The Objectivity of Historical Knowledge: How We Can Know the Past 9781495506970, 1495506975

Citation preview

Tnn On"rrcrIvITY

or IITSTORICAI

KXOWLEDGE

How We Can Know the Past

Han Goo Lee

With a Foreword by

Geoffrey Stokes

The Edwin Mellen Press Lewiston.Lampeter

Library of Congress Crtaloging-in-Publication Data Library of Congress Control Number: 2018955104 Names: Lee, Han Goo. Title: The objectivity of historical knowledge : how we can know the past / Han Goo Lee ; with a foreword by Geoffrey Stokes. Description: Lewiston, NY : Edwin Mellen Press, [2018] | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: ISBN 9781495506970 | ISBN 1495506975 Subjects: Philosophy. I Epistemology. I Philosophy-History and surveys.

hors sirie.

A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Front cover: The School ofAthens

Copyright

O

2018

All rights reserved.

Han Goo Lee

For information Contact

The Edwin Mellen Press Box 450

Lewiston, New York

usA

14092-0450

The Edwin Mellen Press, Ltd. Lampeter Ceredigion, Wales UNITED KINGDOM. SA48 8LT

Printed in the United States of America

For everyone seeking historical truth

Contents

Foreword

v

Prefoce

Introduction: A New Proposal for Justifying Historical

Objectivity

I

Part I. Historical Anti-Realism: History Is Storytelling t t 1.

Historical Realism and Historical

Anti-Realism

Basic Doctrines of Historical Realism (17)

13

/ Basic Doctrines of

Historical Anti-Realism (27) /Problems Afflicting Both Theories (3 1)

2. Presentism: History Is the Present on the Called "The Reasons

Screen

Pasttt

35

for Presentism (37) / The Epistemological Grounds of

Presentism (40) / Problems (49)

3. Pragmatism: History Is Written from the Viewpoint of

Utility

53

Pragmatism and the Reconstruction of the Past (55)

/

Pragmatism

and Historical Truth (61) / Problems (64)

4. Narrativism: History Is a Literary

A

History of Events and a History

of

Genre Structures (70)

69

/

The

Epistemological Structure of Narrative History (72) / Problems (88)

Part II. Historical Realism: History Is the Reproduction of the

Past

9l

5. Objectivity Is Compatible

with Multiple Viewpoints

Focal and Projcctive Viewpoint (95)

/

93

Perspectivism and

Objectivity (100) / Episternological Discussion of Viewpoints (104)

6. Realistic Narratives Can Reproduce the Characteristics

of

Narrative Idealism Discordance

7.

(l

Narratives

(ll2) I

(ll0) /

Past

Narrative Realism

Critical Examination

of

109 and

Structural

18) / Nanative History vs. the Historical Novel (122)

Critical Examination of the "Linguistic

Turn"

127

of the

Linguistic Turn: Linguistic Kantianism (128) lStructuralist Literacy Theory and the Form of Poetic Language (135) / Critical Discussion of the "Language Epistemic Implications

Determination" Thesis

( 143

)

8. How Do We Establish the Objectivity of Historical Knowledge? tst Two Meanings of Objectivity (158) / The Objectivity of Scientific Knowledge (163) / Scientific Knowledge vs. Historical Knowledge (169) I Hermeneutical Objectivity (l 74)

Part and

III. The Necessity of Incorporating Understanding

Explanation

9. The Historical

World Is a Cultural

l'19

World

183

Historical World as Culture (185) / World 3 and the Ontology of the Historical World (188) / Culture and Language (194)

10. Opposing Approaches:Hermeneutical Understanding

and Scientific

Explanation

197

Human Science and the Methodology of Understanding (198) / The

Practical Syllogism in Analyic Philosophy (207) Explanation: The Covering-Law Model

(2ll)

I

The Lngic of

lUnderstanding and

Explanation (219)

11. Rational Explanation Operates on Understanding 225 Descriptive Knowledge and Explanatory Knowledge (226) Rational-Explanatory Model (227)

/

I

The

Comprehensive Rationality

(236)

12. Supervenience Explains Both Social Structures and 239 Macro-Historical Laws The Concept of Supervenience (240) / The Relationship between Base and Superstructure in Marxism (245) lMacro-Historical [aws

and the Critiques of Anti-Historicism (248)

i Explanatory

Models

Based on Supervenience (254)

Part IV. The Historical View as a Scientific Research

Program

263

Writing without a Historical View Is Blind; 267 Historical View without Objectivity Is Empty 13. Historical

The Indispensability of a Historical View (269) / Epistemic Status of the Historical View: A

Piori

Hypothesis (278) /Historical View

and Paradigm (284)

14. The Historical View Can Be Formalized as Scientific Research Three Components

Program of the

Historical View (290)

a

289

/

Lakatos's

Scientific Research Program (298) /Formalization of the Historical

View as a Scientific Research Program (302)

I

Verisimilitude

of

the Historical View (305)

15. Two Prototypes of Modern Historical

Views:

Universal Progressive vs. Individual Developmental 3lt The Enlightenment and the Historical Sciences (312) / The Universal Progress of Civilization by Reason (3 l8) / The General Meaning of Historism (323) / Individual Development of National Spirit (325)

16. Types and Validity of Historical Views: They Should Be Evaluated in Terms of Their Explanatory Power 335 The Spiritual Vicw of History Q36) / The Materialistic View of History (3a6) / The Civilizational View of History (359)

Conclusion: The Wider the Horizon of Knowledge, the Greater the Possibility of Reproducing the Past 369

Notes

377

Bibliography

397

Index

FoRnwono Professor Han Goo Lee's book offers a wide array of arguments for understanding history as a science. Drawing extensively upon the philosophy of Karl Popper, the book traverses the fields of ontology, episternology, and methodology. It deploys Popper's arguments to good effect to criticize anti-realist, relativist, and subjectivist theories of history. This critical study addresses the work of many other philosophers, philosophers of history, and historians with a historiographical sensitivity. It may be ventured that, in many respects, both Popper and Lee are contributing to a conversation initiated by Weber in his 1904 essay on "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy."r Lee extends Popperian insights to propose three main

positive arguments for a realist and objectivist historical science. Like Popper, the author argues that the differences between science in its various forms and history are not as great as it is usually assumed. Indeed, it is striking how applicable to history is Popper's famous metaphor of driving piles into a swamp:

The empirical basis of objective science has thus nothing "absolute" about it. ... The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or "given" base; and if we stop

i

driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached frm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being.2

Some may question whether the aim should be to "reach verisimilitude," a concept that Popper explored and then abandoned, but the search for truth remains a primary epistemic motivation. Lee's first thesis claims that the existence of diverse points of view is compatible with historical objectivity. Historians will always begin from a viewpoint, but these are somewhai like hlpotheses in that they can be tested, and then changed where found deficient. Contary to those who argue for incommensurability, Lee, like Popper, claims that we are not prisoners of our conceptual frameworks. Our task is always to try to find ways to "converge and synthesize these viewpoints." The guiding epistunic values here are objectifiability and falsifiability. Historians must attempt to make their viewpoints objective, by which is meant open to public scrutiny and criticism. They must also understand that their viewpoints are fallible, and try to falsify them, as one would any other scientific hlpothesis.

For his second thesis, Lee outlines an "explanatory hermeneutics" in which explanation and understanding are complementary and indispensable. Explanation can be

by

deploying Popper's situational logic-his adaptation of the covering law model-and the historian is achieved

ll

urged

to

search

for

types

of

sitr.rations. Hermeneutic

understanding is pursued by investigating the desires, beliefs, and intentions of individuals, and rationally reconstructing the historical situation where they are expressed. It is shown

how history too is an exercise in problem solving by trial and error in which one of the functions of Popper's situational analysis is to maintain objectivism. For Lee, however, a key focus is on the objects that are in Popper's contentious World 3 of objective knowledge. Furtherrrore, the understanding (verstehen) of life, minds, culture, and historical periods is presented as a circular process of interpretation. That is, to come to an adequate understanding, the historian must refine their interpretations by continually shuttling between the general and the particular, individual and society, part and whole, within their changing contexts. In this way, historians can portray the interplay between

individual human intention and larger social forces, and come to tentative interpretations.

The third thesis develops further Lee's earlier of historical viewpoints by proposing that they are much like scientific research programs. Viewpoints provide the core theoretical systems for starting the process of reconstructing historical phenomena. Again, these account

viewpoints are not incommensurable. Once formulated and stated, they may be deemed limited or expansive, beffer or worse, and can be compared and criticized. Viewpoints are therefore not simply a matter of subjective preference or dogmatically held belief. For Lee, they can be evaluated in terms of their explanatory power.

llI

Lee takes the idea of convergence further to discuss

what I

would call "grand" historical viewpoints. These include the "universal-progressive" view of the Enlightenment, and the "individual-development" view of the historism, as well as those of Hegel, Mam, and the "civilizational" viewpoints of Toynbee and Spengler. Following Popper, however, Lee proposes that "human history is the history of the progress of knowledge." trn the current age of globalization, where national borders are generally becoming less relevant, there lies the prospect of a universal civilization. Lee contends that this "broadening of historical cognition" presses us to adopt the viewpoint of a "univemal history of humanity." This approach, in turn, requires that a universal history take account of the many

diverse, local histories, and thus become

more

comprehensive and objective.

Overall, Professor Lee has produced a substantial critical rationalist theory of history that develops in detail a number of Popper's often rudimentary and incomplete arguments on the topic. In so doing, Lee has thrown out many challenges to received wisdoms in the philosophy of history. No doubt his conjectures will be taken up, reviewed and fiercely debated. By his systematic and thorough analysis of the problem of history, Han Goo ke has performed a great service not only to the philosophy of history, but also for Popper scholarship. Geoffrey Stokes Deputy PVC, RMIT University Melbourne, Australia

lv

PRBrlcn This book treats the episternological basis of history from the viewpoint of critical rationalism. To date, the epistemology of history has been teated either dogmatically, using metaphysical methods, or relatively, using postmodem approaches. However, this book aims to prove that the

objectivity

of historical knowledge is

possible through

scientific research.

The epistemology of history is based on general epistemology but simultaneously has unique characteristics. The purpose of this book is to show the entire picture of historical epistemology by reexamining both modem scientific epistemology and the unique characteristics of historical epistemology, including hermeneutical understanding.

Traditional historical epistemology has

been

primarily concerned with explanations of individual events, so the issue of how to interpret and organize the results of historical research has been neglected. In other words, epistemologists have focused on historical research rather than on the narrative writing of history. However, it is substantially important for historians to combine individual events ofhistorical research into a grand historical narrative. For this reason, the objective historical science that I discuss in this book includes the nanative writing of history. Most of the content covered in this look has been discussed in Philosophy of history written in Korean. This book is a reconstruction based on the content and logic of

v

the book, but it is not a simple English translation of the book. In the light of the world academy as well as domestic academy, I have made the logic more universal and more refined in this book.

My arguments for historical objectivity will developed

in

theses: (l)

be

with the following three central History can be interpreted from diverse accordance

viewpoints. However, this does not entail the abandonment of historical objectivity. (2) Historical knowledge requires both a hermeneutical understanding and scientific explanation. (3) Historical views can be formalized as scientific research programs.

To secure the possibility of objective history, this book argues against all types of historical relativism. I hope that it contributes somewhat to the pursuit of historical objectivity.

Han Goo Lee

Kyung Hee University, Seoul 2018

vl

IxrRooucrroN: A Nnw Pnoposal ron Jusurvrxc HrstoRrcAl On.lncrtvtrv The term "history" basically possesses two meanings.l On the one hand, it signifies a set of past events, while on the other hand it relates to the branch of academic research that takes these events as its subject. For instance, when we mention "the history of the Roman Empire," we are usually referring to the era of the Roman Empire or a phase of Roman history; however, sometimes we are indicating documents that were written about that era, such as the Annales (records of the Roman Empire by Comelius Tacitus).

To avoid confusing "historic event" with

the

"historic record," different terms are often used for each sense. ln German, Geschichre signifies the former, and Historie signifies the latter. In English, the terms "history" and "story" are sometimes used to convey these distinct meanings. Etymologically, the word "history" comes from Ancient Greek historia, meaning "inquiry," "knowledge acquired by investigation" or'Judge." In Korean, yeok-sa is used to refer to historic event, and yeok-sa moon-heon is used for the historic record (in the rest of this book, reminders of these distinctions are given when necessary). These two meanings of the term "history" are inseparably related. That is, the "historic record" ought to accurately reflect the "historic event," and as soon as it fails to do so, it becomes misleading. The relation in question is

I

similar to that between an object and a photo of that object, or between a geographical area and a map of that area. The purpose of a map is to represent the landscape of an area; thus an incorrectly drawn map is useless. If one draws a map that does not depict a place in the real world, it is more correct to call it an artwork than a map.

The aim of the mapmaker is to draw a map

as

precisely as possible, because accuracy in representation is a map's raison d'Affe. Think of the maps made in ancient or medieval times, which were considered to be extrernely accurate. However, these old maps are of little merit compared to the maps drawn in the modem age, which are, in turn, quite inaccurate in comparison to the contemporary maps produced by satellite technology. This shows that producing an accurate map is no easy task. In fact, there are many rules that ought to be followed when drawing a map, and there are various means of testing a map's accuracy by comparing it to the area it is supposed to depict. However, even though the practice of mapmaking is fraught with difficulties, it would be unreasonable for a mapmaker to abandon the task or to insist that the production of an accurate map is impossible. Such an assertion would be both negligent and irresponsible. The same lesson applies to the production of history. One who creates a history out of one's own subjectivity, or who justifies the distortion of history by appealing to the difficulties inherent in reproducing historical events, can no longer be considered a genuine historian.

2

Historical research is an extension from the simple records or testimonies of directly witnessed events to studying the causes of these events, the background context or interconnected structures related to them, and also the aftermath of such events. Moreover, historical research in a broad sense includes interpretations resulting from the research and accumulated knowledge of the past. Therefore, we can say that the diverse types of historical research have the shared purpose of revealing the past, while that historical research proceeds in a complex, multilayered structure. That said, the study of historical epistemology is concerned with the adequacy ofall these types ofhistorical research. Aristotle famously insisted that poetics is superior to history, on the grounds that poetics deals with universal possibility, whereas history deals with mere individual events. Since Aristotle's time, the question of whether history ought to be classified as a science or an art has remained a matter of dispute; the reason current discussions of historical understanding have become more complicated is related to the fact that the traditional distinction between science and art has recently disintegrated. In other words,

contemporary epistemology has added yet more complications to the difficulties of historical understanding by suggesting that even natural sciences cannot be guaranteed to be objective.

The naditional view is that it is not necessary for art to be objective; objectivity is, however, an obligation for science that has in recent times been challenged. For instance, Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions insists that we can interpret science in a similar

3

way to the way we interpret art. If this view cannot be refuted, then classiffing history as a science would not be a suffrcient reason to require objectivity from it. Therefore, if one were to argue that history must retain objectivity, one would bear the double burden of successfully classiffing history as a science and proving that science itself must retain objectivity. One might wonder if that is a possible task, given such circumstances.

The objects of historical research are events of the past that took place in a specific time and place. While we say that such events exist, they clearly do not exist in the same way that a current event is said to exist. Our investigation of a historical fact is therefore based on current observable evidence. Reconstruction of the past, in circumstances where only a fraction of past events leaves any trace, is like reconstructing an entire picture from damaged, scaffered, and incomplete fragments. Again, we may entertain doubts as to whether or not it is even possible to reconstruct a perfect picture from its fragments. Even though perfect reconstruction is theoretically possible, it is not clear whether or not it can produce the same product as the original.

Although there have always been skeptical objections to the reconstuction of the past, the present degree of skepticism is unprecedented. It would not have been possible for Leopold von Ranke to develop historical

studies as an independent field

of

academics without his belief that the reconstruction of history is possible. Moreover, even when historical studies was well on its way to becoming a social science in the twentieth century, being 4

considerably focused on socioeconomic history, it was never completely devoured by skepticism. The historical sciences of the French Annales, German Kritischer Theoie, and Marxism all developed under the assumption that the reconstruction of history is possible. However, since the 1970s, postmodernism has affected the field of history, threatened its academic characteristics, and brought upon it an unprecedented identity crisis. Posfinodern history denies the possibility of objectively reproducing the historical world, and it attempts to understand historical knowledge as a mere matter of subjective interpretation. In particular, the so-called linguistic tum-a tendency in philosophy that places too much emphasis on linguistic ubiquity-had a definite effect on the linguistics of history, as well as on the spread of postmodern literature theories. Hayden White insisted that a historian has no choice but to recreate past reality according to his framework, no matter how hard he or she tries to describe history objectively. White classified the modes of historical writing into three major tlpes: (a) mode of emplohnent, (b) mode of argument, and (c) mode of ideological implication. He further organized each of these types into subcategories:

mode of emplotment into romantic, tragic, comic, and satirical; mode of argument into formist, mechanistic, organicist, and contextualist; and mode of ideological implication into anarchist, radical, conservative, and liberal. According to White's classifications, any historian will write history according to a combination of these three modes. For example, it is claimed that Jules Michelet tried to combine romantic ernplotment, formist argument, and liberal

5

ideology, whereas Jacob Burckhardt tried to combine satirical emplotnent and contextualist argument with conservative ideology. Such an opinion leads to the ultimate denial of objective history by idurtiffing a fabrication of the facts with a discovery of the facts.

I

As a critical rationalist, have been a consistent opponent of relativism in the philosophy of science and have long been making a stand against scientific irrationalism. This book is an extension of my conviction that all science that probes the actual world must be committed to objectivity as a fundamental principle.

To be precise, we ought to distinguish historical research from historical writing. The former signifies the activity of the historian, whose aim is to reveal historical facts. Here, the historian uncovers facts in a manner similar to that of a detective solving crimes. Just as the detective aims to reveal the culprit of the crime, and also the motives or reasons for the crime, so the historian aims to reveal what has happened, how it happened, and why it happened. However, the vast majority of historical research is, in fact,

only about individual facts, and facts alone do

not

automatically suggest a unified narrative.

ln

contrast, the writer of history goes beyond the discovery of facts and seeks to weave the accumulation of facts into a consistent narrative. In this case, the discovery of facts is merely preliminary. Of course, historical writing does not always indicate one general history; it may indicate a history that is quite specific, such as a history dedicated to a particular period or one that ranges over a specific issue.

5

However, in historical writing, whatever the subject matter may be, that subject matter must be rendered into a consistent narrative. The distinction between the historical researcher and the historical writer is based on this idea.

Traditional historical epistemology has

been

concerned with the explanation of individual events, and so the question of how to interpret and compose the results of

historical research has been neglected. In other words, most discussions have been focused on historical research rather than historical writing. However, the problem of ufinost importance in historical epistemology is how to render the results of historical research into a consistent narrative. For this reason, the objective historical science that I discuss in this book includes the work of historical writing.

My argument for historical objectivity is

developed

through three cental theses:

(l) History can be interpreted from

diverse viewpoints.

However, this does not entail an abandonment of historical objectivity. It is possible to establish compatibility between the diversity of historical viewpoints and historical objectivity. (2) Historical knowledge requires both hermeneutical understanding and scientific explanation. In other words, history is simultaneously the object of understanding and the object of explanation. The incorporation of hermeneutical understanding and scientific explanation can be named "explanatory hermeneutics."

7

(3) Historical views can be formalized as scientific research programs. Historical writing without historical view is blind; historical view without objectivity is empty.

To secure the possibility of objective history, I take a stand throughout this book against all kinds of historical relativism. All such theories exist substantially on the basis of relativist epistemology. Relativist epistemology can be classified into different theories: deconstructionism, conceptual relativism, paradigm theory, postmodernism, traditional historicism, sociological relativism, pragmatism, and culnral relativism. All these theories have a tendency to converge in the recent tend of paradigm theory and conceptual relativism, the struggle against which will last for quite some time.

The first central thesis

of

this book concerns establishing compatibility between the diversity of historical viewpoints and historical objectivity. Most people would automatically think that the existence of diverse viewpoints is simply incompatible with objectivity; they think that the existence of diverse viewpoints implies subjectivity, and that objectivity requires a unified viewpoint. This book argues that this corlmon-sense position is in fact false, and that the possibility of interpreting history from divene viewpoints does not require one to abandon the commitment to objectivity. Here my thesis sides with the position of Leopold von Ranke, who laid the first cornerstone of history as an academic science. Nevertheless, my position differs from that of Ranke methodologically, for Ranke attempted

I

to dispose of all viewpoints in order to secure historical objectivity.

The second central thesis

of this book

concerns

establishing explanatory hermeneutics as the episternology of objective history. History is a cultural world created by the intentional acts of humans. The creation of meaningful culture depends on intentional, planned activity, and these intentions and plans are what a historian will, at a later time,

understand. This is where hermeneutical understanding is required. However, for the understanding of an action to acquire objectivity, it must be given in a form of explanation. Moreover, intentions can sometimes cause unintended results. For instance, a person who wishes to buy stocks wants to purchase them as cheaply as possible, but the fact that he has entered the stock market as an investor leads to an unintended increase in stock prices. Conversely, another person who wishes to sell stocks naturally wants to

aim to

sell them as expensively as possible, yet as soon as he enters the market as a seller, this increase in the number of sellers

in stock prices. This sort of relation can only be explained by the law of markets. This is why the understanding of social interactions or the historical world also requires scientific explanation. I propose that explanatory hermeneutics will allow us to solve this problem. leads to an unintended decrease

The third central thesis of this work concems the characteristics and the epistemological status of the historical view. It is, as a matter of fact, impossible to write history without taking some sort of historical view. Even the simplest chronological record implies a historical view. Nonetheless, this does not mean that we are bound to one

I

specific historical view from which we are never able to escape. Historical views are always open for us to compare, test, and select the one we deem better. The product of such comparisons and tests may, ultimately, turn out to be rational and objective. In this book I formalize the historical view into the form of a scientific research program, in order to dernonstrate both how such comparisons are possible and how historical views are actually applied.

It is the ultimate purpose of this book to argue for historical objectivity and the progress of historical understanding by means of these three central themes. There are relativists and skeptics among us; they are those who do

not accept the possibility of progress in historical science, which they deny in the same way that we deny progress in the arts. In response, this book demonstrates such progress, by comparing and summarizing several perspectives on historical understanding that can, in fact, expand our horizon of understanding. Such expansion will enable us to objectively reproduce the past, and to do so as closely to the original as possible.

10

Plnr I HrsroRrcal Axrr-RnALISM : Hrsronv Is SronvrELLING

,

One may wonder whether historical writing reveals the past as it truly was, or instead creates a fictitious historical world in accordance with the needs and interests of its contemporaries. The first part of this book begins from this fundamental question, for one of the most difficult issues in historical epistemology is whether historical writing is the invention of fiction or, rather, the discovery of fact. Antirealist epistemology leads us to the view that a historical narrative is a tlpe of fiction, whereas realist epistemology proclaims that a historical narrative is aimed at the discovery of facts. In this part, we will discuss the histories and epistemological bases of the following anti-realist theories: presentism, pragmatism, and narrativism.

Anti-realist historical episternology focuses on the activity of composition as practiced by the present subject who beholds history. [n other words, historical cognition ought to be understood as a present issue rather than as an issue of the past. Thus, what maffers is the epistemological framework of the subject, as such subjects exist in the present, whereas history exists in the past. Presentism states that history is the present reflected on the screen called "the past." Narrativism understands the narrative writing of

11

storytelling resulting in the *history conclusion that is a literary genre." Pragmatism, which identifies tnrth with utility, entails the view that "history is inevitably written from the viewpoint of utility." history

to be a form of

As a first response, I argue that although subjectivist theories such as these each contain an element of truth in a sense, they should not be supported. The kernel of the objection is this: Although we discern history from the perspective of the present mundanely, and even though such a perspective leaves us no choice but to rely on our present interests and needs in many cases, this still does not justify arbitrary decisions in historical writing. As long as we human beings function as rational investigators, the objective writing of history remains possible. History is a science. It is neither poetry nor fiction. Just as the role of the astronomer is not the composition of odes to celestial revolution, so the role of the historian is not the reproduction of history as a form of literature.

72

I Htsronrcll Reeusu axo Axrt-Rnlt,tsru

Realism in a broad sense is the claim that the real world that we observe exists objectively, separately, and independently of the mind. I In contrast, anti-realism claims that the observed world exists only in relation to our cognition. If

one believes that the world one observes will continue to exist in a state similar to that of the present even if everyone else ceases to exist, then one is a realist. ln contrast, if one insists that the world will be quite different from how it is at present if all people cease to exist, then one would be committed to a form of anti-realism. An extreme case of anti-realism is solipsism, where the extinction of the mind entails the extinction of the world. There is no doubt that our shared common sense commits all of us to realism to some degree. [t is quite natural to believe that both the rock on which I am sitting and the gingko tree at which I am looking exist, and that they would both continue to exist even if the entire human race were to suddenly become extinct. Common sense tells us that the world existed in a consistent form before it became the object of our perception and that this form does not change according to our perception. Nevertheless,

doubt realism. influence

of

it is not difficult to find reasons to

If we experience an object under the

some preexisting prejudice, then the "real"

13

world we experience may not actually be the world as it really is. This is the reason behind the typical claim that prejudice frustrates our understanding of reality, and it is for this very reason that Francis Bacon famously declared that we must destroy those idols and false notions that preoccupy

human understanding. To understand the world in such a deficient fashion is akin to spending one's life looking through a concave or convex lens, because the distortion of the resultant image is a poor representation of reality. cannot

We may extend this point by noting that, if we rid ourselves of such prejudices or Baconian "idols"

no matter how hard we try to do so, then no option remains for us other than to admit that we are anti-realists. After all, the world we observe will be a world composed by us and not an independent reality. In certain respects, this will commit us to the Berkeleyan claim that the reason objects appear as they do is because of us and not due to some independent "shape" possessed by the object. For instance, The Statue of Liberty in New York will appear smaller from a distance than it does from close up; objects in a room will

look different under various sorts of illumination; and wearing ultraviolet glasses will reveal colors that are quite different from those visible to the naked eye. In essence, everything de,pends upon the manner in which it is perceived. To accept such examples is to accept the thesis that everything we experience is in some sense mind-dependent.

Given this, what would follow if the distinction between realism and anti-realism is applied to the world of history? Historical realism will turn out to be the claim that the past existed in a mind-independent form, and historical L4

anti-realism will assert that historical facts are in some sense mind-dependent. Thus, historical realism amounts to the claim that we can acknowledge the historical world as independent of our minds, and historical anti-realism amounts to the claim that historical facts are always understood according to some framework even though historians may attempt to make claims of objectivity. Rather than contrasting historical realism to a generic

form of anti-realism, I shall contast it with one particular form of anti-realism, which is constructivism. There are two primary reasons for treating these as the basic categories of historical epistemology. The first is that the object of history, the past, possesses a unique characteristic, namely, that the past is already gone and, by definition, no longer really exists. For example, both idealists and some radical empiricists insist that the past exists only when it is recalled in our minds. The second reason is that constructivism contains the cenral claims of contemporary historical antirealism. Constructivism can be classified, by its strenglh, into

a strong form and a weak form. The weak form of constructivism claims that the world we acknowledge is restricted to appearance, through which we infer that the world itself exists, but the strong form insists that the world is nothing more than our production. To take some examples: The former may be fairly represented by Immanuel Kant's constructivism and the latter by Nelson Goodman's "worldmaking theory." Similarly, weak constructivism in historical episternology is defined as the denial that a direct approach to the past is possible, although the independent existence of 15

the past is not denied. In confast, strong constructivism goes so far as to deny the real existence of the past. If we accept

this distinction, then we may as well classify historical presentism and historical narrativism as forms of strong constnrctivism as well as classify historical pragmatism as a form of weak constructivism.

Alun Munslow classifies two tlpes of

history: 2 reconsffuctionist and deconstnrctionist. Reconstnrctionist history maintains a substantial commitnent to both realism and empiricism. It is the theory that history exists and that it

is

possible

for us to know it. h

comparison,

deconstructionist history interprets the contents of history as determined not only by the facts but also by the nature of the language that describes those contents. Deconstructionism denies the correspondence of evidence and interpretation that the reconstnrctionist pursues, and it regards the past as a text to be studied in diverse ways rather than as an object with a real nature that waits for discovery. We may fairly categorize deconstructionism as an anti-realist approach in contrast to the realist epistemology of reconstructionism.3

Historical realism will necessarily imply some form of the correspondence theory of truth, whereas anti-realism will imply either the coherence theory or some sort of pragmatic theory. The principle of correspondence is that a statement will be true when the statement and fact correspond with each other, and it will be false when this is not the case, as per Aristotle's formulation, which reads: "Truth is either stating that the existent exists or that the non-existent does not exist, and falsehood is stating that the existent does not exist, or that the non-existent exists." To L6

take a simple example: "Snow is falling" is true when snowy day, but it is false when it is raining.

it is a

Anti-realism consists of an absolute denial of the correspondence theory. The reason for such a denial is immediately evident, because to admit the correspondence theory is to admit the existence of mind-independent facts. Thus, the anti-realist is liable to conflate the true with the useful, to claim that truth is coherent with the statements of some previously accepted theory, or even to claim that truth results from the assent of some members of a certain community.

lf

we understand tnrth to be the useful, then it is a simple fact that the utility of a certain statement may change depending upon the given circumstance, purpose, or desire, for a belief that was useful in one circumstance may turn out to be completely useless in other circumstances. Or, we might come to deny a statement on the grounds of selfevidence, although "self-evidence" may indicate no more than "clarity in a certain circumstance." Finally, even community agreement may change when community members are replaced or if they change their minds. Thus, there is good reason to think that anti-realism has a close relation to relativist conceptions of truth.

Basic Doctrines of Historical Realism

If we accept historical realism, then it is easy to guess how we will consider historical research. The realist insists that historical research must restore the past as it was. We call

L7

this "the reproduction of the past." While it will often be the case that the perfect reproduction of the past is impossible, for the realist the purpose of writing history is nevertheless to reproduce the past simply as it was.

The realist form of historical writing is the oldest kind of historical research. In The Histories, Herodotus, the father of the Western historical tradition, wrote:

In this booh the results of my inquiries into history I hope to do two things: to preserve the memory of the past by putting on record the astonishing achievements both of our own

and of the Asiatic peoples; secondly, and more particularly, to show how the two races came into conflict. a

From Thucydides and Sima Qian to our contemporaries, most historians have understood this kind of historical realism to be the basic principle of historical writing.

Of course, it is

somewhat difficult to claim that ancient and medieval historians pursued objectivity in the

same manner that modern scientific historians

are.

Methodological limitations peculiar to those times no doubt restricted their ability to attain objectivity. Nevertheless, these historians never doubted that the historical facts they described were indeed true and that the purpose of their narratives was the reproduction of the past.

18

A new form of secular history originated from the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. This new form of history

differed significantly from past forms, such as

St.

Augustine's, which embodied the Catholic perspective. For example, Augustine's City of God, witten at the time of Germanic invasions of the Roman Empire, classified all countries into the categories of Catholic and non-Catholic, insisting that the former, which belonged to God, would inevitably emerge victorious over the latter. The inevitable victory of Catholic countries was regarded as a universal feature of human history. However, the universal history of the Enlightenment was thoroughly secular, having nothing to do with a religious perspective. Enlightenment thinkers believed that all human beings are identical in terms of their reason and that human history forms an excellent stream of progress. [t was thought that, via our cofilmon reason, human beings are able to investigate and come to know this stream ofprogress.

Classical historism, which Friedrich Meinecke praised as the greatest spiritual revolution of Germanic culture, understands history in terms of the development of individuality. Johann Gottfried von Herder, Wilhelm von Humboldt, and Leopold von Ranke opposed the theory of human progress through universal humanity by replacing it with the specific perspectives of the many national spirits (Volksgeist).

Classical historians have argued that histories do not pursue universal facts but rather individual and specific facts. Herder's pluralism is representative of this view:

t9

Have you noticed how inexpressible the individuality of one man is, how difficult it is to know distinctly what distinguishes him, how he feels and lives, how differently his eyes see, his soul measures, his heart experiences, everything? What depth there is

in the character of a single nation whictr, even after repeated and probing observation manages to evade the word that would capture it and render it recognizable enough for general comprehension and empathy.s

Herder's view is that the natural communities of human beings develop autonomously in a manner similar to the growth of grass. Such communities cannot be well composed or well established by forcible means. Spontaneously existing societies pursue the ideals of completion in their own ways, so the ideal of one society is clearly distinguished from the ideals of other societies.

However,

the classical

historians were strict

historical realists for whom historical exploration functioned to reproduce the past. Although many nationalists, including Herder, suggested that dealing with national spirit or some olher Zeitgeisl required an empathic approach, this was, in fact, nothing more than a specific method for achieving objectivity.

20

Even

if

we admit that historians can

accurately

it does not follow that there is only one manner in which this may be done or one

reconstruct the historical world,

purpose for which it may be done. The purpose of history up

until the ancient age was to provide instruction to the next generation. History was required both to enforce religious doctrine and to sustain cultural and national patrimony. The idea that history exists solely for the purpose of the reconstruction of the past is a relatively modern development. [t represents a strengthening of the demand for historical objectivity.

Leopold von Ranke, who is a representative of classical historism, wrote the following in the preface to his History of the Latin and German Peoples (1494-1514):

This book aims to understand all the histories

related

to Latin and German peoples.

