The Oxford Handbook of European Islam 0191756644, 0199607974, 0191026417, 9780199607976, 9780191756641, 9780191026416

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T H E OX F OR D HA N DB O OK OF

E U ROP E A N I SL A M

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

EUROPEAN ISLAM Edited by

JOCELYNE CESARI

1

3 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, United Kingdom

OX2

6DP,

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © Oxford University Press 2014 The moral rights of the authors‌have been asserted First Edition published in 2014 Impression:  1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New  York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number:  2014936672 ISBN 978–0–19–960797–6 Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon,

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Acknowledgements

This book is the outcome of several convergent efforts. First and foremost, I am grateful to all the authors who have worked relentlessly with me to create more than a juxtaposition of case studies, i.e. a consistent critical analysis of the knowledge on Islam and Muslims in Western and Eastern Europe. I also would like to thank Amanda Garrett and Aline Longstale who assisted me in the editorial work with great competence and patience.

Contents

List of Figures List of Tables List of Maps List of Contributors

Introduction Jocelyne Cesari

xi xiii xv xvii

1

PA RT I   I SL A M A S A P O S TC OL ON IA L , P O ST- SE C ON D WOR L D WA R R E L IG ION I N E U ROP E 1. France Jennifer A. Selby

23

2. The United Kingdom Sophie Gilliat-Ray

64

3. Germany Riem Spielhaus

104

4. The Netherlands Maurits S. Berger

158

5. Belgium Nadia Fadil, Farid El Asri, and Sarah Bracke

222

PA RT I I   T H E A R R I VA L OF I SL A M A S P O ST- 1974 M IG R AT ION 6. Italy Chantal Saint-Blancat

265

viii  Contents

7. Spain Ana I. Planet Contreras

311

8. Greece Venetia Evergeti, Panos Hatziprokopiou, and Nicolas Prevelakis

350

9. Scandinavian Countries Garbi Schmidt and Jonas Otterbeck

391

PA RT I I I   T H E OL D E U ROP E A N L A N D OF I SL A M 10. Bosnia and Herzegovina Ahmet Alibašić

429

11. Albanians’ Islam(s) Isa Blumi and Gëzim Krasniqi

475

12. Russia Stéphane A. Dudoignon

517

13. Bulgaria Antonina Zhelyazkova

565

PA RT I V   I SL A M A N D E U ROP E A N SE C U L A R I SM 14. The Institutionalization of Islam in Europe Silvio Ferrari and Rossella Bottoni

619

15. Shariah in Europe Mathias Rohe

656

16. Hijab Jennifer A. Selby

701

Contents   ix

PA RT V   I SL A M A N D E U ROP E A N P OL I T IC S 17. Islamophobia Ayhan Kaya

745

18. Radicalization Daniela Pisoiu

770

Conclusion: Is There a European Islam? Jocelyne Cesari

802

Index

807

List of Figures

1.1 Immigration in France by country, 2008

26

8.1 Apprehensions of undocumented aliens in Greece, 2002–2011

365

9.1 Number of Muslims in Sweden: estimation

396

11.1 Importance of religion among Albanians in the Balkans

493

11.2 Attended religious service among Albanians in the Balkans

493

13.1 Organizational structure of the Muslim confession in Bulgaria

591

16.1 Poster of the SVP with woman wearing niqab, 2009. © Schweizerzeit Verlags AG

727

List of Tables

1.1 Unemployment in France based on nationality

28

1.2 Shifts in the education levels of immigrants and non-immigrants

30

3.1 Persons in Germany from Muslim majority countries according to religion and region of origin (%)

111

3.2 Religious affiliation of individuals with a Migrationshintergrund (migrant background) in Germany according to their country of origin (%)

113

3.3 Muslims in Germany according to denomination (%)

115

6.1 Foreign citizens in Italy from Muslim majority countries

269

7.1 Immigration to Spain from Muslim countries

316

7.2 Employees in Spain of Muslim origin

316

7.3 Religious definition in Spain

337

8.1 Key features of the five most numerous nationalities of Muslim migrants in Greece, 2001

367

9.1 Foreign citizens in Denmark 1965–75

394

9.2 Foreign citizens and descendants in Denmark 1980–2005

395

9.3 Immigration of some size to Sweden from Muslim majority countries (absolute numbers)

397

9.4 Total number of immigrants to Norway (selected countries)

398

9.5 Employment rates among immigrants and the Danish majority population 2009

404

13.1 Population according to denomination and census years (1910–2011) 570 13.2 Educational structure of larger ethnic communities in Bulgaria—persons over 20 (in %)

573

13.3 Number and percentage of Bulgaria’s minority populations 1992/2001/2011

574

14.1 Comparative table on the institutionalization of Islam in Europe

644

17.1 Anti-Muslim statements (agreement in %)

752

List of Maps

6.1 Muslim places of worship in Italy by region

278

6.2 Places of worship in Italy affiliated to the Union of Islamic Organizations and Communities in Italy

286

6.3 Places of worship in Italy affiliated to the Islamic Confederation of Italy

287

7.1 Islamic communities in Spain registered with the Ministry of Justice

320

List of Contributors

Ahmet Alibašić  is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Islamic Studies at the University of Sarajevo and director of the Center for Advanced Studies, Sarajevo. Farid El Asri is an Anthropologist (UCL), Assistant Professor, Sciences-Po Rabat, International University of Rabat, and Researcher and Coordinator of the Interdisciplinary Centre for the Study of Islam in the Contemporary World (CISMOC), Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium. Maurits S. Berger  holds the chair of Islam in the Contemporary West at the Center for Religious Studies at Leiden University, and is a senior research associate with the Clingendael Institute for International Relations in The Hague. Isa Blumi  is Associate Professor of Middle East and Global History, Georgia State University, and Visiting Professor of International History, Graduate Institute, Geneva. Rossella Bottoni  is a Researcher in History and Systems of Church–State Relations, Catholic University, Milan. Sarah Bracke is Associate Research Professor of Sociology at Ghent University, Belgium. In 2014–15 she worked on a project entitled Gender and Sexuality in Western Europe’s ‘Muslim Question’ at the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University. Jocelyne Cesari  is Director of the Islam in the West program at Harvard University and Senior Research Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Politics at Georgetown University, USA. Her most recent books are The Awakening of Muslim Democracy: Religion, Modernity and the State (Cambridge University Press, 2014) and Why the West Fears Islam, Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). Stéphane A. Dudoignon  is a Senior Research Fellow at the National Centre for Scientific Research and a Lecturer at the School of Advanced Studies in Social Sciences in Paris, France. Venetia Evergeti  is a Visiting Research Fellow at the University of Surrey, UK. Nadia Fadil  is Assistant Professor at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium. Silvio Ferrari  is a Professor of Canon Law at the University of Milan, Italy.

xviii   List of Contributors Sophie Gilliat-Ray is Professor in Religious and Theological Studies at Cardiff University and Director for the Centre for the Study of Islam in the UK. Panos Hatziprokopiou  is Assistant Professor at Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece. Ayhan Kaya  is Professor of Politics, and Jean Monnet Chair of European Politics of Interculturalism, at the Department of International Relations, Istanbul Bilgi University, Turkey. Gëzim Krasniqi is a Ph.D.  candidate and research assistant at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland. Jonas Otterbeck  is an Associate Professor of Islamic Studies, Lund University, Sweden.  Daniela Pisoiu  is a Researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, Germany. Ana I.  Planet Contreras  is Professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies, at Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain. Nicolas Prevelakis  is Assistant Director of Curricular Development at the Center for Hellenic Studies and Lecturer on Social Studies, Harvard University, USA. Mathias Rohe  is Director of the Erlangen Centre for Islam & Law in Europe, FriedrichAlexander Universität Erlangen-Nuernberg, Germany. Chantal Saint-Blancat  is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Padova, Italy. Garbi Schmidt  is a Professor of Intercultural Studies at University of Roskilde, Denmark. Jennifer A. Selby  is an Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Memorial University of Newfoundland, Canada. Riem Spielhaus  is a Researcher at the Erlangen Centre for Islam & Law in Europe, Friedrich-Alexander Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany. Antonina Zhelyazkova  is Chairperson of the Board of Directors at the International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, Sofia, Bulgaria.

INTRODUCTION JO C E LY N E C E S A R I

For centuries, Muslim countries and Europe have engaged one another through theological dialogues, diplomatic missions, political rivalries, and power struggles. In the last thirty years, however, due in large part to globalization and migration, what was previously an engagement across national and cultural boundaries has increasingly become an internalized encounter within Europe itself. The debate is no longer one of distant and isolated communities, but rather one of endogenous, face-to-face cultural and religious interactions. Questions of the hijab in schools, freedom of expression in the wake of the Danish cartoon crisis, and the role of shariah have come to the forefront of contemporary European discourse. The recurrent question nowadays is: Are Islamic religious principles compatible with liberal secular European values?

Why a Handbook? Over the last two decades, the amount of literature exploring the issues of Islam in Europe has grown exponentially. A substantial number of publications from fields as diverse as history, sociology, economics, and anthropology have emerged in an attempt to make sense of this ever-evolving and politically emotive debate. There has also been a corresponding growth in the number of edited volumes produced on the subject. Most of these volumes have been limited in scope, however, and tend to be either collections of essays or the proceedings of academic conferences.1 Edited volumes or single-authored books address multiple subjects such as continuity and change in the making of Muslim identities, the development of mosques and 1 

Abumalham 1995; Antes and Hewer 1994; Anwar 1983, 1984, 1985; Bistolfi and Zabbal 1995; Garaudy and Zughayb 1984; Gerholm and Lithman 1988; van Koningsveld 1995; Lewis and Schnapper 1994; Maréchal 2002; Metcalfe 1996; Nielsen 1987, 1992; Nielsen and Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations 1999; Nonneman et al. 1996; Renaerts 1994; Shadid and van Koningsveld 1991, 1995, 1996; Speelman et al. 1991; Vertovec and Peach 1997.

2   Jocelyne Cesari Muslim associations, the struggle to establish Muslim schools in the European context (Doomernik 1991), and social responses to the establishment of Muslim institutions (Rath 1996, 2001, 2005; Sunier and Meyer 1996; Waardenburg 1991, 2001; Esch and Roovers 1986). Others have focused on specific social or institutional aspects of Islam in Europe, such as issues of Muslim youth (Vertovec et al. 1998), political participation (Shadid and van Koningsveld 1996; Klausen 2005; Cesari 2013), legal questions and secularism (Borras et al. 1998; Ferrari 1996; Ferrari and Bradney 2000; Foblets 1996; Nielsen 1979, 1987; Rohe 2007; Cesari et al. 2005), conversion (Allievi 1999), the hijab as a cultural and political phenomenon (Coppes 1994), and radicalization of Muslims (Pargeter 2008; Colsaert 2008). Despite these publications, an examination of the current literature reveals a dearth of fully fledged international comparisons that empirically investigate these issues across national borders on the basis of a single research design. This Handbook has the ambition to fill this gap by presenting a systematic and cross-national analysis. For this reason, the different contributions in this volume present a comprehensive approach to the multiple and changing ways Islam has been studied across European countries. Instead of being another collection of essays on different countries or another book with a specific focus, like women or radicalization, the Handbook aims to be extensive and analytical. In the first part, it addresses the state of knowledge of Islam and Muslims within a selection of European countries, while presenting a critical review of the most up-to-date data and survey findings specific to each country. In the second part, it analyses issues of secularism, radicalization, Islamophobia, shariah, and hijab across European countries. Each national chapter provides a review of the contemporary literature on Islam and Muslims in the country, focusing on the most common topics emerging from this literature, i.e. immigration issues, socio-economic status, religion and secularism, political participation, and international constraints. The selected countries are representative of the three main locations of Muslims in Europe: the countries with postcolonial migration like France or the UK, the new immigration countries like Italy and Spain, and the historical lands of Muslims in Europe where they are either minorities (Bulgaria, Russia) or constitute the majority (Albania and Bosnia). The thematic chapters address secularism, radicalization, shariah, hijab, and Islamophobia with the goal of synthesizing different national discussions into a more comparative theoretical framework. On one hand, the originality of the Handbook lies in the analytical review of the knowledge amassed on Islam and Muslims per country and across countries; and on the other hand, in bringing together the analyses of all these issues in one comprehensive publication. The challenge for all contributors, either per country or per thematic issue, was to ensure that the material in the Handbook would be relevant beyond the specific information or facts it conveys. In other words, each chapter is an attempt to balance cutting-edge assessment with the knowledge that the content itself will eventually be superseded by events. That is why all the contributors have produced interpretations with the hope that they will still be relevant to understanding Islam in Europe in the near future. The following trends emerged from our collective effort: the opposite

Introduction   3

evolution of the research agendas in Western and Eastern Europe, the persistent influence of immigration and socio-economic status on the status of Islam in Europe, the relevance of the public culture on religion specific to each country, and the importance of the international context. Finally, the most challenging common point is conceptual and methodological and relates to the ways of approaching Islam in different national contexts.

The Inverted Trajectories of the Research Agendas in Western and Eastern Europe The different contributions highlight opposite and convergent moves within the scholarly discourse regarding Muslims in Europe. In the postcolonial countries, Muslims have been investigated in the 1960s and 1970s through the lens of immigration studies. Similarly, for countries of recent immigration like Spain or Italy since the 1980s, immigration studies dominate the current research agenda. For the older immigration countries, like France or the UK, the cultural and religious dimensions of the research became predominant in the 1980s. After 9/11, both immigration and cultural studies have been redefined by security concerns and the influence of international constraints. For this reason, all chapters on Muslims in Western Europe start with an analysis of the immigration cycles and studies on the statistics, numbers, and immigration policies related to the presence of Muslims. They all show that the research on Islam is influenced by the diverse political agendas of integration. In other words, most of the academic production in Western Europe has followed the integration cycles of Muslim immigrants in an attempt to provide data that can be helpful to policy-makers. This has been done to the point that in some countries, like Germany, the state has become the major agent of the production of knowledge on Islam and Muslims. Even when the influence is not so direct, or the research is not sponsored by public institutions, it nevertheless addresses political questions such as: Is Islam compatible with democracy and secularism? What are the causes of radicalization among Muslims in Europe? Interestingly, the research motivated by more ‘scholarly’ interests—like comparing the religiosity of Muslims across ethnic or immigrant backgrounds to other religious groups in Europe—is much more sparse. So, despite the ongoing debate on the visibility of Islamic activities in public spaces, there is still very little information on the daily practices of Muslims in ways similar to the information that exists for other religious groups. In this regard, sociology of religion, a specifically European social science, still remains marginal when it comes to Muslims and production of data that can be compared to those existing for Protestants, Catholics, or Jews. At the same time, ethnographies of Muslim communities in multiple localities have mushroomed but do not

4   Jocelyne Cesari provide a clear picture of the most significant trends in terms of acculturation or social practices of Muslims. In Eastern Europe, the opposite shift from religious to immigration studies is observable. Due to the historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, Islam was included in religious studies or orientalism and/or as part of ethnic studies or folklore under communist regimes. As in Western Europe, the ideological influence on research agendas is strong but manifests itself differently. During the communist era, ‘legitimate’ domains of studies were not connected to any sociological investigation of Islam since Muslim groups were treated as ‘ethnic’ minorities under the rubric of folklore. Therefore, Islam as a religion was studied in philosophy or history departments while the reality of Muslims was documented under ‘ethnic studies’. The influx of immigrants from Muslim countries into Eastern Europe has led to new fields of investigation on immigration, primarily dominated by political science and external research agencies. The chapter on Bulgaria shows, for example, the increasing role of the European Union in defining new research agendas on the questions of immigration and cultural diversity. More generally a gap has emerged between studies on Islam and ethnic minorities on one hand, and studies on new immigrants on the other. The research on Islam presented in the chapter on Greece is a paradigmatic case of this gap.

Immigration, Integration, and Social Status Issues such as discrimination, postcolonial identity, adaptation, and assimilation have dominated the research agenda in Western Europe. The immigration policies of the post-Second World War era brought the first wave of Muslims to Europe, but there have been many phases of Muslim immigration to Europe ever since, each one characterized by its own unique and diverse set of political and social challenges. Today, we see this diversity embodied in the newest wave of Muslim refugees from Bosnia, Iraq, and Somalia to Western Europe, as well as in the increasing immigration to countries that had previously never received large numbers of Muslim immigrants, such as Greece, Spain, and Italy, and also to Eastern European countries that all have significant Muslim minorities or are Muslim-majority countries themselves, like Bosnia, Albania, and Russia. Most Muslim immigrants have come to Western Europe from former colonies of European countries as a source of low-skilled labour. As such, they have often lacked the resources and education necessary for success in mainstream European society. Such disparities, combined with racial and religious discrimination in the workplace, have consistently placed Muslims on the bottom rung of the European economic and social ladder. Adding to the problem, Western economies have changed their policies in the past few decades and now offer fewer entry-level or working-class jobs, especially to new immigrants. All chapters examine the economic disparities between European Muslims and non-Muslims and shed light on the ways in which this inequality has affected current political debates on national identity and immigration in the various countries covered by the Handbook. By investigating socio-economic status over a broader range than simply Muslim groups, the authors of the different national chapters have compared Muslims with other immigrant

Introduction   5

groups of non-European extraction who face similar challenges of integration. For this reason, one common theme across the chapters indirectly sheds light on what might be described as a ‘Muslim underclass’. This controversial term refers to less social mobility and the persistence of discrimination, even when the level of education or resources of Muslims are comparable to other immigrant groups. In other words, discrimination seems to exist for immigrants or citizens from a Muslim background. In this regard, one of the outcomes of the Handbook investigation is to show that the concept of ‘underclass’ needs clarification and deserves a more systematic and comparative research across European countries. In the same vein, the different chapters on Islam in Western Europe show an increasing culturalization of immigration and citizenship politics. The ‘Islamic Problem’ as phrased by media and politicians weighs heavily on the design of immigration and integration policies. Or, to say it differently, since September 2001 ‘the radicalized, “nonWestern” disenfranchised, held politically responsible for the systemic changes of neoliberal globalization to European labor markets in the 1990s, have been fused with suspect Muslim individuals or groups. Culturally unassimilated, ideologically inassimilable, and transnationally implicated as disloyal, the “racial politics of the War on Terror” has produced “intolerable subjects”. ’2 The rise of the Islamic Problem is with no doubt due to the fact that Muslims stand at the core of three major social ‘problems’—immigration; class and economic integration; ethnicity and multiculturalism. Therefore, all chapters on Western Europe show how the categories of ‘immigrant’ and ‘Muslim’ overlap.3 In the eastern part of Europe, the ‘Islamic Problem’ is not related (yet) to immigration but to the memory of Ottoman domination and to the specifics of the communist era. Muslim groups are considered the illegitimate ‘heirs’ or remnants of Ottoman domination which until now is very negatively depicted in the various national narratives. For this reason, Islam has been under-studied in history and philosophy departments. Under communist regimes, Muslims were apprehended as ethnic minorities or ‘folkorized’, while the acquisition of demographics or socio-economic data was systematically neglected or biased.

Religion in Public Space All contributors explore the reality of Islam in Europe in the broader context of the status of religion in each European country. It is these very precepts and attitudes towards 2  Alana Lentin and Gavin Titley, ‘The Crisis of “Multiculturalism” in Europe: Mediated Minarets, Intolerable Subjects’, European Journal of Cultural Studies 15(2) (April 2012): 124. 3  In the USA, ‘the prototypical immigrant is a low-skilled Mexican or Central American worker rather than a conservative Muslim. Of the 15.5 million legal immigrants who entered the USA between 1989 and 2004, only 1.2 million were from predominantly Muslim countries. There was a sharp drop from more than 100,000 per year prior to 2002 down to approximately 60,000 in 2003, but this recovered somewhat to 90,000 in 2004. Immigration in the USA is thus a topic in which the issues of Islam and terrorism are at best marginal issues.’ US Office of Immigration Statistics, 2004 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, January 2006: 13, , accessed 27 October 2012. Jocelyne Cesari, ‘Securitization and Religious Divides in Europe: Muslims in Western Europe After 9/11’, GSRL-Paris and Harvard University, 1 June 2006.

6   Jocelyne Cesari religion overall (and not just Islam) that have often been the greatest obstacle to the integration and assimilation of Muslims in Europe. European secularism has traditionally dictated that state interactions with religious institutions display neutrality. There has been much diversity in how this principle has been applied, from the official establishment of religion in England to the radical separation of church and state in France. The first principle of secularity, differentiation of religion and politics, does not equate to the separation of church and state. If this were the case, France would be the only secular country in Europe. Rather, it refers to differentiation and cooperation between church and state. As analysed by Silvio Ferrari and Rossella Botoni in Chapter 14, differentiation takes three main forms across Europe. The first form includes the existence of a state religion as well as the extension of rights to other religious groups, as is the case for the UK and Scandinavian countries. The second form entails formal agreements of cooperation between state and religious institutions, as is the case in Belgium, Germany, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands. The third form is the separation between state and religious institutions, as is the case for France. Cooperation between the state and religious institutions is also implemented in different ways: either the state provides for the teaching of religion in public schools, grants religious organizations free access to public-owned media, or gives direct/indirect funding to religious institutions.4 Usually, religious organizations must comply with specific state requirements in order to receive this conditional support. For example, religious groups must organize local and national representative bodies to serve as counterparts to state institutions. In countries where a denominational teaching of religion is offered in public schools, as is the case in Germany and Spain, the religious community is required to design a central religious authority that serves as an interlocutor with the state. This authority gives credentials to teachers of religion in public schools, cooperates with state agencies to train the teachers, and approves curricula. For groups with strong religious infrastructure, like the Catholic Church, such requirements are easy to fulfil. But for others, like Muslims, these institutions have often been built from scratch. Due to these particular circumstances, facilitating the cooperation between the state and Muslim groups has been a common concern of European governments and has led to the creation of Muslim representative bodies in Belgium, Spain, and France. For state agents, these bodies are aimed at reducing the gap between the political and legal status enjoyed by other religious groups and Muslims. They also are seen as a way to assuage feelings of discrimination that could potentially fuel Islamic radicalism and, ultimately, to ensure that the leadership of Muslim organizations falls into the hands of ‘moderates’.5

4  Gerhard Robbers, ‘State and Church in the European Union’, in Gerhard Robbers (ed.), State and Church in the European Union (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005). 5  Joel S. Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper, ‘Explaining and Accommodation of Muslim Religious Practices in France, Britain and Germany’, paper presented at the Muslims in Western Europe Politics Conference, Bloomington, Indiana, 22–4 September 2005; Jonathan Laurence (ed.), The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims: The State’s Role in Minority Integration (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).

Introduction   7

Interestingly, this institutional integration of Islam within the dominant framework of European secularism shows the willingness—even the eagerness in some cases—of major Muslim organizations to cooperate with the state. However, such cooperation is rarely presented in the public discourse as a positive sign of Muslim integration within secular cultures, and the dominant rhetoric continues to describe Islam in opposition to secularism. At a deeper and even less explored level, the state has become an active agent in reshaping Islam by creating new Islamic institutions and leaders. Those leaders are stateappointed or bureaucratic leaders who often compete or conflict with other authorities that derive their authority from other sources, such as scholarly expertise or transnational networks. Yet, despite the differing legal definitions of the status of religion in society, a common feature of modern European life has been the increasing illegitimacy of the role of religion in the public space. This trend has often found itself at odds with Islamic immigration and Muslims, who have come to Europe with their own understanding of church–state relations and the role of religion. Several symbolic issues, from the hijab and the burqini to minarets (see Chapter 16 on ‘Hijab’ by Jennifer Selby), positions on homosexuality, and various family issues, have led to controversial and heated debates within the various European nations examined in this Handbook. For this reason, the hijab and other contested issues, like Islamic law, have been addressed in greater length in thematic chapters. The recognition of Islamic law within existing legal systems, alongside the concern that specific subcultures can stifle individual rights, is another example of the tension between political orders and Muslim communities. The debate was set in motion in February 2008 by the declaration of the Archbishop of Canterbury approving the inclusion of shariah principles within European legislations.6 Like the term Muslim, shariah has become a construct used in political debates to oppose Islam to Western democratic principles. The construct operates on the historical and political decontextualization of shariah as a fixed medieval set of laws. It also projects the situation of some Muslimmajority countries into Europe. In most Muslim-majority countries, shariah is confined to family law, although there has recently been an expansion of shariah to areas of criminal law (hudud)—including stoning to death and harsh corporal punishments—in countries such as Mauritania or Afghanistan.7 The concern about the intolerant use of shariah in some Muslim states is transferred to Europe without taking into account the completely different context in which references 6  ‘Shari’a law “could have UK role”’, BBC News, 4 July 2008 , accessed 24 July 2012. 7  It is worth mentioning that the claim by some political actors in Muslim-majority countries that divine law is comprehensive and therefore a source of constitutional law diverges from the traditional perception of politics in the Islamic tradition, which is based on the distinction of shariah from siyasah (politics). See Cesari, Jocelyne, The Awakening of Muslim Democracy: Religion, Modernity and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

8   Jocelyne Cesari to shariah operate. Where there is democratic constitutionalism, the debate does not stem from constitutional issues. Contrary to the widespread belief that Muslims in the West seek the inclusion of shariah in the constitutions of European countries, most of the surveys discussed in the Handbook show that Muslims are quite satisfied with the secular nature of European political regimes. When Muslims agitate for change, they engage in politics and the democratic process, utilizing mainstream parties and institutions.8 This does not mean, however, that they renounce Islamic principles and legal rules as a guide or structure for their daily lives.9 If the fear of hudud or (Islamic criminal law) is not well-founded, there are still questions regarding the compatibility of shariah with legal pluralism. It is within this changing framework of the pluralization of family law, and the growing importance of contract and arbitration, that Islamic norms may find a place within European legal references. Additionally, the right to cultural identity, which is a part of European legislation,10 can be used to justify and promulgate the recognition of Islamic norms within European legal frameworks. There is, however, a restrictive condition on the possible recognition of shariah within legal pluralism, which is that Islamic norms should not contradict the basic principles of equality between individuals. These clashes have surfaced in countries where arbitration procedures are permitted. It is therefore not surprising that these procedures have become the focus of political concern about shariah misuse. Mathias Rohe has closely examined the literature and jurisprudence of several key European countries in order to ascertain the arguments used by the courts and by Muslims when conflicts arise between the two.11 The plethora of national laws in Europe and the diversity among Muslim groups make comparison difficult, but he found a general trend of recognizing foreign law. This means that legal systems distinguish between national and foreign jurisprudence, therefore giving the possibility to residents to utilize their national laws. In these situations, the country of residence applies foreign law even if it is discriminatory. It is worth noting that Islamic laws on marriage, divorce, and custody of children that are applied in the European context differ greatly according to the status of Islam in the legal system of the country of origin.12 8  Zsolt Nyiri, ‘Muslims in Europe: Basis for Greater Understanding Already Exists’, Gallup Polling 2007. , accessed 12 January 2011. 9  Jocelyne Cesari, Muslims in the West After 9/11: Religion, Law and Politics (New York: Routledge, 2010). 10 Cesari, Muslims in the West After 9/11, 13. The right to freedom of thought, as promulgated in the European Convention on Human Rights, relates to convictions and modes of behaviour which are central to personal identity. 11  Mary E. Hess, ‘2010 Presidential Address: Learning Religion and Religiously Learning Amid Global Cultural Flows’, Religious Education 106(4) (2011): 360–77. 12  In the Sunni tradition, four schools of jurisprudence have codified Islamic law: Shafi’i, Hanafi, Hanbali, and Maleki. With the emergence of nation-states at the end of the Ottoman Empire, each new country has, most of the time, adopted the school of jurisprudence of the majority Muslim population as the source for civil law while continuously reforming it. See Knut S. Vikor, Between God and the Sultan: A History of Islamic Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

Introduction   9

International Constraints The attacks of 9/11 in the USA—and the Madrid and London bombings of 2004 and 2005 in particular—have raised questions about the potential links between Western Muslims, radical Islam, and terrorism. In recent years, scholars and journalists have begun to explore the ways in which international, politicized Islam has influenced (or has been perceived to have influenced) Muslims in Europe (see Chapter 18 by Daniele Pisoiu). Others, however, have tried to explore the anti-Islamic backlash, often known as Islamophobia, which has taken hold in many quarters of Europe. It should be noted that the term ‘Islamophobia’ emerged as early as 1997 during the discussions in Britain on the topic of anti-Muslim discrimination. Its use has since then spread all over Europe and has intensified after 9/11 and the Madrid and London bombings (see Chapter 18 by Daniele Pisoiu). Ayhan Kaya used a comparative perspective to analyse Islamophobia13 in the broader context of European neo-liberalism after 1989 and the Soviet collapse. In this regard, further research could be comparing the social milieux that have encouraged the rise of right-wing movements in Europe to those that have fostered the rise of Muslim radicalism in other parts of the world. One might also relate the diffuse rise in Muslim religiosity both in Europe and beyond to the rising social conservatism and apoliticism in Europe itself and also to the correlative trend towards moralization and personalization in the global political sphere. The role of state multiculturalist policies brings us to our next point of interest, namely that of state responses to Muslim radicalism and Muslim communitarianism. It is especially important to focus on these matters in light of recent moves to create Muslim ‘representative’ organizations in Europe and the slow shift away from state patronage of multiculturalist and communalist tendencies in educational systems, legal systems, and society at large. Until very recently, in fact, a variety of European states gave asylum, support, and considerable freedom of movement to an appreciable number of Muslim radicals exiled from Arab countries.

How to Approach Islam A challenge for all the authors of the Handbook has been the thorny issue of defining Islam and the Islamic conception of religion. They wished to avoid the risk of employing an essentialist or a normative approach to the definition of either Islam or religion itself. That is why, in any chapter, there is neither a definition of Islam a priori nor an attempt to arbitrarily link predefined Islamic features to a definition of religion, but rather an analysis of Muslim involvement with and relation to the various issues discussed above.

13 

Runnymede Trust, Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All (London: Runnymede Trust, 1997).

10   Jocelyne Cesari That is why the question of Islam surfaces in multiple and various domains from immigration and education to international relations. All the chapters highlight the fact that the concept of Islam as an identifying force has entered the public discussion only in the last quarter-century. Prior to that, there were, and still are, nationalist associations of Algerians, Pakistanis, Yemenis, Turks, Arabs, and so forth who were not necessarily defined by Islam. The fact that all these identities, with their various locations and socio-economic and cultural profiles, have come to be broadly designated as ‘Muslim communities’ is a matter that requires deliberate attention and a willingness to look beyond assumptions of stable, tangible, and readily identifiable indices of Islam. Clearly, the changes in the definition of a Muslim and of what constitutes a Muslim community are the result of a major change in European societies in the recent past. This is firstly a change in the way in which Muslims, or rather specific persons and collectives of Muslim extraction, organize and view themselves. But it is also a change in the European social perception of Muslims in light of increased terrorism and more frequent incidents of veiling as well as the succession of dramatic events from the Rushdie Affair to the assassination of Theo Van Gogh and the Danish cartoons crisis. It is therefore crucial to avoid using or perceiving Islam as a primary unifying signifier that can only serve as a stark contrast to the ‘West’. In this regard, Talal Asad’s14 insistence on deconstructing the Christian assumption of the Western approach to religion and the increasing disconnection between beliefs and practices certainly helps in understanding the debates over some Islamic claims in the public sphere. The Handbook plans to propose a clearer identification and delimitation of what constitutes the category ‘Islam’, family extraction notwithstanding, in terms of three major categories: a multilayered approach to individual religiosity, the influence of transnational movements on the redefinition of Islamic orthodoxy in Europe, and the influence of social media on both the praxis and the doxa.

Believing, Behaving, and Belonging The first concerns the distinctions arising from the continuum of beliefs and practices of Muslims. At one end of this continuum are the ones who might be called ‘sociologically Muslim’, namely those who demonstrate a complete indifference to Islam, or even abandon it. And indeed, incipient movements of ‘former Muslims’ have emerged in Germany and France. On the other end of the continuum, Muslims are characterized by a strict observance of Islamic precepts, usually linked to extraterritorial identity and various manners of dress and behaviour. In between these two extremes, lie minimally believing and/or minimally practising Muslims, pious Muslims unconcerned with public affairs,

14 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).

Introduction   11

culturally sentimentalist Muslims or persons who have become ‘defensively’ Muslim, and much more. Overall, the data across chapters show that Muslims in Western Europe declare themselves as more religious than the general public. But what does this mean? Unlike the common expectation, it does not automatically reflect more intense religious practices. Recent empirical work has highlighted an increasing disjunction between believing, behaving, and belonging15 among followers of all denominations, which is useful to understand the religiosity of Muslims in Europe. These three dimensions have historically been systematically linked or associated in the definition of a person’s religiosity. However, sociological analyses shed light on the disjunction of these three dimensions and apprehend this disjunction as modern forms of religiosity.16 Thus, a person can believe without automatically behaving and belonging; can belong without believing or behaving; or can behave without believing or belonging. For example, surveys have shown that many Christians maintain private, individual religious beliefs but do not practise on a regular basis (i.e. believing without behaving), or in some cases, Christian identity has taken on more cultural than spiritual meanings. The studies discussed in the different chapters show that, for Muslims, the behaving is more challenging than belonging or believing. In other words, belonging is often strongly asserted even in the case of weakness or lack in beliefs. A line emerges between being a ‘practising Muslim’ and just ‘being Muslim’. This difference indicates that ‘being Muslim’ is an identity with no clear relation to a set of practices or even beliefs. So when people say that they are very much Muslims, it does not mean that they are pious. A widespread notion of ‘Muslim culture’ with no fixed content seems to override the more circumscribed definition of ‘being Muslim’ that is usually measured in polls. In consequence, the analytical reviews provided by the Handbook’s chapters draw a complex and rich web of meanings and behaviours both on what it is to be a Muslim and a citizen. It is not possible from the existing data to conclude that Islamic religiosity impinges on cultural or political integration. Most interestingly, the data reveal that Islam is not per se the main factor in the building of Muslims’ social identities or in their political participation. Instead, other elements—ethnicity, class, and residential distribution among them—have an effect that requires further investigation. The second relevant category of investigation refers to the influence of transnational Muslim organizations (Jamaat at Tabligh, Muslim Brothers) on the identification and mobilization of Muslims in Europe.

15 

For a systematic use of this approach to religion on Muslim groups in Europe and the USA, see Jocelyne Cesari, Why the West Fears Islam: Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 16 G. Davie, Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing Without Belonging (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); D. Hervieu-Léger, ‘Religion und sozialer Zusammenhalt in Europa’, Transit 26 (2003): 101–19.

12   Jocelyne Cesari

Growing Influence of Global Salafism The proliferation of religious authorities and the shrinking realm of their legitimacy is by no means a new phenomenon and has been the subject of many studies.17 Both mass education and new forms of communication have contributed to the increase of actors who claim the right to talk on behalf of Islam in both authoritative and normative ways. Therefore, established religious figures, such as the sheikhs of Al-Azhar or Medina, are increasingly challenged by the engineer, the student, the businessman, and the autodidact, who mobilize the masses and speak for Islam in sports stadiums, on the blogosphere, and over airwaves worldwide. This trend predates the internet and is related to public education programmes and the increased availability of new technological communicative media, such as magazines, cassette tapes, and CDs.18 However, the internet has added a new element to this proliferation of religious voices: the greater influence of globalized authority figures who have an audience beyond their particular cultural background. This transnationalization of religious voices can be defined as ‘neo’ pan-Islamism. Although there are multiple forms of this contemporary pan-Islam, contemporary Salafism has become the most widespread. Today, the conditions for communication and the circulation of people and ideas make the ummah (community of Muslim believers) all the more effective as a concept, especially considering the fact that nationalist ideologies have been waning. The imagined ummah has a variety of forms, the most influential of which emphasizes direct access to the Qur’an and Muslim unity that transcends national and cultural diversity. In this sense, those extolling this modern trend can be called pan-Islamists even though the restoration of the caliphate is no longer their priority.19 It is worth noting that not all these movements are reactionary or defensive. For this reason, a distinction must be drawn between the Wahhabi/Salafi and Tablighi movements on one hand and the Muslim Brotherhood on the other. Both trends dominate global

17 

Dale Eickelman, ‘Mainstreaming Islam: Taking Charge of the Faith’, Encounters 2 (2010): 185–203. authority was conferred according to one’s theological knowledge and mastery of the methodologies used to interpret this knowledge. Only those who possessed knowledge that had been passed down through a chain of authorities or a line of recognized masters could claim legitimacy as religious leaders. Though formal education was an important component throughout much of the Muslim world, the transmission of knowledge did not always rely on formal education, especially if the knowledge being passed down was esoteric in nature (as was the case of the Sufi masters). 19  The Hizb ut-Tahrir party is one of the most significant contemporary pan-Islamist movements that still advocates for the restoration of the caliphate. Founded in Jerusalem in 1953, it claims branches in the Muslim world as well as Europe and the USA. In Great Britain, the party is known under the name Muhajirrun, and has been active in the public sphere, particularly before 11 September 2001. Suha Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate (London: Grey Seal, 1996). 18 Traditionally,

Introduction   13

interpretations of Islam across Europe but have very different positions vis-à-vis modernity. Wahhabism as a specific interpretation of the Islamic tradition that emerged in the eighteenth century in the Arabian Peninsula with the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abdel Wahab (1703–92), whose literalist interpretations of the Qur’an became the official doctrine of the Saudi Kingdom upon its creation in 1932. Wahhabism is characterized by a rejection of critical approaches to the Islamic tradition. Mystical approaches and historical interpretations alike are held in contempt. Orthodox practice can be defined as a direct relation to the revealed Text, with no recourse to the historical contributions of the various juridical schools (madhab). In this literalist interpretation of Islam, nothing must come between the believer and the Text:  customs, culture, and Sufism must all be done away with. The heirs of this rigorist and puritanical line of thought, also known as Salafi, make up the existing Saudi religious establishment. Adherents of Wahhabism have rejected all ideas and concepts that are deemed Western, maintaining a strictly revivalist agenda. They contend that the Qur’an and Hadith, when interpreted according to the precedents of the Pious Forefathers (al-salaf al-salih), offer the most superior form of guidance to Muslims. As a stringently revivalist movement, Wahhabism seeks the ‘Islamization of societies’,20 which entails formulating contemporary ways of life in relation to the conditions of seventh-century Arabia by ‘returning to the sources’ whose ‘true meaning’, Wahhabis argue, was lost over the centuries following Prophet Muhammad’s death.21 In their resistance to European expansionism and globalization, Wahhabis have remained true to their literalist, anti-historical, and anti-traditionalist origins by rejecting the teachings and methods of the traditional schools of jurisprudence.22 In sum, the

20  ‘Movements that were conceived as movements of “renewal” were in fact more a part of the ongoing processes of Islamization of societies on the frontiers of the Islamic world. They were, in effect, part of the “formation” of the Islamic societies rather than the “reformation” of existing ones’ (John Obert Voll, ‘Foundations for Renewal and Reform: Islamic Movements in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries’, in John L. Esposito (ed.), The Oxford History of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 516–17). 21  John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 117–18. 22  The modernist and pro-Western reformism of early Salafism has been marginalized in postcolonial Muslim countries. Most Islamic reformist movements became anti-Western for two reasons, one readily apparent and the other more subtle. First, Western policies during colonial and postcolonial periods have supported secular, authoritarian regimes, from the Shah in Iran to Sadat and Mubarak in Egypt, while simultaneously unquestioningly backing Israel. This has resulted in Muslims associating the West with despotic, anti-Islam regimes. The second, less obvious explanation is tied to domestic developments in Muslim nations, in which state actions have reduced the influence of Islam in social life and disempowered Muslim clerics and religious authorities. States began to absorb and cast their influence on traditional Islamic authorities and co-opt Islamic organizations. Therefore, these religious leaders who put their Islamic expertise to the service of oppressive regimes were delegitimized in the eyes of their populations. In some ways, the Muslim Brotherhood is still carrying the message of the original salafiyya movement by maintaining a contextualized and modernist interpretation of Islam.

14   Jocelyne Cesari Wahhabi interpretation can be defined as a revivalist movement premised upon the return to the ‘unadulterated’ Islam of the Pious Forefathers. The most significant difference between the global Salafi Islam of today and the original Wahhabi period is a difference in audience:  in other words, Salafi decisions and interpretations are no longer limited to the Saudi Kingdom but are now followed by Muslims around the world. The fatwas of Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ibn Baaz (d. 1999), Grand Mufti of the Saudi Kingdom, and of Sheikh Al-Albani (d. 1999) are the shared points of reference for their followers in Europe and the USA, and more generally throughout the Muslim world. The movement has succeeded in imposing its beliefs not as one interpretation among many but as the global orthodox doctrine of Sunni Islam. The considerable financial resources of the Saudi state have certainly also helped to create this situation of religious monopoly. In the 1970s, Saudi Arabia began investing internationally in a number of organizations that ‘widely distributed Wahhabi literature in all the major languages of the world, gave out awards and grants, and provided funding for a massive network of publishers, schools, mosques, organizations, and individuals’.23 In the West, this dawa (proselytization) resulted in the construction of new Islamic centres in Malaga, Madrid, Milan, Mantes-la-Jolie, Edinburgh, Brussels, Lisbon, Zagreb, Washington, Chicago, and Toronto, to name just a few; the financing of Islamic Studies chairs in American universities; and the proliferation of multilingual internet sites. In March 2002, the official Saudi magazine Ain al-Yaqin estimated that the Saudi royal family has ‘wholly or partly financed’ approximately 210 Islamic centres, 1,500 mosques, 202 colleges, and 2,000 Islamic schools in Muslim-minority countries.24 It is important to note that these estimates do not include the number of institutions funded by the Saudi government in its entirety or other sources within Saudi Arabia that finance Wahhabi proselytizing.25 According to some estimates, the Saudi Kingdom spent over $80 billion on various Islam-related causes in Muslim-minority countries between 1973 and 2002.26 King Fahd alone invested over $75 billion in the construction of schools, mosques, and Islamic institutions outside of the Kingdom in the 1970s and 1980s.27,28

23  Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (San Francisco: Harper, 2005), 73–4. 24  ‘Inside the Kingdom’, Time, 15 September 2003. , accessed 25 July 2012. 25  ‘Inside the Kingdom’. 26  Alexander Alexiev, ‘Wahhabism: State-Sponsored Extremism Worldwide’, testimony before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, 26 June 2003. , accessed 25 July 2012. 27  Rachel Bronson, Thicker than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 10. 28  According to its website, the King Fahd Foundation has wholly or partially funded thirty such projects in Africa, six in South America, twenty-three in Asia, six in Australia and Oceania, twelve in Europe, and twenty-two in North America (the website is ).

Introduction   15

This massive effort of propagation has contributed to the promotion of Wahhabism as the sole legitimate guardian of Islamic thought.29 The construction of mosques, schools, and other Islamic institutions is only one strategy of the Saudis to circulate the Wahhabi ideology. They also rely heavily on media to promote and spread their message, whether through the circulation of handouts, the creation of websites, or the airing of satellite television shows. For example, in 1984, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia opened the King Fahd Complex for Printing the Holy Qur’an in Medina. According the website of the now-deceased King Fahd bin Abdul ’Aziz, the Complex produces between 10 and 30 million copies of the Qur’an each year. Copies of the Qur’an are also available in Braille, as are video and audio recordings of Qur’anic recitations. By 2000, the Complex had produced 138 million copies of the Qur’an translated into twenty languages.30 It is extremely difficult to gauge the precise influence exerted by Wahhabism on Muslim religious practice. In the case of European Muslims, the influence cannot simply be measured by statistics. In a minority culture lacking both institutions for religious education and the means by which to produce new forms of knowledge, the easy access to theology that Salafism offers is one of the main reasons for its popularity. The widespread diffusion of Salafi teachings means that even non-Salafi Muslims evaluate their Islamic practice by Wahhabite standards. In other words, even if most Muslims do not follow Wahhabite dress codes—white tunic, head covering, beard for men, niqab31 for women—the Salafi norm often becomes the standard image of what a good Muslim ought to be.32

29 

In addition to funds coming straight from the Saudi government, the Kingdom also supports proxy organizations that spread Wahhabism. A notable organization that depends on Saudi funding is the Muslim World League (MWL, Rabitat al-’Alam al-Islami). Today, the Muslim World League oversees a number of non-governmental organizations such as the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), the Holy Qur’an Memorization International Organization, the International Islamic Organization for Education, Makkah Al-Mukarramah Charity Foundation for Orphans, the Commission on Scientific Signs in the Qur’an and Sunnah, The World Supreme Council for Mosques, and The Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) Council. Although to the outside world they strongly emphasize their strong humanitarian aims (providing relief, assisting orphans, etc.), these organizations are often focused on propagating a Salafist interpretation of Islam. Many, including the IIRO and the WAMY, concentrate on setting up and supporting mosque centres with an orthodox persuasion, as well as hiring, training, and subsidizing imams with Salafi/Wahhabi orientation, and publishing and disseminating Salafist literature. 30  The main website is . 31  A cloth covering the face according to Wahhabi law. 32  Another group, albeit with much fewer financial resources, that takes a traditionalist and legalistic approach to Islam is the Tabligh, sometimes referred to as the Jehovah’s Witnesses of Islam. The Tabligh is usually described as a pious and proselytizing movement whose primary aim is to promote Islamic education. The essential principle of this sect within the Deobandi movement—founded in 1927 in India—is that every Muslim is responsible for spreading the values and practices of Islam. In the last two decades, this movement has gained a wide following, especially in Europe and the USA. In these conditions, competition rages in the West between Tablighis and Salafis, and anathemas rain down on both sides.

16   Jocelyne Cesari Despite the strong presence of many different interpretations at the grassroots level,33 the Salafi revivalist interpretation of Islam dominates the internet Dawa. For this reason, the third category or point of interest in further research on Islam is the explosion of electronic media, following an earlier period marked by the use of educational and other infrastructures, which in fact are still in existence to this day. This rise in new media leads to new forms of homogenized global Islam, which some seek to subscribe to or revive, but which are at variance with most of the social practices of Muslims in the West. Very little work has been done to shed light on this ‘online’ religiosity and how it influences the practices of Muslims in different cultural and national contexts. In sum, the Handbook highlights black holes in the abundant literature on Islam and Muslims in Europe. First, there is a need to analyse in more depth the mechanisms of social and economic mobility of Muslim groups, especially as many preconceived ideas of who is integrated (and how) influence policy-making and political rhetoric on Islam. Second, there is a dearth of information on Islamic religiosity within and across countries, as well as of in-depth analysis of the ongoing redefinition of Islamic practices under the influence of transnational influences and local acculturations. For this reason, the localization of transnational processes appears as a key domain of future research to make sense of the variations across national and political contexts.

Select Bibliography Abbas, Tahir (ed.) (2007). Islamic Political Radicalism:  A  European Perspective. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Abumalham Mas, Montserrat and Simposio Internacional sobre Comunidades Islámicas en Europa y en España (1995). Comunidades Islámicas En Europa. Colección Estructuras y Procesos. Serie Ciencias Sociales. Madrid: Editorial Trotta. Akbarzadeh, Shahram and Fethi Mansouri (eds.) (2007). Islam and Political Violence: Muslim Diaspora and Radicalism in the West. Library of International Relations 34. London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies. Allievi, Stefano (1999). Les Convertis à l’Islam:  Les Nouveaux Musulmans d’Europe. Paris: L’Harmattan.

33  There are Muslim Brotherhood groups that are very active at the grassroots level and in creating Muslim organizations to cooperate with political institutions (see Brigitte Maréchal, Les Frères Musulmans en Europe: Racines et Discours [Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots and Discourses] (Leuven: Brill, 2008)). There are religious authorities related to some Muslim countries (Morocco, Algeria, and Turkey) who propagate a traditional interpretation of Islam. Finally, there is a proliferation of independent authorities: scholars (Tariq Ramadan, Professor of Islamic Studies at Oxford University, and known for his reformist thinking), social activists (Hamza Yusuf, Director of the Zeytuna Institute in San Francisco), and more traditional authorities (Cheikh Qaradawi, who became global with his show on Al Jazeera called Al Sharia wal Hayat [Sharia and Life]). For a typology of the different religious leaders operating in Europe and in the USA, see Jocelyne Cesari, When Islam and Democracy Meet (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

Introduction   17

Allievi, Stefano and Jørgen S. Nielsen (eds.) (2003). Muslim Minorities, vol. 1: Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and across Europe. Leiden and Boston: Brill. Antes, Peter and Chris Hewer (1994). ‘Islam in Europe’, in S. Gill, G. D’Costa, and U. King (eds.), Religion in Europe: Contemporary Perspectives. Kampen: Kok Pharos, 46–67. Anwar, Muhammad (1983). ‘Employment Patterns of Muslims in Western Europe’, Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs 5(1): 99–122. Asad, Talal (1993). Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. —— (2003). Formations of the Secular:  Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford:  Stanford University Press. ’Azmah, ’Azīz and Effie Fokas (eds.) (2007). Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity and Influence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bistolfi, Robert and François Zabbal (1995). Islams d’Europe:  Intégration Ou Insertion Communautaire? Collection Monde en Cours. La Tour d’Aigues: Editions de l’Aube. Borrás Rodríguez, Alegría, Salima Mernissi, and R. Babadji (1998). El Islam Jurídico y Europa: Derecho, Religión, y Política. Antrazyt 110. Barcelona: Icaria. Bronson, Rachel (2006). Thicker than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia. New York: Oxford University Press. Cesari, Jocelyne (2014). The Awakening of Muslim Democracy: Religion, Modernity and the State. New York, Cambridge University Press. Cesari, Jocelyne (2004). When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United States. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. —— (2006). ‘Securitization and Religious Divides in Europe: Muslims in Western Europe after 9/11’, GSRL-Paris and Harvard University, 1 June. —— (ed.) (2010). Muslims in the West After 9/11: Religion, Law and Politics. New York: Routledge. —— (2013). Why the West Fears Islam:  Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Cesari, Jocelyne, Seán McLoughlin, and Network of Comparative Research on Islam and Muslims in Europe (eds.) (2005). European Muslims and the Secular State. Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate. Coolsaet, R. (ed.) (2008). Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge in Europe. Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate. Coppes, R. (1994). ‘Niet zomaar een stukje stof. Hoofddoekjes-affaires in Frankrijk, Nederland en Groot-Brittannië’, Sociologische Gids 41: 130–43. Davie, Grace (1994). Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing Without Belonging. Oxford: Blackwell. de Changy, J., Felice Dassetto, and Brigitte Maréchal (2007). Relations et Co-Inclusion, Islam en Belgique. Compétences Interculturelles. Paris: Harmattan. Doomernik, Jeroen (1991). Turkse Moskeeën En Maatschappelijke Participatie:  De Institutionalisering Van De Turkse Islam in Nederland En De Duitse Bondsrepubliek. Nederlandse Geografische Studies 129. Amsterdam: Koninklijk Nederlands Aardrijkskundig Genootschap; Instituut voor Sociale Geografie, Faculteit Ruimtelijke Wetenschappen, Universiteit van Amsterdam. Eickelman, Dale (2010). ‘Mainstreaming Islam:  Taking Charge of the Faith’, Encounters 2: 185–203. El Fadl, Abou (2005). The Great Theft:  Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. San Francisco: HarperCollins.

18   Jocelyne Cesari Esch, W.  van and M. Roovers (1987). Islamitisch Godsdienstonderwijs in Nederland, België, Engeland en West-Duitsland. Nijmegen: Instituut voor Toegepaste Sociologie (ITS). Esposito, John L. (1998). Islam: The Straight Path. New York: Oxford University Press. Ferrari, Silvio (1996). L’Islam in Europa:  Lo Statuto Giuridico Delle Comunità Musulmane. Bologna: Il Mulino. Ferrari, Silvio and Anthony Bradney (eds.) (2000). Islam and European Legal Systems. Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate. Fetzer, Joel S. and Christopher Soper (2005). ‘Explaining the Accommodation of Muslim Religious Practices in France, Britain and Germany’, paper presented at the Muslims in Western Europe Politics Conference, Bloomington, Indiana, 22–4 September. Foblets, Marie-Claire (1996). Familles, Islam, Europe:  Le Droit Confronté au Changement. Musulmans d’Europe. Paris: L’Harmattan. Garaudy, Roger and Mahdī Zughayb (1984). Promesses de l’Islam. Arabic: Wuʻūd Al-Islām. al- Tabʻah. Bayrūt: al-Dār al-ʻĀlamīyah. . Gerholm, Tomas, Yngve Georg Lithman, Stockholm University, Centrum för invandringsforskning, and Kungl. Vitterhets, historie och antikvitets akademien (eds.) (1988). The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe. London and New York: Mansell. Goody, Jack (2004). Islam in Europe. Cambridge: Polity Press. Hervieu-Léger, D. (2003). ‘Religion und sozialer Zusammenhalt in Europa’, Transit 26: 101–19. Hess, Mary E. (2011). ‘2010 Presidential Address: Learning Religion and Religiously Learning Amid Global Cultural Flows’, Religious Education 106(4): 360–77. Hunter, Shireen (ed.) (2002). Islam, Europe’s Second Religion: The New Social, Cultural, and Political Landscape. Westport, CT: Praeger. Jenkins, Philip (2007). God’s Continent: Christianity, Islam, and Europe’s Religious Crisis. Future of Christianity Trilogy. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Jonker Gerdien and Valerie Amiraux (eds.) (2006). Politics of Visibility: Young Muslims in European Public Spaces. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag. Kepel, Gilles (2004). The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Klausen, Jytte (2005). The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. —— (2009). The Cartoons that Shook the World. New Haven: Yale University Press. Laurence, Jonathan (ed.) (2012). The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims:  The State’s Role in Minority Integration. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Lentin, Alana and Gavin Titley (2012). ‘The Crisis of “Multiculturalism” in Europe: Mediated Minarets, Intolerable Subjects’, European Journal of Cultural Studies 15(2): 123–38. Lewis, Bernard and Dominique Schnapper (eds.) (1994). Musulmans en Europe. English: Muslims in Europe. Social Change in Western Europe. London: Pinter and New York: St. Martin’s Press. Maréchal, Brigitte (2002). L’Islam et les Musulmans dans l’Europe Élargie:  Radioscopie. English: Guidebook on Islam and Muslims in the Wide Contemporary Europe. Louvain-la-Neuve: Bruylant-Academia. —— (2008). Les Frères Musulmans en Europe:  Racines et Discours [Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots and Discourses]. Leuven: Brill. Maussen, Marcel (2006). Ruimte Voor De Islam? Stedelijk Beleid, Voorzieningen, Organisaties. Apeldoorn: Het Spinhuis.

Introduction   19

Metcalf, Barbara Daly (ed.) (1996). Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe. Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies 22. Berkeley: University of California Press. Nielsen, Jørgen S. (1979). Forms and Problems of Legal Recognition for Muslims in Europe. Research Paper No. 2. Birmingham: Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, Selly Oak Colleges. —— (1987). Islam and Religious Education in England: Introduction. Research Papers: Muslims in Europe No. 33. Birmingham:  Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, Selly Oak Colleges. —— (1992). Muslims in Western Europe. Islamic Surveys 20. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. —— (2004). Muslims in Western Europe, 3rd edn. New Edinburgh Islamic Surveys. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Nielsen, Jørgen S. and Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations (1999). Towards a European Islam. Migration, Minorities, and Citizenship. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Nonneman, Gerd, Tim Niblock, and Bogdan Szajkowski (eds.) (1996). Muslim Communities in the New Europe. Reading: Ithaca Press. Pargeter, Alison (2008). The New Frontiers of Jihad:  Radical Islam in Europe. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Rath, Jan (1996). Nederland En Zijn Islam:  Een Ontzuilende Samenleving Reageert Op Het Ontstaan Van Een Geloofsgemeenschap. Migratie-En Etnische Studies. Amsterdam:  Het Spinhuis. —— (2001). Nederland En Zijn Islam. English: Western Europe and its Islam. International Comparative Social Studies, vol. 2. Leiden and Boston: Brill. —— (2005). ‘Mijn Hemel, Daar Komen De Moslims!’ MO Samenlevingsopbouw, vol. 23: 4–7 . Renaerts, Monique (1994). Islam and Europe: The Millennium Conference 1994. Brussels: King Baudouin Foundation, Forward Studies Programme. Robbers, Gerhard (2005). ‘State and Church in the European Union’, in Gerhard Robbers (ed.), State and Church in the European Union. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 577–89. Rohe, Mathias (2007). Muslim Minorities and the Law in Europe: Chances and Challenges. New Delhi, India: Global Media Publications. Roy, Olivier (2004). Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. CERI Series in Comparative Politics and International Studies. New York: Columbia University Press. Runnymede Trust (1997). Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All. London: Runnymede Trust. Samad, Yunas and Kasturi Sen (eds.) (2007). Islam in the European Union: Transnationalism, Youth and the War on Terror. Karachi: Oxford University Press. Seufert, Günter and Jean Jacques Waardenburg (eds.) (1999). Turkish Islam and Europe/ Türkischer Islam Und Europa. Beiruter Texte Und Studien Bd. 82. Türkischer Islam und Europa/Europe and Christianity as Reflected in Turkish Muslim Discourse & Turkish Muslim Life in the Diaspora: Papers of the Istanbul Workshop October 1996. Istanbul: In Kommission bei Franz-Steiner-Verlag Stuttgart. Shadid, W.  A. R. (1995). Religious Freedom and the Position of Islam in Western Europe: Opportunities and Obstacles in the Acquisition of Equal Rights (with an Extensive Bibliography). Kampen, the Netherlands: Kok Pharos. Shadid, W. A. R. and P. Sj van Koningsveld (1991). The Integration of Islam and Hinduism in Western Europe. Kampen, the Netherlands: Kok Pharos.

20   Jocelyne Cesari —— (eds.) (1995). Religious Freedom and the Position of Islam in Western Europe: Opportunities and Obstacles in the Acquisition of Equal Rights. Kampen, the Netherlands: Kok Pharos. —— (eds.) (1996). Muslims in the Margin: Political Responses to the Presence of Islam in Western Europe. Kampen, the Netherlands: Kok Pharos. Speelman, G.  M. and Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations (1991). Religion and State in Europe:  Two Seminar Reports. CSIC Papers. Europe, no. 4. Birmingham: Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, Selly Oak Colleges. Sunier, Thijl (1996). Islam in Beweging: Turkse Jongeren En Islamitische Organisaties. MigratieEn Etnische Studies. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis. Sunier, Thijl and Astrid Meyer (1996). ‘Religion’, in Hans Vermeulen (ed.), Immigrant Policy for a Multicultural Society. A Comparative Study of Integration, Language and Religious Policy in Five Western European Countries. Brussels: Migration Policy Group, 101–30. Taji-Farouki, Suha (1996). A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate. London: Grey Seal. van Koningsveld, Pieter (1995). ‘Islam in Europe’, in John L.  Esposito (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 290–6. Vertovec, Steven and Ceri Peach (eds.) (1997). Islam in Europe: The Politics of Religion and Community. Migration, Minorities, and Citizenship Series. Basingstoke:  Macmillan and New York: St. Martin’s Press. Vertovec, Steven, Alisdair Rogers, and Dansk Center for Migration Og Etniske Studier (eds.) (1998). Muslim European Youth: Reproducing Ethnicity, Religion, Culture. Research in Ethnic Relations Series. Aldershot and Brookfield, VT: Ashgate. Vikor, Knut S. (2005). Between God and the Sultan: A History of Islamic Law. New York: Oxford University Press. Voll, John Obert (1999). ‘Foundations for Renewal and Reform: Islamic Movements in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries’, in John L. Esposito (ed.), The Oxford History of Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 509–48. Waardenburg, Jean-Jacques (1991). ‘Muslim Associations and Official Bodies in Some European Countries’, in Wasif Shadid and Pieter van Koningsveld (eds.), The Integration of Islam and Hinduism in Western Europe. Kampen, the Netherlands: Kok Pharos, 24–42. —— (2001). Institutionale Vormgevingen van de Islam in Nederland gezien in Europees Perspectief. Werkdocumenten W 118. The Hague: Scientific Council for the Government Policy (WRR). —— (2002). Islam: Historical, Social and Political Perspectives. Religion and Reason 40. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter. —— (2003). Muslims and Others: Relations in Context. Religion and Reason 41. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter. —— (2007). Muslims as Actors: Islamic Meanings and Muslim Interpretations in the Perspective of the Study of Religions. Religion and Reason 46. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter. Wiktorowicz, Quintan (2005). Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

PA R T I

I SL A M A S A P O STC OL ON IA L , P O ST- SE C ON D WOR L D WA R R E L IG ION I N E U ROP E

C HA P T E R

1

FRANCE J E N N I F E R A . SE L B Y

The experiences and representations of Muslims in France are significant benchmarks with which to gauge the broader socio-politics of Islam in the West. France is home to the largest Muslim population in Western Europe. This factor as well as its unique Republican citizenship model and laïque (French secular) separation of religion and politics significantly shape the lives of French Muslims. As we will see, assimilationist policies have had differing effects. On the one hand, in contrast to other European nation-states described in this volume, France is relatively open to granting citizenship rights to new immigrants, of whom many are Muslim. On the other hand, the French Republic applies sharp legal regulations to visible forms of religiosity in the public sphere that often pejoratively affect Muslims amid highly mediatized debates. This chapter considers some of the ways this complex and dynamic context impacts French Muslims through socio-historical analysis and by situating academic research within five broad topics: (i) the history and politics of immigration and of “counting” Muslims; (ii) how the nation’s separation of religion and politics renders visible religious signs like hijabs problematic; (iii) political participation trends; (iv) French institutionalization of Islam; and lastly, (v) contemporary figures and studies of Islamic movements, radicalism, and Islamophobia. These are politics that have defined and been shaped by scholarship on the subject; woven into this overview is consideration of how academic study has examined and contributed to characterizations of French Muslims. Despite the long-standing presence of Muslims, a shift from a broad-based sociology of immigration with little attention to Islam in the 1960s–1970s to a central focus beginning with the “headscarf affair” at the end of the 1980s is noted.

Immigration and Statistical Studies Muslims have lived in France since the Moor invasion from Spain in the eighth century and continue to migrate thirteen centuries later. Sociological perspectives and French

24   Jennifer A. Selby statistical agencies have shaped knowledge production on Islam in France, initially through the study of immigration. French demographic agencies were among the first in France to formally count French Muslims (Tribalat 1995, 1996; Alba and Silberman 2002), and, in so doing, influenced the way its communities are oftentimes perceived as immigrants. This chapter’s first section identifies key migration trends and how they have shaped the origins of most Muslims in France, from the first waves of male North African temporary workers, to an increase of women and Muslims of sub-Saharan, Turkish, and Middle Eastern origins. This overview also considers the role of research in reinforcing the perception of Muslims as immigrants in the 1960s and 1970s, and with the 1983 Marche des Beurs reflecting a shift to scholarly emphases on the group’s socioeconomic statuses. With the exception of long-standing residents and a small number of Français-de-Souche (so-called native French) converts, many French Muslims immigrated to France in the twentieth century in two principal periods: following the First World War, when a devastating number of casualties and the rise of industrialization meant that temporary workers from nearby North African colonies were encouraged to work in factories; and in the era surrounding the Algerian War (1954–62) as male migrants sought employment opportunities, facilitated because Algeria was a French department. With the end of the First World War, more organized programs of immigration sponsored by government and industry replaced the more spontaneous largely North African immigration before 1914 (Ogden 1989:  44). Of course, Muslims of Algerian origin who were part of this wave were French nationals (Cesari 2009: 195). The Paris Mosque with its 33-meter minaret in the city’s 5th district was inaugurated in 1926 as a gesture of recognition to the more than 100,000 Algerian soldiers who died during the war. Aforementioned, the majority of these migrants were young single men of Maghrebian origin. Their projects in France typically had two objectives:  to send remittances to their families and to gain greater social status in their countries of origin (Zehraoui 1994: 16). Most settled in the outskirts of northern and eastern cities like Paris, Marseille, Lyon, and Lille because of their concentration of metallurgical factories (Stora 1992; Silverstein 2004). This migration wave impacted the social and physical geographies of these suburban regions. Initially many built shacks and lived in shantytowns close to the factories where they worked. Beginning in the early 1960s, these shantytowns were replaced by high-rise apartment social housing projects or habitations à loyer modéré (HLMs) by the French government in an effort to improve conditions (Kepel 2012; Moran 2012). These sites became significant in the 2000s when the accidental deaths of two adolescents ignited social tensions leading to three weeks of riots (this period is considered in greater detail in the subsection “Policing and the banlieues”). Following the independence of Algeria in 1962, immigration to French suburban regions widened to include other African workers, particularly from West Africa. Paris’s banlieues thus welcomed increasingly culturally heterogeneous numbers of Muslims. Following the “Franco flight” in the 1970s when French non-Muslims began leaving suburban regions, its residents were increasingly of Muslim and of immigrant origin.

France   25

An “ethnic penalty” became clear (Santelli 2007). Immigrant Muslim families gained access to government-sponsored housing at the very moment when it was no longer a symbol of progress (Cesari 2005). Today approximately 3 million people live in social low-income housing in the outskirts of Paris alone (Kepel 1987; Begag and Delorme 1994; Fausto 1992). While the precise numbers are not known, many of these residents are Muslims. In the 1970s and 1980s, there was little academic interest in the religious dimensions of this immigration. Sociologically, two notable changes beginning in the 1960s and 1970s in this primarily North African migration to the peripheries of industrialized French cities shifted the discourses of Islam in France: industrialization and roboticization, and a new family reunification immigration policy. The country’s immigration policies began tightening in the 1970s in response to rising unemployment. President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s government (1974–81) unsuccessfully sought to repatriate 500,000 North Africans and offered lump sum payments to encourage workers to leave (Killian 2006: 17). In the early 1980s, in the midst of this recession, the far right grew under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National (FN, the National Front party) (Bréchon and Mitra 1992: 63; Wieviorka 1993: 55). Ethnic minorities who lived in the outskirts of these industrialized cities were greatly affected by this change in industry and Muslims became both the symbols and targets of FN’s anti-immigration rhetoric with exclusionary nationalist campaign slogans like, On n’est plus chez nous (“We are no longer at home”). One response to this xenophobic rhetoric was the Première marche pour l’égalité et contre le racisme (the “First March for Equality and Against Racism”) also called the Marche des Beurs,1 organized by a number of second-generation immigrants to draw attention to the problem. The mediatized Marche des Beurs from Marseille to Paris and subsequent demonstrations reflected the second generation’s differing politics and claim for rights from their parents. The FN’s anti-Islam position arguably also led many second-generation youth, troubled by unemployment and racism, to look to their religious beliefs and practices as sources of identity. Scholarly attention primarily examined the Beurs movement and the creation of organizations like SOS Racisme as reflecting ethnic-based social movements, and not ones centered on religious affiliations (see Jazouli 1992; Rey 1996; Leveau and Wihtol de Wenden 2001; Beaud and Pialoux 2003). As Fetzer and Soper note (2005: 6), so-called religious elements were largely ignored by social scientists because religion was not seen as an influential factor: “one reason for this silence on religious questions has been the perception among social scientists [ . . .] that Western Europe is essentially secular and that issues of church and state are no longer relevant to public policy.”

1 

Verlan, which comes from à l’envers or reverse, refers to spoken words whose sounds are reversed to create a new “code” with the same meaning as the original word, like keufs for flics (cops). Some verlan is straightforward, like ouf that signifies fou (crazy). Often pointed to with the Marche des Beurs in 1982, “Arabes” became known as the Beurs. More than twenty-five years later, Beurs are sometimes now known as the Rebeu (Bachman and Besier 1984; Lefkowitz 1991; Merle 1997).

26   Jennifer A. Selby By the 1990s, the foreign workforce in France had been reduced by half (Hargreaves 2007: 53). These factors led North African immigrants to occupy “the lowest ranking in the country’s ethnic hierarchy” (Hargreaves 2007: 146). Women were equally vulnerable to this economic downturn, as they often found themselves in positions of economic and social dependence on their husbands and male relatives. Contrasting the 1950s with the 1990s underscores how the country’s changing economic climate has impacted both socio-economic opportunities and the ways in which Muslims have been perceived in France. Most of this early immigration stemmed from the former colonies of the Maghreb, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. Contemporarily, Muslim populations in France include converts as well as immigrants from the Middle East, Turkey, Iran, and sub-Saharan Africa (see Figure 1.1). Like the immigration data, statistics on religious affiliation are shaped by French politics. A number of studies suggest a broad Muslim population range, between 5 and 18% of the total French population. These estimates vary because of a lack of concrete data. In its calculations of demographic indicators based on vital records and census data, the national statistical agency INSEE (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques) does not gather data on religion. The smaller INED (Institut national d’études démographiques) examines both national and international demographics to generate its estimates, including data from the Ministry of the Interior and from the Bureau des migrations internationales on immigrant flows (INED 2010, 2011). A 2010 report from the French Minister of the Interior suggested there were 5–6 million Muslims living in France (Agence France-Presse 2010b). As neither of these institutes asks directly about religious affiliation, the resulting lacuna has led demographers to create their own statistics (see Tribalat 1996; Couvreur 1998; Boyer 1998; Borrel and Simon 2005; Gourévitch 2008). A 2003 report suggested that France contains 3.5–5 million Muslims, of whom 1–1.6 million are of Algerian 800 700 600 500 400

Number of immigrants by thousands

300 200 100 0 Algeria

Morocco Portugal FIGURE  1.1 

Italy

Spain

Turkey

Tunisia

Immigration in France by country, 2008

France   27

origin; 800,000–1 million are Moroccan; 400,000–500,000 are from the “Orient” (especially Turkey); 250,000–500,000 are of West African origin; 300–400 are clandestine Muslims; and several thousand are converts (see Dargent 2003: 3). A range of data also exists from private agencies and international groups. For instance, a 2010 Pew study estimated 4.7 million Muslims (Pew Forum 2011). Other statistical studies can be pieced together to tell us something about the make-up of French Muslim communities. A  2011 IFOP (Institut Français d’Opinion Publique) study published in La Croix claimed that most Muslims in France continue to live primarily in the Ile-de-France Parisian region and in the northern and eastern sections of the country. This IFOP study also suggests that the bulk of the Muslim population is young: 31% of the Muslim population falls between the ages of 18 and 24 compared to 12% of the non-Muslim population. The absence of accurate quantitative data can be explained by a “religion-blind” approach. The religious or ethnic origins of residents are not collected by government statistical agencies or the nationwide census every nine years. This decision stems from a laïque-based cultivation of sameness in the public sphere and can be read as in keeping with France’s common anti-multiculturalist position. Indeed, from a Republican perspective, fostering a multicultural ethos through the collection of data on religion serves to further stratify cultural, racial, and linguistic differences rather than to unite citizens (Le Monde 2009; Schnapper 1994; Stasi Report 2003; Harris Interactive 2006). A more culturally homogeneous public sphere acts to erase difference to ensure “equality through invisibility” (Simon 2008: 8; for other critiques of this demographic collection see Silverman 1992: 37; Hargreaves 2007: 11).2 With this lack of concrete demographic information, the closest approximation of the ethnic origins and religious affiliations of the French population is approximated through data published about the nationality of residents. Sectarian differences among Muslims are also estimated. Of course, these approximations are problematic in that they falsely correlate immigration from some countries with Muslimness and discount, among other factors, the numerous Muslims who have lived in France for more than three generations or who may not be of immigrant origin. The French assimilationist position has thus impacted the collection of demographic information about religious affiliation and, quantitatively, what is known about French Muslims.

Socio-economics A number of studies have charted how Muslims in France are characterized by socio-economic marginality and are more likely to be unemployed than the remainder

2  Fear of a multicultural ethos is also articulated as concern for “communalism” (communautarisme), the idea that one will identify more with one’s ethnic or cultural group than with society as a whole (Chevalérias 2008).

28   Jennifer A. Selby of the French population (Hargreaves 2007; Santelli 2007; Laitkin 2009; Adida, Laitin and Valfort 2010: 58). A 2007 INSEE study shows that the unemployment rate for immigrants is more than double that of French nationals (Perrin-Hayes 2008); of course, Muslims fall into both of these groups. Foreign women are particularly affected (see Table 1.1). Three recent studies further exemplify this point. The first, based on 2005 INSEE data, claims that unemployment among people of French origin was 9.2%, while it was 14% among those with foreign backgrounds. Of course, one’s place of birth does not determine one’s religious identity or engagement. Because of a lack of quantitative data, “foreigner” is awkwardly correlated with “Muslimness.” The published statistic of 14% is also inaccurate for it does not account for the high rate of unemployment among illegal immigrants, non-working individuals who are no longer seeking employment, the number of men and women who do not have the necessary French-language or literacy skills to search for legal work, or the European economic crisis in the 2010s. The percentage of unemployed is therefore likely higher than 14%. A second statistical study published in Le Monde reveals that young people of North African origin born in France, even with equal or better qualifications compared with a Français de Souche candidate, have less success in obtaining employment than other applicants (Hargreaves 2007: 58). This study used blind CVs to conclude that an equally qualified young man with a “Muslim” sounding first and last name would receive less interest and fewer call-backs. As Jocelyne Cesari (2009: 217) notes, there are a number of factors that work in tandem to create this unbalanced situation, most predominantly, “residential segregation, creating the political problem of the banlieues.” For young qualified Muslim applicants, a suburban address or postal code acts as a hindrance (Amrani and Beaud 2004; Selby 2012: 186n2). A 2005 DARES study further underscores how living in the suburbs appears to affect one’s employability (http://www.epsilon.insee.fr/ jspui/bitstream/1/3927/1/2005.04-17.3.pdf). Beyond charted discrimination in employment, high unemployment rates in these suburban areas enforce a widespread assumption of a causal link between Islam and poverty.

Table 1.1  Unemployment in France based on nationality French nationals

Foreigners total

EU nationals

Foreigners outside the European Union

Men

7%

14.80%

7.30%

19.60%

Women

8.00%

18.30%

8.90%

26.10%

Total

7.50%

16.30%

8.10%

22.20%

Source: “Situation des immigrés et des non-immigrés sur le marché du travail.” Enquêtes Emploi du 1er au 4e trimestre, 2007. Retrieved June 20, 2012 from .

France   29

A third report produced in 2010 by David Laitin, Claire Adida, and Marie-Anne Valfort, “Les Français musulmans sont-ils discriminés dans leur propre pays? Une étude expérimentale sur le marché du travail” (Are French Muslims Discriminated Against in Their Country? An Experimental Study of the Labour Force), suggests similar results. It offers conclusive evidence of religious discrimination in the French labor market suggested in the aforementioned Le Monde study. Laitin et al. conclude that their results are “unambiguous in finding significant religious discrimination against Muslims” (2010). The study similarly involved creating employment CVs for three fictional job-seekers with differing religious and national backgrounds: one French secular individual, one French-Senegalese with a Christian first name, and one French-Senegalese with a Muslim first name. It found that the Christian job applicant was more than twice as likely as the Muslim applicant to receive a call-back. As we will see in the Islamophobia section, employees who wear hijabs report a higher degree of discrimination.

The Beurgeoisie Thus far I have characterized the majority of French Muslims as economically disfavored and living in stratified banlieue regions, but this situation does not reflect the group as a whole. Sometimes called the beurgeoisie, or upwardly mobile Muslims, these more socio-economically advantaged individuals make up an elite and powerful group not accounted for with the previous demographic snapshot. Generally, they have accessed more central urban neighborhoods and experienced socio-economic prosperity in France. Since 1982, first-generation immigrants (again, awkwardly correlated with Muslims) have become increasingly educated, with more than five times as many holding at least the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree (see Table 1.2). This growth might also reflect how Muslims in France have gained social mobility. A play on words combining beur (verlan for Arab; cf. footnote 2) and bourgeois, the beurgeoisie refers largely to second-generation immigrants, the children of working-class, banlieue-living immigrants, mostly from the Maghreb, who have found economic and professional success in France (Hargreaves 1998; Leveau and Wihtol de Wenden 2000). The children of upper-class immigrants who hold high-status positions such as lawyers, doctors, and businesspeople are not usually considered beurs. The beurgeoisie today are generally more integrated into French society than their parents were and have higher rates of professional and economic successes. They are a small but noteworthy group that have had an impact on Islam-related commerce, notably the availability of high-end halal products in France (Wihtol de Wenden 2011). Largely due to economic factors, the make-up of the Muslim population in the Republic has thus shifted since the end of the Algerian War in the 1960s. While Muslim communities were once predominantly immigrant-based, of North African origins, and residing in the suburban areas of large French cities, they now increasingly comprise a young and French-born population. So too the threads of scholarship have changed, from studies charting immigration, to those mapping ethnic and urban studies and

30   Jennifer A. Selby Table 1.2  Shifts in the education levels of immigrants and non-immigrants No diploma, CEP

BECP, CAP, BEP

Bachelor’s degree

Greater than a bachelor’s degree

1982

~45%

~25–30%

~10–15%

~10-15%

1999

~20%

~40%

~15%

~20–25%

2004–2005

~18%

~30–40%

~15%

~20–30%

1982

~80%

~10%

~5%

~5%

1999

~40%

~20–30%

~10–15%

~20%

2004–2005

~40%

~20%

~10%

~20–25%

Year French nationals

Immigrants to France

Source: Évolution de la structure des diplômes des immigrés et des non-immigrés (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE)). Recensements de 1982 et 1999, enquêtes annuelles de recensement de 2004 et 2005. Retrieved June 20, 2012 from .

social movements in the analysis of the Beur movement, to demographic concerns. Socio-economic disparities have charted Muslimness through countries of origin and through self-reporting within associations like SOS Racisme and the Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en France (CCIF, Collective Against Islamophobia in France). These academic foci are in part attributable to shifts in the broad economic make-up of the community: from unskilled industrialization, to increased unemployment and sociopolitical marginalization, to immigration policies that have favored family reunification and have “feminized” public debates about Islam. It is to this emphasis on Islam through gender studies that I now turn.

Headscarf Affairs This section examines the impact of immigration policy and the country’s conceptualization of secularity related to what have become known as “headscarf affairs.” Recall the “masculine” industrial immigration following the First and Second World Wars. Under the presidency of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, this gendered migration was replaced in the 1970s with a more “feminized” family reunification immigration policy. The country’s more recent immigrant population effectively moved public discourse about Islam in France from male workers (and unrest in the suburbs) toward a greater hijab focus (Koven 1992: 26; Amiraux 2003b, 2007). As single male North African worker migration

France   31

fell, the visibility of Muslim women and children, particularly those wearing visible religious signs, grew. A greater number of female migrants in the French territory meant that children of North African origin—many of whom were from practicing Muslim families—were born, educated in public schools, and socialized in France. As we shall see, beginning in the 1980s, the visibility of Muslim girls in public schools and women in the public sphere inspired a variety of new policies, politics, and scholarship. Research has examined first-generation (Killian 2006, 2003; Selby 2012) and, to a greater extent, second-generation female Muslim immigrants (Lacoste-Dujardin 1991, 1992, 1994; Khosrokhavar 1997; Cesari 1998; Venel 1999; Tetreault 2000, 2001; Guénif-Souilamas 2000; Fernando 2010). This gendered immigration policy shift therefore impacted the politics, public perception, and examinations of Islam in France. While many Muslims’ experiences in France are shaped by this common immigration history, arguably all French Muslims are impacted by the country’s conceptualization of secularity, which some theorists have claimed privileges a “Christian secularism,” or what French historian Jean Baubérot (2003) terms catholaïcité. Articulations of French secularism or laïcité significantly shape debates and controversies about religiosity, particularly related to the public visibility of many Muslim women. Concerns with the power and presence of religion emerged with the French Revolution in the eighteenth century and initially centered on Catholicism. A law formally separating church and state passed in 1905—the Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Églises et de l’État—so that religious signs and beliefs were formally assigned to the private sphere (see Assemblée Nationale 1905). Jean Baubérot (1998) notes that Catholicism therein lost its social vocation. Notably, the Republic no longer officially funded religious education (there remain exceptions; see Bowen 2009: 445–6), and public institutions were to be independent of religious interests (Favell 1998: 75). In 1946, likely in an effort to reassert French identity following German occupation in the Second World War (Baubérot 1998: 186), the principle of laïcité was enshrined in the French constitution (Brulard 1997: 177). Three political and legal shifts in 1989, 2004, and 2011 have shaped the visibility and rights of French Muslims and have generated a great deal of academic interest. Questions of diversity related to regionalisms, religiosity, or ethnicity are generally managed by the French state through the inculcation of a common language and culture within the national school system (Keaton 2006: 31; see also Brulard 1997: 175; Gauchet 1998: 52; Stasi Report 2003: 17, 23). Schools have been key spaces for disputes related to religiosity and difference (McGoldrick 2006; Agence France-Presse 2011a). Following an immigration shift to favor women’s migration, controversy relating to Islam and laïcité in France emerged in a suburban public school in October 1989 with a “headscarf affair.” The case was eventually brought to the French Supreme Court that ruled that hijabs and other religious symbols in schools were permissible so long as they were not “conspicuous” or “militant.” The court left the interpretation of these terms to individual schools (Brulard 1997: 179). This 1989 case marked a shift in French secular debates with its focus on the visibility of hijabs (Bloul 1996; Brulard 1997; Venel 1999; Dayan-Herzbrun 2000; Bowen 2004a; Killian 2006; see also Chapter  16, this volume) and emphasis on Islam and gender studies in studies of French Muslims. Scholars began

32   Jennifer A. Selby considering the politics of Islam in the public sphere as well as reasons why young women veil in contemporary France. The ruling from the Court de cassation appeared to quell the initial issue, but the “headscarf affair” reemerged with gusto five years later in 1994 as local school administrators sought clearer nationally implemented guidelines to determine the acceptability of head-coverings worn by Muslim girls. The government responded with the Bayrou Circulaire (or Bayrou Decree) issued by Education Minister François Bayrou. The Circulaire sought to distinguish between “discrete” (preferred) and “ostentatious” (i.e. proselytizing and discriminating) religious signs (Joppke 2007: 323) to make their interpretation less ambiguous for teachers and administrators. Following its publication, from 1994 to 2003, a number of hijab-related expulsions, student protests, and judicial decisions of headscarf-wearing girls from the ages of 9 to 18 both confirmed and overturned its proposals (Winter 2006). Continued concern in public schools and dissatisfaction over the subjectivity of this classification led in part to the July 2003 Jacques Chirac-mandated consultative commission to investigate the acceptability of visible religious signs in public schools and make more formal nationally-based recommendations. After six months of public forums and round tables, this highly mediatized 2003 commission led to a legal change that restricted the visibility of “conspicuous” religious signs in schools. Directed by Bernard Stasi and a group of nineteen scholars, government officials, and experts, and interviewing 140 individuals about the acceptability of religious signs in public schools, the “Stasi Commission” (Commission de réflexion sur l’application du principe de laïcité dans la République) made twenty-six recommendations related to the protection of laïcité in schools (Weil 2009; Laurence and Vaisse 2006: 166). A number of scholars have argued that, despite its supposed attention to a number of religious signs, it is difficult to deny the commission’s targeting of the Muslim headscarf and associated Islamic cultural tenets treating the status and actions of women (Silverstein 2004; Bowen 2007: 42; Scott 2007; Selby 2011b: 446). One of its twenty-six recommendations regarding religious signs was adopted meaningfully. Lawmakers voted on the bill (Law 2004 - 228) to ban conspicuous religious signs in public schools and government offices on February 10, 2004. The law effectively banned symbols and forms of dress that obviously denote the religious identity of students, notably the Muslim veil, the Jewish kippa, and large Christian crosses carried on the back. It received strong support and passed, almost unanimously (494 votes in favor, 36 against, and 31 abstentions) on March 15, 2004 (Lyon and Spini 2004; Weil 2009: 2701). The report deems more discrete signs acceptable, like medallions, small crosses, Stars of David, hands of Fatima, or little Qur’ans (Stasi Report 2003: 23). It was instituted with relatively little controversy or rejection from the broader Muslim community (Ministère de l’éducation nationale de l’enseignement supérieur et de la recherché 2005; Winter 2008: 224; Selby 2011a).3 In the years since the 2004 law banning conspicuous religious signs in public schools, following a broader European trend (see Chapter 16, this volume), public debates have 3  Former inspector general of the Education Ministry Hanifa Chérifi’s June 2005 report claimed that the majority of students removed their religious signs; only forty-seven students refused to conform to the law and the remaining ninety-six students who objected transferred to private schools (Ministère de l’intérieur et de l’aménagement du territoire 2005: 41).

