The Oxford Handbook of U.S. Judicial Behavior 9780199579891, 019957989X

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T h e Ox f o r d H a n d b o o k o f

U. S . J U DIC IA L B E HAV IOR

The Oxford Handbooks of

AMERICAN POLITICS General Editor: George C. Edwards III

The Oxford Handbooks of American Politics is a set of reference books ­offering authoritative and engaging critical overviews of the state of scholarship on American politics. Each volume focuses on a particular aspect of the field. The project is under the General Editorship of George C. Edwards III, and distinguished specialists in their respective fields edit each volume. The Handbooks aim not just to report on the discipline, but also to shape it as scholars critically assess the current state of scholarship on a topic and propose directions in which it needs to move. The series is an indispensable reference for anyone working in American politics.

The Oxford Handbook of

U.S. JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR Edited by

LEE EPSTEIN and

STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST

1

3 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, ox2 6dp, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © Oxford University Press 2017 First Edition published in 2017 The moral rights of the authors‌have been asserted Impression: 1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2016961438 ISBN 978–​0–​19–​957989–​1 Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

In Memory of the Incomparable Harold J. Spaeth In Memory of Scholar, Mentor and Friend Don Songer

Preface

Some Thoughts on the Future of the Study of Judicial Behavior With its origins in the works of C. Herman Pritchett in the 1940s and Walter F. Murphy, Glendon Schubert, Harold J. Spaeth, and S. Sidney Ulmer (among others) in the 1950s and 1960s, the study of judicial behavior is now an established field in political science and, increasingly in law, history, sociology, psychology, and economics. Written by leading scholars, the chapters in this volume show off the interdisciplinary nature of the factors and institutional dynamic(s) that shape the choices judges make. We hope they offer useful roadmaps to those who are new to the field, and that they provide veteran scholars with ideas for fruitful directions for future research. So too, although the chapters focus exclusively on state and federal American courts, they illuminate theories and perspectives on judicial behavior and provide insights that might assist or inspire comparative research outside the United States. In short, we hope that these chapters push along study in this area by illustrating where we have been and where our scholarly travels might take us. We have divided the Handbook into five parts. Part 1 focuses on the critical issue of staffing the courts. In her chapter on federal judicial appointments in the lower federal courts, Nancy Scherer explores the changing dynamics and forces that have affected the nomination and confirmation process over time. Chapter 2 shifts to the U.S. Supreme Court. Christine Nemacheck explains the strategies that presidents have used to secure their preferred appointments—​including how they anticipate and manage the preferences of senators who must confirm the presidents’ choices. James Gibson and Michael Nelson move us from the federal bench to state judges, many of whom must be elected and re-​elected to retain their jobs. Gibson and Nelson describe and explain how institutional, electoral, and behavioral factors in the context of judicial elections affect the nature of decisions those state court judges make. Once appointed or elected, judges must make decisions about when to step down (unless, of course, they are forced to do so because of an electoral defeat, impeachment, illness, or death). In his comprehensive chapter on the factors that affect federal judges’ decisions to depart or retire from the bench, Albert Yoon reviews the literature

viii   Preface and presents data demonstrating the effect of personal and institutional factors on federal judges’ decisions to leave active status. Judges are not the only court personnel who influence legal outcomes; judges’ law clerks also have the potential to shape judicial decisions through the process of advising their judges. Artemus Ward’s essay reviews the key decision-​making stages in which clerks participate, concluding ultimately that while clerks exercise some influence, it is more modest than we might think. Part 2 includes four chapters that address the process of appellate review, with emphasis on access to courts and oral argument. Christina Boyd’s chapter on access to trial courts highlights the complex dynamics associated with case filings, settlements, and plea bargains—​and the influence of parties and lawyers on these key stages in the litigation process. Losers in the trial courts may appeal to an appellate court, though such an appeal does not guarantee that the higher court will grant full review of the lower court judgment. Donald Songer and Susan Haire’s chapter on access to intermediate appellate courts explores the calculations made by litigants in deciding whether to appeal, as well as the influence of jurisdictional constraints and other factors on the likelihood and scope of appellate review. Next, Ryan Owens and Joe Sieja take up the process of case selection in the U.S. Supreme Court, focusing on four possible explanations of why the justices grant or deny review. Timothy Johnson explores procedures that govern the litigation process, from trial to appellate review, with a particular focus on variations in procedures across appellate courts. He also explores how oral arguments have the potential to affect case outcomes in the U.S. Supreme Court. Finally, Pam Corley’s chapter on opinion writing in the U.S. Supreme Court highlights how bargaining between the justices over opinion content—​in combination with the options available to the justices in concurring, dissenting, or joining the majority—​ultimately affects the nature of legal rules and holdings. Chapters in Part 3 take up the core question: How do judges make decisions and what influences their votes? The first two chapters focus on the influence of law and precedent on the outcome of cases. For the sake of efficiency and predictability lower courts are expected to follow the legal principles and interpretations articulated by courts higher in the appellate hierarchy. Thomas Hansford’s chapter explores the influence of top-​down stare decisis, as well as the potential for bottom-​up influences on judicial policy-​making. David Klein also stresses the influence of law and legal doctrine on court decision-​ making—​an area that has been particularly challenging for social scientists who seek to distinguish between the effects of legalistic versus more political factors. Professor Klein suggests a new strategy for meeting that challenge. Judges may also be strategic as they shape judicial policy in anticipation of reactions from political actors who have the potential to constrain the courts through budgetary and other oversight processes. Chad Westerland’s chapter reviews the literature on the U.S. system of separated powers, with emphasis on how it may create an institutional context that causes judges to act strategically under particular circumstances. Tom Clark’s chapter is related. He explores both normative and empirical theories of judicial review in U.S. courts, noting the implications for non-​U.S. courts as judicial review has become prevalent in many other countries.

Preface   ix Part 3 also includes chapters that consider how judges’ personal and policy preferences, along with their background experiences and characteristics, influence the way they resolve the cases brought before them. As Tracey George and Taylor Weaver explain, judges bring their own personal and background attributes to the bench; in fact, they are often selected on the basis of those background characteristics. George and Weaver assess theories that seek to explain judicial decisions on the basis of judges’ attributes and experiences. Judges’ ideological attitudes are among those key characteristics. In their chapter on partisanship and decision-​making, Jeffrey Segal and Justine D’Elia-​Kueper consider how partisanship—​either as a proxy for ideology or as a group affiliation—​influences judicial decision-​making, and whether the Supreme Court’s decisions reflect party polarization. Lee Epstein and Jack Knight conclude this section with a chapter exploring the economic analysis of judicial behavior that posits judges as rational actors motivated by preferences for multiple goals, including leisure time and policy outcomes. Epstein and Knight apply this approach to help explain judicial behavior in a number of different contexts. Part 4 shifts our attention to external forces and parties that operate to shape the context in which judges reach their decisions, as well as the effect of their decisions. Although we often think about judges’ decisions as having an impact on the public by shaping the rule of law, Lawrence Baum points out that judges are influenced by their audiences, including the elites with whom Supreme Court justices, in particular, interact in Washington D.C. Interest groups, so influential in legislative and executive decision-​making, also play a vital role in the litigation process, as Jared Perkins and Paul Collins’ chapter reminds us. They explain how interest groups, as parties or amicus curiae, can influence case outcomes. Thomas Keck’s chapter explores how the courts interact with another key institutional partner: the legislature. Professor Keck demonstrates that although several theories provide leverage on understanding the relationship between U.S. courts and legislatures, an “interbranch” perspective may be the most promising for future scholarship. Similarly, the executive branch has a significant stake in judges’ decisions, with its own administrative agencies and lawyers frequent participants in litigation. Jeffrey Yates and Scott Boddery explain how court decisions have shaped the power of the president; and how the president, in turn, has altered court outcomes through appointments and legal arguments made by the Solicitor General. The general public also constitutes a key constituency. Americans’ reactions to court decisions can determine the likelihood of compliance and, ultimately, the strength of the rule of law. Rorie Solberg’s chapter explains, first, how the media presents court decisions to the public and second, how media coverage may affect the courts’ institutional legitimacy. As for public opinion more generally, Joseph Ura and Alison Higgins analyze the reciprocal relationship between court decisions and public opinion, with each influencing the other in the formation of public policy. Part 4 concludes with Matthew Hall’s discussion of judicial impact. As institutions that lack the power of the purse (appropriation) or the sword (enforcement authority), U.S. courts are formally weak institutions relative to the legislature and executive. Hall addresses the conceptual ambiguity associated with the term “impact,” and

x   Preface identifies conditions under which the relevant actors will follow and enforce judicial policies. This book concludes with three chapters in Part 5 that address methodological issues and approaches in the study of judicial behavior in U.S. courts. Eileen Braman does double duty, exploring both various theoretical approaches from social psychology and behavioral economics and experiments that scholars have used to assess them. Daniel Ho and Michael Morse revisit how we calculate the justices’ ideal points. They argue for the inclusion of more nuanced jurisprudential data that recent advancements in the automation of data collection will allow us to collect. Finally, Sarah Benesh reflects upon the influence and impact of Harold J. Spaeth et al.’s widely used U.S. Supreme Court Database; she also offers insights on how scholars can most effectively deploy it to study the justices’ decisions. As you can probably tell by now, all our authors offer exciting opportunities for research in their particular bailiwick. Again, whether you are new to the field or a veteran court scholar, we urge you to consider their ideas; pursuing any one of them could lead to important breakthroughs. Here we want to conclude by emphasizing a few broader avenues for future research—​ some on theory and others on design, data, and methods. Beginning with theory, we have two suggestions. The first centers on the way that scholars have long framed their studies of judicial behavior: as a veritable competition between “law versus politics” or among the “attitudinal model” versus the “legal model” versus “strategic accounts.” Although we too have run these races in our work (e.g., George and Epstein 1992; Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2004), we now think they are unproductive (live and learn!) and should be abandoned. We suggest supplanting the competing model/​ division approach with a more encompassing and realistic judicial utility function. Baum (1997, 2006), Epstein and Knight (2013), and Epstein, Landes, and Posner (2013) all gesture in this direction. In different ways, they contend that we should take seriously not only the the political scientists’ emphasis on ideology and the law community’s interest in legalism but also the importance of personal motivations for judicial choice—​including job satisfaction, external satisfactions, leisure, income, and promotion, among others. Actually, we’re now to the point where we no longer “should” but must attend to personal motivations. That’s because a growing body of empirical evidence demonstrates their importance. Take external satisfactions. Scholars have long posited that judges, no less than academics, care about maximizing their “reputation, prestige, power, influence, and celebrity” (e.g., Drahzoal 1998; Miceli and Cosgel 1994; Shapiro and Levy 1994). This desire could be related to policy goals. But the pursuit of external satisfactions also takes more direct forms such as when judges (and indeed most humans) engage in “reputation-​seeking behavior” (Levy 2005). Garoupa and Ginsburg (2015), for example, find that the increasingly global implications of many court cases have paved the way for a competition of sorts among judges and their “teams” for worldwide influence on law. Advancing in this game seems to require competitor-​judges to hone their reputations by hobnobbing at conferences, teaching abroad, and considering developments

Preface   xi elsewhere (see also Breyer 2015). Likewise, in explaining Benjamin Cardozo’s fame, Posner (1990: 132) shows that the judge/​justice “cultivated the good opinion of academics” by regularly citing to their work in his opinions. Cardozo was also far more likely than his colleagues to cite to the opinions of other judges thus fostering their good will as well. Finally, Baum (2006) and Davis (2011) offer some evidence of Supreme Court justices adjusting their behavior to conform to the preferences of “reputation creators” and “esteem grantors” (Schauer 2000: 629). Collapsing the various distinctions we have long made (e.g., law versus politics) and simultaneously expanding the set of relevant preferences will help us account for these and the many judicial choices that we simply ignore because they are neither about law nor politics—​whether the tendency of busy trial court judges to apply access doctrines more strictly than judges with lower workloads; or the inclination of judges with some potential for promotion (the “auditioners”) to impose harsher sentences on criminal defendants, all else equal. Proceeding in this way will also allow us to adapt (or weight) preferences depending on the institutional context in which the judge works. Epstein, Landes, and Posner (2013: 103), for example, offer a simpler utility function for Supreme Court justices than for all other federal judges because the justices can’t be promoted to a higher court and have such a large staff (relative to their workload) that “leisure activities and nonjudicial work activities are not significantly constrained by [their] judicial duties.” Note that our suggestion of reconceptualizing judicial preferences does not require a change in a key assumption in many studies: that judges are rational actors (meaning they make decisions consistent with their goals and interests). We believe this is a reasonable assumption, and one that gets us pretty far in developing explanations of judicial behavior. But it’s hardly infallible, as Epstein and Knight note in their chapter. The problem is that scores of studies tell us that that in many situations, people—​judges not excepted—​have difficulty suppressing or converting their intuitions, prejudices, sympathies, and the like into rational decisions (see generally Thaler 2015; Kahneman 2011; on judges, see, e.g., Guthrie et al. 2007; Wistrich et al. 2015). Which brings us to a second suggestion: We need to take seriously these studies and assess the extent to which non-​rational factors alter what we would expect to see if we assume that judges act rationally. Again, Epstein and Knight say as much in their chapter; and we take note of some limited moves in this direction (see, e.g., Owens 2010)—​ but not nearly enough. We strongly advocate more studies along these lines, whether observational or experimental. These are some theoretical suggestions. On the design and empirical ends, we think it obvious that we should continue to expand the targets of inquiry. Even today U.S. Supreme Court justices and federal appellate court judges receive the lions’ share of attention. We should set our sights on trial court judges (state and federal) and also, despite the Handbook’s focus on the United States, on judges abroad for many reasons, including the illumination of the behavior of U.S. judges. Following from our theoretical suggestion about rethinking judicial preferences, we also want to encourage readers to expand the set of judicial choices. Back in the 1960s

xii   Preface when the systematic study of judicial behavior exploded (see e.g., Schubert 1965; Spaeth 1963; Ulmer 1962), scholars focused on the judges’ votes or the dispositions of cases. That emphasis continues today, and with good reason: dispositions and votes matter a lot. But because other aspects of judicial behavior matter too our focus should be far broader. To provide just one example: What with many courts/​governments (here and abroad) making judicial decisions available online (coupled with advances in the systematic analysis of text), opportunities now abound for the rigorous study of judicial opinions. Work has already begun (e.g., Black et al. 2016; Corley and Wedeking 2014); and more sophisticated efforts will soon follow as scholars move away from canned one-​ size-​fits-​all software and libraries to tools more tailored to our needs. As we develop new research questions and construct new sources of data to answer them, we must be mindful of the way we design our work and conduct our analysis. Many studies of judicial behavior seek to establish causal relationships, for example, war triggers justices to favor the government in cases of rights and liberties, fear of losing a judicial election causes judges to impose harsher sentences on criminal defendants, concerns about enforcement lead judges to write vague opinions, and on and on. Attention to how to make and test causal claims have become obsessions among political scientists and economists but not so much among scholars of judicial behavior. For example, we can identify only a few studies (e.g., Epstein et al. 2005; Boyd et al. 2010; Black and Owens 2012) that make explicit use of the potential outcomes framework (which emphasizes the counterfactual nature of casual inference; see, e.g., Rubin 1974; Ho and Rubin 2011)—​despite its domination in “statistical thinking about causality” over the last two decades or so (Keele 2015: 314). We could point to other related gaps (e.g., inattentiveness to identification strategies). But rather than belabor the point (or sound like the causal inference cops now terrorizing political science), we’ll conclude with the good news: We should embrace, not evade, the challenge of designing studies for credible causal inference; and we should take up, not dismiss, the equally demanding challenges our authors present. As their chapters reveal, meeting them in the past has led to enormous progress; no doubt we’ll say the same about the current crop in the next edition of the Handbook.

References Baum, L. 1997. The Puzzle of Judicial Behavior. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Baum, L. 2006. Judges and their Audiences:  A  Perspective on Judicial Behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Black, R. C., and Owens, R. J. 2012. The Solicitor General and the United States Supreme Court. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Black, R. C., Owens, R. J., Wedeking, J., and Wohlfarth, P. C. 2016. U.S. Supreme Court Opinions and their Audiences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Corley, P. C., and Wedeking, J. 2014. “The (Dis)Advantage of Certainty: The Importance of Certainty in Language.” Law & Society Review 48: 35–​62.

Preface   xiii Davis, R. 2011. Justices and Journalists: The U.S. Supreme Court and the Media. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Drahozal, C. R. 1998. “Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process.” SMU Law Review 51: 469–​503. Epstein, L., and Knight, J. 2013. “Reconsidering Judicial Preferences.” Annual Review of Political Science 16: 19.1–​19.21. Epstein, L., Landes, W. M., and Posner, R. A. 2013. The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Garoupa, N., and Ginsberg, T. 2015. Judicial Reputation: A Comparative Theory. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. George, T. E., and Epstein, L. 1992. “On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making.” American Political Science Review 86: 323–​37. Guthrie, C., Rachlinkski, J. J., and Wistrich, A. J. 2007. “Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases.” Cornell Law Review 93: 1–​43. Hettinger, V. A., Lindquist, S. A., and Martinek, W. L. 2004. “Comparing Attitudinal and Strategic Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals.” American Journal of Political Science 48: 123–​37. Ho, D. E., and Rubin, D. B. 2011. “Credible Causal Inference for Empirical Legal Studies.” Annual Review of Law & Social Science 7: 17–​40. Kahneman, D. 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York, NY: Farra, Straus and Giroux. Keele, L. 2015. “The Statistics of Causal Inference: A View from Political Methodology.” Political Analysis 23: 313–​35. Miceli, T. J., and Cosgel, M. M. 1994. “Reputation and Judicial Decision-​Making.” Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 23: 31–​51. Murphy, W. F., and Tanenhaus, J. 1972. The Study of Public Law. New York, NY: Random House. Owens, R. J. 2010. “The Separation of Powers, Judicial Independence, and Strategic Agenda Setting.” American Journal of Political Science 54: 412–​27. Posner, R. A. 1990. Cardozo: A Study in Reputation. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Pritchett, C. H. 1948. The Roosevelt Court. New York, NY: Macmillan. Pritchett, C. H. 1941. “Divisions of Opinion among Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1939–​ 1941.” American Political Science Review 35: 890–​8. Rubin, D. B. 1974. “Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized and Nonrandomized Studies.” Journal of Educational Psychology 6: 688–​701. Shapiro, S. A., and Levy, R. E. 1994. “Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions.” Duke Law Journal 44: 1051–​80. Spaeth, H. J. 1963. “An Analysis of Judicial Attitudes in the Labor Relations Decisions of the Warren Court.” Journal of Politics 25: 290–​311. Thaler, R. H. 2015. Misbehaving: The Making of Behavior Economics. New York, NY: Norton. Ulmer, S. S. 1962. “The Political Party Variable in the Michigan Supreme Court.” Journal of Public Law 11: 352–​62. Wistrich, A. J., Rachlinski, J. J., and Gutherie, C. 2015. “Heart versus Head: Do Judges Follow the Law or Follow their Feelings?” Texas Law Review 93: 855–​923.

Acknowledgments

This project would not have been possible without the cooperation of our outstanding contributors, whose patience and hard work we greatly appreciate. Several other individuals also made this volume possible. First, we thank our Graduate Assistant Thomas K. Valentine, who served as the Technical and Project Editor for this volume and remained dedicated to ensuring that the authors were supported through the drafting process and that the administrative tasks associated with an edited volume were completed. We are grateful for his persistence and dedication to detail. We also thank Olivia Wells, Assistant Commissioning Editor for Oxford University Press, for her great care and helpfulness in completing this volume. Finally, we note, with sadness, that one of our contributors, Professor Donald Songer, passed away before the volume went to press. Don was a wonderful colleague and mentor and a creative scholar in the field of Law and Courts and we are so pleased that his work is included here (co-​authored with Susan Haire).

Contents

List of Figures  List of Tables  List of Abbreviations  List of Contributors 

xxi xxiii xxv xxvii

PA RT I   STA F F I N G T H E  C OU RT 1. Appointing Federal Judges  Nancy Scherer

3

2. Appointing Supreme Court Justices  Christine L. Nemacheck

29

3. Judicial Elections: Judges and their “New-​Style” Constituencies  James L. Gibson and Michael J. Nelson

48

4. Federal Judicial Tenure  Albert Yoon

70

5. Law Clerks  Artemus Ward

100

PA RT I I   T H E L I T IG AT ION P RO C E S S A N D A P P E L L AT E  R E V I E W 6. Gatekeeping and Filtering in Trial Courts  Christina L. Boyd

129

7. Access to Intermediate Appellate Courts  Donald R. Songer and Susan B. Haire

149

8. Agenda-​Setting on the U.S. Supreme Court  Ryan J. Owens and James Sieja

169

xviii   Contents

9. Courtroom Proceedings in U.S. Federal Courts  Timothy R. Johnson

186

PA RT I I I   J U DIC IA L DE C I SION - ​M A K I N G A N D OP I N ION C ON T E N T 10. Opinion Writing  Pamela C. Corley

205

11. Vertical Stare Decisis  Thomas G. Hansford

219

12. Law in Judicial Decision-​Making  David Klein

236

13. The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Behavior and the Separation of Powers  Chad L. Westerland 14. Judicial Review  Tom Clark

253 271

15. The Role of Personal Attributes and Social Backgrounds on Judging  286 Tracey E. George and Taylor Grace Weaver 16. Ideology and Partisanship  Justine D’Elia-​Kueper and Jeffrey A. Segal

303

17. The Economic Analysis of Judicial Behavior  Lee Epstein and Jack Knight

320

PA RT I V   J U D G E S A N D T H E I R P U B L IC S 18. Judges and their Audiences  Lawrence Baum

343

19. Interest Groups and the Judiciary  Jared Perkins and Paul M. Collins, Jr.

361

20. The Relationship between Courts and Legislatures  Thomas M. Keck

381

Contents   xix

21. Courts and Executives  Jeffrey L. Yates and Scott Boddery

399

22. Covering the Courts  Rorie Solberg

416

23. The Supreme Court and Public Opinion  Joseph Daniel Ura and Alison Higgins Merrill

432

24. Judicial Impact  Matthew E. K. Hall

460

PA RT V   M E T HOD S A N D A P P ROAC H E S TO ST U DY I N G T H E  C OU RT S 25. Cognition in the Courts: Analyzing the Use of Experiments to Study Legal Decision-​Making  Eileen Braman

483

26. New Measurement Technologies: A Review and Application to Nuremberg and Justice Jackson  Daniel E. Ho and Michael Morse

508

27. The Use of Observational Data to Study Law and the Judiciary  Sara C. Benesh

537

Index 

557

List of Figures

1.1 Percentage of lower court nominations not confirmed by the Senate 1933–​2012 

4

1.2A Average and median number of days from nomination to confirmation on the federal courts of appeals, 1981–​January 13, 2013 

5

1.2B Average and median number of days from nomination to confirmation on the U.S. district courts, 1981–​January 13, 2013 

6

1.3A Minorities and women on the courts of appeals, percentage of total judges appointed by president, January 1977–​May 2014 

20

1.3B Minority and female appointees to the U.S. district courts, January 1977–​May 2014 

21

3.1 Confidence in state courts, by state 

61

4.1 When federal judges end active status relative to pension qualification 

84

4.2 Federal judicial salaries, inflation adjusted, 2014 dollars 

91

4.3 Federal judicial caseload, terminated by year-​end 

92

4.4 Number of authorized federal judges 

93

13.1 Spatial representation SOP model 

256

16.1 Distribution of ideal points by party, 98th Senate 

313

16.2 Partisan polarization and ideology of the justices, 1994 term 

313

16.3 Distribution of ideal points by party, 107th Senate 

314

16.4 Partisan polarization and ideology of the justices, 2010 term 

315

23.1 Approval of the Supreme Court, Congress, and president 

435

23.2 Ideological evaluations of the Supreme Court 

436

23.3 Proportion of GSS respondents expressing a “great deal” of confidence in each branch of government 

438

26.1 Votes in all non-​unanimous cases for the 1941–​53 terms 

510

26.2 Illustration of probability (probit) model for judicial votes in three cases 

511

26.3 Illustration of Bayesian updating with judicial votes from the 1941 term 

513

26.4 Static (median) ideal point estimates with 95 percent credible intervals for the 1941–​53 terms 

522

xxii   List of Figures 26.5 Median dynamic ideal points for all justices, with separate pre-​and post-​ Nuremberg trends for Jackson 

523

26.6 Median post-​Nuremburg shift for subsets of cases and all cases, 1941–​53 

525

26.7 Static ideal points in First Amendment cases, 1941–​53 

525

26.8 Ideal point estimates for economic regulation cases and civil liberties cases  527 26.9 Divergent inferences about Nuremberg’s effect on Jackson’s due process views  528

List of Tables

1.1 Comparison of judicial voting by party of appointing president: Greater likelihood of Republican-​appointed judge casting a conservative vote compared to Democratic-​appointed judge, U.S. Courts of Appeals 

11

1.2A Logit cofficients for the probability of a vote by Court of Appeals judge against a criminal defendant, non-​consensual search and seizure cases, January 1, 1994–​December 31, 2001 

17

1.2B Comparison of voting across presidential cohorts: Probability that a judge will vote to uphold a search or seizure, non-​consensual search and seizure cases, U.S. Courts of Appeals, January 1, 1994–​December 31, 2001 

18

1.3A Logit cofficients for the probability of a vote by Court of Appeals judge against a civil rights plaintiff, non-​consensual cases, January 1, 1994–​December 31, 2001 

18

1.3B Comparison of voting across presidential cohorts, probability that a judge will vote for a minority in a race discrimination case, non-​ consensual race discrimination cases, U.S. Courts of Appeals, January 1, 1994–​December 31, 2001 

19

1.4A Logit cofficients for the probability of a vote by Court of Appeals judge against the federal government, non-​consensual states’ rights cases, January 1, 1994–​December 31, 2001 

19

1.4B Comparison of voting across presidential cohorts: Probability that a judge will vote against the federal government, non-​consensual state’s rights cases, U.S. Courts of Appeals, January 1, 1994–​December 31, 2001 

20

1.5 Predicted probabilities on confirmation outcomes and predicted median durations until confirmation, nominations to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1985–​2004 

22

4.1A Summary statistics when federal judges join the bench, U.S. District Court 

72

4.1B Summary statistics when federal judges join the bench, U.S. Court of Appeals 

73

4.2 Comparison across different judicial states 

75

4.3 Legislation for pension qualification and senior status 

77

4.4A Active service on federal judiciary, 1945–​2014, U.S. District Court 

79

xxiv   List of Tables 4.4B Active service on federal judiciary, 1945–​2014, U.S. Circuit Court 

80

4.5 Factors influencing end of active status on federal judiciary, 1945–​2014 

83

4.6 When federal judges end active status after vesting in their pension, judges appointed 1945–​2014 

85

4.7A Summary statistics when federal judges completely depart the court, U.S. District Court 

87

4.7B Summary statistics when federal judges completely depart the court, U.S. Circuit Court 

88

4.8

94

Confirmation statistics–​–​confirmed judges 

4.9 2014 composition of the federal bench 

96

7.1 2013 case management and workload statistics by circuit 

160

26.1 A typology of the role of ideal points in judicial behavior 

519

26.2 Differential case classification in the 1946–​53 period 

524

27.1 Citations to the Spaeth database 

542

List of Abbreviations

ABA

American Bar Association

ACA

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act

ACLU

American Civil Liberties Union

ACS

American Constitution Society

ADA

Americans for Democratic Action

ADR

Alternative Dispute Resolution

AEDPA Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act CFR

call for a response

CVSG

call for the views of the Solicitor General

CRT

Cognitive Reflection Test

FDR

Franklin Delano Roosevelt

FELA

Federal Employee Liability Act

FICA

Federal Insurance Contributions Act

FJC

Federal Judicial Center

FMLA

Family Medical Leave Act

FRAP

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure

FTC

Federal Trade Commission

GSS

General Social Survey

GVR

grant, vacate, and remand

IAT

Implicit Associations Test

IRT

item response theoretic

JCS

Judicial Common Space

LDF

Legal Defense Fund

MCMC Markov Chain Monte Carlo MQ

Martin-​Quinn

NAACP National Association for the Advancement of Colored People NOW

National Organization for Women

NRA

National Rifle Association

xxvi   List of Abbreviations NSF

National Science Foundation

OSG

Office of the Solicitor General

PAIJD

party-​adjusted judicial ideology

PLRA

Prison Litigation Reform Act

QPC

question prioritaire de constitutionnalité

SG

Solicitor General

SOP

separation of powers

SSA

Social Security Act

SCDB

Supreme Court Judicial Database

WL Westlaw

List of Contributors

Lawrence Baum  is Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University. Sara C. Benesh is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee. Scott Boddery  is Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science at Davidson College. Christina L. Boyd is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia. Eileen Braman is Associate Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Bloomington. Tom Clark  is the Asa Griggs Candler Professor of Political Science at Emory University. Paul M. Collins, Jr.  is Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Pamela C. Corley  is Associate Professor of Political Science at Southern Methodist University. Justine D’Elia-​Kueper  is a Ph.D. candidate, Political Science at Stony Brook University. Lee Epstein is the Ethan A. H. Shepley Distinguished University Professor at Washington University in St. Louis. Tracey E. George  is the Charles B. Cox III and Lucy D. Cox Family Chair in Law and Liberty at Vanderbilt University. James L. Gibson  is the Sidney W. Souers Professor of Government at Washington University in St. Louis. Susan B. Haire  is Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia. Matthew E.  K. Hall  is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. Thomas G. Hansford  is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Merced. Alison Higgins Merrill  is a Ph.D. candidate, Political Science at Texas A&M University.

xxviii   List of Contributors Daniel E. Ho  is the William Benjamin Scott and Luna M. Scott Professor of Law at Stanford Law School. Timothy R. Johnson  is the Morse Alumni Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Law at the University of Minnesota. Thomas M. Keck is Professor of Political Science at Syracuse University, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. David Klein  is Professor of Political Science at Eastern Michigan University. Jack Knight  is the Frederic Cleaveland Professor of Law and Political Science at Duke University. Stephanie A. Lindquist  is Deputy Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs, and Foundation Professor of Law and Politics at Arizona State University. Michael Morse  is a Ph.D. candidate, Government at Harvard University. Michael J. Nelson  is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University. Christine L. Nemacheck is Associate Professor of Government at the College of William & Mary. Ryan J. Owens  is Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Jared Perkins  is a Ph.D. candidate, Political Science at the University of North Texas. Nancy Scherer  is Associate Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College. Jeffrey A. Segal  is SUNY Distinguished Professor at Stony Brook University. James Sieja  is Visiting Assisting Professor of Government at Skidmore College. Rorie Solberg  is Associate Professor of Political Science at Oregon State University. Donald R. Songer  is Professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina. Joseph Daniel Ura  is Associate Professor at Texas A&M University. Artemus Ward  is Professor of Political Science at Northern Illinois University. Taylor Grace Weaver  is a 2014 J.D. Graduate of Vanderbilt University. Chad L. Westerland  is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Arizona. Jeffrey L. Yates  is Professor of Political Science at Binghamton University. Albert Yoon  is Professor and Chair in Law and Economics at the University of Toronto.

Pa rt I

STA F F I N G T H E  C OU RT

chapter 1

App oin t i ng Federal Ju d g e s Nancy Scherer

The Lower Court Appointment Process Although the Constitution did not create the lower federal courts—​i.e., the U.S. Courts of Appeals and the U.S. District Courts—​it is clear the Framers contemplated that such courts would exist. Article I, Section 8, expressly accords Congress the power to create “inferior courts.” Article III further states: The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.

