAHNER, “Current Problems in Christology”, in IDEM, 7KHRORJLFDO ,QYHVWLJD WLRQV, vol.I, trans. C. ERNST, OP (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1961), 177: “‘One of the most holy Trinity has suffered’, the Scythian monks used to say, with that brutality of faith which takes not only death but its hidden divinity with the same seriousness, so that hundreds of years after Ephesus and Chalcedon we are still startled by it, though it is perfectly obvious, that we are bound to speak like this and that the whole truth, the single unique truth of Christianity, is contained in it.” 138 Cf. GRESHAKE, 'HU GUHLHLQH *RWW, 342–343. Cf. also e.g. the reserved position of HOPING, (LQIKUXQJ, 116: the Pope confirmed that the theopaschitic formula “can be understood in the sense of Chalcedonian orthodoxy”, which was a step by which “the mild monophysitism was much obliged”. 139 '+ 300; 7KH $FWV RI WKH &RXQFLO RI &KDOFHGRQ II, Session V, Nr. 34, 203. Cf. BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 130: “This means that we have to conclude from this ‘argumentum e silentio’: The passion of Christ remains, according to the Chalcedonian conception, restricted to the human nature of the Lord. The incarnated God-Logos is not passible ‘in his flesh’ (Cyril), but rather (in the sense of Tomus Leonis) as ‘true human’.” 140 7KH$FWVRIWKH&RXQFLORI&KDOFHGRQI, Session II, Nr. 22, 20–21. 137

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flesh”.141 However, Cyril could not allow any hint of theopaschitism either. This would go too far. Therefore, in the second step, he stresses repeatedly – in a slightly Apollinarian way, which results from his mia-physitism – the suffering in the flesh, meaning in the flesh only, thus excluding the divinity from all suffering: “He suffers with regard to the flesh that is his own, not with regard to the nature of the divinity. […] Rather, as I said, he should be thought of as suffering with regard to the flesh that is his own, but not suffering in any such manner with regard to the divinity. […] It is like iron, or some other such material, when it is put into contact with fiery flames. It receives the fire into itself and exudes the flame. But if someone strikes it, the material itself takes the hit but the nature of the fire is not at all harmed by the one who strikes. This is how you should understand how the Son is said to suffer in the flesh but not to suffer as far as the divinity.” 142 Obviously, what happens to Christ, “does not happen LQ WKH VDPH ZD\” to his divinity and humanity. 143 Hence, neither Cyril could keep up the unity fully and avoid the answer to the question, what effect had the death on the union of Christ’s person. Overall, an interesting dyophysite point emerges here within the Cyrilline tradition.144 In the effect, the western and the Cyrilline tradition meet at this point.145 At the same time, this ascription of suffering only to the human nature, to the “flesh”, opened the possibility for a compromise solution to the theopaschitic controversy. The theopaschitic formula was accepted as orthodox at the 5 th Ecumenical Council in Constantinople 553 but with a slight and meaningful shift of emphasis in the sketched direction: “Ei; tij ouvc o`mologei/( to.n evstaurwme,non sarki, ku,rion h`mw/n VIhsou/n Cristo.n ei=nai qeo.n avlhqino.n kai. ku,rion th/j do,xhj kai. e[na th/j a`gi,aj tria,doj\ o` toiou/toj avna,qema e;stw.“146 The important emphasis lies on the word σαρϰὶ. The Son of God suffered and died, but in 141 CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA, “Third Letter to Nestorius”, in MCGUCKIN , 6W&\ULORI$O H[DQGULD, 275 (= 3*77, 121D). 142 CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA, 2QWKH8QLW\RI&KULVW, trans. J.A. MCGUCKIN (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1995), 130–131 (= 3* 75, 1357CD); and also already ATHANASIUS, “Orationes adversus Arianos” III, 34, in 3*26, 396. Cf. ANATOLIOS, “The Soteriological Grammar”, who tries to defend the Cyrilline position as the only right. 143 ANATOLIOS, “The Soteriological Grammar”, 171. 144 Hence, for ERWK these traditions applies the critical question, which ANATOLIOS, ibid., 179, asks towards the western conception of FRPPXQLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP: “Indeed, if we merely separate Christological predications into discrete compartments representing the divine and human natures respectively, are we not trying to describe the features of the Incarnation in pre-Incarnation terms? Are we not thereby positing a separation of natures and making the incarnate Word the subject and agent of this separation instead of the subject and agent of the unity of the two natures?” 145 At the same time, this development opened the possibility of further interpretation of Chalcedon, because it set into a relationship what was then called RLNRQRPLD and WKHROR JLD: Christology and Trinity. Cf. BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 153, 177; ELERT, 'HU$XVJDQJ, 119. Another important impulse for a deeper development of this relationship were the (previously already present) problems emerging from the new terminology, which it made explicit, cf. above, subch. 1.2. 146 '+ 432. Cf. 7KH $FWV RI WKH &RXQFLO RI &RQVWDQWLQRSOH RI , vol. 2, trans. R. PRICE, Translated Texts for Historians 51 (Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 2009), 123: “If anyone does not profess that our Lord Jesus Christ, crucified in the flesh, is true God and Lord of glory and one of the holy Trinity, let him be anathema.” Cf. W. ELERT, “Die Theopaschitische Formel”, 201.

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the flesh, meaning only in the flesh, not in Godhead. The suffering was confirmed in the human nature only. 147 Regarding divinity, clearly the traditional view won, keeping God apart from all suffering and change and preserving God’s apathy and immutability. On this point, both natures were strictly differentiated and kept apart. “Because the impassibility of God was a basic presupposition of all christological doctrine, any formula that seemed to tend toward jeopardizing this impassibility was suspect.” 148 With this emphasis, this solution became the standard solution in the catholic as well as in the Eastern-orthodox theology until today.149 This marks another problem of a rather cautious use of FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP. By not doing the last step vis-à-vis the death of Jesus Christ, it obviously splits the person of Jesus into two. But to do the last step consistently would raise serious questions about the conception of divinity, because the traditional concept of God would be broken from within. Thus, at the point of death, we either – following the tradition – abandon the unity of the person of Jesus Christ, or, we need another concept of God.150 I will argue for the second option.151

In answer to the question, what is meant by the “sharing” of properties, there is one more important differentiation to make. The strict Western differentiation of both natures in Christ supported the old tendency to conceive the FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP only YHUEDOLWHU, i.e., only in the mode of predication about the person of Jesus Christ, not UHDOLWHU, which would mean also a real ontological communication and unification of the natures. 152 What could it mean and how irritating it could be, if the FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP would be applied not YHUEDOLWHU but consistently UHDOLWHU and if, therefore, the divine nature should participate somehow in the human nature, saw Nestorius in the first place – with an obvious scare: “For those who allow themselves to be carried away by this notion of ‘appropriation’ must of necessity admit that because of this appropriation God the Word was i nvolved in sucking at the breast, and in gradual growth, and in trepidation at the time of the passion, needing the assistance of an angel. I will make no mention of circumcision, sacr ifice, sweating, hunger; all those things which, joined with the flesh, are actually adorable 147 Cf. PELIKAN, 7KH &KULVWLDQ 7UDGLWLRQ 1, 246: “The specter of Gnostic and other forms of docetism made it imperative for all to affirm the reality of the sufferings of Christ and of his agony in the garden; the specter of Patripassianism made it impossible to attribute these to the divine nature.” 148 Ibid., 270–271. 149 Cf. POSPÍŠIL, -Håtã]1D]DUHWD, 181: “We can close: Any change, any ‘becoming’ in Christ concerns solely his humanity; God remains basically unchangeable.” And Pospíšil refers to THOMAS AQUINAS, 67KI, q13 a7. 150 Cf. clearly and shortly ELERT, 'HU$XVJDQJ, 122: “Either is Christ, as the one who also suffered and died, the incarnated Logos of God, or he is not him at all. This is the A and O of all theopaschitic formulas. Every incarnational Christology without theopaschitic expression is incomplete. And in case that it avoids such expression knowingly, it is a deception or a self-deception” (originally partly italicized). 151 Cf. below, Ch. 5. For the problem of death of God in Jesus Christ cf. below, Ch. 7. 152 Cf. GLEEDE, “Vermischt”, 72–78, with the typically Lutheran result: “All in all, avnti,dosij tw/n ivdiwma,twn does not have any other meaning than the internal christological joyful exchange” (ibid., 77). However, it is not that simple, cf. below, subch. 2.5.

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because they were done for our sake, but which, if they are attributed to the Godhead, are merely lies and become the grounds for our rightful condemnation as blasphemers.”153 It will take more than thousand years, until M. Luther will claim exactly this “that it is said correctly and truly: God is born, breastfed or nursed, he lies in the manger, is cold, walks, stands, falls down, peregrinates, is awake, eats, drinks, suffers, dies etc.” 154

It is then no surprise that the term “FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP” or “avnti,dosij tw/n ivdiwma,twn” is very often translated as “common application of WHUPV” or as “$XVVDJHQWDXVFK”, as if it concerned only the way of speaking about Jesus Christ. The tradition – which, in the course of time, added onto the ontic level the differentiation between the essential, unshareable properties and shareable accidents for each nature, and, hence, stressed the difference between the natures even more 155 – distinguished also very strictly what can be predicated about each of the natures and about the unity of the person. The particular attributes were to relate to the person in which both natures concur, not to the other nature. The communication runs, therefore, always through the level of the unity of the person, never directly from one nature to the other. All theologians of the early church, of course, speak about the unity of the person and try to think it. But when the duality of the natures becomes the leading perspective, as is the case when one uses the idea of FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP, which starts with the natures as self-standing agents, every higher unity has to fail.156 153 NESTORIUS, “Second Letter to Cyril”, $&2I,3, 25,30–36, English in MCGUCKIN, 6W &\ULORI$OH[DQGULD, 367. 154 M. LUTHER, 'U 0DUWLQ /XWKHUV 7LVFKUHGHQ ±, vol. 6 (Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1921), 68,37–40. 155 Already Leontius of Byzantium distinguishes between universal and individual qualities, cf. DALEY, “Unpacking the Chalcedonian Formula”, 185; B. GLEEDE, 7KH'HYHORS PHQW RI WKH 7HUP evnupo,statoj IURP 2ULJHQ WR -RKQ RI 'DPDVFXV (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2012), 69–99, tracing this distinction back to Aristotle and Porphyry. John of Damascus distinguishes between properties (ivdiw,mata), which are constitutive for the nature, and accidents (sumbebhko,nta), which are constitutive for the person, cf. CROSS, “Perichoresis”, 81: “[A] (universal) nature is a collection of (universal) properties, […] a (particular) hypostasis is this nature along with a unique collection of (universal) accidents”. (Cf. below, subchapter 2.3.) For the later development cf. also THOMAS AQUINAS, 67KIII, q16 a5. G. BIEL, &ROOHFWRULXP FLUFD TXDWWXRU OLEURV 6HQWHQWLDUXP ,,,, ed. W. WERBECK and U. HOFMANN (Tübingen 1979), 154–155, speaks about “determinations” and differentiates determinations of the first (ILQLWXV, FUHDWXUD, DQQLKLODELOLV) and second order (KRPR, DQL PDO, PRUWDOH). Only the latter can be predicated about Christ (cf. O. BAYER, “Das Wort ward Fleisch”, in &UHDWRU HVW &UHDWXUD /XWKHUV &KULVWRORJLHDOV /HKUH YRQ GHU ,GLRPHQ NRPPXQLNDWLRQ, ed. O. BAYER and B. GLEEDE, TBT 138 [Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2007], 18). 156 GRILLMEIER, &KULVW 2/1, 159–166, shows the oscillation between unity and duality in the theology of Leo with all its ambiguities. There is this notion on one side: “Strictly speaking, there would have to be thus two SHUVRQDH in Christ” (ibid., 162). But then also:

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However, and this is the crucial point and the biggest problem, with a verbal-only use of the FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP, the unity of the person of Jesus Christ only remains in the mode of predication, whereas the natures keep their primacy and importance as the individual agents in Christ. Western theology was hence unable to think a real unity of Christ’s person. 157 This was confirmed and from then on fixed at the 6 th Ecumenical Council in Constantinople 680–681 (seen in the discussion about the history of the dogma, in opposition to the 5 th Council of 553, as the victory of Western influence 158), which accepted the dyotheletist doctrine, that, in fact, split the person of Jesus Christ into two: „This doctrine in turn gave rise to the misunderstanding that the duality of wills in Jesus Christ also made it necessary to assume a duality of subjects, so that his divine and human natures must be distinguished not just as DOLXG HW DOLXG but as DOLXV HW DOLXV“.159 The old abyss separating the eternal and immutable God from the mortal and mutable human was only transferred onto the person of Jesus Christ where “the whole question begins all over again”.160 This verbal-only use of the FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP is in contradiction to the original intention of Chalcedon. Its claim was to give a rule not only for how to talk about Jesus Christ but rather for the ontological conception of his person along with a real relation of the natures. 161 Hence, the early Western application of the FRPPXQLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP lags behind the intentions of Chalcedon. There were, however, only a few theologians in the history (actually only Luther and later partly the Protestant Lutheran orthodoxy) who dared to make some steps towards a UHDOLWHU-understanding of the FRPPXQL FDWLRLGLRPDWXP. If this understanding should avoid falling into the aporias of the other extreme, as it is the danger in Luther and the Lutheran orthodoxy “Like Cyril of Alexandria, Leo too always sees first the concrete subject in Jesus of Nazareth. The unity is his starting point” (ibid., 163; cf. BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 92–94). 157 Cf. RAHNER, “Current Problems in Christology”, 180: &RPPXQLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP is being either “understood ‘monophysitically’ in the form of a cryptogamic heresy (VLWYHQLD YHUER!) […], or, while the immutability of the Logos and the Chalcedonian ἀσυγχύτωj remained clear, the emptily formal abstractions of the unity (for all its being hypostatic) would take on no real fullness of meaning for us.” Cf. also J. WERBICK, *RWWPHQVFKOLFK (LQHHOHPHQWDUH&KULVWRORJLH (Freiburg: Herder, 2016), 277, footnote 75: “The doctrine of the communication of idioms comes more and more to the position of a differentiated regulation of speech, which shall on one hand meet the dogma of Chalcedon, and, on the other hand, it shall hold back Nestorianism, which wants to have such communication of idioms excluded; however, it brings no clarity into what is here really said.” 158 Cf. LOOFS, /HLWIDGHQ, 246. 159 DALFERTH, &UXFLILHGDQG5HVXUUHFWHG, 141. 160 RAHNER, )RXQGDWLRQVRI&KULVWLDQ)DLWK, 220. 161 For a more detailed debate about the intrinsic claim and self-understanding of Chalcedon, see the discussion in COAKLEY, “What does Chalcedon solve and what does it not?”, 143–163.

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(cf. below, subch. 2.5–6), it requires – as already mentioned above – a wholly different conception of divinity and of the relation of God to the world. At the same time, the problem of FRPPXQLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP recalls the aforementioned problem of Chalcedon itself. The Creed only sketches a solution in very heavy substance terms and presents the natures in symmetrical relations. This, in combination with the conception of divinity and humanity as opposites (infinite – finite, immortal – mortal, unchangeable – changeable, impassible – passible), results necessarily in logically contradictory claims, which can barely concur in one person, as Chalcedon defined it. The further development showed very soon that it was not possible to keep the symmetry of the natures, as proposed in Chalcedon in the Antiochene-Leonine heritage, because it endangered the unity of Christ’s person. 162 From the beginning of the christological controversy, this was the fundamental stress of Alexandrine theology, which sought an expression of unity with much greater intensity.  (QK\SRVWDVLV The accentuation of the unity of the person had been strong since the Apollinarian and Cyrilline PLDSK\VLV-formula, which corresponded also with popular monophysitism. Whereas the Western and Antiochene approach chose the two natures as the theological starting point, Alexandrine theology started with the unity of Christ’s person. It was Cyril’s important notion that the d uality of Christ’s natures can be discerned only in a retrospective theoretical analysis, not in and through the actions of Jesus Christ. 163 The person of Jesus Christ was constituted “evk du,o fu,sewn”.164 162 Cf. the struggle of Gelasius I with the symmetry, GRILLMEIER, &KULVW2/1, 297–305. PELIKAN, 7KH&KULVWLDQ7UDGLWLRQ 1, 269, calls the symmetry “deceptively simple and ultimately imprecise”. DALEY, “Unpacking the Chalcedonian Formula”, 180–181, summarizes very well: “But Chalcedon’s positive formulation of how the Church must interpret Nicene theology and confess the person of Christ, for all its even-handedness, still seems to have struck many – probably a majority – of Greek-speaking Christians as too symmetrical, too dialectical, too ready to affirm the continuing, even independent, functioning of the two utterly different realities or ‘natures’ united in Christ’s one ‘person,’ to count as an unambiguous affirmation of the Church’s ancient faith that it was truly God the Son who spoke and healed, died and rose, as the Jesus of the Gospels.” 163 “th|/ qewri,a| mo,nh”, as the 5th Ecumenical Council later put it ('+ 428); or evn evpinoi,a|, as wrote LEONTIUS OF JERUSALEM, “Liber contra Monophysitas”, 3* 86, 1801AB. Cf. GRILLMEIER, &KULVW1, 480. 164 However, Cyril was able to write also sentences, which go in the same direction as Leo and found their way into the Chalcedonian definition, cf. CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA, “Second Letter to Nestorius”, PG 77, 45C/46C (=$&2 I,1, 26,25–27,18): “While the natures that were brought together into this true unity were different, nonetheless there is One Christ and Son from out of both. This did not involve the negation of the difference of natures, rather that the Godhead and manhood by their ineffable and indiscribable consilience into unity achieved One Lord and Christ and Son for us” (English translation from

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At the same time, it was subsequently more and more clear that the primary subject and unifying principle with primary activity, i.e., the KHJHPRQLNRQ was the Logos – the preexistent second person of the Trinity, the trinitarian K\SRVWDVLV of the Son who became flesh in Jesus Christ, so that in the unity of natures, divinity had the upper hand. 165 This brought the conception of the two natures, from the very start, into obvious asymmetry, to a one-sided inclination from active divinity to the receptive humanity. For the early church, the divine attributes of Christ were, in the end, more important that the human ones; the main interest lied in the participation of the human nature in the divine rather than the other way round. Divine participation in humanity was, on the one hand, absolutely necessary for salvation, because the main soteriological thesis was the so-called formula of interchange, as expressed most typically by Gregory of Nyssa: “To. ga.r avpro,slhpton( avqera,peuton. What is not accepted is not healed.” 166 The divine Logos had to accept full humanity to save humanity completely. On the other hand, this necessary divine participation in humanity was always a complication for theology (and not only for the theology of the early church). There was a clear interest in Christ’s full humanity (the most may be in the first two centuries in the struggle against gnostic docetism), yet not in the old, sinful humanity, as is the case with all people, but rather in a divine or divinized humanity, because only from such a human could salvation be attained.167 It was thus much more important for human nature to attain the MCGUCKIN, 6W&\ULORI$OH[DQGULD, 263). Based on such sentences, it is not easy to understand why Cyril insisted so much on his PLDSK\VLV-formula. “The right thing now would have been for Cyril to give up the ‘Apollinarian’ language of the mi,a fu,sij formula once and for all. Had he done this, without doubt the further development of christological dogma would have been preserved from much confusion” (GRILLMEIER, &KULVW1, 476). 165 Cf. GRILLMEIER, &KULVW2/2, 455: “In brief, as we have ascertained, there then arose the custom of identifying the ‘one K\SRVWDVLV’ in Christ with the K\SRVWDVLV of the preexistent Logos (Patriarch Gennadius, Diadochus of Photike). In this manner the way was opened for further reflections on what constituted the difference between the ‘concept’ of K\SRVWDVLVand that of ‘nature’, and finally on what could lead to the elaboration of a definition of K\SRVWDVLV.” For the tendency to an asymmetrical relation on the Antiochene side, e.g. in Theodoret, see BEYSCHLAG , *UXQGULVV, 91, fn. 158. 166 GREGORY OF NYSSA, Ep. 101, 3* 37, 181–183; and Gregory continues: “{O de. h[nwtai tw/| Qew/|( tou/to kai. sw,zetai.” It is the unity of humanity and divinity that brings salvation. 167 Cf. the sermons of Leo (3/54, 192, 211, 217) as quoted by CAMELOT, (SKHVXVXQG &KDOFHGRQ, 166: “If Christ wasn’t the true God, he could not have healed us; if he wasn’t a true man, he could not have given us any example [sic!] […] He became man like us so that we can participate [in] his divine nature.” The best example is, however, Leontius of Jerusalem, who elaborated the conception of WKHRVLV. Cf. below and LEONTIUS OF JERUSALEM, “Contra Nestorianos” II, 21, in 3*86/1, 1581 (incorrectly attributed to “Leontius Byzantinus seu Hierosolymitanus”); and UTHEMANN, “Definitionen und Paradigmen”, 106–122.

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positive aspects of the divine attributes, which was possible only through the acceptance of humanity by the divine nature. The divine nature itself in no way needed the low human attributes and accepted them only due to soteriological necessity, while the question remained: to what extent could immutable divinity accept human finitude? Patristic theology was thus concerned not only with the proper way of speaking about Jesus Christ but rather with the ontology of his person, with the orthodox answer to the question of who he substantially was. Patristic theology thought UHDOLWHU about Jesus Christ and sought to answer both the question of how the incarnation had been possible and how the incarnation was to be thought of.

For many followers of the Alexandrine standpoint, Chalcedon was considered a loss, even though the Creed absorbed many of the concrete formulations of Cyril. After post-Chalcedonian attempts to reestablish monophysitism, 168 a serious theological concept arose, which tried to interpret Chalcedon again more according to the intentions of the theology of Cyril and defend it against objections from both extreme wings, from the monophysite as well as from the Nestorian. The discussion speaks since J. Lebon about the so-called “neoChalcedonism” 169 or about “Cyrilline Chalcedonianism” 170, which was prepared in the work of Johannes Grammatikos171 and represented in the first place by the texts of Leontius of Byzantium and Leontius of Jerusalem. 172 They developed – each with his own particular contribution, yet further in my text seen in a synthetic perspective – the concept of incarnation as HQK\SRVWD VLV.173 Starting with the divine Logos as the second person of the Trinity, this 168

By Severus of Antioch and his followers in the first place, cf. GRILLMEIER, &KULVW 2/2, 21–180. 169 The term was used the first time by J. LEBON in his work /HPRQRSK\VLVPHVpYHULHQ (Louvain: J. Van Linthout, 1909). Cf. also UTHEMANN, “Der Neuchalkedonismus”, 207– 255; GRAY, 7KH'HIHQVHRI&KDOFHGRQ, 1–6; IDEM, “Neuchalkedonismus”, in 7KHRORJLVFKH 5HDOHQ]\NORSlGLH , ed. G. MÜLLER (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 1994), 289–296; GRILLMEIER, &KULVW 2/2, 429–438; IDEM, “Der Neu-Chalkedonismus”, in IDEM, 0LW LKP XQGLQLKP&KULVWRORJLVFKH)RUVFKXQJHQXQG3HUVSHNWLYHQ (Freiburg: Herder, 1975), 371– 387; S. HELMER, 'HU1HXFKDONHGRQLVPXV*HVFKLFKWH%HUHFKWLJXQJXQG%HGHXWXQJHLQHV GRJPHQJHVFKLFKWOLFKHQ %HJULIIHV (Bonn: Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, 1962). 170 Cf. MEYENDORFF, &KULVW, 29–46; A. LOUTH, “Christology in the East from the Council of Chalcedon to John Damascene”, in 2[IRUG+DQGERRNRI&KULVWRORJ\, ed. F.A. MURPHY (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2015), 142. To what means “Cyrilline” at this point cf. BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 172–173. 171 Cf. UTHEMANN, “Definitionen und Paradigmen”, 60–95; GRILLMEIER, &KULVW , 52–72; GLEEDE, 7KH'HYHORSPHQW, 50–61. 172 For the identification of both Leontii cf. GRILLMEIER, &KULVW 2/2, 181–186 and 271– 275. 173 To the development of the term cf. GLEEDE, 7KH'HYHORSPHQW; ESSEN, 'LH)UHLKHLW -HVX, 34–48.

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concept tries to reinterpret the incarnation through a Cyrilline reading of the Chalcedonian definition that two SK\VHLV concur in one K\SRVWDVLV. This is done, however, with a significant shift in the understanding of K\ SRVWDVLV, as already mentioned above. In the ILUVWVWHS, this must be clear: The self-standing K\SRVWDVLV of the person of Jesus Christ is not constituted afterwards as the result of the connection of the two natures. It is from the beginning the K\SRVWDVLV of the divine Logos, which precedes the whole incarnation. Therefore, this must be from the beginning the only K\SRVWDVLV and thus the only subject in the whole process.174 The VHFRQG VWHS: The divine K\SRVWDVLV of the Logos must accept the human nature in some way. However, this cannot mean a whole human person, the whole human K\SRVWDVLV – said in the traditional terms: the incarnation proceeds as DVVXPSWLRKXPDQDHQDWXUDH, not as DVVXPSWLRKRPLQLV. This latter concept bears the adoptionist danger that the Logos would accept a complete human being, already constituted before the unity and actually splits J esus Christ into two sons, into two ununifiable K\SRVWDVHLV – which was precisely the danger of Nestorianism.175 The divine Logos accepts, therefore – or more precisely: creates in himself, in-creates176 – solely a human nature, which does not have any own human K\SRVWDVLV, into its own divine K\SRVWD VLV. In this way, the divine K\SRVWDVLV constitutes the unity of the whole person.177 The divine K\SRVWDVLV has then obviously a double function in this process and also in the constituted person: it is the K\SRVWDVLV of the divine Logos and at the same time the K\SRVWDVLV of the accepted human nature. 178 This means, as it seems to be the case in Leontius of Jerusalem, that, in fact, K\SRVWDVLV has three functions, which gives the conception of Leontius a very agreeable dynamic tendency. First, the K\SRVWDVLV of the Logos is the K\SRVWDVLV of the incarnated person of Jesus 174 Cf. UTHEMANN, “Der Neuchalkedonismus”, 217: “For every predication, he [sc. Logos] is the subject ‘in itself’ (kaq’ e`auto,). However, if the individual human nature of Christ, assumed by the Logos, may be also a subject of statements, then it cannot be this subject ‘in itself’ but rather only as a not self-standing subject: ouvk ivdikw/j( ouvk ivdiou?posta,twj( ouvk avna. me,roj etc., as it was said against a Nestorian construction while, at the same time, the first step towards a theory of HQK\SRVWDVLV was made.” 175 Cf. UTHEMANN, “Definitionen und Paradigmen”, 92–93. For the term of nature with its properties and attributes, cf. also DALEY, “Unpacking the Chalcedonian Formula”, 184– 189; CROSS, “Perichoresis”, 73–86. 176 Cf. RAHNER, )RXQGDWLRQVRI &KULVWLDQ )DLWK, 220: “The phrase is already found in Augustine that God ‘assumes by creating’ and also ‘creates by assuming’, that is, he creates by emptying himself, and therefore, of course, he himself is in the emptying. He creates the human reality E\ WKH YHU\ IDFW WKDW he assumes it as his own.” Cf. also BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 179, with references to patristic texts; ESSEN, 'LH)UHLKHLW-HVX, 42. 177 UTHEMANN, “Definitionen und Paradigmen”, 110. 178 Cf. ibid., 111–112.

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Christ, where it is the common (koinh,)K\SRVWDVLV. Second, it can serve, at the same time, as an own (ivdikh,) K\SRVWDVLV for each nature, the divine as well as the human, depending on the relation to God or to humans. And third, for the human nature and its HQK\SRVWDVLV, this means that it KDV a K\SRVWDVLV, but LV QRW a K\SRVWDVLV, i.e., not in itself, not for itself but only within the K\SRVWDVLV of the Logos.179 The human nature can use the K\SRVWDVLVof the Logos as its own (u`po,stasij ivdikh, pro.j h`ma/j) but not as an own particular K\SRVWDVLV (ivdiadzousa u`po,stasij).180 With these very substance-thought terms, Leontius tries obviously to express dynamic relational issues: the divine K\SRVWDVLV seems to have a certain adaptability.181 If the K\SRVWDVLV could work in such multifunctional way, the man Jesus would be then in this respect in no way different from other people. At the same time, I must be fair and not overstretch the interpretation of Leontius. Besides the legitimate question, whether the term K\SRVWDVLV is not being used equivocally here,182 Leontius is, in the case of Jesus Christ, not interested in the common humanity. He wants rather to show the exact opposite: that Christ is not human in the same sense as all other people but different, divinized: “In Leontios comes the human Jesus not closer to all people, but he is and remains the divinized human at a distance to any human ‘like you and me’.”183

And then the WKLUGVWHS – the crucial point of this thought (for Leontius of Jerusalem the main positive of the whole, to me, however, the main problem of the whole): the human SK\VLV cannot exist only DVVXFK, but for a real existence, it has to acquire some specific, particular attributes in order to be constituted as a particular hypostasis. In the case of Jesus Christ, his human nature gets these specific attributes not within a human hypostasis but within the hypostasis of the divine Logos. Thus, WKH KXPDQ QDWXUH JHWV GLYLQH DW WULEXWHVLQWKHLQFDUQDWLRQ. The point in Leontius is not the universal humanity of Christ but the divinization of Christ’s human VDU[, which is never out-

179

Ibid., 92, 100. LOOFS, Leitfaden, 240. Therefore, the human nature is precisely HQK\SRVWDWRQ, not DQK\SRVWDWRQ. It has a K\SRVWDVLV, although not its RZQ K\SRVWDVLV. This slight difference, important for LEONTIUS OF BYZANTIUM (cf. “Contra Nestorianos et Euthychianos” I, 3*86/1, 1277D; GLEEDE, 7KH'HYHORSPHQW, 61–69; UTHEMANN, “Definitionen und Paradigmen”, 92, quoting the unpublished dissertation of B.E. Daley: “anhypostatic” would mean “purely abstract”) as well as for LEONTIUS OF JERUSALEM (cf. “Contra Nestorianos” II 10, 3* 86/1, 1556; GRILLMEIER, &KULVW 2/2, 284–285; GLEEDE, 7KH 'H YHORSPHQW, 122–137), got lost in the flow of time, which supported the common trivial view of Christ as identified solely with the divine Logos in human flesh (this view originates already from Cyril, against whom already Nestorius raised the objection of the human nature as anhypostatical, and therefore only fictional, cf. GLEEDE, “Vermischt”, 61; LOOFS, /HLWIDGHQ, 243–244). The humanity of Christ was thereby diminished the more. 180 LEONTIUS OF JERUSALEM, “Contra Nestorianos” II 14 and V 29, 3* 86/1, 1568C and 1749B; cf. UTHEMANN, “Definitionen und Paradigmen”, 112. 181 Which goes nicely in the direction of my concept of divine accommodation, cf. below, Ch. 5 and 6.1. 182 UTHEMANN, “Definitionen und Paradigmen”, 112; GRILLMEIER, &KULVW 2/2, 292. 183 UTHEMANN, “Definitionen und Paradigmen”, 112–113; LEONTIUS OF JERUSALEM, “Contra Nestorianos” II 14, 3*86/1, 1565–1568.

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side of the divine K\SRVWDVLV, rather always in connection with Logos, and receives the divine attributes, “which do not pertain to any other human”. 184 This interpretation fits smoothly with the conception of the virgin birth from the Holy Spirit as the source of the divine attributes of Christ’s humanity; but, at the same time, a serious question about the IXOO humanity of Jesus Christ arises. Can a solely human nature without particular human attributes be considered a full humanity, a full human being?185 Is this divinized (and in its humanness diminished) humanity still a humanity, given its difference from all other humans? 186 This point would come under heavy but legitimate attack later on in the Enlightenment with its accent on the real and concrete historical humanity of the man Jesus. In this respect, the interest of Leontius and of his concept of HQK\SRVWDVLV is fundamentally different. A stress on the historical humanity is not found here.187 184 Cf. UTHEMANN, “Definitionen und Paradigmen”, 113. ESSEN, 'LH)UHLKHLW-HVX, 29, fn. 15, points already to Gregory of Nyssa, who, in his Christology, was able to avoid the danger of two Sons only at exactly this cost: that the human attributes of Christ’s humanity were replaced by the divine ones. 185 Although this conception has still been used by some until today (cf., e.g., E. JÜNGEL, -XVWLILFDWLRQ 7KH +HDUW RI &KULVWLDQ )DLWK, trans. J.F. CAYZER [Edinburgh/New York: T&T Clark, 2001], 161), this question shows its aporias, which follow from the thinking in the terms of substances and attributes. Already within this old system of thought itself, the crucial question is: how can it exist and what should be human nature without any attributes, as such, when humans exist only as particular exemplars? Is not such an entity, as indicated above, “purely abstract”? Cf. below, Ch. 8.3.3.2 and SCHLEIERMACHER, 7KH&KULVWLDQ)DLWK, § 97.2, 402: “It is not an easily solved problem, to think of something as the human nature of Christ and yet as impersonal, since the nature in which we all share can only be called the nature of an individual in so far as it has become personal in him. But if we go into the idea, there must arise the new difficulty, how, in view of this impersonality, the human nature in Christ can fail to be more imperfect in Him than in us all?” Similarly BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 178–181. GLEEDE, 7KH'HYHORSPHQW, 2, states also that the concept of HQ\KSRVWDVLV led to diminishing of the human personality of Christ and reminds that HQK\SRVWDVLV cannot be simply identified with insubsistence because of the danger that the insubsistence of the human nature in the divine K\SRVWDVLV would be conceived only as accidental (ibid., 187). 186 In a certain variation, the Apollinarian-Cyrilline underestimation of the human soul or mind, which always stood for the specifics of one’s personality, comes back again here (cf. in the context of the polemic of Leontius of Byzantium with the afthartics in GRILLMEIER, &KULVW2/2, 222–226). Interesting for the next development is the fact that the same applies also to the conception of Thomas Aquinas as well, cf. J. WAWRYKOW, “The Christology of Thomas Aquinas in Its Scholastic Context”, in 2[IRUG+DQGERRNRI&KULV WRORJ\, ed. F.A. MURPHY (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2015), 245, who tries to defend Thomas but on this point with an aporetic argument: “A human person in exactly the same way that I am a human person? No; but a human person, nonetheless.” 187 Leonardo Boff, who stresses the historical existence of Jesus as the starting point of Christology, sees, paradoxically, the absence of an own human K\SRVWDVLV as a positive fact, cf. L. BOFF, -HVXV &KULVW /LEHUDWRU. $ &ULWLFDO &KULVWRORJ\ IRU 2XU 7LPH, trans. P.

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Nevertheless, the conception of HQK\SRVWDVLV viewed this fact positively. Its point and the point of the whole of humanity – and hence of salvation – was: WKHRVLV, GLYLQL]DWLRQ.188 The incarnation of Jesus Christ set all the necessary conditions for it once and for all and constituted and opened up a new ontological dynamic for everyone. (QK\SRVWDVLV is hence an LQGLYLQL]DWLRQ, an incorporation of humanity into divinity – which is exactly the opposite of an incarnation in which God enters into the humanity. It is quite a paradoxical outcome: nearly all theologians of the early church speak about incarnation, about how God became man leaning on John 1:14, but no one can really realize it in a theological conception. Mostly, the line of thought goes in the same direction as in Leontius: not *RG does become human, but human is somehow integrated into the divinity. This interpretation, however, blurs an important Chalcedonian distinction, which is fundamental for the whole of theology, not only for soteriology – the distinction between God and humans, between Creator and creation. The Chalcedonian emphasis clearly says that in the unity of the person of Jesus Christ, *RGUHPDLQV*RGDQGKXPDQUHPDLQVKXPDQ; none of them mutates or is transformed into the other. The concept of WKHRVLV, however, tries to establish a base for exactly this direction, with a soteriological point: for salvation, humans will become divine. With this, humanity in its own substance and meaning is diminished, as if it were something soteriologically incapable, what must be enhanced, amended or even – in the most radical version – overcome.189 HUGHES (London: S.P.C.K., 1980), 196–197: “Because he opened himself to and gave himself over to God with absolute confidence […] Jesus does not possess what the Council of Chalcedon taught: He was lacking of ‘hypostasis,’ a subsistence enduring in himself and for himself. […] The absence of a human personality (hypostasis or subsistence) does not constitute an imperfection in Jesus but rather his highest perfection. Emptying himself means creating interior space to be filled with the reality of the other. It is by going out of oneself that human beings remain profoundly with their own selves; it is by giving that one receives and possesses one’s being. Hence Jesus was the human being par excellenc e, HFFH KRPR.” More to the conceptions of liberation theology see below, Ch. 6.3. 188 Cf. UTHEMANN, “Definitionen und Paradigmen”, 109, 113–117; PANNENBERG, -H VXV, 39–42. For the concept of WKHRVLV in broader context, cf. P. NELLAS, 'HLILFDWLRQ LQ &KULVW2UWKRGR[ 3HUVSHFWLYHV RQ WKH 1DWXUH RI WKH +XPDQ 3HUVRQ, trans. N. RUSSELL (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997); 7KHRVLV'HLILFDWLRQLQ&KULVWLDQ7KH RORJ\, vol. 2, Princeton Theological Monograph Series 156, ed. V. KHARLAMOV (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2011); here further literature; ANATOLIOS, “The Soteriological Grammar”, led by the Cyrilline perspective of Constantinople II tries to establish WKHRVLV as the normative conception for the orthodox concept of salvation, tacitly presupposing HQK\ SRVWDVLV as the leading christological model. 189 HICK, 7KH0HWDSKRU, 130, in his only presentical and rather Pelagian soteriological concept, conceives WKHRVLV as “gradual transformation of the person from human animal into the finite ‘likeness’ of God” so that “it is this actual human change that constitutes

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I am convinced that a conception of salvation, where humans remain humans and are brought to the fulfillment of their humanity in community with God, is a much stronger conception, because it can take more seriously humanity in all its dimensions. Instead of WKHRVLV, I would therefore speak about DQWKURSRSRHVLV as the final goal of humanity: to become more or fully human in community with other creation and God.190

The main advantage of the conception of HQK\SRVWDVLVis a clear model of the unity of Christ’s person, which is speculatively reconstructed from a retrospective view as a pro,swpon su,nqetoj or a composite K\SRVWDVLV.191 Leontius of Byzantium calls the result of this retrospective reconstruction – from the trinitarian Son through the creation of human SK\VLV to the HQK\SRVWDVLV – an DSRWHOHVPD.192 That is an important shift compared to Chalcedon: the DSRWHOHVPD, the result of the whole process, is not the K\SRVWDVLV as such, because the K\SRVWDVLV – as the K\SRVWDVLV of the second person of the Trinity – is the KHJHPRQLNRQ principle from the very beginning. The DSRWHOHVPD, the final point, is the retrospectively reconstructed enhypostatical union of the person of Jesus Christ. The concept of HQK\SRVWDVLV was not the first attempt to solve the unity of two different entities. Since the Antiquity, there were some favorite examples of such cases, in which a real unity was established: iron and fire, wine and water, and body and soul. All three were also christologically important. The anthropological analogy of ERG\ DQG VRXO, rooting in the Neoplatonic term of avsu,gcutoj e[nwsij, bears obviously an Apollinarist danger because christologically, one has to think of the unity with the divinity in Jesus Christ QH[WWR the human unity of body and soul. Yet still, body and soul was a convincing example of a unity of an immaterial and material entity and it became the leading metaphor for the unity of the natures in Jesus Christ, although it evoked an intense discussion between the dichotomical and trichotomical structure of the person of Jesus Christ (or, in Grillmeier’s classical terms: between the Alexandrine Logos-sarx Christology and the Antiochene Logos-anthropos Christology).193 :LQHDQG ZDWHU was an example that secured the difference of the substances, which do not merge to a fusion (su,gcusij, cf. against it the Chalcedonian avsugcu,twj). At the same salvation” as re-centering of life in God, appealing to its closeness to “the modern ‘liberal’ approach initiated in the nineteenth century by Friedrich Schleiermacher”. 190 Cf. below, Ch. 6.2.3. and also GALLUS, “Christologické kořeny”; JÜNGEL, “Humanity in Correspondence to God”, 152–153. 191 Instead of the monophysite e[nwsij fusikh, , the conception now speaks of e[nwsij u`postatikh,, of hypostatic union, cf. BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 178. 192 Cf. LEONTIUS OF BYZANTIUM, “Contra Nestorianos et Euthychianos” I, 7, 3*86/1, 1297C; GRILLMEIER, &KULVW2/2, 454; UTHEMANN, “Definitionen und Paradigmen”, 97. 193 For the roots and the use in neo-Chalcedonism cf. UTHEMANN, “Das anthropologische Modell der hypostatischen Union”, in IDEM, &KULVWXV .RVPRV 'LDWULEH (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2005), 103–196. Further cf. GRILLMEIER, &KULVW1, 438 (Theodor of Mopsuestia), and2/2, 34–39 (Severus of Antioch), 204 (Leontius of Byzantium); Pseudo-Athanasianum (Symbolum “Quicumque”), '+ 76; JOHN OF DAMASCUS, “Expositio fidei”, 60 (III,16), 153–155; from him, these metaphor spread through the whole western tradition to Luther and Protestant orthodoxy (cf. below, subchapter 2.5 and 2.6).