France   33

shifted to emphasize the public visibility of face veils (the niqab and burqa) in the public sphere. In early 2009, a communist member of the National Assembly and former mayor of Vénissieux, André Gerin, noted an “alarming” rise in the number of women donning the voile intégral (full-face-covering hijab) in his constituency near Lyon. Gerin was not alone in expressing concern. Former President Nicolas Sarkozy echoed that, “the burqa is not welcome in the French Republican territory” (Gabizon 2009).4 With a great deal of public support,5 Sarkozy commissioned a 2010 “Fact-finding mission on the practice of wearing the full veil on the national territory” (Rapport d’information fait en application de l’article 145 du règlement au nom de la mission d’information sur la pratique du port du voile intégral sur le territoire national) or the “Gerin Report” (named after its commissioner). A 658-page report was presented to the National Assembly on January 26, 2010. Unlike previous commissions that have treated religion in the public sphere, the Gerin Report solely examined niqabs and burqas. After considering factors related to the equality of the sexes, women’s freedom and dignity, a rise in dangerous Islamism, and security and neighborliness, it concluded that face-covering veils are impediments to women’s sexual equality and reflected signs of growing Islamism that must be curtailed. In response to these concerns, the French were the first to legally restrict these face-covering garments in Europe, on April 11, 2011 (Reuters 2010b). The legal restriction entails €150 fines or citizenship classes (or both) for a woman caught covering her face (Radio Free Europe 2011). It carries far greater penalties for husbands, fathers, or brothers convicted of “forcing” the veil on a woman. For men, a €30,000 fine and a year in prison would be doubled if the victim is a minor (Le Monde 2010). In sum, culminating with this 2011 law, the visibility of hijabs has drawn significant attention in France, a point echoed in the scholarship examining these garments. Also, on a juridical level, this focus has translated into two laws, in 2004 and 2011, which restrict hijabs in public schools and face-covering hijabs in the public sphere. Even if focused on the public visibility of some Muslim women, the introduction of these laws to enforce French secularism impacts the lives of all French Muslims. In his testimony before the Gerin 4 

These issues coincide with April 2011 conversations and televised political debates ostensibly about national identity that appeared to solely discuss Islam in France and its effect on French secularism. Polemic began on a French television program, Paroles de Français, when President Sarkozy explained that the Muslim population of France should be able to practice their religion, but he did not want it to become a large part of the French identity (see Pouchard 2011; Cabana 2011; Galaud 2011). The proposal for the debate caused a division within the party, with some members believing it would cause the stigmatization of Muslims. Some French Muslim leaders like Dalil Boubakeur similarly deemed the debate Islamophobic (Libération 2011). More than the full-face veil ban, this debate has led to an important decline in Sarkozy’s popularity among French Muslims. 5  Polling data suggest that most French citizens agreed with the restriction on face veils with fines in the public sphere. An opinion poll conducted by Taylor Nelson Sofres for Europe 1 in April 2010 suggested that 63% of the French population fully supported an outright ban (Étude TNS Sofres-Logica 2010). A similar February 2010 survey conducted by the Financial Times indicated that 70% of French citizens supported a ban (Blitz 2010).

34   Jennifer A. Selby Commission, CFCM president Mohammed Moussaoui noted the stigmatizing effect of apparatuses like it (Assemblée Nationale 2010: 373).

Institutionalization Despite this formalized Republican separation of church and state that seeks to privatize religiosity, the French state has historically and contemporarily sought to institutionalize and centralize religious authorities. As we saw in the previous section, Islam in France has been monitored and shaped through the creation of government commissions designed to scrutinize affairs affecting Republican politics. This section examines institutionalization of the tradition through the struggling place of private Islamic schools, the creation of the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM) and its work on the reception and qualifications of imams, as well as the instauration of a number of institutes, prayer spaces, cemeteries, and halal regulation. Attention to the institutionalization of Islam in France has generated notable research (Bowen 2007, 2011; Caeiro 2005a; Fetzer and Sopher 2005; Frégosi 1996, 1998, 2011; Laurence and Vaisse 2006). Scholarly attention to this institutionalization arguably stems in part from common shifts in the challenges facing Muslim communities. As Laurence and Vaisse note (2006), the first generation of Muslim immigrants focused their attention on securing better rights for foreign workers; the second generation fought against racism and discrimination through left-leaning non-religiously focused activism, like the Beur movement; and the most recent generation increasingly identifies with a more pan-Islamic globalized Islam as a way to assert identities in a public sphere shaped by laïque debates.

Islamic Schools The 2004 law restricting conspicuous religious signs largely concerned Muslim girls not only because of its implicit headscarf focus but also because, unlike the Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish populations, the French Muslim population has only a handful of private Islamic schools where headscarves are permitted (Innovative Minds 2004). Most young women who wear hijabs attend public schools where the law is in effect. Here I mention six private Islamic institutions; three are situated outside Paris, one in Lille, and one outside of Lyon. Another exists in La Réunion, a French overseas territory. In theory, under the 1959 Debré Law, provided that they follow the set state school curriculum and submit to inspections, faith-based private schools are eligible for government grants that pay the wages of state-accredited teachers (Bowen 2009: 447). Only one private Muslim school has thus far succeeded in securing funding, the Lycée Averroès in Lille. Inspiration for its creation grew after the aforementioned 1994 Bayou Decree when nineteen headscarf-wearing students from the Lycée Faidherbe were expelled when their head-coverings were deemed as conspicuous. Surviving initially on donations and becoming an association in November 2001, the school began receiving some financial support from the state in July 2003 (Innovative Minds 2004). In the 2010–11 school

France   35

year it had 150 students enrolled, up from fifteen in 2003–4 (see Lycée Averroès n.d.). It has received support from national Muslim organizations. For instance, the Union des organizations islamiques de France (UOIF) was involved in its launch (along with the Collège Al-Kindi; see Mazawi 2010: 184). For the remaining schools, funding has been a significant issue. For some critics, private Muslim schools threaten the cohesiveness of the Republic (Mazawi 2010: 177). Some feel their focus is counter-productive to the integration of Muslim immigrants (see Bowen 2009). At the same time, given its claims that it adheres to the National Education pedagogical curriculum program, others have suggested that state funding rejections have been Islamophobic in nature (Le Nouvel Observateur 2008; Bowen 2009). The private Muslim school Collège Lycée Al-Kindi in a suburb of Lyon admitted its first twenty-two pupils in March 2007 after an eight-month financial struggle (Heneghan 2007). Even if most girl pupils wear them, headscarves are not obligatory at Al-Kindi and its religion class is optional. In March 2008, Éducation et Savoir (“Education and Knowledge”) opened in the Parisian suburb of Vitry-sur-Seine (Val-de-Marne). Like other private Muslim schools, their biggest challenge has not been obtaining an operation license, but in securing funding. It has so far been funded by a medley of private donors and associations in France (Islam Online 2008). Like the Al-Kindi high school in a suburb of Lyon, the Collège Lycée Réussite (“Success”) in the northern Parisian suburb of Aubervilliers (Seine-Saint-Denis) and Éducation et Savoir in Villeneuve-Saint-Georges (Val-de-Marne) have not been successful in securing funding. La Réussite began as an association in 1992 and opened in October 2001. Its website emphasizes the scholastic achievement of its 100 students and notes that students of all religious backgrounds are welcome (see Collège Lycée Réussite 2011 and overview of this school in Bowen 2011: 110–24). It is regularly on the precipice of bankruptcy and relies primarily on charitable donations; in 2008, La Réussite’s teachers worked for several months without pay and it continues to have financial issues (Nixey 2009; Thomas 2010). At the time of writing, the Éducative school had opened. It has a different model in that it charges €4,500 annually and is otherwise funded by Turkish foreign sources (Le Monde 2009). In sum, while there is clearly a clientele for these schools, reliable funding has not yet been established. The institutionalization of private Islamic schools is far from ecure.

The CFCM and Other Groups In 2003 the tradition was governmentalized6 when then-Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy inaugurated the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (CFCM or French Council of the Muslim Faith) as a centralized representative body for French Muslims. In keeping with the official representatives in place in France for French Catholics, Jews,

6  Sarah Bracke and Nadia Fadil (2012: 42) usefully define governmentality as “the ways in which governments try to produce ‘the citizen’ and all the organized practices and techniques through which subjects are governed.”

36   Jennifer A. Selby and Protestants, beginning in the 1980s, discussions began to formalize a similar group for Muslims. These efforts coalesced alongside post-9/11 securitization initiatives. The CFCM acts at the national level while Regional Councils of the Muslim Faith (CRCM) were established and elected at the local level. Even if common in the French state, Vincent Geisser notes that comparatively this kind of government top-down intervention is rare in Europe (2010: 42). Created under the auspices of offering greater representation, the state’s involvement in the CFCM has drawn criticisms about state interference. These remarks were sharpest with the initial appointment of Dalil Boubakeur as the first council president by Sarkozy and with complaints that the organization follows a Protestant model of representation and does not adequately represent the diverse make-up of French Muslims (see Caeiro 2005a: 71–84; Amiraux 2003a: 24–5; Winter 2008: 85–7). Critiques regarding a lack of representiveness were central to divisions in elections for the organization in 2011, which reelected Mohammed Moussaoui as the organization’s president. The GMP (Mosque of Paris) and the UOIF boycotted, alleging voting rules favored Moroccan-based groups (Le Monde 2011a). In part due to its perceived lack of legitimacy among French Muslims, a number of other organizations have grown. The largest parallel group is the UOIF, an umbrella organization of more than 200 mosques and local Islamic associations founded in 1983 (Caeiro 2005b). The UOIF organizes a large annual gathering in Le Bourget that attracts thousands of Muslims from across the country; in 2011, more than 53,000 people attended the weekend-long gathering (Euro-Islam 2009b). Their ideological stance has sometimes been depicted as reformist Islam inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood movement (Caeiro 2003); the UOIF follows similar principles of education and civic engagement, and does not hold allegiance to a specific school of jurisprudence (madhab). For these reasons, even if the UOIF is recognized as a legitimate member of the CFCM with its president sitting on the CFCM executive, the organization has been considered as suspect by public authorities. A number of scholars have charted the place of the Muslim Brotherhood in France (Kepel 2004; Maréchal 2008; Ternisien 2011). Members of the pan-Islamic Muslim Brotherhood (founded in Egypt in 1928) began migrating from Arab countries at the end of the 1950s. In comparing the group’s presence in the UK and France, Brigitte Maréchal notes that in the latter, “where government policies are focused on the integration of individuals and not collective groups, the claims are usually less explicit and provocative as they seem to be limited to the social sphere” (2008: 37). The Swiss-born grandson of Hassan al-Banna (1906–48), the group’s founder, remains a controversial figure in French political and academic circles. Tariq Ramadan (b. 1962), a scholar of Contemporary Islamic Studies at Oxford University, was strongly critiqued by Nicholas Sarkozy on the French television debate program, 100 minutes pour convaincre, on November 20, 2003, and by French essayist Caroline Fourest (2004; see also Frégosi 1998: 117 and 2004: 138 on Ramadan’s theological message). Other important Muslim organizations include the National Federation of French Muslims (FNMF, the Federation nationale des musulmans de France), controlled by counterparts in Morocco, and the Paris Mosque (GMP, Grande Mosquée de Paris), led

France   37

by former CFCM president Dalil Boubakeur and financed by the Algerian government. The Parti des musulmans de France (PMF, Muslim Party of France), created in Strasbourg in 1997 by Mohamed Ennacer Latrèche, seeks to reflect the political interests of French Muslims. Its influence has been largely restricted to the Alsatian region (http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parti_des_musulmans_de_France). It has not won any elections. Salafism, stemming from Saudi Arabian religious doctrine and associated with literalist conservatism, has been charted by scholars as a growing movement in France since the 1990s. Women who wear niqabs are often characterized as members of this group (like “Mme. M.” who was the first person whose citizenship request in 2008 was refused based primarily on her alleged allegiance to this group; see Prada-Bordenave 2008; Mullally 2010), which is why the 2010 Gerin Report that preceded the 2011 law banning full-face veils in the public sphere spends some time qualifying their presence. The Gerin Report suggests that there are between 12,000 and 15,000 Salafis in France (2010: 59). The report characterizes the group pejoratively as radical, ghettoizing (communautariste), and anti-woman (Assemblée Nationale 2010: 31). While he does not condemn the practice entirely, CFCM president Mohammed Moussaoui testified before the commission that the niqab is “an extreme practice that the CFCM does not wish to see become established in the national territory” (Assemblée Nationale: 36; see also Selby 2011b: 387). Samir Amghar’s Le salafisme d’aujourd’hui: mouvements sectaires en occident (2011) echoes that the group’s popularity has grown in France, particularly among second-generation Muslim youth (see also Kepel 2004). Contextualizing the group’s growth, Amghar distinguishes between pietist, political, and revolutionary Salafism and suggests that 95% of French Salafis fall into the pietist category (Gauthier 2012). Similarly, the Jamaat at-Tabligh, founded in India in 1927, is a revivalist movement targeting the return of Muslims to the “right path.” It became global after the Second World War and established itself in France in the late 1960s (Amghar 2009: 32). There are very few scholarly surveys of this group and its followers in the French context, likely due to their secrecy and separatist posture vis-à-vis mainstream society. For these reasons and because they preach a conservative interpretation of Islam, they are often associated with radical activism (see the next section).

“Home-grown” Imams Related to this concern for an institutionalized Islam de France, there has been a push for “home-grown” imams. Indeed, the training of imams was amongst the first tasks delegated to the CFCM, as the training and low salaries of imams were identified in three reports as contributing to an extremist subculture among Muslims in France. The Haut Commissariat à l’Intégration (High Commission on Integration) released “L’Islam dans la République” in 2000 that discussed the question of imam training. It suggested that training for Muslim leaders was not sufficiently developed and recommended that such

38   Jennifer A. Selby training take place through a university setting. The 2005 Machelon Report (see Ministère de l’intérieur et de l’aménagement du territoire 2005) was commissioned by the French Prime Minister to examine some of the legal issues concerning the relations between the state and religious denominations. The Machelon Report suggests the creation of a statefunded institute of Islamic theology in Strasbourg. More quantitatively, according to the 2003 King Baudoin Foundation survey, of approximately 1,000 imams in France, just over half were permanent residents, fewer than half received regular salaries, and one-third speak little or no French. Attempts to create French-run training centers to rectify these issues have been unsuccessful. From 1994 to 2000, the Mosque of Paris housed a training institute for imams that closed due to lack of subsidies. The Institut d’Études Islamiques de Paris (Paris Institute of Islamic Studies) suffered a similar fate. Since these closures a number of other organizations have offered a variety of Islamic studies programs, including the Centre de Recherche sur l’Islam (CERSI, Centre of Research on Islam), the Institut Français des Études et Sciences Islamiques (IFESI, French Institute of Islamic Studies and Sciences), and the Institut Européen des Sciences Humaines (IESH, European Institute of Human Sciences) (King Baudouin Foundation 2003: 17). These institutes have been unable to continue operating. Their primary roadblock has been budgetary.

Prayer Spaces and Mosques There is not an abundance of congregational prayer space for Muslims in France, whether in public or private settings. Controversy has emerged surrounding the use of public street space for congregational prayer, with particular attention placed on two streets in Paris’s Goutte d’Or in the 18th district. In response to the visibility of Friday prayer on these streets, in June 2010, anti-Muslim far right groups organized a sausage and wine apéro géant (giant appetizer event) to critique halal sensibilities in the multiethnic area of Paris; others emerged in Nice and Lyon. Organizers sought to denounce what they deemed the Islamization of France but were later banned due to their antiIslam message. In response, 800 protesters gathered, singing the Marseillaise, brandishing salami and wearing berets while denouncing “the arrogance of Muslims” (RFI 2010). Far right National Front leader Marine Le Pen compared the Parisian street prayers to German Nazi occupation, a position with which 39% of French citizens allegedly agreed (Reuters 2010a; IFOP 2010). In response to the debate and the spatial issue of outdoor prayer which he deemed “unacceptable,” then French Interior Minister Claude Guéant announced that a former barracks in the same arrondissement would be used to better accommodate the large prayer-attending community. An unused barracks owned by the Ministry of Defense near Porte des Poissonniers in the periphery of the city will be turned into a makeshift mosque to accommodate the overflow of people (RFI 2011). This repurposing reflects the lack of space available in mosques and legal issues with their financing and construction. While there is a long history of mosque construction dating to the eighth century, with the exception of the Mosque of Paris built in the 1920s in the city’s 5th district, more concerted construction began with the wave

France   39

of Muslim immigrants after the Second World War. Many of these prayer spaces were built ad hoc and served male factory workers. Following a 1981 law under Mitterrand that facilitated the creation of social and cultural associations by non-citizens, many more Muslim associative spaces with affiliations to Algeria, Morocco, and Turkey were created (Bowen 2010: 30). These Islamic centers facilitated marriage rites, funerals, classes, and recreational activities (Cesari 2009: 215). Often these mosques and associations were converted from private homes, apartments, and warehouses and offered Arabic classes and after-school tutoring. The possibility of creating associations meant there was a substantial climb, from 500 mosques in 1985 to 1,279 mosques by 1992 (see Bowen 2010: 30–1). Frégosi (1998: 118) notes the disparity of religious sites per capita for Muslims in contrast with Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, pointing to a lack of land-holdings and prejudice as obstacles to this end. However, recent reports suggest mosque creation continues to rise. A 2011 report by CFCM president Mohammed Moussaoui suggests that there were between 100 and 150 mosques under construction across France (Le Figaro 2011c; Le Bars 2012a; see also Institut Français d’Opinion Publique 2009). In addition, should it be completed—at the time of writing its building permit has been revoked and construction on the 2,500 m2 building has stalled—the Mosque of Marseille could be France’s largest mosque (Euro-Islam 2009a; La Croix 2013). Despite land acquisition and the proliferation of buildings, resentment toward Muslim prayer space remains notable, as the outdoor prayer controversies and apéro responses suggest. While reflecting growth, the CFCM announcement of increased mosque construction does not account for two factors: the considerable internal disputes that take place in their construction and the growing number of non-Muslim French who are reluctant to see mosques and minarets in their environs. In the wake of the minaret ban in Switzerland, a 2009 IFOP poll suggested that a growing number of French people do not want a mosque in their backyards. The study concludes that 41% of French people are opposed to new construction of mosques, up from 22% in 2001 (IFOP 2009). In 1989, resistance to the presence of mosques was also high: 38% of the French did not want to see a mosque near their residence. Arguably, therefore, anti-mosque sentiments peak in moments when other controversies related to Islam (in both 1989 and 2009 related to hijabs) are in the public eye.

Cemeteries Another practical issue that has received far less media and scholarly attention compared to hijab debates is that of Islamically-appropriate cemetery plots.7 Burial grounds have been places of contention in the French landscape given that laïque laws dictate 7 

A separate issue has been the desecrations of cemeteries across the country (Le Figaro 2010). Brice Hortefeux, the Minister of the Interior announced in a report that between January 1 and September 30, 2010, 485 cemeteries and religious sites were vandalized, 410 of which were Christian sites, forty of

40   Jennifer A. Selby that there should be no separate or specially marked plot areas to allow the deceased to face Mecca. A 2009 report published in Le Parisien suggests that, with the exception of the cemetery in Bobigny (Seine-Saint-Denis), there are eighty confessional plots available in France (Le Parisien 2009). In an effort to respond to the needs of the families of deceased Muslims, papers were signed in October 2009 to create the first Muslim cemetery in the eastern city of Strasbourg, possible given the province of Alsace’s exclusion from the 1905 law on secularism (Belghiti 2009). There remain few available Muslim plots in the rest of the country. Given these issues of availability as well as cultural and familial ties, many Muslims of immigrant origin opt to be buried in their or their parents’ country of origin.

Halal Regulation A last institutional arm has centered upon halal food regulation through supermarkets, butcheries, and abattoirs. Even if fewer than 50% of French Muslims consider themselves as practicing, the halal food industry in France is thriving. Halal food products deemed permissible according to Islamic law first appeared in French commercial spaces in the 1970s, and were sold mainly in immigrant-owned butcheries. Since then, their demand and sales have increased dramatically so that by 2011, the sector amassed €7.6 billion in annual sales (Crumley 2011a). Distribution has expanded: at first, the market was supplied mainly by international companies serving the Middle East and North Africa; more recently, multinational companies, such as Nestlé and Pazani, have begun producing a wide variety of halal products across Europe (Crumley 2011a). In a 2009 IFOP study for Le Figaro, 59% of Muslims claimed to purchase halal foods regularly, including meats, but also a wide variety of other foods. Ninety-two percent of halal product consumers regularly buy their goods in a halal butcher shop and 34% find halal products in supermarkets like Casino (IFOP 2011). Halal-certified foods are becoming increasingly solicited. In eight of their 362 branches, popular French fastfood chain Quick has begun selling halal-certified meat with success. This availability in regions with larger Muslim populations has brought media attention and has been well received by many French Muslims (Blackler 2010; Brochen 2010). At the same time, as the market has grown, controversy about the sale and the authenticity of halal products in France has also emerged. The Débat Halal website (http://www.debat-halal.fr) is an example of a consumer-driven internet resource that publishes information about popular halal-certified products and their legitimacy for French consumers (Crumley 2011a). Currently, there are no unified standards by which the production and sale of halal products are governed in France.

which were Muslim (of which thirty-four were mosques or prayer rooms and six were cemeteries) and thirty-five of which were Jewish (Agence France-Presse 2010a).

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The availability of religiously sanctioned products is further reflected in concerns around the accessibility of halal-based abattoirs for everyday consumers, particularly with annual Eid al-Adha celebrations at the end of the hajj. While most French Muslims obtain halal meats through their neighborhood halal butcher, when the community seeks to find greater quantities or desires a closer relationship with the sacrificial animal for the Feast of Sacrifice, availability and access to abattoirs become an issue (Bowen 2009:  449). Animal rights activists like actress Brigitte Bardot have voiced discontent against ritual halal slaughter practices in France; critics of her campaign have commented how “it was more about targeting minorities than animal welfare” (Biedermann 2011). In sum, the French government has been involved in the institutionalization of Islam through a number of means. Firstly, while it has not tended to facilitate partial state funding for Islamic private schools, it has created a state interlocutor—the CFCM— which itself has inspired the creation of a number of counter-representative institutions like the UOIF. Secondly, the regulation of imams has reflected a French state seeking to shape Muslim institutions through language, securitization, and limiting immigration should they be found to have suspicious ties. In addition, a number of institutes such as the Institut du Monde Arab and the Institut des Cultures d’Islam, as well as a dedicated wing on the celebrated Musée du Louvre, have sought to showcase the cultural contributions of Muslims. Prayer and burial spaces in cemeteries remain key issues for the viability of Islam in France. Lastly, halal products have come under some regulation as demand has increased substantially since the 1980s.

French Muslim Religiosity As aforementioned, noteworthy qualitative research has outlined the everyday experiences of Muslims with a recent focus on second-generation women (Bowen 2007; Cesari 1998, 2001; Fernando 2010; Gaspard and Khosrokhavar 1995; Guénif-Souilamas 2000; Keaton 2006; Killian 2006; Lacoste-Dujardin 1992; Moran 2012; Parvez 2011; Tetreault 2001; Venel 1999; Weibel 2000). Generally these studies have sought to add nuance and complexity to depictions that have stereotyped religiously practicing women. Findings have highlighted the individualization of practice: that for most women religious dress is not intended to promote a political project, and that with important exceptions, many male and female Muslims practice their faith in accordance with the French distinction of private and public spheres. These depictions counter common monolithic portrayals of passive women railing against assimilation and the French state. Indeed, in light of the aforementioned mediatized controversies regarding religious practice in the public sphere, it is worth considering whether these issues actually reflect the concerns of mainstream French Muslims. A number of quantitative studies suggest that few French Muslims find these issues of pressing concern. Two recent polls suggest that a relatively small percentage of French Muslims consider themselves as pratiquants

42   Jennifer A. Selby (practicing Muslims) and that a far greater number see themselves as croyants (believing Muslims), an understanding of belief which does not appear to trespass the desired laïque public sphere delineated in recent laws. In both studies, the definitional distinction between pratiquants and croyants lies in whether one prays five times per day and attends jumu’ah midday prayer on Fridays like the pratiquants (Bowen 2004 also uses these categories). Strikingly, while they receive a great deal of attention from the press and through academic investigation, data suggest that the majority of the French Muslim population does not deem these three issues as significant in their quotidian lives. The first poll, a 2011 INED study (Institut national d’études démographiques) conducted between September 2008 and February 2009 with 21,000 respondents, suggests that 33% of Muslims in France consider themselves as “practicing and believing” and that a higher percentage of Muslims born in France, 43%, say they are croyants but not pratiquants. This study claims that only 10% of the French Muslim population participates in midday congregational prayer on Fridays, which has been a controversial issue in one district of Paris because of an overflow of congregants into the street. A far higher percentage of French Muslims—80%—say they observe the fast of Ramadan and that they attend mosque regularly during this month. This 2011 INED study also maintains that the religious practices of Muslims born in France differ from first-generation immigrants. This point is notable as more time passes from the initial large waves of immigration in the mid-twentieth century (see also Lagrange 2013). A second study similarly complicates the representativeness of these controversies as common concerns among French Muslims. In it results from a 2011 IFOP poll are paired with longitudinal data from 1989 (IFOP 2011). It suggests that 41% of French Muslims consider themselves as “believers” of Islam, 22% as having “Muslim origins,” and 2% as without religion, suggesting that these respondents deem “Muslim” as a cultural rather than as a religious category. Again, the month of Ramadan appears to be an exception in terms of religious practice: 80% of those surveyed in this IFOP study said they fast, whether completely or partially, during this month. Also notable is that, in comparison with 1989 findings, this IFOP study suggests that the number of Muslims who deem themselves as “believing and practicing” (or pratiquants) has risen slightly. Compared with 37% of the French Muslim population who categorized themselves under this category in 1989, in 2011, 41% saw themselves as pratiquants. In addition, the 2011 results suggest a significant shift among young people. Compared to 1989 findings where 7% of Muslims under 25 claimed to attend mosque once a week, in 2011, 23% of young people attested to attending jumu’ah prayer. While not as dramatic, a similar climb in mosque attendance is found among all ages and both genders (generally up to 25% from 16% in 1989). Female respondents claimed Islam to be more important in their lives than men (INED 2010: 126), but most of the 25% of French Muslim Friday prayer attendees are men. The trend reported in these two studies of fewer pratiquants and more croyants is replicated among the percentage of women reporting to wear hijabs. In other words, while the number of books, commissions, and laws treating headscarves might give the

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impression that there are many practicing Muslims in France, the data suggest otherwise. The IFOP quantitative study proposes a minority percentage—26% of women of those who call themselves pratiquantes—regularly wear the hijab while only 8% of all women who self-define as Muslim and are under 35 wear hijabs on a daily basis. This percentage appears to grow with age: 30% of self-defined Muslim women who are 50 years or older wear head-coverings. This statistic does not distinguish between niqabs and hijabs. Even should we reference the higher measurement of 30%, the number of women wearing hijabs is likely less than we might expect based on the intensity and fervor of public debate. The challenge then is to gauge their importance in the face of disparate accounts (Parvez 2011; Open Society Foundations 2011). For instance, the 2010 Gerin Report that preceded the law enacting fines for women who wear niqabs and burqas suggests two figures: the first of 367 fully-veiled women across the country from a study undertaken by the DCRI (Direction centrale du renseignement intérieur for Le Figaro; see Le Figaro 2009) and the second, which is given more weight in the Gerin Report, from the Minister of the Interior, that estimates 1,900 full-face veil wearing women, of which one quarter are converts and one half live in the Ile-de-France region (Assemblée Nationale 2010: 24–9). These polling data distinguishing between pratiquants and croyants suggest that the number of Muslims who are affected by these debates as everyday practitioners may be more limited than we might expect according to media accounts, government reports, and academic analyses. The data therefore remind us that responses to the debates chronicled in this chapter may affect fewer French Muslims than first appears.

Political Representation Not a great deal is known about the political participation and representation of Muslims in France. As we will see, scholarly publications present differing accounts. On the one hand, Rahsaan Maxwell’s (2010, 2012) work analyzing voting rates among minority migrant groups correlates ethnic background (i.e. Maghrebian origins) with religiosity. Maxwell shows that non-participation in the 2004 national French elections cannot be explained by religious affiliation, but rather the neighborhoods in which voters lived. Comparing immigrants of Maghrebian and Caribbean origin with native French, Maxwell concludes that “migrant/native turnout difference is no longer statistically significant once a series of geographic variable are included in the analysis” (2010: 426). His findings suggest that more significant than religious affiliation is to appreciate how socio-economically disadvantaged areas have a lower voter turnout than more “advantaged” regions. Residence in underprivileged neighborhoods also remains an important predictor of minority unemployment (Richard 2007; Maxwell 2010). Another factor is captured by Laurence and Vaisse (2006: 199) who qualify that only half of the French Muslim population are eligible to vote, given that many are not citizens or are underage.

44   Jennifer A. Selby On the other hand, the Centre for Political Research at Sciences Politiques’ (CEVIPOF) 2011 report on the “Muslim Vote” concludes differently. The report suggests that, with the exception of the second round of voting in the 2002 victory of Jacques Chirac, since 1965, Muslim voters have played decisive roles in presidential results because these elections have been won by only a few points. Recall the Beur movement of the 1980s that reflected a significant moment of change in the perception of voice and power within the Muslim community. By the late 1980s, Leveau and Wihtol de Wenden (2001) chart an increased political and scholarly interest of an “ethnic vote.” Indeed, during the 1989 presidential elections, second-generation Maghrebis were said to be encouraged to vote collectively, as the group was perceived to have significant political power: 84% of the so-called Maghrebi population voted for François Mitterrand (Hargreaves 1998). Politically, French Muslim voters appear to vote more to the left. For instance, CEVIPOF reports that 95% of the community voted for Ségolène Royal in 2007 and only 5% for Nicolas Sarkozy (2011: 2). This suggestion was echoed in 2012. Reports claim that 2 million Muslims voted in the 2012 presidential elections, of whom 93% voted for François Hollande (Heiser 2012; Jacques 2012). Given that Hollande defeated Sarkozy by 1.1 million votes in the election, these reports suggest that the “Muslim vote” was a significant factor. Prior to the elections, media outlets chronicled imams and French Islamic associations calling upon Muslims to “do their duty as citizens and go to the polls” (Ganley 2012b: 1; Crumley 2012). In his analysis, Nick Hewlett (2012) notes that Socialist leader François Hollande’s 2012 presidential victory appears to have uncharacteristically mobilized the traditional working class, which might include Muslim voters (Barzegar 2012).8 Following Hollande’s 2012 victory, photographs posted on the inflammatory French website Observatoire de l’Islamisation showed Muslims “waving the flags of their native countries and jubilant over the defeat of Sarkozy” (Barillas 2012). Together these studies, reports, and news stories suggest that being Muslim shapes voting tendencies. Despite these studies that differently interpret the role of religiosity in voting habits and preferences, there is a paucity of work that examines Muslim political representatives (Jytte Klausen’s 2005 comparative work is a notable exception). At the time of writing, there are currently no elected Muslim members in the national legislature.9 However, even if not elected, there has been an important rise in the number of 8  Following the national elections in May 2012, President Hollande appointed Yamina Benguigui (b. 1957) (whose parents are of Algerian origin) as junior minister for French Living Abroad (Le Nouvel Observateur 2012). Previously, in the March 2008 French municipal elections, she had been elected in the XXe arrondissement to the Conseil de Paris and is known for her films on gender issues in the North African immigrant community in France. Hollande also appointed Algerian-born Kader Arif (b. 1959) as junior minister for Veteran Affairs (Le Monde 2012). These publicly visible members of government arguably reflect a shift in French politics and recognition of the lack of representation of visible minorities and women as political representatives. In 2012 there was gender parity in the cabinet for the first time in French history. 9  So-called Muslim cabinet ministers have been more prominent. Equal Opportunities Minister Azouz Begag (b. 1957) was selected by then-Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin in June 2005; he resigned in 2007 to participate in the unsuccessful presidential campaign of François Bayrou. Nicolas

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candidates who have presented themselves for elections. The 2007 national elections saw a significant increase in the number of candidates of Muslim backgrounds when compared to the national parliamentary elections in 2002. Of the approximately 7,500 candidates in each election, fewer than twelve candidates in 2002 came from minority backgrounds; the number grew to just under 250 in the 2007 election. In 2002, no minority candidates succeeded to the second round of voting, whereas eight minority candidates made the second round in 2007 (Euro-Islam n.d.). In 2011, Kenza (Kendra) Drider became the first woman wearing the voile intégral (full-face hijab) to announce her candidacy for presidency (Allen 2011; Daily Mail 2011; Nikolas 2011).

Islamophobia and Radicalism Islamophobia, “an outlook or world-view involving an unfounded dread and dislike of Muslims” (Runnymede Trust 1997; see also Cesari 2006; Allen 2010: 3; Shryock 2010), was coined in the late 1990s to express an irrational fear of Islam. It differs from racism and xenophobia because of its religion focus. Following Said (1978) and like Mamdani (2004), Orsi (2003: 171) has further recognized a commonplace post-9/11 distinction between “good Islam—which we recognized as like ourselves—and a bad distorted something else that existed in Middle Eastern lands but had nothing to do with Islam and was our enemy.” This section briefly considers scholarship examining Islamophobia in France and concludes by turning to public opinion polls. Benn and Jawad (2004) argue that the sentiment can be traced back to the 1989 Rushdie Affair and 9/11-related discrimination; however, religion-based discrimination in France can be traced to before this time. As we saw in the first section, the contemporary unemployment and socio-economic discrimination that affected first-generation Muslim male workers has at times been explained by racism and xenophobia (Lainé et al. 2005). Racism has often been cited as a chief cause of police discrimination, as reflected in the incidents which spurred suburban riots in 2005 and 2007 (Mohammed and Mucchielli 2006; Dufresne 2007). Of course, as Cesari notes, this discrimination is the culmination of “issues of poverty, ethnicity, and Islam [that] tend to be conflated, both in current political discourse and in political practice” (Cesari 2005).

Sarkozy introduced three members of Muslim background. In 2007 he appointed Algerian-Moroccan Rachida Dati (b. 1965) to the position of Justice Minister until, following some controversy, she resigned in 2009 and became mayor of Paris’s 7th district (Euro-Islam 2007). In the same year he appointed Fadela Amara (b. 1964), former leader of the suburban activist organization Ni Putes Ni Soumises (Neither Whores Nor Submissives) as Secretary of State for Urban Policies. Amara has called herself an atheist. She left this government office in 2010 and in January 2011 was named Minister for Social Affairs (Le Monde 2011b). Also noteworthy is Nagat Vallaud-Belkacem (b. 1977) who was adviser to Ségolène Royal’s 2007 presidential campaign and since 2008 has been the sixth deputy mayor of Lyon, responsible for major events, youth, and community life.

46   Jennifer A. Selby One of the most complete sources on Islamophobic incidents in France is compiled by the Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en France (CCIF, Collective Against Islamophobia in France). The CCIF was founded in October 2003 “in reaction to the essentialist presentation of a monolithic Islam in the French public sphere” (see: http://www.islamophobie.net/presentation.php). It releases annual data on Islamophobic incidents in France. The CCIF expects there are many more incidents than those reported because of the stigma or feelings of powerlessness among victims and because the organization has not yet gained widespread attention. Based on the statistics accumulated for anti-Islamic acts against individuals, the CCIF distinguishes between three types of Islamophobic actors:  within public services (mainly administration, education, and public enterprises); by private companies (mostly in the medical, commercial, and leisure sectors); and by individuals. Its 2010 report notes a continued rise in Islamophobic occurrences with 152 acts reported in 2010. Of these incidents, two figures are noteworthy: 75.6% of Islamophobic acts in the preceding year (2009) were directed toward individuals (and not institutions) and 92% were directed against women (in total, 115 of 152 acts were toward women). This finding supports sociologist Vincent Geisser’s (2010) suggestion that Islamophobia has been no more pronounced in France than in other Western European countries post-9/11. Rather, he posits that the greater impact in the post-9/11 period has been what he calls “hijabophobia,” or the rejection of the hijab (2010: 43–4). Geisser’s argument about a rise in hijabophobia is evidenced in the number of government-mandated commissions examining these issues and in the 2004 and 2011 laws that have come into practice that formally restrict hijabs in public schools and government offices and face-covering hijabs in the public sphere.10 A second more latent example of Islamophobia was apparent in the response by some French politicians following the 2005 suburban riots. Rather than considering factors of discrimination and socio-economic disenfranchisement, polygamy among the majority-Muslim population of African origin emerged in the press and in the responses of some politicians as the root cause of the tensions (Selby 2013).11 While the aforementioned long-standing tensions around immigration, unemployment, and ethnic and religious difference are likely sources to qualify the suburban unrest, in 2005 members of the leading center-right UMP party (Union for a Popular Movement—Union pour un Mouvement Populaire) as well as public intellectuals argued that the riots stemmed from a lack of parental control by polygamous families of African origin. During the curfew period, then-President Jacques Chirac similarly pointed his finger at “disintegrating” 10  Jocelyne Cesari suggests that a great deal of scholarship on Islam published in France reflects attempts to combat Islamophobia. In this discussion she explicitly cites Geisser and Lorcerie’s La Nouvelle Islamophobie (2003) (see Cesari 2009: 200). 11  Polygamy was unofficially accepted until the 1993 Pasqua law introduced a ban on residence permits for more than one spouse (Freedman 2004: 114; Costa-Lascoux 1994: 29). The estimated number of polygamists in France varies with reports ranging from 8,000–40,000 polygamous families or between 150,000 and 400,000 individuals (Institut Montaigne 2009; Oger 2005; Tribalat et al. 1996). Some of these reports suggest a proclivity for polygamy in particular banlieues (Simons 1996).

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families where parental authority had broken down. In a press conference, he instructed French parents to “fulfill their responsibilities” and keep children off the streets and away from rioting gangs (Expatica 2005). A number of other politicians like Gérard Larcher and Bernard Accoyer made similar comments (Arnold 2005; Belien 2005). Scholars have since pointed to the impact of socio-economic issues in contributing to these tensions (Cesari 2005; Mauger 2006; Moran 2012; Kepel 2012).

Radicalism Rather than a 9/11 focus, response to terrorism in France has been more focused on attacks undertaken by Algerian terrorists in 1995, most dramatically in a number of Parisian metro stations. Indeed, there are differing views as to the impact of 9/11 on the perception of Muslims and Islamophobia in France. Some qualify its impact as being more generative of differing policies than necessarily exemplifying pointed discrimination like that experienced by some Muslims in North America (Bowen 2009). Others qualify the fallout more plainly, like Marcel Maussen (2006: 7) who notes how, “In the wake of 9/11, one of the ideas to obstruct Islamic radicalism was to accelerate the incorporation of Islam in France, in order to take away feelings of rejection (especially among younger Muslims).” Recall the creation of the CFCM, as a way to foster greater belonging while creating a formal branch of the organization. The Armed Islamic Group (Groupe islamique armée, GIA) sought to bring attention to the Algerian War to specifically cut off French support for the Algerian military (Hargreaves 2007: 110). The GIA’s terrorist activities killed eight people and injured more than one hundred others. These incidents instilled fear and concern with the rise of “Islamism,” a term which quickly became shorthand for fear of terror and fundamentalist movements. In the French context, these 1995 incidents arguably had a greater immediate impact for French Muslims than 9/11. The “Mohamed Merah” incident in March 2012 has also been invoked by former President Sarkozy as an example of an Islamist threat in France, who, in his 2012 presidential platform pledged to clamp down on communities which might generate similar terrorism (Hewlett 2012: 409). Merah, a young Frenchman of Algerian origin, killed seven people, three French paratroopers, a rabbi, and three Jewish schoolchildren, and injured five others, four seriously, in Toulouse, France. Merah had a criminal record for petty crimes and claimed ties with Al-Qaeda (Ganley 2012a). France’s far-right National Front leader Marine Le Pen claimed that “Islamisation has corrupted the French culture and will change France forever, if no one acts against the influx of Muslim immigrants and the growing demands of Muslims born on French soil” (Associated Press 2012; see also Heneghan 2011). Hewlett (2012) suggests that Sarkozy’s attempt to poach votes from the far right on this issue failed, given the relative success of the National Front in the elections and his loss. For Le Pen, the Toulouse killings reflected what she claims are “whole districts [ . . .] in the grip of Islamists” and undesirable immigration (Trilling 2012). Some evidence

48   Jennifer A. Selby suggests that there was a rise in Islamophobic incidents in the wake of the Toulouse events. Laurent Mucchielli, a sociologist from France’s National Centre for Scientific Research, noted “the strong showing by the [far-right] National Front, in the recent French presidential elections” (Leduc 2012). The Collective Against Islamophobia also confirmed that the number of anti-Muslim incidents rose after the Merah killings (Leduc 2012).

Islamic Movements There has been some scholarship on radical Islamic movements in France (see Amghar 2005, 2008, 2009; Maréchal 2008; Ternisien 2011; Kepel 2004). Samir Amghar’s overview chapter of Islamic movements since the 1980s surveys a range of expressions and incidents of religious radicalism. He usefully defines Islamic radicalism as a “composite, heterogeneous movement based on the diverse projects (not always coordinated) of autonomous organisations or individuals acting alone or in small groups” (2009: 27). His six primary active groups in France include the afore mentioned Salafists, who established themselves through ex-militants of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front in the 1990s (2009: 28); the Albâch, originating in Lebanon, who settled in the country in the 1990s (2009: 31); the Tabligh, the oldest re-Islamization movement in France, founded in India and who established themselves in the late 1960s (2009: 32); Islamic nationalist radicals like the Armed Islamic Group, responsible for a series of bomb attacks in metro stations in Paris in 1995; other Islamo-nationalist jihadists like the GSPC (the Group for Call and Combat or the so-called Al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb) that have organized attacks on France from outside the country and are increasingly oriented within international networks that seek to defend the rights of Muslims (2009: 43); and lastly, secular political radicalism that Amghar links to the a-religious riots in the suburbs of large cities in 2005 (2009: 48). He includes this last category because these radicals do not refer to Islam in their actions, but are often attributed Muslimness by outside observers.

Securitization and Immigration As noted, there are differing views on the impact of 9/11 on the perception of Muslims and Islamophobia in France. Some qualify its impact as being more generative of differing policies than necessarily producing specific discriminatory laws and experiences like in North America (Bowen 2009). Marcel Maussen (2006: 7) notes how the period was generative of positive implications, as well: “In the wake of 9/11, one of the ideas to obstruct Islamic radicalism was to accelerate the incorporation of Islam in France, in order to take away feelings of rejection (especially among younger Muslims).” Recall the creation of the CFCM as a way to foster greater belonging and representation. Even if reported incidents of Islamophobia in France were not greatly impacted by 9/11, three shifts following 9/11 related to securitization laws, immigration policy, and

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police responses have impacted French Muslims. These numbers should also be contextualized: a greater number of Basques have been convicted of terrorism in France than Muslims (Cesari 2006: 27). In the first place, although its anti-terrorism framework was not impacted, a law was passed on November 15, 2001—the Law on Everyday Security—that explicitly aimed to decrease the threat of terrorism. This November 2001 law addresses domestic security, juvenile delinquency, and terrorism (see Cesari and McLoughlin 2005). More tangibly this legislation has meant that the stop and search of vehicles in the context of terrorism investigations became legal without prior court approval. The post-9/11 period did lead to more restrictive governmental positions toward immigration. This point was underscored with the 2002 presidential election results obtained by right-wing National Front leader Jean-Marie Le Pen. His upswing in popularity meant that public policy moved more generally to restrict immigration. For instance, a law related to the control of immigration was adopted on November 26, 2003. By 2004, asylum-seeking was rendered more difficult and it became easier for the French government to expel individuals from the country. Also adopted were increased penalties for illegal immigration, more temporary detention centers, and new limits on family reunification.

Policing and the Banlieues Perhaps because many of those living in suburban areas are of immigrant origin, immigration laws were tightened in response to three weeks of riots in the suburbs of Paris in November 2005. On September 18, 2007, a bill was presented to parliament with President Sarkozy’s backing that would authorize DNA testing for immigrants, and require applicants to pass language examinations and prove they can support themselves. The bill coincided with Sarkozy’s renewed promise to begin deportation of an estimated 400,000 illegal immigrants. On November 15, 2007, the French Constitutional Court threw out the article in the immigration bill that allowed for the census tracking of ethnic origins. The Court did not challenge the amendment allowing for DNA testing of immigrants, however. The 2005 riots have also been directly linked by Sarkozy to his second anti-immigration law, the “law on immigration and integration,” presented to the National Assembly in May 2006. The former President called for “selective immigration” (immigration choisie) as opposed to immigration subie (“uncontrolled/unwanted immigration”). In addition, a number of scholars have charted increased scrutiny by police of Muslim youth since 2001. Two examples highlight this feeling of scrutiny. The first, from November 2006, is that of seventy Muslim employees at the Charles de Gaulle Roissy airport who were fired because of security concerns (Smith 2006). After 9/11, security and cleaning companies working in airports and public buildings received requests from their employers to conduct background checks on their Muslim employees to ensure that none were members of terrorist networks. Some were asked to fire groups

50   Jennifer A. Selby of workers. In a speech delivered at the Sorbonne University on October 21, 2006, Sarkozy explained, “I can’t accept that people who have a radical outlook should work in an airport runway area. I prefer the risk of litigation because we have been too strict than having a tragedy on our hands because we have not been strict enough” (Mabut and Lerougetel 2006). Les mosquées de Roissy: nouvelles révélations sur l’islamisation en France (2006) by French politician Philippe de Villiers further sensationalized concerns through its claim that there are dozens of illegal mosques at Roissy airport. Subsequently, informal prayer spaces were outlawed at the airport (Spiegel Online 2006). A second example stems from the 2005 and 2007 suburban riots, where young men living in the disenfranchised suburban regions are often victims of harassment and discrimination. In late October 2005, youth riots in a number of French banlieues highlighted this police discrimination and the resulting backlash for more than three weeks created a security crisis for French authorities. Tensions with police, systemic racism, and high unemployment are not newsworthy in the banlieues of France’s urban industrial cities (see Beaud and Pialoux 2003; Wacquant 2005). Riots broke out in an eastern Parisian banlieue after two young boys were accidentally fatally electrocuted; a third young man, aged 21, suffered severe burns. Midway through an afternoon pick-up football match, the three adolescents took refuge in an electricity substation believing they were being chased by police responding to a call about a break-in in a nearby barracks. All three were children of immigrants from North Africa who lived in a suburban cité (social housing project) in Clichy-sous-Bois (population approximately 29,000). Despite the relative frequency of police–youth altercations like these,12 with the initially unacknowledged accidental deaths and with Sarkozy’s suggestion that the suburbs’ resident “scum” needed to be “hosed down” (Maddox 2005), for some twenty-one days young male banlieusards railed against police and their environs in what were the worst civil riots since 1968. The deaths of the young men by electrocution, the relative silence of police, a rarely-imposed curfew, and the aforementioned Islamophobic comments of government officials were among the many factors which contributed to the three-week social unrest in the outskirts of Paris (Selby 2013). While a number of “hijabophobic” incidents, as well as responses to Islamophobic-fueled concerns at the Roissy airport and to the suburban riots, are notable, there is some indication of a range of public opinion on these matters. The results of a December 2010 IFOP (Dabi and Fourquet 2010) study reveal that 42% of respondents believed that the Muslim population of France was a threat to the identity of the country. A greater percentage, 68%, believed that the Muslim population of France was not well integrated into French society. Fifty-nine percent said they were opposed to the wearing of the headscarf. While these positions do not necessarily translate to Islamophobia, they speak to a common climate of hostility toward Muslims in France. 12  The city of Marseille, which has a large Muslim population (a 2013 La Croix article estimates 200,000), did not experience similar riots in 2005 and 2007, some suggest because of its geographic distribution of space, which encourages a certain level of mixing (Laurence 2012; for a more nuanced historicized account of Marseille’s Muslim population, see Cesari 2001).

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Conclusion This overview has highlighted the evolving positions and statuses of Muslims in France. I have emphasized elements that have impacted this religious group in broad strokes. Muslim communities in France have shifted from a once mostly-masculine first-generation group to a heterogeneous population with a variety of practices, backgrounds, and socio-economic levels. A number of factors condition the experiences of individual Muslims in France: the Republican laïque context that facilitates and hinders certain kinds of religious expressions and the collection of religiously based demographic information; the institutionalization of government representatives and practices; and a context where fears and notions of radical Islamism and Islamophobia shape the possibilities of Muslims as full members of French society. The foci of academic investigation have also changed since the early twentieth century. Scholarship has moved from a sociology of immigration and social movements that did not focus on the religious backgrounds of those under examination, to a tremendous convergence on the tradition in the 1980s that has examined religious practices, religious dress, as well as the political expressions of Muslims in secular France. In this chapter I have also noted fields of study that have been granted less attention, like political participation, and the religiosity of Muslims of all ages and both genders; men have been studied far less than women. A  last notable largely unexplored topic is the interpretation of shariah (Islamic law) by Muslims in France at times of marriage, divorce, for the custody of children, and in finances, among other moments. For instance, how often is a fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) for minorities (fiqh al-aqalliyyat al-muslima) dispensed? These chronologies and changing scholarship underscore how experiences of Islam in France are ever-changing.

Acknowledgment Thanks to Terry Riche for his bibliographic assistance and to Jocelyne Cesari for her useful suggestions.

References Adida, C., Laitin, D., and Valfort, M. 2010. Les Français musulmans sont-ils discriminés dans leur propre pays? Une étude expérimentale sur le marché du travail [pdf]. French-American Foundation—United States [online]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Agence France-Presse. 2009. 367 femmes portent la burqa en France. Le Figaro, July 29 [online]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012].

52   Jennifer A. Selby Agence France-Presse. 2010a. 500 cimetières dégradés en 9 mois. Le Figaro, November 2 [online]. Available at: [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Agence France-Presse. 2010b. Entre 5 et 6 millions de musulmans en France. Le Point, June 28 [online]. Available at: [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Agence France-Presse. 2011a. Douai:  maillot islamique interdit. Le Figaro, July 7 [online]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Agence France-Presse. 2011b. France:  41% des musulmans pratiquants. Le Figaro, May 13 [online]. Available at: [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Agence France-Presse. 2011c. Multiculturalism “clearly” a failure: Sarkozy. National Post, February 10 [online]. Available at: [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Agence France-Presse. 2011d. Plus de 100 mosquées “en construction.” Le Figaro, July 2 [online]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Alba, R. and Silberman, R. 2002. Decolonization Immigrations and the Social Origins of the Second Generation. International Migration Review 36(4): 1169–93. Allen, C. 2010. Islamophobia. Farnham: Ashgate. Allen, P. 2011. As France issues first fines, burka rebel says:  I’ll stand for president. Daily Mail, September 23 [online]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Amghar, S. 2005. Les salafistes français: une nouvelle aristocratie religieuse? Maghreb-Machrek 185 (Spring): 13–31. Amghar, S. 2008. Le salafisme en France: de l’instauration de l’Etat islamique à la révolution conservatrice. Critique internationale 42 (September–October): 95–113. Amghar, S. 2009. Ideological and Theorical Foundations of Muslim Radicalism in France. In M. Emerson, ed., Ethno-Religious Conflict in Europe: Typologies of Radicalisation in Europe’s Muslim Communities. Brussels: Ceps, 27–50. Amghar, S. 2011. Le salafisme d’aujourd’hui:  mouvements sectaires en occident. Paris: Michalon. Amiraux, V. 2003a. CFCM: A French Touch? ISIM Newsletter 12(1): 24–5. Amiraux, V. 2003b. Discours Voilés sur les Musulmanes en Europe: Comment les Musulmans sont-ils Devenus des Musulmanes? Social Compass 50 (March): 85–96. Amiraux, A. 2007. The Headscarf Question:  What is Really the Issue? In S. Amghar, A. Boubekeur, and M. Emerson, eds., European Islam: Challenges for Public Policy and Society. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 124–43. Amrani, Y. and Beaud, S. 2004. Pays de malheur! Un jeune de cité écrit à un sociologue. Paris: La Découverte. Arnold, M. 2005. French Minister Says Polygamy is to Blame for Riots. Financial Times, November 15. Assemblée Nationale. 1905. Projet de loi relative à la séparation des eglises et de l’etat [pdf]. Assemblée Nationale. Available at: [Accessed December 9, 2012].

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Assemblée Nationale. 2010. Gerin Commission Report [pdf]. Assemblée Nationale. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Associated Press. 2012. French Muslims worry over fallout from Mohamed Merah. Metro News, March 22 [online]. Available at: [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Bachman, C. and Basier, L. 1984. Le Verlan:  Argot d’École ou Langue de Keums? Mots 8(1): 169–87. Barillas, M. 2012. François Hollande: the first Muslim president of France. Spero News, May 17 [online]. Available at [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Barzegar, K. 2012. “Fed up” French Muslims mobilize to unseat Sarkozy. Washington Times, April 19 [online]. Available at: [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Baubérot, J. 1990. Vers un Nouveau Pacte Laïque? Paris: Éditions du Seuil. Baubérot, J. 1998. La laïcité française et ses mutations. Social Compass 45(1): 175–87. Baubérot, J. 2003. Editorial. Libération, December 15: 39. Beaud, S. and Pialoux, M. 2003. Violences urbaines, violence sociale: genèse des nouvelles classes dangereuses. Paris: Fayard. Begag, A. and Delorme, C., 1994. Quartiers Sensibles. Paris: Seuil. Belghiti, L. 2009. Strasbourg donne le jour à un cimetière musulman. Sapphirnews, October 8 [online]. Available at: [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Belien, P. 2005. Too Many Wives Causes Unrest. The Brussels Journal, November 16. Benn, T. and Jawad, H. 2004. Muslim Women in the United Kingdom and Beyond: Experiences and Images. Brill. Biedermann, F. 2011. Bardot group campaigns against halal animal slaughter. The National, January 10 [online]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Blackler, F. 2010. La polémique sur le halal est-elle dépassée? Libération, March 3 [online]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Blitz, J. 2010. Poll Shows Support in Europe for Burka Ban, The Financial Times, March 1 [online]. Available at:  [Accessed July 4, 2011]. Bloul, R. 1996. Engendering Muslim Identities: Deterritorialization and the Ethnicization Process in France. In B. D. Jones, ed., Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe. Berkeley: University of California Press, 234–50. Borrel, C. and Simon, P. 2005. Les origines des Français. In C. Lefèvre and A. Filhon, eds., Histoires de famille, histoires familiales. Paris: INED-PUF, 425–41. Bowen, J. R. 2004a. Does French Islam Have Borders? Dilemmas of Domestication in a Global Religious Field. American Anthropologist, 106(1): 43–55. Bowen, J.  R. 2004b. Muslims and Citizens: France’s Headscarf Controversy, Boston Review:  A  Political and Literary Forum [online]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Bowen, J. R. 2007. Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space. Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press. Bowen, J.  R. 2009. Recognising Islam in France after 9/11. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 3(3): 439–52.

54   Jennifer A. Selby Bowen, J.  R. 2010. Can Islam Be French? Pluralism and Pragmatism in a Secularist State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Boyer, A. 1998. L’islam en France. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Bracke, S. and Fadil, N. 2012. Is the Headscarf Oppressive of Emancipatory? Field Notes on the Gendrification of the “Multicultural Debate.” Religion and Gender 2(1): 36–56. Bréchon, P. and Mitra S. K. 1992. The National Front in France: The Emergence of an Extreme Right Protest Movement. Comparative Politics 25(1): 63–82. Brochen, P. 2010. Au Quick de Montreuil: “Quoi? J’ai mangé halal?” Libération, September 2 [online]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Brulard, I. 1997. Laïcité and Islam. In S. Perry, ed., Aspects of Contemporary France. London and New York: Routledge, 175–90. Cabana, A. 2011. Laïcité, le débat qui scinde l’UMP en deux. Le Point, April 6 [online]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Caeiro, A. 2003. Debating Fatwas in the Cyberspace: The Construction of Islamic Authority in Four Francophone Muslims Internet Forums. Sacred Media—Transforming Traditions in the Interplay of Religion and the Media [online]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Caeiro, A. 2005a. Religious Authorities or Political Actors? The Muslim Leaders of the French Representative Body of Islam. In J. Cesari and S. McLoughlin, eds., European Muslims and the Secular State. Aldershot: Ashgate, 71–84. Caeiro, A. 2005b. An Imam in France: Tareq Oubrou. ISIM Review 15: 48. Cesari, J. 1998. Musulmans et républicains:  Les jeunes, l’islam et la France. Paris:  Éditions Complexe. Cesari, J. 2001. Identité religieuse et territoire marseillais. In J. Cesari, A. Moreau, and A. Schleyer-Lindenmann, eds., Plus marseillais que moi, tu meurs! Migrations, identités et territoires à Marseille. Paris: L’Harmattan, 123–72. Cesari, J. 2005. Ethnicity, Islam, and les banlieues: Confusing the Issues [online]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Cesari, J. 2006. Muslims in Western Europe After 9/11: Why the term Islamophobia is more a predicament than an explanation. Challenge Liberty and Security [online]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Cesari, J. 2009. Islam in the West: From Immigration to Global Islam. Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review 8: 148–75. Cesari, J. and McLoughlin, S. eds. 2005. European Muslims and the Secular State. Burlington: Ashgate. CEVIPOF. 2011. Les électorats sociologiques: Le vote des musulmans. Centre de recherches politiques, No. 5 (December) [online]. Available at: [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Chevalérias, A. 2008. La menace du communautarisme, Le terrorisme depuis le 11 septembre 2001 [online]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Collège Lycée Réussite. 2011. Premier établissement privé musulman d’enseignement secondaire. Collège Lycée Réussite [online]. Available at: [Accessed December 9, 2012].

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Costa-Lascoux, J. 1994. Les lois “Pasqua”: une nouvelle politique de l’immigration? Regards sur l’actualité 199 (March): 19–43. Couvreur, G. 1998. Musulmans de France: diversité, mutations et perspectives de l’islam français. Paris: Éditions de l’Atelier. Crumley, B. 2011a. French Muslims Confused Over Halal Restrictions. Time World [online]. Available at: 

[Accessed December 9, 2012]. Crumley, B. 2012. Fact-Checking: Sarkozy’s Campaign for the French Anti-Muslim Vote, Time World [online]. Available at: [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Dabi, F. and Fourquet, J. 2010. Comparative survey France/Germany on Islam [pdf]. Institut Français d’Opinion Publique. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Dargent, C. 2003. Les Musulmans declarés en France: affirmation religieuse, subordination sociale et progressisme politique, vol. 34. Paris: Cahiers du CEVIPOF. Dayan-Herzbrun, S. 2000. The Issue of the Islamic Headscarf. In J. Freedman and C. Tarr, eds., Women, Immigration and Identities in France. Oxford and New York: Berg, 69–84. Débat Halal. 2011. Saphirnews à la rescousse de ses annonceurs. Débat Halal [blog], July 12. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Dufresne, D. 2007. Maintien de l`ordre: Enquête. Paris: Éditions Hachette Littératures. Euro-Islam. n.d. Islam in France. Euro-Islam [online]. Available at: [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Euro-Islam. 2007. President Sarkozy appoints his former spokeswoman Rachida Dati to justice ministry. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Euro-Islam. 2009a. First Bricks Laid for Marseille Mosque, France’s Largest Mosque. Euro-Islam [online]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Euro-Islam. 2009b. Le Bourget, Europe’s largest and most popular Muslim convention, opens outside Paris. Euro-Islam [online]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Expatica. 2005. Chirac points finger at parents of rioters. Expatica [online]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Fausto, G. 1992. Arabicides. Paris: La Découverte. Favell, A. 1998. Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Fernando, M. L. 2010. Reconfiguring Freedom: Muslim Piety and the Limits of Secular Law and Public Discourse in France. American Ethnologist 37(1): 19–35. Fetzer, J. S. and Sopher, J. C. 2005. Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fourest, C. 2004. Frère Tariq: Discours, stratégie et méthode de Tariq Ramadan. Paris: Grasset et Fasquelle. Freedman, F. 2004. Immigration and Insecurity in France. Aldershot: Ashgate.

56   Jennifer A. Selby Frégosi, F. 1998. Les problèmes d’organisation de la religion musulmane en France. Esprit 239(1): 109–36. Frégosi, F. 2004. L’Imam, le conférencier et le jurisconsulte: Retour sur trois figures contemporaines du champ religieux islamique en France. Archives de sciences sociales des religions 125 (Jan.–Mar.): 131–46. Frégosi, F. 2011. L’islam dans la laïcité. Paris: Pluriel. Gabizon, C. 2009. Les Français de plus en plus hostile aux mosquées. Le Figaro (December 3, 2009) [online]. Available at: [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Galaud, F. 2011. Laïcité: Copé reproche à Fillon de ne pas «jouer collectif». Le Figaro, March 28 [online]. Available at: [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Ganley, E. 2012a. Le Pen says anti-Islam agenda is vindicated. Irish Examiner, March 23 [online]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Ganley, E. 2012b. French Muslims get call to vote for president. Al Arabiya News, May 1 [online]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Gaspard, F. and Khosrokhavar, F. 1995. Le Foulard et la République. Paris: La Découverte. Gauchet, M. 1998. La Religion dans la Démocratie:  Parcours de la Laïcité. Paris:  Éditions Gallimard. Gauthier, A. 2012. Le salafisme, c’est quoi? TF1, March 21 [online]. Available at: http://lci.tf1.fr/ france/societe/le-salafisme-c-est-quoi-7082347.html [Accessed March 22, 2013]. Geisser, V. 2010. Islamophobia: A French Specificity in Europe? Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self Knowledge 8(2): 39–46. Gourévitch, J. 2008. Le coût réel de l’immigration en France. Les Monographies de Contribuables Associés [online]. Available at: [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Guénif-Souilamas, N. 2000. Des Beurettes. Paris: Éditions Grasset et Fasquelle. Hargreaves, A. G. 1998. The Beurgeoisie: médiation or mirage? Journal of European Studies 28(1): 89–102. Hargreaves, A.  G. 2007. Multi-Ethnic France:  Immigration, Politics, Culture and Society. New York and London: Routledge. Harris Interactive. 2006. The French take the most supportive stance toward immigration within their country whilst the British take the least supportive stance. Rochester, NY and London: Harris Interactive [online]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Heiser, J. 2012. French Muslims Overwhelmingly Supported Socialist. The New American, May 10 [online]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Heneghan, T. 2007. France fires official for opposing Muslim school. Reuters, March 21 [online]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012].

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Heneghan, T. 2011. Islam emerges as campaign issue in French local polls. Reuters, March 25 [online]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Hewlett, N. 2012. Voting in the Shadow of the Crisis: The French Presidential and Parliamentary Elections of 2012. Modern and Contemporary France 20(4): 403–20. Husson, J. 2007. Training imams in Europe: the current status [pdf]. King Baudouin Foundation. Available at: [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Innovative Minds. 2004. Protest French Hijab Ban. Innovative Minds [online]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Institut Français d’Opinion Publique. 2007. Minorités Visibles Versus Majorité Invisible: Promotion de la Diversité ou de la Diversion? Migrations Société 19 (May–Aug.): 5–15. Institut Français d’Opinion Publique. 2009. Les Français et la construction des mosquées et des minarets en France [pdf]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Institut Français d’Opinion Publique. 2010. La réaction des français aux déclarations de Marine Le Pen du 10 décembre 2010 [online]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Institut Français d’Opinion Publique. 2011a. Les pratiques religieuses chez les musulmans [pdf]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Institut Français d’Opinion Publique. 2011b. Enquête sur l’implantation et l’évolution de l’Islam en France [pdf]. Available at:  [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Institut Montaigne. 2009. La Polygamie en France:  une fatalité? Report by Sonia Imloul (November) [online]. Available at:  . [Accessed December 9, 2012]. Institut national d’études démographiques. 2010. TeO: Enquête sur la diversité des populations en France [online]. Available at: ), a three-year project funded under the Socio-Economic Sciences & Humanities Programme of DG Research of the European Commission’s Seventh Framework Research Programme. I am grateful to Preet Kaur Virdi from Queen Mary College/University of London for her most valuable remarks and language editing. 1 

Cf. . 2  Cf. the website . 3  Cf. the report in Trouw, December 22, 2010, available at . 4  For European movements of political Islam cf. only Laurence 2012: 70–104. 5  Cf. Rowan Williams, “Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective,” available at ; John Milbank, “The Archbishop of Canterbury: The Man

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to Germany.6 She has similarly responded to widespread irritation in the German public by saying that “the measure for integration is the Basic Law (German constitution) rather than shariah, Islamic law.”7 According to representative polls conducted in Germany in 2012,8 only 22% condoned Wulff ’s statement, whereas 64% objected. The public climate has become unfavorable even to academic debate on these issues. The author was repeatedly accused by the prominent feminist journalist Alice Schwarzer9 and the Turkish author Necla Kelek10 of promoting the replacement of German legal order by shariah, simply because he informs the public about the existing German legal order with respect to the treatment of Islamic norms. Acceptance or rejection11 of shariah has consequently become one of the most heated debates in European public discourse, involving not only non-Muslims, but also a considerable number of Muslims12 including some Muslim activists and “ex-Muslims,” like Magdi Allam13 or Necla Kelek,14 who are among the fiercest critics of any kind of visible

and the Theology Behind the Shari’a lecture,” in Ahdar and Aroney 2010, 43–57; Jean-François Gaudreault-Desbiens, “Religious Courts’ Recognition Claims: Two Qualitatively Distinct Narratives,” in Ahdar and Aroney 2010, 59–69. 6 

Cf. “Wulff: Islam gehört zu Deutschland,” Der Tagesspiegel, October 3, 2010. Cf. “Merkel verteidigt Wulff,” Sueddeutsche Zeitung, October 6, 2010, p. 6. 8  Cf. “Die Furcht vor dem Morgenland im Abendland,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) November 11, 2012, p. 10 (polls conducted by the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach for the newspaper). 9  Cf. Patrick Bahners, Die Panikmacher. Die deutsche Angst vor dem Islam (München: C. H. Beck, 2011), 233–51, and the statement of the author, available at . 10  Cf. “Das ist Kulturrelativismus,” FAZ, February 15, 2011(available at ) and the reaction of the author in “Das ist Rechtskulturrelativismus,” FAZ, February 22, 2011 (available at ). 11  Cf. Jocelyne Cesari, “Shari’a and the Future of Secular Europe,” in Cesari (2010: 145): “shari’a law, perhaps more than any other aspect of Islam, is perceived as a threat to Western culture.” 12  For Germany cf. the representative study of the Ministry of the Interior from 2007, Muslime in Deutschland (by Katrin Brettfeld and Peter Wetzels), p. 389: 72.9% rejected the idea of shariah influence on the existing laws in Germany, and 64.9% rejected it regarding the laws of the country of origin. The study is available at . Brigitte Schepelern Johansen and Riem Spielhaus rightly criticize the study (mapping a decade’s production of surveys and polls among Muslims in Europe, in a paper presented at the workshop “Quantifying the Muslim,” November 2–4, 2011 in Copenhagen, to be published in the Journal of Muslims in Europe), since the evaluation of the questions related to shariah follows a generally negative pre-understanding of shariah, reducing it to its critical legal parts. 13  He is an Italian Muslim convert to Christianity from Egyptian origin who gained public attraction by the public baptism performed by Pope Benedikt XVI in 2008. 14  She is a sociologist living in Germany. After initially having scientifically worked on Islamic religiosity in the daily life of pupils in Germany of Turkish origin, she has now shifted to strong emotional views against Islam and its culture, generalizing her personal negative experiences to an extent which is untenable from a scientific perspective (cf. Bahners, n. 10, pp. 131–74; Klaus Bade, Kritik und Gewalt (Schwalbach: Wochenschau Verlag 2013), pp. 147 ss. in particular). Thus, she has become an “authentic” chief witness for Islamophobic groups and politicians (cf. only the repeated reports on the fiercely Islamophobic German weblog “politically incorrect”). 7 

658   Mathias Rohe Muslim religious presence in the European public space. But what are people talking about when demanding or rejecting the application of shariah rules in Europe?

What is Shariah? Shariah, in the narrow understanding as “Islamic law,” is broadly perceived in Europe not only among non-Muslims (cf. below) to be the opposite of secular legal orders. This is wrong for two reasons. First, this understanding does not capture the full scope of shariah rules. To a large extent, shariah contains religious norms regarding doctrine and rite, which fall under freedom of religion granted by European legal orders. Second, even if perceived in a narrow legal sense, there are broad fields of shariah norms that are in full accordance with European legal convictions, in the fields of civil contract, tort, and economic law, for example. Moreover, in sensitive areas, like family law, where traditional shariah interpretations are in conflict with European legal requirements regarding gender equality, freedom of religion, and equality of religions and beliefs,15 some modern interpretations (e.g. Tunisian family law since 1956) have overcome such obstacles to a vast extent. Thus, it is a primary objective to clarify the different perceptions of the term “shariah law” among Muslims themselves as well as within the broader European public. In a literal sense, as well as according to the Qur’an Surah 45: 18, the term shariah means “the path which has been prepared, the divinely appointed path.” Technically, there are two current definitions that are notably different and thus often cause misunderstanding. Broadly speaking, “shariah” refers to any religious and legal rule prescribed by Islam, including those that address fulfilling the duties of worship and charitable giving, as well as those that regulate contract, family, and penal law. It includes not only the field of norms (furuʿ, the “branches”), but also a system of finding and interpreting the shariah sources like the Qur’an, the Sunna of the prophet of Islam Muhammad, and the other “minor” sources developed by scholars over the centuries (usul, the “roots”).16 Irrespective of the claim to be a “God-given” set of norms, this broad interpretation of shariah provides a flexible system of norms, where the interpretation strongly relies on the circumstances of time and space. It remains the responsibility of human beings to interpret and apply these norms. Plural interpretations within and among the schools of “law” (ikhtilaf al-madhahib) are the backbone of Islamic normativity, supported by a Hadith saying that “Dispute in my community is a grace.”17 Thus, on the basis of shariah, legal work rooted in the Islamic tradition has resulted in interpretations fundamentally

15  For details cf. Wael Hallaq, Sharī’a: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 271–85; Rohe (2011: 351–68 in particular). 16  Cf. only Hallaq (n. 15), 72–124 in particular; Rohe 2011: 9–18, 43–73 in particular. 17  Cf. the article “Ikhtilaf,” Encyclopedia of Islam II, vol. 3 (Leiden and London: Brill, 1986) (by J. Schacht), p. 1061 s. The hadith might be apocryphal, but it is constantly used in the normative debate on pluralism.

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contradicting each other. For example, polygamy is allowed, often under certain restrictions, in most countries following shariah rules. In Tunisia, polygamy was abolished in 1956 according to a new interpretation of conflicting Qur’anic provisions. The key to this pluralism of interpretations is the principle of ijtihad, which means own individual or collective reasoning in dealing with the sources instead of simply adopting the views of scholars of the past (taqlid). In Europe, however, most non-Muslims as well as many Muslims,18 understand “shariah” in a narrower sense that is limited to legal norms that regulate personal status and family relations, inheritance, and sometimes corporal punishment. While the application of rules concerning the broader interpretation of shariah (prayer, fasting, etc.) usually does not conflict with secular European laws and norms, the application of shariah in the narrower sense can lead to conflict. In matters of personal status and inheritance, shariah law in its traditional interpretations maintained in many Islamic states, discriminates between the sexes and religions. The distribution of rights and duties between spouses and within the family follows patriarchal schemes often similar to European family norms until the recent past. Concerning inter-religious legal relations, Islamic law stipulates that it supersedes laws of other religions. It also prohibits inter-religious marriage to a certain extent.19 Such provisions are in conflict with contemporary European laws following the human rights standards recognizing equality of sexes and religions. This can also be said regarding the draconic forms of corporal punishment of certain offenses that are practiced in a number of Muslim countries.20 Despite the variety of interpretations, the perception of shariah law as in total contrast to European secular legal orders that respect and promote human rights is visible in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).21 This becomes clear in the court’s short statement in a decision dating from 2003,22 which inter alia had to deal with the dissolution of the Turkish Refah partisi led by Necmettin Erbakan. This party was suspected of promoting the interests of political Islam relying on shariah principles against the constitutional principle of laïcism: The court concurs in the Chamber’s view that sharia is incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy [. . .]. Like the Constitutional Court (sc.: of Turkey), the court considers that sharia, which faithfully reflects the dogmas and divine 18  This understanding can be found among Muslims of Turkish origin in particular, since the law reforms under Atatürk explicitly aimed at replacing the “outdated” shariah laws concerning these fields of law. 19  Cf. e.g. Rohe (2011), pp. 82 s. 20  Cf. e.g. Rudolph Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 53 ss., 142 ss. 21  Cf. the arguing in Refah Partisi and others, “Turkey,” February 13, 2003 (RJD 2003-II, p. 306) (an English version is available at ); this is a deficit recognized by some judges of the court as well in an informal exchange with the author. 22  ECHR in Refah Partisi and others, “Turkey,” February 13, 2003 (RJD 2003-II, p. 306 n. 15). Cf. Rex Ahdar and Nicholas Aroney, “The Topography of Shari’a in the Western Political Landscape,” in Ahdar and Aroney 2010, pp. 1, 21–3.

660   Mathias Rohe rules laid down by religion, is stable and invariable. Principles such as pluralism in the political sphere or the constant evolution of public freedoms have no place in it. [. . .] It is difficult to declare one’s respect for democracy and human rights while at the same time supporting a regime based on sharia, which clearly diverges from Convention values, particularly with regard to its criminal law and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women and the way it intervenes in all spheres of private and public life [. . .].

This is not the place to decide whether the Turkish Refah Partisi had in fact promoted the implementation of traditional shariah law, which would indeed contradict the Convention. It is only problematic that no specific research was done on the concrete interpretation of shariah. Far beyond European courts, there is widespread fear in Europe—sometimes fueled by Islamophobic parties, organizations, individuals,23 and media—that Muslims may introduce such norms within their own communities on the continent.

European Perceptions of Shariah Some Muslim groups and individuals24 have repeatedly suggested or demanded the introduction of shariah into the European legal context.25 Such debate first arose in Britain in the 1980s and subsequently spread to other European countries in recent years. In general, these discussions mostly lack clarity. If Muslims are simply asked about their opinion on “shariah in the West,” it is unclear whether they consider the religious commands and rites (falling under freedom of religion), or whether they wish Islamic legal rules to be applied to an extent beyond the framework of the law of the land.26 It is in the latter case where possible conflict arises. An example of such simplifying approaches is a poll taken of 500 British Muslims in 2006, in which 40% of respondents supported the introduction of shariah law there.27 Given that some aspects of Islamic law contradict the principles of the prevailing secular legal order (see the previous section), the broader British public has roundly and soundly rejected the idea of implementing shariah norms in the British context without distinguishing between the aspects in conformity with the

23  Cf. the contributions in the volume Thorsten Schneiders (ed.), Islamfeindlichkeit. Wenn die Grenzen der Kritik verschwimmen, 2nd edn. (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010). 24  Cf. e.g. the book of the Muslim extremist Sālim Ibn, ‛Abd al-Ghanī al-Rāfi‛ī, ahkām al-ahwāl al-šakhsīya li-l-muslimīn fī l-gharb (Riyadh 2001). 25  For the Union of Muslim Organisations of Britain and Eire cf. Sebastian Poulter, “The Claim to a Separate Islamic System of Personal Law for British Muslims,” in Chibli Mallat and Jane Connors (eds.), Islamic Family Law (London: Graham and Trotman, reprint 1993), pp. 147 ss. 26  For a variety of understandings and the possible distortion of results on generalizing poll questions cf. only John Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think (New York: Gallup Press, 2007), pp. 52–5. 27  Available at (p. 14).

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law of the land and otherwise. In fact, it is far from clear what the desire to apply shariah norms seeks to achieve: Is it practicing religious rites or establishing a religious infrastructure, which is protected under the principle of freedom of religion? Is it the replacement of the existing legal order, with respect to family issues, criminal cases, or state organization? Or is it something in between, where the law of the land prevails as long as individual choice is protected? While a number of studies covering Islamic and Europe countries have been conducted in the last decade,28 there is little concrete information available on the specific attitudes of Muslims towards the legal aspects of shariah in European continental countries.29 Many polls and surveys were initiated from the angle of security interests and the perceived Muslim threat. In addition, the category of “Muslim” is far from being clear; religious aspects are combined with ethnicity or other factors concerning migration issues.30 Moreover, it is mostly Muslims living in big cities who are interviewed and taken as representative of the whole Muslim population. Correlations in answers are sometimes simply equated to causation. Thus, little reliable data has been published. Concerning state organization (secular democracy under the rule of law), there are polls indicating a high degree of confidence in state institutions among European Muslims.31 Only in Austria were concrete questions on shariah law-related issues raised in fully published representative polls conducted by the Ministry of the Interior and a commercial enterprise conducting polls (Gfk Austria) in 2009. According to them, 50% of Turkish Muslims and those having Turkish family roots condoned the application of shariah rules in family and inheritance matters while 22% rejected that and 16% wanted

28  Cf. the survey by the Pew Research Center on “The World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity,” published on August 9, 2012 based on more than 38,000 face-to-face interviews with Muslims in 39 countries, available at ; no questions relating to legal provisions were implemented; 50,000 interviews have been conducted earlier by Gallup; cf. Esposito and Mogahed (n. 26). Cf. also the evaluation of 50 quantitative surveys and polls concerning Muslims taken in Europe since 2000 by Riem Spielhaus, “Measuring the Muslim: About Statistical Obsessions, Categorisations and the Quantification of Religion,” Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, vol. 3 (2011): 695–715; cf. also Brigitte Johansen and Riem Spielhaus, “Counting Deviance: Revisiting a Decade’s Production of Surveys among Muslims in Western Europe,” Journal of Muslims in Europe 1 (2012): 81–112. 29  According to Johansen and Spielhaus (n. 28), p. 104, the main themes covered integration, belonging and identity, radicalization and security, religiosity and religious practice, political and civil participation, gender and sexuality, but only a few questions related directly to shariah rules as a topic. 30  Cf. only Stefano Allievi, “How the Immigrant has Become Muslim: Public Debates on Islam in Europe,” Revue européenne des migrations internationales 21/2 (2005): 1–23; Riem Spielhaus (n. 29), pp. 698–702, 709–12 in particular; Johansen and Spielhaus (n. 29), pp. 87–103 in particular. 31  According to a Gallup polling in 2006/2007 among more than 3,600 Muslims in Britain, France, and Germany, the confidence of Muslims in the democratic institutions of the respective country of residence equates or even overrides the average of the population, cf. the summary report “Muslims in Europe: Basis for Greater Understanding Already Exists” (April 30, 2007), available at . Cf. also Cesari (2010) (n. 11), p. 146.

