The overthrow of Allende and the politics of Chile, 1964-1976 0822933551, 0822952874

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OVERTHROW " "EIENDE »tics of Chile, 1964-1976 mimi

PITT LATIN AMERICAN SERIES H| Uff*

The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976

The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976 f PAUL E. SIGMUND

University of Pittsburgh Press

Published by the University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15260 Copyright © 1977, University of Pittsburgh Press All rights reserved Feffer and Simons, Inc., London Manufactured in the United States of America Second printing 1980

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Sigmund, Paul E The overthrow of Allende and the politics of Chile, 1964-1976. (Pitt Latin American series) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Chile—Politics and government—1970— 2. Chile—Politics and government—1920I. F31OO.S5 320.9’83’064 77-7181 ISBN 0-8229-3355-1 ISBN 0-8229-5287-4 (pbk.)

Title.

Contents

List of Illustrations

ix

Preface

xi

3

1.

The Coup and Its Causes

2.

The Context of Chilean Politics

14

3.

The “Revolution in Liberty”

23

4.

The Frei “Revolution” Stalls

57

5.

The Emergence of the 1970 Candidates

77

6.

The 1970 Presidential Election

92

7.

Allende’s First Year: The Illusion of Success

128

8.

Polarization and Brinkmanship

161

9.

The Politicization of the Military

188

10.

Prelude to the Coup

202

11.

The Overthrow of Allende

231

12.

Chile’s New Order

248

13.

The Lessons of Chile

275

Notes

295

Index

321

Illustrations

The Chilean presidential palace in flames.

6

Daniel Vergara leads the delegation leaving the presidential palace.

7

Ralph A. Dungan, U.S. ambassador to Chile, 1964-67.

40

Eduardo Frei, president of Chile from 1964 to 1970, with Edmundo Perez Zujovic, his interior minister in 1968-69.

71

Edward M. Korry, U.S. ambassador to Chile, 1967-71.

114

Salvador Allende receives the presidential sash.

129

President Salvador Allende denounces ITT intervention at the United Nations General Assembly.

192

A Chilean policeman is clubbed by a member of the Popular Revolutionary Brigade.

205

Soldiers enter the side entrance of the presidential palace.

245

The president of the Chilean Supreme Court with the new military junta.

251

General Augusto Pinochet, president of Chile since 1973.

271

ix

Preface

I became a Chile-watcher in the early 1960s, when my interest in ideologies of development and in the prospects for constitutional democracy naturally led me to a country where both seemed to flourish. A teaching stint at the two major universities in Santiago in 1967 under the auspices of the Rocke­ feller Foundation gave me a deeper understanding of a complex society at a crucial point in its development. Direct observation of the 1970 presi­ dential election and visits to Chile and articles on Chilean politics over a decade induced me to begin to write this book during the last part of the Allende regime. Since the book was begun before the 1973 coup, it was not written with a preestablished thesis in mind, although I was interested initially in com­ paring the effectiveness of the Frei reforms, which were based on a blend of Christian Democratic, populist, and technocratic prescriptions, with the Marxist-inspired changes being introduced by the Allende regime. The tragic overthrow of Chilean democracy in September 1973 led me to shift the focus to a more direct analysis of the proximate and remote causes of the coup as well as its consequences in the drastic changes which followed. Finally*'the post-coup revelations of the extent of U.S. intervention in Chile since the early 1960s required a consideration of the relative influence of external and domestic factors on the course of Chilean politics. While I did not and still do not possess a single explanation around which to organize the narrative that follows, I have operated with certain assump­ tions which probably should be stated at the outset. As befits a scholar whose original training and writing was in political philosophy, I have as­ sumed that ideas are not mere epiphenomena, but, particularly in a literate and free society, exert a direct influence on conduct and political decision­ making. When, as in Chile, they are organized into ideologies which form part of the raison d’être of a multiparty system, they mobilize to political action, influence policy, and complicate the task of developing democratic consensus. I also believe that in a political system with the strong constitu­ tional and legalist tradition of Chile, institutions and legitimated patterns