Historical researches so far have played a part in judging the past and presenting happiness in the future for contemporaries. However, this book does not intend to perform said noble responsibility but to show how the past really was (wie es eigentlich gewesen).6

Ranke's rnotto was "as it really \ilas," and the central meaning of his proclamation, is a commitment to the accurate reproduction of the past. Ranke's purpose was to put a stop to history's being thought of as instrumental to

21

practical or pedagogical perspectives and, by doing so, to establish it as an independent freld of academics. We may reasonably classiff his approach as a positivistic or scientific approach that still resonates today. The first person to make use of the term "positivism" was Henri de Saint-Simon, an early nineteenth-century French social thinker. Saint-Simon attempted to convey by

means of the term "positivism" the scientific mode of research considered in the general sense. By Auguste Comte's time, positivism was established as a coherent system of thought and became a dominant trend across Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Comte himself believed in the progress of human history and proposed a three-stage model of historical progress (the Law of Three Stages). The flrst stage is the theological or theocratic, in which all phenomena are explained as the result of the direct effect of a supernatural existence. The second, the metaphysical stage, occurs when this explanation is replaced by that regarding abstract power or purpose. The third and final stage replaces the abstract with explanations based upon observations that are verifiable through experiments. The last stage is the positive stage, or, simply put, positivism. Positivism is essentially the belief that every kind of academic research can be conducted scientifically, so it is a

philosophy that crowns science at the pinnacle of academics-the place formerly occupied in the West by medieval theology. In the context of the history of

22

philosophy, positivism derived from the belief in empirical sciences underlying the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. The first goal of Comte's traditional positivism was to establish the unification of all the sciences. [n other words, he claimed that all knowledge could be unified under the basic principles of empirical observation, conceptual selfrefl ection, and verification.

From Comte's perspective, if history is to be raised to the status of a science, then the practice of historical research must be relocated, from the investigation of individual facts to the investigation of general principles. Positivists thought that individual historical circumstances could be explained via the scientific methods of observation, experiment, and the application of general laws, and that history would be established as a science only when such an explanation had been made. The purpose of historical research based on this view was to investigate the phenomena of a social community or of an entire society rather than those of individuals; as a result, history would finally come to be identical to dynamic sociology. However, when the term "positivism" is used in this

book,

it will not refer to Comte's specific brand of

positivism, and it will therefore not relate to his ideas of historical progress and the pursuit of general laws. Instead, the term as used in this book simply indicates the objective scientif,rc research ofgiven facts in the general sense.

When positivist realism

is

applied

investigation, it can be represented as follows:

23

to

historical

(l)

complete separation of and mutual independence between the subject (the historian) and the object (that is, history in the sense of res gestae, or things done). It is taken for granted that

There

is a

history, that

is, res gestae, exists

objectively in the ontological sense.

(2)

A

historical statement is tnre only

if it

corresponds with a historical fact.

(3) The historian can reproduce the past by

of

obtaining impartiality and eliminate all social conditioning of his means

perception.T

(1) is the metaphysical claim that the historical world should be separated from the epistemic subject. It is thereby a commitrnent to strong realism. (2) is a semantic claim that rests upon the correspondence theory of truttr. In other words, historical statements will be true or false depending upon their correspondence or lack of correspondence to historical facts. (3) is the epistemological claim that the reconstruction of the historical world is possible. In essence, it holds that the historical researcher is able to objectiff the historical world by means of reason even though he or she is ontologically situated in the steam of historical process, or, in other words, part of the historical world himself. Moreover, even though subjective factors and social

24

restrictions are involved in the process of historical understanding, the historical researcher is able to exclude and control these factors and thus accurately reconstruct historical facts. As Ranke declared: "l only try to have the facts speak out, removing my ego so that all the historical facts appear."8 Ranke suggested that the primary virtue the historian

adopt is an abstemious attitude, excluding subjectivity to investigate the facts as they are in and of

ought

to

themselves. The nineteenth-century English historian John Dalberg Acton took a similar view, claiming:

Ultimate history we cannot have in this generation; but we can dispose of conventional history, and show the point we have reached on the road from one to the other, now that all information is within reach, and every problem has become capable of

solution.

... The history of the Battle of

Waterloo has to be the history which satisfies the French, English, German, Netherlands all.e

From this point of view, the most important thing in historical research is the collection of sufficient and wellrecorded facts. Theoretical or philosophical introspection turns out to be useless or even harmful, for history is simply composed of the facts.

25

The strongest epistemological basis for historical positivism is likely to be passivism or cumulativism. Passivist epistemology assumes not only that objects exist independently of the perceiving subject but also that the pure observation of these objects is possible. It insists that our knowledge comes via sense experiences and that our sense organs can reveal the object as it is, as a mirror reflects the shape of an object. Error is explained as the distortion of the object's shape by subjective factors, such as prejudice or desire. Thus, the optimal means for us to avoid such error in passivist epistemology is to exclude self-intervention and to insist that the observer remain entirely passive.

The reason for identifuing this as a cumulativist epistemology is that we are trying to determine the overall form of the object by means of the piecemeal accumulation of facts. Our knowledge is simply the collection of sense experiences stored in our minds, in a similar manner to the storage of items in a museum collection. A crude form of induction is then applied to reach general principles from the individual input.ro The method of historical realism can be diagrammed as shown in Figure

l.rr

What we call 'oevidence" is the material left by the historical world. This evidence provides information about the historical world, and historical writing seeks to be in compliance with this evidence. Through this process, we may reconstruct the historical world.

26

History Representation

Evidence

Information

Historical world

Figure l. Realistic epistemologt of history: Each demarcation line is clearly distinguished.

Basic Doctrines of Historical Anti-Realism

The most typical form of anti-realist episternology

is

constructivism. Constructivism regards all of our knowledge as the result of an act of composition upon a raw source of information about the world. It would be more accurate to categorize constructivism as "social" constructivism since it is typically discussed on the societal level rather than on the individual level. However, from a logical viewpoint, individual constnrctivism rernains possible since every

person arguably has his or her own unique form of cognizing the world, and we might, on this basis, argue for a radically individualist form of constructivism. However, such a view may very well be considered excessive on the grounds that every community has its own set of characteristics that differentiates itself from others, and consequently, these characteristics are shared by every individual member of each community. Thus, it seems reasonable that constructivism at the social level ought to be the focus of discussion in the same way that the discussions of pragmatism typically take place on the social level.

27

The founder of constructivist epistemology was Immanuel Kant, whose constructivism is commonly supposed to have sparked a Copernican revolution in philosophy. Just as Copernicus's heliocentric model of the solar system inverted Claudius Ptolemy's geocentric model, so Kant's philosophy inverted the previously understood relationship between the epistemic subject and the object. In other words, Kant inverted the taditional epistemological stance that the subject reflects the object, by claiming that the object reflects the compositional activity of the subject.

This is ultimately to say that the constructivist approach hansforms a passivist conception of epistemology

into an active one. That is: Knowledge is the product of active behavior rather than the result of passive observation. knowledge is to be obtained, we must investigate, compare, summarize, and generalize on our own.

Therefore,

if

Moreover, it tums out that it is impossible for cognition free from presupposition to exist, because our cognition is necessarily the product of a mental process in concert with the application of our cognitive framework. In other words, we cannot start from nothing, and we have no choice but to begin our investigations with a set of presuppositions that is unverifiable according to the standards of empirical science. Although Kant understood this set of presuppositions to be a

fixed set of

conceptual categories, meaning the unchangeable structure of human reason, modem epistemologists tend to allow more diversity, speaking of "conceptual systems," "worldviews," or "paradigms."

The most contemporary example of this tlpe of episternology is the paradigm theory. Although the concept 28

of "paradigm" is complex, it

essentially means the basic

cognitive framework through which we understand the world. Paradigm theory insists that the world is altered depending on the framework we adopt. Depending on which paradigm we utilize, the duck-rabbit appears either as a duck or a rabbit (see Figure 4 below). [f we have no choice but to understand the world through some particular paradigm, then we cannot know the world as it is in and of itself. This is because, from the viewpoint of the paradigm theory, the world we experience is always subject to prior interpretation. The most famous example of the paradigm theory is illustrated in Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of ScientiJic Revolutions. Kuhn's conception of a paradigm can be seen as a "worldview" in a broad sense: a worldview that is composed of theoretical assumptions and rules that a certain scientific community has adopted and the technologies used in their application. From this, it is possible for several incommensurablel2 paradigms to exist, between which comparison and interpretation are impossible. Thus, it could be said that a scientist who understands the world through one paradigm is living in a different world than one who understands the world by means of a separate paradigm.

When we apply this type of constructivism in the context of history the written material encountered by the historian will necessarily be the result of prior interpretation in accordance with a particular paradigm, for the constructivist asserts that an understanding free from such an interpretation is impossible. The historian will then have to engage in yet another interpretation, and here, yet another paradigm will be active. Therefore, as long as the historian's 29

task rests upon the interpretation of written material, he or she will always be engaged in an interpretation of an interpretation. As an example, let us suppose that Julius Caesar's Bellum Gallicum lies open on the desk before us. We would like to interpret this history according to our own favored paradigm, but we must acknowledge that the Annals came to us wrapped in its own paradigm. As seen here, there will always be this double structure and doubled interpretation.

Historical constructivism can

be formalized as

follows:

(l) The subject and the object in

historical organic understanding whole, with mutual influence berween them.

constitute an

(2) A historical statement is true only within a paradigm or a context. (3) The historian's understanding

is

always

socially conditioned. The historian is unable to reveal historical facts as they were.l3

Although the historical form of constnrctivism rests upon presentism or narrativism, the contemporary science of postrnodernism manifests an exfreme form of constructivism. Common to both is a cornmitnent to relativism-the characteristic of which is not normally individualistic but

30

rather "periodic," "cultural," or "hierarchical," as shown in Figure 2.

History Interpretation

Evidence

Providing text

Historical world

Figure 2. Anti-realistic epistemologt of history: Each demarcation line is not clearly distinguished.

Problems Afflicting Both Theories

From the point of view of modern epistemology, it seems very difficult to support naiVe positivism, for it is no longer easy to support the idea that the subject is capable of manifesting a pure reflection of the object. Yet if we accept constructivism, we may very well find ourselves falling into subjectivism and relativism.

A passivist conception of epistemology faces several difficulties. The most significant one is that it is hard to maintain the idea that our observational attitude is "pure." In contemporary terminology, this point is expressed as the claim that observation is necessarily 'theory-laden," which means that theory exists prior to any act of observation. "Theory" here includes everything from a simple hypothesis to a global interpretative framework. Karl Popper explained a "theory-laden" observation as follows:

31

I believe that the prejudice that we proceed in this way is a kind of optical illusion, and that at no stage of scientific development do we begin without something in the nature of a theory, such as a hlpothesis, or a prejudice, or a problem----often a technological onewhich in some way guides our observations, and helps us to select from the innumerable objects of observation those which may be of interest. la

No matter what name we give to conditions that precede observation, the active conception of epistemology seems very hard to reconcile with the third proposition of historical positivism (see above). The second major difficulty for historical positivism is the fact that it is hard to square with the selective nature of history, for history is inevitably selective. For example, the primitive materials of history include newspapeni, but no newspaper reports every single fact that occllr'rs, as to do so

would be impossible. Every newspaper records facts selectively in accordance with editorial principles determining their importance. The existence of such principles implies not only that the importance of the facts themselves will always be relative but also that the context in which such facts are presented will be relative as well. Thus, because the primitive materials of history are subject to selectivity, so is the activity of historical writing, which takes place based upon such materials. If we wish to

32

avoid selectivity, the result would be a heap of facts, the vastxess and random nature of which would render description impossible. Therefore, we may fairly conclude that the necessity of selectivity renders it impossible to expunge subjectivity from the writing of history.

It is now apparent

that a commitrnent to historical positivism is rationally unsustainable, for even if we accept the first two propositions of historical positivism (see above), we simply cannot accept the third in its present form.

Historical positivism emphasized the scientific nature and objectivity of history, but it was unable to sufficiently explain the historical research process because it neglected the role subjectivity plays in such research. However, historical constnrctivism faces its own peculiar problems, for it destroys the scientific and objective nature of historical understanding by placing excessive emphasis on the subjectivity ofthe historical researcher.

Objectivity is a necessary virtue for the historical researcher. Still, it has not yet been made clear whether history is to be included among the sciences or among the arts. Moreover, there have been recent debates about whether there is indeed any genuine difference between scientific rationality and the procedures governing the production of art. However, if we do not consider history to be a science, or if we have doubts about the complete objectivity of science, then, in a fundamental sense, the accusation that any particular history is fabricated or distorted will be meaningless. Such a radical claim is a great

33

offense to common sense and also bears little resemblance to the actual historical practice.

we

The core of the problem we face is that even though wish to pursue history in an objective manner,

objectivity is threatened by the inevitable intervention of subjectivity in historical understanding. It would, however, be a mistake to claim that this problem is unique to the practice of historical research, because the threat to objectivity raised by an active conception of subjectivity-and active epistemologies in general, as opposed to passivist epistemologies-is a general epistemological problem broadly applicable to both the social and the natural sciences. In any case, if we limit our scope of discussion to the effects of subjectivity on historical conditions, the diffrculties can be clarified into two issues. The first issue requires us to determine in detail the subjective factors that intervene in

historical understanding, and the second requires us to determine whether these factors result in the complete destnrction of historical objectivity.

We can conclude that historical

constructivism

commits two fundamental errors. The first is that it regards all subjective factors as obstacles inhibiting objective cognition, and the second is that it is impossible for anyone to critique his or her own conceptual system or paradigm. The fact that historical constructivism has always resulted in relativism originates in this second error.

34

2

PnBsgxrtsrvr: HrsroRv Is rnn PnnsBxr oN THE Scnnex ClI,l,go *THE PAsr"

History obviously has a close relationship with time.r If we grant the commonsense classification of time into past, present, and future, it follows that the researcher and the object of research are located in two distinct temporal periods. We as researchers live in the present and are atternpting to reveal and describe something that existed in the past. The temporal distance between the historian and the object inevitably raises numerous difficulties.

The first problem is raised by "the past." We can never confront "the past" directly, since the past, as it were, has already passed. All that remains to us are the traces left behind. In addition, those who lived in past times acted under very different circumstances, with thoughts and standards that were quite different from ours. Regarding this situation we are placed in, how are we to appropriately deal with the reconstruction of the past? [n the ontological context, presentism is the doctrine which insists that the past can be reconstucted only when

our minds intentionally "resurrect" it. The

presentist

perspective holds that the past that exists only in the historic

35

records is merely dead, but when we read such records and understand them, the past can be resurrected. If no one pays attention to or remembers it, then the past is, in fact, dead.

At the same time,

when we consider presentism within an epistemological context, it is concerned with the manner in which we apply our present perspective and criteria to the people and events of the past. [n other words, to understand the past is to recreate it and to project the present directly to the past. Such a position is opposed to that of positivist realism, for the latter insists that the past ought to be scrutinized as it was in and of itself. The dispute between positivist and presentist views of history is a long-standing one. It can be fairly well understood as a debate between those who believe that the past as an objective reality can be reconstructed accurately via calm, sustained investigation, and those who believe that the past is simply a mass of experiential material retained in our memory and understood via present ideology and interests.2 Positivists insist that if historical understanding fails to accurately capture the form of the past, it must therefore be false and ought to be corrected. In contrast, the presentist perspective proclaims that historical errors are caused by differences in interpretation and not by an inconsistency with the facts of the past. Thus, from a radically presentist perspective the notion of historical error is quite meaningless. lnstead, it would be more accurate to say that mistakes do not exist at all, for this view regards history as nothing more than an interpretation according to the needs and interests of the people who research it.

36

We may wonder whether

it is indeed possible to

justify a presentist perspective, what sort of reasons might be adduced in its favor, ffid, moreover, upon what epistemological basis such a perspective might be structured.

Reasons

for Presentism

As its name so openly states, historical presentism focuses its interest on the present, even though we are researching the past. The reasons for such a perspective are as follows. The fust reason is that presentism regards the past as having altogether disappeared. Therefore, its existence depends upon remembering it in our minds, and the past does not really exist independently of our minds. An alternative way of thinking about it is to simply insist that the past only exists as long as a historian pays attention to it, and that it thus does not exist objectively. From the presentist perspective, we who research the

past must reconstruct facts on the basis of the present, explain historical events according to that basis, and understand the process of history as a whole. Therefore, as its name denotes, presentism emphasizes a focus on the present and not the past, for the present is the key to reconstructing the past.

course, this is not to suggest that presentist historians do not have access to historical records. After all, anyone can visit a museum anytime and view historical documents and relics, including many that are thousands of years old. However, the presentists' claim is that the past

Of

37

itself is dead. Thus, to make a living history we have to resurrect the past in our current consciousness. Only this will yield a real, living history. I shall classify this as an ontological thesis of presentism.

This implies that presentism takes a particular ontological conception of time. The presentist perspective on the ontology of time is that only the present exists, and thus the past and future do not exist. This is the antithesis of eternalism, which is the claim that past, present, and future all actually exist. Between presentism and eternalism, there is another ontological theory of time in which the past and present are held to exist, but which denies that the futtre exists. We may also note that the Buddhist conce,pt of time is a typical example of presentism.3

St. Augustine famously insisted that the past only exists in mernory and that the funre only exists in anticipation, and that therefore only the present really exists. At the same time, he claimed that the present is like a blade between the past and the future and is itself temporally unextended. His reasoning was that if the present manifested temporal extension, then it would be divisible into several parts, all of which would be simultaneous. However, the notion of several pieces of time coexisting simultaneously is at odds with the notion that time is continuously flowing. That is, a particular time could not be both past and present. For this reason, many philosophers following Augustine have concluded that the present is temporally unextended. The second reason adduced in favor ofpresentism is that our reasons for researching the past are inevitably

38

correlated with current interests. Therefore, the past will be resurrected as history only when it becomes the object of pragmatic interest. For instance, the past will be of interest and will be revived when it aids us in explaining the present state of affairs or gives us guidance for solving

contemporary problems. Benedetto Croce remarked, "Therefore the past does not answer to a past interest, but to a present interest, insofar as it is unified with an interest of the present life."a This I classify as an epistemological thesis of presentism. Such an epistemological attitude naturally causes us to review the past from the perspective of the present. That is, we project the present perspective and interests into the past. We may edit and evaluate the characteristics of the past,

its people, and its moral criteria, which may be very different from those of the contemporary world. For example, a presentist perspective identifies Confucius and Mencius as anti-feminists. From a contemporary perspective, they were clearly anti-feminist, but it is quite another matter to consider whether such an evaluation would be justified when we consider the historical circumstances in which they

lived.

in the narrow sense includes both an ontological thesis and an epistemological thesis, but presentism in the broad sense includes only an epistemological thesis. Presentism has a relatively long history. Representative figures of presentism include the Presentism

Italian Benedetto Croce, as well as Ernst Bloch and Lucien Febvre, the leading figures in Annales. Carl L. Becker the new historian, Charles Beard, Raymond Aron, and the 39

pragmatist John Dewey. All these scholars may as well be labeled presentists in the broad sense that they think historical research originates in pragmatic concerns. Even though not all of them insist on ontological presenfism, they are all in agreement when it comes to presentist epistenrological claims.

The focus on practical interests suggests

that presentism and pragmatism have some overlapping claims. Thus, it is fair to regard Dewey as a presentist and a pragmatist simultaneously. Nevertheless, the two concepts do not share the same connotation or denotation because presentism is a wider concept than pragmatism. Even though it is fair to say that all presentists are pragmatists in a certain sense, it is clearly possible to be a presentist without committing wholeheartedly to pragmatism. It is for this reason that I have decided to deal with presentism apart from pragmatism.

The Epistemological Grounds of Presentism

of history. It insists, in a manner similar to George Berkeley's "To be is to be perceived," that "To be is to be comprehended." Whereas for Berkeley the unperceived was non-existent, for the Presentism is an idealistic theory

presentist the uncomprehended does not exist. Such idealism

in

presentist philosophy is clearly exhibited distinction between chronicle and history.

in

Croce's

Within a more recent epistemological context, we can say that Hans-Georg Gadamer's thesis of "nowness of

40

understanding" and the claim that observation is necessarily theory-laden together form the epistemological grounds of presentism.

Gadamer believes that "understanding" means understanding the meaning of the past and its text material. The "nowness of understanding" thesis is that understanding is essentially produced on the structure of the preunderstanding that we unconsciously have, not on a tabula rasa.Here, we may ask the following questions:

(1) Why is it impossible to understand the text from a tabula rasa slate of mind?

(2) When we understand a text based upon a framework,

is it

ever possible

prior

to s@ure an objective

understanding?

Gadamer's answer to the first question is as follows. Dasein is cast into a historical situation and cultural tradition prior to understanding the world, and is a "being-in-a-world (in-der-Welt-Sein)" that cannot objectify a world. This means that we have no choice but to be born in a specific historical situation and to be nurnrred in a specific cultural environment, and that we will internalize a certain type of knowledge and value system through the process of growth. As a result of this process, we come to possess our own sight with which we may see the world. That is, we are inevitably restricted by historical situations. Therefore, according to Gadamer, if we remove our particular viewpoint on the

4L

world in an attempt to achieve a neutral vision of the object, it turns out that we behold nothing, for we cannot have such transparent vision. For this reason, it is impossible to begin from nothing, and we have no choice but to begin on the basis of pre-understanding. Martin Heidegger makes much the same claim, which is:

The understanding

of

what as what is

basically based on pre-having(Vorhabe), preseeing (Vorsicht), pre-understanding (Vorgrffi.It is not the understanding without any pre-condition which was given to us.s

Gadamer regarded such pre-understanding as a prerequisite, labeling it as pre-judgment (Yorurteil).6 The epistemological ground of pre-understanding is tradition and authority (Autorittit). This model of how we understand is obviously quite different from the Cartesian methodology that begins from the cogito of pure subjectivity and the methodology of the Enlightenment, both of which deny tradition and authority. Rend Descartes wished to agree only upon the existence of the thinking subject and to deduce everything else from this starting point via his skeptical

method, doubting everything

in

order

to

reach an epistemically indisputable foundation. ln such a process,

there is no conceptual space in which authority or tradition might intervene. The Enlightenment rejected both authority and tradition on the grounds that they were opposed to the use of reason. For his part, Gadamer did not think that the

42

acceptance of tradition necessitates a rejection of reason. He

thought that tradition was not in direct opposition to rationality, for obeying a tradition is always optional, and we are able in any case to refresh the tradition by applying critical tools. For this reason, it may well be correct to insist that tradition and rationality can coexist, but the critical point of Gadamer's analyics is that, even if this is true, it is impossible for anyone to ever completely free oneself from tradition. Gadamer attempted to separate pre-judgment from prejudice (Vormeinung). In his view, pre-judgment is based upon historical tradition, whereas a prejudice is mere personal opinion. Moreover, a prejudice is arbitrary and

lacks any basis, and it is the source of misunderstanding. However, a pre-judgment cannot be arbitrary, for it is based upon a tradition. It is at the same time the precondition of understanding, but it may be reviewed in the process of understanding and is open to correction.

it

mean for pre-judgment to be based upon historical tradition and cultural authority? It means that the historical fact or transmitted material should be understood in its relationship with our current circumstances. It also means that only the reinterpretation of the past from a current perspective is possible, rather than the perspectivefree reconstruction of the past. That is to say, we can never escape the present to confront the past face to face, completely detached from the perspective of the present.

What does

From this viewpoint, the meaning of a historical object is mediated by our pre-judgment. However much

43

historical research aspires to obtain objectivity, it always depends upon newly raised historical tasks and questionsin other words, the reconstructed shrcture of pre-judgment. It follows that wrderstanding is composed via the interactivity of the past and present: "The working of the living tradition and historical research is integrated into a unity."7 This can be illustrated as shown in Figure 3.

Text Prluodcrstordhg

Figure 3. Understanding exists within the structure of the pre-understanding.

Gadamer referred to the above process of understanding as a "fusion of horizons." Such fusion consists of the unification of nvo horizons, one of which belongs to the interpreter and the other to where the text was created. He remarks:

When the interpreter overcomes what is alienating in the text and thereby helps the reader to an understanding of the text, his/her

own stepping back is not a disappearance in any negative sense; rather, it is an entering into the communication in such a way that 44

the tension between the horizon of the text and the horizon of the reader is dissolved. I have called this a "fusion of horizons" (H o r iz o nt -ve rs c h me lzun g).8

This structure of understanding is ontological rather than epistemological. That is, we are already ontologically unified with the tradition in which we reside. Even if it is possible for us to engage in a critical revision of this tradition, the tradition nevertheless forms the root of our being and thus imposes a limit from which it is impossible to ever completely escape. For this reason, Gadamer's historical hermeneutics is differentiated from the objective hermeneutics pursued by Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey. Those who pursue an objective hermeneutics attempt to overcome the temporal gap that exists between reader and text and to recover the direct relationship between author and reader. It is for this reason that the interpreter attempts to forge an escape from prejudgment and transport him- or herself into the mind of the author.

The objectivity of understanding is not the keyword in Gadamer's affirmative attitude towards pre-judgment. The key point of his hermeneutics is understanding the text by approving the facts of the text and recreating the meaning of the text, rather than reproducing the author's intentions.

The claim that observation is necessarily theoryladen also provides an epistemological basis for presentism. For example, traditional empiricism has always treated the

45

human eye as if it were like a camera, but along with N. R. Hanson in Patterns of Discovery, we may well insist that "to see is a behavior more than the mere movement of the eyeball." We see objects through our eyes. The lens and retina are the most important ophthalmic components, the shape of the perceived object being displayed on the retina in a manner much like a screen. Light rays reflected from the perceived object are refracted through the lens in order for the shape of the object to be displayed on the center of the retina. This more or less describes the mechanism of a camera. However, there is an obvious difference in the manner in which the shape is ultimately recorded, for two cameras taking an identical shot will produce identical photographs, whereas two people who perceive the same object may not acknowledge the object identically. The information transmitted via the optic nerve is interpreted by our consciousness to produce an experience of vision, but we may interpret that information differently depending upon our culttral backgrounds. The result is that what we call the optical experience is not fully determined by the shapes projected upon our retinas. Optical experiences will be affected by past experience, knowledge, and desire. For example, consider the well-known illustration shown in Figure 4.e It is possible for the image to appear to someone as either a group of ducks or a group of rabbits. Those who have never seen a

rabbit will declare that it depicts a group of ducks, whereas those who are in the opposite situation will swear it is a drawing of a group of rabbits. It follows that the illustration itself does not decide the issue one way or another. lnstead,

46

it is the cognitive framework that will determine the nature ofthe experience.

o

s

o o

Figure 4. The Duck-Rabbit-

an observation is determined by contextual knowledge acquired prior to the act of Because such

observation rather than as an impression upon a tabula rasa, we label this phenomenon "theory-laden observation."

The idea of theory-laden observation implies not only that a simple act of observation might be in error, but also that an advanced level of theoretical knowledge is required to verify the validity of an observation. For instance, let us assume that we have made the judgment "This is a cup

of water" upon seeing a cup of liquid on the table. Let us assume that we have tried to verify that it is a cup of water by examining its color and odor, so as to answer the question "Why is this a cup of water?" This is a very simple observation, but even such a simple observation requires the

theoretical knowledge that "water is a colorless, odorless liquid." No one could make the judgment "this is a cup of water" having merely observed the object, in the absence of such theoretical knowledge. Moreover, such an assertion

47

could easily be countered by the claim that a certain kind of alcohol also possesses the property of being colorless and odorless. If one wished to defend the original claim, then ultimately one would have to insist that the liquid in the cup consists of the chernical formula HzO rather than the chemical formula for alcohol. As the debate about the validity of the original judgment develops, the degree of

theoretical knowledge required to answer the question "Why?" would become correspondingly higher.

If

even the simplest act of observation relies on then the situation would be vastly more complex in the case of determining a temporally remote historical fact or interpreting an ancient text. The effect that our scientific and moral theories have on our historical understanding would be of great magnitude. For example, if persons A and B possess contradictory conceptual or moral systems, then A and B might yield contradictory understandings of the same

ft*ry,

object.

The epistemological principles of presentism state that the personal interest and perspective of the cognitive subject inevitably intervenes in the process of reconstructing historical facts, and thus attaining an objective viewpoint is impossible. No mind is ever completely free from interests or needs, and so our perspective on the past is always restricted.

48

Problems

From the presentist perspective, history is the present reflected on the screen called "the past." Although we mistakenly believe that we are seeing the past, what we are really seeing are reflections of ourselves. If history itself is the product of the mind, then every history would be history of the present, because the mind always acts in the present. At the same time, since the mind creates history always

according

to

present interests, history as

a

result will

comprise self-reflections that were derived from the necessity of the present. We cannot exceed our current horizon.

We might accept presentism if we consider how our interest is reflected in all of our cognition. It is surely permissible to write about the unfamiliar past in a way that makes it familiar to those of us who live in the present. In addition, presentism emphasizes the importance of perspective and is particularly influential since it more or less constructs the notion of a viewpoint as we understand it. If it is impossible for us to ever see the object of history as a whole, then we are justified in saying that it is natural that we focus on the part in which we are interested. However, presentism is excessively committed to a relativist doctrine. At its root, it involves a denial of the objectivity of truth. Within the historical context it coincides with former discussions of traditional historism and the sociology of knowledge concerning the limits of human perception. The sociology of knowledge insists that all of our thoughts, and especially those about social and political

49

phenomena, are processed in an environment defined by society, rather than in a vacuum. Karl Mannheim refers to this as "being-dependent consciousness."lo One's beingdependent consciousness is unknown to oneself because one's own thought appears to be unquestionably clear within that specific social environment. However, the fact that a person rernains inside a certain framework is clearly revealed when he or she is compared to other people who have grown up in a different social environment. The

sociology

of

knowledge insists that our consciousness

cannot avoid the relativity of viewpoints, owing to the fact that our consciousness is subject to different conditioning in different societies (this is tpically called a total or general ideology).

Must we acce,pt the thesis that consciousness is being-dependent as an undeniable buth? Is there any way for our consciousness to avoid relativity? My own view is that this kind of relativism, such as that embodied in the sociology of knowledge, originates in an excessive belittling of our reason. Presentism resticts our understanding to an excessive degree by placing an immoderately high importance on current historical perspective and overly rigidifying it. I can agree with the claims of Gadamer and Hanson that a certain theory or pre-understanding is necessarily prior to observation, and that it is also true that there are many cases in which it is impossible for us to drag ow thoughts above our own circumstances. Yet, even if we grant these points, it does not seem necessary to suppose that we are permanently riveted to a particular theory of preunderstanding. We may critique our frameworks reflectively,

50

and we may compare those frameworks with those of others,

or we may even change the pre-conditioned framework and continue our investigation. [n other words, we may compare results generated by the application of different frameworks. After all, Hanson himself attempted to veriff that an illustration can appear different depending upon different points of view, and he had already considered the identical object seen differently by switching between viewpoints.

If it were

the case that we were completely restricted

it would be impossible to be aware of that fact at all. That is, the sociology of knowledge contains within it a contradiction, for if our consciousness

within

a certain viewpoint, then

were completely restricted, then we could not understand the

being-dependent consciousness. If we could observe the same object by changing viewpoints, then we would as a matter of fact be beyond the restriction of a viewpoint. That is, the thesis of a theoryJaden observation insists that a theory should be pre-conditioned prior to the observation, but we can say that such pre-conditioning does

thesis

of

not imply that we are limited to one, and only

one,

perspective. The assertion that we are surrounded by our concepfual systan is, as Donald Davidson has argued, the third dogma of empiriclsn. Our conceptual system is not a

prison that we can never escape from. It is, rather, a very special sort of prison that we can break out of whenever we feel like it. Presentism emphasizes the current viewpoint and

to classify history as art rather than as science. However, if history were closer to art and not to science,

aims

then the suggestion that the history of humanity should be

5L

understood from the perspoctive of ordinary people, rather than from ttrat of ttre ruler, would have no power to pemuade scholars of history. Moreover, the historical debates that occurred among many countries would be nothing more than artistic debates, bereft of any factual weight.

t

52

3

Pnlcrvuusu: HrsroRy Is WntrrnN

FRoM a

VrswrotNT oF Urtltrv

Although pragmatism can be described in a narrow sense as the philosophical theory of meaning, truth, and good that was developed mostly by Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, it could be described in the broad sense as referring to a certain attitude toward research.l James, the so-called godfather of pragmatism, describes it as the attitude of the researcher to avoid the pursuit of origins or principles and rather to pursue results and facts.2 It is for this reason that pragmatism could be developed not only within philosophy but also in more diverse areas such as law, economics, and history. Pragmatist history first appeared in a form that denied the possibility of objective history. Leopold von Ranke, who drove historical objectivism to its height, determined that the discovery of facts exactly as they had occurred in the past was to be the role of the historian. He insisted that to achieve such a goal, a historian had to adopt an ascetic attitude, excluding his or her own ego from the investigation. His view rested upon the following two premises: first, historical fact exists independently of the

53

historian who aims to discover it; and second, it is possible for the historian to uncover a historical fact regardless of his or her own interest or needs-that is to say, in an objective manner. Pragmatists were unable to accept such absolutism about historical facts and such radical objectivity about historical understanding, for these were, according to their opinion, beyond human capacity. From this point of view, Carl L. Becker, a pragmatist historian, derived the following conclusion: "The reality of history has gone forever. The 'truth' of the historian is only the reflection of mind or image that he/she creates to understand whatever the object is."3

However, we may object that such a view is excessively relativist or subjectivist. How could history be established as a science, if Becker was correct? Mor@ver, how could history and historical fiction be distinguished if the pragmatists are right? In any case, it is a mistake to speak of pragmatism as a single, immutable theory, for it has developed diversely for more than a century, and philosophers such as Richard Rorty have insisted on new forms of pragmatism that are even more radical than earlier efforts.