662   Mathias Rohe to differentiate with regard to the respective rules of Islamic law. The “religious”32 group among them supported the measure by 62%, but also within the “secular” group a relative majority of 42% was in favor of this, opposed by 32%.33 The most decisive factor here was access to German language and education: the lower the language knowledge and educational level, the higher the support for Islamic law.34 On the other hand, research among Muslim women in Europe indicates that a considerable number of them prefer the application of European family laws rather than shariah-inspired laws of their country of origin,35 since the former alone grant equal rights in these matters. The application of the latter is thus perceived as an injustice.36 Consequently, Moroccan attempts to enter into bilateral agreements on the applicability of family law in Dutch–Moroccan cases with the Netherlands failed, not least due to strong opposition among Moroccan women living in the Netherlands who feared losing access to the gender-neutral Dutch family law.37 Further concrete quantitative research is more than desirable in this field. While little specific information on Muslim attitudes towards concrete shariah law provisions is available, shariah in general is heavily rejected among the broad European public—including a considerable number of Muslims themselves. Since mistrust towards “Islam” in general is widespread in Europe, shariah as an integral part of it shares the same fate. Explicitly anti-Islamic political parties have gained considerable ground in several European countries within the last two decades, where they are represented in parliaments, such as the Fremskrittsparti in Norway, the Sverigedemokraterna in Sweden, the Dansk Folkeparti (DF) in Denmark, the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PvV) in the Netherlands, the Vlaams Belang in Belgium, the Mouvement National Républicain (MNR) in France, the Schweizer Volkspartei (SVP) in Switzerland, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) in Austria, the Lega Nord in Italy, and the Jobbik Party in Hungary.38 Some of these parties even have partly influenced governments. According to representative polls in several European states published in 2010, nearly half of the 32  Cf. Peter A. Ulram, Integration in Österreich. Einstellungen, Orientierungen, und Erfahrungen von MigrantInnen und Angehörigen der Mehrheitsbevölkerung (2009), pp. 18, 45: the definition of “religious” covers Muslims for whom their religious norms are more important than Austrian law, whereas the “secular” Muslims prefer the latter. These definitions are not totally clear, since the two subgroups of “moderate religious political” Muslims, who put religious norms in the foreground, but do not want them to be implemented into state legislation, are mixed with the “religious-political integralists,” who wish also the latter (p. 45). 508 Muslims were interviewed, a number which is taken to be representative for Austrian Muslims of Turkish origin (Ulram, n. 3, p. 12). 33 Ulram (n. 32), p. 47. 34 Ulram (n. 32), p. 44 in particular. 35  Cf. Edwige Rude-Antoine, “La coexistence des systèmes juridiques différents en France: l’example du droit familial,” in Kahn 2001, pp. 147, 159. 36  Cf. Marie-Claire Foblets, “Le statut personnel musulman devant les tribunaux en Europe: une reconnaissance conditionelle,” in Kahn 2001, pp. 33, 52. 37  Cf. Leila Jordens-Cotran, “Application of the Law of Nationality and the Right to Respect the Identity of Minorities,” in Austrian Association for the Middle East Hammer-Purgstall 2009, pp. 58 s. 38  The policies of some of these parties are analyzed by Hans-Georg Betz and Susi Meret, “Revisiting Lepanto: The Political Mobilization against Islam in Contemporary Western Europe,” in Maleiha Malik 2010, pp. 104–25.

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population believes that there are too many Muslims in their country, and similar numbers consider Islam to be “a religion of intolerance” and support the idea that “Muslim views on women contradict our values.”39 Unequal treatment of the sexes40 and religions/beliefs according to traditional shariah interpretations are the most criticized phenomena regarding shariah regulations; other interpretations are simply neglected. Furthermore, there is a widespread reluctance in European societies as a whole to accept religiously founded norms in secular states apart from those rooted in Christianity. According to representative polls in France in October 2012, 43% of the French regard Muslims as a threat to their national identity, whereas only 17% perceive the Muslim community as an enrichment. Sixty percent (as compared to 55% two years before) said that Islam is too important regarding its influence and visibility in the country.41 Muslim extremist groups, such as Sharia4UK42, Hizb al-Tahrir,43 or Khilavet Devleti44—many of them based in the UK—or individuals, such as Abdul Ghaffar El Almani alias Eric Breininger,45 indeed propagate shariah to be the only valid normative order for Muslims anywhere in the world. This includes adherence to the draconian corporal punishments according to traditional Islamic penal law. According to these groups and individuals, shariah is indeed opposed to democratic principles under the rule of law. This is equally true for crude perceptions of shariah in Salafi youth culture. A former rapper called Deso Dogg (alias Mamadou Cuspert),46 more recently known

39  Cf. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Forum Berlin (ed.) (authors Andreas Zick, Beate Küpper, and Andreas Hövermann), Intolerance, Prejudice and Discrimination: A European Report (Berlin 2011), p. 61, available at . 40  A thorough exemplary analysis of the contemporary legal and political developments in Iraq relating to gender issues in personal law is presented by Layla Al-Zubaidi, “The Struggle over Women’s Rights and the Personal Status Law: A Test Case for Iraqi Citizenship?,” Orient (German Journal for Politics, Economics and Culture in the Middle East) 2/2011: 39–52. 41  Cf. the IFOP study L’image de l’Islam en France. Résultats détailles Octobre 2012, available at , pp. 5, 18. 42  A small group derived from the former extremist group “al-Muhajiroun” led by the extremist solicitor Anjem Choudary; cf. an interview with him from August 10, 2012, available at (November 11, 2012). 43  An extremist group acting worldwide, founded in Jerusalem in 1953 by the Muslim scholar Taqi al-Din Nabhani, aims at restoring the Islamic caliphate and rejecting democracy; cf. e.g. their British website and Mathias Rohe, ”Islamismus und Schari’a,” in Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (ed.), Integration und Islam (Nürnberg, 2005), pp. 120, 135 ss. in particular. 44  Cf. Werner Schiffauer, Die Gottesmänner—Türkische Islamisten in Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000). 45  Breininger was a German convert to Islam following a jihadist-Salafi ideology who was killed in Pakistan in 2010; he has published an autobiography titled Mein Weg nach Jannah (My way to Jannah, i.e. paradise); on shariah cf. p. 95 (a report on him and his ideology is available in Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Inneres und Sport—Verfassungsschutz, Islamismus—Entwicklungen—Gefahren— Gegenmaßnahmen, Hannover 4/2012, pp. 60–2). 46  He is one of the most prominent German Salafi extremists; cf. Nina Wiedl, The Making of a German Salafiyya: The Emergence, Development and Missionary Work of Salafi Movements in Germany (Aarhus CIR, 2012), p. 48.

664   Mathias Rohe as Abou Maleeq, has written a nasheed (song of praise) with the title “Awake finally! Allahu akbar,” calling Muslims to fight in jihad47 and adding verses “Mujahid, Mujahid, Scharia, Somalia, La ilaha illa Allah, Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar; Emigrate, emigrate, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, we are fighting in Chorassan, Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar.”48 “Sharia” here appears as a token of extremist self-definition including the appeal to jihad. While such individuals and groups only represent a small minority of European Muslims, visible Islam as a part of shariah normativity has come under general pressure in a number of European countries. Currently, the building of mosques, with their characteristic minarets, has become the focus of debates on limiting religious freedom. In Switzerland, the right-wing SVP (Swiss People’s Party) launched a successful campaign in 2009 against the building of any new mosques on Swiss soil.49 In the Austrian state of Carinthia previously governed by the populist, right-wing party BZÖ (Prime Minister Jörg Haider), anti-mosque legislation was passed by parliament in 2008.50 The text of the applicable laws refers to the “protection of the local view” in a seemingly neutral way. The newly established local commission has to examine whether a building fits into the existing architectural frame or not. In case of doubt, a certain legal procedure has to be brought forward within the municipality.51 In practice, this amendment is specifically aimed at Muslim buildings of worship: in the draft law from January 31, 2008 mosques were mentioned as an example of the projects to be dealt with by the commissions. The Prime Minister of Carinthia (Kärnten), Jörg Haider, promised the voters during the electoral campaign in 2008 that his state would be “the first country with laws prohibiting the construction of mosque and minarets.”52 This clearly demonstrates the abuse of legislative power by Islamophobic political movements, since these laws obviously violate the neutrality of the state towards religions and the principle of equal treatment under the veil of only formal neutrality. In the same vein, a draft law brought into the Italian parliament in 2008 by the Lega Nord aimed at banning the establishment of mosques.53 According to polls conducted in the Netherlands in 2008, between 56% and

47  In this context, the term jihad has to be interpreted in the traditional sense as struggle/warfare aiming at enlarging the realm of Islam (cf. only Ruud Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1996), pp. 28 ss; Rohe 2011, pp. 149 ss). It is noteworthy that the vast majority of Muslims nowadays follows newer interpretations, reducing jihad to self-defense in case of aggression and to the necessity of combating the evil within everyone’s personality. 48  Translation from German by the author. The German text is published in Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Inneres und Sport—Verfassungsschutz (n. 45), p. 75 s. 49  Cf. Vincenzo Pacillo, “‘Stopp Minarett’? The Controversy over the Building of Minarets in Switzerland,” in Ferrari and Pastorelli 2012, 337–52. 50  Cf. Heine, Lohlker, and Potz 2012, p. 131. 51  For details cf. Heine, Lohlker, and Potz 2012, p. 132; Farid Hafez and Richard Potz, “Moschee- und Minarettbauverbote in Kärnten und Vorarlberg,” in John Bunzl and Farid Hafez (eds.), Islamophobie in Österreich (Innsbruck/Wien/Bozen: StudienVerlag, 2009), 144–56. 52  Cf. Heine, Lohlker, and Potz 2012, p. 131. 53  Cf. “Moschee, la legge-muro della Lega ‘Non deve nascere una ogni 4 ore’,” Corriere della sera, August 22, 2008 (Alessandro Trocino).

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87% of those who vote for major political parties support halting construction of large mosques that have characteristically Islamic architecture.54 In Cologne, Germany, the plans of DITIB (a major Muslim Turkish organization related to the Turkish state) to build a mosque with 55-meter minarets have triggered protests since 2007 not only by extreme right-wing nationalists. The mosque opponents have protested the “visible claim of power” that such mosques represent, also implying obvious distrust of those who wish to build them. At the same time, a broad political majority in Cologne supports the mosque-building plans, arguing that Muslim members of German society have a right to the visibility that comes with the mosques. German law would certainly support this view, provided that the building and environmental codes that apply to construction projects for religious purposes55 are met. Obviously, visible symbols of Islam are still broadly perceived as foreign and even inimical. In sum, public attitudes towards Islam and Islamic norms differ considerably from the legal framework regulating freedom of religion and the applicability of religiously based norms, including those of shariah . In the following section, the scope and limits drawn by European legal orders for the application of important religious and legal shariah rules will be explained.

The Legal Situation: On the Scope and Limits for the Application of Shariah Rules56 Introduction: Differentiation between Religious and Legal Rules The starting point for the application of shariah norms in Europe and worldwide today is the principle of territoriality. Each country is ruled by its own legal order which decides whether and to what extent “foreign” norms might be applied. The legal system is not multicultural as far as it concerns the decisive exercise of legal power, despite the existence of normative pluralism within European societies.57 54  Cf. “Twee derde wil stop op grote moskeeën,” Nederlands Dagblad, June 5, 2008 (available at . Only among the voters of the left-ecologist (GroenLinks: 30%) and liberal (D66: 39%) parties supporters of such a stop are minorities. 55  These are privileged at German law; cf. Rohe 2007, p. 83. 56  This article relies in this part on relevant data collected within the RELIGARE project (n. 1). For the systems of coexistence of norms in Europe cf. Mathias Rohe, “Family and the Law in Europe: Bringing Together Secular Legal Orders and Religious Norms and Need”, in Shah, Foblets, and Rohe (eds.) Family, Religion and Law: Cultural Encounters in Europe (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014). 57  Cf. the most informative volume Shari’a As Discourse edited by Jørgen Nielsen and Lisbet Christoffersen (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), namely the chapter on the British situation written by Prakash Shah, p. 117, and the models developed by Lorenzo Zucca, A Secular Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 194–6 in particular.

666   Mathias Rohe It is necessary to distinguish legal norms enforceable by official state measures from all sorts of norms and acts operating socially without the validation by the official legal system of enforcement. In the latter field, normative pluralism is indeed widespread. But in case of conflict, compulsory state rules will prevail over social or religious ones. However, the legal system maintains the flexibility to accommodate pluralism to a considerable extent.58 First, in applying shariah norms, the legal orders fundamentally differentiate between religious and legal issues. Religious issues are regulated by the European and national constitutional provisions including article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which grants freedom of religion including state neutrality towards religions. Thus, from a legal (certainly not a socio-cultural) point of view, there are no “foreign” religious norms as opposed to “domestic.” In contrast, in legal issues the application of foreign legal rules is an exceptional case, broadly restricted to some areas of civil law (as opposed to public law). Second, regarding religious norms, freedom of religion is not limited to private worship, but also grants an adequate (though not unlimited) protection of religious needs in various aspects of public life (from building mosques to social-security issues) and private labor law.59 Nevertheless, European countries vary in their applications of these provisions due to differing interpretations regarding the desirable degree of distance between the state and religion.60 France and parts of Switzerland, for example, impose strict separation between state and religion through the principle of laïcité. In France, civil servants and even pupils cannot display ostensible religious symbols during work or school hours. In Britain, by contrast, Muslim women teachers (not to mention pupils) and officers and lawyers in court may wear veils. The European Court of Human Rights has accepted such differing national approaches under the “margin of appreciation” given to the national legislator in decisions from 2001 to 2005. The court effectively refused to rule that banning the wearing of headscarves in schools and universities by teachers61 and students62 violates article 9 of the ECHR. Thus the ECHR grants a minimum though considerable European standard of rights, whereas some national constitutions, as in Germany, open broader space for religion in public space.63 58 

For the scope and limits of such accommodation cf. the concise chapter of John Witte, “The Future of Muslim Family Law in Western Democracies,” in Ahdar and Aroney 2010, p. 279. 59  Cf. Rohe 2007, pp. 79, 82–8. 60  For an overview cf. Richard Potz and Wolfgang Wieshaider (eds.), Islam and the European Union (Leuven: Peeters, 2004); European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies of the Union, Islam in the European Union: What’s at Stake in the Future?, May 2007 (PE 369.031); Mathias Rohe and Sebastian Elster, “Zur öffentlichrechtlichen Situation von Muslimen in ausgewählten europäischen Ländern,” in Bundesministerium des Inneren Wien and Sicherheitsakademie, Perspektiven und Herausforderungen in der Integration muslimischer MitbürgerInnen in Österreich (Wien, May 2006). 61  Dahlab, Switzerland, February 25, 2001, NVwZ 2001, p. 1389. 62  Leyla Shahin, Turkey, November 20, 2005, NVwZ 2006, p. 1389. 63  For details cf. Silvio Ferrari, “Religion in the European Public Spaces: A Legal Overview,” in Ferrari and Pastorelli 2012, 139–56 and the other contributions on details in the same volume.

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The Application of Islamic Religious Rules Introduction Conflicts regarding Islam mostly concern the appearance in the public space.64 The aim of secularity and state neutrality has translated into severe restrictions on the expression of religion in institutional public space (e.g. concerning civil servants) in all European countries. In common public space (streets, etc.), religion can be expressed to a vast extent. Differences between countries can be explained by different perceptions of the role of state and religions. In a somewhat simplifying view, countries following the model of strict laïcism try to reduce the public visibility and influence of religions, since they are taken to challenge the supremacy of state power. Other countries recognize the potential of religions to positively contribute to society, reinforcing peace and stability in society, as well as common human rights values. Such basic elements of political culture certainly influence the scope of religious freedom in the public sphere. Nevertheless, in all European states a far-reaching minimum standard is granted by article 9 of the ECHR. In which legal fields can religious shariah norms be applied then?

The Political Debate on Public Law The secular state by definition has to treat religions equally and neutrally despite variations in implementing these principles. Muslims have established a religious infrastructure, such as mosques, organizations, education initiatives, and media, in the twentieth century in many European countries. While the visibility of the Islamic religion might trigger heated debates among the European public, the application of shariah provisions concerning religion is not so problematic from a legal point of view, since it simply requires the application of the legal rules of the land. Thus, there is no element of challenge with respect to the sovereignty of the law of the land. The latter alone decides on the protection of religious freedom. On the other hand, an “internal” challenge arises if the state’s own secular democratic principles, namely that of state neutrality concerning religion and belief and their equal treatment, are not applied. The treatment of Muslims in daily administrative and legal practice turns out to be a litmus test for the seriousness of European legal orders in implementing their basic principles. In Italy for example, there exist no clear regulations on establishing a religious infrastructure for religious minorities. This consequently makes the building of mosques difficult for Muslim communities.65 In Germany, some 64  Silvio Ferrari has developed a very helpful model by distinguishing between (open) common space, (free and plural) political space, and (neutral) institutional space (n. 63).Thus, it can make a difference to admit religious symbols for pupils in public schools for granting the freedom of expression and the plurality of experiences, whereas it can be problematic to shape this space by the compulsory display of a religious symbol like the crucifix. 65  Cf. Regional administrative court of Emilia Romagna judgment no. 792 of November 26, 2009, confirmed by the judgment of the Council of State no. 683 of January 28, 2011; Regional administrative court of Lombardia judgment no. 6226 of December 28, 2009 concerning the establishment of mosques in buildings used for commercial purposes before.

668   Mathias Rohe states like Baden-Württemberg have introduced religious dress code restrictions for (female) teachers or state officers.66 Seemingly neutral formulae are used, without mentioning dress, but parliamentary proceedings make clear that these regulations aim at prohibiting wearing the headscarf. Within the same law, Christian or occidental “cultural values” (including dress elements) are declared not to violate the duty to keep neutrality. Such laws most likely violate the constitutional principle of equal treatment of religions and beliefs:67 the state may decide under its power of discretion (margin of appreciation accepted by the ECHR) whether religious symbols worn by public servants are handled more or less restrictively. In any case, the degree of restrictions has to apply equally. More generally, the more the Christian heritage of Europe is perceived to be legally (not only culturally) dominant by the public or in politics and administrations, the more likely deviations from the existing laws are. To some extent, the confrontation with Muslim needs and creeds may help to clarify fundamental issues regarding the relation between constituent elements of European states: often, in debates among Muslims and non-Muslims alike, democracy and the rule of law are simply equated. In reality though, the two might be in conflict with each other. While a broad scope of political decisions has to be made in accordance with the will of the majority, human rights—including individual and collective freedom of religion and belief68—draw firm limits to this will for the sake of legitimate minority rights, the individual being the smallest minority in this sense. Efficient protection of these rights is necessary not only regarding dictatorial interference, but also towards democratic decisions. The Swiss minaret ban from November 2009 (amendment of the Swiss federal constitution by article 72 section 369) is an example of a conflict between democracy and the rule of law. While the Swiss political elites except the Islamophobic rightpopulist SVP refused this ban, a majority of 57% voted in support of it. Nevertheless, according to a nearly unanimous conviction among European lawyers, this ban violates article 9 ECHR, which grants freedom of religion not only in private, but also in public space. The majority is not entitled to infringe basic rights of the minority. In case of conflict, the rule of law protecting everyone equally supersedes democratic majorities. It is interesting that a considerable number of those supporting the ban had no objections to minarets in particular. Instead, they used the vote to express their unspecific concern about Islam and immigration.70

66  Cf. Ruben Seth Fogel, “Headscarves in German Public Schools: Religious Minorities are Welcome in Germany, Unless—God Forbid—They Are Religious,” New York Law School Law Review 51 (2006/2007), pp. 620, 640 ss. in particular, available at . 67  Cf. the relevant decision of the German Constitutional Court from September 24, 2003 (available at ); a new case challenging the Baden-Württemberg law on schools will be decided in 2014. 68  Cf. only art. 18 UNDHR, art. 9 ECHR. 69  The text and legal references are available at . 70  Cf. the short, but very precise analysis in “Vier Gründe für das Minarettverbot,” Die Presse, November 20, 2009 (Carola Schneider).

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The Swiss example could not have occurred in other democratic European countries, since contrary to the Swiss system of so-called direct democracy, the rule of law is superior to democratic majority decisions. Nevertheless, on the political level the Swiss debates are far from being unique. In Austria, some states have tried to ban or restrict the establishment of mosques and minarets by law in a formally neutral shape but clearly aimed specifically at Muslims. In Germany, according to representative polls in 2010, 58.4% of the population condoned the idea of considerably restricting Muslims’ right to practice their religion.71 Information and education about constitutionally protected human rights is evidently a never ending task with respect to society as a whole rather than to single groups alone. The most recent example of using the public appearance of Islam for mainly internal political reasons is legislation on the so-called burqa-ban in some European countries. While legislation was passed in France, Belgium, and some municipalities in Italy and Spain, in the Netherlands and Switzerland, parliamentarian initiatives have been stopped.72 Interestingly, it is directed not against the burqa alone, an Afghan women’s garment covering the whole face while leaving the eyes visible, which has virtually never appeared in a European context, but against various forms of niqab, a type of garment covering the whole face while the eyes are covered with mesh. This kind of garment is widespread, e.g. in Saudi-Arabia, and promoted by Islamist and Salafi Muslims. Apparently, besides tourists from the Gulf states it seems to be worn rarely in Europe.73 Research in France reveals that among the few Muslim women who wear this garment, a considerable number are European converts to Islam.74 From a legal point of view, this kind of garment can be prohibited under the existing general rules regulating public security or education, concerning all situations of public life where visibility of the face as a whole is simply necessary for legitimate reasons.75 It 71 

Oliver Decker et al., Die Mitte in der Krise. Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2010 (Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2010), p. 134, available at . 72  For the European debate cf. Sara Silvestri, “Comparing Burqa Debates in Europe,” in Ferrari and Pastorelli 2012, 275–92 and the forthcoming volume on the burqa-ban edited by Silvio Ferrari (to be published by Ashgate). For the Swiss developments in September 2012 cf. “Swiss parliamentarians reject burqa ban,” Al-Arabiya News, September 28, 2012, available at . Cf. also Natasha Bakht, “Veiled Objections: Facing Public Oppositions to the Niqab,” in Lori B. Beaman (ed.), Reasonable Accommodation: Managing Religious Diversity (Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2012), 70–108. 73  According to a report in the French newspaper Le Figaro from September 9, 2009 (“Deux mille femmes portent la burqa en France”), the French Ministry of the Interior estimates that around 2,000 women in France are wearing this garment. 74  Cf. the report “Qui sont les femmes qui portent la burqa en France?” in Le Figaro from June 19, 2009. 75  Cf. the relevant judgments of the ECHR in El Morsli v. France (no. 15585/06 from April 4, 2008) concerning security checks at the entrance to consulates, Dogru v. France (no. 27058/05 from December 4, 2008), and Kervanci v. France (no. 31645/04 from December 4, 2008) concerning physical education in schools. In contrast, in Ahmet Arslan and Others v. Turkey (no. 41135/98 from February 23, 2010), the court held that previous Turkish laws prohibiting citizens to wear religious garments in public violated art. 9 ECHR.

670   Mathias Rohe might also make sense to specifically protect women against being forced to wear the niqab. Burqa-ban legislation goes far beyond these fields. In France, legislation came into force in April 201176 to ban garments preventing identification in public space as a whole, irrespective of the presence or absence of particular dangers for public interests, as far as it concerns women wearing such garments voluntarily. Obviously, such legislation is at least in part deemed to broaden political support by proving the “defense of European values” in times when politicians are struggling with all sorts of highly disputed economic and social problems.77 The necessity and the practicability of this legislation were only marginally taken into account in this debate. Nearly no difference was made between the restriction of self-determination by legal measures on one side and a societal debate on the garment indeed (and righteously) irritating civil society on the other side. Some supporters for the ban brought forward the argument that it is impossible to suppose a free decision of women to wear the niqab, since the simple presence of the niqab proves the woman wearing it to be forced to do so. This argument cannot convince for two reasons. First, according to inquiries by the French Ministry of the Interior, among the relatively few women wearing a niqab (around 2,000 in France as a whole), a considerable number are converts to Islam who freely decided on their dress.78 Second, if the niqab is worn under pressure, from a rule of law perspective it would be bizarre to punish those who already suffer from being forced under the niqab by penalty payments. Given the fact that French lawyers, including the Conseil d’État,79 advised against a general ban of the niqab in public beyond specific situations (security issues, public servants, etc.), the promulgation of the law obviously was driven much more by political aims (symbolic policy of demonstrative “cultural self-defense”) than by “usual” legal-regulatory purposes. Similarly, the Belgian parliament has renewed the ban of the dissimulation of the face in part or totally, aiming at the niqab, in public space in July 2011 with only one opposing vote.80 This was a remarkable phenomenon at a time when the country was unable to build a government for more than one year, faced considerable problems with its state debt, and given the fact that there was only a small number of persons in the country wearing such a garment.81 Meanwhile, the Belgian Constitutional Court has approved 76 

Loi no. 2010-1192 du 11. Octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’ espace public. Cf. e.g. the studies of John R. Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 78  N. 74. 79  Cf. the report of March 31, 2010 “Conseil d’État rejects proposed prohibition of burqa, niqab” available at . 80  Cf. “Burqa ban unites a politically divided Belgium,” DW-world.de, July 23, 2011, available at . 81  In other countries like Germany, there were short debates in parliaments and the media, ending up with the broadly accepted conviction that there is simply no need for a general ban on such garments under the legal principle of self-determination, and therefore no legitimate foundation for respective legislation; cf. e.g. the expert hearing in the Federal parliament (Committee for Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid) on October 27, 2010 to which the author has contributed; the official protocol of 77 

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the law,82 except for the case of wearing the niqab within a mosque, which according to the decision falls under the freedom of religion.

Civil Law Another formal level where religious norms may have an impact are social relations governed by civil law, specifically (but not exclusively) employment law. In this field, possible conflicting interests of employers and employees have to be weighed with respect to the employee’s religious needs on one hand and the employer’s needs on the other.83 In general, most Muslims do not face legal problems concerning their employment. For those who need to pray during work hours, acceptable solutions can be found. Many either pray during regular breaks or concentrate their prayers in the morning and evening. In Britain, a bus driver claiming the right to interrupt his work five times a day for prayer lost his case for obvious reasons.84 On Fridays employers often allow breaks for Muslim employees to participate in communal prayer at mosques or allow employees to finish working earlier in the day. Muslim workers are also generally allowed to use vacation days during the feasts of Eid ul-Fitr at the end of Ramadan and the Eid al-Adha (Festival of Sacrifice) in the month of pilgrimage.85 If the need to be present for prayer or celebration of holidays conflicts with employment requirements, solutions seem to be found mainly outside the courts, since there is little relevant case law available. A  rare case in Germany concerning a conflict between employment law and the requirements of Muslim prayer or Eid feasts dates from 1964,86 indicating that mutually acceptable solutions to such potential conflicts are readily found. A new case in 200987 was decided in favor of a Muslim employee who wanted to perform the ritual pilgrimage to Mecca. Her interests88 were taken to be of superior importance in comparison to the needs of her employer. In 2011, the German Federal Labor court decided in favor of a Muslim employee in a supermarket the hearing is available at . The expert’s written preparatory statements are available at . 82  Decision from December 7, 2012, report available at . Three reasons were given to justify the ban: the niqab is taken to threaten public security; gender equality and individuality as necessary prerequisites for a democratic society. 83  For details cf. Mathias Rohe, “Schutz vor Diskriminierung aus religiösen Gründen im Europäischen Arbeitsrecht—Segen oder Fluch?,” in Rüdiger Krause, Winfried Veelken, and Klaus Vieweg (eds.), Gedaechtnisschrift für Wolfgang Blomeyer (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2004), p. 217. 84  Reported in Wasif Shadid and Pieter Van Koningsveld, Religious Freedom and the Position of Islam in Western Europe (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1995), p. 102. 85  Cf. Niloufar Hoevels, Islam und Arbeitsrecht (Köln: Carl Heymanns, 2003). 86  LAG Duesseldorf JZ 1964, 258. 87  ArbG Koeln (Az.17 Ca 51/08), BeckRS 2010, 73919. 88  The 53-year-old woman was employed in the school administration. The next period of holidays coinciding with the time of the pilgrimage would have been thirteen years later, at which point, she would have reached the age of 64. This would be likely to render the pilgrimage during the hot summer time much more challenging or, due to possible health reasons, even impossible. Additionally, she feared that her mother, who was taking care of her disabled child, would not be able to continue this at that time.

672   Mathias Rohe who was ordered to refill shelves with bottles containing alcohol after having worked in other parts of the market before and was dismissed when refusing the new work.89 According to the court, the employer had omitted to examine whether the employee could have reasonably been given other duties not bringing him in conflict with his religious convictions. A British labor tribunal dismissed a similar claim of an employee in 2008.90 In this case the employer was obviously able to convince the tribunal that he had made every effort to find alternative work for the employee; in this case German jurisprudence would also uphold the dismissal. Interestingly, the broad media debates in both cases—which seem to be extremely rare in numbers in Europe—are in stark contrast to those surrounding the widespread problem of dismissals due to alcohol abuse. Furthermore, there are decisions in favor of Muslim female employees wearing a headscarf in cases where no security reasons are at stake. The German Federal Labor court accepted the claim of the appellant who wore her headscarf to work at a warehouse.91 Stressing the great importance of religious freedom, the court ruled that this freedom cannot be abrogated by mere suppositions of possible economic detriment to the employer. Even in case of proven economic detriment, the employer would first have to consider whether the employee could work in a less sensitive capacity before being entitled to terminate her contract. Since European legislation on protecting employees against discrimination on religious grounds has been introduced, the scope of protection will probably broaden even more. A case from Berlin in March 201292 might illustrate this. The application of a well-qualified Muslim woman from Iraq wearing a headscarf for a job in a dental surgery was rejected because the employer insisted on “religious neutrality” in his enterprise. The Berlin Labor Court argued in favor of the applicant, stressing that there is no right to unconditionally keep any sign of religion outside the (non-religious) enterprise.93 The employer was ordered to pay €1,500 in damages to the claimant. This decision was regarded as a milestone by NGOs fighting discrimination.

Penal Law In penal law, the application of religious norms of all kinds has to be restricted to marginal issues, since it is the aim of penal law to grant a common minimum of standards within society. The only case where Islamic (and Jewish) religious provisions are relevant

89  Federal Labor Court, February 24, 2011, available at . 90  Cf. the report available at . 91  Federal Labor Court NJW 2003, 1685. 92  Cf. Berlin Labor Court, March 28,2012 (55 C1 2426/12). 93  Cf. the report “German Dentist Fined for Anti-Hijab Bias” from October 20, 2012, available at .

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is male circumcision performed according to the medical standards of care. This procedure may be well qualified to be a (minor) corporal harm, but nevertheless is taken to be justified on acceptable religious grounds.94 It is relevant that this attitude, which was nearly unanimous for decades, is now disputed in recent legal literature.95 Until 2012, Sweden was the only country to introduce specific legislation on circumcision. In 2001, the Swedish parliament restricted permission for carrying out circumcision to physicians, only after the infant was more than two months old, and the procedure was performed in hospitals according to medical standards of care.96 In May 2012, the German regional court of Cologne97 held male circumcision, even if performed by medical standards of care, to be punishable under German penal law. This decision went against a unanimous opinion in the judiciary98 so far, which held this procedure to be lawful. It was based on short and poorly balanced reasoning, simply stating that the parents cannot validly consent to the harm caused to the child. The court made no attempt whatsoever to weigh up the parent’s motivation of integrating the child into a religious community according to their definition of the best welfare of the child with the (relatively minor) violation of the integrity of the child’s body. This decision, given by one out of 116 regional courts, was not binding beyond the specific case before them, but nevertheless caused uproar in the Jewish and Muslim communities. It was rejected by most of the political parties and by leading politicians including the Chancellor who said that the country will certainly not turn into a “nation of comedians.” Legislation aimed at clarifying the permission of male circumcision performed according to medical standards of care and without unnecessary harm has passed the German parliament on December 12, 2012.99 The ongoing debate shows an increasingly aggressive secularist tone condemning any religious rites to be backward and irrelevant in a secular society.100

94 

Cf. e.g. the judgment of the Finnish Supreme Court in October 2008 (report available at ). For Germany cf. Rohe 2011, p. 344. Certainly, major harms like female mutilation will never be justifiable or excusable on religious or cultural grounds whatsoever. 95  Cf. Holm Putzke, “Die strafrechtliche Relevanz der Beschneidung von Knaben,” in Putzke et al. (eds.), Festschrift Herzberg (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), pp. 669–709, in an unusually aggressive tone. 96  Cf. a report available at (July 30, 2012); cf. also the new debate on a total ban in the report “Swedish docs in circumcision protest” from February 19, 2012, available at (July 31, 2012). 97  LG Köln decision of May 7, 2012 (151 Ns 169/11). 98  According to German law of social welfare, the state even has to finance the costs of a decent celebration of the circumcision in case of need, cf. OVG Lüneburg FEVS 44, p. 465. 99  Cf. Entwurf eines Gesetzes über den Umfang der Personensorge bei einer Beschneidung des männlichen Kindes from November 5, 2012, Bundestagsdrucksache 17/11295, available at . 100  Cf. the lucid essay of Heiner Bielefeldt, UN special rapporteur for freedom of religion and belief teaching at the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, “Marginalisierung der Religionsfreiheit?” available at (July 31, 2012), to be published.

674   Mathias Rohe In the aftermath of the German debate, in Norway101 and Switzerland,102 similar campaigns are underway to ban any kind of (male) circumcision of minors who are not capable to decide on their own. Another field of possible tensions may arise from informal dispute resolution in criminal cases conflicting with the penal legal order. A relevant case involving Salafis was reported in Spain in 2009. A group of seven persons originating from North Africa had allegedly “sentenced” a woman having committed adultery to death in a “shariah court” condoned by the victim’s family.103 They were later set free because the woman had disappeared and thus could not identify the accused before the court. In 2011, a book appeared in Germany dealing with “shariah judges” settling criminal disputes among Muslims in the country.104 It is based on sixteen case studies in the cities of Berlin, Bremen, and Essen, including interviews with so-called shariah justices of peace, lawyers, and attorneys. Allegedly, crime victims were pressed to accept financial compensation for “silence” while witnesses were intimidated. The cases referred to conflicts concerning members of huge Kurdish family clans (comprising several thousand members) who have indeed established legally unacceptable “parallel” structures challenging state authority in penal law matters. While forms of voluntary mediation between culprits and victims are established in penal issues under state supervision, the limits should be clear: exercising pressure on victims or witnesses cannot be tolerated by the state. But it is far from clear whether the decisions relied on shariah rules or, more probably, on cultural norms only bearing a religious surface.

Informal Application Finally, religious norms can be “applied” at an informal level, merely by practicing them. It is mainly in the sphere of religious rules—concerning the relations between God and human beings (‘ibadat) and the non-legal aspects of relations between human beings (mu’amalat)—where a European shariah (in this context: Islamic “theology”) is possibly developing.105 In such cases, the opinions contained in religious rulings, or fatwas, would distinguish between legal validity of the transactions at stake and their religious acceptability. This is not a new development in Islam, but it may rely on the traditional distinction between the religious and the legal dimensions of human behavior (e.g. the 101 

The Norwegian Senterpartiet formulated demands on banning male circumcision; cf. the report available at (July 30, 2012). 102  Cf. the report “Keine Chance für Verbot von Beschneidungen” from July 24, 2012, available at . 103  Cf. “Juicio islàmico por adulterio a una mujer en Reus” (Salud Muñoz), Elmundo.es 06.12.09, available at . 104  Joachim Wagner, Richter ohne Gesetz. Islamische Paralleljustiz gefährdet unseren Rechtsstaat (Berlin: Econ, 2011). 105  Cf. Mathias Rohe, “The Formation of a European Shari’a,” in Malik 2004, p. 161; studies of present developments are presented by Shadid and Van Koningsveld 2003, p. 149, and by Waardenburg 2003, pp. 241, 308, and 336.

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distinction between the categories of what is considered to be forbidden (haram), and what is considered to be “invalid” (batil)).106 Obviously, this reflects a broader trend among Muslims in Europe and other Western countries towards a de-territorialization and de-legislation of shariah developing it anew as a merely or primarily ethical/ moral set of norms. This approach is developed by Muslim scholars under the heading of shariah provisions providing guidance rather than governance.107 The scope of scholars ranges from rather traditionally oriented ones, represented by the European Council for Fatwas and Research, which differentiates between the legal and the religious/moral aspects of human acts108 and other proponents of a “minority fiqh,”109 to innovative approaches like those of Abdulaziz Sachedina,110 Ahmad Moussalli,111 Tareq Oubrou,112Amina Wadud,113 or Mouhanad Khorchide.114 But it should be mentioned that there are some efforts by extremist Islamist groups and the Salafi movement that aim at the construction of an exclusive Muslim normative order opposing the governing rules of the land (cf. above). According to research done in the German state of Bavaria in 2012,115 there are indeed some cases of shariah-inspired 106 

Cf. Rohe 2009, pp. 9–18. Cf. Abdullahi An-Na’im, “Islam and the Secular State,” pp. 28–44 in particular; Abdulaziz Sachedina, “The Role of Islam in the Public Square: Guidance or Governance?,” in Muqtedar Khan (ed.), Islamic Democratic Discourse (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006), p. 173. This trend can be discerned also among Muslim teachers and students in Germany who are involved in establishing Islamic confessional instruction and university education according to the German legal system (cf. Mouhanad Korchide, Islam ist Barmherzigkeit—Grundzüge einer modernen Religion (Freiburg: Herder, 2012), and observations by the author who has been closely involved in the establishment of these projects for more than a decade. Cf. also Jocelyne Cesari, “Islam in France: The Shaping of a Religious Minority,” in Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad (ed.), Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 36, 41 ss. 108  Cf. Mathias Rohe, “The Formation of a European Shari’a,” in Malik 2004, pp. 176, 179 in particular. 109  Cf. e.g. Alexandre Caeiro, “Transnational ‘Ulama’, European Fatwas and Islamic Authority: A Case Study of the European Council for Fatwa and Research,” in Martin van Bruinessen et al. (eds.), Producing Islamic Knowledge: Transmission and Dissemination in Western Europe (London: Routledge, 2011), 121–41; Sarah Albrecht, Islamisches Minderheitenrecht. Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwīs Konzept des fiqh al-aqallīyāt (Würzburg: Ergon, 2010); Hellyer 2009, pp. 79–99. 110  Abdulaziz Sachedina, “The Role of Islam in the Public Square: Guidance or Governance?”, in Muqtedar Khan (ed.), Islamic Democratic Discourse (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006), p. 173. 111  Ahmad S. Moussalli, The Islamic Quest for Democracy, Pluralism, and Human Rights (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003). 112  Tareq Oubrou, “Introduction théorétique à la chari’a de minorité,” Islam de France 2 (1998), p. 27; Tareq Oubrou, “La charia de minorité: contribution pour une integration légale de l’islam” (February 21, 2003), available at (November 10, 2012); cf. also Manni Crone, “Shari’a and Secularism in France,” in Nielsen and Christoffersen 2010, pp. 141, 145–8 in particular. 113  Cf. her work Inside the Gender Jihad: Women’s Reform in Islam (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006), pp. 92 ss. 114  Cf. his work Islam ist Barmherzigkeit. Grundzüge einer modernen Religion (Freiburg/ Breisgau: Herder, 2012), pp. 116 ss. 115  The Bavarian Ministry of Justice implemented a research group of legal practitioners and social organizations working on preventive and repressive measures, the former led by the author. The results are as yet unpublished. 107 

676   Mathias Rohe “parallel justice” in family matters, where undue pressure was exercised on women to refrain from their rights under German law.

The Application of Islamic Legal Rules Introduction When it comes to legal shariah provisions (in the form of modern state law), their application may cause more tensions. While the guarantee of freedom of religion is a part of European legal orders, foreign laws are possible “competitors” of these orders. In the course of a century-old development, personal law systems implementing a kind of legal pluralism have been replaced in Europe and large parts of the world by territorially unified laws granting internal pluralism, but reserving the right of last decision to state law in case of conflicting norms.116 Thus, it is up to the law of the land alone to decide which legal norms are applicable and to what extent. While the secular state does not and cannot claim to provide spiritual guidance or a coherent system of morality, it claims indeed the right of last decision concerning the legally binding regulations of human interaction in this world.117 Certainly, religious convictions may play an important role in formulating and reforming the existing law. Nevertheless, such religious reasoning has to pass a “secular argumentative filter” as to its concrete contents.118 God’s (perceived) will cannot replace reasonable argumentation. For example, the prohibition of drinking alcohol might be derived from religious commands. Secular regulations on banning the consumption of alcohol in certain public spaces (e.g. schools, working places, traffic) cannot rely on such commands. They have to be based on a reasoning that addresses public welfare by weighing up security issues against individual freedom.119 What then are secular arguments for the application of Islamic legal rules in a European legal context? There are two different kinds of reasons here. The following examples will demonstrate that such reasons are “external” insofar as the law of the land simply prescribes the application of such norms in a given case more or less irrespective of the intention of the parties involved. “Internal” reasons are those rooted in the desires of the parties themselves. The latter may be differentiated into technical/institutional, cultural, and religious ones.

116  For the problems of legal transplants concerning personal law systems into Western legal orders cf. only Jean-François Gaudreault-Desbiens, “Religious Courts, Personal Federalism, and Legal Transplants,” in Ahdar and Aroney 2010, 159–80. 117  Cf. Heiner Bielefeldt, Muslime im säkularen Rechtsstaat (Bielefeld transcript, 2003, pp. 32–6 in particular). 118  Cf. only Jürgen Habermas, Glauben und Wissen. Friedenspreis des Deutschen Buchhandels 2001 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001), p. 22; Jürgen Habermas, Zwischen Rationalismus und Religion. Philosophische Ansätze (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2005), p. 137. 119  Cf. e.g. Silvio Ferrari, “Islam und Laizität,” in Gian Enrico Rusconi (ed.), Der säkularisierte Staat im postsäkularen Zeitalter (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2010), pp. 269, 273.

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External Reasons (Given By the State) There are three fields of law where Islamic norms may be applicable or recognized for mainly external reasons. Firstly, private international law may lead to the application of Islamic law within the limits of public policy. Secondly, in some states Islamic norms were implemented into the existing law (UK, Spain) of the land or maintained under international treaty obligations (Greece) for historical reasons. Thirdly, given legal facts created under Islamic law may be recognized under Western laws for social reasons. All these fields are part of civil law, as opposed to public and penal law. In matters of civil law, which primarily regulates private relations (from contract and tort up to family and inheritance issues), individual preferences are of prime importance. It is in this context that foreign legal norms may be applied or tolerated as far as possibly conflicting state interests are not concerned. But it is increasingly the case that modern “strong” states tend to interfere more intensely into fields perceived to be solely or mainly “private” in the past. Family issues are particularly relevant. Whereas in some parts of the world, including many countries in the Islamic world,120 there is a perception of the family being predominantly private and thus excluding any state intervention except in extreme cases of violence, European states have developed a dense system of state control and intervention to protect the welfare of the weaker members of the family. As a consequence, private interests in exercising private autonomy and being granted reliable relations according to their own decisions have to be weighed against possibly conflicting protective state interests under the auspices of public policy. The following examples will show the considerably different principles and outcomes in various European legal orders.

Private International Law (State Law) Private international law (PIL), which regulates conflicting laws pertaining to civil matters, is the most prominent level on which Islamic legal rules can be directly applied. Civil law essentially regulates the legal relations between private individuals, whose welfare is of prime importance. This includes the continuity of existing legal relationships (such as marriage) when crossing “legal borders” (so-called “theory of vested rights” developed by the eminent British and US lawyers Dicey and Beale). In such primarily private matters of an international dimension (e.g. caused by foreign citizenship or residence) it is desirable to apply the substantive law having the most significant relationship to the case to be decided. The revolutionary idea underlying this concept is the principal equality of all legal orders, which is why foreign law can be applied. The question as to whether foreign or national substantive law should be applied in particular cases must therefore be determined, and this is done by the provisions of PIL, which weigh up the relevant interests.

120  This term is widespread, but rather inaccurate. It is used as a synonym for “countries with a Muslim majority population,” but is not intended to express the (wrong) idea that these states and their societies are solely or even mainly ruled and driven by the religion of Islam.

678   Mathias Rohe Nevertheless, the legal community in every country may decide that in certain matters the same substantive law should be applicable to everyone resident there. This would be the case particularly in matters touching the roots of legal and societal common sense, like those regulated by mandatory family law. The PIL provisions on public order draw the necessary limit to maintain important common standards, such as human rights. In shariah-based law, there are many provisions, e.g. concerning contracts, that do not contradict European laws. The main conflicts arise in family and inheritance matters over constitutional and human rights, such as gender equality and freedom of religion, including the right not to believe, and the protection of minors. Provisions reflecting classical Islamic law preserve strict separation between the sexes with respect to their social roles as well as far-reaching segregation of religions under the supremacy of Islam. Though child marriage is abolished in some Islamic countries, it is still practiced in others.121 The different ways of reasoning within European legal orders shall be demonstrated using case law examples concerning repudiation (talaq, unilateral divorce) and polygamy.122 According to traditional Islamic law, which is still in force in many Islamic countries despite a number of internal reforms in favor of women,123 only the husband is entitled to terminate the marriage by a unilateral declaration of repudiation without any reason being given. This has to be repeated two additional times, and attempts at reconciliation have to be made, but in case of their failure the marriage is dissolved. Such a procedure clearly contradicts the European legal principle of equality of sexes, since wives only have very limited rights to divorce,124 in addition to the principle of life-long marriage, which does not allow the dissolution of the marriage by such easy procedures. According to

121 

Cf. e.g. a recent decision of the Court of Appeals (Kammergericht) of Berlin (FamRZ 2012, 1495): the marriage between a former Lebanese German Shi’i Muslim and a 14-year-old Lebanese Shi’i girl valid under Lebanese law (according to the still valid Ottoman family code) was not recognized due to a violation of German public order. A 14-year-old person is not considered to be able to freely and responsibly decide on a fundamental issue like marriage (the minimum age in Germany, dependent on the consent of the parents or the competent court, is 16). 122  For studies concerning the application of Islamic legal provisions cf. Foblets (n. 36), pp. 33, 63 with numerous references, and Foblets, “The Admissibility of Repudiation: Recent Developments in Dutch, French and Belgian Private International Law,” Hawwa 5(1) (2007): 10–32; Veronika Gärtner, Die Privatscheidung im deutschen und gemeinschaftlichen Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrecht (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008); Rohe 2011, p. 353; Julia Koch, Die Anwendung islamischen Scheidungsund Scheidungsfolgenrechts im Internationalen Privatrecht der EU-Mitgliedstaaten (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2012). 123  For new developments cf. Ziba Mir-Hosseini, “Islamic Family Law and Social Practice: Anthropological Reflections on the Terms of the Debate,” in Austrian Association for the Middle East Hammer-Purgstall 2009, pp. 37–48 with numerous references; Rohe 2011, pp. 182 ss., 207 ss.; Maaike Voorhoeve (ed.), Family Law in Islam: Divorce, Marriage and Women in the Muslim World (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012). 124  Cf. Rohe 2011, pp. 93 ss., 216 ss. Courts usually differentiate between these forms of divorce: foreign decisions are then recognized if the cases meet the prerequisites of a “equal rights” divorce, cf. only the French Court of Cassation, February 23, 2011, No. 10-14.760.

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unanimous regulations in European legal orders, a talaq cannot be validly pronounced on European soil.125 Furthermore, usually European legal orders refuse to recognize talaq procedures performed abroad when their citizens/domiciliaries or residents are involved.126 Nevertheless, how should a European legal system address the case where the talaq has become valid abroad under another legal order?127 Would European “public order” prevent its recognition in any case (as opposed to khul‛ or other forms of divorce for discord128) or only in those cases where the wife was not able to defend her rights and did not agree to the divorce? There is a remarkable shift within European legal orders within the last decade. The traditional PIL approach, where the outcome of applying the respective foreign law is addressed, is increasingly challenged in favor of examining the foreign norm itself. German,129 Italian,130 and Spanish131 courts still adhere to the traditional approach broadly.132 Thus, the recognition of talaq would contradict public order in cases where the wife was not able to claim her legitimate interests or was not even informed about the divorce. In other cases, where the prerequisites for divorce according to the law of the land would be fulfilled in a comparable way or if the wife agrees, the legality of such a divorce according to Islamic tenets would be accepted by the controlling legal authority. Belgium followed this way until 2005, when the courts started to handle recognition more strictly after the enactment of the new rules on PIL.133 The same development can be found in court decisions in France since 2004134 and the Netherlands, where in

125  Cf. e.g. Civil Court Brussels, May 26, 1978; House of Lords, R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p. Fatima Ghulam, [1986] AC 527 (HL). 126  Cf. only art. 46 Family Law Act 1986 of England & Wales; art. 57 sections 2.2., 2.3. Belgian PIL code 2004. 127  For an overview cf. Katajoun Alidadi, “The Western Judicial Answer to Islamic Talaq,” UCLA Journal of Islamic & Near Eastern Law 5 (2005): 1–80; Foblets (n. 122). 128  Cf. French Court of Cassation, February 23, 2011, no. 10-14.760, regarding a French-Moroccan case where the spouses had lived separately for three years and the divorce was not qualified as a unilateral divorce by the Moroccan court; Court of Appeals Versailles, March 25, 2010, no. 08/08808; Dutch Supreme Court, July 13, 2001, rechtspraak.nl LJN AB2623 (WPNR 2001 (6470)); Cour d’appel Antwerpen, June 30, 1982, J.D.I. 1982, 740 s. 129  Cf. e.g. Court of Appeals Hamm, March 7, 2006, BeckRS 2007, 00423; Court of Appeals Frankfurt am Main, May 11, 2009, 5 WF 66/09, BeckRS 2009, 24414; Mathias Rohe, “Islamic Law in German Courts,” Hawwa 1 (2003), pp. 46, 50. 130  Cf. Court of Appeals Cagliari, May 16, 2008, No. 198. 131  Cf. Supreme Court, ATS, April 21, 1998, RJ 3563. 132  The Court of Appeals Stuttgart is stricter in its rules; cf. the decisions in IPRax 2000, 427; FamRZ 2004, 25. 133  Court of Cassation, April 29, 2002; after 2005 cf. Court of Appeals Mons, December 20, 2007; Civil court Liège, June 26, 2009; Labor court Brussels, May 27, 2010; but also Labor court Brussels, January 12, 2011. Cf. Foblets (n. 123); Koch (n. 123), pp. 175–8. 134  Older decisions by the Court of Cassation from 2001, 2002 were now overruled since a turn of the same court in 2004 (February 17, 2004, No. 01-11.549, and No. 02-11.618; Court of Cassation, January 3, 2006, No. 04-15.231; Court of Cassation, November 4, 2009, No. 08-20.574). The decisions of 2004 were implicitly approved by the ECHR in the decision of November 8, 2005 (Affaire D.D. c France, no. 3/02, available in the French version at the court’s website ), pointing at the relevant new French decisions.

680   Mathias Rohe the past the differentiation made by German courts equally applied.135 In Austria, the Supreme Court136 from the beginning refused to accept any kind of talaq. There is an emerging trend in PIL to follow a policy of legal symbolism, which means to abstractly defend principles as such instead of deliberating the particularities of a case before the court. The crucial legal question is whether legislative bodies and the courts compare foreign legal norms categorically as with their normative domestic “counterpart” in an abstract way, or whether the results of the strict application of foreign norms must be controlled in specific cases. The abstract “human rights approach” leads to clear results—the rejection of talaq in any case. In addition, it can be used as a political instrument to demonstrate European “cultural self-defense” against Islamic law. The concrete approach is less strict, but it might help the divorced wife, in cases when she wishes to remarry and therefore needs the recognition of the previous talaq, for example.137 In case of non-recognition she would be forced to apply for divorce in European courts, which would often turn out to be equally time-consuming and expensive, particularly if the husband is living in a country which is not easily accessible for judicial correspondence, or if his address is unknown. If the residence permit for the woman is dependent on the new marriage, her need for having the talaq recognized is even more pressing. The abstract “human rights approach” would then turn itself against the person it intends to protect, and the woman is consequently punished twice. The same differences are visible in dealing with polygamous marriages validly conducted under foreign laws. Polygamy fundamentally contradicts European legal standards; therefore it cannot be contracted legally in Europe and is even punishable under many European penal codes. Similarly, polygamous marriages by European citizens or domiciliaries that have been performed abroad are not recognized within the different European legislations.138 The question arises in other cases (where neither citizens nor domiciliaries are involved) as to whether the second wife or other wives can be entitled to claim their rights to maintenance against their husband, rights to participate in the estate of the deceased husband under succession law or in social security claims he acquired during his time of employment. In England, a court has rejected the claim to a widow’s pension by a woman who was engaged in a polygamous marriage, resulting in none of the wives in the marriage

135  The last decisions in this sense were Court of Cassation, July 3, 2001 (Rev. crit. int. privé 2002, 704 note Gannagé). 136  OGH decision of August 31, 2006 (6Ob189/06), Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung 2007, 35; OGH decision of June 28, 2007 (3Ob130/07z); both decisions available at . 137  This was the case in the decisions of the German Supreme Court from 2004 (BGH FamRZ 2004, 1952) and from 2007 (NJW-RR 2007, pp. 145, 148 ss). The same policy seems to be followed in Denmark according to Peter Arnt Nielsen, Internasjonal privat- og procesret (Copenhagen: Gjellerup/Gad, 1997), pp. 69–70. 138  Cf. the English Court of Appeal in Hussain v. Hussain [1982] 1 AllER 369.

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receiving a payment.139 A Dutch court rejected in 2009 the request of the second wife for divorce, because the marriage was not recognized either.140 German social security laws treat polygamous marriages as legally valid, provided that the marriage contracts are valid under laws applicable to them at the time of their conclusion.141 The legal reasoning is not to deprive women in polygamous marriages of their marital rights, including maintenance. Thus, according to German142 and Spanish143 social security laws widow’s pensions are divided among widows who were living in polygamous marriages. In Belgium, widow’s pensions have to be generally divided similarly to the German situation; nevertheless, there is dispute between courts144 as to whether in cases where the first wife has the nationality of a country prohibiting polygamy, the second wife has to be excluded from widow pension claims. The underlying “principle of proximity,” which aims at granting the first wife the full amount of rights in monogamous marriages, applies in France according to the jurisdiction of the Court of Cassation. In consequence, no share of a widow’s pension was granted to the Algerian second wife of a deceased husband who was still married with a French wife.145 In contrast, the same court held that a polygamous marriage valid under the domestic law of either spouse can be recognized.146 Similarly, English courts147 have granted a second wife dower payment agreed upon in the marriage contract under the law of contract, thus separating this particular provision from status issues. The law differentiates between mainly private aspects of marriage and predominantly public ones, especially those relating to immigration law. Italian148 or German149 law for

139  Court of Appeal in Bibi v. Chief Adjudication Officer [1998] 1 FLR 375: none of the widows is accepted to be one legally; cf. the critical remarks of David S. Pearl, Islamic Family Law and Its Reception by the Courts in England, Harvard Law School Islamic Legal Studies program, Occasional Publications, May 2000, p. 14. 140  District Court Utrecht, January 21, 2009, LJN BH 3029. 141  Cf. Regional Court Frankfurt am Main FamRZ 1976, p. 217; Regional Court Osnabrück NJW-RR 1998, p. 582; Local Court Bremen StAZ 1991, pp. 232, 233; Administrative Court of Appeals Kassel NVwZ-RR 1999, pp. 274, 275. 142  Cf. para 34 sect. 2 Social Code I. 143  Cf. Superior Court of Justice of Galicia (TSJ de Galicia, Sala de lo Social), April 2, 2002; Superior Court of Justice of Madid (TSJ de Madrid, Sala de lo Social), July 29, 2002; Superior Court of Justice of Andalusia (TSJ de Andalusia, Sala de lo Social), January 30, 2003; Superior Court of Justice of Catalonia (TSJ de Cataluña, Sala de lo Social), July 30, 2003. 144  Cf. the Belgian Court of Cassation, December 3, 2007, and Constitutional Court, June 4, 2009. The latter equated the situation of simultaneous polygamy to the (well established Belgian) successive polygamy (re-marriage after divorce), which equally leads to shared claims in the public sector pension scheme. The same reasoning can be found in Spanish cases. 145  Court of Cassation, July 6, 1988, No. 85-12.743. 146  Court of Cassation, September 24, 2002, No. 00-15.789. 147 Cf. Shahnaz v. Rizwan [1964] 2 All E.R. 993; Qureshi v. Qureshi [1971] 1 All E.R. 325. 148  Cf. Regional Administrative Court of Emilia-Romagna, December 14, 1994, No. 926; Court of Appeals Turin, April 18, 2001. 149  Cf. OVG Koblenz, March 12, 2004 (10 A 11717/03), available at (July 28, 2012).

682   Mathias Rohe instance, provides only the first wife in polygamous marriages with marital privileges within its scope of application, for example regarding residence permits. Alternatively, a Dutch judgment150 from 2009 accepted such a marriage for immigration purposes, but (more consistently) another Dutch court151 rejected in 2006 the possibility for the second wife to voluntarily participate in the social security scheme of her “husband.” Which are the main reasons for lawyers to decide in such different manners? From a legislative perspective, two types of goals must be considered. One goal would be to establish clear-cut legal norms in absolute accordance with prevailing social mores, in this context, the sole validity of monogamous marriages. This would lead to rejection of polygamous marriages that are legal in other parts of the world and would leave the weaker parties without legal protection, which could encourage the creation of a parallel system of social norms among the parties involved. Suppose the second wife claims maintenance from her husband, wants to participate in inheritance after his death, or wishes a divorce from him. None of these claims can be accommodated if she were to access European courts in cases of conflict. The only solution would then be to resort to informal, socially accepted bodies for granting appropriate remedies. The other goal would be to render justice for individuals who legally enter polygamous marriages in other jurisdictions and who make claims in a jurisdiction that rejects such marriages. In these cases it has to be made clear that accommodation for individuals does not mean acceptance or approval of polygamy. Usually, courts following this approach would first stress in their decisions that polygamy is not accepted as a legal institution. They would then continue by saying that the claimant should not be deprived from her rights which she has reasonably relied on under the legal order which applied at the time of the marriage.

Dispositive Substantive Law A second area for indirect application of foreign legal norms exists within the framework of so-called “optional” civil law. Here, the legislator opens space for private autonomy in creating legal relations. This includes the choice of rules within the given compulsory legal framework. For example, there are various methods of investment that do not violate the Islamic prohibition against usury (riba, which according to traditional interpretations means not accepting or paying interest).152 To enable business financing, Islamic law permits the formation of types of companies (e.g. mudaraba) for this specific purpose.153 In such companies gain and loss is shared among the partners according to the 150 

Rechtsbank Den Haag, November 23, 2009. District court Rotterdam, 20 July 2006, Rechtspraak.nl LJN AY5484 concerning the application of the Treaty regarding Social Security between the Netherlands and Morocco. 152  Cf. Kilian Bälz, “Scharia Jet Set: Islamic Banking,” INAMO Berichte und Analysen 57 (Spring 2009): 14–17 with rich factual background; Luqman Zakariyah, “Legal Maxims and Islamic Financial Transactions: A Case Study of Mortgage Contracts and the Dilemma for Muslims in Britain,” Arab Law Quarterly 26 (2012): 255–85. 153  Cf. Reinhard Klarmann, Islamic Project Finance (Zürich/Bâle/Genève: Schulthess, 2003); Kilian Bälz, “A Murbaha Transaction in an English Court,” ILAS (2004), pp. 11, 117 ss. 151 

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success or failure of the company. None of the partners may thus profit on the expense of the others. In addition, traditional forms of complex sales contracts (e.g. murabaha) are used for the same purpose. This established form of subsequent contracts contains at least two sales contracts regarding one item (e.g. a machine for industrial production), where the margin of profit for the buyer/re-seller is determined as a part of the second contract. Thus, a bank financing the purchase of the machine by the entrepreneur would first buy the machine and then sell it to her customer. Functionally, the denominated margin of profit replaces the interest rate to be paid if the purchase would be financed by credit. None of these transactions would contradict European contract laws in general.154 European states started to use such instruments or facilitated them by legal amendments. Thus, in the UK a special vehicle for “Islamic mortgages” has been developed, enabling Muslims to purchase real estate while avoiding conflicts over riba on the basis of a murabaha. This combination of transactions was financially unattractive, since full stamp tax had to be paid for either of the transactions, while economically only one transaction was intended. Now, stamp tax has to be paid only once. In 2005, the German state of Sachsen-Anhalt offered “Islamic” bonds replacing interest payments by broadly accepted instruments of financial participation in the state’s real estate property to attract Muslim investors. Similarly, investments prohibiting engagement in alcohol and pork production and pornography, for example, are now offered in many European countries by Islamic or other banks.155 This is taken to be a kind of ethical economics which usually does not cause any legal problems in principle. In the field of matrimonial law, introduction of Islamic norms into marriage contracts has also been addressed within several European legal systems. This field gains prime importance in the European states following the Rome III regulation on international divorce law from December 2010.156 This regulation prefers the law of habitual residence as the prime connecting factor in international cases, adding the possibility to choose the law of nationality of either spouse. The same system applies in the new EU regulation on succession and wills from July 2012.157 In all the European states which followed the principle of nationality in family matters until now, there will be a dramatic shift in numbers from “international” to “internal” cases in the future, since jurisdiction rules usually lead to the courts of habitual residence, which then will regularly apply the law of the land. Instead of controlling the application of foreign laws by international public order, the stricter principles of internal legal order (“good morals”) will apply. Institutions of Islamic family law will now regularly be scrutinized by the principles of the established family law rules. This is 154  Cf. e.g. Michael Mahlknecht, Islamic Finance (München: C. H. Beck, 2008); Hans-Georg Ebert and Friedrich Thießen, Das islamkonforme Finanzgeschäft (Stuttgart: Deutscher Sparkassenverlag, 2010), Michael Gassner and Philipp Wackerbeck, Islamic Finance, 2nd edn. (Köln: Bank-Verlag, 2010). 155  Cf. Rohe 2011, pp. 368 ss. According to newspaper reports, there are such developments for example in the UK, in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, and Austria; no in depthresearch results have been published yet on this issue. 156  EU regulation no. 1259/2010. 157  EU regulation no. 650/2012.

684   Mathias Rohe certainly a major challenge for European lawyers, since European family laws are certainly based on Christian perceptions of marriage, while being “secularized” during the last decades.158 Reasonable accommodation has to be sought by clarifying misunderstandings and false conflicts in cases where legal institutions are in fact not contradictory, and to examine to what extent party autonomy opens space for private choice in arranging marriage, in cases such as matrimonial property, for example.159 Contractual conditions regulating the payment of dower (mahr or sadaq)160 in Muslim marriages in particular, had to be judged.161 It should be noted that such payments are due to the bride,162 not to her father/family as is the case in other customary law practices among Kurds,163 or in countries such as Yemen, Afghanistan, or Pakistan which are not recognizable under European laws,164 including Turkey.165 Such payments would be considered as a sales price for the bride, which would challenge her human dignity as well as her free will to decide whether or not to marry. To the contrary, mahr claims would only improve the legal situation of the bride, and thus cannot be considered to violate her rights.166 On the other hand, taking the payment of mahr as an indispensable prerequisite for a valid marriage could violate European public policy, since this could contradict the principles of freedom of marriage and equality of the spouses.167 Often the dower payment is divided into two parts: the first one due at the time of the marriage is only symbolic, whereas the second part is due at the time of (unilateral) divorce by the husband or at his death. This regulation can be an effective instrument of protection for wives who, according to traditional Islamic law, can only claim post-marital maintenance for three months, or as a tool for bargaining over the post-marital custody for children, which is generally distributed according to patriarchal principles—the wife can then waive her claim for the deferred mahr in exchange for the husband’s agreement on a favorable custody regulation. In Britain, according to

158  Cf. Gerhard Dilcher and Ilse Staff (eds.), Christentum und modernes Recht (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984), the contributions of Gerhard Dilcher (“Ehescheidung und Säkularisation,” pp. 304–59) and Helmut Coing (“Die Auseinandersetzung um kirchliches und staatliches Eherecht im Deutschland des 19. Jahrhunderts,” pp. 360–75) in particular. 159  The results of the relevant RELIGARE research were published in 2013; cf. also the case law data available at the RELIGARE database (accessible at ). 160  For details cf. Rohe 2011, pp. 85 ss. 161  Cf. the study of Pascale Fournier on the application of mahr provisions in Western courts (2010, pp. 35–100 in particular). 162  This was stressed by the French Court of Cassation, November 22, 2005, No. 03-14.961: therefore, the mahr cannot be qualified as a “prix de vente.” 163  Cf. Christian Rumpf, Einführung in das türkische Recht (München: C. H. Beck, 2004), p. 118. 164  Cf. e.g. Court of Appeals Hamm, January 13, 2011 (I-18 U 88/10). 165  The Court of Cassation has rejected a başlık para claim due to a “breach of the law and ethical values” of the country; T.C. Yargıtay (19. Civ) no. 2009/6565; decision no. 2010/4421. 166 The mahr was misinterpreted in this sense by Regional court Köln IPRspr. 1980 no. 83; Court of Appeals Lyon, December 2, 2002, reversed by Court of Cassation (1ère civ) November 22, 2005, no. 03-14.961. 167  Cf. the relevant French decision by the Supreme Court (1ère civ) April 4, 1978 (Benziane), and the Belgian decision Court of Appeals Ghent, September 12, 1994 (the lack of dower alone is no proof for the

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a court decision in 2010168 such an agreement was accepted, whereas before they were taken to be void among British citizens or domiliciaries for violation of British public policy.169 Dutch,170 French,171 and German172 courts have similarly accepted these agreements in principle. On the other hand, a Danish court173 has qualified such agreements as simple donation promises, which then usually are in need of specific forms of contracting often unknown to the parties. This does not necessarily meet the complexity of such agreements, which could become meaningful for the couple when leaving for a country governed by Islamic family law, and clearly indicates the need for more in-depth information about Islamic law institutions in European courts.174 In some cases widespread prejudice concerning Muslims might be invoked by the parties themselves. In a German case from 1998, a Turkish wife having accepted a guarantee in favor of her husband claimed that, being married to a Turkish Muslim, she was not free to decide on the contract. By this argument she wanted to have the contract declared void for lack of free will. She did not provide concrete evidence for having been pressed or forced into this contract, but only argued on the basis of an abstract view on “suppressed Muslim wives.” The German Supreme Court175 rejected this claim and clearly stated that there is no room for the presumption of Turkish wives living in a “typical Muslim marriage” to be deprived from autonomous decision-making in daily life without any concrete evidence in the particular case. On the other hand, such prejudice has to be rejected when used against Muslims. In a German case in 2010, an insurance company refused to pay damages to a Muslim pensioner who was hurt in a road accident for the time he was unable to care for the household (which he had done for years) while his wife was still working as an employee. The reason for the payment refusal was the alleged “fact” that Muslim men do not wash

lack of consent between the spouses); but see also Court of Appeals Bruxelles, February 1, 1994 (JLMB 1994, 599) and May 10, 1996 (RTDF 1998, 43), where the lack of dower was taken as an evidence for the lack of consent, but only among other elements indicating a sham marriage. 168  Radmacher v. Granatino [2010] UKSC 42. The prior decision approving mahr (Uddin v. Choudhury [2009] EWCA Civ 1205) concerned a case of informal marriage. 169  Information given to the author by Alberto Neidhardt from University of London/Queen Mary College in 2011. 170  Rb Alkmaar, October 16, 2008; Rb Rotterdam, February 22, 2010. 171  Court of Cassation, December 2, 1997, no. 95-20.026 and November 22, 2005, no. 03-14.961. 172  Federal Supreme Court, NJW 1999, p. 574; OLG Celle FamRZ 1998, p. 374; OLG Saarbruecken NJW-RR 2005, p. 1306. 173  Eastern High Court of Denmark, April 6, 2005; for possible functions of mahr in Denmark cf. Niels V. Vinding and Lisbet Christoffersen, Danish Regulation of Religion, State of Affairs and Qualitative Reflections (Copenhagen, August 2012), p. 38. 174  In a seminar for European judges organized within the RELIGARE research framework in December 2011 the participants unanimously expressed the need to build up easily accessible information structures for courts and administrations. As an example for the necessity of detailed information cf. Werner Menski, “Life and Law: Advocacy and Expert Witnessing in the UK,” in Holden 2011, pp. 151, 168 ss. in particular. 175  BGH NJW 1999, 135.

686   Mathias Rohe dishes or care for the household in other ways according to the “traditional patriarchal male self-understanding in marriage.” After media reports of the case were disseminated, the company decided to pay.176 Both cases demonstrate how parties try to navigate by using prejudice to their respective advantage, and how critical it is for lawyers to carefully handle the facts.

Introduction of Islamic Provisions into the Law of the Land Islamic norms were applied in the European territories under Islamic rule from the Middle Ages until the end of the Ottoman Empire. Today such norms are part of the legal system only in Greece regarding the Muslims of Turkish and Bulgarian origin in Thrace according to the Lausanne Treaty 1923 (see the chapter on Greece). They still live under shariah law based on Ottoman family law.177 In fact, the legal “freeze” by the Lausanne Treaty is increasingly at odds with the family law reforms within Turkey in the course of the “secularization policy” under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the 1920s. They started in 1926, when the Swiss Civil Code provisions on family law, which were patriarchal in Christian-European style of the time, replaced the former shariah-inspired laws. The secularization policy was last amended in 2002 with a completely gender-neutral legislation. A paper on family law and the full implementation of gender equality drafted on behalf of the Ministry of Justice proposes the abolishment of the shariah regime introduced in Greece. Due to delicate political questions at stake, the Greek government does not seem to be inclined to present similar suggestions to the parliament.178 A few European states have introduced Islamic legal provisions concerning family matters that can be applied in Muslim communities on a voluntary basis. As to the celebration of marriages in Britain, Muslim institutions may apply to become entitled to register marriages under the Marriage Act 1949 section 46 with civil effects. In Spain, since 1992 Islamic legal norms regulating marriage contracts have been applied to Muslims179 in tandem with compulsory secular state provisions for the registration of these marriages.180 Furthermore, according to the Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act of 2002, courts can require the dissolution of a religious marriage before granting a civil divorce.181 The Adoption and Children Act of 2002 amended the Children Act of 1989, 176  Cf. the report “Ein Muslim spült nicht ab,” September 25, 2010, available at (July 30, 2012). 177  Cf. Konstantinos Tsitselikis, “The Legal Status of Islam in Greece,” in Rohe (guest ed.), Sharī’a in Europe, Die Welt des Islams 3/44 (2004), 402, 417 ss.; Konstantinos Tsitselikis, Old and New Islam in Greece: From Historical Minorities to Immigrant Newcomers (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), pp. 367 ss. 178  For a critical report on the current situation cf. Lina Papadopoulou, “Trapped in History: Greek Muslim Women Under the Sacred Islamic Law” (2010), available at (October 11, 2011). 179  Cf. Joaquín Mantecón-Sancho, “L’Islam en Espagne,” in Potz and Wieshaider (eds.) (n. 60), pp. 109, 130 ss. 180  Cf. Article 59 Código Civil in conjunction with the administrative provision of the general directorate of the Civil Registry and the Notary from February 10, 1993. 181  Cf. Lord Nazir Ahmad, “Notes on the Judicial Situation of Muslims in the United Kingdom,” in Thorsten Schneiders and Lamya Kaddor (eds.), Muslime im Rechtsstaat (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2005), p. 72;

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introducing “special guardianship” provisions to enable parental relationships by legal means other than adoption, which is forbidden by Islamic law.182 This option is not formulated on the basis of religion and is thus open to all, irrespective of religion. The formal incorporation of Islamic law is nevertheless an exceptional case relating to merely formal legal provisions like the procedural aspects of marriage contracts, and not the substantive ones. In contrast, potential substantive aspects like the minimum age of marriage, polygamy, or repudiation (talaq) pronounced on European soil, are not accepted under domestic substantive law. In other European countries, such legislation has not been proposed. In Germany, most Muslims of Turkish and Bosnian origin would vehemently oppose the introduction of shariah legal norms: according to their understanding, traditional Islamic family and inheritance law, which was abolished in their home countries long ago, contains unacceptable patriarchal concepts and legal inequality of religions. Moreover, personal-status laws based on traditional mores of particular religious communities often conflict with modern law codes that secular European countries formulate and enforce for their populations as a whole. European states maintain centralized control over the definition and enforcement of core rights and duties of the citizenry as a whole, irrespective of ethnic, religious, or other group affiliation. Thus when conflicts arise between commonly defined individual rights and collective claims, the former will prevail. This is why European family laws, which follow the principle of equal treatment of sexes, religions, and beliefs of all citizens and inhabitants, cannot accept the implementation of collective normative systems opposing these basic principles. The constitutions in force would not permit another solution, for example, the introduction of laws that would abolish gender-neutral equal rights in favor of a system of mere “equal dignity.” Given the fact that European family laws to a large extent contain mandatory rules (e.g. regarding the prerequisites for valid marriages and divorces), personal and family matters cannot be seen as merely “private.”

Internal Reasons Technical/Institutional Reasons In cases of intermarriage and transnational conduct of life, the persons involved may have a mere technical interest to create legal relations recognized in all the countries involved, irrespective of the concrete contents or the religious connotation of the law. Problems arise when some religiously-founded foreign state laws do not recognize decisions on marriage, divorce, or custody by secular states in matters of family law, while they would recognize informal acts by religious personnel or (ADR) decisions on the basis of the same religiously-orientated laws. According to verbal reports by many

Urfan Khaliq, “Islam and the European Union: Report on the United Kingdom,” in Potz and Wieshaider (eds.) (n. 60), pp. 219, 246 ss. 182 

1987).

Cf. Qur’an surah 33, 4. s; art. “tabanni” in wizarat al-awqaf, al-mawsu’at al-fiqhiya, vol. 10 (Kuwait,

688   Mathias Rohe family lawyers, this seems to be the case in Morocco,183 Iran, Pakistan,184 and Tunisia, despite the fact that Tunisia went far in recognizing foreign decisions contrary to traditional Islamic family law.185 To give a practical example dealt with in the German local court of Siegburg in late 2011,186 a couple living in Germany, married according to Iranian law in Iran, asked for a divorce in Germany. According to German PIL, Iranian family law had to be applied in this case. Both spouses agreed to the divorce. The wife intended to travel to Iran with her children for an urgent family visit, but then wanted to return with the children to Germany. According to information about the legal situation in Iran, the parties were aware that the husband could challenge the German divorce to be invalid under Iranian law because the German court’s declaration of divorce would not be accepted to properly replace the husband’s pronunciation of the Islamic talaq or his agreement to a khul‛divorce. In consequence, the husband was able to claim that the couple was still married, being able then to prevent the wife and the children from leaving the country without his consent. Thus, the court in a very exceptional manner decided to overcome the problem of recognition by making the husband sign the procedural files, declaring his consent to the divorce. A representative of the Iranian embassy and an imam were also invited to the procedure. Though this was not usual “German” procedure, an additional service was accommodated for the sake of the parties. Nevertheless, usually courts are either unaware or not inclined to assist parties in this way. Parties are then forced into informal procedures fulfilling the prerequisites of the legal order in the parties’ country of origin. In other cases known to the author, mere formal reasons such as the lack of documents required for marriages under the law of the land might draw immigrants, such as Iraqi refugees in Germany, to enter into informal religious marriages in order to create socially accepted fundamentals for living together.

Cultural Reasons Many groups of Muslim immigrants maintain the structures of family life current in their countries of origin. Some of them are reluctant to use the legal remedies provided by the law of the state they are living in because they believe that they are bound to legal

183 

For Morocco (non-recognition of Belgian, Danish, and Dutch decisions) cf. also the references in L. Jordens-Cotran, Nieuw Marokkaans Familierecht en Nederlands IPR (Den Haag: Sdu uitgevers bv, 2007); Mohamed Loukili, “L’ordre public en droit international privé marocain de la famille,” in Bernard-Maugiron and Dupret 2010, pp. 138–58 in particular. 184  For Iran and Pakistan cf. also Kirsten Cherry, “Marriage and Divorce Law in Pakistan and Iran: The Problem of Recognition,” Tulsa Journal of Comparative & International Law 8.2. & 9.1. (2001): 319–54. 185  Cf. Monia Benjemia, Souhayma Ben Achour, and Meriem Bellamie, “L’ordre public en droit international public Tunisien de la famille,” in Bernard-Maugiron and Dupret (2010), pp. 217–32 in particular (the article deals with private international law). 186 Unpublished. Cf. the report “Scheidung mit Richter und Mullah, KStA,” November 16, 2012, available at .

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orders different from the law of the land. Others are simply unaware of the fact that in certain matters, including those pertaining to family law, the formal legal rules of the state of residence have to be observed for creating legally enforceable relations. There is evidence on that particularly regarding Muslims in Britain.187 For three decades some dozen188 informal “Islamic shariah councils” have been in operation in the country. The procedural formalities and the qualifications of the members are highly diverse.189 They are mainly dealing with divorce issues regarding legally invalid, but religio-socially accepted Islamic marriages, or valid marriages in cases when the social environment does not accept the civil divorce alone for cultural or religious reasons, or if such procedures are necessary to obtain recognition in the country of origin. In this case, husbands are asked to agree to the Islamic divorce by pronouncing a talaq or by agreeing on a khul‛ or mubarat (cf. above). Since all kinds of solutions stay in the hands of the husband, he has the potential to exercise pressure on the wife regarding her claims to mahr, which then have to be waived in favor of the husband.190 The decisions of such institutions are not legally binding,191 but may gain considerable social relevance. Here, accessible information about the rules of the law of the land for immigrants is needed. In addition, a lack of cultural sensitivity in some state institutions including courts may lead to distrust and reluctance. Evidence, e.g. from Canada,192 supports this view. The author came across an example of a German family court to which a Turkish woman applied for divorce. She had been forced into her marriage, was severely abused and virtually imprisoned by her husband during the ten years of her stay in Germany. At last, she dared to apply for divorce. In the courtroom, one of the first questions the judge raised in a strict tone was why translation into German was needed, since the applicant

187  Cf. Jørgen Nielsen, Emerging Claims of Muslim Populations in Matters of Family Law in Europe, CSIC-MR Birmingham, CSIC Paper no. 10, November 1993; Pearl and Menski 1998, pp. 51 ss., 73 ss.; Shah-Kazemi 2001; Prakash Shah, In Pursuit of the Pagans: Muslim Law in the English Context, RELIGARE working papers, March 2012, available at (July 30 2012). 188  The number is unclear. Samia Bano has contacted 30 tribunals. The figures given range from 30 to 80 approximately. One of the biggest institutions is the London-based shariah council, which according to its own statistics has dealt with 3,000 cases from 1996–2002 and 2,000 cases from 2003–5, mainly concerning Muslim women’s applications for Islamic divorce (cf. the Council’s website, available at ); cf. also John Bowen (who did the broadest research on shariah councils in the UK so far), “How Could English Courts Recognize Sharia?,” University of St. Thomas Law Journal 7(3), pp. 411, 418 ss., available at . 189  Cf. Bano 2012a, pp. 19 ss. 190  Cf. Bano 2007, pp. 2–26. 191  Cf. the British decision in Al-Midani v. Al-Midani [1999] C.L.C. 904, regarding a decision of such a body in an inheritance dispute among Muslim sisters; the arbitration agreement pointing to an “Islamic judicial body” to be involved was not considered to be fulfilled, since the Islamic shariah council had no statutory authority. 192  Cf. Anne Saris, Jean-Mathieu Potvin, Naïma Bendriss, Wendy Ayotte, and Samia Amor, Étude de cas auprès de Canadiennes musulmanes et d’intervenants civils et religieux en résolution de conflits familiaux (Monréal, March 2007), p. 44.

690   Mathias Rohe had lived a considerable time in the country. Such behavior certainly has the potential to deter potential applicants from resorting to state institutions. A new phenomenon of Islamic marriages has emerged according to reports from several European countries. Some couples explicitly intend to avoid legal consequences under the law of the land (e.g. mutual claims to maintenance and rights to inheritance; costly procedures in case of divorce; loss of social benefits due to sufficient financial means of the spouse), but wish to give their relationship social legitimacy, particularly to placate their parents and families. In some reported cases,193 couples who fall in love and want to marry against the will of their families can exercise pressure on them by the “fait accompli,” which is a kind of revival of marriages agreed upon within the family after the groom has “abducted” the bride, leaving parental consent to this marriage as the sole option for keeping “family honor.” Evidence from Denmark shows that such couples tend to marry validly under the law of the land when children are born or when they decide to purchase real estate property.194 Apart from the religious legitimization aiming at the social environment, this behavior reflects common usage in present Western societies.195

Religious Reasons As regards religious reasons, there are two attitudes which fundamentally differ regarding the law of the land. First, Islamic norms may be applied within the existing framework of the law of the land as far as this law is dispositive for the parties involved. This is the case in vast parts of contract law (cf. above). In addition, attempts to neutrally reconcile family members in case they are voluntarily seeking religious advice are possible under European legal orders and mostly welcomed. The second case—fundamentally different from the one above—is the informal application of Islamic norms for reasons of religiously driven rejection of “worldly” laws given by “infidels.” “Eternal God-given law” is then (wrongly) opposed to “weak man-made law.”196 For example, a former imam in a Berlin mosque (Masjid al-Nur) has published a book in 2001 in Riyadh under the (Arabic) title of The Rules in Family Matters for Muslim Minorities in Germany.197 In this book, he constantly calls German laws and court decisions to be “norms of unbelief ” (ahkam al-kufr)198 and appeals to Muslims to

193  Cf. Anika Liversage, “Secrets and Lies: When Ethnic Minority Youth Have a Nikah,” in Prakash Shah et al. (eds.), Family, Religion and Law: Cultural Encounters in Europe, pp. 165–80. 194  Cf. Liversage, “Secrets and Lies: When Ethnic Minority Youth Have a Nikah.” 195  This was the unanimous impression of the presenters in the RELIGARE conference held in London on September 3, 2012 (papers to be published in the volume mentioned in n. 194). 196  Cf. only the appeal of an extremist Belgian group published in 2011, “Oh Moslims! Blijf weg bij hun rechtbanken,” available at . 197 Sālim Ibn, ‛Abd al-Ghanī al-Rāfi‛ī, ahkām al-ahwāl al-šakhsīya li-l-muslimīn fī l-gharb. 198 Sālim Ibn, ‛Abd al-Ghanī al-Rāfi‛ī, ahkām al-ahwāl al-šakhsīya li-l-muslimīn fī l-gharb, p. 618.