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time, it preserved the immutability of the divinity in the union with humanity. When dissolving a sweet drop of wine in the salty ocean, the wine is afterwards everywhere present, but it does not affect or change the quality or the substance of the water, which remains dominant.194 The example of LURQDQGILUH, very famous and in christological context mentioned the first time probably by Origen 195, stressed, next to the preserved difference of the substances, the activity of the one element, which creates the unity of both. It is the fire (divinity) that heats through the iron (humanity) without diminishing its own quality but, at the same time, giving its quality to the iron as well.196 This metaphor should, therefore, support the concept of the WKHRVLV of human nature.197 Since Antiquity, the common background was the 6WRLFWKHRU\RIPL[WXUH.198 Although the terminology and the meaning of the particular terms were neither here always firm and univocal, the Stoics distinguished in principle three (or four) different ways of two substances creating a unity: para,qesij (or LX[WDSRVLWLR), where the substances remain separated (pieces of different sorts of corn, sand, salt and sugar or gathering of people). The middle form is mi,xij (PL[WLR) or kra/sij (PL[WXUD). In this case, the substances or qualities merge, but keep their properties and can still be separated again, although it might be technically difficult (iron and fire, air and light, water and wine, in some authors also body and soul). The last is total mixture, su,gcusij (FRQFUHWLR, FRQIXVLR), in which the substances merge without the possibility of being separated again and build a new substance wherein the original qualities vanish. For the Christological use, it was clear that su,gcusij is to be avoided. Chalcedon sets against it explicitly the term avsu,gcutwj.199 (What was searched for was avsu,gcutwj e[nwsij

194

Cf. PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 297. He adds correctly, however, that these metaphors were “open to completely opposing interpretations” (ibid.). Cf. also ELERT, 'HU$XVJDQJ, 57, referring to THEODORET OF CYRUS, “Erranistes”, in 3*83, 153D (quoting Gregory of Nyssa); L. ABRAMOWSKI, “Die Schrift Gregors des Lehrers ‘Ad Theopompum’ und Philoxenus von Mabbug”, =HLWVFKULIWIU.LUFKHQJHVFKLFKWH89(1978), 289–290. 195 ORIGENES, 'HSULQFLSLLV II, 6,6; cf. GRILLMEIER, &KULVW1, 146; UTHEMANN, “Definitionen und Paradigmen”, 117. 196 Cf. CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA, 2Q WKH 8QLW\ RI &KULVW, 130–131 (= 3* 75, 1357CD); PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 297; GRILLMEIER, &KULVW2/2, 39–40; UTHEMANN, “Definitionen und Paradigmen”, 117–122. 197 UTHEMANN, “Definitionen und Paradigmen”, 118–121, for Leontius of Jerusalem. However, in this case, the metaphor is inconsistent, because, in fact, it is the iron, which is the substance assuming into itself the fire, whereas the concept of HQK\SRVWDVLV worked in the opposite direction. It is the K\SRVWDVLV of the divine Logos, which assumes humanity into itself. Nevertheless, this metaphor was also used further on for many centuries until the Enlightenment. 198 Cf. GRILLMEIER, &KULVW 2/2, 40 and 205; CROSS, “Perichoresis”, 86–104; J. SELLARS, 6WRLFLVP (Durham: Acumen, 2006), 88–89; H. DÖRRIE, 3RUSK\ULRV¶³6\PPLNWD =HWHPDWD´ ,KUH 6WHOOXQJ LQ 6\VWHP XQG *HVFKLFKWH GHV 1HXSODWRQLVPXV´, Zetemata 20 (München: C.H. Beck, 1959), 24–35. 199 In the earlier times, however, the Fathers like, e.g., the Cappadocians spoke carelessly and undifferentiated about a mixture of natures in Jesus Christ (avna,krasij), cf. GLEEDE, “Vermischt”, 46–47; PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 297. Similarly also Hilary of Poitiers, cf. GRILLMEIER, &KULVW1, 400.

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– against su,gcusij was, therefore and already by Cyril, put the term su,nqesij.200) But for a long time, the middle term of kra/sij seemed to be useful. Moreover, if it was defined as follows: “[T]he two entities are mixed together to the point that every part of the mixture contains both of the original entities, yet each of the original entities retains its own di stinctive properties and can in theory be extracted from the mixture.”201 This seemed to fit for the christological use perfectly. 202 However, there were still some doubts – may be due to the lack of an absolutely firm meaning and due to the middle position, which tends to blur the line towards the extremes. Therefore, some were afraid that in a mixture, the two substances nevertheless create a fusion,203 or at least weaken each other.204 Besides, in the Stoic version, kra/sij creates actually a new entity. 205 In comparison with the concept of HQK\SRVWDVLV, which was developed against this Stoic background,206 kra/sij is static, while HQK\SRVWDVLV has a better dynamic. 207 In the further development, the knowledge of Stoic philosophy rather vanished, while the concept of enhypostasis found its way through the 5 th Council of Constantinople and through John of Damascus into the western Christology (cf. below).208

Next to the obviously leading and principal function of the divine nature, and in terms of the further elaboration of FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP, the figure of HQK\SRVWDVLV brings about a clear declivity, an asymmetry due to its stress on the direction from the divine nature towards the human one and not vice versa.209 In the context of WKHRVLV, it was this direction, in which was the theolo200

Cf. GRILLMEIER, &KULVW 2/2, 205; CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA, ep. 45, 3* 77, 233A; LOOFS, /HLWIDGHQ, 230–231. Cf. also Canon 4 and 7 of Constantinople II, '+ 425 and 428. 201 SELLARS, 6WRLFLVP, 89. Kra/sij in christological use is found e.g. in Tertullian, Novatian or John Chrysostom (cf. GRILLMEIER, &KULVW1, 129, 132, 420). 202 Cf. SELLARS, 6WRLFLVP, 89, when he continues: “For instance, it is reported that if one mixes wine and water in a glass it is possible to extract the wine out of the mixture by using a sponge soaked in oil […]. Although the wine and water are completely mixed, in a way that the grains of salt and sugar are not, it is still possible to separate the two liquids. One slightly paradoxical consequence of this theory of total blending that the Stoics appear to have accepted was the thought that if one added a single drop of wine to the sea then that single drop of wine would have to mix with HYHU\part of the sea, in effect stretching itself out over a vast area.” 203 THEODORET, “Erranistes”, in 3*83, 156, cf. PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 297, fn. 41. 204 GRILLMEIER, &KULVW2/2, 40 and 205. 205 SELLARS, 6WRLFLVP, 89. 206 Clearly in Leontius of Byzantium, cf. GRILLMEIER, &KULVW 2/2, 205; CROSS, “Perichoresis”, 74, fn. 10. 207 Cf. CROSS, “Perichoresis”, 72, who, therefore, distinguishes in John of Damascus, in whom the different patterns and models meet, the static XQLRQLQIDFWRHVVH (the Stoic NUD VLV) and the dynamic XQLRQ LQ ILHUL (the Neoplatonic participation of the human nature in the divine as WKHRVLV). 208 Cf. H.U. VON BALTHASAR, &RVPLF /LWXUJ\, trans. B.E. DALEY, SJ (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2003), 63: With the Chalcedonian ‘indivisibly – unconfusedly’, “the image of a reciprocal indwelling of two distinct poles of being replaced the image of mixture”. 209 Cf. UTHEMANN, “Definitionen und Paradigmen”, 108. Explicitely ANATOLIOS, “The Soteriological Grammar”, 184, who conceives this one-way communication to be funda-

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gy of that time interested. On the contrary, no one was interested in the opposite direction, and although it was clear that Jesus Christ as a true human had to have full humanity there was no interest in humanizing divinity. The path towards salvation led rather through divinized humanity more than through full human humanity as such. Therefore, in Jesus Christ himself, the divine nature was, in the end, more important than the human one. All these small steps contributed to the fact that the KXPDQLW\RI&KULVWZDV PRUH DQG PRUHGLPLQLVKHG. What finally remained was a PHUHO\ GLYLQH picture of Jesus Christ. 210 The neo-Chalcedonist version of Cyrilline theology was officially confirmed at the WK(FXPHQLFDO&RXQFLOLQ&RQVWDQWLQRSOH and became the leading perspective on the Chalcedonian orthodoxy. 211 In accord with the concept of HQK\SRVWDVLV, the council in its mostly negative formulation of the &DQRQHV stated that the union of the Word and of the flesh happened “in the hypostasis”212 – not “concurring into one hypostasis”, as Chalcedon had said leaning on Leo. Therefore, the formulation “evk du,o fu,sewn”, once rejected, was from now on and again an acceptable alternative to the orthodox “evn du,o fu,sesin”.213 The Chalcedonian balance was thus shifted significantly to the Cyrilline line, whereas the Antiochene-Leonine perspective was pushed into the background.214 mental for the hypostatic union, even in the case of Christ’s suffering, which is made possible through divine compassion: “[W]e have to reiterate the principle that any affirmation about Christ can only ultimately mean the communication of the features of the divine nature to the human nature.” 210 Cf. GLEEDE, 7KH 'HYHORSPHQW, 137. Against GRILLMEIER, &KULVW 2/2, 509, who praises the HQK\SRVWDVLV as the perfect unity of divine and human nature. Moreover, analogically to the fusion of church and empire, the missing humanity in the rather divine picture of Christ made place for a merge of this picture with the political emperor into a “p olitical picture of Christ” (BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 182). For a general judgement about the outcome of the old-church Christology cf. BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 192–197. 211 Cf. BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 159–161, 183–185. 212 Cf. '+ 424–426. 213 Cf. LOUTH, “Christology in the East”, 142–143; BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 173: The aim was to “balance dogmatically ‘Chalcedon’ and the ‘whole Cyril’ (including mi,a fu,sij and the 12 Anathematisms) in order to free the Chalcedonian dogma by this key sign [Vorzeichen] from the permanent objection coming from the monophysites against the alleged ‘Nestorian’ heresy.” 214 Cf. BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 182: “The christological integration of the ‘whole Cyril’ [cf. above, fn. 22] was possible only by letting tacitly fall ‘Tomus Leonis’ with its explicit western two-natures doctrine […], which was, since 451, on the equal level with Cyril (this ‘fall’ occurred in 553 when it was overlaid by the ban of ‘Three Chapters’).” In a broader ecclesiastic-political sense, “the christological definition [of the 5 th Council] was not valid universally for the whole empire and church, but it was rather formulated only as a document of the *UHHN orthodoxy, whereas the specific western position was, in fact, disregarded.”

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This council is considered by many the hermeneutical key to Chalcedon itself: in Constantinople II Cyril finally won, as he allegedly should win in Chalcedon itself. To interpret Chalcedon from the viewpoint of Constantinople II is, however, anachronistic and one-sided, because next to the neoChalcedonian perspective, there is also the western perspective, which remained untouched by the neo-Chalcedonian theology215 and asserted itself a hundred years later again in the 6th Ecumenical Council in Constantinople (680–681) with the dogmatic codification of dyotheletism, i.e., of two wills and two energies in Jesus Christ, in which the human obediently submits to the divine.216 However paradoxical it can seem to be, both traditions the eastern and the western finally met in a merely divine picture of Jesus Christ, in one K\SRVWD VLV of Jesus Christ, which suffered, but only in the flesh, only in his humanity. This took place in the West thanks to a strict distinguishing between the two natures and their works, in which the divine nature was always the more important; and in the East thanks to humanity conceived only in the form of the common human SK\VLV, which was divinized in Jesus Christ. Neither concept, however, could think a unity of full humanity and divinity. 217 And both contributed, in the end, to the underestimation of the human element, which lasted since then for many centuries, until the 20 th century. 218 215 Nevertheless, the West got at least the knowledge of the hypostatic union through Gregory the Great, who spent some time in the East, cf. P. GRAY, “Neuchalkedonismus”, in 75( 24, 294. A typical western view on the development of the old church represents CAMELOT, (SKHVXVXQG&KDOFHGRQ, 206–221. 216 This, however, meant to stress the other extreme and to fall into other problems, instead of bringing a solution, cf. '+ 556: “And we proclaim equally two natural volitions or wills in him and two natural principles of action which undergo no division, no change, no partition, no confusion, in accordance with the teaching of the holy fathers. And the two natural wills not in opposition, as the impious heretics said, far from it, but his human will following, and not resisting or struggling, rather in fact subject to his divine and all powerful will.” Cf. ESSEN, 'LH )UHLKHLW -HVX, 54–65. Further cf. above, end of the subch. 2.1. The Eastern perspective with its until then dominant model of HQK\SRVWDVLV led organically from the concept of WKHRVLV and WKHRNLQHVLV over the concept of one hypostatic energy rather to monotheletism, cf. UTHEMANN, “Der Neuchalkedonismus”, 220 and 222–255; GLEEDE, 7KH'HYHORSPHQW, 137. Further cf. BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 185–192. 217 P. SCHOONENBERG, 7KH&KULVW$6WXG\RIWKH*RG0DQ5HODWLRQVKLSLQWKH:KROH RI&UHDWLRQDQGLQ-HVXV&KULVW (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), 61–66, summarizes the objections against the Chalcedonian model and its later interpretations and takes it to the point with a question, which clearly shows the aporetic outcome: “Does the Chalcedonian pattern lead us to a disguised or to a divided Christ?” (ibid., 65). 218 Cf. for the catholic tradition the papal encyclical Sempiternus Rex to the 1500 th anniversary of Chalcedon (1951, '+ 3905), which still denies any human subjectivity in Christ. This is, what WERBICK, *RWWPHQVFKOLFK, 269, criticizes already in the Chalcedonian concept of K\SRVWDVLV: it has no reflexivity or subjectivity. The person of Christ appears therefore as a “metaphysical monster”. The monstrosity of the traditional picture of Christ

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 -RKQRI'DPDVFXV For the further development of Christological doctrine as well as for the continuity of tradition, John of Damascus holds a key position.219 As a Damascus-native (675/676), he lived already in a different religious situation. In the 630’s, Syria was lost to Islam so that Damascus (dar al-Islam) was now the capital of Islamic Umayyad Empire and although the Muslims “had no great desire to convert Christians”, these were, nevertheless, forced to formulate what is Christian orthodoxy. 220 John, therefore, summarizes the Christian tradition in his work. In him, the different Christological traditions and accents of the development until that time meet and he tries to grasp it as a consistent whole. Although he himself does not bring any remarkably new elements next to the traditional ones, through his attempt to systemize the tradition he was brought to a new synthesis of the Christian faith. 221 It is his work – finding its way through Lombardus’ Sentences also into the Western theology, from the scholasticism through Reformation into Enlightenment – which builds the connection between the early Eastern and later Western theology. For the West, who was not so much acquainted with the philosophical traditions, which had built the background for the Eastern theology (“Stoic physics and Neoplatonist metaphysics” in the first place), was John the most important “transmitter of the Chalcedonian tradition”. 222 This meant that with the original background also some important notions and fine differentiations got lost. The interpretation of the John’s Christology has therefore to deal with two basic complications: first, John tries to bind together into a consistent whole in the church Christology is an often-criticized point in the 19th and 20th century from different sides: from liberal theology as well as from some philosophers (cf. e.g. J. MILBANK and S. ŽIŽEK, 7KH 0RQVWURVLW\RI&KULVW 3DUDGR[ RU 'LDOHFWLF" [Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009]). 219 Cf. BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 191–192; C. WESSEL, “Dogma und Lehre in der Orthodoxen Kirche von Byzanz”, in C. ANDRESEN et al., 'LHFKULVWOLFKHQ/HKUHQWZLFNOXQJHQELV ]XP (QGH GHV 6SlWPLWWHODOWHUV, ed. A.M. RITTER (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 322–329; GLEEDE, 7KH'HYHORSPHQW, 162–181. 220 LOUTH, “Christology in the East”, 149. 221 Cf. CROSS, “Perichoresis”, 69, who names him “an unashamed encyclopedist”, who, however, combined traditional elements into a new and unique theory (ibid., 120–121). Further cf. DALEY, *RG9LVLEOH, 223–231. 222 Cf. CROSS, “Perichoresis”, 121. Surprisingly, the Chalcedonian Council is mentioned in John’s main work ([SRVLWLRILGHL only once and as if by the way concerning the Trishagion (JOHN OF DAMASCUS, “Expositio fidei”, 54 (III,10), in 'LH 6FKULIWHQ GHV -R KDQQHVYRQ'DPDVNRVII, ed. B. KOTTER [Berlin: De Gruyter, 1973], 130,44. – I refer further on in the main text to this edition, cf. the English translation JOHN OF DAMASCUS, “Exposition of the Orthodox Faith”, in 1LFHQHDQG3RVW1LFHQH)DWKHUV, Series II, vol. 9, ed. PH. SCHAFF, trans. S.D.F. SALMOND [Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2010], 541–781).

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the whole previous christological tradition with its different positions, developments, and outcomes. It means to unwind a complicated bundle, which necessarily contains contradictions. And moreover, this obstacle is made much more complicated due to the second problem that John is not precise in his terms and expressions. Overall, his work is a piece of early scholasticism, thought in categories of substance and accidents, which shows quite clearly all aporias and contradictions of the early christological tradition. In this respect, John did not bring a new solution, but formulated the tradition in its ambiguities anew. 223 In his christological view, as presented in ([SRVLWLR ILGHL, mainly in the third and fourth part, John tries to unite three different accents. 1) The Western or Antiochene accent on the duality of the natures, which remain unchanged in the union. With this static element goes hand in hand the stress on symmetrical relations between the natures. 2) The neo-Chalcedonian accent on the leading and active role of the divinity as expressed in the concept of HQK\SRVWDVLV. With this dynamic element and with the stress on the unity of the person comes the one-sided declivity from the divine to the human as well as the idea of WKHRVLV. 3) The accent of the uniqueness of Jesus Christ, which John tries to keep in relation to God as well as in relation to humans. All three accents hide their specific dangers, which come out in John, as well as the main problem of impossibility of harmonizing all these ideas into one consistent whole. Regarding the first accent, it might be a surprise that John stands closer to the Western position in general, supported clearly by the dyotheletism of Maximus Confessor. He repeatedly quotes Leo, moreover not only within the Chalcedonian frame but also Leo’s most provocative sentence about each nature performing what is proper to it (47 [III,3], 115,74.79). The Chalcedonian differentiation between natures on one side and the K\SRVWDVLV on the other is obviously of the highest importance to him and he takes a clear stance against all kinds of monophysitism. This differentiation is also the base for the FRP PXQLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP, which, in John’s view, is one of the key points in Christology. He understands the FRPPXQLFDWLR only in the verbal use, but establishes clear rules: the properties of one nature cannot be predicated about 223

With this assessment, I differ from CROSS, “Perichoresis”, 120, who considers the Christology of John to build “a reasonably consistent whole”. In his thorough study, Cross reads John against the background of the Stoic physics (the relation of natures in Christ as Stoic kra/sij) and of Neoplatonist metaphysics (the WKHRVLV of the human nature as participation of the divinity in the humanity). Although he is explicitly interested in the Christ ological predication and in the problem of FRPPXQLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP (ibid., 70), he leaves aside the previous christological development from Chalcedon to Constantinople III, which is important to me and my interpretation of John. Nevertheless, these both approaches do not exclude each other, they can be seen rather complementary. As it will come out, they both meet in many points.

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the other nature. 224 But the properties of both natures can be predicated about the K\SRVWDVLV, even in a mixed way. With this, John justifies what could be otherwise considered an unclear way of predication about Christ: “[W]hen we contemplate the subsistence compounded of the natures we sometimes use terms that have reference to His double nature, as ‘Christ,’ and ‘at once God and man,’ and ‘God Incarnate;’ and sometimes those that imply only one of His natures, as ‘God’ alone, or ‘Son of God,’ and ‘man’ alone, or ‘Son of Man’; sometimes using names that imply His loftiness and sometimes those that imply His lowliness.” (48 [III,4], 116,16–117,21) But a predication about the K\SRVWDVLV cannot be in reward related to both natures, there we must differentiate again. If we speak of Christ as of “God who suffers, and as the Lord of Glory crucified” we do it “not in respect of His being God but in respect of His being at the same time man” (ibid., 117,33–34). The possibility of FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP results from the mutual interpenetration of the natures (ibid., 117,39–40). However, within this strict differentiation or even separation of natures and within this static picture of symmetrical relations, the interpenetration seems to be rather a mere concurrence of two natures existing simply next to each other. The unity, proposed on the verbal level (but at the same time leading to an unclear mixture of expressions), is not backed up by a real unity on the ontical level of the composite K\SRVWDVLV.225 Both natures keep their properties and this is the basic level on which Damascenus thinks. 226 Like Leo, he ascribes very often activities not to the person but to the particular natures. 227 Concerning the conception of nature, there is one new idea that John brought into the discussion, though it is of little help regarding the real unity. Unlike in the Cappadocian theology where nature was simply to koino,n, John brings the difference between properties and accidents: nature is “a collection of (universal) properties”, while K\SRVWDVLV is “this nature along with a unique collection of (universal) accidents”. 228 But obviously, when na224

Cf. 48 (III,4), 117,24–27: “When, then, we speak of His divinity we do not ascribe to it the properties of humanity. For we do not say that His divinity is subject to passion or created. Nor, again, do we predicate of His flesh or of His humanity the properties of divinity: for we do not say that His flesh or His humanity is uncreated.” English translation in JOHN OF DAMASCUS, “Exposition of the Orthodox Faith”, 657. Cf. GLEEDE, “Vermischt“, 35–94. 225 CROSS, “Perichoresis”, 108, tries to differentiate the verbal DQWLGRVLV of idioms from the ontical SHULFKRUHVLV. Although the original aim of FRPPXQLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP was also ontical (as sharing of properties, not only as their mutual predication), one can do this di stinction. However, it stresses the missing ontical sharing of properties the more, so that the unity of person remains only on the verbal level. 226 This is confirmed also by John’s explanation of the two wills and energies of Christ, cf. 58–59 (III,14–15), 137–153. In this context, John works with trichotomical anthropology, cf. 50 and 62 (III,6 and 18), 121,38–49 and 157–160. 227 Cf. CROSS, “Perichoresis”, 86. 228 Ibid., 81, cf. 84.

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ture is a collection of properties (like life, reason, walking, breathing, will, action or death), not all can be sharable. Nevertheless, the problem in the verbal-only use of FRPPX QLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP in the Western style is that there is, in fact, no real sharing of properties, because the natures just coexist next to each other in the claimed composite K\SRVWDVLV. At the same time, John shows a certain carelessness and does not distinguish his use of terms carefully enough when he speaks about the natures in a very material and inappropriate way as “parts” (me,roj, ibid., 117,28 and often), as if Christ would be only partly and not wholly God and man, 229 and when he conceives K\SRVWDVLV even in the trinitarian use like the Cappadocian tradition as “individual” (a;tomon, ibid., 116,4), which would result in tritheism.230

But then, he brings the second accent into play, the enhypostatical one-way dynamics in order to support more unity: “[A]lthough we hold that the natures of the Lord permeate one another, yet we know that the permeation springs from the divine nature. For it is that that penetrates and permeates all things, as it wills, while nothing penetrates it: and it is it, too, that imparts to the flesh its own peculiar glories, while abiding itself impassible and without participation in the affections of the flesh.” (51 [III,7] 126,57–61)

Following up the work of both Leontii, John conceives nature as always subsistent in a K\SRVWDVLV. When Logos assumed humanity, it had to be done enhypostatically: “God the Word Incarnate, therefore, did not assume the nature that is regarded as an abstraction in pure thought (for this is not incarnation, but only an imposture and a figment of incarnation), nor the nature viewed in species (for He did not assume all the subsistences): but the nature viewed in the individual, which is identical with that viewed in species. For He took on Himself the elements of our compound nature, and these not as having an independent existence or as being originally an individual, and in this way assumed by Him, but as existing in His own subsistence. For the subsistence of God the Word in itself b ecame the subsistence of the flesh, and accordingly ‘the Word became flesh’ clearly without any change, and likewise the flesh became Word without alteration, and God became man.” (55 [III,11], 131,8–17)

The price paid for this conception is still the same: diminished humanity, which contains human nature but as the specific accidents receives the accidents of divinity and is, consequently, divinized. However, this was John’s intention – not only divinized humanity but, following Leontius of Jerusalem, divinized flesh (61 [III,17], 155–157).231 It is then a problem for the Dama229

John probably saw the danger, but did not find better formulation than “He is then wholly perfect God, but yet is not simply God: for He is not only God but also man. And He is also wholly perfect man but not simply man, for He is not only man but also God.” (51 [III,7], 126,52–54) 230 Cf. CROSS: “Perichoresis”, 108. 231 And it was the main interest for many following centuries. There was no interest in pure humanity. Only divinized humanity was considered salvific, although not in the form of divinized flesh (cf. CROSS, “Perichoresis”, 110–119, 121). In John, the divinization of

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scene to ascribe to Christ the character of a servant (65 [III,21], 163–164), some inner development (66 [III,22], 164–165) or human affections (65 and 67 [III,21 and 23], 163–164 and 165–166). Christ’s prayer to the Father understands him as if praying in our place (68 [III,24], 167–168). The object of suffering was only Christ’s body (70 [III,26], 169) – and right in this crucial and controversial point comes out clearly the aporeticity of the whole Christological tradition, which John thinks here out to the end: “Christ then, since He is in two natures, suffered and was crucified in the nature that was subject to passion. For it was in the flesh and not in His divinity that He hung upon the Cross.” (80 [IV,7], 179,24–26) In the end, John slips again from the unity to the ascribing of actions to the natures and this results, in a fatal way, as a breach of the Chalcedonian avcwri,stwj.232 Because the natures are “opposite counterparts” (ta, evnanti,a fusika,, 91 [IV,18], 214,57) and as such, they cannot be easily unified.233 All this has an impact also concerning the third accent on Christ’s uniqueness. Absolutely unique is already the fact of the incarnation, God becoming human: it is “the only new thing under the Sun” (45 [III,1], 108,44–45). First, John correctly distinguishes in what lies the uniqueness of Christ: “In so far as Christ’s natures differ from one another, that is, in the matter of essence, we hold that Christ unites in Himself two extremes: in respect of His divinity He is connected with the Father and the Spirit, while in respect of His humanity He is connected with His mother and all mankind. And in so far as His natures are united, we hold that He differs from the Father and the Spirit on the one hand, and from the mother and the rest of ma nkind on the other. For the natures are united in His subsistence, having one compound subsistence, in which He differs from the Father and the Spirit, and also from the mother and us.” (47 [III,3], 115,89–116,98).

But in the course of time, he slips to stressing the divinity, which, however, estranges Christ from humanity and humans:

the flesh of Christ began already with his conception, cf. 87 (IV,14), 198–202: The conception came through the sense of hearing, the birth then went the usual way as birth of chi ldren does, although some said that Mary gave birth through the side of her body. Nevertheless, it was painless and the virginity of Mary remained intact her whole life, because after the birth of Christ she did not consort with a man. “For could it be possible that she, who had borne God and from experience of the subsequent events had come to know the miracle, should receive the embrace of a man. God forbid! It is not the part of a chaste mind to think such thoughts, far less to commit such acts.” (ibid., 202,110–113) The body of Christ was then incorruptible and indestructible, even in death (72 [III,28], 171–172). – To Leontius of Jerusalem cf. UTHEMANN, “Definitionen und Paradigmen”, 115–117, and against it the struggle of Leontius of Byzantium with the afthartics, cf. GRILLMEIER, &KULVW , 213–229. 232 Cf. CROSS, “Perichoresis”, 120. 233 Cf. 47 (III,3), 115,70–74.

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“Moreover, just as He received in His birth of a virgin superessential essence, so also He revealed His human energy in a superhuman way, walking with earthly feet on unstable water, not by turning the water into earth, but by causing it in the superabundant power of His divinity not to flow away nor yield beneath the weight of material feet. For not in a merely human way did He do human things: for He was not only man, but also God, and so even His sufferings brought life and salvation: nor yet did He energise as God, strictly after the manner of God, for He was not only God, but also man, and so it was by touch and word and such like that He worked miracles.” (59 [III,15], 151,188–196)

John tries to keep balance, but in fact, he stresses for the humanity as well as for the divinity the miraculous capacity of Christ. The theology of John of Damascus was the endpoint of the Eastern development. Through it, the Western medieval theology inherited the Eastern tradition with all its unsolved problems and aporias passed on since Chalcedon: Either there are two self-standing natures as primary agents in a solely formal unity, or the humanity is considerably diminished in the unity. There are thus the old Creeds on the one side and on the other the factual development of the doctrine, which cannot meet the demands of the Creeds. The western theology adopts this situation and keeps it in different particular theologies for many centuries (inclusively the medieval scholasticism and later the Protestant orthodoxy on both the Lutheran and the Reformed side, cf. below) until the Enlightenment, in whose perspective, stressing the real and concrete humanity, this aporetic situation is no longer tenable. 234  7KH:HVWHUQ0HGLHYDO&KULVWRORJ\ In Western Christology, the main influence won subsequently in the 13 th century the Christology of Thomas Aquinas and his interpretation of the theory of subsistence, interpreted later by the nominalists in the terms of a suppositional union (and next to it, as the main soteriological model, the satisfaction theory of Anselm of Canterbury).235 Due to a different and in fact much less 234 Cf. also the closing remark of DALEY, “Unpacking the Chalcedonian Formula”, 189: “What Christians since the Middle Ages understand as ‘Chalcedonian’ Christology is, in fact, Chalcedon as ‘received’ in the following four centuries: a reading of the council’s cautious formulation through the modifying lenses of several later ancient councils, as well as through the hermeneutical contributions of late antique philosophy and the interpretation of a number of influential ancient and medieval theologians.” 235 As to the medieval scholastic theology and its christological conceptions of assumptus-homo theory (Abaelard), habitus theory and subsistence theory (Thomas of Aquin), while the latest is actually a Western form of HQK\SRVWDVLV, cf. WEINANDY, 'RHV *RG &KDQJH", 83–86 (and my short sketch of Weinandy’s own neo-Thomist conception below, Ch. 5.4, as well as the conservative neo-Thomist conception of T.J. White, cf. below, subch. 3); PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 295–296; DALFERTH, &UXFLILHG DQG 5HVXUUHFWHG, 141; GRAY, “Neuchalkedonismus”, 75(24, 295; J. BAUR, “Lutherische Christologie im Streit um die neue Bestimmung von Gott und Mensch”, in IDEM, /XWKHU XQG VHLQH NODVVLVFKHQ (UEHQ7KHRORJLVFKH$XIVlW]HXQG)RUVFKXQJHQ (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1993), 150; R.

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complicated term of person, the Western Christology could adopt the concept of the hypostatic union but it did not need to deal with the Eastern detailed discussion and controversies. 236 The theory of subsistence is hence very similar to the concept of HQK\SRVWDVLV, but holds firmly the old Western (Leonine) accents: it starts with the natures as self-standing agents and keeps their strict differentiation, the divine nature being the dominating power in the union. 237 The rather divine picture of Christ is stressed all the more. The leading perspective is still the perspective of incarnation. Whereas the concept of the hypostatic union was similar, probably the biggest difference between East and West lies in GLIIHUHQWVRWHULRORJ\.238 The East was interested mainly in the divinity and the divinized humanity of Christ, resulting soteriologically in the concept of WKHRVLV where Christ in his divinized humanity opened (again) the possibility for the humans to become divinized as well. In a classical (and – at least from the Western perspective – slightly controversial) way, this was expressed by Athanasius with his formula: “He became human so that we can become divine.” 239 The main soteriological dynamics in the Eastern conception is thus the anthropological motion from below upwards; it is a christological elevation of the human nature towards divinity. This is different in the Western tradition, although it knows these accents as well. Nevertheless, the West had since its theological beginnings (cf. e.g. Tertullian or Augustine) a deeper and stronger term of sin and, connected with the seriousness of sin, more understanding for the human need of escaping from the old, corrupt, sinful humanity, of liberation from guilt and sin and for salvation in terms of justification and righteousness in front of God; this

SCHWARZ, “Gott ist Mensch. Zur Lehre von der Person Christi bei den Ockhamisten und bei Luther”, =HLWVFKULIW IU 7KHRORJLHXQG .LUFKH 63 (1966), 293–334. Luther himself refers to medieval theories of the unity of Jesus Christ in the “Disputatio de divinitate et humanitate Christi” (1540), in :$39/II, 93–96: according to him, they are in fact all wrong, but since they all try to express an “ineffable thing” and have the “right and catholic” i ntention (“omnes illi recto et catholicae sapiunt”), this “unsuitable speech” can be “pardoned” (th. 49 and 50, ibid., 96,1–4). Because “that great is the simplicity and goodness of the Holy Spirit that when his people speak with false grammar, they speak truth in the meaning” (th. 61, ibid., 96,31–32). 236 Cf. GRAY, “Neuchalkedonismus”, 75( 24, 294; ESSEN, 'LH)UHLKHLW-HVX, 21–22. 237 Until the Enlightenment, there was actually never and nowhere any comparable interest in the humanity of Christ as it was in his divinity. 238 Cf. GALLUS, “Christologické kořeny”; UTHEMANN, “Zur Rezeption des Tomus Leonis”, 31; IDEM, “Definitionen und Paradigmen”, 54. 239 ATHANASIUS, “Oratio de incarnatione Verbi”, 54,3, in 3* 25, 192B: “Auvto.j ga,r evnhnqrw,phsen( i[na h`mei/j qewpoihqw/men.”

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was the main soteriological question. 240 Although the leading perspective in the Western Christology was still the perspective of incarnation, there was also an important accent on Easter, on the suffering of Jesus Christ on the cross, although Christ served here often only as an example to be piously followed in order to live a sanctified life (VDQFWLILFDWLRQ as the aim of human existence).241 The main soteriological dynamics is therefore God’s condescendence, the theo-logical motion from above down. 242 Its classical expression is the satisfaction theory of Anselm of Canterbury. 243  0DUWLQ/XWKHU This is also the background for the theological thinking of Martin Luther.244 He remained with his Christology within the traditional frame but added

240

A good illustration of the East-West difference is the Pelagian controversy, for which the East had actually only “little understanding”, cf. LOHSE, 6KRUW+LVWRU\RI'RF WULQH, 118. 241 Cf. ELERT, “Die Theopaschitische Formel”, 7K/=75 (1950), 201–203; P. ALTHAUS, 7KH7KHRORJ\RI0DUWLQ/XWKHU, trans. R.C. SCHULTZ (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 182–183; BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 98–99: The humility, which Christ beared in his humanity, “entails also an exemplary character in respect to the atoned, because it encompasses the ‘following’ [Nachfolge] of the ‘humilitas’ of Christ (in the broad sense) as a principle of ecclesiastic life. The ideal of the ‘imitation of God’, inherited from hellenistic Judaism (cf. e.g. Eph 5:1–2) has thus on the Western soil not primarily the Platonic shaping of the ‘highest possible similitude to God’ […], but rather always the particular face of the (sinless) ‘Christus humilis’.” However, ibid., 114, Beyschlag admits that the Western accent on the humble Christ was subsequently pushed out by the neo-Chalcedonian christological dominancy. The following of the humble Christ became “the pattern of the special monastic piety (as though the archetype of the later Christology ‘from below’), whereas the official picture of Christ got more and more the imperial character of the world judge.” 242 Cf. BEYSCHLAG, *UXQGULVV, 98, fn. 171: “Here lies a fundamental christological difference between East and West […]: Both sides presuppose that the incarnation cannot entail any substantial diminution of divinity. However, whereas the East has the tendency to conceive the humiliation of the Logos in the incarnation at the same time as exaltation of Jesus’ humanity, is the ‘Son’ in the Western conception ‘secundum humanitatem’ i ndeed ‘minor patre’.” Beyschlag refers here to 6\PEROXP 4XLFXPTXH (“inferior to the Father in his humanity”) and to the 7RPXV/HRQLV (“For he has from us the humanity that is less than the Father; and he has from the Father the Godhead that is equal with the Father”, 7KH$FWVRIWKH&RXQFLORI&KDOFHGRQ, Session II, Nr. 22, 20). 243 Based on the famous hamartiological thesis: “Nondum considerasti, quantum ponderis sit peccatum”, ANSELM OF CANTERBURY, &XU'HXVKRPR I, 21 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1960), 74–75. 244 Regarding the sources of Luther’s own knowledge of the theology of the old church see CH. MARKSCHIES, “Luther und die altkirchliche Trinitätstheologie”, in /XWKHU ± ]ZLVFKHQGHQ=HLWHQ, ed. CH. MARKSCHIES and M. TROWITZSCH (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 37–85.

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some specific accents.245 It was him, who, after a long time of focusing on the ontology of Christ’s person on one side and his salvific work on the other, pushed again to the foreground the intense interconnection of Christ’s person and soteriology. However, without reducing Christology only to soteriology or only to a function of soteriology.246 This is a tendency, which started already with Melanchthon’s famous thesis “Hoc est Christum cognoscere, beneficia eius cognoscere.” 247 Today, it is a favored interpretation among liberal theologians. 248 Against all tendencies to reduce theology only to existentialism and subjectivism, however, the ontological question regarding the person of J esus Christ must be asked and answered as well. 249 One cannot be satisfied with the work or effect without knowing who is the person behind it. Just the opposite is the case. In Luther, the person of Jesus Christ is the base and the key to his work and effects in a fundamental way.250 Person and work cannot be separated or reduced only to one of it, as it was the case in the medieval theology, focusing primarily on the mysteries of the person, or later in the existentialism or liberal theology, focusing on the actual individual benefits and the meaning of one’s individual life only.

It is not by chance that he developed his Christology deeper in the context of the controversies regarding the Eucharist. 251 In principle, however, Luther follows the traditional church Christology founded on the Biblical Scriptures and holds firmly its fundamental point: “Fides catholica haec est, ut unum dominum Christum confiteamur, verum Deum et hominem.” 252 And Luther accentuates both: not only the divinity of 245 Cf. M. LIENHARD, 0DUWLQ/XWKHUV FKULVWRORJLVFKHV=HXJQLV. (QWZLFNOXQJXQG*UXQ G]JH VHLQHU &KULVWRORJLH, trans. R. WOLFF (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1980), 14; B. LOHSE, 0DUWLQ/XWKHU V7KHRORJ\,WV+LVWRULFDODQG6\VWHPDWLF'HYHORSPHQW, trans. R.A. HARRISVILLE [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1999], 228; ALTHAUS, 7KH 7KHRORJ\ RI 0DUWLQ /XWKHU, 193–194. G. EBELING, “Das rechte Unterscheiden. Luthers Anleitung zu theologischer Urteilskraft“, =7K.(1988), 219–258; IDEM, “Disputatio de homine: Die theologische Definition des Menschen”, in /XWKHUVWXGLHQ II/3 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1989), 129–141, stressing Luther’s unprecedentedly precise dealing with the term of the person of Jesus Christ not as SHUVRQDSULYDWD but rather as SHUVRQDSXEOLFD (ibid., 167). 246 As later e.g. TILLICH, 6\VWHPDWLF7KHRORJ\II, 150, conceives it. 247 PH. MELANCHTHON, /RFL FRPPXQHV  , in 0HODQFKWKRQV :HUNH LQ $XVZDKO, vol. II/1, ed. H. ENGELLAND and R. STUPPERICH (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1978), 20,27–28. 248 Cf. e.g. below the interpretation of Luther by N. Slenczka. 249 Cf. LIENHARD, 0DUWLQ/XWKHUV FKULVWRORJLVFKHV=HXJQLV, 290. 250 Cf. LOHSE, 0DUWLQ/XWKHU V7KHRORJ\, 223–224. 251 Mainly in “Dass diese Worte ‘Das ist mein Leib’ noch fest stehen wider die Schwärmgeister”, in :$ 23, 38–320; and “Vom Abendmahl Christi. Bekenntnis”, in :$ 26, 241–509. Cf. LIENHARD, 0DUWLQ/XWKHUVFKULVWRORJLVFKHV=HXJQLV, 146–198. BAYER, “Das Wort ward Fleisch”, 24, says, knowingly exaggerating: “The Christology of Luther is an auxiliary construction of his doctrine about the Eucharist.” 252 LUTHER, “Disputatio de divinitate et humanitate Christi” (1540), in :$39/II, 93,2– 3. Cf. ALTHAUS, 7KH 7KHRORJ\ RI 0DUWLQ /XWKHU, 186: “The distance between Luther’s theological situation and task and our own is obvious. The primary christological problem

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Christ, not only his divinized humanity but also his real, humble humanity. Because it is this wonderful unity of divinity and humanity in the one person of Jesus Christ, in which God himself is present. “[B]efore Luther, the church and its theologians were primarily concerned with the divine in Christ. They looked for his divine nature, his divine life, and for the divine significance of his satisfaction. Luther, however, looks and finds God the Father himself in person in Jesus Christ.”253

Therefore: “[N]ot merely the deity or divine nature but God himself who is personally involved. […] God is this man, and this man is the presence of God for us. Luther thereby transcends the doctrine of the two natures as inadequate. It says far too little and does not say what is decisive. Luther is ultimately concerned not with the relationship of the divine and the human nature but with the relationship of the person of Jesus to the person of the Father.”254

The deciding soteriological frame is still the formula of interchange (What was not assumed, cannot be saved), but Luther saw clearly that what had to be assumed was not only the humanity as such but the humanity with its suffering under the sin, which leads to death.255 There are thus at least WKUHH VKLIWV or maybe rather strong tendencies, which can be identified in Luther’s Christology, which Luther himself developed subsequently, mostly in polemics with his adversaries, more clearly and explicitly. None of them is finished and consistently held. Luther never intended to create a theological system; his texts arose very often from the need of actual situation. Sometimes, he used the terms quite carelessly or not precisely enough; 256 sometimes, he as if oscillates between the traditional doctrine and his new accents, depending on the particular situation and text, and falls into contradictions.257 However, in my opinion, these three shifts are clear and they describe and explain the new elements of Luther’s Christology. The first point is a UDGLFDO HPSKDVLV RI WKH FURVV (against the traditional emphasis of the incarnation), as Luther expresses it already in the Heidelberg Disputation in 1518: “He deserves to be called a theologian, however, who

and task confronting us is to establish the deity of Christ; this is completely and clearly decided for Luther by the witness of the Holy Scripture.” 253 ALTHAUS, 7KH7KHRORJ\RI0DUWLQ/XWKHU, 182. Because of this fundamental interest of Luther in Jesus Christ as the revelation of God, some call his Christology Johannine (cf. ibid.; LIENHARD, 0DUWLQ/XWKHUVFKULVWRORJLVFKHV=HXJQLV, 174). 254 ALTHAUS, 7KH7KHRORJ\RI0DUWLQ/XWKHU, 191. 255 Cf. LUTHER, “Enarratio 53. capitis Esaiae” (1544), in :$40/III, 715,33; LIENHARD, 0DUWLQ/XWKHUVFKULVWRORJLVFKHV=HXJQLV, 269, 274. 256 Cf. LIENHARD, 0DUWLQ/XWKHUVFKULVWRORJLVFKHV=HXJQLV, 175, 259. 257 Cf. ALTHAUS, 7KH7KHRORJ\RI0DUWLQ/XWKHU, 198.