How would historical research progress if we were to apply to it a pragmatist theory? To answer this, we will first discuss how the historical world is reconstructed and how we might secure historical truth. Second, we will engage in a critical review of the problems and limits that face a pragmatist approach to history.

54

Pragmatism and the Reconstruction of the Past

What would be the upshot of an attempt to apply antirealism, which is inherent in pragmatism, to the historical world? Must we say that the historical world is the sum total of events that have occurred regardless of the question of how they are presented to us, or must we say that the historical world is continuously reconstnrcted in relation to the cognitive subject? If we view the former stance as historical realism and the latter as historical anti-realism, then it is evident that pragmatism must fall under the latter category.

It is true that we do tend to believe that historical facts are immutable, and that events of ancient times occurred long before events of the Victorian era. However, according to the pragmatist historians, past events are not empirical realities to us until the moment of discovery. Strictly speaking, it would follow that the time of an event's discovery is identical with the time of its occrrrence. By this logic, the temporal order of historical events would be identical to the order of their discovery. Of course, we cannot say that a past geological event could ever become a present event, purely because, for example, a geologist discovered some remote geological event for the first time, for the time that the geologist is investigating may be in the ancient past from the perspective of mechanical time. However, pragmatism insists that it should be an object to be discovered if it is to be an empirical reality. Therefore, if we are persuaded by pragmatism, it is reasonable to accept the

following assertion:

55

The world always takes shape from

the

present. It expands into the past as knowledge

of the past is needed to satisfy present desires.... But it remains within the present all

the while,

in fact only

generating a vastly

larger present.a

From this viewpoint, a past independent of any observer cannot exist, for it is inevitable that all observers exist in the present.

New American historians such as James Harvey Robinson, Carl Becker, and Charles Beard are all pragmatist historians. Even though they are classified as presentist historians, strictly speaking they are pragmatic presentists, for they apply the pragmatist principle thoroughly in the construction, selection, and explanation of facts.

Becker insists that a historical fact

is

necessarily

constructed, rather than discovered. He writes:

First then, what is the historical fact? Let us take a simple fact, as simple as the historian often deals with, viz.: "In the year 49 BC Caesar crossed the Rubicon." A familiar fact this is, known to all, and obviously of some importance since it is mentioned in every history of the great Caesar. But is this fact as simple as it sounds?s

56

Becker reasons that this cannot be a simple fact, since

a

to

have an evident and immutable boundary that distinguishes it clearly from any other fact. However, this one does not. When Caesar crossed the Rubicon, he crossed in the company of six thousand people simple fact has

who were under his command. This means that this fact was composed of all kinds of activity, endless discussion and thinking on the part of numerous soldiers. If we had to relate all these facts, we might have to write several books in order to properly relate the single fact that Caesar crossed the Rubicon. Thus, Becker thinks that a simple historical fact such as "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" is really just a symbol that generalizes a number of simple facts that we do not feel under any obligation to explain, rather than something that possesses a distinct nature of its own.

In a similar context, Adam Schaff

has argued, "Therefore, it is correct to assert that there are no 'raw' facts; the so-called 'raw' facts are also the result of some theoretical elaboration and, in addition, their 'promotion' to the category of historical fact is not a starting-point but the result, the point of arrival."6

In other words, a historical fact is, in a sense,

the

result of historical research and not its premise. Furthermore, it is asserted that the process ofconstructing a historical fact is initiated from prior questions-such as those that determine the subject and the boundaries of the subjectrather than from historical documentation.

57

By similar logic, pragmatists insist that no

event

exists sepirately from any other event. In their view, the fact that an event is separated from others is due to the work of

historians. For instance, such "facts" as price fluctuation, the classification of social class, the concentration of land ownership, and the accumulation of capital cannot be explained without depending upon certain theoretical generalizations. These facts have meanings only within the framework of a certain theory that we have adopted.T

The above claim holds that fact and theory have a close interdependent relationship with each other. Moreover, such a view is in line with discussions of the theorydependence of observation or conventionalist theory of fact construction. For example, the following passage from E. H. Carr may be understood to display a similar commitment:

In the first place, the facts of history never come to us "pure," since they do not and cannot exist in a pure form: they are always refracted through the mind of the recorder. It follows that when we take up a work of history, our first concern should be not with the facts which it contains but with the historian who wrote it.8

This assertion holds that historical facts are ultimately the results of creation, and are not, as we nonnally consider them, the objects of discovery.

58

According to pragmatists, the same problem occurs in the selection of facts as in the construction of facts. In principle, anything that occurs in the social lives of human beings may become a historical fact. However, it is obvious that not every fact becomes a historical fact. For something to become a historical fact, it must be selected by a historian and classified into the category of historical facts. In other words, past occurrence is a necessary but not sufficient condition of historical facts. The mundane lives of ordinary people will not attract the attention of historians unless there has been some effect on an important historical fact. A historical fact possesses the following properties:

(l)X

is a fact that occurred in the past.

(2)X is interpreted as having a historical value of p.

(3)A historian is

interested

in X as a

historical fact.

Thus, "facts"

in the mundane sense must be

distinguished from "historical facts," and such a distinction can only be executed within the particular paradigm or grid used by historians. This is the reason Carr argued that a historian's perspective and emphasis take key roles in the selection of facts.e Such selection may be interpreted as the continual rise and fall of simple facts to and from the status of historical facts. A fact that is considered tritial by historians of a certain period or school may be given more

59

authority as a historical fact by historians of some other period or school. It is for these reasons that the pragmatist insists that the constmction of the historical world fundamentally depends upon human interests.

Now let us consider the issue of historical explanation. The task of history is not only to describe historical facts but also to explain why the facts tumed out as they did. Here we may consider the distinction between a chronicle and a narrative. An chronicle refers to a historical record in which every single fragmentary observation is listed in the order of occurrence.lo trn such chronicles, even though the conjunction "because" might be used, it does not serve the function of linking one fact with another by genuine causal explanation.

If historical writing ought to be more ambitious than production the of a mere annal, and attempt to provide some difliculty similar to the in one that occurred the case of selection. This is on the causal explanation, then we face a

grounds that the explanation of one and the same event may

vary depending upon our choice of explanatory theory. As Raymond Aron pointed out:

But the plurality of interpretations is obvious as soon as we look at the labour of the historian. For as many interpretations arise as there are systems, that is, vaguely, as there are psychological conceptions and individual systerns of logic. Even more, we can say that the theory precedes the history, if we

60

understand by theory both the determination

of a certain

system and the value given

to

a

certain type of interpretation.II

Pragmatism and Historical Truth From the perspective of pragmatism, a historian should not use terminology that cannot be operationally defined. This is because pragmatists believe that a concept that cannot be operationally defined does not have a distinct meaning that can be clearly transmitted. For example, the use of metaphysical or theological terminology such as "the absolute spirit," "the absolute," "Zeitgel'sl," or "the ultimate goal of history" would likely be impermissible. Moreover, to determine the history of the world within a particular a priori framework is obviously incompatible with the stance of pragmatism. The two key issues raised here are (1) identifying the interests or needs

of the historian, and (2) identifying how

these interests may interfere with the objectivity of historical

understanding. Let us address the first issue: What might count as the interests or needs of a historian? From Dewey's perspective, every person has his or her own problems that

must be resolved. Such circumstances apply not only to individual people, but also to social groups, and hence, since a historian is necessarily a member of some social group, his or her interests or needs will in part be determined by the question of how to solve the problems that his or her society faces. For example, if democratization is an imminent interest of a particular society, then a historian living within

67

that society will understand history from the perspective of dernocratization, and if industrialization is an imminent interest of a certain society, a historian living within that society will understand history from that perspective.

To what degree could we secure objectivity in historical understanding if the prese,nt interests and needs of every historian interfere with each other as we have just described? According to radical pragmatists such as Rorty, objectivity in historical understanding is impossible on the grounds that such understanding is always thoroughly relativized. For example, if a historical fact that is called a in Grid A is described as a historical fact that is called 6 in Grid B, it is impossible to determine which one is correct. According to this perspective, it is essentially impossible to err in historical understanding. This is because historical understanding is always a historical interpretation, and historical interpretation merely means composing a useful and plausible story from the available material. Therefore, a "good" interpretation can only exist under the prior assumption of some purpose, and there is no possibility that an objectively correct interpretation could ever exist. As Rortyputs it:

We pragmatists are not able to understand the idea that truth should be pursued for truth. We should not regard truth as the aim of exploration. The purpose of exploration is to reach a consensus; in turn, to draw an

62

agreement on the objective to be achieved and what means should be used to achieve it. Research that is not reached to the modification of behavior is nothing but a pun.

of action, not representation, and the word as a tool, not a representation of reality, it makes the following question rendered meaningless: "Have I just discovered, or invented?" It is meaningless to distinguish the interaction

If we consider belief

as a habit

between organism and environment manner.

in

this

12

Moreover, we might argue that the progress of historical understanding is incompatible with accepting such a theory. This is because there is no good reason to insist that interpretation .,4 is any closer to the truth than interpretation B, as all historical interpretations and reconstructions are nothing more than a series of composed myths. As Rorty puts it in another work, "But I shall end this first chapter by going back to the claim, which has been central to what I have been saying, that the world does not provide us with any criterion of choice between alternative metaphors, that we can only compare languages or metaphors with one another, not with something beyond language called'fact."'l3

It

we can possibly apply a particular paradox from Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations to the interpretation of history. Said paradox is elaborated as follows: "This is our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course appears that

63

of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then so there

it

can also be made out to conflict

with it. And

would be nether accord nor conflict here."l4

Let us apply this paradox to the interpretation of history. Suppose there are three historical materials a, D, and

c, and that there also exists an interpretation P

which

interweaves a, b, and c with consistency. Let us also suppose that a historical event added, and that another interpretation Q is available which interweaves a, b, c arfl d

d is

in a consistent manner. At this point, is it possible to say which one is the better interpretation, if both interpretations P and Q were composed according to their own principles? If not, then we are commifting ourselves to relativism. Therefore, if historical interpretation depends upon cultural background, cultural relativism may be inevitable.

Problems The achievement of dragging tnrth from the abstract world down to reality is a worthy aspect of pragmatism. That is to say, pragmatism attempts to match truth with life. However, pragmatism infuses the constnrction of a historical world

with subjectivity, ard as a result historical truth

is

unacceptably relativized. This problem is evident in Dewey's conception of historical understanding. As mentioned above, pragmatism is divided into two t1pes. One is the radical version that identifies practicality with truth, and the other is the version that considers truth to

64

be based on scientific accuracy with practicality. William James, John Dewey, and Richard Rorty would be included under the former t1pe, whereas Charles Peirce and Hilary Putnam would be under the latter. Radical pragmatists do not consider the objectivity of historical understanding to be important, for they believe that it is suflicient for history to satisfy present needs and interests.

Pragmatist historians such as Becker and Beard accepted historical relativism as inevitable and natural. They were overwhelmed by the characteristic relativism of radical pragmatism.15 As a result, history appears to be more like art than science, and the distinction between genuine history and historical fiction is obscured.

contents of the pragmatist conception of history. Becker insists that historical fact is nowhere near as simple as we might think. He insists that we simpliff historical fact relative to the framework we adopt during the process of understanding it. In other words, we transform complex facts into a simple fact by an act of manipulation.

Let us review the important

Becker's assertion that facts manifest considerable complexity is acceptable in certain circumstances. After all, even a simple fact could tum out to be very complicated depending on the perspective one takes. However, when we say that the fact is simplified during the process of understanding, can we say that this is the creation of a fact rather than its discovery? When a historian writes that Caesar crossed the Rubicon on January 11,49 BCE, should we say that the complicated historical fact is genuinely

65

described only when each and ev€ry one of the six thousand

soldiers is taken into account? Of course, the proportion of soldiers and offrcers whose judgment of the matter was the same as Caesar's may well be of historical importance, but the assertion that the opinions of all the soldiers should be described individually is really an issue of description rather than an issue of complexity.

The claim that an event cannot be

easily distinguished from another event is also correct in certain circumstances. However, the claim that this is universal case does not consent to our common sense. For such an assertion to be meaningful, perhaps

it

should be understood as the assertion that we have no idea about how to get to the tnrth, since the nature of the event will vary depending upon

the observer's perspective. However since we can crosscheck the results that are revealed by perspectives, it is possible to estimate the world before interpretation through the switch of perspectives, and therefore things can be distinguished from each other. This doubt is also applicable to polytopic historical explanation. When an event has several causes, the one selected as the "primary" cause may well vary depending upon the context of explanation. However, even though this is the case, it is clearly mistaken to say that the explanation itself is entirely the result of our fabrication. Practical utility is, of course, a worthy value, but even so, practical utility cannot be immediately identifred with tnrth. History might and perhaps definitely has to be written in accordance with interests or needs, but this does not mean that we can interpret history arbitrarily. For 66

pragmatism to be even remotely persuasive, altogether discard the objectivity of truth.

67

it must not

4

Nlnnauvlsu: HrsroRv Is a Ltrnnlnv

GnxRn

If one recalls that during the illiterate period, when written language was yet to be invented, history was inherited through oral ffansmission, it is easy to understand the claim that history is a kind of storytelling.r After all, we all recall grandmother's fireside stories, how joyful and impressive they were, and how excitedly we looked forward to hearing the next one. Stories have to be attractive, because nobody is

fond of dull chronological tables. tf history is a form of narrative fiction, it ought to be fun and memorable. For it to be fun, a certain degree of expressive technique is required on the part of the narrator, in addition to the intrinsic attracliveness of the contents. This explains the pervasiveness of metaphor in storytelling, due to its ability to evoke emotional responses. As a result, we would expect effective historical narration to have something in common with Aristotle's treatise on the art of persuasion, his Rhetoric-

ln

addition,

a narrative history requires some It must have a beginning, a body

dramatic structure. characterized by dramatic development, a climax, and finally a conclusion, be it comic or tagic. A particularly well-executed piece will hold the interest of readers or

69

listeners whether or not it is true, and so the interest in accuracy may well be overwhelmed by the dramatic development of the story. Thus, there is an intrinsic conflict and contadiction in narrative history for as much as history can be storytelling, it ought also to be informative and truthful.

History of Events and History of Structures

A narrative

has no choice but to place events at its center. For a narrative to be made, certain events have to develop, and there needs to be a hero involved in these events. After all, a story without a hero is not really a story. In addition, every event should be unified within the narrative. An event that is not harmonious with the whole story will be an obstacle in the development of the story. This means that a narrative history is inevitably a history of events.

It is for this reason that those who insist

that true history should be the history of social structure and not a history of events have no choice but to reject narrative history. The thinkers of the Enlightenment period during the eighteenth century, such as Voltaire, mostly saw the history of structure as the true history, denigrating the history of events as a superficial form. This view became the fiadition of Annales School and extended from Lucien Febvre to Fernand Braudel. Braudel understood the event as the mere surface of history. He wrote: "The surface has a meaning, only if it indicates the stream of the deep structure."2 Based upon this tradition, a professional history developed that was

70

increasingly interested in the issues of structure, whereas demotic history focused on the transmission of stories. The structuralist insists that the traditional narrative history omits important aspects of past events.3 For example, in the context of a political event, a narrative history cannot help but emphasize the deeds or decisions of a political leader. It is much the same in the case of war. Even in a narrative of a war that has its origin in a certain structural contradiction, the war is inevitably the generals' war and is often composed of the stories of its various heroic figures. However, factors that are beyond the control of leaders or generals can easily be neglected, and the roles of the countless unknown followers and soldiers responsible for the actual prosecution of the war will be omitted or minimized.

lt is more convenient to personiff

social groups or institutions. However, when we deal with institutions such as church, party, and citizenry by personifying them through particular human beings, it becomes difficult to distinguish between a leader and a follower, and intra-group conflict may be disguised as consensus. It is for such reasons that the structuralist believes that storytelling is appropriate to fiction, but not to the serious writing of history. Conversely, one who supports narrative history may argue that a merely structural analysis would be static and that this is more unhistorical, if anything, than a narrative would be. A narrative historian imbues his or her historical explanation with personal characteristics and intentions. He or she does this be,cause such historians regard an event in a

7t

human's history as an event that is purposely related to the activity of that human being. The recently emerging form of micro-history is a t5pical example of nalrative history.

Which should come first: the analysis of a structure or the story of an event? The perspectives of structuralists and narrativists differ from each other not only in their views about the correct form of historical explanation, but also in their selection of what is regarded as meaningful. For example, let us assume that a taffic accident has resulted in several casualties and that it is a meaningful event in a particular history. A structuralist historian perceives the course of the road where the accident occurred and the blizzard conditions that occurred on that day as important factors. In contrast, the narative historian attempts to locate the explanatory factors in the driver's mistake or his state of health.

The Bpistemological Structure of Narrative History The contemporary narative historians insist that a story is the most suitable form for the reconstruction of a historical world. At the same time, they argue as follows:

(l)

Language is a self-sufficient semantic system and not a neutral means for expressing the world.

(2) The structure

of language will a priori

affect historical understanding.

72

(3) Historical writing is the composition of a story about the historical world and does not reflect the historical world.

Roland Barthes and Hayden White are representatives of this view. Barthes himself explicitly regards history as a form of literarure in The Discourse of History. Barthes inherits his structuralism from Ferdinand de Saussure, the

of

structural linguistics. Saussure denied the traditional linguistic view since Plato, which is the idea that language is a neutral means for expressing assertions about the world. According to this traditional idea, the name of an object is somehow given naturally, and a word contains its own meaning, on account of the fact that it represents something other than itself. ln other words, every object in the Garden of Eden was called by its proper name, a name

founder

that reflected its essential nature.

is a set of names for objects-that is, a list of words that represents a list of objects. His reasoning was as follows: If a list of words represents a list of objects, then there will be no problem in the translation of a foreign language. However, the fact that there are so many difficulties in translation shows that there is no such one-to-one correspondence between words and objects in the world, and thus that different languages compose different linguistic worlds. Moreover, if a language is a set of names and a name is that which represents or is applied to an independently existing object, then this would imply a stability of concepts. However, we would then be at Saussure denied that language

73

a loss to explain the fact that concepts appear to undergo continuous change.

Saussure regarded the linguistic sign as a combination of a sound-image and a concept. The soundimage is usually referred to as "signifiant" and the concept as"signifii." The signifiant need not necessarily be a soundimage, as a written inscription would suflice. However, whether spoken or wriffen, the signifianl is the physical carrier of meaning. In contrast, the signifii is the meaning itself. Although the signifiant and signifid can be logically distinguished from each other, they are inseparable in reality. For example, let us assume that a rose is presented to A as an expression of love. The rose therefore has the meaning of "love" to A. "Love" is the signifid, and the rose the signtfiant that transmits the meaning. A rose used in this manner is a symbol that includes the meaning of love for A, and so it is not just a normal flower (although some other flower could be used to make a similar gesture). [t may be understood as a special rose that includes a certain meaning.

In Saussure's linguistic theory, a sign

obtains its meaning from the whole linguistic system. The theory holds that a language contains only the conceptual and vocal differences derived from this system and contains no concepts or sounds that precede the system. A sign obtains its meaning from its differences with other signs in the linguistic system, and not from the essential nature of an external object that it indicates. That is, the meaning of a sign is determined by its position in the linguistic system. For example, the meaning of "rose" is determined by its

74

relationship with other signs, such as "lily," "azalea," "forsythia," and "magnolia." The external object is located outside the sign and is excluded from the initial attachment of significance to the sign. Again, this is due to language being a self-suffrcient system in which signs define each other. This is subjective linguistic theory, as opposed to objective linguistic theory, In summary, Saussure's linguistic theory holds that a language is an autonomous system of meaning. Stnrctural Iinguistics developed when this system of meaning was understood as a structure, and this theory of structure affected historical epistemology. The most significant influence is that the structure of language is held to precede historical understanding and that history itself is a system of signs and not a system of events. The precedence of structure means that linguistic structure is logically prior to historical events, and thus that we understand events solely via ther structure. The claim that history itself is a system of signs means that a particular history is a world to which we have attached significance. From this linguistic perspective, what the historian wishes to discover is history as a text composition, not as a series of events that occurred in the past. Barthes, upon analyzing the history of literature, insists that to be a literary work, a text should first be encoded as "literature." A literary historian is a person who traces the historical manner in which such an encoding came to be. Barthes determined that history is simply another form of literature. He insisted that a historical story

75

functions

in a similar manner to a work of fiction.

He

remarks:

We find the plot of a self-sufficient world in both history and novels. A self-suflicient world is created by the process in which its own status and limitations are carefully refined. In those status and limitations, it creates its own time and space, the residents, the aggregate of their own subjects and its mythology.a

For Barthes, language itself and its structural transformation are the reality of history. Therefore, the composition of historical narrative is the result of historical documentation producing what is called a "history effect," and not the result of historical documentation veraciously reflecting the past. A "history effect" reallocates the sign and the voice of historical documentation and gives the

reader the signal that a narrative writing of history is imminent. For Barthes, the following five signs may be used in the description: the hermeneutic sign, the sentence sign, the symbolic sign, the autotelic sigq and the cultural sign. The autotelic sign and the hermeneutic sign are especially important in the interpretation of narrative history. The autotelic sign is related to the progress of the story, and the hermeneutic sign is related to the means of showing the reader that the truth was revealed. Thus, the hermeneutic

76

sign is closely related to the reader's desire to discover the meaning of the story.s

Barthes strongly emphasizes the plurality of structural possibilities in a given text. He objects to any model in which an original structure is held to be reducible and emphasizes the unlimited nature of meaning in a particular text. He insists that the original meaning cannot be reduced to one specific structure, s)mtax, or logic. He remarks:

The narratives of the world are numberless. Narrative is first and foremost a prodigious variety of genres, themselves distributed amongst different substances-as though any material were fit to receive man's stories. ... Moreover, under this almost infinite diversity of forms, narrative is present in every age, in every place, in every society; it begins with

the very history

of

mankind and there nowhere is nor has been a people without narrative. All classes, all human groups, have their narratives, enjoyment of which is very often shared by men with different, even opposing, cultural backgrounds. Caring nothing for the division between good and bad literafure, narrative is international, transhistorical, transcultural: it is simply there, like life itself.6

77

The gist of Barthes' discussion is his claim that historical discussion is simply attaching significance to a fact, not proceeding based on the fact. That is to say, existence itself has no importance in a historical discussion since a story composes the object thoroughly within itself. Barthes himself stated, "Claims concerning the 'realism' of narrative are therefore to be discounted..,. The function of narrative is not to 'represent,' it is to constitute a spectacle still very enigmatic for us but in any case not of a mimetic order."7

If

it would be impossible to distinguish history from literature. A historian would be a collector of "the signified," not a collector of fact. The historian would merely manipulate objects in order to Barthes were correct, then

establish meaning.s

If

we classify history as a form of fiction, the,n the issue of the truth must be replaced with the issue of pleasure to the reader. Such a substitution would completely assimilate history to literature. One historian who has followed this docnine to an extreme is Hayden White. White insists that history has its origins in literature. As he remarks:

Histories (and philosophies of history as well) combine a certain amount of "data," some theoretical concepts for "explaining" these data, and a narrative structure to affect their presentation as an icon of sets of events presumed to have occurred in times past. In addition, I shall maintain, they contain a deep

78

structural content which is generally poetic,

and specifically linguistic, in nature, and which serves as the precritically accepted paradigm of what a distinctively "historical" explanation should be.e

The part that we have to pay attention to here is the notion of a paradigm that operates as a metahistorical, deep structure prior to historical research. The fact that this paradigm is generally poetic and linguistic more or less means that a history is not different from literature. As White relates, "One of my principle aims, over and above that of identiffing and interpreting the main forms of historical consciousness in nineteenth-century Europe, has

to

the uniquely poetic

elements in historiography and philosophy of history in whatever age

been

establish

they were practiced."ro

White wishes to accomplish this aim by explicating the linguistic bases from which a certain historical concept is composed. White classifies the conceptualization of historical research into five categories: (1) annals, (2) story, (3) mode of emplofinurt, (4) mode of argument, and (5) mode of ideological implication. Annals and story are the primary elements of historical explanation, and the other three are the historical explanations themselves.ll

Arurals are simply a list of events in temporal sequence. Although such a sequential list forms the primary material, a history could not be composed from this alone. Annals are transformed into stories that contain the process

79

of

beginning, development,

and conclusion.

The independent events of annals form a stucture by introducing a relationship in the process that transforms the annals into a

story. There are no introductions in annals. Annals begin literally when a historian of annals starts to record events. Similarly, there are no conclusions and no process in annals. Annals have only one capacity: to be endlessly extendd. ln conffast, a story has a clear and concrete form. A historian transforms the bare events into events that are the elements of a story, and thus creates a genuine story that possesses a beginning, development, and conclusion.

White focuses on several issues that

require

explanation in the process of transforming annals into story. When a historian transforms annals into story, there are problems he or she must anticipate in advance and respond to, such as "What will happen next?"; "How did it happen?"; "Why did the event happen in such a form, and not in another form?"; and "What, evenfually, is the conclusion?" Answers to such questions are essential if the independent events of annals are to relate to each other in the continuous flow that characterizes a story. White locates the answers to these questions in his third category above, the explanation by mode of emplotnent. However, even if such events are successfully related to each other, the explanation has yet to be completed. The following questions will soon arise: "In conclusion, what do all these events mean?" and "What was the point of all that?" Such questions relate to the overarching structure that a set of events-that is, a complete story-possesses. When such

80

a structure is revealed, we can see the entire structure of the world. The answers to these questions lie in the explanation

by mode of argument.

Ethical elements are also taken into account when judgpg facts. White insists that we cannot see events from a value-neutral perspective. Questions such as "did the event increase freedom?" or "did the event result in historical progress?" or even "did the event result in historical regression?" will naturally arise. The answers to these questions are to be found through the explanation by mode of ideological implication. White further classifies these three explanations into four further categories. The mode of emplotment is classified into Romantic, Comic, Tragic, and Satirical; the mode of argument into Formist, Mechanistic, Organicist, and Contextualist; and the mode of ideological implication into Anarchist, Radical, Conservative, and Liberal.

The explanatory form by mode of emplotment intends to ascribe meaning to a story by identifoing its format. The mode of emplotment is a method of transforming a series of events into a specific format of story. Historians are free to choose from one of the four formats upon which to base their narratives.

The classification

of four modes of

emplotment discussed above originates from Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism, which was adopted by White, who considered it useful for the analysis of historical texts. Frye, in his theory ofarchetypes, asserted that all narratives fall into one offour

81

mythoi: comedy into spring, romance into summer, tragedy into autumn, and satire into winter.l2 Romance is a form of drama that is represented by a

hero's attempts to transcend the ernpirical world, to win against the world and ultimately to be liberated from the world. It shows not only the triumph of good over evil, virtue over vice, and light over darkness, but also the final transcendence of humanity over the comrpted world portrayed in the drama. The resurrection of Christ is a notable example of Romance. Satire is antithetical to Romance. Satire does not reward humanity with salvation. It regards humanity as the slave of the world rather than its

ln Satire, the human consciousness and will cannot overcome the violence of death, the archenemy of humanity. master.

Comedy and Tragedy both suggest a partial freedom (or at least the potential for it) from a comlpt and worn-out circumstance. In Comedy, there remains hope in the temporary victory of humanity against the world due to the expectation that the forces of the natural or social world can be reconciled with each other. Such reconciliation is symbolized by festive events. Reconciliation appearing at the end of comedy signifies reconciliation between human beings as well as reconciliation of human beings with the world and society. [n contrast, there are no such things as festive events in Tragedy. Reconciliation as it occurs at the

end of a Tragedy is a form of resignation, an acknowledgment that the circumstances which human beings must endure are unchangeable and eternal, and that they define the limits of human pursuit.

82

White regarded these four formats as the primitive styles from which historians must select in order to compose a story. This is because his view is that all histories are somehow composed of stories. Each primitive format has its unique cognitive function by which historians try to describe the real event. For example, Jules Michelet wrote all his histories in the Romantic style; Leopold von Ranke in Comic; Alexis de Tocqueville in Tragic; and Jacob I Burckhardt in Satirical. 3

of

argument that explains the gist of events is also subdivided into four types: Formist, Organicist, Mechanistic, and Contextualist. The mode of argument can be analped by a classical syllogism, comprised of the traditional major premise, minor premise, and conclusion. The major premise consists of a hypothetical universal causal principle that relates a cause to an effect; the minor premise is the initial condition to which the causal principle is applied; and the conclusion is derived from the premises by logical necessity. This deductive-nomological explanatory method is distinguished from one that shows a specific form of storytelling structure.

The mode

The paradigm

of the following four

formats

suggested by White is borrowed from S. C. Pepper's World

Hypotheses. characteristics

la

Formism intends

to reveal specific

ofan object that exists in the historical field.

Thus, explanation is complete when the particular object is clearly distinguished and its type and characteristics are distinctly revealed. Said object can be anything from an individual to a group, something particular or universal, a

83

concrete material or an abstract concept. [n a nutshell, all objects in formism are thought to have unique characteristics, and historians to have a responsibility to portray thern appropriately. Examples of fonnist historians include Herder

the romanticist historian, Thomas Carlyle, Michelet, B. G. Niebuhr, Theodor Mommsen, and G. M. Trevelyan. Organicism views particulars as an element of the whole. As seen in Organicism, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Organicists are more interested in describing the integral process than the individual elements. History wriffen in this style has a tendency to set an objective or goal, and it is considered that the entire history moves and directs itself toward said objective. Organicist historians include Ranke and a number of nationalist historians from the mid-nineteenth century. Mechanism describes history viathe law of causation.

It

views the objects

of a historical field as existing

in

specific situations governed by the law of causation. Figures such as H. T. Burkle, H. Tainne, Karl Marx, and Tocqueville studied history in an attempt to discover the laws that govern the process of history and to describe the results of such

laws

in the narrative form. In

other words, Mechanist

historians believe that historical description is completed only upon the discovery of the laws that govern history in the same way that the laws of physics govern nature. Contextualism is the view that an event ought to be described within the context in which it occurs. From this perspective, the question of why an event has happened can

be answered through uncovering its specific relationships

84

with other events that took place within its historical vicinity. At first glance, Contextualism seerns similar to Formism, but Formism focuses on the specific characteristics of the subject, while Contextualism attempts to describe what happened by identiflng the functional interrelationship between the agent and the cause that controls the area at the time. This functional interrelationship is clarified through colligation,labeled so by philosophers such as W. H. Walsh and Isaiah Berlin. Contextualist historical research begins by singling out some factors in the historical field as objects of study. It then attempts to frnd a link that connects said factors to another area within the same context. The search for the link is completed when it disappears in the context with other events or when another cause of a new event surfaces. We find the Contextualist model in the work of many outstanding historians from Herodotus to Johan Huizinga, and most especially in Burckhardt. The ideological dimension of historical explanation as suggested by White reflects the ethical element in the historian's specific assumption. This assumption concerns the implications we might derive from both the nature of historical knowledge and the investigation of past events in order to increase our understanding of present events. White proposes four ideological viewpoints by modeling Karl Mannheim's ldeologt and Utopia. They are labeled Anarchist, Radical, Liberal, and Conservative. Each represents different attitudes with respect to the desires to maintain or reform social phenomena, the methods for social

B5

reformations

to

take, the means

of

achieving such

reformations, and the directions of time.

For instance, concerning the speed of

change,

Liberals emphasize social rhyhms such as political debates, while Conservatives emphasize natural rhythms. In contast, Radicals and Anarchists believe in the possibility of rapid convulsions. Conservatives regard the process of historical development as a progressive process of institutional structure. The present state is the best we can achieve on a realistic level, and in a sense it is the accomplishment of utopia, Liberals do not regard the present state as utopia, but they nevertheless believe that history is marching toward utopia. The reason both parties object to the Radicals who wish to bring about utopia immediately is that they believe that a true utopia will not come any time soon. However, radicals tend to believe that the advent of utopia will come

very soon, and for this reason they are interested in revolutionary methods to bring it about. Anarchists, in contrast, tend to idealize the distant past and insist that humanity has fallen into the present corrupt state from this ideal past. In White's mode of ideological implication,

historians Michelet and Tocqueville can be classified Liberals, while Ranke and Burckhardt are Conservatives.

as

of these three explanatory forms. The narrative style of historical writing is a szi generis combination of a mode of Every historian has to take his own position in one

emplotment, a mode of argument, and a mode of ideological implication. White insists, though, that such combinations cannot happen indiscriminately, and his reasoning is in this

86

It is because the connection should be made depending upon the structural homogeneity shared by these explanatory forms. White demonstrates the formats as shown in Figure 5.15 case very clear.

Mode of ldeological

Mode of Emplotment

Mode of Argument

Romantic

Formist

Anarchist

Tragic

Mechanistic

Radical

Comic

Organicist

Conservative

Satirical

Contextualist

Liberal

Implication

Figure 5. formats of modes.

The historian performs

a

systematic historical writing by selecting and combining the formats represented on these three levels. For example, Michelet was a historian who combined Romantic emplotment, Formist mode of argument, and Liberal ideology. Burckhardt combined Satirical emplotment, Contextualist mode of argument, and Conservative ideology. Finally, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel composed a historical narrative that can be seen as Tragic from the micro level of viewpoint, Comic from the macro level, and combining an Organicist mode of argument and a Conservative ideology.

What can we deduce from White's theory? Although he maintains that a historian endeavors to discover facts, his

87

view implies that the historian is nothing more than a literary author, insofar as his or her explanation involves composition. This is because a historian performs the task of composing a story from the raw material of annals under the presupposition of certain modes of emplobnent, argument,

and ideological implication. In conclusion, according to White's theory, history and historical fiction cannot be distinguished, and history becomes nothing more than literature.