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always obey shariah family law rules alone. This imam demands that traditional Islamic law punishment for illegitimate sexual relationship, called zina, which is stoning to death or lashing, should apply to Muslims in Germany. In his opinion this should even be extended to cases of marriage between a Muslim wife and a non-Muslim husband (which is void under Islamic law), and even in cases where the parties are unaware of the traditional Islamic rules. Furthermore, he describes the German system of social care as an evil, which enables women to disregard their marital duty of “obedience” (ta‛a) to the husband because the social system removes that need for his maintenance payments.199 Such attitudes towards the leading principles of gender equality, the equality of religions and beliefs, and human rights standards in penal law are certainly a challenge both for the existing secular legal orders as well as for the vast majority of Muslims who do not understand their religion in this extremist way. The same is certainly true regarding Salafi extremists who feel entitled to kill others when “protecting their religion,” such as in cases of alleged blasphemy.200 Two points regarding the European legal framework and shariah norms should be made clear. First, the fundamental principles of European legal orders cannot be subject to reduction or abolition. Second, the vast majority of Muslims in Europe seemingly supports fundamental European principles rather than rejects them (cf. the sources mentioned above). In the field of private law, mainly in the UK201 a broader discussion has emerged among Muslims on the (optional) introduction of a Muslim law of personal status and inheritance. Given the present status of legal developments and evidence from Islamic shariah councils in Britain, this would lead to forms of legal inequality of sexes and religions.202 At a conference in Leiden in June 2011 on shariah in the West,203 Shaykh Fayz Siddiqi, a leader in the field of shariah councils, explained the philosophy of the British Muslim Arbitration Tribunals (MAT) established since 2007 in London, Birmingham, Bradford, Manchester, and Nuneaton under the Arbitration Act (1996)204 regarding their working practices and results. Contrary to the informally working

199 Sālim Ibn, ‛Abd al-Ghanī al-Rāfi‛ī, ahkām al-ahwāl al-šakhsīya li-l-muslimīn fī l-gharb, p. 79.

200  A Turkish Salafi extremist (Murat K., 26 years old) severely hurt two police officers in Bonn, Germany, on May 5, 2012, during a protest by a right-wing organization (Pro NRW) against Muhammad cartoons. The culprit declared that he felt and still feels obliged to enforce the “values of Islam” violently, and that he does not accept freedom of expression if it contradicts Islam (according to his interpretation). He demonstrated his rejection of secular institutions by refusing to rise in the courtroom, cf. the report “Mit Gewalt für den Islam,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, October 11, 2012, p. 6. 201  Cf. the references in n. 187 and Klausen 2007, p. 190 s. 202  Cf. Shah-Kazemi 2001; Richard Freeland and Martin Lau, “The Shari’a and English Law: Identity and Justice for British Muslims,” in Asifa Quraishi and Frank E. Vogel (eds.), The Islamic Marriage Contract: Case Studies in Islamic Family Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), pp. 331–47 (pp. 340 ss. in particular); Bano 2012a, 2012b; Maleiha Malik 2012. 203  Information available at . 204  A broader report on religious laws and legal institutions in England and Wales including Islamic rules has been recently published by Douglas et al. 2011. Cf. also the website of the MAT, available at .

692   Mathias Rohe shariah councils (cf. above), the MAT are entitled to issue formal awards under this Act, e.g. related to commercial disputes including economic issues arising from family disputes. In family status issues (most notably divorce and custody of children) they have no formal competence,205 but aim at providing informal aid, e.g. in cases of social need for an Islamic divorce206 equal to other shariah councils. Nevertheless, decisions of the MAT might gain additional legal effect in other countries, if they are recognized there. Thus, they have undeniable relevance in the field of law, while not directly under the law of England and Wales. Moreover, if they are issued in larger numbers, they may create a certain normative culture among those Muslims who attribute normative authority to them. Thus, the legal system of the law of the land is inevitably concerned by the normative basis of such decisions, if it differs from the law of the land. In fact, at the conference mentioned above Siddiqi explained that a great number of cases are dealing with divorce, due to the need or wish of the (mostly female) applicant to obtain a document leading to social acceptance of the divorce and of a subsequent new marriage.207 Being asked about gender-biased provisions of traditional Islamic divorce law, he downplayed the totally different legal positions of husband and wife in matters of repudiation by suggesting there was no significant difference between the two, the husband giving the declaration of divorce and the wife receiving it. The exclusive right of the husband to pronounce the repudiation (talaq) of the wife as well as other gender-biased regulations in favor of the husband and thus the dimension of legal-cultural conflicts between traditional shariah provisions and European family law was not even considered. This attitude does not necessarily reflect the work of these institutions as a whole. To the contrary, Samia Bano208 has stated that the twenty-two shariah councils in the UK she contacted seek to avoid any conflict with civil law, e.g. by requiring the civil divorce of a registered marriage before issuing an Islamic divorce. Furthermore, John Bowen sheds light on the fact that the shariah councils are considerably diverse in their attitudes regarding gender relations.209 Nevertheless, it is likely to trigger more resistance against them among the broader public, since it seems to verify the widespread prejudice against shariah law mentioned earlier. The work of such councils and tribunals seems to serve persons seeking religious support, but also those living in considerable distance to the British legal institutions, who seek socially acceptable conflict regulations within the community. This is equally true for cases when divorces under British law are not fully accepted by the parties or the community unless the Islamic divorce (by talaq or khul‛) has also taken place.210 The

205  Cf. Douglas et al. 2011, pp. 17, 22 s. Cf. also Robert Blacklett, “The Status of Religious ‘Courts’ in English Law,” Disputes and International Arbitration Newsletter (2009), pp. 11, 13. 206  Cf. the MAT website, available at (December 9, 2012). 207  Bano 2012b, p. 93, and elsewhere. 208  Bano 2012a, p. 24. 209  Bowen 2012, pp. 84 ss, reporting some concrete cases decided in favor of the wives. 210  For details cf. Shah-Kazemi 2001; Bowen 2012, pp. 84 ss.

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price to be paid then is a considerable lack of rights in comparison to the standards of the law of the land,211 as far as the councils follow traditional divorce rules. In 2011, Lady Cox, a member of the House of Lords, introduced a bill proposal (Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill) aimed at preventing Muslim tribunals from making decisions in family and criminal law and from using discriminatory practices like giving a woman’s testimony less weight than a man’s.212 The second reading in the House of Lords took place on October 19, 2012. No decisions have been made so far. The British Academy Policy Centre has issued a briefing on this bill213 which contains a possible viable solution: The preferred option is to apply cultural voluntarism and mainstreaming on a pragmatic basis. These build on current legal structures and allow minority groups to operate their legal order among themselves, without giving them the endorsement of state law,214 but providing opportunities for individuals to access the state system where it applies to them or where their actions have legal consequences under the ordinary law [. . .]. The state retains the power to withhold such consequences from activities that conflict with “liberal constitutional norms” and some activities may be completely prohibited particularly if they cause harm [. . .]. This allows flexibility: for the state, to decide on a case-by-case basis whether to intervene, and to individuals, to move between groups, and between such groups and the state system.

For European countries, except the UK, there is little information about Muslim attitudes towards Muslim religious norms being applied in a binding way by imams or Muslim scholars. According to interviews conducted by Jytte Klausen among 300 European Muslim leaders from September 2003 to February 2005, a large majority of interviewees outside the UK (mostly more than 70%, as compared to only 20% in the UK) rejected the statement that secular civil law should respect religious law and allow imams and Islamic scholars to decide on legally binding decisions for Muslims living

211  For details cf. Shah-Kazemi 2001; Maleiha Malik, “Feminism, Multiculturalism and Minority Women,” in Alison Diduck and Katherine O’Donovan (eds.), Feminist Perspectives on Family Law (London: Routledge, 2006), 211–31; Rohe 2011, pp. 380 ss. 212  Available at . For supportive and critical voices cf. the report “Bill limiting Sharia law is motivated by concern for Muslim women,” The Guardian, June 8, 2011, available at . In June 2010 already the “One Law For All campaign” has been launched against the application of shariah law in Britain; cf. the website . 213  British Academy Policy Centre, “The Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill,” available at (November 11, 2012), p. 3, no. 11 s. 214  Jean-François Gaudreault-Desbiens, “Religious Courts’ Recognition Claims: Two Qualitatively Distinct Narratives,” in Ahdar and Aroney 2010, 59–69, rightly points to the problems linked with religiously based claims of collective recognition of a parallel legal system. Cf. also his chapter on “Religious Courts, Personal Federalism, and Legal Transplants,” in Ahdar and Aroney 2010, 159–80.

694   Mathias Rohe in the country.215 European legal orders generally admit formal, legally binding ADR (adjudication) in commercial disputes,216 but reject it regarding family status issues (e.g. marriage, divorce, custody), including England and Wales.217 In the latter fields state protection and transparent procedures granted by state courts are taken to be of prime importance. Even for the UK it is not totally clear whether the MAT operating presently are entitled or willing to decide such cases.

Concluding Observations In many European countries there is a considerable gap between the legal attitude towards Islam and shariah norms on one hand and the public perception and debate on the other. Obviously, shariah is taken to be “the other” in political debates irrespective of its fields and interpretations, which are partly in accordance with the law of the land and in part contradict it. Generally, the diversity of shariah rules and interpretations covering mainly non-legal issues is vastly ignored in the European public. At the same time, there is a considerable lack of awareness in European societies as a whole regarding the legal framework of freedom of religion, equal treatment, and the true meaning of “secular” law. The scope and limits of the application of Islamic norms are highly dependent on the respective national tradition regulating the relations between the state and religions. Nevertheless, a broad common standard of religious freedom is granted by article 9 of the ECHR. European legal systems seem to be well prepared in general to accommodate the religion of Muslims, granting far-reaching and equal rights. This attitude is in contrast to many political moves trying to formulate a European or national self-definition in sharp segregation from Islam and shariah in a very simplifying manner and in contradiction to hitherto liberal legal standards. This might have had some impact on restrictive legislation, as is the case in several European countries like Switzerland (e.g. the minaret ban), France, Belgium, the Netherlands (e.g. the burqa-ban), and Austria (the intention to prevent building mosques by only formally neutral state laws), and on the arguing in court decisions like those of the ECHR in the case of Refah Partisi.

215 

Klausen 2007, p. 192. Cf. e.g. cases from Britain concerning an award rendered by an Ahmadi Qdha Board tribunal in a dispute over the beneficial ownership of property (Bhatti v. Bhatti [2009] EWHC 3506 (Ch)); concerning a contractual requirement that disputes are to be resolved by an arbitrator drawn from a specific religious community (Jivraj v. Hashwami [2010] EWCA Civ 712). 217  Cf. e.g. the Danish decision of Eastern High Court of Denmark, February 21, 2006 (OE2006.B-3980-05), rejecting a custody contract arranged by an imam and the Dutch case Supreme Court, January 20, 2006 (available at rechtsprak.nl: LJN: AU3724; RvdW 2006, 107) stressing that maintenance claims agreed upon in a mediation agreement cannot be enforced after one of the partners rejected to stick to the agreement; similarly the same court on April 10, 2009 (LJN BG9470, RvdW 2009, 512). 216 

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From a legal perspective, the normative system of shariah has to be discerned by its religious and legal parts. The former enjoy the full protection of religious freedom in all fields of the law formally and informally. The latter are restricted according to the law of the land to precisely defined fields like private international law, internal optional civil law, and some related issues mentioned already as far as they are formally applied or brought forward. On the informal level there are indications in various European countries, e.g. the UK, that some groups of Muslims resort to shariah rules for various reasons, including small numbers of Salafi or other extremist individuals and organizations openly opposing the governing legal system. In general, legal pluralism as such usually does not endanger socio-legal cohesion in mere “international” cases with few links to the state of a temporary stay, which can be sufficiently tackled by appropriate rules of private international law, whereas “internal” cases involving residents do have such a potential. How then to properly differentiate between “international” and “internal”? In this regard, I would favor choosing habitual residence as the most significant connecting factor in family law issues, as immigration countries usually do for good reasons. Concerning internal law, thorough studies of the scope and limits for dispositive law and ADR are necessary. In the field of family relations, state protection countering typical imbalances of power in family relations seems to be indispensable. Thus, most Western legal orders are restricting options especially with respect to basic legal institutions and ADR.218 Nevertheless, such protection has to be based on sound information about the facts of the cases to be dealt with, and has to respect the broad scope of individual preferences in social life as long as they duly respect the rights of others. In this sense, the system of a uniform secular law for all must not be mistaken with demands for “one rule for all.”219 Instead, private autonomy being an important part of European legal orders has to be taken seriously. It is indispensable for reasonable accommodation of all societal groups including religious ones. To overcome mere technical or institutional problems by applying the law of the land, international efforts to improve the mutual recognition of state decisions are needed. For the cases of lack of documents, administrations and courts should be ready to find creative solutions or make more use of hardship rules. Immigrants from countries maintaining a personal law system should be reasonably informed about the legal situation of their new home country. This includes information about the role of state law and institutions in family-related issues: in the West, the state and its legal system have achieved a strong position during the last centuries. Problems remain in cases where parties are reluctant to bring their cases to state courts for various reasons. If they refrain from doing so without any state-recognized alternative, the conflicts will remain and might even increase. Thus, if state court solutions are 218  Cf. the impressive study of Bano (2012b) on shariah councils in the UK. According to her research, gender-related inequality of bargaining (and decision-making) power is widespread in these institutions. 219  Cf. Zucca, A Secular Europe, p. 133; cf. also Jeremy Waldron, “Questions about the Reasonable Accommodation of Minorities,” in Ahdar and Aroney 2010, 103–13.

696   Mathias Rohe to be maintained, it is absolutely necessary to react to those reasons for possible rejection which can be altered without touching the content of the law. One practical solution is to increase information and cultural sensitivity among judges and administrations.220 Secular legal orders in liberal societies have only limited instruments for implementation and self-perpetuation. They basically rely on the broad societal acceptance of their fundamental rules and convictions. But can such legal orders not only be obeyed, but be accepted by devout Muslims as being “theirs” as well? The overwhelming majority of Muslims living in the West seems to answer in favor of that. They recognize that these legal orders equally search for justice. Understanding the “maqasid al-shari’a,” the deeper reasons for Islamic rules, in search for an overlapping consensus between them and the rules of secular states could be a viable solution on a contemporary intellectual level. It is strongly recommended to support the development of Muslim research and the educational system driven by such thinking, dealing with the conditions of life in secular societies and their basic values. Muslims should take their fair part in the common debate about the future of our common laws. On the other hand, equal standards in granting reasonable accommodation by individual choice within this framework have to be defended—even against majorities—according to the rule of law. The secular democratic state under the rule of law can only succeed by visibility in daily practice. Last but not least, research on shariah in Europe is still in its infancy, despite a considerable number of valuable studies mentioned in this chapter. First, the scope and density of research varies significantly between European countries. Whereas the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Austria, and Denmark are covered to a remarkable extent in general, there are lacunae regarding nearly all countries in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. The same is true to a lesser extent for Spain, Italy, and Greece. More concretely, there is a lack of representative research on how Muslims in Europe perceive the role of shariah in their lives. The main shortcoming up to now is the fact that often people are simply asked about “shariah” as such, without specifying the totally different aspects of religious-ethical beliefs, religious rites, and legal norms. More information about Muslim religious conflict resolution mechanisms and the reasons for their coming into existence is needed. Whereas in the UK and in Nordic countries several studies address this issue, there is a dearth of research about the situation elsewhere, despite some indications that such mechanisms operate in other countries. Further information is required on the “customer” perspective,221 where the impact of resorting to non-state conflict resolution on the parties involved is examined. In addition, we should know more about the possible interaction of debates on the relation between shariah, democracy, and the rule of law in Europe as well as the Middle East and other predominantly Muslim parts of the world.

220 

Cf. e.g. Connolly 2010 and the essays in Holden 2011. The importance of and the difficulties in obtaining data are demonstrated in the study of Samia Bano (2012b), p. 54 in particular. 221 

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To end optimistically: there is no danger for young scholars that they will face a lack of interesting issues in the future.

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Jänterä-Jareborg, Maarit (2004). “Foreign Law in National Courts: A Comparative Perspective,” in Recueil des Cours. Hague Academy of International Law. Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 185–385. Jayme, Erik (ed.) (2003). Kulturelle Identität und Internationales Privatrecht. Heidelberg: C. F. Müller. Jeldtoft, Nadia and Nielsen, Jørgen S. (eds.) (2012). Methods and Contexts in the Study of Muslim Minorities. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. Kahn, Philippe (ed.) (2001). L’étranger et le droit de la famille: pluralité ethnique, pluralisme juridique. Paris: La Documentation française [Mission “Droit et Justice”]. King, Michael (ed.) (1995). God’s Law versus State Law: The Construction of an Islamic Identity in Western Europe. London: Grey Seal. Klausen, Jytte (2007). The Islamic Challenge:  Politics and Religion in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Laurence, Jonathan (2012). The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims: The State’s Role in Minority Integration. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. Levey, Geoffrey Brahm and Modood, Tariq (eds.) (2009). Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Malik, Jamal (ed.) (2004). Muslims in Europe. Münster: Lit. Malik, Maleiha (2010). Anti-Muslim Prejudice:  Past and Present. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. Malik, Maleiha (2012). Minority Legal Orders in the UK. London:  British Academy Policy Centre. Available for download at . Mehdi, Rubya and Nielsen, Jørgen S. (2011). Embedding Mahr (Islamic Mahr) in the European Legal System. Copenhagen: DJ Ø F. Mehdi, Rubya, Petersen, Hanne, Reenberg Sand, Erik, and Woodman, Gordon (eds.) (2008). Law and Religion in Multicultural Societies. Copenhagen: DJ Ø F. Meeusen, J., Pertegas, M., Straetmans, G., and Swennen, Fr. (eds.) (2007). International Family Law for the European Union. Antwerp and Oxford: Intersentia. Murphy, John (ed.) (2000). Ethnic Minorities, their Families and the Law. Oxford:  Hart Publishing. Nichols, Joel A. (ed.) (2012). Marriage and Divorce in a Multicultural Context. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nielsen, Jørgen, Akgönül, Samim, Alibašić, Ahmet, Goddard, Hugh, and Maréchal, Brigitte (eds.) (2009). Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, vol. 1. Leiden and Boston: Brill. Nielsen, Jørgen and Allievi, Stefano (eds.) (2002). Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities In and Across Europe. Leiden: Brill. Nielsen, Jørgen and Christoffersen, Lisbeth (eds.) (2010). Shari’a as Discourse: Legal Traditions and the Encounter with Europe. Farnham: Ashgate. Nolte, Georg, Keller, Helen, von Bogdandy, Armin, Mansel, Heinz-Peter, Büchler, Andrea, and Walter, Christian (eds.) (2007). Pluralistische Gesellschaften und Internationales Recht. Heidelberg: C. F. Müller. Pahud de Mortanges, René and Tanner, Erwin (eds.) (2002). Muslime und schweizerische Rechtsordnung. Les musulmans et l’ordre juridique suisse. Freiburg: Universitätsverlag. Panafit, Lionel (1999). Quand le droit écrit l’islam. Brussels: Bruylant. Pearl, David and Menski, Werner (n.d. [1998]). Muslim Family Law. Lahore: Brite Books.

700   Mathias Rohe Potz, Richard and Wieshaider, Wolfgang (2004). Islam and the European Union. Leuven: Peeters. Poulter, Sebastian (1998). Ethnicity, Law and Human Rights. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Rohe, Mathias (guest ed.) (2004). Sharī’a in Europe, Die Welt des Islams Special Theme 44(3). Rohe, Mathias (2007). Muslim Minorities and the Law in Europe: Chances and Challenges. New Delhi: Global Media Publications. Rohe, Mathias (2011). Das islamische Recht: Geschichte und Gegenwart, 3rd edn. München: C. H. Beck [English translation: Rohe, Mathias (2014). Islamic Law in Past and Present (translated by Gwendolin Goldbloom). Leiden/Boston: Brill.] Roy, Olivier (1999). Vers un islam européen. Paris: Éditions esprit. Shachar, Ayalet (2001). Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women’s Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shadid, Wasif and van Koningsveld, Pieter (eds.) (2002). Religious Freedom and the Neutrality of the State: The Position of Islam in the European Union. Leuven: Peeters. Shadid, Wasif and van Koningsveld, Pieter (eds.) (2003). Intercultural Relations and Religious Authorities: Muslims in the European Union. Leuven: Dudley. Shah, Prakash and Menski, Werner (eds.) (2007). Migration, Diasporas and Legal Systems in Europe. London: Routledge Cavendish. Shah, Prakash, Foblets, Marie-Clare, and Rohe, Mathias (2014). Family, Religion and Law: Cultural Encounters in Europe. Farnham: Ashgate. Shah-Kazemi, S.  N. (2001). Untying the Knot:  Muslim Women, Divorce and the Shariah. London: Nuffield Foundation. Silvestri, Sara (2008). Europe’s Muslim Women:  Potentials, Aspirations and Challenges. Brussels: King Baudouin Foundation. Tsitselikis, Konstantinos (2012). Old and New Islam in Greece: From Historical Minorities to Immigrant Newcomers. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Van Bruinessen, Martin et al. (eds.) (2011). Producing Islamic Knowledge: Transmission and Dissemination in Western Europe. London: Routledge. Van der Ven, Johannes A. (ed.) (2012). Empirical Research in Religion and Human Rights. Leiden and Boston: Brill. Yazbeck Haddad, Yvonne (ed.) (2002). Muslims in the West:  From Sojourners to Citizens. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Waardenburg, Jacques (2003). Muslims and Others: Relations in Context. Berlin: de Gruyter. Zucca, Lorenzo (2012). Law and Religion in the European Constitutional Landscape. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

C HA P T E R

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H I JA B J E N N I F E R A . SE L B Y

Headcoverings worn by some Muslim women have been differently understood and debated across Europe.1 This chapter focuses on veiling practices in ten Western European countries. In addition to theologically-framed expressions of modesty and piety, headscarves have been the foci of innumerable public discussions, including debates about immigration and cultural integration, the governance of religious difference and visible religiosity, as well as gender equality. These debates are widespread, but there is little consensus regarding how the public presence of hijabs is articulated and legislated. The European Commission and the European Parliament adopted the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union on December 7, 2000 but it remains non-binding in law and appears to have little impact on unifying the outcomes of individual cases (McGoldrick 2006: 30). The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) secured by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is a central arbiter in the adjudication of several of the cases described here.2 Generally speaking, the ECHR has not articulated religious

1  Not all women who consider themselves Muslim wear headcoverings and some women may cover intermittently. Some may not cover in their daily lives but may veil depending on the context: for instance when attending a mosque, praying, or visiting a Muslim-majority country (e.g. Shadid and von Koningsveld 2005: 38). Not only contextually-based, these choices also depend on life stage and factors including piety, social status, class, and political affiliation. 2  The Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), established in 1958 and secured in 1998, has been praised and critiqued for its role in the deliberation of headscarf cases. Peter Cumper and Tom Lewis call the ECHR one of the world’s most successful human rights bodies, but also critique its failure to develop the parameters of article 9, which guarantees freedom of thought, conscience, and religion for minority groups (2009: 599). Jane Freedman (2007) analyzes the universalist assumptions of the court, which she argues ignore context and structural inequalities, while Antje Pedain (2004: 539) notes that the ECHR tends to stress public dimensions of belief to the detriment of private ones (i.e. where motivations are “acts of faith”). With reference to a number of high profile cases, Carolyn Evans argues that the Court typically defines the wearing of headscarves as a “practice” and not as a “belief,” which positions their protection under article 9 (2006: 3). In this way, the ECHR has demonstrated a relatively narrow approach to religions in public spaces, more confined than common interpretations in the UK, for instance.

702   Jennifer A. Selby freedom as absolute: headscarves can be restricted if they do not fit into its broad understanding of public freedoms and security (Amiraux 2003: 135). The Court’s decisions are often grounded in the contexts of nation-states where significant legislative variances exist. As we shall see, a number of countries have issued bans on the wearing of headscarves in public institutions and/or in the public sphere, others have no prohibitive regulations and little public debate, while a last group falls somewhere in between. To consider this range, I outline the ways veiling is commonly expressed sartorially, theologically, and politically in the next section. I then briefly chart recent literature, studies, court cases, and polling on hijabs in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The chapter subsequently reviews scholarly literature on hijabs in Western Europe and the prevalent nation-state and cultural diversity frameworks often used to explain their differing acceptances and refusals. While there are a variety of explanations, and while some restrictions cannot be understood at the national level, discourses on headscarves reveal a great deal about the parameters of national identity or how being, for instance, German, Swedish, or Austrian is imagined. Three influential factors that shape national debates include securitization and immigration policies, secular politics, and gender equality critiques. I conclude by considering how the public visibility of headscarves has become emblematic of broader polemical debates about Islam in Europe.

Defining the “Hijab” “Hijab” is a commonly used but imprecise term. Best translated as “modesty,” it can also signify a curtain or barrier. Generally, a woman wearing Islamically-understood modest dress is considered to “wear hijab” (Shadid and van Koningsveld 2005: 36). Veiling can thus include concealing all or some parts of the body. This range of meanings explains why veiling is sometimes described as a mobile form of purdah (seclusion) that offers a visible separation to women while allowing movement in the public sphere (see, for example, Werbner 2007: 175, who describes girls of Pakistani origin in the UK whose veiling as purdah allows for freedom of movement). The more precise Arabic term for that which only covers the head is the rarely used khimar. To capture these broad usages and definitions, in this chapter I use the terms “hijab,” “veil,” and “headscarf ” interchangeably to refer to a cloth that partially covers the hair and neck and the body to a lesser degree. I use “full-face-covering veil” to refer to the niqab and burqa that cover the face, with the niqab exposing the eyes and the burqa concealing the entire face. Despite the fact that veiling is practiced across a number of cultural and religious traditions among both men and women, I refer solely to the practice of veiling in Islam. Typically conceptualized as a female religious expression of modesty, veiling has been characterized as pious, illusory, deceptive, concealing, safeguarding, apocalyptic, propagandizing, fashionable, oppressive to women, an indication of an unwillingness

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to integrate, a sign of protest, as repressive, and as liberating (Heath 2008; Werbner 2007: 175; Shadid and van Koningsveld 2005; Mernissi 1994: 182). Hijabs have multitudinous and at times contradictory meanings, many of which are influenced by variations in the cultural and social statuses of women and common dress codes in historical periods. Motivations for veiling are similarly multiple, overlapping, and changing. In Western social scientific writing these include invocations of religious, social, and sexual modesty, piety, femininity, and fashion (Bouhdiba 1975; Mernissi 1994; Gaspard and Khosrokhavar 1995; Khosrokhavar 1997; Venel 1999; Lorcerie 2005; Tersigni 2005; Keaton 2006). Natasha Bakht (2012) aptly calls the hijab a “shifting signifier” in that it cannot be understood as a symbol with a singular meaning. Debates on these meanings and motivations abound both within and outside Muslim communities. For instance, Asma Barlas argues that, “In the Qur’an, there are two sets of verses that deal with aspects of veiling, but without explicit mention of ‘the veil’” (2006: 267). She suggests that veiling is no longer mandated in contemporary society and that it reflects concerns from a former context (2004: 102). Some interpreters therefore read a specific injunction for veiling in the Qur’an while others see a less formalized call for modesty. This range of readings and intentions underscores the difficulty in interpreting their meanings (Scott 2005: 118). Headscarves vary in fabrics, colors, and the extent to which they cover. Beyond the way I describe the hijab as commonly shielding the hair and neck, other forms include bandannas, that cover some of the hair while referencing hip hop and youth cultures; chadors, long draping coverings which extend from the head below the knees keeping the face visible, and most common in Iran; dupattas, generally worn by Pakistani and Asian women and typically a light chiffon scarf that is loosely draped around the neck; niqabs, a piece of cloth attached at either side of the forehead, fully covering the body and the face except for the eyes; and burqas which cover the entire face and body, often including gloves to cover the hands, with a mesh screen to shield the eyes. The jilbab, or “outergarment,” is related to these coverings in loosely draping over the body, sometimes reflecting a desire to be more conservative in appearance. It is a long loose tunic-like or coat-like garment that covers the entire body except for the face and hands (Werbner 2007: 166; Winter 2006: 280). These sartorial manifestations of modesty are theologically supported through reference to and interpretation of Islamic texts and fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). Understood as a revealed text, the Qur’an is given the most credence in supporting modest dress, even if it describes a wide range of topics related to law and theology and does not focus on clothing. Aforementioned, there are competing interpretations of modesty based on Qur’anic passages that generate interpretative debates amongst theologians, legal experts, and practitioners, as well as in Western courts and commissions (Barlas 2006; McGoldrick 2006; Fournier 2010). There are a number of Qur’anic passages that are commonly referenced in these discussions, like a verse calling for women and men to dress and behave modestly (Qur’an 24: 30–1). Another passage (24: 60) suggests that older women who are not married “incur no sin if they discard their garments, provided that they do not aim at a showy display.” Surah 34 further recommends modest behavior

704   Jennifer A. Selby from women so as not to excite men, “drawing a veil across their chests.” Other passages like 53: 33 call upon the Prophet’s wives or the “mothers of the believers” to “lengthen their garments” to avoid insult. To protect women’s modesty, men should address them from behind a barrier or curtain (i.e. a “hijab”). Altogether there are nine references to the hijab in the Qur’an that are interpreted and varyingly translated into Islamic law, practice, and belief. The other central textual source of appellation for modest dress and social comportment in Islam stems from the hadīth, a vast collection of sayings about the exemplary life of the Prophet Muhammad. A number of hadīth describe veiling as an integral practice for the wives of the Prophet. A range of interpretations exists in this body of literature, as well. Ghassan Ascha (1995) notes that like the Qur’anic verses treating modesty, the mothers of the believers can be differently interpreted as both perfect modest exemplars of their sex and as reflecting the social constraints of the Prophet’s context. Again, these readings are open to interpretation and ignite questions of religious authority. They explain in part why some hijab-wearing women and legal authorities believe veiling is an integral part of their practice, why others do not, and why different styles and types of headscarves and coverings exist based on theological understandings. Beyond these theological concerns, hijab-related debates and controversies in Western European nation-states have important political histories related to colonialism and immigration. While the ten Western countries under discussion have varying colonial histories (if at all), Orientalist discourses have shaped the exoticization and fears related to women’s headcoverings. Edward Said’s now-classic analysis of Western colonial perspectives of the Orient in Orientalism (1978) does not focus on gender-representativity or Muslim women’s dress, but he remarks that, particularly in prevalent French and British literature and artwork, the “Oriental” and headscarved woman is uniformly portrayed as distant, passive, exotic, subservient, veiled, and reacting to events; she is never a participant. Later scholars have similarly noted how Orientalist perspectives were integral to rationalizing European colonialism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Appadurai 1996; Dobie 2001). In the French case, Neil Macmaster and Toni Lewis (1998) argue that the end of French colonialism in Algeria meant a shift from a sexualized imagery of headscarves to more terrorism-related and politicized descriptions. These fears of visible markers of Islam continue in Europe in the postcolonial era with images of dark chadors following the Iranian Revolution, headscarved women with the Gulf War, and a supposed rise in Islamically-inspired international terrorist activities in the post-9/11 period, including attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005. These incidents have meant that some hijab-wearing women have experienced Islamophobia related to their public visibility. They have also been generative of political outcomes.3

3  In the United States, for instance, anthropologists have pointed to how interest in “freeing” women in Afghanistan from their burqas may rightly underline atrocities occurring under the Taliban, but effectively maintains silence about the role of the West in creating these situations (Hirschkind and Mahmood 2002: 342; Abu-Lughod 2002: 784–5).

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Scholars of Islam and gender studies have pointed to how continuing imperialist politics in postcolonial times pejoratively position headscarves through feminist critiques (Abu-Lughod 2002; Mahmood 2005, 2008; Razack 2008). We may therefore conclude that hijabs take on various theological, sartorial, and political meanings dependent on their context and sources of authority.

Headscarves in Western European Nation-States Hijabs are differently interpreted among Muslims and academics but also by individuals, organizations, schools, courts, and other public institutions. I aim to highlight how, on the one hand, these ten countries differ in their social and legal treatments of veils while, on the other hand, recent public opinion data unilaterally depict disdain for full-face headscarves. Firstly, I examine nationally-based responses to hijabs. On one end of the spectrum are those nation-states that take a non-restrictive approach toward the wearing of partial head and body coverings like Austria, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Birgit Sauer (2009) suggests that these countries display greater “tolerance” than their neighbors; I prefer the qualifier of “lesser restriction” as discourses of religious tolerance do not necessarily explain these decisions. Countries like Italy, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland fall somewhere in the middle as they have been more selective in how they apply prohibitions. On the other end of the spectrum are those that take a decidedly prohibitive approach toward Muslim coverings, including France, Belgium, and some German federal states. For the sake of brevity, I focus on headscarf debates in public schools. Secondly, I turn to recent survey data that depict a broad-based Western European rejection of niqabs and burqas in the public sphere. I ask why this commonality in treatments of these garments is so marked.

Headscarf Regulations This section begins with three countries that have been more liberal in their interpretations of hijabs: Austria, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. As we will see, these countries cannot be grouped together in their positions on full-face-covering hijabs.

Less Formally Restrictive Austria is unique among the nation-states under examination in terms of its formalized articulations of religious diversity and its official encouragement of Islamic schools. Heated public debates regarding headscarves have not taken place and no formal bans exist in public schools or institutions. Of course, on-the-ground Austrian positions toward hijabs are more complex as they combine both restrictive and nonrestrictive

706   Jennifer A. Selby elements. On the one hand, Austria does not purport to be a multicultural society. A 2008 report from the Austrian civil anti-racism institution ZARA suggested that the number of verbal abuses against Muslims wearing headscarves was on the rise. Yet, on the other hand, despite its immigration policies based on the jus sanguinis citizenship model (where citizenship is determined by parentage and not by place of birth) and support for anti-immigration right-wing political parties, Austria maintains lenient regulations concerning the expression of religious beliefs and practices in the public realm in Europe (Gresch et al. 2008: 411). There are no official restrictions against wearing headscarves and Islamic public schools are publicly funded. Related to schools, a 2001 headscarf case in the town of Traun gained attention when a headscarf-wearing student was denied enrollment in a secondary school. The ban was eventually lifted on the grounds of religious freedom (Sauer 2009). In 2004, a school in the city of Linz similarly ordered a ban on “headgear,” which included scarves and caps. Following the formal legal complaint of a parent, local authorities overturned the ban citing Austria’s constitutional provisions for the freedom of religion (Holzleithener and Strasser 2006: 11–12). In the wake of this 2004 case, the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture went further to issue a decree stating that as a religious sign, the headscarf is protected by the Basic State Law as well as by the European Convention on Human Rights (Gresch et al. 2008). The current political climate in Austria generally indicates that Muslim women may wear their headscarves in schools, public offices, and in photos for public documents as long as their faces are clearly identifiable. A full-face hijab ban in Austria appears unlikely given that hijabs are generally perceived and protected as religious signs. Nevertheless, other indicators suggest that the Austrian socio-political climate may not be entirely welcoming to non-Christian religious signs in the public sphere. For that reason, in general Austria is relatively open to visible religious symbols. Like the United Kingdom, the Netherlands has been typically characterized as multicultural in its approach to religious and cultural diversity. Headscarves are generally accepted in the Dutch public sphere and typically not positioned as barriers to women’s rights, like in pervasive legal discourses in France and Spain. Debates on cultural diversity and gender in the Netherlands tend instead to focus on so-called issues of “immigrant women” including honor killing, female genital mutilation, and domestic violence. Some scholars (Lettinga and Saharso 2008) have suggested that this climate toward headscarves may be shifting, and that if between 1999 and 2006 religious identity claims including those for headscarves were generally accommodated, this spirit of “neutrality” has changed. The acceptability of full-face-covering veils has been questioned and conservative political parties have gained force. Inquiries and cases involving hijabs are typically brought before the Commission on Equal Treatment (also translated as the Dutch Equal Opportunities Commission), created in 1994. The Commission has historically not restricted religious expression in its decisions, seeing it as a fundamental right (see: ). It has reviewed a broad range of cases. In an October 2005 case, for instance, a woman was refused a job as an Arabic teacher at the Islamic College of Amsterdam because she refused to wear a hijab. The Dutch Equal Opportunities Commission ruled that

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her dismissal was wrongful. Yet, as noted in the next section, this common stance may be shifting. The rise of right-wing political parties like Geert Wilders’s Dutch Freedom Party and pervasive public concerns with full-face veils appear to be transforming a once pervasive liberal position toward a more conservative vision. Lastly, also grouped among the less restrictive nation-states, the United Kingdom differs in its discourse on hijabs from most European nation-states under examination here because of its liberal multiculturalism.4 There are no formal restrictions on headscarves in the UK, including in public schools. While the Churches of England and Scotland are established religious institutions, basic curricula in public schools include the teaching of non-Christian traditions. What follows examines a number of cases that have emerged in public schools as well as data on Islamophobia. The highest profile hijab-related debates in the United Kingdom have focused on public schools. There are only five Muslim schools amid England and Wales’s 25,000 schools (McGoldrick 2006: 176), so most Muslim children attend state or faith-based schools where parents may elect to have their children opt out of Christian collective worship. There are some commonly-held guidelines on school uniforms but the parameters are largely left to the schools themselves. In 1989, the same year as the first of France’s “Headscarf Affairs,” 14- and 15-year-old sisters Aisha and Fatima Alvi refused to remove their headscarves at a girls’ grammar school in Manchester (a position which was eventually accepted). This 1989 incident was among the first significant mediatized public debates on hijabs in the UK. While there have been many more cases, including the January 2004 case of a teacher who forcibly removed a student’s headscarf in Peterborough and was prosecuted for assault, and the 2003 banning of all headgear at Icknield High in Luton, Bedfordshire that was later overturned (Werbner 2007:  173), the “Shabina Begum case” remains precedent-setting in the UK. Two other developments should be noted that framed the context of this specific public school case:  in 1997 the Department of Education approved funding of the Islamia Primary School in London and a Human Rights Act in 1998 ensured that school uniform policies did not interfere with religious freedom (Kiliç 2008: 444). The “Begum case” centered on a Buckinghamshire girls’ grammar school’s uniform policy and the acceptability of the jilbab (and not the headscarf). At the time of the case, 71% of students at the school categorized themselves as of Bangladeshi or Pakistani origin and 79% identified themselves as Muslim; 60% of these female Muslim students wore hijabs, which were accepted in the dress code so long as they were in keeping with the school’s colors (Kiliç 2008). A 14-year-old student at the Denbigh High School in Luton, Ms. Shabina Begum, sought to wear a jilbab, arguing that the accepted shalwar kameeze (a loose Indian pantsuit garment) was not acceptable according to her sense of

4  The tenor of this position is debated as some scholars have charted an assimilationist turn, wherein notions of “civic Britishness” threaten to replace “multiculturalism” as the UK’s primary political discourse (Squires 2007: 539; Kiliç 2008: 449).

708   Jennifer A. Selby religiously-informed modesty. In the initial proceedings against the school in December 2002, both Begum and the school found sources and experts who confirmed that the school’s uniform both was and was not in keeping with a normative Islamic dress code. In September 2004, after having not attended school for more than two years, Begum found a local school, Burnham Grammar, which permitted her to wear the jilbab (Kiliç 2008: 446). Nevertheless, with reference to article 9 (the right to manifest religious practices and beliefs) and article 2 (the right to education) of the European Convention on Human Rights, Ms. Begum went to court in order to seek a declaration that she had been unlawfully excluded from her former Luton school and should be entitled to a home tutor sponsored by the state. The Luton school’s principal, herself a Muslim woman of Bengali origin, stood by the importance of the school’s uniform so that the jilbab was not allowed. While Ms. Begum initially won her case on appeal in March 2005 in the Court of Appeal, the verdict was later overturned by the House of Lords in March 2006, denying her the right to wear her jilbab at school and for it to pay for a tutor. The judges at the House of Lords explained that the school had made great efforts to maintain a uniform policy that respected Muslim beliefs and that the dress code (that allowed for color coordinated hijabs and the shalwar kameeze) was in accordance with mainstream Muslim opinion on modesty (BBC News 2004a). Moreover, the judge determined that Begum was excluded from school because of her “failure to abide by the school uniform policy rather than her religious beliefs as such” (McGoldrick 2006: 182). The final outcome of the Begum case reflects engagement with the ECHR and the continued allowance of hijabs and Muslim dress in public schools in the UK, while at the same time it demonstrates that limits on public school dress exist. The Begum case remains important in the chronology of the acceptability of headscarves in the UK, but, arguably, hijab debates gained velocity and changed focus after the 2006 pronouncement by Foreign Minister Jack Straw that full-face-covering hijabs signal “separation and difference.” The vociferous debate that followed has not extended to hijabs. Indeed in contrast to more restrictive measures in other nation-states, widespread disapproval emerged in Britain following the French 2004 ban on conspicuous religious signs in public schools. A 2005 Pew Global Attitudes study found that 62% of British citizens believed that banning the headscarf in public schools was not a good idea (Menasce-Horowitz and Morin 2006). In response to the French situation and hijab restrictions in parts of Germany, the International Network Assembly for the Protection of the Hijab was formed with the goal of reversing current bans, preventing new ones, and creating awareness of the “negative stereotypical image of the hijab which lies at the root of this discrimination” (Dear 2004; Tarlo 2007: 133). The campaign received support from a number of MPs and the mayor of London who, in his speech to the Assembly noted, “I am determined London’s Muslims should never face similar restrictions [to those in France],” adding that the law reflected religious intolerance on par with extreme religious intolerance like the Holocaust (cited in Werbner 2007: 177). Despite these political initiatives to protect against headscarf restrictions, there is continued evidence of Islamophobia directed against hijab-wearing women in the

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United Kingdom. The 1997 Runnymede Trust Report found that Muslims in Britain experienced significant Islamophobia and recommended that the Race Relations Act be amended to include religious discrimination. These concerns were heightened following September 11, 2001 and the London bombings of July 7, 2005. Based on the responses of 1,200 Muslims in a nation-wide survey, before September 11, 2001 60.8% of women experienced being treated condescendingly. After September 11, 68.5% reported experiencing discrimination (Ameli and Merali 2006: 1). Numerous aggressive individual incidents have also been reported, like that of a 21-year-old male who pleaded guilty to racially aggravated common assault and a public order offence when he tore off the hijab of a 23-year-old woman in the street (BBC News 2007). These incidents and numerous ones like them suggest continued fear and discrimination toward hijabs in the UK.

More Restrictive Headscarf Policies and Cases This section turns to Italy, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland as countries that have been more selective in how they apply prohibitions toward hijabs. Hijab debates in Italy have taken place within a political and historical context that has held an explicitly privileged role for the Catholic Church. While there is no formal separation of religion and state articulated in the 1946 Italian constitution, the government has sought to foster a tolerant position toward non-Catholic faiths. Related to Islam, this means that mosques may receive funding from foreign governments and that multicultural discourse is increasingly prevalent in the public sphere (Pojmann 2010: 234). Hijab debates have been relatively muted in Italy, particularly when compared to those described in Belgium and France. Given the Catholic bases of the country’s national identity, most major public debates about religiosity in the public sphere have focused on whether crucifixes should hang in non-confessional state schools. Nevertheless, in the post-9/11 period, Italy’s military engagement in Iraq and Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s statement that Western civilizations are “superior” to Islamic ones (Alvanou 2008: 123) have stirred some Islamophobic responses. What follows overviews a number of key cases and Italian public opinion on the visibility of hijabs. In March 2004 as international attention turned to France’s legislation against conspicuous religious signs in public schools, a woman of Moroccan origin was dismissed from a daycare center in the northern Italian city of Samone because of her hijab (BBC News 2004b). After some public outcry, however, the Interior Minister insisted that the decision be reversed and stated that “the Islamic veil, worn with dignity, without ostentation, is an innocuous symbol of a cultural and religious identity which deserves all our respect” (cited in McGoldrick 2006: 208). This position appears to have been broadly shared across the country. A 2004 Caritas/Migrantes survey suggests that 70% of Italians disagreed with enacting a law similar to that in France banning conspicuous religious symbols in schools (Caritas/Migrantes 2004). While the Muslim population in Italy remains relatively small and debates limited, the hijab appears to be readily accepted in the public sphere. There have been few school hijab-related controversies, as most have focused on the public visibility of Catholicism. General acceptance is perhaps also reflected in the example of a headscarf-wearing

710   Jennifer A. Selby Italian Muslim woman who ran for Perugia’s communal council for the Sinistra e Liberta (Left Ecology Freedom) coalition. She indicated to the press that she had received positive responses from most Italians (ADNKronos International 2009). In short, while Italy’s strong Catholic history and culture have made it the focus of debates in schools, more recent legislation suggests a publicly-supported legal turn against full-face veils. Like in Italy, debates on hijabs in the public sphere in Spain have become more heated recently related to full-face-covering veils. Spain’s history differs from most other European nation-states as it was under Muslim rule for more than 500 years, from the eighth to the thirteenth centuries. There are no clear national guidelines concerning the public visibility of hijabs. The country’s highest profile hijab-related case took place in 2002 when 13-year-old Fatima Elidrisi was told by Catholic nuns running a state-funded private school near Madrid that she was not allowed to wear her headscarf (McGoldrick 2006: 206). This Catholic school had been assigned to her by the Regional Ministry of Education. Ms. Elidrisi did not attend school for months and was reported to the Inspectorate of the Regional Ministry of Education for absenteeism. The regional Ministry overruled the decision and eventually allowed her hijab because, “a person cannot be deprived of the right to an education just because she is wearing a scarf ” (Bedmar and Palma 2010: 67). Despite this local accommodation, the case sparked national debate. For example, the Conservative Social Affairs Minister, Juan Carlos Aparicio, called headscarves “not a religious sign but a form of discrimination against women” (Henley 2004; Bedmar and Palma 2010: 67). In the wake of this case, there remains little national uniformity on the admissibility of wearing hijabs in public schools. In 2007 an 8-year-old girl was suspended from a Girona school after refusing to remove her hijab. The Department of Education overruled the school’s decision and ordered that the girl be allowed to return. It insisted that the Spanish state respect all religious traditions (Islam Online 2007). Despite these more recent governmental protections of hijabs in public schools two studies suggest that most Spaniards oppose their presence. A December 2009 survey found that 61% of Spaniards opposed the presence of hijabs in schools, compared with 18% in favor (of note, these views extended to the visibility of yarmulkes and crosses, as well; Estudio Fundacion BBVA 2010: 35). Martin-Muñoz and López-Sala (2005) also note a rise in Islamophobia following the 2004 Madrid bombings that focused on hijabs. Both of these studies suggest an increasingly hostile public response. While Spain does not have a nation-wide legal position regarding hijabs, like in Germany and Switzerland individual provinces are able to legislate restrictions that have focused on niqabs and burqas. Public debates surrounding headscarves have also taken a more moderate tone in Sweden. As in most contexts discussed in this chapter, there are no accurate numbers as to how many women in Sweden wear hijabs. There are, however, a number of social scientific studies that have charted an increasing number of first-generation women who have chosen to wear headscarves as adults post-migration, claiming it is a way for them to relate to their tradition and strengthen their identity as minorities (Folkesson 2011: 126; see also McGinty 2006 on converts who take up headscarves as part of their

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practice). The Swedish government has made no formal calls for a ban in the public or educational spheres, although the opposition Liberal party has called for a ban for girls up to age 15 in public schools, arguing for the equal rights of the child (Hellgren and Hobson 2008: 395). Despite assertions that Sweden restricts immigration and cultural diversity, a number of recent cases suggest that there are protections for public expressions of religiosity including the hijab. Even if members of the minority Christian Democratic Party have sought restrictions without success (Euro-Islam 2010), Swedish Prime Minister Frank Reindfeldt has stated that he is against such legislation for it “shouldn’t lead to certain women being isolated even more from Swedish society” (cited in The Local 2010). A January 2010 case of a woman in Malmo, Sweden who was asked to leave a bus after she refused to remove her covering received media attention. The driver said he needed to see her face even though her bus pass did not call for photo identification. The transit company eventually paid a $4,203 settlement to the woman (Simpson 2008; United Press International 2008). Still, cases of Islamophobia toward hijabs have been charted. While unscientific, a Swedish radio program conducted an informal study which concluded that of the two women with very similar CVs who applied for the same jobs with 200 employers in Sweden, the woman without a hijab was contacted by thirty-five employers while the woman with a hijab was called by eight employers (Allah.eu 2010). Thus, there may not be outright legislation against them, but concern with the physical presence of headscarves remains. Sweden therefore falls in the middle range of hijab treatments in Western Europe. Despite restrictions in its immigration and cultural diversity policies and concerns with full-face coverings, polling data suggest that Swedes are open to the visibility of the more common hijab. Like its neighbors, Switzerland has experienced a number of mediatized hijab debates that may be partially explained by its articulation of secularism and by its comparatively strict citizenship rules. Of the country’s 311,000 Muslims, only approximately 10% have Swiss nationality (McGoldrick 2006: 120). In addition, the Swiss recognize Catholicism and Protestantism as official religions. As a federation of states, all matters of religion fall under the cantons within the limits of federal constitutional law and are typically determined on a case-by-case basis. The cantons of Geneva and Neuchatel have the most clearly articulated separations of state and religion; unsurprisingly, these cantons are also those that have been the sites of legal cases involving hijabs. The country’s precedent-setting headscarf case—known as the 1996 Dahlab case— began when the General Directorate for Primary Education prohibited a school teacher who had converted from Catholicism to Islam from wearing her headscarf when teaching. The Geneva cantonal government determined that teachers must “endorse both the objectives of the state school system and the obligations incumbent on the education authorities, including the strict obligation of denominational neutrality” (cited in McGoldrick 2006: 121; Cavanaugh 2007: 15). Ms. Dahlab was asked to stop wearing her headscarf under section 6 of the Public Education Act. Court documents note that Dahlab had not received complaints related to her headcovering from her colleagues, parents, or teachers. She appears to have been sensitive to allegations of proselytism and

712   Jennifer A. Selby allegedly told her students she covered her head to keep her ears warm (Evans 2006: 6). Nevertheless, the court characterized her headscarf as a “powerful external symbol” that was “imposed on women by a [religious] precept” and “hard to square with the principle of gender equality” (Cavanaugh 2007: 15). Like headscarf-wearing plaintiffs in other European nation-states, in her appeal to the Federal Court, Ms. Dahlab alleged a violation of her freedom of religious expression. However, in November 1997 the Federal Court upheld the Geneva cantonal decision based on the domestic courts’ articulation of rights and of the neutrality of the state, determining that Ms. Dahlab was a civil servant in a secular state and that “the wearing of a headscarf and loose-fitting clothes remains an outward manifestation which, as such, is not part of the inviolable core of freedom of religion” (cited in McGoldrick 2006: 123). The European Court of Human Rights concurred with this decision noting that in the context of Swiss law and with the possibility of influencing young children, the decision should stand. In this ECHR case the Swiss legal and social context shaped the final decision.

Most Restrictive In comparisons across European nation-states about the status of full-face and partial hijabs, France is often positioned as a key restrictive example given its Republican understanding of church and state (known as laïcité), its nationally-based legislation against hijabs in government offices and schools in September 2004, and its banning of full-face-covering veils in the public sphere in April 2011. Hijab debates in the Republic have been under intense public and governmental scrutiny for more than thirty years. As Chouki El Hamel aptly summarizes, “no subject about Islam and Muslims [has] received more attention, aggravated attitudes, provoked more fear and anger and more broadened the divide that separates France from its five million Muslim residents than the controversy of the hijab” (2002: 297). The separation of church and state guaranteed by laïcité (French secularism) situates the visibility of headscarves in the public sphere as problematic. With the exception of the Alsace-Moselle region that was then under German occupation (and which today has a sizeable Muslim population of Turkish origin), the 1905 law concretized a strict separation between private and public spheres. While some scholars have argued that secularism has become a religion in its own right (Roman 1991), the 1905 law aimed to place all religious institutions on an equal plane (Scott 2005). Since the 1970s, with the waning socio-political influence of Catholicism and the significant immigration of Muslims from France’s former North African colonies, debates about French secularism in the Republic have emphasized Islamic practices, particularly the visibility of hijabs. Debates peaked in October 1989 with what is now known as the “Headscarf Affair” in a junior high school (Brulard 1997; Venel 1999; Dayan-Herzbrun 2000; Bowen 2004a; Killian 2006). As “laboratories of the future” (Gauchet 1998), questions about secularism have arisen for more than 200 years in the country’s public schools (Poulat 1987; Stock-Morton 1988; Baubérot 1998; Laborde 2005; Bowen 2007). In a public junior high school in Creil, a northern suburb of Paris, the school’s headmaster informed three

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young women they would be expelled if they continued wearing their foulards (headscarves) on school property, calling their defiance an “insidious jihad” (Poulter 1997: 57; Scott 2005: 106). By wearing religious signs deemed conspicuous in a public Republican space, the young women were, according to the school’s administration, explicitly rejecting laïcité. Vocal members of the local French Muslim community argued that it was customary for Muslim women to veil themselves in the presence of men and that doing so was an affirmation of their religious identities and should be respected in a democratic, pluralistic state (Bloul 1996). Conversely, school spokespersons maintained that the symbolic nature of the headscarf was in breach of France’s secular principles. The case was eventually brought to the Cour de cassation (French Supreme Court) which ruled that religious symbols were permissible so long as they were not “conspicuous” or “militant,” leaving the interpretation of these terms to individual schools (Brulard 1997: 179). This 1989 Affair was significant in that for the first time Islam and hijabs were formally characterized as problematic for the French public school system.5 Post-1989, laïque formulations in the public education system have continued to stress the maintenance of a religious and gender-neutral space related to headcoverings. While there have been innumerable veil-related controversies in France, I focus here on three defining moments in 1994, 2004, and 2011. In 1994, as local school administrators sought clearer guidelines on religious symbols, the government responded with the Circulaire Bayrou (or Bayrou Decree) issued by Education Minister François Bayrou. It introduced a distinction between “discreet” signs, which “express a personal attachment to (someone’s) convictions” and “ostentatious signs” that “constitute in themselves elements of proselytism or of discrimination” (Joppke 2007a: 323). The Circulaire was received with some criticism by nine Muslim associations, including the Union des organisations islamiques (Union of Islamic Organizations) and the Fédération nationale des musulmans de France (National Federation of French Muslims), who said the decree would encourage girls to leave school (El Hamel 2002). From 1994 to 2003 a number of expulsions, student protests, and judicial decisions both confirmed and overturned the school expulsions of headscarf-wearing girls from the ages of 9 to 18 (Winter 2006). The Conseil d’État rejected Bayrou’s claim that certain signs could be separated from the intentions of those who carried them and left it to teachers and administrators to interpret the actions of their students. In the wake of this ruling, the Minister of Education appointed Hanifa Chérifi as official mediator for problems linked to the wearing of the veil. As teachers called for more stringent guidelines and with renewed discussions of laïcité surrounding the centenary year of the 1905 law, in July 2003 President Jacques Chirac requested a commission to be led by Bernard Stasi to examine religious signs in public schools. The four-chaptered Commission de réflexion sur l’application du

5  Following the Headscarf Affair the French Prime Minister also established the Haut conseil à l’intégration (High Council for Integration). The Council considers integration issues and makes proposals, but has no regulatory or legal powers (McGoldrick 2006: 50).

714   Jennifer A. Selby principle de laïcité dans la République, or Stasi Commission Report, was released on December 11, 2003. Led by Stasi and a group of nineteen notable scholars, government officials, and other experts, and following forums and selective interviews across the country, the Commission made twenty-six recommendations to protect secularism (Weil 2009; Laurence and Vaisse 2006). Only one of these, a recommendation to ban “conspicuous” religious symbols—notably the Islamic veil, the Jewish kippah, and large Christian crosses—in public elementary and high schools was translated into law with the beginning of the 2004 academic year. The Stasi Report deemed more discreet signs acceptable, like medallions, small crosses, Stars of David, Hands of Fatimah, or little Qur’ans (Stasi Commission Report 2003: 23). Lawmakers voted on a bill to ban conspicuous religious signs (Law 2004: 228) in public schools and government on February 10, 2004. It received strong support and passed almost unanimously a month later on March 15, 2004 (Gerin Commission Report 2003; Lyon and Spini 2004; Weil 2009: 2701). Despite international attention and controversy when the law was passed, like from Human Rights Watch who suggested it violated the European Convention on Human Rights and was Islamophobic in focus (Human Rights Watch 2004), the actual enforcement of the law in September 2004 was relatively uneventful (Selby 2011b). Nevertheless, France has the most restrictive national legal regulations against headscarves in Western Europe. Belgium’s positions on hijabs are shaped by its cultural split. Its French and Dutch communities have traditionally had different approaches toward religious diversity: its French communities lean more toward the previous laïque French model while the Flemish tend to operate under more Dutch-inspired pluralist ideals (Severs 2010). Until recent attention on the regulation of full-face veils, public debates on headscarves in Belgium have emphasized hijabs in public schools. Despite a number of significant restrictions in the public sphere, religion is not excluded from public education in Belgium. Public school students have the option of participating in either non-denominational ethics classes or religious instruction from among the state’s recognized religions. With governmental financial support, the Muslim community provides teachers with some of this religious instruction. Yet, despite this seeming openness toward Islam in public schools, the country’s interpretations of hijabs have become increasingly restrictive in recent years. In the 1990s, public schools began implementing hijab bans through by-laws that allowed individual schools to determine their own dress codes for teachers and students. In considering these school restrictions, comparison with France is useful. In 2002, the Belgian government’s position was similar to that in France in 1989: the decision was left to individual schools as to what they would restrict and allow (McGoldrick 2006: 210). Most recorded disputes took place at a local level. Since then, restricting the presence of headscarves has become more prevalent. By late 2005, approximately 70% of secondary schools under French community authority had banned hijabs, up from 41% in 2000. As of 2008, only eight of 111 public schools in Brussels allow students to wear headscarves (Islamic Human Rights Commission 2008). Aforementioned, the Flemish side has taken a more pluralistic approach.

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The religious freedoms of teachers are differently perceived than those of students. The Belgian Federal Council of Education banned headscarves for teachers in 2007, with the exception of religious education teachers who teach Islam (Islamic Human Rights Commission 2008). Like in France, private Islamic schools and Catholic schools are exempt from these rules. The country’s first Islamic school—the Avicenna Islamic school in Molenbeek—opened in the fall of 2007. Hijab debates in Belgium were revived in 2009 with the oath-taking of a veiled representative for the Christian-Democrat party in the Brussels parliament and with the decision of two school principals to ban hijabs in their schools in Hoboken and Antwerp (these schools had been two of the eight that still accepted veiled girls (Severs 2010: 7)). Beyond public schools, governmental regulation of hijabs in Belgium has shifted. While in January 2001, Belgium’s high court ruled that a Muslim woman wearing a headscarf could not be denied an identification card (US Department of State 2002), by December 2004, the government announced it was considering a ban on conspicuous religious symbols including hijabs for civil servants. Since the early 2000s, wearing religious symbols of all kinds has been prohibited for selected public service officials, such as judges, police, and other uniformed officials (Severs 2010). Polling data suggest reluctance toward the visibility of headscarves. A 2007 study conducted by the Center for Psychology at Catholic University of Louvain-la-Neuve noted that one in three native Belgians were bothered by women wearing headscarves in public and that half would like to see them banned in certain places (Expatica News 2007; Université catholique de Louvain 2007). Belgium is the second country in Europe to institute a legal ban on full-face-covering hijabs. Despite its two models of religious diversity, Belgium has more recently leaned toward the restrictive laïque interpretation of public schools and spaces. As the last more restrictive country under examination, German hijab debates have differed from the French veil affairs in that they have drawn national and international attention almost a decade later—in 1998—and have primarily been determined by the country’s sixteen states or Länder which hold substantial legislative and judicial autonomy. Unlike in France and Belgium, there is no unified national policy position on headcoverings in Germany. Generally speaking, hijab debates have focused on schools and government offices where the reigning view in German courts has been that public school teachers and government officials should not wear headscarves to ensure “precautionary neutrality” (Saharso 2007: 525). Two factors shape its hijab debates: citizenship rights and religion/state relations. In the first place, reformed in 2000, the country’s ethno-cultural citizenship model has played a significant role in headscarf debates insofar as it has historically not encouraged immigration and multicultural difference.6 The disenfranchised citizenship status of many Turkish-origin Muslims in Germany impacts how hijabs are perceived for,

6  These ethno-cultural notions of nationalism may also bolster conservatism toward Muslim headscarves in German public institutions. This trend became apparent after reunification as an attempt to redefine German national identity (Sauer 2009: 88).

716   Jennifer A. Selby as Beverly Weber (2004) notes, headscarves have become pejorative markers of social status, depicted as worn by uneducated immigrant women whose visibility is further predicated on their presumed lack of agency and their cultural difference (Ewing 2000, 2008; Rottman and Ferree 2008). At the same time, in response to these pejorative representations, new scholarship suggests that an increasing number of young Muslim women in German urban centers wear headscarves as a response to this stigma (Weber 2004: 40–1). In the second place, in contrast to other European nation-states described here, Germany does not have an official or established church. Article 137 in its 1919 constitution provided that “there is no state church,” a position which has been incorporated into its contemporary Basic Law (cited in McGoldrick 2006: 108). This seeming legal neutrality toward religious traditions has been called into question by some scholars who claim that it is not uncommon for Christian symbols to be regarded as cultural symbols, while Muslim symbols are depicted as religious or political signs (Joppke 2007a: 328; Weber 2004: 48). In other words, pervasive Christian culture is commonly portrayed as tolerant, open, and changing, while Islam is static and specific. Headscarves in particular symbolize this Islam-based cultural exclusion. This bias against Islam and headscarves distinctively emerged in December 2003 when Johannes Rau, then-president of Germany, called for greater religious neutrality so that if headscarves were banned in public schools then monks’ habits or crucifixes should be similarly restricted. In response to Rau’s call, Bavarian Minister-President Edmund Stoiber was most vocal and noted that the hijab alone entailed “a political symbol incompatible with our democracy” and that the president should not cast doubt on “our national identity distinguished by the Christian religion” (cited in McGoldrick 2006: 118). In the midst of this complex citizenship and Christian-focused church–state context, a number of hijab cases emerged in the 1980s primarily related to passport and identification pictures. In most cases women were permitted to wear their headscarves and received little political or media attention. Beginning in the early 1990s headscarf debates in Germany began emerging in public schools. While there are numerous examples of these cases, the Ferestha Ludin case is emblematic. Its outcomes had an unexpected and profound effect on the country’s fractured positions on hijabs. In 1998, Ms. Ferestha Ludin, a school teacher of Afghan origin, sued the province of Baden-Württemberg claiming that she was not hired because she wore a hijab, a decision she alleged violated her freedom of religious expression (Sauer 2009:  81; McGoldrick 2006: 111–14; Mahlmann 2003; Saharso 2007). Prior to looking for work, Ms. Ludin had worn her hijab as part of her teacher training without issue. The school board in Baden-Württemberg considered that young children were easily influenced and that her hijab would produce a negative influence because, while Ludin claimed she wore her hijab as a religious obligation, the Oberschulamt Stuttgart (Supervisory School Authority of Stuttgart) saw it as a political symbol incompatible with public neutrality and the separation of church and state outlined in German Basic Law (Cavanaugh 2007: 16). The case remained in the German courts for five years as Ludin appealed to the Upper Administrative Court, the Federal Administrative Court, and the Federal

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Constitutional Court (Saharso 2007: 524). Of note, in comparison to a number of other European nation-states, none of these courts referenced Article 3.2 of the Basic Law guaranteeing the equality of men and women as a reason for banning the headscarf in schools (Mahlmann 2003: 1111). The case’s final 5 to 3 decision in September 2003 in Germany’s Constitutional Federal Court determined that Ludin could not be excluded from teaching because of her hijab. The court noted that the decision in her favor was in accordance with the European Court of Human Rights and that the presence of a headscarf would not necessarily impede teaching the values of the German constitution (Mahlmann 2003:  1104). The decision did, however, leave future interpretation of the “outward appearance” of instructors open to reinterpretation, which opened possibilities for locally-based legislation (Cavanaugh 2007: 17). Thus, while the Constitutional Court ruled in Ms. Ludin’s favor, in general, Germans had a very different perspective on the 2003 decision. As Matthias Mahlmann notes, the final judgment in the Ludin case surprised most German citizens, as most held one among a variety of positions against the hijab in public schools. These ranged from pro-Christian/anti-Islam views, to a desire to discourage any visible religiosity, to hopes of “emancipating” Muslim women, to concerns with immigration and outright xenophobia (2003: 1109). Most Germans saw the allowance of hijabs for public school teachers as problematic in maintaining the pedagogical neutrality of the state (Sauer 2009: 82; Amiraux 2003: 129). Public opinion in the wake of the Ludin case thus provoked an important counter result as ten German federal states dominated by the Christian Democratic party quickly passed laws banning headscarves for teachers (McGoldrick 2006: 115). Indeed, with the exceptions of Berlin, which has called for the exclusion of all religious signs and the city of Stuttgart which declared the ban for headscarf-wearing Muslim teachers as unlawful because Catholic nuns can teach in their habits (Sauer 2009: 82), following the Ludin case, the states of Hamburg and Brandenburg that have had no legal restrictions passed anti-veiling legislation, as did Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, Lower Saxony, Saarland, Bremen, and North Rhine-Westphalia, which exempted Christian and Jewish religious symbols from its reach (Joppke 2007a: 331). Germany’s restrictive citizenship laws and Christian presence in public schools and culturally familiar symbols have affected public perceptions of headscarves. Yet, despite this restrictive perspective, most Germans accept the visibility of students’ headscarves in public schools and few support an outright ban on full-face hijabs.

Full-Face-Covering Headscarf Regulations and Public Opinion Despite significant differences in how headscarves are perceived and legislated across these ten European nation-states, recent public opinion polls and government discourse and legislation reveal an emerging and significant common reluctance toward niqabs and burqas. While multiple and overlapping, I submit that the following five concerns

718   Jennifer A. Selby recur in these public and governmental discussions: (1) that full-face hijabs reflect a patriarchal oppression of women; (2) that they reveal a rejection of pervasive cultural values, particularly the secularization of the public sphere; (3) that their presence entails a safety or security threat; (4) that they impede social relationships or “neighborliness”; and lastly, (5) that they cannot be defended from an Islamic theological perspective (i.e. that there is insufficient support for full-face covering within Islamic legal sources like the Qur’an). As we shall see, legislative and governmental discourses in these ten countries draw on these arguments differently. Aforementioned, the UK saw public debate on niqabs and burqas escalate in October 2006 when then-Foreign Minister Jack Straw commented that they signaled “separation and difference,” impeded communication, and obstructed community relations (The Guardian 2006). Straw was responding to the case of a young niqab-wearing teaching assistant who was suspended from her position (Werbner 2007: 164). Straw’s response to the case drew international attention. In a riposte in The Times, the Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams defended the teacher in question’s right to wear religious symbols like the niqab in the workplace on the grounds that the state is “not the source of morality” and that “the ideal of a society where no visible public signs of religion would be seen—no crosses around necks, no side locks, turbans or veils—is a politically dangerous one” (cited in Werbner 2007: 164). Straw later apologized for the statement, but the pronouncement revealed tensions on the acceptability of full-face veils in multicultural Britain that other smaller school council-level disputes on hijabs did not garner. There are currently no bans or restrictions on burqas and niqabs in the United Kingdom. British Tory MP Philip Hollobone has pushed to launch a bill that would ban face-covering garments in the public sphere similarly to France and Belgium, but it has been overruled by the Home Secretary, Theresa May (Morris and Morrison 2011). The UKIP (the United Kingdom Independence Party) is the first British party to call for a ban on full-face hijabs in the public sphere. UKIP leader Nigel Farage has said they are a symbol of an “increasingly divided Britain,” that they “oppress women” and are a potential security threat (BBC News 2011). The British National Party has also called for the veil to be banned in Britain’s schools (BBC News 2011). Most Britons appear to support a public ban of full-face hijabs. When asked in a March 2010 poll conducted by the Financial Times whether they would like to see a full-face hijab ban in their country, 55% supported the ban, 25% did not, and 20% were unsure (Blitz 2010). As we saw in the previous section, the more common hijab has been more widely accepted. There is similarly no official ban on full-face-covering veils in Austria, where the niqab and burqa are exempt from the security-based prohibitions on disguises at public gatherings and demonstrations with reference to legal protections for religious signs. Nevertheless, appealing to concerns for gender equality, Gabriele Heinisch-Hosek, Social Democrat Minister for Women and Public Services, stated in 2009 that, “I consider the burka a sign of the submission of women” and that a burqa ban would be considered if the number of women wearing the garment increases significantly (Austrian Times 2009). In addition, even if there appears to be little threat, other indicators

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suggest that the Austrian socio-political climate may not be entirely welcoming to all non-Christian religious signs in the public sphere. Mirroring most of the countries under examination here, a relative openness toward hijabs in Sweden becomes more restrictive in discussions of full-face-covering hijabs. Mandatory directives were issued in 2003 by the National Education Agency to prohibit girls from wearing the burqa and niqab in public schools to ensure “the common values of the sexes and respect for the democratic principle on which the education system is based” (McGoldrick 2006: 215). Swedes appear to share this position. A study done by Uppsala Universitet- Sociologiska Institutionen suggests that 60% of Swedes believe it is acceptable to wear religious headcoverings like the hijab to work as long as it does not cover the face. The study concludes that only 2.8% of Swedes deem full-face veils acceptable (Islam in Europe 2010). There are no formal burqa or hijab prohibitions in Switzerland. Like in Austria, in 2009, Justice Minister Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf stated that a ban on full-face coverings would be considered if the proportion of women wearing the burqa increased significantly. Far-right Swiss Democrat Rene Kunz stated that the burqa is “a symbol of the domination of men over women” (News.com.au 2010). There appears to be grassroots support for this position. Echoing the country’s November 2009 minaret ban, in May 2011 a petition in the canton of Ticino collected more than eleven thousand signatures to attempt to force a referendum on the prohibition of full-face hijabs (The Local 2011). The canton of Aargau’s parliament similarly introduced a motion to the Council of States. The motion was approved with a vote of 89 to 33. There is popular support in Switzerland for the restriction of niqabs and burqas: 57.6% support a ban, 26.5% are against, and 15.9% are undecided (News 24 2010). Public debates on Islam in Italy have also focused on full-face-coverings. At the time of writing, formal restrictions were in place in the north with a national ban in development. On August 2, 2011, an Italian parliamentary commission approved a draft law that would ban women from wearing face-covering veils in public. Following an argument that they impede cultural integration, the law was sponsored by Souad Sbai, a Moroccan-born member of the Italian Freedom People Party. Sbai indicated that she felt that legislation would decrease the number of women who are “forced” to cover their faces, while helping them to better integrate into Italian society (Farris 2011). The proposal recommended that women found wearing the veil in public would face fines ranging from €100 to €300. Persons found forcing a woman to cover her face in public would be more severely reprimanded with a charge of €30,000 and up to twelve months in prison (Huffington Post 2011; The Guardian 2011). Several northern regions of Italy passed legislation banning the niqab and burqa in public places in October 2010, drawing upon a 1974 law that prohibits clothing or coverings that hinder identification. Briefly noting that the burqa and niqab do not have Qur’anic legitimacy, an Italian Interior Ministry report asserted that full-face-covering veils would be banned for “security reasons” (Walker 2010). Novara is an example of a city that passed a rule against all veils in the public sphere in 2010. In one case, Amel Marmouri was fined €500 for wearing her burqa to the post office. Media reports

720   Jennifer A. Selby suggest that her husband refused to let police see Ms. Marmouri unveiled (Daily Mail 2010; Walker 2010). Similarly, media reports in the north have focused on the burkini (a fully-covering female bathing suit). In one case a woman was asked to leave a public pool on the grounds that her bathing suit was unhygienic (Daily Mail 2010). Niqabs have had little public support in Italy according to a Financial Times poll. When asked whether they would support a ban on full-face hijabs like that in France, 63% of Italians supported the possibility of a ban, 23% did not, and 14% were undecided (Blitz 2010). In Spain, a nation-wide ban curtailing full-face veils was considered in the summer of 2010 on the grounds of female oppression, but was ultimately rejected by parliament (Tremlett 2010). Nevertheless, certain regions have enforced legal restrictions on clothing that covers the face in public, arguably to limit full-face-covering veils. Some areas in the provinces of Catalonia and Andalusia, where Muslim populations are more significant, have enforced bans on wearing the full-face veil in public. The Catalonian city of Lleida, for instance, has enforced a law so that a woman found wearing one in public is first warned and then fined between €300 and €600. Its mayor Ángel Ros appealed to concerns about women’s equality and a rise in religious radicalism, saying, “This is about equality between men and women. The burqa and the niqab are symbols of the political use of a religious dogmatism that had begun to appear in Lleida” (Tremlett 2010). The city of Barcelona passed similar legislation in 2010 that prohibits the full-face veil in all municipal buildings. In general, Spaniards appear to support this legislation. With figures similar to those in Italy, a 2011 Financial Times survey suggests that 65% supported a possible ban, 21% did not support the ban, and 14% were unsure (Blitz 2010). In keeping with the escalation of debates treating face-covering headscarves across Europe, niqabs and burqas have also come under recent scrutiny in Germany. At the time of writing, the state of Hesse is the only länder that has imposed a ban on the full-face veil for public sector workers, implemented in February 2011 (BBC News 2011). Support for a law on full-face veils like that in Belgium and France has received less support across Germany. A 2010 Financial Times survey found that 50% of Germans supported a formal ban of full-face veils, 32% did not support the ban, and 18% were unsure. Of note, when asked whether they would support a burqa ban alongside a wider prohibition of religious icons in the public sphere, only 10% of respondents supported the ban (Blitz 2010). In the Netherlands there is general acceptance toward headscarves that emerges as more restrictive with niqabs. In 2003 the Commission on Equal Treatment approved the prohibition of the niqab in public schools and universities on the basis that it hinders communication (Shadid and Van Koningsveld 2005). This case led the Minister of Education to create a guideline on clothing in public schools that allowed for the hijab but not for full-face coverings. By 2005, the Netherlands was the first European country where a potential burqa ban came to the forefront. Although the Dutch cabinet refused the controversial bill from Geert Wilders’s rightist Dutch Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid), the issue remains on the agenda alongside Wilders’s push to impede so-called Muslim immigration (Lettinga and Saharso 2008; Erlanger 2011). In response to Wilders’s bill against full-face-covering hijabs, the Minister of Integration,

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Rita Verdonk, created a commission to study the implications of a general ban, which were published as a report in 2006 (Vink 2007). The report concluded that a public ban on full-face hijabs infringed the Netherlands’ nondiscrimination principle and the right to freedom of religion and of choice. Anti-full-face hijab rhetoric emphasizes securitization (Saharso 2007; Lettinga and Saharso 2008). By January 2012, the Dutch minority government inched toward banning forms of clothing that cover the face including balaclavas and motorcycle helmets. The Interior Affairs Ministry commented, “people should be able to look at each other’s faces and recognize each other when they meet” (Reuters 2012). Like neighboring Belgium, the Dutch government cited security concerns as a reason for the ban and framed it as a move to safeguard public order and allow all members to fully participate in society. Prime Minister Maxime Verhagen said the ban was intended to ensure that a Dutch tradition of open communication was upheld, as well as to ensure public safety (Reuters 2012). While the most recent governmental position is clear, public opinion polls suggest that the Dutch are divided. A July 2005 poll states that 51% of those surveyed supported a ban on headscarves, and 46% opposed it (Horowitz and Morin 2006). These common public attitudes toward niqabs and burqas have translated into legislation in Belgium, which is the second country in Europe to institute a formal ban on full-face-covering hijabs. After much governmental debate, and while strongly critiqued by Belgium’s Muslim Council and by Amnesty International, on April 28, 2011, the government approved a law banning full-face veiling in the public sphere. Rationale for the law emphasized how veils prevent accurate identification of the individual, thereby threatening public safety. The law went into effect on July 22, 2011. Those caught with their faces covered in public can face fines (€137.50) and/or up to seven days’ imprisonment (BBC News 2011). At the time of writing, the full-face veil ban was challenged by two burqa-wearing women who claimed the law is discriminatory (BBC News 2011). Seven years after the 2004 ban on conspicuous religious signs in public schools, France became the first European country to pass a law banning face-covering veils. It is estimated that there are between 367 and 2,000 women in France who wear niqabs (Le Figaro 2009; Gerin 2010: 24–9). The “burqa ban” was preceded by a commission and a report, the “Fact-finding mission on the practice of wearing the full veil on the national territory” (or the Rapport d’information fait en application de l’article 145 du règlement au nom de la mission d’information sur la pratique du port du voile intégral sur le territoire national). This “Gerin Report” was instigated at the request of André Gerin, a communist member of the National Assembly and former mayor of Vénissieux. In early 2009, Gerin noted to the French National Assembly what he saw as an alarming rise in the number of women donning the voile intégral or full-face hijab in his constituency. He cautioned that to be “politically correct” and ignore the problem was tantamount to accepting it and that rising fundamentalist Islamism would promote sexist practices and fracture national identity. His position had broad political support, including from then-president Sarkozy. Legislating a ban on full-face veils in France also had strong popular support prior to its adoption. An opinion poll conducted by Taylor Nelson Sofres for Europe 1 in

722   Jennifer A. Selby April 2010 suggested that 63% of the French population fully supported an outright ban (Étude TNS Sofres-Logica 2010). A similar February 2010 survey conducted by the Financial Times indicated that 70% of French citizens supported the ban (Blitz 2010). The law restricting niqabs and burqas in the public sphere was put into practice on April 11, 2011. It entails €150 fines or citizenship classes (or both) for a woman caught covering her face. It carries far greater penalties for husbands, fathers, or brothers convicted of “forcing” the veil on a woman. A €30,000 fine and a year in prison would be doubled if the victim is a minor (La Depeche 2011).7 Within the first nine months of the ban’s enforcement, 237 women were cited by police and six women had been convicted; none of the women had been sent to a citizenship class (Arab News 2012).

Interpreting Diverse Headscarf Regimes This overview of the current statuses of hijabs makes evident the wide range of interpretations and legislation across these ten Western European nation-states. With this broad topography of more liberal allowance in the UK to more overt restriction in France in mind, this third section charts these three broad approaches comparatively: first, I turn to the citizenship and immigration models within these ten nation-states to see how they have affected the public acceptability of headscarves; second, I consider conceptualizations of cultural diversity and religiosity in public schools related to hijabs; and lastly, I examine commonly articulated concerns about headscarves in Western Europe related to their supposed expression of radical Islamism and patriarchy. While useful in offering points of comparison, I conclude by critiquing the limitations of these models.

Citizenship and Immigration Models One way the varying positions on headscarves across these nation-states can be conceptualized is by examining the ways in which they, in part, reflect immigration policies and citizenship regimes. A number of social scientists have analyzed how cultural diversity is negotiated in European nation-states (Castles 1995; Joppke 2007b; Lettinga and Saharso 2008). While these perspectives on cultural diversity often problematically position Muslims in Europe as immigrants, turning to common elements within citizenship/nationhood models nevertheless offers a useful window to address how

7  The July 2008 case of “Mme. M.” is cited in the Gerin Report as an occasion where a woman had been forced to wear a niqab. Mme. M. was denied French citizenship due to her deemed adoption of radical Islam incompatible with French values; court documents released to the press reported that her husband had required her to cover her entire face. The Conseil d’État (State Council) interpreted her full-face veil as solely a political sign and pointed to how the garment reflected her anti-Republican beliefs and comportment (Le Monde 2008; Gerin 2010: 164; Selby 2011a: 390).

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national identity can be bolstered relative to hijabs, both by excluding or including them (Bowen 2012). Recall, for instance, how concerns with hijabs in Germany were heightened as a unifying national concern following reunification. Following the conceptualizations of Sauer (2009) and Castles (1995), I situate these ten nation-states into three broad categories. The first model captures the French case, unique among those discussed here for its civic-assimilationist (Sauer 2009: 79) or simply assimilationist (Castles 1995: 298) perspective. This assimilationist context remains open to new Muslim immigrants as citizens but does not generally promote religious or cultural difference. Instead, a common point of allegiance for all citizens—public sphere secularity—ideally grants equal rights and responsibilities in matters of education and political participation regardless of the confessional loyalties of its citizens. Arguably, this context allows for the fostering of religious diversity among the Muslim minority for, as Cécile Laborde notes, “it is precisely because religious freedom is important that no religious group should be granted recognition” (2005: 314). In other words, the French citizenship paradigm purports that the public sphere must be free from potentially exclusionary religious references. At the same time, its expectation that immigrants become culturally indistinguishable from the majority population means that difference, apparent in the public visibility of partial or full headscarves, is problematic (Scott 2005: 110). This concern is articulated in the two government-commissioned reports that bolstered the 2004 and 2011 laws banning hijabs in public schools and full-face hijabs in public spaces. Both reports problematize multicultural politics for promoting communautarisme (communitarianism), which, contrary to shared nationhood, is understood to promote ghettoized segregation and unequal minority communities. Hijabs are thus positioned as threats to cohesive national unity. Six of the ten countries examined in this chapter fall into a second model, an ethno-cultural (Sauer 2009:  85)  or differential exclusion (Castles 1995) approach: Austria, Belgium (which, on the French side, could fall under the first laïque category and on the Flemish side espouses a slightly more pluralistic perspective), and some federal states of Germany, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland. Compared to the first model, the German model has not defined itself in Republican universalistic terms. Rather, Germany has emphasized “Christian-Occidental values” (Joppke 2007a:  335). This ethno-cultural perspective is based on descent rather than the third model examined in the next section that emphasizes consent to common values and principles. This ethno-cultural or differential model typically imposes the strictest citizenship requirements for immigrants. Austria, for instance, requires cultural and social integration as a precondition for naturalization (Sauer 2009: 85), and it and a number of countries including Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium have historically recruited guest workers for more transitory labor demands or as refugees for temporary protection who do not later receive citizenship rights (Castles 1995: 294). I have grouped Italy and Spain under this category because of their historical (and arguably, in Italy, contemporary) affiliation with Catholicism as an unspoken condition of national identity. At the same time, these nation-states do not endorse complete prohibition of religious signs sometimes because of the value accorded to religiosity (read: the so-called cultural visibility of Christianity).