Not surprisingly, one of the first pieces of business taken up by the First Congress was the creation of the lower federal courts through the Judiciary Act of 1789. As Article III indicates, these lower court judges were to enjoy life tenure (“shall hold office during good behavior”), just as Supreme Court justices do. However, what was less clear in the Constitution was the manner in which these judges should be chosen. The best we can glean from the Constitution is a clause in Article II that vests in the president the power to make high-​level appointments, with the “advice and consent of the Senate.” The 1789 Act did little to clarify this point. Instead, George Washington and the First Congress merely followed the procedures laid out in the Constitution for the appointment of Supreme Court justices. It is the interaction of the elected branches with lower court nominations/​confirmations that is the subject of this chapter. For most of our nation’s history, judicial politics scholars almost exclusively focused their attention on understanding the interaction of politics and the Supreme Court of

4   Nancy Scherer the United States, including appointments to the Court. Significantly less attention has been devoted to understanding the political significance of appointments to the lower federal courts notwithstanding the fact that each president makes hundreds of lower court appointments each term, and that the lower federal courts decide thousands of cases daily. Because lower court appointments are regional in nature, each judgeship attached to a particular state, they differ in some important respects from the Supreme Court norms in that home state senators wield more power over the fates of the nominations attached to their states (Steigerwalt 2010). After the president nominates someone, likely in conference with the home state senators,1 the Senate officially begins its vetting process. There are several paths to confirmation that a nomination may take (Steigerwalt 2010). At several stages in the process the nomination could be stalled by Senators and ultimately blocked from confirmation (Scherer 2005; Bell 2002a). As detailed below, these tactics are largely driven by interest groups, who do most of the vetting of the nominees on behalf of the senators, signaling their objections to a specific nomination (Aron interview 2002).2 Though once a process that spanned, from nomination to confirmation, just a matter of weeks, in the last few decades the lower federal court appointment process has grown increasingly divisive and lengthy. There are a host of indicators that point to an increase in the politicization of the lower court appointment process over the past few decades. For example, as set forth in Figure 1.1, the percentage of lower court

40 35

Percentage

30 25 20 15 10 5

Tr

Ro

os e

ve lt um Eis en an ho w Ke er nn e Jo dy hn so n Ni xo n Fo rd Ca rte Re r ag H. a W n .B us Cl h in to W n .B us h Ob am a

0

Percent Unconfirmed

Figure 1.1  Percentage of lower court nominations not confirmed by the Senate 1933–​2012 Source: Adapted from Scherer, Scoring Points (2005) and The New York Times, November 15, 2003, at A10. George W. Bush and Obama data obtained through Thomas.org. Note: The figure for the Ford administration should be seen as an outlier. This is because of the unusual circumstances that put him into office. Twelve of Ford’s nineteen months in office were in a presidential election year, when traditionally fewer lower court nominees are confirmed.

Appointing Federal Judges   5 nominations not confirmed by the Senate has increased dramatically since the Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration, and reached a high water mark of 38 percent in the Obama administration. Similarly, the average number of days from nomination to confirmation, as well as the median number of days, for lower court judgeships has steadily increased since the Reagan administration. As set forth in Figure 1.2A, the median number of days for an appellate nominee to be confirmed during the Reagan administration was forty-​five days; by the G. W. Bush and Obama administrations, that number rose to 216 and 229, respectively. The average number of days for confirmation was highest during the G. W. Bush administration at 350 days. As seen in Figure 1.2B, the average and median number of days for U.S. District Court judges to be confirmed mimics the pattern seen with courts of appeals nominations. During the Reagan administration it took the median district court nomination merely forty-​one days to be confirmed, but 215 days during the Obama administration. In conjunction with this increased politicization of the lower court appointment process, political scientists have turned their attention to the politics of judicial appointments to the lower courts. Though scholarship on the Supreme Court dominates the field of public law, in the last twenty years, a substantial literature has developed about the presidential appointment process, including the lower federal court appointment process. Books on the issue include Goldman’s (1997) historical study of judicial selection from FDR through Reagan; Bell’s (2002a) historical analysis of the Senate confirmation process, including lower court judges; Scherer’s (2005) book on why there is (A) 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Average number of days Reagan

H.W. Bush

Median number of days Clinton

W. Bush

Obama

Figure  1.2A  Average and median number of days from nomination to confirmation on the federal courts of appeals, 1981–​January 13, 2013 Source: Brookings Institution, Weaver (2012).

6   Nancy Scherer (B) 250

200

150

100

50

0 Average number of days Reagan

H.W. Bush

Median number of days Clinton

W. Bush

Obama

Figure  1.2B  Average and median number of days from nomination to confirmation on the U.S. district courts, 1981–​January 13, 2013 Source: Weaver (2012).

increased politicization of the lower court appointment process; Epstein and Segal’s (2006) book focusing on the role of merit and ideology on judicial confirmations, including the lower federal courts; Wawro and Schickler’s (2007) historical and theoretical work on the use of filibusters of presidential nominations, including lower court nominations; Graves and Howard’s (2009) book on recess appointments to the courts, including lower court nominations; and Steigerwalt’s monograph (2010) that maps the paths lower court nominations may take, some on the fast track, some on the slow track to failure. The number of articles in political science journals devoted specifically to the lower court appointment process has similarly increased, covering a broad array of topics. In terms of nominations to the lower courts, scholars have examined critical pivot points in the Senate that may influence a president’s judicial selections (Primo, Binder, and Maltzman 2008). Primo et al. (2008) find that the majority party median and the filibuster pivots best account for confirmation outcomes in both the U.S. District Courts and Courts of Appeals, but more recently, home state senators have influenced district court nominations. There has also been a renewed interest in the presidents’ increasing use of lower court recess appointments in the modern political era (Graves and Howard 2010) Graves and Howard studied all recess appointments made from the beginning of the Republic to 2004; they concluded that presidents in the modern political era use recess appointment sparingly and strategically. Much attention has also been paid to the lower court confirmation process in the Senate, since the percentage of nominations unconfirmed, and the span of a confirmation proceeding, has grown substantially.

Appointing Federal Judges   7 Because it is rare for senators to win a floor fight to defeat a nominee at roll call,3 they instead engage in activities intended to delay confirmation of a controversial nomination, and hopefully make the nominee withdraw. Troubled lower court nominations are more often “killed” at the pre-​floor stage of the confirmation process through a variety of procedural tactics including secret holds, filibusters, and delay of votes (Steigerwalt 2010). Scholars thus argue that the focus of research on lower federal court confirmations should be on the process rather than the votes.4 This corpus of research has sought to identify the forces that impact confirmation timing; it presumes that the longer it takes to confirm a lower court nomination, the more “troubled” the nomination. Shipan and Shannon (2003: 656) make the most compelling case as to why delaying a nomination is an important end in and of itself, apart from the ultimate confirmation outcome. They argue that, even if a nomination is ultimately confirmed, delay by the Senate may weaken a president’s standing with his constituents and thus hinder the president’s ability to enact his policy agenda regarding other matters. Moreover, the longer a nomination is delayed, the more likely the nominee will never be confirmed. Accordingly, scholars started to turn their attention to the factors driving delay in the lower court confirmation process (Bell 2002; Binder and Maltzman 2002; Martinek, Kemper, and Van Winkle 2002). Although all of these duration studies used similar methodological techniques, hazard-​based duration models, their models focused on different possible causes for delay. Bell found that having a “patron” on the Judiciary Committee shortened a nominee’s confirmation time. Binder and Maltzman’s model demonstrated that the nomination’s ideological distance from the median senator increases the number of days a nomination will languish before confirmation, if such confirmation happens at all. Martinek et al. established that, under divided government, a nomination will wait longer to be confirmed. One notable variable missing from all of these studies is interest group opposition. Scherer, Bartels, and Steigerwalt (2008) did a similar examination of confirmation durations, but accounted for the impact of opposition from activists.5 Holmes (2007) also looked at outside influences on judicial confirmations, and found that the more outside written submissions presented to the Senate Judiciary Committee for consideration, the more likely the nomination will fail; this is true regardless if the submissions are favorable or unfavorable. Since the filibuster became a common procedural tactic for senators to indefinitely delay confirmation of lower court judges, particularly during the Clinton, G. W. Bush, and Obama presidencies (Steigerwalt 2010), scholars began consider the impact of this Senate procedural tactic on lower court confirmations, and the possibility of doing away with filibustering judicial nominations all together, known as the “nuclear” option (Klotz 2004; McGuiness and Rappaport 2005).6 In sum, we have a litany of books and articles about different aspects of the lower court appointment process in the modern political era, from nomination to confirmation to appointment. What all of the articles have in common is a focus on the effects of increased politicization of the lower court appointment process. Yet, as an initial matter, the fundamental question that must be addressed here is: why did the lower court appointment process become so politically contentious in the first place, particularly

8   Nancy Scherer given the low visibility of these offices?7 The answer lies in the conjunction of historical changes to two U.S. political institutions: the party system and the U.S. courts (Songer 1991).

Transformation of the Old Mass Party System Prior to 1968, under the old mass party system, parties were loosely connected systems of local party organizations, established to solve the collective action problem that politicians faced in terms of mobilizing voters (Aldrich 1995; Mayhew 1974). There was one critical aspect of the old party system that shaped judicial appointment politics. Because the activists who ran the local party organizations were predominantly interested in obtaining material incentives from politicians—​i.e., jobs and contracts in return for helping the candidate get elected—​the activists working within the party system were seen as largely non-​ideological in nature (Conway and Feigert 1968). Party activists “engage in a conflict without principles, a struggle between the ins and outs which never become fanatical and creates no deep cleavage in the country” (Duverger 1964: 418). Characterized by a pragmatism that made them willing to compromise and strike deals in order to deliver the jobs and contracts they desired for their supporters, these old-​line party activists came to be known as “professionals”(Wilson 1962). Second, as little more than a loosely connected group of local organizations, regional conflicts abounded between politicians in Washington, each representing different factions (Aldrich 1995). It was the job of the national organization to find ways to hold together these various factions (Aldrich 1995). In the 1960s, the old mass party system crumbled (Aldrich 1995). In place of the professionals came ideologically driven political activists known as “amateurs” (Wilson 1962) or “purists” (Wildavsky 1965); these activists were characterized by their unwillingness to compromise on ideological causes (Wildavsky 1965).8 “Purists consider the stock-​in-​trade of the politician—​compromise and bargaining, conciliating the opposition, bending a little to capture support—​to be hypocritical; they prefer a style that relies on the announcement of principles and on moral crusades” (Wildavsky 1965). During the 1960s, purists came to fill the ranks of both the Democratic (liberal purists) and Republican (conservative purists) Parties (Polsby and Wildavsky 1971). Although activists in the parties had become more unified, mass voters were becoming less enchanted with the two major parties. In short, fewer Americans began identifying themselves as a Democrat or a Republican (Rosenstone and Hansen 1996). This meant that the two major political parties were less capable of mobilizing voters on behalf of political candidates—​the very reason they were originally conceived in the early nineteenth century (Aldrich 1995). Picking up much of the slack in national elections were interest groups (Frymer and Yoon 2002; Gibson, Frendreis, and Vertz 1987; Grossman and

Appointing Federal Judges   9 Dominguez 2009). Determined to exercise influence over the outcomes of important federal elections, interest groups began spending millions of dollars on campaign advertising aimed at mobilizing voters to support their favored candidates (Frymer and Yoon 2002). Interest groups also began to contribute volunteers and money to their preferred candidates (Gibson, Frendreis, and Vertz, 1987). By the 1970s, the old mass party system had transformed into the modern party system. According to John Zaller, political parties cater to interest groups because “the public isn’t watching, and the interest groups are watching” (quoted in Griffiths 2012). What does party politics have to do with federal court appointments? Under both the old and modern party systems, party activists closely monitored the selection of lower court judges. But, while local party activists under the old party system viewed lower court judgeships as jobs to be distributed to friends and campaign contributors, in the modern political era, party and issue activists view judicial appointments as having crucial policy consequences. Why did lower federal court judgeships begin to figure into the policy goals of the new breed of political activists? The reason turns on the second historic event in American politics to occur during the 1950s–​60s period: the transformation of the federal judiciary.

Transformation of the Federal Judiciary At the same time that the political parties were undergoing seismic changes, federal courts were undergoing major changes as well; they began, once again to engage in social policy-​making, only this time it was liberal social policy.9 As Epp (1998) explains, rights-​oriented litigation by interest groups did not begin in the 1960s, it began earlier in the twentieth century; however, there is little doubt that liberal interest groups intensified their litigation strategy in the 1960s–​70s. Under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren, however, liberal interest groups like the NAACP and the ACLU sensed that the Court was now sympathetic to the claims of liberal activists for broader constitutional protections for individuals, particularly minorities denied civil rights and liberties in Southern states (Epp 1998). These groups correctly gauged the Court’s trajectory, as justices during the Warren Court era (Silverstein 1994) significantly expanded civil rights and civil liberties in accordance with their personal social policy preferences (Segal and Spaeth 1993).10 The Warren Court also made it much easier for aggrieved parties to bring lawsuits in federal court (Silverstein 1994). By the end of the 1960s, Congress amended the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, making it easier to bring class action suits.11 This included rules on standing so as to afford the federal courts the opportunity to hear the substantive claims of aggrieved groups. This transformation prompted noted scholar Alexander Bickel to observe that “all too many federal judges have been induced to view themselves as holding roving commissions as problem solvers, and as charged with a duty to act when majoritarian

10   Nancy Scherer institutions do not (Bickel 1970, at 134).” To this day, conservative activists see this litigation strategy as a means to bypass conservative state legislatures (Pilon interview 2002). Whether a favorable court order standing alone—​without some extra-​judicial assistance in implementation—​can ever deliver the policy results sought by the claimants has been the subject of much scholarly debate (see, e.g., Horowitz 1977; Rosenberg 1991; Scheingold 1974). Nevertheless, what is important is that, during this period, liberal activists came to share a deep-​rooted belief in the efficacy of the federal courts to achieve social change. And they continue to cling to this belief even today. As Nan Aron, president of the Alliance for Justice, a liberal interest group that monitors the U.S. judicial appointments, reaffirms: The way our democracy works is that poor people, people of color, disenfranchised people, [and] women have very little recourse to the Executive Branch. They don’t make contributions to Democratic or Republican presidential campaigns. They tend not to know people in power. And, therefore, [they] have very little access to the executives … of the world. They have almost no access to members of Congress because they clearly don’t contribute to congressional or senate races. The only recourse they have is to the judiciary. It’s the only branch of government that will hear … cases brought by people without power … This is the only branch whereby a disenfranchised person or group has any ability to have redress for grievances. (Aron interview 2002)

In sum, the rights revolution of the 1950s–​70s encompassed three broad areas of constitutional rights: race, crime, and women’s rights. After Roe v. Wade,12 counter-​activists began to use the courts to undermine the rights accorded women in Roe (Epstein 1985). Thus, conservatives, too, turned to the Court to create social policy. At first, they were met with a liberal majority, but eventually the Court had a majority of justices willing to make conservative social policy.13 Critically, the Court makes social policy in the very same issues with which the Democratic and Republican Parties’ new issue-​oriented activists, who had emerged in the 1960s, were concerned.

Activists Begin to Want the “Right” Kind of Judges Appointed Given these institutional changes to the U.S.  political system, critical new demands for certain kinds of judicial appointments were made. Under the earlier regime, party activists demanded only that the president and senators seat campaign contributors and friends on the lower federal courts (i.e., patronage), producing nominations that lacked much party polarization; newly emerging policy-​oriented activists had different priorities. Though they understand why a politician may want to reward a big contributor to his or her previous election campaign, the new breed of activists, on both the left and right, do not believe patronage concerns should detract from the main goal

Appointing Federal Judges   11 of appointing judges who can be depended on to further the president’s policy agenda. What that means is that only patrons who are known to share the activists’ commitment to certain policy outcomes are now acceptable to serve on the federal courts (Aron 2002). What we now see are party-​polarized nominations who in turn engage in party-​ polarized voting on the bench. In her 2005 book, Scoring Points, Scherer looks at the judicial decision-​making behavior of judges from three distinct time periods in order to establish whether party transformation is, as her theory posits, at the heart of modern-​day appointment politics. The hypothesis is that, in earlier periods in history there will be less ideological voting (because judgeships were based on patronage, not ideology) than there is today, when interest groups demand ideologically pure appointments. The three periods are The Old Party System (judges appointed 1921–​44), the Party System in Transition (judges appointed 1945–​67) and the Modern Party System (1968–​2000). She theorized that, in the two early periods, there would be no significant difference between Republican-​ and Democratic-​ appointed judges (even though Democrats and Republicans in Washington sharply disagreed on these issues) and in the modern era, there would be a significant difference in the voting patterns of Democratic and Republican-​appointed judges, mimicking the party positions of the elected branches. Set forth in Table 1.1 are the differences between Democratic and Republican-​ appointed judges in each of the three periods; the numbers are predictions of the likelihood of a liberal vote. And, in order to rule out the fact that Southern Democrats shifted

Table 1.1 Comparison of judicial voting by party of appointing president: Greater likelihood of Republican-​appointed judge casting a conservative vote compared to Democratic-​appointed judge, U.S. Courts of Appeals Old Party system Party in transition

Modern party system

Labor cases

Race discrimination cases

Race discrimination cases

Abortion cases

Judicial appointees from:

Judicial appointees from:

Judicial appointees from:

Judicial appointees from:

1920–​44

1953–​63 1964–​74

1977–​2000

1977–​2000

All circuits

.07

–​.05

.17**

.27**

.44**

Non-​Southern circuits

.05

–​.04

.16*

.26**

.45**

Southern circuits

.12

–​.06

.18*

.27**

.42**

Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .10 (all two-​tailed test).

12   Nancy Scherer to the Republican Party beginning in the 1960s, which is an alternative hypothesis as to why Democrats became more liberal during this period of transition—in other words, as Southerners left the Party, Democrats became more liberal—​and could also explain why there is more party–​polarized voting in the modern political era, Table 1.1 shows that the results remain the same with and without Southern Democrats in the Democratic and Republican Parties.14 Activists, both on the left and right, discourage patronage nominations. As one liberal activist, Nan Aron, stated, “If the [Clinton] administration nominates candidates who lack a sensitivity and commitment to constitutional principles, we will work hard to make our voice heard” (Aron, quoted in Klaidman 1993). A conservative activist would go further than Aron; he would eliminate patronage completely from the judicial selection process (Jipping 2002). His idea to ensure ideological purists are nominated is to bar home state senators and local party leaders from suggesting names to the president for vacancies on the courts. Jipping believes it detracts from the main focus, the judicial philosophy of the nominee (Jipping interview 2002). As the activists emphasize, what they want is for the president to nominate (or not nominate), and for the Senate to confirm (or not confirm), federal court judges who will be sympathetic to their political causes. Indeed, these activists are so convinced that their desired policy outcomes are dependent on litigation outcomes that, today, seating judges who are sympathetic to their causes, in effect, has become a policy goal unto itself—​almost as important as achieving the underlying substantive policy goals at issue. For example, liberal activists spend almost as much time fighting the appointment of pro-​life judges as they do fighting pro-​life legislation. And, though their desire to secure sympathetic judges originally focused solely on Supreme Court nominations (Silverstein 1994), for a number of reasons, activists began to shift their focus to lower federal court appointments as well. With regard to the lower courts, most of their attention focuses on the appellate courts; however, activists make clear they monitor judges at all levels of the federal judiciary (e.g., Aron, Gandy, Cavendish, and Jipping interviews 2002). Accordingly, activists monitor all of a president’s judicial nominations at all levels of the federal judiciary. Due to the sheer volume of district court appointees every year and the limited resources activists have to monitor these nominations, it makes sense that district court nominations get less attention than courts of appeals nominations.

Activists Shift their Attention from the Supreme Court to the Lower Federal Courts Why do activists focus so much attention on lower federal court appointments, when the general public has little interest in their decisions? First, activists realize that there

Appointing Federal Judges   13 are so few opportunities to affect Supreme Court appointments in the modern political era. Justices are simply serving longer terms than was historically true, affording presidents fewer opportunities to make appointments to the High Court. In contrast, a president names hundreds of judges to the lower federal courts in each four-​year term. Second, with the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts hearing about half the number of cases that the Burger Court did, activists began to recognize that, as a practical matter, the lower federal courts today serve as the final arbiter in over 99 percent of all federal court litigation; in other words, important policy is being made every day in the lower federal courts (Raddazzo and Waterman 2014). According to Elizabeth Cavendish, former Legal Director of NARAL Pro-​Choice America (NARAL), today, it is the lower federal courts where important legal issues in the pro-​choice/​pro-​life debate are being decided: “There’s a real recognition that lower court judges hold vast power over women’s reproductive lives and right now the composition of the Supreme Court is stable, and so there isn’t an immediate threat to overturn Roe” (Cavendish 2002). Ralph Neas, the director of People for the American Way, believes that certain circuits, specifically the Fourth and the Fifth Circuits, generally considered the more conservative circuits, require special attention because the judges there are setting bad precedents for millions who live within those jurisdictions (Neas interview 2002). Third, in an apparent attempt to reduce uncertainty about the way Supreme Court nominees are likely to vote once they secure their seats, presidents have increasingly turned to the courts of appeals in searching for Supreme Court candidates.15 Indeed, eight of the nine current justices were elevated from the federal appellate courts. As Kim Gandy, former president of the National Organization for Women (NOW) aptly notes, the courts of appeals are now the “farm team” for the Supreme Court (Gandy interview 2002). And so, for these litigation-​and conservative-​oriented liberal interest groups, having the “right” kind of judges seated on the appellate courts ensures the “right” kind of judges on the Supreme Court. Fourth, Ronald Reagan began a trend of nominating relatively young men and women to seats on the lower federal courts. While less than 3 percent of Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter appellate judges appointed were under age forty, 10  percent of Reagan’s court of appeals appointments were in their thirties (Schwartz 1988: 60). A judicial appointment was once “meant to cap your career” (Gandy interview 2002). Appointing people so young to the federal bench also raises the stakes of these nominations when senators know that many of these nominees will serve for another thirty-​plus years.

The Emergence of Elite Mobilization Strategies In the face of these new policy demands from key political activists, politicians adapted their nomination/​confirmation strategies, from patronage to policy, so as to conform

14   Nancy Scherer to the changing demands of political activists. Herein lies the core problem with today’s lower court appointment process:  the system turns on satisfying competing policy demands that center on the most divisive issues of the day such as race, crime, abortion, and homosexual rights. With the Senate so highly polarized today, compromise on these hot-​button issues is difficult in the legislature. The courts seem more attractive to settle these divisive policy areas. To satisfy the demands of one party’s activists, by definition, means that the other party’s activists cannot be satisfied. Indeed, they become extremely dissatisfied with appointment outcomes that only lead to more contentiousness in the process. And, yet, politicians continue to accede to these demands even though lower federal court cases are not salient issues with their constituents. Why not simply ignore these demands and continue with the old patronage system? The simple answer: re-​ election concerns. Judicial scholars have previously suggested that there is an electoral component to the Supreme Court selection process. For example, Perry (1991) argues that Supreme Court nominations are often made to generate support among the mass electorate—​e.g., Reagan’s appointment of Sandra Day O’Connor to shore up support among women voters. However, this conventional explanation is problematic even for the Supreme Court, and certainly when we talk about lower court nominations. Consider public opinion polls, which demonstrate that the mass electorate knows virtually nothing about the Supreme Court, let alone the lower federal courts. For example, an oft-​cited poll conducted by The Washington Post found that more people could identify Judge Wapner, former host of the television program The People’s Court, than could identify Chief Justice of the United States, William H. Rehnquist (Caldeira 1991). Why, then, would elected officials invest so much political capital in the lower court appointment process if their constituents are not paying attention?16 There is, in fact, an electoral strategy at play in the lower federal court appointment process, but one much different from that suggested by Perry. Rather than using lower federal court judgeships to curry favor with the mass electorate, Scherer (2005) argued that these nominations are used by the Democratic and Republican Parties to curry favor with only an elite constituency within each party; specifically, conservative activists affiliated with the Republican Party and liberal activists affiliated with the Democratic Party. This includes both party activists and interest group activists (sometimes called “issue activists”). As stated above, these constituents actually care about the composition of the federal bench, and these constituents are the key to politicians’ re-​ election prospects. Activists are central to re-​election efforts because they are responsible for mobilizing the party’s base to get out and vote on election day (Katz and Eldersveld 1961; Sorauf 1967; Sorauf and Beck 1988). “Under the old party system, political activists would be willing to mobilize voters provided the candidate delivered the promised jobs and contracts—​i.e., a patronage-​based system” (Aldrich 1995). Today, politicians look to those who are “well-​positioned in social networks, people who are influential in politics, and people who are likely to participate” (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993: 6–​7): In sum, for winning candidates to the Senate or Presidency, lower federal court judgeships were once used as plum jobs that they could bestow upon the activists who helped them

Appointing Federal Judges   15 get elected (e.g., Baum 1990; Carp and Stidham 1998; Chase 1972; Evans 1948; Goldman 1997, 1967). Dating back as far back as the Andrew Jackson presidency (Bell 2002b), lower court judgeships were nothing more than “rewards for political service” (Howard 1981). Under the modern party system, however, patronage appointments no longer satisfy political activists; rather, they want all appointments used to further policy goals. If a patronage appointment is to be made, the person must be in line with the Party’s base. It has thus become incumbent upon politicians to develop new nomination and confirmation strategies to satisfy the activists’ policy-​oriented demands—​leading to a judicial appointment process based much more on ideological considerations and much less on patronage considerations.

The Methods Used to Satisfy Activists’ Demands Though their efforts to shape the federal judiciary go largely unnoticed by the American public, politicians are nevertheless still engaging in electoral politics through a variety of judicial nomination/​confirmation strategies, all designed to satisfy activists’ policy demands. Collectively, these new nomination/​confirmation strategies are known as “elite mobilization” strategies (Scherer 2005) because they are specifically intended to satisfy key elites affiliated with the two major political parties. Briefly, the new policy-​ oriented appointment strategies are: (1) presidents choosing judges pursuant to ideological litmus tests; (2) presidents choosing judges pursuant to diversity criteria; and (3) senators engaging in “obstructionist” confirmation tactics against nominees found ideologically objectionable. As previously stated, all of these strategies are ultimately designed to satisfy the policy demands of party elites and activists so that they will aid in mobilizing the mass electorate come election day.17 What do all of these strategies have in common? They all involve strategic actions of politicians in choosing (in the case of the president) or confirming (in the cases of sitting senators) on federal court judgeships. By definition, elite mobilization requires politicians to take a public stand regarding lower federal court appointments.18 Politicians let their targeted elite constituents know exactly where they stand on a particular judicial nominee or on the direction of the federal courts as a whole. Politicians thereby send important cues to these elite constituents, telling them that they are directly responding to their demands regarding the composition of the lower federal courts. In this sense, elite mobilization efforts resemble “position taking”—​one of the three classic forms of congressional activity identified by Mayhew in his seminal book Congress: The Electoral Connection (1974), though the audience to whom the position statements are directed is somewhat different than that envisioned by Mayhew. In the case of judgeships, politicians speak to an elite audience, rather than a mass audience. To the extent such elite mobilization cues are successful, the political activists at whom the tactics are aimed can then be counted on to mobilize the mass electorate on the

16   Nancy Scherer candidate’s behalf come the next election (in the case of grass-​roots activists), or to donate money to a candidate (in the case of grass-​top elites). To the extent such elite mobilization cues are not forthcoming, or convey the wrong message, activists and elites may then choose to mobilize the mass electorate against a particular candidate, or alternatively, but an equally effective tactic, not mobilize potential voters at all (Gandy interview 2002).

Empirical Testing of the Elite Mobilization Theory Elite Mobilization Strategy One: Ideological Litmus Tests Starting with the first strategy, ideological litmus tests, and the first hypothesis is that presidents in the modern political era are more likely to appoint lower court judges who share their party’s ideological positions than judges who do not. The data consists of all non-​consensual courts of appeals cases 1994–​2001 in three legal, but partisan policy issues. The three types of cases chosen to analyze were: search and seizure decisions, pitting tough law-​and-​order Republicans against more civil-​liberties-​oriented Democrats; 19 race discrimination cases, pitting civil-​rights proponents from the Democratic Party against color-​blind-​society advocates in the Republican Party;20 and federalism cases, pitting states’-​rights-​oriented Republicans against federal-​ government-​oriented Democrats.21 If partisan voting patterns are detected in these three types of cases, then there is support for the first elite mobilization strategy.22 Table 1.2A displays the probabilities that judges appointed by modern Republican presidents vote more conservatively than judges appointed by Democrats, consistent with the theory. Table 1.2B shows the probabilities of a conservative vote by Republican versus Democratic judges, and the appointees of Nixon, Reagan, G. H. W. Bush, and G. W. Bush are, indeed significantly more conservative than appointees of Carter and Clinton. This pattern repeats itself with the race discrimination cases (Tables 1.3A–​1.3B) and the states’ rights cases (Tables 1.4A–​1.4B). The judges voting patterns mirror that of the presidents who appointed them. Just as Clinton shifted the Democratic Party to the center on the crime issue, his appointees voted in a more conservative direction than the Carter appointees. And, just as Nixon was more towards the center of the ideological spectrum than either Reagan, G. H. W. Bush or G. W. Bush, so too did Nixon’s judges exhibit less conservative voting than the other Republican presidents’ judges.

Elite Mobilization Strategy Two: Diversify the Federal Bench The hypothesis behind the second elite mobilization strategy, diversifying the bench, is that Democratic presidents will appoint more people of color and women to the federal

Appointing Federal Judges   17 Table 1.2A Logit cofficients for the probability of a vote by Court of Appeals judge against a criminal defendant, non-​consensual search and seizure cases, January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2001 B Constant

–​.45*

Robust SE

∆ Probability

.20

NA

Appointing president Clinton

Baseline

NA

.00

G. H. W. Bush

.74***

.18

.18

Reagan

.79***

.15

.19

Carter

.64***

.18

–​.13

Nixon

.73**

.28

.18

(Vote against criminal defendant coded 1; vote for criminal defendant coded 0.) Notes: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .10 (all two-​tailed test). Change in probability is measured at the distance from a probability of 0.5, assuming the presence of that variable. N = 1,469 Likelihood ratio test (14df) = 162.59*** % correctly predicted = 63.785 % observed in null model = 50.30 Proportional reduction in error = 27.12 Throughout this chapter, non-​consensual cases shall be defined as all appellate cases with a dissent plus all unanimous appellate cases that reverse a district court decision. This represents the change in likelihood of a vote against a criminal defendant from a starting place of .50 probability.

courts than Republican presidents, and that the number of diversity appointments will be significant rather than mere tokenism. The underlying theory is based on the fact that most minority-​and women’s-​based interest groups lean Democratic; they are part of the Democratic Party’s base. As such these groups are critical to mobilizing their constituencies on election day. Thus, currying favor with minority and female activists by significantly increasing diversity on the bench has more benefits for Democrats than it does Republicans. Looking at Figures 1.3A and 1.3B, the evidence is consistent with this hypothesis. Democratic presidents are appointing significant numbers of minority and female judges, much more than Republican presidents. Beginning with Carter, with each Democratic administration we see a focus on raising the levels of diversity on the federal bench across racial, ethnic, and gender lines. It should be noted that both Presidents G. H. W. Bush and G. W. Bush appointed fair percentages of women to the bench. And, President G. W. Bush appointed more

Table 1.2B  C  omparison of voting across presidential cohorts: Probability that a judge will vote to uphold a search or seizure, non-​consensual search and seizure cases, U.S. Courts of Appeals, January 1, 1994–December 31, 2001 Clinton judge Clinton judge compared to:

G. H. W. Bush judge

Reagan judge

–​.18**

–​.19**

+.13*

–​.18*

–​.01

–​.32**

.00

+.33***

.01

G. H. W. Bush judge compared with:

+.18***

Reagan judge compared with:

+.19

+.01

Carter judge compared with:

–​.13**

–​.32***

Nixon judge compared with:

+.18***

.00

Carter judge

Nixon judge

–​.33*** –​.01

–​.32*** +.32***

–​

Notes: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .10 (all two-​tailed test).

Table 1.3A  L ogit cofficients for the probability of a vote by Court of Appeals judge against a civil rights plaintiff, non-​consensual cases, January 1, 1994–December 31, 2001 B

Robust SE

∆ Probability

–​1.29***

.19

NA

NA

.00

1.29***

.21

.28

Reagan

.1.26

.19

.28

Carter

.16

.22

.04

Nixon

.92**

.32

.21

Constant Appointing president Clinton G. H. W. Bush

Baseline

(Vote against criminal defendant coded 1; vote for criminal defendant coded 0.) Notes: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .10 (all two-​tailed test). N = 1,408 Likelihood ratio test (13 df) = 193.46*** % correctly predicted = 67.75 % observed in null model = 65.28 Proportional reduction in error = 7.11 This represents the change in likelihood of a vote against a criminal defendant from a starting place of .50 probability.