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comprehends the visible and manifest things of God seen through suffering and the cross.”258 Nevertheless – and that is the second point – WKHLQFDUQDWLRQ still keeps its importance, because it is the point of the mysterious union of divinity and humanity in the person of Jesus Christ. Luther follows here the two-natures doctrine.259 But against Occamists and Zwingli, who (in accord with the western tradition) strictly differentiated between the natures – emphasizing their duality so much that the unity of the person was questionable – Luther stresses (in an Alexandrine manner, although on the western background 260) the unity and, overtime, he starts his christological thinking more and more with the LQGLVVROXEOHXQLW\RIWKHSHUVRQ: “That God became human, that the Creator and the creature are one and the same person in Christ, exactly this is the foundation of theology.” 261 It is this unity of divinity and humanity in Christ, which brings salvation. The incarnation bears thus a fundamental soteriological meaning, which is then fulfilled in the cross. For Occamists, the ontological principle was leading that “uncreated and created being is to be held strictly separate”: QXOODHVWSURSRUWLRILQLWLHWLQILQWL.262 In Luther’s view, this led in the Occamists to equivocations in the term “homo” in the first place (and “aequivocatio est erroris mater”).263 Luther saw here the old problem of equivocational use of “person” in anthropology and Christology (cf. above in this chapter, subchapter 1.2), which he solved with the claim of different logic and language in philosophy and theology, because the personal unity of divinity and humanity in Jesus brings a new reality and with it a new la n-

258

“Disputatio Heidelbergae habita” (1518), th. 20, in :$1, 354,19–20; cf. also ibid., th. 21. 259 Cf. LUTHER, “Disputatio de divinitate et humanitate Christi” (1540), in :$ 39/II, 93–96; LIENHARD, 0DUWLQ/XWKHUVFKULVWRORJLVFKHV=HXJQLV, 244. 260 According to LOHSE, 0DUWLQ /XWKHU¶V 7KHRORJ\, 228, was Luther’s theology “altogether of the Alexandrian persuasion”, whereas ALTHAUS, 7KH7KHRORJ\RI0DUWLQ/XWKHU, 197, sees in his theology also Antiochene accents. It is not advisable to try to press L uther’s theology into the scheme of the old schools because one can find in Luther “the terminology and characteristic motifs of different lines of thought and still, one is not able to assort Luther with only one of these systems” (LIENHARD, 0DUWLQ/XWKHUVFKULVWRORJLVFKHV =HXJQLV, 136). This is no surprising fact – Luther is simply an original thinker. He obviously knew all three main traditions (Alexandrine, Antiochene and western) and his own position results from an original combination of all. 261 SCHWARZ, “Gott ist Mensch”, 308 (cf. ibid., 307–309), with reference to LUTHER, “Disputatio de sententia: verbum caro factum est (Joh. 1,14)” (1539), in :$ 39/II, 8,21. For the development of Luther’s thought in this point cf. SCHWARZ, “Gott ist Mensch”, 345–351; LIENHARD, 0DUWLQ/XWKHUVFKULVWRORJLVFKHV=HXJQLV, 163, 185–186, 278–280. 262 Cf. SCHWARZ, “Gott ist Mensch”, 300. 263 Cf. LUTHER, “Disputatio de sententia: verbum caro factum est (Joh. 1,14)” (1539), in :$ 39/II, 28,10; SCHWARZ, “Gott ist Mensch”, 302–307; LIENHARD, 0DUWLQ /XWKHUV FKULVWRORJLVFKHV=HXJQLV, 247–248.

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guage: “Certum est tamen, omnia vocabula in Christo novam significationem accipere in eadem re significata.”264 Regarding Zwingli as the other major adversary, Luther saw him very close to Nestorius (who, in Luther’s view, refused the FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP),265 but he criticizes here actually the fundamental problem of the Western tradition as well: “Because where the works are appropriated [to one particular nature] and divided, there must be the person divided as well.”266

The third point is, then, a logical consequence of this approach: the understanding of FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP as a UHDOFRPPXQLFDWLRQDQGVKDULQJRI SURSHUWLHVEHWZHHQWKHQDWXUHV. Because the unity of Christ’s person is real, the sharing of properties must be real too.267 Luther, therefore, criticizes the verbal-only use.268 In his neo-liberal christological proposal based on the theory of subjectivity, 1 6OHQF]ND – also with a detailed interpretation of Luther – brings in the opposite extreme: he tries to think this YHUEDOLWHU use to its end and, hence, to think the divinity of Christ only as a subjective predication. His approach is based on the thesis that the term “God” does not refer to any reality, that the divinity of Jesus Christ is rather something one attributes to Jesus in one’s self-understanding; and with this attribution, one constitutes own identity. 269 The whole christological tradition with the doctrine of FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP is understood only as a mode of predication, only as mere hermeneutics, as a certain authoritative la nguage, which should bring better orientation.270 Step by step, Slenczka loosens and then splits the language from reality. Everything in Christology is only a matter of language. And he tries to substantiate this with Luther, who, in some passages of his Great Catechism and his Lecture on the Letter to Galatians, “tends to say that God does not simply possess his divinity but that he gets it rather in an implicit act of human predication”. “[T]his act of predication [Luther] locates in the process of faith.”271 Hence, “Christ is predicated to be God, when a human awaits everything from him”. The core of Slenczka’s approach is a subjectivist twist: in the christological predication, one does not describe, what happens LQ 264

LUTHER, “Disputatio de divinitate et humanitate Christi” (1540), in :$39/II, 94,17–

18. 265

Cf. M. LUTHER, “Von den Konziliis und Kirchen” (1539), in :$50, 587,31–32. LUTHER, “Vom Abendmahl Christi. Bekenntnis” (1528), in :$ 26, 324,10–11; LIENHARD, 0DUWLQ/XWKHUVFKULVWRORJLVFKHV=HXJQLV, 174. 267 LUTHER, “Disputatio de divinitate et humanitate Christi” (1540), in :$ 39/II, 8–9: “propter unitam coniunctionem et unitatem duarum naturarum fit communicatio idiomatum”. And IDEM, “Von den Konziliis und Kirchen” (1539), in :$50, 590,3–4: “Because it has become one person from God and human, therefore the person has idiomata of both natures.” 268 Primarily in the form of the Zwinglian “alloiosis”, cf. LUTHER, “Vom Abendmahl Christi”, in :$ 26, 319–320. Cf. LIENHARD, 0DUWLQ /XWKHUV FKULVWRORJLVFKHV =HXJQLV, 253–254. 269 N. SLENCZKA, “Problemgeschichte der Christologie”, in 0DUEXUJHU -DKUEXFK 7KH RORJLH ;;,,, &KULVWRORJLH, ed. E. GRÄB-SCHMIDT and R. PREUL (Leipzig: EVA, 2011), 61, fn. 4, and 110. 270 Ibid., 67–68. 271 Ibid., 75. 266

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UH in Christ, but through his or her verbal relation to Jesus, one expresses one’s existential position: “[T]he description of Jesus as God or as the Son of God is an expression of an existential attitude, within of which the claim ‘this one is the Son of God’ has its meaning.” However, Slenczka knows that with this attempt of a radical verbal-only understanding of FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP (or better: of attribution of divinity) he claims, in fact, – in a typically neoliberal manner – “to understand Luther differently but anyway better than he understood himself”.272 This conception should be in his perspective “the fundament and the starting point of any Christology, which wants to be possible in a relaxed way”.273

Since the Eucharist-controversy with Zwingli, the UHDOLWHU understanding of the FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP becomes for Luther the “praecipuus [articulus] in nostra religione”.274 If God became man, then this incomprehensible and mysterious unity means that what is divine in the person of Christ belongs now to the human and YLFHYHUVD.275 The result is, on one side, the doctrine of XELTXLW\ RI &KULVW¶V KXPDQ ERG\, on the other side, the provocative thesis about the GHDWKRI*RGRQWKHFURVV. Both theses are logical consequences of a radical conception of the UHDOLWHU understood FRPPXQLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP. The ubiquity of the human body of Christ is a result of a divinized humanity in the union – as it is the case in the old eastern conception of HQK\SRVWDVLV, which Luther follows in his understanding of the hypostatic union.276 “No, my fellow, where you put God there you must put humanity as well. They cannot be separated and divided from each other. It has become one person and it does not dissociate humanity away, as when master Hans takes off his skirt and puts it away when he goes to sleep.”277

Every accent lies here on the Chalcedonian avcwri,stwj.278 272

Ibid., 76. Ibid., 59–60. A similar interpretation is to find in CH. DANZ, (LQIKUXQJLQGLH7KH RORJLH0DUWLQ/XWKHUV (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2013). 274 LUTHER, “Enarratio 53. capitis Esaiae” (1544), in :$40/III, 704,8; IDEM, “Disputatio de divinitate et humanitate Christi” (1540), in :$39/II, 93,5. Cf. also LIENHARD, 0DU WLQ/XWKHUVFKULVWRORJLVFKHV=HXJQLV, 178, 185. 275 LUTHER, “Disputatio de divinitate et humanitate Christi” (1540), in :$39/II, 96,13– 15: “Est res incomprehensibilis, sicut etiam ipsi angeli non possint capere et comprehendere, quod duae naturae in una persona unitae sunt.” 276 Cf. LIENHARD, 0DUWLQ /XWKHUV FKULVWRORJLVFKHV =HXJQLV, 172–179; ALTHAUS, 7KH 7KHRORJ\ RI 0DUWLQ /XWKHU, 398–399; LOHSE, 0DUWLQ /XWKHU¶V 7KHRORJ\, 230–231; J. BAUR, “Ubiquität”, in &UHDWRU HVW FUHDWXUD /XWKHUV &KULVWRORJLH DOV /HKUH YRQ GHU ,GL RPHQNRPPXQLNDWLRQ, ed. O. BAYER and B. GLEEDE (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2007), 186–301. LIENHARD, 0DUWLQ /XWKHUV FKULVWRORJLVFKHV =HXJQLV, 259, asks, if this radical conception does not lead, in fact, to docetism. In opposition to this meaning, the Finnish Luther-scholars stressed the importance of WKHRVLV for Luther, cf. LOHSE, 0DUWLQ/XWKHU¶V 7KHRORJ\, 221 (here also further literature to this problem). 277 LUTHER, “Vom Abendmahl Christi. Bekenntnis”, in :$26, 333,6–10. 278 Cf. LIENHARD, 0DUWLQ/XWKHUVFKULVWRORJLVFKHV=HXJQLV, 185. 273

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However, at the same time, Luther goes beyond it, because next to this figure, which will be later based on the so-called JHQXV PDLHVWDWLFXP, he knows in his conception of a mutual FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP also the opposite case, the (later so-called) JHQXVWDSHLQRWLFRQ, in which the divine nature gets the humble attributes of the humanity. With this consequence, Luther is the first one to break with the old and until then ruling Platonic axioma of divine apathy and impassibility (and, as we will see below, he remains alone in this for another three hundred years, at least).279 Through the radical conception of a UHDOLWHU understood FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP Luther was brought to sentences, which became known: “If I would believe that only the human nature suffered for me, then Christ would be a bad Messiah to me, he himself would rather need a Messiah.” 280 And: “We Christians must know that if God is not with us on the scales und does not give his weight, then we sink with our pan down. I want to say: If it is not true that God died for us but rather only a human, then we are lost. But if the death of God and the death God lies in the pan, then he sinks down, and we go up like a light empty pan. […] He could not sit in the pan, he had to become a human like us so that we can say: God died, God’s sufferings, God’s blood, God’s death. Because God in his nature cannot die. But where God and human are unified in one person, then it is truly said: God dies, when the human dies who is one thing or one person with God.” 281

With these thoughts, Luther admits a change in the divinity. He confirms this later also explicitly when he gives an answer to the objection that God cannot be crucified nor can he suffer: “I know, until he became human he did not suffer from eternity, but since he became human, he is passible. He was not human from eternity, but since he was conceived from the Holy Spirit, i.e., born from the virgin, God and man became one person. Therefore, the same is predicated of God and human. Here, a personal union was made. Here, humanity and divinity merge [gehets ineinander]. The unity is what holds it together. I confess two natures, but they cannot be separated. This is achieved by the unity, which is a bigger and more firm conjunction than the conjunction of soul and body, because they will separate, but this conjunction, the immortal divine nature and the mortal human nature will never

279 It is, therefore, not true that Luther would make an end to this long Christian tradition, as states LIENHARD, 0DUWLQ/XWKHUVFKULVWRORJLVFKHV=HXJQLV, 289–290. Already the lutheran orthodoxy turned to the conception of the impassible God again, cf. below, subch. 2.6 and Ch. 7.2.2. 280 LUTHER, “Vom Abendmahl Christi. Bekenntnis” (1528), in :$26, 320,10–13. 281 LUTHER, “Von den Konziliis und Kirchen” (1539), in :$50, 590,11–22. This and the previous quotation are both quoted in the “Formula of Concord”, Solida declaratio VIII, in 'LH%HNHQQWQLVVFKULIWHQGHU(YDQJHOLVFK/XWKHULVFKHQ.LUFKH, 4th ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1959), 1029–1031.

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separate, but are united in one person. Therefore, I say: Christus, the impassible Son of God, God and human, was crucified under Pontius Pilate.” 282

Incarnation means something new even for God himself. 283 This conception brings a shift in the understanding of FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLR PDWXP. Luther knows very well the old rules set already by John of Damascus that the attributes of natures can be predicated both about the person but not about the opposite nature. The FRPPXQLFDWLR is valid for the FRQFUHWD of the person, not for the DEVWUDFWD of the natures. This rule, which the Lutheran orthodoxy will reestablish again, is changed in Luther. After the incarnation, it is possible to predicate the properties of one nature WKURXJK WKH SHUVRQDO XQLW\ about the other nature as well. With this, Luther breaks an old barrier, which should prevent God from suffering. Now, it is possible to say – not only YHUEDOLWHU but UHDOLWHU: “The man Jesus created the world.” And: “In Christ, God died on the cross.”284 Now, the rule says: “It is thus right that what I say about human Christ I say about God as well: that he suffered and was crucified.”285 In the late Luther, the doctrine of FRPPXQLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP becomes the very heart of his Christology. It is the anchor and fundament for his soteriology, where Luther brings another famous figure into play: the DGPLUDELOH FRPPHUFLXP, the admirable exchange between Christ and humans. 286 It is to say explicitly that in Luther, FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP is not the same as the DGPL UDELOHFRPPHUFLXP, although the latter firmly roots in the first and it is the anchor of Luther’s soteriology, which is grounded not in the work but rather in the person of Christ. Nevertheless, both figures are to be distinguished. &RPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP deals with the relationship of the natures in Christ, while DGPLUDELOH FRPPHUFLXP is a metaphor of the relation of Christ to us, grounded firmly in the unity of divinity and humanity in Christ. &RPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP belongs to the ontological Christology, DGPLUDELOHFRPPHUFLXP to soteriology. 287 It is necessary to differentiate carefully the christological dimension of

282 LUTHER, “Disputatio de divinitate et humanitate Christi” (1540), in :$ 39/II, 101,24–102,6. 283 Cf. BAYER, “Das Wort ward Fleisch”, 22; BAUR, “Ubiquität”, 219–220. 284 LIENHARD, 0DUWLQ/XWKHUVFKULVWRORJLVFKHV=HXJQLV, 257. 285 LUTHER, “Disputatio de divinitate et humanitate Christi” (1540), in :$ 39/II, 101, 22–23. Cf. SCHWARZ, “Gott ist Mensch”, 309–313. 286 Cf. M. LUTHER, “Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen”, in :$ 7, 25,28–26,1, where Luther metaphorically describes the DGPLUDELOHFRPPHUFLXP:Christ and the human soul become one body (cf. LOHSE, 0DUWLQ/XWKHU¶V7KHRORJ\, 225–228). 287 This differentiation is not properly done in J.A. STEIGER, “Die communicatio idiomatum als Achse und Motor der Theologie Luthers. Der ‘fröhliche Wechsel’ als hermeneutischer Schlüssel zu Abendmahlslehre, Anthropologie, Seelsorge, Naturtheologie, Rhetorik und Humor”, 1HXH =HLWVFKULIW IU 6\VWHPDWLVFKH 7KHRORJLH 38 (1996), 1–28. Already the title signifies that Steiger mixes both theological figures together (and with it, he, in fact, supports the above-mentioned reduction of Christology to soteriology): “The communica-

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H[WUD QRV in Christ (FRPPXQLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP) and the soteriological dimension of SUR QRELV of Christ (DGPLUDELOH FRPPHUFLXP). Therefore, it can be said (with a slight shift in the meaning of the admirable exchange 288) that the christological FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP is in itself the realization of the DGPLUDELOH FRPPHUFLXP between God and humans. But this cannot be said YLFH YHUVD, as if DGPLUDELOH FRPPHUFLXP between Christ and humans would be the realization of FRPPXQLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP, as Steiger does it. The relation between Christ and humans is not the same as the relation of divinity and humanity in Christ. Soteriology is not the whole of Christology, although the first is firmly rooted in the latter. To blur this distinction would mean, in the end, either to replace Christology with a direct divine-human relation as liberal theology does it, or to see in Christ merely God, which would be a repetition of the old but the false tendency to stress only the divinity of Christ. Nevertheless, exactly this will be the result of the further development in the Lutheran orthodoxy.

However, as already mentioned above, Luther was no systematic theologian. Neither is he consistent in his speech. Sometimes, he makes a few steps back to the traditional position of divine apathy: “Well, the divinity cannot suffer or die, you shall say. That is true. Nevertheless, because divinity and humanity are in Christ one person, the Scripture, because of this personal unity, gives also to the divinity what happens to the humanity, and the other way round. This is therefore also true. Hence, you shall also say this: The person (meaning Christ) suffers and dies. Now, the person is the true God, therefore, it is correct to say: The son of God suffers. Thus, although one part (so to speak), sc. the divinity, does not suffer, nevertheless, the person, which is God, suffers in the other part, sc. in the humanity.”289

This is the traditional position, which since Constantinople II says that Christ suffered only in the flesh (peponqe,nai sarki,, cf. above, subch. 2.1).290 And even worse: Luther can sometimes say sentences, which obviously contradict to his position quoted above because now, he seems to split the natures. In his struggle in Gethsemane, Christ “had the feeling as if he would be abandoned by God. Yet indeed, he was abandoned by God. Not that divinity would be separated from the humanity (because divinity and humanity in this person, which is Christ, the son of God and of Mary, are united in a way, in which they cannot be separated or parted in eternity), but rather the divinity constricted and hid so that it seemed (and whoever reads it would say): Here is no God but only a human, moreover a grief-stricken and despondent human. The humanity was left alone, and the

tion with God not only takes place in faith, but faith LV the communicatio idiomatum between God and human” (ibid., 9). 288 Cf. BAUR, “Lutherische Christologie”, 149. 289 LUTHER, “Vom Abendmahl Christi. Bekenntnis”, in :$26, 321,4–12. 290 I do not agree with SCHWARZ, “Gott ist Mensch”, 313, that the addition of “secundum divinitatem” or “secundum humanitatem” “should not limit the FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPD WXP in any way”.

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devil had a free access to Christ and the divinity constricted its power and let the humanity struggle alone.”291

One can only guess what the reason of such inconsistencies is. Luther knows that natures must remain distinct, even in the unity. Otherwise, there would be the danger of a mixture. However, exactly this tendency is obvious in Luther – I only remind the above-quoted passage from his Disputatio de divinitate et humanitate Christi: “Here, humanity and divinity merge [orig.: gehets ineinander].”292 – so that he has to oppose it. However, he does it clumsily.293 On the other hand, it is a necessary consequence of a radical conception of UHDOLWHU understanding of FRPPXQLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP. This conception as well leads into apories, which can be clearly shown, so that neither line of thought brings a satisfying solution of the unity of divinity and humanity in Christ. Questions arise regarding both radical endings of this conception and mainly regarding their coexistence. The question in connection with the XELTXLW\RIWKHKXPDQQDWXUH of Christ was already mentioned: is an omnipresent humanity still human? Is not this a substantial change, which, in the end, underestimates the real humanity, because the omnipresent humanity is rather divine? 294 A similar question arises regarding the GHDWKRI*RG: how can God die and remain divine at the same time? Is God, who dies, the same as before? I.e., can he keep his divine identity and the same divinity? The most serious problem is, however, the necessary conclusion of this conception of FRPPXQLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP that both these radical endings – in 291

M. LUTHER, “Predigten des Jahres 1537“, Nr. 40, in :$ 45, 239,32. Cf. LOHSE, 0DUWLQ/XWKHU¶V7KHRORJ\, 229–230; ALTHAUS, 7KH7KHRORJ\RI0DUWLQ/XWKHU, 198, refers to a quotation from another, earlier sermon from 1525: “Christus in cruce pendens non sentit divinitatem, sed ut purus homo patitur” (M. LUTHER, “Predigten des Jahres 1525”, Nr. 12, in :$17/I, 72,32–33). 292 Above, fn. 282. 293 Cf. LIENHARD, 0DUWLQ /XWKHUV FKULVWRORJLVFKHV =HXJQLV, 175 and 259, who brings examples of Luthers careless speach and asks, if this radical conception does not lead “to a certain monophysitism”. His suspicion is correct, but assorted to another heresy: not monophysitism (which would mean a reduction of Christ to only one nature, in the tradition actually always to the divine one) but rather Euthychianism, which conceived the unity as a mixture of divinity and humanity, producing a third substance. Ibid., 236–237, Lienhard mentions an interesting detail that while Luther in his “Von den Konziliis und Kirchen” criticized heavily Nestorius, he did not recognize the problematic tendency of Euthyches’ conception (cf. LUTHER, “Von den Konziliis und Kirchen”, in :$ 50, 592– 606). SCHLINK, “Die Christologie von Chalcedon im ökumenischen Gespräch”, 85, states that Luther breaks Chalcedon in this point: “The objection against Luther is not illegitimate that he, despite him holding firmly the Chalcedonense, went with his doctrine of the FRP PXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP in fact beyond its utterances.” 294 This was criticized already by Luther’s adversaries Oecolampad and Zwingli, cf. LIENHARD, 0DUWLQ/XWKHUVFKULVWRORJLVFKHV=HXJQLV, 161, 171, 175, 259, 276.

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later terms: JHQXV PDLHVWDWLFXP on one side and JHQXV WDSHLQRWLFRQ on the other –would have to coexist at the same time. 295 Herewith, the old aporia of two sets of opposite properties at once returns.296 But opposite properties exclude one another. Subsequently, the proclaimed unity falls apart into the duality of the natures again. The FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP destroys itself in this way. What could remain would be merely a Christology of paradoxes. 297 As we have seen, Luther is not clear enough, he oscillates often between both poles and sometimes falls even into contradiction to his own theses. Nevertheless, a little help could be the differentiation of two VWDWXV, which was – based on Phil 2:6–9 – invented after Luther and became a firm part of traditional protestant Christology: VWDWXV H[LQDQLWLRQLV and VWDWXV H[DOWD WLRQLV.298 This distinction, which goes partly beyond Luther, is, nevertheless, supported in Luther himself by the fact that he develops the doctrine of ubiquity in connection with the Eucharist. 299 And Eucharist is an act, which happens SRVW &KULVWXP FUXFLIL[XP HW UHVXUUHFWXP. Ubiquity would be, then, rather a matter of VWDWXVH[DOWDWLRQLV, of the risen Christ, while the death of God in Christ would concern the VWDWXVH[LQDQLWLRQLV, i.e., the time of the earthly Jesus understood in terms of divine “evacuation” (ke,nwsij).300 A UHDOLWHU understood FRPPXQLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP could not be held in both of its radical endings at the same time. The two VWDWXV would interpret it as a sequence of the two JHQHUD: LQVWDWXH[LQDQLWLRQLV the divinity receives the human attributes (JHQXV WDSHLQRWLFRQ), while LQ VWDWX H[DOWDWLRQLV the humanity receives YLFH YHUVD the divine attributes (JHQXV PDLHVWDWLFXP). Neither this particular solution, however, erases the critical questions of both radical consequences of this conception. This proves again that a satisfying solution would require 295

Cf. ALTHAUS, 7KH 7KHRORJ\ RI 0DUWLQ /XWKHU, 197; LIENHARD, 0DUWLQ /XWKHUV FKULVWRORJLVFKHV=HXJQLV, 179. 296 Cf. above in this chapter, fn. 131 and 132. ALTHAUS, 7KH 7KHRORJ\ RI 0DUWLQ /X WKHU, 196. 297 Cf. LIENHARD, 0DUWLQ/XWKHUVFKULVWRORJLVFKHV=HXJQLV, 257. 298 First time in J. WIGAND, 'H FRPPXQLFDWLRQH LGLRPDWXP (Basileae, 1568), 158: “Nam GXSOH[ VWDWXV in Christo, dum in terris versari voluit, considerandues est: unus quidem humiliationis, alter vero glorificationis.” Cf. TH. MAHLMANN, 'DV QHXH 'RJPD GHUOXWKHULVFKHQ&KULVWRORJLH (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1969), 244, fn. 26. 299 However, as LIENHARD, 0DUWLQ /XWKHUV FKULVWRORJLVFKHV =HXJQLV, 174, points out, the glorification of the human nature of Christ happens already with the incarnation (cf. M. LUTHER, “Von den letzten Worten Davids”, in :$54, 49, 33–34). The ubiquity should be, therefore, valid also for the earthly Jesus. Nevertheless, Luther himself says that although the humanity of Jesus Christ took part on the divine attributes due to the UHDOLWHUFRPPXQL FDWLR LGLRPDWXP, it hid its glorification until the resurrection and used it only when he wanted to (cf. ibid., 50,8; FC SD VIII, in %6/., 1025,30–33). 300 This is a term, which Luther knows very well, but uses it in another meaning than the kenotics later, cf. LOHSE, 0DUWLQ/XWKHU¶V7KHRORJ\, 229–230; ALTHAUS, 7KH7KHROR J\RI0DUWLQ/XWKHU, 195–198.

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a more dynamic term of God and a different definition of humanity (cf. below, Ch. 5 and 6). Overall, Luther’s Christology is a kind of unrestrained thinking, which brought some fresh air into the traditional system, broke some rules and grasped the topic from a different perspective. At the same time, Luther hi mself did not build a system. On the contrary, there are some substantial contradictions in his thinking. 301 From a wider perspective, it is to say that in his attempt at a new approach to Christology, he was left quite alone. Regarding Christology (compared to soteriology and sacramentology), he had no real followers: already since the Formula of Concord, which tried to keep at least some of Luther’s provocative thoughts, it is obvious, how the emerging Lutheran orthodoxy took many steps back towards a certain scholasticism and to the old solutions with their aporias.  7KH3URWHVWDQW2UWKRGR[\ The Formula of Concord (Solida declaratio VIII: De persona Christi) tries to keep at least some of Luther’s specific emphases. It stresses the unity of the person of Christ, the UHDOLWHU understanding of FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP and, next to the JHQXVPDLHVWDWLFXP and to the stress on the ubiquity of the human nature of Christ, it also quotes the above-mentioned of Luther’s texts concerning the death of Jesus Christ. 302 However, at the same time, it balances these emphases by taking some steps back to positions known from the previous tradition. Much stronger than the emphasis on the unity of the person is again the difference of natures in Christ, supported by the perspective of incarnation, which becomes leading again. 303 At this point, FC refers to the Council of Chalcedon, but instead of the Creed it quotes the famous “agit enim” sentence from Leo’s Tomus, which is its interpretation-pattern for the understanding of Chalcedonense.304 Herewith, FC turns back to the traditional western perspective on the two natures, supported moreover with an emphasis on “essential

301

Cf. LIENHARD, 0DUWLQ/XWKHUVFKULVWRORJLVFKHV=HXJQLV, 280. Cf. FC, SD VIII, in %6/., 1017–1049. 303 FC mentions the council of Chalcedon in context with the Cappadocian heritage of the conception of unity of the person of Christ as a mixture (quoting the typical ancient examples of body and soul and of iron and fire), trying to differentiate better. Here, FC comes to a typical formulation: “For it is a far different, more sublime, and [altogether] ineffable communion and union between the divine and the human nature in the person of Christ, on account of which union and communion God is man and man is God, yet neither the natures nor their properties are thereby intermingled, but each nature retains its essence and properties.” (Ibid., 1023, 22–31; cf. ibid., 1022–1023). 304 Ibid., 1031, 37–39. 302

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properties” of each nature, which cannot be changed or taken over by the other nature so that they, therefore, simply exist next to each other.305 And even more: FC underlines the immutability of the divine nature, 306 which – again: in accord with the tradition – assumed the human nature, yet, in the end, “there is and remains in Christ only one divine omnipotence, power, majesty, and glory, which is peculiar to the divine nature alone; but it shines, manifests, and exercises itself fully, yet voluntarily, in, with, and through the assumed, exalted human nature in Christ”.307

With this typically enhypostatical emphasis on the divinized humanity, the JHQXV WDSHLQRWLFRQ is made impossible. 308 The communication of idioms seems to be a one-way affair, as it was traditionally the case in the concept of HQK\SRVWDVLV. Therefore, next to the quotes of Luther, who speaks about the death of God, FC speaks only about the death of the Son, and only in his humanity: “On account of this personal union, which cannot be thought of nor exist without such a true communion of the natures, not the mere human nature, whose property it is to suffer and die, has suffered for the sins of the world, but the Son of God Himself truly suffered, however, according to the assumed human nature, and (in accordance with our simple Christian faith) [as our Apostles’ Creed testifies] truly died, although the divine nature can neither suffer nor die.” 309

The properties of both natures can be attributed to the person, yet the FC differentiates strictly, what belongs to which nature. 310 With all these little steps back, the FC started, what was developed and brought to the end in the Lutheran orthodoxy. Here, the UHDOLWHU understood FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP became the fundamental article, moreover a kind of “a new dogma”. 311 However, what sounds brave and radical turns out in its realization to be rather a big step back towards the old schemes. Still, the or-

305

Ibid., 1020, 4–31; 1021, 1–6. Cf. SCHMID, 'LH'RJPDWLN, 234, referring to the origin of this doctrine in the Lutheran orthodoxy in M. Chemnitz’s 'HGXDEXVQDWXULV (1580). 306 Ibid., 1032, 10. 307 Ibid., 1039, 4–11. 308 Ibid., 1021, 7–25, confirming explicitely that the glorification of human nature happened already with the incarnation. However, cf. ibid., 1038, 37–39: the use of divine attributes is “concealed and withheld [for the greater part] at the time of the humiliation“. 309 Ibid., 1023, 32–44. 310 Ibid., 1028, 14–30. 311 Cf. MAHLMANN, 'DV QHXH 'RJPD, 245, who tries to substantiate the important christological insight of Luther that because of the UHDOLWHU understanding of the FRPPXQL FDWLRLGLRPDWXP, Christology should not be “a two-natures doctrine but rather a unity-ofperson doctrine”. Mahlmann sees this goal fulfilled in the Christology of the Lutheran orthodoxy.

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thodox theologians were very well acquainted with the theology of the early church. The orthodoxy operates again with the typically western differentiation of two natures: the unity is constructed from the two natures.312 The human nature of Christ is anhypostatic, 313 passively taken out from a mass of common human nature and – obviously in an Aristotelian u`lh-morfh-frame – united with the divinity in the person of Logos who is the person-building and active principle.314 This is actually HQK\SRVWDVLVin the western view: not retrospectively analyzed in theory but rather constructed from the two natures.315 The unity (or synthesis 316) of unconfused natures and their proprieties is and remains a mystery: 317 the Scripture teaches so but does not explain how the miraculous unity is constituted. Therefore – here obviously referring indirectly to the Creed of Chalcedon and its negative formulas – one has to be satisfied only with the negative refusal of false possibilities, because it is easier to say who Christ is not than who he is.318 Alike the concept of HQK\SRVWDVLV in Leontius of Jerusalem, this conception has similar consequences for the humanity of Christ in the Lutheranorthodox theology as well: Christ was genuinely without sin (not in an imputative way as other people) and his body and soul had a special excellency. His body was beautiful and genuinely immortal – mortal only by external reasons, and after its death, it remained uncorrupted (in old terms: avqanasi,a and avfqarsi,a).319 The Lutheran orthodoxy developed the mystery of the unity of the two natures into a model, which seems to be a three-step sequence or scheme. The fundamental frame builds FRPPXQLRQDWXUDUXP, from which follows the doc312

Cf. SCHMID, 'LH'RJPDWLN, 211. Further on, I follow this classical compedium. Cf. also DALFERTH, &UXFLILHGDQG5HVXUUHFWHG, 142–148; PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 298–302. 313 This is a shift compared to Leontius of Jerusalem, cf. SCHMID, 'LH'RJPDWLN, 217. 314 Ibid., 212–213. 315 Cf. ibid., 217, with the named particular steps, which – despite of their logical sequencing – should happen at the same time (orig. in J. GERHARD, /RFLWKHRORJLFL III, 421): the Holy Spirit separated and sanctificated the body from the mass of humanity, formed it, and breathed in the soul; this formed and soulful body was then assumed into the subsistence of the Logos and this formed, soulful and subsistent person was then conceived LQ XWHURYLUJLQLV. Cf. ibid., 220 (M. CHEMNITZ, 'HGXDEXVQDWXULV, 23): the Logos increated into himself his own humanity. 316 Ibid., 221. However, here (J. GERHARD, /RFL WKHRORJLFL III, 428) better than in the Damscene: “Not a part with another part, but rather the whole Logos is united with the whole body and the whole body with the whole Logos.” After the incarnation, there is no Logos H[WUDFDUQHP and no body H[WUD/RJRQ (against the so-called Extra Calvinisticum). 317 Ibid., 222 (J. GERHARD, /RFLWKHRORJLFL III, 422, following Luther): “etiam angelorum captum transcendens”, the unity is called a “me,ga musth,rion”. 318 Ibid., 213–214 and 222 (J. GERHARD, /RFLWKHRORJLFL III, 422). 319 Ibid., 218.

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trine of SURSRVLWLRQHV SHUVRQDOHV and finally the doctrine of FRPPXQLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP, which is the final point of the whole framework. However, as we will see, after a courageous start, vis-à-vis the difficult points, this doctrine turns back to the old schemes and their aporias. The stress on the real exchange plays an important role already in the first step (FRPPXQLR QDWXUDUXP): the divine nature appropriates to itself the human nature, the divine nature actively permeates the human nature (like fire the iron or soul the body). 320 However, it is obvious, that it is a RQHZD\DI IDLU: the divine nature is active, the human nature is passive. In an enhypostatical frame, this is the only possible motion. The ontical relation of natures is asymmetrical. Already this is a noticeable step back from Luther’s conception. On the contrary, the possibility of predication of personal appellations (SURSRVLWLRQHVSHUVRQDOHV), which is hereby opened, can be symmetrical. The SHUVRQDO appellation of one nature can be predicated about the other nature (not only about the unifying person). “God is man” and “man is God” – in the case of Jesus Christ, both predications are valid and not only YHUEDOLWHU as a kind of a metaphor or V\QHNGRFKH but also UHDOLWHU, because in the person of Jesus Christ, God really is man (without ceasing to be God). 321 The final point is, then, the FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP. Here, after both previous steps, one would expect a deep expression of the unity and intense mutual relations of the natures, following the direction Luther had set. Yet the opposite is the case: the differentiation of the natures and their duality wins. This is clear to see already in both initial rules for the FRPPXLFDWLRLGLRPD WXP, which are quite cautious. First, any property of any of the natures can be predicated about the person – this is nothing new, to the contrary, this is the oldest rule of the verbal-only use of FRPPXQLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP. And second, no nature can act alone, the other nature always participates in it as well.322 There is obviously a very dualistic way of thinking in the old Leonine way where the unity remains only proclaimed. This is confirmed in the differentiation of three JHQHUD of FRPPXQLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP, which follows from both rules: JHQXVLGLRPDWLFXP as the possibility of predication of different properties for the one person of Christ. *HQXV PDLHVWDWLFXP as the real sharing of the divine properties to the human nature. And JHQXVDSRWHOHVPDWLFXP stressing the soteriological dimension, i.e., the mutual work of both the divine and the human nature for the salvation of humans.