724   Jennifer A. Selby The last model encompasses a more pluralistic (Castles 1995: 301) or multicultural (Sauer 2009: 89) approach and includes the Netherlands, Sweden (arguably), and the United Kingdom.8 Compared to the second paradigm, the multicultural model promotes diversity by granting relatively easy access to citizenship and generally recognizes cultural differences. Particularly in contrast with the civic-assimilationalist model in France, the pluralist version implies that minority communities are granted equal rights without demanding the prohibition of visible elements of cultural difference. With reference to Western European hijab debates, this means that there are relatively few restrictions in these nation-states against their visibility in the public sphere. These three citizenship paradigms are useful in recasting articulations of shared nationhood alongside the headscarf perspectives of these countries. However, the grouping of the larger second group is problematic in its explicatory capabilities because, as Sauer (2009: 89) explains, the ethno-cultural-based citizenship regime can lead to both greater accommodation toward non-Christian religious signs, like in the case of Austria, and to more prohibitive regulations, like in Germany. Considering common factors in the religio-social and legal landscapes of these countries, to which I now turn, is a second useful lens with which to consider headscarf regimes across Western Europe.

Islam in Public Schools Another way that these national perspectives on headscarves can be understood is vis-à-vis their articulation of cultural diversity or religiosity in public schools. As Antje Pedain notes, “there are few countries in Europe whose courts have not yet had occasion to rule on the presence of headscarfs in educational institutions, whether worn by pupils or by teachers” (2004: 537). These cases question the role of religion and the parameters of religious freedom in public education. Examination of the historical situation of religion in the public spheres of these countries falls outside the parameters of this chapter, so for the sake of brevity, I consider mediatized cases in public schools in France, Germany, Italy, Austria, and Britain. In keeping with its assimilationist Republican context, public schools in France are generally understood as microcosms of its political society where children learn about citizenship and participate in a shared public identity that transcends their personal, local, cultural, and religious affiliations. Headscarf debates in 1989, 1994, and 2004 (where hijabs were grouped with other “conspicuous religious signs” like yarmulkes and rarely seen large crosses) emphasized the inadmissibility of visible and distinguishing religiosity among students in this shared Republican space. Indeed, laïcité has an institutional doctrine of separation but also a principle of conscience that “prescribes norms of conduct both for religious organizations and for individual citizens” (Laborde

8 

Cavanaugh (2007: 1) qualifies this branch as a “limited pluralist European model.”

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2005: 307). Schools in France may be characterized as religiously neutral, but they are not politically neutral, particularly amidst concerns about whether female students are able to choose their religious garments free from familial expectations, or peer group or neighborhood pressures (Poulter 1997: 71). Debates have generally not extended to teachers who are expected to uphold and represent the neutrality of the state and cannot publicly express their religious beliefs (Laborde 2005: 325). In contrast to these hijab-free public schools promoting laïque civic values, schools in Britain are more broadly responsive to the needs and demands of individuals in local communities, and tend to see public education as a meeting place of private and public spheres. Unlike in France, in Britain religion is typically taught in schools with the pedagogical aim that instruction of the major religious traditions of the world relativizes them for students (Dwyer 1999: 174; Werbner 2007: 176). In general, public schools are conceptualized as arenas in which difference should be taught and discussed from a position of neutrality in order to educate citizens toward mutual tolerance and respect for difference. This typical position has meant that, until Jack Straw’s far-reaching comments on the niqab, most of the hijab cases examined in Britain have been resolved at the institutional level and have involved the violation of school uniforms and not headscarves. Many public schools encourage hijabs. Germany differs from France and Britain insofar as federal states determine whether hijabs are deemed acceptable in schools.9 Moreover, headscarf-related controversies affect students in France and teachers in Germany. As Christian Joppke explains, “in Germany it was never in question that students were free to wear religious dress as they see fit, while in France it was ever in question that teachers, the proverbial instituteurs of secular Republican morality, were to remain neutral in their personal attire” (2007a: 326). Students in Germany are typically allowed to wear hijabs provided they do not cause disruption and are deemed inoffensive. The outcome of the 1998 Ludin case shows how teachers are not granted the same liberty because, as representatives of the state, their religiously-informed dress might conflict with the school’s commitment to “neutrality.” The more concordatory models of religion in Germany, Italy, and Austria thus allow for greater visibility of hijabs in public schools among students, even if Christian values and practices typically underscore instruction. Public school debates in Italy, for instance, have focused on whether visible crucifixes are appropriate. Austria does not presume a secular position in its educational system and Catholicism remains present. However, Birgit Sauer points out that, ironically, given the strength of right-wing populist parties and the difficulties of achieving citizenship, the public dominance of the Catholic Church in Austria explains the country’s moderate public hijab debates: “A ban on headscarves might result in a similar prohibition of Christian symbols” (Sauer 2009: 88). In sum, the relative acceptability or not of hijabs in public schools is another

9 

On a national level, Islam is not officially recognized, few Muslim organizations are funded, and solely Christianity is taught in public schools (Sauer 2009: 85).

726   Jennifer A. Selby way to think about how these nation-states have framed these garments in one among many public institutions. A range of interpretations is evident, from the highly restrictive understanding of religious diversity in French public schools, to the allowance for students and not teachers in Germany, to the more liberal tolerance of visible religious signs in Britain.

Concerns for a “Fundamentalist” Islam A third way in which to consider these nationally-based Western European headscarf debates is to examine whether or not two prevalent arguments against their public presence are invoked: that they are symbols of patriarchy and/or that they reflect radical political Islamism. These themes have emerged as arguments to prevent hijabs in some nation-state contexts and not in others. Indeed, in some representations, Muslim women who wear a hijab are deemed as symbols of patriarchy (and sometimes misogyny), fundamentalism, or terrorism and as therefore dangerous and inassimilable within “European culture.”10 These two points are separated in this section arbitrarily. My aim is not to determine whether hijabs are inherently patriarchal or necessarily political, but to point to when these arguments have emerged in different nation-state contexts particularly in relation to full-face-covering veils.

Headscarves as Signs of Patriarchy Concerns for women’s equal rights have been central to recent discussions on the acceptability of hijabs in the public sphere. Gender equality advocates have expressed concerns that they symbolize a lesser treatment of women and hinder parity by denying Muslim women full access to the public sphere as equal citizens. There is also dispute about patriarchal calls for modest covering within the Qur’an. As described in the first section, part of this contention stems from Orientalist and colonialist characterizations of headscarf-wearing Muslim women as eroticized and passive, later shifting to postcolonial terrorism-related representations. Other concerns point to the theologically-explained passivity and lesser rights accorded to women under interpretations of shariah in some contexts. Like the representation of the niqab-wearing woman in the anti-minaret campaign in Switzerland (see Figure 16.1), these characterizations are not benign. Concern to cover and uncover parts of women’s bodies in the public sphere— ensuring normativity related to social sexual behavior—have contributed to a “feminization” of debates on Islam in Europe. These arguments related to patriarchy can be multifaceted. A number of scholars have noted how both defenders and opponents of headscarf restrictions refer to principles of non-discrimination and women’s equal rights (Severs 2010: 2; Sauer 2009; Werbner

10 

The 2010 French Gerin Report that preceded the ban on niqabs and burqas, for example, deems invocations for their existence as Salafi and as Taliban-inspired (Gerin 2010: 48–61).

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FIGURE  16.1  Poster

of the SVP with woman wearing niqab, 2009. Source:  © Schweizerzeit Verlags AG.

2007: 163; Winter 2006: 282). They note how those who seek to restrict headscarves in the public sphere argue that in so doing, they liberate women from patriarchal oppression and assert their rights of freedom of expression and equality. This desire to protect women’s rights against “patriarchal control” has been particularly important in arguments to enforce limitations on hijabs in France, Germany, Spain, and Sweden. French feminist philosopher Elisabeth Badinter’s statements exemplify a commonly articulated linkage between the “liberation” of women, especially with reference to the Afghan situation, and the freeing of Muslim women in Europe from patriarchal religiosity embedded in hijabs. Badinter argues that European feminists should draw a lesson from the 2004 French legislation against hijabs in schools: “Soon feminists in the rest of Europe will realise the headscarf is a terrible symbol of submission. You cannot denounce what has been going on in Afghanistan while tolerating the veil in Europe—even if women claim they are wearing it voluntarily” (cited in Freedman 2007: 37–8). On this point, as Bronwyn Winter (2006) points out, feminist groups often find themselves in unlikely alliances with the anti-immigration platforms of the political right (see also Selby 2011a: 380). A more complex situation appears in the Netherlands where the Dutch women’s movement is more divided on the acceptability of headscarves (Sauer 2009:  87). Sawitri Saharso and Doutje Lettinga (2008) argue that less emphasis is placed on the veil as signifying traditional gender roles in the Netherlands than in some countries, but that Somali refugee and prominent author Ayaan Hirsi Ali has gained contested

728   Jennifer A. Selby recognition as a spokesperson for the liberation of women in Islam (and from headscarves) based on her life experiences told in two bestselling autobiographies. At the same time, a number of Dutch headscarved women began the “Islamic Women’s Manifesto” to push for recognition and an alternative voice. This group differs from the French highly politicized suburban-focused (where most Muslims in France live) Ni Putes Ni Soumises (NPNS, Neither Whores Nor Submissives) who, to the surprise of some, supported the 2004 ban in France on headscarves in public schools based on their interpretation of feminist principles (Fernando 2009). In this way, like other feminist organizations in France, NPNS played an active role in promoting secularism (in this case, the removal of visible religious signs) to ensure women’s rights (Scott 2005, 2007; Selby 2011b). Despite the pervasiveness of these rights-driven critiques, Western European nation-states are not uniform on this point. In the German context for one, Saharso (2007) claims that hijab debates are generally not constructed around issues of gender and are generally understood as relating more to integration and citizenship (Rottman and Ferree 2008).

Headscarves as Signs of Terrorism In addition to concerns for their embedded patriarchal influences, hijabs have also been restricted in Western European nation-states because they are seen as terror-ridden signs. The acceptance of full-face-covering veils is sometimes equated with enabling conservative terrorist regimes. In this correlation restrictions against them act to safeguard Western nation-states from fundamentalism and concomitant violence. Much of this discourse became vocalized following September 11, 2001 and later attacks in Madrid and London. These events have been generative of a number of effects for Muslim minorities in the West, including a heightened gaze on headscarves (Bowen 2009; Shryock 2010). As visible signs of a vilified Islam, hijabs thus become symbolically positioned as contrary to shared unifying values and cause for heightened security. A number of studies and sites support this suggestion. The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia identified such a rise, specifically noting the headscarf as the “visible identifier as a target of hatred” (2001). A closer look at the 2009 campaign prior to a referendum on the construction of minarets in Switzerland also exemplifies these anxieties (see Figure 16.1). Three elements in the Swiss no campaign’s poster are worth noting: the woman figured is obscured and dark-skinned, evoking racial difference from the majority Caucasian Swiss population; second, the woman wears a rarely-seen niqab, suggesting that the visibility of minarets will promote more niqab-wearing women; and third, situated behind the niqab-wearing woman are missile-shaped minarets, effectively associating full-face-covering hijabs with fear and undesirable militarization. The advertisement thus links minarets and niqabs and equates them with war and terrorism. In the case of the Swiss minaret referendum, a number of pundits suggested that this powerfully-charged racialized anti-minaret campaign had a decisive impact on the resulting ban on minarets (Soukup 2009). That there are few women wearing these full-face coverings in Switzerland and

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even fewer minarets in the Swiss landscape are obscured in this image. It conveniently taps into racism, discrimination, and xenophobia associated with niqabs and burqas. Similar security concerns emerged against full-face veils in the defense of the April 2011 French ban against burqas and niqabs. They have also been articulated in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and in Switzerland. In these nation-state contexts, beyond ensuring accurate identification, there is fear that full-face veils will obscure the identifying characteristics of a potential criminal. Recall in Italy how a rarely invoked law against the wearing of masks was reformed to include full-face hijabs. Arguments for their removal to ensure security sometimes invoke theological interpretation of their illegitimacy, in part to try to demonstrate that the rationale to censor them is not Islamophobic or against the practices and beliefs of most Muslims. The 2010 Gerin Report in France that preceded the 2011 law carefully referenced theologians and prominent French Muslims who concluded that full-face veils are “un-Islamic” (Gerin 2010: 38, 431). There are thus a number of examples of how headscarves are read as problematic political signs that reflect potential danger. This third section has examined three ways to analyze the similarities and differences in headscarf regimes. One way to understand differences across Western Europe is through approaches toward cultural diversity, whether they be assimilationist, ethno-culturalist, or multicultural-pluralist. The Republican assimilationist perspective in France means that while there is a desire to be inclusive and grant membership rights to immigrants, citizens are encouraged to accept a commonly-shared public sphere devoid of religious differences. A second way cultural elements of difference are articulated vis-à-vis headscarves is in how they mirror “church–state” relations. Again with reference to the French case, a similar notion of sameness is evident in how laïcité has emerged in public schools as foundational for citizenship. Hijabs appear as impediments to this sameness. Thirdly, we can note how some countries have emphasized feminism and securitization to a greater or lesser extent.

Comparative Issues While these rubrics offer frameworks with which to consider headscarf regimes across Europe, these comparative categories are problematic for a number of reasons. First, they ignore how veiled women are often excluded from these legal and policy discussions. Even if not obvious in the ten-country overview, many of the policies and laws that regulate hijabs are formalized without consultation with the women who wear them. This silencing can have a negative effect on women who may already be marginalized by citizenship, social class, and education. On this point, Valérie Amiraux aptly notes a double discrimination in Europe, that in “wearing the headscarf, women become visible twice, first as members of a religious minority (the Muslim believers), second as gendered social actors (women)” (2003: 137). They can be similarly doubly silenced. Second, the way that these laws and public discussions are reported often give the impression that there are far more women wearing hijabs, niqabs, and burqas than there

730   Jennifer A. Selby may be in actual fact. I again turn to the French context to make this point. A 2003 IFOP study suggests that 26% of Muslim women who call themselves pratiquantes (practicing) wear the hijab, of whom only 8% are under 35 years old and 30% are 50 years or older (IFOP 2011: 28). Yet, 2003–4 publicized discussions in France on the acceptability of hijabs in public schools gave the impression that the number was far higher. More generally, full-face-covering hijabs are ubiquitous in photography and news stories in ways that do not reflect the diverse ways women do and do not wear hijabs. A personal anecdote exemplifies this point. In July 2011 I searched through thousands of stock photography and internet and news images for a photograph of a group of French Muslim women who both wore and did not wear headscarves. I had taken numerous similar photos of a variety of coverings among the women with whom I lived and interviewed while conducting ethnographic fieldwork in a Parisian suburb (Selby 2012). To protect their anonymity and given concerns of modesty articulated by some of the women, my own photographs were not appropriate for publication, particularly for a book cover. After an exhaustive search for a similar image to those I had easily and often taken, I came up empty handed. Of course, there are millions of images available of Muslim women, but the multitude of burqa- and niqab-wearing images available do not reflect their prevalence in Western Europe. In the Parisian suburban housing project area that was the location of my research, where most of the area’s 8,200 inhabitants were Muslim, only two women wore full-face veils. These two women were Caucasian converts, a second element not often featured in images of niqab-wearing women in the European Union. The last issue worth noting in the comparative frameworks I  have presented here is how they presuppose a common pattern within nation-states that obscures internal divisions on the regulation of hijabs. The porousness between internal national borders extends to blurred distinctions between private and public spheres (Amiraux 2003: 143).11 In Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and Spain, provincial states and local cities are able to decide how they wish to regulate headscarves in the public sphere; these policies are not reflective of decisions of other provinces or states within their national boundaries. Thus, solely focusing on nation-state positions as I do in this chapter presupposes a homogeneity that may not reflect the countries’ internal diversity.

Conclusion: Whither Headscarves? This chapter has examined the multiplicity of ways ten Western European nation-states have negotiated the public visibility of hijabs in recent years. While their socio-legal

11  As Valérie Amiraux explains, liberal secularism (more radical in France, more flexible in the United Kingdom) is based on a notion of confessional freedom, wherein religious practice is framed as reducible to preferences and choices, so that religiosity is solely relegated to the private sphere (2007: 133).

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treatment toward the more common headscarf differs, a trend toward the banning the full-face hijabs in the public sphere and/or in public institutions is noteworthy. Rather than restating common and differing positions across nation-states in this conclusion, I ask more broadly, why have headscarves become emblematic of contestation about Islam in Europe? As the cases and debates in this chapter make clear, as “shifting signifiers” these cloth coverings reflect concerns with immigration, integration, and securitization heightened in the post-9/11 period, are visibly religious in an age of secularization, and appear to counter commonly held gender and feminist politics (see also Göle 2005:  109). Predictions about the future of these debates are not useful. As “European Islams” communicate and rearticulate Islamic law for contemporary times and contexts, and as Western European nation-states continue debating the acceptability of these garments, these examples across these ten nation-states make clear that the significance of hijabs remains multitudinous and changing.

Acknowledgments I thank Emily Worsley for her assistance in putting together sources for this chapter. Some sections are drawn from Questioning French Secularism (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

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740   Jennifer A. Selby Simonsson, L. 2010. “Sweden Education Minister Moves against Burqa,” M&C News [online] August 4 [Accessed May 30, 2011]. Stasi Commission Report. 2003. Published in full in Le Monde, December 12, 18–24 . Stock-Morton, P. 1988. Moral Education for a Secular Society:  The Development of “Morale Laïque” in 19th Century France. Albany: State University of New York Press. Tarlo, E. 2007. “Hijab in London,” Journal of Material Culture 12(2): 131–56. Tersigni, S. 2005. “La pratique du hijab en France: Prescription, transmission horizontale et dissidence,” in F. Lorcerie (ed.), La politisation du voile en France, en Europe et dans le monde arabe. Paris: L’Harmattan, 37–52. Timmerman, C. 2000. “Muslim Women and Nationalism: The Power of the Image,” Current Sociology 48 (October): 15–27. Tremlett, G. 2010. “Burqa Bans Spread across Catalonia,” The Guardian [online] July 2  [Accessed July 13, 2011]. United Press International. 2008. “Muslim Woman Wins Discrimination Case,” April 13 [Accessed July 11, 2011]. Université catholique de Louvain. 2007. “Belgian Attitudes Toward the Veil,” May 25. US Department of State. 2006. “Belgium:  International Religious Freedom Report 2006,” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Department of State Website [online] . Van Sickle, A. 2008. “Veiled Sentiments:  Does the Burqa Stand Up in Court?” London Progressive Journal [online] March 28  [Accessed July 14, 2011]. VEIL (Values, Equality and Difference in Liberal Democracies) (UK). 2008 [online] October 29  [Accessed July 20, 2011]. Venel, N. 1999. Musulmanes françaises: des pratiquantes voilées à l’université. Paris: L’Harmattan. Vink, M. P. 2007. “Dutch ‘Multiculturalism’ Beyond the Pillarisation Myth,” Political Studies Review 5: 337–50. Vinthagen Simpson, P. 2008. “Muslim Woman Receives Damages for Headscarf Slight,” The Local [online] April 12  [Accessed July 28, 2011]. Walker, P. 2010. “Muslim Woman Fined for Wearing Burqa in Northern Italy,” The Guardian [online] May 5  [Accessed July 13, 2011]. Warner, C. M. and Wenner, M. W. 2006. “Religion and the Political Organization of Muslims in Europe,” Perspectives on Politics 4(3): 457–79. Watson, H. 1994. “Women and the Veil: Personal Responses to Global Process,” in A. S. Ahmed and H. Donnan (eds.), Islam, Globalization, and Postmodernity. London: Routledge, 141–59. Weber, B. 2004. “Cloth on Her Head, Constitution in Hand: Germany’s Headscarf Debates and the Cultural Politics of Difference,” German Politics and Society 22: 33–64. Weil, P. 2009. “Why the French Laïcité is Liberal,” Cardozo Law Review 30(6): 2699–714. Werbner, P. 2007. “Veiled Interventions in Pure Space,” Theory, Culture and Society 24(2): 161–86. Westerfield, J. M. 2006. “Behind the Veil: An American Legal Perspective on the European Headscarf Debate,” American Journal of Comparative Law 55(2): 637–78.

Hijab   741

Williams, R. 2006. “A Society that Does Not Allow Crosses or Veils in Public is a Dangerous One,” The Times [online] October 27  . Winter, B. 2006. “Secularism Aboard the Titanic: Feminists and the Debate over the Hijab in France,” Feminist Studies 32(2): 279–98. World Radio Switzerland. 2009. “Justice Minister Revises Anti-Burqa Statement” [online] November 10  [Accessed May 30, 2011]. ZARA. 2008. “Racism Report 2008: Case Report on Racist Incidents and Structures in Austria” [online] .

PA R T V

I SL A M A N D E U ROP E A N P OL I T IC S

C HA P T E R

17

I S L A M O P H O B IA AY HA N KAYA

Islamophobia: A History of the Term In a report submitted to the European Commission by Jocelyne Cesari et al. (2006: 5), it is stated that although negative perceptions of Islam in Europe can be traced back to the Crusades in many ways, Islamophobia is rather ‘a modern and secular anti-Islamic discourse and practice appearing in the public sphere with the integration of Muslim immigrant communities and intensifying after 9/11’.1 Islamophobia is a much used but little understood term, which is believed to have become popular after the report of Runnymede Trust’s Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia (CBMI) entitled Islamophobia:  A  Challenge for Us All (Runnymede 1997). In this report it is asserted that the first usage of the term was by an American newspaper reporter in 1991. ‘Islamophobia’ was defined by the CBMI as ‘an unfounded hostility towards Islam, and therefore fear or dislike of all or most Muslims’, and further elaborated by the proposal of eight possible Islamophobic mindsets. The eight statements are: (1) Islam is seen as a monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to change; (2) Islam is seen as separate and ‘other’. It does not have values in common with other cultures, is not affected by them and does not influence them; (3) Islam is seen as inferior to the West. It is seen as barbaric, irrational, primitive and sexist; (4) Islam is seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, and supportive of terrorism, and engaged in a ‘clash of civilizations’; (5) Islam is seen as a political ideology and is used for political or military advantage; (6) Criticisms made of the West by Islam are rejected out of hand; (7) Hostility towards Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society; and (8) Anti-Muslim hostility is seen as natural or normal.

1  The website offers a very detailed map of the news and analysis on Islam in Europe and North America. The site is sponsored by GSRL Paris/CNRS Paris and consists of over forty researchers.

746   Ayhan Kaya The term Islamophobia has become popular since the Runnymede Trust report’s publication in describing the phenomenon. There is currently no legally agreed definition of Islamophobia; and the social sciences have not developed a common definition, policy, or action to combat it either. Besides, there are a number of other possible terms to refer to negative feelings and attitudes towards Islam and Muslims, such as ‘anti-Muslimism’, ‘anti-Muslim racism’, ‘intolerance against Muslims’, ‘anti-Muslim prejudice’, ‘anti-Muslim bigotry’, ‘hatred of Muslims’, ‘anti-Islamism’, ‘anti-Muslimism’, ‘Muslimophobia’, ‘demonisation of Islam’, and ‘demonisation of Muslims’ (Richardson 2012). Probably the most commonly used term in today’s world is Islamophobia. Richardson (2012) also reminds us of the fact that there is a similar range of contested terms in other languages as well, not only in English. For instance, in German there is a contest between Islamophobie (fear) and Islamfeindlichkeit (hostility). In French, the contest is in part between islamophobie and racisme anti-arabe, or racisme anti-maghrébin, the latter two phrases indicating that the phenomenon is mainly seen as a form of anti-immigrant racism without having theological and cultural connotations. The Scandinavian term Muslimhat literally means ‘hatred of Muslims’. Such terminological differences may reflect a set of differences of understanding and focus. These different terms may be used to distinguish between various manifestations of the phenomena under discussion. For instance, as Sivanandan rightly states, the term anti-Muslim racism is used to refer to hate crimes and to harassment, rudeness, and verbal abuse in public spaces, whereas the term Islamophobia refers to discourse and mindsets in the media, including the broadsheets as well as the tabloids (Sivanandan 2010). Since Fred Halliday put ‘Islamophobia’ in inverted commas in the title of his article ‘“Islamophobia” Reconsidered’, written in 1999, the term Islamophobia has also been discussed by scholars. Some criticisms refer to the unintended consequences of the term, or its possible political and ideological exploitation. Halliday himself furnishes an example. Halliday (1999: 898) argues that the term ‘reproduces the distortion . . . that there is one Islam’ and that this serves to ‘play into the hands’ of individuals, or groups in Muslim communities who seek to promote a more conservative agenda and to arrogate to themselves the authority to speak for the tradition and culture, whether on the status of women, rights to free speech, or violence. Halliday (1999: 898) also posits an objection on the grounds that the term is a misnomer. According to him, once upon a time, ‘the enemy’ was the religion of Islam, which was attacked by the Crusades and the Reconquista. But today the target has changed. The attack now is not against Islam as a faith, but Muslims as a people. This is why he prefers the term ‘anti-Muslimism’.2 Similarly, delineating the rationale employed by words such as ‘anti-Muslim prejudice’ and ‘anti-Muslim racism’, which demonstrate hostile attitudes towards Muslims, Maleiha Malik (2010) prefers the term ‘anti-Muslim prejudice’ to Islamophobia, rejecting the pathos and seeming irrationality of the use of the term ‘phobia’ to describe hostility towards Muslims in favour of a calculated prejudiced orientation. In this regard,

2 

See also Halliday (1996: ­chapter 6), where he introduces the term ‘anti-Muslimism’.

Islamophobia  747

paraphrasing Edward Said, Semati also eloquently relates Islamophobia to both racism and Orientalism: Islamophobia is a cultural-ideological outlook that seeks to explain ills of the (global) social order by attributing them to Islam. It is a way of thinking that conflates histories, politics, societies and cultures of the Middle East into a single unified and negative conception of Islam. It is an ideology in which the ‘backwardness’ of the other is established through an essentialized Islam. It is, as a form of racism, an essentialist view of peoples whose culture it deems ‘different’ in an eternal, fixed, and immutable fashion. It is a way of conceptualizing (international) politics that explains political acts and political violence not in terms of geopolitical calculations, motives, and actors, but in terms of religion. Islamophobia posits ‘Islam’ as a conception of the world that is incompatible with modernity, with civilization, and, more important, with Euro-Americanness. Islamophobia, on the one hand, creates difference (the ‘other’) and, on the other hand, erases difference (all of ‘them’ are the ‘same’). (Semati, 2010: 266–77)3

Other scholars define Islamophobia as cultural racism (Meer and Modood 2009; Schiffer and Wagner 2011), the roots of which could be traced back to the writings of Arthur de Gobineau (1816–82), who was a French nobleman. The main concern of de Gobineau (1999) was to offer an answer to the ever-fascinating question of why civilizations rise and fall. De Gobineau argued that history is composed of continuous struggle among the ‘white’, ‘yellow’, and ‘negroid’ races. He underlined the superiority of the ‘white race’. The lesson of history is, according to de Gobineau (1999: 56) as argued in 1853, that ‘all civilisations derive from the white race, that none can exist without its help, and that a society is great and brilliant only so far as it preserves the blood of the noble group that created it, provided that this group itself belongs to the most illustrious branch of our species’. He always complained about the mixture of the races (miscegenation), which, he believed, led to the crisis of civilization. The racist thoughts in de Gobineau’s works spring from his fear of the ‘Oriental’ attacks on the ‘Occidental’ lands, which would cause miscegenation and the fall of civilizations. His line of thinking resembles closely the contemporary debate regarding the alleged invasion of the West by Islam expressed by Theo van Gogh, Pim Fortuyn, Oriana Fallaci, and George Bush, a point to which I shall return shortly. As Andrew O’Hagan (2008) has observed very well, Islamophobia is one of the big questions of our day, presenting a problem that is most often answered ‘with ignorance or with common hysteria, and almost never with fresh thinking’. The damage this brings to bear on the European public is ‘making a monster where it shouldn’t exist, a monster made from the mania of our own fear’ (Evans 2010: 3). The ‘monster made from the

3  Similarly, one could also argue that the contemporary European identity is partly built upon what I call Islamophobism, or anti-Muslim racism, in a fashion similar to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when European identity was partly built upon anti-Semitism.

748   Ayhan Kaya mania of our own fear’ presumably derives from a glocal (global + local) context shaped by a growing feeling of insecurity making individuals more and more heteronomous in a way that essentializes communal, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious boundaries. It is this kind of feeling of insecurity that makes individuals lean on what is cultural, religious, and communal in an age of prudentialism. Nostalgia, the past, ethnicity, culture, and religion turn out to be a kind of lighthouse beckoning even the members of the majority societies back to the shore—the one point on the landscape that gives hope of direction in a time characterized by prudentialism, the post-social state, insecurity, fear, loneliness, distrustfulness, and aimlessness (Stewart 2000; Miller and Rose 2008). This is actually the way the neo-liberal state operates: through securitizing and stigmatizing those who are ethno-culturally and religiously different from the majority societies, a point which will be discussed soon. Neither should one underestimate the impact of the major international organizations on the changing definition of Islamophobia in the aftermath of 9/11. The United Nations,4 the Council of Europe,5 the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe,6 and the European Union (EUMC 2006) have lately discussed the term within the broad concepts of racism and racial discrimination. Therefore, they base their approaches to identifying the phenomenon and its manifestations on internationally accepted standards on racism. In 2005 a Council of Europe publication ‘Islamophobia and its Consequences on Young People’ referred to Islamophobia as ‘the fear of or prejudiced viewpoint towards Islam, Muslims and matters pertaining to them. Whether it takes the shape of daily forms of racism and discrimination or more violent forms, Islamophobia is a violation of human rights and a threat to social cohesion’ (Council of Europe 2004). 4  For the definition of racial discrimination by the UN, see the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965, entry into force 4 January 1969. 5  See European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI)’s general policy recommendation No. 7 on national legislation to combat racism and racial discrimination, adopted on 13 December 2002. Since then, noting that intolerance, discrimination, and radicalization have recently seized control of the European public discourse, the Council of Europe decided to create a Group of Eminent Persons in order to prepare a report within the context of the Pan-European project Living together in 21st century Europe to be submitted to the Committee of Ministers prior to the Istanbul Ministerial of 11 May 2011. The group consists of nine high-ranking individuals with a specific expertise and a particular interest in the subject. Former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer is the Chairman, and British journalist Edward Mortimer became the rapporteur responsible for preparing the draft report. The other members of the Group are Timothy Garton Ash, Emma Bonino, Martin Hirsch, Danuta Hubner, Ayşe Kadioglu, Sonja Licht, Vladimir Lukin, and Javier Solana Madariaga. The Group of Eminent Persons is expected to help the Council of Europe to deal with new challenges to the security and stability of European citizens. For further information see the report of the Group of Eminent Persons, (accessed 23 June 2013). 6  See OSCE Meeting on the Relationship Between Racist, Xenophobic and Anti-Semitic Propaganda on the Internet and Hate Crimes, Conference in Paris, 16 and 17 June 2004, available at (accessed 22 March 2013).

Islamophobia  749

Despite this lack of consensus, several scholars use the term, such as Richardson (2012), Esposito (2011), Schiffer and Wagner (2011), Allen (2010), Geisser (2010), Laitin (2010), Semati (2010), Meer and Modood (2009), Werbner (2005), Vertovec (2002), and Modood (2002). Against this background, the term Islamophobia is used in this chapter to define the overarching narrative which informs the manifestations of both anti-Muslim prejudice and anti-Muslim racism. In other words, I will use the term to refer to a set of particular discourses and mindsets formed by the politicians, security forces, bureaucracy, media, and some civil society organizations and academics. Apart from this scholarly debate, the term has also gained a political signification with European politics, which has negatively conditioned public opinion by means of securitizing migration and stigmatizing multiculturalism, a point which will be delineated further in the following pages.

Political Relevance of the Term: Discriminatory Public Opinion Vis-à-Vis Islamic Practices Islamophobic discourse has become mainstream in the West since 9/11. It seems that social groups belonging to the majority nation in a given territory are more inclined to express the distress resulting from insecurity and social-economic deprivation through the language of Islamophobia, even in those cases which are not related to the actual threat of Islam or Muslims. Islamophobic discourse has certainly resonated a great deal in the last decade. It has made the users of this discourse heard by both the local and the international community, although their distress did not really result from anything related to Muslims in general. In other words, Muslims have become the most popular scapegoats in many parts of the world, to be blamed for any troubled situation. For more than a decade, Muslim-origin migrants and their descendants are primarily seen by the European societies as a financial burden, and virtually never as an opportunity for the country. They tend to be associated with illegality, crime, violence, drugs, radicalism, fundamentalism, and conflict, and in many other respects are represented in negative ways. A Pew survey held in 2006 indicated that opinions of Muslims in almost all of the Western European countries are quite negative. While one in four in the USA and the UK displayed Islamophobic sentiments, more than half of Spaniards and half of Germans said that they did not like Muslims, and the figures for Poland and France were 46% and 38% for those holding unfavourable opinions of Muslims. The survey revealed that prejudice was marked mainly among older generations and appeared to be class-based. People over 50 and of low education were more likely to be prejudiced.7 Similarly, the Gallup Organization Survey of 7  For the dataset of the surveys on Islamophobia see ; ; and for an elaborate analysis of these findings see . One can also visit the website of Islamophobia Watch to follow the record of racist

750   Ayhan Kaya Population Perceptions and Attitudes held for the World Economic Forum in 2007 indicated that three in four US residents believe that the Muslim world is not committed to improving relations with the West. The same survey found that half of respondents in Italy (58%), Denmark (52%), and Spain (50%) agree that the Muslim world is not committed to improving relations. Israelis, on the other hand, represent a remarkable exception with almost two-thirds (64%) believing that the Muslim world is committed to improving relations. The picture on the other side of the coin is not very different either. Among the majority-Muslim nations surveyed, it was deciphered that majorities in every Middle Eastern country believe that the West is not committed to better relations with the Muslim world, while respondents in majority-Muslim Asian countries are about evenly split (WEF 2008: 21). Another poll made by the Pew research institute in the United States in August 2010 reveals that the favourable opinions of Islam among the American public have declined since 2005; 35% of the public say that Islam encourages violence more than other religions.8 Similarly, the British Social Attitudes Survey held in 2009 shows that 45% of the British do not like Muslims much, and do not really believe in free speech at all. It has been revealed that dislike of Muslims is related to the belief that Britain is too diverse, and that religious diversity is harming Britain, as was also recently expressed by the British Prime Minister David Cameron in February 2011.9 Islamophobia has also become visible in those countries which are known to be non-religious and very secular, such as Sweden. Sweden received harsh criticisms from the Swedish UN association in 2009 for failing to abide by a number of UN conventions. It was stated in the report that hate crimes increased in Sweden as a result of Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, and homophobic sentiments.10 incidences in each country:  (accessed 22 March 2013). The European Commission has also recently funded several FP7 projects focusing on the legal, political, and social discrimination of religious minorities, particularly Muslims, in the European Union. The projects RELIGARE and ACCEPT PLURALISM are two examples. RELIGARE (Religious Diversity and Secular Models in Europe, 2010–13) is about religions, belonging, beliefs, and secularism. It examines the current realities, including the legal rules protecting or limiting (constraining) the experiences of religious or other belief-based communities. Where the practices of communities or individuals do not conform to state law requirements, or where communities turn to their own legal regimes or tribunals, the reasons behind these developments need to be understood. See . ACCEPT PLURALISM (Tolerance, Pluralism and Social Cohesion: Responding to the Challenges of the 21st Century in Europe, 2010–13) investigates whether European societies have become more or less tolerant during the past twenty years. In particular, the project aims to clarify: (a) how tolerance is defined conceptually, (b) how it is codified in norms, institutional arrangements, public policies, and social practices, (c) how tolerance can be measured (whose tolerance, who is tolerated, and whether degrees of tolerance vary with reference to different minority groups). This was a project I was also involved in. See . 8 

For more detail see . For the British Social Attitudes Survey see (accessed 20 April 2013). For the speech of David Cameron dated February 2011 see (accessed 16 August 2013). 10  See ‘Sweden slammed for UN rights failures’ (9 November 2009), available at (accessed 23April 2013). 9 

Islamophobia  751

The growing distance between the lifeworlds of the majority societies and their allochthonous Muslim-origin minorities has also become evident. Detlef Pollack, a sociologist from Münster, conducted an extensive survey in Germany, France, Denmark, Portugal, and the Netherlands in late 2010. The study reveals that the German society, in comparison to the French, Dutch, and Danish, has recently generated a more intolerant perspective towards Islam. His findings also disprove the statement of the German President Christian Wulff on 19 October 2010, saying that ‘Islam is part of Germany’.11 The findings actually reaffirm that Germans perceive Islam as not belonging in Germany. The study also reveals that fewer than 5% of Germans, compared with more than 20% of Danes, French, and Dutch, consider Islam to be a tolerant religion, according to the study. These findings are also confirmed by another survey, which the German Marshall Fund conducted in 2010. The respondents in several different countries were asked about their perception of the level of integration of Muslim immigrants and their descendants into their societies. Canadians were split evenly, with 45% believing Muslim immigrants were integrating well and 44% thinking they were integrating poorly. Americans were the most optimistic about Muslim integration, 45% of whom thought these immigrants were integrating well, while 40% said that they were not. A further 14% claimed that they did not know, probably because of comparatively low numbers of Muslim immigrants residing in the United States, whereas in Europe, Spanish and German respondents were remarkably pessimistic about the integration level of Muslim origin immigrants and their descendants, where large majorities said that Muslims were integrating poorly (70% and 67%, respectively). They were followed by the Dutch (56%), the British (53%), the French (51%), and a plurality of Italians (49%) who also thought that Muslim immigrants were integrating poorly (GMF 2010). A survey conducted by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in various EU countries in 2011 revealed that in most of the countries a majority believe that Islam is a religion of intolerance, with agreement just below 50% only in Great Britain and the Netherlands (Table 17.1). In almost all the countries, more than half of the respondents said that Muslims make too many demands; Portugal was the only exception, with about onethird. The statement that there are too many Muslims in the country is affirmed by just over one-quarter in Portugal and by about one-third in France. In Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and the Netherlands more than 40% of respondents complain that there are too many Muslims in their country, in Hungary about 60%. The figures for those who say that Muslim culture is compatible with their own, range from 17% in Poland and 19% in Germany to about half the population in Portugal and France. A majority of more than 70% of European respondents find that Muslim attitudes towards women are incompatible with their own values. One-third of the surveyed countries think that Muslims treat Islamist terrorists as heroes, although somewhat fewer believe that terrorism finds moral support in the Muslim community (ranging from under 20% in Germany and the Netherlands to nearly 30% in Hungary). It is obvious that Europeans 11 

For the President’s speech see (accessed 26 April 2013).

752   Ayhan Kaya Table 17.1  Anti-Muslim statements (agreement in %) Item

Germany

UK

France Netherlands Italy Portugal Poland Hungary

There are too many Muslims in [country].

46.1

44.7

36.2

41.5

49.7

27.1

47.1

60.7

Muslims are too demanding.

54.1

50.0

52.8

51.8

64.7

34.4

62.3

60.0

Islam is a religion of intolerance. [France: Islam is a religion of tolerance.]

52.5

47.2

52.3

46.7

60.4

62.2

61.5

53.4

The Muslim culture fits well into [country/ Europe].

16.6

39.0

49.8

38.7

27.4

50.1

19.0

30.2

Muslims’ attitudes towards women contradict our values.

76.1

81.5

78.8

78.2

82.2

72.1

72.1

76.8

Many Muslims perceive terrorists as heroes. [France: question not asked.]

27.9

37.6

–

29.2

28.5

30.3

30.2

39.3

The majority of Muslims find terrorism justifiable. [France: not justifiable.]

17.1

26.3

23.3

19.9

21.5

22.4

26.0

29.6

Source: FES 2011.

are largely united in their rejection of Muslims and Islam. The significantly most widespread anti-Muslim attitudes are found in Germany, Hungary, Italy, and Poland, closely followed by France,12 Great Britain, and the Netherlands. The extent of anti-Muslim attitudes is lowest in Portugal (FES 2011: 60–3). On the other side of the picture, Muslim-origin migrants and their descendants are highly concerned about the ways in which they are being treated by the majority societies in the West. For instance, a survey conducted by the European Monitoring Centre

12 

Vincent Geisser (2010) argues that French Islamophobia often intermingles with ‘hijabophobia’ (rejection of the Islamic veil). He claims that there is a French republican form of Islamophobia, which is partly different from other forms of Islamophobia: according to the French republican form, ‘a perfect Muslim is one who has given up a part of his faith, beliefs and “outdated” religious practices. A beautiful mosque is a quiet one without minaret, practically invisible, in harmony with the republican context. An emancipated Muslim woman is one who has escaped from her tribe, being freed of an “Islamic male’s” supervision’ (Geisser 2010: 45).

Islamophobia  753

on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC 2006)  reveals that Islamophobia, discrimination, and socio-economic marginalization have a primary role in generating disaffection and alienation among Muslim-origin migrants and their descendants residing in the European Union countries. Muslims feel that acceptance by society is increasingly premised on ‘assimilation’ and the assumption that they should lose their Muslim identity. This sense of exclusion is of particular relevance in the face of the challenges posed by terrorism, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11, which has put them under a general suspicion of terrorism (Cesari 2009). The increase of negative attitudes towards Muslims in Europe is confirmed by opinion polls carried out by different researchers as detailed above. In some European countries, the percentage of those interviewed who have either a ‘somewhat unfavourable’ or a ‘very unfavourable’ opinion of Muslims has substantially increased between 2005 and 2010 or, in specific cases, has remained at a high level, sometimes close to 50%. Islam is even perceived as a major threat to Europe by many Europeans because they feel that the minority is growing and that Islam is incompatible with ‘modern European life’. All the public surveys in Europe and the USA confirm the prevalence of negative opinions about Islam. It is likely that the negative perception of Islam in the European countries mainly springs from the Muslim-origin migrants and their descendants residing in the respective countries, while in the USA this negative perception is more likely to be coming from the foreign policy challenges posed by Islam in general. One could describe a few recent events to demonstrate the indirect or direct ascendancy of the Islamophobic perception of Western societies: the assassination of Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands on 6 May 2002, the Danish Cartoon crisis in 2006, the Swiss minaret debate in 2009, and the burning of the Qur’an by an American pastor in Florida in 2011. Pim Fortuyn was a former university professor of sociology, a political columnist, and a gay activist in the Netherlands. He was well known for his extravagant and luxurious lifestyle. He was unable to find a place for himself within the established political parties, and he founded his own party, List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in 2001. He was in favour of lower taxes, less government, abortion rights, and euthanasia. His views on immigration and Islam made him even more popular. He called Islam a ‘backward culture’, and he openly stated that ‘there were too many immigrants in the Netherlands’. Immediately before the elections he was assassinated by an animal-rights activist. This was the first political assassination in the Netherlands in 400 years. Pim Fortuyn’s Islamophobia apparently paid off for the LPF in the general elections held on 15 May 2002, as they received 17% of the vote and twenty-six seats in parliament (Andeweg and Irwin 2005: 16–17). When Jyllands-Posten published twelve cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in September 2006, they could not have predicted the far-reaching and devastating consequences it would have for a small country of 5.4 million people. What started as a trivial attempt to provoke debate in defence of free speech would go on to cause an unforeseen inter-cultural clash on a global scale. Some consider it Denmark’s biggest international crisis since 1945. Damaging not only the Danish economy (a loss of $1 billion in exports), the ‘Cartoon crisis’ destroyed Denmark’s reputation as an open and tolerant society. Many Muslims forbid any visual depictions of the Prophet Muhammad

754   Ayhan Kaya altogether, though others allow it as long as the images are respectful (Laegaard 2007; Kaya 2009). Harmless by most secular standards, the cartoons in this case satirized the Prophet Mohammad—this was their intended purpose in general. While some found the drawings mildly offensive, others experienced sheer outrage and saw the cartoons as an attempt to humiliate them. The reactions ranged from peaceful demonstrations to violent riots, embassy protests, and flag burnings all around the word, and even resulted in a significant number of deaths worldwide. In a country where Muslim immigrants remain fairly geographically segregated (Mouritsen 2006:  74), the media’s influence worked as a stronger force to affect people’s perceptions about Muslims, since the contact between the groups remains limited. Jyllands-Posten facilitated a common stereotype that perceives all Muslims as terrorists. Similarly, in Switzerland, a country where the contact between the majority society and Muslim-origin immigrants remains very limited in everyday life, the negative perception about Muslims was explicitly articulated by the majority society through the debate on minarets. The requests by Muslim-origin immigrants to erect mosques and minarets aroused significant public opposition in various European cities (Baumann 2009; Nielsen et al. 2009; Geisser 2010; Allievi 2010). The Swiss majority vote in the 2009 referendum to ban the building of minarets is not a single and exceptional result. Rather, it is a dramatized culmination of Swiss politics shifting from long-practised equilibrium to populist polarization and aggressive exclusion of minorities. But what was really interesting in the Minaret Referendum was that those Swiss citizens who did not have any interaction with the Muslims in their everyday life were more inclined to oppose the erection of minarets (Pfaff-Czarnecka 2009). On the other hand, those interacting with the Muslims in everyday life either did not go to the polls, or expressed their indifference to the issue. The reaction of the majority of the Swiss citizens to the minaret issue was probably the reflection of their unrest originating from the global financial crisis, increasing immigration of highly skilled Germans, and domestic political problems. Public expression of ongoing structural problems by means of a kind of hate-speech against Muslims has become a popular discourse in Switzerland as well as in other European countries. Another event demonstrating the growing negative perceptions of Islam and the Muslims in the West is the burning of the Qur’an by a pastor in Gainesville, Florida on 20 March 2011. A controversial evangelical preacher oversaw the burning of a copy of the Qur’an in a small church after finding the Muslim holy book ‘guilty’ of crimes committed against humanity, especially since 9/11.The burning was carried out by pastor Wayne Sapp under the supervision of pastor Terry Jones, who in September 2010 drew sweeping condemnation over his plan to ignite a pile of Qur’ans on the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. The event was presented as a trial of the book in which the Qur’an was found ‘guilty’ and ‘executed’. Although the event was open to the public, fewer than thirty people attended.13 However, it caused several different uproars in different parts

13  See the website of International Herald Tribune, 21 March 2011, (accessed 13 September 2013).

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of the world, especially among Muslims, in a way that has further exacerbated the divide between the two worlds. Despite these very visible and mediatized crises, practices of discrimination against Islam or Muslims per se are more difficult to measure. Firstly, this is because most European countries do not count population by religion. Secondly, these acts of discrimination are most of the time underreported, or misreported; that is to say that discriminatory practices against Muslims may have other causes like discrimination against immigrants, or discrimination against a segregated population. In any case, when religious practices or dress codes are at stake, it is indeed possible to define them as Islamophobic. The highest levels of discrimination were found in employment and in services provided by the private sector. For instance, the European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS) held in 2009 very clearly depicts that Muslimorigin individuals residing in the European space complain primarily about discrimination in the labour market. For instance, the Pew Global Attitudes Survey of 2006 found that unemployment registered as a worry (very or somewhat) for 78% of Muslims in Great Britain, 84% in France, 81% in Germany, and 83% in Spain. Other surveys discussed above also show increasing numbers of attacks and instances of discrimination against Muslims, as well as rallies and public gatherings with anti-Muslim messages. But how can we explain the fact that Islamophobic attitudes are more visible in places where there are almost no Muslims, as seen in the Swiss minaret debate in the late 2000s?14 The answer to be given in what follows to this question will show that Islamophobia operates as a form of governmentality that is constructed by conservative politicians, intellectuals, media experts, and public figures.

Islamophobia as Form of Governmentality Islamophobia could be interpreted as a distinctive feature of what Michel Foucault calls modern governmentality, because it operates as a discourse, travelling between state, civil society, and citizens in a way that produces, organizes, and governs subjects. Today, political power is exercised through a set of multiple agencies and techniques, some of which are only loosely associated with the executives and bureaucracies of the state (Miller and Rose 2008: 26). The state is not the source, or agent, of all governing power, nor does it monopolize political power; rather, the powers and rationalities governing individual subjects and the population as a whole operate through a range of formally non-political knowledge and institutions such as Islamophobia, or anti-Muslim 14  An FES Report (2011: 161) also revealed that anti-Muslim attitudes exist without Muslims. For instance, in the Eastern European countries, where the number of Muslims is negligible, prejudice against Muslims is quite prevalent due to the power of prejudice. Prejudice exists in the absence of contact with the group against which it is directed. See Table 17.1.

756   Ayhan Kaya prejudices. The ensemble of legal and non-legal, pedagogical, cultural, religious, nationalist, and social discourses of Islamophobia together produce what Foucault understands as the signature of modern governmentality. Contemporary states are more inclined to use multiple forms of governmentality to control and rule the masses. These multiple forms range from the processes of securitization of migration (Doty 2000; Huysmans 2006; Walters 2006; Kaya 2009) to the growing political discourse of tolerance (Brown, 2006), or from multiculturalism (Povinelli 2002) to Islamophobia. The ways in which these multiple forms of governmentality are performed by the states reveals a very important aspect of modern governmentality. It is a form of discourse: the government defines a discursive field such as prevention of migration or ‘combating Islamic terrorism’ in which the exercise of power is rationalized. This occurs by the reformulation of citizenship and naturalization regimes, the introduction of citizenship tests and integration tests, the overemphasis on secularism and laicism as opposed to religious forms of life, the specification of objects and borders, and the provision of fears, arguments, and justifications. In this manner, government defines, frames, and sometimes even fabricates a problem to be addressed, and then offers certain strategies for handling it. As will be elaborated shortly, the securitization and stigmatization of migration and Islam by contemporary Western states also operates as a form of governmentality along the same lines. Islamophobia as a form of governmentality is being manufactured in parallel with the growing stream of ethnicization, racialization, and culturalization of what is social and political in the West since the early 1990s (Brown 2006). This stream is advocated by several politicians, public servants, bureaucracy, judiciary, police, and the media in order to hold socio-economically and politically deprived migrants and their descendants responsible for their isolation, exclusion, poverty, unemployment, unschooling, and any kind of failure in everyday life (Balibar 2004: 37–8). The European context is different from the American context where Islam was predominantly portrayed by the Bush regime as a challenge coming from outside the ‘nation under siege’. European politics has rather used Islam as an ‘enemy within’ to be the pretext for a certain type of politics discriminating against those whose values are different from the Europeans’. The introduction of citizenship tests and integration tests in several European countries has become a popular debate as both kinds of tests are explicitly designed on the basis of cultural criteria. The rationale of these tests is to restrict the immigration of unqualified candidates. Citizenship reforms in most of the European countries have become more restrictive in the last decade due to fears about terrorism, violence, and the alleged rejection of Western values by Muslim-origin immigrants. The introduction of the ‘attitude test’ (Gesinnungstest) by the state of BadenWürttemberg in 2006 was the first step towards a more restrictive regime of citizenship towards Muslim-origin migrants and their descendants in Germany, who are asked for their views on issues like domestic violence, arranged marriages, religious freedom, and terrorism.15 The citizenship test became a national exercise in Germany in August 2007 15 

See (accessed 10 August 2013).

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as the amended Nationality Act came into effect. It was stated by the Federal Ministry of the Interior that knowledge of German civic values will now be required for naturalization. The definition of civic values includes having basic knowledge of the legal and social order and the way of life in Germany as well as competency in the national language (Federal Ministry of the Interior 2007). The 2007 amendments mark a backward step from the 2000 Citizenship Law in the sense that this new civic-based citizenship has now turned the pre-2000 blood-based restriction on citizenship into a restriction based on ‘values’. The so-called civic integration seems to be discriminatory to Muslims, who are negatively targeted as an ethnic group in Europe under the guise of liberalism (Joppke 2007). Such tests have also recently been introduced in Austria, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. What is polemical and controversial about the tests is not only limited to its content: there is also a debate about who is required to take the test. For instance, the test is only required for ‘non-Western’ peoples in the Dutch case.16 While the test is required for all ‘non-Westerners’, analysis reveals that the test is oriented particularly towards applicants of Muslim origin, who are often perceived and narrated by many politicians and public figures as a threat to the political, social, and cultural security of the prescribed nation (Bauböck and Joppke 2010).

Politics of Fear: Securitization of Islam Muslims are increasingly represented by the advocates of Islamophobia as members of a ‘precarious transnational society’, in which people only want to ‘stone women’, ‘cut throats’, ‘be suicide bombers’, ‘beat their wives’, and ‘commit honour crimes’. These prejudiced perceptions about Islam have been reinforced by the impact of the previously stated events, ranging from the Iranian Revolution to the official ban on the burqa in France in 2011. Recently, quite a number of people in the West have felt the urge to defend Western civilization against this ‘enemy within’ that is culturally and religiously dissimilar to the ‘civilized’ Western subject. Samuel Huntington interpreted the Islamic resurgence as an attempt to counter the threat of Western cultural advance. He noted 16  The Dutch Ministry of Justice states that the following groups of people are exempted from taking the Basic Civic Integration Examination (Dutch Language test and Knowledge of Dutch Society test) (Section 17(1) of the Aliens Act 2000 (Vreemdelingenwet 2000): (a) persons of Australian, Belgian, Canadian, Cypriot, German, Danish, Estonian, Finnish, French, Greek, British, Hungarian, Irish, Icelandic, Italian, Japanese, Latvian, Liechtenstein, Lithuanian, Luxemburg, Maltese, Monegasque, New Zealand, Norwegian, Austrian, Polish, Portuguese, Slovakian, Slovenian, Spanish, Czech, Vatican, American, Swedish, or Swiss nationality; (b) persons of Surinamese nationality who have completed a minimum of primary education in the Dutch language in Suriname or the Netherlands, and can show this by means of written proof (certificate, testimonial) issued and authenticated by the Surinamese Ministry of Education and Public Development; (c) persons who are coming to the Netherlands for a temporary period, such as study, au pair work, exchange or medical treatment; (d) persons with a work permit, self-employed persons, and knowledge migrants; and (e) family members of a person in possession of an asylum residence permit. See (accessed14 August 2013).

758   Ayhan Kaya that the resurgence is a broad global movement that represents an effort to find solutions not in Western ideologies, but in Islam (Huntington 1996: 110).17 Silvio Berlusconi, then the Italian Prime Minister, is one of those to have felt this urge: We are proud bearers of the supremacy of western civilisation, which has brought us democratic institutions, respect for the human, civil, religious and political rights of our citizens, openness to diversity and tolerance of everything . . . Europe must revive on the basis of common Christian roots. (The Guardian, London, 27 September 2001: 15)

Then American President George Bush’s speech regarding the ‘Axis of Evil’ (29 January 2002) was also perceived by the American public in particular as an attempt to demonize ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and the ‘enemies of freedom’ (Asad 2003: 7). Although Bush, as well as some European leaders like Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac, repeatedly stated that the war did not represent a fight against Islam, many people across the world were highly engaged in deepening the Islam-bashing displayed very explicitly in the following speech of George Bush: Our military has put the terror training camps of Afghanistan out of business, yet camps still exist in at least a dozen countries. A terrorist underworld—including groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and Jaish-i-Mohammed—operates in remote jungles and deserts, and hides in the centers of large cities . . . First, we will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice . . . While the most visible military action is in Afghanistan, America is acting elsewhere . . . Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September the 11th . . . (George Bush, 29 January 2002)18

Similarly, Italian journalist and novelist Oriana Fallaci is another figure who generated a very contested discourse in the aftermath of 11 September vis-à-vis Muslims: I say: Wake up, people, wake up! . . . You don’t understand, or don’t want to understand, that what is under way here is a reverse crusade. Do you want to understand or do you not want to understand that what is under way here is a religious war? A war that they call Jihad. A Holy War. A war that doesn’t want to conquest of our territories, perhaps, but certainly wants to conquer our souls . . . They will feel authorized to kill you and your children because you drink wine or beer, because you don’t wear a long beard or a chador, because you go to the theatre and cinemas, because you listen to music and sing songs . . . (Cited in Marranci 2004: 108) 17 

For a detailed account of the ways in which the ‘clash of civilizations’ paradigm was revitalized in the aftermath of 11 September, see Sussex (2004). 18  ‘President Delivers State of the Union Address’, Press Release of the Office of the Press Secretary (29 January 2002), available at (accessed 25 February 2013).

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This right-wing stream of reactions was also echoed in other parts of the Western world. Dutch media presenter and politician Pim Fortuyn (2001) published a book entitled Against the Islamization of Our Culture, in which he claimed Islam was a threat to Western civilization in a way that contributes to the othering of migrant-origin individuals residing in the West. Islam-bashing has become a popular sport practised by ministers, politicians, media specialists, and even prime ministers in the European Union as well as in the other parts of the world. Today, hostile language, offensive language, racist statements, and anti-immigrant policy propositions or real measures take place every day in the news. Conversely, aggressive language and threats directed against politicians who are perceived to be at fault, for whatever reason, have spread as well. The language of hatred replaces the language of dialogue. After the strikes against the United States on 11 September, the ‘Muslim’ became reified as the enemy of the state, as a regressive, violent, bloodthirsty, and menacing fanatic: the typical terrorist. Corey Robin (2004) explicated very well the ways in which the Muslims and the Middle Easterners, especially Iraqis, were stigmatized by the Bush administration as ‘typical terrorists’ with reference to the anthrax scare in the wake of 9/11. Between October and November 2001, when the story broke, five people were killed by anthrax, and eighteen others were infected with it. Government officials immediately hunted for signs that the attack originated in the Middle East, particularly Iraq. This incident provided the Bush administration with a good excuse to go after Iraq. However, no one could find any evidence linking the anthrax attack to the Middle East. Later it was revealed that the perpetrator of the attack was an American citizen, with likely connections to the US military (Robin 2004: 16–17). Similarly, this kind of politics of fear has also had a deep impact on the Muslim residents of the USA, who are considered to be guilty until proven innocent, a reversal of the classic American legal maxim. For instance, it is reported that in 2005 the FBI admitted that it had yet to identify a single Al-Qaeda sleeper cell in the United States (Esposito 2011: 12–13). Mehdi Semati (2010) also finds a correlation between the rise of the Islamophobic discourse prevailing in the West and the ongoing political crisis in the Middle East. With a special focus on the United States, he claims that the current discourse of Islam and Muslims is inextricably bound with the issues of the protection of national security and of terrorism, which tend to shape all other issues concerning the Middle East. The present-day notion of terrorism, however, has a relatively short history. The origin of today’s terrorism discourse is located in the American foreign policy of the 1980s, during the presidency of Ronald Reagan. This era has been characterized as the era of aggressive militarism and a ruthless foreign policy as a response to the perceived erosion of American power and standing in the international political arena. The preceding presidency of Jimmy Carter witnessed events and policies that contributed to a real and perceived decline in America’s credibility as a superpower due to the loss of Nicaragua, Iran, and Afghanistan. The failure in American foreign policy vis-à-vis such events led to a call for a renewal of the projection of American power around the globe. A central tool of the foreign policy of the Reagan regime was ‘resurgent America’ (Prince 1993). The idea of projecting American power in this era brought about aggressive intervention policies around the globe: the invasion

760   Ayhan Kaya of Grenada, supporting the Contra’s war in Nicaragua, and the bombing of Libya were some of these actions. This aggressive jingoist militarism, which culminated in the military operation in the Persian Gulf in 1991, was part of a renewed Cold War by the Reagan administration in the New World Order to reassert American leadership after a period of perceived decline. The major thrust of foreign policy in the 1980s was formulated in response to (perceived) Soviet Union aggression. The threat of terrorism, as ‘Russia’s secret weapon’, became a major theme in the new Cold War. American foreign policy during the Bush administration became more engaged in the war against the Axis of Evil, mainly symbolized by the (perceived) ‘terrorist’ Islamic countries (Semati 2010: 259–60). As demonstrated already, right-wing politicians and public intellectuals, in their speeches, often present themselves as tolerant and understanding, but more often they subtly or blatantly convey the idea that Muslims are not welcome in Europe. The same is true for debates about minority groups residing within the country. Except for a few notable anti-racist voices, the discourse of the political elites thus confirms and reformulates the broader anti-foreigner and anti-Muslim sentiments in Europe and the United States since 9/11 (Cesari 2013: ­chapter 5). Hence, Islam is seen as an existential threat to European and American political and security interests and extraordinary measures against it are justified by the state (Cesari 2013: xvii). The securitization and stigmatization of religious objects and activities like mosques, praying, headscarves, and Islamic vocabulary has also prompted states to invest more in the protection of their national borders against the ‘intrusion of immigrants and Muslims’ (Doty 2000; Bigo 2002; Walters 2006; Huysmans 2006; Cesari 2006; Kaya 2009; Bahners 2011). States have invested in an impressive array of policing technologies—personnel (border patrol agents), material structures (fences and lights), and surveillance devices (helicopters, ground sensors, TV cameras, and infrared night vision scopes)—at the borders in order to keep the so-called undocumented immigrants out of the country. As Chris Allen (2007a, 2010) very eloquently revealed, Islamophobia is not really a ‘phobia’, it is rather a form of governmentality, or an ideology, ‘similar in theory, function and purpose to racism and other similar phenomena, that sustains and perpetuates negatively evaluated meaning about Muslims and Islam in the contemporary setting in similar ways . . . that inform and construct thinking about Muslims and Islam as Other’ (2010: 195). The aim of Islamophobia as a form of governmentality is to make the majorities believe that Muslims and Islam constitute an ‘enemy within’ in the European context, and an ‘outside enemy’ in the American context so that the unity of the nation can be protected against the national, societal, and cultural security challenges coming from inside or outside (Doty 2000; Huysmans 2006; Kaya 2009; and Allen 2010). However, in both contexts what is challenged by the Islamophobic form of governmentality is the multicultural status of Western societies.

Crisis of Multiculturalism More specifically, states are unlikely to accord powers and resources to minorities that they view as potential collaborators with neighbouring enemies. Today, this is

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not an issue throughout the established Western democracies with respect to authocthonous national minorities, although it remains an issue with respect to certain immigrant-origin groups, particularly Muslim-origin groups after 11 September. As stated earlier, ethno-cultural and religious relations become securitized under these conditions. Relations between states and minorities are seen, not as a matter of normal democratic debate and negotiation, but as a matter of state security, in which the state has to limit the democratic processes of political participation, negotiation, and compromise to protect itself. The state of securitization of minorities is likely to lead to the rejection of minority political mobilization by the larger society and the state. Hence, the securitization of ethno-cultural relations both erodes the democratic space to voice minority demands, and decreases the likelihood that those demands will be accepted. The situation with respect to immigrant groups is more complex. In the European context, the same factors that push for multiculturalism in relation to historic minorities have also generated a willingness to contemplate multiculturalism for immigrant groups (Kymlicka 2010). However, immigrant multiculturalism has run into difficulties where it is perceived as carrying high risks with regard to the national, societal, and cultural security of the majority society. Where immigrants are coupled with violence, honour crimes, drug use, drug trafficking and human trafficking, and are seen as predominantly illegal, as potential carriers of illiberal practices or movements, and as net burdens on the welfare state, then multiculturalism also poses perceived risks to the shared moral principles of the nation, and this perception can reverse the forces that support multiculturalism. Accordingly, multiculturalism bashing is also inclined to become a popular sport often revisited in times of social, political, and economic turmoil.19 In moments of societal crisis, the critique of multiculturalism turns out to be a form of governmentality employed mostly by Christian Democratic parties to mobilize those segments of the society who have an inclination towards right-wing extremism due to growing feelings of anomie, insecurity, and ambiguity.20 19  For a similar debate in Germany in the 1990s, see Heitmeyer et al. (1997). Wilhelm Heitmeyer et al. (1997) concluded that it is the Turks who are not tempted to integrate and incorporate themselves into the German society. Their main criterion in declaring the self-isolationist tendency of the Turkish-origin youths was their perceived contentment to live with Islam and Turkishness. This polemical debate around the work of Heitmeyer et al. (1997) is in close parallel to the debate revolving around Thilo Sarrazin’s (2010) book, engaging high-level politicians including the Chancellor and the President of Germany. 20 One should not underestimate the destructive effects of such nationalist anti-multiculturalist rhetoric on Western societies such as Norway and the UK. For instance, the myths that Muslim immigrants are taking over Europe and that multiculturalism is harmful contributed to the murder of seventy-nine individuals by right-wing extremist Anders Behring Breivik in Norway on 22 July 2011 (see BBC website, 23 July 2011, accessed 15 August 2013). In a similar vein, British PM David Cameron had also criticized the multiculturalist rhetoric in February 2011, a few months before the London riots in August 2011. In boroughs where more than half the youth centres have closed, youth unemployment is rising, and negative experience with police is repeated through the generations, many children and young adults feel that neither the state nor the community has anything to offer them. For further detail on the notorious speech of David Cameron on multiculturalism, see (accessed 16 August 2013); and for more detail on the London riots, see (accessed 16 August 2013).

762   Ayhan Kaya Securitization and stigmatization of migration and Islam has brought about the ascendancy of a political discourse known as the end of multiculturalism—a discourse which has often been revisited in the last two decades since the war in Bosnia in 1992, leading to the birth of the Huntingtonian clash of civilizations paradigm. The discourse of the end of multiculturalism is often built upon the assumption that the homogeneity of the nation is at stake, and thus it has to be restored at the expense of alienating those who are not ethno-culturally and religiously part of the prescribed community of ‘us’. It should be kept in mind that migration was a source of content in Western Europe during the 1960s. More recently, however, migration has been framed as a source of discontent, fear, and instability for nation-states in the West. What has happened since the 1960s? Why has there been this shift in the framing of migration? The answers to such questions lie at the very heart of the changing global social-political context. Undoubtedly, many different reasons, such as deindustrialization, unemployment, poverty, exclusion, violence, and neo-liberal political economy turning the uneducated and unqualified masses into the new ‘wretched of the earth’ to use Frantz Fanon’s (1965) terminology, can be enumerated to answer such critical questions. After the relative prominence of multiculturalism debates in both the political and scholarly arenas, we witness today a change in the direction of debates and policies about how to accommodate cultural diversity. Diminishing belief in the possibility of a flourishing multicultural society has changed the nature of the debates about the integration of migrant-origin groups. Initially, the idea of multiculturalism connoted compromise, tolerance, respect, interdependence, and universalism, and was expected to bring about an ‘intercultural community’. Over time, it began to be perceived as a way of institutionalizing difference through autonomous cultural discourses and cultural archipelagos (Cesari et al. 2006). Europe and the other parts of the world including the USA have experienced increasing tensions between national majorities and ethno-religious minorities, more particularly with marginalized Muslim communities.21 It seems that the declaration of the ‘failure of multiculturalism’ has become a catchphrase of not only extreme-right-wing political parties but also of centrist political parties all across the continent, although it is not clear that each attributes the same meaning to the term.22 Angela Merkel for the first time publicly dismissed the policy of multiculturalism as having ‘failed, failed utterly’ in October 2010, and this was followed swiftly by David Cameron’s call for a ‘more active, more muscular liberalism’ and Nicolas Sarkozy’s statement that multiculturalism is a ‘failed concept’. Geert Wilders, leader of the Freedom Party in the Netherlands, has made no apologies for arguing that 21  Similarly, Koopmans et al. (2005), and Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) suggested that immigrant multiculturalism in the Netherlands as well as in the other European countries produced adverse effects. 22  Multiculturalism was also criticized by several left-wing scholars with the claim that multiculturalism became a neo-liberal and neo-colonial form of governmentality, imprisoning ethno-cultural and religious minorities, migrants, and their children in their own ghettos. For a more detailed account of the critique of multiculturalism, see Rosaldo (1989); Rath (1993); Radtke (1994); Russon (1995); Koopmans et al. (2005); Sniderman and Hogendoorn (2007); Kaya (2001, 2009).

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Christians ‘should be proud that our culture is better than Islamic culture’ (Der Spiegel, 11 September 2010). Thilo Sarrazin (2010), a politician from the Social Democratic Party who sat on the Bundesbank board and is the former Finance Senator for Berlin, has argued in his bestselling book that Germany is becoming ‘naturally more stupid on average’ as a result of immigration from Muslim countries. In his critique of Thilo Sarrazin’s highly polemical book Germany Does Away With Itself (Deutschland schafft sich ab, 2010), Jürgen Habermas states that German Leitkultur (leading culture) is currently being defined not by ‘German culture’ but by religion: ‘With an arrogant appropriation of Judaism—and an incredible disregard for the fate the Jews suffered in Germany—the apologists of the Leitkultur now appeal to the “Judeo-Christian tradition”, which distinguishes “us” from foreigners’ (Habermas 2010). Referring to genetic arguments, Sarrazin claims in his book that the future of multicultural Germany is threatened by the wrong kind of immigrants, coming especially from Muslim countries. Although his arguments are based on a conventional racist rhetoric, he is highly credited by German society for securitizing the policies of citizenship (Habermas 2010; Widmann 2010). His racist arguments were later followed by those of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who denounced multicultural rhetoric, as well as by the Bavarian Prime Minister Horst Seehofer’s hate speech against the migrants coming from Turkey and Arab countries (Habermas 2010). The German experience also reveals that the European form of multiculturalism is not yet equipped to accommodate Islam, which has recently become very visible in the public space (Laitin 2010). Interestingly, the German practice, as well as other practices in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the UK, has ended up with a kind of holy alliance between the secular left and Christian right against Islam (Roy 2007: xii). These populist outbreaks contribute to the securitization and stigmatization of migration in general and Islam in particular. In the meantime, such interventions also deflect attention from constructive solutions and policies widely thought to promote integration, including programmes for language acquisition and increased labour market access, which are already suffering because of austerity measures all across Europe including Germany, Belgium, the UK, and the Netherlands. The 2007 Human Rights first report on Islamophobia states that such an anti-Islamic political discourse blames Muslims as a group for the marginalization they feel, even while the discriminatory policies and practices that exclude them from the mainstream are reinforced (HRF 2007: 2). Furthermore, critics of the failure of at least some parts of the Muslim population in Europe to fully integrate often become advocates of measures that would further isolate and stigmatize these minorities. The debate is not restricted to the critique of multiculturalism. Difference-blind Republicanism, which is the other model of managing ethno-cultural and religious diversity, has also failed. The Republican French model has largely collapsed in the last decade. Although France set out to create politically equal citizens without regard to religion, language, race, ethnicity, and gender, it no longer recognizes the politics of recognition generated especially by migrants of Muslim background, ignores the cultural, religious, and ethnic differences emphasized by minorities, and adopts an assimilation

764   Ayhan Kaya policy, all of which serve to show that the Republican project and its values are under threat. These demands, voiced by migrants and minorities and left unresolved by the Republic, clearly show that the Republic at hand needs to be democratized. In other words, Republicanism needs to be reformed by incorporating the egalitarian claims of migrant origin people who are affiliated with a true Republican rhetoric underlining equality, justice, and rights in all spheres of life including politics, education, labour market, and culture (Kaya 2009). Not only does France fail to provide migrants and their children with equal access opportunity to political space and the labour market, but it also cannot provide them with a venue where they can convert their cultural capital to economic capital upon graduation. As such, it can be said that France, much like many other Western nations, discriminates against Muslim-origin migrants and their descendants at work. As Michèle Tribalat (2003) put it very eloquently, what is the point in working hard for success at school if you are going to be discriminated against?23 She reports that the presence of discrimination raises the problem of coherence between Republican principles and the reality of French society. One should remember that the unemployment rate among university graduates of French ethnic origin is 5%, but 27% among those of North African origin.24 This ratio is much higher than it is in Germany (4% and 12%), Belgium (5% and 15%), and the Netherlands (3% and 12%) (Crul and Vermeulen 2003).

Conclusion Migration has recently been framed as a source of fear and instability for the nation-states in the West. In the 1960s and 1970s, it was rather a source of contentment and happiness. Several different factors, such as deindustrialization, economic crisis, changing technology, unemployment, poverty, neo-liberal political economy, Islamophobia, and cultural racism, can serve to explicate the reasons for such discontent. Furthermore, this period of social-economic and political change in the West went in tandem with the rise of discourses like the ‘clash of civilizations’, ‘culture wars’, and Islamophobia that presented societal heterogeneity in an unfavourable light. The intensification of Islamophobia made easier by Al-Qaeda-type violence and the radicalization of some segments of Muslim-origin immigrant communities in several countries reinforced the societal unrest resulting from immigration. The result was the

23 

The data collected by the work of Kaya and Kentel (2005) affirm Tribalat’s findings concerning the discrimination faced by immigrant populations and those of foreign origin. French-Turks, when asked, address mostly the problem of discrimination in France (17%). 24  In order to cope with institutional racism in the labour market as well as in other spheres of life, migrant origin people tend to give traditional French first names to newborn children. Gérard Noiriel (1988: 233) indicates that this is an old practice among migrants: in a Polish community in northern France, 44% in 1935, 73% in 1945, 82% in 1955, and 98% in 1960.

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introduction of restrictive migration policies and increased territorial border security vis-à-vis the nationals of third countries who originated from outside the European continent. Unemployment, poverty, exclusion, institutional discrimination, and Islamophobia have become the main reasons for the Muslim-origin immigrants and their descendants to question the political and legal structure of their countries of settlement in a way that has made them hesitate to integrate into those countries. Instead they have tended to find refuge in the comfort of certain communities of sentiment, such as religious, ethnic, cultural, and fellowship communities. Such communities of sentiment provide immigrants and their children with a safe haven that protects them against uncertainty, insecurity, ambiguity, poverty, unemployment, and exclusion. In this sense, religiosity becomes one of the most resourceful tactics for migrants to come to terms with the existing structural problems. Furthermore, the supremacy of cultural-religious discourse in the West is likely to frame many of the social, political, and economic conflicts within the range of religious differences. Many of the ills of migrants and their descendants, such as poverty, exclusion, unemployment, illiteracy, lack of political participation, and lack of will to integrate, are attributed to their Islamic background, which is stereotypically believed to be clash with Western secular norms and values. Culturalization of political, social, and economic conflicts has become a popular sport in a way that reduces all sorts of structural problems to cultural and religious factors. However, one should not underestimate the fact that European Muslims have become even more politically mobile after the rise of Islamophobic tendencies in the aftermath of 9/11. The growing interest and success of Muslim-origin candidates in local, general, and European elections (see national chapters in this Handbook) indicates that the time of crisis characterized by Islamophobia has brought its own window of opportunity for the European public in general. Ultimately, the Breivik incident in Norway on 22 July 2011 demonstrated that Islamophobia as a form of governmentality is not sustainable anymore. And let us not forget that the failures of one form of governmentality result in opportunities for the formulation of another.

Acknowledgements I would like to express my gratitude to Jocelyne Cesari, Senem Aydin Düzgit, Peter Widmann, and Ayşe Tecmen for their invaluable comments and suggestions.

Bibliography Allen, Christopher (2007a). ‘Islamophobia and Its Discontents’, in Samir Amghar, Amel Boubekeur, and Michael Emerson (eds.), European Islam. Brussels: CEPS, 144–68.

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C HA P T E R

18

R A D I C A L I Z AT I O N DA N I E L A PI S OI U

Radicalization, in particular in connection to ‘Muslims in Europe’ has become increasingly present as a matter of empirical investigation and theoretical conceptualization in the European research landscape and political discourse in recent years. As Silke (2011: 20) notes, ‘In the 1970s and 1980s, there were no claims of Irish Republican Army (IRA) members being “radicalized”, and there was no reference to a “radicalization process”. Such a terminology and framework has primarily been a post 9/11 phenomenon and it has been developed in regard to al-Qa’ida and its disparate affiliates.’ What are the reasons for this development? The same reasons why the European Union and its member states have afforded radicalization special attention in their security and social policies: the assumed connection to Islamist terrorism—in itself a relatively novel development on the continent, and the subsequent securitization of migration and integration of Muslim minorities in Europe. In the words of Vidino (2009: 61): ‘The 2004 Madrid and 2005 London attacks, as well as the arrest of hundreds of European Muslims who had been involved in a variety of terrorist activities, have clearly shown that radicalization is a problem in Europe.’ Necessary or exclusive associations between radicalization on the one side, and terrorism, Islamism. and ‘Muslims’ on the other, should to be treated with caution. Radicalization is a cognitive and behavioural process that may or may not lead to or include the use of violence and the latter may or may not concretize in acts of terrorism. Further, radicalization is not ideology-specific, i.e. one might speak of left-wing or right-wing radicalization for instance. As Al-Azmeh (2006: 1, original emphasis) argues: If one were therefore to approach Islamist radicalization in a manner that renders it comprehensible, one must eschew the altogether common perspective of exoticization which regards Islamism as a phenomenon sui generis, to be comprehended only in its own terms. One would need to take it as an instance of radicalization overall, subject like other movements that one may describe generically as radical to the conditions that give rise to radicalization overall.

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Finally, it should not be associated with a particular group, in this case the ‘Muslims in Europe’ or the ‘Muslim immigrants to Europe’. Whether or not community or religious aspects play a role in this particular variant of the radicalization process is a different question dealt with at a later point in this chapter; what for now is important to remember is that radicalization is a highly individual and individualized process, to which features such as belonging to a particular religious or ethnic community are not inherent. ‘Radicals’ and ‘radicalizing’ are individuals and small groups with a high degree of background heterogeneity, including converts. It would therefore be misleading to speak about ‘the radicalization of Muslims in Europe’. The following will deal with the definition of radicalization, empirical developments, and main theoretical approaches to its explanation, as well as main elements of debate surrounding ‘home-grown’ radicalization, the role of the internet, radicalization hubs, religion, and deradicalization.

What is Radicalization? Definitional problems surrounding ‘radicalization’ mirror to some extent the case of ‘terrorism’, with no generally agreed definition, a fluid meaning, and security-loaded negative connotations. Critical assessments have unpacked the constructed nature of the term, pointing out for instance the mediated connotations of danger, vulnerability, and risk (Hoskins and O’Loughlin 2009), or its various meanings depending on the various contexts of usage—security, integration, and foreign policy—and argue for a relative rather than absolute conceptualization (Sedgwick 2010). There are several approaches to the definition of radicalization: some focus on the cognitive aspect: ‘Radicalization refers to the process of coming to adopt militant Islamist ideology’ (Mullins 2012: 111), while yet others associate it with the use of violence: ‘It is a personal (and at times, interpersonal) process in which individuals adopt extreme political, social, and/or religious ideals and aspirations, and in which the attainment of particular goals justifies the use of indiscriminate violence. Radicalization is both a mental and emotional process that can prepare and motivate an individual to pursue violent behaviour’ (Wilner and Dubouloz 2011: 418). This definition also illustrates a recent trend in both scholarship (Ongering 2007; Neumann and Rogers 2008) and policy: the superimposition of terminology related to ‘extremism’, in the understanding that radicalization is a process leading to extremism, or that extreme ideas (in the sense of opposing democracy and pluralism) are symptoms of early engagement in the process. This has occurred against the background of an increasing use of the term ‘extremism’ in reference to violent illegal action during the last decades and of attempts to situate the new wave of Islamist radicalism within the existing European terminological complex, at the same time underlining its political rather than religious-fundamentalist character. A useful definition is that provided by Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010), who starts from the meaning of the root word

772   Daniela Pisoiu ‘radical’. It reflects the unspecific ideological character of the radicalization process and focuses on its essential content rather than manifestations: radical is understood as a person harbouring a deep-felt desire for fundamental socio-political changes and radicalization is understood as a growing readiness to pursue and support far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a direct threat to, the existing order . . . violent radicalization—[is] a process in which radical ideas are accompanied by the development of a willingness to directly support or engage in violent acts. (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010: 798, original emphasis)

Her further differentiation of ‘violent radicalization’ has the merit of outlining the fact that violence is not a necessary component of radicalization. At the same time it suggests that there are two different radicalization processes, one violent and one non-violent, which is something that has not been proven empirically and is highly unlikely. Ordinarily, violence emerges at some point during the radicalization process in the case of both individuals and organizations, and the trajectory towards it is not necessarily unidirectional.