Problems Narrative history is for us a very familiar form of history, and it has the following three advantages compared to stnrctural history:

(l)

The narrative form makes history easier to

understand by uncovering the stucture hidden in the deep, which normal people rarely have access to. In particular, it is

for a new tlpe of history to emerge from the synthesis of narrative and structure, as demonstrated by

possible

Peter Burke.

(2) By using the features of conternporary fiction, narrative history can display historical events in a vivid, lifelike

scene.

(3) Formerly

neglected areas

in

history can

acknowledged. Micro-history is one of the possibilities.

88

be

Even so, the subjective constructivism of narrative history cannot be justifred. It is nothing more than making history a form of private property. If history ever goes beyond its obligation to reproduce the past, it will become a mere historical fiction. It was a crucial mistake for narative historians to say that a historical narrative is acceptable even if it fails to keep in line with reality. Such a mistake is derived from the erroneous view that language is not a neutral means of representing an extemal object and that meaning is determined autonomously within a linguistic system. That is to say, these narrative historians are the victims of the thesis of linguistic ubiqutty. History is not poetics, and the historical war that continues even nowadays is not just a leisurely game. It is an irrevocable mistake for nanative idealism to identify fictional history with the real historical world.

89

P.lnr Ht

Hrsronv

II

sronrclr, Relltstrl

Is rHE

:

RnpRooucrloN oF rHr

Plsr

In Pafi I, we discussed the problems that various forms of relativism pose in the study of history. In Part II, we will discuss the possibility of historical objectivity.

Our first task is to discuss the claim that, although it is possible for a matter to be open to multiple understandings, it does not follow that an entirely subjective interpretation of it is allowed. To complete this task, we must first understand what is meant by a "viewpoint." In general, a "viewpoint" refers to a subjective take on a maffer, which is considered incompatible with objectivity. In Chapter 5 I attempt to show, by means of a more precise analysis of viewpoints, how it is possible to secure objectivity while allowing multiple viewpoints. Subsequently, in Chapter 6 I argue that even though history may be narrated in the form of storytelling, it does

not follow that history must thereby be separated from reality. The way in which history is narrated is undetermined. It is possible for storytelling to either objectively depict the historical world or otherwise be fictitious, regardless of the historical world. Hence, to secure the objectivity of narrative

9L

history,

it must be proved that reality and storytelling

can

share the sarne stnrcture.

Third, the twentieth century is often referred to as the era of linguistic analysis due to the fact that language was very often the center of philosophical issues. Naturally, the philosophy of language has exerted a tremendous influence on historical studies, and the "linguistic turn" itself has been discussed within a historical context. In Chapter 7, the tnre meaning of the "linguistic turn" is revealed, and at the same time, I argue that historical linguistics must be free from the illusion that the linguistic turn causes. Finally, if the study of history is to be objective, then it is necessary to determine the relationship between historical hypothesis and historical evidence via a scientific method. Chapter 8 considers whether the Bayesian logic can be applied to the case in question. In addition, some methods for obtaining objectivity are discussed.

92

t On.lBcrrvrrv Is CoUPATIBLE wITH Mulrlple Vlnwpotxrs

"Viewpoint" (Sehepunkt) means "the angle or position from which one sees."rViewpoint plays a very important role in one's cognition of any object, for the same object appears

differently depending

on the viewpoint adopted.

Accordingly, the viewpoint plays a crucial role in historical understanding. Constructivist epistemology is a notable example that takes viewpoints as essential elements in understanding history. Some people identify viewpoints with paradigms and

believe that a difference in viewpoint is the same as a difference in paradigm. However, viewpoints take on a variety of meanings. Also, one may have many different viewpoints within one paradigm. Here, I shall use the term "viewpoint" in a broad sense and in no way directly related to paradigms. This broad usage suggests that paradigms or historical views are among the more specific, central viewpoints. The constructivist epistemology of history constructs the past from the viewpoint of the present. Constnrcting the past in terms of a present viewpoint means to put the past up

on the stage of the present and then decipher it. [n this case, the "stage of the present" is the viewpoint for the past.

93

of history all historical understanding may vary

Presentist, pragmatist, and narrativist theories

demonstate

how

according to different viewpoints.

Within the context of contemporary epistemology, it seems impossible to justi$ a positivist view of history, which eliminates the role of viewpoints. This is because in contemporary epistemology it is commonly believed that a purely passive epistemology is impossible. As we have previously discussed, contemporary epistemology deals with this matter under the topic of "theory-laden observations," and its cental claim is that cognition is not an accumulation of pure observations but occurs under the guidance of some prior theory or viewpoint. Even in matters of choice, viewpoints are essential, since choice in the absence of a viewpoint cannot exist. Neverttreless, such critiques

do not by themselves

of historical positivism

justi$ historical constructivism, for

constructivism faces its own difficulties as well. First, if constructivism is taken to extremes, it results in radical relativism. The so-called "viewpoint of the present"

by constructivism is admitted to be variable, to according the subject. If everyone has a right to view the historical world from their own viewpoint, and all viewpoints are equally justified, then there is no sense in attempting to distinguish historical falsehoods from historical truths. This, in the end, makes it impossible to distinguish historical writing from historical novel. suggested

Second, constructivism excessively rigidifies the role

of viewpoints. Thus, adopting viewpoint "A" is rather like 94

being thrown into an inescapable prison cell. However, in actual practice we are free to adopt different viewpoints. Thus, the right way to develop a historical view is to

avoid the problerns afflicting both sides. This involves appreciating the importance of viewpoints to historical understanding while at the same time securing objectivity for that understanding.

Focal Viewpoint and Projective Viewpoint

Considering how theory relies on viewpoints and how choice is inevitable in the selection of facts, it is difficult to deny the importance of viewpoints to historical understanding. However, so far we have only discussed viewpoints on the level of everyday usage. Thus, we require a more detailed analysis of viewpoints. Viewpoints can be classified into two types. The first tlpe is one that reveals an object from a specific point of view, and the second is that which distorts objects by projecting one's psychological state upon them. We can call the former a "focal" viewpoint because it reveals the object by focusing on its particular aspects. ln contrast, the latter deforms the object, so we shall label it a "projective"

viewpoint. The crucial diflerence between the two viewpoints is that whereas a focal viewpoint distinguishes between the subject and object, a projective viewpoint is unable to do so.

Also, it is possible to discuss the matter of degree about a viewpoint, be it focal or projective. That is to say

95

just because "A" and 'oB" are focal viewpoints, they are not necessarily of the same value. For example, "A" could present the facts in a more comprehensive and consistent way than "8." The same applies to projective viewpoints. Some viewpoints may partially distort the facts, but others that

may distort them completely.

By freely switching between viewpoints, we can compare them as well as their results. Some people stress the precedence of viewpoints over observations and treat us as

if

we were slaves to a certain viewpoint. Yet even if we allow for the necessity of viewpoints, we are not thereby

committed

to

them as

if they were irreversible

or

rurchangeable. This is similar to how we devise a hypothesis

prior to performing scientific research, being aware that we are free to revise and modifu the precding hlpothesis during the process.

In the broadest sense, we can also divide viewpoints into those that operate consciously and those that operate unconsciously. Unconscious viewpoints are those of which the historian is unaware; the historian still thinks that he or she is engaged in viewpoint-free understanding. In conhast, a conscious viewpoint is one of which the historian is aware, and he or she uses it as a research hlpothesis. It is normal for the historian to clariff that a particular study is being conducted in accordance with a particular viewpoint. Whether a viewpoint works consciously or unconsciously is not an important matter in itself. What is of interest is whether such viewpoints affect the process of historical understanding positively or negatively.

96

Those who view cognition as a passive process tend

to look at viewpoints in a negative light, thinking that facts ought to be the center of discussion and that subjectivity ought not get in the way. They believe that viewpoints are obstacles to seeing facts as they truly are. They would argue thatjust as using a concave or convex lens to view an object causes it to appear in a somewhat distorted way, so different viewpoints cause us to have a distorted view of the facts. Conversely, those who view cognition as an active process believe that viewpoints' interference with the cognitive process is not always a bad thing. They believe it may actually contribute to understanding the object. Their argument can be explained as follows: When we focus on object "A" out of a desire for "A" to stand out from other

objects, then, just as when we shine a spotlight on a protagonist performing onstage, such an adjustment does not distort the object; rather, it highlights it. Further, when we use a flashlight to illuminate something on a dark night, the objects that are illuminated are those that are located where the beam falls. However, just because the flashlight cannot simultaneously reveal all the nearby objects does not mean that its beam distorts our vision of the objects that it does pick out. Nevertheless, it remains true that we often see an object in the wrong manner due to the effects of prejudice or misconception. How might this duality of viewpoints be explained? Johann Martin Chladenius, an eighteenth-century German historical theorist, understood adopting a viewpoint to be a partisan act having two sides: a negative function of

97

distorting cognition, and a positive function of allowing the subject to understand the object through the environment in which the subject and object are placed or through their relationship to each other.2 Keeping this in mind, it seems fitting to divide viewpoints into trro types. The first is necessary to account for the subject's active role in the cognitive process, and the second is the result of personal interest and prejudice. The case where we understand an object from diverse stances by switching our viewpoints must be distinguished from the case where the object is deliberately tailored to serve needs unrelated to pure academic purposes.

W. H. Walsh suggested that personal group prejudice, differing theories on

prejudice, historical interpretations, and overall worldview are the viewpoints that commonly differ among historians.3 Personal prejudice is a biased opinion based upon individual preferences. For

example, whereas Carlyle tried to praise the heroes of history by putting them at the center of history, Wells viewed these same people as the evildoers and hypocrites of

history-both viewpoints were affected by

personal

prejudice. Group prejudice is a stereotlpe that exists within a nation, race, or some other social or religious organization. Stereotypes that we have of certain religious groups are obvious examples of group prejudice. For example, some Westem Christians have created the prejudice that Muslims are of a violent disposition, whereas Orientalism is the group prejudice that Asians are somehow inferior to Westerners.

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As Walsh explained, while the theory of historical interpretation is understood as the general framework of explanation, worldview is a cognitive framework in an even wider sense. Both are connected and cannot easily be separated, but for the sake of comprehension we can say that worldviews lie at the root of the matter. In other words, a worldview consists of our belief in how objects exist in phenomenal world and should exist in essential world. Therefore, the argument between monists (who try to find a singular cause for some historical event) and pluralists (who refuse to believe that a single source can be the cause of an event) can be perceived as a conflict between theories, and

the opposition between historical materialism and historical idealism can be seen as a conflict of worldviews. Here, personal prejudice and group prejudice are examples of projective viewpoints, while interpretative theories and worldviews can be regarded as examples of perspective viewpoints.

Viewpoints can be initially defined as the stance of view. The same object can be viewed differently depending on the position from which it is viewed; additionally, depending on our angle of view, we may be able to see the sides or the front of the object but be unable to see the areas on the other side. Consider the Statue of Liberty, which looks completely different when seen from the back than it does when seen from the front. From this example, we can reach the following understanding: When we (l) view the object from afar or up close, (2) are unable to see more than one specific aspect of the object, or (3) see the object

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through a medium, then we perceive the same object in different ways.

However, the meaning of "viewpoint" can be broadened to include everything that the subject bestows upon the cognitive process. According to Chladenius, "We label as 'angle of view' whatever allows us to imagine an object and the causes that make us imagine it, such as our soul, body, and whole personality."a

This definition of viewpoint not only highlights the stance of view, but broadens it in four way*-each of which adds to the notion of "simple sight." These additions are: (l) the exactitude of eyesight and its power to see over distances, (2) the sensitivity of the viewer, (3) the inner condition of the viewer, and (a) the position and status of the viewer. These additions generally refer to the subjective state or nature of the viewer. Seen this way, the stance of view is not only a concept of sight, but also a category of cognition that includes both the inner and outer states of the viewer. I hereby define the narrow meaning of "viewpoint" to be the perspective viewpoint, and the broader meaning of "viewpoint" to be the projective viewpoint.

Perspectivism and Objectivity

When viewpoints are classified into focal and projective categories, what epistemological results follow? The connection between projective viewpoints and epistemic relativism seems natural. In contrast, focal viewpoints are compatible with epistemic objectivism. This is due to

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multiple reasons. First, no matter how many different conclusions we may reach about an object on account of perceiving it from different perspectives, none is an arbitrary projection of opinion; the object is still one and the same object even though it is perceived from diverse angles. For example, even though Mont Blanc appears differently when seen from France rather than from Italy, it rernains the same mountain. Second, even

if

distance affects the perceived size

of

an object, we can still anive at a proper understanding of its actual size. For example, Polaris appears to be smaller than

the Sun. However, we know that this is due to the fact that the distance between Earth and Polaris is thousands of times greater than the distance between Earth and the Sun. We also know that, in actual size, Polaris is dozens of times bigger than the Sun. As we know, to the eye, objects seen from afar appear smaller than those that are nearby. We can consider this fact in our appraisal of the relative size of Polaris to the Sun, and by altering our viewpoint, we can come to appreciate the objective nature of the situation.

We can call the claim that an object looks different according to the viewpoint "perspectivism." Some people tend to connect historical relativism with perspectivism, but perspectivism need not be incompatible with objective historical studies. Identifuing perspectivism with relativism is the same mistake as identifying focal viewpoint with the projective viewpoint. Looking at things from diverse stances or angles simply means that we are free to understand history from different viewpoints, not that we are free to

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make up history as we please. In other words, "diversity'' does not imply that we are free to distort the facts in order to fit some preferred framework and ignore those that do not fit.

In fact, it means the opposite: We must collect all evidence related to our viewpoint and go through a thorough, objective investigation. We ought to be aware of our viewpoints, and we are free to care less about those facts that are unrelated to our viewpoints. To take an extreme example, we may view the recent history of the human race as a historical progress toward freedom by highlighting the struggle to abolish slavery, or we may view the same history

by focusing on the enslavement of Africans by Europeans. However, these two viewpoints are not always incompatible, but can be seen as supplementing each other-just as observing a mountain from different sides can increase our understanding of its topography, even though doing so may present starkly different profiles to the observer. Thus, it is fair to conclude that perspectivism does not necessarily imply the rejection of historical objectivity. as a historical regression

However, whe,n we try to ptusue objectivity while still allowing for a diversity of viewpoints, it is important to utilize mechanisms that converge and synthesize these viewpoints. By switching between viewpoints, it is possible to understand the limitations of our viewpoint and the positive aspects of another person's. This is called "changing paradigm," or "putting oneself in someone else's shoes." This is equivalent to understanding the relation between the subject of an experiment and the tool used to measure it, so as to remove or minimize experimental errors;

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by understanding the geometrical rules of perspective, we can observe a single object from various viewpoints.5

Having a fixed viewpoint is completely different from being able to freely switch between viewpoints. The former makes it difficult for us to escape our viewpoint, but the latter enables us to look at objects from different viewpoints and collect results in order to understand the objects more comprehensively. Here, we ought to know how

to go beyond having one fixed viewpoint and proceed to being able to switch between viewpoints.

Moreover, we are able to look back and critique our own conceptual framework. Reason, as a definition, is the very ability to critique oneself. As Karl Popper pointed out, this means that we no longer have to be a prisoner of our own conceptual framework. Of course, it may be said that in a sense we are inevitably prisoners on the grounds that we

anything without relying on conceptual frameworks. Nevertheless, if we make up our minds to do so,

cannot

do

we can always escape a particular conceptual framework.

In addition, we must come to understand that the "objectivity" of knowledge is a separate matter from the "completeness" or "wholeness" of knowledge. This is because a partial truth can be an objective truth, even if it's not the absolute truth that we aim to finally achieve. Thus, there is no reason for us to become frustrated or give up on the concept of objective truth. Even if the historical knowledge we obtain is not perfect, there is no reason to label it fraudulent; through continuous observation, it is possible to get closer to the complete truth.

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The problem lies with projective viewpoints. These distort the facts by projecting our state of mind onto our cognition of the facts. Consider a person suffering from schizophrenia. This person would see everything in a selfcentered manner and, as a result, would interpret reality in a fictional way by associating facts that in reality share no relevance to each other. This is not an objective knowledge of reality.

advocates of presentist, pragmatist, and narrativist approaches, which were examined in Chapter 4, devised many reasons to think that we cannot be free of viewpoints. In the minds of presentists and pragmatists, our

The

viewpoints are connected to present needs and practicalities. Those among them who support the ubiquity of language claim that due to this ubiqurty, our viewpoints are defined by the linguistic system that we use. However, these assertions are based upon an underestimation of.reason. Reason is that power that allows us to be objective about ourselves. This means that we can go beyond ourselves. To take a coillmon example, if our viewpoints are fixed and we cannot objectify ourselves, how would it be possible to measure the size of the Earth without being in outer space, or to talk about the change of the universe while we exist inside of it?

Epistemological Discussion of Viewpoints

Here we can ask the following questions: In historical understanding, (l) Is it possible that only one viewpoint and interpretation is valid? (2) Is it the case that all viewpoints and interpretations have the same value? and (3) If we L04

combine and compare various viewlioints, is obtain a superior viewpoint?

it

possible to

To be blunt, the answer to both the first and second questions is "no." However, the answer to the third question t'yes." is The claim that only one viewpoint and interpretation is acceptable violates our everyday experience of seeing the same object through different viewpoints. There is no obvious reason to choose only one viewpoint. It is possible to find the cause of the French Revolution either through a socioeconomic viewpoint or through a politicaVcultural viewpoint. There is no decisive reason to choose one over

the other. It is possible to find the cause of the revolution from a viewpoint that opposes the revolution, or from one that supports it. It is even possible to interpret the revolution from the viewpoint of poverty or from that of bourgeois growth. Whichever viewpoint we choose does not make it necessary that a different viewpoint be essentially ruled out. There are those who use Kuhnian paradigms to claim

that the adoption

of a different paradigm necessitates

discerning the same fact in a completely different way. However, if we see objects differently, according only to our own paradigms, then it would be impossible to be at all aware of the fact that we are seeing things differently. That is to say, a person under the influence of paradigm "A" could not even have a conversation about the subject with a person under the influence of paradigm "B." Such a view is rather extreme. It is a bare fact that we can change our viewpoint at will and can put ourselves in others' shoes.

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This naturally brings us to the second question. Even if we allow the diversity of viewpoints, it does not follow that all viewpoints are equal. There are viewpoints that are unable to enlighten us about the facts in any way whatsoever, and there are also viewpoints that only partially reveal the truth. For example, the viewpoint that regards the French Revolution as God's punishment may have some meaning from a religious point of view, but from an academic point

of view, it is meaningless. On an academic level, there is therefore no reason to deal with the viewpoint in question. To take another example, the viewpoint of a conspiracy theory would have some meaning if, as a matter of fact, a conspiracy really existed. Yet, even if there were such a conspiracy, it remains questionable as to whether or not it would be the most important reason for the French Revolution. Whe,never something important in history has occurred, there has always been a related conspiracy theory.

However, such theories usually offer no definite proof and are often exaggerated. From this point of view, conspiracy theories are hardly credible. Whichever viewpoint one

will a viewpoint. It is

adopts to find the cause of the French Revolution, one need to pick out evidence to support such

possible here to weigh and determine which viewpoint is more valuable by comparing the collected evidence. Furthermore, perspectivism need not assert that all interpretations are equally valuable. It is possible that there is a standard by which we can discern the superiority of one historical interpretation over another. We distinguish the superiority of one scientific theory over another by the standard of explanatory ability. We may also apply this

106

standard to the historical interpretations. That is to say, an

interpretation that contradicts actual facts is inferior to one that remains consistent with the actual evidence. Moreover, an interpretation that must borrow from a supplementary hlpothesis to explain certain facts is inferior to one that does not require such supplements. For example, if interpretation "A" cannot connect many different facts but interpretation "B" can, then the latter is the superior interpretation on the grounds that it has superior explanatory ability.

If we move on to our third question, we find that the answer is already apparent. Tryrng to find a better viewpoint

always desirable, and the development of historical methodology or other adjacent academic fields could make this possible. There is no reason for us not to try to see the facts better. The following chapter demonstrates this well.

is

t07

6

Rrllrsttc Nlnnarrvns Cxr Repnooucs

rHg Plsr

The theory of narrative history can be divided into two groups: narrative realism and narrative idealism.l Narrative realism conceives stories as pictures or photographs of the past. Here, picture and reality have the relationship of symmetry or corespondence. Conversely, narrative idealism rejects this picture theory, asserting that there is no connection between reality and the narrative. Whether it is possible for a narrative to be an honest history comes down to whether or not the narrative can represent the world of history as it was. What evidence is there to support narrative idealism, which maintains that narratives cannot represent history? [n turn, how can one support narrative realism, which suggests that narratives themselves are the most effective way to do so? In order to answer these questions and for this discussion to be at all meaningful, we must first know the characteristics of the narrative structure.

If the structure of the narrative is quite different from the structure of facts, the narrative will not be able to represent the facts. Therefore, for someone to assert that narratives are representations of the real world, it must first be proven that the narrative and facts share the same

109

structure. Narrative idealists,

in

contrast, must prove

othenvise.

In this chapter, it will be demonstrated that narrative realism is justified, whereas narrative idealism is criticized for various difficulties. The reasoning is roughly as follows: history is a process of life, and since our life takes the structure of a narrative, it follows that history can be revealed through narrative.

Characteristics of Narratives

Naratives are stories aggregated into a single plot. In general, narratives are understood to possess three primary characteristics. 2 First, a narrative has a beginning, a developmental stage, and an ending. Second, the parts of a narrative must be coherent. Thfud, a narrative consists of three factors: the narator, the cast of characters in the story, and the audience.

That a narative has a beginning, development, and an ending does not simply mean that a series of events take place in a tanporal order. If that were so, then we should say

that everything has a beginning, development, and an end. For example, seasons have a beginning, development, and an end. Summer starts with the onset, reaches a climax in midsummer, and then ends with the onset of autumn. However, the development of a season is not a narrative. For it to be a narrative, the opening, development, and ending would have to be interwoven into one organic structure.

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Of course, we can broaden the definition of narrative and allow something like "the story of the stars," or "the story of the sun." The story of the stars would be a narrative of the birth and death of a star, and the story of the sun would be a narrative of the birth and development of the sun; if we take narratives to be this broad in scope, then narratives relaying the birth and death of any organism would be possible. Yet, in this case, "narrative" is being used in too broad of a sense. The question of whether or not history is a narrative must only use the narrowest definition of the term; if not, the question would not be worth discussing.

Narrative in the nalrowest definition must involve descriptions of historical processes in which some goal or purpose is fulfilled. For this reason, this narrow definition cannot be applied to lifeless objects or relatively simple organisms, to which no such thing as a goal or purpose can be attributed. The assertion that a narrative as an organic structure consists of a beginning, development, and an end as a whole implicitly assumes the realization of a goal or an objective. Coherence means to have a single unified structure. There is no reason to add superfluous maffer to a story.

Everything

in a story exists for a reason and is cleverly

placed there to form a single plot. Even those events that are

seemingly extremely complex will turn out to be aggregated

into one storyline. Simply placing unrelated events successively in a line cannot be perceived as forming a narrative.

LLL

In a narrative, the narrator, the cast ofcharacters, and the audience coexist. The narrator is the writer, the cast is the people who are the subjects of the narrative, and the audience is the goup of people who are listening to this narrative.

Narrative structures can be divided into trvo t)?es. The first is a composite narrative in which the events of a continuous series are juxtaposed, and the second is a narrative with a single storyline. A classicist historian would view the world history as a composite narrative consisting of the stories of many different nations, but an illuminist historian would view world history as a single narrative of the human race as a whole.

Narrative Realism and Narrative ldealism Narrative realists believe that a single narrative consists of many individual representations of the past. Here, these individual representations can be compared to single staternents. For example, suppose we are watching a movie.

A movie

consists of many different individual scenes. All the scenes put together make one complete movie. The reason it takes a long time to make a whole movie is because one must move from place to place to capture many different scenes. We can compare a single movie to a single

natrative, and each individual scene to each individual statement from that narrative. A narrative realist asserts that the tnrth of the entire set of statements--in other words, one complete narrativo-is a tnrth function of individual statements. If we symbolize individual staternents as Sl, 32

LLZ

Sn, and the whole narrative as N, this can be stated as follows:3

...

N:

Sl + 52 .....+ Sn

Narrative idealists criticize narrative realism in two ways. They argue that historical reality does not exist independently from narratives, or, even if the constifuent

parts

of a

story match the historical truth, narratives

themselves do not represent reality.

The first argument of narrative idealists is as follows: for a narrative to represent reality, each and every statement in the narrative must correspond to a definite fact. However, historical facts do not exist prior to narratives:

The altemative is to abandon the remnant of the idea of Universal History that survives as a presupposition, namely the idea that there is a determinate historical actuality, the complex referent for all our narratives of "what actually happened," the untold story to which narrative histories approximate.a

This means that historical landscapes are not given to historians; rather, the historians themselves must orgalaize them within a narrative. Moreover:

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In the same vein, Huizinga has already pointed out that it is wrong, although quite enticing, to believe that the "es" in Ranke's dictum that the historian should represent the past "wie es eigentlich gewesen," should refer to something fixed and incontestably having the same contours for all historians.s.

that

If the past is not fixed as narrative idealists assertis, if the past does not exist separately from narratives-

then the theory that narratives re,present the past cannot be valid. The rule of correspondence by which one thing represents the other, or the rule of translation, only exists when these things have a common structure or if they correspond to each other, If the past itself does not possess any narrative stnrctures, and therefore narrative strucfures are only possible inside narratives, then it is impossible to discuss structural similarity.

Franklin R. Ankersmit compared the duty of a historian to that of a costume designer.6 Costume designers use mannequins or dolls to display their work. However, these mannequins are merely insffuments for making the garment stand out; they themselves are not parts of the work.

Similarly, historians have devised concepts such as 'the Renaissance" or "the Industrial Revolution" in order to display the past. Through this process, the past is revealed in terms of "Industrial Revolution" or "Renaissance,'o which are not parts of the past. Narrative idealists argue for the

Lt4

autonomy of narrative structures and emphasize the rules of narratives or the narrative logic that governs narratives. Narrative idealists say it is impossible to look at the past as if looking at a tree or a landscape. We can only see the past through its mask, and there is nothing that resembles the face underneath the mask.

The second criticism is that if we ignore the order of the pieces that make up narrative "N," which are Sr, Sz, St ... Sn, and arbitrarily change their order to form 'Nr," then if "N" is the truth function of St, Sz, Sr'.' Sn, it must follow that "N" equals'oNr." The truth function does not require the order of its atomic constituents to be the same for it to

Yet,

if

we change the narrative process, the result will be an entirely different story, if not total gibberish of which no one can make sense. By removing the connectives, such as "because...," "after...," "before...," and "therefore...," the temporal series is destroyed and the causes are mixed up with the consequences; for this reason, narrative idealists assert that generate the same result.

the realists are mistaken.

Moreover, narrative idealists maintain that the content of a narrative has no individual link to individual statements; they claim that it is only related to the total sum of statements. That is to say, narratives are not capable of being reduced to individual statements. This claim resembles Willard Van Orman Quine's holistic theory of experience, which insists that although we get to know the world through experience, we understand the world as a whole, not as piecerneal units of individual experiences.

115

What, then, does the tuth of historical narrative mean to narrative idealists? [f narratives are not the representation of reality, how do we distinguish what is true from what is not? Regarding this issue, Haskell Fain remarked: "That a story is true means that the story tells us relevant tnrth. However, the appropriateness is a result of complicated interaction between fact and conceptual system."7

Is the narrative idealist's criticism on narrative realism justified? The following reasons seem to suggest that it is not. The first criticism by narrative idealism is based upon constructivist epistemology, saylng that the object itself is the "X" (something that we do not know), but that through our cognitive framework it appears as either "A," "B," or "C," etc. If we apply this theory to history, it is transmuted into the assertion that a historical fact is something that we do not know, but that by taking up different viewpoints it is possible to construct historical facts in diverse ways. However, it was earlier demonstrated that a diversity of viewpoints does not necessarily entail arbitrary interpretation. The assertion that the object is indeterminate before our cognition is a thoroughly internalist claim. According to internalism, the form of the object changes according to the sort of conceptual framework we take in perceiving the object, and it is impossible to study the object in the absence of a conceptual framework.

I shall

for

leave more thorough criticisms of internalism

subsequent discussions on conceptual relativism, but

L16

it will

suflice to point out the problerns faced by relativism on account of its excessive reliance on concepfual frameworks. Let us say, for example, that we have the Behistun Inscription or the Persian Rosetta Stone before us, and that an intelligent extratenestrial being that has a completely different conceptual framework from ours is looking at it with us. The extraterrestrial has no conception of tombstones, but if it hears from us what the tombstone is for and what it represents, can we say that it is still unable to distinguish between a simple piece of rock and an elaborately engraved tombstone? It is excessive subjectivism to suggest that something such as this tombstone can be interpreted in a completely different way according to the conceptual framework adopted. Since the grammar and meanings of the inscriptions on the tombstone were fixed at the time of its manufacturing, the content expressed on the tombstone remains the same. Even if an extraterrestial were to interpret the tombstone, as long as the interpretation is

here

correct, we can arrive at the same conclusion. Though some engtavings may be too damaged to enable a complete interpretation, through continuous observation and critique it is still possible for us to arrive at an objective conclusion.

The second criticism made by narrative idealists is that narrative "N" is not a simple row of factors Sr, 52,... and so on. This criticism can be overcome; narrative realists do admit that a narrative is not a simple juxtaposition of statements but a deliberately arranged connection of statements. Of course, this means that they admit there is some sort of rule that connects these individual statements, and thus they are stepping over the boundaries of absolute

117

reductionism, but does this put the position of narrative realism at risk? Not at all, for a realist need not necessarily be a reductionist. The assertions of a realist are solely concerned with the narrative representing the realitywhether or not it is reducible is a separate question.

Critical Examination of Structural Discordance Positivists of narrative history, who claim that narrative history can be truthful, argue the following:

(l) A narrative

has a stnrcture of X,

Y, andZ.

(2) Historical reality has structures X, Y, andZ.

(3) It is possible for the same stuctures to represent each other.

(4) Therefore, a narrative represents historical reality.

This argument claims that a narrative can represent historical reality on the grounds that both can share the same strrctural patterns. [f the structure of a narrative is the same as the structure of a historical reality-meaning that the structure of a narrative is derived from the experience of historical reality-then there is no reason to claim that na:rative history cannot be truthful history. David Carr is a representative of this belief. InTime, Narrative, and History, Carr states that the stnrcture of narrative represents the

118

existing structure of historical reality. In other words, the narrative of the primary order (i.e., historical reality) can be the source of the narrative of the secondary order.E

This means that the narrative of primary order and the narrative of secondary order correspond with each other. As previously mentioned, the first and second characteristics of narratives are having a beginning, development, and ending in which all factors are coherently organized. The third characteristic is that a narrative also simultaneously contains the narrator, the cast, and the audience. [s it possible to say that historical reality has these same structures?

As previously mentioned, the three characteristics of a narrative do not seem to inllict much difficulty. The narrator can be replaced by the historian, and the cast and audience of the narrative can be individuals in history. The first hnd second characteristics of narrative structure correspond to the teleological structure of behavior and experience. To say that our behavior and experience have a teleological structure is to say that they consist of a beginning, development, and an ending where various behaviors are coherently organized for a purpose and means of accomplishment.

A narrative is the process of events in historical time. Thus, if reality itself is a narrative, it follows that behaviors that form historical reality exist in historical time. Here "historical time" means the experienced time and not physical time.e Only the experienced time has historicality. Since physical time is indiscriminately, equally, and

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mechanically applied to all objects, it is diflicult for us to understand historical temporality in terms of physical time.

In order to discuss historical temporality, we need to understand the characteristics of action. From the perspective of external observation, action appears as a simple physical movement. However, we normally regard action as the realization of an internal intention in terms of consciousness, or we think of it as the means to realizing a certain purpose or expressing a certain mental condition. A committed materialist will try to explain all actions mechanically according to conditioned reflex and stimulusresponse. The epitome of such theories is psychological behaviorism, which aims to reduce our entire inner conscious world to external physical movements. However, it is practically impossible to acc€,pt behaviorist reductionism because it is in fact impossible for us to completely remove the world of autonomic consciousness.

If we define action as the realization of inner inte,ntion, then we are entitled to claim that it has a teleological stnrcture. Every purpose requires the means for its realization. When various means are sequentially developed, it is possible to say that they exist in a certain organic relationship. When we perform an action in the present, it reflectively succeeds from a past action that served to fulfill a past pupose, and in turn it prepares future

actions to fulfill the same purpose. Therefore, in a teleological structure, actions possess historical time. The past, present, and fufure are bound together, and the future and past run together in the present. In historical time, time

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flows against physical time. It does not flow from past to present and then to the future; it simultaneously flows both from past to present and from future to present.

Let us take the following example.ro In the time horizon, the present moments A, B, and C are the points when the past meets the future (Figure 6). However, since the future is designed by anticipation-in other words, taken in advancc-the direction of time flows from the future to the present, not from the present to the future. In the vertical time horizon, the past does not disappear but is maintained beneath the surface, as sedimentation. For instance, C is the point where past and present meet, but it still retains the Az(the past of A) and Br(the past of B). Plenl Past

+

[

B

C +- Futue

Br

Ar

A: Figure 6. The direction of time

the following doubt on this discussion. Our lives or histories seem to merely be collections of individual events that are distinguished in Some may cast

or time; is it possible to attribute some meaning or purpose to this collection? To discuss the purpose of life is space

12L

to regard the

process of life as a whole with all the parts intimately organized. However, is it true that the parts of a person's life are completely knitted from beginning to end? Moreover, if we are to take this discussion to the level of history, countless numbers of individual lives should be unified, and the beginning and ending of history should be organically connected within a specific system. Is there any necessary reason for us to look at history this way?