Table 1.3B  C  omparison of voting across presidential cohorts, probability that a judge will vote for a minority in a race discrimination case, non-​consensual race discrimination cases, U.S. Courts of Appeals, January 1, 1994–December 31, 2001 Clinton judge

G. H. W. Bush judge

Reagan judge

Carter judge

Nixon judge

–​

–​.28***

–​.28***

–​.04

–​.21**

+.01

+.25***

+.10

+.25***

+.08*

Clinton judge compared with: G. H. W. Bush judge compared with: Reagan judge compared with: Carter judge compared with:

–​.18*

Nixon judge compared with: Notes: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .10 (all two-​tailed test).

Table 1.4A  L ogit cofficients for the probability of a vote by Court of Appeals judge against the federal government, non-​consensual states’ rights cases, January 1, 1994–December 31, 2001

Constant

B

Robust SE

∆ Probability

–​.56*

.29

NA

Baseline

NA

.00

1.21***

.34

.27

.90**

.31

.21

Appointing president Clinton G. H. W. Bush Reagan Carter

–​.29

.37

–​.07

Nixon

.67

.65

.16

(Vote against federal government coded 1; vote for federal government coded 0.) Notes: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .10 (all two-​tailed test). N = 337 Likelihood ratio test (9 df) = 31.26*** % correctly predicted = 64.99 % observed in null model = 50.10 Proportional reduction in error = 29.77 This represents the change in likelihood of a vote against a criminal defendant from a starting place of .50 probability.

20   Nancy Scherer Table 1.4B  Comparison of voting across presidential cohorts: Probability that a judge will vote against the federal government, non-​consensual state’s rights cases, U.S. Courts of Appeals, January 1, 1994–December 31, 2001 Clinton judge

G. H. W. Bush judge

Clinton judge compared with:

Reagan judge

.27**

.21**

G. H. W. Bush judge compared with:

+.06

Reagan judge compared with:

Carter judge

Nixon judge

+.07

–​.16

+.32**

+.13

+.26**

+.06

Carter judge compared with:

–​.18*

Nixon judge compared with Notes: *** p θi 1 ≈

1 M ∑Π θmj1 > θim1 . M m =1

(

)

4. These are based on citation counts in Google Scholar from September 2015. 5. See also Ho and Quinn (2008) (finding that close decisions are far more likely to be covered by newspaper editorials). 6. See, e.g., Terminiello, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1941); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951). 7. In the terminology of SCDB, these were the “issueArea” and “lawSupp” codes. 8. Incorporation, for instance, obviously happens via the due process clause. The Jackson scholarship does not define these categories in exhaustive and mutually exclusive ways. 9. More ideal would be a data collection process closer to that of Ho and Ross (2010). 10. We were unable to establish a pattern between Schubert’s classification system and other classification systems, such as Westlaw’s Key Numbers or the United States Supreme Court Database. This makes sense because Schubert admits that his classification system does not “correspond to those employed by constitutional law scholars” (Schubert 1959: 159). 11. This is potentially an example of bridging sensitivity. 12. Relatively little scholarship exists on Reed. See Note (1949). 13. A logistic link could alternatively also be used. 14. See also Bailey (2007) (developing a parametric approach to modeling moving ideal points). 15. Ho and Quinn (2010a) develop an alternate parameterization, assuming (αk, βk) to be independently drawn from a uniform distribution on the region α k , βk : α k ∈[ −4, 4 ] , βk ∈[ −2, 2] , α k / βk ∈[ −2, 2] . This has the convenient interpretation that the prior on the cutpoints dividing the majority and minority in a case are a uniform distribution.

{

}

New Measurement Technologies    533

References Abraham, H. J. 1999. Justices, Presidents, and Senators:  A  History of the US Supreme Court Appointments from Washington to Clinton. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Alarie, B. R. D., and Green, A. 2007. “The Reasonable Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Frank Iacobucci’s Career on the Supreme Court of Canada.” University of Toronto Law Journal 57(2): 195–​226. Bafumi, J., Gelman, A., Park D. P., and Kaplan, N. 2005. “Practical Issues in Implementing and Understanding Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation.” Political Analysis 13(2): 171–​87. Bailey, M., and Chang, K. H. 2001. “Comparing Presidents, Senators, and Justices.” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 17: 477–​506. Bailey, M. A. 2007. “Comparable Preference Estimates across Time and Institutions for the Court, Congress, and Presidency.” American Journal of Political Science 51(3): 433–​48. Black, R. C., and Boyd, C. L. 2012. “US Supreme Court Agenda Setting and the Role of Litigant Status.” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 28(2): 286–​312. Bonica, A., and Woodruff, M. J. 2015. “A Common-​Space Measure of State Supreme Court Ideology.” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 31(3): 472–​98. Carrubba, C., Friedman, B., Martin, A. D., and Vanberg, G. 2012. “Who Controls the Content of Supreme Court Opinions?” American Journal of Political Science 56(2): 400–​12. Clark, T. S. 2009. “Measuring Ideological Polarization on the United States Supreme Court.” Political Research Quarterly 62(1): 146–​57. Clark, T. S., and Lauderdale, B. 2010. “Locating Supreme Court Opinions in Doctrine Space.” American Journal of Political Science 54(4): 871–​90. Clinton, J. D., Jackman, S., and Rivers, D. 2004. “The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data.” American Political Science Review 98: 355–​70. Cushman, B. 1998. Rethinking the New Deal Court. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Domnarski, W. 2006. The Great Justices, 1941–​54: Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, and Jackson in Chambers. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Dunworth, A., Fischman, J., and Ho, D. E. 2009. “Policy Voting: What Amici Tell Us about Law.” Unpublished Manuscript. Epstein, L., and Jacobi, T. 2008. “Super Medians.” Stanford Law Review 61(1): 37–​99. Epstein, L., and Martin, A. D. 2010. “Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court—​Possibly Yes (But We’re Not Sure Why).” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 13: 263–​81. Epstein, L., Martin, A. D., Quinn, K. M., and Segal, J. A. 2007a. “Ideological Drift among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important.” Northwestern University Law Review 101: 1483–​542. Epstein, L., Martin, A. D., Segal, J. A., and Westerland, C. 2007b. “The Judicial Common Space.” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 23(2): 303–​25. Epstein, L., and Mershon, C. 1996. “Measuring Political Preferences.” Annual Review of Political Science 40: 261–​94. Epstein, L., and Segal, J. A. 2006. “Trumping the First Amendment.” Washington University Journal of Law and Policy 21: 81–​121. Fischman, J. B. 2011. “Estimating Preferences of Circuit Judges: A Model of Consensus Voting.” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 54(4): 781–​809. Frank, J. P. 1950. “The United States Supreme Court: 1949–​1950.” University of Chicago Law Review 18(1): 1–​54.

534    Daniel E. Ho and Michael Morse Frankfurter, F. 1955. Foreword. Columbia Law Review 55(4): 435–​7. Freund, P. A. 1955. “Individual and Commonwealth in the Thought of Mr. Justice Jackson.” Stanford Law Review 8: 9–​25. Friedman, B. 2009. The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Gergen, M. P., and Quinn, K. M. 2012. “Common Law Judicial Decision Making: The Case of the New York Court of Appeals 1900–​1941.” Buffalo Law Review 60: 897–​1002. Giles, M. W., Hettinger, V. A., and Peppers, T. 2001. “Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas.” Political Research Quarterly 54(3): 623–​41. Gustafson, P. 2003. Measurement Error and Misclassification in Statistics and Epidemiology: Impact and Bayesian Adjustments. Boca Raton, FL: CRC. Harvey, A., and Friedman B. 2009. “Ducking Trouble: Congressionally Induced Selection Bias in the Supreme Court’s Agenda.” Journal of Politics 72(2): 574–​92. Harvey, A., and Woodruff, M. 2013. “Confirmation Bias in the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database.” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 29(2): 414–​60. Heckman, J. J., and Snyder J. M. 1997. “Linear Probability Models of the Demand for Attributes with an Empirical Application to Estimating the Preferences of Legislators.” RAND Journal of Economics 28: S142–​89. Ho, D. E., and Quinn, K. M. 2008. “Measuring Explicitly Political Positions of Media.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 3: 353–​77. Ho, D. E., and Quinn, K. M. 2010a. “Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?” Journal of Legal Analysis 2: 1–​45. Ho, D. E., and Quinn, K. M. 2010b. “How Not to Lie with Judicial Votes:  Misconceptions, Measurement, and Models.” California Law Review 98: 813–​76. Ho, D. E., and Ross, E. L. 2010. “Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine? An Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921–​2006.” Stanford Law Review 62: 591–​668. Hockett, J. D. 1990. “Justice Robert H. Jackson, the Supreme Court, and the Nuremberg Trial.” Supreme Court Review 1990: 257–​99. Hockett, J. D. 1996. New Deal Justice: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Hugo L. Black, Felix Frankfurter, and Robert H. Jackson. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Hutchinson, D. J. 1996. “Justice Jackson and the Nuremberg Trials.” Journal of Supreme Court History 21(1): 105–​16. Jackman, S. 2001. “Multidimensional Analysis of Roll Call Data via Bayesian Simulation: Identification, Estimation, Inference, and Model Checking.” Political Analysis 9(3): 227–​41. Jackson, R. H. 1955. “The Reminiscences of Robert H. Jackson.” Interviews conducted in 1952 and 1953 by Harlan B. Phillips. Oral History Research Office, Butler Library, Columbia University, NY. Jaffe, L. L. 1955. “Mr. Justice Jackson.” Harvard Law Review 68(6): 940–​98. Lauderdale, B. E., and Clark, T. S. 2012. “The Supreme Court’s Many Median Justices.” American Political Science Review 106(4): 847–​66. Lauderdale, B. E., and Clark, T. S. 2014. “Who Controls Opinion Content? Testing Theories of Authorship Using Case-​Specific Preference Estimates for the US Supreme Court.” Unpublished manuscript. Law, D. S. 2004. “Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: An Empirical Investigation of Ideology and Publication on the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.” University of Cincinnati Law Review 73: 817–​66.

New Measurement Technologies    535 Lax, J. R. 2011. “The New Judicial Politics of Legal Doctrine.” Annual Review of Political Science 14: 131–​57. Lindquist, S. A., and Klein, D. E. 2006. “The Influence of Jurisprudential Considerations on Supreme Court Decisionmaking:  A  Study of Conflict Cases.” Law & Society Review 40(1): 135–​62. Malhotra, N., and Jessee, S. A. 2014. “Ideological Proximity and Support for the Supreme Court.” Political Behavior 36: 1–​30. Martin, A. D., and Quinn, K. M. 2002. “Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–​1999.” Political Analysis 10: 134–​53. Martin, A. D., and Quinn, K. M. 2013. MCMCpack:  Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) Package. R package version 1.3-​4. Martin, A. D., Quinn, K. M., and Epstein, L. 2004. “The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court.” North Carolina Law Review 83: 1275–​322. Note. 1949. “Mr. Justice Reed: Swing Man or Not?” Stanford Law Review 1(4): 714–​29. Poole, K. T., and Rosenthal, H. 1985. “A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis.” American Journal of Political Science 29: 357–​84. Poole, K. T., and Rosenthal, H. 1991. “Patterns of Congressional Voting.” American Journal of Political Science 35(February): 228–​78. Poole, K. T., and Rosenthal, H. 1997. Congress: A Political-​Economy History of Roll Call Voting. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Pritchett, C. H. 1954. Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court. Chicago, IL:  University of Chicago Press. Quinn, K. M. 2004. “Bayesian Factor Analysis for Mixed Ordinal and Continuous Responses.” Political Analysis 12(4): 338–​53. Raso, C. N., and Eskridge, W. N. 2010. “Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases.” Columbia Law Review 110: 1727–​817. Ray, L. K. 1995. “A Law Clerk and his Justice: What William Rehnquist Did Not Learn from Robert Jackson.” Indiana Law Review 29: 535–​92. Rodell, F. 1955. Nine Men: A Political History of the Supreme Court from 1790 to 1955. New York, NY: Random House. Sag, M., Jacobi, T., and Sytch, M. 2009. “Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property: An Empirical Study.” California Law Review 97(3): 801–​56. Sala, B. R., and Spriggs, J. F. 2004. “Designing Tests of the Supreme Court and the Separation of Powers.” Political Research Quarterly 57(2): 197–​208. Schubert, G. 1959. Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. Schubert, G. 1965. “Jackson’s Judicial Philosophy: An Exploration in Value Analysis.” American Political Science Review 59(4): 940–​63. Segal, J. A., and Cover, A. D. 1989. “Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices.” American Political Science Review 83: 557–​65. Staudt, N., Friedman, B., and Epstein, L. 2007. “On the Role of Ideological Homogeneity in Generating Consequential Constitutional Decisions.” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 10(2): 361–​86. Urofsky, M. 1991. “Conflict among the Brethren: Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas, and the Clash of Personalities and Philosophies on the United States Supreme Court.” Duke Law Journal 1: 71–​113.

536    Daniel E. Ho and Michael Morse Westerland, C., Segal, J. A., Cameron, C. M., and Comparato, S. 2010. “Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the US Court of Appeals.” American Journal of Political Science 54(4): 891–​905. White, G. E. 2005. “Constitutional Change and the New Deal:  The Internalist/​Externalist Debate.” American Historical Review 110: 1094–​115.

Cases Cited Adler v. Board of Educ. of City of New York, 342 U.S. 428 (1952). Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953). Garner v. Board of Public Works of City of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716 (1951). West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

chapter 27

T he U se of Obse rvat i ona l Data to Study L aw a nd the Judic ia ry Sara C. Benesh

The subfield of political science that focuses on the courts has, for quite some time, been fairly self-​conscious about what it ought to be and whether or not the scientific study of courts is either possible or advisable (see, e.g., Louthan 1973; Maveety 2003). In this chapter, I consider the evolution of the field formerly known as public law1 in order to trace the influence of multi-​user databases on the field. After the behavioral revolution, data becomes indispensable. Although many of the pioneers of judicial research started to employ quantitative measures of judicial decisions decades ago, it was only when reliable and publicly available data sets became available that the scientific study of the courts ignited. The continued importance of multi-​user, publicly available data sets to both quantitative and more traditional legal scholars confirms the substantial influence of Harold J. Spaeth’s database and its progeny. I spend some time focusing on that particular source of data and its critics and its impacts before concluding that the very essence of “public law” as a scientific discipline is due to its reliance on empirical methods to answer important, theoretically driven questions, and the Spaeth database and others like it have been essential to the field’s development into a political science of judging. True also, though, that qualitative accounts of judicial behavior have also greatly benefitted from the empirical account of judging made possible by the databases.

A Brief History of the Discipline Pritchett argues that before 1948, “political scientists were not doing research on the judiciary. They were studying constitutional law. They were reading judicial decisions. They were reconstructing judicial philosophies out of the written opinions of members

538   Sara C. Benesh of the Supreme Court … But a concern with the judiciary as a functioning part of the political system, related to other political institutions and processes, had not been developed” (Pritchett 1969: 27, as quoted in Louthan 1973: 89). More history or legal analysis than political science, this traditional way of studying courts, though very dearly held by many in the discipline (see, e.g., Mendelson 1964), began to strain credulity when the Court started behaving in a much more political manner (see, e.g., Schubert 1966), and many members of the discipline saw that analyses like these were unnecessarily distancing the study of courts from the rest of social science in general and political science in particular (Peltason 1953). Hence, dating as far back as 1953, scholars argued for a more mainstream political science approach to judging, treating judges’ decisions similarly to decisions made by other political actors, given that they, like other political actors, are subject to a variety of influences and make decisions that allocate power (Peltason 1953). Peltason argued, “if we turn our attention to the judiciary as a facet in the group struggle and relate the activities of judges to that of other groups, we can begin to develop a political science of public law without trying to ‘out-​history’ the historians, ‘out-​law’ the lawyer, or ‘out-​psychology’ the psychologist” (p. 56). This call for a focus on the scientific study of judging seems ahead of its time, for, while it comes years after Pritchett’s masterful analysis of the Roosevelt Court (Pritchett 1948), it would be many years more before Glendon Schubert began to strongly make the argument for empirically studying decisions and their causes (Schubert 1958). Indeed, the reaction to Schubert’s argument—​the bitter controversy surrounding the seemingly common-​sense notion that attitudes matter to decision-​making, treating such an argument as akin to blasphemy—​demonstrates that Peltason’s view from 1953 was not widely held.2

Is Public Law Political Science? Given that political science in the United States in many ways began with a concern over issues of public law,3 it is odd that, at some point, the study of law and courts became something for the lawyers to do; something outside the mainstream of political science. But public law scholars were late to the shift in focus of the behavioralists from normative and descriptive research to behavioral, scientific methods, and much of their early work was published in law journals rather than political science journals (Schubert 1966). As Bond notes, “the beginning of scientific inquiry is the fact/​value dichotomy” (2007: 899, his emphasis). Legal realism, the behavioral revolution in social science, and the reality of the behavior of the Supreme Court, moved the field along toward a focus on empiricism rather than normativism. Indeed, as the crises surrounding the New Deal played out, no one could continue to ignore the Supreme Court as an integral part of the political system (Schubert 1966). Once scholars started considering the Court as a political institution staffed with political actors, moving from values to facts in Bond’s language, scholars of the Court could use the same methods other political scientists were using to study their subject, hence placing the study of courts squarely within the “social sciences rather than with the humanities” (Schubert 1966: 610). Schubert, in 1958, advocated “the

The Use of Observational Data to Study Law and the Judiciary    539 analysis of judicial decision-​making as an aspect of political behavior,” demonstrating the sorts of questions one could ask about judges using experiments, content analysis, and game theory. In that article, he introduces cumulative scaling, an empirical way to measure the agreement among justices and the ideological positions they take in cases (Schubert 1958: 1007). He elaborates on these themes in his very famous book, Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior (1959), and many empirical analyses of judicial behavior followed (see, e.g., Nagel 1961; Ulmer 1969; Kort 1966; Spaeth 1964). Still, though, the continued consideration by those studying courts of the institutional constraints on judicial behavior, focused as they were on courts as being “different” from other institutions, put them a bit at odds with the rest of the political science discipline (Maveety 2003). And the field itself had and continues to have a substantial debate over the utility and desirability of quantitative versus qualitative analysis. Of course, internal debate over the behavioral approach and its lack of consideration for law may have contributed to the increased distance between those who study courts and other political scientists as it drove some in the courts group to whole-​heartedly focus on the content of Court decisions, engaging more in doctrinal analysis and normative legal theory, turning other political scientists away from their now less-​relevant work (Maveety 2003). Pritchett argued, in 1968, that the behaviorist scholars, who put the political back into the study of the courts and gave the courts community the language and methodology to speak to the rest of political science as a profession, are to be credited for the increase in prestige of the study of courts, but he also hoped that the empirical, behavioral approach would not end up to be the only one accepted by those working in the field.4

Rise of Empiricism and the Need for Data Regardless of the extent to which it succeeded or the capacity it has to succeed, the integration sought of “public law” into the mainstream of the social science discipline of political science relied on behavioralism and, hence, data (Schubert 1966; Pritchett 1968; Grossman and Tannenhaus 1969). “Science requires both theoretical models from which operationalized hypotheses can be inferred and methods for testing such hypotheses with data derived from empirical observations” (Schubert 1966: 600–​1). “Behavioralists advocate a scientific approach with the goal of developing systematic theory out of research that has been carefully designed in advance, that operationalizes the relationships among variables, that employs an articulate methodology, and that relies upon quantification and (so far as possible) statistical measurement” (Schubert 1967a: 120). While both Schubert and Pritchett note that quantitative analyses are not the only fruitful way to study courts (Schubert 1967b; Pritchett 1968; Burbank 2011 agrees), Schubert (and later, Djupe and Epstein 1998, and Spaeth and Segal 2000, and Bond 2007, and

540   Sara C. Benesh many others) argue that, to do science (or at least something closely related to it) and in order that the study of law and courts become more mainstream within the discipline of political science, one needs to accept quantification “as an indispensable component of empirical scientific inquiry” (Schubert 1968: 420). Systematizing the observation of relevant empirical facts via reliable and replicable data collection is, then, key (Bond 2007). But, data contained in a systematized set of observations need not be seen merely as a tool for quantitative research, as empirical information continued in such a collection may also be put to good use by qualitative researchers. The next section focuses on the most prevalent such collection: the Supreme Court Database, which is widely used by both quantitative and qualitative scholars of the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Spaeth Database While there are criticisms of the enterprise of collecting observational data in general as well as arguments over the ways in which Spaeth has done so in particular, it is clear that the most frequently used observational data set on law and courts, the Supreme Court Database—​the Spaeth data, as it is commonly known—​has spawned an enormous amount of scholarship and we have learned an inordinate amount because of its availability. It has also influenced similar efforts worldwide, including databases on other courts (see, e.g., the Songer Database, the Auburn Database, the State Supreme Court Database, the High Courts Database, and the U.S. District Courts Database)5 and other institutions (see, e.g., the Comparative Constitutions Project).6 The Supreme Court Database began as a bit of hubris on Spaeth’s part, as he acknowledges thinking that much of the relatively new empirical research being done on courts was not as good as it could be with better data and that he was just the person to collect and code it (Benesh 2003). He sought and received National Science Foundation funding in 1983, and with continued NSF support, has been able to create, expand, and maintain the data set that colloquially bears his name. The data includes Supreme Court decisions coded for background, chronological, substantive, outcome, and voting/​opinion variables (Spaeth and Segal 2000), including citation information, argument and decision dates, issues and legal provisions considered as well as the votes of each justice in the case. The data also codes the background for each case, the reason the Court grants hearing to the case, the litigants to the case and what “type” they are, the legal authority for the Court’s decision, and whether the case was decided liberally or conservatively. The data specify the outcome in the case and whether, in deciding the case, the justices overturn precedent or declare a statute to be contrary to the constitution.7 Using the data, one can ask a variety of questions dealing with the Court’s and the justices’ behavior as well as obtain rich descriptive data about the Court’s and the justices’ caseload and history. While there are criticisms of the data, as detailed later in the chapter, far more scholars praise the collection than denigrate it. Djupe and Epstein (1998) cite the meticulousness

The Use of Observational Data to Study Law and the Judiciary    541 of Spaeth’s documentation, leading to ease in reproducibility, as well as the data’s known reliability, in endorsing the Spaeth data. They demonstrate, in their cross-​validation of less transparent author-​collected data sets, that something as seemingly inconsequential as the definition of what constitutes a case involving “criminal justice” can have a huge impact on a study’s results. Spaeth pays close attention to making all coding decisions eminently clear and it has always been Spaeth’s aim to make the decisions he makes as transparent as possible, thereby enabling the analyst to make different decisions if she deems them advisable, including the controversial determination of whether a given case has been decided in a liberal or a conservative direction, discussed in more detail later (Benesh 2003; Spaeth and Segal 2000; Epstein, Knight, and Martin 2003). Ho and Quinn recognize this, urging legal academics to add to the Spaeth database what they see as missing from it.8 The general availability of the data is of huge service to those seeking to study courts empirically given that they no longer need to spend hours and hours amassing the data to do so, thereby contributing to the movement of public law into a social science of judicial behavior (Epstein, Knight, and Martin 2003). Epstein, Knight, and Martin sought to encourage those in the legal academy to turn to it more frequently as well (2003), and it seems they have been successful.9 Table 27.1 demonstrates that many citations to the database come in law review articles.10 Legal academics themselves tout its worth, arguing that the “availability of germane data resides at the heart of empirical legal scholarship,” which is seemingly becoming more and more prevalent in law schools (Heise 2003: 826). Data are “the backbone of our knowledge base” (Heise 2003: 829), and “empirical methodologies are well positioned to enhance and complement traditional legal scholarship” (Heise 2003: 849). Shapiro also notes that the availability of the Spaeth data vastly reduces the costs of engaging in that ever-​more-​ important empirical research (2008). But, qualitative researchers may also find much of interest here, and many have, even beyond the legal academy. Only some of the articles cited in Table 27.1 are quantitative analyses of the Supreme Court; quite a few use the database to obtain relevant empirical data used in a qualitative analysis. Hwong (2004) laments the lack of a similar datasource for other countries, suggesting that more knowledge about his country of interest, Canada, can only be obtained via empirical research, which requires data. Of course, his concern is ameliorated with the release of the aforementioned High Courts Database, one of the Spaeth database’s progeny. Be it the legal academy or within political science, in the United States or abroad, this “greatest single resource of data on the Court” (Epstein 2000: 225) has had a huge impact on the field and beyond.

The Impact of the Databases Epstein (2000:  131)  claims that “studies of Supreme Court decision-​making nearly always rely on the Spaeth databases for their empirical work,” and the front page of the new home of the Database asserts: “In short, the U.S. Supreme Court Database has not

Table 27.1 Citations to the Spaeth database Books published by: Cambridge University Press Lexington Books Lynne Rienner Publishing MIT Press Oxford University Press Peter Lang Princeton University Press Psychology Press Routledge Press Springer State University of New York Press Susquehanna University Press Temple University Press University of Virginia Press Articles in the following journals: Law California Law Review DePaul Law Review Duke Law Journal Hastings Law Journal Journal of Empirical Legal Studies Journal of Legal Studies Saint Louis University Law Review Stanford Law Review Supreme Court Economic Review University of Colorado Law Review University of Pennsylvania Law Review Political science

General American Journal of Political Science American Political Science Review (Continued)

Table 27.1 Continued Books published by: American Politics Research Annual Review of Political Science Journal of Political Science Journal of Politics Perspectives on Politics Political Research Quarterly PS: Political Science & Politics Southeastern Political Review

Subfield Journals Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization Journal of Legal Studies Judicature Justice System Journal Law & Courts Law & Policy Law & Social Inquiry Law & Society Review Legislative Studies Quarterly Policy Studies Journal Political Analysis Political Communication Politics & Policy Publius Social Networks

Psychology Journal of Applied Social Psychology Journal of Business and Psychology Personality and Social Psychology

Economics American Economic Review (Continued)

Table 27.1 Continued Books published by: Business Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal

Criminal justice American Journal of Criminal Justice Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice

Communication Negotiation and Conflict Management Research

Interdisciplinary Poetics Social Science History Social Science Journal

Public administration Journal of Public Administration

International Berghahn Books European Political Science Review IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing Philippine Political Science Journal Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies Papers presented at the following conferences: Annual Conference of the American Politics Group APSA MPSA Political Methodology Summer Conference Public Choice SPSA Washington University Ideal Point Estimation Conference Workshop on Correlated Data WPSA Source: Google Scholar search, May 2, 2014 and June 8, 2014

The Use of Observational Data to Study Law and the Judiciary    545 just helped fill gaps in our knowledge. It is one of those rare creatures in the law and social science world: an invention that has substantially advanced a large area of study, inspiring research by scholars hailing from no fewer than three and as many as seven disciplines” (Spaeth et  al. 2015, emphasis theirs). Benesh (2003) corroborates these assertions via her study of publications from 1991 to 2000 in the top two journals in political science (the American Political Science Review, and the American Journal of Political Science). Of those articles about law and courts that used some sort of data, Benesh shows that around 80 percent used the Spaeth data. That figure underestimates usage, though, given that the list of articles she cites include studies of public opinion and state supreme courts for which the Spaeth data were obviously irrelevant. She also notes fifty-​nine citations to the database in the Social Science Citation index as of 2000 (Benesh 2003: 117). A Google Scholar search similarly demonstrates the pervasiveness of the database, perhaps to an even greater degree: at least 352 studies cite to the database, nearly always because they rely on it for their data (though it is certainly possible that they cite to it to note that it would not be useful or will not be used).11 However, not all studies that employ the Spaeth data cite it in a way that will get it “counted” by Google Scholar, so that number is also likely an undercount. Indeed, there has not been, until now,12 any single, clear method to cite to the databases, and many works do so quite casually given how well known the data are. Merely attempting to generate a list of citations demonstrates the wide range in citation formats used by those who wish to attribute something to the database. Add to that problem the fact that there exists more than one database13 and that the databases have been housed in several different places,14 and one must consider many different formats in amassing a list of citations. I certainly may have missed some. In my Google Scholar search, I found more than forty-​eight independent citation-​types that all clearly cite to one of the Spaeth databases. Amassing those citations into a list and then deleting duplicates, I find 352 citations including books, book chapters, peer-​ reviewed articles, law review articles, conference papers, working papers, and speeches that reference the database, likely because they relied on it for data. This constitutes, in itself, a substantial impact. However, also evident in that listing of citations is the breadth of influence the database has had. Table 27.1 lists the book publishers and journals that published work citing to the Spaeth data and two things are clear: the best research (research published by the best presses and journals) rely on the data; and, the data has a far reach, well beyond political science and the law, making it quite likely that researchers even far afield are aware of it and have, perhaps, used it. The data have been used in studies in psychology, in analyses of public administration, in criminal justice, economics, business and international research, and studies using the data have been presented at conferences in several different fields. The media has also employed the data to good effect (see, e.g., Liptak 2010). It is surely true that the Spaeth data brought the study of courts into the mainstream of political science—​“few law and courts scholars would doubt the valuable insights gained” by data sets like it (Tolley 2013: 7)—​but it did so much more than that (and continues to do so), in so many fields.