The Geography of Islamist Radicalization in Europe When speaking about Islamist radicalization in Europe, one usually means Islamist radicalization in Western Europe. By looking at the statistics of suicide attack incidents between 2001 and 2012 for instance—twenty in Russia and twelve in Western Europe (GTD 2014)—a more inclusive approach would seem appropriate. That this is not necessarily recognized is due not only to a biased scholarship interest, but also to the conceptualization of the term as it applies to the European space. Radicalization ordinarily refers to the ideological adherence and behavioural involvement of certain individuals and groups in global jihadism. The development in Russia that comes closest to this understanding is the Chechen jihad, whereby this is rather a case of Islamization of an existing nationalist/separatist conflict (for an elaborated account of how this conflict has been integrated in the international jihadi movement and further spread to other republics in the North Caucasus, see Garner 2013; Campana and Ratelle 2014). Also often to be found under the labels of radicalization and radical Islam are the increasing predominance of Salafism and Salafist organizations, both indigenous and coming from abroad, and the frictions and competition with traditional forms of Islam in Northern Caucasus and to some extent Tatarstan (Yemelianova 2010). The last two approaches are also present to a certain extent in the context of the radicalization of Muslim communities in Western Europe; they are, however, not a core component of the problematic. Beyond the significance of the developments in the Northern Caucasus as such, the situation there, similar to previous conflicts in Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo, has had an operational and ideological impact on

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radicalization processes in the West, too. These conflicts have functioned as initial radicalization trigger points for individuals originally travelling there on charity missions and Chechnya has been a preferred destination for jihadi warriors, along with Waziristan and Syria more recently. Additionally, these conflicts have played, along with those in Afghanistan and Iraq, an important role in the construction of the jihadi narrative of oppression exercised by Western powers on Muslims around the world. At the same time, recent developments indicate a shift of focus, whereby scores of Chechen fighters from at home and abroad are joining the Syrian conflict, which might show again the global nature of the jihadi movement, as well as the completion of the ‘jihadization’ of the Chechen struggle. Islamist radicalization in Western Europe is ideologically, in terms of membership and, some would argue, the background contributory factors, related but not confined to colonial histories, work and post-conflict immigration to, and the situation of immigrant Muslim minorities in Europe. In Bakker’s (2008: 79) sample of jihadis associated with the thirty-one terrorist incidents since 2001, the dominant nationalities were Moroccan, Algerian, and British, whereas the majority was found to have roots in North Africa and Pakistan. It would be inaccurate, however, to derive from this an exclusively community or ethnic-related explanatory framework. In the 1980s and 1990s one could speak of ‘imported conflicts’, through the spill-over effect of the Islamist movement in Algeria and the arrival of ‘activists, leaders, ideologues involved in local insurgencies, separatist and anti-occupation struggles’ in Arab countries, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Chechnya, and Bosnia (Nesser 2011: 176). The phenomenon is currently global, both in terms of objectives and membership. Networks spread across countries and operational cells display an increasingly mixed composition, with first-, second-, and third-generation immigrants and converts and focus on conflicts partly not related to the countries of origin. Looking at the form and degree of penetration of Islamist terrorism in Europe mapped in empirical studies (Jordan and Horsburgh 2005; Reinares 2006; Grignard 2008; Nesser 2008; Mullins 2010; Nesser 2014), several stages can be differentiated. In the 1980s, Europe played the role of a marginal basis of operations, while the 1990s saw two concomitant developments: the establishment of resident international networks such as GIA (Armed Islamic Group), GSPC (Salafist Group for Call and Combat), Hamas, Ansar al Islam, Salafia Yihadia, Hizbollah, GICM (Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group), and the Tunisian Combat Group, in several countries (Spain, France, Germany, Netherlands, UK, Italy and Belgium) and their emerging interrelatedness; and members of certain organizations such as the GIA participating in the Afghanistan war and their subsequent refuge in Europe as veterans along with other ‘Arab-Afghans’. This in effect then also marked the link between classical nationalistic struggle and the global jihad and initiated the wave of radicalization through the returning mujahideen. In operational terms, Europe still was primarily a basis of procurement, financing, and propaganda rather than a target. In some accounts, though, already then Al-Qaeda-directed cells commenced the plotting of attacks on the continent, while operatives would travel to the Pakistani‒Afghani area (Coolsaet and de Swielande 2007). Also exceptionally, GIA affiliates carried out the series of bombings

774   Daniela Pisoiu in France in 1995. These would be the two phases of classical jihad outside Europe and in Europe respectively, whereby classical jihad is ‘armed struggle to overthrow Muslim world regimes and establish Islamic states, and . . . armed struggle against non-Muslims occupying Islamic territories’ (Nesser 2011: 175). With the turn of the century, the wave of terror plots targeting various countries in Europe commenced and peaked with the infamous Madrid and London bombings in 2004 and 2005. Again in Nesser’s account (2011), this corresponds to the phase of global jihad inside Europe, against all enemies of Islam, whereby Europe had become a legitimate target due to the involvement in the war in Iraq and controversies such as the headscarf and the Cartoons affair. In a subsequent assessment, Nesser concludes on an overall increase of the number of jihadi plots in Europe, and on the multiplication of targets beyond the ‘usual suspects’ France and the UK, the two countries with, in his assessment, a history of involvement in Muslim affairs (Nesser 2014). The broad trends at the moment are an increasingly decentralized, international, and highly mobile jihadi network, undertaking training and combat travel to conflict areas—Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, Somalia, Syria; the ‘boomerang effect’ (Ranstorp 2010)—these individuals returning to Europe, indoctrinating, recruiting, and plotting attacks there; and sporadic, mostly failed low-scale attacks perpetrated by relatively autonomous and unprofessional cells. The Syrian conflict seems to attract an unusually high number of European foreign fighters, yet the impact of their presence there as well as their possible trajectories once back home have not been so far captured in analysis. The operational structure in the North Caucasus is somewhat different. Jamaats (communities) are the ‘basic structure of radicalism’ (Yarlykapov 2010: 141), originally a traditional form of organization, some of which then shifted orientation from traditional structures to separatism and from ethnic separatism to religious separatism and jihadism, currently with international and multiethnic, religious, and intellectual membership, and partly educated leadership (Yarlykapov 2010: 142–5). More recent analyses observe a geographical expansion of the jihad in Russia beyond the Chechen borders, through the establishment of a network of ‘combat jamaats’ throughout the North Caucasus, under the leadership of the Caucasus Emirate (Garner 2013: 428‒9). The latter is not only responsible for several attacks on the Russian territory, but is also assumed to support plots in Western Europe (Garner 2013: 429). Ideologically, the jihadi discourse has crossed the borders of individual countries to be integrated in that of the global jihad—as a sort of melting pot where European political protest ideas also found a point of entry, while operatives of various origins and ethnicities mix within the same cell, associate temporarily with others for particular operations, and travel from one conflict zone to another. Grignard (2008: 92) named this an ‘internationalist’ project, marked by a global ideology and an operational fusion having occurred in Afghanistan and Londonistan—the latter labelled as such due to the high concentration of radical veterans and preachers. In this context, conditions existent in Europe, European policies, and the fact that some of the jihadis are European citizens and radicalized within Europe are, as will be seen below, not necessarily relevant in themselves (except perhaps in operational and counterterrorism terms, given the financial and mobility advantage of having a European passport), but only to the

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extent that they integrate into the global jihadi narrative and movement. Also in the case of the North Caucasus, analysts observe an alignment of the jihadi discourse to that of Al-Qaeda, with little reference to the Chechen history (Garner 2013: 429).

Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Islamist Radicalization Mapping out the area of Islamist radicalization in Europe, the issues considered of interest, and the types of explanations proposed is a rather complex undertaking, given the somewhat schizophrenic approach to its research. Radicalization has established itself as an independent object of study, yet there is neither an overarching theory to deal with it, nor a theoretical tradition into which it could naturally be placed. In some accounts, such a theory would be neither necessary nor possible (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008). To make matters worse, there is also no general agreement on what exactly should be studied: individuals, groups, or communities, in Europe, in the Middle East, or perhaps Northern Africa, behaviour or ideas. This has to do with the fact that the way in which radicalization is researched depends on the respective discipline, theories, and methods scholars associate their expertise with; and there are quite a few disciplines that have something to say in matters of radicalization: religious studies, psychology, political science, sociology, criminology, communication and cultural studies, and the special fields of terrorism studies and social movements. For the purposes of simplicity, three paradigms can be delineated in terms of unit of analysis: one is to look at Islamist radicalization as a type of social movement, seen either as endogenous or in the tradition of the Middle Eastern ones; this sometimes overlaps with the social movements theoretical approach, also sporadically used in the second paradigm, which is essentially socio-psychological and looks at individuals; the third, the macro-approach, focuses on communities, Diasporas, cultural and religious specificities, issues related to identity, political Islam, Salafism, and jihadism. With the exception of ‘rational choice’ approaches, the underlying rationale of all of these paradigms is that of ‘grievance’. This concept permeates most of the assessments on the causes of radicalization at all levels of analysis and seems particularly problematic in the case of individuals. While it might be relatively easy to point to various levels of insufficiency, frustration, and anger among Muslim communities in Europe and especially abroad, it is not always straightforward to show that the individuals involved have also experienced these or if not how they came to share this sense of grievance. What occurs therefore is the formulation of hypotheses that try to combine the two levels of analysis: in some opinions, the individual adopts group grievances on the basis of common identity (national or religious), in others, there is correspondence between group grievance and one’s own, be it literal or under the more general label of ‘oppression by the West’ (Khosrokhavar 2005; Waldmann 2010). On the reverse and with application

776   Daniela Pisoiu to group radicalization, personal grievance would be framed and interpreted as group grievance in order for it to account for group sacrifice (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008).

The Jihadi Social Movement In a first approach, Islamist radicalization refers to a jihadi endogenous or exogenous social movement of global orientation, based on fundamentalist Islamic tenets but more deeply rooted in socio-political and cultural conditions existent in Europe and the Middle East, respectively. Olivier Roy (2004, 2008b) postulated the existence of an endogenous—in terms of membership and underlying conditions— neo-fundamentalist and anti-imperialistic social movement, in the tradition of the European radical left. His argument builds on the observation that the Al-Qaeda ideology and aims are de-culturalized and de-territorialized and that European radicals perceive themselves as belonging to a virtual ummah, rather than the host or the original community and culture. Evidence for this would be the fact that recruits fight in other countries than those of origin and embrace an extreme variation of Salafism in a quasi-born-again fashion. Quintan Wiktorowicz (2005) looked at the Islamist organization Al Muhajiroun in the UK from the perspective of an Islamist activist social movement framework of analysis and employed some of the precepts of social movement theory, such as the role of social networks, selective incentives, and framing. The two authors’ outlooks on motivation and involvement mechanisms are examined in more detail in the following two sections, since they de facto focus on communities and individuals respectively. The second approach here inscribes Islamist radicalization in Europe within a broader social movement traceable to the socio-economic and cultural conditions specific to the Arab world and based on a series of grievances: perception of hostility between the Arab and the Western world, frustration with underdevelopment, double standards, colonialism, humiliation, powerlessness, economic disadvantage, the poor–rich gap, the educated unemployed, corruption, and doctrinal openness to exclusivist interpretations, all leading young people to protest. The concurrent phenomena of Islamization, politicization, and demonization of the ‘Other’ would then create an explosive mix concretized in acts of terrorism (Al-Azmeh 2006: 7, 8). In a further theoretical development, this sense of grievance would find its way to Europe not necessarily in a direct genealogy, but rather through the intermediary of discourse: ‘a minority within these communities [in the West] has cultivated a mindset and sense of grievance that has its foundations in the anti-Western discourse that permeates the Islamic world, including Pakistan’ (Pargeter 2008: 145). Beyond the theoretical advantages warranted by seeing radicalization as a social movement, which incidentally Al-Qaeda is also at times labelled as, the question needs to be raised whether we are indeed speaking about a social movement in the classical sense. Roy’s (2008b: 112) characterization rather plays the role of making the

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differentiation between the concept of a hierarchical, central organization and that of ‘bottom-up networks’. It might in fact be that precisely this type of loose structure and indeed ideological and programmatic division of the jihadi ‘movement’ prevent the various networks, cells, and groups from constituting a genuine social movement in the sense of ‘distinct social process, consisting of the mechanisms through which actors engaged in collective action: are involved in conflictual relations with clearly identified opponents; are linked by dense informal networks; share a distinct collective identity’ (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 20).

The Individual Works on individual Islamist radicalization can be broadly classified in two categories: one descriptive, dealing with psychological and socio-economic profiles (Taarnby 2007; Leiken and Brooke 2006; Reinares 2006; Bakker 2008), at times linked to specific radicalization paths and motivations (Nesser 2006a), and the other analytical, in the sense that one is given explanations as to the ‘why’ and the ‘how’ of individual and group radicalization. The first approach has proved rather unhelpful beyond mere statistical description, due to the empirical heterogeneity of backgrounds on the one hand, and on the other, the gradual nature of socialization processes into terrorism, the incidence of ‘supportive qualities’ or ‘lures’, and the ‘migration between roles’ (Horgan 2008b: 84). The analytical approach can be again split into two—one is deterministic, in the tradition of the root causes of terrorism explanation and looking at individual or composite factors and triggers; and one developmental, based on the psychological and criminological concept of social learning and on social movement mechanisms of mobilization.

Deterministic Approaches Whereas psychological abnormality has been largely rejected as characteristic or cause of radicalization (Bakker 2006; Sageman 2008), various personal and structural specificities have been proposed as explanation instead. For the particular case of the Chechen Black Widows, Speckhard (2008: 1017) emphasized the role and consequences of psychological trauma in a conflict situation, associated with cultural and social conditionalities. Other commonly mentioned factors within this approach are marginalization, deprivation, alienation, discrimination, foreign policy, and overall being ‘worse-off ’ than the majority population (Dittrich 2006; Nesser 2006b; Choudhury 2007; COT 2008). Not surprisingly, the list of structural strains has increased in recent years and with every new case. Ranstorp (2010: 4) speaks in the meantime about a ‘kaleidoscope’ of contributing factors, split into personal and global grievances that interact: internal— lack of public Muslim debate about the justification of violence, polarization, identity crisis, alienation, radical imams, the glorification of jihad and martyrdom, discrimination, stigmatization and criminalization of youths; and external—perceived injustice against Muslims abroad and Western double-standards, military intervention, and the ‘changing role of global media and cyberspace’, to which are added ‘almost inexhaustible

778   Daniela Pisoiu lists of precipitating factors’. It is apparent from this list that several levels of analysis have been gathered together: assumed causes, together with elements of discourse and facilitating factors. Taking these apart is not simply a matter of academic pedantry, but makes a difference in that certain elements may be considered as motivating factors, or, on the contrary, a matter of opportunity or chance, and therefore requesting different types of intervention. Special attention to the analysis of discourse is warranted from two points of view: first, in order to discern whether certain assertions are reflective of a previous state of things unleashing streams of thought and decision-making, or rather means to create certain frames of interpretation, readings of the reality and motivations; and second, to ascertain whether claims are the natural reflection of ideological discourse or indeed personal concerns. But there are bigger problems with this approach than the question of how to organize and group contributory factors. One is clearly the ever increasing number of factors to the point of ‘everything can lead to radicalization’. A second fundamental problem is the difficulty of showing causal relationships between the various determining factors and individual processes of radicalization. Taylor and Horgan (2001: 52, original emphasis) noted in relation to involvement in terrorism that whilst behaviour may well be determined by the contemporary and historical environment in which it occurs, analyses of this form overemphasize the inevitability of particular circumstances, giving a false sense of predictability and inevitability . . . whilst many people experience circumstances that may be correlated with induction into a terrorist lifestyle, relatively few people actually become violent terrorists.

While hypothesising that radicalization might occur against the background of political, spiritual, and social needs—search for meaning, injustice against Muslims and social belonging—Slootman and Tillie (2006: 5) admit that ‘radicalization is dependent on accidents and coincidences in the surroundings of the individual personality’. Looking at the actual profiles of radicals, it becomes apparent that their socio-economic and educational profile is either above the average of their respective communities or reflects it. As Cesari (2008: 97) notes, ‘the conventional image of the single, disenfranchised young man is not an accurate representation of reality’. In fact, attempts to identify a jihadi profile have failed so far. Nesser (2006a: 11) noted that uncovered jihadi cells in Europe have usually consisted of a diversified group of individuals, encompassing multiple different nationalities and ethnic backgrounds, ages, professions, family backgrounds and personalities. Because of this diversity, it is hard to establish the degree to which, or whether, social background variables matter in the recruitment process.

This should raise serious questions as to whether focusing on individual or structural characteristics is helpful at all in finding explanations for radicalization.

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Another major issue has to do with methodology, in particular the ways to operationalize and measure contributory factors, such as applying minority or community statistics to individuals, mixing the individual with the organizational unit of analysis, or ignoring initial phases of the radicalization process. Mullins (2012: 117) for instance makes an argument that conditions in the West might play a role, among others because the Austrian alleged GIMF (Global Islamic Media Front) members mentioned the issue of student fees in their requests, ignoring the previous engagement in student politics of one of the individuals and the effects of the various stages of politicization on his development. Nesser (2006b: 337–8) developed a series of proxies to measure the impact of the Iraq war on the Madrid and van Gogh incidents, concluding that In the Madrid case, the Iraq link scored significantly on all proxies of analysis, indicating massive motivational spill-over from Iraq. In the Dutch case, the motivational landscape appeared to be more complex . . . the members of the Hofstad Network were mainly driven by grievances related to the domestic Dutch context, but there were indicators that the terrorists also were influenced by Al Qaeda’s ideology of global jihad and the invasion and occupation of Iraq.

Methodologically, there are a series of issues connected to the way in which indicators were created and in particular what they are supposed to measure. Elements such as the modus operandi of the terrorist attack or the ideological profile of the terrorist networks are rather suited to explain organizational strategic behaviour rather than individual motivation, and that mostly in relation to objectives rather than causes. In other analyses, the Iraq war did not have any impact on the Madrid incident (Alonso 2010). An aspect that should be taken into account when discussing the possible impact of macro-level variables, personal experiences, and events, especially when they relate to situations and individuals outside Europe, is that of perception and interpretation. In other words, the question to be asked should be not necessarily what their impact as such is, but rather how and to which extent certain circumstances and events, in themselves perhaps little significant, might be so formulated as to create a strong case for injustice, identifiable sources thereof and the dire need for action. Further, instead of conceptualizing events such as the war in Iraq or the Cartoons incident as ‘causes’ of radicalization, one might think about how they have been included in the broader narrative. Authors have constantly noticed the way in which recruiters play upon elements of discontent, at times of existential and personal nature, having to do with certain circumstances such as transition to adulthood, imprisonment, or conflict of generations (Wiktorowicz 2005; Neumann 2008). In this sense, external events are open to manipulation: ‘These resources [Islamist media] have helped jihadists to use major issues—for example the war in Iraq—to radicalize and recruit young French and European Muslims’ (Beyler 2006: 93). A more promising way therefore seems to be a focus on the mechanisms through which organizational and individual actors frame issues for purposes of resonance with a certain public, such as with the help of framing theory, as will be discussed.

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Developmental Approaches: Process The second approach can be traced to the conceptual and theoretical evolution from ‘root causes’ to ‘pathways’, from ‘determining’ or ‘contributing factors’ to ways of involvement, personal histories, and processes (Horgan 2008b: 82); in a word, the ‘how’ rather than the ‘why’. The concept of pathways can solve some of the problems associated with ‘contributory factors’, but arguably only in the understanding of ‘mechanisms’ which are liable to generalization. Indeed, some of the conceptualizations are in essence the same with those of contributory factors; Ranstorp (2010: 4) argues, for instance that there are: ‘multiple pathways and speeds of progression, devotion and functions within groups’. This is in effect nothing else than postulating that pathways are as individual and potentially infinite in numbers as previously factors. Consistently, this leads to the unsatisfactory result of absence of theory: it seems unlikely that any single theory can integrate all the influences that bring individuals to radical political action, although a conceptual framework in which to view these influences may be possible . . . In every individual trajectory to terrorism of which we are aware, multiple mechanisms can be identified . . . there are multiple and diverse pathways leading individuals and groups to radicalization and terrorism. (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008: 429)

What basically occurs is an evolution from a search for commonalities at the level of features—psychological or socio-economic—through the realization of the high heterogeneity of backgrounds, to the adoption of idiosyncrasy at the level of pathways as a whole. The problem here is confusion between mechanisms and factors and between motivating mechanisms and concrete motivations. While there arguably are a multitude of concrete individual motivations and circumstances along the radicalization process, there is no apparent reason why common mechanisms and motivational variables might not constitute a general explanatory framework, such as the one proposed by Taylor and Horgan (2001). Another aspect relates to the nature and incidence of various radicalization factors and mechanisms along the radicalization process. While most accounts conceptualize them as ‘reactive’ (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008: 430), some speak about gains, ‘lures’, or positive incentives (Horgan 2005). Taylor and Quayle (1994: 21, 28) identified several ‘rewards’ for engagement in terrorist attacks and general involvement: meeting cultural stereotypes and gaining kudos, status, endorsement by peers and family, and the continuity of behaviour with the past. In more recent analyses and specifically for radical Islamists, selective incentives such as ‘being a hero’ or reaching ‘glory’ were found (Roy 2007; Sageman 2007). The way such incentives might function was explained by using the social learning theory in criminology, which postulates the adoption of rules and values based on the feedback of the social environment—the observation of models and rewards and punishments received (Bandura 1973), and conceptualized as behavioural reinforcers (Taylor and Horgan 2001) and as occupational motivational variables (Pisoiu 2011).

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Related to this and along the idea of process rather than multiple pathways, it is of relevance to think about the ways in which various mechanisms can be identified within the process, at which level and with which function. In other words, mechanisms might not necessarily be individual or path-specific, but simply occurring at different stages of the process. As Horgan (2008b: 81) noted, ‘answering questions about why people may wish to initially become involved in terrorism may have little bearing on what they do (or are permitted to do) as terrorists or how they actually become engaged in specific terrorist operations’. Taking for instance the set of radicalization mechanisms proposed by McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) and grouped by individual, group, and mass radicalization, several observations can be made. First, it needs to be noticed that group mechanisms intervene in individual radicalization as well, whereas lone-wolf phenomena are virtually non-existent (Kaplan et al. 2014). Further, some of the mechanisms presented as individual pathways (personal victimization, political grievance, joining a radical group: slippery slope towards more extreme behaviour, and the power of love: network of friends, lovers, and family) might and usually do combine in actual biographies. In fact, the role of social networks in joining (Sageman 2004) is one of the few generally acknowledged constant ingredients of radicalization processes. Mechanisms such as the slippery slope were already found to occur as a matter of common evolution within terrorist groups (Brown 1986). In the few holistic theoretical attempts (Horgan 2008b; Pisoiu 2011), a series of mechanisms were found along the radicalization process, such as status, the community feedback, the gradual isolation from the previous social environment into exclusive milieux and the decrease in relevance of alternatives, and including two of the ones proposed by the two authors: ‘extreme cohesion under isolation and threat’ and the dehumanization of the enemy. Others, such as competition for the same basis of support, competition with state power, and within-group competition, could be elements of a more elaborated model which would also include interactions of the organization with the state and other organizations. These types of developments might of course also be studied at the level of sheer organizational behaviour, with the observation that what one would explain at that point would be ‘radicalization’ in the sense of use or increase of use of violence, and/or the group ideology becoming more extreme. One of the more complex questions is that of the relationship between the cognitive and the behavioural level. In other words, how does an individual evolve from particular ideas to actual actions and, further, how do individuals come to adopt new ideas in the first place, especially if in contradiction with existent ones? A relatively high quantity of scholarship has been produced on the content and rooting of the Al-Qaeda ideology, or what has been labelled Global Salafi Jihad or jihadism (Sageman 2004; Wiktorowicz 2005, 2006). Attempts to situate it within Wahhabism and Salafism were criticized by Hellmich (2008), with the argument that ‘Wahhabism has evolved from its traditional beginnings, and its standards have moderated to a certain degree over the past century’ (2008: 114), and given the diversity and inconsistencies within the Salafi movement (2008: 118). Wesley (2008) argues along similar lines, noting that movements with the same ideology will promote different messages, which would render the focus on Salafism in general relatively useless, and that many recruits joined

782   Daniela Pisoiu without having a full understanding of the jihadist ideology. Some other authors focused on individual features of the jihadist discourse, such as parallels with the Western non-liberal schools of thought (Jones and Smith 2010), the multitude of aims, values, rationales, and identities (Michelsen 2009), the evolution towards common goals in the form of the global war against the West (Nesser 2011), or the narrative elements of the jihadi rhetoric: persecution, precedent, piety, and perseverance, similar to the IRA case (Ryan 2007). The relevance of studying ideological contents needs to be relativized in light of the critique advanced by Taylor and Horgan (2001: 48), who outline the ‘fundamental distinction between ideology as a process (structuring and influencing behaviour) and the content of particular ideologies. The extent to which ideology controls and influences our behaviour may be seen as something apart from particular ideological prescriptions, which contain as it were the content of a particular ideology.’ The more appropriate question therefore is: what are the mechanisms through which ideological discourse has an effect on behaviour? How are radical ideas adopted in the first place and how do they influence behaviour? Two approaches have been developed to answer this question: one psychological revolving around the concept of ‘cognitive opening’ and one sourced in social movement theory based on the concept of ‘frame resonance’.

Cognitive Openings The concept of ‘cognitive opening’ was first proposed by Wiktorowicz (2005) in a threestage model of engagement in Islamist activism. In the first stage an interest for the radical movement develops which is triggered by a cognitive opening which ‘shakes certitude in previously accepted beliefs’ and creates a willingness of exposure to ‘new ways of thinking and worldviews’. ‘Religious seeking’, the second stage, is one of coping with the state of cognitive crisis, where ‘religious meaning’ helps in finding answers. The final stage is engagement in risky activism (Wiktorowicz 2005: 5–6). The crises determining the cognitive openings are either independent or induced by movement activists and can be economic (losing a job, blocked mobility), social or cultural (cultural weakness, racism, humiliation), political (repression, torture, political discrimination), and personal crises such as death or victimization by crime (Wiktorowicz 2005: 20). Grievances like conflict between the mores in the West and the Islamic law, assimilation vs. maintenance of cultural identity, Islamophobia, racism, exclusion, unemployment, and relative deprivation determine in their turn these crises (Wiktorowicz 2005: 89–91). Horgan’s (2008b) model revolves around an element similar to that of cognitive opening determined by a set of exceptional circumstances. He argues that an ‘openness to socialization into terrorism’ is determined by certain ‘predisposing risk factors’ (2008b: 84), in the form of: emotional vulnerability—anger, alienation, disenfranchisement, dissatisfaction with the current activity and seeing terrorism as necessary, identification with victims, sense of reward, kinship or other social ties (2008b: 84–5). Common to both models are the role of social networks and the rational choice aspect of ‘selective incentives’, placed at the end of the process where salvation or ‘paradise’ is conditioned

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by engagement in violence (Wiktorowicz 2005: 175–8), and among the other predisposing factors, respectively. The model developed by Wilner and Dubouloz (2011) rests on the transformative learning theory from education and rehabilitation science and looks at the psychocognitive processes associated with radicalization, the ‘psycho-cognitive construction of new definitions of self ’, ‘ideological learning’: the ‘internalizing [of] the rationales that legitimize violent behavior’ (Wilner and Dubouloz 2011: 419). Their model is also based on an initial moment of ‘crisis’, or ‘trigger phase’, determining a cognitive opening for new sets of beliefs and values which are adopted, then cemented through confirmation from the social environment and which eventually legitimize violence. Triggers determining the initial crisis are both structural and personal, in a sense the same as the original ‘contributing factors’: socio-political alienation, foreign policy, crisis events and dilemmas that ‘lead to critical reflection and reassessment of one’s life, current social position, future ambitions, and personal relationships that can restructure an individual’s meaning perspective’ (Wilner and Dubouloz 2011: 423). Subsequent to the moment of crisis, existing ways of interpreting experiences are challenged by the ‘Islam–West dichotomy’ and replaced with the new reality. Finally, by ‘socializing with like-minded individuals, the new identity is strengthened. With peer-based validation, the transformation is reinforced’ (Wilner and Dubouloz 2011: 423). Violence is a result of the individual’s newly acquired value system: ‘Changes in behaviour (including violent behaviour) is one product of the outcome phase and is a reflection of the solidification and empowerment of the individual’s new meaning perspective, belief system, and identity’ (Wilner and Dubouloz 2011: 423). There are a series of difficulties associated with certain aspects of these models: first, of course, the necessary existence of one or several moments of crisis; related to this, the incidence of meta-level variables as triggers for crises, such as alienation or foreign policy, which brings us back to the specificity argument. Further, it might be indeed difficult to pin down such a sudden cognitive shift, given that the nature of the crises considered for radicalization do not have the quality of existential threat encountered in health science for instance. Apart from that, the general development of the radicalization process has been found to occur in an incremental manner, of ‘small steps’, rather than sudden transformation or breach. A second point of critique relates to the actual assimilation of new sets of values and beliefs. The models do not offer a deeper account of how this might occur, beyond a simplistic assessment of initial replacement and subsequent validation by the social environment. It should be safe to assume that learning would occur on the basis of previously acquired schemata, rather than on a ‘tabula rasa’ basis, and that the social environment has a role to play along the entire process of learning, and not just towards its end. A third relates to the incidence of precisely religious tenets as reservoirs of new meaning perspectives. There seems to be an assumption that religion or a particular religious-ideological discourse would be the only resource for this redefinition of views, or that a certain causal connection would exist between crisis and religious seeking. Whereas it might be accurate to assume that deep existential crises might lead to an increase in or search for spirituality, it is debatable whether this

784   Daniela Pisoiu scheme could be superposed on a process of, essentially, politicization and increasing militant engagement. There are, however, also significant findings in these models: the role of social validation in the process of adopting new ideas and the fact that behaviour, including violence, becomes legitimated by the existence of new values and rules. The latter is consistent with the findings of other models analysing discourse (see the Discourse sub-section).

Discourse Another way to look at the relationship between ideas and behaviour is at the level of discourse and its persuasion potential. The role of narratives has been acknowledged in the literature, yet usually in a descriptive manner, without going more into the details of how certain interpretations are internalized and further influence behaviour. Payne (2009) compares the Al-Qaeda with the UK and US propaganda narratives, the elements of conflict between the West and Islam, self-defence, and the legitimacy of jihad on the one hand, and the dichotomy moderates–extremists, terror as illegitimate, and the idea of Britishness as open, liberal, and inclusive, on the other. Some work has been done based on framing theory in social movements, particularly the description of two elements of frame resonance: empirical resonance and the credibility of the frame articulators. Lia (2008: 4) explained the attractiveness of the Al-Qaeda narrative through three elements of resonance: foreign occupation, religious desecration, and economic imperialism. Wiktorowicz (2005) elaborates at length on the various elements of credibility of the frame articulators:  reputation, authenticity, sacred authority, knowledge, character, and personality. Other explored mechanisms of persuasion pertaining to the jihadi narrative and discourse are that of building a differential and strong collective identity around the ideas of vanguard, exceptionality of piety, and the value of dying for the cause of jihad (Cheong and Halverson 2010), the generation of collective action frames by social actors such as Al-Qaeda around a sense of injustice (Hellmich 2010), frame alignment between the beliefs of potential recruits and the movement’s narrative (Neumann 2008), or rhetorical mechanisms of moral justification to neutralize inhumane behaviour (Cottee 2010). The exploration of the role of discourse and framing for the understanding of processes of ideological adherence and behavioural change is still in an initial stage. The approaches are largely descriptive—they identify relevant elements of discourse and acknowledge the interplay of mechanisms such as frame alignment, yet fail to go deeper into how these mechanisms might in fact work at the individual and group level. More importantly, an analytical differentiation needs to be made concerning the mere correspondence between parts of the message and recipients’ opinions, and the actual creation of new frames of interpretation, whose resonance with the recipient would rely on deeper levels of meaning—beliefs and values. Finally, apart from the unidirectional production of meaningful frames—from the organization to the public or from the recruiter to the recruitee, the emergence of frames within social interaction also needs to be explored.

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Communities, Culture, Identity Apart from individuals and social movements, communities or ‘Muslims in Europe’ also come up as being radicalized in various ways. The meaning of the term here is not only in the sense of radical political activism with the potential of eventual engagement in terrorism, but a broader variety of manifestations: violent and non-violent, political and non-political, religious and non-religious. Labels vary from legal protest to radical Islam, Islamism, non-integration, nationalist struggle, Salafism or Jihadism, the common denominator being that they involve individuals who are Muslim. This is then associated with particular characteristics assumed specific to the ‘Muslim community’—socio-economic and educational underperformance, discrimination and marginalization, structural and cultural challenges facing traditional communities, as well as affective and narrative continuity with countries of origin and the respective situations of grievance and conflict. While all these indicators might be true (though one could argue, in differentiated ways for different generations and ethnic groups), this type of causal relationship is highly problematic as there is no reason why these particular characteristics, or at least in this composition should lead to radicalization. In other words, the protests against the war in Iraq might have been pushed by a sense of cultural relatedness and injustice, and not necessarily by the socio-economic situation; on the reverse, the 2005 riots in Paris could be safely classified within socio-economic protest rather than caused by cultural disintegration, for instance. A highly problematic assumption stands at the basis of this association: that Islamist radicalization in Europe would be a sui generis phenomenon and having to do with the quality of being Muslim or Muslim in Europe. We speak therefore not about Islamist radicalization as a variation of radicalization in general, but rather of the radicalization of Muslims. Consequently, the types of explanations are also drawn from the assumed particularities of the Muslim community, inherent or circumstantial. The argument goes: terrorist or violent radicals are naturally a minority, which however emerges from a broader community and due to conditions affecting this broader community and not others. The focus of the research is therefore to discern these specificities. The approach to community radicalization is usually placed within historical and cultural accounts by country experts (Beyler 2006; Abbas 2007; Amghar 2009; Belarouci 2009; Briggs and Birdwell 2009; Veldhuis and Bakker 2009). For the countries with colonial and work immigration, the attitude of the receiving majority towards immigrants appears to have evolved from initial ignorance to panic at the shock of a ‘dangerous otherness’. At the arrival of ‘guest workers’ from various Muslim countries to Western Europe there was a perception on both sides that this would be temporary, so that there was little incentive to integrate, physically or culturally, in the host society or for the latter to acknowledge their presence for that matter, a situation which surprisingly perpetuated even after the waves of family reunification, where it became de facto clear that these people were going to stay. In a second phase, a series of historical events,

786   Daniela Pisoiu like the Palestinian intifada in 1987, Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses in 1988, the Gulf War, and the progression of radical Islam in Algeria, gradually ‘radicalized’ these communities—which is an umbrella term for the rising of political awareness, interest, and position-taking towards events occurring in the Muslim world and episodes of violence. Several types of violence are included here, from demonstrations to riots to assassinations and terror attacks, and also included are the influence of Islamist ideologies and groups, such as with the appearance in the 1980s of dissidents from the Middle East, the Maghreb, and Pakistan, in Barnes’s (2006: 2) words, ‘a polyglot group of intellectuals, preachers, financiers, arms traders, technology specialists, forgers, travel organizers and foot soldiers’. Vidino (2005: 20) argues that ‘The mosques and networks established by them [asylum-seekers] went on to radicalize thousands of immigrant or European-born Muslims.’ The 1990s brought an additional layer: the awareness of the existence of various Islamist groups and organizations and their proselytizing activities, such as Milli Görüs, the Tabligh, Salafis, and neo-Salafis like Hizbut-Tahrir and Al Muhajiroun, in a constellation of religious or religious-political orientation, national and international focus. A recent development is the emergence of the debates around the issues of marginalization and stigmatization of Muslims in Europe, integration and parallel societies. Explanations of community radicalization in Western Europe occur along four dimensions: one is through the establishment of a relationship with conditions and developments existing in the Middle East, including ideological influences. Roy (2008a) calls this a ‘vertical approach’, one which basically follows the history of Islamic fundamentalism, political Islam, and political conflicts with Western powers up to the present date and further focuses on a loose association of Muslims and violence, from ethno-cultural to delinquency and terrorism. Muslim communities in Europe either find themselves in identical situations of strain as those abroad, or brought these along to the continent. Abbas (2007) paints the picture of a historical Muslim sufferance and resistance against Western colonial and capitalistic powers—the ‘radicalization of Islam’, a context in which the marginalization of Muslims in Western Europe is then inscribed. Kilcullen (2007: 649) argues that European Muslims have brought ‘grievances and political divisions from their countries of origin’. Finally, Speckhard (2009: 151) differentiates between the first generation of immigrants, having family and tribal ties with the countries of origin, and therefore being concerned about what occurs there, and the indoctrinated second and third generations. This occurs through the exploitation of marginalization, frustration, and prejudice, and the virtual ‘bringing home’ of conflicts ‘by showing videos, graphic pictures and giving descriptions of how Muslims in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, Iraq and Afghanistan suffer under what they claim is direct or indirect Western oppression’. The second approach looks at the frictions arising from the condition of being a minority, in a different cultural environment: the erosion of traditions and moral codes, the conflict of cultures and generations, disintegration and identity issues as being in-between. The third and usually added on the second is the specific condition of the Muslim minority which suffers from assumed Muslim specific grievances: marginalization and discrimination. Finally, a broader crisis dimension is that of post-modernity,

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with excessive individualism and loss of meaning, which supposedly affects Muslim minorities to a greater extent, given their propensity towards communitarianism. The four dimensions are at times treated in a conglomerate with emphases on certain aspects. Common to all is the apprehension of the added-value jihadism is supposed to bring—that of a surrogate, strong identity, meaning and mission in life. Roy’s (2004) explanatory framework is a good example of the second and third approach. He emphasizes the element of marginalization and loss of identity, in a situation of break with pristine cultures: All of these preachers and organizations target second-generation Muslims, explicitly playing on their sense of being victims of racism, exclusion and loneliness in the West, and hence are very successful among Blacks or non-Muslim members of the underclass, as well as gaoled petty criminals. They offer a valorising substitute identity: members of the vanguard of internationalist jihadists who fight the global superpower and the international system. (Roy 2004: 309)

Different to the first approach, Roy dismisses the idea of a continuity with the countries of origin, and thus, de facto, the concept of a Muslim Diaspora:  ‘Relations between militants and their country of origin are weak or non-existent; we are facing not a diaspora but a truly deterritorialised population. Almost none of the militants fought in his own country, or in his family’s country of origin (except some Pakistanis)’ (Roy 2004: 305). Khosrokhavar (2005: 155) finds that the cultural identity issue is not so much one of lost identity but rather of being in-between cultures which leads to ‘existential rupture’, triggering a rejection of the West. Second, he reintroduces the initial link to communities at home, through the concept of ‘humiliation by proxy’. Humiliation is a central concept of his explanatory framework and concretizes in three variations: First, there is the humiliation they experience in everyday life because they feel that they have been economically marginalized and made feel socially inferior, as is the case with the excluded Maghrebin youth in France, or young West Indians and Pakistanis in Great Britain. Second, thanks to the media, they experience the humiliation of the Muslim world in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq or Palestine. Mechanisms of identification then lead to the internalization of that feeling. Finally, there is sometimes a feeling that their immersion in the Western world has defiled them . . . Taking part in the operations of a group that is fighting Western hegemony and arrogance inside the West gives the individual a new sense of pride and restores his lost dignity. (Khosrokhavar 2005: 152)

An additional dimension of identity crisis is that of the post-modern society (Khosrokhavar 2005; Belarouci 2009), with a particular effect on Muslims: the multicultural city is ‘lonely and insular’ especially for ‘people from the Islamic world, where the quest for a community or umma is part of their imaginary’ (Khosrokhavar 2005: 158). Anonymity and individualism are destabilizing, disintegrating and threaten the traditional social and family links, thus opening the door to virtual identities.

788   Daniela Pisoiu There are a series of problems associated with this approach. First, again, the specificity argument—the difficulty of explaining why, if presumably these aspects affect an entire community or parts of it, only a few individuals actually radicalize. As Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010: 801) rightly notes: Why is it that only a small minority of the individuals exposed to the same structural influences eventually turn to violent groups? What accounts for the difference between the minority, which reacts to the overall socioeconomic, political, and cultural context, with violence and those who instead chose to become engaged in constitutional politics, those who remain apolitical, and those who seek meaning in an introspective religious movement?

Difficulties also arise regarding the incidence of economic grievances. Thus, Roy (2004: 324) asserts that the motivation to join Al-Qaeda is not born out of a ‘depressed social or economic’ situation, yet the parallel to the leftist movements as well as the underlying logic of working-class protest ‘in depressed housing estates and degraded inner cities’ seem to speak to the contrary. The very assumption of causality between individual radicalization and involvement in terrorism—since in the end this is the level at which radicalization becomes visible—and the situation of particular communities needs to be treated with caution. Problematic are arguments such that the fact that European individuals fought in various conflicts abroad is a proof of ‘extensive radicalization of large segments of the European Muslim population’ (Vidino 2005: 20). On the reverse, the fact that certain communities might display features of marginalization or discrimination does not automatically lead to the conclusion that precisely these features are drivers of individual radicalization. In other words, while the socio-economic and cultural diagnoses might be correct, the causal connection to radicalization is highly questionable. An obvious contradiction within this approach marks the existence of a link with the countries of origin, i.e. whether there is a Diaspora or rather a deterritorialized, uprooted, global, virtual community. Reference to the radicalization of specific ethnic communities is complicated by the fact that groups and cells display more and more a mixed national and ethnic background, not to speak of the presence of converts. The concept of a Muslim community is weakened by the still prominent ethnic identification and separation of the various communities. A concept such as that of ‘humiliation by proxy’ presupposes the existence of a community link which religion as such can hardly provide. Something of the sort of a ‘fictive kin’ emergent in religious communities (Speckhard and Ahkmedova 2006) or the type of group identity subordinating that of the individual specific to protest movements would by definition need the respective contact and group mechanisms. In fact, some authors argue that the ‘Muslim community’ or the (only) existence of a Muslim identity is in fact constructed. Roy (2004: 132–3) explains this through the creation of ‘Muslim’ as a neo-ethnic category understood in anthropological terms and Islam as the culture of a neo-ethnic group which ‘creates a common conceptual ground between Western categories and the strategy of would-be community

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leaders to reconstruct a “Muslim” community on a basis that can fit Western cultural and legal categories of identities’. Barnes (2006: 17–18) argues against the forcing into one identity, that of Muslim (and this explanation assumes that there is a Muslim identity) by faith schools and census questions, because one has multiple identities and should be allowed to choose what one wants to be or be most. Taking this further, Al-Azmeh (2006: 10) speaks about the creation of ‘virtual communities’ with ‘imagined origins, confirming alienation’, the creation of extra-territoriality through special laws and increased authorities to the imams, based on the assumption that ‘Arab countries being predominantly Muslim, it is somehow natural that their inhabitants would gravitate towards Islamist political creeds.’ What these arguments in fact imply is that precisely the elements of uprootedness, difference, and propensity to protest might in fact become a self-fulfilling prophecy and something that the community approach, with the assumed specifics associated with the ‘Muslims’, would actually create rather than combat. As some authors have noted, policies aimed at countering violent extremism and targeting entire Muslim communities entail the danger of constructing ‘suspect communities’ and thus negatively impacting community cohesion, or even acting as triggers of radicalization (Vermeulen 2014). The scholarship on radicalization in Russia could be partly situated within the second and third approach, in particular the arguments relating to the collapse or the challenging of traditional social and religious structures and to situations of socio-economic and political grievance. On the reverse, the socio-economic prosperity in Tartarstan is for instance considered as one of the reasons why the radical threat here is ‘at the political margins’ (Khurmatullin 2010: 118). With regard to the factors leading to an increase in preponderance of the ‘new religiosity’ or new Islamic fundamentalism, a series of parallels can be drawn between Russia and Western Europe. These are the Salafi penetration from Saudi Arabia and Central Asia, the proselytizing of organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and Jamaat e-Tabligh, and in the North Caucasus the targeted actions of Salafis challenging clan and ethnic structures, addressing social problems and promoting individual access to the content of the Qur’an (Khurmatullin 2010; Malashenko 2006; Yemelianova 2010). Interestingly and different from some of the Western European analyses, these elements are supposed to explain just that, the phenomenon of increasing Islamization, and not jihadism or engagement in violence. The latter is related to enduring political and economic grievances and the appropriation of the separatist struggle by the mujahideen: In Chechnya, war conditions predetermined a constituent prevalence of the jihadist form of Islamic activism. The major agents of radical Islam there were foreign mujahidin (Islamic fighters), who came to assist their Islamic brethren in fighting the jihad against the Russian invasion; and radical Dagestani Wahhabis, who fled to Chechnya in the late 1990s. (Yemelianova 2010: 131, original emphasis)

790   Daniela Pisoiu Clearly, in this case there is no need for mechanisms such as that of ‘humiliation by proxy’. The few analyses of individual motivations in fact relate to actual experiences of psychological trauma combined with an ideology more nationalistic in nature than jihadi per se (Speckhard and Ahkmedova 2006).

Main Debates Around Islamist Radicalization Home-Grown Radicalization Subsequent to the 7 July bombings in London and the realization that the perpetrators were ‘born and bred’ in Europe, the topic of ‘home-grown radicalization’ took an important place in the academic and policy debates. Apart from the difficulty of placing motivation within the usual oppression/frustration complex specific to environments outside Europe, security considerations also came into play. A threat coming from the inside is more intensely perceived, not only because it ‘comes from our midst’ but also because it is more difficult to recognize and control. Making matters worse, one of the trends in the following years was the presence not only of ‘born and bred’ individuals, but also of those without specific religious or migration backgrounds—the convert phenomenon. This clearly had implications for the conceptualization of the entire radicalization phenomenon—as movement, network, or part of the global jihad or indeed European. The meaning of ‘home-grown’ evolves broadly around two dimensions: linkage to the West, and to a terrorist organization abroad. Crone and Harrow (2010: 4, original emphasis) call these ‘belonging in the West’ and ‘autonomy from terrorist groups abroad’, with several indicators for each. While operational autonomy is relatively easy to assess, belonging to the West involves more complex aspects; indicators may be nationality or country of origin, the amount of time spent in Europe, whereby it is also not straightforward what for instance ‘formative years’ would mean, or the place of radicalization as mentioned by Mullins (2012: 111), whereby the geographical location might have little to do with the social environment, especially if we think about isolated communities. One could of course stretch the discussion to other levels, such as root causes or ideology. In this sense, the question would become: are the driving forces behind radicalization endogenous or exogenous to the European socio-political space? And is ideology based on European concepts and principles or rather external? As discussed already, approaches differ: authors speak about a jihadi ‘movement’ in the tradition of the European protest movements, completely separated from the socio-political realities of the Muslim world, a de-territorialized, virtual community. Some others see, on the contrary, a clear continuity of both ideology and grievance between political Islam and the current jihadism. Given these

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difficulties and the continuously changing nature of radicalization and recruitment, it is difficult to produce an accurate and especially durable assessment. What can in any case safely be argued is that an entirely home-grown radicalization is not probable, given the global nature of ideology and networks. Operationally, Crone and Harrow (2010: 5) noted that ‘More recent cases indicate that individuals increasingly seek out accessible terrorist communities abroad in countries, such as Pakistan, Yemen, Chechnya, or Somalia.’ Similarly, Kilcullen (2007: 649) finds that ‘most terrorist incidents on European soil since 9/11 have not been purely home-grown, but have drawn on sponsorship, support or guidance from AQ [Al-Qaeda]’. Finally, the prime example, 7 July and the 2006 airline bombing plot, eventually showed ‘clear links to senior Al Qaeda commanders operating in Pakistan’s lawless frontier border area with Afghanistan’ (Hoffman 2009: 1100; see also Barbieri and Klausen 2012 for a similar assessment of the London-based jihadi movement up to 2008).

Internet Apprehensions of the role of the internet in the radicalization process vary from a type of use which is in no way specific to Islamist radicals—namely that of communication, source of knowledge, and social networking—to specific functions replacing real-life situations, such as in the case of training (Kohlmann 2008). Paz (2009: 116) calls the internet ‘the Open University for Militant Jihadi Studies’ and argues that ‘militant jihadi movements, groups, clerics, and scholars, turned the Internet into their main, and sometimes only, vehicle for propaganda, indoctrination, publicity, and teaching of their messages. Their “soft power” is the Internet.’ More differentiated views see it not as a unidirectional communication channel, but rather as a platform of discussion where various types of information and interpretations interact and compete: ‘Thanks to the perpetual beta, everything, whether a product of states or militants, is open to challenge on the Internet’ (Ryan 2010: 678). Through the intermediary mechanisms of social networking and previous involvement in support activities, Bowman-Grieve (2010: 83) finds virtual community involvement as a ‘potential pathway towards radicalization’. Neumann (2008: 55) goes further to argue that the internet has become a social environment where certain views and behaviours are ‘normalized’ and more extreme ones even encouraged—a phenomenon of ‘hyper-radicalization’. This would be an equivalent of the ‘real world’ video-watching conspiratorial apartments and group mechanisms of intensification of opinions. Finally, in spite of the availability, in the meantime, of significant amounts of operational information online, empirical evidence shows that Al-Qaeda has not pursued online jihadi training (Stenersen 2008), that cells aim at and usually go through ‘real’ training (Nesser 2008; Stenersen 2008), and that the latter is in a direct relationship with operational effectiveness (Gohel 2009). Kenney (2010) explains this through the differentiation between techne (abstract

792   Daniela Pisoiu technical knowledge) and metis (experiential knowledge) and argues that the internet cannot provide mētis. This could be also a plausible argument why one could not speak of an overall ‘online radicalization’, since, while social networking, information, perhaps to some extent also group pressure can develop virtually, for operational skills and resources resort to the real world would be necessary.

Prisons and Universities Prisons and universities as hubs of radicalization slid into focus after the observation that high numbers of violent radicals had higher education and/or criminal backgrounds and that in some cases the process of radicalization occurred or deepened in these locations (Reinares 2006; Gutiérrez et al. 2008; Brandon 2009, 2011; Alonso 2012). While accounts of university radicalization usually focus on the role of radicalizing agents, in the case of prisons several explanations were proposed having to do with the particular condition of the environment and that of the individual in this environment, i.e. vulnerability in a situation of stress and alienation, an existential crisis of finding a new path after failure (Neumann 2008), or indeed an ideology that expresses anger and anti-establishment attitudes (Beyler 2006). These aspects need to be treated with caution in view of several considerations. One has to do with the assumed automatic link between certain experiences and radical Islam—similarly to the argument of identity crisis in general. As Olsen (2008: 4) notes, ‘for some inmates, conversion processes lead to radical Islam, while for other inmates they represent a movement away from radicalization—representing instead a way of obtaining a more nuanced and inclusive understanding of Islam’. And indeed such transformations have the potential of reversibility, if one thinks about the general reinsertion mechanisms involved: ‘many of those who adopt radical ideologies in prison, whether out of conviction or for more pragmatic reasons, often discard their extremist beliefs on their return to mainstream society’ (Brandon 2009: 4). On a broader level, it appears difficult to show that the actual radicalization process—and not just conversion or the Salafization of student societies for that matter—and the conditions conducive to it pertain to these environments or (also) have to do with previous experiences. A more promising avenue seems to be the consideration of prisons and universities as forums, platforms for the exchange of ideas and social networking, much like mosques or cafés for instance, where it might or might not come to the presence and influence of certain individuals and messages or the effect of group mechanisms.

Role of Religion That the religion Islam cannot be considered as a cause of radicalization has become a generally acknowledged fact. A series of religion-related aspects, however, have made their way into discussions, such as religiosity and Islamic fundamentalism. In the

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conceptualization of radicalization as a reaction to post-modernity, religiosity is the de facto state of being radical. Khosrokhavar (2005: 156) argues that the fight against Evil becomes an ‘existential project’ and is similar to modern cultist mechanisms: ‘The Manichaeism of this religiosity overcomes the discontent of our late modernity, which offers us no more than quasi-convictions and imperfect motives, a mental landscape painted in half-tones, and a vision of self and other that oscillates between narcissism and rejection.’ Similarly, Belarouci (2009: 11) argues that ‘the return to religion appears as a response to the profound unease present in most societies. Indeed, religion seems to be designed to supply the answer to the question “who am I?” It promotes the construction of a personal identity for the individual and a cultural identity for the group’, and she cites studies showing that there is a link between exclusion, discrimination, and ostentatious display of religion. The problem here of course is that, while the case might be made that new religiosity emerges as a reaction to post-modern anxiety, it is not clear that this is indeed applicable to the type of political radicalization we are looking at. Individual biographies of violent radicals for instance suggest that motivations are usually mundane, political, and unlikely to be inscribed in this type of intellectualized existential crisis. An interesting hypothesis was proposed by Aly and Striegher (2012), who differentiate between a pre-radicalization phase, where religion might offer answers to personal issues, and a radicalization phase, when violent behaviour is triggered by factors of another nature, such as group mechanisms and personal benefits. With regard to Islamic fundamentalism, Slootman and Tillie’s, by their own assessment, most important conclusion from their research is that ‘the religious and political dimensions are independent of each other. This means that orthodoxy does not lead automatically to political discontent (and from there to potential radicalization), and vice versa. It is important to recognize this. Someone who is orthodox is not per se radical, nor will this person automatically become radical’ (2006:  4, original emphasis). Others, however, do focus on strands such as the Salafis or the Tabligh as possible factors of pre-radicalization. This has not only an analytical relevance, but also at the level of policy, since one of the questions posed in counter-radicalization decision-making processes is whether to engage in partnerships with organizations which voice fundamentalist messages or not. In other words, the question is: are they ‘conveyor belts’ or ‘firewalls’? From the point of view of the discursive commonalities between the Islamist messages and that of Al-Qaeda, several pro and con arguments have been proposed. Neumann (2008: 32) finds that organizations such as Hizb-ut Tahrir, the Tabligh, and al-Muhajiroun are gateway organizations which play three roles: socialization in milieux that can include violent extremists, indoctrination into a mindset that legitimizes the use of violence for political and religious purposes, and subversion—the promotion of ideas coming against democracy and social cohesion. Vidino (2009) advances the hypothesis that such organizations might play the role of arsonists, pushing a message that plays on the separate identity of Muslims as well as the alleged persecution to which Muslims are subjected in Europe and which taken to its logical end justifies violence. In the words of a former activist, non-violent Islamists ‘advocate separatist, confrontational ideas that,

794   Daniela Pisoiu followed to their logical conclusion, lead to violence. At the very least, the rhetoric of radicals provides the mood music to which suicide bombers dance’ (Vidino 2009: 72). On the reverse, precisely this commonality of message has been considered as a plus in the attempt to limit the influence of violent radical ideas. Moskalenko and McCauley (2009: 240) argue that such organizations are in fact a competitor for Al-Qaeda, given the similarity of goals. Amghar (2009: 38) states that ‘this form of religious radicalism and the anti-French tirades of its militants act as a sort of “safety valve” that diverts the militants from direct action’. The problem might be of course the fact that there is no a priori reason why individuals should choose a pacifist rather than a violent way to live out their ideology. In fact, in some accounts (Husain 2007), precisely the militancy of some organizations made them more attractive for potential recruits. In pragmatic policy terms, however, the case could be made that targeted deradicalization could have something to gain from this ideological interrelatedness. Lambert in Jackson (2008:  298)  makes the point that ‘Salafi and Islamist community groups in London often have the best tools with which to undermine al-Qaida propaganda within their own youth communities.’ Lambert (2009: 69–70) also argues that because Al-Qaeda distorts these ideologies, they are the best suited to combat it; additionally, they are the best placed to recognize radicalization and recruitment processes where they occur. Still along the ideological component coupled with policy considerations, a different aspect is, beyond the priority of combating jihadism, the potential anti-democratic and anti-community cohesion implications such a world-view might entail (Paris 2007). Belarouci (2009: 17) argues that non-violent organizations are in fact more dangerous because they promote non-integration. Apart from the strict ideological level and considering a developmental approach to radicalization, one needs to consider the potential social networking role of such organizations, in the sense of facilitators of contacts and meeting places. This is a promising way to understand jihadis’ previous associations with non-violent organizations such as Hizbut-Tahrir or Tabligh, as listed by Barnes (2006) and Hoffman (2009). Beyler (2006: 95) argues that ‘selected tabligh believers are indeed sent to attend Pakistani madrassas—known by the intelligence community to be safe havens for terrorists—in order to deepen their religious knowledge’. Briggs and Birdwell (2009: 110) note that ‘these organisations can find themselves being used as convenient spaces for individuals to convene—often in the margins—where the culpability of the organization is due more to its poor visibility and governance than a commitment to violence’.

Deradicalization The scholarship on Islamist deradicalization in Europe has developed to a lesser extent than the one on radicalization and has generally focused either on individual processes, or the assessment of deradicalization programmes. To a greater extent than within the radicalization scholarship, parallels have been noted to involvement in other types of political violence, gangs, criminal lifestyle, religious movements, racist and right-wing

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extremism: ‘although the political and ideological content may be different, the social and psychological processes involved may well be rather similar, or at least comparable’ (Bjørgo and Horgan 2009: 2–3). An important and perhaps counterintuitive finding is that deradicalization should not be understood simply as the reverse of the radicalization process. Horgan (2008a: 3) noted that ‘answering questions about what keeps people involved with a terrorist movement may have surprisingly little, if any, bearing on what subsequently causes them to disengage from terrorist operations or from the organization (and/or broader network or movement) altogether’. Finally, different to most accounts on radicalization, it would appear that behavioural change does not necessarily follow cognitive change and may in some cases not occur at all—thus the differentiation between deradicalization and disengagement: When they leave terrorist or other extremist groups and behaviours, some individuals are stripped of their radical views as a consequence of having left the group rather than being a cause for leaving. Thus, people often re-adjust their value system in order to make it in accordance with their new patterns of behaviour. However, there are also some individuals who distance themselves from the extremist group and its violent means, but retain their extremist views on society. (Bjørgo and Horgan 2009a: 3)

This has clear application in deradicalization programmes and concerning the question of which one is more efficient and more realistic to aim for. Silke (2011: 18) argues for instance that ‘deradicalising prisoners—which requires changing their mindset and ideological beliefs—is exceedingly difficult’. Furthermore, given that the immediate policy priority is to reduce violence, attempting to change behaviour appears more reasonable in this respect and would concretize in the provision of incentives for reinsertion (2011: 20). One might of course argue, and here we are back at the issue of definitions, that disengagement from radical activities or leaving a terrorist organization might not be sufficient, if identification with a radical ideology or the refusal to participate in the democratic process is considered a threat.

Conclusion Islamist radicalization in Europe is a research child born prematurely, marked by substantial political pressure, social change, and global unrest. At the dawn of the jihadi campaigns on European soil and increasingly targeting it, insecurity, insufficient knowledge of the ‘other’, and a wish for quick fixes had an impact on the research agenda. It is therefore little surprising that the development of theoretical tools for its study and the availability of grounded analyses still leave much to be desired. There are nevertheless some elements of progress which have brought us closer to the understanding of why and especially how individuals and groups come to nurture ideas of radical political and social change and possibly act on them in violent ways. That Muslim minorities in Europe tend to display lower income, educational, and housing indicators than the

796   Daniela Pisoiu mainstream, along with experiences of discrimination and marginalization has become in the meantime not so easily associated with a certain vulnerability or openness to jihadism. Simplistic constructions of ‘cause–effect’ have been slowly overtaken by concepts such as ‘pathways’, ‘process’, and ‘selective incentives’, looking at developments through time, although concepts such as ‘factors’ and ‘crises’ still maintain a certain amount of attractiveness. Rather than attempting to establish causal relationships with qualities and structural factors, some of the more promising analyses have concentrated on the ways in which individuals might come to adopt new values and norms in interaction with the social environment. Rather than descriptively displaying and unpacking elements of ideological content, advances have been made in understanding the mechanisms through which a world-view permeated by a sense of injustice against Muslims might be adopted and further legitimize violent behaviour. Islamist radicalization is an individual process, occurring in interaction with various levels of social environments and at the intersection of various types of discourse. More importantly, it is not something specific or derived from the quality of being Muslim. Developments at the macro-level, be it discrimination, the collapse of original social structures, external conflicts, or foreign policy need to be understood not as direct causes or contributing factors, but as elements of discourse purposefully created and further developed within social interaction. While further studies are necessary to explore the mechanisms of radicalization and especially those of deradicalization and disengagement, we are nevertheless at a healthy distance from initial ideas implying that there is something ‘wrong’ with European Muslims.

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C O N C LU S I O N :  I S T H E R E A  E U R O P E A N I S L A M ? JO C E LY N E C E S A R I

In coining the term Euro-Islam, Bassam Tibi1 advocated for the adaptation of Muslims to the civic and political contracts of their countries of residence and for the necessity to adjust Islam to the liberal values of the West. In his words, Islam should be reformed to comply to Europe’s post-Enlightenment values and norms such as human rights, rule of law, democracy, and gender equality. Since Bassam Tibi’s initial contribution, the concept of Euro-Islam has been hotly debated and alternative definitions have been advanced. For example, Tariq Ramadan has distinguished between the customs and ethnicities of different Muslim countries and the religious principles of Islam, arguing that the latter can be (or are already part) of European cultures.2 According to his approach, Islamic principles per se do not require reform, but an acculturation process is needed in order to separate these principles from the different countries of origin of Muslim immigrants and adapt them to different European cultures. Interestingly, according to this Handbook the advocates of Euro-Islam who assume that the values of Islam and the values of Europe are inherently incompatible, and are at odds with the reality of the vast majority of Muslims across Europe. For example, the country chapters analyse the increasing number of surveys that show the loyalty of Muslims to their countries of residence. At the same time, they describe the persistence of the suspicions or doubts of the ‘host’ societies about the integration of Islam into European cultures. In fact, all the chapters in this volume attest to an increase in the concerns about Muslims’ loyalty to their national communities. They also show that the persistence of patriarchal cultures and the growing influence of some anti-Western religious interpretations among Muslims actually reinforce the dominant perception that Islam clashes with European liberal values and lifestyles. In this regard, the visibility of Salafism, which has monopolized the debate on the ‘true’ Islam not only among Muslims but also in the eyes of the general population across Europe, reinforces the antinomy between the West and Islam. In Salafi thinking,

1  2 

Bassam Tibi (ed.), Political Islam, World Politics and Europe (New York: Routledge, 2008). Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1999).

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good Muslims are religiously conservative, wear the hijab, follow strict gender separation, avoid promiscuity, and limit their relations with non-Muslims or Muslims who do not behave like them. In contrast, bad Muslims have been ‘contaminated’ by the Western lifestyle and values and, therefore, are in need of purification. As attested to in the different contributions of the Handbook, this discourse fails to reflect the malleability and flexibility of Muslim religious practices. Nevertheless, it still operates as an authoritative interpretation of Islamic orthodoxy and influences Muslims’ identification to their religious tradition. Thus, the ‘good’ Muslim becomes an ontological category based on total acceptance without critique of divine law, which is defined as immutable. As an inverted image, the ‘good’ Muslims in the eyes of Europeans are secular and Westernized while the bad Muslims are doctrinal, anti-modern, and virulent.3 In other words, a distinction between radical, ‘bad’ Islam and moderate, ‘good’ Islam has become a common political framing across European democracies.4 In this sense, the clash is not between civilizations but between essentialized and inverted perceptions of Islam and Muslims that reinforce each other. Therefore, any claim about Euro-Islam contains the risk of reinforcing this clash of essentialisms. Additionally, cultural, social, and ethnic diversity among Muslims in Europe within and across countries constitutes another challenge to the realization of Euro-Islam. For example, the Handbook sheds light on the cultural gap between Eastern and Western Muslims in Europe who do not share the same historical and political experience and for whom Islam is part and parcel of ethnic or national identities. Another reason why ‘Euro-Islam’ is problematic is that it prioritizes symbolic integration over social or political integration and tends to culturalize debates on the social mobility or economic advancement of Muslim groups. Symbolic integration refers to the inclusion of a particular group into the history and shared memory of a national community. These shared cultural practices divide the world into those who are ‘citizens’ or ‘friends’, and those who are ‘enemies’.5 Symbolic boundaries are thereby constructed around the ‘national community’ both inter-nationally and intra-nationally. For example, ‘enemies’ do not only reside outside of the territorial confines of the nation-state, but may also lie within, reflecting the ‘internal structure of social divisions’, as well as particular national myths, narratives, and traditions.6 Symbolic boundaries within any

3  Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (New York: Three Leaves Press, 2005), 24. 4  Interestingly, some Muslim spokespeople are the most active advocates of this dichotomy. As members of the incriminated minority, they can voice criticisms that would seem unduly harsh or politically incorrect coming from the majority groups. Probably the most representative figure of the good Muslims is Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who is mentioned in several chapters of this book. 5  J. C. Alexander, ‘Citizen and Enemy as Symbolic Classification: On the Polarizing Discourse of Civil Society’, in M. Fournier and M. Lamont (eds.), Cultivating Differences: Symbolic Boundaries and the Making of Inequality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 289–308. Zygmunt Bauman, ‘Modernity and Ambivalence’, Theory, Culture and Society 7 (1990): 143–69. Philip Schlesinger, Media, State and Nation: Political Violence and Collective Identities (London: Sage, 1991). 6 Schlesinger, Media, State and Nation.

804   Jocelyne Cesari given national community operate on a two-dimensional typology: friends/enemies and internal/external.7 Some groups are internal enemies (territorial/linguistic/ethnic minorities); others are external (hostile foreign countries). Across the countries described in this volume, it appears that Muslims have become both internal and external enemies.8 They are internal enemies because they seem to endanger the core liberal values of European societies as well as adding a burden to social problems like unemployment or ghettoization of some urban areas. They are also the external enemies because of the war on terror and the rise of violent Islamic activism. Under these conditions, any expression of Islamic identity or practice, from head covering to dietary rules, is seen as a political act and therefore deemed illegitimate. This double process of estrangement and externalization from the national community has deeply influenced the integration policies in Western Europe by questioning citizenship acquisition and undermining the recognition of cultural diversity. In the eastern part of Europe, Muslim minorities were in some cases already built in as the ‘others’ or the internal enemies. The rise of external threats has reinforced the internal one, leading in countries like Greece or Russia to a dichotomy between the internal historical Muslims and the external ones (immigrants from Muslim countries). Even more disconcerting, the externalization of Islam puts the ‘burden of proof ’ on Muslims alone; making symbolic integration a unilateral process of assimilation to European values with a strong emphasis on European secularism presented as a universal norm.

Conclusion: Relativizing Secularism The European experience of separation of church and state, privatization of religious activities, and the decline of religious practices has served as the universal standard to define secularism. Therefore, when citizens contradict this standard by adopting dress code, dietary rules, or other religious obligations with social implications, the secular political cultures of the West are in crisis. Muslims are troublesome because they express their individuality through religious postures that for most Europeans are not compatible with the idealized secular civism. These tensions have the consequence of relativizing European secularism by showing that it is a way to discipline all religions when they include prescriptions and

7  This approach builds on Georg Simmel’s structural approach of the stranger, which examines an individual’s twofold position as an outsider and an insider when entering into a new group. 8  See Jocelyne Cesari, Why the West Fears Islam: Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

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commitments that do not conform to this neat private–public division.9 They also reveal how secularism can turn into an ideology or counter-religion aimed against any forms of religion in public space.10 The French version of secularism, or laïcité, is an illustration of this extreme ideological interpretation of secular principles. In sum, to avoid a unilateral symbolic integration of Muslims within national communities would require a dramatic change in the current liberal and secularist narratives. It is a daunting task, but it can be done. Then, instead of being a disciplinization of the bad Muslims, Euro-Islam could mean symbolic integration of the Islamic heritage and cultural practices within different European national cultures without endangering the basic principle of equality between citizens.

Select Bibliography Amir-Moazami, Shirin (2007). ‘Euro-Islam, Islam in Europe, or Europe Revised through Islam? Versions of Muslim Solidarity within European Borders’, in Nathalie Karagiannis (ed.), European Solidarity and Solidarity Beyond Europe. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 186–213. Asad, Talal (1993). Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Batnitzky, Leora Faye (2011). How Judaism Became a Religion: An Introduction to Modern Jewish Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bauman, Zygmunt (1990). ‘Modernity and Ambivalence’, Theory, Culture and Society 7: 143–69. BBC News (2011). ‘State Multiculturalism Has Failed, Says David Cameron’, 5 February. [Accessed 27 July 2012]. Beider, Harris (2012). Race, Housing, & Community:  Perspectives on Policy and Practice. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell. Biggs, Stephen (2012). ‘The Monist’, Liberalism, Feminism, and Group Rights. [Accessed 25 July 2012]. Buruma, Ian (2012). ‘Europe’s Turn to the Right’, The Nation, 10 August. [Accessed 27 July 2012]. Celermajer, Danielle (2007). ‘If Islam Is Our Other, Who Are “We”?’ Australian Journal of Social Issues 42(1): 103–23. Cesari, Jocelyne (2006). ‘Securitization and Religious Divides in Europe: Muslims in Western Europe After 9/11’, GSRL-Paris and Harvard University, 1 June. Goldberg, David Theo (2006). ‘Racial Europeanization’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 29(2): 331–64. Islamopedia Online. ‘Missed Opportunity for a Greater Inclusion of Islam in the United States’. Last modified 17 March 2011. [Accessed 25 July 2012].

9  For an analysis of the disciplinization of Islam in the European context, see Cesari, Why the West Fears Islam; for Judaism see Leora Faye Batnitzky, How Judaism Became a Religion: An Introduction to Modern Jewish Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 10 Cesari, Why the West Fears Islam, 113.

806   Jocelyne Cesari Kundnani, Arun (2009). Spooked: How Not To Prevent Violent Extremism. London: Institute of Race Relations. Kundnani, Arun (2012). ‘Multiculturalism and Its Discontents:  Left, Right and Liberal’, European Journal of Cultural Studies 15(2): 155–66. Lentin, Alana and Gavin Titley (2012). ‘The Crisis of “Multiculturalism” in Europe: Mediated Minarets, Intolerable Subjects’, European Journal of Cultural Studies 15(2) (April): 123–38. Mamdani, Mahmood (2005). Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror. New York: Three Leaves Press. Schlesinger, Philip (1991). Media, State and Nation: Political Violence and Collective Identities. London: Sage. Tibi, Bassam (ed.) (2008). Political Islam, World Politics and Europe. New York: Routledge. Toynbee, Polly (2004). ‘Why Trevor Is Right’, The Guardian, 7 April. [Accessed 8 April 2004]. US Office of Immigration Statistics (2004). 2004 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Last modified January 2006. [Accessed 27 October 2012]. Young, Hugo (2001). ‘A Corrosive National Danger in Our Multicultural Model’, The Guardian, 6 November. [Accessed 20 November 2001]. Zine, Jasmin (2006). ‘Between Orientalism and Fundamentalism:  The Politics of Muslim Women’s Feminist Engagement’, Muslim World Journal of Human Rights Special Issue: Post-September 11th Developments in Human Rights in the Muslim World 3(1).

Names Index

Aarbakke, V  358 Abbas, T  786 Abbattecola, E  268 Abduh, Muhammad  453 Abdulwahab, Taimour  411 Abu-Dhar (Oleg Marushkin)  550 Accoyer, Bernard  47 Adam, Ilke  241 Ad-Darsh, Syed  91 Adida, Claire  29 Afandi of Chirkey, Sa’id  540–1, 547–8 Al-Ahdal, Abdallah  226 Al-Alawi, Irfan  506 Al-Albani, Muhammad Nasiruddin  14 al-Albani, Nasir al Din  483–4 Ali ibn Abi T.alib  393, 480 Alibashic, Ahmet  593 Alidadi, Katayoun  241 Allam, Magdi  657–8 Allen, Christopher  749, 760 Allievi, Silvestre  265, 274, 279, 286, 299, 637, 639 Almani, Abdul Ghaffar El (Eric Breininger) 663 Alvi, Aisha  707 Alvi, Fatima  707 Aly, A  793 Amato, Giuliano  282 Ambrosini, M  268, 276, 291 Amghar, Samir  37, 48, 794 Amiraux, Valérie  729 Amir-Moazami, Schirin  108, 132 Amirpur, Katajun  139 Anagnostou, D  364, 370 Anas, Imam Malik ibn  447 Anderson, M  412 Andersson, P  401 Andreassen, R  413 Andrić, ivo 432

An-Na’im, Abdullahi A  448 Antoniou, D  356, 376–7, 382 Anwar, Muhammad  74, 87–8, 90 Aparicio, Juan Carlos  710 Arigita Maza, E  343 Arkoun, Mohamed  448 Armstrong, Karen  448 Arnauti, Shuayyib Muharrem  484 Ascha, Ghassan  704 al-Assad, Bashir  509 Astor, A  325 Atanasoff, Velko  602 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal  604, 686 Attanassof, Velko  445 Ayuso Guixot, MA  292 Al-Azhar, sheikh of  12 Al-Azmeh, A  770, 789 Baaz, Abdul Aziz Ibn  14 Badić, Murat  468 Badinter, Eliabeth  727 Bakht, Natasha  703 Bakker, E  773 Baleta, Abdi  502 Baltsiotis, L  357 Bamba, Ahmadu  287–8 al-Banna, Hassan  36 Bano, Samia  692 Bardot, Brigitte  41 Barlas, Asma  703 Barnard, Benno  248 Barnes, H  786, 789, 794 Barrios Baudor, GL  317 Barton, Stephen  75–6, 87–8, 90 Bastenier, Albert  229, 249–50 Bat Ye’or  415 Baubérot, Jean  31 Bausani, A  265 al-Bayhaqi, Abu Bakr  447

808   NAMES INDEX Bayramova, Fawziya  540, 543 Bayrou, François  32, 34, 713 Begum, Shabina  707–8 Bektovic, S  412 Belarouci, L  793, 794 Belkacem, Fouad  248 Benn, T  45 Berglund, J  412 Berlusconi, Silvio  275, 709, 758 Bernardo, Pais  634 Bershia, Sali  502 Bevelander, P  401, 413, 414 Beyler, C  794 Biffi, Giacomo  274 Bilalli, Idriz  496 Birali Birali  593–4 Birdwell, J  794 Blair, Tony  758 Bobrovnikov, Vladimir  532 Boenders, W  179 Boja, Rexhep  487–8, 495 Bolkestein, Frits  199 Bonne, Karijn  245 Borou, C  360 Borell, K  413 Børresen, S  401 Bosman, André  198 Boubakeur, Dalil  36, 37 Bourdieu, Pierre  412 Bousetta, Hassan  238–9 Bouyeri, Mohamed  165–6, 192 Bowen, John  692 Bowman-Grieve, L  791 Bracke, Sarah  251–2 Branković, Vuk  432 Breininger, Eric (Abdul Ghaffar El Almani) 663 Breivik, Anders Behring  141, 765 Brems, Eva  242 Brettfeld, K  133 Brezhnev, Leonid  522 Briggs, R  794 Brion, Fabienne  242 Brubaker, Rogers  109, 144 Bugari, Sulejman  448, 450 al-Buhairi, Salem  226 Buijs, FJ  628–30 Al-Bukhari, Imam  447

Bunar, N  401 al-Burhani, Al-Hajj Nooh Said  483 Bush, George W  747, 756, 758–9 Caetani, L  265 Čajlaković, Zenica Imam Husein  448 Cameron, David  86, 750, 762 Caneva, E  291 Carlbom, A  410 Carter, Jimmy  759 Castells, M  78 Castles, S  723 Catherine II, queen of Russia (Catherine the Great) 517 Čaušević, Džemaludin  454 Čavić, Dragan  468 Cerić, Mustafa  418, 455 Cesari, Jocelyne  28, 45, 112, 629, 643, 745, 778 Chaouki, Khalid  295 Chérifi, Hanifa  713 Chiesi, AM  273 Chirac, Jacques  32, 44, 46–7, 713, 758 Christopoulos, D  357 Chukov, Vladimir  601 Cimbalo, G  636 Clycq, Noël  233, 251–2 Cohen, Job  188 Colom González, F  321 Contreras Ortega, V  328 Corbin, Henry  448, 546 Courtens, G  292 Cox, Caroline  693 Crone, M  790–1 Cuspert, Mamadou (Deso Dogg/Abou Maleeq) 663–4 Dahlab, Lucia  711–12 Dahmane, Abdessattar  248 Dalgaard-Nielsen, A  771–2, 788 Dassetto, Felice  222, 229, 249–50, 265, 629 Daun, H  641 Davie, Grace  298 Davutoglu, Ahmet  464, 604 Dawud, Imam Abu  447 de Gobineau, Arthur  747 De Stoop, Chris  249 Debeer, Jonathan  237 Decimo, F  273

NAMES INDEX  

Degauge, Muriel  249 Demetriou, O  355 Deso Dogg (Mamadou Cuspert/Abou Maleeq) 663–4 Didero, Maike  136–7 al-Din, Taj  539 Dornhof, Sarah  134 Đozo, Husein  453–4 Drider, Kenza (Kendra)  45 Dronkers, Jaap  231 Dubouloz, C–J  783 Dudayev, Jokhar  542, 549 Duquet, Nils  230–1 Durić, Meliha  468 El Aroud, Malika (Umm Obeyda)  248 El Asri, Farid  229, 247 El Bachiri, Lila  246 El Battiui, Mohamed  235 El Fadl, Khaled Abou  448 El-Ghandour, Naim  377 El Hamel, Chouki  712 Elchinova, Magdalena  582 Elidrisi, Fatima  710 Erbakan, Necmettin  604, 659–60 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip  604 Errichiello, G  273 Esati, Lulëzim  496 Esposito, John L  448, 749 Evergeti, V  362, 366, 375, 377, 379–80, 382 Evers Rosander, E  328 Evstatiev, Simeon  593, 601–2 Eydi, Akbar  448 Fadil, Nadia  242, 245 Fahd bin ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Al Saud, king of Saudi Arabia  14–15, 225 Fallaci, Oriana  265, 274–5, 295, 600, 747, 758 Fanon, Frantz  762 Farage, Nigel  718 Färber, Alexa  129 Fatima, daughter of Prophet  450–1, 480 Fava, T  284 Fayzov, Ildus  517 Ferrari, Silvio  281, 629, 631 Fetzer, Joel S  25, 624, 633 Field, Clive  84 Filandra, Šaćir  433, 467

Fjordman (Peder Jensen)  416 Fleischmann, Fenella  232 Foblets, Marie-Claire  240–1 Fortuyn, Pim  192, 199, 747, 753, 759 Foucault, Michel  245, 412, 755–6 Fourest, Caroline  36 Fraihi, Hind  249 Franco, Francisco  312–14 Frégosi, F  629–30 Frindte, W  135 Frings, Dorothee  117 Frisina, A  294–6 Fuess, Albrecht  138, 631 Galal, LP  412 Gardell, M  413 Gazidede, Bashkim  502 Geaves, Ron  79–80, 87–9, 93 Geisser, Vincent  36, 46, 749 Gellner, Ernest  568 Gem, Ismail  604 Gerin, André  33–4, 37, 43, 721, 729 Gest, Justin  329–30 al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid  447 Ghazy, Randa  295 Ghirighelli, B  293 Gilliat-Ray, Sophie  77, 92 Girardi, D  297 Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry  25, 30 Godard, B  637 Gogonas, N  370, 380 Gol, Jean  224–5 Goli, M  414 González Enríquez, C  330 Gorbachev, Mikhail  523 Gradaščević, Husein-kapetan  433 Graham, Bill  463 Grignard, Alain  249, 774 Gropas, R  364, 370 Gruev, Mihail  578 Guéant, Claude  38–9 Gülen, Fetullah  482–3, 577, 593, 604–5 Güngör, Derya  243 Guolo, R  282, 286, 292 Gustafsson, K  412 Habermas, Jürgen  763 Hadžibajrić, Fejzulah  449

809

810   NAMES INDEX Hafizović, Rešid  454 Hagherty, MJ  325 Haider, Jörg  664 Hajatpour, Reza  139 Hakimov, Raphael  537 Halilović, Safvet  448 Halliday, Fred  746 Hamed, Hajd  392 Hamid, S  89 Hamiti, Xhabir  495, 496 Handžić, Mehmed  454 Hanifa, Imam Abu  447 Harrow, M  790–1 Hasan ibn Ali  480 Hatziprokopiou, P  362, 366, 375, 377, 379–80, 382 Heinisch-Hosek, Gabriele  718–19 Hellmich, C  781 Helqvist, I  407 Hervik, P  413 Hewlett, Nick  44 Hirshi Ali, Ayaan  170–1, 200, 727–8 Hirschon, Renee  353 Hitler, Adolf  107 Hoare, Marko Attila  466 Hoffman, B  794 Hollande, François  44 Hollobone, Philip  718 Hopkins, P  633, 642 Horgan, J  778, 781–2, 795 Horsti, K  413 Hoxha, Enver  481 Huntington, Samuel  508, 757–8, 762 Husayn ibn Ali  480 Hüseyinoglu, A  353 Hussain, Dilwar  87 Hussian, M  413 Hussain, Serena  71 Ihle, Annette H  408 Imhoff, R  141–2 Immig, N  353 Introvigne, M  281 Ioannidou, N  359 Ipgrave, J  633, 642 Isov, Myumyun  588 Izetbegović, Alija  452

Jackson, R  794 Jacobsen, Brian Arly  395, 398, 408, 411 Jacobsen, CM  412 Janmaat, Hans  200 Jansen, Hans  199 Jawad, H  45 al-Jawziyya, Ibn Qayyim  447 Jeldtof, Nadia  267, 412 Jemal, Heydar  535, 547 Jensen, Peder (Fjordman)  416 Jensen, T  412 Jiménez-Aybar, I  317 John Paul II, pope  457 Joly, D  81–2 Jones, Terry  750 Jonker, Gerdien  125 Joppke, Christian  725 Jouili, Jeanette  108 Jover, José María   340 Jozsa, D-P  641 Kadare, Ismail  507 Kanmaz, Meryem  235, 239 Karadžić, Radovan  432 Karadžić, Vuk  432 Karčić, Fikret  435, 444, 454 Karić, Enes  444, 453–4 Karakasidou, A  356 Karlsson Minganti, P  412 Kassimeris, G  375, 378 Kathir, Ibn  447, 462 Katsikas, S  353 Kavazovic, Hussein  418 Kaya, Ayhan  9, 223 Kelek, Necla  657–8 Kendra (Kenza Drider)  45 Kenney, M  791–2 Kentel, Ferhat  233 Khaldun, Ibn  447 Khalid, Amr  447 Khatami, M  448 Khomeini, Ruhollah  225, 546 Khorchide, Mouhanad  139, 675 Khosrokhavar, F  787, 793 Kilcullen, DJ  786, 791 Klausen, Jytte  112, 693 Klinkhammer, Gritt  135 Koçi, Hafiz Sabri  481, 483

NAMES INDEX  

Koenig, Matthias  130, 624 Koutroubas, Theodoros  250 Krasniqi, Shefqet  494–5, 496 Kreienbrink, A  119 Kruschchev, Nikita  521, 523 Kühle, Lene  407–8, 412 Kunz, Rene  719 Kuppinger, Petra  128 Kurban, D  359 Kurdić, Šefik  448 Laborde, Cécile  723 Laitin, David  29, 749 Lakshman-Lepain, Rajwantee  480 Lambert, Robert  794 Lamghari, Younous  241 Larcher, Gérard  47 Larsson, G  405, 412, 413 Latas, Omer Pasha  433 Latrèche, Mohamed Ennacer  37 Laurence, J  34, 43, 631 Le Pen, Jean-Marie  25, 49 Le Pen, Marine  38, 47–8 Lechkar, Iman  247 Legert, Alfred C  445 Leggewie, Claus  140 Leghari, IU  378 Leirvik, O  398, 411 Lesthaeghe, Ron  242–3 Lettinge, Doutje  727 Leveau, R  44 Lewis, Philip  79 Lewis, Toni  704 Lia, B  784 Liengaard, I  412 Little, Kenneth  67 Ljevaković, Enes  455 Longman, Chia  242 López Barrios, F  325 López García, Bernabé  329 López-Sala, A  710 Ludin, Ferestha  716–17, 725 Lunkin, Roman  551 Luqman, S  371 Machelon, Jean-Pierre  41 MacMaster, Neil  704 Maddanu, S  296