Similarly, the purpose

of

one's

life may be

intemrpted or frustrated by other people. At the same time, such purposes can only be achieved with the help of others.

Members of a community inherit common legacy and tradition, meaning that individuals in the same community will lead a joint life. Furthermore, if we consider the close relationship and interaction between communities, we can postulate the '1ife of an era" that characterizes the life of communities and place it under a common purpose. Throughout this process, it is possible to organize the connection of a higher level of life that binds era to era, and to propose the whole meaning and purpose of history within this holistic context.

Narrative Ilistory vs. the Historical Novel As Roland Barthes stated, historical writing of the past may take various forms. It might be true, descriptive, general, abstract, narrative, or a summary of statistical materials. It may be prosaic or poetic. A narrative is even more varied; it begins with the history of mankind, and the forms of storytelling that exist in all eras and societies are unlimited.

tzz

Aristotle states in Poetics that it does not matter what kind of form historical writing takes. He claimed that it could be myth, legend, allegory, novel, poem, history, drama, picture, film, cartoon, news, or dialogue. Because it is "able to be conveyed by articulated language, spoken or written, fixed or moving images, gestures, and the ordered mixture of all these zubstances, narrative is present in myth, legend, fable, tale, novella, epic, histor/, fiagedy, drama, comedy, mime, painting (consider Carpaccio's Saint Ursula), stained glass windows, cinema,

comics, news items, conversations." ll For example, Herodotus's work could be transformed into an epic poem

and this would not change its epistemic value. However, the

reverse is not valid. Narratives or novels carurot become history. In other words, history can be written by means of a narrative, but narratives cannot be identical with history.

The narrative idealist claims that narrative history and the historical novel cannot essentially be distinguished, for two reasons. The fnst is that a historical story does not represent the real world; the second is that it is possible for novels to express truth. We have already discussed the first reason above. The claim was that narrative structure is essentially diflerent from the structure of reality, and so to write history as a narrative would inevitably be the creation of fiction. Yet, it was proven above that it is possible for narratives to share the structure of the historical world.

ln order to explain the second reason, Ankersmit introduced a hierarchical theory of truth.r2 The hierarchical theory of truth claims the existence of two hierarchies: one

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is truth conceming statements pertaining to individual facts, and the other is huth concerning types of tnrth on a general level. Using these criteria, the second reason claims that a historical novel may express general tnrth but does not deal with tuth on an individual level. It is reasonable to assume that Aristotle's claim that poetry possesses greater truth than history is based upon general truth. Realists suggest the opposite: narrative history is interested in the individual tnrth, not the general truth. For this reason, Ankersmit argued that a novel, even it is technically fiction, may indicate general

though

knowledge of a specific tim+-the overall tuth. He claimed that there exists a standard to distinguish narrative history from the historical novel, even though both indicate overall truth. His suggested standard is as follows: narrative historians pursue historical knowledge, and their argument is explanatory and demonstrative, while historical novelists apply this general knowledge to a specific historical situation. 13 This is similar to the difference between theoretical science and applied science. It is further asserted that there is a difference in the manner in which both levels of truth are related. Narrative history proceeds from the parts to the whole, but the historical novel does the reverse. It is for this reason that historical novelists should be well versed in the general knowledge of history.

Ankersmit's general truth seems to be a concept that is prone to misunderstanding. Insofar as historians are concerned with pursuing individual facts and not general laws, it is difficult to say whether or not the general tlpe of

L24

knowledge occupies any status in historical research. It is necessary for us to use "historical truth" in a stricter sense, which limits it solely to the individual and realistic level.

From this standard, history pursues the truth, which is not the case for novels. P. F. Strawson argued that statements in a novel are not true or false, on account of the novel berng essentially fictitious. In other words, histories contain statements that possess truth values, but historical novels consist of statements without truth values. We can understand Monroe Beardsley's suggestion in the same context, for he argued that a historical novel consists of "non-assertion theory" and is not a record of truth. la Perhaps it could be said that the works of historians and novelists are indistinguishable on the grounds that both are products of the imagination. However, the purpose of the novelist is only to create a consistent story that makes sense, whereas the purpose of a historian is to adhere to the narrative's correspondence to the historical reality.l5 Having made these points, it is clearly unreasonable to give up the attempt to distinguish narrative history from historical novels; if history is regarded in the same light as historical novels, then the result will be the denial of history as a science.

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7

Cnrrrc.u- EXAMINATIoN oF THE "LINGUISTIC TURN"

The "linguistic turn"

in

philosophy brought

a

decisive

turning point in historical understanding.l Once the study of history began to be influenced by the linguistic turn, the overall direction of historical discussions rapidly took a relativist turn. Hayden White's 1973 work Metahistory is a typical example of this phenomenon.

In any case, the linguistic tum caused a change in subjects of discussion within the philosophy of history. Before the influence of the linguistic tum, philosophers of history dealt with questions such as "How do we know about the past?," "What does it mean to explain historical events?," and "ls it possible to have objective knowledge of historical events?"

After the linguistic turn, the questions that philosophers of history asked reflected a more intimate concern with language, such as "What is the system in which historical discussions take place?," "ls historical writing scientific or poetic?," and "Does narrative history represent the past?" During the mid-twentieth century, the philosophy of history turned from "explanation and law" to concern with "narration and representation."

127

The "linguistic turn" is a broad term sometimes used to refer to a philosophical methodology and sometimes to a mode of literary critique. Postmodern historians consider the linguistic turn to be a necessary condition for historical understanding, and they believe that the linguistic turn inevitably entails relativism. In this chapter, I shall examine the linguistic turn from its roots and prove that the linguistic turn is valid only in terms of a "representational meaning."

Epistemic Implications of the Linguistic Turn: Linguistic Kantianism

Historically, linguistic analysis has two guiding purposes. The first is to uncover a perfect ideal language so as to avoid the ambiguities'of ordinary language. This was the object of logical atomism and, later, logical positivism. The second purpose is the precise analysis of ordinary language to control and avoid errors. This was the object of the analyic philosophy of "ordinary language." The former presupposes

a structural identity

betwee,lr language and facts, and

it

analyzes language to understand facts more explicitly. The latter uncovers the various uses of language to resolve misunderstandings in the use of language.

From these two approaches, we can define the "linguistic turn" in a broad sense as related to the analytic philosophy that deals with linguistic analysis as the subject of philosophy, and in the narrow sense as related to the analyic philosophy that deals with ordinary language in its daily use. For our purposes, the narrow sense of the term is what matters, for this is what brought about an epistemic 128

change regarding language. The linguistic turn can further

be

into the "representational" and the The former involves the claim that, since we "constructive." are not able to reach any object without language, it is only through the precise analysis of language that we can obtain classified

truth. The latter involves the claim that, because language does not merely represent facts but rather constructs them, it is necessary to analyze language to understand facts. Obviously, our concern here is with the constructive meaning of the linguistic tum.

What are the epistemological claims that

the

linguistic turn implies? We can formalize them into the following theses:

(l)

Language is the mode of life.

(2) Langage is not a neutral medium that represents reality but rather a semantic system that constructs reality.

(3) Therefore, if we are to operate in a different linguistic system, that is, if we take on another mode of life, we come to construct reality in a different way.

The first thesis implies that the various ways of living are revealed through language. From this point of view, verbal behavior is the most important form of behavior. At the same time, this thesis claims that language as the mode

of living constructs reality.

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The works of Wittgenstein in his later years, J. L. Austin, and Gilbert Ryle highlight the fact that languages are not just used to indicate and describe reality. Wittgenstein wrote:

Think of the tools in a tool-box; There is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws. The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects. (And in both cases there are similarities.)2

Austin pointed out that when we use language, plenty of statements do not consider tnrth or falsity to be purposes. Descriptive sentences featuring tnrth may be distinguished from those featuring falsehood, but the distinction is meaningless for statements used for other purposes. Marriage vows are a tlpical example. The officiant at a wedding usually asks both the bride and groom, "Do you take this man/woman to be your lawfully wedded husband/wife?" The bride and groom answer, "l do." None of these questions and answers states a fact. Austin called these performative statements, which he distinguished from constative statements. A constative statement may be proved to be tnre or false, whereas performative statements, such as promises, apologies, appreciations, congratulations, and others, are acts and events by themselves. However, constative staternents also have an aspect of action, so the two q/pes of statements cannot be distinguished.

130

Therefore, Austin viewed all statements as tlpes of speech act and classified them into three tlpes: locutionary acts that indicate things; illocutionary acts that nalne, apologize, and explain; and perlocutionary acts that cause expectations or emotions in others. Of these, the

illocutionary act is the most important. If we arrilyze language in Austin's way, then to ask for the meaning of a statement requires us to ask what tlpe of speech act it is. The answer to this question will include not only the contents of the proposition that the statement implies but also to render any performative aspect it may have. Quine, even though he did most of his work within the context of logical positivism, ultimately reached a conclusion similar to the that of the ordinary language philosophers did. Quine's "two dogmas of empiricism" are an obvious example of what the linguistic turn means. The two dogmas of empiricism that Quine criticized are as follows: (1) that all of our statements can be reduced to the statements related to direct experience, and (2) that anallic judgment can be clearly distinguished from synthetic judgment.

The first dogma is usually referred to as the dogma of "reductionism." Extreme reductionism anticipates the verification theory of meaning in a variety of ways. Both Locke and Hume claimed that all ideas are derived from sense experience or are complexes constructed from simpler ideas derived from experience. Quine criticizes this as follows: "lt remains vague as to the admissible ways of compounding.... We may take full statements as our

131

significant units-thus demanding that our statements as wholes be translatable into sense-datum language, but not that they be translatable term by term.';3 He also wrote: "Our statements about the extemal world face the tribunal of sense experieoce not individually but only as a corporate body.'{ Furthermore, Quine criticized the claim that a distinction exists between analyic and synthetic statements as a non-empirical dogma of empiricists and as a kind of metaphysical belief: "Thus one is tempted to suppose in general that the truth of a statement is somehow analyzable into a linguistic component and a factual component.... But, for all its priori reasonableness, a boundary between analytic and synthetic statements simply has not been drawn."s

Quine's assertion is often referred to as "holistic empiricism." This holistic empiricism implies that language has as much to contribute to tuth as reality does. As Quine rernarked:

My present suggestion is that it is nonsense, and the root of much nonsense, to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component in the truth of any individual statement. Taken collectively, science has its

double dependence upon language and experience;

but this duality is

not

significantly taceable into the statements of science taken one by one. The unit of

132

empirical significance sclence.

If we

is the whole of

6

are faithful followers of Quine's argument, then

Newton's Second Law, also known as "Force = mass x acceleration," may be interpreted in two ways: (l) to understand it as either empirical or synthetic ffuth, or (2) to understand it as an analyic or conceptual truth. It is an empirical truth because it coincides with observations, but it is also understood as a conceptual truth on the grounds that it defines the concepts of force, mass, and acceleration. However, if F : ma is taken as a conceptual truth, then it will not yield information about reality. When we use this law to describe reality, it simply means that this conceptual truth is utilized as an instrument.T Let us apply this logic to historical problems. Let us take as examples "Renaissance" and "Enlightenment." On the one hand, we can say, based on the empiricist's view, that various opinions have been formed about "Renaissance" and "Enlightenment" as a result of historical explorations of the relevant periods of the past. On the other hand, this exploration is offered to us along with definitions of "Renaissance" and "Enlightenment." Thus, we make a connection between "Renaissance" and "Enlightenment" along with other aspects of the past according to how we define the terms. Depending on how we define

"Enlightenment," Rousseau

may belong to

the

Enlightenment or anti-Enlightenment periods. Yet, what does this mean? As long as the contents of all of the

133

statements about the Renaissance and the Enlightenment are

analyically derived from the meanings given to these words, we must make all claims about the Renaissance and the Enlightenmurt analytic truths.s This is merely to apply the same logic that we did in considering Newton's Second Law to be a conceptual tuth. From this point of view, we often cannot distinguish factual from conceptual truth in historical writing. Here, the perception of the past cannot simply be reduced to claims that may be true or false. Thus, from the viewpoint of an active supporter of the linguistic turn, an argument about the

is merely a discussion about how best to define the terms "Renaissance" and "Enlightenment," and it makes no claims about the tnrth of Renaissance and the Enlightenment

the world.

If we are not able to distinguish de dicto truths from re de truths, then our knowledge of the past will be crucially influenced by our decisions about how to endow the words we use with meaning. If it is difficult to distinguish de dicto truths from de re truths, then it is impossible to decide with exactitude which parts of language correspond to which parts of reality. At this juncture, the decisive factor becomes not whether or not a historical statement is true but rather what kind of truth it is we prefer.

L34

Structuralist Literary Theory and the Form of Poetic Language Recent structuralist literary theory has yielded results similar

to those originating from the linguistic turn in philosophy. Both the philosophy of language and structuralist literary theory have had a critical influence on contemporary historical theory. Some have described the linguistic turn by including within it structuralist literary fr*ry, but they are, in fact, completely distinct. For example, White's Metahistory has had a huge influence on historical theory but the claim that this is due to the linguistic turn is highly debatable because White does not mention the linguistic tum even once in his text. Moreover, many modern historians who adhere to White's theory-such as Douglas Kellner and Dominick LaCapra-have no great interest in the philosophy

of language.e Consequently, does any real relationship exist between the linguistic turn and structuralist literary theory? As a matter of fact, a significant similarity does exist between them. Both agree that "language is not a mere 'mirror of nature' and that all our knowledge and all our linguistic representations of reality bear the traces of the linguistic medium in which they are formulated."l0 Let us refer to this claim as "linguistic Kantianism," for in both theories,language acts in the manner of Kant's categories or forms of intuition Nevertheless, despite this similarity, Ankersmit argued that a critical difference exists between the two theories. ll The difference is that literary works are not

135

concerned

with the relationship, or the gap,

between

language and reality in the way that epistemology or literary

philosophy generally are. Literature is always a subject of study and a reality to be explored. Literary theorists talk about literary works in the way that botanists talk about trees. However, to philosophers of language, the gap between language and reality is a very important place where reference, meaning, and tnrth occur. The philosophy of language has two distinct domains: namely, the language and the world. To neglect the gap between these two domains is to neglect the space where significant subjects of interest exist, such as reference, meaning, and truth. When philosophers of language compare languages to tools, they are often referring to microscopes or maps that aid us in understanding the world. There is, as it were, a gap between language and the world that we are not able to neglect.l2 As Ankersmit put it: "The literary theorist 'naturalizes' language, whereas the philosopher of language will always 'semanticize' language and its relationship to the world."l3 The linguistic turn is a Copernican revolution in that the central axis has pivoted between language and reality. Thus Ankersmit suggested that, strictly speaking, the philosophers' linguistic turn is not a matter of great concern to stmcturalist literary theorists. Philosophers focus on the problern of how language affects our beliefs about reality, whereas literary theory has no interest in the relationship between language and reality.

It is possible to accept Ankersmit's

account of the

difference between linguistic philosophy and literature

136

theory to some degree, and there is also no doubt that episternology is not a key topic in literary theory. Nevertheless, semantics is also an important issue in literary theory. For example, when analyzing the meaning of a literary work, it is significant to determine whether this meaning originates from language indicating reality or from language as an autonomous sfucture. Structuralist literary theory especially and obviously owes a great debt to structural linguistics. Given that structural linguistics originated from Saussure's conversion of traditional objective linguistics into subjective linguistics, it is obvious that structural linguistics embodies a Copernican revolution similar to the one that characterizes the linguistic turn.

In

stucturalist literary theory, the relationship between language and reality is discussed through a thorough analysis of styles in poetic language, Thus, even if it is not explicitly linked to the linguistic turn, we may

characterize structuralist literary theory as linguistic Kantianism altogether. White's theory therefore should also be examined within the framework of the linguistic turn, as his central thesis is a claim that our knowledge about the past does not depend solely on how the past was, but rather on what kind of language the historian uses when describing history. In other words, historical knowledge is formed by the historian's language as much as it is found inside historical documents.

In Metahistory, White sought to understand how historians understand the past by analyzing the style of historical text they used. Emphasizing the style similarity

L37

between the realistic novels of the nineteenth century and the historical writings of the nineteenth century, White identified styles such as the ironical style of historical writing in the eighteenth ce,ntury, the metaphorical organicist style of historical writing in the Romantic Period,

and the metonymical style

of

social

science-oriented

historical writings.

White explained, in his theory of figures of speech, that:

Both traditional poetics and modern language

theory identify four basic tropes for the analysis of poetic, or figurative, language: Metaphor, Metonymy, Synecdoche, ffid

Irony. These tropes permit

the

characterization of objects in different kinds of indirect, or figurative, discourse. They are especially useful for understanding the

operations by which the contents of experience which resist description in unambiguous prose representations can be prefiguratively grasped and prepared for conscious apprehension. la

to

White, the activities of historians are fundamentally poetic. His reasons for this belief are as

According follows:

138

(l)

Historical writing: The main task for historians is the composition of a consistent story using chronological materials.

(2) Historians organize materials using styles of description, such as emplotment, argument, and ideological implication. They impose this conceptual framework on chronological materials. (3) To make possible this assignment, historians should demonstate an understandable historical field. In turn, a historical field should be constructed as a subject of perception. This construction is a poetic activity that makes historical fields understood in specific forms through different methods of writing.

This can be explained in detail as follows: We do not know the past itself. The past itself is only a meaningless goup of facts, situations, and events, and also a chaos that is difficult for historians to understand. Therefore, historians must translate prose into narrative poetry by means of historical writing. Such translation employs four rhetorical figures: metaphor, synecdoche, meton)my, and irony. Without these figures, history cannot be translated into a narrative that we can understand. That is, these figures enable us to understand history by selecting and abstracting materials from the chaos of the past.

White stressed that history is not composed only of chronological description. He compared it to the relationship between raw material and a finished product, where the

139

chronicle is the raw material, and the historical account is the finished product. For example, let us suppose that an aggregate of events is arranged in chronological order:

i) a,b,c,d,e

n

History is not composed only of these chronological events. To give these events meaning and to make a story, these events must be described and characteized using the elements of a narrative plot. Thus, history is the joint work of chronological arrangement and a syntactic strategy (narrative strategy). We can construct a story using a variety of patterns while not breaking the chronological order:

ii) A, b, c, d, e ... n iii) a, B, c, d, e ... n iv)

a, b, C, d, e

... n

v) a,b,crD,e...n

vi) a, b, c, d, e ... N Here, the capital letters indicate a privileged position in a series of events. In other words, they indicate a position, such as a symbol of the plot sbucture, that is considered to be a cause explaining the entire stnrctural series or a specific kind of story. For instance, a history that assigns to "a" the position of the decisive element "A" becomes "deterministic"

L40

history, whereas a history that assigns to the last element "n" o'N" becomes "apocalyptic" history. White the explanation gave Rousseau, Marx, and Freud, among others, as examples of the former, and Augustine and Hegel, among others, as examples of the latter. [n between these is a wide range of forms of historical writing that appeal to various fomrs of fictional narrative plots. According to White, history is not merely about facts; it is about the possible sets of relationships between facts. He claimed that "these sets of relationships are not, however, immanent in the events themselves; they exist only in the mind of the historian reflecting on them."l5 For our purposes, the most important concern here is that this relationship inheres in the language that historians use when describing events. White explained the reason for this as follows: "For if the historian's aim is to familiarize us with the unfamiliar, he must use figurative, rather than 16 technical, language." A professional term is familiar to

those who have learned it, but history does not have commonly used professional terms, nor has it come to an agreement on what kinds of events would make specific themes of history. Historians make use of common mundane terms, which implies that the only method they can use to understand the past is to describe it in figurative language. All historical stories are therefore based upon figurative characterizations of events.

White developed his theory as follows, using the example of the French Revolution. Edmund Burke interpreted the French Revolution as satirical, by means of

L4L

an ironical style. Michelet interpreted

it in the mode of

synecdoche.rT Tocqueville used metonymy. Their modes

ernplotment appear

as irony,

of

romance, and tragedy,

respectively.

the

However, what does all of this amount to? It leads to implication that the events themselves are not

distinctively different in the various descriptions, even though the aspects of the relationship between them are significantly changed. In other words, while they share similar raw material, the end products are strikingly different. These aspects appear to be based upon considerably

different theories of society, politics, and history, but the underlying reason is that the entire set of events is char acteized fi guratively :

Metaphor is representational in the way that Formism can be seen to be. Metonymy is reductive in a Mechanistic manner, while Synecdoche is integrative in the way that Organism is. Metaphor sanctions the prefiguration of the world of experiorce in

object-object terms, Metonymy in part-part terms, and Synecdoche in object-whole terms.l8

two

According to White, we rely on figurative language in aspects: first in the characteization of objects, and

L42

second

in the syntactic strategy that transforms objects to

make them easy to understand.

If

we follow White's analysis, no historian

can

of the four figurative methods or combining them. Nietzsche usually used metaphor, while Marx made the best use of metonymy. Hegel was a master of synecdoche, while Croce was well describe history without utilizing one

versed in irony.

Figurative methods,

in tum, pair up

with

combinations of emplotment, argument, md ideological implication. For instance, metaphor pairs up with RomanticFormist-Anarchist, while metonymy pairs up with TragicMechanistic-Radical (see earlier discussion in Chapter 4 above).

Critical Discussion of the "Language Determination" Thesis

The linguistic turn implies an ontological determination of consciousness, similar to that of the sociology of knowledge. According to the sociology of knowledge, our consciousness is ontologically dependent on our living situations. Similarly, the linguistic tum holds that consciousness depends upon the language we use. From this perspective, I will label the linguistic turn the "language dependence of consciousness" thesis.

The issue that the linguistic turn raises in contemporary epistemology comes down to the problem of conceptual relativism. This discussion has emerged from

143

philosophical discussions of the relationship among the mind, language, and the world. The origin of this problern is the idea that we classify the world into various categories or tlpes by applying a conce,ptual scheme or categorical framework, rather than perceiving it as a readymade object. For example, Jaakko Hintikka claims:

Whatever we say of the world is permeated throughout with concepts of our own making. Even such prima facie transparently simple notions as that of an individual turn out to depend on conceptual assumptions dealing with different possible states of affairs. As far as our thinking is concerned, reality cannot be in principle wholly disentangled from our concepts. A Ding ansich, which could be described or even as much as individuated without relyrng on some particular conceptual framework, is bound to remain an illusion.le

Today, conceptual relativism is considered the most important and interesting form of relativism. It is also referred to as "semantic relativism," "linguistic relativism," "ontological relativism," and so on. In addition, conceptual schemes are referred to as "conceptual frames," "modes of life," "schemes of thought," "world views," "paradigms," "viewpoints," etc.

L44

Conceptual relativism rests upon the dualism of scheme and content. On the one hand, some schemes conceptualize or organize the objects, and on the other hand, some objects are categorized and organized. Philosophers understand these conceptual schemes in various ways. Maria Baghramian summarized these schemes as follows:

Sl

The means by which we put constraints on

empirical data. (Quine) ...

frameworks or a set of basic assumptions or fundamental principles. (Popper 1994: 33, 34) ...

57 As Sll

Boundaries we draw, the versions of the world we have or the world we make.

(Goodman 1978)...

Sl2 The

alternative ways

of

describing

reality. Different schemes give

us

different ontologies or alternative ways of describing what there is. (Searle 1995: 1601

"'zo"

According to Baghnamian, we can classify these into two basic forms: (a) principles that bind or organize our experiences in many different ways, and (b) sets of fundamental beliefs we have about the world.2l The critical difference between these two forms of conceptual schemes is that the principles under "(a)" operate at a preJinguistic stage, whereas the beliefs under "(b)" require a linguistic, semantic, and cognitive framework. Thus, what we call "the linguistic turn" is focused on (b).

L45

Content has been characterized in a variety of ways, from Kant's thing in itself (Ding ansich) to the empiricists' sense-data. ln some cases, o'contenf' means "world before conceptual organization" or "nature that is open to organization." Kant's thing in itself sets the limit of our cognition. We have absolutely no ability to directly perceive

it.

"Sense-data" refers to what were known as "ideas" or "impressions" in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is the flow of pure experience that is reworked by an individual mind or a culture. It is either theory-neutral reality that is yet to be interpreted, or the uncategorized contents of experiences. 22

The relationship between content and conceptual scherne is akin to that between our clothes and the rules that

we use to organize our closets, or to that between our sea of experience and a fishing net that sifts out relevant factors, or to a loaf of bread and the bread knife, a lump of marble and the engraver, and so on:

There are, in our cognitive experience, two elements; the immediate data, such as those of sense, which are presented or given to the mind, and a form, construction, or interpretation" which represents the activity of thought. Recognition of this fact is one of the oldest and most universal of philosophic insights.23

t46

On this basis, theories such as Quine's indeterminacy of translation or Hilary Putnam's internal realism could be born. Quine expressed the indeterminacy of translation in this way: "The thesis is then this: manuals for translating one language into another can be set up in divergent ways,

all compatible with the totality of

speech dispositions, yet

incompatible with one another."24

Let "C" stand for a conceptual scheme and "W" for the world. Then, the consequences of conceptual schemes can be explained as follows (Figure 7):

Organiza[on

TIE world inEmreEd

or caEgorization

ur

Tlp workl

itself

cr

W {-----------

&2

Figure

7.

C2

Many interpretations of one world or many distincl worlds?

We can consider two arguments: one is that we interpret the same world in a different way by adopting different conceptual schemes; the other is that, by adopting different conceptual schemes, we end up with completely separate worlds. We can label the former "weak" conceptual relativism and the latter "extreme" conceptual relativism. Extreme conceptual relativism does not claim that interpretations of the same world

we make different

747

according to different conceptual schemes because it does not accept the existence of an "identical" world. Instead, it claims that if conceptual schemes differ, it is simply the case that a different world exists for each scheme. This would mean that the thousands of communities on Earlh, all of which have different conce,ptual schemes, actually live in completely different worlds. Such a view is essentially selfcontradictory. If one is completely segregated from

another's world because of different conceptual schemes, then the argument that different conce,ptual schemes necessarily entail different worlds is impossible, precisely because one is not able to be aware of other conceptual schemes at all. Such extremism is clearly excessive.

Weak conceptual relativism holds that

if

the

conceptual scheme is different, the same world is interpreted differently, and this idea is much easier to understand than is

the extreme form of conceptual relativism. The theories of Quine and Putnam belong to this category. To recall the previous example, an English-speaking linguist and an aboriginal native both simultaneously see a running animal that is called either "Rabbit" or "Gavagai." The problem of translation occurs afterward. This would be the case where an event in the same world is interpreted differently. However, it is possible here to ask: If their conceptual schemes are completely different, how do the two people see the animal as being similar? If their conceptual schemes are

radically different, should they not each perceive a completely different animal? The view that different conceptual schemes lead people to interpret the same world

in a different manner requires that they interpret it similarly

148

for the most part. To put it more concretely, the different schemes share a majority of knowledge but interpret only the minor bits differently. If this is the case, is conceptual relativism still a compelling view?

If we adopt the sociology of knowledge and thoroughly accept the ontological dependence of consciousness, then we face the problem that

it is, in fact,

difficult to justify the claims that the sociology of knowledge makes. [n other words, it is impossible for the sociology of knowledge to justify the universal claim that consciousness is ontologically dependent on our living situation. Universal claims transcend all specific modes of living, yet if all knowledge is relative to a mode of living,

then according to the sociology of knowledge, it would follow that no knowledge of universal claims such as this one can exist. The same objection can be applied to the thesis that consciousness is thoroughly bound to language, for this is also a universal thesis; if our consciousness is rigidly bound to language, it is impossible to conceive a universal claim that is beyond any lingual bounds.

The decisive characteristics of conceptual relativism are summaized by the following two theses: (a) No two distinct conceptual schemes can be translated into each other, and (b) each conceptual scheme arbitrarily interprets the world. Thus, if it is demonstrated that translation between conceptual schemes is possible or that schemes do not distort reality but merely reveal different aspects of reality, we ought to reject conceptual relativism.

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Let us first deal with the possibility of translation between conceptual schemes. Suppose that we use conceptual scheme a to understand another conceptual scheme, b. To know that D is a distinct scheme that is different from a, 6 must somehow be translated into a. Moreover, if translation is to occur, then agreement on most matters of fact must be presupposed. Donald Davidson refers to this as "The Principle of Charity." However, if it is possible to translate 6 into a, there is no reason to say that it is entirely different from a.

In contrast, if it is ever the case that between 6 and a is impossible, then

translation

it would be impossible

to make the claim that D is a conceptual scheme. Consider Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries, or Newtonian physics and Einsteinian physics. Is it plausible to argue that translation between these is impossible? The fundamental definitions of point, line, and area are part of both Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry, and Newtonian physics and the Theory of Relativity use the same mathematics. ln both cases, the theories are established based on the same common basis, and once we understand this, the difference between them is no longer radical.

Donald Davidson offered the following argument to establish that conceptual schemes that are impossible to translate into one another do not exist. His view was that to establish the idea of a conceptual scheme, one would have to propose the idea of a language that cannot be translated. His argument proceeds as follows:

150

(Pl) Conceptual

schemes are languages.

(P2) For anything to count and be identified as a language, it must be translatable.

(Cl)

Conclusion: [n order to be able to identify a conceptual scheme, we must be able to translate it.

(P3) Translation, at least in its initial stages, requires the application of the principle of charity, or the assumption of substantial agreement on a large number of beliefs/ truths.

(P4)

A

conceptual scheme (language) is either wholly ranslatable into ours or it is not. No partial translation is possible.

If

a conceptual scheme is translatable, then it cannot be very different from ours. If it is not translatable, then, given Cl, we have no justification for claiming that

(C2)

there is such a scheme.

(C3) Therefore, there can be no such things as conceptual schemes.25

Now, let us turn to the claim that conceptual schemes distort reality, a thesis that conceptual relativists are reluctant to admit. They claim that we are not able to refer to the world in the absence of a conceptual scheme. As diagrammed above, using conceptual scheme Cr, the world

151

appears as Wr to us, while

it appears

as Wz using scheme Cz.

In addition to their other claims, conceptual relativists argue that we can select superior schemes based on practicality. For this reason, they believe that the world is not interpreted arbitrarily. However, this claim is mistaken because for an interpretation not to be arbitary, a comparison among conceptual schemes should be made in terms of rationality instead of practicality. Conceptual scheme Cz should not be selected instead of Cr because it has higher practicality, but it should be selected because Cz renders reality better than Cr does. This is possible because we are not riveted to a specific conceptual scheme, but rather can freely move from Cl to Cz or C3, create a new scheme Cnl or even engage in a critical comparison of various schemes in relation to reality.

The possibility of free transition from scheme to scheme, the creation of new conceptual schemes, being able to critically review schemes, and being able to compare them in terms of their explanatory power make possible the a priori assumption of a reality independent of conceptual schemes. This presumption opens up the possibility of approaching reality while minimizing the influence of conceptual schemes. It means that conceptual schemes do not control our consciousness, but instead, our consciousness controls our conceptual schemes.

From this perspective, the critical problem of conceptual relativism is that it does not recognize the hypothetical status of conceptual schemes. A conceptual scherne is like a fishing net. By using different nets, we can catch different fish. Moreover, if we use a variety of nets

LSz

and keep creating new kinds of nets, we can even entertain the hope of catching every variety of fish that exists.

We can now raise the following criticisms of White's proposals about history and figurative language. First,

historians need not necessarily use figurative language. Figurative language might aid our understanding, but in any case, historians are capable of using straightforward, professional terminology. For history to be a science, historians should use terms that are clearly defined, and in fact, this is always possible. Second, the claim that historians inevitably distort facts is manifestly unreasonable even if they utilize figurative language.

Admittedly, obtaining a knowledge of reality is difficult, and it is obviously true that reality appears to us through language. Thus, during this process, we cannot ignore the fact that language sometimes partially distorts reality. Nevertheless, if we remember that we are creators of language and that language has continuously evolved, we cannot simply say that language is an insurmountable obstacle to the knowledge of reality.

Among other things, conceptual relativism does not match Noam Chomsky's transformational generative grammar. The theory of transformational grarnmar is that all forms of grammar appear to be different but, in fact, all share the same universal structure at the level of "deep structure." It is for this reason that we are born with a Language Acquisition Device (LAD) through which we can understand and utilize language. Robin Fox took a similar view. He claimed that, if children who were reared in

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complete isolation had somehow survived then:

in good health,

I do not doubt that they could speak and that, theoretically, given time, they or their

offspring would invent and develop a language despite their never having been taught one. Furthermore, this language, although totally different from any known to us, would be analyzable by linguists on the

same basis

as other languages and

translatable into all known languages.26

We should remember that language is the product of evolution. Language has evolved from a primitive state, and in this process, vocabulary has become richer and more accurate. From this perspective, no reason exists to think that conceptual schemes, which are minor compared to the level of deep grammatical stmcture, cannot be translated into one another.