320

Ibid., 224. Ibid., 225, with the precise definition of SURSRVLWLRQHVSHUVRQDOHV: “eiusmodi enuntiationes, in quibus concretum unius naturae (unitae) praedicatur de concreto alterius nat urae”. Cf. ibid., 232–233. 322 Ibid., 226. 321

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All three JHQHUD seem to mark three different modes of real communication. However, in a closer view, this is not the case. Therefore, I propose to differentiate very carefully, what each JHQXV expresses. It is to say that JHQXV LGLRPDWLFXP only repeats the old rule of the YHUEDOLWHU predication, which brings the possibility of symmetrical statements. This genus thus marks only the possibility of what can be said about Jesus Christ. It is the same as the conception of FRPPXQLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP in John of Damascus: all properties of both natures can be predicated about the person of Christ but not about the other nature. We can, therefore, say: “The human Jesus Christ is almighty”, or: “In Jesus Christ, God died.” But we cannot say: “Humanity is almighty”, neither “Divinity died” because both natures preserve and keep their essential properties.323 As a sole mode of predication, JHQXV LGLRPDWLFXP repeats the old aporias; it predicates about Jesus Christ two sets of contrary properties at the same time. However, this possibility of a symmetrical predication cannot be realized without contradictions or, as it was the case in the tradition, without diminishing one of the natures – in this case of the human one.324 Therefore, the second genus, JHQXV PDLHVWDWLFXP, brings the asymmetry and unlike the previous genus, it marks the ontic level. 325 Repeating what was already constituted by the FRPPXQLRQDWXUDUXP, only on the level of properties, this JHQXV states the one-way real communication of properties from the active divine nature to the passive human nature. Moreover, with the additional reason – known very well also from the old tradition and reestablishing the Platonic concept of God with his immutability and apathy – that the divine nature cannot change and thus cannot accept any new properties. 326 That is why there is in this conception of FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP no real PXWXDO exchange of properties but rather only divinization of the human nature, i.e., the enhypostatical WKHRVLV. (One of the consequences of this thought in Luther was the ubiquity of the human nature of Christ and the Lutheran orthodoxy holds this locus still firmly and defends it against the Reformed wing. 327) This means, however, that this solution iterates also the old problems: by the divinization, the human nature is, in fact, diminished in its humanity, and it is substantially changed so that the question arises, whether this divinized humanity, substantially different from all others, is still true humanity common to all people. Nevertheless, the JHQXV PDLHVWDWLFXP is the dominating genus because it describes the ontology of the person of Christ. 323

Ibid., 227–228., cf. 236–237. Cf. above, subchapter 2.2; and also, DALFERTH, &UXFLILHG DQG 5HVXUUHFWHG, 147: The JHQXV LGLRPDWLFXP “formulates the task but offers no solution. The JHQXV PDLHVWDWL FXP, on the other hand, goes a step further.” 325 Cf. SCHMID, 'LH'RJPDWLN, 239 (A. QUENSTEDT, 7KHRORJLDGLGDFWLFRSROHPLFD III, 1685, 159): “Reciprocatio, quae in primo genere locum habet, in hoc genere non datur.” 326 Ibid., 229. 327 Cf. ibid., 239–243. 324

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The third genus, JHQXVDSRWHOHVPDWLFXP, concerns soteriology and claims, in harmony with Anselm’s satisfaction theory, that salvation could be brought only through the work of Christ, in whom the divine and the human nature always cooperate together – the work of only one nature would not be enough. 328 The testing point of this cooperation, however, is the cross: the suffering and the death of Jesus Christ. Here, it comes out that the cross proves to be the insurmountable hurdle for this conception. While the human nature suffers and dies, the divine nature can neither suffer nor die, however, it still should be indivisibly united with the humanity in order to do this work also together.329 This is impossible in the case of death: either both natures really work together – and then the divine dies as well, as Luther dared to say, or, at least at this point, the divine cannot go with the human nature, which would, however, lead to docetism. The traditional aporia of the impassible God on the cross returns. Overall, the final picture is an aporetical mixture. The position of Lutheran orthodoxy could not keep the direction set by Luther, but it takes rather many steps back and returns, in fact, to Constantinople II (divine immutability and apathy, human nature enhypostatical in the divine, suffering of Christ only in the flesh),330 however, read through Leo’s Tome. 331 The aporias are deeper than ever: in the name of unity, the human nature is divinized and hence d iminished in its true humanity. And at the same time, in the name of preserving the divinity from all mutability and passibility, the natures are differentiated insomuch that the unity of the person, so intensively proclaimed at the beginning, tends to fall apart in the end. Nevertheless, to underline the soteriological importance of incarnation and the humanity of Christ, the Lutheran orthodoxy developed, under the influence of the biblical Scriptures and against the backdrop of this doctrine, also the doctrine of two VWDWXV of Christ. This doctrine, following the exposed locus of Phil 2,5–9, says that with the (everlasting) incarnation, Christ was until his resurrection in the state of humiliation (VWDWXV H[LQDQLWLRQLV). However, this humiliation cannot concern the immutable divine nature. It was thus the human nature, which resigned the use of its divine attributes. With his resur-

328

Ibid., 229–230. Cf. ibid., 231–232 and 244, with reference to D. Hollaz and M. Chemnitz, who both struggle with preserving the unity of both natures in the moment of death of Jesus Christ. However, how can unity be preserved, when one nature suffers and dies and the other does not, yet should be still inseparably united with the dead one? Lutheran theologians hold the Aristotelic-medieval position that death is the separation of mortal body and immortal soul. In the case of Jesus Christ, the divine nature must be in the moment of death still united with both. This ends in another apory, cf. more below, Ch. 7.1.1. 330 Cf. ibid., 236–237, with references to J. Gerhard and D. Hollaz. 331 Cf. ibid., 244, with reference to M. Chemnitz. 329

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rection, Christ got in the state of exaltation (VWDWXV H[DOWDWLRQLV), where he used his divine glory also for his humanity in fullness.332 In the 17th century arose the well-known dispute among the Lutheran theologians about the meaning or radicality of NHQRVLV: did the human nature only KLGH its use of the divine attributes (it still used those attributes but in a hidden way) – which is in fact not a NHQRVLV but rather a NU\SVLV (kru,yij crh,sewj, the position of theologians from Tubingen) –, or did it really UHVLJQ the use (ke,nwsij crh,sewj, the position of theologians from Giessen)? Neither the Giessen position denied that the human nature of Christ did possess the divine attributes (kth/sij). The question concerned only their active use. Therefore, the discussion focused primarily on the most provocative point of the whole Lutheran doctrine of FRPPX QLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP: on the ubiquity of the human nature of Christ. While the Tubingen position held the radical version, more close to Luther himself, that Christ was omnipresent since the moment of his conception, the Giessen theologians defended the (at the first sight more acceptable but against the backdrop of the enhypostatical FRPPXQLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP rather problematic333) more moderate position that only the divine nature was omnipresent during the earthly time of Jesus Christ, without the omnipresence of the human one: the divine nature of Christ reigned over the world “non mediante carne”.334 With this, however, the natures seem to be separated. 335 Nevertheless, it was this moderate solution, which was later broadly accepted.336

Yet still – apart from the fact that this doctrine itself already makes the aporias more evident and deeper – with the possibility of the ke,nwsij only for the nature that is mutable, i.e., for the human one, it is only a halfway solution. It was thus only a matter of time until a conception came, which tried to think the NHQRVLV much more radically and expand it to the divine nature as well. The sharpest critique of the traditional Lutheran Christology came from D.F. Strauss, who believed to show its aporias definitively. Next to the massively underestimated humanity 332

Cf. ibid., 271–272, 276 (D. Hollaz). Cf. PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 309: “A place was made for concrete human life in spite of the communication of divine attributes of majesty to Jesus’ humanity. Jesus’ glorification, which supposedly had to be connected with his birth because of the doctrine of incarnation, could be returned to its rightful place, to Jesus’ exaltation, by means of the doctrine of selfemptying. But the God-man of this Christology who merely declined to use his glory remained a sort of fabulous being, more like a mythical redeemer than the historical reality of Jesus of Nazareth. […] They [sc. the Giessen theologians], however, threatened the vital unity of the person. […] The Giessen theologians thus found themselves confronted by the old argument: separate activities require separate persons.” 334 Cf. M. BREIDERT, 'LH NHQRWLVFKH &KULVWRORJLH GHV  -DKUKXQGHUWV (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1977), 21, quoting G. THOMASIUS, &KULVWL 3HUVRQ XQG :HUN, vol. II, 2nd ed. (Erlangen: Bläsing, 1857), 440. 335 That was the critique expressed by the Tuebingen theologians. Cf. BREIDERT, 'LH NHQRWLVFKH&KULVWRORJLH, 21–22. 336 SCHMID, 'LH 'RJPDWLN, 279–284; PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 307–309; BREIDERT, 'LH NHQRWLVFKH&KULVWRORJLH, 19–23; U. WIEDENROTH, .U\SVLVXQG.HQRVLV6WXGLHQ]X7KHPD XQG *HQHVH GHU 7ELQJHU &KULVWRORJLH LP  -DKUKXQGHUW (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011). 333

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of Christ, Strauss criticizes the FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP and the missing JHQXVWDSHLQRWL FRQ next to the JHQXV PDLHVWDWLFXP. He comments with a deep irony the consequence of the JHQXVPDLHVWDWLFXP that the human nature of Christ already as an embryo LQXWHURYLU JLQLV reigns the whole world. The solution, in his eyes, however, aporetical as well, would be a self-diminishing and self-subordination of divinity to the humanity in order to make a fully human development possible. Yet this would mean for God to give up his divinity, which is impossible to accept. Anyway, with this critique, Strauss anticipated the nascent kenotic theology. 337

The5HIRUPHGSRVLWLRQ has inherited the same christological background, but it differs from the Lutheran position from the beginning. For the Reformed, the Son of God came only because of the sin of Adam, i.e., only because of the soteriological purpose. Christ is primarily the Mediator of salvation. The soteriological pattern is the same as in the Lutheran theology: it is Anselm’s satisfaction theory. The unity of the person is conceived in the frame of subsistence theory, however, with the big difference of the so-called ([WUD &DOYLQLVWLFXP, which says that even after the incarnation, the divine Logos exists in unity with the humanity as well as outside of it. The immanent Trinity is thus not identical to the economic Trinity. 338 The assumed humanity is hence not a part of the person of the Logos but rather only an instrument, organ, and medium for its effects and actions on earth. 339 Here, the main critical question would concern the incarnation and both of its sides: the divinity of Christ, which seems to double or to split the Logos, and the humanity, which seems to be underestimated to a mere instrument of divinity. Against the backdrop of the Extra Calvinisticum, the unity in Christ is twofold. First, the human nature is immediately united with the Logos in the hypostatic unity. But, second, the human nature is united with the divine nature only by being mediated through the Spirit. As such, this unity is defined by the four Chalcedonian adjectives. The main emphasis, however, lies on the GLIIHUHQFH of the natures: both keep their attributes and their radical difference remains preserved, because – unlike the Lutherans – the main rule is valid, namely, ILQLWXP QRQ FDSD[ LQILQLWL.340 Thus, the Reformed theologians represent the traditional western position. With this emphasis (i.e., without any tendency to the divinization of the human nature, which is strictly refused), the Reformed Christology can stress much more the humanity of Christ in its natural human development: all ex337

Cf. D.F. STRAUSS, 'LH FKULVWOLFKH *ODXEHQVOHKUH LQLKUHUJHVFKLFKWOLFKHQ (QWZLFN OXQJ XQG LP .DPSIH PLW GHU PRGHUQHQ :LVVHQVFKDIW, vol. II (reprint of the edition 1841, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2009), 142–143; BREIDERT, 'LH NHQRWL VFKH&KULVWRORJLH, 24–26. 338 Cf. H. HEPPE, 'LH 'RJPDWLN GHU HYDQJHOLVFKUHIRUPLHUWHQ .LUFKH, ed. E. BIZER (Neukirchen: Buchhandlung des Erziehungsvereins Neukirchen, 1935), 323–234. 339 Ibid., 326. 340 Ibid., 326–327.

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cellency Christ had, had been the excellency of created gifts.341 The FRPPX QLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP (structured in three sorts: FRPPXQLFDWLR JUDWLDUXP, FRP PXQLFDWLR SURSULHWDWXP and FRPPXQLFDWLR RSHUDWLRQXP) is then basically a mere coincidence of two sets of attributes in the united person. This mutual coincidence is the deciding point for soteriology in the Anselmian frame. Because no direct communication between the natures is possible (unlike in the Lutheran theology), the only point of real sharing is what the Lutherans called SURSRVLWLRQHV SHUVRQDOHV. Here, the Reformed as well can say: “Christ as God is human” and “The human Jesus is God”. Any other cross-predication of the attributes relating not to the person but to the natures in Christ are possible and true but only verbal (which, nevertheless, does not mean vague).342 Because of the strict differentiation of natures, the Reformed have no problems with the VWDWXVH[LQDQLWLRQLV – on the contrary, they offer a much more radical and interesting solution of NHQRVLV: With the incarnation, Christ accepted the form of a servant (IRUPDVHUYL, Phil 2:7), which means that he hid his divinity (not only divine attributes of the human nature, as the Lutherans put it) under his humanity.343 The NHQRVLV concerns here the divinity itself, although it is not a strict NHQRVLV but rather a hiding of divinity (kru,yij qeo,ththj). The suffering on the cross serves fully for the soteriological purpose: Christ suffered only in the flesh but in the person of the Logos, which brings the deciding soteriological impact – the satisfaction. 344 However, the VWDWXV H[DOWDWLRQLV does not mean the divinization of Christ’s humanity. His humanity is glorified, his body becomes immortal and free from suffering, but it is still the highest possible glorification of a creature, not WKHRVLV.345  .HQRWLFLVP The last missing piece of the puzzle brought the kenoticism of the 19 th century – it took almost 2000 years until someone had the courage to express radically, what was actually in the air since the beginning, but what no one dared to say explicitly until now: that in Jesus Christ, God emptied himself in favor

341

Cf. ibid., 354, with reference to Th. Beza. Cf. also PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 301. HEPPE, 'LH 'RJPDWLN, 327–329. The difference in the conception of FRPPXQLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP between Lutherans and the Reformed is one of the main differences. Nevertheless, one should be careful not to make the common mistake of evaluating the Reformed position from Luther’s perspective on Zwingli or from the perspective of the Lutheran orthodoxy on the reformed wing, as it is often the case (cf. e.g. PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 299). 343 Ibid., 387. 344 Ibid., 358–359. 345 Ibid., 388. 342

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of the full humanity of Christ. 346 It is an attempt to develop fully the humanity, be it at the cost of the divinity. It was I.A. Dorner, who in 1839 was the first one to raise the claim that the traditional Lutheran-orthodox JHQXV PDLHVWDWLFXP has to be completed and balanced also by a JHQXV WDSHLQRWL FRQ.347 The incipient kenotic theology assumed this emphasis and focused further on only on it (while Dorner became paradoxically the sharpest adversary of the kenotic approach). 348 While until the 19 th century, the divinity of Christ stood firm and the theology struggled with Christ’s humanity, following the intense quest for the historical Jesus and the idealistic philosophy of Hegel and Schelling 349 also in Christology came the Cartesian-Kantian twist: the starting point is now the true and full humanity of Jesus, to which the divinity is to be harmonized without diminishing it.350 Now, the divinity has to be adapted to the humanity and its capacity. Until now, the humanity was the nature that could change, had to change, and changed indeed. Now, it is the divinity, which must adapt.351 The struggle concerned now the meaning and radicality of this adaptation – and it was understood by the kenotic theologians in the terms of NH QRVLV. Divine adaptation to human capacities means NHQRVLV of the divinity: the divinity has to evacuate itself in order to create space for the full development of Christ’s humanity. Divine NHQRVLV is a condition for true humani-

346

Cf. P. ALTHAUS, “Kenosis”, in 5**, vol. III., ed. K. GALLING, 3rd ed. (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1959, 1244–1246, who names this step “a break with the whole christological tradition” and points to the Formula of Concord, Epitome 8,39, which rejects this idea (ibid., 1245). 347 I.A. DORNER, (QWZLFNOXQJVJHVFKLFKWH GHU /HKUH YRQ GHU 3HUVRQ &KULVWL (Stuttgart: S.G. Liesching, 1839), 169–183; cf. BREIDERT, 'LHNHQRWLVFKH&KULVWRORJLH, 28–29. 348 BREIDERT, 'LHNHQRWLVFKH&KULVWRORJLH, 29. It is this erudite study, written from a rather conservative Lutheran position, which I follow in this subchapter in the first place. Cf. also, from a conservative catholic standpoint and thus very critical, WEINANDY, 'RHV*RG &KDQJH", 101–123; and the rather positive study of D. BROWN, 'LYLQH+XPDQLW\.HQRWL FLVP([SORUHGDQG'HIHQGHG (London: SCM Press, 2011). 349 According to BREIDERT, ibid., 299–300, this was the main background of the kenoticism. He denies that the kenotic Christology would be the legitimate and final step of the early-church or of the Lutheran or Reformed Christology. However, kenoticism understood itself in this way and was therefore called by some “the negative fulfillment of the church two-natures Christology”, cf. ibid., 304; but by others, it was called in the contrary “the fulfilled kenosis of the reason”, cf. W. KASPER, 'HU *RWW -HVX &KULVWL, ed. L. ULRICH (Leipzig: St. Benno-Verlag, 1982), 221. 350 This refers primarily to the German kenotic theology. Next to it, kenoticism developed independently also in the Russian and Anglican theology, cf. BREIDERT, 'LHNHQRWL VFKH&KULVWRORJLH, 14 (here also further literature); KASPER, 'HU*RWW-HVX&KULVWL, 221. Cf. also B. MCCORMACK, “Kenoticism in Modern Christology”, in 7KH 2[IRUG +DQGERRNRI &KULVWRORJ\, ed. F.A. MURPHY (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2015), 444–457. 351 BREIDERT,'LHNHQRWLVFKH&KULVWRORJLH, 303.

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ty.352 This was the most radical attempt in the history of Christology stating that it was the divine nature, the Logos itself, who – even before incarnation – resigned its own divine attributes (ke,nwsij kth/sewj). Within this frame, many different conceptions emerged. The most wellknown, because it is the most mature and consistent – and in the context of others still quite moderate – conception came from the Erlangen theologian * 7KRPDVLXV.353 He follows up the traditional church Christology on the Chalcedonian ground with the assumption of the common and anhypostatical human nature, but – in accord with the Enlightenment and its accent on real humanity, personality, and self-consciousness also in historical and psychological terms – stresses heavily the unity of the person of Jesus Christ: both natures must be united insomuch that a divine-human “I” of the historical personality of Jesus Christ is possible. Therefore, Thomasius criticizes Constantinople III and sees the main problem of the traditional Christology in the duality or duplicity of agents supported by the dyotheletism and by the whole western tradition. 354 Overall, the kenotic Christology can be understood as one big protest against the traditional axiom of divine immutability: if in Jesus Christ divinity and humanity should create a unity, then the divinity cannot remain untouched by it, the divinity as well has to adapt to the humanity.355 Christology has to work with a dynamic term of God – this is a right insight, which the kenotic theology shares with Luther and with the theology of the 20th century. At the same time, however, Thomasius with his accent on unity runs into the same danger of a mixture of natures as Luther. 356 Nevertheless, the main PRYHQV of this whole process is divine love, whose substance is “that it gives up everything except itself and can bear any limitation, even the hindmost one”. 357 Therefore, in order to solve the problem that God must adapt and remain the same at the same time, in his later work, Thomasius differentiates between the “essential” and “relative” attributes of God. The point of this differentiation is that “Logos can, therefore, surrender these non-essential attributes without detriment to what he essentially is”. 358 The fundamental rule in Thomasius says: “Regardless of how deep the NHQR VLV has to be conceived, it cannot be thought of as of giving up the divine es352

BREIDERT,ibid., 23, reminds that this means a substantial shift: from the doctrine of the VWDWXV to the doctrine of the person, and from the ORJRVHQVDUNRV to ORJRVDVDUNRV: “The goal of the kenotic theology is to understand and explain, how could the preexistent Logos enter or get over into the human limits.” 353 The first time published 1845, cf. ibid, 30. 354 Cf. ibid., 82–87. 355 Cf. ibid., 132 (W. Geß). 356 Cf. ibid., 85. 357 THOMASIUS, &KULVWL3HUVRQXQG:HUNII, 205; BREIDERT, 'LHNHQRWLVFKH&KULVWROR JLH, 86. 358 MCCORMACK, “Kenoticism”, 452.

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sence or divine life; this would be a cardinal error, which contradicts the Scriptures.”359 However, at the same time, the essential attributes of truth, holiness, and love can be held in the incarnation only in a way appropriate to the humanity, i.e., only modified and reduced.360 The distinction between the essential and relative attributes thus becomes blurred and only the divinity is diminished because it has to be adapted to the human capacity, which is the last measure for the divinity as well. Breidert, therefore, quotes W. Elert: “This term of capacity is indeed the fundamental term in the Christology of this new kenotic theology. Here […], the human &DSD[ is the eye of the needle, into which the Logos must press himself to become human and which prescribes to him the extent of his selfemptying […] Applying this canon, however, one can only say that the human nature does not have any capacity for God. In a comparison of any attributes, the human nature is always the smaller; and if, nevertheless, ‘God was in Christ’, it could have always been only a smaller God as the real one, indeed, only another God.”361

The work of Thomasius tries to make space for the full humanity, but it rather shows the aporia of a thinking, which conceives divinity and humanity as opposites: if he wants the full humanity, the divinity has to bow out, despite his efforts to try to keep it. However, with the reduced divinity, the person of Christ is reduced as well. The result is Jesus Christ as a kind of a half-God and a half-human; the kenotic Christology thinks of God and human in Jesus together in a way, in which Jesus “is in the end neither the first nor the latter”.362 And, moreover, with both natures as opposites, the unity of the person falls apart.363 Other conceptions were even more radical. E.g. W.F. Gess – unlike Thomasius without any regards to the fundaments of the traditional Christology – was able to state that the divine Logos gave up his divinity and transformed himself into the human soul and ceased to be God. This breaks the Chalcedonian avtre,ptwj and goes even further than the old Apollinarist heresy.364 Then, Jesus remains a sheer human.365

359 THOMASIUS, &KULVWL3HUVRQXQG:HUNII, 199; BREIDERT, 'LHNHQRWLVFKH&KULVWROR JLH, 87. 360 BREIDERT, 'LH NHQRWLVFKH &KULVWRORJLH, 88; WEINANDY, 'RHV *RG &KDQJH", 115: “The Kenoticist, while trying to maintain that the Logos is nevertheless Son of God, cannot maintain that he is KRPRRXVLRQ with the Father as incarnate.” 361 W. ELERT, 'HU FKULVWOLFKH *ODXEH (Berlin: Furche-Verlag, 1940), 382–383; cf. BREIDERT, 'LH NHQRWLVFKH &KULVWRORJLH, 89 and 304; and also PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 311: “The YHUHKRPR is achieved only proportionately to subtractions from the YHUHGHXV.” 362 Cf. BREIDERT, 'LHNHQRWLVFKH&KULVWRORJLH, 309 and 112. 363 Cf. ibid. and 88–89. 364 Cf. MCCORMACK, “Kenoticism”, 453: “With Gess, the older kenoticism had reached its nadir or its full potential, depending upon one’s point of view. Certainly, he had made no effort to uphold divine immutability. Thomasius had tried to maintain the essential immutability of God while finding in God genuine affectivity, and a capacity for real interaction with the created world. Gess had simply given up on immutability.”

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Neither the kenotic Christology, hence, was able to solve the problem of the relationship of the natures in the person of Jesus Christ in another way than by – radically or even extremely – diminishing one nature (divinity) in favor of the other (humanity). Divinity and humanity remain total opposites, IL QLWXP is still QRQFDSD[LQILQLWL. In an attempt to adapt divinity insofar that the humanity will be able to grasp it, it reduces divinity to null. 366 An absolute victory celebrates the moment of incarnation, the Easter plays no important role.367 And besides, Trinity remains possible only at the cost of subordinationism: the reduced divinity in Jesus Christ makes it impossible to conceive the relationship of the Father and the incarnated Son as a God-God relation. Moreover, the change of the divinity in Jesus Christ necessarily means a change in the Trinity, which means that God’s identity would not remain the same.368 Therefore, the adversaries of the kenotic approach stressed intensively the immutability of God.369 The kenotic Christology brings the doctrine of FRPPXQLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP on the background of the two-natures concept obviously DGDEVXUGXP, showing its fundamental problem that it presupposes the natures as self-acting opposite agents.370 Herewith, the old Apollinarian objection is still valid: “Two wholes cannot create unity.” 371 Or with another old argument, mentioned by 365

Cf. BREIDERT, 'LHNHQRWLVFKH&KULVWRORJLH, 123–136; W.F. GEß, 'LH/HKUHYRQGHU 3HUVRQ &KULVWL HQWZLFNHOW DXV GHP 6HOEVWEHZX‰WVHLQ &KULVWL XQG DXV GHP =HXJQLVVH GHU $SRVWHO (Basel, 1856). In fact, this is exactly the opposite result than the kenotics wanted to defend, coming very close to the liberal theologians, who commented this with pleased irony, cf. KASPER, 'HU*RWW-HVX&KULVWL, 221. 366 This is the point of the critique of the kenotic Christology in the papal Encyclical “Sempiternus Rex” by PIUS XII. from 1951, cf. $$643 (Vatican, 1951), 637–638. .HQRVLV is here the opposite heresy to docetism. Nevertheless, the idea of NHQRVLV was (in different ways) developed further in the 20 th century even by catholic theologians, however not as self-emptying but in contrary as the power of divine freedom, cf. RAHNER, )RXQGDWLRQVRI &KULVWLDQ )DLWK, 224; KASPER, 'HU *RWW -HVX &KULVWL, 216–226; IDEM, -HVXV WKH &KULVW, with his attempt of a Christology from below. 367 Cf. BREIDERT, 'LHNHQRWLVFKH&KULVWRORJLH, 300 and 309. 368 Cf. ELERT, 'HUFKULVWOLFKH*ODXEH, 382: “The consequence is, therefore, despite all used precautionary measures, still the same: the lo,goj e;nsarkoj is indeed a different one than the lo,goj a;sarkoj.” 369 Cf. BREIDERT, 'LH NHQRWLVFKH &KULVWRORJLH, 301–302; PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 311– 312. 370 For critique of the kenotic concepts cf. also ALTHAUS, “Kenosis”, 1245, who, however, stresses also the persisting importance of the kenotic concepts and their criticism of the traditional Christology concerning the VWDWXV of Christ (VWDWXV H[LQDQLWLRQLV HW VWDWXV H[DOWDWLRQLV), which pertain both to the whole person, and concerning the immutability of God. 371 Cf. above, fn. 59; KASPER, -HVXVWKH&KULVW, 200: “Apollinaris’ problem is far from being settled even today. It is a basic theme of modern criticism of religion and of modern atheistic humanism that God and man are mutually exclusive.”

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Thomasius: 'LYLVLV RSHULEXV GLYLGLWXU SHUVRQD If we split works, then the person is split as well. 372 With this presupposition, the unity can be either construed only mono-physitically by diminishing one of the natures, or it has necessarily to fall apart. Thus, every Christology working with this pattern must end in aporias. The whole doctrine of FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP proves to be wrong from the very beginning and it can never solve the main christological task of how to think of the unity of divinity and humanity in Christ. What is thus required today is a Christology, which would not need this model at all, which, however, would not leave the fundamental Chalcedonian frame: it would have to start with the unity of the person, but, at the same time, it would have to preserve the full divinity and full humanity of Jesus Christ.373 The first one who tried it in the modern times was Schleiermacher, even a few years before the modern kenotic theology was developed.  6FKOHLHUPDFKHUDQG+LV&ULWLTXHRIWKH7UDGLWLRQDO'RJPD With the Enlightenment’s emphasis on natural humanity, the traditional Christology in its neo-scholastic and speculative form that it received in the Protestant orthodoxy was no longer tenable. After the so-called anthropological turn, traditional Christology seemed to be too metaphysical and supernatural, stressing the divinity of Christ and losing the human Jesus.374 Therefore, it is no wonder that both extreme opinions were present: the first tried to d efend the old theology, the other tried to throw it away as outdated and obsolete.375 Schleiermacher, very well familiar with the old texts and conceptions and, at the same time, schooled in the Kantian criticism of metaphysics, de372

Cf. THOMASIUS, &KULVWL3HUVRQXQG:HUNII, 440, and PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 309. Cf. similarly MCCORMACK, “Kenoticism”, 454–455, who, however, favorizes the problematic dyothelitism of the ancient church: “What is needed today is a new kenotic theory – one which will avoid the problems of the older kenoticism by: (a) making kenosis RULJLQDOto the being of God so that its concretization in time involves no change in God and, therefore, no split between the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity, and (b) understanding kenosis in such a way that no divestment of anything proper to God is entailed and no departure from the dyothelitism of the ancient Church is required.” Cf. more in detail below, Ch. 5. 374 BUNTFUß , “Verlust der Mitte”, 349, points to the roots of the modern critique in the Socinian critique of the traditional christological dogma in the 16 th century: “The presupposition of a connection of divine and human nature in one person contradicts the sound reason. The biblical talk about the Logos and the Son of God thus cannot relate to a preexistent divine being but rather only to the earthly Jesus. Metaphorically speaking, Jesus may be called a GLYLQXV KRPR, a divine human but not YHUH GHXV, true God, as the Council of Chalcedon in 451 did it.” According to Buntfuß, however, “the Socinians provided a sol ution of this problem, which is held until today, when they interpreted the talk about the divinity of Jesus not as an object statement about his being but rather as a religious statement about his importance.” 375 Cf. SCHLEIERMACHER, 7KH&KULVWLDQ)DLWK, § 95.1, 390. 373

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cided to go the middle way and to keep from the old theology as much as possible, as far as it can be harmonized with the current stress on the natural humanity and to the “immediate Christian self-consciousness”.376 It was the undervalued humanity of the traditional Christology (and, as we have seen, it was a strong tendency in Christology since the very beginning), which proved the merely divine picture of Jesus Christ in the eyes of many thinkers as a mere dogmatic construction: the unreal humanity made the d ivinity equally unreal. Therefore – supported also by the quest for the life of the historical Jesus – to keep up the natural humanity of Jesus was the first commandment of this time.377 According to this emphasis, Schleiermacher is interested only in the earthly Jesus between his birth and death, he treats Jesus only in his historical existence without any wider or higher frame (e.g. without Trinity, which Schleiermacher continuously criticizes, without the enhypostatical stress on the divine Logos being the proper subject of the hypostatic unity, or without future eschatology).378 At the same time, however – and this is to be appreciated – he tries to keep the divinity of Jesus, in terms of a qualitatively different and constantly strong God-consciousness, “which was a veritable existence of God in Him”. 379 With this God-consciousness, Christ is historically unique and capable of affecting every Christian believer at any time. His God-consciousness is therefore not only an example bound to his time and place, but rather it is “urbildlich”, which means completely ideal and at the

376

Ibid., § 95.1, 390. A good overview of Schleiermacher’s Christology with references to relevant literature gives DAHLKE, “Die Christologie”, 278–299. Cf. also SCHRÖDER, 'LH NULWLVFKH,GHQWLWlW, 64–83; H. GERDES, “Anmerkungen zur Christologie der Glaubenslehre Schleiermachers”, 1=67K 25 (1983), 112–125, who compares Schleiermacher’s Christology in the first and second edition of 7KH &KULVWLDQ )DLWK; MARIÑA, “Schleiermacher’s Christology Revisited”. To Schleiermacher’s christological sermons cf. E. HIRSCH, 6FKOHL HUPDFKHUV&KULVWXVJODXEH'UHL6WXGLHQ (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1968). To the Christology of his early works (of the Speeches on Religion in particular) cf. K. RUHSTORFER, “Von der Geschichte der Christologie zur Christologie der Geschichte”, in &KULVWRORJLH, ed. IDEM (Paderborn: F. Schöningh/Brill, 2018), 268–272. 377 Cf. SCHLEIERMACHER, 7KH&KULVWLDQ)DLWK, § 97.3, 409: “[W]hat comes into existence through the being of God in Christ is all perfectly human, and in its totality constitutes a unity, the unity of a natural life-story, in which everything that emerges is purely human”. Cf. also SCHLINK, “Die Christologie von Chalcedon”, 80–81. 378 Cf. SCHLEIERMACHER, 7KH&KULVWLDQ)DLWK, § 99.1, 418 and § 29.3, 125; SLENCZKA, *HVFKLFKWOLFKNHLWXQG3HUVRQVHLQ, 212 and 219. Paradoxically, Schleiermacher uses for the person of Jesus mostly the title “Christ” or “Redeemer”. 379 SCHLEIERMACHER, 7KH &KULVWLDQ )DLWK, § 94, Thesis, 385, cf. ibid., § 94.2, 387– 388.

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same time prototypical and effective. 380 With this prototypical Godconsciousness, Christ becomes the anchor and a unique source of all other occurrences of Christian God-consciousness in history. Schleiermacher grounds his Christology, therefore, in this Godconsciousness of Christ and its effect. Its potency and power is the deciding issue: “The Redeemer assumes believers into the power of His Godconsciousness and this is His redemptive activity.” 381 Through this timesurpassing effect of Christ’s personality, the Christian personality and conscience of every believer is constituted: the Christian relation to God is possible only through the personality of the Redeemer. 382 Using the model of causality, for Schleiermacher, Jesus is the source of the God-consciousness in every Christian. 383 Every Christian is thus in an immediate relation to Christ. Schleiermacher calls this relation “mystical”. 384 However, this does not give any answer to what this relation actually is. This point of immediacy remains quite vague in Schleiermacher. This Christian-Christ relation is a closed system. One is either in (and this means: already knowing, what is it all about), or out (and this means: without any possibility to understand it): “no one can be received into this circle arbitrarily, because doctrines are only expressions of inward experiences – whoever has these experiences LSVRIDFWRbelongs to the circle; whoever has not, cannot come in at all.” 385 In the end, it is the Father, who decides, who can enter the space of the Kingdom of grace, i.e., of the church.386

As a consequence of this conception, Schleiermacher can raise the claim that all sentences of Christology are “immediate expressions of our Christian self consciousness” 387, because the basic content of Christology – the consciousness of fellowship with God in form of the divine grace – is “the basic consciousness that each Christian has of his own state of grace, even where the most dissimilar views of Christianity prevail”. 388

380 Cf. ibid., § 93, Thesis, 377. The English version translates “urbildlich” as “ideal”, which is not very fitting. Further on, I will use the word “prototypical” instead. Cf. SCHRÖDER, 'LHNULWLVFKH,GHQWLWlW, 71–74. 381 Ibid., § 100, Thesis, 423. 382 Cf. ibid., § 100.2, 427. For the liberal figure of effective picture of Christ cf. above, Ch. 2.1. 383 Cf. ibid., § 93.1, 377; and also LANGE, +LVWRULVFKHU-HVXV, 147–149, and SLENCZKA, *HVFKLFKWOLFKNHLWXQG3HUVRQVHLQ, 212–213: this makes the question of the historical Jesus and of his relation to the Christian proclamation obsolete. The leading pattern is not &KULVWXVSUDHVHQV in the proclamation but rather the immediacy of inner experience. 384 SCHLEIERMACHER, 7KH&KULVWLDQ)DLWK, § 100.3, 429. Cf. above, Ch. 2.1. 385 Ibid. 386 Cf. ibid., § 105.2, 469. 387 Ibid., § 91.2, 372. 388 Ibid., § 91.1, 371.

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However, as already stated above (cf. Ch. 1.1.2), Schleiermacher cannot keep up this thesis in his Christology, because in the part about the person o f Christ he deals with the historical person, which is the external source and ground for the Christian God-consciousness. This proves to be the case, when Schleiermacher, right afterwards, stresses the historicity of Christ. Trying to keep up both the divinity and the humanity in a historical personality, Christ is defined as fully human RUJDQLVP filled and driven by the eternal divine SULQFLSOH.389 He is thus a natural personality with all human development but of a supernatural origin. This is Schleiermacher’s reformulation of the classical two-natures dogma. On the one hand, Christ is fully human; his personality had to develop from the beginning, including his God-consciousness, and naturally in particular conditions and environments. All this belongs to “true humanity”, 390 which is capable of all human changes. However, in Christ the humanity is ideal, meaning that it is living and receptive and in its relation to divinity only passive; this is because, on the other hand, it is completely driven by the eternal divine principle, by the Spirit, which is always active and never passive or passible.391 It is to say that Christ entered the sinful world, but does not originate from it: he has a divine origin. 392 This affects also his human development, which was “wholly free from everything which we have to conceive as conflict” and which processed sinless as “a continuous transition from the condition of purest innocence to one of purely spiritual fulness of power”.393 There was thus in Christ not even an “infinitely small amount” of the tendency to sin. 394 Besides, Christ never erred, never suffered from natural evils,395 and was also physically prototypical, i.e., healthy. 396 Overall, Christ is a unique manifestation of the divine principle in a historical personality, which is wholly passive and driven by the Spirit, but at the same time, all divine activity is received and applied in and through the par-

389

Ibid., § 93.4, 384. “Organism” and “principle” are the main categories for Schleiermacher’s conception of humanity and divinity. They both can surely and smoothly create a unity, however, compared to (true!) humanity and divinity, “organism” as well as “principle” are both quite reductive. 390 Ibid., § 93.3, 381–382. 391 Cf. ibid., § 97.3, 407–408: “So that in this interrelation every original activity belongs solely to the divine, and everything passive solely to the human.” 392 Cf. ibid., § 93.3 381; § 97.1, 398. A nice illustration of Schleiermacher’s thinking is the passage concerning the supernatural conception of Christ, where Schleiermacher defends against the tradition of the virgin birth the normal human way of conceiving a child: as a true human, Christ had a human father as well; cf. ibid., § 97.2, 403–407. 393 Ibid., § 93.4, 382–383. 394 Ibid., § 98.1, 414. 395 Ibid., § 104.4, 457. 396 Ibid., § 98.1–2, 415–417. On the contrary, Schleiermacher refuses the natural immortality and the supernatural beauty of Christ.

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ticular human organism. 397 “The Redeemer, then, is like all men in virtue of the identity of human nature, but distinguished from all of them by the constant potency of His God-consciousness, which was a veritable existence of God in Him.”398 The strongest and most concrete expression of Christ’s divinity in Schleiermacher is this quote: “this perfect indwelling of the Supreme Being” is to be posited “as His peculiar being and His inmost self. […] it is only through Him that the human God-consciousness becomes an existence of God in human nature”. 399 However, this statement, in fact, breaks from within Schleiermacher’s self-restriction to the earthly Jesus and to the pious selfconsciousness only and opens a path Schleiermacher refuses. If the presence of God in Christ goes so far that it is “His inmost self”, then is it not precisely here where the trinitarian thinking should start and proceed to build the most proper frame of Christology and all theology?

With this concept in mind, Schleiermacher criticizes traditional Christology. At first, he targets the equivocation in the term ‘QDWXUH¶. It cannot be used for both humanity and divinity, because these cannot be brought together under a common conception. 400 Schleiermacher reserves the term of nature only for the humanity. 401 Divinity is more like a “principle” to him. Compared to traditional Christology, his own terms are much more dynamic. Therefore, he criticizes the substance-thinking of the old dogma, which necessarily leads, in his view, to contradictions: “Hence all the results of the endeavor to achieve a living presentation of the unity of the divine and the human in Christ, ever since it was tied down to this expression, have always vacillated between the opposite errors of mixing the two natures to form a third which would be neither of them, either divine nor human, or of keeping the two natures separate, but either neglecting the unity of the person in order to separate the two natures more distinctly, or, in order to keep firm hold of the unity of the person, disturbing the necessary 397 Ibid., § 96.3, 397. Cf. ibid., 97.3, 408–409: “So that in Christ Himself the original assumptive divine activity and the divine activity during the union are not to be disti nguished; but all activities, in so far as distinguishable in time, are simply developments of the human activities. Every outward activity of Christ, whether it is to be regarded rather as an activity of the intellect or as one of the will, was in its aspect of human growth a result of the temporal development; and only in so far as all emergent activity of Christ is to be regarded thus can we rightly ascribe to Him a perfect human soul, but a soul inwardly impelled by this special being of God in Him, which, retaining its unchangeable identity, permeates that soul in the variety of its functions and moments, as that variety continually develops.” 398 Ibid., § 94, Thesis, 385. Cf. ibid., § 94.2, 387: “[T]o ascribe to Christ an absolutely powerful God-consciousness, and to attribute to Him an existence of God in Him, are exactly the same thing.” This is the stumbling block for liberal theology, cf. above, Ch. 1.1.3, fn. 43. 399 Ibid, § 94.2, 388. 400 Ibid., § 96.1, 392. 401 Ibid., § 96.1, 392: “Nature in this sense is for us the summary of all finite existence”.