546   Sara C. Benesh

Criticisms of the Spaeth Database It is clear, no matter what metric is used, that the Spaeth database has had a far-​ reaching impact on the scientific study of the Supreme Court.15 However, no single source of data will be without error nor will any systematic coding scheme be universally applauded, regardless of how carefully it was designed and how meticulously it defines its choices. One such choice in the Spaeth database is that over the essence of the case: the coding of the “issue” as the Spaeth database labels it. In his codebook, Spaeth advances the explicit expectation that cases are usually, at bottom, about one thing, and so a single issue code is generally preferred, with some exceptions (Spaeth et al. 2015). The issue, according to Spaeth, refers to the subject matter of the controversy, not its legal basis (which is coded as its “legal provision” instead), and the most important issue of the case is the one on which Spaeth focuses (Spaeth et al. 2015). These two decisions—​to code the most important issue and to focus on the public policy rather than the legal basis—​are arguably controversial. Ho and Quinn, for example, think the preference for a single issue is overly reductionist and may have resulted in an artifact that we take to be a real finding—​that the justices see the cases in a unidimensional space that ideology can fairly readily explain (Ho and Quinn 2010: 852). This is a problem because “the issues less central from a public policy standpoint may precisely present the complex doctrines that defy ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ classification” (Ho and Quinn 2010: 852). Shapiro also questions this preference for a single issue code in each case (Shapiro 2008). She argues that the Spaeth coding results in underinclusiveness on issues (especially those she considers to be “legal issues”) as well as on legal provisions (the legal basis for the Court’s decision) (Shapiro 2008: 490). Because of this underinclusiveness, she argues, the extant findings regarding the prevalence of ideology over legal considerations should be considered with skepticism, especially given that the determination over which issue to code is not as transparent as it could be. While it is likely true that one could add issues to cases in the database, it is not nearly as self-​evident that doing so would be a useful addition. And, while Shapiro makes a good point that the determination of the most important issue is, in some ways, “invisible and … based on unarticulated criteria,” that determination is likely not very difficult to make in nearly all cases (Shapiro 2008: 511). Most students of the Court have written case briefs in some undergraduate or law course and in so doing have followed a similar process to the one Spaeth follows in identifying the major issue in the case. Shapiro overestimates, I think, the extent to which these decisions are controversial, and underestimates the benefit of having coded the heart of the matter to which the case reaches in order that scholars might use those decisions to understand decision-​making, seems substantial. And, it is unclear that Shapiro’s implicit assumption in coding more issues—​that they are all equally important to understanding of the case outcome—​is defensible either. True, a scholar interested in legal doctrine will not get much from the database. However, should a reliable and valid means exist to code legal doctrine (as, e.g., Segal and Howard

The Use of Observational Data to Study Law and the Judiciary    547 2002 attempt do with originalism), scholars may certainly do so, adding those variables to their copy of the database. Additional criticism, as mentioned earlier, centers on the most-​used variables in the database: the outcome variables, which include a liberal/​conservative direction variable. Young, for example, argues that coding a decision as liberal or conservative is “put forward as intuitive and non-​controversial,” while he sees them as problematic and non-​obvious and “crude,” making a philosophical argument over the definition of liberalism and conservativism and their complexity (Young 2002: 1189). Ho and Quinn assert, “The U.S. Supreme Court Database is a landmark data collection effort, single-​ handedly responsible for major findings in the study of judicial behavior, yet its directional codings—​credible in many instances—​can be questionable” (Ho and Quinn 2010: 837). They also advocate a more straightforward outcome variable that just measures, in standing cases for example, whether the Court favors or opposes issuing standing. Stearns further argues that requiring each case outcome to be coded as liberal or conservative may, in fact, be a “self-​fulfilling prophecy” given that “the databases were constructed in reference to, and in large part with confidence in, the attitudinal model” (Stearns 2000: 238). It is likely that Harvey and Woodruff would agree, and they go even further, arguing that the coding in the database suffers from confirmation bias given that the choice of which issue to code sometimes drives the ideological direction of the coding (2011). The seriousness of their claim makes a bit more attention to their argument justified. Comparing the Spaeth directional variable to what they call an “objectively coded outcome variable” (created via the DW-​NOMINATE scores of the legislators passing the federal statute at issue in cases involving statutory interpretation, and then categorizing the directionality as the same or different depending on whether the Court overturns or upholds the statute), the authors show that, for the 1980–​93 terms, the database codes cases as conservative far more frequently than the statute-​based measure does. This is evidence, they argue, that “a coder’s expectations about how the justices’ preferences affect case outcomes may be biasing that coder’s issue coding decisions” which, in turn, affects the directionality coded for the case. In other words, Harvey and Woodruff charge that the coders (in all of the instances they consider, Spaeth himself) choose an issue that comports with the ideological direction he expects a given Court to rule in rather than the equally acceptable issue code he could have used that would have produced the opposite outcome (Harvey and Woodruff 2011). Again, this is a hefty charge, and it strains credulity given the systematic coding process described in the documentation used by Spaeth at this time. In addition, it is unclear why an ideology measure that is, when a statute is overturned, merely the opposite of the Congressional ideology of those voting in favor of a bill is somehow better or value-​free. While I agree with them over the FTC v. SCTLA (493 U.S. 411) case they cite (e.g., that it is more of an antitrust than a free speech case, which would, in fact, reverse the direction from conservative to liberal), one error does not an argument make. Indeed, in considering the list of cases the authors use in making their argument, I find that in nearly every instance, the Spaeth coding was eminently reasonable and the outcome measure used by the

548   Sara C. Benesh authors—​the extent to which Democrats voted in favor of the statute at issue and the Court’s action on the statute—​severely wanting. While I address their claims more specifically elsewhere,16 for now, a few examples suffice to demonstrate the problems with their argument. In Hannah v. Larche (363 U.S. 420), the procedures of the Federal Commission on Civil Rights are in question, given that it does not allow for confrontation of witnesses. The database codes this as a due process case and codes the outcome as conservative, as the Court finds that confrontation is not necessary to due process in hearings conducted by this particular body. Harvey and Woodruff assert that this ought to have been coded as a liberal outcome given that the law at issue is a liberal one and the Court does not overturn it (2011). True, the creation of the Commission was the result of Democratic legislation, but that it does not protect some rights of those who come before the commission is not a typically “liberal” position. Similarly, a classically liberal law, the Social Security Act (SSA), is at issue in Flemming v. Nestor (363 U.S. 603), where the Court upholds the termination of old-​age benefits to the plaintiff, deported due to membership in the Communist Party. Harvey and Woodruff would consider this decision, which upholds the constitutionality of the SSA, to be a liberal one. It is surely true that more Democrats than Republicans voted for the SSA, but the inclusion of these anti-​communist measures was possibly a compromise or possibly a product of the times, and a decision upholding the exclusion of benefits due to Communist Party members is surely not a liberal decision, even if the statute itself was favored by Democrats. Passage of a statute and its application are two very different things, and Spaeth rightly considers the application of the statute to a given situation, as does the Court. In addition, considering an entire statute–​–​every single provision—​to have the same ideological direction as the statute as a whole (as measured by yea votes on the full measure), may be too much. When Spaeth codes case outcomes as liberal or conservative, as discussed earlier, many argue his measure is too blunt. However, court cases have a clear winner and a clear loser. When Harvey and Woodruff rely on the votes of legislators on a piece of legislation as a whole and the Court’s treatment of that legislation in its entirety, it is far grosser, ignoring as it does the many facets of any given piece of legislation and the many reasons for their inclusion. In addition, it counts the Court’s decision as opposite only when the Court takes the relatively extraordinary step of overturning it (Keith 2007). I do not see this as an improvement over the Spaeth model. (There are many more examples of this sort of problem among the cases they consider to be wrongly coded by Spaeth.) Even when a particular law is arguably correctly labeled, as a whole, as liberal or conservative, the Court’s decision overturning a portion of it, referencing as it does a particular application of the statute, is not necessarily its ideological opposite. Consider U.S. v. Freed (401 U.S. 601). The National Firearms Act is probably correctly considered to be a liberal piece of legislation. But, in this case, the Court upheld it, but made a conservative decision—​that the registration requirements it imposed on transfers did not constitute self-​incrimination. A decision against an accused is rightly considered to be conservative, and that case is coded as such by Spaeth. The application of the law, in this

The Use of Observational Data to Study Law and the Judiciary    549 case, limits the rights of those accused of a particular crime. There are many examples like this in the Harvey and Woodruff list as well. But it should not be surprising when a prior, liberal Congress passes legislation that is later limited in its application by a conservative Supreme Court. This is not unlike what happened after Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436). I doubt we would code a case like Rhode Island v. Innis (446 U.S. 291), which came after Miranda and was decided considering the precedent in Miranda as a liberally decided case merely because it didn’t overturn Miranda. Why should we do so when it comes to statutes enacted by Democrats (or Republicans facing a liberal Court)? There are instances as well where Harvey and Woodruff ascribe directionality to a statute that likely doesn’t have one (the statute creating the Postal Service, in USPS v. Council of Greenburgh, 453 U.S. 114, for example) or ascribe a directionality to a nearly unanimously approved statute (the Victims of Crime Act, at issue in U.S. v. Munoz-​Florez, 495 U.S. 385). Indeed, in Munoz-​Florez, the claim of confirmation bias is particularly difficult to sustain given that Spaeth might have coded this case, in which a judge sentences a defendant to make a contribution to the Crime Victims Fund because he committed a federal misdemeanor (aiding illegal alien entry), as a criminal case (either involving financial statutory interpretation or sentencing), but instead chose the arguably better federal taxation code, given that the question was whether this forced contribution amounted to a tax and was hence unconstitutional under the Origination Clause, leading him to a liberal rather than conservative outcome for the conservative Rehnquist Court. Indeed, the argument that many of the issue codes are equally viable for a given case is inconsistent with the database’s focus, however amenable to criticism, on the most important issue. Surely one could not argue that the number of issues that could plausibly be considered to be the most important at issue in a given case is very large. Consider FTC v. Superior Court, 493 US. 411, concerning a lawyer boycott due to low compensation for court-​appointed counsel. The FTC charged the lawyers with price-​fixing and violating the Sherman Act, while the lawyers argued that they ought to be exempted from such a charge given the expressive content of their boycott. The Court found that the actions by the lawyers violated the Sherman Act as it was aimed more at economic benefits than at free expression. One could plausibly code this case as involving attorney compensation or antitrust, but isn’t the crux of the issue really whether or not the Court saw the boycott as expressive? That expression, and not the Sherman Act, is what Spaeth codes as the most important issue, making the case one decided in a conservative direction. Given the above, I see the confirmation bias claim as unsubstantiated. As a side note, given the new format of the database and the interface used to code cases, wherein separate coders focus on the issue/​direction and the voting coalitions (such that the issue/​ direction coders do not consider the opinion author in any conscious, systematic way), a claim of confirmation bias will become even more incredible. Even after all of these criticisms, though, there is still an easy fix for any who quibble with the coding Spaeth employed: change it. Those who deem certain coding rules to be problematic can recode those variables. Those who deem the database to exclude important information can add it. As noted earlier, Spaeth has always been very vocal about the database’s customizability. The decision rules are clear. If one dislikes them, one can alter them. The

550   Sara C. Benesh coding in the Database is but a foundation for others to build upon and modify, with fullest blessings from its creator. Indeed, its transparency and adaptability is part of its beauty.

Studying Courts Using Data The study of courts has been tremendously advanced via the availability of data, key to an empirical, scientific analysis of the decision-​making of the political actors that make up the judiciary. Data availability has also enabled a rich and complete description of its work. While no database containing observational data will ever be perfect, the substantial contributions made to the knowledge base on judicial behavior of the Spaeth data cannot be ignored, nor can the contributions of the Spaeth database’s progeny (including the Songer Database,17 the Brace and Hall State Supreme Court Database,18 the National High Courts Database,19 and the U.S. District Court Database)20 be overstated.21 The Songer Database, for example, has revolutionized the study of the intermediate appellate courts in the federal system, providing the opportunity for scholars to learn about and test hypotheses about circuit judge behavior in a way that was impossible before it existed (Hurtwitz and Kuersten 2012). And again, not only is it the case that quantitative research has flourished as a result, but we also know more factual information about the Courts of Appeals than ever before, driving further research and analysis (see, Songer, Sheehan, and Haire 2000).22 And without the systematic use of observational data in empirical scholarship, the science in political science would be suspect. Certainly, one can study courts in a variety of ways and historical, institutional, biographical, and doctrinal work should be supported and continued (and, indeed, can and does also benefit from the contents of these databases). But if we want to study courts as another political institution in the way of a political scientist, even if we wish to treat it as somehow special, we need observational data.23 Lucky for us, the Spaeth data are available, current, valid, reliable, inclusive, and easier to use than ever before, and its progeny continue to grow.24 Indeed, the Spaeth database itself is expanding, being backdated so that we have reliable data going back to the earliest Courts, enabling us to learn even more than we have already. Continuing on this path of expanding the data is an important goal, and, like Epstein, Knight, and Martin (2003), Ho and Quinn (2010), and Stearns (2000), I am hopeful that ever more aspects of judicial decision-​making will be coded and made available for analysis25 so that we can learn more, in a rigorous and systematic way, about the myriad influences on judicial decision-​making.

Notes 1. I say formerly because, generally speaking, those studying courts in political science departments today label their field “judicial behavior” or “judicial politics” or “law and courts.” As Maveety notes, there was much hand-​wringing surrounding the movement away from the public law label, which referred to the distinction between private lawsuits and those between an individual and the government, though many position descriptions still use it (Maveety 2003: 3).

The Use of Observational Data to Study Law and the Judiciary    551 2. See Benesh (2003) for a discussion of a particularly heated exchange at a conference in 1960, as told through letters between Harold Spaeth and Glendon Schubert. 3. As Schubert (1966) and Maveety (2003) discuss, many of the first “political science” departments had their genesis in public law. For example, Columbia created the first School of Political Science in 1880 when Theodore Dwight and John Burgess could not agree over whether or not public law ought to be taught in a law school. Most of the early courses in the school were offered by professors with joint appointments with the law school and centered around law. (Students in the department also took courses from history and economics.) The scholars affiliated with this School and those affiliated with the department of politics at Princeton, another early program, envisioned a descriptive, yet empirical, but also normative study of politics and government based on the German model (Maveety 2003). Scholars coming later were more interested in a “behavioral, functionalist, and ‘scientific’ approach” (Maveety 2003: 2). 4. He ends his 1968 article with a quote many considering the history and development of the field of law and courts have used: “Let a hundred flowers bloom” (p. 509). Just before that, Pritchett says, “Hopefully the field of public law … will remain catholic enough to accommodate those political scientists who continue to find interest in the data of constitutional history, judicial biography, jurisprudence, the philosophies of judges, and commentaries on Supreme Court decisions. There are both traditionalists and behaviorists who think that the gate is strait and the way narrow into the public law kingdom, but a more sensible text for all to contemplate is the old Chinese saying, ‘Let a hundred flowers bloom’ ” (Pritchett 1968: 509). 5. The U.S. District Court Database will be made available very soon at the Inter-​University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan. 6. Formal citations for all of these databases are in the references. 7. See Spaeth and Segal 2000 for more detail, or visit the database’s new home at supremecourtdatabase.org. 8. Ho and Quinn (2010) argue that “clear conceptions of legal doctrine” (2010: 852) are missing from the database, and, while it is mostly true that Spaeth does not code various legal arguments, Ho and Quinn do seemingly miss the contributions of the individual-​level databases, when they suggest that legal academics might also add more “jurisprudentially meaningful data” on the reasons for, for example, disagreement among the justices (2010: 853). By focusing on the individual justices and their opinions, the individual-​level database would indeed demonstrate, for example, whether dissents were over the same issues or whether, instead, one justice focused on jurisdiction while another focused on the actual substantive issue in the case. See Benesh and Spaeth (2007) for an analysis of a similar question. 9. Epstein and King, in their discussion of replication standards and good empirical work, also point to the database as a way to improve the empirical research of legal academics (Epstein and King 2002). 10. Of course, this citation count may be a substantial undercount given both the tendency for casual citation to the Spaeth databases (discussed below) as well as due to incomplete coverage of law reviews in Google Scholar, at least according to HeinOnline (see http://​ heinonline.blogspot.com/​2009/​11/​heinonline-​or-​google-​scholar-​why-​you.html). 11. The search used was “Spaeth Database” and the search was conducted on May 2, 2014 and rechecked via the search “Unites States Supreme Court Database” on June 8, 2014. The numbers reported consider 100 pages of results for each search.

552   Sara C. Benesh 12. The new home for the database, supremecourtdatabase.org, suggests the following citation: Harold J. Spaeth, Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal, Theodore J. Ruger, and Sara C. Benesh. 2015. Supreme Court Database, Version 2015 Release 01. URL: http://​ supremecourtdatabase.org. I discuss the new home and all that it adds later in this chapter. 13. There is the big, original database, composed only of decisions on the merits (which used to be called allcourt), the one covering only the Vinson and Warren Courts and including conference vote data along with merit voting data (the old vinwar data set), the expanded Burger Court database, which adds conference vote data for that Court (burger), and the justice-​centered databases (called rehnflpd, burgflpd, and warflpd). 14. First, the data were available via ICPSR at the University of Michigan. Then, the Program for Law and Judicial Politics at Michigan State University housed them. They subsequently moved to the University of Kentucky’s Judicial Research Initiative, which itself moved to the University of South Carolina. There is now a link from the Judicial Research Initiative’s website to the database’s new and permanent home at Washington University in St. Louis, at supremecourtdatabase.org. 15. Some criticize that impact, however, and the degree to which it has limited study of more legally oriented variables, as discussed above. Benesh (2003), for example, considers whether the database may have moved the field into a more single-​minded pursuit of quantitative studies, or whether it may have stymied theory-​building by making data so readily available. 16. See Benesh, n.d. 17. The U.S. Appeals Court Database available online at the Judicial Research Initiative, http://​ artsandsciences.sc.edu/​poli/​juri/​appct.htm. 18. The State Supreme Court Data Project is available online at http://​www.ruf.rice.edu/​ ~pbrace/​statecourt/​. 19. The National High Courts Database is also available via the Judicial Research Initiative at the University of South Carolina: http://​artsandsciences.sc.edu/​poli/​juri/​highcts.htm. 20. The U.S. District Courts Database will soon be housed at the Inter-​University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan, https://​www.icpsr.umich. edu/​icpsrweb/​landing.jsp. 21. Many other publicly available data sets exist as well. For one catalogue of them, see Tolley (2013). 22. A series of Google Scholar searches for citations to the “Songer Database” or the “U.S. Courts of Appeals Database” (considering the first ten pages of results) suggests that at least forty-​six papers used the data to answers questions about the circuit courts since its inception in the late 1990s. This is most assuredly an undercount given that many known books on the circuit courts that employ the data are not among the search results. It is likely the Songer Database suffers from the same lack of agreed-​upon citation format as the Spaeth database did. 23. Of course, many would take umbrage at my classification of more qualitative work as something other than science. See Thomas (2006) for a solid argument against mine. 24. Earlier critiques of the database complained about how complicated its structure was, making it far less useful to those less familiar with data analysis and statistical programs (see, e.g., Benesh 2003, Stearns 2000), and Benesh (2006) was written explicitly to help people successfully navigate the choices one needed to make to run analyses that made sense. The new version of the Spaeth database, however, makes all of those issues moot,

The Use of Observational Data to Study Law and the Judiciary    553 as it incorporates better, more user-​friendly technology to allow users to explore and run simple analyses on the data online, without downloading it into a statistical package. A given case can be explored without consulting the codebook for what a specific numeric issue code means because the information produced is in words rather than numbers. And records in the Database are linked to the full opinion in the case so checking on coding or exploring particular arguments is extremely easy. Finally, the new homepage offers measures of salience and ideology that are state-​of-​the-​art and easily importable into the Database. 25. Already, legalistic variables have been coded and analyzed in individual research projects. For example, Segal and Howard (2002) code for the use of “originalism” in one paper, and legislative deference in another (2004). Spaeth and Segal attempt to measure the influence of precedent (1999). Richards and Kritzer consider “jurisprudential regimes” (2002) and Bartels (2009) considers levels of scrutiny. Benesh and Spaeth consider case framing as a legal constraint (2007). And, Corley, Howard, and Nixon (2005) consider use of the Federalist papers.

References Bartels, B. 2009. “The Constraining Capacity of Legal Doctrine on the United States Supreme Court.” American Political Science Review 103(3): 474–​95. Benesh, S. C. 2003. “Harold J.  Spaeth:  The Supreme Court Computer.” In The Pioneers of Judicial Behavior, edited by N. Maveety. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Benesh, S. C. 2006. “Becoming an Intelligent User of the Spaeth Databases.” Law & Courts 16(1): 15–​21. Benesh, S. C. n.d. “A Response to Harvey and Woodruff.” Manuscript. Benesh, S. C., and Spaeth, H. J. 2007. “The Constraint of Law:  A  Study of Supreme Court Dissensus.” American Politics Research 35: 755–​68. Bond, J. R. 2007. “The Scientification of the Study of Politics:  Some Observations on the Behavior Evolution in Political Science.” Journal of Politics 69(4): 897–​907. Brace, P., and Hall, M. G. 2005. State Supreme Court Data Project. Available at: http://​www.ruf. rice.edu/​~pbrace/​statecourt/​. Burbank, S. B. 2011. “On the Study of Judicial Behaviors:  Of Law, Politics, Science, and Humanity.” In What’s Law Got to Do With It? What Judges Do, Why They Do It, and What’s at Stake, edited by C. G. Geyh. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 41–​70. Corley, P. C., Howard, R. M., and Nixon, D. C. 2005. “The Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The Use of the Federalist Papers.” Political Research Quarterly 58(2): 329–​40. Djupe, P. A., and Epstein, L. 1998. “From Schubert’s The Judicial Mind to Spaeth’s U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Data Base: A Crossvalidation.” American Journal of Political Science 42(3): 1012–​19. Epstein, L. 2000. “Introduction:  Social Science, the Courts, and the Law.” Judicature 83(5): 224–​7. Epstein, L., and King, G. 2002. “The Rules of Inference.” University of Chicago Law Review 69: 1–​100. Epstein, L., Knight, J., and Martin, A. D. 2003. “The Political (Science) Context of Judging.” Saint Louis University Law Journal 47: 783–​817.

554   Sara C. Benesh Grossman, J. B., and Tanenhaus, J. 1969. “Toward a Renascence of Public Law.” In Frontiers of Judicial Research, edited by J. B. Grossman and J. Tanenhaus. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, 3–​25. Harvey, A., and Woodruff, M. J. 2011. “Confirmation Bias in the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database.” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 29(2): 414–​60. Heise, M. 2003. “The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism.” University of Illinois Law Review 2002(4): 819–​50. Ho, D. E., and Quinn, K. M. 2010. “How Not to Lie with Judicial Votes:  Misconceptions, Measurement, and Models.” California Law Review 98: 813–​76. Hurwitz, M. S., and Kuersten, A. 2012. “Changes in the Circuits:  Exploring the Courts of Appeals Databases and the Federal Appellate Courts.” Judicature 96(1): 23–​34. Hwong, T. 2004. “A Review of Quantitative Studies of Decision Making in the Supreme Court of Canada.” Manitoba Law Journal 30: 353–​82. Keith, L. C. 2007. “The United States Supreme Court and Judicial Review of Congress, 1803–​ 2001.” Judicature 90(4): 166–​76. Kort, F. 1966. “Quantitative Analysis of Fact-​Patterns and Cases and their Impact on Judicial Decisions.” Harvard Law Review 79(8): 1595–​603. Liptak, A. 2010. “Court under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades.” The New York Times, July 24. Available at: http://​www.nytimes.com/​2010/​07/​25/​us/​25roberts.html?_​r=0. Louthan, W. C. 1973. “Public Law and Political Science: Subfield or Subterfuge?” Journal of Legal Education 26: 87–​97. Maveety, N. 2003. “The Study of Judicial Behavior and the Discipline of Political Science.” In The Pioneers of Judicial Behavior, edited by N. Maveety. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1–​51. Mendelson, W. 1964. “The Untroubled World of Jurimetrics.” Journal of Politics 26(4): 914–​22. Nagel, S. S. 1961. “Political Party Affiliations and Judges’ Decisions.” American Political Science Review 55(4): 843–​50. Peltason, J. W. 1953. “ A Political Science of Public Law.” Southwestern Social Science Quarterly 34(3): 51–​6. Pritchett, C. H. 1948. The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values 1937–​1947. New York, NY: The Macmillan Company. Pritchett, C. H. 1968. “Public Law and Judicial Behavior.” Journal of Politics 30(2): 480–​509. Pritchett, C. H. 1969. “The Development of Judicial Research.” In Frontiers of Judicial Research, edited by J. B. Grossman and J. Tanenhaus. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, 27–​42. Richards, M. J., and Kritzer, H. M. 2002. “Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Decision Making.” American Political Science Review 96(2): 305–​20. Schubert, G. A. 1958. “The Study of Judicial Decision-​Making as an Aspect of Political Behavior.” American Political Science Review 52(4): 1007–​25. Schubert, G. A. 1959. Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. Schubert, G. A. 1966. “The Future of Public Law.” George Washington Law Review 34(4): 593–​614. Schubert, G. A. 1967a. “Academic Ideology and the Study of Adjudication.” American Political Science Review 61(1): 106–​29. Schubert, G. A. 1967b. “Ideologies and Attitudes, Academic and Judicial.” Journal of Politics 29(1): 3–​40. Schubert, G. A. 1968. “Behavioral Jurisprudence.” Law & Society Review 2(3): 407–​28.

The Use of Observational Data to Study Law and the Judiciary    555 Segal, J. A., and Howard, R. 2002. “An Original Look at Originalism.” Law & Society Review 1(1): 113–​38. Segal, J. A., and Howard, R. 2004. “A Preference for Deference? The Supreme Court and Judicial Review.” Political Research Quarterly 3(1): 131–​43. Shapiro, C. 2008. “Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis of the Supreme Court.” Hastings Law Journal 60: 477–​539. Songer, D. 2010. The United States Courts of Appeals Database. Available at: http://​artsandsciences.sc.edu/​poli/​juri/​appct.htm. Songer, D., Sheehan, R. S., and Haire, S. B. 2000. Continuity and Change on the United States Courts of Appeals. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Spaeth, H. J. 1964. “The Judicial Restraint of Mr. Justice Frankfurter—​Myth or Reality” Midwest Journal of Political Science 8(1): 22–​38. Spaeth, H. J., Epstein, L., Martin, A. D., Segal, J. A., Ruger, T., and Benesh, S. C. 2015. Supreme Court Database, Version 2015 Release 01. Available at: http://​scdb.wustl.edu. Spaeth, H. J., and Segal, J. A. 1999. Majority Rule or Minority Will: Adherence to Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Spaeth, H. J., and Segal, J. A. 2000. “The U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Data Base: Providing New Insights into the Court.” Judicature 83(5): 228–​35. Stearns, M. L. 2000. “Why Should Lawyers Care about Institutional Data on Courts?” Judicature 83(5): 236–​76. Thomas, G. 2006. “What Dataset? The Qualitative Foundations of Law and Courts Scholarship.” Law & Courts 16(1): 5–​12. Tolley, M. C. 2013. “Data Sets in the Field of Law and Courts: Advancing Empirical Judicial Research.” Law & Courts 23(1): 7–​18. Ulmer, S. S. 1969. “The Dimensionality of Judicial Voting Behavior.” Midwest Journal of Political Science 13(3): 471–​83. Young, E. A. 2002. “Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics.” University of Colorado Law Review 73: 1139–​216.

Other Readings Carp, R. A., and Manning, K. L. 2015. U.S. District Court Database. Available at the Inter-​ University Consortium for Social Research, University of Michigan. Elkins, Z., Melton, J., and Ginsburg, T. 2015. The Comparative Constitutions Project. Available at http://​www.constitute.org. Haynie, S. L., Sheehan, R. S., Songer, D. R., and Tate, C. N. 2007. High Courts Judicial Database. Available at the University of South Carolina Judicial Research Initiative, http://​www.cas. sc.edu/​poli/​juri. Zuk, G., Barrow, D. J., and Gryski, G. S. 2009. A Multi-​User Data Base on the Attributes of U.S. Appeals Court Judges. Available at: http://​artsandsciences.sc.edu/​poli/​juri/​appct.htm.

Index

abortion  13, 36, 129, 280, 313, 346, 367, 387, 450, 469–​70, 495 see also cases, types of, abortion and pro-​choice views and pro-​life views Abraham, Henry  520 academics/​academia  viii–​ix, 25n.15, 36, 55, 70, 75, 103, 112, 114, 116, 149, 210, 295–​6, 299, 352, 485–​6, 496, 541, 545–​6, 550n.1, 551n.9 access to courts  vi, 149, 152, 154, 156, 161–​2, 165nn.7 and 9 accountability  48, 59, 257, 260, 276, 325, 381, 394, 402 ACLU, the 9 activists  8, 10–​15, 17, 21–​3, 25nn.8 and 16, 300 see also interest groups and party activists Acts  Amendatory Act of 1802  444 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) (1996)  152 Bakeshop Act of 1895  277–​8 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984  77 Civil Justice Reform Act (1990)  141 Civil Rights Act of 1964  152, 469 Clean Air Act of 1963  112 Court of Appeals Act (1891)   182n.2 Defense of Marriage Act  280 Ethics Reform Act of 1989  77 Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA)  156 Federal Employee Liability Act (FELA)  178 Gun Free School Zones Act (1990)  389 Judicial Circuit Act of 1866  444 Judiciary Act of 1789  3, 165n.7, 274, 385–​6 Judiciary Act of 1869  77 Judiciary Act of 1869  410, 444 Judiciary Act of 1919  77 Judiciary Act of 1925  169, 182nn.1–​2 Judiciary Act of 1939  77 Judiciary Act of 1954  77 Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act  389

Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act (ACA) (2010)  186, 199nn.1 and 6, 353, 432 Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) (1996) 152 Sherman Act  549 Social Security Act  548 Speedy Trial Act of 1974  190 Voting Rights Act  182n.1, 280, 310 Adams, John Quincy  273 administration  74–​5, 393, 427, 466–​7, 544–​5 see also bureaucrats Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts  71, 92, 142, 157, 165n.16 affirmative action  36, 129, 361, 418 Africa 451, 502n.2 agency preferences  466–​7 agenda-​setting  365–​6, 404, 410, 420 role of law clerks in  100, 106–​7, 171–​2, 181–​2 on the U.S. Supreme Court  169, 174–​81, 182 and n.5, 183n.7, 259 cue theory of  174–​5, 179 process for  169–​76 Aid to Families with Dependent Children  391 Alabama 55, 356n.9 Alito, Samuel  58, 212, 314–​15, 353 appointment of  29, 41 opinions of 432 Allen, M.D.  423, 449–​50 Alliance for Justice  10 Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADA)  141 American Bar Association (ABA)  31, 33, 55, 91 American Civil Liberties Union Women’s Rights Project 362 American Constitution Society (ACS)  181, 352 Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) 34, 261 American Lawyer 90 American Revolution, the  276 amicus  115, 411, 422 see also amicus curiae and briefs, amicus

558   Index amicus curiae  vii, 213, 240, 361, 363–​7 1, 373–​4, 411, 422 “anchoring”  489–​90 Anderson, J.M.  91 Anti-​Federalist Papers, the  460 Anti-​Monopoly League, the  36 appeal  vi, 136, 139, 153 see also appeals and judicial review and petitions, for certiorari decision to  154–​6, 190 likelihood of an  139, 179 odds of winning an  155 rates of  133, 154, 160, 162 rights to an  138, 165n.8, 200n.13 standing to 150 winning an 156 appeals  159, 162–​3, 164 and nn.3–​4, 186, 291, 489 number of  160, 162 statutory  169–​70, 182n.1 treatment of  161–​4 see also petitions, for certiorari, granting, process regarding appellate courts  vi, 3, 6, 12–​13, 138–​9, 140, 142, 149–​51, 155, 157, 161–​4, 222, 232n.11, 259, 274, 294–​5, 328, 353, 362, 365, 368, 406, 550 see also State courts, of appeal and U.S. circuit courts and U.S. courts of Appeals and U.S. Supreme Court access to see access to courts courtroom proceedings in see courtrooms, proceedings in, appellate courts federal 13, 191 intermediate  vi, 149, 151–​2, 157, 293, 328, 346, 365 multi-​member  136, 158–​9, 176, 509, 515 see also courts, multi-​member and three-​judge panels appellate judges  13, 136, 292–​3, 295, 297, 351–​2, 502, 516 see also federal courts of appeals judges appellate panels  150 appellate review  vi, 150, 326 see also judicial review appointment (of judges)  3–​4, 6, 14, 38, 42, 282, 400 see also confirmation (of judges) and nomination (of judges) age of 13 challenged  36, 93 see also nomination (of judges), challenged and Congress  74, 78 and diversity  17, 20–​1, 38–​9, 410, 412n.4 and ethnicity  17, 20–​1, 38–​9

factors influencing  37–​42, 43nn.2–​3, 137 to federal courts  30, 71–​4, 79–​81, 296, 372, 409 to federal courts of appeals  5–​6, 17–​20, 22, 24n.6, 26n.22, 73–​4, 93–​4 and gender  16–​17, 20–​1, 38–​9, 43n.2, 72–​3 and ideology  15–​16, 37, 40–​2, 43n.3, 81, 137, 322, 407, 409–​10 to lower federal courts  v, 4, 6, 8, 12–​13, 15–​17, 21–​4, 93–​4, 409 monitoring of the  10, 23 and partisanship  34, 93, 409 and the president  v, 3–​5, 11, 13, 16–​23, 24n.6, 26n.22, 29–​34, 37–​42, 51, 71–​4, 78–​81, 83, 85, 87–​8, 93–​4, 286, 288, 303, 312–​14, 325, 353, 400, 406, 407–​11, 444, 529 Democratic presidents  11, 16–​17, 20, 26n.22, 70–​1, 137, 303, 312–​14, 353 Republican presidents  11, 16–​17, 20, 26n.22, 70–​1, 137, 303, 312–​13, 351, 353, 410, 529 politics of  4–​9, 15, 23–​4, 30, 36, 74, 407 process of  3, 14–​15, 21, 23, 74, 93, 137, 296, 353 and race  16–​17, 20–​1, 39, 43n.2, 72–​3 and the Senate  v, 3–​4, 7, 15, 21, 23, 24nn.1 and 6, 25n.16, 29, 31–​4, 37, 40, 42, 71, 74, 93–​4, 314, 372, 407–​8 to state courts  v, 53, 306 see also state courts, elected to U.S. Circuit Courts  80, 88 to U.S. Courts of Appeals  410 to U.S. District Courts  6, 21, 24n.1, 72, 74, 79, 87, 94 to the U.S. Supreme Court  v, 4, 13–​14, 29–​42, 43n.2, 104, 407–​8 confirmation stage  30–​1, 33–​4, 36, 40, 42 see also confirmation (of judges), to the U.S. Supreme Court pre-​nomination stage  32–​3 selection stage  30–​1, 37–​40, 42 see also nomination (of judges), to the U.S. Supreme Court archival materials  101 Argentina 266, 330 Arlen, J. 501 Army Corps of Engineers  465 Arnold, Thurman  288 Aron, Nan  10, 12 arraignment 190 Ashenfelter, O. 137 Attorney General, the  410, 469 Auburn Database, the  540