811

Mahlmann, Matthias  717 Makariev, Plamen  593 Maleeq, Abou (Mamadou Cuspert/Deso Dogg) 663–4 al-Malik, Amir ‘And (Aleksei Pashintev)  547 Malik, Maleiha  746–7 Malm, A  413 Mamdani, M  45 Mancheva, M  576 Mantovan, C  284–5 Maréchal, Brigitte  36, 229, 246, 250, 589, 629 Marjani, Shihab al-Din  537 Markussen, HI  413 Marmouri, Amel  719–20 Marushkin, Oleg (Abu-Dhar)  550 Maroni, Roberto  282 Martens, Albert  224, 228, 229–31 Martín-Muñoz, G  710 Martini, Carlo Maria  292 Marx, Karl  532–3 Masood, Ahmad Shah  248 Maududi, Maulana  88–9 Maussen, Marcel  47–8, 625, 629–30, 632–3, 635–6, 652 Mavromatis, G  357 Máxima, princess (now queen) of Netherlands 175 Maxwell, Rahsaan  43 May, Theresa  717 Mazllami, Mazllam   496 McCauley, C  781, 794 McLoughlin, Seán  77, 89, 92 Medina, sheikh of  12 Meer, Nasar  749 Merah, Mohamed  47–8 Merkel, Angela  12, 656–7, 762–3 Michail, D  355 Miller, J  633, 642 Milošević, Slobodan  465, 487, 489 al-Misri, Imad  451 Mitsotakis, Konstantinos  358 Mitterand, François  39 Mladić, Ratko  466–7 Modood, Tariq  74, 749 Moe, Christian  439 Mohamad, Ben Ali  392 Moniquet, Claude  249 Moors, A  184

812   NAMES INDEX Moreras, J  324 Moroz, E  546 Moskalenko, S  781, 794 Moulaert, Frank  230 Moussalli, Ahmad  675 Moussaoui, Mohammed  34, 36–7, 39 Mucchielli, Laurent  48 Muckel, Stefan  129 Muhammad (the Prophet)  13, 81, 372, 379, 414, 416, 450–1, 457, 460–1, 658, 704, 753–4 Mullins, S  779, 790 Musa, Sanin  448 Muslim, Imam  447 Musliu, Osman  495–6 Mustafa, Mohamed Kamal  327 al-Mustansir, Muhammad I  392 Mutahhari, Morteza  448 Naik, Zakir  506 Naqshbandi-Mahmudi, Avar  540 al-Nasa’I, Imam  447 Naso, Paolo  281–2 Natvig, RJ  413 Al-Nawawi 447 Negri, A  292–3 Nesser, P  774, 778–9 Neumann, PR  791, 793 Niehaus, I  642–3 Nielsen, Jørgen  76–7 Njegos, Petar II Petrovic  432 al-Nur, Masjid  690–1 Nusri, Said  464–5 Obama, Barack  550 Offa, king of Mercia  67 O’Hagan, Andrew  747–8 Oktem, Kerem  577, 593, 602–4 Olsen, JA  792 Omar, Abu  298 Omel’chenko, Elena  528–9, 531 Oran, B  353 Orsi, Robert  45 Osmani, Mullah  496 Østberg, Sissel  412 Østergaard, K  412 Otterbeck, J 412. 413, 414, 416 Oubrou, Tareq  675

Ouis, P  412 Ozal, Turgut  604 Özsoy, Ömer  139 Pacini, A  282 Palaver, Wolfgang  600 Panafit, Lionel  237 Papadopoulou, Dora  381 Papagaroufali, E  370 Papanastasiou, A  380–1 Papantoniou, A  370 Pashintev, Aleksei (Amir ‘And al-Malik)  547 Payne, K  794 Paz, R  791 Pedain, Antje  724 Pedersen, Marianne Holm  408, 412 Pedziwiatr, Konrad  240, 244 Pérez-Agote Poveda, A  317 Perocco, F  275, 287 Peter, Frank  131–2, 141 Petronoti, M  370 Peucker, Mario  117, 120 Pezo, Adnan  451 Phalet, Karen  232 Pisanu, Giuseppe  282 Plant Contreras, Ana i  313, 338, 343 Podvorica, Armend  495 Pollack, Detlef  751 Purdam, K  86 Putin, Vladimir  517, 523–4, 534–5, 537, 539–40, 542¸ 547–8, 550–1 Qaddafi, Muammar  225 Qader, Abdel  295 Qadïrov, Ahmad  535, 551 Qadïrov, Ramzan  535 Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf  448 al-Qarni, ‘A’id  447 Quayle, E  780 Quilliam, Abdullah  68 Qursawi, Abd al-Nasir Abu’l-Nasr  537 al-Qurtubi, Abu Abdullah  447 Ragaru, Nadege  582 Ramadan, Tariq  36, 174, 188, 802 Ramić, Šukrija  455 Ranstorp, M  777, 780

NAMES INDEX  

Rasmussen, Poul Nyrup  399 Rath, J  628–30 Rau, Johannes  716 Rea, Andrea  241 Reagan, Ronald  759–60 Rechel, Bernd  597 Recker, J  141–2 Reetz, Dietrich  127 Reindfeldt, Frank  711 Rex, John  73–4 Rexhepi, Sulejman  488, 490 Rezaei, S  414 Rhazzali, Mohammed Khalid  290 Riccio, Bruno  273, 288 Richardson, Robin  746, 749 Roald, AS  412 Robin, Corey  759 Rohe, Mathias  8, 118, 632, 635 Ros, Ángel  720 Rose, Flemming  414 Rosenow-Williams, Kerstin  126–7 Roy, Olivier  403, 776–7, 786–8 Royal, Ségolène  44 Ruiz Vieytez, E  328 Rushdie, Salman  10, 47, 81–2, 84, 226, 786 al-Rusi, Haran (Vadim Sidorov)  546–7 Sabirova, Guzel  528–9, 531 Sachedina, Abdulaziz  675 Sachkova, Elena  573–4 Sagitova, Liliya  538–9 Saharso, Elisabeth  727–8 Said, Edward  45, 252, 413, 704, 747 Sa’id the Buryat (Aleksandr Tikhomirov)  547 Saint-Blancat, Chantal  268, 279, 284, 287 Sakaranaho, T  635, 637, 640 Salgado, O  326 Salih, R  273 Salvanou, E  375 Salvarini, B  281 Samouris, A  375, 378 Sander, Åke  396, 405, 412 Sapp, Wayne  754 Sarazzin, Thilo  600, 763 Sarkozy, Nicolas  33, 35–6, 44, 47, 49–50, 721, 762 Saroglou, Vassilis  252

Sartori, Giovanni  265, 274–5 Satarov, Fayz al-Rahman  517–18 Sauer, Birgit  705, 723–5 Sbai, Souad  719 Scaranari Introvigne, S  292 Schäuble, Wolfgang  131–2 Scheffer, Paul  231 Schiffauer, Werner  125, 127–8 Schiffer, Sabine  749 Schiller, Nina Glick  475 Schimmel, Annemarie  448 Schmidt, Garbi  144, 407–8, 412 Schmidt di Friedberg, Ottavia  268, 279, 284–5, 288 Schwarzer, Alice  657 Sciortino, G  268, 274–5 Seehofer, Horst  762 Selimoski, Jakub  491 Sells, Michael  431–2 Selmer, B  412 Semati, Mehdi  749, 759 Šeta, Djermana  448 Shadid, Wasif  640 Shaimiev, Mintimer  537, 539–40 Al-Shawkani, Muhammad  447 Shehu, Xhemali  484–5 Siddiqui, Ataullah  78–9 Siddiqui, Fayz  691–2 Sidorov, Vadim (Haran al-Rusi)  546–7 Silajdžić, Haris  452 Silke, A  770, 795 Silvestri, Sara  282, 284, 631, 638 Simonsen, JB  407, 412 Sinani, Avni  496 Sivanandan, Ambalavaner  746 Skoulariki, A  372, 375 Slootman, M  778, 793 Sloth, Line Vikkelsø  399 Smajić, Aid  461 Smajlović, Ahmed  449 Solzhenitsyn, Alexander  523 Soper, J Christopher  25, 624, 633 Sorabji, Cornelia  444 Speckhard, A  777, 786 Stalin, Josef  477, 521, 532, 554 Stasi, Bernard  32, 713–14 Stichs, A  119

813

814   NAMES INDEX Stoiber, Edmund  716 Straw, Jack  73, 708, 718, 725 Striegher, J–L  793 Sultan Sjöqvist, M  412 Sultanov, Kamil  546 Sultanov, Shamil  546 al-Suyuti, Jalal al-Din Svanberg, I  412 Szelenyi, Ivan  572 Tabatabai, Muhammad H  448 al-Tabligh, Jamaat  37 al-Tahawi 447 Tanaskovic, Darko  604 Tarrés, S  326–7, 339 Tatari, E  625, 630 Taylor, M  778, 780 Teofanov, Tzvetan  601 Teresa, Mother  503 Tërnava, Naim Tezcan, Levent  132, 143 Thielmann, Jörn  142–4 Tibi, Bassam  448, 802 Tikhomirov, Aleksandr (Sa’id the Buryat)  547 Tillie, M  778, 793 Al-Tirmidhi, Imam  447 Torrekens, Corinne  239 Touag, Hanifa  247 Trabelsi, Nizar  248 Triandafyllidou, A  275, 382 Tribalat, Michèle  764 Trubeta, S  382 Tsitselikis, K  357, 359, 372–3 Turajanzada, Ishan Nur al-Din Jan  526 Ukaj, Arid  508 ‘Umarov, Ayyub  549–50 Umarov, Dokku  543 Umm Obeyda (Malika El Aroud)  248 Vaisse, J  34, 43 Valfort, Marie-Anne  29 Van Amerongen, Arthur  249 Van den Branden, Stef  244–5 van Gogh, Theo  10, 108–9, 165–6, 173, 192, 196, 747, 779 van Koningsveld, Peter  640 Van Robaeys, Bea  230

Van San, Marion  232 Vandermeersch, Anke  248 Vanderwaeren, Els  244 Verbeke, Wim  245 Vercellin, G  265 Verdonk, Rita  721 Verhagen, Maxime  721 Vernet, Juan  340 Vertovec, Steven  749 Vidino, L  770, 786, 793–4 Vilks, Lars  416 Villiers, Philippe de  50 Vincentini, A  284 Vogt, Kari  398, 411, 412 Vrielink, Jogchum  242 Wadud, Amina  675 Wagner, Constantin  749 Wahab, Muhammed Ibn Abdel  13 Wanche, SI  380 Warsi, Saeeda  86 Weber, Beverly  716 Werbner, Pnina  68, 76, 81, 87–8, 90, 749 Wesley, R  781–2 Westerlund, D  412 Wetzels, P  133 Widmer-Schlumpf, Eveline  719 Wiegers, Gerard  91 Wihtol de Wenden, C  44 Wiktorowicz, Quintan  776, 782, 784 Wilders, Geert  197, 199–201, 706, 720–1, 762 Williams, Rowan  7, 85, 627, 656, 718 Wilner, AS  783 Wimmer, Andreas  475 Winter, Bronwyn  727 Winter, TJ  89–90 Wulff, Christian  656–7, 750 Ya’qupov, Wali-Allah  517–18, 540, 548 Yeltsin, Boris  517, 528, 544 Yiakoumaki, V  358 Zanfrini, L  297 Zatti, G  292 Zayd, Nasr Hamid Abu  448 Zibouh, Fatima  238 Zilio-Grandi, I  293 Zoccatelli, PL  281

Subject Index

Abdullah Quilliam Society 68 accommodation education and schools  640–3 family law  684 institutions/organizations  620, 630, 635 radicalism/radicalization 637 shariah law  694–6 acculturation  3, 16, 635, 802 Afghanistan burqas  704 n. 3 corporal punishment and stoning  7 dower 684 jihadis 773–4 mujahideen  517, 773, 789 Pakistan 791 Ahmadiyya movements  107, 108 n.2, 125–7, 140, 319, 377, 393, 407–8, 418 Aid el-Kebir festival  282, 638 Al-Qaeda  47, 250, 509 foreign occupation  779, 784 Internet 791 Islamophobia  759, 764 Madrid bombings  2004 779 motivation to join, reasons for  785, 788 propaganda 784 radicalism/radicalization  773, 775–6, 779, 781, 784, 788, 791, 793–4 Salafism 781 social movement, as  776 training 791 transnationalism 776 Albâch 48 Albanian Muslims 475–511 see also Kosovo; Macedonia agreements between states and religious communities 499 Albanian Democratic Party  491 atheist state, as  477

Balkan wars  477 believing, behaving, and belonging  477–84, 492–4 Bektashi  480–2, 485, 490, 499–501 BRDIA 484–5 Catholic Church  477–80, 482–3, 486, 488, 499, 501–3, 510 census data  480 clash of civilizations  477, 506–7, 508 Christianity and Christians  478–83, 506 Catholic Church  477–80, 482–3, 486, 488, 499, 501–3, 510 persecution 477 Protestantism  483, 499 communism  476–8, 481–3, 486, 492–4, 498–9, 502, 506–7, 509–10 Constitution  499, 502 conversions, forced  478 culture and cultural heritage  478–80, 484, 487, 494, 497, 502, 508, 510–11 democracy and democratic principles  477, 492, 507 demographics 478 diaspora  475, 491, 496 discrimination and equal treatment  485, 493–4, 496–7 gender relations/women  492, 496–7 Islamophobia  477, 496, 507–8 diversity  477, 478–87 education and schools foreign donors and influence  498 higher education  482, 498, 500 public schools  500, 504, 510 radicalism/radicalization 482–3 religious education  482–3, 491, 494, 497–8, 500, 503, 506 segregation 498 employment  497, 500

816   SUBJECT INDEX Albanian Muslims (Cont.) equality amongst religions  480, 499 ethno-nationalism  476, 478 European Union  507 Evangelical Brotherhood of Albania (VUSH) 499 forced migration  478 foreign donors and influences  482–3, 487, 491, 496, 498, 506, 509–10, 603 freedom of religion  480, 499 gender relations/women  492, 496–7 generational differences  494, 509 government policy  492, 499 Greece  477–9, 480–1 Gülen movement  482–3 Hanafi school  483 hijab/headscarves  488, 496, 497, 603 history/historical perspective  2, 4, 476–91, 508–11 identity  476, 478–9, 481, 490, 499, 507–8, 510 imams, Muftis and clerics foreign donors and influence  483 Grand Mufti  481 radicalism/radicalization 495 training  483, 500 immigration/migrants  478, 480–1, 502 institutions/organizations  480, 483–6, 490, 493, 495–502, 507, 509, 634 international constraints  506–9 Internet  496–7, 506 Islamic schools  500, 503 Islamophobia  477, 496, 507–8 Italy  268–9, 272, 291, 481 Jews/Judaism  501, 506 labour migrants/guest workers  481 languages  476, 482, 492 legal status  499–502 majority Muslim population  2, 4, 475, 477, 486, 489, 503 media  476–7, 492, 506–8 minorities in other countries, Albanian Muslims as  475, 477 mixed communities  479 moderates  488, 491 Montenegro  475, 485 mosques

building/establishment  487, 501, 502, 506, 508 mosque war  495 radicalism/radicalization 491 Salafism 495–6 Muslim Community of Albania (MCA)  481–3, 499–500, 502, 507 national identity  507–8 nationalism  475–6, 478, 485, 489–90 nationalization of religion  480 naturalization 475 neutrality of state  499, 509 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 502 Orthodox Church  478–82, 489, 499 Ottoman Empire  476–7, 478–80, 492, 506–7, 509, 569 persecution by state  477–8, 479 n.3, 481, 485 political identity  476, 507 political participation/representation  491, 498 population shifts  481 prayers 488 propaganda and promotion  506 Protestantism  483, 499 publications  483–4, 487–8, 506 public sphere/visibility  493, 498–506, 508 race and ethnicity  476–7, 478–9, 484–5, 489, 491–2, 496, 499, 510 radicalism/radicalization  482–3, 491–2, 495–6, 506, 508–10 recognition  480, 499 registration or licensing  499–500 religious authorities  483–4, 486–8, 496, 508–9 religious education  482–3, 491, 494, 497–8, 500, 503, 506 religious identity  478, 481, 499, 507–8, 510 religiosity  480, 492–4 repatriation after WW1  479 representative bodies  500 restitution of religious property  501, 502 revival of religion  482, 492–4, 498–9 rituals, festivals and holidays  488 role of religion in society  502–6 rural areas  485, 494, 497–8, 503, 506

SUBJECT INDEX  

Salafism  480 n. 4, 483–4, 487–8, 491, 494–8, 510, 603 Saudi Arabia  478, 482–3, 488, 497, 506, 603 scholarship  476–84, 487, 499, 507 Second World War  480–1 secularism/secularization  480, 492, 497, 499, 500, 502, 508–9 sectarianism  476, 479–80, 487, 499, 502, 509–10 security/securitization 477 segregation  477, 496–8 September 2011, terrorist attacks on United States  477, 493–4, 506–8, 510 Serbia  475, 489–90 shariah law  501–2 Shi’a Muslims  478, 506 social dynamics  492–8 social media  496–7, 506 socio-economic status  477, 492, 494 Sufism  478, 480–1, 483–8, 490, 494 Sunni Muslims  480–2, 484–6, 490, 506 theology  483–4, 488, 492 traditionalists/conservatives  482, 488, 494–8, 508–11 traditions, competing  482 transnationalism 508–9 Turkey  478, 480, 482, 495 uniqueness of Islam among Albanians 478–9 war on terror  477 youth  481, 494–5, 507 Yugoslavia  476–9, 484–6, 490, 496, 498–9, 501, 509–10 Alevis  115–17, 122–3, 574–5, 590, 592, 603–4 Alevitische Community Germany (AABF) 125 Algeria Algerian Islamic Salvation Front  48 Algerian War  24, 29–30, 47 France  24, 26–7, 29–30, 37, 39, 47, 625, 681, 704 radicalism/radicalization  47–8, 773, 786 Spain  315–16, 330, 336, 341 terrorism 47 Alids 393 Al-Qaeda  509, 759, 770, 773, 775–7, 781, 784, 788, 791, 793–4

817

anti-Islamic attitudes  see Islamophobia anti-Semitism  127, 201, 747 n.3, 750 Arab Spring  268, 540, 584 Armed Islamic Group (GIA)  47–8, 773 assimilation 4–6 Euro-Islam 804 hijab/headscarves 729 institutions/organizations  620, 630, 635 Islamophobia 653 radicalism/radicalization 782–3 asylum seekers  4, 9, 363, 786 Austria Austro-Hungary  429–30, 433, 436, 440–1 Catholicism 725 citizenship  706, 756 education and schools  641, 644, 662, 705–6, 724–5 freedom of religion  706 full-face covering  718–19 halal/religious slaughter  644 hijab/headscarves  705–6, 718–19, 723–4 immigration/migrants 706 Islamic Religious Community  641 Islamophobia 757 language 662 mosques, building/establishment of  639, 644 naturalization 723 neutrality 669 public opinion/perceptions  661–2 recognition 644 religious education  641, 644 representative bodies  644 right-wing populist parties  662, 706, 725 security/securitization 718–19 shariah law  662, 664, 669, 680, 694 Sunni Muslims  641 talaq, recognition of  680 Turks 661–2 xenophobia and racism  706 Austro-Hungary  429–30, 433, 436, 440–1 Avars  523, 541 ‘Axis of Evil’  758, 760 bad Islam and good Islam, distinction between 803 Balkan wars  429, 434, 438, 445–8, 450–2, 461–8

818   SUBJECT INDEX Barelvi movement  88, 377 Bashkortostan  520, 524, 543, 552 Bektashi mystical order  356, 480–2, 485, 490, 499–501, 574–5, 590, 592, 603 Belgium 222–54 accommodation 240–2 Al Qaeda  250 allochthons, Muslims as  228 assimilation  228, 233 attachment to countries of origin  225 believing, behaving, and belonging  242–6, 253 Brussels  222, 238, 243 burquas  242, 721 Catholics 235–6 chaplains 235 Christianity and Christians  235–6, 244 citizenship  223, 225, 229, 240, 253 civil and political actors, Muslims as 238–40 comparative approach  239, 243 crime 232 culture and cultural heritage  228, 231–4, 243, 253 democracy and democratic principles  241, 250 demographics  222, 224, 238–9 demonstrations and protests  225–6, 247–8, 249–50 discrimination and equality  233, 241, 253 gender relations/women  240–2, 244, 246, 248, 251–2 Islamophobia  223, 251–3 xenophobia and racism  233, 248, 251 diversity 241 dual identity  234 education and schools  229, 231–2, 238, 251, 640, 642 higher education  230–1 hijab/headscarves  251, 714–15 public schools  235–6, 715 religious education  235, 243, 640–1, 644 segregation 231 symbols 234 employment  224–5, 230–1, 234, 241–2, 252 Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism (CEOOR)  227

euthanasia and process of dying  244–5 Executive of Muslims of Belgium (EMB) 236–7 family law  240–1 family reunification  224 fear, emergence of expertise of  248–9 Flemings/Flanders hijab/headscarves 714 integration  226, 234, 253 Islamophobia 251 language  223, 234 mosques 235 pluralism  714, 723 political parties  226–7 regional fractures  223, 235 Francophones/Wallonia  222–3, 225–8, 238, 249–50, 252–3 hijab/headscarves 714 integration 226 mosques 235 regional fractures  223, 235 freedom of religion  235, 252, 671, 715 funding  235, 237 gender relations/women  240–2, 244, 246, 248, 251–2 generational differences  230, 233–4, 239, 243–6 government policy  224, 226–7, 231–2, 236–7, 241, 253 halal/religious slaughter  228, 245, 644 healing practices  247 health and healthcare  235, 245 hijab/headscarves  226, 229, 233, 240, 705, 714–15, 723 ban  241–2, 669, 671, 705, 714–15, 721 burquas  242, 721 education and schools  251 employment 252 full-face covering  242, 671, 721 Islamophobia 252 niqabs  671, 721 public opinion/perceptions  714–15 public space/visibility  721 security/securitization  721, 729 shariah law  669, 670–1, 694 symbols, ban on conspicuous religious 715

SUBJECT INDEX  

historical perspectives  223–7 homosexuality 248 identity  225, 233–4, 238, 240, 243–7, 251 ijtihad 244 imams, Muftis and clerics  235, 249 immigration/migrants  224–8, 231–2, 251–2 individuals and individualization  229, 242–5, 253 institutions/organizations  6, 223, 234–42, 246–53, 634 integration  223, 226–34, 237–9, 253–4 international context  247–51 Internet 248 interventionism 237–8 Islamic Cultural Centre (ICC)  225–6, 237 Islamophobia  223, 251–3 language  222–3, 225–6, 234–5 legal aspects  240–2 marriage and divorce  244, 252, 681 media  222, 225–6, 234–5, 238, 248–50 moderates  226, 232 Moroccans  224–5, 230–4, 238, 240, 242–9 mosques 242–3 building/establishment  639, 644 funding  235, 237 number 235 public sphere  238–9 multiculturalism  231–2, 241 musical genres  247 Muslim Brotherhood  246–7 nationalist reforms of state apparatus  226 nationality identity  234 naturalization 230 neutrality model  234, 237, 241, 253 niqabs  671, 721 Other, Muslims as ethnic and religious  227–9, 252 personal law  240–1 pillarization, principle of  235 pluralism 241–2 political participation/representation  223, 226–8, 235, 237–40, 250–1 polygamy 681–2 poverty 229–30 prisoners  235–6, 248 Protestantism 235 public opinion/perceptions  222, 714–15

819

public space/visibility  222, 223–4, 228–9, 233–4, 238–40, 721 publications 248–9 race and ethnicity  227–33, 236, 238, 243, 252–3 radicalism/radicalization  223, 225–9, 237, 247–52, 622 Ramadan  236, 241, 243 recognition  224, 226, 233–8, 644 regional fractures  223, 235 religious education  235, 243, 640–1, 644 religious identity  225, 238, 240, 243–7, 251 religiosity  232–3, 242–6, 253 renewed engagements with Muslim tradition, examining  246–7 representative bodies  6, 226–7, 229, 236–9, 253, 644 residential pattern  222 return  224, 233 right-wing populist parties  226–7, 251, 662 Salafism 246–7 Saudi Arabia  225, 236 scholarship  222–4, 227–8, 232, 234, 238, 240, 244, 246, 252–4 secularism/secularization  223–5, 228–9, 242–5, 250, 253–4 security/securitization  222, 249, 721, 729 separation of church and state  235, 244 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on United States  222, 248 shariah law  240–1, 656, 662, 681–2 Shi’a Muslims  247 socio-economic status  223–4, 228–34, 253 state and religion relations  234–5 stereotyping 252 Sunni Muslims  244, 247 symbols, ban on conspicuous religious  234, 715 terrorism 222 theology  236, 244–5 traditionalists/conservatives  239, 244 transnationalism 225 Turks  224–5, 230–1, 233–4, 238, 242–4 unemployment 229–30 xenophobia and racism  233, 248, 251 youth  232–3, 238–40, 244, 246 Bektashi  356, 480–2, 485, 490, 499–501, 574–5, 590, 592, 603–4

820   SUBJECT INDEX believing, behaving, and belonging 11–12 see also religiosity Beth Din 85 Beurs movement  24–5, 30, 34, 44 Bosnia and Herzegovina 429–69 abroad, studying  444, 446, 452, 453, 459 Active Islamic Youth (AIY)  451 aid 461–2 arms  461–2, 463 associationism  457, 459 Austro-Hungarian rule  429–30, 433, 436, 440–1 Balkan wars  429, 434, 438, 445–8, 450–2, 461–8 believing, behaving, and belonging  430, 444–65 Bogumils 431 Bosniaks  429–31, 433–41, 451, 465–9, 477 burial and cemeteries  455, 457, 458 Catholics and Catholic Church  431–2, 437, 457 census data  468, 469 chaplains 437 Chetniks (extremists)  434 Christianity and Christians  431–2, 437, 457, 463 communism  429–30, 434–5, 444, 446–8, 453, 465 concerts, organization of  449 conversion  430–2, 448, 464 Croatia/Croats  430, 432–4, 438, 442, 451, 465–7 culture and cultural heritage  432, 436, 439, 458, 462–4, 467, 469 Dayton Peace Accords  429, 452, 467 democracy and democratic principles  437, 452 demographics  429, 469 desecularization 444 diaspora 469 discrimination and equal treatment  430, 437, 448, 452, 468, 496 gender relations/women  448–51, 455, 456, 687 Islamophobia  430, 496 donors  446–8, 450–53 education and schools  440–4, 469

abroad, studying  444, 446, 452, 453, 459 Faculty of Islamic Studies  442, 444, 446, 455–7, 459 foreign donors and influence  446 Gazi Husrev Bey Madarasah  442, 444, 446, 456 gender relations/women  456 higher  438, 444, 446, 458–9 hijab/headscarves 456 Iran 463–4 public schools  437, 446, 459 religious education  436, 441–2, 444–6, 448, 452, 459 Saudi Arabia  462–3 Turkey 464–5 employment  456, 458–9 ethnic cleansing  430, 433, 466–9 Euro-Islam 439 European Union  430 Faculty of Islamic Studies  442, 444, 446, 455–7, 459 family law  438, 448–9, 456, 460 fatwas  443, 453–5, 457–9 foreign donors and influence  418, 444–8, 450–2, 459–65, 469, 603 freedom of religion  437, 445 Gazi Husrev Bey Madarasah  442, 444, 446, 456 gender relations/women  448–51, 455, 456, 687 Kewser organization  450–1 Nahla organization  450 representative bodies  450–1 generational differences  438, 444, 454, 456 genocide  430, 433, 466–9 Germany  105–6, 687 government policy  429, 477–8 Grand Mufti  418, 440, 442–3, 485 Hanafi school  435, 441, 451 health and healthcare  437, 435 hijab/headscarves  444, 448, 456, 603 history/historical perspective  2, 4, 429–49, 453–4, 465–9 historiography 430–2 identity national  429, 434, 439, 444, 468–9 religious  429, 431, 439

SUBJECT INDEX  

ijtihad 435 imams, Muftis and clerics  440–3 appointment 440 education and schools  459 foreign donors and influence  418, 459 Grand Mufti  418, 440, 442–3, 485 Islamic Community (IC)  441–2, 459 organization 441–3 revival 452 training  440, 443, 446, 459 independence 465 indigenous Muslim community  429 institutions/organizations  429–30, 432, 436, 440–6, 449–52, 455–6, 634 International Court of Justice  467 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)  465 n. 135, 466–7 Internet 469 interpretation  439, 446–8, 451, 453–4, 459 inter-religious relations  455, 456–8 Iran 463–4 Islamic Community (IC)  436–60, 463–4 Islamized pre-Islamic Bosnian culture  435 Islamophobia  430, 496 Jews/Judaism  434, 457 Kosovo  432, 445, 448–9, 460, 483 language  432, 436, 447–8, 452, 459, 462, 464–5 Law on Freedom of Religion and the Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities 437 main characteristics of Bosnian Islam 436–40 majority Muslim population  2, 4, 430, 452 marriage and divorce  438, 448–9, 456 Maturidi, Sunni Islam tradition of  435 media  444–5, 461, 465, 468 mektebs 445–6 minority, as part of  429 modernity  430, 432–4, 439 mosques  457–8, 460–1 building/establishment/ reconstruction  444–7, 450, 457, 461, 462–3, 468 destruction  436, 442, 446–7, 465, 468 operation  440, 443

821

mystical Islam, attitudes to  455, 458–9 national identity  429, 434, 439, 444, 468–9 nationalism 433 niqabs  448, 456 Orthodox Church  431–2, 437, 468 Ottoman Empire  429–35, 440, 467, 569 personal law  438, 448–9, 456, 460 pluralism  438–9, 448 political participation/representation  461 popular Islam, attitudes to  455, 458–9 prayers  435, 443, 457–9, 461 prisoners  431, 436, 467 public opinion/perceptions  440, 455 public sphere/visibility  435, 444, 446, 449–50 publications  443, 445–9, 453–4, 462–5 Qurʾan  441, 460–1, 462–4 interpretation  446, 448, 453–4 recitation  449, 458, 461 radicalization  438–40, 443–5, 451–2, 773 reformism 435–6 refugees and displaced persons  4, 105–6, 429, 434, 462–4, 467 reintegration into wider Muslim community 435–6 religious authorities  436, 447, 453–9, 485–6 religious education  436, 441–2, 444–6, 448, 452, 459 religious identity  429, 431, 439 religious revival  430, 444–65 religiosity  430, 444, 460–1 representative bodies  429–30, 449–52, 460 revival of religion  444–5, 451–2 rituals, festivals and holidays  432, 435, 437, 441, 457–8, 460–1 Saff  451, 455–8 Salafism  438–40, 445, 447–8, 451–2, 454–9, 462–5, 603 Saudi Arabia  438, 446–7, 462–3, 603 scholarship  431, 434–6, 443, 447–9, 453–8, 464, 468–9 alternative and mainstream, difference between 455–8 growth of mainstream  453–5 revival 447–9 Second World War  429, 434, 453 secularism  436, 439–40, 444, 446

822   SUBJECT INDEX Bosnia and Herzegovina (Cont.) security  440, 445, 453, 469 separation of church and state  437–8 September 2011, terrorist attacks on United States  430, 451, 452, 463, 469 Serbia/Serbs  430–4, 437–8, 442, 451, 465–7 shariah courts  436, 437–8, 460 shariah law  436–9, 448–9, 456, 460, 464 Shi’a Muslims  448, 450, 454, 458–9, 464 socio-economic status  431, 469 Srebrenica massacre  466 Srpska, Republic of  437, 442, 447, 466–8 state-religion relations  437 stereotyping 448 Sufis  434–6, 438–9, 443, 445, 448–50, 452, 454, 457–9, 464 Sunni Muslims  435, 448, 451–2 symbols 444 tariqas  449–50, 460 terrorism and violence  439–40, 451, 468 theology  434–5, 438–9, 450–4, 459, 464, 469 traditionalists/conservatives  433–6, 438, 442, 445–51, 454, 459–61 transnationalism 443 Turks/Turkey  464–5, 604 Ustasha (Croat extremists)  434 war crimes  434, 438 n.35, 465, 467 youth  449, 451, 456 Yugoslavia as part of  429, 434, 437, 440, 444, 446, 465 dissolution  429–30, 435, 436, 464, 465–8 liberalization 453 Britain  see United Kingdom Bulgaria  4, 565–606 abroad, studying  593–4, 602–3 age  576–7, 591–2 assimilation  575, 580, 596–7 Alevi/Kizilbashi/Bektashi  574–5, 590, 592, 603–4 Ataka nationalist party  600–2 believing, behaving, and belonging  594–6 Bulgarian Turks for the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF)  576 burial and cemeteries  578, 588 Catholics  569, 594 census data  570–1, 577, 579, 583

Chief Mufti  589–92, 592–3, 602 Christianity and Christians  566–9, 576–9, 588, 594–5, 597, 600–1, 605 Catholics  569, 594 Orthodox Church  568–9, 579, 589–90 Protestants  569, 578–80, 594, 597 citizenship 576 communism  565–6, 572, 580–2, 592, 594–8 comparative approach  584, 589, 593–4 constitutions  575, 589–90 culture and cultural heritage  4, 566–9, 575–7, 581, 587–9, 605 demographics  569–73, 605–6 demonstrations and protests  600–1 Denominations Act  590 diaspora 604 discrimination and equal treatment  572, 575, 581, 586, 589, 600 gender relations/women  576, 581–6, 595–7 Islamophobia  566, 567, 569, 599–605 Eastern Orthodox Church  568–9, 579, 589–90 economic migration  572 education and schools  568, 572–4, 582–3, 585–8 abroad, studying  593–4, 602–3 curriculum, debates on inclusion of study of religion in  594 foreign donors and influence  593, 602–3, 605 gender relations/women  596 higher education  565, 583, 593–4 illiteracy 572–3 imams, Muftis and clerics  592–3 immigration/migrants  573–4, 606 languages 592 mosques 592–3 Pomaks 579 poverty 572–3 religious education  589, 592–4 Roma  572–3, 580 textbooks 592–3 Turks 577 employment  572, 576, 581–2, 585–6, 596, 606 European Muslims  576

SUBJECT INDEX  

European Union  4, 584 Fethullahci 580 forced resettlement  581 foreign donors and influence  566, 599–605 freedom of religion  567–8, 575 fundamentalism  600, 602 gender relations/women  576, 581–6, 595–7, 603 generational differences  576–7, 579, 591, 593–4, 602 government policy  573–4, 583, 587, 597–8, 605 Greece  354–5, 358–9, 686 Gülen movement  577, 593 Hanafi school  590, 603 health and healthcare  572, 585 High Islamic Institute (HII)  593–4 hijab/headscarves 603 historiography 568–9 history/historical perspective  2, 567–9, 588, 597 human rights  575, 583, 585, 598, 600 identity  568, 576–80, 587, 595, 597, 601, 605 illiteracy 572–3 imams, Muftis and clerics abroad, studying  594, 602–3 age 591–2 Chief Mufti  589–92, 592–3, 602 education and schools  592–3 legal status  589 literature, certification of  595 number of imams  591–2 radicalism/radicalization  579, 594, 600–2, 604 Salafism  579, 594, 596, 604 Thrace, Muftis in  359 training 591–2 immigration/migrants  4, 567, 569, 572–4, 580–7, 591, 599, 604–6 education and schools  573–4, 606 emigration 580–3 gender relations/women  597 illegal  584, 606 immigrants in Bulgaria  582–7 new migrants  567 religiosity 595–6 traditionalism/conservatism 597

823

Turkey, to  576 institutions/organizations  565–6, 583, 586–7, 598, 604–6 integration  573–4, 581, 587, 596, 598 interpretation  569, 589, 595 Islamic schools  592–4 Islamophobia  566, 567, 569, 599–605 Jews/Judaism  574, 597–8 Kurds 576 labour migrants/guest workers  576, 581–2, 606 language  576, 577, 579, 581, 585–6, 589, 592 legal status  589–92 marriage and divorce  582, 583–4, 588, 596 masculinity 596 media  587, 599–602, 604–5 millet system under Ottoman Empire  568 mixed marriages  582, 583–4, 588, 596 moderates 569 mosques  579, 589, 594–6 building/establishment  592, 594–5, 600 demonstrations and protests  600–1 education 592–3 gender relations/women  596–7 Turks 577 Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF)  576, 595, 597–9 multiculturalism  574, 600–1 Muslim Conferences  591 National Conference  590 national identity  568 national victimization  569 nationalism 599–602 neo-Ottoman doctrine  602, 604 number of Muslims  572, 583 Nursi activists  573, 580 organizational structure  590–2 Orthodox Church  568–9, 579, 589–90 Ottoman Empire  566–9, 575, 578, 588, 601–5 political participation/representation  566, 576, 594–602, 604 polygamy 603 Pomaks (Muslim Bulgarians)  477, 568–9, 577–9, 594–7, 600, 602, 605 poverty 572–3 prayers 579

824   SUBJECT INDEX Bulgaria (Cont.) Protestants  569, 578–80, 597 public opinion/perceptions  579, 586–7, 590, 594, 598–600 public sphere/visibility  566–7, 587–97 publications  588–9, 595, 599–602, 604–5 Qurʾan  578, 591–3 race and ethnicity  567, 569, 572, 574–88, 597–9, 605 radicalism/radicalization  567, 569, 579, 594–5, 599–605 Ramadan 578 refugees  567, 569, 572–4, 581, 583–5 regions 567 registration 590 religious authorities  598 religious education  589, 592–4 religious identity  576–80, 595, 597, 605 religiosity  578–9, 581, 585–6, 594–6 representative bodies  595 repression  580, 605 resettlement, forced  581 residence patterns  583–4 restitution of property  592 return 581 rituals, festivals and holidays  574–5, 578–9, 586–8, 592, 594–6, 602–3 Roma  569, 572–3, 579–82, 586, 597–8, 603, 605 Salafis  573, 579–80, 594–6, 601–4 Saudi Arabia  579, 602–3 Schengen criteria  584 scholarship  565–9, 588–9, 594, 597, 605 secularism/secularization  576–7, 581, 595, 598, 604 security services  579, 598, 601 segregation  573, 580, 601 Senior Muslim Council (SMC)  591 September 2011, terrorist attacks on United States  567, 599–605 shariah courts  568 Shi’a Muslims  572 socio-economic status  569, 572, 580–2 state subsidy  592 stereotyping  556–8, 573–5, 586, 588, 601 Suleymanists 580 Sunni Muslims  572, 574–5, 590, 603

tekkes and turbes 592 terrorism and violence  600 theology  567, 592, 595 Thrace, Muftis in  359 traditionalism/conservatism  567–8, 577, 586–7, 590–7, 599, 602–4 transnationalism  581–2, 605 Turks/Turkey  569, 573, 574–82, 587–99, 602–5 unemployment  572, 581, 596 xenophobia and racism  599–601 youth 576–7 burqas  702, 705, 710, 717–22, 729–30, 757 Canada  190, 241, 582, 751 Catholics  3, 6, 626, 634–5, 637, 640–3 Ceuta and Melilla  313, 327, 332, 338 chadors  703–4, 758 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 701 Chechnya  534–6, 540–2 Black Widows  777 combat jamaats  774 diaspora 555 discrimination 526 elections 542 public opinion/perceptions  551–2 radicalism/radicalization  535–6, 541–2, 549, 551, 772–5, 789 Salafism 536 separatism  519, 536, 772 solidarity structures  540 suicide bombers  546 n. 72, 777 wars  520, 529, 534, 536, 540, 548–9, 552–5 children, protection of 678 China  518, 543, 545 Christianity and Christians  11, 620, 631–2 see also Catholics Circassia  529, 554 citizenship citizen and Muslim, being a  11–12 culture and cultural heritage  5 Euro-Islam 804 hijab/headscarves 722–4 institutions/organizations  630, 638, 642 ‘Islamic problem’  5 clash of civilizations  745, 757–8, 762, 764

SUBJECT INDEX  

civil law  671–2, 677–86, 693–4, 695 Cold War  358, 477, 519, 521, 760 colonialism  79 n.13, 223, 636, 704–5, 773 see also postcolonialism commercial disputes, ADR in 694 communist era  3–4, 5, 532, 666 communitarianism  9, 723, 787 comparative approach  2, 5, 9, 634–43 hijab/headscarves 729–30 institutions/organizations  620, 625, 629, 633–52 tables 644–51 types of comparison  643–52 conception of religion  see definition of Islam and Islamic conception of religion conflict of laws  190, 321, 629–30, 677–82, 695 Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (CFCM)  34–6, 37, 39, 41, 47–8 conservatives  see traditionalists/ conservatives Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 372 converts  669–70, 710–11, 730, 764, 771, 773–4, 788, 790 corporal punishment  7, 659, 663 Council of Europe (CoE)  518, 624, 748 Crimean War 517 criminal law  7–8, 672–4, 677, 691 criminology  105–6, 109, 133, 775, 777, 780 Croatia/Croats  430, 432–4, 438, 442, 451, 465–7, 499 Crusades 745–6 culture and cultural heritage acculturation  3, 16, 635, 802 believing, behaving, and belonging  11–12 citizenship  4, 5 culturally sentimental Muslims  10 discrimination and equality  805 diversity  702, 722–4, 729, 803–4 education and schools  724 Euro-Islam 802–4 family law  688–9 hijab/headscarves  702–3, 717, 722–3, 729 identity  8, 793, 803 institutions/organizations  620–2, 624–7, 632, 634-5, 638, 643 Islamophobia 756

825

judges and administrations, sensitivity of 696 marriage and divorce  690 race and ethnicity  747 radicalism/radicalization  775–7, 782, 785–90 security/securitization 3 shariah law  8, 676, 688–90 values, rejection of European  717 Western superiority  753, 757, 759–65 Cyprus  358, 529 Da’awat-e Islami  127, 378 Dagestan  521–4, 526, 529, 531, 535–6, 540–7, 552–4 Danish Cartoon controversy  189, 753–4 demonstrations and riots  414, 754 freedom of expression  1, 342, 414, 753 Greece 362 Islamophobia  84, 753 Jyllands-Posten  414, 416, 753–4 Norway 416 public opinion/perceptions  10, 334, 416 radicalism/radicalization  774, 779 Sweden 411 terrorism 754 Darqawa tariqa 324–5 Dayton Peace Accords  429, 452, 467 defensive Muslims 10 definition of Islam and Islamic conception of religion 9–16 believing, behaving, and belonging  11–12 citizen and Muslim, being a  11–12 identity building  11–12 Muslim, definition of  10 public opinion/perceptions  10 religiosity of individuals  10–13, 15 Salafism, growth of influence of global 12–16 social media  10, 15 transnationalism  10, 12 democracy and democratic values Euro-Islam 802 individuals and individualization  624 institutions/organizations  622, 633, 636, 642 radicalism/radicalization 793 shariah law  663, 668–9, 696

826   SUBJECT INDEX Denmark  see also Danish Cartoon controversy assimilation 399–400 asylum seekers and refugees  394 Catholics 402 census data  392 Christianity and Christians  400, 402 citizenship  400, 757 citizenship test  757 converts 395 Copenhagen  400–1, 403, 407–8 crime 404 culture and cultural heritage  403, 409, 414 Danish People’s Party (DPP)  399–400 demographics 403–4 discrimination and equality  393, 400, 404, 413–14, 750–1, 753, 763 dower 684 education and schools  404, 407–8, 645 employment 404 family reunification  394, 400 freedom of expression  414 government policy  413–14 halal/religious slaughter  409, 645 hijab/headscarves  400, 404 historical perspective  392 identity  403, 408 immigration/migrants  392, 394–5, 402–4, 413–14 institutions/organizations 407 integration  403, 409–10 international constraints  413–14 Internet  409, 416 Jews/Judaism 408 Islamophobia  393, 400, 414, 750–1, 753, 763 language 404 marriage and divorce  684, 690 media 407–8 mosques, building/establishment of  393, 407–8, 645 national identity  408 number of Muslims  395 Pakistanis  391, 393–5 parliamentary debates  408 public opinion/perceptions  400, 408–9, 413 public space/visibility  407–9

radicalism/radicalization 414 recognition 645 religious education  645 religious identity  403 religiosity 402–3 representative bodies  407, 645 right-wing populist parties  399–400, 662 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on United States  413 shariah law  662, 690 Shi’a Muslims  407–8 socio-economic status  403–4 Sunni Muslims  407 terrorism 413–14 youth  402–3, 407–8 Deobandi ‘school of thought’  79–80, 88, 90, 377, 393 see also Tablighi movement diaspora  775, 787–8 discrimination and equality  see also gender relations/women; Islamophobia; xenophobia and racism culture and cultural heritage  805 double discrimination729 education and schools  637 employment  755, 763 European Convention on Human Rights 624 hijab/headscarves  708, 729 institutions/organizations 624 radicalism/radicalization  6, 622 rituals, festivals and holidays  84 shariah law  658–9, 663, 667–8 stereotyping  708, 754, 765, 780 underclass 5 diversity culture and cultural heritage  702, 722–3, 729, 803–4 Euro-Islam 803–4 family law  8 institutions/organizations  622, 627, 635, 637 race and ethnicity  803 shariah law  694 divorce  see marriage and divorce dower  684–5, 689 dupattas 703

SUBJECT INDEX  

Eastern Europe 3–9 communist era  3–5, 532, 666 ethnic or folklore studies  3–4, 5, 352, 566 immigration studies  3–4 ‘Islamic problem’  5 Ottoman Empire  3–4, 5 religious studies  3–4 education and schools accommodation 640–3 Catholics 6 comparative tables  644–52 culture and cultural heritage  724 discrimination and equality  637 foreign donors and influence  14, 626 higher education  626, 792 hijab/headscarves 705–30 public schools  705–30 shariah law  669–70 teachers  706–7, 711, 714–18, 724–6 identity 642–3 immigration/migrants 641 institutions/organizations  621, 626–8, 631, 633–4, 637, 640–52 Islamic schools  14, 642–52, 705, 715 Jews/Judaism 640 public opinion/perceptions  642 public schools  621, 627, 637, 640–3, 705–30 radicalism/radicalization  12, 792 religiosity 724 religious education  621, 626, 628, 631, 633–4, 637, 640–52 Salafism 12 Saudi Arabia  14 segregation 642 shariah law  669–70 Tablighi movement  784 teachers  706–7, 711, 714–18, 724–6 training  6, 621 universities, radicalization in  792 Egypt/Egyptians Bosnia and Herzegovina  438, 446–8, 451, 453 Greece  362, 364–8, 370, 377, 379–81 Italy  265, 268, 271–4, 284, 289, 292, 294–5, 298 Muslim Brotherhood  36 Netherlands  159, 189

827

United Kingdom  70 Eid al-Adha  41, 379, 671 Eid al-Fitr  84, 86, 379–80, 671 enemies, Muslims as external and internal 803–4 employment and labour market discrimination  755, 763 globalization 5 hijab/headscarves  672, 706–7, 711, 714–18, 724–6 immigration/migrants  4, 5 n.3, 761–5 Islamophobia755, 763 prayers  39, 50, 90, 381, 671 rituals, festivals and holidays  671–2 shariah law  671–2 unemployment 763–5 Enlightenment  339, 802 equality  see discrimination and equality essentialism  9, 747–8, 803 ethnicity  see race and ethnicity; xenophobia and racism Eurabia thesis 415–16 Eurocentricism 631–2 Euro-Islam  537, 539, 624, 802–5 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) discrimination and equality  624 hijab/headscarves 701–2 institutions/organizations 624 public space/visibility  627 shariah law  659–60, 666–7, 694 thought, conscience and religion, freedom of  666–7, 694 transnationalism 624 Turkish Refah Partisi  659–60, 694 European Union (EU) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 701 halal/religious slaughter  639 institutions/organizations  629, 631–3 Islamophobia  745, 748, 753, 755, 759 radicalism/radicalization 770 Regulation on Succession and Wills  683 Rome III Regulation on international divorce law  683 Schengen criteria  584 xenophobia and racism  748 n. 5

828   SUBJECT INDEX ex-Muslims  10, 657–8 external influence  see foreign donors and influence family law  see also marriage and divorce accommodation 684 culture and cultural heritage  688–9 diversity 8 dower (mahr or sadaq)  684–5, 689 equality of religion and beliefs  658 freedom of religion  658 gender relations/women  658, 662, 687, 691 information to immigrants, provision of 695 optional civil law  683–4 public policy  677, 684–5 recognition of foreign decisions, lack of 687–8 shariah law  413, 658–9, 661–2, 676, 677, 683–5, 687–8, 691, 694–5 family reunification 785–6 fatwas  14, 674–5 female genital mutilation (FGM)  168–71, 177 feminism  241 n.28, 244, 246, 251–2, 456, 657, 727–9 festivals  see rituals, festivals and holidays Fethullah Gülen movement  125, 393, 418, 463–4, 482–3, 577, 593, 604–5 finance 682–3 Finland education and schools  637, 640–1, 645 halal/religious slaughter  645 integration 635 Ireland  635, 640–1 mosques, building/establishment of  635, 645 multiculturalism 635 number of Muslims  637 recognition 645 registration 637 representative bodies  645 socio-economic status  635 symbols, display of religious  637 Fitna (film) 189 foreign donors and influence  see also Salafism; transnationalism and transnational

networks education and schools  14, 626 institutions/organizations  626, 631–2 Internet 14 mosques, building/establishment of  14, 709 publications and literature, distribution of  14 radicalism/radicalization  599, 774 shariah law  665–6, 676–7, 679–80, 682–3, 687–8 folklore and folklore studies  4–5, 531, 566, 580, 605 foreign policy  753, 759–60, 771, 777, 783, 796 former Muslims  10, 657–8 forum shopping 85 framing  131, 196, 414, 762, 776, 779, 784, 803 France 23–51 see also France and headscarf affairs Al-Qaeda 47–8 Algeria  26–7, 37, 39, 625, 681, 704 Algerian War  24, 29–30, 47 radicalism/radicalization 47–8 terrorism 47 assimilation  23, 27, 41, 635, 763–4 banlieues  24–5, 28–9, 45, 49–50 believing, behaving, and belonging  41–2 Beur movement  24–5, 30, 34 beurgeoisie 29–30 burials and cemeteries  34, 39–40 catholaïcité 31 Catholicism  31, 34–5, 39, 709, 712, 715 CFCM and other groups  34–7, 39, 41, 47–8 Charles de Gaulle Roissy airport, security at 49–50 Christian crosses, restrictions on large  32 Christianity and Christians  29, 31–2, 34–6, 39, 709, 712, 715 citizenship 43 civilization mission  626 Collectif Contre L’Islamophobie en France (CCIF)  30, 46, 48 colonialism 636 Constitution 31 converts (Français de Souche)  24, 26, 28, 43 culture and cultural heritage  24, 27, 31–2, 37, 39–41, 47 demographics  26–7, 30, 51 demonstrations and protests  24–5

SUBJECT INDEX  

deportation 49 discrimination and equality  25–9, 30–9, 45–51 gender relations/women  26, 28, 30–7, 41–2, 44 n.8, 46, 51 Islamophobia  29, 38, 45–51, 746, 749, 751–2, 755, 763–4 xenophobia and racism  25, 34, 45, 50 diversity 637 DNA testing  49 dower 684 education and schools beurgeoisie 29 culture 31 discrimination and equality  764 foreign donors and influence  35 funding  31, 34–5 institutions/organizations  640, 642 Islamic schools  34–5 Islamophobia 764 language 31 levels 29–30 public schools  31–4, 46, 709, 712–15, 721–6, 728–30 religious education  14, 34–5, 640, 646 religiosity 31 Stasi Commission  32, 713–14 employment  24–31, 34, 45–6, 49–51, 755 European Convention on Human Rights  627, 666 family law  51 family reunification  25, 30, 49 feminization of immigration policy  30–1 foreign donors and influence  35, 626 Front National (FN)  25, 38, 47–9 gender relations/women  26, 28, 30–7, 41–2, 44 n.8, 46, 51 generational differences  25, 27, 29, 31, 34, 37, 41–52, 44–5, 51 government policy  25, 30–1, 48–9, 622 halal/ritual slaughter  29, 34, 38, 40–1, 638–9, 646 historical perspective  23–7, 38–9, 626 identity building  25, 31 imams, Muftis and clerics  34, 37–8, 41 immigration/migrants  23–30, 38–9, 47–50, 763–4

829

individuals and individualization  36, 41 industrialization  24–5, 30 institutions/organizations  34–41, 51, 625–6, 634 integration  29, 35–7, 49–50 Internet 40 invisibility, equality through  27 Islamic schools  34–5 Islamism  38, 47 Islamophobia  29, 38, 45–51, 746, 749, 751–2, 755, 763–4 Jews/Judaism  32, 34–6, 39–40, 47, 714 laïcité  6, 23, 27, 31, 34, 39–40, 42, 51, 622, 666, 805 language  31, 38, 49 Machelon Report  38 Maghreb origins  24–6, 43–4 marriage and divorce  679 media  40–1, 43 Mohamed Merah incident  47–8 Moroccans  26–7, 36, 625 mosques  38–9, 42 building/establishment of  24, 36, 38–9, 50, 625, 635–7, 639, 646 illegal 50 imams, training of  38 Marseillle, Mosque of  39 Paris Mosque  24, 36, 38 nationality discrimination  28 neutrality 627 North African immigrants  24–6, 28–31, 50 number of Muslims  23–7, 42–3 pan-Islamic globalized Islam  34 police, discrimination by  45, 49–50 political participation and representation  23, 25, 38, 43–5, 47–9, 51 polygamy 46–7 postcolonialism  2, 3 poverty  28, 45 prayers  34, 38–42, 50 Protestants  32, 34–6, 39 public perception/opinion  24–6, 48–50, 663 public space, religion in  23, 33–4, 38–42 publications 43 race and ethnicity  31, 45–6, 49 radicalism/radicalization  37, 47–50, 51, 774

830   SUBJECT INDEX France (Cont.) recognition 646 regionalisms 31 religiosity  30–1, 34, 41–5, 51 religious education  14, 34–5, 640, 646 repatriation 25 representative bodies  6, 34–9, 41, 47–8, 637, 646 Republicanism  23, 763–4 research  23–4, 31, 34, 41, 44, 48 right-wing populist parties  25, 38, 47–9, 662 riots  24, 45, 46–50, 785 rituals, festivals and holidays  39, 41–2 Salafism  37, 48 Saudi Arabia  37 scholarship  23, 29–33, 36–7, 45, 47–9, 51 security/securitization 48–9 segregation 28 separation of state and religion  6, 23, 27, 31, 34, 39–40, 42, 51, 622, 666, 805 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on United States  45–6, 47–9 shariah law  40, 51, 662–3, 666, 679 social housing projects (banlieues) 24–5, 28–9, 45, 49–50 social mobility  29–30 social movements  25, 30 socio-economic status  24, 26, 27–30, 43–7, 51 state-religion relations  31 Stasi Commission  32, 713–14 statistical studies  23–30 stereotyping 41 stigma 46 stop and search of vehicles  49 street prayers  38–9, 42 symbols, ban on religious  32–4, 666 talaq, recognition of  679 terrorism and violence  47, 49, 773–4 traditionalism/conservatism 37 Turks/Turkey  26–7, 625 unemployment  25, 27–30, 45–6 xenophobia and racism  25, 34, 45, 50 youth  24, 27–9, 32, 34, 42, 47–8, 50 France and headscarf affairs  23, 30–5 age  43, 730

assimilation  723, 724 ban  32–4, 37, 43, 669–70, 705, 708–9, 712–14, 721–2, 727–9, 757 Bayrou Decree  32, 713 burquas  33, 43, 669–70, 722, 730, 757 Catholicism 712 citizenship  723, 729 colonialism 704 converts  669–70, 730 discrimination and equality  29, 33, 46, 50, 727, 752 n.12 diversity 723 education and schools  31–5, 44, 46, 627, 712–15, 723–6, 729 employment 29 European Convention on Human Rights  627, 666, 714 freedom of religion  723 full-face covering  33, 37, 43, 669–70, 721–2, 730, 757 gender relations/women  30–4 Gerin Report  33–4, 37, 729 hijabophobia  46, 50, 752 n.12 identity 724 immigration/migrants  30–1, 712, 723 Internet 730 Islamic schools  34–5 Islamism  33, 44 Islamophobia  46, 50, 714, 752 n.12 Jewish kippa, restrictions on  32 laïcité  23, 31–2, 712–14, 723–5, 729 media 43 neutrality 725 niqabs  33, 37, 43, 721–2 patriarchy 727 penalties 33 political history  704 political participation/representation  45, 50, 723 public opinion/perceptions  31, 33 n.5, 712, 721–2 public space/visibility  30–3, 722–3 religiosity 42–3 representative bodies  713 Salafism 37 schools  31–3, 46 security/securitization  33, 729

SUBJECT INDEX  

segregation 723 shariah law  669–70, 694 Stasi Commission  32, 713–14 stigma 34 symbols and signs, ban on conspicuous  714, 724 teachers  32, 34, 713–15, 725 thought, conscience and religion, freedom of 666 unemployment 29 freedom of expression  1, 252, 342, 414, 416, 727, 753, 691 n.200 freedom of religion family law  658 halal/religious slaughter  639 hijab/headscarves 701–2 institutions/organizations  624, 629, 632 mosques, building/establishment of  664 private international law  678 shariah law  658, 661, 664–8, 676, 695 thought, conscience and religion, freedom of  666–7, 694 Freedom Party (PVV) (Netherlands) 169, 172, 176, 197–9, 201, 707, 720, 762–3 Front National (FN) (France)  25, 38, 47–9 fundamentalism hijab/headscarves 726–9 institutions/organizations 625 interpretation 624 Islamism 726 Islamophobia 758 patriarchy 726–8 radicalism/radicalization  624, 637, 771, 776, 789, 792–3 Salafism 783 terrorism  726, 728–9 gender relations/women  see also hijab/ headscarves Euro-Islam 802–3 family law  658, 662, 687, 691 feminism  241 n. 28, 244, 246, 251–2, 456, 657, 727–9 honour crimes  168–71, 411, 757, 761 Islamophobia 751 patriarchy  717, 726–8, 731, 802 private international law  678–9

831

Salafism 803 segregation 496–8 shariah law  658–9, 662–3 generational differences believing, behaving, and belonging  11 hijab/headscarves 710 individualization  623, 637–8 Islamophobia 749–50 radicalism/radicalization  773, 785–7 Gerin Report  33–4, 37, 43 Germany 104–45 see also Germany and hijab/headscarves 1945, after 107–8 accommodation  104, 129–30 age  107, 114, 122, 134–5 arbitration 130 asylum seekers  117–18 attitude test  756–7 believing, behaving, and belonging  105, 108, 110–14, 131 Bosnians  105–6, 687 burials and cemeteries  130 Catholics  109, 717, 723 census data  109–10 Christianity and Christians  111, 115, 123–4, 128–30, 143 Catholics  109, 717, 723 Protestants  109, 137 citizenship  109, 115, 756–7 constitutional law  129–30, 657, 666, 668–9 converts  105, 107–8 criminal cases, informal dispute resolution in 674 culture and cultural heritage  106–8, 128, 135, 140, 689–90 democracy and democratic principles  106, 133–4, 139 denominations  115–16, 124 demonstrations and protests  140 dialogue initiatives  135–6 diaspora 127 discrimination and equality  117, 120–2, 129, 134–5, 139–44 gender relations/women  105–8, 118–24, 128, 132, 135, 139, 676, 685–7, 691 Islamophobia  140–3, 746, 749, 751–2, 755–7, 763–4

832   SUBJECT INDEX Germany (Cont.) Islamoprejudice 141–2 xenophobia and racism  142 dower 684–5 diversity  105–7, 123 double citizenship  109 education and schools  105–6, 114, 118–20, 122, 137, 140, 637 higher  118, 138 institutions/organizations  637, 642 public schools  6, 105–6, 118, 130, 137–8, 716–17, 725–6 radicalism/radicalization 133–4 religious education  105, 130, 137–8, 641, 647 university chairs  106, 130, 138–9 employment  117–22, 128, 140, 671–2 access to labour market  117–20 asylum seekers, ban on  117–18 conditions 105 discrimination  117–20, 140 gender relations/women  118–19, 132, 139, 685–6 Islamophobia 755 labour migrants/guest workers  105–6, 114, 137 presumptions 685–6 radicalism/radicalization 121 unemployment 119 equality of religions  669 European Union  128 family law  690–1 family reunion  105, 137 federal government  104 finance 683 foreign donors and influence  106, 130, 138–9 former Muslims, movements of  10 framing 131 freedom of religion  669, 672 gender relations/women  105–8, 118–24, 128, 132, 135, 139, 676, 685–7, 691 generational differences  105, 114, 117, 119 German Islam Conference (DIK)  104, 110, 122–4, 126, 131–2 governmental policy  104–6, 126–7, 130–8, 145, 715, 762

guest workers  105–6, 114, 137 halal/religious slaughter  639, 647 hate speech  763 historical perspectives  105–25, 143 home-grown extremists  133 housing 120 identity  116–17, 127–8, 135 imams, Muftis and clerics  107, 121, 122–3, 138 immigration/migrant backgrounds  105–15, 120, 124, 131–2, 136, 144–5, 763 individuals and individualization  108, 144–5 inner-Muslim debates  105 institutions/organizations  6, 105–7, 110, 116–17, 124–31, 136–7, 140, 625, 667–8 integration  104, 106, 110–11, 121, 131–5, 138, 144–5 Internet  128–9, 140–1 Islamic Studies  105–6, 138–9 Islamism 134 Islamophobia  140–3, 746, 749, 751–2, 755–7, 763–4 Islamoprejudice 141–2 Jews/Judaism  107, 111, 131, 134, 137, 142, 717, 763 jihadis  133, 139 journals 139 knowledge production  3, 105, 108–9, 138–9, 142–5 Kurds 674 labour migrants/guest workers  105–6, 114, 137 Länder  104, 131, 633 language  111, 119, 122–4, 129, 143 legal issues  105, 129–30 male circumcision  672–3 marriage and divorce  679, 681–2, 688 media  105–6, 109, 134 n.26, 141, 686 mosques  106–8, 121, 122–4, 138, 143 associations  122–3, 128–9, 131 building/establishment  104, 108, 128, 140–1, 647, 665 conflicts 140–1 multiculturalism  600 n. 22, 763 national identity  104 nationality  109, 112 Nazi regime  38, 107

SUBJECT INDEX  

networking  128, 143 numbers and characteristics of Muslim populations 109–16 Pakistanis  112, 133 Palestinians  105–6, 112 political participation, activism and representation  124, 135–7, 140–2, 665 polygamy 681–2 prayers  123–4, 128–30 Protestants  109, 137 public opinion/perceptions  105–6, 139–44, 669 public space/visibility  105–6, 122, 128–30, 139–44, 666 publications  104–5, 124, 138–9 race and ethnicity  111, 121, 124, 129, 141 n.30, 142–3 radicalism/radicalization  106, 110, 132–5, 139, 141, 145 age 134–5 discrimination and equality  121, 134–5 education 133–4 home-grown extremists  133 jihadis  133, 139 security  132–3, 135 surveillance 132–5 terrorism and violence  133–5, 141 recognition  126–7, 647 refugees 105–6 religious education  105, 130, 137–8, 641, 647 religious identity  116–17, 128 Religion Monitor  110, 116 religiosity  105, 108, 110, 114, 116–17, 122, 135, 143–4 representative bodies  6, 105, 108, 647 residence patterns/concentrations  104, 106–7, 114 return 105 right-wing movements and parties  142 rituals, festivals and holidays  124, 134 scholarship  109, 131, 134, 138–9, 141–2 security/securitization  104, 132–3, 135, 763 separation of church and state  129–30 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on United States  104, 108–9 shariah law  130, 656–7, 667–9, 675–6, 681–2, 687–91

833

Shi’a Muslims  115–16, 125, 143 socio-demographic category, Muslims as a  105, 108–9, 144 socio-economic status  120–1 stereotyping  141, 144 Sufism  116 n. 7 Sunni Muslims  115–16, 143 surveillance 132–5 talaq, recognition of  679 terrorism and violence  106, 108, 127–8, 133–5, 141 theology and pedagogies  137–9, 141 traditionalists/conservatives 135 transnationalism  116, 124, 127–8 Turks/Turkey  110–17, 120–8, 142–3, 715–16 dower 684–5 education and schools  137, 637 gender relations/women  687 institutionalization of Islam  125–6, 625 Islamophobia 142 political participation and representation 135–7 religiosity  108, 114 shariah law  687 unemployment 119 university chairs  106, 130, 138–9 xenophobia and racism  142 youth  105, 107, 114, 133 Germany and hijab/headscarves  107, 121–2, 130, 135–6 assaults 120 ban  705, 708, 710, 717, 720 burquas 710 Christianity and Christians  716, 723 citizenship  715–16, 723–4, 728 Constitution 716–17 discrimination and equality  120, 122 education and schools  118, 130, 140, 633, 666, 715–17, 725–6 employment  118–19, 121–2, 672 freedom of religion  716–17 full-face covering  710, 720 government policy  715 immigration/migrants 715–16 institutions/organizations 633 integration 728 Lander  705, 710, 715–17, 720, 725, 730–1

834   SUBJECT INDEX Germany and hijab/headscarves (Cont.) male members of family, influence of  122 media 716 motives for wearing  122 multiculturalism 715–16 neutrality  715–16, 725 niqabs 710 patriarchy 727 political participation/representation  137 public opinion/perceptions  717, 720 public space/visibility  717 race and ethnicity  723 religiosity 122 reunification 723 separation of religion and state  716 shariah law  668 state-religion relations  715 stigma 716 teachers  118, 130, 140, 633, 666, 717, 725–6 Turks  121, 715–16 GIA (Armed Islamic Group)  47–8, 773 globalization  1, 5, 12–13, 34, 623 Golden Dawn (Chrisi Avgi) (Greece) 371 Global Salafi Jihad  781–2, 790 good Islam and bad Islam, distinction between 803 government policy halal/religious slaughter  638 hijab/headscarves  715, 729 institutions/organizations  631, 636, 638 Islamophobia  759, 762–3 multiculturalism 9 radicalism/radicalization 793–5 Great Britain  see United Kingdom Greece 350–82 see also Thrace, Muslim minority of Albania  352, 363–6, 368, 477–9, 481 asylum seekers  363, 368 Athens  352, 355–7, 368–9, 371, 375–9, 381 central mosque  351–2, 362–3, 369, 372–3, 377, 379 internal migration  355–6, 362 believing, behaving, and belonging  354–7, 379–81 Bulgarians  354–5, 358–9, 686 burial and cemeteries  372, 376 census data  352, 364

Christianity and Christians  361–2, 366, 380–1 citizenship  363, 366, 368–9, 757 Code  366 n. 13 test 747 comparative approach  362, 382 Constitution  357–8, 372 contentious issues  369–72 conversions  366, 377, 381 culture and cultural heritage  353, 355, 358, 361, 370, 378 Cyprus 358 democracy and democratic principles  371 demographics 366 demonstrations/protests 371–2 diaspora 380–1 discrimination and equal treatment  352, 357–8, 362, 370–2, 380–1 diversity 380 Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union 363–4 economic migration  364, 368–9 education and schools  351, 360–1, 641–2 higher education  361 mosques 376 Programme for the Education of Muslim Children (PEM)  361 religious education  357, 361, 372, 380–1, 641, 647 Roma 357 socio-economic status  361 Egyptians  362, 364–8, 370, 377, 379–81 enemies, Muslims as internal and external 804 employment  356–7, 363–4, 366–9, 380–1 European Convention on Human Rights  357, 360, 372 European Union  358, 364 exclusion  355, 357 family law  359, 373, 686 freedom of religion  358, 360, 372–3 gender relations/women  359, 366–7, 370–1, 686 generational differences  363 Golden Dawn (Chrisi Avgi)  371 government policy  357–9, 363, 368–9 Greco-Turkish War  352

SUBJECT INDEX  

Greek-Arabic Cultural Centre  377 Greek civil war  354–5, 366 n.13 Greek nation-state  351–3 Greek War of Independence  351 halal/religious slaughter  370, 378, 647 hijab/headscarves 370 history/historical perspective  350–61 housing  368, 380 human rights  368 identity  350–1, 357–8, 361, 363, 369–71, 380–1, 599 immigration/migrants  350, 361–82 institutions/organizations  352, 362, 375, 376–9 integration  361, 363, 382 international law  372 Internet 377 Iraqis 380 Islamophobia  370–1, 757 Kemalists  354, 356, 358 labour migrants/guest workers  363–4, 366–9 language  352–7, 360–1, 375–7, 380 Lausanne, Treaty of  352–4, 357, 360, 373, 686 legal disputes  372–3 living conditions  367 Macedonia  352, 359 marriage and divorce  359, 370, 381 media  358, 362, 379 Middle East  364 millet system  350, 354, 359 mixed couples  370, 381 moderates 369 mosques Athens, central mosque in  351–2, 362–3, 369, 372–3, 377, 379 building/establishment  351–2, 362–3, 372–6, 377, 379, 639, 647 education 376 informal  374–6, 378 recognition 357 Mufti courts  359 multiculturalism  351, 369 Muslim Association of Greece (MAG)  377, 379 national identity  350–1, 363, 369–71, 380–1

835

nationalism  350–2, 369–71 networks 362 new Islam (recent immigrants)  4, 350, 361–82 New Lands, annexation of  351–2 number of Muslims  351–3, 361, 364–6 old Islam  350–61 Orthodox Church  351, 366, 369, 372 Other  350, 354, 358 Ottoman Empire  350–1, 354, 359, 569, 686 Pakistanis  362, 364–8, 371, 375–81 Palestinians  362, 365, 380–1 Piraeus  368, 379 plural identity  357 police, Islamophobia and racism amongst the 371 political participation/representation  358, 369, 371 Pomaks  355–6, 357, 360–1 population exchange  352–4 prayers  366, 373–5, 377, 379, 381 public opinion/perceptions  362–3, 369–72 public sphere/visibility  379–81 publications 362 race and ethnicity  4, 351–3, 357–8, 362–3, 366, 370–1, 375 radicalization 371–2 Ramadan  370, 379 recognition  357, 372, 380, 647 refugees  362, 368, 376–7 religious education  357, 361, 372, 380–1, 641, 647 religious identity  369, 380, 599 religiosity  355–7, 362, 366, 370, 375, 379–81 representative bodies  352, 362, 375, 376–9, 647 residence patterns  352–3, 355–6, 368–9 return 364 right-wing parties  369, 371 riots 371 rituals, festivals and holidays  362–3, 370, 378–81, 647 Roma (gypsies/Athiganoi)  355–7 scholarship  353, 359, 365, 376, 381 Second World War  353–4 secularism/secularization  356, 371 security 477

836   SUBJECT INDEX Greece (Cont.) segregation  354, 368, 375 shariah law  359, 373, 686 Shi’a Muslims  375–6, 377, 379 socio-economic status  361 South Asia  362, 364, 367–8, 375, 377–8, 381 special celebrations and everyday religious practice 379–81 stereotyping  351, 357, 370 stigma 357 Sufis 377–8 Sunni Muslims  375–6 terrorism 370–1 theology 377 thought, conscience and religion, freedom of  360, 372 traditionalists/conservatives  355–6, 358, 369, 374, 376, 380 transnationalism  356, 362, 377, 379–81 Turkey/Turks  351–61, 366, 369–70, 381 unemployment  357, 368 xenophobia and racism  363, 370–1 youth 364 Grenada, invasion of 759–60 Group for Call and Combat/Al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb) (GSPC)  48, 773 Gülen movement  125, 393, 418, 463–4, 482–3, 577, 593, 604–5 Gulf War 1991  135, 334, 704, 786 Habashi movement 418 hadith  13–14, 446, 463, 483–4, 501, 595, 658 Hajj  41, 90–2, 440–1 halal/religious slaughter Aid el-Kebir festival  282, 638 animal welfare  639 comparative tables  644–52 Eid al-Adha  41 Euro-Islam 804 European Union  639 freedom of religion  639 government policy  638 institutions/organizations  626, 628, 631, 633, 638–9, 644–52 Jews/Judaism 639 state-religion relations  638 Hanafi school  375, 435, 441, 451, 480 n.4, 490, 532, 540, 590, 603–4

Hanbali school  532, 580 n.5 headscarves  see hijab/headscarves healthcare 631 hijab/headscarves  2, 7, 701–31 assimilation 729 bandannas 703 bans  708, 731 burqas  702, 705, 710, 717–22, 729–30, 757 chadors  703–4, 758 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 701 citizenship model  722–4 colonialism 704–5 comparative approach  729–30 culture and cultural heritage  702–3, 722–3, 729 definition 702–5 discrimination  708, 729 dupattas 703 education and schools  669–70, 705–30 employment  672, 706–7, 711, 714–18, 724–6 Euro-Islam 804 European Convention on Human Rights 701–2 feminism  705, 726–9 freedom of religion  701–2 full-face covering  669–71, 702–3, 706–8, 710–12, 714–23, 728–30, 757 fundamentalism 726–9 generational differences  710 government policy  715, 729 historical perspective  704–5 identity  702, 723 immigration/migrants  704, 722–4, 731 interpretation  703–5, 722–30 Islamism  721–2, 726 Islamophobia 704 jilbabs  703, 707–9 less formally restrictive regulation  705–9, 717–22 London bombings 2005  704, 709, 728 Madrid bombings 2004  704, 710, 728, 774 media 729–30 modesty  701–4, 707–8 more restrictive policies and cases  705, 709–12, 719–20 most restrictive regulation  705, 712–17, 720–1

SUBJECT INDEX  

multiculturalism 724 niqabs  669–71, 702, 703, 705, 710, 717–22, 729–30 Qurʾan  703–4, 719 patriarchy  717, 726–8, 731 pluralism 724 political meanings  704–5 postcolonialism 704 public opinion/perceptions  10, 701, 705, 717–22, 729–30 public schools  705–30 public space/visibility  702, 704 radicalism/radicalization 774 reasons for wearing hijab  701–2, 710–11 regulations 705–17 religious authorities  704 Salafism  15, 669, 803 sartorial meaning  702–3, 705 scholarship 705 seclusion, as mobile form of  702 security/securitization  702, 717, 731 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on United States  704 shariah law  669–71, 694 social relationships, impeding  717 state-religion relations  729 stereotyping 708 teachers  706–7, 711, 714–18, 724–6 terrorism  704, 709–10, 726, 728–9, 731, 774 theological meaning  703–5, 717 traditionalists/conservatives  702–3, 707, 710, 716, 727–8, 803 xenophobia and racism  706, 717, 728–9 historical lands of Muslims in Europe  2, 4 historical perspective  2–3, 7, 11, 13, 704–5, 773–5, 785–6 Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islamiyya  12 n.19, 407, 536, 540, 555, 663, 786, 789, 793–4 Hofstad group  190, 192–3, 779 holidays  see rituals, festivals and holidays homogenization  16, 623, 633–5, 637, 730, 762 homosexuality  177, 189, 248, 295 honour crimes  168–71, 411, 757, 761 human rights  see also European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); freedom of religion Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 701

837

cultural identity, right to  8 Euro-Islam 802 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)  372 private international law  678 shariah law  7, 659, 667–8 humiliation  754, 776, 782, 787–8, 790 Hungary Austro-Hungary  429–30, 433, 436, 440–1 Islamophobia 751–2 right-wing populist parties  662 Ibadis  115, 117 identity building 11–12 culture and cultural heritage  793, 803 education and schools  642–3 Euro-Islam 803–4 hijab/headscarves  702, 723 institutions/organizations  635, 643 national identity  702, 723, 803 postcolonialism 4 race and ethnicity  11–12 radicalism/radicalization  775, 777, 785–90, 792–3 religious identity  643, 804 residence  11–12, 635 socio-economic status  11–12 transnationalism  10, 12 ijtihad  96, 244, 290, 296, 299, 435–6, 438, 537, 659 imams, Muftis and clerics binding decisions  693–4 institutions/organizations  621, 632 radicalism/radicalization 789 Salafism 14 training 631 immigration/migrants 2–5 culturalization 5 cycles 3 Danish Cartoon controversy  754 Eastern Europe  4 education and schools  641 employment  4, 5 n.3, 761–5 Euro-Islam 802 family law, provision of information on  695 family reunification  785–6 hijab/headscarves  704, 722–4, 731

838   SUBJECT INDEX immigration/migrants (Cont.) illegal/irregular immigrants  760 immigration studies  3–5 institutions/organizations  620–7, 634–8, 643, 652 integration 4–5 ‘Islamic problem’  5 Islamophobia  751–3, 756, 759–65 labour, source of low-skilled  4, 5 n.3 multiculturalism 761–2 new immigration countries  4 postcolonialism 3 radicalism/radicalization  773, 785–6 refugees 4 security/securitization  3, 749, 756, 760–2 socio-economic status  4–5 stigma  756, 762 individuals and individualization analytical approach  777 assimilation 782–3 cognitive openings  782–4 criminology  777, 780 culture and cultural heritage  777, 782 definition of individualization  623 democracy and democratic values  624 deradicalization 794–5 descriptive works  777 deterministic approaches  777–9 development approaches  780–2 discourse 784 foreign policy  777 frame resonance  782 framing theory  779, 784 generational differences  623, 637–8 globalization 623 identity  777, 792 institutions/organizations  623–4, 628 Internet  777–8, 781 interpretation, liberalization of  624 Islamophobia 782 jihadis  778, 784 mobilization 777 pathways  780–1, 796 personal issues  793 political, spiritual and social needs  778 prisons 792 private affair, religion as a  11, 623, 627–8

processes  780–2, 794, 796 psychology  777–8, 782 radicalism/radicalization  623–4, 771–96 secularism/secularization 804 shariah law  668, 676–7, 687 social conditionalities  777 social learning theory  777, 780, 783 social networks  781 social validation  784 socio-economic status  777 terrorism and violence  777–84, 793 institutionalization/organizations 619–52 see also representative bodies acculturation 635 accommodation  629–31, 635–52 assimilation  620, 630, 635 bottom-down process  619 Christianity and Christians  620, 626, 631–2, 634–5, 637, 640–3 citizenship  630, 638, 642 colonialism 636 comparative approach  620, 625, 629, 633–52 context  620–3, 626, 632, 635 controlled institutionalization  625 cooperation between political and religious authorities 620–1 country-related variables  634–5, 641 culture and cultural heritage  620–2, 624–7, 632, 634-5, 638, 643 definition  619, 629–33 democracy and democratic principles  622, 633, 636, 642 demographics 634 discrimination and equality  624 diversity  622, 627, 635, 637 dynamics  626–8, 630, 635–6, 638, 640 education and schools  621, 626–8, 633–4, 637, 640–52 Eurocentricism 631–2 Euro-Islam 624 European Union  629, 631–3 foreign donors and influence  626, 631–2 freedom of religion  624, 629, 632 fundamentalism 625 funding  621, 628 geography  632, 637

SUBJECT INDEX  

governance, modes of  632 government policy  631, 636, 638 halal/religious slaughter  626, 628, 631, 633, 638–9, 644–52 historical perspective  636–7, 643, 652 homogeneity  623, 634 identity  635, 643 imams, Muftis and clerics  621, 631 immigration/migrants  620–7, 634–8, 643, 652 imperfect institutionalization  631 individuals and individualization  623–4, 628 institutionalization of Islam  619–52 integration  623–5, 628, 635–6, 643, 652 international law  624 interpretation  619, 629–33 Islam Councils, creation of  631 literature review  628–53 local level, at  632–3 marriage and divorce  628 media  621, 631 moderates 622 mosques, building/establishment of  621, 626, 628, 630, 633, 635–40, 643-52 comparative tables  644–52 funding 636–7 public opinion/perceptions  636 multiculturalism 635 Muslim communities, initiative of  619–22, 632, 638 Muslim Communities-related variables 635–8 nationality 622 nationhood 630 neutrality 626–8 official institutionalization  623 players 622–6 pluralism  626–8, 635–6 political and legal status of Muslims  622 political opportunity structures  630 political participation and representation  631, 638 politics and religion, distinction between 620–1 politics of countries of origin  625 prayers  625, 631, 637

839

prisoners 631 privatization of faith  624, 627 public authorities, initiative of  619 public opinion/perceptions  637–8 public schools  621, 627, 637, 640–3 public space/visibility  6, 626–30 publications 628–53 race and ethnicity  622 radicalism/radicalization  622, 624–5, 634, 637, 772, 786 recognition  619, 621, 624–6, 629, 631–2, 637, 644–52 reform 624 registration 637 religious authorities  621–3, 630–1 representative bodies  621–3, 626, 629, 631–2, 637, 644–52 resource mobilization  630 revival of traditional religion  624 rituals, festivals and holidays  631, 638 secularization/secularism  620–1, 627 security/securitization 625 segregation  625, 635 separation of church and state  6, 620, 622 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on United States  622 shariah law  626–8, 632, 661, 667–8, 676, 687–8, 695 socio-economic status  631, 638 state-religion relations  624, 626, 632, 635, 638, 643 strategies 622–3 supra-nationalism 632 terrorism and violence  631, 773 thematic approach  630–2 theoretical approaches  630–2 top-down processes  619, 623 traditionalists/conservatives  623–4, 632 transnationalism  7, 12, 624, 629, 631–2 variables 634–43 country-related  634–5, 641 interplay between  638–43 Muslim Communities-related  635–8 youth 623 integration Euro-Islam 803–4 hijab/headscarves 731