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balance, and making one nature less important than the other and limited by it. The same thing comes out even in the vacillation between the expressions ‘connection’ and ‘union’ – in the latter there is a tendency to wipe out the difference of the natures, while the former makes the unity of the person doubtful. The utter fruitlessness of this way of presenting the matter becomes particularly clear in the treatment of the question of whether Christ as one person formed out of two natures had also two wills.”402

Starting with the unity of the historical personality of Christ within his conception of divine activity and human receptivity, Schleiermacher has, logically, no understanding for the aporetical ending of the two-natures dogma in the dyotheletism of Constantinople III, which dealt with two wills as two competing activities. On the other hand, as it will come out later, in his conception, Schleiermacher himself is not far from exactly this approach. He strictly distinguishes the “natures” in an equally strict subordination of the receptive humanity to the active divinity. 403 In this context, Schleiermacher also sees the terminological chaos and inconsistencies of the early church clearly with its SURPLVFXH use of SK\ VLV/RXVLD and SURVRSRQ/K\SRVWDVLV. In particular, he criticizes the equivocation of the term ‘person’ in theo-logy and Christology, which would lead to tritheism.404 He relates his critique, then, also to the doctrine of the Trinity, which seems to him to be rather an aporetical complication that is not necessary for Christian faith and, moreover, with its personal conception of God does not fit in his conception of God as a principle. 405 For the Chalcedonian distinctions, with which he sees himself in fact in correspondence, Schleiermacher has an understanding only in terms of a historical necessity for keeping a clean doctrine regarding the differentiation of divinity and humanity, which is, however, crucial for him as well.406 Being in accord with the oldest objections against the usability of the Chalcedonian Creed, he sees no use of the negative distinctions for the proclamation of the church and supports this opinion with the precise judgment that since the times of the definitions of the early church, any following era only repeated these old distinctions instead of searching for a positive expression, yet still with the old aporia of the equivocating use of “nature” for the “divine nature 402

Ibid., § 96.1, 394. Freedom of Christ’s human life is defined only as a sole “assent to the influence” of divine activity, ibid., § 100.2, 426. 404 Ibid., § 96.1, 395. 405 Cf. ibid., and also § 97.2, 400: “It is, therefore, much safer […] to establish the doctrine of Christ independently of that doctrine of the Trinity.” And then see the appendix of the whole work: §§170–172, 738–751. 406 Interestingly, ibid., § 96.1, 395, he refers to the phrase “out of two natures” (i.e., HN GXRI\VHRQ), however without quoting Chalcedon. He does not refer directly to Chalcedon even when discussing the relation of the natures. The quoted distinctions (the Chalcedonian four plus two more), ibid., § 97.4, 410, are taken from John of Damascus. 403

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and the duality of natures in the same Person”.407 Therefore, “the definitions of the Schools have long since become a dead letter in which no one any longer can find refuge”.408 He puts against it his conception and in order to show its accordance to the biblical Scriptures, although differing from the traditional doctrine, he interprets – as all theologians of the incarnation have done it – the verse John 1:14: “If this form of expression is very different from that of the language of the Schools as used hitherto, yet it rests equally upon the Pauline phrase ‘God was in Christ’ and the Johannine ‘the Word became flesh’; for ‘Word’ is the activity of God expressed in the form of consciousness, and ‘flesh’ is a general expression for the organic.” 409

This, also, confirms that in Schleiermacher, the Logos-sarx pattern is leading: there is the divine active principle and the human receptive organism. 410 Second, Schleiermacher treats the traditional concept of K\SRVWDWLF XQLW\. With his refusal of the trinitarian dogma, he also refuses the dominating Alexandrine pattern of the HQK\SRVWDVLV that there would have been first the preexistent divine Logos who subsequently united humanity into his K\SRVWD VLV.411 Concerning the person of Christ, Schleiermacher differentiates the supernatural “act of union” and the natural “state of union”.412 Agreeing with the tradition, he states the exclusive activity of the divine and mere passivity of the human and reinterprets the unity of Christ’s person in his terms as the divine “person-forming activity” of the natural organic development of humanity.413 Schleiermacher hence starts in a rather Leonine manner – which tacitly presupposes the given unity of the earthly Christ – with the twoness and asks how divinity and humanity can be united without merging or diminishing. As though in analogy to the old thought of a twofold birth of Christ, the eternal after divinity, and the earthly after humanity, Schleiermacher states a twofold constitution of the personality of Jesus. Interestingly enough, he begins with the opposite direction of uniting than the tradition, and he talks at first about “the implanting of the divine in the human nature”.414 On the one hand, thus, divinity penetrates humanity, is implanted into humanity and into the organic development creating the personality of the historical Jesus. On 407

Ibid., § 96.3, 397. Ibid., § 96.2, 396. Cf. § 97.4, 410. 409 Ibid., § 96.3, 397. 410 Concerning human soul cf. above, fn. 397. 411 Cf. ibid., § 96.1, 392. 412 Ibid., § 97.1, 398. 413 Ibid., § 97, Thesis, 398; ibid., § 97.2, 400; § 100.2, 427. 414 Ibid., § 97.2, 400. Cf. LANGE, +LVWRULVFKHU-HVXV, 157. This is a remarkable thought and an important supplement of the old model. Cf. certain similarity with my proposal of divine accommodation, below, Ch. 6.1. 408

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the other hand, humanity as the receiving part is assumed by the divinity and this proves, in the end, to be the more powerful and frame-giving step: “The nature of the association, however, must at every moment be such that the activity proceeds from the being of God in Christ, and the human nature is only taken up into association with it.” 415 In the final result, the personality of Christ is thus a joint action of divinity and humanity, however still with a clear domination of always active divinity. The human nature is thus conceived in agreement with the old Christology as anhypostatical (although this term seems to be, “in this scholastic dress, very clumsy and obscure” and actually “unfortunate”). 416 Christ’s human nature remains passive and is wholly formed by the divinity, which creates from human nature the concrete personality. 417 The divine interpenetrates the originally passive human nature, and in this interpenetration the unity of divine and human in Christ is constituted with respect to normal human development.418 Until now, Schleiermacher searched for a critical compromise with the tradition.419 What he, however, strictly rejects is the doctrine of FRPPXQLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP. In his view, it is an “extremely empty and formal theory” because, if conceived UHDOLWHU, FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP would break the unity again and, in the end, destroy the specifics of each nature: 420 “[T]he theory of a mutual communication of the attributes of the two natures to one another also is to be banished from the system of doctrine, and handed over to the history of doctrine” because it “must cancel again the union of the two natures, since in virtue of that communication each nature would cease to be what it is”.421

On the one hand, Schleiermacher stresses fundamentally the unity of Christ’s person and strictly refuses any thinking starting with natures. On the other hand, however, and at the same time, within his causal thinking as well as in his model of divine activity and human passivity, he still keeps a strict sep aration between the divine and human and regards it as absolutely unacceptable for the divine to accept some human attributes, like (e.g.) suffering. It i s, hence, obvious that Schleiermacher also struggles with uniting the duality and 415

SCHLEIERMACHER, 7KH&KULVWLDQ)DLWK, § 97.3, 407. Ibid., § 97.2, 402. 417 Ibid., § 97.3, 408. 418 Ibid., § 97.3, 409. 419 His aim was not to destroy the tradition, but rather “to inquire how much of the current form of expression is to be retained, and how much, on the other hand, had better be given up, either because it is an imperfect solution of the problem or because it is an addition not in itself essential, and harmful because the occasion of persistent misunderstandings” (ibid., § 95.2, 390). 420 Ibid., § 97.4, 410. 421 Ibid., § 97.5, 411 and 413. Therefore, Schleiermacher strictly refuses any thought of NHQRVLV or JHQXVPDLHVWDWLFXP, cf. ibid., § 105.3, 473–475. 416

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that he also keeps divinity and humanity as opposites in Christ, which can be united at last only in the form of a kind of one-sided divinization of the human.422 Subsequently, Schleiermacher opens the view from the focus on the individual to the community of the church, to the “common” or “corporate life”.423 The person-forming activity opens widely to a “world-forming” activity so that the final aim of the incarnation is the new life and new Godconsciousness of the whole human nature. 424 “[T]hus the total effective influence of Christ is only the continuation of the creative divine activity out of which the Person of Christ arose.” 425 What happened in Christ should proceed in the whole humankind: “In just the same way Christ is to be the soul also in the individual fellowship, and each individual the organism through which the soul works.” 426 Here, Schleiermacher ends at a conception of universal christification inclining to a Logos-sarx Christology within an Apollianrian manner: the whole world should become a second Christ – organic nature penetrated and revived by the divine principle. Then, Schleiermacher shifts his focus from the earthly Jesus to his remaining impression and his soteriological importance putting aside the problem of Christ’s suffering, death, and resurrection. According to Schleiermacher, neither of these articles is important for the development of individual God-consciousness (because it was not necessary for the apostles either) and, hence, of no importance for salvation.427 All these are only secondary elements, resurrection belongs rather to the doctrine of the Scriptures, 428 the suffering of Christ is rather an illustration of the importance of Christ and of his solidarity with all humankind.429

Overall, Schleiermacher tries to critically follow up the traditional Christology and adapt it for his time. The strong side of his conception is the emphasis on mutual unity and the mutual indwelling of clearly differentiated humanity and divinity in the twofold motion: the divinity penetrating the humanity, and the humanity being assumed by the divinity. Here, Schleiermacher was able to admit some adaptation of the eternal divine principle to the organic humanity to conceive the person of Christ with its divinity within fully natural terms. However, neither Schleiermacher’s speculative concept of unity of divinity and humanity – which he tries to keep both, unlike the following liberal the422 Cf. L. PEARSON, “Schleiermacher and the Christologies Behind Chalcedon”, +7593 (2003/3), 349–367. 423 SCHLEIERMACHER, 7KH&KULVWLDQ)DLWK, § 100.2, 428. 424 Ibid., § 100.2, 427: “new vital principle”. 425 Ibid. 426 Ibid., § 100.2, 428. 427 Ibid., § 99.1, 418; § 101.4, 435–436. 428 Ibid., § 99.2, 419–420. 429 Ibid., § 101.4, 435–436; § 104.4, 458.

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ology that refers substantially to him – can solve this principal problem because he cannot think God in another way than as constantly active. Yet, at the same time, he cannot think God personally but only as a lifeless principle, which cannot be affected or even suffer, while human is in the ideal case only passive, determined from without, as though subordinated to the divine.430 Schleiermacher tries to think of Christ as of a human personality, but he cannot fulfill this goal properly. In the end, he divides Christ into two levels as well, where – paradoxically, in opposition to Schleiermacher’s main interest – the humanity is rather undervalued. He conceives the humanity of Christ physically in terms of human development, of human organism but paradoxically not enough in terms of human person.431 Humanity is reduced only to a kind of organic substrate for the divinity. Thus, the same problem still remains: how is one to think of the unity of the person of Christ in its divinehuman fullness. In the end, Schleiermacher is interested in the humanity of Christ as in the historical manifestation of the divine principle, which should replenish the whole of humankind. After all, dealing with the ontology of Christ’s person, it is again the soteriological point, the immediate “total impression” of the Redeemer, what Schleiermacher stresses.432 This is fully in accord with his program, however, the soteriological level is sustained by the crucial conception of Christ’s personality, i.e., by the ontology of Christ’s person. 433 At this point, Schleiermacher goes thus beyond his own program. Therefore, the question turns back, which Schleiermacher himself mentioned in his Second Letter to Lücke: should not the whole material be organized differently, i.e., starting with Christology? 434 And then also – going even beyond this point – should not the whole material get a trinitarian frame? Nevertheless – although in this new attempt Schleiermacher failed to fulfill what he had intended because crucial questions remain open and the whole conception proves to be constituted not in the pious self-consciousness but rather in the ontological Christology – his thought proved very influential for the development of Christology that followed, mainly in two respects: first,

430

Cf. LANGE, +LVWRULVFKHU-HVXV, 172: The biggest problem of Schleiermacher’s theology is his conception of God, which is “strangely lifeless”. 431 That is a precise observation of SLENCZKA, *HVFKLFKWOLFKNHLWXQG3HUVRQVHLQ, 222. 432 Cf. SCHLEIERMACHER , 7KH&KULVWLDQ)DLWK, § 105.1, 467: “For even His original influence was purely spiritual, and was mediated through His bodily appearance not otherwise than even now His spiritual presence is mediated through the written Word and the picture it contains of His being and influence – so that even now His directive control is not simply a mediate and derived one.” 433 Cf. ibid., § 91.2, 372; § 29.3, 125. 434 SCHLEIERMACHER, 2QWKH*ODXEHQVOHKUH, 55–56 (= .*$ I/10, 338).

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his profound critique of the traditional doctrine; 435 and second, his differentiation of divine principle and particular historical individual. Following this differentiation, the liberal authors after Schleiermacher placed so much stress on the humanity of Jesus Christ (coincidentally, at the beginning of the quest for the historical Jesus) that his divinity was split from him – either into an eternal principle which manifested itself in the historical personality of Jesus, or by abandoning the divinity of Jesus Christ so completely that he remained only a human image of God who more or less mirrored God and served as an ethical example. 436 The more the humanity of Jesus was stressed, the further away God was pushed, either into the undefined horizon of human life or into the very inwardness of human itself. In analogy to Schleiermacher – with all similarities and even bigger dissimilarities – in the 20th century, K. Barth proposed in his Church Dogmatics probably the most complexly conceived and often highly appreciated christological proposal. 437 Contrary to Schleiermacher, his later work is often called a “neo-orthodoxy”. However, like Schleiermacher, Barth as well maintains a wide and thorough discussion with the tradition and accepts its christological fundaments: YHUH GHXV – YHUH KRPR and the Chalcedonian Christology are also his own indispensable groundwork (.' IV/1, 146). Christology is in Barth a part of the doctrine of atonement, where he uniquely combines Christology and soteriology (struggling, therefore, on the most pages with the inclusivity of Christ’s person and work, cf..' IV/1, 231–394; IV/2, 173–422) with the doctrine of VWDWXV H[LQDQLWLRQLV (conceived as the self-humiliation of the divine – as an obedient way into the foreign country: The Lord as Servant, .' IV/1, 171) and of VWDWXV H[DOWD WLRQLV (conceived as the homecoming of the human: The Servant as Lord, .' IV/2, 1). These are two parallel motions, yet still with divinity remaining divine even in the humiliation (.' IV/1, 196; IV/2, 43)438 and without humanity being divinized (.' IV/1, 145: exaltation is not divinization;.' IV/2, 97, 105).439 However, both motions are not symmetrical (.' IV/2, 76), because they both are the matter of divine activity (.' IV/2, 49), construed from above down. This means, surpris435 Cf. the currently standard handbook of systematical theology in Germany: R. LEONHARD, *UXQGLQIRUPDWLRQ 'RJPDWLN, 4th ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), 296–305; DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 106–141; SLENCZKA, *HVFKLFKWOLFKNHLWXQG3HU VRQVHLQ, 118–126. 436 Cf. DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 128–141; SLENCZKA, *HVFKLFKWOLFKNHLWXQG3HUVRQVHLQ, 224–235. 437 Further on in this excursus, if not said otherwise, I refer to the German original 'LH NLUFKOLFKH 'RJPDWLN I–IV (Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1934–1967) with respect to the (not very successful) English translation (&KXUFK 'RJPDWLFV I–IV, trans. G.W. BROMILEY et al. [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1957–1988]). 438 Here, Barth tries to conceive God as dynamic but still immutably divine. In.'I/2, 174–176, he cannot find another explanation than that the incarnation is simply mirac ulous. At the same time, however, it remains valid that God cannot cease to be God. Cf. also below, Ch. 5.5. 439 Cf. the survey of the whole doctrine in § 58, .' IV/1, 83–170; graphically O. WEBER, .DUO %DUWKV .LUFKOLFKH 'RJPDWLN (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1963), 197.

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ingly, that at first, like in Schleiermacher, Barth proposes that the divinity takes part in the humanity (“way into the foreign country”) and only afterward YLFH YHUVD (.' IV/2, 95– 96). There is no soteriological FRQFXUVXV: the whole story of Jesus Christ is purely the mercy of God. In his interpretation of John 1:14, however, Barth accepts the traditional conception (partly with its contradictions): he insists that God became human, nevertheless, in fact, he cannot conceive otherwise than that God assumed humanity (in form of the common human nature) into divinity – i.e., enhypostatically (.' IV/2, 43–44, 51–79; cf. also.' I/2, 176–182). “To put it even more simply, it all depends on the simple fact of the existence and reality of Jesus Christ as it is attested in the New Testament. The doctrine of the two natures cannot try to stand on its own feet or to be true of itself. Its whole secret is the secret of Jn. 1:14 – the central saying by which it is described. Whatever we may have to say about the union of the two natures can only be a commentary on this central saying. Neither of the two natures counts as such, because neither exists and is actual as such. Only the Son of God counts, He who adds human essence to His divine essence, thus giving it existence and uniting both in Himself. In Him, and Him alone, they were and are united.”440 The objection against the diminishing of humanity in the conception of HQK\SRVWD VLV of the sole human nature Barth refuses as a “primitive argument”.441 In his conception, Barth starts clearly with the factual unity of the person of Jesus Christ. It is a principal rule in his whole thinking: he proceeds from the reality (as testified by the Scriptures,.' I/2, 30) to its possibility (.' I/2, 3); in Christology, there is no difference.442 Leading is still the perspective of incarnation (.' I/2, 3). From this perspective, Barth analyzes subsequently the “natures” seeing their problematic but keeping the twonatures doctrine as still necessary, however only in combination with soteriology (.' IV/2, 26–27, 54–55). When then Barth comes to treat the unity again, he struggles with it (cf. e.g..' IV/2, 82–91). He hesitates to treat it as something third next to the divinity and humanity. The person of Jesus Christ is the unity of both natures as the “Mediator and pledge” (.' IV/1, 149). Therefore, in the end, Barth speaks of the unity as of “mystery” (.' I/2, 134): it is rather a point, from which theology should speak, not a point, about which it should speak (.' I/2, 136–137).443 The question thus remains, how would it be possible to think of both motions or VWDWXV at the same time and to avoid the danger either of a merge or concurring contradictions. Barth knows about this danger (.' IV/2, 87 and 93). He tends – in accord with the Western tradition (and with the Reformed tradition in particular) –, rather to keeping the difference of the natures with the sidelining of humanity. The human subject in Jesus Christ is God Himself (.' IV/2, 54). The Word is the mystery of the flesh and the flesh is “the shell and form of the Word” (.' I/2, 183). Barth, therefore, accentuates with Chalcedon the difference of both “natures”, which remain distinct (.' IV/2, 68–69). A balancing, however a very problematic emphasis, could be seen in Barth’s conception of Logos as eternal ORJRV HQVDUNRV. Logos was never without humanity, there was never any ORJRVDVDUNRV (.' II/2, 118; IV/2, 34–35, 69). The flesh is not a mere mode of 440

Cf. clearly BARTH, &KXUFK'RJPDWLFVIV/2, 65–66. .' I/2, 180 442 Cf. GALLUS, 'HU0HQVFK]ZLVFKHQ+LPPHOXQG(UGH, 411–431. 443 Similarly DALFERTH, “Gott für uns”, 63, who speaks about a “fundamental mistake, which can be traced back to Chalcedon”: it is the “theological focusing on Jesus Christ, instead of thematizing of everything else out of the perspective of Jesus Christ. With this, the point of view was made to an object of theological doctrine, instead of theological teaching about God, world and human life out of this point of view.” 441

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revelation, it is the eternal mode of being of the Son (.' IV/2, 36–37). The Son of God therefore eternally “embraces both height and depth, both sovereignty and humility, both lordship and service” (.' IV/2, 92). In the end, nevertheless, the perspective of the twoness of the natures still seems to be stronger than the perspective of unity. 444 Therefore, Pannenberg is quite right in his harsh judgment: Barth, in fact, repeats the old aporias and on the central problematic points, he gives no answers.445 However, next to many particular fitting points, Barth’s fundamental insights into the christological grounding of all theology and into its trinitarian structure as well as his perspective of eschatological realism are still very valueable (and I refer to them on many points of my own conception).

3. What to Do With Chalcedon Today? 3. What to Do With Chalcedon Today?

Looking back on the rich christological debate, there are thus several possibilities for the treatment of the old christological tradition based on Chalcedon: 1. Take it as it is, without any possibility of critique or of questioning the old dogma, referring to the authority of the Council and the church.446 The only possibility for treating the old dogma, would be, then, to try to explain its categories and terms (the so-called “inculturation” of the eternal truth to the changing conditions of being in a particular culture and time), because, based on the unmistakable authority of the church, the old dogmas are an “authentic interpretation of the testimony of the New Testament” and “the less inappropriate way” of expressing the mysteries of faith. The dogma does not change, only its interpretation does. It is to be understood and then presented

444

This uncertainty results partly also from the fundamental problem of Barths work: it is wide and long and Barth sets many different or even opposite emphases, often without final systematization so that one can find in his text contradictory claims, while their mutual relation remains unclear: what is often declared as dialectics seems often to be rather a paradox. 445 Cf. PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 312–315: Barth veils the missing answers by “the kenotic appearance of the language about the humble condescendension of God” (ibid., 314). To the development of Barth’s Christology cf. also GALLUS, 'HU0HQVFK, 219–551. 446 Cf. C. SCHÖNBORN, *RWWVDQGWHVHLQHQ6RKQ, 146–147; WEINANDY, “The Doctrinal Significance”: Chalcedon is an “authoritative doctrinal conception and definitive dogmatic expression” (ibid., 558). Together with Nicea and Ephesus, Chalcedon has a “metaphysical nature” (ibid., 563). As such, Chalcedon’s dogmatic definitions are “sacrosanct” (ibid., 564). It should be remainded here that Chalcedon itself refers to Jesus Christ as the a uthority behind the Christian doctrine, cf. '+ 301, resp. 7KH$FWVRIWKH&RXQFLORI&KDOFH GRQII, session V, Nr. 34, 204: “[…] as the prophets from of old and Jesus Christ himself taught us about him and the symbol of the fathers has handed down to us”. This point as the source of Christian exclusivity is heavily criticized by the proponents of theological pluralism, cf. HICK, 7KH0HWDSKRU, 29, fn. 2; SCHMIDT-LEUKEL, *RWW, 271.

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in an appropriate way. This is, until today, the rather conservative and official (neo-Thomist) Catholic standpoint.447 It is quite paradoxical that the representative of this approach is one of the newest studies in Christology, namely, 7KRPDV-RVHSK:KLWH¶V 7KH,QFDUQDWH/RUG (2015). White writes from the perspective of pre-critical metaphysical realism, interpreting and judging everything and everyone in comparison with Thomism and with a high self-consciousness.448 Any accents of Christology from below are marked as Nestorianism, any emphaysis on God’s condescendence is labeled as kenoticism. 449 He himself speaks about defending the traditional Chalcedonian Christology with reference to Nicea, Ephesus, Chalcedon and Constantinople III; yet, in fact, he reads everything – including the old tradition (and even the New Testament) – from the Thomist perspective, which he presents as the traditional and only orthodox approach: “The understanding of the Bible offered by the fathers and the scholastics, then, is not merely something that can be justified as one possible form of reading among others […]. Rather, it is the only form of reading that attains objectively to the deepest truth about the New Testament.”450 This is the major short circuit of this work: Thomism cannot be presented as ‘the traditional Chalcedonian Christology’.451 Chalcedo447 Cf. the encyclical of Pius XII. “Sempiternus Rex”, dedicated to 1500 anniversary of the Chalcedonian Christology; WEINANDY, 'RHV *RG &KDQJH"; POSPÍŠIL, -Håtã ] 1D]D UHWD, 25, 148 and 147; HOPING (LQIKUXQJ, 12: “The central task of a systematic Christology is a heremeneutic of the christological tradition, being at the same time commited to truth [wahrheitsverpflichtete Hermeneutik der christologischen Überlieferung]. […] To the task of a systematic Christology belongs, therefore, the hermeneutical appropriation of the christological dogma.” Cf. also RAHNER, )RXQGDWLRQV RI &KULVWLDQ )DLWK, 283: “Anyone who thinks that he is able to express what is meant in the classical Christology of the Incarnation in another way without doing violence to what is meant, he may express it differently. This presupposes that he respects the official teaching of the church as a critical norm for his own way of expressing it, and that he knows that his teaching has to be an indispensable norm for him when he enters into the public discourse of the church.” With this opinion, Rahner would stand exactly between point 1 and 5 in my list. 448 T.J. WHITE, 7KH,QFDUQDWH/RUG$6WXG\LQ7KRPLVWLF&KULVWRORJ\ (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2015), 124: “[I]f we can speak in lasting ways of doctrinal truths, we can and must also identify theological errors that can persist through time.” This is also a possible reason why, in his attempts of dialogue with and in his judgments of other positions (e.g. the one of Schleiermacher, Rahner, K. Barth, Schillebeeckx, Balthasar and others), it is sometimes difficult to recognize the real positions of the referred authors. Besides, it is strange that White criticizes the others for their philosophical presuppositions, yet without reflecting on his own, which are quite massive, cf. ibid., 234– 235: “If Barthians frequently adopt Kantian epistemological premises, they do so not because of a theological understanding derived from divine revelation, but because they have inherited a set of philosophical commitments and presuppositions from the German Enlightenment and modern liberal Protestantism.” The towering self-consciousness based on the conviction that Thomas’s and White’s own premises come from divine revelation, is quite fascinating. 449 Ibid., 73–125 and 341–353. Obviously, both these topics present the biggest fears and dangers for White himself. 450 Ibid., 8. 451 Cf. e.g. 236, 280.

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nian Christology offers more interpretations than the western or even only the Thomist in particular, as I hope to have shown above. Not to mention the plurality of interpretations of the New Testament. White pleads for a renewal of ontology and realism by which he, however, understands the SUH.DQWLDQ VXSHUQDWXUDOLVWLF PHWDSK\VLFV.452 It is rather astonishing that in the 21st century one can read assertions that we need to go “EDFN WR WKH WKLQJV LQ WKHPVHOYHV, to measure the truth of the discourse against the structure of reality itself”, to return “to a reflection about the nature of what exists”, from hermeneutics to the underlying and universal metaphysics, to the things behind language and names. 453 Obviously, in White’s view, Kant opened the door for the postmodern plurality of perspectives, which is frightening. 454 “In truth, without ontology, everything descends into night.”455 “In any event, it is clear that once we adopt a post-metaphysical, hermeneutical methodology, the claims of a perennial Christian truth seem deeply compromised, and the aspirations to any form of perennial theological tradition are irrevocably undermined.” 456 Moreover, his view is firmly anchored in the natural theology as it is expressed in scholastic view of the relation between nature and grace within the DQDORJLD HQWLV (which White repeatedly defends against K. Barth) where grace brings supernatural revelation, which elevates nature to a special knowledge.457 The “science of theology”, then, is based on this supernatural knowledge and operates from this perspective of an ultimate truth. From this position, White repeats all the problematic – and, in the end, aporetic – points of the old tradition: the reading of the Gospels from the Johannine perspective while understanding John in a massively ontological way; the Antique concept of God as apathetic, immutable and wholly transcendent; the strict division between immanent and economic Trinity; the substance-burdened and heavy speech of natures and accidents in the western perspective as two pinciples with separate acting (Leo and Constantinople III); the dominance of divinity, for which humanity is only an instrument or vehicle so that any influence from the humanity toward the divinity is excluded; Christ’s direct divine self-consciousness; the notion of a universal hu-

452

Cf. ibid., 51, 56. Supernaturalism defines also his approach and hermeneutics of the New Testament: “Historical-critical reflection on the Gospels might be able to defend rationally the historicity of this mystery or discuss its cultural context and circumstances. It cannot procure, however, the basis itself for belief in the mystery, because this is given to us only supernaturally – through faith in the portrayal of Christ given by the New Testament, which we know by faith to correspond to the historical Jesus himself” (ibid., 372). 453 Ibid., 490–491. 454 Cf. ibid., 235, 467. 455 Ibid., 487, where ontology = metaphysics based on „infallible revelation“ (ibid., 484). 456 Ibid., 485. 457 Ibid., 58, 66, 205, 208, 232–233, 402, 427. However, in the Thomist view in White, the notion of sin is underestimated; even in the fallen state the human is able to recognize that he or she relates to God. Nature is still a firm binding base and precondition for grace (cf. ibid., 162–164, 207). If this is the outer frame of the whole, then Christ has only the role of a loud invitation to follow the path of grace. It is not by chance that in White’s cr ucial soteriological sentences, the metaphor of LQYLWDWLRQ for a virtuous life (sanctification) plays the central role (cf. ibid., 233, 364, 428, 464). This is not much.

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man essence; the suffering and death of Christ only in his humanity; the self-resurrection of Christ; or the divinization of humanity as the final goal. 458 The picture of Jesus Christ suffers thus still under the same pains: his humanity is diminished, his person is treated primarily as divine and superhuman in his perfection including his passion because it is led by the idea of Jesus’ permanent beatific vision of the will of the Father.459 Yet, in the soteriological respect, Christ only opens the way toward God and invites people to follow. 460 The main direction and motion of this conception is given with the central principle of grace elevating the nature: it is the motion from below up, from the human nature, which is obviously not good enough as such for salvation, up to its divinization. The opposite motion – condescendence of God, which would result in the true humanity of God (although White speaks often about the presence of God in the creation), is missing: “God may in no way be assimilated to the world of human creatures. But precisely for this same reason, God may be present in creation in a way that no created reality can be.”461 Is this enough when the topic is the incarnate Lord – God who became human? Seen from an other end, the human relation to God is put mostly in intellectual category of knowledge (revelation grasped in faith is a supernatural knowledge, theology has and elaborates this knowledge, salvation is the perfect knowledge of God). 462 In the end, truth is the matter of divine revelation, which is the VDFUD GRFWULQD of the Catholic church as it is normatively elaborated by Thomas Aquinas.463 What is newer than that should be accommodated to the good old tradition.464 “We should seek the wisdom of God according to this classical understanding, whether it initially makes perfect sense to our contemporaries or not. For they themselves are very often thoroughly disorientated, and stand in need of the wisdom of Christ.” 465 What is conceived from a non-believing perspective, must be deepened and elevated by supernatural insights of faith and theology. The last argument for White says: it “is the teaching of divine revelation”. 466 Overall, White’s conception makes the impression of an immunization strategy by attempting to build of a closed speculative system that appeals to supernatural divine revelation, which thus must be true. Therefore, this approach fulfills the characteristics of what I called above the absolute claim for truth (cf. above, Ch. 1.2.3).

458

Cf. ibid., 62, 64, 113, 116–117, 126, 169, 200, 237, 274, 279, 355, 359–360, 363, 364–367, 372, 374, 433. 459 Cf. ibid., 246, 379. 460 Cf. ibid., 118, 120–121. 461 Ibid., 202, cf. 207. Repeating the Antique term of God, White holds a possible touch of divinity with suffering, death and non-being for “metaphysical absurdities” (ibid., 351). 462 Cf. ibid., 53, 58, 208, 354, 363, 395 (therefore, “salvation is offered to all human beings who attain to the age of reason” [!]). 463 Cf. ibid., 74, 202, 468. 464 Ibid., 125: “If we wish to seek a way forward in Christology even amidst the contemporary questions, then we would do well to seek enlightenment from the perennial principles of patristic and Thomistic theology. For within them, the central key to the future of theological progress is to be found.” The way forward is actually the way backward: a culture or era progresses only if it progresses toward Thomism (cf. ibid., 163). 465 Ibid., 509. 466 Ibid., 426.

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2. Break it from within by dividing the traditional picture of Jesus Christ into Jesus with all his historicity on one side and an eternal divine principle on the other side. This way was introduced by Schleiermacher, radically deepened by D.F. Strauß,467 and can be found in the thought of P. Tillich, 468 and still lives in the conception of the cosmic Christ (e.g. T. de Chardin, R. Panikkar, N.H. Gregersen) 469. 3. Weaken it by conceiving Jesus as a mere image of God, not God-Self. Jesus becomes, then, a big example, a preacher, an appeal to morality, the ultimate referent to the divine itself (W. Herrmann 470, M. D. Krüger 471), the “ideal case of religious subjectivity” (U. Barth 472). 4. Throw it completely away, either because it is all wrong from the beginning (A. von Harnack 473), or because it is already completely passé for the modern times (J. Hick 474, K. Huizing475, Ch. Danz 476, N. Slenczka477). Then, theology has to have a completely different shape. 5. Read it critically but with all necessary critique of its terminology and its way of thinking, keep its intentions and frame and try to reformulate its categories. This is what former and current theologians on the Protestant as well as on the Catholic sides have tried mainly.478 467

Cf. above, Ch. 2.1. Cf. TILLICH, 67KII, 96, although Tillich himself refused this term and spoke rather about the “universal Logos”, cf. ibid., 112. 469 Cf. W. THIEDE, :HU LVW GHU NRVPLVFKH &KULVWXV" .DUULHUH XQG %HGHXWXQJVZDQGHO HLQHU PRGHUQHQ 0HWDSKHU (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001), 37–51; MOLTMANN, 7KH:D\RI-HVXV&KULVW, 274–312; N.H. GREGERSEN, “The Extended Body of Christ”, in ,QFDUQDWLRQ, ed. IDEM (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015), 225–251; to Gregersen’s attempt cf. the critical texts by Moltmann, Polkinghorne and Johnson in the same volume. 470 HERRMANN, 'HU9HUNHKUGHV&KULVWHQPLW*RWW. 471 KRÜGER, 'DVDQGHUH%LOG&KULVWL. 472 BARTH, “Hermeneutik der Evangelien”, 276. 473 Acoording to HARNACK,/HKUEXFKII, 375–376, the Creed of Chalcedon is a “pseudomystery” and “apostasy from the old faith” and its key formulations are “deeply irreligious” because only negative. Neo-Chalcedonism is “aristotelian scholasticism” and a fall into philosophical theology (ibid., 385). Cf. also above, Ch. 1.1.3. 474 Cf. HICK, “Jesus and the world religions”, 167–185; IDEM, 7KH 0HWDSKRU, 29 and 45. Similarly H.M. KUITERT, .HLQ]ZHLWHU*RWW-HVXVXQGGDV(QGHGHVNLUFKOLFKHQ'RJ PDV, trans. K. BLÖMER (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 2004). 475 K. HUIZING, 6FKOXVVPLW6QGH (Hamburg: Kreuz Verlag, 2017), 85–88. 476 DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 1–2, 55, 193. 477 SLENCZKA, “Problemgeschichte der Christologie”. IDEM, “Die Christologie als Reflex“. 478 Cf., as one reference for all, which I personally like, the answer of HAIGHT, -HVXV, 16: “There are only three options possible relative to these classical formulations: to avoid them, to repeat them, or to interpret them. One cannot avoid them because the question of just who Jesus was in ontological terms always remains; it will not go away and is not un468

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Within the current catholic theology, especially in the German speaking area, there is a lively christological discussion, which seeks an appropriate expression for Christology today. However, the catholic Christology in its critical relation to the traditional Christology does not go as far as do some protestant theologians, who speak about the fundamental deconstruction of Christology under the criticism of modernity (it is thus no chance that above, in the points 2–4, are to find almost exclusively names of protestant theologians) 479 and remain strictly within the Chalcedonian frame. Here, catholic Christology seeks in various ways a new expression for the old dogmas, which would allow to abandon the substantialist ontology of the dogma and thus to overcome metaphysics, however, without abandoning ontological Christology. An explicit accent lies on full humanity of Jesus. Catholic theologians, therefore, make proposals based on, e.g., a new reformulation of HQK\SRVWDVLV,480 on more relational interpretation of Chalcedon resulting into a SpiritChristology, 481 on the incarnation Christology approached from below with an accent on the jewish context and on Jewish-Christian relationship,482 on the Kantian theory of subjective freedom,483 on the uniqueness of Christ in combination with the inclusivity of his sac-

important. One cannot just repeat the classical formulas, because they do not have the same meaning in our culture as they did when they were formulated. To repeat them, therefore, is to interpret them in a sense that was not intended by them. Therefore, one has no choice but to engage the classical councils and to explicitly interpret them for our own period. Christologies that try to leap over the classical doctrines fail in comprehensiveness.” (His own interpretation of Chalcedon is, however, undefensible. Cf. ibid., 295–297 and below, Ch. 11.1.) Cf. also the short and sober article by SCHLINK, “Die Christologie von Chalcedon im ökumenischen Gespräch”; or the opinion of RITTER, “Dogma und Lehre”, 273: “Which theological level is to be ascribed to it [sc. to the Chalcedonian definition] until today can be seen on the fact that to give it wholly up means, in particular, to deny, at the same time, some fundamental subjects of the biblical testimony or it means at least a deformation of the faithful response to this testimony.” 479 Catholic theology reacts to the position of Protestant liberal theology partly with a bare stating, cf. G. ESSEN, “Geschichte – Metaphysik – Anthropologie. Diskurskonstellationen der Christologie in der Moderne. Eine katholisch-theologische Vergewisserung”, in 'RJPDWLVFKH &KULVWRORJLH LQ GHU 0RGHUQH, ed. CH. DANZ and IDEM (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 2019), 17: “Unlike the protestant theology [especially in their liberal conceptions], statements about ‘abolishing’ of the old-church Christology have barely found some use in the catholic theology.” Sometimes, however, partly with embarrassment, cf. K.-H. MENKE, “Review of Christian Danz: Grundprobleme der Christologie”, 7KHRORJLVFKH 5H YXH110 (2014), 157: Ecumenical unity is now questioned also at points where “it was previously considered indubitable: on the field of the joint testimony to the uniqueness and to the universality of salvation the Christ event”. 480 ESSEN, 'LH)UHLKHLW-HVX. Cf. more in detail to his proposal below, Ch. 6.1. 481 WERBICK, *RWWPHQVFKOLFK. Cf. more in detail to his proposal below, Ch. 5.4. 482 HOPING, (LQIKUXQJLQGLH&KULVWRORJLH. 483 B. NITSCHE, &KULVWRORJLH (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2012); IDEM, Eine freiheitstheoretische Relektüre chalkedonischer Christologie”, in 'RJPDWLVFKH &KULVWRORJLH LQ GHU 0RGHUQH, ed. CH. DANZ and G. ESSEN (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 2019), 263–285; M. LERCH, 6HOEVWPLWWHLOXQJ *RWWHV +HUDXVIRUGHUXQJHQ HLQHU IUHLKHLWVWKHRUHWLVFKHQ 2IIHQE D UXQJVWKHRORJLH (Regensburg: F. Pustet, 2015); IDEM, “Hypostatische Union als Freiheitsgeschehen”, in 'RJPDWLVFKH &KULVWRORJLH LQ GHU 0RGHUQH, ed. CH. DANZ and G.

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rifice484, on the global importance of the christological heritage, where the history of Christology becomes Christology of history, 485 or on the historicity of the Gospels486.487 A special christological emphasis arising from the Latin American situation of the oppressed brings liberation theology. 488

This last solution is the one I prefer as well. The most important thing in this approach is to make the distinction between what Chalcedon tries to say and how it says it.489 Here, it is permissible to say clearly what I hope to have demonstrated: that the critique of heavy metaphysical terminology and substantial terms from Schleiermacher through today was and is right, i.e., that the doctrine of two natures due to its “questionable realistic semantics” is, in the end, aporetic:490 the term “nature” becomes an equivocation when used to refer to both divinity and humanity (the critique of Schleiermacher); the two natures are conceived as substances opposite to each other and thus cannot be united (the old critique of Apollinaris) so that this model tends either to speak about two self-standing agents in Jesus Christ (Leo in his 7RPXV and the whole concept of FRPPXQLFDWLR LGLRPDWXP) or to diminish one of them (HQK\SRVWDVLV favoring the JHQXV PDLHVWDWLFXP RU JHQXV WDSHLRQWLFRQ leading to NHQRVLV). Much like “nature”, in its Trinitarian and christological use the term K\SRVWDVLV also becomes an equivocation. Therefore, the solution of the question of what to do with Chalcedon is WR JRZLWK&KDOFHGRQEH\RQG&KDOFHGRQ: to keep its criteriological function but not its substance ontology. I will explain it in two steps: ESSEN (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 2019), 239–261; TH. PRÖPPER, 7KHRORJLVFKH $Q WKURSRORJLH I-II. 484 K.-H. MENKE, -HVXVLVW*RWWGHU6RKQ, 3rd ed. (Regensburg: F. Pustet, 2012); IDEM, 6WHOOYHUWUHWXQJ 6FKOVVHOEHJULII FKULVWOLFKHQ /HEHQV XQG WKHRORJLVFKH *UXQGNDWHJRULH (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1997). 485 RUHSTORFER, “Von der Geschichte der Christologie zur Christologie der Geschichte”, in &KULVWRORJLH, ed IDEM (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2008); IDEM, “Gegenwart im Gegenteil. Christologische Überlegungen im Gespräch mit Christian Danz und anderen über das Paradox von Chalkedon”, in 'RJPDWLVFKH&KULVWRORJLHLQGHU0RGHUQH, ed. CH. DANZ and G. ESSEN (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 2019), 207–237. 486 RATZINGER, -HVXVRI1D]DUHWK. 487 Cf. the overview in B. DAHLKE, “Christologie jenseits der Metaphyisk? Zur Diskussion in der neueren katholischen Theologie”, &DWK0 66 (2012), 62–78; ESSEN, “Geschichte – Metaphysik – Anthropologie”. 488 BOFF, -HVXV&KULVW/LEHUDWRU; J. SOBRINO, SJ, &KULVWRORJ\DWWKH&URVVURDGV$/DW LQ$PHULFDQ$SSURDFK, trans. J. DRURY (London: SCM Press, 1978); IDEM, -HVXVWKH/LE HUDWRU $ +LVWRULFDO7KHRORJLFDO 5HDGLQJ RI -HVXV RI 1D]DUHWK, trans. P. BURNS and F. MCDONAGH (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1993); IDEM, &KULVWWKH/LEHUDWRU, trans. P. BURNS (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2001). To Sobrino’s conception more in detail cf. below, Ch. 6.3. 489 Cf. LINDBECK, 7KH1DWXUHRI'RFWULQH, 82. 490 This is a common point in the discussion, cf. DALFERTH, &UXFLILHGDQG5HVXUUHFWHG, 142; PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 283–323; DANZ, *UXQGSUREOHPH, 56–79.