Index   559 Austria 275, 283n.5 authority  175, 220, 273, 282, 394, 540 enforcement  vii, 391, 400, 427n.1, 468–​9, 497 judicial  101, 110, 272, 388, 391, 433, 443–​5, 468, 500 legal  170, 399, 492, 540 political  381–​2, 385, 401, 443, 445–​6, 465 Bailey, Michael  35, 81, 231n.2, 239, 258, 262–​4, 267n.7, 516 Baird, V.A.  445 Barclay, Scott  385 bargaining and negotiation  vi, 114, 133, 135, 140–​1, 208, 328 488 “bargaining in the shadow of the law”  133 Barghothi, A.J.   64n.18 Barnes, Jeb  389–​94 Barrow, D.J.  81 Bartels, B.  7, 231n.7, 240, 442, 553n.25 Baum, Lawrence vii–​ix,  132, 137–​9, 181, 183n.67, 311, 390, 471 Bayesian Markov Chains  35, 512–​13, 531 Bebchuk, L.A.  132 “behavioral equivalence”  303 “behavioral jurisprudence”  290, 293–​4, 517, 523 behavioralism  288, 291–​6, 303, 538–​9, 551n.3 Behuniak-​Long, S.  367 Bell, L.C.  5, 7 bench memos  108–​9, 118n.5, 159 Benesh, Sarah  viii, 107, 545, 552nn.15 and 24, 553n.25 Bentsen, Lloyd  314 Berdejó, C.  50, 52, 64n.13, 325 Bergara, M. 263 bias  229, 307, 331, 424, 465, 487, 489–​90, 492–​5, 498, 501, 502n.2, 547 Bickel, Alexander  9, 280 Bill of Rights, the  520–​1 Binder, S. 7 Biographical Directory of Federal Judges  101 Bird, Rose  48 Black, Hugo  112–​13, 180, 510–​11, 513–​14, 520–​3, 525–​6, 529 Black, Ryan C.  108, 176–​7, 208, 326, 366, 384, 517 Blackmun, Harry  106, 108–​9, 115, 172, 176, 208–​9, 286–​7, 300, 312, 351, 353, 420–​1, 518 papers of  179–​80, 183n.6 Blacks/​African Americans  20–​1, 39, 291–​2, 297, 418, 423, 442, 469, 493–​4 see also

defendants, black/​African American and judges, race of and race Blackstone, Bethany  389, 405 Blackstone, William  Commentaries on the Laws of England 214 blue slip, the  93 Blumberg, A. 135 Boddery, Scott vii  Bohte. J. 404 Bolivia 63n.1, 65n.25 Bond, J.R.  538 Bonica, A.  56, 59, 516 Bonneau, C.W.  49, 55–​7, 59 Bopp, Jim 56 Bork, Robert  35–​6, 41–​2 nomination of 93 Born, Gary  117 International Civil Litigation in the Unites States Courts 117 Box-​Steffenmeier, J.M.  371 Bowie, J.B.  137, 161, 239 Boyd, Christina  vi, 133, 141, 296, 299, 366, 517 Boyd, Epstein and Martin  “Untangling the Effects of Sex on Judging” 299 Boyea, B.D.  50 Brace, P.  50, 181, 306, 550 Braden, George  112 Bradley, Craig M.  117 Braman, Eileen  viii, 488, 498–​500, 503n.13 Brazil 100 Bregnant, J.   502n.4 Brennan, William J.  115, 172, 206, 208, 214, 242, 306 Brenner, S.  180, 206 Breyer, Stephen  237, 312, 315 papers of   183n.6 Brickman, D. 450 briefs 213 amicus  vii, 110, 196, 213, 240, 249n.2, 361, 363–​7 1, 373–​4 see also amicus curiae appellate 161, 170 on certiorari  196, 366 conservative 366 filing of  174, 366 litigants’  110, 197, 200n.19 preparation of 199 submission of 161 study of 198 Brisbin, R.A.   231n.7 Brooke, Edward  314

560   Index Brudney, James  295 Buccafusco, C. 488 burden of proof  187 Bureau of Immigration Appeals  159 bureaucrats  53, 101, 149, 370, 464–​9, 472 and n.3 see also administration Burger, Warren E.  106, 172, 206, 286–​7, 300 and n.1 Burger Court, the  13, 208, 210, 212, 215, 552n.13 Burgess, John   551n.3 Burke, Tom  391, 394 Burton, Harold Hitz  114, 175, 510–​11, 522–​3, 525, 529 papers of 180 Bush, George H.W.  38 appointments by  16–​20, 22, 41, 74, 93 nominations by  4–​6, 72–​3, 79–​80, 87–​8, 94, 313 confirmation of  5–​6, 22 Bush, George W.  309, 353 administration of  5, 7, 23, 153 appointments by  17, 20, 22, 29, 37, 74, 78, 81, 410 nominations by  4–​6, 23, 72–​3, 79–​80, 87–​8, 94 confirmation of  5–​6, 22 failed  43n.3 business  55, 115, 153, 321, 370, 399 see also interest groups, corporate Butler, Pierce  31 Byrnes, James F.  510–​11, 513, 522–​3, 525 Caldeira, G.A.  58, 65n.21, 176, 178, 181, 247, 327, 366, 422, 424, 437, 439, 441, 445, 450 Calhoun, John  196 California  394n.4 constitution of 388 courts of  225, 305, 346 elections in 48 judges of  78, 140, 183n.67 voters of 388 Calvin, B.  139, 213 Cameron, C.M.  34, 222, 315, 328 campaign contributors/​contributions  9–​10, 25n.17, 49, 57–​8, 60, 63, 64n.21, 249, 308, 313, 346, 355n.7, 361, 371–​3, 516 campaigns  expenditure on  56–​7, 65n.21 judicial  48–​9, 55–​7, 64n.20, 65nn.21–​2, 346 presidential 10, 361 for Supreme Court justices  407 Canada  96, 100, 515, 541

Canes-​Wrone, B.  50 Cann, D.  59, 372 capital punishment  39, 42, 242, 305, 346, 356n.9, 367, 498 see also cases, types of, capital punishment Cardozo, Benjamin  ix, 330 careers  114–​16 see also under judges and law clerks Carp, R.A.  137, 409 Carruba, C.J.  259, 517 Carswell, Harrold G.   300n.1 Carter, Jimmy  41 administration of   26n.22 appointments by  13, 16–​20, 93, 409 nominations by  4, 72–​3, 79–​80, 87–​8, 93–​4 Case, Clifford  314 case selection  see cases, selection of caseloads  96, 104, 107, 153, 158, 327, 540 of appellate court judges  91, 151, 157–​8, 162–​3 of circuit judges  91, 160 of district judges  91, 129 of federal court judges  70, 77, 91–​2 of lawyers  135 of lower court judges  4 rising  157–​8, 162 of state court judges  151 of trial court judges  129, 136 of U.S. Supreme Court justices  ix, 129, 149, 196 cases  complex  180, 210–​11, 214, 368, 392, 484, 501 conflation of   199n.6 coverage of  419–​20 see also media, the direction of 366 disposition of x dismissal of 328 Establishment Clause  223 filing of  vi, 130, 153, 160, 162, 176 going to trial  132 implications of 249 intervention in  361, 368–​9 “landmark” 231n.2, 420 management of  158, 162, 189 “medium-​N” groups of  392 merits of  190, 213, 328, 529 number dealt with by individual courts see courts, capacity of “open and shut”  159 politically salient  161, 200n.21, 448, 452n.4 precedent-​setting  226

Index   561 processing of 141 selection of  vi, 157, 164, 182, 260, 327–​8, 364, 366, 411 sponsorship of  361–​4, 369 termination of  131–​2, 159–​60, 187 by plea bargaining  131, 134–​5, 140–​1, 143, 187 see also plea bargains procedural 160, 187 by settlement  131–​3, 140–​1, 143, 187 see also settlements types of  169, 242, 310, 368, 463, 500 abortion  11, 129, 280, 313, 367, 387, 469–​70 administrative regulation  54 affirmative action  129, 361 black lung  192 capital punishment  50–​1, 305, 363, 367, 448 citizenship 152 civil  130–​4, 140–​3, 152–​4, 187, 189, 262, 492 see also trials, types of, civil civil liability  262 civil liberties,  137, 139, 175, 362–​3, 365, 404, 408, 520–​1, 525–​7 civil rights  18, 25n.10, 137, 291–​2, 404, 548 contract 278, 488 criminal  130–​1, 134–​5, 139, 141–​3, 152, 154–​5, 187, 189, 193, 291, 497 see also defendants, criminal and trials, types of, criminal desegregation  25n.10, 129, 138–​9, 144nn.7 and 8, 279–​80, 291, 329, 362, 466, 468–​9 discrimination (against minorities)  279 diversity  165n.7 draft dodging  290 due process of  509, 519–​20, 523–​4, 526, 528–​9, 548 economics  137, 139, 153, 175, 279, 322, 408, 521, 526–​7 election law  54, 303, 308, 310–​11 employment  54, 151, 278 federal power   25n.13 flag burning  354, 470 freedom of speech  307–​8, 387 gay rights  109, 423, 449–​50 healthcare 361 housing 137 immigration 159, 517 incorporation  519, 523–​4, 532n.8 individual rights   25n.13 labor  11, 137, 178, 192, 277–​9, 295, 346 lgbt rights  362, 463

libel 222 medical malpractice  130, 134 negligence 492 non-​consensual search and seizure  17–​18, 222 patent 137 privacy  367, 384, 517 property  361, 487, 517 public interest  322 race discrimination  11, 19, 291, 362, 408 race relations  371 rape  292, 294, 496 religious liberty  129, 137 same-​sex marriage  272, 351, 361–​2, 385, 388, 462–​3 securities fraud  137, 139 sex discrimination  111, 151, 299, 351, 362, 495 sex-​salient  294, 384 shareholder liability  497 social security disability  192 states’ rights  19–​20 tax 137 tort  63n.8, 152, 518 voting rights  129, 223, 297, 310 welfare  54, 392–​3 women’s rights  362 worker’s conditions/​rights  25n.9, 54 winning 164 Casper, J.D.  281, 389–​91 Cato Institute, the  363 causality  x, 372, 464, 483–​4 Cavendish, Elizabeth  13 “cert pool”, the  172, 179 Chafee, Lincoln  314 Chaiken, S. 494 “chamberizing” 141 chambers  75, 113–​14 “crosswind” 106, 110 “foxhole” 106, 110 Champlin, Alan   316n.1 Chang, Kelly  35, 516 charges (criminal)  130, 135, 330 Chase, Harold  33 Chase, Samuel  444 Chicago 246 University of 36 Law School  104 Chief Justice of the United States  14, 89, 173, 195–​6, 205, 274, 300n.1, 328, 399, 423, 433, 530

562   Index Chile 272 Choi, S.J.  91, 96n.6, 139 choice viii, 483 judicial  294, 321, 323, 325, 329, 346, 354 Christenson, D.P.  371 circuit judges  51, 71, 78, 81, 93, 95, 118n.5, 151, 161, 163, 176–​7, 196, 240, 287 see also U.S. Circuit Courts ideology of  139, 232n.12 retirement of  82–​6, 88 circuit splits see decisions (legal), split and U.S. Circuit Courts, split decisions on citizens  52, 57, 65n.23, 153, 186–​7, 243, 306, 311, 411, 492, 495, 516 see also public, the civil disputes see cases, civil civil liberties  16, 137, 291, 305, 363, 365, 420 see also cases, types of, civil liberties Civil War, the  279, 383, 385 Clark, Tom C.  vi, 115, 383–​4, 510–​11, 522–​3, 525, 529 Clark, T.S.  50, 54, 258, 263, 282, 329, 388, 394n.1, 425, 515, 517 Clawson, R.A.  418 Clay, Henry  196 Clinton, Bill  309, 421 administration of  7, 12, 24n.3, 26n.22 appointments by  16–​20, 22, 410 nominations by  4–​6, 72–​3, 79–​80, 87–​8, 94 confirmation of  5–​6, 22 Clinton, J.D.  509, 514 CNN 417 coalition formation  370 process of  100, 108–​9, 113, 197, 208–​10, 212, 214, 370 role of law clerks in  101, 108–​9, 113–​14 coalitions  212, 371, 382, 384–​5, 387, 448, 521, 526 activity of 361 majority  205–​12, 214–​15, 383, 517 minimum winning  214 minority 211 partners in 370 “Coase Theorem”, the  487 coercion 135 Coffin, Frank  158 “cognitive illiberalism”  496 Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT) scores  491 Cohen, J. 408 collective action  228, 355n.2 Collins, P.M.  vii, 36, 139, 213, 240, 249n.2, 410, 425

color-​blind-​society advocates  16 Colorado  50–​1 marijuana referendum  59, 63n.10 Columbia 272 Columbia University   551n.3 Law School  104, 551n.3 communication 59, 544 communism 548 communities  51, 64n.12, 130, 138, 495 Comparato, S.A.  231n.1 and 5 Comparative Constitutions Project 540 competence 33 compliance  vii, 186, 219, 327, 348–​9, 391, 465, 467 see also noncompliance computers/​computing  296, 532 confidentiality 114 confirmation (of judges) see also appointment (of judges) approaches to the see strategy, nomination/​ confirmation factors influencing  6–​7, 16, 21–​2, 33, 35, 37 interest groups  7, 21–​3, 26n.18, 36 and ideology/​partisanship  6–​7, 16, 21–​2, 35, 93 to lower courts  v, 4–​7, 15–​16, 21–​3, 24nn.1 and 6, 25n.16, 26n.18, 92–​4, 409 delays to  7, 21, 23 outcome of  7, 22 see also appointment (of judges), outcomes and the president  21–​2, 33, 41, 409 process of  v, 4–​7, 16, 24n.4, 29–​36, 40–​2, 92–​4, 407–​8, 421 blocking/​stalling of  4–​7, 15, 21–​3, 24nn.1 and 6, 25n.16, 26n.18, 93–​4 see also blue slip, the and filibusters and the Senate  v, 4–​5, 7, 12, 15, 21–​2, 24nn.1 and 6, 32–​4, 37, 40–​2, 71, 92–​4, 315, 407–​9 success rates of  21–​2, 42, 410 to the U.S. Supreme Court  v, 4, 24n.4, 29–​36, 40–​2, 58, 93, 343, 407–​8, 421 conflict  179–​80, 296, 300 institutional  381, 385, 387–​91, 447 resolution of  177, 277 conflict of interest  65n.21, 153 Congress  3, 35, 77, 150, 162, 194–​5, 231n.2, 255, 258, 265, 267n.5, 307, 384, 393, 404, 427, 470, 547 access to  10, 106 actions/​activity of  9, 15, 104, 169–​70, 182nn.1–​2, 273, 281–​2, 384, 386–​7, 389–​91, 443, 445 consultation with  32

Index   563 Democrat dominated  383, 389, 549 and the judiciary  61, 75–​6, 165n.7, 169–​70, 178, 197, 214, 255, 257–​65, 274, 279, 281–​2, 329–​30, 344, 348–​50, 384–​91, 394n.1, 412, 443–​7, 464, 516, 549 see also U.S. Supreme Court, and Congress limits upon  164n.4, 279, 383, 386, 549 members of see congressional members powers of  279, 329, 386, 388–​9, 412, 432–​3, 443, 471 preferences of  154, 178, 232n.11, 263, 388, 390, 392, 403–​4, 444, 547 and the president  42, 194, 412 and the public  435, 437–​8, 444–​5 Republican dominated  153 requirements placed upon  90 rules/​legislation made by  150, 153, 157–​8, 165n.7, 190, 273, 281, 391, 443, 464, 549 sessions of 23 staff of  102–​3, 106 Congressional Quarterly  Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court 420 conservatism  43n.3, 70, 164, 256, 330, 353–​4, 436–​7, 441, 496, 509, 511–​13, 522, 525, 541, 546–​7   see also conservatives and votes (of judges), conservative conservatives  20, 106, 110, 181, 280, 303, 313–​14, 351–​4, 356n.15, 496 see also activists, conservative and interest groups, conservative and judges, conservative and New Right, the Constitution, the  3, 152, 242, 271, 273, 276–​7, 279–​80, 391, 401, 406, 412, 418, 444, 448 Amendments to  329, 388, 444, 464 1st  240, 307, 387, 399, 416, 420, 512, 517, 520–​1, 523–​5, 529 2nd  25n.13, 245, 363 4th  117, 209, 521 6th 190 7th 190 11th 444 14th 25n.9, 278 17th 36 Article I  Section 8 3 Article II  3, 388, 406 Section 2 71 Article III  3, 71, 74, 76, 86, 386–​8, 443 Section 1 90

Section 2  275, 444 appealing to 257 Commerce Clause, the  279 design of the  387 Establishment Clause, the  223 framers of the  3, 37, 190 interpretation of  32, 280, 282, 283n.3, 329, 332, 400, 422, 448 provisions of  170, 399–​401, 432, 443 requirements of  34, 383 as the supreme law of the land  277 constitutional issues  36, 259, 272, 280, 283n.5, 365, 385–​6, 433 constitutionalism 276 constitutionality  25nn.10 and 13, 55, 271, 382, 463 lack of 242 of laws  54, 186, 272, 445 constructivism 258 context see environment/​context Cook, Beverly Blair  290–​1, 298 Coombs, Clyde  289 Cooper, C.A.  425 Corley, Pamela C.  139, 210, 213–​15, 226, 326, 553n.25 Costa Rica  272, 275 “counter-​majoritarian difficulty”, the  276–​7, 279–​81, 283, 382, 384, 394, 461, 463 court governance  74 court system, the  294 design of 134 federal 186, 199 pressures on 143 structure of  150–​1, 164 courtroom workgroups  52–​3, 64n.15 courtrooms  behavior in 188 proceedings in  appellate courts  190–​1 circuit courts  187, 191–​4, 200nn.15 and 18 district courts  194 federal courts  186–​7, 189, 191, 199 state courts  191 trial courts  187–​90 U.S. Supreme court  194–​7, 199, 200nn.16 and 20 removal from  191 rules of  192–​4, 200n.21, 367 courts see also appellate courts and court system, the and federal courts and state courts and U.S. Circuit Courts and U.S.

564   Index courts (Cont.) Courts of Appeals and U.S. District Courts and U.S. Supreme Court access to see access to courts backlogs in 190 capacity of  107, 157–​8, 162–​3 collegial  113, 142, 321, 327 see also appellate courts, multi-​member and judicial collegiality constraint of  vi, 220, 261, 263, 329–​30, 344, 350, 367, 443–​6, 464, 516 see also decisions (legal), constraints upon by budgetary means  vi, 259, 282, 329 by means of oversight  vi, 282 and the executive see under executive, the issue agendas of  150 and the legislature see under legislature, the legitimacy of see legitimacy, of courts levels of 164 multi-​member  151, 159, 192, 509, 514–​15 see also three-​judge panels nature of  219, 289, 307 operation of  394, 451 power of  282, 460, 463–​5, 469, 471 relatively strong  460 relatively weak  vii, 460, 465 and the public see under public, the role of  171, 271, 276–​7, 280, 282, 461, 463, 467 staff of  101–​2, 143, 157–​8, 161 variation across  242, 372 courts of appeal see appellate courts and U.S. Circuit Courts and U.S. Courts of Appeals Cover, A.D.  34, 304 Cox, Adam  297 “creativity effect”, the  488 crime  24n.3, 50, 549 see also defendants, criminal cronyism 40 Cross, F.B.  223, 226, 231n.3 Cross and Tiller  “Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine” 321 Crowe, Justin  386 C-​SPAN  194 Dahl, Robert  281–​2, 382–​5, 388, 390–​1, 448, 460, 463 Daley, H.W.K.  189 Danelski, D.J.  33

Darley, J. 495 data  viii, x, 16, 143, 304, 419, 450, 509, 514, 516–​17, 519, 523, 530, 537, 539–​40, 550, 552nn.14–​15 and 24, 553n.24 see also opinion polls availability of  142, 183n.6 censored 78 collection of  viii, 142, 363, 508, 522 lack of  180, 332, 530 sets of  262, 296–​7 Davis, J.W.  196 Davis, R.  ix, 422 “dead list”, the  173 “deadline effect”, the  133 debate 36 decision-​making  132, 153, 164, 186, 222, 241, 325, 464, 472, 483, 486–​7, 489–​94, 497–​501, 502 and n.3 see also decisions (legal) accuracy of  491, 494, 502 in appeals courts  223, 232n.11, 292, 363, 471 see also decisions (legal), by circuit courts calculus 156 by defendants  134–​5 discretion in  34, 52 in district courts  137–​9, 230, 363 see also decisions (legal), by federal courts and decisions (legal), by lower courts ideological  136–​8, 224 influences upon see decisions (legal), factors influencing by lawyers  135 by litigants  132–​3, 135, 154–​5, 472 in lower courts see decisions (legal), by lower courts models of 242 nature of  163, 219–​21, 223–​5, 228, 230, 237–​8, 240, 242–​9, 253–​5, 287–​93, 295–​6, 298–​9, 303–​4, 307, 321, 329–​32, 343, 354, 440–​1, 497, 501, 508, 519, 539, 550 objectivity in  501, 502n.8 opportunities for  136 and partisanship  vii, 137, 246 see also voting behavior (of justices), party/​ ideology driven periods of  52–​3 process of  100, 108, 163, 288, 422, 501 positive theory of  30 role of law clerks in  100, 108, 117 spending on 63 stages of  vi, 365–​7

Index   565 in state courts  50, 54, 63, 140, 305–​6 see also decisions (legal), by state courts in trial courts  130, 133, 136–​9, 143, 149, 155–​6, 292 see also decisions (legal), by lower courts understanding of  483–​7, 489–​94, 497–​502, 508, 537–​41, 546, 550 in the U.S. Supreme Court  41, 197–​9, 220, 255–​60, 321, 422, 425, 440–​1, 445, 447, 451nn.2–​3, 468, 472, 515–​16, 529, 541 see also decisions (legal), by the U.S. Supreme Court decisions (legal)  vii–​ix, 101, 188–​90, 199, 280, 325, 366, 388, 490, 502, 537, 540, 548 see also outcomes (legal) and votes (of justices) and voting behavior (of justices) and opinion writing and opinions to appeal  155 see also appeals and litigants, requests for review attempts to influence  374n.2 see also interest groups and judges, influences upon availability of x by circuit courts  193–​4 and case selection see cases, selection of collective  355n.2 constitutional  259–​60, 263, 271, 283n.1, 365, 392 constraints upon  220, 223–​30, 231n.2, 237, 253, 255–​6, 258–​9, 263–​4, 282, 293, 353, 516, 553n.25 by colleagues  293–​5 by the law  293, 295, 490 self-​imposed  219, 330, 445 by superiors  293–​4 content of  501, 519, 539 controversial/​adverse  132, 271, 388, 391, 432, 448, 472n.4 criticism of  245–​6 defects in  149, 155, 163, 491 entering  154–​5 factors influencing vi–​vii,  117, 138–​9, 219, 228, 231, 237–​8, 241–​9, 258, 288–​98, 303, 305, 320, 326, 332, 343, 366–​7, 369, 371–​3, 405, 483, 489–​94, 500, 516–​21, 529, 550 see also decisions (legal), constraints upon and decisions (legal), by the U.S. Supreme Court, factors affecting and judges, influences upon and U.S. Supreme

Court justices, influences upon and votes (of justices), factors influencing apologies 492 background and experiences of a judge  287, 289, 291–​3, 297–​8, 483–​4, 520–​1 context/​institutional setting  293 economics  320–​1 electoral  49–​54, 140, 144n.8, 214, 346–​7 gender of a judge  138 ideology  137–​8, 214, 224–​5, 231n.7, 237–​8, 240, 249n.2, 303–​8, 316, 322, 447, 517, 519, 553n.24 law, the  236–​7, 239–​44, 246 non-​rational  ix partisanship  306–​11 personal  288–​93, 295, 298, 304, 344 precedent  224–​9, 231n.7, 240 see also precedent preferences of judge  137–​8, 222–​4, 237–​8, 244–​5, 247, 255, 293, 305, 498–​500 prospect of appeal  139, 326, 329, 467–​8, 489 public mood/​opinion  330, 348–​9, 353–​4, 425, 445, 447–​8, 451nn.2–​3, 515 race of judge  39, 138 in favor of the defendant  291, 354 in favor of the plaintiff  297 by federal courts  272, 351, 356n.16, 401, 465 going against the defendant  17 about granting review  171 see also judicial review and petitions, for certiorari, deciding upon by higher courts  230–​1 implementation of  465, 468–​9 impact/​implications of  vii–​viii, 228, 248, 364–​6, 421–​2, 460, 462, 464–​7, 470–​2, 515 see also judicial impact interpretation of  392, 467 by lower courts  170, 175, 181, 182n.3, 214, 220–​7, 230–​1, 239, 368, 392, 467–​8, 471–​2 see also opinions, of lower courts monitoring of 220 overturned  138–​9, 175, 178, 181, 221, 229, 239, 293, 326, 328, 344, 348, 389–​90, 444, 464, 468, 489, 540 published 160, 163 reactions to/​reception of  131, 249, 349, 463–​4, 466–​7, 472 see also decisions (legal), by the U.S. Supreme Court, reception of by the public  vii, 55, 232n.14, 265, 349, 356n.9, 423–​4, 434, 439–​42, 446,

566   Index decisions (legal) (Cont.)

448–​51 see also public, the, opinion/​ opinions of the, and the reapportionment  462, 470, 472n.1 reasons for  244–​6, 248–​9 records of 346 review of  149–​51 see also judicial review split  118n.4, 179, 182 by state courts  v, 49–​51, 55, 309, 324–​5, 394–​5n.4, 465 see also decision-​ making, in state courts statutory  259–​60, 263–​4 summary judgements  133 terms of  by majority  189 non-​unanimous  240, 311, 510, 518 see also opinions, plurality unanimous  189, 240, 311 by super majority  189 in trial courts  149, 155–​6, 325, 356n.16 unpublished 139, 164 by the U.S. Supreme Court  vii, 34, 56, 205, 210–​11, 215, 222, 225, 227, 231n.4, 258, 260, 263–​5, 280–​2, 309, 327–​9, 349, 353–​4, 363, 366–​7, 373, 392, 421–​7, 432, 444–​5, 449–​50, 451nn.1 and 3, 452n.3, 463–​4, 466–​8, 470–​2, 515, 539, 551n.4 see also decision-​making, in the U.S. Supreme Court changes in the nature of  29, 41 conservative  280, 309, 348, 409 factors affecting  197–​9, 214, 259–​61, 263–​5, 287, 304–​5, 309, 311, 316, 330, 348–​9, 371, 405, 426, 447 see also votes (of justices), factors influencing liberal  225, 280, 348, 442, 446, 452n.3 number of 420 overriding of  260–​1, 263–​4, 356n.9 partisan  304, 309, 409 reception of  259, 265, 280, 432, 439–​42, 444, 446, 448–​51, 452n.4, 466–​7 regarding which cases to hear  169, 174 see also under agenda-​setting and judicial review and petitions without a written opinion  296 decisions (non-​legal) v–​vi,  59, 156, 253, 259, 386, 441, 485, 491–​2, 502nn.3 and 7, 541 defendants  133, 135, 143n.3, 164n.6, 496 black/​African American  292, 294, 493 choices of  134 see also decision-​making, by defendants

criminal  51–​3, 137, 165n.8, 188, 191, 200n.8, 325 decisions against  17, 493 decisions in favor of  291, 346, 354, 493 sentencing of  x, 50–​3, 188–​9, 294, 490 harsh  50–​2, 63n.10, 137, 292, 294, 325, 346–​7, 493 variation in  52–​3, 137, 493 out-​of-​state  63n.8, 164n.6, 324–​5 prior record of  130 democracy  48, 62, 259, 276, 278–​81, 283 and n.4, 322, 385, 393, 400, 408, 416, 422, 451, 461, 486 see also “counter-​majoritarian difficulty”, the Democratic Party, the  14, 16–​17, 20, 26n.22, 308–​9 Democrats  8, 11–​12, 24nn.3 and 6, 309–​14, 352, 433, 470, 548 see also appointment (of judges), and the president, Democratic presidents and judges, Democratic and U.S. Supreme Court justices, Democratic conservative  311–​12 judicial appointment preferences of  16–​17 Southern  11–​12, 311 demographics  39, 70, 82, 84, 450 departmentalism 280 Devins, Neal  311, 356n.13 disability 77, 96n.2 discuss list, the  172–​3, 180–​2, 366 Distlear, C. 181 district attorneys   64n.13 District of Columbia  71, 150–​1 district judges  5, 71, 74, 78, 93, 95, 111, 117n.1, 129, 139, 142–​3, 158 behavior of  139, 310 decisions by see decision-​making, in district courts ideology of 139 preferences of  137, 297 retirement of  82–​3, 85–​7 role of 187 Southern  138, 291–​2, 354 workload of see caseloads, of district judges diversity see appointment (of judges), and diversity and minorities and nomination (of judges), and diversity criteria Djupe, P.A.  540 Domnarski, W. 520 Dorsen, Norman  114 double jeopardy   164n.3

Index   567 Douglas, William O.  102, 111–​12, 115, 172, 198, 510–​11, 513, 520–​3, 525–​6, 529 Downs, A. 254 Driscoll, A.   65n.25 Ducat, C. 401 Dudley, R. 401 Durr, R.H.  445 Dwight, Theodore   551n.3 Dworkin, Ronald  242, 244, 248 Dwyer, C.  115–​16 Dyke, A.   64n.14 Easterbrook, Frank  111 Easton, D. 434 “ecological validity”   502n.1 economics  70, 137, 277–​9, 320–​1, 387, 404, 470, 509 see also cases, types of, economics institutional  293, 320–​1, 330 economics (as an academic discipline)  v–​viii, x, 288, 321, 484, 487, 543–​5 economists  76, 155, 323 Eggelilng, William S.  116 Eisenberg, T.  133, 137 Eisenhower, Dwight  41, 409 appointments by  13, 71 nominations by  4, 72–​3, 79–​80, 87–​8, 94 Eisgruber, C.L.  280 Elder, H.W.  134 election law  54–​6 see also cases, types of, election law elections  48, 50 see also elections (national) and judicial elections and state judges, elected elections (national)  8–​9, 14, 16, 23, 48, 308–​10, 361, 445, 516 see also campaigns, presidential and politics, electoral electorate, the see voters elites  14, 16, 25n.17, 102, 106, 163, 311, 352, 420, 462 groups of  350–​4, 356n.15 interests of 409 and judges  vii, 345 mobilization see strategy, “elite mobilization” Ely, John Hart  Democracy and Distrust 280 Emmert, C.F.  305 emotions  197, 225, 331 empiricism  16, 248, 539–​41, 550, 551n.9 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 288 “endowment effect”, the  487–​8

enforcement  x, 282, 324, 391, 461 see also authority, enforcement and law, the, enforcing environment, the  153, 404 environment/​context  vii, ix, 156, 289, 293, 326–​7, 343–​5, 354, 355 and n.2, 424, 466–​7, 472, 490, 501 political  30–​1, 49, 348–​50, 355 environment, the  153, 404 Epp, Charles R.  9, 464, 471 Epstein, Lee vii–​ix,  6, 35, 51, 133, 137, 139, 213, 255, 261, 282, 297, 299, 307, 314, 322–​4, 326, 329–​30, 333n.1, 363, 367, 400, 405, 408, 445, 451n.3, 515–​18, 530, 532n.2, 540–​1, 550, 551n.9 Epstein and Knight  The Choices Justices Make 329 Epstein and Martin  “Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court? Possibly Yes (But We’re Not Sure Why)”  330 equality  280, 351, 388, 408, 442, 517 equity 51 Eskridge, William N.  261, 389–​90, 517 “esteem grantors”  ix ethics  55–​6, 373, 427 ethnicity 38 see also Hispanics and judicial appointments see appointment (of judges), and ethnicity Europe  321, 325, 521 European Court of Human Rights  275 European Court of Justice (ECJ)  100, 105, 275 evidence  189, 191–​2, 298, 368, 495–​7, 502n.8, 503n.12, 526, 547 admission of  200n.11, 298 “aggregate”  520–​1 “granular” 522 DNA 490 strength of  130, 188, 197 presentation of  187–​8 relevance of  298–​9 types of  187, 503n.11 executive branch, the  48, 255, 276, 280, 361, 364, 369, 399–​400, 405, 410, 427, 437–​8, 463 see also president, the accountability of see accountability, of the president administrative agencies of  vii, 404 agents/​agencies of  403, 410 see also Solicitor General (SG), the challenges to  153–​4