Now let us apply this conclusion to

historical research. "The Renaissance" that erupted in fourteenth- to sixteenth-century Europe and "the Industrial Revolution" of

the eighteenth century were not terms used at those times. They were created by later historians to characterize the social and cultural transformations of these eras. Thus, the notions of these particular phases appeared along with these terms and concepts. In addition" the appearance of the past

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differs in accordance with how we define these concepts. Nevertheless, it remains true that there was a spreading movement, centered in what is now Italy, devoted to reading and translating the Greek classics and valorizing ancient Greek culture, prior to historians conceiving of "the Renaissance." Hence it is impossible to define "Renaissance" arbitrarily. We might use some other term in place of "Renaissance" to describe these events, but the term should reflect the event properly. The term "Renaissance" is merely a hypothesis set up to explain the event and ought to be borne out by facts.

It

goes without saylng that the lifestyle of the ancients clearly differed from ours, and that their conceptual scheme in the ancient era was also somewhat different from our own. Concepts are related to human activities in two ways: the first forms the acts of past people and past events, and the second conveys them to us. For example, it is not possible to understand Greek civilization without understanding the concept of moira(fate), which is quite unfamiliar to our conceptual scheme. This approach toward history suggests that acts and events should be described with the terms that participants and observers of that time would be able to understand. However, in no case are such forms of human life so completely different that we cannot understand. Regardless of whether we are talking about ancient or modern times, human communities have had much the same forms of life.

For example, we are quite capable of understanding the lifestyle of Stone Age human beings because we share a

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similar form of life. Interpreting forms of life too narrowl5 separating ourselves from faraway communities, and even disconnecting communication between the young and the old all merely result from the excessive interpretations of minor differences. We are not prisoners of our conceptual scheme as long as we can freely change it. This implies the possibility of an objective knowledge of the past. Therefore, we have to refuse the claim that our exploration of the historical world must produce only relative truth.

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I How Do WB Esra,uLrsH

THE On.lpcT

rvlry

oF

Hrsrorucll Knowleocr?

In this chapter, I shall comprehensively discuss the obstacles to the achievement of historical objectivity.lThe first task is to review the characteristics of objective scientific knowledge in order to explain how objective historical knowledge is possible by means of comparison with scientific knowledge. Objectivity can be discussed from two perspectives: ontological and epistemological. Ontological objectivity indicates the object that exists regardless of the perceiving subject. Hence we say that objective knowledge is derived from the object. Science pursues objective knowledge. Many people

argue that

if we exclude subjective factors-such as

prejudice, bias, ideological tendency, or political loyaltyand return to the pure condition of rationality, it is possible for us to acquire objective knowledge.

Classical Empiricism and Classical Rationalism possess much the same view. As a critical rationalist, my own view is that foundationalist attempts to justify knowledge have failed. Classical Empiricism affempts to find the source of objective knowledge in uncontaminated

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pure experience, while Classical Rationalism tries to do the same thing with transpare,nt rational intuition. However, no source has absolute power in this respect. Reason can always be subject to elTor. Thus, we can claim that it is fundamentally misguided to search for infallibility in any part ofreason.

I

agree that the question "What is the source of objective knowledge?" should be replaced with "How do we find error in our arguments and remove it?" While taking this perspective, I have stipulated the conditions required for objective knowledge, which are "objectifiability" and "falsifiability." To these general conditions I shall add "reconstlrction of situation." In addition, the relationship

between historical hypothesis and falsifiability will be discussed, using both Bayesianism and Falsificationism.

Two Meanings of ObJectivity

"Object" and "subject" have long been used together

as

fundamental epistemological terms. "Subject" indicates the person who perceives, and "object" is the target to be perceived. "Objectivity" is derived from the nature of the object or the object itself, whilst "subjectivity'' is derived from the nature of the subject or the characteristics of the subject.

"Cognition" means the process whereby the subject understands the nature or structure of the object. The problern is that the subject may or may not be able to perceive the object in itself. Such things often occur

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unconsciously. For example, the object may appear yellow

if

one has jaundice, even though it is not yellow. The old saying "The grass is always greener on the other side" is founded on the possibility of error due to subjective prejudice.

We tend to call knowledge that recognizes the object as it is "objective knowledge" and that which doesn't, due to the intervention of the subject, "subjective knowledge." In this sense, objective knowledge is true knowledge, but subjective knowledge is not because it distorts the object. Therefore, epistemological discussion is focused on the possibility of objective knowledge, which faces the problem

of whether or not we can grasp the object properly through our judgments.

Objectivity has two aspects: one ontological and the other epistemological. Correspondingly, "objectivity" possesses two meanings. "Ontological objectivity" means the object itself, which exists independently of the epistemic subject. This sort of objectivity should have nothing to do with the epistemic subject because it exists regardless of whether or not we recognize it. Strictly speaking, it is hard to say that what we call phenomena have ontological objectivity because their existence depends on our cognition.

"Epistemological objectivity" is related to the justification of our beliefs or assertions. When our beliefs or assertions reveal the real nature or appearance ofthe object as it is, they are said to possess objectivity. This is the reason we consider objective knowledge to be derived from the object. In order to acquire objectivity, the process of

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belief formation must not be affected by an individual's peculiar prejudices or preferences, md it must be accomplished by universal rationality and not by individual tendency. This does not mean that individual interest or opinion should be completely excluded. It only highlights that cognition of the object must not be distorted by individual prejudice or preference. People sometimes deviate from objectivity because of the following tendencies: prejudice and passion (hatred, fear, jealousy, greed, etc.); a

blind attitude that uncritically accepts the opinions of others; personal preference or fidelity; ideological or political faith; individual prejudice; wishful thinking; and so on.2 Other factors that inhibit objectivity can be found in the various obstacles that Descartes pointed out during his methodically skeptical approach to reaching the truth, and the many idols that Bacon attanpted to remove. Epistemological objectivity can easily be confused with the following two cases: when consensus has been reached among epistemic subjects, and when universal cognition of phenomena has been achieved.

If we compare the case where all individuals make different judgments to the case where there is a consensus between individuals, it is reasonable to believe that the latter has higher epistemic value. Nevertheless, agreement does not guarantee objectivity. This is the case because, besides the unanimous judgments that have been achieved, there can always be new subjective judgments that are yet to be agreed upon. Hence, philosophers who seek the standard of truth in agreement try to consider ideal communication

160

conditions and to derive consensus that obtains everyone's consent. Jtirgen Habermas is representative of such philosophers. Nevertheless, such theories face two problems.

The first is that

it is diflicult to create a situation where

everyone reaches agreement. The second is that, even if this does come to pass, the result may be very different from

objectivity because intersubjectivity is not the same

as

objectivity. The universal cognition of phenomena is more likely to be similar to objectivity. As an example, Kant admits that

we should seek objective cognition; at the same time, however, he argues that we are not able to know things in themselves but only phenomena as they appear to us, His reasons for such a claim rest on his constructivist epistemology, which is, in its universality, quite distinct from that of contemporary social constructionism. In this sense, Kant is considered to be a philosopher who pursues intersubjectivity of knowledge to its limits. Many see Kant as a seeker of objective knowledge on the grounds that he claims that Newton's theory is universal knowledge. However, in light of our present discussion, it is not reasonable to consider Kant as pursuing objectivity, since his universality is restricted to the phenomenal world, which is, by definition, not objective.

Those who are repulsed

by

epistemological objectivity insist that strict objectivity is impossible because we cannot see things from the "God's eye view." These people understand objectivity to be the result of universal

L61

viewpoint. William James, the father of pragmatism, states the following:

There is no point of view absolutely public and universal. Private and uncommunicable perceptions always remain over, and the worst of it is that those who look for them from the outside never know where.3

This criticism is excessive. Objectivity has nothing to do with seeing things from some absolute "God's eye view." It is undeniable that we experience things from a specific point of view. We cannot see things from an absolute viewpoint. Nevertheless, we need not cease believing in objectivity. Objectivity does not reside in an absolute view or a "view from nowhere," but in representing the object appropriately from a certain viewpoint. Let us take an example of landscape photographs. It is impossible to take photographs without any angle whatsoever. Landscapes will necessarily appear differently when photographed from different angles. Yet, even so, we should not deny the fact that all the photos taken from all of the different angles reveal the scenery objectively. It is not reasonable to assert that none of the photos is objective merely because the photographer was not God.

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The Objectivity of Scientific Knowledge Science pursues objective knowledge. Science that gives up

is no longer science. However, some philosophers argue that art, too, pursues objective seeking objectivity

knowledge. Notable examples of such philosophers are Benedetto Croce and Martin Heidegger. They argue that art is, like science, just a way to understand the world. lndeed, they believe it gives us a more insightful and richer understanding of the world. Of course, we must admit that art can symbolize the world, either in a simpler way or with greater significance than science. However, it is difficult to believe that artistic expressions possess objectivity. As Nicholas Rescher has suggested, objectivity should be understandable to all rational people.a [n contrast, cubist or surrealist paintings lack the requisite objectivity. Although this kind of artistic expression may evoke empathy from some people, it remains incontestably subjective. Let us compare the so-called "objectivity" in art with objectivity in physics. Physics-the state where, although a variety of researchers observe things according to their own personal preferences, prejudices, or biases, the result of the observation is immutable-is defined as the state of

objectivity. This shows that objectivity

necessarily

distinguishes itself from personal traits or group bias and is not affected by personal preference or taste, such as in art.

We should satisfu some necessary conditions if we are to attain objective knowledge. The first is the condition of objectifiability. "Objectifiability" denotes a form of belief in an objective way that reflects the actual situation, rather

163

than some personal mental state. For example, the cognition of yellow forsythias is formalized as a proposition that reflects the objective situation, such as "These forsythias are yellow," rather than "These forsythias look yellow to me" or "[ am sure these forsythias are yellow." At this point, the subject who perceives the forsythias is insignificant. The point of interest is whether the proposition that "these forsyhias are yellow" is true or false. Karl Popper calls this

"knowledge

in the objective sense" or "epistemology

without a knowing subject."s

Rescher objects

to

Popper's conception of "knowledge in the objective sense," arguing that if you pursue knowledge in Popper's objective sense, then you should accept a realistic account of propositional content.6 [n other words, if we pursue knowledge in Popper's objective sense, then we should accept some version of Platonism. In response, Rescher suggests the universality and rationality

of reason

of objective knowledge. Reason is univercal, meaning non-personal. What is reasonable for some people to do, believe, and evaluate would be reasonable for us, too. At the same time, the fact that reason is rational means that rational belief and behavior are founded on a reliable basis. Rescher covers the concrete contents of rationality up to the scope of behavior and evaluation.T Rationality in terms of epistemological aspects is based upon: (l) matching one's belief with available proof, and (2) keeping one's belief system consistent. Thus, objectivity is based upon rationality. Rescher's claim that scientific knowledge is objective on account of the universality and rationality of our reason is generally in as the source

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with our common intuition. However, if we bear in mind that reason.also can be contaminated by prejudice and that we occasionally have irrational beliefs, it seems necessary to establish a means to objectify rational belief for the objectivity of knowledge. accordance

The second condition is falsifiability. It is always possible that our reason may be mistaken. Thus, scientific knowledge, which is the result of a rational process, cannot escape the possibility of error. However, this does not mean that we have to mistrust our reason, even if it is mistaken, since we are able to discover and remove our mistake by means of rational criticism. Hence, objective knowledge should always be formalized in a falsifiable way. A claim for which falsification is impossible cannot therefore be classified as objective knowledge because it is by definition mere methodological proposal. From this perspective, the more falsifiable a knowledge is, the more objective it is. It follows that, to reach objectivity, we should allow as much criticism as possible, by nurturing a social climate and instirutions that are open to critical thinking. Appointing experts from relevant areas to serve as panel members for research journals, expanding the range of invited experts, keeping the screening results open-all of these add up to efforts to obtain objective knowledge. However, "objective knowledge" in this sense does not mean verified knowledge. Justificationists understand objective knowledge to be justified belief. They have a pyramidal understanding of belief systems.

165

A pyramid is composed of

a heap

of stones in which

the stones higher up are supported by those underneath. The pyramid rests upon the ground and ends with stones that do

not rely on other stones for support. Suppose each stone represented a belief and the whole pyramid represented a belief system. Beliefs located in the "upper" part of the belief system will rely on beliefs located in the "lower" part, whereas those at the "bofiom" will not rely on other beliefs for their justification. These last "basic beliefs" are certain and immune to doubt. They are pieces of objective knowledge that reflect our research objects as they are. We usually refer to these as "basic beliefs" or "directly justified beliefs" (Figure 8).

In this pyramidal structure, non-basic beliefs are justified either directly or indirectly by basic beliefs. Nonbasic beliefs connected to a basic belief are justified directly by the basic belief. Non-basic ones that have some "distance"

from the basic belief are connected to the basic belief through other non-basic beliefs. Thus, all non-basic beliefs in our belief system rely on basic beliefs for their justification.

(--

ltrlir-lcvcl belicf

€-

Figure 8.

The

B88ic

b"lirf

pyramid of beliefs is supponed by the basic beliefs.

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If we explain the justification of objective knowledge iri this way, the problem of knowledge comes down to how we establish basic beliefs. Classical empiricists such as Francis Bacon, John Locke, and David Hume believed that pure and uncontaminated experiences yield basic beliefs. The pure experiences of classical empiricists or the rational intuition of classical rationalists are, so to speak, the final bastion that guarantees the objectivity of knowledge. Hume gave an attempt at proof of this in the form of the following question:

If I ask why you believe any particular matter of fact, which you relate, you must tell me some reason; and this reason will be some other fact, connected with it. But as you cannot proceed after this manner, in infinitum, you must at last terminate in some fact, which is present to your memory or senses; or must

allow that your belief is antirely without foundation.8

ln contrast, Ren6 Descartes believed that reason that has clear and distinct ideas plays an authoritative role. The new authority for Descartes was reason-for reason has only clear and distinct ideas, and clear and distinct ideas carurot be false. Thus, Descartes argued that reason does not err.

However, such arguments as these rest upon an epistemology that is too idealistic and utopian. [n fact, our

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it is always possible for us to err. Hence, any knowledge we have is both tentative and hlpothetical, even though it is scientific. Although we pursue objectivity by means of rational activity, it is reason is not absolute, and

reasonable to think that we do not reach absolute perfection.

it as follows: "The empirical basis of objective has thus nothing 'absolute' about it. Science does

Popper put science

not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles."g

if we do not reach absolute objective knowledge, rational criticism enables us to approach approximate truth, or reach verisimilitude. We always make mistakes and the possibility of error remains ever-presen! but our knowledge can be enhanced and improved by means of critical trials and discussion. The following arguments from the critical rationalists explicate the meaning of criticism: "l do not know-I only guess. But I can examine my guess critically, and if it withstands severe criticism, then this fact may be Even

taken as a good critical reason in favour of it."lo

lf

we do not aim to reach an ultimate and absolute state of tnrth but instead subject our beliefs to critical tests and require discussion and rational demonstration, then we can still approach the truth with increasing proximity. But no theory excluded from falsifiability can count as a scientific th*ry, since science puts a priority on falsifiability.

168

Now, let us compare science with history. If science is selected as the standard of knowledge, how can historical knowledge be evaluated?

Scientific Knowledge vs. Historical Knowledge

It is impossible to write history in the absence of objective proof. If there is no direct evidence available, then at least some indirect evidence is required. History cannot be reconstructed from nothing. As scientific technology progresses, the power and scope of proof change. For instance, the historical importance of a strand of hair has changed as a result of developments in molecular biology and "genetic fingerprinting." In the past, a strand of hair did not have such great importance as proof; however, we can now reconstruct the past from a mere strand of hair. Some evidence preserves past information but some does not. In any case, historians must start from evidence.ll

Historical data can serve as proof for historians. This in turn is classified into many different types. For example, it is sometimes divided into primary historical data and secondary historical data. Historians sometimes perform external or internal criticism to determine whether the data is true or false. Here, we may ask the following question: What kind of relationship is obtained between evidence and historical argument? Figure t helps to illustrate this.

History can be a science insofar as a methodology for fair treatment of evidence is established. Many argue that history and natural science are completely different on the

L69

grounds that history deals with an unobserved past, while science deals with an observed object. In addition, they claim that the historian occupies a more disadvantageous position than the physicist, For example, Ernst Bloch and John Passmore point to the fact that physicists directly confirm experimental results whereas historians cannot help

but depend on the testimony of others who experienced historical events. Many people agree with this opinion. No current historian has ever met Barca Hannibal, Bonaparte Napoleon, or Genghis Khan, and of course there are no surviving participants of events such as Genghis Khan's thirteenth-century war of conquest. So, in this sense, these arguments seem reasonable.

TO

pd

TI

p.rl

T2

D,Bol

Figare 9. Whether 6r not lhe present becolnes evidence ofthe past depends on whether that transmission line of infurmationfrom past to

present is destroyed or preserved.

However, these arguments face some serious problems. First, according to Peter Kosso, they are unreasonable in that all observations are ofthe past and none is of the present.l2 Take, for example, the case of physics. Strictly speaking, we should say that the physicist is

L70

concerned with past events, not presort events. The present

is, after all, a very short moment existing between the past and the future. At the moment, we observe an object. While performing an experiment, it is already a past object and the data we obtain are from the past. Astronomical examples make the point more obvious. Suppose an astronomer is observing the Andromeda Galaxy, which happens to be one million light years from the Earth. What he or she observes is not the present state ofthe Andromeda Galaxy but its state one million years in the past. The astonomer bases his or her beliefs about the Andromeda Galaxy upon data that are a million years old. Studies based upon evidence from the past, such as

geology, evolutionary biology, and comparative linguistics, all face the same problem. They study the past based upon the evidence left in the present. Thus, it is hard to say that history occupies a uniquely disadvantageous position

compared

to natural

science

just because

it

deals with

unobserved objects.

This also means it is not necessarily the case that the past has an unfavorable position when it comes to observation. For example, is there a comparative disadvantage in watching a soccer match that is recorded on videotape, compared to watching

it live on TV? We can still

watch the 2002 World Cup semifinals between Korea and Germany. This obviously does not mean that we can see all of the events of the past. Recorded videotapes may possess defects or be damaged beyond repair. Nevertheless, it is not the case that we have nothing worth observing.

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Second, considering that any science may not solely

rely on direct observatio4 the assertion that history has a disadvantageous position is not justified. logical empiricists highlighted the importance of experience by claiming that science is based upon experience and that the source

ofall of

otr knowledge is experience. Their logic is as follows: We possess many different kinds of knowledge, but they can all

ultimately be reduced to direct observations. Knowledge that cannot be reduced to direct observation is not genuine ernpirical knowledge. If we suppose that the record of the simplest and most direct form of observation is the "protocol sentence," then all genuine empirical knowledge involves various combinations of these protocol sentences-that is, a truth function of protocol sentences. However, this deductive view of knowledge is no longer supported, owing to the fact that even the simplest scientific law turns out to be non-reducible to protocol sentences.

In fact, no scientist is in a position to observe all of the important experiments in the relevant area. He or she only gets to know about many empirical proofs through the testimony of other researchers working in separate labs. This observation of other labs includes observations of the past. Science journals, rather than actual performance of experiments, are, in a practical sense, more important materials to the individual scientist. If we apply the same lesson to historical research, then the forms of evidence with which historians deal, such as historical data, are the records of the observations made by others. Thus, it is unreasonable to claim that historians occupy a disadvantageous position in

172

comparison with other sciences simply because historians do not deal with their own observations but with those of others

Narrative idealists argue that the difference between an exact science such as physics and history is as follows:

In physics, we have a starting point. This starting point may be wrong, corrected, or modified but we start from the acquisition of data. However, there is no starting point in history. For this reason, the knowledge of historians is not accumulated. Historians may utilize the work of others but should always make a fresh start.13

Due to the problems outlined above,

it is difficult to see how

such a position can be defended.

Third, many philosophers still maintain that physics deals with data about objects that in principle are verifiable by anyone, for the observations of others are trusted only insofar as their experiments are repeatable by anyone who is interested. [n contast, history must necessarily deal with non-observable objects. This does seem like a reasonable objection, for Alexander the Great is definitely not an observable object in the way that the objects of physics are. However, this tums out to be an invalid comparison, for physical particles such as electrons cannot be directly observed, and physicists must rely on evidence of their existence such as is provided by a bubble chamber.la This is

173

no different in principle from reconstnrcting the historical Alexander the Great based upon the evidence left by Alexander the Great himself or other relevant forms of evidence. Nonetheless, this argument may invite an immediate counterargument, for Alexander the Great was once an observable object, but the elecffon has never been observed. Thus, it seems unreasonable to compare the two. To resolve

this difficulty, we need a more detailed account of the term "observation." Obseryation can be performed using the naked eye, glasses, a microscope, or a telescope. Even though in some cases we use tools to observe, it is difficult to deny that these are genuine cases of observation. Were more accurate instnrments to be developed in the future, it might be possible to observe objects that have previously been unobservable. Thus, it is unreasonable to insist on a

fixed distinction between the observable and unobservable. For example, questions such as "ls x observable?" and "[s this actually an observation of x?" are the wrong sort of questions. If we admit that observation is not the only source of knowledge, then we should ask the following sort of questions: "ls this information relevant to the event?," "How was this information delivered?"; and "ls there any reliable independent explanation about the source of this information?"

Hermeneutical Obj ectivity

Many people suspect that history lacks the objectivity possessed by natural science on the grounds that the latter L74

deals with the natural world, whereas history is based upon interpretation of historical data or documents.

Deconstructionism is the theory that denies the possibility of objectivity i" the interpretation of original texts. This theory originated in discussions related to the interpretation of literary texts and came to be applied to interpretations in general, such as the interpretation of original texts in the history of philosophy. Deconstructionists do not accept that a specific original text has a fixed and objective meaning. Deconstructionism does not allow for objectivity. Thus, deconstructionists do not ask what the original text means, but instead ask what it can mean or what it may mean. Rescher formalizes the theory

of deconstructionism

into the following theses:

Omnitextuality: Any proposed interpretation of a text must itself take the form of another text. In the hermeneutical sphere there is no means of escape from the textual domain.

Plasticity: Every text has

multiple interpretations. It admits a plurality of diverse

constructions.

Equivalency: Every interpretation is as good as any other interpretation. These various interpretative constructions of a text are all of

equal or roughly equal merit: none is definitive, canonical, or discriminatively

175

appropriate. Indeed, none

is

substantially more cogent or tenable than the others.ls

Let us apply this theory to the study of history. Omnitextuality appears in the form of radical theses such as "There is nothing but the text" or "Reality does not exist: only language exists." In other words, the text is itself complete and is not related to some external reality. If this is true, then the claim that historical description is based upon events that actually occurred in the past is no longer tenable. The three basic theses of deconstructionism turn out to contain serious difficulties. 16 In holding that discrimination between the textual and non-textual world is impossible, omnitextuality implies that it is impossible to escape the prison of interpretation. This is an extreme form of idealism. Just as Berkeley claimed that "only the perceived exists," so deconstructionists claim that "only the interpreted exists," but such a claim makes life in society impossible, because it intemrpts cortmunication between people.

The second thesis, plasticity, has its own problems. Plasticity simply means arbitrariness of interpretation. For interpretation to be arbitrary, at least one of the following must be the case: Either the meaning of a text cannot be fixed since there is no world extemal to the text that serves to determine its meaning, or access to the true meaning of the text is impossible, even though such a "true meaning" exists. Deconstructionists prefer to assent to the former case. However, this is based upon a misunderstanding of language

776

in general, for if the meaning of a text is not fixed, then all genuine communication via text and its interpretation becomes impossible. Such a conclusion is an excessive devaluation of our reason. This problem has already been discussed in Chapter 2 on presentism. Although the meaning

of a text is determined and we can interpret it objectively, interpretation may differ depending upon which aspect of the text we are considering. However, these interpretations are objective and must be distinguished from the arbitrary interpretations that are supposed to be a result of plasticity.

The third thesis of deconstructionism, namely, the equivalency of interpretations, faces a more significant difficulty, for it reduces interpretation to a state of anarchy and destroys history as a science.

For the objective interpretation of historical text, the following principles have to be respected:

First, any historical texts must be interpreted under the principle of record. This means that historical texts are the records of facts, no matter how they were written. The records have their meaning in relation to facts and realities. A historical text that has nothing to do with facts is a contradiction in terms. Although mythology and fables have some value to the historical record, that value lies only in how they represent the thoughts and vision of people in that place and time. Here, we must focus on interpreting the contents of historical records as they are, by assuming that the text in front of us has a fixed, objective meaning. The interpretation of a text is not a matter of establishing "subjective" meaning or expressing feelings about the text,

777

but one of objective formalization in the

sense

of "this

means that."

Second, any historical texts must be interpreted under the principle of situational reconstuction. This is necessary in order to understand the context in which the text came into existence. For example, if we are to understand Platoos theory of forms, then we need to reconstruct the historical context in which that theory came into being, namely, the crisis of Greek Atomism caused by the discovery of irrational numbers. Similarly, to understand Kant's question "How is synthetic a priori judgment possible?," we should reconstnrct the historical context in which questions about how absolute tnrth is possible were asked at the time of the publication of Ihe Critique of Pure

Reason.

We shall further

discuss objectivity

and

interpretation in Chapter 10.

Third, there may be a variety of views of a particular text, but all interpretations, no matter which perspective we adopt, must be done under the principle of criticism. If it is permissible that historical interpretations may not be criticized on the basis of fact, then they are not part of historical research pursuing the objective knowledge of historical facts.

178

Plnr III THn Nncessrry oF INCoRpoRATTNG UxonnsraNDrNc axo Expt.lNATroN

Historians have a responsibility to reveal not only which events happened in the past, but also why these events

occurred. The former responsibility requires

the

understanding of the characteristics

of historical events; the laffer requires the explanation of the causes or reasons that

evoked them. Thus, both understanding and explanation are necessary parts of historical writing. Even during the eighteenth-century Enlightenment,

it

was not acknowledged that historical explanation was a special issue to be aware of. Historians of that era thought that it was possible to explain everything by means of Newtonian physics, the principles of which were considered to have the ability to explain every object in nature. It was only in the late nineteenth century that philosophical introspection regarding methods of historical explanation began.

Philosophers such as the Neo-Kantians and Dilthey

methodologically developed the Kantian theory of distinguishing Ding ansich and the phenomenal world, or the Hegelian theory of distinguishing the mind and nature.

779

They came to insist that the nomothetic methodology ought to be distinguished from idiographic methodology and likewise that the methodology of natural sciences ought to be distinguished from that of human sciences. Hence came the tradition of strictly dividing the respective sciences and their difference in explanatory methodology; the methods for human sciences were thought to be completely differant from the logical stnrctures of explanation in natural sciences. However, with the accelerated progress of the natural sciences and their increasing influence, attempts to unify scientific methodology by the methodology of natural science ernerged once more and were very popular until the mid-twentiethcentury, particularly with the advent of logical

positivism. Within the historical context, the controversy about historical methodology comes down to the conflict between the monist, who idealizes the methodology of natural sciences and insists that all types ofscience ought to follow suit, and the dualist, who tries to separate the methodology of human sciences (or cultural sciences) from that of natural science. Within the ontological context, the conflict is between the monist who regards the historical world as part of the natural world, and the dualist who regards the historical world as a distinct human world apart from the natural world.

In this part of the book, we shall first examine the activities and culture that constitute the historical world' We shall then discuss the characteristics of hermeneutical understanding and scientific explanation, and move on to discuss the explanatory hermeneutics that make objective

180

history possible. Finally, it will be shown that the theory of supervenie,nce demonstrates how the substructure explains the zuperstructure and how microscopic laws of activity explain macroscopic laws of history.

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9

THn HrsroRrcAL Wonlp Is a CulruRAL WoRLD

Everything in the world has its own specific history, insofar as everything exists in time.l In a broad sense, history is the process of the change of a particular thing within time. Thus, it is not only human beings that have histories. Stars also go through a process of transformation from birth to death. Plants and animals have their own histories as well, which we usually refer to as their evolution. Human beings also have a history of biological evolution insofar as we are classified as animals. However, this process of biological evolution occurs over a long period of time and has no direct influence on our life-world. Therefore, such a process of evolution only makes up the background of human history

rather than occupying

a

central position. Instead, the conscious activity of humans and culture forms the center of human history.

The biological foundation acts as the basis on which cultural history develops. Culture sometimes contradicts the

biological foundation

or

functions as

a

medium

to

supplement and expand the biological foundation.

Today, biologists think that animals other than human beings also create culture. For example, the social mechanisms in anthills or beehives are typical of culture that insects create. Furthermore, since anthills and beehives and

183

their social mechanisms also go through tansformation within time, it can be said that ants and bees have history of their own. However, no other species has been able to create culture that is as broad and sophisticated as that of human beings. This is why human history is considered to be cultural history. Even though culture is not the exclusive property of humans, it is reasonable to try to understand human history through culture, considering the weight culture in human lives.

of

Culture indicates the sum total of mental and physical products that human beings have acquired by applyng labor to the natural environment. This is a mixture of lifestyle and its contents, both mental and physical. The everything shared by its members concerning food, clothing, and shelter, as well as sryles of behavior, emotion, and thought. It includes not only the relationship between humans and nature, but also interpersonal relationships and all the intellectual and mental assets that people have acquired. Thus, from the spatial point of view, culfure is a buffer zone created between pure animalistic instinct and the natural environment, and from the ternporal point of view, culture is the social tadition that is passed down through time from one generation to culture

of a society consists of

another.2

In this chapter, I will take a general overyiew of the definition of culture and then examine a classic theory of culture by Wilhelm Dilthey, followed by the most recent theory of culture, known as critical rationalism.

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The Historical World as Culture

The world of culture is the result of conscious human activities, as opposed to the world of nature. Nature is everything that occurs by itself and grows by itself, whereas culture indicates the creation or products of human effort. Thus, in a broad sense, what grows freely from the earth is the product of nature, while what humans sow and reap is the product of culture. Humans are a part of nature, and our

biological desire and basic consciousness are naturally given to us. However, we satis$ our biological desires through a variety of methods, using our own conscious effort, which transforms nature into something else. Seeing such results of change and creation as culture, humans can be said to be natural beings who, at the same time, are cultural beings who contradict the nature. In the West, it is well known that the word "culture" is derived from "cultivation of soil."3 The original meaning was transferred to "cultivation of mentality" and ended up indicating all conscious activities of humans and their products. Definitions of culture vary greatly. The hrst modern definition of culture, by E. B. Tylor, is as follows: "Culture or Civilization taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society."a Meanwhile, Robert Lynd defined culture as the embodiment of works, the manner of thinking, emotion, tools, value, and symbols of human community in the same area.s

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Culture is sometimes defined in a narrow sense, not as the social concept of "physical and mental lifestyle." Idealists define culture as the actualization of universal and absolute value. Such definition gives a moral meaning to culture, indicating the ideals of a perfect humanity. From another perspective, culture refers to works of art and intellect that exist in reality.6

Heinrich Rickert, who was the first person to use Kulturwissenschaft (ailtwal science) as an academic term, claimed that all cultural ideas express a certain value that is approved by human beings, and that these ideas are created or protected due to this value. Thus, culture is no more than an expression of value, and cultural events cannot exist without values. That is to say, humans created culture out of the given nature by applying value to it. Rickert claims, "Religion, church, law, nation, ethics, science, language, literature, arts, @onomy and technical means required to operate them are considered as cultural objects or goods, providing that their value are approved by the whole members of a community.'7

This view, by placing an excessive emphasis on normativity, has the risk of approving only the ideal culture as genuine culture.8 In practical terms, Wilhelm Dilthey's definition of the cultural world appears more reasonable. Dilthey thought that the world of culture is the life-world, where the mind is objectified. He claimed that "all things one encounters, all purposive systems which one participates in, and external organizations ofsociety that are established

by one's cooperation make a unified world of life."e Dilthey

185

admitted that cultural phenomena are connected to values. His view, however, was that "such values are not transcendental values, but life-values (Lebenswerte)." t0 These values are not given to us transcendentally, but are made through reflection on the experience of historical life.

The world of culture is sometimes referred to as "objective mind" (objektiver Geist). When Hegel first used the term objektiver Geist, it was to indicate the area between the subjective mind and the absolute mind, as the arts, religion, and philosophy belonged to the absolute mind rather than to the objective mind. However, since Dilthey, the objective mind has come to be a comprehensive concept,

including the arts, religion, philosophy, and so on. Dilthey wrote:

I think that objective mind is various tlpes of common expression in individuals. For objective minds, the past exists continuously to us. This influences areas from lifestyles or types of exchange to the objective system that society established: ethics, laws, nation, religion, art, science and philosophy.ll

Dilthey's notion of the objective mind is similar to Karl Popper's notion of "World 3." It consists of the products of the human mind, comprised of stories, myths, tools, scientific theories, scientific problems, social systems,

187

and works of art. All these thinkers consider the historical world to be the cultural world in a broader sense.

World 3 and the Ontologr of the Historical World Within a broader context, culture can be classified in terms of Popper's "World 3." According to critical rationalism, there are three worlds: World l, World 2, and World 3.12 World I is the physical world; World 2 is the mental world; and World 3 is the world of ideas in the objective sense.

World

I

is the world of physical objects, which

consists of things such as soil, water, wind, and fire. From a

microscopic point of view, all of these can be said to be compounds that consist of molecules. Living organisms are also a part of World l, since they consist of cells, which are made up of molecules.