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1. :LWK &KDOFHGRQ In the first step, we need to go with Chalcedon, because the Creed does two things of the highest importance. First, with its repetition of “one and the same”, it heavily stresses the XQLW\RIWKHSHUVRQRI-H VXV&KULVW. This, the factual person of the earthly Jesus, is the fact with which Christology has to start (following in this point Cyril, Luther, Schleiermacher, or K. Barth). And second, it preserves and keeps the fundamental christological distinction of Christ’s humanity DQG divinity: “9HUHGHXVYHUHKRPR is an indispensable statement of Christian theology.” 491 This distinction says: Christology remains in its track if it avoids either extreme position (both of which can be found in the Christian theological tradition from the beginning until today). Christ is to be conceived neither as an exclusively divine figure nor as a merely human example of the pious life or religious self-consciousness.492 The historical human Jesus was God-Self, unconfused and undivided. Herewith, Chalcedon refers unmistakably to the Nicene KRPRRXVLRV and, thus, to the Trinitarian frame. At the same time, for the question of Christology, it is obvious that we have here still WZREDOOVLQSOD\KXPDQLW\DQGGLYLQLW\. But with this notion, we seem to be at the beginning again. Humanity and divinity of Jesus Christ are two – what? In the search for non-substantial terms, theologians speak about two “sides”, “perspectives”, 493 “angles of view” 494, “moments”, “aspects”495 or “ways of being” 496 and try to express the unity of these both in rather relational terms. 497 In my opinion, the terms humanity and divinity are 491

PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 285. Cf. DALFERTH, -HQVHLWV YRQ 0\WKRV XQG /RJRV, 3, who adds also the necessary Trinitarian frame: “Christian theology is Christology. It cannot speak about God without speaking about Jesus Christ. It cannot speak about Jesus Christ without speaking about the Spirit. It cannot speak about the Spirit without speaking about God and Jesus Christ. […] Whatever theme it grasps, it relates it to God and, hence, to Jesus Christ and to the Spirit who is the source of the confession to Jesus Christ. To be able to speak about God not without Jesus Christ, about Jesus Christ not without God and about both of them not without the Spirit is the very core of Christology. Insofar everything what Christology treats has christological foundations.” 492 Cf. DALFERTH, “Gott für uns”, 66–67, who names these extremes “God-Man” and “Good-Man”. MOLTMANN, 7KH:D\RI-HVXV&KULVW, 57, speaks about a “God-human being” on the theological background and about “God’s human being” “in an anthropological foreground”. SCHÖNBORN, *RWW VDQGWH VHLQHQ 6RKQ, 37, calls the latter position straight “neo-Arianism”. 493 DALFERTH, &UXFLILHGDQG5HVXUUHFWHG, 139. 494 POSPÍŠIL, -Håtã]1D]DUHWD, 201. 495 PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 155. 496 BARTH,.'IV/2, 50. 497 Cf. paradigmatically E. JÜNGEL, “Thesen zur Grundlegung der Christologie”, in IDEM, 8QWHUZHJV]XU6DFKH (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1972), 277: “The being of Jesus Christ is on the one side God’s self-relation as the relation to the humanity of the man Jesus and

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sufficient, without any further necessity to subsume them under another common term because they are not absolutely paratactic. At the same time, there is not firstly a common term of humanity and divinity which should be applied to Jesus Christ; we have to proceed in exactly the opposite way: “From a theological point of view, the essence of this ‘divine nature’ or ‘d ivinity’, which is conjoined with human nature in Jesus Christ without confusion and without division, can be stated only in relation to this historical story.”498 And this applies YLFHYHUVD also for humanity: divinity as well as humanity are defined in Jesus Christ and are to be further developed from this christological starting point. 2.%H\RQG&KDOFHGRQTo keep this fundamental christological distinction between humanity and divinity within the unity of the person but not to fall into the old aporias at the same time, we have to change the frame, we have to VKLIW WKH SHUVSHFWLYH from the aporetic perspective of incarnation, within which Chalcedonian Christology traditionally operates, to the fundamental perspective of the Christian faith – WKH SHUVSHFWLYH RI UHVXUUHFWLRQ.499 From Christmas to Easter. 500 The Easter perspective is the point of intersection between Christ’s humanity and divinity, between the earthly and the risen Jesus, and at the same time, it stresses that he is all the time one and the same person. With the Easter perspective, we start from the factual unity of the person, not with the differences of the natures, which can be analyzed only subsequently. From this perspective, theology does not construct the unity of the person only DSRVWHULRUL, from the preceding natures (as the Western theology mostly did it), but rather starts with the already realized unity in the person of the crucified and resurrected. Making the resurrection the leading perspective throws a clear light on the cross and the incarnation as well. It is the confirmation of the life of Jesus Christ and at the same time the revelation of the very meaning of his person. In the light of the resurrection, both divinity and on the other side the self-relation of the man Jesus as the relation to God.” Yet still, even in such a complex relational statement, both halves of the sentence have a different subject. 498 DALFERTH, &UXFLILHG DQG 5HVXUUHFWHG, 144. Cf. MOLTMANN, 7KH :D\ RI -HVXV &KULVW, 68f. This argument stressed also K. BARTH,.'IV/1, 203, and IV/2, 27, as well as PANNENBERG, “Christologie und Theologie”, 140. 499 Cf. PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 322–323; ZIZIOULAS, %HLQJ DV &RPPXQLRQ, 55, fn. 49: “All things in Christology are judged in the light of the resurrection. The incarnation in itself does not constitute a guarantee of salvation. The fact that ILQDOO\ death is conquered gives us the right to believe that the conqueror of death was also RULJLQDOO\ God. This is the way in which Christology in the New Testament has developed – from the resurrection to the incarnation, not the other way round – and patristic theology never lost this eschatological approach to Christology.” 500 Cf. MOLTMANN, 7KH:D\RI-HVXV&KULVW, 49. The Easter perspective is leading also in PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 53; DALFERTH, &UXFLILHG DQG 5HVXUUHFWHG, 30–31; WENZ, &KULVWXV, 27; M. WELKER, *RGWKH 5HYHDOHG, 55, fn. 49; G. O’COLLINS, SJ, &KULVWRORJ\ $%LEOLFDO+LVWRULFDODQG6\VWHPDWLF6WXG\RI-HVXV, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009).

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the humanity can be taken seriously: the earthly Jesus, his particular life and death; and precisely this particular life and death as the presence and act of Godself, so that this particular human life and death proves to be a part of God’s life itself (cf. below, Ch. 4). For the conception of divinity and humanity implied by this construct, KX PDQLW\DQGGLYLQLW\FDQQRWEHVHHQDVRSSRVLWHV but rather as concurring, aiming towards and harmonizing with each other. The terms of divinity and humanity are to be thought in such a way that they can build unity together and in harmony with each other. In this way, WKHSHUVRQRI-HVXV&KULVWUHPDLQVD WKHRORJLFDOQRUPIRUERWKWKHWHUPµKXPDQLW\¶DVZHOODVWKHWHUPµGLYLQLW\¶ I would, therefore, propose to replace the traditional model of FRPPXQLFD WLRLGLRPDWXP, which I consider to be the main problem of the Chalcedonian substance thinking starting from the incarnation, with a more effective model. As history has shown, FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP presupposes the two natures as self-acting and opposing agents, either splitting the unity of Christ’s person into two parts or fundamentally diminishing one of them. The use of this doctrine requires, in fact, that the unity of the person falls apart into two opposite parts. No matter in which form it was applied, it proved to be aporetic anyway: the YHUEDOLWHU use, resulting in paradoxical claims about the person, is not backed up by a real communication of natures; the UHDOLWHU use would be only one-way (HQK\SRVWDVLV), or it would result in an aporetic mixture (the danger in Luther). When the natures stand as opposites to each other, there are only two possibilities: either WKHRVLV, diminishing humanity, or NHQRVLV, diminishing divinity. 501 This does not mean, however, that the christological aim would be a full symmetry of “natures”. This proved to be impossible shortly after Chalcedon. The asymmetrical declivity – or better: the one-way direction from the divine to the human – as brought the first time by the concept of HQK\SRVWDVLV, is 501

Cf. PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 301: “The conflict between Lutherans and Reformed – and within Lutheranism itself – over the communication of attributes shows the inescapable dilemma of every Christology that begins with the statement of the incarnation in order to reproduce the uniting of the Son of God with the humanity of Jesus beginning with his birth rather than moving to the statement of incarnation as the goal of Christology in order to find Jesus’ unity with God retroactively confirmed from his resurrection for the entirety of his existence. If one thinks from the perspective of the incarnation as an event that took place at Jesus’ conception and was concluded at his birth, one is forced on the one hand to the consequent deification of Jesus’ humanity, in contradiction to the humanity of his earthly life. Or on the other hand one will be subject to the criticism of having conceived the unity of God with the man Jesus only incompletely and with reservations. If the two are joined together in a real unity, the FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP is to be maintained not only between the natures and the person but also between the natures themselves, thus the communication of the divine attributes of majesty to the human nature. Of course, such a unity means blending together; in this process the human nature does not simply remain what it was and is before and outside of it.”

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necessary. 502 However, not the way HQK\SRVWDVLV does it, because it diminishes humanity and results in WKHRVLV. The opposite attempt of NHQRVLV goes this one-way direction as well, but, with its opposite solution, it loses the divinity. Therefore, I propose to replace the FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP with a combination of divine accommodation and the characteristic of the human being as LPDJR'HL. In my view, the divine has still to have full activity in the interpenetration of humanity, yet not as the WKHRVLV of humanity but as the accommodation of the divine. This accommodation, however, cannot be conceived as NHQRVLV but rather as SOHURVLV, as fulfilling of God’s own divinity. At the same time, the accommodation makes sure that the humanity can be developed fully, because as LPDJR'HL, humanity can be true humanity only in relationship with God. 503 Therefore, in short, I aim to show that in Jesus Christ both have its roots and its legitimacy: WKHRVLV RI WKH GLYLQH DQG DQ WKURSRSRHVLVRIWKHKXPDQ WKHGLYLQL]DWLRQRI*RGLQKLVDFFRPPRGDWLRQWR KXPDQDQGIXOOKXPDQL]DWLRQRIKXPDQVEDVHGRQWKHLUUHODWLRQVKLSWR*RG And finally, because Christology does not stand alone, but opens up to soteriology, to the doctrine of the Trinity, and to theological anthropology in general, it is to say: if the general terms of divinity and humanity are to be defined christologically and derived from the humanity and divinity of Jesus Christ, then the relation of humanity and divinity, as described in Chalcedon with the famous four negative adjectives, can become a theological pattern for the relation of God and human in general, or more precisely: of God’s presence and acting in the world.504 The Chalcedonian definition preserves the fundamental distinction between Creator and creation, God and the world: God remains God and human remains human. Its key point is neither humanity becoming divine (WKHRVLV), nor reducing divinity to true humanity, 505 but the true humanity of humans in their relationship to God and the true divinity of God in his relationship to his creation. And it says at the same time: wherever God acts, it is always in the created forms, never in separation from it. 502

Cf. below, Ch. 6. Cf. PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 321–322, and for a detailed explanation of both these figures below, Ch. 5 and 6. 504 Cf. GRILLMEIER, -HVXV1, 774: “[T]he person of Christ is the highest and unsurpassable kind of the connection between God and man, God and the world.“ And also RAHNER, “Current Problems in Christology”, 182–183: “[W]e should now go on to first examine the question […] how far and in what way would such a position [i.e., here: the Chalcedonian DV\QFK\WRV concerning the constitution of an internally differentiated unity] makes it necessary to go back to a PRUHJHQHUDO theory of the relationship between God and his world, of which the relation ‘Logos – human nature’ would appear as a special case“. And also SCHÖNBORN, *RWWVDQGWHVHLQHQ6RKQ, 147–150. 505 Cf. J.G. HERDER, %ULHIH ]XU %HI|UGHUXQJ GHU +XPDQLWlW. 'ULWWH 6DPPOXQJ (Riga: J.F. Hartknoch, 1794), 8–9: “The divine in the humankind is the cultivation [Bildung] to humanity.” 503

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And YLFHYHUVD: although God acts with, in, and through created forms, it is good enough, he can act within creation DV*RG With this Chalcedonian pattern, Christology opens from the particular person of Jesus Christ to the universal pneumatological width and depth of the whole creation, being at the same time its source: what was in Jesus Christ uniquely and unrepeatably enacted in a historical person holds for the presence of God as Spirit in the whole world.506

506 It is nicely put in DALEY, “Unpacking the Chalcedonian Formula”, 183: The Chalcedonian decision, in fact, opened “a wider perspective that probably had never crossed the minds of the drafters of the Chalcedonian formula itself: a new sense of the paradigmatic importance of the person of Christ, in its very structure, for revealing God’s way of saving and transforming humanity through nondestructive union, as the goal of creation itself. For Leontius of Byzantium in the mid-sixth century, as for Maximus the Confessor in the midseventh and John of Damascus in the mideighth, the Chalcedonian formula becomes, to an increasing degree, more than just a summary of the varying terms and models used to speak of Christ; it develops into the concrete, living model of how God acts to save and ‘divinize’ humanity, by establishing a relationship with the world and with each of us, which – analogous to the person of Christ itself – makes us one with God in our concrete mode of being who we are, without compromising either the natural distinctiveness of what we are as creatures, or the inconceivable fullness of what God is.” I intend to develop the direction of this thesis in detail in my next book dealing with pneumatological anthropology.

Chapter 4

The Perspective of Christology: The Resurrection 1. The Route of Christology: There and Back Again 1. The Route of Christology

 5HVXUUHFWLRQDVWKH6WDUWLQJ3RLQW In the previous chapters, I have tried to substantiate and indicate what I am now going to say explicitly: Christology as the theological and critical reflection of the Christian faith, in accord with its fundamental Easter perspective, is based on and proceeds from the perspective of the resurrection of Jesus Christ.1 From the first chapter on, I have conceived Christology as the centre of the whole theology. The resurrection is, then, the very centre of this centre. With the resurrection, I start in the middle of Christology, because it is the crucial point of intersection, which unites all important dimensions of the person of Jesus Christ: a) It shows clearly that the risen Christ is the earthly Jesus of Nazareth, that the resurrected one is the crucified one and YLFH YHUVD. No division between the earthly Jesus and the risen Christ is possible. On the contrary, it is through the resurrection where the life and death of the earthly Jesus get a clear meaning, final legitimation, and their point. b) It makes the Christology free from all speculative constructing of the unity of the person of Jesus Christ. 2 The perspective of resurrection VWDUWV from the unity of Christ’s person, in accord with the historical experience of Jesus as the divine Christ: Jesus Christ as a person is simply a historically attested fact.3 The resurrection definitely confirms – at least within the perspective of the Christian faith but this is the perspective theology is speaking from

1

Cf. above, Ch. 2.2. Cf. above, Ch. 3. 3 Cf. BARTH, &KXUFK'RJPDWLFV IV/2, 66: “To put it even more simply, it all depends on the simple fact of the existence and reality of Jesus Christ as it is attested in the New Testament.” Similarly SCHOONENBERG, 7KH &KULVW, 66: Jesus Christ “is one person. This fact, as we have said, is universally accepted. In the books of New Testament it is a supp osition no one reflects on: everyone knows who is being spoken of when the names ‘Jesus’ or ‘Christ’ are pronounced.” 2

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– that Jesus Christ is human and God in one person. 4 Personal unity of humanity and divinity in him is thus a legitimate theological presupposition, based on the historical experience and confession, with which all faith and theology began. c) It is the point of intersection between Christology from below and Christology from above, creating, at the same time, the necessary space for both. From the perspective of resurrection, the earthly life of the crucified resurrected gets its fundamental meaning (and creates space for all important questions of his particular fully human life and his self-understanding – for his biography and his psychology as well). 5 And at the same time, the Christological perspective opens even beyond his earthly life in both directions: to his preexistence and to his postexistence (creating space and legitimating the theological dealing with the preexistence, Trinity, eschatology, and questions of the eternity-time relation).6 The perspective of resurrection opens space for a theologically conceived history, present time, and future; Christology from this perspective opens up space for the theology of creation, soteriology, and eschatology. 7 Despite it, the christological start from the perspective of resurrection is not so frequent in theology.8 On the contrary, there are many alternative starting points, represented partly by the big names of Christian theology: a) The most common is the classical &KDOFHGRQLDQ &KULVWRORJ\, which was reigning for a long time in both the East and the West, starting with the incarnation and dealing, then, with the difficult questions of the duality of the natures and the unity of the person. 9 b) As a typical &KULVWRORJ\IURPDERYH could be characterized the Christology of Karl Barth, who starts with the Trinity and the preexistence of Jesus Christ and conceives his Christology within his complex and unique doctrine of atonement in a twofold dynamics of

4 Cf. DALFERTH, &UXFLILHGDQG5HVXUUHFWHG, 24; PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 136: “Had Jesus not been raised from the dead, it would have been decided that he also hat not been one with God previously. But through his resurrection it is decided, not only so far as our knowledge is concerned, but with respect to reality, that Jesus is one with God and retroactively that he was also already one with God previously.” 5 Cf. WENZ, &KULVWXV, 68; and below, Ch. 6.2. 6 Cf. PANNENBERG, 6\VWHPDWLF 7KHRORJ\ 2, 289, where he conceives the Christology from above and the Christology from below as two complementary approaches, grounded in the perspective of resurrection. Cf. also IDEM, “Christologie und Theologie”; WENZ, &KULVWXV, 69–73. 7 Cf. also KASPER, -HVXVWKH&KULVW, 8–13. 8 To mention are in the first place W. PANNENBERG (-HVXV, 53–114; 6\VWHPDWLF7KHROR J\2, 343–363), I.U. DALFERTH (&UXFLILHGDQG5HVXUUHFWHG, 39–82), G. WENZ (&KULVWXV, 27–45), M. WELKER (*RG WKH 5HYHDOHG, 55, fn. 49), G. O’COLLINS, SJ (&KULVWRORJ\), P. POKORNÝ (7KH*HQHVLV, 61), or J.D. ZIZIOULAS (%HLQJDV&RPPXQLRQ, 55), however all of them with their own specific accents. 9 Cf. above, Ch. 3.

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“the way of the Son into the foreign country” and of “the homecoming of the Son of man”.10 c) In contrast to it, other approaches like, e.g., OLEHUDOWKHRORJ\ or SURFHVVWKHRORJ\ try to start consistently IURPEHORZ and search for the signs of divinity within the humanity of historical Jesus.11 However, in these conceptions, Jesus remains mostly and on purpose only human.12 The resurrection is, then, merely a symbol of hope, or, as it is the case often in liberal theology, it is held, both with Reimarus and Schleiermacher, even as an unnecessary and useless fiction.13 d) An important starting point within the protestant theology is Luther’s DFFHQWRQWKH FURVV, revived again in the 20th century (e.g. in E. Jüngel or J. Moltmann). The emphasis lies on the dialectic of veiling and unveiling, on faith as an existential struggle on one line with Luther’s question “How can I get a merciful God?” The cross is exactly this question but – and that is the problem – not the answer to it. The cross itself is speechless, it is a question hanging in the air, it is (or it seems to be) the end. “The cross is silent and renders all silent. God was silent. Jesus died. The disciples ran away. The cross provides us with no further understanding of human experience. There is no route from here to the resurrection message.”14 In the Gospels, the cross is not the last word. The story needs to be read until the very end. e) Christological conceptions of the Latin American OLEHUDWLRQWKHRORJ\ combine elements of the both last approaches and and elaborate it into a specific shape, which arises in an authentic way from the local social situation of oppressed people. Liberation Christol ogy starts with the historical existence of Jesus as testified in the Gospels. In the centre of this approach stands the cross as God’s solidarity with the oppressed. While J. Sobrino points only to the cross, where the power of liberation and of the good news lies in bearing of the cross, L. Boff sees the final point of all liberation – and, hence, the starting point for Christology – in the resurrection.15

10

BARTH,.'IV/1, 171;.'IV/2, 20. Cf. above, petite at the end of Ch. 3.2.8. Next to both named theological groups, exactly this is also the program of E. SCHILLEBEECKX, -HVXV, 34 and 636, who searches for traces of transcendence within the life-story of the man Jesus, as testified in the biblical texts, in order to make him manifest as an invitation to God. 12 To liberal theology, cf. above, Ch. 1.1.2–3 and 2.1. To process Christology, cf. below, Ch. 5.4. 13 Cf. VON SCHELIHA, “Kyniker”, 29, who states with respect to his emphasis on the contingency of Christian dogma: “It seems to me to be very questionnable to construct the ZKROH Christology from the resurrection.” 14 DALFERTH, &UXFLILHGDQG5HVXUUHFWHG, 45. To Luther cf. above, Ch. 3.2.5, to Jüngel Ch. 7.2.2.5. A critique of the cross as a possible starting point of Christology expresses, from his position, L. BOFF, 3DVVLRQ RI &KULVW 3DVVLRQ RI WKH :RUOG, trans. R.R. BARR (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1987), 115: “The cross cannot be posited as the generating principle of a system of intellection […]. The cross is the death of all systems. It will not fit into a framework. It bursts all bonds. It is the symbol of a total negation. It is sin and rejection of God.” 15 Cf. SOBRINO, &KULVWRORJ\DWWKH&URVVURDGV, 380; IDEM, -HVXVWKH/LEHUDWRU, 36–63, 272; BOFF, -HVXV &KULVW /LEHUDWRU, 290–291. To liberation Christology more in detail cf. below, Ch. 6.3. 11

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Therefore, I am convinced that the resurrection is the most appropriate star ting point for Christology, it is the IXQGDPHQWDO KHUPHQHXWLFDO SHUVSHFWLYH.16 The resurrection of Jesus Christ is the final answer, which sheds light upon everything before. Resurrection is the last, identifying and revealing word, it is the key which opens a new perspective – not only to the life of Jesus but also on God and his relation to the universe. The resurrection brings the fu ndamentally new perspective, in which things, relations, and occurences get a new context and with it a new meaning and status. 17 For the Christian faith, it was this perspective, which was leading. As I have said already before, it was not the only possible and thus necessary perspective but a surprisingly new and surprisingly plausible perspective, which, at the same time constituted, the Christian faith.  7KH)XQGDPHQWIRUWKH6SHHFKRI5HVXUUHFWLRQ This new perspective was expressed in the first Christian confessions, it has been reflected more and more and later formulated in a theological way also. In the beginning, however, stood obviously the surprising (or even unbelievable, cf. Mat 28:17; Mk 16:14; Lk 24:11; John 20:25) notion and experience that Jesus, who died on the cross and was buried, is alive (Lk 24:34). 18 And that the most plausible explanation of this experience was that this experience – and its recognition – cannot be just a chance or an achievement of some human geniality, but it must be an act of God-Self, who is the only one to overcome death (Rom 9:10; Acts 2:24.32; Phil 2:9). 19 From this recognition were born the first short confessions of this new faith that express Jesus as the Christ, the Saviour, or even the Lord (1Cor 15:3b–5; Mt 16:16; Mk 8:29; Lk 4:41; John 11:27; Phil 2:11). 20 It was the 16

Cf. DALFERTH, &UXFLILHGDQG5HVXUUHFWHG, 158. Cf. ibid.: “This is the subject of the Christian resurrection message. It sets the cross within the context of the life of God and thus within the context of our life. This does not negate, surpass or invalidate the cross. […] The cross as such is silent and renders all silent. Not until it is interpreted by the word of the gospel in the context of the life of God does it begin to speak.” 18 A nice argument makes N.T. WRIGHT, 7KH5HVXUUHFWLRQRIWKH6RQRI*RG (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), 699: “[W]hatever it was that the early Christians were expecting, wanting, hoping and praying for, this was QRW what they said, after Easter, had happened.” 19 Cf. DALFERTH, &UXFLILHG DQG 5HVXUUHFWHG, 62–63. IDEM, “Volles Grab, leerer Glaube?”, in 'LH:LUNOLFKNHLWGHU$XIHUVWHKXQJ, ed. H.J. ECKSTEIN and M. WELKER (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 2004), 284–289. 20 For the differentiated meaning of the Greek ku,rioj cf. POKORNÝ, 7KH *HQHVLV, 75– 76. W. FOERSTER and G. QUELL, “ku,rioj”, in 7K:17, vol. 3, ed. G. KITTEL (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1938), 1038–1094; F. HAHN, &KULVWRORJLVFKH +RKHLWVWLWHO LKUH *HVFKLFKWH LPIUKHQ&KULVWHQWXP, 4th ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1974), 67–132. 17

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perspective of resurrection, which already in the first years after Jesus’ death integrated all different Christologies as different accents of the one message.21 At the same time, the first Christian confessions after the resurrection followed and interpreted further the experiences with the earthly Jesus and his own words. This applies also for the so-called early Christological titles (ku,rioj, Son of God, Son of man, Christ), which are not to be taken only as after-Easter interpretations, but they arise from the life and work of the earthly Jesus. 22 As I already tried to show above (Ch. 2.2), the Easter perspective does not represent only a strict discontinuity (even artificially constructed by Paul, as Harnack stated) but is founded on a strong continuity from the earthly Jesus and from the experiences with him. “The earthly Jesus is part of the Easter kerygma, which relates to him and through him affects the whole horizon of his proclamation and his service”.23 The resurrection brought a new, surprising but still plausible perspective also on the earthly Jesus and the experiences of his followers so that, at the same time, resurrection is “the fact that changes everything”. 24 The New Testament calls the message, the core of the Easter perspective euvagge,lion, the Gospel (Rom 1:1; 10:16; Mk 1:14; 1Cor 15:1). It can have different expressions and accents, but the very core or the “common denominator” is the resurrection. *RVSHOLVUHVXUUHFWLRQ.25 Without the resurrection, there would not be in the biblical perspective any faith and any Gospel. “As a historical statement we can say quite firmly: no Christianity without the resurrection of Jesus. As Jesus is the single great ‘presupposition’ of Christianity, so also is the resurrection of Jesus. To stop short of the resurrection would have been to stop short.” 26

The resurrection brings thus DUDGLFDOO\QHZSHUVSHFWLYH, a twist, a new light on the whole of reality. It is a new, discontinuous experience on the backdrop of the continuity. 27 This can be shown at least on three levels: 21

Cf. POKORNÝ, 7KH*HQHVLV, 95–96, and above, the end of the Ch. 2.2. SCHRÖTER, -HVXV XQG GLH $QIlQJH, 223. Cf. POKORNÝ, 7KH *HQHVLV, 74–109; THEISSEN and MERZ, 7KH+LVWRULFDO-HVXV, 553–563. The classical work about the christological titles is HAHN, &KULVWRORJLVFKH+RKHLWVWLWHO. 23 POKORNÝ, 7KH*HQHVLV, 62. 24 MOLTMANN, 7KH:D\RI-HVXV&KULVW, 242. 25 Cf. POKORNÝ, 7KH *HQHVLV, 67. DUNN, -HVXV 5HPHPEHUHG, 826, footnote 4: “‘God raised him from the dead’ is probably the earliest distinctively Christian affirmation and confession. It is presupposed again and again in the earliest Christian writings”. Dunn adds a long list of biblical texts. Cf. also BULTMANN, “Die Christologie”, 261: For Paul “Christology is WKHZRUGRI*RG”. 26 DUNN, -HVXV 5HPHPEHUHG, 826. Cf. DALFERTH, &UXFLILHG DQG 5HVXUUHFWHG, 31: “Christian faith stands or falls with the confession that Jesus has been raised by God – and Christian theology stands or falls with the clear and careful conceptual exposition of this confession” (originally partly italicized). 22

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a) Regarding the VRXUFH WH[WV, the Gospels: their point in the resurrection makes the reader read the whole story once again, this time, however, in a new perspective, which sheds new light on the main person, his works and words.28 The story makes sense from its end, therefore, it is necessary to read it from the end once again, now knowing, who the main person is. At the same time, it is to say that the second reading does not make the first obsolete. Now, there exist two possible readings of the same text, two possible perspectives on the same thing, a secular and a believing one. This reminds the theology that it always speaks from a particular perspective of the Christian faith and as such does not make other perspectives obsolete. b) Regading the SHUVRQRI-HVXV&KULVW: With the resurrection, Jesus ceased to be solely the main preacher and became primarily the main content of the Christian preaching. He ceased to be the subject of the proclamation and became primarily the object of proclamation. Not only what he said but in the first place who he was and what he achieved by his life and death, became the most important issue. 29 c) This same shift applies also to the FHQWUDOPHVVDJH: now, the Gospel is not what Jesus preached, now, the Gospel is he himself. It is not the Gospel RI Jesus, as Harnack would like to have it, but now it is the Gospel DERXW Jesus.30 “[T]he first Christian preaching was not simply a repreaching of Jesus’ PHVVDJH; it was a proclamation of Jesus’ UHVXUUHFWLRQ. That there was a turn from Jesus’ gospel to the gospel about Jesus, from Jesus as proclaimer to Jesus as proclaimed, remains a fundamental perception of the difference between pre-Easter Jesus tradition and post-Easter kerygma.”31

Within the reference to the same God of the Jewish tradition and of Jesus’ own message, the Christian proclamation applied the Easter perspective also to the speech of God so far: “Christian discourse concerning God does not 27

Cf. DALFERTH, &UXFLILHG DQG 5HVXUUHFWHG, 80–82; DUNN, -HVXV 5HPHPEHUHG, 875: “It also should be observed that ‘resurrection’ is indeed core belief from the beginning. The ‘resurrection of Jesus’ is itself the EHJLQQLQJ of belief in Jesus as exalted, and not simply an elaboration of some other affirmation or prior belief.” 28 DALFERTH, &UXFLILHG DQG 5HVXUUHFWHG, 159, calls this method “hermeneutical selfapplication”: “[B]y interpreting an interpretative relationship (‘Jesus is the Christ’) DIUHVK within its own interpretative horizon, the theological interpreter moves hermeneutically between the two interpretative instances, from Jesus to Christ and from Christ to Jesus, so that the resulting intensification of the original interpretation makes it possible to unde rstand what was originally stated better than it understood itself.” 29 BULTMANN, 7KHRORJ\RIWKH1HZ7HVWDPHQW, 33; cf. IDEM, “Die Christologie”, 266: “The preacher must become the preached one because the decisive point is the fact (Daß) of his preaching, his person but not his personality and its here and now, its event, its mi ssion, its address.” 30 Cf. POKORNÝ, 7KH*HQHVLV, 108. 31 DUNN, -HVXV5HPHPEHUHG, 876.

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simply continue Jesus’s and Israel’s discourse concerning God; it redefines it and understands it afresh in the light of Easter.” 32 Therefore, “[a]fter Easter, whatever Jesus himself said must be said differently.” 33 With this shift, Christology gets also a clear soteriological dimension.34 I have said above that the new perspective was based on the surprising experience of Jesus being alive. Where did this experience come from? What is the source of the Easter perspective? *7KHLVVHQ refers to the Easter visions of the disciples, for which we have enough evidence and testimonies. There should be no doubt that this was an “authentic subjective experience”. 35 According to Theissen, they are the result of GHDOLQJ ZLWK WKH FRJQLWLYH GLVVR QDQFH between the expectations connected with Jesus and his end on the cross. Among the first Christians, this led, in the end, to an intensified co nsensus, grounded in and enforced by the Jewish monotheism that despite his death on the cross Jesus has to be exalted higher than any other power – human or divine. 36 Theissen explains, hence, the resurrection as a result of social psychological processes, as an interpretation of subjective experiences, as a “mystery of religious imagination”, which led, in the end, to a “mythicization of this human being” to a divine status. 37 In such an interpretation, the resurrection would be a result of a selfpersuading view, which refuses to accept a clear loss and creates, on the one hand, the faith in the human subject, and, on the other hand, simultaneously the object of this faith. This would then correspond with other liberal views, which conceive the resurrection as a secondary projection of an internal exp erience or as a myth created by faith. Religion lives, then, in a world of religious images, which have no direct link to reality, but, nevertheless and in an ideal case, are somehow useful images for a good life in this world. 38 The interpretation of Theissen cannot explain, why it starts with the Easter visions and – if they are purely subjective, regardless their authenticity – why 32

DALFERTH, &UXFLILHGDQG5HVXUUHFWHG, 159. Ibid., 162. 34 POKORNÝ, 7KH*HQHVLV, 68–69. 35 THEISSEN, 5HOLJLRQRIWKH(DUOLHVW&KXUFKHV, 41. 36 Ibid., 41–60. 37 Ibid., 60. 38 Cf. the conceptions e.g. of Ch. Danz (above, Ch. 1.1.3, footnote 65), M.D. Krüger (above, Ch. 2.2., at footnote 78) or M. Moxter (“Szenische Anthropologie”, 81–84). In the Czech discussion represents this position O.A. FUNDA, -HåtãD PêWXV R .ULVWX (-HVXVDQG WKH 0\WK RI &KULVW) (Praha: Karolinum, 2007): the revelation of the risen Christ was “a psychic process, which happened in the minds of Jesus’ followers” (ibid., back cover), cf. ibid., 172–173, where he refers positively to the interpretation of G. LÜDEMANN, 'HU JUR‰H %HWUXJ 8QG ZDV -HVXV ZLUNOLFK VDJWH XQG WDW (Lüneburg: zu Klampen, 1998). All these approaches are based on the old Enlightenment figure of Reimarus, which splits the historical Jesus from the proclaimed Christ stating that the latter is a construct of the emerging Christian faith and church (cf. above, Ch. 2.1). 33

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we should take them seriously. Furthermore: would subjective vision have the power to start such a turn in the mood and such vitality and energy in a whole group, as the texts of the New Testament portray it? Moreover: If there was a subjective vision at the beginning, how could it be explained that the movement, based on the mythization of a man, survived more than the first generations and even until now? 39 The reference to the “mystery of religious imagination” seems to emphasize this question since it shows that there is no satisfying answer. Therefore, it is legitimate to presuppose that something “had to happen after his death which occasioned such new confessional phrases”. 40 P. Pokorný points out that not the Easter visions were the subject of the further Christian proclamation but their presupposed preceding source, which was interpreted as the resurrection of Jesus. 41 To explain what went on after Easter, it is legitimate to presuppose an original “impulse”. 42 “However differently we interpret the Easter appearances, it is clear that what is communicated through them is an event that precedes them.” 43 Against all tendencies to conceive the resurrection only as a result of the Easter faith or to reduce its reality only to the “expression of the significance of the cross”,44 to reduce it to an internal picture of faith, to the ongoing Christian proclamation or the community of the church is to stress that UHVXU UHFWLRQKDVWRKDYHDQH[WHUQDOVWDUWLQJSRLQW, an external trigger, an external impulse, an external ground, which is the cause of all items just named. The resurrection, from the perspective of Christian faith, is the cause of the i mportance of the cross, of faith, of Christian proclamation, and of the commu-

39 Cf. POKORNÝ, 7KH*HQHVLV, 124–125: “There are no unbiased witnesses to the resurrection of Jesus. They are all at the same time the witnesses of faith, so that their testimony always was and is exposed to the suspicion that it is a case of wishful thinking or halluc ination (subjective vision), or the historization of a myth or ideology. This suspicion ca nnot, however, be proved either. And it is belied by the sheer number of inwardly contingent visions. The subjective conviction of the spiritual presence of the dead teacher or leader can indeed return anew and persist among his followers after a period of depression, but it dies with the people who came under the personal influence of the dead person. It does not extend to wider circles and further generations. The declaration of the resurrection of Jesus is of a different kind.” 40 Ibid., 122. 41 Ibid., 123. 42 Ibid., 119. 43 Ibid., 123. 44 R. BULTMANN, “New Testament and Mythology”, in IDEM, 1HZ7HVWDPHQWDQG0\ WKRORJ\DQG2WKHU%DVLF:ULWLQJV, trans. S.M. OGDEN (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 36.

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nity of the church.45 Otherwise, without this presupposition the origin of the Easter visions could not be explained, nor why we should take it seriously and how they could start such a movement lasting over thousands of years, where this perspective is in faith shared as well by those who did not have these visions themselves. The perspective of the Christian faith in its self-understanding is based on this IXQGDPHQWDO LPSXOVH. As Pokorný shows, it is this impulse, which grounds two mutually independent phenomena: the appearances or visions of the resurrected Jesus and, at the same time, the Easter faith. Both are following from the original impulse but there is no causality between them: the Easter faith does not ground the visions, nor do the visions cause the Easter faith.46 From both these phenomena arises then the Easter proclamation. The important point is that it is the Christian proclamation, which interprets the original impulse with the metaphorical term of resurrection. It is therefore crucial to distinguish the original impulse from its Christian interpretation, although we have no other access to the impulse than through the Christian proclamation and through the visions of the resurrected, which are in the biblical texts, however, already formed by the proclamation. At the very beginning lies, thus, an eschatological act of God, which has an impact also in human history. As an eschatological act of God, it exceeds the sole dimension of history. It is not only an act ZLWKLQ the world, but as an eschatological act of God, it is an act ZLWK the world. But as such, it also has a historical dimension. 47 I will deal with these questions of ontology and historicity of resurrection in detail later (Ch. 9). For now, dealing with the Easter perspective of resurrection as the fundamental KHUPHQHXWLFDO perspective of Christology means two points that are important to hold: a) The resurrected Jesus is no construction (be it a phantasy, or a pious picture of the courageous faith) but rather a practical recognition of faith, which recognizes the resurrection as the act preceding its own existence, as an act H[WUDPH and before one’s faith. It is a surprising and new experience, shedding a fully new light on the whole reality. Within this frame, within the perspective of faith, the important question to be answered by Christology is: when resurrected, who is this Jesus actually? Again: it is the ontological question, which follows from the experience of the resurrected and this new perspective. And it is the task of Christology to give an answer. Not only in 45

Cf. WENZ, &KULVWXV, 50: “We have to speak about the all-determining reality of God, if we want to grasp the reality of Easter in a way, in which it can become the subject of a believing trust in the meaning of fiducia.” 46 POKORNÝ, 7KH*HQHVLV, 10, 126–127, with a graphical scheme, and below, Ch. 9.1. 47 DALFERTH, &UXFLILHGDQG5HVXUUHFWHG, 79–80; POKORNÝ, 7KH*HQHVLV, 126. Cf. below, Ch. 9.4.

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the form of a story, not only by repeating, what Jesus said and did, but rather to give an answer to the RQWRORJLFDO question regarding the person of Jesus as well as his impact on the world. Theological, dogmatic, christological thinking is the necessary result of the encounter with the resurrected one. b) Starting with the perspective of resurrection Christology still remains ZLWKLQWKHLQWHUQDOSHUVSHFWLYH of the Christian faith. The starting point at the resurrection is a point, which starts with the Christian interpretation of the original impulse as resurrection. Therefore, this starting point and its chara cter can become a subject of theological arguing as well. Nevertheless, I tried to show, why I consider this point to be the most appropriate for a fundamental characterization of the Christian faith and to be the most plausible option for Christology.  7KHUHDQG%DFN$JDLQ If the resurrection of Jesus Christ is the very point of his life, which gives the final meaning to everything he is and did, then it opens the route for an appropriate PHWKRGLFDOSURFHGXUH in Christology. 48 In light of the resurrection, the previous story of his life opens up its fundamental meaning. 49 Starting at the resurrection, Christology goes therefore first noetically backward: now, it is clear who died on the cross, how the words and deeds of the earthly Jesus should be interpreted, what status should be given to his birth – it is the point of the divine incarnation that allows his earthly life to be taken with ultimate seriousness. This QRHWLFDOURXWH EDFNZDUG, then, does not stop at the incarnation, because it is possible to ask the question, what was before. That is the question of Christ’s preexistence, which leads into the heart of the divine life, to the Trinity, and the outermost frame of the whole reality. From the perspective of resurrection, the whole existence and being of Jesus Christ unrolls. That is the key point that makes it possible to reconstruct his whole be48

Cf. DALFERTH, &UXFLILHGDQG5HVXUUHFWHG, 26–28. SOBRINO, -HVXVWKH/LEHUDWRU, 44, objects: “The resurrection of Christ was necessary for faith in Christ to appear, and it is therefore a necessary condition for any christology. However, it is not a useful starting point, since until we are clear about who was raised (Jesus of Nazareth), why he was raised (so that God’s justice might be made manifest against a world of injustice), how we gain access to the risen one (in the end, through discipleship of Jesus), the resurrection does not necessarily lead to the true Christ.” Sobrino misses in the resurrection as starting point the stress on the earthly Jesus. Yet, I cannot see, as I try to show above (Ch. 2.2) where else could the resurrection lead. On the contrary, it is only the resurrection RI WKH FUXFLILHG RQH, which provides the necessary ground for all the answers, which Sobrino requires. Later, Sobrino partly corrects himself: “the UHDO starting point is always, in one way, overall faith in Christ, but the PHWKRGRORJLFDO starting point continues to be the historical Jesus” (ibid., 55). “[P]recisely after the resurrection he was recognized as the Son of God, the quest for the meaning of his death became more urgent, sharpening the question, ‘Why did Jesus die?’” (ibid., 211). 49

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ing and existence in the opposite direction and with an RQWRORJLFDO LPSHWXV (within an internal realistic position), that tries to think theologically to the end, who Jesus Christ is in his whole being and how it is possible to think and formulate the most important stations of it. 50 Christology is, then, like reconstructing a detective story: knowing already, how it ended, we want to reconstruct step by step, how could it happen, where were the turning points, what is the real meaning of words and works, which was until now hidden in the flow of history. 51 The perspective of resurrection, as the perspective starting with the deciding divine act of the whole of history, gives a clear theological qualification to the above-described position of internal realism. 52 The christologically founded internal realism of the perspective of Christian faith is an HVFKDWR ORJLFDO UHDOLVP.53 This means that all reality has, in the end, its measure in this ultimate and revealing act of God; that all reality should be theologically read against the backdrop of this eschatological reality; and that theology should not forget to think things to the end. 54 This is the methodical procedure I have chosen to follow in the next chapters. I will propose an attempt of an ontological reconstruction of the whole stor y of Christ, starting with his preexistence (Chapter 5) and going through inca rnation and life (Chapter 6), death (Chapter 7), its soteriological meaning (Chapter 8) and resurrection (Chapter 9) to the ultimate horizon of eternitytime relation (Chapter 10) and to the question of Christology within the plurality of religious traditions (Chapter 11). All of this, of course, being in an intense connection with questions of soteriology, which arise immediately from the christological theme.