568   Index and the courts  vii, 153–​4, 274, 399–​406, 410–​11, 412 and n.1, 443–​6, 463, 516 see also U.S. Supreme Court, and the president influence of  399–​400 lawyers of vii see also Solicitor General, the monitoring of 403 power of  vii, 153, 274, 399–​402, 406, 411, 471 limits to the  399, 401–​3, 411 and the public see president, the, and the public recourse to 10 role of 401 Expected Utility Theory  487 experiments  viii, 483–​9, 492–​3, 497–​9, 501, 502nn.1 and 5, 503n.13 external pressure  466, 468–​9, 515–​16, 520 Facebook  426–​7 facts  189, 197, 199n.6, 219, 222–​4, 261, 299, 310, 489–​90, 495–​7, 502n.9 finding  136, 492, 494, 497, 501, 502 and n.5 fairness  248–​9, 440, 448 Fallin, Mary   64n.17 Family Trust Foundation  56 Farhang, Sean  391 Farnsworth, W. 499 federal courts  v, 151–​3, 186, 191, 225, 230, 274, 288, 326, 369, 391, 393, 406, 412n.1, 443, 472n.1 see also appellate courts and federal judges and trial courts and U.S. Circuit Courts and U.S. District Courts access to see access to courts appeal rates for  133 and Congress  61, 385–​7, 390 composition of  96, 442 courtroom proceedings in see courtrooms, proceedings in, at the federal level efficacy of 10 higher  113, 219–​24, 226–​7, 229–​30, 239, 293, 322, 328–​9, 344, 468, 472n.4, 540, 550 jurisdiction of  150, 164nn.2 and 5 litigation in 23 lower  v, 3, 10, 12, 81, 86, 138–​9, 154, 178, 214–​15, 230, 239, 293, 306, 328–​9, 343–​4, 386, 461, 467, 472n.4 see also circuit courts and U.S. District Courts age of judges on the  13 appointment of judges to see appointment (of judges), to lower federal courts

behavior of  221–​3, 305, 309 cases handled by see caseloads, of lower court judges decisions of see decisions (legal), by lower courts disagreement amongst  106, 171, 176–​7, 179, 240 expectations of vi  as final arbiter  13 following/​constrained by higher courts  219–​27, 229–​31, 293, 329, 344, 467–​8, 472n.4 and the general public  14 guidance for  209 law clerks at  108, 110 opinions of see opinions, of lower courts preferences of 220 power of  164n.6, 385–​7, 391–​3, 463 support for  388 see also U.S. Supreme Court, standing/​reputation of system of see court systems, federal vacancies on  70, 74, 82, 87–​8, 96 and n.3, 140, 143 variations across  134, 193, 242 federal courts of appeals judges  51, 104, 111, 117n.1, 118n.5, 139, 164, 305 federal judges  ix, 15, 42, 92, 108, 115, 154, 181, 272–​3, 296, 324, 352–​3, 372, 442–​3 see also circuit judges and district judges and federal judiciary, the and U.S. Supreme Court justices campaigning of 42 candidates for being  90 challenges facing  70, 283n.2 concerns of 51 conservative 225 directory of see Biographical Directory of Federal Judges entering characteristics of  71–​4 motivations of  70–​1, 84, 86–​9 performance of  71, 91, 388 and policy  9, 12 see also policy goals, and federal court judgeships salary of  90–​1, 96n.4 387–​8 tenure of  70–​1, 75, 78, 83–​4, 87–​9, 95, 296 Federal Judicial Center (FJC)  71, 86, 90, 101, 159, 165n.14 federal judiciary, the  9, 16–​17, 83, 129, 137, 162, 199n.7, 273, 387, 409, 442–​3, 463, 538 see also judiciary, the (as a branch of government)

Index   569 expansion of the  288 influences upon the  399 power of the  277, 385–​7, 391–​3, 427n.1 transformation of 9 federal questions  171 Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) 154, 161 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  9, 368–​9 Rule 16 140 Federal Rule of Evidence 401  299 Federalist Papers, the  214, 381, 443, 460, 553n.25 Federalist Society, the  181, 353 Feeley, Martin  391 feminism  494–​5 see also women filibusters  6–​7, 23, 24n.6, 25n.16, 93, 258, 407 filtering  130–​3, 135, 142, 143n.2, 181 see also trial courts, gatekeeping and filtering role of Fischman, J.B.  517 Flemming, R. 404 Florida 186 courts of  199nn.2–​3, 309 Ford, Gerald  nominations by  4, 72–​3, 79–​80, 87–​8, 93–​4 foreign policy and defense  401–​2, 451 formalism 323, 519 Fortas, Abe 40 Founding Fathers, the  406, 416 Fox News  352, 417 France  63n.1, 272, 276, 323 Frank, Jerome  288 Frankfurter, Felix  112, 114, 267n.8, 510–​11, 513–​14, 521–​3, 525–​6, 529 Franklin, D.L.  448–​9 freedom  186, 295, 416 of the press  416 of speech  307–​8, 387 Freund, Paul  521 Friedman, B.  263, 282, 333n.5, 349, 490, 516 Friendly, Henry  89 Fuller, L.L.  243 functionalism 519, 551n.3 Furgeson, J.  498–​9 Galanter, M. 135 game theory  178 Gandy, Kim 13 Garfield, James A.  appointments of 36 Garoupa, N.  viii, 323 Gates, J. 408

Gaussian random walks  531 Geller, K.S.  170, 177 Gely, R.  261, 263 gender  105, 351–​2, 495 General Social Survey (GSS)  437–​8 George, Tracy  vii, 363 Georgetown 356n.15 Georgia 272 Gergen, M.P.  518 Germany  100, 241, 243, 266, 275, 323, 521 Gibson, James  v Gibson, J.L.  48, 56, 58, 65nn.21–​3, 137, 247, 422, 424, 434, 437, 439, 441, 445 Giles, M.W.  138, 305, 516 Gill, K.  115–​16 Gillman, H.  307–​8, 385 Giner-​Sorrola, R.  494 Ginsburg, Douglas  42 Ginsburg, Ruth Bader  39, 111, 209, 214, 237, 314–​15, 353 papers of   183n.6 Ginsburg, T. viii  Goelzhauser, G. 405 Goldman, S.  5, 291, 295 Gordon, S.C.  50, 52, 140, 325, 347, 356n.10 Gore, Al  309, 314 government, the  x, 53–​4, 102, 175, 194, 255–​6, 273, 329, 345, 362, 393–​4, 402, 404–​5, 439, 441, 446–​7, 465 see also legislature, the and state governments actions of  241, 391–​2, 416 agencies of  151, 326, 405–​6, 465–​8 see also administration and bureaucrats decisions going against  19–​20 see also litigants, governmental as divided  7 and the economy   25n.9 jobs in  114–​16 and the judiciary  243, 255–​6, 259, 271, 277–​82, 348–​50, 355, 381–​94, 403, 405, 443–​7, 460, 463–​5, 521 as a litigant  53, 151, 155–​6, 175, 271, 403, 550n.1 by majority rule  276 see also “counter-​ majoritarian difficulty”, the and the people  48, 276, 445, 447 perceptions of 416 powers of  388, 443 limiting the  276, 283, 383–​6 relations between branches of  271, 279, 281–​2, 446–​7, 460 Graber, Mark  385

570   Index Grant, E. 179 Graves, S.E.  6, 54, 409 Gray, Horace  103–​4 Gray, John Chipman  103 Great Depression, the  279 Greenhouse, Linda  286, 425–​6 Grenstad, G. 322 Gressman, E.  170, 177 Grossman, Joel  31, 33 Guam 151 Guantanamo Bay  153 Gulati, M.  91, 96n.6, 139 Gulf War (first)  438 guns  245–​6, 363, 370, 389, 548 Guthrie, C.  488–​9, 491 Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich  “Blinking on the Bench”  491 Guttman, Louis  289 habeas corpus  152 Hagle, T. 206 Haider-​Markel, D.P.  423, 449–​50 Haines, Charles Grove  289 Haire, Susan  vi, 222 Hale, F.D.  422 Hall, Matthew  vii, 176 Hall, M.E.K.   472n.1 Hall, M.G.  49, 55–​9, 181, 262–​3, 306, 384, 550 Hamilton, Alexander  381–​2, 387, 400, 443, 460–​1 Hamilton, Walton  288–​9 Hansford, Thomas  vi, 81, 86, 230, 239, 263 Hanson, R.A.  189 Harding, Warren G.  appointments of 31 Harlan II, John Marshall  102, 114–​15, 198, 209, 278 Harrison, William H.  41 Hart, H.L.A.  243–​4 The Concept of Law 241 Harvard Law School  72–​4, 83, 85, 103–​4, 113, 287, 300 Harvey, A.  263, 516, 547–​9 Hausegger, Lori  390 Hayes, Rutherford B.  appointments of 36 Haynie, S.L.  206 Haynsworth, Clement Jr.   300n.1 hazard-​based duration models  7 Hazelton, M.L.W.  57 Heise, Michael  295 Helland, E.  91, 134, 324–​5, 333n.3

Helmke, G.  266, 330 Hendrickson, S.A.  179 Hermann, J.R.  115 Hettinger, Virginia  295, 305 High Court Database, the  540–​1, 550 Higgins, Alison vii  Hirschl, Ran  386 Hispanics/​Latinos  20–​1, 38, 418, 450 history (as an academic discipline)  v, 538, 550 Hitt, M.P.  371 Ho, Daniel  viii, 267n.7, 509, 517, 532nn.1, 9 and 15, 541, 546–​7, 550, 551n.8 Hockett, J.D.  520–​1 Hoekstra, V.J.  422, 449 Hoffman, D.A.  133 Hollywood 189 Holmes, L.M.  7, 409 Holmes, Oliver Wendell  41, 278 Hönnige, C. 323 Hooper, L.  165n.15 Horowitz, D.L.  463 House, Toni  195 House of Representatives  153, 194, 256, 262 Howard, J. Woodford  149–​50 Howard, R.M.  6, 137, 214, 303, 385, 408–​9, 553n.25 Hsieh, C.R.  130 Huber, G.A.  50, 52, 140, 325, 347, 356n.10 Hughes, Charles Evans  113 human beings  242, 484, 495 Hume, Robert  464 Hutchinson, Dennis  520 Hwong, T. 541 Iacobucci, Frank  515 ideal points  viii, 35, 262, 313–​14, 515–​16, 518–​19, 522–​4, 526–​8 ideological balance  24n.4, 37 ideological drift  42, 532n.2 ideological distance  7, 21–​2, 32, 34, 40, 384, 394n.1 “ideological divergence”  408 ideological litmus tests  15–​16 ideological polarization  115, 303, 352–​4, 356n.14, 420, 436 ideology vii–​viii,  8, 11–​12, 15–​16, 22, 33, 35, 40, 106–​7, 136–​7, 144n.6, 154, 206, 215, 222–​3, 237–​9, 242, 249n.2, 260, 262, 265, 304–​7, 311–​13, 315, 322–​3, 327, 348, 354, 366, 381–​2, 388, 403, 410, 435–​7, 441–​2, 445–​7, 466, 469, 471,

Index   571 495–​6, 508–​9, 511, 518, 539, 546–​8, 553n.24 and the appointment of judges see appointment (of judges), and ideology and the confirmation of judges see confirmation (of judges), and ideology/​partisanship of judges see judges, attitudes of, ideological/​ political and judges, preferences of, ideological/​political and U.S. Supreme Court, and ideology and voting behavior (of justices), and party/​ ideology measuring  35, 509, 512–​14, 547 see also measurement and the nomination of judges see nomination (of judges), party/​ideology driven Ignagni, Joseph  389 Implicit Associations Test (IAT)  493 immigration  159, 245, 277–​8, 517 impartiality  65n.21, 288, 372–​3, 497, 502 impeachment (of judges)  55, 329–​30, 444 incarceration  135, 468, 471 India 96 individuals  64n.21, 94, 186, 248, 271, 283, 354, 423, 443, 451, 464, 466, 485–​6, 488, 492–​3, 495–​7, 501, 550n.1 rights of see rights, individual industrialization  277–​8 information  59–​60, 109, 161, 183n.5, 196–​7, 257, 364, 368, 449, 502n.7, 519, 540 obtaining 114 production/​presentation of  416, 422, 425–​7, 452n.4 public 195 sharing of 141 institutionalism 288 institutions  29, 34, 37, 103, 105, 176, 210, 219, 261, 275, 280, 283, 324, 381, 391, 400, 404, 409, 424, 444, 451, 465, 467, 539, 550 see also economics, institutional and New Institutionalism building 384 changes to  10, 115 democratic 281, 400 design of  62–​3, 304, 446 constraints imposed by  33, 49, 138, 515 interactions between  382, 389, 391–​3, 445 see also conflict, institutional judicial  130, 164, 190, 228, 253, 259–​61, 263, 266, 282, 325, 332, 344, 356n.12,

372, 385, 392–​3, 424, 427, 433, 440–​2, 444, 446, 451, 467, 484 legitimacy of see legitimacy, institutional majoritarian 10 mechanisms of  90, 220–​1, 227–​30, 328, 332, 461 norms of  178, 219, 255 political  8, 31, 260, 385, 393, 405, 440, 462 power of  vii, 282, 392 rules of  180–​1, 255, 304 strength of 61 study of 35 “integrative complexity”   250n.6 interest groups  59, 345, 361, 366, 374 see also activists activity of  8–​9, 21, 23, 36, 55, 57–​8, 62, 361–​5, 367–​74 and the confirmation of judges see confirmation (of judges), factors influencing conservative 13 corporate 55, 370 influence of  36, 57–​8, 60, 346, 348, 351, 361, 365, 370, 372–​3 legal 61 left-​leaning  55 liberal 9, 13 and the litigation process  vii, 362 see also litigation, organizational minority-​based  17 opposition of/​from  7, 21–​2 right-​leaning  55 rise of  33, 49, 55, 346, 351 role of  vii, 4, 23, 49, 55, 62, 346, 348, 351, 361 single interest  33 success of 363 women’s-​based  17 Internal Revenue Service  465 Iowa  64n.17, 86, 137 irrationality 155 Islamic world, the  451 Israel 331, 493 item response theoretic (IRT)  509, 512, 514–​16, 518, 530 Jackson, Andrew  15, 23, 400 Jackson, Jesse  418 Jackson, Robert  197, 508–​13, 519–​26, 528–​30, 532nn.1–​2 and 8 Jaffe, Louis  520 Japan 322

572   Index Javits, Jacob  314 Jefferson, Thomas  214, 273–​4, 400 administration of 445 Jesse, S.A.  515 Jipping, T. 12 Jo, M. 115 Johnson, Andrew  41 Johnson, G.   64n.19 Johnson, J.S.  133 Johnson, Lyndon B. (LBJ)  appointments by  13, 78 nominations by  4, 72–​3, 79–​80, 87–​8, 94 failed 40 Johnson, T.R.  vi, 108, 196, 206, 208, 448, 450 Johnston, C.D.  442 Jones, Aubrey   532n.1 journalists  70, 102 see also media, the Judge Wapner  14 Judges see also appellate judges and district judges and federal judges and non-​U.S. judges and state judges and trial court judges and U.S. Supreme Court justices  accountability of see accountability, of courts actions/​activities of  48, 74, 111, 153, 286, 293, 295, 311, 320 Article III  71, 74, 76, 86 attitudes of  137–​8, 164, 237, 240–​2, 248, 255, 292, 368, 404, 483, 493–​4, 499–​500 see also judges, preferences of ideological/​political  vii, 62, 137–​9, 144n.6, 176, 205–​6, 208, 211, 215, 238, 240, 249n.2, 300, 303–​8, 310–​11, 404, 539 private  30, 245, 286, 307 attributes/​characteristics/​personality of  vii, 31, 94, 137–​8, 237, 286–​7, 289, 291, 293–​300 see also federal judges, entering characteristics of background of  25n.15, 33 286–​7, 290, 292–​3, 295, 297, 299–​300, 402, 483–​4 educational  33, 72–​4, 83, 289, 291–​2, 295–​6, 300, 484, 491 occupational  72–​4, 83, 85, 290–​1, 294–​6 social  286–​7, 289, 293, 296, 299, 484, 491, 496 bargaining between see bargaining and negotiation behavior of  49, 56, 63n.8, 64n.14, 90, 95, 138–​ 9, 141, 226, 228, 242–​4, 247, 289, 296, 320, 367, 417–​18, 422, 425,

496–​7, 550n.1 see also U.S. Supreme Court justices, behavior of and voting behavior (of judges) analysis of  253–​4, 266, 290, 293–​8, 304, 320–​4, 331–​2, 345, 394, 493–​4, 514, 537–​9, 541 see also “behavioral jurisprudence” bad 76, 244 good 71, 443 sentencing 138 see also sentencing and also defendants, criminal, sentencing of theories of see also models of judicial behavior institutional  294–​6 positive 289 see also models of judicial behavior social background  286–​9, 293–​4, 296–​300 strategic 295 see also strategy, judicial benefits accorded to  75 “bleeding heart”  52 career paths of  287 choices of see choice, judicial conservative  116, 154, 164, 172, 175–​6, 215, 225, 238, 266n.2, 303, 305, 308, 312, 323 see also U.S. Supreme Court justices, conservative conviction rates of  52 see also sentencing decisions made by see decisions (legal) Democratic  52, 137, 176, 303, 306, 308–​9, 311 see also U.S. Supreme Court justices, Democratic departure from the bench of v–​vi,  81, 86–​9, 388, 421, 444 see also judges, retirement of disabled 77, 96n.2 disagreements between  249n.3, 300 see also U.S. Supreme Court justices, individual rulings of, differences between discretion of 240 earnings of  74–​5, 89–​91, 96 and n.4, 114 elected see state judges, elected election of see judicial elections electoral campaigns of see campaigns, judicial ethnicity of  33, 81 experience of  33, 38, 43n.3, 54, 237, 402, 484, 492 experiences of  vii, 286, 290, 292, 294–​5, 298, 300, 484 female  52, 71–​3, 83, 85, 292, 294, 296, 299

Index   573 gender of  33, 72–​3, 81, 83, 85, 138, 286, 292, 294, 296, 299, 410 “hanging” 52 at home  113 influence of  viii, 115, 238, 323–​4, 391, 464 influences upon  vii, ix, 64n.18, 138–​40, 240, 243–​4, 293, 296, 320, 343, 345–​8, 351–​5, 361, 366, 368, 371–​3, 418 see also decisions (legal), factors influencing and judging, influences upon and U.S. Supreme Court justices, influences upon interests of  65n.21, 389 see also conflict of interest interviews with  162–​3, 165n.13, 177–​8, 368 intuitions of  ix, 331 issue positions of  55–​6, 60 see also nominees, views of liberal  116, 154, 164, 175–​6, 215, 225, 238, 266n.2, 303, 305–​8, 312, 323 see also U.S. Supreme Court justices, liberal from minorities  292 monitoring of  12, 62 motivations of  viii, x, 94, 228, 232n.15, 237, 243–​4, 255, 296, 321–​4, 331–​2, 344–​5, 354, 355n.5, 498–​9 approval-​seeking  344–​8, 353–​4, 355nn.5–​6, 425 see also under public, the career ambitions  51, 229, 232n.15, 238, 321–​2, 353 for ending active status  81–​4, 86–​9, 92, 296 health 84 income  viii, 75, 90, 94–​5, 320, 323–​4, 332, 373 job satisfaction  viii, 323–​4 leisure  viii, ix, 228, 323, 327 personal  viii, 228, 237–​8, 293, 296, 323–​4, 344–​5, 350, 354 see also judges, preferences, personal political  70–​1, 81–​2, 84–​6, 95, 137, 350 power 326, 332 prestige  viii, 81, 89, 296, 323–​4, 347 promotion  viii–​ix, 49, 322–​4, 344–​5 reputation  viii–​ix, 138, 229, 232n.15, 323–​4, 326, 354–​5, 468 as non-​rational actors ix see also decisions (legal), factors influencing, non-​rational non-​white  72–​3, 83, 85 number of  92–​4, 96, 157, 162 opinions of see under opinions

party affiliation of  95 see also judges, attitudes of, ideological/​political and political parties different from that of the appointing president  80–​3, 85, 312 see also “ideological divergence” same as that of the appointing president  286, 353, 409 and paternal occupation  33 pensions of  70–​1, 76–​86, 89, 95 see also Rule of 80 perception of  65n.21, 70 see also public, the, opinion/​opinions of, and the courts personal papers of  101 preferences of  vii, ix, 70, 81, 137–​9, 209, 222, 227, 238, 247, 255, 257, 261, 293, 298, 305–​7, 329, 331, 389, 493, 496, 503n.12 ideological/​political  107, 137–​9, 164, 178–​9, 181, 205–​6, 208, 211, 215, 232n.12, 237–​9, 246, 249n.2, 255, 266, 286, 300, 303–​11, 316, 328, 333n.3, 350, 388, 402, 409, 484, 498 jurisprudential 107 maximization of  320–​2 personal  vii, 237, 243–​4, 248, 289, 304, 307, 493 see also judges, motivations, personal refraining from imposing  277 regarding policy  vii, 56, 137, 164, 177–​8, 206, 219, 223, 237–​8, 248, 253, 258, 261, 264–​ 5, 286, 304, 321, 323, 333n.2, 344, 354–​5, 408, 446–​7, 484, 499–​500 performance of  71, 91, 321–​2, 434 see also judging, quality of race of  39, 72–​3, 83, 85, 138, 286, 292, 294–​7, 410, 442, 493–​4 ratings of 31 as rational actors  vii, ix, 320–​2, 325, 331 see also decisions (legal), rational and rationality reappointment of 54 re-​election of  48–​50, 52–​4, 58, 324–​5, 346–​7, 356n.8 see also state, judges, re-​election of religious affiliation of  33, 39, 286, 291–​2, 295, 493 removal of 388 Republican  52, 137, 139, 176, 303, 306, 311 see also U.S. Supreme Court justices, Republican

574   Index judges and trial court judges and U.S. Supreme Court justices (Cont.) responsibilities of  64n.21, 74, 157, 237, 243 responsiveness of  50–​1, 53–​4, 59, 138, 144n.8, 163, 330, 388, 425 retention of  49–​50, 52, 54, 58–​9, 62, 140, 321–​2, 324, 332, 346–​7, 356n.8 retired 105 retirement of  74–​6, 78, 81–​2, 86, 90, 96 and nn.2–​3, 296, 314, 421 see also departure from the bench and Rule of 80 role of  135–​8, 142, 188–​9, 271, 277 see also courts, role of schedules of 116 selection of  3, 321–​2, 324, 332, 353, 372 see also appointment (of judges) and confirmation (of judges) and nomination (of judges) sexual orientation/​identity of  286, 361 state of service of  75–​6 active status  71, 74–​6, 78–​89, 92, 95, 96n.3, 105 resignation  74–​6, 78–​80, 95, 421 senior status  71, 75–​80, 87–​9, 92, 95, 96 and nn.3 and 5, 158 strategies of see strategy, judicial and their successors  70, 78, 81–​2 sympathies of  ix, 331 tenure of  13, 70–​1, 75, 78, 81, 89–​90, 92, 95, 296, 332 see also life tenure (of judges) term limits for  96 votes of see votes (of justices) and voting behavior (of justices) “whistleblower” 321, 328 working together  113 years of service of  77–​80 judicial biographies  296 judicial clarity  219, 226, 228 judicial collegiality  293–​4, 326–​8 see also courts, collegial Judicial Common Space (JCS) scores  110, 262–​3, 267n.6, 305, 313, 516 judicial compliance see compliance judicial doctrine  138, 275, 517, 550 judicial efficiency  153, 219 judicial elections  48–​53, 55–​62, 63 and nn.4 and 8, 64n.16, 65nn.22 and 24–​5, 140, 231n.1, 249, 265, 346–​7 see also state courts, elected and state judges, election of campaigning for see campaigns, judicial

competition in  48, 50, 59 fear of losing  x, 346–​7, 354 “new style”  48–​9, 60, 62, 63n.3 non-​partisan  50, 58–​9, 356n.10 partisan 347 judicial hierarchy  vi, 130, 133, 138–​9, 142, 149, 220–​1, 224, 229–​31, 232n.15, 257, 265, 321–​3, 328, 467–​8 see also stare decisis bottom-​up influence within  229–​31 see also policy-​making, judicial, bottom-​up influences on influence of  139, 293–​4, 328, 516 position of judges within  136, 223 judicial impact  vii, 460–​7, 470–​1, 472 and n.3 judicial independence  61–​2, 324–​5, 343, 381, 387, 433, 440, 443–​4, 446, 450, 463 see also U.S. Supreme Court, independence of the judicial legitimacy see legitimacy, judicial judicial norms  219, 241, 244, 472 judicial policy/​policies  vi, viii, 464 judicial predictability  219.232n.13, 248 judicial process, the  103, 190, 421, 440 judicial restraint  258, 519 judicial review  vi, 118n.4, 158–​9, 178–​9, 271–​5, 279–​83, 332, 365, 382–​6, 389, 400, 464, 469, 517 see also petitions, for certiorari of administrative regulations  54 decentralized 272 deciding upon  169, 171, 179, 366 denial of  vi, 149, 153, 162, 172–​4, 177–​8, 180, 182n.4, 365 eradication of 329 of federal legislation  382–​4 granting of  vi, 149–​50, 154, 161–​2, 171, 174–​9, 182n.4, 365 see also petitions, for certiorari, granting process for  150, 171 limits upon  282 mandatory 169 origins of  273, 385, 400 requests for see also petitions, for certiorari role of  279–​80, 283, 469 of state legislation  383 use of  277–​80, 382 judiciary, the (as a branch of government)  48, 63, 77, 162, 259, 271, 276–​7, 280, 282, 330, 344, 348–​50, 354, 392–​4, 400, 404–​5, 439, 446, 460, 463

Index   575 Judiciary Committee, the  7, 24n.1, 5n.16, 237, 258, 372, 432 Judging see also decision-​making and decisions (legal) and opinions, judicial influences upon  286–​8, 294–​300, 326, 491 nature of  236–​7, 245, 288, 330 quality of  90, 486 similarity in 500 strategic  294, 300 see also strategy, judicial juries  111, 135, 187–​9, 191, 483, 486, 490–​1, 495, 497 jurisdiction  150, 153–​4, 164nn.2 and 5, 170, 181, 247, 259, 272, 274, 344, 370, 385–​6, 388, 500 diversity  152–​3, 165n.7 rules of 151 statutes pertaining to  169–​70, 283n.3 withdrawing 329 jurisprudential regimes  231n.6, 240, 247, 553n.25 justice  civil 141, 156 criminal  135, 405, 420, 544–​5 hierarchy of see judicial hierarchy perception of  441, 448 pursuit of 486 Justice at Stake Campaign  60 Kagan, Elena  25n.15, 36, 39, 211, 237, 314–​15 Kahan, Dan  495–​7, 501–​2 Kahneman, Daniel  165n.12, 487–​8 Kang, M.S.  57 Kansas 50, 347 Kastellec, J.P.  315 Katz, Ellen  297 Keck, Thomas  vii, 384, 387, 463 Keele, D.M.  137 Keilitz, S.L.  189 Kelly, J.P.  50 Kelman, M. 488 Kelsen, Hans   283n.5 Kennedy, Anthony  41, 207, 211, 315, 351, 353–​4 opinions of  134, 432 papers of   183n.6 Kennedy, John F. (JFK)  409 appointments by  13, 86, 312 nominations by  4, 72–​3, 79–​80, 87–​8, 94 Kentucky 58 Code of Judicial Conduct of  56 University of  552n.14 Kessler, D. 133

Kilwein, J.C.   231n.8 Kimel, T.J.  410 King, G.   551n.9 King, K.L.  137 Klein, B.  132–​3, 143n.3, 240, 517 Klein, David vi  Knetch, J.L.  487 Knight, Jack vii–​ix,  213, 255, 282, 329, 400, 405, 445, 541, 550 Kobylka, J.F.  213, 367 Kopko, K.C.  310 Kosaki, L.C.  448–​9 Kramer, L.D.  280 Krauthammer, Charles  314 Krehbiel, K. 408 Kritzer, H.M.  57, 133, 141, 240, 292, 403, 553n.25 Kromphardt, C.D.  106, 110 Kuklinski, J.H.  50, 140 Kunda, Z. 499 Landes, W.M.  viii–​ix, 51, 133–​4, 137, 139, 322–​4, 326, 408 Langer, L.  54, 306 language  111, 197, 214, 223, 230, 249n.3, 258, 499, 532, 539 analysis of  225–​6 of legal rulings  29, 34, 117, 139, 309, 326 see also opinions, style/​language of variability measures (V scores)  207 LaRowe, N. 422 Larson, S.G.  419 Latin America  63n.1, 272, 275, 321, 446, 451 Lauderdale, B.E.  258, 515, 517 Lax, J.R.  231n.6, 328, 425 law (as an academic discipline)  v, viii–​ix, 484, 487–​8, 545 law  civil 151 federal 152 public 5 state 152 tort  152, 324, 346 law, the  vi, 246, 289, 311, 386, 464, 472, 490, 502n.9, 515 see also legal doctrine application of  136, 247, 271, 276, 304, 548 approaches to 238 areas of 519 being ‘outside’   249n.3 careers in 103 case 499 clarification of  171, 177, 390, 500

576   Index law, the (Cont.) conceptions of 70 conflicts within see laws, conflict between considerations of 109 constitutional  277, 382, 393 see also Constitution, the, as the supreme law of the land content of 139 creation of  136, 209, 213, 328, 355nn.3 and 5, 390 due process of  151, 191, 279, 295, 509, 519–​20, 523–​4, 526, 528–​9, 532n.8 enforcing 149, 468 federal see legislation, federal force of 211 harmonization of 180 improving 179 influence of  vi, 236–​44, 246, 249 interpretation of  171, 177, 222, 271, 276–​7, 282, 364, 382, 390, 392, 463, 498–​9 letter of 34 matters of  192, 224 meaning of  282, 444 nature of  241–​4, 246–​8 principles of  298–​9 provisions of 170 public  537–​9, 541 questions of 171 readings of 274 requirements of 242 respect for  227 role of  136, 236–​9, 241, 243, 246–​7, 471 rule of  34, 52, 149, 215, 497 impact of the public upon the vii  strength of the vii  theory of  241, 244, 247–​8, 288, 539 understanding of  155, 157, 205, 483–​4, 486, 490, 508 variability in 52 violation of 152 law clerks  100, 102, 104–​5, 113, 116, 143, 159, 177–​8, 368, 371, 373–​4, 499 activities post-​clerkship  101, 105, 114–​17 Bonus Baby Regime  115–​16 Natural Sorting Regime  115 and agenda-​setting see agenda-​setting, role of law clerks in and “cert petitions” see petitions, for certiorari, role of law clerks in dealing with and coalition formation see coalition formation, role of law clerks in

earnings of  114, 116 experience of 103 gender of 105 hiring of 75 and ideology/​partisanship  105–​6, 110, 115–​16, 181 influence of  vi, 100–​103, 105, 107–​14, 116–​17, 181, 208 and judges  100–​101, 103–​6, 108–​11, 113–​17, 181, 207–​8 law school attended by  105 and legal outcomes see decisions (legal), law clerks and shaping of networks of 114 number of  104, 113 and opinion-​writing see opinion writing, role of law clerks in and oral arguments see oral arguments, role of law clerks in preparing  108 pool  102, 107, 179 race of 105 responsibilities of  100, 103, 105 role of  101, 103, 106–​7, 109, 111–​12, 114, 172, 180–​2, 207, 367, 374 seeking 104 selection of  100, 103–​6 (proposed) confirmation of by Senate  103 teams of 106 types of  in-​chambers clerks  101 staff attorneys  101 at the U.S. Supreme Court see U.S. Supreme Court, law clerks at the and votes on merits see merits, votes on, role of law clerks in law firms  jobs with  114–​15, 287 private  75, 114, 116 public interest  23, 116 specializing in U.S. Supreme Court practice 115 law schools  72–​4, 83, 105, 291, 321, 551n.3 see also judges, background of, educational and law clerks, law school attended by elite  295–​6, 300 Southern  291–​2 law students  104, 193, 352, 485, 488, 498–​500, 503nn.12–​13 laws  conflicts between  271–​2, 277 federal see legislation, federal