In contras! World 2 is the world of subjective experience. It is the inner mental world containing such things as the emotions of happiness, anger, sorrow, and pleasure. It is the world of the will, the world of the Of course, World 2 is not humans, for as long as animals have they are considered to be part of World 2.

subconscious and unconscious.

exclusive

to

consciousness,

According to Popper, self-consciousness and awareness of death epitomize World 2. Meanwhile, materialists, who insist that only World 1 genuinely exists, try to reduce the phenomena of World 2 to those of World l. They think that the inner mental world is nothing more than the physical and chemical reactions of neurons in the brain. In response to

188

this, Popper argues that World 2 exists independently, on account of its influential power that affects the objects of World 1.r3 We are quite familiar with both World 1 and World 2, but World 3 is a little less familiar to us. World 3 is neither physical nor mental. It consists of objects of thought; it is the world of theories and their relationships, of arguments and theoretical problems. According to Popper, "Theories, or propositions, or statements are the most important thirdworld linguistic entities." la In order to argue for the genuineness of World 3, Popper attributes to World 3 the following properties: substantiality, autonomy, 15 Within an intersubjectivity, and temporal invariance.

evolutional context, World 3 cannot exist unless World 2 exists. In other words, World 3 is ontologically dependent on World 2. However, the authentic substantiality of World 3 can be proved on account of the fact that it exists regardless of World 2 once it has been created. Let us consider the following thought experiment, devised to prove the authenticity of World 3:

(l) A case in which all methods of production and the understanding of their use have been destroyed, but libraries and the ability to learn from them still exist.

(2)

A

in which all

methods of production and the understanding of their

case

use have been destoyed, all libraries have

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been destroyed, but the ability from books still exists.r6

to

learn

Of the two, in which case would it be easier to rebuild civilization? It seems certain that the reconstnrction of civilization would be easier if libraries are preserved. What does this entail? It entails the substantiality of World 3, for mental contents that have been symbolized in a book do not depend on World 2 for their causal influence or existence. A beehive or a bird's nest is constructed by bees or birds, but both remain even after the bees or birds leave. This analogy proves the substantiality of World 3.

The autonomy of World 3 is explained as follows: we created natural numbers, but prime numbers, odd numbers, and even numbers have been discovered.lT We have created the series of natural numbers by continuously adding I to l, and this series autonomously came to possess properties such as prime numbers, odd numbers, and even numbers. These properties are there to be discovered, and are not created. Of course, this does not mean that World 3 is entirely autonomous, but only that it possesses some parts that are not intended products of World 2. As Popper remarks, "My next point is that this autonomous part of World 3 is 'real'in the se,nse that it can interact with World 2 and also, via World 2, with World l.'r8The objects of World 3 can have strong causal influence on the processes of World 2, and this influence may even reach all the way to World l.

190

of World 3

transcend time because temporal predicates cannot be applied to them. Of course, since entities in World 3 have a specific time of creation, it can be said that, as a whole, World 3 increases over time. Yet, once they are created, the individual realities of World

The objects

3 continue to exist eternally, like Plato's Forms.

That the objects of World 3 are intersubjective means that they are capable of being understood by minds other than the one that created them. The important point here is that intersubjectivity is a characteristic property shared by objects of World 3, regardless of whether or not they have materialized in reality. As Popper remarks, "Thus, I do admit that in order to belong to the third world of objective knowledge, a book should-in principle, or virnrally-be capable of being grasped (or deciphered, or understood, or "known") by somebody."l' Popper's World 3 is considered to be similar to Plato's world of Forms, Hegel's objective mental world, and Frege's third realm. Anthony O'Hear has labeled Popper's World 3 as Platonic.2o However, despite being very similar, World 3 differs from Plato's world of Forms in that World 3 is a creation of the human mind. The objects of World 3 range from stories, myths, tools, scientific theories, and scientific problerns to social systems and the arts (see Figure l0). The existence of objects in World 3 depends on the existence of material things, so in this sense, these objects belong simultaneously to Worlds I and 3. For example, a book as a material object is a member of World l, but the

L9L

contents of the book that remain the same throughout lots copies belong to World 3.

of

(6) Works of art and of science World 3 (including technology) (the products of the human

(5) Human language. Theories about

mind)

self-consciousness and death

(4) Self-consciousness and awareness

World 2 (the world of subjective experiences)

ofdeath (3) Senticnce (Animal consciousness) (2) Living organisms

World I

(l)

The heavier elements;

(thc world of physical liquids and crystals objects)

(0) Hydrogen and Helium

Figure I0: From World

I

to World

3.

These three worlds are all independent and not reducible to each other. However, they are connected by means of an evolutionary process.2l

Popper's pluralistic ontology has a significant similarity to Nicolai Hartmann's four classes of existence, which are: inorganic existence, organic existence, conscious existence, and mental existence.22 The first two classes of inorganic and organic existence correspond to Popper's World 1, the third class of conscious existence to World 2,

792

and the fourth class

of mental existence to World 3.

However, since Harnnann classifies minds into the three categories of "individual mind," "objective mind," and "objectified mind," Popper's worlds and Hartmann's classes of mind do not show perfect congruence. From Popper's point of view, the individual minds and objective minds of Hartmann should belong to World 2, while objectified mind (Der objecktivierte Geist) corresponds exactly to World 3. For Hartmann also, the objectified mind is a product of objective and subjective minds. Here, the "subjective mind" refers to individual consciousness, whereas the objective mind is a super-individual mind that encompasses the individual minds. These minds are all alive and vibrant. However, the objectified mind is fixed in physical objects, rather than being active by itself. tn this sense, it is also called the materialized mind. HarEnann includes in the world of the objectified mind creations such as: literature, poetry, formative arts, and music, as well as monuments, architecture, technological works, tools, weapons, handcraft s and industrial products, scientific and philosophical systems, and mythological and religious ideas. In a nutshell, all cultural heritage created by human beings belongs to the world of the objectified mind. Hartmann further categorizes the objectified mind into "foreground" and "background."23 The foreground is the level ofperceptually accessible physical objects that bear the mind, while the background refers to the fixed mental contents within the foreground. Although mental contents or the objectified mind do not have independent methods of existence, they can be activated by contact with living minds.

193

For example, we can say that the Renaissance, which was the rediscovery of the Greek and Roman minds, happened when the objective mind that had been inert for hundreds of yearc was awakened and reintroduced into the living minds. When objectified minds are activated, they become a power that moves living minds. This is similar to the process by which Popper's World 3 affects World I through World 2.2a

If we accept such pluralistic ontology,

then which one of these "worlds" does the historical world fit into? The answer is clearly World 3. When we consider the society in which we live, then every system and lifestyle that we have created belongs to World 3. Our conscious states or mental structures that belong to World 2 can also be objects of study, but we are not able to understand the conscious states of people directly, without the help of any expressions from World 3. World I may also include objects of historical research. However, it is only meaningful to discuss World I in terms of its relationship with World 2 or World 3. Therefore, an understanding or explanation of the historical world is necessarily related to the issue of how to understand or explain the objects of World 3.

Culture and Language The thesis that the history of mankind is the cultural world does not mean that only human beings create culture or that history is solely composed of culture in a narrow sense. The most important point here is that culture is not something that is entirely unrelated to our biological desires. Since humans are living organisms, we are somewhere along the

L94

evolutionary process, and it is necessary for humans to satisfu instinctive desires. Culture is a device that enables us to satisfy desires according to appropriate situations. At the same time, culture is an intentional device that we have consciously created, and history is the footsteps of this cultural evolution. This is what it means to say that the historical world is the cultural world. Language is a product of culture, but can be said to be a container containing the contents of culture. Sometimes, language is defined as the software of culture. [n the case of Wilhelm Dilthey, who understood the world of history as the

world of culture, language is very special among many expressions. Holding that understanding can obtain objectivity only when the expression of life is fixed so that we can always go back to that expression, and that the stage of hermeneutics appears through the opportunity of this fixation, Dilthey thinks that the internality of human experience is expressed most completely and creatively in the form of a language, and that language is the most objective and understandable form of expression. ln other words, language can preserve flowing life best in itself, and

publicity

of language can eliminate the subjectivity of

understanding as much as is possible. Therefore, linguistic work takes precedence over other expressions, and only linguistic expression is the original target of interpretation in all three types of expression (propositions, acts, and lived experiences, discussed in Chapter l0).

Also in the case of Karl Popper, language forms the core of World 3, the culture world: "Theories or

195

propositions, statements are the most important linguistic reality of World 3."25 Thereforg it can be said that it is difficult to establish the world of culture, which is a product of the human spirit, without language. From these classifications, we find that language is the primary bearer of culture, because culttre is presenred by language. From this perspective, the understanding of history comes down to the understanding of language in history. Thus, historical science is indeed historical hermeneutics.

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10

Oprosrnc AppnoacHps: HrRprBxrurrcAL UxpBnsrlNDING axo SctnxrIFIC Expunnrton

From a methodological point of view, the characteristics of academic studies vary depending upon the methodologies applied, even with identical objects.l From an ontological point of view, the methodology may vary depending upon

the object

of

study. Understanding and explanation are

opposing methods based upon an ontological difference.

language on a daily basis, "understanding" and "explanation" are not clearly distinguished in many cases, but within academic use, these

In the use of

terms ought to be strictly distinguished. Understanding is the direct cognition of the mind, while explanation is the

indirect cognition of nature. We are able to directly cognize

not only our own minds but also the minds of others. However, robots with artilicial intelligence would not be able to understand love. If understanding the minds of others were not at all possible, then social life would be impossible. Of course, it is not a simple matter to understand the minds

of

others, as has been proved by the frequency of misunderstandings in human communication. Occasionally, we are not certain even of our own minds, and in extreme cases, we seek aid from psychological professionals.

L97

We do not understand nafure in the same way that we understand other minds. In some ways, as Giambattista Vico pointed out, nature is much more unfamiliar and difficult for us to understand than we understand the minds of others. The study of nature is essentially the study of nomology. Explanation is made possible by attributing the object of study to a specific law of nature. Thus, the following thesis is established: The methodology of human sciences is understanding, while the methodology of natural sciences is explanation.

In this chapter, I shall classiSing

discuss hermeneutics by

it into two categories. The first is classic

hermeneutics, represented by Dilthey, and the second is the

practical syllogism of analytic philosophy. This classification clearly reflects differences in ways to guarantee the objectivity of understanding. I will examine the characteristics of each category and point out their problems based on the objectivity of understanding. Subseque'ntly, I will discuss the logic of explanation, centered upon Carl Hempel, and will also discuss the incorporating of understanding and explanation.

Human Science and the Methodology of Understanding

Wilhelm Dilthey

is a philosopher who established

the

methodology of understanding in the most systematic way, by the unique epistemological methods of human sciences.

The Neo-Kantians Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert were his contemporarieso but neither of these philosophers was able to establish a methodology of L98

like Dilthey's. Neither Windelband's idiographic method nor Rickert's value-associated

understanding quite

description is considered an authentic hermeneutical method. Dilthey distinguished understanding and explanation: We should "explain" nature and "understand" mental life.2

The opposition of understanding and explanation is concerned with the two types of perception that Dilthey distinguished. One is external perception through the five senses, and the other is internal perception that does not depend on these five senses. The extemal world is revealed to us indirectly by the five senses, while our own internal states, such as joy or sadness, are revealed directly by means of intemal perception: "Perceiving nature is related to the events given to consciousness. However, the subject of hermeneutics is the existence of lived experience itself, given from inner experience (innere Erfahrung)." 3 According to this classification, natural science deals with various facts that are given to consciousness as events from the external world. Human science, in contrast, deals with the more foundational facts of internal realities and living systems.

Understanding can be completely elucidated when discussed within Dilthey's framework of lived experience, expression, and understanding. Dilthey employed this hermeneutical structure to examine understanding as a part

of his critique of historical reason (Kritik der Historischen Vernunft). ln the hermeneutic structure, "The first thing offered is lived experience alone."4 However, the internal perception of lived experience remains unclear and

t99

of life in this step is not yet clear. Thus, one should reveal oneself to achieve a clear perception of oneself, which involves various types of expressions of life. At this point, the last issue of ambiguous. The understanding

understanding remains in the understanding of expression.

To "understand" is to recognize the mind from the expressions of mental life given to sense.s The process of recognizing the internal state by symbols given from the external world is called "understanding."u Understanding is first of all the understanding of othbr people's minds, and from there, it is the understanding of the expressions of life, ranglng from individual

to

great cultural systems. One of the characteristics of understanding life that distinguishes it from the knowledge of nature is that, when we understand life, the subject and the object are identical. Knowledge of nature requires that we comprehend, through hlpothetical expressions

systems, a natural world that is neither created nor creatable

by urwhereas to understand life is to directly grasp our own worlds that we have created. As Dilthey put it, "Mind understands only what it creates."T

According to Dilthey's theory of understanding, it is possible to achieve great clarity about the world of life because human nature is almost identical wherever it exists. In other words, the life-world can be understood due to the similarity of human lives. However different individual human beings may appear to be, their inner natures are not as intrinsically disparate as are the things that make up the material world. "You" and "1" create the life-world together,

200

and this common world is the subject of our understanding.

On the basis of the similarity of our lives, we are able to understand all expressions of human life. In other words, I can understand the expressions of others as essentially similar to mine, insofar as we put our own lived experiences inside those expressions. "Understanding is rediscovery always of myself in you. Mind rediscovers itself in a higher level of system."8 Therefore, "Understanding premises the lived experience."e

Three Types of Undercunding related to the expressions of life, then it is natural for there to be three tlpes of understanding corresponding to the three forms of expression: propositions,

If understanding is solely

acts, and lived experiences. These three tlpes of understanding ffio, respectively: logical understanding, practical understanding, and emotional understanding. The object of logical understanding is a proposition. To understand such a proposition is to comprehend objective knowledge. Understanding relates only to the contents of a thought, and these are always the same in any context. [n other words, the meaning of a proposition is always the same, either to the person who signifies the proposition or to

it. However, this type of understanding does not yield an understanding of the another person who understands

internal feeling of the person who signifies the proposition. The object of technical and practical understanding is

an action. To understand an action means to identiff its

20L

intention or purpose. An intention or purpose makes an action meaningful and understandable beyond its nature as a

simple physical movement. However, understanding an action is not a fomr of logical understanding by means of inference. The understanding of action that comprehends other people's minds from their physical movements is different from inference for two reasons. The first reason is that inference is an indirect form of deduction that transits across two separate factors, the pranise and the conclusion, whereas understanding is a form of direct comprehension. This is because the expression and what is expressed, and the physical condition and the mental condition, are a united

fact, not nro inde,pendent facts. The second reason is that inference is a completely intellectual process linked by logical relationships, whereas understanding is an imaginative process that is fundamentally holistic.

Only an understanding of expressions of lived experience, in which the intemal world of human life is revealed, can be labeled proper understanding. This is an understanding that takes pure artwork as its object. If the most important world for humans is our own internal world with unique values, then efforts to understand the life-world will necessarily concentrate on this expression of lived experience. The expression of lived experience does not belong to judgments concerning the tnrth or teleology of things, but to judgments concerning authenticity and inauthenticity. The expression of lived experience is not a form of knowledge or perception. It is achieved not by mere intelligence but by complicated, organic living humans

202

themselves under their emotions, impulses, ideologies, purposes, social environments, and so forth.

Basic and High-Level Understanding

The three kinds of understanding can be further classified into "basic understanding" and "high-level understanding." Basic understanding addresses the relationship between individual expressions and meanings, while high-level understanding is concerned with entire systems of expression rather than individual expressions. Again in Dilthey's words, "I apprehend the meaning of individual expressions under the form of basic understanding."lo The understanding of individual expressions exists in every area of the expressions of life. A proposition indicates a fact, and facial expressions convey emotions, such as joy or sorrow. A simple action enables us to be directly aware of a purpose.

However, what will guarantee the objectivity of such understanding? Dilthey seeks the answer in the "objective mind (Objehiver Geist)." The objective mind is a totality of various systems where the commonality between individuals has been objectified in the phenomenal world. "The objective mind that includes daily life patterns, social purpose, custom, law, religion, arl, science, philosophy and more" is an overall historical heritage in which we are ll nurtured and sustain our lives. Thus, the objectivity of understanding is guaranteed, and objective knowledge in human science is possible because all of us live within the

203

objective mind. We have taken nutrition from the objective mind and have been nurtured by it since infancy. Thus, "objective mind is a medium that helps us understand other people and their expressions."l2 Therefore, the notion of

objective mind, which Dilthey inherited from Hegel, provides the common basis of our lives. It is the foundational groundwork for objective hermeneutics.

All individual expressions of life refer to some in the domain of the objective mind. Words and sentences, gestures and manner, and artworks and shared object

historical actions are all understood due to this commonality, which conjoins the expressed object and the person who tries to understand it. Individuals always experience, think, and act in this cornmon domain, and they also understand in this common domain. All people who underetand, therefore, have the same taits that the objects of understanding have in this common domain.l3

Here is how a fundamental inversion of understanding occurs. We do not understand individuals first

and then deduce the objective mind from them, but we understand individual people after understanding the commonality of the objective mind, or spirit, that surrounds us. Thus, the world of the objective mind is not a simple medium through which we understand others; rather, all of us are the media who live, advance, and fundamentally define ourselves in that world (Figure 1l).ra

To Dilthey, the objective mind has materialized in the phenomenal world. 15 We label this objectified spirit objective because it generally belongs to all of us in

204

it

appears through individuals. Therefore, the object ofunderstanding can be regarded as a factor of objective mind that shares the same source with those who understand it, and hence, we secure the possibility of understanding.

corlmon, even though

Objcctitc mind

Figure 1 I . The structure of objective mind

High-level understanding becomes possible due to basic understanding. Whereas the individual expressions of life and the relationship between their meanings are significant in basic understanding, high-level understanding places more emphasis on the entire system of life. Here, the transition from basic to high-level understanding happens for the following two reasons. First, it is impossible to understand complex expressions and to resolve the contradictions caused within the basic level of understanding. Second, on the basic level of understanding, the farther the distance between a given expression of life and the person trying to understand it, the more difficult it is to eliminate the uncertainty that interferes with basic understanding. High-level understanding is possible due to the possibility of transpos ition (S ic hh in e i nv e rs e tz en). As Dilthey

205

expressed

it, "Transposition is to identi$ myself with

the objects, based upon empathy,"tu and "Transposition makes the relived experience (Nacherleben'1 arrd reconstnrction (Nachbilden) possible, by which the whole spiritual world is understood."lT

rzunion of elements by logical action; rather, "Reconstruction is the relived experience." 18 Therefore, understanding, which is a Reconstruction

is not a

rehogressive procedure that goes against the actual pro"irt of events, is basically an imaginative task and at the same time a holistic task. To understand others is not only to

simply be aware of the experiences they have had, but also to deeply empathize with the effects of those experiences. That is to say, we re-experience and re-constnrct through imagination, so that it is possible to trace events that happened in different taditions or in the spirits of historical people. "When we can reconstruct the whole event from the piece of event,"le and "when we can understand the author better than the author understands himself"2o understanding is completed.

Dilthey considers all interpretation to take the form ofcircular reasoning. Such circular reasoning is a necessary evil 2l of any epistemology that does not acc€pt an Archimedean starting point, and makes up the fundamentals of hermeneutics. The interpretation of a work is a circular process that continues from the whole to the part and from the part to the whole. The interpreters suggest the partial relationship within the worls that support their view, as evidence.for the validity of their interpretation. However,

206

so-called "partial relationship" is merely basic understanding with a hlpothetical characteristic, or

this

something that is predefined by prior understanding.22 Thus,

the result derived from understanding calrnot possess deductive certainty.

After Dilthey's theory of hermeneutics, some other philosophers have proposed their own hermeneutical discourse, such as Martin Heidegger (hermeneutic phenomenology), Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida (radical hermeneutics), Richard Kearney (diacritical hermeneutics), and Fredric Jameson (Marxist hermeneutics). However, they did not proceed further than Dilthey's work in terms of objective understanding.

The Practical Syllogism in Analytic Philosophy

Several analyic philosophers have insisted on the importance of understanding, but the most prominent philosophers to formalize the characteristics of "understanding," as opposed to "explanation" within a teleological structure, were Gertrude Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright.

Wright compares the teleological tradition of scientific explanation, exonplified by Aristotle, with the causal tradition, exemplified by Galileo. Causalists believe that actions can be explained by cause and effect, whereas

teleologists insist that actions can only be explained by teleology. Teleological explanations are, again, divided into

207

functionalist and intentional explanations. Functionalist explanation, which is mainly used in biology, is the attempt to reveal the role of a part "a" in an organism by examining the function that "a" performs within the entire organism. For example, if one were to answer the question "What is the kidney?" using a functionalist explanation, the answer would be that the kidney serves to cleanse the blood. Meanwhile, an intentional explanation can be asked of conscious beings of higher dimensions, such as human beings. Therefore, the explanation for human actions falls into the category of teleological and intentional explanation. When we say that human action has two aspects-

internal and external-the internal aspect indicates the directivity of the action, for it is the inte,rrtion or will behind the act. The external aspects of human actions are physical actions, including muscle movements, such as raising a hand

or moving a leg, and their physical effects. An action that lacks intentionality is merely a reflexive action, solely the reaction of the body to a stimulus. There is no need to discuss these reflexive actions here, for they are irrelevant to the purpose of this chapter. To explain an action teleologically is to indicate the precise object of the intention. Anscombe considers an action to be the actualization of an intention, and considers the teleological explanation related to the intention as a type of practical syllogism, which takes on the following general form:

Major premise: the purpose or desire of the agent

208

Minor premise: the belief about the method for achieving the purpose

Conclusion: the action that actualizes this method

These can be formalized as follows:

Major premise: A tries to achieve P.

Minor premise: A thinks that P will not be achieved unless A performs a. Conclusion: Therefore, A intends to perform

4.23

Here, we can see A's action a and understand his intention P. This is not a demonstrative syllogism because the premises do not necessarily i*ply the conclusion. Even though we want P and know we have to perform a to achieve it, there might be many reasons not to do so. This can be formalized as shown in Figure 12.

Actioo

hl@tion

(ooo-Huru Explaaans

Figure 12. Intentional explanation is not Humean causal uplanation.

209

We may wonder whether it is possible to regard the relation between intention and action as a causal relation. After Hume's proposal, the general characteristic of causal relations is that the relationship between a cause and effect does not require a logical connection, and the cause and effect are connected by laws. For example, if a container of gas exploded due to exposure to a flame, no logical connection exists between the presence of the flame and the explosion. They are logically independelrt. Only the laws of physics and chemistry connect them. Von Wright refers to this as Hume's cause-and-effect relationship. However, an obvious logical connection seems to exist between intention (reason) and action as follows:

l)

John wants to quench his thirst.

2) John thinks that drinking beer will quench his thirst. 3) Therefore, John drinks beer.

Here, a logical relationship between ttre premises and conclusion is established. Thirst-quenching (major premise),

thirst-quenchrng via drinking beer (minor premise), and drinking beer (conclusion) are logically, not nomologically, connected. No law is established between inte,ntion and action. Therefore, the relationship between intention and action is not a Humean causal relation. The relationship between cause and effect need not be a logical relationship, but the relationship between action and intention is

2L0

connected logically. For this reason, some philosophers have

attempted to distinguish cause from reason. Frederick Stoutland labels this attempt to clarifu the relationship

between cause and reason "the logical connection argument."2a It implies the existence of a conceptual link between an intention and an action.

The difficulty of practical syllogism is that it is possible for us to choose action a to achieve either desire P or desire Q. If P-a and Q-c both satisfy the principle of rationality, then it is not easy to determine, based only on the observation of action a, whether the agent desired P or desired Q.

The Logic of Explanation: The Covering-Law Model

While methodological dualists assert that we should admit the uniqueness of individual life-worlds and that they should be anallzed through the method of Nacherleben, monists argue that all facts can be understood in terms of nomological explanations. Monists, owing to the great development of the natural sciences, believe that science aims to discover the relationships of cause and effect between variables, and based on its discoveries, to explain previous events and predict future events. They argue that insofar as human and social sciences are classified as science, their purpose is not much different from that of the natural sciences. Their argument is as follows: [n the social sciences, it is difficult to discuss cause and effect due to certain limitations. For example, a specific social phenomenon might occur too infrequently to provide a

zLL

decent statistical analysis. For instance, if one were to establish a wriversal theory about social revolution, it would follow that statistical analysis is difficult since revolutions are infrequent occurrences in history and also because each revolution possesses unique characteristics. However, even if this is the case, it is still true that the ultimate aim of such studies is to discover a universal law regarding the objects of study.

Carl Hempel is the person who established this theory in a most elaborate way. Hempel's central claim is that even though the historian understands history by different methods, in the end, the historian explains a historical event in exactly the same way that natural science explains the events of the physical world. To prove this, Hempel divides natural scientific explanation into two basic models: the deductive-nomological explanation and the inductive-statistical explanation. Then, he suggests two basic models of historical explanation: developmental explanation and motivational explanation. He then proves that these two models of historical explanation are really nomological or statistical explanations, just like in natural science.2s The term "covering-law model" was first used by William H. Dray to designate this theory.

Deducrtve-No n o logical

Ery lan ation

The deductive-nomological explanation is a method in which a phenomenon is subsumed under a universal law. This takes an argumentational form. The explanans consists of a series of universal hypotheses and statements that assert

212

a specific event, and all the statements in the explanans should be empirically well defined; the explanandum must be logically deduced from the explanans. Hempel's wellknown formalization of the logic of explanation is shown in Figure

13.26

C, Lt Lz ...... L'

Ct Ct ......

Explanans-sentence

."r*,

deduction

J E

Explanadum-sentence

Figure I 3. Deductive-nomo logical

exp

lanation

The phrase "deductive-nomological explanation" is used because this explanation only deduces the explanandum E by general law. In other words, this explanation shows that event E results from special individual conditions Ct ,Cz , ... Ch according to various laws, and L r , L z , ... Lk. Of course, the object of explanation could be either a particular fact or a general law. The explanation of a general law is deduced from a more comprehensive law. For example, if we deduce the law of free fall from the law of universal gravity, we thereby explain it.

I n du ctive -S t ati s t ic a I E xp I a n at i o n In deductive-nomological explanation, the various laws and principles take on a strictly universal form. According to such explanations, the same incident will occur whenever

certain conditions are met. 213

In

contrast,

the

second

explanatory model of science takes a probabilistic-statistical form. That is to say, given that specific conditions are met, a certain statistical probability exists that a certain type of

will

occur. Unlike the deductive-nomological explanatiorL in the inductive-statistical explanation, the event

results from a set of conditions do not necessarily occur but

are only given a high probability

of

occurring. This is

expressed in Figure 14:

F : Initial Conditions P(O, F) is very high: Statistical law

.'. O: Explanandum Figure I 4. Inductive-Statistical Explanation

Of course, statistical explanation is also nomological because it is based upon general laws. However, since this law takes a statistical rather than a universal forrn, the resulting explanation is inductive rather than deductive. This sort of inductive explanation attempts to show that a future event has a high probability of occurring on the basis of a statistical laur.21 Here also, the laws play a significant role. Hempel attempts to prove that these two models of natural science also apply to historical explanations. According to Hempel, explanations by economic factors, by general principles of social or culrural changes, or by psychological generalizations are all nomological despite not taking a clear-cut form.

2L4

Hempel tries to validate his logic by analyzing the structure of "developmental explanation" and "explanation by motivational reason," both of which historians frequently use. Developmental explanation, as its name suggests, explains a specific event in terrns of developmental stages. This method of explanation is generally known as a unique explanation method of history, as it explains an event through the historical developmental process of it. Hempel claims that this tlpe of explanation is essentially based upon a nomological explanation. He takes the history of the sales of indulgences in the time of Martin Luther as an example. The historical facts are as follows:

The history of selling indulgences originated in the ninth century. The Pope at that time was involved in a holy war with the Muslims. The Christian soldiers who were fighting in foreign lands had no access to priests or confessionals, and were afraid they would be

if they did not confess their sins before they died. To assuage their worries, Pope John VII promised to absolve the crusaders of their sins through the process of creating a Papal abandoned to spend eternity in hell

Bull that granted indulgences.2s

How is this account of the sale of indulgences based upon a nomological explanation? According to Hernpel, a developmental explanation should dernonstrate that each

2L5

step is followed by the next step, which is then connected to

the following step by a general law that allows at least a probability for the latter to occur. In the example, this general law is suggested as a psychological generalization to explain the interests of the Pope in saving and preserving military sfre,ngth. A variety of general assumptions about the fear of purgatory explains the appeal of indulgences to Christians.2e

Hernpel does not refer in detail to the general law demonstrated in this example. Judging from his arguments, it might be formalized as follows: "All Christian Popes who fight against Muslims always (or with high probability) wish

Christians to fight without fear of death." Also, "All Christians always (or with high probability) wish to be redeemed, on account of fear of purgatory." This situation could be also expressed in a different form. However, the cental point Hempel wishes to convey is that the same historical events may happen anytime and anywhere if the same conditions are obtained, rather than being unique events. This is similar to the way in whiclU any time a rock falls, it falls under specific conditions according to the laws of motion, and any time an egg hatches, it hatches into a chick under specific biochernical conditions. In the end, physical and historical events fall under the same law. This can be expressed by the following formula: "lf a has personality taits ofp, e, andr, then given condition b, a will always (or with high probability) perform c."

It

remains to be proved that the explanation by motivational reason, which is the explanation of an action in

2L6

terms of rational factors, is based upon a nomological explanation. Here, rational factors indicate the aims that agents hope to achieve and the means that the agent believes will make them possible. First of all, Hempel takes Dray's argument as an example, which happens to express a method almost identical to Collingwood's.

According to Dray, "rational explanation is to show rational factors, and to recalculate the ways and means which the agent selected, in view of the current situation, in order to achieve the chosen goal.'030 This does not subsume objects of explanation under a general law, but it demonstrates a variety of reasons for why something has been done. Thus, it has the characteristic of a behavior assessment, which demonstrates that what has been performed is appropriate or justified. This can be formalized as follows:

(A)

A should do x under the following tlpes of situations, Ct, Cz, ... Cn.

Hanpel tries to analyze this in detail, and insists that this argument has: (l) the goal that an agent intends to achieve; (2) empirical situations that he sees and actions that he performs; and (3) ethical standards or principles of concrete actions that the agent has performed, which are all implied as fundamental elements. For the question of why agent A performs x,Dray aruiwers as follows:

2L7

(B)

(l) A was in a situation of type C; (2) The appropriate thing to do in a situation of type C isx.

However, Hempel argues that this tpe of explanation is not able to show why A actually did x. This is because the above two statements offer good reasons to believe that the appropriate thing for A to do is "r, but they do not prove whether A actually did x. According to Hempel,

it is not clear what "the thing that is to be explained"

means

in Dray's rational explanation. As Dray himself pointed out, the expression of "what should be done" functions as a form of "evaluative language." However, from a logical point of view, the evaluative principle expressed by the second sentence of (B) cannot be derived from the first sentence, which is merely empirical and non-evaluative. To explain that A actually did x, descriptive claims such as "A was a rational agent" or "A has a personality that behaves reasonably at such times" should be given, rather than normative claims. Moreover, a type of law should be presupposed that states something like: "In a situation of tlpe C, a reasonable agent always or with high probability performs.r." Thus, Hempel presents the following formula:

2L8

(c)

(l) A was in a "type C" situation; (2) A has the personality to behave reasonably;

(3) Anyone who habitually behaves

reasonably

always (or with high probability) performs x in a "rype C" situation.3l

In this formula, "that A performs x" is based upon a deductive-nomological explanation or statistical explanation, and therefore, this explanation falls into one of the nomological explanatory models of natural science. Nevertheless, the coveringJaw model reveals some problems that the major premise (l) of the argument (C) is not clear. In this argument (C), "A was in a 'type C' situation" is described by external observation. However, the act of an agent is not directly related to the objective situation but to subjective judgment which means what the

agent understands things in the objective situation. It is considered common practice that each of two agents will understand things differently in the same situation.

Therefore,

the

argument

(C),

centered

on

external

observation, is not justified all of the time.

Understanding and Explanation

We may wonder whether human action is an object of understanding or an object of explanation. This question has a long history, and the debate is ongoing. The key concepts

219

of

understanding are the spirit (intention) and empathy, while those of explanation are law and subsumption.

It seems clear that an intentional action is not a physical simple incident since it belongs to a higher category of the conscious world that is not reducible to physical processes. Intention is revealed by actions, but it is not itself the object of direct obsenration. Instead, it is natural to require understanding if we are to comprehend intentions. However, the biggest problem facing understanding is that understanding does not appear to be able to yield objective knowledge. To solve this problem, Dilthey proposes the objective mind, which is the basis for our common understanding and enables us to secure objectivity. The theory of the objective mind appears both reasonable and persuasive, for objectivity of understanding appears to be guaranteed by the fact that people live in communities with the same traditions and education. However, the concept of the objective mind remains somewhat vague, for it is not easy to determine its extension. Also, the objective mind seems to vary according to temporal and spatial distances, such as differences in historical periods or geographical communities. How, then, can we say that understanding through this objective mind yields objective knowledge? The logic of explanation is a great counterargument to this. According to the logic of explanation, the purpose of science is to establish laws. Thereforg when science describes individual events, it does not pay attention to individual characteristics but rather treats them as instances of a certain law. The classification of individual events is a

220

necessary process in establishing universal laws. The process of explanation operates in the opposite direction to the process of establishing a law, as it is a process of subsuming an individual event under an established law. Here, the explanation obtains objectivity in the same degree, because the law itself is objective. Moreover, upon observing a person's intentional action, one may ask what

the agent's intention is and why the intention came to be. Explanation tries to provide answers for such questions. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether explanation can completely replace understanding. Intentions are not objects

of direct observation, ild the

autonomous

and

comprehensive world of consciousness operates according to the principle of rationality rather than laws.