50

To the ontological commitment of theology cf. DALFERTH, -HQVHLWV, 312–313; IDEM, ([LVWHQ]*RWWHV. 51 Cf. MOLTMANN, 7KH:D\RI-HVXV&KULVW, 76–77. 52 Cf. above, Ch. 1.2.3. 53 Cf. below, Ch. 9.4. Concerning this term cf. DALFERTH, “Theologischer Realismus”, 407, who describes with it the realism of K. Barth. Cf. also GALLUS, “Verschiedene Wege”, 245–250. 54 As MOLTMANN, 7KH :D\ RI -HVXV &KULVW, 181, puts it: “To think eschatologically means thinking something through to the end.” I try to draw the lines to the very end in both last chapters 10 and 11.

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2. Trinity as the Necessary Background 2. Trinity as the Necessary Background

 7KH,PSRUWDQFHRIWKH7ULQLWDULDQ$SSURDFK One more thing is to be stressed, although it is already implicitly clear from what was said until now. Christology is possible only in the background of Trinity. 55 It is a common theological notion from the early beginnings of theology, shared across all major Christian traditions (orthodox, catholic, protestant) that Christology, as Christology of the crucified and resurrected Jesus, provides the epistemological ground for the doctrine of the Trinity, whereas the Trinity provides the necessary logical and ontological context for Christology. It was not by chance, that it was the question of Christ’s divinity, which led almost necessarily to the formulation of the Trinitarian dogma. And, similarly, it was no chance that right afterward, the first problem to be solved after establishing the doctrine of the Trinity was the question of the relation of divinity and humanity in Jesus Christ. Trinity and Christology support each other in a fundamental way. Christology leads necessarily to the Trinity, the Trinity makes it possible to think Christology to the very end. 56 Especially in western theology it took a very long time (actually until the 20th century) until this strength of the trinitarian theology was discovered again.57 Under the influence of the Antique Platonic-Aristotelian concept of God, for a long time the definition was leading, as Thomas puts it: “Deus est omnino simplex.” 58 Something of it survives still in the tradition of theism. I will try to show in the next chapters that at least some of the classical prob55

Cf. DALFERTH, &UXFLILHGDQG5HVXUUHFWHG, 157–233. Cf. ibid. Dalferth – thinking consistently from the perspective of Easter – adds to the trinitarian consequences of incarnation also the trinitarian consequences of the cross: “It is no accident that both the attempt to conceive of God’s activity of justification on the cross in dogmatic terms and the attempt to conceive of the incarnation event as God’s universal saving activity lead to the doctrine of the Trinity. Where God is concerned, the christological coincidence and the soteriological volte-face of consecration and incorporation enacted on the cross make it necessary to conceive in specific terms of a personal Trinity. For only in trinitarian terms can the VROXV'HXV be properly conceptualized, and only in trinitarian terms is it therefore possible to fulfill the requirement that the genesis of the Christian faith be described historically and reconstructed hermeneutically, and also that a theological basis be established for its claim to validity.” Cf. ibid., 157–233. 57 An important foreplay – which is a certain shame for theology – were the big philosophical concepts in German idealism: the philosophy of Hegel – actually a huge trinitarian conception where the Trinity is the outermost frame of all reality, and the philosophy of the late Schelling, known as the philosophy of revelation and discovered in its final shape in 1992 (F.W.J. SCHELLING, 'LH 8UIDVVXQJ GHU 3KLORVRSKLH GHU 2IIHQEDUXQJ, 2 vols [Hamburg: Meiner, 1992]). A good introduction to the doctrine of Trinity from the catholic perspective is offered by GRESHAKE, 'HUGUHLHLQH*RWW. Cf. also DALFERTH, &UXFLILHGDQG 5HVXUUHFWHG, 184–195. 58 THOMAS OF AQUIN, 67K I q3 a7. 56

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lems and aporias in the theo-logy VHQVXVWULFWR – e.g. questions of divine apathy and immutability (Ch. 5 and 7) and the relation of eternity and time (Ch. 10) – often arise and end in aporias because of the missing trinitarian frame, which has its anchor in Christology. Ch. Schwöbel brings the importance and the motivation of the trinitarian approach clearly to the point: “This resurgence of trinitarian theological reflection is motivated by the conviction, that Christian faith is irreducibly trinitarian in character and that a distinctively theological and authentically Christian perspective from which theology can engage in dialogue with the rich diversity of non-Christian and secular views of reality is therefore necessarily trinitarian. […] Dissatisfaction with the theological possibilities of non-personal, unitarian or unipersonalist conceptions of God leave open for a reasoned account of the central claims of Christian faith about the person of Christ and his saving work is among the reasons for the renewed interest in trinitarian theology, supported by disappointment with the inability of many versions of Christian theism, conceived in terms of metaphysics of substance or a philosophy of subjectivity, to do justice to the relational ‘logic’ of such central Christian statements as ‘God is Love’.” 59

The trinitarian theology gets thus a fundamental status for the whole of theo logy: &KULVWLDQWKHRORJ\LVWULQLWDULDQWKHRORJ\ Once more Ch. Schwöbel: “In spite of the different motivations for this trinitarian turn in many stands of recent theology and the diverse expectations invested in it, there is nevertheless a considerable consensus concerning the status and significance of the doctrine of the Trinity. The doctrine of the Trinity is not regarded as one doctrine among others in the doctrinal scheme of Chri stian dogmatics, so that changes in its conception would have only limited implications for the systematic exposition of Christian faith. On the contrary, it is seen as determining the systematic structure of Christian dogmatics and its content in all its parts. A trinitarian approach radically affects the exposition of who is the God in whom Christians believe, and the presentation of what can be asserted about God’s being and the God-world relationship. Therefore the doctrine of the Trinity determines what can theologically be said about God as well as what can be stated about the world and humankind. Only because of this comprehensive status can trinitarian theology constitute a Christian theological perspective on reality. The trinitarian turn in theology therefore has implication for the whole of Christian dogmatics in all its parts.” 60

Only one thing is to be added explicitly: the source and the starting point of trinitarian theology is Christology, respectively the original Easter experience of the Christian faith that in the crucified and resurrected one was God -Self. At the bottom of all trinitarian theology stands the (later in Nicea and Chalcedon explicitly formulated) confession of Jesus Christ as truly human and truly God. By now, it might be obvious that in my conception I presuppose the LGHQWL W\ RI WKH LPPDQHQW DQG HFRQRPLF 7ULQLW\, as classically formulated by Karl 59 60

SCHWÖBEL, “Introduction”, 10. Ibid., 11.

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Rahner in his so-called “Grundaxiom”: “the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity and YLFH YHUVD”.61 The proper theological path leads, as stated above, from Christology to the Trinity; not metaphysically from an abstract tractate 'HGHRXQR with a speculative philosophical term of God to the tractate 'H GHR WULQR, which is then limited by the previous one. 62 There is no need to differentiate two Trinities because with the Christological starting point with the crucified and resurrected true God and true human, there is no anxious need to keep God in a kind of apathetic transcendence apart of all processes of the worldly reality. It is the very point of the conception of revelation as God’s self-revelation: what and how Jesus Christ is, so is God. There is no different, other, or larger divinity somewhere beyond Christ. What happened and was in Christ was God-Self. (This statement immediately needs, however, the trinitarian concretization, that it was the second person of the Trinity who became human in Christ.) In the same sense, there is no need for the figure of the so-called H[WUD &DOYLQLVWLFXP, which repeats the same on the Christological level but while trying to preserve the divine Logos from all possible dangers of changing wordliness. It states that the divine Logos assumed humanity in the incarnation, however, at the same time, it remained as /RJRV DVDUNRV outside of the process: QRQFDURH[WUD/RJRQVHG/RJRVH[WUDFDUQH: “Mirabiliter enim e coelo descendit Filius Dei, ut coelum tamen non relinqueret.” 63 My Christological point is just the opposite: it was exactly the second person of the Trinity who went “into the foreign country” and became human, leaving no “reserve” behind. 64

61 K. RAHNER, “Der dreifaltige Gott als transzendenter Urgrund der Heilsgeschichte”, in 0\VWHULXP 6DOXWLV, vol. 2, ed. J. FEINER and M. LÖHRER (Einsiedeln: Benzinger, 1967), 328, cf. ibid., 334–336 (“The Identity of the ‘economic’ and ‘immanent’ Logos”). Against it POSPÍŠIL, -Håtã]1D]DUHWD, 173: “[H]owever, the words ‘YLFHYHUVD’ hide some dangers. Whereas the economic Trinity is ontologically fully dependent on the immanent Trinity, this relation does not hold in reversely because the freedom of the Eternal cannot be conditioned ‘from without’ by the created form of his incarnation and revelation; God does not become Trinity due to the processes in the salvation history!” Obviously, Pospíšil ca nnot think one Trinity – he calls it “mixing up of the immanent and of the economic Trinity” (ibid., 174) – and still divides two Trinities, where the immanent Trinity even “surpasses” and is “independent on the economic Trinity” (ibid., 175). However, should there be two Trinities, would it also imply two differring divinities, which is exactly the consequence that should be avoided. 62 Cf. RAHNER, “Der dreifaltige Gott”, 325; J.D. ZIZIOULAS, %HLQJ DV &RPPXQLRQ 6WXGLHVLQ3HUVRQKRRGDQGWKH&KXUFK (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997), 40. 63 CALVIN, ,QVWLWXWLR UHOLJLRQLV FKULVWLDQDH II, XIII, 4, ed. A. THOLUCK (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1874), 333. Cf. HEPPE, 'LH'RJPDWLN, 335, with more references; and above, Ch. 3.2.6. 64 Cf. below, Ch. 5 and 6.

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Only with such a courageous conception of God who really and fully enters the world and humanity, the trinitarian framework can provide the dynamics, which is necessary for the proper conception of God and Christology. The trinitarian approach, this unique signature of Christian faith – although the concept of Trinity may be the most complicated theological topic of all – can be, then, a great theological instrument, which opens the possibility to think of God-Self and his relation to the creation on more levels, in a complex way and thus dynamically, making it possible to express the richness of God’s acting (cf below, Ch. 10.2).  7KH&KDOOHQJHVRID&RQVLVWHQW7ULQLWDULDQ6SHHFKRI*RG At the same time, however, it is a challenge for theology to keep this approach up. There is at least one huge tendency in the theological language within the trinitarian frame, which concerns Christology, which is very often used but is false. The roots of it reach into the biblical texts and to their unr eflected use of the term God in relation to Jesus Christ. For example, when Paul says in the famous sentence in Rom 9:10: “If you confess with your mouth the Lord Jesus and believe in your heart that God has raised Him from the dead, you will be saved.” “God” stands here obviously for “Father” and this is also the traditional Christian view on the whole Old Testament: wherever stands “God”, it should be understood as “Father”. Nevertheless, this unreflected use, which mixes up the oneness of God with the threeness of divine persons, is not restricted only to the biblical texts but is quite often to read in many outstanding and respected authors and many theological texts until today. The traditional answer says that because it is so in the New Testament, is it theologically acceptable and one shall in such cases understand “God” as “Father”. 65 Some theologians refer here to the traditional eastern conception of Trinity and to the so-called RUWKRGR[ SDWUR FHQWULVP, where the divine unity is the presupposition for the divine threeness and this unity is concentrated in the person of the Father as the source of divinity. The Father is conceived “as God kat¾ evxochn”.66 With the speech of 65 Cf. K. RAHNER, “Theos in the New Testament”, in IDEM, 7KHRORJLFDO,QYHVWLJDWLRQV, vol. 1 (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1961), 138–148, who tries to substantiate his thesis that “God” is not simply the suppositon for Father, but that it rather signifies Father. Rahner gives also plenty of biblical references for the occurrence of “God” representing the Father. 66 Cf. ibid., 146; JOHN OF DAMASCUS, ([SRVLWLR ILGHL, 8,30; M.D. KRÜGER, *|WWOLFKH )UHLKHLW (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 287–296. The conception is clearly and shortly explained in ZIZIOULAS, %HLQJDV&RPPXQLRQ, 40–41 (cf. also above, Ch. 3.1.2): Divinity is not founded in the divine RXVLD but rather in the K\SRVWDVLV of the Father: the Father makes God one God. In the Father, all persons of the Trinity have their source and their divinity: “the ontological ‘principle’ of God is the Father. The personal existence of God (the Father) constitutes His substance, makes it hypostases. The being of God is constituted

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the Father simply as God, the unity should be stressed and it should prevent the one God from falling apart into three separate persons. The necessary consequence is, however, an asymmetry in the inner trinitarian relations (the Father is the source of divinity, originates the Son, and lets proceed the Spirit) tending to an equivocation in the term of the person (the person of the Father is different from the persons of the Son and the Spirit). This use seems to support a slight Arian tendency in the Christian theology suggesting that there is God and next to him (and in this sense actually as if outside of him) Christ. The problem thus does not lie in the fact that it is the Father who should be understood as God in the strict sense. The problem lies in the Christological consequence where it seems that Christ is not God in the same sense as the Father or only in a secondary way: the asymmetical relations seem to imply an asymmetry in the divinity. It can be seen in another typical expression, originating from the New Testament as well: the conception of Jesus Christ as the “Son of God”. The title of the Son of God has its roots in the Old Testament conception of the ruler or king as the adopted son od God (cf. Ps 2:6–7).67 Exactly due to this context of adoption, this expression bears the same danger as mentioned in the previous case: there is God on one side, and then his Son on the other. 68 The Father remains as if the “main” God. On one hand, for many Christians this makes it possible to accept sentences like “The Son of God died on the cross”. This sounds somehow usual and probably no Christian would object anything to it. On the other hand, nevertheless, this is possible only due to the latent Arian with the person” (ibid., 41). Here, the person of the Father makes the substance, hence the term of K\SRVWDVLV, clearly favored by Zizioulas, comes again close to the term of RXVLD: the person of the Father is the divinity. The being of God is thus identified with the person of the Father, which, however, entails an equivocation of the term person within the Trinity: only the Father is a person in the proper sense of the word; Son and Spirit are derived from him and hence only secondary persons. Cf. also P. SCHOONENBERG, 'HU*HLVWGDV :RUW XQG GHU 6RKQ (LQH *HLVW&KULVWRORJLH, trans. W. IMMLER (Regensburg: Pustet, 1991), 187–188, who conceives the Trinity as evolving from the person of the Father in the moment of incarnation (cf. also below, Ch. 6.1). 67 Cf. S. SCHREIBER, “Von der Verkündigung Jesu zum verkündigten Christus”, in &KULVWRORJLH, ed. K. RUHSTORFER (Paderborn: F. Schöningh/Brill, 2018), 77. 68 Cf. HENGEL, “The Son of God”, 89–90: “The ‘Son of God’ has become an established, unalienable metaphor of Christian theology, expressing both the origin of Jesus in God’s being (i.e., his love for all creatures and his unique connection with God) and his true humanity.” Is this a correct expression of a trinitarian approach, when next to the true humanity stands only a “unique connection with God”? Cf. also BARTH, &KXUFK'RJPDW LFVIV/1, 207–210, and his dealing with the term ‘Son of God’. Barth comes to a dialectical conclusion, which is quite typical for him: the title of the Son of God is “a true but inadequate and an inadequate but true insight and statement”. “We have no better term” and this one is “very suitable and indeed indispensable if we are to say what has to be said concer ning His deity” (ibid., 210).

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tendency in this expression. In contrary to it, the correct trinitarian expression would be “God the Son died on the cross”. This may sound for many Christians problematic, because now, there is Godself at stake, not “only” his Son.69 The trinitarian theology is thus, on one hand, the fundamental expression of the Christian faith, the framework of all christologically anchored theology, and a great theological instrument for talking about of God. On the other hand, however, it is a constant challenge for the theological thinking and the correct theological speech.

69

I will try to think this provocative thought radically to the end, see below in Ch. 7.

Part Two

 Chapter 5

Divine Preexistence: The Accommodation With this chapter, I start the ontological reconstruction of Christology in the above-mentioned sense: from the internal realistic perspective of the Christian faith trying to provide a plausible answer to the question ‘Who is Jesus Christ?’ As already said in the previous chapter, the perspective of the resurrection, which as such presupposes a trinitarian frame, leads beyond the incarnation and allows us to ask what was before the incarnation.1 It allows Christology to start with the preexistence, with the inner life of the divine Trinity, before incarnation, before creation, before time. But again: this is done always from the particular perspective of here and now, trying to think things to the end (resp. in this case: to the beginning) with the rationality, lo gic, terms and other instruments ZH have here and now. The necessary theological speculation should provide a plausible – and sober – theory of the triune God (i.e., theo-logy proper). I will try to show that this topic is not a mere obligatory piece of theological speculation, but rather that decisions made here preset fundamental limits for further thinking and effect everything that comes next. It is, therefore, this chapter where I will introduce one of the key terms of my christological co ncept: the term of GLYLQHDFFRPPRGDWLRQ. However, the common definition of divinity or of God throughout most of Christian history was not primarily trinitarian. Following the old Antique tradition, Christian theology saw God defined not by the trinitarian dynamics but by the exact opposite: by apathy and immutability. 2 1

Cf. PANNENBERG, -HVXV, 150–151: “Jesus’ unity with God, insofar as it belongs to God’s eternal essence, precedes, however, the time of Jesus’ earthly life. From the idea of revelation we attain access to the understanding of the old concept of Jesus’ preexistence. At least this concept appears as a meaningful H[SUHVVLRQ for a material concern, that we, too, must retain, namely, for Jesus’ full and complete affiliation with the eternal God. J esus’ revelational unity with the God who is from eternity to eternity forces us conceptually to the thought that Jesus as the ‘Son od God’ is preexistent. This is true even if we must characterize the idea of preexistence taken by itself as a mythical concept.” And Pannenberg refers to the fact that preexistence is presupposed already by Paul (cf. Gal 4:4; Rom 8:3). 2 Cf. e.g. already THEODORET OF CYRUS, “Erranistes”, which are three dialogues on Christ and Christology entitled “The Immutable”, “The Unconfounded” and “The Impassible”. As Theodoret writes: “For clearness’ sake I will divide my book into three dialogues.

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1. The Immutable God of the Theological Tradition3 1. The Immutable God of the Theological Tradition

hy7UDQVIRUPDWLRQV RI WKH 0DU[LVW &KULVWLDQ'LDORJXHLQ&]HFKRVORYDNLD@, ed. I. LANDA and J. MERVART, Praha: Filosofia, 2017, 275–296. –, “Orientující teologie [Orientating Theology]”, in IDEM and P. MACEK, 7HRORJLH MDNR YČGD >7KHRORJ\DVD6FLHQWLILF'LVFLSOLQH@, Praha: CDK, 2007, 9–144. –, 3UDYGDXQLYHU]LWDDDNDGHPLFNpVYRERG\ [7UXWK8QLYHUVLW\DQG$FDGHPLF)UHHGRP], Praha: SLON, 2020.

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–, review of “M.D. Krüger, Das andere Bild Christi. Spätmoderner Protestantismus als kritische Bildreligion”, &RPPXQLR9LDWRUXPLIX(2017/1), 122–125. –, “Theologie – eine Glaubenswissenschaft?”, in 'LH 5ROOH GHU 7KHRORJLH LQ 8QLYHUVLWlW *HVHOOVFKDIWXQG .LUFKH, ed. J. SCHRÖTER, Veröffentlichungen der Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft für Theologie (VWGTh) 36, Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2012, 55–67. –, “Der Tod Jesu Christi, Zeit und Ewigkeit”, 1HXH=HLWVFKULIWIU 6\VWHPDWLVFKH 7KHROR JLHXQG5HOLJLRQVSKLORVRSKLH60 (2018), 531–537. –, “Verantwortliche Rede von der Sünde”, &RPPXQLR9LDWRUXPLX(2018/2), 137–170. –, “Verschiedene Wege, ähnliche Resultate? Barth-Rezeption bei Ingolf U. Dalferth”, in 8PVWULWWHQHV(UEH/HVDUWHQGHU7KHRORJLH.DUO%DUWKV, ed. M. GOCKEL et al., Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2020, 243–256. –, “Was ist der Mensch?” in  -DKUH 5HIRUPDWLRQ LQ GHU 6ORZDNHL, ed. M. NICÁK and M. TAMCKE, Berlin: LIT Verlag, 239–256. GASSER, GEORG, “Einleitung: Die Aktualität des Seelenbegriffs”, in 'LH $NWXDOLWlW GHV 6HHOHQEHJULIIV, ed. G. GASSER and J. QUITTERER, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2010, 9–27. GERDES, HAYO, “Anmerkungen zur Christologie der Glaubenslehre Schleiermachers”, 1HXH=HLWVFKULIWIU6\VWHPDWLVFKH7KHRORJLH 25 (1983), 112–125. GESE, HARTMUT, “Die Sühne”, in: IDEM, =XU ELEOLVFKHQ 7KHRORJLH $OWWHVWDPHQWOLFKH 9RUWUlJH,München: Chr. Kaiser, 1977, 85–106. GESS, WOLFGANG FRIEDRICH, 'LH /HKUH YRQ GHU 3HUVRQ &KULVWL HQWZLFNHOW DXV GHP 6HOEVWEHZX‰WVHLQ&KULVWLXQGDXVGHP=HXJQLVVHGHU$SRVWHO, Basel, 1856. GESTRICH, CHRISTOF, &KULVWHQWXP XQG 6WHOOYHUWUHWXQJ 5HOLJLRQVSKLORVRSKLVFKH 8QWHU VXFKXQJHQ]XP+HLOVYHUVWlQGQLVXQG]XU*UXQGOHJXQJGHU7KHRORJLH, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001. GESTRICH, CHRISTOF and HÜTTENBERGER, TILL: “Stellvertretung V. Kirchengeschichtlich und systematisch-theologisch”, in 7KHRORJLVFKH 5HDOHQ]\NORSlGLH, vol.32, Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2001, 145–153. GILKEY, LANGDON, “A Theology in Process: Schubert Ogden’s Developing Theology”, ,QWHUSUHWDWLRQ21 (1967), 447–459. GLEEDE, BENJAMIN, 7KH 'HYHORSPHQW RI WKH 7HUP evnupo,statoj IURP 2ULJHQ WR -RKQ RI 'DPDVFXV, Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2012. –, “Vermischt, ausgetauscht und kruzweis zugesprochen. Zur wechselvollen Geschichte der Idiome Christi in der alten Kirche“, in &UHDWRU HVW &UHDWXUD /XWKHUV &KULVWRORJLH DOV/HKUHYRQGHU,GLRPHQNRPPXQLNDWLRQ, ed. O. BAYER and B. GLEEDE, Theologische Bibliothek Töpelmann 138, Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2007, 35–94. GRAY, PATRICK T.R., 7KH'HIHQVHRI&KDOFHGRQLQWKH(DVW± , Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979. –, “Neuchalkedonismus”, in 7KHRORJLVFKH 5HDOHQ]\NORSlGLH, vol. 24, ed. G. MÜLLER, Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 1994, 294–296. GREGERSEN, NIELS HENRIK, “The Extended Body of Christ”, in ,QFDUQDWLRQ, ed. IDEM, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015, 225–251. GREGORIOS THAUMATURGOS, $G7KHRSRPSXPGHSDVVLELOLHWLPSDVVLELOL LQ'HR, ed. B. PITRA, Analecta Sacra Spicilegio Solesmensi parata 4, Paris, 1876–1882. GREGORY OF NYSSA, Ep. 101, 3DWURORJLD *UDHFD, vol. 37, ed. J.P. MIGNE, Paris, 1862, 175–194. *UHJRU\ RI 1\VVD 7KH 0LQRU 7UHDWLVHV RQ 7ULQLWDULDQ 7KHRORJ\ DQG $SROOLQDULVP, ed. V.H. DRECOLL and M. BERGHAUS, Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2011.

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Index of Names Abramowski, Luise 107 Adam, Jens 355 Ahlbrecht, Ansgar 257 Allison, Dale C. 24, 43, 56, 58, 338, 340, 342, 345–348, 350, 354–356, 361–362 Althaus, Paul 118–121, 123, 127–128, 138, 141, 257 Altizer, Thomas J.J. 286 Anatolios, Khaled 65, 70, 73, 76, 89, 92, 95, 105, 274 Anderson, Deland S. 278 Anselm of Canterbury 26, 116, 118, 134, 136–137, 187, 296–297, 304, 306–310, 314, 334 Apollinaris of Laodicea 68, 73, 75, 78– 79, 81–82, 86, 90, 94, 99, 104, 106, 140–141, 160, 255 Athanasius 68, 73, 79, 82, 95, 117, 273, 308 Augustinus Aurelius 84, 102, 117, 186, 210, 234–235, 255, 294, 300, 310, 325, 336, 373–379, 382–383, 387 Baasland, Ernst 57 Balserak, Jon 204 Balthasar, Hans Urs von 108, 155, 188 Barker, Margaret 317 Barth, Hans-Martin 410, 413 Barth, Karl 8–11, 13, 16, 26, 27, 152– 156, 161, 162, 166–168, 176, 181, 190, 206, 209, 217, 222, 262, 300, 326, 328, 347, 351, 355, 361, 366, 377–378, 387, 389, 414 Barth, Roderich 52, 260 Barth, Ulrich 15, 41, 46, 158, 204, 395 Basilius Magnus 86 Bauman, Zygmunt 20 Baur, Ferdinand Christian 16

Baur, Jörg 116, 123, 125–126, 296 Bayer, Oswald 90, 97, 119, 123, 125, 390 Becker, Jürgen 339, 350 Bendemann, Reinhard von 260, 358 Berges, Ulrich 271, 427 Berkouwer, Cornelis Gerrit 326 Beyschlag, Karlmann 65, 67–69, 71, 73, 76–78, 80–82, 85, 89–95, 97, 100– 102, 104, 106, 109–111, 118, 189 Biel, Gabriel 97 Bieler, Martin 312 Bietenhard, Hans 23 Boethius 84, 220, 374, 393 Boff, Leonardo 104, 160, 168, 225, 241, 242, 244–245 Bonhoeffer, Dietrich 31, 299–300, 323, 325, 334 Bonsiepen, Wolfgang 277 Bovon, François 59 Braaten, Carl E. 38, 365 Brandt, Sigrid 299 Breidert, Martin 135–136, 138–141 Brom, Luco J. van den 378–383, 388 Brown, Colin 37 Brown, David 138 Brümmer, Vincent 210 Brunner, Emil 236 Brüntrup, Godehard 260 Buchheim, Thomas 260, 264 Bultmann, Rudolf 33, 41–42, 54, 60, 62, 170–171, 173, 246, 304, 342, 346– 347, 352–353 Buntfuß, Markus V, 45, 142 Calvin, Johannes 173, 204, 300 Camelot, Pierre-Thomas 67, 71, 89, 100, 110

454

,QGH[RI1DPHV

Campenhausen, Hans Freiherr von 343, 355 Carnley, Peter F. 347 Charlesworth, James H. 339, 341, 347, 363 Chilton, Bruce D. 39, 343, 347–348, 356, 362 Clayton, Philip 34 Coakley, Sarah 20–21, 78, 80, 98 Cobb, John B., Jr. 197–200, 408, 417 Cross, Richard 90, 92, 97, 102, 107– 108, 111–115 Crossan, John Dominic 43 Crouzel, Henri 235 Cullmann, Oscar 251, 259–260, 265– 267 Cyril of Alexandria 65, 68–74, 78–82, 85, 87–97, 99, 101, 103–105, 107– 110, 161, 189, 194–195, 220, 273– 276, 293, 308, 405 D’Costa, Gavin 10, 394, 396, 408–409, 413–416 Dahlke, Benjamin 15, 46, 53, 60, 143, 160 Daley, Brian E., SJ 65, 67–68, 71, 77, 81, 89, 97, 99, 102–103, 108, 111, 116, 165 Dalferth, Ingolf Ulrich VI, 3, 10–13, 18–21, 24–25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 52–53, 61, 63–64, 66, 77–78, 84, 88, 98, 116, 131, 133, 153, 160–162, 167–172, 174–177, 192, 200, 202– 203, 210, 217, 220, 227–230, 237, 240, 249, 270–272, 300–302, 304, 318–319, 321–322, 329, 333–334, 336–337, 341, 345–347, 352–354, 356–360, 362, 365, 371–377, 381– 382, 384, 390, 392, 395, 397 Danneberg, Lutz 204 Danz, Christian 5, 10, 15, 17–18, 33, 36–37, 40–44, 46, 50–52, 54–55, 57, 59, 123, 152, 158–160, 172, 395, 408, 416, 418, 421 Davis, Stephen T. 78, 339–340, 342, 347, 349–350, 362 Deines, Roland 301 Derrett, John Duncan Martin 346 Dorner, Isaak August 138

Dörrie, Heinrich 107 Dunn, James D.G. 44–45, 49, 55–57, 79, 170–171, 338, 341, 348, 350, 354, 361–362 Dupuis, Jacques, SJ 242, 325, 409–413 Ebeling, Gerhard 11, 119, 230 Eckstein, Hans-Joachim 169, 352, 354– 355, 425, 430 Eco, Umberto 19, 24, 29, 44 Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah 20 Engel, George L. 259 Epperly, Bruce G. 188, 197, 199, 381 Essen, Georg 18, 46, 54, 57, 73, 82–84, 101–102, 104, 110, 117, 159–160, 193, 217–219, 246, 345, 352 Evers, Dirk 7, 9, 13–14, 18, 40, 46, 52, 301, 372, 389, 393 Farrington, Peter 79 Fichte, Johann Georg 13, 52 Fiorenza, Francis S. 9, 342, 351, 361 Fischer, Georg 235, 237 Fischer, Hermann 9 Fischer, Johannes 53, 312, 322, 334, 418, 420, 429 Foerster, Werner 169 Freud, Sigmund 53 Frey, Jörg 37, 299, 301, 305, 315 Funda, Otakar Antoň 172 Gabriel, Markus 29–30 Gaddis, Michael 65, 70, 79 Gallus, Petr 3, 6, 11, 13, 19, 22–29, 35, 47, 67, 88, 106, 117, 153–154, 176, 228, 297, 323, 326, 332–333, 354, 365, 369, 372, 404 Gasser, Georg 257, 260, 425 Gerdes, Hayo 143 Gese, Hartmut 304 Gess, Wolfgang Friedrich 139–141 Gestrich, Christof 305, 308, 310–312, 322, 324 Gilkey, Langdon 197 Gleede, Benjamin 90, 96–97, 101, 103– 104, 107, 109–111, 113, 123 Gräb-Schmidt, Elisabeth 17, 41, 61, 122, 338

,QGH[RI1DPHV Gray, Patrick T.R. 69–70, 74, 101, 110, 116–117 Gregersen, Niels Henrik 158 Gregorios Thaumaturgos 187 Gregory of Nyssa 86, 100, 104, 107, 208, 273 Greshake, Gisbert 81–82, 84–85, 93–94, 177, 186, 192, 252–255, 258, 264, 266 Griffin, David Ray 197–200 Grillmeier, Alois 14, 65, 67–68, 70–74, 76, 81–85, 87, 89–91, 93, 97, 99– 101, 103–104, 106–109, 115, 164, 221, 225, 255, 275–276 Grosshans, Hans-Peter 3, 20, 29, 232, 323 Grube, Dirk-Martin 44, 52, 59 Gunton, Colin 78, 212 Gwynn, David M. 65 Habermas, Jürgen 23, 25, 28, 236, 401 Hahn, Ferdinand 169–170 Haight, Roger 20, 158, 242, 274, 394, 403–410, 412 Hainthaler, Theresia 14, 79 Halleux, André de 67, 70, 74 Hampel, Volker 271, 299, 301, 305, 309, 312, 322, 327 Härle, Wilfried 261 Harnack, Adolf von 13–14, 32, 37, 44, 47, 49, 54, 61, 71, 158, 170–171, 395, 407 Hebblethwaite, Brian 33, 396 Heckel, Ulrich 317 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 10–11, 15, 17–18, 31, 62, 92, 138, 177, 220, 257, 264, 277–286, 288–289, 297, 325 Heim, S. Mark 400, 413, 415 Helmer, Siegfried 101 Hengel, Martin 54, 181 Henning, Rudolf Christian 257–258, 264, 267, 368 Heppe, Heinrich 136, 179, 388 Herder, Johann Gottfried 164 Hermisson, Hans-Jürgen 271 Herrmann, Wilhelm 10, 40–41, 49, 62, 158

455

Hick, John V, 32–33, 44, 51, 78, 81, 92, 105, 158, 266, 310, 330, 347–349, 396–405, 407–412, 417 Hirsch, Emanuel 143 Hodgson, Peter C. 32, 257, 281 Hošek, Pavel 394, 396, 400, 408–410, 414–415, 417, 419–421, 423 Huizing, Klaas 158 Hüttenberger, Till 308, 310–312, 322 Irenaeus of Lyon 235, 273 Jandejsek, Petr 242, 404, 409 Janowski, Bernd 237, 301, 315 Jeanrond, Werner G. 210 Joest, Wilfried 389 John of Damascus 86, 90, 92, 97, 101, 106, 108, 111–116, 125, 133, 147, 165, 180, 208, 269, 349 Johnson, Luke Timothy 43, 55 Jüngel, Eberhard 11, 53, 57, 62, 66, 84, 104, 106, 161, 168, 190, 207, 210– 212, 227–229, 236, 239–240, 260– 263, 265–267, 274, 276–279, 282, 284, 286–290, 295, 297–298, 302– 305, 333, 342, 371, 373–374, 377– 379, 383, 387, 389, 393 Justinus Martyr 273 Kähler, Martin 38–40, 44, 47, 54, 62 Kant, Immanuel 15, 31, 39–40, 52, 61– 62, 142, 155–156, 159, 217, 236, 311–312, 332, 379, 395, 401 Karfíková, Lenka VI. 373, 387 Kärkkäinen, Veli-Matti 34 Käsemann, Ernst 42, 271, 272, 300, 322–323, 327–329 Kasper, Walter 64, 73, 138, 141, 167, 192, 204, 223–224, 353 Kaufmann, Gordon 348 Kessler, Hans 339, 47, 352–353, 355– 356, 358–359, 361 Keupp, Heiner 231 Kierkegaard, Søren 210, 236 Knitter, Paul F. 6, 21, 32–33, 394, 396, 409, 413, 415, 419–420, 422 Koch, Anton Friedrich 28, 30 Kolář, Ondřej 252–253, 257, 261, 267– 268

456

,QGH[RI1DPHV

Körtner, Ulrich H.J. 204, 408, 413–414, 416, 418 Koselleck, Reinhard 44 Kripke, Saul A. 232–233 Krüger, Malte Dominik VI, 13, 29–30, 41, 48, 53, 57, 60, 158, 172, 180, 208, 260, 273–274, 323, 339, 349– 350, 387, 395, 403 Kuitert, Harry M. 158 Küng, Hans 186, 192, 194, 277–278, 287, 355 Lampe, Peter 260, 358 Landa, Ivan 6, 92, 277–278 Landmesser, Christof 23, 37–38, 42–43, 45, 50, 56–57, 60, 64 Lauster, Jörg 6 Lebon, Joseph 101 Leo I, Pope 67–72, 74, 76–77, 79, 81, 84–85, 89–94, 97, 99–100, 109, 112– 113, 117–118, 129, 132, 134, 148, 156, 160, 188, 195, 220, 274, 293, 310 Leonhardt, Rochus 14 Leontius of Byzantium 97, 100–101, 103–104, 106–107, 115, 165 Leontius of Jerusalem 99–105, 107, 114–115, 131, 222, 360 Lerch, Magnus 159 Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim 10, 37, 40, 45, 318 Levenson, Jon D. 339, 362 Lienhard, Marc 119–125, 127–129 Lindbeck, George A. 6, 19–20, 22–23, 28, 32, 63–64, 78, 160 Link, Christian 264 Lohfink, Gerhard 252, 258, 266 Lohse, Bernhard 66, 70, 118–119, 121, 123, 125–126 Loofs, Friedrich 70, 79, 81, 93, 98, 103, 108 Louth, Andrew 79, 101, 109, 111 Lüdemann, Gerd 36, 172, 348, 356 Luther, Martin 10, 50, 90, 96–98, 106, 116–139, 161, 163, 168, 189, 192, 239, 276–277, 282, 288, 296–298, 300, 310, 312, 320, 390, 417–418 Lyotard, Jean-François 20, 22, 29, 31

Macek, Petr 11, 198 MacGregor, Neil 6 Macquarrie, John 13, 31 Madigan, Kevin J. 339, 362 Mahlmann, Theodor 128, 130, 256 Machovec, Milan 52 Mariña, Jacqueline 8, 143 Markschies, Christoph 14, 118, 235–236 Marxsen, Willi 347 McCord Adams, Marylin 28, 33 McCormack, Bruce 138–140, 142, 191 McFague, Sallie 347 McGuckin, John A. 68, 70, 73–74, 94– 96, 99, 274 Melanchthon, Philipp 119 Mellor, David Hugh 387 Menke, Karl-Heinz 159–160, 309, 312, 314 Merz, Annette 37–39, 42–43, 55, 59, 170, 270, 338, 356, 361–362 Mesch, Walter 373–376 Meyendorff, John 67, 70, 101 Milbank, John 111, 416 Moltmann, Jürgen 13, 31, 61, 65, 158, 161–162, 168, 170, 176, 236, 244, 264, 270–271, 274, 290–296, 352, 358, 375, 377, 379, 392 Moxter, Michael 28–29, 41, 172, 237 Mrázek, Jiří 233 Mühlen, Heribert 186, 192 Mühlenberg, Ekkehard 71, 89 Murrmann-Kahl, Michael 15, 17–18, 44, 50, 55 Narcisse, Gilbert 27 Neidhart, Ludwig 373, 379 Nellas, Panayotis 105 Niebuhr, Richard R. 8 Nietzsche, Friedrich 210, 286, 287 Nitsche, Bernhard 159 Norris Jr., Richard 70, 78 Nüssel, Friederike 215, 309–312, 317, 320–322, 327 O’Collins, Gerald, SJ 162, 167, 342, 349, 351 O’Donnell, Matthew Brook 341, 360 Oort, Johannes van 67, 71–72, 79 Origen 97, 107, 187, 308, 346

,QGH[RI1DPHV Osthövener, Claus-Dieter 15, 204 Özen, Alf 36, 348, 356 Pailin, David A. 197–198 Pannenberg, Wolfhart 5–6, 10, 12–13, 19, 66, 78, 88, 90–91, 105, 107–108, 116, 131, 135, 137, 140–142, 154, 160–164, 167, 185, 191, 193, 203– 206, 208, 210, 217–219, 228, 233– 234, 240–241, 246–247, 252, 256, 261–263, 290, 304, 307–313, 318, 320, 322, 324, 326, 328, 335, 341– 343, 345–346, 348, 351,352, 355, 361, 370 374, 376–380, 383, 396, 433 Paul (the apostle) 14, 41, 54, 57–58, 60, 148, 170, 180, 185, 196, 260, 292, 300, 305, 307, 313, 315–316, 320, 322, 327–329, 343, 349, 355, 358, 363, 369, 397 Paulus, Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob 346 Pearson, Lori 150 Peirce, Charles Sanders 19, 25, 401 Pelikan, Jaroslav 70, 94–95, 99, 273 Pesch, Otto Hermann 270 Pesch, Rudolf 342, 347 Peters, Albrecht 246 Peters, Ted 260, 351, 354, 387 Piaget, Jean 213–214, 423 Pieper, Josef 210, 252–254, 257 Pittenger, Norman 13, 200–202 Pius XII. 141, 155 Plato 77, 106–108, 111–112, 118, 124, 133, 177, 186–187, 96, 200, 222, 235, 239, 250–254, 373–374, 377, 423 Plotinos 186, 373–374, 377, 379 Pokorný, Petr 51, 54–55, 57–60, 167, 169–174, 271, 316–317, 338, 341, 343–345, 347, 352, 355, 361, 363 Porter, Stanley E. 37, 43, 57, 317, 339, 341 Pospíšil, Ctirad Václav 10, 27, 30, 80, 96, 155, 161, 179, 221, 259, 342 Price, Richard 65, 67, 69–70, 77, 79, 95 Pröpper, Thomas 5, 160, 217, 236, 406 Prudký, Martin 235, 237 Putnam, Hilary 28–29, 401