Index   577 hierarchy of 271 “higher” 271 “lower” 271 pertaining to elections see election law unconstitutional  54, 272, 274, 276–​7, 279, 281 lawsuits 362, 550n.1 class action  9, 52, 363 crafting of 130 quality of 134 lawyers  100, 115, 131, 136, 142, 143nn.2 and 4, 157, 162–​3, 187, 189, 193, 195, 198, 215, 240, 320, 486, 492 see also district attorneys and law firms, private actions/​activities of  205, 346 aspirations of  49, 90 Assistant U.S. Attorney  187 background of 483 becoming judges  344, 353 behavior of 141 black conservative  20 court appointed   200n.8 defense  52, 135, 141, 187, 200n.8 earnings of  91, 134, 143n.4, 144n.4 elite 363 female  20–​1 hiring of 362 Hispanic 21 influence of 176 and litigation see litigation, process of, role of lawyers in mistakes by 193 opinions of 70 private  187, 200n.8 see also law firms, private prosecuting  83, 85, 130–​1, 134–​5, 141, 144n.5, 187, 294, 356n.16 questions posed by/​to  108–​9, 188, 191, 193, 200nn.10 and 19 role of  136, 158, 188–​9, 191, 195–​6, 237 senior staff attorneys  158–​9, 165n.14 statements of 189 success of 240 Supreme Court  240 Leahy, Patrick  432 Lee, Rex  411 legal analysis  106 legal criteria  498 legal doctrine  vi, 111, 186, 228, 295, 322, 389, 498, 546, 551n.8 see also judicial doctrine legal education  103, 420, 422, 484–​5, 491, 499, 501 see also law students

legal factors vi  legal formalism   43n.1 legal goals  227–​8, 494 legal innovation  232n.15 legal mobilization  106 legal policy  41, 175, 347, 399, 405 conservative 172, 175 liberal 175 shaping of  399–​400 legal presumptions  487 legal realism  30, 43n.1, 277, 288–​9, 303, 343, 538 legal reasoning  486, 491–​2, 494, 498–​9, 501 legal rules  vi, 34, 150 legal rulings see also decisions (legal) Aaron v. Cooper, 358 U.S. 5 (1958)   25n.10 Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923)  25n.9 Adler v. Board of Educ. of City of New York, 342 U.S. 485 (1952)  529 Arizona v. United States 245 Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009)  327–​8 Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon (1995)  449 Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530 (Haw. 1993)  394n.4 Baker v. Carr (1962)  444 Baker v. State of Vermont, 170 Vt. 194 (Vt. 1999)   394n.4 Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)  420 Barker v. Wingo (1972)  190 Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly (2007)  327 Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet (1994) 449 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)  165n.10 Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)  109, 211, 420, 449 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000)  449 Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955)  25n.10, 36, 138–​9, 144n.7, 279, 326, 373, 468–​9 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)  420 Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953)  529 Bush v. Gore 531 U.S. 98 (2000)  304, 309, 316n.2, 353 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal  64n.21 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc. et al., 467 U.S. 865 (1984)  403–​4 Chisolm v. Georgia (1793)  444 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission  29, 399, 405, 470

578   Index legal rulings (Cont.) Clinton v. Jones 309 Coy v. Iowa (1988)  191 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1941)  532n.6 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. (2008)  25n.13, 363, 370 Dred Scott v. Sandford 279, 383 EEOC v. Wyoming (1983)  116 EPA v. EME Homer City Generation (2004) 112 Escobedo v. United States (1964)  465 Family Trust Foundation of Kentucky v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d (E.D. Ky. 2004)  56 Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960)  548 Florida ex.rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida, 350 U.S. 413 (1956)   25n.10 FTC v. SCTLA, 493 U.S. 411 (1990)  547, 549 Furman v. Georgia (1972)  448 Garner v. Board of Public Works of City of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716 (1951)  529 Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961)   25n.10 Gideon v. Wainwright (1963)   200n.8 Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309 (Mass 2003)  394n.4 Gregg v. Georgia (1976)  448 Grove City College v. Bell (1986)  255, 261 Griswold v. Connecticut 384 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)  373 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)  25n.9 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960)  548 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S., 379 U.S. (1964)  25n.10 Illinois v. Allen (1970)  191 Katz v. United States (1967)  209 Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951)   532n.6 Lafler v. Cooper (2012)  134 Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free High School District (1993)  449 Lawrence v. Texas (2003)  211, 351, 384, 423, 449 Ledbetter v. Goodyear (2007)  389 Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971)  223 Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905)  25n.9, 277–​9 see also Lochner-​era Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)  373, 470 Marbury v. Madison (1803)  265, 273–​4, 276, 383, 400, 445 Maryland v. Craig (1990)  191

Massachusetts v. Murgia, 427 US 307 (1976) 116 McClesky v. Kemp (1987)  448 McConnell v. Federal Election Commission 29 McDonald v. Arizona 246 McDonald v. City of Chicago  245–​6 Miller v. California (1973)  222 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)  222, 224, 465, 468, 470, 549 MVMA of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance et al. (1983) 261, 403 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012)  353, 356n.15, 432–​3 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) 116 Nilva 114 New York Times v. Sullivan (1964)  222, 224 Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944)  112 Obergefell v. Hodges 179, 463 Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation (1995)  449 Pence v. United States, 316 U.S. 332 (1941) 509, 511 Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)  111–​12 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 195, 444 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)  191 Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) 116 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)  165n.10 Republican Party of Minnesota v. White 48, 55–​6, 60 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980)  549 Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945)  526 Roe v. Wade  10, 13, 36, 280, 420, 448, 450, 468–​70 Romer v. Evans (1996)  351, 449 Scott v. Sanford 274 Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953)  532n.6 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) 170 States of Florida et al. v. United States Department of Health and Human Services et al. 170 Steel Seizure Case 399 Stuart v. Laird (1803)  445

Index   579 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)  511–​12, 520–​1, 532n.6 Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. (1964)  25n.10 U.S. v. Carolene Products 279 U.S. v.Curtis-​Wright Export Corp. (1936)  401 U.S. v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971)  548 U.S. v. Lee (1882)  444 U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S.  549 25n.13 U.S. v. Marion (1971)  190 U.S. v. Munoz-​Florez, 495 U.S. 385 (1990)  549 U.S. v. Nixon 309, 400 U.S. v. Virginia (1996)  111–​12 U.S. v. Windsor (2013)  463 USPS v. Council of Greenburgh, 453 U.S. 114 (1981) 549 Varnum v. Brien, 763 NW.2d 862 (Iowa 2009)  394–​5n.4 Wal-​Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) 165n.11 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989) 448 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)  511–​12, 520–​1 Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 547 (2001)  112 legal stability  232n.13, 248 legal symbolism  424 legal system, the  370, 386, 486, 490, 502 common law  272 legal tests  219 legal values  258, 328 legalism viii, 518 legislation see also legal rulings challenged  262, 362, 445 court-​curbing  263, 329, 350, 387, 444 federal  177–​80, 288, 373, 383–​4, 387–​9, 391, 445, 547–​8 influencing 106 judicial service  76 new 281 pro-​life  12 process of 259 regular 257 review of see judicial review striking down of  281, 349, 384, 388–​9 legislative majorities  382, 385 legislators  152, 381, 386, 389, 547 legislature, the  23, 48, 255–​7, 276, 280, 311, 321, 364, 444, 447, 463 see also

Congress and government, the and House of Representatives and Senate, the and the courts  vii, 74, 152–​3, 256–​61, 263, 265, 271, 281, 324, 330, 355, 381–​93, 443–​7, 463–​4 lobbying  23, 361, 369–​7 1 power of  vii, 443 state-​level see state governments, legislatures of legitimacy  418, 441, 443, 464, 469 see also accountability of courts  vii, 48, 163, 228, 266, 329, 417, 432, 434, 442–​3, 462, 467 state courts  56, 58, 60, 62, 65n.22, 265, 308 U.S. Supreme Court  38, 176, 214, 257, 259–​ 60, 263, 265–​6, 356n.11, 385, 417–​18, 423–​4, 426, 432–​4, 438–​9, 441–​3, 445, 447–​50, 467 institutional  62, 228, 257, 265–​6, 308, 356n.11, 416, 438, 443, 445, 447 judicial  219, 228, 385 lack of   65n.22 leniency 135 Lepper, M.R.   502n.8 Levy, A.  165n.15, 326 Levy, Robert  363, 370 Lewis, Richard   428n.6 liberalism  12, 70, 164, 256, 276, 283, 306, 330, 351–​ 2, 436–​7, 441–​2, 446, 449, 452n.3, 462, 496, 509, 511–​14, 522, 525, 541, 546–​8 see also liberals and votes (of judges), liberal and social policy see policy-​ making, social, liberal liberals  110, 115, 181, 278–​80, 314, 351–​2, 442, 496 see also activists, liberal and interest groups, liberal and judges, liberal libertarianism 278 liberty  25n.9, 512 see also under cases, types of and also rights Library of Congress  101 life expectancy  71, 96n.1 life tenure (of judges)  3, 75, 89, 260, 279, 324–​5, 332, 353, 381, 443 see also U.S. Supreme Court justices, tenure of Lindquist, S.A.  54, 163, 223, 226, 240, 262–​3, 282, 295, 316n.7, 517 Lindstädt, R.  35, 314 Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC)  214 Linos, K. 420 Lipsky, Michael  465

580   Index litigants  131–​2, 135–​6, 140, 142, 150, 156–​7, 161–​2, 164, 170, 174, 189–​90, 247–​8, 320, 322, 462, 486, 500, 540 see also defendants and petitioners and plaintiffs behavior of  133, 139, 155, 368, 464, 487 characteristics of 493 choices of  130, 132–​3, 152, 154 see also decision-​ making, by litigants costs to  63, 132, 155, 176 expectations of 134 favorable responses to  331 governmental see government, the, as a litigant losing  138, 151, 154–​6 pro se 159 rational  139, 154–​5 requests for review  107, 150–​1, 155, 170, 200n.13 see also appeal satisfaction of 139 success of  363, 366, 371 types of 163 litigation  13, 23, 132–​3, 136–​7, 153, 156, 366–​7, 370–​1, 460, 462–​3, 471 see also cases features of 189 methods of 361 organizational  361–​4, 367–​70, 373–​4 outcome of  12, 462 process of  vi, 136 role of interest groups in vii  role of lawyers in vi  role of parties in vi  procedures governing  vi, 153–​4, 159–​61, 165n.8 rights-​oriented  9 strategy see strategy, litigation theories of  asymmetric information  132 divergent expectations  132, 134 understanding 483 venue of see venue selection Llewellyn, Karl  288 Lloyd, R.D.  310 local governments  245, 384, 390, 465 Lochner-​era, the  25n.9, 386 see also legal rulings, Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905) Locke, John  214 Lord, C.G.   502n.8 Los Angeles Times 305, 419 Luse, J.K.  223 Lutz, S. 494

Lyles, K.L.  136 Lynch, K.J.  371 Lynch, M.S.  179 Lyons, W. 247 Madison, James  274, 387 magistrate judges  143 Magna Carta  271, 273 majorities 62 see also “counter-​majoritarian difficulty”, the Malhotra, N. 515 Maltzman, F.  7, 180, 206, 210, 212, 231n.2, 239, 258, 263–​4 marijuana  42, 51, 59, 63n.10, 503n.10 see also Colorado, marijuana referendum Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)  297, 532 Marks, Brian  255, 261 marriage  272, 280, 361–​2, 385, 388, 462–​3 Marshall, John  196, 274, 276–​7, 400 Marshall, T.R.  449, 464 Marshall, Thurgood  39, 102, 111, 113, 172, 206–​7 votes of   266n.2 Marshall Court, the  265 Martin, Andrew  35, 259, 261, 282, 299, 330, 445, 448, 450, 451n.3, 514–​15, 531, 541, 550, 551n.8 Martin-​Quinn (MQ) scores  35, 261–​2, 267nn.6–​7, 312, 315, 333n.2, 531, 546–​7 Martinek, W.L.  7, 295 Maryland 86 Massachusetts 103 Massaro, J. 32 material incentives  8 Mather, L.M.  129, 141 Mathias, Charles  314 Matthews, Burnita  71 Matthews, Stanley  appointment of 36 Maveety, N.  210, 551n.3 Mayhew, D.  Congress: The Electoral Connection 15 Mayo Clinic, the  287 McCaffery, E.J.  488 McCloskey, Robert  349 McClurg, S.D.  231n.1 and 5 McGuire, K.T.  115, 411, 463 McKenzie, M.J.  223, 310 McMahon, Kevin J.  387 McManus, Edward  86 measurement  508–​9, 512, 518, 524, 537, 547 technologies/​techniques of  508–​9, 513–​14, 516–​19, 521, 523–​4, 529–​31

Index   581 media, the  62, 280, 350, 352, 416, 427, 428n.5 see also journalists attention of the  129, 149, 405, 408, 419–​21, 452n.4 see also “new pegs” audience of the  417, 421, 425 see also public, the broadcast  57, 417, 419, 422, 427 coverage provided by  vii, 49, 60, 112, 411, 416–​23, 425–​7, 428nn.3 and 6 electronic 421, 426 framing/​tone of items by  417–​26, 427n.2 influence of  416–​18, 420, 424, 426–​7 interest of  29, 39 mainstream 418 and presentation of decisions vii  print  34–​5, 304–​5, 417–​19, 421–​3, 425–​7 role of  416–​17, 425, 427 social  426–​7, 451 “median justice” theory, the  212 Meernik, James  389 Melnick, Shep  391–​2 memoranda  114, 328 see also bench memos and pool memos merits  150, 158, 160–​2, 164, 177, 213, 328, 365–​7 and the appointment of judges see appointment (of judges), factors influencing of a case see cases, merits of and the confirmation of judges see confirmation (of judges), factors influencing votes on  109, 113, 179, 366, 552n.13 role of law clerks in  101, 109, 113 merits panels  161 Merritt, Deborah  295 Messinger, I.S.  115 methodology  viii, 7, 250n.6, 258, 297, 290, 297, 308, 320, 485–​6, 488–​9, 497, 501, 518–​ 19, 524, 526, 529–​32, 537–​9, 541, 546, 550, 551n.9, 552nn.14 and 24 see also empirical testing and measurement Mexico  266, 274–​5 Michigan Law School  104, 551n.5, 552n.14 Middle East, the  321, 489 Miers, Harriet  43n.3, 313 Miles, Thomas  297 military conscription  290 Miller, Mark  392 Miller, R.E.  130 Miller, Samuel Freeman  444 Minneapolis 287

Minnesota 55 Supreme Court of  108 University of 287 “Minnesota Twins”, the  287 see also Blackmun, Harry and Burger, Warren E. minorities  20, 279–​80, 297 groups advocating for see interest groups, minority-​based rights of see rights, of minorities Minow, Martha  113 Minton, Sherman  112, 522–​3, 525, 529 Mishler, W.   451n.2 Missouri  Eastern District of   24n.3 Missouri Compromise, the  274 models of judicial behavior  “attitudinal model”  viii, 164, 209, 237–​8, 253–​4, 257, 260, 266 and n.2, 304–​5, 316n.2 “institutional maintenance model”  260, 262, 264, 343 “legal attitudinal model”  164 “legal model”  viii, 303–​4 “normative” 288 “separation of powers (SOP) model”  253–​66, 267nn.8–​9, 446 “stimulus-​response model”  290 “strategic model”  viii, 210, 253, 257, 265–​6, 267n.4, 344, 347–​8, 354–​5, 388, 447 moderates 70, 512 Mondak, J.J.  423 money  362, 488 see also campaign contributors/​ contributions and judges, earnings of and litigants, costs to distribution of  63n.8, 324 Monte Carlo approach  35 Montgomery, J.M.  57 mootness 327 morality  241–​3, 248, 448, 470, 495, 518 Moraski, B.J.  262, 407 Morris, Rebecca   532n.1 Morriss, Andrew  295 Morse, Michael viii  motions  157–​8, 162–​3, 189–​90 Murphy, Frank  102, 112, 510–​11, 513, 520–​3, 525–​6 Murphy, Walter F.  v, 140, 255, 266, 267n.3, 321, 391 Elements of Judicial Strategy  254–​5, 267n.3, 321 NAACP  9, 362–​3 Legal Defense Fund  155, 362, 373 Nader, Ralf  310

582   Index Nagel, Stuart  290 NARAL 13 National Grange  36 National Organization for Women (NOW) 13, 362 National Rifle Association (NRA)  370–​1 National Science Foundation (NSF)  540 national security  154 Nealon, William  86 Neas, Ralph  13 Nelson, Ben  314 Nelson, M.J.  v, 50, 59, 63n.10, 64n.14, 65n.25 Nelson, T.E.  498–​9 Nelson, W.E.  115 Nemacheck, Christine  v Network Analysis  297 New Deal, the  279, 383, 517, 538 New Institutionalism  295 see also judges, behavior of, theories of, institutional New Jersey  181 New Right, the  105 New York (state)  63n.6, 518 New York Times  356n.15, 419, 421, 423, 425, 515 “news pegs”  419–​20, 427n.3, 428n.3 Newspapers see media, the, print Nixon, D.C.  214, 553n.25 Nixon, Richard  309, 351, 400–​401 appointments by  16–​20, 286, 300n.1, 312, 409 nominations by  4, 72–​3, 79–​80, 87–​8, 94 Nominate scores  516 nomination (of judges) see also nominees approaches to see strategy, nomination/​ confirmation challenged  22–​3, 24n.1, 26n.18, 93–​4 see also appointment (of judges), challenged controversial 7, 42 “critical”  24n.4 defeated  7, 22–​3, 24n.3, 32, 40–​2, 94 and diversity criteria  15–​17 see also appointment (of judges), and diversity to federal courts of appeal  33, 73, 93 and ideology/​party  11–​12, 15, 407 “killing of ” see confirmation (of judges), process of, blocking/​stalling of to lower federal courts  v, 4–​5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 21–​2, 24, 25n.16, 26n.18, 78, 87–​8, 93–​4, 409–​10 and the president  6, 12, 14–​15, 21–​3, 24nn.1, 3 and 6, 31–​3, 37–​42, 43n.3, 72, 78, 87–​8, 93–​4, 262, 288, 311–​14, 406–​10 process of  29–​30, 33, 37–​8, 305

and the Senate  4–​5, 7, 15, 25n.16, 26n.18, 32, 36–​7, 42, 93, 315, 372, 407 successful  32, 37, 41–​2, 94, 407, 410 unchallenged  21–​2 to the U.S. Supreme Court  4, 12, 29–​34, 37–​42, 43n.3, 262, 288, 311–​14, 406–​8, 421 nominees  93, 262, 372, 407–​9 background of see under judges characteristics of  40, 296, 410 choosing  13–​15, 31–​3, 41, 407 see also under nomination (of judges) and strategy, nomination/​confirmation ideology of  21–​2, 26n.18, 32–​5, 37, 40–​2, 43n.3, 312, 407, 410 judicial philosophy of  12 knowledge of 31 personality of 31 partisanship of  315, 409–​10 potential 296 qualifications  31, 33, 38, 43n.3, 407 questioning of 36 views of  31, 42 noncompliance  226, 326, 348, 463 non-​trial adjudication  131–​2, 157 non-​U.S. courts  vi, 105, 237, 272–​3, 321, 331–​2, 355n.1, 451, 544–​5 non-​U.S. judges  ix, 323 North Carolina  57 North Dakota  86 Norway 322 “nuclear option”, the  23 “numeracity”  502n.4 Nuremberg Trial  508–​10, 512, 519–​23, 525–​6, 528–​30 Nyhan, B. 57 Obama, Barack  38, 356n.15, 399, 406, 433 actions of  186, 405 administration of  5, 7, 23 appointments by  20, 38, 71, 78, 410 nominations by  4–​6, 23, 24nn.3 and 6, 72–​3, 79–​80, 87–​8, 93–​4 confirmation of  5–​6 Obamacare see Acts, Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act (2010) O’Connor, K. 115 O’Connor, Sandra Day  14, 41, 106, 111, 115, 191, 207, 281, 418, 444, 514 papers of   183n.6 retirement of  29, 39 Oklahoma 64n.17, 164n.3

Index   583 online tools  x operationalization 425 opinion polls  14, 279, 350, 434–​9 see also public, the, opinon of opinion writing  327 assignment of  205–​7 judges and  111–​13, 175, 199n.4, 207–​8, 211, 295–​6 process of  111, 158, 207, 210–​12, 255 role of law clerks in  101, 103, 109, 111–​14, 172, 207–​8, 374 in the U.S. Supreme Court  vi, 205–​15, 255 opinions  205, 237, 239, 321, 326–​7, 363, 367, 369, 467, 512, 521, 537 see also opinion writing clarity of 466 comments upon  114 content of  vi, 205, 212–​13, 367 drafting/​crafting of  172, 207–​12, 214, 230, 326, 432, 496 see also opinon writing en banc  200n.15 errors in 112 and ideology  205, 208, 211, 214–​15 judicial  74, 90, 109, 111, 241 of lower courts  196, 213–​14 majority  111, 134, 205–​15, 223, 226, 278, 294, 326, 328, 351, 367, 371, 406, 496 minority 211 plurality  209, 215, 226 positions of judges regarding see also bargaining, over opinion content and coalitions concurrence with  vi, 197, 210 doctrinal  210–​11 emphatic  210–​11 expansive 210 limiting 210 regular  208–​9 reluctant  210–​11 special  208–​9 unnecessary 210 dissent from  vi, 112, 180, 208, 211–​12, 295, 321, 351, 367, 423, 426, 521, 526 aversion to  326–​7 joining the majority  vi, 208–​10, 294–​5, 309 requesting revision  208 published  139, 158, 162, 214, 296 separate  112–​13 solo authored  295 style/​language of  111–​12, 205, 207, 213–​14, 230, 326

unpublished 159 opinions of see opinions, of U.S. Courts of Appeals 214 opinions of see opinions, of U.S. District Courts 214 of the U.S. Supreme Court  139, 214, 403, 406, 423, 433, 551n.8 vague x workload regarding  205 oral arguments  vi, 195–​6, 199, 209, 213, 240 appeals brought to  150, 158, 160–​3, 165n.16 case for  159 consideration of 142 persuasiveness of  164, 197–​9 role of law clerks in preparing  108–​10 rules pertaining to  192–​6, 200nn.17 and 21 at the U.S. Supreme Court  194–​9 originalism  238, 553n.25 outcomes (legal)  133, 156, 215, 247, 307, 366, 411, 447, 462, 464, 469–​70, 487 489, 494, 546–​7 see also decisions (legal) and litigation, outcome of and opinions and opinion writing and policy outcomes/​results against the government see government, decisions going against conservative 549 control of 132 factors influencing vi–​vii,  199, 237–​8, 294, 494 see also decisions (legal), factors influencing law clerks  110 see also law clerks, influence of trial court judges  139 trial processes   200n.9 ideological 154 liberal 225, 549 regarding policy see policy outcomes reversals  138–​9, 221, 229, 239, 259, 293, 326, 328, 344, 468, 489 see also decisions (legal), overturned in trial courts  190 in the U.S. Supreme Court  211, 403 Owens, Ryan  vi, 176–​7, 214, 262–​3 Oxley, Z.M.  422 Palmer, J. 180 Pareto sets  256, 259, 263–​4 Park, J. 315 Parker, C.M.  307 Parrillo, Nick   532n.1

584   Index “particularism” 52 partisanship  vii, 95, 279–​80, 304, 307–​12, 314–​15, 333nn.2–​3, 381–​4, 388, 409, 441, 446, 469 and decision-​making see decision-​making, and partisanship and judicial appointments see appointment (of judges), and partisanship as a proxy for ideology  vii, 306–​7 party activists  8–​9, 14–​15, 23 see also activists party-​adjusted judicial ideology (PAIJD) scores 306 party polarization  vii, 10–​11, 14, 106, 311, 315, 352–​4, 356n.14 see also ideological polarization and political parties party system, the  8, 14–​15 see also political parties and political system, the periods of  Modern Day Party System  11, 15, 24n.7, 25n.8 Old Party System  11 Party System in Transition  11 types of  modern party system  8–​9 old mass party system  8–​9, 23 patronage  7, 10–​15, 23 see also campaign contributors/​contributions Pennsylvania 58, 272 courts 325 judges  50, 86, 140, 347 People for the American Way  13 The People’s Court 14 Peppers, T.C.  110, 181, 305 Peretti, T.J.  280 Perino, M.A.  137, 139 Perkins, Jared vii  Perry, B.A.  14 Perry, H.W.  107 Peterson, D.A.M.  450 petitioners  170–​1, 174, 213 petitions  374n.2 for certiorari  107, 151, 170–​3, 178, 181, 182 and n.1, 366, 411 see also briefs, on certiorari and “cert pool”, the deciding upon  171–​2, 174–​9, 181, 328 see also decisions (legal), about granting review time spent  174–​5 granting of  169, 174–​9, 182n.4, 186, 327, 366 see also judicial review, granting of “aggressive” 327

and ideology  175–​6 number of 173 process regarding  170–​6 rejection of  172–​4, 177–​8, 180, 182n.4, 366 role of law clerks in dealing with  107, 171–​2 selection of cases for  410 Philippines 275 Pickerill, Mitchell  389 Pickle, K.L.   502n.5 Pinello, D.R.  239 Pinkney, William  196 plaintiffs  18, 131, 143n.3, 153, 164n.6, 346, 488 decisions in favour of  297 in-​state  63n.8, 324–​5 wins by 133 Plapinger, E. 141 plea bargains  vi, 131, 134–​5, 140–​1, 143, 356n.16 see also cases, termination of, by plea bargaining pleas of guilt  51, 141 police, the  151, 497 policy  49, 102, 129, 179, 210, 257, 260, 262, 276–​8, 362, 385–​6, 389–​93, 405, 408, 412, 425, 433, 439, 441, 444–​5, 448, 451n.1, 460–​4, 469, 499 changes to  466, 469 implementation of  465–​7, 469 legitimization of  418, 424 regulatory 361, 393 policy alternatives  35 policy consequences  9, 225, 230, 364–​5, 448, 461 policy demands  14–​15, 23, 156 policy goals  viii, 10, 13–​15, 23, 130, 206, 329, 333n.2, 354, 355n.5, 362, 365, 369, 386, 390, 392, 446, 498 and federal court judgeships  9, 11–​12, 23, 177 see also policy outcomes/​results, and the judiciary policy-​making  280, 326, 350, 382, 384–​6, 389–​94, 402, 404–​6, 412, 460, 462, 464, 466 judicial  129, 137, 139, 149, 154, 164, 213, 219–​20, 223, 228, 230, 277–​8, 344, 400, 406, 408, 442, 460, 463–​4 see also judges, preferences of, regarding policy bottom-​up influences on  vi, 220, 229 good  344–​5, 355nn.3 and 5 influences upon  361, 370 legal  399–​400 process of  390–​4, 405, 412

Index   585 public see public policy social  9–​10 policy mood index, the   451n.1 policy outcomes/​results  vii, 150, 260, 366, 381–​2, 445, 461 and the judiciary  10–​11, 179 see also policy goals, and federal court judgeships preferences regarding  220, 258, 381–​2 policy space  257–​8, 267n.5 political actors  vi, 30–​1, 59, 136, 257, 275, 289, 321, 324, 382, 464, 465, 470, 472 and n.3, 539, 550 see also politicians political environment, the see environment/​ context, political political experience  54, 300 political factors  vi, 81–​2, 84–​6, 93, 95, 176, 401 political parties  15, 35, 40, 49, 58, 65n.24, 79–​80, 246, 258, 279, 300, 305, 307–​8, 311, 314 see also Democratic Party, the and partisanship and party system, the and Republican Party, the and party polarization political philosophy  278 political science  v, viii, x, 5–​6, 30–​1, 74, 144n.6, 321–​2, 484, 494, 538–​43, 545, 550n.1, 551n.3 political scientists  149, 237, 250n.6, 289, 321–​4, 333n.2, 343, 385, 388, 392, 432–​3, 446, 450, 471 political service  15 political system, the  10, 260, 291, 364, 385–​6, 391–​3, 412, 417, 422, 424, 538 politicians  8, 13, 15, 23, 58, 102, 265, 275, 367, 386 Politico 432 politics  ix, 12, 15, 26n.18, 49–​50, 106, 129–​30, 136–​ 7, 161, 236–​7, 260, 274–​5, 279, 281–​2, 307, 328, 382, 385–​9, 391–​4, 412, 423, 433–​4, 436, 439–​40, 443–​8, 463, 469, 517, 539, 550n.1 see also institutions, political and political actors and political factors and political system, the judicial  57, 163, 253, 255, 259, 265, 393, 427 and judicial appointments see appointment (of judges), politics of and the U.S. Supreme Court  3, 253 “pool memos”  172 Poole, Keith  35, 262 Poole and Rosenthal Common Space scores see Judicial Common Space (JCS) scores

“Positivity Bias Theory”  424 Posner, E.A.  91, 96n.6, 133, 137, 139, 227, 245, 246, 322–​4, 326, 408 Posner, Richard  viii–​ix, 89, 111 post-​argument conference discussion  109 Powell, Lewis F.  106, 109, 116, 172, 197, 206–​9, 306, 312, 400 power viii, 31 of the purse see appropriation of the sword see authority, enforcement pragmatism 518 precedent  vi, 34, 156, 178, 182n.4, 197–​8, 200n.19, 209, 213, 215, 220, 222–​30, 231 and nn.3–​5 and 8, 232nn.10–​11 and 14, 238–​40, 295, 321, 326, 364, 467, 500, 553n.25 following  219–​20, 224, 229 overruling 227, 540 role of 136 setting of   231n.2 support for  227 “vitality” of 239 president, the  77, 153, 195, 262, 399, 402 see also executive, the acts/​actions of  349, 406, 409–​10, 444 appointments by see under appointment (of judges) and Congress  42, 412 ideology of  33, 35 and the judiciary  197, 288, 348, 443 legacy of  399, 408 mistakes made by  32 nominations by see under nomination (of judges) policy agenda of  11, 23 power/​powers of vii ,  3, 31–​2, 42, 399–​402, 406, 411, 471 preferences/​considerations of  13, 15, 24n.1, 31–​ 3, 37–​42, 51, 70, 74, 178, 288, 312, 325, 348, 403, 406–​11, 467 prestige of  401–​2, 407 and the public  7, 33, 38, 402–​3, 407–​8, 411, 435, 437–​8 see also public, the, and the president re-​election concerns of  14, 402 relationship with judges  81, 95, 286 rhetoric of  405–​8 and/​versus the Senate  v, 4, 6, 25n.16, 32–​3, 40–​1, 74 see also Senate, the, and/​versus the president staff of 102

586   Index president, the (Cont.) State of the Union address by  194 strategies of  14–​15 terms of  32, 40 veto of  258–​9 Preston, Elizabeth   502n.8 Priest, G.L.  132–​3, 143n.3 Primo, D. 6 principal-​agent theory  219–​21, 231n.1, 328, 387, 393 prison 152 Pritchett, C. Herman  v, 30, 41, 289, 298, 322, 508, 521, 530, 537–​9, 551n.4 The Roosevelt Court 254, 538 pro-​choice views  13, 450 pro-​life views  12–​13, 450 “prospect theory”  155, 165n.12, 487, 501 psychology  v, 164, 250n.6, 289, 298, 321, 484–​5, 491–​2, 494, 499, 502n.7, 538, 543 social see social psychology public, the  29–​30, 57, 59, 106, 138, 247, 278, 280, 350, 352, 356n.14, 367, 401, 404, 432, 448, 470 see also citizens and voters, the attention/​concerns of  9, 12, 24, 29, 48, 149, 163, 391, 405, 408, 416, 420–​1, 423, 427, 452n.4, 462 consent of  48, 330 see also accountability and legitimacy divisions within  278 eye of  193–​5 and the government  276 health of 186 influence/​impact of  vii, 176, 330, 346–​8, 354 interests of  116, 322, 394 see also law firms, public interest and the judiciary  48, 51, 237, 247, 279, 282, 324–​5, 330, 344–​8, 351, 353–​5, 356n.9, 388, 434–​5, 443, 446, 448, 450–​1, 461–​2 diffuse support for  434, 440, 442–​3, 462 specific support for  434–​5, 438, 440, 442–​3, 462 state courts  55–​6, 58–​62, 306, 433 U.S. Supreme Court  38–​9, 256, 259–​60, 265–​6, 279, 348–​50, 354, 356n.12, 417–​18, 421, 423–​7, 432–​51, 452n.4, 515 see also U.S. Supreme Court, and the public knowledge of  14, 55–​6, 65n.22, 282, 440–​1 opinion/​opinions of  vii, 14, 63n.10, 64nn.11–​12, 65n.23, 129, 232n.14, 265, 330, 352, 407–​8, 418, 423, 434–​42, 445–​50,