840   SUBJECT INDEX integration (Cont.) immigration/migrants 4–5 institutions/organizations  623–5, 628, 635–6, 643, 652 Islamophobia  751, 756, 763–5 lawyers, role of  628 political agendas  3, 4–9 public space/visibility  6, 7 radicalism/radicalization  785–6, 794 representative bodies  7 secularism/secularization 805 symbolic integration  803–4 intergenerational differences  see generational differences international constraints  2, 9, 413–17, 506–9 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 467 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 372 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)  465 n.135, 466–7 international law  186, 190, 466, 624 see also private international law Internet hyper-radicalization 791 radicalism/radicalization  771, 777–8, 781, 791–3 Salafism  12, 14–16 social network  791 training 791 interpretation fundamentalism 624 hijab/headscarves  703–5, 722–30 ijtihad  96, 244, 290, 296, 299, 435–6, 438, 537, 659 individuals and individualization  624 institutions/organizations  619, 629–33 literal interpretation  13–14, 37, 483, 553 pluralism 658–9 Qurʾan  13, 37, 483, 553 Salafism 803 shariah law  658–9, 666, 694 ‘intolerable subjects’ 5 investments 682–3 IRA (Irish Republican Army)  770, 782 Iran Bosnia and Herzegovina  463–4

chadors 703 Iranian Revolution 1979  444, 704, 757 recognition of foreign decisions  688 Sweden 397 Iraq Greece 380 Gulf War 1991  135, 334, 704, 786 invasion (2nd Gulf War)  84, 334, 709, 759, 773–4, 779, 785–7 jihadis 773 Kurds 362 Norway 393 refugees  4, 112, 159, 398, 498, 584–5, 688 Sweden  397, 405 Ireland accommodation 635 Catholics  634–5, 637 diversity 635 education and schools  640–1, 648 Finland  635, 640–1 halal/religious slaughter  648 institutions/organizations  634–5, 637 IRA  770, 782 model of extended privileges  635 mosques, building/establishment of  635, 648 multiculturalism 635 recognition 648 representative bodies  637, 648 socio-economic status  635 symbols, display of religious  637 ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham) 509 Islamic conception of religion  see definition of Islam and Islamic conception of religion Islamic law  see shariah law Islamic marriages  178, 190, 195, 689–90 Islamic Movement Millî Görüş  125, 126–7, 133, 786 Islamic schools  14, 642–52, 705, 715 Islamism hijab/headscarves  721–2, 726 Islamophobia  746, 751 neo pan-Islamism  12 radicalism/radicalization  770–7, 779–80, 782, 785–6, 789–91, 793–6 shariah law  656, 669, 675

SUBJECT INDEX  

Islamophobia  2, 9, 745–65 anti-Muslim racism and prejudice  746–9 anti-Muslimism 746 assimilation 753 citizenship 756–7 clash of civilizations  745, 757–8, 762, 764 Council of Europe  748 Crusades 745–6 culture and cultural heritage  756–7, 759–65 Danish cartoon crisis  84, 753–4 definition 745–7 demonstrations and protests  755 employment  755, 763–5 essentialism 748 European Union  745, 748, 753, 755, 759 fundamentalism 758 gender relations/women  704, 751 generational differences  749–50 government policy  759, 762–3 governmentality, as form of  755–64, 765 hijab/headscarves 704 immigration/migrants  751–3, 756, 759–65 integration  751, 756, 763–5 invasion of the West  747 Islamophobia Watch  749 n.7 Israel 750 Italy  750, 752 Jews/Judaism 763 language 763 media  746, 755 Middle East, crisis in  759 mosques, building/establishment of  664 multiculturalism  749, 756, 760–4 natural and normal, as being  745 Orientalism 747 Other  745, 759–60 political ideology, Islam as  745 political participation/representation  765 political relevance of the term  749–55 public opinion/perceptions  749–56, 762–4 Qurʾan by American pastor, burning of  753, 754–5 race and ethnicity  747, 756 radicalism/radicalization 782 right-wing populist parties  759–63 Runnymede Trust  84, 709, 745–6 scapegoating 749

841

scholarship  746, 749 security/securitization  748–9, 756–64 segregation 755 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks  9, 745, 748–9, 753–4, 759–61, 765 shariah law  660, 664 socio-economic status  749, 753 stereotyping  754, 765 stigma  748, 756, 762–3 terrorism and violence  751–4, 756, 759 traditionalists/conservatives  746, 755 transnationalism 757 United Nations  748 Western superiority, idea of  753, 757, 759–65 Israel Islamophobia 750 Israel/Palestine conflict  250, 786 Italy 265–99 activism  273–4, 285, 288, 294–7 Albanians  268–9, 272, 291 believing, behaving, and belonging  289–90 bilateral agreements between state and confession (‘intesa’)  281–4 Bossi-Fini Law  271 burials and cemeteries  282 Catholic Church  266, 274, 277–84, 291–3, 643, 709–10, 723, 725 census data  267 chaplains 282 Christianity and Christians  268, 270, 296, 709–10 Catholic Church  266, 274, 277–84, 291–3, 643, 709–10, 723, 725 crucifixes/crosses  277, 709, 725 Protestants  279, 292–3 Christmas 277 citizenship  272–3, 275, 291, 293, 296–7, 638 Committee for Italian Islam  282 comparative approach  278 crucifixes/crosses  277, 283 n.2, 709, 725 culture and cultural heritage  265, 274–7, 279–80, 284–5, 289, 295–9 democracy and democratic principles  279 demographics  270, 279 demonstrations and protests  277, 288, 296 deportations 297–8

842   SUBJECT INDEX Italy (Cont.) diaspora  268, 288, 299 discrimination and equal treatment  275– 80, 281, 284 gender relations/women  268, 270, 272–3, 275, 289–90, 294–6, 299 homosexuality  275, 295 Islamophobia  267, 274–80, 298, 709, 750, 752 xenophobia and racism  274–7, 291 diversity  268, 274, 280–1 dual citizenship  273 education and schools  276–7, 289 agreements with state  640 crucifixes 277 higher education  294, 297 hijab/headscarves 709 Islam of Europe masters  297 language 292 public schools  277, 282, 710, 724 religious education  282, 289, 291–3, 640, 648 Egyptians  265, 268, 271–4, 284, 289, 292, 294–5, 298 employment  268, 270–1, 273, 285, 296–7 entrepreneurship 273 Eritreans 268 ethnography  273, 290, 299 exclusion  283, 298 family reunification  268, 270, 285 foreign donors and influence  284 freedom of religion  277 full-face covering  719–20 gender relations/women  268, 270, 272–3, 275, 289–90, 294–6, 299 gender roles  273, 299 hijab/headscarves  266, 295–6, 669, 705, 709–10, 719–20, 723, 725, 730 generational differences  272–4, 285, 288, 290–1, 294–8 GMI association  294–7 government policy  265–80, 298 halal/religious slaughter  273, 289, 290, 299, 648 health and healthcare  276 hijab/headscarves  266, 295–6, 669, 705, 709–10, 719–20, 723, 725, 730

historical perspective  265–6, 286 homosexuality  275, 295 human rights  277 identity  265, 275–6, 281, 283, 288, 290–1, 295–6, 709 ijtihad  290, 296, 299 imams, Muftis and clerics  282, 287–8, 296, 294 immigration/migrants  265–80, 284, 293, 295–9, 638 Bossi-Fini Law  271 irregular  265–6, 270, 276–7 Martelli Law  271 policy  266, 267–80 regularization 271 sending countries, cooperation with  268 Sicily 268 Turco-Napolitano Law  271 youth 293–7 individuals and individualization  267–8, 293, 299 institutions/organizations  6, 266, 274, 281–2, 284–8, 293, 294–5, 298, 621, 667 integration  267, 270–3, 284, 291, 298 inter-faith dialogue  291, 292–3, 295–6 ‘intesa’ 281–4 Islam of Europe masters  297 Islamic Council  282 Islamic Cultural Centre of Italy  285 Islamophobia  267, 274–80, 298, 709, 750, 752 Jews/Judaism  268, 279, 281, 292, 295–6 jihadis 297–8 labour migrants/guest workers  268, 270–1, 285 Lampedusa, arrivals on  268 language 292 Libyans 268 local policies, heterogeneity of  276–80 Lodi mosque conflict 2000  265, 279 Maghreb, Muslims from the  268–9, 271, 273–4, 290, 294 marriage and divorce  272, 292–3 mixed marriages  292–3 polygamy 681–2 talaq, recognition of  679 Martelli Law  271

SUBJECT INDEX  

media  266–7, 275, 277, 279, 294–5, 719–20 Middle Eastern Muslims  268–9, 271, 273–4 mixed marriages  292–3 moderates  282, 285 Moroccans  268–9, 271–4, 276, 285–91, 294, 297 mosques  285–6, 289–90 building/establishment  266, 278, 280, 282, 625, 639, 648, 665, 667 conflicts  276, 277–80 funding 709 Lodi mosque conflict 2000  265, 279 radicalism/radicalization 297 recognition  278, 293 multiculturalism  266, 285 n.3, 709 multiple identity  290–1 Muslim, definition of  267 Muslim exception  265 national identity  265, 275–6, 283, 295–6, 709 naturalization  272, 297 neutrality 281 new Islam (recent immigrants)  2, 4, 265, 268–75, 298–9 Northern League (Legal Nord)  274–5, 277, 283–4, 291, 662, 664 number of Muslims  267–70, 294 Orientalist tradition  265 origins, diversity of  289–90 Other  274–5, 294 Pakistanis  268, 270, 276, 284, 290, 299 Palestinians 294–5 pluralism  266, 268, 270, 277, 279, 281, 284, 287–93, 298–9 political participation/representation  274, 277, 279, 283–4, 295–7 Northern League (Legal Nord)  274–5, 277, 283–4, 291, 662, 664 political parties  270, 274–5, 277, 279, 283–4, 291, 295, 297, 662, 664 polygamy 681–2 postcolonial immigration  268 practices, diversity of  289–90 prayers  278, 289 prisoners 290–1 Protestants  279, 292–3

843

public opinion/perceptions  265–7, 274–5, 283, 298, 709, 719–20 public space/visibility  267, 276–88, 293–7 crucifixes/crosses  277, 283 n.2, 709, 725 hijab/headscarves 709–10 publications  265, 268 race and ethnicity  266–7, 273–9, 284, 295 radicalism/radicalization  267, 295, 297–8 Ramadan  282, 289–91, 295 recognition  266, 278, 280–3, 288, 293, 296, 648 refugees 270 regions  265–6, 275–8, 281, 284–5, 288–91, 297, 299 religiosity  289–90, 294, 296, 709 religious authorities  295–5 religious education  282, 289, 291–3, 640, 648 representative bodies  274, 282, 284, 290, 293, 294–5, 648 residence patterns  268, 270 residence permits  271 right-wing populist parties  270, 274–5, 277, 279, 283–4, 291, 295, 297, 662, 664 rituals, festivals and holidays  277–8, 282, 289–91, 293, 295 Salafis  293, 297–8 scapegoat, Islam as  265 scholarship  294, 299 secularism/secularization  265–6, 276, 279–80, 283, 292–3, 296–7, 299 security/securitization  275, 297–8, 719, 729 segregation/ghettoization 270 Senegalese  268–9, 273, 284–5, 287–90 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on United States  265, 293, 294, 297 shariah law  293, 627, 662, 667, 679, 681–2 Shi’a Muslims  268, 270 Sicily  265, 268, 284–5 socio-economic status  266, 270–4, 279 Somalians  265, 268–70, 273, 284 South-East Asians  268–9, 271, 276, 285 special treatment  281–3 state-religion relations  280–3 stereotyping  266–7, 293, 295 Sufism 287–8 Sunni Muslims  270

844   SUBJECT INDEX Italy (Cont.) symbols, bans on religious  277, 283 n.2, 709, 725 talaq, recognition of  679 tax advantages  282 terrorism  266, 297–8 theology  265, 296 traditionalists/conservatives  273, 295 transnationalism  273, 288, 295, 299 Tunisians  268–9, 271–3, 284, 289–90 Turco-Napolitano Law  271 UCOII (Union of Islamic Organizations and Communities in Italy)  285–7, 294 Veneto region  284, 289, 297 xenophobia and racism  274–7, 291 youth  267–8, 272, 274, 282, 285, 290, 293–9 Jabhat al-Nusra 509 Jadidism  521–2, 537 Jamaat-i-Islami movement 88 Jamaat at-Tabligh  see Tablighi movement Jews and Judaism anti-Semitism  127, 201, 747 n.3, 750 Beth Din  85 Christianity and Christians  620 education and schools  640 halal/religious slaughter  639 Islamophobia 763 male circumcision  672–3 organizational model  620 ritual slaughter  639 sociology of religion  3 jihadis  772–5, 784–5, 787, 794–5 classical jihad  774 converts 773–4 definition  664 n. 47 Global Salafi Jihad  781–2, 790 home-grown jihadis  790–1 identity 777 individualization  778, 784 Internet 791 networks  773–4, 777 oppression narrative  773 social movement  776–7 terrorism and violence  48, 89, 297–8, 343, 773, 789–91 jilbabs  703, 707–9 juridical schools (madhab)  13, 36

Jyllands-Posten  414, 416, 753–4 Kaplan movement 125 Khilavet Devleti 663 Kizilbashi  574–5, 590, 592 Kosovo  475, 478, 483, 485–8 Bosnia and Herzegovina  432, 445, 448–9, 460, 483 census data  486 n. 11 Circassian national movement  529 constitution  499, 500, 502 demonstrations 503–4 discrimination 503–4 donations from Gulf states  487 education  488, 497–8, 500–2, 504 higher  500–1, 504 hijab/headscarves 504 religious  497, 500–1, 504, 506, 510 European Union  494, 507, 510 foreign donors and influence  495–7, 506, 509–10 freedom of religion  499, 500 fundamentalism 503 gender relations/women  497 Grand Mufti  487, 485 hijab/headscarves  497, 504, 603 identity  502, 510 imams, Muftis and clerics  487–8, 495 Islamic Community of Kosovo (ICK)  487– 8, 495–6, 497–8, 500, 503, 510 Islamophobia  494, 496, 507–8, 510 language 502 legal status  499–501 media 506 mosques, building/establishment of  503, 510 nationalism 499 Orthodox Church of Serbia  500 Ottoman Empire  569 political parties  504, 510 public opinion/perceptions  502–3 publications 506 race and ethnicity  502–3, 510 radicalism/radicalization  494–5, 506, 508–10 registration 500 religiosity 492–3 religious education  497, 500–1, 504, 506, 510 religious identity  502, 510 restitution of religious property  501

SUBJECT INDEX  

revival of religion  506 rural areas  485–8, 494, 498, 503 Salafism  487, 494–6, 497, 506, 510 Saudi Arabia  487–8, 495, 498, 506, 603 secularism/secularization  496, 509 segregation of women  497 Serbians  489–90, 497, 502–3 shariah law  501–2 socio-economic status  494 Sufis  485–8, 494, 506 Turks/Turkey 604 UN resolution  487 United States  494 UNMIK 494–5 war  503, 510 Kumyks  523, 541 Kurds/Kurdistan  70, 112, 161, 362, 366, 393, 397, 576, 674, 684 language  14–15, 637, 662, 746, 757, 763 Legal Nord (Northern League) (Italy) 274–5, 277, 283–4, 291, 662, 664 Libya, US interventions in  225, 247–50, 760 London bombings 2005 foreign donors and influence  9 hijab/headscarves  704, 709, 728 home-grown jihadis  790 Islamophobia  9, 599 public opinion/perceptions  334 radicalism/radicalization  9, 770, 774, 790 security/securitization 371–2 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on United States  9 social cohesion  82 socio-demographics 108–9 lone-wolves 781 loyalty to countries of residence 802 Macedonia  475, 478, 486, 488–91 Bektashi Community  501 Catholic Church  501 census data  489 Christianity and Christians  501, 505 citizenship 489 communism, end of  504 Constitution  489, 499, 502, 504–5

845

discrimination and equality  498, 504, 508, 510 diversity 490 education and schools  498, 501, 505 European Union  507 Evangelical Methodist Church  501 foreign donors and influence  603 freedom of religion  499, 501 fundamentalism 488–9 gender relations/women  498 Greece  352, 359 hijab/headscarves 603 identity  504, 508 imams, Muftis and clerics  359, 490 institutions/organizations  501, 505, 507 Islamic Religious Community (IRC)  490– 1, 501, 504–5 Jewish community  501 legal status  499, 501 Millennium Cross  505 mosques, building/establishment of  505 Muslim Religious Community (MRC)  491, 504 national identity  504 nationalism  488, 499, 508 number of Muslims  489 Orthodox church  489, 501, 504–5 public space/visibility  504–6 race and ethnicity  505 radicalism  491, 510 recognition 504–5 registration 501 religionization of landscape  505 religiosity 492–3 religious education  498, 501, 505 religious identity  508 restitution of religious property  501 revival of religion  504 Salafism  491, 603 Saudi Arabia  603 secularism/secularization  499, 509 segregation of girls  498 shariah law  501–2 Skopje 2014 urban revitalization project  505 Sufism 501 Thrace, Muftis in  359 Turks/Turkey 604 war on terror  508

846   SUBJECT INDEX Madrid bombings 2004 foreign donors and influence  9, 248 hijab/headscarves  704, 710, 728, 774 Islamophobia  9, 341 public opinion/perceptions  341 radicalism/radicalization  248, 342–3, 770, 774, 779 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on United States  9 socio-demographics 108 Machelon Report 38 male circumcision 672–3 marriage and divorce dower 689 gender relations/women  678–80 human rights  680 institutions/organizations 628 Islamic marriages  690 minimum age  678, 687 polygamy  659, 680–2, 687 repudiation, termination by  190, 321, 359, 678–80, 687–9, 692 Rome III Regulation on international divorce law  683 shariah law  8, 627, 678–80, 687 talaq  190, 321, 359, 678–80, 687–9, 692 Maturidi, Sunni Islam tradition of 435 media free access  6, 294, 621 hijab/headscarves 729–30 institutions/organizations 631 ‘Islamic problem’  5 Islamophobia  746, 755 radicalism/radicalization 771 Salafism 14–15 Melilla and Ceuta  313, 327, 332, 338 migrants see immigration/migrants military service  175, 321, 352, 410 Millî Görüş  125, 126–7, 133, 786 moderates  89, 622, 631, 781, 784, 803 ‘Mohamed Merah’ incident 47 Moluccans 159–60 Montenegro  475, 485 Morocco/Moroccans Belgium  224–5, 230–4, 238, 240, 242–9 diaspora 288 family law  662 France 625

Italy  268–9, 271–4, 276, 285–91, 294, 297 jihadis 773 Netherlands  159–65, 168–72, 179–81, 184–5, 191, 197–8, 200, 202, 662 recognition of foreign decisions  688 Spain  313, 315, 322, 324, 326–31, 335–43 mosques, building/establishment of comparative tables  644–52 foreign donors and influence  14, 709 freedom of religion  664 funding 636–7 institutions/organizations  621, 626, 628, 630, 633, 635–40, 643-52 Islamophobia 664 public opinion/perceptions  636 public policy  636 radicalism/radicalization 86 shariah law  644–5 Al Muhajiroun  776, 786, 793 mujahideen  444–5, 451–2, 517, 549, 773, 789 multiculturalism communitarianism, state response to  9 crisis 760–4 failure of multiculturalism  762–3 hijab/headscarves  724 immigration/migrants 761–2 institutions/organizations 635 ‘Islamic problem’  5 Islamophobia  749, 756, 760–4 neo-liberal and neo-colonial, as  762 n. 22 public opinion/perceptions  763 radicalism/radicalization  9, 787 representative organizations, creation of  9 Muslim Brotherhood (MB)  13, 36, 133, 246–7, 250, 287, 393, 418 Muslim, definition of 10 national identity  702, 723, 803 Nazi regime  38, 107 neoliberalism  5, 9, 410, 748, 762, 764 neo-pan-Islamism 12–13 Netherlands 158–204 1970s onwards  158 age  177, 185 AIVD (Dutch Intelligence Agency)  193–5 allochthones/autochthones, definition of 162 Amsterdam  159, 172–4, 183, 187–8

SUBJECT INDEX  

arts, research into the  203 asylum seekers and refugees  159, 185 believing, behaving, and belonging  176–85, 202 burial and cemeteries  177, 186 burquas 183–5 Catholics  180, 187, 189, 195 chaplains 189 Christianity and Christians  162, 176, 178, 184–9, 197 Catholics  180, 187, 189, 195 Protestants  179–80, 189, 195, 197 citizenship  174, 187–8, 757 citizenship test  757 CMO (‘contact body Muslims-government) 189–90 colonialism 636 Commission on Equal Treatment  706–7, 720 commitment to Dutch society  173 Constitution 185 converts 159–60 crime  168–71, 173 culture and cultural heritage  158, 160, 162–77, 180, 184, 191, 195, 201–2, 706 discrimination and equality  165, 168, 184, 185–7 Constitution, equal treatment provisions in 185 freedom of opinion  200–1 gender relations/women  158, 168, 186, 190–2, 202–3, 706, 727–8 hijab/headscarves 184 radicalism/radicalization 194 xenophobia and racism  168, 196 diversity  162, 164, 168, 173, 188–9 domestic violence  168–71 double identity  175, 190 dower 684 education and schools  158, 165, 166–7, 172–3, 176, 178, 195, 201 gender relations/women  186, 202–3 higher education  182–3, 203 hijab/headscarves  184–5, 189, 706–7, 720 history test  175 institutions/organizations  640, 642–3 mosques  182, 186 multiculturalism 163

847

public schools  182, 720 religious education  158, 182–4, 204, 640–1, 649 segregation 166–7 employment  165–9, 199, 203 discrimination  168, 184 diversity 168 dress  176, 184, 189 gender relations/women  168, 203 hijab/headscarves  184, 189 labour/guest workers  159–60, 163–4, 166, 172, 179, 201–2 unemployment 167–9 youth 167 empowerment  164, 183, 186–7, 195 entrepreneurship 203 ethnography 176–7 European Convention on Human Rights 201 family law  190–1, 662 family reunification  159–60, 191 n.55 female genital mutilation  168–71, 177 finance 192 forced marriages  191–2 foreign donors and influence  179, 203 freedom of opinion  199, 200–1 freedom of religion  185–6, 200, 721 Freedom Party (PVV)  169, 172, 176, 197–9, 201, 707, 720, 762–3 gender relations/women  158, 168, 186, 190–2, 202–3, 706, 727–8 generational differences  165–7, 171–2, 177–81, 183, 191, 194, 199–204 government policy  160, 162–5, 172–5, 185–91, 193–6, 202, 636 halal/religious slaughter  186, 649 health and healthcare  162, 166, 168, 196 hijab/headscarves  177, 189, 669, 705, 706–7 burquas 183–5 Commission on Equal Treatment  706–7, 720 cultural diversity  706 discrimination and equality  184 education and schools  184–5, 189, 706–7, 720 employment  176, 184, 189 freedom of religion  721 full-face covering  183–5, 720–1

848   SUBJECT INDEX Netherlands (Cont.) gender relations/women  706 immigration/migrants 706 multiculturalism 706 niqabs 184–5 patriarchy 727–8 pluralism 724 political parties  706–7 public opinion/perceptions  706–7, 721 right-wing populist parties  706–7, 720–1 security/securitization  721, 729 shariah law  669, 694 teachers  184, 189, 706–7 history/historical perspective  158, 159–60, 163–4, 174–5, 201 history test  175 homosexuality  177, 189 honour crimes  168–71 housing 172 human rights  193 identity 174–8 culture  164, 175 national 196 plural 175 radicalism/radicalization 194 religious  177–9, 188, 200 shared values  176 imams, Muftis and clerics  179–80, 186 chaplains 189 foreign donors and influence  179 home-grown 183 radicalism/radicalization  179–80, 183, 203 recruitment 160 training 183 immigration/migrants  159–65, 171, 188, 191, 197, 201, 706, 720–1 inburgering  173, 175, 183 incitement of hatred  200–1 individuals and individualization  178, 188 Indonesians  158, 159, 172 infrastructure, research into religious  204 institutions/organizations  6, 158, 180–3, 186, 189–90, 192, 195, 204, 634 integration  158, 160, 162, 164–77, 186–8, 191–6, 198–9, 204, 643 international law obligations  185 Internet  179, 203

Islamic marriages  190–1, 195 Islamic schools  158, 183–4 Islamic studies  176 Islamophobia  196–201, 751–2, 762–3 Jews/Judaism  176, 178, 180, 189, 201 jihadis 193 labour/guest workers  159–60, 163–4, 166, 172, 179, 201–2 language  160, 163, 166–7, 180, 195, 757 n.16 legal matters  158, 201 living environment  172–3 loyalty to country  175, 177 marriage and divorce  171, 177, 178, 190–2 forced marriage  191–2 gender relations/women  203 import marriages  191 Islamic marriages  178, 190–1, 195 polygamy 681–2 shariah law  190–2, 679–82 media  164, 177, 179–81, 188, 198–200 moderates 197–8 Moluccans 159–60 Moroccans  159–65, 168–72, 179–81, 184–5, 191, 197–8, 200, 202, 662 mosques  177–8, 181 building/establishment  159–60, 187–8, 635–6, 649, 664–5 education and schools  182, 186 funding 187 multiculturalism  158, 162–6, 171, 173–4, 200, 635, 706, 762–3 municipalities and social cohesion  173–4, 194, 202 national allegiance  173 national identity  196 National Minorities Conference  180 nationality  161–2, 175, 177, 190 naturalization 161–2 Netherlands Coordinator for Combating Terrorism (NCTb)  194 neutrality 185–7 new immigrants  159 niqabs 184–5 number of Muslims  162, 189, 199 Other, Muslims and Islam as the  198–9 patriarchy 727–8 personal freedom  176

SUBJECT INDEX  

pluralism  635, 724 political participation/representation  169, 172, 176, 180–2, 188–9, 197–202, 706–7,   720, 762–3 postcolonial migrants  159–60, 163, 172 prayers 178 prisoners  169, 186, 189, 195 private domain  178 private welfare support, state support for 186 profiling 193 Protestants  179–80, 189, 195, 197 psychological factors  168, 177, 191 public opinion/perceptions  164, 174, 182–4, 195–200, 706–7, 721 public sphere/visibility  158, 178, 183, 203 race and ethnicity  161–9, 177–81, 187–8, 197–8, 201–2 radicalism/radicalization  158, 177, 190, 193–6, 202 AIVD (Dutch Intelligence Agency)  193–5 discrimination 194 foreign donors and influence  203 imams, Muftis and clerics  179–80, 183, 203 integration  192, 194–6, 204 Islamophobia 199 profiling 193 salafism 194 securitization 195–6 segregation and parallel societies  193–5, 204 socio-economic status  165–6 terrorism 193–4 youth 193–4 recognition 649 religious authorities  178–80, 183, 189, 203 religious education  158, 182–4, 204, 640–1, 649 religious identity  177–9, 188, 200 religiosity  177–80, 202 representative bodies  180–1, 189–90, 649 research  158, 165, 167–84, 188, 191, 196, 198–204 residence patterns  159, 172, 198 return  160, 163 right-wing populist parties  169, 172, 176, 197–201, 662, 706–7, 720–1, 762–3

849

rituals, festivals and holidays  158, 163, 176, 178, 190–1 Rotterdam  159, 172–4, 181, 183, 186, 188 Salafism 194 scholarship  158, 163–4, 175–6, 179, 193, 201–3 secularism/secularization  158, 179–80, 182, 202 security/securitization  192–6, 721, 729 segregation  166–7, 172, 193–5, 203–4 separation of church and state  185–7, 190 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on United States  178, 182, 196–7 shared values  173, 176, 662 shariah courts/tribunals  178, 192, 204 shariah law  178, 190–2, 204, 656, 669, 679–82, 694 social bonding and isolation  203–4 social cohesion  173–6, 187–9, 194 social welfare system, burdens on  171–2 socio-cultural status  165–6, 173–5, 198 socio-economic status  163, 165–73, 177, 179, 199, 643 Somalians  159, 170–1, 198 state, relations with  185–92, 195 Surinamese  159–60, 162, 165, 168–9, 172, 179–80 surveillance 193 talaq, recognition of  679–80 terrorism  179–80, 190, 192–6 theology  158, 177, 179, 182–3, 189, 201–2 traditionalists/conservatives  170, 178, 191, 203 transnationalism 203 Turks  159–65, 168–72, 175, 179–81, 184, 191, 197–8, 200, 202–3 unemployment 167–9 upbringing 177 white flight  172 xenophobia and racism  168, 196 youth  158, 167–70, 173, 177, 179, 190, 193–4 networks  see transnationalism and transnational networks neutrality  6, 626–8, 667–9 Nicaragua, Contra’s war in 760 niqabs  702, 703, 705, 710, 717–22, 729–30 Northern League (Legal Nord) (Italy) 274–5, 277, 283–4, 291, 662, 664

850   SUBJECT INDEX Norway Danish Cartoon controversy  416 discrimination and equality  406, 411, 413, 416 education and schools  649 employment  406, 411 Eurabia thesis  416 freedom of expression  416 gender relations/women  406 halal/religious slaughter  649 historical perspective  392 immigration/migrants  397–8, 405–6 institutions/organizations  398, 411 international constraints  416–17 Internet 416 Iraq 393 Islamic Council of Norway  411 Islamophobia  411, 413, 416 male circumcision  674 media 411 mosques, building/establishment of  411, 649 multiculturalism  761 n. 20 number of Muslims  397–8 Oslo and Utøya atrocities of 22 July 2011  141, 413, 761 n.20, 765 Pakistan 393 Progress Party  400 public opinion/perceptions  411 public space/visibility  411 recognition 649 registration 398 religious education  649 representative bodies  411, 649 right-wing populist parties  400, 662 scholarship 392 shariah law  662 Somalians 397–8 socio-economic status  405–6 state church, registered members of  392 terrorism/violence  141, 411, 413, 761 n.20, 765 Tunisians 392 unemployment 406 Nursis  465, 573, 580 Observatorio Andalusí  313–15, 332 oil crisis  224 n.6, 225, 391 oppression narrative  773, 775–6, 786

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)  225, 315, 502 Orientalism  223, 252–3, 371, 704, 726, 747 orthodoxy, evolution of  10, 16, 196, 505, 538 Oslo and Utøya atrocities of 22 July 2011 141, 413, 761 n.20, 765 Other  745, 759–60, 776, 804 Ottoman Empire Eastern Europe  3–4, 5 millet system  350, 354, 359, 433, 568 Orientalism 223 Pakistan/Pakistanis Afghanistan 791 Denmark  391, 393–5 dower 684 dupattas 703 hijab/headscarves  702–3, 707 Germany  112, 133 Greece  362, 364–8, 371, 375–81 Italy  268, 270, 276, 284, 290, 299 nationalist associations  10 Norway  393, 398 radicalism/radicalization  773–4, 776, 786–7, 791, 794 recognition of foreign decisions  688 Scandinavia  391, 393–8, 402, 406 shariah law  684, 688 Spain  313, 315–16, 324, 326, 336 Tablighi movement  794 United Kingdom  68–70, 72, 74, 76, 81, 86, 99, 702, 707, 773–4 Waziristan 773 Palestine/Palestinians Germany  105–6, 112 Greece  362, 365, 380–1 intifada 786 Israel/Palestine conflict  250, 786 Italy 294–5 radicalism/radicalization  250, 786–7 pan-Islamism  12–13, 34, 36, 468, 529 Paris Mosque (GMP)  24, 36–7, 38–9 patriarchy colonialism 726 discrimination and equality  726–7 Euro-Islam 802 feminism  727–8, 731

SUBJECT INDEX  

fundamentalism 726–8 hijab/headscarves  717, 726–8 Orientalism 726 postcolonialism 726 public opinion/perceptions  726 public space/visibility  727 penal law  672–4, 677, 691 perennialists  454 n.100 personal law  627, 676, 683, 691, 695 see also family law pilgrimage  41, 90–2, 339, 410, 440–1, 462, 540, 592, 595, 671 Pious Forefathers (al-salaf al-salih) 13–14 political ideology, Islam as  197–8, 415, 745 political participation/representation  2, 631, 638, 662, 706–7, 723, 753, 761–2, 765 polygamy  659, 680–2, 687 Pomaks (Muslim Bulgarians)  594–7, 605 abroad, studying  579, 594 Bektashi mystical order  356 Christianity and Christians  578 education and schools  579, 594, 600 gender relations/women  596 Greece  355–6, 357, 360–1 identity  577–9, 587, 594–5, 597 numbers 577 oral tradition  578 Ottoman Empire  477, 568–9 persecution 477 political participation and representation  597 race and ethnicity  577–8, 597 radicalism/radicalization  579, 595, 600, 602 religiosity  578–9, 595 rituals, festivals and holidays  578 Salafism 579 social and economic status  582 Thrace, Muslim majority in  355–6, 357, 360–1 Turks 577–8 Portugal  634–5, 649, 751–2 postcolonialism  3, 4, 13 n.22, 704, 726 Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) 83 prison and prisoners  631, 792 private international law  190, 321, 629–30, 677–82, 695 privatization of religion  34, 229, 541–2, 554, 623–4, 627, 804 prayers

851

employment  39, 50, 90, 381, 671 institutionalization of Islam  625, 631, 637 Protestantism  3, 43 n.3, 179, 637 psychology  777–8, 782 public international law  186, 190, 466, 624 public opinion/perceptions  see also Islamophobia Danish Cartoon controversy  10, 334, 416 education and schools  642 full-face coverings  717–22 hijab/headscarves  10, 701, 705, 717–22, 726, 729–30 institutions/organizations 637–8 mosques, building/establishment of  636 multiculturalism 763 Orientalism 371 Salafism 802–3 shariah law  657–65, 694 social media  10 special pleading  10 terrorism and violence  10 public schools  621, 627, 637, 640–3, 705–30 public space/visibility 5–8 assimilation 6 cooperation between state and religious institutions, methods of  6 European Convention on Human Rights  627 hijab/headscarves  702, 704, 717, 727 illegitimacy of role of religion  7 institutions/organizations 626–30 integration  6, 7 neutrality 626–8 pluralism 626–8 politics and religion, differentiation of  6 Salafism 802–3 secularism/secularization  6, 805 shariah law  7–8, 667 Pussy Riot 548 Qurʾan burning by American pastor  753, 754–5 hijab/headscarves  703–4, 719 literal interpretation  13–14, 37, 483, 553 Pious Forefathers (al-salaf al-salih)  13–14 production of copies  15 Salafism 13–14 shariah law  658–9

852   SUBJECT INDEX Quilliam Foundation (UK) 83 race and ethnicity  see also xenophobia and racism Eastern  Europe 4 Euro-Islam 803 identity building  11–12  institutions/organizations 622 ‘Islamic problem’  5 Islamophobia 756 new immigrants  4 radicalism/radicalization  2, 3, 770–96 see also jihadis accommodation 637 al-Qaeda  773, 775–6, 779, 781, 784, 788, 791, 793–4 assimilation 782–3 asylum seekers  9 bringing home conflicts  786 cognitive openings  782–4 colonialism 773 communitarianism 787 community radicalism/ radicalization 785–90 criminology  777, 780 culture and cultural heritage  775–7, 782, 785–90, 793 Danish cartoons controversy  774, 779 definition  770, 771–2 democracy and democratic values  793 demonstrations and protests  786 deradicalization  771, 794–5, 796 deterministic approaches  777–9 development approaches  780–2 diaspora  775, 787–8 discrimination and equality  6, 622, 785–8, 796 economic grievances  788 European Union  770 family reunification  785–6 foreign donors and influence  599, 774 foreign policy  777 framing theory  779, 784 freedom of movement  9 fundamentalism  624, 637, 771, 776, 789, 792–3 generational differences  773, 785–6 geography 772–5

government policy  793–5 group grievances  775–6 hijab/headscarves 774 historical perspective  773–5, 785–6 home-grown radicals  771, 790–1 hubs 771 humiliation  787–8, 790 proxy, by  788, 790 hyper-radicalization 791 identity  775, 777, 785–90, 792–3 imams, Muftis and clerics  789 immigration/migrants  773, 785–6 individuals and individualization  623–4, 771–96 analytical approach  777 cognitive openings  782–4 deterministic approaches  777–9 development approaches  780–2 discourse 784 frame resonance  782 framing theory  779, 784 identity  777, 792 pathways  780–1, 796 processes  780–2, 794, 796 social conditionalities  777 social learning theory  777, 780, 783 terrorism and violence  777–84, 793 institutions/organizations  622, 624–5, 634, 637, 773 integration  785–6, 794 Internet  771, 777–8, 781, 791–3 IRA  770, 782 Iraq war  779, 785 Islamism  770–7, 779–80, 782, 785–6, 789–91, 793–6 Islamophobia 782 left-wing radicalization  770 lone-wolves 781 London bombings 2005  770, 774 Madrid bombings 2004  248, 342–3, 770, 774, 779 Middle East  786 mosques 786 media 771 mobilization 777 mujahideen  444–5, 451–2, 517, 549, 773, 789

SUBJECT INDEX  

multiculturalism  9, 787 networks 786 non-integration, promotion of  794 North Caucasus  772, 774–5 number of Muslims  9 oppression narrative  773, 775–6, 786, 790, 793 organizations  772, 786 Other 776 political, spiritual and social needs  778 pre-radicalization 793 prisons 792 processes  780–2, 794, 796 psychology  777–8, 782 rational choice theory  775, 782 religiosity  789, 792–3 representative bodies  6, 637 right-wing radicalization  770 role of religion  792–4 Salafism  772, 775–6, 785, 789, 792–4 security/securitization  637, 770, 790 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on United States  770, 791 shariah law  691, 695 social conditionalities  777 social learning theory  777, 780, 783 social movements  775, 785 social networks  781, 791, 794 socio-economic status  777, 788–9, 795–6 stereotyping 780 stigma 786 suicide attacks  770, 772, 794 Tablighi movement  48, 88, 786, 793 terrorism and violence  5, 9, 770–91, 793–6 theoretical approaches  775–90 traditionalists/conservatives  772, 774–5, 785–7, 789 training 791 universities 792 virtual communities  789–91 xenophobia and racism  782, 787 Ramadan  92, 295, 339 diversity 530 Eid al-Fitr  84, 86, 379–80, 671 employment  241, 671 Pomaks 578 religiosity  42, 232 n.16, 241, 243, 289, 379, 460–1, 577, 596 n.20

853

representative bodies  236 xenophobia and racism  291, 370 rational choice theory  775, 782 recognition comparative tables  644–52 family law  687–8 foreign law  8 institutions/organizations  619, 624, 626, 629, 631–2, 637, 644–52 norms, of  632 selective recognition  625 shariah law  626–7, 677, 679–81, 684, 687–9, 692, 695 refugees and asylum seekers  4, 9, 363, 786 Regulation on Succession and Wills (EU) 683 religion, freedom of  see freedom of religion religiosity 10–13 see also believing, behaving, and belonging culturally sentimental Muslims  10 defensive Muslims  10 education and schools  724 generational differences  11 hijab/headscarves 724 minimally believing/practising Muslims  10 pious Muslims unconcerned with public affairs 10 radicalism/radicalization  789, 792–3 Ramadan  42, 232 n.16, 241, 243, 289, 379, 460–1, 577, 596 n.20 residence, area of  11 rise in religiosity, social conservatism and apoliticism 9 social media  15 socio-economic status  11 sociologically Muslim  10 strict observance  10 religious authorities  620–3, 630–1, 704 see also imams, Muftis and clerics religious slaughter  see halal/religious slaughter representative bodies comparative tables  644–52 discrimination and equality  6 institutions/organizations  621–3, 626, 629, 631–2, 637, 644–52 integration 7

854   SUBJECT INDEX representative bodies (Cont.) moderates  6, 622, 631 multiculturalism 9 radicalism/radicalization  6, 637 secularism/secularization 7 state, reshaping of Islam by the  7 research agendas 3–9 Eastern Europe  3–9 ideological influences  3–4 immigration studies  3–5 international constraints  9 political influences  3–4 public space, religion in  5–8 religious dimension  3 sociology of religion  3 Western Europe  3–9 resource mobilization 630 right-wing populist parties  656, 662–5, 727, 759–63 riots  24, 45, 46–50, 72, 371, 414, 754, 761 n.20, 785 rituals, festivals and holidays  see also burials and cemeteries; halal/religious slaughter; prayers; Ramadan Aid el-Kebir festival  282, 638 Christmas 277 discrimination 84 Eid al-Adha  41, 379, 671 Eid al-Fitr  84, 86, 379–80, 671 employment 671–2 female genital mutilation (FGM)  168–71, 177 institutions/organizations  631, 638 male circumcision  672–3 pilgrimage  41, 90–2, 339, 410, 440–1, 462, 540, 592, 595, 671 shariah law  658, 660–1, 671, 673–4, 696 Roma Bulgaria  569, 572–3, 579–82, 586, 597–8, 603, 605 census data  579–80 discrimination and equality  357, 586 education and schools  357, 360, 572–3, 580, 582 employment  356–7, 572, 582 exclusion and marginalization  357, 598 ghettos 573 Greece (gypsies/Athiganoi)  355–7

identity 579 immigration/migrants 582 integration 587 language  360, 579 non-traditional movements, influence of 580 number of Roma  574 Orthodox Christians  579–80 political participation and representation 598 Protestants 579–80 race and ethnicity  357, 579 radicalism/radicalization 573 religiosity 357 Salafism  573, 580, 603 segregation  573, 580 socio-economic status  572 stereotyping 357 stigma 357 Rome III Regulation on international divorce law 683 Runnymede Trust’s Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia (CBMI)  84, 709, 745–6 Rushdie affair  10, 47, 81–2, 84, 226, 786 Russia 517–56 see also Chechnya Afghan mujahideen resistance  517 antagonism or accommodation  519–20 Avar model  523 Azerbaijan 526 Bashkortostan  520, 524, 543, 552 believing, behaving, and belonging  518, 521–3, 530 Beslan attack  551 n. 85 blogosphere 546 Caucasus  518, 521, 525–9, 532, 540–3, 546–7, 551, 553–5 censorship 545 census data  524–5 Central Asia  518, 521, 525–7, 543, 547–8, 554–5 China  518, 543, 545 Christianity and Christians  527, 548 Circassia  529, 554 civil and criminal procedures  533 Cold War  358, 477, 519, 521, 760 comparative approach  530–1, 554–5 constitution 538

SUBJECT INDEX  

converts 545–50 Council of Europe  518 culture and cultural heritage  519, 521–2, 530, 534, 538–9, 545, 555 Dagestan  521–4, 526, 529, 531, 535–6, 540–7, 552–4 democracy and democratic principles  540, 547 demographics  518, 520, 523–5, 528–9, 547 demonstrations and protests  522, 543 deportations 541–2 dialectics  519–20, 521–2, 533 diaspora 555 discrimination and equal treatment  526, 528, 530 gender relations/women  520, 528–9, 531–2, 537, 547 Islamophobia  9, 520, 548, 551–5 diversity  519, 527–9, 533–4, 536, 544 DUMRT (Muslim Spiritual Board of Tatarstan) 539–40 education and schools  543–5, 548–9, 553–5 higher education  544–5 language 529 mosques 545 political issue, as  543–4 religious education  520, 522, 526, 529, 532, 539, 543–4, 549 textbooks 534 employment  525–7, 539 enemies, Muslims as internal and external 804 essentialism 520 ethnography  532–3, 549, 553, 556 Euro-Islam project  537, 539 family in transmission of knowledge, role of family  528–9, 539, 549, 554 fluidity of the religious field  532–8 foreign donors and influence  534–5, 539–40, 548, 554 freedom of religion  534 fundamentalism  535, 537–8, 551 gender relations/women  520, 528–9, 531–2, 537, 547 generational differences  528–30, 539, 542, 545–6, 549–50, 555 government policy  530, 538, 545, 548, 551, 553, 555

855

Greece 363–4 halal/religious slaughter  530 hijab/headscarves  528, 531–2 history/historical perspective  2, 4, 517–23, 537–8, 543–4 human rights  553 identity  524–5, 527–9, 534–6, 553–4 ijtihad 537 imams, Muftis and clerics foreign donors and influence  554 funding  533, 543 multiplication of muftiates  539, 541, 543 radicalism/radicalization  517, 536, 540, 548, 552 Sufism 540–1 immigration/migrants  518, 523–8, 538, 543, 548, 555–6 institutions/organizations  522, 526, 534, 538–9, 542–3, 548–9 integration  518, 523–32, 555 inter-faith relations  528 Internet  526, 530, 543, 546, 550 interpretation  522, 537, 553 Islamic Revival Party of the USSR (IRP)  535, 542, 547, 555 Islamophiles  518, 551–4 Islamophobia  9, 520, 548, 551–5 Jadidism  521–2, 537 Jews 534 jihadis  525, 529, 541–2, 547, 550 kolkhoz system  522, 541 Kremlin-approved extremism  547–9 Kumyks  523, 541 labour migrants/guest workers  525–7, 539 language  522, 529–32, 552 marriage and divorce  526, 531 media  517–18, 521, 526, 530, 535, 546, 548–52 mixed marriages  526, 531 moderates  518, 534 mosques  526, 536, 539, 545, 548–9 mujahideen  517, 549 Muscovy 519 National Organization of Russian Muslims (NORM) 546 nationalism  546, 554–5 number of Muslims  524 Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 517

856   SUBJECT INDEX Russia (Cont.) Orient, relationship to  519 Oriental studies  519, 521–3, 532, 553, 556 Orthodox Church  520, 528, 532, 534, 538, 544–9, 555 Ottoman Empire  517, 529 political participation/representation  518, 527, 535, 542–3 politicization, barriers against Islam’s 549–50 prayers 526 privatization of religion  541–2 protest organizations  543 Protestants 527 public opinion/perceptions  518, 536, 551–2 public sphere/visibility  518, 524, 538–43 publications  533, 535, 545–6, 552 qualitative parameters  528–9 quantitative approaches of religious affiliations and practices  527–8 Qurʾan  532, 545, 553 race and ethnicity  519, 522–9, 531, 534–40, 548, 553–5 radicalism/radicalization  517–18, 528–9, 534–7, 553, 789 converts 545–50 jihadis  525, 529, 541–2, 547, 550 Kremlin-approved extremism  547–9 hijab/headscarves 528 imams, Muftis and clerics  517, 536, 540, 548, 552 Internet 546 Islamophobia 552 jihadis  525, 529, 541–2, 547, 550 securitization 550–2 terrorism and violence  546–8, 550–1 traditionalism/conservatism 545–7 Ramadan 530 reform  521–2, 536–40 regions 520 religious authorities  520, 533, 538–41, 545, 551 religious education  520, 522, 526, 529, 532, 539, 543–4, 549 religious identity  524–5, 527, 534–6 religiosity  522, 524–7, 532, 555 representative bodies  543

repression  518, 522, 540, 552–3 resettlements, impact of mass  522–3, 541 retraditionalization 531 return 529 rituals, festivals and holidays  520, 527, 530–1, 532–3, 540 Salafis  522–3, 525, 527, 534, 535–8, 540–1, 555 Saudi Arabia  517, 529, 540 scholarship  519–21, 526, 532–4, 538, 545, 552 Second World War  520 secularism/secularization  518, 521–2, 533–42 security/securitization  519, 534, 550–3 segregation  528, 538–9, 541, 548 separation of church and state  545 September  2011, terrorist attacks on United States 543, 550 Shafii theology  532 Shanghai Five  518 Shi’a Muslims  546 Siberia 532 social sciences  532–8, 551, 553, 555 socio-economic status  518, 528 sociology of religion  518, 521, 523–4, 528–32, 540 Soviet Union  9, 363, 417, 517–29, 532–41, 545–8, 553, 556, 760 stagnation period  522 stereotyping  522, 531 Sufism  523, 540–3, 546–9, 555 suicide bombers  531, 547, 772 Sunni Muslims  540, 546, 550 Tablighi movement  555 Tajikstan  525–6, 535, 543, 555 Tatarstan  520, 524, 526, 528–32, 536–40, 542, 549, 551–2, 555 terrorism and violence  518–19, 546–53, 772 theology  522, 532–3, 544 traditionalists/conservatives  519, 521, 525, 529–40, 543–51, 555 transnationalism  518, 522, 525, 534–6, 543, 545, 549–53, 555 Tsarist Russia  517–20, 524, 532, 536–8, 543–4, 553, 556 violence  536, 540–1, 548, 550–3 Volga region  520–1, 524 n.18, 528, 530, 536–7, 542–3, 554

SUBJECT INDEX  

xenophobia and racism  526 youth  528–9, 542, 545–7, 549–51, 555 Salafism/Wahhabism  772, 775–6, 785, 789 Al Qaeda  781 deradicalization 794 dress code  15 Euro-Islam 802–3 fundamentalism 793 gender relations/women  803 Global Salafi Jihad  781–2, 790 growth of influence of global Salafism 12–16 hijab/headscarves  15, 669, 803 imams, Muftis and clerics  14 Internet  12, 14–16 Islamic centres, building of  14 Islamization of societies  13 juridical schools (madhab) 13 literal interpretation of Qurʾan  13–14, 803 literature, distribution of  14 media 14–15 neo pan-Islamism  12–13 Pious Forefathers (al-salaf al-salih)  13–14 postcolonialism  13 n. 22 pre-radicalization 793 proselytization (dawa)  14–16 public education programmes  12 public opinion/perceptions  802–3 public space/visibility  802–3 Qurʾan 12–15 revivalism 13–14 Roma  573, 580, 603 Saudi Arabia  13–15 schools, financing of  14 shariah law  663–4, 675–6, 691, 695 social problems, dealing with  793 Sunni Islam  14 transnationalism 12 universities  14, 792 West, attitudes to  13 n. 22 youth 663–4 Saudi Arabia Albania  478, 482–3, 488, 497, 506, 603 Bosnia and Herzegovina  438, 446–7, 462–3, 603 Bulgaria  579, 602–3

857

education and schools  14, 462, 483, 497–8, 593 fatwas 14 foreign donors and influence  13–15, 225–6, 360, 482–3, 495–8 Bosnia and Herzegovina  446–7, 462–3 Bulgaria  579, 602–3 Kosovo  487–8, 506 France 37 imams, Muftis and clerics  14, 360, 488, 496, 602 Internet  14, 16 Kosovo  487–8, 495, 498, 506, 603 Macedonia 603 niqabs 669 oil crisis  225 Qurʾan, production and distribution of  15, 462 Russia  517, 529, 540 Salafism  13–15, 37, 462–3, 789 segregation of women  497 Spain  315, 326 Scandinavian countries 391–419 arts, involvement in the  418 assimilation 398–401 Christianity and Christians  402 citizenship  392, 394 converts 391 culture and cultural heritage  391, 399–400, 412 demographics 391–2 discrimination and equal treatment  394, 417 employment  401, 417 essentialism 407 family law  413 gender relations/women  417, 418 history/historical perspective  392, 412 homosexuality 418 housing 417 identity  399, 406–7 immigration/migrants  391–412, 417–18 individuals and individualization  412–13, 418 institutions/organizations  406, 412, 417–19 integration  398–401, 419 international obligations  413–17

858   SUBJECT INDEX Russia (Cont.) Internet 418 interpretation of Islam  412, 417–18 Iraqis 393 Islamophobia  413, 417, 746 knowledge production  391 language 393 masculinity 418 media  391, 393, 398–9, 413, 417 moderates 417 mosques  393, 406, 417–18 multiculturalism 413 Muslim Brotherhood  418 Muslim, definition of  393–4 nationality 402 number of Muslims  392–8, 401–2 Pakistanis  391, 393–8, 402, 406 political participation/representation  394, 401, 417–19 prayers  403, 417 prisoners 410 public opinion/perceptions  391–2, 400, 417 public sphere/visibility  6, 406–11 publications  396, 399, 413 qualitative perspectives on individuals and groups 412–13 race and ethnicity  392–3, 402, 407 radicalization 417 regions 393 religious authorities  412 religious identity  399, 406–7 religiosity 418 representative bodies  406, 417–19 right-wing populist groups  417 rituals, festivals and holidays  401, 411–12 Salafis  393, 418 security 417 segregation  401, 417 shariah law  412–13 Shi’a Muslims  393 socio-economic status  394, 401–6 Somalians  394–5, 397–8, 402, 406 South-East Asia  391 stereotyping  413, 415, 418 Sufis  393, 418 Sunni Muslims  393 terrorism and violence  394, 417

traditionalists/conservatives 417 transnationalism 418 Turks 391 unemployment 401 scapegoating  265, 550, 749 scholars of the past (taqlid) 659 schools  see education and schools secularism/secularization  2, 804–5 education and schools  642 Euro-Islam 803–5 halal/religious slaughter  638 immigration/migrants 756 individuals and individualization  804 institutions/organizations  620–1, 627 Islamophobia  748–9, 756–64 neutrality 6 public space/visibility  805 radicalism/radicalization 770 relativization 804–5 representative bodies  7 shariah law  656, 658–63, 667, 676, 691, 693–6 security/securitization culture and cultural heritage  3 hijab/headscarves  702, 717, 731 immigration/migrants  3, 749, 756, 760–2 institutions/organizations 625 Islamophobia  748–9, 756–44 radicalism/radicalization  637, 790 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on United States  3 shariah law  661, 676 segregation/seclusion  625, 635, 642, 702, 754–5 Senegalese/Senegal France 29 Italy  268–9, 273, 284–5, 287–90 Spain  315–16, 324, 328, 336–7 separation of church and state  6, 620, 622, 666 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on United States hijab/headscarves  704, 728 institutions/organizations 622 Islamophobia  9, 745, 748–9, 753, 759–61, 765

SUBJECT INDEX  

links between Western Muslims, radical Islam and terrorism  9 Qurʾan by American pastor, burning of  754 radicalism/radicalization  770, 791 security/securitization 3 suspect Muslim communities  5 Serbians/Serbia Albania  475, 489–90 Bosnia and Herzegovina  430–4, 437–8, 442, 451, 465–7 Chetniks (extremists)  434 fundamentalism 503 hijab/headscarves 603 Islamophobia  496, 603 Kosovo  489–90, 497, 502–3 national identity  499 nationalism 489–90 Ottoman Empire  569 religious authorities  485 Salafism 603 Shah Jahan Mosque, Woking (UK) 68 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)  518, 543, 545 shariah law  2, 656–96 accommodation  684, 694–6 application of Islamic legal rules  676–94 external reasons given by the state  676, 677–87 internal reasons  676, 687–94 application of Islamic religious rules 667–76 arbitration 8 children, protection of  678 civil law  671–2, 677–86, 693–4, 695 commercial disputes, ADR in  694 constitutions, inclusion in  8 construct to oppose Islam, as  7 contract  8, 658, 677–8, 680–1, 683–7, 690 corporal punishment  659, 663 criminal law  7–8, 674 cultural identity  8 cultural reasons for application  676, 687–95 cultural sensitivity of judges and administrations 696 decontextualization 7–8 definition 656–60

859

democracy and democratic principles  663, 668–9, 696 differentiation between religious and legal rules 665–7 dispositive substantive law  682–6, 695 diversity  8, 694 dower (mahr or sadaq)  684–5, 689 ECtHR, case law of  659–60 education and schools  662, 669–70 employment 671–2 enforcement, official system of  666, 687 equality of religion and beliefs  658–9, 663, 667–8 European Convention on Human Rights  659–60, 666–7, 694 ex-Muslims 657–8 external reasons for application given by the state  676, 677–87 dispositive substantive law  682–6, 695 introduction of Islamic provisions into law 686–7 private international law  677–82 family law  7–8, 658–9, 661–2, 676, 677, 684–92, 694–5 fatwas 674 finance 682–3 fixed medieval set of laws, construct as  7 foreign donors and influence  665–6, 676–7, 679–80, 682–3, 687–8 foreign law, recognition of  8 freedom of religion  658, 661, 664–8, 672, 676, 678, 695 gender relations/women  658–9, 662–3, 678–80, 692–3 hadith 658–9 hijab/headscarves  669–72, 694 human rights  7, 659, 667–8, 678 ijtihad 659 imams, Muftis and clerics, binding decisions from  693–4 individuals and individualization  668, 676–7, 687 informal application  674–6 institutions/organizations  626–8, 632, 661, 667–8, 676, 687–8, 695 internal reasons for application  676, 687–95 cultural reasons  676, 688–90

860   SUBJECT INDEX shariah law (Cont.) religious reasons  676, 690–4 technical/institutional reasons  676, 687–8, 695 interpretation  658–9, 666, 694 introduction of Islamic provisions into law 686–7 investments 682–3 Islamism  656, 669, 675 Islamophobia  660, 664 language 662 legal situation  665–94 male circumcision  672–4 marriage and divorce  8, 190, 321, 359, 627, 678–80, 687–90, 692–3 mosques, building/establishment of  664–5 Muslim-majority countries  7 mutual recognition  677, 679–81, 684, 687–9, 692, 695 national identity  663 neutrality 667–9 not to believe, right  678 optional civil law  682–6, 695 overlapping jurisdictions  627 penal law  672–4, 677, 691 personal law  627, 691 pluralism  8, 658–9, 665–6, 695 polygamy  659, 680–2 polygamy 687 private international law  677–82, 695 public law  667–71, 677 public opinion/perceptions  657–65, 694 public policy  684–5 public space/visibility  7–8, 667 Qurʾan 658–9 radicalism/radicalization  691, 695 recognition  7–8, 626–7 religious reasons for application  690–4 repudiation, termination of marriage by  190, 321, 359, 678–80, 687–9, 692 right-wing populist parties  656, 662–5 rituals, festivals and holidays  658, 660–1, 671–4, 696 Salafism  663–4, 675–6, 691, 695 scholars of the past (taqlid) 659 scope and limits of application  665–94

secularism/secularization  656, 658–63, 667, 676, 691, 693–6 security/securitization  661, 676 state-religion relations  666–7 Sunna 658 talaq  190, 321, 359, 678–80, 687–9, 692 technical/institutional reasons for application  676, 687–8, 695 territoriality, principle of  665 thought, conscience and religion, freedom of  666–7, 694 traditionalists/conservatives  658–60, 663, 674–5, 678–9, 682–8, 691–3 transnationalism 687 youth 663–4 Sharia4Belgium  248, 656 Sharia4Holland 656 Sharia4UK 663 Siddiqui Report 78–9 slaughter  see halal/religious slaughter social learning theory  777, 780, 783 social media  10, 15 social networks  781, 784, 791 social security 680–1 sociologically Muslims, individuals who are 10 sociology of religion  3, 158, 267, 518, 527 socio-economic status  2, 11–12 discrimination and equality  5 identity building  11–12  immigration/migrants 4–5 institutions/organizations  631, 638 ‘Islamic problem’  5 Islamophobia  749, 753 radicalism/radicalization  777, 788–9, 795–6 underclass  5, 580, 787 Somalians/Somalia Italy  265, 268–70, 273, 284 Netherlands  159, 170–1, 198 Norway 397–8 Scandinavia  394–5, 397–8, 402, 406 refugees and asylum seekers  4, 70, 159 United Kingdom  66–7, 70 SOS Racisme (France)  25, 30 Soviet Union  9, 363, 417, 517–29, 532–41, 545–8, 553, 556, 760 Spain 311–44 see also Madrid bombings 2004

SUBJECT INDEX  

Algeria  315–16, 330, 336, 341 Andalusia  313, 322–3, 325–7, 332, 339, 341 Aragon  322, 330–2 Association of Muslims in Spain (AME) 318 autonomous regions  322–31 Basque country  322, 328–9, 332 believing, behaving, and belonging  335–42 burials and cemeteries  327 Canary Islands  328, 332 Catalonia  322–8, 333 Catholics  312, 314, 317–18, 321, 330, 337, 340, 643, 723–4 census data  312 Ceuta and Melilla  313, 327, 332, 338 Christianity and Christians  334, 337, 340, 643 Catholics  312, 314, 317–18, 321, 330, 337, 340, 643, 723–4 Protestants  323, 328 clash of civilizations  311, 342 colonialism 340 comparative approach  334–5 Constitution  312, 318 converts  313–15, 318, 325, 329 cooperation agreements  318–19, 321, 323, 330–2 criminal cases, informal dispute resolution in 674 culture and cultural heritage  312, 322–3, 326, 328–9, 333, 341–2 democracy and democratic principles  338 demographics  312, 343 demonstrations and protests  325 discrimination and equality  327–9, 331–2, 336, 341–3, 720, 727 diversity  312, 322–31 education and schools  312–13, 323–4, 330–3 gender relations/women  328–9, 331–2 higher education  313, 326, 329 hijab/headscarves  331–3, 342, 710 public schools  6, 330–2 religious education  321, 329–33, 335, 650 employment  315–17, 327–8, 336, 755 essentialism 341 family law  321 family reunification  322, 330

861

freedom of expression  342 freedom of religion  317, 318, 342 gender relations/women  327–9, 331–2, 341–3, 720, 727 generational differences  314–15, 329, 336 halal/religious slaughter  321, 650 health and healthcare  336 hijab/headscarves  331–3, 705, 709, 710, 723, 730 Catalonia 333 Catholicism 723–4 education and schools  331–3, 342, 710 full-face coverings  333, 720 Islamophobia 710 Madrid bombings  710 Muslim rule  710 patriarchy 727 public opinion/perceptions  710, 720 radicalism/radicalization 720 shariah law  669 historical perspective  311–12, 317, 322, 326, 339–44 homosexuality 335 housing 336 human rights  338 identity  313, 335, 338 imams, Muftis and clerics  321, 324, 327, 338 immigration/migrants  311–17, 322–44 indigenous Islam  312 individuals and individualization  318 institutions/organizations  6, 312–14, 318–30, 333–6, 342–3, 634 integration  322–4, 338, 341 Internet 343 Islamic centres  324–5 Islamic Commission of Spain (CIE)  318–21, 331–2 Islamic Council of Spain  319 Islamophobia  312, 339–42, 710, 749–51, 755 Jews/Judaism  323, 334, 340 jihadis 343 Junta Islámica  326 language  312, 329, 332–3 legal framework  312, 317–18, 344 loyalty to country  338 Madrid  319, 322, 325, 327, 329–30, 335 marriage and divorce  318, 321–2, 681

862   SUBJECT INDEX Spain (Cont.) Moro, use of term  340–1 Moroccans  313, 315, 322, 324, 326–31, 335–43 mosques  321–9, 336, 338 Andalusia 325–7 buildings/establishment  324–5, 639, 650 Catalonia 324–5 gender relations/women  327 Madrid 329 Muslim rule  339–40, 710 new Islam (recent immigrants)  2, 4 niqabs 333 North Africans  313, 322, 325–31, 335 number of Muslims  312, 328, 330 Observatorio Andalusí  313–15, 332 Pakistanis  313, 315–16, 324, 326, 336 pluralism  311–12, 317–23, 328, 330–1 political participation/representation  312, 338–9 polygamy 681 prayers  317, 323–4, 335 prisoners  321, 327, 343 private international law  321–2 Protestants  323, 328 public opinion/perceptions  312, 334–5, 339–42, 710, 720 public space/visibility  317–31, 335 publications  311, 314, 327, 334 race and ethnicity  341–2 radicalization  334–5, 342–3, 720 Ramadan 339 recognition  313, 317–19, 323, 331–3, 650 regions  312, 314, 322–31, 344 religious authorities  6, 315, 338 religious education  321, 329–33, 335, 650 religious identity  335, 338 religiosity  313, 317–18, 333–42 representative bodies  6, 313–14, 318–30, 333, 335–6, 342–3, 650 riots 327 rituals, festivals and holidays  321, 332, 335, 338–9, 650 Saudi Arabia  315, 326 scholarship  314–15, 322 secularism/secularization  317, 335 segregation  328, 335, 341 Senegalese  315–16, 324, 328, 336–7

September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on United States  342–4 shariah law  321, 669, 681 socio-economic status  312–17 Spanish Federation of Islamic Religious Entities (FEERI)  318–21 state-religion relations  335, 338 stereotyping 341–2 Sufism  323, 324–5 theology 324 transnationalism  312, 324, 327–8, 339, 344 unemployment  315, 336 Union of Islamic Communities in Spain (UCIDE) 318–21 Valencia  313, 319, 322–3, 327, 330 war on terror  344 youth  329, 339 Srebrenica massacre 466 Srpska, Republic of  437, 442, 447, 466–8 Stasi Commission  32, 713–14 state-religion relations  624, 626, 632, 635, 638, 643, 666–7, 729 stereotyping  708, 754, 765, 780 stigma  34, 46, 83, 274, 357, 748–9, 756, 759–63, 777, 786 stoning  7, 691 succession and wills 683 Sufism  13, 324–5, 328 n.5, 356, 480–2, 485, 490, 499–501, 574–5, 590, 592, 603 suicide attacks  248–9, 411, 416, 531, 546 n.72, 547, 772, 777, 794 Sülemanci movement 125 Suleymanists  418, 580 Sunna  13–14, 319, 331, 658 Sunni Muslims  14, 641 Surinamese  159–60, 162, 165, 168–9, 172, 179–80 Sweden age 396 Christian Council of Sweden  401 Christian Social Democrats (Brotherhood Movement) 409 Christianity and Christians  392, 401, 409 citizenship  395–7, 409 converts 710–11 crime 400 culture and cultural heritage  411, 711

SUBJECT INDEX  

Danish Cartoon controversy  416 democracy and democratic principles  409 demographics 396 diaconal work  410 discrimination and equality  405, 413 diversity 711 education and schools hijab/headscarves  710–11, 719 public schools  711, 719 religious  410–11, 650 employment  401, 405, 410, 414–15 entrepreneurs 410 Eurabia thesis  415 freedom of religion  711 gender relations/women  409–20, 415, 705, 709, 710–11, 719, 727 halal/religious slaughter  410, 650 hate crimes  750 health and healthcare  409–10 hijab/headscarves  410, 705, 709, 710–11, 719, 727 historical perspective  392, 395 honour killings  411 housing  401, 405, 414–15 immigration/migrants  395–7, 400–1, 711 institutions/organizations  396–7, 409–10, 634 international constraints  414–16 Internet  410, 416 Iranians 397 Iraqis  397, 405 Islamic Centre  396–7 Islamism 410–11 Islamophobia  413–15, 711, 750 male circumcision  673 Malmö 400–1 media  410–11, 415, 711 moderates 410 mosques, building/establishment of  393, 396–7, 410–11, 639, 650 multiculturalism 410 number of Muslims  395–7 patriarchy 727 pluralism 724 police registers  392 political participation/representation  400– 1, 409–11, 415, 662

863

popular culture  411 private issue, religion as a  411 public opinion/perceptions  400, 410–11, 413, 415, 710–11, 719 public space/visibility  409–11 publications 396 race and ethnicity  397, 403 radicalism/radicalization  410–11, 414–16 recognition 650 registration 392–3 religiosity  392, 403, 711 religious education  410–11, 650 representative bodies  650 residence patterns  401 resident permits  396 right-wing populist parties  400, 410, 415, 662 rituals, festivals and holidays  321, 332, 335, 411 security/securitization  410–11, 415–16 segregation 405 shariah law  662 Social Democrats for Faith and Democracy 409 socio-economic status  405 SST (Commission for State Grants to Religious Communities)  396, 409 Stockholm 405 suicide bombers  416 Swedish Democrats (SD)  400 Tatars 395 terrorism  410–11, 415–16 Turks 392 unemployment 405 Union of Islamic Congregations in Sweden (FIFS) 409 violence 400 youth  396, 401, 403, 410–11, 415 Switzerland cantons 711 citizenship 711 education and schools  711–12, 641 European Convention on Human Rights 712 freedom of religion  712 gender relations/women  719 hate speech  754

864   SUBJECT INDEX Sweden (Cont.) hijab/headscarves  669, 705, 709, 711–12, 719, 723, 728–30 Islamophobia  753, 754–5 male circumcision  674 media 711 mosques/minarets, building/establishment of  39, 625, 664 hate speech  754 Islamophobia  753, 754–5 no campaign poster  726–7, 728–9 referendum 754 shariah law  668–9, 694 neutrality 712 official religions  711 public opinion/perceptions  719, 754 religious education  641 right-wing populist parties  656, 662, 664, 668 secularism/secularization 711 security/securitization729 separation of state and religion  666, 711 shariah law  656, 662, 664, 668–9 Swiss People’s Party  656, 664, 668 xenophobia and racism  729 symbols  7, 803–5 see also hijab/headscarves boundaries 803–4 institutionalization of Islam  627, 637, 639 shariah law  665–6, 668, 680 Syria, conflict in  509, 547, 584, 773–4 Tablighi movement  293, 393, 540, 555 fundamentalism 793 gateway organization, as  793 globalization 37 jihadis 794 Muslim Brotherhood  13 Pakistan 794 pre-radicalization 793 proselytising  15 n. 30, 326 n.4, 377–8 radicalism/radicalization  48, 88, 786, 793 religious education  794 Russia 555 Salafism 13 terrorism and violence  297 transnational networks  127, 326–7, 339, 418 Tajikstan  525–6, 535, 543, 555

takfiri Islamism  541, 603 talaq  190, 321, 359, 678–80, 687–9, 692 tariqas  324–5, 328 n.5, 443 Tatars/Tatarstan radicalism/radicalization  772, 789 Russia  520, 524, 526, 528–32, 536–42, 549, 551–2, 555 Sweden 395 territoriality, principle of 665 terrorism and violence  see also London bombings 2005; Madrid bombings 2004; September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on United States Danish Cartoon controversy  754 deradicalization  795, 796 Euro-Islam 804 fundamentalism  726, 728–9 hijab/headscarves  704, 726, 728–9, 731 institutions/organizations  631, 773 IRA  770, 782 Islamophobia  728, 751–4, 756, 759 jihadis  48, 89, 297–8, 343, 773, 789–91 legitimatizing role of religion  793 lone-wolves 781 multiculturalism  761 n. 20 Oslo and Utøya atrocities of 22 July 2011  141, 413, 761 n.20, 765 public opinion/perceptions  10 radicalism/radicalization  5, 9, 770–91, 794–6 stereotyping 754 suicide bombers  248–9, 411, 416, 531, 546 n.72, 547, 772, 777, 794 war on terror  5, 222, 468, 477, 508, 804 thought, conscience and religion, freedom of  666–7, 694 Thrace, Muslim minority of  350–61, 381–2 burials and cemeteries  376 Citizenship Code  366 n. 13 demographic description  354–7 discrimination and equal treatment  352, 357–8 education  360–1, 372 employment  355–7, 369 ethnic composition  354–7 family law  686

SUBJECT INDEX  

gender relations/women  359 government policy  357–9, 369 imams, Muftis and clerics  357, 359–60, 376 judicial system  358, 359 language  352–8, 360 legal status  357–9 marriage and divorce  372 migration to urban areas  355–6, 368–9 mosques  359–60, 373 Muftis  357, 359–60, 376 courts 359 election versus appointment  359–60 pseudo Muftis  360 recognition  357, 360 nationality, loss of  358 new immigrants  366 political participation/representation  358 Pomaks  355–6, 357, 360–1 recognition  357, 360 religiosity  354–5, 357 Roma (gypsies/Athiganoi)  355–7 Sunni Muslims  356 Turks  350–61, 686 traditionalists/conservatives  see also rightwing populist parties; Salafism hijab/headscarves  702–3, 707, 710, 716, 727–8, 803 institutions/organizations  623–4, 632 Islamophobia  746, 755 literalism  13–14, 37, 483, 553 moralization, trend towards  9 orthodoxy, redefinition of  10, 16 radicalism/radicalization  772, 774–5, 785–7, 789 religiosity, rise in  9 shariah law  658–60, 663, 674–5, 678–9, 682–8, 691–3 social conservatism, rise in  9 transnationalism and transnational networks  see also foreign donors and influence Council of Europe  624 European Convention on Human Rights 624 identity  10, 12 institutions/organizations  7, 12, 624, 629, 631–2

865

‘intolerable subjects’  5 Islamophobia 757 orthodoxy, redefinition of  10, 12, 16 Salafism 12 shariah law  687 Tunisians/Tunisia France 26 Italy  268–9, 271–3, 284, 289–90 Norway 392 polygamy 659 recognition of foreign decisions  688 shariah law  659, 688 Turks/Turkey Albania  478, 480, 482, 495 Austria 661–2 Belgium  224–5, 230–1, 233–4, 238, 242–4 Bosnia and Herzegovina  464–5, 604 Bulgaria  569, 573, 574–82, 587–99, 602–5 Cyprus 358 diaspora 127 discrimination and equality  122 dower 684–5 education and schools  137, 577, 627, 637 employment  120, 128, 576 European Convention on Human Rights  659–60, 694 France  26–7, 625 gender relations/women  121, 627, 687, 715–16 Germany  110–17, 120–8, 142–3, 715–16 dower 684–5 education and schools  137, 637 gender relations/women  687 hijab/headscarves  121, 715–16 institutionalization of Islam  125–6, 625 Islamophobia 142 political participation and representation 135–7 religiosity  108, 114 shariah law  687 Greece  351–61, 366, 369–70, 381 Greco-Turkish War  352 Kemalists  354, 356, 358 population exchange  352–4 Thrace, Muftis in  360 Turkification  358, 360 Gülen movement  482

866   SUBJECT INDEX Turks/Turkey (Cont.) hijab/headscarves  121, 627, 715–16 identity 597 imams, Muftis and clerics  360 institutionalization of Islam  125–6, 625 Islamophobia 142 Kemalists  354, 356, 358 Kosovo 604 Kurds  161, 362, 366 Macedonia 604 military service  175, 352 mosques 123 Netherlands  159–65, 168–72, 175, 179–81, 184, 191, 197–8, 200, 202–3 neutrality 627 political participation and representation 135–7 Pomaks 577–8 religiosity  108, 114 Scandinavia 391–2 secularism/secularization  356, 686 shariah law  687 Sweden 392 Thrace, Muslim minority of  350–61, 686 Turkish Refah Partisi  659–60, 694 underclass  5, 580, 787 United Kingdom 63–93 see also London bombings 2005 8th century to 1945  65–8 1945 to present day  68–70, 80–1, 89–90 age 71 assimilation 81 asylum seekers  70, 74 Bangladeshi settlers  70, 72 banking and finance  73 believing, behaving, and belonging  68, 74–5, 87–92 Birmingham Central Mosque, shariah council of  85 British Muslim Arbitration Tribunals (MAT) 691–4 British Muslim Studies  73, 93 buildings 68 burials and cemeteries  74, 75–6 burquas 718–20 Cardiff mosque in  1860, establishment of 68

Yemeni and Somali seafaring communities 66–7 Catholics 626 census data  63, 70–4, 81 Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations (CRER)  73–5, 77, 79 Centre for Research on Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations (CSIC)  76–7, 79 chaplains, 78, 82 charities 92 children, special guardianship of  686–7 Christianity and Christians  66, 76, 85, 626 cities, settlements in particular  63–4, 66–8 citizenship test  757 colleges 63 communal networking  74 community cohesion  82 Community Religions Project (CRP)  74–5, 77 comparative approach  66 culture and cultural heritage  73–4, 689 demobilized servicemen, settlement of  68 demographic change  70–3 diaspora  79, 89 discrimination and racism  72–4, 81–5 employment 84–5 Equality Act 2010  85 hijab/headscarves 708–9 Islamophobia  9, 83–4, 707, 708–9, 745–6, 749–52, 758, 763 xenophobia and racism  72–4 diversity  70, 75, 87–92, 750 dower  684–5, 689 dress in workplace  84 economic activity  71–3 economic migration  69–70 education and schools  71, 73–4, 76, 86, 90–2 funding 81–2 hijab/headscarves  91, 666, 707–9, 725–6 Islamic Studies in Britain  76, 78–90 public schools  642, 707–8, 724 religious education  74, 78, 81–2, 84, 87, 90–1, 633, 642–3, 651 seminaries 79 universities 78–9

SUBJECT INDEX  

employment  71–3, 84–5, 671–2, 755 entrepreneurship, wealth-creation and achievement 73 Equality Act 2010  85 Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) 85 European Convention on Human Rights  666, 708 family law  85, 684–5, 689, 692, 694 far-right extremism  84 fasting 92 fatwas  91, 226 foreign donors and influence  79–80, 626 framing 81 freedom of religion  707–8 funding  73–4, 81–2 gender relations/women  69–71, 76, 82, 86, 91–2, 662, 692–3 generational differences  69, 88–9 government policy  66, 71, 74, 76–7, 80–7, 92 halal/religious slaughter  73, 76, 91 651 health and healthcare  71–2 hijab/headscarves  705, 707–9, 720–1 ban, debate on  708, 718 burquas and niqabs  718–20, 725 discrimination 708–9 education and schools  91, 666, 707–9 European Convention on Human Rights 708 full-face coverings  708, 717–20, 725 freedom of religion  707–8 institutions/organizations 725–6 Islamophobia  707, 708–9 London bombings  709 media 707 multiculturalism  707, 718 pluralism 724 public opinion/perceptions  708, 718 right-wing populist parties  718 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on United States  709 thought, conscience and religion, freedom of 708 historical perspective  65–73, 80–1, 626 housing  71–2, 86 identity  73–4, 78, 81–2, 84, 87–8, 93 ijtihad (interpretive effort)  78

867

imams, Muftis and clerics  75, 79–80, 92 immigration and settlement  64, 65–75, 82, 86 individuals and individualization  78, 83–4 institutions/organizations  82, 86–92, 624–6, 725–6 integration  64, 87–92 inter-disciplinary perspectives  73–80 Internet  76–8, 91 IRA  770, 782 Islamic centres  74 Islamic Studies in Britain  76, 78–80 Islamisation of space  90 Islamophobia  9, 83–4, 707, 708–9, 745–6, 749–52, 758, 763 Jewish courts  85 Jews/Judaism 84–5 jihadis  773–4, 776 language 71 leadership  76, 79–81 life-cycle rites  74, 75–6 literary works  66 Londistan 774 margin of appreciation  666 marriage and divorce dissolution of religious marriages  686 gender relations/women  692–3 polygamy 680–1 register marriages, places entitled to  686 shariah law  689, 692–3 talaq  689, 692–3 media  67, 83, 85, 707 mobilization 82–3 mortgages 683 mosques building/establishing  68–9, 75–6, 87, 90, 639, 651 leadership 81 networking 74–5 religious education  78, 90–1 Yemeni and Somali seafaring communities 66–7 multiculturalism  64, 74, 81–2, 93, 266, 707, 718, 761 n.20 Muslim Council of Britain (MCB)  81–2 myth of return  69, 70, 81, 89–90 networking and community  74–6, 81–2

868   SUBJECT INDEX United Kingdom (Cont.) newer migrants  70, 82 niqabs  718–20, 725 number of Muslims  70 official religion, in  6 Pakistanis  68–70, 72, 74, 76, 81, 86, 99, 702, 707, 773–4 pluralism  85, 724 policing 83 political participation and representation  72, 81–7, 638, 718 polygamy 680–1 postcolonialism  2, 3 poverty and deprivation  72–3 prayers  90, 92 ‘Prevent’ projects  87 Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) agenda 83 prisoners 90 private space of homes  76 professionalization of welfare and pastoral services Muslim communities  77–8 protest and lobbying  81–2 public opinion/perception  83–4, 708, 718 public space/visibility  6, 84, 90 publications  70, 80, 84, 87, 92 Qurʾan, recitation of  78 race and ethnicity  69–75, 81–2 radicalism/radicalization  80, 83, 93, 784 Ramadan 92 recognition 651 reform movements  87–8 religious education  74, 78, 81–2, 84, 87, 90–1, 633, 642–3, 651 religious identity  73–4, 81–2, 84 representative bodies  81–2, 86, 651 research  63–80, 83, 86–7, 91–3 residence patterns  66–8, 71–3, 76, 85–6 return  69, 70, 74–5, 81, 89–90 right-wing populist parties  718 riots/urban disturbances  72, 761 n.20 rituals, festivals and holidays  75, 84, 92 Runnymede Trust  84, 709, 745–6 Rushdie affair  10, 47, 81–2, 84, 226, 786 Salafis 89 scholarship  66, 75, 77, 79, 91, 93 schools of thought  88, 91, 93

seafaring communities  66–7, 69 segregation  67, 72–4, 82 seminaries 79 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on United States  77, 84, 86, 709 shariah councils  85, 91, 689, 691–3 shariah law  78, 84–5, 91, 627, 660, 680–1, 689, 691–4, 695–6 Shi’a Muslims  93 social cohesion  82, 87, 643 social media  66 social policy  64, 80–7 social welfare  86 socio-economic status  71–2, 81 Somalians  66–7, 70 South Asia, settlers from  68–76, 81, 88, 92 state-church relations  625 stereotyping 84 Sufis  68, 75 symbols 666 talaq 692–3 terrorism  83–4, 93, 770, 782 thought, conscience and religion, freedom of 708 traditionalists/conservatives  78, 91 transnationalism  68, 75, 93 UKIP 718 universities 78–9 xenophobia and racism  72–4 Yemeni and Somali seafarer communities 66–7 youth  64, 71, 79–80, 82, 89, 93 United Nations (UN) 748 United States  see also September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on United States Al-Qaeda 759 anthrax attacks  759 Cold War  358, 477, 519, 521, 760 foreign policy  753, 759–60 Grenada, invasion of  759–60 Gulf War 1991  135, 334, 704, 786 immigration/migrants  5 n. 3 Iraq, invasion of  84, 334, 709, 759, 773–4, 779, 785–7 Islamophobia  749–50, 753, 756, 758–60, 762 Kosovo 494

SUBJECT INDEX  

Libya, bombing of  225, 247–50, 760 Nicaragua, Contra’s war in  760 radicalism/radicalization 784 Salafism 14 Soviet Union aggression  760 terrorism and violence  759–60 university chairs, financing of  14 universities, radicalization in 792 UOIF (Union des organizations islamiques de France)  35–6, 41 violence  see terrorism and violence virtual communities 789–91 visibility  see public space/visibility Vlaams Bloks  226–7, 251 Wahhabism  see Salafism/Wahhabism Al Waqf al Islami 579 war on terror  5, 222, 468, 477, 508, 804 Waziristan 773 Western superiority, idea of  753, 757, 759–65 women and girls  see gender relations/ women; hijab/headscarves World Muslim League (WML) 225 xenophobia and racism anti-Semitism  127, 201, 747 n.3, 750 European Union  748 n. 5 hijab/headscarves  706, 717, 728–9

869

radicalism/radicalization  782, 787 Yearbook of Muslims in Europe  589, 593, 634 Yugoslavia Albania  477–9, 484–6, 490, 498–9, 501, 509–10 Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of  429, 434, 437, 440, 444, 446, 465 dissolution  429–30, 435, 436, 464, 465–8 liberalization 453 dissolution Albania  486, 498–9, 510 Bosnia and Herzegovina  429–30, 435, 436, 464, 465–8 diversity 484–6 identity 490 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)  465 n. 135, 466–7 inter-war period, experience during  478 Islamophobia 496 Jews/Judaism 434 liberalization  453, 476 persecution 478–9 public space/visibility  498 restitution of religious property  501 Salafism 663–4 security 477 socialism, experience under  478