457

Quell, Gottfried 169 Rahner, Karl 5, 89, 94, 98, 102, 141, 155, 164, 179–180, 187–190, 192– 194, 197, 200, 204, 211, 217–218, 236, 248, 253, 262–263, 287, 292, 294, 406, 409, 414 Ratzinger, Joseph 55, 160, 193, 251– 257, 259–260, 267 Redeker, Martin 8 Reimarus, Herrmann Samuel 10, 16, 37–39, 44, 53–54, 57, 59, 168, 172, 345–346 Ricoeur, Paul 370 Ringleben, Joachim 266–267, 296, 339, 358, 377 Ritter, Adolf Martin 68, 70, 93, 111, 159 Robinson, James McConkey 49 Roldanus, Johannes 67, 71–72, 79 Ruhstorfer, Karlheinz 143, 160, 181 Rüsen, Jörn 23, 43–44 Russell, Norman 72, 75, 105 Sauter, Gerhard 23, 26 Segal, Alan F. 362 Sellars, John 107–108 Schaede, Stephan 306–309, 311–313, 318–323, 332, 334 Scheliha, Arnulf von 5, 46, 50, 54–55, 168 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph 138, 177, 225, 387 Schillebeeckx, Edward 84, 86, 155, 168, 195, 342, 347, 349, 404 Schleiermacher, Friedrich Daniel Ernst 7–9, 15, 40–41, 49–50, 61, 64, 80, 83, 104, 142–153, 155, 158, 160– 161, 188–189, 201, 204, 216–217, 221–222, 224, 240, 307, 312, 314, 325, 334, 395, 397, 405 Schmid, Heinrich 84, 130–135 Schmidt-Leukel, Perry 10, 154, 330, 355, 396, 398, 400, 402–405, 407 Schönborn, Christoph 88, 154, 161, 164, 310 Schoonenberg, Piet 110, 166, 181, 193, 217, 221–225 Schopenhauer, Arthur 250

458

,QGH[RI1DPHV

Schreiber, Stefan 181 Schröder, Markus 9, 143–144 Schröter, Jens 3, 17, 23, 28, 37, 43–47, 51, 53–59, 170, 299, 301, 305, 315, 322–323, 328–329 Schuele, Andreas 230, 352 Schulte, Raphael 378, 389, 391 Schüßler, Ingeborg 186 Schwarz, Reinhard 117, 121, 125–126 Schwöbel, Christoph 10, 61, 66, 77, 84, 178, 205, 212, 217, 263, 373, 377, 395, 416–418 Slenczka, Notger 17–18, 52, 119, 122– 123, 158, 395 Slenczka, Reinhard 8, 40–41, 49, 143– 144, 151–152 Sobrino, Jon, SJ 160, 168, 175, 241–245 Sölle, Dorothee 286, 299, 314 Souček, Josef B. 316 Spaemann, Robert 84, 239 Stamatović, Slobodan 208 Steiger, Johann Anselm 125–126 Stock, Eberhard 268 Strauss, David Friedrich 15–16, 18, 32, 38, 40, 42, 47, 59, 61, 135–136, 158, 345–348, 397 Swinburne, Richard 340, 342, 358 Taylor, Charles 262 Tertullian 84, 91, 108, 117, 220, 273 Thiede, Werner 158 Thielicke, Helmut 204, 286–287 Theissen, Gerd 21, 37–39, 42–43, 45, 51, 55, 59, 170, 172, 270, 338, 348, 350, 354, 356, 361–362 Theodoret of Cyrus 68, 85, 92, 100, 107–108, 185 Thomas of Aquin 52, 88, 96–97, 104, 116, 155, 157, 177, 187, 194, 208, 252, 256, 270, 380, 383 Thomas, Günter 352, 354–355, 358– 359, 361, 387, 393 Thomasius, Gottfried 135, 139–140, 142 Tietz, Christiane 52 Tillich, Paul 5, 11, 13, 41, 47–48, 119, 158, 201, 209, 264, 273, 374, 380, 395, 404, 406, 409 Tracy, David 20, 22, 53 Tworuschka, Udo 421

Urbina, Ignacio Ortiz de 67, 75, 76 Uthemann, Karl-Heinz 67, 69–74, 81, 83–85, 90, 92–93, 100–108, 110, 115, 117, 222, 360 Volf, Miroslav 370 Wagner, Falk 13, 15–17, 36, 52 Waldenfels, Bernhard 204 Wawrykow, Joseph 104 Weber, Otto 152, 187, 204 Weinandy, Thomas G., OFM Cap. 27, 70, 72, 88, 116, 138, 140, 154–155, 186, 188, 194–195, 197, 200, 289 Welker, Michael 56, 162, 167, 169, 292, 301, 351–352, 355 Welz, Claudia 235 Wendebourg, Dorothea 79, 89 Wenz, Gunther 45, 57, 60–61, 162, 167, 174, 335 Werbick, Jürgen 98, 110, 159, 195–197 Wessel, Claus 111 Weth, Rudolf 271, 299, 301, 305, 309, 312, 322, 327 White, Thomas Joseph 116, 155–157, 194, 273, 360 Whitehead, Alfred North 197–199, 381 Wiedenroth, Ulrich 135 Wigand, Johannes 128 Wilckens, Ulrich 312 Williams, Rowan 413 Winter, Dagmar 21, 45 Wittekind, Folkart 17–18, 50–52 Wolter, Michael 271, 301, 315, 322, 329, 338, 345, 349, 358 Woźniak, Robert J. 18, 62 Wrede, William 37–38 Wright, Nicolas Thomas 169, 339–340, 342, 351, 354–355, 398 Wyrwa, Dietmar 71, 89 Yarbro-Collins, Adela 355–356 Yerkes, James 277–278, 285 Zarnow, Christopher 229 Zizioulas, John D. 77, 84–87, 162, 167, 179–181, 221 Žižek, Slavoj 111

Index of Subjects abduction 24, 353–354 accommodation see God DFKRULVWRV 74, 115, 123 DGLDLUHWRV 74 Alexandria 67–68, 72, 89, 91, 94, 99, 101, 106, 121, 148, 218, 220 DQK\SRVWDVLV see nature Antioch 67–72, 75, 85, 89–93, 99–101, 106, 109, 112, 121, 201, 218, 220, 273, 275, 412 apathy see God apostles 37, 40, 130, 150 appearance 151, 173–174, 261, 280, 285, 340, 343–346, 350–352, 354– 359, 361–364, 390 Arianism 77, 94–95, 161, 181, 191 assimilation see God DV\QFK\WRVV\QFK\VLV 74, 106–108, 164, 248 atonement 18, 118, 152, 167, 206, 301– 305, 309–310, 315, 318, 320–322, 326, 329, 335, 342, 369–370, 398 DWUHSWRV 74–76, 140, 192, 203, 206 body 62, 81–82, 90, 106–107, 115, 123– 125, 129, 131–132, 134, 137, 151, 158, 236, 251–261, 263–266, 269, 283, 289, 303, 323, 339–341, 347, 354–359, 361–362, 370, 398 Bible 6, 48, 155, 204, 321 – New Testament 33, 37–40, 42, 46, 48, 51, 54, 56, 60, 153–156, 162, 166, 170–171, 173, 180–181, 201, 208, 213, 235, 246, 252, 289, 302, 304–305, 315–317, 321–322, 329, 338, 341–344, 347, 349, 359–360, 398, 417 – Old Testament 180–181, 192, 233, 235, 246, 270, 304, 341

– Scripture 5, 40, 42–43, 47–49, 57, 77, 91, 119, 134, 140, 148, 150, 153, 213, 396, 417 biblical V, 5, 36, 38–42, 46–48, 54–58, 62, 64, 86, 88, 91–f93, 119, 134, 142, 148, 159, 162, 168, 170, 174, 180, 192, 206, 210, 212, 215–216, 222, 224, 233, 235–237, 241, 251– 252, 260, 270, 297, 299– 300, 304, 315–316, 320–322, 328, 335, 339, 341, 343, 345, 348–349, 351–352, 354–356, 358, 360, 362, 370, 381, 384, 389, 396–397 Chalcedon 3, 16, 27, 36, 65–165, 167, 178–192, 194–195, 206–207, 212, 216–217, 220, 222–223, 226, 247– 248, 275–276, 282, 287, 294, 296, 305, 333, 384, 387, 396, 398, 403– 405 – neo-Chalcedonism 70, 74, 83, 89, 93, 101, 106, 109–110, 112, 118, 158, 195, 217, 220, 223, 226, 275, 305, 405 Christology passim – from above 167, 194, 224, 405 – from below 118, 141, 155, 159, 167– 168, 195–196, 222, 224, 242, 349, 384, 404–405 – implicit Christology 59 church 4–5, 1114, 16, 20, 26, 33–36, 38, 47, 49–51, 54, 59–60, 62, 68, 71–72, 77, 79, 82, 86–90, 97, 99–100, 105, 109–111, 118–120, 131, 138–139, 142, 144, 147, 150, 152–155, 157, 159, 166, 172–174, 179, 181, 186– 187, 197, 200–201, 203, 206, 209, 217–218, 222, 246, 251–252, 255, 272–274, 287, 295, 300, 303–304,

460

,QGH[RI6XEMHFWV

306, 309, 322–323, 325328, 339, 341, 344–345, 347–349, 351–352, 355, 361, 377–378, 387, 389, 397– 399, 405, 408–410, 414–415, 421 claim 6, 10, 19–29, 50–51, 66, 71, 76– 79, 94, 96, 98–99, 121, 123, 134, 138, 144, 154–157, 163, 177, 228, 241, 290, 308, 316, 330, 339–340, 351, 386, 394–396, 399–400, 407– 408, 412–420 – absolute 31–32, 157, 386, 411, 416– 418 – universal 31–34, 364, 386, 408, 417– 418, 420 FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP see Jesus Christ communication 10, 19–22, 25, 29–30, 35, 62–63, 76, 90, 93, 96–98, 108– 109, 122, 130, 133, 135, 149, 163, 189, 196, 214, 225, 332–333, 335, 366, 402, 416 community 15–16, 26, 34, 38, 49, 55, 106, 150, 173, 209, 213, 232, 277, 280, 285, 302, 320, 323, 325, 334, 344, 349, 354, 366, 399, 414 consciousness 7, 9, 15–16, 18, 20, 41, 46, 51, 53, 64, 139, 143–146, 148, 150–151, 155–156, 161, 201, 217– 219, 228, 241, 245–246, 248, 264, 273, 277–283, 285–286, 311, 325, 348, 395, 401, 404 Constantinople I 65, 68 Constantinople II 70–71, 75, 78–79, 85, 89, 95, 105, 108–110, 126, 134, 188, 194–195, 275–277 Constantinople III 71, 98, 112, 139, 147, 155–156, 196, 217 construction 20, 23, 42–44, 50, 54, 59, 102, 119, 143, 159, 174, 259, 268, 278, 307, 418 creation 4–5, 13, 32, 62, 86, 105–106, 110, 157, 164–165, 167, 180, 185, 195–202, 207–209, 211, 214–215, 218, 224–225, 227, 236–237, 239– 241, 247 252, 254, 256, 259, 263, 266–268, 297, 304, 309, 329–330, 352, 359–360, 363, 365–367, 369, 371, 373, 375, 377–378, 380, 382–

383, 385–389, 391–393, 401, 407, 417 cross see Jesus Christ death 47, 51, 54, 64, 80, 93–96, 114– 115, 123–124, 127–131, 134, 143, 150, 157, 162–163, 166, 168–173, 175–176, 188, 196, 206, 210–211, 214, 233–234, 243–245, 247, 250– 302, 304, 306–309, 312–318, 321– 332, 335, 337, 340, 342–343, 346, 348–349, 351, 359–360, 362–364, 366–371, 384, 390–391, 396, 398, 403, 406–407, 414–415 – relocation of death 269, 297, 330– 331, 368 – total-death theory 252, 256, 259–269 diagnostic rationality 19, 22–24, 27–28, 287, 316, 340, 383, 386, 401 dialogue 6, 155, 178, 185, 217, 386, 394, 400, 408–409, 414–416, 418– 423 divinity see Jesus Christ dogma 10, 14–15, 17, 23, 36, 38–42, 45, 50, 53, 68, 70–72, 77–80, 88–89, 93, 98, 100, 109–111, 128, 130, 142– 152, 154–155, 159, 168, 177, 187, 193, 217, 242, 261, 396, 398–399, 403 dynamic 167, 180, 185–186, 188, 190– 203, 207–210, 214, 221, 239, 295– 296, 337, 365, 377, 380, 382–383, 386–387, 389, 415 Easter 34, 37–39, 42, 48, 51, 54–61, 63– 64, 118, 141, 162, 166, 169–174, 177–178, 190, 195, 265, 270, 290, 313, 316, 326, 329, 336, 339, 343– 345, 347–354, 359–360, 362–364, 390 HNK\SRVWDVLV see nature encounter 21, 33, 47–49, 60, 62–63, 218, 251, 265, 288, 316, 344, 355, 358, 363, 389, 394–395, 405–406, 416–417, 419–421, 423 HQK\SRVWDVLVsee nature enhypostatical inversion 222, 224, 226, 228, 240

,QGH[RI6XEMHFWV Enlightenment 5, 15, 17–18, 20–21, 33, 36, 46, 51–52, 59, 66, 84, 104, 107, 111, 116–117, 139, 142, 172, 188– 189, 220, 228, 236, 304, 307, 309, 311, 395, 405, 408, 412, 416 Ephesus 27, 65, 37–71, 76, 89, 94, 100, 110, 154–155 eschatology 19, 29, 31–32, 64, 143, 154, 162, 167, 174, 176, 223, 230–231, 245, 251–257, 259–261, 264, 267, 292, 316–317, 320, 329–332, 334, 342, 344, 347–348, 351–354, 360, 362–367, 369, 372, 389–382, 385, 387, 389, 391, 398, 401, 411 eternity 88, 124, 126, 167, 176, 178, 185, 188, 196, 203, 208, 263–264, 277, 293, 297, 328, 361, 363, 367, 371–393, 406, 411 ethics 210, 304, 373, 395 eucharist 63, 86, 119, 123, 128, 303, 334 exclusivism 394, 402, 409, 414–415, 419 fact 8–9, 16, 22–24, 27, 30, 32, 34, 39, 42–45, 47, 49, 51, 53–58, 60, 78, 80–83, 92, 115, 153, 161–162, 166, 170–171, 195, 216, 222, 224, 232, 243, 245, 257–258, 265, 268, 270– 271, 299, 304, 326, 329, 341, 346, 348, 350–353, 355, 361, 364, 366– 367, 385, 402 faith V, 3–5, 7–12, 15, 17–19, 26–27, 30–36, 38–42, 46–53, 55–67, 79–80, 83, 94, 98–99, 102, 104, 111, 113, 122, 126, 130, 141–144, 147, 149– 151, 154–159, 162, 166–178, 180, 182, 185, 187–188, 190, 196, 200, 204, 206, 210, 214–216, 221–222, 224, 229–231, 240, 242–243, 245, 253, 257, 273, 278, 280, 282, 285– 287, 290, 299–301, 311–312, 314– 317, 326–329, 334–340, 343–351, 354–356, 358–359, 362–366, 376– 377, 384–385, 390–391, 394–397, 399–400, 402–404, 406–407, 409, 413–415, 417–423 Father see Trinity

461

fiction 38, 44, 77, 103, 168, 348, 356, 361 ILQLWXPFDSD[QRQFDSD[LQILQLWL 6, 136, 140–141, 196, 402 fire 95, 106–107, 129, 132, 269 formula of interchange 100, 121, 306, 310, 324 future 31, 44, 53, 65, 143, 157, 167, 198, 200, 228, 245, 256, 260–261, 269, 301, 311, 313, 316–317, 325, 327–328, 330, 332 God passim – accommodation 103, 128, 164, 185– 217, 219, 221, 225, 234, 246 –247, 295–296, 333, 386, 390, 422–423, 426 – apathy 93–95, 124, 126, 133–134, 156, 178–179, 185–187, 190, 244, 276, 296, 376, 381, 386 – assimilation 23, 157, 213–214, 420, 423 – GHXV 14, 33, 61, 72, 87, 118, 140, 142, 152, 161, 177, 187, 189, 208, 256, 262, 282, 291, 297, 304, 308– 309, 314, 326, 334, 384, 414 – condescendence 118, 154–155, 157, 204, 206 – grace 144, 156–157, 208–209, 212, 235, 245, 252, 254, 257–259, 267– 268, 317 – immutability 75–76, 95, 98, 101, 107, 130, 133–134, 139–141, 152, 156, 178, 185–195, 197–198, 203– 204, 206–208, 211, 214, 225, 248, 269, 273, 276, 287, 294–296, 374, 376, 382, 286 – NHQRVLV 76, 128, 135–142, 149, 154– 155, 160, 163–164, 188–189, 191, 195–196, 205–207, 210, 219, 225, 279, 294, 386–387, 399 – SOHURVLV 164, 205, 208, 219, 279, 386 – revelation 5–6, 9–13, 16–17, 20, 40, 47–48, 61–62, 120, 154–157, 162, 172, 177, 179, 185, 195, 202, 219, 223–224, 243, 266, 270, 282, 285, 333, 350, 358, 397, 400, 402–404, 407, 410–413, 418

462

,QGH[RI6XEMHFWV

Gospel 13–14, 37–40, 42–47, 49–51, 54–56, 58, 61, 64, 99, 156, 160, 168–171, 224, 240–241, 253, 270, 273, 286, 326, 333–334, 338–339, 343, 346, 350, 354–355, 361, 363, 396–397, 405, 420 hermeneutics 20, 30, 60–61, 64, 110, 116, 122, 155–156, 169, 171, 174, 177, 204, 210, 315, 338–343, 353, 360, 364, 405, 411 history 4–6, 14, 16, 18, 22, 24, 28–29, 36, 38, 40–41, 43–47, 49–51, 54, 57, 60, 66–38, 70, 79, 87–89, 98, 118, 139, 144, 149, 160, 163, 167, 174, 176, 179, 185, 188–189, 191, 197, 200, 210, 216, 223, 228, 232, 234– 235, 242–245, 247, 261, 268–269, 272, 276, 280, 282, 285, 291, 296, 312–314, 316–319, 325, 329–332, 335–336, 339, 346, 348, 350–354, 360–362, 366–367, 369–370, 372– 373, 377, 381, 384–385, 387–390, 392, 401, 406–407, 410–411, 413– 415, 425 humanity see Jesus Christ humankind 150–151, 164, 178, 186, 188, 273, 307, 314, 320, 345, 388, 391, 397, 411 K\SRVWDVLV 72–76, 80–87, 90–91, 94, 97, 100–110, 112–114, 147–148, 160, 180–181, 193–195, 198, 220–224, 228, 245, 275, 305 identity 64, 79–80, 122, 127, 141, 146, 178–179, 186, 190, 195–196, 200, 202–203, 206, 208–209, 214, 216, 226, 228–234, 237, 239, 241, 244, 246, 251–253, 256–258, 261, 263– 267, 271, 277, 279, 281, 289–290, 294–296, 307, 318, 319, 330, 334, 353, 357–358, 360, 362–363, 366– 371, 388, 391, 411–412, 416, 419, 422–423 LPDJR'HL 164, 212, 216, 235–239, 346–247, 386, 389 immortality 94, 99, 124, 131, 134, 137, 145, 224, 233–234, 236–237, 251– 269, 275, 294, 330, 358

immutability see God impulse 51, 95, 173–175, 198, 214, 225, 272, 341, 344, 348–349, 356, 359, 364, 394 incarnation see Jesus Christ inclusivism 402, 409–415, 419 individuality 25, 83, 203, 227, 234, 238, 261, 277, 319, 324, 368, 369–370 intercession 381 interchange see formula of interchange internal realism 19, 23, 28–29, 176, 185, 364, 385, 401 iron 94, 106–107, 129, 132 Jesus Christ passim – Christus praesens 60–63, 144, 316 – FRPPXQLFDWLRLGLRPDWXP 76, 80, 89– 99, 108, 112–114, 122–130, 132– 133, 135–137, 141–142, 149, 160, 163–164, 189, 194–196, 212, 247, 274, 276, 310 – cross 33, 47–48, 54, 81, 91, 93, 115, 118, 120–121, 123, 125, 134, 137, 162, 168–169, 172–173, 175, 177, 181–182, 190, 196, 204, 209–211, 213, 243–245, 258–259, 269–273, 275, 277, 288, 290–294, 299–337, 339, 342, 346–347, 353–354, 365, 369–370, 381, 390–392 – crucifixion 265, 270, 343, 346, 351, 353, 356, 358, 360, 365–366 – divinity 3–4, 12, 14–15, 33, 41, 51, 63, 65–68, 72, 75–76, 80–81, 85–86, 88, 91–96, 98–101, 105–107, 109– 110, 112–128, 131, 133–134, 136– 143, 145–153, 156–157, 160–164, 167–168, 177, 179–181, 185–196, 200–201, 203–208, 210–226, 237– 238, 240, 242, 247–249, 255–256, 265, 268–269, 273–276, 279, 283– 284, 289, 292, 294–296, 306, 309, 378, 384–385, 394, 397, 402, 405, 407–408, 412, 417 – earthly Jesus 7–8, 45–46, 54–55, 57– 61, 128, 135, 142–143, 148, 150, 161–163, 166–167, 170, 175, 190, 216, 219, 223, 246–247, 348, 356, 358, 360, 367, 372, 384, 389, 391, 406

,QGH[RI6XEMHFWV – exclusive vicarious representation 305–337 – JHQXV 87, 124, 128–130, 132–134, 136, 138, 149, 160, 311 – KHQRVLV 106–107 – historical Jesus 21, 23–24, 36–60, 138, 143–144, 148, 152, 156, 168, 170, 172, 175, 241–242, 270, 338, 354, 356, 361–362, 407 – KRPR 72, 76, 87, 97, 105, 116, 118, 121, 127, 140, 142, 152, 161, 187, 189–190, 221, 226–249, 256, 273, 282, 284, 197, 304, 308– 309, 314, 334, 384 – KRPRRXVLRV 82, 140, 161, 191, 412 – humanity 3–4, 47–48, 61–63, 65–68, 72, 75–76, 80–82, 85–88, 91–93, 95– 96, 99–100, 103–107, 109–110, 112– 118, 120–121, 123–131, 133–143, 145–153, 156–157, 159–165, 167– 168, 177, 179–181, 188–191, 193– 197, 200–203, 207, 211–214, 216– 229, 234–236, 238–243, 246–249, 255, 268, 273–274, 276, 281–287, 289, 294, 296–297, 306, 309–310, 313–314, 324, 335, 366–367, 378, 385–386, 389–391, 394, 403, 405, 423 – hypostatic union 76, 92, 106, 110, 117, 123, 136, 143, 148, 221–222, 247–248, 274, 310 – incarnation 13, 16, 33, 36, 51, 59, 63–66, 74, 76, 78–79, 81, 83, 86–88, 94–96, 101–103, 105, 113–115, 117– 118, 120–121, 125, 128–131, 134– 137, 139–141, 148, 150, 152–153, 155, 157–159, 162–163, 167, 175– 177, 179, 181, 185–189, 191–194, 196–197, 200–201, 203–204, 206, 209–212, 214, 216–249, 258, 266, 273, 275, 277–280, 286–287, 295, 300, 305, 308, 310, 312, 324, 333, 336, 340, 342, 347, 360, 366, 377– 378, 388, 392, 395–400, 403, 405, 412, 417 – inclusive vicarious representation 305–337 – preexistence 167, 175–176, 185, 189 – quests for the historical Jesus 37–53

463

– resurrection 4, 33, 36, 48, 51, 58–60, 64, 66, 80, 128, 134, 150, 157, 162– 163, 166–176, 185, 190, 204, 209– 210, 213, 216, 225, 230, 234, 244– 245, 247, 251–256, 258–261, 263– 267, 269–272, 283, 285–286, 289– 291, 293, 296–298, 316–317, 319, 324, 328–333, 335, 337–371, 381, 384–385, 387, 390–393, 398, 403– 404, 406, 410 – VWDWXV 128, 134–135, 137, 139, 141, 152–153, 334 – tomb 339–340, 343, 346, 351, 354– 359, 361–364, 404 – vicarious representation 270, 299– 337, 391  NHQRVLV see God Last Judgement 230, 250, 258, 266–267, 332, 335–336, 363, 367, 369–371 liberal theology 4–7, 10, 13, 15, 18, 22, 25, 27, 32–33, 36, 38–42, 44, 46–52, 55–56, 58–59, 61–62, 66, 71, 106, 111, 119, 122–123, 126, 141, 144, 146, 150, 152, 155, 159, 168, 172, 188, 229, 242, 247, 273, 301, 315, 326, 349–350, 395–397, 403, 405 liberation theology 105, 117, 160, 168, 241–245, 250 life 3–4, 6, 8–9, 13, 15, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 36–41, 46–49, 53, 58–61, 64, 106, 114–116, 118–120, 135, 140, 143, 147, 150–153, 156, 161–163, 166–172, 175–176, 185, 190–193, 195–196, 199, 201–202, 206–211, 215–216, 219, 223, 226, 228–229, 231, 233–234, 236–237, 239, 241– 243, 245, 247, 250–251, 255–256, 258–272, 278, 280–283, 289–290, 292, 295–299, 306–307, 311–312, 317–320, 328, 330–337, 342, 346, 349, 353–354, 357–358, 360–362, 364–371, 374, 377–380, 382, 384– 393, 395–401, 403, 406–407, 410– 411, 414–415 memory 24, 56, 70, 256, 263–264, 267, 370, 375, 406

464

,QGH[RI6XEMHFWV

miaphysitism 79, 90 modernity 20, 24, 159, 262 monophysitism 68, 73–75, 79, 82, 88, 90, 93–94, 98–99, 101, 106, 109, 112, 127, 189, 218, 275 moral 22, 30, 41, 47, 49, 67, 158, 256, 248, 272, 291, 311, 395 name 31, 33, 79, 113, 134, 156, 167, 186, 192, 198, 203, 231–234, 246, 254, 269, 273, 279, 291, 296, 303, 307, 310, 313, 360, 367–368, 390– 391 – proper 186, 231–234, 269, 360, 367– 368, 390–391 nature 6, 16–17, 19–20, 22–23, 28–29, 32, 36, 42, 48, 63–64, 68–69, 72–85, 88–100, 102–110, 112–117, 120– 122, 124–142, 145–150, 153–154, 156–157, 160, 162–164, 167, 186, 189, 191, 194–195, 197–201, 214, 217, 220–225, 235, 243–244, 248, 253–255, 261, 273–277, 279, 282– 283, 285–287, 291–295, 300, 305– 307, 309–310, 323–325, 352, 355, 357, 360, 366, 369, 373, 382–383, 399–400, 403–405 – accidents 97, 102–104, 156 – DQK\SRVWDVLV103, 131, 139, 149, 220, 223, 305 – HNK\SRVWDVLV 193–219, 221–222 – HQK\SRVWDVLV 73, 76, 89, 93, 99–110, 112, 114, 116–117, 123, 130–135, 143, 148, 153, 159–160, 163–164, 193–195, 211–212, 217–226, 240, 246, 296, 300, 305, 309–310, 314 – NUDVLV 107–108, 112 – PLDSK\VLV formula 69, 73, 75, 78, 81, 89, 94, 99, 109, 274–275 – mixture / PL[LV 68, 94, 107–108, 113, 127, 129, 134, 139, 163, 206, 240 – SDUDWKHVLV 107 – SK\VLV 73, 75, 80–83, 85, 87, 103, 110, 147, 198, 314–315, 324 – properties 91–92, 96–97, 102, 107– 108, 112–114, 122, 125, 128–130, 132–133, 232

– two-natures doctrine 16–17, 36, 77, 89, 109, 121, 130, 138, 141, 145, 147, 153, 217, 193 neo-Chalcedonism see Chalcedon Nicea 65–66, 71, 77, 154, 178, 384, 396, 405  ontology 180, 185, 203, 205, 208–209, 212, 215, 217–218, 221, 227–228, 233–235, 245, 248, 250, 254, 258, 269, 278, 288, 296, 304, 318, 320, 324, 328, 331, 333, 335, 337, 353, 360, 362, 364, 366–369, 372, 374, 376, 383, 385–387, 390–391, 397, 409, 412 organism 145–146, 148, 150–151, 213 particularity 10, 19–21, 30–33, 61, 88, 196, 231, 277, 279, 314, 324, 340, 371–372, 395, 412–413, 416–417, 419 past 31, 43–44, 50, 56, 79, 96, 228, 256, 267, 286, 316, 325, 328, 330, 354, 358, 362, 365, 370, 373–375, 377– 378, 380, 387 patripassianism 76, 95, 293 SHULFKRUHVLV see Trinity SHUVRQD 74, 84–85, 90, 97, 119, 129, 142, 253, 303, 401 personality 39–40, 46–47, 49, 82–84, 104–105, 139, 144–145, 147–149, 151–152, 171, 220–223, 226–231, 233–234, 237, 239–241, 245–246, 314, 332, 334, 366, 370 perspective 3–7, 9–11, 16, 18–35, 37– 39, 42–44, 46, 51–6, 70–73, 78, 80, 82, 85, 88–89, 97, 101, 105, 109– 110, 116–118, 123, 129, 137, 153– 157, 161–163, 165–178, 185, 189– 190, 200, 204, 210, 216–217, 221, 228, 230–231, 235, 237–238, 244– 245, 262, 270–272, 278, 290, 296, 313, 329, 331, 333–336, 338–341, 343, 348–349, 354, 362–365, 368, 372, 375, 380, 383–386, 388, 390– 392, 394, 400–402, 405, 407–409, 412, 414, 416–423 perspectivity 28–30, 35, 62, 340, 365, 400

,QGH[RI6XEMHFWV SK\VLV see nature picture V, 13, 17, 20, 30, 39–41, 44–53, 56, 60, 62, 67, 70, 92, 109–110, 113, 117–118, 134, 143–144, 151, 157– 158, 173–174, 187, 189, 195, 221, 225–226, 242–243, 247, 269, 280, 295, 308–309, 315, 349, 369, 374, 380–381, 401, 119 pluralism 10, 27, 30, 32–33, 78, 154, 325, 347, 394–396, 399–404, 407– 422 plurality 10, 19–23, 25, 27, 30–32, 34, 39, 43, 45–46, 52, 57–60, 63, 156, 176, 332, 372, 385, 388, 394–397, 404, 409, 414–416 pneumatology 18, 207, 280, 286, 325– 326, 333, 417 postmodernity 20, 22, 24, 416, 421–422 prayer 115, 310, 422 presence 15, 39, 62–63, 68, 86, 120, 135, 146, 151, 157, 163–165, 173, 187, 196, 201, 204, 208, 214, 224, 237–239, 242–243, 247, 249, 267, 282, 303, 319, 348, 353, 360, 363– 364, 366, 374, 378, 380, 386, 389, 392, 397–401, 403–404, 410, 423 present time 228, 231, 301, 316, 327, 366, 373–375, 377–379, 387–389 principle 7, 9, 15, 18–19, 23, 27, 36, 40, 44, 61, 82, 85, 100, 106–107, 109– 110, 118–119, 121, 131, 145–148, 151–152, 157–158, 168, 180, 199, 201, 216, 221, 225, 243, 266, 373, 376, 408, 416 process theism / theology 168, 188, 197–203, 214, 227, 381–383, 388 proclamation 37, 39, 60, 62–63, 144, 147, 170–171, 173–174, 215, 291, 306–307, 316, 326, 343–346, 348, 351–352, 363–364, 366, 384, 390, 421 projection 18, 39, 52–53, 59, 172, 231, 286, 347, 395 SURVRSRQ 72, 80–85, 87, 106, 147, 220, 222, 228 quests for the historical Jesus see Jesus Christ

465

reality 3, 6, 13, 19–20, 23, 25, 29–31, 51, 53, 57, 60, 64, 66, 71, 80–82, 95, 102 ,105, 121–122, 135, 143, 156– 157, 166–167, 170, 179, 189, 195, 197–199, 201–202, 206, 209, 224, 228, 238, 241–245, 248, 257, 262, 271, 277–278, 287, 326–327, 329– 330, 334–336, 338–339, 342–352, 354, 358, 360–362, 364–365, 367, 372, 375, 379, 381–388, 396–397, 399–402, 404, 406, 410, 412, 420 reconciliation 31, 34, 270, 280–281, 283–285, 326, 335–336, 370 religion 5–6, 8–12, 14, 17–18, 20, 22– 24, 28, 32–34, 36–37, 40–41, 44, 48–49, 51–53, 78, 123, 141, 143, 158, 172, 179, 197, 204, 223, 229, 236, 247, 257, 271–272, 277–281, 286, 305, 311, 332, 373, 394–397, 400–404, 407–423 religiosity 6, 13, 18, 52 representation (exclusive and inclusive) see Jesus Christ resurrection see Jesus Christ revelation see God sacrifice 47, 96, 244, 251, 259, 270, 273, 286, 299–304, 306–308, 310, 312, 315, 318, 321–322, 324, 326– 327, 329–331, 342, 369 salvation 4, 18, 32, 53, 76, 88, 100, 105–106, 109, 116–117, 121, 132, 134, 136, 150, 157, 159, 162, 179, 190, 196, 223, 235, 238, 243–244, 250–251, 258, 265, 269–271, 299– 300, 308–309, 311, 316, 319–321, 323–328, 331–333, 335–337, 362, 368–370, 376, 380, 388, 391, 395– 396, 398, 400, 402–403, 406–409, 412–413, 415, 418 VDU[ 86, 103, 106, 148, 150, 222, 297 satisfaction 116, 118, 120, 134, 136– 137, 178, 304, 306–312, 314, 323, 327, 330, 342 Scripture see Bible self-consciousness 7, 15–16, 18, 46, 51, 139, 143–144, 146, 151, 155–156, 161, 217–219, 228, 241246, 248, 273, 277–280, 284–285

466

,QGH[RI6XEMHFWV

semiotics 19, 24–28 simultaneousness 344, 373, 375, 380, 388–389, 392 sin 88, 117–118, 120, 130–131, 136, 145, 156, 168, 213–215, 222, 224, 228, 231, 243, 250, 258, 262, 268, 269–270, 283, 296–297, 300–304, 308–318, 324–325, 327–332, 334, 354, 365, 369–370, 385, 388–390, 400, 403 sociality 25, 227, 234, 237–238, 260, 311, 368–370 Son see Trinity soteriology 4, 8, 63, 88, 92, 105, 117, 119, 125–126, 129, 134, 137, 152, 164, 167, 176, 215, 222, 243–244, 250, 255–256, 265, 267–268, 297, 299–301, 304–308, 310, 316–317, 319–321, 323–324, 327, 331–332, 336, 338, 342, 357, 367, 407, 413 soul 49, 81, 104, 106–107, 124–125, 129, 131–132, 134, 140, 146, 148, 150, 230, 236–237, 251–269, 277, 283, 289, 295, 342, 358–359, 362, 376 sources 15, 39, 43–44, 46–47, 53–56, 58, 81, 118, 188, 220, 229, 241, 270, 299, 343, 356, 362, 405 space 18, 22, 30, 41, 49, 63, 67–68, 70, 7485, 87, 105, 138, 140, 144, 167, 187, 189–192, 198, 206, 208, 212, 220–223, 233, 238–239, 241, 246– 247, 266, 269, 292, 297, 310, 320, 324–325, 331, 333, 335, 351, 361– 362, 367–368, 373, 377, 379, 385, 388–389, 392, 411–412, 414, 417, 423 Spirit see Trinity subjectivity 15, 18, 33, 41, 110, 122, 158, 178, 195, 117–118, 236, 277– 278, 280, 307, 349–350, 372 sweet exchange / DGPLUDELOHFRPPHUFL XP 96, 125–126, 306, 310, 318, 320  theopaschitism 93–96, 118, 275, 288, 292 WKHRVLV 76, 86, 100, 105–108, 110, 112, 115, 123, 137, 163–164, 189, 207, 221, 225, 239, 300, 310

Thomism 116, 155–157, 194, 252, 297 time 14, 19–20, 27, 31, 38, 40–44, 50, 66, 142, 176, 178, 185, 193, 196, 203, 227, 233, 251, 261, 264, 297, 306, 316, 318, 320, 351, 361–363, 365–367, 372–393, 395, 412 Trinity 14–15, 17, 12, 14, 20, 63, 65– 66, 74, 77, 80–87, 91, 93–95, 100– 101, 106, 114, 118, 141–143, 146– 148, 151, 154, 160–161, 164, 167, 175, 177–182, 185, 187–188, 190, 200–203, 205, 208, 210–212, 214, 217–223, 225, 228, 240, 242, 244, 246, 270, 274–276, 278, 281, 285, 288–289, 291–296, 300, 305, 308, 321, 325, 328, 331–333, 336–337, 354, 360, 365–366, 376–379, 381, 383–392, 399–400, 403–405, 409– 413, 415, 417–418, 420, 422–423 – economic Trinity 136, 142, 156, 178–179, 191, 202, 211, 294, 296, 377 – Father 13, 49, 65, 82, 85–87, 94, 115, 118, 120, 140–141, 144, 157, 180–181, 191, 193, 202, 208–210, 218, 225, 240–241, 245–246, 248, 259, 266, 273, 289, 291–294, 296, 303, 312–313, 325, 360, 366–367, 378–389, 391–392, 140, 412 – immanent Trinity 62, 136, 142, 156, 178–179, 191, 199, 202, 211, 294, 296, 377, 386, 404 – RLNRQRPLD 83, 95 – patrocentrism 85–86, 180, 208, 225 – SHULFKRUHVLV 90, 92, 95, 102, 107– 108, 111–115, 202, 208–209, 366, 386, 388, 392 – Son 7, 13–15, 33, 36, 37, 51, 51, 58– 59, 64, 73, 78, 83, 86–87, 91, 93–95, 99–100, 102, 104, 106, 113, 118, 123, 125–126, 130, 136, 140–142, 153–154, 163, 168–170, 175, 181– 182, 185–186, 187, 189–191, 196, 202, 204, 206, 209–211, 217–219, 221–222, 225, 235, 240–243, 246, 274, 281–282, 289–294, 296, 305, 317, 325–326, 339, 342, 360, 366, 376–378, 387–389, 391–392, 397– 399, 410, 412

,QGH[RI6XEMHFWV – Spirit 5, 11, 15, 34, 39–40, 46, 62– 63, 74, 81, 86–87, 104, 115, 117, 124, 131, 136, 145, 151, 159, 161, 165, 173, 181, 187, 191–192, 196, 202, 208–210, 213–215, 223–225, 236, 241–242, 249, 253, 255–256, 259–260, 263–264, 277–286, 291– 292, 294, 303–304, 312, 325, 331, 333, 335, 346, 348, 354, 358–360, 362–364, 366, 373, 375, 378, 381, 388–389, 391–393, 396–400, 403– 404, 406–408, 410–411, 414–415, 421 – WKHRORJLD 83, 95, 133 tomb see Jesus Christ truth 6, 10–11, 19, 21–23, 25, 27–30, 32, 42–43, 55, 71, 77, 94, 117, 140, 154–157, 186, 189, 229, 232, 243, 280–282, 285, 287, 292, 319, 326, 342, 351–354, 366, 376, 396, 399, 401, 405, 407, 409, 411–414, 416– 418, 420 unity 4, 15–16, 19, 21, 26, 31, 34, 38, 46, 49, 62, 67–68, 72–81, 85, 87–

467

100, 102, 105–107, 109–110, 112– 117, 120–132, 134–136, 139–143, 145–151, 153–154, 159, 161–164, 166–167, 173, 180–181, 185, 188– 189, 191, 194–196, 201–203, 207– 209, 211–213, 216–218, 220–222, 225–226, 228, 231–232, 234, 239– 241, 247–248, 252–256, 259, 264, 274–282, 284–286, 289, 291, 293, 295, 302, 317, 320, 323, 325, 331– 332, 334, 336–337, 344, 349, 354, 366, 378, 385, 387, 390–392, 399, 410, 413–415, 418 universality 10, 32, 88, 159, 277, 280– 281, 285–286, 314, 319–320, 337, 372, 404, 415–417 vicarious representation see Jesus Christ vision 157, 172–174, 197, 343–345, 347–351, 355, 358, 362–363 water 106–108, 116 wine 106–108, 217, 226, 303 worship 61, 74, 90, 213, 220, 402, 407, 422