Aristotle famously claimed that causal questions about natural beings can be divided into four q/pes. His four causes are:

(l) What is the thing made from? (the material

cause); (2) What is its essence? (the formal cause); (3) What

brought it into being? (the effrcient cause); and (4) What purpose is it for? (the final cause). In other words, everything is a composite of form and material that came into being on account of some specific action and that has a specific purpose. Thus, answers to these questions will involve descriptions of materials, essential definitions, explanations in terms of cause and effect, and explanations of purpose. Although in Aristotle's philosophy the most important causes were the formal and the final ones, they have been replaced by the importance of the material and the effrcient causes in the development of experimental natural

221

science. Essential definitions and final causes were reduced

to causal explanations. Therefore, those who argue for a unification of all sciences believe that everything can be explained solely by causal explanations. In contrast, those who argue for the independence of the human sciences attempt to adopt teleological explanations, which deal with the intentions or purposes of actions, as the methodology of the human sciences. Regarding the creation of nature, we are unable to ask for more than just the causes inherent in nature

itsell but in the case of culture or historical

phenomena, it is possible to ask for the human intentions or purposes behind the actual phenomena.

lt seems quite diflicult to understand human action completely excluding intentions. trntention-based explanations therefore appear inevitable. Nevertheless, it is diffrcult to understand the intention directly from all different situations, as some theorists insist. [n complex situations, one can only guess intentions through inference. In any case, understanding the intention behind a specific action does not simultaneously yield an explanation of why

that intention occurred. The traditional advocates of understanding claim that if the intention is already understood, then no further explanation is required. However, it is reasonable to hold that an understanding of a particular intention does not automatically imply the reason for which that intention exists. Mor@ver, actions can always cause unintended results. In these cases, it is reasonable that

explanation takes

on central importance, rather than

understanding.

222

If this limiation is added to the taditional view, then understanding and explanation are placed in a supplementary relationship rather than a conflicting one. I discuss this further in Chapter I

l.

223

11

Rltronll Exrllxetlox Ornn,rtes oN

UNDERSTANDING

In this chapter, I discuss how historical science should be an explanatory science and why the qpe of explanation involved in this science should be the rational explanatory model.rAt first this might seem excessively positivistic to those who maintain that there is a conflict between "explanation" and "understanding" based on the uniqueness of historical science, and also to those who emphasize the classification of sciences based on episternic interests. However, this chapter aims to accept both the hermeneutical tradition and the merits of explanatory science.

First, we can classify our knowledge into lcnowing how ard lonwing that.2 Further subdivision is possible. For instance, our knowing that it is hot today differs from our knowing why it is hot today. The same logic applies not only to natural events, but also to cultural events. The answer to the question "What is the content of this work?" differs from the answer to "How was this work possible?" Similarly, the answer to "What is the function of this particular system?" diffem from the answer to "Why did this particular system come about?" We label the former "descriptive knowledge" and the latter "explanatory knowledge." Explanatory questions about cultural events may not be answered as

225

accurately as those concerning nafural events. However, it does not seem that studying such questions is blocked from the onset or is dependent upon particular interests.

Descriptive Knowledge and Explanatory Knowledge

Natural scientists generally consider explanatory knowledge to be superior to descriptive knowledge. They believe that the knowledge of a fact or event is completed only when one knows why the fact or event happened. This attitu{e is significantly related to the beliefs that "knowledge is powed' and "knowledge is control." To people in this school of thought, descriptive knowledge is merely a preliminary for explanatory knowledge. Those who insist on the uniqueness ofcultural events assert that cultural science cannot be an explanatory science, only a descriptive science. This argument is based upon multiple reasons. First, cultural events are the products of free human activity, and all such events are the results of unique actions and have unique characteristics. It is unreasonable to give a nomological explanation to these unique products based on a determinist

worldview. Second, cultural phenomena

are

the

materializations of meanings. To understand this, we need special epistemic processes called Vers tehen (understanding), which is distinct from sensory perceptions. Here, our purpose is fulfilled when the understanding of this meaning has been achieved.

This view has been supported by people who emphasize the autonomy of the human mind, and it has led to the demand for the authenticity of descriptive science 226

instead of explanatory science. Hence, Wilhelm Windelband insisted on the idiographic method (idiographische methode)

of cultural science as opposed to the nomothetic

method

(nomothetische methode) of the natural sciences.3

explanation is originally the answer to the question "Why necessarily so?" The most important thing in such explanations is the role played by laws, since we explain by subsuming the object of explanation under a law. o'coveringThus, Dray called this form of explanation the law model."a

An

My

satisfu the needs of both understanding and explanation is: (l) to make the strategy

to

understanding as objective as possible, and (2) to diversify the laws used in explanation. I will refer to this as "explanatory hermeneutics."

The Rational-Explanatory Model

The rational-explanatory model is built upon the following theses. First, all cultural events are the creations of humans. Cultural events that were not created by individual subjects can still be considered the creations of a group of individual subjects. Second, individuals (or a group of individuals) understand and act rationally. Third, the actions of individuals or the results of such actions are simultaneously objects of both understanding and explanation. When we study the historical world, we encounter the following question. The historical world is created by the human mind, and the human mind is free, for it is not

227

govemd by the laws of natural science. The

products

created by this free mind possess meaning or value, each

of

which exists as uniquely individual. Thus, the historical world differs from the natural world. If this is the case, then how might the historical world be the object of rational explanation?

We must first admit that the cultural world is not the object of sensory perception like the natural world is; rather, it is the object of understanding. Thus, we accept the inevitability of hermeneutics, but hermeneutics should be completely objective if it is to become an academic methodology. When discussing the problem of urderstanding, it is convenient to classify understanding as either subjectivist

or objectivist understanding. Wright classified understanding into semantic and empathic forms,s Empathic understanding is the understanding that occurs when we reflect upon our own emotional response to some expression. For instance, we express various emotions and impressions with our own voice. We may understand the emotions of others from the impressions created by their voices because we reflect our own emotional responses onto thern. Many theorists define understanding in this way, characterizing it as ernpathy, intuitive identification, or imaginative reenactment. Popper said that this understanding of subjective experience is of the objects of World 2. Objective understanding is different. [t is not related to the subjective experience of agents; it is related to dealing with objects of Popper's World 3, According to critical understanding

228

rationalism, which aims to establish objective understanding, what is "essential is not the re-enactment but the situational analysis."6

The limitations of subjective understanding are obvious. It is diffrcult to reenact the experiences of other subjects (especially when they are artistic works or heroic deeds), and impossible to properly verify the validity of understanding. For these reasons, positivists such as Carl Hempel, Ernest Nagel, and Theodore Abel regarded understanding as a mere supplementary means for scientific explanation. Abel considered understanding to be an act of

interpolation. 7 Suppose, for example, that when the temperature suddenly falls, one's neighbor arises from his desk, cuts down a tree, and burns the wood in his fireplace. We naturally assume that he is trying to warm his room because it is cold. This assumption is an act of understanding. The logical characteristic of understanding is that it reaches a certain law of action by the internalization of said action. However, insofar as this law of action is hypothetical and yet to be objectively verified, understanding does not possess methodological characteristics that can be distinguished from causal explanation; it is merely a part that enables the logical manipulation of explanation.

Objective understanding can be defined in a radically different way. This is the trace of the process of problemsolving, and the rational reconstruction of the objects of World 3. The theory of critical rationalism regards culture as the result of human activity solving particular problems. The

229

relationship between problems and their solutions is a logical and objective relationship that belongs to World 3. Therefore, the method for understanding this process can be suggested in accordance with the general formula of problem-solving. What is problern-solving in the broad sense? We face some problerns, for example, when we seek to understand the range of selection, to solve a scientific paradox, or to determine the most efficient method available. Cognition in the absence of problems cannot exist, for all cognitive systems or scientific explanations are attempts to solve problerns. Works of art can be explained in the same way. All living organisms perpetually focus their attention on problem-solving, and the problerns they solve have objective meaning that may later be reconstructed hlpothetically. Problem-solving always takes the course of trial and error. New modes of behavior and new hlpotheses are continually tried, and are controlled through the removal

oferrors.

If human actions

are essentially attempts at problem-

solving, then we may understand the process and result of these attempts by tracing how the agent realizes the problem and how he or she attempts to solve it. Popper said that this is a meta-problem. 8 It involves discovering what the problern is, what the tentative hlpothesis or critical test is, and what the new problem is. Thus, the process of understanding is the secondary tracking and reconstruction of the problem-solving process on the objective level. Finally, the following formalization is possible:e

230

(A) Problem-solving process on the objective level:

@=- tentative --- critical test + Problematic

Problematic situation hypothesis

situation @

(A') Problem-solving

process at the level

of

understanding:

Problematic situation of understanding O-' tentative hypothesis of understanding --critical test of understanding Problematic situation of understandlng @

Popper elaborately explained this process of understanding by situational logic.ro Situational logic is a means of establishing some kind of tentative or assumptive hlpothesis about human actions that an agent performs in a situation. Popper stated:

It

may be a historical explanation: we may perhaps wish to explain how and why a

certain strucfure of ideas was created. Admittedly, no creative action can ever be fully explained. Nevertheless, we can try, conjecturally, to give an idealized reconstruction of the problem situation in which the agent found himself, and to that extent make the action "understandable" (or "rationally understandable"), that is to say,

231

to his situation as he saw it. This method of situational analysis may be described as an application of the rationality adequate

principle.rr

Situational logic assumes humans to be rational, and thus applies the principle of rationality to human action.

Situational logic has two basic aspects. The first concerns the tlpe of situation, and the second is the principle of rationality. The former consists of a detailed description

of the situation that is to be solved by the agent. However, this description is never a psychological method. The analysis of a situation analyzes things that are prima facie psychological factors, such as desire, memory, and association, and transforms them into sinrational factors. As

a result, one who desires something is identified with one who pursues a goal, and one who has memory or association is identified with one who has bean given information. The principle of rationality is a principle that allows a reasonable understanding of actions in the situation. From this principle, it is possible to rationally deduce that anyone who is in a situation of tlpe A will perform P.r2This is formalized as follows: nomological

(B) O A is in

a

"Type C" situation.

@ One always acts reasonably (the principle

of rationality).

232

@ The reasonable selection to be done in a "Type C" situation is q.

.'. Therefore, g exists.

Situational logic seems to be identical to Hempel's explanatory model. The type of situation is the same as the statement of initial condition, and the principle of rationality is the same as theoretical laws.l3 The principle of rationality is therefore used as the major premise of a deductive explanation. The agent's action is deductively derived from the principle of rationality. If situational logic is the same as the deductive-nomological explanatory model, shouldn't historical science accept the nomological explanatory model? At the same time, is the creation of the free human mind thus excluded?

For these questions, the following answers are available. trn situational logic, the principle of rationality performs a similar function to Hempel's laws, but it is not an empirical law. It is an a priori principle that functions as a

methodological postulate in the study of human activity. This methodological postulate enables a scientist to analyze an agent's action by justifying the action to be appropriate for the situation of the agent. 14 Thus, the principle of rationality is not incompatible with the freedom of human mind.

What

is the difference between

considering the principle of rationality to be an a priori principle and considering it to be an empirical law? Let us apply this to

233

of scientific research. Empiricists accept the rationality of scientific practice as the standard for the process

explaining events in the history of science. From this point of view, the actions of scientists in the past might be seen as irrational. Good examples are Newton's studies of astrology and Biblical prophecy. Yet, if we shift our position to

apriorism, we may see the sifuation as they understood it, and thus accept the past practice as rational. Let us take Galileo's theory of tides as an example.ls According to Popper's account, Galileo held that the tide is a result of acceleration, which is in turn the result of

complicated movements of the Earth. This theory was deemed false on the grounds that it denied the well-known lunar influence on tides. What should we do to understand Galileo's theory of tides? We must first ask: With what World 3 problem was Galileo concerned? In other words, what was the situation in which this problem arose? Galileo's problem was to explain the occurrence of tides. Yet Galileo was not interested in that particular problem but attempted to use tidal theory as decisive evidence in favor of Copernicus's view of the solar system. Given that fact, why did Galileo deny the well-known lunar influence on tides? He did so for the following re".ons: First, he opposed the astological claim that meteors were gods; second, he explained rotary motion of the Earth using the conservation principle of dynamics, which appeared to exclude the influence of meteors. Even though his theory turned out to be false, it was a reasonable conjecture; thus, Galileo was neither an irrationalist nor a dogmatist.

234

This logic of rational explanation is applicable not only to scientific studies but also to the understanding of art and the history of art. I,et us review Popper's reconstruction of the history of art from post-knpressionism to the emergence of contemporary art. To understand this process, we need to understand the problem that Impressionist artists were attempting to solve. Impressionists made a strict distinction between "knowing" an object by scrutinizing it for a long time and "seeing" it instantaneously through the reflection of light. The impressionists attempted to capture the "seeing" of objects by recreating the play of light as it occurred at a particular moment of sight. They attempted to paint the impression of the light reflected from the object rather than the object itself. However, this led to the realization that the world as we see it is higtrly uncertain due to the constant change in lighting conditions. Moreover, not only was it found to be extremely difficult to recreate the moment of sight, it was also discovered that "seeing" itself is only one option among various possible interpretations. Thus, these painters faced the problem that it was impossible to clearly distinguish "the world as seen" from "the world as known." Artists such as Cdzanne, Van Gogh, and Gauguin were obsessed with finding the solution to this problem.16 Such interpretations of art history are opposed to the

holistic view on art history, which suggests that art develops autonomously according to its own internal developmental law, and that the transformation of styles can also be explained by the impulses within artistic styles themselves. This holistic view is based upon historicism. Meanwhile, situational logic interprets the appearance of new art styles

235

as attempts to solve proble'ms issued from previous sryles and does not appeal to some mysterious or supematural power that guides the development of art. From this perspective, the birth of new styles of art is the result of a continuous exercise in problem-solving.

Nevertheless, situational logic as suggested by Popper has its defeats. The premise @ in argument (B) above is problematic. That is, the reasonable selection to be made in a "Type C" situation depends on how a person subjectively understands the "Typ" C" situation. In conclusion, on argument (B), "Therefore, 4 exists," is not always tnre.

Than, even if we take the principle of rationality for a regulative postulate by Popper rather than an empirical law by Hempel, there still remains a gap between the subjective understanding and the objective observation of specific situations.

Comprehensive Rationality

We may classify rationality into two categories: (l) the rationality of beliefs, and (2) the rationality of actions. A rational belief is a belief that is based on available evidence and keeps internal coherence. In other words, it is supported by evidance and does not imply self-contradiction. Rational activity is the activity of setting appropriate goals and seeking to fulfill those goals efficiently. At the same time, it is the action of balancing one's purpose with one's belief or evaluation.

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So far, we have conducted our discussion of rationality by focusing on the rationality of actions. However, it may be insufficient to explain actions solely in terms of the rationality of actions. Human actions are not based upon an objective situation; rather, they are based on the agent's subjective understanding of an objective situation. Thus, how the agent understands the situation is most important in the explanation of actions. If the agent's understanding of the situational factors were different-that is to say, if the agent had different beliefs-he or she might act differently.

How might we make assumptions about the way others understand their world and the belief systems they have? Should we say that everyone perceives situations differently, or should we assume that all individuals are capable of rational belief?

The principle of charity, os suggested by Donald Davidson, is an extremely useful a priori principle that we can adopt to solve this problem. Davidson's principle is that we must assume that another person shares most parts of desires and beliefs with us if we are to understand other people's speech and actions as expressions of subjects. In Davidson's words, "The method is rather one of getting a best fit."17 In other words, this principle is the policy we use to maximize or optimize our agreement with the speaker as we interpret their speech. Alexander Callinicos referred to this as the "rationality of interpretation of action."lE When we interpret the rationality of human actions or cultural phenomena as a comprehensive one that includes

237

rationalities in both interpretation and action, the possibility of objective explanation is secured. Therefore, (B) should be modified as follows:

(c) O A is in

a

"Type C" situation.

@ One always cognizes and acts reasonably principle comprehensive rationality).

(the

of

@ The rational choice

in a "Type C" situation

is q.

.'. Therefore, q exists.

In argument.(C), the premise O "One always cognizes and acts reasonably (the principle of comprehensive rationality)" is the most important. This is an a priori principle rather than an empirical law.

In its functional aspects, the principle of comprehensive rationality is similar to the objective mind of Dilthey, who

aimed to guarantee objectivity in

hermeneutical

understanding. It only expresses the objective mind in rational aspects. Based on these reasons, I conclude that rational explanation eventually has to operate on hermeneutical understanding.

238

t2 SuppnvBuENCE Explatxs BorH

SocLlt SrRucrunns lnp MlcRo-Hrsronrcll Ln ws

We often categorize the structure of our societies into superstructure and base, explaining the superstructure by means of the base and explaining macroscopic historical laws by means of the laws of micro-scale action.l If so, what is the relationship between superstructure and base, and between microscopic and macroscopic laws?

A popular claim is that the base is the determinant of the superstrucfure. According to Marxism, the economy, which is the primary base of a society, determines the political or cultural superstructure. However, the superstructure sometimes affects the base. How can this be explained?

In a similar context, metaphysicians of history have attempted to answer fundamental questions such as "What is

the ultimate goal of history?" and "ls history the result of contingent, individual decisions, or is it controlled by divine providence or some law of fate that supersedes the free will of individuals?" Some historians consider the history of mankind as a

long scenario that develops according to a plot, much like a

239

Shakespearean play. They also interpret history as

a living

organism that goes through the periods of birth, growttr, and death. According to this view, there is a law or rhyhm of life that controls the historical process, and we could foresee

how the future will develop if we discovered this law or rhythm. The idea of such a law is suflicient to attract our interest, for we are all curious about the future, and knowledge of the urtirety of human history would ultimately lead to knowledge of the essence and meaning of human lives.

We shall explain the

relationship

between

superstmcture and base, and between macroscopic and microscopic laws, using "the supervenience theory," which is a recent discussion in the philosophy of mind. There are two benefits of applying the supervenience theory to the explanation of social structure: (l) it provides the best explanation of the relationship between superstruoture and base, and (2) it gives us a standard with which to distinguish the truth or falsity of a theory.

The Concept of Supervenience When the term "supetrene" was first used in the seventeenth

century, it meant that when an event was given, there was another event that was added to it. It usually referred to the supervenience between events with temporal implication, which meant that the supervaning event followed the given event as its result. In contemporary usage, "supervenience'o is mostly used to indicate a dependent relationship benreen properties, mainly within discussions of moral philosophy.

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George E. Moore did not use the term "supervenience" himself, but he did describe the dependent relationship between moral and non-moral properties, which has an equivalent meaning to "supervenience":

The second part of what is meant is that if a given thing possesses any kind of intrinsic value in a certain degree, then not only must that same thing possess it, under all circumstances, in the same degree, but also anything exactly like it, must, under all circumstances, possess it in exactly the same degree.2

Richard M. Hare first used "supervenience" as a philosophical term to indicate the dependent relationship between nafural and moral properties. 3 For instance: Suppose A is a "good" person; if B acts the same as A in the same situation, then we should also consider B to be a "good" person. Similarly, if we define a "virtuous" person as brave, benevolent, and honest, then all people who are brave, benevolent, and honest are virtuous.

The concept of "supervenience" was not derived solely from moral philosophy. Emergent evolutionists and their critics used the term earlier, and moral philosophers including R. M. Hare seem to have borrowed the term from the emergent evolution th*ry.t According to the ernergent evolution theory, once basic physical and chemical

24L

processes reach a sufficiently complicated level, completely

new properties (such as mental properties) will emerge. Emergent evolution was discussed in biology, psychology, and sociology in the 1920s and 1930s. The central aim of the

theory was

to counter anti-naturalistic theories such as

Canesianism and vitalism, and also to oppose mechanical reductivism while suggesting a plausible naturalistic alternative. The supervenience theory also rejects both extreme materialism and mind-body dualism while attempting to propose a plausible materialistic alternative. Thus, it can be said that emergent evolution and the supervodence theory share the same context. Emergent evolution can be formalized as follows:

(l)

There are basic non-emergent existenceso which are material existences and their physical properties.

(2) When

a

basic existence reaches a sufficient level of complication, new

properties emerge. They are properties or characteristics that are attributed to the sum total of basic existences within suitable relationships.

(3)

Emergurt properties cannot be reductively explained by their basic properties.s

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The supervenience theory is quite similar to the theory of emergent evolution, for it also argues that (l) material existences and their properties are basic; (2) based on the basic existences, emergent properties such as mental and moral properties are supervened; and (3) these supervenient properties cannot be reductively explained by materialistic properties.

One recent discussion of

supervenience is

Davidson's essay "Mental Events," in which he argues:

Although the position I describe denies there are psychophysical laws, it is consistent with the view that mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on physical characteristics. Such supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental resp@t, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in some physical respect. Dependence or supervenience of this kind does not entail reducibility through law or definition.6

Davidson suggested that "supervenience" has two meanings. One is "dependence relation," and the other is "nonreductive relation." His supervenience theory is specified in his theory of "anomalous monism," which

243

suggests that mental properties depend on physical properties. However, there is no law that connects mental properties with physical properties, which makes it impossible to reduce mental properties to physical properties. Jaegwon

Kim developed a more refined conception

of supervenience:

([) Covariance: supervenient

properties

change along with their base. This implies

that what is not distinguished among basic properties is thereby not distinguished in the supervenient properties.

(2) Dependency: supervenient properties depend on, or are defined by, their basic properties.

(3) Non-reducibility: supervenient properties are not reducible to basic properties.T

If we define M as the relative set of supervenient properties, P as the relative set ofbasic properties, and x and y as objects, then M supervenes on P ifand only ifin any possible world x and y share P, then x and y also share M.

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The Relationship between Base and Superstructure in Marxism Base and superstructure are a core pair in Karl Marx's theory of society. The base indicates the economic sffucture as the material foundation, while the superstructure indicates all non-economic structures or systems, such as the structures of law, politics, religion, art, and philosophy:

Human society has a material base which is

comprised of the productive forces and relations of production associated with those forces. This is economic structure. And all of the rest that is not economic base makes the superstructure.E

What is the relationship between these two structures, and what did Marx attempt to explain by distinguishing the

two? As its name implies, the superstructure is a structure constructed upon a base. However, this idea of being constructed upon a base can be interpreted in nvo ways. The first is that the base determines the superstructure. This can be called "economic determinism," which means that economic structures determine all non-economic structures, such as politics, art, etc., while these non-economic structures have no authentic causal power. That is to say that the economic aspect holds complete dominance over the non-economic, and all maffers of social life are effects resulting from economic causes. According to this view, all

245

social phenomena can be reduced to economic phenomenq regarding all social phenomena as the blproduct of

economic activities. The second interpretation is that the base affects the superstructure, and in turn the superstructure has a secondary effect on the base. According to this interpretation, it is true that the influence of the base is primary and essential to the superstructure but it is not denied that the superstructure has a secondary function or role to the base. These interpretations are respectively labeled "@onomic determinism" and "interactionism."

Mamists have long held that the original interpretation of Marxism is economic determinism. However, this view faces the difficulty that economic determinism cannot fully explain historical reality. That is to say, there are many cases in reality where the superstructure is not a mere blproduct. There are many instances where

in

political structure or morality has led to transformations in economic stnrctures. Typical examples change

are countries that

adopted

a form of

"top-down modernization" as well as the central theme of Max Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalisn. Moreover, economic determinism cannot even explain the history of communist revolution. Mamist ideas had enofinous effects immediately prior to the Russian Revolution, such as: "Workers of all lands, unite! Proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win!"e Such ideas ended up significantly affecting economic conditions. Even Marx himself mentioned the active influence of superstucture several times. Consequently, it follows that we have no choice but to accept interactionism as the proper

246

interpretation

of the relationship between base and

superstrucfure.lo

The base can be funher classified into "forces of

production" classification

and "relations of production." This resembles the relationship of base and

superstructure. "Forces of production" refers to the power to

produce goods by processing nature. "Relations of production" indicates the social relationship between participants in the process of production. Traditional revolutionists argue that the relations are superior to the forces. This means that a change in the relations of production causes a change in the forces of production. However, this interpretation carulot explain why the forces of production did not increase when socialist revolutions were successful and the relations of productions were completely transformed. Many examples can be found in the vicious cycle of third-world revolutions and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

ln contrast, there are many cases in which changes in the forces of production have affected the relations of production. Marx himself predicted that as the forces of production developed in capitalist societies they would inevitably transform into socialist societies. Therefore, it is needless to persist in determinism; rather, we should accept interactionism, which affrrms the influence that both the forces and relations ofproduction have on each other.

247

Macro-Historical Laws and the Critiques

of

Anti-

Historicism Now, let us turn to the issue of historical laws. There are two kinds of laws that historians have used to explain historical events. The first are the ernpirical laws that diverse individual sciences have established, such as the laws of the natural and social sciences. Historians have not attempted to establish these laws themselves. Instead, they have tried to explain individual historical events using the empirical laws that other scientists have established. For example, if a historian tries to explain the defeat of a revolution using inferior physical forces, the explanatory method will be as follows:

(Premise l): Revolutions cannot succeed without suffrcient physical forces. (Premise 2): The Spartacus Rebellion lacked suflicient physical forces.

(Conclusion): Therefore,

the

Spartacus

Rebellion could not succeed.

Premise I is a sociological law established by sociologists. Historians, especially positivists, make extensive use of this law, and therefore historians are merely consumers and not producers of such laws in this context. There are other types of laws that historians usFnamely, the tlpe that is quite different from the empirical

248

law; this type of law is called "the laws of history" by historians. Such laws are not borrowed from other individual sciences; rather, historians or philosophers of history argue that they themselves have discovered them. Examples of these laws include Hegel's three-step law of development and Marx's five-step law of development.

Hegel considered world history to be the progress of free consciousness, and insisted that history develops from the freedom of one person to that of a few and eventually to

of all people. Marx suggested a five-step developmental law of history based upon his historical materialism, in which society develops from primitive

the freedom

communism to the ancient slave-holding society and then to feudalism, capitalism, and finally to communism. Comte, considering the history of humanity to be a development of intelligence, suggested that human history has gone through three stages: the theological, the metaphysical, and finally the positivistic stage. Macro-historical law

Historical stage I

Historical stage 2

Figure

15.

Historical stage 3

Macro-histoical law

These historical laws are also known as laws of social evolution because they all define social development as a gradual escalation from low to higher levels, and these laws have led society consecutively from one level to the next as follows, in Figure 15.

249

Historical laws do not refer solely to laws regarding social transformations. Other than these laws that are applicable to the entire historical world, there are laws that are applicable to a certain nation, ethnic group, or civilization. In this case, the subject unit of history is not the entire human race but a specific nation, ethnic group, or civilization, and it follows these macroscopic historical laws. For example, according to Vico, all ethnic groups evolve from the Age of God through the Age of Heroes to the Age of Men. Toynbee specified 2l civilizations in human history and argued that they were all subject to birtt5 growth, and death. Oswald Spengler, in The Decline of the West, diagnosed the end of human history based upon a law which he believed governed the growth and death of civilizations. Such arguments are based upon the claim that the life cycle of bir0r-growth-death does not apply only to animals and plants, but can also be applied to nations, ethnic groups, and civilizations. These historical laws are quite different from the previously mentioned. While the previously mentioned laws are concerned with only the single history of the entire human race, the latter laws govern many different historical processes of diverse people or civilizations. Nevertheless, both tlpes are considered to be macroscopic laws of history because they are beyond our nornal observation. Even though these laws are applied to repetitive instances, the cases in question are too vast to be verified or falsified. Hence, these historical laws have to be distinguished from the empirical laws established by the individual sciences

250

since these are

in the normal scope that can be verified or

falsified. Popper, who is an anti-historicist, argued that the Hegelian and Mamist developmental laws were not "laws that tumed out to be false," but in fact were not laws at all in the first place. A law refers to a regularity that affects a specific class of object; however, if we are limited to a single observation, it is impossible to discover any regularity. Furthermore, Popper held historical determinism to

be a derivation of evolutionism and denied the law of evolution as suggested by evolutionism. His reasons were as follows: The evolution of life on Earth or of human society is a unique historical prc)cess, and these processes do not

follow one unified law; they are a collaboration of diverse laws taking eflect together. For example: If species .,4 evolves into species B, we may describe this process by causation. However, it is not the case that one single law is in charge of the entire event, since the event is a consequence of a various number of laws all taking part, including dynamics, chemistry, genetics, natural selection, and so forth. Therefore, Popper asserted that neither laws

regarding evolution nor those regarding social transformation exist. He did not, of course, deny the evolutionary phenomena that occur in the actual world; he only opposed the nomological point of view that suggests there is a single law that governs the entire process of evolution. He argued:

25L

What we call the evolutionary hlpothesis is an explanation of a host of biological and paleontological observatiorr-for instance, of certain similarities between various species and general4y the assumption of the common ancestry of related forms. This hlpothesis is not a universal law, even though certain universal laws of nature, such as laws of heredity, segregation, and mutation, enter with it into the explanation.ll

Here it is notable that Popper sharply contasted singular historical statements with universal laws. A universal law indiscriminately applies to all objects of a specific t1pe. tt takes on the form of a universal statement. [t is due to the universal nature of such laws that when we understand a universal law, we are able to predict transformative processes involving objects or events covered by the law. However, a singglar historical statement relates only to a particular object or event and so lacks the universal characteristic, which makes it useless for future prediction. For example, if we are only able to observe one single tadpole, that single observation will not help us in any way predict that it will become a frog. Nevertheless, even though we cannot establish a law

of social evolution, it would be clearly unreasonable to deny the occurrence of social change or the phenomena of specific trends or tendencies in such transformations. Antihistoricists do admit such things but insist that laws and

252

trends should be separated. This is because, while statements

about trends are existential statements that claim the existence of something at a specific time and place, universal laws do not claim the existence of something; they are non-existential statements that claim the impossibility of

something. According to Popper's famous standard of falsifiability, the difference between universal statements and existential staternents becomes even clearer. Universal statements can be included in the scope of empirical science, whereas existential statements are metaphysical statements that cannot be included in theoretical empirical sciences.

lsaiah Berlin argued that those who insist on macroscopic laws of history are guilty of misunderstanding the concept of a group. According to him, concepts such as "nation," "race," and "civilization" are collective concepts that indicate individuals who possess cofllmon characteristics. Historicists made the mistake of considering them as something concrete and realistic, as super-individual

realities, and eventually came up with ideas such as macrohistorical laws. This criticism can be said to be taking a nominalistic view on society.

Are such criticisms completely justified? Despite their powerfi,rl persuasiveness, they seem unable to completely defeat our common intuition that macroscopic laws of history may exist. Let us now discuss the common inruition in light of the supervenience theory.

253

Explanatory Models Based on Supervenience What happens if we apply the supervenience theoryl2 to exp.lain the two core factors of historical materialism? Materialism can be divided into diachronic and synchronic forms. Slmchronic materialism concerns the relationship between economic and non-economic aspects of society, whereas diachronic materialism is concerned with why revolutions occur and why some relations of production are replaced by others:

(l) Synchronic materialism:

The

superstructure (non-economic structure) supervenes upon the base (economic structure).

(2) Diachronic mateialism: T\e relations production supervene upon the forces production.

of of

These explanations by supervenience demonshate the relationship between the superstnrcture and the base, and between the forces of production and the relations of production, as Figure 16 shows. tn both cases, the superstructure relies on the base. Thus, if the base changes, the superstrucfure must follow. However, the supersffucture is not a mere byproduct, and it has functions of its own.

254

relations

superstructure

of

oroduction

supervenlence

suPervenrence

forces of oroduction

base

Figure 16. The structure ofsupervenience

The supervenience theory expresses these relationships

as

follows:

Sr: No two societies can share the base but differ in the superstructure. Sz:

No two societies can share the forces of production but differ in the relations of production.

If

is true, then societies with the same economic structure must have identical laws and identical political systems. In addition, if Sz is true, societies with the same forces of production must have the same relations of production. This formalization offers a good standard for verification. For example, if it is reasonable to use the supervanience theory to explain Mamist materialism, and if it is found that Sr or Sz is false, then we can confirm that the Marxist theory is erroneous. Similarly, if we find some cases possessing the same base but different superstructures, or Sr

255

cases where the forces of production are identical but relations of production differ, then the Marxist conception regardrng the relationships between these must be wrong.

G. A.

Cohen's functionalistic interpretation of historical materialism is one of the most influential interpretations. However, Cohen's interpretation does not include any means of proving whether the theory is tnre or false. The supervenience theory provides a solution to this defect.

Let us now apply these lessons to the problem of laws of history. Suppose that three people, a, b, and c, have individual properties A, B, and C. Let the collective set of these individual properties be P. Individuals a, b, and c participate in a specific relationship and make a society, s. In turn, s possesses social properties Q andR. Let the collective set of these social properties be M. Now, if we accept the mereological supervenience theory, then we can say that M supervenes P. Suppose that we have another world with asterisks attached to every property. Then, by the same logic, we can say that the propertyM* supervenes P*.

If P is changed to P*, then M would change to M*, M supervenes P and M* is a supervenient property of P*. If so, then what connects Mto M? What is the causal connection ftom M b Mn Is it the laws [r,lz,b,h,ls] that because

connect P to P*, or are there some other laws? According to

the mereological supervenience theory, it is possible to conclude the following: If the laws [r,lz,ll,l+,15] that connect P to P* exist, then alaw L that connects the social properties

M andM*, which supervene P and P*,

256

ought to exist as well.

However, I would only exist in the sense that M and M* exist. Z turns out to be a macroscopic law of history of the sort that historicists claim.

It is formalized

as show in Figure 17:

M[Q,RI'

M'lQ', R'l '

Supervenience

P tA, B, Cl e

u.