451 and nn.2–​3, 452n.4, 464, 468, 470 see also opinion polls and the courts  vii, 49–​53, 55, 58–​63, 65nn.21–​3, 140, 144n.8, 260, 265, 279, 282, 330, 344, 346, 348, 354, 388, 416–​ 18, 424–​7, 432–​43, 450–​1, 462, 515 and the president  7, 33 see also president, the, and the public reaction to decisions of the courts see decisions (legal), reactions to, by the public as voters see voters welfare/​well-​being of  186, 409, 411 will of  276, 282 see also “counter-​majoritarian difficulty”, the public debate  404 public policy  vii, 40, 343–​5, 370, 461, 464, 546 public schools  291, 465–​6, 468–​9 see also cases, types of, desegregation publicity 40 Puerto Rico  151 purposivism 519 questions presented (to the court)  170–​1 Quinn, Kevin  35, 267n.7, 509, 514, 518, 531, 532nn.1 and 15, 541 race  38, 43n.2, 105, 138, 277, 291, 297, 362, 371, 408, 418, 442, 469, 493 see also Blacks/​ African Americans and color-​blind-​ society advocates cases involving see cases, types of, race discrimination and judicial appointments see appointment (of judges), and race Rachlinski, J.J.  331, 488, 490, 492–​3, 498, 502 Rader, K.T.   231n.6 Ramseyer, J.M.  322 Randazzo, K.A.  139, 410 Rasmussen, E.B.  322 Raso, C.N.  517 rationality  134, 155, 320–​1, 325 see also decisions, rational and irrationality and judges, as rational actors and litigants, rational Reagan, Ronald  actions of 38 administration of 5 appointments by  5, 13–​14, 16–​20, 22, 38, 409, 411 nominations by  4–​6, 41, 72–​3, 79–​80, 87–​8, 93–​4

Index   587 confirmation of  5–​6, 22 failed 41 Real, Manuel  78 reason 245 “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, the  209 reciprocity 228 Redding, R.E.  498 Reed, Akhil Amar  432 Reed, Harry   24n.6 Reed, Stanley Forman  510–​11, 513, 521–​3, 525–​6 regional conflicts  8 regret/​contrition  492, 502n.6 Rehnquist, William H.  14, 70, 90, 115–​17, 172, 198–​9, 206, 387, 421 opinions by 403 papers of   183n.6 votes of   266n.2 Rehnquist Court, the  13, 116, 210, 215, 383, 389, 549 religion  38–​9, 43n.2, 292, 450, 465–​6 see also judges, religious affiliation of cases involving see cases, types of, religious liberty catholics/​Catholicism  39, 291, 450 Islam 451, 493 jews/​Judaism  39, 493 protestants/​Protestantism  39, 291, 450 Reppucci, N.D.  498 Republican Party, the  12, 14, 16, 287, 313–​14, 387 Republicans  8, 11, 20, 26n.22, 153, 273, 310–​13, 352, 437, 548 see also appointment (of judges), and the president, Republican presidents and judges, Republican actions of  24nn.3 and 6 female 38 judicial appointment preferences of  16 liberal  311–​12, 314 strategists of 55 “reputation creators”  ix resources  130, 156–​7, 214, 370 responsibility 492 Rice, D. 425 Richards, M.J.  240, 403–​4, 553n.25 Richman, B. 263 rights  x, 25n.9, 273, 276, 369, 520, 549 see also rights revolution, the civil  137, 365, 420, 548 see also cases, civil rights constitutional 463, 472n.2 of criminals   26n.22 federal 149

gay  109, 272, 423 individual  9, 25n.13, 275–​6, 283, 363 and litigation see litigation, rights-​oriented of minorities  9, 62, 276–​7, 390 procedural  165n.8 protection of  152, 280 states’  16, 273 see also cases, types of, states’ rights and trials  187–​91, 200n.13 violation of 280 of voters  129 of women  10, 362 rights revolution, the  10 Riker, W.H.  254, 442 Ringhand, L.A.  36 Rishikof, H. 115 Robbennolt, Jennifer  492, 502 Roberts, John  70, 90, 237, 315, 343, 356nn.15 and 17, 383, 387, 433, 516, 526 nomination of 36 opinions of 432 votes of  353, 510–​11, 513, 522–​3, 525 Roberts, Owen  113 Roberts Court, the  13, 116, 211, 389 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano (FDR)  279, 401, 444, 516 administration of 5 appointments by  5, 30, 40–​1 nominations by  4, 288 confirmation of 41 and the U.S. Supreme Court  61, 333n.4 Rosen, J. 349 Rosenberg, Gerald  391, 460–​1, 463, 472n.2 Rosenthal, Howard  35, 262 Ross, E.L.  517, 532n.9 “rotational invariance”  512 Rottenstreich, Y. 488 Rove, Karl  55 Rowell, A.   502n.4 Rowland, C.K.  137, 363, 409 Rubin, Edward  391 Rule of 80  77–​8, 95 Russia 100 Rutledge, Wiley Blount  510–​11, 520–​3, 525–​6 Sag, M. 517 St. Paul (Minnesota)  286 Sala, B.R.  263, 516 San Francisco Chronicle 305 Sarat, A. 130 Savchak, E.C.  64n.18, 81, 86

588   Index Scalia, Antonin  39, 111–​12, 199, 211–​12, 214, 312, 315, 351–​2, 354, 496 decisions of  245–​6 opinions of  423, 432 papers of   183n.6 votes of 353 Schanzenbach, M.M.  137, 139 Schauer, F. 491 “Is There a Psychology of Judging?”  491 Scheb, J.M.  247 Scherer, Nancy  v, 5, 7, 14, 26n.22 Scoring Points 11 Schiavoni, Sara  295 Schickler, E. 6 Schoen, R. 181 Schotland, R.A.  48, 63n.3 Schubert, Glendon  v, 178, 298, 520–​1, 525–​6, 532n.10, 538–​9, 551nn.2–​3 The Judicial Mind 254 Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior 539 Schwab, S.J.  137 Scigliano, Robert  31–​2 The Supreme Court and the Presidency 31 Scott, R. 75 SCOTUS 386 screening  157–​8, 162–​3 secret holds  7 Segal, Jeffrey  6, 34–​5, 222, 231n.2, 239, 254, 261–​ 3, 266n.2, 282, 303–​5, 307, 314, 316n.7, 322, 330, 362, 408, 445, 517, 553n.25 Segal-​Cover scores  34–​5, 261, 306, 333n.2, 512 segregation  139, 144n.7, 279–​80, 291, 362, 448, 468–​9 see also cases, types of, desegregation self-​government  276–​7, 279 separation of powers (SOP)  vi, 49, 253, 281–​2, 433, 446, 516 see also models of judicial behaviour, “separation of powers (SOP) model” September 11th 438 Sen, Maya  297 Senate, the  194, 256, 262, 313–​14, 407 see also senators actions/​activity of  23, 258 and the appointment of judges see under appointment (of judges) balance of power in  33 and the confirmation of judges see under confirmation (of judges)

Democrat dominated  24n.6, 93 election to 14 Judiciary Committee of see Judiciary Committee, the and law clerks  103 Leaders of   24n.6 norms of   316n.5 pivot points in  6 polarization of  14, 303, 312, 315 and/​versus the president  v, 4–​7, 15, 23, 25n.16, 32–​3, 40–​2, 74, 93–​4 and the nomination of judges see under nomination (of judges) recesses of 409 relationship with judges  81 Republican dominated   24n.6 senators  32–​3, 314 see also Senate, the actions of  15, 23, 25n.16, 93 election of 36 former 36 home state  12, 24n.1, 305 ideology of  22, 33, 35, 40 influences upon  23 median 7 sentences 135 sentencing  x, 63n.9, 64n.14, 135, 137, 188–​9, 294, 346–​7, 356n.10, 493 see also defendants, criminal, sentencing of and sentences guidelines for  92, 193, 295, 490 settlements  vi, 131–​4, 140–​1, 143, 156 see also cases, termination of, by settlement Sevier, J. 492 sex discrimination  111 “shadow of the trial”, the  134 Shannon, M.L.  7, 32 Shapiro, S.M.  170, 177, 382, 391, 546 Shayo, M. 331 Sheehan, R.S.  222, 224, 403, 451n.2 Shepard, J.M.  57 Shepherd, J.M.  53 Shipan, C.R.  7, 32, 262, 407 Shugerman, J.H.  54 Sieja, Joe vi  Sill, K.L.  206 Simon, Dan  497, 502 Sinclair, Upton  The Jungle 277 Sisk, Gregory  295 Sloan, F.A.  130 small claims courts  331

Index   589 Smith, J. 403 social psychology  viii, 331 social science  290, 298, 401, 403, 498, 503n.12, 538, 541, 545 social scientists  242, 288–​9, 382 socialism 322 society  244, 248, 279, 352, 356n.15, 391, 394, 404, 420, 427, 460–​1, 464, 468–​70, 487, 495, 497 changes in  448, 460–​4, 471–​2 role of courts in effecting  10, 460, 463–​4, 469, 471 values of  51, 450, 470 see also communities, values of sociology v, 298 Solberg, Rorie  vii, 419–​20, 422, 425–​6 Solicitor General, the (SG)  vii, 174–​5, 177, 374n.1, 404, 410 Office of  115, 155, 240, 400, 410–​11 and the U.S. Supreme Court  410–​11 Songer, Donald  vi, 81, 86, 222, 224, 409 Songer Database, the  540, 550, 552n.22 Sood, A.M.  495, 503n.10 Sotomayor, Sonia  38, 315, 356n.9 Souter, David  38, 41, 106, 312–​13, 351 papers of  180, 183n.6 South Carolina  University of  552n.14 Soviet Union, the  275 Spaeth, Harold J.  v, viii, 206, 231n.2, 239, 254, 266n.2, 297, 322, 362, 445, 537, 540–​1, 545–​6, 548–​50, 551n.2, 552n.24, 553n.25 see also U.S. Supreme Court Database Spain 275 speech codes  56, 60 Spence, L.K.  437, 439 Spencer, Herbert  Social Statics 278 Spitzer, M.L.  488 Spriggs, J.F.  81, 206, 210, 213, 230, 239, 263, 371, 406, 516 Springman, C.J.  488 Spill, R.L.  422 Spiller, P.T.  261, 263 Spurr, S.J.  141 staff attorney offices  158 Stanford Law School  72–​4, 83, 85, 104 Stanga, J.E.  50, 140 stare decisis  vi, 36, 219–​20, 224, 228, 232n.13, 239, 258

horizontal  219, 231nn.2 and 7 vertical  219–​22, 225–​7, 229–​30, 231 and n.2, 468 state courts  v, 40, 58–​62, 91, 151–​3, 165n.8, 227, 239, 249, 265, 321, 332, 343, 364, 369, 372, 412n.1, 433 appellate  157, 165nn.8–​9 attacks on  61, 64n.17 candidates for  55–​7 courtroom proceedings in see courtrooms, proceedings in, state courts decisions of see decisions (legal), by state courts elected  v, 58, 231n.1, 265, 276, 306, 346–​7, 356n.10 high/​supreme  50, 53–​4, 57, 63n.6, 107, 149, 151, 165n.8, 171, 180, 231nn.1, 5 and 8, 305–​6, 309, 346, 366, 388, 516, 540, 550 law clerks at  107, 110 jurisdiction of   164n.5 legitimacy of see legitimacy, of courts, state courts lower 308 rulings of  49 see also decisions (legal), by state courts salience of  49, 59, 426 structure and function of  61, 63n.6 vacancies on   64n.16 variations across  134 state governments  53–​4, 61–​2, 64n.17, 281, 390, 412n.1, 465 agencies of  59, 64n.19 constraint of  49, 384 legislatures of  23, 53, 61–​2, 65n.23, 165n.9, 189, 390, 462 limits upon  164n.4, 383–​4 spending of 54 state governors  53–​4, 62, 64n.19, 102 state judges  ix, 74, 273, 371, 467, 516 actions of  63n.8, 64n.19, 140 appointment of see appointment (of judges), to state courts decisions by see decisions, by state judges election of  v, 51, 56–​7, 59, 61–​2, 65n.22, 140, 144n.8, 265, 306, 324–​5, 333n.3, 346–​7, 354, 356n.10 see also judicial elections experience of 54 ideology of 306 impeachment of 55

590   Index state judges (Cont.) re-​election of  v, 48, 50, 324–​5, 346–​7, 356nn.8 and 10 see also judges, re-​election of responsiveness of  50–​1, 59, 64n.18, 144n.8, 325 salary of 91 variation between  181 state prosecutors  144n.5, 152 State Supreme Court Database, the  540, 550 states  25n.9, 32, 63n.8, 130, 140, 151–​2, 245, 272–​3, 281, 306, 324, 326, 333n.3, 372, 464, 468, 470 judgeships attached to  4, 291 rights of see rights, states’ senators from  4 see also senators, home state Southern  466–​7, 469 statutes of 42 Staton, J.K.  226, 260, 266, 282, 326 Staudt, N. 515 Stearns, M.L.  547, 550 Steigerwalt, A.  6–​7, 24n.2 Stenger, A. 230 Stern, R.L.  170, 177 Stevens, John Paul  106, 111, 115–​16, 211–​12, 311–​12, 314, 351, 403 papers of   183n.6 Stewart 51 Stewart, Potter  38, 106, 111–​12, 172 Stidham, R.A.  137 Stienstra, D. 141 Stimson, J.A.  449, 515 Stone, Harlan Fiske  113, 510–​11, 513, 522–​3, 525 Story, Joseph  196 Stoutenborough, J.W.  423, 449–​50 Stras, D.R.  75, 108 strategic holds  24n.2, 26n.18, 93 strategy  55, 372, 391, 405, 445, 483, 489–​90, 492 electoral  14–​15 “elite mobilization”  15–​17, 21, 24n.7, 25n.17 implementation  465–​8 judicial  vi, 26n.18, 109, 139, 141, 179, 182, 208, 213, 253–​9, 264–​6, 283n.2, 293–​4, 321, 329–​31, 347–​8, 354, 355nn.2–​3, 411, 446–​7 see also models of judicial behaviour, “strategic model” litigation  155–​6, 362, 365, 462, 472, 492 nomination/​confirmation  13–​15, 23, 288, 311–​12, 407, 409 Streb, M.J.  55–​6 Strother, Logan  394 Stuntz, W.J.  135

Sutton, Jeffrey  179 Swanson, R.A.  110, 114 Tabarrok, A.T.  134, 324–​5, 333n.3 Taft, William Howard  182n.1, 399, 401 Talley, E. 501 Tauber, S.C.  363 tax/​taxation  75, 89 see also cases, types of, tax Tax Courts  151 Taylor, Zachary  41 termination see departure from the bench  86 territories of the U.S.  151 Teske, P. 54 Texas 55, 164n.3 textualism 519 Thaler, R.H.  487 Thayer, James Bradley  277 “The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law”  277 Thomas, Clarence  39, 41, 112, 315 papers of   183n.6 opinions of 432 votes of 353 Thornberry, Homer  40 three-​judge panels  176, 192, 219, 232n.12, 310, 326–​7 see also courts, multi-​member threshold issues  153–​4, 500 Thurstone, Louis  289 Tiller, Emerson  137, 139 Timpone, R. 408 Tocqueville, Alexis de  275 tokenism 17 Traut, C.A.  305 trial court judges  129, 138, 140–​2, 292–​3, 296, 325, 328–​9, 353, 502 see also district judges behaviour of  136, 138–​9, 141, 346–​7, 356nn.9–​10 decision-​making of see decision-​making, by trial courts federal ix, 129 influence of 139 privacy concerns of  142 reputation of 138 responsiveness of  138, 142, 144n.8 role of  135, 142, 199n.4 see also trial courts, gatekeeping and filtering role of state  ix, 50, 129, 144n.8 and settlement of cases  140 workload of see caseloads, of trial court judges trial courts  vi, 129, 131, 133, 135–​6, 142, 143 and n.1, 144n.6, 149–​51, 190, 192,

Index   591 368 see also cases, going to trial and U.S. District Courts civil  131, 143 see also cases, civil courtroom proceedings in see courtrooms, proceedings in, in trial courts criminal  131, 134, 141, 143, 155 see also cases, criminal decisions in see decision-​making, by trial courts gatekeeping and filtering role of  129–​31, 133, 135, 137, 139, 142, 143 and n.2 number of cases tried in see caseloads, of trial court judges  129 policy-​making role of  129–​30, 139 on remand  140 trials  vi, 133, 135, 186, 368 see also cases cost of 362 outcome of see outcomes (legal), in trial courts process of  188–​92, 199, 200nn.9 and 21 see also courtrooms, proceedings in reaching 187, 191 rights associated with see rights, and trials speed of 190 types of  bench 188 civil 187, 189 criminal  187–​9, 492 jury 188 Truman, Harry  399 appointments by 71 nominations by  4, 72–​3, 79–​80, 87–​8, 93–​4 truth, the  188, 198, 288 Turner, C.C.  210 Tushnet, M. 280 Tversky, A.  165n.12, 488 Twist, K. 420 Twitter 427, 451 Uhlman, Thomas  292 Ulmer, Sidney S.  v, 175, 293 uncertainty  132, 227, 367, 489 United Kingdom, the  96, 190, 273 United Nations, the   502n.2 “universalism” 52 Ura, Joseph  vii, 206, 265, 420, 445, 449 U.S. Circuit Courts  83, 85, 88, 92–​3, 139, 149, 150–​2, 159, 161–​3, 164 and n.2, 192, 200n.15, 239, 326, 328, 552n.22 see also circuit judges 1st  158–​60, 165n.14, 192–​3

2nd  159–​60, 165n.14, 192–​4 3rd  29, 160, 165n.14, 192–​3 4th  13, 160, 165n.14, 192–​3, 300n.1 5th  13, 160, 165n.14, 192–​3, 300n.1 6th  160, 165n.14, 179, 186, 193 7th  160–​1, 165n.14, 179, 193 8th  160, 165n.14, 165n.14, 193, 286–​7, 300 9th  108, 118n.5, 159–​60, 165n.14, 179, 192–​4, 517 10th  160, 165n.14, 193 11th  160, 165n.14, 186, 192, 193–​4 D.C.  24n.6, 150–​1, 160–​1, 165nn.14 and 16, 192–​3, 300 appointments to see under appointment (of judges) courtroom proceedings in see courtrooms, proceedings in, in circuit courts disagreement amongst  177 disbanding of 443 ideology/​partisanship of  139 Non-​Southern  11 Southern 11 split decisions on  118n.4, 179, 182, 199n.5 U.S. Courts of Appeals  149–​52, 157, 162, 164, 191, 219, 291, 323, 327, 363, 406, 408, 465–​7, 550 see also circuit courts appointment of judges to see under appointment (of judges) composition of  20, 96, 410 experience on   43n.3 opinions of see opinions, of U.S. Courts of Appeals role of 149 screening on the  158, 162–​3, 165n.14 staff of  104, 108, 117n.1 success in 156 and the U.S. Supreme Court  222 U.S. Courts of Appeals Database 552n.22 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 186 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)  156, 287 U.S. District Courts  83, 85, 87, 92–​4, 150, 194, 230, 239, 323, 327, 363–​4, 401, 406, 467, 540, 550 see also district judges appointments to see under appointment (of judges) composition of  21, 96 courtroom proceedings in see courtrooms, proceedings in, in district courts decisions made in see decision-​making, by district courts

592   Index U.S. Supreme Court (Cont.) opinions of see opinions, of U.S. District Courts and policy-​making  137 staff of  104, 111, 117n.1 U.S. District Courts Database, the  540, 550 U.S. Forest Service  137 U.S. Supreme Court  3, 113, 115, 150, 180, 237–​8, 240–​1, 256–​7, 260, 262, 326, 365, 373, 399, 404, 509 see also U.S. Supreme Court justices actions of the  153, 199n.6, 227, 277–​81, 329, 445, 548–​9 activism of  278, 280 agenda of the  163, 169, 190, 230, 259, 405 see also agenda-​setting, on the U.S. Supreme Court appointment of judges to the see appointment (of judges), to the U.S. Supreme Court attacks on  61, 444 and case selection see case selection, in the U.S. Supreme Court cases dealt with by the  64n.21, 149–​51, 165n.8, 169, 171, 174–​5, 182, 196, 274, 277, 280, 304, 328–​9, 411, 420, 443–​4, 446 see also legal rulings Chief Justice of see Chief Justice of the United States composition of the  29, 37, 39, 41, 314, 407–​10, 442, 516, 526, 529 conferences of the  173, 205–​6 and Congress  169–​70, 178, 214, 256–​65, 267n.5, 273, 279, 281, 329–​30, 344, 348–​9, 385–​7, 394n.1, 443–​6, 516, 549 considerations of the  140 courtroom proceedings in see courtrooms, proceedings in, in the U.S. Supreme Court criticism of the  36, 279–​80, 349, 356n.15, 444 decisions by the see decision-​making, in the U.S. Supreme Court and decisions (legal), by the U.S. Supreme Court Democrat dominated  176 departure from the  81 divisions within the  279, 303, 309, 312, 353, 423, 529 see also U.S. Supreme Court justices, individual rulings of, differences between efficiency of the  205–​6 expectations of the  29 and the government  274, 278–​80, 282, 330, 348–​50, 382, 399, 403, 405, 443–​5, 447, 460, 465

and the granting of reviews  171–​9, 181, 182 and n.4, 186 history of the  196, 311, 385–​6 and the House of Representatives  256 and ideology  262, 282, 303–​4, 306–​8, 312–​16, 366, 403–​4, 436, 442, 445–​7, 449, 451n.3, 452n.3, 517, 526, 529, 549 influence of the  213, 265, 448–​51, 452n.4, 460, 465, 467–​8, 470–​1 importance of the  29 independence of the  253, 257, 265, 416, 433, 440, 443–​6, 450 interaction with politics of the see under politics and interest groups  361, 366 see also interest groups law clerks at  102–​10, 112, 115–​16, 117n.1 legitimacy of see legitimacy, of courts, U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts  224–​5, 227, 230, 231nn.1 and 8 nomination of judges to the see nomination (of judges), to the U.S. Supreme Court norms of the  4 and opinion writing see opinion writing, in the U.S. Supreme Court opinions of see opinions, of the U.S. Supreme Court outcomes in see outcomes (legal), in the U.S. Supreme Court and partisanship  307–​9, 311–​12, 314–​16, 446 paths to 287 polarization of the  303, 311–​15 and policy-​making  400 power of the  259, 266, 279, 348, 382, 385–​6, 400, 427n.1, 460, 465, 467, 471 perceptions of the  417–​19, 421–​7, 434–​42, 467 preferences of the  227, 255, 261–​2, 264, 447 and the president  178, 288, 333n.4, 348–​51, 399–​400, 403–​8, 410–​11, 412n.1, 433, 444–​5, 447, 516 proclamations of 155 and the public  38–​9, 259, 265–​6, 278–​9, 282, 330, 348–​54, 356n.12, 417–​18, 421, 423–​7, 433–​51, 515 see also public, the, and the U.S. Supreme Court Republican dominated  176 responsiveness of the  446–​7 rules of the  118n.4, 180, 210, 304, 406 10 171 Rule of Four  173, 182n.2

Index   593 secrecy/​seclusion of the  180, 182n.5, 183n.5, 195 and the Senate  256 size of the  444 and the Solicitor General  410–​11 standing/​reputation of  259–​60, 266, 330, 349, 354, 356n.12, 417–​18, 427, 434–​43, 445–​ 8, 450–​1, 462 and state legislation  281 structure of the  439 Terms of the  419–​20 and the U.S. Courts of Appeals  222 vacancies on the  29, 33, 39, 51, 281, 515 U.S. Supreme Court Database (SCDB)  viii, 297, 305, 332, 420, 515, 523–​4, 526, 529, 532nn.7 and 10, 537, 540–​7, 549–​50, 551nn.5 and 9–​11, 552nn.12–​13 and 24, 553n.24 U.S. Supreme Court justices  ix, 86, 111, 115, 195, 293, 300, 421–​2, 551n.8 see also votes (of justices) and voting behavior (of justices) actions/​activities of  172, 175, 196–​8, 205, 207–​9, 211–​15, 405, 428n.5 Associate 173 attitudes of 30 behavior of  ix, 39, 41–​2, 174–​80, 289, 300, 312, 322, 325, 345, 349, 354, 433, 443, 446, 508, 515 see also voting behavior (of justices) candidates for 13 conservative  266n.2, 308, 312, 353–​4, 433, 508, 521, 526, 529 decisions of see decision-​making and decisions (legal), by the U.S. Supreme Court Democratic  311, 313–​14, 353 experience of  54, 210, 540 expertise of 206 “Four Horsemen”, the  279 individual rulings of see also votes (of judges), differences between differences between  287, 289–​90, 300, 423, 426, 529 see also under votes (of justices) similarities between  287 influences upon  175–​7, 179, 197–​8, 241, 253, 255–​6, 264–​6, 300, 304, 309, 311, 316, 345, 348–​54, 366, 400, 405–​6, 425, 446–​7 see also decisions (legal), factors influencing law clerks and  100, 112, 117n.1

leisure time of  ix liberal  266n.2, 307–​9, 312, 353, 366, 446, 449, 452n.3, 508, 517, 521, 529 median  514–​15 panels of see three-​judge panels papers of 101 practices of  172–​3 preferences of  232n.12, 261, 265–​6, 267n.4, 279, 289, 307–​8, 447 ideological  253, 264, 279, 282, 306–​7, 312–​13, 315 partisan  307–​9, 311–​13, 315 problems facing   283n.2 and the public  14, 29, 345, 354 race of 39 relationships with one another  211–​13, 255, 312 see also U.S. Supreme Court, divisions within the Republican  311, 313–​14, 351, 353, 517 seclusion of  173, 195 senior associate  205 social circles of  312 staff of  ix, 102–​4, 106 “swing” 206 tenure of  13, 81, 279, 443 see also life tenure (of judges) utterances/​questions of  196–​7, 200n.16 views of  198–​9 workload of  205 see also caseloads, of U.S. Supreme Court justices utility  viii–​ix, 134, 487, 501 see also Expected Utility Theory and judges, utility of and utility function utility function  ix “validity beliefs”  494 Vanberg, G.  226, 260, 266, 282, 326 Van Devanter, Willis   182n.1 venue selection  361, 369–​70, 373 Vietnam War  290 Vines, Kenneth  291–​2 Vining, R.L.  422, 428n.3 Vinson, Fred  113, 199n.4, 510–​11, 522–​3, 525, 529 Vinson Court, the  508, 552n.13 Virginia Law School  104 Virginia Military Institute  111–​12 Volokh Conspiracy  352 voters  20, 23–​4, 36, 38, 48–​9, 55–​6, 59–​60, 62, 445 mobilization of  8–​9, 16 role of  49, 231n.1, 354 support of  14, 324

594   Index votes (of justices)  x, 30, 109, 176–​8, 182n.4, 206, 214, 262, 433, 510–​13, 518–​19, 525, 552n.13 being in the majority  205, 510–​13, 529–​31 being in the minority  510–​13, 529, 531 cancelling one another out  41 changing  206, 211–​12, 240, 515, 519, 525–​6, 529–​30, 532n.2 see also voting behavior (of justices), fluidity of and coalitions see coalitions and opinions, positions of judges regarding conservative  11, 266n.2, 509, 511–​13, 515, 520, 522, 525 differences between  290, 311, 518, 529 see also U.S. Supreme Court justices, individual rulings of dissenting  422–​3, 529 divided 240, 423 factors influencing  vi, 109, 164, 176–​7, 181, 249, 290, 304, 366–​7, 402, 404, 425, 515–​19, 529 liberal  11, 266n.2, 446, 509, 511–​15, 520, 522, 525–​6 and party/​ideology see voting behavior (of justices), and party/​ideology on petitions  173–​4, 176 and policy  177–​8 predicting 239, 249n.2 and strategy  109, 256 swing 41 unanimous 113, 311 voting behavior (of justices)  498, 516, 518, 525 in accordance with appointing presidential preferences 51, 325 analysis of  24n.4, 34–​5, 304, 509–​19, 522, 524–​ 6, 529–​30, 552n.13 anticipated  39–​41 fluidity of  109, 211–​12, 351, 408, 514–​16, 520–​1, 525–​6, 529–​30, 532n.2 see also “ideological divergence” and ideological drift and votes (of justices), changing and party/​ideology  11, 17–​19, 109, 176–​9, 246, 303–​4, 311, 323, 367, 402, 404, 508–​9, 511–​13, 516–​18, 521, 525–​6, 529 presidential disappointment with regard to 41, 351 and public preferences  59, 425 see also public, the, and the judiciary, U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme Court, and the public

spatial 256 uncertainty regarding  13 voting rights see rights, of voters Waldfogel, J.  132–​3 Wahlbeck, P.J.  81, 180–​1, 206, 210, 212–​13, 371 Walker, T.G.  137–​8 Wall Street Journal 352 Wallander, Z. 107 Wal-​Mart  153 Waltenburg, E.N.  418–​20, 422, 425–​6 Ward, Artemus  vi, 107, 110, 115–​16 wardens 135 Warren, Earl  9, 108, 115, 510–​11, 522–​3, 525 Warren Court, the  383, 391, 442, 552n.13 Wasby, S.L.  104, 109–​10, 114, 371, 471 Washington, D.C.  vii, 8, 194, 273, 351–​2, 356n.15 Washington (state)  356n.10 judges 50, 325 Washington, George  287 appointments of  3, 34, 37, 40 Washington University (St. Louis)  552n.14 The Washington Post 14, 419 Watergate 309 Wawro, G.J. 6 Way, L.B.  210 Weaver, Taylor vii  Webster, Daniel  196 Wedeking, J.  208, 214, 226, 326 Weiden, D.L.  107, 110 welfare 54, 186 Westerland, C.  35, 227, 261–​3, 282, 314, 316nn.7–​8, 516 Westlaw (WL) Key Numbers  523–​4, 532n.10 White, Byron  106, 115, 172, 180, 198, 312 White, Ronnie   24n.3 Whitford, A. 402 Whittaker, Charles  102 Whittington, Keith E.  32, 383–​6, 394n.1 Wildavsky, Aaron  401, 495 Wilhelm, T.  59, 422, 428n.3 William Mitchell College of Law  287 Wistrich, A.J.   502n.5 witnesses  188–​9, 191, 368 child  191, 200n.10 Wohlfarth, P.C.  214, 265, 411, 445 Wolbrecht, C. 445 women  20–​1, 38, 52, 362, 469–​70 see also National Organization for Women (NOW) groups advocating for see activists, female and interest groups, women’s-​based issues concerning  39, 294

Index   595 as judges see judges, female and judicial appointments see appointment (of judges), and gender rights of see rights, of women support of 14 Wood, B.D.  404 Woodruff, M.J.  56, 59, 516, 547–​9 workers and the workplace  39, 54, 178, 277–​9 World War I  275 World War II  275, 386 Wright, J.R.  176, 178, 181, 327, 366 writs of mandamus 274 Wydra, Elizabetha  432

Yale Law School  72–​4, 83, 85, 104, 112 Cultural Cognition Project  495–​6 Yanus, A.B.  422 Yarnold, B.M.  137 Yates, Jeffrey  vii, 402–​3 Yoon, Albert  v, 81–​2, 86, 89, 296 Yuchtman, N.  50, 52, 64n.13, 325 Zaller, John 9 Zeiler, K. 485 Zorn, C.  110, 137, 178, 239, 259, 327, 411 Zuk, D. 81 Zussman, A. 331