\i

xii t

Preface

of political action make a difference in political outcomes. That the Frei government could adopt the strongest agrarian reform law ever adopted under democratic auspices, that a committed Marxist could come to the presidency of what was basically a very “bourgeois” society, and that he would only be overthrown after the breakdown of the economy and the widespread belief that his government was systematically violating the con­ stitution, are all explicable in terms of the strength of Chilean political institutions which until September 1973 endured strains that no other demo­ cratic system in the world could have supported for such a period of time. In keeping with this, I also believe that Chilean politics is influenced principally by internal factors, and that, contrary to the dependency school now dominant in Latin American social science, external influences have not been central determinants of the course of political life there. This em­ phasis therefore distinguishes this study from those which attempt to explain recent Chilean politics primarily in terms of either U.S., Soviet, or Cuban intervention. I take account of the role of the CIA and U.S. policy, but I do not believe it made a decisive difference. I am now convinced—with the benefit of hindsight—that even if the CIA had not been giving substan­ tial financial support to the opposition, Allende would not have lasted a full six-year term unless he had drastically altered his policies, so long as the armed forces retained the autonomy and independence which they were guaranteed from the outset of his administration. There were also external pressures inspired or influenced by U.S. policy, but Allende’s self-defeat­ ing domestic economic policies and polarizing politics were adopted from the outset of his administration and seemed to ignore or disregard what his predecessor had recognized—that, particularly with as fragile and inflationprone an economy as Chile’s, there are serious economic constraints on the possibilities of more than incremental changes in a democratic system, al­ though over time those changes may in fact result in a “revolutionary” shift in political and economic power. Recognizing the political, economic, and institutional limits on policymaking, I also have assumed that there was no inevitability about the course of recent Chilean history, and that there were always alternatives available —some of which might have avoided the tragic dénouement of 1973. In particular, at the beginning of both the Frei and Allende administrations, alternative ways of dealing with those outside the government party or parties could have made a difference in Chile’s subsequent political evolu­ tion. Similarly, in the middle of their periods in office, both presidents had opportunities to alter their political and economic policies in ways which could have avoided the downward spiral which occurred in both cases— with far greater intensity and adverse effects, of course, in Allende’s case than in Frei’s. To identify these and other crucial turning points in the stormy recent history of Chile, I refer the reader to the following chapters.

Preface t

xiii

As I hope this book will demonstrate, neither Frei nor Allende fits into the neat categories that the mythmakers of left and right have assigned to them. Frei was neither the willing tool of foreign and domestic reaction nor the initiator of a social revolution in Chile, but a dedicated democrat who tried to use constitutional channels to promote a greater degree of social justice for low-income groups. Allende was neither an innocent so­ cial democrat overthrown by fascist thugs and the CIA, nor a Marxist revolutionary who manipulated Chile’s democratic institutions in order to set the stage for a violent Communist seizure of power. Rather, he was a skilled parliamentary politician committed to aiding the poor and under­ privileged, who could never abandon his romantic admiration for those, like Castro and Guevara, who had waged a successful armed revolution. When at last the contradiction between parliamentarism and revolution led to his overthrow, he chose to die holding a submachine gun which was a gift from Fidel Castro. There is not space to identify and thank all those who have helped me, especially the hundreds of Chileans with whom I have discussed politics since my first visit in 1963. Besides the Rockefeller Foundation, which supported my teaching there, I should also express my gratitude to the Committee on Regional and International Studies and the Committee on Research in the Social Sciences and the Humanities of Princeton Univer­ sity, which made possible repeated visits to Chile over more than a decade, and to the Princeton Center of International Studies for its support for two summers of research and writing. The Twentieth Century Fund’s spon­ sorship of my current work on nationalization in Latin America was also helpful in the sections on Chilean policy toward the copper industry. Finally I wish to thank my wife for her continued advice, assistance, and example as to what a dedicated democratic (and Democratic) politician can accomplish. This book is dedicated to the Chilean people in the hope that they may soon reestablish the free society concerned with social justice that all those who have worked with them have known and loved.

The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976

CHAPTER ONE

The Coup and Its Causes

At 8:30 a.m. on September 11, 1973, Radio Agricultura in Santiago inter­ rupted its regular programming to play the Chilean national anthem, fol­ lowing it with the announcement, “This is the network of the armed forces and carabineros.” Citing “the grave social and moral crisis in the country, the government’s inability to control the chaos, and the constant increase in paramilitary groups trained by the Popular Unity parties which will lead Chile to an inevitable civil war,” the pronunciamiento demanded that Presi­ dent Salvador Allende turn over his office to the military and the national police, and declared that “the armed forces and carabineros are united in carrying out their historic mission and responsibility to fight for the liber­ ation of the fatherland [patria], to prevent the country from falling under the Marxist yoke, and to seek the restoration of order and institutionality.” The military declaration promised that the workers would not be deprived of their “economic and social conquests,” advised Santiago residents to re­ main in their homes, and ordered the progovernment press, radio, and tele­ vision to cease to function “beginning at this instant” or be subject to at­ tack by the Chilean army and air force.1 Informed earlier that the Chilean navy had seized Valparaiso, President Allende had left his residence in Santiago’s fashionable Barrio Alto for the presidential palace, La Moneda, shortly after 7:00 a.m. He was joined there by his ministers of foreign affairs, economy, and interior, as well as his close friend, José Tohá, former minister of interior and defense. In addidition, several doctors, his two daughters, his personal secretary (and, as the pro-junta press noted after the coup, “intimate friend”) Miria Contreras, along with a well-known journalist, Augusto Olivares, and the undersecre­ tary of the interior, Daniel Vergara, came to the palace. The armed per­ sonal bodyguard of the president (usually referred to as the GAP, an acronym for Allende’s description of them as a group of personal friends, “Grupo de Amigos Personales”), twenty detectives from the Investigation Squad (Investigaciones), and the three hundred carabineros of the Special Services section of the national police were also on hand to defend the

3

4

f

The Overthrow of Allende

palace. (After the carabineros were informed that the national police had joined the coup, they left the palace, dismantling the machine-gun em­ placements which had been set up in front of the building.) Allende replied over the radio to the military ultimatum, expressing his determination to resist “by whatever means, even at the cost of my life.” The military countered with a communique which accused his government of violating fundamental rights, “artificially fomenting class struggle, vio­ lating the constitution, destroying the economy, and endangering the secu­ rity of the country,” concluding that the Allende government was “illegiti­ mate, immoral, and unrepresentative of the overwhelming sentiment of the nation.” By 9:30 a.m. only one progovernment radio station continued to broad­ cast, and on it Allende delivered his last message to the Chilean people: This is surely the last time that I will be able to speak to you. . . . My words are not spoken in bitterness, but in disappointment. In the face of these events, I can only say to the workers, “I am not going to resign.” At this historic juncture, I will pay with my life for the loyal­ ty of the people.

Allende thanked the workers for their support and insisted that he had kept his promise to respect the constitution and the law. Blaming “foreign capital and imperialism allied to reaction” for creating the climate which persuaded the armed forces to break their tradition of nonintervention, he said he was speaking to the worker, the peasant, and the intellectual, to those who will be per­ secuted because fascism is already present in our country, blowing up bridges, cutting railroad lines, destroying pipelines in the face of the silence of those who should have taken action. History will judge them. . . . My voice will no longer come to you, but it does not mat­ ter. You will keep hearing it; it will always be with you. At the least you will remember me as an honorable man who was loyal to the rev­ olution.

During the speech, Allende said that the people should “defend them­ selves but not sacrifice themselves,” which seemed to indicate that he did not wish the workers to carry out armed resistance if it was evident that the armed forces possessed overwhelming military superiority. The military leaders in charge of the siege of the presidential palace were situated in the Ministry of Defense just across Santiago’s main boule­ vard, and Allende was in telephone contact with them throughout the morning. They gave him until 11:00 a.m. to surrender, repeating several

The Coup and Its Causes

f

5

times an offer of safe conduct out of the country for him and his family. At about 10:00 a.m. the president permitted his military aides to leave, as well as those of the twenty-man detachment of detectives from Investiga­ ciones who wished to do so. Over their objections, Allende finally per­ suaded his two daughters to leave the palace an hour later. He donned a helmet, gas mask, and bulletproof vest, and carried a submachine gun which had been a gift to him from Fidel Castro, inscribed “To my friend and comrade in arms, Salvador.” Along with progovernment snipers located in the upper floors of government buildings around Constitution Square be­ hind the palace, the only armed defenders of the palace besides Allende himself were the thirty members of the personal bodyguard and some de­ tectives from Investigaciones. When the telephone negotiations were concluded with the announce­ ment by the military that Hawker Hunter fighter bombers were already on their way to bomb the palace, those within took refuge in its side subcel­ lars on the theory that the pilots would hit only the central portion to avoid damaging surrounding buildings. At 11:55 a.m. the rocket bombing runs be­ gan. A total of eighteen rockets hit the building, and when the seven bomb­ ing runs were completed at 12:15 p.m., a thick cloud of black smoke bil­ lowed out of the north central facade and flames leapt out of the main entrance. After 140 years of almost uninterrupted constitutional rule, the Chilean armed forces, long known for their adherence to constitutionalism and civilian rule, had set fyre to the building that for most of that period had been the symbol of civilian constitutional government in Chile. After the bombing, a four-man delegation from Allende crossed over in an armored car from the palace to the Ministry of Defense to conduct sur­ render negotiations, but sniper fire prevented them from returning. Tanks and army troops began to advance on the palace amid sporadic firing from surrounding buildings. Shortly after 1:30 p.m. the besieging troops gave the defenders a four-minute deadline to capitulate. Allende, who was de­ fending the palace from the second floor, is quoted as saying, “Surrender. This is a massacre. La Payita [Miria Contreras] should leave first. I will go at the end.” A white handkerchief was tied to a broom, and the group be­ gan to file through the side door of the palace; but Allende did not follow them. Sniper fire forced those who had left the building to lie on the side­ walk, and the fighting continued within the palace between the members of the GAP and the soldiers led by General Javier Palacios, who had entered through the main gate. When they reached the Independence Salon on the second floor of the east side of the building, the soldiers found one of the president’s doctors with the body of Allende. The doctor, Patricio Guijón, said that he had seen the president shoot himself through the chin with his submachine gun. At 6:15 p.m., after examination by medical and ballistics experts, Allende’s body was taken out of the building wrapped in a poncho

The Chilean presidential palace, symbol ¡973. (United Press International)

o f civilian ride,

after rocket bombing by the Chilean air force, September

11,

render at the Ministry